

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU FOREIGN POLICY IN SYRIA WITH  
NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE AND REALIST POWER EUROPE

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EU FOREIGN POLICY IN SYRIA WITH NORMATIVE POWER EUROPE AND REALIST POWER EUROPE**

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One of the most important of debates over the role of the EU in post-Cold War period has been the Normative Power Europe which is built on the idea that the EU does not act as traditional actors in terms of foreign policy and has a norm-setter and promoter role in post-Cold War period. The Normative Power Europe concept has been highly embraced by the EU Representatives, as well. However, the anarchic structure of the system can limit the actions of actors and acts as an important determinant in decision-making. This thesis aims to analyze to what extent the EU acts a normative power and where the restrains of the structure of the international system begins in EU foreign policy through Syria crisis.

Therefore, firstly a theoretical framework will be laid out in light of Normative Power Europe and Realist Power Europe. In the next chapter, EU foreign policy towards the Middle East, the EU-Syria relations prior to the crisis and EU reactions to the key development of the Syrian crisis in its chronological order will be covered. This will be followed by the analysis of the EU reactions to the key developments of the

crisis through the lenses of Normative Power Europe and the Realist Power Europe. Finally, the findings will be use to make a deduction for the question of "what kind of identity does the EU have as an international actor in the world politics?".

**Keywords:** EU Foreign Policy, Syria crisis, normative power, neo-realism.

## ÖZ

### AB DIŐ POLİTİKASININ NORMATİF GÜÇ AVRUPA VE REALİST GÜÇ AVRUPA İLE SURİYEDE KARŐILAŐTIRMALI ANALİZİ

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Avrupa Birliđinin Sođuk Savaş sonrası dönemde uluslararası rolü üzerine başlayan en önemli tartışmalardan birini Sođuk Savaş Sonrası dönemde Avrupa Birliđinin dış politikada geleneksel aktörler gibi hareket etmediđi ve norm belirleyici ve teşvik edici rolü olduđu iddiası üzerine inşa edilen Normatif Güç Avrupa yaklaşımı oluŐturmaktadır. Normatif Güç Avrupa kavramı, aynı zamanda Avrupa Birliđi Temsilcileri tarafından da oldukça kabul görmüş ve benimsenmiştir. Ancak, uluslararası sistemin anarŐik yapısı aktör davranışlarını önemli ölçüde kısıtlayıcı etkiye sahip olmakta ve karar vermede önemli bir belirleyici olarak yer alabilmektedir. Bu tez, Avrupa Birliđi'nin hangi ölçüye kadar normatif bir güç olduđunun ve uluslararası sistemin yapısal kısıtlamalarının Avrupa Birliđi dış politikasında nerede kendisini hissettirmeye başladığının Suriye krizi üzerinden bir analizini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Bu minvalde, ilk olarak Normatif Güç Avrupa ve Realist Güç Avrupa kavramları ışığında teorik bir çerçeve çizilecektir. Daha sonra, Avrupa Birliđi'nin Orta

Dođu'ya yönelik dıř politikası, Suriye ile kriz öncesi ilişkileri ve Suriye krizinin kronolojik sıraya göre önemli gelişmelerine yönelik vermiş oduđu yanıtlar ele alınacaktır. Ardından, Avrupa Birliđi'nin krizin önemli gelişmelerine vermiş olduđu söz konusu yanıtlar, Normatif Güç Avrupa ve Realist Güç Avrupa yaklaşımlarının bakış açılarından deđerlendirilecektir. Son olarak, elde edilen bulgular, "Avrupa Birliđi dünya politikasında nasıl bir kimliğe sahiptir?" sorusuna yanıt oluşturmak için kullanılacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** AB Dıř Politikası, Suriye krizi, normatif güç, neo-realizm.

*To my ever-supporting husband, my family and my friends who made a difficult time easier for me and never let me give up.*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| APL   | Anti-Personnel Landmines                             |
| CEECs | Central and Eastern Europe Countries                 |
| EC    | European Community                                   |
| ECSC  | European Coal and Steel Community                    |
| EIB   | European Investment Bank                             |
| EMP   | Euro-Mediterranean Partnership                       |
| ENI   | European Neighbourhood Instrument                    |
| ENP   | European Neighbourhood Policy                        |
| EOA   | Election Assistance and Observation                  |
| ESDP  | European Security and Defense Policy                 |
| ESS   | European Security Strategy                           |
| FRG   | Federal Republic of Germany                          |
| GDR   | German Democratic Republic                           |
| ICC   | International Criminal Court                         |
| ISIL  | Islamic State of Iraq and Levant                     |
| ISIS  | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria                      |
| JCPOA | Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action                   |
| OSCE  | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PSC   | Political and Security Committee                     |

|     |                                   |
|-----|-----------------------------------|
| TEU | Treaty of European Union          |
| UfM | Union for the Mediterranean       |
| UN  | United Nations                    |
| USA | United States of America          |
| WEU | Western European Union            |
| YPG | Kurdish Peoples' Protection Units |

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The EU is the only hybrid actor of the international politics. Since its inception, the main motivation and driving force of the EU and its predecessors have been the sustainability of peace in Europe. Although, it had been mainly an economic actor during the Cold War period, the end of the Cold War brought changes in terms of actors, interrelations as well as perspectives. Attempt to annex a foreign, security and defense wing to the EC during the Cold-War gained momentum in post-Cold War period under the heavy efforts of the Member States for political integration. In the post-Cold War period, the EU assumed a role of promoter of universal values and norms such as democracy, human rights and liberty. Those norms were also enshrined by the *acquis communautaire* of the Union (Manners, 2001). Furthermore, foreign, security and defense policy were claimed to be driven by the promotion of those norms of the EU by the Member States and the Representatives of the EU.

The foreign policy motivations of the EU may seem to be driven by its own norms and principles, however, the late inconsistent reactions of the Union and low profile that it keeps in engaging for mediations in conflict situations or picky attitude towards the cases in which the Union prefers to be an influential actor shadow this image. This situation brings up the actorness debate of the EU and its consistency between discourse and actions in conduction foreign, security and defense policy towards the rest of the world, especially in its reactions to the crises. This thesis aims to find an answer to the question of "what kind of identity does the EU have as an international actor in the world politics?".

The Normative Power Europe has become one of the pioneering concept to describe the EU's role and stance in world politics since the onwards of the 2000s with the article of Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the

EU". The nature of the EU has been matched with different concepts, however, normative power concept has been strongly embraced by the EU itself, as well. The concept of "Normative Power Europe" has stirred a big debate over the extent of the foreign policy making based on norms and principles as well as the traditional roles of international actors. In parallel with these discussions, the discourse of the EU Representatives has been supporting the normative power conceptualization by emphasizing the importance of values, norms and principles in EU external relations.

According to realism, actors of international politics are constantly under the pressure of anarchic structure. The structure can be challenging for international actors and may not leave all the decisions to the actors. The EU, especially after the end of the Cold-War has been trying to find its path in foreign policy and be an influential actor in world politics while presenting itself as driven by its norms and principles. Is it possible for an international actor to follow a value-based foreign policy regardless of feeling the pressure of anarchic structure? Moreover, the EU seems to embrace this new outlook of Normative Power Europe in its foreign policy, yet the Union tends to act reflexive to the pressures and constraints of the structure in some cases or political developments. An assessment of EU Foreign policy within the frameworks drawn by Normative Power Europe and Realist Power Europe would provide an opportunity to capture the main driving force of the EU in its external relations.

In order to solve out what kind of identity the EU has in world politics, Syrian crisis will be put under the microscope in terms of foreign policy responses and approaches to those key developments. Events in Syria following the Arab Spring and outbreak of a civil war with multi-actors, interests and strategies have caused the most striking and biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time. Syria and Bashar Al-Assad Regime also surprised the international community by not stepping down against all the pressures coming from international actors with exceptions of a few supporting countries. Syria even prior to the crisis had been a playground of many influential actors of world politics. The actors involved in Syria has multiplied with the war. Now the crisis has turned into a protracted one with many pressing humanitarian crises, some answered some ignored. From this perspective, Syria crisis presents an opportunity to

assess the foreign policy tendencies of all actors involved, including the EU. Therefore, the important stages of the Syrian crisis will be the case study to evaluate the actions taken by the EU from the perspectives of the Normative Power Europe and Realist Power Europe with the aim of achieving a conclusion in the end on what kind of actor the EU is.

In this regard, this research starts with a brief historical development of CFSP and ESDP since they are the main foreign policy instruments of the EU in order to make an assessment of the EU's foreign policy direction in Syria. The attempts of establishment of foreign, security and defense policy, milestones and challenges on the way to achieve this goal as well as impacts of actors will be covered. After that, the main assumptions of Normative Power Europe will be laid out. Considering that the Normative Power Europe is a young and still developing theory, the method which will be used to describe will be different than Realist Power Europe. Instead of enlisting the main assumptions of the Normative Power Europe, a set of guiding questions will be resorted to present the Normative Power Europe's perspective on the issues asked in the questions. Following the Normative Power Europe, the main tenets of the Realist Power Europe will be explained and analysis of the CFSP and ESDP through the lenses of neorealism will be discussed.

The third chapter will focus on the Syria case. Firstly, a snapshot of the EU's external relations to the Middle East will be presented. By doing so, a perspective to the general framework of the EU-Syria relations within the EU's foreign policy towards the Middle East is aimed to be provided. After explanation of the EU- Middle East relations, the EU's relations with Syria before the crisis broke out will be mentioned. The distanced yet existing relations of the EC with Syria during the Hafez Al-Assad administration, a fresh start with the Bashar Al-Assad's initial ruling period and the EU's support to the reform process that was started by Bashar Al-Assad and the revival of the relations will be central to this part of the chapter. Finally, the Syria crisis which started with the Arab Spring and turned into the biggest humanitarian crisis of our time will be elaborated with its key developments and reactions of the EU to those developments.

The next chapter will be allocated to the theory testing of the EU's actions,

inactions and actorness in Syria crisis from the perspectives of Normative Power Europe and Realist Power Europe. This chapter aims to analyze the real extent of the normative power discourse of the EU. In this regard, the reactions of the EU towards the key developments of the Syrian crisis will be evaluated from the perspectives of both Normative Power Europe and Realist Power Europe theories. However, the realist glasses will be put on to analyze the consistency of Normative Power Europe in the case of Syrian crisis.

The final chapter will focus on the findings of the theory testing within the framework of historical development of EU foreign, security and defense policy as well as the relations with Middle East and Syria. Then, the main question of this thesis, "what kind of identity does the EU have as an international actor in the world politics?" will be answered according to the findings.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Many definitions have been made for the EU's role in the world politics from civilian power to economic power. European Union has been an actor of the international community with different names since 1950s. The nature of this actor has been discussed since its inception which was a fair debate because it is a matter of representation in the international community.

The European Union represents neither a civilian power of an intergovernmental nature utilizing economic tools and international diplomacy, nor a military power of a supranational nature using armed force and international intervention, but a normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard notions of 'state' or 'international'. (Ian Manners, 2001, p.7)

'Normative' derives from norms and it should reflect the general norms of the EU foreign policy which in the end creates an image that the EU has ground rules and acts accordingly.

The founding treaties are the main norms of the EU which are written to give the Europe peace through economic sphere in the beginning. Yet in time, according to Manners (2001) it turned into more political and driven by peace, the treaties became the guarantors of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. In this context, a question arises: what norms have been promoted by the EU?

End of the Cold War created an atmosphere for scholars and politicians to reshape the spin of the word politics. Moreover, other than the superpowers, other actors gained a chance to stand on behalf of themselves without aligning themselves to any side in global politics. Some concepts and theories were also given a way to rise in this process. Humanitarian intervention, civilian power, normative power, soft power and

liberal-driven ideologies have been quite influential among academicians who are studying world politics in terms of describing the nature of those new emerging actors.

Softened discourse of the international relations changed power understanding, as well. Soft power, civilian power, economic power, technological powers have become as important as military power in today's world politics. Yet again, the very relevant question still preserves its importance. Are these new actors acting solely on their interests and for survival?

## **2.1. The Foreign Policy Development of The European Union**

Although it is hard to define EU's stance in world politics with a label on, due to its changing nature, analysis of the EU foreign policy development throughout its integration process would be a good start on the way of defining its label.

"Over a half of the century, European integration has evolved from a primarily economic endeavor to one with substantive political and foreign policy dimension" (Keukeleire & MacNaughten, 2008, p. 35). In 1947 Marshall Plan was embarked on in order to recover the economic losses of the European states in the post-war period. Yet this was not enough, there was a need to exterminate the political reasons underlying the wars that Europe had gone through. In 1950, the French Foreign Minister of the time came up with a solution to unify the coal and steel market and the production in France and the FRG under a Higher authority which founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Foundation Robert Schuman, 2011). According to Keukeleire and MacNaughten (2008), the Schuman Plan was offering an unorthodox solution to political conflicts and a new way to conduct foreign policy at the time that will eventually give a fresh start to the relations with West Germany, hopefully not one ending up with another war. It could be said that it was a good start to change states' perception towards each other, rather than otherization.

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed between the Europe and the USA, which introduced collective defense strategy led by the USA. The threat of being attacked necessitated a European militarization which also meant rearmament of

Germany. After the German aggression which caused many deaths and losses of resources, rearmament of Germany was an intimidating scenario for European states. For the USA, according to Cook (1989) it was just like military Marshall Plan to help the Europeans until they are ready to get on their feet. A Europe who is capable of defending itself was a situation that the USA would happily embrace (Cook, 1989, p.225).

With the new partnership, and the rising concept of collective defense, the six ECSC members signed the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty in 1952, a supranational entity motivated to create a 'European army' as an alternative to US-led one (Ruane, 2000). However, this was not as successful as in theory and it faced an obstacle from French Assembly which did not ratify the Treaty (Fiott, 2017). This bump on the road of European collective defense was perceived as "intense disappointment, and a rapid response was required" which led to another attempt ("The Failure of the European Defence Community", 2019, para. 3). In 1954, Brussels Treaty let the Western European Union (WEU) come into life (WEU, 1954). "Its main feature was the commitment to mutual defense should any of the signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe" (WEU, 2009, History of WEU, para.2). The Article IV of the Treaty was addressing NATO for military matters. According to Keukeleire & MacNaughten (2008) "stripped of its potential as a site for European defense cooperation, the Europeans lost the opportunity to use their own military capabilities to pursue their own foreign policy choices" (p. 42).

In 1960, President of France came up with a defense cooperation proposal in order to create an intergovernmental yet not a part of the European Economic Community, namely (EEC) Fouchet Plans (Teasdale, 2016). "De Gaulle's objective was to reform the European Communities, with the aim of establishing a Union of States" which was "in contrast with the union among the peoples in the EEC Treaty preamble" (Fouchet Plans, 2016, p.1; Stein, 1983, p.50). The plan has a strong inter-governmental emphasis which made the EEC members consider the plan as a threat to the supranational structure of the EEC. It was widely regarded as an attempt to change EEC's direction towards French national interest and domination maneuver over EEC by

affecting the balance of power within the EEC (Fouchet Plans, 2016). De Gaulle's motivation was to undermine the EEC since it was getting more supranational than its earlier years (Stein, 1983, Teasdale, 2016). The plan was rejected and France withdrew from NATO's military wing to focus on its own national interest, yet more importantly this unsuccessful initiative of De Gaulle pointed out that the EEC was still not resilient enough to handle integration in susceptible areas such as foreign policy (Teasdale, 2016). This move created frostiness among the EEC partners and France, which ended up forming a bottleneck for development a common foreign policy within the EEC.

The EEC was creating its own brand in international trade by establishing relations with different actors around the world. The EEC's presence and influence in the international trade had waken up new expectations in international community. The EC was expected to be an actor who has an influence in world politics. In line of these developments, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was launched in 1970 which can be attributed as a basic form of a common foreign policy for the EC (Tulli, 2017). EPC was established as "a separate and additional framework of cooperation between the Nine member States of the Communities under which the Nine agree to consult on, and so far as possible, to coordinate and act in common on foreign policy matters" (Fitzgerald, 1974, p. 18). It served as a way of "informal framework for identifying common interests in the foreign policy area" (Duke, 2006, p.2). However, it "was initially kept separate from economic integration in the context of the European Community" (Keukeleire & MacNaughten, 2008; Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker, 2017, p.3)

The EPC had an intergovernmental nature and a motivation to create a harmonious Community action in foreign policy. The decisions were taken in consensus by the member states' foreign ministers. Although "the history of EPC procedures reveals its unique growth and intergovernmental character" of the Community, it was not very useful in practice since the EPC has no legal body or distribution of roles and responsibilities among EC institutions which was later solved out with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 (Starr, 1992, p.446; Potter, 1993). "The EPC continued to operate without a secretariat, relying instead on a modest support that rotated each six months with the Presidency" (Duke, 2006, p.4). Nevertheless, compared to other

attempts and despite lack of many mechanisms, the EPC provided an opportunity for the Community to have its own brand in world politics besides creating a ground that can turn into a common foreign policy.

According to Stein (1983), the developments in 1969 laid the ground work for the EPC. With the coming of the Pompidou Government into power in France, green light was given to UK for accession to Community and later the Hague Summit brought fruitful outcomes out of the efforts (Duke, 1999). Within this atmosphere, the leaders of the Hague Summit steered the direction of the Community towards deepening and widening. Foreign Ministers were asked "to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification" (as cited in Starr, 1992, p. 446). This followed by the Luxemburg Report which was stressing the importance of harmonized interests in foreign policy as the facilitator of a political unification (McAllister, 2010). The report used rather cautious language compared to its previous attempts and expressed the objectives as well as mechanisms which were to be used in the field (Star, 1992; Davignon Report, 1970). The Report states that "Europe must prepare itself to discharge the imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role" (Davignon Report, 1970, p.2). It provided a framework for intra-Member States consultation in all important areas of foreign policy as well as more coordination with the Commission (Duke, 2006). The Luxembourg, also known as Davignon Report prepared the fully-fledged formation of the EPC with this legal ground.

As one of the series of the European Summits following the Hague, Paris Summit is another one that adds one brick more on the development of a common foreign policy of the Community. With the Paris Summit in 1972, Member States discussed the coordination of EPC, recognized their good cooperation in the foreign policy and recommended 4 times regular meetings of foreign ministers (Brown, 2012). The outcome document of the Summit, the Paris Communiqué defined the President of the Council as the representative of the Nine as expressed in point 4, namely " The President-in-Office will be the spokesman for the Nine and will set out their views in international diplomacy" (Final communiqué of the Paris Summit, 1974, para. 6). What was missing in the attempts so far was an institutional common actor/leader. The famous

question of Henry Kissinger "Who do I call when I want to speak to Europe" was a good illustration of the need for an actor who could speak for the Community (Blockmans & Koutrakos, 2018, p.488). This time with Paris Summit, Kissinger and actors of international community found themselves a spokesperson on behalf of the Community.

In 1973, the Heads of Governments and States convened at Copenhagen Summit (EFPU, 2017). The result document, the Copenhagen Report acknowledged the commitments of Member States to consult with each other the important issues in foreign policy and went one step further by agreeing on taking the final action after consultation with each other (Declaration on European Identity, 1973). Therefore, it was not only a commitment for coordination in foreign policy but also the commitment of the Member States to bring a European identity EC's external actions.

In 1981, the EC Foreign Ministers adopted the London Report which was composed of renewed commitments towards more coherent foreign and security policy including the crisis times. It was also an "attempt to define and reform the institutional organization of EPC" (Starr, 1992, p. 447).

The reasons behind the arrested development of common foreign and security policy of EC after World War II can mostly be enlisted as "mutual distrust among Western European countries, US nuclear supremacy, the Cold-War period West Germany's status and geographic position, and British-US ties" (Kirschner, 1989, p.1). The obstacles in front of the European integration was amplified with the unanimity rule in the Council (European Union Center of North Carolina, 2006). All of this had led the member states to pursuit their security concerns through NATO (Kirschner, 1989).

Within this atmosphere, in 1986, the Single European Act was signed and it was a successful attempt on the way to deepening (The Single European Act, 1986). The SEA was the revision of the Treaty of Rome and it was one of the milestones that made possible the European integration with a single move. It was an important step to jump over the De Gaulle's reservations over integration (Nelsen & Stubb, 1994).

The Agreement made possible the institutionalization of the Community's foreign policy without touching its nature. "With regard to foreign policy, the major effect of the Single European Act (SEA) was the codification of the European Political

Cooperation and the European Council" (Bindi, 2010, p. 24). The SEA bolstered the EPC with administrative institution (Starr, 1992). It identified the roles of each institution related to the EPC and made the distribution of roles and responsibilities (The Single European Act, 1986). The difference of the SEA was that it was not ambitious compared to previous attempts and its emphasis on institutionalism softened the edges of the common foreign policy (Kirschner, 1989). However, considering the time period that the Member States had come to terms bringing down their guards against economic cooperation and preserved their national codes over susceptible areas such as foreign and security policy, the EPC can be regarded without a doubt as a success in the EC integration history.

EC Member States signed the Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European Union on 7 February 1992 (The Treaty of Maastricht On European Union, 1992). The temporality of the treaty is of high importance since "the whole international context of the European Community had been transformed substantially by the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the Iron Curtain and the unification of Germany" (Ludlow, 2013, p.11). The late of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s were the tumultuous years of the world politics when communist regimes were failing one by one. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was also stalling the international politics which eventually turned into the Gulf War. It caused a long dispute among the Members in terms of many issues surrounding foreign policy and how to response to the crisis as well as on which platform the Member States should pursue their national security interests (Bindi, 2010). In 1990, East Germany (GDR) and West Germany (FRG) united which meant fall of communism in GDR. Moreover, in December 1991, the USSR disintegrated into fifteen states (United States Department of the Historians, 2016). This was a cornerstone in the history and cause of abrupt and dramatic changes in the course of world politics. With the dissolution of the USSR, one side of the balance of international politics was eliminated and international system waited in curiosity with the question in mind of what is going to happen from the day on. Almost simultaneously the Yugoslavian question in the middle of Europe, which also turned into a war and resulted in break up Yugoslavia, put all the actions or inactions of EC more under international spotlight

(Hook, 2013). Although the EC's response was not fulfilling for anybody in terms of Yugoslavia, it left a wave on the Member States and caused them to question how they approach to a common EC Foreign policy.

All these surrounding political developments around the EC brought out that the Community requires a consistent and coordinated way of conducting the Community's foreign policy. The reasons behind the Maastricht Treaty and a series of Treaties that brought the Union ever-closer may not entirely be attributed to these political events, however it would not be wrong to assume that the political developments surrounding Europe between the late 1980s and early 1990s which was shaped mostly by the German unification and end of the Cold War have impacts on the course of the Community history and the way that the EU acted in its external relations.

According to Ludlow (2013) there is also change of understanding inside the Community which prepared the EU to dive in ever closer Union idea. The Community evolved conducting the institutional and systematic changes from mostly through informal methods, which were the main reason behind the reluctance of Member States at the onset of 1980s, to the treaty based methods (Ludlow 2013). In order to open the bottlenecks of the integration and to foster the process, institutionalism was used as the main instrument instead of informal conduct of business (Ludlow, 2013).

The Maastricht Treaty was signed within these atmosphere. It constitutes an important pillar under the political integration of the Community. After its ratification by the signatories, the EC transformed into European Union. The Maastricht Treaty is the founding treaty of the EU despite further amendments made to it later. Changes that were brought by the Maastricht Treaty transformed EC both institutionally and structurally (Treaty on European Union, 1992). The Treaty provided the EU with a three pillared structure: the European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (JHA) (Treaty on European Union, 1992).

The Maastricht Treaty affected the lives of people of the Member States directly. It introduced the European citizenship, single currency, common foreign policy and brought collaboration in police and judiciary areas which needs a certain national

sovereignty to Union level (Sokolska, 2018a). It laid the foundation for a "common foreign and security policy, with the option of leading to a common defense of the union" (Laurentzen, 2017, para. 5). One of the most important modification on foreign policy was that the Commission's role in foreign policy was recognized and gained a treaty basis with the Title V of the Treaty (Ludlow, 2013).

The CFSP was planned to facilitate the member state's inter-relation and the relations with EU institutions in the chaotic atmosphere of the 1990s which was a challenging task considering a united external action and consensus in foreign policy is hard to achieve in the EC (Blockmans, 2017). The Treaty highlighted the importance of a Community as a united front in the world politics and of solidarity (Treaty on European Union, 1992).

"The CFSP is supported by a distinctive institutional framework, in which national diplomats and EU officials jointly make policy on the basis of consensus" (Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker, 2019, p.2). The main instruments of the CFSP in this process, according to Karen Smith (as cited in Gerrits et al, 2009) were "declarations, confidential demarches to foreign governments, high-level visits, diplomatic sanctions, political dialogue, making peace proposals and dispatching envoys" (p.42).

In order to increase the importance of the EU in the eyes of the citizens, to strengthen the EU's role in international politics and to make the conduct of business of the Union more effective, Amsterdam Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997 (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). The Treaty improved the decision making process and instruments of the CFSP more efficient with some provisional changes. Firstly, the function of the Secretary General of the Council was expanded with being appointed as the High Representative for the CFSP with the Article 151 (University of Luxemburg, 2016; Bindi, 2010). The Maastricht Treaty was an important step for closer coordination and stronger cooperation of national policies in the field of foreign policy however decision-making mechanism remained a pending issue to be dealt with later (Chryssogelos, 2016; Dehousse, 1998). This was overcome by the Treaty of Amsterdam. As Bindi (2010) notes, "for the first time the EU foreign policy was to have a name and a face" (p.34). Treaty of Amsterdam also enabled the establishment of a Policy Unit which is a policy

planning and early warning unit for CFSP and replaced it under the responsibility of High Representative (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). Secondly, the Treaty relaxed the voting procedure in the Council and brought qualified majority voting which was to prevent blockage in the decision-making (Dehousse, 1998).

Representation of the EU was still exercised by the Presidency and in order to provide coordination and effectiveness the Secretary General of the Council, who is also the High Representative for the CSFP, was decided to work in assistance of the Presidency (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). The Treaty of Amsterdam regulated the relations with the EU and the WEU, as well (Pagani, 1998). The Treaty, laid the legal ground for the WEU to provide "the Union with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg tasks" (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p.125). This way, the EU was given to option to decide on launching the Petersberg Tasks yet the implementation of the decision still remained on the WEU (EFPU, 2017). It was an important step for the EU en route to develop a common defense policy. Member States also put in place a mechanism so-called "common strategies" to act in a more orchestrated way in terms of reacting to international political developments (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997; Bindi, 2010).

The late 1990s witnessed the take off of the EU security policy and defense initiatives. After revision of the CFSP provisions by the Amsterdam Treaty, two Member States set out to increase defense wing of the Union and enhance its operational capacities (Hautula, 2000). First failure of the EU to come up with a sustainable solution and to stand as a united front was the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The unsuccessful attempt of the EU for a coherent response did not result in very fruitful in terms of solving the crisis (Hwee, 2013). The intervention of the USA supported by the NATO from military wing and its diplomacy initiatives from political wing brought out the Dayton Peace Agreement and resulted in ending the crisis in the backyard of the Europe, yet not thanks to the Europe (Bindi, 2010; Hwee, 2013). When the Kosovo crisis broke out in the onset of 1998, the US intervention through the NATO between March to June 1999 strengthened the perception and determination of the EU leaders to establish an

autonomous defense capacity of the EU, particularly in the area of crisis management (Gross, 2007).

The Franco-British Summit on 3-4 December 1998 in St. Malo marks a historic moment in the course of the European foreign and defense policy with the "formal removal of the long-standing British resistance to the development of a substantive defense competence within the EU itself" (Rohan, 2014, p. 296). As the outcome document of the Summit, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac adopted the St. Malo Declaration which was permitting to develop a common defense within the EU to acquire capacity for autonomous action and a ready military forces to be used in international crises (Perry, 2008; "Chaillot Papers", 2001; Rohan, 2014). St. Malo was an important development which laid the foundation of an elusive area. The declaration was acknowledging the responsibility of the Member States under the NATO and its role for the EU with a reference of "the foundation of the collective defense of its members" (Franco-British St. Malo Declaration, 1998, para.3). Yet it was showing the autonomy and distinguishing itself from the Atlantic Alliance by saying "to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged ((Franco-British St. Malo Declaration, 1998, para.7). It was an important step for the EU, considering the NATO had been the primary platform for defense cooperation of the Member States. According to Rohan (2014), St. Malo was an important step not only with the relations with the Atlantic Alliance, but also with the WEU itself since it acknowledged "the integration of the WEU into EU as a common position" (Rohan, 2014, p. 296).

After the St. Malo in 1998, the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils in 1999 further carried the commitment of Member States to form a common security and defense policy. The fifteen Member States of the EU extended the decision of the St. Malo with the Summit to an EU-wide policy (Trybus, 2005). By avoiding vague terminology in terms of what is planned to be achieved in the end, the Cologne Summit which was held in June 1999 crystallized the EU's goal of establishing a common security and defense policy, namely ESDP (Andréani, Bertram & Grant, 2001). The EU's pressing institutional problem was the lack of consistency in foreign policy in terms of leadership due to troika structure and change of representation with each

Presidency (Gardner& Eizenstat, 2010). While there is a High Representative for the CFSP, the troika was still representing the EU in international platforms (Gardner& Eizenstat, 2010). Also, the limited budget and human resources of the High Representative for the CFSP as well as its limited mandate were making this new mechanism a duplication. Therefore, the Summit established a combined position which is "the Secretary-General of the Council and the High Representative for the CFSP" and designated Javier Solana as the first Secretary General and High Representative (European Council, 1999b, p.2). The flaw in the representation system was solved out with the Summit.

With the Summit, it was decided to establish new security bodies which will be dealing both political and military side of the security matters. Therefore, Political and Security Committee composing of civilian representatives of the Member States who are experienced in security field for coordination of the security issues with the CFSP and a Military Committee which is composed of chiefs of defense of Member States to give military advise to the Political and Security Committee as well as to manage the military activities of the EU were established (Andréani, Bertram & Grant, 2001; European Council, 2017b). The Member States also took another step and decided that the Petersberg tasks can be implemented by the EU, as well (EFPU, 2017). This can be commented as the replacement of the WEU by the EU in terms of defense and military capabilities.

The Cologne Summit can be summarized as the institutional preparation phase for a common security and defense policy. The Helsinki Summit in December 1999 worked on leapfrogging for the Union's military capabilities. Therefore, the Member States opened an independent headline for the defense and security policy and decided on "developing the Union's military and non-military crisis management capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defense" (European Council, 1999b, p.3). Without compromising its responsibilities under the UN for international peace, the EU Member States displayed their determination to form its own defense mechanism that does not require NATO's support (European Council, 1999c).

The Union, by the initiatives of UK and France, adopted headline goal on military capabilities which is in such "a capacity to deploy and sustain forces able to pursue the full range of Petersberg Tasks" (Hunter, 2002, p.63). With this, Member States agreed on scaling up its military capacity by establishing a "rapid reaction corps" composed of up to 50.000- 60.000 persons within two months and capable of sustaining this resource (Rohan, 2014, p.313). This headline goal was followed by establishment of "a wide range of command, control, intelligence, and strategic transport capabilities—notably, those areas that, under the 1996 Berlin agreement" in order to live up to the goals set by Member States (Hunter, 2002, p.64).

The Treaty of Nice is another important Treaty in terms of evolution of the EU Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty, which entered into force on February 2003, prepared the Union for the fifth wave of enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEECs). The Treaty of Nice further strengthened the CFSP pillar introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. It regulated the qualified majority voting that constitutes an important step for the coherency in the foreign policy decisions (Bindi, 2010). It also increased the "PSC's role in crisis management" (Lorca, 2007, p. 5).

The Nice Treaty was not regarded enough in terms of reformation of the EU institutions or preparedness of the Union to the big enlargement. Therefore, in order to facilitate the next and fifth enlargement wave of the EU with CEECs in 2004 and 2007 institutionally and legally and to "replace the confusing patchwork of EU treaties with a single, overarching constitution", the Treaty for Constitution for Europe was prepared (Sokolska, 2018b). However, it has never entered into force since it was declined by the people of France and Netherlands in referendum (Gardner& Eizenstat, 2010, para.3). The Treaty was providing legal foundation for a European Foreign Minister, European External Action Service (EEAS) and military and defense institutions with operational capabilities (EFPU, 2017).

The debacle of the Constitutional Treaty led to negotiations tackle the pending institutional problems of the Union such as weighting of votes, composition of countries and voting system for a new reform treaty in which some expressions or titles like European Foreign Minister which caused "supra" emphases were toned down ("Chaillot

Papers", 2001; EFPU, 2017). After the finalization of drafting, the new reform treaty, Treaty of Lisbon was signed on December 2007 by the Member States.

The Treaty of Lisbon unified the TEU and the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. The EC was replaced by the EU under one identity. It reinforced the mode of policy making and integration that was established by the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). New innovations regarding the institutions of the EU were made with the Treaty of Lisbon such as designation of the Council in charge of steering of the CFSP (Chrysogelos, 2016). In general, Treaty of Lisbon brought "three major institutional innovations, namely the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the European Council, and the European External Action Service" (Gaspers, 2008, p. 19). It amplified the role of the High Representative and "incorporated all the foreign policy functions of the rotating presidency" (Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker, 2017). The Treaty tightened the High Representative's relations with the Council and the Commission which would brought integrated approach and provided closer coordination among the Member States and the EU institutions. As Lehne (2017) calls, the High Representative became the "lynchpin" of the new foreign policy of the EU (p.4).

The Treaty "reviewed the union's whole set of institutional arrangements for foreign policy" (Vimont, 2015, p. 2). Although the main obstacles remained such as unanimity and lack of harmony in national foreign policy interests of the Member States, the Treaty prepared a ground for the foreign policy strategies, approaches and instruments to function efficiently (Lehne, 2017).

Throughout the pipes of the history of EU foreign policy, one question preserved its relevance: to what role have all these developments been preparing the EU for in world politics?

## **2.2. The Normative Power Europe (NPE) and the EU Foreign, Security And Defense Policy**

According to Toje, "no other part of European integration more clearly embodies the ambition to develop a political union than the foreign policy dimension" (Gerrits et al., 2009, p.37). And this political union has a stance when it comes to international politics. The EU has been developing its common foreign and security policy since the 1950s, although they are not always at the same time. The EU's actions against or reactions to events put the EU under the scope of scrutiny in terms of the foreign policy analysis, the actorness and what kind of actor the EU presents itself to the world politics. The destination that the EU wants to reach in terms of external relations shaped the development of its foreign and security policy throughout the years. Is it trying to be a moral role model in international politics as a unique and successful example of political and economic integration or is it just trying to survive and be an influential in line with its political interests just like states? What kind of actor does the EU present itself? In order to understand the conditions which brought the 'actorness' in international relations issue of the EU into question, the spirit of the time should be well-captured.

### **2.2.1. Change of Order in World Politics**

The 'actorness' and its nature of the EU in international relations has evolved around 1990s. Until 1990s, the "civilian power Europe" by François Duchêne was the dominant defining role of the EC in international relations.

According to Duchêne, Europe was "long on economic power and relatively short and armed force" (Duchêne,1972,1973 as cited Manners 2001, p.4). In the notion of civilian power, diplomacy is the primary instrument to find solution for international problems; economic power has a central role in achievement of national interests and the supranational institutions are important for progress of the matters of world politics (Twitchett,1976; Maull, 1990). The surrounding circumstances urged the Union to have a stance as an international actor that is capable of changes. It can not be diminished into

only one event, however the accumulation of the challenges starting with the fall of Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold-War can be asserted to act altogether as trigger for EU to desire to be an actor with the impact of change in international politics.

When the Berlin Wall fell and crashed into the ground of USSR to the very core on 9 November 1989, the reunification of East and West Germany appeared as the next step. Considering its geopolitical position, demography and large territory, the question of where to position a united Germany in Europe arose. The intention for "incorporation of GDR" to EC was expressed by Jacques Delors in 1990 by saying that " East Germany [is] a special case and there is a place for East Germany in the Community should it so wish" (European Parliament, 2015, para.2; Smith, 2004, p.86). However, there were some opposition to this "incorporation" and statements to treat GDR no different than the other Eastern European Countries which were expressed in an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers held in 1990 (Smith, 2004). While these discussions continued, the course of events changed and the two Germanies signed treaty for social, economical and monetary unification on 31 August 1990 which "led naturally to the questioning of the position of the former German Democratic Republic, and of unified Germany, vis-à-vis the European Community"(Jacqué, 1994, para.1).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has a paramount impact on EU just like to the rest of the world in terms of external relations. Some scholars called this historical milestone as the end of peaceful and stable system of international relations, some others called it as the victory of the Western liberal democracy (Waltz, 1979; Fukuyama, 1989).

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. (Fukuyama, 1989, p.1)

Having been on the focus and the most important playground of the superpowers over forty years of a world politics shaped by the bipolarization which ended up altering the balance in Europe as the rest of the world, "the EU was suddenly presented with a

multitude of challenges that needed to be addressed for it to be considered a power in the international system" (Hardwick, 2011, para.1).

Although it came as a shock wave, the dissolution of USSR did not only end the Cold War, it also released the Eastern European countries out of Soviet orbit which all pursued to get their national sovereignty after the collapse of the USSR (Hardwick, 2011, para.1). The civil war in Yugoslavia breaking out in times when like every member of international community the EU was trying to embrace the fact that the bipolar nature of the world politics had ended, failed the EU to react the events as a united front. It can be understood for an actor who deploys itself an 'economic actor'. It has failed the EU due to the fact that it was the group of the most powerful countries in the Region and the core purpose of its integration was to maintain the peace and to prevent possible conflict in the region with the means of economy, yet it has no strong and coherent voice against all the tragic events happening next to itself.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the EC responded quickly with common motivation of preserving the oil supplies to EC and protecting the citizens of its Member States according to Starr (1992). However, divergence of interests at the later phase of the crisis and the entrance of US-led alliance forces including Great Britain, Italy and France from EC made the Member States act in an uncoordinated foreign policy through EPC (Hardwick, 2011, Starr, 1992, "The Gulf War", n.d.). It was also demonstration of lack of organization around a common foreign policy which shadows the European security (Starr, 1992).

All these international challenges unsettled the balances for the Europe and the urge for the EC to act as a more coherent and united actor in the international relations became more obvious which led the EC to search for itself a role to assume in conducting its external relations. The fact that the EC was an attempt to maintain the peace with economical means and its nature of not being a 'state' were keeping the EU acting as a state would act in its relations with the rest of the world. In a system which has an international Organization responsible from the maintenance of international peace and security, the EC had limits to act as a global decision-maker. As a regional organization established to maintain peace in the region, it was expected to have some

coherent voice and a stance against injustice as well as to further advance the European interests in global scale. The reactions coming from the EC should neither late as in the Afghanistan invasion of the Soviet Union nor incoherent as in the cases of 'incorporation' of Germany and later phases of the Gulf War (Starr, 1992).

These discussions and expectations of EU to assume more responsibility in external relations led the EC to search for remedies to improve its stance in world politics. Therefore as Hardwick (2011) notes "the signing of the Treaty on European Union in 1992 signaled a more coherent outlook for an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy" (para. 1). It is asserted by some scholars that adoption of a common foreign and defense policy by the EU would promote and enhance a common identity as well, which will help securing the EU's interest in the final analysis (Starr, 1992).

### **2.2.2. Discussions over EU's conceptual role**

Since "it is the vanguard of the EU's presence", in other words its actorness, this shift from state level of analysis to institution level of analysis raised the debates over the nature of EU's actorness and EU's "conceptual role over world politics" (Gerrits et al., 2009, p.37; Hardwick, 2011, para.2). In 1970s, Duchêne came up with the notion of civilian power to describe to EC's identity in world politics and it was widely accepted by many (Duchêne, 1972). "Civilian power" which can be summarized as the "use of persuasion and civilian control over foreign (and defence) policymaking" was not fitting on the EU anymore, which seeks to "represent a new kind of power in international politics" (Duchêne, 1972, p.43; Smith, 2005, p.65; Diez & Manners, 2007, p.1).

One of the recent and most prominent conceptualization of EU's external relations has been the "normative power" approach developed by Ian Manners (Manners, 2002). Manners (2001) describes the "international role of the European Union as a promoter of norms in the solidarist tradition" (p.1). Diez and Manners (2007) argues that the "civilian" definition of EU's conceptual role in international relations suits the EU to describe its foreign policy approach during the Cold-War times, however, the "normative power" approach reflects the EU of which Agestam (2008) observes as

"seeking to position itself as a global player with a broad spectrum of civilian and military capabilities", better in post-Cold War era (p.1). Aggestam (2008) explains this as "François Duchêne 's original concept of civilian power reflected the constraining context of the Cold War, while that of 'normative power Europe' in turn grew out of the idealism and constructivist turn that followed the end of the Cold War" (p.2). According to Asle Toje (2009), this power question of the European Union in world politics exceeds the three-pillar structure of the EU.

### **2.2.3. Rationale Beyond the Normative Power Europe**

With the end of the Cold War, the numbers of academic studies on international norms, power types and international actors have radically increased. Manners (2000) argues that these studies mostly do not heed how international norms had a central role in international relations until the midst of 1980s (Manners, 2000). From this argument, Manners (2000) further explains that three kinds of norms underpin the international norms. These are utility norms which are regulative ones and focus on efficiency; social norms which are constitutive ones of the international norms and focus on constitutive processes; and finally the moral norms which he uses interchangeably as "maxim norms" in his other studies and focus on justness and question of what is moral in international relations (Manners, 2000, 2004). In addition to these group of international norms, Manners (2000) adds one more norm of his own, namely narrative norms which "legitimate certain narratives" and he addresses to them as "allow[ing] us to acknowledge that grand narratives are just that of bearing witness to diferends (Manners, 2000, p.32; Lyotard,1993, p.10 as cited in Manners, 2000, p.32). From this originating point, Manners argues that;

An international norm is probably best understood as being a shorthand way of expressing what passes for "normal" in international relations, with all the problems of contestation which this provokes. Normative power, as understood here, is therefore the ability to shape or change what passes for normal in international relations, and which

will undoubtedly have utilitarian, social, moral, and narrative dimensions to it, just as it will undoubtedly be disputed. (Manners, 2000, p.32)

Manners (2004) explains why he used 'normative power Europe' as to attempt to capture the movement away from Cold-War (p.2). He believes that the actions and stance of the EU deserves for a better point of view which does not limit itself in defining its nature and actions as outcome in international relations (Manners, 2000, 2001, 2004). According to normative power approach, this normative role gives the EU an important power. It emerges from the discussion of the nature of EU's foreign policy as "neither military nor purely economic, but one works through ideas, opinions and conscience" (Diez and Manners, 2007, p.175). If the EU is neither civilian nor military only, then what is the nature or essence of the 'normative' beast? (Whitman et al, 2011, p. 5)

According to Aggestam (2008) the normative power discourse "explicitly seeks to conceptualize Europe's role beyond the state" (p.4). The question here is the soul of the EU as Manners (2001) describes "the EU and its actions in world politics demand a wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect what it is , does and should do" (p.4). The distinct feature of the EU as an international actor, the historical roots and context that led the formation of the EU and its legal basis makes the EU different than any other international actor in world politics (Diez and Manners, 2007).

#### **2.2.4. What Are the EU Norms?**

Treaty on European Union begins with an operative part "confirming their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law" (Treaty on European Union, 1992, p.3). Manners (2004) claims that along with these norms, the EU also seeks to promote the equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance by taking the Constitution for Europe as basis although it was not ratified by all Members. Norm promotion of the EU is not limited to the principles. Alongside the "common liberal democratic principles" and "less-common social-democratic principles", EU makes

promotion of the enabling corporate entities of these values, such as “institutions, international and regional organizations, multilateral cooperation and respect for the UN Charter” (Manners, 2004, p.5)

The norms suggested above are not simply declaratory aims of a system of governance, but represent crucial constitutive features of a polity which creates its identity as being more than a state. In the post-Cold War era, it is no longer enough for the EU to present itself as „merely“ a form of economic government for the management of global economics, as the increasing resistance by its citizens to economic liberalisation suggests. (Manners, 2002, p.33)

However, these five core norms within the EU laws according to Manners are not enough to make EU a normative power. Therefore, Manners (2000) argues that EU spread its founding principles to international relations through six factors which are “contagion, informational, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filters” (p.35). These instruments are the way that EU demonstrates its normative power (Hardwick, 2011).

Contagion is “symbolic normative power” and occurs as a result of unintentional external actions of the EU in foreign policy (Manners, 2000, p.35). It comes naturally through and after the EU gets in relations with other actors. The way that EU communicates with other actors and its strategic documentations consist the “informational diffusion” (Manners, 2000, p.35).

EU membership, economical agreements, regional and bilateral dialogues and agreements are major foreign policy instruments for the EU. They are important to the third parties as much as the EU since these instruments are the legal basis of on enlargement, change in national regulations and laws as well as regional relations for both parties. Considering the enlargement policy and the membership, EU puts its criteria in front of the candidates and demands institutional as well as legal adaptation for these criteria to be met. After all, the institutional and legal preparations are done, the candidate is accepted, despite the controversial nature of the argument and opposite examples in the EU history. This foreign policy instrument gives the EU power, according to Manners (2000) a “substantial normative power” since it “institutionalize

the relations of the EU with third parties”(p.35). For Haukkala (2007), enlargement has two major roles. It was one of the most effective instrument to manifold the stability in the region and it served it help the EU legitimize its norms (Haukkala, 2007). Therefore, it is an instrument in EU foreign policy to set "what passes normal in international system" (Manners, 2000, p.32).

Transference diffusion happens through economic relations with the other international actors, influence of which according to Manners (2001) "can be seen in the European Development Fund Initiative to the Lomé countries" (p. 13). There are also overt diffusion which spreads the norms with the diplomatic representation of the EU in bilateral or multilateral platforms (Manners, 2001). Lastly, the cultural filter is the factor that spreads the norms through the knowledge - building and the "export of social and political identity" of the EU (Manners, 2000, p.35).

Smith (2001) enlists three instruments employed by the EU to spread its norms which are "inclusion of negative and positive conditionality to the agreements with third parties, use of diplomatic channels and development assistance given by the EU" (p.188). "The Union's use of these tools suggest an intention to be an international norms-promoter" (EEAS, 2016a, para.5). Another set of mechanisms are identified by Lee (2012) in order for the EU to diffuse its norms are "humanitarian aid, institutionalized dialogues and multilateral approach" (p. 41).

### **2.2.5. How Can the Normative Power of EU Be Identified?**

How can a normative power be identified? According to Diez & Manners (2007) normative power can be identified through its impact on setting the standards in which the actors interplay and "by the impact it has on what is considered appropriate behavior by other actors" (p.175). According to this the EU is a normative power that is driven by the ideas, values ad universal principles through which it changes the social structures as well as the rules the other international actors operate accordingly. In order to identify the normative power of the EU, the scope of the concept of normative power,

the impact of norms and how it stands with the concept of military power should be analyzed more closely (Diez&Manners, 2007).

Manners (2002) describes the EU presents a new kind of actor in world politics which is not overwhelmed by the traditional concerns of a state since it is not one as a result of its historical configuration. This results in that the EU does not conduct its external relations aggressively and not simply in pursuit of self-interest like the traditional actors of anarchic structure of the system (Wagner, 2007). It functions through “promoting the standards, values and principles of the European project in the international sphere with the use of specific political instruments (so-called ‘soft instruments’” (Skolimowska, 2015, p.112). Therefore, normative power takes its power from change itself and its power unlike status quo which is more traditional reading of the power and preserved by the great powers or super powers of the international system (Manners, 2006; Diez &Manner; 2007). Yet, it is motivated by "setting standards" in international politics (Diez &Manner; 2007,p. 175). "That peace was achieved in worn-Europe generates a powerful ethical imperative in European foreign policy for the Union to become a peace builder in the world" (Aggestam, 2008, p. 5). As stated by the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini in the launch of the Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe which is a new Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy:

A fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union, it calls for an outward and forward looking European foreign and security policy. Our citizens understand that we need to collectively take responsibility for our role in the world. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action. (Frederica Mogherini, 2016, p.5)

Normative power is more interested in the impact of the EU's norms and social construction of its identity as well as its changing effect on actor behaviors in international politics (Diez &Manner; 2007). Through insisting on new Members and candidates to abide by its norms and principles, Hardwick (2011) states that the EU gives a sound ground to the normative power Europe argument.

It is also argued by the supporter of normative power Europe that execution of the "global responsibility" through normative power does not close the doors to other forms of power (Mayer and Vogt, 2006; Manners, 2006; Diez&Manner, 2007). Being considered an economic power would make the membership to the EU more attractable and the norms and values of the EU would be tried to be embraced by the candidates which would spread these norms easier in their countries or countries considering to put their nominations to EU membership (Oguzlu, 2002).

As Diez and Manners (2007) observed, taking its power from 'change' than status quo, being interested in influences of EU's values and norms in world politics than its preserving the existing ones and the enabling nature to get along with other forms of powers give the necessary indicators to brand the EU as a normative power. However, Diez and Manners (2007) also notes that the scholars and researchers generally disregard the "de-facto impact of the EU policy" which demonstrates if the EU is a normative power, and incline to ask the question of which particular policy instruments are used by the EU in order to demonstrate the EU "acts as a normative power" (p.176).

The basic instruments of a normative power are identified by Foot (2000) as "moral persuasion, the power of argument, and the power of shaming" (p.9). Rather than applying other coercive methods, a normative power leads others to its direction with its coherent and consistent external actions in which open dialogue keeps its high position during the process (Foot, 2009). In addition to carrying these characteristics, its respect for international law, promotion of multilateralism and open communication are important features which show the normative power of the EU (Manners,2004; Hardwick, 2011). "A genuine coalition implies a collective ambition, two-way communication at all times, and a fair share-out of responsibility and decision-making rather than unilateral action, or strictly bilateral arrangements" (Solana, 2002, p.4).

Based on these characteristics performed by the EU in conducting its external relations, as well as the absence of sanctions and physical force, Manners (2001, 2004) identifies a very existentialistic feature as the most influential factor that shapes the EU's role in world politics. He claims that the question of "what the EU is" is more important

than "what the EU does" in order to discern the EU's normative power (Manners, 2002, p.252).

#### **2.2.6. Similarities and Difference of Civilian Power and Normative Power**

Although Manners (2006) claims that normative power approach puts a broader horizon than civilian power approach to evaluate the foreign policy of the Union in post-Cold War era, the line that separates the two approach is not clear-cut. According to Maull (2005), the nature of the EU is more influential than what the EU does and this is the main instrument in external relations of the EU which is the Manners's emphasis to those who wants to describe the EU's external relations. Their stance in terms of military power is another aspect. While Diez and Manners (2007) claims that the civilian power stands opposite side of military power and normative power as does not, Aggestam (2008) explains the similarity between normative power and civilian power by defining them as "concepts premised on the idea of the declining utility of military power in an increasingly domesticated world of international system" (p.3). Also, both concepts put an important emphasis on ethics and its influence on formation of the European identity (Aggestam, 2008). Although Manners articulates opposite, both concepts are putting the EU beyond the traditional role of states in international relations which is a result of its unique character shaped by norms and peacekeeping purposes (Manners, 2006; Duchêne, 1973; Aggestam, 2008).

These features lead one question to arise: how different is the normative power from the civilian power?

The emerging point of the civilian power is the fact that the devaluation of the notion of militarization by the European people which shows the influence "by a large political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power" (Duchêne, 1973, p.19). According to Manners (2002) the parting of the roads between civilian power and normative power starts at this point since Duchêne's "focus, shared with Bull was invariably strengthening of the international society not civil society" (p.238). This focus is read by Manners (2002) as an attempt to preserve the status quo in international

relations. The problematic part of this approach for him is that the current status quo of world politics puts Westphalian nation-state structure into centre (Manners, 2002, 2004, 2006). However, Manners starts with the question of what kind of actor the EU is. "The concept of an EU society builds on the concepts of world society" (Manners, 2000, p.9). With this in mind, he claims that "the EU represents a new and distinct kind of actor within the international system, and transcends the anarchic and self-interested behaviour of states" (Manners,2002; European Union External Action, 2016, para.3). The objective of Manners is to take the EU out of nation-state spectrum and provide with a world society audience in international relations.

Furthermore, Manners (2006) describes Duchêne's 'civilizing' terms to explain the external relations of the EU as "encumbered" since it is a way of self congratulation of the EU for how far it has come throughout the history (p.184). Secondly, he finds civilian power definition as "fixed on the nature of nation state" which he finds limited to analyze the external relations of the EU (Manners, 2006, p.184). Thirdly, since both concepts have commons in terms of the actor they attempt to explain, the relationship of the same actor and the means to realize the goal, Diez &Manners (2007) observes that "civilian power can be read as one specific form of normative power" (p.177). Manners (2001) also criticizes Duchêne for selecting the images of the EU that would reflect it as a civilian power.

### **2.2.7. Is Normative Power Unique to the EU?**

"EU's normative difference comes from its historical context, hybrid polity and historical-political constitution which is elite-driven, treaty based and legal order" (Manners, 2002, p.240). These factors according to Manners (2002) shapes the characteristics of the EU's stance in external relations.

Manners (2001) notes that Bertrand Russell highlights the issue in his book "Power", with a distinction among types of power: economic, military and power over opinion (Russel, 1938, as cited in Manners, 2001 ,p.6). Influenced by this distinction,

E.H. Carr (1946) uses normative power in his studies as well as in Galtung's ideas (Manners, 2001).

Diez and Manners (2007) retrospectively draw attention to the empirical examples of exercising normative power by USA and Vatican to spread norms and values in international relations though driven by different motives, means and with the associations of other kinds of power. "Leaving aside its rather more openly ruthless engagement in the Americas in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, most of the USA's international engagement has had strong normative under-, if not over-tones" (Diez & Manners, 2007, p.180). Yet, during the Wilson's term of Presidency and the famous Fourteen Principles during World War I, the most clear adoption of normative power approach in conducting external affairs was exercised (Diez & Manners, 2007). The Cold War, according to this argument can be read as the ideological war of two powers to spread their own values and norms around the world with a help of deterrence of military power since "normative power is not the opposite of military power" (Diez & Manners, 2007, p.180).

Moreover, when USA president G.W. Bush declares war on Iraq, he describes his enemy, Saddam Hussein as "who has no regard for rules of morality" and justifies waging war as "to liberate its people.. to be hope to its oppressed people.." (CNN, 2003). Diez and Manners argue that it would be overlooking the whole picture in case of War on Iraq by looking only "power politics" aspect since it was built on "strong ideas" of democracy and human rights (Diez & Manners, 2007, p.180-181). However, interests and norms can not easily be separated (Cox,2003, p.9 as cited in Diez & Manners, 2007, p.181).

The fact that after both of the World Wars, the USA helped international organizations to be established to maintain and provide peace in the international relations can not go unnoticed. It can be commented as norm setting and an institutionalized step of normative power, yet it can also be read as Cox (2003) described, the mixture of interests and norms as well as enabling means of steering the international community to the interests of the USA.

The difference between the USA and the EU is that while the USA is reluctant to commit itself to the international treaties that are based on the norms which are mostly pushed over by it, the EU implements what it imposes (Diez & Manners, 2007, p.181). From this perspective it can be argued that the EU and the USA differentiate in terms of the methods which they choose in order to spread their norms. Manners (2008) argues that the way the EU spreads its norms is as important as the norms itself. In this regard, the EU identifies itself as a normative power, as a result of the codification of its norms as binding agreements (Hardwick, 2011, para.4).

In contrast to Manners, Balibar (2003) points out exact opposite end that will lead the EU by normative power in the end. Balibar (2003) claims that successful normative power Europe will alter the rules and principles of the international politics in which those norms will be widely accepted, yet in the end it will diminish the power of the EU since the EU would lose its role as force of change. However, the impact on the USA would be opposite. Raddled with military power, the USA example of normative power would give "the universal validity of its own norms and a missionary zeal to spread these norms to places marked as 'evil'" which will make legitimate the use of military force (Diez & Manners, 2007, p.182).

### **2.2.8. Examples of Use of Normative Power**

This year we have seen that the world has turned towards the European Union looking for a credible, reliable, solid, multilateral partner. This is a trend that I had not experienced before. It is probably linked to the uncertainty that is growing across the world but from Latin America to far East Asia, to Africa. We see our partners looking at us to strengthen the UN system, to uphold humanitarian law, to make sure that human rights are part of every single step we do in foreign policy, to protect rights, to promote the work of civil society or human rights defenders. (Mogherini, 2017)

The High Representative of EU Foreign and Security Policy highlights the importance of the EU as an important actor in world politics driven by its norms, human rights and international legal system. The speeches of the EU Representatives reflect that the EU feels obligated to conduct a moral foreign policy in world politics. Built on the common values of the EU, Manners presents exemplification for use of normative

power in each value area (Manners, 2001). He argues that EU helped substantially for cleaning of "more than 60 million hidden mines" with the campaign against antipersonnel landmines (APL), and helped establishment of International Criminal Court (ICC) which both serve as examples of European normative power in the field of peace and security (Manners, 2001, p.14). It is possible to see the EU's this normative power also in the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations which is also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and signed in 2015 in order to halt Iran's nuclear proliferation (Argano, 2018). The EU, as the plus one of the UN Security Council took an active part in the preparations as well as finalizations of the deal. Even though Trump's withdrawal from the Agreement, the High Representative Mogherini declared EU's commitment to the agreement (Argano, 2008). In terms of democratization, development of Election Assistance and Observation (EAO) by the Commission in 2001 in order "to support the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights" are example of normative power driven by "political concerns" (Council Conclusions, 2001, para.2; Manners, 2001, p.14). In the field of human rights, Manners (2001, 2002) claims that the EU has devoted itself to abolish the death penalty. In the area of development aid, the EU joined the Jubilee 2000 campaign which was the debt relief for the 35 poorest countries (Advocacy International, 2000). Lastly, he shows the development European Climate Change Programme which was an attempt to strengthen the commitment of VI<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties (COP6) held in Netherlands in 2000 as the use of normative power in environmental protection (Manners, 2001).

Lee (2012) shows the engagement with North Korea through opening an institutionalized dialogue contrary to other actors involved in the issue with North Korea to discuss the development of nuclear power programme and the status of human rights as an example of EU's normative power. Sjursen (2005) highlights the key feature that will allow to sort out a normative power is the fact that "it acts through international legal system" (p.19). As an indicator of this abundance and consistency, Sicurelli (2013) points out the EU's endeavors to persuade of the African States to be parties to ICC.

### **2.2.9. Militarization and Normative Power**

This aspect has always been the most controversial area for normative power, particularly in terms of the expectation of an answer to these questions: Does an actor in international relations can be a power without resorting the traditional means of power? Is there a need to use physical force to be a real power?' and "Can military power be exercised along with normative power?"

A historical irony stands with these questions. A continent, the primary means of which is the physical force to rule the world has gradually become the norm setter of world politics of civilian standards (Rosecrance, 1998). Duchêne (1973) articulates the importance of being an "ideé force" for the EC which is based on an idea to be a real and influencing factor for other actors and events, in order to prevent being "a victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself" (as cited in Manners, 2002, p.6). Although Duchêne emphasizes on being an influential actor in world politics, Hedley Bull (1982) criticizes the unenabling nature of civilian power for self-sufficiency and its ineffectiveness in self-defense as well as security. For some scholars, the discourse of civilian power Europe which was coined by Duchêne to describe the EU's external aspect in time of Cold-war, was "economic giant and a political dwarf" and insufficient due to lack of room it provides for self reliance in terms of security (Whitman et al, 2011, p. 106). Just like Hedley Bull, British political scientist Hill (1993) asserts that if the EU ever planning to be a player in world politics and to be taken seriously, then the EU should strengthen its military capabilities.

However, when Manners brought 'normative power Europe' concept in 2000, he identified one of the key feature of the EU foreign policy that led him to assert this approach as the lack and reluctance of use of force in order to spread its norms (Manners, 2000). It was also the time when the pursuit of common good or greater good outpowered the pursuit of self-interest. In this regard, it can not be wrong to claim that "the EU's normative power is a true-born child of the heyday of liberal internationalism" (Gerrits et al., 2009, p.43). This aspect of the EU is the defining detail of its role in the world politics according to normative power concept (Manners, 2004). It distinguishes

the EU from the traditional, self-interested state actors who depends on physical force to survive in international relations. Although it is not in the opposite side of militarization, 'not relying on a physical force dimension', according to Manners (2001), makes the EU also a designated setter of "normal" in international relations.

If this is the case, how does the EU exercise its power over others? The lack of consensus on decision-making mechanism in the Union and the common European interests pave the way for using persuasive means for EU in external relations rather than coercive ones (Gerrits et al., 2009). According to Wallace (2007), the EU traditionally influences international actors through providing an attractive model and showing its reluctance to use physical force as well as means to reflect its power. Just like Wallace, Björkdahl focuses on the attraction of good example performed by the EU and asserts that the normative power Europe concept aims to "alter the identity of others by providing an attractive model of good governance and peaceful relations to be imitated by others" (Whitman et al, 2011, p. 108). Manners (2008a) notes that the EU promotes its normative power through its "normative ethics which are mostly composed of living by example, being reasonable and doing least harm" approaches (p.80).

It can be argued that the issue of EU's self defense and protection of its own territory is important as much as being a 'player' in world politics since neither can exist without the other. After all, the international conjuncture and the spirit of time have changed since Manners first came up with the idea of Normative Power Europe. As a direct reflection of this change, actor behaviors on international relations have also changed. Even within the EU, political changes affects the balance of the Union. Moreover, the widening and deepening process had political appeal of the norms shined among international community.

The change in process also opened the way for EU to set what is normal in international relations (Manners, 2002). It can not be asserted that the shift is only within the EU. There were also changes in how much the EU has place in the foreign policy of the biggest partner of the EU, the USA. Once protegé of the USA, the EU has become "less of concern for the USA in foreign policy dimension", which is a challenge to the EU due to the fact that "its foreign policy dimension was built on a foundation of and

supplement to 'American hyper power'" (Gerrits et al., 2009, p.44). Zakaria (2008) makes a claim that "there are three tectonic shifts", in first of which the West was on the political dominance, in the second of which the USA was unchallenged and unprecedented dominant power and in third of which, namely the time we are living is the time of the rise of the rest from Asia to Africa (p.1-2). It does not mean that the USA is weak, in his perspective, the rest of the world has witnessing new emerging powers and they are also getting stronger (Zakaria, 2008).

In order to reduce the impacts of these kinds of power shifts in international relations, Bull (1982) supports that Europe should improve its militarisation since the motivations, alliances and pursuit of actors in international relations can change. Laïdi (as cited in Gerrits et al., 2009) supports Bull's argument in terms of self-sufficiency and security of its own territories which he seems an important obstacle for the EU of being a great power. Furthermore, Bull (1982) criticizes the dependency situation of the EU which he sees insufficient in terms of military aspect and does not find it "compatible with the dignity of nations with the wealth, skills and historical position of those of Western Europe" (Bull, 1982, p.156).

It can be attributed to these changes in foreign policy and international conjuncture, the EU started to move from ideé force role to being a proactive agent of "global common good and peace builder" (Aggestam, 2008, p.1). This shift in EU security and foreign policy came "only after the EU begun to recognize the challenges posed to NPE by issues such as peace operations, humanitarian disasters, post-conflict reconstruction and international terrorism" (Whitman et al., 2011, p. 111). Diez (2005) reminds the USA under President Wilson who wanted to diffuse peace and eliminate intervention through binding normative power and reluctant to resort military force yet he realized the fact that normative power should have the support of the wings of military force in order to be effective. The European Council meeting in Cologne in the June 1999 carries an important meaning firstly since the member states of the EU comes to terms that the EU should live up to its potential in international stage and so decided to back the Union with credible military forces so that the EU can have the capacity for an autonomous action (European Council, 1999c). Secondly, Following the Council

meeting in Cologne, the EU leveled up its involvement in crisis management and peacekeeping operations. (Manners, 2008b). Again, declaration of European Security Strategy in 2003, with its call for more enhancement for operational capability including joint disarmament operations is for Manners (as cited in Hardwick, 2011) an important shift away from "its constitutional norm and sustainable peace" (para.6). This shift reflected in the speeches of the High Level Representatives of the Union.

There is a "demand for Europe" linked to our know-how in regional integration; to the compassionate way we address humanitarian crises; to the values of inclusiveness and social tolerance which are common to all our countries. We must match this demand with an adequate offer.(Solana, 2002, p.1)

At this point, the capacity question arises. Where does normative power Europe approach stand in terms of improving capability aspect of the EU? Diez and Manners (2007) states that "in contrast to civilian power, normative power is not the opposite of military power" (p.180). For Diez (2005), it is a back up mechanism to be effective in spreading the norms and values. The issue is also controversial for Manners, as well and he contradicts with himself in this matter. He states that actorness and civilian versus military discussions put the EU in the middle of an unnecessary debate over the state figure of the EU (2001). He places Russel's (as cited in Manners, 2001) study on distinction of power types and the "power over opinion" within the Union as the center of the EU's normative power (p.6). Diez (Gerrits et al., 2009) asserts that in extent to which the EU adds up its military capabilities besides to its normative power, that amount will make lesser the normative power of the EU and closer to a traditional power. Therefore, according to Manners (2002), militarisation would undermine the normative nature of the EU. Unlike Manners, Gerrits observes that (Gerrits et al., 2009) the EU is a normative power thanks to its military power and suggests that the EU would be a counter example of what Diez advocates. He believes that both power nourish each other and make the EU an exception (Gerrits et al., 2009).

The concepts of civilian power Europe to define the EU's role during Cold war, the normative power Europe to define the influence of European integration process and the "ethical power Europe to define the EU's role in world politics as a positive role

model" point out the characteristic of the EU as having an influence through means of soft power in international politics (Aggestam, 2008, p.1). In other words, these descriptions of EU's identity does not associate the EU with use of physical force and military power. Manners (as cited in Whitman et al., 2011) argues that "The lack of military capability is often regarded as constituting the very source of EU's normative power" (p. 107). The EU's direction in world politics, for Manners (2004), should be steered by sustainable peace which should be also the core of the EU's norms. According to Björkdahl "developing a capacity to conduct independent peace operations, or to contribute to the United Nations' (UN) operations may therefore also contribute to closing the gap between the rhetoric and the actions of the EU" (Whitman et al, 2011, p. 105). Solana in his speech in 2002 underlined the importance of military capabilities by saying that "the effort to enhance European military capabilities should and will continue", despite his identification of the EU as an "unrivalled" claimer of civilian power (p.3-4).

In theory, the idea of using military forces to restore the peace and civil rights in a conflict may seem very appealing. In practice, the lines, the roles and perception of the receiving party may be quite different than the delivering side. In this regards, Manners (2004) highlights the difficulty of staying within the lines in civilian and military interventions. The first military operation of the EU was the Concordia in Macedonia, later SFOR and EUFOR in Bosnia which were counted among successful ones because the EU was able to separate the roles and make the distinction very clear. (Manners, 2004, 2006; Gerrits et al., 2009). However, this does not give the guarantee for the future operation o be conducted in the same way.

The launch of the ESS in this regard helped the EU to present itself as where it stands in the world politics in terms of military interventions (Whitman et al, 2011). The concepts which were defined in the Strategy were very carefully taken steps to define the threats for the EU, the questions of which threats will be responded, how and when the EU should resort its military capacity found answers in the Strategy document. Yet, as Björkdahl (Whitman et al, 2011) argues that it does not explain "why the Union should intervene beyond its borders and according to what criteria and how to couple

normative and military powers" (p.111). Manners (2004) points out the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan and argues that civilian and military operations become difficult to be kept separated from each other and mixing both operations mostly make people in those humanitarian missions targets of attacks. What he support is that the sustainable development concept should be the answer of the EU in conflict prevention and if there is a need for humanitarian military intervention, then it should be done under the UN mandate (Manners, 2004).

Going back to the beginning of the discussion, the issue of actorness of the EU restricts the discussions to go further since it makes discussant choose a side on what kind of actor the EU is. White (2004) argues that according to this approach, outcomes are the center of attention not the process itself and this situation compels one to think that the EU is a single entity which is a misinterpretation of what the EU really is.

It is possible to see the change in discourse of Manners in terms of militarization of the EU. In his article in 2004, Manners (2004) picks 5 cases which are for him are good examples to observe the normative power of the Union and comes into terms that the EU is successful in conflict prevention and conducts structural foreign policy that helps the EU spread the international security into the roots of the international system. Therefore, he (2004) believes that unless the military intervention is carried out UN, it will undermine the precious value of the EU which is normative power. However, In 2006, he claims that EU developed a conflict prevention policy in the context of sustainable peace and therefore "the militarization of the EU does not necessarily mean the diminution of the normative power of Europe" (Manners, 2006, p.182). He asserts that the inhuman acts in Bosnia and Rwanda are the main reasons for the EU to develop such a priority (2006). According to Toje (2005), the War on Iraq by the USA was a triggering impact for EU to revise its defense and security policy since the reality and the ideal do not match anymore. The repercussions of the War on Iraq tightened the transatlantic relations as well which led to militarization of the EU in the end (Manners, 2006).

### **2.3. Realist Power Europe And The EU Foreign, Security And Defense Policy**

After toppling down by liberal, constructivist and idealist theories, the oldest theory of international politics according to Doyle (1990,1997), realist theory makes a comeback in foreign policy analysis in multipolar order of the post-Cold War era (Reichwein, 2011). According to Toje and Kunz (2012), this return has a lot with the fact that power and influence does not lose its relevance to explain the world politics and to get results in foreign policy. Even though it keeps its relevance in understanding of international politics, realism has not been the main theory in policy explanation of the EU. This situation is caused mainly by the perception of the EU's image of being above the power politics of the international system as well as fragmented nature of realism in itself which makes state-centric and high-politics focused realism out of the theories of analysis list for the EU (Rynning, 2011).

The reason behind the comparison of realist approach with normative approach is how much realist theory can "shed considerable light on the emergence, development and the nature of the EU foreign and security policy co-operation" (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.217). Also, realism works with what is handed to itself different than liberal and idealist theories. For liberal and idealist driven theories, a future that can be shaped according to rules and principles are the main destination. Whereas realism is interested in the actor behaviors within the existing rules and principles of the system. This different points of angles provide us with different explanations. The aim here is not to claim that one theory explains the EU's all external relations perfectly. In fact, no theory can give a whole of theoretical explanation of EU's external relations or an actor of international community for that matter (Hyde-Price, 2006). The aim of this thesis is to put different perspectives and to bring more light on the issue. Before proceeding any further, realism should be elaborated with its common aspects. As Wagner (2007) puts into words, there are so many varieties of realism that "there is an embarrassment of realism" (p.12). However, they all share some basic features in common.

Realism is built on the assumption that man is evil and selfish, therefore man is the root cause of war in the international system (Waltz, 1959). Realism describes this

characteristic of international system as self-help and anarchic, yet "does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder" (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018; Mearsheimer, 2001, p.30). In order to survive in this anarchic system, states pursue power and power prevails over morality. Realists regard interest as the core of international politics which also comes with another name according to realist as power that remains an indifferent fact regardless of time of the events (Morgenthau, 1954). From this point of view, according to neorealists, the most profound bond among states is interest in international relations. Although political realism acknowledges the moral outcomes or necessities of conducting foreign policy, according to Morgenthau (2006), states are not bound with these moral principles and point of view of man.

Security and survival are also central for realism. Especially the great powers live in constant fear of danger, so they strengthen their military capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2001). This nature of international system forces states act in pursuit of interest which Morgenthau (2006) defines as power. In order to get peace, this nature of man should be changed (Waltz, 1959). "In this gloomy world, concepts such as the balance of power and the security dilemma become the main realist analytical tools" (Pashakhanlou, 2009, para.5).

The EU has been trying to be in the power struggle of the international system with its attempts of CFSP. Although, the EU has always tried to add itself a security and defense wing since its inception, assessment of how powerful or influential actor the EU is and what theory dominates the EU's foreign policy tendencies have been an ongoing debate among theoreticians. Driven by the idea to illuminate this quest of the EU, it would be wise to ask what gives the best assessment tool to evaluate power than the theory of power politics, namely realism itself?

Having been the most dominant theory in international relations for hundred years, realism is discarded in explaining EU foreign policy development and its analysis for a long time (Hyde-Pierce,2006). This is mostly because Realism was in the opposite direction with its constant emphasis of national sovereignty, power-seeking actor behavior and relative gain perception. Although it is thought that the EU seems to reflect for itself that power politics and acting as a realist stereotype is beneath itself with the

rhetoric of its representatives, the EU passed the line of that kind of thinking with establishment of CFSP and ESDP (Rynning, 2005). Critics of realism claim that foreign policy is more than that hits the eyes of realist as well as decisions are taken with consideration of many parameters than realists reduce to a few key causes as well as blame realism with acting in boundaries of a small area of explanation. However, realism can widen our understanding of EU foreign policy to a broader horizon and offer an alternative theoretical framework of EU's external relations.

Hyde-Pierce (2006) identifies the liberal-idealist approaches, particularly the civilian and normative power concepts as "reductionist", "negligent of power" and "explicitly normative" which respectively mean that they try to bring explanation to international politics from national levels, they are unaware the fact that the civilian or normative power which are claimed to be exercised by the EU institutions owes its existence to a safe environment provided by the military power of the EU Member States and their perception of those kinds of powers as good which makes them partial to the argument (p.218). He also notes that neorealism's system focused perspective provides deeper understanding of the EU's international role (Hyde-Pierce, 2006).

Pollack describes realism as "not a single theory but a family of theories" which has not lost its chain of development since the first works of classical realist, namely Thucydides and Machiavelli until 20th-century realists like Waltz and Morgenthau (Pollack, 2010, p. 3).

### **2.3.1. Neorealist Analysis of the EU Foreign and Security Policy**

"One of the appeals of realist thinking is its applicability to practical problems of international relations " (Keohane, 1986, pp.7-8). Realist thinking provides a way of thinking and reading that has not been obsolete despite the amount of time since Thucydides. Since there is no profound change in the international system from then, its interpretation is still relevant although it can not be held accountable for the whole rationale behind state behavior (Waltz, 2000; Hyde-Price, 2006). Therefore, especially with its stress on "structural distribution of power", realism would provide a good

platform to discuss the shaping factors of EU's external relations as opposed to normative approach. Considering the time gap between the Thucydides and the 21st century as well as the need for adaptation of the theory to the current system, neorealism would provide more sophisticated and detailed understanding of contemporary international politics. Therefore, realist perspective of this thesis will be grounded on neorealism.

"The ordering principle is anarchy, and the distribution of capabilities sums up as polarity" (Weaver, 2009, p. 209). It is a realm where there is no superior authority to reign over. Instead of one governing actor, states as primary actors of the international system are independent sovereigns on their own (Hyde-Price, 2006). Neorealism does not hold human nature accountable for the states' behaviors. According to neorealist, states act similarly because they are constrained by the anarchic system (Orban, 2008). This "dangerous and ruthless" system distributes states the same functions of seeking power maximization (Keohane, 1986; Mearsheimer, 2001, p.1). Yet the difference of the great powers than others is that great powers seek to be the hegemon of the system (Mearsheimer, 2001). As a result, the great powers accumulate offensive military capabilities which can destroy each other (Hyde-Price, 2006, Mearsheimer, 2001). In this system rationality appears as an important factor that bounds the actor to the system (Keohane, 1986). Balance of power is the most important element that keeps the structure peaceful (Waltz, 1959). These realist readings of structure and actors of international system unify states under one thing: all states share the same threat and therefore are concerned to keep their surrounding environment safe.

According to these tenets of neorealism, it could be said that structure of international system drives the states to compete with each other for security and power maximization as the best defense instrument in a self-help system to ensure their survival (Hyde-Price, 2006; Waltz, 1959). The structure of the system makes cooperation difficult. Yet, all theories would eventually come to terms that states would cooperate at one point, though the circumstances and conditions surrounding the cooperation may differ for every theory. Realism is not different from these theories, either. According to neorealism, anarchic structure of the international system makes

cooperation difficult especially when it comes to multilateral institutionalized cooperation, due to cheating concerns caused by prisoner's dilemma and the distribution of relative gain from the cooperation in question (Collard-Wexler, 2006). Yet this does not mean that neorealism labels cooperation unlikely. For neorealism, "cooperation is possible as long as the relative gains deriving from the cooperation are acceptable for those involved" (Orban, 2008, p.13). In the case of EU, neorealism explains the roots of this cooperation of Member States by giving up some of their national sovereignty as, firstly because security concerns and formation of a united front to stand together against a bigger power threat as in the Cold War period, secondly due to economic reasons (Walt, 2011).

For neorealist, the amount of power maximization is important for states, especially for great powers. Although the system makes states pursue power at stake of other states, aggressive pursuit of power would work in the opposite direction of the aim to survive since it would steer others to make alliances against itself. Wolfers (1962) describes goals of a state as the one regarding its possessions and the one related with its environments which he calls respectively as "possession goals" and "milieu goals" (p.74). He classifies peace as a milieu goal since it can not be possessed by only one state and requires at least two state (Wolfer, 1962). He claims that since states have milieu goals peace takes its place among them which otherwise would never be a national policy objective (1962). "From a realist perspective, therefore, EU external policy co-operation constitutes a collective attempt at milieu shaping, driven primarily by the Union's largest powers" (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.222).

Foreign policy analysis of the Neorealism emerges from the structure of the international system. In a system that is anarchic, states are not in control of all their behaviors (Waltz, 1979). Although the differences among states are an accepted notion, this "distribution of capabilities in an anarchic order shapes relations" (Donnelly, 2000, p.18). Neorealism refuses the idea of states being "trapped" in the system, and does not accept that states have full will and liberty to do whatever they want, either (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.6). In this understanding they are at liberty to do whatever they want, in the end they will be rewarded for their actions which are suited to the system

and they will be punished for their actions that do not fit the particular patterns of the system (Donnelly, 2000). Although the structure shapes the state behaviors, states are the ones in decision-making in this system. The question of how states react to the system pressure is related with mixture of parameters such as national level politics, the competency of the leader and where the national interests of the state lie (Hyde-Price, 2006; Mearsheimer, 2001, 2001b). Great powers have less limited options under structural distribution of power (Booth, 2011). "Blackmail and war are the main strategies that states employ to acquire power, and balancing and buck-passing are the principal strategies that great powers use to maintain the distribution of power when facing a dangerous rival" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 7). As for smaller states, according to Booth (2011), neorealism takes this inequality issue by offering survival instruments composed of "invention coalition, or 'bandwagoning', among the weaker states, who then together balance against the strong state" (p. 237).

### **2.3.2. European Foreign and Security Policy Assessment of Neorealism During Cold War Years**

In line of these tenets, how does neorealism explain the need of Europe to launch a security and defense policy and its success in the shape of such a unique actor of the international system while some liberal-idealist initiatives such as League of Nations failed (Hyde-Price, 2006). The answer of this question lies in the structure of the system, namely the bipolarity. For neorealism, changes at the unit level does not affect the structure of the system, but the change in the structure of the system has the opposite effect on the unit level (Waltz, 1959, 2000). The unit level analysis in neorealism is mostly ignored since "structure determines the way unit-level actors arranged in the international system" (Orban, 2008, p.13). Change in the polarity of the system is a major change therefore has impact on how states seek to secure their security, as well (Waltz, 2000). Bipolarity makes states certain about the capabilities of others in which they can trust their alliances and internal endeavors, whereas competition in multipolar system is more complex both because it is not easy to weigh the capabilities of other

units in the system due to complexity of multipolarity and because "comparative capabilities of states multiply as numbers grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make" (Waltz, 2000, p.6).

From this point of view, the success of the European integration process comes from the successful reading of the spirit of the time by the European states and careful use of it. "The structural realist attempts to explain the ESDP/CSDP begin with the structure of the international system and the preponderance of American power" (Ryning, 2011, p.25). As it was mentioned above, bipolar system makes cooperation among states easier compared to multipolar system (Waltz, 1959). Hyde Price (2006) explains this in the case of Europe as multipolarity puts the great power in Europe in competition for relative gain and wealth whereas bipolar system makes them "security consumers" and focus on achieving milieu goals (p.224). The security cooperation of Western Europe provided alliance with USA under NATO. Moravcsik (1999) explains this situation as "perceived state intentions (and geography) reverse the predictions derived from pure power balancing, thereby leading country after country to side with the overwhelming U.S.-led coalition" (p. 37). This sudden change of the nature of the relations among European great powers, according to Waltz (2000) is not due to the fact that the European states are finished competing with each other over relative gain and superiority of their national interests, on the contrary, these concerns remain to exist yet expectation of resorting use by opposite side to does not. End of such concerns brought new path in front of the Europe. Bipolar structure of the international system in the Cold-War period faded the nationalism's impact on the East-West relations (English, Svyatets & Zhanalin, 2018). "The decline of nationalism in Europe since 1945 has contributed to the peacefulness of the postwar world" (Mearsheimer, 1990, p.7). Neorealists, therefore, refuse the liberal-idealist claims that "EEC/EC/EU is a civilian/normative/soft power".

The enabling nature of the bipolar system allows the European States to breathe without heavy pressure of nationalism, providing own security by own resources and to dedicate their resources for improving the elements of low politics rather than spending on contemplating war (Hyde Price, 2006). Therefore, neorealists does not accept that the

structure changed radically and the emergence of "new form of power" claims by the liberal-idealist theories. According to neorealists, EEC/EC/EU had been and still is a cooperation built for low politics areas, formed as a response against other super power, allowed by the enabling nature of bipolarity and USA's security umbrella, and driven by the great powers.

In terms of foreign policy development attempts, EPC is seen a successful one although it is not a fully fledged common foreign policy. Eventhough its impacts are not counted important or influencing for a real change in global politics, neorealists interpret this initiative again as led by its largest powers and born out of need for milieu shaping (Hyde Price, 2006). In line with these approach, the neorealism assumes that the EU Member States might be seeking for security in the EU with these intentions; as a balancing instrument against dominant actors of the system such as USA, Russia and China, secondly for buck passing purposes in order to direct their security focus to other threats coming from different parts of the world which would in the end provide new horizons on economics and trade, and finally for bandwagon effect in which the Member States could grow influence more than before by aligning with the strongest actor in the system (Hyde-Price, 2006). Waltz (2000) describes many states as lacking the sufficient resources needed for balancing, therefore he states that most states bandwagon out of necessity to survive.

### **2.3.3. CFSP and ESDP Analysis of Neorealism in Post-Cold War Years**

Dissolution of the USSR marked a cornerstone in the course of international politics. Although neorealism does not pay immense attention to the changes at unit level due to its negligible impact on the system and actor behaviors, change in the structure of the system has the opposite effect on the unit level (Waltz, 1959, 2000). The demise of the Soviet Union meant a rather abrupt cessation of the bipolarity in international system. According to Waltz (2000), "both changes of weaponry and changes of polarity were big ones with ramifications that spread through the system" (p.6). The actor relations, conduct of business, alliances were need to be revised. This

also meant a new balance of power, new alignment of interests and relations among states which brought out emergence of new systemic pressures on the states. Therefore, it could be said that the onwards of the 1990s were the years for every actor to place themselves in the arena of international politics and adjust to the new system.

For neorealists, the change of the polarity does not mean the change of the anarchic nature of the system otherwise according to Waltz, the past would no longer be of help to future of the international politics which would also be no longer the same (Waltz, 1959, 2000). From Waltz's analysis, Mearsheimer (1990) made some predictions regarding the systemic pressure on the states and how the security concerns would lead them back to contemplate their relative gain and to what to do with united Germany (Pollack, 2010). With the dissolution of the USSR, some scholars started to use the unipolar world concept to describe the post-Cold War era led by the USA. According to Mearsheimer (1990), the withdrawal of two superpowers from particularly Central Europe would cause multipolarity and security competition to place in the European politics and rise of five great powers, accordingly although lessened by the power, Soviet Union would be a major power in European politics; the rising number of great powers and the capability inequities would cause damage on the stability of the region (Walt, 2017). Some scholars like Kagan (2008) argued that the Europe will diminish in the face of remaining super power USA as well as rising and adjusting powers like Russia and China, while some other neorealists like Layne (1993) predicted that the unipolarity of the post Cold-War era will terminate itself and cause regional great powers because of the unbalanced power and emergence of new great powers which was explained both by Waltz (1959,2000) and Mearsheimer (2001) as the overwhelming hegemonic power creates alliances against itself.

The world reacts to changes. For Hyde Price (2006), the demolition of the bipolar structure of the system resulted in three outcomes; acceleration of European integration through the TEU so that the united Germany would be in the impact area of the Western Europe, strengthening of the EU with the TEU in terms of economics which can compete with global economies of scale and finally being enabler of stability to the CEECs countries. The stability and peace in the CEECs was tried to be achieved with

the accession of those countries into the EU. The security line surrounding the EU was expanded since how far that line goes, that much stable the external milieu of the EU would be (Hyde Price, 2006). In the case of the EU, this reaction was to secure its milieu by making the neighbors or potential threats as one of them (Cremona & Meloni, 2007).

The point where the normative power Europe and neorealists split is at this point. They both accept that the EU resorts to soft power and has the means of it but unlike normative power supporters, neorealists claim that the EU does not use its soft power out of charity, rather the EU uses this method to shape its external environment (Seeberg, 2009). Converging the resources into desired outcomes needs strategic thinking and can be achieved by knowing the contexts of the game like in the example of the Vietnam War and USA's loss in spite of holding all the power resources (Nye, 2004). According to this understanding, an actor that wants truly to be a power should know the other players, the game, the contexts and the prize in the end (Nye, 2004). Time adds up or changes what components make an actor powerful or not. After the dissolution of the USSR, the USA strikes the only power at first glance. The world after the Cold War witnessed the emergence of new powers (Waltz, 2000). Considering this, Nye (2004) refuses the idea of that there is only one independent power and it defines the rules. He finds this idea naive and asserts that the USA may be holding the upper hand in the game but it can not reach its goals only by military and without the agreements of Europe or Japan or China on trade and finance (2004). This is also a case for the EU, as well. The EU needs other actors to define its power in world politics. The best way to increase its relative power is to make its environment think like itself. "The EU acts as civilizing power only in the sense that it is used by its most powerful member states to impose their common values and norms" in the post Cold War era" (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.227).

Whatever the predictions and assumptions were, the widely accepted dedication among the scholars was that the USA is the remaining superpower and the leader of the new unipolar system in which it possesses not just military power but also other components that consist of soft power (Nye, 2004). However, according to Waltz, the anarchic structure of the international system did not change with the split of the bipolar

system. In light of Mearsheimer's analysis of USA being hegemon only in its own region after the Cold war, Layne (2003) argues that the USA had less interest towards the security concerns of the Europe, therefore preferred to stay on the sidelines with regard to European security and because the structure of the international system forces great powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power, it acted as an "offshore balancer" that intervenes in Europe only when the continental balance of power appears unable to thwart the rise of a would-be hegemon without U.S. assistance" (para.6; Mearsheimer, 2001). Waltz (1959,2000) enlightens this loose point of views of USA towards Europe after Cold War as the strong states have broader margin of mistakes, and act without being challenged by a significant rival, yet weak states have smaller borders to act within in following their security and national interest.

Bipolarity of the Cold War made the Western Europe place under the umbrella of USA (Kennedy, 1988). In a system where there is a bipolarity, the hegemon's dilemma appears in which "a hegemon always overpays for security, which eventually weakens the internal foundation of its external position" (Layne,1993, p.34). This was also the case for the USA and the Europe. During the Cold War, while USA overpaid the security of itself and its allies, the Europe under the umbrella of the USA underpaid their security and could focus on their economic growth which was both necessary for the sake of containment of USSR and brought out different economic growths as well as new great powers in the Continent. As it is, the bipolar Europe transformed into a Europe within a "balanced multipolarity" which is a multipolar system without a potential hegemon despite the existing power gaps among its members (Mearsheimer, 2001,p. 24).

With the fading of the power distribution of bipolar structure in time, European states found themselves in a situation where they have to revisit their roles and capabilities. In addition to that, with the lift of the imminent Soviet threat, USA had chance to focus on its priorities without needing of aligning its allies. Neorealists, as in nature of realism, assume that security competition still remains in Europe yet it is silent. And although the "post-Cold War period has seen a marked decline in interstate violence and a growing concern about terrorism and civil or ethnic wars, realism

continues" (Walt, 2017, p.15). "Factors of military power have been most important in shaping past events, and will remain central in the future" (Mearsheimer, 1990, p.7). Thus, from neorealist angle of the course of events in the post Cold-War era, these developments made the EU establish their own security and defense mechanism, namely ESDP (Hyde Price, 2006). "As ethnic conflict and civil war began to dominate the post-Cold War security agenda" particularly after 9/11, the EU strengthens itself to oppose these threats but it is not because the EU fears the USA or the Russia (Walt,2017,p.15; Rynning, 2011). According to neorealists, by the means of CFSP and the ESDP, the EU in the post-Cold War period, tries to built a collective security, to shape its external milieu led by the collective security understanding driven by its past failures in its backyard as a civilian power (Hyde Price, 2006). The development of ESDP and the CFSP from this point of view stems from ensuring security in the region instead of balance of power, which happens against a threat and in the unipolar world the USA seems not a threat, provides legal and institutional infrastructure for regional security. Hyde-Price defines this initiative as "a collective instrument for coalitional coercive diplomacy and military crisis management by EU Member States, as defined by the Petersberg Tasks and the European Security Strategy" (p.231).

Although the analysis of Buzan (Marc 27, 2013) of "the power gap between a small core and a big periphery as beginning quite rapidly to disappear", neorealists believe that there will be a growing competition among great powers of Europe which will shape the direction of future security initiatives (B. Buzan, personal communication). Whatever the reason might be, neorealist predict for the EU that securitization will continue with more sovereignty emphasis in the future because "factors of military power have been most important in shaping past events, and will remain central in the future" and it is not in the nature of the states to give up their sovereignty (Mearsheimer, 1990, p.7).

## CHAPTER 3

### THE EU - SYRIA RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

#### 3.1. Characteristics of the EU Foreign Policy Towards Middle-East

Retrospectively, the main framework of the European foreign policy towards Middle East is seen as the promotion of democracy, human rights, security and peace. "Not least because of regional proximity, the Middle East – and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular – have been important EU priorities since member-states started cooperating in foreign policy" (O'Donnell, 2010, p.73).

The EU's Middle East policy started with the Venice Declaration in 1980 in which "the right to existence and security of all the States in the Region including Israel and...legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" were recognized (European Communities, 1980, p. 4). This democratic quest of the EU in the Middle East crystallized with Barcelona Process which started in 1995 and consists of commitments of parties' pledges to promote and strengthen "the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region" (European Union, 1995, Political & Security Partnership section, p.3). In line with the Barcelona Declaration which was adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers meeting in 1995 and later named as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), "the EU chose to focus on deepening a 'Mediterranean' rather than 'broader Middle East' policy suggested a preference for inclusive cooperation with the Union's neighbours" (Youngs, 2015, para.7). "The declaration itself divides the Partnership into three 'baskets', titled 'political and security partnership: establishing a common area of peace and stability" (Diez, 2005, p.630). The underlying objective of the process could be summarized as the formation of prosperity zone (Nsouli, 2006). Although it has not achieved that can be counted as breakthrough for neither peace or security of the region nor interrelation of EU and the Mediterranean

States in question, it still constitutes a cornerstone in relations with the Mediterranean Countries and Middle East.

"Comprehensive peace" and playing an active role in bringing peace to the conflict has been an "a strategic objective" in the Middle East Policy of the EU (European Union, 2007a, New Momentum in the Peace Process section, para. 2). Onwards of 2000, the EU involved more in conflict resolution and restoration of peace in the Middle East. The Berlin Declaration adopted in 1999 has a substantial place in terms of one of the chronic conflicts of the region, Israel-Palestine. After recognizing the rights of Palestinian with the Venice Declaration, the EU "included an explicit commitment to the creation of a Palestinian state and to the recognition of a Palestinian state, when appropriate" (EEAS, 2016d, Middle East Peace Process section, para. 17). After the deterioration of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, the EU drew a plan of work in the Declaration by the EU on the Middle East, which was adopted in 2001 in Luxemburg and by the Seville European Council in June 2002 (European Union, 2001, 2002). In order to provide a two-state settlement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, "the Middle East Quarted Mediators" which consists of the UN, EU, USA and Russia came together and draw a road map in 2002 with targeted year of 2005, along with a clear timeline and phases for settlement of two party parties' conflict and peace building under the surveillance of the Quartet ("The Middle East Quartet Roadmap", 2003).

In 2007, the EU continued being a part of the Middle East peace initiatives by supporting the Annapolis Process, started by George Bush and resulted in a Joint Understanding by the Israel-Palestine to stop the violence and continue to the negotiations and to fulfill their obligations under Performance-Based Roadmap of the International Quartet by 2008 (USA Congressional Research Service, 2007). In addition to the support given to the Annapolis Process, an EU Action Strategy was prepared by the Troika in 2007 for reinforcing the state building and peace initiatives in the Middle East. Although Annapolis Process and the Action Strategy of the EU could not be achieved at its deadline, the process provided negotiations in the meantime (EEAS, 2016d; European Union, 2007a).

In line with the strategic objective of comprehensive peace in the Middle East, the EU also directed its focus to the Mediterranean and other Middle East Countries, as well. In this regard, the European Presidency, High Representative/Secretary General and the Commission prepared an interim report upon the request of the European Council in 2003, which reflects the policy proposals to be implemented in terms of relations with Middle East and Mediterranean Countries (European Union, 2004). Under this Partnership, the EU provided financial and non-military aid for bolstering of the economies of the Mediterranean and Middle East Countries except the Gulf Countries which was assumed to foster the economies and reduce the insecurity in the region. With the Report, the EU was also making the account of the success of the targeted outcomes of the EMP. The EMP identified democracy, peace and dialogue as the targeted outcomes and cooperation, shared prosperity as well as the human capital as the mechanisms to achieve these outcomes. The Report was presenting the calculation of what have been achieved under this Partnership Framework (Profant, 2008). The Report served as a tracker of EMP successes and provided the EU with the following results; the EMP was successful in terms of promoting the regional dialogue, "north-south regional integration and trade", human rights and development (European Union, 2004, What has been achieved section, p. 5). Given that, the report provided the idea of that the EMP paved the ground for a coherent foreign policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Partnership bolstered the existing bilateral relations shaped with an Association Agreements for establishment of free trade of the EU with the countries of the region such as Jordan and Egypt and paved the way for new potential ones (European Commission, 2016a, 2019). Provision of forum for dialogue of the EMP to its partners in the region also presents another "only multilateral context outside the UN" for engagement of parties in many different areas (EEAS, 2016d).

EU's steps towards Middle East further reinforced by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)<sup>1</sup> which was embarked on in 2003 and finalized 2004

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<sup>1</sup> ENP Countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine (EEAS,2016)

(Coşkun & Demirtaş, 2012). Although the inception of the ENP was to provide a framework for the political and economical relations with 16 countries that has closest borders to the EU in East and South yet not a member of it, later countries in the Middle East such as "Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Palestine were also embraced by the European Neighbourhood Policy" (European Union, 2004; Kuzmicheva, n.d, p.1). The ENP was launched to reinforce the integrity of the newly-enlarged EU and to increase the solidarity between the EU and its neighbors by promoting security and prosperity in the ENP geography as well as to attain highest possible level of cooperation with the East and the South of the EU (European Commission, 2016a). The enabling instruments of the ENP was mostly bilateral and neighborhood-wide cooperation with the ENP countries as well as the empowering the role of NGOs and civil societies in the region (European Commission, 2016).

The ENP is different in nature than the enlargement policy of the Union. Although it has some similarities to the enlargement policy of the EU, the ENP is different in terms of membership, policy contexts and function (Bindi, 2010). As a framework policy, the ENP does not include membership, provides privileged partnership with different scopes for each country under policy framework with the main objective of rule transfer from the EU to the partner countries of the ENP (Kausch, 2010; Bindi 2010).

After her appointment as the first High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission in 2009, Catherine Ashton made her first visits to the Middle Eastern Countries, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon as well as Jordan and had to spend a substantial amount of time in her tenure due to the political developments in the Region (Baker, 2010). According to Howort (2014), Ashton started a change in the course of EU's foreign policy in terms of active involvement in the peace process of the Middle East and having a real impact on the issue by leveraging the EU's trade relations with Israel at its maximum.

In light of the development following the Arab Spring which resulted in substantial changes in the region, the ENP required to be revised in 2011 with commitment to increase finance and engagement (European Union, 2011a). "In 2015,

the EU has committed itself to a fundamental revamping of its southern (and eastern) neighbourhood policy" (Youngs, 2015, para.4). In this context, a Joint Communication which defines the framework of the revised ENP was published in 2015 after a public consultation with stakeholders of the Partnership with the objective of establishing a more secure and stable EU neighborhood through more effective partnership in political, economical and social areas (European Commission, 2016a; EEAS, 2016c). Under the renewed ENP, the EU shared amount of 15 billion Euro for the period of 2014-2020 to be delivered through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (European Commission, 2016a; EEAS, 2016c).

In addition to the regular consultations with the partners of the Regions, the EU also has been engaging in cooperation with the important actors and International Organizations in the region for various reasons from humanitarian and emergency aid, state-building, economic and trade related issues to border assistance and empowerment of civil society (EEAS, 2016d). In this context, a Strategic Dialogue process was initiated with the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and the League of Arab States in 2015 (Council of the European Union, 2019). The scope of the Strategic Dialogue ranges from the counter-terrorism, Middle East Peace Process, arms control, diplomatic exchanges to crisis management (EEAS, 2019a).

"Despite a rich if complex history of engagement with the region, European powers, neither singly nor collectively, have been able to successfully implement a new set of regional policies" (Fawcett, 2019, p.9). As Fawcett claimed, EU is generally criticized due to incoherent and ineffective policy implementation towards Middle East and being a bystander to the developments as well as crises of the region (Osiewicz, 2019). Despite the fact that the Middle East has an important place in the EU foreign policy, the EU prefers to engage in the region through dividing the region into groups such as League of Arab States, Mediterranean States, OIC Countries and Gulf Countries or simply conduct its relations through individual bilateral agreements with the states of the Region (Kuzmicheva, n.d; Osiewicz, 2019). The 2008 economic crisis caused a decrease in the performance of the EU-Middle East relations, as well and the "lack of political agreement amongst member states, and their reluctance to let the EU speak on

their behalf" often hinders the potential of the relations (O'Donnell, 2010, p.75). Also, outweighing policy choices of certain member states such as UK, Germany and France over a common EU approach, different approaches due to the complexity and capacity differences of the EU institutions furthers the situation (Kuzmicheva, n.d.). In spite of these fragmented and incoherent policy implementation, a denominator of the EU relations with the Middle East countries can be identified as "prevention and containment of threats" which is also called as soft security and shaped around rule transfer (Ziyal, 2004, p. 3).

### **3.2. EU-Syria Relations in Historical Context Prior to the Conflict**

"The Community started to establish contractual links with most Mediterranean non-member countries in the 1960s" which was initially for trade and establishment of free market for industrial products, later was expanded to bilateral cooperation in political and economical areas in 1970 (European Commission, 2018b, para.1). However, during the Hafez Al-Assad administration, relations with Syria for most international organizations including the EEC was limited due to closed ruling and society of Syria (Peters, 2012). The relations between the EU and Syria can be said started officially with the signature of Cooperation Agreement in 1977 (EEAS, 2016e). With the Agreement "Syria had been granted duty-free access to the European market for its industrial goods in the framework of the 1977 cooperation agreement" (Dorstal & Zorob, 2009, p. 58). During the 1970s, the volume of trade between Syria and the EEC incrementally increased despite the political setbacks. Therefore, the EEC wanted to enhance the extent of the trade with Syria by grasping the opportunity wind and to be an accelerator of its social and economic development (Seeberg, 2012; Peters, 21012). The EEC also sought the ways of political dialogue for more democratization and political reforms (Kuzmicheva, n.d.; EEAS, 2016e).

Engagement with non- European Mediterranean countries, particularly with the south of the region became more important due to their political support to Iraqi government in the events of onwards of 1990s (Couloumbis, Stavridis, Veremis &

Waites, 2016). The events led to launch of the Western Mediterranean Forum in Rome in 1990 and Renovated Mediterranean Policy for the EC, which is also referred as Five Plus Five Dialogue and aimed to provide an informal platform for the EC countries as well as the Maghreb pertaining to the developments of the region (Western Mediterranean Forum, 2013). Although a new process was launched with the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, the EU was not very eager to dive in the political atmosphere of the Middle East and refrained from too visible democracy promotion activities in the Middle East. From this partnership " Syria received only a tiny proportion of the funding from the MEDA Democracy funds" which constitutes the financial pillar of the Union's policy towards Mediterranean Region (Seeberg, 2012, p.5; EMWIS, 2011).

Syria was a part of the Barcelona Process and later then EMP since the onset of the Process (Kuzmicheva, n.d.). In 1997, The Council of the European Union gave the authority to the Commission to open negotiations with Syria to conclude a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between EU and Syria" (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 2). In June 2000, Hafez Al-Assad died and his son Bashar Al-Assad came into power. His ruling was initially prone to steer Syria towards more economic liberalization and national adjustment to global developments (Seeberg,2012). "Between the summer of 2000 and the summer of 2001, in a movement now known as the "Damascus Spring," Syria saw a flowering of expression, assembly, and political action unknown since the 1950s" (Wikas, 2007, p.4). Syria witnessed the emergence of human right activists and organization of civil society with the encouragement of the EU until Syria shut down the activities of most of those organizations due to fear of civil war in 2003 (Peters, 2012; Seeberg, 2012). However, after Bashar Al-Assad's succession to his father, the EU-Syria Relations had revived. Negotiations and drafting efforts for an Association Agreement which would which would envisage cooperation political, economical and socio-cultural area were begun in 2003 and finalized in October 2004 (European Union, 2017).

The Agreement was a preparing stage of Syria to the full participation of the ENP, yet the Agreement did not wind up with ratification after seven years negotiation period. This is because of flaws caused by both parties involved. Although the

Association Agreement was considered as a cornerstone in the bilateral relations, temporality was not on the side of either parties. At the initial phase some Member States such as Germany and UK were putting reservations on the clause of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in which the EU side was "insisting on reference to the nonproliferation of WMDs as part of any association agreement" with Syria and Syrian side was refusing the idea since the same rule was not any part of the Association Agreements made by the other countries ("EU signs 'association agreement' with Syria", 2004; Kuzmicheva n.d.,p.2). France along with the USA was pressuring Syria for withdrawal from Lebanon and cracking down on terrorism (Peters, 2012). One month before the completion of Agreement's drafting, the Resolution 1559 which was co-sponsored by France and the USA and "calling upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" was adopted by the UN Security Council held in September 2004 (Pan, 2005; UNSC,2004, para. 8). For the Syrian side of the Agreement, putting Syrian Government's cooperation in the investigation of Hariri's assassination as a condition for continuation of the negotiations was the final deadlock (Peters, 2012).

After Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, EU-Syria relations improved. After this step of Syria, the EU mostly focused on amplifying the reform process that Assad Government started and supporting the civil society (Peters, 2012). Prior to conflict the cooperation between the EU and Syria was "to take into account the reform of the Syrian customs tariff and EU enlargement", yet it never got the chance to be signed due to increasing frosty relations of France and UK's with Syria (EEAS, 2016e, para.2; Kuzmicheva n.d.). In 2007, a Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme which are the type and programming document of the Commission assistance to Syria for the period of 2007-2013 were outlined (European Union, 2007b). However, the challenging nature of the EU-Syria relations made difficult to proceed after setting priority areas for action and budgetary planning (European Union, 2007b). In addition to that, "Syria also approved the Euro Med Five-Year Work Programme 2006-2010 and the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism at the Barcelona 10+ Conference in November 2005" (Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018, p.

2008 was the year that the wave in Syria turned towards the EU. The diplomatic relations gained pace which according to Peters (2012) "led to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Lebanon, indirect peace talks with Israel and closer associations with other Arab neighbors" (p.100). Within these atmosphere the EU and Syria undertook an update of "2004 draft EU-Syria Association Agreement to take into account the reform of the Syrian customs tariff and EU enlargement" in 2008 (EEAS, 2016e, para.2). However, as in the previous precedents, the updated Agreement was never signed.

Prior to conflict, the EU was the main trade partner and donor of the Syrian economy with a share of € 286.5 million to bilateral cooperation with the starting the year 1995 till 2016 and with € 925 million in loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) over the period of 2000 and 2007 (Kaldor, Rangelov, Selchow, 2018). Seeberg (2008) analyzes why the EU-Syria relations could not developed as it was expected and notes that "the lack of societal and institutional development in Syria and added to that the European perception of Syria as a radical Arab state in regional as well as in international politics have created obstacles for the EU in approaching Syria" (p. 14).

### **3.3. Syrian Crisis in Arab Spring and the Reactions of the EU**

Upon a Tunisian citizen's burning himself alive in 17 December 2010, protests against the government escalated and spread across the Middle East quickly (Mercan, 2012). With the toppling down of the leaders of Arab World one by one and the success of the protesters awakened the society of Syria who had been demanding an end of authoritarian regime of Bashar Al-Assad. In an interview with Wall Street Journal in 2011, Assad was asked if he expects uprising like Tunisia and Egypt at Syria and he responded back by saying that he does not expect such uprisings due to the alignment of his administration and Syrian people against USA and Israel, in addition he promised more reforms ("Syrian Civil War", n.d; Solomon & Spindle, 2011). However, after a few months, protests started over arrest and torture of a few teenage boy in Daraa who drew

graffiti against Assad Government which came along with a brutal strike back from the Assad Government (TSI, 2015).

In Syria, it can be said that the more the protests increased, the brutal answers were given by the Syrian Government which was actually the reason feeding up the antiregime protests mainly caused by the economic regression and poverty (Mercan, 2012). At first, as a response to the protests, Assad Regime declared introduction of reforms in some areas such as amendments to political party regulations, release of political detainees and replacement of state of emergency with a new constitution (Çomak, Sancaktar, Yıldırım, 2016). Meanwhile the reaction of the Government along with the numbers of deaths and detainees increased at the same direction (Çomak, Sancaktar, Yıldırım, 2016). Government retaliated with brutality to the protesters which by the time spread across the country. It was a sign that the situation in Syria would be tough and in different character compared to the other countries lived through Arab Spring (Mercan, 2012). Upon the continuation of unrest, Assad Regime changed the discourse and cracked down on antiregime protests which evolved into an "existential regime crisis" (Çomak, Sancaktar, Yıldırım, 2016; Wieland,2012, p.2019). In 15 March 2011, called as the 'day of rage' by protesters, even the smallest crumbs of the Damascus Spring and the modernization and liberalization wind that was brought by Bashar Al-Assad were long gone with the government's response back with violence and arrests which also resulted in Assad's "fall back into isolation"(Wieland,2012, p.2019).

The international echo of what had been happening in Syria started to turn back one by one. The first response of the EU came from the High Representative Catharine Ashton by declaring a statement which calls Syrian Government for commonsense (European Union, 2011c). In May, EU took further step against Assad regime and "froze the draft Association Agreement and suspended bilateral cooperation programmes between the EU and the Syrian government under the European Neighbourhood Policy" which followed by restrictive measures (sanctions) with the adoption of a decision in 2011 ranging from arms embargo to prohibition on EU banks to open an office in Syria (EEAS, 2016e, para.3; European Union, 2011b).

In June 2011, uprising turn into conflict and rebels took control of a town for the first time which ended being taken by the Government in the following days ("War in Syria", 2015). Many people sought refuge from the neighbor countries, large amount of people were killed and the situation in Syria turned into a civil war by mid-2011. High Representative Ashton called upon Assad to stand down in media following the USA President Barack Obama's call to Assad to step aside (Harris, 2012). With the attack of Syrian Government to Hama, Deir al-Zour and Lattakia with a disproportionate military force in August 18, EU changed its attitude (Turkmani and Hadid, 2016). The EU announced Assad as lost his legitimacy and urged him to step down (Turkmani and Hadid, 2016). "Syria's participation in regional programmes was suspended in September 2011 and the provision of loans and technical assistance by the European Investment Bank (EIB) was ceased in November 2011" (European Commission, 2018a, para.1). In addition, the EU "culminated in a ban on the importation of Syrian oil imposed" which hit the Syrian economy substantially since "92% of Syrian exports to Europe are energy products" despite its small impact on EU economy (Harris, 2012, p.24; Traynor, 2011, para. 5). All kinds of cooperation with Syrian Government were suspended, including the Syria's membership in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (EEAS, 2016e).

The statements made by the EU representatives and the High Representative Ashton reflects that the EU supported a policy, which was also highly embraced by the international community, that Assad should leave the power for a democratic political transition by the people of Syria (Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018). Meanwhile the EU acted as an active supporter of the UN-led initiatives in order to bring a solution to the conflict.

Since the beginning of the crisis, the EU has mobilised all political and humanitarian tools at its disposal in support of the Syrian people, remaining one of the main supporters of the UN-led efforts to reach a political solution and the main humanitarian donor for Syrians, with over €16.9 billion mobilised collectively with EU Member States in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance. (EEAS, 2019b, para.1)

In June 2012, an important UN-led diplomatic initiative, also known as Geneva Peace Talks on Syria was launched to find a solution to the crisis. With the participation of all international actors on the ground "to work urgently and intensively to bring about an end to the violence and human rights abuses and the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people" (UN, 2012, p. 1). The EU represented by the High Representative Ashton was a part of this important Conference which resulted in a final communiqué prescribing a six-point plan and implementation of UNSC Resolutions 2042 and 2043 in hoping to help a Syrian-led transition (UN, 2012). The EU still finds the implementation of the roadmaps defined in the Geneva Communiqué along with the UNSC Resolution 2254 adopted in 2015 "the most credible solution" towards a peaceful Syria (EEAS, 2019b, para. 1).

July 2012, Syrian National Security Building was bombed which resulted in deaths of high ranking officials including one family member of Assad and spread of conflict to Aleppo, the largest city of Syria (MacFarquhar, 2012). With the spread of state of insecurity upon this and the following developments, the EU closed its Delegation to Syria in December 2012, yet the Head of the Delegation continued its occasional visits to Syria (EEAS, 2016e). In a press conference in August 2012, USA President Barack Obama set out their "red line" as the use of biological and chemical weapons in Syria ("Obama warns Syria", 2012, para.1). In November 2012, the parties of the crisis, opposition groups, tried to change the balance of the weights in the situation by getting united one roof called The Syrian National Coalition which was not very effective due to inner conflicts of interests among groups ("War in Syria", 2015).

The humanitarian and political situation had dramatically changed in August 2013, when a chemical weapon assault killing hundreds of people was made with fire of rockets filled with sarine gas at Ghouta, antiregime rebels-held city ("Syria War", 2018). Although there were condemnation from both the EU and the individual Member States, there was not a strong response to what happened in Syria. How the USA would react to such military intervention- warranting act of Syria would be was the main curiosity of the international community. However, the USA chose not to embark on a military intervention at least not before getting the approval from the Congress (Tisdall, 2018).

Driven from this attack, British Prime Minister David Cameron proposed a government motion to for military action against Syria which would give a go for joining allied military intervention with USA yet ended up by denied by the British Parliament (Watt & Hopkins, 2013; Tisdall, 2018). Similarly, France tried to be a part of this coalition yet rejected by the public opinion in majority (Zaretsky, 2018). In September, "the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118, which demanded the destruction or removal of Syria's chemical stockpile by mid-2014" (What's the Geneva II, 2014, para. 5). Upon these developments with the nudge of Russia Assad announced in September 2013 that the Government "would sign an international chemical weapons treaty and admitted the scale of its chemical weapons stockpile for the first time" (Borger, Roberts, Ackerman & Watt, 2013, para. 1). Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow (2018) explains this inaction of the EU to go further than asking Assad to step aside and leave the power to a democratic administration as well as the individual attempt of UK to act as rooted in the constraining outcome of the existing instruments and states centric policy making of the EU. "But with no threat of direct international intervention, the Syrian Government gradually escalated its tactics from snipers to tanks, to helicopters and warplanes, to barrel bombs, chemical weapons and other non-conventional munitions" (TSI, 2015, para.3).

As the crisis continued, the outcomes, particularly humanitarian outcome, grew with it. In response to the increasing humanitarian aspect of the crisis and its impacts on the neighboring countries, the EU adopted a new comprehensive strategy towards the Syria crisis (EEAS, 2016e).

The new strategy, Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to the Syrian Crisis aimed for sustainable solution, regional stability and assistance to the affected populations and mapped out the methods to achieve these purposes (European Commission, 2013). Although its emphasis and line regarding the Syrian-led political transition and support to UN-led initiatives and humanitarian aid stayed the same, this time the EU took one step back regarding Assad's step down by not mentioning anything about the administration which meant a small amount of regained legitimacy due to Syrian Peace talks in the eyes of the EU (Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018). The new

strategy also included the refugee situation and pledge to support neighboring countries (European Commission, 2013). By the mid-2013 the refugee crisis started to grow. In the new approach, the EU identified its first priority as promotion of political settlement of deteriorating situation in Syria and increased its financial contribution by 400 million Euros to be used in humanitarian and economic improvement of Syrian people and neighboring countries which in total reached to 1.25 billion Euros with the abovementioned addition (European Commission, 2013).

The year 2014 started with the Geneva Conference II on January with the aim of bringing political solution to the conflict and enabled both sides and other actors related, including the EU, to be heard yet failed in terms of the consequences ("Syria Geneva II", 2014). 2014 marked the rise of the various groups in the field, especially the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ("War in Syria", 2015). The response from the international community came as establishment of Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS which started with 62 partner and has reached to 79 by 2019 (U.S. Department of State, 2019). The EU is also a member of the Global Coalition and from 2014 to onset of 2019, 33,000 strikes have been conducted under the coalition (U.S. Department of State, 2019). As a non-military partner of the coalition, EU engaged in counter terrorism, border security and increased cooperation activities (Global Coalition, 2019).

According to Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow (2018), international response to Syrian Crisis brought out a new approach of legitimacy of states. They further explain this as in the past the legitimacy was seen as an internal issue and if a government was to lose its legitimacy, the answer from the international community was to call upon the ruler of the state to comply with the international rules (Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018). Although the EU and other actors responded initially by inviting Assad to comply with the international law then the responses changed discourse and turned into assigning an entity, namely Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces or also known as Syrian National Coalition which "is a coalition of opposition groups that was formed in November 2012 during opposition meetings in Qatar" as the legitimate power in Syria (Carnegie Middle East, 2019, para. 1). After meeting with the President of the SNF in

December 2012, High Representative Ashton mentioned the SNF as the legitimate representative of Syria of the Syrian people ("EU Recognizes Syrian National Coalition", 2012).

In December 2015, the UNSC adopted the resolution 2254 which clearly outlines "a road map for a peace process in Syria, setting out an early-January timetable for United Nations-facilitated talks between the Government and opposition members, as well as the outlines of a nationwide ceasefire" (UNSC, 2015). The resolution along with the Final Communiqué of 2012 Geneva Conference have been the most credible solutions supported by the EU at every platform (EEAS, 2016e, 2019). However, "the sudden influx of those escaping violence, persecution and poverty starting in 2015 triggered a series of reactions from individual governments in Europe" (Boghani, 2018, para.6). Having been very understanding and sympathetic towards the victims of the crisis, the EU Member States, particularly the small members started to put strict motions into actions and tightened their borders (Boghani, 2018).

In February 2016, a "Supporting Syria and The Region Conference" was held in London in order to "raise significant new funding to meet the immediate and longer-term needs of those affected" ("Supporting Syria", 2018, para. 3). The EU was an active participant of the Conference and enabled to mobilize aid up to \$ 12 billion through pledges of the participant countries, the EU pledged € 3 billion to be used in humanitarian aid (European Council, 2019b). Meanwhile the Assad regime and some of the opponent groups, ISIS and Al-Nusra excluded, agreed on a ceasefire which resulted in resume of Geneva Peace talks on Syria tentatively (Tierney, 2016, para.4). However, the Peace talk was not a success and failed in two days without even really starting (Syria Conflict, 2016). Main reason was that "the opposition wanted sieges lifted and prisoners released, the Syrian government played for time, asking for a written agenda and a full list of participants" (Syria Conflict, 2016, para.19). In August 2016, a rebel-held city, Aleppo was attacked in a suspected chemical assault which happened after Syria declared its riddance of chemical weapons (Graham-Harrison, 2016). The EU condemned the attack, threw the blame on Syrian Government and its allies, Russia primarily, and called for ceasefire as well as humanitarian aid.

Meanwhile, in terms of humanitarian result of the situation, in spite of all the political and financial attempts of the EU to prevent people from coming to Europe, nothing seemed to be working. Therefore, the EU decided to change the rules of the situation. In March 2016, the EU made a closure agreement with the biggest refugee hosting country, Turkey in order to keep the refugees coming to Europe which was one of the most pressing problems of Europe since 2015 (European Commission, 2016b). The Agreement was offering a trade-off between EU and Turkey. According to this, "the EU sends all Syrians who reached the Greek islands illegally after March 20, 2016, back to Turkey" yet keep the ones legally reached to Europe whereas Turkey will be granted € 6 billion to be used in the process ("The EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement", 2018, para.10). As undermining as the EU's commitment to humanitarian causes, the agreement dramatically reduced the refugee influx to Europe. "Arrivals have fallen by nearly 85 percent, dropping from more than one million in 2015 to 171,300 last year, according to data from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)" (Boghani, 2018, para.10).

When the USA Ambassador to UN declared that the USA is no longer interested in ousting Assad, all of its allies changed its approach to the issue and the main focus became the elimination of the ISIS (Morrison, 2017). In 3 April 2017, the EU adopted a new strategy on Syria which was in response not only to the threats in Syria but also in Iraq and Da'esh, also known as ISIS (European Council, 2019b). With the new strategy, the "EU's strategic objectives in Syria are focused in six key areas" and redefined with new emphasis of economic engagement, "transitional justice" and "post-war recovery and reconstruction" (European Council, 2019a; 2017, para.18-22). In 4 April 2017, Assad Regime made another chemical attack with sarin to Khan Sheikhoun which resulted in deaths of 80 people (Bailey and Ortiz, 2018). Following the incident, USA-led air strike including UK and France started to fall on the air bases of Syrian Government (Almukhtar, 2018). The EU responded with condemnation of the attack and put in place further restrictions on Syria including scientists and officials due to their roles in chemical weapons proliferation and delivery (EEAS, 2018; European Council, 2019a). In May 2017, another round of Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria

and the Region was held in Brussels, brought 70 countries together and resulted in € 5.6 billion pledged financial assistance for 2017 (European Council, 2017c, 2019b).

In September 2018, the mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard was revised by the Commission (European Commission, 2019c). According to this decision, a standing corps consisting of 10.000 staff with operational capacity will be deployed to the external borders of the EU by 1 January 2021 in order to "to improve the protection of its external borders as part of its comprehensive approach to migration" (European Commission, 2019c, para.1).

In the final analysis, the 8 year-old crisis has not come to an end however, with the thrown of the ISIS out of the picture by USA-led coalition and of supports of Russia and Iran, Assad managed again to take two-third of Syria under his control (Dudgeon, 2019). With the reluctance of the USA to get involved in the Middle East even after its red line was crossed caused change of discourse in the future reactions from its allies. The legitimacy of Assad gradually increased although it took years (Turkmani & Hadid, 2016). In addition to that, military operations of Turkey, Euphrates and Olive Branch, in northern Syria against Kurdish Peoples' Protection Units (YPG) and ISIS cleared the area from militia groups and resulted in return of region's people back their home ("Mapping the targets", 2018).

## CHAPTER 4

### THEORY TESTING

In this chapter, the responses of the EU to major developments of the Syrian Crisis will be analyzed on the ground of our two approaches, normative approach and realist theory.

Treaty of European Union sets the scope of the EU foreign policy as " The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies" (European Communities, 1992, p.4). According to Skolimowska, "the force of the EU's normative power in the face of the internationalized conflicts should correspond to its capability to diffuse European standards, values and principles" (Skolimowska, 2015, p.114).

In the case of the Syria Crisis, the EU's initial responses was in line with its normative principles. Turkmani and Hadid (2016) summarizes the EU strategy towards the Syria until the new strategy launched in 2013 as "insisting that President Assad to step aside", "pledging a new partnership after the stepping down of the president", "gradually assigning legitimacy to exile opposition", "repeatedly announcing its support to the UN and Arab League" and political solution mapped out in Geneva Communiqué, as well as "repeatedly condemning violence by the regime" while increasing "financial support to humanitarian assistance and the number of sanctions imposed on the regime (p.8-9). In addition to that EU has been actively participated to the international initiatives such as Geneva Peace Talks on Syria Conferences, Kofi Anna Plans, Supporting Syria and The Region Conferences (Harris, 2012). These reactions and efforts fit the normative image that the EU wants to portray as well as its constitutional norms which " embody the principles of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights" (Sjursen, 2005, p.14).

The basic assumption is that the European Union, in defining its identity in international relations as a normative actor, should exert a positive influence on the remaining participants of international relations equally in the times of crises. Such an arrangement should lead to the diffusion of the European norms that should, at least theoretically, subsequently entail progressive changes in the behavior of both sides of the conflict. (Skolimowska, 2015, p.114)

The EU tried more to be influential and drive change in the beginning of the crisis by firstly urging Assad to comply with the international law. When Assad Regime used large-scale of military force against his citizens in Latakia, Hama and Deir Al-Zour, the EU changed its approach to Assad and announced that Assad lost its legitimacy in his people (Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018). According to Turkmani and Hadid (2016) this was an "orchestrated move" because following the statement of Obama calling Assad for stepping down, European leaders and the EU expressed their calls to Assad asking for resign immediately while there is no plan in case of such scenario (p.8; Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018). The EU's inconsistency strikes in cases of EU's mediator roles in conflicts, as well. The same EU that promotes the mediation efforts for conflicts in Yemen and South Sudan "discourage comparable steps in Syria" with the Assad regime and recognize an entity of their choice as the true legitimate representative of Syrian people (Vimont, 2015, p.3; Carnegie Middle East, 2019).

When looked closely, Syria was punished via suspension of Agreements with Syria in the context of ENP which is according to Diez (2005) "a normative power" and make the Mediterranean states "infused with normative power in particular in that they bind the signatories (all EU member states and states bordering the Mediterranean except Libya) to the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, societal diversity and pluralism (Diez, 2005, p.630). By freezing the Association Agreement, suspension of programmes conducted under bilateral relations within the framework of ENP, it would not be wrong to assume that the EU responded to the situation within its capacity as normative power.

EU has been also increasing its voice against the human rights violations, chemical weapon attacks and targeting the civilians by the regime. Although EU followed an amount of solidarity in foreign policy as Manners (2001) argued, when the crisis turned into a protracted one, the foreign policy towards Syria changed discourse. Not until 2013 when the EU turned into the destination of refugees caused by the Syrian crisis and crisis related poverty, human rights violation and intolerance, EU had ignored the refugee crisis that had been affecting the neighboring countries primarily. It also made closure agreements with neighboring countries in order to fight against *irregular migration* (European Commission, 2016b). Considering the late awareness, closure agreement and deployment of 10.000 military staff with operational capacity, EU driven by neo-realist tenets showed everybody that when it comes to external relations, human rights have constraints "as central organizing principle within the CFSP" in spite of the rhetoric otherwise (Forsber & Herd, 2005, p.455). EU failed to act as an actor who "reshapes the normal" in international politics many times (Manners, 2011, p.15). Consequently, as Sjurson (2005) notes, living by double standards becomes a problem (p.14).

Neo-realist analysis of ENP is as the ENP "takes as its point of departure the manner in which power relations shape the structural context in which actors interact and pursue strategies to achieve their aims and objectives" (Schumacher, Marchetti & Demmelhuber, 2017, p. 62-63). From this point of view, the EU tried to shape the course of events in Syria in order to protect its borders, yet when the outcomes of the crisis started to affect the EU and Member States directly, it changed wheels.

In response to this dilemma, Vimont (2015) argues that the EU does not act in light of a common foreign policy doctrine or does not develop one by truly contemplating all together which causes EU's influence in world politics to fall short. As an extension of this, he claims that outcomes of these actions do not serve a common and well-thought purposes and further argues that therefore even military actions like in Syria and Libya has no objective grounds (2015). Aggestam (2008) asserts that normative power approach falls short of seizing the recent environment that the EU have been through which resulted in ESDP. Thus, she questions the distinctive nature of the

EU attributed by scholars supporting that the EU is a normative power as “to be sure, the EU is a unique hybrid international polity with significant supranational competence, but the jury is still out on whether this ‘difference’ produces a distinctive normative foreign policy unlike that of any other international actor” (p.4).

Syria was another test run for EU foreign policy. Although it did not repeat the same mistake of incapacity to act like in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, actions of individual members undermined the normative power of the EU. According to Diez & Manner (2007) "normative power is not a foreign policy tool to be wielded for national interests" (Diez & Manners, 2007, p.179). Yet, a certain "lack of consistency between internal policies and external actions" is also pointed out (Manners, 2008, p.56). The EU still suffers from the superiority of sovereignty of its member states which is an important factor undermining the normative power of the EU. "The most significant limitation on the EU's normative power is the tension between the EU's ethical norms, and the material interests of Member States" (EEAS, 2016a, para.8). This situation is more obvious in the tightening borders of Member States against refugee influx. Instead of living up to their norms, the steps taken initially by some member states became a policy. "Whilst the EU portrays itself as a normative power through its constitutional norms, the individual actions of member states,... highlights how it is not demonstrating norms separate from state-centricity" (Hardwick, 2011, para.10). UK's failed attempt to join the USA for military intervention in Syria is another example of this divergence from the Union.

In a neo-realist perspective, great powers of the EU determines "the formulation and implementation of EU policy in ways that have generated short term political capital for policy makers at the expense of understanding the role function and integrity of key EU institutions over the longer term" (Forsber & Herd, 2005, p.455). This makes the EU "less than the sum of its parts", namely, "the EU 's collective power and reach is smaller than many of its member states" (Gerrits et al, 2009, p.38). Some scholars highlights the increasing importance of member states' relative weight within the EU as the main reason of divergence in terms of policy formulation towards Syria and Middle East.

"European governments sought to regain their sway in overall EU policies towards the Middle East" (Youngs, 2015, Impacts of the Arab Spring section, para. 2).

EU's normative power may not only be undermined due to state centricity or steering of great powers within the EU in the direction of their interests. It may be also because of the part that they want to transcend their norms to whom do not want the EU's universal norms (Aggestam, 2008; Manners, 2001). Aggestam (2008) questions the EU's self-claimed role as 'force for good' works in liberating for others or just imposing its western values. She elaborates her argument by stating that "what are often proposed as 'universal' values are in fact widely contested, and in some parts of the world seen as little more than an imposition of western values" (p.6). Tocci (2008) shows practical examples to this idea by pointing out Turkey and Russia's reactions to these imposed norms. According to him, this imposition regarding the promotion of human right by the EU in Russia and Turkey "seems to be provoking a negative effect rather than stimulating convergence on the basis of shared values" which was also the case for Assad (Tocci et al., 2008, p.10). The more the USA and the EU tried to ignore Assad as legitimate president, the more Assad hanged on to the power. This method of influencing power makes the EU presumptuous and "arrogant" in the eyes of its partners (Gerrits et al., 2009, p. 10). This must have been due to perception of the states on the other side of the dialogue. Sjursen (2005) argues that "efforts to justify foreign policy with reference to norms also often lead to suspicions of hypocrisy and hidden agendas" (p.8).

When it is looked through the neo-realist glasses, the readings of the events comply with the tenets of neo-realism. What the EU was trying to achieve with the ENP was its attempt for milieu shaping and create a peaceful surrounding environment in order to prevent direct threats (Hyde-Price, 2006). In the initial phases of the crisis the EU made call for stepping down to Assad. Then this call turned into not recognizing Assad as the legitimate representative of Syrian people and recognition of another entity they chose. It was a invasion of one nation's sovereignty (Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018). By doing so, the EU was trying to gain some relative power and restoring the balance of power in its favor because states are not bound with these moral principles

and point of view of man (Mearsheimer, 2001). The most profound bond among states is interest in international relations. (Morgenthau, 2006).

In terms of the EU response to refugee influx by closure agreement and deployment of 10.000 military staff with operational capacity, the EU simply reacting to the fear of danger which is a constant reality of states according to realism. Just like Mearsheimer' (2001) description a state's behavior under constant fear of danger, the EU focused on strengthening its military dimension in the issue. Realists believes that civilian or normative power which are claimed to be exercised by the EU institutions owes this power to safe environment provided by the military power of the EU Member States and their perception of those kinds of powers as good which makes them partial to the argument (Whitman et al., 2011; Hyde-Price, 2006). Otherwise, the economies, demographic structure and the inner harmony of the states would be affected and resulted in change in the balance of power within the EU. In terms of individual reactions of the Member States like UK's failed attempt to join USA for military action in Syria can also be explained as pursuit of relative gain, superiority of sovereignty as well as result of a pursuit of national interests.

Although realism can bring explanation to many reactions of EU and different stages of the Syria crisis, it does not give an explanation to the whole picture. Neo-realist theory is insufficient to explain EU's financial assistance which is "over €6.8 billion from the EU and Member States collectively allocated in humanitarian and development assistance since the start of the conflict" (EU, 2016,p.2). It is also inadequate when describing why it is in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS as a Union.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

The end of 80s and onset of 90s were tumultuous years of international politics. Events starting with the fall of the Berlin Wall prepared the ground for the dissolution of USSR which brought the German question in front of the EC. The end of the Cold War marked the emergence of new states, new roles and adjustment process for all the actors in international politics. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Yugoslavian civil war in the middle of Europe and the Gulf War brought the effectiveness and actorness of the EC into light. As a result, a debate over the international role and actorness of the EC started to be discussed by scholars and politicians which increased the academic works upon the new role of the EC in post-Cold War period and the conceptualization of what kind of identity the EC presents in world politics.

As one of the pioneering concept shaped within the political atmosphere of the end of the Cold War, the Normative Power Europe added fuel to the these discussions and aroused a very relevant question among scholars of *to what extent norms and principles can be the determinants of foreign policy making?*. Manners (2001) argues that the EU presents a unique role as a post-Westphalian actor in terms of its composition and nature. This sui generis nature of the EU provides an opportunity to play an important role of shaping the perception of normal by and exporting norms to international actors (Manners, 2001, 2002). The Normative Power Europe argument is mainly driven by the idea that norms, values and principles have been underrated and overlooked in international politics by the traditional actors of the international relations (Manners, 2001; Diez & Manner, 2007). Moreover, according to Manners (2001) the older conceptualization of EU does not capture the EU's movement away from the Cold-War and provide the necessary ground to explain its actions (Aggestam, 2008). The

norms and principles that the EU lives by in conducting its external relations are listed as democracy, rule of law, human rights, liberty by Manners (2001, 2002).

With regards to the question of *how does the EU's normative power can be identified?*, scholars are generally gathered around the superiority of persuasive methods resorted by the EU over use of force to convince the other parties in its external relations as an indicator. However, this is also one of the main assumptions of the Civilian Power Europe concept by Duchêne. In this regard, it becomes hard to distinguish the line between these two conceptualization. However, it can be said that these two concepts change paths when it comes to militarization issue. While Civilian Power Europe is opposed to militarization, Normative Power Europe does not place itself as opposed to militarization and use of force. In this issue, however, even Manners have some confusions. He emphasizes the undermining role of the use of force and militarization to the normative power of the EU, yet he slightly moves in time to the ground where he starts to defend the development of a military wing under the ESDP. Normative Power Europe should solve out its controversy over militarization within itself, which is also essential from an existentialistic aspect considering that it is a differentiating point of view from Civilian Power Europe.

The EU is not the only actor that has a normative power, as well. Diez & Manners (2007) argues that the USA under President Wilson's administration and Vatican are other two examples of normative power in world politics despite the differences in their motivations and instruments. The EU shows this normative power in cases such as the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations, in its leading role to abolish death penalty and diplomatic talks with the North Korea. However, some scholars highlights an important and overlooked aspect of the normative power of the EU. Accordingly, this self righteous role of the EU causes adverse effects and perceived as arrogance in some cases. Aggestam (2008) argues that "the problem with this ambition to shape the world in Europe's image is that it is based on an assumption that European ways and ways of doing things are intrinsically superior" (p.7). This attitude also leads some readings like division among international actors as the EU versus the others as well as overlook of

cultural differences which are result of long historical process and shaped by the geography of world nations.

The actions of international actors are affected and shaped by many determinants. One of them has an overarching feature, namely anarchic structure of the international system. Actors are bound to some extent with the constraints of this structure whether they want or not and the pressures of the structure can force actors to act in particular way despite their intentions. The Normative Power Europe centers its main assumptions around the idea of EU's role beyond traditional actors as norm-setter and promoter. However, a certain question comes into mind: where does the structural pressures starts to influence these value-based foreign policy of the EU? Just at this point, Realism strikes as an important analysis tool, particularly neo-realism in order to put more light on the structural pressures of the system over the EU in terms of foreign policy actions.

Realist Power Europe divides the EU foreign policy in two period, namely, the Cold-War and post-Cold War periods. Realist Power Europe evaluates the EC external relations during the Cold-War as shaped by the security concerns, allowed by the enabling nature of bipolarity yet under the umbrella of USA and navigated by the European great powers. Also, Realism often emphasizes the trust among allies in bipolar order and the reduced structural pressures over security consumers such as nationalism. In this regard, Realist Power Europe argues that since the expectation of the EC Member States to resort use of force against each other reduced substantially during the Cold-War period, their competition among each other also reduced in parallel with this expectation which led them to develop their own resources to provide their own security. From this perspective, the EC was a security consumer of the USA, had chance to focus on low politics and mobilized its energy and resources on shaping its milieu. With the end of the Cold-War, the roles and relations of states were needed to be revisited. The emergence of new actors, increased nationality and relative gain pressures resulted in with the acceleration of European integration along with a strong economic deepening (Hyde Price, 2006). The EU also assumed new roles for its near geography such as CEECs. It can be said that the EU became more self-aware and recognized its political

importance from the perspective of Realist Power Europe. Therefore, the EU focused on developing its foreign and security policy instruments, i.e. CFSP and ESDP. From Realist Power Europe perspective, these instruments were to establish a collective security in the region in post-Cold War period.

Middle East has an important role in terms of economy, trade and security for the EU and the Member States since 1970s. Within the framework of these areas, mutually beneficial links were tried to be established by the EC. First Venice Declaration, then the Barcelona Process and the ENP were result of this efforts to increase the volume of relations with the region. While Normative Power Europe interprets this initiatives as the attempts to increase democracy, human rights and free market, Realists Power Europe reads them as attempt to shape the exterior environment of the Union towards more security. Considering the general framework of the EC/EU- Middle East relations and EU's attempts to engage democratization, peace solution initiatives to Israeli-Palestine conflict and endorsement of trade lead one to think that the EU has been acting to export an promote norms instead of reacting the structural pressures.

The EC's official relations with the Syria started during the Hafez Al-Assad administration and mainly focused on trade. The relations until Bashar Al-Assad did not grow as intended by the Europe. This is half because the Syrians and Hafez Al-Assad felt that the EC had been looking down on Syria and implementing double standard compared to the other countries in the region and half due to the Syrian invasion of Lebanon from the side of the EC. Relations revived when Bashar Al-Assad came to power after his father's death. His attempts and views towards reformation of the socioeconomic and political life of Syria was endorsed by the EU. Reform process was supported, trade between two parties increased in volumes and civil society was tried to be empowered by the EU in this process. Progress made in many aspects of the EU-Syria relations was swept off with the brutal response of the Assad regime to the anti-regime protests following the Arab Spring. Despite the initial response by the Assad regime against the protests were towards the introduction of new reforms and liberties, the Assad Government later changed its strategy and focused its energy to crack down on the anti-regime movement as well as the protesters. The initial responses of the EU

was like the other international actor to call Assad for complying with the international law and stepping down. The EU constantly condemned the attacks made by the Regime, imposed a set of sanctions, engaged in the international initiatives, particularly UN-led ones. These reactions were all in compliance with the normative outlook of the EU. The problem with these reactions are that despite their volumes, they are not effective as they seem in terms of outcomes. However, one important action of the EU that can be count as off the book was the recognition of the SNC as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people which is still controversial and unorthodox in terms of its outcome discussion over the legitimacy of the states. Also, it can be commented as that the EU attempts to reshape the standards of the legitimacy of the states and acts as a normative power. Through the Realist Power Europe lenses, this action does not comply with the superiority of the sovereignty of states.

With the chemical assault of the Regime forces against its own citizens in Ghouta in 2013, the course of the reactions coming from the international actors changed, as well. This time, the individual attempts of the Member States like UK and France to side with the USA for a military operation against Bashar Al-Assad Regime showed themselves and shadowed the EU reactions. After the repeating chemical attacks of the Regime, the humanitarian aspect of the crisis deteriorated and a refugee crisis broke out. Although its important amount of financial aids to refugee hosting countries, the EU ignored the refugee crisis and did not work on a tangible solution. It even changed a discourse with the new strategy towards the Syrian crisis by not mentioning anything about the regime and stepping down of Bashar Al-Assad. Meanwhile, the EU joined the Global Coalition to Defeat the ISIS and worked on counter-terrorism as a non-military partner, supported the civil society and increased financial aids for humanitarian purposes. These were the years that the EU shuttled between being a normative power and realist power due to structural pressures.

Meanwhile, an amount of reaction from the Member States against the Syrian refugees coming to the borders of the EU started to be heard, especially from the small members. The refugee issue maybe the watershed between the normative power quest of the EU in international politics and the realist reflexes of the Member States against tests

of the structure. March 18, 2016 was the turning point in terms of the EU's normative power role and the date when the EU started to act as a Realist Power Europe in external relations with the signature of the Closure Agreement with Turkey. The decision of strengthening the EU borders with the deployment of 10.000 military staff with operational capacity yet calling this response as a movement to fight with irregular migration, the EU changed its course from being a Normative Power towards a Realist Power despite the initial norm-promoting intentions.

As the conflict in Syria has entered its 8<sup>th</sup> years, there has not been an effective political solution that would actually help to end the crisis. As a regional power and the only hybrid actor of the international community, the reactions of the EU attracts attentions particularly of the Syrian people, neighboring countries, its allies and Assad-allies. "Given the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong reliance on the resources of the member states, the EU is still not a full-fledged actor, yet it has a strong international presence nonetheless" (Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker, 2017, p.1). The reason of why Syrian crisis was selected as the analysis case is that developments in Syria starting with democratization demands turned into the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. The EU has been gradually assuming a normative power role or attributed to by some scholars. Syria crisis provides the best platform to put this new role of EU on a test. As an opponent to normative power approach, neo-realism was used due to the fact that states or actors show off their true nature when there is a threat against them.

Toje defines the EU's power as "transcends the metaphorical pillars" and "[thus] captures a foreign and security policy that runs from the Commission's development and neighborhood policies via the ESDP under the auspices of the High Representative for the CFSP and into Police and Judicial Cooperation" (Gerrits et al., 2009, p.37). However, Vimont (2015) notes that "foreign policy, when compared with other fields of action like trade or development assistance, has received very little input from the union's members. Even since the Lisbon Treaty, European diplomacy is still mostly a national affair" (Vimont, 2015,p.3).

The post-Cold War period has been dominated by ethnic conflicts, civil wars and international terrorism (Walt, 2017). Syria has added one more example to Walt's this

observation. It has been the stage of democratization demands by Syrian people, protests, conflicts, civil war and the most dramatic humanitarian crisis since World War II. In the meantime, international actors have been tested with their reactions, actions and inactions as well. Syria was the playground of many actors on and behind the stage. The sides are not easy to determine due to the various impacts of the crisis on the actors. Therefore, it has constituted a very different case for actors of international community to follow a consistent foreign policy towards the crisis. "The case of Syria shows that imposing sanctions alone cannot change the regime behaviour and end the conflict" (Turkmani & Hadid, 2016, p.18). On the contrary, they affected the Syrian people more than Assad regime and force them to live in extreme poverty and added another reason for Syrian people to escape from the country (Kaldor, Rangelov & Selchow, 2018). Ignorance, also, has deteriorated the situation in Syria and encouraged both Assad regime and the opposition to commit war crimes repeatedly (Turkmani & Hadid, 2016).

As a result of the arguments laid out above, my conclusion is that normative and realist perspectives both shape the external relations of the EU and both branches of theories of international relations coexist together within the EU while shaping its external relations. "Whereas both normative and neo-realist arguments have some relevance, both also have flaws in conceptualizing the EU as an international actor" (Hardwick, 2011, para.9). However, this lack of a designated doctrine framing its foreign policy limits its added value to international politics (Vimon, 2015). The reasons may vary yet this does not change the fact that the Member States does not allow the EU to take wheels in foreign policy since every Member States look at the same situation through their own national lenses.

Lehne (2017) argues that "the EU has had trouble of adjusting to a multipolar world increasingly ruled by power politics" (p.3). However, ambition of the EU to be an influential actor is obvious. In order to be one of the decisive actor in the Syria case, EU should leverage its economic tools against Assad regime and make a bargaining chip, increase its role in terms of empowerment of civil society and be a platform for them to be recognized as part of solution, "consider sending monitoring mission from the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to monitor local ceasefires in Syria", and

actually should open its border to refugees to live up to its norms other than merely marketing the neighbors (Turkmani & Hadid, 2016, p.21).

The EU acted as a normative power in the beginning of the crisis, however, with the deterioration and the increasing impacts of the crisis, the Normative Power reflexes of the EU replaced with a Realist Power Europe ones. Although the EU failed to play an influential role to change the course of the crisis in favor of Syrian people and in the way of its norms, it has not acted as a pure realist actor, either.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan yorgun ve ekonomik açıdan çökmüş çıkan Avrupa, Fransa Dışişleri Bakanı Robert Schuman tarafından 1950'de önerilen Fransa ve Almanya'nın çelik ve kömür piyasasını yüksek bir otorite altında birleştirmeyi öngören teklif ile uluslararası ilişkilerin en alışılmadık barış yöntemlerinden birisini geliştirmiştir. Schuman Planı ile başlayan Avrupa Kömür ve Çelik Topluluğu zamanla genişlemiş, 1957 yılında imzalanan Roma Anlaşması ile Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu (AET) halini almıştır. Kuruluş yıllarının Soğuk Savaş dönemine denk gelmesinin de etkisiyle AET zaman içerisinde bazı dış politika ve güvenlik işbirliklerine ev sahipliği yapmıştır.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sona ermesi ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ile Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği (SSCB) arasında Soğuk Savaş başlamış ve dünya iki kutuplu bir düzene geçmiştir. Komünist düzen ve liberal düzen arasında taraflar, başat aktörler olan ABD ve SSCB saflarındaki yerlerini almış birbirlerine karşı ortak savunma stratejileri ve kurumları geliştirmişlerdir. Bu doğrultuda, 1949 yılında Batı bloğunda Kuzey Atlantik Anlaşması Örgütü, 1955 yılında ise Doğu bloğunda Varşova Paktı kurulmuştur. Bu iki kutuplu düzende ABD'nin yanında yer alan Avrupa Kömür ve Çelik Topluluğu'nun 6 kurucu üyesi kendi aralarında da ortak savunma işbirliği oluşturmak amacıyla 1952 yılında Avrupa Savunma Topluluğu Antlaşması'nı imzalamışlar ancak Anlaşma istenilen amaca ulaşma noktasında başarısız olmuştur.

1960 yılında, dönemin yeni Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı Charles De Gaulle ile Topluluk üyelerinin dış ve güvenlik politikalarında uyumu ve koordinasyonu sağlayacak yeni bir örgütlenme içerisinde yer almasını öneren ve hükümetlerarası vurgusu yoğun olan bir plan sunulmuştur. Planın reddi ve oluşturduğu sert hava AET için dış politika ve savunma konularında bir çıkmaz oluşturmuştur.

1970'lerde kurmuş olduğu ticaret ortaklıkları ile AT'nin uluslararası alandaki rolü artmaya başlamış ve Topluluk'un uluslararası politikadaki rolüne ve etkinliğine ilişkin beklentiler de artmıştır. Bu kapsamda, 1970'te ortak bir dış politikanın ilk adımı sayılabilecek Avrupa Siyasi İşbirliği oluşturulmuştur. Topluluk içerisinde üye ülkelerin dış politikalarında uyumu amaçlayan İşbirliği, 1986 yılında imzalanan Tek Avrupa Senedi (TAS) ile daha kurumsal hale getirmiştir.

1980'lerin sonu ve 1990'ların başı uluslararası politikada çalkantılı yıllar olup iki kutuplu düzenin sona ermesi, Avrupa'nın yanı başında savaşların yaşanması ve AT'nin sessizliği, iki Almanya'nın birleşmesi AT'nin bir aktör olarak etkinliği ve rolü tartışmalarını beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu doğrultuda kendisini gerek kurumsal olarak gerekse de sayı olarak yenileyen AT, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice ve Lizbon Anlaşmaları dış, güvenlik ve savunma alanını daha da güçlendirmiştir.

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi, yeni aktörlerin, devletlerin ve rollerin ortaya çıkmasına ve alışılmış düzen içerisindeki ilişkilerin tekrar gözden geçirilmesine yol açmıştır. Bu tartışmalar arasında AT'nin uluslararası politikadaki rolü, geleceği ve etkinliği de önemli ölçüde yer tutmuştur. 1993 yılında Avrupa Birliği (AB) halini alan ve daha bütünleşmiş bir yapıya bürünen AT, dış politika, güvenlik ve savunma alanlarında da daha sistemli bir politika geliştirmeye yönelmiştir. Yumuşak güç, sivil güç, ekonomik güç ve ticari güç gibi bir çok kavram ile AB'nin üçüncü taraflar ile yürütmüş olduğu ilişkilerindeki etki gücü ve rolü tanımlanmaya çalışmıştır. Bu tartışmalardan en önemlilerden birisini Ian Manners'ın Normatif Güç Avrupa kavramı oluşturmaktadır.

Normatif Güç Avrupa kavramı, Avrupa Birliği'nin Westphalia sonrası dönemde geleneksel rolleri aşan bir rolü olduğunu ve sahip olduğu bu kendine has yapısı ile demokrasi, insan hakları, hukukun üstünlüğü gibi evrensel değerlerin küresel anlamda yayılmasında belirleyici role sahip olduğunu savunmaktadır. Normatif Güç Avrupa, uluslararası ilişkilerde normların, ilkelerin ve değerlerin uluslararası ilişkilerin geleneksel aktörleri tarafından görmezden gelindiği ya da ihmal edildiği düşüncesinden hareketle AB'nin kendisine has yapısının da sağlamış olduğu avantaj ile kendi

normlarını yayarak aktörlerin *normal* kavramını şekillendirmede önemli bir gücü olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, Manners (2001) tarafından Duchêne'in geliştirmiş olduğu ve askeri gücün önemini yitirerek yerini siyasi ve diplomatik işbirliklerine dayalı bir güç çeşidi olan sivil gücün aldığını, bu kapsamda AT'nin de sivil bir güç olduğunu ileri sürdüğü Sivil Güç Avrupa kavramının Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde AB'nin uluslararası politikadaki rolü, eylemleri ve gerekçelerini tanımlamakta yetersiz kaldığı ileri sürülmektedir.

Manners (2001) tarafından sıralanan ve AB'nin mevzuatında da yüceltiildiği belirtilen AB normları demokrasi, özgürlük, insan haklarına saygı ve temel özgürlükler ile hukukun üstünlüğü ilkeleridir. AB, bu normların yanı sıra ayrıca sürdürülebilir kalkınma, iyi yönetim, sosyal dayanışma ve eşitliğin de ilerletilmesinde çalışmalar yapmaktadır. Normatif Güç Avrupa yaklaşımına göre AB, bu normlarını yayarken üyelik, ekonomik işbirlikleri, bölgesel ve ikili diyaloglar ve anlaşmalar gibi dış politika araçlarını kullanmaktadır.

Normatif Güç Avrupa, AB'nin normatif gücünü ikna, tartışma gücü, ve utandırma araçlarından birisine başvurarak uyguladığını ileri sürmektedir. Geleneksel aktörlerin aksine, normatif gücün kapsamlı ve tutarlı dış politika yürüterek diyalogu açık tutması yine AB'nin normatif gücünün göstergeleri arasında sayılmaktadır. Bu açıdan, Manners (2001) AB'nin ne yaptığından ziyade ne olduğunun daha önemli olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. AB'nin normatif bir güç olduğunu savunan akademisyenler, İran ile yürütülen ve İran'ın nükleer silah geliştirmesinin önüne geçilmesini amaçlayan ve 2015 yılında imzalanan Ortak Kapsamlı Eylem Planı kapsamında AB'nin müzakerelerdeki etkin rolünü örnek göstermektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, demokratikleşme alanında üyelik müzakereleri, insan hakları konusunda ölüm cezasının kaldırılması çalışmalarındaki öncü rolü gibi örnekler AB'nin savunduğu değerler alanındaki normatif gücüne örnek olarak verilmektedir.

Normatif güç olarak sadece Avrupa Birliği mi gösterilebilir sorusuna ise Manners ve Diez (2007), özellikle I. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ABD Başkanı Wilson tarafından uygulanan dış politika örneğini ve Vatikan'ı örnek göstermektedir. Her ne kadar amaçları ve kullanmış oldukları araçlar yönünden farklılık gösterebilir de bu iki

devlet de uluslararası ilişkilerde normatif güç uygulamasına bir örnek olarak gösterilmektedir. Fakat Manners ve Diez (2007), ABD'nin empoze ettiği değerleri kendisinin yaşamadığını, AB'nin ise yaydığı değerleri kendisinin yaşayarak diğer aktörlere örnek olduğunu ve özendirdiğini ifade etmektedirler.

Özellikle askerileşme konusunda Sivil Güç Avrupa kavramından ayrılan Normatif Güç Avrupa, askerileşmeye karşı değildir fakat bu konuda çizmiş olduğu net bir çizgi de bulunmamaktadır. Ancak, değerler üzerine inşa edilmiş dış politikayı savunan bir yaklaşımın askerileşmeye bakış açısı noktasında dikkatleri üzerine çekmektedir. Rosecrance (1998) bu anlamda tarihi bir çelişkiye dikkat çekmekte ve dünyayı yönetirken en temel aracı fiziksel güç olan bir kıtanın giderek uluslararası politikada medeni standartları belirler hale geldiğini ifade etmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, Duchêne (1973) kendisinden daha güçlü devletlerin güç politikaların kurbanı olmamak için güçlü ve etkili bir aktör olmak gerektiğinin altını çizmekte, Bull (1982) ise kendini savunmada yetersiz ve etkisiz bir Avrupa'yı eleştirmektedir.

Manners 2000'lerin başında, Normatif Avrupa kavramını ortaya attığında askerileşme konusuna da değinmiş ve AB'nin dış politikasının en önemli özelliklerinden birisinin askeri güce başvurmadaki isteksizliği olduğunu ifade etmiştir. Wallace (2007) ve Manners (2008) AB'nin geleneksel olarak güce başvurmak yerine sunmuş olduğu iyi örnekler ile diğer aktörler üzerinde etki sahibi olduğunu savunmaktadırlar. Fakat geleneksel aktörler ve anarşik bir yapının hakim olduğu bir sistemde AB'nin askeri güce başvurmadan nasıl bir güç olacağı sorusuna ise zaman içerisinde değişen cevaplar ile yanıt vermiştir. Bu kapsamda, Manners 2004'teki makalesinde AB'nin bir savunma politikası olması gerektiğini belirtmekte ancak karşılaştırmalı üstünlüğünün çatışma önleme ve yapısal dış politika uygulama olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Askeri gücün iyi niyetler ile başlatılsa bile bir noktadan sonra sivil ve askeri müdahale arasındaki sınırın belirsizleşeceğini, bu yüzden askeri güce başvurmanın AB'nin normatif gücünü zedeleyeceğini vurgulamaktadır. 2006'daki makalesinde ise Manners (2006) AB'nin askerileşmesinin aslında normatif gücünün azalması anlamına gelmediğini kaydetmektedir. İyi bir savunma politikası ve alt yapıya sahip olmakla birlikte AB'nin

yapıcı ve sürdürülebilir kalkınma eksenli bir politika yürütmesi gerektiğinin de altını çizmektedir.

Bazı akademisyenler tarafından ise AB'nin kendi değerlerini evrensel ilan etmesiyle tepeden bakan bir yapıya büründüğünü ve bu durumun da diğer aktörler üzerinde ters etki oluşturduğu ve kibir olarak algılandığı öne sürülmektedir. Aggestam (2008), Avrupa'nın dünyayı değiştirme imajındaki sorunun Avrupa metodunun doğal olarak diğer herkesten üstün olduğu varsayımına dayanması olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu yöntem ayrıca, diğer uluslararası aktörler tarafından AB'nin coğrafi konum tarafından şekillendirilmiş ve uzun tarihi süreç sonunda ortaya çıkmış olan kültürel farklılıkları göz ardı etmesi şeklinde yorumlanmasına ve *AB herkese karşı* şeklinde bir mücadele içerisinde algısının oluşmasına sebep olmaktadır.

Uluslararası aktörlerin davranışlarını belirleyen ve şekillendiren bir çok etken bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan en önemlilerinden birisi ise uluslararası sistemin anarşik yapısıdır. Uluslararası aktörler bu yapının içerisinde hareket etmekte ve anarşik yapı aktörleri kendi isteklerinin aksine hareket etmeye zorlayıcı baskılar oluşturabilmektedir. Normatif Güç Avrupa, AB'yi geleneksel aktörlerin de ötesinde norm oluşturucu ve küresel olarak norm ve değerlerin yaygınlaştırılmasının öncülüğünü yapan bir aktör olarak nitelendirmektedir. Ancak, bu durumda yapısal baskıların hangi aşamada devreye girerek AB'nin değer odaklı dış politika yapımında etkili olaya başladığı sorusu akla gelmektedir. Tam da bu noktada Realizm, özellikle anarşik yapının daha da yakından incelendiği Neo-realizm, AB'nin dış politika ve güvenlik kararlarında ve eylemlerinde yapısal baskıların etkisine daha çok ışık tutacak bir analiz aracı olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Neo-realizme göre devletler uluslararası ilişkilerin en önemli aktörüdür, akılcı davranırlar ve anarşik yapıda bekalarını devam ettirmek için güç kovalarlar, güç ise ahlaki değerlerin üzerindedir. Dış politikada değerlerin ve normların önemi kabul edilse de Realizme göre devletler insanoğlunun bağlı olduğu ahlaki değerler ile bağlı değildir. Her ne kadar anarşik yapı aktörleri seçeneksiz bırakıyor izlenimi verse de Neo-realizm sistemin aktörleri hapsedtiği fikrine de karşı çıkmaktadır.

Realist Güç Avrupa ise AB dış politikasını Soğuk Savaş Dönemi ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası olmak üzere iki döneme ayırmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş dönemi AT'nin dış

ilişkilerini; güvenlik endişeleri ile şekillendirilmiş, ABD'nin şemsiyesi altında yer alan güvenlik tüketicisi konumunda ve Avrupa'nın büyük güçleri tarafından yönlendirildiği şeklinde yorumlamaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, iki kutuplu düzen içerisinde müttefikler arasındaki güven ilişkisini vurgulayan Neorealizm, bu düzen içerisinde ulusalcılık gibi yapısal baskıların da aktörler üzerindeki etkisini azalttığını öne sürmektedir. Bu kapsamda Realist Güç Avrupa yaklaşımı tarafından AT üye ülkeleri arasında Soğuk Savaş döneminde birbirlerine karşı güç kullanma beklentilerinin önemli ölçüde azalmasından dolayı kendi aralarındaki rekabetin de bu beklenti ile birlikte azaldığı, bu yüzden mevcut güç ve kaynaklarını ekonomi, ticaret gibi alanlara yöneltme fırsatı buldukları ve AT'nin dış çevresini şekillendirmeye çalıştıkları öne sürülmektedir.

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesi aktörler için rollerin ve ilişkilerin tekrar gözden geçirilmesi sürecini başlatmıştır. Yeni devletlerin ortaya çıkması, artan ulusalcılık ve aktörlerin birbirine göre daha fazla güçlü elde etme çabaları gibi başlıca yapısal baskılar, Realist Güç Avrupa'ya göre AT için Avrupa entegrasyonunun hızlanması ve ekonomisinin güçlenmesi sonucunu getirmiştir (Hyde Price, 2006). Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde geçirmiş olduğu entegrasyon süreci sonrasında Avrupa Birliği adını alan Topluluk ayrıca Orta ve Doğu Avrupa Ülkeleri gibi yakın coğrafyada *denge sağlayıcı* gibi yeni roller üstlenmiştir (Hyde Price, 2006). Bu kapsamda Realist Güç Avrupa perspektifinden AB'nin kendi potansiyeline yönelik farkındalığının daha çok arttığı ve siyasi önemini kabul etmeye başladığı söylenebilir. Bu farkındalığın neticesinde AB, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası ile Avrupa Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası gibi dış politika ve güvenlik mekanizmalar oluşturmaya odaklanmıştır. Realist Güç Avrupa'ya göre AB bu girişimleri Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ortak güvenlik oluşturmak için yapmıştır.

Orta Doğu, AB için sadece coğrafi yakınlıktan dolayı değil ekonomi, ticaret, güvenlik gibi birçok sebepten dolayı önemli dış politika alanlarından birisi olmuştur (O'Donnell, 2010). Bu çerçevede, AT tarafından Orta Doğu ülkeleri ile karşılıklı fayda esasına dayalı ilişkiler kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Avrupa'nın Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikası ise demokrasinin, insan hakları, güvenlik ve barışın geliştirilmesi üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu kapsamda AB, Bölge'de barışın sağlanması amacıyla İsrail - Filistin

sorununun çözüm süreçlerine katılmış, ticaret anlaşmaları yapmış ve Bölge ülkeleri ile ikili ilişkileri geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. İlk olarak 1980'de Venedik Deklarasyonu ile ilişkiler başlamış, daha sonra Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı halini alan 1995'teki Barselona Süreci ve 2004'te Avrupa Komşuluk Politikası ile ilişkilerin hacmi büyümüş ve derinleşmiştir. AB tarafından başlatılan bu girişimler Normatif Güç Avrupa tarafından Orta Doğu'da demokrasi, insan hakları ve serbest piyasanın geliştirilmesi çabaları olarak yorumlanırken, Realist Güç Avrupa yaklaşımı tarafından ise Birliğin daha güvenli hale getirilmesi için kendi dış çevresini şekillendirme çabası olarak yorumlanmaktadır. AB'nin Orta Doğu ile ilişkilerinin genel çerçevesi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Bölge'deki demokratikleşme hareketlerine ve sivil toplumun güçlendirilmesine vermiş olduğu destek, katılmış olduğu İsrail-Filistin sorununa yönelik barışçıl uluslararası çözüm arayışları ve serbest ekonominin geliştirilmesi için Bölge ülkeleri ile yapmış olduğu ticaret hacmini genişleten anlaşmalar, AB'yi yapısal baskılara reaksiyon gösteren bir aktörden ziyade kendi norm ve değerlerini yaymaya çalışan bir aktör olarak göstermektedir.

Orta Doğu'nun önemli ülkelerinden biri olan Suriye ile ilişkileri 1970'lerde Hafız Esad döneminde başlayan AT, çoğunlukla ticaret alanına yoğunlaşmıştır. Ancak, ilişkiler Beşar Esad dönemine kadar istenilen düzeye ulaşamamıştır. Bunun başlıca sebepleri ise Suriye halkı ve Hafız Esad'ın AT'nin kendilerine yönelik tepeden bakan tavır içerisinde olduğuna ve Bölge'de AT'nin işbirliği yaptığı diğer ülkelere kıyasla Suriye'ye çifte standart uyguladığına inanması ile Suriye'nin Lübnan'ı işgalinin AT üyesi ülkeler tarafından eleştirilmesi sayılabilir.

AB ve Suriye ilişkileri Hafız Esad'ın ölümünden sonra yönetime geçen oğlu Beşar Esad ile canlanmaya başlamıştır. Beşar Esad'ın Suriye'nin sosyal ve ekonomik alanlarında gelişmesine yönelik olarak başlatmış olduğu Şam Baharı olarak da bilinen reform hareketi AB tarafından desteklenmiştir. Bu dönemde, Suriye ve AB arasındaki ticaret hacmi artmış ve AB tarafından sivil toplumun güçlendirilmesi çalışmaları yapılmıştır.

Barselona Sürecinin bir parçası olan Suriye ile ilişkilerin daha sistemli ve kapsamlı bir şekilde yürütülmesi amacıyla Avrupa Birliği Konseyi, Suriye'yi Avrupa-

Akdeniz Ortaklığının bir parçası yapması amacıyla görüşmelere başlaması için Komisyonu görevlendirmiştir. Ortaklık Anlaşmasının müzakereleri ve yazım çalışmaları 2003'te başlamış, 2004'te sonlanmış ancak imzalanamamıştır. Söz konusu Anlaşmanın, Suriye'yi Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının tam üyesi haline getirmesi planlanmış olup siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal alanda işbirliği öngörmekteydi. AB-Suriye ikili ilişkilerinde köşe taşı kabul edilen Anlaşmanın imzalanamamasının nedeni, Almanya ve İngiltere gibi AB üyesi ülkelerin Anlaşmanın başlangıç safhasında Kitle İmha Silahlarına karşı madde ekleterek Anlaşmanın bir parçası haline getirmek istemesi, Suriye'nin de daha önce yapılan hiçbir Ortaklık Anlaşmasında yer alamamasından dolayı bu durumu reddetmesidir.

Suriye'nin Lübnan'dan çekilmesinin ardından AB-Suriye ilişkileri tekrar ivme kazanmıştır. Bu gelişmenin ardından AB Suriye'de Hükümet tarafından başlatılmış olan reform hareketini desteklemeye ve sivil toplumun güçlendirilmesine odaklanmıştır. 2007 yılında AB tarafından Suriye'ye 2007-2013 döneminde yapılacak yardımların planlamasını hazırlayan Ülke Strateji Dokümanı çalışması başlamış ancak önceliklerin bütçelendirilmesi konusunda yaşanan sıkıntılardan dolayı ilerleyememiştir. 2008 yılında ilişkiler tekrar ivme kazanmış yarım kalan Ortaklık Anlaşması çalışmalarına devam edilmiştir. Ancak, bir öncekinde de olduğu gibi taslak Anlaşma yine imzalanamamıştır. Savaş öncesine kadar AB'nin Suriye'nin en büyük ticaret ortağı ve donörü olmasına rağmen Suriye-AB ilişkilerinin istenilen seviyeye ulaşamamasında Seeberg'e (2008) göre Suriye'deki sosyal ve kurumsal eksiklikler ile AB'nin Suriye'yi Bölge'deki radikal bir Arap devleti olarak görmesi rol oynamaktadır.

AB-Suriye ilişkisinde az da olsa gelinen tüm aşama Suriye Hükümeti'nin Arap Baharı sonrasında başlayan rejim karşıtı protestolara vermiş olduğu sert müdahaleler ile geriye gitmiştir. Rejim tarafından başlangıçta yeni reformların ve özgürlüklerin hayata geçirilmesi olarak verilen yanıt daha sonra rejim karşıtı müdahalelere ve göstericilere yönelik sert tepki halini almıştır. Rejim tarafından verilen bu sert tepkilere karşı AB'nin başlangıçtaki yanıtı diğer uluslararası aktörler gibi Hükümeti uluslararası hukuka uymaya ve yönetimi demokratik ve Suriye halkının tamamını temsil eden bir geçiş hükümetine devretmeye çağırarak olmuştur. AB bunun yanı sıra, Rejim tarafından

yapılan saldırıları devamlı olarak kınamış, bir takım yaptırımlar uygulamaya koymuş ve özellikle Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından başlatılan uluslararası girişimlerde aktif olarak yer almıştır. Bu tepkiler AB'nin çizmiş olduğu Normatif Güç Avrupa ile uyuşmaktadır. Bu tepkilerdeki sorun ise tepkilerin sayısına rağmen sonuç olarak etkisizliğidir. AB tarafından savaşın gidişatında değişikliğe sebep olan 2013 yılına kadar göstermiş olduğu en beklenmedik eylemi, tüm muhalif grupların tek çatı altında toplandığı Suriye Ulusal Koalisyonu adlı oluşumu Suriye halkının meşru temsilcisi olarak tanınması olmuştur. Sadece AB tarafından değil bir çok ülke tarafından da tanınan bu oluşum uluslararası ilişkilerde devletlerin meşruiyeti sorununu bir kez daha gündeme getirmiştir. Bu kapsamda, Normatif Güç Avrupa yaklaşımından konu ele alındığında bu durum, AB'nin bir normatif güç olarak devletlerin meşruiyeti konusunda standartları yeniden şekillendirmeye çalışması olarak yorumlanmaktadır. Realist Güç Avrupa açısından ele alındığında ise AB'nin Westphalia'nın en önemli sonucu olan devletlerin egemenliğinin üstünlüğü ilkesini ihlali söz konusudur.

Rejim güçlerinin 2013 yılında Guta'da kendi vatandaşlarına karşı kimyasal silahlı saldırısı hem krizin hem de uluslararası aktörlerden gelen yanıtların seyrini değiştirmiştir. ABD tarafından daha önce açıklanan kimyasal saldırının kırmızı çizgi olarak sayılacağı uyarısına rağmen gelen bu saldırı sonrası ABD, askeri bir operasyon hazırlığına başlamıştır. AB'den ise kınama gelmiş ancak üye ülkelerin bireysel tepkileri AB'nin tepkisini gölgede bırakmıştır. Bu kapsamda, İngiltere ve Fransa ABD'nin başını çekeceği olası bir askeri operasyonda yer almak için öneri sunmuşlar ancak öneriler kendi Parlamentoları ve halktan yeterli desteği görememiştir.

Rejim tarafından tekrarlanan kimyasal saldırıların sonrasında Suriye'deki insani durum ağırlaşmış ve komşu ülkelere ve oradan da Avrupa ülkelerine mülteci akını başlatmıştır. AB her ne kadar mültecilere ev sahipliği yapan Suriye'ye koşu ülkelere mali yardımda bulunsa da mülteci krizini bir süre görmezden gelmiş ve kalıcı bir çözüm için çalışmamıştır. Bunun yanı sıra, Rejime yönelik söylemde de değişikliğe gitmiş ve 203 yılında kabul ettiği Suriye krizine yönelik yeni stratejisinde rejim ve Esad'ın yönetimden çekilmesine hiç yer vermemiştir. Bu sırada, Suriye'de sayısı giderek artan aktörlere eklenen ve radikal bir örgüt olan Irak Şam İslam Devleti (İŞİD) ile mücadele için ABD

öncülüğünde kurulan IŞİD'i Yenmek için Küresel Koalisyon'a sivil üye olarak katılım sağlayan AB, bu kapsamda yürütülen terörle mücadele faaliyetlerine destek vermiş, sivil toplumu desteklemiş ve insani amaçlarda kullanılması için mali yardımlarda bulunmuştur. Bu yıllar AB'nin normatif bir güç olmakla yapısal baskılardan kaynaklı sebeplerden dolayı realist bir güç olmak arasında mekik dokuduğu yıllardır.

Mülteci krizinin giderek artması ve sonrasında özellikle AB üyesi küçük ülkelerden gelen tepkiler üzerine AB, normatif güç olma görevini yarıda kesmiş ve yapısal sınamalar karşısında realist tepkiler geliştirmeye başlamıştır. 18 Mart 2016, AB'nin normatif rolü açısından bir dönüm noktası olup dış ilişkilerinde Realist Güç Avrupa olmaya başladığı tarihtir. Bu tarihte AB, en çok Suriyeli mülteci barındıran ülke olan Türkiye ile Suriyeli mültecilerin iadesi ve sınırdan geçirilmemesi için anlaşma yapmıştır. Buna ilave olarak, söz konusu Anlaşma, AB tarafından düzensiz göç ile yoğun mücadelesinin bir ürünü olarak tanımlanmıştır. Ayrıca, Sahil Güvenlik Koruma'nın görev tanımı gözden geçirilmiş ve 2020 yılına kadar 10.000 operasyonel kapasiteye sahip askeri görevlinin AB sınırlarına yerleştirilmesi kararı alınmıştır. Bu olaylar AB'nin başlangıçtaki norm ve değerlerin geliştirilmesi ve teşviki iyi niyetleri ile başlayan rolünün Normatif Güç Avrupa'dan Realist Güç Avrupa olmaya doğru yön değiştirmesini sağlamıştır.

Sonuç olarak, sekizinci yılına giren Suriye krizine halen etkili bir çözüm bulunamamıştır. Bölgesel bir güç ve uluslararası ilişkilerin tek melez aktörü olarak AB'nin krize ve krizdeki önemli gelişmelere yönelik vermiş olduğu tepkiler özellikle Suriye halkı, komşu ülkeler ve müttefiklerinin dikkatlerini çekmektedir. Demokratikleşme talepleri ile başlayan ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan bu yana en kötü insani kriz halini alan Suriye'deki kriz, birçok açıdan müdahil aktörlerin tepkileri ve rollerinin test edilmesinde önemli bir analiz fırsatı sunmaktadır. Bu açıdan, AB'nin giderek uluslararası politikada bürünmüş olduğu normatif kimliğinin değerlendirmesi için de önemli bir platform oluşturmaktadır. Bu değerlendirme için yapısal baskıları en iyi değerlendirme olanağı sunacak olan neorealizm yani Realist Güç Avrupa'nın perspektifinden inceleme yapılmıştır.

Suriye krizi yalnızca yaptırım uygulamanın davranış değişikliği getirmede ve çatışmayı durdurmada yeterli olmadığını göstermiştir. Aksine, uygulanan yaptırımlar Suriye halkını Esad rejiminden daha çok etkilemiş ve aşırı fakirliğe sürükleyerek ülkelerinden kaçmalarının yolunu açmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra, olayların uluslararası toplum tarafından görmezden gelinmesi rejim ve muhaliflerin birçok kez savaş suçu işlemesine sebep olmuştur (Turkmani & Hadid, 2016).

AB'nin dış, güvenlik ve savunma politikası ise normatif ve realist motivasyonları içerisinde barındırmakta ve iki teori de AB dış politikasını şekillendirmede etkili olmaktadır. İki teori de AB'nin uluslararası rolünü tanımlamakta başarılı olup ikisinin de eksik kaldığı yanlar bulunmaktadır. Normatif Güç Avrupa, AB'nin başlangıçta meşruiyetini yitirdiğini iddia ettiği ve kendi seçtiği bir oluşumu meşru atama fikrinden daha sonra vazgeçmesini, mültecilerin kendi sınırlarına gelmesinin önüne geçmek için sınıra konuşlanacak 10.000 askeri çalışana açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Aynı şekilde Realist Güç Avrupa da AB'nin henüz kriz ortada yokken sivil toplumu destekleme çalışmaları, krize yönelik uluslararası çözüm arayışlarındaki aktif rolü ve mali desteği açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Buna rağmen, AB'nin krizin başında normatif bir güç olarak davrandığı ancak krizin kötüleşmesi ile birlikte özellikle küçük AB ülkeleri üzerinde artan etkisi AB'nin uygulamakta olduğu normatif gücün yerini Realist Güç Avrupa'nın almasına sebep olmuştur. Her ne kadar AB krizin Suriye halkı lehine çözüme ulaştırılması noktasında gidişatı değiştirecek kadar etkin bir normatif güç göstermese de, salt realist motivasyonlar ile hareket eden bir aktör olarak da davranmamıştır.

## APPENDIX B. THESIS PRMISSON FORM/TEZ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

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### YAZARIN / AUTHOR

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**Bölümü** / Department : Avrupa Çalışmaları

### TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS:

AB Dış Politikasının Normatif Güç Avrupa ve Realist Güç Avrupa ile Suriye'de Karşılaştırmalı Analizi/Comparative Analysis of EU Foreign Policy in Syria with Normative Power Europe and Realist Power Europe

### TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE:

**Yüksek Lisans** / Master  **Doktora** / PhD

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
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