COMPARISON OF 1919 AND 2011 REVOLUTIONS OF EGYPT
FROM SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to analyze how workers and business elite as networks in Egypt evolved within the century by comparing two ruptures in country's last century which are revolutions in 1919 and 2011. Social network analysis argues that networks are the mobilizing structures of the societies and in this regard, workers are the prominent network in Egypt. Their role has been compared with business elite to state two poles of the society when it comes to revolutions. Major finding is that workers are the pillars of nationwide revolutions of Egypt while an Egyptian elite in business world struggles to emerge and gain power in economics and politics in the last century. Repertoires of actions of workers makes them a threat for authorities and strength of ties among actors and the coherency of the network is the main difference of them from other networks, particularly business elite. In the thesis, not only role of workers and business elite but also two revolutions from their emergence to the results will be compared.

Keywords: Social networks analysis, Egypt, revolutions.

ÖZ

MISIR'DA YAŞANAN 1919 VE 2011 DEVRİMLERİNİN SOSYAL NETWORK ANALİZİ İLE KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

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Bu çalışma, Mısır toplumunun değişimini, toplumda öne çıkan networklerin 1919 ve 2011 devrimlerinde üstlendikleri rolü karşılaştırarak analiz etmeyi amaçlıyor. Çalışmada özellikle işçilere ve Mısırlı iş adamlarına odaklanılıyor. Sosyal network analizinde networkler toplumu harekete geçiren yapılar olarak tanımlanıyor. Bu bakış açısından yola çıkıldığında işçiler, aktörler arası ilişkilerin gücü ve uyum göz önüne alındığında en etkin network olarak öne çıkıyor. Toplumun iki uç kesimini karşılaştırmak amacıyla işçilerle iş dünyasındaki Mısırlıların incelendiği çalışmada, bu iki networkün iki devrimdeki rolleri ve yüz yıllık süre zarfındaki değişimleri ele alınıyor. Çalışmada varılan temel sonuç ise işçilerin 1919 ve 2011 devrimlerinde en güçlü network olarak otoriterileri zorladığı, bu süreçte Mısırlı iş adamlarının ise varoluş ve yükseliş çabası içinde olup devrimlerde işçiler kadar güçlü rol üstlenemedikleridir. Çalışmada ayrıca iki devrim aşama aşama karşılaştırılmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Sosyal network analizi, Mısır, devrimler.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CTUWS	Center for Trade Union and Workers Services
EBDA	Egyptian Business Development Association
ECESR	Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights
EFITU	Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions
EMG	East Mediterranean Gas Company
ETUF	Egyptian Trade Union Federation
HMLC	The Hisham Mubarak Law Center
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

Social movements are produced by complex human interactions of committed and motivated people. Social network analysis focuses on interactions and ties between individuals to understand a social movement. With the help of social network analysis and historical comparison, scholars can detect the change in social relations of a particular society. This study aims to indicate the transformation of Egyptian society in the last century by comparing the 1919 and 2011 Revolutions of Egypt through social network analysis. In order to set a research area the focus will be on two networks within the society, business elite and workers.

This study investigates how business elite (notables) and workers, evolved from 1919 to 2011 and the research will be via social network analysis. Network analysis is "the bridge between micro-macro gap" (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 1418) and paves the way to direct us from particular networks to the analysis of Egyptian society. Moreover, there will be a two-sided comparison in the study. Firstly, each network's role, involvement, attitudes towards authority and expectations from the revolution will be compared between 1919 and 2011. Such a comparison will shed light on how the workers or elite of the country have been affected by independence and whether their sphere of influence expanded or not within the century. Secondly, networks will be compared with each other for particular revolutions. For instance, workers mobilized with unions while business elite did not have such an organization in 1919. This analysis aims to highlight reflections on the universal clash between the workers and business elite in Egypt.

Among countries with several mobilizations in the Middle East, Egypt has been chosen because of two reasons. First of all, Egypt is always at the center of regional

politics as the largest Arab country. It is an important country with potential to set trends for the rest of the region. Abou El Fadl states;

> Egypt is the most populous Arab country, geographically central, and a regional pioneer in political, economic and cultural realms. It is often dubbed "the natural leader of the Arab world", and its trends and precedents have long echoed loudly beyond its borders. Notwithstanding scholarly differences over Egypt's regional record, many agree that the fortunes of the Egyptian revolution have been vital to those of its fellow uprisings across the Arab world. (2015, 1)

As he indicates, Egypt leads social and political changes in the region. Although its economy has not developed as much as Gulf countries, it is capable of raising social and political leaders and organizations that affect other regions, like Nasser or the Muslim Brotherhood. Secondly, Egypt experienced several critical ruptures created by revolutions in its modern history that are comparable to the history of mobilization in other Middle East countries. Consequently, lessons from Egypt have a great deal of relevance for the Middle East in general and for Arab countries in particular.

Revolutions are created by the mass of people coming out into the streets. However, in order to manage literature and create a base for the discussions and conceptualization, we need to choose particular events and networks. In 2011, major opposition parties and campaigns, leftist, liberal and Arabist politicians, human rights activists, youth from Muslim Brotherhood, students and academics or football fans were also in the streets (Abou El Fadl, 2015), but workers and business elite have been chosen because they represent two distinct segments of society which means their expectations, motivations and aims are different which affects their relations with the authorities. Regarding the aim of this thesis which is to compare role and effects of workers and business elite in 1919 and 2011 revolutions with each other and the change from 1919 until today; focusing on two different socio-economic classes will provide wide variety of results.

Secondly, these two networks showed great change in late decades. Duboc states that "Egypt has been experiencing the largest wave of labor action since the 1950s, with over two million Egyptians protesting in the workplace between 2004 and 2011 and rising numbers of labor action since 2011." (Duboc, 2015, s. 27) As the discussion in the second chapter will reveal, workers were an organized networks in 1919 and, as Duboc states, they enhanced their capacities and were active protestors in streets. During the period between 1919 and 2011, Egypt witnessed different economic policies and these changes dramatically affected workers and they responded these changes by protesting. The analysis states that workers were an organized and united network since 1919. For elites, there were *effendies* in 1919, Western educated men who were amongst the few Egyptians working in bureaucracy making them socially and politically strong. However, after the independence, a new elite class, of rich and educated business men, has emerged in time. The analysis will help to state the differences between *effendies* and the business elite of 2011 and what affected their involvement or non-involvement in the respective revolutions. There are workers with ties to different political parties, but these parties are not as instrumental as worker networks in the organization of strikes. However there are unintentional effects over each other in different sectors (Duboc, 2015).

A historical comparison has been applied to set the base of the study because it allows us to benefit from different disciplines including history, sociology or political science. Such an interdisciplinary analysis that allows us to make a historical comparison was considered necessary (Palabıyık, 2018). However, it should be noted that historical comparison is not the method of the study but rather a way of testing the hypothesis that the expectations of workers shaped their reactions in Egypt, but stubborn fact is that they are one of the most organized network even in 1919 and active protestors while the business elite has emerged as a new social and political actor in the country. When there was foreign authority in political and economic life, there were Egyptian workers standing for their rights while such a foreign rule and Nasser's state-centered policies in later decades, delayed the emergence of an Egyptians business elite as a network while there was effendies as educated

bureaucrats who were politically motivated rather than economic expectations. It is an easy trap for social scientists to fall into generalization or specification while using historical comparison. In order to balance these two, the century between 1919 and 2011 paves the way for generalization, but focusing on particular networks which are workers and business elite helps for specification.

Revolutions are created by collectives including people from different ideological, identity and occupational backgrounds and it is difficult to concentrate on a few of them in order to define a framework for the study. It would be an interesting debate to discuss how workers, who cannot even gain minimum wages, and the elite who have the privilege to occupy positions entitled only for a small group of Egyptians, can work together. There were plenty of networks in 1919 and most of them were organized network like women, Muslim Brotherhood, youth or nationalists 2011. These networks are intertwined in regards to their affiliations and difficult to separate. In this case, workers and elite have been chosen mainly because they represent opposing sides in economics and I wanted to discover whether they agreed or not in 1919 against foreign rule and Mubarak regime in 2011 in addition to following reasons. They represent or expected to represent opposed poles of a society in terms of their incomes, education, social rights or relations with authorities.

Moreover, workers have a long history of protest not only in Egypt but all over the world. In this respect, when I review the literature, I confronted with the fact that workers are prominent actors both in 1919 and 2011 with their power to stop economy by strikes and to put authorities into a difficult position. Analyzing their roles helps to review the economy policies of the last century of Egypt while I was searching for what workers revolted against. Policies on economy, which is directly linked with politics in Egypt, affects daily life of workers like vacations, minimum wage, insurance, etc. and helped me to analyze how these policies paved the way for revolts, which are mostly created by workers. Workers have power also because massive events not only affect them but also their families and number of protestors increases more and more when workers involved in addition their capacity to organization. Whether they have unions and are effectively represented or not affects

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their organization during revolutions or more importantly, whether they are satisfied with the rights they have or not can be a cause to revolution since such matters not only affects them but their families. Considering that there must be at least one person in every home employed with rights, satisfactory or not and even more unemployed, the effect on families is important.

Social networks have long been a phenomenon. Before digital/online relations emerged, face to face relations with family, friends, co-workers and social, political or economic connections were examined by sociologist since the 1930s. Social network analysis "comprises a broad approach to social analysis and a set of methodological techniques that aim to describe and explore the patterns apparent in the social relationships that individuals and groups form with each other." (Scott, 2017, s. 2) Since the thesis aims to define the role of ties among people in contestations of Egypt, social network analysis has been chosen. Although social network analysis is mostly applied to create diagrams of complex relations among networks, this study benefited from the glossary of the approach in order to use social network analysis' profound academic comparison of networks and revolutions.

Network analysis is particularly suitable for heterogonies societies like in Egypt. Talmud and Mishal (2000) states;

> We argue therefore that the study of Middle Eastern politics requires an explicit construction of a more systematic and holistic analytical perspective. In contrast to the dominant categorical perspective, we propose a network approach as an analytical strategy which focuses on social ties and political interactions. The proposed theory's particular advantage is its special suitability for analyzing complex strategic interactions between internally heterogeneous entities, structurally strained social systems, and changing identities. Using this network perspective, researchers can analyze more effectively the multiple configurations by which the politics of the Middle East is embedded in social, structural and religious connections (176).

Without examining religious, political, ethnic, historical, occupational or identity ties among individuals in the Middle East, the analysis of why and how revolutions emerged, organized and spread in the Middle East will be deficient. One of the main discussions of the study is that networks are the most utilizing structure for academics while comparing mobilizations. McAdam et al. (1996, 141) argue that networks are mobilizing structures which means "those agreed upon ways engaging in collective action which include particular tactical repertoires, particular social movement organizational forms, and modular social movement repertoires". His studies highlight contrasting elements in different social movement organizations and he states that networks are the best utilizing element to use in comparative historical analysis of social movements as mobilizing structures. Inspired by such studies, this study also benefits from social network analysis while comparing the two revolutions of Egypt. It will illustrate how complex ties among individuals created revolutions in Egypt.

Revolutions in the Middle East have been discussed intensively since the Arab Spring. Media, particularly social media, was at the center of discussions and social movement theories have been neglected except for a few examples (Beinin and Vairel 2011; Beck 2014; Cole 2014; Foran 2014; Ghanem 2016) which mostly focused on why people revolted or how they were organized to do so in a peaceful manner. There is a need of further studies on Egyptian revolutions to highlight how society and their repertoires of mobilization have changed during the century. Such a *longue duree* perspective would help in understanding the changes and continuities across the themes that mobilize people as well as across the networks that mobilize. This thesis will approach the two moments of Egyptian mobilization by exposing them to social network analysis.

Although the masses were involved in the revolutions, the literature focuses on nationalists in 1919 and youth and Muslim Brotherhood in 2011. However, workers and elite segments of society also played a crucial role with their organizational capacity, repertoires of actions and their relations with the authorities in revolutions. Workers were effective since 1882, first collective action in Egypt by workers

(Beinin and Lockman 1988) and they contributed more and more to their organization capability and institutionalization. Their repertoires of action like strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations can cause break in communication, transformation and production in all fields. This makes workers a crucial network. Business elite on the other hand, can be argued that emerged as a political network in 1919 and turned out to be a crucial actor in politics with their power in economics in 1970s. Since wealthiest and strongest businessmen is from few strong families, they have capacity to have a control on economy by affecting each other to pressure on authorities. These two neglected networks are expected to provide stunning results on 1919 and 2011 revolutions in Egypt. Within a century a lot has changed in Egypt in social, political and economic life in addition to changes in technology and communication and it is expected that there must be significant changes in these networks and their involvement in revolutions.

There is a gap in the literature on analyzing networks as the mechanisms that motivate individuals to act collectively (Roberts et, al, 2010; Diani 2013) or as Castells (2012) states catalyzer of social movements. He argues that disenfranchised groups overcome fear when they are not alone for the sake of majority and this network turns out to be the mechanism of revolt. Especially, during the Arab Spring people communicated and mobilized through social networks and anonym online identities free them from fear. Most of the studies focus on social media in 2011 and nationalists in 1919. However, this particular study focuses on workers and elite. In this respect, this study aims to fill a gap in the literature.

Tilly, pioneer of social movement studies, is concerned to understand the actors on social movements and investigate networks as the mechanisms mobilizing actors to transform society. Networks hoard opportunities compared to outsiders and that puts them into advantageous positions (Tilly, 1998). His theorization is based on inequalities, exploitation and control of surplus by other sections of society rather than producers. Marxist influence on network analysis provides universal and standing perspective like class-based discussions and studies on disenfranchised

segments of society will be applied to understand networks as mechanisms of revolutions in Egypt.

As mentioned above, this study's main aim is to analyze the transformation of the society's expectations from 1919 to 2011, particularly the business elite and workers. To explore this topic the following questions will be answered; how the organizational structure of the business elite and workers have changed within the century, how their repertoires of actions have changed, what was their attitude towards authority and revolutionaries, how their expectations from revolutions and motivations to revolt have changed and what are the differences and similarities between 1919 and 2011?

My overall review revealed several results in addition to findings on comparison between 1919 and 2011 that will be stated in detail in the third chapter. First of all, 2011 was debated highly around social media, however, the analysis of the power of workers on authorities shows that centrality, clique, density and social cohesion[1] of networks is more important than the digital networks for the emergence and spread of a revolution. If actors are not directly and strongly linked to others, such communication tools would be useless. In this regard, another result is that since elite is a recently emerged network and had no role in 1919 as "business elite" but only as nationalist bureaucrats, the social cohesion of workers show up essential to turn street events into revolution. This argument will be discussing in detail in the third chapter while comparing and analyzing the role of workers and -business- elite.

Most prominent result of the comparison between roles of workers and elite is that, in 1919, riots has been started by nationalists, mainly elite Egyptians and turned out to be a revolution with the involvement of workers, while in 2011, riots have been started by secular youth and events turned out to be revolution with the involvement of many networks including Muslim Brotherhood, nationalists, Feminists and

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[1] Glossary of network analysis terms are taken from Emirbayer and Goodwin's (1994) work titled *Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency*.

workers. Elite did not involve the riots until they realized that revolution was going to topple down Mubarak, which will be discussed in the second chapter in detail. This shows that workers are the pillar of in the both revolutions while role and status; expectations and motivations of business elite has been evolved. They were against the foreign rule, Britain, since it was an obstacle to the rise of Egyptians in 1919 but they were skeptical to change status quo in 2011. Still, I was expecting to see full support of business elite to Mubarak regime before I review the literature and statements of business elite at the time. However, they did not show any support during the events and declared support afterwards.

First elected president of Egypt, Morsi, died in prison and today the country is being ruled by military. We could ask why Egyptians did not revolt against military while same people toppled down an autocrat in 2011. Adly (2014, 6) argues that, "Egypt's new military-backed regime has many reasons to restructure relations with big business; its prime goal, after all, is legitimizing and stabilizing its rule". He states that, military restructured its relations with business elite in order to legitimize their rule. Moreover, as second chapter discusses how politicians like Abdel Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak in his early days tried to gain the support of workers, military is also aware the organizational capacity of workers. There is a strong relation between economics and political stability. As long as military achieves basic rights for workers and stable economy for elite, any attempt to another revolution would lack country's one of the most organized revolutionary network which is workers and pressure mechanism toward hegemony with money and media power of business elite.

Farah (2013, 47) argues that the 2011 revolution was characterized against "neoliberalism, corruption and authoritarianism". Her argument is based on the slogan of the revolution which was "bread, freedom and equality". This shows that people revolted against the overall economic, social and political system in the country. It is difficult to separate economy from politics or social life because they are interconnected. That's why, even though there were more than two networks involved in the revolution, this study focuses on workers and elite, in order to debate

how two different socio-economic classes of society reflected the revolution that demanded change in the overall system. In fact, in 1919, the case was similar because if British rule could have been ended sharply, Egypt would have needed a new economic, political and social system.

The elite were expected to be close to the authorities and against revolutionaries, to maintain the status quo and make sure their socio-economic position was protected. However, as a result of the research it was found that the elite in 1919 were against British authority, although Zaghlul and his friends were in high bureaucratic positions and they risked their social status.

It was expected to define crucial differences between the 1919 and 2011 revolutions in terms of people's expectations because there is a century between the two events. However, when we excluded technological developments, it can be seen that there is not much that has changed in the country.

1.1.   The Outline of the Thesis

In order to answer the main questions above, the first chapter has been dedicated to the literature review on social movement theories and network analysis. The chapter has two main discussions which are social movement theories in general and network analysis in particular. Initially the significance of social movement theories to understand social movements, how these theories define stages of revolutions and which questions they ask, is explored. In addition, leading theories of social movements are summarized, particularly new social movements, resource mobilization, political process theory, mass society and collective action.

The debate then focuses on network analysis. Network analysis has been chosen because ties among individuals are crucial for them to take part in an action particularly in the Middle East, even though the theory itself has been built and

capacitated in USA and Europe. This section defines a network, what their role is in revolutions and how social movements have been analyzed. The contributions of the approach to social movement theories, how effective networks are in recruitment of people and why it is important, are also discussed. Moreover, in this chapter, revolutions of Egypt in the last century has been reviewed and why 1919 and 2011 has been chosen among them has been explained.

The second chapter is a descriptive chapter which focuses on occupational networks in Egypt and literature on Egyptian society. This chapter is a re-reading of modern Egyptian history from a network analysis point of view. Workers and business elite will be described in detail. For every chosen network the following questions are answered: why they have been chosen to be analyzed; which groups are included in that network; how their structure, motivations and goals evolved in time and were affected by the events like World War I and what were their repertoires of actions and organization. The historical perspective has been built on three phases as follows; towards the 20th century, during the 20th century and the turn of the 21st century.

The third chapter compares two revolutions and reciprocal relations of revolutions and networks. This chapter states how the century affected workers and the business elite with regard to revolutions. In effect, this chapter combines the theories handled in the first chapter to analyze the case study detailed in the third chapter.

Literature review and analysis is the main methodology of the study. Since this study benefits from network analysis to compare 1919 and 2011 revolutions of Egypt, the literature on social movement theories, network analysis and revolutionary history of Egypt has been reviewed. Network analysis has been applied mostly for Europe and US (Keck and Sikkink 1989; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Passy and Giugni 2000; Della Porta and Diani 2006; Diani 2013). There are only a few studies which applied network analysis to the Middle East (Mishal and Talmud 2000; Clarke 2014).

Network analysis is a structural approach. Scholars put networks at the center of their studies and explore the society around them. In this respect, this study is written from

a structural perspective and benefits from qualitative methods while comparing two revolutions and analyzing the role of networks at multiple levels.

Network analysis scholars also apply the graph theoretic methods of mathematicians, algebraic and statistical models. However, such an analysis requires field work, particularly surveys. Since it was not possible to hold surveys for this particular study, the literature review is the main methodology employed in the thesis.

There are a few limitations of this study. There was no access to the field and no chance to interview the protesters, in addition to the lack of ability of the researcher to read Arabic sources. Therefore, secondary sources in English were used to review, understand and analyze the approach and the case. However, most of the studies reviewed have been overlooked by Euro-American academic centers (Abou El Fadl, 2015).

CHAPTER 2

2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES, NETWORKS ANALYSIS AND REVOLUTIONS OF EGYPT

This chapter aims to understand the questions being raised in the field and relevant theories that may address them, particularly social network analysis, in addition to the review of the revolutions in Egypt.

2.1. Introduction

The chapter reviews the literature on social movement theories, network analysis and revolutions of Egypt in order to understand the questions being raised in the field and relevant theories that may address them. In what follows, I first introduce social movement theories by drawing on leading scholars and research. By doing so, I intend to define what revolutions entail, why I define 1919 and 2011 as revolutions, which questions can be asked to compare them and how I can analyze their reasons and outcomes through defining their stages.

Given the definitions and theories on social movements, next I discuss social network analysis with regard to its relevance and implications for various socio-economic groups. What a network is, what their role is, how they contribute to social movement theories, how networks are effective on recruitment of people, why it is an essential tool to mobilize people, how it analyzes social movements, which social movement theories apply to networks and why network analysis has been chosen for this particular subject will be answered.

I also present a brief review of revolutions that has taken place in Egypt; with a special focus on revolutions in 1919 and 2011, I consider the Egyptian citizens' evolving expectations from authorities throughout the country's history. I summarize the key issues with the aim of paving the way to the following chapter. Revolutionary history of Egypt will be reviewed around Urabi movement in 1879-1882, 1911, 1952 and 2011 revolutions. The section also explains why 1919 and 2011 revolutions are relevant to the what the study explores, i.e. the evolution of the Egyptian society during the past century with a special focus on the drivers, actors, consequences and implications.

2.2. Social Movement Theories

In this section, significant terms like revolution, social movements, will be explained in addition. Furthermore, leading theories will be reviewed which are resource mobilization theory, political process theory, collective behavior and new social movement theories.

2.2.1. Social Movements and Revolutions

Before delving into the social movement theories and network analysis, it is important to explain key terms and why 1919 and 2011 revolutions are taken up as revolutions in this study. Although the theories focusing on contestation and collective action are tagged as *Social Movement Theories*, the terms *revolution* and *social movement* cannot be used interchangeably.

Revolution is defined as "the rapid and basic transformations of a society's state and class structures … accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below" (Skocpol 1979, 4). Skocpol uses this definition by highlighting common

aspects of revolutions in Russia, France and China. The most important feature of revolutions is their impact which brings about rapid transformations on the state and class structure. From this perspective, the revolution that took place in 1919 paved the way for an independent rule of Egyptians and transformed British state rule in the country. On the other hand, the one in 2011 brought an end to more rapidly ended 30 years of Mubarak rule. Skocpol also underlines the fact that this transformation is created from below, which indicates that both revolutions of 1919 and 2011 were nationwide revolutions and majority of the segments were involved.

However, while 2011 was a leaderless revolution, Sa'd Zaghlul and his friends who were highly educated and hailed from the elite class led the revolution in 1919. Still, Zaghlul's leadership does not change the fact that 1919 turned out to be a revolution with the participation of rural segments of society and workers. All in all, revolutions that took place both in 1919 and 2011 were due to quite a lot of social and political change created from below. Another major scholar in this area, Tilly (1978, s. 191) draws our attention to the outcomes of revolutions by arguing that "extreme revolutionary situations do not necessarily produce revolutionary outcomes". Although Akder Gocer (2013) warns that such an analysis may underestimate the efforts of revolutionaries, it is undeniable that neither in 1919 nor in 2011, people could not fully gain what they expected. In 1919, the aim was national independence but total riddance of Britain from Egypt could be achieved only in 1956; as for the revolution in 2011, the first elected leader Morsi was later to be defeated by the coup and to the day the military rule continues despite the struggles of the revolutionaries towards establishing the democracy.

As regards the nature of social movements, Diani and McAdam (2002, s. 301) define them as "networks of informal interactions, between a plurality of individuals, groups or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity". These three elements pinpoint social and political agenda pursued by masses with a shared identity and ideology. In that regard, there seems to be not much of a difference between social movements and revolutions; however, O'Kane (2015) argues that:

Revolutions, revolts and protest movements are viewed in the study of politics as belonging together because they take place outside political institutions and, through collective action, involve mobilization against established practices and the values that lie behind them. Although sharing these features in common, they also differ and not least among these differences is that revolts, social movements and protest movements may each occur within or alongside revolutions but they can also occur quite separately from revolutions, and usually do. (s. 317)

Regardless of the size of the action and paralleled movements O'Kane refers to, they may not always yield revolutionary results, i.e. a regime change. In this regard, Mukherji (1977) highlights an important aspect of social movements and revolutions:

Structurally they are alike, but in scale they are distinguishable. The origins of a revolutionary movement logically can be traced from its quasi-movement stage, to the social movement stage, to its revolutionary stage. Again, this should not be taken to mean that its scale is defined by the quantitative strength of its mobilization but by the scale of the changes envisaged and the intensity of the commitment of its participating members (s. 48).

Taken together, it can be claimed that social movements are collective movements around shared values with the aim to bring change, while revolutions are creating the change regardless of the aim of revolutionaries but only with the change in minds that people do not accept the ongoing situation. In this respect, what makes 1919 and 2011 a revolution is that they created a rupture in the history of Egypt with the involvement of the whole country from different classes. Even though they did not bring the agenda of revolutionaries in reality, they showed that they are not happy with the ongoing authorities and they challenged authorities.

2.2.2. Leading Theories

Social movement theorists do not have an active role in the movements per se, at least compared to activists, but theories are essential to make sense of the movements and their significance and implications. In this section, I will deal with the research context, major issues, various stages of revolutions and leading theories so as to grasp the evolution of the revolutions that took place in 1919 and 2011 as well as to compare and contrast them.

I would like to present Rootes' (1990) points on the significance of social movements that:

> To that extent it is content to be theory of social movements and to leave the question of whether it is actually useful for social movements to the activists themselves. Nevertheless, many, perhaps most, social movement theorists are or have been social movement activists and their theorizing bears the marks of their affective involvement with movements (10).

Although I do not agree, Rootes finds social movement studies' importance on bearing the marks of academic's involvement to social movements as activists. From activists' perspective, theorists' experience in activism is quite a precious asset in order to form theories and inform the activist, as Rootes argues "Good theory is … enabling activists better to understand...It is in this way that theory of social movements, even without being theory for social movements, may yet be useful to social movements" (15). In this regard, leading theories that will be discussed below will help me to understand 1919 and 2011 and compare them in the following chapters.

Different perspectives, tools, and research areas on social movements have been developed since late 1940s. Due to the fact that it is impractical to include all of them in this study, I will dwell on the influential theories that are relevant to my research.

Among the social movement theories, major ones are new social movement theory, value-added theory, structural-strain theory, relative deprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, and mass society theory (Flynn 2011).

Della Porta and Diani (2006), adds to the list other main strands such as collective behavior, resource mobilization and political process theories. The main difference between these theories is their take on Marxism and the relationship between cultural structures and collective action. This is due to the fact that up until 1970s, Marxism was quite influential for social movement theorists, as also argued by Crossley (2002) who points out to the study of collective behavior in pre-1970 period, in the US which evolved into a focus on 1970s, resource mobilization/political process from 1970s onwards. Crossley observes the same trend in Europe yet with an additional theory called *new social movement*, though he does not elaborate on why 1970s a turning point were particularly. With of the development of intense discussions on human rights, civil society as well as the wider access to and availability of the media and communication, cultural structures have become more relevant for building theories and revolutions like in Iran in 1979 could be effective factors. In that regard, geography was a key element throughout 1980s which Goldstone (2001) highlights and draws attention to studies conducted in England, France, Russia and China spanning across Europe and Asia. The revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua in 1979, and in Philippines in 1986 urged scholars to investigate contexts in the Middle East and Africa, followed by a series of social movements in early 2010s collectively as well as individually scrutinized under the umbrella term *Arab Spring*.

Overall, the evolution of social movement studies might be captured in a brief account:

> In the early 1960s, many sociologists believed society had reached a stage of development in which pluralist, pragmatic consensus, instead of protest, would resolve social conflict. Their expectations proved wrong and the 1960s became a decade of activism, riots, demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, and many other forms of collective action(...) In the 1970s, for instance, Islamic fundamentalist and Marxist movements mobilized in Iran, in Nicaragua the Sandinistas organized, and in Germany and Italy a

number of radical leftist terrorist groups were formed(...) Over the past two decades, we have witnessed further expansion of the movement sector, but also new forms of mobilization such as the rise of transnational protest, ethnic mobilizations, Internet protest, and Islamic movements (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007, 1).

As stated above, theories are closely related to what goes on in streets. As streets evolve, theories and their foci change too. Therefore, action taking place in the field transforms theories, though vice versa might not be the case for each and every instance.

Against this backdrop, in my research in order to grasp social movements, I will draw on a number of major theories, the first of which is *resource mobilization theory* that takes up social movements as a conflicting power "with the state or agents of the state and mobilize resources to challenge it, to create social change and demand reform" (Wienclaw and Howson 2011, 39). Resources referred here include money, labor, social status, knowledge, the media and political elites (Sen and Avcı 2016). The theory puts forth that political actions are structured socially and activists are assumed as rational agents of change who make use of the resources they have or they have not (Rootes, 1990). It should be noted that resource mobilization theory was highly influenced by Marxism in terms of its economic assumptions and class reductionism (Buechler, 1995). Resource mobilization theorists argue that during the movement's phases, a leader, members and repertoires of action emerge by mobilizing resources and the main concern is the ways the resources can be mobilized. As it is a key factor to determine whether revolutions will fail or succeed, theorists emphasize building networks bringing together organizations, unions, revolutionary parties to take collective action and revolt (Goldstone 2001).

Political process theory, on the other hand, draws attention to the political aspect of movements and the determination of forms of actions, while also drawing from resource mobilization theory on the issue of institutional variables to such as agenda-setting, decision making and alliance building (Della Porta and Diani 2006). With this theory, the influence of sociology on social movement studies has declined as it relied more on political science and cultural factors (Sen and Avcı 2016).

The third theory I will draw on is the *collective behavior theory* which was developed in the field of sociology with contributions of scholars like Blumer (1951), Turner and Killian (1987) who defined social movements as expressions of transformation (Della Porta and Diani 2006). From this perspective, scholars conceptualized collective behavior as a rational and organizational behavior (Tilly, 1978). This is a crucial conceptualization to employ when approaching social movements, which helps social scientists construe them as rational and organized collectives instead of random ruptures of social life.

New social movement, which is the fourth and the final theory relevant to my research, was developed as an alternative to resource mobilization theory (Buechler, 1995), bearing "smorgasbord of somewhat different theories" other than one specific theory (Sen and Avcı 2016, 128), hence it regards civil society and collective identities as a way to protest social and political living (Wienclaw and Howson 2011). As Melucci (1995, 41) argues, in the past two decades "emerging social conflicts in advanced societies have not expressed themselves through political action, but rather have raised cultural challenges to the dominant language, to the codes that organize information and shape social practices". Therefore, people's demands and the way they demonstrate have changed since 1789 and new social movement theory is the inevitable reflection of this change which focuses on cultural change and political action.

In that regard, new social movements theory in focuses on ideology, culture and identity codes like gender, sexuality or ethnicity in social movements. That way, the theory provides key analytical tools to understand networks and collective action from identity and ideology perspective (Buechler, 1995) mostly focusing on anti-war, civil rights, environmental and feminist movements.

Having reviewed major theories relevant to my research, in the following section I will present the questions these theories tend to tackle and my research questions guided by them.

2.2.3. Questions that Social Movement Theories Pose

Social movement theories mainly deal with inquiries such as why social movements emerge, whether are they national, international or transnational, how and when they succeed or fail, and what people's motivations are (Goldstone 2001). To specify, collective behavior theorists focus on people's grievances to explain collective action, while resource mobilization theorists explore how people manage their sources for contestation instead of zooming in on the reasons why they aggrieve (Edwards, 2014). In addition to these specific explorations, Diani and Della Porta (2006) outline four sets of questions for the social movement studies.

The first question shows that scholars try to understand whether social movements are related with a conflict and is it transformative or social movements are results of transformation. Second set of questions is related with the role of culture on the sense of "we", how individual unite with/without the role of culture. Third set of questions is about the reasons of collective action. Why people struggle against authority and sometimes they even put their lives into danger and which concepts of social life direct collective action? Finally, in what circumstances activists achieve their aim, what is the role of opposing sides (Diani and Della Porta,5)? The list of questions builds a framework even though they do not all inclusive of the discussion. Unification of individuals all but impossible and that's why, the question of how they achieve to unite is a popular research area.

2.2.4. Stages of Revolutions

Stages of revolutions are listed as "social ferment, popular excitement, formalization and institutionalization" (Blumer, 1951) in early studies, whereas recent works cite "emergence, coalescence, bureaucratization and decline" (Christiansen, 2011) as key phases. The first stage of a social movement is emergence/social ferment, does not

involve any organization, it merely depends on an individual creating a network with fellow human beings based on dissatisfaction with ongoing circumstances. At the second stage which is coalescence/popular excitement, the dissatisfaction grows to be more than complaints and people start to organize and unite. At the third stage bureaucratization/formalization, the opposition challenges the organized community and the repertoires of the social movement reach its peak. The final stage referred as decline/ institutionalization, sees the movement decline with either by repression, co-optation, success or failure (Miller, 1999). I will apply these stages in my analytical framework to make sense of Egyptian revolutions in the following chapters as a tool to understand how society works and what the roles of networks at these stages are.

2.3.   Social Network Analysis

Network analysis conceptualizes the society from the lens of a vast link between individuals. From that regard, networks stand for the structures of a society and culture as Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994, 1448) define them as "the set of social relations or social ties among a set of actors (and the actors themselves thus linked)". Related to the concept of networks, they discuss the complex relationship between the structure and agency because a pre-structured individual identity cannot exist on its own considering that "both individuals and societies are the products and the contents-but not the starting points-of interaction" (1444). Therefore, networks cannot be handled as mechanical constructs due to their close ties with an individual's culture (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007) which is not only constituted by his/her human connection such as friendships or family bonds, but also his/her identity, ideology, gender, age, socio-economic status, occupation or nationality- all of which requires a lifetime dependence:

> In our view, networks are not only important because they provide
> individuals with an environment that facilitates recruitment to social

movements, but also because they create a structure of meanings about their commitment that helps them to remain committed over time (Passy and Giugni 2000, 121).

Passy and Giugni list family, studies, work and political engagement as principal connections people are locked-in and as areas where they find motivation and courage to take to the streets, which might explain the impact of networks on recruitment to revolutions. Snow et al. (1980, s. 792) refer to the concept of network to explain: "the fact remains that not all relatives, friends or acquaintances of movement members participate in movement activities when invited". They argue that in addition to interpersonal ties, the absence of countervailing networks could have recruit function.

The relation between people and social movements is reciprocal, therefore "the mobilization does not just depend on social ties; it also creates them" (Gould, 1991, s. 719). People could join a movement because of previous ties and they may built new relations while participating. In addition to that, social networks are a way of sustaining participation (Passy and Giugni 2000), as it creates and strengths the relations between people, it enhances commitment.

Overall, the main function of networks for social movements is to "utilize mobilizing structures to recruit members, obtain other resources, and disseminate information" (McAdam et al. 1996, 61) and to build the repertoire and sources of a movement as the identity, ideology or any other ties that may eventually join individuals into masses.

2.3.1. Social Movement Theories and Network Analysis

It is quite perplexing to see how individual identities merge within a network, yet Tilly argues that "Real people do not get together and act collectively" (1978, s. 143) indicating that it is a big deal for people to create an alternative body against

governments motivated by a common goal, for social transformation. There is one point to keep in mind, though "people know and interact with others most like themselves in social attributes (age, education, race, etc.), attitude and beliefs, and routine activities" (Knoke, 1990, s. 70) whom they find via interpersonal ties (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007; Azzi 2011). Once different identities unite and create a network, it can motivate a movement as a melting pot (Diani, 1995).

The power of social movements that stems from the human interaction among groups is emphasized by Marx as well who discussed it in his accounts on "class struggle, symbolic interactions, exchange processes, or contentious politics" (Snow and Soule 2004, 198). Thus, it should not be surprising that Marxism is a leading theory for social change highlighting the need for a network to bring about a social change. Individuals, therefore, need a sustained and engaged interaction with other actors with various identity, ideology, gender, age, socio-economic status, occupation or nationality to be organized and to create a collective behavior (Della Porta and Diani 2006).

Network analysis does not only focus on social movements but it also investigates linkages between any set of social actors, organizations, or institutions (Diani, 1995). One of the most important contributions of network analysis is that it provides maps of transnational political identities for international relations scholars (Keck and Sikkink 1989, Klandermans and Roggeband 2007). Even though there is no military involvement or a rupture, a social movement analyses from network analysis perspective could provide a political scientist a plenty of information about the social-political relations of that society's networks as communicative structures (Keck and Sikkink 1989, 90). Networks create a voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal pattern of communication and exchange based on shared values of a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services. International networks are enabled and turned prevalent by globalization and new technologies (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Klandermans and Roggeband 2007), as also confirmed by Diani and McAdam's (2002) idea of movements as networks:

Social movements are neither distinctive because of their adoption of radical forms of action, nor because of their interest in new issues, or their predilection for loose organizational forms, but because of their consisting of formally independent actors, who are embedded in specific 'local' contexts (where local is meant in either a territorial or a social sense), bear specific identities, values, and orientations, and pursue specific goals and objectives, but who are at the same time linked through various forms of concrete cooperation and/or mutual recognition, in a bond which extends beyond any specific protest action, campaign, etc. (s. 301).

In other words, Diani and McAdam state that what makes social movements interesting is that individuals unite in a local context with specific conditions, and they engage in a social conflict, share a collective identity and exchange practical and symbolic resources through informal networks. For example, Arab Spring is a network-based movement with the help of a constant communication channel via social media (Snow et al. 1980).

Network analysis asks "how" question to understand "why" people join social movements (Snow et al. 1980). "The redefinition from an 'I' into a 'we' as a locus of self-definition makes people think, feel and act as members of their group and transforms individual into collective behavior" (van Stekelenburg et al. 2013, 4). Scholars like Klandermans and Roggeband (2007) argue that networks are the tools to develop durable relations between organizations and individuals.

The concept of network informs major social movement theories such as resource mobilization theory, collective action and rational actor theory. Diani and McAdam (2002, 304) explains that resource mobilization theory, viewing movements as networks allow us to get over the tendency to treat movements as organizations of a peculiar type, and therefore to address the issue of the relationship between movements, parties, and interest groups from a different perspective. The focus of resource mobilization theory is on "the material resources, organizational capacities (including skills and networks), and tactics" to mobilize (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007, 30), thus it argues that network analysis observe the connection between people and organizations across time and space.

Collective action theorists discuss movement networks as a vital precondition (Diani, 1995) as they can be reasons and results of a revolution by creating a group identification (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007). Identity is crucial for people to engage in action, it could also be a political motivation for transnational movements. The resource mobilization perspective attaches more importance to valuation of public goods, the emotional bite of solidary bonds, and the robustness of normative principles than collective behavior theories regarding interpersonal networks (Knoke, 1990).

One main obstacle of theories is that while every one of them illuminates some aspects of the movements, they also leave some aspects in the dark (Buechler, 1995). For example, groups other than white, middle class participants of Western societies is mostly underexplored; the theories above are designed for the Global North; though recent studies like Beinin and Variel's (2011) review these theories for Middle East, which is also the main motivation of my study.

If we go back to Emirbayer's definition of network which he defines as "the set of social relations or social ties among a set of actors (and the actors themselves thus linked)" (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, 1448), this study argues that workers and the elite in Egypt are revolutionary networks. However, what we mean for elite as a network needs more clarification. While workers are individuals who share a common occupation and class status which tie them to similar problems and expectations from authorities; the elite has transformed in 20th and 21st century in Egypt, which was initiated right after the independence from British rule. Therefore, the main question my research investigates is whether there is a linked set of actors in Egypt that we can define as "elite network". Even though the literature shows that the educational background or expectations from authorities and attitudes towards revolution of *effendies* in early 20th century and bureaucrats and businessmen around Mubarak in 21st century, have changed dramatically, we can observe an existing elite group of Egyptians in the country. What matters is that this group is peculiar to Egypt and they should not be compared with the elite in Europe. Transformation of the country and its elite, who has political power and capital, can be grasped via a network analysis. Further discussion of workers and elite will be presented in the

second chapter. However, to ascertain whether this two group of people are network or not, it should be noted that networks are strong with their connectivity and information dissemination based on shared values in addition to "dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses" (Keck and Sikkink 1989, 7). In this respect, when we analyze workers and the elite of the country, it is evident that they share similar values that bind them to a particular set of actors. This could be either ethics or ideology, but in any case, they share a union, an association or a political party that they showcase values they have in common. Furthermore, these organizations provide exchanges of information among members and allow them to know what other actors in the network think or plan. This enables them to develop a common discourse against the authority or revolutionaries, but it highly likely makes them actors of revolutions within a particular network.

2.3.2. Why Network Analysis has been Chosen for the Analysis

One of my main motivations to study revolutions is to understand how individuals acts collectively and social network analysis asks "how" question to understand revolutions (Snow et al. 1980). Regarding this particular study, I benefited from the way social network analysis explains revolutions as a result of human interactions. I focused on the strong communicative structures as networks (Keck and Sikkink 1989, 90) and I found workers as one of the most organized structure and compared its role with its opposite in society, business elite.

Moreover, social network analysis "explore the patterns apparent in the social relationships" (Scott, 2017, s. 2) and for such an analysis that compares two historical evets in 1919 and 2011, digging apparent patterns was helpful to come up with cross comparison results among two revolutions and two networks.

Lastly, aforementioned theories which are basically resource mobilization, political process, collective behavior and new social movements theories are in fact in a strong relation with network analysis, and focusing on network analysis as a way to

understand social movements, helps to benefit from the strengths of these theories. For instance, resource mobilization theory points resources that state and opposition have, like money, knowledge or population, while network analysis uses this paradigm to define a group as an actor in a revolution.

Bu using network analysis, I avoided to miss some paradigm because all these particular theories defined by particular paradigms. For instance, while political process theory focuses on political agenda of the period and may miss individual's role as social actors in the events; new social movements theory focuses on cultural elements and may miss effects of politics. In this regard, network analysis helps to analyze all these paradigms by focusing on human interactions in multiple levels from social to political.

2.4.   Literature on Egypt's Revolutions

Although most parts of the Middle East have been shaken by revolutions in the 21st century, Egypt has been chosen for the study because it has experienced several revolutions and these developments have affected rest of the region. It also has the capacity to set political and social trends in the region in addition to having the largest Arab population. In this regard, it provides a space to formulate further questions and to explore them widely. In this section, I will deal with four revolutions, namely Urabi movement, and revolutions in 1919, 1952 and 2011 by presenting their reasons, outcomes, effects on the country, their leaders and the region, followed by a close analysis of the revolutions in 1919 and 2011.

Urabi movement happened more than a century ago but it is included in this study because it tremendously influenced the leaders of the following revolutions and movements. Sa'd Zaghlul and El Benna were still minors during the Urabi's fight against the British occupation and they had quite a good amount of time to consider the factors leading to the failure of Urabi, henceforth they strived to continue his legacy (Ghanem, 2016). Following revolutions in Egypt were also against the British

occupation, therefore a close attention to Urabi movement is required to make better sense of subsequent movements.

In 1882, when France faced Pan-Islamic revolts in Tunisia and Algeria, it warned Britain to be cautious about similar revolts in Egypt. As a precaution, Britain sent "Joint Note" to Khedive Tawfiq, the son of Ismail which guaranteeing reciprocal advantages for Tawfiq and Britain on Egypt's governance affairs. This note provoked nationalists in the country and under the leadership of Colonel Urabi, the Minister of War, nationalists signed a petition to get rid of the Khedive. Riots in Alexandria followed the petition and Urabi took the leadership and achieved order in the country. Britain's reply was political and military intervention. Revolts ended with the defeat of Urabi (Harris, 1962). Leaders and rebels in this case were rather inexperienced and failed to achieve their goals. However, Urabi movement was an important revolutionary step in the history of modern Egypt as the first nationalist movement against the British rule and revealed the social fabric of North Africa.

Following Urabi movement, Egypt was in turbulence during pre and post-World War I. Due to demonstrations, especially with the outbreak of World War I, the political status of Egypt changed. The Young Turk government declared war against Britain, as despite the fact that all Egyptians were subjects of the Ottoman Sultan, they were under the rule of Britain. Britain did not withdraw from Egypt mainly because it wanted to protect its passage to India. Thus, the status of Egypt transformed into *protectorate of Great Britain*, Khedive was removed from his stand and Great Britain titled son of Ismail as the Magnificent Sultan of Egypt. World War I changed the nature of Egypt just like it did with all other Middle Eastern countries. Their grievances against Great Britain led to the revival of a national movement (Harris, 1962). In addition to having lost many lives while fighting for Britain, the economy has failed, poverty increased and political suspension led to even more problems. As years gone by, the number of British officers multiplied in bureaucracy because it was difficult for Egyptians to receive required education to compete with them. As a result, Egyptians lost their voices in administration day by day.

Britain rewarded Sharif Hussein of Mecca because of his pledge of independence in the war against the Turks while Egypt was under oppression and terribly suffering.

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Britain's policy towards Middle East redirected Egyptian nationalism from Turks to Britain. In 1918, Fourteen Points of President Wilson on self-determination inspired nationalists in Egypt. In 1919, students of Al Azhar stroked against the changes in the curriculum and Gorst, successor of Lord Cromer as Agent and Consul-General of Britain in Egypt, and Khedivial revived harsh rules on press to suppress nationalist voices (Harris, 1962). People expressed their discontent, patriotism and revolutionary ideas across the country. Sa'd Zaglul and Wafd Party were the leading figures of these events and benefited from nationalist atmosphere.

Sa'd Zaghlul was recognized by both Mustafa Kamil and Lord Cromer who appointed him as the Minister of Public Instruction. Harris argues that for Muslim Egyptian Mustafa Kamil, Zaghlul was a patriot and for Lord Cromer, he was the best of nationalists. Sa'd Zaghlul witnessed Urabi revolt, Cromerian Era and World War I, and he served in different ministerial positions until 1912 after the protectorate. He realized the potential of global political environment in the post war era and in 1918, he requested to bring forward the complete authority of Egypt in London. Harris argues that while Britain failed to deal with Egyptian crisis at the eve of Paris Peace Conference, Egyptians realized that a new version of world political map would be defined in the conference.

Sa'd Zaghlul and the Wafd did not have a political party at the time but they were well-organized in 1919 to influence public opinion on unification for independence. When Britain realized the danger, Sa'd Zaghlul and his friends were arrested and deported to Malta, but this created nationwide rebellions with serious implications for the country such as the disrupt of communication, general strikes and dislocation of public business (Harris, 1962). Britain sent Special High Commissioner Lord Allenby to Egypt, repression reduced, Zaghlul and associates went to Paris.

British government tasked Viscount Milner to analyze Egypt before, during and after the war to understand the domestic affairs of the country. Nationalism in Egypt evolved in time but consolidated. The comparison of Wafd Part and Nationalist Party in fact could present the evolution of Egyptian nationalism. National Party was more radical and indignant compared to Wafd. Wafd and Zaghlul's relations with

authorities helped them to achieve their aims since they were experienced enough to influence the officers.

In 1922, Britain declared the unilateral independence of Egypt, yet Zaghlul was not in Egypt during the declaration meeting and therefore the King obtained more power than Wafd. Wafd Party turned out to be the main opposition but not the leader of Egypt. Wafd had to wait until the first elections in 1923 in which turned out as the winner of 90% of the seats in the parliament and proved its highly influential position in the society.

There is a strong correlation between the foreign rule and nationalism which should not be a coincidence. The wrongful policies of British rule during the protectorate in fact nurtured nationalism. Among them was the right to education and practicing professions. Egyptian students were not allowed to practice and specialize in medicine while most of the doctors were imported from Britain and other European countries. After the occupation ended, organized social structures like Wafd Party, Muslim Brotherhood and other social welfare institutions allowed Egyptians to practice their specializations (Clark 2014). It is an important indicator of independence when citizens have a chance to receive education and choose their subjects and jobs.

In addition, women's emancipation, right to education, work and political participation developed from 1919 onwards. Badran (1995) argues that 1919 was a nationalist revolution for Egypt and different groups of people in the networks united around the shared purpose:

> When the First World War ended, Egyptians rose up in demonstrations and strikes—the revolution of 1919—demanding an end to the protectorate imposed on the country at the beginning of the war and a termination of British colonial occupation. Women and men, the old and the young, and all social classes sustained a united struggle until independence was achieved. Women worked for the nation in any way they could. Gender rules were suspended. From the outbreak of the revolution of 1919 to independence Egyptian women were fully involved in nationalist militancy. Feminists and other women engaged

in highly visible organized nationalist political agitation and in more masked nationalist political activism in a professional context (s. 74).

As Badran states, the independence was the key development for all parties involved in the networks in 1919. Although feminist movements did not emerge at the time, 1919 revolution paved the way for feminism in Egypt. For women, nationalism was a tool to involve political and social movements especially in 1919 Revolution as Ramdani (2013) discusses:

> … nationalism became the obvious means by which Egyptian women could make their voices heard in society. It effectively allowed them to deal with numerous vexed questions including education, seclusion, veiling, and not least of all political action. The 'mother of the nation' role, which women held for themselves meant venturing out of their homes as the country's feminist movement, entered a vital second stage in the fight for independence for Egypt between 1919 and 1922. The progress of the 1919 Revolution had convinced thousands of women that their place was alongside male nationalists, not just because they supported their ultimate goal of a free Egypt, but because this proved that they, as women, could have political influence. What was undeniable, however, was that the two key movements – nationalist and feminist – had combined in a grouping, which would have a huge impact on the development of Egypt in the years ahead. A joint quest for independence from Britain suited both men, and women who had been driven to political action (s. 45).

Nationalism allowed people not only to stand against British rule but also to reject the conditions they live in. Nationalist atmosphere all around the world inspired and encouraged Egyptians for the independence and 1919 was the crucial milestone for it.

When it came to 1952, an important rupture in Egypt's political and social life took place due to the first appearance of military's hegemony in political life that still continues today. Free Officers, a group of nationalist soldiers within the army, took over the political control in the country. Their main goal was the elimination of foreign power from the country, particularly Britain. In 1954, the iconic leader of

Arab nationalism and a member of Free Officers, Gamal Abdul Nasser became the president and his power lasted until 1970 (McNamara, 2005). Between 1954-1970, there were two important wars between Israel and Arabs under the leadership of Egypt. In 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal which was a significant event to prove that Egypt can manage on their own without a foreign control. Nationalization of Suez Canal and Israel's invasion of more lands caused Suez Crisis between Egypt and Britain-France -Israel. This war was followed by Six Days War in 1967. The failure of establishing an internationally recognized Palestine was the most important devastation for Arabs. After Nasser's death, Arab nationalism lost its effect as a legitimate ideology, but Palestine and Jerusalem have maintained their significance for the region, Arabs and the Muslim world.

Kandil (2014, 13) argues that institutional grievances of military motivated ordinary soldiers to endorse a coup in 1952 for the benefit of their country. "Their aim was to liberate Egypt from foreign occupation and install a reformed civilian regime that would enhance military power and restore its credibility." However, he states that, Nasser and his friends were motivated by Turkey's Ataturk, who was a soldier and became revolutionary leader of his country and believed that the solution was a revolution from above to have strong-centralized state. For ordinary military members, revolution was for the national will and for the top officers, revolution was a prerequisite for a stronger Egypt.

Around 2005, youth moment in Egypt started to develop; especially Kifaya and Youth for Change were crucial moments for revolutionary youth. These allowed activists to develop into a loose network to work together and co-mobilize. They preferred dual efforts of street action like protests, meetings, marches, campus activities against Mubarak regime in addition to recent involvement in media (Rennick, 2015).

Onodera (2009) states that "Youth for Change" was youth wing of "Kifaya" movement. In following years, at the edge of revolution, the "April 6th Youth Movement" and the "We Are All Khaled Said" Facebook page emerged as platforms that united youth as a political actor. An important distinction of this youth group was their solidarity and emphasis on non-violence, because their main target was the

crushing autonomy and economic conditions of three decades under Mubarak regime (UNDP, 2010). Unlike the sudden revolution in Tunisia, Egypt was preparing for a revolution with Kifaya and Youth for Change (Abdalla 2010; Khamis and Vaughn 2011; Rennick 2015). Furthermore, Muslim Brotherhood was well-developed since 1928 as an opposition to regimes in Egypt. Events in the Middle East after Bouazizi burned himself stroked the match in Egypt where there were youth groups ready to revolt.

In 2011, another revolution started mainly led by secular youth including liberal nationalists joined by the leftists and Nasserist. People struggled against political, economic and social conditions in Egypt. After Mubarak's fall, Muslim Brotherhood led by Morsi held a strong presidential campaign, succeeded in the elections and ran the government for the following year. However, Morsi's was overthrown by the military because of the protests against his initial policies.

Thanks to April 6th Youth Movement and the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page in addition to smaller groups in Facebook as well as individual tweets with similar hash-tags and posts, 2011 Revolution was characterized by the use of social media and mostly youth-managed social media accounts. The role of social media might be overexaggerated, but it was a strong medium to channel public anger into streets (Khamis and Vaughn 2011). Young people were the major user of the social media and they took to the streets before other networks thanks to their communication through social media in Arab Spring.

Muslim Brotherhood was involved in the movements much later than other youth groups that were organized through social media. Although there were members of Muslim Brotherhood in Tahrir and they were providing blankets and tents to protestors, slogans of the Brotherhood were not chanted to avoid another clash with the government (Mekhennet and Kulish 2011). Youth within the Muslim Brotherhood joined protests as individuals (Martini et al. 2012). When the fall of Mubarak was obvious, members of the Muslim Brotherhood joined protests (Nowaira 2011) and its political body Freedom and Justice Party was formed right after the fall of Mubarak.

As overall revision states, 2011 is similar to 1919 in many respects compare to other revolutions and apart from these similarities, differences among them helps us to see how Egyptians evolved. 1919 revolution was a nationwide revolution. In both revolutions, all segments of society were involved. Moreover, there is almost a century between two and gives us a valid time period to compare what has changed in the country. Although 2011 was another nationwide revolution, this time it was not against the British rule. In addition to being the final revolution in the country, it was a dramatic point to show what has changed in the country since 1919. It is interesting to realize that most of the expectations of people from authorities has not changed that will be discussed in third chapter.

Military's role in revolutions continued when Mubarak and Morsi failed as military took over the control. Between the period of Mubarak's fall and Morsi's election, political control was in military while after Morsi's fall, military took over the control again. 1952 was not chosen to compare with 2011, most recent revolution, because it was from above and it was a coup d'état and that's why it was not nationwide.

2.5.   Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to review the literature that inspired the main discussions of the thesis which will be further explored in the third and fourth chapters. It has covered social movement theories, network analysis and Egypt's revolutions in the last hundred years. Around the review of the social movement theories, definition of the revolution as a term and how it was studied by social movement theorists was discussed followed by a revision of leading theories, their research questions and means to analyze a revolution. The investigation on network analysis set the framework of the research design of this study, with a special focus on the definition of a network, how network analysis approach takes of revolutions and how leading theorists applied network analysis to explain role of networks in revolutions. Lastly, four important revolutions of Egypt that affected today's leaders, social and political

system, and people's expectations from political authorities have been summarized. Although the study covers the last century of Egypt from 1919 onwards, Urabi revolution of 1879-1882 was added to review, because significant leaders like Zaghlul or al Banna witnessed the Urabi revolution and inspired by its impacts. Revolutions that took place in 1919, 1952 and 2011 have also been visited.

Following chapter will cover the workers and business elite in Egypt in the last century in order to better understanding of case study.

CHAPTER 3

3. WORKERS AND THE ELITE IN EGYPT

This chapter has been dedicated to the two focused networks which are workers and business elite. In the end, it is stated that while the struggle of workers has not changed at all in the last century which are based on basic rights, elite as a term has changed and business elite emerged in 1970s.

3.1. Introduction

Social networks played a critical role in instigating and shaping the landscape of revolution in Egypt by bringing together people from diverse social and economic strata of the Egyptian society. This study focuses on people belonging to two of those socio-economic classes, namely: Egyptian workers and elites. Shedding light on how socio-economic policies affect Egyptian workers and elites provides conclusive results towards answering the main research question of this study, i.e. how has Egyptian society's expectations from their governments changed within the century. This chapter will focus on the transformation of Egyptian workers and elites at the turn of the 20th century, in the 20th century, and at the turn of the 21st century to present a background for further discussion on the evolution of Egyptian society in the next chapter. This chapter examines how the actions, organization patterns, and communication of workers and elites in Egypt have transformed within the last century. It also analyzes the contrast between how workers and elites in Egypt were defined in 1919 as opposed to 2011.

It is important to note that in the Egyptian case, it is fairly easy to define the worker class as compared to the elite class. With the exception of Clarke's titular work

"Unexpected Brokers of Mobilization", a class based network analysis of Egyptian revolutions has largely been neglected in literature on the subject. According to Clarke, there are three important networks in Egypt, "the Cairo-based political opposition, the informal Egyptian labor movement, and the Society of Muslim Brothers" (Clarke, 2014, s. 380). He defines these networks as the organizers of the 2011 revolution during which anyone who wanted to be a part of the revolution needed to interact in order to become a part of the movement. Therefore, Clarke argues that these networks assumed not only the role of recruiter for the revolution, in his own words:

> A smaller collection of scholarship, which comes closer to the way in which I employ the network concept, uses networks to understand inter-organizational dynamics within social movements. These latter studies focus both on how organizations relate to each other—how they form ties, build coalitions, and jointly manage campaigns—and how the overarching structure of inter-organizational linkages gives social movements their particular shapes and forms (382).

Clarke's understanding of networks in mobilization is focused on relations among networks. He selects three networks as organizing units of the Egyptian revolution and his analysis is largely based on their relations with each other in terms of coalitions.

Other studies that analyzed Egypt's 2011 revolutions using network analysis (O'Connell, 2014) have focused on the role of social media as a medium that connects people and creates a tie that can motivate them to revolt collectively. However, since social media and other platforms did not exist in 1919, many contemporary studies do not evaluate revolutions using a class based network approach. Therefore, by adopting a comparative lens, this study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on class-based network analysis of workers and elites in 1919 and 2011.

3.2. The Workers

Egypt has a long history of labor strikes. The first recorded strike took place during the building of the Pyramids. Even with such a revolutionary culture, sixty percent of Egyptian workers today are a part of the informal economy. Workers in the country do not receive minimum wages, health insurance, vacations, sick leave or trade union protection (Beinin, 2010).

Beinin argues that there are some key elements to understanding the state of workers in Egypt. Firstly, the Egyptian economy is dominated by public institutions and private foreign companies. Even though most of the foreign companies were nationalized in 1950s, their culture does not favor the workers. Another element is that labor movements in Egypt are often intertwined with nationalist movements as a result of the British occupation. Lastly, employers in Egypt are often coercive in their handling of unions and worker protection bodies, making it impossible to protect worker rights or improve their societal condition.

Workers emerged as urban wageworkers at the end of nineteenth century. Landless agricultural wageworkers, urban and rural working class were members of the worker class, but they were not politically active. Casual or seasonal peasants working in the industry or transportation sector and wageworkers in small companies were politically conscious because they were affected by their employers (Beinin and Lockman 1988). Foreign capital and colonial power shaped the urban working class and how they organize themselves in the form of unions against foreign capital and employers.

3.2.1. At the Turn of the 20th Century

Towards the 20th century, workers were the "most organized and militant fighters" (Beinin, 2010, s. 5) of resistance against foreign rule because they were in direct

communication with foreign supervisors. The first nationalist party, the National Party, campaigned in early 1900s over labor rights and workplaces to make sure a strong segment of society supported them.

Goldberg (2011) argues that 1919 was the revolt of peasants against foreign rule and late modernization. Foreign rule was a problem because, even though Egyptians were producing, they had to give their goods to Britain under war conditions and this obligation caused starvation. Agriculture was not modernized and they were not able to produce more to meet the needs of themselves and Britain's desires. That's why they attacked transportation systems, mainly railways, to protect men and goods. Goldberg further maintains that Wafd embraced the revolution, not the peasants, because Wafd and the peasants' expectations were different. Peasants achieved what they wanted when they attacked railroads. They protected the rest of the goods from Britain but Wafd asked for more and continued to revolt.

Workers strikes were the great power of Zaghlul and his rivals. That's why establishing unions became a competition between different parties in the following decades. While this competition prevented unions from being long lasting, it provided workers the opportunity to be prominent figures in political life. As a consequence, conditions for female workers improved and restriction was enforced on employing child workers. In 1937, expectations from politicians decreased and the Commission to Organize the Worker's Movement was established to enhance the unions' capacity. Even though World War II prevented developments, after the war, the number and legal capability of unions increased. However, they were never capable of providing real protection to workers (Beinin, 2010).

3.2.2. The 20th Century

The economic conditions in Egypt were almost never capable of providing for the peoples necessities. A decrease in European imports, consumer shortages like British weaponry and decline in the demand for cotton caused an increase in prices and

decrease in profit resulting in food shortages. While the world developed with the coal and iron industry, Egypt was deprived from these resources and, until World War II, the industrial middle class was not significant (Harris, 1962).

It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the main motivation of people to mobilize is poverty. Masses risk their lives when they have nothing to lose. Bayat argues that between 1928 and 1952 unions in Egypt enjoyed a relatively liberal era but after Nasser' coup, prosperity was governed in favor of public sector workers (Bayat, 2000).

Nasser marked the 20th century for Egypt. The Free Officers changed the system by nationalizing foreign investments but they were not in favor of unions. Moreover, they implemented "public sector expansion, nationalization for foreign and domestic assets and subsidies for basic consumption goods" (Nagarajan, 2013, s. 22). Although these policies removed British control over the economy, it could not achieve national welfare provision. The Egyptian Trade Union Federation was established as the "arm of state" to unite all unions under state control. Another important impact of the Nasser era was the effect of socialism, on the economy and worker rights, by increasing the standards through nationalizing (Beinin, 2010). During the Sadat and Mubarak era, the autonomy was protected but the economy was never stable and the rights of workers were never satisfactory. In addition to that, neither Sadat nor Mubarak followed Nasser's socialist ideology but chose free market neoliberalism.

During the Nasser era, a minimum wage was set for workers, which boosted welfare for peasants for the first time. An iconic project of national welfare economy was the Aswan Dam. However, not only investments but also political atmosphere affects the economy and the 20th century was hit by war with Israel. Especially after the 1967 war the regime faced protests for a stable economy and politics and they applied the March 30 Program to restructure the economy. In contrast to the previous approach of investing in the public sector, the private sector and luxury goods increased, creating a gap between industrialists and rich farmers on the one side and peasants and workers on the other (Nagarajan, 2013).

Sadat succeeded Nasser, after his death in 1970, and in order to meet the high expectations of people following the charismatic leadership of Nasser, he followed populist policies like lowered consumer goods and imports restrictions. He relied on Arab capital, Western technology and Egyptian resources for development and progress. In order to gain foreign capital, the country was open to foreign investment and Egyptian workers were encouraged to move abroad. Public companies were distributed to the private sector and as a result, investments went into luxury construction, tourism and finance, failing to increase income while consumption increased. In order to finance the gap between consumption and exports, Arab states, mainly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates formed the Gulf Organization for Development in Egypt in 1976. This created a trend of Gulf hegemony in Egypt's economy which continues today. Lower classes were the most affected segments of society from these developments in economics and poverty increased (Nagarajan, 2013).

In 1981 Mubarak took over, after Sadat's assassination, while the country was exploding with revolts because of the failed economy. In contrast to previous leaders, Mubarak did not set any political or economic agenda. He applied an Open Door Policy in the economy to increase investments. In 1982, a Five Year Plan was announced based on infrastructure projects, public sector investments and policies like lower interest rates. However, all of these benefited the sector owners and lower classes continued to pay high prices for goods. That's why, riots on economic conditions continued. In 1987, Egypt implemented the IMF program, but it did not work either, to increase welfare or improve the economy and demonstration was the tool of Egyptians to raise their voice. Instead of reforms, Mubarak chose emergency laws and maintained these until the end of his rule (Nagarajan, 2013).

3.2.3. At the Turn of the 21st Century

In the 1990s, there was an obvious need to enhance conditions for the poor. Unemployment, urban income poverty and the income gap increased and the

government attempted to revive the economy with the recommendations of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Bayat, 2000). The Egyptian government could not prevent strikes and revolution. Government bodies were aware of the poverty however their policies were not capable of prevention but just delayed the consequences.

> Despite the acceleration of neoliberal policies, urban mass protests ebbed noticeably during the 1990s. Several factors contributed to this. Alarmed by earlier unrest, governments imposed tighter control, while delaying or only gradually implementing the unpopular policies. Aside from internationally sponsored safety nets, such as the Social Fund for Development, additional outlets were offered by the growth of welfare NGOs and "Social Islam" (Bayat, 2000, s. 5).

The role of trade unions and labor organizations is to force governments to imply policies on problem solving but in Egypt they failed to prevent the authorization and unite with other organizations like Islamic groups or youth. In the 2000s, as in politics, in the economic opposition was silenced. Nagarajan (2013) states:

> As for the labor movement, it was also kept completely subservient to the regime. The workers most affected by the changes were the public sector workers. These workers are required to join their respective federations. On top of all these federations was the national body, the General Federation of Trade Unions. The regime made sure that the top leadership of the GFTU was filled with regime supporters (34).

All these developments increased the gap between rich and poor with the rich segments mostly circled around Gamal Mubarak. Worsening conditions for workers in both public and private sectors and the lack of an ability to oppose the state paved the way for the search for alternatives.

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Between 2004 and 2009, Egypt witnessed waves of workers protests, mostly over the loss of jobs or private sector conditions, from the likes of Kifaya and Youth for Change. Another phenomenon was that tax collectors, school personnel and teachers organized and protested after 2005. Workers were focused on their own interests compared to people in general who revolted against the system. Only between 2004 and 2008, more than 1.7 million Egyptian workers protested against their working conditions. These protests were effective but they were not organized on a national scale until 2011 (Beinin 2010).

With regards to the repertoires of actions of workers, the role of the labor movement during 2011 was not only in joining demonstrations in streets but more importantly they turned to "delegitimizing the regime and popularizing a culture of protest" (Beinin, 2012, s. 3). They managed the first institution of the revolution; the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions during demonstrations. Work stoppage was a huge pressure on the Mubarak government. Even though labor did not hit the headlines like Muslim Brotherhood or youth, their involvement was crucial for the revolution to succeed in precipitating the fall of Mubarak. In 2011, even though they did not call for the protests, they managed to challenge the Mubarak regime.

> The closure of factories during the first week of February further facilitated the individual participation of workers. However, when work-places reopened on 6 February, over 450 labor protests took place across Egypt, involving about 200,000 workers-including those employed at large and strategic workplaces such as the Cairo Public Transport Authority, Egyptian State Railways, the Suez Canal Authority and Telekom Egypt (Duboc, 2015, s. 37).

In addition to sit-ins and demonstrations, workers have the capacity to cripple the economy of the country. Moreover daily life can be frozen, including transportation and communication. In such cases, all individuals are affected from the ongoing events in the country and choose to support or oppose the revolution. What makes workers a network is their capacity to organize through already existing ties amongst themselves to enable communication to revolt and what makes them revolutionary

networks is their ability to make street revolts a challenge to the authorities. When 4000 workers in the Egyptian national coal company protested on February 5 and when workers in state electricity company workers, public transportation workers, Supreme Council of Antiquities' workers in addition to textile, medical bottle manufacturing and ship repair companies stopped working on February 9; daily life was paralyzed while workers in different sectors continued to join protests and strikes (Farah, 2013).

On the 19th of January, Independent Trade Unionists declared their demands for the good of the country in ten steps which were: increase in the minimum wage, narrowing the gap with maximum wages, independent unions, protection against job losses, nationalization of private companies, ending corruption, price control on goods, right to strike, health insurance and dissolution of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (Farah, 2013). Whether these basic expectations were welcomed or not by the subsequent government and the current position of workers will be discussed in the third chapter. However, with regard to these expectations, Clarke (2014) argues that labor protests were mostly small and isolated in 2011 and expectations were about local changes rather than a change in the economic system of the country. Moreover, labor units were not in touch with political movements in Cairo neither secular youth movements like Kifaya nor the Muslim Brotherhood but they were isolated in terms of workers' rights instead of political rights or changes. In regard to local expectations and political attributions, Duboc (2015) argues:

> Labor protests before 2011 did not overtly call for the ousting of Mubarak. They remained localized, were not coordinated with each other and actually refrained from going beyond labor grievances. However, workers did not support Mubarak's regime either (28).

Between 2004 and 2010, workers protested against the erosion of wages or rising inflation strikes with sit-ins and other protests from different sectors like medicine or education.

Towards 2011, there were two main issues; more independent unions and national minimum wages. Campaigns were held by three important non-governmental organizations: the Hisham Mubarak Law Center (HMLC), the Center for Trade Union and Workers Services (CTUWS) and the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR). These non-governmental organizations brought workers together with lawyers and activists and enhanced their capacity as revolutionary networks (Clarke, 2014). Moreover, Hanieh (2015) states that all strikes, labor actions and mobilization were aiming at basic rights like democracy in workplaces, access to health and education or preventing contemporary labor contracts. However, the departure of Mubarak empowered them to ask for a better economy. Beinin (2011) states that workers with sixty strikes in six months of 2011 in addition to political protests from 2004, workers contributed to revolutionary protest.

Their involvement allowed them to organize and awaken their unions in opposition to Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) which was bound up with the Mubarak regime. After the revolution, independent unions like Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), CTUWS, ECESR asked for the dissolution of ETUF as the main representative of workers, in fact, ETUF had been one of the targets of protesters (Duboc, 2015, s. 34). Another achievement of workers was to increase the minimum wage. However, the most prominent change was the attitude that the workers took against the government.

In the post-revolutionary period, Clarke (2014, 393). argues "the labor and human rights NGOs continued to separately serve the political opposition and the labor movement, though as before, they limited their activities to legal and advocacy work". The Labor movement did not argue for an executive role in post-revolutionary Egypt, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, military rulers and some small secular youth parties. During Morsi's presidency, workers insisted on their demands for socio-economic system change. Duboc (2015, 39) argues that until Sisi, the labor movement continued to put forward this agenda, however Sisi aimed to "depoliticize workers" to prevent a revolution similar to the one of 2011. However, strikes and protests still occur and the labor movement continues to be one of the most organized and institutionalized networks of the country.

3.3. The Elite of the Country

The Elite is a group of people who have a lot of power and influence due to their knowledge, money or skills. The political changes, which occurred over and over in late 19th century in Egypt, mean that it is difficult to define an "elite" network originating from the last century. Changes in political rule have affected the business world and elite within this world. With the reign of Muhammed Ali, the effect of Ottoman rule on society was slightly changed. Moreover, from 1882 onwards, Britain assumed control of the bureaucracy and economy. That's why, in the discussion of the elite, towards the 20th century, the role of "effendies" will be discussed. From Nasser's era onwards, the upper class has mostly consisted of the relatives and allies of the ruler, in other words, the Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak wider families.

3.3.1. Towards the 20th Century

World War I changed the nature of Egypt as with all other Middle Eastern countries. Their grievances against Great Britain led to the revival of the nationalistic movement (Harris, 1962). Egyptians lost their lives while fighting on Britain's war front while the economy failed and impoverishment increased with the suspension of political activity. The results of the war were not in favor of the Egyptians, they faced great suffering both during and afterwards. Every year, the number of British officers increased in the bureaucracy because it was difficult for Egyptians to receive the required education to compete with them. Egyptians lost their control of the administration day by day which prevented them from having a national elite network.

However, Ryzova (2005) mentions "effendies" in reference to the "stratum of Western-educated town dwellers". Although the term is used for the middle class,

since they gained the utmost level of education, financial status and bureaucratic role among Egyptians, they can be assumed as the upper class. Ryzova states their common aspects as follows:

> They might have something in common with all of these categories without being quite any of them; they lie at the intersection of the merchant and the bureaucrat, of the rural second stratum and the professional, or even the national elite, yet they were distinct as effendis and what makes them stand apart as a category is precisely their being effendis (s. 125).

What makes them a unique network is not their class situation but their cultural position in the society. Ryzova argues that this network emerged because of "the very policies that Muhammed Ali put in motion, the building of modern schools on the Western model, sending students to missions, and enrolling children from the provincial notability to attend these schools" (s. 127). Therefore, they are not privileged as we understand today but they are not destitute either. For instance, foreign companies were paying lower taxes because of capitulations and this prevented Egyptians from gaining more capital even though their occupations varied from engineer, lawyer, doctor to journalist or political activist (135). In addition to being Western educated and earning money from one these occupations, effendis were mostly nationalist and secular.

The Wafd Party, in other words, Zaghlul and his friends were prominent "effendies". They lead the 1919 revolution and they were crucial political figures in forming the constitution and international representation. Sa'd Zaghlul was recognized by both Mustafa Kamil and Lord Cromer who appointed him as Minister of Public Instruction. Harris (1962) argues that for Muslim Egyptian Mustafa Kamil, Zaghlul was a patriot and for Lord Cromer, he was the best of nationalists. Sa'd Zaghlul experienced the Urabi revolt, Cromerian era and World War I and he served in different ministerial positions until 1912, when the legislative assembly was dissolved with the establishment of Egypt as a British protectorate. He realized the

potential of global political environment in the post war era and in 1918, he requested to be allowed to go to London to negotiate a treaty to bring forward the complete authority of Egypt. Harris argues that while Britain failed to deal with the Egyptian crisis at the eve of Paris Peace Conference, Egyptians realized that a new phase of the world political map was going to be decided in the conference (Harris 1962).

Sa'd Zaghlul and the Wafd was not a political party at the time but they were well enough organized in 1919 to influence public opinion on unification for independence. When Britain realized the danger, Sa'd Zaghlul and his friends were arrested and deported to Malta, but this created nationwide rebellions. Events escalated to the degree of disrupting communication systems, a general strike and dislocation of public business (Harris, 1962). Britain sent Special High Commissioner Lord Allenby to Egypt, who strategically ensured that repression was reduced so that Zaghlul and associates were able to go to the Paris Peace Conference. In this process, Wafd and Zaghlul's relations with the British authorities helped them to achieve their aims since they were experienced enough to influence the officials.

It is difficult to mention a business elite in the country other than British officers and representatives, but "effendies" in many respects were advantaged compare to other Egyptians and they used this advantage for the national will. Not only men, but also their wives were in the frontline. Ramdani argues that upper class women were educated and they led the struggle for independence while middle class women were aware of the need of independence and this enthusiasm reflected in women's magazines and literature in the country. Huda Sha'war was the leader of women during the 1919 demonstrations enjoying close interaction with Sa'd Zaghlul and his wife Safiyya Zaghlul. Those two upper class women organized the female presence on the streets (Gorman, 2003).

In 1922, when Britain unilaterally declared the independence of Egypt, Zaghlul was not in the country and therefore the King obtained more power than Wafd. Even though the Wafd Party was the main opposition it was not the leader of Egypt and had to wait until the first elections of 1923 as the winner of 90% of the seats in the parliament to prove its effect on society. In 1922, all state institutions were

Egyptianized but the commercial sector remained under the control of Britain until 1952 and efendies, called *beys* and *pashas,* turned out to be the main state makers.

3.3.2. 20th Century

Effendies were the elite Egyptians until Nasser's coup in 1952. From Nasser's rule onwards, all companies were nationalized. This policy diminished the British hegemony in the economy but it also prevented the birth of a business class. Sadat and Mubarak's policies created a bigger gap between the rich and poor.

Leading businessmen, like Sawiris or Salem, started their investments, or their families, in the 1970s and they boosted their businesses when they enhanced their relations with Gamal Mubarak in the 1990s with this circle forming the main business world of Egypt in the 20th and 21st century. Tryhorn summarizes how Sawiris developed such a huge capital in the country;

> The family patriarch, Onsi, was born in 1930, the son of a lawyer in southern Egypt. He started out in agriculture, before switching to construction and becoming one of the country's largest contractors. But his early business career was frustrated by the socialist government of Gamal Abdel Nasser, which prevented him from leaving the country for six years in the 1960s. After a spell in Libya, he returned to Egypt during the more business-friendly regime of the next Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat. The Sawiris family have continued to prosper over the past three decades under Hosni Mubarak's government Tryhorn (2010).

Not only the Sawiris but also other business elite including the Mansour family, Mohamed Fayed, Mohamed Khames and Raouf Ghabbour entered the business world in the 1970s and 1980s while the El Sewedy family established their business

in the 1930s. This is mainly the result of the economic policies of the Egyptian presidents.

3.3.3. Towards the 21st Century

Mubarak's son Gamal's inner circle prevailed in the business world in Egypt towards the 21st century, while in agribusiness Gulf countries particularly dominated. The biggest firms like Dina Farm, Beyti, Juhayna are interconnected to Gulf conglomerates. In addition to that, the supermarket and fast-food sector is co-dominated by US and Gulf countries with companies like KFC, Pizza Hut or Costa Coffee. Hanieh (2015, 169) argues that agribusiness, finance and real-estate are three big sectors and "patterns of ownership in the agribusiness, finance and real estate sectors confirm the deep linkages that exist between the internationalization of Gulf capital and Egypt's class structure".

Naguib Sawiris is one of the leading figures of the Egyptian economy as the founder of Egypt's Orascom Telecom Holding. He owns On TV which gives him the ability to use media power. In contrast to claims against him, he argues that he stayed in Egypt during protests to make sure that the country will have a democratic future. Moreover, he invested in the Free Egyptians Party that has policies which promote a capitalist economy and a pluralistic democracy in the post-Mubarak era, as a rival to the Muslim Brotherhood. However, in spite of his power in the media and his money, he lost the elections (Glain, 2011). The Morsi government imposed a travel ban on Nassef and Onsi Sawiris, Egypt's wealthiest man and his business-tycoon father, while investigating the corruption during Mubarak's reign (The Economist 2013). As a result of this feud between him and the Muslim Brotherhood authority, he took an active role in ousting the Muslim Brotherhood from government (Saleh, 2015).

In contradiction to this, he stated that he stands against the Mubarak government, however others have commented on these alliances. "Being extremely rich in Egypt is an occupational hazard nowadays, especially with investigators going after

allegations of corruption and cronyism in the fallen regime of Hosni Mubarak" (Stier, 2011). Since the Mubarak reign was an autocratic regime, it is expected that businessmen had to be close to the regime and moreover, Naguib was a friend of Gamal Mubarak, who was in favor of privatization and helped many businessmen. However, in contrast to this relationship between him and Gamal Mubarak, he even supported a political party to form an opposition. More interestingly, Al Wafd and the Free Egyptians Party were also supported by other businessmen (Shehata, 2011). It was expected that a century between the two revolutions and the switch from being dependent on Britain towards being an authoritarian country would make the elite be in favor of the status quo, but they were not. Still, revolution affected the business world, particularly Gamal Mubarak's circle. Hussein Salem, partner of Israeli businessman Yosef Maiman in the East Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG), fled the country with his family in the early days of the revolution (Barkat and Yeshayahou 2011).

After the fall of Mubarak, the Brotherhood was ready to dominate the business world with its already existing network. Hassan Malek, a Brotherhood member founded the Egyptian Business Development Association (EBDA) before the elections. This union was inspired by Turkey's Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD) which is an association of religiously oriented small businesses. Such associations are important for there to be a network capable of setting the agenda of business through sharing information. EBDA aimed at establishing equality in order to break the hegemony of Gamal Mubarak's circle without excluding companies that were strong during Mubarak's reign and were not involved in any cases of corruption (Awad, 2012).

3.4.   Conclusion

In this chapter, the last century of Egypt has been reviewed in terms of the workers and elite. The review has been organized in three periods of time which are towards

the 20th century, the 20th century and towards the 21st century. Overall revision has revealed that both workers and the business elite are directly linked with the authorities and their policies. While under British rule, an Egyptian business elite could not emerge and workers built their links with the inspiration of foreign fellows and counterparts abroad. When Nasser nationalized the economy, again an elite group could not emerge even though workers were still not happy with economic conditions in contrast to rights like a minimum wage and changes to insurance. Sadat paved the way for privatization and Mubarak furthered its progress. The business elite that emerged during their reigns were challenged by the Muslim Brotherhood's own business network but survived both Morsi and the coup. They maintain their hegemony in the country's economics in addition to partnerships with Israeli and Gulf companies.

CHAPTER 4

4. COMPARISON OF 1919 AND 2011 REVOLUTIONS OF EGYPT FROM NETWORK ANALYSIS

This chapter aims cross comparison among workers and business elite in 1919 and 2011 around their roles, repertoires of actions and how their expectations evolved within the century.

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will explore the dynamics of Egyptian society from the aspect of network analysis by comparing workers and business elite as revolutionary networks in the two revolutions. The aim is to discover the differences and similarities between the two revolutions which will draw the map of the continuities and changes of Egyptian society, particularly for workers and business elite. The conceptual map of network analysis is discussed in the first chapter and indicators from that analysis will be used to analyze and compare the networks of Egyptian society. Comparison between these revolutions will help to observe the change of Egyptian society from 20th towards 21st century from a unique perspective using network analysis. We will be able to see how networks evolved and what the repercussion of this evolution was for the Egyptian society at large. This is a within-case comparison, sampling time period within the same country. In this sense, it overcomes a critical dilemma regarding comparative studies.

Comparative studies are very useful in showing the difference and similarities and hence in producing explanations, for example, regarding why some rebellions end up in revolutions and not others. However, they are not that powerful in showing the

relationality between different rebellions across time. Within-case comparison remedies this dilemma partially, by both simultaneously comparing and contextualizing in the long durée.

The questions that are aimed to be answered through this conceptualization are as follows; What are the similarities and differences between 1919 and 2011 revolutions? How did the workers and the business elite, as networks, affect the revolutions' path? How did the revolutions affect the workers and the business elite in terms of their aims and future role in society?

In the chapter, the two revolutions and role and stand of workers and business elite networks will be compared. How revolutions emerged and ended, whether they are repercussions of international revolutions, did people reach their aims in addition to how networks affected revolutions and how they transformed during/after revolutions will be discussed.

4.2. Historical Comparison of 1919 and 2011

Two revolutions of Egypt among all others of the last century distinguished in terms of the pressure they created on the opposing authorities and the results that affected country's future, particularly in regard to positions of workers and business elite.

4.2.1. Similarities between 1919 and 2011 Revolutions

Although there is almost a century between 1919 and 2011, there are two outstanding similarities between the two revolutions. First of all, people from different socio-economic backgrounds were involved in protests from every corner of the country.

In other words, they were nationwide. Secondly, people united for the same agenda and achieved their aim.

The literature remarks that the two revolutions were "nationwide". Cole (2014) argues that the 2011 revolution resembles most the 1919 revolution when compared to the Urabi movement or the 1952 revolution in terms of "being that it was nationwide, rocking the country from Alexandria to Aswan" The Urabi Movement created ties among Egyptians to revolt for their national aims but the British authorities did not allow it to expand. That's why, even though nationalism emerged as a revolutionary network during the Urabi movement, distance, function of number and strength of ties that separate actors and in this case nationalists to create such a difference, prevented the movement from becoming nationwide; patterning of actions and gaps in networks meant that the situation was not ready to create a rupture. The 1952 Revolution and following events transformed the country's economy, politics and all other fields of life in addition to how individuals stated their identity as Egyptians, it was a revolution from above, it was not nationwide and networks did not become involved.

Secondly, the 1919 and 2011 Revolutions were successful in terms of achieving a national goal. The agendas of networks were the same in the first phase, their ties were symmetric and strong. In 1919, they were against British authority while in 2011 they were against the Mubarak regime. Furthermore, the networks' centrality was broken after they achieved their common goal and they were separated, which will be analyzed in the second part of the chapter. This separation resulted with long lasting instability, lack of institutionalization, paving the way for authoritarian regimes and a fragile economy and failing to create a national ideology that everyone could accept for better or worse.

4.2.2. Differences between the 1919 and 2011 Revolutions

Most of comparisons indicate that 1919 and 2011 were similar, however there is a slight difference on the discourse on human rights. To note that, these differences are mostly a result of the period between the two revolutions which spanned a century. In 1919, human rights issues were not on the agenda because of the prior importance of national independence. Huda Shaarawi, a leading feminist figure, resigned from her position a president in the Wafdist Women's Central Committee claiming that Wafd ignores half of the nation. In contrast to that, in 2011, revolutionaries defended women specifically while Mubarak and police forces insulted women in marching areas in many ways including virginity tests. There were mass discussions on human rights violations in 2011 and people lost their lives. However, this encouraged people to demand human rights be established in the country compared to 1919. It is important to note that in 1919, not only in Egypt, but all over the world, human rights was not an issue of discussion. However, it is an important indicator to see that Egyptians are standing up for human rights issues in 2011, an evolution we cannot ignore.

Furthermore, Anderson (2011) states an important connection between 1919 and 2011 which reflects that Egyptians did not revolt through such a peaceful organization in 2011 because of social media but because they had similar experiences in 1919:

> It was 1919. That year's events demonstrate that the global diffusion of information and expectations-so vividly on display in Tahrir Square this past winter-is not a result of the Internet and social media. The inspirational rhetoric of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech, which helped spark the 1919 upheavals, made its way around the world by telegraph. The uprisings of 1919 also suggest that the calculated spread of poplar movements, seen across the Arab world last winter, is not a new phenomenon (Anderson, 2011).

The 2011 revolution was attributed to social media in its early stages by academicians and media. However, as Anderson (2011) states, ways of communication transform in time. It is important for activist to communicate, but how they communicate is not important. Since they were experienced in terms of unification through different networks for a common aim, they are capable of using the new technology.

> Egypt has a culture of deep communal bonds and trust, which manifested itself in the demonstrators' incredible discipline: their sustained nonviolence, their refusal to be provoked by thugs and saboteurs, their capacity to police themselves and coordinate their demands, and their ability to organize without any centralized leadership (Anderson, 2011).

This study aims to state the transformation of Egyptian society by examining how networks evolved from 1919 to 2011. As Anderson states, time has contributed to networks' experiences. It is almost impossible to maintain such a non-violent revolution without a leader but Egyptians were experienced. Unfortunately, they could not reach their aims with the fall of Morsi and the authoritarian rule of military but their achievements cannot be ignored starting from the fall of Mubarak after 30 years in power.

The main question of social movement studies is how individuals from different backgrounds can unite for a common aim. In this section people's motivations, pre-revolutionary atmosphere, communication, role of leaders, repertoires of action and civil society will be compared. Dunne (2015,4) argues that they have found it in the nationalism of 1919: "At the time of the January 2011 uprising, there was an attempt to invent a new form of nationalism—or perhaps to revive an older form, one that evoked the 1919 revolution against British colonialism more than the 1952 movement". In 2011, people needed a national identity capable of erasing differences between them.

The political and social atmospheres were different in pre-1919 and pre-2011, but both revolutions were part of the concurrent waves of global revolutions. Towards

1919, Egypt was struggling for independence like many other countries of Ottoman heritage. World War I was recently ended and Egyptians were traumatized during the war because of fighting with the Allies against the Central Powers, including the Ottoman Empire. It was a crucial time to awake Egypt's national identity in addition to similar movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Balkans. Furthermore, Egyptians were ready to revolt since the Urabi movement had planted the seeds of a national struggle in addition, not to mention the effects of poverty and colonialization.

Communication is crucial for revolutions, not only to mobilize but also in order to spread and create global effect. In addition to the aim of expanding the ideologies across the world, people need to know that other people are also in the streets and putting their lives in danger. Cole (2014) states that the media of the time has been used; the telegraph in 1919 and social media in 2011 In 1919, channels of communication were "leading marches, protecting the streets against vandals, mobilizing demonstrations and writing investigative journalism among other efforts" (Perrin, 2015, s. 56) which are still applied today, although in 2011, there were more ways to communicate between people.

The role of social media during Arab Spring has been discussed enormously. While some scholars praised it (Foran, 2014), some of them regret its role (Ali and Fahmy 2013). Youth were experienced in terms of using social media since Kifaya in 2004 and April 6 Youth Movement in 2008 for revolutionary purposes. In June 2010, young businessmen Khaled Saeed was beaten to death because of a posting about police corruption. A Google executive Wael Ghonim created the Facebook page "We are all Khaled Saeed" and 350,000 people followed the page. Saeed turned out to be the symbol of the reputed "Facebook Revolution" (Ali and Fahmy 2013). After popular uprisings from 2011 until 2013, there has been an increase in the number of Facebook users in Egypt (Arab Social Media Report 2017).

Not only youth but also other networks particularly women, workers and Islamist groups used social media in the Arab Spring. In addition to this, there are different methods of recruitment for networks to mobilize people, such as unions for workers or mosques for Islamic groups. For instance, graffiti was popular in 2011. "Political

agency, non-discrimination, and gender-based violence" are the main problems of Egyptian women and its reflection can be seen in graffiti which appeared during the revolution (Perrin, 2015, s. 102). When they see this graffiti in streets, women felt that they were not alone and it is worth to demonstrate and struggle for how they are treated.

Furthermore, graffiti was a unique way of communication in the Middle East that motivated people to revolt and remind them that they were not alone in feeling agitated. It is personal but open to everyone, anonymous and reaches everyone in the street. Graffiti artists express themselves without fear of punishment (Rodrigues, 2003). Graffiti is a way of expressing grievances and vision of protestors. Perrin argues that graffiti is a strong media for the expression of feelings. In addition to graffiti, movies, documentaries, social media and other modern communication technologies were applied by Egyptians in the 2000s. Revolutions have a transnational nature which spreads through these technologies.

Before 2011, there had been waves of revolutions against authoritarian regimes all over the world, since 2008, from USA to Iran. Networks in Egypt, especially secular youth, feminist organizations and worker unions were also active from 2008 onwards. Still, the prominent discussion of Arab Spring in media and academia has been about why people revolted. Academics, politicians and media were not expecting contention in the Middle East and particularly in Egypt. In order to understand why Egyptians waited 30 years to revolt, Ghanem (2016) argues that Mubarak benefited from being an opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sharia law and he received secular support. If he could have created sham democracy and stepped down for a younger leader, other than his own son, in his later years, revolution would not have been needed. He was in power for thirty years; the country's poverty and undemocratic political life was closely identified with him. There was no hope for Egyptians but to take to the streets.

The 1919 Revolution had Sa'd Zaghlul as the leader in the national and international arena, while there was no leader in 2011. The 1919 Revolution was started by nationalists, particularly Zaghlul and his friends. The support of other segments of society was at short notice, and workers were the only networks that were

institutionalized and experienced. The military were occupied with activity in Sudan at the time and significantly powerful Islamic groups did not exist. Zaghlul was experienced in bureaucracy, he knew British officers and used these experiences to unite the whole country around nationalist ideas. However, 2011 was not only deficient of a leader but also there was not a particular aim or expectations. Hassan (2011) summarizes the stages of revolution and expectations of revolutionaries as follows:

> The first is directly connected to the establishment of the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya) at the end of December 2004. This wave of protest raised the slogan "No to extension or to inheritance or corruption" and enough of the continuing conditions in Egypt since 1981... The second wave of protest movements in Egypt took a new economic approach as protesters raised wage-related demands and asked for improved working conditions in the light of the high prices that keep pace with the policies of privatization. These movements have no political demands, rather their main focus is to improve living conditions. Protests expressed by textile workers in Egypt's various factories in Kafr el-Dawar, and Mahalla, workers and drivers of subway trains are clear examples… The third wave was launched on April 6, 2008 by the new young heroes who exhibited a new political and social force. This new force turned to the internet as a new protest group (14).

As he summarizes, there were three stages that lead to the revolution through the involvement of several networks without a specific leader. This is one of the reasons why Morsi failed to maintain his political power because most of the secular groups stated that neither Morsi nor Muslim Brotherhood were part of the revolution from the beginning.

In 2011, the revolution was started by secular youth with no political agenda or a leader. When the Muslim Brotherhood joined the street movement, protests became disciplined and massive which Mubarak could not resist. One of the reasons behind the Muslim Brotherhood's success is the institutionalization of the organization which will be discussed below, but another reason is that it is a multiplex network. There is a structural equivalence within the Muslim Brotherhood actors which means

they share equivalent relations to a third actor even while they are necessarily linked to each other. There are female workers within the Muslim Brotherhood who were also chanting for better conditions for women in the workplaces but they mostly contradict with secular feminist groups on several other matters. The military, on the other hand, it can be argued, is an egocentric network, which had autocratic control over other networks and therefore they do not need to consider the opinions of other networks of society.

Repertoires of action vary among networks, but they are similar between 1919 and 2011. For instance, the youth is always ready to occupy the streets, politicized in universities and able to use the communication technologies of the time. Islamic groups cannot be usefully compared between 1919 and 2011 since they did not have a set of relations among any actors in 1919, but towards 2011, they became involved in political activism and institutionalization through health services or education centers. Nationalists and women started build their repertoires of action after 1919; nationalists were active in politics while women actively used printed media. Workers, on the other hand, have unions to organize.

During the Mubarak era,Egyptian Trade Union Federation had a monopoly of representation. When the 2011 revolution broke out, workers rejected the federation and formed the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions. While the mainstream media did not pay much attention to workers, it should be noted that the first new institution against Mubarak was formed by workers. Beinin (2012) states more of what workers contributed to revolution as:

> Facilitated by the government's closure of all workplaces in early February, many workers participated in the popular uprising as individuals. On February 6 they returned to their jobs; just two days later, EFITU called for a general strike demanding that Hosni Mubarak relinquish power. Tens of thousands of workers—including those employed at large and strategic workplaces like the Cairo Public Transport Authority, Egyptian State Railways, the subsidiary companies of the Suez Canal Authority, the state electrical company, and Ghazl al-Mahalla—answered the call, engaging in some 60 strikes and protests in the final days before Mubarak's fall on February 11 (7).

Workers did not start street protests but they contributed strategically. Their involvement weakened the economy and prestige of British rule in 1919 and Mubarak regime in 2011.

Lastly, it should be noted that there were almost no civil society organizations in 1919 compared to 2011. Civil society is a relatively new concept all over the world but it definitely strengthens people's ties, enhances their capacity to affect other networks and motivate each other. Therefore, it is a significant indicator to compare. In 1919, the first civil society organizations appeared as trade unions in 1898, the cooperatives in 1908, political parties in 1907, chambers of commerce in 1910, professional associations in 1912 and the feminist movement in 1919 (Hassan, 2011) while, by the end of 2008, there were 30,000 civil society organizations in the country with most of these organizations belonging to religious groups.

Neither 1919 nor 2011 met the expectations of Egyptians. However, they created a rupture in the country's political and social life. The constitution of 1922 or first fair elections of 2012 were significant developments. Unfortunately, the main aims of both revolutions were not also realized which were end of British rule in 1919 and authoritarian rule in 2011.

Britain did not give up its control over Middle East to protect its interests in India after World War I, but the 1919 revolution stated that Egyptians were not going to accept foreign control but the events of that time were not helpful and Britain was not an easy enemy. Nasser was luckier in terms of conjuncture. There were other successful struggles against colonial powers, World War II was weakened Britain's hand and nationalism strengthened since the Urabi movement. Given these realities it can be said that the 1919 revolution did not produce immediate results, but nurtured the necessary political atmosphere for further revolts.

In 2011, on the other hand, the revolution was expected to be the gate of democracy in the early post-revolutionary days. However, the first democratically elected leader Morsi faced secular opposition and a coup d'état. The question of why people

rejected the first elected leader in a few months is the keystone to understanding Egyptian society. Ghanem (2016) argues that Islamism is in a sharp contradiction with significant ideologies of Egypt which are liberal nationalism and Nasserism. In a way Islamists are the antithesis of Egyptian nationalism and nationalist groups supported Morsi's ouster. This contradiction is reflected in the results of the revolution. It should be noted that a clique of nationalist actors, directly and strongly linked to others, prevail in other networks because of constant foreign rule in the country as foreign rule affects daily life and motivates nationalist feelings. Neither women nor workers nor Islamic groups can ignore that their intra network aims do not overcome the national will. The content of the network is stronger than any other personal identity or ideology and can transform relations towards nationalism which creates simultaneity, for example how Muslim Brotherhood identified national independence with Islamic order.

4.3. Reciprocal Relations between Revolutions and Networks

Social network analysis pay attention to effect of ties among nodes, individuals to the creation and expand of revolutions. Furthermore, expectations and power of networks are affected by revolutions, which are ruptures in country's history and changes socio-economic conditions in the country. That's why, this chapter is dedicated to understand this reciprocal relation between 1919 and 2011 and workers and business elite.

4.3.1. How Were They Affected from 1919 and 2011?

Revolutions transform networks, their expectations from authorities and relations with each other as well as their repertoires of action. In 1919, all networks aimed at national independence while in 2011 the downfall of Mubarak and they achieved

these aims. However, in 2011, networks were more insistent on their intra-network expectation than they were in 1919. In general, the revolutions affected all networks in terms of gaining experience and self-confidence. Even though the revolutions did not bring activists what they wanted, they encouraged them to pursue their agendas further.

The repertoires of actions of networks has changed in time, shaped by their experiences. However, workers' repertoire has not change between 1919 and 2011, except for the independence of unions. While there are small victories and disappointments for all networks, there is another common conclusion for all. They gained self-confidence and experience. Beinin (2012) states that for workers:

> The most important achievement of overthrowing Hosni Mubarak for workers was one they shared with all Egyptians: the recovery of their human dignity and their voices. But many institutions, practices, attitudes, and personnel of the former regime remain in place. Little Hosni Mubaraks are still ensconced in thousands of workplaces and other institutions throughout Egypt, operating with the same undemocratic, corrupt, clientelist norms as the Mubarak regime and its elites. At best, it will take years for this to be addressed and transformed. But even the lowest paid and most marginalized workers now feel they have the right to challenge existing hierarchies of power and demand accountability from their government and their supervisors at work (10).

This conclusion guides us to make further analyses on Egypt's future. The Arab Spring proved that people in the region have the courage to revolt. Revolutions are created by networks and networks are transformed during revolutions.

4.3.2. How Were Networks Affected in 1919 and 2011?

In this section, the role of networks in the revolutions from their involvement to end will be discussed in addition to how networks transformed in the century. The

networks' main role while revolutions emerge is one of "social networks as a workshop where grievances, identities, and strategies of resistance are constructed" (Kitts, 2000, s. 241). The literature highlights how networks affected individuals' participation as well as the role of social ties and different networks on participation of the people to the revolution and building strategies for resistance.

To start with networks' effects, activists within the networks take over the streets and break the routine of country; they stop production, prevent state institutions from working and confront security forces. For instance, Hodgkin (1957) argues that workers in Africa were not leaders of national struggles but they radicalized them by raising social and political demands. Leaders of revolutions need to know that there are disgruntled people in the country that will support them before and during the revolutions.

Sometimes small or unexpected networks can create dramatic effects on revolutions. Egypt was an agricultural state in 1919 but workers were the most effective revolutionary network. Most of the factories belonged to British and European companies and the first revolt of workers was started by Greek employees, therefore these foreign employers and employees created the institutionalization and union culture among workers in Egypt (Beinin and Lockman 1988).

4.4. Conclusion

Historical analysis in the second chapter and discussions above reveal that the business elite and workers have been affected by the political authorities and their economy politics in the last century and their evolution has been shaped around these policies. British rule prevented the development of an Egyptian business elite while workers were not in a position to ask for basic rights like a minimum wage or weekly vacation. The 1919 Revolution and Zaghlul era raised hopes of workers and *effendies* confronted as an elite group, even though they were not a business elite. When we focus on the networks in revolutions, workers were the crucial actors of the 1919

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revolution, turning it into a challenge for British rule. As mentioned in the second chapter, workers were working with foreigners in companies governed by foreigners. This environment helped them to learn about the rights of other workers abroad and what they can expect from a revolution. What motivated workers was that, they were working hard but they were still starving because all production was exported for the British consumers. Zaghlul's nationalist ideas were correlated with workers and *effendies* and workers were allies in 1919.

Nasser's rule was a dramatic change for the business world in the country. He nationalized the economy and developments like the building of the Aswan Dam or nationalization of Suez Canal raised hopes for the future of Egyptian workers. Workers' rights like a minimum wage and organization of working hours were also realized but these slight developments did not bring welfare improvements because of political problems. As the economy is always related with political developments, the Arab-Israeli wars, particularly in 1967, ruined Egypt's economy. Neither were workers appeased, nor was a business elite network established.

From 1970 onwards, during Sadat's reign, today's business elite started to emerge. Families like the Sawiris or Salem started their investments. Moreover, Sadat opened the country up to foreign capital and Gulf countries started to invest in Egypt. Gulf hegemony in Egypt's economy is another trend that still continues. Sadat's policies widened the gap between rich and poor and workers' conditions worsened while a business elite started to emerge.

Sadat was followed by Mubarak and for 20 years, there were not any significant developments for the workers while business elite continued grow in strength and wealth. This group consisted mostly of friends and relatives of Gamal Mubarak, the son of Hosni Mubarak. People, mostly youth, started to revolt from the 1990s onwards and workers were part of these revolts. The business elite on the other hand kept silent until 2011. In 2011, workers were at the forefront as an organized and institutionalized network despite the reality that their main union, ETUF, was directly related with the government. Business elites, like the Sawiris, argued that they were also against autocratic power of Mubarak while some of them had to leave country, like Hussein Salem. They all stood against the Muslim Brotherhoods rule after the

election while the Brotherhood tried to create its own business elite with close ties to Turkish businessmen.

From all these discussions it can be argued that the Egyptian peoples' expectations in the last century evolved from nationalization to equal distribution of welfare. There was not even a business elite class until Sadat's era because the country was struggling for national independence in all aspects of life including the economy. Nasser's efforts were not fully realized because of the wars with Israel. In 2011, the business elite's discourse was pro-revolutionary but they benefited from the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and Sisi's hegemony while workers still have to deal with poor working conditions.

Moreover, when making a comparison between the two revolutions' emergence and results, it looks like there are significant similarities including the fact that they were nationwide revolutions in which all sectors of society were involved. However, the differences between the revolutions are mostly a result of the century separating them and, as in the discussion of human rights, Egyptians can be seen to follow global trends.

CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis assumes that structural analysis from a comparative perspective can help to explore the changes and continuities of Egyptian society. This assumption is supported by the theoretical framework of network analysis approach. In this concluding chapter, each of the chapters will be summarized and discussed in order to provide final remarks regarding the role of networks in social movements.

Before to start summary and discussions, this study has a number of limitations that should be highlighted. First, field research cannot be realized while main methodology of network analysis is analyzing networks with surveys and interviews and creating quantitative data. The second limitation is that the researcher does not speak Arabic, that's why resources in English were used. The third limitation is the lack of application of theory to Middle East (Clarke, 2014). There is lack of similar discussions with field research based on the network analysis to contribute to the study. Future researchers may hold field research and create a quantitative data to understand Arab Spring from a structural perspective.

Egypt's 1919 and 2011 Revolutions has been chosen to focus on because there is almost a hundred years between two revolutions to observe continuities and changes in the structure of society. Egypt was a prominent actor during two significant revolutionary terms of Middle East which are dissolution of Ottoman Empire and Arab Spring. The society reflected these two crucial events of the region with revolutions.

This research aims to benefit from network analysis which is a relatively ignored approach. Social network analysis has been chosen as the guiding tool because the role of social media during Arab Spring has been discussed massively and these debates inspired the study to focus on networks, in other words, mapping the ties

among people. Social media is also a network among people. Glossary of network analysis helped for profound analysis to define prominent networks and observe their historical transformation.

Before all the readings and research, I was expecting to state that business elite would have power in politics at least as much as workers. However, in 1919, there was no Egyptian business men that can put pressure on British governance while workers challenged their authorities with sit-ins and strikes, especially in public communication and transportation. There were *effendies* in 1919 who were Western educated bureaucrats with nationalist motivations and towards 1970s onwards, strong Egyptian business men started to emerge. When we came to 2011, there were two important families who were Sawiris and Mansour brothers who have 6.25 percent of Egypt's total gross domestic product (Adly, 2014). Regarding their power as a network, Adly argues:

> In Egypt, as elsewhere, big business is not just active in the economy. It can also take social forms, with family-owned holding companies, as well as dense, elite networks based on friendship, kinship, and educational and professional backgrounds. Big business can be a political actor as well, either formally through contributing to electoral campaigns, financing political parties, owning media outlets, and founding or joining business associations, or informally through direct personal links with high-ranking officials and politicians. And in Egypt, both formally as well as informally, many large business owners, conglomerates, and families were an integral part of Mubarak's political system, especially toward the end of his thirty-year reign. This crony capitalist system was characterized by the uneven distribution of property rights in favor of a politically connected few (5).

While elite in 1919 was trying to gain national independence and international recognition of Egypt apart from Britain, in 2011, there was a strong business elite as a network based on family relations who wants to protect their own interests. In this regard, as stated in the Introduction chapter, expectations of workers have not much changed but their struggle continued to be around the basic rights like minimum wages or independent unions. However, they are one of the most organized networks

with communication structures in the form of unions and repertories of actions like sit-ins and demonstrations. However, elite, particularly in business sector, evolved within the century. They turned out to be a mechanism that can put pressure on governments particularly with money and media channels.

When we compare networks with each other from 1919 to 2011 and two networks within themselves, results will be more apparent. To start with comparison of workers' role and strength in 1919 and 2011, I would argue that they were an organized structure with communication tools and power to change flow of events in both revolutions. Like for the rest of the country, nationalist motivations were at the top of agenda for workers in 1919, because what they produced were taken for Britain. As a result, workers attacked transportation systems, mainly railways, to protect their men and goods (Goldberg, 2011). Beinin (2012, 3) argues that in 2011 workers were not only joining demonstrations in streets but more importantly they turned to "delegitimizing the regime and popularizing a culture of protest" As a prove of their organization capacity, the first institution of the revolution; EFITU was established during demonstrations in addition to work stoppage, the closure of factories and protests in strategic workplaces such as the Cairo Public Transport Authority, Egyptian State Railways, the Suez Canal Authority and Telekom Egypt (Duboc, 2015, s. 37). Workers' demands declared by Independent Trade Unionists for the good of the country in ten steps which were: increase in the minimum wage, narrowing the gap with maximum wages, independent unions, protection against job losses, nationalization of private companies, ending corruption, price control on goods, right to strike, health insurance and dissolution of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (Farah, 2013) and Clarke (2014) argues that independent unions and national minimum wages were at the top of agenda.

When we compare effendies in 1919 and business elite in 2011 as networks, there are remarkable differences between them. As mentioned above, there was no Egyptian elite in business in 1919 but there were Zaghlul and his friends as Western educated bureaucrats with nationalist goals. However, when we come to 2011, there are big family business that controls several sectors but especially communication and media like Sawiris and Mansour brothers. Effendies started the revolution in

1919 against Britain and they achieved their aims in 1922, national independence. However, in 2011, business elite did not take part in the revolution. These families were in friendly relations with Mubarak family. Interestingly, Naguib Sawiris, second richest man in the country after his father and members of the inner circle of Mubarak family, stated that "Mubarak does not deserve to be executed" (Ahram 2011) but he invested in the Free Egyptians Party that has policies which promote a capitalist economy and a pluralistic democracy in the post-Mubarak era, as a rival to the Muslim Brotherhood although they failed in spite of his power in the media and his money (Glain, 2011). Later on, they used this power to stand against Morsi and support Sisi (Adly 2014). In fact, not only business elite but also workers were not in good relations with Muslim Brotherhood because workers were mostly associated with leftist ideologies.

When we compare the roles of workers and effendies in 1919, Goldberg argues that Wafd embraced the revolution, not the peasants, because Wafd and the peasants' expectations were different. Peasants achieved what they wanted when they attacked railroads. They protected the rest of the goods from Britain but Wafd asked for more and continued to challenge Britain in international arena and domestic politics. Workers' strikes were the great power of Zaghlul and his rivals (Beinin, 2010). As mentioned above, workers did not leaded both revolutions, but they were the most experienced network to demonstrate because of the century long efforts to gain basic rights while elite in the country was in front in 1919 to stand for Egypt's independence against Britain. Interestingly, neither in 1919 not in 2011, workers did not revolt directly against business elite apart from small demonstrations, because main problems of workers were related with the country's economic system and laws. That's why, workers targeted state instead of business elite in revolutions.

When we compare the roles of workers and business elite in 2011, I would argue that both networks did not supported Mubarak. Workers took streets and used other actions even though they did not leaded the revolution, while business elite remained silenced. Duboc (2015, 28) argues that "Labor protests before 2011 did not overtly call for the ousting of Mubarak. They remained localized, were not coordinated with each other and actually refrained from going beyond labor grievances. However,

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workers did not support Mubarak's regime either". While workers chanted for local expectations and business men stayed silenced, workers were in more intense relations with other networks compare to business elite. For instance, youth, particularly students were the first organized network in 2011 through social media. While youth was the first crucial network that started the revolution, they connected with workers to be organized.

> Youth groups' efforts to coordinate with their contacts who had ties to other social sectors, especially the labor movement. They had a particularly strong relationship with the HMLC and the ECESR, both of which had frequently offered their offices as meeting spaces for youth movements, including during the planning of the January 25 event (Clarke, 2014, s. 388).

Networks needed each other to topple down Mubarak, but business elite stand suspicious and waited for the results of the events. Overall result is that, revolutionaries need support of organized networks like workers and elites'a ttitute affects the results because of their money money and control in media. In Egypt, workers were the pillar of revolutions both in 1919 and 2011. Elite, on the other hand, were not active in business but only in bureaucracy in 1919 and from 1970 onwards, they became powerful in economics. However, while elite were the leaders in 1919, they did not involve revolution in 2011 since this time it was against the ally of elite, particularly, businessmen in the country.

I covered these arguments in three chapters through the thesis. The first chapter presented a literature review on social movement theories, network analysis and Egyptian revolutions to state why social network analysis has been chosen among other theories and why 1919 and 2011 has been chosen among other revolutions. The chapter has three sections. In the first section of the chapter, five leading theories which are new social movement theory, resource mobilization, political process, mass society and collective action has been discussed around their significant theorists and research questions. In the second section, social network analysis has

been reviewed. Several definitions of "network" has been indicated, role of networks in social movements defined and how several theories benefit from the tools of networks analysis stated. In the third chapter, Egypt's revolutionary history has been reviewed, particularly Urabi movement, and revolutions in 1919, 1952 and 2011. This chapter states that while social movement theorists are aware of the importance of networks analysis, there is not many studies because social network analysis requires a lot of effort with the field work and data analysis to map the results.

The second chapter explored workers and elite in Egypt and explained why particular networks were chosen. Literature on social movements in Egypt showed that while workers are the pillars of the revolutions and elite is showed great evolution within 100 years, literature ignores these two networks. Analysis in this chapter is historical. The last century of these networks has been analyzed in three phases which are turn of the 20th century, 20th century and 21st century. In the turn of the 20th century, British rule and 1919 Revolution analyzed. In 20th century, Arab-Israeli relations and Nasser's policies affected almost all networks. This stage states how economy politics of governments affects workers and elite. In the turn of 21st century, Mubarak era and Arab Spring discussed. The chapter showed the strength of actors in workers network while elite still struggles to strength coherency among its actors.

The third chapter is analytical which combined the first and second chapters by applying concepts of network analysis while reviewing Egypt's last century. The discussion in the third chapter was based on the comparison between two revolutions and two networks among each other. Differences and similarities between two revolutions has been reviewed in addition to their stages. Mainly, two revolutions were nationwide and this is one the reasons that they were chosen to focus on. Moreover, in both revolutions, networks united a common agenda, independence in 1919 and end of Mubarak rule in 2011. Secondly, discourse on nationalism can be seen in both revolutions. There is prominent difference between two revolutions in regard to role of networks which is the discourse has been diversified from nationalism to human rights, women rights, secular-Islamic debates like other parts of the world. In addition to that, communication tools are also diversified with the development of technology. Another difference is that, 1919 was leaded by Zaghlul

and Wafd Party while there was no leader in 2011. Repertoires of actions has been diversified of workers and they stayed as a great threat against authorities with work stoppage while business elite do not have such a power.

The study argues that there is an interrelated relation between networks and revolutions. Networks are the structures that creates revolutions while revolutions shape and transform the motivations and aims of networks for future revolutions. However, although in 2011 revolution against Mubarak and 2013 revolts against Morsi networks gained experience, Egyptians did not revolt against authoritarian rule of military since 2014. The review of literature and analysis of Egyptian revolutions may demonstrate Kandil's (2014) conclusion:

> Perhaps Egyptians still hoped the future might somehow steer their revolution toward a happy ending. Perhaps the precondition for revolution never existed in Egypt, and the people are simply tired of pretending they do. Be that, as it may, one thing is for sure: Egyptians consciously preferred the risk of backtracking toward military rule to the certainty of sliding into religious fascism (263).

As following discussion will demonstrate, 49% of Egyptians who did not vote for Morsi are happier with military rule rather that Islamic rule, but how Sisi maintains his military rule needs further research. In addition that, as discussed in the Introduction chapter, overall discussion states that nationalism and economic welfare are at the top of agenda. Military has been associated with nationalists will in the eyes of people and moreover, brought stability even if not brought welfare to economy.

Affan (2016) compares coup attempt in Turkey and Sisi's success and argues that Morsi tried the same methodology of Erdogan against military which is "temptation" and "appeasement". However, Affan argues that Morsi was in a weaker position against army and failed to de-militarize country. In the last decade, Turkish military's political power was reduced and military was divided in contrast to Egypt.

In the case of Egypt, enduring military-hegemonic authoritarianism resulted in a fragile political class, fake party politics, and ill-developed political awareness. Therefore, in contrast to Turkish civilians who responded to the coup attempt in an undivided and in a decisive way, civilian political powers in Egypt were too divided and hesitant to stand together in the face of the military. This comparison reveals that networks were not only experienced to revolt but also, they were aware of the authority of military in country's bureaucracy and such a revolt against Sisi has not been realized.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Sosyal hareketler bir hedefe odaklanmış kişiler arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiler sonucu ortaya çıkar. Sosyal network analizi ise sosyal hareketleri açıklamak için bu ilişkilere ve etkileşimlere odaklanır. Sosyal network analizi ve tarihsel karşılaştırmalı araştırma ile belirli bir toplumdaki bireylerin belli bir zaman diliminde yaşadığı sosyal dönüşüm incelenebilir. Bu çalışmanın amacı Mısır toplumunun son yüzyılda yaşadığı değişimi 1919 ve 2011 devrimlerini karşılaştırarak ortaya koymaktır. Araştırmanın kapsamını sınırlamak amacıyla işçiler ve iş adamları olmak üzere iki zıt networke odaklanılmıştır.

Çalışmada 1919 ve 2011 aralığında iş adamlarının ve işçilerin dönüşümü sosyal network analizi ile incelenmiştir. Network analizi "micro ve macro arasında köprü" görevi görmektedir (Emirbayer ve Goodwin 1994, 1418) ve belli iki network üzerinden toplumun dönüşümü hakkında fikir sahibi olmamız için yönlendirici olmaktadır. Çalışmada iki yönlü karşılaştırma yapılmaktadır. Öncelikle, bu iki networkün 1919 ve 2011 devrimlerindeki rolü, katılımı, diğer aktörlerle ilişkisi ve devrimden beklentileri karşılaştırılmıştır. Bu sayede işçilerin ve iş adamlarının 1919 sonrasındaki bağımsızlıktan nasıl etkilendiği ve son yüzyıl içinde etki alanlarının nasıl değiştiği başta olmak üzere dönüşümleri ele alınmış olacaktır. İkinci olarak ise, bu iki networkün devrimde üstlendiği rol karşılaştırılmıştır. Örneğin, işçiler 1919'da en organize networklerden biriyken henüz Mısırlı iş adamları ekonomide aktif değildi. Bu analizle işçiler ve iş adamları arasındaki evrensel çatışmanın Mısır'daki karşılığı da araştırılmıştır.

Orta Doğu gerek I. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında gerekse 2011 yılında birçok sosyal harekete tanık olmuştur. Tüm bu ülkelerin arasından Mısır'ın seçilmesinin iki temel sebebi vardır. Öncelikle, Mısır en büyük Arap ülkesi olarak bölge siyasetinde merkezdedir. Siyasal trendleri belirleme özelliği ile önem arz etmektedir. Her ne

kadar ekonomisi Körfez ülkeleri kadar gelişmiş olmasa da Cemal Abdül Nasır veya Müslüman Kardeşler gibi diğer ülkelerin sosyal ve siyaset dünyasını etkileyen aktörler Mısır'dan çıkmaktadır. İkinci olarak, Mısır diğer ülkelere kıyasla sosyal hareketler konusunda tecrübeli bir ülkedir. Bu sebeple Mısır incelenirken çıkarılan dersler Arap ülkeleri ve Orta Doğu hakkında fikir sahibi olmamız açısından yardımcı olacaktır.

Devrimler halkın sokağa çıkması sonucu ortaya çıkar. Ancak çalışmada literatür taraması yapabilmek ve araştırma için bir zemin oluşturmak adına halkın içinden iki networke ve son yüzyılın temel olaylarından ikisine odaklanılmıştır. 2011 yılında muhalif gruplar, solcu, liberal ve milliyetçi gruplar, insan hakları savunucuları, seküler gençlik grupları ve Müslüman Kardeşler üyesi gençler, akademisyenler ve hatta futbol taraftarları sokağa çıkmıştı (Abou El Fald 2015). Tüm bu gruplar arasından işçiler ve iş adamlarının seçilmesinin temel sebebi toplumun iki zıt kutbunu temsil etmeleri; beklentileri, motivasyonları ve amaçlarının siyasi otoritelerle ilişkilerini etkileyecek biçimde farklı olmasıdır. Tezin amacının işçiler ve iş adamlarının 1919 ve 2011'deki rollerinin ve etkilerinin karşılaştırılması olduğunu düşünürsek, iki uç sosyal-ekonomik sınıfa odaklanmak zengin sonuçlar verecektir.

İkinci olarak, bu iki network son yüzyılda büyük değişiklikler yaşamıştır. Duboc 1950'lerden sonra Mısır'da işçi hareketlerinin daha da arttığını, 2004-2011 yıllarında ise iki milyondan fazla işçinin çalışma koşullarını protesto ettiğini belirtmektedir (Duboc 2015, 27). Son yüzyılda Mısır'da birden çok ekonomi politikası denenmiş ve bu değişiklikler iş adamlarına alan açarken işçilerin şartlarında iyileşmeler olmamıştır. Analizde ortaya çıkan sonuç bu durumun işçilerin organizasyon kapasitesini her geçen gün arttırdığıdır. İş adamlarına bakılacak olursa, 1919'da Mısırlı iş adamları görülmezken, Batı'da eğitim almış ve bürokraside görev üstlenen ve 1919 devrimini başlatan "efendiler" vardır. Bu grup zaman içinde siyasette muhalif bir rol üstlenirken özellikle 1970'lerden sonra Enver Sedat'ın özelleştirme odaklı ekonomi politikaları sayesinde Mısırlı iş adamları ortaya çıkmıştır. Mübarek döneminde ise bu grup otoriteye yakın duruşları sebebiyle daha da güçlenmiştir. Bu çalışmada efendilerden iş adamlarına dönüşüm, devrimlerdeki rolleri bağlamında ele alınmıştır.

Tarihsel karşılaştırma çalışmanın temelini oluştururken tarih, sosyoloji, siyaset bilimi gibi farklı disiplinlerden faydalanılmasını sağlamıştır. Bu anlayış tezin yöntemi olarak değil, hipotezi test etmenin bir yolu olarak kullanılmıştır. Elde edilen sonuç ise işçilerin 1919'da dahi en organize network olduğu ve protestolarda aktif rol aldığı; iş adamlarının ise siyasette ve sosyal hayatta yeni yeni yer edinen bir network olduğudur.

Devrimlerde protestolara katılan insanlar farklı ideolojik gruplardan veya mesleklerden olabilir ve akademik bir çalışmada yalnızca bir veya birkaçına odaklanmak zor olabilir. Ancak ben minimum maaş, hafta sonu izni gibi temel haklarını dahi kazanamamış işçiler ve yalnızca birkaç aileye mahsus servetin, bu iki grubun otoritelerle olan ilişkisine etkisini, özellikle de iş birliği hali varsa, araştırmanın ilginç olacağını düşündüm. Kadınlar, Müslüman Kardeşler ya da milliyetçiler gibi birçok network 1919 ve 2011'de oldukça aktifti. Ancak tüm bu grupları birbirinden ayrı düşünmek de oldukça zordur çünkü hepsinin arasında başka birçok bağ vardır. İşçiler ve iş adamları özellikle ekonomi politikalarında farklı taraflarda yer alırlar ve devrimler esnasında yönetimlere karşı aldıkları tavrında farklı olması beklenmiştir. Gelirleri, eğitimleri, sosyal hakları ve otoriterle ilişkilerinin farklı olması da karşılaştırma yapılmasında yardımcı olmuştur.

Bunlara ek olarak, özellikle işçilerin protesto geleneği yalnızca Mısır'da değil dünyanın her yerinde çok eskiye dayanmaktadır. Bu sebeple, literatür taramasının sonunda işçilerin 1919 ve 2011'de grevlerle ekonomiyi durma noktasına getirme gücüne sahip olduğunu ve otoriteler üzerinde baskı kurabildiklerini fark ettim. Buna ek olarak, etkileri yalnızca grevlerle sınırlı değildir, neredeyse her ailede bir işçi bulunur ve işçilerin içinde bulunduğu durum tüm aileyi etkiler. Böylece sokağa çıkan insan sayısı işçi örgütlerinin organizasyon kapasitesi ile birleşince daha da artar.

İşçileri devrime iten durumları incelerken aynı zamanda ülkenin son yüzyıldaki ekonomi politikalarının sıradan insanlar üzerinde etkisini de incelemiş oldum. Sigorta, haftalık ve yıllık tatiller, asgari ve azami ücret gibi konularda alınan kararlar insanların günlük hayatını etkilemektedir. Aynı zamanda, Mısır'da ekonomi politikalarının siyasetten ayrı düşünülemediğini de fark ettim.

Sosyal networkler oldukça eski bir fenomendir. Dijital ve çevrimiçi ilişkiler gelişmeden önce de insanlar yüz yüze kurdukları ilişkilerle networkler oluştururdu ve bu durum devam ediyor. İnsanlar arasındaki sosyal ve ekonomik bu ilişkiler 1930'lu yıllardan beri incelenmektedir. Sosyal network analizi bireyler arasındaki ilişkilerin aleni yönlerini keşfetmemizi sağlayacak metodolojik teknikler ve analizler konusunda yönlendiricidir. Bu tezin amacı Mısır'daki devrimlerde insanların arasındaki sosyal bağların önemini incelemek olduğu için sosyal network analiz literatüründen faydalanılmıştır. Her ne kadar sosyal network analizi insanlar arasındaki karmaşık bağların diyagramını oluşturmak için geliştirilmiş olsa da, yaklaşımın sözlüğü networkler ve devrimler arasında karşılaştırma yapmak için fayda sağlamıştır.

Bunlara ek olarak, Talmud ve Mishal (2000) sosyal network analizinin özellikle heterojen toplumları incelerken daha geniş bir perspektif sağladığını belirtmektedir. İnsanların arasındaki dini, siyasal, etnik, tarihsel veya mesleki bağları görmezden gelerek Orta Doğu'daki devrimlerin neden ve nasıl oluştuğunu ve yayıldığını açıklamak eksik sonuçlar verecektir. Bu çalışmada ele alınan temel meselelerden bir tanesi de devrimler incelenirken networklere odaklanmanın fayda sağladığıdır. McMarthy (1996) networklerin toplumu harekete geçiren yapılar olduğunu ve bu yaklaşımın devrimler üzerinde karşılaştırmalı tarihsel analiz yapılırken akademik çalışmaları kolaylaştırıcı bir yönü olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bu tür yaklaşımlardan etkilenen bu çalışma da, Mısır'daki iki devrimi karşılaştırırken sosyal network analizinden faydalanmakta ve bireyler arasındaki bağların devrimlerin ortaya çıkışı ve yayılışındaki etkisini ortaya koymaktadır.

Özellikle Arab Baharı sonrasında Orta Doğu'daki devrimler akademide çokça incelenmiştir. Medya, özellikle sosyal medya, bu çalışmaların birçoğunun merkezindedir ve birkaç örnek dışında (Beinin ve Vairel, 2013; Beck 2014, Cole 2014, Foran 2014, Ghanem 2016) sosyal hareketler teorileri göz ardı edilmiştir. Bu çalışmalarsa insanların neden ayaklandığı ve nasıl barışçıl bir şekilde organize olduğu sorularına odaklanmıştır. Özellikle Mısır'da devrimlerde kullanılan yöntemlerin ve toplumun beklentilerinin nasıl değiştiği soruları cevaplanmamıştır.

Bu çalışmada ele alınan yöntemle Mısır toplumunun networklerinin devrimlerde üstelendiği rolün değişimi ortaya konmuştur.

Her ne kadar toplumun büyük kısmı devrimlere iştirak etmiş olsa da, akademisyenler 1919 devriminde milliyetçilere, özellikle efendilere, ve 2011 yılında Müslüman Kardeşlere ve seküler gençlere odaklanmıştır. Ancak işçiler ve iş adamları organizasyon kapasiteleri, ayaklanma yöntemleri ve otoriterilerle ilişkileri açısından bu devrimlerde önemli rol oynamıştır. İşçiler 1882 yılından itibaren Mısır'da devrimlerin önemli aktörleri olmuştur. Grevler, oturma eylemleri ve sokak protestoları ile ülkedeki iletişim, ulaşım ve üretim faaliyetlerini durdurma gücüne sahiptir ve bu durum işçileri çok önemli bir pozisyona taşımaktadır. İş adamları ise, 1919'da iş dünyasından çok siyasette etkin olan bürokratlarca, efendiler, temsil edilirken, 1970'lerden sonra önemli aktörler haline gelmiştir. Ülkenin en zengin ve güçlü iş adamları birkaç aileden gelmektedir ve siyasi otoriteler üzerinde ekonomik baskı oluşturma gücüne sahiptir. Akademide göz ardı edilen bu iki networkün karşılaştırılması şaşırtıcı sonuçlar ortaya çıkarmıştır. Son yüzyılda sosyal, siyasal ve ekonomik değişikliklere ek olarak iletişim teknolojilerinin değişmesiyle Mısır'da önemli dönüşümler yaşanmıştır. Bu durum networkleri ve devrimlere katılımı da etkilemiştir.

Yalnızca Mısır'da odaklanılan networkler konusunda değil, Diani (2013), Rebecca, Roberts ve Soule (2010) gibi birkaç çalışma dışında genel olarak networklerin devrimci aktörler olarak ele alınması konusunda da boşluk vardır. Bunlara ek olarak Castells (2012) mahrum bırakılan grupların yalnız olmadıklarını fark ettiklerinde korkuyla baş edebildiklerini ve devrimci yapılara dönüştüklerini belirtmektedir. Özellikle Arap Baharı'nda insanlar sosyal medya üzerinden irtibat kurabildikleri ve anonim kimlikler kullanabildikleri için korku unsuru azalmıştır. Ancak, bu çalışma korku faktörüne rağmen sokağa çıkan işçileri ve iş adamlarını ele alması ile akademideki bir boşluğu doldurmayı hedeflemektedir.

Tilly çalışmalarında networkleri toplumun devrim mekanizması olarak tanımlar (McAdam ve Tilly, 2001). Teorisi eşitsizlik ve sömürü gibi kavramlar üzerine kurulu olan Tilly, network analizi üzerindeki Marxist etkinin örneklerinden biridir ve bu yaklaşımın Mısır'da da karşılığı bulunmaktadır.

Yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi, bu çalışmanın temel amacı 1919'dan 2011'e toplumun dönüşümünü işçiler ve iş adamları özelinde analiz etmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda şu sorular cevaplanmaya çalışılmıştır; iş adamları (elitler) ve işçilerin organizasyonel yapısı son yüzyılda nasıl değişti, devrimlerde kullandıkları araçlar nasıl değişti, siyasi otoritelerle ve diğer devrimci gruplarla ilişkileri nasıl değişti, devrimden beklentileri ve bu doğrultudaki motivasyonları nasıl değişti ve iki devrim, 1919-2011, arasındaki benzerlikler ve farklar nelerdir?

Yaptığım literatür taraması sonucunda üçüncü ünitede ele alınan karşılaştırma sonuçlarına ek olarak, birçok önemli çıkarımda bulundum. Öncelikle, 2011'deki devrimin sosyal medya etrafında tartışılmasına rağmen işçilerin ilişkilerindeki merkeziyet ve yoğunluk siyasi otoriteler üzerinde baskı kurmalarını sağlamış ve devrimin oluşumu ve yayılımında sosyal medyadan çok daha etkin rol oynamıştır. Eğer aktörler direkt olarak ve güçlü bir şekilde bağlı değilse sosyal medyanın faydasının da azaldığı olduğu görülmüştür. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, iş adamları yeni yeni ortaya çıkan bir networktür ve 1919'da ekonomik bir rol üstlenememiş, dönemin eğitimli Mısırlıları bürokraside rol alıp tecrübe edindikten sonra milliyetçi bir kalkınma başlatmış olsa bile bunu işçilerin katılımı devrime dönüştürmüştür. Bu argüman üçüncü ünitede detayları ile tartışılmıştır.

İki yönlü karşılaştırmalardan elde edilen bir diğer önemli sonuç ise 1919'da milliyetçilerin başlattığı ve işçilerin katılımıyla devrime dönüşen olaylar, 2011'de seküler gençlik gruplarının başlattığı ve Müslüman Kardeşler, milliyetçiler, Feministler ve işçilerin katılımıyla devrime dönüşmüştür. Elitler ve özellikle iş adamları olaylarda aktif rol üstlenmemiş, Mübarek'in devrildiği kesinleşene kadar sessiz kalmıştır. Bu durum, işçilerin Mısır devrimlerinin temel direği olduğunu, elitlerin ise beklentilerinin ve motivasyonunun ciddi bir dönüşüm yaşadığını göstermektedir. Bunun temel sebebi ise 1919'daki İngiliz yönetiminin Mısırlı elit sınıfın ekonomi dahil herhangib ir alanda rol almasını engellemesi, 2011'de ise Mübarek yönetiminin bu sınıfın ekonomik büyümesindeki temel faktörlerden biri olması gösterilebilir. Ancak belirtmek gerekir ki, literatür taraması öncesinde iş adamlarının 2011'de Mübarek yönetimini desteklemesi beklenirken sessiz kalması

da önemlidir. Bunun sebebinin olarak ise Mübarek yönetiminin uluslararası prestijini kaybetmesi gösterilebilir.

Mısır'ın seçilmiş ilk başkanı Mursi geçtiğimiz günlerde hapishanede öldü ve ülke 2013'den beri ordu tarafından yönetilmektedir. Bu noktada Mısırlıların Mübarek ve Mursi yönetimlerine karşı dururken orduya karşı ciddi bir direniş göstermemesinin sebebi sorgulanabilir. Adly (2014) bunun sebebinin ordunun iktidarını legalleştirmek için iş dünyasıyla sıkı ilişkiler kurmasına bağlamaktadır. Buna ek olarak, ikinci ünitede ele alındığı üzere Nasır, Sedat ve Mübarek'in ilk dönemlerinde olduğu gibi ordu da işçilerin organizasyonel kapasitesinin farkında olup, yaklaşımlarını buna göre belirlemektedir. Görüldüğü üzere ekonomi ve siyasal istikrar arasında bağ bulunmaktadır. Ordu işçilerin temel haklarını sağlayıp iş adamları için istikrarlı bir ekonomi kurduğu sürece, ordu karşıtı hareketler iki önemli networkten mahrum kalacaktır.

Farah (2013) 2011 devriminin neoliberalizm, yolsuzluk ve baskıya karşı olduğunu düşünmektedir. Bu teorisini devrimin "ekmek, özgürlük ve eşitlik" sloganına bağlamaktadır. Bu durum insanların ülkedeki ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasal düzene karşı çıktıklarını göstermektedir. Bu sebeple devrimde rol alan birçok network olmasına rağmen iki farklı sosyal-ekonomik sınıfın devrimlerdeki duruşunun karşılaştırılması çok yönlü analiz imkanı sağlamaktadır.

Elitlerin otoritelere yakın olması ve devrime karşı çıkması, statükonun devamını istemesi beklenirken litetür taraması sonucunda 1919'da efendilerin, 2011'de ise iş adamlarının böyle bir duruş sergilemediği, hatta 1919 devriminin öncülerinin efendiler olduğu görülmektedir.

Son olarak, iki devrim arasında 100 yıla yakın zaman olduğu için ciddi değişimler gözlenmesi beklenirken, temel hedef ve yöntemlerin, teknolojinin etkileri hariç tutulduğunda, çok da değişmediği fark edilmiştir.

Yukarıda sözü edilen soruların cevaplanması ve tartışmaların detaylandırılması için tezin ilk ünitesi sosyal hareketler teorileri ve network analizi hakkında yapılan literatür taramasına ayrılmıştır. Bu teorilerin devrimleri anlamamızdaki önemi,

devrimleri nasıl tanımladıkları ve hangi soruları sordukları ele alınmıştır. İkinci kısımda ise network analizine odaklanılmış, yaklaşımın ABD ve Avrupa'da gelişmiş olmasına rağmen Orta Doğu'da nasıl başvurulabileceği incelenmiştir. Bu kısımda network bir kavram olarak tanımlanmış ve devrimlerde rolleri incelenmiştir. Aynı zamanda bu ünitede Mısır'ın son yüzyıldaki devrimleri özetlenmiş ve neden 1919 ve 2011'in seçildiği açıklanmıştır.

İkinci ünitede ise çalışmada odaklanılan iki networkün son yüzyıldaki değişimi incelenmiştir. Bu ünite aynı zamanda modern Mısır tarihinin de özeti niteliğindedir. Her iki network için de şu konular ele alınmıştır; neden özellikle bu networkler seçildi, Mısır'da nasıl tanımlanıyorlar, yapıları, motivasyonları ve hedefleri nelerdir, I. Dünya Savaşı gibi önemli olaylardan nasıl etkilenmişlerdir ve organizasyonel kapasiteleri ve kullandıkları araçlar nelerdir? Bu sorular 20. Yüzyıla doğru, 20. Yüzyıl ve 21. Yüzyıla doğru olmak üzere tarihsel bir yaklaşımla cevaplanarak üç dönemde incelenmiştir.

Üçüncü ünitede ise iki yönlü karşılaştırma yapılarak devrimler kendi aralarında ve networkler kendi aralarında ve birbirleri ile karşılaştırılmıştır. Bu ünitede iki networkün dönüşümleri ele alınmıştır. Aynı zamanda ilk ünitede elde edilen teorik bilgiler ikinci ünitedeki tarihsel verilerle harmanlanmıştır.

Literatür taraması bu ünitenin temel metodolojisidir. Çalışmada 1919 ve 2011 devrimlerinde networklerin rolü karşılaştırılırken network analizinden faydalanıldığı için sosyal hareketler teorileri, network analizi ve Mısır'daki işçiler ve elitlerin son yüzyılı hakkındaki kaynaklar incelenmiştir.

Network analizi yapısalcı bir yaklaşımdır. Akademisyenler networkleri çalışmalarının merkezine koyar ve toplumu onların etrafında inceler. Bu sebeple bu çalışmada yapısalcı bir yaklaşım izlemiş ve çok yönlü analizler geliştirmeye çalışmıştır.

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