

THE ROLE OF FAITH-BASED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN TURKEY’S HUMANITARIAN AID POLICY AND PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF FAITH-BASED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN TURKEY’S HUMANITARIAN AID POLICY AND PRACTICE

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As the presence of Turkish NGOs in humanitarian aid hits its two-decade mark, their overseas activities have become the subject of more global scrutiny than ever before. The state-NGO aid relationship, however, has not received adequate scholarly attention. The main purpose of this thesis is to address this gap by asking what roles NGOs play in Turkey’s humanitarian aid policy and practice. Contrary to strong state tradition of Turkey’s administration structure, this dissertation uncovers selected NGOs attempt to play political role in Turkish foreign policy, particularly when the decision of the government is related to the humanitarian aid. By doing this, it pursues a descriptive and interpretive approach, based on qualitative findings and taking Turkey a single case. In examining political role of selected NGOs in Turkey’s nascent development community, it focuses on techniques derived from constructivism such as agenda-setting, lobbying, norm-building, framing and information providing. Based on this literature and considering the period between 2004-2016, this thesis argues that Turkish NGOs seek to play political roles in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice by functioning as knowledge-providers, powerful catalysts for humanitarian aid activities, and voice-articulators in bringing humanitarian issues to light through raising awareness in Turkey.

Keywords: State-NGO aid relations, Faith-based Organisations, Humanitarian Aid, Constructivism, Political Role

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'NİN İNSANİ YARDIM POLİTİKASI VE UYGULAMASINDA İNANÇ TEMELLİ SİVİL TOPLUM KURULUŞLARININ ROLÜ

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Türk Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının insani yardım alanındaki varlığı ve yurtdışı faaliyetleri son yıllarda daha fazla ilgi çekmeye başlamıştır. Lakin, devlet ile STK arasındaki ilişkiler konusu akademide kendine yeterince yer bulamamıştır. Bu tezin temel amacı, Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikası ve uygulamasında STK'ların oynadığı siyasi rollerin neler olduğunu araştırarak bu boşluğu doldurmaktır. Türkiye'de kabul gören “güçlü devlet yönetim yapısı” geleneğinin aksine bu tez, Türk STK'ların dış politikada siyasi bir rol oynamaya yönelik girişimlerini, özellikle insani yardım karar alma sürecindeki rolünü ortaya koyarak incelemektedir. Bunu, nitel bir çalışma yöntemiyle betimleyici ve yorumlayıcı bir yaklaşımla, Türkiye'yi tek bir vaka analizi olarak alarak yapmaktadır. Araştırmaya konu olan STK'ların Türkiye'nin insani yardım alanındaki siyasi rolünü, konstrüktivizm (inşacılık) teorisinden türetilen gündem belirleme, lobicilik, norm oluşturma, çerçeveleme ve bilgi sağlama tekniklerini kullanarak incelemektedir. Bu literatür temelinde ve 2004-2016 yıllarını esas alan tezin argümanı şu şekildedir: Türk STK'ları; bilgi sağlayarak, insani yardım faaliyetlerinde güçlü katalizör etki oluşturarak ve insani meselelerin Türkiye'de farkındalığı artıracak şekilde gündeme gelmesini sağlayarak ve toplumsal tepkilerin de nabzını tutarak Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikası ve uygulamasında, siyasi bir rol üstlenmeye çalışmaktadırlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Devlet-STK Yardım İlişkileri, İnanç Temelli Kuruluşlar, İnsani Yardım, Konstrüktivizm, Siyasi Rol.

To my Eda and İrfan Tahir,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Authority
AGO	Anti-governmental Organizations
AI	Amnesty International
BINGO	Business and industry Non-governmental Organisation
CAFOD	The Catholic Agency For Overseas Development
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DONGO	Donor-Dominated Non-governmental Organisation
DSI	State Hydraulic Works
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FBOs	Faith-based Organisation
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GNP	Gross National Product
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GONGO	Government-organized Non-governmental Organisation
GRINGO	Government Regulated Non-governmental Organisation
HD	Humanitarian Diplomacy
IHH	Foundation for Human Rights, Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGO	Inter-governmental Organisation
IDSB	The Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
OA	Official Assistance
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDSP	The Union of NGOs of the Islamic World
ILO	International Labour Organisation

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-governmental Organisation
KAGEM	Kadın Aile ve Gençlik Merkezi
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCS	National Security Council
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NNGO	Northern Non-governmental Organisation
NSA	Non-state Actor
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PRA	Presidency of Religious Affairs
RNGO	Religious Non-governmental Organisation
SPO	State Planning Organisation
SSI	State Statistical Institute
TAMP	Turkey Disaster Response Plan
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Network
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TDAM	Turkish-type Development Assistance Model
(T)DF	(Türkiye) Diyanet Foundations
TİKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TNC	Transnational Corporations
TNO	Transnational Organisation
TOBB	Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TOKİ	Housing Development Administration
TPMT	Third Party Monitoring Team
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent (KIZILAY)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nation Refugee Agency
YTB	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It was on the eve of April 1992, when the unprecedented wave of ethnic violence began against Bosnian civilians. An attack both expansionist and genocidal in character. In just under a year, nearly 140,000 civilians had been killed and millions of others were forced to migrate through a brutal regime of ethnic cleansing orchestrated by Radovan Karadzic. At the onset of the conflict, information was scarce, and the intensity of the war prevented any verification of the systematic massacres. The only viable, authentic first-hand accounts of these atrocities were provided by humanitarian Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) workers. Over the course of the violence, the information provided by these aid workers fostered considerable pressure for the media to investigate deeper into the claims of active concentration camps and death camps. Leading NGOs and the media systematically obfuscated the key issue through several linguistic devices, such as the language, key terms, and phrases used to describe an event.¹ A policy which played an essential role in establishing how the real situations in Bosnia came to be defined. Because the seriousness was downplayed by the international community and kept hidden from the world for a long time.

Alongside other actors, a group of Turkish volunteers (which later led to the establishment of the IHH- İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı) played a pivotal role in disseminating information in Turkey on the situation of Bosnians, particularly Muslims. This led to a great proportion of Turkish society, spanning across the political spectrum, feeling immense sympathy for the Bosnian Muslims. In due course, there was a more substantial and effective engagement with the real problem of genocide in the region. The role of the media and civil society were driving forces for the Alliance (NATO) responding as early as summer 1992 and a

¹ Gregory Kent, *Framing War and Genocide: British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia* (Hampton Press, 2006), p. 189.

“no-fly-zone” being declared by the UN Security Council in 1993. Without the engagement of NGOs, the increasingly turbulent situation of the Bosnian war may have taken a completely different turn. Once more, this case has provided ample evidence on moral matters such as adherence to values of humanitarianism, and on political process matters such as influencing decision-making process, the NGOs have real power.²

Despite the direct involvement of civil society organizations in war-torn regions and their proactive engagement in a struggle against the slave trade,³ no satisfactory studies regarding both the potential and limits of NGO’ contribution to humanitarian crises, peace-settlement, and influence upon world politics was made in the literature until the post-World War II period. From this time onward, densely networked transactions have made NGOs non-negligible actors in global politics. Following that, there was a period NGO bloom in the 1990s, which was accompanied by academic studies on the direct and indirect role of NGOs in several issue areas. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane’s claim that “states are by no means the only actors in world politics” in 1977,⁴ became part of the common sense in the 1990s. And in the research that followed it was seen non-state actors were not only challengers to but also supporters and shapers of the international system.⁵

² Bas Arts and Piet Verschuren, “Assessing Political Influence in Complex Decision-Making: An Instrument Based on Triangulation”, *International Political Science Review* (Vol. 20, No. 4, 1999), p.417.

³ For instance, American Anti-Slavery Society (1833-1870) organised meetings, adopted resolutions, signed anti-slavery petitions to send to Congress, printed various advertisement in vast quantities, published journals to carry the anti-slavery campaigning. With total membership of 200.000, their intense initiatives played essential role in tackling slavery. See more about, Encyclopaedia Britannica, American Anti-Slavery Society, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/American-Anti-Slavery-Society> (Accessed 23.08.2018)

⁴ Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, *International Organization* (Vol. 25, No.3, 1971), p.330.

⁵ Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p.15.

The main objective of this thesis is to map the uncharted terrain of Turkish NGOs⁶ and explore their political role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice. Although Turkish faith-based organisations (FBOs)' traditional relief and emergency role continues to occupy a significant place in the repertoires of their overseas activities, they engage in agenda-setting, norm-building, lobbying, framing and information providing, all of which is intended to influence the humanitarian policy and practice of Turkey. In the parlance of current scholarship, these political roles have become more visible in the state-NGO aid relationship over the last decade in favour of the latter. At the public level, selected FBOs seek to mobilize public alike to support particular policies, frame issues, set humanitarian policy-agendas, and advocate norms. At the individual level, they do lobby for their activities and provide information. At both levels the essential point of FBOs activities lies in their ability to influence which makes them a potential political actor.⁷ However, this research distinguishes the *influence* from the *role* and only focuses on the latter form of NGOs' attempt.

The orientation of Turkish state tradition and administration structure has long been categorized within the “*strong state*” typology, where the state remains autonomous from the influence of other actors, including civil society.⁸ This thesis, however, challenges this paradigm by showing NGOs' political role in humanitarian aid landscape of Turkey. It focuses on the period between 2004 and 2016, highlighted by a growing interaction between the state and NGOs with regard to humanitarian aid.

The subject of humanitarian aid is deliberately chosen in the light of the ever-growing role of most mainstream humanitarian NGOs in this field and Turkey's

⁶ Hereinafter, Turkish NGOs refer selected nine Turkish Faith-based Organisations.

⁷ Shamima Ahmed and David Potter, *NGOs in International Politics*, (Kumarian Press, 2006), p.54.

⁸ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1985); Metin Heper, “The State and Politics in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* (12, no. 2, 1988); and Metin Heper *The Strong State and Democracy The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Bilkent Uni. Press, 2016).

track record in humanitarian assistance is clearly ahead of other forms of assistance.⁹ Therefore, this study focuses specifically on faith-based organisations who seek to have a role in humanitarian aid in Turkey. It is generally acknowledged that FBOs in Turkey have close contacts with the government due to their political and religious proximity. This is in part related to the role of the government in constructing a civil society that is attuned to its own interests. This also suggests that the Turkish government and the NGOs work closely in overseas aid. However, delving into deeper analysis regarding why there is a symbiotic relationship between the two actors is beyond the scope of this research.

Of the many approaches to analyse the relationship between states and NGOs, scholars focus on either top-down or bottom-up relationships. In the bottom-up relationship, NGOs (or civil society in Robert Cox's phrase) who are disadvantaged by the globalization of the world economy, seek alternatives to central government and can mount their protests. Whereas in top-down relationships NGOs are influenced by states who treat them as an agency for stabilizing the social and political status quo.¹⁰ But, the line between these two approaches is not so firm, as an NGO can both challenge the state and be part of the policy process simultaneously. Following the line of bottom-up relationship, this thesis, however, does not claim that NGOs are more powerful or that states are less important in analysing overall foreign aid structure of the state-NGO relations in Turkey. Nor, does it posit a zero-sum game approach to their relations on foreign aid in underlying political role of NGOs in Turkish humanitarian aid, known as the retreat of the state debate. Thus, in attributing the power to one side over the other, there is an error observed in the appraisal of interaction, which this thesis attempts to avoid.

⁹As of 2016 Turkish official development assistance has reached \$6.695 billion, and out of this amount humanitarian aid ranked at 5.865 billion USD. In terms of humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI, Turkey provided most humanitarian aid and become the most generous country in the world with a rate of 0.69% in 2016. See more about, Turkish Development Assistance Report, TİKA, 2016. p.5.

¹⁰ Robert W. Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order", *Review of International Studies* (Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan 1999), p.10-11.

Taking the position that NGOs do matter in seeking to play role in the state policies and practice, this thesis seeks an answer to the question of what roles do NGOs seek to play in humanitarian aid policy and practice? “What” question leads to the production of descriptions. It helps the researcher to discover and describe “the characteristics in and patterns of some social phenomena.”¹¹ Although what questions that focus on description and exploration are sometimes despised by social researchers, the knowledge produced on the basis of these questions form the basis of why and how questions. In this dissertation, however, I go a few steps back to inquire into the “what” question. Instead of examining the conditions under which NGOs become effective, the dissertation looks the role that they adopt. With particular reference to the topic of this dissertation, exploratory research is very significant. This is because; research on the role of non-state actors in Turkey’s aid policy is still at its early phases.

This research does not aim to measure the extent of political influence, but an analysis of the forms in which it is attempted. Therefore, it follows a descriptive approach. There are various ways in which NGOs attempt to play role on the central government's foreign aid policies, one of them is political role. Political role aims to influence or change in foreign aid policy and practice. Change, in this case, is not meant as change within a system, nor change of the system itself. In other words, this thesis is not suggested that the selected NGOs political role in change means that their relations with the state become institutionalized with a structured form. Rather, it refers to a mutually dependent process, where the state and NGOs work hand-in-hand when responding to humanitarian crises.

In order to answer the research question, this study benefits from constructivist literature to analyse NGO’ practices. According to this, the political roles that NGOs play such as agenda-setting, lobbying, norm-building, framing and information providing. These five techniques can be categorized into two frames: the direct and the indirect. Direct form involves NGOs’ information provision/supply, agenda

¹¹ Norman Blaikie, *Designing Social Research* (2nd edition, Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), p.60.

setting and lobby in government to the favour of their preference. Indirectly, NGOs mobilize public opinion to shape and re-shape the conventional politics and seek to generate new norms that the state complies with due to external and increasing public pressure.

This framework roughly corresponds to James Anderson's policy cycle process: which are agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation, and evaluation.¹² NGOs' political roles are associated with these policy cycles at various levels. The attempt of selected Turkish NGOs to participate in the five stages of the policy cycle through direct and indirect techniques are examined in this thesis. Finally, considering the legal and practical aspect of the humanitarian aid, four gradual levels of participation is visible for the role of NGOs. This level of participation is applied in state-NGO relations to understand how NGOs seek to be a part of, and within, the humanitarian aid decision-making process in Turkey.

Methodologically, this thesis follows an interpretive and descriptive qualitative social research approach. In particular, it uses Turkey as a case to analyse NGOs' role in relation to Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that selected FBOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through techniques that have been employed by them. In line with this frame, there are five sub-hypotheses which are:

H₁: The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through agenda-setting

H₂: The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through norm building

H₃: The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through lobbying

¹² James E. Anderson, *Public Policymaking* (Cengage Learning, 2014). p.3.

H₄: The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through framing

H₅: The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through information-proving

In order to understand their role, I employ data from two types of information: primary and secondary sources. The data are collected from semi-structured interview and documents, including official documents of related organisations (e.g. reports, policy papers, official websites), as well as my personal field activities in Mozambique (2007) and Tanzania (2017) as the primary sources of the study, and finally, the academic studies as the secondary sources. A considerable amount of qualitative data is gathered through face-to-face semi-structured interviews in three different cities, Ankara, İstanbul and Konya. The interview questionnaires are composed of five different sets of questions, detailed in the annex. Eighteen respondents completed the questionnaires, representing nine different FBOs. Seven respondents replied from three different state-related institutions which are AFAD, TİKA and Kızılay. The nine selected FBOs organisations are Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, İHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı-Humanitarian Relief Foundation), Deniz Feneri Association, Cansuyu Association, Yeryüzü Doktorları Association, Dosteli Association, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation, Beşir Association and Hayrat Humanitarian Aid Association. In addition to these selected nine organisations, there are several other organisations- such as Bilkent University, Türkmeneli Cooperation and Culture Foundation, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Foundation-, which have placed their name in the TİKA report. However, they are excluded in this research due to the reason that they do not regularly deal with humanitarian aid activities and cannot be categorised within FBOs taxonomy.

I have selected these nine FBOs based on four criteria. These are the longevity and the potential capacity of the FBOs; their political/ideological proximity; motivation (religious or secular); and their outreach/visibility in the society. As Y. Kim argued in his much-cited article titled, "How NGOs Influence US Foreign Aid Allocations" (2015), longevity and the number of the NGOs are important in influencing the U.S.

foreign aid which secures higher amounts of aid from the U.S. government.¹³ The more and the longer FBOs perform field operations abroad, the more they can strengthen the effectiveness of the function of the state, which is elaborated in the fifth chapter more. Longevity gives the opportunity to the NGOs to understand the local situation that gears motivations and eases upcoming aid more systematically.¹⁴ The ideological/political proximity between actors is also a matter for the effectiveness of aid.¹⁵ If organisations have a close relationship with the government, their suggestions are more likely to be listened to by the government. To understand the proximity linkage between selected FBOs and the state, the *National Will Platform* (Milli İrade Platformu) in Turkey is a suitable instance where 293 civil society organisations exist, including İHH, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation, Deniz Feneri Association, Beşir and Hayrat Humanitarian Aid. This platform has released several press statements in support of the ruling party's policies.¹⁶ The other criteria is the motivation of the selected NGO, whether it is a secular or a faith-based organisation. Taking the centrality of G. Clarke and M. Jennings' definition on FBOs -discussed in the second chapter under the heading of "What are FBOs"-and Elizabeth Ferris's four distinctive characteristics¹⁷ of faith-based NGOs, selected organisations are categorised within Faith-based organisation. Finally, selected organisations' outreach and visibility in the society

¹³ Youngwan Kim, "How NGOs Influence US Foreign Aid Allocations", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2015), p.6.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.6.

¹⁵ Axel Dreher, Anna Minasyan and Peter Nunnenkamp, "Government Ideology in Donor and Recipient Countries: Does Political Proximity Matter for the Effectiveness of Aid?" *European Economic Review* (vol. 79, 2015).

¹⁶ For instance, just before the 24th Presidency Election, this Platform released full support to the current government on 22 June 2018, <https://milliradeplatformu.com/guclu-ve-buyuk-turkiye-icin-devam#guclu-ve-buyuk-turkiye-icin-devam> (accessed 20.09.2018).

¹⁷ These are an affiliation with a religious body; financial support from religious sources; board members and the staff are based on religious belief/affiliation; a religious mission statement and decision-making process based on religious value. Elizabeth Ferris, "Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organizations", *International Review of the Red Cross* (Volume 87, number 858, 2005), p.312.

where they perform aid activities through various means is an important element. These four criteria explain why specific NGOs have been chosen, or conversely why others have not been chosen, in this research.

To increase the reliability and validity of the argument, five strategies were also applied. First, the interviews were conducted with two different people in the same organisation at a different time and location to match the consistency of the shared information. Second, to verify the information given by the FBOs, at least two interviews were also held with the relevant state organizations. Third, the *timing* factor was applied to reveal the correlation between the informants' assertions on specific cases. In other words, in the instance where the state and the NGO workers provided contradicting information on their initial role in the same cases, I have considered the date of the activities and campaigning. Fourth, the interviews covered media and discourses of officials to find consistency between the informant's responses and the public officials' remarks. These official sources ensure the coherence between the informant's assertion and the officials' point of view on common topics. Fifth, to engage with the individuals who have worked in humanitarian aid for a substantial amount of time, the respondents were selected from amongst the high-level and/or the senior level positions, that is staff with extensive background knowledge on the activities in their respective organisations. This is known as the *elite interview*, which refers to a particular form of an interview where the respondents are chosen by considering the level of their official position within the organization. This selection process ensured that the interviewees were those with the best knowledge of the organisation and its context, with institutional memory allowing this thesis to pursue in-depth analysis on the political role of the NGOs.

This research makes three specific contributions to the study of state-NGO relations, as added value to the study of International Relations. First, it contributes to the constructivist literature by specifying the role of NGOs to play through direct and indirect techniques. It reveals what roles NGOs seek to play in Turkey's humanitarian policy and practice by providing a more interpretive and descriptive analysis and putting forward an analytical framework to understand Turkey's case.

Linked the first one, second contribution is challenging the passive, ineffective and unilateral approach to the state-civil society relations in Turkey. Third, the study identifies the evolutions of state-NGO relations through the lens of legal frameworks. In other words, it sheds light on how constitutional frameworks have evolved to underpin state-NGO relations in the Turkish case. From this angle, the structure of this study is organised into six chapters, each part representing a building block of the overall thesis.

The first chapter explains overall research design of this dissertation. As Robert K. Yin remarks in his book “Case Study Research, Design and Methods (1994)”, the research design encompass five components which are (1) research questions, (2) propositions (hypothesis), if any (3) unit(s) of analysis, (4) the logic linking the data to the propositions, and (5) the criteria for interpreting the findings.¹⁸ Based on the same logic, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: What roles do NGOs seek to play in Turkey’s humanitarian aid policy and practice by focusing on the five hypothesis mentioned previously? The unit of analysis is the NGOs actions in relation to the state. The analytical framework to the hypothesis is based on constructivist framework and political roles that NGOs employ.

The second chapter is divided into two different sub-headings. To begin, the chapter identifies the range of non-state actors in world politics. A definitional discussion of each actor is provided. This section scrutinizes the types, range and number of non-state actors and non-governmental organizations, by clarifying actorness status of non-state organisations within global politics. Following a descriptive analysis, the chapter provides a taxonomy to non-state actors. The chapter, then, turns to a more in-depth analysis and conceptual examination of faith-based non-governmental organizations, as much of the discussion within this study revolves around the role of FBO’s in Turkey’s humanitarian aid. The second part of this chapter proceeds to analyse the relevance of mainstream international relations theories to non-state actors. By doing so, a brief sketch of theories – (Neo)Realism,

¹⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods* (Second Edition, California: Sage Publications, 1994). p.20.

(Neo)Liberalism, and Constructivism - is outlined. Their theoretical outlook on the relevance of NSAs is scrutinized respectively. Among these in particular, constructivism regards non-state actors as powerful entities, able to change state preferences by offering a more subtle understanding of world politics. Therefore, this part specifically touches upon constructivism and its relevance to NGOs.

The third chapter takes a threefold focus. The first section provides a brief background on foreign aid and its relationship with development studies. This part also underlines growing role of non-governmental organisation in development aid within historical retrospective. The second section outlines basic definitions of foreign aid to comprehend all aspects of the concept. The third section is devoted to an examination of the empirical literature on types of foreign aid, including development aid and humanitarian aid. To identify the research topic, this part also specifically deals with humanitarian aid, which is non-political *per se*, yet it can indeed perform a political function when it operates within a political context.¹⁹

The forth chapter provides the conceptual framework of the thesis. Constructing an analytical framework to map out state-NGO relations, this part seeks to identify which political role underpins NGOs in relation with the state. Drawing on the constructivist perspective, it analyses five techniques that NGOs employ as political role, alongside the alternative toolkits that matter in foreign aid. It shall be emphasized again that here the focus is on roles played by the NGOs and the thesis does not make any claims to the effectiveness and therefore the impact of NGOs. Five political roles are identified: agenda-setting, norm-building, lobbying, framing and information providing. Considering the importance of each factor, this part also provides examples of NGO roles. Lastly, a path diagram is provided to exhibit the direct and indirect role of NGOs on state policy.

The fifth chapter primarily presents the general structure, content, scope, objective and principles of Turkish official development assistance and NGO's humanitarian aid landscape, in the period 2004-2016. Divided into two parts, the first part

¹⁹ Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", *The American Political Science Review* (Vol. 56, No. 2, Jun. 1962), p.301.

investigates a brief history of Turkey's growing role in official development assistance (ODA) from recipient country to the net donor. Additionally, turning points in development assistance are outlined with figures and charts. Moreover, this part addresses humanitarian aid from Turkey based on annually-published reports of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA). The second part of this chapter develops a framework to analyse FBO-led humanitarian aid activities through the cases of nine prominent Turkish-based FBOs. Following Turkish NGOs' overall humanitarian aid activities, the chapter focuses on each of selected nine faith-based organisations by underlying their thematic area, founding principles, orientation, and humanitarian aid activities.

The sixth chapter extensively covers the legal framework and empirical data of the study. Following the identification of the five stages of policy-making (known as policy cycle), this part examines the EU's four gradual levels of participation of NGOs in the decision-making process. These three models are synthesized as a whole. Based on these accounts the nature of state-NGO relations in the case of Turkey is outlined. Here, three prominent humanitarian aid actors -AFAD, TİKA and Kızılay- are identified, exploring their legal duties given by the constitution and their practical relationship with NGOs. The second part of this chapter assesses the implication of the thesis's main arguments. Based on the accounts gathered by semi-structured interviews and the authors personal field experience, this part explains how the conceptual model is applicable to the thesis hypothesis. Through the presenting how NGOs employ the five techniques to appeal to the state, the validity of the five hypotheses and conceptual model is demonstrated. The aim of this part is to highlight how the theory and evidence align, and to see what is consistent and what is anomalous. The third section of this part finally assesses the gathered data and observations regarding the interviews. Because, several key points raised by the informants that would not otherwise put into state-NGO humanitarian aid relation under five political roles, have been added in this part as supportive remarks to thesis's overall objective. The final chapter of the thesis is the conclusion part which gathers all finding, results, and consequences based on data investigated throughout the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

2.1. ACTORS IN WORLD POLICTICS

"A central focus of world politics will be on the coexistence of interaction between transnational organizations and the nation-state"

Samuel Huntington, 1973

It has long been acknowledged that world politics consists of complex interactions among similar units, known as nation states. Within this interaction, entities such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations, inter-governmental organisations are given secondary status as non-state actors (NSAs).²⁰ Within these entities, some envisage multinational corporations as the principal agent in triggering fundamental changes in world politics and its ascending entities.²¹ Others maintain that the structure of the international system

²⁰ Peter Willetts, "Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics", in John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford University Press, Six edition, 2013), p.320.

²¹ Critical scholars such as Emmanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunde Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto pointed out the importance of transnational economic relations in limiting state's unilateral actions.

can still be treated on the basis of inter-state relations.²² Somewhat more implicitly, a cohort of scholars underline greater power for new actors of international governance²³, whilst others emphasise preliminary global social movements resembling “global civil society”, or the bringing into existence of a “world polity.”²⁴ Meanwhile, several scholars see actors in world politics as “transnational activist networks”, representing the interests of resource-poor actors.²⁵

The process that prepares the ground for these debates started with the second world war. The emergence of the post-World War II period was a turning point for the strength of the non-state actor, particularly concerning the acceleration of their power at the expense of the state. Several factors have weakened the “state-as-a-unitary-actor” line of thought, including the rapid development in technology and communications posing direct intersections between actors and sectors, and the increased economic power of multinational corporations in parallel to the increasing level of political, cultural and commercial transactions between individuals, societies, and states.²⁶

²² Notably American International Relations was driven by the debates between neo-realists and the liberal institutionalist, sharing the assumptions that the States as coherent and mostly rational actors continued to define international relations. Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, *Non-State Actors in World Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2001), p.11.

²³ James Rosenau and Ernst Czempiel, *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

²⁴ John Boli and George Thomas(eds.), *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1999).

²⁵ Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

²⁶ Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift”, *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1997), p.50-66.

In addition to this, the interstate model founds too inadequate to grasp world affairs, so a new realistic model was proposed in the 1970s, principally for two reasons.²⁷ Firstly, some non-state actors such as NGOs gained much more power and influence in their respective area than some of the nation-states. Secondly, states are not treated like ships that have unified structures and can pursue only one course of action at a time. As such, since states are not unified, various entities within the state engage in transnational processes and with organizations to thwart the activities of other groups.²⁸

Today's globalized world politics questions the absolutes of the Westphalia system in which non-state actors' influence on a wide range of issue-areas (environment, economy, human right) is an undeniable fact, *res ipsa loquitur*. An alternative model of the world system, therefore, gradually included other actors such as intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and multinational business enterprises. Such a landscape was predicted nearly five decades ago by Samuel Huntington who extensively stressed the significance of the relationship between state and non-state actors by uttering that "a central focus of world politics will be on the coexistence of interaction between transnational organizations and the nation-state."²⁹

From this background, then, this chapter consists of two sections. The first part scrutinizes actors in world politics, exploring three key aspects. It identifies who the actors are in world politics, presents a definitional discussion, and discusses state and non-state actors separately. It then follows on with the classification, types, and range of non-state actors and non-governmental organizations. In this

²⁷ Kjell Skelsbaek, "The Growth of International Nongovernmental Organization in the Twentieth Century", in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Harvard University Press, 1973), p.87.

²⁸ The compelling argument is that how these organizations are dependent on governments, or independent from government control. Skjelsbaek uses "extra-nationalism" that differs from transnationalism, which is defined in terms of activities across state borders by nongovernmental actors. Though their possible influence on high politics is mainly indirect but not, a priori, negligible. See Kjell Skelsbaek, op.cit., p.86.

²⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics", *World Politics* (Vol.25, no:3, 1973), p.368.

section, intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations are dealt with separately through underlining their historical trace, characteristic of NGOs. In this taxonomy, a catalogue and schema for the catalogue are proposed to understand the place of more complex organizations. Subsequently, this section identifies faith-based organizations within the NGOs classifications. The second part of this chapter analyses three orthodox international relations theories (Realism, Liberalism -also their neo-variants-, and Constructivism) and their relevance to the non-state actors.

The overall contribution of this chapter is framed through two outcomes: First, it seeks to clarify the actorness of non-state actors in world politics. In relation to this, the section provides an overview of the extant literature regarding status of the non-governmental organization in international law. Second, it deals with non-state actors and their relationship with mainstream international relations theories. The premise of the Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism approaches on non-state actor's position within global politics are discussed within the existing literature. Since this dissertation scrutinizes Turkish FBOs' growing role on Turkey's humanitarian aid policy, the suitability of constructivist theories on the thesis' research questions are presented in this chapter.

2.1.1. A Lexical Introduction of Actors in World Politics

Identifying the actors in world politics is a subject of much debate, not only for the analyst, but also for the practitioner of foreign policy and the public as well.³⁰ Despite the convoluted nature of its contextual definition, at the most basic level the actor is defined as “any entity which plays an identifiable role in international relations.”³¹ This definition encompasses both official and unofficial entities, and

³⁰ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essay on International Politics* (John Hopkins Press, 1962), p.3.

³¹ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics: Reference Guide to Concept, Ideas and Institutions* (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1990).

even includes the influence of individuals. In his seminal essay, Oran Young defines an actor in world politics as: “any organized entity that is composed, at least indirectly, of human beings, is not wholly subordinate to any other actor in the world system in effective terms and participates in power relationships with other actors.”³² The underlining point of this definition is that an actor needs to possess a degree of autonomy and influence, rather than the legal and state-related status of sovereignty,³³ which is discussed later in this section.

By this token, Hocking and Smith proposed three criteria for evaluating the international actor: Autonomy, referring to the degree of freedom of action that an actor utilizes in the time of achieving its objective; representation, referring to the types of constituencies which an actor represents; and, influence, underlining the capacity of an actor to affect within a certain context on a specific issue.³⁴ These criteria are rather different from the state-related principles of actorness; sovereignty, recognition of statehood and control of territory and people.³⁵ Hocking and Smith’s account moves beyond the narrow state-related actorness, identifying various kinds of actors that interact in world politics. Somewhat more explicitly, their criteria for labelling an actor opens a new perspective on alternative actors apart from the state. In the light of this assumption, one can begin to acknowledge the existence of individuals, private corporate and even illegal terrorist organizations as actors in world politics.

Accordingly, Hideki Kan follows a similar line to that of Hocking and Smith. His definition of actors in world politics is underpinned by three distinctive

³² Oran Young, “The Actors in World Politics”, in J. N. Rosenau and M. A. East (eds.), *The Analysis of International Politics* (New York: The Free Press. 1972), p.140.

³³ Gustaaf Geeraerts and Anne Mellentin, “Analysing Non-state Actors in World Politics. A Conceptual Approach”, *Pole Paper Series* (ISSN 1370-4508 Vol.1, No:4, October 1995), p.14.

³⁴ Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, *World politics: An introduction to international relations* (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p.71.

³⁵ Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunc, “What Constitutes the Sovereign State?”, *Review of International Studies* (Vol. 22, No. 4, 1996), p. 381-404.

characteristics.³⁶ First, actors should have the autonomous capacity to determine their interests and objectives. Second, they should have the capability to drive human and material resources to implement these interests and objectives. Third, their actions should be strong enough to affect state-to-state relations or the behaviours of other non-state actors in international relations. Each of these three primary characters is directly related to the meaning of actorness. That is to say, any entities which have independence, and the capability to continue their objectives with human resources, can achieve the principles of actorness. This definition typically applies to the actors who engage in transnational relations.

2.1.2. The Range of Transnational Actors

The range of transnational actors is categorized in various ways, such as in relation to their place on the regulatory continuum between purely public and private forms of regulation or actor constellations.³⁷ Some scholars distinguish the actors according to their place in a three-sector model of the state, the private sector, and civil society.³⁸ Likewise, actors in world politics can be distinguished through two dimensions.³⁹ The first dimension refers to their internal structure, which this thesis do not elaborate it, whilst the second is about the motivations of various types of transnational actors. This motivation can be either economic through material gains or promoting principled ideas as well as knowledge. The former is linked to multinational corporations, whereas the latter encompasses a range of actors from

³⁶ Hideki Kan, "Actors in World Politics", in Pinar Bilgin, Paul D. Williams and et al (eds.), *Global Security and International Political Economy*, Volume II, (Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems, EOLSS, 2010), p.179.

³⁷ Anne Peters and et al., *Non-State Actors As Standard Setter* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.14.

³⁸ Ibid., p.14.

³⁹ Thomas Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics" in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (Sage Pub., 2002).

international non-governmental organisation (INGO), such as peace movements, arms control experts, trans-governmental networks among state officials.

In the broadest sense, there are three fundamental transnational actors in world politics. These three actors are defined by their identifiable role in international relations, performed on the international stage through official and unofficial mechanisms. These are state, non-state and mixed actors (or in Archer's phrase, the *hybrid actor*).⁴⁰ The hybrid actor includes both governmental and non-governmental representations, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), whose members include government officials, trade union representatives and employers. Additionally, one can easily theorize about many types of actors in global politics,⁴¹ with each actor exhibiting peculiar features in the sense of membership, scope, objectives, activities, and roles.

The range of actor(s) in world politics is even varying among scholars, who particularly focus on this field. James Rosenau develops a "*two worlds of world politics*" which presents an international system where state and non-state actors coexist.⁴² On the other hand, political scientist Arnold Wolfers puts forward three actors: "state", "corporate actors" and "individual". In particular, he signifies the position of the individual in international politics as an actor.⁴³ He claims that a reaction set in against the traditional state-as-actor approach after World War II, has taken two forms: first the "*individual as actor approach*", or the "*minds-of-men*"

⁴⁰ Clive Archer, *International Organizations*, (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group Press, 2nd Edi. 1992), p.43; and Oran Young "The Actors in World Politics", in J. N. Rosenau and M. A. East (eds.), *The Analysis of International Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

⁴¹ For instance, Dieter Neubert maps out "marginal actor" to consider entities that promote criminality. See more about Dieter Neubert, "Local and Regional Non-state Actors on the Margins of Public Policy in Africa" in Anne Peters and et al.(eds.) *Non-State Actors As Standard Setter* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.36.; see also Peter Willetts, op. cit., "Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics", p.323.


⁴² James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton University Press, 1990), p.6.

⁴³ Wolfers, op. cit., p.4.

approach”, and the second paradigm emphasises the side-by-side existence with the state, or other corporate actors, especially international organizations.⁴⁴ Finally, Peter Willet- forerunner scholar on non-state actor- provides a taxonomy for all actors in global politics on three bases: First, government departments; second, non-legitimate transnational actors, divided into two sub-ranges as criminal and guerrillas/liberation movements; and third legitimate transnational actors, which are categorized under three sub-ranges -transnational companies, political parties and single country NGOs.⁴⁵

On the basis of the argument brought forward, there are various definitions provided by scholars. A synthesis of the different views based on typology of actors will be visualised in the table below, listing actors suggested by different authors. In short, this taxonomy of actors offers a broader picture within alternative perspectives. The list of actors shown in the table constitutes the basic framework of today’s debate, where this research is more in line with this scheme. Basic classifications of actors in world politics can be shown as follow:

Table 1 Typology of Actors in World Politics



⁴⁴ Ibid., p.4.

⁴⁵ Willetts, “Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics”, op. cit.,

This taxonomy excluded individuals and mixed actors. Such exclusion is plausible since contemporary international relations politics has yet to theoretically underpin the individual and mixed actor in gaining ground within those actors.

2.1.2.1. State

The view of states as the main actors to international politics is firmly entrenched with orthodox international relations theories. It is claimed that since the end of the Middle Ages, or more precisely since the 1648 Westphalia War, a comprehensive world system of states has been established which is global in extent, and in which military-political and economic relationship occupy the same geographical space.⁴⁶ Therefore, the parameters of the state system, what is called “modern state building” or “state-as-the-sole-actor”, started with the end of Thirty and Eighty Years Wars (1648) that resulted in an international treaty between parties.⁴⁷

In the formation of the basic premises of the state, the contribution of various scholars was essential. For instance, Max Weber's contribution continues to enjoy wide currency in understanding the state. He remarks that “the modern state is compulsory association which organizes domination,” and “state is a relation of men dominating men which is relation supported through legitimate violence.”⁴⁸ Known as the most widely recognized quoted declaration, Weber concludes this frame by asserting that “a state is a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”⁴⁹ Weber's notion of

⁴⁶ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford University Press, 2000), p.241.

⁴⁷ Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, *International Organization* (Vol. 55, No. 2, Spring, 2001), p.251-287.

⁴⁸ Hans Gerth and Charles Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford University Press, 1958), p.78.

⁴⁹Ibid., p.78.

the state involves three basic elements: *Territory* and social boundary which separate the state from other non-state or private actors.⁵⁰ *Human Community, or People*; and “*authority*” (or *practice* according to Migdal). However, he has been criticized for attempting to only create a heuristic, ideal type of state.⁵¹ Following Weber, Joel Migdal remarks that the state is “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts”⁵² is an essential contribution.

For many years, the basic principles underpinning the concept of the state revolve around these three premises, which are territory, the loyalty of population and sovereignty within its boundary. Among these columns, the precise power of the state is sovereignty, which is the legitimate and ultimate authority over a polity. Therefore, the concept of the state has a fundamental meaning: a legal person, a political community and a government.

Since the state as a legal person is highly abstract, scholars easily confuse the state with three concepts: “country”, “government” and “civil society.”⁵³ If we take the meaning of state as the whole country, there is little room to accept the existence of transnational non-state actors. If we take the state to mean the government only, that does not encompass civil society, then the investigation of intergovernmental relations and the inter-society relationship of transnational actors would be

⁵⁰ Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.17.

⁵¹ Werner J. Cahnman, “Ideal Type Theory: Max Weber’s Concept and Some of Its Derivations”, *The Sociological Quarterly* (Vol.6, No.3, Summer, 1965), p.268-280.

⁵² Migdal, op. cit., p.16.

⁵³ Willetts, “Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics”, op. cit., p. 321.

feasible.⁵⁴ Despite these clarifications, however, no standard method exists to tackle ambiguity. For this reason, therefore, in this thesis the term *state* refers to the abstract legal concept, as well as government and country, and is used to analyse political behaviour.

2.1.2.2. Non-State Actors (NSAs)

“NSAs are heroes and villains in different narratives of international politics”

Daphné Josselin, and William Wallace, 2001

For decades, the term Non-State Actors (NSAs) has remained as vague and diplomatic jargon⁵⁵ in the narrow heading of the state-centric world system. The term NSA began with the emergence of private societies or organizations with a public purpose in the late eighteenth century.⁵⁶ In this century, the restriction of the monarchy's power, sharing power between the legislative, executive and judiciary, and the acquisition of more power by the local people led to the emergence of what we now call non-governmental organisations. That is organisation which are based on this idea of democratic states with socially and politically active citizens.⁵⁷ Active cross-border interaction between various parts of the world has contributed to marking the beginning of transnational activities (setting up international non-

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 321.

⁵⁵ This concept, which was initially expressed in diplomats and decision-makers on international platforms, was later used by academic circles and society. See, Peter Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance* (Routledge, Taylor Francis Group, London, 2011), p.22.

⁵⁶ Bob Reinalda (eds.), “Non-State Actors in the International System of States”, in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors* (Routledge Press, 2013), p.11.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.11.

governmental organisations) and private politics (addressing governments, multinational conference, and inter-governmental organisations).⁵⁸

There are three important factors that have prevented non-state actors from being treated as actors for so long. These are “*etymological obstacles*”; “*judicial obscurity*” and “*inadequacy in global technological development*” (exogenous factors) such as in science and technology. Etymological obstacles refer to the fact that the term “non” is a residual category of things which cannot be explained or included in the dominant concepts and theoretical traditions or within dominant methodologies.⁵⁹ This is why the term “non-state actor” seemed so vague and abstract. Likewise, the definition of transnational non-state organizations appears to pose great conceptual difficulties since they are neither purely governmental, nor purely private in nature.⁶⁰ Scholars who study non-state actors tend to focus on the particular characteristic and their agency, rather than their environment in the fields of economics, sociology, and political sciences.⁶¹ It seems no coincidence, then, that the term NSA “does not contain a positive attribute, but is so to speak- an empty term”.⁶² For this reason, NSAs manifest academic helplessness vis-a-vis the great

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.12.

⁵⁹ Elizabeth Bloodgood, “The Yearbook of International Organizations and Quantitative Non-State Actor Research”, in Bob Reinalda (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors* (Routledge Press, 2013), p.19.

⁶⁰ Gustaaf Geeraerts and Anne Mellentin, “Analysing Non-state Actors in World Politics. A Conceptual Approach”, *Pole Paper Series ISSN 1370-4508* (Vol.1, No:4 October 1995), p.14.

⁶¹ In this regards, Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge Uni. Press, 1995); Josselin, “Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework” op.cit.; and Ann M. Florini (eds.) *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society* (Washington, D.C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).

⁶² Peters, op. cit., p.14.

differences among those actors who accept the state as the most crucial point of reference for governance.⁶³

The second factor is judicial *obscurity* which induces debate concerning the status of NSAs within international law. While NSAs hold greater de facto institutional and economic power, they lack any corresponding legal status. This is because international legal personality is translated to cover those entities that the legal system has cast to appear on the monopoly of law-making, law adjudication, and law enforcement. Therefore, only those *personae* that play a direct role in the legal system could appear on the international stage, irrespective of their participation in the production of the play.⁶⁴

Notwithstanding, NGOs have participated in the process of law-making in two cases: the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Ottawa Convention banning landmines. That is to say NGOs have significantly affected the formal international law-making mechanism.⁶⁵ Another aspect of the participation of NGOs into law adjudication process is the submission by NGOs of *amicus curiae* briefs before international courts.⁶⁶ The increasing practice of submitting *amicus curiae* briefs has gained momentum in recent years, attracting scholarly attention.⁶⁷ In a contemporary sense, NSAs simultaneously act both in the domestic and international arena, regularly convey and accord some form of legitimate

⁶³ Ibid., p.14.

⁶⁴ Bin Cheng, 'Introduction to Subjects of International Law', in M. Bedjaoui (eds.), *International Law: Achievements and Prospects* (Paris and Dordrecht: UNESCO and MartinusNijhoff, 1991), p.24.

⁶⁵ Andrea Bianchi (eds.), *Non-State Actors and International Law* (Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p.xxi.

⁶⁶ Dinah Shelton, "The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings", *American Journal of International Law* (1994), p.61.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.61.

authority.⁶⁸ They assume authorship over several significant issues such as environmental awareness⁶⁹ and human rights through setting agendas, establishing boundaries or limits to action, guaranteeing contracts and providing order and security.

The third factor is related to development of science and technology. To express in turn, rising educational standards, the emergence of global media, international travel means and the revolution in communication became primary driving forces behind in various means. In parallel to a booming global connectivity, a dramatic increase in the number of international organizations, both in private and public sectors, led to the creation of the new architecture of global governance⁷⁰ which constitutes an international, even if only partially global, society.⁷¹ In the twentieth century alone, more than 38,000 IGOs and INGOs were founded, equivalent to a rate of more than one per day.⁷² For that, NSAs were favourably influenced by technological development which increased academic studies on NSAs.⁷³

⁶⁸ Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker (eds.), *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance* (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.4, see also Oscar Schachter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law", *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* (36, 1997), p.7–23.

⁶⁹ K. J. Holsti points out how environmental groups have been instrumental in helping to create an international regime to protect animals' species and to reduce harmful damages of industrial pollution. See more about, K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 6th ed., 1992), p. 338.

⁷⁰ Thomas G. Weiss, D. Conor Seyle, and Kelsey Coolidge, *The Rise of Non-State Actors in Global Governance Opportunities and Limitations* (One Earth Future Foundation, 2013), p.5.

⁷¹ Daphné Josselin, and William Wallace (eds.), *Non-state Actors in World Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p.4.

⁷² Thomas G. Weiss, *Governing the World? Addressing Problems Without Passports* (New York: Routledge, 2014). p.16.

⁷³ Among these studies: Myres S. McDougal, "The Realist Theory in Pyrrhic Victory" *American Journal of International Law* (49, 1955), p.376–378.; Oscar Schachter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law", *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* (36, 1997), p.7– 23.; Reinalda, op cit., p.1–8.; Josselin and Wallace, op, cit., p.1–20.; Fred Halliday, "The

Broadly speaking, NSAs encompass any actors that are non-sovereign and are not states, which can perform, participate and act on the national and international stage.⁷⁴ According to Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, non-profit actors are private, self-governing entities who bear an institutional identity, structurally separate from the instrumentalities of government.⁷⁵ However, they may receive a great amount of government support. The significant point in the definition is the criteria that private actor has an institutional structure and identity which distinguishes it from state and does not exercise governmental authority.⁷⁶

On the other hand, Peter Willetts, one of the leading scholars dealing with NSAs, prefers to use *transnational actors* instead of NSAs. Defining it as "any private group from within one country that involve in activities to another country, or another private group, foreign government, intergovernmental organization, thus transnational actors include not just NGOs but also criminals, terrorists and companies".⁷⁷ In parallel to this, but in a broader sense, Josselin and Wallace interpreted NSAs in three extensive ways.⁷⁸ Firstly, NSAs are entirely economically autonomous and independent from central government control due to their civil structure. In addition, they are autonomous from political impulse beyond the state

Romance of Non-state Actors", In Daphné Josselin and William Wallace (eds.), *Non-state Actors in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.21–40.; Pierre Calame, "Non-state Actors and World Governance" *Forum for a New World Governance Discussion Paper* (2008); Andrew Clapham, "Non-state Actors" in Vincent Chetail (eds.), *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.200–212.

⁷⁴ Wolfers, op, cit., p.3.; In this point, it should be distinguished that defining NSAs chiefly by their independence from state and state authority would be misleading, Josselin, and Wallace, op, cit., p.2.

⁷⁵ Lester M. Salamon, and Helmut K. Anheier, *The Emerging Nonprofit Sector* (Manchester University Press, 1996).

⁷⁶ Reinalda, op.cit.,

⁷⁷ Peter Willet, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics The construction of global governance*, (Routledge Press, 2011), p.23.

⁷⁸ Josselin, and Wallace, op, cit., p.1.

direction and from the market economy. Secondly, by extending the boundaries of two or more states, NSAs operate in a network engaging transnational relations, linking political systems, economies, and societies. Thirdly, NSAs are those whose actions affect political outcomes of states, either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective, or as one aspect of their activities. Transnational non-state actors include not just NGOs, but also political parties, profit-oriented organizations, and even criminal formations. Hence, “NSAs are heroes and villains in different narratives of international politics.”⁷⁹

In addition to its definitive affluence, the range of NSAs is categorically divided into different classifications. For instance, Martin Koch underlines three general forms of NSAs that are intergovernmental organizations; non-governmental organizations; and expertise organizations.⁸⁰ Thomas G. Weiss et al. reflect three types of NSAs: non-governmental organization, transnational corporations, and intergovernmental organizations⁸¹, whilst Miller and Brown divide theirs into two categories: international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational or international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).⁸² Nation-states create the former organizations; the latter are formed by non-state entities. Correlatively, Anne Peters et al. examines three various NSAs which are: inter-governmental or international organizations; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); multinational or transnational corporations (TNCs).⁸³

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.1.

⁸⁰ Martin Koch, "Non-State and State Actors in Global Governance", in Bod Reinalda (eds.) *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors* (Routledge Press, 2013), p.197.

⁸¹ Weiss, ConorSeyle, and Coolidge, op, cit., p.4.

⁸² Muhittin Ataman, “The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-States”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* (Vol.2, No.1, fall 2003), p.43.

⁸³ Peters, *Non-State Actors As Standard Setter*, op. cit., p.14.

It is possible to extend the list of these categorisations. Yet, in a broad sense, the range of NSAs can be classified under three rubrics: Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs); Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and (International)Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). IGOs are defined as an association of (more than two members) states, established by an agreement among its members.⁸⁴ IGOs facilitate international cooperation by offering a venue, providing reliable data and information, acting as advisors or consultants, norm entrepreneurs, law-makers and norm-diffusion agencies. MNCs are another component of the non-state actor in world politics. It seems worth noting that MNCs are not generally deemed to enjoy international legal personality,⁸⁵ which means that MNCs cannot create international binding law by themselves. Yet, they can function as consultants and lobbyists. The other actors such as illegal terrorist groups, political parties, churches, experts etc. can be put into a sub-range of those three NSA categories.

2.1.2.2.1. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

The term “international nongovernmental organization (INGO or NGO)⁸⁶ is a post-World War II expression that first appeared in the UN in 1945 with the provisions of the UN Article 71, Chapter 10. It was first addressed as a consultative role for organisations that are neither member states nor government. Since then, the importance of NGOs in the international arena has grown significantly, gaining a striking position in world politics. The rising influence of NGOs is attributed to the retreat of the state worldwide, which envisages a giving up of responsibilities from

⁸⁴ Martin Koch, “Non-State and State Actors in Global Governance”, in Bod Reinalda (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*, (Routledge Press, 2013), p.200.

⁸⁵ This is a different matter from their legal status under domestic law, which may be formalised (an NGO may, e.g., be incorporated, or registered as an association).

⁸⁶ The abbreviation INGOs is generally used by the academic community, whereas the UN literature favours NGO. While the term NGO refers to national context, the two are used interchangeably here.

the state to other actors in society.⁸⁷ In this juncture, NGOs stand out for their presumed ability and involve private action and public service. In addition, economic growth worldwide led to the formation of a new citizenship attitude towards global issues, such as environment and human rights in which NGO's visibility gained ground.

Despite its increasing attachment to the academic literature, there is no common term that refers to NGOs. For instance, Norbert Götz prefers to use civil associations, while Peter Willetts uses pressure groups. Even in the United States, non-profit organizations are used nearly synonymously with the NGO. Therefore, this chapter first addresses the meaning of NGOs.

2.1.2.2.1.1. Definitions

Reaching a precise definition of an NGO is meant to take a political position, either explicitly or implicitly.⁸⁸ Following this line of reasoning, one can then assume non-governmental organizations do not include all organized groups that are independent of government. A common ground of all NGOs, however, is the *desire to make the world a better place*.⁸⁹

Despite increasing interest and the growing literature on its definition, it is unclear what this phrase encompasses.⁹⁰ So, the nongovernmental organization as a defined

⁸⁷ Lester Salamon, "The Rise of Non-profit Sector," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol 73, No:4, 1994), p.109.

⁸⁸ Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance*, op, cit., p.6.

⁸⁹ Aall, Miltenberger and Weiss, op, cit., p.89.

⁹⁰ Kerstin Martens, "Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations", *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Non-profit Organisations* (Vol. 13, No. 3, 2002), p.272.

concept is still contested.⁹¹ Princen and Finger have underlined a clear reason why it is so complicated to pin down a common characteristic for NGOs since it' "diversity derives from differences in size, duration, range, and scope of activities, ideologies, cultural background, organizational culture, and legal status".⁹²

Much of the research on the definition of NGOs has been drawn from the UN Charter article 71. The UN formulated the NGOs, under the provision of intergovernmental organizations and private organizations, to have formal relations with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In article 71, a clear distinction is drawn between NGOs and government observers or specialized agencies. It notes that "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned."⁹³ However, the first definition of what an "international NGO" (INGO) is found in the resolution 288 (X) of ECOSOC on February 27, 1950, defining it as "any international organization that is not founded by an international treaty."⁹⁴

Despite their descriptive variations on the NGO, there are commonly accepted principles on the definitions. Although it has proved difficult to find a definition of NGOs, the United Nations document of 1994 describes an NGO as quoted in Simmons: "The non-profit entity whose members are citizens or associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the

⁹¹ Steve Charnovitz, "Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law", in Andrea Bianchi(eds.), *Non-State Actors and International Law* (Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p.150.

⁹² Thomas Princen, and Matthias Finger, (eds.), *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global* (Routledge, London, 1994), p.6.

⁹³ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-x/index.html> (accessed 17.01.2019)

⁹⁴ Union of International Association, <https://uia.org/faq/yb4>(accessed 17.01.2019).

collective will of its members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates.”⁹⁵

This definition excludes terrorist groups, private profit-making organizations, and political parties.⁹⁶ However, in his analysis of so-called marginal actors, Dieter Neubert maps such actors as potential non-state actors with significant standard-setting authority.⁹⁷ Peter Willets asserts that NGOs are “any non-violent, non-profit, organized group of people who are not seeking governmental office.”⁹⁸ Finally, extensive coverage on its definition is conducted by Norbert Götz, who enriches the scope of the NGOs definitions by seeking for an appropriate praxis-based definition. His definitions are rather politics-oriented and relational, instead of typological and polity-oriented.⁹⁹ After an extensive discussion on the background of NGOs, he concludes with a precise definition: “non-governmental organization (NGO) is a private body in its capacity of being excluded, marginalized, graded, contained, or used by a government, an intergovernmental organization, or an observer.”¹⁰⁰

In a nutshell, there is extensive usage of various definitions of NGOs which broadens the content of its characters. A variety of definitions are also provided by the organizations such as the World Bank, the UNDP and OECD. Despite contestations over the meaning of the term, in the narrowest frame, NGOs are

⁹⁵ P. J. Simmons, “Learning to Live with NGOs”, *Foreign Policy* (No. 112. Autumn, 1998), p.83.

⁹⁶ Peters, “Towards Non-State Actors As Effective, Legitimate, And Accountable Standard Setters”, op, cit.,

⁹⁷ Dieter Neubert, “Local and regional non-state actors on the margins of public policy in Africa” in Anne Peters and et al *Non-State Actors As Standard Setter* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.35.

⁹⁸ Peter Willets (eds.), *The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System*, (Hurst, London, 1996), p.5.

⁹⁹ Norbert Götz, “Reframing NGOs: The Identity of an International Relations Non-Starter”, *European Journal of International Relations* (Vol. 14/2, 2008), p.250.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.250.

independent of government and are not profit-making organizations.¹⁰¹ In the broadest sense, NGOs are organizations that: are not established by intergovernmental agreement, are dedicated to alleviating human problems, have some sort of representative structure and aims that are not-for-profit, are private in essence, have a voluntary and self-governing character and do not use violence.

2.1.2.2.1.2. A Taxonomy for NGOs

Taxonomy provides a reference to figure out what NGOs do, how their structure, goal, and objective are framed, who their members are, and where their money comes from. This classification gives us a clearer picture of their respective goals, membership, area of operations, functions, geographic range and other factors. This section touches upon these taxonomic elements in NGO classification. Therefore, this part is important to understanding how an NGO is categorised, which will help in analysing nine selected Turkish FBO's relationship with the state.

According to Willetts, NGOs apply and combine four different types of structure when they cooperate transnationally: *as international NGOs*, which are established as formal joint organizations with a permanent headquarters, secretariats, and regular meeting; *as advocacy networks*, which bring together various NGOs, and sometimes other governmental and non-governmental actors to achieve major policy changes against the oppositions of leading governments;¹⁰² *as caucuses*, which is a temporary network formed to aid the lobbying on the agenda items at the

¹⁰¹ While NGOs are seen as synonymous with non-profits, a distinction between the two is necessary. Non-profit encompasses an extensive range of organizations, such as museums, universities, and hospitals that focus on services and rarely engage in advocacy. By contrast, NGOs always have a vital advocacy mission. See more about James A. Paul, "NGOs, Civil Society, and Global Policy Making", *Global Policy Forum* (2000), p.1.

¹⁰² Keck and Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Border: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, op. cit.,

particular meeting; *as governance*, which is formed by NGOs to enhance participation rights of NGOs in intergovernmental meetings.¹⁰³

Many NGOs are organized around particular issue areas, while others maintain activities to address human rights, peace or environment. Some provide services (e.g. humanitarian aid) or advocacy or do both. Other NGOs are information-gathering and disseminating bodies (i.e. Transparency International). In this regard, NGOs are categorized into *operational groups* that run their projects and *advocacy groups* that seek to influence policy.¹⁰⁴ In contrast to the former which provide aid, medical care, safe water, sanitation and food such as the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders and Oxfam; the latter is aimed at promoting some specific issues and are dedicated to raising awareness, broadening knowledge, influencing public perceptions by doing activities like lobbying, press work, and events. This thesis' selected FBOs are set in both operational and advocacy groups.

NGOs relationship with their own government is another category in understanding link between the state and NGOs. In this regard, various acronyms have been applied: BINGO (Business and industry NGOs), GONGO (Government-organized NGOs), GRINGO (Government regulated NGOs), DONGO (donor-dominated NGOs) and AGO (anti-governmental organizations).¹⁰⁵ In this sense, NGOs can be divided into two dimensions: purposive orientations (public interest versus private) and spatial scope (transnational versus international).¹⁰⁶ NGOs have public interest orientations which aim to promote public good such as environmental protections (e.g. Greenpeace), development aid (e.g. Oxfam), or human rights (e.g. Amnesty

¹⁰³Willetts, "Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics", op, cit., p.331.

¹⁰⁴Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance*, op, cit., p.8.


¹⁰⁵ Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (Lynne Rienner Pub., 2010), p.223.

¹⁰⁶ Martin Koch, op, cit., p.202.

International). In contrast, NGOs can be classified as public interest or private foundations (e.g. the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation).

Maintenance is another category in analysing NGOs. Mainly two resources are significant when NGOs want to influence public policy: "members" and "money."¹⁰⁷ Regarding spatial scope, NGOs are domestic actors when they frame their operations within the national political system, and international actors when co-operating across national boundaries, such as involving a network which gathers NGOs from various states. Geographic range of NGOs varies, combining six scopes of NGO: Community-based, city-wide, sub-national, national, regional and transnational. Their level of action is divided into three levels: micro-policy, macro-policy, and norm-setting.¹⁰⁸ Finally, Membership is another category of analysing NGOs, encompassing individual, quasi-governmental, voluntary and open-to-everyone in practice.

Table 2: A Taxonomy for Non-government Organizations



¹⁰⁷ Shamima Ahmed and David M. Potter, *NGOs in International Politics* (Kumarian Press, London: 2006), p.27.

¹⁰⁸ James A. Paul, "NGOs, Civil Society, and Global Policy Making", *Global Policy Forum* (2000), p.2.

In short, NGOs can have diverse objectives and forms. This taxonomy on the level, origins, goals, membership, interest, funding, activities, structure, vision, and several other factors differentiate each NGO from each other. Therefore, the exact number of NGOs depends on which classifications of NGOs one prefers. This taxonomy helps to understand the position of the religious-oriented non-governmental organisation in the overall NGO literature.

2.1.3. Faith-Based Non-Governmental Organizations (FBOs)

“You shall give the due alms to the relatives, the needy, the poor, and the travelling alien, but do not be excessive, extravagant”. Qur’an, 17:26

FBOs are key actors in international development and aid flow.¹⁰⁹ They have historically been at the forefront of relief aid, and poverty alleviation as channels and providers of international aid.¹¹⁰ This is reflected, for example, both in theoretical studies and at a practical level with the UN and donor state's implications. Serving as a "gap filler" both for state retreat and market-driven programmes, FBOs today represent one of the key drivers of civil society.¹¹¹ They are among some of the oldest and well-organized entities which featured more saliently in the scholarly literature on a wide range of service and civil society. For some, they represent new incarnations of previously established religious organizations.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Laurie Occhipinti, “Faith-based Organizations: An Introduction”, in Emma Tomalin (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development* (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2015).

¹¹⁰ Aud V. Tonnessen, “Faith-based NGOs in International Aid: Humanitarian Agents or Missionaries of Faith, *Forum for Development Studies* (34:2, 2007), p.323.

¹¹¹ Charles Pemperton (eds.), *Theology and Civil Society* (Routledge, 2017).

¹¹² Julia Berger, “Religious Nongovernmental Organizations: An Exploratory Analysis”, *International Journal of Voluntary and Non-profit Organizations* (Vol, 14, No:1, 2003), p.20.

Although having had a long-lasting existence in civil society structure and with nearly 80 percent of the world's population professing some sort of religious faith,¹¹³ the issue of faith-based organisations has long been uneasy due to two factors. First, FBOs' self-originated ignorance, relating to their philosophy envisaging exclusion from public level and media, means they stand aloof from their secular counterparts.¹¹⁴ Second, society and secular NGOs have attached negative connotations to this type of organisation and they tended to regard FBOs as the subset of NGOs, marginal and as a counterforce to modernization.¹¹⁵ In addition, they see religious values as backward, inflexible and opposed to change,¹¹⁶ anti-developmental,¹¹⁷ and are suspicious of ulterior motives.¹¹⁸ Finally, they lack in agreement on what constitutes a religious NGO as legal.¹¹⁹ Despite

¹¹³ Matthew Clarke and Vicki-Anne Ware, "Understanding Faith-Based Organizations: How FBOs Are Contrasted With NGOs In International Development Literature", *Progress in Development Studies* (15,1, 2015), p.39.

¹¹⁴ Wolfgang Bielefeld and William Suhs Cleveland, "Defining Faith-Based Organizations and Understanding Them Through Research", *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* (42/3, 2013), p.443.; see also, Clarke and Ware, op, cit., p.38.

¹¹⁴ Robert Wuthno, *Saving America: Faith-based Services and the future of Civil Society* (Princeton University Press, 2004), p10.

¹¹⁵ Occhipinti, op, cit.,

¹¹⁶ Gerard Clarke, "Agents of Transformation: Donor, Faith-based Organizations and International development," *Third World Quarterly* (28:1, 2007) p.78.

¹¹⁷ Rick James, "What is Distinctive About FBOs?: How European FBOs define and Operationalise their faith." *INTRAC Praxis Paper* (22, 2009), p.3.

¹¹⁸ Jenny Lunn, "The Role of Religion, Spiritually, and Faith in Development: A Critical Theory Approach", *Third World Quarterly* (30/5, 2009), p.943.

¹¹⁹ Berger, op, cit., p. 17.

this, there has been a global religious revitalisation since the 1970s¹²⁰, or as Peter Berger called it, a “*deseccularization of the world*.”¹²¹

This chapter now turns to a more in-depth analysis and conceptual examination of faith-based non-governmental organizations (hereafter, FBOs).¹²² Such analysis is much needed as this thesis aims to map the uncharted terrain of Turkish-based Muslim-oriented NGOs through the identifications of their involvement in foreign aid policy. To do that, this part of the thesis contributes to faith/secular distinctions in the literature. After focusing on the etymological understanding of faith and religion, this part then moves onto typologies of FBOs and characteristics of Muslim faith-based organisations. It also provides a conceptual framework to analyse the character of selected Turkish NGOs, whether they are set in secular or faith values.

¹²⁰ Gerard Clarke indicates six fundamental events which led to a growing salience of FBOs in international development. First, the rise of political Islam in the Middle East and Gulf, including Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Second, the elections of Ronald Reagan as US President in 1980, a historical landmark in the rise of US Christian right, centred on evangelical congregations. Third, aid to the Mujahidin echoed increasing aid from Arab countries (particularly Saudi Arabia) to others with substantial Muslim populations. Fourth is the decline of communism and demise of the Cold War which fuelled the rise of identity politics, centred on ethnic, cultural as well as religious identity. Fifth is the emergence of the transnational civil society that fostered a growth in faith-based activities. Finally, the immigration context increased multi-cultural and multi-faith society in the Western states, in which the migrant community establish a certain familial link to the country of origin. Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bringing the Sacred and the Secular* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.18-24.

¹²¹ Peter L. Berger (eds.), *The Deseccularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999).

¹²² By and large, the term of FBOs and religious NGOs are frequently used interchangeably. The term of Religious NGO is more common at the UN, yet scholars more widely use faith-based organizations, policymakers and practitioners, however, there is a distinction between religious NGOs, i.e. organizations involved in social activities as an integral part of mission for the affiliated, and faith-based NGOs, i.e organisations engaged in social activities without directly involving or performing religious mission though they are often inspired and motivated by religious values. This thesis will use the latter terminology throughout the remainder of this thesis and shorten the designation to FBOs. Also, in this thesis, the term religion or religious refers to activities that include various religious heritages and reserve the use of the term faith to describe particularly Islamic activities.

The direct contribution of this section to the thesis is to understand whether those selected nine Turkish NGOs, discussed in the fifth chapter, can be classified as faith-based organisations or not. The criteria for an NGO to be called faith-based are discussed in detail in this chapter. Therefore, the conceptual framework referred to throughout this part will be applied to those nine Turkish NGOs.

2.1.3.1. A Comparison between Faith-based Organizations and Secular NGOs¹²³

One of the most salient characteristics of all NGOs, secular or faith-based, is that they are moral entities¹²⁴ which challenge wrong in favour of right. These *third sector* institutions are characterized by networks of people seeking to “change the status quo in the interest of some assumed public good”.¹²⁵ In this regard, all NGOs have founding principles which are “*force for good*”, helping to improve the well-being of the disadvantaged community, with the essential objective of promoting common goals both at domestic and international level. That is why FBOs and secular NGOs share several common characteristics such as independence, being non-profit, voluntary and altruistic, but their establishment dates are rather different.

¹²³ In this context, secular NGOs encompass all NGOs which are not established with a faith mission, and their overriding motivations are not religiously based. The word of secularism is not a clear-cut concept which is derived from the same etymological root as the French word *siècle*, meaning century or age. However, most people are familiar with the usage of secular as opposed to religion (not entirely rejecting), at least exclusion of religion from public affairs, from political and civic affairs, from public institutions and elimination from a philosophical or moral system. Secular, in this context, refers to those organizations based on non-faith merits and implications. See more about the etymological background of secular vs faith variations. Emma Tomalin, *Religions and Development* (Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013), p. 69.

¹²⁴ Berger, op. cit., p.19.

¹²⁵ Charles Chatfield, “Intergovernmental and nongovernmental associations to 1945”, in Smith, J., Chatfield, C., and Pagnucco, R. (eds.), *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse University Press, 1997), p.19.

On the other hand, several characters set FBOs apart from secular NGOs. FBOs have a constituency that is broader than humanitarian concern.¹²⁶ In other words, the motivations of NGO mission and implementations are distinguishing factors between the two. Though FBOs operate within the same political and legal framework together with other secular NGOs, their missions are guided by a concept of the divine and recognition of the sacred nature of human life.¹²⁷ They are distinguished through their affiliation with structure, doctrine or community.¹²⁸ Often FBOs serve both the spiritual and non-spiritual needs of people whom they help. In contrast, secular NGOs do not include spirituality in their work.

Likewise, FBOs are more directly able to raise moral issues, fueling a sense of moral duty, whereas secular NGOs rely to a degree on appeals to morality as a means of activating public opinion and awareness.¹²⁹ Furthermore, secular NGOs' must build their resource and support networks from the ground up, whilst faith-based organizations have access to widespread social and resource networks by virtue of the long-lasting existence of faith networks in the communities.¹³⁰ While both organizations could receive money from governments, FBOs tend to finance their income directly from civil society due to its almsgiving and religious practice revenue-scheme.

Based on these distinctions, four significant characteristics distinguish FBOs from their secular peers.¹³¹ First, they draw on elaborate moral and spiritual values that

¹²⁶ Elizabeth Ferris, "Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organizations", *International Review of the Red Cross* (Volume 87, number 858, 2005), p.316.

¹²⁷ Berger, op, cit., p.19.

¹²⁸ Clarke and Ware, op, cit., p.40.

¹²⁹ Berger, op, cit., p.35.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.20.

¹³¹ Tomalin, op, cit.,p.206. (cited in Clarke, 2006, p.845).

distinguish them. Second, this moral value increases their ability to mobilize adherents. Third, they have extensive networks¹³² and are embedded in political contests and the process of governance in both horizontal and vertical terms. Finally, they are less dependent on donor funding. As a regular fulfilment of all monotheistic faiths to give charity to faith-related organisations, this remains an essential source of income to faith-based organizations.

These classifications, however, are often not compatible in practice, so the gap between the two could hardly be greater. This is because the great variety in types of FBOs produces many ways of expressing their faith component in practice.¹³³ For instance, Islamic Charities in Karachi, Pakistan, do not identify themselves as FBOs, since they believe that the Islamic framework would impede their income capacity from the international arena. In other cases, the Aga Khan Foundation - the humanitarian arm of the Ismailis - identifies itself as a secular organization. Similarly, many religious actors are involved in development with a secular logic and work towards material goals, although drawing on religion and oriented by faith.¹³⁴ The content on etymological differences is clearly evident between secular and faith, but there is no easy way to measure this variation, nor is it the aim of this dissertation to do that.

In short, the differences between the two kinds of actors is not only stemming from their organisational and institutional structure, but the degree of relations with the government in respective countries. That is to say, the role of FBOs or secular NGOs on state policies depends on several factors, including the ruling leaders' proximity with religious organisations and the societal dynamic of casual people

¹³² Even in the smallest village; there is a mosque, a temple, a church or a traditional healer because small communities are primarily bound to faith. Religion in these parts of the world is still central to the social, cultural and moral life.

¹³³ Beryl Hugen, "The Difference of Faith: The Influence of Faith in Human Service Programs", *Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought* (28:4, 2009), p.408.

¹³⁴ Darren Noy, "Material and Spiritual Conceptions of Development: A framework of Ideal Types", *Journal of Developing Studies* (25, 2009), p.300.

from the countries in focus, whether they tend to be more faith-oriented or not. Therefore, various dynamics must be considered in this research to understand the complex relationship between FBOs and the state.

2.1.3.2. What is FBO?

The term FBO is itself often taken for granted¹³⁵, and therefore, it is highly problematic due to different religious groups interpreting it in different ways.¹³⁶ Its understanding is changeable in terms of social, cultural, political and geographical context. For instance, unlike in Europe where FBOs are more like secular NGOs, in Africa, by contrast, FBOs are seen as churches or mosques. Within this heterogeneity, seven terms refer to the same meaning: faith-based organizations, faith-related organizations, religious organizations, parachurch, charitable choice, social service, and service provider.¹³⁷ But when it is examined in *extenso*, each concept has its own definition and principles that vary. For this reason, it is worthwhile helping to clarify what religion or faith-based versus faith-related concepts are and defining what is included or excluded in each terminology from the outset, because the term faith based- which is used throughout the thesis- differs from other terms in various points.

The term *faith-related* or *faith-based* is used differently, as both terminologies address different interpretations. For instance, Smith and Sosin (2001) prefer to use faith-related organizations rather than faith-based, as the former is a considerably broader concept than the latter. Faith-related does not necessarily concern itself with the integration of faith in performing actions which may contain traditional

¹³⁵ Tomalin, op, cit., p.220.

¹³⁶ James, op, cit., p. 4.

¹³⁷ Wolfgang Bielefeld and William Suhs Cleveland, "Defining Faith-Based Organizations and Understanding Them Through Research", *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* (42(3), 2013), p.444.

providers who are not formed by religious programme content without formal denominational ties with interfaith groups.¹³⁸ On the other hand, depending on place and purpose, the term faith-based is employed in policy initiatives to increase religious ideologies in activities.

Another terminology often used in academic studies as a substitute for faith-based organizations is *religious NGOs*. While the distinction is conceptually and operationally tricky to pin down with precision,¹³⁹ there is an implicit tension between the two. To express this in the broadest sense, religion is associated with the rules, values and social practice that stem from the belief in a spiritual and supreme being which include Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, usually codified in a sacred text such as the Bible, Quran, or Bhagavad Gita(buddhist book that is called Tripitaka).¹⁴⁰ That is to say, religion is not a static set of values and beliefs, but a dynamic social construction which is subject to change concerning tradition and how belief is interpreted.¹⁴¹ Faith, conversely, encompasses not only the sacred texts mentioned above, but also political philosophies with strong religious elements, and belief systems associated with traditional indigenous societies,¹⁴² as well as including significant religious or quasi-religious movements.¹⁴³ Despite these distinctions, the word “religious” is usually used instead of the word of faith.

¹³⁸ Kathleed Tangenberg, “Spirituality and Faith-Based Social Services”, *Journal of Religious & Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought* (23:3, 2004), p.5.

¹³⁹ Clarke and Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bringing the Sacred and the Secular*, op, cit., p.5.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.5.

¹⁴¹ Severine Deneulin and Carole Rakodi, “Revisiting Religion: Development Studies Thirty Years on”, *World Development* (39/1, 2010), p.50.

¹⁴² Such as mysticism, animism, and shamanism.

¹⁴³ As the African Independent Church or Evangelical Churches of Latin America. See more about, Clarke and Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bringing the Sacred and the Secular*, op, cit., p.5.

So, the differences between these two terms may be relatively minimal, such as a question of usage and style rather than a specific technical difference.¹⁴⁴

The definition of FBOs varies among scholars. One of the leading scholars, G. Clarke and M. Jennings define FBOs as “any organizations that derive inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teaching and principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation of school of thought within the faith.”¹⁴⁵ Robert Wuthnow highlights that FBOs must be connected with an organized faith community together with a religiously oriented mission statement and ideology.¹⁴⁶ Although Wuthnow’s identifications require an affiliation with an organized faith-community, Clarke and Jennings’s definition is much more encompassing, including all organizations as FBOs if they are founded with the idea of spiritual attachment or goals, rather than structurally connected with a faith community, like various forms of shamanism.¹⁴⁷

Some thinkers have a conceptual approach through focusing on criteria rather than definitions. For instance, Elizabeth Ferris characterizes FBOs by having one or more of the following criteria: affiliation with a religious body, financial support from religious sources, board members and staff are based on religious belief/affiliation, a religious mission statement and decision-making process based on religious value.¹⁴⁸ Peter Howard, on the other hand, proposes six distinctive features and principles that are required of an NGO to be called a faith-based organization.¹⁴⁹ First, the notion of the sacredness of life which envisages the value

¹⁴⁴ Occhipinti, op, cit.,

¹⁴⁵ Clarke and Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bringing the sacred and the Secular*, op, cit., p.5.

¹⁴⁶ Occhipinti, op, cit.,

¹⁴⁷ Clarke and Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society*, op, cit., 5.

¹⁴⁸ Ferris, op, cit., p.312.

¹⁴⁹ Peter Howards, “Humanitarian Aid Organizations and Sustainable Development”, The Paper Presented at the G20 Interfaith Summit Meeting in Istanbul, 2015 (cited in Dan Heist and Ram A.

of life for all. Second, FBOs have a long-term and consistent existence in a wide range of areas with great needs. Third, FBOs use religious doctrines that promote help for the needy and are rendered as a voice of conscience. Fourth, FBOs indicate how faith is a key factor for coping and resilience, so they operate from the standpoint of faith. Fifth, FBOs advocate the philosophy of forgiveness and mercy. Sixth, FBOs fully underscore charity, which means a willingness to give time, attention and resources in abundance. However, it is difficult to find FBOs which are fully adhere to all of these six requisites.

Having said this, difficulties to locate faith in the faith-based organization are evident. Yet, Thomas Jeavons suggests that organizations may clearly define their religiosity through seven dimensions: self-identity, participants, resources, goals, decision-making procedures, power-authority, and inter-organizational relationship.¹⁵⁰ These dimensions represent the continuum or degree of an organizations' religiosity. The focal point lies on the tie or link to institutional religion, and these ties and links revolve around three areas: resource, authority, and culture.¹⁵¹ Overall, four grounds are distinguishing factors of FBOs: economic source (charity, almsgiving), establishment principles (evangelism, advocate forgiveness, mercy, and voluntarism) and organizations structure (independent) enforcement on the practice (operate from the standpoint of faith.)

Cnaan, "Faith-Based International Development Work: A Review", *Religious MDPI Journal* (7,19, 2016), p.3.

¹⁵⁰ Thomas H. Jeavons, "Identifying Characteristics of Religious Organisation", in N.J.Demerath and et al. (eds.) *Sacred Companies: Organizational Aspects of Religion and Religious Aspects of Organizations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.81.

¹⁵¹ Beryl Hugen, "The Difference of Faith: The Influence of Faith in Human Service Programs", *Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought* (28:4, 2009), p.408.

FBOs differ in the extent to which faith provides the impulse for action.¹⁵² Due to this inherent variety, many FBOs remain vague about their definition of faith.¹⁵³ Furthermore, since overly broad definitions exist in the literature, it is unclear how FBOs would differentiate between congregations, such as FBOs that are established to serve the poor, or organizations that serve the public who are part of a religion's institutional structure.¹⁵⁴ In this sense, typology helps to uncover a much clearer framework to grasp the range of organization types that comprise FBOs. A typology of FBOs is quite requisite to bringing a more nuanced understanding of significant differences within and between them.

2.1.3.3. Typologies of FBOs

Academics and practitioners have distinguished NGOs based on structure, origin, goals, functions, membership, spatial scope, region, mission, and representation. These categorizations, however, have several flaws which are subjective and normative in nature.¹⁵⁵ This is because there is a broad range of ways in which FBOs are classified and categorized in relations to general NGOs framework. To clarify the position of FBOs within the landscape of NGOs, M. Clarke and V. Ware provide an overview of seven various nexus and alternative categorizations between FBOs and NGOs.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Clarke and Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bringing the sacred and the Secular*, op, cit., p.7.

¹⁵³ James, op, cit., p.12.

¹⁵⁴ Occhipinti, op, cit.,

¹⁵⁵ Terje Tvedt, "Understanding the History of the International Aid System and the Development Research Tradition: The Case of the Disappearing Religious NGOs", *Forum for Development Studies* (33:2, 2006), p.347.

¹⁵⁶ These are, intersections, distinct, substitute, subset, co-existing, atomistic grouping, constitutive. See more detail, Matthew Clarke and Vicki-Anne Ware, "Understanding Faith-based Organizations:

There are different criteria that are taken as a basis to define various typologies of FBOs. Based on different variables, several typologies can be put forth: their thought, their attitudes towards traditional principles of humanitarianism, their dependence/independence from government and their impartial traditional or partial stance regarding humanitarian principles.¹⁵⁷ Similarly, there are many ways to cut the cake, in so far as FBOs as a set of organizations are concerned.¹⁵⁸ For instance, the critical religious world sub-divide into different branches and the ethos of FBO may derive from one of these as such from Christianity, Islam, Jewish or in faith/ sub-faith system of Buddhism, or Hindutva (sectarian Hindu nationalism).

Taking the engagement of organisations in the development sector, G. Clarke suggests five types of FBOs: “faith-based representative organizations or apex bodies” which rule on doctrinal matters, “faith-based charitable or development organizations” which mobilise the faithful in support of the poor, “ faith-based socio-political organisations” which interpret and deploy faith as a political construct, “faith-based missionary organizations” which spread distinct faith message beyond the faithful and seeking to convert, “faith-based radical, illegal or terrorist organizations” which promote militant forms of faith identity.¹⁵⁹ He claims that donors have typically engaged with FBOs of the second type, faith-based charitable or development organizations, and selected Turkish NGOs in this thesis fall into this sector. Although his analysis encompasses clear-cut divisions among FBOs, this category is malleable, as an FBO can straddle more than one of these taxonomies.

How FBOs are contrasted with NOGs in International Development Literature,” *Progress in Development Studies* (15,1, 2015), p.40-47.

¹⁵⁷ Carlo Benedetti, “Islamic and Christian Inspired Relief NGOs: Between Tactical Collaboration and Strategic Diffidence?”, *Journal of International Development* (18, 2006), p.851.

¹⁵⁸ Clarke and Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bringing the sacred and the Secular*, op, cit., p.24.

¹⁵⁹ Gerard Clarke, "Faith-Based Organizations and International Development: An overview" in Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings (eds.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bringing the sacred and the Secular* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.25.

Sider and Unruh, in other respects, categorise FBOs in terms of the extent to which faith is manifest in different aspect of their work by grouping six different classifications: “faith-permeated”, “faith-centred”, faith-affiliated”, faith-background” and “faith-secular partnership” and “secular”.¹⁶⁰ In line with previous one, The Working Group on Human Needs and Faith-Based Community Initiative (2002) propose a somewhat resemble typology conceptualized as continuum of religiosity ranging from: faith-centered, faith-related, faith-background and faith-secular partnership.¹⁶¹ All these taxonomies, however, apply to differing organizational dimension and characteristics.

On the other hand, A. Tonnessen posits two types of FBOs: organizations engaged in religious activities and organizations inspired and motivated by religious values, but not directly performing religious activities.¹⁶² From this point of classification, Heist and Cnaan put forward three types of FBOs, which are somewhat blended typologies and positioned on three places: “the least fundamentalist FBOs”, “moderate FBOs” and “the most religious fundamentalist FBOs”.¹⁶³

Apart from these three places, Tonnessen asserts diaconical organizations; that is serving God by serving people. According to this notion, diaconical work is not identical to faith missions or proselytizing. Instead, it is found as being the faith value-based principle to the need for serving them without discrimination and

¹⁶⁰ Ronald J. Sider and Heidi R. Unruh, “Typology of Religious Characteristics of Social Service and Educational Organizations and Programs”, *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* (Vol. 33, no. 1, March 2004), p.119.

¹⁶¹ Beryl Hugen, “The Difference of Faith: The Influence of Faith in Human Service Programs”, *Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought* (28:4, 2009), p.408.

¹⁶² This distinction corresponds to the Christian theological distinction between mission organization and diaconical organization. The first being concerned with social activities but not directly involved in a mission, whereas the second usually sees social activities as an integral part of the mission. See more about, Aud V. Tonnessen, “Faith-based NGOs in International Aid: Humanitarian Agents or Missionaries of Faith, *Forum for Development Studies* (34:2, 2007), p.323.

¹⁶³ Dan Heist and Ram A. Cnaan, “Faith-Based International Development Work: A Review”, *Religious MDPI Journal* (7,19, 2016), p.12.

influencing belief of beneficiary.¹⁶⁴ Nordic-centred FBOs often prefer to be labelled within this type. Even with all these typologies, several others can be listed including Vidal's¹⁶⁵ and Clarke's.¹⁶⁶ To avoid further confusion, I shall not use this part of the thesis to review this long-drawn case. The degree to which an FBO fits within those typologies depends on how it chooses to operationalize its faith in ten areas: structural affiliation, motivations of staff, mission, strategy, faith practice, choice of beneficiaries, staff, organizational culture, constituency and source of funding, external relations.¹⁶⁷

All these typologies are somewhat transparent where a typical FBO may address more than one type. Any precise typology, thus, is inherently limited. The degree, structure, and work of many FBOs may overlap, or fall into a grey area. Therefore, these categories should be adapted as points along a spectrum rather than as discrete archetypes.¹⁶⁸ Even though there is no unified typology that is globally accepted, categorisations contribute to the ample basis for academic debates. Scholars strive for a blanket classification of FBOs to help donors to choose appropriate organizations to work with. To simplify this conundrum, three dimensions can be taken as a basis for categorizations: the degree to which organizations are affiliated to faith; the structure to which organizations structurally form in a faith frame and

¹⁶⁴ Tonnessen, op, cit., p.326.

¹⁶⁵ Avis Vidal, "Faith-based Organizations in Community Development", *The Urban Institute* (2001).

¹⁶⁶ Clarke and Ware, "Understanding Faith-based Organizations: How FBOs are contrasted with NGOs in International Development Literature," op, cit., p.40.

¹⁶⁷ Ronald J. Sider and Heidi R. Unruh, "Typology of Religious Characteristics of Social Service and Educational Organizations and Programs", *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* (Vol. 33, no. 1, March 2004), p.121. Despite Sider and Unruh typology, there is a problematic distinction between organizations and programs which sidestep the contentious issue of directly funding congregations providing social service. See more about Thomas H. Jeavons, "Religious and Faith-based Organizations: Do we know one when we see one?" *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* (33, 2004), p.142.

¹⁶⁸ Sider and Unruh, op, cit., p.119.

the work in which organisations engage. Most important, faith-based organisations are vary between Muslim-oriented and Christian-oriented organisation even within other religious congregations. Therefore, Muslim FBOs needs further analysis for this research.

2.1.3.4. Muslim and Islamic FBOs

Muslim faith-based Organizations (MFBOs) are divided into the Sunni and Shia traditions, which further the sub-divisions into a variety of derivative traditions depending on denominations of Hanafi, Shaafi, Maliki, and Hanbal. Before delving deeper into parameters of voluntarism, almsgiving and the modus operandi of Muslim FBOs, it is necessary to outline the terminological distinctions between Muslim and Islamic FBOs. Because, several studies prefer to use one of these two terminologies in analysing NGOs in focus.

Basically, Islam is the religion, a Muslim is the person who claims to follow Islam based on revealed to the Qur'an and Prophet Mohammed path. Beyond linguistic distinctions, however, both terminologies adhere to slightly different parameters. At most general level, Islamic NGOs are voluntary entities (transnational, national, regional or community-based) "for which Islam is an important inspiration to do good and an identity maker that distinguishes them from NGOs with similar objectives and orientations."¹⁶⁹ At essence, they are non-profit establishment aiming to provide goods and service in a manner Islamist deem which unswerving Islamic practices and values.¹⁷⁰ That's to say, while engaging aid activities, these NGOs propagate a religious messages, therefore they serve as institutions for the production, dissemination of values of Islam to combat non-Islamic values and approaches. Moreover, while they are supposed to be apolitical entities tightly

¹⁶⁹ M.A. Mohamed Salih, "Islamic NGOs in Africa: The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism", *Occasional Paper* (2002), p.3.

¹⁷⁰ Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki, "Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics: A Case from Jordan", *Third World Quarterly* (Vol. 21, No. 4, 2000), p.686.

regulated by the state, they are inherently political because these NGOs are contextualised by struggles over values and culture.¹⁷¹ On the other hand, Muslim NGOs are defined as founded on the initiative of Muslims whom generally mobilize their support among Muslims in varying degrees and forms¹⁷². In addition, it is inspired as well as legitimated by the Islamic religion or at least certain tenets thereof,¹⁷³ distinguishing itself from other non-governmental originations in terms of voluntarism principles.

As seen that Islamic NGOs address more religious practices and values in attaching aid activities. However, some selected NGOs (e.g. Yeryüzü Doktorları) in this research do not necessarily pursue a religious values or practice while engaging aid and relief activities. Categories them as Islamic NGOs would be difficult, thus the term of Muslim NGO is more blanket form of description in which selected NGOs could be set in. Adding to that, this paper prefers to use Muslim faith-based organizations (MFBOs) instead of Islamic to prevent aid being seen as secondary to a religious agenda.

Regarding the taxonomy of MFBOs, binary classifications can be applied. The first group of MFBOs can be titled as *radical*, that is those which have an openly religious agenda and use humanitarian aid as a vector for it.¹⁷⁴ The second group of MFBOs can be titled as *moderate*, and are established in the more humanitarian sense of initiatives inspired by religion, but who do not perform as conservative organisations.¹⁷⁵ The former organizations usually engage in *Da'wa*, which is the

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.686.

¹⁷² By and large, it can be classified as moderate and radical-oriented MFBOs.

¹⁷³ Bruno De Cordier, *Faith-Based Aid, Globalisation And The Humanitarian Frontline: An Analysis Of Western-Based Muslim Aid Organizations* (Blackwell Publishing, 2009), p.609.

¹⁷⁴ For instance, The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is closely linked to Saudi Wahhabism.

¹⁷⁵ For instance, Islamic Relief does not distinguish their recipients on the basis of religion.

Islamic equivalent of Christian evangelism, disseminating and broadcasting Islamic values and principles as well as asserting the specificity of Islam.¹⁷⁶ The latter, on the other hand, provides humanitarian and relief assistance to poor communities without prioritizing Muslim society and Islamic identity, reinforcing global and universal values.¹⁷⁷ This paper focuses on a category within the latter group, namely, Turkish-based MFBOs (by accepting cultural diversity within itself) who are part of recognized international aid systems.

The economic source of MFBOs derives from two funds: voluntary activities¹⁷⁸ and state support. In order to oblige religious duty of Islam, all Muslim (except the absolutely poor) are obliged to duty of Islam. Since the Quran frequently addresses how volunteerism and solidarity are significant in Islamic beliefs, Muslim organizations enjoy the affluence of financial gain as well as the robust backing from the community. Thanks to these sources, MFBOs are less dependent on government financial support and have been less swayed by the secular environment.

In a nutshell, FBOs have distinct characteristics that make them stand out from other secular peers. Depending on the region and country from which FBOs originate encompasses them with distinct characteristic, placing them in a better position than secular NGOs in terms of development, humanitarian and welfare services. This section in general has dealt with various criteria to classify an NGO as an FBO. The typology section, in particular, raised the issue of how important an organisation's origin, goals, functions, membership, mission, and representation are to be set in their position within three places: the least fundamentalist FBOs, moderate FBOs and the most religiously fundamentalist FBOs. In order to understand the agency role of Turkish FBOs', which vary in many ways from their secular counterparts,

¹⁷⁶ M.A. Mohamed Salih, *op. cit.*, p.3.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.1.

¹⁷⁸ Among these voluntary resources, seven alms are listed: zakat; kharaj (land tax); sadaqat id al-Fitr (an equivalent to pool tax); waqf (charitable endowments); donation and gift; voluntary service; obligatory family support. Salih, *op. cit.*, p.2

this section is essential. Following an overarching analysis of actors in world politics with a taxonomy and placing of FBOs in this context, a theoretical analysis of non-state actors needs to be underlined. Therefore, the second part of this chapter sheds light on how mainstream IR theories treat non-state actors.

2.2. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE NON-STATE ACTORS

“Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War

For quite some time, orthodox international relations theories have analysed global politics through the view of state-centric paradigm.¹⁷⁹ Strictly framing the unit of analysis within state-to-state interactions, non-governmental organizations and international organizations are both neglected regarded, instead, as secondary. This assumption is mainly based on the idea that the domestic sphere is autonomous and different from that of the international sphere.¹⁸⁰ Given the full authority of the state within the domestic sphere, in respect to the role of force on the legal basis, this led to ontological differentiation between these two spheres. A significant linkage on the struggle for power, interest and survival between the state and NSAs has been identified in the last three decades. This rejuvenating interest doubled in the post-Cold War period.

This section aims to identify the underlying assumptions of International Relations (IR) theories in relevance to non-state actors. The *relevance* here refers to the ontological position of non-state actors within mainstream international relations

¹⁷⁹ James N. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalisation of World Affairs* (New York: Nicholas, 1980), p.5.

¹⁸⁰ Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics The construction of global governance*, op. cit., p.114.

theories and their attributed value-laden position at the expense of the state-oriented world system. How three mainstream international relations theories deal with the NSAs - that are entirely or partly autonomous organisations from state control and funding, operating transnationally-¹⁸¹, is the primary question seeking to be answered throughout this part. Since the research would be incomplete without highlighting NGO's actorness position within IR theories and approaches, this part provides a theoretical outlook for the thesis. Therefore, it develops a theoretical framework for understanding the NGOs ever-growing role in world politics. By doing so, a brief sketch of three major competing theories is outlined, which stimulate the development of state-to-state relations to transnational interaction.

IR theories basically revolve around the discussion of this question: should non-states actors be treated as distinct and autonomous actors or merely as an instrument of nation-states? In response to this, three basic overviews are shared by academics:¹⁸² "*as instruments*" which treat non-state actors as operative tools of states or global capitalism, in which realism, neorealism, critical theories, and Marxism belong to this camp. The second view is "*semi-autonomous agency*", which provides a suitable platform to form peace, an entity to define state's identity-preferences and policy outcomes, as well as defining norms and rules, which are shared by (neo)liberal, constructivist, institutional and neo-institutional (sociological) approaches. The third perspective is "*an actor*" whereby the theory of Global Governance is prominent, claiming that NSAs play supporting actors or protagonists.¹⁸³ The role of NGOs in supporting actors is pointed out in principal-agent models, which engage with questions on how a state (as principals) treats

¹⁸¹ Josselin and Wallace, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, op, cit., p.5.

¹⁸² Ian Hurd, *International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice* (Cambridge University Press, 2010). p.17.

¹⁸³ In this regard, Ian Hurd's three partite distinctions are worthy of study. He elaborates how global politics shape international organizations, by giving three plots: the practice of enforcement in the organization; the mechanism which otherwise ensures conformity by their member states; legal obligations which grant international organizations their power. Ibid.,

non-state actors (as agents) in challenging inter-state problems.¹⁸⁴ Three International Relations theories (Realism, Liberalism -and their neo variants- and Constructivism), respond to these questions from their epistemological premises. Taking the centrality of NGOs as a premise, however, constructivism is arguably more useful in explaining how NGOs influence state foreign aid policy and its implication. Mainly due to the fact that it concerns the ideas, norms, beliefs, ideological proximity that epistemic communities and global civil society attain in the process of interaction. Therefore, the theory of constructivism is taken as the backbone of this thesis's theoretical frame.

2.2.1. (Neo)Realism and its Relevance to Non-State Actors (NSAs)

“States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones”

Kenneth Waltz, 1979;93

The issue of non-state actors is subject to an analytic bifurcation between (neo) realism and (neo) liberalism theories, which has paved the way for disciplinary polarization between international relations theories.¹⁸⁵ While the former is less likely to be attached to the NSAs than the latter, both theories fail to capture essential dimensions of the NGO bloom, with an accelerated burst of NGO proliferations since the 1990s. The assumptions of realism, however, have been a very influential approach in global politics since the Second World War.

¹⁸⁴ Martin Koch, “Non-State and State Actors in Global Governance”, in Bod Reinalda (eds.) *The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors* (Routledge Press, 2013), p.200.

¹⁸⁵ Steve Smith, “The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline”, *International Study Review* (4, 2002), p.67.

The idea of classical realist notions, from the orientalist point of view,¹⁸⁶ dates as far back as Thucydides' masterpiece, "*History of the Peloponnesian War*". Thucydides brilliantly details the dynamics of power politics, the importance of the political decision, war strategy, alliance and other issues related to peace and conflict. As states are unique and primary actors in international affairs, international politics is best analysed in terms of inter-state relations.

The position of other actors at the expense of the state is measured with their actorness principles, sovereignty, recognition of statehood and full control over population and territory.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, a traditional conceptualisation of classical realism has been associated with state-centric realism in which international institutions, as well as multinational corporations and transnationally organized groups, are characterized as extensions and simply instruments of states with little influence on state-to-state interactions.¹⁸⁸ The Realist belief is that hegemonic powers have created NSAs, yet imposition is only one mechanism¹⁸⁹ and

¹⁸⁶ It is an interesting fact that significant books written on this field attach to the origin of international relations through the western-centric point of view. This retrenchment hypothesis, stemming from western (civilizations) scholar's existing books, reaches out to today and their direct assumptions on power politics. Although non-western society, empires, and power politics are as old as western counterparts, little attention has been paid to them in these euro-centric points of IR theories. Theoretical inquiry pertinent to the intellectual underpinning of the scholarship needs to expand the scope of time and spatial-bound, covering the non-western experience of international relations. This, of course, does not mean that euro-centric approaches failed to grasp power politics, wars, trade, power politics, etc. but it's highly simplistic to seek for the answer of this question: Why is there no non-western international relations theory. Thanks to recent publications, however, this issue has been taken into consideration. For instance, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan's recent efforts to ascertain the possibility of a non-Western IR theory in Asia are particularly significant in filling this gap. See more about, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia* (Routledge, 2010).

¹⁸⁷ Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, *World Politics*, (Now York: Havesterm Wheatsheaf, 1990), p.80.

¹⁸⁸ Grievies Forest L, *Transnationalism in World Politics and Business* (New York, Pergamon Press, 1979). p.4.; and Clive Archer, *International Organizations* (London: Routledge Pub., 1992), p.85.

¹⁸⁹ Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise And Fall Of International Regimes", *International Organization* (1982) p. 277–97.

hegemonic powers often provide inducements to create institutions.¹⁹⁰ In other words, the theoretical spectrum of realism envisages the growth of non-state actors as a reflection of most powerful states' own interests. They see NSAs as merely an epiphenomenon or extension of state power and interest, accepting NGOs, either as front organizations thinly disguising the interest of the specific country, or as potential revolutionaries, seeking to undermine national stability and solidarity of the state system.¹⁹¹ Particularly as a means available to states for achieving their goals.¹⁹² In this vein, Gilpin and Cox are akin to this line, proposing some similarities between rising U.S hegemony and its ability to expand multi-national corporations and economic interdependence in the first place.¹⁹³ Gilpin explicitly underlines that multi-national cooperation are primary instruments of American foreign policy and power, not the other way around.¹⁹⁴

The founder of neo-realism Kenneth Waltz also claims that non-state actors do not qualify as objects in his leading work *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz's analysis of non-state actors does not fundamentally diverge from classical realism. Waltz contends that "states are not and never have been the only international actors. But then structures are defined not by all the actors that flourish within them

¹⁹⁰ Arthur A. Stein, "Neoliberal Institutionalism" in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.) *Oxford Handbook on International Relations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 212.

¹⁹¹ Josselin and Wallace, op, cit., p. 1.

¹⁹² Charles Glaser, "Structural Realism in a Complex World", *Review of International Studies* (29 (3): 2003), p.409.

¹⁹³ According to Robert Cox, power is seen as emerging from social forces. He criticises Waltz, Morgenthau, Carr, and even Marx, claiming that they become a victim of historically constructed knowledge by taking the concept of power as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities. Robert Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, (New York: Colombia Uni. Press, 1987).

¹⁹⁴ Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power, and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*, (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p.139.

but by the major ones.”¹⁹⁵ So, hegemonic powers define the structure of the international system. So long as the major states are the main actors, the structure of international politics is determined by them. He remarks that:

States set the scene in which they, along with non-state actors, stage their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs. Though they may choose to interfere little in the affairs of non-state actors for long periods of time, states nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse, whether by passively permitting informal rules to develop or by actively intervening to change regulations that no longer suit them. When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate.¹⁹⁶

Waltz’s theoretical principles have been established to understand states’ behaviour and their relation to the system. Yet, without completely rejecting the importance of non-state actors and the extent of transnational activities, he concludes that state-centric understanding of international politics is made absolute. Since (neo) realism essentially deals with state behaviour, NSAs do not have the power to change the belief and behaviour of states. As such, their roles are marginal.¹⁹⁷

Another neorealist, John Mearsheimer, excludes non-state actors within neorealist thought, stating that "there is no room for non-state actors in structural realism because the theory would end up getting watered down, and it would lose its analytical bite."¹⁹⁸ Since non-state actors operate a state system that is anarchic and

¹⁹⁵ Kenneth Waltz, “Political Structures,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, R. Keohane (eds.), (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1986), p. 88.

¹⁹⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p.94.

¹⁹⁷ To emphasise how important states at the expense of non-state actors, he remarks that: “states are the units whose interactions form the structure of the international-political systems. They will long remain so. The death rate among states is remarkably low. Few states die; many firms do. Who is likely to be around 100 years from now -the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Egypt, Thailand, and Uganda? Or Ford, IBM, Shell, Unilever, and Massey-Fergusson? I would bet on the states, perhaps even on Uganda.” See more about Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p.95.

¹⁹⁸ John Mearsheimer, *Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer: Part II*, SAGE Publications, (Vol 20/2, 2006) p.235.

decentralized, they have to pay careful attention to how states react to them to survive.¹⁹⁹

The conclusion from all these viewpoints is that both realism and neorealism accept that states are not the only actors. However, they are primary ones, and they form the structure of the international system. Realists, such as S. Krasner, argue that the impact of non-state actors mainly depends on their success in altering the preferences and policies of the most powerful states.²⁰⁰ In other words, (neo)realism does not attribute agency to non-state actors, agreeing that the main determining actors in the balance of global power are states. The position of NSA in this structure is considered passive. As Charles Glaser notes: “Realism is designed to understand relations and interactions between states; we should not be surprised that it has less to tell us about non-state actors.”²⁰¹ R. Gilpin clarifies realism as a whole concept that NSAs do matter, and does not ignore the importance of NSA in the determination of international affairs.²⁰² But, due to the structural limitation of NSA power and capacities (i.e. lack of autonomy and agency in world politics), states continue to be the principal actor in both economic and political affairs.

2.2.2. (Neo)Liberalism and Its Relevance to Non-State Actors (NSAs)

In contrast to realism and neorealism, liberalism and its neo variants devote far more attention to trans-border interactions outside of the state, run through non-state actors. Initially, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and Alexis Tocqueville have questioned traditional authority and systems through embracing *reason* to make the

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p.235.

²⁰⁰ Josselin and Wallace, op. cit., p.12.

²⁰¹ Glaser, op, cit., p.407.

²⁰² Robert Gilpin, “A Realist Perspective on International Governance”, in Anthony McGrew and David Held (eds.) *Governing Globalization: Power Authority and Global Governance* (Cambridge Uni, Pres, 2004), p.328.

world a better place. Following the First World War, the emergence of international law and the creation of the League of Nations necessarily increased interest in and importance of actors, apart from the nation-state. This increase was mostly descriptive and based on normative perspective.

There are many strands of (neo) liberal thought that directly address non-state actors and their influence on international relations. Such as, H. Milner emphasises four key elements in relation to neoliberalism's paradigm and non-state actors: on the forms of powers together with military forces and threats; on the role of interdependence concerning anarchy in the system; on the importance of cooperation; and on the conflict in international politics.²⁰³ That is to say the relationship between state and NGOs is too complicated and abundant to be confined within single elements.

Neoliberalism acknowledges the importance of states in a decentralized world. However, they are not necessarily the only important actors in global politics, nor the gate-keeper between intra-societal and extra-societal flow of actions.²⁰⁴ Therefore, it allows more room and attention to transnational interactions outside the state. Broadening the conception of actors by including others, it specifically focuses on international institutions and regimes. Regarding this, international institutions constitute a much broader category than organizations, in which state practices are institutionalized in the form of rules, norms, and principles, and decision-making procedures.²⁰⁵ By virtue of considering a wider range of actors, it includes sets of governing arrangements that involve implicit or explicit

²⁰³ Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik, *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*, (Princeton University Press, 2009), p.5.

²⁰⁴ Keohane, and Nye (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, op. cit., p.722.

²⁰⁵ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press Princeton, 1984), p.8.

principles.²⁰⁶ Therefore, world politics is institutionalized to various areas and regions.

The growth of international institutions creates a set of some sort of international collective outcomes based on mutual self-interest, which form a *harmony of interests* among nation-states according to liberalism. This harmony of interest generates a rule for international institutions that states will voluntarily agree to follow.²⁰⁷ As a result, all states need to cooperate for their own benefit. In creating a harmony of interest, non-state actors or international institutions and regimes (in Keohane's words) develop rules and principles to promote cooperation among states to varying extents. Keohane's ultimate goal is to create a paradigm that utters the importance of institutions using (neo)realist assumptions regarding the overall framework of international relations. His interest derives from this notion that international cooperation is good for all, since it creates the realization of mutual benefit within respective nations.²⁰⁸ This normative interest somehow fulfils the role of formal and informal institutions, leading to potential collaboration between states. However, this affinity is not based on wishful-thinking as liberals envisage. Instead, it is based on substantial empirical evidence of cooperation among states in modern international relations, through using a combination of game theory, rational choice theory, and economic metaphors.²⁰⁹

To signify great attachment of non-state actors on the world's institutionalization, neoliberal schools adopt a more scientific approach. The importance of NGOs for international relations theories rests upon their ability to be key players in forging

²⁰⁶ Stephen, D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Cornell Uni. Press, 1983), p.16.

²⁰⁷ Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, op. cit., p.51.

²⁰⁸ Anne L. Herbert, "Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas and Franck", *Berkeley Journal of International Law* (Volume 14, Issue 1, 1996), p.226.

²⁰⁹ Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in Robert O. Keohane (eds.) *Neorealism and Its Critics* (Columbia University Press, 1986), p.175.

and consolidating networks as emerging patterns of global governance.²¹⁰ In that regard, neoliberalism offers a nuanced understanding of NSAs in theorizing institutional identity and political importance of NSA in world politics.²¹¹

The other characteristic of neoliberalism related to non-state actors, is its descriptions of the international system. Agreeing with the neorealist thought on the decentralized structure of the system often relies on self-enforcing behaviour, but it does not state that anarchy dominates the system. In this regard, Keohane and Nye construct a new model, named "*complex interdependence*", which refers to a set of "multiple channels that connect societies including inter-state, trans-governmental and transnational relations' with an agenda consisting of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear and consistent hierarchy and with economic interests on the same footing as military ones."²¹² Under this complex interdependence, non-state actors are direct participants to world politics because of the existence of multiple channels of interaction within and outside of societies. This structure, however, is not solely a combination of economic interdependence. The relative power of non-state actors is, to some extent, exercised via power resources that are available within that complex interdependence structure. As Keohane and Nye explicitly emphasise, transnational actors have become a regular part of domestic and foreign relations, not only because of their self-interest aspirations, but also because they act as a transmission belt, making central states policies more sensitive to one another.²¹³

In short, the influence of liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism on the scientific grounding of NSA within IR theories is evident. Since mutual interactions among states are profoundly institutionalized, state and non-state actors deserve to fair evaluations in world politics. In many issue-areas, the role of traditional power is

²¹⁰ Anna Ohanya, "Network Institutionalism and NGO Studies", *International Studies Perspectives* (13, 2012), p.369.

²¹¹ Milner, and Moravcsik, op. cit., p.10.

²¹² Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, op. cit., p.24.

²¹³ Ibid., p.26.

not sufficient for understanding change and continuity but requires an alternative toolkit to capture the full picture of interaction. To do that, both state and NSAs are equally important in analysing the global system, since both represent an important component within the working system of the present structure. However, in this structure, neoliberalism does not attribute a subjective and determinate role to non-state actors, nor does it assign the state secondary status. In contrast, it underlines that all actors have a relative strength that stems from their internal and external characteristics, and that their smooth influence on world politics differs from one actor to another. In many cases, not only concerning time and space, but also differing on the level of the relevance and effectiveness to one another.

2.2.3. Constructivism and It's Relevance to Non-State Actors

“Constructivism sensibilities encourage us to look at how actors are socially constructed, but they do not tell us which actors to study or where they are constructed.”

Alexander Wendt, 1999;7

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, mainstream International Relations scholars debated the possibility of international cooperation in an anarchic structure, driven by neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought sharing the assumptions that state is the most prominent actor in world politics. However, the pace of globalization has drawn the attention of scholars on transboundary activities, in which private and public actors would be considered jointly. Therefore, unlike the 1970s which were focusing on *whether* NSAs play a role in world politics or not, in the late 1980s IR scholars were focusing on *how* NSAs do so.²¹⁴ Although it is a simple and straightforward question, it represents a divergence within international relations theories in terms of its context and consequences.

²¹⁴ Josselin and Wallace, op. cit., p.12.

In contrast to *whether* NSAs play a role in world politics or not, which underlines state' role as actor and factor, *how* they play a role inherently attributes the potential role of NSA in global politics. In other words, the *how* question seeks an alternative conceptual model which explains mechanisms NGOs use to influence countries in focus. In line with the latter, scholars are divided into two groups.²¹⁵ The first group focuses on functions performed by NSAs in the maintenance and establishment of the international regime. Identifying entry points at the level of international institutions and analysing the input of NSAs in international policy, the first group of scholars largely underline the role of institutions in mediating NSA influence. An influence which is process-oriented and broadly liberal in outlook.²¹⁶ The second group concentrates on the role of NSAs in normative change, such as in climate change governance which often borrows from constructivism²¹⁷ and sociological institutionalism.²¹⁸

Basically, constructivism claims that the world system is created through the repeated interactions of states and other actors.²¹⁹ It focuses on norms, rules, shared

²¹⁵ Ibid., p.12.

²¹⁶ Ibid., p.12.

²¹⁷ The status of constructivism is still contested whether theory or approach. Being as a middle ground between rationalist and post-structuralism, A. Wendt says "Constructivism is not a theory of international politics, I have been unclear about this in my previous work (e.g., 1992, 1994). I now wish to draw a sharper distinction between constructivism and the theory of international politics that I sketch in this book. One can accept constructivism without embracing that theory", Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.7.; Similarly, N. Onuf claims that constructivism is not a theory, but a way of studying social reality; Finnemore contends that constructivism is a social and not a political theory, Martha Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society* (Cornell Uni, Press, 1996), p.27.; and beyond that, Rutherford proclaims that constructivism is an alternative ontology, which can explain why certain behaviour is even deemed neo-realist, neoliberalist or even constructivist to begin with, Kenneth R. Rutherford, "Banning landmines", *International Politics journal* (2002) p.470.

²¹⁸ Constructivism and sociological institutionalism seem rather various approaches, distinguishing between the 'thin' vs 'thick' understanding of norms and institutions in social life labelled both theories are sometimes the same. Therefore, sociological institutionalism has been tightly interwoven with constructivism. See more about Maria Green Cowles, "Non-State Actors and False Dichotomies: Reviewing IR/IPE Approaches To European Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy* (10:1 February 2003), p.110.

²¹⁹ Ahmed, and Potter, *op. cit.*, p.13.

ideas and their emergence by social interaction and learning process, rather than as given, or defined by the structure. This is socially-constructed knowledge that determines the state's parsimony towards each other, because that knowledge has specific social meaning. For instance, the nuclear arsenals of Canada and Iran, though comparably destructive, have very different meanings to the United States. As a result of this parsimony, it creates very different patterns of interaction. Therefore, certain concepts such as (in)security, enemy, alliance and even states, have meaning depending on what one attributes to them, as Onuf describes as a world of our making.²²⁰ By seeking for socially-constructed reality, arguably one must reveal a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs to which world politics is situated.

From the point of constructivism, national interest and identity are not fixed. Thus, the political behaviour of state and other actors can be changed.²²¹ In this change, constructivism centres its ontological substance upon the agent, rather than on structure, claiming that agents and structure are mutually constitutive.²²² Accordingly, Finnemore deals with the dichotomy of the arguments based on the agent versus structure dialectic, demonstrating the power of social structure (particularly international organizations). She shows how this agent and structure influence states by bringing agency back into this social structure and she investigates the origin of the normative structures influencing states, by asking who created them and how they became embedded in the context of organizations.²²³ However, she tends to over-emphasize the role of norms and social structure at the

²²⁰ Nicholas G. Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

²²¹ Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* (50, no. 1, 1998), p.324–48.

²²² Alexander E. Wendt "The Agent-Structure Problem In International Relations Theory", *International Organizations* (Volume 41, Issue 3 Summer 1987), p.350.

²²³ Martha Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society* (Cornell Uni, Press, 1996), p.24.

expense of the agents who generate and change them in the first place.²²⁴ Although the early constructivist approach focuses mainly on the norms and discourse of public actors, institutions and elites, later on constructivists (known as liberal constructivist) have underlined the importance of private actor in their premises.²²⁵

Given this information, constructivism sees non-state actors as powerful entities which change state preferences.²²⁶ It offers a subtler understanding of non-state actors in world politics, helping to clarify what NGOs do in international politics. As by extension, NSAs do attempt to influence, shape and even transform state actions, and constructivism investigates the potential power that NSAs have and how this is maintained. Believing in the determinative role of inter-subjective understanding, it argues that the potential role of NSAs includes norm building, principles, and shared belief. For example, the role of NSAs in altering state belief about international trade, preferences and use of landmines in war, are elaborated within constructivist assumptions. In line with this, creating the term "*norm entrepreneurs*" Keck and Sikkink point out non-state actors' influence on state preference and behaviour through rhetoric or other forms of lobbying and persuasion.²²⁷ In other words, those who have several influencing mechanisms on the foreign policy of the state, in the form of framing, lobbying, agenda-setting, and norm-building.²²⁸

²²⁴ Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* (50, no. 1, 1998), p.324.

²²⁵ Maria Green Cowles, "Non-state actors and false dichotomies: reviewing IR/IPE approaches to European integration", *Journal of European Public Policy* (10:1 February 2003), p.110.

²²⁶ Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society*, op. cit., p.6.

²²⁷ Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, op. cit., p.887-917.

²²⁸ Ibid., p.887-917.; see also Steve Charnovitz, "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance," *Michigan Journal of International Law* (18, no. 2, 1997), p.281-282.; Anna Holzscheiter, "Discourse as Capability: Non-State Actors' Capital in Global Governance", *Millennium Journal of International Studies* (33, 2005), p.723.; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

In contrast with the neorealist sense which sees NGOs largely as passive and the instrument of states, constructivism notes that international organisations could have potential to pursue their own agenda and interests such as human right projects and free trade, within the structure which created these entities.²²⁹ It shows some relative influencing capacity of non-state actors. Of course, NSAs do not have the material power that states do, and they are not sovereign or legally equals of state. But, they possess greater de facto economic, financial and institutional power, in which they exercise some specific skill, and act internationally. Here is the breakthrough contribution of constructivism; analysing NGOs power of influence through various toolkits. Since these toolkits are examined thoroughly in the next chapter, this part briefly touches upon them in a general sense.

One of the mechanisms which constructivism emphasises on NSAs influencing power is the mobilization of society.²³⁰ They can influence public through media or other channels which have values to exercise influence over policy decisions. The other power that NSAs have is persuasion. The persuasion naturally hinges on communication, which is the essence of all actor's social interaction. The power of persuasion has been seen to have varying degrees of success and methods such as empowering people through local means, educating the public, social network construction and monitoring international agreements, that NSAs freely enjoy without coercion. The powers that NSAs possess are persuasion and action to build or change understandings of how the world operates and why. Considering the existence of NGOs in various issue areas, they operate as if constitutive norms exist and are an appropriate object of the conduct of international politics.²³¹ NSAs also

²²⁹ Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2004).

²³⁰ Amnesty International, for example, is a global movement that operates in more than 150 countries and with more than 7 million members' works to end human rights violations. It drives global legitimacy from its high status, and from the high moral values. Thanks to these, it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, and many people engage in the policies it is pursuing. See more about, Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The construction of global governance*, op. cit., p.128.

²³¹ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit., p.15.

have the implementation capability where they take on operations responsibility. Hiring private security companies to wage war or hiring social and economic consultants to meet their needs are some examples of operational issues of NSAs.

2.3.4. Conclusion

By way of conclusion, constructivism argues that non-state actors are powerful entities that change state preferences. Offering a profound understanding of non-state actors in world politics, helping to clarify what NGOs do in international politics, constructivism sees the social dimension of the non-state actor's potential role in norm building, principles, shared belief, and languages.²³² NSAs attempt to influence, shape and even transform state acts, and thus it investigates the potential power that NSAs have and how these are maintained. Although they do not view themselves as akin to state which has yet to hold sovereignty at bay, it is often claimed that the largest MNCs, NGOs such as Oxfam, Christian Aid, World Vision, Greenpeace or Amnesty International (AI) possess economic resources greater than the GNP of some of the world's smaller nations. NSAs, such as an institution, can act as intervening variables between the pressures of the international system and related behavioural consequences, seen through cooperation.²³³ Constructivism allows the possibility of changing interest and identity through socially-constructed facts which stem from the endogenous process of inter-subjective interactions, labelled as the bottom-up contribution on state preferences.

In short, this section presents the relevance of three different IR theories to non-state actors. As underlined in previous paragraphs, the weight of non-state actors in world politics is treated distinctively within the principle of these theories. Among these, (Neo)Realism pays little attention to NSAs. It deals with state behaviours and system, and anything but the state has no power to influence the system in which

²³² Karin M. Fierke, "Constructivism" in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (Oxford Uni. Pres, 2010), p.179.

²³³ Krasner, op., cit., p.7.

all actors live. However, the extent of transnational interactions among actors poses a strong challenge to the state-as-unitary-actor principle. It renders the account that states by themselves do not have the power to control the outcome of others, as non-state actors resist to alter policies in favour of them, a dimension which liberal theory emphasises. Lastly, constructivism allows the possibility of NSAs to influence matters of global politics and alter state preferences and beliefs about foreign policy. Scholars in this school tend to the view that NSAs have the potential to set global norms, in which all states freely wish to follow. Since system and actors are mutually constituted, changes in norms lead to changes in state behaviours. Following the analysis of the relevance of non-state actors within IR approaches the next chapter deals with relationship between development studies and foreign aid, in particular the concept of humanitarian aid is scrutinised.

CHAPTER 3

3. FOREIGN AID AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF HUMANITARIAN AID

“Foreign Aid is not a science but an art. That art requires by way of mental predisposition a political sensitivity to the interrelationship among the facts, present and future, and ends and means.”

Hans Morgenthau, 1962;301

The concept of Foreign aid (shortly FA) is one of the most original political innovations of the twentieth century, which has contributed to the transformation of contemporary global politics.²³⁴ Thanks to foreign aid is being used as means and an end, several studies have underlined its importance in academia. Accordingly, it has become well entrenched politically as an essential relationship between developed and underdeveloped nations.

This chapter is intended to touch upon the theoretical perspective and historical process of foreign aid in relation to development studies, which enables the setting of this thesis' vital analytical bases. In the light of existing literature, the place of humanitarian aid within broad foreign aid typology is investigated, a theme which this dissertation develops for specific types of aid. The main aim of this chapter is to emphasise growing role of NGOs in development and humanitarian aid. In particular, NGOs' growing visibility in foreign aid since 1950s has been underlined.

²³⁴ Jean-Philippe Thérien, "Debating Foreign Aid: Right versus Left", *Third World Quarterly* (23, no. 3, 1 June 2002), p.449.

This chapter has been equally divided into three sections. The first section provides an intellectual debate on the historical overview of foreign aid in relation to development studies. It pushes this time-spatial boundary and places the history of foreign aid in a much more extended period. Therefore, the first part makes a retrospective appraisal of foreign aid since its inception and lays out its implications at the level of state or civil society. The second section covers technical and terminological identifications of the term, including categorization of aid flow (official development assistance, official assistance, and private voluntary assistance), exercising methods (direct and indirect), types of resource allocation (economic exchange, redistribution, and giving) and ways of measuring aid (total dollars, as a share of GDP and per capita). Finally, the third section is devoted to an examination of the empirical literature on types of foreign aid. Over the course of decades, scholars have identified various aid types including humanitarian aid, development aid and emergency aid. A growing number of studies look for a broader concept of humanitarian aid, which is per se non-political according to Morgenthau.²³⁵ However, recent studies have outlined and analysed various aspects of the increasing relationship between politics and humanitarian aid,²³⁶ since it can indeed perform a political function when it operates within a political context.²³⁷

²³⁵ Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", *The American Political Science Review* (Vol. 56, No. 2, Jun. 1962), p.301.

²³⁶ Fiona Fox, "The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid", *A Discussion Paper for Caritas Europe* (2000); and Devon Curtis, "Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension", *Humanitarian Policy Group Report 10* (2001), p.3

²³⁷ Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", op., cit., p.301.

3.1. Foreign Aid and The Rising Prominence of NGOs in Development Landscape

Foreign aid as a subject matter of development economics and international politics emerged in the post-World War II era.²³⁸ Taking the origin of the concept in the second half of the 20th century, however, poses a methodological and scientific division between aid as casual relations (means) and aid as value-laden action (means and end). In other words, attachment to the foreign aid as *a means and end* leads rather direction. While states have long been involved in voluntary giving to one another, which represents a means, foreign aid as a scientific term was just coined about 50 years ago, to represent both means and end. In other words, Official Development Assistance (ODA) or in more common parlance "foreign aid" is quantitatively different from its historical predecessors.²³⁹ Yet, development studies do not recognize foreign aid as an independent area of research. It is often taken to be a part of the general theory of development (growth) and considered as a variant, sub-set and practical method of growth and development.

Foreign aid is one of the important topics in the development discourse.²⁴⁰ Although foreign aid and development (growth) theory is inter-related in terms of its scope and role - FA is often seen as an extension of national interest- therefore a brief analysis of the latter would be useful in understanding the foundation of the former. While both concepts are often used as interchangeable, development theory²⁴¹ has

²³⁸ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit., p.101.

²³⁹ Ashok Kumar Pankaj, "Revisiting Foreign Aid Theories", *International Studies* (42, no. 2, 1 April 2005), p.105.

²⁴⁰ George Mavrotas, *Foreign aid For Development: Issues, Challenges, and the New Agenda* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

²⁴¹ There is a precise distinguishes in a division between the term of development and theory of development. Because taking only conceptual terminology of the concept to lead us to a different discipline. Development as a term originated in the biological science and was then applied to the social science through the positivist view of history. See more about, J.G. Cavalcanti, "*Development versus Enjoyment of Life: A Post-Development Critique of the Developmentalist Worldview*" (Taylor and Francis Pub., 2007).; Gustavo Esteva, "*The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as*

a more profound historical root that can be traced back to the Age of Enlightenment, the era of the enthronement of reason, and the beginning of such concepts as economic growth and social reform.²⁴² During this age, development has been incorporated with a belief of virtuous human nature and equality in the sense of human rights via the optimistic view of progress, but the West is taken as a model and placed centrally in development studies. Over the subsequent centuries, development studies were re-shaped by the hands of various scholars, which enriched the content of the concept.

In fact, the period Post-World War II caused a strong impetus to change the structure of development. Western policy-makers started to envisage the power of development assistance for underdeveloped countries.²⁴³ From then onward, the term foreign aid concept was often used following the stunning success of the Marshall Plan²⁴⁴ and creation of the Bretton Woods institutions. That's to say, the emergence of foreign aid in a scientific manner dates back to the 1940s, which was marked by laying the institutional basis thanks to the Marshall Plan, instigated by US President Truman who first coined the term of foreign aid as it is understood today. To this regard, Sachs says that "following the breakdown of the European colonial powers, the United States found an opportunity to give worldwide dimensions to the mission their founding fathers had bequeathed to them: to be the beacon on the hill."²⁴⁵ The early scholars focused on the clarification regarding the

Power" (Zed Books Pub. ,2nd Edition, 1992), p.3.; Peet, R., and Hartwick E., (2009), *Theories of Development: Contentions, Arguments, Alternatives* (Guilford Press, 2009), p.3.

²⁴² Vladimir Bartenev and Elena Glazunova, "International Development Cooperation: Set of Lectures", *The World Bank*, (1 January 2013), p.21.

²⁴³ Among the many, the most crucial reason behind this initial motivation to re-structuring the foreign assistance was political rather than normative and humanitarian sense. But, the subsequent years would prove that political and humanitarian aid are not diametrically opposed to one another, in contrast, so much inter-related and even supplementary to one another.

²⁴⁴ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the Reconstruction Western Europe, 1947- 1952*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.20.

²⁴⁵ Wolfgang Sachs, *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London: Zed Books Pub. 2nd Edition, 1992), p.xv.

delicate balance between income, investment, saving and output that is required. Therefore, the emphasis in the 1940s and 1950s, to seek for an answer to the question of how to start and maintain economic growth, was reflected in the rationale for foreign aid. This period can be considered as the advent of foreign aid as an instrument of economic growth.

When it comes to the 1960s, empirical studies were undertaken to test the hypothesis, showing a close relationship between increases in national savings and rapid industrial growth, though it was not confirmed.²⁴⁶ Whereas aid in 1950s was mostly designed to support investment in infrastructure and strengthen domestic organisations' capacities, the policy of 1960s was on aid and trade.²⁴⁷ The process of institutionalization of foreign aid reflected the dominant theoretical views of that time which resulted in the elaboration of the 'two-gap' model. These two gaps are the import-export gap and the investment gap. This occurs when there is gap between these two fields and foreign aid is required to fill in, over time, whichever gap is binding in the given state.²⁴⁸ In fact, from the 1940s to 1960s, the basic idea of international development assistance was to ensure self-sustained economic growth by eliminating any foreign exchange gap that would supersede the saving gap as the essential development constraint.²⁴⁹ Thus, the role of foreign aid was reinforced in that it combined foreign exchange and investment resources. Throughout 1950s and 1960s, there were given little, if not null, role for the NGOs which were seen as useful in emergency organisations rather than as serious actors

²⁴⁶ Louis Emmerij, "Aid as a Flight Forward", *Development and Change* (33, no. 2, 1 April 2002), p.248.

²⁴⁷ Basma Bint Talal, *Rethinking and NGO: Development, Donors and Civil Society in Jordan* (London: I.B. Tauris Pub., 2004), p.5.

²⁴⁸ This model was popularized by the work of Hollis B. Chenery and A.M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development", *The American Economic Review* (56/4, 1966), p.679-733.; see more about Mitsuo Ezaki, "On the Two-Gap Analysis of Foreign Aid", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* (Vol. 6, No. 2, 1975), p.151.

²⁴⁹ Emmerij, op. cit., p.248.

in development circle.²⁵⁰ Therefore, states and NGOs pursued different development agendas and they remained largely disinterested in each other's activities, even they approached suspiciously to each other's agendas.²⁵¹

1970s was a real shift occurred towards the end of decade when bilateral donors began to support NGO programme directly, beginning with Norway and Canada. This remarkable change in NGOs's scale and significance was accompanied by ideological ascendancy of neoliberalism which raised structural adjustment in aid policies, reductions in public expenditure and the withdrawals of state-provided service.²⁵² Because, despite economic theories' technical and scientific measure on aid and growth simultaneously, practical reflection on development thinking was not matched, as real economic growth did not lead to increase in wealth and living standards for underdeveloped nations in the 1970s. On the other hand, foreign aid started to be influenced by the concept of dependency theory. South-South cooperation was geared up to avoid exploitation, reliance on internal resources and implementation of import-substitution strategies that aimed at achieving self-reliance in food and consumer goods.²⁵³ Theoretical principles of dependency theory were developed by very renowned scholars, such as Gunnar Myrdal, Gustavo Esteva, Johan Galtung, Richard A Easterlin and Arturo Escobar, who all posed a challenge to existing concepts of foreign aid. Therefore, the concept of foreign aid has changed drastically through widening the scope of the content by adding social considerations, such as health, employment, education, basic needs, nutrition, income distribution, environmental considerations, gender, and so on.

²⁵⁰ David Lewis, *The Management of Non-Governmental Development Organizations: An Introduction* (London: Routledge Pub., 2001), p.63.

²⁵¹ Ibid., p.63.

²⁵² Nicola Banks and David Hulme, "The Role of NGOs And Civil Society In Development And Poverty Reduction", *Brooks World Poverty Institute Paper 171* (2012), p.5.

²⁵³ Bartenev and Glazunova, op. cit., p.43.

As of the 1980s, the social aspect of foreign aid had the upper hand, together with growing trend of NGO's role in development with an accelerated rate. Existing paradigms could not alleviate the macroeconomic problem of both developing and Third World countries which faced severe, accumulated external debt and a sharp decrease in export income due to the economic crisis of 1982-83. Most of the developed countries cut down or reduced the amount of foreign aid they were providing, and they initiated *conditional aid* upon the recipient states to bring about structural reform. One of its more far-reaching effects during this decade has been its influence on the conditionality of "structural adjustment" and on the conditions attached to IMF loans, this is also known as the Washington Consensus.²⁵⁴ This new orthodoxy was, of course, "a recycled version of trickle-down economics which aimed to achieve growth that would also promote social life by increasing the living standard of the poorest."²⁵⁵ The years of the 1980s were later remembered as *lost decades* in the literature.²⁵⁶

Conversely, the 1980s were more productive and useful in terms of increasing the effectiveness of NGOs in the global arena. Supporting to NGOs programmes, donor states recognised that NGOs could contribute to official foreign aid objectives in various fields, including health, educations, poverty reduction and environmental conservations which also reflected the growth of the new policy agenda.²⁵⁷ At the centre of development strategies, the market replaced the state and poverty lost its position as a first priority, given beliefs in the trickle-down effects of economic

²⁵⁴ Jan P. Pronk and et al., *Catalysing Development: A Debate on Aid* (Blackwell Pub., 2004). p.34.

²⁵⁵ Paul Streeten, "Structural Adjustment: A Survey of the Issues and Options", *World Development* (15/12, 1987), p.1469–82.

²⁵⁶ Gustavo Esteva, *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London: Zed Books Pub. 2nd Edition, 1992), p.12.

²⁵⁷ Lewis, op. cit., p. 63 (cited in Michael Edwards, and David Hulme, D. (eds), *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World*, London: Earthscan Pub, 1995).

growth.²⁵⁸ In this atmosphere, states fuelled interest in NGOs a desirable alternatives, viewing them favourable for their representation of beneficiaries and a suitable platform in bringing new technologies into the development field to deal with the poor.²⁵⁹ Therefore, several states have initiated state-NGO cooperation in development assistance; however, the degree of this cooperation varies considerably from country to country. For instance, in 1985, the Indian government began formally to increase cooperation with national NGOs and make use these organisations to implement their development program with state funds.²⁶⁰ With regard to state-NGO relations, the 1980s were known in the development field as the NGO decade, in which NGOs were emerging as a promising development alternative amidst the Western pursuit of neoliberal policies.²⁶¹

The 1990s has given birth to a new kind of development assistance. At the onset, political aid under the name of "democracy assistance" came on to the stage, often used as a new tool by the West in relation to the South. Aiming to strengthen institutional and cultural liberal democracies by political aid, its influence on the South has remained mostly undocumented.²⁶² Another important concept of *human development* came to the dictionary together with *capacitation*, following Amartya Sen's work on capacities and entitlements. In his famous book "*Development as Freedom* (1999)", Sen argues for an even broader concept of development focusing on the concept of freedom, which is a principal determinant of individual initiatives and social effects that is good primarily because it enhances the ability of

²⁵⁸ Warwick E. Murray, and John D. Overton, "Neoliberalism Is Dead, Long Live Neoliberalism? Neo-structuralism And the International Aid Regime of the 2000s", *Progress in Development Studies* (11/4, 2011), p.307-319.

²⁵⁹ Banks and Hulme, op. cit., p.5.

²⁶⁰ Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 37.

²⁶¹ Banks and Hulme, op. cit., p.6.

²⁶² Julie Hearn, "Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa", *Third World Quarterly* (21, no. 5, 2000), p.815.

individuals to help themselves.²⁶³ His concept of human development led to a further diversification of development assistance, which included various key concepts such as freedom, human rights and democracy that became new priorities, over and above the others. In addition to human development and good governance, another issue concerning NGO is embedded a focus back on the role of the state. Overall, empirical studies came to the tautological conclusion that aid might have more impact on growth if it was systematically allocated towards developing an environment of good policies.²⁶⁴

In terms of NGOs role in development, the early 1990s were not promising years. Neoliberal approach and its accompanying structural adjustments started to be drawn back, so development discourse shifted towards state-oriented and interventionist approach.²⁶⁵ In the late 1990s, however, the perceived inability of conventional aid assistance to achieve both growth and social development in recipient countries led to *donor(aid) fatigue*. Therefore, conservative economic policies came to the front, emphasizing the role of the private sector that could be interpreted from decreases of state activity to increases in civil society voluntarism.²⁶⁶ New international aid regimes, promising a new focus on alternative factors and emphasising the importance of public-private multilateral initiatives, gained popularity throughout the late of this decade. The agenda of good governance encapsulated the human rights, democracy and public participations which were seen as important fields of NGO's activities.

Consolidating the centrality of NGOs in development landscape, this aid regime had evolved in 2000s, promising greater consultation between recipients and donors by moving beyond growth-focused neoliberalism. In this climate, strengthening

²⁶³ Amartya Sen, "Development as Freedom" (New York: Anchor Books Pub, 1999), p.19.

²⁶⁴ A. Craig Burnside and David Dollar "Aid, Policies and Growth", *Washington, DC: The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 569252* (1997), p.848.

²⁶⁵ Murray, and Overton, op. cit., p.307-319. (cited in Banks and Hulme, op. cit., p.6).

²⁶⁶ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit., p.104.

civil society dimension of foreign aid was widely acknowledged to continue riding the NGOs wave thanks to their people-centred, grassroots-driven and rights-based approach.²⁶⁷ Donor states have seen NGOs as good partner to increase aid efficiency in corrupt governments and a way of getting around the problem of lack of impact in the place where official aid programmes have been suspended.²⁶⁸ For instance, in post-September 11 process, significant portions of countries ODA has channelled to and through NGOs and Civil Society Organisations. Hence, the bulk of development work undertaken by civil society organisations has increased. Total aid flow was around 190 billion USD, in which states provide the bulk of aid nearly 80% as of 2012. Out of this amount, NGOs spend about 14% of all aid.²⁶⁹ Even some of large international NGOs' total aid flow have surpassed those of some OECD donor countries.²⁷⁰ As of 2010s, NGOs are channelling much more aid to recipient countries than ever before.²⁷¹

Alternatively, the years of the 2000s have introduced sound policies to get over aid fatigue syndrome and make an adjustment to the foreign aid doctrine by drawing lessons from past experiences. The new optimism reflected in a further institutionalization of foreign aid that shifted once again toward poverty reduction through fulfilment of basic human rights and economic growth.²⁷² The turning point

²⁶⁷ Banks and Hulme, op. cit., p.5.

²⁶⁸ Lewis, op. cit., p.64.

²⁶⁹ Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.1.

²⁷⁰ Bill Morton, "An Overview of International NGOs in Development Cooperation: Possibilities for South-South Cooperation", *UNDP Case Study 7 Report*, (2012), p.325. (to Access report, <http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH11%20An%20Overview%20of%20International%20NGOs%20in%20Development%20Cooperation.pdf>)

²⁷¹ Ibid., p.333.

²⁷² Bartenev and Glazunova, op. cit., p.51.

showing a significant shift in the paradigm of aid was undertaken by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, accepting the "*country ownership programme*".²⁷³ According to this programme, any state which receives aid should take ownership of development policies and only accept that aid which suits their needs to build up their own resources for coordinating donors. This ownership is frequently used by donors to mean a commitment to policies, irrespective of how those policies were chosen.

In short, the evolution of foreign aid has been largely influenced and shaped by structural changes in the global system, such as: decolonization, the Cold War, democratization process, environmental pressure, globalization and post 9/11.²⁷⁴ Throughout these processes, the characteristics of the foreign aid landscape moved far beyond the donor-recipient paradigm. In part, NGOs and civil society organizations undertook an essential role in the expansion of foreign aid' size, scale, geographical reach, budgets, access to alternative funds and ground implications. Whereas in the 1970s NGOs were little-recognised in terms of policy influence and in the implementation of development projects, in the early 1980s there was a remarkable change in the scale and significance of their favourable role in the development sector. At this time, civil society organisations were focusing on problems arising from structural adjustment policies. When it comes to the 1990s, they were increasingly involved in campaigns aimed at writing off the debts of the poorest countries.²⁷⁵ Donor distrust and frustration with states opened a new getaway for NGOs, viewing them as favourable for their representation of beneficiaries.²⁷⁶ NGOs are treated as desirable actors to bring about new

²⁷³ Paolo de Renzio, Lindsay Whitfield, and Isaline Bergamaschi, "Reforming Foreign Aid Practices: What Country Ownership Is And What Donors Can Do To Support It", *Global Economic Governance Programme, Geg Briefing Paper* (2008), p.2-3.

²⁷⁴ Homi Kharas, "Development Assistance in the 21st Century", *Brookings* (blog), 30 November 2001, 2, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/development-assistance-in-the-21st-century/>.

²⁷⁵ Lennart Wohlgemuth, "Support to Civil Society Within Swedish Development Cooperation", *School of Global Studies Perspectives* (No:20, 2011), p.8.

²⁷⁶ Banks and Hulme, op. cit., p.5.

development alternatives. Concurrently, an aura of the influence of NGO's in foreign aid found in development studies represented a central locus of academic scholarship from this time onward.²⁷⁷

3.2. Definition of Foreign Aid: Beyond Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Foreign aid is at best ambiguous, disguising more than it reveals, so to understand its meaning entails particular analysis. Initially, the question of *what* the foreign aid is leads us to various conclusions compared to *why*(purpose) the foreign aid is given. The former question has yielded three prominent responses from international relations theories. While political realism treats foreign aid as a policy tool to influence the political judgment of recipient countries in favour of donors,²⁷⁸ liberal internationalism regards it as a technical and practical measure aimed to reduce, if not eradicate, the socio-economic and political problems of recipient countries.²⁷⁹ In addition, the world system theory treats foreign aid as a means of restraining the development process of recipient countries to the continuity of unequal accumulation of capital in the world.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Lesley Gill., "Power Lines: The Political Context of Nongovernmental Organisation (NGO) Activity In El Alto, Bolivia", *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* (2:2, 1997), p.144-169.; Lewis, D., "Actors, Ideas and Networks: Trajectories of The Non-Governmental In Development Studies", in U. Kothari (eds.), *A Radical History of Development Studies* (London: Zed Books, 2005).

²⁷⁸ Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", op. cit., p.302.; George Liska, *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).; McKinlay, R. D., and R. Little, "A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation", *World Politics* (30, 1977), p.58-86.

²⁷⁹ David Baldwin, *Foreign Aid, and American Foreign Policy: A Documentary Analysis*, (New York: Praeger, 1966).; Riddell, R. C. "The Moral Case for Post-Cold War Development Aid", *International Journal* (51/2, 1996,) p.191-210.

²⁸⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein. *The Capitalist World-Economy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

The standard definition of foreign aid comes from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to the OECD definition, which is by far the most prevalent, ODA refers to the loans and grants allotted to underdeveloped and developing countries. They need to fulfil three criteria. First, the loans and grants must come from the public sector; second, these loans must be granted with the aim of fostering economic development, and third, they must be concessional and contain a grant element of at least 25%.²⁸¹ The bottom line is source of aid, which must be public flow. Similarly, C. Lancaster defines foreign aid as “a voluntary transfer of public resources, from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or to an international organization (such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program) with at least a 25 percent grant element, one goal of which is to better the human condition in the country receiving the aid.”²⁸² This definition is similar to that of the OECD, with two important distinctions. This definition includes only "official assistance", and second, the wide-reaching phrase "to better the human condition" is used, instead of DAC's focus on economic development.²⁸³

ODA is qualitatively different from its historical predecessors which have tended to be the state-to-state transfer of grants that carry no expectation of reimbursement. The crucial part is that the assistance can be financial flow, technical assistance and commodities, which aim to promote social and economic development via subsidized loans or grants. In this context, loans are non-concessional financing which carry market or near-market terms, thus are not foreign aid, yet grants and subsidized loans are concessional financing.²⁸⁴ Therefore, in OECD's terminology,

²⁸¹ OECD, “Twenty-Five Years of Development Co-operation: A Review, Paris”, *OECD*, (1985), p.171–173.

²⁸² Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago Press, 2007), p.9.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.10.

²⁸⁴ Radelet, "A Primer on Foreign Aid", *op. cit.*, p.4.

ODA excludes military assistance²⁸⁵ foreign direct investment, export subsidies, trade and export; but administrative overheads of development agencies, and their domestic efforts to advocate in favour of more assistance, as well as debt forgiveness on non-concessional flows, are all counted as foreign aid.²⁸⁶ In addition to this, public resource transfers to states which are classified as poor by the Development Assistance Committee, or upper-middle income, low income, lower middle income and the least developed countries (LDCs) are not counted as ODA.²⁸⁷

However, as we look on the ground, the term of foreign aid encapsulates a broader scope, whereas OECD's definition of foreign aid is more technical, constraining the concept's holistic perception. At the most general level, foreign aid “consists of material goods or services that are owned or controlled by donors, the allocation of which may vary according to their purposes and interests.”²⁸⁸ From this angle, combining OECD’s definitions and the overall perceptions, foreign aid can be defined as any voluntary transfer of resource from government or NGOs to another country with at least a 25 percent grant element which includes service or material goods that are owned or controlled by donors in the form of skills, goods, know-how, credits and grants. The general objective is to address one or more of four issues: first, it should strengthen education, health, environmental, or political

²⁸⁵ However, due to the UK' lobby, OECD is now showing a tendency to re-define foreign aid, including some military spending which supports the security forces in fragile states. See more about, Rowena Mason, the Guardian newspaper, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/feb/20/oecd-redefines-foreign-aid-to-include-some-military-spending> (accessed on 09.03.2018).

²⁸⁶ Homi Kharas, “Trends and Issues in Development Aid”, *Wolfensohn Center For Development Working Paper* (1, 2007), p.5.

²⁸⁷ Carol Lancaster, “Foreign Aid in the Twenty-First Century: What Purposes?”, in Louis Picard, Robert Groelsema and Terry F. Buss (eds.), *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Lessons for the Next Half-Century* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), p.39.

²⁸⁸ Tomohisa Hattori, “Reconceptualising Foreign Aid”, *Review of International Political Economy* (8:4, 2001), p.635.

systems; second, it should help stabilize an economy following economic shocks; third, it should stimulate economic growth through building infrastructure, supporting productive sectors such as agriculture, or bringing new ideas and technologies; fourth it should support subsistence consumption of food and other commodities, especially during relief operations or humanitarian crises.²⁸⁹

Since the concept of foreign aid is an elusive term, often confused with development assistance, the difference between the two must be underlined. Both concepts are aimed to sustain “a better result for the human condition”. The distinguishing factor between foreign aid and development assistance remains in their underlying aim and purposes. As defined above, the purpose of foreign aid is to maintain a better human condition in a given state, short term in character through deductive means. Development assistance, conversely, encompasses all aid given by states and other private agencies to support the social, economic and political development over the long term through inductive means. In this regard, foreign aid can be taken to be a part of the general theory of development assistance and considered as either a variant, a sub-set or practical application of the bigger issue. As a matter of fact, the pure concept of development assistance encapsulates more overarching aid flow through state and private actors, in the form of economic and social activities.

The other distinguishing factor between foreign aid and development assistance is in terms of ends and means. Both are different in their purpose, as either ends or means for promoting development. In this sense, development assistance can be considered as closer to an end since its ultimate goal is to reduce poverty and increase social welfare. On the other hand, foreign aid is more of a means to achieve that development. However, since foreign aid is a tricky concept, which is sometimes thought of as a policy and a tool of policy, this paper claims that foreign aid is both, an end and a means, a separable purpose distinct from bringing about economic and social progress in poor countries. Since there is a grey area regarding what should be included and excluded in the definition of foreign aid, it can be concluded that, in a broad frame, foreign aid is a sub-category of development

²⁸⁹ Radelet, "A Primer on Foreign Aid", op. cit., p.7.

assistance and development aid is sub-title of foreign aid. That is to say; development aid can be run through state channels (known as official development aid) or private channels. For instance, in terms of goals, foreign aid is divided into military, humanitarian, and development aid.²⁹⁰ According to Morgenthau, foreign aid is divided into six, these are a humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige and foreign aid for economic development (development aid).”²⁹¹

Given this reality, a few distinctive characteristics on foreign aid must be underlined. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) classifies aid into three overarching categories. Among these, ODA occupies the largest one, consisting of aid provided by donor governments to low- and middle-income countries. The second is Official Assistance (OA), which is provided by governments to richer countries, with per capita incomes higher than approximately \$9,200 in 2001 (for instance, Cyprus, Bahamas, Israel, and Singapore). And the other aid flow is Private Voluntary Assistance that includes grants from non-government organizations, foundations, private companies, religious groups, and charities.²⁹² When most literature addresses foreign aid, it often refers to ODA.

Finally, typology of resources allocation is mainly divided into three components by American anthropologist M. Sahlins. These are an economic *exchange*, *redistribution*, and *giving*.²⁹³ From this typology, one thing is certain that most of the foreign aid falls in the giving category that is accepted as a gift extended from one state to another, that is unreciprocated. Accordingly, two basic aid practices take place: direct and indirect. The former is also known as *bilateral assistance* which aims to send aid from one country to another, as historically applied by most aid programs. The latter, known as *multilateral assistance*, pools aid together from many donors; including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or

²⁹⁰ Bartenev and Glazunova, op. cit., p.63.

²⁹¹ Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", op. cit., p.301.

²⁹² Radelet, "A Primer on Foreign Aid", op. cit., p.4.

²⁹³ Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), p.185.

National Bank. Aid is also typically measured in one of three ways: *total dollars*, as a *share of GDP*, or *per capita*.²⁹⁴ This thesis, particularly centres its focus on ODA, Private Voluntary Assistance, Giving and Direct(bilateral) aid via state and NGOs. Concentrating on these foreign aid categories requires analysis of types of foreign aid.

3.3. Types of Foreign Aid

Types of foreign aid change according to teleological (goals), methodological (technical) and practical ways. Therefore, most studies have as yet failed to differentiate between various types of aid.²⁹⁵ For instance, according to the purpose of foreign aid, four major types can be classified: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, and commercial.²⁹⁶ Methodologically, types of foreign aid can be classified as public or private aid and bilateral or multilateral aid. Practically, taxonomies can be diverse such as humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige and foreign aid for economic development.

Of these distinct types, this chapter takes official and private development aid, particularly humanitarian aid at the bilateral level, as its core analysis. While the official foreign aid does not include foreign direct investment, export subsidies, military assistance, trade, export credits or trade financing, intelligence-related expenditures, and bribes or tributes for purely diplomatic or political ends; private aid includes any aid from non-governmental organizations and private sources, such as private companies, commercial banks, corporate foundations, family foundations, and individuals.²⁹⁷ More precisely, international NGOs, like Oxfam,

²⁹⁴ See more about this measurement., Radelet, 'A Primer on Foreign Aid', op. cit., p.5.

²⁹⁵ Jonathan Glennie, *The Trouble with Aid: Why Less Could Mean More for Africa* (1 edition, London: Zed Books, 2008), p.82.

²⁹⁶ The cultural purpose is also present but less prominent, see more about, Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, op. cit., p.13.

²⁹⁷ Riddell, op. cit., p.2.

CARE International and Save the Children are the second group of major private aid players. However, there is a trend, increasing year by year; foreign aid that is financed both by non-state actors and by states simultaneously.

This trend increased at a much faster rate than the overall ODA budgets in the 1980s. Due to their private and independent character, NGOs can easily implement their own aid policies. Contrary to the government's stance, NGOs can be disassociated from the ideological considerations of global politics. In addition to their perceived apolitical nature, two competencies of NGOs could ease their relations with the governments regarding aid.²⁹⁸ Firstly, NGOs allow states to expand the scope of donor's aid in the place where ODA is thin or non-existent. Secondly, they are less constrained by a bureaucratic organization, which increases their efficiency. Directly subsidizing NGO-based projects allows donors to avoid relying on inefficient bureaucracies, often found in developing countries, to transmit aid through the NGOs networks at a local level.²⁹⁹

State and NGO aid interactions function under three modes: NGOs operate as donor's clients (on behalf of the donor); NGOs operate as donor's constituents in which official aid agencies benefit from NGO support in aiding; NGOs operate independently from the state.³⁰⁰ In the first and second modes of interaction, NGOs have the motivation to influence their own priorities directly or indirectly over aid practice. This motivation to influence is seen at two levels: project level and policy level. At the policy level, NGOs implement aid practices to enhance social, political and economic policies in a given country, which takes place before aid policy is set. At project level, NGOs become involved in the aid practice through halting or

²⁹⁸ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit., p.119.

²⁹⁹ Brian Smith, *More than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid* (Princeton University Press, 1990).

³⁰⁰ Vernon W. Ruttan, *United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

changing the focus of particular projects.³⁰¹ In the end, these two levels of influence are inevitably inter-related.

It can be seen that the growing role of the NGOs' position within the development sector has been accompanied with their increasing interaction with the state. These three modes of state-NGO relations, therefore has deepened in the course of recent decades. However, the magnitude and degree of state-NGO aid relations change in accordance with NGOs potential power within the domestic and global circle, as well as NGOs attachment to the particular aid types. In other words, NGOs have long been implementing a people-centred and participatory approach in humanitarian crises. Since most of the NGOs have evolved from one of the three main historical strands, the religious humanitarian, the Dunantist and the Wilsonian, of which religious humanitarian tradition is the oldest,³⁰² early state-NGO aid interactions have prevailed over this particular type of aid.

Currently, much of the NGOs' power stems from its global influence over humanitarian aid activities. Facts and figures in overall humanitarian aid flow led by the NGOs illustrate a dramatic increase of NGOs' attachment to this aid type. Even the objectives in the foundation of most prominent NGOs, their global aid practices and their relations with the society are run on the basis of humanitarian aid. With this in mind, the thesis also walks us through the complexities of Turkey-FBO intersection over humanitarian aid. Therefore, humanitarian aid's scope, conceptual framework and its relationship with development studies needs to be scrutinized.

³⁰¹ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit., p.109.

³⁰² Joanna Macrae and Adele Harmer, "Humanitarian Action and The Global War on Terror: A Review of Trends and Issue", *Overseas Development Institute- Humanitarian Policy Report* (14, 2013), p.27.

3.3.1. Humanitarian Aid

Within various types of foreign aid, humanitarian aid can be used as a sub-category. Compared to others, aid for humanitarian relief is the least controversial, because only humanitarian foreign aid is *per se* non-political, albeit it can indeed perform a political function when it operates within a political context.³⁰³ There is also a growing distinction made between emergency aid and humanitarian aid,³⁰⁴ yet the line between these two concepts is hard to draw, so, both concepts are often referred the same meaning in this thesis.

Having said, the root of aid for a relief mission, known as religious humanitarian aid, goes back to 17th-century philanthropy, though humanitarianism has emerged as a component of the global response to disaster or conflict zone areas.³⁰⁵ The hardship caused by human-led or natural-based disasters was a significant area for action in humanitarian practice. Several NGOs' were initially formed in response to emergency needs, such as the Red Cross in Italian unification and Oxfam in the Greek famine of 1942.³⁰⁶ In fact, due to the influence of Cold War politics, much humanitarian aid was confined to the periphery of conflicts, until the 1980s. The rise of multilateral humanitarian aid and the recent shift in grant foreign aid through the 1990s have been accompanied with the thawing of Cold War relations and the humanitarian issue has emerged as a significant aid component. This idea finds a place in the categorisation of aid by changing the traditional implication of humanitarian aid. That is to say, even though most of the early practices of humanitarian aid basically ran through the auspices of central states, humanitarian aid today is often practiced without the consent of central states in war-torn

³⁰³ Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", op. cit., p.301.

³⁰⁴ Günther Fink and Silvia Redaelli, "Determinants of International Emergency Aid-Humanitarian Need Only?", *World Development* (Volume 39, Issue 5, May 2011), p.741-757.

³⁰⁵ Jonathan Goodhand, *Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), p.78.

³⁰⁶ Ahmed, and Potter, op. cit., p.5.

countries, such as Afghanistan and Ethiopia. In the name of protecting human rights and liberal values, military interventions to Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti were launched to address the humanitarian consequences of wars.

In part reflecting this trend, NGO-oriented humanitarian aid has been gradually accelerated, to now become a significant player in several humanitarian experiments conducted under the umbrella of the UN. In parallel to the enhancement of NGO-based humanitarian aid, total humanitarian aid has increased. Looking over a more extended period, despite its low share of aid, only increasing from 5% to 10% of the total aid in the last 30 years, humanitarian aid has increased at a far faster rate annually than total official aid.³⁰⁷ For instance, within a decade (from 1990 to 2000) the volume of official humanitarian assistance nearly tripled from \$2 billion to \$5.9 billion, which is equivalent to increasing the proportion of ODA from 5.83 percent to 10.5 percent.³⁰⁸ In other words, starting from three decades prior to the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a seventeen-fold increase in humanitarian aid, whereas ODA has just increased two and a half times.³⁰⁹ Because of its direct focus on human life, humanitarian aid is treated as one of the fast-growing types of aid in terms of scope and budget, therefore NGOs and DAC donors disbursed over 16,7 billion USD public flow as humanitarian aid in 2016.³¹⁰

According to OECD-DAC definitions, “humanitarian aid (referred to as humanitarian assistance) is designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain

³⁰⁷ Riddell, op. cit., p.50.

³⁰⁸ Joanna Macrae (eds.), “The New Humanitarianism: A Review Of Trends In Global Humanitarian Action”, *Oversea Development Institute HPG Report* (11, 2002), p.11.

³⁰⁹ Roger C. Riddell, “Does Foreign Aid Really Work?” in M. Kremer, P. van Lieshout and R. Went (eds.) *Doing Good or Doing Better: Development Policies in a Globalizing World* (Amsterdam University Press, 2009), p.50.

³¹⁰ OECD Humanitarian Assistance, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/humanitarian-assistance.htm> (accessed 13.06.2018).

human dignity following shocks, natural disasters, and conflict”.³¹¹ Therefore, aid must be consistent with the principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity, in accordance with UN Resolution 46/182.³¹² Humanitarian aid is by nature short-term, given during and in the aftermath of the emergency situations in various forms including: health services, water-sanitation, shelter, emergency food, protection, support services, search and rescue, reconstruction, rehabilitation and preventative measures (such as early warning systems). To meet the immediate needs of victims, services and aid given by state or private organizations (NGOs, churches, and foundations), are covered by the category of humanitarian aid. However, according to OECD-DAC criteria, humanitarian aid has many loopholes, for instance, OECD criteria do not include the long-term work of disaster preparation activities or prevention of floods and long-term implications to improve infrastructure.³¹³ It instead addresses any situation that results from man-made crises or natural disasters within a short-term period.

In a broader sense, the term humanitarianism addresses two aspects: normative and material. In the normative sense, humanitarian aid is synonymous for compassion that is based on commitment to shared humanity and the subject of ethics. It provides a clear and logical explanation of the ethical framework guiding humanitarian action.³¹⁴ The material aspect, on the other hand, relates more specifically to the technical delivery of relief in conflict or post-disaster zones.

Based on the above definitions, humanitarian aid encapsulates activities which save lives, address human-suffering and ensure personal dignity either during or in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters. The relationship between

³¹¹ OECD Humanitarian Assistance, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/humanitarian-assistance.htm> (accessed 13.06.2018).

³¹² To see this resolution, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm>

³¹³ TİKA, Development Assistance Report, 2013, p.57.

³¹⁴ Hugo Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster* (Oxford University Press, 2015).

humanitarian aid and development aid lie in two different approaches.³¹⁵ The first approach focuses on the time-period between two aid types, envisaging that the humanitarian activities are about to be completed, and development activities are about to begin. The second approach points to an institutional gap which comes from not only the practical problems of coordinating development and humanitarian institutions, but also fundamental differences in cultures, mandates and priorities.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter handles foreign aid and development aid in the same context, since foreign aid's initial usage derives from development studies. Besides, foreign aid was initially meant as one of the important antidotes for under-development in the "Third World" states. Nevertheless, an instrumental role for FA was later used by several donor states to further their foreign policy goals.³¹⁶ Since it allows the donor country influence by accessing to domestic affairs in the country focus. For instance, US leaders view foreign aid as an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy, always associated it with national security.³¹⁷ Therefore, security is lately linked to humanitarian and development aid in the context of post-2011 Western foreign policy.³¹⁸ Despite its highly contested usage, several foreign aid types brought fresh

³¹⁵ Astri Suhrke, and Arve Ofstad, "Filling the Gap: Lessons Well Learnt By Multilateral Aid Agencies", *CMI Working Paper* (14, 2005), <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/2063-filling-the-gaplessons-well-learnt.pdf>

³¹⁶ Clair Apodaca, *Understanding U.S. human rights policy: A paradoxical legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

³¹⁷ Marian Leonardo Lawson, "Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance", *Congressional Research Service Report*, (2016), see full report <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42827.pdf>

³¹⁸ Róisín Hinds, "Relationship Between Humanitarian and Development Aid: Applied Knowledge Services", *GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report* (2015), p.2.

understanding from political objective to pure normative and humanitarian way of actions.

This part of the thesis has placed humanitarian aid within the context of official development assistance, even though humanitarian aid had been used much earlier than other forms of aid. Because, the concept of humanitarian aid gained scholarly attention in academia in the second of the 20th century. Additionally, the dividing line between foreign aid, humanitarian aid and development aid is hard to draw, but this chapter has tried to divide these terms in the context of existing literature. In the final analysis, this chapter is neither a critique nor a praise of foreign aid. It has not tried to answer the question "does aid work" or why the issue has raised so many questions. It has instead concentrated on the conceptual understanding of ODA, private voluntary assistance, giving, direct(bilateral) and humanitarian aid to shed light on further research topics, aimed to help the analyse state-NGO humanitarian aid relations in the case of Turkey and the civil society nexus. Following an in-depth investigation into foreign aid, the thesis proceeds to the conceptual framework of the thesis.

CHAPTER 4

4. NGOs' ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

The paradigm which attributes a minor role to NGOs on state policies, has been losing ground in academia over the last three decades. Non-state actors, though lacking power in the traditional sense, have direct and indirect effects on the policies and behaviours of states.³¹⁹ It has been widely acknowledged by academic circles that foreign policy makers work with and even rely on non-state actors in implementing foreign policy.³²⁰ A clear sign of NGO power can be seen in the creation of domestic and international norms, and the dissemination of these norms within international and domestic realms.³²¹

However, measuring the inputs of NGOs into foreign policy-making and practice is difficult. It is even close to impossible in the positivist sense since the main channels of NGOs influence on law-making are often informal, their influence is hard to measure.³²² In the traditional sense, foreign policy decisions and implementation are taken by official authorities who have full power over its

³¹⁹ Thomas Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics", in Thomas Risse and B. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage Pub. 2002), p.266.

³²⁰ Lawrence Davidson, "Privatizing Foreign Policy," *Middle East Policy* (13, no. 2, 2006).; Virginia Haufler, "International Diplomacy and the Privatization of Conflict Prevention", *International Studies Perspectives* (5, no. 2, 2004).; Carol C. Adelman, "The Privatization of Foreign Aid", *Foreign Affairs* (82, no. 6, 2003).

³²¹ Anna Ohanyan, "Network Institutionalism and NGO Studies", *International Studies Perspectives* (2012), p.371.

³²² Anne Peters and et al., "Towards Non-State Actors As Effective, Legitimate, And Accountable Standard Setters" in Anne Peters and et al., (eds.), *Non-state Actors as Standard Setters* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.498.

jurisdiction. But this is not an *ex parte(unilateral)* process, as states are naturally subject to several internal and external dynamics that mutually influence each other. NGOs represent one of these dynamics, which play their most significant role during policy-making and implementation through agenda-setting, norm building, framing, lobbying, persuading and conferring legitimacy. Their power to produce autonomous or semi-autonomous outcomes in foreign policy process seem to depend on several factors, such as receptivity to alternative perspectives, reliability, reputation, flexibility, in short on factors that simultaneously contribute to their legitimacy.³²³ In this regard, Simmons claims that the impact of NGOs on national government's foreign policy depends on two factors: the government's attitude towards NGOs³²⁴ and the capabilities of NGOs.³²⁵

Taking the position that NGOs do matter in influencing state policies and behaviours, this part of the chapter elaborates *what* and *by which techniques* do NGOs employ in relations to change on state foreign policy and practice. Yet, many empirical works pose the questions *why* and under *what conditions* these effects are achieved, as most of the controversies are centred around the importance of these intervening factors.³²⁶ In this dissertation, however, I go a few steps back to inquire into the “what” question. Instead of examining the conditions under which NGOs become effective, I look the role that they adopt. What questions lead to the production of descriptions. It helps the researcher discover and describe “the

³²³ Ibid., p.498.

³²⁴ Regime type of states is one of the key variables in this regard. For instance, there is deep methodological and practical outlook between the democratic regime and authoritarian one. While the former regimes feel more compelled to accommodate public-private partnerships (PPPs), the latter is less willing to work with non-state actors, perceiving them a threat to their political continuum.

³²⁵ P. J. Simmons, “Learning to Live with NGOs”, *Foreign Policy* (Fall, 1998), p.84.

³²⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Post-war Europe”, *International Organizations* (54: 2, 2000), p.217-252.; Thomas Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics”, *op. cit.*, p.263.; and Chaim D. Kaufmann, and Robert A. Pape, “Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade,” *International Organization* (53:4,1999), p.631–668.

characteristics in and patterns of some social phenomena.”³²⁷ Why questions, on the other hand, focus on causal relations between different phenomena, often expressed in terms of dependent and independent variables. Finally, how questions are concerned with change and inquire into the ways of intervening in a specific state of affairs.

This part of the chapter seeks to reveal political role of NGOs and techniques, including agenda-setting, norm-building, framing, lobbying and information provision, which all play a significant role in a state-NGO relationship. While some literatures refer to pathways, methods, mechanism or instrument in labelling the role that NGOs employ, I prefer to use the term “techniques” since ultimately these are the tools deployed to influence the humanitarian policies of the state.

Following this prologue, this chapter reviews the literature of state-NGO relations. Firstly, this chapter discusses the significant roles that NGOs play to change the preferences and policies of states. Focusing on the political roles of NGOs in foreign policy process, this part examines alternative techniques that matter in the relationship between state and NGOs on foreign aid. It does not postulate a linear and holistic process which argues that all techniques are applicable to all states, independent of external influences. In other words, each state’s (democratic vs undemocratic) foreign policy process works in a different way. Depending on regime type, NGOs have various toolkits and various degrees of influence over governments’ decisions. It is clear that the influence of NGOs on government foreign policy is stronger in democratic countries. Thus, this thesis only takes into consideration the state-NGO relationship in relatively democratic settings.

Secondly, drawing on constructivist perspectives, this part of the thesis analyses the *political role of NGOs* in relation to the state. NGOs perform a significant role in relief (famine relief, disaster), social and economic recovery role. This latter set of roles are usually referred to as the service aspect of NGO activities. But this chapter primarily centres upon the political role. I cover service and implementation related

³²⁷ Norman Blaika, op. cit.,p.60.

functions of NGOs to the extent that it is relevant to the five techniques mentioned above. Although realist-inspired authors essentially argue that NGOs only promote soft norms, claiming NGOs' impact is more or less epiphenomenal,³²⁸ there is empirical evidence³²⁹ to challenge this paradigm. NGOs influence is neither minor nor merely ineffective, as has been amply documented in issue areas (i.e. environment and human rights). This influence is shown through *actor-centred approach* and thus characterised as 'bottom-up' norm formation.³³⁰ However, to demonstrate this goes beyond the purposes of this thesis as I focus on the what question to prepare the ground for future research on effectiveness. Thirdly, considering the importance of methodological problems, such as case selection is also covered in this chapter.

4.1. Direct and Indirect Role of NGOs

Before delving into NGO's direct and indirect role, one issue needs to be clarified. This thesis investigates faith-based NGO's (FBOs) role in Turkish foreign aid. FBOs' influence and NGOs may vary concerning their scope and context. For instance, techniques that NGOs utilise are much broader, persistent, direct and formal than that of FBOs. However, in the Turkish case, most selected NGOs represent moderate FBOs, which work with a humanitarian mind-set. Theoretically, NGO literature tended to regard FBOs as the subset of NGO taxonomy, so the concept of NGO is a blanket term, embodying influencing mechanisms which are intrinsically mechanisms of FBOs as well. Ultimately, both actors attribute morality

³²⁸ Stephen D. Krasner, "Power Politics, Institutions, and Transnational Relations," in T. Risse-Kappen (eds.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.257–279.

³²⁹ For instance, Youngwan Kim's article: "How NGOs Influence US Foreign Aid Allocation" is a good example.

³³⁰ NGOs can also engage in the top down attempts to shape state action. Shaping norms at the UN may shape state action. See more about Jutta M. Joachim, *Agenda Setting, the UN, and NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights* (Georgetown University Press, 2007).

as their standpoint in implementations. Therefore, techniques of NGOs is treated as the techniques of FBOs simultaneously in this dissertation.

There are various ways to conceptualise state-NGO relations. According to Dennis Young, the conceptual model in a state-NGOs relationship can be formed in three comprehensive ways: supplementary, complementary and adversarial.³³¹ Young claims that in supplementary relations, NGOs work independently and supplement the governments' policy in a certain field. For instance, in the absence of diplomatic relations between two states, NGOs can operate certain projects abroad. In the complementary relationship, NGOs work hand-in-hand with central governments to complement their state's policy. For instance, during the NATO airstrikes on Kosovo in 1998, French affiliates of Medecins du Monde (MDM) led to the construction of refugee camps in Macedonia for Albanians, while the Greek affiliate NGOs decided to enter Kosovo to help the Serbs as a fellow Christian Orthodox population.³³² In both cases, the organisations had close cooperation with their respective governments on the ground, while their states were absent in remote areas. Finally, the third is adversarial relations in which NGOs can criticize and monitor the state's overall policy/actions. They can influence a state by applying those mechanisms mentioned above. For instance, two leading international NGOs, Amnesty International and Oxfam international, worked together in promoting an Arms Trade Treaty at the UN level, against the interests of those significant power's unilateral actions in 2003 and 2006. These three forms of relationship are important to understand state-NGO relation in Turkish case.

Considering the different authors' view who made distinctions, state-NGOs relations can be framed within two overall forms: *direct* and *indirect*. While the former encompasses the messages, they convey and activities that NGOs engage in, the latter is seen through the responses to their activities and messages they provoke

³³¹ Dennis Young, "Alternative Models of Government Non-Profit Sector Relations: Theoretical And International Perspectives", *Non-profit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* (29/1, 2000), p.149–172.

³³² Macrae and Harmer, op. cit., p.27.

from governments and private actors within other states.³³³ The influencing capacity of NGOs, therefore, lies in their link to both direct and indirect involvement in domestic and foreign policy. The ability to set the agenda through contributing discourse and language of national debate, directly lobbying in government, such as campaigns addressed to the mass public, effort to shape and re-shape the conventional politics or domestic legal order and role over national policy-making process in various states; these are some of the characteristic political forms of direct and indirect techniques of NGOs to employ. The motivation of NGOs' political role through direct and indirect ways is seen at two levels: project level and policy level. While the latter takes place in advance of aid practice through enhancing social, political and economic consequences of policy, the former takes place in the next phase of policy through halting or changing the condition of the project.³³⁴ In the end, these two levels of interaction are inevitably inter-related.

The other distinguishing factor in analysing state-NGO relations is the *area of influence*. In other words, activity areas are some important variables. At some length, NGOs are usually identified with charity and relief, because they are founded with the principle of "*force for good*" as helping to improve the well-being of the disadvantaged community; and so, the main aim is to promote common goals in the domestic sphere as well as the global arena. Alongside the social, economic and missionary role that they have played, NGOs emergency relief role has taken new directions, dimensions and shapes since the 1970s,³³⁵ as discussed in the third chapter. Looking at today's example, NGO' involvement in all spheres of society and issues are noted, for example in human security³³⁶, environmental

³³³ Josselin, and Wallace, "Non-state Actors in World Politics: A Framework." op. cit., p.13.

³³⁴ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit., p.109.

³³⁵ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit.,p.37.

³³⁶ Claude Bruderlein, "The Role Of Non-State Actors In Building Human Security: The Case Of Armed Groups In Intra-State Wars Geneva", *Report From Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue* (2000), p.1-19.

governance³³⁷, building the capacity to support prisoner re-entry into society³³⁸, in HIV prevention and care,³³⁹ to name but a few. These examples explain the seemingly flourishing involvement of NGOs' in various areas.

Coming back to areas of influence, firstly, NGOs have a direct role in "*relief*" with the traditional responsibility and duty of NGOs being a pioneering role in disaster and famine relief. Known for their emergency missions in recent history, NGOs purvey a significant role in easing obstacles that vulnerable people are faced with in unstable areas. For instance, NGOs played prominent roles in the absence of functional states, such as in Somalia and Haiti, and have delivered vital services to civilians in areas of acute risk, such as in Chechnya and the African Great Lakes.³⁴⁰ Secondly, NGOs play a leading role in "*social and economic affairs*". Particularly, in recent years, the economic issue has increasingly taken the special attention of many NGO's field of involvement. Exploring the so-called relief-development continuum, providing intangible technical services and tangible resources for development, enterprising support activities are some of the economic and social matters that NGOs are involved in. Thirdly, NGOs are pioneering a "*political role*" for themselves, such as advocacy, agenda setting, public education and lobbying. For instance, a global NGO, such as Amnesty International seeks influence on specific issues at the global level in the political decision-making process.³⁴¹ In contrast to previous roles (relief and economic) which are regarded as non-political due to the technical and material objectives of the mission, the third role of NGOs

³³⁷ Kristen Lyons, Peter Walters, and Erin Riddell, "The Role of Faith-based Organizations in Environmental Governance: The Case of Forestry in the Solomon Islands", *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning* (18:3, 2015), p.342-360.

³³⁸ Reverend Eugene Williams, "Building the Capacity of Faith-Based Organizations to Support Prisoner Re-Entry", *Ontrack Communication Paper* (2013), p.1-6.

³³⁹ Kathryn Pitkin Derosé and et al., "The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in HIV Prevention and Care in Central America", *RAND Corporations, Investment in People and Ideas* (2010), p.1-123.

³⁴⁰ Macrae and Harmer, op. cit., p.25.

³⁴¹ Bas Arts, *The Political Influence Of Global NGOs-Case Studies On The Climate And Biodiversity Conventions*" (Netherland: International Books, 1998), p.50.

is intended to influence the policies of central governments. The challenge is not only to the existing policies but also promoting alternative policies of states; there is a growing realization that both Northern and Southern NGOs attach to the importance of this political area of influence. Ultimately, in transparent policy-making process of democratic states, NGOs are using or being used (in the realist-sense) by external powers as political leverage on government. However, it's hard to delineate where the politically-oriented NGOs distinguish themselves from relief-oriented or economic-oriented NGOs, since an NGO may be harmoniously involved in relief, economic and political roles simultaneously. To understand the mutual relationship between NGOs and state in the field of foreign aid, this chapter concentrates upon the political role that NGOs play, which is gaining much more position at the expense of the other roles.

Regarding political and normative role of NGOs in relation to state, several studies list variables which NGOs employ to influence foreign policy of state. Alternative approaches list different techniques that rest upon a certain theoretical angle in conjunction with their premises. For instance, according to constructivist scholars Finnemore and Sikkink, NSAs influence the foreign policy of the state through framing, lobbying, agenda-setting, and norm-building.³⁴² By the same token, Keck and Sikkink developed a nuanced typology of the tactics that NGOs³⁴³ apply through their power of information, ideas, and strategies to alter information and value context within which states make policies, including "information politics,

³⁴² Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," op. cit., p.887-917.; Chamovitz, "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance," *Michigan Journal of International Law* (18, no. 2, 1997), p.281-282.; Anna Holzscheiter, "Discourse as Capability: Non-State Actors' Capital in Global Governance", *Millennium Journal of International Studies* (33, 2005), p.723.; Keck and Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders...*, op. cit.,

³⁴³ Although they refer to advocacy networks rather than NGOs, advocacy networks contain all organizations characterized by a voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal pattern of communication which includes NGOs, foundations, media, churches, parliamentary branches of government, intellectuals. Therefore, while advocacy networks are a broader concept encompassing NGOs underneath, this part applies to NGOs. See more about: Keck and Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, op. cit., p.9.

symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics".³⁴⁴ Following typologies, they identify five types and stages of NGO influence: influence on issue creating and agenda setting; influence on the discursive position of states; influence on institutional procedures; influence on policy change in the target country; and influence on state behaviour.³⁴⁵ Basically, the generative role of NGOs (advocacy networks) on state preference and behaviour through rhetoric or other forms (e.g. lobbying and persuasion), are some of the mechanisms which constructivists emphasise.

Similarly, while constructivist-inspired Boli and Thomas illuminate the central role played by NGOs in the creation of global rules, norms, change and world culture at the national and international level,³⁴⁶ realist-inspired P.J. Simmons demonstrates four ways that NGOs affect government: negotiating outcomes, conferring legitimacy, setting agendas and implementing solutions.³⁴⁷ In a similar direction, Youngwan Kim asserts two conceptual functions, that NGOs have a direct influence on state policy as "information providers" and "lobbying groups".³⁴⁸ Applying these functions in analysing NGOs influence on US foreign aid allocations seems closely related to how some NGOs have a great degree of influence on preference and policy. In addition to these, NGOs have the power of *persuasion, mobilizations, discourse* and *determinative* role on state foreign

³⁴⁴ Keck and Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, op. cit., p.16.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p.25.

³⁴⁶ John Boli, and George M. Thomas, *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford University Press, 1999).

³⁴⁷ Simmons, op. cit., p.84.

³⁴⁸ Kim, op. cit., p.3.

political discourse.³⁴⁹ The alternative techniques can be added, yet it goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

Considering the hybrid character of NGOs that are 'private in form, but public in purpose' and given the large variety of activities that NGOs are involved in, this chapter strictly circumscribes the direct, indirect, political and normative role of NGOs in the humanitarian aid policy process. Given this background, combining various listed techniques under a single title within the light of constructivist approach is required. Scholars generally underline techniques including agenda setting; lobbying; norm-building; framing (preference, behaviour, public opinion) and persuasion (negotiation, bargaining); information providing; conferring legitimacy; activating public opinion and awareness; and monitoring compliance. Among these, four techniques are commonly acknowledged by scholars which are framing, lobbying, norm-building and agenda-setting.³⁵⁰ Moreover, input from NGOs on state aid policy through information providing is also empirically confirmed,³⁵¹ therefore this research has included it as techniques. But this review should not be interpreted to suggest that the other techniques are less significant than these five forms.

4.1.1 Agenda-Setting

Setting agenda is a prevailing concept utilized frequently in the literature on non-state actors, accepted as a key process of NGOs to influence foreign policy. NGOs

³⁴⁹ Anna Holzscheiter, "Discourse as Capability: Non-State Actors' Capital in Global Governance," *Millennium Journal of International Studies* (33, 2005), p.723.

³⁵⁰ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", *International Organization* (52, no. 4,1998), p.887-917.; Steve Charnovitz, "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance", *Michigan Journal of International Law* (18, no. 2, 1997), p.281-282.; Holzscheiter, op. cit., p.723.; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

³⁵¹ Youngwan Kim, "How NGOs Influence US Foreign Aid Allocations", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2015).

participate actively in the agenda-setting process thanks to their well-endowed knowledge and expertise. The term agenda setting refers merely to any actions which aimed to get into the political process through prioritising and listing issues that official policy-makers pay attention to at a given time.³⁵² In other words, agenda-setting implies the phase of problem and interest definition in reaction to an issue, particularly at the national level in the initial phases.³⁵³ Among various phases in the international policy cycle, including policy formulation, decision making (or adaptation), implementation and evaluation, agenda setting represents the initial phases of this process.³⁵⁴ In the first stage, which agenda-setting process is being maintained needs to be identified in order to define the problem in an appropriate way. It is an accepted argument that *ceteris paribus* the direct and indirect role of NGOs on foreign policy has always been greatest during the agenda-setting and norm emergence.³⁵⁵ They are able to exert agenda by utilizing political opportunity and provoke international debate in relation to the issues at stake.³⁵⁶

In fact, agenda-setting is a temporary process where interested parties are called upon regarding specific problems and proposals for solutions also appear on the political agenda. Seeing this phase as a negotiation period, during the agenda-setting process, stakeholders advocate specific issues to policymakers to gain attention on the respective agenda.³⁵⁷ These stakeholders engage in a debate with

³⁵² Ahmed Potter, op. cit., p.48.

³⁵³ Peter Newell, *Climate for Change: Non-state Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse*, (Cambridge Uni. Press, 2000), p.7.

³⁵⁴ James E. Anderson, *Public Policymaking* (Cengage Learning, 2014), p.6.

³⁵⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", op. cit., p. 895.

³⁵⁶ Hannah Murphy, *The Making of International Trade Policy: NGOs, Agenda-Setting and the WTO* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), p.2.

³⁵⁷ Simmons, op. cit., p.84.

the government, so as to gain a favourable reaction to a new problem at various levels.

Note that there are some conceptual issues, which call for caution about sweeping generalisations on agenda-setting.³⁵⁸ Setting political, economic or social agendas is one of the variations of this divergence. In other words, here agenda refers to the initial process of policy initiations in response to problems and solutions. Before implementing any policy on the ground, state authorities may apply the opinions of related organisations in the content of any proposals that are being formulated. That policy is considered through a debate among interested parties, where the ultimate objective is to reach a common ground. Therefore, the NGOs potential role on setting agenda is critical in determining the shape of any issue raised by stakeholders that would become official foreign policy of the state. Privileged access by NGOs in this earliest phase is a key power, accepted that wide-ranging policy domains encompass direct role of NGOs. Thanks to efforts of NGOs, several critical issues have been considered, such as women's suffrage, human rights, along with other issues. It is easier for NGOs seek a political role through pressure on political authorities, given that they can focus on one government with which they have an established relationship.³⁵⁹

Despite of its constant nature changing from case to case, three prominent factors are essential in allowing any NGOs to play agenda-setting role.³⁶⁰ First, political opportunity provides a legitimatising set of circumstance of each NGO campaigning. Second, NGO's success in interpretation of case in an emotive manner is an essential factor. Given the fact that using right narrative could be

³⁵⁸ For instance, during the search on agenda-setting, one can quickly come across abundant literature on the function of mass media, mass communication or forecasting. See more about, Maxwell E. McCombs, and Donald L. Shaw. *The Emergence of American Political Issues* (New York: West Publishing Co, 1977).; James R. Wilson and Roy S. Wilson, *Mass Media, Mass Culture, Fifth Edition* (Boston: Mc Graw Hill, 2001).; John Little and Stephen W. *Theories of Human Communication*. Seventh Edition (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Wadsworth, 2002).

³⁵⁹ Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, *Global Environmental Politics*, (Westview Press, 1996).

³⁶⁰ Hannah Murphy, op. cit., p.12.

widely acknowledged by community that pressure on authorities to take an action. Third, NGO could utilise state power by fusing their normative objective through their personal relationship or proximity.

Since NGOs represent one kind of civil society organisation, they are particularly crucial when it comes to a paradigm shift on the international agenda. There has not been a minimal normative issue on the global arena, which has not been advocated by NGOs or epistemic communities.³⁶¹ Considering their motivation based on values, instead of material concerns or professional norms, NGOs often reach beyond the policy change to provide and instigate changes on the principled basis of global action.³⁶² For example, NGOs are able to mobilise normative consensus which led to the international ban on anti-personal landmines through putting external pressure on a target actor.³⁶³ Similarly, putting Keynesian ideas of embedded liberalism on the international agenda was a great achievement of NGOs' agenda-setting on the negotiations table during the establishment of the Bretton Woods system.³⁶⁴ In the time of Bretton Woods Agreement (1944), the setting of a policy idea inspired by Keynesianism, well-placed British and American experts and their "new thinking" was significant in overcoming the political stalemate both within and between related parties. By prioritising issues on the meeting, such as significance of the ozone layer, deforestation, wildlife conservation, and global warming, NGOs tried not only to set agendas to influence policy outcome, but also to transform the terms and context of the debate. Likewise, NGOs have long played a key role in forcing policymakers to focus on humanitarian aspects, for example

³⁶¹ Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics", op. cit., p.436.

³⁶² Keck and Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders...*, op. cit., p.2.

³⁶³ Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines", *International Organization* (52/3,1998).

³⁶⁴ G. John Ikenberry, "The Political Origins of Bretton Woods", in Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen, (eds.), *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform* (University of Chicago Press, 1993), p.157.

they were accepted as driving forces behind the establishment of the Anti-Slavery Society. Thanks to their effort, NGOs inserted human-rights language in the UN Charter in 1945, and they were largely responsible for putting every major human-rights issue on the international agenda.³⁶⁵

One of the most clear case in which the NGO (Global Witness) set the agenda of the UN on banning blood diamond took place in 1990s. The issue of Blood diamonds and landmines are intricately linked to Angola's civil war. In 1993, The UN had harsh decisions and embargo against UNITA (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the second largest political party controlling most part of the diamond land in Angola. The UN Security Council Resolution 876, 864, 1173, 1176 were released to prevent illegal trade on diamond, while allowing legitimate Angolan diamonds to be sold. Despite of the UN's resolution, the result was not promising on the ground, Global Witness published *A Rough Trade*, the first NGO publication based on campaign against conflict diamonds. It documented violations of the UN sanctions regarding UNITA by several trading states (mostly Belgium-based) and company such as De Beers, in trading Angolan rebel diamonds which violates UNSC Resolution 1173.³⁶⁶ This report was significant and carried impact globally since it emerged in the context of UN activities on Angola by examining the ineffectiveness of the sanction regime. Following this report which provided fertile ground for further actions, the UNSC invited authorities of Global Witness to an unofficial briefing in 1999, illustrating a remarkable momentum in which an NGO's expertise and valuable input were recognised by the UN authorities.³⁶⁷ The finding of *A Rough Trade* was firmly established on the UN agenda which led to renewed of sanctions on Angola. De Beers- international corporation that specialises in diamond exploration-, later admitted on receiving

³⁶⁵ It's possible to list similar instances, including on anti-drug movement, chemical weapons convention population issues, land-mines. See more about, Simmons, op. cit., p.83.

³⁶⁶ Franziska Bieri, *From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process How NGOs Cleaned Up the Global Diamond Industry* (Ashgate Publishing, 2010), p.19.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p.24.

parcels of diamonds coming from UNITA-held areas. The UN's renewed investigation, UNSC mandate for the Angola sanctions committee, appointing new members and Robert Fowler as a new Chair of the Angolan Sanctions Committee, De Beers' confessing and announcing to stop buying Angolan diamonds, must be understood in relation to increasing NGO success on agenda-setting in 1990s.

An effective role of NGOs through agenda-setting depends upon several factors, including state's acknowledgment of credibility to NGOs and the ability of NGOs to locate sympathetic individuals who could convince policymakers towards their interest in policy debates.³⁶⁸ Alongside expertise of NGOs, their financial budget, global activities, adherents and ideological proximity with the ruling governments are other factors which directly affect the agenda-setting process.

On the other hand, agenda-setting is not same with norm creation.³⁶⁹ In other words, while there has been a tendency towards the direct role of NGOs to international rule creation in the very process of international treaty making,³⁷⁰ NGO initiatives may not turn into effective rules or norms. Determining agenda does not naturally translate into having a transformative effect on foreign policy, since the issue may not be put into practice even if it is considered. For this reason, agenda setting can be described as the first stage. In this stage, it is fundamental to acknowledge that they have quite some leeway in a setting which and whose concern they are advocating on to, or alternatively are keeping off, the global agenda.³⁷¹

³⁶⁸ Newell, op. cit., p.103.

³⁶⁹ Risse, "Transnational Actors and World Politics", op. cit., p.436.

³⁷⁰ The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a case in this point

³⁷¹ Jens Steffek and Kristina Hahn (eds.), *Evaluating Transnational NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.5.

4.1.2. Norm Building

The other element of political role of NGOs is norm building. Though building norm via NGOs is comparatively recent, norm itself is not a contemporary phenomenon. However, the role of NGOs in the norm-building process has been the subject of strikingly little study until the second half of the 20th century. Attempts in the 1970s, focused on the role of transnational actors who were influenced by norms and ideas.³⁷²

The end of the Cold War has accelerated a novel period as the major normative growth and consolidation into the process of "homogenization of global norms".³⁷³ In this process, compatibility between global norms and given domestic identities and collective beliefs was a crucial factor to accommodate norms domestically. Along with other norm entrepreneurs, NGOs became a crucial agent for the emergence of a norm, because most NGOs deliberately make new ideas and principled beliefs that resonate with pre-existing and embedded norms.³⁷⁴ Accommodating non-state actors and hybrid institutions in norm building process was meant as the transformation of international relations dominated by a nation-state.³⁷⁵

Norm is –following Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)- “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity”.³⁷⁶ More broadly, norms can be defined

³⁷² Nye, and Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, op. cit., p.329-349.

³⁷³ David Weissbrodt and et al., *International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process* (LexisNexis pub., Fourth Edition, 2009), p.1246.

³⁷⁴ Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics”, op. cit., p.271.

³⁷⁵ Wolfgang Hein and Lars Kohlmorgen, “Transnational Norm-Building in Global Health: The Important Role of Non-State Actors in Post-Westphalian Politics”, in Sandra J. MacLean (eds.), *Health for Some The Political Economy of Global Health Governance* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.87.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 891. Despite this clear definition, there is still confusion about its conceptual definition. For instance, while constructivist talk a language of norms, sociologists talk a language of institutions to refer the same behavioural rule.

as “a broad class of prescriptive rules, standards, principles, both procedural and substantive’ that are ‘prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed.”³⁷⁷ Norms by definition embody a quality of “ought-ness”, standards of appropriate (judgements of a community) behaviour, shared moral assessment and prompt justifications for action. So, the lexical meaning of norm is an accepted standard pattern or behaviour (especially of social behaviour) that most of society agrees with. This behaviour is typical, appropriate and favourable to the human being.

However, despite addressing more or less the same behavioural rules, constructivists apply a language of *norms*, in contrast, sociologists talk in a language of *institutions*, to refer to these same behavioural rules.³⁷⁸ As aggregation is one of the distinctions between norm and institutions in the sociological sense, while the institutions underline the way in which behavioural rules are structured together, the norm, on the other hand, isolates single standards of behaviour.³⁷⁹ Therefore, social scientists must be cautious in using the language of norms.

Accepting any behaviour into norm status requires a certain degree of global recognition. In this sense, the norm can be regional or global. The crucial question is: how many actors must accept that behaviour is considered to be a universal norm? In part, this is a question of empirical domain. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) about a third of the total states in the system should adopt the norm for it to be called global.³⁸⁰ However, I claim that the evolution of any behaviour into norm status through quantitative number will lead to wrong interpretations,

³⁷⁷ Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles”, in Janne E. Nolan (eds.), *Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1994), p.65.

³⁷⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", op. cit., p.891.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., p.891.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., p.891., Concerning implications of this paradigm into this thesis's argument on Turkey's foreign aid, we refer local one, particularly adopting on foreign aid.

since this might lead to the assessment that those norms accepted by more countries numerically gain more prestige and statute, are worthier or superior than the others that are accepted by fewer countries. It must be borne in mind that every norm has its own merit and sense of value, while cultural and social contexts are key variables in accepting any behaviour into norm statue. Therefore, the right question is not counting the number of actors who agree upon certain patterns as a norm. My argument is much more inclusive than those scholars who coined “*hegemonic socialization*”,³⁸¹ the term in which norms will be influential as they are embraced and espoused by a hegemon. Hegemonic socialization cannot be applicable in every juncture, since any small state may be viewed as successful without being hegemonic.³⁸²

Given this information, we need to differentiate among various types of norms. On the one hand, norms reflect actual patterns of behaviour and give rise to anticipation as to what will be done in a particular situation with a known regulative norm. On the other hand, the norm reflects patterned behaviour which creates new actors and interest that gives rise to normative anticipation as to what ought to be done.³⁸³ In regulative and constitutive norms, one thing is clear that there is no easy way to decide which norms matter and under what circumstances. However, norms inevitably produce social order and stability, limit the range of choice, constrain actions and operate like rules that define identities and / or prescribe (or regulate) behaviour.³⁸⁴

³⁸¹ G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan “Socialization And Hegemonic Power”, *International Organization* (Volume 44, Issue 3 Summer 1990), p.283-315.

³⁸² Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", op. cit., p.906.

³⁸³ Andrew Hurrell and Terry Macdonald, “Ethics and Norms in International Relations”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (SAGE Publication, 2013), p.69.

³⁸⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1996), p.5.

From this backdrop, I can move onto more in-depth analysis of the whole process of norm-building, known in Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as the *norm-building cycle*. This can be understood as a three-stage process: “norm emergence”, “cascade”, and “internalization”.³⁸⁵ First, *norm emergence* is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs³⁸⁶ who initiate an attempt to persuade a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms. In this state, new rules of appropriate behaviours are put onto the agenda by norm entrepreneurs with the support of an organizational platform. For instance, the founder of International Committee of the Red Cross, Henri Dunant is the best example of someone who directly re-defined what is or isn't allowed in war, while UNESCO was described as a “teacher of norms”.³⁸⁷ The second stage *cascade* is characterised by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders (person, state or an institution) initiate to socialize other states to become norm followers. As the norm leaders persuade sufficient states a critical point (tipping point) is reached (1/3 of total states)³⁸⁸, then the second stage starts. In this process, norms are promoted in a socialization process where states become sensitive to the reaction of the international community. Many states comply with norms due to the fact that they belong to international society (identity) and *peer pressure*, which can affect their domestic legitimation, conformity (psychological need to be part of a group) and esteem (states want others to think well of them, and they want to think well of themselves).³⁸⁹ Finally, at the far end of the norm cascade, *norm*

³⁸⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", op. cit., p.895.

³⁸⁶ Norm entrepreneurs are agents who actively build norms based on strong notions of what constitutes appropriate or desirable behaviours. For instance, advocacy networks, epistemic community, professional, doctors, economic, soldiers, NGOs and even a single person can pervasive agents (norm entrepreneur), to internalize norms among their adherents. However, there is a lack of academic studies which questions why and for what purpose these entrepreneurs initiate norms? This issue is worth studying. The other criticism can be the orientalist perspective of this norm entrepreneurs' identity. So, why are there no non-western norm-entrepreneurs?

³⁸⁷ Fabrizio Gilardi, “Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons(eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (SAGE Publication, 2013), p.466.

³⁸⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," op. cit., p.901.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 903.; and Judith Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring.” *International Organization* (62/02, 2008), p. 247-248.

internationalization occurs. In this stage, norms are deeply accepted as a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate. Internalized norms have so much power that states find it hard to not comply with them.³⁹⁰ For instance, few people discuss whether slavery or landmines are necessary today or whether women should be allowed to vote, that is women's suffrage.

This norm life cycle is not an inevitable process; however, several emergent norms even fail to reach a tipping point.³⁹¹ Norm entrepreneurs play a substantial role at all stages of the process, particularly in the first two stages. All these norm promoters at the international level necessitate an organizational platform where they can propose norms.³⁹² For example, NGOs such as Greenpeace, the Red Cross, and TransAfrica, all became a part of the process in promoting environmental norms, the ban on landmines or opposition to apartheid in South Africa, respectively.

4.1.3. Lobbying

The term of lobbying (in the sense of monastic cloister) can be traced back to the mid-16th century as people hung around in the lobby of the house of the legislature to get a word in with legislators into supporting issues. Seeking to role on the government to undo the decision, lobbyists were later on professionalised and hired by special interest groups to push the elected member of the government to pass legislation that is favourable to them. The use of financial methods by the lobbyists to influence governments has caused legitimacy problems, so those special interest groups' reliability has begun to be questioned. Leaving aside the question of

³⁹⁰ Nadelmann, op. cit., p.491.

³⁹¹ Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," op. cit., p.901.

³⁹² Peters and et al., *Non-state Actors as Standard Setters*, op. cit., p.494.

lobbyists as a bad or good formation, they currently funnel millions of dollars into the hands of legislators.³⁹³

Applying the tactic of lobbying in international relations as a powerful toolkit is a recent phenomenon. Without much having changed from its initial usage, the concept has gained a theoretical ground thanks to the direct contribution of constructivism, in which it becomes recognized as the most frequent tactic that non-state actors apply. Scholars believe that NGOs are similar to interest groups who operate like pressure groups affecting the decisions of the government.³⁹⁴

Risse underlines three potential pathways that transnational advocacy networks (NGOs) influence the multilateral negotiations process, and one of these pathways is lobbying. He says that “through lobbying activities in the domestic society of powerful states such as the United States, transnational advocacy networks exploits two-level game mechanisms and change state preferences.”³⁹⁵

Lobbying is basically an organized attempt to influence, persuade or push certain groups to impact on a particular issue. This attempt can be driven by a single person or institutionalised groups whose common objective is to influence government to give their issues an advantage. These groups do lobby on behalf of their government, other governments or different actors, both at home and beyond. For instance, many NGOs initiate to exert influence in environmental politics through lobbying at home and on the international platform. The well-known NGOs like Greenpeace frequently lobby on behalf of specific issues and achieve great success in a local- regional and global sphere. The importance of lobbying by NGOs is much more crucial in economically and democratically developed states, for example, US-based NGOs actively serve as lobbyists to influence their government. They often testify in support of increased foreign assistance at Congress in which

³⁹³ <https://represent.us/action/is-lobbying-good-or-bad/> (accessed on 01.02.2018).

³⁹⁴ Peter Willet (eds.), *The Transnational Relations of Issue-orientated Non-Governmental Organization* (London: Pinter, 1982).

³⁹⁵ Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics”, op. cit., p.436.

State Department envisage them as reliable actors to support foreign aid.³⁹⁶ InterAction is a USA-based NGO, which has explicitly functioned to provide recommendations for the foreign aid policy of the US. Similarly, the Stiftungen political organizations affiliated with major political parties in Germany lobby on behalf of German government to promote the institutions of parliamentary democracy in developing countries.³⁹⁷ They sometimes act as informal representatives of the governing party of Germany in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

As lobbying groups, NGOs are often awarded consultative status as a legitimate actor in the political system, given to them by the UN. To do that, they have extensive direct interaction with government officials through various channels, including conferences, official meetings, congressional testimonies and professional reports. The use of meetings, official talks, workshops, or forums which are labelled as lobbying platforms, is classified as direct lobbying of NGOs.

On the other hand, lobbying can be another innovative form, which I call indirect lobbying, and Keck and Sikkink call the “boomerang pattern”.³⁹⁸ This pattern occurs when channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked. Domestic NGOs can bypass their government and seek for international allies to bring pressure on their states from outside. Additionally, NGOs could raise global consciousness through lobbying which brings pressure both from above and from below. Through this process, they apply both direct and indirect lobbying over their own state. But, one should bear in mind that, during the direct and indirect lobbying, if NGOs gain insider status by joining government delegations as advisors, they will be more effective. Remaining as lobbyists and so outsiders, their influence

³⁹⁶ Ahmed and Potter, op. cit., p.44.

³⁹⁷ Veronica Forrester, “The German Political Foundations” in C. Stevens and J. V. Van Themaat (eds.), *Pressure Groups, Policies, and Development: The Private Sector and EEC-Third World Policy* (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1985), p.40-60.

³⁹⁸ Keck and Sikkink, *Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, op. cit., p.12.

remains usually low.³⁹⁹ Accordingly, a successful lobbying depends on well-designed entrepreneurial strategies, involvement into the negotiation cycle at the right time, financial strength and a personal relationship with government delegations. For instance, human rights NGOs like Amnesty International and several NGOs in Argentina provided detailed reports of human right violations and lobbied the government of the US,⁴⁰⁰ as a result of which, in 1977, the US government decided to decrease its military aid to Argentina. Similarly, through direct lobbying, the World Vision began to rally its donor base for grassroots political action campaigning in the 1990s. Sex trafficking in Southeast Asia and child labour in South Asia, the World Vision run several campaigning's which became the front line of its advocacy work, as a result its leadership testified before Congress as expert witnesses in an attempt to influence legislation.⁴⁰¹

4.1.4. Framing and Public Opinion

The concept of framing has become a significant currency in the various fields of social science. The concept, in fact, is derived primarily from the work of Goffman (1974) who defines it as schemata of interpretation which enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their living space and the world at large.⁴⁰² The frame thus functions to guide actions which are “intended to

³⁹⁹ Katharina Rietig, “Public Pressure Versus Lobbying – How Do Environmental NGOs Matter Most In Climate Negotiations?”, *Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper* (No. 79, 2011), p.3.

⁴⁰⁰ David Weissbrodt and Maria Luisa Bartolomei, “The Effectiveness of International Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina, 1976-1983”, (75 Minn. L. Rev. 1009, 1991), p.1017. available at http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/264.

⁴⁰¹ Soong-Chan Rah and Gary VanderPol, *Return to Justice: Six Movements That Reignited Our Contemporary Evangelical Conscience* (Brazos Press, 2016), p.69.

⁴⁰² Erving Goffman, *Framing Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of the Experience* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1974), p.21.

mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”⁴⁰³

As a foundation, the construction of social reality can be achieved through the framing process, since it contributes to shape points by which society envisages the world. The constructivist approach asserts that people live in a society that reflects any action based on these perspectives or what Lippmann (1922) deftly described as "the pictures inside our heads," rather than "objective reality."⁴⁰⁴ In the construction of social reality, framing helps to connect to the underlying psychological process that people utilise to examine information, to draw inferences about the issues around them and make judgments on them.⁴⁰⁵ Therefore, framing involves both the process of exclusion and inclusion, as Entman clearly notes regarding this process:

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Frames, then, define problems, determine what a causal agent is doing and costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of cultural values; diagnose causes, identify the forces creating the problem; make moral judgments, evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies, offer and justify treatments for the problem and predict their likely effects.⁴⁰⁶

The construction of the cognitive frame is an essential component of NGOs role on behaviour and preferences of states; therefore, framing is directly related to the construction of social reality. When NGOs are successful in framing processes, then new frames resonate with the broader public consent and are adopted as novel

⁴⁰³ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Process and Social Movement: An Overview and Assessment", *Annual Review Sociology* (26, 2000), p.11. (cited in Snow & Benford 1988, p.198).

⁴⁰⁴ Walter Lippmann, *Public opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1922).

⁴⁰⁵ Kirk Hallahan, "Seven Models of Framing: Implications for Public Relations", *Journal of Public Relations Research* (11/3, 1999), p.206.

⁴⁰⁶ Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward A Clarification of A Fractured Paradigm", *Journal of Communication* (43, 1993), p.55.

ways of understanding and talking about an issue. This is not a natural process, as NGOs face firmly embedded alternative frames, which create an alternative perception of social obligations, morality, interest and appropriateness.⁴⁰⁷

Moreover, framing plays an integral part in the foreign policy process. The establishment of common objectives about foreign policy is a necessary condition for an effective and powerful foreign aid policy to be established. In this sense, NGOs' power to determine the content of issue and define the border of that issue's scope is pre-requisite. This discursive power is not meant in the material sense since NGOs are often said to dispose of, or exert, alternative techniques such as information providing, lobbying, or path dependence. This power represents soft power, because they convince state leaders or the public with the argument, contrary to hard power based on coercive capacities. Despite some variations, soft power, in this sense, focuses on the power exerted over other's interests and preferences.

As part of broader norm entrepreneurs' coalitions, NGOs convince and socialize other actors through the framing process. In so doing, they often take advantage of media to publicize their activities to influence the public. Public opinion will automatically put pressure on the government, therefore framing and public opinion is in the form of indirect role of NGOs technique. For instance, the well-known Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation applies framing through covering their stories and projects which ultimately increases awareness of an issue in public opinion. At the end of social awareness, government officials cannot turn a blind eye to an issue as it becomes sensitive within a certain community.

In fact, framing is directly related to influencing public opinion and persuading them in favour of an actor's objective. The essential goal of NGOs in framing (defining preference and behaviour) or public opinion (persuasion) is not pursuing a line similar to the state authorities' fixed preferences, but rather to seek a commonly accepted reasoned consensus.⁴⁰⁸ Since all actors' preferences, interest

⁴⁰⁷ Finnemore and Sikkink "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", op. cit., p.897.

⁴⁰⁸ Peter Willetts, *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance* (Routledge, Taylor Francis Group, London, 2011), p.128.

and perceptions are not fixed but subject to discursive challenges, NGOs apply framing mechanisms to form mutually accepted global legitimacy to validate normative assertion.

Since this section merely focuses on the NGOs frame issue,⁴⁰⁹ it compromises a set of activities on how people and state authorities perceive and communicate about an issue. In other words, it refers to "conscious strategic efforts by groups of people or organizations to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivates collective action."⁴¹⁰ Rendering an issue understandable to society is another meaning of framing. Therefore, framing attaches the process of persuading states, as well as civil society actors regarding all issue areas. This process is influenced by a number of factors of socio-cultural context, including cultural opportunities, political opportunity structure, constraints, and the targeted audiences.⁴¹¹

One of the sound examples in framing is the success of women's organisations in placing, at the front of and central to the UN agenda, two issues that had been perceived as significant.⁴¹² Reproductive rights and health of women; and violence against women are both cases where women's organisations spent a great effort in framing the content of these two issues before they were accepted at the UN. The Save Darfur Coalition, a network consisting of more than 190 political, religious and human rights organisations, launched various advertisements in televisions, magazines, and newspapers presenting disturbing facts from Sudan and in so doing

⁴⁰⁹ Not only NGOs, but also other civil society organizations, mass media, political parties, political leaders, or other actors and organizations can frame an issue.

⁴¹⁰ McAdam and et al. (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Framing* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), p.6.

⁴¹¹ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Process and Social Movement: An Overview and Assessment", *Annual Review Sociology* (26, 2000), p.628.

⁴¹² Jutta Joachim, "Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women's Rights", *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 47, No. 2, 2003), p.247-274.

gained the attention of the public in the US, even shaped American policy and priorities.⁴¹³

4.1.5. Information Providing

The other technique that NGOs employ is providing information. NGOs supply sound and substantial information to governments to seek a political role. Through formal and informal means, they provide information that would not otherwise be available to the state and to the people who may be geographically and socially distant. Since NGOs have the institutional capacity to monitor the general environment, they can undertake detailed information about an issue. This prevents simplistic, duplicate and ad hoc copying of policy which might otherwise lead to policy failure.⁴¹⁴ Thanks to this link, NGOs and state cooperate over a number of policies. However, due to the existence of many intervening variables, the causal nexus between information provided by NGOs and their application in the policies of governments is not smooth, nor monolithic.

Through serving as an alternative source of information, NGOs can gain a substantial role over a given state. Known as *information politics*, Keck and Sikkink define it as “an ability to move politically usable information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact.”⁴¹⁵ Therefore, information flow is not only providing facts, but also testimonies. These facts and testimonies are reinterpreted by NGOs in terms of right and wrong to convince both civil society and

⁴¹³ Rebecca Hamilton, *Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011).

⁴¹⁴ Diane Stone, “Transfer Agents And Global Networks In The Transnationalization of Policy”, *Journal of European Public Policy* (11:3, 2007), p.558

⁴¹⁵ Keck and Sikkink, *Activities Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, op. cit., p.18.

governments, stimulating them to take action towards issues.⁴¹⁶ Information flow is deliberately shared with officials to play role on governments' decisions over several issues, including foreign aid. The main reasons that motivate NGOs to share information with governments are threefold.⁴¹⁷ First, through providing information, NGOs can get more foreign aid from the government, which enhances their intended projects on the grounds. Second, NGOs supply information to direct government's official aid into their own programme. Through conformity with their programme and official aid activities, NGOs aim to utilize some portion of foreign aid. Third, with direct help from the government, NGOs provide information to rehabilitate and improve socioeconomic conditions of local people that will indirectly ease NGOs implementation of on-field operations.

The information provided can be a significant source of influence for states to take into account and evaluate their intended action. To do that, NGOs, in turn, usually employ experts and professionals whose theoretical and empirical studies help or block the promotions of the foreign policy of given states. However, there is no unified categorization of state, because the domestic affairs of states are neither linear nor heterogenic. In other words, shared information must be consistent with countries' sui generis structure. NGOS need to provide objective, reliable and solution-oriented information. This requires a clear and powerful message that appeals to shared norms and principles, in which case it has more influence on state policy. That's to say, the crucial debates over information provided by NGOs are whether it is as an issue handled by qualified experts or something that addresses much broader international constituency.⁴¹⁸

NGOs as institutional entrepreneurs and initiators of novel foreign policy praxis hence can have a direct and indirect effect over the structure of national foreign

⁴¹⁶ William E. DeMars, *NGOs and Transnational Networks Wild Cards in World Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), p.7.

⁴¹⁷ Kim, op. cit., p.3.

⁴¹⁸ Keck and Sikkink, *Activities Beyond Borders...*, op. cit., p.19.

policy.⁴¹⁹ They transform information into knowledge, applicable to all spheres of society, which later use this accumulated knowledge to exercise power in two ways.⁴²⁰ First, through their knowledge, they can regulate the social world, altering the preference and behaviours of the state by changing incentives for their decisions. Second, using knowledge and authority to both regulate what currently exists and constitutes the world, creating new actors and interests, understood as a social construction of reality.

Government agencies occasionally rely on the information capacities of NGOs and monitoring functions. The reliance on NGOs expertise and information gathering capacity is notably significant in issue-areas such as environment, foreign aid, and human rights, and less so in hard issues such as security. As Peter M. Haas emphasises how knowledge-based NGOs are essential in identifying interest, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, by arguing that “control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination.”⁴²¹

On the other hand, NGOs, as information providers, help to legitimize foreign aid along with technical and statistical information. For instance, NGOs size, scale and large staff contingents have proven that they are trustworthy channels for delivery of aid in the eyes of the public and donor.⁴²² Their greater global reach reputation and visibility facilitate government’s foreign aid to demonstrate how foreign aid is necessary for recipients. The information that is shared by NGOs with the public is

⁴¹⁹ DeMars, op. cit., p.7.

⁴²⁰ Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Cornell Uni. Press, 2004), p.6.

⁴²¹ Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination” *International Organization* (Vol. 46, No. 1, 1992), p.3.

⁴²² Morton, op. cit., p.329.

crucial, since official authorities could face difficulty in convincing their policy without enough information. This power of NGO's knowledge has been eloquently elaborated by constructivist-oriented scholar Matthew Evangelista's seminal study "Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War".⁴²³ Emphasising the crucial role of information and ideas supplied by NGOs to the domestic structure of Soviet policy, he challenges existing paradigms about the peaceful resolution of the Cold War. Thanks to the heavily interconnecting work of transnational peace movements throughout the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev eras, some solemn progress has been achieved on moderate and transparent foreign policy implications for the Soviet Union. He shows that the demise of the Cold War was shaped by the normative power of NGOs, revealing the connections between the end of the Cold War and Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking". In other cases, during the wars of the former Yugoslavia. In the 1990s the former Yugoslavia, and in particular Bosnia-Herzegovina, civilians faced systematic massacres. The massacres occurred at the onset of the conflict. Until states took action, several humanitarian organisations were involved in the areas where they provided a verified knowledge on systematic massacres of civilians. Through media framing and sharing this information with the public, leading humanitarian NGOs helped to develop a political action,⁴²⁴ even though this action did not take place at the onset of the conflict.

4.2. Conclusion


In a nutshell, it is important to note here that both in theoretical and empirical terms, the political and (in)direct role of NGOs is a significant aspect of state-NGO relationship. Within the domestic politics of individual states, it is natural for NGOs

⁴²³ Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces. The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

⁴²⁴ Gregory Kent, "Humanitarian Agencies, Media and The War Against Bosnia: 'Neutrality' and Framing Moral Equalisation In A Genocidal War Of Expansion", *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (2003), p.3.

to challenge but also support and complement the sovereignty of states and the political independence of their foreign policy process. In a fundamental manner, the literature shows that NGOs have a considerable impact, either via direct or indirect (boomerang effect) methods, in the form of agenda setting, lobbying, norm-building, framing and public opinion, and information providing. This role is summarized in the chart below.

Figure 1 Model of NGOs’s Political Role: Direct and Indirect Techniques



CHAPTER 5

TURKISH DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE LANDSCAPE

5.1. THE LANDSCAPE OF TURKISH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: FROM RECIPIENT COUNTRY TO NET DONOR

"By reaching out to all over the world, we, as Turkey, will give a helping hand as much as we can to whoever is in need of assistance."

President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,

Over the past two decades, development communities have been intensively discussing the development assistance provided by emerging donors.⁴²⁵ Among these emerging donors, though being a relative newcomer to the development scene⁴²⁶, Turkey has achieved unprecedented success in the volume of ODA over the last decade, with an upward trend expected to continue. In the absence of a colonial historical past combined with the country's deep-seated historical, cultural and religious ties with under-developed countries, Turkey empowers its position with the "Turkish-type Development Assistance Model" (TDAM) approach. In line

⁴²⁵ The terms of Assistance and Aid has been used interchangeably throughout this part. Besides, the term 'emerging donors' refer to those countries that have relatively new or recently revived, aid programme who have started to become actors in the international aid system. Contrary to members of OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), they have begun putting in place new policy and institutions to coordinate their development assistance programme, while pursuing a closer relationship with the DAC. See more about, Kimberly Smith and et al., "Beyond the DAC the Welcome Role of Other Providers of Development Co-operation", *OECD Development, DCD Issues Brief* (2010), p.1.

⁴²⁶ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey as an Emerging Donor and the Arab Uprisings", *Mediterranean Politics* (19/1 September 2014), p.334.

with state-led development assistance, Turkish NGOs have also been using participatory and cooperation-friendly methods in respect to mutual development targets and working hand-in-hand with the state, to further advance this approach on a global scale.

This part of the thesis mainly aims at presenting general structure, content, scope, objective and principles of Turkish official development assistance. To get a better understanding of mutual relations between these two actors and a potential bottom-up influence of NGOs, it is first necessary to identify Turkey's historical retrospective in development assistance landscape and its main characteristics in development policy. Tracing back from historical background to contemporary assistance policy, this chapter consists of two parts and three sub-headings in each section.

The first part is composed of three sections and the first section contextualises Turkey's profile from the recipient country to net donor. Aiming to explore relations between state and NGOs in humanitarian aid, Turkey's historical background in development assistance, turning points in development assistance, its objectives, scope, strategy, vision and goals are examined. The second section encompasses a more practical aspect of Turkish ODA, particularly humanitarian aid category, which is underlined in accordance with TİKA's Annual Reports. It includes aid structure, the form of official development assistance (bilateral and multilateral) and the analysis of recipient countries' profile are also outlined with figures and charts. The third section finally provides a short overview of contemporary foreign policy of Turkey (from 2004 onward) to understand the significance of foreign aid in overall Turkish foreign policy (TFP). Therefore, a brief analysis of the latter would be useful in understanding the basic motivation of the former. Accordingly, the change in the axis of Turkish foreign policy pillar is critically examined to seek what the theoretical and methodological pillars are that underpin state-NGO relations.

The second part of this chapter includes three sub-headings, which are general performance of Turkish NGOs in humanitarian aid; four selection criteria for choosing nine Turkish FBOs (longevity; potential capacity of FBOs, ideological

proximity; and origin – as faith or secular); and the analysis of selected nine faith-based NGOs. The purpose of this part is to understand overall performance of Turkish NGOs in the field of humanitarian aid. In the final analysis, this chapter directly contributes to the main tenet of the thesis's content. The data shared in this section represents one of the most important pillars of the thesis with regard to the reference of the next chapter.

5.1.1. The Synopsis of the Turkish Development Assistance in Historical retrospective: Momentum

Since the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923, the country has undergone various phases from an aid recipient country to an emerging donor state. In this process, five major turning points can be classified. First, *the early period* that covers from 1920s to 1950s, as Turkey first started to provide development cooperation in Afghanistan during the 1920s on education and health.⁴²⁷ Second, *regression period* that encapsulates the 1950s to 1980s, the date Turkey became an important aid recipient country with Greece in the form of the Truman and Marshall plan of the USA. Third, *resurgence period* that covers 1985 to 1992 as the State Planning Organisation-SPO- (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı-DPT) worked out a comprehensive aid package worth 10 million USD to Sahel countries in 1985. Forth, *institutionalization period* that treats the date from 1992 to 2004 as SPO (1992-1996) and later on the -State Statistical Institute-SSI, (Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü-DİE) started to analyse assistance in a systemic method through gathering official data on development assistance. Fifth, *taking off period* covers from 2004 until today, as TİKA was re-structured in 2004 and entrusted with the responsibility of implementing Turkey's development cooperation and coordination within the international community, where Turkish ODA increased aid activities over five continents and 150 countries. Each of these five periods, to

⁴²⁷ TİKA Report, "The Role of Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency in South-South Triangular Cooperation" (2017), p.1.

some extent, also includes several sub-periods, so a brief analysis of these five periods will help to understand the present pillar of Turkey's ODA.

In fact, Turkey's foreign aid has a deeper history than the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923. That is to say, Turkey has inherited structural and traditional aid (charity) principles from the Ottoman Empire, and this heritage system continues to affect the corporate body of today's philanthropic organisations.⁴²⁸ Knowing the security landscape that Turkey faced during the war period, Turkey's foreign aid considerably decreased. For instance, during the national struggle of Turkey, Afghanistan extended political and economic help to Turkey which had a very distinctive place in the birth of modern Turkey.⁴²⁹ Therefore, Turkey first started to provide development cooperation in Afghanistan during the 1920s, focusing primarily on education and health.⁴³⁰

The 1950s were a *regression period* for Turkey, since it became fully dependent on foreign assistance, receiving multiple flows of foreign aid from western counterparts to keep its position within Western political, economic and military hemisphere. Due to the strategic importance of Turkey, it has been given a grant of \$100 million military aid under the Truman Doctrine in the summer of 1947.⁴³¹ After that Turkey was offered development assistance, alongside Greece, by the United States and received \$150 million of aid within the context of the Marshall Plan in 1948.⁴³² In subsequent years, the country has received \$1.947,7 million

⁴²⁸ Murat Çizakça, "Osmanlı Dönemi Vakıflarının Tarihsel ve Ekonomik Boyutları", *TÜSEV Publication* (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, 2006), p.31.

⁴²⁹ Turkey' Ministry of Foreign Affair, official web page, Turkey-Afghanistan Bilateral Relations, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_afghanistan-bilateral-political-relations.en.mfa (accessed 30.05.2018).

⁴³⁰ TİKA Report, "The Role of Turkish Cooperation...", p.1.

⁴³¹ Senem Üstün, "Turkey and The Marshall Plan: Strive For Aid", *The Turkish Yearbook* (vol. xxvii, 1997), p.34.

⁴³² Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi: 1914-1995* (Alkım Yayın, 2016), p.444.

from OECD countries, and within this amount, nearly 70% of total aid was given by the United States of America⁴³³ and nearly 16% given by Western Germany in the 1960s and 1970s.⁴³⁴ While Turkey has been positioned as a passive recipient, it has also begun contributions to the UN's multilateral technical assistance programme in 1957.⁴³⁵

However, 5 June 1985 was a milestone in the history of Turkish development assistance, which led to the *resurgence period*. This date can technically be classified as "re-emergence period" and for the first time foreign aid became an instrument of Turkish foreign policy.⁴³⁶ While Turkey was still on the DAC list as an aid recipient state, the State Planning Organization⁴³⁷ (SPO) launched a comprehensive aid package worth \$10 million to aid the fortification of an institutional capacity, building in Guinea; Mauritania; Somalia; Sudan; Senegal; and Gambia in 1985.⁴³⁸ Endogenous factors such as the pioneering role of former President Turgut Özal in 24th January Resolution in 1980 and exogenous factors

⁴³³ Zafer Z. Başak, *Dış Yardım ve Ekonomik Etkileri Türkiye 1960-70* (Hacettepe University Pub., C 16, 1977), p.66-68.

⁴³⁴ Germany has also launched its technical cooperation through Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in 1970 that provided quite a range of technical support in various Project. Hakan Fidan, and Rahman Nurdun, "Turkey's role in the global development assistance community: the case of TİKA", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* (10:1, 2008), p.99.

⁴³⁵ Pınar İpek, "Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy Instruments: Soft Power and the Case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2015), p.179.

⁴³⁶ *Türkiye'nin İkili Dış Yardımları:1992-1996* (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü Pub.,1998), p.1.

⁴³⁷ SPO was responsible to gathering and recording statistics of Turkey's development assistance until it handed over its task to the State Statistical Institute in 1996.

⁴³⁸ Turkey' Ministry of Foreign Affair, official web page, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa (accessed 03.05.2018).

such as systemic change in global politics were the main reasons for the expansion of Turkish development assistance throughout this period.

The *institutionalization period* in Turkish development assistance began in 1992. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey had the opportunity to strengthen its cultural, linguistic and geographical ties with these newly-born states, which led to re-constituting the Turkish development policy. Apart from other state institutions, Eximbank, Undersecretariat of Treasury and Turkish Grain Board (Türk Mahsulleri Ofisi) were the top three prominent players in distributions and organisation of Turkish bilateral and development assistance.⁴³⁹ In the same year, Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (later on, it was re-named Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency-TİKA) was established. TİKA's early aim was "to protect newly established Central Asian states' own social structure, help to build their construction of an identity in a sustainable way, and the remedy of deficiencies of their technical infrastructures."⁴⁴⁰ However bearing this in mind, the national outlook (linguistic and cultural motivation) was one of the essential driving forces in the establishment of TİKA.

However, TİKA's initial mission was limited to increasing social and cultural cooperation with those newly independent states on a tight budget.⁴⁴¹ As we look at Turkey's overall cultural/scientific cooperation between 1992 and 1996, nearly 95% of aid was distributed via TİKA,⁴⁴² which demonstrates the initial mission of TİKA. Yet, since its establishment, TİKA has passed through three major periods.⁴⁴³ First, the early period, which spans from TİKA's establishment in 1992

⁴³⁹ *Türkiye'nin İkili Dış Yardımları: 1992-1996*, op. cit., p.1.

⁴⁴⁰ TİKA official web address, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650 (accessed 28.04.2018).

⁴⁴¹ The total development assistance of TİKA was 14.09 bin USD in 1992.

⁴⁴² *Türkiye'nin İkili Dış Yardımları: 1992-1996*, op. cit., p.16.

⁴⁴³ İpek, op. cit., p.179.

to May 2001, when its administrative status changed. Second, the transition period from 2001 to 2004, when TİKA was restructured under the supervision of the Prime Minister, becoming *de facto* dependent upon his instructions. In this period, Turkey has set its development assistance in harmony with the Development Assistance Committee's rules of reporting and classification. Third, from 2005 till the present,⁴⁴⁴ as TİKA was charged to regulate and implement development policy and practice of Turkey with the issue of Presidential decisions, it become one of the most strategic institutions in development assistance together with AFAD.

In short, Turkey's evolution in foreign aid from passive recipient to net ODA donor has undergone five basic phases. However, much has been done in the post-2004 period. The motivations behind Turkey's prolonged attachment on foreign aid does lie wholly with the principle beliefs of AK Party's foreign aid policy parameter- notably Ahmet Davutoğlu's novel paradigm- rapid economic booming in terms of the GDP of Turkey and accession process with the European Union. These factors marked a new stage for Turkey's development aid policy and therefore for TİKA, which become one of the instruments for expanding Turkey's soft power⁴⁴⁵ by encapsulating material interest and ideational forces towards its historical, cultural and geographical hinterland. Although this motivation seems to have lost its ground and is not as strong as a decade ago, it is still being employed by TİKA and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurt Dışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluğu-YTB) through education and social assistance such as in Africa. Before focusing on the general structure of Turkish ODA, a brief analysis of the

⁴⁴⁴ With the 24 June 2018 Presidential system, the position of Prime ministry has been abolished, so TİKA's legal bounding position has been handed over to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

⁴⁴⁵ Despite of losing it's ground in academia following the demise of-Ahmet Davutoğlu era, over the last decades, the concept of soft power is widely employed by various scholars to explain the transformation in Turkey's foreign policy, see more about, Tarık Oğuzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* (2007,61), p.81-97.; Meliha B. Altunışık, "The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East", *Insight Turkey* (2008, 10), p.41-54.; Ziya Onis and Suhanaz Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey During the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies* (2009, 10), p.7-24.; İbrahim Kalın, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey. Perceptions", *Journal of International Affairs* (2011, 16), p.5-24.

Turkish Foreign policy paradigm that underpins its overall foreign aid needs to be underlined.

5.1.2. Main Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Development Assistance

Turkey's development assistance has extensively been influenced by its foreign policy. A foreign policy which has long been framed on two basic pillars:⁴⁴⁶ First, the *status quo* paradigm, which aims to protect the existing borders of Turkey by pursuing a balance of power within the global system; and second, the *Westernisation/modernization*⁴⁴⁷ paradigm as a part of its bicentennial efforts to reach the highest level of contemporary civilizations.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt-1* (İletişim yay. İstanbul, 2009), p.46.

⁴⁴⁷ Actually, Westernisation and Modernization are perceived as being the same in Turkey's case thanks to the reason that all modern states were the Western ones. Furthermore, Modernisation directly addresses western-centric understanding which played a key role in the modernization process of Turkey, that's why two concepts are inevitably intertwined with each other. However, despite analogies within their foreign policy outcomes, two concepts contain slightly various contextual understanding literally. Westernization is not referring to a geographical or physical place as many observers refer in the territorial sense. Yet, it's rather a way of thinking (consult to reason instead of faith: rationalism), acting (pragmatism) and economic developmental (liberal economy). Once Atatürk pointed out the level of contemporary civilization, it does not adhere solely geographic places, but on a more global scale to catch high-level growth irrespective of its geopolitical location. As such today, the modernisation of Japan has been successful without the policy of westernisation. So Modernisation in TFP contains a broader understanding in contrast to Westernisation. See more about: Uygur Kocabaşoğlu (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Modernleşme ve Batıcılık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p.171., Fulya Ekerer, "Dış Politika ve Kimlik: İnşacı Perspektiften Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi", *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, (Ankara, 2010), p.68., A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Japonya'nın Avrupa Uluslararası Topluma Entegrasyonu", in A. Mete Tohumcu (eds.), *Japon Dış Politikası, Sistemik ve Bölgesel Aktörlerle İlişkiler* (Nobel Akademi Yayınları, 2013), p.5-22.

⁴⁴⁸ Western-oriented foreign policy practices started long before the establishment of modern Turkey. Initially, reform initiatives were implemented during the Ottoman era. When the Ottoman Empire lost the second Vienna war (1683) its military dominance was shaken at the expense of the western powers. From then onward, Ottoman authorities accepted the military and technological superiority of the West. This process has proceeded by sending permanent diplomats to the West to follow the latest technological developments and to bring them into the country during the Caliphate of Selim III. Administrative, financial, educational reforms have been followed respectively during the Mahmut II. period. All these processes have prepared the structural background of Tanzimat

Despite the initial motivations, prolonged endogenous (revolts) and exogenous (Balkan's war, World War I, National Struggle and Cold War) questions have turned Turkey's priorities towards its security-oriented and identity-formation process, known as Kemalism. Domestic policy, therefore arguably, has led Turkey to detach from its previous legacy. However, a new process started with Turgut Özal period, later continued with Ismail Cem era in the late 1990s, which was accompanied with the accession process to the European Union. As the AK party came to power in the early 2000s, this process has multiplied.

Since 2003, there has been a shift in the axis of Turkey's traditional foreign policy paradigm, from inward-oriented and passive to pro-active and out-ward, known as "*Strategic Depth policy*", promoted by Ahmet Davutoğlu.⁴⁴⁹ His ideas are primarily shared by Hakan Fidan, former head of TİKA and current head of the National Intelligence Service, and İbrahim Kalın, the Chief Foreign Policy advisor and Presidential spokesperson.

From the beginning, Turkey perceived itself as a conveyor belt for diffusing the norms of the Western world,⁴⁵⁰ by presenting itself as a part of it to the newly independent countries in post-Soviet regions. Such an identity disregarded Turkey's important, civilizational and religious advantages in its foreign relation. Thus, Davutoğlu's conception was based on re-enacting and renewing this link in foreign

Fermanı(1839) (known as Edict of Gülhane) known as the beginning of Ottoman's modernisation period. Less than two decades after Tanzimat, the second reforming process, namely Islahat Fermanı(1959) have been released by Sultan Abdulmecid to rescue the empire from collapse, which is why he took several reforms initiatives in the areas of political organizations, people's rights and other fundamental changes. While new reform initiatives have been taken, the grievance among Ottoman's society was still pervasive. Even, these new reforms have created its gravedigger. So, Jön Türk, (also known as the Young Turks) came to therefore in the last phase of the Ottoman Empire as ardent defiant to the Sultan's decisions, See more about Süleyman Seyfi Ögün, *Türk Politik Kültürü* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2000), p.91-92., also Balcı, op. cit., p. 25, Fulya Ekerer, op. cit., 2010, p. 68.

⁴⁴⁹ He was previously Chief Foreign Policy advisor to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2002-2009), then appointed as Foreign Affair Minister (2009-2014) and ran for Prime Minister (2014-2016).

⁴⁵⁰ Altunışık, "Turkey as an Emerging Donor and the Arab Uprisings", op. cit., p.336.

policy. He bought a distinctive sense of responsibility for Turkey towards its historical background, cultural identity and geographical nexus by saying that:

AK Party has developed a new and rival identity for Turkey, with particular implications for Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. This new definition emphasizes Muslim and democratic identity and places Turkey in a different civilization – that is, Islamic – and yet in harmony with western civilization. This is a dramatically different definition of Turkey’s identity [as a result] Turkey’s new position has both an ideational and geographical basis.⁴⁵¹

In his book “*Strategic Depth*”, published in 2001, he draws on the main tenets of foreign policy paradigms as a kind of outline of the ongoing foreign policy praxis. The book is often perceived as a re-interpretation of Turkey’s history and geography, adhering to the changing global system and international context. Davutoğlu argues that Turkey possesses a strategic depth which it had hitherto failed to exploit but can no longer pursue the isolated and passive policy of the culturally and historically dependent era of the Middle East, Asia, Transcaucasia, and the Balkans.⁴⁵² He further explains the main columns of new Turkish foreign policy based on its historical assets and geographical depth, which makes Turkey a unique country. Historical depth is related to penetration of Turkey’s identical and cultural nexus with the regions where the Ottoman Empire existed. Failing to do this would be similar to a conducting a psychological analysis neglecting the subjects memory.⁴⁵³

Geographical depth, similar to the historical concept, is based on Turkey's identity and location, which the country inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, as

⁴⁵¹ Melija B. Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East.” *New Perspectives on Turkey* (40, Spring 2009), p.190.

⁴⁵² Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre yayınları, 2001), p.10.

⁴⁵³ Hüseyin Bağcı and Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın, “From Chaos to Cosmos: Strategic Depth and Turkish Foreign Policy in Syria”, in Ş.S. Erçetin and S. Bnerjee (eds.), *Chaos, Complexity and Leadership*, (Springer Pub., 2015), p.14.

Nuri Yurdusev highlights, in contrast to those 35 states who became independent after the Ottoman Empire collapsed, is a reminder and direct continuation of the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵⁴ With this in mind, Davutoğlu confines the theoretical frame of TFP to three basins: Near Land basin (the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus), Near Maritime basin (the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Caspian and the Gulf) and Near Continental basin (Europe, Northern Africa, the Middle and Eastern Asia, Southern Asia) where Turkey must seek a proactive, constructive and realist policy with its assets.⁴⁵⁵

He further remarks that Turkey is no longer on the margins of Europe or Asia but is at the epicentre of Afro-Eurasia in which it must fulfil an effective role of an "order-instituting country" in its environs. Within this geographical position and with these historical assets, Davutoğlu points out five principles in TFP. These are promoting balance between security and democracy; no problems with neighbouring countries,⁴⁵⁶ improving regional relations beyond Turkey; multi-dimensional foreign policy in league with big powers; the pursuit of the principle of rhythmic diplomacy.⁴⁵⁷ To maintain historical, cultural and civilizational responsibility, Turkey must deepen and strengthen its institutional structure, pursue a proactive policy in regional matters and implement a holistic approach to its foreign policy. By meeting the requirements of these initiatives, Davutoğlu claims that Turkey would receive the ultimate achievement of being considered a "global

⁴⁵⁴ A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine", in Osman Bahadır Dinçer and et al. (eds.), *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası, Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri* (Ankara: Usak Yay., 2010), p.47.

⁴⁵⁵ Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, op. cit., p.119-208.

⁴⁵⁶ This policy paradigm has gained quite substantial criticism and reaction from academic circle since the Arab Fall.

⁴⁵⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey* (Vol. 10, No.1, 2008).

actor" by 2023. Coincidentally, the one-hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish republic.⁴⁵⁸

Despite this, Davutoğlu's foreign policy paradigm cannot be explained by mere pragmatist and geopolitical interest. Beyond that, it emphasises a moral responsibility towards fellow Muslims and societies within the former Ottoman region. Believing artificial structural boundaries within the Middle East countries divide the *ummah*, he insistently employed the Ottomans' discourse⁴⁵⁹ concerning the Muslim world. His mild prescriptive interest derives from his belief that Turkey is '*the last castle of resistance*' against imperialist designs, saying that: "Turkey is the last castle where oppressed people can take refuge amidst the great conflicts surrounding us. Some people want to destroy this last castle. Today Turkey manages to survive thanks to the prayers of oppressed people. We will do our best to defend this last castle."⁴⁶⁰

By the same token, President Erdoğan mentions that "*this nation is the hope of the ummah and the world*" pointing out Turkey's mission to take up its historical responsibilities.⁴⁶¹ The ideas that underpin the foreign policy of the AK Party, therefore, arguably stem from the conception promoted by Davutoğlu. Various scholars have defined his foreign policy paradigm as constituting two different

⁴⁵⁸ Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", op. cit., p.77-96.

⁴⁵⁹ Previous leaders such as Turgut Özal and İsmail Cem were also applied Ottomanist discourse in their foreign policy. See more about, Altunışık, "Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East." op. cit., p.171-194.

⁴⁶⁰ Time Turk, "Davutoğlu: Son kaleyi savunacağız, <https://www.timeturk.com/davutoglu-son-kaleyi-savunacagiz/haber-121189> (accessed 07.05.2018).

⁴⁶¹ Hürriyet, March 31, 2011.

versions: paradigm shift⁴⁶² or continuity of western-oriented policy⁴⁶³; pan-Islamist and expansionist⁴⁶⁴ or moderate foreign policy⁴⁶⁵; middle easternization of Turkish foreign policy⁴⁶⁶ or no less deterministic than prevalent approaches⁴⁶⁷ and precious loneliness.⁴⁶⁸

In conclusion, Davutoglu's divergence from orthodox Turkish foreign policy introduced a fresh insight into policy areas, including development assistance. In line with the deepening of the strategic depth paradigm, the state and civil society apparatus on development assistance has visibly paved the way for the institutionalization process of aid. In this regard, Davutoglu outlines the key mission of TİKA, stating that a "strong and effective organization was needed in the broad political and historical geography in which Turkey operates and TİKA successfully fills this gap. TİKA has given a huge boost to Turkish foreign

⁴⁶² Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges." *Turkish Studies* (11, no. 1, 2010), p.103–123.

⁴⁶³ Ramazan Gözen, "Türk Dış Politikasında Değişim Var mı?" in Cüneyt Yenigün and Ertan Efeğil (eds.), *Türkiye'nin değişen Dış Politikası* (Ankara: Nobel Yay., 2010), p.32.

⁴⁶⁴ Behlül Özkan, "Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (56, no. 4, 2014), p.119–140.

⁴⁶⁵ According to Mustafa Aydın and Ismael, tendency to "Islamism" in TFP is not structural, but rather conjectural that has been used mainly as a tool for legitimizing foreign-policy preferences by the AK party, see more about Mustafa Aydın and Tarih Y. Ismael (eds.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (Ashgate Publication, 2003), p.13.

⁴⁶⁶ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?" *Turkish Studies* (9, no. 1, 2008), p.3–20.

⁴⁶⁷ Pınar Bilgin, "Securing Turkey through western-oriented foreign policy", *New Perspectives on Turkey* (No:40 Spring 2009), p.120.

⁴⁶⁸ Chief foreign policy advisor and Presidential Spokesman İbrahim Kalın coined this expression. Hurriyet daily news <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/yusuf-kanli/precious-loneliness-112503> and financial times <https://www.ft.com/content/69662b36-7752-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7> (accessed 04.05.2018).

policy.”⁴⁶⁹ During his tenure, TİKA has re-structured itself both at the management level and in the aid bureaucracy as a whole.⁴⁷⁰

5.1.3. The General Structure of Turkish Development Assistance: Scope, Principles and Actors

Turkey’s development assistance has been in flux since its emergence. The driving forces, which geared Turkey’s development aid, are ranged from ideological, cultural, religious, humanitarian and material motivations. For the first time in the history of the Republican era, foreign aid was used as an instrument of foreign policy in the form of "food aid" in 1985.⁴⁷¹ One of the foreign policy objectives at the time, was to set Turkey within the global power league. Turgut Özal, who worked in the World Bank and was later appointed as undersecretary of SPO, with his neo-liberal political vision, found suitable ground in the state. At the time of institutionalisation of development assistance’s, in the 1990s, ethnocultural proximity was an essential variable in shaping the scope of Turkish foreign aid policy.⁴⁷² Therefore, the period of initial assistance was influenced by “national outlook” motivations, and little attention paid to non-Turkish countries.⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁹ Interview with FM Ahmet Davutoglu, *TİKA Dünyası*, (No. 2, 2012), p.20.

⁴⁷⁰ İpek, op. cit., p.10.

⁴⁷¹ The issue of 85/9573 by Council of Minister’s Decision on 15 June 1985. See more about, “*Türkiye’nin İkili Dış Yardımları: 1992-1996*”, p.1.

⁴⁷² Official web page of TİKA, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650 (accessed 03.06.2018).

⁴⁷³ Despite pursuing national outlook policy, non-Turkish states have also benefited from Turkish ODA, though comparatively less, including Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Mongolia which proves that human-oriented aid policy was maintained. To see the figure of "allocation of humanitarian aid in terms of countries", Nükrettin Parlak, *Orta Asya, Kafkasya-Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Yardımları, 1992-2003*, (TİKA publication, 2007), p.80.

When it comes to the middle of the 1990s, there was a shift in focus to reconstruction and humanitarian effort to the Muslim-dominated regions in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The ethnic wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1993-1995-1998 and 1999, had much influence in the eyes of state authorities and civil societies, which shaped the scope of Turkish development assistance. The emergence of several Muslim-oriented faith-based philanthropy organisations, accompanied with the revivalism of Islam in the domestic sphere, that attaches directly to humanitarian assistance in this period.⁴⁷⁴ Thus, the religious outlook becomes an essential factor in the emergence of FBOs. Seeking alternative foreign aid activities through their method and budget, paved the way process as the state had to consider importance of these organisations. The provision of state-NGO mutual relation has found a comfortable position vis-à-vis the humanitarian aid. Despite an increase in state-NGO relations, however, throughout this initial phase, the role of civil society, therefore for FBOs, has been quite limited. These newly emerged FBOs have mainly played a supplementary and complementary role to state development policy, rather than adversarial (determinative) role.

At the beginning of the 2000s, due to the conservative-oriented AK party coming to power, the number and visibility of civil society organisations flourished. In particular, changes in the legislation on “associations” in early 2003, together with the Europeanisation process, directly motivated NGO’s activities both in Turkey and abroad. As a result, the amount of official development assistance from Turkey, which was 76 million USD in 2003, has jumped to 339 million USD in 2004, and reached 7 billion in 2016.

⁴⁷⁴ As a reaction to ethnic cleansing in the Muslim-dominated area of the Balkans, several civil-society initiatives undertook various actions. This later turned into the establishment of Muslim-oriented humanitarian NGOs to mobilize financial and human resources, and to increase awareness of the Turkish public sense towards Muslim-dominated regions. For instance: the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı, İHH, 1992) and Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse, 1996) are two of them.

Throughout this process, Turkey has initiated a novel model, known as Turkish-type Development Assistance Model (TDAM)⁴⁷⁵ in 2010, addressing its geopolitical, cultural and religious landscape in a larger context.⁴⁷⁶ TDAM aims to move beyond the donor-recipient paradigm, based on human-oriented policies, conscious of local sensitivities, aiming to establish and maintain the facilities which a person needs at every stage of her/his life without expecting anything in return.⁴⁷⁷ The overriding motivation of TDAM is to render an inclusive, cost-effective, solidarity based partnership, sharing the tools of ongoing significant economic and social transformation. Expanding the scope of development principles by implementing “*a just world order*” principle at the centre of its activities, Ankara is primarily trying to harmonise material and humanitarian resources under a common canopy. As President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, “we will extend to any point across the world, go to any place where any sufferers exist and lend a helping hand to them more or less, since this nation is the hope of the ummah and the world.”⁴⁷⁸ By the same token, the President of TİKA, Serdar Çam continuously emphasises the main pillar of Turkish development policy, noting that “Turkey adopts the moral and humanitarian values of our civilization as a principle, and continues its activities using modern methods without establishing secret agendas,... to realize

⁴⁷⁵ President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has first referred to this Model on 16 May 2016 in addressing the opening ceremony of a TİKA project: "... as I said before the Turkish type constitution, Turkish type presidential system and Turkish type women's rights, now I believe that we have achieved 'Turkish type development model' with the effort of TİKA". <http://diyariturk.com/index.php/2016/03/16/tika-turk-tipi-kalkinma-modeli-uyguluyor/> (accessed 04.06.2018).

⁴⁷⁶To see more about TDAM, Turkish Development Assistance Report, 2016, p.5., available at file:///C:/Users/SONY/Desktop/T%C4%B0KA%20RAPORLAR/TİKA%20Develop.%20Raport%202016.pf

⁴⁷⁷TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), p.8., to accessed full Report, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/en>

⁴⁷⁸ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), Introduction, p.5.

our mutual development target by adopting an approach which is not exclusive but inclusive.”⁴⁷⁹

Although this model has been seen as a novel approach over the last few years, its theoretical and methodological backbone is built on the strategic depth analysis and public/ humanitarian diplomacy concepts forwarded by former Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu.⁴⁸⁰ The policy behind it intended to win the hearts and minds of people, which might turn into a global norm if Turkey rightly advocates at the UN level.

To maintain TDAM, there are a multitude of Turkish public and private institutions, which undertake a seminal role in Turkey’s development activities through engaging and collaborating with one another. Among the state actors, following TİKA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Development, the Ministry of National Education, Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Housing Development Administration (TOKİ), Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) and Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, stand out as essential players in Turkish development assistance. Among these actors, General Directorate of Emergency Management (AFAD), Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) Association (Türkiye Kızılay Derneği) and TİKA are by far the most significant foreign aid organizations, having the official mission to make and implement development aid of Turkey.

Turkish Red Crescent (for short Kızılay or TRC) is the oldest among the selected organisations, founded on 11 June 1868 under the name “Society for Aiding the Wounded and Ailing Ottoman Soldiers”, later had various names through the years. The association was recognized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), established by the Geneva Convention by international law. Thanks to its global acknowledgment, Kızılay has free rein to enter disaster zones without

⁴⁷⁹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), Introduction, p.7.

⁴⁸⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges And Prospects”, *Nationalities Papers The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (41:6, 2013), p.867.

requiring the permission of target countries. However, the identity of Kızılay has contested whether it is a quasi-nongovernmental organisation (quangos)⁴⁸¹, semi-official institution,⁴⁸² a semi-autonomous organisation or purely civil society organisations.

Kızılay is basically a corporate body ruled by a special legal provision and performs under the provision of “Law of Association”. The official web page of Kızılay express that it is non-profit, volunteer-based social service institution providing unconditional service and aid,⁴⁸³ as well as having some financial privileges established by law.⁴⁸⁴ Together with professionals who receive a salary, volunteers work on behalf of Kızılay. According to its Regulation (Tüzük), the legal position of Kızılay is defined as “The presence of Kızılay is not limited within a time-period, working under the auspice of the Turkish Presidency”.⁴⁸⁵ In the first three articles of its regulations, it proclaims that Kızılay is an autonomous organisations operating in accordance with the principles of International Red Cross Society in the field of education, health and social welfare, with programs to prevent disease and, relief human suffering, within their budget and staff. Given this background, Kızılay represents a civil society organisation.

However, upon closer examination, Kızılay does not meet the basic criteria to be classified as NGOs. There are two essential principles on the definition of NGO,

⁴⁸¹ Osman Gökhan Hatipoğlu, "Türkiye Kızılay Derneği'nin Kamusalılığı: Bir Çözümleme Denemesi", *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi* (Cilt: 11, Sayı: 22,2013), p.167.

⁴⁸² Çelik and İşeri, op. cit., p.441.

⁴⁸³History of the Turkish Red Crescent, official web page., <https://www.kizilay.org.tr/kurumsal/tarihcemiz>

⁴⁸⁴ Information File on TRC, <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/06/Logframes/Europe/TR/Prof.pdf> (accessed 10.07.2018).

⁴⁸⁵ The full document is issued on 24/12/ 2008, Number 4094, “Turkish red crescent society of regulation”, the full expression is: “Varlığı zamanla sınırlı olmayan Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanlığının yüksek himayeleri altındadır”, https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Editor/files/1235049841_Tuzuk_19_02_2009.pdf

which are: NGO is independent of government and is a not profit-making organization.⁴⁸⁶ This definition includes every kind of group, but excludes terrorist groups, private profit-making organizations and political parties. Kızılay has its revenue-generation schemes, including Kızılay Bottled Water, Kızılay Mineral Water and Private Medical Centre where Kızılay pursue capital-oriented activities.⁴⁸⁷ Running an autonomous policy under the protection of the Presidency and not meeting the non-profit principle of NGOs, causes an ontological question on the identity of Kızılay. Accordingly, Kızılay has been commissioned by the constitutions of the Disaster Response Plan (Türkiye Afet Müdahale Planı-TAMP) where the organisation has a responsibility to provide decent shelter and nutrition in the event of a disaster and therefore must preserve stocks of food and tents in its warehouses. Therefore, Kızılay has a legal duty given by the constitutions together with AFAD and TİKA on humanitarian aid.

Bound on "law of association", enjoying the tax-free status and voluntary membership, as well as having independent sources of revenue indicates that Kızılay is an open system organisation. It is closer to a *quasi-nongovernmental organisation*. Kızılay's regulation clearly identifies that is working under the auspices of the Turkish Presidency, rather than independently. Moreover, it has a de facto relationship with the central government as seen from its affiliations of board members with the government.⁴⁸⁸ For this reason, Kızılay cannot be classified as classical NGOs. This thesis therefore posits Kızılay's statue as "quasi-non-governmental" NGO structure. Quasi-Non-Governmental organisation refers an

⁴⁸⁶ Non-governmental organisations are often used as synonymous with non-profits, yet, a distinction between the two is necessary. Whilst non-profits encompass a vast range of organizations including universities, museums, and hospitals that focus on services and rarely engage in advocacy. By contrast, NGOs always have an essential advocacy mission. See more about James A. Paul, "NGOs, Civil Society, and Global Policy Making", *Global Policy Forum* (2000), p.1.

⁴⁸⁷ According to officials at Kızılay, they claim that these projects are not aimed to make a profit, but rather enrich financial sources of Kızılay, which are then used for humanitarian aid activities.

⁴⁸⁸ In particular, current president of Kızılay Dr. Kerem Kınık have been criticized as acting on behalf of the ruling party by the leader of the main opposition party.

agency, corporation or organisation that is financed by the government but does not act within the confined of the state control. They can act independently and perform regulatory functions.⁴⁸⁹

Nevertheless, since it holds financial and social privileges from the state, having a legal mandate given by constitutions, often set in position with other state institutions, this thesis *categorises its humanitarian aid activities under the official aid flow*. Even, in TİKA's Annual Reports, the service and field work of Kızılay are both analysed within Turkish official development assistance category in 2006, 2007, 2012 and in NGO-based humanitarian aid category in 2013 and 2014.⁴⁹⁰

The other state-oriented actor on humanitarian aid is AFAD. The institution increased its budget, scope and became one of the most important state institutions over the previous 9 years. AFAD was founded when the Turkish Parliament passed Law No.5902 in 2009 to help people, affected by natural or human-made disaster.⁴⁹¹ Its vision has been defined as “being a leading and coordinating organization which offers a model that can be taken at the international level as being, based on sustainable development, risk-centred, efficient, effective and performing reliable service related to disaster and emergencies.” And its mission has been framed as “building a disaster resilient society.”⁴⁹² To accomplish its vision and mission, AFAD works on promoting cooperation among various government institutions and NGOs. It currently has 81 provincial branches throughout Turkey and 11 search

⁴⁸⁹ Hague D.C., Mackenzie W.J.M., Barker A. (eds.) “Quasi-Non-Governmental Organisations”, in *Public Policy and Private Interest, The Institutions of Compromise* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1975), p.91-165.

⁴⁹⁰ In 2013 and 2014 TİKA Report, there is two version of Kızılay. First, Kızılay NGO Coordination and second Kızılay Association. The Former was established to regulate foreign aid that Turkey received to distribute within Syria through the means of Kızılay. The latter is a fund that directly shared by Kızılay's sources.

⁴⁹¹ Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun. This issue is extensively handled in the part of Foreign-aid Policy-making process of Turkey.

⁴⁹² AFAD, 2013 – 2017 Strategic Plan Report, p.,14 to access full report https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2584/files/Afad_Strtjk_web_en_son.pdf

and rescue units. While it initially focused on domestic issues, over the years, AFAD has completed successfully tasks in humanitarian aid in over 50 countries. In particular, AFAD's mission, vision and the budget has lately expanded, due to the Syrian-related humanitarian issue that Turkey has faced over the last 7 years. As of 2018, it runs a network of 21 state-of-the-art refugee camps where over 23,000 people safely enjoy regular access to housing, healthcare, education, and psychological support. Its financial sources, which are based on both state and private flow,⁴⁹³ are spent on food, sheltering, constructing temporary tent cities, transportation, logistic depot rental, drinking water projects, airfare expenses for victims of injury and their companions to be brought to Turkey, medical supplies (medicines and ambulances) and expenditures for patients.

The third actor is TİKA, though its objective is more inclusive than the rest of the institutions. TİKA defines its vision as “being a pioneering organisation that can provide fast and effective solutions to regional and global problems without distinction, through using all necessary instruments effectively in all areas of development cooperation with the justice and conscience which are derived from Turkey’s deep-rooted history.”⁴⁹⁴ In parallel to this, TİKA's mission is treated as "to carry out sustainable projects and activities through the human-oriented perspective that will promote the economic and social development processes and improve Turkey' common cultural heritage in project-run countries, in coordination with the respective institutions within the framework of international cooperation and development policy."⁴⁹⁵ Currently, TİKA is accredited to collect and report ODA statistics of Turkey to OECD.⁴⁹⁶ It increased its Programme Coordination

⁴⁹³ AFAD official web page, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2572/About-Us> (accessed 29.06.2018).

⁴⁹⁴ TİKA Activity Report, 2017, p.12.

⁴⁹⁵ TİKA Activity Report, 2017, p.1.

⁴⁹⁶ Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Official web page, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-development-cooperation.en.mfa (accessed 28.04.2018).

Offices from 12 in 2002 to 60 in 2017, across 58 countries spanning five continents, alongside running over 20,000 projects in 160 countries in 2017. Despite having institutional coordination problems and lacking a pre-deployment assessment mechanism⁴⁹⁷, as well as suffering from an insufficient analysis on the impact of Turkey's aid at the local level in recipient countries,⁴⁹⁸ TİKA today represents a leading institution in the coordination and cooperation of Turkey's development assistance.

5.1.4. The Analysis of Turkish ODA Activities: Facts and Figures on Aid Activities

Although Turkey's attachment to development assistance has a long history, the first statistics and reports were only published between 1992-2002.⁴⁹⁹ Even this period's facts and figures are not reliable since there were cases of duplication in state institutions.⁵⁰⁰ Therefore, recording and data collection of total foreign assistance has been partly solved once TİKA took over this task from the State Statistic Institutions in April 2005, aiming to organize a systematic calculation of development assistance following OECD DAC Guidelines.⁵⁰¹ That is why the following facts and figures must be evaluated within this reality.

⁴⁹⁷ Teri Murphy and Onur Sazak, "Turkey's civilian capacity in post-conflict reconstruction", *Sabancı University, Istanbul Policy Paper* (2012), p.22. Available at <http://research.sabanciuniv.edu/21550/1/IPM-Turkish-CivCap.pdf> (accessed 28.04.2018).


⁴⁹⁸ Altunışık, "Turkey as an 'Emerging Donor' and the Arab Uprisings", op. cit., p.335.

⁴⁹⁹ For instance, the Turkish representative submitted a paper at the OECD Conference on July 1993.

⁵⁰⁰ Parlak, op.cit., p.110.

⁵⁰¹ Hakan Fidan and Rahman Nurdun, "Turkey's Role In The Global Development Assistance Community: The Case of TİKA", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* (10:1, 2008,), p.100.

Figure 2 Turkish Official Development Assistance: 2002-2016,



Source: Compiled from TİKA, Turkish development assistance reports, 2016

However, the development assistance of Turkey was initially limited in scope and geography. As such, in 1992, Turkish bilateral aid was calculated as \$1.182,18 million, but then went down to \$188 million in 1996.⁵⁰² Total bilateral Turkish aid from 1992 to 1996 was \$1,9 billion which was a relatively good figure considering the total GDP and GNI of Turkey. While there has been up and down trends, overall development assistance from 1992 to 2002 has slightly decreased over this time period.

Together with the private sector and NGO flow, Turkish development assistance has significantly increased rapidly since 2003. Most of the TİKA reports that include charts and figure on Turkish ODA as of 2002. The sharp increase in funds, nearly five times higher than the previous year, can be attributed to external reasons including relief aid to Pakistan and South-east Asia; and Turkey's recent aid projects to broader geography and improvements in data collection system that ease access to other government actor's assistance figures.⁵⁰³ The latter can be attributed

⁵⁰² *Türkiye'nin İkili Dış Yardımları: 1992-1996*, op. cit., p.1.

⁵⁰³ Fidan and Nurdun, op. cit., p.101.

to increasing political motivations in the country, a change in domestic politics and economic interest within Turkish authorities that have been outlined above.⁵⁰⁴ In this process, domestic and foreign developments have played an equally important role. Another significant increase took place in the 2010s, with a nearly 100-percent increase from 2011 (\$1.272 million) to 2012 (\$2.533 million). From that time onward, Turkey's total aid flow increased due to its response to the refugee crisis in the neighbouring country of Syria.⁵⁰⁵

As of 2016, Turkey's state-led and private-led development assistance has reached a historical record. Turkish official development assistance, which began with \$85 million in 2002, has reached \$6.695 billion, with Private Flows (\$1.2478 billion) and total development assistance amounting to nearly \$8 billion in 2016. Compared to the previous year, Turkish ODA has increased by 66% in 2016. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.45% in 2014 to 0.54% in 2015 and 0.69% in 2016. This figure is above the rate of average increase at the amount of ODA of the OECD/DAC countries in 2016.⁵⁰⁶ According to this statistic, Turkey has been ranked 6th among OECD/DAC countries regarding the ODA, as 4th among the OECD/DAC countries with an ODA/GNP rate of 0.76%. Also, for the first time in its history, Turkey reached the 0.7% target of the United Nations. Regarding humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI, Turkey became the most generous country in the world in 2016.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁴ İpek, op. cit., p.181.

⁵⁰⁵ According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Turkey continues to host the world's largest refugee population (over 3.5 million)) and 70 percent of refugees in Turkey are women and children as of 2017, See more about, UNHCR Turkey Factsheet - October 2017, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCRTurkeyFactSheet-October2017.pdf> (accessed 28.04. 2018).

⁵⁰⁶ OECD, Turkish Official Development Assistance, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm> (accessed 07.05.2018).

⁵⁰⁷ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), p.1.

5.1.4.1. Country Analysis in Distributions of Turkish ODA

The aim of looking at a detailed analysis of each country is to reveal Turkey's ODA tendency and the motivation behind its aid. The country analysis will later help to find whether there is a correlation and parallels between the state's targeted regions and those of NGOs. In the final analysis, NGO-led campaigns towards specific areas, the amount of aid and types of aid would be essential variables to find state-NGOs relations on foreign aid. Therefore, country analysis with total aid amount is important to set how state and NGOs focus is similar or divergence.

There has usually been parallelism among aid recipient countries by years in terms of the distribution of Turkish official assistance by regions. Turkey adopts various benchmarks to direct its aid for recipient countries, changing from political proximity of recipient state to humanitarian situation in the destination country. To understand overall country breakdown that encapsulates the overarching and homogenous vision of Turkey, TİKA's last 6 years reports deserve further scrutiny, following the brief analysis of previous years.

From 1992 to 1995 Caucuses and Central Asian countries have received a significant portion of Turkish ODA, followed by the Balkan countries from 1995 to 1999. Having cultural, linguistic and religious proximity to Turkey, early development assistance was based on the principles of national (ethnocultural) and religious outlook. However, from 2003 onward, several regions, which were outside of the traditional sphere of influence including South Asia, Latin America and Africa, came within Turkey's area of interest. Therefore, material, humanitarian and political outlook have been added into an overarching and homogenous vision of foreign aid.

In 2011, Pakistan benefitted the most from Turkish ODA with \$204 million, mainly in the form of emergency/humanitarian relief, effected after the flood.⁵⁰⁸ Syria (\$162,03 million) became the second biggest recipient country from Turkish ODA

⁵⁰⁸ From now on, Turkish official development assistance currency type is United State Dollar in millions.

due to the result of civil war and concomitant influx of Syrian refugees. After that Afghanistan (\$130,89 million), Somalia (\$93,39 million), Liberia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Palestine, Kosovo, Sudan, have followed respectively.⁵⁰⁹ In 2012, Turkish bilateral development assistance had almost doubled, reaching \$2,422.5 million. In this figure, Syria was the largest recipient of Turkish ODA at \$1,019.93 million, largely because of support given to Syrian refugees. Egypt was the second largest recipient, with 503.92 million USD, Afghanistan ranked third with \$151.75 million, Kyrgyzstan ranked fourth with \$105.51 million, and Somalia fifth with \$86.61 million.⁵¹⁰ In 2013, Turkish bilateral ODA reached 3,156 million USD which represents a 30% increase on the previous year. Breakdown of top five recipient countries are as follows: Syria at \$1,638.50 million, Egypt with \$538.83 million, Kyrgyzstan with \$131.55 million, Somalia with \$115.74 million and Afghanistan with \$89.73 million respectively.⁵¹¹ In 2014, Syria again was the top receiver with \$2,291.5 million, then Tunisia (\$200.7 million), Kyrgyzstan (\$84.8 million), Somalia (\$74.4 million) and Palestinian (\$65.9 million) followed respectively.⁵¹² As of 2015, Turkish bilateral official development assistance totalled \$3.845 billion, and the top recipient's countries were Syria (\$2,694.0), Somalia (\$314.8), Kyrgyzstan (\$91.4), Albania (\$85.7), Afghanistan (\$56.8), Palestine (\$29.8).⁵¹³ In 2016, Turkish bilateral development assistance reached \$6,237.5 million. Syria received \$5,851.23, Somalia (\$59,63), Palestine (\$43,12), and Afghanistan (\$32,69) have respectively followed.⁵¹⁴ In addition to those countries, North and South American countries (Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, Colombia)

⁵⁰⁹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report 2011, Distribution According to Countries, p.83.

⁵¹⁰ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2012), p.95.

⁵¹¹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2013), p.90.

⁵¹² TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2014), p.64.

⁵¹³ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2015), p.19.

⁵¹⁴ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), p.17.

and Far East countries (China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Philippines) also received a significant amount of funds from Turkish assistance.

In short, Turkey's ODA regional distribution is now addressing much broader geographical coverage, as opposed to initially limited areas.⁵¹⁵ Last five years' country analysis explains that particular countries have been prioritised over others for a number of factors. Turkey's immediate neighbours who need urgent humanitarian aid, countries who share a common language, identity, religion, social memory and political vision with the state benefited the most from Turkish assistance. It is hard to delineate where one of the variables overlaps another, but there are correlations between Turkish assistance and the recipient countries' political, religious and humanitarian situation.

5.1.4.2. Sectoral Focus in Turkish ODA


Turkey has increased its thematic areas which are framed within four main headlines.⁵¹⁶ 1-*Social Infrastructure and Services*: encompassing education, health, water and sanitation, government and civil society and other social infrastructure and service. 2- *Economic Infrastructure and Services*: includes transport and storage, improving communication infrastructure, energy and labour. 3- *Multisector Activities*: includes various aid types in which aid may be cutting across several categories. 4-*Production Sector*: includes agriculture, industry, mining, construction, trade, and tourism. Of these distinct sectors, most of the humanitarian assistance is categorized within Social Infrastructure and Service, which receives the lions' share of Turkish bilateral aid. Since this thesis focuses on the

⁵¹⁵ For instance, between 1992 and 1996, the Caucasus and Central Asia had the highest share of Turkey's total ODA (86.5%) then shifted to Balkans-Eastern Europe region had the highest from 1997 to 2003, last five years (2011-2016) the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and South-Central Asia set into the top recipient country list.

⁵¹⁶ This category has been obtained from TİKA's Development assistance report of 2016. Until 2015, bilateral development assistance has been provided under various names. For instance, Production Sector(2016) has been named as the manufacturing sector in 2015 report. Therefore, the latest taxonomic approach has been taken as a basis.

humanitarian aid of the state, this part underlines the importance of this sector in analysing state-NGO relations as most NGOs aid activity fall into this category.

Figure 3 Turkish Bilateral Official Development Assistance by Sectors, (6,237.7 Million USD,2016)



Source: Turkish Development Assistance Report, 2016

When the sectoral breakdown of Turkish bilateral ODA is examined in Figure 1, Social infrastructure and Service is at the top of the proportion of the resources used with nearly \$4 billion. This sector includes sub-sectors such as education (31,8%,); health (9,7%); water and sanitation (0,4%); government and civil society (10,3%) other social infrastructure and service (14,2%).⁵¹⁷ Following that, economic infrastructure and service are in second place covering nearly \$1.5 billion. Within this sector, several sub-sectors are benefited as follow: transport and storage 0.9%; improving communication infrastructure 12.3%; energy 0.1%; labour and other sectors 11.0%. Multisector activities, such as constructing a factory and buying

⁵¹⁷ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), p.23.

machinery and equipment for the project in the recipient country, rank third, production sectors rank fourth.⁵¹⁸

Bear in mind that official emergency and humanitarian aid received \$5,865.8 million in overall bilateral official development assistance in 2016. Putting humanitarian aid under one category, e.g. Social infrastructure and Service, which accounted for \$4 billion of all ODA, results in false interpretations. That is to say, emergency and humanitarian aid appears in more than two sectors due to their diverse nature, ranging from medicine to post-disaster constructions.

5.1.5. General Performance of Turkey in Humanitarian Aid Landscape

Humanitarian aid, or in more common parlance emergency aid,⁵¹⁹ is treated as a sub-category of overall foreign aid types. With regard to historical background, humanitarian aid has a deeper root in all aid types, as well as in the Turkish case. Turkey's track record in humanitarian assistance is ahead of other forms of assistance. Its powerful tradition inherited from the culture and religion (Islamic waqf culture), and concomitant increases of non-state actor's attachment into humanitarian aid, has spurred the importance of this type of aid. Despite having a longer history, official records of Turkey's international humanitarian aid contributions only goes back to the 1990s.

From 1997 to 2004, Turkey's overall humanitarian aid has amounted to \$73.63 million,⁵²⁰ yet this period's statistics are not credible due to duplication, deficiencies, and errors in the records system of Turkey. Development assistance

⁵¹⁸ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), p.22.


⁵¹⁹ Both terminologies refer to the same meaning, covering any short-term activities during and aftermaths of the emergency situations in the various forms. Therefore, they are used interchangeably in this thesis.

⁵²⁰ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2006), p. 40.

has often been carried out by various state and civil society organisations in an informal manner, which has impeded co-ordinated recording by central institutions.⁵²¹ The humanitarian assistance record has also faced a similar problem. Therefore, Turkish humanitarian statistics from 1992 to 2003 should be analysed bearing these deficiencies in mind.

According to SPO statistics, Turkish humanitarian assistance was just slightly above \$100 million in 1992 (Uzbekistan received the highest flow), which was the highest amount in the period of 1992-2003. After 1992, Turkish humanitarian assistance in fact decreased year by year. Apart from 1999 (nearly \$10 million), the general trend in humanitarian aid was a downward process. In 2004, however, humanitarian aid increased slightly to \$44.96 million in which Asia (\$41.46 million) and Africa (\$2.75 million) benefited the most.⁵²²

Figure 4 Turkish Official Emergency and Humanitarian Aid By Years



Source: Compiled from TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report, 2016

⁵²¹ Parlak, op. cit., p.110.

⁵²² TİKA Development Assistance Report (2004), p.25.

As shown in the figure, the humanitarian assistance has increased nearly four times from \$44 million to \$178 million within a year in 2005 due to Turkey's strong reaction to the Tsunami disaster in South-East Asia. In TİKA's annual report, the Ministry of Education has supplied 34% of aid, Kızılay provided 14%, and AFAD 11%.⁵²³ Kızılay and Diyanet Foundation aid was handled within the official development flow. From 2005 onward, Turkish humanitarian assistance deteriorated until 2009. While overall Turkish development assistance was in a general upward trend from 2005, the ratio going to humanitarian aid was decreasing.

In 2007, \$46 million of humanitarian aid was allocated: \$23,55 million of this was spent on Iraq through TİKA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kızılay and Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). 58% of total humanitarian aid was in the form of medicine, medical equipment, health, doctors and nearly 20% was in food while 17% was for temporary shelter, tents, blankets, and heaters. In 2008, humanitarian aid went down to \$31,09 million, though overall Turkish development assistance increased to \$780 million. A considerable share of 2008's humanitarian aid was directed to Iraq (\$11.73 million), Palestine (\$3.52 million), Pakistan (\$2.68 million), Georgia (\$2.57 million) and China (\$2.01 million). In 2009, humanitarian aid increased nearly 70% compared to previous years by reaching \$49,80 million, where Kızılay was the pioneering organisation.⁵²⁴

From 2010 there has been a constant increase until 2016. Humanitarian aid increased nearly 206%, reaching \$152,52 million in 2010, compared to a 30% increase in overall Turkish development assistance from 2009 to 2010.⁵²⁵ The severe flooding in Pakistan (received \$114,25 million of Turkish humanitarian aid), internal conflict-led casualties in Iraq (\$14,45 million), severe earthquake in Haiti

⁵²³ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2005), p.49-50.

⁵²⁴ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2009), p.17.

⁵²⁵ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2011), p.23.

(\$6,87 million) and Chile (\$2,35million) were all significant targeted countries. Kızılay, Ministry of Health, AFAD and TİKA shared humanitarian aid in the form of shelter (tents, blankets, temporary housing), emergency food, clothing assistance and health care. In 2011, the existence of various natural disasters boosted Turkey's humanitarian aid assistance by a 73% increase from \$152 million to \$264 million.⁵²⁶ Turkish authorities have evaluated humanitarian assistance under two different categories: first emergency aid which is provided to victims affected by the civil unrest of Arab Fall; second humanitarian aid given to victims of natural disasters in various parts of the world.⁵²⁷ The latter was greater in terms of budget, effectiveness and results.

The most unusual year was 2012 as humanitarian aid exceeded \$1 billion by an increase of over 300% in the previous year.⁵²⁸ Syria by itself benefited \$980 million aid, then followed Somalia (\$47.54), Palestine (\$6.61), Iraq (\$2.42); Myanmar (\$0,80), Libya (\$0.71) Pakistan (\$0.71) respectively. The pattern of humanitarian aid volume in 2013 has jumped to \$1.629,16 million, and its humanitarian aid to GNI ratio went up from 0.13 to 0.21 of the previous year. With this figure, Turkey ranked the third most generous country in the world after the United States of America and the United Kingdom.⁵²⁹ Top recipient countries (in terms of million USD) are as follows: Syria (\$1,571.28), Somalia (\$27.19), Myanmar (\$13.43) and Niger (\$4.44).⁵³⁰ When it comes to 2014, Turkish humanitarian aid has doubled with a volume of \$2.416 billion. Compared to total Turkish ODA (\$3.591 billion), a ratio of nearly 67% of Turkish ODA has been allocated to humanitarian assistance

⁵²⁶ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2011), p.44.

⁵²⁷ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2011), p.44.

⁵²⁸ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2012), p.52.

⁵²⁹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2013), p.57.

⁵³⁰ To know more detail about the number of refugees and facilities provided by Turkish institutions (AFAD, TİKA, Ministry of Health etc.), look at the Turkish Development Assistance Report (2013), p.59-70.

with a total of \$2.416 billion.⁵³¹ Out of this amount, Syrian guests have benefited by \$2.280 billion. The upward trend continued in 2015 increasing to \$2.738 billion which is considerable bearing in mind Turkish ODA (\$3.2 billion). With this amount, Turkey ranked as the second largest donor country and become the most generous donor country in terms of its GNI/ humanitarian ratio.⁵³²

Finally, the upward process gained much impetus in the year 2016, reaching a historical record. As of 2016 Turkish official development assistance reached \$6.695 billion, and out of this amount humanitarian aid ranked at \$5.865 billion. Compared to previous years, humanitarian aid represents a nearly one-hundred-fold increase. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.45% in 2014 to 0.54% in 2015 and 0.69% in 2016. This is above the rate of average increase at the amount of ODA of the OECD/DAC countries in 2016.⁵³³ With these statistics, Turkey maintained its position as being the second most generous country as a proportion of national income according to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report of 2017. Regarding humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GNI, Turkey provided the most humanitarian aid and became the most generous country⁵³⁴ in the world with the rate of 0.69%.⁵³⁵ In the light of this success, Turkey hosted the first World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in 2016. Furthermore, for the first time in its history, Turkey has reached the 0.7% target of the United Nations. The countries receiving the most are as follow: Syria (\$5.818), Palestine (\$20.85), Somalia (\$10.90), Iraq (\$2.5), and Myanmar (\$1.10). Facts and figures of 2016 are taken as the final year of analysis for this study.

⁵³¹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2014), p.44.

⁵³² TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2015), p.8.

⁵³³ OECD, Turkish Official Development Assistance, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm> (accessed 07.05.2018).

⁵³⁴ United Arab Emirates (%0.18), Luxemburg (%0.15), Sweden (%0.14) and Denmark (0.14) have followed Turkey respectively.

⁵³⁵ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), p.1.

In short, the track record of Turkish ODA reveals that basic motivations, the scope of aid, sectoral distributions, regional allocations and policy objectives have changed over the course of time. In this process, Turkish foreign aid policy and practice have ranged from pragmatist motivations to national, religious, political and humanitarian outlook. The following section focuses on selected NGOs who have been engaging in humanitarian aid, listed as the generous Turkish NGOs in the period from 2005 to 2016.

5.2. THE ANALYSIS OF NINE TURKISH NGOs' FOREIGN AID: FOUNDATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

This part aims to develop a framework to analyse FBO-led humanitarian aid activities through the cases of nine prominent Turkish-based FBOs. Based on a threefold, the first part focuses on NGOs foreign aid activities through a historical trace to contemporary process. Going back to 1990s, this section particularly highlights NGOs development (as well as humanitarian aid) landscape from the period 2004-2016. The second part briefly deals with the selection criteria of NGOs, reasons as to why particular NGOs are chosen or, why the others are not chosen are addressed. Although these criteria have been handled in methodological part (first chapter), this part covers a broader understanding of these four criteria: NGOs' potential capacity (members, longevity); their origin (faith or secular), visibility in the media and society; ideological proximity to the government. Mapping nine case studies (FBOs) in the midst of various NGOs in accordance with these criteria is a central pillar of this section. Finally, the third part scrutinizes nine FBOs including, Türkiye Diyanet Foundation; İHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı-Humanitarian Relief Foundation); Deniz Feneri Association, Cansuyu Association; Yeryüzü Doktorları Association; Dosteli Association; Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation, Beşir Association and Hayrat Humanitarian Aid Association. Selected FBOs are analysed under five sub-headlines: their thematic data, founding principles, orientation, humanitarian activities and the characters that differentiate each FBO from one another.

5.2.1. General Performance of Turkish NGOs in Humanitarian Aid

Turkish civil society culture is deeply rooted in centuries of charitable foundation/waqf tradition,⁵³⁶ which dates back to as early as the Seljuk Dynasty. Here they had a strong position in the functioning of social and economic life in the society, which was then transmitted into the culture of the Ottoman Empire. Waqfs were the most important institutions of philanthropy in the whole Ottoman Empire.⁵³⁷ This system was one of the building stones of the Ottoman social and economic order, in which the dynasty and high-ranking officials founded several waqfs to provide charity and contribute to the economic and social welfare of society.⁵³⁸ By the time the Ottoman Empire collapsed on 1 November 1922, there was 26.798 waqfs left to the Turkish Republic.⁵³⁹ Considering the total population of the late Ottoman era⁵⁴⁰, the number of waqfs indicates how significant and decisive functions they had, embedded in civil society structure in the late Ottoman period.⁵⁴¹

⁵³⁶ The term of waqf is referring *foundations* in the western sense, so waqf and foundation terms are used interchangeably.

⁵³⁷ Ahmet Serdar, “The Impact of Waqfs on Economic Development of the Ottoman Empire: The case of Western Thrace”. in Metin Aşığ and et al., (eds.) *Turkey at the Beginning of the 21th Century* (St Kliment Ohridski Uni. Pres, 2005), p.31.

⁵³⁸ Adem Çabuk and et al., “Auditing Of A Waqf In The Ottoman Empire In The Beginning Of 19th Century”, *Accounting And Financial History Research Journal January* (14, 2018), p.130.

⁵³⁹ According to Sabahattin Zaim, nearly % 12 of the total income of the Ottoman Empire's state budget belongs to that waqf organisations. See more about, Sabahaddin Zaim, “Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları”, *Yeni Türkiye, Sivil Toplum Özel Sayısı* (sayı:18, 1997), p.298.

⁵⁴⁰ According to the first General census in 1927, total populations of Turkey was about 13.648.270

⁵⁴¹ Murat Çizakça, “*İslam Dünyasında Vakıflar*”, (Kto Karatay Üniversitesi Yayinlari, 2017), See also, Timur Kuran, “The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System”, *Law and Society Review* (Vol. 35, No. 4 , 2001), p.841-898.

Contrary to the early Republican era,⁵⁴² NGOs found a new escape in the booming of their domestic and global visibility on humanitarian issues in late 1990s. Besides the gearing up role of the accession process to the European Union, the ruling party's benign approaches in easing bureaucratic restriction for the establishment of civil society organisations accelerated the quality and quantity of NGOs from 2005 onward. According to the Ministry of Interior, Department of Associations, there are 113.254 associations as of June 2018.⁵⁴³ Additionally, the number of waqf/foundations was 5.159 as of 2017.⁵⁴⁴ Simplicity in establishing the provision of associations (less bureaucratic), addressing wider coverage in various fields and having favourable image in the eyes of the public, explains why associations outnumber foundations in Turkey.⁵⁴⁵

Within these Associations/waqfs, 390 hold “public interest status”, as of 2018. In the official webpage of the Department of Associations there are 22 NGOs that hold legal status, which allows them to collect charity donations without requiring special permission.⁵⁴⁶ In this respect, Deniz Feneri Association gained this status in 12.07.2005, Diyanet Foundation in 12.07.2005, Turkish Red Crescent Association

⁵⁴² Turkey's strong state structure would presumably be one reason for preventing NGOs power at the expense of the state.

⁵⁴³ There are in total 8,782,010 male and 2,304,943 female members of associations. Considering total populations of Turkey (80.810,525 million), total member ratio is 13,72% which is far less compared to most western countries. See more about <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/default.aspx>

⁵⁴⁴ <http://rakamla.com/turkiyedeki-dernek-vakif-sayisi-131.html> (accessed on 2 July 2018).

⁵⁴⁵ The difference between the foundation and the association is that both entities are a part of civil society organisations, they are structurally different. With respect to founding principles, associations are built on the legal person (at least 7), but a foundation owes its existence to donations of goods or property. The crucial part is that property or goods are key variables in establishing Foundations. There is a membership procedure in the association which is not necessary for foundations (this rule was abolished by the Constitutional Court in 2008). Association enjoys legal status, which requires a General Assembly, the Board of Directors and the Auditing Board.

⁵⁴⁶ Official web page, Ministry of Interior, Department of Association, <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/home-links/Legal-Personalities-having.aspx> (accessed 07.07.2018).

(Kızılay) in 07.11.2005, İHH in 01.04.2013, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi in 18.11.2013, Hayrat Aid Association in 13.03.2017.⁵⁴⁷

In addition to the number of NGOs, there has been an expansion of associations as well. The field of activity of NGOs ranges from humanitarian to social responsibility. The highest number of associations (totalling 35,473) exists in the field of "Vocational and Solidarity Associations". "Sports Associations" (22,934) has the second place and "Maintaining and Improving Religious Affairs Associations" (18,236) is in third place. Following that, "Educational Associations" (6,062), "Humanitarian Aid Associations" (5,530), "Individual Learning and Public Progress" (2,540) and "Health Associations" (2,537) follow respectively.⁵⁴⁸ This numerical data proves how faith/religious and humanitarian motivations are key variables as a driving force behind NGOs establishment.

Throughout the 1990s, Turkish humanitarian aid was shared by three prominent institutions: Turkish Red Crescent, Turkish Grain Board (founded in 1938) and Housing Development Funds.⁵⁴⁹ In addition to these, The Presidency of Religious Affairs has undertaken a strategic role through sending clerics/Imams abroad, constructing mosques and providing student scholarships.⁵⁵⁰ In this period, two essential developments empowered and fastened to the emergence of Muslim-oriented humanitarian NGOs in Turkey. Firstly, the ethnic wars in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1993-1995-1998 which motivated Muslim solidarity, as İHH (1995) and Deniz Feneri (1998) were founded in reaction to the atrocities witnessed in the Balkans. Secondly the Marmara earthquake in Turkey (1999) which caused the death of nearly 30,000 people. The response to the earthquake reveals, even more,

⁵⁴⁷ Official web page, Ministry of Interior, Department of Association, <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/home-links/Legal-Personalities-having.aspx> (accessed 07.07.2018).


⁵⁴⁸ <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/default.aspx> (accessed 3 July 2018)

⁵⁴⁹ *Türkiye'nin İkili Dış Yardımları: 1992-1996*, op. cit., p.5-9.

⁵⁵⁰ Parlak, op. cit., p. 87.

the extent to which the civil society organisations became rapidly involved as third sector alleviators in post-natural disasters.

Figure 5 Development Assistance of Turkish NGOs (2005-2016; Million USD)



Source: Compiled from TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report, 2016

The number and overall role of NGOs multiplied in 2005 with the adoption of the new legal framework- *Law on Associations*.⁵⁵¹ With this *law*, NGOs gained the privilege to enjoy forming a partnership with foreign NGOs, the eligibility to gain financial support from abroad and were allowed to collect from lucrative sources (such as collecting raw hides during the Eid-ul-Adha).

In addition to this Law, article 27 “*public interest status*” -granted by AK party government-, permits specific NGOs to collect revenue without prior bureaucratic permission, tax-free status for property, expenditures and vehicles. As a result of this process, NGOs financial and administrative burdens have been eased which became important variables in gauging the level of strength of NGOs.⁵⁵² Demonstrating the powerful moral support of the state, the Turkish Grand National

⁵⁵¹ The full text of Law: <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/mevzuat/kanun/5253-dernekler-kanunu.aspx>

⁵⁵² In the last five years, TİKA identifies how much state fund on NGOs to implement foreign aid project. TİKA Development Assistance Reports 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 are a clear instance to this.

Assembly awarded IHH and Deniz Feneri Associations with "Excellence Service Award in 2007."⁵⁵³

Since the early 2000s, NGOs had a favourable atmosphere to develop their capacity. Their growing role also required a sustainable relationship between the state and NGOs within systematic structure, therefore TİKA took responsibility for this mission. The foreign assistance maintained by Turkish NGOs was officially registered by TİKA as of 2005.⁵⁵⁴ Since then, TİKA started to record NGOs' overseas aid activities, such as in 2005 nearly 450 NGOs and state institutions have implemented over then 1700 projects according to TİKA Report. In this year, Diyanet Foundation carried out 129 activities with \$ 11.4 million.⁵⁵⁵ Besides, the total development assistance of NGOs was \$56.7 million in 2015. Of this amount, \$ 41.10 million was for emergency assistance while \$15.6 million was spent on technical cooperation.⁵⁵⁶

The most generous NGOs engaged in foreign aid in 2005 are as follows: The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), Foreign Economic Relations Board, Deniz Feneri, Kimse Yokmu Association, and IHH. Interestingly, the activities of the Diyanet Foundation, which was the third most active actor in development assistance with more than 190 activities, are classified within the category of public institutions.⁵⁵⁷ In 2005, an important note to be mentioned concerning NGO-state relations on foreign aid was the "consultation meeting" between the state and NGOs. Aiming to increase conscious and technical capacity in a systematic way, between the state and NGOs, this meeting represents a historic

⁵⁵³ Çelik and İşeri, op. cit., p.435.

⁵⁵⁴ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2011), p.68-69.

⁵⁵⁵ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2004), p.29.

⁵⁵⁶ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2005), p.47.

⁵⁵⁷ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2005), p.49.

moment in terms of NGO activity, giving them the status of important players in foreign aid at the state level.

In 2006, NGOs' foreign aid increased by 45% compared to 2005, reaching \$78,25 million. Out of this amount, \$47,89 million was spent on humanitarian/emergency aid, and \$30,36 million to technical cooperation aid.⁵⁵⁸ Emergency aid of NGOs was 41,4% share of total humanitarian aid flow. The most generous NGOs are listed respectively: Deniz Feneri, İHH, Kimse Yokmu, Türkmeneli İş birliği ve Kültür Foundation (Turkmeneli Cooperation and Culture Foundation), Sosyal Araştırmalar ve Dayanışma Foundation (Social Research and Solidarity Foundation), Uluslararası Mavi Hilal Vakfı (International Blue Crescent Foundation), Yeryüzü Doktorları (Doctors worldwide), and Cansuyu Association.

In 2006, Kızılay' humanitarian aid was categorized under the official flow. In TİKA's annual reports, NGOs foreign aid is classified under two rubrics: "private flow" if the sources come from NGOs own revenue; and "official flow" if NGOs use public sources or project funding by the state. As will be seen in the review of upcoming years' aid activities, Diyanet Foundation and Kızılay's foreign aid activities are classified as either private flow, or official flow category depending on their revenue sources. Therefore, categorisations of Kızılay or Diyanet Foundations under the official and private aid, stem from this distinction. However, both organisations' typologies either NGOs or state institutions, arise from their structure and documents of the constitution, which has been discussed in the previous chapter.

In 2007, development assistance provided by NGOs decreased to \$45.66⁵⁵⁹ million, due to fewer activities on emergency aid, compared to the previous year. Regional distributions are ranged in which South and Central Asian regions (response to the

⁵⁵⁸ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2006), p.50.

⁵⁵⁹ In fact, there is inconsistency in the amount of total aid. According to TİKA Development Assistance Report 2007 (p.,47), total NGO's foreign aid is at 55,38 million. However, 2008 and 2010 TİKA Reports simultaneously refer to the total NGO's foreign aid amount at 45,66 million USD. This difference presumably arises from inclusion/exclusion of state-fund aid over NGOs. But, since two reports agree on the latter figure \$45,66 million has been chosen.

Sidr Hurricane in Bangladesh) benefited from the most aid by sharing 20,12% of overall aid, followed by Africa (14,87%), Middle East (9,39%) such as Israel-Lebanon conflict and Europe (8,55%).⁵⁶⁰ Like the previous year, activities of Diyanet Foundation and Kızılay have been classified under the official foreign aid. The names of any NGOs and their activities were not mentioned in TİKA's 2007 report.

In 2008, NGOs development aid reached \$53.11⁵⁶¹ million, including with public funds their total assistance came to \$124.5 million.⁵⁶² However, in TİKA's Development Assistance Report of 2011 and 2015, the total amount is shown as 72.32 million USD. Out of the total amount, educational activities share the highest number of NGOs aid activities of 43% with 293 projects. Regarding emergency aid, earthquake, flood, hurricane and civil conflict caused immense casualties in more than 40 countries and Turkish NGOs maintained projects with 177 voluntary workers. In 2008, leading NGOs were Türkiye Diyanet Foundations (43%),⁵⁶³ İHH (25%), Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı (13%), Bilkent University (6%), Deniz Feneri Association, Dost Eli Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Association and Kimse Yokmu Association.⁵⁶⁴

Despite global financial crises, the year 2009 has witnessed an astonishing success in overseas aid flow for Turkish NGOs by increasing nearly 100% of their aid,

⁵⁶⁰ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2007), p.47.

⁵⁶¹ Similar to previous years; there is a different figure for the total amount of 2008 aid. According to TİKA 2008 report, the total amount is 53,11, but TİKA-2009 report shows this amount as 69,39 and a report from 2011-TİKA shows this amount as 72,32 million. Within all these numbers, TİKA's 2008 Report is taken as the real figure.

⁵⁶² In fact, in TİKA's Development Assistance Report of 2011 and 2015, the total amount is shown as 72.32 million USD. Since both reports take the latter number, in table 5, this amount is indicated.

⁵⁶³ From 2008 onwards, TİKA Reports categorizes Türkiye Diyanet Foundations's activities within the NGO taxonomy.

⁵⁶⁴ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2008), p.28.

totalled at \$109,00 million.⁵⁶⁵ The main thrust of NGOs foreign aid has remained unchanged: it has tended to focus on education, health and emergency situations. In reaction to the post-disaster situations that occurred in Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh, NGOs materialised essential projects to ease situations. Forerunners NGOs were IHH (24,28%), Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (21,54%), Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Foundation (15,63%), Dost Eli Associations (5,65%), Yardımcı Engelli ve Muhtaçlar İçin Eğitim ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (Helping Hand Educations and Solidarity Associations for Disabled People; 4,14%), Deniz Feneri (2,59 %) and Cansuyu (2,41%).⁵⁶⁶

As it comes to 2010, NGOs have provided \$105.68 million foreign aid through 527 different projects.⁵⁶⁷ The bulk of foreign aid was distributed in the form of social infrastructure and services sectors, sharing 97% of total aid. In addition to that multiple cluster of activities, infrastructure reconstruction, basic services provision, healthcare and educational support were alternative fields in which NGOs were involved. TİKA 2010 Report does not mention any NGOs who were involved in foreign aid activities. Diyanet Foundation's activities were jointly categorised in analysing activities of the Presidency of Religious Affairs as official flow.⁵⁶⁸

In 2011, Turkish NGOs provided \$199,52 million foreign aid which becomes a source of national pride for their devotions to gather donations.⁵⁶⁹ TİKA categorised NGOs foreign aid under two forms: TC/PPA which includes financial and non-financial assistance given to developing countries; and Emergency Aid which consists of food, sheltering and the provision of health services. While emergency

⁵⁶⁵ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2009), p.30.

⁵⁶⁶ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2009), p.33.

⁵⁶⁷ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2010), p.73.

⁵⁶⁸ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2010), p.74.

⁵⁶⁹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2011), p.68.

aid totalled to \$68,5 million, TC/PPA figures of NGOs equalled \$118,5 million.⁵⁷⁰ Following IHH (shared 26,68% within total NGO-led foreign aid), Kimse Yokmu (12,39%), Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Foundation (11,58%), Yeryüzü Doktorları (9,72%), Cansuyu (9,42%), Türkiye Diyanet Foundation (8,42%) have followed respectively, in the form of medical supplies, distributions of hot meals, qurban(meat distributions), Ramadan(food boxes) activities and water well projects.⁵⁷¹

In 2012, development assistance of NGOs went down to \$111.65 million with a year on year decrease of 44%. However, thanks to Turkish public entities funds (nearly \$39,43 million), NGOs' funds meant a total of \$151,08 million.⁵⁷² Out of this total amount, technical cooperation and programme aid shared \$89.10 million, and humanitarian/emergency aid stands at \$54.80 million with nearly \$7 million spent on administrative expenses.⁵⁷³ Comparing assistance by region, Africa becomes the leading recipients of NGO' aid in which Somalia, Niger, Sudan benefited the most. Among prominent NGOs, Kimse Yokmu provided \$45 million, İHH \$24.96 million, Dost Eli \$16.28 million, Yunus Emre Foundation \$12.75 million, Yardımcı Society (Helping Hand) \$8.28 million, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Foundation \$8.23 million, Cansuyu \$7.40 million, Yeryüzü Doktorları \$7.36 million and Diyanet Foundations \$3.35 million.⁵⁷⁴

In 2013, assistance by Turkish NGOs amounted to \$ 232,5 million, with state funds reaching \$280.23 million. Of this amount, \$122.88 million was in the form of

⁵⁷⁰ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2011), p.69.

⁵⁷¹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2011), p.71.

⁵⁷² TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2012), p.75.

⁵⁷³ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2012), p.76.

⁵⁷⁴ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2012), p.78. Turkish Red Crescent is categorised under the public institutions' development assistance part in TİKA Report of (2012).

programme aid and technical cooperation, \$150.15 million in humanitarian aid and \$7.2 million in administrative cost.⁵⁷⁵ The most significant volume of aid was shared by respective NGOs: Turkish Red Crescent NGO coordination (\$58.85 million), Diyanet Foundation (\$35.74 million) Kızılay (\$33.65 million)⁵⁷⁶, IHH (\$32.93 million), Doctors Worldwide \$16.12 million, Yunus Emre Institute \$12.38 million, Dost Eli (\$12.16 million), Cansuyu (\$9.84 million), Aziz Mahmut Hüdai Foundation (\$9.53 million).⁵⁷⁷ Since Yunus Emre Foundation and Kızılay' aid are classified within government-organized NGOs, this chapter excludes them from the analysis. Additionally, the activities of Kimse Yok mu have been excluded since 2013 TİKA Reports due to its affiliation with the Güllénist terrorist organisation.⁵⁷⁸

In 2014, Development assistance performed by NGOs has increased by 31% and realized as \$327.6 million. In addition to Turkish public institutions funds of 40.72 million, NGOs provided a totalled \$368.28 million.⁵⁷⁹ Out of the total amount, humanitarian aid was realized as \$182,71 million, while technical cooperation/programme assistance was \$169,86 million. Red Crescent's NGO coordination became the most generous actor by spending \$100,06 million in aid flow. After that, IHH (\$80.89 million), Diyanet Foundation (\$49.91 million), Doctors Worldwide (\$15.12 million), Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation (\$14.99 million), Yunus Emre Institute (\$12.78 million), Deniz Feneri (\$12.77 million), Dost Eli Association (\$12.04 million), Yardımeli Association (\$7.64), Cansuyu

⁵⁷⁵ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report, (2013), p.76.

⁵⁷⁶ If the sources of Foreign Aid is funded by externally (e.g. the UN), then categorised under this name.

⁵⁷⁷ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2013), p.78.

⁵⁷⁸ Resolution No: 47/43-Pol on the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) adopted by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Organisation 43rd Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ss.en.mfa> (accessed 05.07.2018).

⁵⁷⁹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2014), p.52.

(\$6.94 million) and Hayrat (\$6.05 million) have followed respectively.⁵⁸⁰ Similar to previous years, Diyanet Foundation and Kızılay' activities have been classified under the NGOs-led development assistance category.

In 2015, foreign aid provided by NGOs amounted to \$476 million, representing nearly 45% increase as compared to previous years.⁵⁸¹ However, contrary to previous years TİKA Development Assistance Report, 2015 report shares very limited space for the assistance made by NGOs. Showing the only chart which highlights' historical trend from 2005 to 2015, there is no more detail about which NGOs, to which region and what amount of aid they provided. Considering the fact that Turkey is ranked 10th among OECD / DAC member countries by aiding \$3.919 billion in 2015, and \$2.738 billion in humanitarian aid, NGO's development assistance is not negligible in that respect.

In 2016, an increasing trend continued at an accelerated pace and reached \$655.17 million in 2016, which shows an increase at a rate of 38% compared to that of 2015.⁵⁸² A sharp rise in NGOs aid can be attributed to the following reasons. First, assistance funded to Syrian guests constitutes the most important part of NGOs foreign assistance. Second, state-NGO cooperation on the field has increased total capacity of NGOs aid. Third, TİKA has expanded in collecting NGOs aid statistics with a systematic calculation that boasted NGO-TİKA cooperation. In the sectoral distribution of NGOs assistance, the highest amount has been spent on humanitarian aid about \$429 million, then Social Infrastructure and Service Sector followed with an amount of \$136.20 million, Education sector at an amount of \$36 million, Health sector at an amount of \$12.9 million.⁵⁸³ Similar to previous year's Reports, TİKA

⁵⁸⁰ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2014), p. 54.

⁵⁸¹ TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2015), p.28.

⁵⁸² TİKA, Turkish Development Assistance Report (2016), p.99.

⁵⁸³ Ibid., p.99.

report of 2016 does not mention any name of NGOs, involved in foreign aid. The year 2016 is the final year of analysis that TİKA has so far released.

As shown throughout this chapter, several leading NGOs have often ranked in the TİKA's NGO-led aid lists, while their place change each year. These are: Turkish Red Crescent, Diyanet Foundation, IHH, Yeryüzü Doktorları, Deniz Feneri, Dost Eli, Yardımelı, Cansuyu, Aziz Mahmut Hudayi, Hayrat, Türkmeneli İş birliğı ve Kùltür Foundation. Among them, Kızılay and Diyanet Foundation activities have sometimes been classified under the official flow such as in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2010 or private flow as in 2008, 2011 and 2012. However, since the TRC worked under the auspice of the Turkish Presidency and is categorised as a quasi-non-governmental institution, this chapter categorises its activities within the official flow. Furthermore, due to the affiliation of the Kimse Yok mu Association' with the Güllenist movement organisation,⁵⁸⁴ and direct link between this NGOs' managers and the Güllenist movement, it was closed down, therefore this chapter excluded it from the analysis.⁵⁸⁵ Moreover, Türkmeneli Cooperation and Culture Foundation⁵⁸⁶ and Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Foundation focuses explicitly on the cultural project toward Turkic-speaking regions, specifically to the Turcomans of Iraq, therefore excluded in this research.

In short, from 2005 to today, NGOs pro-active role in humanitarian assistance has been continuing to increase, as shown in the graphics. The ideational linkage

⁵⁸⁴ Resolution No: 47/43-Pol on the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) adopted by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Organisation 43rd Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ss.en.mfa> (accessed 05.07.2018).

⁵⁸⁵ The Association has been closed down in 2016 by order of chief public prosecutor's office, and so has no headquarter or branch in Turkey. Various national news agencies from a range of political spectrums agree on this issue <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2018/gundem/kimse-yok-mu-diye-diye-paralari-goturdule-2323301/>, <https://odatv.com/kimse-yok-muda-ahlak-da-vidan-da-yokmus-01041823.html>,; <https://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2018/02/14/kapatilan-kimse-yok-mu-dernegi-calisanlarina-feto-fezlekesi>; <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/02/04/feto-organizations-could-lose-their-consultative-status-in-un>, <http://www.haberturk.com/kimse-yok-mu-dernegi-ne-teror-orgutu-feto-fezlekesi-1837785> ((accessed all these web page 05.07.2018).

⁵⁸⁶ The official webpage, <http://turkmeneli.org.tr/>

between NGOs foreign aid practice and state's activities have been made amply clear. Since this thesis aims to understand humanitarian aid relations between the FBOs and state, nine of these which are identified as the most effective FBOs are taken under scrutiny: Türkiye Diyanet Foundation⁵⁸⁷ İHH, Deniz Feneri, Cansuyu, Dosteli, Yeryüzü Doktorları, Hayrat Aid Association, Beşir Association and Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation.

As explained in the introduction part, there are four selection criteria: longevity and potential capacity of FBOs, their political/ideological proximity, motivation (religious or secular) and outreach/visibility in the society. Longevity is an important criterion since state authorities aim to pursue more result-oriented and efficient aid flow, NGOs' increasing experience reduce costs and increases possibilities for cooperation. Besides, longevity helps to create certainties between NGOs workers and official authorities over the years. Under this heading, the selected FBOs have a range of ages. Among them, the Diyanet Foundation is the oldest one established in 1975. Following that Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation (1986), İHH (founded 1992 and institutionalized in 1995), Deniz Feneri (1996), Yeryüzü Doktorları (2000), Dosteli (2001), Cansuyu (2005), Beşir (2013), and Hayrat Humanitarian Aid Association (2013)⁵⁸⁸ have been identified. Although the last two organisations have been only recently established, they represent two of the biggest congregations. For instance, Besir association has affiliations with the Menzil movement established in 1930 by Muhammed Raşit Erol, while Hayrat Association has affiliations with the Nur movement and its sister organisation Hayrat Foundations was established by Ahmed Hüsrev Altınbaşak in 1974.

Related to longevity, the number of branches and members, the profile of human resources, main areas of activity, budget, income-expenditure characters are another organizational strength of NGOs. For instance, Diyanet Foundation has

⁵⁸⁷ The next part explains why Diyanet Foundation is categorised under NGO classification within NGO category.

⁵⁸⁸ In fact, this Association is directly affiliated with Hayrat Foundation which has been established in 1974.

1,000 branches in Turkey and works in 135 countries. Similarly, IHH is one of the biggest foundations and is also actively working in 135 countries.

The second criterion is the origin of NGOs, whether they represent secular organisations or FBOs. As this research demonstrates, if NGOs are close to faith-based structures, they are more likely to be influential in state-NGO aid relations. Taking centrally G. Clarke and M. Jennings' definition on FBOs⁵⁸⁹ and Elizabeth Ferris's four distinctive characteristics, which differentiate FBOs from others, selected organisations are outlined within these principles. According to Ferris, there are four criteria to be framed for defining FBOs which are: an affiliation with a religious body; financial support from religious sources; board members and the staff are based on religious belief/affiliation; a religious mission statement and decision-making process based on religious value.⁵⁹⁰ While these characteristics are *sine qua non* principles of FBOs, they may not be applicable in today's FBOs structure as today several FBOs are involved in humanitarian aid with a secular approach. From this angle, Heist and Cnaan put forward three types of FBOs, which are somewhat blended typologies. FBOs can be positioned on three places in a trajectory: "the least fundamentalist FBOs", "moderate FBOs" and "the most religiously fundamentalist FBOs".⁵⁹¹ All these typologies are somewhat vague where a typical FBO may address more than one type. In this case, this research's selected Muslim-FBOs⁵⁹² can be set amongst these typologies.

⁵⁸⁹ They define it as "any organizations that derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teaching and principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation of school of thought within the faith", see more about Clarke and Jennings (eds.), op. cit., p.5.

⁵⁹⁰ Ferris, op. cit., p. 312.

⁵⁹¹ Dan Heist and A. Cnaan, "Faith-Based International Development Work: A Review", *Religious MDPI Journal* (7,19, 2016), p.12.

⁵⁹² This paper prefers to use Muslim faith-based organizations (MFBOs) instead of Islamic to prevent aid being seen as secondary to a religious agenda.

The respective organisations are aligned accordingly in the analysis of FBOs, which was also confirmed during the interview process with each organisation.⁵⁹³ Their sources of income are generally based on religious sources, including zakat, almsgiving, collecting raw hide (skin of slaughtered animals during the Eid-ul-Adha), qurban donations etc. Their board members and staff are religiously harmonised, pursuing aid activities as a principle of religious obligations and humanitarian commitment. The organisations generally quote hadiths or verse of Qur'an in defining their vision and mission as will be seen in the next section. While they do not discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic origin in distributing foreign aid, they particularly focus their attention on Muslim populations.

The third criterion is the ideological/political proximity. This is important because organisations, which have a close relationship with the ruling party, are more likely to be listened to in terms of their suggestions, at the expense of related state organisations. Most of the selected FBOs approach their work with a strong Muslim identity.⁵⁹⁴ Quoting a similar narrative in line with the ruling party, FBOs often address certain discourse including "oppressed Muslims", "safeguarding the ummah" and "Ottoman past". One of the clearest linkages is the Milli İrade Platformu (National Will Platform), which is often criticised as supporting the government's policies. There are 293 civil society organisations including İHH, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation, Deniz Feneri, Beşir, and Hayrat in the *National Will Platform (NWF)*. This platform has released many press statements in support of the ruling party's policies,⁵⁹⁵ such as during the 24th June 2018 Presidential Election. However, Cansuyu Association is less supportive of the AK party, due to its close affiliation with the traditional wing of the Islamist movement ruled by

⁵⁹³ Only the Association of Yeryüzü Doktorları do not consider themselves directly as a faith-based organization, since they claim that theoretically their position is not categorised as a pure FBO.

⁵⁹⁴ Çelik and İşeri, op. cit., p.436.

⁵⁹⁵ For instance, Just before the 24th Presidency Election, this Platform released full support to the current government on 22 June 2018, <https://milliiradeplatformu.com/guclu-ve-buyuk-turkiye-icin-devam#guclu-ve-buyuk-turkiye-icin-devam>

Necmettin Erbakan. Despite it, their common religious background and shared similar political leaning smooths over their differences.⁵⁹⁶

The fourth criterion is outreach/visibility in the society where they perform aid activities through various means. In part, taking up alternative toolkits that FBOs apply to influence public opinion, most of the leading FBOs aim to increase their outreach in national and international media through journals or broadcasting. For instance, Diyanet Foundation publish "İyilik Dergisi (Journal of Good Deeds)", İHH prints "İnsani Yardım- (Humanitarian Aid)", Deniz Feneri Association publishes "Deniz Feneri Dergisi-(Journal of Deniz Feneri)", and Hayrat Humanitarian Aid Association publish "Hayrat Publications". Along with these printed media, they advertise in national media and on the internet to increase fund-raising in the form of campaigns on specific issues.

In sum, selected FBOs have a comparatively longer history, have political/ideological proximity with the ruling party and implement an effective aid campaigning through various means. These four selections are useful to understand why specific NGOs more effect on humanitarian aid policy and practice have, but this thesis does not analyse this and does not compare NGOs. However, it is clear that the competence of NGOs creates both a fertile new set of relationships for humanitarian aid and a whole set of new complex challenges within it. Importantly, these opportunities depend to a large degree on how NGOs apply their capability through political role: the one is in many respects the flip-side of the other.

5.2.2. The Analysis of Selected Faith-based NGOs

Before proceeding a detail analysis of each selected NGO's structure and humanitarian aid activities, in the below a taxonomy is drawn based on eight titles. Next part will elaborate selected NGOs according to founding, origin, mission, area of function, source of income, geographical coverage, oversea activities, and

⁵⁹⁶ Çelik and İşeri, op. cit., p.440.

distinguishing factor, which is set in this taxonomy. Each of these sub-titles are scrutinized in the subsequent part. This table is prepared as summary of selected NGOs features to give preliminary information.

Table 3 A Taxonomy for Selected Non-government Organizations

Yeryüzü Doktorları	Deniz Feneri	IHH	Diyanet Foundation					
2000	1998	1995	1975	Founding	Origin	Mission	Area of Function	Source of Income
Least fundamentalist faith-based organisation	Moderate faith-based organisation	Moderate faith-based organisation	Faith-based organisation					
Provide basic health care	Humanitarian support	Social welfare and human rights	Material (financial) and moral (spiritual) support					
Nine Area: from remedial to mother and child health, psychosocial health projects	Various areas including projects aid to orphan, constructions, cataracts, qurban	Seven area: from humanitarian relief to human right and advocacy	Charitable & Social activities; Educational activities;					
Religious form of income, donation, income from institutions	Religious form of income, membership fee, public institutions income	Religious form of income, donation, rental income	Religious form of income, donations, commercial enterprise and financial Income					
Africa, Middle East and Central Asia	Asia, Europe, Balkan, Middle East and Francophone region in Sub-Sharan Africa.	Middle East (Syria & Palestine), Sub-Saharan Africa, Balkan	Africa, Asia, Pacific, Latin America and the Middle East					
50 countries	65 countries	135 countries	145 countries					
Active on Health issue, engage joint activity with WHO, UNICEF and OIC	Aid organization System	Advocacy actions: humanitarian diplomacy	Semi-autonomous					

Table 3 (Continued)

Hayrat	Beşir	Aziz Mahmud Hudayi	Dost Eli	Cansuyu					
2013	2011	1986	2001	2005					
Faith-based organisation	Faith-based organisation	Faith-based organisation	Moderate faith-based organisation	Faith-based organisation					
Responding to all material and spiritual needs of people	Aid activities in accordance with Islamic rituals	Increase solidarity and ummah consciousness	Aid to maintain self-sustainability	Social, Humanitarian, and Moral support					
Humanitarian aid, Ramadan/Qurban activities, orphans protection	Food distribution, post-disaster search and rescue activities	Relief aid, educational activities, publications, social and cultural activities	Emergency aid, health and training activities	Six area: Orphan, Ramadan, food bank, water wells, constructions					
Religious form of income,	Religious form of income	Religious form of income	Religious form of income	Religious form of income					
Sub-saharan Africa, Middle East, Central Asia and Balkan	Africa, Balkans, Caucasasia and Central Asia	Africa, Balkans, Caucasasia and Central Asia	Sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle East	Africa, Asia, Middle East, Balkans					
26 coordination offices	55 countries	30 countries	42 countries	85 countries					
Affiliation with Sufi congregation (Nur Cemaati)	Personal Assistance System, and affiliation with Sufi congregation	HAY (Hüdayi Acil Yardım), affiliation with sufi congregation (Erenköy)	Food Banking System and animal distribution	Proximity to Milli-Görüş movement and less supportive of AK party					

5.2.2.1. Türkiye Diyanet Foundation

The Diyanet Foundation of Turkey⁵⁹⁷ (Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, shortly DF or Diyanet) was founded on 13 March 1975 by the President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs Dr Lütü Doğan, together with vice-president Dr Tayyar Altıkulaç and Yakup Üstün, aiming to support activities set out by The Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA). In order to be freed from the bureaucratic restriction on PRA, to diversify its income sources and to strengthen civil society dimension of PRA, the Diyanet Foundation was established under the surveillance of PRA. In due course, DF has sharply increased its economic independence by having 1000 branches (locations) in Turkey and implementing overseas activities in 145 countries.⁵⁹⁸

Based on the “until goodness becomes dominant on earth” principle blended with the motto of “the best of the people are those who are most beneficial to others”,⁵⁹⁹ Diyanet Foundation declares its mission as “to establish the sovereignty of goodness on earth by means of providing institutions for financial aid, moral and spiritual support.”⁶⁰⁰ The mission pinpoints two dimensions of aid: material (financial) and moral (spiritual) support to civilians without sidelining any groups, race and ethics. In line with this, its vision is defined as “to be a model Foundation in humanitarian services in Turkey and the world.” As a harmonisation of mission and vision, DF states eight sine qua non principles which are compassion, justice,

⁵⁹⁷ There is different versions of the Diyanet Foundation in various countries, such as the Diyanet Foundation of Germany, the Diyanet Foundation of Switzerland, Diyanet Foundation of France etc. Therefore, Diyanet Foundation from now on refers to its Turkish-based one.

⁵⁹⁸ Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, Official Introduction Booklet, p.1.

⁵⁹⁹ Official web-page of Diyanet Foundation, <https://tdv.org/en-US/site/icerik/hakkimizda-1038> (accessed 13.07.2018).

⁶⁰⁰ Official web-page of Diyanet Foundation, Mission and Vision, <https://tdv.org/en-US/site/icerik/misyon-ve-vizyon-1039> (accessed 16.07.2018) .

goodness, sustainability, accountability, collectively and persistence, and aesthetics.⁶⁰¹

Contrary to the initial practices which were geographically and financially limited, the DF's current pattern of aid is now covering far more than a religious-oriented approach. Rather, it encompasses thematic areas including humanitarian assistance, social and cultural activities, building mosques, Qur'an courses, schools, universities, dormitories, culture/social service, training Muftiate and Imam, scholarships for local and foreign students, distributing unconditional food-in-kind materials, and aid boxes during the month of Ramada and Qurban. It has now expanded its reach to a wider geographical area, including countries in Africa, Asia, Pacific, Latin America and the Middle East.

However, the legal status of DF within general NGO classification is contested. It is not clear whether it is a semi-official institution, semi-autonomous organisation, government-organised NGO (GONGO) or pure faith-based non-governmental organisation. According to Diyanet Foundations' official web page, it is a corporate entity established in accordance with Turkish Civil Law No 903DF gained "public interest civil society statue" in 2005.⁶⁰² As is understood from its name, DF directly works under the provision of "Directorate General of Foundations"⁶⁰³ which represents an important body that regulate the CSOs together with the "Department of Associations". Both institutions are a blanket body of civil society organisations, where Associations and Foundations' provisions are applied. In this sense, DF represents a form of a civil society organisation, and therefore an NGO.

So, what do we mean when referring to NGOs. According to Peter Willets, an NGO is defined as "any non-violent, non-profit making, organised group of people who

⁶⁰¹ Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, Official Introduction Booklet, p.1.

⁶⁰² Official web-page of Diyanet Foundation, About Us, <https://tdv.org/en-US/site/icerik/hakkimizda-1038> (accessed 13.07.2018).

⁶⁰³ This state institution is now bound to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

are not seeking governmental office.”⁶⁰⁴ Volker Heins, in a wider perspective, frames NGOs “as voluntary organisations formed by individuals to achieve a common purpose, often oriented to the public good”; therefore they “neither have a mandate from government nor want to share government power.”⁶⁰⁵ This mandate is not only for political independence but also encapsulated for financial independence. This definition includes every kind of group but excludes terrorist groups, private profit-making organisations, state-oriented NGOs and political parties, since civil society organisations are understood as being neither part of the state nor the market.⁶⁰⁶

According to the DF voucher (establishment regulations), the “Head of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is automatically chosen as a President of the Board of Trustees of the Diyanet Foundation.” This board of trustees consists of eight members⁶⁰⁷, most of whom are bureaucrats, public officers, retired personnel of the PRA, academics and businessmen. Normally, the general assembly of DF is the highest organ, having the right to choose these eight members. However, the President of the Board of Trustee of DF tends to suggest potential candidates to the general assembly. Therefore, the Board of Trustees is neither a symbolic nor passive unit. Instead, it has a prominent role in designing the DF policy and principles. Similar to its administrative structure, other contested issues arise at the more local branch level of the DF. Nearly every town and province has branches of the DF, where the Mufti (highest representative of PRA in the local area) is the manager of DF’s offices. Once again, the DF is not autonomous in appointing the manager of these local branches.

⁶⁰⁴ Willetts (eds.), *“The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System*, op. cit., p.5.

⁶⁰⁵ Heins. op. cit., p. 17.

⁶⁰⁶ Kaldor, op. cit., p.583-593.

⁶⁰⁷ Adding the head of Precedency of Religious Affairs; the number reaches nine.

Upon closer examination, however, its administrative structure does not align within the theoretical framework outlined in the NGO literature.⁶⁰⁸ In other words, the Diyanet cannot be classified within the simple NGO structure because it does not meet two criteria: independence from the government (DF has no power to choose its head of Trustees) and having no mandate from the government or share in government power. Nevertheless, the Foundation has their policy priorities, an independent budget and extensive local connections both in Turkey and abroad. It employs professionals and volunteers who work on behalf of DF.

In short, the foundation neither fits within NGO taxonomy nor represents state organisations or institutions. In general, it is safe to argue that, *ceteris paribus*, the Foundation is a distinctive entity, which can best be framed as a "*semi-autonomous*" or "*semi-official*" institution. Despite this fact, TİKA, which is a public institution that was recently attached to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism,⁶⁰⁹ has categorised DF's overseas assistance within official flows (2005, 2007, 2010 reports) and private flow (NGO:2008, 2009, 2011 to 2016reports). In line with TİKA's current classification, this thesis sets DF's activities in the NGO category.

Another contested issue on the statue of the Diyanet Foundation is related to its direct relationship with the government. To underline an NGOs' relationship with governments in a theoretical way, various acronyms have been applied: BINGO (Business and industry NGOs), GONGO (Government-organized NGOs), GRINGO (Government regulated NGOs), DONGO (donor-dominated NGOs) and AGO (anti-governmental organizations).⁶¹⁰ Among them GONGO mainly emerged within the realm of the foreign policy process and accordingly deserves more scrutiny.

⁶⁰⁸ NGO literature herein refers theoretical approach that addresses association and foundation principles.

⁶⁰⁹ TİKA's current position is changed from Prime Ministry to Ministry of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, after transforming from Parliamentary system to Presidential system.

⁶¹⁰ Karns and Mingst, op. cit., p.223.

GONGO is categorised as a part of civil society organisation but dissociating from NGO literature with two precise distinctions: they are set up or financially sponsored by a government to further a state's political interest in domestic and foreign platforms.⁶¹¹ They are usually founded and initially organised by governments to provide services for society that the state is unwilling to do. However, in many respects, GONGO is seen as the "unwanted black sheep in international affairs, thought to be too governmental by society-centric scholars, but not governmental enough by the statist."⁶¹² However, as Naim says, it is "benign or irrelevant because most of them are dangerous... and act as the thuggish arm of a repressive government."⁶¹³

NGOs in non-democratic states are treated as GONGO.⁶¹⁴ For instance, Russian Youth Group, Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation, China Youth Development Foundation, Saudi Arabia's International Islamic Relief Organisations are typical GONGO versions of entities. The crucial question is: why do government-sponsored groups masquerade as civil society? First, governments sponsor NGOs to access private information or resources domestically to manipulate connections with international NGOs.⁶¹⁵ Second, governments aim to control other NGOs agenda in favour of them through GONGO to suppress any unexpected civil

⁶¹¹ Reza Hasmath, Timothy Hildebrandt, and Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, "Conceptualizing Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations" *SSRN Scholarly Paper, Rochester; Social Science Research Network*, (2016), p.5.

⁶¹² Ibid., p.2.

⁶¹³ Moises Naim, "What Is A GONGO? How Government-Sponsored Groups Masquerade as Civil Society", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2009, October 13), p.95-96.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., p.95-96.

⁶¹⁵ DeMars, op. cit.,

movement.⁶¹⁶ Third, governments wish to expand their interest at home and abroad through the means of GONGO types organisations.

Having said that GONGOs are usually dependent on states for funding and resources, yet they also have a great deal of autonomy, which Lu describes as “dependent autonomy”.⁶¹⁷ Considering this background, DF cannot be set into GONGO types of NGOs, since it has not been established by the government and has an independent source of income directly from society without depending on the government.⁶¹⁸ A large and excessive amount of revenue of DF is based on private flow, sourced by donations through various means, including religious practices.⁶¹⁹ Inevitably, DF and the current government in Turkey share a similar political and religious outlook, strong narratives to the same religious tradition (Islamic civilization), the *ummah* and Turkey's sense of responsibility. However, prevailing parallelism on overseas activities and having familiar narratives between government and the DF does not mean that DF is a GONGO since DF was established nearly 30 years earlier than the current government (AK Party). Moreover, the independent income source of DF, including campaigns, Ramadan activities and donations⁶²⁰ from the state are distinguishing variables which exclude it from being under GONGO taxonomy.

The other debate on the DF statue is based on its origin, whether it is a secular or faith-based NGO. Previous paragraphs underlined four grounds which distinguish

⁶¹⁶ Youngwan Kim, “The Unveiled Power Of NGOs: How NGOs Influence States' Foreign Policy Behaviours”, (*University of Iowa Iowa Research Online*, PhD Thesis, 2011), p.36.

⁶¹⁷Yiyi Lu, *Non-Governmental Organizations in China* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

⁶¹⁸ An official economic relation between DF and PRA is with regards to Hajj and Umrah, the religious pilgrimages for Muslims. Though Presidency of Religious Affairs rules these two activities, its accounting works, the cashier and teller are organised by the Religious Foundation.

⁶¹⁹Diyanet Foundation, Activity Report 2017, p., 18 (see full report, https://tdvmedia.blob.core.windows.net/tdv/files/Media/Files/raporlar/TDV_2017_FaaliyetRaporu.pdf)

⁶²⁰ Diyanet Foundation, Activity Report 2017, p.18-20.

FBOs from other organisations which are economic source (charity, almsgiving); establishment principles (evangelism, advocate forgiveness, mercy and voluntarism); organizations structure and member's affiliation, and enforcement on the practice (operate from the standpoint of faith). Setting these four variables on DF, first DF's revenue is primarily based on religious practices as outlined before. Second, the founding mission of DF is defined as “to provide financial and spiritual support to the people and institutions that put effort, so goodness can prevail in the world” which furthers doctrinal support for Islamic resurgence. Even the motto of DF is based on hadith (the statements of Prophet Mohammed), that is “the best of the people are those who are most beneficial to others.”⁶²¹ Third, the affiliations of its members and organizational structure show its origins. DF has a direct relation with PRA at the administrative level, and people affiliated with DF are, albeit to different degrees, hold a similar spiritual, faith and ethnic philosophy. The fourth indication is the enforcement of religious practice from the standpoint of faith. While DF does not discriminate based on religion or ethnic origin when implementing its activities, it mainly focuses its attention on Muslim populations,⁶²² but without conducting proselyting activities on the ground.⁶²³ Meeting these four criteria, Diyanet Foundation can clearly be classified as a faith-based organisation. By taking an overall view on Diyanet’s mechanism, practice and principles, DF can succinctly be set into the category of pure FBOs structure.

There are five main policy principles of DF: corporate growth and expansion of service network, fundraising, enhancing educational activities, amplifying charity and social service, and increase cooperation with other organisations. To a certain extent, these five policies are being maintained through three broad sectoral

⁶²¹ Other version of this hadith is “The best people are those who are kind and benefit others and” or “The most beloved to Allah are the most beneficial to the people” cited from Buhârî, Mağâzî, 35.

⁶²² Çelik and İşeri, op. cit., p.435.

⁶²³ To see how it focuses on Muslim-dominated society in the activities: <http://m.milliyet.com.tr/amp/yazarlar/abdullah-karakus/meksika-nin-musluman-2739291/> (accessed 05.10.2018).

distributions: 1) charitable and social activities; 2) educational activities; 3) cultural activities.

The first inclusive activity of the DF is framed under charitable and social activities. This activity encapsulates four general distinctive sub-headings: Humanitarian aid, Ramadan activities, Qurban activities and Water well projects. Through charitable activity, the DF is serving as gap fillers both for the state's retreat and religious-driven programme. This is due to philanthropic activities being one of the most important conduits that the DF uses to apply and disseminate its policy.

The DF's initial charity activities were geographically and financially limited to certain regions. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, several Turkish-speaking countries sought urgent help to ameliorate their political, social and economic hardship. In response to the religious demands of the people, the PRA and Diyanet Foundation have cooperated to meet their needs through various means, including sending imams Muftiate, providing religious publications, offering scholarships and constructing mosques.⁶²⁴ For instance, from 1995 to 2002, the DF organised the "Eurasia Islamic Councils" where religious figures gathered to strengthen ummah conscious and adjust a mutual calendar among respective states in regard to Islamic holy days. As a result of the Council meeting, religious days (eid al-fitr and eid al-ahda) have since been the same for Turkey and those countries. This was followed by the construction of several cultural spheres and mosques, where people had chance to increase religious knowledge via strengthening their faith and consciousness of ummah solidarity. Throughout the 1990s and beginning of 2000s, the Diyanet's overseas activities were generally maintained in collaboration with the PRA. As such, the Diyanet's activities have often been handled within the PRA's annual activities. From 2008 onwards, however, these Diyanet-led activities have started to be categorised separately under the NGO-led activities by TİKA' Annual Reports.

⁶²⁴ Parlak, op. cit., p.87.

According to TİKA's Annual Development Assistance Report of 2008, NGO-led development assistance totalled \$ 73.32 million and the DF become the most generous NGO⁶²⁵, sharing 43% of all aid by itself, followed by İHH with 25%.⁶²⁶ In 2009, the total amount of NGOs aid reached \$109 million, with the DF providing 21.54% of all aid by itself. Although, this was second to the İHH, which constituted 24.28% of total NGOs aid.⁶²⁷ In 2010, NGO's aid flow totalled \$105.68 million, but the DF's performance has been classified under the PRA (official flow) activities.⁶²⁸

By 2011, foreign aid provided by NGOs had increased by \$199,52 million, while the Diyanet's overall rank decreased, ranking as the sixth most generous organisations among NGOs. Sharing only 8.42% of total aid, the İHH constituted over 26% (26.86%).⁶²⁹ In 2012, the total aid shared by NGOs reached \$151.08 million, with the Diyanet spending only \$3.35 million total aid,⁶³⁰ slipping down the rankings once again. This time ranking 10th among other NGOs. As of 2013, development assistance provided by NGOs has almost doubled, with \$280,23 million in which the DF and Kızılay were the largest deliverers. The DF, itself, spent \$35.74 million of aid.⁶³¹ In addition, a total of 1,458 students received education in Turkey in 2013 through the sponsorship of the Diyanet at the following

⁶²⁵ Noted that, TİKA categories all civil society organisations under NGO taxonomy, irrespective of NGO's origin, whether FBO or secular.

⁶²⁶ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2008), p.28.

⁶²⁷ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2009), p.33.

⁶²⁸ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2010), p.40.

⁶²⁹ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2011), p.71.

⁶³⁰ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2012), p.78.

⁶³¹ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2013), p.78.

levels: 1,012 students of high school, 379 bachelor's, 14 master's and 53 doctoral.⁶³²

In 2014, development assistance performed by NGOs increased by 31% compared to 2013, reaching \$368.28 million.⁶³³ The humanitarian assistance totalled as \$182,71 million. The three most generous NGOs were listed respectively: Kızılay (\$100.06 million), İHH (\$80.89 million) and Diyanet (\$49.91 million).⁶³⁴ In 2015, NGO-led assistance jumped to \$427 million, representing a 45% increase compared to 2014.⁶³⁵ In this year, the Diyanet ranked second place, sharing \$73.93 million of humanitarian aid. In 2016, Turkey's ODA increased to a record-breaking \$6.487,7 billion, When compared to that of 2015, the amount increased at a percentage of 66%, in which Turkey's humanitarian assistance ratio to GNI was 0.69%, labelling it as the most generous country in the world when considering the rate of humanitarian aids/GNP of 0,69%. NGO-led development flow raised to \$665 million.⁶³⁶ In keeping up with this acceleration trend, the DF provided 88.39 million worth of humanitarian aid in 2016.⁶³⁷

Seeing that, the DF's overall aid performance has been escalating year by year, which by now addresses in 145 countries. The DF provides primary resources in areas struck by natural disasters or crisis regions, including Afghanistan, Chad, Central African Country, Pakistan, Myanmar, Haiti, Iraq, Mali, Syria, Myanmar, Bosnia Herzegovina, Somalia and the Philippines. For instance, from 2017 to 2018,

⁶³² TIKA Development Assistance Report (2013), p.79.

⁶³³ TIKA Development Assistance Report (2014), p.52.

⁶³⁴ However, In Diyanet's Activity Report of 2016, this number is shown as \$53.24 million

⁶³⁵ TIKA Development Assistance Report (2015), p.28.

⁶³⁶ TIKA Development Assistance Report (2016), p.8.

⁶³⁷Diyanet Foundation Activity Report (2016), p.12. (to full Access Report: <https://tdv.org/tr-TR/site/projelerimiz/raporlar-1068>).

nearly 15 million Turkish Lira has been spent on aiding the Rohingya Muslim community, where 521.264 civilian have benefited. Besides, from 2012 to 2017, nearly 197 million Turkish lira was distributed among Syrian civilians.

Ramadan activities represent another key area where the DF has a deeper experience. Adopting the motto based on the Quranic verse, “whoever saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of whole of community”, the DF performs alternative campaigning that urges generosity. It is especially emphasising forms of charitable giving (zakat and sadaqa) and bestows special merits during the annual holy month of Ramadan. The DF, both in domestic and foreign assistance, has provided 6.083.548 Turkish lira worth of aid in 2015.⁶³⁸ An increase of nearly 50% from previous years, this amount increased to 9.532,272 Turkish Lira in 2016 and even further to 15.169.902 Turkish lira as of 2017.⁶³⁹ Regarding overseas activities in 2017, the DF served in 64 countries and 278 regions, providing 61.830 aid-boxes and maintaining 150.792 fast-breaking meal program in Ramadan.⁶⁴⁰

Additional major fieldwork of the DF’s charitable activities is the sacrificial slaughter and meat distribution project during eid al-adha. The DF has tended to focus on this activity to a great extent since 1993 in collaboration with the PRA. This program is run in accordance with the religious prerequisites of the Diyanet, and under the supervision of its own personnel and voluntary teams. In other words, the DF directly provides human sources in serving this activity. Pursuing the “be part of happiness” slogans, the Diyanet’s overriding motivation is to an extent a help toward neglected areas and expand an aura of influence of Turkey in its

⁶³⁸ The currency in average rate in 2015 was about that 1 dollar equalled to 2,7 Turkish Lira. So, this amount was more or less 2,2 million UD Dollar.

⁶³⁹ In 2017-dollar currency average was 1 dollar equalled 3.6 Turkish Lira. Though more than 100% increase in overall Ramadan aid, this amounted to 4,2 million US because of sharp devaluation of Turkish Lira at the expense of foreign currency. Even, the average currency rate as of July 2018 is 1 dollar equal 4,7 TL. This devaluation has malign effects on Turkish aid the ratio at the expense of foreign currency.

⁶⁴⁰ Diyanet Information Booklet: An Introduction., p.13.

hinterland. In 1993, the total number of sacrificed animals was 2.634, and this amount increased to 257.789 in 2017, even doubling to 430.008 by 2018 in 143 countries.⁶⁴¹ Since the first activity on Qurban program in 1993 up until the year of 2017, the total number of qurban distributed to the needy has been 1.364.158, spanning from Africa to Asia and from Latin America to Middle East.⁶⁴²

The final charity activity of the Diyanet are water well projects. Underpinned by the “to flourish hopes” principle, the DF’s charity activity is grounded in a set of shared principles which pursue the belief that “every person has right to access a clean water” and a corpus of global responsibility that encapsulates the notion of shared humanity. Nine water well projects have been put into practice in 2015, which nearly doubled in 2016 (15 water wells), and nearly tripled in 2017 (47 water wells).⁶⁴³ As of 2018, there are a total of 46 water wells projects that have been put into operation. Across 14 different countries, this totals 117 water wells have been served for people in need of help.⁶⁴⁴

In short, DF aims to become a model FBO in the area of Ramadan and Qurban programmes which DF’s has been organizing since 1993. It started with 2634 qurban in 1993 and reached 430.008 in 2018. Therefore, DF's power of influence on Turkish humanitarian aid practice through Ramadan and Qurban facilities is more visible in this issue. The events of the attempted coup on 15 July 2016 and the information which emerged in the following period has inevitably secured this process, by increasing the publics’ suspicions towards non-state religious groups (Cemaats/congregations) and consequently launching an affirmative process between the people and the state institutions. In this process, President Recep

⁶⁴¹ <https://tdv.org/tr-TR/site/haberler/turkiye-diyanet-vakfi-kurban-organizasyonunda-tarihi-rekor-3761> (accessed 09.10.2018).

⁶⁴² Diyanet Information Booklets: An Introduction, p.15.

⁶⁴³ Diyanet Information Booklets: An Introduction., p.,23, see also, www.sukuyusu.tdv.org

⁶⁴⁴ Diyanet Information Booklet: An Introduction., p.23.

Tayyip Erdoğan called on people to donate their qurban to reliable institutions, including PRA and DF, further strengthening support for these organisations. He publicly donated his own family's qurban to the Diyanet Foundation in 2016 and 2018⁶⁴⁵, and to Kızılay in 2017. This picture clearly reflects the fulfilment of the humanitarian mission that Diyanet Foundation taken up, in responding to civil society' needs to extend their charitable commitments to the wider world.

Table 4 Türkiye Diyanet Foundation Incomes and Expenditures:2015,2016,2017
(Turkish Lira)

Income/Expenditure Years	2015	2016	2017
EXPENDITURES	482.638.242,09	622.808.974,20	798.161.236,66
A. General Expenditures	30.839.960,14	34.969.938,53	124.578.312,10
B. Personal Expenditures	22.342.619,18	27.291.211,88	33.913.153,33
C. Total sum of Other expenditures	429.455.662,77	560.547.823,79	639.669.771,23
1- Health	0,00	0,00	0,00
2- Social Services	63.019.951,75	151.392.144,04	165.764.750,07
3- Charity works and Voluntary Activities	243.611.237,40	259.221.386,53	278.303.302,04
4- Education and Research	72.829.114,94	91.069.213,01	123.267.089,38
5- Culture, Art and Sport	16.767.198,32	17.170.791,43	25.891.004,69
6- Others	33.228.160,36	41.694.288,78	46.461.625,05

⁶⁴⁵ To see more about, <https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Detay/11843/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-tdvye-kurban-bagisinda-bulundu> (accessed 11.08.2018).

Table 4 (Continued)

INCOMES	632.080.029,34	791.594.882,21	914.203.123,97
A- Membership Fee	0,00	0,00	0,00
B- Foreign Assistance	0,00	0,00	0,00
C- Income from Public Institutions	0.00	0,00	0,00
D- Donations and Grants	517.334.494,09	669.256.150,40	777.979.811,60
E- Commercial Enterprise Income	6.084.728,14	4.326.627,24	5.593.840,52
F- Financial Income	23.780.294,32	22.810.200,37	28.872.293,35
G- Others	84.880.510,79	95.201.904,20	101.751.178,50
Total Income/ Expenditure Differences	(+)149.441.787,25	(+)168.785.908,00	(+)116.041.887,31

Sources: Compiled from Diyanet Foundation' official web page

5.2.2.2. İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı-IHH- (The Foundation for Human Rights, Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief)

The establishment of IHH goes back to the 1990s. A group of volunteers initiated humanitarian relief work as a reaction to the Bosnian War, which broke out in 1992. This initiative eventually led to the establishment of an official organisation in 1995. In due course, IHH expanded its scope of work and geography, stretching from Turkey to five continents in 135 countries.⁶⁴⁶ Giving priority to humanitarian relief operations in war-zones, natural disasters and poverty-stricken countries, IHH today has become one of the most influential NGOs in Turkey, addressing a wide

⁶⁴⁶ Official web page of IHH, about us, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/about-us> (accessed 09.08.2018).

range of field operations from social welfare, education, healthcare to human rights (advocacy).

The overarching mission of IHH is to let the good will rule everywhere.⁶⁴⁷ Its vision encompasses a wider perspective, stating that “to eliminate the negative effects of wars and natural disasters and to create the circumstances that will allow individuals and communities to sustain self-dependence.”⁶⁴⁸ Harmonising from mission and vision, IHH defines nine work ethics, ranging from being a transparent and just to being an effective humanitarian actor.

In parallel to its global vision and mission, IHH plays an active role in various platforms. For instance, it obtained a consultant statue and membership in the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); Organization of Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Funds (OICHF) councillorship; the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World (IDSP) membership; Humanitarian Forum (THF) membership; and International Council of Voluntary Agencies. Upon IHH’s application, the Foundation has been granted “tax-free status” through the cabinet decision no. 2011/1799 dated 04.04.2011 according to Article 20 in Law No.4962 on 08.05.2009.⁶⁴⁹ It also acquired public interest statue by a Council of Ministers in 2005,⁶⁵⁰ and had legal status to collect charitable donations without permission in 2013.⁶⁵¹ Thanks to its activities, the Turkish Grand National Assembly awarded IHH with an “excellence service award in 2007.”

⁶⁴⁷ Official web page of IHH, about us, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/about-us> (accessed 09.08.2018).

⁶⁴⁸ Official web page of IHH, about us, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/about-us> (accessed 09.08.2018).

⁶⁴⁹ Official web page of IHH, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/tax-allowance> (accessed 10.08.2018).

⁶⁵⁰ Çelik and İşeri, op. cit., p.435.

⁶⁵¹ Official web page, Ministry of Interior, Department of Association, <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/en/home-links/Legal-Personalities-having.aspx> (accessed 07.07.2018).

IHH's administrative structure consists of four main committees: board of trustees, supervisory board, executive board and a higher committee of advisors, so it has no mandate from the state on its administrative structure. Having an independent financial budget based on all kinds of real estate, cash and in-kind of donations, shares of local and international firms, coupons and valuable documents, IHH's significant portion of revenue comes from public donations, religious practices in particular (during Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr) preserve an essential place in the total income of IHH. Its revenue in 2017 was realised as 563.923.714,77 TL.⁶⁵²

As one looks at IHH's scope of work, seven prominent sectoral variations are seen. These are humanitarian relief, emergency aid, search and rescue assistance, human rights, humanitarian diplomacy, volunteer works and raising awareness. Among them, humanitarian relief and emergency aid are the most visible one, where IHH aims to be a role model. The purpose of this activity is to provide basic human needs to the needy who suffer from conflicts, internal wars or natural disasters in the form of shelter, food, healthcare. While aiding to the victims, IHH also priorities specific kinds of aid (such as permanent facilities) to help the regions become self-dependent. Here is the crucial line in which IHH do not distinguish between emergency aid and development aid. Despite emphasising that two concepts are used in different ways, in practice they categories certain long-term activities within humanitarian aid. For instance, educational activities are set in humanitarian relief category.⁶⁵³ In this category, building or renovating schools, institutions, madrasas; and providing professional training programme in the crisis regions are underlined. Interestingly, IHH is also sensitive on cultural activities, in particular towards the area where local communities face intense missionary activities. To increase local consciousness and to preserve cultural structure in Muslim-dominated areas, IHH organises cultural activities in terms of providing visual and textual materials, setting up worship facilities, translation of scholarly works and setting up media

⁶⁵² IHH's Budget Chart, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/income-expense> (accessed 10.08.2018).

⁶⁵³ Official web page of IHH, Humanitarian Relief <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/humanitarian-relief> (accessed 10.03.2019).

outlets.⁶⁵⁴ These types of activities verify that IHH is a faith-based organisation, but considering other forms of activities, IHH can be set in moderate FBOs.

The other factor that makes IHH exceptional compared to other NGOs selected for this study is its human rights activities in which Turkish aid NGOs do not give much weight to human rights. Probably this is because human right issues often contradict with the political agenda of respective state. IHH's human rights activities basically aim to bring about violations of victims' rights to the light. Starting from a moral standpoint, IHH's efforts are actualised through preparing reports on human rights violations. They disseminate their reports globally and seek to mobilise the international judicial bodies. "Stop the persecution in Egypt", "Closing Concentration Camp" and "Saving Syrian Women" are some of the human rights activities that IHH conducted.⁶⁵⁵

The other area where IHH pays special attention is "Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD)". IHH has created a unit within the organization and has recruited experts to promote this concept in Turkey and beyond. According to Dr. Ahmet Emin Dağ-senior expert in the Humanitarian and Social Research Center (İNSAMER)-IHH is the only Turkish NGOs dealing with the HD practice and interprets this concept broader than other actors.⁶⁵⁶ Based on three pillars, he defines IHH's humanitarian diplomacy as: saving the lives of civilians in turmoil regions; rescuing of prisoners through peaceful means; and engaging crises regions actively where traditional diplomacy is not sufficient in solving questions.⁶⁵⁷ For instance, IHH's approach to Moro Peace Talks in Philippines and Rescuing prisoners in Syria are two prominent

⁶⁵⁴ Official web page of IHH, Humanitarian Relief <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/humanitarian-relief> (accessed 10.03.2019).

⁶⁵⁵ Human Rights Activities of IHH, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/haber/insanhaklari> (10.03.2019).

⁶⁵⁶ Ahmet Dağ, "Moro Peace Monitoring Mission: A Humanitarian Diplomacy Experience", *İnsamer Analiz* (13, 2016), p. 2.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., p.3.

HP efforts of IHH. Since the next chapter analyses IHH's humanitarian diplomacy initiative, this part does not delve into deeper.

Search and Rescue activities consist of practical and project level of actions in response to natural disasters. Under this unit, IHH has established emergency search and rescue teams which set off from Turkey across the world. Recruiting professional trainers who instruct IHH members (so far 850 members are trained) under the surveillance of expert on underwater, in fire and under debris. Therefore, IHH often cooperate with related departments including, AFAD and Search and Rescue Association (AKUT).

Finally, volunteer works and raising awareness activities are two area where IHH focuses on specifically. The former unit run activities in various states in the form of healthcare service, education, fundraising and etc. The latter efforts are run through projects to gain world attention on social injustice, inequality, equal distribution, and human-being's responsibility. Despite of the former's ground implications which might be set in humanitarian and emergency aid category, the latter efforts are maintained thorough visual and oral media and much inclusive objective of IHH.

In addition to these seven various scopes of works, there are five agendas which remain the most prominent topic that IHH attach. Cataract operation, Syria, Orphan, Water wells, Palestine/Gaza, and Mavi Marmara. Each of these agenda represents main items on IHH's agenda. These agendas often converge or diverge from the state's humanitarian aid activities on the ground. Cataract operation is common activity in which IHH dominated this issue by setting agenda of the state and become model for the other NGOs. Citing example, launched in 2007 with the nation-wide acknowledged campaigning "100 Thousand Cataract Surgeries in Africa", the project reached the successes in 2017, becoming a global event as well.⁶⁵⁸ The other agenda issues are also noteworthy issues that played a major role in becoming vital actor of IHH both in domestic and foreign circle.

⁶⁵⁸ IHH web page, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/cataract> (accessed 22.04.2019).

There are certain issues and regions where IHH particularly attaches importance. While IHH plays an active role in the eastern coast of Africa, the Cansuyu Association actively operates in the western coast of Africa. By the same token, a strong influence of IHH is clearly seen on the Palestine issue and in the Syrian case, in which IHH has played the role of mediator between opposition groups and the Syrian regime in releasing civilian captives. Some of its actions have turned into a global-scale affair, as seen in the case of the Mavi Marmara issue, which directly affected Turkey- Israel diplomatic relations. Therefore, IHH's leading role on certain issues and in certain fields of activity cannot be ignored.

The Mavi Marmara affair needs a further scrutiny since it provided IHH with worldwide recognition and instigated the most strenuous phase in Turkey-Israel relations.⁶⁵⁹ In 2010, IHH co-organised a humanitarian aid flotilla to breach the blockage of Gaza on 31 May 2010. It resulted a harsh attempt by Israeli commandos, killing 10 Turkish activities on board in international waters. The event broke down Turkey-Israel relations in the form of the suspension of the diplomatic ties and military agreements, while it did not endangered Turkey's commercial ties with Israel. IHH-led humanitarian aid campaigning resulted such a consequence, where two parties come close to war. Erdoğan stated that the Mavi Marmara attack could be “grounds for war” and often accused Israel of being a “terrorist state”.⁶⁶⁰ Until the diplomatic relations restored based on a reconciliation deal signed on June 28, 2016, bilateral relations were tumultuous. In response to harsh criticism on this deal, Erdoğan remarked that “did you ask the prime minister of the day to take such action (Mavi Marmara).”⁶⁶¹ This is interpreted as indirect criticism to IHH's unilateral action's influence on bilateral relations.

⁶⁵⁹ Mensur Akgün and et al., “Politics in Troubled Times: Israel-Turkey Relations”, *TESEV, Foreign Policy Programme Report*, 2014, p.6. http://teseiv.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Politics_In_Troubled_Times_Israel_Turkey_Relations.pdf

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

⁶⁶¹ “Erdoğan'dan İHH'ya: Gazze'ye yardımı bana mı sordunuz?”, BBC New Turkish, 30 June 2016 (accessed 24.05.2019).

Finally, situations in which IHH was the first FBO to take action, in respect to a specific issue, should be underlined.⁶⁶² IHH was the leading NGO that broke the siege in Sarajevo to deliver aid during the Bosnian War. It is one of the first relief organizations to enter Gaza, following the fall of the wall on the Egypt-Gaza border. It is the first FBO to have delivered humanitarian aid to Kosovo and the Chechen people. In 2006, IHH initiated its "*Africa Emergency Aid Campaign*" and once more was the first Turkish FBO to launch a nationwide campaign to Africa and establish a healthcare campaign in Africa with its "Cataract Project". IHH became one of the most effective Turkish-based NGOs operating in Syria, which help to facilitate the release of over two thousand captives and prisoners in 2013. It is still a very influential actor on the ground within Syrian territory.

Table 5 Statement of IHH's Incomes and Expenditures: 2016,2017,2018 (Turkish Lira)

Income/Expenditure Years	2016	2017	2018
OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURES (-)	469.736.224,13	576.976.412,58	586.662.606,35
A. Educational Expenditures	18.537.077,33	32.725.768,22	30.713.005,39
B. Health Expenditures	18.191.712,36	26.326.068,05	29.856.076,93
C. Social Expenditures	358.050.956,40	413.908.976,09	378.839.794,43
D. Cultural Expenditures	4.741.876,78	5.141.144,04	11.087.722,64
E. Operational Expenditures	49.710.897,06	73.423.031,05	105.583.606,27
F. Other Expenditures	3.066.752,40	4.017.302,52	8.572.548,59
1- Foreign Exchange Losses	2.820.582,80	3.984.779,77	8.246.767,65
2- Other Extraordinary Expenses and Losses	246.169,40	32.522,75	325.780,94

⁶⁶² The full list can be reached via, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/en/history> (accessed 11.08.2018).

Table 5 (Continued)

G. General Administrative Expenses	17.436.952,00	21.434.152,61	22.009.852,10
OTHER OPERATIONAL INCOMES (+)	535.159.763,87	563.923.714,77	653.047.042,90
H- Rental Incomes	618.740,00	662.085,00	949.369,00
İ- Other Incomes	4.054.267,50	2.273.951,01	15.485.029,56
1- Legal Allowances	1.231.277,36	1.494.873,97	2.582.021,42
2- Other Extraordinary Incomes and Profits	2.822.990,14	779.077,04	12.903.008,14
J- Accretion Incomes	5.516.303,15	4.072.969,06	13.505.066,19
K- Foreign Exchange Incomes	2.003.281,72	3.196.428,18	2.484.006,89
L- Donation Incomes	522.967.171,50	553.718.281,52	620.623.571,26
1- Voluntary Donations	400.986.331,67	435.271.613,46	517.391.665,12
2- Conditional Cash Grants	9.552.917,71	5.115,00	15.129.543,48
3- In-kind Donations	112.427.922,12	118.441.553,06	88.102.362,66
Total Income/ Expenditure Differences	535.159.763,87	-13.052.697,81	66.384.436,55

Sources: Compiled from IHH's official web page.

5.2.2.3. Deniz Feneri Association

The story of Deniz Feneri Association started with a TV program organised by a group of volunteers called "City and Ramadan" in 1996. This initiative later turned into an organisational identity and became an association called Deniz Feneri in 1998 in Istanbul.⁶⁶³ Based on "until reaching the last person in need of assistance

⁶⁶³ Official web page of Deniz Feneri Derneği, About Institutional Data, https://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/kurumsal/hakkimizda_43/ (accessed 12.08.2018).

on the earth" principle, Deniz Feneri provides a comprehensive service and aid to recipients in the form of a food-in kind, clothes, shelter, education, rehabilitation, health and money in kind.

Having held the ISO 9001 Quality Certificate since 2002, the association has been conducting specific a system namely the Aid Organization System (Yardım Organizasyon Programı). This system aims to track the whole process of any single donation from receipt to handing it to the recipient. Thanks to this effort, Deniz Feneri was granted outstanding service award by Turkish Grand National Assembly in 2007. The Association has also acquired public interest status from the Council of Ministers in 2004 and was given rights to collect donation without permission.⁶⁶⁴

Its administrative structure consists of two forms: permanent members and temporary members, who are chosen by committee members.⁶⁶⁵ Its revenue is based on a membership fee; the activities organised by the association (such as charity bazaars, festivals, publications, concerts, agenda/calendar selling); association's real-estate income; donations and gifts provided by civil society and money-in kind financial support.⁶⁶⁶

Deniz Feneri positions itself as a "Leader in Social Responsibility." To do this, over 22 years, more than 1 million recipients in nearly 65 countries and more than 4 million citizens in Turkey have benefited from its aid activities. However, its foreign aid trend does not continue in a consistent way. For instance, though the Association was placed as second most generous NGOs in 2005 and first in 2006, it then decreased to fifth in 2008 and sixth in 2009. From that time onward, its

⁶⁶⁴ Official Web Page of Deniz Feneri, About us, <https://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/kurumsal/> (accessed 08.3.2019).

⁶⁶⁵ Administrative Chart, https://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/kurumsal/yonetim-kurulu_44/ (accessed 12.08.2018).

⁶⁶⁶ About Income sources https://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/kurumsal/deniz-feneri-dernegi-tuzugu_48/ (accessed 12.08.2018).

visibility and effectiveness on foreign aid has been decreasing.⁶⁶⁷ The investigation of e.V. Deniz Feneri in Germany was a primary reason for the fall in its income. Although the Association does not have such visibility and outreach on the humanitarian field, it still remains as a non-negligible foreign aid actor, thanks to having an extensive outreach network both in Turkey and abroad, in 65 countries from Central Asian to Africa.⁶⁶⁸

The range of aid activities of Deniz Feneri is quite extensive, from money-in-kind to permanent constructions. It is being categorised within various heading. To catch the current picture, Deniz Feneri's aid activities in 2018 is scrutinised. Throughout this year, 1,100,000 pieces of clothing has been given to 125,000 people which costed a total of 31.500,000 TL aid. Regarding cleaning and health aid, 8,800 cleaning packaging were given where a total of TL 2.200,000 was distributed. The other aid types is about sheltering and proving material for constructions. 10,000 pieces of goods, repair, construction equipment was given to 32,200 people, ranked 4.810.000 TL. For food aid, 80.000 food-package have been distributed to 520.000 needy which totalled 17.820,000 TL. As of 2018, total aid was 83.600,000 TL, increasing nearly %15 than the previous years that was 71.470,200 TL in 2017.⁶⁶⁹

Humanitarian aid activities of Deniz Feneri is also noteworthy. The most visible destination over the last eight years is Syria. Alone 2018, Deniz Feneri provided 20.000.000 aid-in-kind. Besides, Ramadan and Qurban activities often took place in various parts of the Syria. Under the name of "Urgent accommodation to Rohingya Civilians", Deniz Feneri initiated a nation-wide campaigning in 2016.

⁶⁶⁷ The most pressing development which negatively affected Deniz Feneri's reliability, happened in 2007. Known as "The Issue of Deniz Feneri", the case started with an operation by German police, alleging to mis-use, or using out of its real mission, of collected donations. Since that time, Deniz Feneri's total revenues sharply reduced as many people reframed from supporting them.

⁶⁶⁸Official Web Page of Deniz Feneri, Faaliyetler: <https://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/faaliyetler/>(accessed 08.3.2019).

⁶⁶⁹Deniz Feneri Activity Report, https://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/pdf/2018-yili-faaliyet-bulteni_26.pdf

Within a year, 1000 houses have been established in May 2017 and following year (2018) 600 houses were constructed for civilians in Myanmar. Moreover, civilians affected from Yemen war benefited from aid. Together with Indonesia (effected from earthquake), 200.000 TL aid was distributed. In Ethiopia, food aid, water wells, mosques, schools are some other aid activities that Deniz Feneri conducted. Several other activities including organising seminar, symposium, scientific conference, goodness competitions are some of them. Deniz Feneri is working in 65 countries, in particular taking a leading role in francophone regions in Sub-Sharan Africa.

Table 6 Deniz Feneri' Incomes and Expenditures: 2016-2017 (Turkish Lira)

INCOME	2016	2017
A. Membership Fee	1.450,00	1.350,00
B. Foreign Income	229.329,00	215.392,38
C. Public Institutions Income	276.656,00	0
D. Donation Income	27.715.394,75	40.288.057,44
E. Financial Income	204.235,79	229.044,06
F. Other Income	9.564.251,89	13.338.985,55
Total Income	37.991.317,43	56.018.993,68
EXPENDITURE		
General Expense	665.023,79	776.590,36
A. Personal Expense	4.444.380,27	5.992.362,52
B. Total Service Expense	32.830.050,43	49.222.282,52
C. c.1. Culture, and Sport	0	0

Table 6 (Continued)

c.2. Education and Research	49.816,48	48.691,48
c.3. Health	65.724,58	66.124,58
c.4. Judicial	0	0
c.5 International Activities	9.654.285,91	13.734.340,64
c.6. Other	5.580.524,40	35.373.125,82
Other Expenses	2.431,81	27.758,28
D. Total Expenses	37.991.317,43	56.018.993,68

Sources: Compiled from Deniz Feneri official web page.

5.2.2.4. Yeryüzü Doktorları Association

A group of healthcare workers launched a voluntary action during the 17th August 1999 earthquake in Turkey which later turned into an official platform and Yeryüzü Doktorları Association was founded in 2000 in London, due to a restriction on NGOs overseas flow in Turkey. In the 1990s, there were strict measures and processes if a Turkish NGO wished to send aid abroad. Therefore, to avoid this bureaucratic burden, Yeryüzü Doktorları based itself outside Turkey. To become a pioneering NGO in health care, the Association has initiated aid activities with the mission of "supplying sufficient support to those who are unable to access basic health care."⁶⁷⁰

Based on voluntary principles, its members are often doctoring or medical staff. Income sources range from donations to campaigning. For instance, the prominent campaigns are “almsgiving that heals the world”; “open your eyes”; “life or death issue”; “life is meaningful as one save a life”, “qurban that brings health”; “water

⁶⁷⁰ Mission and Vision, <https://www.yyd.org.tr/misyonvizyonilkelere/> (accessed 15.08.2018).

means life for needy” etc.⁶⁷¹ The total income of the Association totalled as 23.279.08,76 (TL) in 2016, and 31.136.797,28 (TL) in 2017.⁶⁷²

Contrary to its initial activities which were short-term projects such as surgery operations, it's contemporary projects cover long-term activities, including hospital building, clinics and training local doctors. They have established: 3 food health centres in Somalia (2011); Şifa Hospital (2012); the mother, child and nutrition health centre in Niger (2012); training centre in Lebanon's Wadi Khaled district (2012); blood bank in Lebanon (2013); micro-surgical unit in Gaza (2013); midwives and nursing schools (2014); the primary health care clinic in Bangui, Central African Republic (2014); Hewa Bora Hospital in Congo DC (2015); the FTR Laboratory of Gaza Islamic University (2015); a refugee camp clinic in the Sido region of Chad (2015); medical faculty in the Uganda Islamic University (2015).⁶⁷³

The association pursue human-oriented aid activities due to their *raison d'être* which is to save human live. To increase globe-scale visibility of the association, it signed the Code of Conduct for NGOs in Disaster Relief initiated by International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. They are also partner of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and actively engaging joint training activities with the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination, the office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. In addition to this, the Association often attach to health activities of World Health Organisation, the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Not only Yeryüzü Doktorları works with international actors, but also national actors including AFAD, TİKA, Kızılay, within Turkey and beyond in more than 50 countries.

⁶⁷¹ Faaliyet ve Kampanyalar, <https://www.yyd.org.tr/faaliyetler/kampanyalar/> (accessed 15.08.2018).

⁶⁷² Financial Source of Income, <https://www.yyd.org.tr/kaynak-kullanimi/> (accessed 15.08.2018).

⁶⁷³ History of Actions, <https://www.yyd.org.tr/tarihce/> (accessed 15.08.2018).

Its overseas aid activities are framed within nine groups: Remedial projects; Disaster-Emergency projects; Nutrition Health projects, Mother, Child Health projects; Preventive Healthcare projects; Education project; Psychosocial Health Projects; Consumption and Hygiene Material Aid Project; and Equipment and System Support Projects.⁶⁷⁴ In remedial projects, the associations conduct surgical activities (e.g. cataract surgery), obstetric fistula surgery and cleft lip surgery. In disaster-emergency project, the Associations burst upon the area where natural and human-made crises emerge. The most visible emergency actions conducted by the Associations are Aceh Earthquake and Tsunami in 2004, Yogyakarta Earthquake in 2006, Philippines Typhoon in 2013, Pakistan Flood in 2015, Niger, Syria, Palestine, and Yemen. Health responses in these crises' regions attract the attention of global NGOs working in health field. Compared to its equivalent NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders (1971), Catholic Relief Services (1943), International Medical Corps (1984), Yeryüzü Doktorları (2000) is a new actor stepped in the stage.

Yeryüzü Doktorları pursues non-political humanitarian aid policy with less of a faith-based outlook. Because, health issues are an essential requirement for all, so approaching cases from a humanitarian perspective, not selecting on people's religious background, is an important principle of this association. In that sense, the Association represents less FBOs compared to others⁶⁷⁵ even though it often encompasses volunteers who are sensitive to the requirements of their faith. The source of income also depends on several religious rituals. Besides, there are clear interactive relations between the government and the Association at the policy and project level. For instance, former Head of the Yeryüzü Doktorları, Dr Cemalettin Kani Torun became the first ambassador once Turkey reopened its embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia in 2011. He was then, in 2014, appointed as a chief advisor to the prime minister responsible for humanitarian and foreign aid policy of Turkey.

⁶⁷⁴ Yeryüzü Doktorları Activity Report (2017), p.14 <https://www.yyd.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/yyd-faliyet-raporu-2017-web.pdf>

⁶⁷⁵ For instance, one of the senior representatives of the Association has reframed from being classified as FBOs during the interview on 18.09.2018.

Following his tenure, one year later, he ran as a candidate for the AK party in the June 2015 election. A similar case, current Head of AFAD Dr. Mehmet Güllüoğlu was former President of the Yeryüzü Doktorları. The flow of interactions between the Association and the state demonstrates the proximity between it and the government.

Table 7 Yeryüzü Doktorları Incomes and Expenditures:2016-2017(Turkish Lira)

INCOMES	2016	2017
A. Individual Donation	11.079.700,84	14.692.792,79
B. Income from Institutions	8.578.909,56	680.495,90
C. Fund and Grant	0,00	11.892.029,38
D. In-kind Donation	3.768.689,50	3.023.153,58
E. Others	301.783,86	848.335,63
Total	23.279.08,76	31.136.797,28
EXPENDITURES		
A- Administrative Expenses	463.224,75	818.315,98
B- Projects and Programs		
B-1. Project and Resource Development	1.047.291,47	1.627.893,41
B-2. Operation Management	25.787.810,97	23.590.458,97

Sources: Compiled from Yeryüzü Doktorları Activity Reports

5.2.2.5. Cansuyu Aid and Solidarity Association

Cansuyu Association was founded on August 31, 2005. Immediately after its establishment, the Association sent foreign aid to Pakistan, where a severe earthquake had struck just a week before the establishment of the Association. Since then, the Association has been carrying out aid activities in disaster areas, war-zones and famine regions. The association is active in 85 countries ranging from

Africa to Asia, from the Middle East to Balkans, Cansuyu mainly focuses on two areas: African continent in which Mali, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Burkina Faso benefit the most, and the Middle East where Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Pakistan benefit.⁶⁷⁶ The establishment purpose of Cansuyu is to project oppressed and victims. It's motto is to "Cansuyu take you to the real needy."

The overall aid assistance of Cansuyu is framed under six main headings: Orphan Projects, Qurban Activities; Ramadan activities; Food Bank activities; Water wells activities and Constructing Mosques projects. Each activity has of its own budget, system and implementation procedure. For instance, the primary purpose of the orphan activities is to make financial and moral contributions to the orphans to meet their needs until they are independent enough to maintain themselves.⁶⁷⁷ In Qurban, meat-distribution and financial assistance during Eid al-adha are administered. In this context, in 2017 alone, 30,000 animals were sacrificed in 25 different countries and nearly 1.5 million people benefited from this activity.⁶⁷⁸

Water well project is another essential field activity of Cansuyu Association in which it materialised 1600 water well projects over a decade.⁶⁷⁹ Finally, the Food Bank Project represents another pillar of its aid activities. Based on "a man is not a believer who fills his stomach while his neighbour is hungry" principle,⁶⁸⁰ this project aims to ensure robust and sustainable campaigning to tackle famine and malnutrition. This aid activity runs each year, especially during the holy month of

⁶⁷⁶ Official web page, Faaliyetler, <http://cansuyu.org.tr/tr/icerik/1795/10/faaliyetler> (accessed 13.08.2018).

⁶⁷⁷ Yetimlere Sahip Çıkıyoruz, <http://cansuyu.org.tr/tr/icerik/1703/13/yetimlere-sahip-cikiyoruz> (accessed 13.08.2018).

⁶⁷⁸ Official web page, <http://kurban.cansuyu.org.tr/> (accessed 13.08.2018).

⁶⁷⁹ Interview with Head of Cansuyu, Mustafa Köylü, <http://cansuyu.org.tr/tr/news/1570/hayata-cansuyu> (accessed 14.08.2018).

⁶⁸⁰ Hadith of Prophet Mohammed, cited in Ibn Abbas, al-Sunan al-Kubrá 19049

Ramadan in the form of food-parcels,⁶⁸¹ together with and fast-breaking meal (iftar) programme.

Though Cansuyu's ideological proximity is less supportive of the AK party, due to its close affiliation with the traditional wing of the Islamist movement lead by Necmettin Erbakan (known as Refah Yol), but responding to humanitarian aid cases, both actors work closely. Regarding humanitarian aid, there is little difference between them, and common points are much prevailing. As such, pursuing a strong Muslim identity, which shapes its approach in their work, financed by religious sources of income, Cansuyu empowers its visibility and sources by addressing Turkish-origin citizens living in Europe as well.

5.2.2.6. Dost Eli Konya Food Bank Aid and Solidarity Association

The Dost Eli association was established in 1996 in Konya. Based on voluntary contributions, this movement later expanded its vision and members by obtaining an official statue. In 2001, the Association started systematic work within civil society structure under the name of Dost Eli Association.

Dost Eli carries out a mission, based on “a fair policy, equal system, fair work, transparent sources to sustain happiness and tranquillity for recipients”.⁶⁸² Though the Association has launched by a group of people in centre of Anatolia in response to emergency crises in Konya, its structure represent moderate form of faith-based organisation. Because, the sources of income are based on Islamic practices and the people who are affiliated to this Association tend to pursue Islamic sensibility, it's activities in the field are more human-centred and the establishment mission of the Association is based on an honest and fair donation. The mission is defined as “our supreme goal is to ensure the happiness and peace of mind, with an honest aid

⁶⁸¹ Gıda Bankacılığı Yapıyoruz, <http://cansuyu.org.tr/tr/icerik/985/33/gida-bankaciligi-yapiyoruz> (accessed 14.08.2018).

⁶⁸² Misyonumuz, http://dosteli.org.tr/kurumsal-Misyonumuz_110 (accessed 14.08.2018).

system, with a fair system, with a neutral work, with a transparent view, to those who seek help, to donors, to volunteers and to employees.”⁶⁸³

In line with this mission, it pursues a vision, structured on using contemporary technology in tackling famine and poverty to alleviate the material and spiritual necessity to those who are in need of urgent help.⁶⁸⁴ Despite its initial aid scope on food-in kind, in due years, it included emergency aid, educational activities, health and training programmes. However, the association has particularly undertaken a pioneering role in goat distribution to self-sustainability and Food Banking System, which was first launched by Dost Eli Association in 2004, then inspired other FBOs who set-up similar projects.⁶⁸⁵

According to TİKA Development Reports, Dost Eli Association has achieved great success in the period from 2008 to 2012 on foreign aid. While it was placed as 6th most generous NGO in 2008, within four years, it ranked as second most generous NGO in 2012. Between 2005 to 2016 period, Dost Eli Association had its most fruitful year in 2012 with \$16.28 million in foreign aid. From that time onward, its aid activities reduced compared to other FBOs in terms of total humanitarian aid portion. This endeavouring performance has brought a statue, known as "public interest statue" given by the Council of Ministers on 30.04.2014, issue 2014/6343.⁶⁸⁶

The association has categorised aid activities based on two scope: Domestic and Overseas aid flows. The former aid activities are quite extensive, based on ten heading: rural aid, food aid, clothe aid, quest-house, education, emergency aid,

⁶⁸³ Dost Eli Derneği Misyonumuz, https://dosteli.org.tr/kurumsal-Misyonumuz_110 (accessed 23.08.2018).

⁶⁸⁴ Vizyonumuz, http://dosteli.org.tr/kurumsal-Vizyonumuz_111

⁶⁸⁵ Official Web page of Dost Eli Association, about us, http://dosteli.org.tr/kurumsal-Hakkimizda_109 (accessed 16.08.2018).

⁶⁸⁶ Statue of Association, http://dosteli.org.tr/kurumsal-Kamu-Yararına-Calisan-Dernek-Statüsü_112 accessed 16.08.2018).

marriage aid, refugee aids, new born baby aid, be with me at the school aids, mother care aids, 1000 library to 1000 schools. The latter aid activities are based four headings: Water well activities, goat-distribution, education and orphan facilities.⁶⁸⁷ Water wells are urgent human needs in drought region of the world. In particular Africa face severe drought, occasionally caused thousands of the civilians in Africa. Therefore, Dost Eli maintains active water well projects in Niger, Chad, Tanzania and Burkina Faso. Even, the Association's first oversea activities took place in Niger in the form of opening water well. Interestingly fact that Niger represents a special place in the activities of this Associations. Even, other aid actors apply this association if they want to run aid activities in Niger, since Dost Eli has been engaging in all part of the Chad since 2005. Distribution of goats in vulnerable area is another field activity of this associations. This animal is intentionally chosen since they can adjust African climate, can provide milks and fertility is better than other animals. Therefore, the Dost Eli provides goat to the needy to sustain their own lives without depending on external aid. For instance, the price of a goat project is 80 \$. The education and orphan aid activities take place in refugee camps and post-war areas. Orphan houses are built to the children who lose their parents in the regions of hunger, poverty and disease prevails.

In short, Dost Eli Association has been working for nearly two decades. Over this time, the particular methods of Dost Eli, namely Food Banks and Animal distributions, gained credence for its visibility in the NGO circle. Under this approach, aid referred to the change from a traditional giving to concentrating on self-sufficiency and professionalism in the field of humanitarian assistance. In this respect, Dost Eli's competence in food in-kind humanitarian aid and animal distributions represent a central locus of its relationship with the state in the field of humanitarian assistance. The Association active in 42 countries ranging from Chad, Afganisatan, Mogalistan, Kosova and Georgia.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁷ Dost Eli Official Web page, activities, <https://dosteli.org.tr/hizmetlerimiz> (accessed 27.12.2018).

⁶⁸⁸ Countries in which Dost Eli do activities, <https://dosteli.org.tr/ulkeler> (07.12.2018).

5.2.2.7. Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî Foundation

Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî Foundation was established in 1985, and officially registered on 4th January 1986 in Istanbul.⁶⁸⁹ Its name comes from a prominent religious figure in Islamic civilisation. Mahmud Hüdâyî was one of the religious teachers who is a descendant of Junayd Baghdadi, and therefore a Sayyidd, that is a descendant of Prophet Muhammad. He was born in the town of Koçhisar near Ankara, in 1541. Concentrating its effort on relief issues, the Association has been dedicated to the memory of his legacy.

Hüdâyî Foundation pursues humanitarian activities based on Hüdâyî's principles and methods. Its human-oriented implications are often harmonised with religious motivation. Its vision is also defined within those principles, stating that: to introduce Islamic culture, civilisation and values for people in Turkey and abroad; and to become a model foundation for other FBOs through its method, policy and institutional structure. In parallel with vision, the Foundation defines its mission as; to breed a generation who embrace Islamic ethics and values, having a social responsibility, qualified education, committing Islamic values; and providing solidarity and ummah consciousness amongst Muslims through becoming a getaway to their spiritual demand.⁶⁹⁰

Seen that, the Foundation tends to focus on the material and spiritual dimension of the recipients. In addition to educational activities, the Foundation performs several other projects, such as soup kitchen activities; the distribution of food; goods assistance; qurban activities; health projects; women's cultural activities; Qur'an schools and emergency aid activities.⁶⁹¹ All these activities represent important support for its domestic and foreign fields.

⁶⁸⁹ Hakkımızda, <http://hudayivakfi.org/hakkimizda.html> (17.08.2018).

⁶⁹⁰ Vizyonumuz ve Misyonumuz, <http://hudayivakfi.org/vizyonumuz-misyon-ve-degerlerimiz.html> (17.08.2018).

⁶⁹¹ İnsani Yardım Hizmetleri, <http://hudayivakfi.org/kategori/faaliyetlerimiz/insani-yardim-hizmetlerimiz> (17.08.2018).

On the other hand, the foundation has a special unit on the emergency issue, abbreviated as HAY (Hüdâyî Acil Yardım, Urgent Aid), established in 1999, following the Izmit-Adapazari Earthquake. It aims to ensure emergency aid in the aftermath of earthquakes and similar catastrophes. This unit is equipped with advanced supplies and members trained in responding to crises both in Turkey and abroad. For instance, following the tsunami catastrophe in Aceh (Indonesia) and the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza and Syria, emergency unit maintained an essential role on the ground.⁶⁹²

Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî Foundation has been performing humanitarian aid activities for nearly three decades. However, during this process, it has particularly maintained domestic aid activities, whereas its foreign aid contributions is comparatively newer. For instance, according to TİKA Development Reports, Hüdâyî Foundation first placed its name on the list of "the most generous NGO" category in 2013, where it ranked 8th. One year later, it moved up to 5th most generous NGO.

Its aid activities are categorised under five rubrics: humanitarian relief, qurban, education, publications, and social and cultural activities. Each category is also sub-categorised. Under the humanitarian relief activities, several other activities are organised including emergency aid, orphan care, constructing mosques, water wells, food in Ramadan, food banking, relief aid in cash, meal centers. Hüdayi emergency aid contains medical support, shelter, food, and cleaning materials towards needy. Among all these foreign activities, Hüdayi pay great attention on educational activities. As will be in the next part (interviews), the Foundation supports educational activities since 1992 in cooperation with sister organisations. In this context, they run schools in more than 30 countries including in Africa, Balkans, Caucasia and Central Asia. Moreover, in collaborating with 200

⁶⁹² Hüdayi Acil Yardım Ünitesi , <http://hudayivakfi.org/hudayi-acil-yardim-unitesi-hay.html> (accessed 17.12.2018).

institutions both in Turkey and abroad, the Foundations offers free education, accommodation, and material equipment to meet student's needs.⁶⁹³

The Foundation has a profound social network due to affiliation with Erenköy congregations (Erenköy Cemaati). Gathered around Altınoluk Journal, Erenköy group represents one of the widely spread groups in Turkey. This group has its root from the early republican era, but its expansion has been noted in the last two decades. Emerging from Nakshibendi (a religious chain of suffi practitioners) sources, this group is well organised within merchants and people in business circles. Having a wide range of social connections increases the Foundation's lucrative sources and influence on civil society. Therefore, the Foundation represents an important faith-group and is a member of *National Will Platform* that has close relationship with the current ruling party of Turkey.

5.2.2.8. Beşir Welfare Association

The association was founded in 2011 to respond to flood disaster, which occurred in Indonesia. Humanitarian crises became a triggering factor in its founding. The other purpose of its establishment was to maintain religious activities (qurban, Ramadan, sadaqa) within a proper Islamic sense of obligations.⁶⁹⁴ Therefore, Beşir Association was set into an official platform, aiming to materialise religious activities with utmost care through their volunteers.

Though, its global outreach is comparatively recent, within a short time, Beşir has opened offices in 81 provinces across Turkey and is now operating in 55 counties around the world. Obtaining public benefit status since 2013, the Association has

⁶⁹³ Hüdâyî Education Aids, <http://hudayivakfi.org/en/education-aids.html> (accessed 19.12.2018).

⁶⁹⁴ Interview with a senior worker of Beşir, 24.09.2018.

a tax-free statute.⁶⁹⁵ It is a member of the National Will Platform (2015) and a member of the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World since 2014.⁶⁹⁶

Beşir Association represents a faith-based NGO typology, because there are religious motivations which directly address the Islamic procedures in their activities. Most importantly, the association is connected to one of the Nakşibendi congregations, founded by Muhammed Raşit Erol and known as Menzil Cemaat, which boasts a large number of adherents in Turkey.⁶⁹⁷ Considering its nexus with congregations, the association can easily reach out to the wider community in its campaigns and activities on humanitarian aid. Beşir facilitates its aid campaigning through the national media, international media and Semerkand TV.

Beşir Association's field activities range from health to food distribution and post-disaster aid. Sending search-and-rescue teams, providing a hot meal in the disaster area, constructing tents, containers, prefabricated structures are prominent humanitarian aid activities. The distinguishing feature that makes the association differ from others is its running of a Personal Assistance System. It is based on a demand-oriented operation, which increases the effectiveness of aid. Natural Disaster Response aid and Search and Rescue Aid are directly related to this thesis content. Since natural disasters are often large-scale incidents, which occur largely or entirely outside of people's control, which can cause property and loss of life, the Besir association response to the disaster areas with search-and-rescue teams by providing hot meal, tent, container, prefabricated structures, clothing, food and medical treatment. In addition to these activities, fuel aid, social and cultural aid,

⁶⁹⁵ <https://www.besir.org.tr/Detay/EN&constitution-besir-constitution-code-of-conduct-1391.html> (accessed 27.09.2018).

⁶⁹⁶ İslam Dünyası STK'ları Birliği (İDSB)(The Union of NGOs of The Islamic World) has completed its foundation process with the Cabinet Decree dated December 31, 2005, under the provisions of the Act No. 3335 regarding the Foundation of the Organizations Having International Characteristic, see official web-page <https://www.idsb.org/>

⁶⁹⁷ <http://www.internethaber.com/menzil-tarikati-naksibendi-seyhi-abdulgazi-erolun-kerameti-ne-foto-galerisi-1805369.htm> (accessed 27.09.2018).

education, food, Ramadan and Qurban activities are some other activities of Beşir directly or indirectly related to humanitarian aid field.

5.2.2.9. Hayrat Humanitarian Aid Association

Founded in 2013 in coordination with Hayrat Foundation, Hayrat Humanitarian Aid Association was granted a public interest status with the cabinet decision of 12.02.2016 and given the right to collect donations without permission with the issue of E.2732 in 2017.⁶⁹⁸ The Association defines its vision as: "responding to all material and spiritual needs of people in the best possible way together with its coordinators, stakeholders, public bodies and institutions both in Turkey and abroad."⁶⁹⁹

Hayrat Association sets its priority on both meeting material and spiritual needs of civilian through activities on educational support, healthcare assistance, sacrificial benefits, Ramadan activities, orphans' protection, and emergency aid.⁷⁰⁰ In pursuing humanitarian aid, Hayrat resolutely announces the word of God, Quran and hadith, by pointing out Islamic civilisation and culture. So, it underlines that Islam is a religion of fraternity and peace, and Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) is the saviour sent not only for Muslims but also for the entire humanity.⁷⁰¹ Its revenue is based on religious form of income including zakat alms, and fitir.

⁶⁹⁸ History of the Association, <https://www.hayratyardim.org/tr/kurumsal/tarihcemiz> (accessed 16.08.2018).

⁶⁹⁹ Mission and Vision of Association, <https://www.hayratyardim.org/tr/kurumsal/vizyonumuz-ve-misyonumuz> (accessed 16.08.2018).

⁷⁰⁰ Projects, <https://www.hayratyardim.org/en/projeler/acilyardim-yakacak-yardim-projeleri> (accessed 16.08.2018).

⁷⁰¹ History of the Association, <https://www.hayratyardim.org/tr/kurumsal/tarihcemiz> (accessed 16.08.2018).

The Association distributes humanitarian aid in various part of the world, and currently operates from 26 coordinating offices where aid activities are organised directly by its adherents. Organising assistance via their volunteers reduces the costs and increases direct assistance on the ground. The Hayrat Association pays special attention to emergency aid to serve long-term goals. This includes three sub-headings: food aid, clothing assistance and fuel aid projects. Although other fields of activity could be classified under humanitarian aid category, such as in Ramadan and Qurban, which run in war-torn and disaster areas, the Association frame this field as a separate category.

In emergency aid, Hayrat supplies sheltering, clothing, foodstuff and cleaning materials, delivering necessities to war and disaster-stricken regions. For instance, 1300 aid trucks to Syria, the distribution of 25.000 kg of flour during the Afghanistan flood disaster, medical and food distribution in Indonesia after the earthquake, are some examples of emergency aid conducted by the Hayrat Association.⁷⁰²

Despite its recent attachment to aid activities, it has achieved a fast record on the field. Sharing a political proximity with the ruling party, including being member of National Will Platform, the Association has an affiliation with the Hayrat Foundation (1974). This Foundation represents one of the biggest religious congregations in Turkey, namely the Said-i Nursi movement. Known as one of the wings of Said-i Nursi Nur Cemaat (congregation), this movement has a world-wide network and addresses thousands of adherents at home and beyond Turkey, from which the Hayrat Association benefits.

5.2.3. Conclusion

In short, there are different degrees of religiosity among selected FBOs but the majority of them fall into the moderate FBO category since they pursue aid

⁷⁰² Emergency Aid, <https://www.hayratyardim.org/tr/projeler/acilyardim> (accessed 16.08.2018)

activities with a humanitarian philosophy. Their methods are often similar to each other, though there are slight differences in implications. For instance, while IHH and Hayrat aim to distribute their aid activities in co-operation with their affiliated-organisations in recipient countries, Diyanet and Cansuyu ect. engage in aid activities through collaborating with local partners. Moreover, they apply diverse tactics. What is common is that all selected FBOs apply the same fundraising method, based on religious sources including qurban, zakat and sadaqa. Interestingly, their regional orientation diversifies in accordance with the organisation's priorities. Whereas Cansuyu which is active in francophone region in Africa, IHH is in anglophone region in Eastern Africa. However, as the natural or human-made crises erupt, then all actors focus on that crisis, seen in Myanmar and Syrian crises. Having special attention to certain regions and types of aid (health, food, water-well), they apply the organisations' competence to mobilise related state organisations' aid. In addition to that, according Aras and Akpınar⁷⁰³, most of these selected organisations share several common characteristics which are summarized as flexibility; ensuring sustainability; absence of conditionality; relying on private donations; culture and religion as catalyst, representing/promoting Turkey abroad and some of them pursue advocacy (human rights) activities. In considering these characteristics, their activities do not deviate from the orthodox approach in western sense.⁷⁰⁴ However, there is no conditions attached to the aid which is main variables from the western NGOs which often requires certain pre-conditions such as inclusion of youth and women. Besides, relying on private donations is another point of deviance since several Northern NGOs receive government grants.⁷⁰⁵

As a conclusion, this chapter provided an overview of Turkish NGO-led foreign aid. It highlighted the specifics of those nine selected FBOs and concludes that

⁷⁰³ Bülent Aras and Pinar Akpınar, "The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping* (22:3, 2015), p.237.

⁷⁰⁴ Ibid, p.241.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., p.241.

with ever-growing visibility in humanitarian aid, contributions have improved substantially. When the amount and scope of aid within the historical period is examined, it is seen that there is an increasing trend over the years. On a country-by-country basis analysis, a similar picture exists between the state and the NGO regional distribution of aid, too. Although, the state and NGOs respond, when the humanitarian crises emerge, the presence of all NGOs varies according to the country and region. Because, various organisations select particular issues to champion concerning their cultural, ethical, substantive and tactical approach to an organization's mandate.⁷⁰⁶ Besides, certain regions, topics and issues gain more concern based on media attention, political opportunity, frame availability, donor resources and issue attributes.⁷⁰⁷ Acting on the principles of shared-mission, these selected FBOs play a entrepreneurship role at different stages of humanitarian aid process by using their organisational leverage. As can be seen in the next section, bringing humanitarian crises in Turkey where they attach, these selected FBOs apply techniques to direct state aid flow towards targeted regions. The next section clearly demonstrates these techniques.

⁷⁰⁶ Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, the Media and International Activism* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), cited in R. Charlı Carpenter, "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergency in Transnational Advocacy Networks", *International Studies Quarterly* (2007), p.115.

⁷⁰⁷ R. Charlı Carpenter, "Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergency in Transnational Advocacy Networks", *International Studies Quarterly* (2007), p.116.

CHAPTER 6

STATE-NGOs AID RELATION: TURKISH CASE

6.1.POLICY MAKING PROCESS IN TURKEY: HUMANITARIAN AID POLICY FRAMEWORK

In general usage, the concept of policy designates the behaviour of actors and a relative purposive course of action, followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a specific issue, question or matter of concern.⁷⁰⁸ Such a definition refers to what is actually done, rather than what is only proposed or intended. This implies a specific choice among alternatives.⁷⁰⁹ The policy-making process often differentiates between policy-areas such as public policy, health policy, foreign policy or development policy. The processes associated with all these policies differ from one another, requiring one to move from content analysis to context analysis. That's to say, policy-making is a continual process without a definitive beginning or end.

The stages of policy-making have been coined by a variety of terms, including the *policy cycle*.⁷¹⁰ The number of the stages that constitute the policy-making process also varies, with discussions often settling between five and seven. For instance,

⁷⁰⁸ Anderson, *Public Policymaking*, op. cit., p.6.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid., p.6.

⁷¹⁰ Kevin B. Smith, and Christopher W. Larimer, *The Public Policy Theory Primer* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009).; Peter DeLeon, "The Stages Approach To The Policy Process: What Has It Done, Where Is It Going?" In P.A. Sabatier (eds.), *Theories of the Policy Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p.19-34.

similar to Anderson, Howlett and Ramesh (2003), this thesis utilises and draws upon a five-stage policy cycle, comprising agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision making (or adaptation), implementation and evaluation.⁷¹¹ The starting point is agenda-setting, known also as problem identification, where the issue is clearly defined at an appropriate scale. As discussed in the chapter on NGOs' Role in Foreign Policy, the agenda-setting stage refers to when specific issues are selected to be acknowledged as a public interest. Various stakeholders can address certain issues and engage in activities to influence one another.

The second stage is *policy formulation*, which represents the evolution of an issue and the solution that addresses this issue. It encompasses the identifications or creation of options for resolving or ameliorating public problems.⁷¹² Policy options are considered to be possible solutions forwarded by public administration. In Turkey, there are nine *Presidential Policy Boards*, consisting of several selected people who have the power on respective policy formulation under the auspices of the President.⁷¹³ The third stage is *decision-making(adaptation)*, which involves deciding which proposed alternatives will be used to handle a problem.⁷¹⁴ This stage represent a governing body's commitment to enforcing the policy's tenets in which several stakeholders across agencies and the governing entity may be involved. The engagement of civil societies in this stage is highly possible, contingent upon the specific content of the issue. Fourth is *implementation*, referring to putting into effect or applying adopted policies. Here the point is what is done to enforce a policy. In the Turkish case, executive power - held previously by prime ministers and cabinets - was transferred to the President in 2018. Finally, the *evaluation* stage

⁷¹¹ Michael Howlett, and M. Ramesh, *Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems* (Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁷¹² Anderson, *Public Policymaking*, op. cit., p.3.

⁷¹³The establishment of this Board is in Presidential Decree No.1, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2018/07/20180710-1.pdf>

⁷¹⁴ Anderson, *Public Policymaking*, op. cit., p.3.

that addresses possible outcomes as a result of a defined policy's implementation. Either qualitative or quantitative in nature, policymakers evaluate their policies to verify that they are effective in achieving their goals. By doing this, they may apply their own related agencies, consultants and civil society organisations.⁷¹⁵ Even though each of these stages were previously envisaged as an emerging, successful policy development as in a linear process, it is now perceived more as occurring in an inverse order or sometimes simultaneously.⁷¹⁶

In addition to evaluation of policy process in terms of stages, it is also possible to examine it in terms of degrees of “civil participation.” Examining the main component of the policy-making process, the European Union has released the “Code of Good Practice For Civil Participation In The Decision-Making Process, (CONF/PLE (2009) CODE1)”.⁷¹⁷ According to this Code, there are four gradual levels of participation of CSOs in the decision-making process, ranging from least participatory to most participatory. Following this order, the levels constitute information, consultation, dialogue, and partnership. The first level is *information*, required at every stage of the decision-making process. CSO engagement, thereby, is at its most basic level. *Consultation* constitutes the stage where CSOs express their opinion upon the public authorities request on certain issues. Moving beyond consultation, *Dialogue* encompasses a two-way communication and can play a role throughout every stage of the decision-making process. Finally, *Partnership* includes any joint plan or action, initialised at any the stage of decision-making. These four levels may be applied at any step in the decision-making process.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹⁵ Howlett, and Ramesh, op. cit.,

⁷¹⁶ “Public Policy Models and Their Usefulness in Public Health: The Stages Model”, *National Collaborating Centre for Healthy Public Policy* (2013), p.1.

⁷¹⁷ Full text, <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/code-of-good-practice-for-civil-participation-in-the-decision-making-process-en.pdf> Though this code does not have a mandatory character or prescribe rule, it offers a repertoire of good practice to all actors.

⁷¹⁸ Code of Good Practice for Civil Participation in The Decision-Making Process, (2009), p.9.

Combining Anderson, Howlett and Ramesh's five stages of the Policy-making process with the EU's four gradual level of participation of CSOs into the decision-making process, the state-NGO relations within the legal structure can be aptly outlined through the example of Turkey. Given the large number and complexity of the policy-making processes, however, this section particularly touches upon humanitarian aid policy and its implications. Before this, a further examination of the policy-making structure of Turkey should initially be underlined.

The orientation of Turkish state tradition and administration structure has long been categorised within the “strong state” typology⁷¹⁹, whereby state remains autonomous from other actor’s influence, including civil society. Transmitted from the late Ottoman traditional culture to the early Republican era, the concept of the strong state is based on bureaucracy capable of dealing with myriad administrative structures within a large political entity. As an extension of this entity, actors who are in charge of decision-making are constrained to conform to the ideas held by those factors that limit them. Primarily, ideas which grew out of two developments. First, the Kemalist elements of the state that created state institutions insulated from public and political pressure. Second, the military's tremendous power of oversight that renders tight restrictions on civilian authorities, curtailing their authority over them through a series of legal and political structures.⁷²⁰ In this structure, two systemic factors are essential: the preservation of the status quo structure, including its secularist and modernist structure, and the maintenance of the nation’s independence.⁷²¹

⁷¹⁹ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberstone: The Eothen Press, 1985).

⁷²⁰ Brent E. Sasley, "Turkish Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Lobbying for European Union Membership", *Middle Eastern Studies* (48, no. 4 ,1 July 2012), p.555.

⁷²¹ Baskın Oran (eds.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (İstanbul İletişim Yay. 2001). To see more about, Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Alkım Kitabevi Yayınları, 1989).

In that sense, “Turkey is a decentralised polity in which various state actors would constrain the primary decision makers.”⁷²² In a decentralized system, the decision-making process is dispersed among various entities, rather than concentrated in the hands of the central government. Such a decentralised polity is one of the reasons that Turkey has faced several political crises. For instance, Turkey has changed four constitutions (1921, 1924, 1961, 1982 and one 2007 Constitutional Amendment), faced three military coups (1960, 1971, 1980) in which the army overthrew the government, and has been governed by 66 different governments in just 95 years.

The most pressing factor of this strong state paradigm lies in the constitutional and administrative structure of Turkey. Based on the 1982 constitution, Turkey had been enjoying parliamentary democracy, in which Turkish foreign policy was invested in the Prime Ministry and the Cabinets. According to the 1982 Constitution, however, the most important duty was given to the National Security Council (NSC), established after the 1961 Constitution as an advisory board, consisting of various positions including general staff and commanders-in-chief of armed forces.⁷²³ Although cabinets were considered the chief policymaking authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were permitted to implement policies and principles issued by these bodies,⁷²⁴ the political weight of the military has always overshadowed policy-maker decisions.

Since 2000, however, the strong state paradigm has not only been challenged in terms of the systemic level, but also the implementation level, too. Accordingly, many academic studies in this regard now commonly associate with a changing

⁷²² Sasley, op.cit., p.556.

⁷²³ Atilla Özer, *Gerekçeli ve 1961 Anayasasıyla Mukayeseli 1982 Anayasası* (Ankara: Bilim Yayınları, 1984), p.357.

⁷²⁴ Contrary to this general view, the assembly’s role in the Iraq war in 2003 shows the power, and limits of Turkish parliament as actors in foreign policy. See more about, Baris Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, “When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey’s Iraq Decision”, *International Studies Perspectives* (11/1, 2010) p.19 – 36.

trend of this process. Studies such as the role of public opinion⁷²⁵, personality and leadership⁷²⁶ and parliaments⁷²⁷ on the policy-making process of Turkey are particularly noteworthy. Adding to this, the involvement of NGOs in the policy-making process of Turkey has been notable since the early 2000s, evident in their contribution to the active citizen model in participatory democracy⁷²⁸, their leading role in societal development⁷²⁹, their determinative power on public policy⁷³⁰, their consultation factor on the state,⁷³¹ and the FBOs role in humanitarian aid policy and practice (as this thesis claims).

In short, with the systemic change from parliamentary to Presidential, the position of the NSC in the foreign policymaking process has remained untouched, while the political weight of the military has been undermined. The bottom line in this new political landscape is the centralization of power in the hands of various members of the state apparatus. Given a suitable context, the role of other actors (e.g. NGOs),

⁷²⁵ Ali Çarkoğlu, “Who Wants the Full Membership? Characteristics of Public Opinion Support for EU Membership in Turkey” in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.), *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics* (Frank Cass Pres., 2003), p.xx.

⁷²⁶ Aylin Ş Görener and Meltem Ş Ucal, ‘The Personality and Leadership Style of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy’, *Turkish Studies* (12, no. 3, 1 September 2011), p.357.

⁷²⁷ Kesgin and Kaarbo, op.cit., p.19 – 36.

⁷²⁸ Fuat Keyman, “Türkiye ve Avrupa’da Sivil Toplum: Sivil Toplum ve Demokrasi Konferans Yazıları, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi STK Eğitim ve Araştırma Birimi, (No.3, 2004).

⁷²⁹ Yakup Bulut and et al., “Kamu Politikalarının Oluşturulmasında Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Etkisi,” *Strategic Public Management Journal* (Volume 3, Issue 6, 2017), p.28.

⁷³⁰ Hamza Ateş and Ahmet Nohutçu, “Kamu Hizmeti Sunumunda Gönüllü Kuruluşlar ve Devlet”, C.11, *Selçuk Üniversitesi, İİBF Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi* (2006), p.245-276.

⁷³¹ Nilda Bullain and Filiz Bıkmen, *Türkiye’de STK’lar ve Kamu Sektörü Arasında İşbirliğinin Geliştirilmesi ve STK’ların Demokratik Katılım Düzeyinin Güçlendirilmesi* (ECNL and TÜSEV Publication, 2006); and Gökçeçişek Ayata and Ulaş Karan, *Sivil Topluma Aktif Katılım: Uluslararası Standartlar, Ulusal Mevzuattaki Engeller, Öneriler* (TÜSEV- Pub., 2015).

therefore, becomes much clearer. As Bülent Aras clearly identifies, one of the fundamental changes following the 15 July event on Turkish foreign policy apparatus is that traditional foreign policymaking actors such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council and Armed Forces have turned into non-players and marginal bookkeepers.⁷³² In that sense, proliferation of various organisations who engage in foreign policy process, ease to set a non-traditional form of policy-making process in which they are positioned in an active role. That's to say, the nature of state-NGO relations has been positively influenced with constitutional change when considering the period 2004 to 2016.

6.1.1. Legal Framework of State–NGO relations in Turkey and NGOs Involvement in Policy Cycle Process

Although Bulut et. al claim that civil society organisations have become an influential actor over the government since the 1980s⁷³³, a closer inspection shows that in fact empirical samples are linked directly to post-2000s period. A line of thought held by this is when the first practice on NGOs' engagement in policy cycle began in the 2000s to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria⁷³⁴, it was quickly followed by the enhancement of the Legal Procedure on the Association's overseas aid activities. In this process, civil society organizations contributed to the content of the framework that aligned with international standards on freedom of association.⁷³⁵

⁷³² Bülent Aras, "Turkish Foreign Policy After July 15", *Istanbul Policy Centre* (2017), p.4.

⁷³³ Bulut and et al., op.cit., p.28.

⁷³⁴ Bullain and Bikmen, op.cit., p.6.

⁷³⁵ Ibid., p.6.

The legal provisions between state-NGO relations have been handled by a number of different laws. For instance, at the central level, one of the affirmative developments on the financial relationship is the Law on Public Financial Management and Control, the issue of 5018 in 2003.⁷³⁶ Article 29 of this law⁷³⁷ permits financial support to civil society organisations under the condition that aid serves public interest, providing that the amount is foreseen in the budgets of public institutions. This provision indicates positive progress within the legal framework that directly influences state-NGO relations, as it explicitly permits government agencies and officials to include CSOs in their budgets.

Another comprehensive legal framework is drawn through the “By-law (Yönetmelik) on Rules and Procedure of Preparing Legislation” (2005), which regulates the rules and procedures regarding all law, rules, decrees, regulations, and decisions of the Council of Ministers.⁷³⁸ The relationship between state institutions and civil society organisations is explicitly mentioned here. Article 6.2 of this By-Law state that, the unit that are preparing legislation shall benefit from the views of relevant institutions including, non-governmental organizations.⁷³⁹ As can be seen here, NGOs are treated as an advisory platform where discretionary power (takdir hakkı) remains in the hands of related institutions. Following that, the Article 7 (2/3) states that NGOs can examine the drafts and submit their opinion on the matter within a period 30 days.⁷⁴⁰ Here, NGOs have evaluation power and give in it to the respective institutions. In both practices, the participation of NGOs still

⁷³⁶ It has been ratified with the Decree Law No. 703 dated 2/7/2018

⁷³⁷ To see the full draft, <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5018.pdf>

⁷³⁸ Full text of Regulation: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2006/02/20060217-4.htm>

⁷³⁹ Article 6(2) states that “Taslaklar hakkında konuyla ilgili mahallî idareler, üniversiteler, sendikalar, kamu kurumu niteliğindeki meslek kuruluşları ile sivil toplum kuruluşlarının görüşlerinden de faydalanılır.”

⁷⁴⁰ “(2)-Kamu kurumu niteliğindeki meslek kuruluşları ile sivil toplum kuruluşları da taslaklara ilişkin görüşünü otuz gün içinde bildirir. Süresinde görüş verilmezse olumlu görüş verilmiş sayılır. And (3) Bakanlıklar, kamu kurum ve kuruluşları, kamu kurumu niteliğindeki meslek kuruluşları ile sivil toplum kuruluşları taslakları öncelikle kendi görevleri açısından inceler ve düzenleyici etki analizinde belirtilen hususların yerinde olup olmadığını değerlendirir.”

remains at the consultation level, and their engagement is dependent upon the related institution's request. The latter article, however, addresses a broader mode of interaction, referring to the relationship at the dialogue level as well. Nevertheless, in both cases, the absence of a mutually-structured framework where NGOs would be involved in the decision-making process without depending upon related institutions request is palpable. Linked to this, the Law on Association issue of 5252 dated 2004, deals with regulations about collecting donations from and engaging in activities outside Turkey. Part 3 of this Law, Article 21 states that "Associations may receive in-kind and cash assistance from persons, institutions and organizations abroad provided that they report [to] the civil administrative in advance. The form and content of the report shall be regulated by the regulation. It is mandatory to receive cash benefits through banks".⁷⁴¹

On the other hand, the participation of NGOs in the decision-making process and creating plans are more favourable at the local level, in which Special Provincial Administration Law (İl Özel İrade) of 16th, Metropolitan Municipality Law of 15th and Municipality Law of 24th strongly emphasise the right of attendance of NGOs in *specialization committee meetings*. Whereby, they deliver their opinions, albeit without holding voting power.⁷⁴² Since this thesis focuses on humanitarian aid activities of NGOs outside of Turkey, an analysis of the local-level is beyond the scope of this research.

Finally, the latest comprehensive legal framework was initiated with the Presidential Decree of 17th, dated 10/7/2018 and numbered 30474. With this change, the Department of Association has been renamed the General Directorate

⁷⁴¹ Article 21: "Dernekler mülkî idare amirliğine önceden bildirimde bulunmak şartıyla yurt dışındaki kişi, kurum ve kuruluşlardan aynî ve nakdî yardım alabilirler. Bildirimin şekli ve içeriği yönetmelikte düzenlenir. Nakdî yardımların bankalar aracılığıyla alınması zorunludur." <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/ebulten/duyurular/5253-sayili-yardim-toplama-kanunu-degisiklik.aspx>)

⁷⁴² To see more detail on it, Gökçeçiçek Ayata And Ulaş Karan, "Türkiye'de Sivil Toplumun gelişimi ve Sivil Toplum-Kamu İşbirliğinin Güçlendirilmesi Projesi: Sivil Topluma Aktif Katılım: Uluslararası Standartlar, Ulusal Mevzuattaki Engeller, Öneriler", *TÜSEV Publication*, (2015), p.108.

of Civil Society Relations. As a central unit, their role includes the surveillance and full control of all civil society organisations. In relation to the context of this thesis, Article 263 (h) states that “the legal duty and authority of this unit is to carry out research and development activities related to issues assigned with their working area through cooperation with civil society organisations, relevant entities, universities, and other research institutions, to determine medium and long-term strategies.”⁷⁴³ This article directly addresses the dialogue and partnership level of interaction between the state and CSOs. Cooperation with civil society organisation in defining short and long-term strategy means that NGOs are treated as co-partners in shaping the scope of strategy. Going beyond suggestion, the article urges with a strong recommendation. Whereas, previous laws tended to only mention the consultation and dialogue level of engagement.

In order to further state-NGO relations, Turkey and the EU co-financed the Public-Civil Society Cooperation Project in July 2017, with plans for completion in 2019.⁷⁴⁴ Within the scope of this project, it aims to train public officers who engage in relations with CSOs. To increase the capacity of respective personnel, the overall objectives of this Project are: to strengthen communication skills between CSOs and Public, to prepare a suitable platform to increase cooperation and to promote CSOs engagement in the decision-making process. For maintaining these objectives, there are several pre-conditions that are taken into consideration. These include public officers’ conscientious instruction on how to implement a legal framework in relation with NGOs. In turn, NGOs should increase their own communication capacity. Above all, the environment of reliance between these two actors must be re-established. Given this background, this project seems to increase the communication level of interaction between the public and CSOs, rather than finding permanent solutions on legal restrictions that NGOs face to engage in the

⁷⁴³ Madde 263 (h):Sivil toplum kuruluşları, ilgili kuramlar, üniversiteler ve diğer araştırma kuruluşlarıyla işbirliği içerisinde, görev alanına giren konularda araştırma-geliştirme çalışmalarında bulunmak, orta ve uzun vadeli stratejileri belirlemek.” <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/19.5.1.pdf>

⁷⁴⁴ <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/haberler/kamu-stk-isbirligi.aspx> (accessed 28.10.2018)

policy-making process. Encouragement of NGOs to increase their involvement in the decision-making process does not depend on an NGOs request. Rather, it is dependent upon the respective institutions' unilateral demands. Thus, the objective of this research is not to specifically draw a line between what really exists and what is lacking. Moreover, it remains unclear what stages of the policy-making process that NGOs would engage with. By establishing these dialogue channels, however, this may create an affirmative environment for state and NGOs leaders to undertake other level of interactions, including information, consultation, and partnership.

Looking retrospectively (2004-2016 and even 2018), there is substantial evidence that underpins the evolution of state-NGO relations, from unilateral to multi-dimensional. While the legal restrictions that NGOs face (oversea aid, etc.) were softened, state-NGO common platforms were initiated. So, we can see an understanding in which the state has taken decisions together with other actors. The big boost came from the Consultation Meeting between the state and NGOs in 2005, where officials adopted a holistic approach to the augmentation of the incentives to transition to more multi-dimensional relations.⁷⁴⁵ To this end, the structure of the General Directory of the Association has been reshaped. Until 2003, all Associations were bound to the General Directorate of Security Affairs, suggesting that the existence of associations was perceived more from the security perspective. In 2004, however, it was handed over to the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, with the recent change of the Presidential Decree of 17th in 2018, the General Directory of the Association formally became the General Directorate of Civil Society Relations. On behalf of NGOs vis-a-vis other actions, this represented a more favourable step, since its corporate body changed from head of department to general directorate. It is a positive step in strengthening the civil society dimension of the institutions and obtaining certain self-authority. Yet, the legal framework is still not clearly defined, and which stages NGOs would engage with agenda-setting,

⁷⁴⁵ TIKA Development Assistance Report (2015), p.47.

policy-formations, decision-making, implementation and the evaluation process of policy remains open to debate. These stages are being shaped in the hands of respective state institutions, and NGOs input is *ad-hoc* and informal.⁷⁴⁶

It is clear that the policy-making process inevitably varies in its salience and significance, and this is related to the interest of various state departments in a relatively complex way. For instance, while high politics (security) is conducted by officials from the foreign office and the defence department, low politics are managed by low-profile state institutions. From this perspective, the position of TİKA regarding the coordination of Turkey's development projects and policy, as well as Kızılay and AFAD's legal mandates arising from the constitutions on humanitarian aid policy and practice, means they continue to be essential foreign policy actors in Turkey. Therefore, the role of those respective organisations in humanitarian policy and practice requires a more in-depth examination.

Before dwelling too much upon the role of these institutions in the humanitarian aid landscape, Policy Boards, established by Presidential Decree 1st in 2018 needs to be explained. According to this Decree, the Board ranges from Science to Culture, and Health, Economy, to Security. Under the leadership of the President, Board members can be appointed from any walk of life, with a duty to develop new policy strategies for the respective issues. They also have a duty to conduct surveillance on respective institutions activities and are required to prepare reports for the President. Among these nine Boards, the issue of Disaster and Emergency is delegated to the Security and Foreign Policy Board. Article 26(f) of this Decree states that: "related to preventions of disaster and emergency situation response, and improvement, the Security and Foreign Policy Board has to develop policy recommendations".⁷⁴⁷ Therefore, the Board is granted involvement in four stages of the policy-making process: agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making,

⁷⁴⁶ Bullain and Bikmen, op.cit., p.13.

⁷⁴⁷ Afet ve Acil durum halleri ile ilgili önleme, müdahale ve iyileştirme konularında politika öneriler geliştirmek.

and evaluations. Of the 12 new members of this Board were recently appointed, the majority came from an academic background⁷⁴⁸, emphasising the non-bureaucratic civil dimension of the Board.⁷⁴⁹ Therefore, while the President and his personal imprint on the policy-making process is an indispensable variable at the helm of foreign policymaking, the role of specific institutions and Policy Boards on humanitarian aid policy and practice have increased.

6.1.2. Turkish Humanitarian Aid Policy-making Process: The Role of AFAD, TİKA, and KIZILAY

Despite the Assembly being the main body in Turkey in responsible for drafting new law, the Council of Ministers – directly bound to the President - is primarily responsible for determining the basic principles and goals of Turkish Foreign policy. Yet, this is supposed to be less applicable in the case of humanitarian aid policy-making process and practice at the international level. Using a step-by-step decision-making process, the AFAD, TİKA and Kızılay are carrying this legal duty outlined by the Law of 5902 (AFAD), articles 7/3(Kızılay), and articles of 520-530 (TİKA). As an extension of these laws, the AFAD develops policy plans, coordinates post-disaster responses and promotes cooperation among various agencies. TİKA has a responsibility to coordinate humanitarian aid, whilst Kızılay is a subsidiary organisation to public authorities with a duty to conceptualise the projects and implement national and international humanitarian aid programmes which are funded by Turkey. In addition to this, various articles (e.g. AFAD article 3) permit - if not strongly require - official bodies to consult the opinion of NGOs. And in some instances, laws even encourage engaging in a partnership level of

⁷⁴⁸ <http://www.karar.com/guncel-haberler/sondakika-cumhurbaskanligi-politikalar-kurullarina-yeni-atamalar-992732>, (accessed 09.10.2018).

⁷⁴⁹ For instance, one of the members of this Board, İsmail Safi is the Chairman of the Board of the Eurasian Civil Society Cooperation Association. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/avrasya-ulke-temsilcilerini-bulusturan-ankara-yerelhaber-2121593/> (accessed 01.11.2018).

interaction with NGOs. Therefore, NGOs involvement in this process is actualised in the condition of the respective institution's demand.

Before analysing the role of AFAD, TİKA and Kızılay on Turkish humanitarian policy, the decision-making structure in politics must first be scrutinised, since it enables to understand the main tenets of a country's policy-making process. Terminologically, the concept of decision-making refers to choosing the best option among the alternatives which may differ significantly regarding the scope, content, and actors involved. In the domain of political science, decision-making is a part of the policy-making process where two concepts primarily vary in their purpose. While a policy may apply more generally, decisions are specific to a situation. That is to say, decisions would turn into a de facto policy if they are accepted within a structured frame by respective authorities. Located in the third stage of the policy cycle, decision-making is mainly undertaken by governmental bodies and officials, but non-governmental actors and factors still have the ability to influence that policy development⁷⁵⁰ through the various techniques discussed in the fourth chapter. By the same token, the level of participation of NGOs in the decision-making process is also differential by the four levels of engagement, from information-providing, consultation, dialogue, to partnership.

Having said that, following to the turn of the millennium, the course of legal actions gave more power to the non-traditional actors (e.g. TİKA, AFAD) which have increased their power in their respective functions. Traditional actors such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interior Ministry and National Defence are taking part in humanitarian policy-making processes through involving the Commission set by non-traditional actors. This involves planning projects and drafting reports on current humanitarian aid initiatives taking place. For instance, the law of 5092 of AFAD, article 3 and 4 set commissions of "Disaster and Emergency High Commission-Afet ve Acil Durum Yüksek Kurulu" and "Disaster and Emergency Coordination Board- Afet ve Acil Durum Koordinasyon Kurulu" respectively,

⁷⁵⁰ Anderson, op.cit., p.6.

where representatives of the Foreign Affairs office attend – as discussed later on in this thesis.

Among non-traditional actors, TİKA and AFAD came to the fore, seeking a leading role in facilitating foreign aid policy and practice through their own toolkits. Responsible for coordinating Turkey's development projects and policy, including those involving international organization and bilateral donors, TİKA⁷⁵¹ has assumed a great position and is tasked with collecting and reporting the ODA statistics for Turkey to OECD. Its Programme Coordination Offices increased fivefold from 2002 (12) to 2018 (60), across 58 countries spanning 5 continents. Similarly, though its establishment is recent (2009), AFAD⁷⁵² currently has 81 provincial branches throughout Turkey and 11 search and rescue units. Within a decade, it successfully completed humanitarian aid tasks in over 50 countries. Finally, Kızılay's functions on emergency and humanitarian are clearly palpable as the fifth chapter of this thesis explicitly emphasised.

AFAD represents one of the most important organisations in the field of humanitarian aid and emergency relief. It emerged to exercise the legal authority in response to humanitarian relief situations by single-handedly establishing a coordinate system. In this regard, three various institutions⁷⁵³, previously associated with relief issues have closed, and their missions merged under the AFAD presidency. Formed with the Law No: 5902 in 2009, AFAD primarily formulates policy plans and coordinates post-disaster responses and promotes cooperation among various agencies. In that sense, AFAD is involved in the policy-formulation, adaptation and implementation stages of the policy cycle, in conjunction with

⁷⁵¹ With the recent regulations, TİKA has been attached to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, together with the Directorate General of Foundations.

⁷⁵² Recently, AFAD has been positioned under the auspices of Interior Ministry by having a particular unit under the name of Presidency of AFAD.

⁷⁵³ General Directorate of Civil Defence, General Directorate Of Natural Disasters And General Directorate Of Turkish Emergency Management (Sivil Savunma Genel Müdürlüğü, Afet İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Müdürlüğü).

cooperation to the related actors. Therefore, it is a legally mandated body of the state, both at policy and practical level of humanitarian activities, outlined by the law of 5902.

The law of 5902 clearly defines the scope, duties, target and committee structure of the AFAD. Notably, Article 2 of that law states that “this law encapsulates policy-making and implementations duty of AFAD in response to disaster, humanitarian and emergency situations.”⁷⁵⁴ Following that, Article 3 notes the establishment of a commission, namely the “Disaster and Emergency High Commission-Afet ve Acil Durum Yüksek Kurulu”⁷⁵⁵ where the representatives of various state institutions,⁷⁵⁶ as well as NGO representatives, may be invited to discuss specific topics. The role of this commission is to approve policy plans, programmes and reports regarding disaster and emergency situations by gathering twice a year. Although this is primarily addressed to NGOs, the level of interactions (information, consultation, dialogue, partnership) and NGOs engagement in policy cycle has not been mentioned. Considering the context, the role of NGOs seems to be treated as an advisory platform where the consultation level of interaction likely prevails.

Article 4 also forms a new unit of the Board, the “Disaster and Emergency Coordination Board- Afet ve Acil Durum Koordinasyon Kurulu”, which is tasked with evaluating information about disaster and emergency situations, determining the alternative measures to be taken, ensuring the implementation and facilitating coordination between state institutions and NGOs. Meeting quarterly, the bottom line of this article is to emphasise the coordination function between NGOs and

⁷⁵⁴ To reach the full text of the prescript. <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/06/20090617-1.htm> (accessed 03.10.2018).

⁷⁵⁵ Together with AFAD. This Council consists of ten different state institutions, ranging from the Ministry of National Defence to Health and National Education. See more about, Article 3 <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/06/20090617-1.htm>

⁷⁵⁶ These are National Security Council, Ministry of Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Education, Health, Energy, Transport, Finance, Environment and Urban, Agriculture and Forestry.

related institutions in responding to crises. It means that interactions over the course of humanitarian activities are taking place between two actors. Therefore, a coordination mechanism is necessitated. This highlights that the role of NGOs on the ground is clearly palpable, yet they are still excluded from the decision-making process. Like the previous article, no level of interaction has yet been mentioned. Another drawback is seen in the following Article (5), where only accredited civil society organizations are chosen for the Earthquake Advisory Council, presumably stemming from the required specialism to deal with an earthquake crisis.

Article 3 and 4 openly highlight two influential Commissions – the “Disaster and Emergency High Commission” and the “Disaster and Emergency Coordination Board” - where various actors act on the principle of shared-mission understanding. Consisting of official institutions, they have unilateral power to determine the humanitarian aid policy and may invite NGOs to provide input and vocalise their opinion. Interestingly, Kızılay’s name has been included among other state organisations in Article 4, whereas TİKA’s name is not referred to. This document justifies the previous argument of classifying Kızılay’s humanitarian aid activities within the official flow of aid.

The Disaster and Emergency High Commission later published a new “Commission Resolution”, by the issue of 28871 in 2013.⁷⁵⁷ Within the scope of this resolution, the Disaster Response Plan (Türkiye Afet Müdahale Planı -TAMP) was released which structured a task-sharing system based on the collaboration mechanism with the related parties. Alongside other partners⁷⁵⁸, Kızılay once more, joined this Commission.⁷⁵⁹ However, contrary to Article 3 and 4 in which the AFAD’s duty is

⁷⁵⁷ To see the full text of the Resolution, <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/01/20140103-12.htm>

⁷⁵⁸ The Ministry of Interior, Communications, Health, Energy and Natural Resources, Environment, Family and Social Policy, Finance, and Food, Agriculture and Livestock. See more about, <https://www.afad.gov.tr/tr/2419/Turkiye-Afet-Mudahale-Plani>

⁷⁵⁹ In this partner team, Kızılay is responsible for providing proper nutrition and it has to preserve sufficient tent in its warehouse.

not restricted within a particular sphere (domestic or foreign), the TAMP system focuses on domestic affairs in collaborating with other respective states and non-state organizations concerning the scope of the issue. Even the role of NGOs is directly referred to, as responsible actors in service plans group together with other state institutions.⁷⁶⁰ Therefore, the dialogue and partnership level of interactions are marked in this Resolution.

TİKA is by far the most principal institution in the development policy of Turkey. Yet, its attachment to the humanitarian policy and practice is limited compared to that of AFAD. Thanks to accumulated experience since 1992 and a widespread global network through its offices, it funds projects which directly go to the humanitarian aid sector. That is to say, TİKA is playing a much more indirect role over the humanitarian aid policy and practice by providing financial support to other state and non-state actors.

TİKA's scope, procedure, and driving principle regarding the establishment, duties and responsibilities, are given in the Articles 520 to 531 of the Presidential Decree No. 4 dated 15.07.2018. Since Chapter 4 has extensively handled TİKA's establishment process and structure, this part touches only on Articles 520 to 531 to understand its legal mandate over humanitarian policy and practice.

Article 522 of Presidential Decree 4 extensively identifies the overall duties of TİKA under the 12 sub-chapters. Most of the responsibilities encompass development-related projects and programmes, including technology transfer, restorations of historical sites, building social and educational facilities, environmental and natural resources management, energy, infrastructure, sustainable development, capacity building support. In short, preparing social and economic infrastructure tools and developing support programs.⁷⁶¹ However, the most pressing article in relation to this thesis is *Article C* which states that “TİKA

⁷⁶⁰Responsibilities of TAMP, Article 1,3, https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2419/files/Afet_Mud_PI_ResmiG_20122013.pdf

⁷⁶¹ To see the full chapter of the Resolution, http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/teskilat_kanunu-238

has a responsibility to coordinate humanitarian aid and technical assistance towards foreign states and communities”.⁷⁶² This article indicates a good overall fit for its activities within the implementation stage of the policy cycle.

TİKA’s role concerning humanitarian issues is evident through two aspects. First, it plays a key role at the project level, since TİKA's nexus with humanitarian aid and most of its development assistance are maintained through projects. For instance, post-disaster construction of rehabilitation centres, health clinics, permanent shelters and educational campuses are sometimes classified within the humanitarian aid category. TİKA's projects, in that regard, can be classified as humanitarian aid activities. Second, TİKA's financial assistance to the NGOs, based on project applications can be categorised within the humanitarian aid field. Most of the selected FBOs this thesis focusses on, submitting projects to TİKA to get funds for their practices.⁷⁶³ Due to this linkage between TİKA and NGOs, a specific office, called “TİKA NGO Coordination Office” was founded in 2010, whereby policy (e.g. invitation to the meeting) and projects level interactions take place. The ever-growing power and visibility of NGOs in forming this office is evident⁷⁶⁴ and the newly-recognised significance of the NGOs in the realm of humanitarian aid policy and implementation is key to the nature of the contemporary aid frame of TİKA.

Finally, Kızılay is the third key actor which carries out an important role in different cycle of policy process on humanitarian aid. As discussed in the previous chapter, Kızılay represents a quasi-non-governmental organisation, holding financial privileges from the state, and having a legal mandate on specific issues given by

⁷⁶² “Madde 522 - (c) Başkanlığın görevleri: Gerektiğinde yabancı ülke ve topluluklara yapılacak insani yardım ve teknik desteklerin koordinasyonunu sağlamak”, http://www.tika.gov.tr/tr/sayfa/teskilat_kanunu-238

⁷⁶³ Out of total budget, Project support to NGOs shares nearly %10 of the operational budget. Interview with the TİKA officials on 27.09.2018

⁷⁶⁴ It has been confirmed during the interview with top-level bureaucrats at the TİKA.

constitutions. Therefore, this thesis analyses Kızılay' humanitarian aid activities under the official aid flow.

The Kızılay's Document of Regulation openly states that it is an autonomous and independent organisation, working in accordance with the Turkish Civil Code numbered 4721 and the Law on Associations No. 5253.⁷⁶⁵ Given this legal frame, Articles 4 and 7 of the Regulation deals with the humanitarian issue. Article 4 and section 2(ç) outlines Kızılay's role as "a subsidiary organisation to public authorities in humanitarian activities, and subject to Turkish Laws and international agreements which are accordingly put into effect by the Turkish Republic; and within this frame Kızılay has autonomy to run its activities in accordance with the International Red Cross-Red Crescent Movement' Fundamental Principles".⁷⁶⁶ The key point drawn from this, in reference to International and domestic law, is that there is not only implementation on specific reasons and issues. More importantly, it represents an even more overtly power-sharing context (subsidiary to the government) on humanitarian issues. The following articles later clarify the role-sharing dynamic between the government and Kızılay.

In a similar way, article 7 (3) and section B of Kızılay's regulation pinpoints Kızılay's national and international duties on specific issues. In this regard, there are twelve duties of Kızılay listed under the field of "social assistance and disaster management". While covering a wide range of missions, this section also concerns the humanitarian policy-making and implementation task of Kızılay. The *first* and *seventh* duties relate to this. The first duty (7-3-b,1) states that Kızılay "has a duty to conceptualise the projects and implement national and international humanitarian

⁷⁶⁵ The Regulation of Kızılay, Article 3., <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/02/20090219-1.htm>

⁷⁶⁶ Madde 4, /2 (ç): "Türk Kızılayı bağımsız bir kurumdur. Kızılay, insancıl faaliyetlerinde kamu otoritelerinin yardımcısı olarak, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti tarafından usulüne uygun olarak yürürlüğe konulmuş uluslararası sözleşmeler ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti kanunlarına tabi olup bu çerçevede Uluslararası Kızılay-Kızılhaç Hareketi Temel İlkelerine uygun hareket etme özerkliğine sahiptir."

aid programmes which are funded by the state and as well as its own sources”.⁷⁶⁷ This is directly addressing Kızılay's role in the implementation stage of engagement into the policy cycle. The seventh duty (7-3-b,7), on the other hand, covers a more overarching mission on that regard, saying that Kızılay “has a duty to maintain national and international disaster response actions in regard to state-funded situations, through preparing humanitarian aid programmes and to implement these programmes on behalf of the state in cooperation with national associations and institutions.”⁷⁶⁸ This article also underlines to run this disaster response plan in coordination with NGOs.

Under the heading of Kızılay’s Regulation, it is seen as a clear mandate given to Kızılay in dealing with humanitarian aid programmes (decision-making stage) and practising (implementation stage) of that programme. Kızılay, itself, has the power to act independently in responding to conflict and disaster issues, but the inter-institutional policy-making structure is shaped within a broader environment by many aid actors, including states and non-state actors. Kızılay’s Regulation, Article 4 (2/ç) underlines this principle of independence stating that “The Turkish Red Crescent is an independent institution. As subsidiary institutions to the public authorities in humanitarian activities, it has autonomy to act in accordance with basic principle of International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and it is subject to Turkish Law and International Convention enacted by Turkey.”⁷⁶⁹

In this structure, there is a complex pattern of tasks regarding humanitarian issues associated with various actors that become more significant. Thus, linkages appear

⁷⁶⁷ Article 7-3-b,1, “Öz kaynakları ve Devlet tarafından sağlanan fonlar ile ulusal ve uluslararası insani yardım programlarını projelendirmek ve uygulamak.” <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/02/20090219-1.htm>

⁷⁶⁸ Article 7-3-b,7 “Devletin fon sağladığı durumlarda ulusal ve uluslararası afet müdahalelerinde bulunmak, insani yardım programlarını oluşturmak ve buna ilişkin projeleri Devlet adına diğer ulusal dernekler ve kuruluşlar ile işbirliği yaparak uygulamak.” <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/02/20090219-1.htm>

⁷⁶⁹ Regulation of Kızılay Article 4(2-ç), https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Editor/files/1235049841_Tuzuk_19_02_2009.pdf

to ignore a hard-line task-sharing on the ground regarding the humanitarian field. In line with Article 4 (2/ç), at this stage Kızılay demands more self-reliant activities within government circles to its collective responses on humanitarian issues.

Based on this background, there is a task-sharing among these three actors, yet this line is not strict. According to this framework, AFAD often takes a leading role in policy formulation and evaluation process in the policy cycle stages, whereas TİKA and Kızılay set in implementation stages. In this process, Kızılay and AFAD also involve in agenda-setting and decision-making process as well. However, as said before, setting the foreign policy principles in general, humanitarian aid policy in particular is no longer a task confined to specific actors. Instead, various stakeholders are involved in the multi-stage process of policy-making, relating to the subject and scope of the issue. While, AFAD, TİKA, and Kızılay are legally bound to state institutions in directing humanitarian aid policy and practices, non-state actors' contributions and influence must not be underestimated. Throughout each stage of the policy-making process, they play an important role. During the first stage (agenda-setting) of interaction, for instance, periodical meetings take place between state and NGO representatives. In other stages, forums such as "Economic Cooperation and Development", "Turkey-Africa Cooperation" have the potential to bring together 120 experts from NGOs and state authorities to engage in discussions over alternative mechanism to increase relations on knowledge transfers.⁷⁷⁰ In short, while acknowledging the dominance of AFAD and Kızılay (TİKA is comparatively less), NGOs explicitly develop more inclusive and to-the-point projects on humanitarian aid. From the early 2000s, there has been a notable surge in the contributions and influence in both humanitarian aid policy and practice, as the subsequent chapter tries to illustrate it based on interview.

⁷⁷⁰ TİKA, Development Assistance Report (2007), p.47.

6.2. THE ANALYSIS OF NGOs' ROLE IN TURKISH HUMANITARIAN AID: BASED ON INTERVIEWS

This section builds upon findings from a series of qualitative interviews and the strategy proposed to see whether the argument of this thesis is in line with informant responses. Based on the five techniques that NGOs use to appeal while engaging in humanitarian aid relations with the state, the validity of the employed conceptual model is presented through discussing how the conceptual model is applicable to the selected case. The qualitative element of this thesis is based on semi-structured interviews and personal observations recorded during periods of fieldwork in Mozambique (2007) and Tanzania (2017). These data are organised into a theoretical explanatory scheme to explore the potential role and contribution of FBOs on Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice.

Based on direct and indirect form, FBOs political role through agenda-setting, norm-building, framing, lobbying, and information providing is examined. To test the presence of a selected NGOs role in foreign aid policy and practice of Turkey, several criteria have to be taken into consideration, including the longevity of the organisations, capacity in economic and material strength, and ideological proximity with the government which are extensively discussed in methodological sections of the thesis. Due consideration has been given to identifying these to reflect the influence of FBOs on Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice.

The sources of data analysed in this chapter are transcriptions and fieldwork notes from face-to-face interviews, supplemented by information derived from annual reports and online resources of the respective organisations. While the formalised list of interview questionnaires was established prior to the fieldwork stage, the interviews followed a semi-structured interviews plan where open-ended questions were also asked. The interview questionnaires are composed of five different set of questions. Although the interviews were flexible, with no strict or exact order of questions, the data obtained from interviewees is largely consistent with the following five various categories of questions. The first set of questions is thematic,

comprising the demographic profile of respondents (i.e. age, education, job-experience) and their affiliation with the organisation and positions of the informants. In addition, this category also attempted to tap into the instruments (written and visual media) which the organizations apply to distribute their activities both in Turkey and outside the country. The second set of questions relate to the orientation of the respective organisations, including establishment purpose (religious, humanitarian etc.). The third set of questions are based on practical matters, uncovering the mutual relations between the state and FBOs, aiming to reveal the level of interaction, whether on project or policy level between these two actors. The fourth section focuses on the direct and indirect role and contribution of FBOs on humanitarian aid policy and practice through the five aforementioned techniques: agenda-setting (direct/indirect); norm-building(indirect); lobbying (direct/indirect); framing and public opinion (indirect); and information providing (direct). The final set of questions enquired how selected FBOs engage in the policy cycle process of Turkey. Through this, the interviews aimed to elicit and record some concrete and tangible examples to reveal the relationship between state-NGO humanitarian aid relations at the policy and project level.

Eighteen people from FBOs and seven people from state-related institutions were interviewed. Each interview lasted about an hour, on average, and were conducted in the headquarters of the related organisations in three different cities: Ankara, Istanbul, and Konya. All interviewees (with the exception of one) are male, between ages of 25 and 45 years old. While most interviewees are citizens of the Republic of Turkey, a few of them hold dual citizenship. Alongside this, all of the interviewees hold university qualifications, while some hold a Master or Ph.D. degree. Most of the interviewees speak English fluently. Their educational qualifications range from fields such as psychology, political science and industrial engineering, to theology and several others.

All respondents have relatively extensive job experience in the field. The civil society experience of those eighteen NGO workers ranges from 5 to 22 years (together with professional and voluntary periods) - giving an average of 14.6 years of field experience per person. On the other hand, the seven interviewees from state-

institutions have experience which ranges from 7 to 25 years (including civil society background and state position) – making an average of 14.2 years’ experience per head. In addition to these 25 respondents, I have also sought the opinion of people in the Ministry of Health, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Department of Association and General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su İşleri-DSİ) and General Directorate of Civil Society Relations to confirm the assertions about these institutions which are addressed by respondents during the interviews.

Therefore, this part of the thesis relies heavily on the informants’ answers to the questions and personal field-work on humanitarian aid activities conducted during volunteer placements in Mozambique in 2007 and Tanzania in 2017. The findings of my fieldwork have been added as a supportive material to the thesis. Along with these two sources, this part covers the information collected through official webpages of the respective organisations, annual reports, and booklets.

Above all, this thesis applied several strategies to increase the reliability and validity of the thesis, which is often subject to discussion when it comes to qualitative case studies. The political influence of NGOs on foreign aid cannot be determined quantitatively, given the data collected are assumed to be grounded in the meaningful social and cultural setting. Therefore, I drew on five methods to increase the validity, which are listed as follow. First, to devise correct assumptions about the nature of FBOs role, I conducted an interview with two different people from the same organisations at a different time and in a different location. The objective here to crosscheck, making certain that information is validated by asking various persons in the same organisations given the ambiguity in unfolding data requires flexibility to different aspects of the same story. Second, to verify the information given by FBOs, at least two interviews were also held with the relevant state organizations. The purpose of doing this is to match data to see if what the respondents (FBOs) claim as accomplishments were completed due to their initiative, and not arising coincidentally. By this way, the quality assurance of specific information is tested through crosschecking once again.

Third, timing is taken as a key variable in validating gathered information. During the interview, informants were asked to evaluate their organisation's role in humanitarian aid. In the instance where state and NGO workers provided contradicting information on their initial role in the project, I looked at the date of activities and campaigning.

Fourth, the narratives and discourse of respective officials, as well as Tika's Report are scrutinised as supportive documents. Therefore, these official sources ensure correlation and coherence between informant's assertion and officials' point of view on common topics.

Fifth, to minimise the disadvantages of using interviews, such as dependence on subjects' memory and the interviewee gives what interviewer wants (this is referred to as social desirability bias) to hear, meaning questions can be asked without needing to refer to the conclusion of the research. Therefore, I remained impartial to refrained from steering their speech on overall objective of this research. Besides, respondents were selected from top-level senior and leadership positions, who have engaged in humanitarian aid for a long period of time, known as elite interview. Most of interviews with NGOs workers allowed using a recording device, but interviews with state-related people were not recorded. Permission was granted by some respondents to refer to their name in the thesis, once they had seen and reviewed the final draft before it was handed in. However, to retain uniformity in the qualitative method, all respondents are anonymous. Finally, alongside those five techniques, the FBOs role in the decision-making process has been added under a different rubric. Accordingly, the increasing effect of NGOs has been incorporated into foreign policy-analysis by focusing on the contributions to government's decision-making process. That's to say, NGOs role in decision making is clear-cut. Moreover, most of the informants mentioned their ever-growing role in decision-making and shared examples which could be set into the decision-making process.

6.2.1. Selected FBOs' Role in Decision-making

Decision-making is the process of gathering information, unfolding alternative solutions and making choices about them. The first pattern that this research investigates is the NGO's role in decision-making processes. However, this pattern does not belong to one of the five techniques (conceptual framework) of NGOs. In other words, decision-making is not a technique that NGOs seek to employ, but rather a consequence of NGOs attempts to do so. Since respondents underlined and shared tangible sequences on their role in decision-making, this section is elaborated it under a separate heading.

Based on this background, the interviews have been analysed from the perspective of NGO engagement in the decision-making of the governments in Turkey. Responses of NGOs varied when asked about their role in decision-making. The majority of interviewees emphasized that NGOs' involvement in this process is still relatively less developed, although this has a significant impact on NGO activities. The state holds full authority and NGOs attendance in this process is discretionary. Still, selected FBOs enjoy involvement through channels, including direct (attending the meeting) and indirect (personal level of interaction) engagement to convey their demands. In other words, I observed a trend towards a 'de facto' relationship between the state and the NGOs in various aspects of the decision-making process. An example of the indirect engagement is seen in the Deniz Feneri's role in the amendment of The Law of Association. This law is key milestone in the state-NGO relations as the government has taken several decisions such tax-free status to the NGOs and removing of bureaucratic restrictions that have facilitated NGO activities which were therefore favourably influenced by this amendment. Interviewee 1 at Deniz Feneri stated that:

The state remains the most dominant actor in the decision-making process. However, civil society organisations have begun to play an influential role through supplementing, complementing and sometimes influencing the state. For example, in 2004, there was a discussion on the proposed Law of Association⁷⁷¹, which is directly related to our foreign aid activities. We later learned about the content of

⁷⁷¹To see the full text of Law on Associations 2004, <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/mevzuat/kanun/5253-dernekler-kanunu.aspx> (accessed 21.10.2018).

that draft text and communicated to respective bureaucrats that this law is limited, it restricts our overseas aid and doesn't suit us, and we objected to it. However, the bureaucrats in Ankara were turning a blind eye to our requests. Then we handed our request to the Head of the relevant Department. At that time there were few NGOs engaged in aid activities on a global scale (IHH and Deniz Feneri). Then, the Chair of the Department of Associations visited our association and held a meeting with our President, Yusuf Atalay (a lawyer). I was present at this meeting. After a long discussion, the Chair took the phone and called the bureaucrats who drafted the Regulation. While he was on the phone, he was asking our demands on the one hand, and ordering the bureaucrat to change this, that, add this and remove this etc, on the other hand. Thanks to our initiatives, the size, and scope of this draft text have been expanded.⁷⁷²

This statement addresses the unofficial engagement of NGOs in the decision-making process. At the beginning of this process, their demands were neglected by bureaucrats who worked on this Law. Then, relying on personal interaction between the Head of the Department and the president of Deniz Feneri, the NGOs employed a political role. The change on the Law of Association was a turning point for NGO activities. With this regulation (Law No,5253) several bureaucratic restrictions have been eased. For instance, an NGO could form a partnership with a foreign NGO, receive donations from abroad on condition of informing the government in advance and could disburse foreign aid without the permission of the Council of Ministers.⁷⁷³ Moreover, article 27 gives NGOs public interest statue, which allows them to collect donations without prior official permission.

Respondent 1 from Kızılay confirmed that “thanks to this regulation, several NGOs actively engaged in post-Tsunami humanitarian aid activities (in 2004) where they tested their organisational strength and leverage.”⁷⁷⁴ This issue was put to the second informant from Deniz Feneri who confirmed that the content of that Regulation and Deniz Feneri’s contributions are connected. To confirm this

⁷⁷² Interviewee 1 at Deniz Feneri Association, September 12, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁷³ Law on Association, Law No 5253, Article 10 and 21, see full text, <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5253-20041104.pdf>

⁷⁷⁴ Interviewee 1 at Kızılay, September 10, 2018, Ankara

assertion, I contacted the Department of Association⁷⁷⁵, yet they did not confirm such an involvement in decision-making. A top-level bureaucrat stressed that:

In fact, the change in the Law on Associations goes back to 1997 in relation to the negotiation process with the EU. The reason behind the change in 2004 was the accession process to the EU, and the Regulations have been expanded in accordance with the EU *acquis* to protect fundamental rights. Until 2003, the associations were connected to the General Directorate of Security Affairs, but this changed in 2004 and handed over to the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, with the recent change in 2018 (Decree of 17th), we became the General Directorate of Civil Society Relations, as a Central Unit, rather than the Presidency. From my own knowledge, I would say that NGOs role in this recent change (2018, 17th Decree) is evident due to their lobbying effort in parliament.⁷⁷⁶

The role of the EU in this process is also confirmed by several other officials. Presumably, they would have thought that treating NGOs as a main actor in this process could undermine the state's dominance over the change on this regulation. For instance, a top-level bureaucrat at the Kızılay shared a similar view with a previous quote, while criticising the unsatisfactory content of this change: “the EU process had an impact on the change of the Legislation of 2004. However, this legislation does not meet NGOs expectations. It was written as if to manage a Mosque Association. Its scope is still very narrow. Today we need to go through this Regulation to address today's requirements for NGOs.”⁷⁷⁷

It is clear that the negotiation process with the EU required several legal amendments in the early 2000s. One of the expectations of the EU was to improve civil society's freedom of action. Therefore, organisational expansion of NGOs and the state's positive attitude towards their overseas activities coincided with the Europeanisation process of Turkey. However, several parts of this law were arguably shaped by NGOs, rather than the EU bureaucrats. The EU set the broader condition for the change in the law. Nathalie Tocci has described this role of the

⁷⁷⁵ Its name has recently been changed to the General Directorate of Civil Society Relations

⁷⁷⁶ Interviewee 1 at the General Directorate of Civil Society Relations, October 5, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁷⁷ Interviewee 1 at Kızılay, September 10, 2018, Ankara.

EU as the “trigger” factor.⁷⁷⁸ The EU was an external stimulus. On the other hand, civil society actively sought to shape the content of the Regulations. Therefore, while the EU played a role as an external actor, the NGOs as domestic actors also sought to play a role.

NGO’s political role can be applied when alternative platform, such as attending official meeting, are available. One of the most important actors involved in decision-making process is Kızılay in which a top-level official emphasises that “NGOs contribution in the decision-making process is evident. They are invited to meetings to convey their views, however their full involvement in this process is still lacking. The mechanism has not been fully structured.”⁷⁷⁹ This is not direct involvement in the decision-making process such as the adaptation of specific law process, but rather related to the facts and factors dealing with humanitarian aid issues. By doing this, informants talked intensively about their role and the need to rely on their expertise and field competence. Even, the majority of respondents boasted of the NGOs success on humanitarian aid activities with underscoring the importance of their local capacity building. Citing several statements, they pinpoint Turkish NGOs expertise role which is often applied as leverage in the process of decision-making. A respondent from Dost Eli notes that “Kızılay, AFAD, TİKA are far behind us in the humanitarian aid issue since they are not active enough locally.”⁷⁸⁰ Unlike state workers who do not leave the office in the security risk areas,⁷⁸¹ staying in luxury hotels, thinking of travelling expense, our staff are there

⁷⁷⁸ Nathalie Tocci, “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?” *South European Society and Politics* (10, no. 1, 2005), p.73–83.

⁷⁷⁹ Interviewee 1 at Kızılay, September 10, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁸⁰ Based on my personal observation during the humanitarian aid activities in Mozambique and Tanzania, I have confirmed this assertion. Since their existence and local nexus are deeper, NGO-led humanitarian aid activities were able to reach the remotest parts of the country and gathered information to send the headquarters in the form of reports, whereas state-led activities were operating around the capital and big cities.

⁷⁸¹ However, informants 3 from the TİKA replied that “this is not true, you can go and ask interviewee 2 why he got shot by a gunman while in the field operations”

voluntarily, serve in high-security risk areas, stay at guest houses, mosques and even in tents.”⁷⁸²

The valuing NGO’s opinion by the state actors is a positive process, which motivated civil society actors to engage in decision-making in their issue-areas. Turkish NGOs ensure this advantage by pursuing activities mainly at the grassroots level. Verifying this point, an informant from Yeryüzü Doktorları states that “In the field, governmental bodies support us. Now we do not enter our embassy building nervously, we go there with pride. The attitude of the diplomats has changed; they have begun to show hospitality. They have become like facilitators. This change started in Ankara”.⁷⁸³ Another official from Kızılay confirmed such a linkage:

In recent years, the state gives value to NGOs’ opinion. Because formerly, when the state invited an NGO's president, campaign coordinator or external relations manager, only one person could come. But now, NGOs have various units and each unit has experts who do this job as a career - not temporarily - permanently chosen as a career, receiving training, and actively taking part in the field operation. Over the course, NGOs have developed institutionally and have now a corporate identity. For this reason, the state now recognizes NGOs as actors, listens to them and takes them seriously.⁷⁸⁴

Despite being a very ambitious statement, some NGOs workers stated that NGO’s activities on the ground in humanitarian aid had a direct influence on the formation of AFAD, the most active state institution in terms of humanitarian aid. Interviewee 2 at Deniz Feneri stressed that:

Turkish authorities have now understood how important NGOs are. The regular consultation meeting between NGOs and the state is an extension of these realities. At that meeting, I see that state authorities value our contributions. The case of Syria is a clear example of this. Even, the emergence of AFAD is directly related to [an] increased number of NGOs and their active involvement in the humanitarian issue. Because the state felt a missing role in this regard and wanted to fill it through

⁷⁸² Interviewee 2 at Dost Eli, September 26, 2018, Konya.

⁷⁸³ Based on Interview at Yeryüzü Doktorlar in 2015 conducted by Çelik and İşeri, op.cit., p.438.

⁷⁸⁴ Interviewee 1 at Kızılay, September 10, 2018, Ankara.

AFAD. Something along the lines of when the state realised their organisational and directing role over NGOs, AFAD's establishment process was initiated.⁷⁸⁵

NGOs role in the establishment of AFAD is still open to question, since NGO workers did not mention whether they directly suggested to official in regard to necessity of such state institution to fill gap regarding humanitarian aid. They rather underlined their trigger role for the state who felt to establish a coordination center for humanitarian aid.

Several issues which are not directly related to humanitarian aid but linked to decision-making processes are also shared by NGO-based respondents. Among them, Beşir's proposal to give a service passport to those who work in the field of humanitarian aid,⁷⁸⁶ and Deniz Feneri's protocol with Maarif Foundations, aiming to appoint their own personal in the Orphan Education Centre in Ethiopia with a budget fully sponsored by Maarif,⁷⁸⁷ can be given.

For the purposes of comparison, therefore, the same questions were asked to the top-level bureaucrats at TİKA, AFAD, and Kızılay to see if these responses converged with the FBO informant claims. As highlighted below, such a linkage is also confirmed by the respondents from the top-level bureaucrats. Respondent 2 from TİKA says:

NGOs have an impact on the State's humanitarian policies and practice. To say this, there is no need to look for too much evidence, and everyone agrees that NGOs actually open the way for the state and call the state there. By influencing our policy and practice, they contribute a vision to Turkey. For instance, in setting Turkey's diplomatic relations, economic relations, and the existence of Turkey in various part of the world, NGOs have a significant role. Apart from the concrete events, in Africa, in the health sector, water well, etc., NGOs go ahead of us and contribute

⁷⁸⁵ Interviewee 2 at Deniz Feneri, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

⁷⁸⁶ Interviewee 1 at Beşir Association, September 24, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁸⁷ Protocol no 1.7: "Türkiye Maarif Vakfı ve Deniz Feneri Derneği arasında imzalanan 12.01.2018 tarihli iyi niyet protokolüne dayanarak, Deniz Feneri Derneği tarafından inşaatı yapılan TİKA'nın tefrişat desteği verdiği Kenya Dadaab Aysel ve Şerif Fındıkkaya Yetim Eğitim Külliyesinde çalıştırılmak üzere, Deniz Feneri Derneği tarafından belirlenen, Türkiye Maarif Vakfı tarafından uygun görülen 1 Türk personelin istihdamı ve 5 yerel personelin aylık idari giderleri Maarif Vakfı tarafından karşılanacaktır." Interviewee 1 at Deniz Feneri, September 12, 2018, Ankara.

to us through their initiatives. However, this now occurs less, compared to earlier periods... NGOs are able to reach the crisis regions quickly, bringing the case to us. This is, in fact, normal due to the civil dimension of NGOs and their unbounded bureaucratic restriction. They are directly sourced from the public. We are also instructing them on how to write a proper project to submit to respective organisations.⁷⁸⁸

The remarks from these top-level bureaucrats on the role of NGOs are clear evidence that supports the overall argument of the thesis that NGOs seek a political role. The mentioning of “vision”⁷⁸⁹ can be conceptualised within policy formulation in policy cycle. Through this, the attempt of NGOs to contribute to TİKA’s policy mission in different areas is evidenced by respondents from TİKA. Moreover, Informant 2’s remarks on the NGOs diplomatic role is emphasised by IHH workers, which is discussed in the next part under the title of lobbying. According to İzzet Şahin, the head of IHH’s Humanitarian Diplomacy Department, IHH’s role in third party involvement for hostage negotiations and peace monitoring in Syria, Philippines and Libya is assumed as part of the NGOs diplomatic role.⁷⁹⁰

The other direct engagement of IHH in stimulating diplomatic activities of Turkey can be seen in the Philippine peace process. The peace process is not directly related to humanitarian aid, however IHH treats the peace deal based on humanitarian diplomacy effort and classified it as a norm. Notwithstanding, peace efforts took place in the aftermath of the conflict in the Philippine peninsula. Humanitarian aid covers post-war implications as well, according to OECD-DAC definition. As will be discussed in the norm-building part, Turkey’s hesitant attitude and decision towards this peace process was comparatively low-scale with respect to IHH’s proactive engagement at the early phase of negotiation. A top-level official at IHH who was involved in peace processes, Hüseyin Oruç, claims that IHH’s leading role was

⁷⁸⁸ Interviewee 2 at TİKA, September 27, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁸⁹ TİKA’ policy vision states “...protect our common historical heritage, support the economic and social development processes with a anthropocentric approach in coordination with the relevant organisations in the countries where TİKA operates.”, TİKA Annual Report (2017). p.10.

⁷⁹⁰ Interview with İzzet Şahin for the Dissertation Thesis on 02.07.2016, cited in A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis “A Categorization of State-Ngo Relationships in Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case of IHH In The Philippine Peace Process”, *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.35.

significant in defining Turkey's position within this process. He explains that in the time as negotiation failed on the peace process, IHH met with military wings leaders of MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and advised them to meet with Turkish government officials in order to get Turkey involve in the peace process. Following IHH's advice and meeting with MILF, several important figure at MILF visited Ankara, then met with IHH representatives at their headquarters in Turkey. "Following their meeting, Turkey's decision towards the peace process was influenced which paved the way for Turkey's membership of the International Contact Group".⁷⁹¹ Oruç claims that IHH' had indirect role through MILF in Turkey's decision to become involved in the peace process, by saying that "It was MILF who wanted the involvement of Turkey in the process. And IHH had a great effect on that."⁷⁹²

Due to the wide-ranging cooperation between the state NGOs, TİKA has established an NGO Coordination Office to manage state-NGO relations in a structured framework. This office often engages in a relationship with NGOs through providing financial support for the project submitted to the office. In addition, when TİKA needs to take field activities into crises regions, they consult with relevant organisations. This set of actions has been maintained since 2005 and each year state-NGO consultation meetings are organised where civil society has the opportunity to convey their demands. During the interview, I asked about the NGO's role in the decision-making process of TİKA. Two respondents out of three, confirmed a positive correlation between NGOs contribution and the state decision-making process at TİKA:

The contribution of NGOs to the humanitarian activities of TİKA cannot be denied. Turkey has accepted the effect of NGOs on the global scale in the field of humanitarian aid capacity-building. Due to this reality, TİKA decided to establish a unit of the NGO Coordination Office, in response to NGOs' demand. With this unit, a legal basis was established to coordinate the relationship between TİKA and

⁷⁹¹ Hüseyin Oruç, "Geçmişten Günümüze Moro Barış Süreci", Interviewer: H. Z. Kavak. IHH İnsani ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, (İstanbul. 2014), cited in A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization of State-Ngo Relationships in Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case of IHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.47.

⁷⁹² Ibid., p.47.

the NGOs. However, the coordination mechanism is still lacking since the boundaries in the bilateral relations are not fully drawn. Despite the fact that the state is the main actor in these bilateral relations, the humanitarian aid competence and field experience of NGOs are effective in the implementation of humanitarian aid processes due to such characteristics.⁷⁹³

The same question was asked to informant 3 at TİKA, who rather underlined the inadequate form of joint-cooperation on the ground, treating NGOs role in decision-making as low-level:

First of all, it is necessary to evaluate each NGO separately in accordance with their budget, human resources, and historical background. In terms of the humanitarian aid relationship, the state and the NGO act jointly - not the unilateral relationship - and there is a mutual relation, interaction, and dependence... However, there is still a legal shortcoming in Turkish legislation regarding organising a joint cooperation with Turkish NGOs in the foreign territory, which has not yet been legally structured. Besides, no more than 10% of our budget goes to NGO-led projects. The rest is distributed to our coordination offices.⁷⁹⁴

Officers at AFAD also confirmed a close cooperation between the NGOs and the state on humanitarian aid relations. Pointing out the legal background of this linkage (Article 5902), one officer noted that “NGO’s have played an important role in raising public opinion through campaigns with regard to Palestine, Yemen and Arakan crises, which influenced our decisions on towards these crises.”⁷⁹⁵ He continues to emphasise that “we are aware of the growing NGO visibility outside Turkey, therefore we have written an official letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with Turkish NGOs oversea activities in the destination country.”⁷⁹⁶

In contrast to NGO’s search for bottom-up contribution in the decision-making processes of Turkey, state institution’s top-down influence on NGO’s decision-making process is important to be noted. While the scope of this research is beyond responding to this form of relations, a brief expression from NGO sources needs to

⁷⁹³ Interviewee 1 at TİKA, September 24, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁹⁴ Interviewee 3 at TİKA, September 27, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁹⁵ Interviewee 1 at AFAD, September 27, 2018, Ankara.

⁷⁹⁶ Interviewee 1 at AFAD, September 27, 2018, Ankara.

be underlined. While NGO and state workers identify consultation, partnership and dialogue as the level of interaction between the two actors, NGO officials reject any direct influence of state on decision-making of the NGO. İzzet Şahin, the head of IHH's Humanitarian Diplomacy department notes that "IHH acts independently in decision-making, contact-making, and implementation of its projects."⁷⁹⁷ By the same token, another IHH workers Munawwar Hossain notes that IHH has never been commissioned or offered a project by a Turkish state agency.⁷⁹⁸

In short, pertaining to the decision-making issue, informants provided a very patchy picture. Perhaps due to the fact that NGOs deal with difficult and complex matters in which Turkey had been most pervasive and that the shift in power balance towards NGOs was not structurally set. Most of the informants mention the visibility of NGOs at the state level as an important factor, agreeing that "there is no longer a misunderstanding of the role of the NGOs". A necessary condition for understanding the role of NGOs in the decision-making process, however, is a systematic structure that still remains to be developed. Otherwise, the bulk of the analysis remains interpretative.

In sum, across the interviews, I observed that NGOs regard themselves as key actors, contributing to the Turkish humanitarian aid decision-making process. A similar narrative has been observed during the interviews with the state-based respondents. Regarding cooperation with the state institutions, informants were asked whether they make decisions together or unilaterally, and then the NGOs were asked whether they agree or not. Most of the respondents from the state believed that it was a mixture of both. Depending on the issue-areas, state authorities do not try to obscure NGOs activities, since they trust NGOs knowledge and field experience to set the advantages of working together. For instance, the

⁷⁹⁷ Interview with İzzet Şahin, for the Dissertation Thesis, (02.07.2016), cited in A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization of State-Ngo Relationships In Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case Of İHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.43.

⁷⁹⁸ Interview with Munawwar Hossain, for the Dissertation Thesis, (02.07.2016), cited in A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization Of State-Ngo Relationships In Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case Of İHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.43.

Consultation Meetings permits NGOs a de facto engagement in the decision-making process, where they call on the government to take certain action.

6.2.2. Direct and Indirect Role of NGOs

6.2.2.1. Selected FBOs' Role in Agenda-Setting

Agenda-setting is defined as the alternative solutions that are proposed and the relevant parties that are participate. It represents the first stage of the policy cycle. The direct and indirect influence of NGOs in this first stage has always been of much importance in relation to the state.

The scope of agenda addresses various interaction models which lead to interaction between actors and the structural settings changes that are crucial for a change to arise.⁷⁹⁹ In this research selected NGOs are treated as participants in that they seek to exert their influence by setting-agenda and even offering alternative policies. Three factors influence their ability to shape the agenda.⁸⁰⁰ These are, political opportunity in favour of NGOs in waging their campaigning; framing the topic at stake through building normative consensus among fellow organisations; and cooperating with various state institutions to set their issue as agenda of the given state. These factors facilitate the NGO's success in setting agendas.

From this background, this part aims to explore the attempts of NGOs at agenda-setting. It examines how selected NGOs mobilise their organisational capacity by convincing the significance of NGO-led campaigning in agenda-setting process and engaging in public demonstration activities to raise the profile of the issues at stake.

⁷⁹⁹ Micheal Cohen, James March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice", *Administrative Science Quarterly* (17, 1972), p.1-25.

⁸⁰⁰ Hannah Murphy, *The Making of International Trade Policy: NGOs, Agenda-Setting and the WTO* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), p.6.

In the Turkish case, though NGOs still lack the power base from which to enter this initial policy cycle, selected FBOs boast about their participation in the agenda-setting process thanks to leverage they hold. The points of leverage they emphasised are: personal relationship with officials, ground experience on humanitarian aid and organisational strength. To reveal how they apply these in relation with the state, interview questions were asked to NGO workers, and subsequently to officials at TİKA, AFAD and Kızılay. They shared tangible patterns, so each selected quote examines the extent to which NGOs spent their organisational strength in order to get an issue onto the agenda of the Turkish state.

The most visible pattern is NGO's role in setting the agenda of Africa's humanitarian crises within Turkey's political sphere by bringing it to the public attention. Academic studies often handle NGOs role in African issues and Turkey's growing response to African humanitarian crises simultaneously. The head of IHH, Fehmi Bülent Yıldırım links Turkey's attachment to Africa and IHH's role behind in it by noting that:

Actually, Turkey's African policy first began in 1998. However, we were organising many humanitarian activities in this year, even before, when the official step has been taken towards Africa. During the opening up to Africa period, we had a constant relationship with the bureaucrats in Ankara where we found a positive atmosphere to share our opinion on how Turkey could do more regarding the humanitarian aid issue in Africa. I believe that, despite global conjectural problems that Turkey faced at that time, IHH's field activities in the regions played a catalytic role for Turkey. For instance, being one of the main grassroots transnational NGOs in Turkey, we organised the first African conference in Turkey. No one was talking about Africa at that time; we achieved to place African issues on Turkey's agenda. Following our activities, an African conscience has been raised in Turkey. Notwithstanding, we shared our field experience with other NGOs and government agencies to attach Africa, where we played an encouraging role for them. In this sense, we paved the way for the state-NGO cooperation on the African case. As a result, IHH has conducted many joint projects with state actors, including TİKA.⁸⁰¹

This statement highlights a political agenda that IHH seek to employ. Organizing academic activities, seminar or campaigning, IHH upgraded Africa agenda within other political issues at the state level. It represents a political agenda-setting

⁸⁰¹ Interview with Fehmi Bülent Yıldırım, cited in Mustafa Sabancı, Master thesis, "Türkiye-Afrika İlişkilerinde Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Rolü: İnsan Hak Ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı Örneği", *Yalova University*, (2017), p.80.

implication that IHH seek to influence the state. To verify IHH's assertion, I applied the timing variable. In fact, Turkey's Africa policy goes back to 1998, Ismail Cem who proposed the Africa Action Plan as a new policy vision towards Africa.⁸⁰² The idea found robust implementation in 2005. This year was declared as the "Year of Africa" and Turkey was accorded observer status by the African Union in the same year. Following that, Turkey was declared as "Strategic partner" in the 10th African Union Summit in January 2008 and "Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit" was held with high-level participations. From that time onward, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian relationships have escalated.

Although, Turkey declared 2005 as the Year of Africa, the relationship gained a substantial momentum since Turkey was accepted as strategic partner by the African Union in 2008. Therefore, from 2005 to 2008 in particular, NGOs Africa projects were constituted as the prime orientations for Turkey's foreign policy. The claim that IHH is the first NGO to organise an African conference in Turkey seems to be ungrounded, since there is no such activity found in the official web page at IHH and elsewhere. Considering IHH's initial role in aid activities, Bülent Yıldırım might have meant that "IHH is the first civil society organisation that conducted a national campaign for Africa in Turkey (2006 Africa Emergency Aid Campaign)."⁸⁰³ In contrast, TASAM's (Turkish Asian Centre for Strategic Studies) "1st International Turkish - African Congress", which can be given as one of the early academic activities, took place at November 23, 2005 in Istanbul.⁸⁰⁴ However, based on official web page, IHH has organised 482 various campaigns on Africa since 2006. With these campaigns IHH wanted to highlight Africa in Turkey by organising joint activity with the state actors in Africa, sharing field activities with

⁸⁰² Nur Bilge Criss, "Introduction", in Pınar Gözen Ercan (eds.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), p.10.

⁸⁰³ IHH official web page, "Türkiye'de Afrika için ulusal kampanya düzenleyen ilk sivil toplum kuruluşudur (2006 Afrika Acil Yardım Kampanyası)" <https://www.ihh.org.tr/tarihce> (accessed 11.02.2019).

⁸⁰⁴ http://www.tasam.org/en/Etkinlik/116/1st_international_turkish_-_african_congress

fellow relief and aid actors as well Turkish media outlets.⁸⁰⁵ Just within 2008, IHH maintained aid activities in 41 African states in the form of water wells, constructions and medical operations. IHH' leading role in setting the Turkish African agenda is thus best understood in terms of its founding principle pursuing humanitarian crises issues, pushed by its highly committed representatives.

The emerging IHH and other NGOs campaigning about African issues and Turkey's new orientation to Africa were mutually reinforcing and supportive. As Özkan and Akgün wrote "IHH's African campaigns broke new ground in Turkey-Africa relations, and facilitated the activities of many organisations in the region. They have created social awareness and brought Africa to Turkey's attention. The IHH projects have been included in the agenda of meetings between Turkish and African leaders, thus becoming a foreign policy subject themselves."⁸⁰⁶ By the same token, Aras and Akpınar claim that Turkish NGOs activities in Africa "precede Turkey's official reach, leading rather than following this foreign policy activism."⁸⁰⁷ That's to say, the change in Turkey-Africa relations which found favourable perception at the expense of public sphere in 2000s needs to be handled with NGOs special campaigning on Africa.

Therefore, it is safe to say that Turkey' African agenda and NGOs's campaigning coincided and was implemented in parallel to each other. In this process, NGOs worked to build a common agenda and generated a normative consensus among the broader civil society community. Next to matter of prestige, in fact Africa was crucial to widen many NGO's overseas activities with various motivations (humanitarian and religious etc.). Moreover, faith-based organisations popularised Africa as a means to elevate their humanitarian aid projects up to the global scale, not to mention as a pressurising factor in negotiation with the state. In this process,

⁸⁰⁵ Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün, "Turkey's opening to Africa", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (Vol. 48, No. 4, 2010), p.542.

⁸⁰⁶ Ibid., p.542.

⁸⁰⁷ Bülent Aras and Pinar Akpınar, "The Role of Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping* (22:3, 2015), p.240.

reaching to remote areas, having local connections, and voluntary-based membership (free from financial burden) form part of the capacity to influence the state's further actions in Africa. These are assumed to be practiced through campaigning. IHH's Cataract Campaign can be given as an example. IHH has initiated the "100.000 Cataract Surgery" campaign in 2007 and reached success within 10 years, being sponsored by the World Health Organisation and Islamic Development Bank.⁸⁰⁸ For domestic support, TİKA and the Ministry of Health provided assistance by establishing the ophthalmic(eye) hospital in Niger.⁸⁰⁹ The interviewee 1 refers to such a relationship, saying that:

Following the success of IHH's health activity (Cataract Project), domestic response was quite affirmative, and then TİKA followed and performed 12.000 surgeries. As a Turkish NGO, we launched the largest health operations in Africa for the first time with cataract project.⁸¹⁰

Another outstanding feature of selected NGOs is promoting Turkey in Africa with national pride attached to carrying the Turkish flag abroad. In this regard, they attribute themselves a role and responsibility as promoters of Turkey.⁸¹¹ Head of IHH, Fehmi Bülent Yıldırım states on this issue:

In the time of no one else referring to the name of Africa, IHH was organising aid activities in the regions. Therefore, before Turkish institutions and NGOs attached to Africa, IHH created some sort of positive image and background for this attachment. African consciences were thus developed in Turkey. We inform Turkish society on African issues by organising academic activities, campaigning, and publications. Beyond that, thanks to African students who enrol in Turkey, IHH created permanent structure which levelled up bilateral relations. Today, civil relations have been developed with several African nations thanks to student

⁸⁰⁸ We Reached 100.000 aim on Cataract Operation, IHH web page <https://www.ihh.org.tr/haber/katarakt-ameliyatlarinda-100-bin-hedefimize-ulastik> (accessed 09.02.2019).

⁸⁰⁹<https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/ihhnin-afrikada-100-bin-katarakt-ameliyati-projesi-tanitolacak/976685> (accessed 02.11.2018).

⁸¹⁰ Interviewee 1, at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸¹¹Ibid., p.242.

associations that we set up. The activities that we do and constructions we built play a key role in Turkey-Africa relations.⁸¹²

The emphasis on promoting and representing African issues within Turkey's agenda is not a one-way relationship in their attachment to Africa. As Informant 1 notes "we are not only bringing African issues into Turkey's agenda, but also take Turkey's issues to the African agendas."⁸¹³ They often substantiate this through Turkish-based NGOs operating in Africa and Africans who have received an education in Turkey (known as good-will ambassadors) as helping to broaden Turkey's influence in Africa.

In access to the negotiation table, NGOs consistently advocate for the insertion of their agendas and attempt to get their claims accepted by using personal relationships and attracting like-minded actors to build a normative consensus among fellow organisations. A clear-cut pattern is shared by respondent 1 at Yeryüzü Doktorları Association:

The Union of the NGOs of the Islamic World (İDSB), where we are the member, have organised a coordination meeting on the agenda of the Syrian issue. In that meeting, there were representatives of NGOs, officials from AFAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though the agenda was the Syrian issue, we brought the crisis in Chad to the table, noting the need for urgent responses to it. Thanks to our former president Kerem Kınık's pioneering role, AFAD decided to send a plane filled with a humanitarian aid packages to Chad, in which we provided medical, and health aid.⁸¹⁴

In this pattern, two factors need to be underlined that are linked to the agenda-setting framework. First, Yeryüzü Doktorları applied personal connections in setting Chad's issue onto the table. Kerem Kınık's leading role was a distinguishing factor. Second, the Association used peer-pressure tactics to influence state actors. İDSB is used as a suitable platform where they had a favourable place to convince

⁸¹² Interview with Fehmi Bülent Yıldırım, cited in Mustafa Sabancı, Master thesis, "Türkiye-Afrika İlişkilerinde Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının Rolü: İnsan Hak Ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı Örneği", *Yalova University*, (2017), p.80.

⁸¹³ Interviewee 1, at İHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸¹⁴ Interviewee 1, at Yeryüzü Doktorları, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

state actors. They presented how urgent the situation is to address to convince the officials to take the Chad crisis into their agenda and sent humanitarian aid. Therefore, bringing an external topic into table, then convincing parties to send aid is clear example of how an NGO could set an agenda.

One drawback of calling upon policy makers and the state to implement development policy, is that they do not have sufficient local branches or staff to engage in the activities across the world. Therefore, they prefer to support local NGOs or Turkish NGOs in reaching out to remote areas of the world. In that regard certain NGOs have tended to be responsible for the implementation of humanitarian aid (4th policy cycle), since they are organised to implement government policy to remote and hard-to-reach areas. The technical qualification of NGOs who advise state institutions, maintain humanitarian and development policy in fields is related to their specialism, such as Yeryüzü Doktorları's competence on health.

The accounts provided by the informants that NGOs play an important role in agenda-setting, were asked to an officer at TİKA:

NGOs are inextricably active in bringing several neglected issues to the agenda. They are as such nerve endings which drive reactions. Having a deeper connection than the state, NGOs can access the capillary which plays a crucial role in shaping the content of the humanitarian agenda.⁸¹⁵

As seen from the responses, FBOs retain a substantial role in their area of expertise, local outreach, and organisational strength (e.g. flexibility and low-cost activities). In the agenda-setting process, the state-NGO relationship remains in a continuous state of flux. This relationship depends on several factors, including the state's acknowledgment about the credibility of the NGO, political opportunity in favour of NGOs in waging their campaigning, NGOs capability to build a normative consensus among fellow organisations. These factors are directly related to understand the NGOs' role in the agenda-setting process in the Turkish case.

⁸¹⁵ Interviewee 2, at TİKA, September 27, 2018, Ankara. For instance, once I have attended aid activities in Mozambique, two of us from the group travelled to the Nampula region (nearly 865 miles away from capital Maputo). Even, we went further into the rural areas to distribute sacrificed animals (nearly 500 cows) where none of NGOs or state organs existed. Four years after our local aid activities, Turkish embassy was opened in 2011.

Thanks to these factors, Hüdayi, İHH, Yeryüzü Doktorları all shared tangible patterns related to agenda-setting. What's more, selected FBOs maintain the motivation to become directly involved in the very process of agenda-setting. In addition to the need for political motivation to achieve output (set the agenda), the most visible input of FBOs is the introduction of a well-developed sense of change and offering a new way of conducting operations on the ground. Considering previous quotes, the thesis's first hypothesis, entitled (*H₁*): *The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through agenda-setting* seems to be consistent with the cases shared by NGOs and verified by officials.

6.2.2.2. Selected FBOs' Role in Norm-Building

The issue of norm-building in humanitarian aid remains profoundly less prevalent in the Turkish case, compared to celebrated cases such as the ban on slave trade or anti-personnel landmines. Therefore, compared to the other four elements of political role, there are few examples which align with Finnemore and Sikkink's approach to the norm-building.⁸¹⁶ Because, given the granting of any behaviour the status of "the norm" requires a global recognition, at least a third of states should accept this process which Finnemore and Sikkink coin as, the *norm cascade* process.⁸¹⁷ This is the second stage in the global norm-building process, following the norm-emergence (first) and internationalisation of the norm (third stage). During the interviews, the norm issue was observed to be relatively unknown as many informants chose to pass on these questions. The one exception, however, were informants from the İHH who proclaim that their Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) efforts can be seen as the norm. İHH's several activities are classified within HD effort, including the Philippine Moro Peace Process and prisoner swap in Syria. A senior İHH officer notes that:

⁸¹⁶ Finnemore and Sikkink, op.cit., "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", p.892.

⁸¹⁷ Ibid., p. 895.

The first organisation who contributed to the concept of humanitarian diplomacy into NGO literature is IHH. Even, we have a "humanitarian diplomacy" department where professional colleagues working at the academic and practical level under the responsibility of Mr. İzzet Şahin. He has just gone to Geneva to attend the Human Rights Council meeting [...] This concept is so important that we pay great attention to it. For example, in 2013, we have ensured the release of 2,000 civilians and prisoners in Syria through humanitarian diplomacy. This is the largest number of civilians saved from conflict since the Second World War, and IHH achieved this. Even before using concepts by the state such as public diplomacy⁸¹⁸, we were using the concept of humanitarian diplomacy. In our opinion, humanitarian diplomacy includes all actions to save civilian life through the negotiation process with all parties.⁸¹⁹

In this quote, the respondent underlined three factors related to the norm life cycle. First, identification of certain actions as norms. Therefore, it requires firm behaviour that any actor adopt. Second, setting up of special units to maintain such actions, as IHH established a special unit on HD. Third, promoting it on a global scale by attending conferences or organising events in Turkey and beyond. Attending meetings and organising seminars, forums and conferences provides a suitable platform for moving from norm emergency stage to norm cascade. Given this fact, IHH has attended 50 national and international conferences to promote its HD initiatives within 2017.⁸²⁰

İzzet Şahin, Board Member and Diplomacy Coordinator, argues that their engagement in the advocacy effort for oppressed people and human rights are norms which need to be seen as a part of peacebuilding.⁸²¹ He further notes that the reasons for these essential areas is the lack of NGOs operating in conflict zones with the purpose of pursuing humanitarian diplomacy, therefore the particular

⁸¹⁸ The Coordination of Public Diplomacy Unit was established with the Circular No. 2010/3 of the Official Gazette no. 27478 dated 30 January 2010.

⁸¹⁹ Interviewee 1, at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸²⁰ IHH Activity Report 2017, p. 55, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/public/publish/0/118/ihh-faaliyet-raporu---2017.pdf>

⁸²¹ Interview with İzzet Şahin at the meeting on the Role of NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding, Istanbul Policy Centre, Istanbul, 3.12.2013., cited in Aras and Akpınar, op. cit., p.238.

necessity for this policy.⁸²² For instance, IHH's most visible effort in this regard is its mediation role between the Assad Regime and opposition forces, which resulted in the release of 2000 prisoners. While engaging in this activity, IHH applied the support of both domestic and foreign actors. They worked with the UN, Turkish and Lebanese authorities, ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Turkish, Lebanese and Syrian Red Cross. İzzet Şahin describes IHH's role:

IHH was in the centre. It established the coordination between OCHA [UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs], ICRC, Syrian Red Cross, Hatay governorship, and Turkish Airlines. For instant and simultaneous cooperation, we created a whatsapp group, which included all the partners. The operation was accomplished by moving towards the border from the Syrian and Turkish side simultaneously, going to airports from the borders, taking off from the airports at the same moment, and landing at the same moment, and then conducting the exchange. ... Of course, during this exchange the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the governorship, borderline security etc. was among the supporting parties. However, IHH was the key coordinator of all the partners due to its presence in Syria and ease of communication with the Turkish government, since the main exchange took place within Turkey.⁸²³

This case does not show that HD norm is in the process of a global cascade. But it certainly indicates that IHH was able to carry out an operation based on specific humanitarian principles. This operation involved a significant amount of interaction branded as HD by the IHH and thus can be sued as a launching pad or a test case to bring about a larger normative impact. This case indicates that IHH's political role monitored the process successfully. Similar to the Syrian case, certain emergency issues present an opportunity to measure their organisation's strength and contribute to its global recognition. In such a situation, they share their resources and capacities with other stakeholders. The Syrian case is one of them as IHH often engaged in activities and categorised them as humanitarian diplomacy. IHH worked to mobilise support for the recognitions of their HD effort in policy-relevant international organisations. It can be regarded as a process to set from norm emergency stage to norm-cascade stage. By this way, domestic and foreign actors

⁸²² Ibid., p.238.

⁸²³ Interview with İzzet Şahin, cited in A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization of State-NGO Relationships In Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case of IHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.4.

legitimize IHH's local activities by providing essential policy arenas for the network to publicise the link between humanitarian diplomacy and their promotions.

Another important case that IHH proclaims that their HD efforts took place is in the Philippine peace process. As briefly explained IHH's kick starting role in this peace building process, IHH approaches this case from the HD aspect, therefore as a norm. Its political role in this peace process is clearly emphasised by prominent figures at IHH. Ömer Kesmen, IHH's Board of Directors member and Representative of Philippines, underlines IHH roles, saying that "we occasionally visit government offices, as well as the President of Religious Affairs to inform about IHH's peace activities in the Philippines."⁸²⁴ Another Board Member, Hüseyin Oruç, highlights IHH's proactive role in setting a personal channel between Turkish officials and parties in the Mindanao peace platform. IHH's leading role can be interpreted as norm-entrepreneur, since IHH aimed to limit the range of choice, containing actions and operating like rules that define identities or prescribe behaviours of the parties. Interlocutors are conflictual parties and third parties, including Turkey. Here, the main variable is IHH's HD definition and Turkey's interpretation is rather different. Informant 2 from IHH explains this difference:

In 2013, there was the 5th Annual Ambassador Conference in Ankara 2013 with the theme of "Humanitarian Diplomacy", where Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu defined the concept. However, the state's approach to this concept - and ours - is rather different on the content. While the state prioritizes human-oriented foreign policy which seeks alternative solutions in responding to socio-economic hardship, we interpret it in combination with conflict resolution, negotiation, advocacy, humanitarian aid, formal agreements, and other measures.⁸²⁵

Given this statement, there are several important variations on the definition of humanitarian diplomacy between the state and IHH. According to Davutoğlu, the concept "reflects the compassionate and competent character of the Republic of

⁸²⁴ Interview with Ömer Kesmen on 14.07.2016, cited in Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization of State-NGO Relationships In Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case of IHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.44.

⁸²⁵ Interviewee 2, at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

Turkey and depicts the human-oriented nature of our foreign policy which merges our interests with our values. Turkish foreign policy takes human dignity as a point of reference and remains determined to use all its means [TİKA, Kızılay, THY] and capabilities in this direction.”⁸²⁶ He outlines, therefore, three dimensions of HD. The first dimension is related to negotiating problems for Turkish citizens (e.g. visa). The second dimension is Turkey's human-oriented approach in crisis regions. Whilst, the third dimension is acting globally in accordance with the UN system.⁸²⁷ Davutoğlu's political and human-oriented will-formation found in humanitarian diplomacy principles represents a central locus of Turkey's overseas activities during his tenure.

On the other hand, IHH defines the concept within a broader framework based on three pillars: 1) protection of civilians in the man-made or natural made disaster area, 2) rescuing (saving) prisoners in a peaceful manner, and 3) taking a pro-active role where traditional diplomacy is unable to appropriately address and solve problems.⁸²⁸ To cite examples, IHH's humanitarian diplomacy initiatives saw the release of over 2,000 civilians (including 73 women) in exchange for 48 Iranian prisoners;⁸²⁹ and the actualisation of a peace deal between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Philippines.

It is clear that the HD efforts of Turkey and IHH occurred at rather different times. The usage of HD by Turkish authorities stems back to the start of 2010 with the Somalia issue. Yet, Ahmet Davutoglu refers to this in his speech as 2013. On the other hand, without referring to a precise time in the establishment of the Humanitarian Diplomacy Department, the official web page of IHH' lists that the

⁸²⁶ Speech of Ahmet Davutoğlu at Fifth Annual Ambassadors Conference. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/final_declaration_of_the_fifth_annual_ambassadors_conference.en.mfa (accessed 20.10.2018).

⁸²⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects”, *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (41:6, 2013).

⁸²⁸ Ibid., p.3.

⁸²⁹ <http://www.middleeastnews.net/index.php/sid/211864940> (accessed 20.10.2018).

first HD action took place in Syria on April 23, 2012.⁸³⁰ In addition, the rescue of two Turkish journalists took place on May 12, 2012, was regarded a part of HD effort.⁸³¹ Indeed, the first usage of HD by the state or IHH is still open for debate. However, the General Directory of Turkish Archive published a book, "Shelter of the World: Humanitarian Diplomacy from The Ottoman Period to the Present (2016)",⁸³² which claims that the title of Ottoman Leaders as "Cihan-penâh", âlempenâh" is the equivalent of Humanitarian Diplomacy in present terminology.

Neither IHH nor the Turkish political elites have used the term of humanitarian diplomacy. Much earlier, several studies contextualise⁸³³ this as a novel approach, independent from the state's official humanitarian diplomacy in the early 2000s. Staying within the humanitarian domain, however, the concept has yet yielded an internationally recognised statue and does not have a clear definition in international law. Therefore, this concept still necessitates global recognition to be classified as a global norm. But, considering the norm life cycle process based on Finnemore and Sikkink, the concept can best be evaluated within the process of "norm-emergence". Norm entrepreneurs such as The United Nation Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who are pervasive actors, employ appropriate and desirable behaviours to persuade a substantial proportion of the state (at least a third of the total state) to accept this concept as a global norm. Therefore, treating humanitarian diplomacy as a norm

⁸³⁰ <https://www.ihh.org.tr/haber/suriyede-insani-diplomasi-siviller-icin-devrede-1066> (accessed on 20.10.2018).

⁸³¹ <https://www.ihh.org.tr/haber/insani-diplomasinin-buyuk-basarisi-1039> (accessed on 20.10.2018).

⁸³² Uğur Ünal and et al., Osmanlı'dan Günümüze İnsani Diplomasi: Cihan-Penâh (Shelter of the world: humanitarian diplomacy from the Ottoman period to the present), Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü (2016).

⁸³³ Philippe Regnier, "The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Identification of A Community of Practice And Prospects For International Recognition", *International Review of Red Cross* (Vol. 93, December 2011).; and Larry Minear and Hazel Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and Their Craft*, (UN University Press, 2007).

needs to be fully adherence by norm entrepreneurs with the support of the organizational platform.

The concept of norm-building was asked to all respondents at the official level. The common perception shared by officials was the same as that taken by NGOs. Norm by itself is a less attributed terminology amongst the people I interviewed. However, one top-level bureaucrat at the TİKA remarked that:

[...] We can give an example in the field of humanitarian diplomacy. I can say that IHH contributed to this field. The release of the hostages in Syria has fulfilled an important mission. In fact, IHH has arrived in Somalia before us, where they have contributed to provide a safe place for Turks. I know that they have an active role in the solution of some crises as well.⁸³⁴

In short, accepting any behaviour, such as humanitarian diplomacy, into the norm status requires certain global recognition, therefore long-lasting process. But, the norm can be regional or global. Considering IHH's initiatives (Moro and Syria) they would most suit in regional norm initiatives since the addressees are Muslims and maintained regionally restricted coverage. Will it evolve into a global norm, seems to be uncertain for the current picture, yet IHH's attempts should be interpreted in that direction. In other words, IHH can be seen as a norm entrepreneur, but its success in "selling" this in the humanitarian community is an open question. Contrary to other transnational Muslim FBOs and selected Turkish FBOs' apathy attitude towards norm-building process, IHH does seem to consider it with utmost care. IHH claims that it is the first international non-governmental organization in the Islamic world conducting humanitarian diplomacy,⁸³⁵ and is the only Turkish NGO that deals with "humanitarian diplomacy practices".⁸³⁶ Since its international recognition, IHH actively promotes humanitarian diplomacy and the norm-emergence process in global platforms where it has consultant status and

⁸³⁴ Interviewee 2, at TİKA, September 27, 2018, Ankara.

⁸³⁵ History of IHH, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/tarihce> (accessed 21.10.2018).

⁸³⁶ Ahmet Emin Dağ, "Moro Peace Monitoring Mission: A Humanitarian Diplomacy Experience", *INSAMER, Humanitarian and Social Research Center*, (Analysis 13, 2016), p.2.

membership in the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); Organization of Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Funds (OICHF) and several others.

In conclusion, the significant contribution of IHH to HD is evident. It sought and utilised the support of international institutions to be seen as global recognition. Considering the tangible examples including Philippine and Syria support this thesis's initial hypothesis (H₂) *The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through norm building* and its reflections on Turkey's humanitarian policy. However, to what extent does IHH played role in Turkey's policy change is still contested. Most importantly, NGOs' norm-oriented activities found a suitable conjecture in relation to the state during the Ahmet Davutoğlu tenure, but it has lost its importance since then.

Finally, two informants from the state and FBO mentioned *Religious Diplomacy* as a norm.⁸³⁷ However, both respondents did not delve into deeper information on this concept. Therefore, further analysis is limited, and the concept remains relatively unknown. In addition, media coverage also did not yield sufficient information on religious diplomacy either.

6.2.2.3. FBOs' Role in Lobbying

Lobbying refers to an attempt to seek influence from the respective authority on a particular issue to gain advantage. Since non-state actors are similar to interest groups who operate like pressure groups, they do lobby through various channels including personal relationship, professional reports, conferences, workshops, meetings, and forums known as lobbying platforms. In addition to these modes of direct lobbying, there is an indirect way. For instance, if lobbying channels are blocked or if the international platform is more favourable, then NGOs seek

⁸³⁷ One of the few instances, Deputy Chair of the Presidency of Religious Affairs Dr. Selim Argun defines religious diplomacy as "religious diplomacy is the unification of Islamic Sciences and Diplomacy disciplines" http://haber.dpu.edu.tr/tr/haber_oku/5ae6f525c6765/islam-medeniyet-tarihinde-dini-diplomasi-ve-alim-diplomatlar (accessed 02.11.2018).

international allies to put into practice their targeted objectives. Considering the lobbying relationship between the Turkish FBOs and the state, there are several examples which appear to work in favour of the former.

It is generally expressed by the people who are interviewed that NGOs carry out lobbying through individuals to advocate their activities. A definite case on lobbying is implemented by IHH workers during the Philippine peace process. Hüseyin Oruç, board member and the representative of IHH in Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT), highlights that he had often brought the Philippine peace deal to the table in discussing with officials from the foreign ministry and other institutions during the Ahmet Davutoğlu period. It occurred on multiple occasions before IHH's role in the TPMT. During meetings with officials and policy makers, Oruç was lobbying to ensure Turkey takes a possible diplomatic role in this peace deal which Turkey can assume, including membership of the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB). Oruç believes that prior communications through his personal representations have paved the way for Turkey's positive acknowledgement of the diplomatic role of the Turkish NGO in the peace deal,⁸³⁸ in which Turkey joined IDB in 2014. Before that, IHH became a member of the TPMT in 2013 on its establishment. After IHH's success in joining TPMT, Oruç paid a visit to the Turkish embassy in his first trip as a TPMT member. Soon after, an official from the Turkish embassy invited Hüseyin Oruç to share insights after the first meeting on the monitoring team. Regarding the meeting at the Turkish embassy, Oruç remarks that "the meeting at the Embassy was overall positive, the government approved and encouraged our position in this monitoring team." He adds that for the first time an NGO (IHH) undertook a diplomatic role in the TPMT and the state welcomed this role.⁸³⁹ Ahmet Davutoglu praised this peace deal, saying that "we are very happy to see this process is very successful and we are

⁸³⁸ Interview with Hüseyin Oruç for the Master Thesis, June 6, 2016, A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization of State-Ngo Relationships in Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case of IHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.45.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.45.

very proud that the chairman of the Independent Decommissioning Board is a Turkish diplomat.”⁸⁴⁰

Applying the timing factor to verify IHH’s political role, it is necessary to look at Turkey’s engagement to the Mindanao peace process. Based on the web page of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of Turkey has been actively contributing this peace process since the 1970s, but an official step has been taken in November 2009 as Turkey become the member of the International Contact Group (ICG).⁸⁴¹ In this group, Turkey attended the meeting as an official observer in the negotiation process, taking place between the government of the Philippines and the MILF. Following the ICG membership, five years later Turkey joined to the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB), which is one of the six actors in the Third Parties structure in the peace deal, including Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Mediator (Malaysia), the International Contact Group, the International Monitoring Team, the Third-party Monitoring Team. Turkey’s membership actualised nearly one year after IHH’s membership in TPMT. Therefore, IHH’s influence through lobbying tends to reach its success. Until this process, IHH set a grass root link to Moro Muslims since 1996 through humanitarian aid activities by appointing a permanent representative to organise humanitarian aid activities in Philippine, while TİKA’s Manila Office was opened in April 2015. IHH’s leverage, including personal lobbying, being an official part of the peace deal and its long-lasting aid flow towards the region, played an influential role on Turkey’s attachment into the IDB. IHH’s claim, that it assumed a positive contribution on Turkey’s active engagement, seems to be consistent when considering the timing.

In the Philippine peace process, IHH successfully projected their own role through lobbying. This has captured the attention from the state actors, so IHH’s role was promoted by Turkish authorities. However, in this case, lobbying by itself cannot

⁸⁴⁰ Turkey to support Mindanao peace process. The Philippine Star we page, November 2014 <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/11/18/1393006/turkey-supportmindanao-peace-process> (accessed 23.05.2019).

⁸⁴¹Relationship between Turkey and Philippines, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-philippines_.en.mfa (accessed 23.05.2019).

be interpreted as a single technique applied to influence Turkey's positive approach to IHH's role. Nor Hüseyin Oruç's personal attempt and IHH's core competence in the shaping process. These are inevitable reflections on the degree and dimension of IHH's influence. Besides them, IHH's success on framing the Philippine peace process, common sensibility between the political elite and IHH towards Philippine Muslims, and Philippine Muslims' positive approach to IHH must be taken into consideration equally in analysing the relationship with the state.

Another case is where IHH mediated various local disputes between conflicting parties in Libya, as a part of humanitarian diplomacy initiatives. In this case, IHH did lobbying for the participation of the Turkish state in the peace process in which IHH employed kick-starter pattern of relationship with the state.⁸⁴² İzzet Şahin, the chair of IHH's Humanitarian Diplomacy Department, remarks that IHH played great role in the involvement of Turkey in the final agreement as a third party in the Libya peace agreement. According to Şahin, IHH did lobby to convince Turkey to be a part of the agreement and to finalize the process successfully, since the NGO lacked the enforcing power to guarantee compliance to the negotiated agreement.⁸⁴³

Selected NGOs apply direct and indirect lobbying in relation to the state. Among these forms of influence, meeting (forum, seminar etc.) and person-to-person relations are the most visible way of interactions in regard to lobbying. These two modes of interactions are emphasised by several interviewees.

The situation in Aceh, Indonesia was getting worse and worse. I was working at Deniz Feneri, and on behalf of it, we went to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). We thought that the General Secretary of OIC- Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu's power at the decision level would be respected. We told him that the Islamic world needs to take a step. It is necessary to establish a structure in the presence of your cooperation. We proposed to establish a common structure in the field of humanitarian aid and, he promised to support it. Then, we established the "International Humanitarian Aid Forum", gathered 13 different entities from Muslim countries and institutions established by Muslims in the West. The first

⁸⁴² A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization of State-Ngo Relationships in Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case of IHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University*, (2016), p.46.

⁸⁴³ Interview with İzzet Şahin for the Master Thesis, July 2, 2016, A. Faruk Demircioğlu, op. cit., p.47.

meeting was held in Istanbul in 2006. I did the coordination process of this organisations by myself. There were also IHH and IBS⁸⁴⁴ as [the] Turkish NGOs, with other organizations from Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, England, and the USA. Our objectives were: 1) Affiliation to OIC. 2) Act together with the framework of common plan and coordination. However, when the Deniz Feneri case erupted, the project remained unfinished.⁸⁴⁵

Although Deniz Feneri's attempt has not succeed, such a phrase underlines direct and indirect lobbying at the same time. Here, three interlinked factors are applied by Deniz Feneri which can be set to lobbying form of role. First, Deniz Feneri thought that the OIC could be an external factor, in convincing respective parties to pursue a humanitarian activity towards Indonesia. Being an international platform, the power of the OIC over Muslim states is thought to be a suitable channel to direct aid. This is an indirect way of lobbying. Second, the general secretary's identity (Turkish) was thought of as leverage for easing the agreement to give humanitarian aid. Third, in addition to the indirect lobbying, Deniz Feneri organised a Forum where direct lobbying took place. A similar instance is shared by a respondent from Cansuyu, saying that:

Every year, we gather globally well-recognised Muslim leaders in the Muslim Union Congress. The agenda for each year changes in accordance with global development such as Syria, Myanmar, Islamophobia, etc. In that Congress, we invite government officials to reach a consensus on the issue where we are lobbying with our local and international partners.⁸⁴⁶

Providing examples of indirect lobbying, FBOs, in both samples, attempted to influence the state with this technique. By deploying intelligently strategic methods, Cansuyu applied the peer-pressure⁸⁴⁷ strategy. Gaining external support thus facilitated the pursuit of a more distinctive effect as well as increasing the rate of accomplishing the targeted projects, as the internal support was ineffective.

⁸⁴⁴ Uluslararası İşbirliği ve Yardımlaşma Derneği, International Cooperation, and Benevolent Association, the official web page, <https://www.ibs.org.tr/>

⁸⁴⁵ Interviewee 1 at Kızılay, September 10, 2018, Ankara.

⁸⁴⁶ Interviewee 1 at Cansuyu, September 13, 2018, Ankara.

⁸⁴⁷ Peer-pressure refers a certain degree of influence on behaviours of actors from another actor that interact with socially and professionally.

The strength of lobbying depends on several conditions, such as the financial strength of the organization, involvement in the negotiation cycle at the right time, well-designed entrepreneurial strategies and personal proximity of people with government delegations. These conditions are applied by respective FBOs,

Thanks to our President Bülent Yıldırım's personal contact with the people in the Department of Associations, we were involved in the changing process of the Regulations of 2004 on Association. I clearly remember that he personally called the respective people and conveyed IHH's contribution to that Regulation's content. [...] IHH conducted both direct and indirect lobbying.⁸⁴⁸

The feature that interviewee 2 at IHH emphasised was using personal relations as catalysts in their lobbying. IHH and the majority of selected NGOs bear a religious sensibility, representing a common objective with the government. This identity is treated as a positive feature embedded in a personal level relationship in humanitarian aid. Knowing that their humanitarian activities often have consequences for Turkey's image beyond border, NGOs do lobby at the state officials who approach them favourably. A top-level worker from Kızılay stressed that,

Under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, there was a Somali Coordination meeting in 2011. In that meeting, two institutions from the Civil society were present: Kızılay and the Diyanet Foundation. There was a remarkable cooperation with great synergy. Later on, during the Ahmet Davutoğlu tenure, Murtaza Yetiş was assigned to coordinate the Syrian issue. Since Mr. Yetiş has an NGO background and believes in the merit of state-NGO cooperation, we have accomplished an abundance of work within a short time and carried out the process in a different dimension.⁸⁴⁹ However, after Davutoğlu and Murtaza Yetiş, the coordination mechanism could not continue.⁸⁵⁰

⁸⁴⁸ Interviewee 2 at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸⁴⁹ One of the speeches of Murtaza Yetiş on the issue of Syrian case, he says, "Today (August 2015), together with the public and NGOs, we have discussed this issue (Syria) in length. The province of Hatay is a city that reflects an ancient culture where it is now hosting thousands of Syrians. Thanks to the contribution of public institutions, our government, and NGOs, the problems have minimised", <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/basbakanlik-basdanismani-yetis-goc-akinlarini-hatay-yerelhaber-944395/> (accessed 02.11.2018).

⁸⁵⁰ Interviewee 1 at Kızılay, September 10, 2018, Ankara.

Based on these accounts, the manner and scale of the lobbying relationship between the state and FBOs differentiates. This is particularly perceptible, in part, for person-to-person bases, rather than pertaining to the structured process as a whole. Considerations of this kind probably help to account for some essential influence in the tenure of the officer who is in power. In other words, this relationship is consistent throughout the duration of those respective people's terms at the various levels. One of the interviews from Deniz Feneri follows a similar pattern by pointing out the importance of the approach taken by top-level bureaucrats toward civil society organisations and their previous experience on this nexus,

At present, the people who are in important positions in the state institutions have a civil society background. For example, former Head of AFAD Fuat Oktay - now Vice President - was Head of the Yeryüzü Doktorları Association. The current president of AFAD, Mehmet Güllüoğlu, also served for a long time in various NGOs, before he was appointed as the Head of AFAD. The current Chairman of Kızılay Kerem Kınık, General Manager İbrahim Altan, and the Deputy General Manager Mustafa Tutkun and more in state institutions, have a civil society background. This illustrates the degree of relationship between the state and NGOs. Thanks to these people, state-NGO cooperation has moved up to new levels.⁸⁵¹

Given that AFAD and Kızılay are major actors in humanitarian aid, the NGOs focuses their efforts on lobbying through these NGO-origin officials, arguing that these people are leverage for aid activities. The role of these people is expressed by various respondents. Interviewee 2 from İHH confirms such role, stating that "Fuat Oktay, Kerem Kınık, İbrahim Altan, Mustafa Tukun, these are officials with an NGO-origin, occupying an important position at the state. Thanks to them, the interaction between the state and NGOs has increased. Today, it is easier to communicate with these people, since they are aware of reality. They play a dynamic role in understanding the problems that we face and in solving them."⁸⁵² Moreover, Interviewee 1 from Hüdayi underscores a similar point, noting that the relationship between the state and NGO has been positively influenced since these people came to power. Mehmet Güllüoğlu is a favourable example of this

⁸⁵¹ Interviewee 1 at Deniz Feneri, September 12, 2018, Ankara.

⁸⁵² Interviewee 1 at İHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

relation.⁸⁵³ By the same token, Interviewee 1 from Beşir Association remarks that “since NGO-origin people came to power, we easily get much faster appointments from the state, they reduced bureaucratic difficulties and favourably influenced our field activities.”⁸⁵⁴ Notwithstanding, interviewee 1 from Yeryüzü Doktorları shared a definite case by attributing the role of these people,

Güllüoğlu, Altan, Tutkun etc., these are the names who have an NGO background. They act as a bridge between the state and NGOs. Despite the lack of an institutional background of this bridge, these people removed the bureaucratic red tape (bürokratik kırtasiyecilik) when they were appointed. For instance, I believed they secured the recent passing of the Decree of General Directorate of Civil Society Relations, which has been waiting since the July 15 event.⁸⁵⁵

Although several other informants confirm such a revival in state-NGOs relations once these people came to power at the state institutions, interviewee 2 from TİKA approached this relation from a different perspective, while noting a positive correlation on this regard:

Actually, the process worked like this. At the onset, the state supported civil society organisations and helped them to gain ground experience in the field. Later on, this accumulated experience and knowledge has been transferred to the state by appointing these people at the state level. The most important point is that civil society organisations should stay in the civil area and the state should remain in line with the state identity, and through this, they can understand each other and develop a common model.⁸⁵⁶

As such, the responses outline the point that lobbying is not a well-structured mechanism in state-NGO relations. Turkey’s political landscape, which often changes to also deter person-to-person relations, is one of the factors contributing

⁸⁵³ Interviewee 1 at Hüdayi Foundation, September 20, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸⁵⁴ Interviewee 1 at Beşir Association, September 24, 2018, Ankara.

⁸⁵⁵ Interviewee 1 at Yeryüzü Doktorları, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸⁵⁶ Interviewee 2 at TİKA, September 27, 2018, Ankara. The Presidential Decree of 3rd has released Appointment Procedure in public institutions on 10 July 2018. According to this Decree, the President can appoint a director or top-level manager at the state institutions on condition of several requirements. (see the Decree, <https://www.memurlar.net/common/news/documents/761318/kamu01.pdf>)

to this. Primarily due to the fact that unlike FBOs' institutional memory, people at the ruling level often change. As interviewee 1 from Yeryüzü Doktorları emphasise this circumstance, remarking "lobbying take place at the person-to-person level. In other words, rather than an NGO's core competence, NGOs maintain lobby activity through their individual relationship in the Turkish case. In the nature of things, as people change from their position, then this mechanism disappears."⁸⁵⁷

Another factor which was often raised during the interview is the perceptual dimension of lobbying, given that many of the informants attached a negative connotation to the lobbying concept, identifying it from the western point of view. Therefore, they were hesitant to respond.

All in all, this dissertation's third hypothesis- (*H₃*) *The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through lobbying-* is evident in considering the personal relationship between NGO workers and the state official. It is probable that lobbying activities will become more important in determining the course of state-NGO humanitarian aid relations which is likely to increase the dialogue level of interaction in the years to come. In large part, this can be attributed to assignments of NGO-origin people to the aid-related institutions. Yet, it is very premature to predict a mainstream analysis on this issue since their appointment to state positions is quite recent, mostly post-2013.

6.2.2.4. FBOs' Role in Framing and Public Opinion

Another element of political role is framing issues in such a way as to appeal to state interests or to influence public opinion. The construction of the cognitive frame is a key factor in NGOs' influence on the preference and behaviour of the government. Therefore, it is directly related to the construction of social reality. In reference to it, the concept of framing essentially selects some aspect of perceived

⁸⁵⁷ Interviewee 1 at Yeryüzü Doktorları, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

reality and makes it more salient in the communicating text,⁸⁵⁸ resonating with a broader public consent. The role of NGOs lies in their competence to determine the content of an issue and define its extent. In this respect, framing plays an integral role in humanitarian aid relations between Turkey and selected FBOs. IHH's approach to the Moro Peace process can be set as a clear pattern of framing. Interviewee 2 at IHH underlines how they framed the Moro process, noting that:

IHH is the member of the TPMT (Third Party Monitoring Team) in the Moro Philippine Peace Deal.⁸⁵⁹ In other words, it is a Peace Monitoring Team member with other five partners,⁸⁶⁰ where we have been working for nearly 6 years. Initially, Turkish authorities approached this case negatively, considering this issue like the PKK question. Because of this security-oriented perspective, they pursued a defensive attitude. However, we approached this case from a humanitarian diplomacy perspective, so in each platform (media, seminar, workshops) we disseminated information on Philippino Muslim's rights. Since public support has increased day by day, the point that we reached today is very different. Now, our ambassador is dealing with us, having negotiations and approaches this case positively. At this point, changes in the political aura and mind-set of bureaucrats should be handled together with our contribution to this issue.⁸⁶¹

The Moro peace deal requires further scrutiny since it address two interrelated factors on the framing issue and IHH's potential contribution for Turkey. The first factor is that IHH interprets the Moro issue differently from the state. Hüseyin Oruç, IHH's representative to the TPMT, describes IHH's early role in Moro in 1990s as "we attached to Moro since 1996 with a continuous process, at that time our aid capacity was small-scale. Despite it, our presence aimed to show our solidarity with

⁸⁵⁸ Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward a clarification of a fractured paradigm", *The Journal of Communication* (43, 1993), p.55.

⁸⁵⁹ For those who wish to know more on this issue can see, Dr. Ahmet Emin Dağ, "Moro Peace Monitoring Mission: A Humanitarian Diplomacy Experience", *IHH Humanitarian and Social Research Center*, (Analiz 13) <http://insamer.com/rsm/files/Moro-Peace-Monitoring-Mission.pdf> and see also, <https://www.ihh.org.tr/haber/moro-baris-surecinde-tarihi-adim-atildi-2060> (accessed 18.10.2018).

⁸⁶⁰ The monitoring committee of Moro Peace Deal is composed of five members: former EU ambassador to the Philippines Alistair Macdonald, IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation Board Member Hüseyin Oruç, representative of the Asian Foundation Steven Rood, the head of Peace Institution Gaston Z Ortigas and President of Mindanao Human Rights Action Center Zainuddin Malang.

⁸⁶¹ Interviewee 2 at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

Moro Muslims, since we are part of the same body and part of the *ummah*.”⁸⁶² IHH’s early approach to the Moro process was based on brotherhood and ummah consciousness, therefore a religious perspective. While providing relief aid and regular food distribution since 1996, IHH framed its activities as a form of global Muslim solidarity, positing itself as the protector of Muslims and helping the oppressed, similar to IHH’s reaction towards Bosnian and Chechnya Muslims in the late 1990s. However, when it comes to the late 2000s, IHH started to take a diplomatic role and framed the Philippine peace deal from Humanitarian Diplomacy perspective, therefore human rights and self-governing rights to Moro Muslims. In this regard, Hüseyin Oruç remarks that “thanks to our initiatives, several of the state and NGO actors attached to the peace process in 2010s. One thing we pay great attention to is that this peace deal will give broad autonomy for Moro people, including a self-governing structure. There will be a bi-law structure and Islamic law will be implemented inshallah.”⁸⁶³ Following the peace agreement in 2014, Oruç remarked that “an autonomous Muslim state is on the verge of establishment. Turkey will contribute to the establishment and development of this state.”⁸⁶⁴ Compared to the earlier approach in the 1990s, IHH attributed and narrated the Moro peace process from a Humanitarian Diplomacy frame in the 2010s, therefore advocacy to Muslim minority’s rights and freedoms. This perspective is more normative and inclusive than the humanitarian aid perspective, and it encompasses three pillars: protection of civilians in the man-made or natural made disaster area; rescuing (saving) prisoners in peaceful manners; and taking a proactive role where traditional diplomacy is unable to appropriately address and solve problems.⁸⁶⁵

⁸⁶² Interview with Hüseyin Oruç, <http://www.medeniyetvakfi.org/vakif/ana-sayfa/guencel-haberler/moro-muslumanlarinin-72-yillik-mucadelesi-2> (accessed 22.05.2019).

⁸⁶³ Ibid.,

⁸⁶⁴ Moro’yu Türkiye inşa edecek, 1711.2014, <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/moroyu-turkiye-insa-edecek-2026138> (accessed 22.05.2019).

⁸⁶⁵ A. Dağ, “Moro Peace Monitoring Mission...”, op. cit., p.3.

On the other hand, Turkey addressed the Moro peace deal from an autonomy and a freedom perspective, but it rejected the applicability of the case into the Kurdish issue. The government was uncomfortable with linking a relationship between Moro process and the Kurdish issue for two reasons.⁸⁶⁶ First, the ruling party refrains from interpreting the Islamist autonomy movement as the same experience on the Kurdish peace process. Second, being in the same frame, the government harshly objects to involvement of any third party into the Kurdish issue, while the Moro peace process welcomed third party involvement. That is to say, the distinction between IHH and the state lies in the methodology they employed on the Moro case. IHH framed the case from a humanitarian diplomacy context with embedding motivation as the struggle of Muslim people (religious aspect) to build an autonomous structure in their historical lands. Whereas Turkish authorities approached their problem from a security-oriented perspective. Despite Turkey's early stance, it has softened its standpoint and got involved in the peace deal actively during the Ahmet Davutoğlu tenure. In this visit to Philippines as Prime Minister, he stated that "We are very happy to see this process is proceeding successfully and we are very proud that the chairman of the Independent Decommissioning Board is a Turkish diplomat."⁸⁶⁷ Turkey's proactive attachment is realised by assuming the International Contact Group (2009) and the Chairmanship of the Independent Decommissioning Body (2014).

The second factor is about a potential contribution of IHH to Turkey's involvement in the peace process. As discussed in the section on *NGOs role in lobbying*, IHH did lobby and played active role to Turkey's further involvement in the peace process in 2013. Before Turkey's active involvement in the deal, IHH had taken a diplomatic role in becoming a member of the TPMT which was accepted by the IHH's own will, without any prior communication and consultation with the

⁸⁶⁶ Nuray Mert, Moro'lu Müslümanlara otonomi, Kürtlere 'Kamu düzeni', <http://www.diken.com.tr/moro-muslumanlarina-barisi-kurtlere-kamu-duzenini-reva-gormek-nasil-bir-anlayistir/> (accessed 22.05.2019).

⁸⁶⁷ Aurea Calica, "Turkey to support Mindanao peace process", The Philippine Star November 18, 2014, <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/11/18/1393006/turkey-support-mindanao-peace-process> (accessed 30.05.2019).

government, according to Hüseyin Oruç.⁸⁶⁸ Two factors paved the way of IHH's official membership of the TPMT: IHH's proactive presence in Mindanao since 1996, and the global recognition it received following the Mavi Marmara event.⁸⁶⁹ In this case the domestic support that IHH received, amongst local people in Moro society, was due to IHH's stance on the Palestine case. As Oruç emphasises that IHH's adoption of the Palestinian case generated sympathy with Moro Muslims which was important factor for the MILF.⁸⁷⁰

Accordingly, the process of framing is inseparable from public opinion, in which the two concepts are often associated. Since civil society organisations attempt to convince, persuade and socialise other actors through the framing process, they apply various methods including media to influence the public. As such, public opinion will indirectly put pressure on the given state:

As a foundation, its financial sources are based on people's donations, often applying for public support in various means. Through mosques, the Foundation's visibility over the public is much ahead of others. For instance, in the case of Myanmar, we apply for public support and increased awareness on this issue. Our Foundation has released a short Documentary Movie, "Stay Alive-Hayatta Kal"⁸⁷¹, which deals with the Myanmar government's oppressive genocide over Muslim civilians. Those people's challenging living conditions and their struggle to escape are displayed. The drama of these people was shared with Turkish society through the media. Our workers, who are engaged in humanitarian aid activities, brought first-hand information to the public to increase awareness. In the final analysis, we have seen a great deal of sympathy and compassion towards Myanmar Muslims in Turkey. We measured the occurrence of this compliance in two ways: 1) Public opinion survey. 2) Looking at the increase in the amount of donations. As a result of these activities, we observed a significant increase in social awareness towards the Myanmar case.⁸⁷²

⁸⁶⁸ Interview with Hüseyin Oruç for the Master Thesis, June 6, 2016, A. Faruk Demircioğlu, Master Thesis "A Categorization of State-Ngo Relationships in Humanitarian Diplomacy: The Case of IHH In The Philippine Peace Process", *Sabancı University* (2016), p.44.

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid., p.37.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid., p.36.

⁸⁷¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vRdbEzdIt38>

⁸⁷² Interviewee 1 at Diyanet Foundation, September 14, 2018, Ankara.

In the movie, Stay Alive-Hayatta Kal, the Myanmar issue was depicted through the frame of genocide against the innocent Muslims. Systematic torture, persecution, and religious identity was brought to the fore to increase moral leverage due to Turkish society's extremely high sensitivity to such issues. Therefore, what occurs in Turkey's humanitarian sensibility towards Myanmar is related to the increasing attachment of NGOs to this issue. The linkage between the Foundation's campaign on Myanmar and civil society's abundant donations and awareness of this issue is necessarily linked.

It was pointed out that framing is also related to public opinion. Therefore, the questions on the role of public opinion were also asked to those in state organisations:

Indeed, civil society organisations are playing a role in humanitarian aid by using public opinion. Bringing the issues to Turkey from crises regions, increasing awareness in the eyes of society and mobilizing the society's emotional sense, NGOs carry out important tasks at this point. Even though Turkey is proud of its generosity, NGOs' social networks are much wider, can penetrate local society deeper and wider. For example, the role of NGOs in influencing public opinion on the Somali case is evident. Even, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Somalia, NGO's role through raising public opinion was essential.⁸⁷³

[...] On the issues of Palestine, Yemen, Myanmar, Syria, etc., NGOs have played such an immense role through their campaigning. Sharing the economic and political burden of the state, no discussion of humanitarian aid would be complete without mention of a vast range of NGOs contribution, that they have made the emergency issue peculiarly their own.⁸⁷⁴

According to the first informant, Turkey's engagement in the Somali crisis stems from various factors, including NGOs and the role of the media. There was a marked improvement in the overall aid flow of NGOs, nearly doubling that of the previous year and totalling \$199.5-million in aid in 2011. Various celebrities and

⁸⁷³Interviewee 1 at TİKA, September 24, 2018, Ankara.

⁸⁷⁴Interviewee 1 at AFAD, September 27, 2018, Ankara.

NGOs have initiated great campaigns to draw public attention in Turkey to the Somali crisis, gaining great support during the holy month of Ramadan in 2011.⁸⁷⁵

One of the visible campaigns was “Humanity is not dead”, organised by Kimse Yok Mu Association with a nation-wide TV programme on 12, August 2011. In the live broadcast, a record donation (25 million Turkish Lira) was gathered with generous donations from various well-known celebrities.⁸⁷⁶ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan directly connected to this TV campaigning through cell phone and explained government’s ongoing and future activities in Somalia. This campaigning led to an immense domino effect on a large proportion of Turkish society, spanning across the political, business, media, entertainment spectrum, raising awareness on the most enduring drought and scarcity of the last 70 years in Somalia. Nearly one week after this Campaigning, Erdoğan paid an official visit to Somalia with a crowded delegation including celebrities.⁸⁷⁷ The success of this campaign can be considered as an essential factor in the government’s initiative to Somalia, both responding to voters’ views and expectations.⁸⁷⁸

In the case of Somalia, NGO and the state’s humanitarian aid relations had reached an all-level high. Ahmet Davutoğlu verifies this partnership level of interaction in his article, noting that: “Today, everyone comes across signs of Turkey’s presence wherever it goes in Somalia. Furthermore, Turkey’s understanding of humanitarian diplomacy is multifaceted and multi-channelled; there have been contributions from several of Turkey’s public institutions and NGOs, ranging from Turkish Airlines to

⁸⁷⁵“Policy Report of IPM/IPC”, *Sabancı University Istanbul Policy Center* (March 2015), p.7.

⁸⁷⁶<https://www.takvim.com.tr/dunya/2011/08/12/canli-yayinda-afrikaya-25-milyon-tl-bagis>(accessed 23.05.2019).

⁸⁷⁷Erdoğan’s Somali Ziyareti, <https://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-somali-ziyareti/a-15324269> (accessed 23.05.2019).

⁸⁷⁸Christie-Miller, “Turkey takes the lead in rebuilding Somalia”, *The Christian Science Monitor* (5 June 2012).

TİKA, Kızılay, TOKI, and AFAD”.⁸⁷⁹ On the ground, the state’s visibility tends to increase year by year, following the NGO-led initiatives which raised a public awareness.

In short, this thesis’s fourth hypothesis *-(H₄) The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey’s humanitarian aid policy and practice through framing-* matched what NGO and state officials said and shared examples. The quotes show that selected FBOs have been able to mobilise public opinion which went along with insider and outsider activity. That is to say, public opinion is mobilised to influence humanitarian issues by using a non-confrontational approach with the aim of gauging the attention of the government. The efforts that selected FBOs have made in this domain have already borne fruit in various campaigns, including Pakistan (2005), Somalia (2011), Myanmar (2013) and more recently Syria (2012...). To understand the exact interaction in which humanitarian issues appear and disappear in the public platform and become salient in the state, these NGO-led campaigns have clearly eased to stimulate public conscious - and in turn a political response.

6.2.2.5. FBOs’ Role in Information Providing

Information by itself is a key variable that NGOs play role in state’s policy, but equally important is analysing the information to account for factors such as the reliability, objectivity and integrity of the data and its source. In other words, the issue of providing information refers to a complex structure that does not simply pertain to the generation of pure knowledge. Therefore, we need to go beyond knowing the facts and figures associated with it and place the issue in context by showing cohesion and correlations between them. For example, by providing information on how specific issues, the agenda-setting, framing, and even decision-making processes can be influenced. In other words, information can directly

⁸⁷⁹ Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy”, op.cit., p.867.

mobilize all other political roles, as seen in the examples of policy change and agenda-setting from the responses below:

Although we have recently attached to the water well projects, in a short time we have made significant progress. Previous water well projects⁸⁸⁰ are based on manually drawn system (drainage) which costs \$ 2-3,000. I have learned that the drainage system is very close to the surface, and the water wells constructed with this system are only as deep as to 5-10-20 m and they last-long no more than 6 months, because they are not artesian wells. We have prepared a project, based on an appropriate technical infrastructure through cooperating with the State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su işleri-DSİ), national and international organizations. In this project, water wells are planned to be as deep as 100 m to reach artesian water which can last as long as 10 years and work with electric and solar energy [...] Later on, AFAD planned to open up water wells in Myanmar (Bangladesh), then invited the respective NGO and we presented our project. In that meeting, the president of the AFAD praised our project, and he made the following statement: “we should take the example of the Diyanet Foundation, their model of water wells should be applied.” We have created a model in this field.⁸⁸¹

The information is also associated with facts. The above quote examines that DF shared their accumulated knowledge on the views of a model during the meeting which was ultimately praised by the officials. This is a case where DF contextually shaped the scope of the meeting by sharing information on their water wells. This information played an important role for the future aid activities of AFAD, as the respondent claimed. A more precise instance is shared by the informant 1 from Yeryüzü Doktorları:

As is known, no organisations from Turkey could enter Gaza over the last two years. Even Kızılay was unable to enter there. We are the first organization in the region from Turkey after many years to enter Gaza. Following our step in the region, our volunteers made observations which were later prepared as an Analysis Report.⁸⁸² These reports are shared with state institutions, including TİKA. In light

⁸⁸⁰ This address NGO-led Project since I have been confirmed by DSİ that their projects are not drainage system.

⁸⁸¹ Interviewee 2, at Diyanet Foundation, September 25, 2018, Ankara.

⁸⁸² However, I have not found sufficient documents regarding Yeryüzü Doktorları’s activities in Gaza during 2018. Only, a short information on its attachment into the regions from March 2018 is shared by official web-page, <https://www.yyd.org.tr/yeryuzunden-haberler/gazze/> (accessed 28.11.2018).

of our data reports, various projects by Ministry of Health, TİKA and AFAD are currently being prepared towards Gaza.⁸⁸³

The case shared by Yeryüzü Doktorları demonstrates that an NGOs's sharing of data could influence further activities toward certain regions. Since this NGO enjoys privileged access to respond to crises on health matters (humanitarian) due to its expertise on health issues, it has special capacity to operate as a highly important actor in attempting to influence Turkey's humanitarian policy deliberations in terms of information-providing. Therefore, the NGOs working area is a key factor in providing sufficient and reliable information.

IHH's Philippines representative Ömer Kesmen shared a similar instance. He comments on the relationship between Turkey and IHH's mutual relations, saying that "we were not able to undertake a joint project with TİKA so far. However, in our meetings and consultations with them, we point out to the fields in which there is a need and deficiency, and then they develop projects in those fields."⁸⁸⁴ Such a phrase underlines that IHH tries to direct the state towards neglected areas through sharing information on those crises. Kesmen furthermore adds that a mutual relationship with other state actors is also available where IHH presents reports and information on the issues that need to be addressed to the state officials.⁸⁸⁵ Similar to previous cases, several other interviewees underlined a positive correlation between NGOs information and the state's acknowledgement of its importance.

Since NGOs' have knowledge about the field, they contribute to the state on how to follow a policy at the local level. Information about geographically and socially distant regions is provided by NGOs that would not otherwise be available to the state. For example, the matter of humanitarian aid in Myanmar has reached the level of satisfaction, and we have even seen that some of the NGOs' products are being sold with money. We urged state authorities to change aid policy in that region from short-term aid to a more long-term development policy such as aid for

⁸⁸³ Interviewee 2, at Yeryüzü Doktorları, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸⁸⁴ Interview with Ömer Kesmen for the Master Thesis, Jul 14, 2016, A. Faruk Demircioğlu, op.cit., p.47.

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid., p.47.

education or health. Together with other NGOs, the information that we shared with related institutions, directed the state's further involvement.⁸⁸⁶

Over the last two years, we have established a camp with more than 2,000 tents for the civilians in Myanmar where 40,000 people benefited. Since our activities represent a significant part of the aid, TİKA officers required a detailed report on our operations during the visit of former Ministry of Health, Recep Akdağ to this camp. We explained all our activities one by one. Then the minister thanked us for our ground activities. The reports presented by NGOs have been important data for the state's further activities in the region, such as establishing camps and sending equipment to victims.⁸⁸⁷

These informants' remarks imply that the information on the Palestine and Myanmar issues is useful in their attempt to play a role in state's other humanitarian aid activities. Having worked on various issues, informants from FBOs seek to show how useful NGOs are to state institutions, who give them access and rely on their expertise. There is a genuine respect for the role that NGOs play in providing micro information, owing largely to their ability to bring the minute detailed information about the actual nature of the questions on the ground since they are locally-based, well-connected actors. Findings from my personal field experience verify this assertion, through joining aid activities in Tanzania in 2017. Four local partners (such as Hüdayi and Hayrat's sister organisations in Tanzania) that the Diyanet Foundation worked with, were inevitably granted considerable influence in the scope of organizational activities. Local partners were much more active in organising qurbans, their transportation, and the distribution of slaughters to the needy people under the control of volunteers from Turkey. At the end of the activities, all volunteers were required to submit a report to the Foundation online. These reports include evaluations of field activities to shed light on further activities. Later, it became known that the data collected was shared with respective institutions when required to inform state institutions about the situation of each local area the volunteers were involved in. The information and dialogue level of interaction is strongly supported by the findings from different samples of informants, shown above.

⁸⁸⁶ Interviewee 2, at Diyanet Foundation, September 25, 2018, Ankara.

⁸⁸⁷ Interviewee 1, at Cansuyu Association, September 13, 2018, Ankara.

During the interviews, I have seen various strategies employed by NGOs when dealing with the information issue. Information is a form of political influence that non-state actors have come to realise, therefore NGOs usually rely on experts and professionals who wish to gain power over given states. To do this, most of the selected FBOs are recruiting experts who hold doctoral degrees or have professional job experience, to analyse and evaluate the data gathered from local sources. These specialists also actively attend the official meetings where the transfer of knowledge takes place between NGO and the state actors.

Under different headings, various workshops were held at the World Humanitarian Summit and we were there to provide first-hand information based on local experience. Although the UN was the main organiser, NGOs took an important role in defining the content of the meeting through putting local data into the workshops. [...] IHH went to Myanmar in 1996, even the recent issue of Myanmar (2017-8) was revealed to Turkey and to the World media thanks to IHH's Reports and Displays that we did in 2012.⁸⁸⁸

IHH has various departments. For instance, İzzet Şahin is the head of the department of Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) where there are professional colleagues working in this unit under his leadership. He always promotes and advocates IHH's HD effort by attending global platforms. He is now in Geneva, attending a meeting of the Council of Human Rights.⁸⁸⁹

We are one of the three most important partners cooperating with the state on the Syrian issue. In that sense, we have consultation status and our opinion is seriously taken into consideration by the state authorities [...] one day after the ISIL's attack on Kobane, Beşir Association reached the area. We shared information on that situation with the public and authorities, and shared data on what kind of humanitarian aid should be directed to the regions. I believe that our shared data steered further aid which was sent to the region following us.⁸⁹⁰

The informant 2 from IHH remarks that shared data is a significant factor in changing the content of meeting the needs and types of aid. He highlights IHH' role at the consultation level of interaction, and leading function on local issues at the World Summit. NGOs' functions were also praised by academics. In this regard,

⁸⁸⁸ Interviewee 2, at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸⁸⁹ Interviewee 1, at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

⁸⁹⁰ Interviewee 1, at Beşir Association, September 24, 2018, Ankara.

Bülent Aras and Fuat Keyman state that various NGOs have the power to reach the masses, evidenced through attempts to bring humanitarian issues to the table during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in parallel to Turkey's diplomacy and development plan.⁸⁹¹ This two-day programme organised seven round table meetings, fifteen special sessions, and one-hundred and twenty subsidiary activities. Regarding the humanitarian aid issue, various stakeholders, including NGOs, presented their activities to all the actors who joined during the subsidiary activity sessions.

On the other hand, the health issue is sometimes included within the humanitarian aid classification. According to the UN, there are key entities delivering humanitarian aid. One of them is the World Health Organization, which coordinates the international response to humanitarian health emergencies. Therefore, if the activities take place in war-torn regions or natural-disaster areas, health activities can be evaluated within humanitarian aid. In such instances, the activities of Yeryüzü Doktorları Association are framed within it:

We are particularly focusing on the health issue, so when TİKA or the Ministry of Health wants to establish a hospital, they apply our knowledge and field experience, where they give weight to our opinions. For instance, TİKA wanted to establish a hospital in war-torn country Niger and requested a model from us. Our experts in that field worked hard in designing the structure, size, budget etc., and presented them to TİKA. Point by point of each room is carefully designed by us. Although there were some changes to this project, the general structure of the hospital was based on our model.⁸⁹²

Health is an essential field to which several FBOs and state institutions attach. During the interview conducted with staff at the Ministry of Health and FBOs, both actors prioritised their initial role on the ground, which sometimes contradicted each other if they were on the same case. The case of Niger was frequently mentioned by all contributors. Therefore, I applied the timing factor to find consistency amongst the responses. Yeryüzü Doktorları association first organised

⁸⁹¹ <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/dunya-insani-zirvesi-ve-turkiye> (accessed 03.11.2018).

⁸⁹² Interviewee 1, at Yeryüzü Doktorları, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

a health operation in 2007, later establishing a Health and Nutrition Center in Tilaberi, Niger in 2012.⁸⁹³ With the Sahel region of Niger being one of the poorest places in the world, several other NGOs paid special attention to Niger. Following Recep Tayyip Erdogan's official visit to Niger in 2013, Turkey and Niger signed an agreement to construct a number of schools, hospitals, mosques etc. Among them, the Turkey-Niger Friendship Hospital was opened in 2014,⁸⁹⁴ nearly seven years after Yeryüzü Doktorları Association's first health operation. Therefore, NGOs competence in certain crises regions is very much result-oriented and grassroots based. For instance, Dost Eli association pays special attention to Niger. Interviewee 1 from Dost Eli emphasises that:

Our first overseas activities took place in Niger in 2005. Since that time, we have implemented many activities with TİKA as well. For instance, when we take doctors to Niger, TİKA sponsors their tickets and passport fees. Soon after we started work in Niger, we become one of key players in the country, even our field competence in Niger was praised by TİKA officials. For instance, İhsan Karaman's (former head of Yeryüzü Doktorları) first Africa project has maintained under the leading of our association.⁸⁹⁵

Selected FBOs have an institutional memory on certain regions and issues, as seen in previous instances. Regarding the validity of the claim that is shared by Yeryüzü Doktorları on health issues, I asked questions to the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Health whether they cooperate with NGOs and how NGOs did take role. Three respondents from the Ministry of Health confirmed such positive contribution of NGOs on their field activities, noting that their local questions were mitigated by regular campaign management meetings between them and related NGOs (IHH, Yeryüzü Doktorları). Adding that for the many events on Syria or Myanmar, for example, the Ministry lends support and material supplies to the NGOs.

⁸⁹³ <https://www.haberler.com/yeryuzu-doktorlari-nijer-e-elini-uzatiyor-4027635-haberi/> (accessed 22.10.2018).

⁸⁹⁴ <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/tika-onlarca-ulkede-kalici-eserler-insa-etmeye-devam-ediyor/768061> (accessed 22.10.2018).

⁸⁹⁵ Interviewee 1, at TİKA, September 24, 2018, Ankara.

Considering the examples given here, the following analysis provides solid empirical grounding. The role of respective FBOs on humanitarian aid through information providing is clear-cut. Reaching the crisis regions much faster than the state institutions, the collected data is shared to the related organisations to transform as a political role, such as exercising power. As pointed out in the previous chapter, knowledge orients and re-orients the behaviour of authorities. A top-level informant at TİKA provides ample support for such an analysis, noting that:

In order to determine how the issues should be approached in a more global framework, TİKA invites NGOs to the meeting where we exchange ideas and collaborate with them. Indeed, an NGO specializes in a sector, spends a long period of time, accumulates knowledge and experience, and has known the field longer. Therefore, we apply their knowledge and get support from them with respect to the agenda by means of having evaluation reports from them. Ultimately, we try to reach a shared wisdom and common ground.⁸⁹⁶

In considering FBO-centre quotes and top-level bureaucrats remarks, this thesis's fifth hypothesis-(*H₅*) *The NGOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through information-proving*, selected FBOs's role through information-providing is much manifest. All informants (FBO and the state) agreed, as well as my field experience confirmed that information is an essential tool through which FBOs seek to play key role in the state's humanitarian aid policy and practice. Besides, shared quotes clearly underline that there are four levels of interaction between the state and NGOs including information, consultation, dialogue, and partnership.

On the other hand, respondents have also provided significant information which situates outside the scope of this framework. In other words, their more shared instances are not fit to set in one of political role that NGOs employ. The next part of the assessment, therefore, analyses such data in supporting the overall objective of the dissertation.

⁸⁹⁶ Interviewee 1, at Dost Eli, September 26, 2018, Konya.

6.3. ASSESSMENT OF INTERVIEW: OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS

During the interviews, it was observed that neither informants from state institutions nor NGO workers have responded to lobbying and norm-building questions easily. This is related to two factors. These two concepts find less ground in Turkish academia on the one hand, and there is a negative approach towards the concept of lobbying by public alike on the other. In addition, the words used by the interviewees were carefully chosen in responding to questions. For example, state-oriented individuals were reluctant to provide specific data, opting for more general answers, whereas NGO informants were more flexible, often allowing the use of a recording device. Yet, the terminology used by both sides was carefully chosen. Instead of using ambitious expressions such as “NGOs are unique and most dominant actor in directing the state’s humanitarian aid policy and practice”, both actors picked more moderate expressions to emphasize mutually-dependent cooperation. In particular, FBOs who have an affiliation with a specific sufii group, such as Hayrat, Beşir and Hüdayi Foundation- were more sensitive to using the right expressions compared to other FBOs. The crucial factor concerned the content of the answers. Informants from FBOs who has longer aid experience shared clear-cut examples about agenda-setting and lobbying, whereas less-experienced workers shared more technical information. In most selected NGOs, informants expressed that they are moderate FBOs, whose work is framed through a humanitarian mindset. With a consensus, their local competence, experience in the field, public-opinion potential and information capacity are unanimously accepted as important advantage that FBOs possess.

One of the overriding findings in determining the layout of the state- NGOs relations are turning points. All of the decisive turning points of these relations were characterised by vital and usually transformative. Informants noted certain periods in state-NGO relations and four major turning points that have generally been framed. First, the 1990s saw the emergence of mainstream FBOs, but due to bureaucratic restrictions, several NGOs (IHH, Yeryüzü Doktorları) were established outside Turkey. Bosnian War (fostering a sense of Muslim brotherhood) and later the Marmara Earthquake (facing disaster-oriented region) have triggered

a cognitive sense of civil society organisation. The establishment of mainstream FBOs arguably has emerged out of these two events.

The second turning point takes place in 2004. For some informants, this date is crucial, signifying the point when it was possible for FBOs to address the international setting on aid flow thanks to the Change on Regulation of The Associations. Concurrently, the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami disasters on Boxing Day of 2004 became the first event in which these FBOs engaged in a global aid activity, testing their capacity, strength and effectiveness.

The third turning point is the case of Somalia, in which all informants agree that state-NGO relations reached an all-time high. Having accumulated high institutional and economic capacity, NGOs provided \$199.52 million in foreign aid, nearly doubled in compared to previous year. In addition, 60.80% of their aid was distributed to Africa, particularly Somalia.⁸⁹⁷ TİKA's 2011 Report verifies these mutual relations, noting that “recently, the active political engagement that has been observed in Turkey’s foreign policy has contributed to the development of Turkey’s foreign relations. Non-governmental organizations have taken upon important missions with regards to supporting these developments.”⁸⁹⁸

The fourth and most important turning point is the post-2016 period, in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt in Turkey on July 15. Since the events of 15 July, most of NGO has been unaffected by the event, both in terms of financial strain⁸⁹⁹ and state-NGO relations. Although the nature and intensity of its impact may vary from organisation to organisation, this event has vehemently changed the scope and dimension of relations between the state and NGOs, both in a malignant and benign sense. Except for the Besir Association, Diyanet Foundation and partly

⁸⁹⁷ Too see more about, TİKA Development Assistance Report (2011), p.70.

⁸⁹⁸ TİKA Development Assistance Report (2011), p.68.

⁸⁹⁹ Most of respondents mentioned about people’s negative outlook toward all NGOs due to Gülen-affiliated NGOs.

Deniz Feneri⁹⁰⁰ who clearly highlight a continual affirmative process through increasing their size in the post-15 July period, the rest of the FBOs share a negative outlook. In retrospect, between 2016 and 2018, the efforts of the NGOs and the reversal of the alliance with the state have largely failed so far:

Compared to the 1990s, the state-NGO relationship was very different in the 2000s. In the former period, civil society organisations were seen as an unreliable entity, even their legal formation was ignored, but there has been a process of internationalization of NGOs. Similar to the 1990s, in post-2016, the state began to dis- trust the NGOs. Through strengthening their own implementation capacity, the state now runs activities via their own actors: Kızılay, AFAD, TİKA. As a matter of fact, the state does not want to see any religious organisations and other civil society organisation as powerful as the state, both financially and socially. When a humanitarian aid activity needs to be carried out, the state makes it through its official GO (governmental organization). They say every entity should continue activities without overshadowing the state's activities. After the coup, the government does not want to give free rein to civil society organizations. That is, the honeymoon period has ended.⁹⁰¹

Recently, the state has used their institutions as NGOs. Thanks to these units and funds, field operations are completely achieved under the control of the state itself. After the FETO incident, they no longer trust them because the state has suffered from this relationship a lot. Previously IHH had huge privileged relations with the state, but now the state has begun to enter into crisis areas with Kızılay, AFAD who are undertaking the role of an NGO [...]. For example, looking at the previous mission of AFAD and today's mission, then this trend can easily be confirmed. But, this is a question, because direct engagement in crisis regions, in turn, undertakes the risk and the financial burden on the state.⁹⁰²

July 15 event has affected the state-NGO relationship. While there has been a constant and a systemic relation between the state and NGOs on Somalia, Syria, and Africa crises, after this date, state cordially strengthened its capacity and regarded the NGOs as a platform to legitimise their activities, this was a mistake. Through like-minded organisations such as the National Will Platform, the press statements of this Platform have shifted on a political dimension.⁹⁰³

⁹⁰⁰ Because the second informants from Deniz Feneri Istanbul Office did not confirm that their relationship with the state has increased following the 2016 event.

⁹⁰¹ Interviewee 2 at IHH, September 19, 2018, İstanbul.

⁹⁰² Interviewee 1 at Hayrat Association, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

⁹⁰³ Interviewee 1 at Yeryüzü Doktorları, September 18, 2018, İstanbul.

Another essential point uttered by respondents is the appointment of NGO-origin people at the state level. Though NGO humanitarian aid has been a factor in their relations to state since the beginning of the 2000s, salient points were shared by informants on the appointment of former NGO leaders at the AFAD and Kızılay. Fuat Oktay, Kani Torun, Mehmet Güllüoğlu, İsmail Palakoğlu, Kerem Kınık, İbrahim Altan, Mustafa Tutkun and several others. All of whom are important figures, holding extensive experience and serving at various NGOs which highlight a nexus in understanding the state-NGO relations. This person-oriented landscape in humanitarian aid poses a significant question; whether these people would pursue proportionate and consistent relations with the NGOs, or whether they would seek an alternative approach? Inevitably, a profound linkage has been established thanks to these people, but it is too premature to predict whether this process will evolve into a cooperative relationship or *NGOisation*⁹⁰⁴ of the state process. So far, the latter appears prevalent in the points FBOs underlined.

During an official visit to the headquarters of each FBO to conduct interviews, I observed how developed NGOs are both institutionally and morally (in sense of devoting their energy to this field) in terms of their capacity. Even, the qualification of professional work is highly competitive for those whose influence goes beyond Turkey. For instance, some Turkish FBOs (IHH, Deniz Feneri) are now training foreign nationals on how to establish an NGO, design and strategize proper projects and implement aid activities both in Turkey and in their countries. In my research, I attended one of the training courses organised by Deniz Feneri for African students who are completing their education in Turkey. Similarly, IHH has trained 54 NGOs within Syria. Thus, the establishment of Turkish-led NGOs in Africa or elsewhere will have an impact on the nature of a given states' society, as well as on Turkey's relationship with that country. The other dimension of the FBOs capacity is that this area is not seen as a temporary place of work. In contrast, experts set their career on their domain while doing aid activities in their affiliated FBOs. Writing a Master or Ph.D. thesis on their area, these people are often involved in

⁹⁰⁴ This refers a process where the state entirely maintains a unilateral activity with upholding NGOs mission.

operations on the ground as well. The existence of these people and their physical capacity have a substantial impact on steering the practicing level of interaction between the state and FBOs.

Finally, to understand the exact interaction in which specific issues appear and disappear in the public arena and become influential at the state level, certain NGO-led campaigning has clearly helped to stimulate public awareness and in turn political response. In this sense, state-NGO aid relations can be fully understood by looking at major humanitarian crises. Among them, the 2004 Tsunami (Ache), 2005 floods in Pakistan, the 2011 famine in Somalia, the political and religious violence in Myanmar in 2015, and the Syrian issue (2012-...). In responding to these crises, selected FBOs and the state institutions have been deploying their own personnel in overseas development projects. Thus, the absence of high consultancy fees helps to preserve financial resources for the development assistance projects.

In conclusion, the main points of evidence are summarised in relation to interview responses and thesis questions in this part. The findings are also reviewed in terms of their relevance to humanitarian aid issues and the current relationship between the state and selected FBOs. It should be clearly stated that only due to the sheer volume of the qualitative data collected, there is no attempt here to cover all points of the respondents, if only because of the limitation of space.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Setting out to map the uncharted terrain of FBOs' political role on the state, data collected from the series of interviews has been conducted and analysed in terms of the policy and practical levels of interaction. Thereby, illustrating how selected FBOs become involved in the humanitarian aid policy arena and seek to play a key role. In analysing their strategy and methods for achieving political and practice influence, the outcome of the research was consistence with the conceptual model presented in chapter four, direct and indirect political role of NGOs. Based on the accounts given by the informants, the main hypothesis of the thesis -selected FBOs seek to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice through techniques that have been employed by them- was confirmed by data gathered through interview and field work. Turkey's humanitarian aid policy change and the selected NGOs' political role through these five techniques were also testified by FBO worker and the officials.

Although this research investigates state-NGO aid relations within the timeline of 2004 to 2016 –considers that post-15 July 2016 military coup attempt has deeply changed political climate in state-NGO relations- throughout the interviews, all respondents touch upon the post-2016 period as well. When asked about the humanitarian linkage throughout these 12 years, informants draw a positive correlation between state-NGO aid relations during that period. 92% of all respondents uttered that NGOs are a key actor who are recruited to provide specific assistance by constituting agenda, norm, public-opinion, information, and lobby - though each technique's degree of role is changeable.

The second chapter outlined the position of NGOs within the literature of actors in world politics. It pointed out how NGOs have gained ground on several issues, such as environmental awareness and human rights, through setting agendas, establishing boundaries or limits to action, as well as providing order and security. Therefore, its status has been handled both in the legal and political framework. As broadly discussed, NGOs' are institutionalized by the UN. Namely, by means of the well-known consultative status procedure based on Article 71 of the UN Charter. To minimize the definitional challenge of actors in world politics, this part drew on a detailed taxonomy of the actor and non-state actors where the place of faith-based organizations within this classification has indicated. The second part of this chapter investigated how three mainstream IR theories (Realism, Liberalism and their neo-variants; and Constructivism) treat NGOs. Focusing on the determinative role of inter-subjective understanding, this part employed the constructivist perspective, which forwards the potential role that the NSA employs in norm building, principles, lobbying, and shared belief. For example, the role of NSAs in altering state belief about international trade, preferences, and use of landmines in war have been explored and elaborated within constructivist assumptions. In short, this chapter has underlined how NGOs are set within the international context and the mainstream international theories' approach to non-state actors has investigated the position of actors, apart from the state, within the global politics.

The chapter on foreign aid investigated the concept of foreign aid in relation to development studies. This part made a retrospective appraisal of foreign aid since its emergence following World War II. Besides, NGOs' growing role in development studies through historical process has been identified. In this process, civil society organizations undertook an essential role in the expansion of foreign aid' size, scale, geographical reach, budgets, access to alternative funds and ground implications. Whereas in the 1970s, NGOs were little-recognised in terms of policy influence and in the implementation of development projects. In the early 1980s, there was a remarkable change in the scale and significance of their favourable role in the development sector. While this trend has decreased in 1990s, NGOs role has once more accelerated in development sector in 2000s. This part of thesis spotlighted this process, then moved on the types of foreign aid including

humanitarian aid and development aid. Humanitarian aid which is *per se* non-political, has been contextualized within a separate title where its conceptual definition and proportional share of overall foreign aid has been underlined. This part succinctly tried to distinguish humanitarian and development aid in the context of the existing literature.

The following chapter explained the conceptual framework of the research, as it the approach taken in this chapter was informative and argumentative in character. Drawing on the constructivist perspective, this part analysed various political roles both direct (agenda-setting, lobbying, information providing) and indirect (public opinion, norm-building), as well as the multi-faceted role of NGOs including relief operations and social and economic development role. While NGOs have long engaged in traditional relief operations and social/economic affairs, their political role such as agenda-setting, lobbying, norm-building, and framing came to the fore in the last three decades. Contrary to realist-inspired scholars who argue that NGOs only promote soft norms in line with the great powers' economic and security policies, this part shared various cases such as empirical research on how NGOs influence US foreign aid: the influence of epistemic communities on implementing Keynesian ideas of embedded liberalism in the international agenda during the establishment of the Bretton Woods system and GATT (agenda-setting); the role of Greenpeace, the Red Cross and Trans-Africa in promoting environmental norms, imposing sanctions and the prohibition of landmines, and opposing the apartheid regime in South Africa (norm-building); World Vision's lobbying functions on the US in stopping child-trafficking in Malaysia (lobbying); the Save Darfur Coalition's efforts to gain the attention of the US public and raise awareness of the situation for Sudanese people (public opinion), and Global Witness's agenda-setting role at the UN level. Finally, the function of emergency aid workers in the dissemination of first-hand information that arguably changed the direction of the Bosnian war (information-providing). These cases, therefore, underline each role implications on the ground, which were handled in the fourth chapter.

The next part of the thesis traced the evolution of Turkey's official development aid policy and its implications from the 1990s to the present time. In this part, the state-

NGOs relations on humanitarian aid, general structure of official and private aid, sectoral focus, geographical distributions of foreign aid and overall performance in humanitarian aid of Turkey and nine selected NGOs were explored. Based on TİKA's annual reports and official documents, a periodization of Turkish aid is provided on the basis of structural and systemic change in the context of the foreign aid landscape. Contextualising the nature of state-NGO relations within this periodization, five main periods were identified that track the establishment of Turkey's development aid policy. First, the *early period* (1920s to the 1950s), when Turkey started to provide development assistance, for education and health in Afghanistan. Second, the regression period (1950s to the 1980s), when Turkey became an important aid recipient country under the Truman and Marshall Plans. Third, the resurgence period (1985-1992) as the State Planning Organisation (SPO) strategized a comprehensive aid package worth \$10 million to Sahel countries in 1985. Fourth, the institutionalization period (1992 to 2004) as the SPO (1992-1996) - and later on the State Statistical Institute - started to gather official data on development assistance, known as systematisation of foreign aid. Fifth, the taking off period (2004 till present) with the restructuring of TİKA in 2004, responsible for implementing Turkey's development cooperation and coordination.

This part dealt with thematic area of Turkey's ODA, framed within four main rubrics: Social Infrastructure and Services (education, health, water etc); Economic Infrastructure and Services (transport and storage, infrastructure, energy etc); Multisector Activities (including various aid types in which aid may be cutting across several categories); and Production Sectors (tourism, agriculture, mining, industry, trade and construction). Of these four sectors, most of the humanitarian assistance provided is categorized within Social Infrastructure and Service, which receives the lion's share of Turkish bilateral aid. Therefore, NGOs visibility is clear-cut in relation with state in this field of activity. This chapter proceeded to choose nine FBOs based on four selection criteria (longevity and potential capacity of FBOs, political/ideological proximity, motivation (religious or secular) and outreach/visibility in the society). Each of these selected organisations have been analysed, from their background and, establishment, to their general performance in humanitarian aid. Acting on the humanitarian principle, these selected FBOs play

entrepreneurial role at different stages of the policy-making process by using their organisational leverage. Therefore, their organisational strength and global-wide aid activities were scrutinised, since their material competence strongly reflects the degree and dimension of a reciprocal relationship with the state.

The sixth chapter of the thesis investigated the legal framework of the state-NGO relations, in respect to the humanitarian aid landscape. Two main aspects were, therefore, examined. First, the role of three prominent organisations (AFAD, TİKA, and Kızılay) in the humanitarian aid policy framework. Second, the legal engagement of NGOs in terms of a five-stage policy-making cycle, and a four-level scale of participation in the decision-making process of the state. This part which provides a constitutional framework to understand state-NGO relations, highlighted an evolutionary trend in favour of the NGOs. For instance, providing financial support to civil society organisations by the Law No. 5018 (2003), Article 28; permitting the collection of foreign donations with The Law on Associations issue of 5252 (2004), treating NGOs as an advisory platform with Article 6 of the by-law on Preparing Legislation on Rules and Procedure (2005); and underlining the consultation and dialogue level of interactions between the state and NGOs with Article 7 (2/3) in the same law. Following the Presidential Decree of 17th (2018) and number 30474 of Article 263 (h) directly addresses the consultation, dialogue and partnership level of interactions between the state and CSOs. Looking retrospectively, particularly between 2003 and 2016, there are very clear threads of evidence that underpin the evolutions of state-NGO relations in favour of NGOs, from the information and consultation level to the dialogue and partnership level of interaction. In this evolution, AFAD's law of 5902 (Article 2 and 4), TİKA's Presidential Decree No. 4 (2018) Articles 520 to 531 and Kızılay's Regulation Article 4 and Section 2(ç) have been discussed within the legal framework of the relationship.

The final part of the research has dealt with the findings from a series of semi-structured interviews, alongside a discussion of the validity of the employed conceptual model that formulated. Based on constructivist understanding on the relationship between NGOs and state, this dissertation revealed that NGOs seek a

political role through agenda-setting, lobbying, norm-building, framing and information providing. From the interviews, with the exception of one informant in both cases, all informants from an NGO background and state background confirmed a degree of state-NGO cooperation and NGOs' supplementary, complementary role and to some degree advocacy role on state's humanitarian aid. More specifically, 92% of all respondents stated that NGOs are key actors, who draw upon specific assistance by constituting agendas, framing, information, and lobbying. Due to the limitation of my study, I take these remarks as indications of the attempts of NGOs to participate in decision making rather than attributing them any influence on policy processes.

The conceptual framework that the fourth chapter pointed to, seem to be largely congruent with the data gathered in this interview. The applied political roles of the information, consultation, dialogue and partnership level of interactions all seem to be applicable to the state-NGO relations in the Turkish case. In addition, those five political roles galvanise FBOs to promote their views and to participate at the policy level and practical level of cooperation with the state. In the light of the data collected on the Turkish case, the former is less applicable and relatively restricted, taking place in humanitarian aid practice by enhancing social, economic and political consequences of policy. The latter is much more perceptible, evidently taking place in the next phases of policy through changing or halting the condition of particular aid projects. As such, FBOs attempt to play a role in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice appears to rely much more on information providing, agenda-setting, framing, public opinion, and lobbying than that of norm building.

Based on the accounts provided by interviewees, this research concedes that NGOs' access to the policy-making process is *de facto* and constitutionally still lacking. In other words, the current system grants less voice to NGOs when engaging in the policy-making process. However, its virtue lies in permitting NGOs to make statements and allowing them to attend meetings to make formal contributions on the scope of aid projects. Therefore, this research has found that NGOs role over

humanitarian aid practice is considerably high, compared to their role in the policy-making process.

This research is also in line with Dennis Young's (2000) conceptual model on state-NGO relations, regarding distinctions between the supplementary, complementary and adversarial role of NGOs. Based on the accounts given by interviewees, the role of selected FBOs at the supplementary level is explicit, such as maintaining humanitarian aid activities in the absence of diplomatic relations between Turkey and recipient state. By the same token, the complementary role is the most common form of interaction, as seen with joint operations between the state and NGOs in Somalia, Pakistan, and Syria. However, within the given time-period the adversarial role is less visible for the majority of the NGOs. With the exception being IHH, Yeryüzü Doktorları and to a lesser extent Cansuyu, who all exhibit such tendencies for adversarial relations, such as monitoring the state's overall policy and practice until the state's retreat from a particular issue.

The other finding is that the state and FBOs are tied together by horizontal patterns of interaction and often person-to-person levels of communication between actors. The point that lies on the intersection of this horizontal relation is a reciprocal system where FBOs rely on legitimacy and moral sources- to some extent economic support- of the state. In turn, the state relies on their access to local data and networks in crisis regions, and the accumulated experience of respective FBOs. The other result of this research is a common narrative between selected FBOs and the state. Employing the concept of Turkey as and "protectors of Ummah", both actors' prioritise certain regions and countries in accordance with the Turkish foreign policy principle.

In short, it is safe to argue that state-NGO relations in humanitarian aid policy and practice represents an important case. This dissertation is thus quite important considering the conceptual background previously used to understand state-NGO aid relations. Through citing a series of examples, focusing on the appointment of staff with a background of working in NGOs, at the state institutions, redefining the structure of the Department of Associations, and making new amendments to regulations on NGO engagement in policy-making process, each should be taken

as proof that the state is serious about the policy of renewal in relations with the NGOs. The net effect of this renewal also yields a favourable relationship between persistence proof and NGOs, bearing correlations with the EU accession process. In the post-2016 context, the 15 July process has vehemently re-framed the state-NGO relations. The code of this relation can be interpreted by looking at the latest statement of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “We envisage civil society organisations as the essential columns of the cities, so a new regulation is under-construction. From now on, we will build a form of intense relationship with them. Relations with the CSOs will take a new form with this arrangement: those who are working for these CSOs will no longer be able to stay permanently. Each group of think-thanks will establish its own CSO. Through a transparent and expansionist approach, the establishment process of any NGO will begin.”⁹⁰⁵

Summing up, there has been a surge in NGO role in Turkey’s humanitarian aid policy and behaviours throughout the last decade. Although academic studies have tried to underline the role of public opinion, personality, leadership and parliament in the policy-making process of Turkey, this thesis tries to fill the gaps on some of the general aspects underlying the political dynamics between the state and NGOs using the case of the humanitarian aid landscape. By uncovering both direct and indirect role of NGOs in humanitarian aid policy and practice, this dissertation goes beyond mere parallelism analysis, by differing from those studies which explore civil society’s contribution on the active citizen model in participatory democracy, its leading role in societal development, or its consultation factor on the state.

Despite the newfound approach offered by this thesis and the findings it illuminates, this thesis has several limitations in terms of theory and empirical findings. The findings from this research make no presentation toward the universality of NGOs political role over other foreign policy issues in the Turkish case. While fieldwork experiences and primary sources are incorporated to increase the validity of the thesis, an important constraint in this context - as all social science study faces- is

⁹⁰⁵<https://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-bu-stk-lara-oturanlar-10550100/>(accessed 21.11.2018).

the reliance on interviewees responses making it hard to determine the reality behind their assertions and consequently, whether this can truly be considered a structured framework. Most importantly, since the political spectrum has been in flux in Turkey, the existing positive correlations in state-NGO relations between 2004-2016 might evolve into a more structured framework. Or, conversely, state might take unilateral role in responding humanitarian crises via their own institutions by sidelining other non-state actors, which I call *NGOisation* of the state institutions. It is very difficult to make predictions on this topic given the recent 15 July military-coup attempt. Nevertheless, a somewhat more benign relation could be expected particularly if the trust re-established between the two actors, that was profoundly damaged by the events of 15 July.

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APPENDICES

A. HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER



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08 AĞUSTOS 2018

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Şerif Onur BAHÇECİK

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız doktora öğrencisi Yunus TURHAN'ın "*İnanç Temelli STK'ların Türkiye'nin İnsani Yardım Politikasına ve Uygulamasına Etkisi*" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay **2018-SOS-159** protokol numarası ile **08.08.2018 - 30.12.2018** tarihleri arasında geçerli olmak üzere verilmiştir.

Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım.

Prof. Dr. Ayhan SOL

Üye

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil TURAN

Başkan V

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Gürbüz DEMİR

Üye

Doç. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI

Üye

Doç. Dr. Zana ÇITAK

Üye

Doç. Dr. Emre SELÇUK

Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Pınar KAYGAN

Üye

B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

First set of questions: Thematic

Question 1.1: Is it alright for me to record our conversation using a tape recorder?
All data will be anonymised and you will not be required to provide your name

Question 1.2: What is your age, educational background?

Question 1.3: What is your position in the organisation? How long have you been working in humanitarian aid field?

Question 1.4: What is the overall performance of the organisation in the field of humanitarian aid?

Question 1.5: What kind of instruments (written and visual media) does the organisation use in distributing humanitarian aid activities inside Turkey and beyond?

Second set of questions: Orientation

Question 2.1: What is the founding purpose of the organisation (religious-national sensitivities, socio-economic improvement, humanitarian aid)?

Question 2.2: What is the main working area of the organisation? At what points does it differ from other NGOs and government agencies?

Question 2.3: What are the main factors that motivate the activity/activities of the organisation?

Third set of questions: Practical

Question 3.1: Does the organisation have any interaction with other actors (State or NGO)? If so, at what level: policy or project level?

Question 3.2: What are the projects and activities carried out with other counterparts in the field of foreign aid, in particular humanitarian aid?

Question 3.3: Is there any regional focus while engaging aid activities, or task-sharing between actors on the ground?

Forth set of questions: Implementation

Question 4.1: *Agenda Setting*: Is the institution involved in agenda-setting? If so, which instruments does it apply?

Question 4.2: *Norm-building*: How does the organisation play a role in the formation of the norm on humanitarian aid?

Question 4.3: *Lobbying*: What channels do the institution lobby, such as formal meeting, workshop, forum, or indirect, if using external country connection? Are there any tangible cases which might be set in lobbying?

Question 4.4: *Information-Providing*: Which instruments are used in providing information? How and to what extent does the information affect the humanitarian aid policy and activities?

Question 4.5: *Framing and Public Opinion*: What is the importance of framing and public opinion in changing humanitarian aid policy and practice? Did the campaigning carried out on different platforms achieve success on framing and public opinion?

Fifth set of questions: Policy Cycle Process

Question 5.1: How are NGOs involved in foreign aid policy-making process?

Question 5.2: Considering humanitarian policy-making process, what parties would you say, if any, are the most influential in determining it?

Question 5.3: What methods do you perceive as having the most influence?

Question 5.4: How do you perceive your organisation's influence on humanitarian aid policy and practice?

Question 5.5: Any other comments regarding the state-NGO humanitarian aid relation?

C. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Hacettepe University International Relations	2013
BS	Karadeniz Teknik University International Relations	2009
High School	Kırşehir High School, Kırşehir	2003

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2018- Present	Osmaniye Korkut Ata University International Relations	Research Assistant
2013-2018	METU Department of International Relations	Research Assistant
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FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English,

PUBLICATIONS

1. Arslan, Havva K  k and Turhan, Yunus, “Reconciliation-oriented Leadership: Nelson Mandela and South Africa” in All Azimuth, *Journal of the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research*, V5, N2, July. 2016, 29-46
2. Turhan, Yunus and Tam  elik Soy  lp, “G  ney Afrika’da Ulusal Uzla  ma Stratejisi ve Nelson Mandela’nın Siyasal Rol  , in Tam  elik, Soy  lp (eds.) *K  resel Politikada Y  kselen Afrika*, Gazi Kitapevi, 2014, Ankara, p. 125-158

D. TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

Sivil toplum örgütlerinin (STK) uzun yıllar savaş bölgelerinde oynadığı rol ve köle ticaretine karşı yürüttükleri aktif mücadeleye rağmen, ikinci dünya savaşına kadar bu örgütlerin insani krizlere, barış anlaşmalarına ve dünya siyasetine katkılarını araştıran çalışmalar yeterli sayıda değildi. Bu tarihten sonra, küreselleşmesinde etkisiyle artan yoğun etkileşimler, STK'ları önemli birer aktör haline getirdi. Bu aktörlerin çeşitli alanlarda doğrudan ve dolaylı rolünü araştıran akademik çalışmaların eşlik ettiği bir döneme ise ancak 1990 sonrası girilmiştir. Öyleki, Joseph Nye ve Robert Keohane'nin 1977'de ortaya attığı “devletlerin dünya siyasetinde tek oyuncu olmadığını”⁹⁰⁶ argümanı 1990'larda genel kabul gören bir paradigma olmuştur. Artık devlet dışı aktörler, sadece karşı çıkan değil aynı zamanda uluslararası sistemin destekçileri ve şekillendiricileri olduğu fikri akademide kabul edilmeye başlanmıştır.⁹⁰⁷

Bu tezin temel amacı, Türk STK'larının araştırma konusu olmamış yönlerini ortaya çıkartarak, Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikası ve uygulamasındaki politik rollerini mercek altına almaktır. Her ne kadar Türk inanç temelli STK'ların geleneksel yurtdışı insani yardım faaliyetleri çalışma alanlarının ana omurgasını oluşturmaya devam etse de, gündem belirleme, norm oluşturma, lobicilik, çerçeveleme ve bilgi sağlama faaliyetlerinde bulunmaktadır. Ki bu faaliyetler Türkiye'nin insani politikasını ve uygulamasını etkilemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Hatta, devlet-STK arasındaki son on yılın (2004-2016) insani yardım ilişkisine bakıldığında STK'lar lehine işleyen bir ilişki durumu mevcuttur. Kamu düzeyinde, STK'lar belirli politikaları desteklemek, meseleleri çerçevelemek, insani politika gündemlerini belirlemek ve normları savunarak toplumu belli bir davranışsal düzeyde harekete geçirmeyi hedeflemektedirler. Bireysel düzeyde ise, faaliyetleri

⁹⁰⁶ Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, *International Organization*, (Vol. 25. No.3, 1971), p. 330.

⁹⁰⁷ Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, (Palgrave Macmillan; 2001), p. 15.

için lobi yaparak ve bilgi sağlayarak siyasi rol oynamaktadırlar. Her iki düzeyde de STK'ların temel hedefi, onları potansiyel bir siyasi aktör yapacak etkileme kapasitesi oluşturmaktır.⁹⁰⁸ Ancak, bu çalışma STK'ların *etkileme* potansiyeli ile *rolü* arasındaki ayrımı yaparak, STK'ların sadece rolleri üzerine odaklanmaktadır.

Türk devlet geleneği ve idare yapısı, sivil toplum örgütleri dahil diğer tüm aktörlerin etkisinden özerk kaldığı “güçlü devlet” tipolojisi içinde sınıflandırılmıştır.⁹⁰⁹ Ancak bu tez, Türkiye'nin insani yardım alanında STK'ların politik rolünü göstererek bu paradigmaya karşı bir argüman gelişmektedir. Bunu yaparken devlet ve STK'lar arasındaki etkileşimin yoğun yaşandığı 2004 ve 2016 arasındaki döneme odaklanılmıştır. Ayrıca, insani yardım konusunun özellikle seçilmesi, Türk STK'ların bu alanda artan etkisi ve Türkiye'nin dış yardımında insani yardım kaleminin diğer yardım türlerine göre rekor seviye ulaşması gibi faktörler etkili olmuştur. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma insani politikada rolü olan inanç-temelli STK'lara odaklanmaktadır. Türkiye'deki bazı inanç-temelli STK'ların siyasi ve dini yakınlıklarından dolayı hükümetle yakın temasları olduğu genel olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu kısmen, hükümetin kendi çıkarlarına uygun bir sivil toplum kurma konusundaki rolü ile ilgilidir. Aynı zamanda, Türk hükümetinin ve STK'ların yurtdışı yardımlarda yakın bir ilişki içerisinde çalıştığını göstermektedir. Ancak, iki aktör arasında neden simbiyotik bir ilişki olduğuna dair daha derin bir analiz yapılması bu araştırmanın kapsamı dışındadır.

Devlet ile STK arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz ederken, bilim insanları yukarıdan aşağıya ya da aşağıdan yukarıya yaklaşımlarına odaklanmaktadır. Aşağıdan yukarıya yaklaşımında, merkezi hükümete alternatif arayan ve yer yer eleştirilerini ileten STK'ların rolüne vurgu yapılmaktadır. Yukarıdan aşağıya yaklaşımına göre ise, kendilerini sosyal ve politik statükoyu istikrara kavuşturma aracı olarak gören

⁹⁰⁸ Shamima Ahmed and David Potter, *NGOs in International Politics*, (Kumarian Press, 2006), p., 54.

⁹⁰⁹ Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (Walkington, North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1985); Metin Heper, “The State and Politics in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* (12, no. 2, 1988); and *The Strong State and Democracy The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective*, (Bilkent Uni. Press, 2016).

devlet sistemindeki STK'ların rolleri vurgulanmaktadır.⁹¹⁰ Ancak, bu iki yaklaşım arasındaki çizgi, bir STK hem devlete karşı durup hem de aynı anda politika sürecinin bir parçası olabileceğinden, bu kadar net değildir. Aşağıdan yukarıya ilişki yaklaşımını takip eden bu çalışma, devlet ile STK arasındaki dış yardım ilişkisini incelerken STK'ların daha güçlü olduğu ya da devletin daha az güçsüz olduğunu iddia etmemektedir. Yani, STK'ların insani yardım alanındaki siyasi rolünü vurgularken, devlet ile olan ilişkisinde “sıfır toplamı oyun” görüşünü savunmamaktadır. Bu nedenle, gücü bir tarafın diğer tarafa tahakkümü şeklindeki yorumlamanın sakıncasını bilerek aktörlerden herhangi birine güç atfedilmemektedir.

Bu tez, STK'ların devlet politikalarında ve uygulamalarında rol oynadığı görüşünden hareketle, onların insani yardım politikası ve uygulamalarında hangi roller oynadığı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır? Burada cevap aranan ne sorusu, bazı sosyal olayların özelliklerini ve yapılarını ortaya çıkartılmasına ve tanımlanmasına yardımcı olmaktadır.⁹¹¹ Her ne kadar *ne* sorusu sosyal bilimci araştırmacılar tarafından betimleyici bir pencereden ele alınsa da nasıl ve niçin soruları da benzer bilgi temelinde üretilmektedir. Lakin, bu tez’de birkaç süreç geriye giderek sadece ne sorusuna odaklanılmıştır. Ayrıca, STK'ların hangi koşullarda etkili olduğu hususu yerine, onların bu etkiyi oluşturmak adına sahip oldukları roller incelenmektedir. Bu tez ’de görüldüğü üzere araştırmacı bir yaklaşım çok önemlidir. Bunun nedeni ise; devlet dışı aktörlerin Türkiye'nin yardım politikasındaki rolü üzerine araştırmalar halen ilk safhadadır.

Tez, STK'ların siyasi etkilerini ölçmek yerine, onların bu etkide uyguladıkları roller üzerine odaklanmaktadır. STK'lar farklı yollar ile merkezi hükümetin dış yardım politikalarında rol oynamaya çalışmaktadırlar. Bunlardan biri de siyasi roldür. Siyasi rol, farklı teknikler kullanılarak devletin dış yardım politikası ve

⁹¹⁰ Robert W. Cox, “Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order”, *Review of International Studies*, (Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan 1999), p.10-11.

⁹¹¹ Norman Blaikie, *Designing Social Research* (2nd edition). (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009), p.60.

uygulamasında deęişim amalamaktadır. Lakin, bu tez’de kabul edilen deęişim ifadesi, bir sistem içindeki deęişiklik veya sistemin kendisinin deęişmesi anlamında deęildir. Başka bir ifadeyle, seilen STK’ların Türkiye’nin insani yardım politikasının deęişimdeki politik rolü, onların devlet ile olan ilişkilerinde kurumsallaşmış ve yapısal bir ilişki ağıının olduęu anlamına gelmemektedir. Bunun yerine, devlet ve STK’ların insani krizlere cevap verirken el ele alıştıkları karşılıklı bağımlılık sistematığı içindeki bir ilişkiden bahsedilmektedir.

Araştırma sorusuna cevap vermek için, konstrüktivits teorisinden faydalanılmıştır. Bu teoriye göre, STK’ların gündem belirleme, lobicilik yapma, norm oluşturma, çerevele ve bilgi sağlama gibi politik rolleri bulunmaktadır. Bu politik roller aynı zamanda beş teknik diye de tanımlanabilir ve doğrudan ve dolaylı diye iki bölüme ayrılmaktadır. Yani, STK’lar doğrudan ve dolaylı, hatta hem doğrudan hem dolaylı şekilde devlet üzerinde siyasi rol oynamaktadırlar. Doğrudan oynadığı roller gündem belirleme, lobi faaliyetleri yapmak ve bilgi sağlamaktadır. Dolaylı olarak ise STK’lar geleneksel politikaları biçimlendirmek ve yeniden şekillendirmek için kamuoyunu harekete geçirerek, dışsal baskı oluşturarak ve yeni normlar meydana getirerek devletler üzerinde siyasi rol oynamaya alışırlar.

Bu analitik çereve, James Anderson’un gündem belirleme, politika oluşturma, karar verme, uygulama ve deęerlendirme diye beş temel hususa ayırdığı politika döngü süreciyle kesişmektedir.⁹¹² STK’ların yukarıda bahsedilen beş politik rolleri, çeşitli düzeylerde bu politika döngüleriyle ilişkilidir. Seilen Türk STK’larının politika döngüsünün bu beş aşamasına doğrudan ve dolaylı tekniklerle katılma girişimleri bu tezde incelenmiştir. Son olarak, insani yardımın yasal ve pratik boyutu göz önüne alındığında, STK’ların rolü için kademeli olarak dört katılım düzeyi görölmektedir. Katılım düzeyi, STK’ların Türkiye’deki insani yardım politikasındaki karar alma sürecinin bir parası olup olmadığı, oluyor ise hangi katılım düzeyinde olduęu bu tez ile ortaya ıkartılmıştır.

Tez, metodolojik olarak yorumlayıcı ve betimleyici nitel araştırma yöntemini takip etmektedir. Özellikle, Türkiye vaka analizi üzerinden STK’ların insani yardım

⁹¹² James E. Anderson, *Public Policymaking* (Cengage Learning, 2014). p.3.

politika ve uygulamasında devlet ile olan ilişkisini incelemektedir. Tez'in ana hipotezi şudur: inanç-temelli STK'lar kullandıkları farklı teknikler ile Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikasında ve uygulamalarında rol oynamaya çalışmaktadırlar. Bu çerçeveye uygun olarak, beş alt hipotez vardır:

H₁: STK'lar, gündem belirleme yoluyla Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikasında ve uygulamasında rol oynamaya çalışmaktadırlar.

H₂: STK'lar, norm oluşturarak Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikasında ve uygulamasında rol oynamaya çalışmaktadırlar.

H₃: STK'lar, lobicilik faaliyeti yaparak Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikasında ve uygulamasında rol oynamaya çalışmaktadırlar.

H₄: STK'lar, çerçeveleme faaliyeti yaparak Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikasında ve uygulamasında rol oynamaya çalışmaktadırlar.

H₅: STK'lar, bilgi sağlayarak Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikasında ve uygulamasında rol oynamaya çalışmaktadırlar.

STK'ların devletin insani yardım politika ve uygulamasındaki politik rollerini ortaya çıkartmak için iki tür bilgiden veri sağlanmıştır: birincil ve ikincil el kaynaklar. Birinci el kaynaklar olarak, ilgili kuruluşların resmî belgeleri (raporlar, resmi web siteleri), benim Mozambik (2007) ve Tanzanya'daki (2017) kişisel saha faaliyetlerim ve ilgili kişiler ile gerçekleştirdiğim yarı-yapılandırılmış görüşme tekniği kullanılmıştır. İkincil kaynaklar olarak akademik çalışmalar incelenmiştir. Yarı-yapılandırılmış görüşmeler Ankara, İstanbul ve Konya gibi üç farklı şehirde ve yüz yüze yapılarak nitel veriler toplanmıştır. Görüşme anketlerinde sorulan sorular beş farklı soru grubundan oluşmaktadır, ve tez'in en sonuna eklenmiştir. Dokuz farklı inanç-temelli STK'dan 18 katılımcı ile görüşme yapılmıştır. Diğer taraftan AFAD, TİKA ve Kızılay⁹¹³ olmak üzere üç farklı devlet bağlantılı

⁹¹³ Kızılay esasında devlet kuruluşu olarak değil de, Kızılay'ın insani yardım faaliyetleri resmi yardım altında incelendiği için burada AFAD ve TİKA aynı kategoride sınıflandırılmıştır. Bu tez'in beşinci bölümünde de genişçe ele alındığı üzere Kızılay yarı- otonom STK statüsündedir, yani quasi-nongovernmental organisation (quangos).

kurumundan 7 katılımcı bu röportaja dahil edilmiştir. Röportaj yapılan ve incelenen dokuz STK şunlardır: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, İHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı-İnsani Yardım Vakfı), Deniz Feneri Derneği, Cansuyu Derneği, Yeryüzü Doktorları Derneği, Dosteli Derneği, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Vakfı, Beşir Derneği ve Hayrat İnsani Yardım Derneği. Bu seçilen dokuz kuruluşun yanı sıra, TİKA raporunda da ismi geçen Bilkent Üniversitesi, Türkmen eli İş birliği ve Kültür Vakfı, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı gibi başka kuruluşlar da vardır. Ancak, bu kuruluşlar düzenli olarak insani yardım faaliyetlerinde bulunmamaları ve bu tez’de temel alınan inanç-temelli kategorisine girmemeleri sebebiyle araştırma dışında tutulmuştur.

Seçilen bu dokuz STK dört farklı kriter temel alınarak belirlenmiştir. Bu kriterler: STK’ların faaliyet süreleri ve potansiyel kapasiteleri; hükümet ile siyasal ve ideolojik yakınlıkları, kurumsal yapıları (inanç-temelli veya laik STK); toplumsal karşılığının ve etkisinin yüksek olması. Y. Kim’in “STK’lar ABD’nin Dış Yardım Dağıtımındaki Etkileri” başlıklı makalesinde de bahsedildiği üzere, STK’ların tarihsel geçmişlerinin uzunluğu ve sayısal olarak fazlalığı ABD’nin dış yardımını etkilemede önemli bir faktördür.⁹¹⁴ STK’ların yurt dışında bulunduğu sürenin uzunluğu da devleti etkilemede önemli bir fonksiyondur. Uzun yıllar dış yardım faaliyeti yapan kuruluşlar, yerel durumu daha iyi idrak ederek, bu da sonraki yardım faaliyetlerine sistematik bir kolaylık sağlamaktadır.⁹¹⁵ Devlet ve STK arasındaki ideolojik ve siyasi yakınlıkta dış yardımda önemli bir faktördür.⁹¹⁶ Hükümetler ile yakın ilişkisi olan STK’ların önerileri daha makul bir kabul sürecini de beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu tezde araştırma konusu olan dokuz STK’nın mevcut hükümet ile olan yakınlığı gösteren en güzel örnek Milli İrade Platformudur. İHH, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Vakfı, Deniz Feneri Derneği, Beşir ve Hayrat İnsani Yardım da

⁹¹⁴ Youngwan Kim, “How NGOs Influence US Foreign Aid Allocations”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, (2015), p.6.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid., p.6.

⁹¹⁶ Axel Dreher, Anna Minasyan and Peter Nunnenkamp, “Government Ideology in Donor and Recipient Countries: Does Political Proximity Matter for the Effectiveness of Aid?” *European Economic Review* (79, 2015).

dahil olmak üzere 293 sivil toplum kuruluşunun bulunduğu bu platform, merkezi hükümetin politikalarını destekleyici basın açıklamaları mevcuttur. Diğer bir kriter ise, STK'ların kurumsal yapılarının inanç-temelli mi yoksa laik bir yapıda mı olduklarıdır. G. Clarke ve M. Jennings'in inanç-temelli STK'lar tanımı ve Elizabeth Ferris'in STK'ları sınıflandırırken ortaya koyduğu dört ayırt edici özellik⁹¹⁷ temel alınarak bir STK'nın inanç-temelli olup olmadığı belirlenmiştir. Son olarak, seçilen kuruluşların, çeşitli yollarla yardım faaliyetleri gerçekleştirdikleri toplumda ulaşılabilirliği ve görünürlüğü önemli bir unsurdur. Bu dört kriter ışında, neden belirli STK'ların seçildiğini ya da diğerlerinin neden seçilmediği açıklanmıştır.

Tez'in ana argümanın desteklemek için beş strateji izlenmiştir. İlk olarak, aynı organizasyondaki iki farklı kişiyle, farklı mekân ve zamanda, paylaşılan bilgilerin tutarlılığını eşleştirmek adına görüşmeler yapılmıştır. İkincisi, STK'lar tarafından verilen bilgileri doğrulamak için, ilgili devlet kuruluşlarına müracaat edilmiş ve orada da en az iki farklı kişiyle görüşme yapılmıştır. Üçüncüsü, zamanlama faktörüdür ki bu bazı ortak veriler arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymak için uygulanmıştır. Yani, devlet ve STK yetkilileriyle yapılan mülakatlarda birbiriyle çelişen veriler var ise, bu durumda ortaya atılan iddiaların doğruluğunu teyit etmek için faaliyetlerin tarihleri incelenmiştir. Dördüncüsü, elde edilen verilerin doğruluğunu ortaya çıkartmak adına yetkililerin söylemleri incelenmiş ve medya taraması yapılmıştır. Beşincisi, verilerin güvenilirliğini artırmak için insani yardım alanında uzun yıllar bulunmuş, bu alanda saha tecrübesi olan üst düzey kişilerle görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Seçkin görüşme taktiği 'de denen bu yöntem görüşülen kişilerin devlet ile yürütülen insani yardım ilişkilerinde kurumsal hafızaya sahip olması, STK'ların siyasi rolü konusunda derinlemesine bir analiz yapma imkânı sunmuştur.

Bu tez devlet-STK ilişkileri açısından uluslararası ilişkiler literatürüne üç katkı sunmaktadır. Birincisi, STK'ların doğrudan ve dolaylı tekniklerle devletler üzerinde oynamaya çalıştığı siyasi rolü Türkiye örneğinde göstererek inşacılık literatüre

⁹¹⁷ Bunlar dini bir yapıya sahip bir birlikteliktir; dini kaynaklardan finansal destek; yönetim kurulu üyeleri ve personeli dini motivasyona sahip olması; dini değere dayalı bir dini misyon beyanı ve karar alma sürecinde din etkeni, Elizabeth Ferris, "Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organizations", *International Review of the Red Cross*, (Volume 87, number 858, 2005), p. 312.

katkıda bulunmaktadır. İkinci katkı, Türkiye'deki devlet-sivil toplum ilişkilerinde kabul edilen pasif, etkisiz ve tek taraflı yaklaşımı sorgulayarak bunun gerçekliğini tartışmaktadır. Üçüncüsü, devlet-STK arasındaki ilişkilerin tarihsel süreçteki dönüşümünü yasal çerçeveler ışığında ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, anayasal bir zeminde devlet-STK ilişkilerinin nasıl bir süreçten geçtiğine ışık tutmaktadır. Bu açıdan, tez'in her bir bölümü inşa edilen bir evin tuğlası misali genel yapıya katkı sağlamaktadır.

Tez'in ilk bölümü genel araştırma çerçevesini ortaya koymaktadır. Robert K. Yin'in "Case Study Research Design and Methods (1994)" adlı kitabında belirttiği gibi bir araştırmada şu beş husus bulunmalıdır: (1) araştırma sorusu, (2) önerme (varsa hipotez) (3) analiz düzeyi (4) veriler ile önerme arasında kurulan mantık ve (5) bulguları yorumlama kriterleridir.⁹¹⁸ Bu mantıktan yola çıkarak, bu tez aşağıdaki soruyu cevap aramaktadır: Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikası ve uygulamasında STK'lar nasıl bir oynamaktadırlar? Analiz birimi ise, STK'ların merkezi hükümet ile ilgili olan eylemleridir. Hipoteze ilişkin analitik çerçeve, konstrüktivist bir yaklaşımı temel almakta ve STK'ların kullandığı politik roller bu çerçevede incelemektedir.

İkinci bölüm iki farklı alt başlığa ayrılmıştır. Başlangıçta, dünya siyasetindeki devlet dışı aktörlerin neler olduğu sorusuna odaklanmış ve buna cevap aranmıştır. Devlet dışı aktörlerin mevcudiyeti, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının türlerini, çeşitliliğini ve sayısını, küresel siyaset içindeki devlet dışı kuruluşların aktörlük durumunu tartışmaktadır. Tanımlayıcı bir analizin ardından, devlet dışı aktörlere bir sınıflandırma yapılmıştır. Devlet dışı aktörler vurgulanırken sivil toplum kuruluşların bu yapı içerisinde konumları incelenmiş, böylece inanç-temelli STK'lar bu yapı içerisinde konumlandırılmıştır. Bu bölümün ikinci kısmı, ana akım uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin devlet dışı aktörleri nasıl ele alındığını incelemektedir. Üç farklı teorinin taslağını- (Neo) Gerçekçilik, (Neo) Liberalizm ve Konstrüktivizm- ana hatlarıyla açıklanmıştır ve STK'ların bu teorilerce nasıl ele alındığı incelenmiştir. Özellikle bunlar arasında, konstrüktivizm (inşacılık), devlet

⁹¹⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, Second Edition (California: Sage Publications, 1994), p.20.

dışı aktörleri, dünya siyasetine yeni bir alternatif sunarak devletlerin tercihlerini değiştirebilen güçlü varlıklar olarak görmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu kısım özel olarak inşacılık teorisi ve bu teorinin STK'larla olan ilgisine ele almaktadır.

Üçüncü bölüm ise üç farklı alt başlığa ayrılmıştır. İlk bölümde dış yardım ve kalkınma arasındaki ilişki hakkında kısa bir bilgi verilmektedir. Bu kısım aynı zamanda, sivil toplum kuruluşunun, kalkınma çalışmalarında nasıl bir rol aldığını ve tarihsel süreçte STK'ların kalkınma alanındaki artan rolünün altını çizmektedir. İkinci bölüm, dış yardım kavramını tüm yönleriyle incelenerek literatürde bu kavrama yüklenen alternatif tanımlara odaklanmaktadır. Üçüncü bölümde, kalkınma yardımı ve insani yardım dahil olmak üzere, dış yardım türleri hakkındaki ampirik literatür taraması vardır. Tez'in en temel kavramı alan ve diğer yardım türlerine göre politik olmayan (lakin siyasi bağlam içerisinde değerlendirildiğinde siyasi işlevi olan)⁹¹⁹ insani yardım kavramının tanımını ve uygulama alanlarını incelenmiştir.

Dördüncü bölüm, tezin kavramsal çerçevesini içermektedir. Devlet-STK ilişkilerini analitik bir çerçevede inşa etmek için STK'ların hangi siyasi rolleri olduğunu ve bunun devletle ilişkisi incelemektedir. İnşacılık perspektifinden ele alınarak STK'ların dış yardımda siyasi rol olarak kullandıkları beş tekniği analiz edilmiştir. Burada, STK'ların oynadığı rollere odaklanıldığını ve STK'ların devlet üzerindeki etkisi ölçmeye yönelik bir amaç taşımadığı vurgulanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, beş farklı siyasi rol belirlenmiştir: gündem belirleme, norm oluşturma, lobi faaliyetleri yapma, çerçeveleme ve bilgi sağlama. Her bir faktörün ne ifade ettiği açıklanarak, aynı zamanda STK'nın bu siyasi rolleri nasıl kullandıklarına örnekler verilmiştir. Son olarak, STK'ların devlet politikası üzerindeki doğrudan ve dolaylı rolünü bu beş mekanizma üzerinden daha net açıklamak adına bir şema çıkartılmıştır.

Beşinci bölüm, 2004-2016 dönemlerini kapsayacak şekilde Türk resmi kalkınma yardımları ve STK'nın insani yardım faaliyetlerinin genel yapısını, içeriğini, kapsamını, amacını ve ilkelerini incelemektedir. İki bölüme ayrılan bu bölüm, ilk

⁹¹⁹ Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", *The American Political Science Review* (Vol. 56, No. 2, Jun. 1962), p.301.

olarak Türkiye'nin yardım alan ülke statüsünden donar ülke ligine geçme süreci yakından incelemektedir. Ayrıca, kalkınma yardımlarındaki dönüm noktaları, rakamlar ve tablolar ile çeşitlendirilmiştir. Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı'nın (TİKA) yıllık olarak yayınlanan raporları temel alınarak Türkiye'nin yurtdışı insani yardım faaliyetleri yıl yıl incelenmiştir. İkinci kısımda ise, sivil-toplum kuruluşlarının yukarıda belirtilen tarihler arası insani yardım faaliyetleri, hedef ülkeleri ve hangi tür yardım yaptıkları anlatılmıştır. Akabinde, çalışmaya konu olan dokuz STK'nın genel kurumsal yapıları, kuruluş süreçleri, çalışma alanları ve diğer STK'lardan ayırt edici özellikleri ayrı ayrı ele alınmıştır.

Altıncı bölüm tez'in ana iskelesini oluşturmaktadır ve bu bölüm ampirik verilerin kapsamlı bir şekilde analizini içermektedir. Politika yapım sürecinin beş aşamasını inceledikten sonra, AB'nin STK'ların karar alma sürecine kademeli olarak katılmasını öngören dört kademeli katılım süreçlerini kısaca ele almaktadır. Politika yapım süreci ve AB'nin karar alma sürecine STK'ların dört aşamalı katılım adımları sentezlenerek ilgili Türk STK'ların Türkiye'nin insani yardım politikası ve uygulamasında beş siyasi rolü kullanarak nasıl bir oynadıkları incelenmiştir. Anayasa tarafından belirtilen devlet-STK ilişkisinin yasal çerçevesi ortaya çıkartılarak, devlet bağlantılı üç insani yardım aktörünün (AFAD-TİKA-KIZILAY) pratikteki ilişkileri mercek altına alınmıştır. Devam eden bölümde ise, yarı-yapılandırılmış görüşmeler neticesinde elde edilen veriler, yukarıda bahsedilen analitik çerçeve temel alınarak beş hipotezin ve kavramsal modelin geçerliliği tartışılmıştır. Bu bölüm, teori ve pratiği bir arada analiz ederek neyin tutarlı olduğunu ve neyin anormal olduğunu göstermektedir. Daha sonraki bölümde, görüşmeler neticesinde elde edilen bazı önemli verilerin, tez'in teorik çerçevesinde ele alınamadığı için, gözlemler ve değerlendirmeler şeklinde ayrı bir başlık altında incelenmiştir. Tez'in son ve yedinci bölümü ise sonuç bölümüdür. Bu bölümde, tez verilerinden elde edilen tüm sonuçlar ayrı ayrı ele alınmıştır.

Görüşme yapılanların sağladıkları bilgiler ışığında şu sonuca varılmıştır: STK'ların politika yapma sürecine katılımı fiili olarak devam etmekte ve bu alanda anayasal boşluklar mevcuttur. Başka bir deyişle, mevcut hukuki alt yapı, STK'ların bu alandaki varlığını ve devlet ile olan ilişkinin kapasitesine uygun nitelikte değildir.

Buna rağmen, 2005 yılından itibaren süregelen devlet-STK istişare toplantıları, bu toplantılara ilgili kuruluşların davet edilmesi, iki aktör arasında ilişkinin yaşandığının en net tablosudur. Buralarda, STK'lar farklı teknikler kullanarak siyasi rol oynama çalışmaktadırlar. İnsani yardımın uygulamasındaki STK'ların rolü, politika yapma sürecine nazaran daha belirgindir.

Bu araştırma aynı zamanda Dennis Young'un (2000) devlet-STK arasındaki ilişkileri kavramsal modeline uyarladığı üç farklı etkileşim modeli olan tedarik edici, tamamlayıcı, ve muhalif bir ilişki Türkiye örneğinde görülmektedir. Muhalif bir ilişki modelinin çok az olduğu Türkiye örneğinde, STK'lar daha çok tedarik edici ve tamamlayıcı bir fonksiyona sahiptir. Mesala, diplomatik ilişkilerin yokluğunda insani yardım faaliyetlerini yürütmek, Somali, Pakistan ve Suriye'deki devlet ve STK'lar arasındaki ortak operasyonlarda tamamlayıcı roller üstlenmek, bu ilişki modeline örneklerdir.

Bu tez'in diğer bir bulgusu, devlet ile STK arasında yatay ilişki kurma çabalarının varlığıdır. Bu yatay ilişki, STK'ların devleti, faaliyetlerine meşruiyet kazandıracak bir dayanak ve bir dereceye kadar da ekonomik destek mekresi olarak görmesi, buna karşılık devletin ise kriz bölgelerinde yerel bağlantılara erişmek ve ilgili STK'ların birikmiş deneyimlerinden faydalanma olarak görmesi temelinde ilerlemektedir.

Sonuç olarak bu tezde, dördüncü bölümde genişçe ele alınan kavramsal çerçeve ve ondan türetilen hipotez, saha çalışması neticesinde elde edilen veriler ile uyumlu bir sonuç ortaya çıkmıştır. STK-devlet ilişkisinde bilgilendirme, danışma, diyalog ve işbirliği gibi dört etkileşim süreçleri farklı kanuni çerçevede kendine yer edinmiştir. STK'lar beş siyasi rolü devletle etkileşimde politika düzeyinde ve uygulama düzeyinde diye iki farklı kulvarda uygulamaya çalıştıkları sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Toplanan veriler ışığında şu analiz yapılabilir: politika düzeyindeki rol girişimi sosyal ve ekonomik sonuçları göz önüne alınırsa, uygulama düzeyine göre daha kısıtlı oranda gerçekleşmektedir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, STK'ların siyasi rol girişimi politika düzeyinde merkezi hükümetteki karşılığı ile uygulama düzeyindeki karşılığı aynı değildir. Uygulama düzeyinde STK'ların siyasi rolü daha ön plana çıkmaktadır. Belirli yardım projelerinin kapsamını, içeriğini değiştirerek

veya durdurarak politik rol oynama girişimi vardır. Uyguladıkları beş teknik ise, kendi içerisinde farklılık göstermekle birlikte, norm-oluşturma gibi tekniklerin STK'ların kahir- ekseriyetince uygulanmadığı (İHH hariç) sonucuna varılmıştır. Ayrıca, STK'ların karar alma mekanizmasına resmi katılımı hala fiili olarak devam etmekte, bunun hukuki alt yapının eksikliği ikili ilişkide etkileşimin seviyesine olumsuz yansımaktadır. Lakin, devlet-STK arasında 2005'den devam eden istişare toplantılarına ilgili STK'lar da çağrılarak onların görüşlerine başvurulması yoluyla, STK'ların kişisel olarak kurdukları üst düzey bürokratlar ile bağlantılar yoluyla, sahip oldukları teknik altyapı, kapasite, yurt dışı tecrübesi, bünyesindeki uzman kişiler ve kamuoyunu doğrudan etkileyebilecekleri farklı kampanyalar yoluyla devletin insani yardım politikasını ve uygulaması doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak siyasi rol oynamaktadırlar. Dokuz farklı STK ve üç farklı devlet-bağlantılı kuruluştan toplam 25 farklı kişiyle yapılan görüşmeler neticesinde, katılımcıların %92'si STK'ların son 10 yılda kurumsal altyapılarının geliştiği ve devletin artık bu yapıların potansiyelinin farkına vararak onların görüşlerine başvurduğu, taleplerini dikkate aldığı hususlarında ortak görüş beyan etmişlerdir. Son olarak, devlet-STK ilişkisinde yardımcı, tamamlayıcı ve muhalif edici (daha az orada da olsa) bir ilişki boyutu Türkiye örneğinde kendine yer bulmaktadır.

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