

BRIDGING BORDERS FROM ASIA TO EUROPE:
A CASE STUDY ON UYGHUR AND HAZARA MIGRATION TO TURKEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
BY
MADELINE ANDREA VANDER VELDE

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST 2019

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sadettin Kirazcı

Director (Acting)

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat Tanrısever

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in the scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant

Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members (first name belongs to the chairperson of the
jury and the second name belongs to the supervisor)**

Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer Akder (METU, ARS) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant (METU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceren Ergenç (XJTU, China Studies) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Madeline Andrea VANDER VELDE

Signature :

ABSTRACT

BRIDGING BORDERS FROM ASIA TO EUROPE: A CASE STUDY ON UYGHUR AND HAZARA MIGRATION TO TURKEY

Vander Velde, Madeline Andrea
M.Sc., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant

August 2019, 54 pages

In the last five years, Turkey has hosted the most refugees in the world. Although very different in regard to the journeys they take as asylum seekers, Uyghurs and Hazaras make up two of these refugee communities that end their passage in Turkey. By first exploring related critical political moments and ethno-cultural identity, this thesis intends to identify the beginnings of persecution and connect them to more recent developments. The objective is to examine how the refugee path to protection of these two Central Asian groups differ or are similar. Therefore, this research also highlights critical pieces of international legislative mechanisms and national Turkish legal remedies which play a critical role in flight from persecution, arrival in Turkey and beyond.

Keywords: Migration, Xinjiang, Refugee, Asylum Seeker, Turkey

ÖZ

ASYA'DAN AVRUPA'YA KURULAN KÖPRÜ: TÜRKİYE'YE GÖÇ EDEN UYGURLAR VE HAZARALAR ÜZERİNE BİR VAKA ANALİZİ

Vander Velde, Madeline Andrea
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonnenfant

Ağustos 2019, 54 sayfa

Son beş yılda, Türkiye dünyadaki en çok sayıdaki mültecilere ev sahipliği yaptı. Sığınmacı olarak gördükleri yolculuklar açısından çok farklı olsalar da, Uygurlar ve Hazaralar, Türkiye'de geçişlerini sona erdiren iki mülteci topluluğunu oluşturuyor. Bu tez öncelikle ilgili kritik siyasi anları ve etno-kültürel kimliği inceleyerek, zulmün başlangıcını belirlemeyi ve bunları daha yeni gelişmelere bağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Amaç, bu iki Orta Asya grubunun korunmasına yönelik mülteci yolunun nasıl farklı veya benzer olduğunu incelemektir. Bu nedenle, bu araştırma, zulümden kaçışta, Türkiye'ye gelmede ve ötesinde kritik bir rol oynayan uluslararası yasama mekanizmalarının ve ulusal Türk yasal çözümlerinin kritik parçalarını da vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Göç, Sincan, Mülteciler, Sığınmacı, Türkiye

In memory of
my late grandfather, Edward J. Vander Velde Jr.,
and also
my late mother, Christine A. Payne-Mattern

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank my thesis adviser, Işık hocam, you have been nothing but support through the process of writing and researching. Thank you for your patience and guidance.

A special “thank you” to my grandparents, Edward J. (Jr.) and M. Jade Vander Velde—for without you these studies would have not been possible. To Colin, and my sister, Lilly, I would like to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the love you have shown me and how you have believed in my abilities even when I did not.

This last year and a half has been a trying time, showing me loss and teaching me growth. To my brother, EJ, and my Uncle Tim, I would like to express my thanks for the support you have given me. And to all friends, colleagues and loved ones who have shown me kindness and support over the course of these three years of traveling, studying, researching and writing, I thank you too—you know who you are.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGERISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iv
LIST OF FIGURES	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xi
CHAPTERs	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Scope and Objective.....	1
1.2 Literature Review.....	1
1.3 Methodology.....	3
1.4 Organization of the Thesis.....	4
2. THE HISTORY OF IDENTITY AND GROUNDS FOR PERSECUTION.....	9
2.1 Who are the Uyghurs?.....	10
2.2 “If you haven’t been to Xinjiang, you’re not a good Han!”	11
2.3 Who are the Hazaras?.....	24
2.4 Hazara History and Afghanistan.....	26
3. FROM ASYLUM SEEKER TO REFUGEE: APPLICATION OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE MECHANISMS	33
3.1 International Charters and the United Nations	33
3.2 Turkey & National Legislation.....	34
3.3 Where’s the gap?.....	40
4. ON THE GROUND: INTEGRATION INTO TURKISH SOCIETY.....	45
4.1 Does Identity play a role?.....	46
5. COMPARING & CONTRASTING REALISMS	49

5.1 Differing Realities & Commonalities	49
6. RECENT EVENTS & CONCLUDING NOTES.....	53
6.1 Current Developments	53
6.2 Conclusion.....	55
REFERENCES.....	57
APPENDICES	
A. TRKE ZET / TURKISH SUMMARY	67
B. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM	78

LIST OF FIGURES & MAPS

FIGURE 1: MAP OF ASIA	7
FIGURE 2: MAP OF CHINA	8
FIGURE 3: MAP OF XINGJIANG.....	9
FIGURE 4: POPULATION OF VARIOUS XINGJIANG ETHNIC GROUPS, 1947-2000 (MILLIONS)	16
FIGURE 5: MAP OF AFGHANISTAN	23
FIGURE 6: MAP OF ETHNICITIES IN AFGHANISTAN (1).....	22
FIGURE 7: MAP OF ETHNICITIES IN AFGHANISTAN (2).....	23

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
INGO	International non-governmental organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
PDMM	Provincial Directorate of Migration Management
PDPA	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
XUAR	Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope and Objective

The main objective of this thesis is to explore the ways in which the asylum-seeker journeys of Uyghurs and Hazaras (pre, post and after arrival) to Turkey compare. This process of research requires first delving into the distinction of each identity, culture, the history of political regimes and beginning of persecution. Then the thesis will explore the ways in which national legal remedies and international regimes effect the path to asylum for each group. Finally, it will touch on the process of integration of Hazaras and Uyghurs in their host communities in Turkey towards the end. In doing so, the main goal of this thesis is to highlight differences and commonalities of the migration journeys of these two Central Asian communities.

In addition, this thesis aims to briefly analyze the importance of how global geopolitical power and geography play a role in an asylum seeker's ability to access protection from persecution under the scope of the United Nations 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. Although the international academic community has studied an array of individual asylum seeker groups, there has seldom been much cross-analysis of these groups. As part of the concluding chapter of this thesis, I present not only where the cases of Uyghurs and Hazaras are similar in their journeys, but also how they differ in the legal paths that they take—whether due to geographical implications or choice.

1.2 Literature Review

In the case of the Uyghurs, history has been and continues to be a dividing point when speaking with activists and historians alike. Since China changed its

isolationist policies in 1978, there have been books and articles written from the Han Chinese perspective and others from the Uyghur perspective—both making historical claims to the region of Xinjiang (sometimes otherwise referred to as East Turkestan). This has in turn meant enhanced tension between both groups. Although there has always been contention over the Xinjiang region (largely due to its strategic placement between China and the former Soviet Union), such dispute remains especially strong due to China's recent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region. Therefore, it has been difficult to maintain a neutral narrative, whilst reading from a wide array of both Han and Uyghur academic works. It is due to this that in the first section, the focus is more on specific political turning points since the 1950s and less on each side's own claim to the territory. I have found James A. Millward's 2007 book, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, to be the most reliably balanced and therefore often use it for reference.

Unlike Uyghur history, the narrative for the Hazara community in Afghanistan is quite clear, objective and rather well-documented by international academics. The fact that there is such a clearly documented narrative can largely be attributed to the country's prevailing separatism (which has plagued communities for decades), coupled with well-preserved and uncontested historical documents that denote specific political regime policies. However, I would like to indicate that I do largely draw from Thomas Barfield's various articles and books, as his work is especially extensive on the topics of identity, history and politics in Afghanistan. In addition, what makes Barfield's work especially unique is that it highlights the intersectionality of these ideas, and how key concepts that have been framed from a Western perspective differ widely from the reality of society and politics in Afghanistan. Two examples took place in the 1990s, when the international community experienced the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Central Africa. These two events largely shaped Western understanding of how wide ethnic diversity within a country has inevitably led to ethnic divisions that

threaten the fragmentation of a centralized political state structure¹. As Barfield highlights, for much of the international development community, there was much anticipation that preexisting ethnic differences, in conjunction with the fall of the Taliban regime in the early 2000s, would lead to a permanent fracture of any possible centralized state in Afghanistan. It was also presumed that this would result in the dissolution of the country into multiple individual states, as what had previously happened in Yugoslavia a decade earlier². While this Western perspective does hold true in a number of cases, Afghanistan is not one of them.

Finally, I found that although there was much academic work on specific refugee populations (identity, history, flight, integration, etc.), there was seldom any work that compared different refugee populations with one another. Each asylum seeker reality will be different, that is given, but in comparing and contrasting two populations there are striking differences in various areas. Not only that, but in order to further the effectiveness of international legislation and international institutions, it is vital to learn from the shortcomings of the system, as well as highlighting the progress that has been made. It is for this reason that the majority of the concluding chapters of this thesis focus on the similarities and differences of both communities and their respective asylum seeker journeys to Turkey.

1.3 Methodology

Since this thesis focuses on exploring the asylum-seeker journeys of the Hazara and the Uyghur communities, it depends heavily on a wide variety of different sources. For the introduction and history of each community, the majority of what I reference is previously written scholarly articles and books. In addition, specifically in the section on Afghan history, I do also reference a very informing Way Press

¹ Thomas Barfield, "Afghanistan is Not the Balkans: Ethnicity and Its Political Consequence from a Central Asian Perspective", *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, Vol. 4, 2-8, (2005), p. 2-3.

² *Ibid.*

International Productions documentary on the country's Hazara population, entitled: *Afghanistan, Messengers from a Dark Past*. In the sections that follow, where there is focus on history or on legislation (both national and international), I use primary historical documents that have been well-preserved in various online databases, as well as critical pieces of national and international law. In contrast, regarding the most recent developments, I tend to refer to articles and first-hand video documentation from reputed news sources, such as the BBC, Vox and The Diplomat.

In addition, I would like to note that (especially regarding more recent developments in concluding Chapter 6) I will be drawing conclusions from personal experiences. From 2017 to 2018, I had the opportunity to work as an intern at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Turkey office as part of the Livelihoods and Refugee Status Determination Units. Over the course of the last year, I further expanded my professional experience in advocacy and persecution as an Erasmus trainee at the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). While there, I worked closely with World Uyghur Congress (WUC) officials and focused on other areas of dispute in Asia, including China's Belt and Road Initiative.

1.4 Organization of the Thesis

Chapter 2 explores the importance of ethno-socio-cultural identity, and also attempts to pin-point important political events that pushed Hazaras and Uyghurs to face persecution based on elements of their identity. Therefore, I use more of an anthropological lens when defining how both communities identify themselves, and how each is distinct from their respective mainstream culture. In the case of the Uyghurs, this distinction is made with the autonomous mainstream culture of the People's Republic of China, that of the Han Chinese. For Hazaras, the distinction between them and various communities in Afghanistan has largely to do with their religious sect, and less to do with ethnicity. After, it is pertinent to examine history and recent events in order to develop sufficient understanding from where persecution of each group begins and continues. In identifying these political turning

points, this chapter attempts to locate moments of identity-building of the Hazara and the Uyghur communities. In order to most effectively explain the journey of each group, the sections are ordered so that identity will be immediately followed by the respective community's historical background.

Chapter 3 will focus on the importance of international institutions, the application of international legal mechanisms, Turkish legislation, geopolitics and geography. The aim of the chapter is to explore each group's path from asylum seeker to refugee by examining international legislative protocols, the United Nations, and Turkish national legal remedies that are available to each community. In doing so, it will show how international regimes and varying levels of legislation (or lack thereof) have the ability to alter the asylum seeker journeys of Uyghurs and Hazaras. Two other important aspects that can lead to additional limitations of an asylum seeker's path are geopolitical power and economic trade. Afghanistan's geopolitical power has little to do with refugee status in the case of Hazara individuals. Therefore, the Hazara asylum seeker path to initial temporary protection in Turkey usually involves a straight-forward request, and direct application of the 1951 Geneva Convention (and 1967 Protocol). However, for Uyghurs such an option is far from reality. Given how recent and ongoing the persecution of Uyghurs is, ultimately, they are pushed to creatively craft a path of flight without access to initial protection under the 1951 Convention or the assistance of UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency. Finally, to segue into Chapter 4 of the thesis, I examine and categorize (political, ethnic, cultural, etc.) the type of persecution of which Hazaras and Uyghurs are subject to their countries of origin.

The next chapter, Chapter 4, briefly examines how Hazaras and Uyghurs integrate into Turkish society upon their arrival. In doing so, important connections to identity and diaspora are explored. Then, based on these principles, the focus shifts to what implications this has for Uyghur and Hazara integration into local communities in Turkey.

In Chapter 5, I compare and contrast the major differences of Uyghurs and Hazaras leading up to, during, and after flight from China and Afghanistan. Therefore, the focus of this chapter is to connect the end of Uyghur and Hazara asylum-seeker journeys back to commonalities and differences among both communities, which stem from the main variables of: identity, historical regimes, international legislation, international institutions, geography and geopolitics. Not only is it country-specific history, but also the journey to Turkey, itself, in combination with current developments that will have an effect on Uyghurs and Hazaras as migrating communities. This chapter therefore delves deeper on the previous sections' focus on legislative remedies, geopolitics and the reach of international institutions, while connecting it all back to history and identity. In doing so, I compare and contrast major differences about Uyghurs and Hazaras leading up to, during, and after flight from their respective countries of origin, China and Afghanistan.

The concluding chapter of the thesis, Chapter 6, indicates some of the most recent events related to both Uyghur and Hazara migration. Then gives a simple summary of the main points of difference amongst both migrant groups. As a final thought, the conclusion stresses findings of the research which greatly affect the ability for asylum seekers to attain protection from persecution, including noticeable gaps in the applicability or reach of international legislation and institutions.



Figure 1: Map of Asia³

³ National Geographic. Available at: <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/education/classroom-resources/mapping/outline-map/?map=Asia>. Accessed 12 July 2019




Figure 2: Map of China⁴

⁴ Starr, F. (2004). Xingjiang: China's Muslim Borderland. Page xiii.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORY OF IDENTITY AND GROUNDS FOR PERSECUTION

Persecution-induced migration does not begin on its own. The process of growing animosity between societies or communities generally involves specific political events or agendas. So, in order to best understand why and how Uyghurs and Hazaras are persecuted and eventually flee from their countries of origin, this first chapter explores the themes of identity and important historical moments.



Figure 3: Map of Xingjiang⁵

⁵ Harris, R. (2018). Securitisation and Mass Detentions in Xinjiang. Available at: <https://thecessblog.com/2018/08/securitisation-and-mass-detentions-in-xinjiang-by-rachel-harris-soas-university-of-london/#comments>. Accessed 12 July 2019.

2.1 Who are the Uyghurs?

The majority of the Uyghur (also commonly written Uighur) population, an estimated 11 million people⁶, originate in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China, which is sometimes referred to as Eastern Turkestan. However, since political policy changes before the 1950s, there are an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 Uyghurs living abroad⁷. Of this 5-6 percent of the global Uyghur population, Shichor indicates that there are roughly 350,000 living in Kazakhstan, about another 100,000 in Kyrgyzstan and in Uzbekistan, and a few smaller communities in other Central Asian countries. In addition, although considerably smaller in number, there are an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 Uyghurs in Turkey⁸.

The Uyghur community is most notably different from other ethno-cultural communities in China based on their Mongoloid features and their Turkic language, Uyghur⁹. More importantly yet, the large majority of the Uyghur population identify themselves as practicing Muslims and in turn show their commitment to faith in their daily lives. Most follow a halal diet (refraining from drinking and smoking and ingesting pork), many dress modestly, pray five times a day and some follow the Sunnah¹⁰. These are all rather noticeable characteristics, especially when compared

⁶ Ondřej Klimeš, (2018, October 25), “China’s Decimation of Uyghur Minds”, *Asia Dialogue*. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/10/25/chinas-decimation-of-uyghur-minds/>

⁷ Yitzhak Shichor, “Net Nationalism: The digitalization of the Uyghur diaspora.” *Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, Politics, and Community*, (2010), p. 294-295; Kristian Petersen, “Usurping the Nation: Cyber-Leadership in the Uighur Nationalist Movement”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 1, (April 2006), p. 65.

⁸ Yitzhak Shichor, “Net Nationalism: The digitalization of the Uyghur diaspora.” *Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, Politics, and Community*, (2010), p. 294-295; Thierry Kellner, “China: The Uighur Situation from Independence for the Central Asian Republics to the Post 11 September”, *Writenet Paper*, No. 2, (2002), p. 12. <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/465e8a292.pdf>

⁹ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*. (New York, USA: Columbia University Press, 2007) p. 43.

¹⁰ Rachel Harris, “The Changing Uyghur Religious Soundscape,” *Performing Islam*, Vol. 3 No. 1, 93–114 (2014), p. 7.

with their Han Chinese counterparts and other indigenous communities in China. Furthermore, being that Islam is such an integrated part in daily life and considered a core part of Uyghur identity, any national legislation that denounces or openly pressures the practice of religion is therefore understood as a directed attack on the Uyghur people¹¹.

Although it is important to understand how Uyghurs identify themselves, it is pertinent to note how they are viewed by mainstream, Han culture and throughout the rest of China. Millward indicates that 1950s propaganda, which consistently referred to Han as ‘big brother’ and *minzu* (or ethnic minorities) as ‘little brother’, has continued to patronize national minorities, including the Uyghur¹². While no longer publicly used, such rhetoric continues to indirectly point minorities to their designated “place” in society, thus historic tension that once existed continues to exist.

2.2 “If you haven’t been to Xinjiang, you’re not a good Han!”¹³

Throughout history, Xinjiang has always been regarded as a strategic stronghold in the Asiatic frontier, optimally placed between Russia, formerly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and China. Before the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the region was more or less autonomous despite the ebb and flow of animosity and friendship between the USSR and China or regional Turkic

¹¹ Allès, Élisabeth, Leïla Chérif-Chebbi, and Constance-Hélène Halfon, “L’islam chinois, unité et fragmentation”, *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions*, Issue 115, 15-47, (2001), p 22. <https://doi.org/10.4000/assr.18153>.

¹² James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 349.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 310. “*Bu dao Xinjiang, bu hao Han!*” (as it’s said in Mandarin) was the slogan of Jiang Zemin during his tour of Xinjiang. As Millward explains “‘Hao Han!’ has a general meaning akin to ‘a real *mensch*’, but in the ethnically politici[z]ed environment of Xinjiang, it takes a more literal sense”. The call of the State for ‘Development of the West’ and incentivized migration drew a great many to migrate to Xinjiang.

oases. Even throughout the Qing dynasty local Turkic Muslim and Uyghur communities were somewhat allowed to manage their regional politics and lifestyle.

Despite Beijing's policies which restructured community administration, allowing for homesteading of Han in the region and reforming education, the implementation of most policies was successful in some ways more than others. In the mid 1880s, changes were made that stripped the highest-ranked local officials of their duties, replacing them with county and prefectural administrators¹⁴, and Confucian schooling was offered locally and free of charge (142). However, local village elders or clerks, *onbashi* (head of ten households) and *yüzbash*i (head of one-hundred households), remained as the overseers of domestic disputes and the politics of their communities. Mullahs and well-respected educated elders of society continued to use their knowledge to translate between Xinjiang communities and upper administrative officials from the Qing dynasty.

In contrast, where there was significant change was in the mass migration of Han individuals to the region under the homesteading policy. The political interest of regime officials was that the influx of Han individuals would encourage local Uyghur communities to assimilate to Han culture¹⁵. Even though the Dynasty was unable to attain mass cultural assimilation and strong regional control as it had originally set out to gain, the influx of Han individuals was enough to change the dynamics of the region for centuries to come. Despite the failure of the Qing to secure centralized control in Xinjiang, the Dynasty had commenced a number of policies that would (1) allow for mass securitization within Xinjiang and (2) mainstream national identity through widespread sinicization and mass cultural assimilation. Even after the fall of Qing power, the Chinese Revolution and then the establishment of Republican rule, the next generation of ruling elites of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued to pursue policy based on these ideas.

¹⁴ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 140-142.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

Throughout decades and even centuries under oppressive and repressive rule, the Uyghur people were not always governed but did in fact hold independence for multiple periods of time. The most recent times of Uyghur self-governance during the twentieth century is in 1933 and 1944. Leading up to the first instance in the 1900s of a united East Turkestan state, Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim communities in Xinjiang saw a heavy influx of new (Han) migrants and increased taxes levied in their regions. This led to furthered disdain for governing warlords such as Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren¹⁶. In 1933 rebellion against Beijing officials broke out, ending with the establishment of the Kashgar East Turkestan Republic¹⁷. The new republic lasted less than one year and then quickly fell back under Chinese rule. About one decade later, the next period of independence began with the founding of the Soviet-backed East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in 1944¹⁸. This second period of self-governance lasted 5 years (until 1949), when China adopted communism and USSR officials withdrew their support, instead aligning with China in its effort to regain control and reassert dominance over the East Turkestan Republic¹⁹. In both cases, leading up to and during these two periods of independence from the Chinese State, Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in the area went through an important identity-building stage. Aside from the fortification of their own ethno-cultural identity, such a process meant further distance from Han culture and an increasing dislike for the governing Chinese administration.

¹⁶ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 188.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

¹⁸ It should be noted that long historical trade routes with the Soviets were almost completely intact at this time and had been for centuries. In supporting the independence of the East Turkestan Republic in 1944, the Soviets were strategically backing in order to gain influence over the region under Chinese rule and thus spread the idea of communism. *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 194; Vox. *China's Secret Internment Camps*. Edited by Danush Parvaneh & Sigal Samuel, (2019, May 7) <https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/5/7/18535634/chinas-uyghur-muslim-internment-camps-reeducation>.

On the 1st of October 1949, Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and with it the adoption of communism. For centralized authority in Beijing, this meant the once-perceived threat of Soviet power now became a powerful neighboring ally. Under the rule of Zedong, for minorities throughout China (in this case Xinjiang), this period meant suppression of their quality of life. Previous centuries of rule over the Xinjiang region had been failures in comparison to the dominance that Zedong's administration asserted after reconquering the East Turkestan Republic. Careful and suppressive leadership of Xinjiang continued until Zedong's death. Anywhere from changing the Uyghur alphabet four times in a half century to purging of regional Turkic leaders to land reform and political re-education²⁰, rule in the region was secure.

It was only in 1978, after the death of Mao Zedong and the beginning of the reform era, that China as a country changed its isolationist policies and opened to the rest of the world²¹. Deng Xiaoping's leadership presented a considerable swing of the pendulum back to minority non-assimilationist policies—mosques were reopened, travel to Islamic countries was allowed. In 1984, the National People's Congress passed a specific minority law. It highlighted the need to stronger local autonomy, encouragement for promoting minority culture and language²². This new wave of openness allowed for those who fled Xinjiang in the 1950s and created the first diaspora populations, such as Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Bugra, to reconnect with the rest of the Uyghur population back in the homeland, Xinjiang²³. Although this cultural openness did truly create change in minority areas throughout China, an

²⁰ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 235-240.

²¹ Gardner Bovingdon & Nabijan Tursun, "Contested Histories". *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, 353-374, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp 2004), p 355.

²² James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 278.

²³ Işık Kuşçu, "The Origins of Uyghur Long-Distance Nationalism: The First Generation Uyghur Diaspora In Turkey", *Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu* Vol. 8 No. 16, 73–94, (2013), p. 74-82; Işık Kuşçu, "The Uyghur Diaspora in Cyberspace: Identity and Homeland Cause", *Bilgi, Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World*, Issue 69: 143–60, (2014), p 147.

industrial development boom began for the first time in region. For Xinjiang, this meant an increase of migrants to the region in order to harvest cotton and other crops.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia were given independence of their respective Republics, Uyghurs naturally thought there ought to be an independent “Uyghuristan”²⁴. This fact, in conjunction with dissatisfaction of minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet led the Chinese state to tighten its control over the regions. However, in exchange for heightened security (and with the hope of quelling future instances of separatism and ethnic dissent), the state promised economic development²⁵. The idea of the Great Development of the West indicated that the regional development would mean increased quality of life for locals (and indeed they did), but it also meant that Han migration to Xinjiang would continue. Reality was that, even though such development brought positive change, the Chinese administration incentivized Han migration to Xinjiang with offerings of land in southern parts of the region²⁶. With such a great influx of Han to the region (see table below), Uyghurs couldn’t help but take notice to the fact that they were becoming a minority in their own lands.

²⁴ Sean R. Roberts, “A ‘Land of Borderlands’: Implications of Xinjiang’s Transborder Interactions”, *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland*, 216-37, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 229.

²⁵ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 295.

²⁶ Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties”, *The China Journal*, Vol. 44, p. 65-90, (2000) p. 76-77.




Figure 4: Population of Various Xinjiang Ethnic Groups, 1947-2000 (Millions)²⁷

In addition, the “familyism”²⁸—‘big brother’ and ‘little [minzu] brother’—mentality continued to be used, upholding the 1950s propaganda as yet another societal dynamic between the Han and China’s minorities. Although often used (perhaps) unintentionally, this sentiment is often implied through the seemingly kind words of Han individuals to those more obvious in the comments of Chinese politicians²⁹. As

²⁷ Note from the original author, Millward: “Tend lines are interpolated from figures taken for the years shown”. Millward, J. (2007). *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*. Page 307.

²⁸ “Familyism” is a term that J.F. Billeter used to describe societal hierarchy in China, where ethnic minorities have the role of “younger brother”. Thierry Kellner further explains that in regard to traditional Chinese culture, the role of the younger brother is notably one of subservience, where the younger brother answers to the authority of the “older brother”—in this case, the Han. Gardner Bovingdon further explains that although this is a social hierarchical structure, it does indeed spill over into inter-ethnic relations, as well as the politics of Xinjiang. Bovingdon, Gardner, “The Not-so-silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang.” *Modern China*, 28 no. 1 (2002); Thierry Kellner, “China: The Uighur Situation from Independence for the Central Asian Republics to the Post 11 September”, *Writenet Paper*, No. 2, (2002), p. 9. <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/465e8a292.pdf>; J.F. Billeter, “La Civilisation Chinoise”, *L’histoire des Mœurs, Encyclopédie de la Pléiade* Vol. 3, 865–931, (1991), p. 912.

²⁹ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 349-350.

Bovingdon³⁰ indicates, the negative prejudice of “familyism” characterizes Uyghurs as less “civilized” and eventually finds its way into Xinjiang/East Turkestan politics, where which the Han hold power. For example, in former Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang Wang Lequan’s³¹ comments on the region’s educational development in the early 2000s, he says “Chinese-language education was necessary to ‘improve the quality of ethnic minorities’ and bring them ‘in step with the twenty-first century’”.

Along with the continued slander of the Uyghur population, the mid-1990s to the 2000s brought years of increased securitization policies for Xinjiang and a tipping point of tension between Uyghurs and the Han. For one, with the presence of the terrorist organization, al Qaeda to the south-west, Beijing viewed Xinjiang feared that ethnic tensions would turn into something greater. Then, in 1999 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened in Kosovo for self-determination of a Muslim minority, this deeply changed China’s view of its ethnic minorities³²—fearing that the same would come to be in the land of the Uyghurs and Tibetans. This began the CCP’s revisioning of the rights of China’s ethnic minorities, and led to crack down and mass securitization policies superimposed on these populations. Rising tension between the Han and the Uyghurs persisted. The carefully-crafted façade of continued economic development kept the international community from seeing true suppression happening locally.

In 2002, the Chinese PRC white paper documents on the 1990s were released and strongly alludes to wide-spread terrorism on masses of Han by the Uyghurs³³. As

³⁰ Gardener Bovingdon, “The Not-so-silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang”, *Modern China*, Vol. 28 No. 1, (2002), p. 57.

³¹ Cindy Sui, “China Orders End to Instruction in Uighur at Top Xinjiang University”, Agence France Presse (AFP), 28 May 2002.

³² James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 347.

³³ USC US-China Institute, “White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2002,” (2002, December 9), <https://china.usc.edu/white-paper-chinas-national-defense-2002>.

importantly indicated by Millward³⁴, most documented violence, especially that which is scrutinized in the white papers occurred involving small groups of Uyghurs who advocated separatist opinions³⁵. That being said, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City, China was able to push an agenda that would offer aid to United States efforts to preemptively stop terrorism. However, in doing so, Beijing requested American forces to support Beijing's national initiatives in squelching national terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang³⁶. In fact, this is how Beijing has provided legitimacy for its repressive policies on Uyghurs. After 9/11, the PRC's white paper gained much international coverage and support over what was perceived as China's "war on terror" in Xinjiang. This coupled with the increasing number small fights between individual Han and Uyghurs meant an easily carved path for the central administration to place restrictions on Xinjiang as a whole. Under the auspices of Xinjiang's autonomous title, PRC leadership was able to develop the region economically with top Han officials while pursuing securitization of the region's specifically of the non-Han populations.

While the CCP continued its stream of Han migration and pumping in strategic developmental plans, governmental policies on religious and cultural freedoms in Xinjiang given back in the 1980s seemed to be all but entirely erased. Religious education was banned for those under 18, restrictions for pilgrimage to Mecca was highly reduced, and there was an increasing push for the use of Mandarin almost exclusively. All of these were understood by the Uyghur people as full-blown attacks

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 324; James A. Millward, *Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment*, Policy Studies Vol. 6, (Washington DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), p. 23, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf>.

³⁵ This of course does not make violence, terrorism, even small-scale, any less wrong but it does give a more complete view on reality as opposed to terrorist attacks that targeted masses of Han.

³⁶ Thierry Kellner, "China: The Uighur Situation from Independence for the Central Asian Republics to the Post 11 September", *Writenet Paper*, No. 2, (2002), p. 23.

on what defined them as an ethno-cultural group³⁷—their Islamic belief and the Uyghur tongue being further marginalized by Han Mandarin and the CCP’s evident preference to atheism. Pressure continued to rise between the two ethnic groups.

Then in 2009, a peaceful Uyghur protest against Han Chinese discrimination broke out into violence³⁸. The new economic developments, although they had increased Xinjiang’s GDP, were not transforming into better quality of life for Uyghurs. The Han were promoted to higher-paying jobs, whilst the region’s natural resources had been grossly exploited and the majority of the Uyghurs were left behind tending crop fields and farming³⁹. In response to the violent outbreak, the Beijing government led a strategic widespread and invasive crackdown on the Uyghur population. This cyclical pattern of the violence of a few Uyghurs to the tightening of securitization policies and restriction of cultural practices that Beijing imposed has led and is continuing to lead to increased ethnic tensions with the Han.

In the last decade, Beijing has become more and more creative in finding motive for increased CCP presence in Xinjiang. With the public unveiling and launching of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, President Xi Jinping’s central government has the perfect excuse to further securitize XUAR and assert control as it begins its ambitious infrastructural project in the area⁴⁰. The BRI will run from the eastern city Xian through Xinjiang, strategically linking China to the rest of Asia, the Middle

³⁷ Colin Mackerras, “Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism”, *Central Asian Survey* Vol. 20 No. 3, 289–303, (2001), p. 296.

³⁸ Vox. *China’s Secret Internment Camps*. Edited by Danush Parvaneh & Sigal Samuel, (2019, May 7) <https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/5/7/18535634/chinas-uyghur-muslim-internment-camps-reeducation>.

³⁹ Bruce Gilley, “Uyghurs Need Not Apply”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (2001).

⁴⁰ Michael Clarke, (2017, July 18), “The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Xinjiang Dilemma: ‘Connectivity’ Versus Control?”, *The Central Asian-Caucasus Analyst*, <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13458-the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-china%E2%80%99s-xinjiang-dilemma-%E2%80%9Cconnectivity%E2%80%9D-versus-control?.html>.

East, Western Europe, and North and East Africa⁴¹. As the administration's repression of Uyghurs and increasing securitization policies—policies that almost directly targeted Islam—began to increasingly encroach on day-to-day life of Uyghurs and other (Turkic-Muslim) non-Han from the region, insurgency began. Tension-driven violence that had slowly spewed in the form of minor acts of ethnic violence were suddenly beginning to look more like planned terrorist attacks⁴². Two examples of such events are (1) a bombing in Urumqi and (2) the killing of thirty-three people at the hands of a handful of masked Uyghurs at Kunming's train station.

In response, under the region's secretary Chen Quanguo, “the People's War on Terror” began⁴³. In 2015, the government introduced new counter-terrorism legislation that intentionally criminalized Uyghur cultural and religious expression, thereby dubbing such acts as extremist or terrorist⁴⁴. The reality of this new law meant surveillance of Uyghur families through government-imposed homestays, where Han “relatives” were required to report on any behavior they dubbed as “extremist”. Suddenly bazar vendors were made to dress in soldier fatigues and had to undergo training in case of “enemy invasion”, Uyghur neighbors were compelled to spy on one another, surveillance applications installed on every mobile phone, and hijabs and Uyghur cultural attire was no longer allowed⁴⁵. Although, as strict and

⁴¹ World Bank, (2018, March 29), “Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors.” World Bank. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative>.

⁴² Rachel Harris, (2018, August 18), “Securitisation and Mass Detentions in Xinjiang”, The CESS Blog. <http://thecessblog.com/2018/08/securitisation-and-mass-detentions-in-xinjiang-by-rachel-harris-soas-university-of-london/>.

⁴³ Sean R. Roberts, “The Biopolitics of China's ‘War on Terror’ and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs”, *Critical Asian Studies* Vol. 50 No. 2, 232–58, (2018). Quanguo was the former Secretary of Tibet and is widely known for his repressive policies that were placed over the Tibetan people over the first decade of the 2000s.

⁴⁴ Rachel Harris, (2018, August 18), “Securitisation and Mass Detentions in Xinjiang”.

⁴⁵ Ruth Ingram, (2018, November 12) “Xinjiang: Life During a People's War on Terror”, *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/xinjiang-life-during-a-peoples-war-on-terror/>.

repressive as these policies are on their own, Beijing had future plans to intensively assimilate and wipe out an entire culture through the creation of “re-education” internment camps⁴⁶. In these “vocational training centers”, as Chinese officials call them, Uyghurs and other Muslims are forced to denounce their identity and then to recite the slogan of the Chinese Communist Party⁴⁷.

Since late 2016, there have been reports of people vanishing—disappearing in the night—facial recognition technology is widely used along with finger printing and body scans, as recently documented by multiple reports and in a Vice News video⁴⁸. There are checkpoints all throughout cities in Xinjiang and QR codes were attributed to each Uyghur home. The Human Rights Watch⁴⁹ reported that DNA tests began being mandatorily imposed on all residents in Xinjiang, and passports became increasingly difficult to obtain. International travel or communication with relatives living outside of Xinjiang meant highly increased probability of disappearing or being detained in a “re-education” camp⁵⁰.

⁴⁶ Adrian Zenz, “‘Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude’: China’s political re-education campaign in Xinjiang”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 38 No. 1, 102-128, (2018).

⁴⁷ BBC News, (2019, June 17), “Inside China’s ‘thought Transformation’ Camps”, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48667221/inside-china-s-thought-transformation-camps>; Rachel Harris, (2019, January 17), “Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang” How China Targets Uyghur Artists, Academics, and Writers”, <https://theglobepost.com/2019/01/17/cultural-genocide-xinjiang/>; Rachel Harris, (2018, August 18), “Securitisation and Mass Detentions in Xinjiang”.

⁴⁸ Isobel Yeung, (2019, June 29), “They Come for Us at Night: Inside China’s Hidden War on Uyghurs”, VICE News, https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/8xz3qg/they-come-for-us-at-night-inside-chinas-hidden-war-on-muslim-uyghurs.

⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, (2017, December 13), “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions”, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions>.

⁵⁰ BBC News, (2019, July 4), “Xinjiang: China, Where Are My Children?” <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48873934/xinjiang-china-where-are-my-children>; Rachel Harris, (2018, August 18), “Securitisation and Mass Detentions in Xinjiang”.




Figure 5: Map of Afghanistan⁵¹

⁵¹ UN OCHA. (2014). Afghanistan: Administrative Divisions.




Figure 7: Map of Ethnicities in Afghanistan (1)⁵²




Figure 8: Map of Ethnicities in Afghanistan (2)⁵³

⁵² Dennis McClendon, Chicago Cartographs. (2016).

⁵³ Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2009).

2.3 Who are the Hazaras?

Since the last population census in Afghanistan took place in 1979, all population estimates are based off of projections of the past. The lack of census-taking is largely due to war and conflict within the country that has been ongoing for the last thirty years. According to a report that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan released for 2017 to 2018, the country is home to an estimated 29.7 million individuals⁵⁴. Several sources⁵⁵ indicate that the Hazara population is between nine and nineteen percent of this estimate, meaning that Hazaras make up somewhere between 2.67 million and 5.64 million Afghans. In addition, there are one million in Iran and an estimated five-hundred thousand to six-hundred and fifty thousand living in the Balochistan province of neighboring Pakistan⁵⁶.

Like the Uyghurs in China, the Hazara are recognizably distinguishable amongst Afghan society based on their Mongoloid physical characteristics. Being that Afghanistan is almost entirely Muslim, religious sect within Islam is of great importance socially and over the last few centuries has played a divisive part in politics. This is a significant identity factor that sets Hazaras apart from the rest of Afghanistan's diverse ethnic communities, as the very large majority of Hazaras follow Shiite Islam. Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks and others mostly practice Sunni Islam, although Afghanistan is also home to a small number of Sufis and Ismaelitis as well. In terms of linguistic differences, Hazaras speak an oral language called

⁵⁴ Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan, "Final Population 1396", (2017), <http://cso.gov.af/en/page/demography-and-socile-statistics/demograph-statistics/3897111>.

⁵⁵ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, (2008, August), "Country Profile: Afghanistan", <https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf>; Ghulam Ahmad Waak, "A New History of Afghanistan", University of Helsinki, (2005), p. 4; Malik Ayub Sumbal (2013, July 4), "The Plight of the Hazaras in Pakistan", *The Diplomat*. <https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/the-plight-of-the-hazaras-in-pakistan/>; Mujib Mashal, (2011, October 6), "Pakistan's Minority Hazaras Live in Fear", Al Jazeera, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/2011105145451806959.html>.

⁵⁶ Malik Ayub Sumbal (2013, July 4), "The Plight of the Hazaras in Pakistan"; Mujib Mashal, (2011, October 6), "Pakistan's Minority Hazaras Live in Fear".

Hazaragi, which is a dialect of Dari but characteristically very close to an archaic version of Persian. The language itself is a mixture of words of Persian origin and others of Turkic origin. Historically, the Hazara people have held a very close connection with Iran and Iranian culture. Consequently, many Hazaras that did not return to Afghanistan in the early 2000s stayed in Iran.

Also playing a part in Hazara identity is the affinity for travel, which is largely linked to their somewhat nomadic ancestors. Due to historic cross-border population movements to Tajikistan, Pakistan and Iran, Hazaras have a tendency of voyaging between locations⁵⁷. Originally, Hazaras inhabited the mountainous area of Hazarajat in the central highlands of Afghanistan. They were (and continue to be) known for their ever-rich cultural heritage. Mazar-e-Sharif is said to be burial place of the Imam Ali, cousin of Prophet Mohammad and is considered an important city for Muslims. Another cultural hub for the Hazara community is Bamiyan. A city that was quite important during the Silk Road era, as it was on the main trade route which connected Western Asia to the East. It was home to and famous for its mystic Buddha statues which towered stories over onlookers, but for the Hazara, the Buddhas of Bamiyan represented the ancestors of their indigenous population⁵⁸. However, in 2001—under the earlier years of Taliban rule—the buddhas (then protected as UNESCO world heritage sites) were destroyed. This was but a continuation of past decades of discrimination, and yet another attempt by those in power to wipe out Hazara culture—to make a people forget who they are and how they identify themselves by destroying their connection to the past.

⁵⁷ Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo, “Afghanistan: Hazaras and Afghan Insurgent Groups”, (2017), p. 19, <https://landinfo.no/en/?s=afghanistan&land=Afghanistan&spraak=english>.

⁵⁸ Pierre Centlivres, “The Controversy over the Buddhas of Bamiyan,” *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*, no. 2 (December 31, 2008), p. 26, <https://doi.org/http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/992>.

2.4 Hazara History and Afghanistan

Over centuries, Afghanistan has been a central location between warring great powers. Whether it be between the British and Napoleon or during the years of the Great Game with the Russians, or the years of the Cold War between the Soviets and the Americans, this has meant that Afghanistan has long been a popular buffer or war zone. Although the rest of the country's ethnic groups took great interest in power of the region, it was not until 1892 that the Hazara became involved in ethnic political control of Afghanistan. Until the regime of Amir Abdur Rahman⁵⁹ began in 1880, Hazarajat had been a somewhat autonomous region, that had never been under effective centralized control⁶⁰. The Hazara had peacefully led stable lives as craftsmen or shepherds in the region and therefore had little interest in power politics of the rest of the country.

The establishment of the Emir of Kabul, and Rahman as its (Pashtun) leader, was the first time the Hazara began to face aggressive political and financial pressures. Being that they had historically been a people of the land, the Hazara resisted such demands. Amir Abdur Rahman was angered by their resistance and decided that since his demands of the region's Shi'ite population (the Hazaras) was not met, the only way forward was with the use of oppression and violence. Yet, despite Rahman's policy of oppression, the Hazara continued to resist and held onto their control of Hazarajat until 1893. Rahman fought every Hazara tribe, defeating them all, and incorporated Hazarajat into the greater Emirate of Kabul. The failure of the Hazara Rebellion resulted in the capturing and enslavement of about 10,000 Hazara men under Rahman's regime. In late October that year, these men were sold in order to offset the Amir's cost of quelling the Rebellion⁶¹. However, Hazara resistance had

⁵⁹ Sometimes also written as *Amir Abdul Rahman* in other sources.

⁶⁰ Thomas Barfield, "Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan", *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 37, 263-293, (2004), p. 278.

⁶¹ The Age, (1893, October 20), "Affairs in Afghanistan", (Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: 1854 - 1954) p. 5. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article197182456>.

made Rahman grow furious and vengeful. In response, he ordered widespread persecution of the Hazara that continued until his death.

Before this time, Hazaras and the region's ethnically diverse Sunnis had lived amongst one another in relative peace. Under control of the Emirate of Kabul, this was the first time the Hazara faced such calls for violence against them and outright disregard for their humanity as a community. Rahman decreed that Afghanistan's Shi'ites were infidels (a decree which would repeat itself later in decades to come). As infidels there were two options, either convert to Sunnism or face the consequences and very likely die⁶². Sunni clerics were sent to all cities of Hazarajat, where they were forced to destroy Hazara Shi'ite Qurans and pressure the population to accept Sunni Islam⁶³. Pashtun leaders were installed in the place of well-established and respected Hazara elders, where they implemented exorbitant taxes on all. Hazara women were by and large mistreated, harassed and assaulted. Homes were pillaged. Enslavement of the Hazara population became a normalized practice and also a widely accepted lucrative means of trade⁶⁴. Furthermore, land that had historically been owned by the Hazara was snatched and redistributed to Pashtun nomads, the Kuchis⁶⁵. The cities of the region, that were once home to the Hazara community, became suddenly filled with Pashtuns. Consequently, an estimated sixty

⁶² Hossein Sadre & Florence Gavage, *Afghanistan, Messengers from a Dark Past*, Documentary, (Way Press International Productions, 2007), 13:16.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Thomas Barfield, "Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan", *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 37, 263-293, (2004), p. 279; *The Age*, (1893, October 20), "Affairs in Afghanistan", (Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: 1854 - 1954) p. 5. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article197182456>.

⁶⁵ Christian Bleuer, "State-Building, Migration and Economic Development on the Frontiers of Northern Afghanistan and Southern Tajikistan", *Journal of Eurasian Studies* Vol. 3 No. 1, 69-79, (2012), p. 70; Thomas Barfield, "Nomadic pastoralists in Afghanistan: Reconstruction of the pastoral economy", *Present State and Perspectives on Nomadism in a Globalizing World*, Jörg Janzen and Batboldyn Enkhuvshin ed., 189-204 (Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2008), p. 193; Thomas Barfield, "Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan", p. 280.

percent of all Hazara individuals and families were displaced⁶⁶. Years later the Emirate of Kabul had fallen and the modern state of Afghanistan had been created under the leadership of Rahman's eldest son, Amir Habibullah Khan. The new leader formally requested in an open letter to Hazaras, that those living in exile return to Afghanistan⁶⁷. However, war and persecution had forever changed the Hazara lifestyle and community. Life after their return to Afghanistan would never be as it had before Rahman's rule.

In 1919, Afghanistan graduated from a British protectorate to an independent state with the signing of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty. Although this did change national political dynamics, ruling power still rested in the hands of the Pashtun majority. The decades to follow, were marked by various regimes changes amongst Pashtun leaders. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan managed to resolve internal disputes and govern itself for a number of decades without falling into civil war.

Then at the peak of the Cold War in 1979 things changed. The Soviets invaded due to heightened fear of perceived growing instability in neighboring Afghanistan⁶⁸. As part of the invasion, new leadership was aggressively appointed and the leader of the ruling Pashtun faction was killed. The Soviets attempted to conquer the country and force its population to submit to them—as they had done previously in other Central Asian territories. The result was widespread internal displacement of individuals and mass migration of millions of Afghans into neighboring Pakistan and Iran⁶⁹. Pakistan facilitated aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia to the *mujahidin*, in a campaign to drive Soviet forces out of Afghanistan. Although successful in the end,

⁶⁶ Minority Rights Group International, "Hazaras Profile," 2015, <https://minorityrights.org/minorities/hazaras/>.

⁶⁷ Amir Habibullah Khan, *Letter to the Hazara*, 1904.

⁶⁸ Thomas Barfield, "Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan", p. 282.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

what was left was ungovernable, war-torn remains of a previously independent nation.

With the absence of the Soviet rule, the *mujahidin* and other Afghans returned to their country. However, the previously USSR-backed Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was left in control of maintaining the country's fragile political order, with Najibullah as its leader. In the years to follow, a chain of events would lead to complete collapse of not only the USSR but also any sense of remaining political stability in Afghanistan.

In 1992, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the disorderly dismantling of the PDPA government along with it. As Barfield⁷⁰ indicated, the fall of the Kabul government then led to the inevitable fracturing of the *mujahidin* into smaller warring factions. Without an obvious strongly-backed leader, as respected individuals from each of Afghanistan's major ethnic groups separately vied for power⁷¹. In addition, with the dissolution of the USSR, global super powers who had been invested in the Cold War lost all interest in furthering their financial aid to Afghanistan.

Pakistan however, remained invested in the future of the country and focused its own efforts on political support of Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan. This eventually led to Pakistani support of the Taliban, which rose to power in 1994 after establishing governance in Kandahar⁷². The Taliban continued on to spread its rule across the majority of the country. Most of the population was relieved to be free of the anarchy of contending *mujahidin* warlords, and welcomed the puritan Islamic Taliban rule. However, not long after establishing rule in the country, a series of decrees were

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.283-285.

⁷² *Ibid*, p. 288.

made by the group's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar⁷³. Following Taliban control, radical Islamic Sharia Law was established throughout the country. The majority of the population was opposed to this radical foreign Islamic law⁷⁴. However, there was little that could be done, given the growing strength of the Taliban.

To the Hazara especially, the years that followed under Taliban rule mirrored those of the oppression and persecution under Amir Abdur Rahman's regime in the 1880s. As Shi'ite Muslims, the Hazaras were once again singled out as infidels—they were classified as a non-Muslim religious minority. In addition, their rights to practice the *haji* or religious pilgrimage to Mecca were revoked and pressures to convert to Sunnism came about once again⁷⁵. Seeking refuge, many migrated to Mazar-e-Sharif in the north—a religious city for its known importance to Islam as the burial place of Imam Ali, cousin of Prophet Mohammad. In August 1998, the Taliban waged a six-day war against the city and its majority Hazara population⁷⁶. What resulted was the massacre of between 2,000 and 5,000 Hazara and Tajik individuals⁷⁷.

This genocidal violence led men, women, children and families fled, to flee further than they previously had, to Bamiyan—the home of the infamous Buddhas built in stone. As aforementioned, in 2001 there had been an agreement between UNESCO and the Taliban to leave the Bamiyan Buddhas unscathed in Taliban persecution of the Hazaras. Despite that fact, Taliban force destroyed them just days later. Although

⁷³ Hossein Sadre & Florence Gavage, *Afghanistan, Messengers from a Dark Past*, 17:34.

⁷⁴ Thomas Barfield, "Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan", p. 288.

⁷⁵ Hossein Sadre & Florence Gavage, *Afghanistan, Messengers from a Dark Past*, 18:21.

⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-e-Sharif", (1998) HRW Vol. 10 No. 7 (C). <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0.htm>

⁷⁷ William Maley, "Afghanistan: An Historical and Geographical Appraisal", *International Review of the Red Cross* Vol. 92 Issue 880, (2010), p. 12; Hossein Sadre & Florence Gavage, *Afghanistan, Messengers from a Dark Past*, 20:42; Kenneth J. Cooper, "Taliban Massacre Based on Ethnicity", *The Washington Post*, (1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/11/28/taliban-massacre-based-on-ethnicity/efe15f81-abed-4e57-96f1-046cc59d1d48/?utm_term=.0c8563c75546.

symbolically Buddhist, the Bamiyan Buddhas represented an important cultural artifact that linked to Hazara folklore⁷⁸. The example of the Buddhas is but one of the Taliban's attempts to culturally erase the Hazara from the face of the earth.

Despite the Taliban's fiercely terrible control throughout the majority of Afghanistan, the group depended heavily on international drug trade and was otherwise isolated from the rest of the world for harboring terrorists, like al Qaeda⁷⁹. Being that the Taliban was beginning to lack financial support for further stability in the country, it turned to the Pakistani government and al Qaeda for funding. Following the New York attacks of 11 September 2001, Pakistan dropped its financial support as the United States declared war against al Qaeda and its terrorist supporters in the Middle East⁸⁰. Following shortly, the Taliban lost stable control of Afghanistan and has since maintained only a minimal presence in the country.

Although there is historical sectarianism amongst groups in Afghanistan, the start of modern-day sectarianism can be explained by socio-ethno-cultural communities living so separated from one another. Whether it be under Amir Abdur Rahman, the Soviets or the Taliban, numerous top-down decisions and decrees forced religious and cultural identity to define national political power. For the Hazara, what resulted is a low social status and cyclical political marginalization and economic deprivation⁸¹. In addition, the singling out of the Hazara Shi'ite minority to general historic policies of widespread pashtunization, were specifically detrimental to

⁷⁸ Said Reza Huseini, "Destruction of Bamiyan Buddha: Taliban Iconoclasm and Hazara Response", Wariko, K (ed.), *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, Bamiyan Special, Vol. 16 No. 2, 15-50, (April-June 2012), p. 8.

⁷⁹ Thomas Barfield, "Problems in establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan", p. 289.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Niamatullah Ibrahim, "Shift and Drift in Hazara Ethnic Consciousness. The Impact of Conflict and Migration", *Crossroads Asia Working Paper Series*, Vol. 5, (2012), p. 2, https://www.academia.edu/16729115/Shift_and_Drift_in_Hazara_Ethnic_Consciousness_The_Impact_of_Conflict_and_Migration

intercultural communities that had previously coexisted. They directly caused isolated social lifestyles where clan mentality and group identity led each group to pit themselves against one another, all the while living in fear of furthered national instability or violence on their respective ethnic groups. Largely due to a failure of Afghanistan's nation-state building, ethnic consciousness and cultural ties have been used to unite Hazaras in an attempt to create an over-simplified interpretation of political ideology⁸². As explored above, this is historically true in times of extreme ideological and political changes in the governing elites' policies in Afghanistan.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

CHAPTER 3

FROM ASYLUM SEEKER TO REFUGEE: APPLICATION OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE MECHANISMS

3.1 International Charters and the United Nations

Largely created due to the horrors of World War II and the ensuing mass migration of the European Jewish population, the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Statues of Refugees was created. The Convention remains the primary document that is used for international refugee protection, as it not only consolidated previous international legislative mechanisms but also has a comprehensive and clear definition of the term “refugee” (as seen below in Article 1A)⁸³:

For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who...owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or...is unwilling to return to it.

In addition, the 1951 Convention also delineates “...a number of fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization and *non-refoulement*”⁸⁴. Most important of these is *non-refoulement* of Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention that declares...:

⁸³ UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees”, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. 189, (28 July 1951), p. 137, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html>.

⁸⁴ UNHCR. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” (2010, December), <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>.

No Contracting State shall expel or return (*'refouler'*) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

The original Convention was initially geographically and temporally limited to those fleeing the European continent before January 1951. Therefore, individuals fleeing persecuted areas after 1951 failed to be recognized and were thus excluded. On the 31st of January 1967, the United Nations General Assembly formally adopted what is now known as the 1967 Protocol.

This vital amendment removed geographic limitation and allowed for universal coverage of the original 1951 Convention, regardless of region from where asylum seekers are fleeing⁸⁵. However, despite this amendment, there remain a number of countries which have yet to sign the Protocol and therefore do not implement it within their borders. In the case of other countries, some have signed the 1967 Protocol, yet do not accepted the new geographic limitations. Countries of this kind generally end up as countries of transit—where the asylum seeker applies for refugee status with the UN's Refugee Agency, UNHCR. In every case, individual persecution must align with one or more sections of the Convention in order to be officially recognized as refugees. After applying and being granted the status of refugee, the individual case is then evaluated for resettlement in another country.

3.2 Turkey & National Legislation

Last year, UNHCR reported that Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees in the world at about 4 million—a six percent increase since 2017. Of these 3.6 million were nationals of neighboring Syria and 400,000 were registered refugees and

⁸⁵ UN General Assembly, "Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees", United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 606, (31 January 1967), p. 267, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html>.

asylum seekers mostly from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia⁸⁶. For many, Turkey is a country of transit but for some it is their final destination.

One core particularity that greatly complicates asylum seekers applying in Turkey upon arrival is that despite having signed the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, Turkey has decided to maintain the European geographical limitation of the original 1951 Convention⁸⁷. As such, only migrants fleeing from persecution in Europe (should their case fall under Article 1 of the Convention) are immediately offered permanent refugee status in Turkey⁸⁸. For individuals from non-European countries of origin that apply, such as Hazaras and Uyghurs, this process varies greatly. When applying for asylum in Turkey, as their country of first arrival, the majority of individuals are granted a temporary refugee status, whilst they wait to be resettled in Europe and North America. Therefore, in the case of non-European individuals, the geographical limitation means that they most likely experience Turkey as a country of transit as opposed to a final country of destination⁸⁹.

In Turkey, since initial refugee status is granted on a temporary basis for the majority of today's migrants, there are generally two paths that individuals follow while they await resettlement. In the first case, there are asylum seekers that do choose to register with UNHCR, where they are (depending on their individual case) accepted and granted refugee status. Then, after becoming a recognized refugee, UNHCR vets

⁸⁶ UNHCR, "Turkey | Global Focus", (2018), <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2544?y=2018#year>; Daily Sabah, "UN Hands over Refugee Work to Turkish Authority", (2018, September 11), <https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2018/09/12/un-hands-over-refugee-work-to-turkish-authority>.

⁸⁷ UNHCR, "Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey", (2013), <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey>.

⁸⁸ Noah Arjomand, "Afghan Exodus: Smuggling Networks, Migration and Settlement Patterns in Turkey | Afghanistan Analysts Network", Afghanistan Analysts Network, (2016), <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghan-exodus-smuggling-networks-migration-and-settlement-patterns-in-turkey/>; UN General Assembly, "Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees".

⁸⁹ Ahmet İçduygu & Deniz Yüksek, "Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey: Reality and Re-Presentation in the Creation of a Migratory Phenomenon", *Population, Space and Place* Vol. 18 No. 4, 441–56, (2010), p. 442-443.

them for resettlement (as mentioned above, generally) in Western countries⁹⁰. Unfortunately, according to Arjomand, there are a number of Afghans (including Hazaras) that remain stuck in Turkey even after being granted refugee status and end up not being resettled⁹¹. In such a case, the fact that they do not go on to be resettled further West is largely due to restraints of country-specific refugee quotas⁹². In some cases, the quotas are so limiting that eligible, recognized refugees still have to wait several years before exiting the resettlement process and beginning a new life in their host country⁹³.

In the second case, there are a number of asylum seekers who arrive to Turkey unintentionally and/or illegally through the help of smugglers with the intention of continuing on to seek refuge in European countries. İçduygu and Yüksekler indicate that, of this group that enters Turkey illegally, there is a high trend in the number of individuals that then attempt to leave illegally with the help of human smugglers to a third country⁹⁴. It is very likely that the final destination of these individuals is a European country, where they hope to apply for asylum and be granted permanent refugee status upon arrival. Yet some of those who illegally and mistakenly arrived to Turkey by boat, such as Somalian's and Mauritanians, are unwillingly left stranded in the country despite full payment and promises of ending the journey in

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 449.

⁹¹ Noah Arjomand, "Afghan Exodus: Smuggling Networks, Migration and Settlement Patterns in Turkey | Afghanistan Analysts Network".

⁹² After the total refugee quota is decided by the respective nation at the beginning of each year, the quota is relayed to UNHCR. However, this total also includes a detailed breakdown of the number of refugees that a potential host country is willing to accept for resettlement based on the country of origin of the refugee in question. When in the process of resettlement, UNHCR strictly considers these limitations.

⁹³ Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Yüksekler, "Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey: Reality and Representation in the Creation of a Migratory Phenomenon", p. 449.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 444.

Europe⁹⁵. As in the first case, some will legally register with UNHCR and undergo the process to be granted temporary refugee status in Turkey while they wait for resettlement. Others opt to try their luck in the country with an illegal status for prolonged amounts of time, without applying for asylum through international institutions⁹⁶.

Arjomand suggests other individuals (including Hazaras and many others from Afghanistan) develop local connections and decide to make a new life in Turkey despite holding an illegal status—many without proper visas or any official documents at all⁹⁷. As Brewer and Yüksekler indicate, most of those stranded in Turkey end up doing the same, becoming part of the informal economy as irregular labor migrants⁹⁸. Such is the case for most Afghans and others that end up settling in the Zeytinburnu neighborhood of Istanbul, an important stop along the migrant transit route to greater Europe.

In the case of the Uyghurs, there is a national Turkish route which is followed instead of going through the United Nations channel. The Turkish government is known to have previously offer Uyghurs individuals assistance under humanitarian reasons linked to religion and culture⁹⁹. Some sources indicate that official passports, flight itineraries and other documents were prepared and offered to Uyghur

⁹⁵ Deniz Yüksekler and Kelly Todd Brewer, “Astray and Stranded at the Gates of The European Union: African Transit Migrants in İstanbul”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* Vol. 44, 129–59, (2011), p. 140, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0896634600005963>.

⁹⁶ Noah Arjomand, “Afghan Exodus: Smuggling Networks, Migration and Settlement Patterns in Turkey | Afghanistan Analysts Network”.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Deniz Yüksekler & Kelly Todd Brewer, “Astray and Stranded at the Gates of The European Union: African Transit Migrants in İstanbul”, p. 140.

⁹⁹ Işık Kuşçu, “The Origins Of Uyghur Long-Distance Nationalism: The First Generation Uyghur Diaspora In Turkey”, *Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu* Vol .8 No. 16, 73–94, (2013), p. 77.

individuals by Turkish diplomats stationed in Southeast Asian countries¹⁰⁰. According to the report, the document issued was entitled “Republic of Turkey Emergency Alien’s Travel Document” and had been issued to a numerous Uyghurs who faced oppression and persecution by the Chinese government. For other Uyghurs, it is likely that they found a way to be smuggled out of China and into Turkey. Then, upon arrival, they likely applied for Humanitarian Residence Permits under Article 46 (1) Turkey’s National Law on Foreigners and International Protection. As stated, under Article 46 (1)¹⁰¹:

Under the following cases...a humanitarian residence permit...may be granted and renewed by the governorates without seeking the conditions for other types of residence permits:... (b) where...foreigners cannot be removed from Turkey or their departure from Turkey is not reasonable or possible;...(e) in cases when foreigners should be allowed to enter into and stay in Turkey, due to emergency...in the absence of the possibility to obtain one of the other types of residence permits due to their situation that precludes granting a residence permit; (f) in extraordinary circumstances...

The issuing of documents and arrangements for travel on behalf of Uyghurs by Turkish officials was a source of great tension with China for quite some time¹⁰². However, in great contrast to the vibrant anti-China protests of July 2015¹⁰³ and Erdogan calling the CCP’s oppression of Uyghurs “a kind of genocide”, the Turkish government’s stance has since dropped its critical tone and even embraced Chinese

¹⁰⁰ Shannon Tiezzi, “Why Is Turkey Breaking Its Silence on China’s Uyghurs?”, *The Diplomat*, (2019, February 12), <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/why-is-turkey-breaking-its-silence-on-chinas-uyghurs/>; Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkish Help for Uighur Refugees Looms over Erdogan Visit to Beijing”, *Reuters*, (2015, July 27), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-china-uighurs-insight/turkish-help-for-uighur-refugees-looms-over-erdogan-visit-to-beijing-idUSKCN0Q10PM20150727>.

¹⁰¹ Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, “Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection”, (2013), p. 16-17, https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/law-on-foreigners-and-international-protection-lfip_913_975.

¹⁰² Humeyra Pamuk, “Turkish Help for Uighur Refugees Looms over Erdogan Visit to Beijing”.

¹⁰³ Shannon Tiezzi, “Uyghur Issues Cast Pall Over Turkey-China Relations”, *The Diplomat*, (2015, July 28), <https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/uyghur-issues-cast-pall-over-turkey-china-relations/>.

treatment of Uyghurs. In May 2016, about 100 Uyghurs were arrested as they attempted to flee to Saudi Arabia with forged passports¹⁰⁴. Although this is clear indication of the Turkish government's pivot away from reliance on the United States and potential interest in prospective lucrative to come from the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative¹⁰⁵, it also poses a problem for Uyghur asylum seekers.

For Hazara asylum seekers, a newly adopted refugee system in Turkey has meant that many are left in limbo. As in many countries, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) usually works closely with government officials to support population registry and refugee status determination through application of the 1951 Convention. Up until late last year, Turkey relied heavily on UNHCR to centrally register and determine refugee status for arriving asylum seekers. However, Turkey witnessed a great influx of persecuted individuals applied for asylum since the outbreak of the Syrian War and the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) decided to boost its capacity. According to multiple reports, around September 2018, UNHCR's previous responsibilities were officially shifted over to the Turkish migration authority, DGMM¹⁰⁶. In addition, one of major change in procedure since the takeover is decentralization of the registration system. Now asylum seekers must now first apply at a local level Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM). Furthermore, in the last few years, largely due to the massive influx of Syrian asylum seekers, Turkey has increased its

¹⁰⁴ Wang Jin, "After the Failed Coup: A New Dawn for China-Turkey Relations?" *The Diplomat*, (2016, August, 10), <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/after-the-failed-coup-a-new-dawn-for-china-turkey-relations/>.

¹⁰⁵ George Marshall Lerner, "In Turkey, US Loss Is China's Gain", *The Diplomat*, (2017, January 31), <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/in-turkey-us-loss-is-chinas-gain/>.

¹⁰⁶ Izza Leghtas and Jessica Thea, "You Cannot Exist in This Place: Lack of Registration Denies Afghan Refugees Protection in Turkey," *Refugees International*, (2018, December 13), <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/12/13/you-cannot-exist-in-this-place-lack-of-registration-denies-afghan-refugees-protection-in-turkey>; Daily Sabah, "UN Hands over Refugee Work to Turkish Authority," (2018, September 11), <https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2018/09/12/un-hands-over-refugee-work-to-turkish-authority>; UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, "Turkey," (2018, September 8), <https://help.unhcr.org/turkey/information-for-non-syrians/registration-rsd-with-unhcr/>.

focus on Syrians—drawing away attention which was previously allotted to Afghans, Iranians, Uyghurs, and others¹⁰⁷.

Although handing-over of refugee registration is an important step for the Turkish government, especially given the total number of asylum seekers that are currently hosted in the country, there have been major consequences for new waves of incoming refugees. Such is the case with Hazaras and the majority of the Afghan population. According to a recent Refugees International (RI) report, many individuals claimed that since this hand-over, many faced significant changes in being able to register in a timely manner or at all¹⁰⁸. As RI indicates, without registering, these individuals are left without proper Turkish identification cards, which “...exposes [them] to the risk of arrest, detention, and deportation, and impedes their access to such essential services as healthcare and education”¹⁰⁹. In turn, as highlighted previously by Arojmand, this creates a need for neglected asylum seekers to look elsewhere—whether it be for work in Turkey’s informal economy, or the possibility of safe passage by way of a smuggler into Europe¹¹⁰.

3.3 Where’s the gap?

While the asylum-seeking process for most individuals of the Hazara community, the path to asylum is notably much more convoluted for Uyghurs fleeing from Xinjiang. Although the United Nations ambassadors have recently spoken out about mass detentions and the “re-education vocational training centers”¹¹¹ implemented in

¹⁰⁷ Izza Leghtas and Jessica Thea, “You Cannot Exist in This Place: Lack of Registration Denies Afghan Refugees Protection in Turkey”.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Noah Arjomand, “Afghan Exodus: Smuggling Networks, Migration and Settlement Patterns in Turkey | Afghanistan Analysts Network”.

¹¹¹ Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China Rebuked by 22 Nations Over Xinjiang Repression.” The New York Times, (2019, July 10), <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rights.html>.

Xinjiang, the force of China as a political superpower has likely meant diminished power of the UN agencies within China (despite it being a signatory to the Convention and Protocol). In the case of Turkey, the very fact that Uyghurs fleeing China have been directly given visas via Ambassadors stationed in South Asia implies the likelihood of this presumption. However, there are a number of other important factors when examining jurisdiction of the UN agencies in China. One of these is the reality that most neighboring countries to the south, are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.

These bordering Southeast Asian countries, like Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam, also generally lack proper legal terminology for “refugee” and therefore recognition of refugees or a system that will work with asylum seekers to arrive safely in a third country. In addition, this means that these countries are not legally bound to accept a national policy of *non-refoulement*. Therefore, it does not come to much surprise that Uyghurs are having specific difficulties in fleeing persecution once exiting China. As Australian Member of Parliament Andrew Leigh indicates, countries like Malaysia have given the explanation that they have not and (likely) will not become signatories in the future because “they do not wish to attract refugees from neighboring countries”¹¹². Furthermore, a valuable consideration in this process is the fact that China’s neighboring countries are not as wealthy or highly developed. In addition, with a vast number of refugees fleeing persecution in the region, such as the Rohingya of Myanmar, countries like Malaysia would have quite a bit of appeal due to their geographic appeal. These factors alone mean that accepting even a small number of asylum seekers could amount to much strain on the economic cost of proper education, health and housing for the countries concerned.

¹¹² Andrew Leigh, “Why Don’t Some Countries Sign the Refugee Convention?” (2012, September 12), <http://www.andrewleigh.com/3253>.

In addition to being non-signatory neighbors, these Southeast Asian countries rely heavily on China as a trading partner and are therefore incentivized to make decisions based on Chinese influence. Such has been the case in previous years related to Uyghurs traveling outside of China's Xinjiang. Ironically, despite the fact that China is a signatory to the 1951 Convention (and therefore to its *non-refoulement* policy of refugees), the Beijing government has requested that all Uyghurs in any foreign country be extradited back to China. Thailand, but one of the countries in concern, has honored such demands in accordance to a bilateral extradition treaty that the country signed with China in 1993¹¹³. In July 2015, Thai authorities forcibly returned 109 Uyghur asylum seekers back to China¹¹⁴. This was not, however, the first incident involving the detainment or refoulement of Uyghur individuals in Thailand. As the Amnesty International report indicates, in March 2014 Thai authorities directly targeted some suspected human smuggling camps in southern Thailand, detaining more than 300 Uyghurs¹¹⁵. In the months to follow, some asylum seekers died due to the incredibly bleak living conditions of Thai detention facilities. Over a year later, after calls from multiple countries to end the fowl treatment of detainees, Thai officials granted a group of 173 individuals to fly to Turkey, while extraditing another part of the group back to China¹¹⁶.

¹¹³ Amnesty International, "Between a Rock and A Hard Place: Thailand's Refugee Policies and Violations of the Principle of Non-Refoulement," (2017), p. 30, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/refugees-in-thailand-forcibly-returned-to-danger/>.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23; Human Rights Watch, (2017, July 6), "Thailand: Implement Commitments to Protect Refugee Rights", <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/06/thailand-implement-commitments-protect-refugee-rights>.

¹¹⁵ Amnesty International, "Between a Rock and A Hard Place: Thailand's Refugee Policies and Violations of the Principle of Non-Refoulement," p. 24.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*; Nurbanu Kizil, "173 Uighurs Kept under Detention by Thailand Arrive in Turkey", Daily Sabah, (2015, July 1), <https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/07/01/173-uighurs-kept-under-detention-by-thailand-arrive-in-turkey>; Radio Free Asia, ed. 2015. "Group of 173 Uyghurs Freed from Thai Detention Arrive in Turkey", (2015, July 1), <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/arrival-07012015160103.html>.

Even in places where the UN supports or takes an active role in refugee status determination, such as China's Central Asian neighbors to the West, there are other difficulties that arise. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded in the mid-1990s by China under the premises to curb terrorism in the region. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan became members. With the membership, each signed a pact that established control and stability in the region based on Chinese principles¹¹⁷. SCO offices with Chinese officials were established and remain in major cities like Bishkek.

Whether it be due the absence of necessary refugee legislation, national interest or Chinese pressures, the situation for Uyghurs seeking asylum in neighboring countries oftentimes ends the same—in *refoulement*. In conjunction, despite the United Nations' wide global reach, the international institution's actions remain very limited without country agreements for refugee-related jurisdiction. And sometimes (as in Central Asia), even if it is granted jurisdiction can be limited due to other bilateral agreements. Given the obvious lack of legislation and the harsh reality that asylum seekers face in Southeast Asia, it is of no wonder that Uyghurs would turn to their Muslim Turkish brothers at embassies and consulates abroad for aid. Furthermore, this reality is likely directly related to the fact that Uyghur asylum seekers are seldom processed through the UNHCR individual case system, despite their large communal presence in Turkey.

On the other hand, although many Hazaras have been processed through the UNHCR system in years past, the recent changes in Turkey's national asylum-seeker registration system have created great obstacles for the community. In stark contrast to previous years, where central registration was normalized and there was possibility for access to education and healthcare, the community now faces uncertainty. Overall, despite that Turkey still is offering aid, the focus from all

¹¹⁷ James A. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 337.

refugees to the majority Syrian refugee population is one major reason why Hazaras are now experiencing issues of proper integration post-arrival in Turkey. Without proper health care and education, younger generations especially cannot be expected to integrate well into Turkish society. Furthermore, this gap can be attributed to a lack in extensive national Turkish legislation and a centralized registration system¹¹⁸.

However, equally as important to both Uyghurs and Hazaras is that Turkey, although a signatory to the Convention and its 1967 Protocol, still retains the original geographical limitation. This means that even if Hazaras and Uyghurs are able to register and be granted refugee status, they will likely in the end only experience Turkey as a transit country. After months or perhaps years, individuals will be finally be resettled into a final destination host country¹¹⁹. Not only does this mean that neither population is likely to have fully successful integration into Turkish society but also that years of inability to access vital health care and education will also develop into bigger problems both for final host countries and refugees down the line.

¹¹⁸ Izza Leghtas and Jessica Thea, “You Cannot Exist in This Place: Lack of Registration Denies Afghan Refugees Protection in Turkey”.

¹¹⁹ Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Yüksek, “Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey: Reality and Re-Presentation in the Creation of a Migratory Phenomenon”, p. 449.

CHAPTER 4

ON THE GROUND: INTEGRATION INTO TURKISH SOCIETY

The previous chapters have explored themes of identity, history, persecution and law—all expressing the journey of Uyghur and Hazara asylum seekers as migrant groups. As the title suggests, this chapter will focus on the success (or lack thereof) of integration of these two groups in Turkey, their new host country.

Identity is an inherent part of who we are as individuals and therefore will always play a part in the way in which we connect with various cultures and societies. Since language is one of the main challenges for refugees in the integration process¹²⁰, logically, linguistic similarities of an immigrating refugee community with a potential host country will be a big drawing factor. One will look for commonalities in language and customs that are practiced. More important yet, refugee integration is generally understood on the basis of a *one-way process*, where the new immigrants are expected to adapt to the new culture¹²¹. Da Lomba notes that this *one-way process* does not focus much on the host society's responsibility to help adapt these populations¹²². In addition, as Alencar notes on immigrant integration in the Netherlands, many turn to social media and other local communal organizations that help facilitate the learning of new cultural and linguistic competences¹²³. Given this fact, many migrants (if given the choice) are very likely choose host countries of

¹²⁰ Amanda Alencar, "Refugee Integration and Social Media: a Local and Experiential Perspective, Information", *Communication & Society*, Vol. 21 No. 11, 1588-1603 (2018), p. 1597, DOI: 10.1080/1369118X.2017.1340500

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1589.

¹²² Sylvie da Lomba, "Legal Status and Refugee Integration: a UK Perspective", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2010, Pages 415–436, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq039>

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 1599-1600.

like-minded ways of life or those where preservation of their own culture is respected.

4.1 Does Identity play a role?

However, not only is it the ethno-cultural aspect of a community that is central to its identity, but also the connection to one's homeland. The idea of homeland is a core feature to the diasporan identity¹²⁴, especially in the case of flight from one's "...homeland [due to] foreign rule or for political reasons, [as] the homeland is not only an idea that helps [a diaspora] to preserve their diasporic identity but a sacred territory which needs to be preserved"¹²⁵. Furthermore, the grasp of homeland is what allows for successful transnationalization of identity. For the Uyghur diaspora, the understanding of one's homeland is vital.

For Uyghur asylum seekers, integration into Turkish society tends to be fluid. This is likely attributed to the sizeable Uyghur diaspora and the existence of different organizations that serve as a web to unite and connect new Uyghur migrants in Turkey. However, the success of the Uyghur diaspora took time to grow, build and learn how to connect with Turkey's nationals. The well-established connection between Turkish society and Uyghur migrants began to be forged in the 1950s by early emigrés like Bugra and Alptekin¹²⁶. It is clear that the written work and connections made with the international community by Burga and Alptekin led to furthered success for the new generations of Uyghur diaspora to come.

¹²⁴ Işık Kuşçu, "The Uyghur Diaspora in Cyberspace: Identity and Homeland Cause." *Bilig, Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World*, No. 69, 143–60, (April 2014), p. 143, <https://doi.org/10.12995/bilig.2014.6907>.

¹²⁵ Işık Kuşçu, "The Origins Of Uyghur Long-Distance Nationalism: The First Generation Uyghur Diaspora In Turkey", p. 74.

¹²⁶ Işık Kuşçu, "The Origins of Uyghur Long-Distance Nationalism: The First Generation Uyghur Diaspora In Turkey", p. 90.

For the Hazara, although identity surely is important, both for the individual and in the formation of community in a new host country, the idea of “homeland” seems all but absent. This is likely due to the complex way that Afghanistan’s ethnic groups perceive and experienced nationalism and decades of war. It is true that the instability and changing of governments and outbreak of internal and proxy wars has deepened the sentiment of separatism amongst groups, but this has not led to the much anticipate dissolution of the Afghan state. Well-known scholars, such as Barfield, indicate that while separatism has become increasingly prevalent amongst, the idea of splitting the country apart is not a reality in which any Afghan takes interest¹²⁷.

Despite the fact that Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, Hazaras and other groups differ significantly in political interest, these groups do not tend to gravitate towards nationalism based on clan or ethnicity. Barfield¹²⁸ importantly notes, that it is vital to understand how the case of Afghanistan is different from fracturing Yugoslavia of the 1990s, where ethnic minority after ethnic minority demanded and self-governance and independent statehood. Remarkably, nationalism has only been used as a driving force to band together as Afghans when (1) there is an external threat or (2) great likelihood of outbreak of civil war. If such threats are absent, these groups will go back to clan mentality and resume their disputes with one another, eventually ending in resolve.

It is in this way that Afghan historical understanding of nationalism also greatly affects this “homeland” identity. The reality is that Afghanistan is home to all, but after many years of war and countless waves of mass migration and internally

¹²⁷ Thomas Barfield, “Afghanistan’s Ethnic Puzzle”, *Foreign Affairs Magazine*, (2011, September/October), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2011-08-19/afghanistans-ethnic-puzzle>; Thomas Barfield, “Afghanistan is Not the Balkans: Ethnicity and Its Political Consequence from a Central Asian Perspective”, p. 7.

¹²⁸ Thomas Barfield, “Afghanistan is Not the Balkans: Ethnicity and Its Political Consequence from a Central Asian Perspective”, p.7.

displaced populations, how can a “homeland” exist? Generations were killed, and with them, their invaluable cultural identities and connections to Afghanistan and its land lost with them. As reported by UNHCR’s Afghanistan office¹²⁹:

“The majority of Afghan refugees remaining in these two countries have been displaced for thirty years or more, with the second and third generations of children born in exile with few links to their ancestral country and extremely weak support networks and coping mechanisms in place to facilitate their successful reintegration.”

Given these aspects, reality for one specific ethnic group is more complicated still. Not only is Hazara identity fractured due to great loss of its population that was displaced, killed or both due to Taliban rule. Even centuries before that, under Amir Amin Rahman’s regime and throughout various proxy wars, the Hazara were singled out due to their Islamic difference in Shi’ite belief. Logically, with the loss of generations and destruction of priceless cultural artifacts (like the Bamiyan Buddhas), the idea of “home” means a different reality. “Home” exists in a present setting, with those who are living and perhaps in memory of those who have recently passed. Although unsuccessful in his time of rule, Amir Rahman’s goal of driving the Hazara community to forget their identity has become reality. The repetition of occurring persecution, destruction and conflict that forced Hazaras to be displaced has meant that this community is unable to connect in the same way with the lands of its ancestors.

¹²⁹ UNHCR, “Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, (2015, August), p. 5, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1403771117_539ab7f79.pdf

Chapter 5

COMPARING & CONTRASTING REALISMS

This chapter of the thesis will explore commonalities and differences between Hazara and Uyghur asylum seekers and refugees. As topics of identity, history, international and national legislation and Turkey as a host country were previously explored, this section aims to compare and contrast the varying experiences of Uyghur and Hazara asylum seekers. Since the thesis is a combination of interdisciplinary topics, aims to maintain a balanced critical lens.

5.1 Differing Realities & Commonalities

As previously discussed, Ibrahimî explained that ethnic-consciousness of Hazaras is a symptom of Afghanistan's failed nation-state¹³⁰. I would like to add that it does not matter whether it be during the Soviet communist regime in bordering Central Asian republics, the Communist Party of China's rule in Xinjiang or the peak of Taliban power that followed in 1996, identity-building in times of struggle against oppressive governments is a common link between minority groups in each of these situations. In the face of persecution ethno-cultural groups often band together as a means to protect their shared heritage and secure potential preservation of their culture¹³¹. Thus identity-building can be understood as more or less an instinctual response to persecution whether it be amongst national ethnic groups amongst one another or, in the case of warring Afghanistan, outward towards a threat to the shared nation.

¹³⁰ Niamatullah Ibrahimî, "Shift and Drift in Hazara Ethnic Consciousness. The Impact of Conflict and Migration", p. 21.

¹³¹ Işık Kuşçu, "The Origins of Uyghur Long-Distance Nationalism: The First Generation Uyghur Diaspora In Turkey", p. 74.

There are a few notable distinctions between Uyghur and Hazara cases. Refugee legislation, international institutions and geography are vital aspects that determine the reality of arriving in Turkey and seeking asylum for both groups. However, the Hazara and the Uyghur have different experiences with the following three variables. The first is a very stark contrast of availability in binding international legislation or mechanisms which were created to protect those threatened or persecuted in countries of first arrival—such as the 1951 Geneva Convention. Such legislation appears to be out of reach for asylum seeking Uyghurs fleeing to Central Asian countries, due to strong economic and anti-terrorist influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The second is the jurisdiction of UNHCR in countries of first arrival, which seems to be all but unreachable by Uyghurs fleeing to countries such as Thailand or Malaysia. The third is geographical proximity of each asylum-seeking population to Turkey. While geography impedes relatively feasible or clear-cut paths of arrival for Hazaras, Uyghurs must find other means to flee the East Asia. In addition, securitization or lack thereof of borders is an important factor. For Afghans, although dangerous, the border with neighboring countries and then to Turkey is much less securitized than that of China. Given the surveillance technology alone, one can imagine how heavily patrolled and protected its borders are.

Even though some Uyghurs have successfully crossed the border into Central Asian countries, the chances of being sent back to China are great due to the aforementioned extradition treaties and overpowering influence of SCO. Others, who have tried their luck further south have faced troubles due to minimal UNHCR jurisdiction of refugee status determination or absence of even the slightest refugee-related legislation. Few have been met with compassion, more often than not ending up in detention centers before being extradited back to China. For Hazaras, given the closer geographic proximity, the ability to border hop over to Turkey is much more feasible although still relatively challenging.

Interestingly, although the process of arriving in Turkey is much more feasible for Hazaras than Uyghurs, cultural integration of Hazaras does not appear to be as successful. As explored in chapter 4, since the 1950s migrating Uyghurs have built a solid diaspora community in Turkey. Regardless of new technological developments and the transnationalization of the Uyghur cause, the successfully organized events and various publications of Bugra and Alptekin established a strong rapport between Uyghur and Turkish nationals. Additionally, being that Uyghurs have (1) found comfort in religious similarities and (2) that they are closer culturally and linguistically to the Turkish, it is of no surprise that integration is generally successful.

On the other hand, Hazaras lack such rapport with local communities, a factor that likely has much to do with the absence of an active diaspora throughout Turkey. Although this likely also has much to do with the complicated displacement of the population due to war and conflict over the course of the last four decades. As such, the already small minority of Hazaras are left disconnected from one another in neighboring countries, such as Pakistan or Iran.

When looking at the geopolitical reality in the world in conjunction with the policies of the Chinese state, deciding to process cases of Uyghur asylum seekers would likely damage important economic ties between China and its neighboring countries. Although purely speculative, it could also be presumed that if UNHCR were to process any Uyghurs seeking asylum that there might be retributions made by Beijing. Such a scenario would likely change the functionality of a variety of UN agencies that are established across Chinese provinces.

A common thread between the historical persecution of both groups is political policies linked to religion. In the case of the Uyghurs, this has meant unlawful securitization, surveillance and detentions, coupled with the involuntary denouncing of their faith and identity as Muslims. For the Hazaras, this meant forced suppression

and imminent physical violence, often times resulting in displacement or death. The richness in culture of Uyghurs and Hazaras, alike, has been diminished and marginalized to the point of no return. Political regimes have carved a path for each that results in low social status, poor quality of life, economic hardship and political suppression.

CHAPTER 6

RECENT EVENTS & CONCLUDING NOTES

Finally, the thesis will highlight the most current developments in Uyghur persecution. In addition, it will touch on Hazara refugees returning to their native Afghanistan and what this means for the country. Finally, there will be concluding remarks which will highlight the overarching themes of this study.

6.1 Current Developments

In 2002, after the demise of the Taliban, UNHCR commenced a campaign to assist Afghan refugees with repatriation back to their country of origin. Although definitely challenging, in May 2019, a UNHCR report announced that a total 4.4 million Afghans had been successfully repatriated to Afghanistan—even those who had lived in neighboring Pakistan or Iran for the past three decades¹³². Of course, there do still remain communities of Afghans who have yet to return, many of whom are apprehensive and fearful of their children being recruited as child soldiers¹³³. Hazaras especially face discrimination in their community within Balochistan province of Pakistan due to their Shi'ite faith¹³⁴.

¹³² Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Afghanistan-Pakistan: Refugee Woes – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, (2019, July 2), <https://www.eurasiareview.com/02072019-afghanistan-pakistan-refugee-woes-analysis/>

¹³³ Mahwish Qayyum, “Why Afghan refugee women in Pakistan fear repatriation”, Al Jazeera, (2019, May 9), <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/afghan-refugee-women-pakistan-fear-repatriation-190508203445898.html>

¹³⁴ Syed Ali Shah, “20 killed, 48 injured in attack targeting Hazara community in Quetta”, Dawn, (2019, April 12), <https://www.dawn.com/news/1475621>; Gayeti Singh, “Hazaras Targeted in Quetta”, The Citizen, (2015, May 28) <https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/1/3792/Hazaras-Targeted-in-Quetta>; Human Rights Watch, “‘We Are the Walking Dead’ | Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan”, (2014), <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/29/we-are-walking-dead/killings-shia-hazara-balochistan-pakistan>.

It has been over four years since the “re-education” camps have opened as places to politically reeducate “recalcitrant” or “terrorist” persons that are non-conforming to China’s high culture (political, identical, idealistic). In the last year, and perhaps even longer, relatives of Uyghurs traveling abroad to individuals involved in criticism of CCP policies to internationally acclaimed athletes or stars have been taken to these detention facilities. China has done its utmost to keep those living in Xinjiang from communicating with the outside world.

More than ever the situation is in dire need of proper response, as reports indicate recent ways in which treatment of detainees in Xinjiang has developed. This includes one from China Tribunal (2018, 2), which concludes that there is not substantial evidence supporting that the People’s Republic of China has ended human organ harvesting of prisoners¹³⁵. And while that alone is not indicative that Chinese officials mandate such on Uyghur and Muslim prisoners in Xinjiang, it does not negate the likely reality that these detainees are in fact or will be subject to organ harvesting. The China Tribunal went on to state:

Falun Gong¹³⁶ practitioners have probably the main source of organ supply...the concerted persecution and medical testing of the Uyghurs are more recent and it may be that evidence of forced organ harvesting of this group may emerge in due course.

This begs the question of how long it will take for the international community to be outraged enough to intervene in such a situation. It is not hard to understand reluctance given China’s secure position on a global geopolitical scale. With such

¹³⁵ China Tribunal, “Final Judgement Report - China Tribunal”, China Tribunal: Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China, (2018, December), p. 2, <https://chinatribunal.com/final-judgement-report/>.

¹³⁶ Falun Gong is a spiritual-mediation regime of Taoist Buddhists. Anti-religious legislation adopted by the CPC, as previously mentioned, has led to persecution of people of any and all religions. In the case of the Falun Gong, this community of like-minded practicing Taoist Buddhists has been persecuted by the Chinese government since the 1990s. In 1999, the Communist party pushed a campaign to eradicate the Falun Gong.

incredible power as one of the major members of the United Nations, the country has been able to refuse highly involved inspection visits from national and international non-governmental organizations—something that the international community would view as unacceptable and sanctionable, even, if China were not the country in which such atrocities are being committed.

6.2 Conclusion

To conclude, international immigration regimes and the application of international protective and preventative refugee legislation play a big role in determining the asylum-seeking journeys for both the Hazara and the Uyghur. It is evident that the fact of being or not being a signatory to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol have determined accessibility to initial proper protection in light of persecution. While the majority of the Hazara have initial access to these crucial aspects of the international human rights regime, the journey of the Uyghur proved to be far less certain.

The flight of the Uyghurs was made invariably complicated due to absence of international mechanisms that were created in order to protect asylum seekers, like the 1951 Convention, or overruling extradition treaties and national regulations. This was largely due to two factors. The first, a number of Southeast Asian countries are not signatories to the Convention and therefore do not abide by the terminology nor recognition of refugees due to various national interests. The second, China's economic and geopolitical power in the region have further influenced any regional independent nations to reconsider noble actions. Separately, Uyghur integration into Turkish society after arrival is generally successful due to two factors: (1) the existing closeness of Turkic cultural and linguistic aspects, and (2) comfort in religious similarities and freedom of practice.

Aggressive political policies over the course of centuries have had long-lasting detrimental effects that have resulted are outright persecution (sometimes in the form of forced silence and disappearances) and the threat of losing one's identity and

cultural link all together. The major commonality between the Hazara and the Uyghur is that it is the religious part of their identity that was singled out. In the case of the Hazara, their belief in Shiism, despite being devout Muslims. For Uyghurs, in light of the Chinese Communist Party's atheistic principle, this meant their general faith in Islam. The result of this persecution based on religious identity has meant marginalization even during periods of relative peace, and continued on to culturally damage the integrity of these two Central Asia minorities—threatening them to forget the link they hold to their ancestors. Due to multiple generations born outside of “native” Afghanistan, for Hazaras this means that most have already lost this link. The case of the Uyghur is a bit different. There is still time to preserve their culture. However, if the destructive indoctrination policies and separation of families under political power of the Chinese Communist Party continue, the youngest generation of Uyghurs will grow in a mainstream Han culture without knowing their true cultural identity.

On arrival in Turkey, both communities integrate differently. This has largely to do with variables in the identity of each—whether, in the case of the similarities, it be Turkic-ness or, in the case of differences, Islamic sect—and how they align with Turkish society. Regardless of all factors and the challenges of marginalization, the asylum seeker journeys of the Uyghur and the Hazara have meant navigating the inner workings of the international immigration regime. The the lacking jurisdiction of this regime in Southeast Asian countries has made the journey of one invariably convoluted, while (in the case of the other) accessibility has led to straightforward protection.

REFERENCES

- The Age. "Affairs in Afghanistan." 20 October 1893. (Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: 1854 - 1954) p. 5. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article197182456>
- Alencar, Amanda. "Refugee Integration and Social Media: A Local and Experiential Perspective." *Information, Communication & Society* 21, no. 11 (June 21, 2017): 1588–1603. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2017.1340500>.
- Allès, Élisabeth, Leïla Chérif-Chebbi, and Constance-Hélène Halfon. "L'islam Chinois, Unité et Fragmentation." *Archives de Sciences Sociales Des Religions* 115 (October 2001): 15–47. <https://doi.org/10.4000/assr.18153>.
- Amnesty International. "Between a Rock and A Hard Place: Thailand's Refugee Policies and Violations of the Principle of Non-Refoulement," 2017. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/refugees-in-thailand-forcibly-returned-to-danger/>.
- Arjomand, Noah. "Afghan Exodus: Smuggling Networks, Migration and Settlement Patterns in Turkey | Afghanistan Analysts Network." Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 10, 2016. <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghan-exodus-smuggling-networks-migration-and-settlement-patterns-in-turkey/>.
- Barfield, Thomas. "Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle." *Foreign Affairs Magazine*. 2011. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2011-08-19/afghanistans-ethnic-puzzle>.
- . "Afghanistan is not the Balkans: Ethnicity and its political consequence from a Central Asian perspective". *Central Eurasian Studies Review* 4 (2005): 2-8.
- . "Nomadic Pastoralists in Afghanistan: Reconstruction of the Pastoral Economy", with Appendix: *The Afghan Pasture Law 10 March 1970*. (Washington DC: Bank Information Service, 2004). <http://www.bicusa.org/en/Document.102626.pdf>

———. “Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan”, *Iranian Studies* 37 (2004): 263-293.

BBC News. “China, Where Are My Children?,” July 4, 2019.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48873934/xinjiang-china-where-are-my-children>.

———. “Inside China’s ‘thought Transformation’ Camps,” June 17, 2019.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-china-48667221/inside-china-s-thought-transformation-camps>.

Becquelin, Nicolas. “Xinjiang in the Nineties.” *The China Journal* 44 (July 2000): 65–90. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2667477>.

Bhattacharya, Sanchita, “Afghanistan-Pakistan: Refugee Woes – Analysis.” *Eurasia Review*, July 2019. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/02072019-afghanistan-pakistan-refugee-woes-analysis/>

Billeter, J-F. “La civilisation chinoise.” *Encyclopédie de La Pléiade: Histoire des mœurs*, 3 (1991): 865–931.

Bleuer, Christian. “State-Building, Migration and Economic Development on the Frontiers of Northern Afghanistan and Southern Tajikistan.” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 3, No. 1 (2012): 69–79.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2011.10.008>.

Bovingdon, Gardner. “Contested Histories.” In *Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland*, 353–74. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, 2004. (with contributions from Nabijan Tursun).

———. “The Not-so-silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang.” *Modern China*, 28 no. 1 (2002).

Centlivres, Pierre. “The Controversy over the Buddhas of Bamiyan.” *South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal*, no. 2 (December 31, 2008).
<https://doi.org/http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/992>.

- Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan. "Final Population 1396," 2017. <http://cso.gov.af/en/page/demography-and-socile-statistics/demograph-statistics/3897111>.
- China Tribunal. "Final Judgement Report - China Tribunal." China Tribunal: Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China, 2018. <https://chinatribunal.com/final-judgement-report/>.
- Clarke, Michael. "The Belt and Road Initiative and China's Xinjiang Dilemma: 'Connectivity' Versus Control?" *The Central Asian-Caucasus Analyst*, July 20, 2017. <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13458-the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-china%E2%80%99s-xinjiang-dilemma-%E2%80%9Cconnectivity%E2%80%9D-versus-control?.html>.
- Cooper, Kenneth J. "Taliban Massacre Based on Ethnicity." *The Washington Post*, November 28, 1998. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/11/28/taliban-massacre-based-on-ethnicity/efe15f81-abed-4e57-96f1-046cc59d1d48/?utm_term=.0c8563c75546.
- Cumming-Bruce, Nick. "China Rebuked by 22 Nations Over Xinjiang Repression." *The New York Times*, July 10, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rights.html>.
- Daily Sabah. "UN Hands over Refugee Work to Turkish Authority," September 11, 2018. <https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2018/09/12/un-hands-over-refugee-work-to-turkish-authority>.
- da Lomba, Sylvie. "Legal Status and Refugee Integration: a UK Perspective", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Volume 23, Issue 4, December 2010, Pages 415–436, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq039>
- Gavage, Florence and Hossein Sadre. *Afghanistan, Messengers from a Dark Past*. Documentary. Way Press International Productions, 2007.

Gilley, Bruce. “‘Uyghurs Need Not Apply.’” *Far Eastern Economic Review*. (2001).

Harris, Rachel. “Cultural Genocide in Xinjiang: How China Targets Uyghur Artists, Academics, and Writers.” *The Globe Post*, January 17, 2019. <https://theglobepost.com/2019/01/17/cultural-genocide-xinjiang/>.

———. “Securitisation and Mass Detentions in Xinjiang” *The CESS Blog*, August 18, 2018. <http://thecessblog.com/2018/08/securitisation-and-mass-detentions-in-xinjiang-by-rachel-harris-soas-university-of-london/>.

———. “The Changing Uyghur Religious Soundscape.” *Performing Islam* 3, no. 1 (2014): 93–114. https://doi.org/10.1386/pi.3.1-2.101_1.

Human Rights Watch. “Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-e-Sharif.” *Hrw.Org* 10, no. 7 (C) (November 1998). <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0.htm>.

———. “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions,” December 13, 2017. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions>.

———. “Thailand: Implement Commitments to Protect Refugee Rights,” July 6, 2017. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/06/thailand-implement-commitments-protect-refugee-rights>.

———. “‘We Are the Walking Dead’ | Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan,” June 29, 2014. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/29/we-are-walking-dead/killings-shia-hazara-balochistan-pakistan>.

Huseini, Syed Reza. “Destruction of Bamiyan Buddha: Taliban Iconoclasm and Hazara Response”, Wariko, K (ed.), *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, Bamiyan Special, Vol. 16 No. 2, (April-June 2012): 15-50.

Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. "Shift and Drift in Hazara Ethnic Consciousness. The Impact of Conflict and Migration." *Crossroads Asia Working Paper Series* 5, no. 2192–6034 (September 27, 2012).

https://www.academia.edu/16729115/Shift_and_Drift_in_Hazara_Ethnic_Consciousness._The_Impact_of_Conflict_and_Migration.

İçduygu, Ahmet, and Deniz Yüksek. "Rethinking Transit Migration in Turkey: Reality and Re-Presentation in the Creation of a Migratory Phenomenon." *Population, Space and Place* 18, no. 4 (November 26, 2010): 441–56.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.633>.

Ingram, Ruth. "Xinjiang: Life During a People's War on Terror." *The Diplomat*, November 16, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/xinjiang-life-during-a-peoples-war-on-terror/>.

Jin, Wang. "After the Failed Coup: A New Dawn for China-Turkey Relations?" *The Diplomat*, August 11, 2016. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/after-the-failed-coup-a-new-dawn-for-china-turkey-relations/>.

Kellner, Thierry. "China: The Uighur Situation from Independence for the Central Asian Republics to the Post 11 September," May 2002.
<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/465e8a292.pdf>.

Khan, Amir Habibullah. Letter to Hazara community, November 20, 1904.
<http://www.hazara.net/2013/04/letter-of-amir-habibullah-khan-1901-1919/>.

Kizil, N. (2015). "173 Uighurs Kept under Detention by Thailand Arrive in Turkey." *Daily Sabah*. July 1, 2015.
<https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/07/01/173-uighurs-kept-under-detention-by-thailand-arrive-in-turkey>.

Klimeš, O. (2018). "China's Decimation of Uyghur Minds." *Asia Dialogue*, October 25, 2018. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/10/25/chinas-decimation-of-uyghur-minds/>.

Kizil, Nurbanu. "173 Uighurs Kept under Detention by Thailand Arrive in Turkey." *Daily Sabah*, July 1, 2015.

<https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2015/07/01/173-uyghurs-kept-under-detention-by-thailand-arrive-in-turkey>.

Klimeš, Ondřej. "China's Decimation of Uyghur Minds." *Asia Dialogue*, October 25, 2018. <https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/10/25/chinas-decimation-of-uyghur-minds/>.

Kuşçu, Işık. "The Uyghur Diaspora in Cyberspace: Identity and Homeland Cause." *Bilig, Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkish World*, no. 69 (April 28, 2014): 143–60. <https://doi.org/10.12995/bilig.2014.6907>.

———. "The Origins Of Uyghur Long-Distance Nationalism: The First Generation Uyghur Diaspora In Turkey." *Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu* 8, no. 16 (2013): 73–94.

Leghtas, Izza, and Jessica Thea. "You Cannot Exist in This Place: Lack of Registration Denies Afghan Refugees Protection in Turkey." Edited by Refugees International, December 13, 2018. <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/12/13/you-cannot-exist-in-this-place-lack-of-registration-denies-afghan-refugees-protection-in-turkey>.

Leigh, Andrew. "Why Don't Some Countries Sign the Refugee Convention?" September 12, 2012. <http://www.andrewleigh.com/3253>.

Lerner, George Marshall. "In Turkey, US Loss Is China's Gain." *The Diplomat*, January 31, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/in-turkey-us-loss-is-chinas-gain/>.

Library of Congress Federal Research Division. "Country Profile: Afghanistan," August 2008. <https://www.loc.gov/r/r/frd/cs/profiles/Afghanistan.pdf>.

Mackerras, Colin. "Xinjiang at the Turn of the Century: The Causes of Separatism." *Central Asian Survey* 20, no. 3 (September 2001): 289–303. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930120095321>.

Maley, William. "Afghanistan: An Historical and Geographical Appraisal." *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 880 (December 2010). <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1816383111000154>.

Mashal, Mujib. "Pakistan's Minority Hazaras Live in Fear." Al Jazeera, October 5, 2011. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/2011105145451806959.html>.

Millward, James A. *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*. New York, USA: Columbia University Press, 2007.

Millward, James A. "Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment." Edited by Policy Studies. East-West Center Washington, 2004. <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf>.

Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, "Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection," 2013. https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/law-on-foreigners-and-international-protection-lfip_913_975.

Minority Rights Group International. "Hazaras Profile," 2015. <https://minorityrights.org/minorities/hazaras/>.

Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, Landinfo. "Afghanistan: Hazaras and Afghan Insurgent Groups." Landinfo, October 3, 2016.

Pamuk, Humeyra. "Turkish Help for Uighur Refugees Looms over Erdogan Visit to Beijing." Reuters, July 27, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-china-uighurs-insight/turkish-help-for-uighur-refugees-looms-over-erdogan-visit-to-beijing-idUSKCN0Q10PM20150727>.

Petersen, Kristian. "Usurping the Nation: Cyber-Leadership in the Uighur Nationalist Movement1." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 26, no. 1 (April 2006): 63–73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000600738681>.

Qayyum, Mahwish. "Why Afghan Refugee Women in Pakistan Fear Repatriation." *Al Jazeera*, May 9, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/afghan-refugee-women-pakistan-fear-repatriation-190508203445898.html>.

Radio Free Asia, ed. "Group of 173 Uyghurs Freed From Thai Detention Arrive in Turkey," July 1, 2015. <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/arrival-07012015160103.html>.

Roberts, Sean R. "A 'Land of Borderlands': Implications of Xinjiang's Transborder Interactions." In *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, 216–37. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004.

———. "The Biopolitics of China's 'War on Terror' and the Exclusion of the Uyghurs." *Critical Asian Studies* 50, no. 2 (March 22, 2018): 232–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2018.1454111>.

Shah, Syed Ali. "20 Killed, 48 Injured in Attack Targeting Hazara Community in Quetta." *Dawn*, April 12, 2019. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1475621>.

Shichor, Yitzhak. "Net Nationalism: The Digitalization of the Uyghur Diaspora." *Diasporas in the New Media Age: Identity, Politics, and Community*. (2010): 291-316.

Singh, Gayeti. "Hazaras Targeted in Quetta." *The Citizen*, May 28, 2015. <https://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/1/3792/Hazaras-Targeted-in-Quetta>.

Sui, Cindy. "China Orders End to Instruction in Uighur at Top Xinjiang University". *Agence France Presse (AFP)*, 28 May 2002.

Sumbal, Malik Ayub. "The Plight of the Hazaras in Pakistan." *The Diplomat*, July 4, 2013. <https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/the-plight-of-the-hazaras-in-pakistan/>.

Tiezzi, Shannon. "Why Is Turkey Breaking Its Silence on China's Uyghurs?" *The Diplomat*, March 5, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/why-is-turkey-breaking-its-silence-on-chinas-uyghurs/>.

———. “Uyghur Issues Cast Pall Over Turkey-China Relations.” *The Diplomat*, July 28, 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/uyghur-issues-cast-pall-over-turkey-china-relations/>.

UN General Assembly, *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html>.

UN General Assembly, *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html>.

UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency. “Turkey | Global Focus.”, 2018. <http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2544?y=2018#year>.

———. “Turkey,” September 8, 2018. <https://help.unhcr.org/turkey/information-for-non-syrians/registration-rsd-with-unhcr/>.

———. “Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” 2015. http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1403771117_539ab7f79.pdf.

———. “Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey,” 2013. <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey>.

———. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” December 2010. <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>.

USC US-China Institute. “White Paper on China’s National Defense in 2002 | US-China Institute,” December 9, 2002. <https://china.usc.edu/white-paper-chinas-national-defense-2002>.

Vox. “China’s Secret Internment Camps.” YouTube Video. Edited by Danush Parvaneh and Sigal Samuel. *Vox*, May 7, 2019.

<https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/5/7/18535634/chinas-ughur-muslim-internment-camps-reeducation>.

World Bank. "Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors." World Bank, 2019. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative>.

Yeung, Isobel. "They Come For Us at Night: Inside China's Hidden War on Uighurs." VICE News, June 27, 2019. https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/8xz3qg/they-come-for-us-at-night-inside-chinas-hidden-war-on-muslim-ughurs.

Yükseker, Deniz, and Kelly Todd Brewer. "Astray and Stranded at the Gates of The European Union: African Transit Migrants in İstanbul." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 44 (2011): 129–59. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0896634600005963>.

Zenz, Adrian. "'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude': China's political re-education campaign in Xinjiang." *Central Asian Survey*, 38 (1), (2018): 102-128. doi: 10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997.

A. TRKE ZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu Yksek lisans tezinin odaklandığı nokta, uluslararası mlteci rejimlerinin iki Orta Asyalı sığınmacı toplumun, zerinde nasıl etki ettiğini incelemektir; Uygurlar ve Hazara Afganları. eşitli lkede mlteceler, uluslararası hukuk ve varış sonrası btnleşme konularında birçok akademik alışma yapılmış olmakla birlikte, benim araştırmalarım sonucu, bir boşluk olduğı açığa çıktı. Kken lkelerinin politik gelişmelerinin, bir grubun kimliğine dayalı nfus zulmne nasıl byk lde katkıda bulunduğunu da dâhil etmek şöyle dursun, bir lkede iki mlteci grubunu apraz inceleyen nadiren makaleler vardı.

Trkiye, geçtiğimiz yarım on yıllık srete, siyasi, ya da diğerk zulm biimlerinden kaçarak, sayıları bir noktada 4,5 milyonu bulan sığınmacılar iin byk bir merkeze dnşmştr. Bu faktr gz nne alındığında, Trkiye'yi ev sahibi lke olarak semek akla yatkın geldi. Bunun yanı sıra, Suriye Savaşı'nın başlamasından bu yana, Suriyeli mlteceilerin byk akını gz nne alındığında, Trkiye'de zulmden kaçan daha kk etno-kltrel topluluklara odaklanmayı ok daha ilgi ekici buldum. Bu sebeple bu tez, Trkiye'ye geliş ve geldikten sonra Uygur ve Hazarlı sığınmacıların ortaya ıkan durumlarına bir rnek alışmasını sunmaktadır.

Bunu yaparken, bu rnek olay alışmasının temel amacı, uluslararası mevzuatın ve uluslararası kurumların yargı yetkisinin Uygur ve Hazara mlteci yolculuklarının Trkiye'ye sığınmacı olarak gelmeden nce, sırasında ve sonrasında g seyahatlerini nasıl etkilediğini incelemektir. Bunu yaparken, sadece her grubun kimliğini araştırmak değıl, aynı zamanda siyasal politikaların iki grubun da on yıllardır sren uğradıkları zulmn nasıl şekillendirdiğı de nemlidir. Bunun yanı sıra bu tez, uluslararası rejimlerin her iki grubun gnde nasıl bir rol oynadığını daha iyi anlamak iin ilgili uluslararası mevzuatı, ulusal Trk mevzuatını ve jeopolitik gc incelemektedir.

Bu nedenle, ilk blm her bir grubun kltrel ve etnik kimliğinin ayrımını ele almaktadır. Her iki grup iin bu, belirgin Moğolit fiziksel zelliklerini

vurgulamaktadır. Hem Uygurlar (Sünni) hem de Hazaralar (Şii), İslami inançlarıyla on yıllardır süren bir bağlantıya sahiptir.

Uygurlar konusunda zulüm, büyük ölçüde çeşitli hanedanların merkezi otoritesine ve Sincan bölgesi üzerinde kontrol altına almak için liderliğe duyulan ihtiyaçtan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bölgenin kendisi Çin ile Rusya (daha önce SSCB) arasında bir tampon bölge olarak görüldü ve bu nedenle potansiyel ihtilaftan Çin'in batısında toprakların stratejik bir parçası olarak hizmet etti. Her ne kadar Sincan'ın kontrolü altına alınması ve bunun sürdürülmesi zor bir alan olduğu biliniyor olmasına rağmen (büyük ölçüde kurak iklimi nedeniyle), Çin'in politik liderleri ve yöneticileri yüzyıllar boyunca onu ele geçirmeye çalışmaktan vazgeçemediler.

Zulüm temelinde, politikaların çoğu aslında Uygur kültürünün Han ana kültürüne kıyasla varyasyonu ile bağlantılı. Geleneksel Çin kültüründe görüldüğü gibi, Çin'in etnik azınlıkları (minzu) “küçük erkek kardeş” rolünü üstlenirken, Han “büyük erkek kardeş” rolünü üstlenir. Bu sadece sosyal bir hiyerarşiyi temsil ediyor gibi görünse de, hem yerel hem de ulusal düzeyde politikaya yayılma var. Uygur (ve Çin'deki Tibetliler gibi diğer azınlıklar) için bu güç dinamiği, otoritenin hem sosyal hem de politik olarak nasıl görüldüğüne büyük ölçüde katkıda bulunur. Bu gerçek göz önüne alındığında, Uygurlar, düşünce ve kültür bakımından farklılık gösterdikleri için kültürel olarak geriye dönük olarak görülüyor -Han'ın yaptığı gibi Konfüçyüs ideolojisini takip etmiyorlar ve kendi dillerini, Uygurca'yı kullanıyorlar. Ayrıca, Uygurların Sünni Müslümanlar olarak sahip oldukları güçlü kimlikleri göz önüne alındığında, bu Çin Komünist Partisi'nin (ÇKP) ateist ilkeleriyle doğrudan çelişiyor.

Buradan hareketle, Qinq Hanedanından (ve öncesinden) bu yana çeşitli siyasi rejimler farklı şekillerde bölgeyi Çinlileştirmeye çalışmışlardır. Bu girişimlerden en başarılı olanlarından biri, Sincan bölgesindeki Han bireylerinin yerleşikleştirilmesidir. Önceden, “Batı'nın Gelişimi” kampanyası ve şimdi Kemer ve Yol Girişimi (BRI), gelişmeyi en geniş çaplı politika için dayanak noktası olarak

kullandı. Buradaki asıl umulan, azınlık bakımından zengin olan bölgeye yapılan Han göçünün, Uygurların Han kültürüne doğru, dilsel ve ideolojik olarak, asimilasyonuna hizmet etmesidir.

1900'lerde Uygurların kendilerini Doğu Türkistan adı altında yönettiği iki önemli dönem vardı - bölge aynı zamanda Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi (SUÖB) olarak da adlandırıldı. Komünist Çin'in Maoist döneminde, Uygurlar, hakları ve göçü zorlaştıran izolasyonist politikalar konusunda ağır bir baskıya maruz bırakıldılar. Maoizm sonrası, buna rağmen yıllar süren kısıtlamanın ardından bir açıklık dönemi getirmesi, Çin'in azınlıklarına yönelik daha rahat politikalara izin verdi. Bununla birlikte, özellikle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri "terörle savaşı" ilan ettikten sonra (11 Eylül sonrası), Çin, yerli Uygurlar üzerindeki en kısıtlayıcı ve kültürel açıdan zarar verici politikaları izledi. Bu, Uygurların indoktrine edilmesi ve kendi kültürlerinin tüm yönlerini kınamak ve ÇKP'nin liderliğini övmek için kullanılan siyasi yeniden eğitim kamplarının açılmasını içermiştir.

Hazaralar için, yıllar boyunca kendilerine zulme yol açma sebepleri, Afganistan'daki dini bir azınlık olarak, Şii Müslüman kimlikleriyle kolayca bağlanabilir. Yıllar süren Emir Abdur Rahman ve Kabil Emirliği yönetiminde Hazara, Sünni olmayan kimlikleri nedeniyle kâfir olarak dışlandılar. Rahman yönetimi Hazaraları hedef alan doğrudan zulüm politikaları –köleleştirmeyi, katliamları, köylerin ve evlerin talan ve yağma edilmesini ve bireylere cinsel saldırıyı da içeren- acımasızdı. Rahman'ın ölümünden sonra, doğru yönde siyasi değişiklikler olmasına rağmen, çok geçmeden Sovyetler işgal etti. İşgal ile birlikte, hâlihazırda kırılgan olan Afgan merkezi hükümeti tamamen çökmüş oldu. Pakistan, Suudi Arabistan ve ABD'nin yardımıyla, *mücahitler* Sovyetlere karşı savaştı ve sonunda Sovyetleri dışarıya attı. Bununla birlikte, Amir Abdur Rahman'ın zamanının kesin ayrımcı politikaları, Taliban'ın Afganistan'daki yükselişiyle yeniden ortaya çıktı. Taliban Afganistan'da iktidardan düşmüş olsa dahi ideolojik olarak tehdidi devam ediyor. Ve daha da önemlisi, Hazaralar'ın ve diğer Afganların büyük çoğunluğu sınır ülkeleri olan Pakistan, İran

ve Irak’a uzun süre önce iltica etmek için uzun süre kaldılar ve bunların bazıları Türkiye ve hatta Avrupa’ya kadar gittiler. Hem Uygur hem de Hazaralar vakıalarında, zulüm ışığında göç yolunun uluslararası mevzuat, uluslararası kurumlar ve jeopolitik erişilebilirlikle ilgisi var.

Birleşmiş Milletler 1951 Mültecilerin Statüsü Sözleşmesi aslen Yahudi Soykırımı sırasında, Yahudilere yaygın olarak uygulanan zulmü takiben, Avrupa'dan kaçanlara coğrafi olarak sınır koyarak mülteci korumasını oluşturuldu. 1967 Protokolünde, bu coğrafi sınırlamayı kaldırmak için bir değişiklik yapıldı. Her iki mevzuat da, aynı dönemdeki (Sözleşmede belirtildiği gibi) mültecileri tanımaya ve savunmasız toplulukların korunma sürecine yardımcı olmaya karar veren dünya çapında çok sayıda ülke tarafından imzalanmıştır. “Mültecinin” doğru ve muntazam bir biçimde tanımlanmasına ek olarak, Sözleşme aynı zamanda imzacı bir ülkenin bir kimseyi (fark edilebilir bir şekilde zulümle yüzleşecek) kendi ülkesine geri göndermesini engelleyen *geri dönüşsüzlük* politikasını da vurgulamaktadır.

Uygurlar için, burası sığınma yolculuğunun karmaşık bir yolculuğa dönüştüğü yerdir. Sincan'ın güvenli hale getirilmiş çevresinden kaçmayı başarabilenler için yolculuk, genellikle komşu Orta veya Güneydoğu Asya komşu ülkelerinde sona eriyor. Bu ülkelerden büyük bir çoğunluğu 1951 Sözleşmesi veya 1967 Protokolüne (Bangladeş, Butan, Hindistan, Endonezya, Laos, Malezya, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Tayland ve Vietnam da dâhil olmak üzere) imzacı değildir ve doğru düzgün bir “mülteci” tanımlamasına ve/veya göçle ilgili olan hayati ulusal mevzuata dahi sahip değildirler. Bu gerçeğin çeşitli nedenleri var, ancak bunun temelinde Çin'in jeopolitik gücü ve ekonomik teşvikler önemli faktörler oldu. Ulusal düzgün bir mevzuatın olmamasına ve/veya Sözleşme veya Protokolün imzacı olmamalarına ek olarak, yukarıdaki Güneydoğu Asya ülkeleri için mültecilere ev sahipliği yapmak, özellikle ulusal eğitim, barınma ve sağlık hizmetleri sistemlerinde ağır baskılar anlamına gelebilir. Bu gerçek ve her birinin Çin'in yeni Kemer ve Yol Girişimi (BRI) ile olan ekonomik ilgisi göz önüne alındığında, bu faktörler, herhangi bir

mülteci için imza sahibi veya ev sahibi ülke olma potansiyelini caydırmak için yeterli olmuştur. Ayrıca, Çin, ülkesi dışında seyahat ederken yakalanan Uygurlar konusunda iade anlaşmaları imzalamaları için komşularını zorladı. Bu, çoğu durumda, kamp baskınlarına ve daha sonra genellikle iadeyle sonuçlanan yasadışı gözaltılara yol açtı. Komşu Orta Asya ülkeleri konusunda, Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği (BMMYK) bölge genelinde ofislere sahip olmasına rağmen, Çin, Şangay İşbirliği Teşkilatının (ŞİÖ) terörle mücadele hedefleri himayesi altında her bir ülkeye iade anlaşmaları imzalamalarını sağlamıştır. Sonuç olarak esasında da bu, Uygur sığınmacılarının, koruma arayışı umuduyla Türkiye'ye seyahat etmek için farklı araçlara güvenmelerine sebep olmuştur. Bazıları, Türkiye'ye ulaşmak için kapsamlı kaçakçılık gerektiren uzun yolculuklara başvurmaktadır.

Diğerleri farklı bir yollar seçiyorlar. Geçtiğimiz yıllarda da belgelendiği gibi, Güneydoğu Asya ülkelerinde konuşlandırılan Türk diplomatlarının Uygur bireylerine Çin'deki zulümden kaçmaları için yardım ettiği birçok vakıa oldu. Bu görevliler mülteciler için gereken seyahat programından Uygurlara güvenli hava yolculuğu için verilen uygun belgelere kadar her şeyi planladılar. Türk Yabancılar Kanunu'nun 46. Maddesi korumaya ihtiyaç duyan kişilere insani hukuki belgelerin hazırlanmasına izin vermektedir ancak bu hükümetin takdirine bırakılmıştır. Hazaralar içinse, Afganistan, merkezi politik istikrarını on yıllar önce kaybetti ve bu nedenle jeopolitik, uluslararası mevzuatın uygulanmasında ya da komşu ülkelerdeki uluslararası kurumların yetki sınırları konusunda büyük rol oynamıyor. Hazaralar, komşu Pakistan, İran'da sonlanan veya daha batıya Türkiye veya Avrupa'ya giden Afganlar arasında çoğunluğu teşkil eden gruplardan. Hazaralar, çoğu durumda, geçmiş kırk yıl boyunca süren savaş, çatışma ve açıkça ayrımcı siyasal politikalar nedeniyle Afganistan dışında ikamet ediyorlar. Bu sebeple ve coğrafi yakınlık nedeniyle, (1) Sözleşmeye ve/veya Protokol'e imza atan ülkeler olan ve (2) Birleşmiş Milletler ajanslarının önemli bir şekilde bulunmalarına izin veren politik durum sebebiyle, Hazaralar ve diğer Afganlar uluslararası koruma sistemine Uygurlara kıyasla çok daha kolay erişebiliyorlar.

Türkiye'ye göç ve her bir etno-kültürel grubun Türkiye'ye girişten sonra karşı karşıya geldiği gerçeği açısından, durumun onlar için bazen zor olduğunu kanıtlamaktadır. Türkiye şu anda yaklaşık 4,5 milyon mültecinin (çoğunluğu Suriyeli) geçici evi olduğundan, göç politikasında, özellikle göçle ilgili olarak birçok değişikliğe yol açıyor. Türkiye, her iki sözleşmeye de imzacı olan, ancak 1951 Avrupa coğrafi sınırlamasını stratejik olarak koruyan az sayıdaki ülkeden biri. Bu nedenle, bu Hazaralar ve Uygurların Türkiye'yi sık sık transit ülke olarak kullanmaları konusunda benzer oldukları anlamına geliyordu. Başka bir deyişle, Türkiye bir sığınmacıyı uzun süreli olarak, ülke içi korumaya ve doğrudan, ancak bir Avrupa menşe ülkesinden kaçıyorlarsa kabul edecektir.

Hem Hazara hem de Uygur için netice, sonuçların bir karışımı olabilir. Pek çoğu, mülteci olarak kabul edilmek umuduyla BMMYK'a (veya şimdi DGMM / PDMM'ye) kaydolmaya başvurdu. Tanınmanın ardından, birçoğu son ev sahibi ülkede yeniden yerleştirme sürecini bekliyorlar. Yeniden yerleştirme süreci bazen ülke kotaları nedeniyle bir yıl alabiliyor ve bu nedenle bazı bireyler Türkiye'de bir hayat yaratmanın farklı yollarını bulmak için arayışa girerler. Bazı durumlarda bireyler, tanınacakları ve yeni bir ev sahibi ülkeye entegre edilmeleri için resmen karşılanacakları Avrupa ülkelerine kaçak yollarla gidebilmek umidiyle kayıt altına alınmayı atlamayı tercih ederler. Bu kişilerin, sınırı geçebilecekleri mükemmel zamanı beklerken kendilerini, uygun belgeler veya izinler olmadan geçici olarak gayri resmi işgücüne entegre oldukları İstanbul gibi daha büyük Türkiye şehirlerinde bulmaları oldukça muhtemeldir. Bazı kişiler için bu, yerel olarak bağlantılar kurarak ve bir topluluk oluşturma ve ülkede daha uzun süre kalma riski taşır. Diğerleri içinse, geçici olarak kayıtdışı işgücü sektöründe çalışarak kaçakçılık beklenirken Türkiye'de kalmayla sonlanabilir. Bireyler, zorlu Avrupa politikaları göz önüne alındığında oldukça uzun bir süre bekleyebilir, aynı zamanda da kaçakçı araçlarında kapasite olması için bekleyebilir. Türkiye, merkezi BMMYK mülteci kayıt ve statü belirleme sistemini ülkedeki Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü'ne (GİGM) devretti. Bu, yükü

merkezi bir sistemden yerel İl Göç İdaresi Müdürlüğü'ne (İGİM) geçiren sürecin yerelleştirilmesi de dâhil olmak üzere birçok değişiklik anlamına geliyordu. Her ne kadar böyle bir sistem işlevsel olduğu kanıtlanmış olsa da, değişim Eylül 2018'de oldukça hızlı bir şekilde gerçekleşti ve Hazara topluluğunun (ve muhtemelen Uygurlar'ın da) çeşitli sorunlarla karşılaşmalarına yol açtı. Çoğu, normalde varışta doğrudan kayıt olur ve uygun ulusal kimlik kartlarını bekliyorsa da, bazıları İGİM tarafından haftalar sonra geri gelip kayıt olmaları istenildiğinden şikâyetçi olmuştur.

Kimlik, her bir toplumun Türkiye'deki entegrasyon sürecinde rol oynamaktadır. Uygurlar için Türk kimlikleri, onlarla ve onların (muhtemelen geçici) ev sahibi toplulukları arasında bir yakınlığa izin vermektedir. Ayrıca uzun süre önce kurulmuş olan, 1950'lerde Bugra ve Alptekin ile ilk kez kurulan, Uygur diasporası nedeniyle, ülkedeki Uygur toplulukları, güçlü bir diaspora ağı yaratabildiler. Daha da ilginç, Uygurların anavatanları Sincan (Doğu Türkistan)'a yatırım yaparak bağlantı kurmuşlardır ancak, Hazaraların Afganistan ile bu kadar güçlü bir kültürel mirası bağlantısı yok. Dahası, Uygurlar, Sünni Müslüman inancını Türk toplumunun çoğunluğu ile paylaşıyor ve bu nedenle Türk dili ve kültürünün yanı sıra bir dini inanç noktasına da bağlanıyor. Türk hükümetinin daha önce Uygurlara, dini ve kültürel bağları göz önünde bulundurarak, insani nedenlerle yardım önerdiği bilinmektedir.

Bununla birlikte, Hazara için, büyük bir olasılıkla, onlarca yıl süren zulüm kaçışları ve ayrıca İran ve Pakistan sınırındaki Afgan mültecilerin yoğunluğu nedeniyle, Türkiye'de güvenilecek güçlü bir Hazara diaspora grubu bulunmamakta. Ayrıca, geçen kırk yıldan beri nesiller boyunca Afganistan'ın dışında kaldıkları için, Hazaralar'ın geride bıraktıkları mirasları, 2001'deki Bamiyan Budalarında olduğu gibi, tamamen ortadan kalktı. Bu, Hazaralar'ın Türkiye'de bir ev sahibi ülke olarak yaşadığı deneyimin çoğunluğunu doğrudan belirlememesine rağmen, Kuzeybatı Avrupa'ya devam etmek karşısında, ülkede kalmak için fazla bir çekim kuvveti olmadığı anlamına geliyor.

Son birkaç yıl içinde KP liderlięindeki zulüm Uygurların řimdi yeni Han-asimilasyon nesiller yaratmaya zorlayan kltrel soykırımla karřı karřıya olduęu anlamına geliyordu. eřitli saygın raporlarda ve video belgelerinde belgelendięi gibi, yeniden eęitim kamplarının sayısının artması, yalnızca yurtdıřında yařayan ve seyahat eden aile yeleriyle baęları olan Uygur bireyleri deęil, aynı zamanda kltrlerini tanıtan veya dıřarıdan KP yasaklama ve baskılarına karřı konuşanlar iin de bulunduęunu gstermiřtir. Btn bir ailenin gzaltına alındıęı durumlarda ocukların ve ebeveynlerin ayrı ayrı indoktrine edilmektedir. Dięerleriye zorla ortadan kaybolur ve artık haber alınamayabilirler; akrabalarınsa bu durum en ktsn dřnmesine neden olur, fakat aynı anda direnmek ve onları bulmak iin yardım ister. Her iki grubun tarihsel zulm arasındaki ortak bir konu, dine baęlı politik politikalaradır. Uygurlar sz konusu olduęunda, bu, Mslman olarak inan ve kimliklerini istemeden kınamakla birleřtięinde yasadıřı sorgulanma, gzetleme ve gzaltına alma anlamına geliyordu. Hazaralar iin bu, zorla bastırma ve yakın fiziksel zorlama anlamına geliyordu; bu, oęu zaman yerinden olma ya da lmle sonulandı. Daha da endiře verici olan, Uygurların gzaltına alındıęı ve muhtemelen sulular olarak sınıflandırıldıęı iin, in’in ulusal organ toplama probleminin Uygur topluluęunu etkilemedięine dair kanıt yoktur.

Son 17 yılda, Afganistan'daki Taliban gcnn dřmesinden bu yana, BMMYK da dhil olmak zere BM kurumları Afganların lkesine geri gnderilmesini teřvik etti. Toplamda, kendi lkesine geri dnen Afganların sayısı toplamda 4,4 milyonu ařtı. Bununla birlikte, bazı durumlarda, birokları, onlarca yıldır kendi lkelerinin dıřında yařadıktan ve ocuklarının potansiyel olarak ocuk askerler olarak toplanabileceęi gereęinden yznden kuřkulu kalmaktadır. lke­deki eęitim ve saęlık hizmetlerinin eriřilebilirlięi dhil olmak zere lke iinde yapılması gereken ok geliřme var. Bununla birlikte, Afganistan’ın kırılgan merkezi siyasal sistemi gz nne alındıęında, lkenin ilerleme iin uluslararası desteęe baęımlı kalmaya devam etmesi kuvvetle muhtemeldir. Hazaralar ise, zellikle řii’nin inancından tr Pakistan’ın

Belucistan eyaletinde yaşayan topluluklarında ayrımcılıkla karşı karşıya kalmaya devam ediyorlar.

Özetlemek gerekirse, hem Uygur hem de Hazara topluluklarının zulmünün gelişimini geniş ölçüde şekillendiren tarihi politik rejimler olmuştur. Sonuç, sadece ihanet ilanı yoluyla doğrudan bir baskı ve zulüm olmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda zorla susturma ve ortadan kaybolmalar yoluyla da devam ettirilmiştir. Bu durum, göreceli barış dönemlerinde bile marjinalleşmeye yol açtı ve bu iki Orta Asya azınlığın bütünlüğüne kültürel olarak zarar vermeye devam etti; atalarıyla aralarındaki bağı unutmalarına sebep olacak bir tehdit yarattı. Her iki toplumda da, tarihi zulüm, her birinin dini kimliği etrafında, bu ister İslam'ın mensubu oldukları mezhebinden olsun ya da sadece dini inancın varlığından mı kaynaklanıyor olsun.

Sonuç olarak, sistematik zulmün tarihi ve son gelişmelerindeki en önemli faktörler, sadece uluslararası mevzuatın rolünü değil aynı zamanda uluslararası kurumların ve jeopolitik gücün ve bu konudaki yetki sınırları da dikkate alındığında, özellikle ilgi çekicidir. Uygurlar açısından bu, Çin'in komşu ülkeleri arasında sınırları aşır kaçak yollarla yapılarak korunma yolunu dikkatlice oluşturmak anlamına geliyor. Bu Orta ve Güneydoğu Asya ülkelerinin çoğu BM 1951 Mültecilerin Statüsü Sözleşmesine veya 1967 Protokolüne imza atmayan, ulusal göç mevzuatına sahip olmayan ülkelerdir ve yine bunların birçoğu Çin ile anlaşma ve iade anlaşması imzalayan ülkelerdir. Bu nedenle, iltica eden sığınmacı Uygur nüfus için, kendi ülkelerine geri iade edilmeleri ve bir toplama kampına yerleştirilmeleri tehlikesi de mevcuttur. İmza sahibi olmayan komşular olmasının yanı sıra, Güneydoğu Asya ülkeleri bir ticaret ortağı olarak Çin'e büyük ölçüde güvenmekte ve bu nedenle Çin'in etkisine dayalı kararlar vermeye teşvik edilmektedir. Bu, önceki yıllarda Çin'in Sincan'ın dışında seyahat eden Uygurlarla ilgili olarak böyle olmuştur. İronik olarak, Çin'in 1951 Sözleşmesine (ve dolayısıyla mültecilerin geri gönderilmemesi politikasına) imzacı olmasına rağmen, Pekin hükümeti, herhangi bir yabancı ülkedeki tüm Uygurların Çin'e iade edilmesini istedi. Tayland, ancak ilgili ülkelerden biri olan bu tür talepleri,

ülkenin 1993'te Çin ile imzaladığı ikili iade anlaşması uyarınca yerine getirmiştir. Temmuz 2015'te, Taylandlı yetkililer zorla 109 adet Uygurluyu sığınma talebinde bulunmalarına rağmen Çin'e geri göndermiştir. Ancak bu, Uygur bireylerinin Tayland'daki tutuklanmasını veya geri gönderilmelerini içeren ilk olay değildi. Uluslararası Af Örgütü raporunun belirttiği gibi, Mart 2014'te Taylandlı yetkililer, Güney Tayland'daki şüpheli insan kaçakçılığı kamplarını doğrudan hedef aldılar ve 300'den fazla Uygur'u gözaltına alarak kamplara yerleştirdiler. Takip eden aylarda, bazı sığınmacılar, Tayland'daki gözetim tesislerinin inanılmaz derecede kasvetli yaşam koşulları nedeniyle öldüler. Bir yıldan fazla bir süre sonra, birçok ülkeden tutukluların kümes hayvanı muamelesi görmelerine son verilmesi çağrıları sonrasında, Taylandlı yetkililer, grubun bir bölümünü Çin'e iade ederken, Türkiye'ye kaçabilmeleri için 173 kişilik bir grup bırakıldı. Güneydoğu Asya'da sığınma talebinde bulunanların bariz eksikliği ve sert gerçekliği göz önüne alındığında, Uygurların Müslüman Türk kardeşlerini elçilik ve konsolosluklarda yardım için kullanmaları şaşırtıcı değildir. Dahası, bu gerçek, Uygur sığınmacılarının, Türkiye'deki geniş toplumsal varlığına rağmen, nadiren BMMYK bireysel dava sistemi üzerinden işlenmesi gerçeğiyle doğrudan ilgilidir.

Çin'in küresel bir jeopolitik ölçekte güvenli konumu göz önüne alındığında isteksizliği anlamak zor değil. Birleşmiş Milletlerin en büyük üyelerinden biri gibi inanılmaz bir güce sahip olan ülke, ulusal ve uluslararası sivil toplum kuruluşlarının yüksek oranda dahil olduğu inceleme ziyaretlerini reddetmeyi başardı; bu durum, uluslararası toplumun kabul edilemez ve yaptırım uygulanabilir olarak göreceği durumların başında geliyor, bu tür zulümlerin işlendiği ülke Çin olmasaydı dahi. Birleşmiş Milletler büyükelçilerinin yakın zamanda kitlesel gözetimler ve Sincan'da uygulanan “yeniden eğitim mesleki eğitim merkezleri” hakkında konuşmuş olmalarına rağmen, Çin'in siyasi bir süper güç olarak gücü, Çin'deki BM kuruluşlarının gücünü azaltması anlamına geliyordu. (Sözleşme ve Protokolü imzalayan bir ülke olmasına rağmen)

Ayrıca, Çin'in komşularındaki uluslararası mevzuata ve BMMYK'nın yetkisine uygun şekilde erişilebilmesi nedeniyle Uygurların, Türkiye'nin Yabancılar Ulusal Kanunu'nda korunma yoluyla da ilerlemesi muhtemeldir (Madde 46). Hazaralar içinse bu durum, kırk yıl süren yaygın zulüm ve mevcut insan hakları uluslararası rejimi tarafından uygulanan uluslararası korumanın erişilebilirliği nedeniyle, iltica süreci daha dolambaçsız ve kolaydır. Bununla birlikte, ulusal Türk mülteci kayıt prosedürlerindeki son değişiklikler sistemi karmaşık bir hale getirmiştir. Her iki durumda da, her iki toplumun da çoğunluğu Türkiye'yi ev sahibi ülke olmaktan ziyade daha çok bir geçiş ülkesi olarak tecrübe ediyor. Her iki durumda da, sonuç ve önemli bir benzerlik olarak, genellikle bireyleri büyük Türk şehirlerinde kayıt dışı işgücü sektörüne iten ekonomik ihtiyaçtan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bir başka benzerlik ise, her iki durumda da Türkiye'deki entegrasyonun kimliğe değil, aynı zamanda diaspora topluluklarının varlığına veya eksikliğine de bağlı olmasıdır.

B. TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Social Sciences ☒
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐
- Enformatik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Informatics ☐
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : MADELINE ANDREA
Adı / Name : VANDER VELDE
Bölümü / Department : ULUSLARARASI İLİSKİLER

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) :

BRIDGING BORDERS FROM ASIA TO EUROPE: A CASE STUDY ON
UYGHUR AND HAZARA MIGRATION TO TURKEY

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☒ **Doktora** / PhD ☐

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ☒
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. * ☐
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. * ☐

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir.

A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature **Tarih** / Date