

NIETZSCHE AND FOUCAULT ON THE RELATION BETWEEN
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

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ABSTRACT

NIETZSCHE AND FOUCAULT ON THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

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This thesis analyzes the Nietzschean and the Foucauldian ideas concerning the relation between knowledge and power, in order to show that the philosophies in question have different advantages and disadvantages for different purposes. This means that new philosophical and political doors may be opened for us with the critical dialogue of the thoughts of these thinkers. In this thesis, by reading Nietzsche and Foucault as complementary to one another, I quest for the philosophical and political results of such a dialogue.

Keywords: Nietzsche, Foucault, knowledge, power

ÖZ

NIETZSCHE VE FOUCAULT'DA BİLGİ – İKTİDAR İLİŞKİSİ

Yıldız, Necdet

Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu tezde Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun bilgi ve iktidar ilişkisi bağlamındaki görüşleri, bu iki düşünürün farklı amaçlar için farklı avantajlara ve dezavantajlara sahip olduğunu göstermek amacıyla karşılaştırılmıştır. Bu karşılaştırmayla bahsi geçen iki düşünürün birbirleriyle olan eleştirel bir diyalogunun bize felsefi ve politik kapılar açması hedeflenmiştir. Özetle, bu tezde, Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun bilgi-iktidar ilişkisi bağlamındaki görüşleri birbirini tamamlayıcı bir şekilde okunmuş ve bu okumanın felsefi ve politik sonuçlarının bizi nereye götürdüğü tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nietzsche, Foucault, bilgi, iktidar

To the Joy of Life

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AK: *Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 2002).
- BC: *The Birth of the Clinic* (Foucault, 2003).
- BGE: *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (Nietzsche, 2007a).
- D: *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* (Nietzsche, 1997).
- DP: *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison* (Foucault, 1991).
- EH: *Ecce Homo* (In Nietzsche, 2007b).
- GM: *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic* (Nietzsche, 2017).
- GS: *The Gay Science* (Nietzsche, 1974).
- HH: *Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits* (Nietzsche, 2005).
- HM: *History of Madness* (Foucault, 2006).
- HS: *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: The Will To Knowledge* (Foucault, 1998).
- NGH: Nietzsche, Genealogy, History (Foucault, 1984).
- OT: *The Order of Things* (Foucault, 2005).
- TI: *Twilight of the Idols* (In Nietzsche, 2007b).
- TL: On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (Nietzsche, 1992).
- WP: *The Will to Power* (Nietzsche, 1968).
- Z: *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None* (Nietzsche, 1961).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

THIS THESIS WILL compare and contrast the Nietzschean and the Foucauldian ideas concerning the relation between knowledge and power, in order to show that the philosophies in question have different advantages and disadvantages for different purposes. This means that new philosophical and political doors may be opened for us with the critical dialogue of the thoughts of these thinkers. In this thesis, by reading Nietzsche and Foucault as complementary to one another, I will quest for the philosophical and political results of such a dialogue.

The indicated study will be performed with four initial attempts which will later open up new horizons of ideas. These attempts are to expose 1) the guiding perspectives that lead *Herr* Nietzsche and *Monsieur* Foucault philosophize, 2) Nietzsche's and Foucault's conceptions of "power" and "knowledge" with reference to the manifestation of their genealogical methods in their works, 3) their emphasis on the role of "nature" and "nurture" in the making of modern knowing subject, and 4) the similarities and differences between the goal and the scope of their overall projects. I think that Foucault's project is a properly performed and an extended application of Nietzschean ideas on the relation between power and knowledge to the socio-historical and political phenomena with a slightly different perspective than that of Nietzsche. More specifically, I argue that the Foucauldian concept of "power" is the translation of the Nietzschean "will to power" to the socio-political realm, and the way this

translation is performed has some consequences which make the two thinkers useful for different purposes.

In this chapter, I would like first to discuss the context which makes the subject of this thesis a problem worth studying. Then, I would like to present the plan of the thesis shortly. Lastly, I would like to present my initial thesis statements which will be revised, refined, complicated and multiplied throughout the essay.

1.1. Background

In the history of philosophy, till the end of the modern period, the phenomenon of knowledge had often been treated as a relation between a knowing subject and an object of knowledge. The will to knowledge, accordingly, was the knowing subject's will to possess the object of knowledge. A key term for depicting a long journey of the history of epistemology might be that of "disinterestedness". Since the truth—the only truth, which is valid for everyone—is what the states of affairs in the world is, only an independent truth-seeker which has no interest to change the representation of the states of affairs is appropriate for that search. Thus; the best philosopher, scientist, or moralist should possess a "disinterested eye."

But under these conditions, where can the will to truth come from? Nietzsche is one of the major thinkers who ask this question. Why do we humans desire to know? Why not ignorance? What in us wants to know? One of the major answers comes from the antiquity, from Aristotle. For him, the will to *theoria*, to know for the sake of knowing itself, must be a natural and universal thing. The famous words at the beginning of *Metaphysics* is as follows:

All men [sic] by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight (Aristotle, 1984, p. 1552).

In 1970, when he was appointed as Professor of Systems of Thought to Collège de France, Foucault launched his inaugural series of lectures called “The Lectures on the Will to Know.” In the opening lecture, when he was talking about the method he will use in analyzing some examples in the Greek history in the domain of justice, he points out a contrast between two approaches to the issue of the will to know in human beings. For him, Aristotle and Nietzsche “constitute two extreme and opposite forms” (Foucault, 2013, p. 13). Aristotelian model, by claiming 1) “a link between sensation and pleasure,” 2) the independence of this link from the pragmatic consequences of sensation, 3) analogousness between “the intensity of pleasure” and the quantity of knowledge delivered by sensation,” and 4) “the incompatibility between the truth of pleasure and the error of sensation,” constitutes the first extreme (ibid). Aristotelian model assumes the desire to know, or the will to knowledge, for the sake of knowledge itself (or alternatively, for the sake of the pleasure we take from knowledge); and it might be quite legitimate to hold that this model is, with or without some modifications, what characterizes the vast majority of the traditional metaphysics on the issue of the will to know(ledge). In this model, the direct usefulness of knowledge is not the issue. Instead, the point is the natural “link between knowledge, pleasure, and truth in the satisfaction it carries” (ibid).

The other extreme, which is the model provided by Nietzsche in *The Gay Science*, however, posits knowledge as an “invention.” Behind this invention, there is something completely different from a pure and direct will to *theoria*: there is “an interplay of instincts, impulses, desires, fear, will to appropriation” (ibid.). Not that their harmony, but the struggle between these inner forces of the knowing subject is active in the production of knowledge, and thus, knowledge “is an event or at least a series of events” (ibid.). Hence, according to the Nietzschean model, knowledge “is always servile, dependent, alert to advantages (not to its own, but to what might interest the instinct or instincts that dominate it [i.e., knowledge])” (ibid.). This model, as Foucault himself points out, puts “interest”

as the prior force in the formation of knowledge, and knowledge is subordinated as a mere instrument of the instincts. In this picture, the unquestioned link between truth and knowledge is cancelled; truth is only an effect, since if knowledge

[p]rofesses to be a knowledge of truth, this is because it produces the truth through the action of a primordial and renewed falsification that establishes the distinction between the true and the untrue (ibid.).

What at stake is, as the above picture suggests, then, “body;” its falsifications, and its interested distinctions. Since instincts are, as Nietzsche understands, directly related to the living body, knowledge must be a tool for it to grow: by their instincts and the coping mechanisms (including knowledge), it must be the living body that wants to know. This is the consequence of Nietzsche’s perspectivism: knowledge as an “organic” invention of the living human body

Foucault’s declaration of the two extremes concerning the models provided in the history of philosophy about the will to know(ledge) as the Aristotelian and Nietzschean models can be understood with a reference to the history of traditional philosophy as metaphysics. When it is trying to solve a cosmological problem, or examining life for making it worth living, or being in the search of the knowledge of the Forms or the “most important things,” or being in the search of what God says, or looking for how world and mind is related, or even criticizing the pure reason in order to find its limits to show to what extent a metaphysics can be possible; what we have at hand is a “knowing-subject” who is trying to know the “truth” without an appeal (or, with a secondary appeal) to its practical interests. Foucault says that Nietzsche’s

model of a fundamentally interested knowledge, produced as an event of the will and determining the effect of truth through falsification, is doubtless as far as it could be from the postulates of classical metaphysics. It is the one that has been freely adapted and used, in this year’s course, with regard to a series of examples (ibid, p.14).

Foucault uses the Nietzschean model in his 1970-1971 courses with different purposes than Nietzsche, and provides several examples related with his own

agenda. However, from the citation above, we may infer that what he understands by knowledge and how he conceptualizes the relation between knowledge and what he calls “power” is profoundly Nietzschean. His application of concepts might differ, but he directly accepts the perspectival character of knowledge presented by Nietzsche, and applies it to the social realm.

I think, reading Nietzsche and Foucault in relation to one another on the relation between power and knowledge is a subject matter worth studying since Nietzsche and Foucault are, among others, two major figures in the collapse of the “disinterested knowing subject,” and their views on the production of knowledge with reference to “will to power” and “power” in their genealogical knowledges give us powerful insights to understand the way we experience and know ourselves and the world. From them, we understand that knowledge is not a fixed substance. It is created out of the needs of the individuals and the needs of the societies. Moreover, Nietzsche and Foucault question and denaturalize what is unquestioned by traditional metaphysics. With this denaturalization, as will be seen, the strictness of the traditional division between the branches of philosophy (i.e., between epistemology, ethics, ontology, political philosophy, etc.) gets dissolved to a great extent. As a result, it will be seen that knowledge is a deeply normative phenomenon. In parallel with this, it will be seen that there is a profound relation between knowledge and politics. How Nietzsche and Foucault treat the issue of the relation between power and knowledge, as will be seen, gives us important political insights. The aim of this thesis is to gather insights for a future political ontology and a fruitful political intellectualism with inspirations from these thinkers. I will try to gather such insights through reading Nietzsche and Foucault together. Specifically, I will try to do this by reading Nietzsche and Foucault as complementary to each other by utilizing specific strengths of either of them, while at the same time fulfilling the deficiencies of one with the strengths of the other.

1.2.The Plan

In the second chapter, I will elaborate on Nietzsche's views on the relation between knowledge and power. For this, I will begin with an exposition of the term "perspectivism." The idea of perspectivism is not solely epistemological, and it is very indicative of what Nietzsche thinks about the relation between knowledge and power. For Nietzsche, perspectivality is the condition of life. Knowledge is an invention of human beings in "the struggle for growth and preservation," which is roughly what Nietzsche understands by life. Thus, life (or the multiplicity of organic processes) is the condition of the possibility of knowledge. In the struggle for growth and preservation, each center of force (it might be anything about the organic; may it be a cell, a plant, a human being, a horse, an instinct, a society) has a perspective. Knowledge, as a human tool of power, was invented in this struggle to enrich and preserve the species. Thus, in Nietzsche's view, from its genesis, knowledge is "strategic," since it is a mere tool for the appropriation of the world. It is a result of a process of organic interpretation. And all knowledge is perspectival, since all interpretations are performed from a different perspectival point. For growth and preservation, life creates values, and knowledge is always already dependent on these. In these processes, the objects of knowledge (i.e., the directions of the wills to know) are dependent upon the needs of the centers of forces—their will to power. Hence, I will entitle perspectivism a "process-ontology-of-life."

Philosophical research, in Nietzschean perspectival understanding, is a manifestation of a specific will to power of the philosophers themselves, considering the philosophers themselves a center of force among others. For this reason, in each philosophical inquiry, a guiding perspective is needed for the living-philosopher-as-an-interpreter-of-the-world. It is quite uninteresting to say, for those who are familiar with Nietzsche's works, that *Herr* Nietzsche's guiding perspective was "life," since in his oeuvre, it is very frequently proclaimed.

Nietzsche was disturbed by what he calls the life-denying effects of Western metaphysics; and he philosophized in order to affirm a joyful life trying get rid of the decadent consequences of the dominant perspectives (e.g.; Platonism, Christianity, and Utilitarianism) in his time. The question of life is his expressly taken guiding perspective. And life, in Nietzsche's philosophy, can be summarized in a technical term with a philosophical slogan: "[L]ife itself is the will to power" (BGE, Part I [*On the Prejudices of Philosophers*], 13).¹ Thus, for Nietzsche, the basic explanatory principle of all the actions of living beings is "the will to power."

In line with his guiding perspective, Nietzsche performs a genealogy of morality. This is because the most appropriate methodology for a perspectivist ontology is the genealogical methodology. As Nietzsche describes, genealogy is based on two basic questions; namely, the question of the historical conditions of emergences of values, norms, and objects of knowledge; and the question of whether or not these emergences are valuable for life. With his genealogical knowledges which reveal the historical contingency of the great human ideals of morality, Nietzsche shows the perspectival character of not only values, but also knowledge. Moreover, along with thinking of life as an eternal return of force relations between centers of force, and everything in life as a product of that struggle, Nietzsche provides several political insights for his readers. The second chapter will thus be concluded with the political consequences of the thought of Nietzsche.

The subject matter which will be discussed in the third chapter will be Foucault's perspectives on the relation between knowledge and power. The idea of perspectivism permeates to all Nietzsche's writings, as he says in WP (section 616). This is, I think, also the case for Foucault. In this fashion, he produces examples of what I would like to entitle "discursive perspectivism of knowledge

¹ References to Nietzsche's works are, unless indicated otherwise, to the aphorism numbers in Arabic numerals and essay or part numbers in Roman numerals.

and values” which is *against* the following ideas: 1) there are facts independent of the time of interpretation, and 2) human nature and values are external, fixed, and independent from the available historically contingent conditions of existence. In his archaeological works, Foucault dwells upon what he calls the historical a priori rules of the formation of objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies of human-scientific discourses. With a research on his archaeological works, it can be seen that Foucault is a “discursive perspectivist.” With his archaeological works, Foucault shows us the historical conditions of the existence of statements of human sciences with reference to the discursive battlefield where discourses struggle to reach the highest status of scientificity. This battlefield is the system of possible statements, or, using Nietzsche’s terminology, the system of possible *perspectives* in a specific historical period. In a nutshell, with his archaeology, Foucault shows us that “one cannot speak of anything at any time” (AK, p. 49). This is to say that the “things said” can only be intelligible in relation to a battlefield as a historical context.

Yet, as Foucault admits, his archaeological method is inadequate in explaining change and causality of the historical *a prioris*. This is to say that archaeology can illuminate the condition of the existence of statements, but cannot say anything about the transformation of these conditions and the reasons behind these transformations. In other words, archaeology shows us that statements may only be intelligible in relation to a historical battlefield, but it faces the difficulty to explain the changes in historical conditions and why these changes occur. In order to overcome this difficulty, Foucault extends his methodology to genealogy with the inclusion of the concept “power.” Power, in his specific conception, is the explanatory principle of the emergence and the transformations in the discursive realm. This is to say that the term power includes the non-discursive battlefield when analyzing the discursive battlefield. The multiplicity of force relations between discursive and non-discursive centers of force (i.e.; power) shows itself as the key to explain historical changes and their

reasons. Thus, with his genealogical works, Foucault situates the discourses to their birthplace; i.e., the battlefield; or, in Nietzsche's terminology, to "life." Doing this, he shows the relation between the discursive and the non-discursive centers of power. Moreover, he conceptualizes and formulates the modern forms of power (i.e., "disciplinary power" and bio-power"), and provides us with a great deal of detail about their functioning and their way of producing reality, including the reality of (knowing-)subjects. His work on "disciplinary power" and "bio-power" is crucial to understand how power and knowledge are inextricably connected. With his term power/knowledge that embodies and signifies this connection, Foucault shows the deep political relevance of knowledge and human sciences. This is because, with his genealogical works, Foucault shows us that modern forms of power are not only positive in the sense that they are productive of reality, but also dangerous to the extent that they tend to naturalize their norms and tend to produce states of domination.

Naturally enough, Foucault the perspectivist does not perform his works for a disinterested theoretical illumination. Both his archaeologies and genealogies are informed by a guiding perspective. Sharing Nietzsche's perspectival understanding of knowledge as a tool in a battle, and perfectly parallel with Nietzsche's "sacrificial use" of history—which admits its own perspectivity—Foucault performs his genealogies in order to eliminate what he calls "domination." Thus, Foucault's guiding perspective is freedom. However, as will be discussed, Foucault's conception of freedom is completely different from an understanding of freedom that assumes the absolute autonomy of the subject. In the third chapter, along with the above, the difference between Foucault's conception of freedom and the metaphysical conception of it will be discussed.

1.3. Initial Thesis Statements

With a research on the above issues, I hope to make it clear that both Nietzsche and Foucault criticized traditional Western understanding of disinterested knowledge via their overall guiding perspectives. As a result, in my view, we learn from these thinkers that knowledge and the knowing-subject are inseparable from power. Knowledge and the knowing-subject, as a result, are societal products of the organic, and an organic product of the society. I argue that reading Nietzsche and Foucault on the relation between knowledge and power gives us brilliant insights on political intellectualism and social episteme-ontology.

My initial thesis statements are as follows:

- 1) The intra-individual (micro-) trajectory of Nietzschean genealogy opens up the possibility of a profound understanding of the organic roots of knowledge and its relation to individual subject and its will to power. Nietzsche opens us a way to form individual strategies of overcoming the dominating aspects of metaphysical morality by making us hear the voice of our physiologies. But, since his guiding perspective is the affirmation of life, he does not analyze in detail the peculiarities of the functioning of the forms of power that produce the (knowing-)subject and reality, and he over-generalizes societal aspects of knowledge. Thus, he allows room for crude organicist readings. This is to say that Nietzsche's organicist reading needs a social-scientific articulation.
- 2) The socio-political (macro-) emphasis of Foucauldian genealogy is advantageous for the interpreter for a deep understanding of the functioning of power in the societal level, formation of the subject and its possibility of resistance to the technologies of some forms of power that tend to the states of domination. Foucault opens up the possibility to

refuse who we are by showing us how we are produced, and shows us strategies to counter-attack the states of domination. However, his philosophy does not provide us with the psycho-organic aspect of our bodies as effective as what we find in Nietzsche's philosophy. To wit, Foucault's socio-political reading needs an organicist articulation.

As a result, a need for an organic-discursive, a Nietzsche-Foucauldian new social and political episteme-ontology will show itself. This new episteme-ontology, being alert to the inseparability of power and knowledge and the tendency of power to produce states of domination, must be one that should ignore neither the role of "nature" nor the one of "nurture" in the making of knowledge. Moreover, since organic and discursive roots of knowledge are simultaneously active in the making of the knowledge, the new social and political episteme-ontology should be one that does not fall into nature – nurture dualism.

CHAPTER 2

NIETZSCHE ON THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

For Nietzsche, what we call knowledge is the product of the human condition, such that the interpretative activities of human beings manifest themselves in conceptual thinking, like writing and speaking which involves reflection and expression in language (I will entitle this human condition “the discursive second-nature,” and the human activities which involve conceptual thinking, like philosophy and science, “the discursive”). However, neither the discursive nor the non-discursive (i.e., the activities that are not involved in conceptual thinking) has any superiority over one another. Instead, they spring from the same source: the will to power. The discursive and the non-discursive are continuous activities, rather than being separate. The inseparable flux of the discursive and the non-discursive activities constitute human life.

In the thought of Nietzsche, the will to power, as a technical term, is used occasionally as a synonym of life. Life is the condition of the possibility of knowledge, because it is the condition of the possibility of the knowing subject. Consequently, knowledge (and the will to knowledge) is the product of a specific kind of human will to power: its discursive, human-all-too-human manifestation.

What is said above seems to be consisting of simple sentences. However, the senses in which the terms are used are profoundly complex, because Nietzsche uses the terms “will to power,” “life,” “subject,” and “knowledge” in accordance

with his own agenda, aiming to dissolve and reconsider in a critical and perspectival fashion the “unities” of the Western metaphysics (such as subject, truth, and knowledge). The rest of this chapter can be considered as the clarification of the way in which Nietzsche formulates these terms. This clarification will bring us to the following question: On what basis can we compare and contrast the Nietzschean ideas on the issue of the relation between knowledge and power with those of Foucault’s?

For the exposition of the relation between knowledge and power in Nietzsche’s thought, four concepts—which are inextricably connected to each other in Nietzsche’s philosophy—are crucial. These are “perspectivism,” “genealogy,” “the will to power,” and “eternal return.”

I argue that the idea of perspectivism reveals Nietzsche’s process episteme-ontology which is grounded on the notion of “the will to power.” For this reason, by discussing some key elements of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, we will see his understanding of life and the living subject. Moreover, since the only beholder of knowledge is the living subject, after an analysis of perspectivism, we will see why in Nietzsche’s thought the condition of the possibility of knowledge is life. Thus, it will be clear how the idea of “disinterested knowing subject” in its full autonomy is criticized and a new perspectivally interpreting living subject—a body-subject, or an embodied subject—is offered as the agent of the epistemic (i.e., philosophical and scientific) activities. After the exposition of the term perspectivism, thus, the inextricable connection between knowledge and power in the thought of Nietzsche will be explained. The role of power in the birth, production, dissemination, and the character of human knowledge—which will involve a guiding perspective in a philosopher’s philosophical inquiries—in the same way, will be clarified. Afterwards, we will see why Nietzsche had chosen the genealogical method for the critique of “what is taken for granted.”

Genealogy is another key term since it serves as Nietzsche's way of unfolding the historically contingent nature of what is seen as necessary. It is his method of the transvaluation of the existing values by questioning under what (psychological and historical) conditions they—including the value of knowledge—are formed. This transvaluation is performed according to what is unfolded: the genealogical knowledge which shows that what we see necessary and natural are in fact contingent and historical (and thus empirical) constructs. Since all knowledge and values are perspectival as opposed to being universal, their contingency must be shown in a method in which their contingencies show themselves. Hence, only a method like genealogy, the method that seeks the beginnings not as "eternal origins," but historical events, is apt for a perspectivist critique of the disinterested knowing subject of Western metaphysics. Moreover, it will be seen that according to Nietzsche's application of the genealogical method, there are some ruptures in history which result in sharp changes of human condition. The ruptures that Nietzsche shows us to happen in the historical processes in the making of the modern human subject, along with the constant organic processes which also take their basis from the will to power, is crucial for understanding Nietzsche's approach to the relation between power and knowledge.

Nietzsche's genealogical method, along with his perspectivist world-view in his writings, will reveal the way Nietzsche conveys the message that human interests, as a manifestation of their wills to power, play a crucial role in the formation and history of knowledge types since they are the primary source of human will to knowledge. Correspondingly, in what way in the thought of Nietzsche human interests create values, and how these values inform the human will to knowledge will be elucidated. Basically, in the end, after the clarification of the controversial terms he uses, it will be seen that *Herr* Nietzsche's philosophy—especially, his thoughts concerning the relation between knowledge and power—shows a meaningful unity. It will be seen that, by subverting the

knowledge-value distinction, Nietzsche offers a new episteme-ontology in which knowledge is informed by values and values are informed by will to power, which operates with knowledge for the modern human subject. Moreover, it will be seen that the thought of eternal recurrence is the continuation of his perspectivist episteme-ontology of life. This thought is also a link to his political ontology. The things discussed, as a result, will give us a preliminary idea about the connection between Nietzsche's thought on the relation between knowledge and power on the one hand, and those of Foucault on the other. In this fashion, this chapter will pave the way for reading Nietzsche's philosophy alongside with Foucault's philosophy in a correlative and productive way.

2.1. Nietzsche's Perspectivism and His Guiding Perspective: Life

2.1.1. Why Perspectivism? The Episteme-Ontological Background

What is perspectivism? In the thought of Nietzsche, the question of the form of a "What is X?," as a philosophical question, requests the eternal essence—the "ideal form"—of the concept questioned (Cf. WP, 431). This type of philosophical questioning hides the relationality of a concept; as if there are disinterested knowing subjects that observe the world consisting of atomic objects and try to find the real meaning of the concepts which corresponds to certain objects in that world. Alphonso Lingis, in his article "The Will to Power," draws attention to this matter (i.e., the search for the fixed universal meaning of an object, or an object's "essence").

The philosophical question "what is . . . ?" is answered by supplying the quiddity, the essence. Philosophical thought is a question of appearances, an investigation of their essence, their organizing structure, their *telos*, their meaning (Lingis, 1997, p. 37).

However, this way of questioning assumes that "the sequences of appearances mean something, indicate, refer to an underlying something, a *hypokeimenon*" (ibid.). The meaning of a term, in this reading of the world, is its eternal essence which includes the *telos* of the object in question. The metaphysical questioning,

as Lingis puts it, involves “an assumption of the succession of sensorial images as signs of intelligible essences” (ibid.). However, this type of world-picture is the very thing that Nietzsche refuses (WP 556). Nietzsche’s ontology does not accept a ground consisting of unchanging essences, or atomic objects which are to be known by a disinterested knower. Rather it assumes infinity of relations (e.g., relations between the interpreter and the interpreted—the world consisting of different interpreters and contexts such as organic, social, juridical, sexual, medical, political ones) and perspectival interpretations. If something is uttered as an essence by an interpreting center of force, it is only accepted as such by the perspectives of that center of force (ibid.). That which is called an essence is in no way universal or eternal. Instead, every center of force, as a *subject* of the interpretation, interprets the world from its point of view and that center of force draws a world-picture only out of its perspectives. Its interpretation of the world around involves feeling, measuring and forming the world which is experienced. That center of force, however, can interpret something as an essence, and interpret the world accordingly. Nietzsche states:

[the] world picture that [physicists] sketch differs in no essential way from the subjective world picture: it is only construed with more extended senses, but with our senses nonetheless— And in any case they left something out of the constellation without knowing it: precisely this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center of force—and not only man [sic]— construes all the rest of the world from its own view-point, i.e., measures, feels, forms, according to its own force— They forgot to include this perspective-setting force in “true being” –in school language: the subject (WP 636).

Moreover, while trying to demystify the essential infinities (like God, Soul, and Ideas) and to take the infinities back to the material world, Nietzsche says the following:

Our new “infinite.”—How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without “sense,” does not become “nonsense”; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation—that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and *only* in these (GS, 374).

As these quotations suggest, the concept of “sense” [*Sinn*] is of great importance for understanding what Nietzsche thinks about the link between power relations and the formation of knowledge. The concept of sense gives us a big clue about Nietzsche’s psycho-physiology of knowledge; and this psycho-physiology is the main ontological connection between force relations and knowledge in the thought of Nietzsche. Since the German term *Sinn* has two meanings which are “feeling” and “meaning,” it would be proper to consider the both senses of the term in question. Firstly, for Nietzsche, what we call knowledge must rely on our feelings, or in technical terms, our faculty of sensibility. The centers of force (in this context, human beings) have affects, since when they have an experience, they are affected by their sensibility. They measure and form the rest of the world out of what they feel (i.e., how they are affected) in the course of their experiences. Precisely, out of their affects which are derived from their experiences, centers of force give meanings to what they experience according to their will to power. The second sense of the term *Sinn* is, accordingly, directly connected to the first one. The experiences which the centers of forces have create affects in them, and the interpretative apparatus of human beings are ignited by their affects derived from empirical experiences; thus the meaning occurs (WP 556). As a result of the relations between their drives, the will of human beings occur; and as a result of the feelings, affects, and the meanings created after the interpretation of the world with those affects, the will to knowledge as a human will comes into being. Thus, the will to knowledge is a human will, which has its basis on human sensibility rather than what some might call the rational nature of the human. In effect, according to Nietzsche’s psycho-physiology of knowledge, the rationality of a human being is grounded on its empirical nature; its sensibility and assigning meanings to experiences by virtue of interpretation based on its will to power.

Thus, we see that, like all other centers of force (like drives, needs, living things, societies, etc.), human beings draw world-pictures by interpretation only

from their perspectives, only from their point of view. However, it is impossible for human beings to claim an all-encompassing perspective transcending the human intellectual apparatus which can find the unchanging essences and extra-perspectival universals (ibid.). The episteme-ontological background, which assumes eternal unities, grounds, and essences—constant atomic objects out of any relationality—is what Nietzsche experienced and got affected, and set his own perspective as a philosophical subject. This will be discussed later in detail, but suffice it to say that Nietzsche, born into this episteme-ontological background, philosophized with hammer: checked whether this episteme-ontology is life-affirming, and he tried to create a new picture since he believed that this background has life-denying causes and effects.

Contrary to the metaphysical understanding, Nietzsche's philosophy is relational; and in philosophy, the world around us can be considered both as a constant chaos and the ground that produces knowledge by producing affects to the knowing subject's interpretative apparatus, i.e., the chaos to be united via the perspectival interpretation of the human intellect. What philosophy declares as essences are, for Nietzsche, only their meanings [*Sinnen*] (Lingis, 1997, p. 37) which are produced with the aid of our sense organs and our interpretative apparatus. Thus, they are produced from a point of view, both in the senses of "feeling-affect" and "meaning." As the above quotation from GS suggests, the metaphysical reading of the world is an interpretation of the world, a possible interpretation, one among the infinity of others; but not the one that reveals the "essences of the things" (Lingis, 1997, p. 37; cf. WP 481) considered universally, regardless of the perspective of the thing that interprets. Since it is the senses that shape the interpretative capabilities of the interpreter, a living being who has senses must be the agent of epistemic/interpretative activities. Moreover, since essences can exist only as an "essence-from-a-perspective," in the case of a human being, which will be discussed in the following, this will be "an essence from the perspective of a synthetic will" of an embodied subject.

Nietzsche's episteme-ontology (which I will entitle process episteme-ontology hereafter) does not consider subjects and objects as unities as it is considered in the metaphysical understanding. For Nietzsche, "[w]hatever is real, whatever is true, is neither one nor even reducible to one" (WP, 536), and "[a] 'thing' is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept, an image" (WP 551). However, philosophical thought is "com-prehensive thought, a taking of many in one grasp, a taking of many as one" (Lingis, 1997, p. 39) as an extension of the common sense which is full of the traps of grammar. When human beings attribute unity to a human subject, this is too an interpretation: they feel, measure, and form the world and interpret human beings as unities. We consider another human being as a unity, however, this is our interpretation which does not mean that human beings are essential unities as atomic subjects in an extra-perspectival universality. Language, with its subject-object structure of its grammar, show reality as consisting of things as unities; and since we human beings can think and perceive within the boundaries of language, we are seduced by the metaphysics hidden behind language and perceive supposedly unchanging (unchanging just like the words and concepts do not change in their nominality) unities —self-identical identical things and subjects—around us. With this trap of language, philosophy and science have the ground to build an ontology consisting of self-identical objects: language gives us a discursive second-world that has its own objects. Thinking with concepts becomes our discursive second-nature, since the evolution of our reason resulted in this way without giving us another option. Philosophy (Nietzsche sometimes uses this term with reference to the classical Western metaphysics) and science, as advanced forms of human thinking, while being very beneficial achievements of humanity, are not immune from this conviction since

[t]he importance of language in the development of civilization consists in the fact that by means of it man [sic] placed one world, his own, alongside another, a place of leverage that he thought so firm as to admit of his turning the rest of the cosmos on a pivot that he might master it. [...] He [sic] really supposed that in language he possessed a knowledge of the cosmos. [...] [I]n truth, language is the first movement

in all strivings for wisdom. Here, too, it is *faith in ascertained truth* from which the mightiest fountains of strength have flowed. Very tardily—only now—it dawns upon men [sic] that they have propagated a monstrous error in their belief in language. Fortunately, it is too late now to arrest and turn back the evolutionary process of the reason, which had its inception in this belief. Logic itself rests upon assumptions to which nothing in the world of reality corresponds. For example, the correspondence of certain things to one another and the identity of those things at different periods of time are assumptions pure and simple, but the science of logic originated in the positive belief that they were not assumptions at all but established facts. It is the same with the science of mathematics which certainly would never have come into existence if mankind [sic] had known from the beginning that in all nature there is no perfectly straight line, no true circle, no standard of measurement (HH, 11).

Here, a question forces itself to be answered: Since Nietzsche also philosophizes and uses words to do it, how can he escape from the same traps of language? The answer will be sought in the following section, and Nietzsche's perspectival interpretation of the world will show us three things in his mind: 1) Essences, concepts, and words are "errors," but philosophy and life without perspectival errors is impossible: "untruth is a condition of life" (BGE, "On the Prejudices of Philosophers," 4), 2) All unities and concepts (including the unity and the concept of "subject") are transient unities as tools of different interpretations; and they have different meanings from different perspectives, and since the concepts cannot represent their referent in a perfect way (since this is an impossibility and to assume its possibility is a meta-philosophical error), they can be considered as tools of expression used in some description (and never in a complete definition), and 3) All philosophy is grounded on some values to be supported (and for the opposing values to be eradicated), and all human knowledges alike are based on value perspectives (or, "perspectival values"). This means that concepts have different meanings according to the value-ground. In the context of a human being's philosophical activity, I will entitle this value-ground as the standard of evaluation, as the "guiding-perspective."

2.1.2. Perspectivism as a Process-Episteme-Ontology

The thought of Nietzsche can be evaluated in two dimensions. He was firstly the one who "philosophized with hammer" and tested whether the

metaphysical values—which work on the “essentialist” epistemological basis described above—were valuable for life or not (TI, Preface). However, stopping at the point of the destruction of all values into pieces would lead to passive nihilism—nihilism that stops at accepting that nothing has any value and does not move forward for creating new values—against which he waged a battle (WP, 22; cf. 12-15, 19 and 657). Thus, as an active nihilist—who knows that nothing has an intrinsic value but still reach out for power by creating new perspectival values—(ibid.), Nietzsche also created his own values with which he intended to affirm life. Nietzsche found, after he hit with hammer, that classical Western philosophy (he occasionally calls it Platonism or Platonic-Christian philosophy) is dogmatic since it tends to impose its knowledge and values as extra-perspectival, universal, and non-relational. Classical Western philosophy, for Nietzsche, is also life denying, since 1) in epistemological terms, it tends to separate the mental content from the affects of the living body, and 2) in axiological terms, it denigrates everything that belongs to corporeal life (like passions, bodily desires, etc.). Precisely, Nietzsche’s thought can be understood effectively if we see two dimensions which are simultaneously at work in his writings: 1) His critique of the essentialist and dogmatic philosophy before himself—which can be called traditional Western philosophy—characterized by “life-denying” Platonic-Christian values, and 2) The values he offered in order to serve his philosophical purpose of creating “life-affirming” values.

Perspectivism is, among its other functions, Nietzsche’s conceptual hammer hit on metaphysical values. In other words, perspectivism, like his genealogical method, works as a part of Nietzsche’s theoretical critique of traditional Western philosophy, and functions as a tool of overcoming metaphysical obstacles—or the (unchanging) “ground”: dogmatic “truths” that are widely accepted and taken for granted by the philosophical audience—in order to defend his philosophical guiding perspective, namely “life”.

My claim is that, apart from what just stated, perspectivism is Nietzsche's process episteme-ontology of life. As a philosopher in the search for *his* truth, Nietzsche observes that the "Platonism" of metaphysics has a false claim of the possibility of an extra-perspectival "Truth," —the truth in itself— and answers that claim using the very metaphysical concepts in a subversive fashion —with his polemical and aphoristic style which targets at the dogmatic character of some dominant examples of classical western philosophy. Nietzsche is critical of the metaphysical dogmatism (and in occasions, we see him caricaturizing it too) which is in contradiction with the "flux of life," and looks for the origins of knowledge in human interests —which are based on the human will to power. And against dogmatism which he declares life-denying, he offers his perspectivist process-episteme-ontology.

According to the Nietzschean interpretation of the Platonic-Christian metaphysics, there is a key and widely accepted assumption in philosophers' minds which is hardly questioned. This is the assumption of a "two-world" system; i.e., the "true" world, and the "apparent" one. The true world is the world in which things are as they are in themselves, in a fixed form and purified from their relations with other things; as in a fictional condition that they are seen, as it were, from an omniscient and omnipresent God's eye point of view. Disinterested knowing subject is the one that tries to reach this type of knowledge. In that view, the soul is pure (i.e., non-empirical and non-material). For Nietzsche, assuming a God's eye point of view in which everything is as itself independent of a perspective is —apart from its life-denying effects— a distortion of reality which is in constant becoming and can be interpreted only from a point of view, a lie which "has made humanity false and hypocritical down to its deepest instincts" (EH, Preface, 2). For Nietzsche, "true world" is an invention, and it devalues the only world that there is (EH, "Why I am a Destiny," 8). Nietzsche's philosophy, and specifically his idea of perspectivism, in this sense, can be read as "overturning of Platonism" (Cf. Haar, p. 47). Nietzsche says that "talking about

spirit and the Good like Plato did meant standing truth on its head and disowning even perspectivism, which is the fundamental condition of all life” (BGE, Preface). What Nietzsche conveys us is that, in a living reality, epistemologically, there must always be perspectives; and every evaluation and knowledge claim must be performed from within a certain perspective. What we call “spirit” (and it is strongly related —and used almost interchangeable— with “subject” in Western philosophy) is never pure—it is necessarily empirically constructed in its relations with the rest of the world —which entails a continuous process of becoming— and on par with materiality. In axiological terms, nothing can be Good (or evil/bad) in itself: good and bad/evil are empirical phenomena which require another empirical, a worldly and temporal ground—a perspective, a worldly point of interpretation, a relation of the interpreter (a subject as the perspective-setting force) with the world. Nietzsche writes:

You have heard me call for philosophers to place themselves beyond good and evil, - to rise *above* the illusion of moral judgment. This call is the result of an insight that I was the first to formulate: *there are absolutely no moral facts*. What moral and religious judgments have in common is the belief in things that are not real. Morality is just an interpretation of certain phenomena or (more accurately) a *misinterpretation*. [...] That is why moral judgments should never be taken literally: on their own, they are just absurdities. But *semiotically*, they are invaluable: if you know what to look for, moral judgments reveal the most valuable realities of the cultures and interiorities that did not *know* enough to 'understand' themselves. Morality is just a sign language, just a symptomatology: you have to know *what* it means in order to take advantage of it (TI, “‘Improving’ Humanity,” 1).

Precisely, in order for something to be good, evil, or bad; there must be an interpreting power-center which perceives and interprets it out of its will to power that thing to be good, evil, or bad. That power-center must be, in living reality, in a specific position (geographical, discursive, psychological, moral, conceptual, etc.) in order to interpret it. It is the perspective of the interpreter. Moralities are lies from different perspectives: they are, thought from the extra-perspectival manner of former metaphysics, specific kinds of immoralities (WP, 461). In other words, there is no extra-perspectival “good,” or “evil.” Moreover, every philosophy is based on the morality it concedes: values are prior to the production

of what we call knowledge. (However, although they are illusions, moral judgments can enable us to evaluate the symptoms of the physiology of the one who makes the judgment. This issue will be dealt with in detail in the following chapter).

Thus, for Nietzsche, apart from its being the most dangerous one, Platonism is an “error” in the guise and claim of the absolute and unchanging truth (Cf. BGE, Preface). Nietzsche warns his fellow philosophers on this issue as follows.

From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge’, let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts of as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, ‘knowledge as such’: – here we are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretative powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye is demanded. There is *only* a perspectival seeing, *only* a perspectival ‘knowing’; the *more* affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’ (GM III, 12).

This quotation shows the basic character of the Nietzschean perspectivist process episteme-ontology. The subject of knowledge is not pure: it is “empirical” in the sense that its empirical “affects” (which result from the relation between its drives and experiences) make the subject will to interpret, and knowledge springs from that will. Since knowledge arise from affects, sensibility, and given meanings; a *psyche* of an embodied subject (a psychology of a physiological being) and its experiences—which must be some processes, since experiences are processes in the constant process of becoming—must be involved in it. It must be, therefore, a living, an embodied knowing-subject which interprets and creates “knowledge.” In other words, if there were no living things which will to interpret because of its affects, no knowledge would be possible at all. Thus, epistemology can never be separated from physiology, psychology and the values created by them: values, in the thought of Nietzsche, are regarded as “symptoms of the body,” and philosophies are erected on these symptoms (GS, 2).

Thus, not only perspectivism is the fundamental condition of life, but also life is the fundamental condition of knowledge. For Nietzsche, “life itself is will to power” (BGE, 13), and what we call knowledge is the outcome of the interpretation of the living being (when accepted as a unity) performed for being used for its self-preservation or for that living being’s discharging its strength (Cf. WP 643). The understanding of a disinterested (and thus, lifeless) eye, like an omniscient and omnipresent God’s eye, is meaningless: in order for there to be something called knowledge, there must be life: the will to power of a center of force who wants to grow and interpret for growth. Just as Lingis stated, Nietzsche is against the idea of the unchanging ground of knowledge, and the multitude of intellectual unchanging unities (or, essences). For Nietzsche, there is no “fact in itself,” but only interpretations (WP, 643), and knowledge is—and must be—an outgrowth emerged within the natural struggle of inherent forces of an embodied subject. Nietzsche holds that

[t]he will to power interprets (—it is a question of interpretation when an organ is constructed): it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power. Mere variations of power could not feel themselves to be such: there must be present something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow. Equal in that— In fact, interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something. (The organic process constantly presupposes interpretations.) (WP, 643).

In the context of philosophy, this “something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow” is the embodied philosopher. Philosopher is, precisely, both a living interpreter and an embodied subject. Philosophers philosophize out of their will to power, and how they philosophize depends on their guiding perspectives. The details of those will be discussed later. But in the micro-perspective, it is the drives that interpret, and they, out of their will to power, want to be the master of all other drives.

Coming back to the quotation cited above, Nietzsche’s term “organ” can be understood as a heuristic device: it describes the organic roots of interpretation and the physiological thinking inherent in the thought of Nietzsche. According to this conception, we, human beings, have eyes just because we need them. The

same for knowledge: we knowers know simply because we need to know.

Nietzsche writes

[t]o what extent even our intellect is a consequence of conditions of existence: we would not have it if we did not *need* to have it, and we would not have it *as it is* if we did not need to have it *as it is*, if we could live *otherwise* (WP, 498).

The organic interpretation and the discursive one are continuous, and they serve for the same aims, since they spring from the same resource: the will to power. Knowledge is invented as a tool for increasing power, and accordingly, its root is the will to power. As Nietzsche understands the need for preservation as a derivative of increasing power, knowledge is based on the preservation of the species. According to Nietzsche,

[k]nowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases with every increase of power—

The meaning of "knowledge": here, as in the case of "good" or "beautiful," the concept is to be regarded in a strict and narrow anthropocentric and biological sense. In order for a particular species to maintain itself and increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behavior on it. The utility of preservation—not some abstract-theoretical need not to be deceived—stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge—they develop in such a way that their observations suffice for our preservation. In other words: the measure of the desire for knowledge depends upon the measure to which the will to power grows in a species: a species grasps a certain amount of reality in order to become master of it, in order to press it into service (WP, 480).

Accordingly, we can say that, in Nietzsche's understanding of knowledge, there is a "rule of immanence": if something is constituted as an area of investigation, this is only because our will to power (our inner or outer power relations) established it as a possible object. It is our "interests" and our interpretation of the possibilities of our interests to be satisfied that makes us "will to know." And if our will to power was able to take it as a target this is because our techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse (e.g., our discursive second-nature) were capable of investigating it. In other words, we human beings use the techniques of knowledge and procedures that can be understood both by us and the society in the temporal/historical condition in which we become subjects. In short,

knowledge is a result of the discursive second-nature of human beings, but just as the non-discursive, the discursive springs from the human will to power.

However, what a definite center of force (a drive, a person, a society, etc.) needs may differ from what another one needs —interests can vary— and even within a specific center of force, in different contexts, different needs can arise—interests can change. Thus, contradictory knowledges are possible, since they depend on some different interests and different value-grounds, accompanied by different perspectives as different manifestations of the will to power.

For the further clarification of the previously discussed picture, I think that it is helpful to give Nietzsche's clearest description of perspectivism in its epistemological sense. It is as follows:

In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.—
"Perspectivism."

It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm (WP, 481).

Firstly, in parallel with what is said above, the use of "For and Against" gives us a clue that, in Nietzsche's mind, as interpretation, an economic calculation of forces is in play in the struggle of growth of living beings, in relation to other centers of forces. In other words, every interpretation is performed from a "power- perspective": a living being, considered as a unity, by its very nature wants to grow, and it interprets the disadvantages and advantages outside itself for its growth via its drives that spring out of its primordial will to power. In the thought of Nietzsche, knowledge is the result of this organic process of interpretation, and has no difference in value from the non-discursive interpretation. It is a tool: a strategic weapon, just like its muscles, in a human being's organic process: muscles are for overpowering the opponent by physical force, while the discursive interpretation is for setting norms to be obeyed by oneself and the others for overpowering the obstacles for growth.

Secondly, what interprets (i.e.; the “subject” of interpretation) is not an unchanging and extra-perspectival unity in Nietzsche’s perspectivist process episteme-ontology. Since “our needs” (“our drives” and their For and Against) interpret the world, we human beings cannot be considered as unchanging souls or spirits. However, soul is, like everything else, not one and not reducible to one. Human beings do not have an unchanging essence informing their existence: there is no *hypokeimenon* as an eternal soul like it is widely accepted in the Nietzschean understanding of Platonic metaphysics. What we call “souls” are embodied and under constant becoming according to the experiences they live, the drives they have, the affects they get, and interpretations they constantly perform. The ground is process: the organic process that can be characterized by constant becoming. Perspectivism is, thus, a process episteme-ontology of life.

Just as metaphysical atomism is well-refuted in the science quarters in Nietzsche’s time, atomism of the soul, as a teaching of Christianity rooted in Platonism must be refuted and it must be considered only as a non-scientific “household tool” in order to communicate with each other in the possibilities of language. In other words, the fact that language seduces us to think the subject as a unity does not mean that spirit and soul are unities in reality (BGE, 12). Nietzsche tells us that,

[f]irst of all, we must also put an end to that other and more disastrous atomism, the one Christianity has taught best and longest, the *atomism of the soul*. Let this expression signify the belief that the soul is something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, that it is a monad, an *atomon*: this belief must be thrown out of science! Between you and me, there is absolutely no need to give up "the soul" itself, and relinquish one of the oldest and most venerable hypotheses -as often happens with naturalists: given their clumsiness, they barely need to touch "the soul" to lose it. But the path lies open for new versions and sophistications of the soul hypothesis -and concepts like the "mortal soul" and the "soul as subject-multiplicity" and the "soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects" want henceforth to have civil rights in the realm of science (BGE, 12).

Our human condition that we communicate with each other via fixed unities (i.e., words and concepts) does not mean that what we “have to” believe that what we intend to refer are fixed unities. This also applies for the term “soul,”

as a concept which is parallel to the concept of the subject in traditional Western philosophy. In other words, for Nietzsche, the soul as a subject (i.e., as a fixed unity) is a superstition. What we call “soul,” in Nietzsche’s view, is in constant process of becoming. Soul, in Nietzsche’s understanding, is thought as a “society constructed out of drives and affects,” and the drives in our souls all “crave for mastery” over each other. A self as a unity occurs only when a hierarchy of drives and affects is settled within the human embodied soul, and this occurrence must be, if exists at all, transient; since the power relations within the body, or in other words, the bodily (i.e., physiologically rooted) *psychic* intra-power relation (between drives and affects) is, like the outer power relations, a constant flux. In other words, when we consider temporality, the hierarchies of drives in the embodied soul change, because the process of interpretation and the clash of drives constantly go on.

In a parallel fashion, John Richardson entitles the transient unities of persons (and societies too) in the thought of Nietzsche “synthetic wills” (Richardson, 1996, p. 44):

A person [...] isn't a simple will for Nietzsche but an organized complex of numerous drives of various strengths. [...] [W]e must understand these drives in our Nietzschean way: not as 'doers behind the doing' but as activity patterns or behaviors themselves. Each habit or practice enacted in a person's life tries to extend and enrich itself [...]. A person is just such a balance among simpler wills, an interweaving of those behaviors, allowing each to express itself proportionately to its strength. [...] This synthetic will thus restrains these parts, because it now wills power itself-tries to develop itself, as this synthesis. Thus, a person's identity lies in the system of his drives, but this system isn't simply their sum but the power relations, the 'order of rank', among them. And so Nietzsche analyzes the expression 'who he is' with "in what rank order the innermost drives of his nature are set toward one another" (ibid., p. 45)².

When one thinks that the soul is not an atomic unity, and that the micro-state interpreting subject is our drives ignited by our affects which are resulted

² I have a small disagreement with Richardson’s description, and it is with his definition of drives in Nietzsche’s thought as “activity patterns” and “behavior.” I would rather call them “drives-for-activity-patterns,” or “drives-for-behavior.” Except for this part, I accept the message of the quotation.

from the sense stimuli in our experiences, how can one give an account on the subject as a fixed unity? Richardson, in the above quotation, offers “synthetic will” as a higher and more complex unity, as a hierarchical synthesis which restrains the simpler wills. This restriction means that, a human being as a synthetic will consisting of drives and affects is a form of power—considered as a hierarchical unity. But how does this hierarchical unity act? How can this synthetic-will be a philosopher?

We can see a variety of textual evidence in Nietzsche’s oeuvre in support of the heart of the quotation above; i.e., “person as a synthetic will”; however, I will choose the section 6 of BGE, since I believe that there is further information in this passage that answer the questions just asked: Nietzsche’s understanding of the knowing-subject is explained there vividly, which assumes that the moral drives underlie the will to philosophize and the will to know. Nietzsche uses the plant-seed analogy when he is telling us the morality-philosophy relation. For him, if a philosophy of a “person” is a plant, then the living seed is h/er moral intentions (BGE, 6). He claims that “to explain how the strangest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really come about, it is always good (and wise) to begin by asking: what morality is it (is he -) [sic] getting at?” (ibid.). Thus, the drive of knowledge, in Nietzsche’s view, is not the factor that makes persons philosophize; rather, “another drive” uses this drive (i.e.; the drive for knowledge –or even mis-knowledge) merely as a tool (ibid.). For Nietzsche,

anyone who looks at people’s basic drives, to see how far they may have played their little game right here as inspiring geniuses (or daemons or sprites -), will find that they all practiced philosophy at some point, — and that every single one of them would be only too pleased to present itself as the ultimate purpose of existence and as rightful master of all the other drives. Because every drive craves mastery, and this leads it to try philosophizing (ibid.).

In the context of philosophers, what can be inferred from the above picture is that the most basic drives of a philosopher are the moral intentions of the synthetic will of the philosopher, and for the mastery within the individual philosopher, *they* perform philosophy. There is an unconscious element in philosophy which

supersedes its conscious parts and it is the basic drives as moral intentions (ibid.). What these basic drives become, when they win the battle of mastery and “become the ultimate purpose of existence and [...] rightful master of all the other drives” within a philosopher as a person, can be called their “guiding perspectives”. Hence, in Nietzsche’s view, what constitutes the synthetic and transient unity of the will, at a certain time of interpretation, is a certain transient hierarchy of drives; and the drive that has become able to subordinate the others to itself in this hierarchy at the time of interpretation can be considered as the guiding perspective in the thought of Nietzsche.

Thirdly, Nietzsche discusses the necessary perspectivism of knowledge from the standpoint of our means of conceptual thought and expression, i.e., language. As discussed, human beings can create and express knowledge only within the boundaries of language, and language only gives us our relations to things, not things-in-themselves. Nietzsche claims that

[w]e cannot change our means of expression at will: it is possible to understand to what extent they [words] are mere signs. The demand for an adequate mode of expression is senseless: it is of the essence of a language, a means of expression, to express a mere relationship—The concept “truth” is nonsensical. The entire domain of “true-false” applies only to relations, not to an “in-itself”—There is no “essence-in-itself” (it is only relations that constitute an essence—), just as there can be no “knowledge-in-itself” (WP, 625).

According to this process episteme-ontology which conceives the essence of language as expressing mere relationship in a process of constant becoming, what is the status of concepts? This is a key issue in perspectivist episteme ontology, and its answer is precisely as follows: all concepts are invented tools for the expression of the relations with reference to the world apart from the interpreter. All concepts get their meaning in the relational background in which it gets its meaning, and this makes a perfect definition of a concept impossible (WP, 556). The complete grasp of a concept must, then, mean that the interpreter must receive by its senses and interpret everything that belongs to that concept in reality accordingly. Since 1) human beings are finite and always situated in a perspective,

2) concepts are invented tools which are “errors” from the standpoint of truth, and
3) the meanings of concepts change in time since the relational background is also subject to constant becoming; it is impossible for human beings to have a complete sense of a concept. For Nietzsche, human beings designate things that they experience with words and

[e]very word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases—which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept “leaf” is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects (TL, p. 83).

Hence, the ideal limit of “experiencing all the unequal things that belong to a concept” is unattainable. For communication, however, human beings use concepts and benefit from their invention, although they can never be open for a full grasp. Moreover, since the relational communicative context is subject to constant becoming in history, the meanings of concepts change. Basically, any complete definition of a concept that refers to real things (not formal things; i.e., logical or mathematical) is impossible. Their meaning is limited by our finitude: our total experience of a concept can never reach the full experience of everything related with that concept.

All in all, the idea of perspectivism, as Nietzsche puts it, entails that there is no “disinterested knowledge” as conceived throughout the years of the domination of the postulates of classical metaphysics. Knowledges are interpretations: they are a result of an organic and economic calculation process in order for a living being to enhance its power. Knowledge is relational and strategic. Thus, the term knowledge is something different in the perspectivist process-ontology-of-life: it is a strategic weapon in the battle-for-growth of countless centers of force.

Lastly, perspectivism is Nietzsche's process episteme-ontology of life which uses "will to power" as its basic principle. Since it is "our needs (our drives and their For and Against) that interpret the world," perspectivism is a tool of deconstruction of the relation between subject and knowledge in the sense that it rejects the atomism of the subject in the understanding of the classical metaphysics: the atomist understanding of the subject, as a continuation of the understanding of soul-atomism in which soul is considered as simple and indivisible, as a fixed thinking substance which is purely mental. In Nietzsche's "perspectivist process-episteme-ontology," as what he offers against what he criticizes, however, each interpreting subject as "perspective-setting force," within a human being or as a human being considered as a synthetic will, is described as a "center of force" among others; and since life is continuous becoming and flux, the centers of force themselves undergo constant change (Cf. WP, 636). This means that, even within an individual human being, there are power struggles between the inherent centers of force; and these centers constitute, as Nietzsche puts it, the "needs" of that knowing-subject as a synthetic will. Thus, in this process episteme-ontology that describes life and reality, there is no eternal Being, but eternal change and becoming even in the "individual" human subject; and the explanatory principle of these changes is the will to power. Then, the knowing-subject is an "interpreter of the world" from a perspective produced by its will to power, and human interpretation of the world relies on its discursive second nature: it can be performed only within the boundaries delimited by its discursive practices and procedures.

2.1.3. The Concept of “Guiding Perspective” and Nietzsche’s Guiding Perspective: Life

In Nietzsche’s perspectivist process episteme-ontology, as discussed, life is the continuous flux in which the will to power of the “centers of force”³ interpret in order to grow. According to this understanding, the knowing subject must be a synthetic will which consists of simpler units (i.e., its drives) and this synthetic will, as a higher unity—which is also subject to constant change—also subordinates its parts: there are constant interactions and mutual power relations between the drives themselves and between the drives and the synthetic will of the embodied subject. The knowing subject, as the person, is described as the hierarchical organization of its simpler drives. This hierarchical organization is the perspective-setting force who “wills to know,” and interprets the world with its own perspectives. It wills to know as a manifestation of its will to power, and as *that* quanta of power: as the knowing-subject.

In the context of philosophy, “that which philosophizes” is firstly the drives in the competition of mastery, however, considered as a unity (i.e., as a synthetic will). The basic drives which are in the position of mastery (i.e., the perspective-setting force) in the unity of synthetic will of that embodied person is the guiding perspective of that person. According to the embodied philosopher *Herr* Nietzsche, the most basic drives of human beings (the perspective-setting forces which subordinate the others in the hierarchy of drives) are their moral (or immoral) intentions, and all philosophy is done in order for some values to be supported and others to be eradicated. (Cf. BGE, “On the prejudices of Philosophers”, 6). The guiding perspective can be described as the moral value-ground of the philosopher: the guiding perspective of a philosopher is the most basic, profoundest value for which the philosopher wants to change the world

³ Nietzsche also uses terms such as “quanta of power,” “quanta of force,” “constellation of force,” and “dynamic quanta” to refer to the same phenomenon (Cf. WP 551, 633, 635, 689, 784).

which s/he interprets. According to *Herr* Nietzsche, all of the philosophers' interpretations of the world surrounding themselves (i.e., their philosophies) are value-laden because they are performed out of will to power, and these interpretations are performed for a change in the world the way in which their guiding perspective requires, since they themselves philosophize for or against something or another in the world that they interpret.

At this point, I think a further clarification of Nietzsche's perspectivist psychology of knowledge would be helpful. As discussed, in Nietzsche's perspectivist thinking, human beings measure and form the rest of the world out of what they feel from their empirical experiences: they measure the variations of power in the experiences. The interpretative apparatus of human beings work according to the affects driven from these experiences and these variations. According to that picture, "that which philosophizes" is the drives of human being. But two questions remain to be answered: 1) how do these drives come into existence? And 2) why they philosophize?

Nietzsche's answer to those questions can be formulated as follows: Drives of human beings occur by being affected by the world via experiences (or, by having inner affects from the world), and these drives create values in order to guide that human being. As a synthetic unity, the battle between drives within a human being goes on with the affects continue to be conceded and revised in a process of becoming, and an ever-changing hierarchy of drives defines who that human being in the process of becoming is. The will to knowledge is the product of these drives which are product of the affects which are the product of feelings and empirical experiences. The drive for knowledge, however, is a secondary drive under another more basic drive. The most basic drives are moral intentions: they refer to how these drives drive the human being to change the world or that human being itself. In the light of the above, guiding perspective of a philosopher can be described as the most basic moral intention of that philosopher. However, this guiding perspective too, springs from the most fundamental drive, the basic

premise of living, the a priori drive which precedes all experience: the will to power, the will to conquer, the will to discharge one's strength (WP, 423).

Nietzsche clearly announces in many places of his oeuvre that he philosophizes for the sake of what he calls "life." Thus, it is plain that Nietzsche's guiding perspective is life. Perhaps the most striking quotation in which Nietzsche describes why he produces his philosophical judgments is as follows:

We do not consider the falsity of a judgment as itself an objection to a judgment, this is perhaps where our new language will sound most foreign. The question is how far the judgment promotes and preserves life, how well it preserves, and perhaps even cultivates, the type (BGE, "On the Prejudices of Philosophers," 4).

In its visible part, this quotation tells us that Nietzsche philosophizes for the promotion and the preservation of life. Moreover, between the lines, it tells us much more. Why does Nietzsche think that he has a new language than before? Why does Nietzsche think that his language will sound foreign to others when he says truth and falsity of the judgments is not the real matter?

Herr Nietzsche interpreted the practiced philosophy and science upon his time, and reached the conclusion that they were performed on the understanding of the supreme value of truth. In the understanding that Nietzsche opposes himself, "truth at any price" is the main moral intention: The two main mottos of this understanding are 1) "I should not deceive myself in front of the universal truth," and 2) "I should not deceive others from the perspective of universal truth" (GS, 344). Nietzsche does not think that truth, according to that understanding is mainly an epistemological issue. Instead, the basis under which any truth (which is necessarily perspectival) can flourish is its "moral" ground, and the interpretation of the metaphysical truth is based on its morality of "truthfulness" as described with its two mottos (ibid.).

However, since values that are created are also interpretations out of will to power, moral drives are as immoral as the others in the "perspective of universal truth," from which everything is sought to be seen as they are in-

themselves. Nietzsche thinks that, from that perspective—which is an impossibility, a “nonsense”—(WP, 558) if it was possible for it to exist at all, there would be an absolute homogeneity of events in terms of morality: everything would be as moral (or immoral) as another from that perspective because all spring from the will to power as an immoral (can be called “amoral”⁴ in this context) end. He says that

[m]y purpose: to demonstrate the absolute homogeneity of all events and the application of moral distinctions as conditioned by perspective; to demonstrate how everything praised as moral is identical in essence with everything immoral and was made possible, as in every development of morality, with immoral means and for immoral ends; how, on the other hand, everything decried as immoral is, economically considered, higher and more essential, and how a development toward a greater fullness of life necessarily also demands the advance of immorality (WP, 272).

Nietzsche thinks that, apart from being based on moral intentions, the drive for philosophy is the tyrannical drive: “[i]t always creates the world in its own image, it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the “creation of the world,” to the *causa prima* [first cause]” (BGE, “On the Prejudices of Philosophers, 9). Philosophy, for him, tries to dictate its world picture to every force in the world around itself, as an amoral activity. It wants to tyrannize: it wants to universalize its perspective, wants all other world pictures to be accepted as false. For a philosophy to universalize its perspective, the most appropriate socio-epistemological ground is the one that people accept that a world-picture can be universalized at all. This ground, as a perspective, is the perspective of the extra-perspectival, universal truth, and the will to know is directed towards the extra-perspectival truth, the “disinterested knowledge” from

⁴ The reason why the term “amoral” is used is that Nietzsche believes in the absolute homogeneity of all events in moral terms. When Nietzsche uses the term immoral, it can be understood in the sense of immoral from the perspective of those who believe that some events are moral and some are not. However, for a thinker who claims to think beyond good and evil, or beyond moral and immoral, the term “amoral” would be a good choice in parallel with Nietzsche’s general attitude to philosophy. The German term *aussermoralisch* in the title of his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” [*Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne*] where he treats truth and lies beyond morality would be an explicit example for this notion.

this perspective. In the times that metaphysics was dominant, this ground was built and the people of metaphysics were searching the universal truths.

However, human knowledge and philosophies, including Nietzsche's philosophy, do not come from a disinterested individual interpretation of the objects around. Instead, they are "fruits," and the soil of the fruits of the trees—the philosophers—is the world they interpret. The philosopher is like a tree which grows out of the same soil with others: their interpretations can only arise in relation to the world s/he lives in; and h/er basic will—the guiding perspective—guides how the fruit will grow. Nietzsche holds that

[w]e have no right to stand out individually: we must not either make mistakes or hit on the truth individually. Instead, our thoughts, values, every 'yes', 'no', 'if' and 'but' grow from us with the same inevitability as fruits borne on the tree -all related and referring to one another and a testimonial to one will, one health, one earth, one sun" (GM, Preface, 2).

We have seen that it is our needs (our drives and their For and Against) that interpret the world. However, since each drive craves for mastery, and wants to be the rightful master of all drives in the inner battle of a living being, what follows is that interpretation is something profoundly normative. Since in Nietzsche's thought, it is the case that all knowledge is interpretation, then what we call knowledge (even when it is in the claim of being theoretical) has a connection with norms at least to some extent. After all, all knowledge is the product of the will to power and the normative value-ground over which the knowledge is produced. This is another way of saying that knowledge is interested rather than being a product of a disinterested inquiry: each center of force (drives, human beings, etc.) wants their norm to be accepted by all the universe. Accordingly, philosophy is, even if it is theoretical, always a normative enterprise, where the guiding perspectives of the philosophers are the ownmost normativity that philosophers want the rest of the world to accept. Precisely, the will to power, in order to operate properly, needs norms to propagate to rest of the world, and norms need power in order to be accepted and applied by others. Philosophers as

norm-setting forces (i.e., the philosophical subjects, which are the philosophical perspective-setting forces) create values—involving in a normative activity—do set their guiding perspectives according to their needs and the things that make them interested and distressed. In other words, knowledge and its normative basis have a strategic, and thus, a political character.

Herr Nietzsche, in this context, was interested in the joy of life, and he was in distress for two reasons: 1) the dominant perspective of universal truth had life-denying implications, and 2) truth was “dead,” and with this death, the danger of nihilism approaches. Thus, his guiding perspective, the standard of interpretation and evaluation had been to affirm life against both the remaining effects of metaphysical interpretation of the world and the danger of nihilism.

Up to now, I tried to expose that Nietzsche wanted to affirm life with his philosophy and his guiding perspective is life. But what does he mean by life? What does he mean by affirming life? Is not life an all-encompassing term that every living being and their activities belong to; and because of this, is it not impossible to deny life although one lives? Then how can Nietzsche think that an actually living being can deny life? Or alternately, does Nietzsche prefer a type of life over another, and tries to affirm the one he prefers by saying no to some other types? In this section, I will attempt to find answers to these questions with the hope of the clarification of Nietzsche’s guiding perspective and his usage of the term “will to power,” which he occasionally uses as a synonym to life.

What Nietzsche understands from affirming life can be understood based on three axes: 1) against metaphysics, to affirm the organic roots as the senses and the feelings of the human being and their continuity with the intellect—Nietzsche’s physiological thinking, 2) against the understanding of life of simply being alive biologically (i.e., only self-preservation), to affirm the will to power as the cardinal instinct in all living beings understood as a living being’s will to discharge its strength (i.e., its will to grow and expand), and 3) against nihilism, to

affirm life as a ceaseless productive and creative struggle between centers of force—as “the eternal return.”

Nietzsche describes life as “a multiplicity of forces, connected by a common nutrition,” (WP, 641) and this description shows the organic, or the physiological aspect of what Nietzsche understands by a living being. The feelings, thoughts and concepts that emerge in a living being belong to the same unity of nutrition (the unity as a living being) as a means to 1) resist other forces (i.e., it is a united power-center), 2) an adjustment of the same according to form and rhythm (i.e., it is a multiplicity of drives which are guided by a hierarchy), and 3) an estimate in regard to assimilation of excretion (i.e., out of its will to grow, it decides to take in the other things or expel the the material it already took in) (ibid.). Precisely, a living being is a multiplicity of drives and affects, a “synthetic unity” that is defined in relation to other forces, trying to find a harmony in its inner relations, and that which interprets what to appropriate and what to expel from itself. Life, for Nietzsche, can be defined as “an enduring form of processes of the establishment of force, in which the different contenders grow unequally” (WP, 642). The organic processes of constant establishment and reestablishment of power which human beings share with all other animals were present much before than the emergence of the human subject (WP, 640). Even within a specific living being, there is a struggle: Nietzsche thinks “[t]he individual as a struggle between parts” (ibid.). Its evolution, for him, is “tied to the victory or predominance of individual parts, to an atrophy, a “becoming an organ” of other parts” (ibid.). Thus, the relationality produces the individual living being: there is a continuous power struggle within an individual living being between its parts—the parts of an individual will to power— and the relation between their parts make what a living being is. Similarly, as a unity of nutrition to resist other forces, a living being is affected by its outer relations that include an aim of mastery. As stated earlier, Nietzsche thinks that the will to power interprets and the organic process presupposes continuous interpretation. Human

knowledge springs from the discursive interpretation, using concepts which are their invention. Yet, this too depends on physiology contrary to the metaphysics which assume a pure, will-less subject. For Nietzsche, the emergence of affects and feelings are based on its physiology. Since the drives and affects constitute the human values as their will, values are physiologically rooted. The activity of knowledge-producing, based on value-creation which is physiologically rooted, hence, is considered as a “symptom of a body” in a continuity and a homogeneity with the non-discursive activities.

Life affirming in the philosophical sense is, thus, positing life as the condition of the possibility of knowledge. Metaphysical thinking was, in Nietzsche’s view, denigrating all that belongs to the organic roots of the human being and the “interested” nature of human interpretative powers. Rejecting senses and affects is, since they are the most basic roots of human intellect (or, its interpretative powers) and thus knowledge, is castrating the intellect (GM, II, 12).

When it comes to the second axis, we see Nietzsche claiming that the cardinal instinct of a living being is not self-preservation. Aiming to be simply being biologically alive does not have any value for Nietzsche to affirm. In his thought, all drives are kinds of lusts to rule, and all are rooted in our instincts, which come from our organic existence. It can be thought that there are several instincts of human being, like nutrition, sexual instincts, self-preservation, etc. However, for Nietzsche, self-preservation is not a direct drive or an instinct. Rather, it is a consequence of the cardinal instinct of discharging one’s strength. The will to power interprets. When measuring degrees and variations of power, if it feels itself capable to act, it inclines to discharge its strength. If it feels that it is more appropriate to preserve itself for a later discharge of strength, then it strategically tends to self-preserving activities. In Nietzsche’s words

[p]hysiologists should think twice before positioning the drive for self-preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all, a living thing wants to *discharge* its strength -life itself is will to power -: self-preservation is only one of

the indirect and most frequent *consequences* of this (BGE, On the Prejudices of Philosophers, 13).

This type of thinking, as it posits self-preservation as a consequence of a cardinal instinct, does not mean that Nietzsche does not affirm self-preservation. Rather, he affirms it by putting it under a more basic value, because he was in distress from the *over-emphasis* on the self-preservation in metaphysics. In his work *On the Genealogy of Morality*, which will be discussed in the next section in some detail, Nietzsche entitles the metaphysical morality with terms like “slave morality,” and “*ressentiment*.” These terms are coined by him in order to emphasize that the metaphysical morality is a moral interpretation of a slavish type which hates its master since it is unable to take an actual revenge. The “slave morality” based on *ressentiment* was invented and imposed by the weak—the ones that need self-preservation most—and in Nietzsche’s thought, these values make us forget the basics. The historical evolution of this type of morality will be discussed later. At this point, it is enough to infer that Nietzsche considers the morality of *ressentiment* as life denying since rather than action as discharging one’s strength, it valued “reaction,” since it is a morality of ones that are incapable to act, and it is invented in order to hold the strong responsible and guilty from its very strength, in order to preserve themselves. Nobler values, for Nietzsche, can only be the values that affirm action as opposed to reaction. Action, strength, struggle and fighting can be some characteristics of Nietzsche’s life-affirming values since they are more compatible with the cardinal instinct of *βίος* (bios): discharging one’s strength by actively participating in the struggle of life.

The last axis is related to our modern human condition: there are ideals which we found to be unattainable, and this makes life not worth living. The only interpretation, the ascetic ideal, the metaphysics of “truth,” the Christian God as truth, which promise salvation in a beyond world has collapsed. Thus, the only thing that gave meaning to life up to now has evaporated into nothingness. There

emerges, as a consequence, a danger of nihilism. Under these circumstances, what does it mean to affirm life?

Since in the thought of Nietzsche nihilism is the consequence of the collapse of the Platonic-Christian values, the antidote can be to have a look at the premises of a joyful life which were long forgotten in the dominance of metaphysics. Unlearning the values and the ascetic ideal created by metaphysical valuation as the affirmation of “perspective” can be the starting point. Life, in Nietzsche’s thought, is a ceaseless productive and creative struggle between centers of force. It is a battlefield. Affirming to be in the battle, to will to create, the will to overcome, to want to invent the new is, in Nietzschean valuation, life-affirming values from which he was inspired by the knightly aristocratic self-affirmative spirit. This is the remembering of the original innocence of the will to power, which had been subjugated in the long years of the domination of the Platonic-Christian values. These values, by denying “perspective,” invented the same responsibility for everyone and bred a docile animal: an animal who is calculable and allowed to give promises. However, affirming the constant becoming as a creative struggle can be the first thing to do for an aim of affirming life against a danger with which we start to believe that this life is not worth living.

Thus, we see that Nietzsche’s most basic aim in his philosophy (i.e., his guiding perspective) is to affirm life as how he interprets it; as a battlefield: an incessant clash of centers of force as wills to power which interpret their world of constant becoming, as ones which are sometimes in co-operation and sometimes in struggle. Affirming the infinite establishment and re-establishment of power calls for the affirmation of an eternity, an eternal recurrence of the same. Since life consists of relations rather than external objects, to affirm life is to affirm the complete relationality. Nietzsche writes

[i]f we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence. For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us our-selves nor in things; and if

our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event-and in this single moment of affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed (WP, 1032).

Accordingly, in Nietzsche's historical context, to affirm life must have started with a negation: the negation of the negation of life. Nietzsche aimed at unlearning the nihilistic values which are themselves negations of life. Examining the history of human evaluations which resulted in life denying values were a very good starting point since their emergence and contingency would be shown. Thus, with his genealogical method, Nietzsche had the chance to convey the message that human values are not a manifestation of a fixed human nature. Since denaturalizing the naturalized life-denying values primarily designed for the self-preservation of the weak might open a space to affirm nobler values which can affirm life as a constant struggle—with all its strength, fight, pain, blood, tear, adventure, risk, tragedy; and without the obsessive need of fixing all things as eternal entities to render them as harmless as possible—for an eternity, Nietzsche's genealogy may be counted as an establishment of the history of morality as a continuous (or alternatively, eternal) recurrence of power struggles.

2.2. Nietzsche's Genealogy

2.2.1. The Questions and the Aim of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*

In his work *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche declares that the descent of our moral judgments—he calls them “moral prejudices” too—was a question engaging his attention from his childhood (GM, Preface, 3). He says that, after a period, he gave up searching for the origin of what he calls “moral prejudices” beyond this world by separating “theological prejudices” from the moral ones. Hence, in this work, Nietzsche traces back the processes of the evolution human moral judgments. As he puts it, with some knowledge of history and philology, and his personal sensitivity to psychological problems; Nietzsche

states that his question regarding the descent of our moral prejudices have evolved to the following:

[U]nder what conditions did man [sic] invent the value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves have? Have they up to now obstructed or promoted human flourishing? Are they a sign of distress, poverty and the degeneration of life? Or, on the contrary, do they reveal the fullness, strength and will of life, its courage, its confidence, its future? (ibid.).

Accordingly, it can be said that Nietzsche uses his genealogical method in search of an answer to two main questions: 1) “Under what conditions did the moral judgments “good and “evil” are invented?” and 2) “What are the values of those values for life?” Gilles Deleuze (1983) puts those two questions into a simple formula to describe the meaning of genealogy (reversing the order of the questions above) as follows: “Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values” (p. 2). When the general character of the work *On the Genealogy of Morality* is considered, it can be said that, since answering the first question with philological, historical, and psychological insights will reveal that the norms of human morality—rather than being naturally fixed, necessary, and universal—are in contingent and constant becoming; Nietzsche aims to show us their contingency, that they could be otherwise: we could have invented and can invent in the future completely different values from “what we take for granted” today, based on the perspectivist episteme-ontology which claims that all the valuations emerge and change according to the constant clash of the wills to power. In other words, instead of having their ground on a fixed human nature, human values are shaped in the history of force relations. Moreover, because Nietzsche believes that the Platonic-Christian values spring from “symptoms” of certain bodies that can be characterized by a degeneration of life, Nietzsche has the goal of showing the reader the psychological aspects of the historical processes under which they have evolved to their current form. By answering—in the form of a polemic, as the name of the work suggests—the second question, in technical terms, he performs a physiological (and thus psychological too, since psychology is included in the larger system of physiology) “symptomatology” with which he evaluates the

health of moral values according to his guiding perspective of valuation, which is life. Deleuze writes

The whole of philosophy [for Nietzsche] is a symptomatology, and a semeiology. The sciences are a symptomatological and semeiological system. Nietzsche substitutes the correlation of sense and phenomenon for the metaphysical duality of appearance and essence and for the scientific relation of cause and effect. All force is appropriation, domination, exploitation of a quantity of reality. Even perception, in its divers aspects, is the expression of forces which appropriate nature. That is to say that nature itself has a history. The history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take possession of it and the co-extinction of forces which struggle for possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense depending on the force which appropriates it. History is the variation of senses, that is to say "the succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subduing" (1983, p. 3).

What Deleuze says here can be interpreted as referring to the direct path from perspectivism to genealogy. One of the major claims of Nietzsche's perspectivism is that centers of force (drives in the micro-level; human beings including philosophers and societies in some other levels) interpret things based on their will to power, will to grow, will to appropriate in organic processes, and create norms resulting from their interpretation, wanting them to be accepted as the ultimate purpose of existence. They give meaning to things, and the way living beings give meaning to things reveal the strength or weakness in their physiology. In dualist metaphysics, for example, philosophers try to grasp the essence of things with an inquiry on the appearances. In traditional sciences, scientists try to find the cause of events with an inquiry on the effects. When it comes to Nietzsche, on the basis of a symptomatological interpretation of phenomena, he tries to find clues about how human beings sensed things (i.e., gave meanings to them), how they created norms, and how they created knowledge which is interested, considering that knowledge is always based on the norms they created. Nietzsche also looked for the evolution of these norms, since he has the perspectivist understanding that every force is in becoming and this makes them constantly interpret in order to grow in constantly changing situations. Since the history of a thing is "the succession of forces which take possession of it and the co-existence of forces which struggle for possession," Nietzsche looked for

historical changes (not only slow changes as adaptation, but also ruptures which forced human beings change their valuations immediately). In other words, the constant interplay of forces, in Nietzsche's understanding, creates an upper-level power which forces the interpreting, perspective-setting forces (i.e., subjects), which, in turn, affect the upper-level power. For example, a drive is a subject in a human being, but at the same time, it is subjected to other drives in the power struggle within an individual human being. In a higher level, a human being is a subject who interprets the world around itself with h/er senses obtained from it with h/er will to growth, the world where s/he is subjected; while at the same time it is a subject who is a part of the struggle in the same level. Since how the changes in the senses of values and meanings of human beings occur in the history on the basis of contingent force relations, can only be uncovered by a method which questions the creation of meanings and their changes according to various force relations, Nietzsche's perspectivist world-view directly brings him to his genealogical method, which denies the disinterested universality of the values (or, the disinterested normativity) and investigates them on the basis of the history of force relations.

2.2.2. Nietzsche's "Genealogical Method"

For answering the questions discussed above, Nietzsche uses his genealogical method. Describing what he does to answer those questions, he states the following: "I distinguished between epochs, peoples, grades of rank between individuals" (ibid.). For the application of this analysis, as Nietzsche puts it, "that which can be documentable" is needed. Rather than hypothesizing about our nature, relying on the "historical sense" is a crucial merit to interpret the moral past of humanity. Nietzsche argues:

[I]t is quite clear which colour is a hundred times more important for a genealogist than blue: namely grey, which is to say, that which can be documented, which can actually be confirmed and has actually existed, in short, the whole, long, hard-to-decipher hieroglyphic script of man's [sic] moral past! (ibid., 7).

With his genealogical method, Nietzsche hopes that the “genealogical knowledge” which unveils the changes of the human moral judgments between epochs, the differences between different peoples’ moralities, and the role of the different hierarchies and their psychological effects on people will be reached. When we remind ourselves that, in the thought of Nietzsche, the will to power is the locomotive force that moves the process of becoming, perspectival value-creating, and the knowledge-forming; we can infer that Nietzsche’s genealogical knowledge will show us “the history of the will to power and its perspectival moral interpretations:” how the wills to power of some power-centers undergo a process of becoming and how the values and knowledge types change in the process of history accordingly. In order to see how Nietzsche shows the way these things happen, it is a legitimate way to look at what genealogical knowledges Nietzsche produced in *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

2.2.3. Nietzsche’s “Genealogical Knowledges”: The Three Essays in *On The Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*

In the “First Essay” of GM, Nietzsche claims that the aristocratic moral evaluation in the form of “good vs. bad” transformed into the form of “good vs. evil” as a result of a slave revolt in morality; and analyzes the way this change happens.

Those whom Nietzsche calls “English Psychologists”⁵ claim that unselfish acts are called good by the people that find it useful at first; and later, everyone forgot the origin [the original usefulness of the act for its recipient or the society] of the praise; and because such acts are praised as good as a habit with a forgotten origin of usefulness, people started to experience them as good *as such* (GM, I, 2). This theory assumes a fixed origin as a natural necessity behind the moral sentiments and a fixed human nature at the same time, since according to

⁵ For example, Paul Reé (although he is not English), Jeremy Bentham, Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill (Allison, 2001, p. 188).

this approach, “usefulness” is the “good in itself” and our moral psychology evolved, through forgetfulness, within the boundaries of the human nature which is fixed. As a reaction to this claim, Nietzsche asserts that this is a misplacement of the “breeding ground” of the concept “good.” He holds that

the judgment 'good' does not emanate from those to whom goodness is shown! Instead it has been 'the good' themselves, meaning the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded, who saw and judged themselves and their actions as good, I mean first rate, in contrast to everything lowly, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was from this pathos of distance that they first claimed the right to create values and give these values names: usefulness was none of their concern! (ibid.).

In other words, Nietzsche thinks that the term good was originated by the self-affirmation of the warlike knightly-aristocratic class. Their will to power interpreted the world in the self-affirmative way that they themselves give the name good to themselves since they have the privilege to give names to things as a ruling class (ibid.). Hence, this naming as a valuation in the form of “good vs. bad” has nothing to do with usefulness: it is the result of a self-affirmation in a relation between a higher class and a lower one. Thus, it is not the case that the idea that the unegoistic acts (and their usefulness—for their recipient, or for the society) are the origin of the word “good;” instead, for Nietzsche, the type of valuation which is based on the dichotomy of egoistic and unegoistic acts started to enter into humanity’s consciousness with the decline of the aristocratic value system (ibid.).

Nietzsche reaches this conclusion with a philological and a historical sense: he looks at the etymology of the term good and the evolution of it in history. Nietzsche, from the etymological point of view, finds everywhere “the same conceptual transformation:” the difference between social classes transforms to the moral difference. The terms that signify “spiritually good,” “spiritually high-minded” developed from the terms that signify higher aristocratic social class. In the same fashion, the terms that signify the term bad is developed from the terms like “common,” “plebeian,” etc. In other words, when Nietzsche looks at the evolution of the terms good and bad, he sees that the concepts of political

superiority transform into the concepts of moral and psychological superiority.

Nietzsche gives some examples on the issue, especially in the fourth section of the first essay, and one of them is as follows.

The best example for the latter [the evolution of the term “bad”] is the German word 'schlecht' (bad) itself: which is identical with 'schlicht' (plain, simple) -compare 'schlechtweg' (plainly), 'schlechterdings' (simply) -and originally referred to the simple, the common man with no derogatory implication, but simply in contrast to the nobility (GM, I, 4).

The noble class, in the first place, evaluated things based on themselves, accepting themselves as the ultimate measure of things, since there was no power against them to force them to do otherwise. They did it so with a psychology which is not involved in a resentment directed towards an enemy, since they were mighty for a direct revenge when some threat occurs against their will to power. Thus, they did not damn those who they evaluate as bad; rather, they saw the bad as a different, a distant thing from themselves whom they call the good as a result of a self-affirmation. But how did these type of valuation transform? The decline and the transvaluation of the aristocratic type of valuation, for Nietzsche, started from within the aristocratic class itself, since they were the ruling class and they were allowed to designate things by their self-affirmation. In the beginning of the change of the aristocratic type of evaluation, the emergence of the aristocratic priestly caste played a crucial role, since the first changes in the warlike aristocratic values came from priests who were also administrators. Since the priests belonged to the ruling class, their evaluation still depended on self-affirmation. They called their habits as good rather than needing an enemy to be “evil” in order to affirm themselves. However, there had been a crucial change in what they called good since the habits (eating habits, hygiene, etc.) of the priestly caste was completely different from the knightly ones. With the emergence of the priestly caste, the judgments “pure” and “impure” were juxtaposed to the aristocratic self-affirmative valuation system; which has led to a distinction between good and bad without a class connotation, since the priestly caste started to name some habits or actions as good and bad in the way that, as it were, they

were good or bad as such, as that actions are “bad in themselves.” The evaluation of priestly caste involved a profound hatred and wrath which were lacking in knightly aristocrats who actually did not care “the bad” at all since it was the lowly as compared to themselves (GM, I, 6). Hence, the smell of the birth of “evil” starts to be heard from the “pure” vs. “impure” valuation of the priestly caste (ibid.), however that was only a *beginning* of a victory of the process of the complete reversal of the aristocratic type of evaluation.

At this point, Nietzsche warns that the judgments “pure” and “impure” are not as we understand today as symbolic terms. The ancient human beings produced value judgments directly, in an unsymbolic, crude, coarse, detached way that we (who are deeply spiritualized in the long processes of history) today can scarcely imagine: “From the outset the ‘pure man’ was just a man who washed, avoided certain foods which cause skin complaints, did not sleep with the filthy women from the lower orders and had a horror of blood, -nothing more, not much more!” (ibid.). This conception does give name to acts and gives psychological superiority to certain acts (generally the habits of themselves) without a profound categorization between human beings—they do not eternalize and spiritualize the differences. Instead, the difference between good and bad, pure and impure, and the like is simply the difference between the deeds, and nothing more. However, for Nietzsche, the unsymbolic value differences quickly get sharpened and started to become a symbolic and categorical difference (instead of a difference in degree) in this early aristocratic stage because of the nature of the priestly aristocratic class: they live in an unhealthy way, and the sharpened distinctions are the symptoms of this early degeneration. Nietzsche asserts that

[f]rom the very beginning there has been something unhealthy about these priestly aristocracies and in the customs dominant there, which are turned away from action and are partly brooding and partly emotionally explosive, resulting in the almost inevitable bowel complaints and neurasthenia which have plagued the clergy down the ages; but as for the remedy they themselves found for their sickness, -surely one must say that its after effects have shown it to be a hundred times more dangerous than the disease it was meant to cure? People are still ill from the after-effects of these priestly quack-cures! (ibid.).

Since, unlike the warlike knightly aristocrats, the priestly caste developed customs that made themselves devoid of action, they became unable to fight, and they became incapable of direct revenge. They become sickly and emotionally explosive which made them great haters because of their new habits, and their being unable for a direct revenge when they see a threat to their will to growth. Moreover, priests, as a result of their habits, became *actually* sick, and they sought some cures for their sickness. Nietzsche gives some examples to what they have found as cures: certain diets like avoidance of meat, fasting, sexual abstinence, the flight into the desert (isolation), the metaphysics which is antagonistic to senses (which make them lazy and refined), self-hypnotizing (ibid.). For Nietzsche, the habits and cures of the priestly caste are also sicknesses, and the lifestyle consisting of those habits forced them to create new values which, in Nietzsche's understanding, can be characterized as examples of willing "nothingness," a symptom of a weak body, an impoverishment of life, or a *decadence*, when compared to the values of knightly aristocrats which are symptoms of a "powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health that includes the things needed to maintain it, war, adventure, hunting, dancing, jousting and everything else that contains strong, free, happy action" (GM, I, 7).

Accordingly, the Jewish priestly caste started the process of the transformation of the knightly aristocratic value system. What was called good in the former evaluation started to turn into "evil," and what was bad in the former start to be valued as "good." Since the priestly caste become devoid of action and impotent to fight, as Nietzsche puts it, they fought with their warlike enemies with a reversal of their values. The Jewish priestly caste reversed the self-affirmative value equation of the warlike (i.e., "good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed") out of their hatred towards their knightly enemies (ibid.). In Nietzsche's words, the logic of evaluation of the impotent has been like the following.

'Only those who suffer are good, only the poor, the powerless, the lowly are good; the suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly, are the only pious people, the only ones saved, salvation is for them alone, whereas you rich, the noble and powerful, you are eternally wicked, cruel, lustful, insatiate, godless, you will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned!' ... (ibid.).

The priestly caste of Christianity had been the heir of this value reversal and brought this reversal to its fullest extent, in the degree of a victory against the aristocratic system of valuation, and human being had become a sickly animal who rejects the basic premises of a joyful life.

Nietzsche entitles this phenomenon “the slave revolt in morality.” As Nietzsche observes, the slave revolt in morality begins with the value creation of *ressentiment*: “the *ressentiment* of those beings who, denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge” (GM, I, 10). While noble morality was based on a self-affirmation, the morality based on *ressentiment* needed an enemy to deny in order for affirming oneself. This act of denial is the value creation of the slavish type. Their actions are basically a reaction: since they are impotent to act from overflowing power and health, they need an “evil” enemy to be condemned in the first instance, and they only become themselves with a reaction to that enemy. In the former system, the “bad” was something nearly sympathetic: the self-affirmers did not deny their others as condemned. Rather, they called them in terms like “unhappy,” or “pitiful.” Since the powerful is potent enough for a real revenge, they do not care about their enemies that much as the impotent, and “good vs. bad” type of evaluation was not of a condemnation or resentment. In contrast, the reversed evaluation of the “good vs. evil” starts with an initial condemnation in the form of an “imaginary revenge.” *Ressentiment*, as a character of constantly living with an imaginary revenge from the powerful had thus become the new value creator in the form of “good vs. evil.” Nietzsche gives a famous analogy as follows.

There is nothing strange about the fact that lambs bear a grudge towards large birds of prey: but that is no reason to blame the large birds of prey for carrying off the little lambs. And if the lambs say to each other, 'These birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey and most like its opposite, a lamb, -is good, isn't

he?', then there is no reason to raise objections to this setting-up of an ideal beyond the fact that the birds of prey will view it somewhat derisively, and will perhaps say: 'We don't bear any grudge at all towards these good lambs, in fact we love them, nothing is tastier than a tender lamb.' (GM, I, 13).

However, there is an absurdity, as Nietzsche puts it, for expecting strength not to manifest itself as strength, an absurdity at the same level with expecting a weakness to manifest itself as a strength. The birds of prey, as long as they are “quant[a] of force,” they are quanta “of will, drive, [and] action” (ibid.). However, with the help of the metaphysical subject-object structure in language, the lamb can declare the bird of prey “guilty” as the subject, the “doer” of the deed as a unity. Nietzsche writes the following:

[O]nly the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), which construes and misconstrues all actions as conditional upon an agency, a 'subject', can make it appear otherwise [i.e., a “doer” as a unity]. And just as the common people separates lightning from its flash and takes the latter to be a deed, something performed by a subject, which is called lightning, popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of strength, as though there were an indifferent substratum behind the strong person which had the freedom to manifest strength or not (ibid.).

Yet, for Nietzsche, since there is not a fixed unity of the “doer,” as a Being, the “subject” as a Being, there are only deeds as beings. The “doer” is an addition to the original phenomenon of the deed. For example, the strength of a bird of prey simply manifests itself in its deeds. It is not a matter of choice. There is no substratum behind a bird of prey on which the bird chooses to manifest it or not. The doer as the one who chooses to manifest something or not is not a fact, but only an interpretation; an interpretation which the ones who are impotent, namely the people of *ressentiment*, need the most in order to blame the strong for manifesting its strength. Robert C. Solomon (2006) formulates this idea as follows:

Who benefits from this procedure [of levelling, the procedure of producing uniform, calculable persons]? Obviously those who are worst off, the weak, but also, and perhaps equally, the mediocre. The system [of moralization, as a product of the slave revolt in morality] works above all to suppress the drives and energies of the superior, the strong, those who would rather make something of themselves that “Morality” does not allow or, in any case, does not sufficiently recognize” (p. 51).

The categorical separation of the doer and the deed, in Nietzsche's view, opened up to the way of the domination of metaphysics which meant the victory of slave morality, the morality of *ressentiment*, with a long history of Christianity and its metaphysics. In this process, the subject-object structure of language, as stated, played a crucial role, since human beings sense the world, philosophize, and perform scientific activities within the boundaries of language; and just like the organic interpretation was normative, the discursive interpretation had become a vital aspect of constructing a human, all too human normativity. The discursive, thus Nietzsche shows us, is only a product and a continuation of the organic, since the discursive elements of normativity has the same characteristic (i.e., sharing the same basis, the will to power), although it is a different form of interpretation. The difference between the discursive and the non-discursive interpretations, in other words, is only a formal difference, not a categorical one.

Moreover, in the process which the normativity of the aristocratic class changed into its opposite, i.e., the victory of the metaphysical morality and its forgotten history—its history is forgotten since it is victorious and its values had been naturalized as a result of some processes—the animal human had evolved to be a docile being, a calculable animal. Rather than following their instincts without the intellectualized and spiritualized care of future, they started to be “tamed animals” who are allowed to give promises with the emergence of their memory, sharpened consciousness, sense of guilt, and bad conscience. Nietzsche investigates this process in the second essay of GM.

In the second essay of GM, Nietzsche asks whether “to breed an animal with the prerogative to promise” is the real problem of humankind (GM, II, 1). In this breeding, for him, the first condition is to build a memory on an original active forgetfulness. Forgetfulness, in Nietzsche's understanding, is not *vis inertiae*; since it is the active expulsion of our experience: we ingest, digest and expel the unnecessary from our flux of experiences (ibid.). It is a necessary

condition of a joyful, cheerful, proud and happy life. If the systems of suppression and expulsion are blocked in the system of a human being, s/he cannot live in a robust health (ibid). However, the building of memory is the most important condition of the animal who is expected to promise, who is calculable, and who is responsible: the “sovereign individual.” For Nietzsche,

In order to have that degree of control over the future, man [sic] must first have learnt to distinguish between what happens by accident and what by design, to think causally, to view the future as the present and anticipate it, to grasp with certainty what is end and what is means, in all, to be able to calculate, compute - and before he can do this, man [sic] himself will really have to become *reliable, regular, necessary*, even in his own self-image, so that he, as someone making a promise, it is answerable for his own future! (ibid.).

The sovereign individual who can be held responsible, however, is a late phenomenon, which had emerged as a result of long historical processes. In other words, the responsibility, reliability and calculability of the human being is something built in the history over the semi-animal human. The human subject, rather than having a fixed nature, is malleable in the sense that it always interpreted the world and became something new in the constant flux of the history, based on its will to power.

Nietzsche observed that the method human beings used to build a memory for themselves was involved mostly in cruelty and pain. He writes

When man [sic] decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices: the most horrifying sacrifices and forfeits (the sacrifice of the first-born belongs here), the most disgusting mutilations (for example, castration), the cruelest rituals of all religious cults (and all religions are, at their most fundamental, systems of cruelty) -all this has its origin in that particular instinct which discovered that pain was the most powerful aid to mnemonics. In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas have to be made ineradicable, ubiquitous, unforgettable, 'fixed', in order to hypnotize the whole nervous and intellectual system through these 'fixed ideas' -and ascetic procedures and lifestyles are a method of freeing those ideas from competition with all other ideas, of making them 'unforgettable' (GM, II, 3).

In the above paragraph, Nietzsche tells us the macro-level interpretation—and the resulting form of power—of the human beings which is oriented towards the preservation of the species, and the reason behind the need for building a memory

for the preservation. For the existence of the individual in the political society with others, responsible individuals who share same sense of justice and conscience were needed (Cf, Allison, 2001, p.228). Since the forgetfulness is the primal phenomenon, human beings started to build a memory upon the instinctive human existence, so that they acquire conscience and become capable of responsibility. In the first place, in order to insert some fixed ideas (such as justice, conscience, etc.) into the human mind, a strong memory—a memory of a will; or, a will not to forget—(GM, II, 1) was built for igniting a fear of punishment for an unjust, an evil act with great torments inflicted publicly on those who involve in kind of acts that is accepted as evil. Then, with ascetic lifestyle and metaphysics, those ideas engulfed the minds of all people and became the profoundest values of them. In the end of the process, where the history of responsibility reaches to the degree of the emergence of the sovereign individual, the modern subject which has the instinct of conscience proudly appears, which values itself over those who are not as reliable, with its being a being who has prerogative to promise, a reliable and moral human being (Cf. GM, II, 2).

In the making of the end product of “sovereign individual,” a Kantian term which Nietzsche uses to designate the autonomous subject who is the master of its inclinations and acts according to the moral law of which s/he is the author by h/er reason, the emergence of the concept of free will plays a crucial role because one cannot be held responsible for an act that s/he could not do otherwise (GM, II, 2). Yet, the emergence of bad conscience was the phenomenon which led to the invention of the free will and the late fruit of the sovereign individual.

Nietzsche elaborates on the history of the emergence of these phenomena which led to the modern human being, “the sovereign individual” by analyzing the spiritual concept *Schuld* [guilt/debt] which owes its descent to an economic concept of *Schulden* [debts]. In the first instance, *Schuld* [as debt] was just

signifying the relation with the creditor and debtor. If the debtor was unable to pay his debt; the creditor, for the retribution, was given the right to inflict pain upon the debtor. Nietzsche writes

[t]he debtor, in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will be honoured, in order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise, and in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience, pawns something to the creditor by means of the contract in case he does not pay, something that he still 'possesses' and controls, for example, his body, or his wife, or his freedom, or his life [...] (GM, II, 5).

After the legalization of the creditor's right to inflict pain on the debtor, the process of the intellectualizing of the obligation took place and this led to the creation of conscience: The thoughts in the form of "I should not" had been spiritualized, intensified and built the sense of justice with the emergence of bad conscience. The feeling of "I should not" in the hypothetical imperatives" brought about the formation of the "categorical imperative:" one's will to be a regular reason-abiding person begun with the fear inspired conscience.

The feeling of guilt and the sense of personal obligation started with the legalization of the economic relation between the creditor and debtor. The legalizing of this relation was based on the assumption that human beings can calculate the compensation for everything in a just manner. This way of thinking also was inspired by the idea that human being is the measure of all things: human beings can fairly calculate the value of everything. The civilizations, as legal systems, started with the process Nietzsche describes as follows.

[f]ixing prices, setting values, working out equivalents, exchanging -this preoccupied man's [sic] first thoughts to such a degree that in a certain sense it constitutes thought: the most primitive kind of cunning was bred here, as was also, presumably, the first appearance of human pride, man's sense of superiority over other animals. Perhaps our word 'man' (manas) expresses something of this first sensation of self-confidence: man [sic] designated himself as the being who measures values, who values and measures, as the 'calculating animal as such' (GM, II, 8).

The sense of justice thus started with the legalization of the creditor-debtor relationship and transferring this relationship to the one between individual and the society. An imaginary contract between the community and the individual was

thus established, as a corollary of what community provides to individuals. According to this imaginary contract in the minds of human subjects, community provides certain goods (like wealth, security, shelter, etc.) to the individual with the price of following the fixed rules of calculation. If the individual fails to abide by these laws, s/he is in danger of either being cruelly punished or expelled from the society altogether (GM, II, 9). We are creatures who measure and evaluate everything: everything has a price, deeds just as much as goods. Human beings, in order to stay in their community with peace, started to intellectualize and spiritualize the notion of debt. Then, they have begun to practice their original cruelty upon themselves instead of directing it outwards. Debt to the society became the bad conscience, the guilt. When the human being found itself imprisoned within the confinements of the society, its “soul” emerged as a result. In Nietzsche’s words, “[a]ll instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards -this is what I call the internalization of man [sic]: with it there now evolves in man [sic] what will later be called his 'soul'" (GM, II, 16). Unlike semi-human animals who were not considering their safety in a profound spirituality, happily involved in war, adventure, and risk, the civilized animal of human being started to have unconscious impulses for safety. A heaviness had started to show itself upon them as they had to think twice before acting one way or another. Their instincts are devaluated and suspended (ibid.). Nietzsche asserts

[a]nimosity, cruelty, the pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying -all this was pitted against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of 'bad conscience'. Lacking external enemies and obstacles, and forced into the oppressive narrowness and conformity of custom, man impatiently ripped himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed at himself, gave himself no peace and abused himself, this animal who battered himself raw on the bars of his cage and who is supposed to be 'tamed'; man, full of emptiness and torn apart with homesickness for the desert, has had to create from within himself an adventure, a torture-chamber, an unsafe and hazardous wilderness -this fool, this prisoner consumed with longing and despair, became the inventor of 'bad conscience' (ibid.).

The joy of cruelty in the animal human being who is imprisoned in the civil society turned its primal instincts of wildness to itself and formed bad conscience.

However, for Nietzsche, the alteration of the animal human being into the all-too-human being that devised bad conscience was a rupture, rather than a slow adaptation to a new context. This is his first assumption on the origin of bad conscience in the making of the modern subject. He has two assumptions on the origin of bad conscience as follows:

The first assumption in my theory on the origin of bad conscience is that the alteration was not gradual and voluntary and did not represent an organic assimilation into new circumstances, but was a breach, a leap, a compulsion, an inescapable fate that nothing could ward off, which occasioned no struggle, not even any *ressentiment*. A second assumption, however, is that the shaping of a population, which had up till now been unrestrained and shapeless, into a fixed form, as happened at the beginning with an act of violence, could only be concluded with acts of violence, - that consequently the oldest 'state' emerged as a terrible tyranny, as a repressive and ruthless machinery, and continued working until the raw material of people and semi-animals had been finally not just kneaded and made compliant, but *shaped* (GM, II, 17).

When we have a closer look at the first assumption, Nietzsche asserts not only that the emergence of bad conscience is a sudden rupture resulting from the emergence of the state, but also he claims that there is no *ressentiment* in the beginnings of bad conscience. Because of the emergence of the state, all of a sudden, human animal found itself in a position that it had to internalize its instincts; and there was no escape from it. *Ressentiment* is a later phenomenon, which belongs mostly to the priestly valuation system, which Nietzsche discussed in the first essay of his genealogy. Secondly, with constant violence and inflicting of pain, the human being is shaped by the organization of the state. It is stated that the latest product of this shaping is the modern subject as the sovereign individual. However, even in the very late modern subject, the “instinct for freedom” (by which Nietzsche means “the will to power”) (GM, II, 18) is still the basic premise of life which can never be annihilated; no matter how much it has become latent, repressed, and internalized. This issue will be discussed further when it comes to the third essay in Nietzsche’s genealogy. At this point suffice it to say that, for Nietzsche, even willing nothingness is a willing and it is a specific manifestation of the will to power. This is because willing nothingness is an instinct to free itself from its

constraints and to will a more appropriate world to discharge its strength for a certain type; namely, the weak (Cf. GM, II, 17-18).

In Nietzsche's view, bad conscience emerged as a sickness, however, a sickness like a pregnancy (GM, II, 19). Without the direction of the wilderness of an animal from the outward direction to the inward, s/he would not be conscious of anything, including beauty (GM, II, 18). The tendency of forming, will to power as shaping the reality, the artistic will to power emerged with the bad conscience: human beings tamed themselves with the pleasure of inflicting pain. They now inflict pain upon themselves and started to shape and form themselves as an artist out of their cruelty. Nietzsche explains the descent of "unegoistic" behavior as a moral value in this way: instead of its usefulness, it is a result of something inherited from the animal human ancestors; namely, the primal joy of cruelty of the human being when this cruelty turns inwards (ibid.). The bad conscience is like a pregnancy since it has given depth to the superficial animal human being: they have become profound and artistic with the phenomenon of bad conscience, and shaped themselves like a sculpture, sharing the same violent instincts with their non-humanized ancestors. The unegoistic has nothing to do with the fixed human nature that values utility. Instead, it is a product of a long history of evolution, constant establishments and reestablishments of power, affects, and interpretations. According to this understanding, the evolution of human beings will go on constantly, both in the way of assimilation into new contexts and sudden inescapable ruptures.

When it comes to the "Third essay: what do ascetic ideals mean?" in *Genealogy*, as the name of the essay suggests, Nietzsche contemplates on the issue of the meaning of what he calls ascetic ideals for several groups of people, namely artists, scholars and philosophers, women, priests and saints (Cf. GM, II, 1). By *ascetic* ideals Nietzsche refers to the values of Platonic-Christian morality, which have different meanings for different types of subjects. As the term

“ascetic” suggests, in Nietzsche’s thought, these values depend on *suffering*. The ascetic ideal (in the context of scholars and philosophers), the term which Nietzsche uses to summarize the moral past of the western civilization under the domination of traditional metaphysics, has three great catchwords: “poverty, humility, chastity,” (GM, III, 8) all of which legitimize suffering for a purpose.

It is important to bear in mind that, for Nietzsche, contrary to intuition, suffering is not something that human beings tend to escape; but quite the opposite, it is a profoundly positive and creative phenomenon. This is because Nietzsche thinks that suffering has the power to give meaning to life. For him, the worst nightmare for a human being would be meaninglessness, a vacuum. According to the basic structure of human will which Nietzsche presents us, human beings even *prefer* suffering—as long as they find a meaning in it—rather than finding themselves in meaninglessness. Nietzsche writes

That the ascetic ideal has meant so much to humankind reveals a basic fact of human will, its horror vacui; it needs an aim -, and it prefers to will nothingness rather than not will. – Do I make myself understood? ... Have I made myself understood? ‘Absolutely not, sir!’ – So let us start at the beginning (GM, II, I).

Accordingly, Nietzsche, in the third essay of *Genealogy*, aims to reveal two aspects of ascetic ideals; namely 1) the ascetic ideals were *vital* and *necessary*, since the Platonic-Christian ascetism was the only available interpretation of the world that gave meaning to the lives of different types of subjectivities, and 2) the ascetic ideals meant different things for different subjectivities in accordance with their specific deployments of will to power.

The necessity of ascetic ideals was discussed in the above paragraph: The only available means of giving meaning to life was the ascetic ideals, which even made some people will nothingness. This is because they made possible that people will something, and these ideals served as an antidote to the *horror vacui* of people. To make this point clearer, what Nietzsche writes at the end of the third essay of *Genealogy* may be helpful:

Except for the ascetic ideal: man [sic], the *animal* man had no meaning up to now. His [sic] existence on earth had no purpose [...]. [S]uffering itself was *not* his [sic] problem, instead, the fact that there was no answer to the question he screamed ‘Suffering for *what?*’ Man [sic], the bravest animal and most prone to suffer, does not deny suffering as such: he [sic] *wills* it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a *meaning* for it, a *purpose* for suffering [...] – and the ascetic ideal offered man [sic] a *meaning*! [...] Within it, suffering was interpreted; the enormous emptiness seemed filled; the door was shut on all suicidal nihilism (GM, III, 28).

The ascetic ideals brought to human beings, for Nietzsche, a hatred of life and senses, which meant “a *will to nothingness*” (ibid.). Hence, Nietzsche—as a thinker with the guiding perspective of life—called for a transvaluation of these values with life-affirming ones. However, although ascetic ideals were a “rebellion against the most fundamental prerequisites of life” (ibid.), they served a vital purpose: they saved the *will* of the human beings.

Secondly, Nietzsche gives an account of the ascetic ideals, against the supposedly “disinterested” values created out of them. This happens especially when he deals with the meaning of ascetic ideals for artists and philosophers. Therefore, in order to give further details on Nietzsche’s arguments against disinterested values and disinterested knowledge, and investigate them in their genealogical exposition—which, among others, has the function of abolishing the strict boundaries between art, science and philosophy—I will examine what he says about the meaning of ascetic ideals for artists and philosophers.

I will start with what Nietzsche says about the meaning of the ascetic ideals for artist. In Nietzsche’s view, for artists, ascetic ideals mean either nothing at all; or so many things that, when they come together, do not constitute a meaningful unity (GM, III, 5). But what does Nietzsche mean by that? Paying some attention at how Nietzsche reaches this conclusion will be helpful. Nietzsche thinks that,

[d]own to the ages, they [artists] have been the valets of a morality, or a philosophy, or a religion [...]. At the very least, they always need a defender, a support, an already established authority: artists never stand independently, being alone is against their deepest instincts (GM, III, 5).

The reason why Nietzsche reaches the conclusion that the ascetic ideals mean either so many things or nothing at all, with the premise that they are never independent, is as follows. Since the creation of the artist depends on a value from either a morality, philosophy, or religion, what the ascetic ideals mean for an artist is dependent on the interpretation of the authority from which h/er artistic will to power is supported. A true artist, in Nietzsche's view, is the one who is "cut off from what is 'real' and actual for all eternity [...]" (GM, II, 4). However, the artist creates h/er works presenting reality from the perspective of an established value system which s/he relies on. Since ascetic ideals mean different things to different authorities (i.e., for each morality, each philosophy and each religion), Nietzsche thinks that the meaning of the ascetic ideals for artists cannot be described as a meaningful unity. This means that we cannot formulate a sentence in the form of "the meaning of ascetic ideals is x" for artists. Analogous to what is said in the sections about perspectivism and the guiding perspective, the value grounds of artists (i.e., their guiding perspectives) with which they depict the world in their artworks is that of the force on which they depend. For instance, some of them may have the guiding perspective of constantly creating new interesting things; some other might like to show that the ultimate meaning of life is human rights, or sensual pleasures, or some specific philosophical ideas; some might prefer presenting the world as the place where what God says in the Bible takes place.

At this point, the surface value of what Nietzsche says would, however, be misleading. This is because attributing to Nietzsche the thought that art is a lower level activity than non-artistic discursive activities (such as philosophy and science) is not a correct reading. Hence, as usual, it should be thought twice before taking what Nietzsche says literally. Since it is very recurrent in Nietzsche's oeuvre that he treasures art⁶ (Cf. Deleuze, 1983, pp. 102f, Allison,

⁶ One of the most striking praise which Nietzsche gives to art is in the article "An Attempt at Self-Criticism," which Nietzsche wrote as a second preface after the publication of BT: "Behind such a way of thinking [Christian understanding that denies, condemns and passes sentence on art] and

2001, p. 75f.) the artistic will to power and creativity, and since he does not presuppose a sharp distinction between art and philosophy (and even science), one might notice an irony. This is to say that, in fact, what Nietzsche says about artists in *Genealogy* (i.e., that they can never stand alone) applies to philosophers and scientists, too—although he does not directly point on them—except for those who create values. In the perspectivism section, it is discussed that all philosophy and sciences (i.e., all the discursive) are based on a normative ground which is the perspective-setting force, and at the same time, a physiological symptom. Hence, it can be said that, with his *polemic* against the dominant normative ground of his time (i.e., the values of Platonic-Christian metaphysics and the heirs of these values, such as utilitarian and positivist world-views) Nietzsche *seems* to put scholars and philosophers to a higher status above artists by attributing to them the ability to stand alone; however, this is an irony. The reason why this is an irony is that, according to the understanding which separates the philosopher and the artist based on their relation with reality and appearance (i.e., philosophers deal with reality while artists create appearances), philosophers are *supposed to be* standing alone against reality in order to find the truth in it, while artists create some lies as new appearances. However, this is not the case for Nietzsche. For him, there is no reality beyond appearances (TI, 6. Cf. TI, “How the True World Finally Became a Fable.”). He thinks that every meaningful thing in life is artistic. This is because everything is produced by creative forces; and in discursive and human-all-too-human realm, truth is one of the human artistic creations. It is created since it was

evaluating, which must be hostile to art, so long as it is in any way consistent, I always perceived also a hostility to life, the wrathful, vengeful aversion to life itself.” As a matter of fact, the whole BT can be considered as a praise for art. For direct quotations from Nietzsche on art, among many others, one might have a look at TI, 9 and 24; WP, 794-853 and GS, “Preface for the Second Edition,” 4. For secondary literature discussions about Nietzsche’s views on art, among many others, the reader might see Deleuze (p. 102f), Allison (p. 76); or books like Nehamas (1987), Came (ed.) (2014). On the other hand, the fact that Nietzsche treasures art does not mean that it treasures all kinds of arts. For him, decadance can leak into arts when the artist is an “artist of decadance” (CW, 4f).

needed for life: “[t]ruth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life [human beings] could not live (WP, 493). Nietzsche writes:

To divide the world into a 'true' half and an 'illusory' one, whether in the manner of Christianity or in the manner of Kant (an *underhanded* Christian, at the end of the day), is just a sign of decadence, - it is a symptom of life *in decline* . . . The fact that artists have valued appearance more highly than reality is not an objection to this proposition. Because 'appearance' here means reality *once again*, only selected, strengthened, corrected . . . (TI, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy,” 6).

Thus, it is seen that Nietzsche takes appearance as the ultimate level (in fact, the *only* level) of reality. Presenting a true world relying on philosophy or science is—just like art—the selection, strengthening and the correction of appearances on the guiding perspective of the truth-maker—who creates at best a useful lie for life after all. Hence, in technical terms, ἐπιστήμη [épistémè] is τέχνη [techne]. In this sense, scholars and philosophers, since they produce creative but sometimes useful lies, belong to the same level of reality: the level of artists (or alternatively, the level of appearance). In a parallel fashion, by interpreting Nietzsche’s views, philosophy and science can be described as discursive arts, since philosophy and science basically involves in creating ideas by interpreting one’s context by using available concepts, or creating new concepts out of the existing ones. However, while some scholars and philosophers have universal truth claims, artists are sincerer to their lies (i.e., they know that what they create is not an ultimate and unchanging truth but appearances). Hence, they can be considered as truer to Nietzsche’s understanding of life, which is based on constant change of appearances (i.e., an eternal becoming).

Throughout his inquiry on what ascetic ideals mean for scholars and philosophers, Nietzsche directs his arrows to the victorious ones (like Socrates, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer, etc.) who can also be counted as the strongest representatives of the life-denying Platonic-Christian type of valuation. Hence, it can be said that the symptomatology Nietzsche performs in examining the meaning of ascetic ideals for scholars and philosophers, who are

mostly supposed to be disinterested knowing subjects, is the most central one in the third essay in his polemic with the existing values.

Then, what do ascetic ideals mean, in Nietzsche's understanding, for scholars and philosophers? Nietzsche's answer to this question shows his idea of the *interested* nature of scholarship and philosophy, as an objection to the idea that scholars and philosophers are autonomous disinterested knowing subjects. In other words, scholarship and philosophy are discursive manifestations of the will to power. They are discursive arts which are grounded on the guiding perspectives of their artists. As discursive artists, who produce world-pictures in accordance with their interest (including their productivity), the victorious scholars and philosophers interpreted the ascetic ideals according to their interests, too, and they created knowledges accordingly. Nietzsche writes

As you see, they are hardly unbribed witnesses and judges of the *value* of ascetic ideals, these philosophers! They are thinking of *themselves*, - they don't care about 'the saint'! At the same time, they are thinking of what, *to them*, is absolutely indispensable [...]. [T]hey think of the ascetic ideal as the serene ascetism of a deified creature that has flown the nest and is more liable to roam above life than rest. We know what three great catchwords of the ascetic ideal are: poverty, humility, chastity: let us now look at the life of all great, productive, inventive spirits close up, for once, - all three will be found in them, to a certain degree, every time. Of course, it goes without saying that they will definitely *not* be 'virtues' - this type of person cannot be bothered with virtues! - but as the most proper and natural perquisites for their *best* existence and *finest* productivity (GM, III, 8).

Hence, we see that, in Nietzsche's view, the philosophers of the ascetic ideal, having the slogan of "poverty, humility, chastity," in fact, looked for their own condition of the possibility of existence and their best conditions for productivity. What they called virtues with reference to the ascetic ideal were in fact pseudo-virtues artistically created in order to support their interests. Just as artists, women, the physiological casualties and the disgruntled, priests and the saints, the scholars and the philosophers, too, interpreted ascetic ideals (which were both the only available ideals and the most appropriate ones for them) and with this interpretation, they calculated the variations of power and the conditions of their best existence, rather than having (or, even trying to have) some disinterested

aims such as “virtue in itself,” “knowledge in itself,” and the like. They invented the eternal truth in one way or another by selecting, strengthening and correcting appearances for their own growth of power. In the opening section of the “Third Essay,” Nietzsche gives his preliminary account of the meaning of ascetic ideals for the above mentioned types of subjectivities as follows:

With artists, nothing, or too many different things; with philosophers and scholars, something like a nose and sense for the most favourable conditions of higher intellectuality [*Geistigkeit*]; with women, at most, one more seductive charm, a little *morbidezza* [delicacy, softness] on fair flesh, the angelic expression on a pretty, fat animal; with physiological causalities and the disgruntled (with the *majority* of mortals), an attempt to see themselves as 'too good' for this world, a saintly form of debauchery, their chief weapon in the battle against long-drawn-out pain and boredom; with priests, the actual priestly faith, their best instrument of power and also the 'ultimate' sanction of their power; with saints, an excuse to hibernate at last, their *novissima gloria cupido* [newest desire for glory], their rest in nothingness ('God'), their form of madness (GM, II, 1).

Thus is seen that, in Nietzsche's view, for all types of subjectivities, the activity of the interpretation of ascetic ideals is based on their specific deployment of will to power. Their interpretative artistry, according to their guiding perspectives, opts for some appearance instead of some other and creates a world-picture. Accordingly, this artistry subjugates other world-pictures in a strategic manner which supports conflicting interest.

When it comes to the third aspect of Nietzsche's discussion on the ascetic ideals (i.e., the danger of nihilism), we see his offering of a revaluation of all values. The direct consequence of the death of God (or, the collapse of the Platonic-Christian values) is the coming true of the worst fear of humanity: living in meaninglessness. Ascetic ideals were life-denying, since they were against the basic premises of a joyful life and they spoiled many things such as health and taste among others (GM, III, 23). On the other hand, they were the only things that made life meaningful. In this context, when Nietzsche's guiding perspective is considered, the direct path to a new aim is clear: creating new and life-affirming values. As Nietzsche describes, after the collapse of the Platonic-Christian system in the hearts of the people (i.e., the death of God), the scientific (usually in a

positivistic manner) value system in Nietzsche's day seemed to replace it.

However, this value system is still life-denying. This is because it is an atheistic continuation of the Christian morality, where only the belief in truth replaces the belief in God. However, since God is dead, for Nietzsche, truth is dead as well.

Nietzsche writes

No! Do not come to me with science when I am looking for the natural antagonist to the ascetic ideal, when I ask: 'Where is the opposing will in which its *opposing ideal* expresses itself?' Science is not nearly independent enough for that, in every respect it first needs a value-ideal, a value creating power, in whose *service* it *can believe* in itself, - science itself never creates values. Its relationship to the ascetic ideal is certainly not yet inherently antagonistic; indeed, it is much more the case, in general, that it still represents the driving force in the inner evolution of that ideal. [...] Both of them, science and the ascetic ideal, are still on the same foundation [...]; that is to say, [they] both overestimate truth (more correctly: they share the same faith that truth *cannot* be assessed or criticized), and this makes them both *necessarily* allies [...] (GM, II, 25).

Hence, for Nietzsche, with the collapse of the only value system which gave meaning to life, there emerges a need for the revaluation of all values and creating new values. The death of God and the appearance of science oriented valuation do not solve the problem of life-denying ascetic ideals. Nietzsche thinks in this way because the scientific world-view of his time was as ascetic and life denying as Christianity, insofar as they were on the same foundation of overestimating truth—an overestimation which values truth even more than life. A counter-ideal to the ascetic ideal was the work of art a philosopher like Nietzsche would need to create in order to subjugate ascetic ideals and to transvalue their values. Here comes the importance of the thought of eternal recurrence.

2.3. The Thought of Eternal Recurrence and Its Political Consequences

As cited, Nietzsche warned his fellow philosophers to guard against the notion of “pure, will-less subject,” since, epistemologically, a “disinterested knowing subject” as the will-less pure subject meant rejecting the fundamental condition of all life; namely perspectivism. In Nietzsche's thought, as discussed, the knowing subject interprets the world out of its will to power. However, as a

plurality of drives and affects, it is the drives of the knowing subject that interpret the world. The interpretation of any power-center is perspectival: each center of force which wants to grow interprets its relational context in which it feels and measures the variations of power. In other words, each center of force, including the human knowing-subject, observing the growing chances in the variety of modes of power around itself, strategically positions its will to power and creates values accordingly. In the same fashion, moral values are inventions which are created strategically in order to grow in the relational context where the value-creating center of force is situated. Since the moral values are created strategically out of the basic instinct for growth, they do not have any universal moral value: each value is homogenous in moral terms. They are equally moral (or immoral). The relation between knowledge and morality, in the thought of Nietzsche, can be briefly expressed with the following: Knowledge is based on the values that the perspective-setting force (i.e., the subject) created in the human subject as a synthetic will in the course of its life and in the context it lives. Thus, the condition of the possibility of knowledge is life, as the continuous perspectival interpretation for growth.

With the genealogical knowledges Nietzsche had put forward, this picture gets its historical basis. Firstly, elaborating on the value reversal of the knightly aristocrats by the “slave revolt” based on *ressentiment*, Nietzsche showed how a certain change in the manner of living changes values. Since knightly aristocrats were able to fight, they did not need their enemies to be condemned in order to discharge their strength, or in order to grow. However, when the priestly caste which is unable to fight has emerged and they still wanted to discharge their strength in their society with other means, they needed to create values that eternally condemn their enemies which can fight back physically. Thus the priests condemned their enemies as “evil,” with an eternal wrath. From their power perspective, they needed to create a metaphysics of truth which served to deceive both themselves and their enemies. This metaphysics presented their incapability

to fight as their goodness of the soul. For this, they invented the “eternal soul” as an addition of fixed doer to the deed.

Secondly, with the legalization of creditor-debtor relation, and the transference of the creditor-debtor relation to a contract between the individual and the state, Nietzsche claimed that the animal human beings devised “bad conscience” in order for positioning themselves in the society with the interpretation of the variations of power in that mode of political power. They tamed themselves and created the “sovereign individual,” not because their eternal nature was based on “reason,” but out of their will to discharge their strength both in their society and within themselves, since they had to internalize their ancestral tendency to violence. For being able to discharge their strength, their power-perspective created spiritual values and these values created a context in which the subjects had to interpret them in order to discharge their strengths. In other words, the will to power of the subjects created a web of norms in the society where the subjects have been subjected to. As a result, they had become deeply spiritualized and interpreted the world with their new values, and constantly went on interpreting it.

Thirdly, by declaring “the death of God” (i.e., the collapse of the Platonic-Christian value system) which meant that the only thing that gave meaning to life had been gone away, Nietzsche points that there arises a need for meaning creation in order to escape from the complete meaninglessness of life, namely suicidal nihilism. Before the death of God (which also meant the death of the truth, since God was *the* truth), all kinds of subjects interpreted the world according to the ascetic ideas for their interests. They created knowledges which are interested, even though it had the name of science. The scientific values in Nietzsche’s time were, for him, a specimen of a new kind of ascetic ideals. This is because these values do not get rid of the basic life-denying character of Christianity—valuing truth more than life. Science was the “natural ally” of

ascetic ideals, having the guiding perspective of the holy truth (Cf. GM, II, 25). The scientific type of interpretation after the death of God had become the perspective of “disinterested truth.” However, for Nietzsche, aiming at disinterested truth is an impossibility, a false idol, and a continuation of the Christian ascetic ideals.

As an alternative to ascetic ideals and scientific value ground that emphasizes disinterested truth, genealogical knowledges show the perspectival character of value-creating and interpreting. In Nietzsche’s perspectivist world view that accompanies his genealogical method, values are created by power centers from a point of view. All power-quantas are situated, and perspectival. Thus, genealogical knowledges serve as a negation of the understanding of a fixed human nature and disinterested knowing subject. Instead, they offer the constant becoming and perspectivism as the conditions of life and all the things created, including knowledge.

What is the political aspect of Nietzsche’s critical philosophy, which has a perspectivist episteme-ontology of life as the basis and the critical hammer of the genealogical method? This question is crucial, since an inquiry into it will reveal an important connection between Nietzsche’s critical philosophy and that of Foucault, a common basis on which the two thinkers in question can be compared and contrasted. Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal recurrence,” at this point, is apt for revealing the Nietzschean understanding of the affirmation of the constant force relations as productive of all things for all eternity. Moreover, the explanation of the will to power with regards to the concept of eternal recurrence will give us the clues about the rise of the modern political subject that Foucault found in Nietzsche’s work.

2.3.1. Eternal Recurrence: An Exposition of the Concept and Its Role in the Thought of Nietzsche

Before introducing Nietzsche's conception of the eternal recurrence of the same (or alternatively, the eternal return), I think that it is vitally important to bear in mind the reasons behind and the consequences of Nietzsche's aphoristic style. As discussed, in Nietzsche's view, all knowledge is interpretation based on the will to power. However, the vast majority of philosophers expressed their ideas in a direct propositional way, in order to discover eternal truths. Nietzsche, on the other hand, with his aphorisms and parable-like writings (like those of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*) which required constant interpretation, positions his style in accordance with his view that all knowledge is interpretation. Nietzsche writes

An aphorism, properly stamped and moulded, has not been 'deciphered' just because it has been read out; on the contrary, this is just the beginning of its proper *interpretation*, and for this, an art of interpretation is needed. [...] I admit that you need one thing above all in order to practice the requisite *art* of reading, a thing which today people have been so good at forgetting - and so it will be some time before my writings are 'readable' -, you almost need to be a cow for this one thing and certainly not a 'modern man': it is *rumination* . . . (GM, Preface).

As Nietzsche states, one needs to interpret and re-interpret constantly, not only what one lives, but also the texts s/he reads—including the texts of Nietzsche. When it comes to interpreting extremely difficult concepts like the eternal return,⁷ the art of exegesis reveals its importance and makes the reader consider the whole oeuvre of the thinker in order to make sense of the specific subtleties included in it. In this case, I offer to bear in mind what had been said above in this chapter before performing an interpretation of the concept of eternal return.

⁷ It is an extremely difficult concept mainly because of two reasons: 1) Nietzsche calls it his "most important thought," and 2) There are not many relatively direct explanations of it in his text, especially in the published ones. This causes a lack of direct textual evidence for linking his idea of eternal recurrence to his other thoughts like "*Übermensch*," "the will to power," "perspectivism," etc. The lack of textual evidence, however, can be overcome by interpreting Nietzsche's oeuvre; and then, by drawing upon other scholars' interpretations.

Nietzsche thinks that “the highest possible formula of affirmation” is the thought of eternal recurrence, and this thought is the basic idea of *Zarathustra* (EH, III [*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*], 1). When it is considered that Nietzsche’s guiding perspective is the affirmation of life, with a short reasoning, it can be said that the thought of eternal return is central to Nietzsche’s philosophy. However, there is a variety of (sometimes contradictory) interpretations on the thought of eternal recurrence among scholars in the literature (Anderson, 2017, Sec. 6.3). Hence, along with bearing in mind the idea presented in the above paragraph, it would be a good strategy to start with Nietzsche’s own exposition of the term, and consider his stylistic variations and the place of the term in his overall thought. Moreover, significant differences in kind can be found between what Nietzsche says in his published works and what he does in his notebooks. This gives the reader a new room of interpretation in the way that one can interpret the tension between what Nietzsche had in mind and how he introduced this thought to his readers.

The first published aphorisms considering the thought of eternal recurrence appear in *The Gay Science* (Especially GS 285 and 341). In section 341 of *The Gay Science*, which is the most widely referred aphorism on the issue, Nietzsche tells the reader the following:

The greatest weight.—What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, an in the same succession and sequence [...]. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!”

[...] If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, “Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?” would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to crave nothing more fervently* than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? (GS, 341).

When we remember that the thought of eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's "highest possible formula of affirmation," as well as the hypothetical character of the aphorism that is expressed in the "what if" type of question are taken into consideration, it can be conceded that what Nietzsche offers in the passage cited above is a thought experiment which tests the strength of the will of the one who receives the question of the experiment (Ridley, p. 102f). If one is more than ready to accept to live h/er life again and again eternally in each and every detail; then, s/he affirms h/er life for all eternity, and this shows h/er strength of will, h/er tragic character which affirms even the pains and sufferings of life *ad infinitum*.⁸ This is the test with "the greatest weight," and shows one's strength of will since each and every room for an escape from one's fate is closed for all eternity if one accepts this thought. In a parallel fashion, Nietzsche declares that his "formula for human greatness is *amor fati*: that you do not want anything to be different-not forward, not backward, not in all eternity" (EH, II, 10). Since life is will to power, affirmation of life means the affirmation of the will to power: In the micro level, affirmation of one's own personal history of all joys and distresses as a product of h/er will to power, drives, and affects (GS, 341); and in the macro level, the affirmation of eternal war and peace (GS, 285). According to this thought, there is no ideal state of affairs to be attained and there is no fixed comfort since life is the incessant clashes of will to power and nothing else, like eternal ideals, unchanging truth and complete knowledge. In this sense, the thought of eternal recurrence is a continuation of Nietzsche's perspectivist episteme-ontology of life, and a link of it to his political thought. What recurs eternally in the macro-level (or alternatively, cosmological level) is constant force relations, joys and distresses, wars and peace

⁸ In GS 285, Nietzsche introduces the term eternal recurrence for the "the man [sic] of renunciation," the phrase Nietzsche uses for those who strive for a higher life, and renounce from the things which "would encumber [their] flight" (GS, 27). In their renunciation, however, they are affirmers of life, since they *will* the "eternal recurrence of war and peace" (GS, 285). For Nietzsche, the strength to will the "eternal recurrence of war and peace," however, is not yet achieved by anyone (ibid.). Therefore, a connection between the concept of *Übermensch* [Overman] and the thought of eternal recurrence shows itself. This connection will be discussed in the following chapter briefly.

that are independent of morality and that are based on the will to power. Thus, Heidegger (1961) rightfully writes that “[t]he will to power is, in its essence and according to its internal possibility, the eternal return of the same” (p. 467. As qtd in Birault, 1985, p. 220).

In addition to giving an idea about what exactly returns eternally, the above picture shows that, in the micro-level (i.e., the level of the individual), Nietzsche presents the concept of eternal return as a thought experiment in order to test to what extent one affirms h/er life. Let us call this interpretation “thought experiment hypothesis.” However, some scholars think that Nietzsche actually believes in a cosmological theory of eternal recurrence: “the idea that all events in the world repeat themselves in the same sequence through an eternal series of cycles” (Anderson, Sec. 6.3). Let this be called “cosmological doctrine hypothesis.” There is a good deal of support for this interpretation. However, they are all in Nietzsche’s *Nachlass*, his posthumously published notebooks. For instance, Nietzsche writes

The eternal recurrence. A prophecy.

1. Presentation of the doctrine and its *theoretical* presuppositions and consequences.
2. Proof of the doctrine.
3. Probable consequences of its being *believed* (it makes everything *break open*).
 - a) Means of enduring it;
 - b) Means of disposing of it.
4. Its place in history as a *mid-point*.
Period of greatest danger.
Foundation of an oligarchy *above* peoples and their interests:
education to a universally human politics.
Counterpart of Jesuitism (WP, 1057).

Let us think this thought [the thought that everything is in vain] in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: “*the eternal recurrence* [...] It is the most *scientific* of all possible hypotheses. We deny end goals: if existence had one if it would have to have been reached (WP, 55).

The law of the conservation of energy demands *eternal recurrence* (WP, 1063).

In the first quotation above (i.e., WP 1057), which is very obscure and has a character of a quickly taken note of a greater plan, the thought of eternal recurrence is presented as a prophecy. Hence, although it is mentioned as a *doctrine* in the later part of the quotation, and although Nietzsche talks about its *proof*, the title of the note shows the thought's instrumental character; a character of a prophecy, rather than a scientific theory. Moreover, it would be helpful to bear in mind that Nietzsche never tried to provide a proof for eternal return in his oeuvre (Cf. Kaufmann, 1974, p. 327). In the following of the passage, Nietzsche seems to plan to write the means both to endure and to dispose of the *theoretical* presentation of the thought. It is also helpful to remember that, in Nietzsche's philosophy, theories (as well as prophecies) are in the level of arts; they select certain appearances and hide some others. They are means of interpretation (and hence, serve as instruments, as means to some end), and all instruments get their meaning in their relevant context. In the first quotation, then, what Nietzsche tries to convey us can be interpreted as follows: Nietzsche offers that the *doctrine* of eternal recurrence is *theoretically* meaningful in a historical "mid-point" between the religious and secular Jesuitisms as the period of greatest danger—of nihilism; but after the theory completes its function, for him, it is to be disposed—for all theories are to be used and disposed in relevant contexts.⁹

When we look at the second quotation, we see that Nietzsche offers the *hypothesis* of eternal recurrence as *the most scientific of all hypotheses*. In the light of the earlier discussion on perspectivism and genealogy, it follows that Nietzsche understands the term "scientific" different from how the term is

⁹ In order to have an idea of what Nietzsche thinks about Jesuitism, I think that the following passage would be helpful: "Modern socialism wants to create the secular counterpart to Jesuitism: *everyone* a perfect instrument. But the purpose, the wherefore? has not yet been ascertained" (WP, 757). Here, Nietzsche seems to support the oligarchic organization of the Jesuits, however, does not like it since it is a form of life-denying religion of Christianity with its egalitarian motives. At this point, an interpretation like the following is possible: Nietzsche would like to contribute a secular form of Jesuitism for higher ends (than Christianity, morality, etc.) that affirm life.

understood in the paradigm of modern science. Science, for Nietzsche, as all other interpretations, is not the path to absolute and unchanging truth. Instead, it is the discursive manifestation of human will to power—a discursive art—which has a potential value for life. Moreover, for him, as quoted, “[t]ruth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive” (WP, 493). Hence, truth and science (when taken into consideration as a path to truth) have instrumental values for life. Like philosophy, literature, religion, and all the discursive, science is a strategic weapon of humanity in order for itself to grow and preserve the species. Therefore, by denying “end goals” which are contrary to life’s continuously changing nature, Nietzsche offers another truth (which is also to be disposed in the future when it is not needed anymore) in order to affirm life as his strategic weapon. Moreover, the hypothesis of eternal recurrence, for Nietzsche, is the most scientific of all hypotheses because it denies any end goals. This is because starting a scientific inquiry by accepting end goals at the outset is unscientific in even the daily sense of the term “science.” Here, Nietzsche seems to communicate the dogmatic character of a kind of conducting science with having end goals (such as trying to find the eternal, unchanging truth fixed for all eternity, since a pursuit for finding the eternal truth presupposes that there *exists* one) beforehand; and thus contradicting its own principle of searching truth without any biases. Moreover, with the second quotation above (i.e., WP, 55), we see that Nietzsche 1) accepts the complete meaninglessness of existence—and accepts it in its most terrible form, that is, existence recurs eternally without any finale or aim, 2) believes that human beings need values and meanings in order to survive—considering the quotation in question together with the just mentioned phrase in WP 493, with his dictation of a truth (as an error) in order to live meaningfully in a world he believes to be intrinsically meaningless, and 3) declares his own meaning (his own instrumental and strategic truth) which he imposes on life (i.e., affirming life as the eternal return of all the force relations and ceaseless struggles

of the will to power), and which he believes to be helpful for the affirmation of life. Furthermore, by saying that “if existence had [an end goal] if it would have to have been reached,” Nietzsche rejects a terminal state of affairs—both in the past and future. Deleuze (1983) describes this thought as the first aspect of the eternal return (as a cosmological and physical doctrine), and describes Nietzsche’s line of thought as follows:

Nietzsche’s account of the eternal return presupposes a critique of the terminal or equilibrium state. Nietzsche says that if the universe had an equilibrium position, if becoming had an end or final state, it would already have been attained. [...] The infinity of past time means that becoming cannot have started to become [...]. [P]ast time being infinite, becoming would have attained its final state if it had one (p. 47).

The third quotation from WP above (i.e., WP, 1063), which is the most difficult one to interpret because of the fact that it shows the character of a support of a scientific doctrine, thus can be laid out by dint of the discussion in the previous paragraph. In WP 1063, Nietzsche tried to set eternal recurrence as a provisional scientific hypothesis and tries to provide evidence that corroborates it. When we know that the law of the conservation of energy is not the unchanging truth independent of any perspectives, what Nietzsche tries to do with this quotation gets clearer. When we look at WP 636 which was partly quoted in the course of discussion on perspectivism, we see Nietzsche writing the following:

Physicists believe in a "true world" in their own fashion: a firm systematization of atoms in necessary motion, the same for all beings-so for them the "apparent world" is reduced to the side of universal and universally necessary being which is accessible to every being in its own way (accessible and also already adapted made "subjective"). But they are in error. The atom they posit is inferred according to the logic of the perspectivism of consciousness-and is therefore itself a subjective fiction. This world picture that they sketch differs in no essential way from the subjective world picture: it is only construed with more extended senses, but with *our* senses nonetheless-.

Hence, although it is a good path to the interpretation of the world, and although it bears a good deal of instrumental value (i.e., to preserve the species, etc.), physics is not the path to the true world in the thought of Nietzsche. Just as all beliefs, all scientific theories and all philosophies (i.e., all *the discursive* in general) are based on useful errors (we can even say that, for Nietzsche, they all depend on a specific

mythology), Nietzsche seems not to think that eternal recurrence is the ultimate truth. Therefore, despite the image that Nietzsche once tries to prove the thought of eternal recurrence in one of his notes, this is not to mean that the eternal recurrence is a scientific cosmological doctrine in the way we understand the terms “science” and “doctrine” today. Consequently, it is not appropriate to treat the thought of eternal recurrence in the way cosmological hypothesis hypothesize, if it assumes terms like science, doctrine, etc. to have truth-claiming connotations independent of their practical value for life; and if it gives those terms a different and a higher rank *in kind* (as opposed to difference *in degree*) than those of literature, prophecy, etc. It would be an internal contradiction in Nietzsche’s philosophy if Nietzsche offered a scientific doctrine that claims the eternal truth. Rather, it must be the case that the thought of eternal recurrence is a good mythology for Nietzsche to rely on—in Deleuze’s (1983) words, a practical rule (p. 68)—when conducting life-affirming discursive activities—as it is the highest formula of affirmation. Maudemarie Clark (1990) describes the practical character of the thought of eternal return by stating that “[w]e do not [...] need cosmology to explain the justification Nietzsche offers for his practical doctrine of recurrence. Nietzsche’s basic argument for his ideal is that we need a counterideal to the ascetic ideal, and affirming eternal recurrence is the only candidate that fits the bill” (p. 253). Indeed, in the light of the above discussion, if one argues that Nietzsche has a different conception of the term science [*Wissenschaft*] and that Nietzsche meant that the thought of eternal recurrence is a scientific cosmological hypothesis (or, a cosmological doctrine) to be interpreted within his specific process episteme-ontology including his instrumental (or alternatively, strategic) use of the terms that belong to the discursive realm (i.e., science, doctrine, cosmology, etc.), then this interpretation would also be acceptable. After all, meaning is, for Nietzsche, relative in all cases. Moreover, “all meaning is will to power” (WP, 590). Accordingly, the meaning of eternal recurrence can be accepted as a scientific hypothesis (a cosmological one) in the mental and spiritual

world of *Herr Nietzsche*, based on his personal will to power. And this “scientific hypothesis” has a crucial importance: It is the counterideal of ascetic ideals which affirm life as it is and which can be used for a transvaluation of the life-denying values.

At this point, a question is needed to be answered regarding the consistency of the thought of Nietzsche. Is not the aim to give way to *Übermensch*¹⁰—[some of whose English translations are Superhuman, Superman, or Overman] which is a denial (of the modern human being)—contradictory with the concept of eternal recurrence which is a will to affirm all that is? In my opinion, the answer lies in a one-word concept: “breeding.” This is the reason behind the fact that many scholars treat Nietzsche’s thought of eternal return and

¹⁰ The concept of *Übermensch* is introduced in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and it is the main subject of the book. Zarathustra, the main character of the work whom Nietzsche uses like his messenger, says “I teach you the [Übermensch]. Man [sic] is something that should be overcome” (Z, “Prologue,” 3). Reading the same passage, we see Zarathustra saying that all creatures created something beyond themselves (ibid.). Thus, *Übermensch* must be some person or species which is something beyond human being. This means that, no present human being is an *Übermensch*, it must be an ideal rather than a concept to refer to existing individuals. Human being is, for Nietzsche’s messenger Zarathustra, “a rope, fastened between animal and [Übermensch]” (Z, “Prologue,” 4). “Moreover, Zarathustra says that “[Übermensch] is the meaning of the earth” (Z, “Prologue,” 3). When Nietzsche’s understanding of meaning attribution is considered, it can be said that it is a Nietzsche-given meaning to the earth, since the meanings are the products of the will to power; and they are created according to the guiding perspective of the meaning-creator. As discussed, *Herr Nietzsche*’s guiding perspective is life; he is a philosopher of future who tries to contribute to a life-affirming culture instead of the modern human being whom he finds life-denying. As his will to power produces this meaning, he talks to the reader which share same future goal: those who share the same form of will to power, those who seek a higher culture than that of the modern human being. Accordingly, Zarathustra says “Let your will say: The [Übermensch] shall be the meaning of earth!” and “I love him [sic] who works and invents that he may build a house for the [Übermensch] and prepare earth, animals and plants for him: for thus he wills his own downfall.” Here, we see that *Übermensch* is Nietzsche’s goal which is not yet attained. Löwith (1996) summarizes the connection between the thoughts of *Übermensch* and eternal recurrence as follows: “The teaching of the superman [Übermensch] is the precondition for the teaching of the eternal recurrence, because only the man [sic] who has overcome himself can also will the eternal recurrence of all that is [...]” (p.55. Cf. Birault, p. 220). In other words, Nietzsche’s philosophy which aims a life-affirmative culture seeks to breed *Übermensch* who wills eternal war and peace. The meaning of the earth after the death of God, for Nietzsche, is something beyond the modern human being who wills comfort since it is not strong enough to will the eternal war of the wills to power.

Übermensch as strongly interrelated to each other, rather than being contradictory (Cf. Kaufmann, 1974, p. 307). Nietzsche writes:

Fundamental innovations: In place of "moral values," purely naturalistic values. Naturalization of morality.

In place of "sociology," a theory of the forms of domination.

In place of "society," the culture complex, as my chief interest (as a whole or in its parts).

In place of "epistemology," a perspective theory of affects (to which belongs a hierarchy of the affects; the affects trans-figured; their superior order, their "spirituality").

In place of "metaphysics" and religion, the theory of eternal recurrence (this as a means of breeding and selection) (WP, 462).

It can be said that, by demonstrating the absolute moral homogeneity of all events, Nietzsche accomplished his first goal of the naturalization of morality. His genealogy of morality, as discussed, was based on the history of the forms of power, rather than on a moral or utilitarian ground. Thus, all values were naturalized, by providing them with their natural basis of the will to power. We see that he also accomplished his second goal with his genealogy, due to the same reason (i.e., with his genealogical method, he provided us with a theory of forms of domination). His new sociology had thus been a theory of will to power. His perspectivist episteme-ontology of life, as discussed in detail, was a perspectival theory of affects which served as Nietzsche's epistemology; and all those "innovations," including the innovation in epistemology were performed in accordance with Nietzsche's guiding perspective (i.e., affirming life). The last sentence of the above passage is no different than the others in that way. Nietzsche states that he offers the theory of eternal recurrence in place of metaphysics and religion in order to take a part in establishing a culture complex which is life-affirmative (as his chief interest): a counterideal to ascetic ideals. A test of the strength of will is of a great importance for breeding and selection for the individual of the future culture complex which Nietzsche desires to emerge in the future. Nietzsche, by identifying it with ascetic ideals, finds the current world

with its past life denying in the three axes discussed above,¹¹ and finds his counterideal in his thought of eternal return. Hence, all *the discursive* (including the thought of eternal return) has a non-discursive ideal: a culture complex which consists of, and breeds, higher types. Metaphysics and religion bred the modern human being; however, the modern human being must be surpassed. Instead, a life-affirming type must be created in such a culture complex. The thought of eternal recurrence is, therefore, a tool for surpassing the old humanity of the old world with a new ideal. His ideal is, as discussed, breeding a life-affirming type (i.e., *Übermensch*) who wills eternal war and peace and constant overcoming, instead of a constant comfort.

To summarize, there are three major hypotheses among Nietzsche scholars on the concept of eternal return, namely the “thought experiment hypothesis,” “cosmological doctrine hypothesis,” and the “existential significance of the thought” (or, its “mythical import”) (Cf. Anderson, 2017, Sec. 6.3). I have discussed the first two, which led my discussion to the third one: the thought of eternal recurrence has an existential significance, since affirming it means affirming one’s own worldly existence as well as affirming the worldly existence in general—life as eternal war and peace. Hence, in my interpretation, all the three hypotheses can be accepted, but with a sensitive care about the terms used and the functions of the hypotheses. The thought experiment hypothesis shows the way of articulation of the thought of eternal return, and it is valid since Nietzsche presents the thought of eternal return in a hypothetical way in his published works. The “cosmological hypothesis,” based on Nietzsche’s posthumously published

¹¹ The axes of which Nietzsche’s aim of life-affirming were discussed in Section 2.1.3. These were “1) against metaphysics, to affirm the organic roots as the senses and the feelings of the human being and their continuity with the intellect [...], 2) against the understanding of life of simply being alive biologically (i.e., only self-preservation), to affirm the will to power as the cardinal instinct in all living beings understood as a living being’s will to discharge its strength (i.e., its will to grow and expand), and 3) against nihilism, to affirm life as a ceaseless productive and creative struggle between centers of force—as “the eternal return.” Thus, it can be said that Nietzsche performs a denial of a denial (of the life-denying past), in order to put forward a future life-affirming project.

notebooks, which treats this thought as a scientific cosmological doctrine, is not acceptable if the terms science and cosmology refer to paths to eternal truths. However, this hypothesis is acceptable when one takes into consideration Nietzsche's instrumental use of the term science (as a discursive strategic weapon based on the will to power) in parallel with his perspectivist process episteme-ontology. The third hypothesis which shows the existential significance of the thought of eternal recurrence (i.e., accepting the thought in order to affirm the constant force relations, all the joys and distresses produced by this character of life which is based on the will to power as an affirmation of life) functions to show Nietzsche's aim to take part in establishing a cultural structure (his political interest) which lets the higher types emerge, and to empower the higher types or those who have the potential to create achievements, in their war of life.

Indeed, since Nietzsche believes in the importance of mythical and affirmative-functional beliefs in the life of a human being in order for h/er to retain h/er strength of will, and cares about producing aphorisms in order for his readers to help accept their life as it is (as will to power), he presents a variety of parable-like statements in his corpus. Especially *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is full of this kind of statements. However, I would like to give a very famous example of his aphorisms of this kind from *Twilight of Idols*. Nietzsche writes:

From life's school of war. – What doesn't kill me makes me stronger. (TI, "Arrows and Epigrams," 8).

In the above aphorism, in its face value, Nietzsche seems to claim that every event that does not kill him makes him stronger. Or alternatively, as a general statement, there seems a claim that the events that do not kill a human (or, living-) being make h/er stronger. However, when we consider the introductory remark with which Nietzsche indicates that he took the second statement from "the military school of life," the true status of the second statement reveals that it is a motto to survive in the war of life. In other words, if one *believes*, or *relies on*, the motto of "what doesn't kill me makes me stronger," then for Nietzsche, s/he positions h/erself with a good strategy to retain the strength of h/er will. Conscious or

unconscious commitment to this obviously errant proposition has an existential value in the service of one who commits h/erself to being an affirming warrior of life who can be stronger than those who do not have such a commitment. It is a motto for the tragic personality who accepts the endless war of the will to power; affirming not only joys, but also the wounds of the war of life—and even takes joy from the wounds. In the preface of the same work, he states that

[w]ar has always been the most sensible measure for spirits who become too inward-looking and profound, even the wounds have the power to heal. I have had a motto for a long time (and I won't gratify scholarly curiosity as to its source):

increscunt animi, virescit vulnere virtus [The spirit soars, valour thrives by wounding] (TI, "Preface").

The thought of eternal recurrence can, in the same way, be considered as a motto-like principle of a strong will whose wounds have the power to heal. Since for Nietzsche,

nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event—and in this single moment of affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed (WP, 1032).

Hence, the third hypothesis (i.e., the thought of eternal recurrence as having an existential significance and a mythological import) is also acceptable in the above sense. In other words, for the "highest possible formula of affirmation" is the thought of eternal return for Nietzsche, conceding this prophecy as the formula bringing forth the greatest weight for one has the existential significance for an affirmation like the self-affirming of the warlike knightly aristocrats: Affirming one's war of life with all its joys and pains.

2.3.2. Nietzsche and the Political

Formula for my happiness: a yes, a no, a straight line, a *goal*... (TI, "Arrows and Epigrams," 44).

Among scholars, there is a variety of differing interpretations concerning the reception of Nietzsche as a political thinker.¹² In this section, however, I do not plan to deal with the issue of "Nietzsche as a political thinker." As almost all human beings living in modern society, it is certain that Nietzsche had political views both in the categories of political philosophy and *realpolitik*. Yet, if we look at the issue in a perspectivist manner, we can say that those views (especially those belonging to the category of *realpolitik*) were based on the political context of his time. Moreover, it is known that Nietzsche did not provide us with a direct political theory. Hence, if one wants to read Nietzsche with political interests, it would be a good strategy to deal with the political consequences of his thought, rather than trying to form a political thinker out of Nietzsche's oeuvre.

Since in the thought of Nietzsche, life *as it is* is an eternal struggle of the will to power, the human existence itself—in its all aspects—is a deeply political matter. In the thought of Nietzsche, everything in life (including the societal matters, the *polis*, and the micro power relation between drives and affects within an individual) is produced out of force relations between power centers. At this point, some questions need to be taken into consideration. Recognizing that life has no intrinsic meaning at all, how could persons operate in political realm? If

¹² For example, Nussbaum (1997) thinks that Nietzsche has nothing to offer to political theory in terms of understanding material need; procedural justification; liberty and its worth; racial, ethnic and religious difference; gender and family; and justice between nations. For her, the only relevance of Nietzsche to political terms is the moral psychology he offers. While some readers find an aristocratic radicalism, or even a support to caste-based society in Nietzsche's thought (Leiter, 2015), some scholars including Thomas Brobjer (1998) think that one cannot find any political ideal in the thought of Nietzsche. Either accepting or rejecting that there are political ideals in Nietzsche's work, some scholars argue that Nietzsche has a great relevance to today's politics, even with ideas like radical liberalism (e.g., Walzer, 1990). Among many others, the reader might find several different perspectives on the issue in the edited book *An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker* (Ansell-Pearson (ed.), 1994), consisting of several articles from a number of scholars.

we accept that there is no extra-perspectival progress, no universal teleology which gives the political world a meaning, how can a political subject operate? Nietzsche's perspectivist process episteme-ontology of life along with his thought of eternal recurrence provide us with a political ontology—according to which there is no intrinsic meaning of anything, but only perspectival and transient progresses in the constant struggle of forces—which has many things to offer for those who would like to deal with those questions. Hence, Nietzsche's views on the relation between power and knowledge have profound political consequences.

One of the direct consequences of such a political ontology is that the will to power is productive—it is a positive phenomenon. As discussed, the will to power is the basis of everything (in the context of modern human being, the basis of both the discursive and the non-discursive) according to Nietzsche's perspectivist episteme-ontology of life. This basis is an organic basis, and life is the precondition of all that is. Willing power, willing more power is not something to be blamed. Instead, it is the creative force of life that makes life possible at all. Trying to escape the will to power is both an impossibility and a denial of life. The question is the *quality* of the will to power. Since Nietzsche's guiding perspective was the promotion of life and health, Nietzsche criticized the strength or weakness of the will to power of some power centers, but not willing power *per se*. According to Nietzsche, in the context of the discursive, knowledge is the product of the will to power, too. Knowledge is produced by embodied human beings as power quanta who interpret the phenomena, based on their primary moral intention (i.e., their guiding perspective) that occurs within their relation with the context. Thus, knowledge is a tool of power: it is willed and produced in order both to preserve and expand the power quanta, the body (either as a drive, a human being, or a specific society) that wills it. This means that the will to knowledge is political: knowledge is both shaped by and shapes force relations. It is a strategic weapon in order to gain and exercise power, rather than being performed by disinterested searchers of brute facts or an absolute truth.

Accordingly; science, discursive arts, morality, philosophy, and all the discursive—as well as the non-discursive, including the non-discursive arts—have a political character. Thus, an important lesson to be learned from Nietzsche's political ontology is that the discursive realm, which seems apolitical and disinterested, may be deeply political. Further to that, while what unites them (i.e., science, philosophy, and all the discursive) is their political character, there is no exact line of demarcation between them. This is because they all have the same basis—the will to power.

The inescapability of the will to power is also applicable to the political sphere of power (or alternatively, the forms of power which operate with their specific subjects and institutions) is not something to deny. Instead, if one has a problem with a form of power, what s/he can do is to create a counter-power to *that* form of power in line with h/er guiding perspective, rather than denying power itself altogether. Yet more, to deny and not to will power is an impossibility. It is a disguised—in Nietzsche's terminology, a slavish manifestation of—will to power. Each power quanta wants to be “the ultimate purpose of existence” and rightful master of all its alternatives. Life is the creation of the clash of power quanta. The formation of power starts from the lowest level; the drives crave for mastery and their synthesis constitutes the human subject. In the same fashion, the human wills are synthesized in societies and this synthesis creates a higher form of power. Hence, there arises two things to take into consideration for those who read Nietzsche with political interest: According to Nietzsche's political ontology, power 1) comes from the lowest level (i.e., drives), and 2) is inescapable, because it is everywhere.

When we look at Nietzsche's genealogy; we see supportive material to the consequences discussed above, and even more. Nietzsche holds that moral, theoretical and political truths—as strategic weapons—are artistically created by interested perspective-setting forces—there is no disinterested, extra-perspectival knowledge—whose concepts are subject to change of meaning when conditions

change. These strategic weapons serve as the creators of various forms of power. For example, the metaphysics of the priests created norms that govern the behavior and self-understanding of huge masses by changing the meaning of some concepts. The form of power Nietzsche mostly dealt with was the power created by the truth of Western philosophy, and he observed that it served to the victory of the modern human subject which is docile and selfless. In Nietzsche's terminology, the success of the slave revolt in morality (which means the domination of the slavish type over the others) owes much to the knowledges created by the slavish type. However, from Nietzsche's genealogical practice, we also understand that the overcoming of this domination must be also supported with knowledge—genealogical knowledges which resist the crystallization of the form of power that operates with the accompaniment of modern metaphysical and scientific discourse. In Nietzsche's practice, the means of creating a counter-power for this discursive domination was a transvaluation of values with genealogical knowledges that can be characterized by “philosophizing with a hammer.” Checking whether those values are strong by hitting them with a discursive hammer; and after they all break into pieces, creating new values instead of them. Nietzsche created the counterideal of the eternal return (or, the counterideal of *Übermensch* who affirms the eternal return) to the ascetic ideals which propagate poverty, humility and chastity in order for a future salvation. Thus, Nietzsche's political ontology and his practice show us the political character of the seemingly apolitical things such as knowledge and morality. As discussed, Nietzsche produced his genealogical knowledges for supporting his guiding perspective of the affirmation of life. His guiding perspective was his resistance to the dominant context of his time which he found life-denying. As a consequence, he tried to contribute to the emergence of a new type which is life-affirming (i.e., *Übermensch*). Nietzsche's practice is a consequence of another aspect of his political ontology. According to Nietzsche's political ontology, one becomes who s/he is within the context of force relations of which s/he constitutes

a part. In other words, one can be a subject only in a context of force relations where s/he is subjectivated, since one can have interests only in relation to a certain context. This is because a body cannot have interpretations without affects which are produced in relation to a specific context. Interpretation (including self-interpretation) cannot come from nowhere; it needs the material to interpret. This material is the forms of power which constitute the context (e.g., sexual, juridical, medical discourses). All ideologies and political theories are perspectival and strategic interpretations (sometimes, interpretations as resistance) of certain forms of power—they are artistic and strategic works in support of some cause. Relations (specifically, force relations) constitute the ground which subjects and objects get their meaning. In a nutshell, according to Nietzsche's political ontology, the condition of the possibility of a political subject is the force relations that make the political subject *a subject*. In Nietzsche's physiological thinking, this also means that the condition of the possibility of the political subject is life; since life, according to him, is tantamount to the multiplicity of ongoing force relations. Hence, Nietzsche reminds the political reader not to forget the organic basis of war and prevents h/er from sticking with naïve moralities which do not take into consideration the importance of force relations.

Moreover, with the thought of eternal recurrence, Nietzsche's political ontology blocks any escape from the will to power and any Platonic consolations (like any "ideal state of affairs"). Accordingly, the thought of eternal recurrence requires a thinker, an activist, or a politician to be ready to be active—like a warrior—throughout h/er life, knowing that h/er ideals will never be fixed to an ideal state of affairs. The activist, if s/he accepts the thought of eternal recurrence, knowing that only force relations are eternal, is in the wake of the futility of searching for any emancipatory theory which is in the search for an unchanging system of government to save h/erself or the society. With the death of God, in the thought of Nietzsche, Truth is also dead—including the political truth. The prophecy of the eternal recurrence is, then, the new metaphysics (or alternatively,

the new mythology) of the Nietzschean political intellectual who is inspired by the idea that we are all products of certain manifestations of an eternal system based on force relations. This thought is antithetical to the strict ideological stance that searches for an extra-perspectival, unchanging, eternal ethico-political truth or subjectivity as the savior to all the problems. Grand narratives are discursive inventions, which might serve as a guideline to walk; however, they present utopias. Hence, the task of the political subject who accepts the political ontology derived by the eternal return of the productivity of force relations is to perform genealogy in order to resist the form of power that s/he considers to be the enemy, in order to show that what presents itself as power-independent, and, thus, disguises and multiplies its power, is in fact a center of force, a power-perspective that can be resisted. New intellectualism—after Nietzsche—is not the one that urges one to put forward political ideals as grand narratives which are based on some allegedly moral and universal truths. Instead, it is the one that requires the political subject to perform genealogy as resistance—a genealogy which interprets under what conditions the opposing form of power emerges and operates, shows that things could be otherwise (i.e., shows the contingency of what is taken for granted by virtue of the form of power in question) and tries to find how a counter-power can be possible. Moreover, since the establishments and the re-establishments of force are eternal, the political task never finishes—political realm is a realm of constant overcoming. There is no political Garden of Eden on earth and never will be. There is an organic root behind all the political, and this root is at the same time the root that produces life itself. Since non-discursive life is not designed according to moral principles, moral principles can only serve as invented guiding perspectives for a power formation or a resistance. The thought of eternal recurrence, hence, calls for an eternal genealogy for resistance and overcoming; and this genealogy requires the genealogist to be in the wake of the political nature of the seemingly apolitical discourses such as science, philosophy and morality, and any type of normativity. What is taken for granted, what is

taken as necessary or natural can have forgotten origins that reveal their contingency and their production based on force relations. The relation between knowledge and power is eternal, and thus, knowledge is eternally a political matter.

Moreover, although Nietzsche is widely and at times rightly associated with aristocratically oriented thoughts,¹³ Nietzsche's political ontology shaped by the thought of eternal recurrence of force relations and perspectives is even relevant for the purposes of democratic openness and pluralism. With his genealogical knowledges, Nietzsche showed us that each form of power bears the danger of crystallization. This is because we can infer from Nietzsche's perspectivism that each power center craves for mastery, and want their perspectives to be accepted as the ultimate truth—the rightful master of all. In the societal level, some form of power might reach the strength to naturalize and render unquestionable its perspectives to its subjects; and thus, might establish its perspectives as the universal truth. By naturalizing its perspectives, the form of power in question might tend to subjugate opposing perspectives. Hence, in the discursive level, some knowledges might be subjugated as a result of a specific crystallization of power. A reading of the success of what Nietzsche calls “the slave revolt in morality” can be that the forms of power (or alternatively, normativities) which were grounded upon the western metaphysics and its morality was crystallized until the emergence of the first great threat to it; namely, “the death of God.” With its crystallization, it subjugated some knowledges while propagating some others, or making them almost impossible to be questioned. As

¹³ Some examples among many others might include Conway (1996, pp. 36f, p. 41) who attributes to Nietzsche an aristocratic thought directly; Owen (2002, pp. 121-5) who argues that Nietzsche's old aristocratic views in BGE changed when he was writing GM and became compatible with perfectionist democracy; and Ansell-Pearson (1994, pp. 50f; and p. 95f) who holds that Nietzsche's middle-period aristocraticism was as a means to a higher culture rather than being an end in itself, and his final position on aristocracy was overly culturalist and aestheticist—a position from which we cannot infer that democratic politics necessarily denies life.

discussed, an appropriate way to resist to such possible crystallizations is conducting genealogical research.

With genealogy, Nietzsche shows that there were subjugated perspectives and subjugated knowledges thereof in the making of the crystallization of the forms of power created by western morality. For those who read Nietzsche with political interests, this is also important in terms of the thought of eternal recurrence. This is because if one accepts that there will always be a war and peace of forces, one must also concede that there will always be differing perspectives. One might have the guiding perspective of “being a good citizen,” while the other might have a specific perspective on “what it means to be a woman,” or another would think that a certain form communism is the best solution to today’s problems. Hence, although a number of scholars—at times, legitimately—read Nietzsche in the confines of aristocratic politics, the perspectivist pluralism can be a Nietzschean alternative for the basis of the contemporary democratic/pluralistic discussions. For example, a pluralist who is inspired by Nietzsche’s political ontology of eternal recurrence of the clash of power-perspectives might argue that each political perspective should eternally be in dialogue with each other; and while they try to force other perspectives to come in terms with themselves, each perspective has the potential to be shaped and reformed by the other. By this argument, s/he might conclude that this makes each perspective transform within the communicative context which it shares with others. Or alternatively, the same pluralist theorist might warn h/er fellow intellectuals for the danger that one of the available perspectives might dominate the others and might have a crystallized power which subjugates all the others and gives no chance for others to resist. Thus, s/he encourages others to come up with social policies and institutions that would prevent social dialogue from being abolished.

Up to now, I think that some important reasons to study Nietzsche with political interests and the relevance of Nietzsche's thought to today's political discussions are revealed. Moreover, a common basis under which one can compare and contrast Nietzschean and Foucauldian is established in many respects which will be revealed in the next chapter in which the thought of Foucault will be examined. Before moving ahead to study the thought of Foucault, in my view, it would be helpful to expose some aspects of Nietzschean thoughts on the relation between knowledge and power that have the potential to be interpreted to be deficient—not necessarily because of Nietzsche's own fault. In my view, these aspects are at the same time cogent reasons for the need to study Foucault together with Nietzsche. For example, although Nietzsche gives us the background idea that each form of power has the potential to crystallize, he never provided us with a detailed analysis of modern forms of power that might also be regarded as some continuations of Platonic-Christian metaphysics. One might say that since Nietzsche treated the normativity of Platonic-Christian valuation and that of scientific-utilitarian worldview as unitary forms of power in the sense that he did not deal with the specific variations of them, he also did not provide us with an analysis of how one modern form of power differs from the other, as well as an analysis of how each form requires a different strategy to be resisted and prevented from crystallization. As a result—although this can be interpreted as a consequence of his chronological position—we cannot find the contemporary context in which the discursive resistance can be performed in Nietzsche's oeuvre. Moreover, Nietzsche's philosophy has at least two more interpretative dangers. The first one is that, a political reader in need of a meaningful ground can interpret Nietzsche's philosophy as a champion of the futility of resistance. Nietzsche's philosophy, in other words, might make one say yes to *all* that happens by rejecting any true moral ground of politics. This can be called the danger of political nihilism. Secondly, if the reader is not careful enough, Nietzsche's philosophy can be read as a form of crude organicism. Although there

are the seeds of social constructivism in the thought of Nietzsche that accompanies his physiological thinking, Nietzsche's strong emphasis on the importance of the organic over the discursive, normative and the governmental might cause readers to conclude that politics is completely based on the organic.¹⁴ In my opinion, a reading of Foucault against the background of and in relation to Nietzsche's philosophy can prevent these dangers. Nietzsche and Foucault, when read together, might give us an efficient synthesis which reminds us of both sides of the story.

¹⁴ For example, Nazi interpretations of Nietzsche were based on his alleged thought of biological and eugenic distinctions and a resulting hierarchy between people (or alternatively, peoples) and understood Nietzsche's organicism in terms of categorical differences between races. Two examples may include Bäumler's (1931) work and Rosenberg's (1944) speech in a posthumous birthday event held in honor of Nietzsche in *NSDAP*. There are also some anti-Nazi thinkers who critically attribute to Nietzsche a crude organicism and a kinship with power-drunk totalitarianism (for instance; Fischer, 2010, p. 119; and Masur, 1961, p. 91.). There are also some non-Nazi and sympathetic Nietzsche scholars who read Nietzsche's philosophy as a type organicism which may count—for some—as crude organicism. For example, Brian Leiter (2002) holds that Nietzsche is a methodological naturalist who systematically depends on the organic for scientifically explaining the deterministic causes of the various human phenomena; and thus, he is "in the company of naturalists like Hume and Freud—that is, among, broadly speaking, '*philosophers of human nature*'" (pp. 2-5, 11). There is a wide (and in my opinion, correct) agreement in the literature that Nietzsche is a "naturalist" who reads various human phenomena upon an organic basis; however, the way in which Nietzsche applies his naturalism is highly debated. Since the relevant parts of Nietzsche's organicism, and his symptomatology based on his physiological thinking is discussed above, I will not give further detail on the issue. Yet, a vivid example for a scholarly discussion about Nietzsche's position concerning naturalism and the organic (i.e., the discussion between Brian Leiter, P. J. E. Kail, and Christian J. Emden which takes place in the Spring-2017 issue of *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*), the reader may see Leiter (2017), Kail (2017), and Emden (2017).

CHAPTER 3

FOUCAULT ON THE RELATION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

For Foucault, knowledge and the relations of power are inextricably tied. With his work, Foucault tried to show to what extent and in what ways this connection works and operates in discursive realms, such as medical, sexual and juridical discourses. This chapter will be the clarification of the way in which Foucault juxtaposes these two terms and coins the term *power/knowledge*. While this clarification occurs, three main issues will be revealed; namely, 1) Foucault shares the perspectivist thought of Nietzsche, and his perspectivism can be called “discursive perspectivism,” 2) Foucault’s genealogy has many Nietzschean elements; however, as opposed to Nietzsche, he deals with the specific details of the discursive battlefield and different forms of power operating on it, and 3) Foucault’s guiding perspective is freedom. These three axes will uncover the basis on which Nietzsche and Foucault can be compared and contrasted, this time from Foucault’s side. In the end, it will be seen that Foucault’s concept of power is a translation of the Nietzschean will to power into the socio-historical realm.

Foucault’s thought is generally accepted as consisting of three periods; namely, archeological, genealogical, and ethical (Cf. Gutting, 2006, p. 2; Oksala, 2008, p. 3). In order to show that Foucault shares Nietzsche’s perspectivism and makes this perspectivism of his own (i.e., as “discursive perspectivism”), I will firstly elaborate on some material from his archaeological period in which Foucault works on the condition of the possibility of discourses, that is, the rules

of formation of discourses and their elements. Thus, it will be seen that, in the thought of Foucault, without *historical a priori* rules of formation as the relational, empirical and temporal conditions of the possibility of discursive irruptions and transformations, no knowledge would be possible at all. However, since archaeology alone is not a sufficient tool to reveal the dynamics behind the transformations of discourses, how these transformations are affected by non-discursive elements (such as moral norms and various institutions), as well as the consequences of discourses in non-discursive realms; Foucault's perspectivism required a genealogy in order to analyze modern forms of power and power/knowledge networks. Hence, secondly, I will discuss Foucauldian genealogies and the way in which he lays bare the relation between some specific forms of power and knowledge. In this part, the close relation between Nietzsche's thought and that of Foucault, as well as his "social constructivism" of the human subject (that might be slightly different from Nietzsche's approach) will be revealed. Foucault—sharing Nietzschean ideas that 1) knowledge is a strategic tool of power, 2) soul (or alternatively, subject) is not atomic, and 3) there is no disinterested knowledge which is independent of perspectives—performs his studies for a strategic purpose. This discussion will lead to the view that Foucault's guiding perspective is freedom, and the differences between the thoughts of the thinkers in question mostly arise out of different guiding perspectives. When it comes to examining the issue of "Foucault and freedom," I will firstly discuss the notion of freedom itself in relation to subjectivity. This is because the way Foucault treats the term "subject" as distinct from the traditional view of the subject. Consequently, if one thinks that Foucault is a thinker of freedom, s/he must give an account of how freedom is possible in the confines of Foucauldian subjectivity. Lastly, with examples from all of his archaeological, genealogical and ethical periods, both the thought that Foucault's guiding perspective is freedom, and the way in which Foucault's understanding of freedom manifests itself will be discussed.

3.1. Foucault's "Discursive Perspectivism"

3.1.1. Foucault, Archaeology, and the Perspectival Character of Knowledge

In my opinion, Foucault's works in his three so-called intellectual periods (i.e., the archaeological, the genealogical and the ethical) hang together consistently in terms of their guiding perspectives; however, there occurs shifts of questions, focuses and methodologies among his works according to changing tactics of his strategic goal of promoting freedom throughout his intellectual career. Since Foucault shares the Nietzschean idea of the perspectival character of knowledge from the time of his archaeological studies, and since his archaeological period is crucial for getting into the thought of Foucault, I will firstly elaborate on Foucault's archaeological method and the works he produced with this methodology.

The four major works *History of Madness*, *The Birth of the Clinic*, *The Order of Things*, and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* which are published in 1960s are generally considered as belonging to the group of Foucault's archaeological works (Oksala, 2008, p. 3). I will focus on AK in order to describe Foucault's archaeological period, since this is the work in which his archaeological method is elaborated in the highest level of precision, detail, and intellectual maturity. Moreover, in this work, Foucault's discursive perspectivism manifests itself in systematic terms. However, before doing this, it would also be helpful to give some relevant information about Foucault's earlier archaeological works briefly, in order to show not only the continuity of his perspectival thought which rejects truths independent from perspectives throughout his intellectual career, but also that his works are designed and performed in accordance with his guiding perspective of freedom from the very outset.

In *History of Madness*, Foucault intends to "draw up the archaeology of [the] silence" of the mad, resulting from the death of the common language

between the modern human being and the mad in the reign of the discourse of medical psychiatry (p. xxviii). This is because the earlier inseparability of reason and unreason disappeared and an absolute expulsion of the mad from society had begun with the emergence of the “reasonable” human being’s abandoning of the mad to the judgment of the doctor; and

thereby authorizing no relation other than through the abstract universality of illness; and on the other is the man [sic] of madness, who only communicates with the other through the intermediary of a reason that is no less abstract, which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure of the group, the demand for conformity. (ibid.).

Foucault, by referring to the psychiatric “monologue by reason about madness” (ibid.), implies that the unreason came into being by the emergence of the separation of reason and unreason, and performs a “structural study of the historical ensemble— notions, institutions, juridical and police measures, scientific concepts—” which “hold captive” the mad (HM, p. xxxiii). In other words, Foucault, with this work, tries to lay bare the historical evolution and the conditions of the possibility of the term “madness” as we understand it today, with its medical connotations which serve to legitimize the mad’s being thrown out of the society. To be more precise, with this work, Foucault shows how the historical ensemble which dominates over the mad subjugates their perspectives.

The Birth of the Clinic, as its subtitle suggests, is an archaeological study of medical perception—a historical and critical project which deals with the conditions of the possibility of medical experience in modern times (BC, pp. xxi-ii). The work has the main thesis that the clinic is “both a new ‘carving up’ of things and the principle of their verbalization in a form which we have been accustomed to recognizing as the language of ‘positive science’” (BC, p. xx). The minute but decisive change of the question from “where does it hurt” to “what is the matter with you?” in the eighteenth century, according to Foucault, activates the redesigning of the operation of the modern clinic (BC, p. xxi). In short, as Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow (1982) put it, BC attempts “to find the silent

structure which sustains practices, discourse, perceptual experience (the [medical] gaze), as well as the knowing subject and its objects;” and with this work, Foucault “was not seeking *atemporal* structures,” but *historical* conditions of the possibility of the modern medicine as an “experience,” rather than being something belonging to the category of eternal truth (p. 15).

According to Foucault, the history of science and thought—in France at least—dealt mostly with the noble sciences such as mathematics, cosmology and physics, and attributed to them a regularity and continuity almost like an “uninterrupted emergence of truth and pure reason” (OT, p. ix.). On the other hand, the other disciplines that concern living beings, languages or economic facts were considered to be having an irregular history since these disciplines are thought to be too much involved in empirical (i.e., historically contingent)¹⁵ thought unlike the “noble sciences” specified. In *The Order of Things*, as he himself puts it in the “Foreword to the English Edition” of the work, Foucault takes the risk of asking the question “what if empirical knowledge, at a given time and in a given culture, *did* possess a well-defined regularity?” (OT, p. x), and tries to formulate such regularities.¹⁶ The second risk Foucault took in OT, in his words, was his wish to describe “the genesis of [...] sciences as an epistemological space particular to a period” (OT, p. xi). This is because conducting a comparative and regional study aiming at analyzing a definite number of elements (i.e., the knowledges of living beings, the laws of language, economic facts) in relation to each other and relating them to “the philosophical

¹⁵ By the term “empirical,” in this context, Foucault refers to the body of knowledge which is not considered to be as rigorous as the “noble sciences” like mathematics, physics and cosmology. On the other hand, for instance, physics, as a science which is considered to be one of the noble sciences, deals with empirical things in the daily usage of the term. Foucault, on the same page, describes the “empirical knowledge” as the ones that are considered to be “too exposed to the vagaries of chance or imagery [...]” (OT, p. ix). It is evident that Foucault does not refer to the sciences like physics while he uses the term “empirical.” Hence, it is appropriate to describe what Foucault means by this term as “historically contingent.”

¹⁶ This formulation is systematically continued to be performed in AK in the name of “historical *a priori*,” and it will be discussed later in detail.

discourse that was contemporary with them during a period extending from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century” (OT, p. x) led him abandon the traditionally accepted great divisions between disciplines. By redrawing the frontiers between discourses, Foucault claims that he found other proximities and isomorphisms than what the scholars thought in modern times (ibid.).¹⁷ Therefore, Foucault states, he did not operate at the same level with a traditional historian of science (OT, p. xi). As Foucault describes, the traditional historian of science works on the level of the internal economy of knowledges, and traces “the progress of discovery, the formulation of problems, and the clash of controversy” back to their sources. Thus, the basic concern of this level is the scientific consciousness. As opposed to this, it is also possible to work on the things that taint the scientific consciousness—such as “the influences that affected it [consciousness], the implicit philosophies that were subjacent to it, the unformulated thematics, [...] unseen obstacles” (ibid). This is about the “negative unconscious” of science, since the unconscious is thought to resist, deflect, or disturb science (ibid). In contrast, the level at which Foucault performs his studies in OT (as well as HM, BC, and finally AK) is the *archaeological* level which has the aim of revealing “a *positive unconscious* of knowledge: a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist and yet is a part of scientific discourse” (OT, pp. xi-ii). It is important to note that the aim of archaeology is not to diminish the scientific value of discourses. Instead, the archaeological method tries to lay bare the unconsciously shared rules of formation of objects, concepts, and theories of a variety of discourses (OT, p. xii). Rather than analyzing this work in more detail, I would like to pass to AK; since Foucault’s archaeological methodology was further elaborated in that work. Yet, at this point, it is important to bear in mind that Foucault sees the phenomenon of science a very complex issue which needs to be examined in many levels. However, he rejects only a specific view of

¹⁷ In AK, these isomorphisms were treated under the title of *episteme*. This will also be discussed in the AK section.

science, one that gives absolute priority to the autonomous knowing subject.

Foucault writes:

If there is one approach that I do reject, [...] it is that [...] which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity – which, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness. It seems to me that historical analysis of scientific discourse should, in the last resort, be subject, but rather a theory of discursive practice (OT, p. xv).

From the quotation above, it can be inferred that Foucault rejects the autonomous subject as the locomotive force of the history of science. Since, in Foucault's view, which is against both the Christian and modern "truths," the subject is nothing but a dispersion of perspectives, one that seems an atomic and autonomous unity *only* within the framework of an extra-perspectival truth, the historical analysis must not be a theory of the knowing subject as a disinterested observer. Instead, the rules of formation of the discourses which can be derived from practices—which makes the discourse (its elements including the unconscious and non-discursive ones, including its subject) possible—is the subject matter of Foucault's archaeological studies.

Apart from the impropriety of assigning priority to the disinterested autonomous observer as the subject, Foucault also thinks that the discursive must always have non-discursive aspects (such as institutions, state, society, etc.). This is why he analyzes discourses by treating them as "practice," and locates his studies on the level of the positive unconscious of the discursive which includes the non-discursive elements. Arguing against the idea that the analysis of propositions should be performed only within their linguistic elements, Foucault declares that "discourse is something that necessarily extends beyond language" (as qtd. in Davidson, 2003, p. xix). As Davidson puts it, one necessary level of further analysis must be, for Foucault, the level of "strategic intelligibility," in which statements are treated in their "functioning" (ibid. p. xx). Foucault holds that

[t]he perspectival character of knowledge does not derive from human nature, but always from the polemical and strategic character of knowledge. One can speak of perspectival character of knowledge because there is a battle and knowledge is the effect of this battle (DE vol. 2, p. 551; as qtd. in Davidson, 2003, p. xxi).

In this context, treating knowledge as an “effect” in the battle—which also implies that some statements gain the status of scientific and reliable knowledge while others, the subjugated ones, do not—can thus be considered as acknowledging knowledge as a strategic weapon. This is because the discursive battlefield—which is an aspect of the more general struggle of modern human life as a mixture of the discursive and the non-discursive—that Foucault analyzes is, first and foremost, about the battle for acquiring the status of scientificity, and in terms of preservation, for not being subjugated. A discourse, consequently, produces knowledge in order to gain the respectable status of science, to increase its persuasive power in both discursive and non-discursive realms, and thus, to try to universalize its norms and perspectives as much as possible. Given that the scientific discourses, with all their accompanying institutions, as well as their inter- and intra- relations, provide the culmination of the “will to knowledge” as a result of the intellectualized “will to power” of contemporary human beings; Foucault, throughout his academic life, dealt with scientific discourses on the levels of their internal rules and the non-discursive roots behind them. Moreover, he did that in a strategic manner. We might say that he was in the search for truth—his “other” (or, non-metaphysical) truth with his “perspectival strategies,” in his ongoing, moving, and transforming “battle,” just as how Nietzsche was.

The perspectival character of knowledge, and its practical nature that renders it an experience in the battle rather than being a manifestation of a transcendental consciousness were dealt with in Foucault’s earlier works. In AK, Foucault makes this picture clearer by elaborating on the discursive battlefield by reference to historical *a priori* rules of formation, rather than dwelling upon teleological continuities and unities of human reason and its transcendental consciousness. It is worth noting, however, that in Foucault’s archaeologies of the

1960's, the strategic aspect of the discursive battlefield, the role of force relations in the discursive domain, and the connection between the discursive and the non-discursive realms have not been elucidated sufficiently. For this elucidation, one must have a look at Foucault's works of the 1970's; namely, his genealogies.

3.1.2. Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge*

3.1.2.1. The Context of Foucauldian Archaeology, and the Description of the Archeological Method

Archaeology of Knowledge is a pivotal work for Foucault's intellectual career in many respects. Firstly, being the most theoretical work belonging to Foucault's oeuvre, it is the work in which he clarifies the working principles and major concepts of his archaeological method. Doing this, Foucault also sets forth the methodological basis for what he had done in his previous works. Moreover, with a theorized outlook, Foucault provides some additions, corrections and clarifications for his previous works. Other than these, in AK, Foucault centers his focus on the issue of knowledge in its most general sense; and again, philosophizes on the vast field of history of human sciences. Furthermore, with this work, he signals his shift to genealogical methodology in which he conducted his two of the most central works in his future career; namely, *Discipline and Punish*, and the first volume of *History of Sexuality*. Lastly, for the purposes of this thesis, the most important aspect of AK is that, in this work, Foucault executes his study in a discursive perspectivist approach that 1) rejects the idea of the unity of the disinterested knowing subject (or alternatively, sovereign conscious subject) as the major constituent of knowledge, and 2) treats knowledge to be in continuity and in relationality with both the discursive and non-discursive realms.

In the "Introduction" part of AK, Foucault claims that the history of thought (of knowledge, philosophy, literature, etc.) of his time was seeming to be in quest of discovering discontinuities, while on the other hand, history proper

was appearing to be “abandoning of the irruption of events in favor of stable structures” (AK, p. 6). However, in either case, the same problem—the questioning of the *document*—was posed (ibid.). In Foucault’s time, both of the two histories were nothing but “that which transforms *documents* into *monuments*” (AK, p. 8). Basically, in new historiography, instead of questioning only whether they tell the truth or not, or, using them only as passive memories, documents of the past have been organized and reorganized in order to build up meaningful traces with the aim of deciphering the arrangement of things in a specific historical period where the documents in question belong to. This is partially because “history is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably connected” (AK, p. 7). In the past, according to Foucault, archaeology—which dealt with “silent monuments, inert traces, objects without context”—was trying to reach the status of the science of history in order to be meaningful; however, in Foucault’s time, history, with its pursuit of “the intrinsic description of the monument” (i.e., the mass of documentation) for representing the order of things in a particular time span, was aspiring “to the condition of archaeology” (AK, p. 8).

In Foucault’s view, these new happenings in conducting historical research, or, basically, historiography, had four consequences; which might be summarized roughly as 1) the known series of events (the teleological and great ones) were started to be widely doubted; 2) the notion of discontinuity became the working concept of history; 3) there emerged a shift from total history to general history¹⁸—which tends to eliminate continuities as homogenous and great unities; and 4) new history faced some methodological problems (AK, pp. 8-12).

Although the first three consequences betoken an epistemological mutation in the

¹⁸ Total history, as Foucault uses the term, is the historical approach which accepts that *everything* is connected to each other in an absolute teleological continuity. On the other hand, general history tends to list the events or event-series side by side without claiming a strict teleological causation among them. Hence, general history tries to explain historical events in and for themselves while total history presents them as a consequence of a historical progress.

field of history which signals a moving away from totalities, in Foucault's view, there was a conservative reaction, which resulted from the fact that historians felt

a particular repugnance to conceiving of difference, to describing separations and dispersions, to dissociating the reassuring form of the identical. [...] As if we [the history scholars] were afraid to conceive of the *Other* in the time of our thought (AK, p. 13).

Hence, for Foucault, this epistemological mutation was not yet complete. The reason behind conservative reactions to abandoning totalities in the form of arguing for the continuous flowing of the teleological rationality of human consciousness is the belief in the indispensability of the continuous history for the founding function of the subject (ibid.). Accordingly, since the eighteenth century, the trend to preserve the human subject against decentralizations was in play (AK, p. 14). Although Marx and Nietzsche decentralized the role of the conscious subject and the teleological continuity of its transcendental consciousness—owing to the ideas of some popular figures who have misread Marx and Nietzsche and produced a history of totality with incorrect inspirations from these thinkers—one was denounced to be the murderer of history when s/he used terms like “discontinuity,” “difference,” “threshold,” “rupture,” and “transformation” as a positive constituent of history (AK, pp. 15f). In the body of AK, Foucault elaborates on the discourses which have gained the status of scientific knowledge and tries to understand the web of relations which make possible these discourses to be accepted as established unities in their dispersion. For this, he coins or uses some terms (such as archive, enunciation, *episteme*, historical *a priori*, positivity, statement) that question teleologies and totalization, and/or describe historical contingencies. While doing this, he also tries to formulate the conditions of the possibility of the transformation of these discourses, and investigates on discontinuities, ruptures, and thresholds without appealing to *the* unchanging truth and conscious subject, in parallel with his aim stated in OT, which was to reveal the positive unconscious of discourse.

Foucault starts the second part of the work by stating that the theme that will be studied in AK is the concepts of discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series, and transformation (AK, 23). However, he delimits his study to a particular field which is called the history of ideas (or of thought, or of science, or of knowledge in general).¹⁹ For this, at first, as Foucault puts it, one must get rid of some received, pre-existing notions that diversify the theme of continuity or establish the sovereignty of either the individual or the collective consciousness, such as author, book, oeuvre, spirit, or tradition (AK, pp. 23f). Moreover, for the performing of his archaeological analysis, the pre-existing yet unquestioned divisions between politics, philosophy and literature must be put into question (AK, p. 24). This is because these terms have connotations that make us think in the forms of the same, the continuous, the identical (ibid.). Since what Foucault calls for is the investigation of the *Other*, or the “dispersion” as opposed to unity and totality, the negative work of the suspension of the unquestioned continuities must be done in the first place. For example, assuming the material unity of a book is flawed. This is because “beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it [a book] is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network” (AK, pp 25f). Once the unity of a book is questioned, it loses its certainty and it “constructs itself only on the basis of a complex field of discourse” (AK, p. 26). In the same fashion, it would be wrong to assume that we know what exactly distinguishes philosophy from politics, or, that philosophy and politics are two distinct totalities with exact boundaries of their own, or, that the philosophical discourse has a unitary essence which is exclusive of all others (such as politics, arts, sciences, etc.). Hence, among many others, philosophical discourse is, instead of being an autonomous and pure discipline, a product of the complex relations in the

¹⁹ Foucault expresses the object of his archaeological study at the end of the chapter “Unities of Discourse” more vividly as follows: “all the statements that have chosen the subject of discourse (their own subject) as their ‘object’ and have undertaken to deploy it as their field of knowledge,” or alternatively, “the ‘sciences of man [sic]’ ” (AK, p. 33).

discursive field. Moreover, in order to perform an analysis on the level of the exact moment of the irruption of discursive events, two more tendencies must be overthrown. These are 1) assuming a secret, teleological origin behind any event that prevents it from being analyzed as a distinct event; and 2) grounding the possibility of discursive events on a silent “already-said,” which in fact is “never-said”—an *ad hoc* origin that already forewarned the event itself (AK, 27f). In the end, it will be seen that these tendencies are those that prevent us from understanding the historical contingency of discursive events in their specific regularity and their discursively perspectival nature.

At this point, it is helpful to note that Foucault only suspends those unities, and await them in doubt. This does not mean that he wants us to reject them all. What Foucault intends to do is to disturb their self-confident authority by questioning them, and to open a new field of investigation by “freeing the problems they pose” (such as their whatness, how they can be defined or limited, what laws they can obey, etc.) (AK, pp. 28f). The opened field is “made up of the totality of all effective statements (whether spoken or written), in their dispersion as events and in the occurrence that is proper to them” (AK, p. 29). In short, Foucault articulates this field—archaeological field of knowledge—with the words “pure description of discursive events.” (ibid.). This research field may seem tantamount to linguistic analysis. However, it is easily distinguishable from it. This is because,

[t]he question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of events of discourse poses a quite different question: how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another? (AK, 30).

Moreover, as mentioned above, the pure description of discursive events must involve the non-discursive constituents of discourses (such as institutions, relations, etc.), and statements must be treated in their strategic intelligibility rather than in their linguistic existence. The battle-field of the discursive and

knowledges as the effects of this battle-field can thus be analyzed in the archaeological method. This is because “a statement is always an event that neither language (*langue*) nor the meaning can quite exhaust” (AK, p. 31). And since the archaeological level concerning knowledge is the level of the “positive unconscious of knowledge,” instead of appealing to linguistic analysis, or to the psychology or consciousness of the subject of the discourse, the regularities in this battle-field will be studied in *relations* other than the relations of the conscious subject itself; namely, 1) relations between statements, 2) relations between groups of statements thus established, 3) relations between statements and groups of statements and events of a quite different kind. Hence, the analysis of discourse must not be a closed-circuit. Instead, it must “leave oneself free to describe the interplay of relations within it and outside it” (AK, p. 32). Moreover, with the study on the pure description of discursive events, the meaning of a statement will get clearer by showing “the analysis of their coexistence [the coexistence of statements], their successions, their mutual functioning, their reciprocal determination, and their independent or correlative transformation” (AK, p. 32). In the end, Foucault claims that the study in the field of archaeology will let us discover new legitimate forms of regularities with a close inspection—with controlled decisions—instead of falling prey to the long unquestioned old continuities that remain secret (*ibid*).

In order to describe the relations between statements legitimately, Foucault is confronted with the questions of “where to start” and “by which criteria should the grouping must be established.” Foucault deals with four hypotheses about the grouping of discursive unities; namely, 1) statements—although different in form and dispersed in time—that refer to the same object constitute a unitary discursive group (AK, p. 35); 2) statements can be grouped according to their form and type of relation (AK, p. 36); 3) groups of statements might be established “by determining the system of permanent and coherent concepts” that they include (AK, p. 38); and 4) a regrouping of statements can be

made according to their common and persistent themes (AK, p. 39). However, each hypothesis fails for various reasons. The common basis of all these failures must have been to seek regularities on the basis of a certain similarity, order, correlation or reciprocity among statements or groups of statements, as well as a certain correspondence between self-identical statements and pre-discursive objects. An analysis of statements would not, therefore “try to isolate small islands of coherence in order to describe their internal structure; it would not try to suspect and reveal latent conflicts; it would study forms of division.” (AK, p. 41) Moreover, “instead of reconstituting the *chains of inference* (as one often does in the history of the sciences or of philosophy), instead of drawing *tables of differences* (as the linguists do)” one must seek a “system of dispersion” (ibid), in order to find the new regularities of discourse which do not depend on the form of the self-identical and the sovereignty of the conscious subject, or on the form of the self-identical, pre-discursive object. Thus, this analysis is freed from “truth” and “meaning,” but only meant to be descriptive of the rules of formation of the whole and the elements of the discursive field of the human sciences. Foucault entitles the discursive divisions that show regularity in the system of dispersion, *discursive formation*; and the conditions to which the elements of a discursive division (such as objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies) are subjected, *the rules of formation* (AK, 41f). In Foucault’s words, “[t]he rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance) in a given discursive division” (AK, p. 42).

Giving examples from the discourse of psychopathology from the nineteenth century onwards, Foucault questions the rules of the existence of the objects of discourse. The choice of psychopathology in this time span would be illuminating since “[t]he objects with which psychopathology has dealt since this break in time are very numerous, mostly very new, but also very precarious, subject to change and, in some cases, to rapid disappearance” (AK, pp. 44f). For example, in a certain point of history, the main objects of this discourse were

analyzed under the very general term “madness.” However, from nineteenth century onwards, new concepts of “minor behavioral disorders, sexual aberrations and disturbances, the phenomena of suggestion and hypnosis, lesions of the central nervous system, deficiencies of intellectual or motor adaptation, [and] criminality” have emerged (AK, p. 45). A variety of objects have been named, analyzed, redefined, challenged and disappeared in the specified time span in the specified discourse (ibid.). From what is said above, one can infer that there are different conceptions of madness according to various historical discursive contexts. In other words, Foucault tells us that there is no madness outside of historical conceptualization: there is no fixed essence of madness. As a consequence, madness is experienced through available discursive perspectives.

In order to get into the details of the general issue of the formation of the objects of discourses with the specific example of psychopathology of the nineteenth century, Foucault asks “[w]hat has ruled their [the objects of psychopathology that emerged from the nineteenth century onwards] existence as objects of discourse?” (ibid.). An alternative for consideration for finding where the answer is, for Foucault, might be the surfaces of emergence of the objects; such as the family, the immediate social group, the work situation and the religious community (AK, p. 45). This is because they are all normative groups that had the potential to rationalize madness in order to exclude the mad or turn the type of madness into some sort of disease. Meanwhile, in the nineteenth century, new surfaces of emergence began to function for psychopathology; namely, art, sexuality, penalty. For example, the sexual “deviations in relation to customary prohibitions become for the first time an object of observation, description, and analysis for the psychiatric discourse” (AK, pp. 45f). Again, while in the previous periods, madness was distinguished from criminality and taken into consideration as an excuse, criminality “becomes a form of deviance more or less related to madness” in the nineteenth century (AK, p. 46). Foucault writes

In these fields of initial differentiation, in the distances, the discontinuities, and the thresholds that appear within it, psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object — and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable (ibid.).

Hence, with the examples from the nineteenth century psychopathology, we see that, for analyzing the rules of the formation of objects, the first place to take into consideration may be the surfaces as the unities of normativity. Moreover, we see Foucault claiming that when the surfaces of the emergence of the objects of discourses change, the objects and their nature also change. This is because each normative group has its discursive strategy to universalize its normative perspectives.

Other than the surface of emergence, two more options are proper for the analysis of the rules of formation of the objects of discourse; namely, authorities of delimitation and grids of specification (AK, p. 46). For example, medicine was a major authority in the society—as an institution having its own rules that was recognized by the public opinion, law and government—that “delimited, designated, named, and established madness as an object in collaboration with other authorities such as law, the religious authority, and art criticism” (ibid.). This means that, different authorities, more generally, different alliances of authorities (which are historically contingent and in constant becoming) produce different strategical delimitations. Moreover, “different ‘kinds of madness’ are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another as objects of psychiatric discourse” according to the grids of specification. Some of the grids of specification in the nineteenth century were the soul (as a group of hierarchized faculties), the body (as a community of organs), the life and the history of individuals (as a continuous succession of developmental stages) (AK, p. 46f). In other words, nineteenth century psychopathology used those phenomena that were recognized by the scholars and the society in order to organize and reorganize its objects. Without those historically contingent grids of specification as the perspective-setting ground, conceptualization and differentiation of what is

what (e.g., differentiation of the normal and the abnormal, the good and the bad, etc.) is not possible at all. This is also to say that, an object of discourse is dependent to historical context.

The above analysis on the formation of objects is, for Foucault, still inadequate since the emergence of an object of discourse is not only connected to the relation between the object and its surfaces of emergence, but also with many other planes (for example, the relation between the law, police, and psychopathology). Hence, for the aim of defining the place of the object in a system of dispersion, the complex relations with the object and the vast land of other discursive strata must be taken into consideration. This is because “one cannot say anything at any time:” historical conditions consisting of complex relations of several planes (discursive or societal) must let the object of discourse emerge—the object “does not pre-exist itself” (AK, p. 49). Hence, the object must be defined by its exterior relations rather than its internal, conceptual nature: its juxtapositions with other objects must be placed in a field of exteriority.

With his archaeological method, Foucault not only questions the rules of the formation of objects, but also enunciative modalities (or alternatively, the subject and its position), concepts, and strategies of discourse. Giving examples from the medical discourse, Foucault begins to question these formations. The major question concerning the enunciative modalities is the one of “who is speaking? Who [...] is accorded the right to use this sort [medical] of language? Who is qualified to do so?” (AK, p. 55). Moreover, the institutional sites (hospital, library, etc.) and the position of the subject (the position in which s/he gazes, touches, observes the patient) must be something to investigate (AK, pp. 56-58). This investigation must be performed, as Foucault puts it, “neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity [...],” regulations of whose enunciations should be defined (AK, p. 61). On the contrary, what should be done is to define the historical rules that govern the operation of

the institutional sites and other factors (such as relations between discourses, economic facts, political developments, etc.) that make possible various subject positions and different enunciations. When it comes to the formation of concepts—instead of relying on the horizon of ideality, or to the empirical progress of ideas—the archaeological investigation must be on the preconceptual level—the level which defines the (battle)field of unconscious rules of formation (their rules of their succession, their coexistence, modification and transformation); the rules “that have made possible the heterogeneous multiplicity of concepts [...]” (AK, p. 70). Lastly, according to their degree of coherence, rigor and stability, discourses (such as economics, medicine, etc.) give rise to certain organization of concepts and certain types of enunciation that lead to themes or theories which Foucault treats under the title of “strategies” (AK, p. 71). However, for analyzing strategies, all dimensions of the discursive formations (i.e., objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, theoretical choices) must be taken into consideration. Since Foucault did not deal with the rules that govern the formation of strategies in his previous works in detail, he only indicates directions for further research (AK, pp. 72f). Yet, since the archaeological method is performed in the field where discourse is treated as a practice rather than the manifestation of the truth of the transcendental consciousness of the subject, and since it seeks for the well-defined regularities that govern the emergence and the transformation of the discourse and its elements, one must not relate the basis of the choices between theories, that is, preferences for some strategies at the expense of others, “either to a fundamental *project* or to the secondary play of *opinions*” (AK, p. 78). This is to say that a choice of theory among other alternatives is 1) not a predetermined manifestation of a teleological progress, and it is 2) a strategic issue for a discourse—considering that it is performed on the basis of calculations with respect to its best functioning in the domain of scientific respectability and of its power of

persuasion—and is governed by some historical rules, instead of being dependent on the opinions of the sovereign subject.

Up to now, I have tried to expose the background—the main questions of the archaeological method and the historical context in which Foucault devised it— with some textual evidence and examples. At this point, some questions arise. With what concepts does Foucault seek to reach his goal of the “pure description of discursive events?” What do discursive relations consist of? What does the term “statement” refer to? How does Foucault deal with the rules of formation of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of discourse? Hence, I would like to expose how Foucault presents the term “statement” as the basic unit of a discourse, and the term “historical a priori” as the rules governing the formation of the objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of discourses. And on the more general level—the level of scientificity and knowledge in general—I would like to describe the way in which Foucault puts forward the term *episteme* in order to describe the historical a priori rules of the formation related to a specified time span that govern the knowledge (*savoir*) of that temporal era in general.

3.1.2.2. The Basic Formulations and Terminology in Foucauldian Archaeology

Statement, as Foucault deploys the term, is the “elementary unit of discourse” (AK, p. 90). But what is its difference from other similar terms like “proposition,” “sentence,” or “speech act”? According to Foucault, the presence of a proposition is neither the necessary, nor the sufficient condition of its material existence (AK, p. 91). For example, the propositions “no one heard” and “it is true that no one heard” are two coins of the same propositional structure. However, according to different enunciative characteristics (such as the use of the latter by some person for an affirmation of the former declared by another person), these can be two different statement events. Statement is neither an equivalent term with the one of “sentence.” For example, “a classificatory table of the botanical

species is made up of statements, not sentences” (AK, p. 92). This implies that, statements express differentiations—such as a normative differentiation of truth and falsity, or a categorical differentiation between two species—and they can do it without having the form of a sentence. Lastly, statement is not equivalent with “speech act” since “more than a statement is often required to effect a speech act” (such as oath, prayer, contract, promise, demonstration, etc. which involves the intention of the speech actor for embodying the acts of the specified kinds) (AK, p. 94), and the analysis of statements have nothing to do with a subjective intentionality—“the visible body in which they [speech acts] manifest themselves” (AK, p. 95). Contrary to the analyses of grammar (dealing with sentences), logic (dealing with propositions), and the one of the English analysts (e.g., John Searle, dealing with speech acts); “[t]he threshold of the statement is the existence of signs” (AK, p. 95) which are neither solely linguistic, nor solely materialistic like an object presented to perception (AK, p. 97). Statement is not something definable with a unitary proposition, sentence, or a speech act. Instead, it is a “function”—in a nutshell, an enunciative function of signs relative to variables such as its relation with the spaces of differentiation, subject position, associated domain, and material existence (AK, pp. 97f, 99-118). But what does this mean?

Rather than analyzing signs in their purely linguistic (as a verb, noun, sentence, letter, etc.) or purely material (such as the pile of letters on a sheet) existence, Foucault looks for the conditions of their operation which constitute statements as enunciative functions. The enunciative level of the formulation—as opposed to linguistic or logical ones—of the statement depends firstly on its link with a referential (or alternatively, its *correlate*); however, this referential is not made up of things, facts, realities, or beings. This is because, as noted earlier, there is no pre-discursive being. Instead, on this level, the statement can be analyzed by its relations with the spaces of differentiation (such as a scientific discipline, an artistic discourse, a disappeared discourse, etc.) “in which the

statement itself reveals the differences” which is governed by some “laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within it” (AK, p. 103). Here, the term differentiation, as stated before, refers to a normative action which distinguishes between true and false, between different categories, between “good” and “bad,” between the reason and the unreason, etc. Foucault writes

what might be defined as the *correlate* of the statement is a group of domains in which such objects [as its referential] may appear and to which such relations [of verification] may be assigned: it would, for example, be a domain of material objects possessing a certain number of observable physical properties, relations of perceptible size – or, on the contrary, it would be domain of fictitious objects, endowed with arbitrary properties (even if they have a certain constancy and a certain coherence), without any authority of experimental or perceptive verification; it would be a domain of spatial and geographical localizations, with coordinates, distances, relations of proximity and of inclusion – or, on the contrary, a domain of symbolic appurtenances and secret kinships; it would be a domain of objects that exist at the same moment and on the same time-scale as the statement is formulated, or it would be a domain of objects that belongs to a quite different present – that indicated and constituted by the statement itself, and not that to which the statement also belongs (AK, p. 102).

Accordingly, the first characteristic of the enunciative function—regardless of which discursive domain the statement belongs to (physics, psychopathology, absurd theatre, philosophy, astrology, etc.)—is its special relation with its domain which takes place under some rules of existence and enables the statement to function as a differential from within its domain. This is a crucial point, since the claim that a statement works as a differential function in relation with some rules of existence implies two vital theses; namely, statements 1) either create or repeat *norms*, and 2) can only emerge from within an ensemble of rules which makes it possible to exist.

The second variable of the statement function is the subject position. However, the subject of the statement is not the one and the same individual with the author of the formulation (AK, p. 107). This is because s/he “is not in fact the cause, origin, or starting-point of [...] the articulation of a sentence” (AK, p. 107). The place of the subject is vacant: it may be filled by one individual or another. If

a set of signs constitute a statement, this requires that the subject position can be assigned (ibid.). Hence, Foucault holds that the analysis of a formulation as a statement consists in “determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he [sic] is to be the subject of it” (ibid.). In other words, the statement function is relative to the rules of the assignment of the subject position (such as the site from which s/he speaks, the modality of observation, etc.) from which the author or the repeater performs the statement function. When it comes to the third characteristic of the statement function, we see the exigence of an associated domain (AK, p. 108). It is not possible for a statement to exist in isolation from a surrounding set of statements which provides its context. Just as one cannot speak of anything of anytime, one also cannot say of anything from nowhere. In Foucault’s words, “a statement always belongs to a series or a whole, always plays a role among other statements, deriving support from them and distinguishing itself from them” (AK, p. 111). Last but not least, the fourth characteristic of the enunciative function is the requirement of a material existence (AK, p. 112). In other words, contrary to the ontological status of proposition, a statement must always be given in a material medium: it is an event in the material world. However, for Foucault, it is not the case that the statement is an event that occurs in a *particular* spatio-temporal position and it is over and done by the time of its occurrence. Moreover, statement is neither some immaterial thing like a meaning of a proposition. It is not “an ideal form that that can be actualized in any body” (AK, p. 117). In Foucault’s view, statement is in between those two poles, and paradoxically, it has the characteristics of materiality and repeatability at the same time (AK, p. 117f). In other words, it is a worldly and material event or thing that may be begun again, re-evoked, and actualized; but only under specific rules governing it.²⁰ This is a vital aspect of the statement—

²⁰ At this point, it is worth noting a specific detail about the repeatable materiality of the statement. Such materiality is what distinguishes statement from its alternatives that Foucault discusses (namely; sentence, proposition, and speech act). For instance, in a different context consisting of different rules of formation, a sentence, a proposition, and a speech act is

the repeatable materiality renders statement a strategic tool in the discursive “battlefield.” Foucault holds that,

[t]his repeatable materiality that characterizes the enunciative function reveals the statement as a specific and paradoxical object, but also as one of those objects that men produce, manipulate, use, transform, exchange, combine, decompose and recompose, and possibly destroy. Instead of being something said once and for all – and lost in the past like the result of a battle, a geological catastrophe, or the death of a king – the statement, as it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters various networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced. Thus the statement circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realization of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry (AK, p. 118).

Thus, we see that Foucault describes statement as an empirical event or a thing in its repeatable materiality, which may serve to some interest or another in a struggle or rivalry in the world—although Foucault, in AK, is mostly concerned with what might be called “the discursive world.” One might say that there is everything about “power” in this citation, except its name. However, this will be elaborated later. At this point the question is as follows: How does Foucault describe the special conditions under which statements emerge, appear, circulate, are used, disappear, and become a tool in the battle? What is it that enables statements to exist as events or things? What is it that confines statements to their current form? What is it that prevents certain statements from emergence? In fact,

repeatable. However, when a sentence, a proposition, or a speech act is repeated in a different context, it is not the same statement. In other words, although a sentence (or a proposition, or a speech act) is repeated in a different collection historical rules of formation, because of the different rules of the materiality of the statement, this repetition produces a different statement-thing with a same appearance. For example, if one says that “homosexuality is normal” in ancient times, this sentence does not have a character of a statement. This is because the term “homosexuality” does not have any meaning, and thus, any differentiating function in the minds of the individuals in ancient times (Karademir, 2015, p. 94). However, if a scholar uses the same sentence in a psychiatry conference in 1960’s context where homosexuality is considered to be abnormal in psychiatric discourse, then, it is a statement-event which opposes the general norms. On the other hand, if one uses this sentence today in a group of people who accept liberal norms, then, the same sentence becomes a statement-thing which repeats the generally accepted norms of the context.

to some extent at least, these questions are answered above. However, the terminology Foucault uses makes the picture clearer.

Foucault uses the term “positivity” in order to describe the battlefield of a basic discursive formation—like that of Natural history, political economy, or clinical medicine. The positivity of a discourse, as he puts it, “characterizes its unity throughout time” (AK, p. 142). This is not to say that, through positivity, one can analyze the truth or the scientificity of the discourses. Instead, the unity of positivity reveals the subjects belonging to it are talking about the same thing: it is the conceptual domain—a conceptual battlefield—in which several subjects agree or disagree with each other. Along with the conditions of the operation of the statement function; positivity “defines a field in which formal identities, thematic continuities, translation of concepts, and polemical interchanges may be deployed” (AK, p. 143). To be more precise, positivity of a discourse is a battlefield in which different subjects and objects operate under the same historical rules of formation, a historical background against which meaningful statements about a specific discursive division may be enunciated, understood, circulated, criticized, modified, and possibly destroyed by different individuals. Thus, Foucault says, “positivity plays the role of what might be called a *historical a priori*” (ibid.).

What then the seemingly oxymoronic term “historical *a priori*” refers to? How can an *a priori* be historical at the same time? The answer of these question lies in the fact that Foucault uses the term *a priori* not for the validity of statements, but as a condition of their reality (or alternatively, emergence) (AK, p. 143). This term assumes that the “things said” can be analyzed in terms not only of their levels of meaning or truth value, but also of a history that both limits and enables their existence. About his aim of coining the term historical *a priori*, Foucault says the following:

It is not a question of rediscovering what might legitimize an assertion, but of freeing the conditions of emergence of statements, the law of their coexistence with

others, the specific form of their mode of being, the principles according to which they survive, become transformed, and disappear (AK, p. 143).

In other words, for Foucault, statements have a specific history that does not depend on a secret origin. Instead, they can enter into the battlefield only within the conditions of the operation governing the battlefield. The rules that govern the discursive battlefield are a historical, historically contingent, and, therefore, historically changeable ensemble—the totality of the historical *a priori* rules of formation of the objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies of discourses. The historical *a priori* is “defined as the group of rules that characterize a discursive practice” (AK, p. 144). However, as opposed to formal *a prioris* (like Kant’s or mathematics’ ones) these rules are neither fixed, nor imposed from outside, such as the sovereign subject or spirit. Instead, they are the very rules of this battlefield which can be described as a “transformable group.” (ibid.). The historical *a prioris* do not share the same dimension with formal ones. Rather, they are the condition of the reality of the latter. More precisely, while the formal *a prioris* belong to the conscious dimension of discourses or sciences, the historical *a priori* rules of formation belong to the positive unconscious side of them. These historical *a priori* rules of formation, as the positive unconscious of the discourses, provide the discourses with a constantly becoming context which makes any conscious discursive practice possible at all. Moreover, Foucault uses the term “archive” in order to designate the inter-discursive general system of “what can be said” in a specified temporal duration which has its own historical *a priori* rules of formation. Archives, as Foucault puts it, are “the systems that establish statements as events (with their own conditions and domain of appearance) and things (with their own possibility and field of use)” (AK, p. 145). Rather than belonging to a positivity of a single discursive formation, archive is the “general system of the formation and transformation of statements” (AK, p. 146). Archive is at the base of a statement-event, and defines “the system of its enunciability” (ibid.). It is the system of the functioning of the statement-thing or statement-event, and “it is that which differentiates discourses in their multiple

existence and specifies them in their own duration” (ibid.). For Foucault, archaeology describes discourses as practices, and it does it so in the element of archive (AK, p. 148). Here lies the importance of archaeology. For Foucault, analyzing the archive—and thus, archaeology too—has a unique function. This is because archaeology does not presuppose self-identical subject. Instead, it claims that different subjects are relative to different subject positions. It relativizes the concepts that subjects use, the objects that they refer to and the modes of their enunciations by claiming that the subject is dependent upon some rules that are subject to historical changes, transformations and ruptures. Foucault holds that, with the analysis of the archive, archaeology

deprives us of our continuities; it dissipates that temporal identity in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish to exorcise the discontinuities of history; it breaks the thread of transcendental teleologies; and where anthropological thought once questioned man’s being or subjectivity, it now bursts open the other, and the outside. In this sense, the diagnosis does not establish the fact of our identity by the play of distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the difference of times, our selves the difference of masks. That difference, far from being the forgotten and recovered origin, is this dispersion that we are and make (AK, p. 147f).

Thus, it is seen that, with his archaeological method, Foucault aims to 1) get out from the chains of the received unities which depend on the sovereignty of the subject, 2) dismantle the established teleologies by reference to the “other” which is uncovered by the archaeological analysis, 3) show that human beings are sets of contingent dispersions—whose contingency is governed by some rules—rather than being the unchanging soul with a naturally endowed universal consciousness. Our discourses are, For Foucault, governed by some rules that we are not aware of. Our reason is, being a product of history, can think, can conceptualize things, and in the discursive realm, can create, circulate, manipulate, accept and reject some statements or another in the boundaries of historical regularities. Since these regularities are transformable, in different archives, we see different modes of thoughts. The contrast between the archives of a society and another, or an era and

another has the capability to establish, not a teleological continuation, but a set of discontinuations, with the implication that things could be otherwise.

From Foucault's delimitation of his interest to the history of the sciences of human beings in his archaeological works, one might think that archaeology is only related with either pseudo-sciences or proto-sciences. For this reason, Foucault sets up to answer the question "what is the relation between archaeology and the analysis of the sciences?" (AK, p. 197). For Foucault, the group of the elements of discourse (i.e., objects, subjects, concepts and strategies) "formed in a regular manner by a discursive practice; and which are indispensable to the constitution of a science, although they are not necessarily destined to give rise to one, can be called *knowledge*" (AK, p. 201). There can be bodies of knowledge which stand independently from sciences; however, no knowledge is possible without a discursive practice. Moreover, a discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge it produces (ibid.).

In order to understand the relation between archaeology and sciences, the term knowledge in Foucault's use is of great importance. Foucault describes knowledge under two different French terms that belong to two different levels of analyses; namely, *connaissance* and *savoir*. While the French term *connaissance*, in daily language, designates the body of knowledge belonging to a discipline (such as mathematics, biology, etc.), the term *savoir* refers to knowledge as a whole (AK, p. 16). However, Foucault uses these terms in a definite purpose, that of making a distinction between two senses of the term knowledge in their relation to their level of analyses. Foucault writes:

By *connaissance*, I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. *Savoir* refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance* and for this or that enunciation to be formulated (AK, pp. 16f).

From this definition, it might be inferred that Foucault uses the term *connaissance* at the level of scientific formalization, while he uses the term *savoir* to refer to

knowledge at its historical level—which belongs to archaeology—in which he investigates the historical *a priori* rules of formation of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies. Apart from this, as the above quotation suggests, the term *savoir* is a historical one in the sense that it consists of the rules of formation and conditions of operation belonging to a specified historical period. Accordingly, knowledge (*savoir*) 1) is produced in a discursive practice (i.e., in a particular domain); 2) is a space in which its subject may take its position and speak of the objects of h/er discursive practice, 3) “the field of coordination and subordination of statements in which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and transformed), and 4) is defined by the possibilities of use and appropriation by other discourses or some non-discursive practices (AK, p. 201). In short, knowledge (*savoir*) can be defined as the general discursive battlefield of a particular period in which some formations may acquire the status of science, while some others only imitate the epistemological structure of science, but all formations have subject positions to be filled by one subject or another according to some rules and discursive relations with other discursive and non-discursive realms (such as institutions, juridical structures, power mechanisms, etc.).

Since archaeology seeks to analyze the positive unconscious of knowledge, it explores the discursive practice/ knowledge (*savoir*)/ science axis instead of the one of consciousness / knowledge (*connaissance*)/ science, “which cannot escape subjectivity” (AK, p. 201f). For Foucault, sciences come into existence out of a discursive formation and against the whole context of *savoir* (AK, p. 203). In any discourse, there exists a special relation with science and knowledge; and the task of archaeology, as Foucault puts it, is to show “how science functions in the element of knowledge” (AK, p. 204). One of Foucault’s concerns on the issue of this functioning is the involvement of ideology in science. Foucault holds that “ideology is not exclusive of scientificity” (AK, p. 205). In other words, a body of scientific knowledge (*connaissance*) cannot be accused of a lack of scientific rigor or objectivity only because one can find traces

of an ideological stance in its statements. Archaeological analysis, as Foucault puts it, must treat science as a practice among others, and rather than uncovering its philosophical or ideological presuppositions (ibid.).

Foucault maps several thresholds of discursive practices on the way to scientificity, which make several forms of analysis possible. The moment at which a discursive practice reaches its individual autonomy, as Foucault describes, is the threshold of positivity (AK, pp. 205f). The second threshold is the point of time when the discursive formation “claims to validate (even unsuccessfully) norms of verification and coherence,” in other words, when it acquires a dominant function over knowledge. This is the threshold of epistemologization (ibid.). When the epistemologized discursive practice obeys some specified rules for the construction of its propositions, according to Foucault, it crosses the threshold of scientificity (ibid.). Lastly, when the scientific discourse becomes able to define its axioms and its elements, decides on the legitimate propositional structures in its operation, and thus, becomes able to take “itself as a starting-point, to deploy the formal edifice that it constitutes,” in Foucault’s words, this scientific discourse crosses the threshold of formalization (ibid.). However, the way to scientificity (i.e., the journey of a discursive formation in its aim to be accepted as a science) cannot be characterized as a linear accumulation. In each discursive practice, the chronology of the thresholds varies, even some steps might be lacking (AK, pp. 206f). Only one science—namely, mathematics—is the discursive practice that have crossed all the thresholds at the time of its appearances. However, for Foucault, it would be wrong to take mathematics as a model for other sciences for a historian. This is because the actual development of other sciences differs from mathematics when one takes into consideration the historical dimension of the story (AK, p. 208). Precisely, as well as discourses, all sciences appear and develop in relation with their context, the discursive battlefield of *savoir*.

In Foucault's terms, the analysis of discursive formations and knowledge in their relationality with sciences and epistemological figures is "the analysis of the *episteme*" (AK, p. 211). Foucault describes the term *episteme* as follows:

By *episteme*, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization are situated and operate; the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, be subordinated to one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far as they belong to neighbouring, but distinct, discursive practices. The *episteme* is not a form of knowledge (*connaissance*) or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities (AK, p. 211).

From what is stated above, we might infer that the most general level of archaeological investigation regarding the scientific status is the analysis of *episteme*. When one considers the norm-setting power of science and scientificity in modern times, the importance of the analysis of *episteme* shows itself. The relations of a discourse with other proximal discourses, established sciences, and non-discursive realms describe the functioning of a discourse, and its normative power. Hence, Foucault, in a later interview made in 1977—when he was said to be in his so-called genealogical period and was concerned more with the relations of power—retrospectively defines the term *episteme* in the following way.

I would define the *episteme* retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won't say a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and, which it is possible to say are true or false. The *episteme* is the 'apparatus' which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific (Foucault, 1977, p. 197).

Accordingly, from what is said above, we can see that Foucault treats the statements and discourses at the level of their strategic intelligibility, and its functioning in a definite *episteme*. This is because *episteme* reveals the rules of the battle in the battlefield in which discourses try to reach the highest level of scientificity for their best functioning. There is a battle, and knowledge is the

effect of it. This battlefield is characterized by the historical *a priori* rules of formation which govern the elements (i.e., objects, subjects, concepts and strategies) of discourses which are the condition of the existence, coexistence, maintenance, modification and the disappearance of them.

3.1.3. Nietzsche's "Organic Perspectivism" and Foucault's "Discursive Perspectivism"

In the previous chapter, we have seen that Nietzsche's perspectivism is an episteme-ontology of life which claims that knowledge is an invention of human beings that works as a tool of power. Rejecting extra-perspectival knowledge, the idea of an atomic subject as the disinterested observer of the world, and the subject-object ontology, Nietzsche's perspectivism suggests a relational ontology in which the centers of force (including the human subject) feel, measure and interpret the variations of power in the world they are situated in, and human knowledge is an effect of the interpretation of the will to power in the struggle of life. Instead of unchanging essences, subjects, and objects, Nietzsche offers us an infinity of relations between the interpreting centers of force and the interpreted—their contexts. When it comes to knowledge, a human subject draws a picture of its world only by its own perspectives which consist of its interests and the available perspectives of its historical context, which is in constant becoming. Human beings live in a discursive context and they interpret their world in conceptual thinking. This is the discursive second nature of human beings; however, it has an organic root (i.e., the will to power). The will to power is the locomotive force of both the discursive and the non-discursive activities. Unbeknownst to them or not, for Nietzsche, human beings will to know as the discursive manifestation of their will to power. Hence, as a tool of power, knowledge is a strategic weapon for human beings in order to grow or preserve themselves.

In the same fashion, it was shown that, in Nietzsche's perspectivist episteme-ontology, knowledge is a profoundly normative phenomenon which is grounded on the interests and the resulting moral intentions of the interpreting subject. Knowledge depends on a normative value-ground (or alternatively, a guiding perspective) which ignites all the will to know as a discursive manifestation of the will to power. The object of knowledge is tied with this normative value-ground, since not all objects are for the interest of the knowing subject. After all, our needs that interpret the world; and the objects of our discursive activities are inextricably connected with our guiding perspectives which describe our configuration of needs in the discursive realm. Thus, in the intellectual realm, human beings appropriate available knowledges and use them in accordance with their guiding perspectives, which are tied with their will to power. This means that knowledge is 1) not a substance to observe; instead, it is empirical—it is a performance (or alternatively, an event), 2) is interested (i.e., it is a strategic tool to serve to the interests of the knowing subject), 3) is tied with a value-ground, and performed in order to support some values while trying to eradicate others.

When it comes to the Foucauldian picture, we also see a perspectivist episteme-ontology, which is based on relations and treats knowledge as an empirical event in history; however, this without recourse to an organic ground. As it was discussed, Foucault rejected the sovereignty of the conscious subject, and tried to lay bare the positive unconscious of knowledge. Foucault observed that there is a battle, and knowledge is an effect of it. Just as how Nietzsche thought, Foucault holds that knowledge is not a substance which is used in the manifestation of truth. Rather than being a product of the sovereign subject, or being a substance which leads to the truth, knowledge occurs as an event—or alternatively, as a practice—in the empirical world. Knowledge is a consequence of a web of relations. These relations are not only within discursive realms. Instead, knowledge has a profound relation with non-discursive domains such as

institutions, political events, economic practices, etc. There are rules that govern these inter- or intra-discursive relations. Foucault names the total set of rules for a given period of time *episteme*—the historical a priori rules of formation of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of discourses and their scientificity. From what he says, we might infer that each discourse wants to reach the highest level of scientificity in order to function better in the battle, and their deployment in the discursive battlefield is strategically preformed in relation with its *episteme*. However, each *episteme* is subject to transformation, since it is in constant becoming. Moreover, knowledge is a strategic tool which is a matter of appropriation by figures belonging to the discursive (scientists, philosophers, historians, etc.) and non-discursive (authorities, law makers, politicians, etc.) realms. Knowledge is not extra-perspectival, it is produced and appropriated by perspectival interests of the figures in the battlefield.

The empirical nature of knowledge and its being an event rather than a fixed substance implies that the norms that knowledges produce are historically contingent. In other words, things could be otherwise. Hence, an analysis which dismantles the truth-claims of discourses lays bare the possibility of other perspectives. The fact that a perspective is subjugated does not mean that it is false while what is regarded as the scientific knowledge is the true perspective. This is because the silencing of a perspective is a performance—a performance which is conducted according to some historical regularities. Foucault, with his archaeological method, reveals the contingency of what is regarded as “natural,” “identical,” “same,” and “teleological;” and shows that they are perspectives among others.

When we compare the perspectivisms of the two thinkers, thus, we see several common points. The first one is that both Nietzsche and Foucault reject the object (or alternatively, substance-) ontology, and offer a relational process ontology of knowledge. In other words, for both thinkers, instead of having

unchanging essences, objects get their meaning, identity, and even their very existence or materiality in relations. Moreover, both thinkers reject the privilege of the subject as the disinterested observer of objects. For Nietzsche, it is the will to power that interprets; the subject as a unity is an additional interpretation, and even the interpretation of the subject as a unity is taken for granted, what we refer to when we say “subject” can never be disinterested. For Foucault too, knowledge is not a substance which manifests the universal truth. Instead, it consists of statements as events or things which have a repeatable materiality. Moreover, subjects are neither the disinterested observers, nor the starting points of knowledge, nor the autonomous creators of knowledge. They are members to be assigned to the vacant place of the subject as a result of discursive relations. Thus, both Nietzsche and Foucault decentralize the role of the autonomous subject in the making of knowledge. Moreover, they both reject knowledge as a culmination of a transcendental consciousness, or a teleological progress. In both thinkers, knowledge is dependent on historical perspectives which serve as the context which makes any interpretation, judgment, or statement possible.

However, Foucault’s perspectivism is silent on the pre-discursive ground of knowledge. As stated, for Nietzsche, knowledge, along with our discursive second-nature, comes also from a pre-discursive and organic ground; namely, the will to power. Our first nature, in Nietzsche’s thought, leads to our discursive second nature, since we human beings needed knowledge in order to survive and grow. If human beings had wings to fly, or strength to survive without epistemic activities, knowledge would not be possible at all. Moreover, after our discursive second-nature have come into being and operation, we still continued to will knowledge out of our interests based on preservation and growth, instead of finding the unchanging truth for itself. Since Nietzsche’s perspectivism puts so much emphasis on the role of the organic on the issue of knowledge, I will entitle his perspectivism “organic perspectivism.”

On the other hand, Foucault does not deal with our “first nature.” On the contrary, when dealing with discourses, he delegates the prediscursive realm to silence. This is because he thinks that discourse is not life; instead, it is a dimension of life which has other regularities peculiar to itself (AK, pp. 84f, 232). He delimits his study to the very regularities of discourses which determine the human subject as their object. Doing this, he analyzes why one statement—as an enunciation of a perspective—exists, while another—as the declaration of another perspective—does not. In fact, when we look at his earlier works, ones before the publication of AK, we see that he deals with how the subjugated perspectives were silenced. For example, the normative historical ensemble which subjugates the perspectives of the mad by favor of medical discourse was the subject matter of HM. With his archaeological analyses that are concentrated on discursive normativities; the “other,” the subjugated perspectives burst open, and the possibility of other perspectives is revealed. Since Foucault reaches the other perspectives that are subjugated by analyzing the normativities created by discourses, and shows the regularity of discourses in their dispersion, I will entitle his perspectivism “discursive perspectivism.”

With his discursive perspectivism, as discussed, Foucault performs a detailed analysis of several discourses and shows the contingency of the norms that they created. Unlike Nietzsche who performs a symptomatological study which is based on the health or liveliness of the individuals and societies, Foucault conducts *regional* studies on several discourses, focusing on the *specific details* of the formation of *particular* statements and on the *specific differences* between the different rules of formation behind different discursive formations with their *peculiar* objects, concepts, subjective positions, and theories. Precisely, by archaeology, Foucault studies the rules of formation as the perspective-forming media as the battlefield, as the discursive ensemble which enables some statements to exist and some others not.

As is seen, with the term “battlefield,” Foucault describes the discursive realm, the field that consists of multiplicity of discursive and non-discursive relations. However, in his works belonging to his so-called archaeological period, he does not focus on the battle itself. In other words, Foucault’s archaeological analysis is very low in voice, if not fully silent, when it comes to the strategic aspect of these relations. Instead of analyzing the strategic aspect of the discursive realm, he concentrates his study on the explication of the historical rules governing the discursive practice, and mostly the ones internal to the discourses. Although he mentions institutions, non-discursive aspects of the discourse, political and economic events, and the issue of “appropriation,” we cannot see an explicit discussion in Foucault’s archaeology on the strategies of subjects or other actors, the way in which some perspectives are subjugated, the working principles of non-discursive realms which are inextricably tied with the discursive realm (such as institutions). For example, Foucault, in his archaeology, lays bare the historical ensemble that hold captive the mad concentrating on the historical rules of formation of the objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of the psychopathological discourse. However, the strategical rules according to which mental hospitals were administrated is not the main subject matter of the archaeological analysis. This poses two interconnected problems for archaeology. The first one is that, in order to explain the discursive realm in reciprocal relation with the non-discursive one—which is a *sine non qua* for the discursive realm—archaeology remains unsatisfactory. Foucault, for the explication of the non-discursive realm, needed the analysis of the multiplicity of force relations. In order to situate knowledge (*savoir*) into where it comes from, Foucault needed to describe the battlefield itself. In this battlefield, there are embodied subjects, and a regime of truth (which is in constant change, since it is a product of the changes in the structure of force relations) consisting of institutions and societies of interest that produce norms while subjugating some perspectives according to strategical rules. In Nietzschean terms, Foucault needed to show the position of knowledge in

the constant struggle of forces; or alternatively, “life.” Hence, he shifted his focus to the analysis of power after his archaeological works, and conducted genealogical studies in which he analyzed the battle as a whole. Another problem that results from Foucault’s concentrating on the internal rules of formation in his archaeology is that, as Foucault himself admits, archaeology has a weak explanatory power for the problems of change and causality (OT, pp. xiif). This is because an analysis of the relations of power is essential for revealing the dynamics behind the transformations of discourses, the emergence of new ones, and the reasons why these changes occur. Consequently, he extends his methodology to genealogy, one that investigates not only the internal rules that govern the operation of knowledge (*savoir*), but also force relations—either discursive or non-discursive—that cause the transformations in the discursive realm.

To sum up, in Nietzsche’s organic perspectivism, we see him concentrating on the organic ground from which knowledge flourishes and transforms, with the slogan of “the will to power interprets.” The will to power, as Nietzsche puts it, is the basic premise of all the actions of all living beings, and consequently, it is the reason of the existence of knowledge. For him, if we human beings did not need knowledge in the organic struggle of life, we would not invent knowledge. On the other hand, Nietzsche is silent on the specific details of the discursive realm. For example, the whole of western normativity, that is, the two-thousand years of the history of the norms of Christianity and “its shadows,” is expressed with the term “ascetic ideals,” without showing in detail the particular conceptual distinctions between and mapping of different systems of norms, sects, kingdoms, disciplines, walks of life, subjective positions, etc. However, as we observe in Foucault’s work, there is not a unitary set of ascetic ideals, but production, circulation, modification and transformation of many types of them. For example, even if one accepts that the norms created by medical, juridical, penal, and psychopathological discourses as manifestations of the ascetic ideals,

in Nietzsche's works, we cannot see the specific historical rules of formation of the norms created by those forms of knowledge peculiar to each of them. In the same fashion, the early psychopathology and the psychopathology from the nineteenth century onwards are treated as two different forms of normativity, and it is performed with the description of specific details and with a much higher precision. Again, in Foucault's work, we see the thresholds that lead a discourse to scientific authority and persuasive power, which gives the discourse right to subjugate other perspectives (such as the perspectives of those who are identified as "mad" by psychopathology, or, the enunciations of their caregivers, etc.) in the discursive realm. With all these specific details, Foucault has the apparatus for explaining why a statement exists in the domain of a discourse when some others do not, while Nietzsche reduces almost the whole of the knowledge of Christianity and modernity to the ascetic ideals. Nevertheless, what is missing in Foucault's works is an analysis of the organic ground of knowledge. Accordingly, the advantages and disadvantages of this contrast between Nietzsche's and Foucault's philosophies will be discussed below, after an elaboration on Foucault's genealogies which will make the picture clearer.

As stated, Foucault situates knowledge to the battlefield with his genealogical studies. At this point, performing a discussion on Foucault's major genealogical works may be helpful. This is because, in addition to the exposition of Foucault's situating of knowledge in the battlefield, three crucial issues need be uncovered. Namely, with an elaboration on Foucault's terms "power" and "power/knowledge," 1) the gist of his discursive perspectivism will get clearer, 2) his translation of Nietzsche's "the will to power" to socio-historical realm (as "power") will be explained, and 3) his guiding perspective of freedom will be unveiled.

3.2. Foucault's Ontology of Power and His Genealogies

3.2.1. Foucault's Ontology of Power

In his genealogical works, Foucault extends his archaeological method with the inclusion of the concept of power. This inclusion helps to solve the problems of change and causality in the objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of discourses. With genealogical method, power becomes the major explanatory principle for the transformations in the discursive realm. In his genealogical works, accordingly, Foucault focuses on power relations and their effects on the discursive field, treating knowledge in an explicit and reciprocal relation with power. For example, he argues that “[t]here is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (DP, p. 27).

But what exactly does Foucault mean when he uses the term power? Since Foucault does not use the term power in the traditional sense, which gives it a solely repressive role, this question needs to be answered. Firstly, for Foucault, power is not an essentially negative concept. This is to say that power, rather than being a concept that denotes a repressive function, is also a productive phenomenon. Power is productive: it produces not only knowledge, but also the whole reality, including the knowing subject. Foucault writes:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and knowledge that may be gained of him [sic] belong to this production (DP, p. 194).

Apart from its productivity, power, for Foucault, is everywhere. In other words, there is no escape from power. Indeed, since power is not a solely negative phenomenon, there is no need for an escape. However, since power is believed to play an exclusively repressive function in what Foucault calls the juridico-discursive model of power (which will be discussed below), the inescapability from power must be emphasized. Foucault does so by saying that “there is no

escaping from power, that it is always-already present, constituting that very thing which one attempts to counter it with” (HS, p. 82). This is because, in Foucault’s understanding, power does not merely correspond to the sovereign political authority. This is to say that the state and the multiplicity of institutions are only a part of the general functioning of power. In fact, power itself is the condition of the possibility of the functioning of the sovereign state and institutions. Power is everywhere; and contrary to the traditional understanding of power which holds that power works from upside down, in Foucault’s understanding, power comes from below. It is in one’s relation to oneself, in family, in universities, in friendships, in schools, etc., and these micro-relations give the sovereign power the basis on which it can operate. Foucault tells us that

[a]s against this privileging of sovereign power, I wanted to show the value of an analysis which followed a different course. Between every point of a social body, between a man and a woman, between the members of a family, between a master and his pupil, between everyone who knows and everyone who does not, there exist relations of power which are not purely and simply a projection of the sovereign’s great power over the individual; they are rather the concrete, changing soil in which the sovereign’s power is grounded, the conditions which make it possible for it to function (Foucault, 1980a, p. 187).

If power is everywhere, then, how is resistance possible? If reality, even the thinker herself is a product of power, how is for a thinker possible to talk about the terms like resistance and freedom? The answer of these question lies in the same place: Foucault’s conception of power is not negative. Power necessitates resistance, it makes possible even the things that one wants to resist. Since power has a strictly relational character, for Foucault, power without resistance, and resistance without power are two impossibilities. Precisely, for Foucault, “where there is power, there is resistance” (HS, p. 95) and resistance is the “irreducible opposite” of power (ibid., p. 96).

In his genealogical works, as it will be seen, Foucault perform his works based on a power ontology according to which power 1) is productive, 2) is everywhere, 3) comes from below, and 4) is relational (and thus, inextricably connected with resistance). This is very similar to Nietzsche’s ontology of power

(or in my terms, perspectivist process episteme-ontology of life) since in Nietzsche's understanding, as discussed earlier, the will to power 1) is productive, 2) is everywhere, 3) comes from below (i.e., from drives, instincts, etc.), and 4) is relational (i.e., always works in relation with a context where it is situated). By the end of this section, the similarities of the episteme-ontologies of Nietzsche and Foucault will be clarified, along with the departure points between the philosophies of the thinkers in question. But, before an elaboration on Foucault's genealogical method and his genealogies for the explication of this power ontology, and for showing the way in which Foucault treats knowledge and power as two inextricably connected phenomena, I think that Foucault's reception of Nietzsche (especially his exegesis of Nietzsche's genealogy in the article "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History") is worth dealing with. This is because, as it will be seen in the end, Foucault performs a genealogy in parallel with his understanding of Nietzschean genealogy.

3.2.2. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History"

The article "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" can be said to be a milestone in Foucault's oeuvre. This is because with his interpretation of Nietzsche's genealogical method and attitude in this work, Foucault signals the way in which he will perform his genealogical studies. As Donald F. Bouchard—the editor of the English translation of the article—notes in the first footnote, this essay is a manifestation of Foucault's attempt to show his relation with the sources that are fundamental to his philosophy, and, therefore, "its importance, in terms of understanding Foucault's objectives, cannot be exaggerated" (NGH, p. 76). It is known that Nietzsche and especially his genealogical method has a crucial effect on Foucault's works; especially the ones in the 1970s and afterwards. This crucial effect is summarized by Hans Sluga (2010) as Foucault's "threefold agreement with Nietzsche: (1) with regard to the genealogical method, (2) with regard to the goals of the genealogical enterprise, and (3) with regard to its broad implications"

(p. 37). In NGH, accordingly, Foucault signals the trajectory of his genealogical works of the 1970s and onwards by describing Nietzsche's genealogical method and genealogical stance that he adopts.

In Nietzsche's genealogical method, Foucault observes four characteristics. Firstly, instead of reducing the entirety of history (such as the history of morality) to a single exclusive concern (like the one of utility, human nature, etc.), genealogy "must record singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality" (NGH, 76). This is to say that, as Foucault also emphasizes in his archaeological works, genealogy forbids the assumption of a teleological continuity, and instead, analyzes events relative to the historical conditions in which they appear. Secondly, genealogy must seek the singularity of events "in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history—in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts" (ibid.). This is because, 1) as Nietzsche showed us, human nature is malleable and our sentiments were transformed throughout history, and 2) the historical developments have a direct link with the historical evolution of human sentiments—such as the emergences of bad conscience, *ressentiment*, etc. Thirdly, genealogy must be sensitive to the recurrence of events (ibid.). However, since the evolution of our feelings and instincts do not follow a teleological continuity, this is done for isolating "different scenes where they [our feelings, instincts, etc.] engaged in different roles," rather than "tracing the gradual curve of their evolution" (ibid.). For example, ascetic ideals recurred in the dominance of scientific valuation of the world, but they played a different role than the one they play in the context of religion and morality. Moreover, the emergence of bad conscience was not a result of a teleological continuity; instead, it appeared as a result of the contingent emergence of the state, and played the role of making human beings self-shaping animals out of their instinct of cruelty.

After talking about the major characteristics of genealogy, Foucault draws attention to two distinct senses of the term *Ursprung* (origin) in Nietzsche's genealogical use; namely, the stressed and the unstressed. The stressed sense of the term *Ursprung*, according to Foucault, refers to the "metaphysical origin" of historical phenomena; while the unstressed one, along with the terms *Entstehung* (emergence), *Herkunft* (stock, descent), *Abkunft* (parentage), and *Geburt* (birth) that Nietzsche uses alternately, refers to their contingent beginnings, the times of their birth (NGH, 77-80). At least when he is truly a genealogist, according to Foucault, Nietzsche challenges the pursuit of the origins, since such a pursuit is—as used in the stressed sense of *Ursprung*—"an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities," as well as a search of "that which was already there," a search of a "primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity" (NGH, p. 78). However, when Nietzsche studies history with his genealogical stance, he observes that there is no timeless or essential secret. There is no absolute and unchanging essence of things. If one may talk about essences, these are created in a piecemeal way in the course of history (ibid.). For instance, the scientists' devotion to truth was not as a result of human nature's inborn inclination. Instead, being reasonable was produced in a process in which the passion of scholars, their hatred of one another, in short, the intellectual manifestation of their wills to power, built up the precision of the scientific method (ibid.). Another example is that the concept of liberty was in fact an invention of ruling classes, rather than being fundamental to human nature (ibid.). When one investigates the beginnings of historical events without the balls and chains of eternal truth and teleological continuity, one finds that in the beginning of things, there is no "inviolable identity of their origin." Instead, one finds a "dissension of other things," a disparity as the cause of the beginnings of historical events there (NGH, 78-9).

Moreover, the search of the metaphysical origins is the search for immobile forms, truths that come before the body. According to metaphysical understanding of history, every major event has a high origin; an origin that transcends the bodily existence of human beings. The origin “is associated with gods, and its story is always sung as a theogony” (NGH, p. 79). But as Nietzsche found with his genealogical method, “historical beginnings are lowly: not in the sense of modest or discreet like steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation” (ibid.). For example, Nietzsche says that “[w]e wished to awaken the feeling of man’s [sic] sovereignty by showing his divine birth: this path is now forbidden, since a monkey stands at the entrance” (D, 49; as qtd in NGH, p. 79). Accordingly, genealogical method dismantles the indivisible teleological frameworks and their alleged “great births;” and thus, shows how the so-called great achievements have ordinary, daily, bodily beginnings. Precisely, genealogy shows us that what we take for granted as a part of indivisible and high nature of human beings were in fact born out of ordinary, daily, bodily things, even out of what metaphysics may hold to be shameful. Genealogy shows the *pudento origo* [shameful origin] of great events and ideas (Cf. D, 102; NGH, p. 77) and changes their status from “the site of truth” to the site of “becoming.” Thus, a genealogy of “values, morality, ascetism and knowledge [...] will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning; [...] it will await their emergence, once unmasked, as the face of the other” (NGH, p. 80). By getting rid of “the chimeras of the origin,” genealogy shows us that things were otherwise in the past, and since there is no fixed essence, can be otherwise in the future (ibid.).

Consequently, for Foucault, the concepts *Entstehung* (emergence) and *Herkunft* (stock, descent) are more apt for the objectives of genealogy. This is because the aim of genealogy is not to show that the past is directly active in the present (NGH, p. 81). On the contrary, the aim is, by following “the complex course of descent,”

to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents (ibid.).

When the exteriority of accidents as a collection of historical processes is shown to be the thing that produces the truths that we know, the values that we have, and the way in which we live; the normative homogeneity of all events, that is, the immoral basis of the moral, and the “heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself” shows itself (NGH, 81f). To perform a genealogy is to study history with hammer. It is not for erecting foundations. Quite the opposite: “it disturbs what was previously considered immobile” (NGH, p. 82). For example, genealogical analysis, by tracing its descent, shows under what conditions the apparently disinterested devotion of our ancestors to truth and pure objectivity emerges, and exposes the interested nature of this devotion (ibid.).

Moreover, “descent attaches itself to body” (NGH, p. 82). With a research on the descent of moral values, Nietzsche told us that since fathers mixed up causes and events, believed in the afterlife, and gave value to eternal truths, their children’s bodies suffer (NGH, p. 82). For example, the sickness of the ascetic priests, and their metaphysics as a result of their sickliness affected even our bodies—bodies that emerged centuries and centuries afterwards. With a genealogical analysis, it is seen that “the body is the inscribed surface of events [...], the locus of a dissociated self [...], and a volume in a perpetual disintegration” (NGH, p. 83). Hence, genealogy is the study that shows how our bodies are shaped, and how our bodily perceptions shifted throughout the history. Accordingly, after a genealogical analysis, it will also be seen that human beings do not have a fixed nature, and our bodies are a product of history. In other words, our bodies could be otherwise.

Entstehung (emergence), on the other hand, as Foucault puts it, is always “produced through a stage of forces” (NGH, p. 83). Hence, the analysis of *Entstehung* is performed in order to describe the struggle of forces. The emergences are produced, in Nietzsche’s terms, by the eternal recurrence of the play of dominations (NGH, p. 85). This is because “[t]he domination of certain men [sic] over others leads to the differentiation of values [...]” (ibid.). For example, the idea of liberty emerged out of class domination, and logic emerged out of the needs of human beings for survival (ibid.). In more striking terms, the emergences in history show us that any major event on earth is saturated in blood (ibid.). Moreover, “humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination” (ibid.). For example, the idea of liberty gives a system of rules to human beings. However, when the history of the idea of liberty is studied, the rules imposed by this idea (as well as any other system of rules) show a constant change. This is because

[r]ules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules (NGH, 85f).

With these words, Foucault emphasizes Nietzsche’s thought of the interpretation of the will to power. The systems of rules emerge out of the interpretations by centers of forces, and their bending of the rules (what they interpret) according to the interests of their will to power. Then, it must be that “the development of humanity is a series of interpretations” (NGH, p. 86). The role of genealogy, as Foucault observes in Nietzsche’s work, is to record the history of interpretations, i.e., the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, etc. Since they are all different interpretations of different types of will to power, “they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process,” the stage that is filled with force relations, that is, with power understood relationally (ibid.). In other words, instead of a teleological continuity or a culmination at the root of historical events,

there is a constant struggle of centers of forces; and these force centers, if they succeed, create different forms of power as a historical event by interpreting the former sets of rules and bending them to their will to power.

Consequently, genealogy represents the “historical sense” and it does what a historical research in fact should do. Genealogy is “true history” [*wirkliche Historie*] since it does not start from what is already concluded but “places within a process of development everything considered immortal in man [sic]” (NGH, p. 87). What is taken for granted must be put under investigation; such as our feelings and physiology. This is because our preconceived unities get dissolved with some historical research. Foucault holds that when we look at history with a historical sense (i.e., when we are freed from a suprahistorical objectivity which tries to reduce the whole diversity into a teleological totality) (NGH, p. 86), we see that

every sentiment, particularly the noblest and the most disinterested, has a history [...]. The body is molded by a great distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs resistances (NGH, p. 87).

Thus, genealogy as “effective history” must dismantle and dismiss historical Platonism. Instead of depending on constants, unchanging essences, teleological manifestations of immobile ideas, and “the consoling play of recognitions” (NGH, p. 88), it must introduce discontinuity to its interpretation of human condition (NGH, p. 88). This is because history tells us that we humans, our thoughts and feelings, even our physiologies are the product of teleologically discontinuous historical processes. By historicizing what is taken for granted (or alternatively, what is believed to be the immutable in human beings), genealogy as effective history produces a counter-power to the traditional knowledge (historical or else) and its contemporary regime of truth (or alternatively, *episteme*) in which knowledge is produced. It thus fulfils its aim, since “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (NGH, p. 88). In other words, going beyond the traditional or contemporary clichés, genealogy is a strategical and a critical

research aiming at being effective as presenting a resistance to knowledges that justify some centers of force by creating norms with the claim of extra-historical universality, and the eternal truths that are believed to be corresponding to them. Hence, the intellectual function of genealogy is to open up new possibilities for different deployments of power and different regimes of truth by denaturalizing (or alternatively, showing the historical contingency of) the naturalized norms of contemporary centers of power and knowledge.

Foucault, in a parallel fashion, lists the characteristics of Nietzsche's *wirkliche Historie vis à vis* traditional history. The first is that while traditional history aims to reduce singular events to great teleological movements, the genealogist, deals with the *unique* characteristics of events. Secondly, genealogy treats an event as a product of force relations, and accordingly as a result of the clashes and reactions of the will to power of force centers in the face of haphazard conflicts; as opposed to traditional historian's concepts such as treaty, decision, reign, which all imply transcendental consciousness (ibid.). Thirdly, the traditional historian's interest is the contemplation on the distances and heights, such as the eternal truth. On the other hand, genealogist focuses on things that are nearest to h/er: "the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies" (NGH, p. 89). However, s/he looks at those phenomena from a distance, just like the gaze of a physician, and finds body, its health or sickness, in the heart of historical events. Finally, the fourth trait of Nietzsche's effective history, as Foucault states, is "affirmation of knowledge as perspective" (NGH, p. 90). While the traditional historian denies the perspectival character of knowledge, and tries to show h/erself as a disinterested knowing subject who is in search of *the* truth; the genealogist is aware that knowledge is for cutting—it is a strategic weapon, a counter-force, a resistance, a surgery—and performs h/er genealogy for the support of h/er passions (or alternatively, h/er guiding perspective). Foucault holds that

[h]istorians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy—the unavoidable obstacles of their passion. Nietzsche's version of historical sense is explicit in its perspective and acknowledges its system of injustice. Its perception is slanted, being a deliberate appraisal, affirmation, or negation; it reaches the lingering and poisonous traces in order to prescribe the best antidote. It is not given to a discreet effacement before the objects it observes and does not submit itself to their processes; nor does it seek laws, since it gives equal weight to its own sight and to its objects. Through this historical sense, knowledge is allowed to create its own genealogy in the act of cognition; and *wirkliche Historie* composes a genealogy of history as the vertical projection of its position (ibid.).

The historians' history is, accordingly, the one that denies even h/er body and h/er perspective in the search of eternal truth. As it is discussed, knowledge, in Nietzsche's understanding, is the product of the interpretation of the will to power of a power-quantum—in this context, the historian. However, the alleged objectivity of the historian inverts the relation between will and truth, and necessarily appeals to “final causes and teleology—the beliefs that place the historian in the family of ascetics” (NGH, p. 92).

Under these circumstances, Foucault asks, how could a genealogist as a historian be possible in the thought of Nietzsche? The answer is simple: by turning history against its birth (NGH, p. 92). The genealogical task is to master history and to use historical knowledge against history itself for overturning its Platonic convictions. Accordingly, the historical sense produces “three uses that oppose and correspond to three Platonic modalities of history” (ibid.). These are: 1) parodic and farcical use (against the Platonic recognition of reality), 2) dissociative use (against the Platonic identity and continuity of Ideas), and 3) sacrificial use (against Platonic truth—affirming its own injustice and perspectivity).

As it will be seen, Foucault performs genealogical analyses on penalty and sexuality in such a way that share the four constraints that he observed to exist in Nietzschean genealogy in NGH; i.e., he performs genealogy 1) recording the singularity of events without teleological constants, 2) seeking the historical emergences of things in the most unpromising places like body and sentiments, 3)

being sensitive to the recurrence of events, and 4) defining the instances where the historical events are absent. Doing this, again, Foucault will find the historical emergences in “dissension of other things,” and find the lowly character of the great emergences of history. Thus, it will be seen that, the emergences occur in the level of the exteriority of accidents. However, this accidental character of beginnings does not imply the *complete* haphazardness of historical events. The haphazardness is tied to power, the contextual deployment of the totality of the multiplicity of force relations. Hence, Foucault, just as what he observed in Nietzsche’s genealogy in NGH, looks for the beginnings of historical events (mainly, the transformations in discourses) on the stage of force relations. Consequently, historical transformations in the system of rules will appear as new interpretations of rules by some forces and their bending the old set of rules according to their interests. Moreover, in accordance with the genealogical stance he puts forward in NGH, he questions what is mostly taken for granted and remained unquestioned (i.e., our physiology) and investigates the functioning of the distinct regimes that molded the body of the modern human subject. With what he finds, Foucault tries to illuminate the way in which bodies were made subjects. As a result, affirming knowledge as perspective, with his genealogical studies, he aims to produce a counter-power to modern power/knowledge networks, by historicizing the truths of some modern forms of power—those that produce modern subjects, truths, and bodies, and that naturalize what they produce in order to solidify their power. Foucault does this for the sake of his guiding perspective: freedom. That is, he historicizes what is naturalized to show us that we could be otherwise, and could know otherwise. Lastly, in parallel with his description of Nietzschean genealogy in NGH, Foucault uses parodic, dissociative and sacrificial use of history. This means that Sluga is right to note that Foucault performs his genealogical works in a threefold agreement with Nietzsche in terms of the genealogical method, the goals of genealogy, and its broad implications.

3.2.3. Foucault's Major Genealogical Works

Foucault performs his genealogical works of the 1970s on the basis of 1) his extended discursive perspectivism; which can be termed as a “power ontology” whose major characteristics are described above and 2) his agreement with Nietzsche in terms of quiddity, goals and the implications of genealogical method. In such a manner, he investigates how modern forms of power function, and how “regimes of truth” govern the body and the behavior of modern subject. In other words, Foucault analyzes the “governmentality” (or alternatively, governmental rationality) of the present in its historical development. For Foucault (2008), governmentality is “the way in which one conducts the conduct of other men [sic].” It is the analytical grid for force relations (p. 186). In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault analyzes “disciplinary power.” Specifically, he elaborates on those force relations that conduct the behavior of human beings individually, by normalizing their souls and disciplining their bodies. When it comes to *History of Sexuality*, Foucault focuses on “bio-power”—the power/knowledge network in the modern governmental rationality that operates at the level of populations, instead of individuals.

3.2.3.1. *Discipline and Punish*

Discipline and Punish is written to be a “correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge” (DP, p. 23). While what Foucault means by “soul” shows itself as the modern arrangement of human sentiments, what he means by “a new power to judge” corresponds to a “scientifico-legal complex” which 1) gives the power to punish its legal, ethical and scientific basis, 2) extends the effects of the punitive power to the degree that it produces a new type of society (i.e., carceral society), and 3) masks the historical specificity of the new penal style (ibid.) by being the style of governing the whole of social body. With an investigation on the history of penal styles by situating them into constantly changing power/knowledge networks, Foucault observes the

emergence of a new form of power. This is “disciplinary power,” (as opposed to the old “sovereign power”) and it is a major constituent of the soul of the modern individual. In other words, modern subject not only designs h/er behavior according to disciplinary power, but also perceives h/erself and h/er body in accordance with this form of power. In modern times, unlike the Platonic idea of the body as the prison of the soul, for Foucault, “soul is the prison of the body.” (DP, p. 30). *Discipline and Punish* is written as a “history of the present,” (DP, p. 31) to show how and why disciplinary power as a “body politics,” or a “political anatomy,” invests human bodies and “subjugate[s] them by turning them into objects of knowledge” (DP, p. 28), as well as how it imprisons the body of the modern subject to its own soul by such an objectification. Moreover, Foucault analyzes how disciplinary power produces a prison-like society in order to operate effectively by creating docile and useful individuals. With these, Foucault tells the story of the technologies of power, aiming at the production of the modern subject and its soul (i.e., its instincts, its sentiments, its personality, its way of perceiving oneself and others, and its everyday habits).

This study is performed in accordance with four rules that are helpful to bear in mind in order to capture its character and aims. These are 1) rather than focusing solely on the repressive side of punishment, regarding punishment as a complex social function which possibly has some positive effects as well as negative ones (DP, p. 23), 2) instead of treating punitive styles “simply as consequences of legislation or as indicators of social structures,” situating them to the general working mechanisms of power and regarding punishment as a political tactic (ibid), 3) rather than considering the history of penal law and of human sciences as separate series that overlap on occasion, looking for whether they both derive from the same process of “epistemologico-juridical” formation—“in short, make the technology of power the very principle both of the humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of man [sic]” (ibid)., and, lastly, 4) trying to find out whether the entry of the soul (and with this entry, the “insertion in legal

practice of a whole corpus of ‘scientific’ knowledge) to the system of penal justice is an effect of a transformation in the society or not (DP, p. 24). When we look at the first rule, we see the power-ontology that Foucault adopts: power is, rather than representing a negative and censoring function, is a positive phenomenon, since it produces reality. Second rule shows us the strategical aspect of the genealogical stance that Foucault shares with Nietzsche: treating historical events (in this context, the emergence of “disciplinary power”) as taking place from within a stage of force relations. The third rule shows us something similar to the second; i.e., the strategic aspect of genealogy. This means that, rather than treating human sciences as a development based solely on human consciousness that finds eternal truths in the end, and believing that penal power operates according to those developments in human sciences, Foucault investigates whether they are both results of a certain deployment of force relations. Hence, Foucault investigates the conditions in the battlefield under which the discourses related to penalty emerge and reach to the status of scientificity, and inquiries into the effect of disciplinary power on the general level of knowledge—of *savoir*. Lastly, when we look at the fourth rule, we see Foucault in search of a knowledge of the transformation of an interpretation on how to exercise power in general. This will, as will be seen, work as the dismantling of the modern human soul and the claims that the present style of punishment is a humanitarian improvement; and by the completion of this study, Foucault aims at producing a resistance, a counter-power for the “disciplinary power” which has a high potential of creating states of domination. In the light of these, it would be helpful to elaborate on what Foucault does in DP in terms of his genealogical aim; that is, showing that the things we take for granted, or as natural and universal, were historically contingent, and may be otherwise in the future.

Foucault begins DP with a striking example of a public execution which takes place in Paris in 1757. The pain inflicted on the body of Damien the regicide (Robert-François Damiens) was, as Foucault reports, a public spectacle

which took the serious attention of people and even newspapers. Each horrifying detail of the torture on the body is spoken by several people, like Damien himself, officers, the clerk of the court, the executioner, etc. This was an example of a punitive style in which torture is the main element, and the main target of the punishment is the body. Eighty years later, Léon Faucher formulates the rules “for the house of young prisoners in Paris” which consists of a timetable for waking up, eating, working and praying, moral reading, schooling and recreation, as well as a dress- and conduct-code (DP, 6f). In less than a century, “in Europe and in the United States, the entire economy of punishment was redistributed” (DP, p. 7). Foucault considers, among many other changes, “the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle” (ibid.) and “elimination of pain” (DP, p. 11). For example, if an execution will happen, the body of the convicted is now injected tranquilizers. In 1792, the first use of guillotine had taken place, which is perfectly consistent with the principle of the elimination of pain (DP, p. 13). This is because “[t]he guillotine takes life almost without touching the body, just as prison deprives of liberty or a fine reduces wealth” (ibid.).

With some gradual changes and with some exceptions, by the beginning in the nineteenth century, “[t]he age of sobriety in punishment had begun” with the disappearance of spectacle, torture, and the theatrical representation of pain (DP, p. 14). The diminishing of the harshness of punishment was often regarded as a quantitative phenomenon, such as “less cruelty, less pain, more kindness, more respect, more ‘humanity’” (DP, p. 16). However, for Foucault, although the intensity of the punishment may be less in the new penal style, these changes point to a “displacement in the very object of the punitive operation” (ibid.), instead of the improvement in humanity. In other words, new penalty is a sign of a change of objective—a new technology of power. Just like what Gabriel Bonnot de Mably proposes regarding what the target of the punishment must be, the new objective of penalty is to “normalize” individuals’ behavior, as well as their soul—their instincts, sentiments, personality, and everyday habits (DP, p. 20f).

This means that what is now judged and “punished” is not the body but the soul. For the aims of normalization, a “whole series of subsidiary authorities” now assist the judge in order to support h/er judgment, such as psychiatric or psychological experts, magistrates, educationalists, and members of the prison service (DP, p. 21). Foucault describes the judge’s position, and links the new understanding of criminal justice to knowledge as follows:

'Of course, we pass sentence, but this sentence is not in direct relation to the crime. It is quite clear that for us it functions as a way of treating a criminal. We punish, but this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a cure.' Today, criminal justice functions and justifies itself only by this perpetual reference to something other than itself, by this unceasing reinscription in non-judicial systems. Its fate is to be redefined by knowledge (DP, p. 22).

Since according to the new understanding of criminal justice, a corrective or normalizing action is sought for the criminal’s soul, and punishment is intended to be a “cure,” new objects, subjects, concepts and strategies as “a whole system of truth” come into existence. Norms must be created for a claim of curing the criminals and delinquents, and these must be rules that make human beings classified according to certain scientific criteria, such as normal and abnormal, or criminally insane and monstrously healthy. DP is written to lay bare this new system of truth that human sciences get their strength in relation with the new deployment of power (i.e., disciplinary power) which emerges with some historical processes and gets shaped according to the needs of the industrialized society.

For explaining disciplinary power in which the modern subject is constructed, its genealogical contrast with the old sovereign power is worth elaborating. Pre-eighteenth century sovereign power is based on the punishment of the body in order to reassure the power of the king, the power which is attacked by the individual who offends the laws, which represents the authority of the sovereign. The visibility of the punishment is a show-off of the sovereign power in proportion to the offense, showing that the sovereign power is invincible with respect to the power of the offender. Hence, public execution, is a “technique of

power,” which is representative of the sovereign form of power, rather than being “an extreme expression of lawless rage” (DP, p. 33). It is a planned regulation of pain exercised on the body of the one who attacked the authority of the king.

Foucault writes the following:

We must regard the public execution, as it was still ritualized in the eighteenth century, as a political operation. It was logically inscribed in a system of punishment, in which the sovereign, directly or indirectly, demanded, decided and carried out punishments, in so far as it he who, through the law, had been injured by the crime. In every offence there was a *crimen magistatis* and in the least criminal a potential regicide. And the regicide, in turn, was neither more nor less, than the total, absolute criminal since, instead of attacking, like any offender, a particular decision or wish of the sovereign power, he attacked the very principle and physical person of the prince. The ideal punishment of the regicide had to constitute the *summum* of all possible tortures. It would be an expression of infinite vengeance [...] (DP, pp. 53f).

This form of power is deployed on the basis of a principle juridical truth peculiar to itself, and since no power relation exists without “the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge” (as discussed above), sovereign power is tied to a system of knowledge which produces a kind of truth.

But what is the kind of truth that is produced and investigated? What is the object of knowledge which is tied to this form of power? The answer is rather simple: Since sovereign power, as its name suggests, rests on the absolute sovereignty of the king, the truth which is needed is about the absolute authority of the sovereign; and in criminal issues, the truth is about whether the violation of this absoluteness of the law enforced by the king takes place or not. Some techniques of the establishment of the truth of the crime may be listed as the confession of the criminal, juridical torture (in order to make the criminal confess), using official documents and evidences collected and interpreted by judges and magistrates who represent the power of the sovereign. Accordingly, the object of knowledge in the sovereign juridical system is solely the “act” of the crime (i.e., whether the offense to the king had took place or not). In criminal issues, since the matter is whether the king is attacked or not, “the establishment of truth was the absolute right and the exclusive power of the sovereign and his

judges” (DP, p. 35). In short, the truth in criminal justice is the truth of the act. Knowledge is designed for the establishment of the truth of the absolute power and the truth of the act of the crime. The target of the punishment is the body of the criminal; and, finally, the strategy of this power/knowledge network is the constant reestablishment of the power of the sovereign by making the punishment visible in order to inscribe the truth of the invincibility of the power of the king. Just as what Nietzsche states about memory in GM, sovereign power inflicts pain with atrocity, and renders itself imprinted to the hearts of its subjects (Cf. DP, p. 55, 57).

The above picture is quite different from the operation of the modern forms of power. In DP, Foucault analyzes the historical process of the transformation of the sovereign power to the disciplinary power. This transformation is profoundly linked to the birth of prison, and to the generalization of the methods used in prisons to the entire society. An important step on the way to the birth of prison is the petitions against torture and public executions organized by reformists who demand penalties to be “regulated and proportioned by the offences,” passing “death sentence only [to] those convicted of murder,” and “the tortures that revolt humanity [to] be abolished” (DP, 73). In the second half of the eighteenth century, protests against public executions grow rapidly among people like philosophers, theorists of law, lawyers, as well as in parliaments and public petitions (ibid.). In the nineteenth century, the demand of leniency succeeds, and a complete different regime of truth, a different understanding of a penal justice, a different regime of truth is produced in parallel with a completely different *savoir* from the one of the sovereign power—and this means that a completely new *episteme* is on play. For Foucault, this transformation “cannot be separated from several underlying processes” (DP, p. 76). For example, it is not a coincidence that the emergence of the leniency in punishment takes place at the same time with the growing capitalization in economy, and the emergence of the bourgeois class at the times of industrial

revolution. One of the crucial processes in the macro-level is, as Foucault partially narrates from Pierre Chaunu,

a change in the operation of economic pressures, a general rise in the standard of living, a large demographic expansion, an increase in wealth and property and 'a consequent need for security' (DP, p. 76, Cf. Chaunu, 1971, p. 76).

Since in the regimes up to the *Ancien Regime* (characterized by the sovereign form of power, and abolished with the French Revolution), the bodies, health, and the lives of the citizens were of little importance, there is no surprise that punishments were executed with a contempt for the body.

However, in industrialized societies in which trade and production makes possible the accumulation of wealth only with the inclusion of the trained bodies and disciplined souls as the labor force into the system, a need for transformation occurs (Cf. DP, p. 221). But how does this happen? Does not a punitive style with more leniency contradict with the accomplishment of the need for security? Foucault answers these questions with his genealogical analysis based on a micro-physics of power in which power is inextricably connected with knowledge. For him, rather than eliminating the illegalities, the new penal system must be conceived as a new mechanism of power for administering them (DP, p. 89). Foucault enlists the essential *raisons d'être* of the penal reform in the eighteenth century as follows:

Shift the object and change the scale. Define new tactics in order to reach a target that is now more subtle [sic] but also more widely spread in the social body. Find new techniques for adjusting punishment to it and for adapting its effects. Lay down new principles for regularizing, refining, universalizing the art of punishing. Homogenize its application. Reduce its economic and political cost by increasing its effectiveness and by multiplying its circuits. In short, constitute a new economy and a new technology of the power to punish [...] (ibid.).

The new object is the “citizen,” who is in a social contract with *the people*. Scale-wise, the criminal is, now, not the enemy of the king, but the enemy of the people, since s/he broke the contract. Hence, in the new form penal strategy, punishments are performed for the defense of the industrialized society and its wealth (DP, p. 90). The techniques for punishment are adjusted for the defense of the industrial

society and using their effects are performed by power/knowledge networks which universalize the art of punishing, and produce a carceral archipelago which increases its cost effectiveness; and thus, disciplinary power claims its victory throughout the whole of the society.

But what phases does this process follow, and how does knowledge get involved? Foucault holds that two types of objectification of the crime and the criminal in order to universalize the punitive function happens: 1) objectifying the criminal as the “enemy of all,” as a villain, a monster, and after some time, a “sick person,” the abnormal who needs treatment for being normalized in terms of scientifically objective norms: the *homo criminalis* (this objectification appears after the birth of prison) and 2) objectification of the crime itself (i.e., definitions for what the offences really are); as a consequence of the need to measure and calculate the effects (social damages of offences, and the utility of punishment) and an organization of prevention thereof (DP, p. 101). Each line of objectification, for Foucault, has the faith to be tied with a domain of knowledge. Foucault observes that,

[i]n either case, one sees that the power relation that underlies the exercise of punishment begins to be duplicated by an object relation in which are caught up not only the crime as a fact to be established according to common norms, but the criminal as an individual to be known according to specific criteria. One also sees that this object relation is not superimposed, from the outside, on the punitive practice, as would be a prohibition laid on the fury of the public execution by the limits of the sensibility, or as would be a rational or ‘scientific’ interrogation as to what this man that one is punishing really is. The processes of objectification originate in the very tactics of power and of the arrangement of its exercise (DP, 101f).

This is to say that in order for the new power to judge operate properly, there is a need for the legitimization of the punishment, and for this, there is a need for a norm widely accepted by the people—a need for scientific objectivity. Hence, the crime and the criminal must be defined and must be agreed upon, and this is the job of knowledge (*savoir*)—discourses related to penalty. However, knowledge does not superimpose a norm outside of power. In other words, objectification in punishment is a *strategic* need emerged in a specific stage of power (such as the

emergence of the bourgeois and the need of the labor force for the accumulation of capital), and the related knowledge is an epiphenomenon of this strategical need informed by the same stage of power. For example, as Foucault states in NGH, the concept of liberty is not rooted in human nature; instead, it is an invention of the ruling classes (NGH, p. 78) as a strategical weapon for their growth. That is, power needs knowledge in order to operate properly. Moreover, disciplinary power objectifies human beings by making them something to be known. It classifies human beings under some scientifically objective categories (such as normal human beings, criminals, delinquents, homosexuals, etc.) and hierarchizes them by placing them under some category. However, these classifications would not be possible if the new deployment of power had not been emerged. This aspect of power/knowledge is the other side of the story: knowledge needs power in order to get its object of study. For example, as will be discussed, in the reign of sovereign power, sciences of nature flourished and rapidly grown, since they served to establish the facts of the crime against the king (DP, p. 226). This is because the object of their study overlapped with the needs of sovereign power: the truth of the act of the crime must be revealed with the procedures of these sciences.

In accordance with the understanding of punishment for the defense of the society, as Foucault notes, in the late eighteenth century, three technologies regarding the power to punish were under discussion (DP, p. 130). The first is the one that belongs to the old sovereign power, which is discussed above in detail. The other two are corrective, utilitarian perspectives; however, diverging in their working mechanisms. The second model is the one of the “punitive city” (defended by the reformists such as Cesare Beccaria, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Jacques Pierre Brissot, etc.) whose rationale is based on the constant distribution of the “signs” of punishment, refreshing the memories of the juridical subjects. Reforming jurists, as Foucault puts it, “saw punishment as a procedure for requalifying individuals [...] as juridical subjects” (ibid.). According to this

understanding, witnessing diverse signs of punishment—such as employment of the criminal, theaters of punishment, the reminders of the idea of severe punishment throughout the city—deters potential criminals and establish an efficient penal economy (DP, pp. 104-114). The third technology of power in question is the institution of prison which rests on the idea that punishment is “a technique for the coercion of individuals” which operates “techniques of training the body – not signs – by the traces it leaves, in the form of habits, in behavior,” and presupposes “the setting up of a specific power for the administration of the penalty” (DP, p. 131). In other words, the third punitive technique in question does not treat the actual or potential criminals as juridical subjects. Instead, it seeks to train their bodies by habit-imposition with techniques such as organized timetables, and by building upon them a soul that makes these bodies docile and useful with techniques of constant surveillance, documentation and normalizing intervention. At this point, Foucault asks “how is it that, in the end, it was the third that was adopted?” (ibid.). How did a “quite different materiality, a quite different physics of power, a quite different way of investing men’s [sic] bodies had emerged” within a short time span (DP, p. 116)?

For answering this question, Foucault refers to some historical events. The first one is that, as he puts it, “the classical age discovered the body as object and target of power” (DP, p. 136). The investment in the body in that age is done by the intensive care on the manipulation of the body, making it skillful and forceful like a soldier in the early 17th century who has “a lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach [...]” (DP, p. 135). “[A] man of such a figure could not fail to be agile and strong” for he is trained for waiting the command and successfully perform it when it is given (ibid.). By the late eighteenth century, as Foucault describes, “the soldier has become something that can be made out of a formless clay” with training procedures that shape the habits and body postures of the army recruits and “one has 'got rid of the peasant' and given him 'the air of a soldier'” (ibid.). The book *Man-the-Machine*—or alternatively, *Man a Machine*—

published by Jullien Offray de la Mettrie as a response to the Cartesian argument that the functioning of the non-human animals is that of automata was written at the same time. This work shows us two aspects of the body: the intelligible and useful body (DP, p. 136). As both a reduction of the soul to the material and a theory of training, this work shows up with the central theme of “docility” which combines the analyzability and the manipulability of the body. Foucault writes:

A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved. The celebrated automata, on the other hand, were not only a way of illustrating an organism, they were also political puppets, small-scale models of power (ibid.).

Although it was not a new thing that the human body is under the exercise of power and control, Foucault observes three differences in the new technique of power based on constant training: the scale, the object and the modality of control. In terms of scale, the body is now not treated as a “wholesale,” an indissociably united material; instead, as having a “retail” individuality which divides the body infinitely to things like its movements, gestures, attitudes, and rapidity, each open to manipulation, control, and improvement. In terms of object, instead of elements of behavior, or, the language of the body; the economy, efficiency, and the internal organization of movements is under discussion. Moreover, in terms of modality, this new technique is based on an uninterrupted, a continuous coercion. In other words, instead of exercising power over the individuals only when a violation occurs, disciplines control the entirety of the processes of activities (DP, 136f). Foucault writes the following:

These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called ‘disciplines’. Many disciplinary methods had long been in existence - in monasteries, armies, workshops. But in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the disciplines became general formulas of domination (DP, p. 137).

In this new context where the disciplines became the general formulas of domination, there is an emergence of a formation of a type of a relationality in which bodies are made the more the obedient, the more the useful (DP, p. 138).

With the emergence of disciplines, human body is explored and analyzed by being broken up into its elements; thus a new political anatomy and a mechanics of power is born. Since this mechanics of power defines the way to govern others' bodies with its own techniques and its procedures based on training, "discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies." (DP, 138). The invention of the disciplines which produce docile and useful bodies, for Foucault, was not a sudden discovery; instead, it gradually spread from the secondary education to primary schools, started to be effective in hospitals, and within two decades, "restructured the military organization" (DP, p. 138). In each case, however, the adoption of disciplines was due to some needs such as an industrial innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle or the victories of Prussia (ibid.). In the end, they became the system itself to be analyzed, i.e., as "disciplinary power" (DP, pp. 137f). To summarize, the third punitive style in question (i.e., disciplines) was the most appropriate one in the context of its emergence. This is firstly because disciplinary techniques proved their success in many institutions such as military barracks, factories, hospitals, etc. and they were ready to be used. Secondly, the mode of production changed, and the industrialized society needed disciplines for cost-efficiency. That is, eliminating offences before they occur with an automatically working machinery of power, and creating docile and useful individuals who are integrated into the system of production is what exactly the industrial society needs for its growth. It is way cost-efficient than either severely punishing the offenders, or building a punitive city. As a result, disciplinary techniques governed the whole of the Western society, and the whole system gradually changed from sovereign power to disciplinary power.

But how does disciplinary mechanism work? According to Foucault, "discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space" (DP, p. 141). It employs some techniques such as enclosure, partitioning, establishing functional sites, and ranking for achieving this distribution in a controlled and efficient way

(DP, pp. 141-6). With these techniques, disciplines organize cells, places, and ranks; and thus, create a disciplinary distribution which

allows both the characterization of the individual as individual and the ordering of a given multiplicity. It [disciplinary distribution] is the first condition for the control and use of an ensemble of distinct elements: the base for a micro-physics of what might be called a 'cellular' power (DP, p. 149).

In other words, with spatially distributing the bodies, disciplines create cellular individualities. In this micro-physics of power, each individual is a case study; each of which may be ranked as "higher cells" or lower ones in the social body, according to their functioning of docility-utility. They have the chance to become the subjects of operation as long as they work efficient in the whole system.

Discipline works in order to supervise individuals and train them as efficient as possible; and thus, choose its highly ranked subjects according to their docility-utility. Foucault holds that "[d]iscipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of power that regards individuals both as its objects and instruments of its exercise" (DP, p. 170). The success of disciplinary power can be sought in its simple but permanently coercive techniques which gradually engulfed all the modern institutions. In other words, its simple techniques of training become triumphant in the course of history. According to Foucault, the triumphant means of effective training used by disciplines are 1) hierarchical observation, 2) normalizing judgment, and 3) the examination.

Firstly, with hierarchical observation, there occurs a constant coercion on the basis of a constant gaze. The ideal model of the "military camp" with a hierarchized and anonymous surveillance (i.e., "the eyes that must see without being seen") of their visible and categorized subjects introduced a new machinery of power that is closely connected with a new architecture that allows the multiplicity of individuals to be known and manipulated. Factories, schools, and hospitals are started to be built in accordance with the technique of hierarchical

observation; and with these developments, the new machinery of power started to function with the following properties:

The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is true that its pyramidal organization gives it a 'head', it is the apparatus as a whole that produces 'power' and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field. This enables the disciplinary power to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and always alert, since by its very principle it leaves no zone of shade and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of supervising; and absolutely "discreet", for it functions permanently and largely in silence (DP, p. 177).

This is to say that, with its technique of hierarchical observation, disciplinary power 1) is not a property to be possessed; instead, as a relational machinery, it gives its subjects certain roles in its exercise, 2) distributes its individuals to their hierarchical fields, 3) is temporally permanent, spatially everywhere, and infinitely interventionist. Hence, disciplinary power reproduces itself without recourse to an identifiable subject: it is a self-growing machinery which produces docile and useful subjects by means of constant observation.

The second means of correct training to which disciplinary power owes its success is the "normalizing judgment." As its name suggests, this technique depends on norms and a judge-function. Yet, the judge-function of disciplinary power is essentially different from the function of the judge in a court of law. The function of the judge in a court of law is to perform a judgment with respect to a possible crime in the sense of a violation of an article of a law. This judge-function, however, is incompetent in administering the whole life—the time, activity, behavior, speech, body, habit, personality, sentiments, and instincts of an actual or potential criminal. Disciplines, on the other hand, established, firstly,

an 'infra-penalty'; they partitioned an area that the laws had left empty; they defined and repressed a mass of behaviour that the relative indifference of the great systems of punishment had allowed to escape (DP, p. 178).

Firstly, with this technique of power, even the slightest departure from the "normal" behavior had been subject to a punishment in institutions such as schools, mental hospitals, and factories; by normalizing-judges such as

pedagogues, teachers, doctors, mentors, etc. Secondly, in disciplines, even the inability to perform a task became punishable. For example, the regulations of Prussian infantry suggest a severe treatment to those who fail to learn how to use a rifle correctly, or those who fail to learn their lessons properly (DP, p. 179). Thirdly, instead of being a manifestation of a vengeance, disciplinary punishment is essentially corrective. It reduces gaps in the shaping of the individual by punishing them only in the way of forcing them to perform specific exercises in order to regulate their habits and personalities. For example, educational reformer Jean-Baptiste de La Salle offers a punishment either of writing out, or of learning by heart for the students who fail to write what they were supposed to write (DP, 179f). Fourthly, disciplinary power is a double system of gratification-punishment where punishment is not the whole, but an element. This double system itself is corrective and normalizing. This is because 1) instead of being limited only by punishment, the individual is encouraged to follow rules by being assessed with respect to the two poles of the norm (i.e., the good and the evil; or alternatively, the normal and the abnormal) at the same time, and 2) an establishment of a hierarchy of the 'good' and the 'bad' subjects can be put into operation; and thus, the individual can be motivated not only by the negative effects of the punishment, but also by the positive reinforcement of the privileges of being a good subject—i.e., being a good student, citizen, soldier, worker, or inhabitant of the prison. This is a micro-economy of a *perpetual* penalty in which each individual has a balance-sheet of minuses and pluses, and this micro economy

operates a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individuals themselves, of their nature, their potentialities, their level or their value. By assessing acts with precision, discipline judges individuals 'in truth'; the penalty that it implements is integrated into the cycle of knowledge of individuals (DP, p. 181).

Accordingly, disciplinary power operates hand in hand with knowledge—by constantly producing truth about individuals and placing them into a hierarchical position on the basis of this truth. In other words, disciplinary power is inextricably connected to knowledges: Knowledges of observation; the taxonomy

and classification of individuals based on the knowledge at hand by constant observation; the knowledge of the indexed, compared, classified individuals; and the “truth” of the human sciences that serve as the norm according to which classified individuals are distributed to one hierarchical position or another. These knowledges consisting of a regime of truth and a classification of individuals is the condition of the possibility of the exercise of power and conducting the conduct of human beings in the context of disciplinary power that, in turn, makes human beings an object of knowledge, observation, classification, and hierarchization. While in sovereign power, truth was about the law, in disciplinary power, it is about the norm. Hence, norm—produced by the “scientific” knowledge of the human sciences—is the new law (DP, p. 183). It is the new basis on which individuals are made subjects, and they are hierarchized. Moreover, since it gives no room outside of a perpetual penalty for the individuals to be corrected, disciplinary power has hegemonic effects on the lives of individuals. It deepens the inequalities between those who have the authority to put a gaze upon others and those who are visible; or those who have the authority to punish and those who are corrected.

According to Foucault, the third technique of disciplinary power is examination. It is the combination of the techniques of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment. The power of examination comes from the fact that “[i]n it are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth” (ibid.). An important aspect of examination is its functioning in a disciplinary mechanism. Examination executes the distribution of the subject-object relation: “It [examination] manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected” (DP, 184f). In other words, it has a great role in the process of classifying and judging its objects. Foucault writes that

In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of

being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection. And the examination is the technique by which power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification. In this space of domination, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification (ibid.).

An important aspect of examination that links disciplinary power to knowledges of human sciences is the introduction of individuals into the field of documentation (DP, p. 189). Documentation in examination is a kind of administrative writing that collects and records detailed information about those who are documented in order to follow their developments, deficiencies—in short, their special characteristics. This is because, with this body of documentation, the knowledge of the population, and a chance of comparing the individual with the whole can be obtained (DP, p. 190). With this procedure of documentation, examination “makes each individual a ‘case’: a case which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power” (DP, 191). In other words, power produces individuals not only as disciplined souls and docile bodies, but also as individuals (i.e., as individual case-studies) with their peculiar/individualized abilities, habits, positive or negative potentials, and characteristics.

Documentation of an individual serves as a means of objectification and subjection. Discipline renders individuals objects to be classified under categories (or alternatively, species) as “the child, the patient, the madman, the prisoner” from the eighteenth century on, and these classifications were made more and more from that time on based on the body of increasing disciplinary documentation. This objectification gave the human sciences (such as pedagogy, medical sciences, psychopathology, criminology, etc.) their objects, namely, individuals as case-studies; as documentable, classifiable, observable entities. As a result, with this new deployment of power-knowledge (i.e., disciplinary power,) individual as well as knowledge is produced—they are *fabricated* by constant description, formalization and proliferation of scientific discourses on different

individualities. In opposition to the juridico-discursive model of power, Foucault writes the following:

It is often said that the model of a society that has individuals as its constituent elements is borrowed from the abstract juridical forms of contract and exchange. Mercantile society, according to this view, is represented as a contractual association of isolated juridical subjects. Perhaps. Indeed, the political theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries often seems to follow this schema. But it should not be forgotten that there existed at the same period a technique for constituting individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge. The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called 'discipline'. We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors' it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him [sic] belong to this production (DP, p. 194).

With those words, Foucault rejects the juridico-discursive model of power that considers individuals as those whose only contract with power is through laws. Power, in this understanding, gets involved into the lives of individuals—as juridical subjects—in order to keep them lawful. Thus, the power of law represses the individual in order to maintain its force upon h/er. However, with disciplinary techniques, as Foucault puts it, power also acquires a productive function that makes itself more manifest from the nineteenth century onwards: it creates individuals, truth, and in the macro level, reality. On the other hand, it dominates individuals by putting them under constant intervention, judgment, and examination.

For Foucault, Bentham's Panopticon, as an architectural figure, is an epitome of the culmination of disciplinary power, and its spread throughout the entire society (DP, 200). The principle mechanism of Panoptic prisons is that there is a tower in the center of a circular building for which each cell and each individual inmate is completely visible. Moreover, there may or may not be an observer in the tower. Hence, the prisoners—or in other institutional buildings (such as clinics, hospitals, factories and schools based on the Panoptical principle), the madmen, the patients, the workers, the schoolboys—not knowing

whether they are actually watched or not, feel the gaze of the constant surveillance, and act accordingly. Thus, disciplinary power inscribes its norms on their hearts by rendering them “perfectly individualized and constantly visible” (ibid.). The major effect of the Panoptical model is “to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power [and] creating and sustaining a power independent of the person who exercises it” (DP, p. 201). Power, in this mechanism, is visible but unverifiable. This is because the tower is always visible to the inmate; however, s/he never knows whether or not s/he is actually under any gaze at a specific point in time. As a consequence, in the Panoptical mechanism, the subject of power becomes anonymous. It is in such an arrangement that the exercise of power does not need a harsh intervention to the state of things. Instead, it subtly increases its efficiency by spreading its points of contact. In other words, when it is established, the subjects and objects of this system become an empty, an anonymous function, and make this anonymous function work by its own arrangement of objects in different. Hence, a huge cost-efficiency follows—just as Bentham describes the effects of the Panoptic inspection-house as

‘Morals reformed – health preserved – industry invigorated – instruction diffused – public burthens lightened – Economy seated, as it were, upon a rock – the gordian knot of the Poor-Laws not cut, but united – all by a simple idea in architecture!
(Bentham, 39; as qtd in DP, p. 207).

In this context, carceral punishment as a corrective or disciplinary mechanism makes sense, and gains victory over the punitive styles of sovereign power and “punitive city.” Moreover, with such efficiency of control, and thanks to its low costs, it is not a surprise that the Panoptical model spread through all the institutions of the state, and form a “disciplinary society.”

According to Foucault, the formation of the disciplinary society is connected to economic, juridico-political, and finally, “scientific” historical processes (DP, p. 218). Firstly, eighteenth century faced a problem of administrating the masses. Disciplinary power proved efficient for the task of the

solution of this problem by 1) performing the exercise of power at the lowest cost (thanks to “its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses” (ibid), 2) bringing affects as intense, as extended, and as flawless as possible, and 3) linking its economic growth of power with the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) where it works; “in short, [increasing] both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system” (ibid.).

The conjecture of the eighteenth century could be characterized not only by the thrust of the floating population to be “fixed” (as settling them in an anti-nomadic fashion), but also by the new apparatuses of production (produced by the industrial revolution which gave rise to the increase in trade activities, as well as in the mobility of population and capital), which extended, complicated, and became more and more costly up to a point where they faced the problem of controlling the costs of, as well as the need for efficient administration of resources (ibid.). Feudal power and administrative monarchy was inadequate for meeting this need. This is because of two facts about their functioning: On the one hand, their disorganized and inadequately extended nature, and on the other, their high cost of exercising power (DP, 219). Firstly, there is no organized activity of the sovereign power before the crimes appear. But after the violation happens, it severely and provocatively executes the criminal. Secondly, in parallel with this, it is way costly to hire too many security officers in order to capture and punish the criminal in a disorganized society where the crimes, violations, and resistances may unexpectedly come from everywhere. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, produced a “mildness-production-profit” by meeting the needs of growing population and production by producing “knowledge and skills in the school, [...] health in the hospitals, [...] the destructive force in the army” (ibid.) with a perfectly efficient machinery that automatically and autonomously function. In other words, the violent forms of power became useless with the emergence of the capitalist economy because of its costs. Hence, in Nietzschean terms, it can be

said that the sobriety in punishment is a perspectival interpretation of the ruling classes, by calculating the Pros and Cons, rather than being an effect of the humanitarian ideals of Enlightenment. In other words, behind great ideals, there are the political tactics. Behind the holy, there are temporal historical needs. Behind the supposedly disinterested knowledge, there are the interests of certain centers of force. Our knowledge, our humanitarian ideals, and “who we are” today are not the fulfillment of a teleological process which proceeds to the revelation of the perfection or the destiny of human nature. There is no *Ursprung* in its metaphysical sense. Instead, there are historically contingent *Entstehungen*. Consequently, the new power to judge, as the effect of a stage of forces—an interpretation of centers of force—also produced its relevant fields of knowledge (such as pedagogy, psychopathology, criminology, psychiatry, medicine). In a strategically proper conjuncture, there emerged their objects (individuals as case-studies), subjects (disciplined “souls”), theories (human sciences), and concepts (such as normal, abnormal, criminal, delinquent, homosexual, etc.).

Secondly, Foucault refers to the contrast between “humanitarian” juridico-political processes and the panoptical functioning of disciplinary power against the background of the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class. Specifically, for Foucault, the panoptical modality of power emerged with a reciprocal dependence on certain juridico-political structures. While the bourgeoisie became the dominant class, it gave rise to a formally egalitarian juridical system, as well as to the representative parliamentary regime, which are based on the universal norms of equality before the law. While these formations work as the good cop of the age of Enlightenment, disciplinary mechanisms had been introduced into the system as the backdoor apparatuses of inequality (DP, p. 222). On the one hand, the juridical form seems to guarantee the system of rights and equality, which subjects the sovereign to the will of all. On the other hand, however, disciplines constitute non-egalitarian micro-power systems that guarantees the asymmetry of power by the submission of forces and bodies into

its infinitely extended panoptical mechanism of perpetual surveillance, normalization and marked exclusion (ibid.): “The 'Enlightenment', which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines” (ibid.). In this twofold system, disciplines function as the infra-law—a counter-law which produces “insuperable asymmetries” (ibid.). It excludes from the machinery those who refuse to conform its norms, even in the degree of minute deviations. Given the asymmetrical and automatized power relations between its subjects, this is why disciplinary power tend to calcify, tend to get frozen to a state of domination. The way in which disciplines produce constant coercion creates a “non-reversible subordination of one group over another”—the right to distort the contract in a one sided fashion (DP, pp. 222f). This is the “surplus power” of those who exercise the disciplinary power over those who are disciplined. For example, while the work contract serves as a system of reciprocal obligations, the workshop discipline establishes a disciplinary link between the subject and the subjected, which gives the workshop judge an opportunity to characterize, classify, specialize, hierarchize, and if needed, to disqualify or invalidate others (DP, p. 223). This means that the juridical law is neither totalized nor annihilated, but a counter-law works in the background. In a genealogical outlook, the panoptical modality of power serves as the “political counterpart of the juridical norms according to which power was redistributed” (ibid.). The set of physico-political techniques that constantly train, control, normalize and examine the bodies constitute the everyday morality of the system, and establish the continuation of inequalities by dint of the function of its “sciences,” norms and classifications of the normal/abnormal. Hence, what guarantees the power to punish is not “the universal consciousness of the law in each juridical objects” (DP, p. 224). Instead, it is “the regular extension, the infinitely minute web of panoptic techniques” (ibid.).

An important historical process in the formation of the disciplinary society, according to Foucault, is the scientific process in which disciplinary

techniques cross a technological threshold, which culminates in the eighteenth century. Disciplines, according to Foucault, are combined and generalized in this century, and “they attained a level at which the formation of knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process (ibid.). Hospitals, schools and workshops were not only reordered by disciplines, but also have become, thanks to disciplinary mechanisms, “apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could be used in them as an instrument of subjection” (ibid). For example, “clinical medicine, psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology and the rationalization of labor have become to appear as the result of this process” (ibid). Foucault holds that,

[t]he great empirical knowledge that covered the things of the world and transcribed them into the ordering of an indefinite discourse that observes, describes and establishes the ‘facts’ (at a time when the western world was beginning the economic and political conquest of this same world) had its operating model no doubt in the Inquisition - that immense invention that our recent mildness has placed in the dark recesses of our memory. But what this politico-juridical, administrative and criminal [...] investigation was to the sciences of nature, disciplinary analysis has been to the sciences of man [sic]. These sciences, which have so delighted our ‘humanity’ for over a century, have their technical matrix in the petty, malicious minutiae of the disciplines and their investigations. These investigations are perhaps to psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy, criminology, and so many other strange sciences [...]. Another power, another knowledge (DP, p. 226).

What the above lines tell us is the gist of the term power/knowledge. According to Foucault’s understanding that links knowledge and power, the birth of the sciences of nature and their development in precision goes hand in hand with the needs of the sovereign power that needs to establish the empirical fact of the violation of the king’s rule, and find the potential regicide. For doing this, the truth of the violation must be empirically proven. Hence, this machinery of power functions in parallel with the growth of empirical sciences. However, with the emergence of industrialization, a new machinery of power emerges, and this machinery needs another type of knowledge, namely, human scientific and normalizing knowledge. Specifically, disciplinary power needs knowledge in order to operate: it must produce norms in order to realize its normalizing function. Moreover, it needs human beings to be conceptualized as classifiable,

documentable and manipulable object of knowledge. This, in turn, leads to the individualization of human beings. That is, the disciplinary power-knowledge networks conceptualize humans as individual case-studies to be known.

Knowledge, on the other hand, needs power in order to emerge and operate, since if the new needs based on the operations of power have not been appeared, sciences like psychology, psychiatry, criminology would neither emerge, nor find their area of operation—since they can only operate in a system in which the documented details of the individuals are needed for the power to function. That is, there needs to be a reason to conceptualize human beings as documentable, classifiable, and manipulable/normalizable entities. In short, human sciences needed an *episteme* in which they can claim their objects of study, an *episteme* in which human beings are considered classifiable and documentable. Consequently, disciplinary power is the historical a priori of human sciences.

In the context where disciplinary power operates, in the light of the above, the one who occupies the subject position is neither the body of the guilty person that is confronted with the body of the king, nor the juridical subject who participates in a social contract (DP, p. 217). In the understanding of the penal justice of the Ancien Régime, the culmination of justice was the infinite destruction of the body of the condemned as a manifestation of the truth of the absolute power of the sovereign (ibid.). In contrast, the ideal point of today's penal justice is the infinite fragmentation of the souls of individuals—as it were, all cellular individuals are under constant investigation facing a condemnation of the violation of norms with the need of being acquitted as “normal.” (Cf. ibid.). Foucault, at this point, asks the following:

Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penalty? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons? (DP, pp. 227f).

These two are obviously rhetorical questions. With those words, Foucault declares the institution of prison as the natural mechanism of disciplinary power in the modern times not only for the prisoners themselves; but also, with its disciplinary techniques which depend on constant surveillance, normalization and examination, for all the individuals in the modern texture of the society.

In parallel to the above, Foucault discusses the success of the system of prison in spreading throughout the society. Beginning from the first half of the nineteenth century, prisons have become the self-evident institutions for punishment. This is because in a society in which liberty is a good for everyone, detention, as the deprivation of one's liberty, would be the natural consequence of the egalitarian punishment (DP, p. 232). Moreover, the criminal is thought to offend not only the victim, but also the society as a whole (ibid.). However, the self-evidence of prison is also based on its training and correcting function which provides efficiency (ibid.). Prison provides this efficiency due to its omnidisciplinary character which consists of 1) "the isolation of the convict from the external world, from everything that motivated the offence, from the complicities that facilitated it" (DP, p. 236), 2) the imposition of penal labor for habitimposition based on working time-tables (DP, 240-3), and 3) the modulation of the penalty (DP, p. 244). The third character, combined with the first two, is a crucial one. In the penal style of the institution of prison, for example, as opposed to the old functioning of power, [t]he length of the penalty must not be a measurement of the "exchange value" of the offence; it must be adjusted to the 'useful' transformation of the inmate during his [sic] term of imprisonment" (ibid.). This is to say that the aim of punishment is the reformation of the inmate; as it were, to cure h/er from the illness of being burdensome for the State. The method of reformation through punishment results in cost-effective means of production by disciplined labor power, controlled population, and normalized individuals who do not stop the process of constant production and consumption. For this, prisons impose a set of moral norms and normalize the inmate by

controlling and normalizing h/er behavior. Accordingly, instead of judges in a court, people like supervisors, prison governors, instructors are those who exercise power over the inmates. In a parallel fashion,

[i]t is their judgement (understood as observation, diagnosis, characterization, information, differential classification) and not a verdict in the form of an attribution of guilt, that must serve as a support for this internal modulation of the penalty - for its mitigation or even its interruption (DP, p. 246).

Consequently, there is a transformation of punishment from a judicial one to the carceral. And the great carceral machine—the society that is governed by a carceral archipelago consisting of disciplinary mechanisms based on Panoptical principles—got inspirations from this total, efficient, and automatic functioning of power. The form of penitentiary is the addition of the disciplinary apparatuses to the juridical penalty, and it proves a perfect efficiency for the constant and automatic coercion based on constant surveillance, normalization and examination by judges of normality who are distributed everywhere.

As a result, what Foucault would say about the new power to judge would not be that the penal system had been humanized. Instead, the whole system is altered with a carceral society as a political tactic, as the product of force relations. Moreover, disciplinary power is exercised by those who present scientific knowledge. In other words, disciplinary power is based on knowledges such as psychiatry, criminology, pedagogy, which are the products of this very power. Disciplinary power, which depends on the new strategies of training and correction instead of harsh punishment, is a strategy, rather than a sign of humanity. The sobriety of the punishment is an effect of the battle, with all knowledges it produced and operated together. Foucault holds that

[i]n this central and centralized humanity, the effect and instrument of complex power relations, bodies and forces subjected by multiple mechanisms of 'incarceration', objects for discourses that are in themselves elements for this strategy, we must hear the distant roar of battle (DP, p. 308).

Thus speaks Foucault about disciplinary power in DP, as a “history of the present,” and shows the emergence and operation of disciplinary power as a body

politics and a political anatomy that invests human bodies and renders them objects of knowledge with constant surveillance and documentation—and this is a strategic issue, a battle. It is an attempt to historicize what is taken to be natural by the hegemonic interpretation of the bourgeoisie, as well as an attempt to show the “unholy” background of the “holy” ideals. It is an attempt to violate the sacred ideals of the modern network of power/knowledge: “humanity” of modern forms of punishment, “truth” of human sciences, and the “good” character of disciplined individuals, *as the products of mundane force-relations*. Disciplinary power, as is shown, imprisons the body of the modern subject to its own soul and constitutes a prison-like society by generalizing the disciplinary methods culminated in the institution of prison. It creates docile individuals who become more useful in proportion to their docility, and it does this for the sake of power. The modern subject is the very product of human scientific knowledges, and these knowledges are the effect of the battle—the strategic relational interpretations of power/knowledge networks.

3.2.3.2. *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: The Will to Knowledge*

As discussed earlier, in DP, Foucault elaborates on disciplinary power. When it comes to HS, along with disciplinary power, Foucault deals with another aspect of the modern governmentality. It is bio-power; one that concerns the control of populations. While the loci of the exercise of disciplinary power are such institutions as schools, armies, prisons and workshops; bio-power is exercised by states in order to control the movements of the population as a whole (Cf, Taylor, p. 46). These two forms of power, according to Foucault, are not in contradistinction with each other. Instead, stemming from the same needs that emerge from industrialization (such as the accumulation of wealth, continuous production, and the need for healthy and strong generations as labor force, etc.), as will be discussed below, bio-power overlaps with disciplinary power. However, bio-power is exercised by and serves to the economic and political needs of the

states. It organizes campaigns and produces norms on the issues of birth control, “body-hygiene, the art of longevity, ways of having healthy children, [...] and methods for improving human lineage” (HS, p. 125). The exercise of bio-power, hence, needs the production of knowledges on demographic statistics, regulation techniques, and general characteristics of the population, such as its “birth-rate, mortality-rate, crime-rate, [...] climate, and tradition” (Karademir, 2013, p. 116; Cf. Foucault, 2007b, p. 22, 37f, 104f). In this genealogical work, Foucault deals with sex since it is an enormously important issue to the extent that it is the intersection point between the individual body and the population: “it is a matter of discipline, but also a matter of regularization” (Foucault, 2003, pp. 251f). Moreover, he deals with the deployment of sexuality as a power/knowledge network in which centers of power and discourses interact in a strategical way. Furthermore, in HS, Foucault gives a detailed genealogical methodology that both defines the term power as clear as possible and communicates his genealogical trajectory with a high precision.

Elaborating on his aims, Foucault refers to the dominant view of sexuality, which he later calls “repressive hypothesis.” According to this view, in the 19th century, the only legitimate sexuality of the Victorian regime is the one that takes place in the parents’ bedroom. That is, other types of sexuality were silenced and excluded from being verbalized since they are inefficient, infertile and abnormal (HS, p. 3f). Repressive hypothesis, as Foucault puts it, holds that the “abnormal” (i.e., non-reproductive) sexualities can only be tolerable when they are included in the isolated circuits of production and profit, such as the brothel and the mental hospital (HS, p. 4). In everywhere else, modern puritanism imposes its threefold edict of taboo, nonexistence, and silence (HS, p. 5). This hypothesis provides the believer with a very convenient model of explanation:

[I]f sex is so rigorously repressed, this is because it is incompatible with a general and intensive work imperative. At a time when labor capacity was being systematically exploited, how could this capacity be allowed to dissipate itself in

pleasurable pursuits, except in those—reduced to a minimum—that enabled it to reproduce itself? (HS, p. 6).

Moreover, this hypothesis is beneficial to those who speak about it. If sex is repressed, then the one who speaks of it transgresses the established order and has the privilege of the emancipator—s/he seems as a revolutionary, an emancipator, a person who establishes the conditions of the future sexual freedom (ibid.). Hence, under these circumstances, saying that “the relationship between sex and power is not characterized by repression, is to risk falling into a sterile paradox” (HS, p. 8). This is because this thesis not only rejects a well-accepted argument, but also interrupts the general economy of discursive interests that underlie this argument (ibid.).

Foucault situates his project in HS right at this point—taking the risk of opposing the mutual interests of both the modern power and their emancipatory antagonists in the issue of sexuality. He describes his aim as follows:

Briefly, my aim is to examine the case of a society which has been loudly castigating itself for its hypocrisy for more than a century, which speaks verbosely of its own silence, takes great pains to relate in detail the things it does not say, denounces the powers it exercises, and promises to liberate itself from the very laws that have made it function. I would like to explore not only these discourses but also the will that sustains them and the strategic intention that supports them. The question I would like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? but rather, Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed? (HS, p. 8f).

In short, Foucault, in HS, deals with the reasons behind modern subject's passion for speaking of sex in the confines of the repressive hypothesis. Moreover, Foucault performs a genealogical analysis in order to “define the regime of power-knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality” in the Western world (HS, p. 11). In other words, Foucault attempts to describe the way in which sexuality was put into discourse in correlation with certain relations of power. Hence, he aims to describe the form of power that operates on sexuality—a combination of disciplinary power and bio-power—by giving an account on how polymorphous techniques of power gather detailed information of the sexual lives of individuals, how they produce new forms of sexualities, and how power

“penetrates and controls everyday pleasure” via discourses and their power effects (ibid.). Consequently, the essential aim of this genealogical work is to lay bare the modern “will to knowledge” that serves both as the support and the instrument of the discourses on sexuality, instead of establishing truths or falsities about sex (HS, pp. 11f). According to Foucault, the modern deployment of sexuality and its will to knowledge 1) is based on incitement to discourse rather than restriction of speaking, 2) depends primarily on the production of polymorphous sexualities rather than silencing them, and 3) does not operate as a force to undermine sex as a taboo; instead, it produces a science of sexuality (HS, pp. 12f).

Foucault examines the new form of power over sex by stating that the developments in the last three decades deny the hypothesis that speaking of sex is explicitly censored by power. Just the opposite, an institutional incitement to speak shows itself as the new strategy of power (HS, pp. 17f). Foucault relates this transformation back to the ritual of confession in Christianity. He observes that the explicitness of the questions in confession manuals rise little by little since the Council of Trent (HS, 18f). The former principle of privacy slowly turns into the demand of the verbalization of the details of the confessor’s sexual desires (yet with a careful language). Foucault holds that

while the language may have been refined, the scope of the confession—the confession of the flesh—continually increased. This was partly because the Counter Reformation busied itself with stepping up the rhythm of the yearly confession in the Catholic countries, and because it tried to impose meticulous rules of self-examination; but above all, because it attributed more and more importance in penance—and perhaps at the expense of some other sins—to all the insinuations of the flesh: thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the body and the soul; henceforth all this had to enter, in detail, into the process of confession and guidance (HS, p. 20).

This trend reaches to an extent that everything must be said—nothing in the desiring soul is trivial or insignificant. This is because the body is thought to be the basis of all sins, and that something like a sensitive concern of bodily desires must be put into operation in order to control the flesh (ibid.). The aim of decency in words while increasing the scope of the confession (not only to the desires that

transgresses the sexual law, but to every single detail of bodily desires) “are the ways of rendering it [putting sex into discourse] morally acceptable and technically useful” (HS, p. 21).

The Victorian rule, according to Foucault, gets informed by the tactical efficiency of confession, and strategically adopts the incitement to discourse as its new way of operation. Instead of solely censoring and silencing, “there was an apparatus for producing an ever greater quantity of discourse about sex, capable of functioning and taking effect in its very economy” (HS, p. 23). However, the success of this apparatus is linked with the support of other mechanisms. Towards the beginning of the 18th century, although a general theory of sex was not yet formed, rational accounts of sexuality emerged “in the form of analysis, stocktaking, classification, and specification, of quantitative or causal studies” (HS, 23f). In these studies, there was a hesitation to speak. This is because sex was usually considered to be a moral rather than a rational issue. “How could a discourse based on reason speak of *that*?” (HS, p. 24). This was a question that occupied the minds of scholars and the people, and the decency of the language was mostly due to this difficulty. However, to speak about sex in a scientific manner became a need for the functioning of power. Foucault writes

one had to speak of it as of a thing to be not simply condemned or tolerated but managed, inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made to function according to an optimum. Sex was not something one simply judged; it was a thing one administered. It was in the nature of a public potential; it called for management procedures; it had to be taken charge of by analytical discourses (HS, p. 24).

In a parallel fashion (i.e., as a matter of administration), in the 18th century, sex became a police matter. For the administration of sex by state and the police, a rational discourse on sex was needed. Foucault states the following: “A policing of sex: that is, not the rigor of a taboo, but the necessity of regulating sex through useful and public discourses” (HS, p. 25). To be more precise, bio-power needed knowledge in order to operate properly, just like disciplinary power.

But why did sex become a police matter? Why did it cross the boundaries of morality and become an object of scientific discourse? Foucault gives the example of the emergence of the phenomenon of population in the 18th century as a major reason behind the success and speed of this transformation. Foucault holds that

One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower [sic] or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with a "population," with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation (HS, p. 25).

Sexuality, according to Foucault, is at the heart of the problem of population, both as an economic and as a political problem. This is why it has to be administrated. For an effective, productive and profitable operation of a capitalist economy in industrialized societies, it becomes necessary to analyze such issues as "the birth rates, age of marriage, legitimate and illegitimate births [...]" (HS, p. 25). By the emergence of the political economy of the population, a web of observatory techniques start to appear: "There emerge[s] the analysis of the modes of sexual conduct, their determinations and their effects, at the boundary line of the biological and the economic domains" (HS, p. 26). Sex becomes an issue between the state and the individual, and consequently, "a whole web of discourses, special knowledges, analyses, and injunctions settle[s] upon it" (ibid.). As a result, from the eighteenth century on, in parallel with disciplinary power, bio-power emerges as a form of power which conducts the conduct of human beings hand in hand with human sciences. These sciences provide the needed demographic statistics and regulation techniques. In parallel with this, these discourses get their objects of study: population.

Hence, Foucault opposes to the repressive hypothesis. From the 18th century on, there emerges a deployment of sexuality consisting of several institutions that observe and document the sexual conduct of the subjects, and

makes the economic and political issue of sexuality a scientific issue. In the discursive fields of economy, pedagogy, medicine and justice, a huge deal of discourse gets accumulated (HS, p. 33). In the Middle Ages, in contrast, the issue of flesh was tied to a unitary discourse on the danger of the sexual desires upon the soul. This unity of discourse, however, in the recent times, gets “broken apart, scattered, and multiplied in an explosion of distinct discursivities which [take] form in demography, biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism” (HS, p. 33). With the age of reason, the deployment of sexuality makes sex a rational and scientific issue. In such rational discourses, sex becomes objectified and each individual is set the task to recount for their own sexuality. According to Foucault, there emerges,

around sex, a whole network of varying, specific, and coercive transpositions into discourse. Rather than a massive censorship, beginning with the verbal proprieties imposed by the Age of Reason, what was involved was a regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse (HS, p. 34).

As Foucault explains, up to the end of the 18th century, three major codes govern sexual conduct and demarcate the licit and the illicit in the confines of matrimonial relations; namely, canonical law, the Christian pastoral, and civil law (HS, p. 37). Since the focus of attention is the matrimonial relations, the rules concerning extramarital sexualities remains rather confused: “one only has to think of the uncertain status of sodomy, or the indifference regarding the sexuality of children” (ibid.). Each sexual deviation outside the husband-wife relation is somehow equally condemned—except for the instances that are regarded as against the nature. Sex is considered in the form of law, and the law of nature was at stake. For example, hermaphrodites were regarded as either criminals or the offspring of a crime against the law of nature, “since their anatomical disposition, their very being, confounded the law that distinguished the sexes and prescribed their union” (HS, p. 38). The discursive explosion of the 18th and 19th centuries causes two major transformations in this roughly unitary system based on the law of nature. Firstly, the focus of the discourse moves outside the “legitimate couple”

and the husband and wife enjoy an increased right of discretion (ibid.). Secondly, the issues of the sexuality of children, the mad and the criminals, of those who are not interested in the opposite sex, in short, the sexual desires of “the perverse,” are put under scrutiny. The classification and the proliferation of the abnormalities starts to emerge as the discourse on the peripheral sex increases.

At this point, what Foucault offers is neither treating this picture as a growing indulgence to peripheral sexualities, nor explaining sexuality in terms of repression. Instead, he holds that, rather than these, there is a different (and much more complex) functioning of power in emergence: a new political tactic that administrates individuals and the population. As he puts it, the function of the new power in sexuality involves several operations, each of which indicate a tactical change of power in new circumstances. Firstly, instead of a simple prohibition, “all around the child, indefinite *lines of penetration* were disposed” (HS, p. 42). For example, educators and doctors waged a battle against child masturbation as if it was an epidemic to be eradicated. This provided a support to the power and its subjects, and with this support, “power advanced, multiplied its relays and its effects, while its target expanded, subdivided, and branched out, penetrating further into reality at the same pace” (ibid.). Moreover, as a result of the discursive persecution of new peripheral sexualities, there emerges an “*incorporation of perversions* and a new *specification of individuals*” (HS, 42f). While the sodomite of the Middle Ages is a juridical subject, the homosexual of the 19th century becomes a case history, consisting of a childhood, past, morphology, anatomy, and physiology. Each abnormality begins to be considered as a part of h/er nature, h/er soul, h/er case: “The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual [is] now a species” (HS, p. 43). Aberrant sexualities, in accordance with these new tactics, get classified as different species; such as zoophiles, zooerasts, auto-monosexualists, mixoscopophiles, gynecomasts, etc. (ibid.). The strategy underlying this proliferation of classifications, for Foucault, is “to strew reality with [the abnormal] and incorporate them into the individual” by

creating “a principle of classification and intelligibility” (HS, p. 44). In other words, power individualizes every person by giving them the class into which they put themselves and according to which they perceive themselves, as normal or abnormal. With this, power produces subjects according to its own principles and categorizations. It subjectivates bodies by imprisoning them to a soul that consists of a web of categories and norms. This makes a better control over the population possible, in the sense of both regulating and producing a strong, reproductive, utilizable, healthy, and long-living population, in which diverse sexual energies are on play.

On the other hand, the more the discourses emerge, the more types of perversity emerge. Hence, Foucault writes that

Pleasure and power do not cancel or turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap, and reinforce one another. They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and incitement (HS, p. 48).

As a consequence, it is untenable to defend the hypothesis that the main modality of power that operates in the modern industrial society is to repress sexuality, censor it and exclude it out of discourse. Instead, the modern power constantly produces discourses, which are more and more specialized in order to govern sexuality with multifarious techniques, and which conduct the conduct of modern subjects by inciting them to speak in detail about their sexuality. This deployment of power is quite different from the power that operates by defining subjects in juridical terms, such as law-abiding and unlawful. As a result, modern power functions in the form of constant intervention into the sexual lives of individuals, and operates hand in hand with the knowledge and the discourses it produces.

In order to further explicate the role of discourses in the operation of modern power (or alternatively, the operation of power/knowledge networks), Foucault refers to a contrast between two procedures of producing the truth of sex; namely *scientia sexualis* (the science of sex) and *ars erotica* (the erotic art). As Foucault describes, *ars erotica* applies to sexual acts and experiences; it dwells

upon experiential terms such as the intensity, duration, and the reflection of the pleasure in the body and the soul (ibid.). Foucault holds that the Western industrialized societies did not devise an erotic art. Instead, they produced a science of sex that moves away from the sexual practice and pleasure itself, and focuses on the confession of perverse thoughts: “Western man [sic] bec[omes] a confessing animal” (HS, p. 59) everywhere: in juridical courts, in medicine, in education, and even in familial and romantic relations. One confesses (or, is forced to confess) h/er sins, desires and thoughts as precise as possible to h/er doctor, h/er family, h/er friends, to every judge of the normality. This is the sign of the modern power: It conceals its dominating effects, and gives the impact that it “frees” subjects to speak, and the idea that it encourages them to find their “true” sexuality. This means that, deployment of sexuality subjects bodies by making them feel free when they conform to its norms. Subjects, in the modern times, in fact, want to “break free from abnormality.” Hence, with the sexual science, modern power *subjects* the bodies in the both senses of the word (HS, p. 60). Foucault writes that,

[t]he confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation. For centuries, the truth of sex was, at least for the most part, caught up in this discursive form (HS, 61f).

This is to say that in the discursive form of confession, one becomes a subject only by being subjected to an authority who judges h/er according to a norm. A conscience is built in the souls of individuals; and with this conscience, s/he is made a subject. For Foucault, as a consequence of treating sexuality as a scientific truth, modern power relation in the Western world makes the confessing animal a subject, but only by inducing a fear of violating the norm of truth—as a

conscience that seeks the approval of normalization or correction from an actual or an imaginary authority. Thus, in Western societies, for Foucault, confession of the sexual matters is especially placed in medicine. Medicalization of the effects of confession has an important role to play in modern force relations:

[S]ex would derive its meaning and its necessity from medical interventions: it would be required by the doctor, necessary for diagnosis, and effective by nature in the cure. Spoken in time, to the proper party, and by the person who was both the bearer of it and the one responsible for it, the truth healed (ibid.).

In short, Foucault claims that the modern Western society adopts *scientia sexualis* as opposed to *ars erotica*, in a gradual movement from the Christian rituals of confession to clinical listening methods. Sex becomes something to be known, an object of truth (and thus, the object of knowledges); and “sexuality” emerges as a correlative of this discursive practice (HS, p. 68). Sexuality is defined as a domain of suspected pathologies, normalizing interventions, a focus of causal relations. Hence, for Foucault, the history of sexuality must be regarded as a history of discourses (HS, p. 69), which dominate individual lives, and, in the end, pave the way for the regulations of the population.

According to Foucault, instead of using the methods of repression or censoring the discourse on sex, capitalist society compelled everyone to speak and “it also set out to formulate the uniform truth of sex [...] [a]s if it needed this production of truth” (ibid). Hence, Foucault calls for a historical research of the discourses on sex with the aim of locating the “strategies of power that are immanent in this will to knowledge” (HS, p. 73). Foucault asks what happened to this society in the last three centuries that has made it willing to explain everything with the aid of sexuality, and see sex as the cause of every abnormality? Why did it force everyone to talk about sex in an exhaustive fashion? What is the reason behind the search of the truth of life in sexuality? How did this type of will to know come to existence? For answering these questions, Foucault describes objective, method, domain and periodization of his genealogical research on sexuality.

Foucault declares his aim in HS to be an analytics of power more than a theory of power (HS, p. 82). This analytics of power is “toward a definition of the specific domain formed by relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible its analysis” (ibid.). However, for this, one must get rid of the juridico-discursive representation of power that regards power as a uniform phenomenon which works solely by prohibitions. According to this representation of power, power operates as a rule of law which consists of relations of punishment in the level of the state, the school, and even in the level of family; as if, there is a “legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on the other” (HS, p. 85). However, For Foucault, history shows us that power is not a static and monotonous phenomenon; it is not uniform in its strategies, nor is it something solely negative. As stated above, power consists of dynamic and multifarious strategical relations that are positive (or alternatively, productive), in the sense that they produce discourses, subjectivities, and reality.

Foucault’s objective is, hence, “to analyze a certain form of knowledge regarding sex, not in terms of repression or law, but in terms of power” (HS, p. 92). In Foucault’s genealogical conception, power does not refer to a group of institutions and organizations. It is neither a form of subjugation in the form of the rule of law. Neither is it “a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body” (ibid.). These are, as he puts it, only the terminal forms of power. What Foucault means by power is first and foremost

the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies (ibid.).

From this, we can infer several results. Firstly, contrary to the monistic nature of power in the juridico-discursive representation, Foucault views power as a

multiplicity. Secondly, Foucault bases power on relations and processes in the form of constant struggle which are the cause of change in the battlefield of force relations and their correlative discursive realms. Accordingly, each state of power and each strategy is subject to potential change.

In line with his ontology of power discussed above, and, in the context of sex and the sexual discourses in the claim of producing the truth of sex, Foucault sets four preliminary rules which guide his investigation. The first of these is “[t]he rule of immanence” (HS, p. 98). This is a profoundly important thought in Foucault’s genealogical thought—since it 1) directly links his genealogy to archaeology, and 2) is explanatory of his term power/knowledge. Foucault describes it as follows:

If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this was only because relations of power had established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power was able to take it as a target, this was because techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it. Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the basis of their difference (ibid.).

The above lines tell us that Foucault views power as the condition of the possibility of any knowledge about sex. There is no disinterested knowledge; instead, there is a positive unconscious of knowledge, which is constitutive of it, and it consists of the effects of power relations. Looking from the other side, if the modern will to knowledge of power could take sex (and any issue such as delinquency, madness, etc.) as a target, it was because it had an appropriate epistemological basis (i.e., *episteme*) which might produce strategically intelligible results. Since this epistemological basis is formed from the local power-knowledge centers at the outset, Foucault sets out to investigate these micro centers, their developments, and their integration into the great apparatuses as descriptive of the general machinery of power. For example, the relation between the confessors and their religious guides produces some knowledge and some procedures of knowledge (self-examination, questionings, interviews, interpretations, etc.), and these serves as a form of subjugation and a schema of

knowledge (ibid.). As a strategically helpful development, this shifts the episteme, and these procedures are interpreted and integrated into medical discourse.

Consequently,

the body of the child, under surveillance, surrounded in his cradle, his bed, or his room by an entire watch-crew of parents, nurses, servants, educators, and doctors, all attentive to the least manifestations of his sex, has constituted, particularly since the eighteenth century, another "local center" of power-knowledge (ibid.).

In short, these local centers of power-knowledge operate within a general machinery, and their relationality with the other centers constitutes the principles of causation and transformation in this very machinery of power and the *episteme*. Hence, instead of an exteriority relation with power, Foucault offers the relation of immanence between power and knowledge. This is also constitutive of the positive unconscious of knowledge. Again: power needs knowledge in order to operate; and knowledge needs power in order to emerge and claim its objects of study.

Secondly, Foucault prescribes “[t]he rules of continual variations” (HS, p. 99). This means that the relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution. Instead, they are “matrices of transformations” (ibid.) and are always subject to change in historical processes. For example, the power-knowledge network (consisting of the educators, parents and doctors), in the first place, targets solely the child’s sexuality. This structure of operation of power-knowledge gets modified, and produces an interesting reversal. With this reversal, the sexualities of the parents themselves starts to be problematized. This happens through a process of force relations in which the relation between the psychiatrist, the child and the parents develop to another direction (ibid.). This means that, according to Foucault, objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of knowledges change constantly in a reciprocal relationality with the stages of power which are themselves subject to constant change.

Thirdly comes “[t]he rule of double conditioning” which means that 1) no local center of power-knowledge can function without being integrated into an over-all strategy, and 2) no over-all strategy can succeed without support from relations with local centers (ibid.). There is neither discontinuity, nor homogeneity between the macro and micro levels of power-knowledge centers. Instead, for Foucault, “one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work” (HS, p. 100). For example, the family organization—as an insular and heteromorphous one with respect to other mechanisms—was used in strategic state-centered maneuvers such as birthrate controls, populationist incitements, and medicalization of sex; all of which were conditioned in relation to, as well as with support from with the family organization itself (ibid.).

Fourthly, Foucault offers “[r]ule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses” (ibid.). This is also a profoundly important perspective, especially, considering the aims of this thesis. According to this prescription, “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together” (ibid.). Remembering that resistance is in the network of power itself, from this sentence, one can infer that it is also in discourse where resistance and knowledge are joined together. There is no universal and once-and-for-all distinction between the discourses of power and those of resistance. There is no clear-cut distinction between the dominant discourse and the dominated one. Alike power, knowledges are not unchanging substances. Since power relations are complex mechanisms which are subject to constant change, “[d]iscourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (HS, p. 101). Power might incite discourses in order to control, normalize, and dominate; however, situations may change and its discourses might create a point of reversal for such power. In other words, power is productive to the extent that it also produces its own enemy. For example, the discourses of power produced the term homosexuality by categorizing

perversions, in order to control and normalize them; yet, this made possible for homosexuality to speak for its own behalf, to claim its rights, legitimacy, normality and naturalness, “often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified” (HS, p. 101). Hence, power, joining with knowledge not only shapes the discursive battlefield (i.e., the *episteme*), but also creates its adversaries.

With his new conception of power described above (or alternatively, his genealogical method), Foucault shifts the privilege of investigation from the law to the viewpoint of the strategy, from prohibition to tactical efficacy, from sovereignty to the multiple and mobile relations of force which are far-reaching but never static. He calls this “the strategical model,” and claims that he uses this model not out of speculation or as a result of a theoretical preference. Instead, as he describes throughout his genealogical works, he uses this strategical model because

it is one of the essential traits of Western societies that the force relationships which for a long time had found expression in war, in every form of warfare, gradually became invested in the order of political power (ibid.).

In other words, as well as the non-discursive battlefields, the discursive world is also a battlefield, and knowledge is the effect of the overall battle of life. In the course of history, the unity of the king—the subject of power—in the warfare and his enemy dissolves, and gives way to a states as governmental machineries. A different form of power in every sphere of life emerges, and consequently, such power produces new formations in the discursive world which are supposed to serve to its interest of a strong political order.

For Foucault, sex occupies a crucial place in the modern battlefield. This is because it is a dense transfer point for power relations (between man and women, parents and children, population and administration, etc.). Hence, it has a high degree of instrumentality: it opens a huge room for useful maneuvers for various strategies of power. This is the reason why it is that much invested by the

modern will to knowledge (HS, p. 103). However, there is no “all-encompassing strategy, valid for all of society and uniformly bearing on all the manifestations of sex” (ibid.). For example, the tendency to conclude that the overall strategy is to reduce whole sexuality to the legitimate one of the married couple is incorrect, in the sense that it fails to see the manifold objectives and means of various social politics revolving around different sexualities, different age groups and different social classes (ibid). However, Foucault observes four great strategic unities, beginning from the 18th century, which “formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex” (ibid.). These are 1) hysterization of women’s bodies, 2) pedagogization of children’s sex, 3) socialization of procreative behavior, and 4) psychiatrization of perverse pleasure (HS, pp. 104f). What is at stake with these strategies was, for Foucault, the very production of sexuality. Instead of being a natural given, in Foucault’s view, sexuality is a historical construct which is

a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power (HS, pp. 105f).

For example, the hysterization of the feminine body, as its professional pathologization, as well the integration of this body into the medical practice, is one of the great strategies of modern power. Making the wife medico-morally responsible 1) to the society through its healthy fecundity, 2) to the family through certain functionalizations (such as making her responsible for a healthy spouse-relation through her sexual behavior), and 3) to the children (i.e., for their education and healthcare) are the main tactics of this strategy. This strategy, with these tactics, produces many areas of investigation, and leads to more incitement to speak to the normalizing authorities, and to a demand of normalization from the subjects themselves for their own interests. As a result, this strategy produces an anchor (i.e., the figure of the nervous mother) around which holds several procedures of knowledges, several controls and resistances. Along with other

strategies, hysteresis of women plays a crucial role in the emergence of the deployment of sexuality—the deployment that treats sex as a matter of scientific knowledge. In the modern deployment of sexuality, with these great strategies, a healthy life (such as the health of the individual, the health of the population, criminality, sanity/insanity, future generations, etc.) are considered to be in connection with the truth of sex. These strategies, hence, administer sex with an interplay of norm and truth.

As a result, Foucault observes a change in the deployment of power from sovereign's right to kill (or alternatively, *patria potestas*) to the power of the deployment of sexuality exercised over life. The major characteristic of the sovereign power is, as Foucault puts it, its power to determine whether or not it will kill its subjects or let them live (HS, p. 135). In this stage of power, the symbol of power is sword, and sword is for cutting. In its juridical form, the power of the sword is exercised "as a means of deduction [...], a right to appropriate a portion of the wealth, a tax of products [...], labor and blood, levied on the subjects" (HS, p. 136). However, these mechanisms of power have changed in the West since the classical age. "Deduction" is no longer the major form of power; it is now an element among several others. Mechanisms of power are used for the incitement and reinforcement of, as well as controlling, monitoring, and optimizing, the life-forces under it. In other words, instead of cutting the wealth, time, or heads of its subjects, the new machinery of power works for "generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them" (HS, p. 136). This is to say, power starts to exert "a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations" (HS, p. 137). What is at stake here is the biological existence of the population, instead of the juridical existence of the sovereign (ibid). Consequently, death penalties become very rare, and they are applied only to those who posed a danger to the lives of others and to those who were considered to be incorrigible. This is

because of the new mentality of power—modern governmentality—which is based on its role to ensure, sustain and multiply life.

Starting from the 17th century, as Foucault observes, there emerge two interconnected poles around which the modern governmentality (which can be characterized as “the power over life”) is deployed. These are disciplinary power and bio-power. Disciplinary power, as discussed in detail, is centered on the body as a machine; and operates by disciplining bodies, multiplying their capacities, integrating them into systems of controls, and making them docile and useful (HS, p. 139). As Foucault tells us, the second pole (namely, “bio-power;” or alternatively, “bio-politics of population”), emerges somewhat later (in the late 18th century, and when it emerged, it

focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and *regulatory controls* [...] (ibid.).

Thus, in the course of the classical age, with these two interconnected poles, the highest function of power becomes to invest life more and more, and its peculiar characteristic had become “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (HS, p. 140). Moreover, there occurs a rapid growth in the procedures of the subjugation of bodies (disciplines) and population control (politics and procedures dealing with “the problems of birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration”) which makes the beginning of the 18th century the beginning of the age of bio-power (ibid.). Disciplinary power and bio-power operate relatively separate in the 18th century; however, they are conjoined in the form of concrete arrangements which engenders the great technologies of power in the 19th century (which can be defined as the modern governmentality).

For Foucault, the efficient operation of capitalism would not be possible at all without bio-power. This is because bio-power provides a controlled integration of the bodies into the machinery of production and the adaptation of

population to economic processes (HS, p. 141). However, this alone is not sufficient for capitalism to operate. The availability and docility of the bodies and the growth of their capabilities is also required for economic developments. Hence, bio-power could only operate with the sustainment of the disciplinary institutions such as family, army, schools, police, medicine, and etc. (ibid.). Bio-power makes possible the adjustment of the accumulation of the population according to the available resources, the growth of societies according to the growth of production. Moreover, bio-power regulates the differential allocation of profit with its effects of segregation and hierarchization. It does this hand in hand with disciplinary techniques. Thus, according to Foucault, “[t]he investment of the body, its valorization, and the distributive management of its forces were at the time indispensable” (ibid.) for the capitalist mode of production.

To a great extent with the contribution of the economic and agricultural developments in the 18th century, a growth in wealth occurs. This occurs when potential threats (such as starvation and epidemics) which kept alive the fear of death in the society gets alleviated. There emerges, then, a surplus provided by the greater growth of production. At the same time, development of several fields of knowledge concerning life in general, methods of power and knowledge conquers the space for movement and claim “responsibility for the life processes and [undertakes] to control and modify them” (HS, p. 142). This transformation, for Foucault, has several consequences. Firstly, it changes the classical *episteme* and gives birth to the modern subject as an individual, docile and utile living being to be utilized and controlled—just as it was discussed in the DP section. Secondly, with the emergence of bio-power, there occurs a “growing importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of the law” (HS, p. 144). The law of the sword—right of death—gives its way to *power over life*; “continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms” designed for organizing the dynamic energies of life (HS, p. 144). Normalizing society, with all its examiners, is the consequence of the twofold operation of disciplinary and bio-political

technologies of power. Moreover, those who resist this new technology of power start to demand the very thing that bio-power brings forward: life, “understood as the basic needs, man's [sic] concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plenitude of the possible” (HS, p. 145). What is at stake in political struggles starts to be the “rights” to life, to health, to happiness, to self-actualization, that were completely alien to former juridical system. In other words, in parallel with the tactical polyvalence of discourses, “life as a political object was [...] turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it” (ibid.).

Under these historical conditions, Foucault holds that the profound importance of sex as a political object lies in the fact that it is “at the pivot of the two axes along which developed the entire political technology of life” (ibid.). In other words, sex is an intersection point between disciplinary power and bio-power. This is the reason behind its instrumental efficiency to conduct the conduct of individuals and populations. It is used as a tool of constant surveillance, medical and psychological examinations—in short, of “an entire micro-power concerned with the body” (HS, pp. 145f). It is also used for the comprehensive measures in society, such as campaigns for or against birth-control. Sex is, for Foucault,

put forward as the index of a society's strength, revealing of both its political energy and its biological vigor. Spread out from one pole to the other of this technology of sex was a whole series of different tactics that combined in varying proportions the objective of disciplining the body and that of regulating populations (HS, p. 146).

Consequently, the deployment of sexuality, and four great technologies of it are of great importance in the control of the individuals and the population. Each of it has a specific way of combining the techniques of disciplinary power and bio-power. The strategies of hysterization of women's bodies and pedagogization of children's sex “rested on the requirements of regulation, on a whole thematic of the species, descent, and collective welfare, in order to obtain results at the level of discipline” (ibid.). The sexualization of children operated as a campaign for the health of the human race, and the hysterization of women's bodies was put into

operation in the name of women's responsibility for their children's health and education, as well as the strength of the family as the most basic cell of the social body (HS, p. 147). In the socialization of procreative behavior and psychiatrization of perverse pleasures, on the other hand, one can see a reverse relationship. This is to say that these strategies target the population as a whole; however, they require support from disciplines (ibid.). In other words, these strategies are connected mainly to bio-power. In light of these, Foucault concludes that "at the juncture of the "body" in ligand the "population," sex becomes a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death" (ibid.). Sex is a crucial means endowed with a great deal of instrumentality for the modern governmentality since it

was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was employed as a standard for the disciplines and as a basis for regulations. This is why in the nineteenth century sexuality was sought out in the smallest details of individual existences; it was tracked down in behavior, pursued in dreams; it was suspected of underlying the least follies, it was traced back into the earliest years of childhood; it became the stamp of individuality—at the same time what enabled one to analyze the latter and what made it possible to master it (HS, p. 146).

Taking the advantage of this instrumentality, as a result, the modern governmentality produces a society of sex. It develops a science of sex in which sex is seen as the cause of everything; and the modern governmentality divides, classifies, and hierarchizes bodies in accordance with the *scientia sexualis*. Moreover, it regulates the conduct of the population with comprehensive measures thanks to the contribution of certain discourses.

In HS, in light of the above, it can be said that Foucault investigates the terms sexuality and sex as historical constructs that emerged as a product of the relations of power, instead of being natural phenomena. Moreover, against the repressive hypothesis, for him, one should not think that saying yes to sex means saying no to power. Just the opposite: it is staying in the same historical formation of modern deployment of power. The idea of sexuality as a natural constant, as that which waits for emancipation from the chains of repression, exclusion, and

censoring is the very tactical production of the modern deployment of sexuality. Thus, searching for the truth of sex that is supposedly covered by the repressive power would be falling into the trap of the deployment of sexuality.

As a result, along with what he does in DP, Foucault, in HS, situates knowledge to its birthplace—the battlefield consisting of discursive and non-discursive centers of force, and historical processes. By showing the strategic aspect of the battlefield, he presents the family tree of today's human sciences which are produced in a strict relationality, constantly changing in different stages of forces. Furthermore, doing this, he shows the contingency of what is taken for granted—such as sex as a natural substance. Lastly, by showing the strategic aspect of the discursive battlefield with his genealogy, Foucault argues that knowledge is not a product of disinterested observers. For him, knowledges rely on, produce, spread, empower, renew and annul norms in strategical relations with the deployment of power. Knowledge has a normative, relational and interested character. It is a product of the forms of power in modern times.

3.3. Foucault's Guiding Perspective: Freedom

3.3.1. Foucault's Discursive Perspectivism Revisited

As is seen, with his genealogical works, Foucault explicitly deals with the strategic roots of human sciences, and situates knowledge to where it comes from: the battlefield. The discursive battlefield is, as Foucault exhibits, in an inextricable and strategical connection with the non-discursive one. Non-discursive phenomena—such as family, church, and economic and political institutions of the society—play a crucial role in the relevant regime of truth. They constitute a multiplicity of force relations, which, in turn, function as the historical a priori of knowledge. However, it is also true that without such knowledge, no centers of force within these relations can operate effectively. Thus, with his genealogical works, Foucault shows that knowledge and power are the condition of the possibility of existence and operation for one another. This view is the

translation of Nietzsche's understanding of knowledge into to the socio-historical realm. As discussed above, Nietzsche's perspectivist thinking viewed knowledge as the interpretation of the will to power that comes from our organic existence—our needs; i.e., our drives, and their Pros and Cons. In this picture, life is the condition of the possibility of knowledge. Accordingly, for Nietzsche, knowledge is a relational phenomenon: It is based on our will to grow. It is not a substance—it is relational since it is based on constant interpretation. Hence, instead of giving us eternal truths, the function of knowledge is to inform the human subject about the relations of things to human beings. When it comes to Foucault's view, the social body as a whole constitutes forms of power according to its needs, and determines the objects of knowledge accordingly. Hence, focusing on our discursive existence, Foucault, in his genealogical works, translates Nietzsche's organic (and micro-) trajectory of drive/affect-need-will to power-interpretation that leads to knowledge into the discursive (and macro-) trajectory of society/institution-need-power-*savoir*. Moreover, in Foucault's view, the battlefield of discursive and non-discursive elements gives us the system of the existence of historical perspectives—the battlefield serves as the a priori of sciences. One cannot say anything at any time: the conceptual ground on which the knowing subject has its epistemic activities is the episteme of the discursive battlefield. It is the historical outcome of the multiplicity of force relations between the discursive and the non-discursive.

Secondly, by showing that the historical a priori rules of the formation of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of discourses (i.e., *episteme*) are produced by power, he solves the problems of change and causality, which he faced in his archaeological period. The relational and dynamic nature of power, including multifarious techniques, strategical and constantly changing relations and their dependence on processes explain how and why changes occur in *epistemes*. For example, while the sovereign power needed the verification of the act of the violation of the law, and therefore functioned in parallel with the

advancement of natural sciences; the need for the efficient functioning of an industrialized society led to the emergence of the objects of human-scientific knowledge. Under these circumstances, modern governmentality in parallel with the emergence of human sciences, such as criminology, pedagogy, and psychiatry. Thus the gist of Foucault's discursive perspectivism—perfectly parallel with Nietzsche's organic perspectivism that relate knowledge to the interests of the living body—thus reveals: knowledge is never disinterested. It is the product of power, just like the knowing subject. The subject, in the modern world, is not a conscious and disinterested observer of the truth; instead, it is a “function,” a vacant place to be filled—in an automatically functioning machinery of power that functions by hierarchizing—by several replaceable individuals. As a result, the objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of discourses emerge and change in a battlefield of force relations; and knowledge is the effect of the ongoing battle, or, using Nietzschean terminology, of the eternal recurrence of power relations.

Thirdly, Foucault's genealogy shows that his discursive perspectivism needed a genealogy to show the historical contingency of what is taken for granted as “necessary,” “natural” and “normal;” and Foucault performs this genealogy with profound inspirations from Nietzsche. However, Foucault limits the scope to human sciences, and extends the precision (by dealing with specific details and peculiarities) of Nietzsche's genealogy. Foucault's genealogy shares the four characteristics that he observes in Nietzsche's genealogy. Firstly, Foucault's genealogical concern is to record the singularity of events without appealing to a teleology. Foucault does this with a research of history and, for instance, finds out the emergence of disciplines in places such as military barracks, schools, hospitals, and factories. Secondly, Foucault seeks the emergences in the most unpromising places, such as our sexual instincts, showing that they are produced in a piecemeal fashion through a long history. Thirdly, Foucault shows, by being sensitive to the recurrence of events, for example, how the disciplinary techniques used in the military were appropriated and used in

medicine and hospitals, as well as in prisons and human sciences. Fourthly, Foucault describes the instances where a historical event is absent. For instance, he shows that the severe punishments such as the spectacles of scaffold is absent in the modern deployment of power based on constant surveillance; and constant surveillance is absent in the regime of sovereign power. Moreover, he shows the “unsacred,” *Entstehungen* of today’s great values, such as “liberty,” by showing that its emergence occurs in relation with the exteriority of accidents (i.e., the historical needs that contingently arise in the age of industrialization). With these works, Foucault questioned the unquestioned, for example, our physiology which is shaped in history. With his genealogical works, he elucidated how our bodies are made subjects. Moreover, embracing the parodic, dissociative, and the sacrificial uses of history, accepting that his history is guided by a perspective too, Foucault the genealogist tries to produce an intellectual counter-power to the hegemonic effects of modern power. This is because modern forms of power tend to result in domination and cause the subjugation of some perspectives by naturalizing their tools, concepts, and practices; that is, their weapons. What Foucault sets out to do in his genealogical works is an intellectual counter-conduct of denaturalizing the norms of the modern forms of power. These forms utilize certain discourses that claim to have at their disposal the truth about the human nature. Thus, Foucault historicizes the so-called human nature itself. This brings us the discussion of Foucault’s guiding perspective; namely, freedom.

3.3.2. Freedom as Foucault’s Guiding Perspective

After all, what would be the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent as possible, in the knower’s straying afield of [one]self? (Foucault, 1990, p. 8).

It is seen that the archaeological study of the archive and the genealogical study that shows the historical contingency of what is considered to be immutable in human beings burst open the “other:” things could have been otherwise now,

and may be otherwise in the future. Looking at Foucault's discussion on the sacrificial use of history (i.e., affirming that his history as genealogy is also a perspective among others) in NGH, and at how he conducts a genealogical study in parallel with this discussion, shows us that Foucault's guiding perspective is freedom from the hegemonic effects of the modern forms of power. With his genealogical studies, Foucault shows how our souls are historically shaped by power relations, and how they imprison our bodies with such thoughts as sex as a natural substance, or as the idea that there is a natural and humanitarian connection between crime and imprisonment. These thoughts are historically imposed on us by the allegedly "scientific truths" of certain discourses, such as medicine, pedagogy, psychiatry, etc., in relation with the needs of power. These discourses, having the claim to define the unchanging nature and essence of human beings, set the norms about the so-called human nature. They thus dominate and imprison us. However, according to Foucault, power is not a solely repressive phenomenon; it is also productive: it produces reality and our subjectivity.

Before providing the details of what Foucault means by the freedom from such domination and imprisonment, I think that a brief preliminary discussion on the term freedom itself will be helpful, especially in order to answer some objections against Foucault's conception of power/resistance: "Without the existence of an autonomous subject and/or universal truth, we cannot talk about freedom." I think that, the best strategy to overcome such objections is to distinguish between the traditional understanding of freedom and Foucault's conception of the term. As Todd May (2011) puts it, the term freedom has a pivotal position between two types of philosophical problems; namely, "metaphysical status of human beings [...]" and "their political status (p. 71). Hence, there are two distinct types of freedom that traditional philosophy has in its repertoire. These are "metaphysical freedom" and "political freedom." Those who defend that human beings are metaphysically free reject any type of

determinism and hold that humans “have some conscious control over their thought and their behavior” (ibid., p. 73). Conceptually distinct from the metaphysical one, political freedom is about the configuration of liberties in society, such as freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, freedom of movement, etc. (ibid.). The theorists of metaphysical freedom defend that regardless of the degree of political freedom in one’s society, “metaphysical freedom is something all human beings possess” (ibid., pp. 73f). In other words, for those who defend metaphysical freedom, the human subject has a conscious control over h/er activities and over who s/he is regardless of the preventions s/he receives from the society. According to May, holding this thought is to miss the point that human beings are reinforced to think, to behave, and to perceive themselves in some way or another in the context of their societies. Moreover, this thought overlooks profound limitations that tend to create states of domination over human beings, ones that are posed by the society. If those who philosophize on freedom take into consideration these concrete conditions instead of dealing solely with an abstract philosophical position,

[w]hat would be of more interest to them would be to understand the character of their constraints, how these constraints affect who they are and what they do, and what they might do to liberate themselves from them (ibid., p. 74).

May argues that this is the exact place where the relevance of the thought of Foucault to the issue of freedom shows itself. As he puts it, Foucault does not explicitly deny metaphysical freedom; but instead, he shows the *historical* constraints that bound the human subject. However, this practice is, instead of being metaphysical, a *political* one (ibid.). This is a convincing stance in the sense that, with his archaeological and genealogical works, Foucault sets out to free our thinking and acting from their constraints. That is, he shows the way out by describing the dominating effects of the modern governmentality, and by producing a discursive counter-power to the crystallization of modern norms. Foucault’s works help us to think otherwise and act otherwise. They remind us that we could be otherwise, especially by showing that what we regard immutable

and inevitable in ourselves and around us are in fact historical constructs. In parallel, Colin Koopman (2013) calls this “*the anti-inevitability thesis*” (p. 528). Along with this thesis, for him, Foucault’s genealogy contains “the composition thesis,” which seeks “to describe *the process of how* modern subjectivity was contingently composed of a whole congeries of elements that contribute to who we are” (ibid.). As Koopman puts it, with these two aims, Foucault sets out to furnish us with the tools to resist our current selves as the product of modern governmentality, and free our thinking from its effects of domination.

At this point, however, another crucial problem presents itself. As discussed above, in his archaeological and genealogical works, Foucault takes the subject to be a position to be filled. In other words, the subject is a historical construct: it is a product of power. Then, the natural questions are the following: Whose freedom? If we cannot talk about the control of the subject on h/er behavior, how can we talk about h/er freedom, or h/er resistance to an authority whatsoever? Under such conditions, who can we assign the capability to resist? For answering this thread of questions, firstly, I would like to give a brief reminder; and secondly, talk about Foucault’s genealogy in reciprocal relation with his “ethical” writings in the early 1980s. The brief reminder is as follows: As discussed earlier, Foucault’s ontology of power is not a subject-object ontology. It is rather a process-ontology according to which subjects and objects become what they are in certain processes—especially in the processes of force-relations. Hence, Foucault neither accepts nor rejects metaphysical freedom. What he does is to reject the *absolute* authority of the autonomous subject and showing the positive unconscious informing h/er consciousness and h/er body. In other words, instead of claiming or rejecting that a subject has a free will to some or another extent, Foucault shows that the conceptual framework of the subject with the help of which it perceives itself and what is around it is produced by an historical ensemble. The level of Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical analyses is not the level of *connaissance*; instead, they are of *savoir*—which is defined by the

historical a priori rules of the formation of objects, subjects, concepts and strategies of discourses. Accordingly, he does not offer any *connaissance* (in the form of S is P) on the issue of free will. That is, he does not seek to find the metaphysical truth of the free-will—he is neither a defender, nor an opponent of the thought of metaphysical freedom. Instead, he tries to lay bare the positive unconscious of knowledge—that not only produces, but also imprisons us—and lay bare historically contingent nature of the alleged necessities of human existence. Doing this bursts open the difference, the other—what is subjugated by modern forms of power. Genealogy makes it clear to us to what extent certain forms of power contributed to who we are. Under these conditions, for Foucault, freedom is to refuse who we are. Refusing who we are requires to act strategically. Thus, genealogy, as counter-knowledge, is made for cutting. It is the *logos* of Foucault’s political intellectualism. Genealogy is a strategical stance, since it lays bare the operation of the modern deployment of power and its effects of domination—resisting to the hegemonic effects of the battle from within the same discursive battlefield. This aim brings Foucault to deal with an *ethos* of producing resistance to “who we are” as dealing with ethics; namely, an ethos of transforming one’s self for the sake of freedom. Freedom in this sense is an ethical as well as an artistic practice. It contains the ethos of destroying and recreating oneself as if one’s self is a work of art.

Let us pay a visit to the basics and turn back to the term “governmentality.” Governmentality refers to the *logos* of conducting the conduct of others, operating both in the micro-level of individuals and in the macro-level of the population. It is a term coined by Foucault to refer to the modern operations of power as opposed to the juridico-discursive representation. Aret Karademir (2013) summarizes the productive character of modern governmentality as follows:

[P]ower as governmentality, as opposed to the juridico-discursive conception of power, is positive, because it is productive. It produces the population as an

analyzable, predictable, and healthy collectivity of individuals. It produces docile bodies and normalized subjects. It produces desires, inclinations, tendencies, and ways of life for both the population and its individual constituents. It also produces knowledge. For it produces case studies, taxonomies, objects and domains of knowledge. And lastly, it produces individualities; it produces subjective positions one identifies oneself with in order to experience oneself as what one is, such as: abnormal, homosexual, delinquent, or criminal (p. 118).

Under these circumstances, we ourselves and our self-knowledge are the products of power. It is worth noting that if this is true, then, the aim of resistance cannot be identified with waging war against power *per se*. In parallel with this, Foucault asserts that “[p]ower is not evil. Power is games of strategy” (Foucault, 2000a, p. 298) or techniques of government (Foucault, 1998, p. 299). According to Foucault, since resistance is the irreducible opposite of power, it is on the same level with it, operating in the same battlefield. Consequently, resistance is a part of the “games of strategy.” In other words, resistance is not an escape from power. Instead, for Foucault, the problem concerning freedom as resistance is “to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the *ēthos*, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible” (ibid.).

Thus, Foucault’s understanding of freedom can be formulated as resisting against the dominating effects of power. But what is domination? In what way it is different from power in general? Foucault (1998) makes a distinction between strategic games, techniques of government, and states of domination (p. 299). In strategic games and techniques of government, centers of force try to influence the behavior of others with the presupposition that the counter center of force is free at least to some extent. In other words, freedom is the condition of the possibility of power. Foucault writes:

Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free.” By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available. Where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no relationship of power: slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape (Foucault, 2000b, p. 342).

What Foucault describes above as the state in which one is in chains and has no chance of resistance is the elimination of power. It is the state of domination: “the limit case, the zero-degree of power (Foucault, 1988, p. 2). For Foucault, power itself is not bad, but “everything is dangerous, which is not exactly same as bad” (Foucault, 2000c, p. 256). Modern forms of power are dangerous insofar as they “tend to congeal into states of domination” (Cf. Simons, 2013, p. 102). In other words, they tend to crystallize to the point that it becomes almost impossible to change their state of hegemony, either because they are thought to be natural or historically necessary. However, given that everything is dangerous, it means that the game is not over yet, and there are still things to do. Hence, Foucault’s intellectualism is “a hyper- and pessimistic activism” (Foucault, 2000c, p. 256). It is a hyper- activism since in every overcoming of a danger, new dangers arise: there is an eternal return of force relations. This is also the reason of the pessimism of Foucault’s intellectualism: the political task never finishes. Genealogy is a constant activity that is conducted as a criticism of the danger of domination. But this pessimism is also an optimism for the same reason: since the task never finishes, “we always have something to do” (ibid.). In other words, perfectly in parallel with Nietzsche, Foucault’s intellectualism does not believe in a political “Garden of Eden.” It perpetuates the political task (in Foucault’s case, ethos of transformation) to eternity since it sees new dangers to resist in each stage of forces. Since Foucault’s guiding perspective is freedom against the states of domination caused by the modern forms of power, it requires a constant genealogy as a counter conduct to the norm-universalizing and norm-naturalizing modern governmentality. If we leave what is taken for granted unquestioned, as if we were social robots, we have no possibility to be with respect to the norms imposed on us by the hegemonic centers of force. In that case, there is no resistance, no power, no relationship, but a crystallized, calcified, a frozen state of domination. However, with a genealogical denaturalization of the universalized norms of modern governmentality that have domineering effects, we produce a

chance to be otherwise. Genealogy, thus, is the counter-conduct for the sake of producing the conceptual means of “how not to be governed *like that*, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them” (Foucault, 1997, p. 44). Hence, genealogy is performed as a critical activity that reflects upon what constrains us in order “to give new impetus [...] to the undefined work of freedom” (Foucault, 2000d, p. 316). Therefore, Foucault’s conception of freedom is based on the “*strategic acts*” of resistance, with two terms emphasized: they are strategic, and they are acts. This requires, firstly, the weapons for the battle of resistance. For Foucault, genealogic knowledge is this weapon:

Knowledge is never anything more than a weapon in a war, or a tactical deployment within that war. War is waged throughout history, and through the history that tells the history of war. And history, for its part, can never do anything more than interpret the war it is waging or that is being waged through it (Foucault 2007, p. 173).

Thus, as Eduardo Mendieta (2011) puts it, genealogy is the “science of freedom, of creative freedom that opens up horizons of being [otherwise] by challenging us to exceed, to transgress, to step over the limits established by existing modes of subjectivity and subjectivation” (p. 113). Genealogy is one’s tool, h/er weapon for use in h/er battle against domination.

Foucault’s conception of freedom consisting of strategic acts (such as performing genealogy, practices of freedom, etc.), accordingly, has the *ēthos* of transformation in one’s conducts and one’s very being. This can be characterized by looking for new possibilities of subjectivities as a counter-conduct to the automatically functioning governmentality that dominates us and determines who we are. Freedom, thus, is a strategic art in a specific phase of the eternal return of force relations, which is conducted in the same battlefield with all forms of power, performed with a “political spirituality:” “the will to discover a different way of governing oneself through different way of dividing up true and false [...]” (Foucault, 1998, p. 233). This is the gist of the *ethos* of transformation that

Foucault offers. As a consequence, in his so-called ethical period, he is preoccupied with concepts like “care of the self,” “technologies of the self,” and “aesthetics of existence.” He does this by turning back to the ancient roots of philosophy based on “*askēsis*, an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought” in order to “know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known” (Foucault, 1990, p. 9). Affirming that one’s relation with h/erself is also a power relation, in his so-called ethical period, he performs a critical project and tries to find the ways out of the technologies of the modern governmentality that makes us all subjects. As a result, Foucault’s guiding perspective is freedom—as resistance to domination, both in his early and late writings.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Reading Nietzsche and Foucault together gives us precious insights into understanding what knowledge is and its interested character, how the modern (knowing-)subject is constructed in historical processes by the multiplicity of force relations, and into the nature of a further research on a political ontology for a new intellectualism. Their discussion on the relation between knowledge and power has many similarities and some differences. However, the insights to be acquired by these two thinkers come from both the similarities and differences of their thoughts.

Let us start with the similarities. Rejecting the static substance-ontology, both Nietzsche and Foucault provides us with a relational process-ontology according to which knowledge is “invented” in processes, in specific stages of forces. Both thinkers decentralize the authority of the autonomous subject in the making of knowledge, and denaturalize the supposedly “eternal origins” and “unchanging essences,” such as a fixed “human nature.” Doing this, they show us that knowledge depends on context and perspectives. Moreover, in the philosophies of both Nietzsche and Foucault, knowledge is built upon a normative ground. According to them, there is no disinterested knowledge. Knowledge is a tool of power in the battlefield of life. Whether or not the knowing-subject accepts it, knowledge depends on a value-ground. Knowledge is necessarily partial, i.e., intended to serve to a value-perspective. It is a human-made discursive tool for supporting and/or eradicating a set of norms. Producing, repeating, or combating

some norm or another, knowledge is essentially normative. Given that norms are deeply effective in shaping and administrating human behavior both in the individual and the societal levels, Nietzsche and Foucault show us that knowledge is a profoundly political phenomenon.

This perspectivist conception leads both thinkers to perform a genealogy. In the critical encounters of Nietzsche and Foucault, it is seen that genealogical method is chosen to be the most appropriate method for a perspectivist critique of values and discourses. This is because genealogical method unveils the historical contingencies of the norms, and their interested nature by questioning under what historical conditions the norms emerge. Genealogy is a counter-conduct to the exercise of a certain form of power via waging a war against the crystallized norms that are universalized by the form of power in question. Since a form of power might tend to a state of domination by universalizing and naturalizing its norms, a norm-denaturalizing genealogy is needed in order to overcome its domination.

This picture has important political implications. Firstly, genealogy shows that since there are no eternal origins and everything is subject to change in historical processes, things could be otherwise. What we live today is not a teleological accomplishment. Instead, it is a product of a specific temporal point of power. When we see how things are made, we see that they also can be unmade. This is because genealogy shows us that 1) reality is a product of power (i.e., the multiplicity of force relations), and 2) things get their meaning in the stage of force relations (or alternatively, processes), and 3) everything is subject to change. Genealogical study bursts open the “other” in this sense. It shows us that there were different norms and different knowledges, in short, different perspectives in the past. Thus, it makes us see that there might be different ones in the future. Studying the history of present opens up horizons for intellectual strategies for shaping the future.

Secondly, genealogy shows us that the political task can never be completed. Reality is the product of the eternal return of the clashes of centers of force. In this sense, power *per se* is not a “bad” thing inasmuch as it is productive. Hence, power itself is not something to escape. However, since reality is a product of power, everything is dangerous. This is because each form of power has the potential to be crystallized to a point where it becomes almost impossible to be challenged. Genealogy shows that in each stage of force, new dangers of domination appear. In the political realm, it is impossible to talk about an ideal state of affairs. In other words, there is no political Garden of Eden. Thus, in the intellectual sphere, genealogy as a counter-conduct is a need for overcoming the dangers of domination in each stage of power. Ideologies, as guiding perspectives, may be beneficial for practical activity for changing the world. They indeed provide motivation and guidelines to walk in the historical processes. However, they should not fix once and for all the dynamic relations of forces. Accordingly, new intellectualism, after Nietzsche and Foucault, does not assume a specific ideology to be the absolute emancipatory leg to stand on. Instead, eternal genealogy as a political intellectualism is what they offer in order to contribute for the overcoming of the dangers of domination. In other words, for a new political intellectualism, there is a need for a permanent problematization of what tends to present itself as natural or universal. Thus, genealogic politics is a never-ending task with no Garden of Eden.

Thirdly, regardless of the political ideologies these thinkers hold, reading Nietzsche and Foucault together gives us insights for an intellectualism with a guiding perspective of what we may call “democratic pluralism.” Genealogy, unveiling the eternal struggle of forces, shows us the contingency of hegemonic perspectives, as well as of the subjugated ones. Perspectivism and genealogy, affirming an eternal return of the clash of the centers of force, not only shows that there is a constant struggle among different perspectives, and that no truth or norm is independent of force/perspective relations, but also makes us see that there

might be other perspectives than ours that are equally valid. If a scholar who embraces the guiding perspective of a democratic pluralism reads Nietzsche and Foucault together, s/he can gather the insight that openness to other perspectives, being in dialogue with those who are excluded, being open to be challenged by other, non-hegemonic perspectives is something valuable. Thus, s/he might affirm that there is a constant battle in the realm of politics. However, this is not an obstacle for h/er to care for diversity. Thinking of power as the multiplicity of strategic games can be interpreted by h/er not only as something to be used in order to shape others' behavior, but also as being against domination, as being open to be shaped by the "other," and as being tolerant to be challenged by the perspective of the "other," even of the enemy. Genealogy, by showing the eternal perspectivism of knowledge and values has the political implication that an "ethics of war"—which can be characterized by an ethos of social diversity and being in constant dialogue with opposing perspectives—may be a strategy of war among others; and this strategy is in parallel with the Nietzschean idea of loving of one's enemy.²¹ This strategy is the very strategy of a democratic pluralist: Being constantly open to the perspective of the other.²²

Departing from a similar perspectivist ontology for which power is productive, everywhere, below-rooted and relational, Nietzsche and Foucault perform different genealogies. Consequently, affirming that knowledge is a political matter, they produce different knowledges as different tools for "cutting" different products of power. This is because they have different guiding perspectives. For cutting a paper, a huge electric saw would be inappropriate. Similarly, for cutting a pillar of a building, a paper scissors would be useless.

²¹ Cf. "The person of knowledge must not only be able to love his enemies, but to hate his friends too" (Z, I, "On Bestowing Virtue," 3).

²² The relevance of Nietzsche's thought with social dialogue is discussed above (Section 2.3.2.). For a detailed elaboration on the relevance of the thought of Foucault to social dialogue, the reader might see Falzon, 2006.

Since Nietzsche's guiding perspective is affirming life, he focuses on the psycho-organic aspect of knowledge. His treating of knowledge begins with the organic basis, i.e., drives and affects, and follows the trajectory of drive/affect-need-will to power-interpretation. With this trajectory, he produces genealogical knowledges that shows the organic roots of knowledge. He shows that knowledge stems from the combination of the organic (i.e., interpretation of the the will to power) and the discursive (i.e., the conceptual thinking based on the inclusion of language into human life). However, Nietzsche argues for the continuity of the organic and the discursive in knowledge and morality, and the priority of the organic over the discursive by claiming that on the very basis of all interpretation, there is the will to power. Performing a genealogy, he exercises a counter-power to the dominant norms of Western metaphysics that, in his view, deny life by rejecting the role of psycho-physiological in science, and denigrating everything about the living body such as feelings, senses, and perspectives in morality. When it comes to Foucault, it is seen that his guiding perspective is freedom from the states of domination caused by modern forms of power. Hence, his explanation of the perspectivity of norms and knowledge starts from the macro-level (i.e., the historico-societal level), and his genealogy follows the trajectory of society/institution-need-power-*savoir*. He entitles the multiplicity of force relations "power," which is tantamount to Nietzsche's "clashes of the will to power" between centers of force, and treats knowledge with reference to the evolution of the forms of power in the historical processes in the socio-historical level. Foucault, in other words, looks for the roots of knowledge in the social body, analyzes the discursive investments of power in industrialized society, and finds the society's will to knowledge in the needs of the effective operation of governmentality. This is to say that he translates Nietzsche's term "will to power" to the socio-historical realm. With this translation, his discursive-perspectivist episteme-ontology, and his guiding perspective of freedom, Foucault performs a genealogy in order to unveil the states of domination caused by modern forms of

power that operates hand in hand with the knowledges it produces. Knowledge, he shows us, is inextricably connected to power. Doing this, he elaborates on modern forms of power and human-scientific knowledges that enables it to operate, and produces a body of genealogical knowledges as a tool of counter-attack to the states of domination produced by modern power/knowledge networks. In short, while Nietzsche explains the relation between knowledge and power in the direction from the micro- to the macro- levels, Foucault deals with the macro-level (i.e., the level of society), and investigates the social body as a whole as productive of knowledge. This means that Foucault's genealogy is a properly performed adaptation of Nietzsche's genealogy to his agenda, or alternatively, to his guiding perspective of freedom.

Up to now, it is seen that the philosophies of Nietzsche and Foucault have different advantages for different purposes. Reading Nietzsche on the relation between power and knowledge is useful for understanding the organic roots of knowledge. Nietzsche tackles the issue starting from the genesis of language and human discursive activities. From there, he brings the issue to the social realm, and provides us with a psycho- and physio-symptomatological analysis. Hence, Nietzsche's treating the issue has the advantage of understanding the organic roots of the normative phenomenon of knowledge and for devising individual strategies that take into consideration human psychology in order for resisting to a life-denying form of power that tends to dominate us. For example, among others, with his treatment of the term *ressentiment*, he gives us profound inspirations on the psychological obstacles in a battle against a form of power. However, Nietzsche over-generalizes the operations of modern forms of power with reducing all of them to the products of life-denying "ascetic ideals" rooted in Christianity. Given that Christianity is not a unity, this approach may pose some problems. For example, Max Weber (1958) examines different branches of Christianity, each of which has different views about this-worldly existence. The Protestant ethic, which urges the believer to work and produce, and to be active in

this-worldly life as a religious calling, for him, informed the spirit of capitalism. Moreover, as Weber puts it, Lutherans did not rely on ethical principles for the reformation, and thought that “the world had to be accepted as it was, and this alone could be made a religious duty” (p. 160).²³ In a parallel fashion, Nietzsche is silent in the issue of how exactly power operates hand in hand with knowledge. He does not investigate into how exactly power produces the (knowing-)subject in modern times, and how exactly does the modern relation between power, knowledge, and subject differ from that of pre-modern times. Nietzsche does not do this since his guiding perspective is life. To wit, his guiding perspective does not guide him to analyze specific details like a social scientist. Nietzsche’s guiding perspective leads him to investigate into the organic processes at the primary root of knowledge, and urges him to oversimplify the phenomena that in his view denies life all at once. Thus, while enabling him to be alert to the organic, his guiding perspective of life renders Nietzsche blind to the socio-historical specificities behind power and knowledge. The lack of this knowledge may pose a problem for one who tries to determine proper strategies, even for one who tries to affirm life. This may pose a problem specifically because even Nietzsche’s “organic” can only be formulated in discourse which is a product of power. Hence, Nietzsche’s organic reading needs a social-scientific articulation.

On the other hand, reading Foucault on the relation between power and knowledge is useful right at this point. Reading Foucault is an illuminating experience for understanding how modern power operates, how it makes us subjects and objects of knowledge. Embracing Foucault’s philosophy is advantageous for understanding how the states of domination are made by power, and thus, for developing intellectual strategies for their unmaking. However, Foucault’s treatment of subject can be read as a pure social constructivism. With

²³ Here, it is worth noting that Nietzsche was not a capitalist, and that these examples were given in order to emphasize the complex axiological structure of Christianity in the issue of ascetism which seems to be oversimplified in Nietzsche’s philosophical discourse.

the evaporation of the subject to its complete dissolution, there arises some problems. For example, if subject is a product of power to the fullest extent, who is supposed to resist? Or alternatively, if we are perfectly produced from non-organic sources, what in us wants to resist? Are not we, then, supposed to be social robots? Who exactly is the one that has the potential to be otherwise? Moreover, Foucault's social constructivism that is silent of the physiological body is inadequate to explain how power produces docile bodies. Specifically, power invests to human body recognizing its limits, and produces subjects according to its organic constraints. Human physiology is not infinitely malleable, i.e., human body has certain limits. Medicine is used on bodies, and it changes the psychological and behavioral structure of a human being. Medicines are chemicals that only can be physiologically and psychologically effective on organic bodies. If the organic constitution of human bodies as the raw material to be shaped did not have regular characteristics at least to some extent, how chemical material would change the body in a regular way at least to some extent? Hence, power, in order to produce docile and utile individuals, has to take into consideration the organic limits of the body. For producing docile and empowered individuals, if it needs, power uses medicines with the awareness of the limits of the body. Even the sole fact that power uses chemicals in order to shape the physiological, psychological or the behavioral structure of the body means that it treats the body as an organic entity. Hence, without taking into consideration of the organic, the operation of modern power cannot be understood completely.

These problems arising from Nietzsche's and Foucault's philosophies, along with their advantages, gives us some insights into a new social epistemology. With an elaboration on their critical encounters, in the operation of power and in the production of knowledge, we see that *the discursive without the organic is empty, and the organic without the discursive is blind*.²⁴ Hence, reading

²⁴ With inspirations from Kant's words from *Critique of Pure Reason*: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our

Nietzsche and Foucault, we see that not only that power and knowledge are inseparable from each other, but also that the organic and the discursive (or alternatively, nature and nurture) are inextricably connected in knowledge. This is to say that, knowledge has one and only one side; i.e., it is an inseparable mixture of the organic and the discursive. For a new social and political episteme-ontology inspired by reading Nietzsche and Foucault in a critical and complementary dialogue, then, how may we formulate this inseparability?

As is seen, when we walk on the path of the organic like Nietzsche, we are opposed by the complex historical and discursive construction mechanisms of power. Similarly, when we walk on the path of the social, we are challenged by the complex constitution of the body as an organic material. The point where reading Nietzsche and Foucault as complementary to one another brings us is the need of a social and political episteme-ontology to work on the social-organic without falling into dualism. Executing the formulation of such an episteme-ontology is outside the scope of this thesis, and it may be the subject matter of further researches. However, in order to visualize a future episteme-ontology which treats knowledge as the societal product of the organic and the organic product of the society, thinking about the *Möbius Strip* would be helpful. Elaborating on the roles of the socially constructed mind and the material body in the terrain of sexual difference, Grosz (1994) offers the Möbius strip model for understanding human psyche since it has

the advantage of showing that there can be a relation between two “things” — mind and body—which presumes neither their identity nor their radical disjunction, a model which shows that while there are disparate “things” being related, they have the capacity to twist one into the other” (pp. 209f).

Fausto-Sterling (2000) embraces Grosz’s Möbius strip model, and adapts this model for her investigation on “how the social becomes embodied” (p. 7). Her

concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts” (Kant, 2003, A 51 / B 75). Reference to the paginations of the A and B editions of the German original.

aim is to formulate how the genitalia (the exterior of the body) and the *psyche* (the interior of the body) are related, and to show that the criteria for the decision of a body's sex as a female or a male is not based on a purely scientific ground. Instead, she holds that medical authorities label the sex of bodies as "female" or "male," especially the bodies of intersexuals who are patently in the grey area, under the thumb of social assumptions. Fausto-Sterling, trying to formulate the relation between the social and the material, defines Möbius strip, and summarizes Grosz's account relating to her own as follows:

The Möbius strip is a topological puzzle [...], a flat ribbon twisted once and then attached end to end to form a circular twisted surface. One can trace the surface, for example, by imagining an ant walking along it. At the beginning of the circular journey, the ant is clearly on the outside. But as it traverses the twisted ribbon, without ever lifting its legs from the plane, it ends up on the inside surface. Grosz proposes that we think of the body—the brain, muscles, sex organs, hormones, and more—as composing the inside of the Möbius strip. Culture and experience would constitute the outside surface. But, as the image suggests, the inside and outside are continuous and one can move from one to the other without ever lifting one's feet off the ground (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 24).

With these words, Fausto-Sterling gives a huge clue for overcoming the dualism of pure naturalism and pure social constructivism. The Möbius Strip Model is, with offering a monism of two seemingly opposite sources of knowledge (i.e., the organic and the discursive), and with providing a "three-dimensional" (Cf, Grosz, 1994, p. 89)—or, if we take into consideration temporality as another dimension, four-dimensional—topology of knowledge, a very useful heuristic device to reevaluate the thoughts of Nietzsche and Foucault. In this topology, the binary oppositions like nature-nurture, material-social, and organic-discursive dissolve, and are seen simultaneously active in the production of power and knowledge in either experiential micro- or historical macro-levels.

Even if we assume that the organic and the discursive are two opposing sources of knowledge that work *against* each other in a two-dimensional outlook, putting them in a Möbius strip shows us that it is not the case. Imagine that we are creating a Möbius strip by half-twisting a strip of paper which represents knowledge. Before doing the half-twisting, we will see the strip of paper as if it is

in two dimension and it has two sides, one front side and one back. Inspired by the colors the litmus paper can get, let us think that we paint the front side to the blue, which represents the organic roots of our knowledge. Then, turning back the paper, imagine that we paint the other side to the red, which represents the discursive. After this, we can half-twist the paper, and stick its edges together. Thus the Möbius strip as three-dimensional object is in front of us. Then, imagine that we put a pen whose point represents a philosopher at any point of the strip, and move it to wherever in the surface of the strip we would like to. What we see is, firstly, starting either from the red or the blue side, when the pen moves on to a direction straightforwardly without stopping, it will definitely face the other color. This is to say that when a philosopher is wandering around the blue surface of the organic roots of knowledge, s/he will in the end face the socially constructed *a priori*, and will find out that two sources of knowledge are on the same surface. And vice versa; when s/he delves into the depths of the red discursive surface which is socially constructed, the philosopher will find the living body on the way. Secondly, in each case, when the pen perforates the paper from a certain point painted on either color, it will find the other color on its background. Or alternatively, if an imaginary ant on the colored Möbius strip moves its head down and glances to the opposite part of the split, it will see the other color than the one where it walks. This is to say that any time when a philosopher investigates the organic roots of knowledge, h/er ground is the discursive; and any time when s/he elaborates the discursive, s/he finds out that s/he dwells upon an organic ground.

Hence, we can conclude that reading Nietzsche and Foucault as complementary to one another in a critical dialogue gives valuable insights into a complete Möbius strip of knowledge which characterizes a three-dimensional social and political episteme-ontology. Nietzsche, with a higher emphasis on the “nature” on the making of the knowing-subject, provides us with a detailed physio-psychological analysis of knowledge. Yet, we cannot find a sufficient analysis of the “nurture” in his thought. Right at this point, we find Foucault

providing us with the wide-spectrum analysis of the modern forms of power. However, remaining silent on the organic, his analysis shows a shortcoming for delving into the depths of our physio-psychological existence. Pros and Cons of their philosophies, as is seen, complete one another. Thus, for a new intellectualism, and further research on social and political episteme-ontology, I would like to offer the following motto: “Do not forget Foucault, just remember Nietzsche!”²⁵

²⁵ In connotation with Jean Baudrillard’s (1987) work *Forget Foucault*. This work is outside the scope of this thesis. However, I would like to give some brief information on this work, offer a related academic resource, and provide some quotations from it for the reader. In *Forget Foucault*, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, “Baudrillard proposes that we forget Foucault because [Foucault’s] theory is obsolete in a postmodern era of simulation and determination by models, codes, information, and media where the classical referents of social theory disappear.” (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 122f). Best and Kellner (1991) dwell upon Baudrillard’s challenges to Foucault in detail, and conclude as follows:

As Nietzsche argued, a multiplicity of perspectives provides a richer approach to phenomena than a single-optic perspective. Thus, while Baudrillard provides a corrective to Foucault’s neglect of semiotic or media power, Foucault’s work is a useful counter to Baudrillard’s implosive analysis. Where Baudrillard asserts that all oppositions and lines of differentiation implode, Foucault shows how discipline and power segregates, differentiates, creates hierarchies, marginalizes, and excludes. Foucault also demonstrates the ways in which power creates knowledge, disciplinary mechanisms, and subjects in his analysis of institutions, practices, and discourses, while Baudrillard simply offers an abstract semiotic theory of power. An adequate theory of power, therefore, would forget neither Baudrillard nor Foucault and would theorize, in a contextualist manner, the multiple forms of power in contemporary society (ibid, p. 123).

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

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CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

1. A Metaphilosophical Perspective on the Practical Justification of Philosophy. OZSW Graduate Conference in Theoretical Philosophy, Twente University – Enschede: 2016.
2. Perspectivist Approaches to “Truth”: James and Nietzsche. *Philo-Sophia*: 125 Years of University Philosophy in Bulgaria. Sofia University St. Klement Ohridski – Sofia: 2017.

B. TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

NIETZSCHE VE FOUCAULT'DA BİLGİ – İKTİDAR İLİŞKİSİ

Bu tezde Nietzsche ve Foucault'un bilgi ve iktidar ilişkisi bağlamındaki görüşleri, bu iki düşünürün farklı amaçlar için farklı avantajlara ve dezavantajlara sahip olduğunu göstermek amacıyla karşılaştırılacaktır. Bu karşılaştırmayla bahsi geçen iki düşünürün birbirleriyle olan eleştirel bir diyalogunun bize felsefi ve politik kapılar açması hedeflenmektedir. Özetle, bu tezde Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun bilgi-iktidar ilişkisi bağlamındaki görüşleri birbirini tamamlayıcı bir şekilde okunacak ve bu okumanın felsefi ve politik sonuçlarının bizi nereye götürdüğü tespit edilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Bahsedilen çalışma, daha sonra farklı ufuklar açması beklenen dört adet başlangıç hedefi ile ilerleyecektir. Bu hedefler şunlardır: 1) *Herr* Nietzsche'nin ve *Monsieur* Foucault'nun “kılavuz perspektifleri”ni ortaya koymak, 2) Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun “iktidar” ve “bilgi” kavramlarına bakış açılarını, eserlerinde kullandıkları soykütüksel yöntemin dışavurumuna referansla incelemek, 3) mevzubahis iki düşünürün modern bilginin ve bilen-öznenin oluşumunda “doğa” ve “terbiye”nin rollerine yaptıkları vurguları ortaya çıkarmak, ve 4) Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun genel projelerinin amaç ve kapsamını değerlendirmek. Bu hedeflerle yapılan bir okumanın sonucunda, Foucault'nun projesinin Nietzsche'nin bilgi ve iktidar arasındaki ilişki hakkındaki görüşlerinin sosyo-tarihi ve politik alana—Nietzsche'nin perspektifinden kısmen farklı bir perspektifle de olsa—uygun bir biçimde gerçekleştirilmiş bir genişletilmesi olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Daha spesifik olarak, iddiam şudur ki, Foucault'nun “iktidar” anlayışı Nietzsche'nin

“güç istenci” kavramının sosyo-politik alana bir tercümesidir ve bu tercümenin yapılış biçimi bu iki düşünürün düşüncelerini farklı amaçlar için avantajlı kılmaktadır.

Felsefe tarihi boyunca, modern dönemin sonuna dek, bilgi fenomeni genelde bir bilen özne ve bir bilgi nesnesi arasındaki bir ilişki şeklinde tahayyül edilmiştir. Bilgi istenci, bu anlayışa göre, bilen öznenin, bilgi nesnelerinin bilgisine ulaşma çabasıdır. Epistemolojinin uzun yolculuğunu resmedecek önemli bir kavram tam da burada karşımıza çıkar: “çıkarsızlık” [*disinterestedness*]. Bu anlayışta hakikat—herkes için geçerli olan tek bir hakikat—dünyadaki olgu durumunun tam olarak ne olduğunu ifade ettiği için, bilgiyi arayan kimse yalnızca bu olguların ne olduklarını bulmaya çalışan bağımsız bir hakikat arayıcısı olmalıdır. Bu surette, en iyi filozof, bilim insanı veya ahlak düşünürünün sahip olması gereken şey şudur: “çıkarsız göz” [*disinterested eye*].

Fakat bu şartlar altında hakikat istenci nereden gelmektedir? Nietzsche bu soruyu soran büyük düşünürlerden biridir. Biz insanlar niye bilmeyi arzu ederiz? Neden cehalet değil de bilgi? Bizdeki hangi güç bilmek ister? Bu gibi sorulara verilmiş önemli cevaplardan birisi eski çağlardan, Aristoteles’ten gelir. Ona göre *theoria*’ya olan istenç, yani yalnızca bilmek için bilme istenci, doğal ve evrensel bir şey olmalıdır. Aristoteles (1984), *Metafizik* adı verilen çalışmasında, bütün insanların doğaları itibarıyla bilmeyi arzu ettiklerini iddia eder ve bunun işareti olarak da duyularımızdan (özellikle de, olanı biteni görmemizi sağlayan görme duyumuzdan) duyduğumuz hazzı öne sürer (s. 1552).

Foucault, 1970 yılında Collège de France’a Düşünce Sistemleri profesörü olarak atandığında “Bilme İstenci Üzerine Konuşmalar” [*Lectures on the Will To Know*] adında bir konuşma serisini başlatır. İlk konuşmasında, insandaki bilme istenci ile ilgili iki yaklaşım arasında bir kontrasta dikkat çeker. Bu kontrast, birbirine taban tabana zıt olan Aristoteles ve Nietzsche modelleri arasındadır. Aristoteles modelinin dört temel iddiası vardır. Bunlar 1) duyular ve haz arasında

bir bağlantı bulunduğu, 2) bu bağlantının, duyuların pragmatik sonuçlarından bağımsız olduğu, 3) hazzın yoğunluğu ile duyulardan edinilen bilginin miktarı arasında bir paralellik bulunduğu, ve 4) hazzın hakikati ile duyudaki hataların bağdaşmaz olduğu iddialarıdır. Aristoteles, Foucault’ya göre, bu iddialarla, bu kontrasttaki ilk ucu temsil eder. Aristoteles modeli, bilginin yalnızca kendisi için (veyahut, bilginin kendisinden aldığımız haz için) arzu edildiğini varsayar. Aristoteles’in bu modelinin (aynı şekilde korunarak veya bazı küçük değişikliklerle) geleneksel metafiziğin büyük bir çoğunluğunun bilgi/bilme istenci konusundaki görüşünü karakterize eden model olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Bu modelde bilginin doğrudan yararlılığı esas değildir. Aksine, bilgi, haz ve hakikatin birbirlerine olan doğal bir bağ içinde tatmin getirdiği düşünülmektedir.

Kontrastın diğer ucu Nietzsche tarafından *Şen Bilim* (GS) adlı eserde ortaya konmuştur ve bu model bilginin bir “icat” olduğunu savlar. Nietzsche modeline göre bu icadın arkasında saf ve doğrudan bir *theoria* istencinden tamamiyle farklı bir şey bulunmaktadır. Bu da, içgüdülerin, dürtülerin, arzuların, korkuların ve el koyma istencinin birbirleriyle olan etkileşimidir. Bilginin üretiminde bu içsel güçlerin harmonisi değil, birbiriyle savaşımı yatmaktadır. Bu nedenle de, bilgi bir etkinlik, veyahut, etkinlik dizisidir. Dolayısıyla, bilgi her zaman ortaya çıkışını domine eden içgüdülerin veya dürtülerin emrindedir, onlara bağlıdır, onların avantaj ve dezavantajlarına karşı tetiktedir. Bu model, bilginin temelinde tam olarak da bir “tarafli olmaklığı” [*interest*] görmektedir ve bilgiyi içgüdülere ve dürtülere salt bir araç olarak tâbi kılmaktadır. Bu resimde ise, bilgi ve hakikat arasındaki pek de sorgulanmamış bağ iptal edilmiştir. Hakikat yalnızca bir yansımadır. Çünkü, bilginin “hakikatin bilgisi” olduğunu iddia etmesi, onun hakikati doğru olanla olmayanı ayırma eylemini gerçekleştiren ezeli ve sürekli yenilenen yanlışlama eylemi üzerinden üretmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır (Foucault, 2013, s. 13). Bu durumda, mevzubahis olan şey “beden”dir. Yani, bedenın yanlışlamaları, ve onun büyümekten yana “tarafli” ayrımları. İçgüdüler doğrudan yaşayan bir bedeni gösterdiğinden dolayı, Nietzsche için, bilgi bedenın

büyümek için kullandığı bir alettir. Özetle, bilmeyi isteyen şey, büyümeyi isteyen bir beden olmalıdır. Bu, aynı zamanda, Nietzsche'nin perspektivizminin sonucudur: "Bilgi, yaşayan insan bedeninin "organik bir üründür."

Foucault'nun bu iki uç arasında gözler önüne serdiği kontrast, geleneksel metafiziğe referansla daha net anlaşılır. Kozmolojik bir problemi çözmeye çalışırken, veya yaşamaya değer bir hayatı sorgularken, veya Formların ya da "en önemli şeylerin" bilgisine ulaşmaya çalışırken, veya Tanrı'nın ne demeye çalıştığını anlamaya çalışırken, veya zihin ve beden birbiriyle nasıl ilgili olduğunu araştırırken, hatta metafiziğin ne derece mümkün olduğunu göstermek için arı usun limitlerini sorgularken elimizdeki şey herhangi bir doğrudan veya dolaylı pratik amaca yönelmemiş ve hakikati aramakta olan bir "bilen özne"dir. Foucault, bundan ötürü Nietzsche'nin kökten bir biçimde taraflı [*interested*] bilgi modelini klasik metafiziğin postülatlarından olabildiğince uzak görür ve 1970-1971 derslerinde bu modeli belirli örneklerle referansla kullanacağını ifade eder (a.g.e.; s. 14). Foucault Nietzsche modelini o yıllardaki derslerinde kendi gündemi doğrultusundaki örneklerle kullanır. Kendi gündemi Nietzsche'ninkinden farklı olsa da denilebilir ki onun bilgi anlayışı ve bilgiyle iktidar arasındaki ilişki hakkındaki görüşü özü itibariyle Nietzschecidir. Kavramları kullanım şekli farklı olsa da Nietzsche'nin sunduğu "bilginin perspektival karakteri" görüşünü benimser ve bu görüşü sosyal alana uyarlar.

Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun bilgi – iktidar ilişkisi bağlamında birbirleriyle ilintili olarak okumasının önemi, Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun "çıkarsız bilen özne"nin çöküşündeki başlıca iki düşünür olmaları ve onların "güç istenci" ve "iktidar" kavramlarına referansla sokyütüksel eserlerinde yer alan ve bilginin üretimi hakkında olan düşüncelerinin bize kendimizi ve dünyayı nasıl deneyimlediğimize dair önemli içgörüler kazandırabilme gücüdür. Onlardan bilginin sabit bir töz olmadığını öğreniyoruz ve onların incelemesiyle bilginin bireyin ve toplumun ihtiyaçlarıyla ortaya çıktığını anlıyoruz. Dahası, Nietzsche ve

Foucault, karşımıza klasik metafiziğin sorgulamadığını sorgulayan, doğallaştırdığının meşruiyetini yıkan iki düşünür olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. Bu yıkım aynı zamanda, görüleceği üzere, felsefenin klasik alt dalları (epistemoloji, etik, ontoloji, siyaset felsefesi, vb.) arasındaki ayrımı da büyük ölçüde bulanıklaştırıyor. Sonuç olarak ise, bu okumayla, bilginin son derece normatif bir yapıya sahip olduğu ortaya çıkıyor. Buna paralel olarak da bilgi ve politika arasındaki derin bağ gözler önüne seriliyor. Bu de bize oldukça ufuk açıcı politik tahayyüller ve verimli bir entelektüalizm için önemli içgörüler kazandırıyor. Bu tezin amacı gelecek bir politik ontoloji için önemli olabilecek bazı düşüncelerin peşinde koşmaktır. Bu da, Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun bilgi – iktidar ilişkisi bağlamındaki görüşlerinin karşılıklı bir entelektüel diyalogu, yani güçlü yönlerinden faydalanılması ve birinin zayıf olduğu yerin diğerinin gücüyle tamamlanması yolu ile yapılmaya çalışılacaktır.

Nietzsche'nin bilgi – iktidar ilişkisi bağlamındaki düşünceleriyle başlayalım. Bunun için öncelikle onun “perspektivizm” düşüncesini inceleyeceğim. Perspektivizm düşüncesi yalnızca epistemolojik bir görüşe işaret etmez ve Nietzsche'nin bilgi – iktidar bağlantısı hakkındaki düşüncelerini anlamak için bir yol haritası sağlar. Nietzsche için perpektifliklilik yaşamın temel koşuludur. Bilgi, insanlığın “büyüme ve kendini koruma” (ki bu, Nietzsche'nin kabaca “yaşam” kavramından anladığı şeye işaret eder) için yaptığı bir icattır. Bundan ötürü, yaşam (veyahut, organik süreçler çokluğu) Nietzsche'ye göre bilginin imkan – koşuludur. Büyüme ve kendini koruma savaşımında bütün güç-merkezleri dünyayı bir perspektiften görür. Bilgi, insanın bir güç aleti olarak bu mücadele esnasında ortaya çıkarmak durumunda kaldığı bir fenomendir. Öyleyse, Nietzsche'ye göre bilgi, ortaya çıkışından itibaren “stratejik”tir—dünyaya “el koymayı” amaçlar. Bilgi organik süreçlerin ürünüdür ve bütün yorumlamalar bir perspektifsel noktadan yapılmak durumunda olduğu için insan bilgisi perspektivaldir. Büyüme ve kendini koruma için hayat (güç merkezleri aracılığıyla) değerler yaratır ve bilgi her zaman bu değerlerin güdümündedir. Bu

organik süreçlerde, bilginin nesneleri (ya da, güç istençlerinin yönü) güç merkezlerinin ihtiyaçlarına bağlıdır. Bu yüzden Nietzsche'nin perspektivizmi yaşama dair bir süreç speisteme-ontolojisi'dir.

Felsefi araştırma, Nietzsche'nin perspektivist düşüncesine göre felsefecilerinin kendilerinin spesifik güç istençlerinin kavramsal olarak dışavurumudur. Bu düşünce, felsefecilerin de kişi olarak kabul edildiklerinde birer güç merkezi olduğunu varsaymaktadır. Bilgi güç istencinin bir dışavurumu olduğu için ve felsefi yorumlama da, bilgi değerlere bağlı olduğundan dolayı, bir değer altyapısını gerektirdiği için, her felsefi soruşturma, dünyayı yaşayarak yorumlayan felsefeci için bir kılavuz perspektif gerektirir. Nietzsche felsefesine birazcık da olsa aşina olanlar bilirler ki, bu kılavuz perspektif, *Herr Nietzsche* için düşünüldüğünde “yaşam”dır. Çünkü bu, külliyyatının bir çok yerinde açıkça ifade edilmiştir. Nietzsche, batı metafiziğinin hayatı reddettiğini düşündüğü etkilerinden rahatsızdı ve felsefe yapma motivasyonu tam olarak da bu rahatsızlıktı. Nietzsche'nin amacı, haz ve acıyı birlikte kabul eden sevinçli bir hayatı olumlamak ve yaşadığı zamanın dominant felsefelerin (ör. Platonizm, Hristiyanlık, Faydacılık) yaşamı reddettiğine inandığı etkilrine karşı savaşılmaktı. Ve yaşam, Nietzsche'nin düşüncesinde şu teknik ifade ile dile getiriliyordu: “Yaşam güç istencidir” (BGE, [On the Prejudices of Philosophers], 13). Bu nedenle, denilebilir ki, Nietzsche'ye göre yaşayan bütün canlıların edimlerinin temel açıklayıcısı güç istencidir.

Kılavuz perspektifiyle uyumlu bir şekilde, Nietzsche ahlakın soykütüksel yöneme dayanan bir incelemesine girer. Bunun nedeni, perspektivist bir anlayışa en uygun düşen metodun soykütüksel yöntem olmasıdır. Nietzsche'nin anlatımıyla, soykütüksel yöntem iki temel soruya dayanır. Bunlar 1) değerlerin, normların, bilgi nesnelerinin hangi tarihsel koşullarda ortaya çıktığı, ve 2) bu ortaya çıkışların yaşam için değerlerinin ne olduğu sorularıdır. İnsanın büyük ahlaki ideallerinin tarihsel olumsuzluğunu göz önüne seren soykütüksel yöntemi

ile ulařtıęı bilgilerle Nietzsche, yalnızca deęerlerin deęil, bilginin de perspektival karakterde olduęunu bize gsterir. Bunun dıřında, bu dřnce, Nietzsche'nin g merkezleri arasındaki mcadelenin ebedi dnř (bengi dnř) dřncesiyle ve dnyadaki her řeyin bu mcadeledeki sreler iinde oluřtuęu grřyle birlikte yorumlandıęında, bu yorumlamanın eřitli politik implikasyonları oluřur. Bu da řudur ki, politik alan sreęen bir iktidar mcadelesidir. İdeolojiler gibi byk sylemler belki yrmek iin faydalı olabilirler. Ancak yařamın g istencine dayalı dinamik yapısı olguların sabitlenmesine asla msade etmeyecek ve her kořulda yeni politik avantajlar, dezavantajlar, fırsatlar ve tehditler olacaktır. Bu řu demektir: Politik alanda bir cennet bahesi yoktur. Her řey g istenlerinin ebedi atıřmasında ortaya ıktıęından ve yine burada yok olduęundan dolayı kendine politik bir grev atfeden bir kiři iin bu grev asla bitmez.

Nietzsche'nin perspektivist dřncesinin, kendisi bir demokrat olmasa da, bařka bir sonucu da řudur ki, perspektivizm, demokratik oęulculuk iin iyi bir dřnce sistemini oluřturabilir. nk deęerlerin tarihsel olumsuzluęını dřndęmz zaman tm perspektifler ahlaki stnlk olarak eřitlenir. Politik alanın srekli bir savař alanından ibaret olması, oęulcu bir demokrat iin perspektifler arasında srekli bir diyalog olması ihtiyaını gznne serer. Bařka bir deyiřle, kılavuz perspektifi demokratik oęulculuk olan bir enetllektalizm, perspektiflerin birbirini srekli řekillendirme abası ve savařımı kabul ederken, bir yandan da hepsinin eřit derecede geerli perspektifler olduęunu da dřnerek, perspektifler arası sregelen kavganın yanına diyaloęu da koyarak ebedi bir diyalog arayıřına girebilir. oęulcu perspektivist bir dřnr, bunu yaparken, bahsedilen savařımın ve bu savařımla paralel seyreden diyalog ihtiyaının hibir zaman tam ve sabitlenmiř bir barıř durumuna eriřmeyeceęinin ve yolda karřısına srekli yeni grevler ıkacaęının da farkındadır.

Foucault'nun bilgi – iktidar iliřkisi baęlamındaki dřncelerine gemedennce, onun Nietzsche'nin perspektivizmini oznde nasıl kabul ettięini

ve bu anlayışı hangi şekilde işlediğinden bahsedelim. Perspektivizm düşüncesi nasıl Nietzsche'nin tüm düşüncesine sirayet etmişse, bu durum Foucault için de geçerlidir. Ancak Foucault, organik ve tarihsel süreçlerde, Nietzsche'nin organik süreçlere yaptığı vurgudan farklı olarak, çalışmasının ağırlık merkezine tarihsel süreçlere, özellikle de bilimsellik iddiası taşıyan söylemlerin geçirdiği tarihsel süreçleri koyar. Bu durumda Nietzsche'nin perspektivizmini "organik perspektivizm," Foucault'un perspektivizmi ise "söylemsel perspektivizm" olarak adlandırmak mümkündür. Foucault'nun söylemsel perspektivizmi kendini en temelde iki iddianın karşısında konumlar. Bunlar 1) yorumlamanın gerçekleştiği tarihindeki perspektiflerden bağımsız olgular vardır, ve 2) insan doğası ebedi, sabit ve tarihsel olarak olumsal varoluş koşullarından bağımsızdır iddialarıdır. Foucault'nun çalışmaları literatürde genel olarak üç döneme ayrılır: Arkeoloji, soykütük ve etik dönemler. Arkeolojik adı verilen dönemde ortaya koyduğu eserlerden Foucault'nun "söylemsel perspektivist" olduğu kolayca anlaşılır. Arkeolojik eserlerinde Foucault, insan bilimlerinin temel yapı taşı olan "sözce"lerin [*statement*] söylemsel savaş alanı içerisindeki varoluş koşullarını ele alır. Söylemsel savaş alanı, söylemlerin daha güçlü etkiye sahip olabilmek için en üst bilimsel kabulü görme savaşı verdikleri alandır. Bu savaş alanı, olanaklı sözcelerin sistemidir, veyahut Nietzsche'nin terminolojisiyle anlatacak olursak, olanaklı perspektiflerin sistemi. En kısa ifadeyle, arkeolojik dönemdeki eserleriyle Foucault bize şunu anlatır "bir kişi bir şeyi herhangi bir zamanda söyleyemez" (AK, s. 49). Bu da şu demektir: "Söylenen şeyler" ancak kendisine referans verilebilecek söylemsel bir savaş alanıyla bir ilişkisellik içerisinde söylenebilir. Yani, her sözce, dolayısıyla da her söylem tarihsel bir sistem gerektirir. Bu arka plan sistemi de, söylemlerin tarihsel a priorisini oluşturur.

Ancak, Foucault'nun da daha sonra kabul ettiği gibi, arkeolojik yöntem değişim ve nedensellik konularında açıklama gücü ile ilgili güçlükler yaşar. Foucault, arkeolojik adı verilen dönemde sözcelerin söylemlere içkin varoluş koşullarını incelemiş, ancak içinde varolduğu savaş alanında bu varoluş

koşullarını oluşturan arka plan sistemlerin, yani tarihsel a priorilerin bulunduğu ve söylemlerin en üst bilimselliğe ulaşma savaşımını verdiği epistemelerin değişimini ve bu değişimlerin ardında yatan nedenleri açıklamamıştır. Başka bir deyişle, arkeoloji sözcelerin varoluş koşullarını aydınlatabilir, ancak bu koşulların dönüşümü ve bu dönüşümlerin arkasındaki nedenler hakkında hiçbir şey söyleyemez. Başka bir deyişle, arkeoloji bize ifadelerin yalnızca tarihi bir savaş alanıyla ilgili olarak anlaşılabilir olabileceğini gösterir, ancak tarihsel koşullardaki değişiklikleri ve bu değişikliklerin neden meydana geldiğini açıklamamanın zorluğuyla karşı karşıya kalır. Bu zorluğun üstesinden gelmek için Foucault, metodolojisini “iktidar” kavramını da içerecek şekilde soykütük kavramıyla genişletir. İktidar, Foucault’nun anlayışına göre, tarihsel başlangıçların ve söylemsel alandaki dönüşümlerin açıklayıcı ilkesidir. Foucault, soykütüksel çalışmaları ile iktidar teriminin söylemsel savaş alanını analiz ederken, iktidar terimini de kullanarak, söylemlerin söylemsel olmayan bir savaş alanını da içerdiğini söyler. Söylemsel ve söylemsel olmayan iktidar merkezleri arasındaki güç ilişkilerinin çokluğu, tarihsel değişimleri ve nedenlerini açıklamamanın anahtarı olarak kendini göstermektedir. Böylece, soykütüksel eserleri ile Foucault, söylemleri kendi doğum yerlerine yerleştirir; yani, savaş alanına; veya, Nietzsche’nin terminolojisindeki “yaşam”a. Bunu yaparken, söylemsel ve söylemsel olmayan iktidar merkezleri arasındaki ilişkiyi gösterir. Dahası, modern iktidar biçimlerini (yani “disipliner iktidar” ve biyo-iktidar”) kavramsallaştırır, formüle eder, ve bunların işleyişi ve ürettikleri bilgiler de dahil olmak üzere, hakikati üretme şekilleri hakkında ayrıntılı bilgi verir. “Disipliner iktidar” ve “biyo-iktidar” konusundaki çalışmaları, iktidar ve bilginin ayrılmaz bir şekilde nasıl bağlantılı olduğunu anlamak için çok önemlidir. Foucault, bu bağlantıyı oluşturan ve ifade eden bilgi/iktidar terimiyle, bilgi ve insan bilimlerinin derin politik ilgisini gösterir. Bunun nedeni, soykütüksel eserleri ile Foucault’nun bize, modern iktidar biçimlerinin yalnızca gerçeğin üretkenliği anlamında olumlu bir olgu olduğunu değil, aynı zamanda normlarını doğallaştırma eğiliminde olmaları

ve tahakküme meyleden durumlar ortaya çıkarma eğiliminde olmaları açısından tehlikeli olduğunu göstermesidir.

Tabii ki, Foucault, bir perspektivist olarak, çalışmalarını salt bir teorik aydınlanma için gerçekleştirmez. Onun hem arkeolojik hem de soykütüksen çalışmaları bir kılavuz perspektif doğrultusunda şekillenmiştir. Nietzsche'nin “bilgi bir iktidar aracıdır” düşüncesini paylaşır. Nietzsche'nin kendi perspektifliliğini kabul eden “tarihin feda edici kullanımı”yla [*sacrificial use of history*] tam bir paralellik gösteren soykütüksen çalışmalarını “tahakküm” adını verdiği şeyi ortadan kaldırmak için gerçekleştirir. Bu bağlamda, Foucault'nun kılavuz perspektifi özgürlüktür. Ancak, Foucault'un özgürlük anlayışı, öznenin mutlak özerkliğini benimseyen bir özgürlük anlayışından tamamen farklıdır.

Nietzsche ve Foucault'yu bir arada okumak, bize bilginin ne olduğunu ve onun çıkarlı [*interested*] karakterini ve modern (bilen-)öznenin bir iktidar ilişkileri çokluğu tarafından şekillenen tarihsel süreçlerde nasıl oluşturulduğunu gösterir. Bunun yanı sıra, bu okuma bize yeni bir entelektüalizm için nasıl bir politik ontoloji gerektiği hakkında son derece aydınlatıcı içgörüler sunar. Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun bilgi ve iktidar arasındaki ilişki hakkındaki tartışmalarının birçok benzerliği ve bazı farklılıkları vardır. Ancak, bu iki düşünürden ilhamla edinebileceğimiz görüşler, bu düşünürlerin düşüncelerinin hem benzerliğinden, hem de farklılığından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Benzerlikler ile başlayalım. Statik töz-ontolojisini reddederek, hem Nietzsche hem de Foucault bize bilginin iktidar ilişkilerinin belirli tarihsel aşamalarında, yani süreçlerde “icat edildiğine” dair ilişkisel bir süreç ontolojisi sağlar. Her iki düşünür de özerk öznenin bilgi yapımındaki otoritesini merkezileştirmez ve sözde “ezeli ve ebedi kökenleri” ve “değişmeyen özleri” denatüre [*denaturalize*] eder. Ayrıca, Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun felsefelerinde, bilgi normatif bir temel üzerine kuruludur. Onlara göre, çıkarsız [*disinterested*] bir bilgi mümkün değildir. Bilgi, yaşamın savaş alanındaki bir güç aracıdır. Bilen-

öznenin bunu kabul edip etmediğinden bağımsız olarak bilgi, bir değer temeline dayanır. Bilgi mutlaka çıkarlıdır [*interested*], yani bir değer perspektifine hizmet etmeyi amaçlar. Bir takım normları desteklemek ve / veya ortadan kaldırmak için icat edilmiş insan yapımı bir söylemsel araçtır. Bir normu veya zıttı olan başka bir normu üretmesiyle, normları tekrarlamaıyla veya onlarla savaşıyla, bilgi, kökten bir şekilde normatiftir. Normların hem bireysel hem de toplumsal düzeylerde insan davranışını şekillendirmede ve yönetmede çok etkili olduğu göz önüne alındığında, Nietzsche ve Foucault bize bilginin derinden politik bir fenomen olduğunu gösterir.

Perspektivist anlayışları, her iki düşünürü de soykütüksel çalışmaya yöneltir. Nietzsche ve Foucault'nun eleştirel felsefelerinde soykütüksel yöntemin, değerlerin ve söylemlerin perspektivist bir eleştirisi için en uygun yöntem olarak seçildiği görülmektedir. Bunun nedeni, soykütüksel yöntemin, normların ve bilginin hangi tarihsel koşullar altında ortaya çıktığını sorgulayarak çıkarlı [*interested*] doğalarını ortaya çıkarmasıdır. Soykütük, belirli bir iktidar formu tarafından evrenselleştirilen kristalize edilmiş normlara karşı bir savaşa girilerek belli bir iktidarın kullanılma şekline karşı oluşturulmuş bir karşı-edimdir. Her iktidar biçimi normlarını evrenselleştirerek ve doğallaştırarak bir tahakküm durumuna sebep olabileceğinden, tahakkümünün üstesinden gelmek için norm denaturalize edici bir soykütük gerekir.

Dolayısıyla, bu resmin önemli politik sonuçları karşımıza çıkar. Birincisi, soykütük, ebedi özlerin var olmadığından ve her şeyin tarihsel süreçlerde değişime maruz kalarak oluştuğundan ötürü, her şeyin şu anda olduğundan başka türlü de olabileceğini göstermektedir. Bugün yaşadıklarımız teleolojik ikmaller değildir. Aksine, bilgiye dair ortaya çıkan her şey, belirli bir tarihsel aşamanın, yani geçici bir iktidar konumlanmasının ürünüdür. Şeylerin nasıl ortaya çıktığını formüle edebilmek, bize onların nasıl değiştirilebileceği hakkında önemli fikirler verir. Soykütük bize bilginin 1) bir iktidar (yani, kuvvet ilişkilerinin çokluğu)

ürünü olduğunu ve 2) kuvvet ilişkileri aşamalarında (veyahut alternatif olarak, “süreçlerinde”) şekillendiğini ve 3) başka süreçlerde değişebileceğini gösterir. Soykütük araştırmaları bu anlamda “öteki”ni gözlerimizin önüne serer. Soykütük bize geçmişte farklı perspektifler aracılığıyla farklı normlar ve farklı bilgiler oluşturulduğunu, dolayısıyla da, gelecekte oluşacak durumlar ve yeni perspektifler doğrultusunda bugünkünden bambaşka normların ve bu normlara dayanan yeni bilgilerin ve iktidar formlarının oluşabileceğini gösterir. Başka bir deyişle, bugünün tarihini incelemek, geleceği şekillendirmek amacıyla geliştirilebilecek entelektüel stratejiler için yeni ufuklar açar.

İkincisi, soykütük bize politik amaçların asla ideal koşullar ortaya çıkarıp sabitlenemeyeceğini gösterir. Soykütüksel çalışmalardan çıkan sonuca göre gerçeklik, iktidar merkezlerinin çatışmalarının ebedi dönüşünün ürünüdür. Bu anlamda iktidar, gerçekliği üreten şey olduğu için, haddizatında “kötü” bir şey değildir. Dolayısıyla, iktidarın kendisi kaçılacak bir şey olmaktan çıkar. Ancak, gerçeklik bir iktidar ürünü olduğundan, her şey tehlikelidir. Bunun nedeni, her bir iktidar formunun, kendisine en ufak bir karşı çıkışın bile neredeyse imkansız hale geldiği bir noktaya kadar kristalize olma potansiyeline sahip olmasıdır. Soykütük, iktidar ilişkilerinin her tarihsel aşamasında yeni tahakküm tehlikelerinin ortaya çıkabileceğini de göstermektedir. Politik alanda ideal ve değişmez bir durumdan bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Başka bir deyişle, politik bir Cennet Bahçesi yoktur. Bu nedenle, entelektüel alanda bir karşı-edim olarak soykütük, iktidarın her aşamasında tahakküm tehlikelerinin üstesinden gelmek için bir ihtiyaç olarak karşımıza çıkar. Birer perspektif olarak ideolojiler dünyayı değiştirmek amacıyla gerçekleştirilen pratik faaliyetler için faydalı olabilir. İdeolojiler, gerçekten de, tarihsel süreçlerde “yürümek için” motivasyon ve rehberlik sağlarlar. Ancak, ideolojilerin dinamik bir doğaya sahip olan iktidar ilişkilerini sonsuza dek sabitleyebilmeleri mümkün değildir. Buna göre, Nietzsche ve Foucault'dan sonraki yeni entelektüalizm, mutlak özgürleştirici bir dayanak olarak olarak ideolojileri görmez. Bunun yerine, tahakküm tehlikelerinin aşılmasına katkıda

bulunmak için başvurulacak olan yöntem politik bir entelektüalizm olarak ebedi soykütüktür. Başka bir deyişle, yeni bir politik entelektüalizm için, kendisini doğal veya evrensel olarak gösterme eğilimi taşıyan iktidar formlarının süregelen bir sorunsallaştırma sürecine sokulmasına ihtiyaç vardır. Bu nedenle, soykütük siyaseti bir Cennet Bahçesi vadetmez. Aksine, ebedi bir politik sorgulamaya olan ihtiyacı ortaya çıkarır.

Üçüncüsü, söz konusu düşünürlerin sahip oldukları siyasal ideolojilerden bağımsız olarak, Nietzsche ve Foucault'yu birlikte okumak bize “demokratik çoğulculuk” perspektifi için de çeşitli ilhamlar sunar. Soykütük, ebedi güç mücadelesini ortaya koyar. Güç merkezlerinin çatışmasının sonsuz bir dönüşünü onaylayan perspektivizm ve soykütük, yalnızca farklı bakış açıları arasında sürekli bir mücadele olduğunu göstermekle kalmaz, aynı zamanda hiçbir bilginin veya normun güç/perspektif ilişkilerinden bağımsız olarak varolmadığını gösterir. Yani, bizim perspektifimizden başka, bizimkiyle eşit derecede geçerli olan bakış açıları olabilir. Eğer demokratik bir çoğulculuğun yol gösterici perspektifini benimseyen bir düşünür Nietzsche ve Foucault'yu birlikte okursa, başka bakış açılarına açık bir tavır geliştirebilir. Dışlanmış veyahut hegemonik olmayan perspektiflerle, kısacası “öteki”yle diyalog içinde olma anlayışını benimseyebilir. Çoğulcu bir demokrat, politika alanında sürekli bir savaş olduğunu onaylayabilir. Bununla birlikte, bu, çeşitliliğe özen göstermesi için ona engel teşkil etmez. İktidarı stratejik oyunların çokluğu olarak düşünmek, sadece başkalarının davranışlarını biçimlendirmek için kullanılacak bir şey olarak değil, aynı zamanda “öteki” tarafından şekillendirilmeye de açık olmak olarak, veya tahakküme karşı olmak olarak da yorumlanabilir. Bu da, “öteki”nin perspektifi tarafından eleştirilmeye toleranslı olmak perspektifi olarak değerlendirilebilir. Soybilim, bilgi ve değerlerin ebedi perspektifliliğini göstererek, söylemsel bir “savaş etiğinin” (özünde bir toplumsal çeşitlilik etiği olmak suretiyle) de makul bir enelektüel mücadele stratejisi olabileceği politik çıkarımına sahiptir—bu strateji

Nietzsche'nin "düşmanını sev" fikrine paraleldir. Bu strateji, demokratik bir çoğulculuğun stratejisidir: "Ebedi olarak ötekinin perspektifine açık olmak."

İktidarın üretken, her yerde, ve alttan gelen bir fenomen olarak okunduğu perspektivist ontolojilerden yola çıkarak Nietzsche ve Foucault farklı soykütüksel çalışmalar ortaya koyar. Sonuç olarak, bilginin politik bir mesele olduğunu teyit ederek, farklı iktidar ürünlerini "kesmek" için farklı araçlar olarak farklı bilgiler üretirler. Bunun nedeni, farklı kılavuz perspektiflere sahip olmalarıdır. Bir kağıdı kesmek için, büyük bir elektrikli testere uygun olmazdı. Benzer şekilde, bir binanın sütununu kesmek için bir kağıt makas kullanılamaz. Nietzsche'nin kılavuz perspektifi yaşamı olumlamak olduğundan, o, bilginin psiko-organik yönüne odaklanır. Bilgi meselesini ele almaya bilginin organik temelinden başlar. Buna paralel olarak dürtü/duygulanım-ihtiyaç-güç istenci-yorum yörüngesini takip eden bir soykütük ortaya koyar. Bu yörünge ile, normların ve normatif düzlemden yükselen bilginin fizyolojik köklerini gösteren bir soykütük bilgisi ortaya koyar. Bilginin organik (yani, "güç istencinin yorumlaması" ile ilgili) ve söylemsel (yani, dilin insan yaşamına dahil edilmesine dayanan kavramsal düşünce ile ilgili) olanın kombinasyonundan kaynaklandığını gösterir. Bununla birlikte, Nietzsche organik ve söylemselin bilgi ve ahlak anlamındaki sürekliliğini ve organik olanın söylemsel üzerindeki önceliğini tüm yorumların temelinde güç istenci olduğunu iddia ederek savunur. Soykütüksel çalışmalarını ortaya koymak suretiyle, psiko-fizyolojik'in bilimdeki rolünü reddettiğini ve yaşam, beden, duyular ve duygular gibi canlılık hakkında her şeye kara çaldığını düşündüğü Batı metafiziğinin baskın normlarına karşı bir karşı-edim uygular. Foucault söz konusu olduğunda ise, onun kılavuz perspektifinin modern iktidar biçimlerinin neden olduğu tahakküm durumlarından özgür olmak anlamında ele alınan "özgürlük" olduğu görülür. Bu nedenle, normların ve bilginin perspektifliliği konusundaki açıklaması makro düzeyden başlar (yani, tarihçi-sosyal düzey) ve onun soykütüğü toplum/kurumlar-htiyaç-iktidar-bilgi yörüngesini izler. Yani, Nietzsche mikro'dan başalayarak makro'yu; Foucault ise makro'dan yola çıkarak mikro'yu yorumlama işine girer.

Foucault, Nietzsche'nin güç istençlerinin çatışması anlayışına eşdeğer bir terim olarak, güç ilişkileri çokluğuna "iktidar" ismini koyar ve sosyo-tarihsel dülemde iktidar biçimlerinin tarihsel evrimi ile ilgili bilgileri ele alır. Bir başka deyişle Foucault, bilginin köklerini "sosyal beden" içinde arar. Endüstrileşmiş toplumdaki iktidarın söylemsel yatırımlarını analiz eder ve bilgi istencini endüstriyelleşmiş toplumun ve yönetimselliğin etkin bir şekilde çalışmasının ihtiyaçlarında bulur. Bu da Foucault'nun, Nietzsche'ye ait "güç istenci" terimini sosyo-tarihsel dünyaya "iktidar" olarak tercüme ettiği anlamına gelir. Bu tercümesiyle, söylemsel-perspektivist episteme-ontolojisiyle, ve özgürlük olan kılavuz perspektifiyle ürettiği bilgilerle Foucault, bilgiyle el ele çalışan modern iktidar biçimlerinin neden olduğu tahakküm durumlarını ortaya çıkarmak için bir soykütüksel çalışmaya girer. Bu çalışmasıyla bilgi ile iktidarın birbirinden ayıramaz olduğunu ortaya koyar. Bunu yaparak, modern iktidar formlarını ve bu formların verimli çalışmasını sağlayan insan-bilimsel bilgiyi ele alır. Modern iktidar/bilgi ağları tarafından ortaya çıkarılan tahakküm durumlarına karşı bir karşı-edim olarak soykütüksel bilgiyi kullanır. Kısacası Nietzsche, bilgi ve iktidar arasındaki ilişkiyi mikro seviyeden makro seviyeye doğru açıklarken, Foucault makro seviyeyle ilgilenir ve toplumsal bedeni bir bütün olarak incelemekle başlar. Bu da, Foucaultcu soykütüğün, Nietzscheci soykütüğün usulüne uygun bir şekilde gerçekleştirilmiş ve Foucaultçu amaçlara göre uyarlanmış bir soykütük olduğunu gösterir.

Şimdiye kadar Nietzsche ve Foucault felsefelerinin farklı amaçlar için farklı avantajlara sahip olduğunu göstermeye çalıştım. Görüldü ki, Nietzsche'yi bilgi-iktidar ilişkisi bağlamında okumak, bilginin organik köklerini anlamak için faydalıdır. Nietzsche, dil ve insanın söylemsel aktivitelerinin ortaya çıkışından başlayarak konuyu ele almıştı. Oradan, konuyu sosyal alana taşımış ve bize psiko-ve fizyo-septomatolojik bir analiz sunmuştu. Bu nedenle, Nietzsche'nin sorunu ele alışı, normatif bilgi olgusunun organik köklerini anlama ve bize hükmetme eğilimindeki bir yaşam biçimine direnmek için insan psikolojisini dikkate alan

bireysel stratejiler geliřtirmek konularında olduka aydınlatıcıdır. Örneėin, Nietzscheci soykütük, *ressentiment* [hın] terimi ile, bize, bir iktidar formuna karşı savařta karřımıza ıkabilecek psikolojik engeller ile ilgili olarak derin ilhamlar verir. Bununla birlikte, Nietzsche, büyük bir eřitlilik ve karmařıklık gösteren modern iktidar biçimlerinin işleyişini, Hristiyanlıėa dayanan ve yaşamı inkar eden “ileci idealler”e indirgeyerek aşırı geneller. Buna paralel olarak, Nietzsche, modern iktidar formlarının söylemlerle el ele bir biçimde tam olarak nasıl işlediėi konusunda sessizdir. Modern zamanlarda iktidar ilişkilerinin bilen-özneyi tam olarak nasıl ürettiėini ve iktidar, bilgi ve özne arasındaki modern ilişkinin modern öncesi zamanlarınkinden tam olarak nasıl farklılařtığını arařtırmaz. Nietzsche bunu yapmaz, ünkü kılavuz perspektifi yařamdır. Yani, kılavuz perspektifi, onu bir sosyal bilimci gibi belirli detayları analiz etmeye doğru götürmez. Nietzsche’nin kılavuz, onu bilginin ilksel kökenindeki organik süreçleri arařtırmaya yönlendirir ve ona göre yaşamı inkar eden fenomenleri basite indirgemeye yöneltir. Böylece, onun organik kökenlere karşı dikkatli olmasını saėlarken, yařam olan kılavuz perspektifi Nietzsche’yi iktidar ve bilginin ardındaki sosyo-tarihsel özellikleri göz ardı etmeye iter. Bu bilgilerin eksikliėi, uygun stratejileri belirlemeye alışanlar için—hatta yaşamı olumlu perspektifinden düşünenler için bile—bir sorun teşkil edebilir. ünkü Nietzsche’nin “organik” dediėi şey bile yalnızca bir iktidar ürünü olan söylemde formüle edilebilir. Bu nedenle, Nietzsche’nin organik okumasının sosyal-bilimsel bir eklemlenmeye ihtiyacı vardır.

Öte yandan, tam da bu noktada Foucault’yu iktidar ve bilgi arasındaki ilişki bağlamında okumak faydalıdır. Foucault’yu okumak, modern iktidarın nasıl işlediėini, özneleri ve bilgi nesnelerini nasıl yarattığını anlamak için aydınlatıcı bir deneyimdir. Foucault’nun felsefesini benimsemek, tahakküme meyleden durumlarının iktidar tarafından nasıl üretildiėini anlamak ve dolayısıyla onların yapımı ve yıkımı için entelektüel stratejiler geliřtirmek için avantajlıdır. Bununla birlikte, Foucault’nun özneye yönelik tutumu saf bir sosyal inřacılık olarak

okunabilme potansiyeli taşır. Öznenin çözülerek tamamen buharlaşması ile birlikte bazı problemler ortaya çıkar. Örneğin, eğer özne tam ve eksiksiz bir şekilde iktidar ürünü ise, direnecek olan kimdir? Ya da alternatif olarak, eğer bütünüyle organik olmayan kaynaklardan üretildiyse, içimizdeki hangi kuvvet direnmeyi isteyebilir? Öyle olsaydı sosyal birer robot olmamız gerekmez miydi? Başka türlü olma potansiyeli olan kişiyi nasıl betimleyebiliriz? Ayrıca, Foucault'nun fizyolojik bedenine sessiz kalan sosyal yapılandırıcılığı, iktidarın uysal bedenleri nasıl bir ham maddeden ürettiğini açıklamakta yetersizdir. Spesifik olarak, iktidar insan bedenine onun sınırlarını tanımak için yatırım yapar ve özneyi bedeninin organik kısıtlamalarını göz önüne alarak üretir. İnsan fizyolojisi sonsuz şekilde şekillendirilebilir değildir. Yani, insan bedeninin belli sınırları vardır. Tıp, ancak ve ancak yaşam sahibi bedenler üzerinde uygulamaya kavuşabilir. Mesela, bir takım kimyasal maddeler uygulayarak, bir insanın psikolojik ve davranışsal yapısını değiştirir. İlaçlar sadece bedende fizyolojik ve psikolojik olarak etkili olabilen kimyasallardır. İnsan vücudunun şekillenecek hammadde olarak düşünülebilecek organik yapısı en azından bir dereceye kadar düzenli özelliklere sahip değilse, kimyasal madde bedeni en azından bir dereceye kadar geçerli bir düzenlilik içerisinde nasıl şekillendirebilir? Görülmektedir ki iktidar, uysal ve faydalı bedenler üretebilmek için vücudun organik sınırlarını dikkate almak zorundadır. Uysal ve güçlendirilmiş bireyler üretmek için iktidar, eğer ihtiyaç duyarsa, bedeninin sınırlarının bilincinde olan tıbbi ve bedeninin yapısına etki eden ilaçları kullanır. İktidar tarafından bedenlerin fizyolojik, psikolojik veya davranışsal yapısını biçimlendirmek için kimyasal maddeler kullanılması gerçeği bile, bedene organik bir varlık olarak yaklaştığı anlamına gelir. Bu nedenle, öznenin organik yapısı dikkate alınmadan modern iktidarın işleyişi tam olarak anlaşılamaz.

Nietzsche'nin ve Foucault'nun felsefelerinden kaynaklanan bu problemler, yine bu felsefelerden gelen kullanışlı bilgilerle birlikte bize yeni bir sosyal episteme-ontoloji hakkında da bazı içgörüler sağlar. Kritik

karşılaşmalarının detaylandırılmasıyla, iktidarın işletilmesinde ve bilginin üretiminde, görüyoruz ki, *organiksiz söylem boş, söylemsiz organik kördür*. Bu nedenle, Nietzsche ve Foucault'u okumak bize yalnızca iktidar ve bilginin birbirinden ayıramayacağını değil, aynı zamanda, bilgi konusunda, organik ve söylemselin (veya alternatif olarak, doğanın ve terbiyenin) birbirinden ayıramaz bir şekilde bağlantılı olduğunu gösterir. Bu, bilginin bir ve sadece bir yüzeyinin olduğu; yani, organik ve söylemselin ayıramaz bir karışım olduğunu gösterir. Peki, Nietzsche ve Foucault'yu eleştirel ve tamamlayıcı bir diyalog içinde okumaktan ilham alan yeni bir sosyal ve politik episteme-ontoloji için bu ayıramazlığı nasıl formüle etmeliyiz?

Görüldüğü gibi, Nietzsche gibi organik yollardan yürüdüğümüzde, iktidarın karmaşık tarihsel ve söylemsel inşa mekanizmalarını karşımızda buluruz. Benzer şekilde, Foucault gibi sosyal alan üzerinde yürüdüğümüzde, yolumuzun üzerinde organik bir madde olarak bedenin karmaşık yapısıyla karşılaşırız. Nietzsche ve Foucault'yu birbirlerini tamamlayıcı olarak okumanın bize getirdiği nokta, sosyal-organik dualizmine düşmeyen sosyal ve politik bir episteme-ontolojiye olan ihtiyaçtır. Böyle bir episteme-ontolojinin formülasyonunun yürütülmesi, bu tezin kapsamı dışındadır ve sonraki araştırmaların konusu olabilir. Ancak, bilgiyi toplumsalın organik ve organiğin toplumsal ürünü olarak ele alan gelecekteki bir episteme-ontolojiyi görselleştirmek için *Möbius Şeridi* analojisini düşünmek faydalı olacaktır.

Fausto-Sterling (2000), Grosz'un Möbius şeridi modelini benimsemektedir ve bu modeli "toplumsal olanın nasıl bedenlendiği" konusundaki araştırmasına uyarlamıştır (s. 7). Amacı, cinsel organların (vücudun dışı) ve *psyche*'nin (vücudun içi) nasıl ilişkili olduğunu formüle etmek ve bir kişinin bir kadın ya da bir erkek olarak cinsiyetlendirilmesi kararına ilişkin kriterlerin tamamen bilimsel temellere dayanmadığını göstermektir. Bunun yerine, tıbbi otoritelerin, bedenlerin—özellikle de açıkça gri alanda bulunan interseks

bedenlerin—cinsiyetini tam da sosyal varsayımların etkisinde “kadın” veya “erkek” olarak etiketlediğini iddia eder. Toplumsal ile materyal arasındaki ilişkiyi formüle etmeye çalışan Fausto-Sterling, Möbius şeridini tanımlar ve Grosz’un görüşünün kendisinininkiyle olan ilişkisini şöyle özetler:

Möbius şeridi topolojik bir bilmecedir [...], bir tarafından bükülmüş düz bir şerit, daha sonra yuvarlak bir yüzey oluşturmak için uçtan uca bağlanır. Biri, örneğin, üzerinde yürüyen bir karınca hayal ederek yüzeyi izleyebilir. Dairesel yolculuğun başında, karınca açıkça dışarıdadır. Ancak bükülmüş şeridi gezerken, bacaklarını düzlemde kaldırmadan, kendini iç yüzeyde bulur. Grosz, vücudu - beyin, kaslar, seks organları, hormonlar ve daha fazlasını - Möbius şeridinin içini oluştururken düşünmemizi önerir. Kültür ve tecrübe dış yüzeyi oluşturur. Ancak, görüntünün önerdiği gibi, iç ve dış süreklidir ve yüzey üzerindeki biri ayaklarını yerden kaldırmadan birinden diğerine geçebilir (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, s. 24).

Fausto-Sterling bu ifadelerle saf doğalcılık ve saf sosyal yapılandırmacılık ikileminin üstesinden gelebilmemiz için büyük bir ipucu verir. Möbius Strip Modeli, görünüşte zıt iki bilgi kaynağının (yani, organik ve söylemsel olanın) bir monizminin sunulması ve “üç boyutlu” (Cf, Grosz, 1994, s. 89)—zamansallığı başka bir boyut olarak kabul edersek, dört boyutlu — bilgi topolojisi sağlamanın yanı sıra, Nietzsche ve Foucault’un düşüncelerini yeniden değerlendirmek için çok yararlı bir analogi ortaya koyar. Bu topolojide, doğa-terbiye, materyal-sosyal ve organik-söylemsel gibi ikili karşıtlıklar çözülür. Bu topoloji, buna paralel olarak, bu ikili karşıtlıkların zıt uçlarının bilginin ve iktidarın üretiminde—hem deneyimsel mikro-, hem de tarihsel makro-düzeylerde—*eşzamanlı* etkenler olduklarını gözümüzde canlandırır.

Organik ve söylemsel olanın, iki boyutlu bir bakış açısında, birbirlerine karşı çalışan iki karşıt bilgi kaynağı olduğunu varsaysak bile, onları bir Möbius şeridi içine koymak bize bunun böyle olmadığını gösterir. Bilgiyi temsil eden bir kağıt şeridi bükerek bir Möbius şeridi oluşturduğumuzu hayal edelim. Bükme işlemini gerçekleştirmeden önce, turnusol kağıdının alabileceği renklerden esinlenerek, bilgimizin organik köklerini temsil eden ön tarafı maviye boyadığımızı düşünelim. Ardından, kağıdı geri çevirip, diğer tarafı kırmızı olana, yani söylemsel olana boyadığımızı tasavvur edelim. Bundan sonra, kağıdı yarı-

bükebilir ve kağıdın kenarlarını birbirine yapıştırabiliriz. Böylece Möbius şeridi üç boyutlu bir nesne olarak karşımızda belirir. Ardından, ucu şeridin herhangi bir noktasında konumlanmış ve bir filozofu temsil eden bir kalem koyduğumuzu, ve bu kalemin ucunu şeridin yüzeyinde istediğimiz yöne doğru devamlı hareket ettirdiğimizi düşünelim. Gördüğümüz şey, ilk olarak şudur ki, kalemin hareketini kırmızı taraftan da mavi taraftan da başlatsak, kalem durmaksızın bir yöne doğru hareket ettirildiğinde karşısında kesinlikle diğer rengi bulur. Bu noktada Möbius şeridi analojisi bize bir filozofun organik bilgi köklerinin mavi yüzeyinde dolaştığı halde, eninde sonunda sosyal olarak inşa edilen bir a priori ile yüzleşeceğini ve iki bilgi kaynağının aynı yüzeyde olduğunu göreceğini söyleyecektir. Ve bunun tersi: Sosyal alanda inşa edilen kırmızı söylemsel yüzeyin derinliklerine girdiğinde, filozof, yolun üzerinde yaşayan bedeni bulur. İkincisi, her durumda, kalem kağıdı herhangi bir renge boyanmış belli bir noktadan deldiğinde, arka planında diğer rengi bulur. Veya alternatif olarak, renkli Möbius şeridindeki hayali bir karınca başını aşağı doğru hareket ettirir ve ayağını koyduğu zeminin altındaki renge bakarsa, gözünün önünde yürüdüğü zemin kırmızıysa maviyi, maviyse de kırmızıyı görecektir. Bu analogi, bir filozofun bilginin organik köklerini araştırdığı zaman bulunduğu zeminin temelinde söylemselin olduğunu ve söylemi incelediği her an organik bir zeminin üzerinde yürüdüğünü gözler önüne serer.

Sonuç olarak, Nietzsche ve Foucault'yu birbirleriyle eleştirel bir diyalog içinde tamamlayıcı olarak okumanın, üç boyutlu bir sosyal ve politik episteme-ontolojiyi karakterize eden bir Möbius şeridi hakkında değerli bilgiler verdiği söylenebilir. Nietzsche, bilgi konusunun yapımında “doğaya” daha fazla önem vererek, bize bilginin ayrıntılı fizyolojik-psikolojik analizini sunar. Ancak, düşüncesinde “terbiye”nin Foucault kadar yeterli bir analizini bulamıyoruz. Bu noktada Foucault'yu bize modern iktidar biçimlerinin geniş spektrumlu bir analizini sağlarken buluyoruz. Bununla birlikte, Foucault'nun organik madde üzerinde sessiz kalmayı seçen toplumsal analizi, fizyolojik-psikolojik varlığımızın

derinliklerine dalma konusunda bir eksiklik göstermektedir. Nietzsche ve Foucault felsefelerinin artıları ve eksileri, görüldüğü gibi, birbirini tamamlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, yeni bir entelektüalizm ve sosyal ve politik episteme-ontoloji üzerine yapılacak olan gelecek araştırmalar için şu sloganı sunmak isterim: “Foucault'yu unutma, Nietzsche'yi hatırla!”

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