

THE CRITIC OF LIBERAL APPROACH TOWARDS JDP

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Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cenk Saraçoğlu	(Ankara Uni., GZT)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen	(METU, SOC)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdoğan Yıldırım	(METU, ADM)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ	(METU, ADM.)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Kurtuluş Cengiz	(Ankara Uni., SOS.)	_____

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

**Name, Last name:** Özgür Olgun Erden

**Signature** :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE CRITIC OF LIBERAL APPROACH TOWARDS JDP**

Erden, Özgür Olgun

Ph.D., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Assoc.Prof. Dr. Mustafa Şen

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This study examines the analyses and arguments of three major intellectual groups, which is termed as liberal, conservative-Islamist, and leftist-liberal and/or liberal-leftist, concerning the JDP and Islamism. Based on in-depth interviews which was made with these intellectual groups, it investigates the reasons why these groups have taken a critical stance against the JDP and its power after a certain period while supporting the JDP since its foundation. The inquiry endeavors to do two things. The first interrogates why these two contrary position and attitude emerged and upon what they were based. The second makes a critic of these intellectual group's approach towards the JDP, in the light of my own perspective which was developed in the course of investigating what the approach behind the mentioning position and attitude change is. For that, all these have been relied on two fundamental things. One is a far-reaching inquiry and debate of literature. Other is in-depth interviews made with those who have been situated in the foregoing intellectual groups. On the basis of these literature and in-depth interviews, the study tries to put forward these intellectual groups' approach, expressed as liberal, in line with the literature and the answers which have taken in in-depth interviews. It also develops a perspective that

allows a critique of the interviewees' approach. It makes a critic of these intellectual groups' approach through this perspective.

**Keywords:** JDP, Intellectuals, Islamism, Liberal Approach, Historical-Political Islamism

## ÖZ

### AKP'YE YÖNELİK LİBERAL PERSPEKTİFİN BİR KRİTİĞİ

Erden, Özgür Olgun

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, liberal, muhafazakar-İslamcı, sol-liberal ve/veya liberal-sol olarak adlandırılan üç ana entellektüel grubun AKP ve İslamcılık üzerine analiz ve argümanlarını inceler. Bu entellektüel gruplarla derinlemesine görüşmeler yaparak onların kuruluşundan itibaren AKP'yi desteklerken neden belli bir dönemden sonra AKP ve iktidarına karşı eleştirel bir pozisyon aldıklarını araştırır. Çalışma, iki şeyi gerçekleştirmeye çalışır. İlki, bu iki karşıt pozisyon ve tutumun neden ortaya çıktığını ve onların neye dayandırıldıklarını sorgular. İkincisi, anılan bu pozisyon ve tutum değişikliğinin arkasındaki yaklaşımın ne olduğunu araştırma sürecinde geliştirilen bu çalışmanın perspektifinden belirtilen entellektüel grupların AKP'ye yönelik perspektifinin bir kritiği yapılır. Bütün bunlar, iki temel şeye dayandırılmıştır. Birincisi, kapsamlı bir literatür araştırması ve tartışmasıdır. Diğeri de, sözü edilen entellektüel gruplarda yeralan isimlerle yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerdir. Bu literatür ve derinlemesine görüşmelere dayanarak bu çalışma söz konusu görüşmelerde alınan yanıtlar ve literatür doğrultusunda liberal olarak ifade edilen bu entellektüel grupların yaklaşımını ortaya koymaya çalışır. Ayrıca, görüşülen entellektüel isimlerin yaklaşımının bir eleştirisini yapma imkanı tanıyan bir perspektif geliştirir. Bu perspektif temelinde belirtilen entellektüel grupların yaklaşımının bir kritiğini yapar.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** AKP, Entellektüeller, İslamcılık, Liberal Perspektif, Tarihsel-Siyasal İslamcılık

In Memory of My Mother,

And

To My Wife and Our Little Daughter,

Meltem and Derin Bircan.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DP	Democrat Party –Demokrat Parti (DP)
EU	European Union –Avrupa Birliđi (AB)
FP	Felicity Party –Saadet Partisi (SP)
IMF	International Monetary Fund –Uluslararası Para Fonu (UPF)
JDP	Justice and Development Party – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)
JP	Justice Party –Adalet Partisi (AP)
MB	Muslim Brotherhood –Müslüman Kardeşler
MÜSİAD	The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen – Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneđi
NAP	Nationalist Action Party –Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization –Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşma Paktı
NOP	National Order Party –Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP)
NP	Nation Party –Millet Partisi (MP)
NSC	National Security Council –Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK)
NSP	National Salvation Party –Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP)
NTSU	National Turkish Student Union – Milli Türk Talebe Birliđi (MTTB)
NWT	National View Tradition –Milli Görüş Geleneđi (MGG)
RPP	Republican Poeples Party –Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)
TPP	True Path Party –Dođru Yol Partisi (DYP)
TÜSİAD	The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen –Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneđi
UN	United Nations –Birleşmiş Milletler (BM)
US	The United States –Birleşik Devletler (ABD)
VP	Virtue Party –Fazilet Partisi (FP)

WB	World Bank –Dünya Bankası (DB)
WP	Welfare Party –Refah Partisi (RP)
WPT	Workers' Party of Turkey –Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP)

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. The Problem of the Study

This thesis aims at studying three major intellectual groups' arguments, which have analyzed and debated Islamism and the National View Tradition (NWT) –Milli Görüş Geleneği<sup>1</sup>- since its foundation and the 1980s and come into prominence with their writings and discussions regarding the JDP –Justice Development Party- (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) power and its new political orientation(s). Defined as liberal, conservative-Islamist, and left-liberal and/or liberal-left, these groups have

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<sup>1</sup> This tradition is known as Milli Görüş in Turkish, National View in English. It is an independent and highly important Islamist movement in the history of Turkey, which was led by Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the movement in question. Its ideological bases laid in the end of 1960s. However, it should also be stated that the concept National has been more often used such as 'view tradition', 'outlook movement' or 'view movement' in literature. In other words, it seems that the literature has sometimes preferred to use 'National View tradition', 'National Outlook movement' or 'National View movement' for defining this political group. Here we will be mostly using the word tradition when referring to National View. In the context of which words have been preferred, for the discussions with regard to National View, see William Lale and Ergun Özbudun *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP*, New York: Routledge Publications, (2010): 10-29 Ümit Cizre (edit.), *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party*, New York: Routledge Publications, (2008): 3-201, Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, New York: Cambridge University Press, (2009): 45- 50, Yıldız Atasoy, *Turkey, Islamists and Democracy: Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State*, New York: I. B. Tauris Publications, (2005): 115, Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*, New York: Cambridge University Press, (2010): 88-230, Angel Rabasa and F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*, National Defense Research Institute, (2008): 40, Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekinçil, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (6): İslamcılık*, İstanbul: İletişim, (2011) 544-575, Yalçın Akdoğan, Yalçın Akdoğan, *Ak Parti ve Muhafazakâr Demokrasi*, İstanbul: Alfa, (2004): 91-103, Ahmet Yıldız, "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook", *The Muslim World*, 93 (2), (2003): 187-190, İhsan Dağı, "Transformation of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization", *Turkish Studies*, 6 (1), (2005): 1-16, Bilal Sambur, "The Great Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of Justice and Development Party and Erdogan", *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, 2 (2), (2009): 117-127, İhsan Yılmaz, "Beyond Post-Islamism: Transformation of Turkish Islamism Toward 'Civil Islam' and Its Potential Influence in the Muslim World", *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, 4 (1), (2011): 245-280

initially supported this power by making important intellectual contributions. However, later on, they changed their views with regard to the JDP and begun to criticize this party and its power. This study will, at the same time, focus on this change and criticism in their views. For this, I will basically investigate what lies behind the change and criticism in question. I will argue that there has been a fundamental approach behind these intellectual contributions, the change and criticisms. I will term it as liberal approach. With the arguments regarding Islamism and its emergence, this approach has influenced the aforesaid intellectual groups' views and dominated them.

The liberal approach, which has had a strong academic and intellectual background, expresses a dominant form of analysis of Turkish politics<sup>2</sup>. This background later on has paved the way for realizing a variety of intellectual productions by penetrating into certain intellectual groups, composed of liberals, conservatives-Islamists, and liberal-leftists or/and leftist-liberals. Firstly, it should be stated that by the term liberal what it is meant here is not a political identity or belonging. For the most part, with this term, I will imply academic and intellectual studies and debates produced

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<sup>2</sup> In this academic background, with studies on Islam, Islamism, and secularism, I think, some prominent academic figures are Kemal Karpat, Şerif Mardin, Binnaz Toprak, Nilüfer Göle, and Elisabeth Özdalga. For their some studies, see, Şerif Mardin (1993), "Religion and Secularism in Turkey", in *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson (edit.), London: I. B. Tauris, Şerif Mardin (1973), "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, Vol. 102, No. 1, Şerif Mardin (1991) *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset: Makaleler III*, Mümtaz'er Türköne and Tuncay Önder (edit.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, Kemal Karpat (2001), *The Politization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Oxford University Press, Kemal Karpat (2004) *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays*, Leiden: Brill, Binnaz Toprak (1981), *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, Binnaz Toprak (1988) "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey" in *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, Metin Hepar and Ahmet Evin (edit.) New York: Walter de Gruyter, Binnaz Toprak (1993) "The Religious Right", in *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson (edit.), London: I. B. Tauris, Binnaz Toprak (2005) "Secularism and Islam: The Building of Modern Turkey", *Macalester International*, Vol. 15, Nilüfer Göle, (2000) "Snapshots of Islamic modernities", *Daedalus*, Vol. 129, No. 1, Nilüfer Göle (1997) "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 51, No. 1, Nilüfer Göle (200), *İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine: Melez Desenler*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, Elisabeth Özdalga (1998) *The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey*. Richmond, Surrey, England: Curzon, Elisabeth Özdalga (1998) *Modern Türkiye'de Örtünme Sorunu Resmi Laiklik ve Popüler İslam*, Yavuz Alogan (trans.), İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınları, Elisabeth Özdalga (2007) *İslamcılığın Türkiye Seyri: Sosyolojik Bir Perspektif*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, Elisabeth Özdalga (1999) "Sivil Toplum ve Düşmanları", in *Postmodernizm ve İslam, Küreselleşme ve Oryantalizm*, Abdullah Topçuoğlu and Yasin Aktay (edit.), Ankara: Vadi Yayınları

based on a certain standpoint. Secondly, this liberal approach presents a quite complete framework with its academic arguments, which have created a broad literature on Islam, Islamism and secularism, and its intellectual discussions, which have included various intellectual groups. We will see this in some sections of this dissertation, but particularly in Chapter three. This chapter fundamentally consists of both literature discussions relevant to the liberal approach, and the intellectual groups' views, whom I have interviewed and comprised of liberals, conservatives and Islamists, and liberal-leftists and/or leftist-liberals.

The liberal approach has generally argued that religion, namely Islam, became an important conflict area in Turkish politics after the establishment of Republican Turkey. The main reason behind this conflict was the rigid stance which the founder cadres and elites of the secular-national Republic took against religion. One of the most significant indicators of this stance has been the republic's secular reforms and westernization move (Mardin, 1993, Toprak, 1993 and 2005, and Karpat 2004). For instance, according to Binnaz, by the way, the Kemalist-secular reforms and westernization equated with modernization, the role of Islam in Turkish society was done away with the reforms and westernization in question which not only deactivated the Islamic institutional networks in the administrative, legal and educational areas, but also undermined the strength of Islam in social life (Toprak, 1993: 631). However, in the years following the death of Atatürk, and especially after the transition to multi-party democracy in 1950, the secular-republican establishment's understanding of laicism, which was given shape by these reforms and westernization attempts, was challenged by a number of groups (Mardin, 1993: 371-372). These groups were composed of religiously-conservative Muslims, which more lived in rural regions of Turkey in those years. They were dominated by a variety of religious orders, notably Naskhibendi and Nurcus. This domination created a significant change with regard to religion perception in those groups. In a sense, it reshaped their perceptions in line with a cultural confrontation, especially as opposed the western-Christian culture. Put it another way, the groups at issue politically, for the most part, understood and perceived religion based upon cultural conflict and

contrast<sup>3</sup> (Mardin, 1993a, Mardin, 1993, Kara, 2014, Çakır, 2012 and Yavuz, 2003). On the basis of such a conflict and contrast, as Reed remarked, they were represented by quite a few opposition political parties in the 1940s. For example, in 1948, the Nation party (NP) –Millet Partisi-, which cared about religion and religious sensibilities and mostly involved conservatives, who were in search of a revitalized and traditional Islam, was founded. But, its political life did not last long and was closed down after a short while. Afterwards, in 1950s, with the establishment of Democrat Party (DP) –DemokratParti-, the party’s leadership paid regard to the demands of these religiously-conservative groups and softened the Kemalist-secular reforms by taking a range of steps, ranging from religious education, the institutions for the training of İmams, and the abolition of the Turkish form of the call to prayer (ezan) to the proliferation of religious publications. Since the rise of opposition parties, the role of religion in Turkish life has become one of much important public issues (Reed, 1954: 271 and Daver, 1967: 59). After the 1960 military coup, political conditions changed, and many new political traditions and parties, varying from the left to the right, appeared in political sphere. Of these kinds, one was Islamist parties established in the name of the National View (Kili, 1980 and Karpas, 2004). From then onward, these religiously-conservative groups were to be represented by the National View parties, the National Order Party (NOP) –Milli Nizam Partisi- and the National Salvation Party (NSP) –Milli Selamet Partisi-, led by Necmettin Erbakan. The aforementioned parties, based on Islamic sentiments and traditions, was to symbolize the political use of Islam in Turkish politics. Thus, religion began to become an important factor in politics in the context of the cultural representation of the groups in question (Kili, 1980: 394-395). This was the cultural aspect of the groups which would form the social base of Islamism in Turkey. In other words, as will be seen in the next chapters of this thesis, it would constitute the cultural aspect of political cleavage occurring between the secular establishment and the religiously-conservative groups, which has been claimed by the liberal approach.

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<sup>3</sup> This discussion is immesenly important in terms of disclosing how political conflict and struggles have taken form in Turkish politics, considering Turkish Islamism’s political goals, and fundamental political contrast which it has created in its struggle with the secular establishment.

Another aspect of this political cleavage is economy. Turkish Islamism has been a politics which has had economic bases and class conflict from its establishment to present. During the years, when it was founded, this politics economically represented small and middle-sized enterprises in the small-Anatolian cities and towns separated from the Justice party, described as a centre-right politics, on the account of advocating big industrialists' and businessmen's economic interests. These economic groups consisted of small merchants, artisans, shopkeepers and peasants in rural areas deprived of economic benefits of modernization (Sarıbay, 1985 and Toprak, 1984). Following the 1980 military coup, accompanied by the changing economic policies under the leadership of the coup's commanders and Özal, a rightist politician, in line with a neoliberal politics, the economic social base of Islamism gradually shifted. Özal's economic policies played an important role in this change (Gülalp, 2001, Öniş, 1997 and Yavuz, 1997). These policies fundamentally paved the way for the growth of small and medium-scale entrepreneurships, which have been culturally religious and conservative and composed of small-size provincial businessmen, involving merchants, contractors, restaurant owners, relatively small-scale industrialists, and middle class professionals (Gülalp, 1999: 29 and Yavuz, 2003: 215). At the same time, this social base was to comprise of working classes and civil servants, low-income groups and a broad externalized and dispossessed population in metropolitan cities (Toprak, 1988: 129 and Gülalp 1999 and 2001). However, the Islamist Welfare party, established in the early 1980, was to represent new small and middle-sized businessmen and middle classes arising as a result of Özal's neoliberal policies (Öniş, 1997). For instance, MÜSİAD -the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen- (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş adamları Derneği) which organized these religiously-conservative enterprises and businessmen, was to support this party (Öniş, 1997, Yavuz, 2003 and 1997, and Gülalp, 2001). At the beginning of 2000s, the JDP, which was founded by the innovationists separated from the VP –Virtue Party- (FaziletPartisi) in the National View line, would be the new representative of the foregoing social classes developing from the 1980s onwards (Öniş, 2007, Yavuz, 2009: 4, Özcan and Turunç, 2011: 70, Demiralp, 2009: 320).

The liberal approach has mainly described a historical-social Islamism in Turkey by underlining the social base of Islamist politics based on cultural and economic aspects, and the political cleavage taking place between this social base and the secular establishment outlined above, without considering how religion, Islam, has been politicized in Turkish political history. This description of Islamism has come into prominence with its emphasis on culture and economy laying the social bases of this political current. I will refer to such description framed by the liberal approach while pointing to a historical-social Islamism. By remaining within that description, the liberal approach has, I think, claimed that there has been a fundamental cleavage occurring between two main political actors. In Turkish politics, these actors have been expressed in different manners. For instance, Mardin states that these two groups have consisted of centralized, cohesive and overly secularist state elites, and a culturally heterogeneous periphery with strong religious overtones (Mardin, 1973). Toprak has defined them as secularists-Islamists (Toprak, 2005: 35), whilst Yavuz has referred to the political actors in question as the secular establishment and pro-Islam forces (Yavuz, 2009: 262). Generally speaking, the way to understand and explain Turkish politics is this political cleavage taking place between the two major actors described above. The liberal approach has dominated academic and intellectual field in the course of too long years with an argument based on historical-social Islamism, which comprises given cultural demands and economic interests of the religiously-conservative social groups, and their struggle with secular establishment. As Tuğal has clearly stated, the main assertion behind this domination is the idea that religiously-conservative groups represent the periphery and civil society as opposed to the centre and the authoritarian state tradition (Tuğal, 2016: 24). In Turkey, three major intellectual groups, composed of liberals, conservatives-Islamists, and leftist-liberals or/and liberal-leftists, which I have also interviewed, have debated and tried to clarify Islamism and the JDP politics on the basis of a liberal approach.

These groups have shaped their own arguments around two main allegations of the liberal approach expressed as historical-social Islamism. Thus, it can be in general alleged that they have developed a common outlook based upon the liberal

approach's arguments, even if labelled as liberal, conservative-Islamist, and leftist-liberal and/or liberal-leftist. Nevertheless, I can make a distinction between these three intellectual groups, though not sharply separating one from another. For instance, the liberals have focused on state-society relationships, liberal-political freedoms and rights, military-politics relationship, European Union (EU), neoliberal policies, and economic and cultural aspects of the religiously-conservative groups. In common with the liberals, the leftist-liberals have dwelt upon basic political rights and freedoms, deficiency of civil society, democratization, European Union, neoliberal policies, and military-civil politics relationship. As for the conservatives and Islamists, they have put emphasis on oppression and violence performed upon conservative and devout people, their victimization, military interventions and pressures, democratic and election-based politics, neoliberal economy, EU, and economic and civil organizations of religiously-conservative groups. However, those intellectual groups' arguments have brought about a liberal-conservative intellectual leadership, largely composed of liberals, conservative and Islamists, partly of left-liberals/liberal-leftists, in academy and intellectual field. This leadership has begun an overall discussion process concerning state, laicism, enlightenment idea, and in general terms Kemalism and the leftist politics in new period, when Turkey has been accepted as a candidate country to EU membership. It has evaluated the starting of negotiation process with the EU as an opportunity for facing society, politics, and of course state with itself (Develioğlu, 2010: 143). Mostly, led by liberals and conservatives-Islamists, the intellectual leadership has dominated the discussions relevant to the transformation of Islamism and the emergence of the JDP politics. Since 2002, the strength of the JDP power has come from that intellectual leadership. The JDP has ideologically and politically legitimized its own politics in national and international arena through the intellectual leadership in question, and this leadership has also consolidated the JDP power with arguments.

These intellectual groups have had two fundamental views related to Islamism and the JDP politics in Turkey. One has been the economic and cultural dimension of the religiously-conservative social group, which would basically form the social base of Islamism or Islamist politics. The other has also been the struggle of that group with

the Kemalist-secular establishment. Based on these two assertions, the aforementioned intellectuals groups have commonly made a description of historical-social Islamism with regard to Turkish Islamism and the JDP, without considering the political history of Islamist politics, namely its political connections and battles, and its relationships with political compositions -terkip- and syntheses, which has been shaped within a rightist political framework. Moreover, they have ignored the secular establishment's politically changing attitudes against religion, Islam, over the years in Turkish political history. General speaking, the main framework of those groups' opinions has consisted of these two aspects, which have not dealt with political history and processes regarding Islamism in Turkey.

In the first dimension, the foregoing intellectual groups laid weight on economic bases of religiously-conservative groups, which were composed of small and middle-size entrepreneurs and industrialists, new form of capitals and middle classes. This emphasis became more dominant following the 1980s, a period when a military coup was staged and a civil government, led by Özal, carried neoliberal economic policies into effect in cooperation with the coup executives. But yet, it should be indicated that there was such an emphasis since the emergence of Islamism under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of National View, in the early 1970s. According to most interviewees, the reason for this way was that the National View politics before 1980 represented social classes comprising small traders, artisans and farmers in opposition to Süleyman Demirel's JP –Justice party- (Adalet Partisi), which advocated large industrialist and businessmen's economic interests, and secular and Istanbul-centered capital groups. It was not able to prove itself owing to remaining under the dominant right-politics' hegemony in 1960s and 1970s. However, they underlined the post-1980 period, since it expressed a new historical-social situation for Turkish Islamism. With global opportunities and new economic conditions, the post-1980 period changed the social base of Islamism in Turkey. What underlies this change was the neoliberal politics on the basis of free market economy, liberalization, export promotion, deregulation, privatization and minimal state. Thanks to these new economic policies, new economic actors, which would consist of particularly small and medium-scale provincial businessmen, new middle

classes, civil servants, working classes, and low-income groups, arose. They were the new socio-economic base of Islamist politics, led by the National View, after the 1980s. This economic base also had a cultural aspect. In other words, the above-mentioned base intertwined with culturally a religiously-conservative social groups. Because, Islamism is at the same time a political current composed of cultural orientations. That orientation has been exceedingly conservative and religionist. Given this cultural and economic elements, which formed the social base of Islamism, Islamist politics has been the voice of culturally religious-conservative group and economically small and middle-sized entrepreneurs and middle classes in Turkey. The JDP would be a political party that culturally and economically best represented these new actors and their economic interests. Generally, it would be asserted that there were strong social factors and dynamics behind this politics, ranging from class formation, capital accumulation, pietism, and conservatism to education, upward social mobility, and urbanization in the context of Islamism and the JDP.

As regards the second dimension, upon which these intellectual groups dwelt, the interviewees saw Islamism and its successor, the JDP, as an outcome of a political cleavage taking place between a heavily secular establishment and religiously-conservative groups with cultural and economic bases stated above. The actors of this political cleavage were defined in different ways. They were sometimes expressed as centre and periphery, and were rarely stated as seculars and Islamists. However, they were in general described as the secular establishment and the religiously-conservative groups. Here, the secular establishment was seen as a political actor mostly comprising the state and its civil and military bureaucracy. Along with the foundation of a secular-national republic in 1923, according to the interviewees, the Kemalist-secular establishment, which initiated secular reforms erasing religion, Islam, from public and social life, caused a political cleavage, which had fundamentally cultural and economic bases, between itself and religious-conservative political actors in question. However, interestingly, they supposed that there was a quite fixed and unchanging secular establishment in the stance which it had against religion. To put it another way, they stated that the secular establishment

did not change its strict and hard opposition to religion, Islam, within Turkish political history. Thus, they made an analysis and discussion of Islamism and the JDP, based on a binary opposition, such as centre-periphery, state-society, or secular-Islamist. They developed a democratic perspective by taking the political struggle of these two political actors into account. For instance, one of the interviewees, Bayramoğlu commented on this struggle as an 'equation' in accordance with this perspective. Generally, the leftist-liberals or the liberal-leftists also saw it as a democratization from a democratic perspective. In a nutshell, these intellectual groups disregarded the political history of the Islamist politics and the secular establishment, and the political-historical processes through which they passed, by basing upon a description of historical-social Islamism. In a sense, they were not interested in how Islam, religion, was politicized by both the right-wing and Islamist politics and the secular establishment in a historical-political context. They did not address the processes of politicization of Islam in their debates and analyses with historical and political aspects.

Instead of a historical-social Islamism, on which the liberal approach, and thus the interviewees grounded their own views, I will make a description of historical-political Islamism that focuses on how Islam was politicized within Turkish political history. This Islamism was shaped as a result of various historical-political processes occurring in Turkish politics. With such description of Islamism, I will debate on the historical and political adventure of a politicized Islam. By a historical-political Islamism, what I would like to express will be an Islamism as the politicization of religion based on politicizing cultural, moral and symbolic aspects of Islam from Tibi's approach (Tibi, 2001), which I will debate in the chapter two. Tibi emphasizes that with these aspects Islam is an instrument of political power and a guarantee of legitimacy, along with having the opposite political functions. It promotes a political mobilization with the support of moral, cultural and symbolic components, and legitimizes the existing political order instead of destabilizing it by attributing to it religious symbols (Tibi, 2001 and Tibi, 1983). This politicization is not a one-way process, in sense of politicizing Islam under the leadership of the National View. On the contrary, it is a two-way process that the politicization of Islam has been realized,

with cultural, moral and symbolic elements. In that politicization, there is the secular establishment on the one side, and Islamist politics in Turkey on the other. We already know that in Turkey Islamism has been a politics grounded on the politicization of cultural, moral and symbolic components of Islam. This politics has basically aimed at making Islam an essential cultural element of the identity of Turkish state, and thus increased moral, symbolic and cultural visibility of Islam in public sphere and social life through various institutions, such as education. As for the secular establishment, which mostly consisted of civil and military bureaucracy and elites, the situation was more different, given the fact that the position which it took against religion has changed in Turkish political history. I think that, the secular establishment has not been a fixed and unchangeable structure, in the context of its stance ideologically and politically in the face of religion, Islam. In other words, the secular establishment shifted its attitude, opposed to religion, over time within Turkish political history. Its attitude became different depending on historical and political developments and facts in Turkish politics. For instance, the 1940s and 1950s' establishment was more distinct from that of the 1920s and 1930s, since it softened its stance against religion (Zürcher, 2004). Or, following the coup, the 1960s' secular establishment, which created a rather liberal atmosphere, and thus paved the way for arising a variety of political tendencies and parties from the left-socialist politics to ultra-nationalist and Islamist one (Karpas, 2004: 119, 123-124 and Kili, 1980: 395, 396-397) also differed from that of the 1970s, when the left-socialist politics was on the rise, and from that of the 1980s, which was the supporter of Turkish-Islam synthesis and the main actor of political and ideological use of Islam (Kaya, 2004: 74-106). Taking all of these into account, it can be concluded that religion, namely Islam, was politicized by the secular establishment in different periods. This politicization ended up with the use of moral, cultural and symbolic elements of Islam in the context of being an essential part of identity of Turkish state, and of the increase in the visibility of religion in public sphere and social life.

Of course, the politicization of Islam is not just made up of its moral, cultural and symbolic components. This politicization has also an economic dimension. Since its foundation, with anti-capitalist, developmentalist, and social justice-based economy

policies Islamism has objected to a capitalist-free market economy. It maintained this emphasis after the 1980s, as in the mid-1960s and the 1970s. For instance, in the 1990s it promised a 'just order' and defended equality and an interest-free economic system as opposed to a capitalist economic order. However, in the 2000s, following the establishment of the Virtue party, Islamist politics renounced from this emphasis, in accordance with the economic standpoint of new economic actors and capital groups endowed with devout-conservative tendencies. It would have no longer had no objection to neoliberal politics and its economic policies by embracing the dominant argument that there has been no conflict and incompatibility between Islam and capitalist economic system (Hoşgör, 2014 and Şen, 2010). New economic classes and businessmen, who formed the social bases of Islamist politics in the 1980s and 1990s, played an active role in shaping and dominating that idea. This idea has been another dimension of politicization of Islam, in sense of conforming to the existing political-economic order. The JDP has been one of the major actors of this politicization, which would provide a class domination with economic policies based on the neoliberal politics and free-market economy of the global-capitalist order.

From the standpoint of a historical-political Islamism, in explaining and discussing this politicization, theoretically, I will make use of Althusser and Gramsci's political theory and Bourdieu's approach to religion. Within this theoretical framework, I will highlight political and ideological structures, involving the state and ideological apparatuses from an Althusserian point of view. Althusser basically argues that society consisted of political and ideological structures, including state, ideology, religion, education, culture, political parties, and law; not just economic ones, and strongly rejects economism. These structures have autonomous political and ideological developments, dynamics and contradictions within themselves (Althusser, 2014 and Martin, 1998: 153). He focused on the state and ideology. For him, far beyond a classical differentiation of the state-civil society as in liberal view, the state, which has been created by the forms of state law, is something 'above the law'. For, it exists with ideological-political functions, in sense of providing continuation of social cohesion and exercise of class domination. As a result of his

anti-empiricist attitude, Althusser suggested that with these functions, politics is something that overreaches beyond a given social class and its economic interests in production field. It is a field which is shaped beyond economic structure and relationships, on the basis of ideological and political struggles. In this sense, political subjects are not given as well, but are constituted in those struggles. Within the aforesaid struggles, the state strives to form various ideological and political ties between people for cohesion of 'the social whole' through its ideological apparatuses. According to Althusser, religion has already proved the existence of these ties. Apparently, it is no coincidence that its reality has been noticed in the first general form of ideology because ideologies has a similar function with religion as a part of securing the foregoing ties between people and providing the cohesion of social whole by regulating the relation of individuals to their tasks fixed by social structure (Ranciere, 1994: 142, 143-144 and Hirst, 1976: 386, 393). Likewise, Gramsci also alleges that state is a total of political society and civil society, by objecting to the difference between the state and -civil- society. Here, political society comprises coercive institutions, like the armed forces, police, law courts, and prisons, which are embodied in the state apparatuses. Civil society, composed of all organizations and institutions out of the production sphere and the state, is an ethical or moral society which the hegemony of dominant classes would be constituted by tools of political and ideological struggles. As a cement holding the interests of different social groups together, rather than a single class like proletariat or bourgeoisie, ideology is a sphere on which the state acts to create a collectivity. This collectivity is usually a national-popular formation and political consciousness, including national, religious, and cultural and morals elements, not just economic classes and their interests (Gramsci, 1992: 20, Gramsci, 2000: 420, and Simon, 1999). In his theory of the state and ideology, another significant concept, which Gramsci frequently uses to theorize hegemony, is intellectual and moral leadership. This concept is directly related with his theory of hegemony based on the production of consent through ideas and values legitimizing one group or class' power, since it plays an active role in the building of a hegemonic politics through political and ideological leadership (Simon, 1999: 24, 26 and Martin, 1998:1-2). As Mouffe has pointed out, this leadership, which constantly reconstructs hegemony, appears as an outcome of intellectual productions,

which dominates fundamental ideological elements of a society. It is something that clearly overreaches a simple idea like class alliance (Mouffe, 1979: 15, 185). It is an intellectual and moral struggle that takes place over the key concepts which fashion the way people think. It is necessary to form a political leadership. For instance, in the 1980s, Thatcherism was the example of a considerable political leadership which won a great success by popularizing the term 'market' as the key instrument for organizing the economy and welfare services. This kind of political leadership was constructed on the very existence of intellectual and moral leadership (Simon, 1999: 121 and Mouffe, 1979: 184). Therefore, there was a close relationship between these two forms of leadership. For the most part, formulated as a production of consent, the intellectual and moral leadership was the fundamental condition of political leadership of any group, class or political party, which wishes to establish its own hegemonic politics.

From the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, in Turkey, a group of liberal and conservative intelligentsia started to undertake the intellectual and moral leadership mentioned above. It can be termed as a liberal-conservative leadership. It is a conservative leadership because it embraced a conservative modernization line, which cared about religion as a belonging and identity and saw its moral, cultural and symbolic elements as an essential part of Turkish society and the state, in the face of the Kemalist-secular modernization. Here, a liberal leadership has two aspects. One is more economic, in the sense of advocating a capitalist economic system and leading a neoliberal politics and economic policies. The other has a more academic and intellectual aspect, in the sense of conceptually and definitionally determining the main framework of intellectual and moral leadership in question. This academic-intellectual aspect focused on understanding and explaining Turkish politics over two main actors, notably the secular-Kemalist state bureaucracy and military at the centre on the one side and the religiously-conservative groups at the periphery with class base, religious orders, and conservative worldview on the other. It fundamentally claimed that these groups were excluded from -political- power, and that the secular establishment put pressure on these groups, which desired more democracy, by using military and juridical apparatus. The right-inclined politicians took a great interest in

this assertion, formulated in the axis of the centre-periphery. Later, they became strong apologists of it, on the account of fact that it was immensely useful for their own politics. They were alleged to have struggled for democracy against an authoritarian state<sup>4</sup>. With that basic argument, the liberal-conservative leadership dominated the political sphere, especially after the 1980s in my view, and provided to the right-wing politics the chance with coming to power, notably including the DP in 1950s, the JP in 1960s and 1970s, and the Motherland party in 1980s. As of today, there has been such a leadership behind the JDP power as well (Develioğlu, 2010: 137). However, the liberal-conservative intellectual leadership, which provided a basis for the political leadership of the right-politics, ignored religion's relationships with the state and its ideological-political apparatuses within Turkish political history. For, in Turkey, religion, namely Islam, was not a means of cultural and economic demands of one social group, defined as devout and conservative, but also was an important political-ideological symbol and identity for both Turkish state, and other conservative-nationalist right-politics outside National View Islamism. On this point, particularly, Bourdieu's approach to religion presents a strong illustrative framework as to how we should understand and elucidate religion in Turkey. To begin with, according to Bourdieu, religion is a significant tool for the maintenance and legitimacy of the existing political order, and the symbolic building of any politics. It undertakes a central role in political and symbolic struggles (Bourdieu, 1991). In Bourdieuan sense, if Turkey's historical-political processes are considered, it would seem that the political and symbolic aspects of religion, Islam, gained more prominence. The main reason that lies behind this is historical-political conditions. These conditions provided the shaping of a historical-political Islamism in Turkey. It is an Islamism grounded on the political dynamics, contradictions and antagonisms specific to Turkey, rather than a historical-social Islamism as the political expression of one social group with given cultural and economic bases.

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<sup>4</sup> Behlül Özkan, "Bir anti-komünistin hatıratı: Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Türkiye Müesseses Nizamı'nın röntgeni", Birgün newspaper, accessed September, 29, 2018, available from: <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/bir-antikomunistin-hatirati-soguk-savas-donemi-turkiye-muesses-nizami-nin-rontgeni-232027.html>

Keeping the general theoretical framework outlined above in mind, in this dissertation, I will fundamentally make a description of historical-political Islamism as a right-politics shaped within in Turkey's historical-political structures and processes. In doing so, first of all, I will allege that religion, Islam, gradually began to become more important for both other right-wing politics, outside of Islamism, and the secular establishment in Turkish political history. Thus, the position of religion slowly changed in historical-political processes. Islam was no longer just a significant political, cultural and symbolic elements for Islamist politics, which was centered on religion with its moral, cultural and symbolic aspects and saw it as an essential part of Turkish state and society. Particularly, from the late 1960s, and 1970s onwards, other currents of the right-politics, the centre-right (JP) and ultra-nationalist (NAP), embraced Islam as a cultural and moral part of Turkish society, as the DP had done in 1950s. However, differently from the 1950s, the left-socialist and social-democrat politics were on the rise in Turkey. Other right-politics, involving Islamism, started to emphasize religion more as an essential political argument against the rise of the left-politics. Religion was to be reshaped by certain political-ideological compositions -terkip- by moving beyond the emphasis. One of them was nationalist-conservative composition that had reframed Islam with moral, cultural and symbolic elements as a tool of political-ideological legitimacy of the right-politics from the mid-1960s and 1970s. This composition reformed Islam by redefining it in a nationalist and conservative form. Thus, religion, Islam, was re-politicized within a nationalist-conservative framework based on moral, cultural and symbolic aspects, aside from Islamist politics that had politically and ideologically used Islam. This politicization reached up the top with the Nationalist Front governments. Turkish Islamism reshaped and politicized itself by taking part in certain political experiences, such as Nationalist Front, and embracing this nationalist-conservative framework.

This politicization is not limited to the political-ideological composition and the Nationalist Front political experiences mentioned above. The secular establishment itself has politicized religion, Islam by seeing an essential part of Turkish society and state, especially from 1970s onwards, when the left-politics rose in Turkey.

Henceforth, it would attach a great importance to religion capable of producing a political legitimacy and providing the continuation of the existing political-social order. In this way, religion would be a crucial tool of political and symbolic legitimacy of Turkish state, with the purpose of providing a basic for political legitimacy and holding the society together. It would be initiated to be regarded as a social cement with moral, cultural and symbolic components, and as an essential part of the identity of Turkish state. Following the 1980 military coup, the secular establishment started to form an official frame for Islam. This official frame was considerably fulfilled through Turkish-Islam synthesis, which the military adopted as well. Thus, religion officially became an indispensable element of the identity of Turkish state. Accepting Islam as an identity showed itself in political and social life with a variety of political enterprises and propagandas. The September 12 regime brought compulsory religious education into primary and secondary school, opened a great number of religious vocational schools, and increased the number of Koranic schools (Poulton,1994). What is more, the leader of the coup, Kenan Evren made religious propaganda by reading verses of Quran and giving examples from prophet's hadiths in his public meetings<sup>5</sup> . All these were fundamental political assertions of Islamist politics in Turkey. The coup carried out all of those assertions, alongside with turning Islam into an essential component of Turkish state, which has been another political claim of Turkish Islamism. All in all, after 1980s, in Turkey, reorganized under the leadership of Welfare party, founded in 1983, Islamism adopted a new political position, which did not put too much emphasis on religious issues, laicism, and Islam. It mostly centered on social justice and 'just order' in domestic politics and anti-westernism, anti-Americanism and anti-European Union in foreign policy (Yıldız, 2003).

In Turkey, Islamism has formed a basic for a national and popular politics in Gramscian sense, as a result of the politicization stated above. Gramsci defines this politics as going beyond economic conflicts and class interest by taking the aims and interests of other classes and social groups into consideration (Simon, 1999). In that

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<sup>5</sup> Oral Çalışlar, "Kenan Evren...", Hürriyet newspaper, accessed October, 02, 2018, available from: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/oral-calislari/kenan-evren-28969147>

sense, in a Gramscian framework, Islamism has been a quite nationalist-populist politics which has conducted a nationalist politics by turning into a nationalist form, and provided a basis for a culture-based populist political movement grounded on the distinctions like seculars-religious people or Muslims- others. The political subjects of this politics are not given, as the interviewees have asserted by basing on a liberal approach. The interviewees have in general defined the political subjects as ones that have had a given cultural and economic base, which form the social base of Islamist politics. For them, this subject has been the main political actors of Islamism with religious and conservative tendencies and new economic actors and social classes, which have been composed of small and middle-sized entrepreneurs and businessmen, and professional middle classes. It has been mainly a political subject intertwined with cultural and economic elements. In contrast to their views, a political subject is, I think, constituted, not given, in Althusserian sense. In line with his theory of state and ideology, Althusser asserted that ideologies, which have no 'ideal, idea-dependent', or spiritual existence, and, as a material existence, just and always exists in the apparatuses, are real creators of those subjects (Althusser, 2014 and Hirst, 1976). Briefly stated, from this Althusserian viewpoint, it can be concluded that belonging to an economic class and identifying with certain cultural-religious elements are not sufficient to constitute a political subject. Therefore, in Turkey, the religiously-conservative masses cannot be claimed to have become a political subject with given cultural and economic appearances. They are political subjects created within politicization processes. More precisely, they are subjects of historical-political Islamism shaped as a result of politicization of religion, Islam, in Turkey's historical-political processes. The historical-political Islamism, which has transformed into a nationalist-populist politics by virtue of this politicization, has constituted a nationalist-populist political consciousness in the political subject mentioned above. This political consciousness is a product of political-ideological conflicts and struggles taking place with other social classes, cultural-religious and ethnic groups, and political movements in Turkish political history. It is a political consciousness that has politically a rather nationalist, statist, authoritarian, xenophobic, exclusionist and intolerant political-ideological implications. Accordingly, as in the interviewees' approach, it is difficult to allege that there has

been a democratic struggle or democratization between these masses and the secular establishment by referring to the cultural and economic bases of the religiously-conservative masses. For, as remarked earlier, there has been a strong politicization of Islam. As a result, this politicization reached up the top with the September 12 coup which had worked up into a crucial part of the state ideological apparatuses of Islam in Althusserian sense. After this, these political subjects and their consciousness were continuously reproduced as an outcome of the politicization of Islam by the rightist political actors, and the state and its ideological-political apparatuses. In this reproduction process Islam, religion, has been a significant tool of social-cultural cohesion and political and symbolic legitimacy for both the right-wing politics, including Islamism, and the secular establishment. Moreover, following the September 12 military coup, Islamist politics ideologically and politically became one among the prominent supporter and basic constituents of the center, and Turkish state and its identity, owing to the secular establish and its changing opinions related to Islam.

As a consequence, in the light of the explanations above, it seems that in Turkey, Islamism has been something beyond the economic interests and cultural demands of one social group. These given things cannot alone make this religiously-conservative group political, considering the historical-political background of Islamism, and the politicization of Islam by different groups and actors -the state or the right-wing politics-as a means of culturally and morally social cohesion or cement and politically and symbolically legitimacy. As a matter of fact, particularly, the politicization of Islam has shown us that there is a historical-political Islamism in Turkey. In that politicization, Islam has been a significant political-ideological factor in the context of either creating a coherent collectivity in moral and cultural sense or providing a basis for legitimacy of the dominant classes in the politicization processes of religion. What also creates a historical-political Islamism has been such an Islam appearing as a fundamental political and ideological element for both the right-wing politics and the secular establishment in Turkish political history. However, contrary to this, the interviewees have made an analysis and debate of

Islamism and the JDP grounded on a historical-social Islamism, without dealing with the political and ideological importance of Islam, and its politicization processes.

In the consideration of the analysis and debate by the interviewees, I will basically focus on the foregoing intellectual groups' arguments and assumptions concerning Turkish Islamism and the JDP politics. Besides, regarding to these argument and assumptions, I will address what kind of an approach they had when defining Islamism and the JDP, and positioning them in Turkish political spectrum. In doing this, I will examine the kind of conceptual framework and definitions they used and how they discussed this political current by looking into which factors or variables. However, more importantly, I will argue that there is a description of Islamism commonly shared by them in analyzing this political movement and party. This description will be termed as historical-social Islamism, which is grounded on two fundamental social variables, culture and economy, and the political cleavage mentioned above. Particularly, I will propound the idea that they tried to understand and explain the transformation of Islamism and the JDP on the basis of such a description. In this dissertation, in the light of the interviewees' views and description stated above, I will study and discuss Islamism and the JDP politics through a description of historical-political Islamism by criticizing the interviewees' approach and arguments. Based on a criticism of the approach and arguments in question, I will point out that the JDP was an important apologist of a historical-political Islamism by attaching new things, such as the absorption of Islam to neoliberal market economy, to this kind of Islamism. I will assert that the JDP maintained and consolidated its own politics by leaning on an Islamism intertwined with the existing political order, which was grounded on the politicization of the moral, symbolic and cultural elements of Islam as tool of a social-cultural cement and political legitimacy, and neoliberal capitalist order and market economy.

## **1.2. Methodology**

As I stated above, this study attempts at making an analysis and debate of why they changed their views and got a critical position against it and its power, while ardently supporting the JDP, by focusing on three main intellectual groups which are termed

as liberal, conservative-Islamist and left-liberal and/or liberal-left. It is not a descriptive study, but tries to make a critic of these intellectual groups' views by asking the question of why. In doing this, it aims at putting forward a historical perspective by considering the perspective, definitions and concepts of the groups in question on which they have grounded their explanations and discussions regarding the JDP and its politics. This perspective is to involve a large literature, which has too strong academic-intellectual bases, with regard to historically Islamist politics, National View Islamism, its emergence, evolution and transformation, and the JDP, since the foundation of a secular-national Turkish Republic.

The analyses and debates of the study based upon two fundamental things. One is these intellectual thought and opinions, which consisted of the data of interviews. Other is the literature, which has provided a basic for either Islamism, National View tradition and JDP, or the foregoing groups' analysis and discussions concerning Islamism and the JDP. Before the interviews, I made a comprehensive literature inquiry from Islamism and National View tradition to the JDP in Turkey, particularly which included how the JDP was debated and analyzed. The aforesaid literature cannot be only composed of academic articles and studies, but also of non-academic writings, debates, interviews, and columnists' ideas regarding Islamism and the JDP issue. In consequence of this inquiry, I discerned that there were three major intellectual groups. I classified those groups as liberal, conservative-Islamist and left-liberal and/or liberal-left. I made more than 20 in-depth interviews with the names who have a part in the groups above. When choosing these names, their distinguishing feature for me were that they have moved to a critical position against the JDP and its politics after a while. They were rather popular intellectual figures, most of who have been journalist, columnist, and researcher-writer. A few were politician who were among the founders of JDP, and made politics there by being elected deputy in nearly the years 2001-2010. Most of the interviewees had an academic background, and some had been working in university. Among those who were interviewed were Ali Bayramođlu, Etyen Mahçupyan, Nuray Mert, Ömer Laçiner, Yüksel Taşkın, Abdüllatif Şener, Ertuğrul Yalçınbayır, İhsan Dađı, Tanel Demirel, Mustafa Erdoğan, Fuat Keyman, Ahmet Faruk Ünsal, Hidayet Şefkatli

Tuksal, Ümit Aktaş, Tanıl Bora, Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, Taha Akyol, Ruşen Çakır, Levent Gültekin, Murat Aksoy, and Baskın Oran. With the aim of developing a historical perspective, I directed to them various questions concerning Islamism, National View tradition and the JDP, from the late Ottoman period and the foundation of secular Turkish Republic till at present. There were two fundamental things behind what makes this perspective historical. As noted above, one was the literature on Islamism, National View and the JDP, which has a long academic-intellectual history since the mid-1960s. The other was the questions which I had asked in relation to historically Islamism, its emergence, evolution and transformations.

In consideration of the academic-intellectual literature and the questions directed to the interviewees, I aimed at examining and debating the above-stated intellectual groups' remarks and analyses until the end of the years 2010-2013, following the foundation of JDP. More importantly, I researched and interrogated the reasons why these groups have taken a critical stance against the JDP and its power after a certain period. Actually, there were two concrete situations underlying such a research and interrogation. One was these intellectual groups' supports and pioneer roles, whose dominant-intellectual productions, discussions and analyses had given direction to the foundation of JDP and made important contributions to the party. The other was also the critical position and opponent attitude which they had taken against the JDP and its power by completely renouncing from their supports and roles stated above. Having investigated the reasons of those two concrete situations appearing, this study endeavored to do two things. The first interrogated why these two contrary position and attitude emerged and upon what they were based. The second made a critic of these intellectual group's perspective towards the JDP, in the light of my own perspective which was developed in the course of investigating what the perspective behind the mentioning position and attitude change is. For that, the study was relied on two fundamental things. One was a far-reaching inquiry and debate of literature. The other was in-depth interviews made with those who have been situated in the foregoing intellectual groups. The literature at issue, historically since the late Ottoman period and the foundation of a national-secular republic, involved a period

from the emerging of Islamism and National View tradition until the JDP and after. In in-depth interviews, a variety of questions were directed to the interviewees regarding Islamist politics, National View and the JDP period. Thus, the aforesaid intellectual groups were historically strived to understand.

My study and its criticism related to the intellectual groups' approach in question tried to carry out two main purposes. The first was to put forward to these groups' approach in line with the literature and the answers which have taken in in-depth interviews. The second was to present this study's approach that had enabled us to make a critique of the interviewees' approach. In doing so, as parallel with the replies given in in-depth interviews which I made with the intellectuals, who have analyzed and discussed, the study gave place to a broad conceptual framework and literature debate. This framework and literature, which I had stated, shaped around the replies given to my questions. They formed a basis for the interviewees' supports, intellectual contributions and/or productions, and later on, their criticisms and counter-position. My interest either in those intellectual groups or the change appearing in their views allowed this study to put forward its own perspective and/or approach. In the light of the interviewees' replies, thus, it was shown how the intellectual groups developed and presented an approach to the JDP and its politics, on the basis of the conceptual framework and literature discussed hand in hand with the interviewees' arguments. Starting from here, it was propounded what this study's approach historically is concerning Islamism, National View and the JDP.

Also, generally, I did not entered to in detailed explain what they exactly expressed when labelling the intellectual groups as liberal, conservative-Islamist and left-liberal or liberal-left. The reason was I had made such a labelling over common concepts, definitions, assertions, and viewpoints existing in those groups, by considering the discussions which these intellectual groups made in the literature. However, in the context of a political belonging or identity, we saw that the names, who I interviewed, have been publicly defined as liberal, conservative-Islamist, and left-liberal or liberal-left. Strictly speaking, this situation provided that I felt myself more comfortable when labelling the interviewees in this manner. Nevertheless, before starting to the interview, some interviewees asked me what I meant whilst expressing

these groups as liberal, conservative-Islamist and left-liberal or liberal-left. Once again, I remember to have made an explanation similar to above.

I preferred in-depth interview as data collection tool based semi-structured interview form. This method interview is one of data collection tools to be commonly used in qualitative research. It is defined as “conversation with a purpose.” It reconsiders fundamental process through which knowledge about any issue “is constructed in human interaction.” (Legard, Keegan and Ward, 2003: 138) As one of qualitative data collection tools, in-depth interview gives us rich and descriptive data regarding to interviewee’s perceptions, attitudes, conceptual discussions, concepts and classifications, and unfolding complex processes. When using this data collection tool, I asked interviewees open-ended questions, such as “what do you think about? could you tell me how you understand and explain the JDP politics and Islamism in Turkey? What is this politics and Islamism according to you? Based on these questions, I tried to show what kind of an approach the interviewees had when analyzing and discussing Islamism and the JDP. Starting from this approach, I strived to put forward this study’s description of Islamism and to explain the JDP politics and its Islamism. Such a description, at the same time, formed a basis for critic of the liberal approach, which laid the bases of the above-mentioned intellectual groups’ description of Islamism.

### **1.3. Organization of the Study**

In the following chapter, I focus on Islam and Islamism, the difference between them, and their historical-intellectual origins. First of all, I point to a distinction between these two concepts, and later on, attempt at conceptually defining them. I debate their historical and intellectual background in order to show how this conceptual differentiation arose. In consideration of this background, I return to more current discussions with regard to the concept Islamism. These discussions are majorly important because of giving a clue about how certain intellectual groups, termed liberal, conservative-Islamist and leftist-liberal and/or liberal-leftist, addressed and debated Islamism and the JDP in Turkey. Among those discussions are two prominent scholars, Asaf Bayat and Oliver Roy, with definitions and

conceptualizations concerning Islamism in recent years. I examine their fundamental works which presented new arguments concerning how Islamism changed and transformed. I strive to show the foregoing intellectual groups' theoretical perspective regarding Islamism by dealing with these two scholars in conjunction with the interviewees who I selected to interview in those groups. Following that, I indicate this study's theoretical perspective related Islamism. This perspective is based upon Bassam Tibi's approach, which is interested in how Islam is politicized with moral, symbolic and cultural elements, and also draws attention to the politicization of Islam. I define this approach. It also contributes to re-contextualizing Islamism in Turkey.

In the third chapter, I examine the liberal approach in company with the interviewees' replies to the questions. It has strong academic-intellectual bases and has formed a dominant literature on Islamism and the JDP, since the late Ottoman period and the foundation of a secular-national republic in Turkey. I historically discuss this literature, and try to put forward the relationship between it and the interviewees on the basis of their answers. As stated above, this forms the academic-intellectual aspect of the historical perspective. It also seem that the aforementioned literature provides a basis for the debates of the intellectual groups in the post-1980 Turkey who I interviewed. We see this in the next chapter.

In the fourth chapter, I analyze the interviewees' views and arguments that underlie their debates regarding the JDP. I address how the interviewees historically described Islamism in the light of the answer which they gave to the questions, since it has formed a basis for their analyses of the JDP. Basically, I explain the interviewees' approach to Islamism and the JDP in Turkey by considering their discussions and assertions during interview. I concentrate on this approach's description of Islamism.

In the fifth chapter, in consideration of the interviewees' description of Islamism and the literature upon which they based their own description, I present this study's perspective concerning Islamism and the JDP. It is a perspective underlying the study's description of Islamism. It also provides a basis for the critic of the interviewees' approach. It focuses on the politicization of Islam in Turkish political

history and debates how Islam has been politicized in historical-political processes. In that chapter, I try to make a description of Islamism based on ideological and political structures existing within these processes. This description contributes to understand and explain the JDP politics, and Islamism laying the base of this politics.

## CHAPTER 2

### A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION: ISLAMISM

#### 2.1. Introduction

This chapter aims at conducting a conceptual debate with regard to Islamism as a political current, which has risen in the world and Turkey. I will point to two situations about the concept in this debate. One will be more classical definitions of Islamism that consists of older debates with historical roots since its emergence. The other is more current definitions made in recent years. I will separate some notions from one another to be more understandable when making these definitions. For example, one of them is Islam and Islamism. In doing this, I will state that it is necessary to make distinction between these two concepts. This distinction will be not only between the concepts stated. The same concepts will be seen to have different definitions in themselves. For instance, one of main concepts, Islamism is one of them. It does not express same thing for all. Some see Islamism as a secular ideology formulated to solve problems emerging in modern world, whereas others identify Islamism with Jihadism or reactions. On the whole, it means politicizing Islam, and is promising an alternative political order. This is same for the definitions made to put forward the distinction between Islamism and Islam. For, Islam does not connote Islamism as a political project. It is just a religion on its own. As for Islamism, it would be a modern political ideology. However, for some Muslims, the term at issue had been essentially produced by West. Accordingly, they would assert that “there is no Islamism, only Islam”. At this point, Fuller remarks that, in spite of being ‘only Islam’, Islam has had a great deal of forms, consisting of more modern interpretations and practices related to politics (Fuller, 2003: 52). Therefore, neither Islam nor Islamism conceptually express same thing. This even shows us how

concepts have been differently defined and conceptualized from certain standpoints. These draw certain road map concerning one issue discussed. Moreover, they invent new concepts to elucidate and conceive the issue, and thus attempt at making new definitions through the concepts in question. In the case of Islamism, these new concepts and definitions would more come into prominence. Among them would be particularly some remarkable concepts and definitions, like ‘the failure of political Islam’, post-Islamism, or ‘globalized Islam’. These fundamentally put forward a conceptual framework in order to understand how Islamism or political Islam has transformed and reshaped at present. For this reason, it is indispensable to form a conceptual framework in order to explain what and why we would like to address and how we will define that.

Drawing a conceptual framework is also of vital importance to explain and understand the interviewees’ views, considering the significance of conducting a debate over certain concepts and definitions. This conceptual debate will at the same time put forward what kind of a perspective the interviewees had when analyzing Islamism and the JDP in Turkey. They express their views according to the position which they have gotten position. I have classified those interviewees as liberal, leftist-liberal and/or liberal-leftist, and conservative-Islamist. There have been a good many common points in the arguments of Turkish Islamism and the JDP politics which they made. Put it another way, their perspective, which they have ground on their discussions, have had lots of similarities. These similarities are to, I think, originate from the definitional and conceptual frameworks upon which they have drawn. This framework is to be more relied on Oliver Roy and Asef Bayat’s assertions, two popular scholars known with their studies on religion, Islam, Islamism, secularization, and so on in recent years. Later on, I will in detail discuss both Roy and Bayat’ opinions, under the titles, respectively, “‘Globalized Islam’: The end of Political Islam?” and “Post-Islamism”, in this section.

The interviewees have also used these kind of concepts and definitions, without directly referring to Roy and Bayat. It seems that they have had a more historical-social viewpoint with regard to Turkish Islamism by basing on a society-centered perspective that lies behind two scholars’ remarks. They have spoken of many

changes and transformations in the religiously-conservative social groups, ranging from economy, culture education, and individualization to new social movements. Furthermore, some have expressed that Islamism ended and a new political-ideological orientation has started along with the JDP.

Taking into account all these debates of the interviewees, it appears that they have made a discussion related to Islamism and the JDP on the basis of certain definitions and conceptualizations. These would make an important contribution to a conceptual framework on which they have based their own perspective. This conceptual framework has, I think, mainly shaped around Roy and Bayat's arguments. I will criticize these arguments not able to explain and understand Islamism and the JDP in Turkey. Another reason of the criticism is that the interviewees have based their own analyses and perspective concerning Turkish Islamism and the JDP politics upon these two scholars' assertions.

However, some concepts or conceptualizations can be sometimes insufficient to explain a fact or situation since they have been attempt at explaining only certain case. For, they are sometimes concepts which have been created by paying regard the present conditions of any case in question. For instance, the term, post-Islamism, conceptualized by Asef Bayat who draws attention to new situations and conditions of Islamism in Iran, would be one of them. This notion makes a new definition of Islamism by grounding on new social movements rising in Iran. Is it possible to define or explain a new political orientation(s) of Islamism, along with the JDP, in Turkey? Or, Oliver Roy's concept, globalized Islam. It is a generalized concept formed on the basis of the global processes and structures, rather than a local case, such as Iran. By this concept, he means that a new neo-fundamentalist Islamization has arisen, which has developed bottom to top through various networks, associations, unions and grassroots organizations in Muslim societies.

Considering Bayat and Roy's concepts and definitions which I will extendedly explain later on, I will assert that it is unfeasible to understand Islamism and the JDP politics in Turkey. Accordingly, in this dissertation, I will argue that the JDP has maintained an Islamist politics in a reformulated way, rather than abandoning from

Islamism or an Islamist politics. At the same time, I will allege that Islamism has not ended, and has taken other form, conjunction with the JDP. This is because it - Islamism- was a more product of definite historical-political conditions and structures. The JDP has reshaped it, alongside not giving up. Meanwhile, I should state that the mentioning conditions and structures have expressed historically the political and ideological experiences that pave the way for emerging an original Islamism in Turkish political history within certain processes. I will try to explain that in the chapter 5. In a nutshell, I think that it is difficult to understand Islamism and the JDP politics through Roy and Bayat's conceptual frameworks. With the arguments that the political Islamism is over and that Islamism as a politics should be reconsidered with the concepts, post-Islamism and globalized Islam, neither Islamism nor the JDP can be explained. As a result, I will focus on this last debates linked with Islamism in recent years for making my own conceptual framework clear. A second reason to involve them is that they have considerably affected the discussions and literature of Islamism in Turkey. In the case of the JDP and Islamism, most, included those who I have had interview, have largely drawn on them when embarking on debating and explaining the change and the political-ideological course of Islamism. To put it another way, the conceptual schema, consisting of Roy and Bayat's arguments, have, to a large extent, given shape to the dominant discussions of Islamism in Turkey. The discussions at issue, conducted by various Turkish columnists, journalist or scholars writing on Islamism, have given a direction into analyses of the JDP.

All of these above discussions can also be observed in some intellectual groups, which I have interviewed. These intellectuals have been composed of liberals, leftist-liberals and/or liberal-leftists, and conservatives-Islamists that have dominated and shaped the debates on Islamism in Turkey. On the whole, based their perspectives on a liberal approach the intellectual groups have attempted at analyzing and understanding Turkish Islamism, and the JDP politics, by applying to similar concepts and conceptualizations. Among the concepts, which would be used to redefine and relocate Islamist politics and the JDP in Turkey, have been globalization, economy, class formation, education, new generation, woman movement, urbanization, and so

forth. They would be conceptual tools of a debate framework which the interviewees by mainly inspiring from Roy or/and Bayat's theses have used in identifying the ideological-political course of Turkish Islamism and the JDP. By use of the foregoing conceptual tools, in Turkish Islamism would be strived to be redefined, more particularly after 1980s. For the most part, they have pointed to the existence of an understanding of religion not politicizing Islam. They have been one of new ways to explain and describe the JDP's outlook on Islam. What is more, they have provided a basis for the claim that this party has been a product of new Islam(ism)-underlying conditions. Besides this, taking a glance at the debates of new Islam(ism), which have accelerated shortly after the JDP power in Turkey, will also contribute that we can re-describe and re-contextualize Islamism and its new political orientation in Turkey.

To conclude, this section will be a pre-introduction to discussions to be made in the next chapters, in addition to defining Islamism as a concept and re-contextualizing Turkish Islamism in the historical-political conditions of Turkey. For this, firstly, I will conceptually describe this political movement by making a distinction Islam and Islamism. Secondly, in order to put forward the intellectual groups' perspectives which I have interviewed, I will at length debate their outlooks on Islamism and Islamist politics in recent years by referring to Roy and Bayat's studies. Lastly, I will re-contextualizing Turkish Islamism by basing on Bassam Tibi's arguments about Islamism to make clearer what my own perspective is. To sum up, I will give place to a conceptual and definitional framework for understanding Islamism and the JDP politics in Turkey in the light of these three leading scholars' opinions and debates.

## **2.2. Islam and Islamism**

At Before passing to what Islamism as a concept is, it might be started with a debate regarding the distinction between Islam and Islamism. This distinction is, to large extent, made by conceptually distinguishing Islam and Islamism from each other. When discussing these concepts, Turkish and foreign scholars generally take care of separating these from each other. For, in their views, Islam is wholly a thing different compared to Islamism. As a matter of fact, it is a product of separating

religion from politics. Nevertheless, we must remark that there has been a great deal of views with regard to this distinction. Some assert that separating Islam and Islamism is certainly impossible since Islamism does not, by itself, mean a lot. Others do point out not to be required such a distinction between the Islam and Islamism, on the ground that it is not possible to claim that one has been an Islamist, entirely forming an identity different from being a Muslim due to his/her belonging to Islam. This situation at the same time results from a discussion issue of how two forms of belonging, religious and political, have become differentiated.

In the first place, it should be stated that this separation between Islamism and Islam stems from distinguishing religion from politics. This is because Islamism has been a political choice such as socialism, nationalism or liberalism. The basic reason is that it has been interested in political order, not faith. However, Islamism would not be just politics but a “religionized politics” (Tibi, 2012: 1). Put it another way, it has been usually a political formulation based on Islam. As Tibi has stated, the “religionized politics” refers to an Islamism developed by substantially relying on Islam’s beliefs and principles. Furthermore, in the case of Islamism, it should be underlined that this “religionized politics” has meant a promotion of political order which have had faith in the will of Allah” and not been grounded on a popular sovereignty. As for Islam, it itself has not been not exactly something like that. Based on a faith and moral framework, Islam involves certain political norms and values directed to believer’s behaviours and actions, but does not predict a specific government system. So, Islamism, as Tibi has emphasized, arises as a result of the distinct interpretations of Islam, but it is not Islam. It has been just a political ideology differentiated itself from “the teaching of the religion of Islam” (Tibi, 2012: 1). In fact, one clearly sees that Islamism has little to do with religion by taking a look at connections between Islamism and the political context which it has emerged (Teti and Mura, 2009: 92). All in all, Islamism seems to have been nothing from an Islam politicized and ideologized. As an interpretation of Islam, it has promised a political order with the economic, political and cultural structures and relationships.

Given the discussions above, first of all, it is certain that Islam has not been the same with Islamism. Islamism would be a product of a range of sociological and

economic changes in Islamic societies compared with western societies. These changes of necessity revealed certain interpretation of Islam. For this reason, it is not true to see this as an 'Islamic threat' by ignoring those changes and Islamic societies' relationships with the West and the western countries. Roy indicates that many have interpreted the rising of Islamism all over the world as 'a threat'. They have been also reading an Islam engaged in politics as "anachronism". Quite the contrary, by asking question of "how is it possible, late in the twentieth century, to return to the Middle Ages?" Roy argues that the emergence of Islamism cannot be interpreted in this way. It has been never a political current which strives to bring back a Middle Age order, adversely Islamism has, as he stated, been a modernist political stance and enterprise which had generated its own political institutions, and struggled to carry out its promise of political order (Roy, 1994: 1). It cannot be portrayed as a religious revival. On the contrary, in modern world, it has been a political statement of Islam that refers to a different interpretation by building a new understanding of Islam not in line with its history and legacy. As Tibi has expressed, because of distinguishing itself from Islam as a religion or faith, Islamism has been nothing but "invention of tradition" (Tibi, 2012: 1). In addition to that, at the same time Tibi points out that in both Islam and Islamism one meets with "diversity within unity". In other words, in his thought "certain beliefs and principles are common to all Muslims, but they are expressed in the multiple traditions." For instance, one can claim to be only a Muslim by declaring to be devoted to five principles or pillars of Islam, namely shahadah, salat, fasting, zakat and hadj. But, Islamism cannot be presupposed to be directly associated with those principles. The reason is that "the major creed of Islamism is *din wa dawla* [unity of state and religion] within a system of constitutionally mandated shari'a law. Therefore, Islamism has been not faith but the imposition of a political system under the name of faith" (Tibi, 2012: 3). Despite all, Islam should be something more different than Islamism. Though it give a Muslim the innumerable ways of positioning and formulating political Islam, Islam both "forms the essence of, and becomes independent of all political interpretations" (Fuller, 2003:16). What separates an Islamist from Muslim has been the ways of describing Islam and Islamism. Whereas one defines oneself as a believer, other - Islamist- has been a political actor which ideologizes Islam with a distinct project of

society, and state organization. Accordingly, distinguishing Islam from Islamism would be eminently significant in terms of comprehending difference between those two actors as well.

Besides, there have been also various views regarding to difference between Islam and Islamism. One of the prominent views is to reject a separation to be made between Islamism and Islam. In this view, since the fundamental point of reference on which Islamism is being relied is Islam itself, it would become misleading to separate Islamism from Islam. For, if there is a project of state and society promised to all Muslim world, this ought to be only a project but Islam. As a religion, Islam has lots of things to say regarding how society and its political-legal institutions should be constructed and maintained, and whom should govern this society. An Islamist, -and thus Islamist politics- was interested in explaining and understanding Islam in this manner (Fuller, 2003). Tibi debates by separating those who share this view into two parts. One of them is Islamists themselves. For them, Islam can be never divided, no matter what it has been claimed, such as Muslim, Islamist, or Islamism. There has been one and an unchanging Islam obliged to be defended in Islamic societies. It is a monolithic religion. Neither Muslims nor someone else can reject this view since it has been a true representation of Islam. As for the others, they comprise of those who tend Islamophobia and do not accept “any meaningful diversity” in Islam. The apologists of this idea claims that there has been no Islamism separated from Islam, but rather a global “Islamic threat” (Tibi, 2012:11). This perception of threat is not groundless, and has been supported in various ways. Yet more, it has been promoted by some debates, intellectual or political, being made concerning Middle Eastern societies, and has been sometimes support as a political material able to be used for domestic politics in the West (Teti and Mura, 2009: 92). Hence, this view has been shared by all, whether Islamists or Western scholars and intellectuals. Moreover, they have fed each other through their own arguments. The arguments at issue have paved way for being set up a contrast between Islamic and Western societies. This contrast has appeared more in the form of the West and the East, or more precisely Islam and Christian West. This has been only thing that an Islamist politics would desire. For, generally speaking, Islamic societies’ stances

against West and westernization have formed the bases of such politics. The struggle that they would politically continue has been directly concerned with civilization<sup>6</sup>. Their aim has been to build up a civilization based on Islam's principles and values. Laying the foundation of such a civilization, Islam at the same time provides a basic for political, economic and cultural structures capable of leading all the world and making Islamization successful. It has been the underlying reason of achievements and victories gained in Muslim societies (Ranke, 2000: 495). In the line with the aim in question, the leading leaders of Islamist movements have criticized the West and its superiority from such viewpoint more grounded on civilization, rather than political goals (Tibi, 2001: 92). This idealized aim cannot be actualized by using Islam towards political goals and ideologizing it. So, there should be no conceptual separation in the form of Islam and Islamism, and cannot be as well. What underlies the base of civilization has been only Islam. It has been an essential view that advocates and underlines Islam's unity and oneness by leaving the conceptual differentiation between Islam and Islamism aside. According to this view, if there was such a distinction, it would cause a fragmentation, division, and conflict, and even polarization among Muslims, and in Islamic societies. For this reason, the Islam ought to be an essential element integrating and bringing all Muslims together around the world, as different from Islamism. Islam, of course, as a religion has had many distinct meanings for all believers and satisfied numerous needs, ranging from cultural, moral, juridical or psychological ones, to political and ideological ones as an essential tool of legitimacy in Muslim societies. By the same token, one cannot, too, express same things when speaking of Islam and Islamism. This is because what it awakens in our minds is that it has been a politicized religion or "religionized

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<sup>6</sup> Pan-Islamism is one of notable concepts required to be considered in discussions upon civilizations. This concept means 'unity of Islam' or 'Islamic union'. It is an important argument for applying to frame and embody Islamic civilization. For more detailed debates, included both civilization, Pan-Islamism and Turkey, see Bassam Tibi, *Islam between Culture and Politics*, New York: Palgrave, (2001): 84-115, Yıldız Atasoy, *Turkey, Islamists and Democracy: Transition, Globalization in Muslim State*, New York: I.B. Tauris Publications, (2005): 126, Mümtaz Er Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, İstanbul: İletişim, (1991): 197-243, Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (1990):248-303, Leopold Von Ranke, "The Sources of Islamic Civilization", within *The Cambridge History of Islam: Islamic Society and Civilization* (vol. 2B), P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (edit.), New York: Cambridge University Press, (2000): 469-510, Claude Cahen, "Economy, Society, Institutions", within *The Cambridge History of Islam: Islamic Society and Civilization* (vol. 2B), P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (edit.), New York: Cambridge University Press, (2000): 511-538

politics”, as Tibi has stated. Islamism presents an ideological-political framework for the supporters by politicizing Islam, in sense of shaping an alternative political order for Muslim societies. So, with modern sense, it is a political ideology that takes the suffix “ism”, as in fascism, nationalism or Marxism (Tibi, 2012). Taking into account all these points as regards Islamism, the idea that there has been a difference between these two concepts considerably matters in terms of redescribing and recontextualizing Islamism within the present conditions. This idea makes the issue relevant to the distinction between these two concepts more comprehensible. Starting from this idea, we express Islamism as the politicization of religion and a way of politically interpreting Islam.

### **2.3. Islamism: The Definition, the Historical-Intellectual Roots, and the Re-contextualizing of Islamism in Turkey**

There will be a brief discussion on an introductory basis which expresses what has been implied with Islamism for being the next discussions more understandable. This introduction, which asks the question of what is Islamism?, will be concerned with conceptually just defining Islamism. It will try to show how Islamism as a political current has been framed and positioned according to other political positions, such as nationalism, conservatism or socialism, and so on. Actually, as in the debate between Islam and Islamism above, this definition also gives us a general draft concerning whether or not Islamism separates from Islam as a religion. It will be a short introduction providing a basis for the next discussions. In this place, we will conduct a similar one to the former discussion between Islam and Islamism, by embarking on defining Islamism as only a concept.

To start with, it will be needed to look at this concept’s historical and intellectual roots which provide opportunity to make such a definition, when attempting at defining Islamism. We see that the concept Islamism has had a long historical and intellectual past as a product of certain historical, social and political conditions. Some asserted that this past had created a tradition, which was maintained for the

centuries, with the emergence of Islam as a faith<sup>7</sup>. For this reason, in explaining reasons why the historical and intellectual past emerged and how it was built up, it will be firstly necessary to consider that Islamism shaped within which historical-social conditions. Once, this past is initiated with a period when Islam itself started politicizing and referring to itself as an ideological framework. The politicization and ideologization of Islam begun in the early nineteenth centuries. In the early 1900s, a period when the West started to gain a great strength with institutions and military technologies, Islamism had been asserted as a political formulation on the basis of Islam's main principles and historical experiences. It was expressing a brilliant epoch termed as Golden Age of Islam limited to the time of the Prophet and the Era of Four Caliphs, and, with universal-democratic sense, of the presence of a number of institutions like consultancy –meşveret-, council –şura- or public opinion –ehl-i hall ü akd- respectively instead of democracy, parliament and public opinion in history of Islam. (Türküne, 1991: 102). In those years, namely 1900s, the Islamic world had entered into a great period of regression, and were increasingly losing their power and effectiveness against the western societies, which consolidated their political power, and enlarged and developed their economy through the rapid scientific and technological progresses. As a sign of entering into a new historical period for Muslim world, the mentioning years were at the same time those of which Islam was politicized by gaining an ideological framework. In the aforesaid periods, Islam, under the name of Islamism as a political alternative, formed bases of a promising politics in some foremost Islamic countries, included Egypt, Pakistan, and Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, most recently, as an example of such politicized Islam historically, one of remarkable historical-political facts was Iranian Revolution of Islam, which arose as a result of certain historical conditions endemic to Iran, and influenced all Muslim world. Both religious and political leader of revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini was a salient Islamist intellectual providing to actualize this historical-political event. Assuredly, before Khomeini, there had been other preeminent Islamist thinkers that leaded a politics like Islamism and theorized it,

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<sup>7</sup> As stated earlier, those who have this view, asserts that there has been no distinction between Islam and Islamism. The reason is that the Islam was inherently political and had an alternative project of society and politics as in other ideologies. Also, see this section, “*Islam versus Islamism: Is there a difference between these two concepts?*” in chapter two.

included a few significant intellectual figures such as Sayyid al Mawdudi, founder of Jamaat-e-Islami movement, Hassan al-Banna, the founding leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, and Sayyid Qutb, who joined to the organization of Muslim Brotherhood in 1951 and tookover leadership soon after al-Banna's death, alongside Jamal al- Din al-Afgani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Except for al-Afgani and Abduh, others were the leading Islamist intellectuals, even political actors, who had theorized political Islam and put it in a political formulation for their followers. They were the prominent Islamist-intellectual leaders that had undertaken much important roles in the emergence and development of Islamism as a political movement. They had been at the same time crucial influences on the formation of Islamism or political Islam in Turkey. Many Turkish Islamists begun to read their views about political Islam by especially translating their books and/or various works into Turkish. In this regard, for instance in 1960s and 1970s, inspiring from those views, Turkish Islamism situated itself into an anti-imperialist and anti-western political position. Therefore, in order to understand and resituate Islamism as a political choice it is needed to regard this historical period of Islamism and its intellectual roots.

Considering the definitions of Islamism and its historical and intellectual backgrounds, this basic framework will enable that we recontextualize Islamism in Turkey from past to today. In doing this, we will apply to a few outstanding scholars in defining Islamism. Among these scholars will be Bassam Tibi and Oliver Roy. Recently, they have been, I think, the leading intellectual figures over which dispute the historical evolution of Islamism and its current situation. Besides Tibi and Roy, we can also add Mohammed Ayoob to them, though not as important as them. Ayoob will present us an important contribution in the matter of how Islamism can be recontextualized in his book entitled "The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim world". In this way, with the aid of all these contributions, we will be able to recontextualize the evolution and the formation of Islamism in Turkey.

### **2.3.1. What is Islamism?**

Islamism is a modern political movement that has arisen as an outcome of a range of changes which Islamic societies were exposed in contemporary world. It was among the prominent ideologies of the twentieth century. As a politics that certain historical-social conditions have produced, Islamism thus has been never a reactionary and irrational political movement. As Roy stated, it was not ever a movement that had tried to invade our contemporary world. It was a political current that modern historical-political conditions had emerged. Moreover, those who had made contribution to intellectually and politically organizing and theorizing it with the emergence of such politics were also a product of the modern world. They had taken education in modern educational system, and those who were university educated were apt to be scientific more than literary. Most were coming from nearly urbanized families or from lower middle classes (Roy, 1994: 1). As in Roy, similar explanations were by Türköne regarding Islamism in the context of Turkey. First of all, he pointed out that there was a distinction between the traditional Islam and Islamism. Afterwards, he asserted that Islamism, which would interrogate human reason's acts and borders dissimilarly from traditional Islam, regarded them by highlighting human reason and its enterprising force as an essential source (Türköne, 1991:28). They were mostly a modernist reading. On the basis of this reading, this political current was to be a reply to the problems which the modernist historical-social conditions and modernization had produced in Muslim societies. In other words, Islamism was a political challenge against the West and its assertions in solving the problems in question. The actors of that challenge were Islamists who had experienced a modern life and educated in modern institutions. They had been composed of both political and intellectual actors in sense of either leading a revolutionary politics like Islamism or laying the bases of this political movement. For instance, among their well-known figures in with the political and intellectual backgrounds were Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb.

Even if the fundamental reference of Islamism is Islam itself in forming its political claims, it has been usually a political interpretation of this religion. However, Islam has been just a religion, not political ideology. Although Islam, as a religious faith,

was one and unique, differently from a political ideology, Islamism had numerous forms. For, it has been a comprehensive political-ideological framework with religious, moral, cultural, political, and economic aspects. These aspects, which provide a basis for their own political purposes, were represented by many Islamist movements separated from one another. In addition to that, it had never completely vanished, and its message is also timeless for Muslims, considering the fact that it has been a politics inspiring from Islam which has something important to say about the political and social order. Therefore, Islamism evolved and transformed but did not disappear. The reason was the existence of a wide range of understandings and interpretations regarding society and politics in Islam (Fuller, 2003: 14). Islamism was only one of those approaching to Islam politically. A similar situation was seen in the explanations which Bassam Tibi made when defining the notion, Islamism, in his book entitled, "Islamism and Islam". He stated that this political movement was an "invented tradition" by reinterpreting Islam as only a religion. It has been, to be sure, a political interpretation of Islam in his view. His interpretation about Islamism consists of six themes<sup>8</sup>. These themes demonstrate why Islamism has been a more interpretation in political sense. They were the essential themes that had framed and conceptualized by differentiating Islamism from Islam (Tibi, 2012:1, 5-6). In this case, if we argue that what is meant by Islamism has been a more interpretation of Islam, not itself, then there will be more accurate to speak of 'Islamism(s)'. Also for this, we will here dispute over Islamism(s), and deal with the leading intellectuals and actors' views regarding this political current.

What factors did make way for the emergence of a political ideology like Islamism? The reply to this question can be given in different manners. For one thing, these factors indicate a great difference according to the explanations made. Some explains these as a sign of arising a dual crisis, which has embodied both a structural

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<sup>8</sup> Tibi remarks that these six themes have been i) "the interpretation of Islam as nizam Islami (state order)"; ii) "the perception of the Jews as the chief enemy conspiring against Islam, because they are believed to be pursuing a 'Jewish world order' in conflict with the Islamist goal"; iii) "democratization and the place of institutional Islamism in a democratic state"; iv) "the evolution from classical Jihad to terrorist Jihadism"; v) "the reinvention of shari'a"; and vi) "the question of purity and authenticity, which determines the Islamist view of secularization and desecularization." For more explanations regarding this matter, see, Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam*, New Haven: Yale University Press, (2012): 1-30

changing, and the normative claims of Islamism in sense of referring to a distinct way of civilization. For example, Tibi sees structural factor as unrealized development; other, the normative claims, as secular modernity. According to him, the call to religion had emanated from this dual crisis associated with secular modernity and unsuccessful development. (Tibi, 2012: 2) The failed development was a result of fact that other three political alternatives could not carry out a great progress in Muslim societies, which would be termed as nationalism, capitalism and socialism (Fuller, 2003: 15). What is implied by other factor, namely secular modernity, is that in the Islamic political thought there has been no distinction between the religious and political order whereas state and religion are institutions separated from each other in a secular modernity (Roy, 1994: 13; Tibi, 2012: 3). The first was a failure of modern political ideologies. On this point, for example, Roy suggests that the decline of Soviet Union and socialist bloc caused that Islam became a dominant force in the Muslim world and was a strong political alternative which had mobilized masses in Islamic societies since the Third world had been in crisis. (Roy, 1994: 6). Likewise, Fuller does argue that Islamism were an unrivalled political movement in those societies, on ground that the foregoing modern ideologies had not thoroughly been able to penetrate into Islamic world (Fuller, 2003: 15). Thus, it had become a predominant political movement in the Islamic World, on account of particularly other political ideologies' ineffective interferences. It was a new political force that was shaping political structures, actors, and relationships in this world. In the rise of Islamism, these factors had played a significant role.

As regards the definitions of Islamism, we bear witness that there have been necessarily plenty of definitions of Islamism. Although dissimilarities in the definitions, one sees that these definitions have had certain common points. Before passing to them, we can give place a few definitions of Islamism. However, it should be underlined that Islamism has borne a great resemblance to other modern ideologies by taking the suffix 'ism', for instance, like adding an 'ism' to Marx. Above all, it refers to an idea of Islam politicized by using religion as a way of articulating political interests incompatible with Islamic faith. Termed as Islamism,

“this political religion becomes a means for the pursuit of nonreligious ends”. It is a political interpretation of Islam. Basically, its emphasis has been on political order. This resulting order is a political-legal organization grounded on shari'a bases. For that reason, Islamism has become prominent with defining itself as an ideology which combines religion and state in a shari'a-based political order (Tibi, 2012: 2, 7). It has been a political current that purposes to extensively transform politics and society according to Islam's bases. Those who would actualize this transformation have been Islamists themselves, taking the lead to this political movement. They have aimed at the Islamization of state and society, which expresses fundamentally a return to a more socially and morally just life/order (Teti and Mura, 2009: 103). As an ideology, therefore, Islamism basically makes reference to the political use of Islam with this worldly-oriented rational arguments and goals in weberian sense for transforming the existing social-political structure and relationships. Thus, it has been predominantly a sum of ideological-political rational aims designed by idealizing Islam.

This political current restructured Islam as a worldview just as it was in other western-contemporary ideologies. It did not seek an accuracy or justification in a transcendental entity and accept the existence of a transcendental force able not to be rationalized. This is because Islamism was in search for a rational justification and legitimacy. It advocated the claim that the Islam had been this worldly-oriented religion based on reason compatible with the paradigms of our epoch. Differentiated from the traditional Islam in line with the other-world faith, the ideologization of Islam was highly coherent with this world. In it, this understanding of the other-world had lost its importance, and Islam had ever-increasingly secularized. (Türküne, 1991: 26-27). So, produced from a rationalized-secularized religion in political sense, Islamism was a new expression of political unity and solidarity in Muslim societies in this world against other modern political ideologies. For the realization of this unity and solidarity, the building of community has been possible by taking another form in an Islamist ideology. Just as nationalism created a collectivity based on nation, Islamism tried to build a collectivity that all believers integrated under the Islamic norms and principles. The name of that faithful community was umma, but,

as Tibi stated, in an Islamist ideology, this idea of umma became different from classical Islamic umma which expresses a “‘super-tribe’ uniting various tribes within a ‘federation of tribes’ in the direction of the purposes of prayer”, along with not being political. Quite contrary, in Anderson's words, with modern sense, an Islamic umma was “clearly political, and ‘imagined community’” (Tibi, 2012: 4). With this, Islamism purposed the formation of an unrealistic collectivity able to build in this world by creating a community –umma- composed of totally believers. The creation of such collectivity was possible by being placed Islam in a more ideological-political form. Led by the political collectivity in question, this political current was nothing but ideologizing religion for designing society and politics according to the Islamic norms and bases.

In Islamism, the above-mentioned design of society and politics made a sense in many distinct political-ideological forms from radical fundamentalist movements and revolutionary politics to new fundamentalism. These forms were largely an invention of the traditions different from one another in this politics. For instance, there were Salafi traditions recasting Islamist politics in a more fundamentalist form, which amounted to return to the Quran, the Sunna, and sharia, and rejected the commentaries which had been a part of the tradition (the gloss, the philosophy, but also the four major legal schools, the madhahib –Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali-). But, on the other hand, there were also other political forms, like revolutionary Islamist politics and new fundamentalist movements, more giving place to right to ijihad, and individual interpretations. They created political collectivities dissimilar to one another. For this reason, there were a great deal of distinctions among them. For instance, Roy undertook to uncover one of those distinctions by indicating a fundamental point which differentiated them within themselves. He thought that one of them was differentiation between Islamist and fundamentalist. At this point, for example, Islamism contained some basic points in itself separating an Islamist from a fundamentalist. They were political revolution, sharia, and woman issue. Starting from the principle that Islam was profoundly “a global and synthesizing system of thought”, Islamists argued that the issue was political in sense of a top-down revolutionary transformation through state power. They expressed that

it was insufficient to exist a society composed of only Muslims. For this, a political interference was needed for the building of a society grounded on the norms and values which Islam was preaching within a political-legal establishment (Roy, 1994: 35-36). To be sure, Islamists' aim was to Islamize society through their political actions in the direction of Islamic norms and principles. This was more likely with capturing state power and a revolutionary politics, unlike more moderate fundamentalist movements that had aimed at Islamizing society bottom to top through various networks from cultural, religious, and educational to economic ones at the present time. These movements described a new form of fundamentalism. Later on, we will at length see this in Roy's explanations addressed under the title of 'Globalized Islam: the End of Political Islam?' As a result, differently from these new fundamentalist movements, Islamism or political Islam was always a political movement that aimed at an Islamic-political transformation top-down through state power. It was all the time in a struggle to transform state and society by directly interfering into political-social life. (Roy, 1994: 36 and Roy, 2004). So, Islamism was a political current in search of a top-down political-social transformation by applying to the state apparatuses. The transforming force was Islamists themselves arising as the political agent of Islamism. The political revolution was essential for the transformation of society and state organization.

Considering all these views with regard to Islamism as a concept, it can be said to be a modern, historical and political notion that interpreted Islam ideologically and politically. As an ideological and political interpretation of Islam, the term Islamism was not just used to define this politics. At the same time, political Islam was there used as well. However, those concepts did sometimes not express same things. The reason was that Islamism was expressing 'a new form of the activist Islam', whereas political Islam evoked 'a failed project' (Oliver Roy, cited by Mozaffari, 2007: 19). Roy made such a distinction between two concepts. We can understand this distinction in the light of Roy's new conceptual debates reframing Islamic movements and groups in a globalized world (Roy, 2004). With that distinction, he intended that Islamism expressed a -new- situation portrayed as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, group, and organizations that pursued

political objectives.” In that definition, it was a political thing that “provided responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations, which rested on reappropriated, reinvented concepts, borrowed from the Islamic tradition.” (Ayooob, 2008: 2) Bearing all these explanations about Islamism or political Islam in mind, as Mozaffari stated in his extensive definition of Islamism, as a political movement Islamism was always a religious ideology with “a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim was the conquest of the world by all means.” He asserted that it consisted of four interrelated elements. The first was a “religious ideology”, second a “holistic interpretation of Islam”, the third “conquest of the world”. Lastly, the fourth was the usage of “all means in the search for the final objective”, ranked from propagation, peaceful indoctrination and political struggle to violent methods such as assassination, hostage taking, terrorist and suicide actions, and even massacre of civil populations (Mozaffari, 2007: 21-24). Therefore, this politics expressed many distinct political forms from radical fundamentalism and revolutionary politics to new fundamentalist movements with the different struggles and practices in the Islamization of state and society. It redefined according the forms which it took within the current historical-social conditions of the Muslim societies. As will be seen later, of those forms which enabled to redefine this politics, one was distinction between Islamism and new fundamentalism.

### **2.3.2. The Historical Intellectual and Political Roots of Islamism**

In consideration of the conceptual definition above, Islamism at the same time can be said to be a political movement which had significant historical intellectual and political bases. It was relied on those bases, which was designated itself as a political initiative emerging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In fact, what makes a definition of Islamism possible has been these historical intellectual and political roots. They involve some prominent intellectual-political Islamist leader, who had lived in different times. Those leaders had viewpoints, and definitions regarding Islamism different from one another. They were to originate from more philosophical and political discrepancies. Some stated that these leading Islamist thinkers, such as Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Jamal al-din al-Afgani (1838-1897) and Rashid Rida (1865-1905), had more philosophical-scientific and reformist

views on Islam as a religion. These views had interrogated among reason, science and Islam. So, they had a more philosophical stance. On the other hand, in the early twentieth century, known as the leading Islamist-political leaders, others, like Abul A'la Maududi (1903-1979), Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), were Islamist intellectuals that had undertaken to ideologize it by interpreting and reading Islam politically. Generally speaking, these figures have been remembered as those laying the bases of historical intellectual and political roots of Islamism. They have been at the centre of intellectual and political debates made concerning Islam and Islamism. I will present their ideas incompatible with a differentiation, namely philosophical and political, mentioned above. But yet, it should be stated that this differentiation has not been much apparent.

Approaching to Islam from a philosophical outlook, Islamist thinkers have been usually termed as modernist Islamist (Kurzman, 2002). One of those modernist Islamists is Muhammad Abduh, known as a gradualist reformer and defending some European values, principles, and institutions. Born in Egypt, he was coming from a wealthy family and giving lectures at Cairo's well-known al-Azhar University (Teti and Mura, 2009: 96). He basically propounded that Islam was this worldly-oriented religion, and thus was able to be reconsidered and reinterpreted through reason. For, the present conditions were forcing it to such thing in sense of adapting Islam to this world. In his view, one change, for instance from empire to nation-state in political sense, was not able to be realized by the will of those who had only an authority. Rather, the underlying reason for the change, political or social, were the conditions of the people, the increase in their level of thought, and their new awareness of the need to go further from their present situations and even to overcome it (Kurzmann, 2002: 53). In this sense, Islam as religion was a main tool capable of understanding and explaining the existing conditions. These tools could be easily found in Qur'an, Holy Scripture of Islam. Properly speaking, a Qur'anic interest in rational judgment, along with the use of anecdotes in allegorical or vague passages in the revealed text, opened a larger field to "alert intelligences". For this reason, "the appeal of this religion to reason in the study of things was in no way limited with conditions". Its closest example was law. (Kurzmann, 2002: 52-53, 55).

Therefore, in his theological and apologetic studies, Abduh expressed that it has been necessary to look at “essential harmony of reason, revelation, and individual moral temperament”, not only the compelling conditions. There was no conflict among them, provided that “the fact that man mostly comprehended them in ‘distorted form’ supposed that there were contradictions” (Kerr, 1966: 109). For him, religion’s relations with individual and reason were more important than its ones with politics, state, or government. As in his philosophical views, it was difficult to strive to present “Abduh’s political ideas within a systematic structure”. Moreover, in spite of taking a great interest in politics his early years, this interest had lasted a short time. He himself devoted to writing on social, religious and juridical matters. However, it was denoted that his early writings, which addressed political issues, comprised fundamentally of “appeals for moral reform and cultural advancement rather than attempts at resolving questions of the role of the political authority in Islamic society” (Kerr, 1966: 147). He had stressed religion’s social and cultural dimensions more than its political ones. These had also focused on relations among individual, reason and religion or Islam. For him, Islam was the charged of mostly moral and cultural norms or values directing to individual and his/her actions in everyday life. Man was be able to easily obtain all these in the Holy Scripture, Qur’an, and Islamic texts by using his/her mind.

Another modernist Islamist, Jamal al-din al-Afgani, was not much interested in political aspects of Islam as in Abduh’s approach to Islam. His intention was to dwell on relations among science, religion and education. He attached importance to science, and a scientific perspective, included method, observation, investigation, and its institutions. In his thought, there was no end or limit to science. Nor the advantages of science were comparable and arguable. He suggested that science and a scientific activity had proved their influence and power, wherever they were in the world. As far as it was known, in reality sovereignty was based on science. If we looked at all of wealth or prosperity, we would see that their source was just science and its success. It had grown and developed commerce, industry, and agriculture in all regions where it emerged. This is because the agriculture was achieved only by agricultural science, botanical chemistry, and geometry. Industry was able to be

product of just physics, chemistry, mechanics, geometry, and mathematics (Kurzmann, 2002: 104). According to Afgani, “the first Muslims had no science, but thanks to Islam, a philosophical spirit had been born there. As a result of this philosophical spirit, they started to debate all issues of human and world since they were concerned with science, translating from the Syriac, Persian, and Greek into the Arabic language (Kurzmann, 2002: 105). As seen, his approach to science was immensely pragmatic. It was in general identified with power and domination. This identification was more apparent in science’s relationships with Islam. For, if those who believed in Islam opposed to science and knowledge, they at the same time was described as the enemies of Islamic religion. The reason was that the Islam had been the closest of religions to science and knowledge. Basically, Al-Afgani argued that there had been certainly “no inconsistency and contradiction between science and knowledge and the foundation of Islamic belief. He alleged that this could be overcome by Muslims, on condition that they adopted a view based on science and knowledge and reformed them (Kurzmann, 2002: 106).

Influencing from both Abduh’s and al-Afgani’s views, Rashid Rida would be a turning point in Islamic idea (Teti and Mura, 2009 and Kerr, 1966). He was an Islamic thinker becoming differentiated from other two. His language was more political than others. His aim was to retail power to Islam and resurrect an Islamic one in the face of the western civilization. He had a great deal of writings during the British occupation of Egypt. He advocated an active resistance to imperialist encroachment by suggesting that (defensive) Jihad had to be widened in a way to include defence against political one as well as religious oppression (Teti and Mura, 2009: 96). Besides political views, he had a definite philosophical and scientific point of view as in others, Abduh and al-Afgani. At the outset, he underlined that Islam was a real religion. Put it another way, it did not only take care of other-worldly but also was a this-worldly-oriented religion. It has already had certain norms and rules that organized and governed all spheres of society from political and economic structures to social and cultural ones. But, all these were to be able to realize by explaining and understanding nature and human society. What makes this possible was reason and scientific rules. Rida was also thinking that there was clearly

no contradiction between religion and reason, either in the rules of behavior which they formed or in the material ends to which they led. In a sense, Islam was a religion of both social and natural dispositions. Actually, it was contradicting with no law in society and nature. So, Muslims was wholly mistaken to think that the loyalty to religion had consisted of irrational elements compelling man to error (Kerr, 1966: 156-157). In other respects, Rida shaped his own political opinions in the direction of his philosophical viewpoint mentioned above. He suggested that there was an Islamic civilization, and it was a fundamental task to actualize it for all Muslims. For that, “as in other nations, an independent renewal was needed to promote our economic, military and political interests and develop our agricultural and industrial and commercial wealth.” By that renewal, they were able to create a “dignified” umma (Islamic community) and strong state on the one hand, whilst protecting their nation’s religion, culture, laws, and language, and its national way of clothing, good customs and values on the other. This renewal was possible with the reformation of educational institutions, which meant a resurrection for our civilization (Kurzman, 2002: 78). As seen, Rashid Rida read and interpreted religion, Islam, from a philosophical-scientific and political standpoint. He had a political project in sense of carrying out an Islamic civilization with economy, politics, culture and tradition. Also, he had a philosophical-scientific view regarding how to realize it. According to him, in order to bring such civilization into being, Muslims had to apply to reason and scientific rules and norms. Otherwise, this civilization was to become nothing but a fantasy without them.

In the early twentieth century, the foremost Islamist thinkers, like Mawdudi, Hassan al-Banna, or Sayyid Qutb, differed from those of the preceding century in interpreting Islam. The reason was that they had been a product of different historical periods and conditions, especially a century which the colonial movements dominated. The originality of this period and the conditions came from being under the British occupation of both Egypt and India. That the British forces colonized these countries had caused to interpret Islam as a religion politically. Islam was anymore a religion promising a political salvation by presenting itself within an ideological framework. One of those providing a political-ideological framework for

Islam was Abul A'la Maududi, who was born in India as a journalist, an Islamic scholar, a Muslim revivalist and political philosopher and the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami [the 'Islamic party'] (Jackson, 2011: 1). He was the most preeminent figure among all other ideologists of the Islamist movement. As Ayoob stated, his approach to Islam was inarguably political. In his idea, the free will by Muslim groups could, by itself, have fulfilled such a salvation in lands, where they lived in. He defined politics as a legitimate tool for "the manifestation of Islamic revelation, and saw it as one way of "the expression of Islamic spirituality." So to speak, politics had to aim at combining "piety with political activity, the cleansing of the soul with political liberation, salvation with utopia" (Mawdudi, cited by Ayoob, 2011: 66-77). In Egypt and India the Islamist movements, including the Mawdudi's political movement were not true to describe as a reaction against British rule, they were at the same time a way of conserving and maintaining itself for Muslim minority in terms of moral-ethical, cultural, political, and religious. They had arisen in the historical-social conditions peculiar to India in a period, when the British colonial power lost weight, included the decline of Muslim Mogul dominance, and the rise of the Hindu nationalism and secularism (Jackson, 2011: 25, 83). According Mawdudi, Islam was, above all, a political ideology that had demanded from its followers to give all their powers to actualizing an Islamist utopia grounded on the foundation of an "Islamic" state (Mawdudi, cited by Ayoob, 2011: 67). A significant aspect of Islamist ideology, mostly quoted by revivalists, including Mawdudi, was that there had been no separation between religion and politics. On this point, Islam, as in Mawdudi, was as a whole life itself, rather than a part of life. It had an assertion regarding all spheres of society, whether economic, cultural social or political. It was a rather inclusive religion, particularly with political arguments. Therefore, it was a more political religion than economic, cultural or social one. (Jackson, 2011:84). Mawdudi also emphasized more political aspect of Islam than others. His main goal was an Islamic state obligated with interpreting and implementing God's law. This state could have been legitimated through an Islamist ideology.

Unlike Maududi, Hassan al Banna was not concerned with Islamic state, government, or/and law with political sense. He mostly took care of Islam as a just

religion or faith, and saw it as an essential source directing to “a way of true life” in society. His aim was to teach religion and only preach as to how to live in society for those who knew nothing about Islam and faith and moved away from “a true Islamic lifestyle and principles” with an orientation to other cultural and moral directives. For this, first of all, he purposed taking a good education in order to show and elucidate what ‘a true Islam’ was and how it had to be lived. Afterwards, he took part in various social organizations, such as Society for Moral Behaviour, an institution directed by his teacher to aim to sensitize its members to moral offences. Other was Hasafiyya Society for charity, another institution which he bore an important part in his goals. The last was Society of Muslim Brother which “he himself saw as the root and forerunner of society.” In those institutions, his aim was to “fight for the preservation of Islamic morality, and to resist the work of Christian missionaries in the town”. These were able to be achieved with two ways. The first was “the path of true Sufism’ –‘sincerity and work’ in the service of humanity”. The other was “way of teaching and counselling, which was similar to the first in requiring sincerity and work” (Mitchell, 1993: 2, 6). He was firstly an organizer and activist, not a political philosopher or even an ideologue. His ideas relevant to social order was identified with the organization, Muslim Brotherhood (MB), founded by him in 1928. It had to be a holistic system with cultural, moral, religious and ethical-political functions covering all aspects of Muslim life. It had to have no relationship with political parties, state, class antagonism, or political power. As the founder leader of Muslim Brotherhood’ organization, Banna dedicated himself to “a bottom-up strategy of Islamizing society” before undertaking to conquer state power, or creating an Islamic state (Ayoob, 2011: 70). With such way of Islamizing, he had separated from either Mawdudi, or Sayyid Qutb who participated in Muslim Brotherhood in 1951 and radicalized this organization with his involvement. On this point, particularly, it seems that Sayyid Qutb was a prominent-Islamist thinker who had remarkable influences on Islamist politics and determined course of its political tactics or strategies all over the world.

Sayyid Qutb was one of remarkable theorists of Islamism, who had exactly embodied political Islam itself with his ideas and political struggles. He was most often known

as one of radical ideologists of political Islam. He took part in Muslim Brotherhood in 1951 after living two years in the US. He played role an important in presenting a theoretical support to that Islamist organization, following al-Banna's death, although not an excellent guide (Teti and Mura, 2009: 98). Yet, he had become the prominent ideologue of the MB in 1950s and 1960s. As one of those having indispensable contributions to Islamist thought, Qubt was among the foremost ideologists making essential contributions to the MB during the last fifteen years of his life (Ayoob, 2011: 73). At length discussed earlier, the leading two Islamist theorists, Mawdudi (Calvert, 2013) and Rashid Rida (Khatab, 2006) had highly influenced the ideas of Sayyid Qubt. Besides such an effect, there were other factors affecting his thoughts, but in particular political views. Those were events peculiar to certain historical periods. They were inter-related developments paving the way for radicalization. One was the process of national self-determination and anti-colonial movements that had taken place in many regions of Africa and Asia following the war. Especially, these anti-colonial enterprises sensitized Egyptians to the international imperialism and forced them to maintain their own battles. Other was the rise of Zionism after World War II and Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49. Due to their Arab identity, in Egypt people were aware of the international support given to Zionism, involving initially Great Britain and United States. As a result of those historical-political developments, Qubt majorly embraced an anti-imperialist rhetoric (Calvert, 2013: 116-117). This anti-imperialist discourse had a more Islamic-oriented way than nationalist one. For, Qubt opposed to an authoritarian and repressive nationalist order, which had had excessively taken hard measures against Islamist political movements, particularly the MB, in Egypt. (Ayoob, 2011: 74). The underlying thing of this religious-oriented imperialist struggle was that he had more politically and ideologically formulated Islam. As a matter of fact, he himself more saw as a political theorist of Islam since he claimed that Islam had been a political religion with the promises and projects concerning political order, government, and law and so on, compared with other religions, like Christianity, Hinduism.

Also, for Qubt, the role of Islam in the state and its apparatuses was more than it was known. So, it had a central position in all political discussions upon constitution, law

and civil rights, and identity issues. Precisely for this reason, Islam had been, by its nature, a 'political religion'. The unity between religion and politics was one of essential principles in Islam. In short, Islam was expressing nothing but the unity of religion and state (Khatab, 2006: 8). It was not possible to construct a political system appropriate to Muslim world, without considering Islam and state simultaneously. This is because that religion had a project of state based Islamic laws. The source of laws was Islam itself (Khatab, 2006). It was a quite inclusive religion that had contained all everything in itself, ranging from social, intellectual, cultural, and moral to political and economic dimensions. The reason why this so that Islam has been a holistic religion. With a holistic standpoint, Qutb also referred to Islam as a "nizam", an "integrated system", or "closed order" composed of the realms of society, economy, and politics (Calvert, 2013: 130). From this aspect, it was rather close to other modern-political ideologies with the holistic approach. In Qutb's thought, it was able to compete with modern-contemporary ideologies like Communism, Capitalism and Liberal Democracy rather than Christianity, Judaism or Hinduism (Calvert, 2013: 130-131). Islam was much different from other religions with promising a political order under the unity of religion and state. The way to realize such political order was passing from having an understanding of state and society. This order was just possible with the building of a strong and independent Islamic state based on Islamic laws. For this reason, Islam was a religion not able to imprison only to morality, or ritual duties, or salvation of an individual alone. For, it was a main source for Islamists to found a state based on Islamic bases. The fundamental point was that Islam had never been, with Qutb's words, a society-centered religion without having a political claim. (Khatab, 2006: 42-43). Accordingly, in Qutb's view Islam was politically interpreted in sense of being more interested in state, law, and political order. Islam, mostly formulated by Qutb as a political ideology, laid the bases of a general idea of Islamism embracing various political locations from anti-colonialism, anti-Westernism to social justice, equality, and cooperation (Calvert, 2013; Khatab, 2006). With different solutions to real economic, social and political grievances, his idea of Islam was the full of obvious implications to the Third World populism emerging. (Calvert, 2013: 137).

#### **2.4. 'Globalized Islam': The End of Political Islam?**

The debates on Islamism gained a new dimension with Oliver Roy's arguments. They discussed how and why this politics had changed and transformed to another form, with Roy's words, neo-fundamentalism declaring the end of political. Roy in depth addressed them in his well-known two books, one, "The Failure of Political Islam", published in 1994, other, "Globalized Islam: The Search for e New Ummah", made first edition in 2004. Firstly, I will focus on his theses in first book. For, this book, the Failure of Political Islam, considerably provoked the discussions on 'the end of Islamism or political Islam?' in both Turkey and all over the world. In the context of Turkey, this idea was differently expressed among the interviewees by alleging that Islamism ended or turned into other political form along with the JDP. They did not directly refer to Roy himself but used his conceptual framework, except for neofundamentalism, and arguments to redefine and politically reposition them when debating Islamism and the JDP politics. For, with a new conceptual framework and arguments, Roy made an important contribution to the debates concerning Islamism, and reframed it, including Turkey. The main argument of the book was the question of "what became Islamism?"

Roy manifested his own thesis by proposing that this political current ended. He stated that this politics was a Third World Movement theorized by the prominent Islamist intellectuals like Hasan al Banna, Abul-Ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb as well as Ayatollahs Khomeini, Baqir al-Sadr and secular Ali Shariati, who took education in modern institutions. In his view, Islamism was a product of modern society, since it was a political movement that its political cadres and masses were educated, urbanized and demanded consumerism and upward social mobility (Roy, 1994: 2-3). Of course, it was a political formulation constructed by ideologizing Islam as a religion. What Roy implied with Islamism is that it was a politics formulated either a break from salafiyya or as linked with it. Generally speaking, as the political actors of this political current, Islamists approved Salafist theology to advocate the return to Quran, Sunna and Sharia, and rejected the commentaries which had been part of tradition on the basis of individual interpretation and the right to ijtihad. To them, this politics separated in three main points from others. One was political revolution,

others, the sharia and woman issue. As a political current, Islamism or political Islam purposed an Islamic building of society and state by realizing transformation through a top-down political action. It was an ideological politics that the Islamist-political pioneers directly interfered in political life and endeavored to obtain state power as from 1960s for the success of a top-down Islamization. This politics was something other than the implementation of sharia. The sharia more often referred to a project than a corpus, described as an Islamic law in motion, but its political actors were less interested in the sharia. Islamism was a synthesist and totalistic political ideology which aimed at a top-down transformation, on the grounds that the sharia could only be established under an Islamic state. An Islamic entity of the state was more essential than a rigidly implementation of sharia grounded on a truly Islamic society (Roy, 1994: 35-36, 38-39). As would be clearly seen here, from Roy's point of view Islamism amounted to revolutionarily transforming society towards top-down by taking hold state power. It expressed the political-ideological formulation of Islam created as directly connected with political power. However, this politics came to an ended. Çakır mentioned from a similar situation in Turkey. He declared the end of political Islam and Turkish Islamism, in conjunction with the AKP and its new political orientation. For Çakır:

The AKP was not Islamist. There were no longer Islamism. It cannot be too meaningful to read this over Islamism. The things that it put into practice in the preceding years are required not to interpret as a hypocrisy, -takiyye in Turkish-. It is not true. Actually, there was a transformation. -Strictly speaking-, there was a search of getting rid of Islamism. For, Islamism had narrowed all everything, -more particularly- its legitimacy in Turkey, as in all over the world. In that sense, it was all-important to cut loose from Islamism, especially anti-westernism, by conserving Muslimism and pietism. Or, the European Union.

To sum up, as Roy stated, Islamism as a political ideology was a modern-political current that centered upon reconstituting a real Islamic society, by creating an Islamic state through political action, not implementing the sharia. The Islamist actors never envisaged Islam as a religion since it (Islamism) was a political ideology to reshape all aspects of society ranging from politics, law, economy to social justice, and foreign policy (Roy, 2004: 58). In explaining Islamism as a political ideology in

this manner, Roy's interest was on "what became this Islamism?", considering the definitions of Islamism above . He also tried to reply that question in his two books.

At first, Roy showed neo-fundamentalism as an answer to this question. Put it differently, whereas Islamism failed, what replaced it has, he states, been neo-fundamentalism. In a sense, the fact that Islamism had intellectually and politically collapsed caused the occurrence of neo-fundamentalism as a new tool of Islamization. It forced the Islamists to express secular or nonpolitical positions (Browsers, 2014: 16). What is meant by the term secular was not the secularization of society. So, Roy described the secularization in question "as redefinition of relationship between politics and religion as two quite autonomous sphere". Expressed "a return to religion", this secularization was a product of being over-politicized religion, namely Islam. As a political current, Islamism played an active role in the over-politicizing of religion with the emphasis on state power, the building of Islamic state, and the realization of Islamic norms, values and principles for the formation of an Islamic society in the present society. As Roy remarked, especially the overemphasis by Islamists on state power brought about "devaluation of religion". So, it was not secularism, but it was a way of secularization in sense of expressing a "religious civil society" based the claim that the shaping of social values under a religious paradigm and the loyalty to religious norms originated from individuals and not from state. Mahçupyan spoke of being a similar secularization between Muslim masses in Turkey in conformity with Roy's definition. However, he differently expressed this. According to him:

In Turkey, Muslims have been secularizing for the last two decades, in sense of progressing, not renouncing from religion. Now, much more who are fasting, but far less when entered into - these groups-.

On the other hand, the use of civil society by Islamists became differentiated. Roy signified that they referred to the disintegration of religion and state politics (Roy, 2004: 90-91). It was declaring the coming of a new islamization under the name of neo-fundamentalism. In this way, Islamism had evolved into neo-fundamentalism, and Islamist actors' interest from Khatami to Ghannouchi changed into civil society.

Whereas Islamism targeted a state-centered islamization from top down, neo-fundamentalism has aimed at a more society-centered islamization. With the downfall of the over-politicization of Islam, and state power, the failure of Islamism brought along a neo-fundamentalist bottom-up Islamization through various networks, associations, unions and grassroots organizations in society.

The neo-fundamentalism has been the new name of return to religion without politicizing Islam. For that, there were three main motivations to emerge neo-fundamentalism. These were “entry into official political life, reinvestment in social sphere, either on the level of mores and customs or on the level of economy, and the formation of small groups –both ultra-orthodox religious movements and terrorist groups.”It might be stated that the situation was same in terms of economy in Turkey. The interviewees generally had a strong emphasis on economic changes as a fundamental motivation in the transformation of Islamist politic after 1980s in Turkey, of course without ever referring to neo-fundamentalism, since it can be misunderstood. For instance, Keyman clearly expressed that:

In Turkey, it became an integration with globalization in the Özal years. Within that global integration, there were a structuring directed to free market, liberalization, and neoliberalism which we have told. Economy and market had an all-important place in arising a variety of fighting in Islam in the context of the National View’s national developmentalist and national structure.

Nevertheless, as a political motivation in the transformation of Islamism, in 1980s, in Egypt Muslim Brotherhood accepted to participate in electoral politics. The Algerian FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) presented candidates in the 1990 and 1991 elections. In Tunisia, Islamic Tendency Movement, organized under Nahda party, undertook to reformulate itself in legal-political system (Roy, 1994: 77). It was not sufficient to get involved in political institutions and structures for neo-fundamentalists. This was because neo-fundamentalists have taken care of dominating all spheres of society. At their centre was society, not the state. In order to reshape society towards Islamic values, norms, and practices, they have set up various professional associations (like lawyers, engineers), educational and religious institutions, tv and radio broadcasts, daily newspaper, weekly and monthly magazines, unions, and grassroots

organizations. They dedicated themselves to ‘preaching’, the transformation of daily mores and values, the return to daily religious practices, and the efforts for implementation of the sharia, one of the most privileged demands among others in neo-fundamentalism. Society was to be re-Islamized through their self-devotions. Basically, unlike Islamism, neo-fundamentalism saw ‘preaching’ as one of the most important tools to build an Islamic society. In all spheres of society, the preachers’ goal was to promote individuals to provide the return to the practices of Islam in daily life, ranging from the prayer, the fasting to the wearing of headscarf for women. They centered on religious practices and symbols, and the fear of God (Roy, 1994: 78, 79-80). At the same time, they encouraged individuals to have all these religious gains in their life. For, a new way of Islamization had no a political project and totalizing view directed to society. It had no longer political leaders and organizations to regard Islam as a source of political belonging. There were merely individual preachers to show and elucidate how one had to live depending on Islamic symbols, values, norms, and Holy Scripture (Quran). Those preachers might have been everywhere, as a teacher in school, a lawyer or engineer in professional associations, an employer in business life, and a journalist, columnist or tv programmer in printed and visual media. They focused on realizing an Islamization by starting from individuals in society. For this reason, they aimed at individuals for re-Islamization (Roy, 2004: 175-176). A bottom-up re-Islamization was necessitating something like that. The aim was not an Islamic state in Islamizing society. For this, there would be civil organizations capable of Islamizing society by creating religious individuals. What is necessary for this was professional and commercial associations, charities, unions and grassroots organizations, and educational institutions (like university, private or public schools) that would get access to individuals.

These religious individuals were the foremost actors of the re-Islamization everywhere. They could attempt at Islamizing society under lots of identities with their different roles in society, such as woman, student, youth, Muslim immigrants, businessman, worker, ethnicity or religious belonging, and the like (Roy, 2004: 38, 41). Similarly, in case of Turkey, Bayramoğlu pointed out that a young woman

movement has risen, hand in hand with individualization and a new generation in the religiously-conservative groups. To sum up, he propounded:

Relationship between individual and identity. For instance, a woman with headscarf, Merve Kavakçı, worn a sandals displaying her foots, sandals sales boomed. All girls begun to wear sandals while going out. These are much important. Of course, they were young girls, not everywhere. They were mostly in universities. How were they getting in contact with young man identity? Where were they bounding or how were they jumping when feeling uneasy? All of them are very crucial elements. It was a story of the social values directing to politics.

Under the leadership of these new actors, neo-fundamentalist movements formed diverse political practices and positions. Furthermore, they generated in many different political forms, ranging from Jihadist and violence-inclined Islam, national Islam, and conservative Islam to liberal Islam. In Turkey, Dağı disparately addressed this. He focused on some political principles as linked with European Union. He argued that Islamism changed into other political form towards new targets and tendencies, along with the JDP. He stated that:

In Turkey the EU politics, the integration with international order, and an understanding of global politics brought significant changes, in the sense of law, democracy, and individual autonomy. In fact, the AKP did maintain and embrace such a politics by considering political constraints in Turkey. We -liberals- supported that.

According to Roy, Islamism left its utopic approach aside by undertaking to construct an alternative idea of politics and society. It anymore evolved to conservatism by abandoning a revolutionary politics. Moreover, it tended nationalism, and leaded a politics synthesizing Islam and nationalism. There was no longer a political strategy and argument to shape politics. On the contrary, there was a new politics developed with more conservative interpretations of Islam that neo-fundamentalism rendered possible. (Roy, 2004: 62-65, 75-78, 92-97). Even, in case of Turkey, Roy asserts that these interpretations were sometimes in line with modern forms of economic liberalism based on individual practices, on ethic and not on culture. On this point, he expresses that the Islamist organization MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) clearly praised the

‘work ethic’ in Islam, and was more Weberian. As a result, this example has indicated us how the changing patterns of Islam were in conformity with modern models of economic liberalism, entrepreneurial individualisms and compassionate conservatism (Roy, 2004: 40). Also, it has showed that individuals had a great deal of social belongings, not political ones. They took several forms from an ethnical-Islamic group, religious-conservative identity, and student or woman movement to charitable brotherhood. With those belongings, the mentioning individuals preferred a soft re-Islamization of their society by keeping away from revolution, violence, and political struggle, considering the groups like Gülen, Kaftaro, and Ahbash. To put it more explicitly, they were in favour of free market and privatization by leaving behind the promise of Islamic revolution (Roy, 2004: 80). Thus, more moderate politics there emerged in tune with these new opportunities which neoliberal-capitalist structuring has provided that Islamist politics could anymore express itself in other political forms from conservatism, liberal Islam to conservative democracy.

## **2.5. Post-Islamism**

The term Post-Islamism is a quite popular one referred to comprehend and clarify the course and development of Islamism after one period, especially the end of 1980s and the mid-1990s, in the Muslim world. No doubt, this is the case for Turkey as well. It seems that many Turkish scholars used this notion as an analytical tool to comprehend how in Turkish Islamism had transformed and evolved. Moreover, some of them directly preferred to resort to that concept to explain Islamism and its political and ideological change in Turkey (Yılmaz, 2011, Yavuz, 2009, Dağı, 2004 and Sambur, 2009). Others have tried to explain it by considering all discussions with regard to the notion post-Islamism, with the context and the case of which enable to conceptualize (Bulaç, 2003, Akdoğan, 2003, Canatan, 2003, Bayramoğlu, 2001, Yavuz, 2003, and Çayır 2008)<sup>9</sup>. I have borne witness a similar situation in the

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<sup>9</sup> It should be highlighted that the conceptualization of post-Islamism, and the views and explanations related to it has taken Turkish scholars’ interest in for studying the evolution and the transformation of Islamism from National View Tradition (NVT) to the JDP in Turkey, without directly referring to the term. For this reason, except for Turkish scholars cited above, in general, this notion has a very important place due to its context and explanations for many Turkish scholars, most of who have studied and debated the trajectory and the change of Islamism in Turkey from the beginning of 1980s until today.

interviewees' statements as well. They strived to understand and elucidate Turkish Islamism, and its change and transformation in conjunction with the JDP. However, its popularity has not been limited with Turkey. This concept has been frequently referred to debate and analyze the transformation of Islamism and Islamic movements in other places, as in the cases of al-Nahda in Tunisia, of Muslim Brothers in Egypt or of Hizbullah in Lebanese (Cavatorta and Merone, 2015).

It is Asef Bayat that first-time used this concept with many studies consisting of either articles or books concerning the transformation of Islamism, Islamic movements, and the change of Islamist slogan and propaganda in politics. He used it to express his own observations regarding the present situation of of Islamism, Islamist discourse and politics, especially in the context of Iran. In his one article, *The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society*, published in the journal of *Critique* in 1996, Bayat embarked on broadly defining and explaining the concept in question. When using post-Islamism, he stated that it was in general a notion which had redescribed a case, Iran, and its new conditions with the motivations, the slogans, the energies, the symbols of and the changing bases of Islamist politics during early 1990s. This concept did not, as Bayat pointed out, absolutely express a condition anti-Islamic; rather, it characterized a disposition that had re-secularized religion, namely Islam. It asserted that the presence and foundation of an Islamic state was anymore redundant and meaningless. In a sense, it meant that the political role of religion, Islam, decreased and delimited. -With a more sociological emphasis- on religion, not political, it expressed an integration between Islam –as a more personalized faith- and individual liberty and preference. More importantly, it was linked with the values of democracy and modernity (Bayat, 1996: 45). In the same way, Mahçupyan underlined this through the sociological changes in the religious-conservative groups in Turkey, rather than political. For him:

Once, a sociological change realized in 1990s. We are speaking of a global and postmodern world. New occupations emerged. There were Islamic groups that entered into all cultural spheres, especially media and cinema. A Muslim who wants to be director, and so on. All these first-time appeared in 1990s. Also, there were those who have been able to get education in different places and meet with varied cultures.

Bayat suggested that post-Islamism was the new name of the political and social conditions that had lead up to arise remarkable social tendencies, and political standpoints as a part of the “reform movement” in the late 1990s in Iran. For sure, post-Islamism was not only a condition but also a project, a conscious enterprise towards forming a strategy, and re-conceptualizing a logic and style to make Islamism superior in social, political and intellectual fields. Neither was it anti-Islam, nor non-Islamic nor rigidly secular. But rather, it represented religiosity and rights, faith and freedoms and Islam and liberty. It was initiative to revise the principles underlying Islamism by stressing on rights instead of duties, pluralism in the place of a singular-authoritarian voice, historicism rather than a fixed text, and future more than past (Bayat, 2015: 44-45). Basically, as Bayat signified, post-Islamism was associated more with whether or not a democratic government would be possible in the Muslim societies as Islamism predicted a regime according to Islamic bases and norms attributed to Holy Scripture, Quran. For this, Bayat emphasized on new political and social conditions in Iran, and interrogated if or not a post-Islamist situation has occurred there by relying his views on the observations which he made. So, given an Islamic state founded after Iranian Islam Revolution of 1979, it can be concluded that this concept was more connected with a wide range of conditions and changes appearing following an Islamic state in Iran.

The emphasis on Islamic state is immensely important because of indicating what Islamism is and under which conditions post-Islamism as a situation arose. Bayat has also frequently highlights such a thing in his whole writings. Then, can be it alleged that post-Islamism was an Iranian phenomenon? As stated earlier, Bayat mostly based his ideas on observations which he has made the mid-1990s in Iran. In his case, it cannot be mistake to say that it was a fact peculiar to there. Nevertheless, I should signify that he expressed that Iran’s post-Islamist experience had similarly contributed to an ideological change among some Islamic movements like Rachid Ghannouchi’s al-Nahda in Tunisia as an Islamic revolution encouraged those movements in 1980s in the Muslim countries (Bayat, 2015: 46). Strictly speaking, from Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (JDP), Tunisia’s Islamic Nahda Party, and Malaysia’s Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS) to Indonesia’s Partai Keadilan

Sejahtera (PKS) many Islamist movements and political parties started to tend post-Islamism. Even, Bayat (2015) alleged that this brought out an 'Islamic-liberal' disposition in these movements and parties from Egypt, India, and Turkey to Saudi Arabia. In the case of the JDP, in Turkey, Keyman defined this disposition as follows:

The JDP has been a conservative-liberal synthesis. That is to say, basically, -the term- liberal means free market. -The notion- conservative expresses the transformation of Islamism.

By this way, they softened their political stances, and begun to become more moderate concerning democracy, grounded more on a elected government by the majority of voting citizens and free elections. They had been fundamentalist in essence before, and devoted themselves to the formation of an Islamic state. However, as a result of confronting with realities of electoral politics, of in search of responding the changing demands and ideas of Muslim majority, and of taking many lessons from authoritarian sides of an Islamic state, most Islamist political movements deserted their Islamic state agenda (Rahim, 2011: 3). For, Islamic state was one of the most essential elements of Islamism. While Islamism was politically and ideologically formulated, the main goal had been Islamic state. The promise of an Islamic state foresaw an Islamic constitution –sharia- obtaining its sources from Quran –the literal word of the God-, Hadiths –the Sunna of the Prophet-, and the Conventions of Rashidum (the era of four caliphs). Basically, the Quran, the words and the deeds of Muhammed, that is hadiths, constituted the bases of the law known as sharia. An Islamic state was governed by divine law, namely the law of god defined as sharia. Its citizens must have been, too, only Muslim. This is because one who had lived under an Islamic state could have been just a Muslim. For this reason, an Islamic state could not be defined within national boundaries, nor could it be organized under the leadership of a race, gender, or class. Rather, it was a political organization established by Muslims (umma). This formed the Dar al-Islam –“the House of Islam- (Jackson, 2011: 86, 88, and 110). In 1979, Iran, which put an Islamic revolution into practice, was a good example of Islamic state by creating an Islamic constitution. This state had monopolized religious truth, the duties of a Muslim, and an ideal order by referring to an Islamic Golden age in the past. Post-

Islamism substituted an Islamism based on such state. That this political current had politically reached to its limitations during the 1980s and 1990s rendered the political and social circumstances of post-Islamism possible.

To be sure, what had emerged a post-Islamist condition was not merely Islamism's crisis in political sense. There were other reasons to enable to rise post-Islamism. It was at the same time something for which some social circumstances paved the way. Bayat stated that one of its most striking conditions was new social movements. When drawing attention to the case of Iran in the shaping of post-Islamism, he focused on the occurrence of some social movements there. These movements were either a student initiative, a woman movement, or an intellectual intervention. In globalized world, they were pointing out new social conditions of the Muslim world. In dealing with the emergence of new social movements in the Islamic world, Bayat begun with a criticism of social movement theories<sup>10</sup>. Afterwards, he propounded the

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<sup>10</sup> Bayat asserts that social movement theories have ignored by regarding the movements in the Muslim societies either as a religious revivalism, an output of pre-modern devotions, or as original and ahistorical fact which could not be studied by traditional social science perspectives. In his one article, which published in 2005 and termed as "Islamism and Social Movement Theory", Bayat has broadly presented his views about this subject. The first point has been modern interpretations of social movements. In those interpretations, he points out the existence of two main views needed to be criticized. The first view to be criticized would be that the 'modernist interpretations' described Islamism as a reactive movement undertaken by traditional people, intellectuals, and urban poor as opposed to Western-style modernization. These movements are defined as anti-democratic and regressive. They were representing an anti-movement and regressive utopianism as a distinguishing element of their own movements. The second view is that these modernist interpretations have focused on leadership, ideology, and structural conditions when theorizing a social movement. They have a quite essentialist stance. They have tended to look at either a structural-material processes, like class, in Marxian sense, or a charismatic leadership and rationality in a Weberian sense. In a Weberian framework, a social movement obtains fundamentally from their commitment to a specific belief system. For it, it is basically ideas and symbols that have forced a social change in the movements. Therefore, social movements can be mobilized by only a charismatic leader who would bring a group of people devoted to a particular idea together. In a Marxian terminology, when mentioned from a social movement, it can be only social classes that occupy a certain position in the mode of production. Linked with a class position, they has been engine force of a social movement together which holding those who have been exposed to same economic processes. In other words, in Marxian idea social classes would be carries of a collective behaviour underlying '*generalized beliefs*' and '*shared values*' as the pivotal axis around which mobilization bring about. Similarly, in a recourse mobilization theory, which centre upon rationality, what mobilizes a collective action has been group actors' rational motives and interests for becoming part of a collective. However, the basic feature of foregoing modern movements are that they have been homogenous and harmonious entities which would lead to a collective action based on collective identity (Bayat, 2005: 891-892, 894-895, 896). For explanation, see Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory" in *Third World Quarterly*, 2005, Vol. 26 (6), pp. 891-908

main argument that new social movements had made a very basic contribution to the formation of a post-Islamist condition, particularly by revealing themselves in the case of Iran. In Turkey, Tuksal pointed out that a similar contribution to Islamism or Islamist politics, including the JDP, came from women, a woman movement with religious-conservative orientation. She argued that in Islamism woman movement was a very significant factor, in conjunction with 1990s. In those years, in his idea women were anymore going into politics under the organization of an Islamist party. She fundamentally highlighted that:

Something was changing, along with the practices, and the experiences to come to power. For instance, the issue of women's political engagement. This was a thing problematic in the Islamic circle. Can woman become a prayer leader, or executive? The debate was that. In 1980s, the fathers could have never permitted women to go somewhere from house. But, when the Welfare party came, then women started to work there and reached an endless liberty. This party opened a move area to women. -So- women's meeting with politics had occurred with the Welfare party. Not only political participation. After the Ak Parti, in particularly the February 28 process, the headscarf bans had dismissed a good deal of women from public sphere. The students who were not be able to go to school, or the teachers who were fired from job, all of them were housewife. Most of those took charge in Ak Parti organizations and the party' women branch. There was a mobility. -Furthermore- in the woman branches, many feminist works were done. Also, lots of works which the feminists had done were contributed.

These movements differed from the former social movements because of not focusing on class position, ideology, or rational interest and motives in quite a few points. For one thing, they referred to a new situation by drawing attention to structural changes in their structure and action. They were linked these changes with structural transformations in society. There were three main points that those new social movements have become different from the former ones. One was that they had had a lot of social bases which overreached a class position. In them, the actors had much different roles, ranging from youth and woman movement to anti-war and environmental movement, and gay liberation movements. The second was that they seemed not to have a unifying and totalizing ideological ground behind their actions, as in a class movement. The last was that they represented an identity involving a wide range of cultural and symbolic values to mobilize a social movement. These

values were associated with those of identity rather than economic issues. They were composed either of a vast number of beliefs, symbols, values, and meanings related to sense of belonging to a divergent social group, or of new and socially produced practices, symbols and meanings regarding to everyday life. What is more, sometimes, among those were even ethnic, religious, separatist and nationalist movements to challenge the legal-political order. (Johnston, Larana and Gusfield, 1994: 6-7). Bayat argued that post-Islamism was a product of new social movements outlined above. It was a situation that had risen in societies which had a top-down Islamization through an Islamic state. In this context, he underlined the changes in Iran, where some social movements arose from student, woman, religious intellectuals, and post-Islamist youth to post-Islamist feminism. In Turkey, there were new youth movements differentiating from one another in 1990s and 2000s within the Islamic groups. On this point, Aktaş remarked that:

Today- the youth's lifestyle which has supported the Ak Parti is not same with the Islamist youth in 1990s. That youth lives in new cafes, new life spaces, and residences.

Following 1970s, in Egypt, for instance, Islamist activism penetrated into various civil institutions, mass media, formal education and social services. In 1980s, Muslim brotherhoods were controlling a great deal of professional associations from lawyers and engineers to doctors, student organizations, and Islamic investment firms (Bayat, 1996: 46-49 and Bayat, 2015: 77-78, 112-158). Therefore, as of today, it cannot be suggested that Muslim societies have no longer static and unchanging social structures. They were exposed to structural transformations, and technological-communicational changes in a global world. As a result of this, for instance, with some economic changes there were a capital accumulation, class formation, and various employer-employee associations. Moreover, there were at the same time many social movements from woman and student movement to intellectual ones. The dynamic character of social movements unavoidably affected relationships, organizations and structures in those societies. It shifted political tactics, strategies and aims. For this reason, Muslim societies were anymore more dynamic societies for which clear the way variety of economic, political and cultural changes, struggles, antagonisms among distinct social groups, as ones in the West. These gave

many clues concerning the slowdown of the political Islam in Egypt in the late 1990s, and more importantly the failure of Islamist politics as the leading actor of an Islamic revolution in Iranian sense (Bayat, 2005: 897-898). Islamist social movements, included student, youth, woman movements, gave rise to changing the political forces and relationships by bringing a strong dynamism into societies. Henceforth, there was no longer an Islamism in sense of representing a unifying and totalizing ideology since Islamist movements have anymore fragmented and differentiated. (Bayat, 2005: 901). These new Islamist social movements laid the bases of a post-Islamist condition. They put an end to Islamism, which aimed at realizing a top-down Islamization by capturing state power. Thus, they were one of the prominent actors that had undertaken an active role in the mobilization of a post-Islamist situation.

Those terms, Islamism and post-Islamism, have been major conceptual categories or concepts referred to understand the transformation of Islamism and the changes in Islamist movements. Undoubtedly, the advance of post-Islamism does not absolutely mean the historical end of Islamism. Rather, it should be perceived as emerging a rhetoric and politics separated qualitatively from Islamic experiences (Bayat, 2015: 47). Its difference came from the contradictions of an Islamic state failed, and deeper social transformations (globalization, new economic actors, new social movements, individualization) which had produced new urban individuals and social actors, including women and youth (Bayat. 1996).

## **2.6. The Re-contextualizing Islamism in Turkey**

This heading is one of most remarkable debates made in the context of my dissertation because I can re-contextualize Islamism and Islamist politics in Turkey in consideration of those discussions. The re-contextualization of Islamism will be at the same time an attempt at conceptually reframing this politics in Turkey. This will reflect my own perspective regarding Turkish Islamism. Considering the literature which has defined what Islamism or political Islam is, we can argue that there have been two main approaches. One is Bassam Tibi' approach, which brought an alternative explanation concerning how Islamism as a political current should be

reframed in his one book entitled, *Islam between Culture and Politics*. He presented a different framework which explained the politicization of an Islam based upon culture by approaching to religion as a cultural system, including various symbols, codes of behaviour and action, attitudes and rituals. Other is Oliver Roy's approach, which embarked on framing Islamism and political Islam in his one book, *The Failure of Political Islam*, one of the most familiar books with the contributions to the issues of Islam, Islamism and the evolution of political Islam. His approach was upon the emergence of Islamism or political Islam as an alternative ideology independently from modern-contemporary ideologies, such as liberalism, socialism or nationalism. In his view, briefly, Islamism was a political-salvation movement which arose in Muslim societies, where Muslims were exploited and colonized by the Western states. Based on these two approaches, I will try to re-contextualize Islamism and/or Islamist politics in Turkey.

In the first instance, I can start with Roy's approach which defined Islamism as a Third World Movement and interpreted it in this way. On the whole, he stated that Islamism was a political movement in the third world. This politics had also some leading leaders who had made it more strong and impressive in all Islamic world, from Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt to Mawdudi, the founder of Jamaat-i Islamic party in Pakistan. In Iran, the revolutionary Shiite Islamism can be, too, added into these, since it shared same views with the Islamist leaders above, despite different from one another (Roy, 1994: 1-2). Islamism, which arose at the beginning of the twentieth century as a political movement in Islamic world, had appeared as a result of some historical and social conditions. It was a product of modern world. It was a rather modernist politics because its political actors shaped within modern historical-social conditions. As Roy pointed out, they had got education in modern educational institutions and tended to thinking more rational and scientific. Most were coming from urbanized families and lower middle classes in cities. They had adopted the values of modern world, especially consumerism and upward social mobility. At the same time, they were living in conformity with a modern life –from movie theaters, cafes, jeans, and video to sports-(Roy, 1994: 3-4). Far from being an irrational and archaic political fact, this politics, argues Roy, had two general

tendencies. First was fundamentalist disposition or fundamentalism, focusing on the Sharia; other, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist orientation, which took an anti-Westernist attitude in those times –from Cairo to Tehran (Roy, 1994:4). With an anti-imperialist and anti-colonist struggle this politics aimed an Islamic state based on basic Islamic sources, Holy Scripture and Hadith, thus revolutionarily realizing a top-down Islamization of society. For, as Roy emphasized, Islamism was basically a top-down political formulation, since it had aimed at forming an Islamic society through state power, from the Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, especially under the leadership of Sayyid Qubt, to Ayatollah Khomeini's Iranian Islamic Revolution. This is because the state was required to enable to live as a good Muslim, and to defend Islam. For this reason, as a political ideology it was more interested in "what a true Islamic state should be" (Roy, 1994:14, 24-25 and Roy, 2004:1). It differentiated itself from other contemporary ideologies with political goals, which consisted of the construction of Islamic state and the top-down islamization of society. However, its most distinguishing character was that it had anti-imperialist and anti-colonist political stance. Because, most of Muslim societies were under a colonialist dominance. It was born as a reply to power balances created by that encounter in order to mobilize the Islamic world in face of a West strong with scientific and technological forces. On this point, in common with Roy, Ayoob linked the emergence of Islamism to the colonialist enterprises. According to him, European colonial power gave cause for the matter of legitimate authority in Muslim societies. The reason was that colonialism had changed whole paradigm and all Muslims interrogated whether or not an Islamic lifestyle was possible under the dominance of a foreign country. Islamist politics had promised to overthrow this colonialist-imperialist domination in the Muslim societies. Islamism as a politics was one of the most fundamental political tools of resistance against the western states' occupation and domination (Ayoob, 2011: 6, 8). As the expression of a revolutionary phase in Islamist movements this third world movement seemed as a way of powerful salvation. Unfortunately, the mentioning revolutionary path of Islamism was a great defeat. Roy expressed it as a failure in Islamist politics. He alleged that, the failure of the revolutionary Islamist politics towards the end of 1980s brought Islamism or political Islam termed as a third world movement to an

end. As a new form of activist Islamism (Mozaffari, 2007), Islamism has passed into a fundamentalist phase, which has been expressed as a puritanical, preaching, populist and conservative movement. This phase primarily purposed a bottom-up Islamization of society, whereas the political Islam had attempted at making a top-down Islamization of society through state power (Roy, 1994: 24-25). From now onward, there were fundamentalist movements that undertake to differently re-Islamize society by rejecting the main tools which the political Islam adopted. It was a sign of the end of the political Islam as a Third World Movement developing in Islamic societies.

Other is Bassam Tibi's approach, which has laid the bases of my own perspective concerning Turkish Islamism in the context of the re-contextualization of Islamism in Turkey. My aim is to re-contextualize it by attempting at redefining Islamism, led by the National View under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, in Turkey through Tibi's conceptual-definitional framework. This re-contextualization will help Islamism as a right-wing politics to distinguish from other right-politics in Turkey. It will at the same time make an important contribution to indicating what this political movement exactly aimed with political struggles, considering that it has been, I think, a more historical-political Islamism shaped in Turkish political history.

Tibi's approach is a more illustrative framework than that of Oliver Roy in defining Islamism in Turkey. It will be one of the basic arguments of this dissertation when discussing Islamism as a political movement. There are two main reasons that I use Tibi's approach in question. One is that this approach is immensely successful in positioning Islamism as a political current peculiar to Turkey, and in manifesting what its main motivations are, when emerging as political movement in Turkish political history. Other is that it is a more appropriate framework to conducting a discussion by referring to Turkish state's identity, and its hegemony crisis in 1970s and 1980s, particularly against the rising left-politics, and the state's relationships with religion, Islam, in order to show this identity issue and crisis in historical-political processes.

Tibi starts to the discussion by firstly remarking that Islamism has been a place between culture and politics. What he means by this is that Islamism has been a cultural fact with cultural symbols, attitudes, codes, and rituals. Although he does not deny that it aimed an Islamic state based on an Islamic belief and principles, his basic assertion is that Islamism or political Islam has been a pendulum between politics and culture. He emphasizes that it has been interested in the politicization of Islamic cultural concepts and symbols (Tibi, 2001: 2). In a sense, Islamism has been a way of politicization being rested on cultural objects. It attempted at doing a politics by embracing the cultural elements of Islam as a religion, composed of symbols, values, practices, codes, and rituals. In Tibi's approach, the use of cultural components of Islam toward political tools is among the remarkable features of Islamism (Tibi, 2001: 2). In framing Islamism in this manner, Tibi defines religion as a cultural system. He uses Clifford Geertz's anthropological perspective to show why religion is, and should be, a cultural system. Geertz has also denoted that religion is a total of symbols that act to form strong, convincing, and long-lived actions and motivations. In his view, it constructs an idea of general order of existence more morally and embodied this idea with an aura of factuality which all actions and motivations appear unarguable realistic (cited by Boccock and Thompson, 1985: 67). So, it cannot be only belief, but also is a social fact that has certain functions in societies. With values, norms, codes and rituals, it shapes human actions and forces to act human beings in a certain way. With an anthropological-sociological view, Tibi argues that Islam as a religion has comprised of socio-cultural symbols that creates the conception of reality, and seemed it realistic by compelling to behave or act human beings in a definite manner. Therefore, for him, these symbols are directly related to reality, not a reflection of it (Tibi, 2001: 28). As a total of cultural symbols, religion, thus Islam, makes a way of Islamism or political Islam possible by politicizing cultural symbols, norms, and practices inherent in itself. Such politicization of Islam refers to a new situation by reformulating political Islam.

The foregoing situation has a great importance in two points for me in the context of re-contextualizing Turkish Islamism. Firstly, I should state that there have been two political actors that politicized Islam as religion with cultural aspects in Turkey. One

of those is the secular establishment; the other is Islamists. Taking into account the historical-political processes (in Chapter 5) in Turkish political history, the secular establishment saw as reply to the ongoing identity crisis of the modern secular Turkish nation-state. It politicized it by working up Islam into an essential element of the nationalist identity of Turkish state. Other, namely Islamists, had two fundamental political motivations in politicizing Islam. First motivation was directly related to the pure secular identity of Turkish state, which had been entirely purged from religion, Islam, in the early Republican period. They aimed at Islam to become a constitutive element of Turkish nation-state identity. The second motivation was that Islam as a religion becomes more visible in social and political sphere with moral and cultural components. In Turkey, Islamist politics politicized Islam through the aforesaid political motivations. For this reason, the politicization of Islam has two significant aspects. One is that it was at the same time the product of a reply to the ongoing crisis of the modern secular Turkish nation-state. Other was Turkish Islamism's political motivations stated above. What is important for two political actors in Turkey whilst politicizing Islam has been religion's cultural components based on morals, symbols, rituals, values, and practices, as in Tibi's conceptual-definitional framework. Another important point has been that religion had an expression of defensive culture<sup>11</sup>. This was particularly the case for Islamist politics in Turkey. For, this notion, defensive culture, referred to a counter-cultural movement that had initiated a self-assertive tendency of acculturation hostile to the

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<sup>11</sup> Tibi does not deny that the politization of Islam and the way of defensive culture, which express the use of intensely religious symbols and codes, is directly connected with the globalized world. In throughout the world, this global system is full of uncertainties on the ground that "it embrace fragmented structures and culture of varied levels of development and bring people of different norms, values, and worldviews to interact with one another more closely." Because, with *cultural defence mechanisms* this defensive culture appears to have begun to get into motion when a moment of despair, in sense of either redemption or destruction, become apparent. This defence has been an output of overall political, economic and cultural changes that the globalization created with a rapid social change, corresponding with disintegration of existing structures that rose from discontent, social turmoil, and the perception of external threat. But yet, what is at issue in globalization has been structures and institutions, not values (Tibi, 2001: 8-9, 79, 103). So, while discussing all these impacts of globalization, Tibi sees cultural modernity as most important reason of this confrontation culturally. In Europe, some familiar events had occurred which came such a modernity into existence. They were Renaissance, Reformation of Christianity, Enlightenment and French Revolution. But, the core idea of cultural modernity is an worldview based on belief that human beings can mould his/her own fate and determine his/her own social and natural environment. It expresses individualism, autonomy of action, the right to criticism, secularization, and rationalization (Tibi, 2001: 4, 9).

dominant processes of Western acculturation. The cultural movement of self-assertion also implied an Islamic civilization grounded on a number of principles such as divine revelation, umma as a community, and absolutism (Tibi, 2001: 2, 78-79, 87-91). In Turkey, Islamism, which has been relied on the cultural elements of Islam, implicitly with the promise of an Islamic civilization, in taking a political position against the West and the westernization, was a product of this defensive culture. Of course, it should not be overlooked that the aim has been the building of a moral order, while mentioned from an Islamic civilization. As result, there was a moral order which has been designed as an ideal based on the cultural and moral components of Islam (Tibi, 2001: 103-104). From this point of view, I think that Turkish Islamism or Islamist politics can only be explained through Tibi's approach broadly debated above. When framing my own perspective with Tibi's explanations, my basic assertion regarding Islamism is that it emerged by politicizing the cultural symbols, values and norms of Islam. By re-contextualizing Islamism in Turkey through Tibi's approach, I will claim that it is more likely to understand the change and transformation of Turkish Islamism, along with the JDP. Thus, I will put forward the formation of a historical-political Islamism in Turkey by looking at how Islam was politicized in the light of Tibi's approach.

The politicization of Islam was carried out by use of religio-cultural symbols in Turkey. We see this in both the late Ottoman period and after the establishment of a national-secular Republic. So, I will argue that there has been a continuity between those periods, rather than a break. One point behind this continuity is the irreplaceable contributions to which Islam has made the state's identity and presence with cultural-moral elements. Second point is the separation between science-technique and culture. With this separation, in Turkey, Islamist politics advocated the West' science and technology on the one hand, whereas it definitely rejected its moral values, spirituality and culture on the other (Mardin, 1991: 18, 119, 135 and Tunaya, 2007: 64). In other respects, Islam as a religion was in a close contact with the state in Turkey, either as a political way of salvation of Ottoman Empire in the late Ottoman period (Mardin, 1991 and Türköne, 1991) or as an essential element of Turkish state's identity after the foundation of national-secular Republican state

(Atasoy, 2009, Mert, 2007, Bora, 2017, Eligur, 2010, Kaya, 2004 and Poulton, 1997). Just after foundation of Modern Turkish Republic, we have seen two points mentioned above in the rise and formation of Islamism in Turkey as well. Following the Second World War, Islamic awakening gained a political form by running late. Nation Party, which separated from Democrat Party called the first opposition party, was a militant-Islamist party. However, it could have never got support from masses and disappeared after 1960. A similar thing is not possible to say for the Islamist political parties founded under the leadership of Erbakan, the founder of the National View tradition. The major political slogan of these parties was generally “morals and spirituality before”. They were frequently complaining from obscene films shown in cinemas, degeneration of youth’s morals, the materialist system of education, and inadequacies of religious education to teach moral values, religion and tradition (Ertem, 2015: 77, 79). Mardin does express a same view, but deals with Islamism in Turkey, without regarding how the politization of an Islam based on cultural symbols and values was carried out with political processes in Turkish political history. He basically argued that the most characteristic feature of Erbakan’ Islamist politics was that it gave an image of militant and puritan Islamist party which seemed decisive to end moral corruption. This image was also based on the respect to older, the prohibition of alcoholic beverage, veiling, and the control of sexual life, sex discrimination, and the importance of Turkish family structure (Mardin, 1991: 25, 105, 135-136). However, as remarked earlier, one of the leading names of the dominant liberal approach, which read Turkish politics upon the centre-periphery relationships, Mardin was not interested in how religion, Islam with cultural-moral aspects was politicized by historical-political processes. This is where I differentiate from the approach in question. For, I do not see Turkish Islamism as a political movement which arose a representative of the religiously-conservative social groups, grounding itself on a number of social factors like economy and culture. Conversely, from a point of view based on a historical-political Islamism, basically I will assert that Turkish Islamism or Islamist politics was a political movement shaped within political processes occurring in Turkish political history. With a historical-political Islamism, I will refer to a political current shaped in the historical-political processes

of Turkish politics with culturalist-political orientation based on Islam's symbolic, moral, and cultural elements.

## **2.7. Conclusion**

Islamism was a political current emerged depended on the historical-social conditions within the Muslim societies have been. It differentiated from Islam as a religion, since it had had a political framework formulated intellectually and ideologically. Quite a few definitions of Islamism were made, and these definitions seem to have had strong intellectual roots considering this politics' historical and intellectual background. Generally speaking, Islamism as concept has been defined as a political movement that aims at realizing a top-down Islamization through state power. What is necessary for this was to capture state power. This politics purposed to form an Islamic state grounded on Islamic principles and bases with the takeover of state power. It was a top-down Islamization politics under the organization of an Islamic state. We have seen this aspect of Islamism both in some prominent Islamist intellectual's views explaining this politics' historical-intellectual roots, and particularly in Roy's discussions in his study entitled 'the failure of political Islam'. With striking arguments in this study and other, 'Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah', Roy substantially gave a direction to the discussions relevant to Islamism in recent years. The debates which Bayat had made around the term, post-Islamism, can also be included in these. Those debates seems to have influenced the discussions with regard to Islamism in Turkey, even if the interviewees, which have consisted of three intellectual groups, liberals, leftist-liberals and/or liberal-leftists and conservatives-Islamists and dominated the discussions in question, did not directly refer to Roy and Bayat's arguments.

What is more, it cannot be alleged that there was only an influence upon those groups. At the same time, it has been seen that these intellectual groups applied to each two scholars' arguments when forming their own perspectives. That will be among my fundamental assertions. In order to make this clearer, I quoted the interviewees' views while discussing these two scholars' arguments. Taking into account their views regarding Islamism debates, especially along with the JDP, in

Turkey these interviewees grounded them on Bayat and Roy' arguments, ranging from the end of political Islamism, the JDP's conservative-liberal orientation, democracy, economy, and individualization to new social movements. I will express these views as a liberal approach in this dissertation, which dominated the debates with regard to Islamism or/and Islamist politics in Turkey, particularly after 1980. I think that the distinguishing feature of this liberal approach was that it had made the definition of a historical-social Islamism in Turkey, without considering Turkish political history and political processes. It focused more on economy and culture, alongside other social factors such as education, social mobility, individualization, new generation, and youth and woman movement, when analyzing and debating Turkish Islamism and its new political-ideological orientation, like conservatism, or liberal-conservative democracy. Actually, given that this approach fundamentally based itself on the arguments in Mardin's article, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", published in 1973, it can be argued that it had a long historical background. In this sense, it is not limited to the post-1980 Islamism discussions, on the contrary it also involves the debates before 1980. We will clearly see this in next chapter. In that chapter, it will be borne witness that the dominant liberal approach on which the interviewees relied their own views begun to propound its own arguments with the emergence of Islamism and Islamist politics from the late 1960s. The post-1980 debates, including Roy and Bayat's assertions, strongly made this approach dominant in the discussions related to Islamism in Turkey.

I will base my own perspective upon Tibi's arguments concerning Islam and Islamism. He tried to show how this politicization was carried out, if Islamism expresses the politicization of Islam. His basic argument was directly interested in the politicization of Islam. He asserted that Islam had been politicized based on cultural, moral and symbolic elements of Islam as a religion. Therefore, the politicization of Islam means doing a politics by applying to these moral, cultural and symbolic aspects of religion in economy and politics. In economic sense, a politicized Islam represents certain social classes and economic actors. In a political sense,

it creates a political identity or/and collectivity. What politically and economically provides this is the use of symbolic cultural and moral components of Islam. In

Turkey, Islamism or Islamist politics had two basic purposes in politicizing Islam with cultural, moral, and symbolic elements. One was to make Islam an essential constituent of Turkish state identity. The other was to become Islam more visible in social and political sphere, with moral and cultural directives. Within Tibi's conceptual-definitional framework, the politicization of Islam has not been limited with Islamist political current in Turkey. In the same the breath, the secular establishment, which has taken distinct forms in the different historical-political periods of Turkey, has been another significant actor that politicizes religion by seeing Islam as a cultural, moral and symbolic tool to legitimate the present political order. For it, religion, namely, Islam has been an irreplaceable political-ideological apparatus to unify and homogenize Turkish society. The secular establishment aimed at two things while politicizing Islam. One is that Islam has been a fundamental element of the national identity of Turkish state. The second is that it has been used Islam as a political-ideological instrument against the rising of the left-politics since the late 1960s, and the 1970s. More importantly, following 1980, it embarked on carrying out some political and institutional arrangements, (for example, compulsory religious course) in order to become Islam more visible in social and political sphere whilst it accepted Islam as a significant component of Turkish state identity in compatible with an official-legitimate initiative formulated as Turkish-Islamic synthesis. I will at length address the politicization of Islam within certain historical-political processes in Turkey, when presenting my own perspective in the chapter 5. With this perspective, I will try to put forward a historical-political Islamism. I will claim that such Islamism shaped a Islamist politics more different from that the dominant liberal approach has argued. For this, firstly, in next chapter, I will in detailed debate this approach, which describes a historical-social Islamism based on the cultural and economic bases of the religiously-conservative social groups and the political cleavage occurring between these groups and the secular establishment, along with the interviewees' views.

## CHAPTER 3

### LIBERAL APPROACH TO ISLAMISM IN TURKEY

#### 3.1. Introduction

The liberal approach to Islamism has intellectually and academically quite strong bases from the late Ottoman period to the secular-national Turkish Republic. Many intellectuals and scholars, most of who have been Turkish and come from different academic backgrounds, have made an important contribution to this approach. The names which first come to mind among them are, I think, Şerif Mardin, a prominent Turkish social scientist and sociologist, and Kemal Karpat, a famous Turkish historian and political scientist. With the studies on the Ottoman history, nationalism, Islamism, and Ottomanism in the late Ottoman period, and Islamism and political history in the Republican Turkey, Karpat has contributed to form a liberal framework concerning Islamism and Islamist politics in Turkey. This framework includes both the late Ottoman and the national-secular Republican period. He fundamentally investigated the intellectual and social bases of Islamism, and, as a historian, studied the historical and social context for which had paved the way the formation of this political current. Other is Şerif Mardin, who had quite a few studies on politics, religion, secularization, Islam, religious order, and Islamism after and before the foundation of a Republican Turkey. He was one of well-recognized scholars in the shaping of a liberal approach regarding Islamism. Perhaps, his one article, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” was one of those in the context of making an essential contribution to the approach in question. Afterwards, there are other intellectuals and academicians that support this approach with their views and take it further. To name but a few, Nilüfer Göle, Binnaz Toprak, Elisabeth Özdalga, Ali Bayramoğlu, Nuray Mert, Fuat Keyman, Cengiz Çandar, Etyen Mahçupyan, Hasan Cemal, Mehmet Altan, and Murat Belge are some of them.

The one reason why I have emphasized these two scholars is that they formed a frame for a more historical-social Islamism with class bases, intellectual background, and cultural orientations. While making such description of historical-social Islamism, the liberal approach, I think, underlined some social factors, especially economy and culture, and others, education, intellectual elites, urbanization, social mobility, and the like. The other is that it analyzed and debated Islamism and Islamist movement by creating some conceptual dualities, for instance, like state-society, Islamist-secular, or secular establishment-religiously-conservative periphery. On this point, for example, Mardin (1991) made a distinction like 'official-popular Islam' for the Ottoman history, 'center-periphery' for the Republican history so as to define this duality, while Karpat expressed this distinction as 'peripheral Islam-caliph-centred Islam' to explain Islamism as a political current. They generally supposed that a conflict or cleavage between these occurred. But, on the other hand, religion, namely Islam, was an important cultural component to establish a collectivity, national or religious, for political actors conceptually created in the foregoing dualities.

Based on the binary oppositions stated above, the liberal approach tried to frame religion as a cultural element by adopting a Weberian and Durkheimian line. For it, for instance, in weberian sense, distinct social classes or groups could differently understand and interpret religion. Basically, expressing that distinct groups have somewhat different religious outlooks, Weber propounded that the middle and lower middle class have been real carrier of ethical-rational religions, whereas with more magical and irrational attitudes the lowest classes have not tended towards developing different religious ideas. He established a strong connection between economic development and religious factors (Weber, 1978 and 1965, and Hamilton, 1995). Or, in Durkheimian sense, religion is a tool of creating a collectivity which shares common symbols, values, rituals and morals. It is nothing other than the collective force of society over the individuals. As a system of ideas, religion is where moral power most explicitly felt and moral and social sentiments are strengthened and revived (Durkheim, 1995, Hamilton: 1995). In the light of these explanations, my aim is to put forward the liberal approach' outlook on religion. In line with

Durkheim's opinions, this approach defined and explained religion, Islam, as a cultural fact with cultural, symbolic and moral aspects on the basis of cultural and economic elements. This 'cultural fact' corresponds to a collectivity or/and collective consciousness in a Durkheimian framework. It in general expresses a social class or economic actor in a Weberian viewpoint. At this point, I must state not to have an attitude against a Weberian and Durkheimian outlook in relation to religion. Here the basic point is that this approach made a description of historical-social Islamism framed with a viewpoint based upon a Weberian and Durkheimian view, without regarding historical-political dynamics, structures, and processes.

The intellectual groups, which I interviewed, stated their views by grounding on the general framework the approach mentioned above, when expressing their thoughts concerning Islamism, Islamist politics and the JDP. Considering this approach, in my opinion, the interviewees addressed the issue by focusing on two basic points. One of them was 'secular establishment', that is the state, the other, the religiously-conservative groups, the carriers of economy and culture, namely society. In other words, these were two main points of the interviewees' debates in order to comprehend and explain the evolution and transformation of Islamism. Besides these, there were education, individualization, new generation, and youth and woman movement. On the other part, the interviewees propounded that there was a fundamental political conflict and cleavage between those, namely state/society or the secular establishment-the religiously-conservative groups. According to them, the basic reason behind the cleavage or conflict in question was economic and cultural differentiation. This differentiation was an important political motivation for the religiously-conservative social groups and their struggles, which has paved the way for the formation of Islamist politics. In the foregoing differentiation, economy expressed a capitalist class formation, the educated-professional middle classes, a new capital accumulation, and upward-social mobility emerging in these groups. Culture comprised cultural, symbolic, and moral aspects of religion, Islam, ranging from piety, headscarf, and religious education to the identity of Turkish state. Based on these two concepts, the interviewees asserted that what ideologically and politically formed the bases of these groups' worldviews was that cultural and

economic background. This background provided a basic for the description of a historical-social Islamism manifested by the interviewees. They were not absolutely interested in how the aforesaid background was politicized in historical-political processes. In the context of this dissertation, here is where my standpoint has differed from theirs. I will have a viewpoint grounded on a historical-political Islamism, which appeared in political dynamics, structures, and processes. With this, I will look at how this cultural and economic dimension in Islamism was politicized within Turkish political history. In the cultural side of this politicization, religion gained a nationalist form and became an important tool of political and cultural-symbolic struggle against the left-socialist and secular politics, and other social groups and identities, like Alevists, Kurds, Jews, and Christian communities. More importantly, especially from the 1980s onwards, it has been a significant means of political and ideological legitimacy for the secular establishment, alongside being an essential part of identity of Turkish state. In the economic side of politicization, Islamist politics, particularly along with the JDP, embraced a neoliberal politics by directing to its economic policies in compatible with capitalist classes' interests and global economic order. Within this general framework, I will present my own standpoint concerning Islamism in Turkey in the Chapter 5.

As a conclusion, in this section, I will do two things when addressing the liberal approach to Islamism in Turkey. My aim is to present both the historical background of the interviewees' description of Islamism in academic-intellectual sense, and to show that this was product of a certain approach, expressed as liberal. For that, first is to be quoted their views in order to understand better them and make the interviewees' historical-social Islamism explicit. This will be also the interviewees' approach to Islamism and the JDP politics, since I will put forward their views within the general framework of the liberal approach. Second is to given place to the literature, which has outlined a liberal approach, in order to make the interviewees' opinions clearer. By all means, in this chapter, the reason why I discuss the literature and the interviewees' opinions together is to show that the interviewees exceedingly made use of that literature, which had laid the bases of a liberal approach, while defining a historical-social Islamism. At the same time, the aforesaid literature

enabled the interviewees to make such a description of Islamism, because of having historically strong academic and intellectual background. Likewise, they have continuously supported and reproduced this approach with their intellectual and academic contributions during interviews. In doing so, I will classify by separating Islamism in Turkey into certain periods. In this classification, there will be some titles which comprise “Islamism in the Late Ottoman Period”, “Islamism after the Foundation of Republican Turkey”, “The Early National View Islamism (1960s-1970s)”, “The Late National View Islamism (1980s-1990s), and “Islamism after National View (the JDP Period)”. I will deal with the liberal approach under these titles in order to make this dissertation’s approach and assertions more explicit. Lastly, I will complete this section with a brief conclusion to sum up the discussions here.

### **3.2. Islamism in the Late Ottoman Period**

In the early 1900s, the Ottoman Empire had found itself within disruptive political events, far-reaching economic transformations, and the disappointing military defeats which realized at the beginning of the twentieth century. As a political current, nationalism and nationalist movements had begun to appear in many places, and the different ethnic groups, which had lived in the Ottoman territories, were rebelling against the Ottoman state. Besides all these, around the world a new economic system, namely capitalism, was rising, and the social classes, which had economic capitals and was termed as capitalist, were arising. With the occurrence of a capitalist economic order, a wide range of colonialist and imperialist enterprises by some western states were borne witness in the world. For instance, the leading European states, notably England and France, had begun to colonize the areas which the Ottoman Empire had to leave with the military defeats. At that time, to all those developments had to be somehow responded for being rescued from the situation within which the empire had been. Islamism had been one of those replies, and the most important. As a political alternative or way out, Islamism, which was believed to be politically a solution to the problems encountered, had more identified with the reign Abdülhamid II (Mardin, 1991; Karpas, 2001, and Landau, 1990). On this point, Gültekin interpreted this politics as follows:

Islamism was a bit more intellectual while emerging. It was a resistance against westernization. It was an understanding that had wished for constituting a civilization around our own –Islamic– values. In those times, there was a westernization process which had emerged along with the Tanzimat decree. The Ottoman was not able to keep up with the world. It was necessary to enter into a renewal effort. However, Islamists were understanding this as leaving religious values. –So–, Islamism had arisen as resistance to it.

In the Ottoman, Islamism had three basic characters, differently from Islamism(s) and/or Islamist movements developed in other places in those years. Following the emergence of the colonialist-imperialist movements led by the western states, one was that the Ottoman state or executives had desired to use Islamism as a religious-cultural bond to internationally unite all Muslims, since the Ottoman Caliph was the protector of all Muslims (Landau, 1990: 69 and Hanioglu, 2008: 68-69). In this case, this politics was termed as Pan-Islamism. Other was the advantages of Islamism that capable of holding Muslims together in a territorial area on the face of the rising of ethnically and religiously nationalist-separatist movements. The Ottoman Sultans, particularly Abdülhamid II, had seen them as an opportunity for the salvation of the state (Tunaya, 2007). This situation had caused an ‘official or caliph-centred Islamism’ (Mardin, 1991 and Karpas, 2001). Another was the emergence of an Islamism as a political current with intellectual and social bases grounded on a class formation (Karpas, 2001 and Karpas 1972). This way of Islamism had been termed as ‘popular or peripheral Islamism’ (Mardin, 1991 and Karpas, 2001). It had an intellectual background, Young Ottomans, and class bases, a new middle class.

These ways of Islamism shaped in a more Durkheimian framework. Quite a few scholars, especially Mardin (1991) and Karpas (2001), interpreted and explained them through a Durkheimian standpoint. This standpoint expresses that religion has two basic features. One is beliefs and rites upon which religion has been based. Other is the formation of a collectivity in sense of belonging to certain social group as a result of sharing a common faith, value and practices. What renders this collectivity possible is religion with collective representations which involves a ‘totality of ideas, representations, beliefs, and feelings common to the average members of society’, and classifies real or ideal things by describing the world through two notions like

profane and sacred. Thus, religion creates a powerful sense of identity, norm, symbol, solidarity, and the like (Durkheim, 1995: 34-35, 41 and Allan, 2005: 108, 114). In Durkheimian sense, it has two fundamental purposes, or functions, expressed as regulative and stimulative. With these, religion regulates individual's behaviours and actions to form a collectivity towards a common belief, symbol, ritual, and values, and stimulates collectivity to awaken a feeling of community and unity. It is basically interested in the consolidation of group, not with the saving of souls (Durkheim, 1995: 421 and Hamilton, 1995: 110). Based on a Durkheimian framework explained in details above, Mardin stated that there were two kinds of Islam or/and Islamism in the Ottoman. He named these as 'official and popular Islam/Islamism'. He absolutely separated 'official Islam/Islamism' at the political level from 'popular Islam/Islamism' termed as 'civil Islam/Islamism' at the social level (Mardin, 1991: 16, 22). As in Mardin, Karpat made a similar distinction either. He separated Islam or Islamism in the Ottoman Empire into two. Karpat defined one as peripheral Islam; and other, as caliphal center, namely in sense of caliph-centered Islam or Islamism (Karpat, 2001: 48). The 'official or caliph-centered Islam/Islamism' was used to refer to very close tie or relationship between the state or power elites (sultans, or political executives) and the politically use of Islam. Specially, Sultan Abdülhamid II was of those who had put such an Islamism into practice. He had adopted and supported Islam/Islamism in accordance with his political aims. In the state or/and Ottoman Sultans' standpoint, Islam had ideological functions to provide social order. At this point, Mardin pointed out that Islam had an ideological function for the reinforcement of society in order to form a common identity and harmonize society (Mardin 1991: 20). One of the most essential features of such an Islamism was the privilege of the state, instead of Islam. In the foregoing Islamism, the state was something more important and irreplaceable than all everything, and what was the most necessary for the state had been its unity and presence. As Karpat denoted, perhaps the Ottoman sultans were one of those who had been closest to prototype of an ideal Islamic ruler, but all in all, for them the state's interests had been more significant everything, including Islam itself. They just remembered Islam when it was required for their own power, as it strengthened the bases of the state and ensured a popular support (Karpat, 2001: 48). Other,

‘peripheral or civil Islam/Islamism, was a more historical-social Islam/Islamism that had intellectual backgrounds and strong class bases as a result of modernization processes. It had organized in society, and was a form of Islamism which had represented certain social groups and economic interests (Karpas, 2001 and Mardin, 1991).

In the Ottoman, when debating Islamism, one of those who first come to mind is Abdulhamid II, since he adopted and imposed this politics towards his political goals. Though Islamism as a political current arose following 1908, the most foremost one of political architects of Islamism was sultan Abdulhamid II, the thirty-fourth Ottoman sultan who had played pivotal role in the rise of Islamism and the shaping of the last four decades of Ottoman history (Karpas, 2001: 158). In the pursuit of the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy II in 1908, Islamism had been one of the most influential and powerful political-ideological currents dominating the ideas of that period. It was ideological because of suggesting a system of idea and faith which had created a common identity, and organized and mobilized a social group. On the other hand, it was also political by the virtue of the fact that it had directed to a certain goal, for instance like maintaining the integrity and unity of Ottoman state (Tunaya, 2007: 1). This political-ideological movement had gradually got strong with the entry 1876 Constitution into force again in 1908. In those years, as Mardin stated, the press had found itself in relatively a free atmosphere. A variety of magazines, which promoted Islamist theses, had begun to appear. *Sırat- Müstakim* and *Sebilü’r- Reşad* were just a few of those. At the same time, there were some intellectual figures, such as Cemaladdin al-Afghānī and Muhammed Abduh, who had been defined as modernists and more politically and philosophically supported Islamist theses. One of those who I interviewed, Aktaş argued that they were two remarkable intellectual figures in the Ottoman. He stated that:

Cemaleddin al-Afghānī and Muhammed Abduh were two important founder figure of Islamism. Afgani had a political aim to integrate Islamic countries and form a united power. But, Abduh’s goal was to educate and free Islamic societies.

Besides those, among the familiar-leading names who wrote in these magazines in recent years were Eşref Edip, Babanzade Ahmed Naim, Mehmet Akif, and Şemsettin Günaltay. For this reason, Dağı remarked that;

In this period, Islamism carried the influence of some Islamist thinkers like Abduh, who had become prominent in the world of that period. It had arisen with the idea of a sufi-traditional Islamism. It was a more intellectual movement not developed in consequence of any social demand or expectation.

They had generally advocated that Koran, Holy Scripture of Islam, was an invariable constitution able to implement for all times, as well as the 'defender' of Islamism. For them, the Koran was a source that had replied to the questions of organization which could continuously come about in two fundamental spheres like society and politics. For instance, Meşveret, an advisory council, which amounted to doing politics by advising, was only one of the answers which Islam gave to this. Also, in their views, there were no contradiction between Islam and science (Mardin, 1991: 17-18). Generally speaking, those intellectuals made an intellectual contribution to Islamism. This contribution affected the political direction of Islamism either. Later on, the influence at issue was seen in both Sultan Abdulhamid's ideas of Islamism and the intellectual movement known as the Young Ottomans.

In Ottoman history, Sultan Abdülhamid II was, all the time, remembered as one who leaded to Islamism and used it as a political aim by describing Islam politically and ideologically. The most important of these political aims was the salvation of the state. In era of Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman lands were slowly being lost as an outcome of military defeats. The western states had started to take hold and colonized the regions where Muslims constituted the majority of population. Muslim communities had faced with the far-reaching colonialist threats of Western countries in international arena. Islam, religion and being a Muslim were, for all time, very significant components to form a common goal and to struggle against these threats. So, for Abdülhamid II, the first main element of Islamism was to object to European colonialism and imperialism (Karpat, 2001: 182). The other component was that Abdülhamid II, who had believed science and its practical applications, was in quest of holing them together by uniting all Muslims. He decided that the only thing which

commonly shared among Muslims was Islam and that this religion could merely indoctrinate a common consciousness directing to a political aim. His aim was to awaken a feeling of identity among Muslims. Islamism by Sultan Abdülhamid II was more symbolic because of emphasizing that it was needed to create an umbrella in common to compose an identity of group. For Muslims, the only way to form such an identity was Islam. For this reason, in order to unite Muslims under an Islamic umbrella, he had undertaken an array of construction of symbolic structures, ranging from mosque, school, barrack to railroads and weapon factories. The presence of the Ottoman state was to be reconfirmed by especially the construction of such structures in so poor places that were not able to build its own mosques. These structure had strong symbolic values and was able to produce a collective consciousness through common values and rituals in Durkheimian sense. At this point, Mardin asserted that the Sultan's Islamist politics had mostly shaped around idea of building symbolic structures (Mardin, 1991: 92-93). At the same time, this Islamism had a more developmentalist viewpoint. It was a unique political alternative that would rescue the Ottoman society from backwardness by placing importance on science, progression and development in the face of the developed Western countries. In this sense, Tunaya underlined that it was a rational, progressive, reformist and open-minded understanding of Islamism, which had avoided from an imitation, in sense of westernization and aimed at putting an end to ignorance, laziness, and economic enslavement (Tunaya, 2007: 9-12, 13-20). Abdülhamid II defended an understanding of Islamism similar to above. As in the foregoing idea of Islamism, he was not accepting that Islam was not a reactionary faith portrayed by Western intellectuals, but rather a religion based on reason, science, progress, and peace. So, he certainly believed that Islam was open to progress and science, and never acknowledged fatalism (Karpas, 2001: 173). As a result of such Islamism, he had, too, confirmed the Ottoman reforms to be initiated during the reign of Sultan Selim III and Mahmut II. These reforms had transformed the Ottoman state by centralizing and modernizing the state apparatuses. He never rejected the comprehensive changes from abolition of the patrimonial tax-farming, the secularization and formalization of education and judicial system to the functional separations between the institutions of government with the declaration of Tanzimat decree of 1839. Moreover, he

maintained these reforms efforts, and had, to a large extent, secularized the system of administrative palace and education (Mardin, 1991: 94 and Karpat, 2001: 168). On the other side, he attempted at depoliticizing the bureaucracy, and tried to raise its efficiency by professionalizing it. Also, he had founded a civil service commission in 1878 and a personnel committee to reform bureaucracy, and lastly he had opened a great deal of professional school, ranging from finance, trade, law to higher education, agriculture, and fine arts. (Karpat, 2001: 168). All these showed that his idea of Islamism had never aimed at the formation of an Islamic state grounded on Islamic law and principles, and did not desire the implementation of a shari'a law. The reason was that he had not defended "the involvement of religious men in politics and government". Therefore, as Karpat signified, it was an Islamism based on uniting the Ottoman Muslims together by converting Islam into a modern type of ideology, rather than the building of an Islamic state. Abdülhamid II had been more interested in a common faith which united Müslims themselves as a family", rather than their ethnic identity. The only thing that he desired was to consolidate the unity of the Ottoman Muslims (Karpat, 2001: 174, 177). When suggesting it, he had wished to try to create a brotherhood of Muslims. He attempted at combining the society consisting of Muslim components under a new and coherent core of identity. It was an Islamism that had risen as a result of the attempts to redefine Ottomanism with the aim to come non-Muslims and Muslims together in a brotherhood of the Ottoman (Tunaya, 2007), and it aimed at preventing to spread proto-nationalist activities among Muslim Ottomans. (Hanioglu, 2008: 130, 142). So, Ottomanism and Islamism were always two sibling political ideologies. They had same political goals to be realized, and were not absolutely two opponent political movements (Tunaya, 2007: 76). Abdülhamid II, making a new synthesis by combining Ottomanism with Islamism, opted to use Islam as an ideology of unity, and tried to benefit from the symbolic power of Islam (Jung, 2006: 139). Lastly, his Islamism was largely authoritative due to not allowing for for the formation of any opposition, and at the same time he had seen all opponent movements as a threat to his own regime. At this point, for instance, as a result of this authoritarianism, he had closed down the parliament and suspended the Ottoman constitution (Karpat, 2001: 182). The mentioned authoritarianism was also reflected in his attitude with regard to civil

religious associations which had emanated outside of the state control. For, Abdülhamid II had always suspected from civil-organized religious groups capable of forming an opposition to regime. For this reason, he preferred to use them for his own goals by controlling the existing religious associations, rather than to promote new civil-religious formations (Landau, 1990: 51). He prevented the emergence of many Islamist movements able to criticize his Islamist politics. Moreover, he banished most of those which existed (Hanioglu, 2008: 140). Hence, the authoritarian Islamism of Sultan Abdülhamid II was commented more as the attempt at obtaining religion's monopoly of symbolic reproduction and thus controlling over religious affairs (Jung, 2006: 139). To sum up, his Islamism purposed to create a collectivity directed to certain political goals, for example, like salvation of the Ottoman state, under the name of Islamic ethos. It was new name of common identity to hold together the Ottoman society by highlighting the moral and symbolic components of Islam. It was an Islamism that had been shaped around the state interests. So, it has been an official and authoritarian Islamism.

In addition to an official-authoritarian Islamism, there was another Islamism that had had further social and intellectual bases in the late Ottoman period. The term social more often means that Islamism had a social base, in economic or other forms, in the Ottoman society. The intellectual base does refer that there was an intellectual-moral group, which formed a moral-ideological frame for this political current in sense of organizing and mobilizing one social group for continuing and protecting its own interests, in Gramscian sense. In the Ottoman, such an Islamism, I think, expressed a historical-social Islamism. Bayramoğlu, another interviewee, propounded that it would be more accurate to look at Ottoman Islamism from this standpoint. According to him:

More interesting things can be found if Islamism in the Ottoman is reconsidered from the point of view of Islamic movements. For example, Naskhibendi movement. There is a Gümüşhanevi ecole within Naskhibendi. All these shows that there has been a bit more different tradition. It is more significant and precious that they points out the presence of a tradition. And, the political roles that religious orders begun to play. That is to say, for instance, domestic goods matter, the positions which Naskhibendi

movement has taken against exports, and the frameworks that this movement has produced around a national economy.

As historian, Karpas, in detail, explained the historical-social bases of Islamism in question. He argued that a new middle class rose in the Ottoman society. As remarked earlier, Karpas mentioned from a more official and Sultan-caliph-centered Islamism in the Ottoman. He at the same time underlined that there was a more historical-social Islamism that had had class bases, alongside intellectual ones, in the Ottoman society. He was linked the emerging of this Islamism to social and political transformations carried out in the Ottoman. As emphasized before, by the force of centralization and modernization in the Ottoman state, a range of reforms were made to renew the state and its institutions. For examples, Selim III embarked on making a set of military and economic reforms. He founded colleges to teach European military sciences, and invited foreign specialists to serve as advisers to the Ottoman army. He undertook the renewal of the Ottoman military and established a modern army expressed as 'new order' –Nizam-i Jedid-, in despite of being Janissaries' threats. Besides, quite a few economic reforms, which proposed gradually the abolition of major timars in Selim III, and the Land reform of 1858 in Sultan Abdülhamid II, were embarked. Sultan Mahmud II begun to open the schools which aimed at training personnel for government service. He also reorganized bureaucracy. Known as the Zaptiye Müşiriyeti, a police organization was founded to provide security, and the Translation Bureau (Tercüme Odası), which served as a bureau for the training of Ottoman diplomats, was opened. Many ministries were established by separating civil affairs and foreign affairs from each other. In 1856, a Directorate of Vakfs was formed in order to arrange the basic social institutions of Islam and use their revenue for government expenditures over time. Right after, the Tanzimat degree of 1839 and the rescript of 1856 –Islahat Fermanı-, which reflected another important efforts of reform in the transformation of Ottoman state, was initiated (Hanioglu, 2008: 43-51, 72-76 and Karpas, 1972: 251-256, 258). As Karpas stated, Sultan Abdülhamid II maintained these reforms, which had transformed the political and social bases of the Ottoman society (Mardin 1991 and Karpas, 2001). In conclusion, ranging from laissez-faire attitude toward economy to a variety of developmentalist initiatives which consisted of the magnificent buildings and the

infrastructure of railways and roads under the name of progress, all these policies were to give rise to emerge a new middle class. Another reason was particularly Land Code of 1858 which provided to make easier the transition of state lands into, mostly Muslims, private lands. Although no encouragement for private enterprises, there was no obstacle to take part in economic activities (Karpas, 2001: 161-162). He also expressed that the term *ayans* was used to define the Muslim sections of those middle classes. It was a rather symbolic concept because of constantly shifting its meaning, function and power of in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, instead of *ayans*, the term ‘notables’ or *eşraf*, was more preferred to describe this new middle class (Karpas, 1972: 244). Likewise, Mardin did define such an Islamism as a form of populist Islam in the face of ‘palace Islam’, in sense of representing a new class which had risen in the Ottoman society. In his view, populist Islam, which expressed ideas of people stratum and was led by a second Ulama defined as “*Hadis Ehli*”, was an understanding of religion to be more fundamentalist, provincial, conservative and closed to innovations (Mardin, 1991: 22, 29-30). But yet, it should be highlighted that this Islamism was substantially the representative of new economic actors composed of middle classes. These actors were not alone in forming Islamism in question. Also, there were other actors who had basically a position in the Ottoman bureaucracy, shortly after the transformation of the Ottoman state structure through a series of reforms. In other words, those who had mostly come from the state bureaucracy were another actor to shape Islamism. They were some intellectuals who had tried to use it as tool of a social opposition by ideologizing Islam. This intelligentsia, which was expressed as “*Young Ottomans*”, was the first Muslims that had shaped the intellectual and moral bases of Islamism with far-reaching theoretical justifications and ideological bases. Those were important tools of legitimacy for the modern-centralist structure of the Ottoman state. Among the prominent intellectuals of the foregoing Islamism were İbrahim Şinasi (1826-71), Ziya Paşa (1825-80), and Namık Kemal (1840-88). They had got training in government schools and spent most of their adult life by working in government positions. They were also the agents of the rising centralized bureaucratic structure (Karpas, 1972: 262).

These new intellectuals were apologists of new middle classes by framing Islamism. They were propounding that the reforms, which had made way for the transformation of the Ottoman state, had demolished the ‘old’ [administrative] system because of not supporting and protecting certain social groups, especially new middle classes within which they themselves were. Particularly, the transformations, which Tanzimat policies had caused in the institutional structures of Ottoman state, were one of the main points that these intellectuals criticized (Hanioglu, 2008: 103). The intellectuals’ understanding of Islamism focused on restructuring the Ottoman state institutions in line with Islamic principles by reinterpreting through some concepts like justice –adalet-, the contract of investiture –biat-, the consensus of community – icma-i ümmet- and consultation –meşveret-, which was borrowed from Islamic political tradition ( Mardin, 2000: 81, Karpas, 1972: 262 and Türköne, 1991: 102-124). Aktaş expressed that:

Among those intellectuals were Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, and Ali Suavi. They had affected from the ideas of al-Afghānī. This intellectual movement that the Ottoman intelligentsia formed was political.

This was an aspect of Islamism in intellectual sense. Other aspect was economic problems that caused to shape such an Islamism. There were a lot of criticisms, ranging from trade, agriculture, and the safeguard of state property to the property rights accorded to foreigners, and the demands for rational reorganization of economic life. They were reflected more in the form of moral criticism of the existing conditions. For instance, Namık Kemal, ideologist of Islamism, was in favor of enlarging and nationalizing national economic activity. In his writings on economy, he had more often spoken of the need for Muslim Bank, Muslim Corporations, and of protecting and supporting Muslim merchants (Karpas, 1972: 263-264). But yet, in the deas of Young Ottomans, Islamism was an organic ideology in Gramscian sense, rather than a class ideology, which has been defined as tool of one class ruling to protect the interests of the classes like the bourgeoisie or the proletariat in Marxian sense. By stating that organic ideologies have been system of ideas to organize and mobilize not only one class but also masses, including craftsmen, peasants, and common people, Karpas particularly underlined that

Islamism was historically an organic ideology to try to mobilize masses in the defense of -the Ottoman- society and state under the common identity of Muslim by creating an unity among the Ottoman Muslims (Karpas, 2001: 10, 12). The Young Ottomans attributed a function of creating a collectivity to Islamism, on the ground that they saw Islam as a social reinforcement in Durkheimian sense (Türküne, 1991: 99). What provided this collectivity had been a charismatic hero as well. For, Islamism was politically a cult of heroes as called for a new charismatic leader to fulfill a political-social transformation by creating a collectivity under the leadership in question. In history, the examples were Saladin, Sultan Selim I, and Mehmet II. Their basic aim was to create a new identity for the Ottoman subjects and loyalty to the state. For example, the term “fatherland” (vatan), was only one of these new concepts that highlighted the continuity of nation-millet (in essence it defined Muslim community) and demanded the sacrifice of individual goals on the behalf the respect to a greater community. It had aimed at creating a new type of identity. This loyalty and identity was not able to form without an emotional experience capable of connecting one’s values with the new political entity, modern state. This form of Islamism, which the Young Ottomans formulated by relying on the feeling of a loyalty and the formation of identity, strived to enhance the loyalty to the Ottoman state through the notion ‘fatherland’ more based on Islam’ symbols, moral and cultural bases (Karpas, 1972: 264-265). On this point, Akyol, one of the interviewees, expressed that:

The understanding of Islamism of the Young Ottomans was one that referred to political modernization and law. Instead of a revolutionary and fundamentalist understanding of religion, such as Seyyid Qubt, it was a modernist movement that had connected the understandings of era with a number of concepts in Islam.

For this reason, their Islamism became different from al-Afgani and Muhammed Abduh’s view of Islam which was more interested in the reform of Islam and had philosophical bases and doctrinal aspects. In the Young Ottomans, as Karpas remarked, Islamism was in quest of an institutional adaptation and political socialization, rather than religious reform, and tried to provide the unity of society by restructuring the Ottoman state institutions (Karpas, 1972: 262). It was a form of

Islamism which argued that the aim of the state was to form a union of all Islamic people, in spite of being liberal effects on this intellectual group when making a definition of Islamism (Mardin, 2000: 60, 78-80).

Lastly, it can be required to state a last point when addressing Islamism in the late Ottoman period. This is the subject of pan-Islamism. The pan-Islamism has been generally used to refer a politics that aimed at uniting all Muslim in throughout the world by exceeding the borders of Ottoman. In one article, entitled “The Origins of Pan-Islamism”, published in 1942, Dwight Lee focused more on international character of this politics by preferring to use the term Pan-Islamism. The internationalism of pan-Islamism had stemmed from other countries’ imperial interests, among which there were notably England and Russia. With these interferences they provoked the emerging of a pan-Islamist politics, which defended the unity of all Muslims. In his view, the politics of pan-Islamism could not be understood by leaving aside the imperialistic rivalry of the Western powers (Lee, 1942: 282-283). Because, pan-Islamism had been usually a politics that the Ottoman executives had to adopt to remove from bad conditions arising as a result of the Ottoman’s encounter with the western imperialist rivals. In the nineteenth century, it was just one of several major ideologies, alongside Ottomanism and pan-Turkism. The apologists of an-Islamism mostly saw themselves in a camp which defined Islamism with a completely anti-Western tendency. Not only an anti-Western orientation, but also there were other developments to cause the emergence of such politics. One was the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which disclosed the Ottoman’s imperial goals and was signed between Ottoman and Russia in 1774. With this treaty, the Ottoman state followed a politics under the name of pan-Islamism to go beyond its own borders by relying on the Sultan’s spiritual jurisdiction over Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire (Landau, 1990: 9-10). Furthermore, this pan-Islamist politics was embraced by all Ottoman Sultans from Mahmud II (1808), Abdülmecid (1839), Abdül-aziz (1861) to Abdülhamid II, since it was seen as a symbolic expression the the spiritual auhority of the Caliphate inherited from the last Abbasid Caliph. At the same time, the 1876 Ottoman Constitution was inserted into an item which declared that “the Sultan, as Supreme Caliph, was the Protector of the Muslim religion”. It

was an item that defined the Sultan as the “Supreme Caliph” of Islam and gave him the task of protecting the religion of Islam (Landau, 1990: 10-11 and Lee, 1942: 282). So, pan-Islamism was a call to all Muslim community so as to promote the political use of Islam as a vehicle of protest against foreign domination or intervention. Most particularly, because the imperialist enterprises of European countries amounted that the Cross had won a victory over the Crescent, this politics was a call of ‘Crescent versus Cross’. It had increased a sense of Muslim identity and solidarity (Landau, 1990: 12-13). It was seen as Muslims’ reaction to the impact of the Christian West. This was one aspect of pan-Islamism (Lee, 1942: 281). In other respects, it was a politics that objected the West's attacks, based on culture, technique, rational administration, power either materially or morally, to the Muslim world. Tunaya alleged that this was an external reason of the emerging of pan-Islamism (Tunaya, 2007: 8). All in all, it can be concluded that Pan-Islamism was an international-Islamist politics which had got beyond the borders of the Ottoman state. However, in addition to the international dimension of pan-Islamism to be mobilized against the imperial attacks, it was a significant political move for the Ottoman state. The Ottoman executives, even some prominent Ottoman Sultans, like Abdulhamid II, had showed this by applying to such a politics as a political-ideological tool in the lands where the empire dominated.

### **3.3. Islamism in Republican Turkey**

#### **3.3.1. Islamism After the Foundation of National-Secular Republic**

Differently from the late Ottoman period, there was anymore a new political order based on national and secular bases. This order was to express a sharply break from the Ottoman Empire in terms of either the state’s identity or its attitude against religion, Islam. More importantly, there was even no question to speak of ‘an official Islam/Islamism’ as in the Ottoman state. This is because Islam was diminished in importance in the state and society following a secular-national republic established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of Republican Turkey, and his close associates. Especially, besides the Kemalist political cadres, notably Mustafa Kemal, and state elites’ efforts to build a Turkish state grounded on more secular-national

bases ruptured from Islam's moral, cultural and symbolic components, and they also erased Islam from public and social life. I think that in Republican Turkey these had the main motivation behind the liberal approach's arguments. In Turkey, the liberal approach put forward a fundamental argument as a way of understanding and explaining Turkish politics. That argument was directly related to the Kemalist-secular establishment's interferences above concerning religion, or Islam. Mert alleged that these interferences created some problems. At this point, she basically signified that:

In Turkey, nation-state fiction was too successful from some aspects. But, it had produced a number of tensions, and politics had been conducted over these. One of them is the Kurdish issue within so naturally a nation-state framework. The other is the understanding of laicism. More precisely, western modernization and the foundation of a secular republic. That this understanding had been perceived in a narrow and strict way and implemented produced some blockages in the context of rights and freedoms and a democratic society. In other words, the republicans had perceived it in a rigid and formalistic form. This created distresses and restricted freedoms.

The foregoing approach tried to elucidate and discuss by differentiating Turkish politics into two main political actors, the secular establishment on the one side, and the religiously-conservative social groups on the other. For, according to this approach, a basic political cleavage appeared in Turkish politics by virtue of the changing of the position of religion with the Kemalist-secular establishment's attempts on the basis of the secularization of Turkish state's identity and the eradicating of Islam from political and social life. This cleavage was between the secular-establishment and the religiously-conservative groups, which have been claimed to form the social bases of Islamist politics, but occasionally represented by the centre-right politics from the Democrat party (DP), the Justice Party (JP) to the True Path Party (TPP) and the Motherland Party. The reason underlying the aforesaid cleavage was Kemalist revolutions based on –a secular- nationalism and westernization.

With the proclamation of the republic on 29 October 1923, the secular-Kemalist cadres led by Mustafa Kemal were to embark on a series of political reforms that

structured the new identity of Turkish state and converted the position of religion in Turkish society and politics. These reforms, which were named as Kemalist Revolutions, were enframed around two basic concepts: nationalism and westernization (Mardin, 1991: 65 and Ayvazoğlu, 2008: 548). Gültekin pointed out these reforms and stated that in the Ottoman the situation, namely the position of religion, changed in the republican period with the reforms in question. For him:

Those reforms might be interpreted as a sharp axe directed to the religionists. Undoubtedly, this hurt. Laicism was declared, and religion had been withdrawn to private sphere. These radical decisions caused to trauma in the religionists. For, the republic put an end to the unity of the state and religion which they got accustomed in the Ottoman.

Mardin remarked that they were two main motto that provided a basis for new political order which the revolutions had shaped. Besides, these two concepts were closely associated with the Kemalist-secular political elites' attitudes, which had carried out revolutionary reforms in question, in relation to religion (Mardin, 1991: 65). Before passing into this subject, perhaps it can be useful to mention a little from what nationalism as a political current is. Nationalism is a modern political current linked with the rise of bourgeoisie and the emergence of industrial capitalism. As a modern-political collectivity, it forms a basis for nationalists to mobilize their followers through a common history and language and a variety of symbols and rituals. In other respects, it has also an emotional direction, except for ritualistic and symbolic ones, to form an identity which has been "strong enough for people to risk their lives for their country" (Woodley, 2009: 164-165, 169). As a matter of fact, this ideology appears to be a new way of creating a collectivity so as to hold people together in modern-industrial societies. The reason is that the modern societies have needed in Durkheimian sense a homogeneity woven around a language, culture, shared history, and even religion. It is a factuality of our world, which has still maintained its presence today, and more realized in industrial societies, where the great structural transformations occurred, ranged from centralization (of state), class formation and new mode of production to differentiation, social mobility, the division of labor, specialization, and the increasing of educational opportunities. Gellner signified that nationalism, which took shape as a tool of political legitimacy,

was directly related to a centralized state (often political elites), and moral-political climate based on homogeneous language and culture. For, where the modern societies structurally differentiated, homogeneity had been a necessity for the modern-central state. Nationalism was a form of homogeneity grounded on a common history, language, and culture (Gellner, 1983: 4-5, 39-40 and Taylor, 1999: 221). It is at the same time a community. In spite of added an 'ism', it exists as a community either, and in this sense separates from other contemporary ideologies. Anderson envisaged it as "an imagined community" more than to classify it as an ideology. As a community, nation was more understandable as long as it was associated with 'kinship' and 'religion', rather than with 'liberalism' or 'fascism'. It was imagined as a community, because nation was "always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship", without considering a real social inequality or exploitation which dominated in the societies. Therefore, nationalism as community has been comprehended as associated with great cultural systems before itself, rather than political ideologies, since it has been a collectivity closer to religion (Anderson, 2006: 5, 7, 12). These, which have described nationalism as a homogeneity or community, are closer to Durkheimian framework which aimed more at creating a collectivity on the basis of a "collective consciousness" composed of "totality of ideas, representations, beliefs and feelings common to the average members of society" (Allan, 2005: 108) In the discussions of nationalism in Turkey, if we consider how an important element religion is, the above explanations, particularly Anderson's ones, concerning nationalism have had a great importance. This is because in Turkey, in the years to come, religion has been a remarkable factor in creating a homogeneous community or collectivity as linked with (Turkish) nationalism.

In the light of the explanations above, to start with, let me explain how the Kemalist-secular founder-political cadres of the state defined and framed nationalism in the early Republican era (1923-1945). Firstly, this form of nationalism, which has been described more as the Kemalist Nationalism or the Atatürk Nationalism, was an understanding of nationalism that had kept out Islam and broken its ties with the Ottoman history. It had attached a great importance to language and history, as well

as a territorial unity. Islam was no longer a crucial element of being a “Turk” in a Kemalist nationalism. In this understanding of nationalism, it was advocated that what formed a nation was more associated with idea of national independence. On the other hand, considering such a nationalism’ relationships with religion, namely Islam, its core idea was to erase Islam from itself. Poulton specially underlined this characteristic feature of Kemalist nationalism. In spite of being accepted the role of religion in the emergence of the idea of nationalism, the basic thesis of Kemalist nationalism, was that “Turks were a great nation before adopting Islam”. Thus, “religion, i.e. Islam, was no longer a component of Turkish nationalism” (Poulton, 1997: 101). A nationalism without Islam was sine qua non for Kemalist nationalism. In order to prove the presence of such a nationalism, one of its basic theses was “Turkish History Thesis” formulated to form a basis for Kemalist nationalism in the process of the building of the nation. Eranlı argued that this thesis was required to be adopted Turk nationalism as an official ideology in the face of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Pan-Turkism after the foundation of a secular-national republic. It was one of the most important supplementary parts both of Kemalism, and a cultural revolution, which referred to the cultural front of Kemalist ‘revolution’. In addition to that, it had at the same time been built on idea that Turks had made a significant contribution to the history of civilization by creating great civilizations in Egypt, Anatolia, Aegean and Mesopotamia before the Ottoman Empire. Apart from bringing a civilization to the whole world, Turks had already founded great civilizations in their fatherland, Central Asia, in various dates. They were a nation that had survived up to the present by conserving their own cultural identity even in a multinational empire. (Eranlı, 2003: 14-15, 103-104, Poulton, 1997: 105 and Mardin, 1991: 69

Another step to lay the bases of Turk nationalism in those times was “Sun Language Theory”. Turkish History Thesis was formulated to strengthen with such a theoretical construction. The main assertion of the theory was to prove that “Turkish was the most aristocratic, strong, lively and ancient of languages, and that it had a very special role”. In order to make native language clean from Arabic and Persian-based words, this theory was an expression of efforts to rebuild “pure” Turkish, and had claimed that Turkish formed the base of other many languages (Poulton, 1997: 111

and Mardin, 1991: 69). All these steps taken to shape a Turkish nationalism had in fact aimed at building a secular nationalism free from religion, namely Islam. The underlying reason of these enterprises was Ottoman-Islam heritage. As Ersanlı emphasized, Turkish History Thesis, which was framed in the First History Congress in 1932 by denying a historical background composed of Ottoman Empire and Islam, tried to create a 'Golden Era' with the understanding of a laicism based on a romanticized idea of pre-Islam and history (Ersanlı, 2003: 234). Likewise, Sun Language Theory, proposed for the shaping of a nationalism purged from the Ottoman-Islamic past, was also an initiative to rescue "the Turkish language from the Islamic yoke" by defining the Ottoman period as 'the dark age' (Poulton, 1997: 114). Therefore, in the building of a Turkish nationalism grounded on secular bases, Islam, which was identified with the Ottoman history, had been subtracted from being an element of Turkish state's identity. It had lost its legitimacy in Turkish society and the state apparatuses because of being imprisoned to private life. Thereby, as Poulton stated, a pre-Ottoman Turkish background, which had substituted an Islamic-Ottoman history, had laid the bases of new Turkish state's identity (Poulton, 1997: 102).

As stated earlier, another significant component of the Kemalist revolution was westernization moves. This Kemalist move was also in keeping with the building of a Turkish nationalism based on secular and pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic elements. In the second place, it aimed at secularizing the social and cultural life of Turkish society and institutional structure of the state with a westernization move. On this point, as for secularization, it has included three distinct social processes. The first of them is "the autonomization of politics", describing an institutional separation between state and religion, in the modern state. The second is "the decline of the cultural relevance" regarding that religion has played an important and unifying role in modern societies. Lastly, the third is "privatization of religion", a way of individually expressing religious belief outside institutionally or traditionally recommended way of organized as a tool to overcome with the 'difficulties' of modern life (Bruce, 2011: 2 and Jung, 2006: 132). In Turkey, in the early republican period, secularization involved the first and second processes. A wide range of

secular political steps had been put into effect in accordance with these processes. These politics targeted to change both the institutional structure of the state and culturally and symbolically everyday life in society. They are mostly known as secular reforms, which tried to westernize Turkish society and the state structure and organization. Among those reforms were the abolition of the Caliphate and the office of Sheikh 'I-Islam (on 3 March 1924), the removal of religious courts (on 18 April 1924), the admission of Law of Unity of Education –Tevhidi Tedrisat Kanunu-, which dispossessed Ulema's authority on education and implemented coeducation (on 3 March 1924) and the closure of centers for Religious Brotherhoods, termed as lodges, hermitages and madrasahs –tekke, zaviye ve medreseler- (on 30 November 1925), Hat Law, which banned religious attire such as fez and male turban (on 25 November 1925), the adoption of the Gregorian calendar (on 1 January 1926), the adoption of Swiss Civil Code (on 4 October 1926) and new penal code (on 1 July 1926), the removal of the Constitutional provision declaring Islam as the official religion of state (on 10 April 1928), the replacement of Arabic Alphabet with the Latin Alphabet (on 1 November 1928), and the translation of call to prayer (ezan) into Turkish (on 3 February 1932) (Mardin, 1991: 76, 97). Mardin alleged that all these reforms expressed a cultural movement of westernization equal with civilization for laying bases of a new worldview, which substituted religion and religious culture. It meant that they annihilated predominant role which religion, i.e. Islam, had undertaken in forming a collective identity (Mardin, 1991: 71, 77). In this way, the role of Islam in creating a collectivity based on the cultural, symbolic, and moral bases of religion as a crucial component of the Ottoman state and society ended during the secular-national establishment of Republican Turkey. For, as Gültekin stressed:

The founder cadres of the republic, which had taken a variety of lessons regarding religion from the debates and insurrections in the Ottoman, had troubles to struggle with politico-religious. But it had turned into the struggle with religion itself. Thus, this situation and the struggle with politico-religious converted into a fight with religiousness. It was, all the time, continued in the republican history. The religionists strongly reacted to that.

From now on, Islam has been a subject of the private sphere and cleansed from the whole functions, including moral, cultural, and symbolic, which plays a fundamental role in forming a collectivity (Akgün and Çalış, 2008: 593, Poulton, 1997: 98, 100, and Eligür, 2010: 1). All in all, Mardin concluded that religion was entirely a matter of conscience in individual sense (Mardin, 1991: 68). Henceforth, Islam had no longer a role in constituting a group identity socially and in creating a sense of belonging by politically identifying with another collectivity, like nation. More importantly, given this new relationship between Islam and Turkish nationalism, in the establishment of Republican Turkey and in the coming years, Islamist dose gradually disappeared in the formation of Turkish nationalism. Comprehensively, a process of de-Islamization, initiated by secular reforms, occurred, and thus religion, namely Islam, was confined to the private sphere, alongside of being completely erased from public sphere. In other words, this was interpreted as eradicating Islam from public and civil life. As a result, the link between these two identities had removed as a result of the struggle with Islam and religiously-conservative groups (Zürcher, 2004: 264 and Akgün and Çalış, 2008: 593). Oran differently underlined that:

The republic carried out a top-down revolution based on westernization, modernization, or Europeanization. This was a culture revolution, ranging from civil law, woman rights, and alphabet revolution to the changing of calendar and hour. Therefore, of course, lots of things had been done. However, the religiously-conservative people were deactivated. Yet, they are a majority which cannot forever be excluded.

This struggle arose a basic political cleavage between two distinct groups as the bearers of those political identities. It was between the secular establishment and the religiously-conservative groups. At this stage, Mert argued that:

This secular establishment has been composed of the republicans and Turkish army. The underlying reason of the aforesaid cleavage between those two groups was the establishment's principle of laicism which has been perceived in a much formalist and rigid way. This perception has restricted some rights and freedoms.

On the other hand, more differently, Laçiner attempted at defining this political cleavage by positioning himself within a democratization perspective. According to him:

This cleavage has been mostly between Turkish military, which has been the leading actor of the coups with its interferences in democracy and -civil- society in Turkish political history. A democratization has been possible by making this society stronger, which has mainly consisted of Muslims, or religiously-conservative groups culturally and middle classes economically, on the condition that Turkish army's power on Turkish politics and democracy has been shattered and deactivated.

This cleavage has been a way of analyzing and explaining Turkish politics. However, the actors of the mentioning cleavage have been described by the interviewees in different ways. Though, these actors have been differently defined, it seems that this definition was based on a liberal approach, which has been one of dominant forms of such analysis and explanation with particularly some conceptual dualities, state-society, or, as in Mardin's conceptual framework, centre-periphery.

In the liberal approach, the foregoing political cleavage was basically interested in the stances taken against religion, i.e. Islam. There were no longer two kinds of Islam or Islamism, as in the distinction 'official-peripheral/popular Islam' in the Ottoman. This is because for the founder political cadres of Turkish Republic, religion, Islam, had been no longer of significance due to two reasons. Thereupon, they initiated a range of reforms focused on the secular re-building of Turkish nationalism and the state's identity and a number of cultural and symbolic reforms towards westernization. These reforms provided a basis for the formation of a new Turkish nationalism disassociated with Islam, and for their secularization by cleansing the state and Turkish society from the moral, cultural, symbolic aspects of Islam. Akyol criticized this radical attitude appearing with the reforms. To him:

Unfortunately, the radical laicism of the republic was very effective in disappearing the Ottoman experience. The republic precluded the learning of all religious culture through the alphabet revolution and various prohibitions. With the transition to democracy, this evolved into another direction.

The new form of nationalism developed by the Kemalist-secular cadres was to be a significant element in fashioning Turkish state's identity. This was one of the basic issues for the founders of new Turkish state built upon the secular-national bases. The most essential characteristic of an identity established on those bases was its scientific-positivist approach, given the scientific articles and arguments presented in the First and Second Turkish History Congress under the name of 'Turkish History Thesis' and/or 'Sun Language Theory' with the aid of many distinct disciplines, such as anthropology, archaeology, ethnology, and history (Mardin, 1991: 68 and Ersanlı, 2003). It was a non-religious attitude shaped by abandoning all Islamic elements of identity. Thus, the new Turkish state's identity was grounded on scientific-positivistic bases, beside secular. For, as Waxman stated, while constructing an identity for a secular-national based Turkish state, the political elites of Turkish Republic were more concerned with what the place of religion should have been in Turkish nationalism. He argued that such nationalism was a product of efforts by the state elites, who led to various formal and legislative reforms to westernize society and state organization. The national identity that they wished to constitute was entirely modern and free from any religious components. According to Waxman, many Turkish scholars have claimed that this identity was hostile to Islam and substituted religious identification predominant among people before. They have alleged that this identity, seeing Islam as a reactionary and potentially threatening force which prevented modernization and the building of a secular nation-state, was in sharply contrast with Islam (Waxman, 2000: 5-6, 8) Other than this, a second point was the secular-cultural reforms that had eradicated the moral, symbolic and cultural elements of Islam from Turkish society and the state institutions. Shortly after the War of Independence was won, these reforms had termed as 'radical policies of state secularization'. It was argued that they were a 'revolution of values', a cultural revolution that radically expressed the transformation of an identity built upon the Ottoman-Islamic bases. They legitimated a secular nationalist republic and laid its foundations (Sunar and Toprak, 1979: 426). Demirel propounded that:

The main motivation behind these was that an understanding of laicism, which was established in a sharp contrast to religion, begun to dominate the republican period. For, Mustafa Kemal and

his close associates had embraced a rigid secular attitude, especially with Takrir-i Sükun law.

Therefore, as Demirel pointed out, in those two points, the new secular-national regime was to lead up to the emerging of an Islamist politics or Islamism peculiar to Turkey. Fundamentally, the roots of Islamism and an Islamist politics was in the Turkish state's new political orientation which aimed at the westernization and the secular-national rebuilding of Turkish state by breaking loose from the Ottoman-Islamic past. The main theses of the liberal approach in Turkey shaped around the above political orientations of Republican Turkey.

The liberal approach claimed that these reforms divided into two political camps. There were the Kemalist-secular political cadres and state elites which represented the secular establishment in one camp, the religiously-conservative masses which positioned in the periphery in other one. They brought about a political cleavage, which became crystallized around the secular-progressive political elites and cadres of the state and the conservative, religious traditionalism of peripheral communities. Sunar and Toprak remarked that what underlying this political cleavage was the clash of values that the religious, social, and cultural communities of periphery had faced with the “new orthodoxy of progressivism” embedded in a secular and positivist ideology. No cleavage, whether socioeconomic, ethnic or religious one, was as permanent and deeper as that mentioned above (Sunar and Toprak, 1979: 426). In the coming years, especially with transition to multiparty system in 1946, this politics had been one of the most fundamental cleavages by paying the way for the occurrences of a number of Islamist parties from Nation Party –Millet Partisi-, with militant-fundamentalist dispositions, up to National View's ones. Mardin pointed out that these Islamist parties were political currents in tendency to soft laicism in the Atatürk era from 1940s onwards. Their politics in general grounded on practical issues by taking a stance against settling western cultural values and symbols into Turkey under the name of the westernization, rather than an Islamic philosophy as in case of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or in Mawdudi's idea of Islamism. He defined Turkish Islamism or Islamist politics as ‘puritanism’ in some way. Put it another way, Turkish Islamism was expressing a more puritanical form of

Islamism composed of a narrow, populist and non-philosophical ethos such as prohibition of alcohol, respect to older, veiling, and control on sexual life (Mardin, 1991: 35). Likewise, ranging a series of reforms from the political and socio-economic rights of women, monogamy, the banning of veil, the changing of weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday, and the translation of call to prayer into Turkish to the prohibition of religious order and Sufi brotherhoods, and legal restrictions to use of religion for political goals and the like, Toprak has also asserted that all these were reforms which the republican regime had completed a radical rupture with the Islamic past. Also, in her view, this regime mostly ostracized the religious-conservative people, who had been portrayed as reactionary and fanatics and continuously kept under control. From this point of view, she stated that it was “those marginalized groups” that formed the “backbone of political Islam”. (Toprak, 2005: 32). In a sense, as Gültekin highlighted:

An Islamist resistance formed there, since the republic’s attitude to struggle with politico-religious had turned into a fight with religiousness. Put it another way, this attitude began to transform religiousness into Islamism.

Assuredly, during the emergence of Islamism which Toprak described, the basic reason behind this politics was the political cleavage between Islamists and secularists. The Islamists objected to the secular identity of Turkish state, and the westernization reforms and suggested that it would be suffice to adopt western industry and technology to modernize. As for secularists, they insisted on westernization by propounding that western science, technology and industry would be inadequate to progress, and that culturally other reforms were needed for modernizing as connected with institutional structures. Along with the transition to democracy in 1946, when the conflicts between these two groups started to accelerate, Toprak highlighted that in Turkish politics the main political differentiation was between Islamists and Secularists or Westernizers. This differentiation gained great momentum in 1980s and 1990s, and henceforth Turkish politics and the public gradually, argues Toprak, became divided into Islamist versus secularist camps. (Toprak, 2005: 29-30). Taking into account Turkish scholars' all those views with contributions to a liberal approach, we can conclude that in Turkish

Islamism was a product of political conflict shaped culturally and symbolically between these two camps. This politics has brought moral, cultural and symbolic aspects of religion into prominence in political sphere for getting masses' support by creating a political identity based on an Islamist politics developed in a more puritanical sense in the face of other politics.

Undoubtedly, there was only no a culture-based political conflict behind this political cleavage. The liberal approach propounded that one of the basic motivations of this political cleavage was economy and class interests. Just as culture, economy was also one of the dominant-common arguments of the approach in question. As Keyman expressed that:

Economic Islam gradually begun to be important. There was an Islam which has become stronger by excessively integrating with economy. More importantly, after 1980s, there was an Islamism that had been the carrier of this change and gained strength with globalization and Europeanization in the periphery on the basis of urbanization and the formation of middle classes in Anatolia in the context of the centre-periphery relationship.

As will be seen later on, there was a strong emphasis on the social base of Islamism or Islamist politics from the late 1960s up to the present. This social base was defined more on the basis of economic interests, class belonging, capital accumulation, and economic and class transformation. On this point, for instance, this political movement was argued to generally represent small and middle-sized enterprises in the small-anatolian cities and towns in the face of large industrialists and businessmen in economic sense. Similarly, Bora indicated:

The formation of the middle-sized and local capital has emerged in Anatolia, alongside a more monopolist big capital in metropolitan cities. Islamism has been a politics that has replied to this middle-sized capital's demands, defined as Anatolian capital, against the big capital's monopolist tendencies.

In 1960s and 1970s, it was the voice of small enterprises, which had consisted of small merchants, artisans, and shopkeepers, in small provincial cities, and farmer living in rural regions. After 1990s, with new economic opportunities and urbanization, there were an urbanized social bases, and economic groups and social

classes including large and middle-size economic entrepreneurs, petty bourgeoisie, civil servants, and low-income social groups and working classes (Toprak, 1988, Sarıbay, 1985, Yavuz, 1997, Günalp, 1999, Yavuz, 2003, and Çakır, 2005). This emphasis on economy became more prominent with globalization, neoliberal economic policies and free-market economy after 1980s. Particularly, in 1990s, when dealt with the WP politics, the same emphasis was many times repeated on economy and economic transformation (Yavuz, 1997, Günalp, 1999, Yavuz, 2003, and Yeşilada 2002). Along with the rise of the JDP to power in 2002, this emphasis made more explicit with the party' new political orientation, based on global world economy, neoliberal economic policies, and competitive free- market economy. Therefore, beside culture, economy was one of the most essential assertions in the discussions which the liberal approach has made regarding Islamism and the JDP politics.

### **3.3.2. Religion and Politics Before National View (1940s-1950s)**

Turkey passed to a multi-party system in the mid-1940s. In the one-party period before this, the Kemalist –secular establishment, which embarked on the secular rebuilding of Turkish state's identity and the secular reforms, had put an end to its political and social-cultural functions by taking a radical stance against Islam. However, this radical attitude of the secular establishment concerning religion had softened over time. With the transition to a multi-party democracy in 1946, the softening at issue became more visible. There was a strong historical and intellectual background behind this change of the secular establishment. It might be useful to briefly speak of the background in question.

In Ottoman Empire, there were both an official Islam/Islamism and popular or civil islam/Islamism, located in the periphery. Just after founded a republican state with secular-national base in in 1923, this situation had changed. The state had no longer an official Islam. What is more, it considerably decreased its social role in society by rejecting the cultural, moral, and symbolic functions and elements of Islam. But, the Kemalist political cadres and state elites changed their preceding attitude against religion. One of the reasons behind this was, I think, the Union and Progress Party

which the founders of Turkish Republic, especially Mustafa Kemal, were a member and had powerful impacts upon themselves. The other was the influence of Ziya Gökalp's thoughts on the Kemalist founder cadres. Given the change and the influence mentioned above, it can be said that the Kemalists' attitudes created a binary situation in the matter of Islam. For, for instance, the foregoing party saw ideological effects of religion during the war. It had a rather tolerant attitude in relation to Islam, and had looked at Islam as a constituent component of the state's identity in line with Ziya Gökalp's views, a foremost Turkish scholar who strived to integrate nationalism (Turkism) with Islam (Poulton, 1997). A significant intellectual that had influenced the Kemalist cadres and elites of Republican Turkey, Ziya Gökalp saw religion as a symbolic expression of life in sense of creating a collectivity, and did not ignore the cultural and ethical aspects of Islam (Heyd, 1950 and Mardin, 1991: 23, 29). Nevertheless, another name, Ahmet Rıza, influencing potently from Auguste Comte's positivist philosophy, as one of the prominent founders of Union and Progress Party, stated that Islam was not an obstacle to progress and development. He claimed that it had been a result of missionary propaganda that Islam was being discredited. Even, in his view, Islam was politically a religion sufficient to develop, and never hostile to a republican regime. It was able to be used as a tool to provide peace, since it played too important role in society. Mardin has seen all these as a sign of how significance he gave to tradition. However, of other foremost members of party, Abdullah Cevdet, was in a hard attitude against Islam. He had linked the decline of Ottoman Empire and Islamic world to Islamic faith and values for a long time. Also, he thought that what was required for westernization was to change ideas and standpoint, and that it was just possible with getting close to West, by in-depth understanding the meanings of western classics. For him, the issue was more cultural, rather than religion, namely Islam. Some cultural reforms were needed by keeping religion out. For this reason, for example, he had never cared about the efforts to do a synthesis of Islamism and Turkism. Mardin stated that Abdullah Cevdet was a typical representative of the disposition which political should contain cultural. This was to form a basis for the cultural reforms, and the policies of secularization in Republican Turkey, ranging from significance given to woman rights to suspicion with regard to institution of

Sultanate (Mardin, 2008: 189-190, 209-210, 226, 232-233). The Kemalist cadres were reflected this binary attitude about religion in its own politics. As Poulton has remarked, even though the winning of War of Liberation and the rapid diffusing of nationalism forced the Kemalist cadres to a change, Islam was not denigrated during the war, and quite the contrary, Mustafa Kemal “used it as a rallying cry against the foreign invaders” (Poulton, 1997: 91). But, the attitude in question had changed after the war, as also seen during the re-building of Turkish state’s identity and the secular reforms. This change did not long maintain. The outlook on religion was reconsidered. The influence of Ziya Gökalp’s thoughts was surpassingly great in this reconsideration. For, he shaped the views of the founder cadres of the secular-national republic, particularly with his remarks on nationalism, republicanism and laicism. Most especially, his views on religion had been considerably efficient in providing a basis for the formation of a secular republic. He attached great importance to religion and religious institutions’ roles in society and the state organization for forming social-cultural solidarity and providing a political unity. Also, he advocated the unification of secular and religious education. All these had been, to a great extent, decisive while the secular-national cadres and elites designated their attitudes with regard to religion, Islam. For him, the state and social order were more important than individuals and their freedoms. What provided this was Turkish nationalism as a cultural element and Islam as an ethical constituent. As a culture Turkish nationalism was expressing a common culture, emotion, ideals, religion, morality, and education, with language. As for Islam as ethical constituent, with Durkheimian influences, Gökalp argued that it was a symbolic expression. He underlined the ceremonial aspects and rituals of religion in forming a collectivity. Therefore, according to him, Turkish nationalism and Islam was to undertake an active role in the building of a collectivity, since they were closely tied with each other (Parla, 1985: 14, 25-41, 75-81) In Turkey, the secular establishment in time shifted its stance in the face of religion as a result of intellectually Gökalp’s views and historically the Union and Progress Party’s position concerning Islam. Particularly, it had slowly a more moderate attitude against religion in the mid-1940s, along with the multi-party system. On this point, it should be highlighted that its attitude was more populist and attempts directed to meet religious needs and to

perform basic Islamic requirements. However, in the years to come, the secular establishment's attitude to religion was to gradually become different from its previous one, for example, in sense of making Islam an essential component of Turkish state's identity and becoming the cultural, moral, and symbolic elements of religion more visible in political and social life. To be more precise, it can be suggested that there was a distinct secular establishment in every historical-political period. Here what is important for us in the context of this debate that there was a softening towards religion, Islam. This shift, which referred to a softening initiated in the mid-1940s, should not be exaggerated much, considering the secular establishment's radically changing attitude to religion in positive sense in the years ahead.

As stated above, with the transition to multi-party systems, it became a change in the strict attitudes taken against religion. For, in the 1930s and the 1940s, the secular regime's attitude towards religion was rather oppressive and intolerant (Zürcher, 2004: 233). This was not a result of intensive criticisms by the opposition, which had arisen in the wake of secular reforms and non-religious nationalist identity that the regime initiated in 1920s. After the coming of the multi-party democracy, there was an ever-increasing Muslim vote, and both parties, the RPP and the DP, had been eminently willing to get these votes. As a result of this, the RPP itself adopted a more moderate or/and tolerant stance against Islam (Zürcher, 2004). Therefore, it was expressing a populist attempt by the secular establishment, which consisted of some steps taken. Thus, the republican regime had gradually softened its approach to religion, i.e. Islam. This contrary turn, interestingly, defined by Mardin (1991) as an ironical event, had started in the Seventh Congress of the Republican People's Party (RPP) gathered in 1947 (Zürcher, 2004). On this point, as a result of this, for example, the Ministry of Education took again religious courses –electively- into the programme of the primary schools, and besides the schools was opened so as to train imam hatip –preacher-. Following new attitudes in relation to religion initiated in 1947, some new steps were taken regarding religious ceremony and worship. For example, for the first time in 1948, those who wished to make pilgrimage were begun to be given currency, in 1949 the tombs and shrines was reopened for visit,

and Ankara University declared the foundation of a Faculty of Divinity (Zürcher, 2004: 233). Therefore, not only the opposition parties, like Democrat Party (DP) as a centre-right party founded in that period in Turkish political spectrum, but also the Republican People's Party, which was the pioneer party of Kemalist-secular reforms and founded under Atatürk's leadership, regarded Islam as an important source to apply in politics with a quite populist approach, namely for votes (Mardin, 1991: 123-124 and Sunar and Binnaz, 1983: 428). This situation, which had arisen compared to the early republican period, was absolutely in contradiction with the previous secular reforms and the series of steps to be taken to compose a national-secular Turkish identity. But, it was done far more than the situation in question. Though, not accepted as a part of Turkish state's identity in the early republican period, Islam was no longer to be ignored in the attempts at building the state's identity. On the contrary, by force of a nationalist outlook, the secular regime unified Islam with its secular-national identity by turkifying it. Thereafter, the efforts to turkify were, step by step, carried out with the adoption of latin alphabet, the attempts to worship in Turkish, and the translation of call to prayer into Turkish (Tunçay, 2009: 94). As Waxman<sup>12</sup> emphasized, even though subtracted Islam from the official definition of nation, the founders of the republican regime, which was influenced by the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, approved a type of "Turkified Islam", since they hoped it would consolidate Turkish national identity (Waxman, 2000: 9). All in all, in Turkish politics the important of Islam, either as a constitutive component of political belonging or for voter support, continued to increase with the rise of DP's to power. The party -DP- embraced the RPP's moderate politics based on relaxing restraints in the matter of expressions of religious feelings and making concessions to the feelings of the Muslim communities (Zürcher, 2004). This was clearly seen in the DP's policies with regard to Islam.

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<sup>12</sup> As proofs of a 'Turkified Islam', the use of an Islamic discourse, which was applied to provide a popular legitimacy and to unify the local Anatolian notables, religious leaders and peasantry during the War of Independence between 1919-1922, and the article 4 of the Law of Settlement, which was enacted that "only those who belong to Turkish ethnicity and culture" were permitted to settle permanently in Turkey, have been showed. The government regarded Albanians, Bosnians, Torbes, Pomaks, and Montenegrin Muslims as culturally "Turks" and helped them resettle in Turkey. By contrast, the Gagauz Turks of Moldovo, who had converted to Orthodox Christianity, were not considered to be culturally Turkish", also see about this, Dov Waxman, "'Islam and Turkish National Identity: A Reappraisal", *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 30 (2000), p. 10

The Democrat Party (DP), which was set up by the dissidents separated from the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) on 7 January 1944, came to power with a large voter support opponent (Toprak, 2005) to Kemalist-secularist Turkish modernization. It put end to the one party period by taking 52.7 percent of the votes in the election hold on 10 May 1950. It was a political party that had represented a wide-ranging coalition among the dissatisfied peripheral groups composed of provincial landowners, merchants and semi-aristocratic families of rural areas, peasantries, religious orders and groups, alongside minorities, lower and urban classes, opponent intellectuals (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 429 and Karpas, 2004: 15). The DP was defined as a centre-right party in Turkish-political spectrum. The reason why this party was a centre-right politics was hidden in the republican-secularist elites' understanding of secularism. In this understanding, given the early republican period, religion, that is Islam, had no place in society and politics. Also, the republican elites had pursued a rigid secularization politics from the rebuilding of Turkish identity till a range of secular reforms in social and political life. So, the Democrat party (DP) was more commemorated as a political enterprise which tried to eliminate the religious discontents of groups in periphery. It severely criticized the Republican Party for intervening in the religious practices of the citizenry by highlighting that laicism was not simply a separation between state and religion but also meant taking a negative attitude without interfering to religious sentiments and practices. Its aim was to change this understanding stated above. In the first month after they rose to power by winning the elections of May 14, 1950, they undertook to make a number of changes concerning the discontents in question. Among those were the transfer of Turkish liras to foreign exchange for the pious Muslims who liked to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, the re-translation of the call to prayer (ezan) into its original Arabic version, religious broadcasts by the state radio during the holy days, in 1950 the opening of İmam Hatip –religious vocational high- schools to train religious personnel, the reopening of sacred shines (türbe) of the 'saints', and the establishment of a Faculty of Theology in Ankara (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 430 and Toprak, 2005: 34). The support of the foregoing groups was not just stemming from the DP' moderate attitude to religion, religious sentiments and practices. This centre-right party (DP) had at the same time a clientalist relationship with those groups,

which was based on rewarding regional cliques, kindship ties, religious orders and personal influence networks, along with the apply to religious sentiments and populism. The afore-mentioned relationship, which was fed with the redistributive policies, and liberalization and populist language in economy, along with a more moderate attitude regarding religious demands, tied the interest groups in periphery loosely to DP. But yet, the main reason underlying behind their supports was mostly the moderate stance that the party took in the face of religious displeasures. However, its stance certainly objected to religious extremism and religion-welded activities, such as Tidjani<sup>13</sup>, threatening Kemalist –secular order and symbols, and did not tolerate unmeasured criticisms made by some religious order for secular reforms, like Nurcus. Moreover, it did not abstain from making laws against such activities and to imprison those who engaged in them. For, as Sunar and Toprak would state, the relationship between religious groups in the periphery and the Democrat Party (DP) did not go beyond electorate support for the party. As for those groups, they expressed that the most significant reason of their supports were the decrease of religious oppressions (Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 429-430). Although, the party was remembered as a political enterprise mobilizing an Islamic ‘resurgence’ or ‘revival’, it was essentially a centrist party in terms of its cultural views and dispositions. What occurred in the DP’s period was that the political interventions, which had focused on minimalizing and marginalizing religion, were no more on the agenda. The social role of Islam had gradually increased, and religion was being seen as the most essential component of social solidarity. As Grigoriadis has indicated, this period was first signs of moving from conflict to synthesis by turning Islam into an indispensable element of the Turkish identity (Grigoriadis, 2013: 68-69 and Sunar and Toprak, 1983: 429-430). At the same time, the DP years was a period liberalization relatively (Mardin, 1993: 217, Yıldız, 2006:43), ranging from the proliferation of religious activities and publication and the emancipation of religious acts and movements to a variety of religious rights and freedoms composed of religious education, freedoms to express and to propagate religious ideas publicly, and rights to freely worship. It was during the DP’s period (1950s-1960s) that

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<sup>13</sup> In periods when the Democrat Party was in power, Tidjani was a religious movement that would get famous by smashing the busts of Atatürk.

religious-spiritualist life began to increase its strength in social space, and that many religious orders from Naskhibendi to Nurcus were an essential part of social life by dominating individuals' ideas, values and lifestyles in their daily livings. The party was basically opposed to the idea of politicization of Islam in sense of politicizing religious values, symbols and lifestyles in the face of those of secular order. It did not accept the claims that it was a religious party by positioning itself at centre of politics. Also, its secularist understanding of the state did not highly differ from that of the RPP in 1950s (Zürcher, 2004: 233-234). However, the 1950-60 period, when the DP was in power, had been over with a military coup in 1960. As the reason of the coup, party's extreme authoritarian attitudes, its violation of republican-secular principles, and its exceedingly religious toleration had been showed (Zürcher, 2004). This coup had been first step of a new political process with the closure of party (DP) and the penalization of its political leader and prominent cadres.

### **3.3.3. The Early National View Islamism (1960s-1970s)**

The May 27 military coup laid the bases of a new political order by intervening in civil-political sphere and making the 1961 Constitution. Not only was the coup a sign of undemocratically overthrowing an elected political power, but also it was meaning to redesign political parties and actors, and political system by means of a new constitution. With an anti-democratic interference, as Sarıbay has indicated, the most significant outcome that the 1960 military coup had revealed in terms of social change was the 1961 Constitution. The most basic feature of that constitution was that it gave a great important to the freedom of political thought and organization, alongside that of civil and social organization. Following 1961, it had made way for the emerging of some political currents, nationalist or socialist, by assuring a relatively setting of liberty. Besides these, another one was religion-based current, which had an Islamist line inclined to politicize religion (Sarıbay, 1985: 97). Likewise, having expressed that the above-mentioned constitution generated relatively pluralist and partly a participant public sphere, Yıldız highlighted that there was an Islamic idea developed with intensely being translated the studies of some prominent Islamic thinkers from Mawdudi in Pakistan to Sayyid Qubt in Egypt into Turkish (Yıldız, 2006: 44). What had substantially provided this was relatively the

free setting of the 1960s. Following the 1960 military coup, it allowed for the organization of a great deal of political movements, ranging from the centre-right and Islamist politics to leftist-socialist one. One was the centre-right politics that the Justice Party (JP), which was founded by nationalist-conservative politicians on 11 February 1961, claimed to be the continuation of the tradition of Democrat Party, which was closed down by the 1960 military government. This politics had a nationalist-conservative position (Bora, 2012 and Yıldız, 2006: 44) in Turkish politics. This political position saw religion in more conservative sense as a unifying and descriptive component of society, without perceiving it as a range of political principles necessary to be insisted upon. However, it was a conservatism arisen by integrating with –Turkish- nationalism (Mert, 2007: 77). Put it another way, this position was conservative-nationalist in sense of both having respect for religious values and morals and advocating Turkish state against communism threat (Demirel, 2005a: 548). The political position at issue was a politics which had defended that Islam was one of the most important elements of –Turkish- nation. But it also absolutely rejected the political use of Islam by taking a more tolerant attitude towards individuals' and groups' religious life. In a nationalist-conservative synthesis, 'religion and nation' were spiritual needs, which had intertwined with each other. Religion was a holy source of a common feeling. (Bora, 2012: 83-84 and Yıldız 2006: 43). Islam, which appeared for the centre-right politics as a basic component of national identity, was no more than a "personal matter", and this politics was opposed to the exceedingly politicization of religion. It seems state that, compared to other rightist politics, namely Islamist or nationalist, the difference of this politics was directly related to attitude that it took against the politicization of Islam (Poulton, 1997: 178). After 1960s, the only advocate of the foregoing politics was the Justice Party (JP), which had substituted the DP, immediately after the 1960 coup, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, a rightist politician. However, this political position had met with an Islamic opposition, a political movement which had strong religious tendencies and feelings and went to political organization, -the NOP and the NSP-, by leaving from the JP at the end of 1960s. In other words, in the centre-right politics, this division had paved the way for the formation of Islamist political parties, which was termed as Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) and

Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party). Their prominent leader was Necmettin Erbakan, a professor of machine and Turkish-Islamist politician (Sarıbay, 1985, Mardin, 1993, Çakır, 2005, Yavuz, 2003, and Bora, 2017).

With the advent of an Islamist politics under the leadership of Erbakan in the late 1960s and 1970s, there was also a social base that had promoted and mobilized this political current. This base had political, cultural, geographical, and economic dimensions. It was addressed from various aspects, culturally devout-secular, socially educated-uneducated, geographically developed-underdeveloped or urban-rural, economically lower -middle class or upper class, and politically Islamist, nationalist or conservative centre- right politics. In order to see this, it might be looked at the 1973 and 1977 national elections, two of which was first sign of the studies on this political current as well. To be sure, although difficult to determine the social base of pro-Islamist parties, as Toprak has pointed out, the election statistics was showing that these parties, to a large extent, got support from rural areas (Toprak, 1984: 131). For instance, by considering a wide range of surveys to be made on this politics during the 1973 election, Sarıbay stated that it geographically represented rural and underdeveloped ones, rather than urban and the developed, and the developing regions. Especially, those who voted to this political tradition, he argues, usually lived in the underdeveloped places, including partly the central Anatolia's cities, such as Konya, Kayseri, Sivas, Çorum, and Kırşehir, and, largely the eastern and southern east Anatolia's smaller cities composed like Kars, Erzincan, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Mardin, Elazığ and Gümüşhane (Sarıbay, 1985: 149, 159-160). With the social base coming from those regions Islamist politics gained a great strength in the eastern and southern provinces by developing a political language around Islam or religion. Put it another way, as Bayramoğlu remarked,

It was a political Islam that had had a class base, coming from lower class, and cultural and symbolic aspects.

Although an intensive Kurdish population, Yavuz pointed out that it was supported by Sunni-Kurdish electorate by creating a religious-political collectivity under an Islamic flag. For this reason, he emphasized that its voters composed largely of the pious and conservative groups by virtue of the sectarian-religious divisions,

particularly based on tensions between Sunni and Alevi Communities (in cities such as Kahramanmaraş, Malatya, Sivas). Laçiner emphasized that:

This electoral base was largely coming from the towns in rural regions, rather than peasants. This base had consisted of small merchants, artisans, shopkeepers. It was a religiously-conservative base composed of Sunni-Muslims.

The aforesaid groups were in the rural regions. So, for example in the 1973 elections the National View' parties, like MNP or MSP, had won 67.2 percent of the voters in rural areas (Yavuz, 2003: 210). Nevertheless, it should be indicated that the electoral success of the Islamist parties in Turkey did not take long. A decline had been observed in their vote rates following the 1977 election. The reason was the emergence of a nationalist political party, so-called Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) –Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in English. As Bora and Can has emphasized, the most remarkable feature of the nationalist party was that it had applied to Islam in order to pull devout-conservative masses toward itself. Especially, the 1977 elections was an important jumping-point in terms of using an Islamic motif in the party (Bora and Can, 2015: 200-201). So, Sarıbay alleged that in the 1977 elections the MHP as a rival party, which had attached 'Islam' to its own political jargon, beside 'Turkishness', had a great share in the downfall of the Islamist parties. This decline was so apparent in some provinces of the central and eastern Anatolia, ranging from Elazığ, Erzincan, Sivas, and Nevşehir to Tokat and Yozgat (Sarıbay, 1985: 165). Taking into account all these, a conclusion can be drawn that during 1960s and 1970s the Islamist parties were based on the religiously-conservative groups in socio-cultural sense, who had geographically lived in rural areas where the middle and underdeveloped cities were at present.

For the supporters of the pro-Islamic parties, one of the most important three characters of an Islamist party was that it had respect for religion with 88.9 percent. Others were, too, its nationalism with 3.7 percent, and lastly its position which advocated individual rights and freedoms with 3.7 percent (Sarıbay, 1985: 179). However, the most basic reason behind their supporters' encouragement was more hidden in these Islamist parties' relationship with religion, and in how much

important they gave to Islam as a cultural belonging and identity in society. At this point, there was no suspicion that this political tradition saw religion as the most essential component of society by defining it, namely Islam, as a political-social belonging at the top. For, as Dağı pointed out,

Islamist political movement had tried to conduct a doctrinal politics based on religion, namely Islam in Turkey. It had carried the Islamist fluctuations and their ideological influence of that period. It was politics that had, to a large extent, been continued in 1960s and 1970s.

As a result of this, some religious orders or/and groups supported the formation of those parties, and formed their political cadres by joining in among the founders of these political parties. For this reason, it was an important source that they had laid the bases of Islamist parties in Turkey (Sarıbay, 1985: 167 and Yavuz, 2003: 209). These groups, identified with the Islamist parties of the 1960s and 1970s, were pious and conservative people that had been members of religious orders and organizations. Because, as Bayramoğlu expressed:

In Turkey, Islamism as an intellectual effort, not an ideology, has been more important. It formed a strong political ground, especially considering religious orders. Ranging from Naqshbandis, and Nurettin to Gümüşhanevi and Kotku ecolas, these religious orders produced National View, and later on Motherland Party.

They were introduced as ‘oppressed, silent Muslim masses’ which the Islamist parties represented (Narlı, 1999: 39, and Yavuz, 2003: 209) Economically, these parties advocated small and middle-sized enterprises in the small-anatolian cities and towns, ruptured from the Justice Party (JP) led by Demirel, which was anymore believed to begin to defend large industrialist and businessmen’ economic interests, based more on secular and Istanbul-centered capital. For instance, Erbakan was to frequently express that his parties was the voice of the small enterprises and farmers, which hardly continued their life in the furthest provinces of Anatolia, since they emphasized social and economic justice and equal distribution of national wealth. These economic groups, which had no access to economic resources and government

jobs, and was politically rather defenseless, voted for those parties (Sarıbay, 1985: 98 and Yavuz, 2003: 210). Because, as Taşkın remarked,

With the establishment of a secular and national republic, all everything had been closed down, ranging from many religious sects to Bektashi orders of dervishes. More importantly, the republic had wiped urban Islam out. Thus, Islamism was to become a politics which had been intertwined with mosque and involved peasantry and conservatism. Erbakan had risen on this historical background.

With the historical-social background comprised of peasantry and conservatism, Islamism was mostly to consist of religiously-conservative Sunnis groups that engaged in agriculture and lived in villages in the rural regions. It also included small traders, and artisans of the small provinces far from the centre. The only thing that these groups wished was to benefit from all opportunities of modernization economically and socially of which themselves was deprived, owing to their religious-traditional opposition to Kemalist-secular establishment (Narlı, 1999: 38). Keyman argued that:

In this period, interestingly, religion was the most important clientalist, populist and nepotist tool in the course of being governed society by the state, and additionally, in the state-society relationships. More importantly, this had created a -political-ground for the Islamist parties.

It has been claimed that they consisted of three social strata: first, new elites that generally engaged in self-employment and got training in secular educational institutions of republic by coming from devout families with provincial origin; second, pious-conservative small and medium-sized enterprises that occupied with commerce and industry in the province; and lastly third, low-income Sunni-devotees that lived in both metropolitan cities and province (Çakır, 2005: 545). For those social groups, NO's parties had a politically strong developmentalist language and statist ideas, which meant broader economic resources and job opportunities. Keyman underlined that:

They pursued a national and national-developmental politics. In order to put this politics into practice, they had taken advantage of

clientalist and nepotist relationships. For, their political goal was to get involved in the existing political-social order.

They had believed that with a developmentalist and statist political propaganda, this political movement would present some economic and technological opportunities of modernization to small merchants, artisans, shopkeepers and peasants in rural areas deprived of economic benefits of modernization with its economic policies focusing on social justice and the state's role of distribution in economic sphere. For this, there were constructions of factories among Islamist parties' economic programmes by initiating a "heavy industry" breakthrough in each administrative district (Toprak, 1984: p. 126, 132). For, these policies were a way of taking service to people, in a similar way to the other right politics in Turkey, just as the centre-right of DP or AP. It was one of fundamental political mottos of Islamist parties in Turkey, the main political aim of which was to present a number of services provided by economic and technological investments of modernization.

On the other hand, as for the political ideology of the early National View Islamism, one of the most remarkable difficulties that we are encountering, in whether academic sense or political-intellectual one, is that this politics' position was unable to be entirely found out in Turkish political spectrum. Çakır stated that it has been the most important of a series of problems of Islamist political movement. He described this as 'ideological uncertainty'. From his standpoint, because of not having strong intellectual backgrounds and experienced political cadres, the existing secular political-judicial order was, to a great extent, restricting conducting an Islamist politics. (Çakır, 2005: 546). But yet, it has been possible, we think, to reveal the ideological scheme of Islamism in Turkey by focusing on Islamist parties' political arguments, their leader and political cadres' statements, and the assertions and explanations at academic and intellectual level. Lastly, before giving the details of its ideological framework, it is needed to note that Turkish Islamism was an original politics, different from many Islamist political movements throughout the world.

For one thing, Islamism showed up with the basic claim that it was 'true' representation of the right by 'filling the present gap in the right-politics' (Mardin,

1993: 105 and Çalmuk, 2005: 559) in Turkish political life. It asserted to become dissimilar from other politics, which represented westernization and a rejection of the Ottoman-Islam history. It defined itself as a ‘indigenous’ and ‘national’ politics in sense of frequently advocating the Ottoman heritage and Islamic culture, and of not alienating from the people’s cultural values and beliefs with Islamic roots (Toprak, 1985 and Mardin 1993). Demirel asserted that:

The main issue of this politics was devoutness, and interested in putting its own understanding of good society based on religiousness into practice by capturing state power. For this reason, it saw Demirel and his centre-right politics as a colorless and scentless political tendency that had moved away from its own -Islamist- culture and had an understanding of laicism akin to the RPP.

For instance, by propounding that there were three main views, involving “liberal”, “leftist”, and “national” ones, in Turkish politics, Süleyman Arif Emre, one of the foremost members of Islamist parties and the former chairman of MSP, suggested that his own party represented ‘national view’ (Sarıbay, 2005: 581). The term ‘national’ was implying both a religious, in sense of expressing a Muslim-believer community, and indigenous political outlook as statement of an original political movement different from other radical political currents and Islamist politics in the Muslim world. It had an ambiguous implication, religious or nationalist, as it was a political current based on Ottomanist, nationalist independence, Islamist, and economically modernist-developmental directions (Çalmuk, 2005: 554, Çakır, 2005: 546 and Sarıbay, 1985: 114). With the political implications above, Islamism was fundamentally a criticism of Western orientation of –secular- Turkish elite from a cultural(ist) standpoint grounded on religious values, morality, mores, symbols, and rituals. In the first place, it had rejected the imitation of Western cultural patterns, which was implemented by the secular-Kemalist reforms in the early republican period, since it gave a great importance to traditional family structure and social life which were woven around more religious components. This politics more often explained the world in the framework of the cultural and economic imperialism of the West (Toprak, 1985: 124, 126). For, as Demirel indicated:

In this period, the National View movement had an anti-westernism which Demirel did not have. It was an anti-American politics and had a strong criticism of Americanism and capitalism. Most particularly, its anti-capitalist and anti-western vein was surpassingly powerful.

In the end, in sense of not having western roots and coming from a ‘foreigner or unknown’ ideological position (liberal or left-wing), and lastly of becoming an apologist of the Ottoman-Islamic history, the early National View parties presented themselves as an “authentic” and “indigenous” representation of Turkish nation. As indicated earlier, this representation was in essence a right-wing politics. This politics had a quite eclectic (Çakır, 2005) political-ideological position because of consisting of all implications of Turkish-right from the centre-right to ultra-nationalist politics.

For this, the early National View Islamism strived to cope with the “ideological uncertainty” (Çakır, 2005) by framing the main elements of the right-politics through its own political viewpoint. There were two basic political implications of the right-politics led by the Islamist parties. One was nationalism (milliyetçilik) while other was a shrined-centralized conservatism (mukaddesatçılık) framed with the dominant right-politics in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Erbakan embraced those two components of the right-leaning politics, which he described as the rightist, rather than an Islamist mission. For him, there were three political directions in the world: one, communism; other, Zionism; and the last, each nation’s own nationalism and shrined-centralized conservatism. He propounded that we had to prefer the third political direction, which was defined as nationalist and shrined-centralized conservatism, by claiming that the way to represent the right was able to be possible with such a political direction (Çakmur, 2005: 559). Despite all these, Gergerlioğlu highlighted that:

Turkish Islamism began little more differently. It was a reaction, including the collapse of the Ottoman and resentment directed to Atatürk. It had claimed that our values were disregarded, and that religious values were neglected for the sake of westernization and modernization. So, this politics was to be the name of a great anger with such arguments.

Of course, Erbakan was, too, aware of the perception which his party had been a militant and puritan-Islamist political party decisive to end ‘moral corruption’ which he portrayed as the most significant feature of modern Turkey. At the same time, it was said that he was ready to shut down ballet schools and similar non-moral institutions (Mardin, 1993: 105). In so doing, his primary goal was to separate his own party from other rightist politics or/and parties. For this, he highlighted that a conservative-religious spiritualist (maneviyatçı) and moralist (ahlakçı) politics had been one of the most essential characters of the Islamist parties led by him. These parties attracted attention to significance of spiritual-moral values in solving the issues politically or economically. In Turkey, with right-inclined orientations, one had to comprehend a right-politics in this way. The reason was that the early National View parties had been ‘true’ representative of the right-politics within Turkish political spectrum (Çakmur, 2005: 559). Because, as Gergerlioğlu signified:

Erbakan had tried to form a movement linked with the moral codes of Anatolia. He attempted at conducting an Anatolia-based movement. Obviously, he was cold to the -political- currents able to come from outside. Besides nationalist-conservative orientation, his fundamental aim was to conduct a -political- movement, which involved the conservative values of Anatolia, with religious order’s leaders, which influenced generations.

Based on a strong moralism and shrined-centralized conservatism, this cultural disposition of Turkey’s Islamism had been one of its most distinguishing characters making different from the other forms of the right-politics. With a more puritan sense, in a culture-based politics, its major political argument was ‘cultural corruption’. In order to preclude this corruption, Gültekin suggested that:

Islamism attempted at prohibiting abortion, and aimed at predominantly giving religious lessons in schools. At the same time, it had ostracized those who wore mini skirt.

For this politics, what underlying all these was the weakening of traditional family and its authority over children, younger’ disrespect for older, youths’ impiety, the increasing of pornography and sexual liberty, women’s rising interest to Western wearing-style, the proliferation of nightclubs and bars with the alcoholic drinks and Western amusements everywhere. Further, some social activities as in movie and

theater, and television programmes were increasingly challenging social morals and norms by allowing for Western productions, which corrupted the traditional family values and social and religious precepts (Toprak, 1985: 124). So, Mardin interpreted this political disposition of Islamism in Turkey as appearing a more provincial and puritan-based Islamist politics, which focused on taking a number of measures to prevent the coming of Western-secular culture to Turkey (Mardin, 1993: 35, 105).

This politics entered into Turkish political scene with the slogan, “morals and spirituality before”, in accordance with the political disposition framed with more cultural issues stated above. It was to become one of the most fundamental components of Turkish Islamism beyond a slogan. In attempting to define the ideological scheme of the 1960s and 1970s’ Islamism by studying the statements of the Islamist parties’ leaders and political cadres, and their party programs, Sarıbay states that they framed this as a ‘spiritual development’ in their own programmes. There were religious knowledge and teaching behind such a development. The basic way to fulfill this was educational institutions. For, the Islamist parties of National View had aimed at the spiritual and mental education of individuals by concentrating more on a spiritual development and moralism. According to their programmes, the most important thing that lied behind an economic order was a moral order (Sarıbay, 1985: 102-103). Also, such an education was to mean the reaffirmation of a Muslim way of life. The way to accomplish this was an accurate policy of education. Because, the main reason that Turkey fell behind in development was the educational policies shaped by the educational philosophy of the secular-national establishment, which focused on the imitation of Western civilization and technology, and on the degeneration of the national history and culture grounded on the Ottoman and Islam history. For this, in Turkey Islamist politics had firstly, states Toprak, targeted a rapid development as a way of resurrecting “indigenous” cultural values, which provided a basis for ‘a new work ethic’ with spiritual and moral attributions. This form of development was to make a distinction between technology and civilization (Toprak, 1984: 125-126). With only such development, the ‘heavy industry’ move, which the early National View parties had adopted as an economic programme, might have succeeded. It formed the bases of a political and economic independent.

This way of economic development with a rapid industrialization was frequently declared by the party spokesmen. For, the issue of industrialization was one of the most significant elements of the party ideology (Toprak, 1984: 126 and Sarıbay, 1985: 103). In economic matters, the other emphasis was on social justice. Çakır points out that this emphasis was an important political component differentiating Islamist politics from other right-politics. He remarks that the Islamist parties competed with the leftist politics by advocating the state's intervention to economy to carry out social justice, and with the rightist politics thanks to its conservative-religious spiritualism –*maneviyatçılık*- (Çakır, 2005: 547 and Mardin, 1993: 106). Aktaş also underlined that:

In those periods, Islamism demanded a just society and defended social justice, alongside anti-Americanism, anti-NATO, and anti-colonialism.

For this reason, Turkish Islamism was fundamentally opposed to a capitalist economic order, which “advocates an unregulated market economy and unconditionally mobility of capital”. Nor did it accepted a communist order, which grounded on “dispossessing of individuals’ economic rights and freedoms”. As an alternative to a capitalist or socialist order, with an economic and moral development, the core element of Islamist politics was to build a ‘moral order’, and to create a “believer type of human who participates in social life and economic activities (Sarıbay, 1985: 103). This type of man and envision of ‘moral order’ were acutely anti-capitalist and anti-socialist/communist political stance, in conformity with the claim which the capitalist and socialist order were materialist and immoral ones. To be more precise, capitalism was to be refused as a consequence of having a dominant opinion that this order was wholly inclined to defending big capital' rule and interests. As for socialism, it was to be objected since it was seen as a political-social order restricting individual liberties. The main reason why they were not approved was also that they had been “materialist and selfish” and deprived of a “moral basis”. (Eligür, 2010: 69). For, the National View was a politics oriented to a state-based development, social justice, and economically and culturally the building of a moral order based on symbolic, cultural and moral aspects of Islam. It firstly

aimed at creating a cultural-moral order surrounded with social life. An economic order was to form according to this cultural-moral order.

The political and ideological strength of Islamist politics was to stem from being promoted by some religious orders, (Mardin, 1993: 34, 107 and Yavuz, 2003: 173-174), namely Naskhibendi order or/and the Nurcus groups, either with electoral support or an intellectual production. The followers of each two religious organizations, Naskhibendi and Nurcu, had played active role during the institutionalization of this politics under a party organization (Çakır, 1994:23, Yavuz, 2005: 592-593, and Eligür, 2010: 66). Aktaş propounded that:

Naskhibendi was the original base of the National View. Because, the National View was a movement founded under the leadership of Mehmet Zahid Kotku. This religious order was reserved against the West. It was a more conservative movement, not too sectarian.

The support of the Naskhibendi religious order was so clear in the emergence of Islamist politics in Turkish political life. The party cadres and leadership were in so close relationship with that religious order. So, Naskhibendi religious organization had been quite influential in the shaping of the National View Islamism. Bayramoğlu expressed that:

This religious order has been an individual-centred movement, not ideology-centred. It has focused on increasing the numbers of believer Muslims. It was a movement that has tried to extend and popularize its domain by creating a believing Muslim through various networks. It has been the main core of Turkish Islamist movement.

The said influence had rendered possible the formation of one of the most apparent characters of Islamist politics, which distinguished it from the centre-right and ultra-nationalist politics in Turkey. Yavuz read this influence as interpreting and presenting Islamic symbols and norms within concept of a culture, rather than religion (Yavuz, 2003: 212). Mardin did attempt at defining this politics by referring to one of the most essential features of Naskhibendi order. He stated that this order appeared in the modern arena with a fiercely ‘anti-secular’ and ‘anti-imperialistic’ attitude. The traditional Naskhibendi order had become prominent with its objection

to 'Western European Christian culture, which this order defined as an 'other'. He has interpreted this situation as "the promotion of the ideological use of Islam by highlighting the fact that the West was perceived as a hostile culture and that it was one of the greatest 'preoccupations of Islam. From now on, there was an Islam or/and Islamism that appeared and shaped as a culture (Mardin, 1993: 212). As a result of this, as Toprak has remarked, the early National View Islamism looked at the world in the context of the cultural and economic imperialism of the West. Rather than an integration with the Third World countries, this look was to express a 'co-operation among the Muslim countries'. For instance, the Islamist parties of those periods had acutely objected to 'Turkey's entrance into the Common Market'. This was linked with their oppositions to European Economic Community (EEC) perceived as a Christian-dominated organization willing to 'melt the Muslim Turkish nation within Christian Europe'. In the place of such a community, they were to recommend the foundation of a 'Moslem Economic Community' (Toprak 1985: 126-127). Also, this order's influence on Islamist politics in Turkey was seen in their attitudes towards Jews and Israel, in not only their opposition to EEC. For instance, Erbakan, the chief leader of Islamism in Turkey, and his supporters were excessively susceptible to anti-Semitism and anti-Israel. Even, a daily newspaper, Milli Gazete, published in İstanbul since January 1973 and predominantly known as organ of the Islamist parties in Turkey, was filled with attacks on Jews and the state of Israel by identifying communists, freemasons, Christian missionaries, Greeks, and Jews with one another. Particularly, these attacks on Jews, Zionism and Israel, generally defined as the enemies of Islam, was continued for years for revitalizing this political current's contrast to EEU, which was defined as a Catholic organization supported by Zionist Jews and freemasons (Landau, 1988: 298-299).

To sum up, the Islamist political current, mostly known as National View –Milli Görüş-, had shaped as a political opposition to Kemalist-secular modernization. For, during this modernization the Kemalist-secular establishment rejected Islam and the Ottoman history as the primary component of identity, and cleaned Islam and its cultural, moral and symbolic values from public sphere in creating a collective identity. Economically, this politics was opposed to other rightist (AP) and leftist

(CHP) ones with argument of more statist and developmentalist economic policies, and social justice in favor of small merchants, artisans, shopkeepers and peasants in the less-developed provincial cities and rural regions of country. The National View's Islamism consisted of four fundamental constituents, including culture, industrialization, social justice, and education. It was at the same time a populist politics based on economically a developmentalist politics and national economic policies, and cultural and religious mobilization. Yavuz described it as 'hybrid populism' (Yavuz, 2003: 212). With its typical political –ideological elements stated above, the early National View Islamism was to represent an original political position in Turkish politics. However, its political life came to an end with a military coup carried out by Turkish army on September 12, 1980.

#### **3.3.4. The Late National View Islamism (1980s-1990s)**

At the Following the September 12 military coup Turkey has entered into totally a new political threshold, which was reshaped political and economic structure. Economy was restructured towards neoliberal economy policies on the basis of deregulation, privatization, minimal government intervention, and the reduction of public expenditure on social services. Political structure was redesigned after the closure of the present political parties and currents, involving the radical left-politics, the social-democrat, the centre-right, and Islamist and ultra-nationalist politics. Also, their leaders and political cadres were banned from politics and penalized in various ways. Some trade union confederations and many civil society-based associations had been closed down. The coup had forbidden all political activities which were charged with making way for political uncertainty and violence, and ideological polarization. For this reason, the 1980 military intervention was not only a coup, but also expressing the far-reaching political and economic transformations, especially through the 1982 constitution (Atasoy, 2009: 84 and Çınar and Duran, 2008: 29). Islamist parties took their share of these transformations either. The coup shut down Islamist party and prohibited the 27 founder members of the party, included Erbakan, from politics. It reordered the role of Islam in the public life (Toprak, 1988: 126-127, Yavuz, 1997: 67 and Yavuz, 2003: 218). In the end, considering all these, tith the September 12 military coup, Turkey experienced a transitional stage restructured by

the military officers before democratic politics and elections. To a civil-democratic politics was passed immediately after the military administration had allowed to carry out first post-coup national elections in 1983.

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Turkish Islamism was addressed around globalization and economic transformation, which occurred all the world. More precisely, its changing social base was analyzed and emphasized after the transformation in economy policies and class structure, particularly along with Özal's neoliberal economic policies based on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, export-oriented trade, competitive market economy, post-fordist production, and the decline of import-substituting industrialization (ISI), a model of state-led development (Gülalp, 2001, Öniş, 1997 and Yavuz, 1997).

Having underlined that, after 1980s, the Islamist movement began to become more important for himself, Keyman stated that:

One of the most remarkable results of the 1980 coup has been the integration with globalization expressed as the Özal years. This integration was a beginning of the structuring directed to liberalization and free market based on neoliberal -policies- today. Thus, Islamism was to start to be more significant in economic sense. That was also the case in sociological sense.

From now onward, Islamism was to be represented by the Welfare Party (WP), 'a multi-class political movement' which had consisted of small and medium-scale provincial businessmen, petty bourgeoisie of big cities (Yavuz, 1997), working classes and civil servants (Toprak, 1988: 129) and members of young professional middle class, students, low-income groups and a broad externalized and dispossessed population in metropolitan cities, along with rapid urbanization and the formation of a political collectivity within religious terms based on a cultural project and superiority (Gülalp, 1999 and Gülalp, 2001). For this reason, the late National View Islamism took its social support from a large social spectrum, ranging from the upper and middle classes to the lower ones. In this sense, it was a more urban political movement as different from the former.

Taking into account all these views above, the 1980s had been an important turning point in the encouragement of political Islam as a populist movement, with the changing of economy and class structure in Turkey. As Dağı expressed,

Especially, following 1980s, the Islamist politics begun to embrace a more popular politics by bearing the 1960s and 1970s politics, which could not flourish and improve, in mind. It cannot be directly named as a class politics, since it was a movement that had highlighted a number of political messages, like social justice and equality.

These years were at the same time to become prominent with the weakening of trade unions, the emerging of new technologies of production, such as post-Fordism instead of Fordism, and the promotion of flexible forms of capital accumulations. The most important among those new forms was subcontracted production, the latest mode of production, which enabled bosses to opt out of the control of trade unions and gets rid of many restrictions in laying off workers and employing with lower wage. Because, the global trends of economy were anti-statism, civil society, and private entrepreneurship. In line with those trends, the Welfare party, which reorganized Islamist politics after 1980, was to advocate civil society against the state, pluralism, and autonomy against the centralized modern-state, since it was in favor of the promotion of individual initiatives and disengagement of state with all economies activities. Its social base was mostly composed of small businessmen and middle class professionals. It was quite natural that it had had a more post-nationalist and post-statist position in politics (Gülalp, 1999: 27-29). Bayramoğlu argued that:

The mentioning years were a period that in the Özal period, small and middle-sized capital ever-increasingly raised its share in either bank and economic system or the centre, in conjunction with incorporating into small markets in the West and the preparing of technological infrastructure. It was economic base of the Welfare party and Islamic movement.

The main reasons why these results had arisen were globalization and a competitive-neoliberal market economy, which negatively affected the worker's working conditions but gradually also increased the small and medium-scale employers' power. In Turkey, political Islam grew in this convenient ground which has ended traditional working-class politics and provided the rise of petty enterprises (Gülalp,

2001: 435-437). The government policies in the post-1980 period gave a great support for arising these economic outcomes by undertaking an active role in particularly the building of organized industrial districts for the small and medium-sized enterprises, for example in the recently gradually-growing five provinces of Anatolia such as Denizli, Gaziantep, Konya, Çorum, and Edirne. More importantly, Özal's free market policies were to accelerate the growth of small and medium-scale entrepreneurs by promoting small-size provincial businessmen and the petty bourgeoisie composed of merchants, contractors, restaurant owners, and relatively small-scale industrialists. Yavuz alleged that these classes were one of major reasons of the Welfare party, which had economically liberal dispositions but socially Islamic ones (Yavuz, 2003: 215). Therefore, new economic developments and far-reaching changes, which they created in class structure and the mode of production had been one of main factors in the rise of political Islam. Bayramoğlu highlighted that view. For him:

This was a formation that had emerged with getting a great deal of factors expressed as socio-economic causalities and class factors in the world and Turkey conditions. It would be mistake to look at issue from a single factor. That is to say, there was a too large class story behind this.

There was a close tie between those classes, which increasingly grew in the neoliberal and free market-orientated conditions of the 1980s, and the Welfare party (WP). The party was to defend the political and economic interests of these rising businessmen (Öniş, 1997: 758). For instance, MÜSİAD - the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen-, which organizes and represents the economic interests of those businessmen, had begun to support this party (Öniş, 1997, Yavuz, 2003 and 1997, and Gülalp, 2001).

Another social group behind the rapid rising of political Islam in 1980s and 1990s was economically poor and low-income groups who lived in the periphery of big metropolitan cities and constituted a great majority of those coming from small provincial towns and rural regions. The success of Welfare party in the large cities was to originate the migrations from the countryside. Above all, the large parts of those migrations were fundamentally to consist of working classes and urban poor.

However, the welfare party was at the same time the voice of the provincial people living in smaller cities with traditional way of life woven around religious-conservative elements and a strong belief system (Gülalp, 1999: 34). For, as Bayramoğlu pointed out,

In Islamism, the victimization -mağduriyet- language, the representation of the periphery, and the criticism of system were too powerful in those years. It was a heterogeneous structure, involving not only the Islamists, but also other groups and components. However, it would not have been an Islamist movement if it was just an economic movement. As a matter of fact, it would express overlapping economic polarization with cultural one. In a word, its cultural assertion was important, but could not be too strong if there were not class ruptures. Its motivation was coming from being a cultural-political claim, but yet economic motor behind it was extremely significant.

As for the big metropolitan cities, it was predominantly the poor neighborhoods that had formed the social base of the party there. Taşkin argued that:

This situation turned Islamism into an urban movement as a result of the increase of population in the peripheries of cities, and of the migration originated from Kurdish movement. This politics was anymore a product of urban sociology. That sociology was proceeding to the centre from the periphery.

As an alternative politics with the downfall of the statism and the crisis of modernist ideologies, such as nationalism and socialism, the Welfare was a representation of a post-nationalist and post-socialist understanding of “justice” based on the idea “just order”, which aimed at creating a “just” and “egalitarian petit-bourgeois society composed of individual entrepreneurs” (Gülalp, 2001: 440-442). Similarly, with reference to the opening speech of the First Congress of the party of Ahmet Tekdal, Toprak stated that he used an extensive statistical data criticizing Özal’s policies, and that the WP tried to get the support of civil servants and workers, in a sharp contrast to its predecessors, NOP and NSP, which was, for the most part, composed of small merchants, traders, shopkeepers, and artisans (Toprak, 1988: 129 and Yavuz, 1997: 71).

Lastly, to the foregoing social base of the political Islam the political cleavage between secularists and devout-conservative and Islamist groups has been added

with the formation of a society sharply divided within secular and Islamist socio-cultural lines. In this cleavage between two opponent groups, the aforementioned social groups has been defined more over an Ottoman-Islam tradition, whilst the other has been identified with a Kemalist-secular identity. At this stage, Aktaş propounded that:

This cleavage was a more cultural formation, rather than a class one. Because, Islamism was, to a large extent, the full of Islamic-conservative assertions, as in an East-West contrast. The separation between them has been elucidated by the cleavage in question.

The Welfare party was a new stage of pro-Islamic victory by voicing the pious-conservative groups' demands and Islamist tendencies in public sphere. At the same time, it was a political party that had mobilized a broad segment of population, ranging from religionist Kurdish groups to the new emerging conservative-Moslem Anatolian bourgeoisie (Yavuz, 1997: 72, Yavuz, 2003: 214-215, Gülalp, 1999 and Gülalp, 2001). Further, there were some religious orders, for example like Naskhibendi , which had played a key role in the advancement of the Islamist Welfare party by strengthening in the employers' organization such as MUSİAD and promoting entrepreneurship and business connections in economy (Yavuz, 1997: 72). Specially, Bayramoğlu stated that:

The religious orders, ranging from Naskhibendi movement to Nurcus, played a very important role in Turkish politics, particularly in the context of elite production. The roots of National View had come from those. Its founder and producer were Zahid Kotku. He had manufactured the National View.

The religious aspect of the WP did not stem from relationships with religiously-conservative associations and social groups, and Sufi-religious organizations but also there was also a religious nationalism shaped around historically an Ottoman and Islamic links. This provided a basis for that the party took the support of Sunni-Muslim Turkish and Kurdish population under a belief umbrella, except for Alevi community. Notedly, among the supporters of party in big cities like İstanbul and Diyarbakır were Kurdish populations as different from other parties for emphasizing historically the Ottoman and Islamic bonds, not Turkish ethnicity. Thus, the Kurds was one of the party's most remarkable constituencies whenever it entered into

elections, whether parliamentary or municipal. However, given all these things mentioned above, as Yavuz would point out, if the WP's constituency is regionally looked at, there seems that the WP formed its own social base by benefiting from three areas of confrontation in Turkish society. These had consisted of (just order-based) 'Islamism versus Marxism and liberal-capitalism' in the western metropolitan cities of the country, of an ethnic separation -Turks versus Kurds- in East and South Eastern region, and lastly of a religious division -Sunni versus Alevi- in Inner and Central Anatolia (Yavuz, 1997: 74, 78-79).

The Islamist view of the WP's predecessor, the MNP and the MSP, had focused on economically a national development based on 'heavy industrialization', and on morally a religious-spiritual development as opposed the Kemalist-secular modernization's outlook of westernization. Just like the former Islamist parties, the WP gave a great important to the promotion of 'heavy industry' for developing Turkey with such a move. The easiest way to fulfill this was to annihilate regional disequilibrium and incompatibilities between income groups. For the solution of disequilibrium and incompatibilities in question, Demirel suggested that

The Welfare party (WP) defended the idea 'just order' in economic sphere. This assertion had contained quite statist and interventionist elements in itself.

Also, as Dağı remarked,

This politics was -basically- a movement that had highlighted a number of political messages, like social justice and equality.

This was the party's outlook on economy. Keyman saw more economy than others as the reason of the division, in his words, the National View-JDP or the traditionalists-innovationists, within the Islamist politics. For him,

The National View was a movement of transitional stage from 1980s to 2000. It was not able to give an answer about globalization and economic integration. This movement's view concerning economy and economic issues was more in favor of national development and nation state, in a sharply contrast with free-market economy and global integration. Conversely, the JDP has been more pro-globalization and pro-free market. That process has made the division clearer.

On the other hand, differently from other left and right-politics, the WP also underlined that it was needed to conduct an independent foreign policy towards the interests of Turkey by using its own manpower, and resource. For the party, this political orientation was possible with being set up close relations with the countries, which have ‘spiritual’ (might be read as ‘religious’ either), and historical and cultural background, namely the Muslim Middle East (Toprak, 1988: 129). Demirel advocated that:

The WP involved anti-capitalist and anti-westernist political characters. It had a variety of projects, such as D8, and was not leaning towards the EU.

This politics developed as part of an anti-western political disposition. Because, among the party’s goals were to constitute closer links and unions between Turkey and the rest of Islamic world. For this, it had been one of the most significant targets to be suspended relationships with Europe and Western states, and even more, to be put an end to some deals made with them, particularly the Custom Union agreement, which was signed between Turkey and European Union in 1996. For this reason, in Turkish politics the Welfare party took shape its political position by standing against their secular and Western-oriented political tendencies, including the centre-right and the left and social democrat politics (Öniş, 1997: 754-755). Besides this, as Gergerlioğlu pointed out,

Along with the WP, this political movement at the same time continued its anti-imperialist and anti-Americanism politics. In other words, it had aimed at maintaining its traditional politics.

Its political stance at issue in the face of the West and European countries had been one of major elements in framing its political identity. What provided basis for such an identity was Islam and its symbolic and cultural components.

At this point, it might be required to open a separate parenthesis in order to explain the party’s emphasis on religion. The Welfare party wished to maintain with the former Islamist parties’ insistence on Islam as a significant moral, cultural and symbolic constituent of loyalty. As Demirel spoke out,

The Welfare party tradition had brought Islam forward. Because, in it the emphasis on Turk and Turkishness was more latent and invisible. With this aspect, this tradition was Islamist. But, it did not certainly keep Turkishness out while underlining Islam and Islamism.

Just as the former National View parties, it had accepted that Islam was one of essential components of Turkish identity, since 'being Turk' meant 'being Muslim' in the WP's political outlook. So, the party's emphasis on religion was eminently clear (Poulton, 1997: 187 and Toprak, 1988: 129). But, though the party's identity was, once again, built on the moral, cultural, and symbolic elements of Islam, in the new version of the late National View Islamism the political identity was to be formulated around the idea 'just order'. In the new identity, the party only concentrated on political economy as the party's goal was to expand its voter base, and thus conquer political power. The 'just order' was meaning a new social-economic order on the basis of two concepts, namely right and justice, as opposed to the western social order. For it, there were two types of orders or civilizations in the world. One was the western civilization which had preferred 'force'; other, the 'just order' (i.e. Islamic civilization) which declared 'right'. The world was in search of a new order on the face of failure of two western orders like capitalism and communism, which the West civilization had set up. That might have been only 'just order' which the WP tried to realize in Turkish political arena (Dağı, 1998: 26). It was also in keeping with the party's Third Worldist and anti-imperialist view. This order was described by the party as a third way, based on a more mixed economic structure standing somewhere between the free market capitalism and the state-controlled socialism. In it, private enterprises had become main actors of economic development and progress on the one hand. But, on the other, the 'just order' was a social-economic order that the state undertook fundamental infrastructural services and played a distributional role. With that political promise, Islamist politics had differentiated itself from other centre-right and ultra-nationalist right politics and the left-socialist and social democrat politics (Öniş, 1997: 754). However, this economic order had rather pragmatic and opportunist implications, since whereas it rejected both capitalism and communism on the one part it had taken their positive aspects on the other part. Put it another way, it was opposed to interest but not profit, to

monopoly but not free competition, and to central planning but not state regulation (Gülalp, 1999: 27). At the same time, it was an eclectic and utopic project that the WP's social base could never understand, because of being complicated as well as hard to be explained by the party's prominent political cadres. So, Çakır highlighted that it was not able to go beyond being a slogan which sounded nice (Çakır, 1994: 133, Çakır, 2005: 558-559). As for the party's supporters, they interestingly saw social equality as one of fundamental goals of the 'just order'. For them, the 'just order' was symbolizing justice, a reliable social and economic development, the protection of state property, the end of nepotism and corruption, the collaboration between state and nation, and the conservation of unity of state. But, among its most significant priorities were the protection of the state and its unity.

In other respects, as Yavuz pointed out, the idea 'just order', quite the contrary to the widespread assertions in Turkey, was to represent neither an interest-free economic system nor a welfare state. On the contrary, it was never able to go beyond the efforts to abolish injustice and religious discrimination against devout people (Yavuz, 1997:73-74). By opposing to definitely western types of order such as capitalism and communism, it had promised a more Islamic order peculiar to Muslim societies with welfare, opportunity equality, and right and justice, on the lieu of the present economic orders defined as 'slavery. For, the dominant economic orders would were more tended to create an atheist and monopol economic-social order fashioned by imperialist and Zionist ideas. Quite the contrary, a 'just order' was to show the strength of Islam by putting an end to those monopol orders (Çakır, 1994: 135). It had primarily aimed at a spiritual development, alongside the protection of environment, the abolishment of corruption, the advocate of decentralized administration, the encouragement of individual initiatives, and the retreat of state from all economic activities (Gülalp, 1999: 27). Gergerlioğlu clearly expressed that:

The -welfare- party had oddly an economic development, and had defended an economic revolution. For this, a spiritual development was required before, and the heavy industrialization move was to come after.

So, at one other point, it was a more moral order with religious-Islamic implications, which declared to cease corruption, nepotism, discrimination and injustice. Its political classifications, which depicted the western social orders as atheist and Zionist, was to disclose this situation in question. In line with these political classifications, the Islamist Welfare party had returned to Islam so as to specify what constituted an 'unjust conduct' and how a Muslim community defined it. It used the term 'just order' as the key to a successful government by referring to historically an Ottoman and Seljuk tradition before the Kemalist-secularist modernization. Yavuz indicated that it was a type of thinking which attributed a 'sanctity' to the state given a 'Gazi' status, which based on 'the advocate of Islam against external attacks' and creates a feeling of loyalty to the state (Yavuz, 2003: 224).

After 1980, the most distinguishing character of Islamist politics was its anti-Westernism. Some Turkish scholars argued that the party's percept of external world, i.e. the West, was the most important source of the National View's formation of identity. A Turkish academician and columnist, Dağı was only one of those who has argued such an idea. He remarked that the political outcomes of the westernization and the alienating effects of Western values, and instead, the building of a new 'indigenous' national identity were continuously emphasized by the Islamist Welfare party. With anti-western political stance, Islamist Welfare party had been an unrivaled politics which gained a great popularity by gradually strengthening in those periods. Hence, since anti-Westernism was always one of the major political orientations to attract religious-conservative masses for the traditional Islamist politics, the wave of anti-Westernism in the first half of 1990s had been in favor of the Welfare party (Dağı, 2002: 6, 16). For, as Şener pointed out that:

Erbakan had defined the National View as an anti-westernist movement, as connected with anti-imperialism. He aimed at establishing an Islamic union against European Union, and D8 in lieu of G8.

This anti-Westernism had at the same time fed the party's Third Worldist outlook. There was a few points to be referred depending upon its perception of Third Worldist in question. Öniş stated these in three context: one, the party's Third

Worldist based on merciless attacks on the West by concentrating on specially Western values and Western imperialism; other, a critique of the established parties as ‘imitators of West’; and lastly, another, the ‘indigenous’ and ‘national’ character of the WP as ‘the only faithful party tied to the country’s historical and cultural heritage’ (Öniş, 1997: 753). In a similar vein, but Çakır, who had described the WP’s relevant political stance by addressing this issue from a different standpoint, read anti-Westernism as a result of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. He claimed that the Welfare party had a rigid anti-Westernist attitude, without making no concession from anti-Americanist and anti-Semitic political stance in Turkish politics. Because, it objected to all western international organizations, ranging from the European Common Market, the European shared currency (EURO), the EU’ membership to the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and even the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Instead of this, it wished to establish international Muslim organizations led by Turkey. Thus, Turkey was to be the leader of Islamic world by getting rid of being a ‘satellite country’, when WP came to power (Çakır, 2005: 565-566). In a nutshell, opposing to all values that the West was representing was the main source of the WP’s ideology. That its political identity was essentially defining in opposition to West which it claimed as ‘root of all present negations’ was not be merely an issue of foreign politics, but also it was sine qua non of the party’s political stance in domestic politics. For this reason, as Dağı underlined before, the WP was mostly a political movement that defined its own politics as an anti-thesis by ideologically and politically positioning itself on the face of the West (Dağı, 1998: 23).

Another significant factor in shaping ideological framework of Turkey’s Islamism following the 1980 military coup was new Islamist intellectuals, among of who have been Ali Bulaç, Abdurrahman Dilipak, and İsmet Özel. They influenced the political orientation of the post-1980’s Islamism with their views on democracy, state, law, and civil society. Likewise, Bayramoğlu argued that:

As a result of external world, a globalized Islamic language and assertions, this influence provided the emerging of an identity-based thing directed to an identity and individual-focused movement grounded on a new socialization, belonging and

network. It was a major wave. This once, another politicization was seen in the 80s' generation, including Ali Bulaç, and the like. Erbakan movement was a place that had been mirrored all these developments.

In addition to these views, they were defending civil society and minority rights. Although a modern state has been a bureaucratic-hierarchical organization based on national sovereignty over a given territory, for them an Islamic model of state was to be a “confederation of faiths”. This model had been carried into effect by the Prophet during his rule in Medina (Gülalp, 1999: 28). Starting from this historical and experiential background, the Islamist intellectuals’ views were to criticize the western democracy. Thus, they refused the western idea of democracy by being fed from anti-Westernist thoughts of Islamist thinkers living in the regions like Egypt or Indian Subcontinent. Also, they affected from the anti-imperialist criticisms which Turkey’s left had made. However, their criticisms concerning democracy and other issues were too far from formulating a concrete Sharia program, even if they had promised an alternative political order grounded on a long Islamic history as well as the influence of the Iranian Islam Revolution in 1979 (Çakır, 1994: 113-114). The Welfare party formed its own arguments with reference to political views developed by the foregoing Islamist intellectuals. Among these arguments, for example, were the system ‘of multiple legal-orders’, and the religious-political orders composed of individuals community designed by a legal order which corresponds to their beliefs. Gülalp propounds that it was the arguments that the WP had embraced in the 1993 convention. Afterwards, the WP was to offer a constitutional amendment based on these arguments regarding the dominant doctrine of secularism, with the encouragement of civil society versus the state, in the national assembly. They were, at times, emphasized by the party’s leader, Erbakan. The aforesaid arguments were diversely expressed by the mentioning Islamist intellectuals in Turkey. In their opinions, they were to put forward as a result of the criticism of the modern-bureaucratic state which centralizes a great deal of institutions or structures, ranging from law, education, and power to culture (Gülalp, 1999: 28). These intellectuals had, as Karasipahi has remarked, made Kemalism and its secular process of modernization responsible for all political, economic and cultural downfalls in society, and insisted that it was required to return to the sources of Islam and the

historical-political experiences of Islamic Golden Age, in place of imitation of the Western civilization. (Karasipahi, 2009: 11). Öniş saw all these as an outcome of a ‘postmodern wave’, which amounted to stressing on the values of a strong and pluralistic society as well as a cultural relativism, and approving the right of ‘others to co-exist’ (Öniş, 1997: 761-762). Laçiner interpreted this situation as a renaissance of Islamist-Muslim intellectuals. According to him,

The Islamist-Muslim intellectuals obtained a superior position, in sense of becoming more critical to intellectual, technical and sociological outcomes arising in the western world. They were more criticizing all results of modernity, ranging from industrialization to devastation of nature. They were also speaking of an Islamic political alternative and a new state model. That is to say, a self-reliance had come to them.

Considering all these, it seems that the party’s anti-Westernism was affected by those intellectuals’ thoughts. Therefore, it can be concluded that there was a close connection between the party’s political views and these intellectuals’ thoughts. This connection can be so easily seen by being taken a look at the Islamist intellectuals’ ideas, which have been somewhat expressed in a variety of Islamist magazines, including *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, *Umran* and *Tezkire* (Kentel, 2005).

### **3.3.5. Islamism After National View (The JDP Period)**

A new period began for Turkey’s Islamist politics, in sense of being reshaped by a military intervention -28 February process- which had forced the prime minister, Erbakan, to resign in a WP-led coalition founded with the TPP (True Path Party)’s support, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. It became different from the others, because of being incorporated some state institutions, notably university or/and jurisdiction, and media and civil organizations into the intervention in question (Bayramoğlu, 2013). Although the same things had occurred in the preceding years, for instance, the 1971 military memorandum which wished Süleyman Demirel’s resignation, the leader of Justice Party (JP) and a prominent rightist politician of the 1960s, Günalp pointed out that in 1997 the 28 February intervention completely differentiated from others as it was organized by civil associations, media, and some state institutions to dismiss a elected government. He defined this as a ‘postmodern

intervention’, since the struggle between the political power and the secular establishment led by Turkish military was maintained with media tools (Günel, 1999: 40). Likewise, Yeşilada expressed that the February 28 intervention was a “soft coup’ realized after the briefings given to media, university, and juridical institutions to overturn the Erbakan government (Yeşilada, 2002: 62). As a result of that, Erbakan withdrew from the coalition government by resigning in May 1997 (Mecham, 2004: 345 and Günel, 1999: 40). After a while, the case of closure for the Welfare Party was opened in the constitutional court with the claim that the party violated the secular principles of constitution and the code of political parties and was in anti-secular activities. Soon after, the Constitutional court closed down the Welfare Party in January 1998, and Erbakan and five other Welfare deputies, included Şevket Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and İbrahim Halil Çelik, were banned from political activities for five years (Taniyici, 2003: 463, Mecham, 2004: 345 and Günel, 1999: 40). In this way, the political life of the Party came to end and the prominent political cadres embarked upon some enterprises for the formation of a new political party. After the closure of the Welfare party (WP) by the Constitutional Court, new political party, the Virtue party (VP), which asserted that it had had an original political programme without accepting the claim to substitute the WP, appeared in Turkish political arena.

The debates on Islamism after the National View have mostly comprised the division occurring between the National View and the JDP in Islamist politics. A significant part of the debates was relevant to the VP. However, following this division, the political organization on which was dwelt has been the JDP, founded by the innovationists. The interviewees had different views with regard to this subject. Some argued that in Turkish Islamism the transformation began after the establishment of the Virtue Party, whereas others propounded that the main actor in transforming Islamist politics was the JDP. For instance, Bayramoğlu stated that:

After the 28 February process, two political parties, the VP and the JDP, was born. The VP was a transition party. But, there was a continuity between these two parties. The Virtue was an important inner-discussion, which had consisted of the overturn of Erbakan, the coming of a new generation in the place of the old one, and the reflection of new sociological and class dynamics.

Similarly, Keyman also signified that:

The party of the innovationists has been the JDP. In the wake of 2001 crisis, those innovationists, described as globalist and pro-free market movement, have triumphed in the division inside Islamism which basically began with global-economic integration. Because, the National View was a transition process from the early 1980s until the end of 1990s. The major actor has been the JDP in the integration with global and European market in the context of new middle classes and free-market.

However, Dağı alleged on quite the contrary. According to him;

The significant changes became in the Welfare party (WP) in sense of starting to conduct a popular politics. But, the most explicit and important change was in the Virtue party (VP). This politics, namely the VP, was a rather liberal movement.

Generally speaking, I think that the main actor of the transformation of Islamism was the JDP. But yet, the VP has been an important political threshold in explaining and understanding the transformation in question. For this reason, I will both refer to the literature, which has dealt with the foregoing transformation, and cite the interviewees' views concerning the transformation of Islamism after the National View, included the VP and the JDP.

Following the late 1990s and the early 2000s the social base of Islamist politics did not change much according to the previous periods, when the Islamist parties of National View had been supported by broad masses. Moreover, this social base had showed so great resemblances with that of the former Islamist parties. Most of religiously-conservative Turkish Muslims, who had undergone a change with industrialization, class transformation and capital accumulation, urbanization, mass education, media and communication tools, and global-neoliberal economic restructuring, played a very important role in constituting the social base of this period's Islamism. Yavuz remarked that, following the closure of the WP, the same social groups established a new political organization like the VP (Yavuz, 2003: 208).

As Bayramođlu indicated:

Included the VP, this social base has trained and gained strength after the Özal period, and more refers to the emerging of those who have had a mentality ready to get in more coherent contact with new liberal period outside the Cold War. These two parties, the VP and the JDP, have been the representative of a new generation, when looking through a class standpoint.

However, differently from other parties, the VP was to exceedingly highlight the importance of religious-conservative values and life-style. The basic reason behind the support of the religious-conservative social bases was that emphasis (Yeşilada, 2002: 74). For, as Mahçupyan emphasized:

In each two parties, the social base has been composed of a Muslim mass movement which has focused on globalization towards individual targets, and aimed at penetrating into public sphere and producing new centers by canalizing itself. This movement has intertwined with the headscarf, religious vocational schools, religiousness, and public visibility of religion. Because, it is Islam that has constituted and reinforced solidarity networks and created moral ties between that social base.

Many investigations, especially included the World Values Survey (WVS) studies, had similar findings with regard to the change of the voter base above. For instance, according to the data of the WVS of 1996 and Yılmaz Esmer's post-election study in 1999, the supporters of the VP were consisting of individuals with relatively low educational backgrounds. The study suggested that there were a close correlation between the values and beliefs of the party supporters, party activists, and party elites. Also, it expressed that the party supporters and/or activists stemmed from its extreme religious attitude that had lied behind their supports regarding the party and its leadership, and they were quite strict in the matter of attributing themselves to Islamic ideals (cited by Yeşilada, 2002: 74, 75-76). Considering all these, it can be concluded that the social base of the Virtue party (VP) and the Justice Development Party (JDP) was composed of a more religious-conservative electorate and tied to moral, cultural, and symbolic values and lifestyle of Islam. Actually, this was the case for all National View parties. With the National View roots, these parties had generally a strong emphasis on a pious culture, morals, symbols, and lifestyle in

order to separate itself from other right-wing political currents or/and parties in Turkey.

At another side of the social base of the party were class structure and economic transformation. The base at issue underwent a change in a more class sense, along with the emerging of new conservative middle classes and business world with globalization and new economic opportunities created by the Özal's neoliberal and exported-focused economic policies. On this point, particularly, Keyman focused on economic change and transformation within Turkish Islamism. For him:

Based on economic liberalism and export promotion the transition to an economy created an important break in Islamist politics. For, with the emergence of new middle classes in these groups, the periphery has tended towards globalization and Europeanization. The bearers of the periphery was İslamism or Islamist politics. This has been a period interwoven neoliberal market with Islamism.

These classes no longer wished to conflict with the state or the secular establishment, by force of its own class interests. Nor did it support the former Islamist parties' non-EU's policies and anti-Western political disposition, except for the Virtue party (VP). With the VP' new political vision, which promoted democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and Turkey's EU membership and abandoning its anti-western views (Dağı, 2005: 8, Güllalp, 1999: 41, and Taniyici, 2003: 474), as Yavuz remarked, they demanded to integrate with it, rather than to clash with the existing political-social order by supporting the VP in the elections (Yavuz, 2009: 141). Yet more, by declaring to renounce from the idea 'Just Order' the party had alleged to adopt economic policies in accordance with those classes' interests. For this, for instance, Recai Kutan, the chairman of the Virtue party, planned a range of visits to business associations and clarified that the VP had been no longer in close relationships with only MÜSİAD and deserted its preceding economic projects, including the removal of interest rate and the creation of a "just order" (Güllalp, 1999: 41). Yeşilada also expressed a similar view by arguing that in Turkey, the social base of Islamist parties, the VP and the JDP, in terms of both political parties, and civil organizations and religious orders, was Islamic capital (Yeşilada, 2002: 77). Having highlighted

that the fundamental intellectual break has been created by the innovationists separated from the Virtue party, Demirel propounded that:

The distinction between Erbakan's National View and conservative democrat has stemmed from the JDP's capitalist, neoliberal and pro-free market tendency. Erbakan remained archaic and his idea of just order did not understand capitalism and its logic. Secondly, there was an emphasis on the West, the EU and democracy.

Therefore, the mentioning classes' strong support was a result of those parties' new political approach to EU, US and Western-international organizations. For, with that approach, each two parties' prominent political cadres declared to Western public opinion that their party embraced western political system and values as democracy, human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, alongside of accepting the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and European Convention on Human Rights. Bayramoğlu stated that:

In Islamism, this transformation has been in search of a new language and invention. It has been attempt at banding conservatism, religiousness and democracy together. It was a period in contact with universal human rights, political freedoms, and universal value systems and rights. Hence, within the transformation mentioned, there have been at the same time universal values, liberal principles and democracy.

Nevertheless, intrinsically, the Virtue party was argued to initiate the basic transformation in the Islamist politics. For, following the closure of Welfare Party (WP), the political cadres and leadership of new party (VP), most of who were members of its predecessor (WP), deserted its old political jargon based upon a religious morals, culture, symbols and lifestyles , 'just order', anti-Westernism, and non-European Union. The Virtue party as an opposition party embraced a new political idea more shaped around the term democracy. For instance, Erbakan, the banned leader of the WP, initiated a "democracy campaign", which aimed at precluding party closures. For that, he endeavored to persuade other party leaders to act together with him for changing the code of political parties, which had turned Turkey into a graveyard of parties, and generally making a variety of laws to strengthen democracy (Gülalp, 1999: 40). However, Bayramoğlu objected to this opinion. He claimed that:

Erbakan was a cold war politician from the Demirel generation. His approach to faith and Islam was so clear. He had kept away from the West and attempted at rebuilding the tradition. He had political ideas based on domestic goods discourse and the construction of car and motor factories. He had politically aimed at establishing an Islamic civilization as opposed to the western civilization.

Despite Erbakan's political views, in Turkish politics, the party (VP) embraced a distinct political position grounded on a new' assertion that Turkey was not democratic enough, by abandoning from its old assertion that Turkey was not religious enough. The first signs to politically change the party gave in the first convention of the Virtue party, which the party organization carried out on 14 May, 1998. Kutan, who was elected by the party delegates in the congress as new leader of the party under Erbakan's influence, got to work on saying that the newly founded party had had an essentially democratic agenda by underling that it was not certainly the continuation of the Welfare party (WP). He expressed that his party's message, involving lots of things from a real democracy, human rights to political liberties, basically focused on the lack of democracy in Turkey (Mecham, 2004: 346). The party programme was utterly in compatible with the messages above as well. It emphasized that the party had adopted real democracy, human rights and freedoms in the widest sense, and the superiority of the will of the people. Also, in its programme the party saw basic rights and freedoms as unalienable rights of individual, and declared its commitment to international deals and contracts, among of which had been the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, the Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, the Paris Charter for a New Europe, and other international legal forms (cited by Taniyici, 2003: 474-475). The party organization and leadership, which was aware of difficult to struggle alone with the secular establishment, concentrated on forming an alliance with the West. Especially, its stance on EU shifted, and defended Turkey's integration to EU in a sharply contrast with the previous views concerning this union. Even, the party's leading political figures many times called for government to meet Copenhagen criteria, which would provide the full membership in the EU. Based on this stance, Kutan, the chairman of the party, laid emphasis on necessity of catching up EU standards in democracy by

demanding a civil constitution that answered the Copenhagen political criteria for individual rights and freedoms (Dağı, 2005: 9). Bayramoğlu argued that the party's changing political orientation was directly linked with the innovationists. According to him:

The story of the Virtue party was that of young generation. It was the party of the innovationist movement. Within the party, the Welfare ecote had dropped into a more secondary position, though winning the election. The young wing of the party has represented a more different mentality. At least, it has had no the cold war mentality. It was a mentality open to have intercourse with distinct social, economic and political systems. The victimization story has played an important role in changing the mentality. This story has unavoidably pushed this wing to democratic position and quest.

Likewise, Demirel expressed similar opinions about the Virtue party as to how and why Turkish Islamism transformed. For him::

The basic motivation behind this transformation has pertained to the innovationists. They have seen not be able to come to power with Erbakan's form to do politics. So, they have attempted at reformulating the National View, and argued not to apply to religion as a means of politics. They have emphasized on their Muslim identity. Consequently, it is not accurate to attribute to the Virtue party an ideological thing. It has been just a transition party.

However, the claim that the Virtue party broke away from the National View was many times put into words. It was also propounded by other important members of the party in different ways. For instance, Oya Akgönenç, joining to the Virtue party by coming from a centre-right politics, TPP, claimed that her party was a democratic platform, and that this platform consisted of solely democracy, human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. She stated that the only request of this platform from the secular establishment was freedom of religion and conscience. Another political character, Oğuzhan Asiltürk who was hitherto the most radical political figure of the traditionalist and one of the most persistent advocates of anti-European perspective and non-European Union, clearly defended Turkey's integration with the EU, and demanded from the government to fulfill European pressures for democratization (Usul, 2008: 178 and Mason, 1999: 3). Having read the political transformation,

which has grounded on the EU, political freedoms and rights, from a more economic perspective Keyman pointed out that:

In the Islamist politics, including the VP and the JDP, the change of political orientation was more interested in the integration with global and European markets. The actor of this change has been the JDP. This party has always attached a great importance to free market. When looked at free market-Islamism relationship, free market preceded the other within the party. So, not conservative democrat, the JDP was a liberal-conservative synthesis, since it has accepted liberal free market -ideology- and transformed Islamism into conservatism.

All in all, as would be seen above, along with the VP and the JDP, the Islamist politics transformed, because of unconditionally supporting the EU and accepting universal human rights, liberal political freedoms and rights able to contribute to Turkey's democratization. Following the late 1990s and the early 2000s, one of important turning points for Turkish Islamism has been that it changed its views with regard to the EU and the West.

Taking into account all these views, it can be concluded that with Islamist roots each two parties as a part of their new political position did not only gave up their opposition to West, but also embraced western political values like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. For instance, in the case of the VP, as Dađı signified, the most distinguishing feature of the party was its emphasis on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, immediately, after the closure of the Welfare party (WP) and the banning of Erbakan (Dađı, 2005: 8). Likewise, Taniyici alleged that the changes in the VP's political views and position did not stem from the emergence of a new fraction (reformists) within the traditionalists. In his view, presumably, the reformists was more willing in relation to change, but it was the old leadership that gave the start of changes which it 'saw as necessary with some feedback from both the conservatives and the reformist-wing (Taniyici, 2003: 476). According to akır, the Virtue party 'sincerely' advocated the European Union and its values, without "putting on any act". It was "the most fervent and stringent defenders of EU" (akır, 2005). However, the same thing was the case for the JDP. As Sambur highlighted, the JDP embraced political principles and values, which is in

compliance with Western values. As an imperative result of sociological conditions of Turkey, by rejecting the political use of Islam, not religion and religiousness, it tended towards supporting Turkey's European Union membership, free market economy, the development of human rights, the constitutional reforms, liberal democracy, rule of law, religious diversity, religious freedom (Sambur, 2009: 122). Specially, the main political agenda of the party has been the relationships with the EU. For, the party has fundamentally acknowledged the role of the EU for the advance of Turkey in in the areas of democratization and human rights. So, for it, the European Union was not only been a political entity necessary to be become member. At the same time, it was accepted as a 'democratic model'<sup>14</sup>

### **3.4. Conclusion**

It seems that the liberal approach has based upon two fundamental arguments to put forward its own views while analyzing and debating Islamism or Islamist politics in the Republican Turkey. One is the political cleavage between the secular establishment and the religiously-conservative groups. The interviewees have expressed this cleavage in various ways. Some has seen it as a political-cultural struggle between the centre and the periphery. Others has described it as a political-economic conflict between the state and society, or the Kemalist-seculars and the religiously-conservative Muslims. The other argument is economy and culture. In other words, these two concepts has been the conceptual tools appealed by the liberal approach to discuss the Islamist politics from its foundation to the present. Based on them, the aforesaid approach has defined the cleavage in question as the religiously-conservative groups' economic and cultural struggles against the secular establishment.

This approach has generally associated the emerging of Islamism after the establishment of a republican state with the secular establishment political orientations and implements. For, the secular establishment purged Islam from

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<sup>14</sup> Senem Aydın and Ruşen Çakır (2007) "Political Islam in Turkey", *Centre For European Policy Studies*, available from <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/political-islam-turkey>, 10 September, 2018

Turkish state's identity and began to implement radical secular reforms, which had positioned religion as an individual matter, rather than a social and cultural component of Turkish society. These secular enterprises had marginalized and ostracized Islam as a religion, and thus the religiously-conservative social groups. In the Ottoman, Islam had been an essential element of the state and society. There were both an official Islam/Islamism, which the Ottoman executives had shaped for the salvation of the state, and a peripheral/civil Islam/Islamism, which had represented the conservative groups and intellectuals in the Ottoman society. However, with the building of a secular-national state established by the Kemalist-secular elites, immediately after the proclamation of Turkish Republic in 1923, the situation mentioned in the Ottoman period had changed. On account of being founded a secular-national Republican state, there was no longer an official Islam/Islamism, and a peripheral/civil Islam or Islamism was under the secular state's hard control and had been repressed. In the periphery, the bearers of Islamism, which was led by Erbakan and his National View tradition initiated in the late 1960s, were economically a variety of social classes and actors composed of small merchants, artisans, shopkeepers and peasants in rural regions in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Afterwards, with the 1980s, especially as a result of neoliberal economic policies and opportunities, they have been economic classes and actors which have consisted of small and middle-sized enterprises and businessmen, working classes, poor and low-income groups in metropolitan cities and small provincial towns and cities. Generally speaking, they have been culturally pious and conservative. The liberal approach has more often interpreted Islamism in Turkey as a political cleavage between two actors mentioned above, which has had cultural and economic bases. Based on all these, the interviewees have seen this cleavage as a way to understand and explain Turkish politics, notably Islamism or Islamist politics, considering their references during interview when speaking of this political current. They have at times expressed this as a cleavage between secular-Turkish army and these social groups. However, they have directly defined it as a cleavage between the secular establishment,

composed of civil and military bureaucracies, and the religiously-conservative groups. It has been one of the main arguments on which they have grounded their own views.

Another argument, used by the liberal approach to clarify the Islamist politics and its emergence and transformation in Turkey, is economy and culture. The interviewees have more referred to these two concepts when speaking of Islamism. This approach has more focused on the social base of Islamism in Turkey with the argument based on economy and culture. It has stressed the historical-social context of Islamism, which economy and culture intertwined, with the emphasis on social base. On this point, it has alleged that economic actors and social classes played an important role in emerging Islamist political movement, by referring to economic changes and conflicts. This politics has been the voice of those economic groups in the face of the centre-right politics, which usually advocated large industrialist and businessmen' economic interests based more on secular and Istanbul-centered capital. The liberal approach argued that these groups have been culturally devout and conservative. They have been marginalized and excluded by the secular establishment in more cultural sense. Therefore, Turkish Islamism has been commonly a politics that has been described over the economic and cultural struggles of those groups against the secular establishment. We see this in the liberal approach to Islamism with its references in this chapter, and in the interviewees' thoughts which I have cited here. They mostly defined this struggle over the description of historical-social Islamism, which has had strong economic and cultural bases, and is based upon the political cleavage between the secular establishment and the religiously-conservative groups. In that struggle, they ignored how this cultural and economic elements have been politicized, and the changing position of the secular establishment against religion, namely Islam, within historical-political processes.

Lastly, the liberal approach, and of course the interviewees, have attempted at understanding and explaining Islamism over a binary opposition on the basis of the conceptual pairs, like state-society, centre-periphery or the Kemalist-secular establishment-the religiously-conservatives. They concentrated on the historical and social roots of Islamist politics, without considering the historical-political

relationships between two political groups, the seculars and the religious-conservatives, in question. They saw Islamism, and later on the JDP politics, as a democratic-political struggle taking place between these two political actors, by basing upon two fundamental concepts, such as culture and economy, which have formed their own conceptual framework. For, in their thought, the state or centre has always expressed authoritarianism, and anti-democratic interventions to political sphere, whereas to the periphery or society has been attributed a democratic element with its economic and cultural demands against the state. This assertion has been grounded on their description of historical-social Islamism. As will be seen in next chapter, such description has been strongly reframed and grounded by the interviewees' opinions which focused more on social and economic transformations historically taking place after 1980. It has at the same time provided a basis for their criticisms in the matter of the JDP and its political change. In this chapter, we have urged upon the academic and intellectual background of the description in question. In next section, we will see that the interviewees, underlining that the 1980s were a crucial historical-political moment for Turkish politics and society, in sense of the realization of far-reaching economic and social transformations, have made it dominant over the intellectual-academic world of the post-1980 by contributing to such description with their views. For, we will also bear witness that there has been a powerful intellectual domination, which has shaped around liberal-conservative intellectuals and guided to the description stated above.

## CHAPTER 4

### A HISTORICAL-SOCIAL ISLAMISM: DEBATES ON ISLAMISM IN THE POST-1980 TURKEY

#### 4.1. Introduction

The interviewees gave place a great importance to new historical-social conditions which emerged after 1980s. For, in their view, these conditions paved the way for appearing a historical-social Islamism. When debating Islamism, the interviewees were highly in tune with the general framework of this Islamism, which has been outlined in the chapter three. This framework has two fundamental points needed to be underlined. One was economic dimension intertwined with culture. The other was Islamist political actors' struggle with the secular establishment based on a political cleavage, which has had economic and cultural bases. The interviewees discussed economic dimension as part of globalization and neoliberal economic transformation. They also emphasized the changing sociology of political actors of Islamism, termed as religious-conservative social groups, in parallel with the economic change. As for the other, the struggle with the secular establishment, most interviewees dwelt it upon democratization. For, according to them, this struggle was to democratize the dominant political order, which was shaped around a military-bureaucratic tutelage, in Turkey under the JDP leadership. This democratization was at the same time an answer to both cultural and economic requests of the groups stated above. In other words, the JDP was to be the major political actors of democratization. In those debates with regard to the JDP, an anachronistic point, which undermined the democratization process, was the party's leader, Erdoğan, or that is to say, Erdoganism. The interviewees expressed that the bad going of the JDP politics,

which changed into a more nationalist, statist, authoritarian, and even fascist political line, was linked with Erdoğan, and his character and temperament.

Basically, in this section, the discussions, which the interviewees had made by paying regard to the economic and social transformations emerging following the 1980s, were important intellectual contributions made to the historical-social Islamism, which has a strong academic-intellectual background with liberal approach, as seen in Chapter 3. In fact, we will be overtly seeing their liberal approach regarding Islamism and the JDP, taking into account the very last title, “Liberal Academic-Intellectual Background”, in this chapter. With a liberal approach, they saw the post-1980 period as a significant historical-political moment which had formed a basis for a historical-social Islamism. We will clearly bear witness to why this is so in the next title. In conclusion, in this chapter, I will dispute this period, which was claimed to lay the bases of historical-social Islamism, by classifying under certain headings. These headings are in general a product of the common arguments which I have subtracted from the interviewees’ thoughts. Therefore, they can be at the same time thought as the interviewees’ main arguments.

#### **4.2. Why Is the Post-1980 Period Too Important in Islamism Discussions?**

In Most of the interviewees see the 1980s, when Turkey politically, economically and ideologically underwent comprehensive changes following a military intervention, as an important threshold in discussions to be made with regard to the new situation of Islamism as a political current, and its changing social base. The new situation expresses a transformation for this politics as a consequence of utterly different occasions, like globalization, postmodernism, neoliberal economy, and of the crucial economic and social changes, involving growth and development economically, the spread of education, urbanization, migration, upward social mobility, and new forms of -green- capital, and social classes. Having stated that Islamism, remaining under the hegemony of the rightist groups till the Özal period, reached up to a more separate significance with the 1980s years, Taşkin, one of the interviewees, clearly emphasized:

The 80s unavoidably made differences –for Islamist politics. From now on, Islamism was turning into an urban movement, with a rapid migration wave from urban mobility emerging due to Kurdish movement to places where a more religiously-conservative population was living. Of necessity, it became a product of urban sociology in the smaller provinces of Turkey, like Sivas, Kahramanmaraş and Konya, by cutting loose from peasant movement.

Likewise, Laçiner indicated that the 1980s was too much significant threshold for Islamism without going much into the causes. He spoke out it as follows:

There was an Islamic wave in 1980s. Ranging from Refah, and Fazilet to AKP, the main source of these politics was such an Islamism. Islamism was starting from the 1980s onward and has been on the rise since those years.

Keyman expressed similar views but by propounding distinct reasons. He pointed out that the post-1980 period has been of much more significance for Islamism in his view. He particularly highlighted that:

It has been more focused on Islamism after 1980s, rather than the pre-1980 periods. Because, in the 1980s, which would be remembered as the years of Özal, Turkey was integrated to globalization that had paved the way for structuring towards liberalization and free market, which were termed as neoliberal. More importantly, globalization made Islamic identity multidimensional and worked it up into a structure gradually getting strong.

Under this assertion of globalization, there were, above all, new social classes appearing as a result of neoliberal economic policies, in collaboration with Özal. Following 1980s, Bayramoğlu bluntly stated that:

There would be a reading of political Islam based on class texture, coming from lower classes, along with being symbolic and cultural. Because there has been a great class story paving the way for such an Islamism, which became more visible with Anatolian tigers or capital.

Therefore, the discussions related to Islamism after 1980 revolved around certain themes, notably globalization, as would be seen above. However, globalization and a sociological change, which most symbolized a structural change and majorly dominated the debates relevant to Islamism in Turkey, have not only been spoken of.

Like postmodernism, or postmodern world, other terms were also included in those discussions to be able to be more understandable. Mahçupyan expressed that these terms, especially postmodern world, gradually changed intellectual-cultural world of Islamists, or Islamic actors. He remarked that they, at the same time, referred to a sociological change. He pointed out that:

Having provided a basic for sociological change, this world once would be one revealing that non-Muslims outside us have failed. Thus, there would appear an Islamic group that has had a strong self-confidence by entering into all cultural spheres, ranging from media, cinema to innumerable Islamic magazines. Moreover, among Muslim youth one would for the first time emerge who says "I would be director". On the other hand, along with this postmodern world, there has been a global situation and a young generation affected by it. If there was not a story called globalization, nevertheless would it have been such thing? I do not know. In that case, this would bring out a quite different Islamism.

Laçiner applied to the foregoing concepts, like postmodern or postmodernism, which formed a strong basis for intellectually emerging self-confidence in Islamic world, in order to explain the rise of Islamism either in Turkey or around the world since 1980s. Laçiner identified the coming of a postmodern world with a wide range of criticisms initiated concerning modernism in the West. As Mahçupyan, he specified that it was a turning point in intellectual-cultural sphere for both Islamism and Islamist actors and intellectuals. He argued:

The West has made a serious self-criticism about modernism by centering on itself. These deconstructivism and postmodernism have a period of self-criticism for the western world itself. In a sense, it was a time that the West has interrogated itself in the matter of industrialization, nature, political and economic order, and so on. Also, it was a matter of refreshing of self-confidence for Islamists. For the first time, in Islam such a thing, an atmosphere of renaissance, was arising. Turkey did see this. Islamist intellectuals, such as Ali Bulaç, or generally Islamists were anymore reading Foucault, Hardt, so on. There was a dominant atmosphere that we could synthesize something in consideration of those new intellectual figures. That is to say, there was morally and intellectually a 'self-coming'. Therefore, a Islamist wave became in 1980. Islamism was beginning from the 1980s onwards. So, these years were a break and jumping for this politics. It was such an Islamism that laid the bases of the Welfare, the Virtue, and their successor, JDP.

Actually, all interviewees might be told to have had a general opinion that Islamism as political movement following 1980 was on the rise in Turkey and the other regions of the world. They laid stress on this period as a considerable threshold in changing and re-activating Islamism. Their emphases were more on social, cultural, intellectual, and economic transformation from class structure, capital accumulation till education, and urbanization while discussing Islamism in Turkey, besides international factors like globalization, neoliberal economy. Although a dissimilarity in their emphases, there was common idea in relation to the rise of Islamism in Turkey and throughout the world. Bora clearly indicated that:

The basic argument would be that the 80s years have been, in the widest sense, generally a shiny epoch for Islamism in the world. Those years would be also an era that radical Islamism has started to strengthen with varied colors by taking over the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist discourse of the left gradually losing weight, from developments in Iran and the influence of Muslim Brotherhood to the resurrection of radical Islamist leaning going out of general the right-political framework in Turkey. With social and political energy, this radical Islamism created an affect that had revived, strengthened the National View –politics- and provided it an opportunity for being opened fields of new penetration.

All in all, as Bora remarked, all interviewees were in a similar approach concerned with the post-1980 period, since Islamism began to rise in Turkey and the world. This approach fundamentally claimed that the aforesaid period was an important historical threshold in the transformation of Turkish Islamism, owing to structural changes. Generally speaking, they jointly underlined a number of social and economic factors, ranging from economy, neoliberalism, capital accumulation, class formation, and urbanization to globalization, and postmodernism. They, at the same time, attracted attention to a sociological change taking place in Islamism and its social base, alongside all these factors stated above. However, except for these emphases, interestingly there were some interviewees who referred that Erdoğan, the JDP's leader, was a much important factor under an image of 'Erdoğanism' in the shaping of Islamist politics from the beginning of 1990s to the present and the shifting of the JDP politics. Now, I will put forward a general framework of debates

made on Islamism in the post-1980 Turkey by classifying the interviewees' views around certain common arguments.

### **4.3. Globalization**

Globalization has plenty of definitions. At this place, I refer to this term as the standardization of political, economic, socio-cultural structures or/and relationships throughout the world. In a sense, it might be in a word defined as increasing global interconnectedness. Also, it is a well-rounded process that has been composed of flows of goods, capitals, people, information, ideas, and risks across national borders, integrated with the occurrence of transnational and international networks (Nash, 2010: 43). It was a transformed historical process described by new modes of production as well as destruction, not by unlimited expansion or unrestricted implosion of ideas, information, and investments across borders and societies (Soguk 2010: 20). Having seen this process as a significant historical crossroad for Turkey, most interviewees underscored that it had a dramatic impact in terms of changing Islamism and its social base. For them, once it created a group of winners in economic context by providing important opportunities for new social classes and forms of capital with religiously-conservative orientation. At the same time, it brought along a crucial economic transformation in Turkey, making way for rising new middle classes which consisted of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs and educated professionals. The interviewees concluded that particularly after 1980 Islamism was a political movement based on those new social classes which involve a substantial section of winners of globalization. They expressed this emphasis of globalization in different ways. For instance, Mahçupyan generally spoke of a global condition and argued that a distinctive way of Islamism rose under those conditions. With globalization, he pointed out:

In Turkish Islamism, far better native with Welfare Party and Justice and Development Party tradition, would be a Muslim mass movement that has aspired to go into public sphere, taking aim at globalization towards individual targets, and trying to produce new centres by opening to itself diverse channels.

Another interviewee, Keyman, highlighted that the post-1980 Islamism's originality came from globalization. Those who intensely debated what had happened to Islamism subsequent to 1980 concentrated on global developments and processes. At this point, Keyman, above all, underlined that:

In the post-80 period, free market –economic liberalism- opening to globalization, transition from import substitution to export promotion, and -this new situation- that all these revealed in a hegemonic manner basically created a much important break in Islamism in Turkey. The post-80 Islamism as a political current has been a critical breaking point with ideology and sociology. However, some points have not been able to be well understood processes within globalization and transformation by being more given weight to globalization and its transformative strength.

Again, having dwelt on globalization from a different viewpoint, the interviewee, Laçiner mentioned from a change of structure. Together with this change, he suggested that:

Those men with Islamist-conservative tendencies had no longer intentions to open small grocery store, or to engage in fresh vegetables export. Rather, they have set up all kinds of factories from furniture, textile, and elevator to leader trade. Also, they pursue international things, namely money movements and financial world, by coming into contact with outside. After this, there would be a new sociology and Islamism which all these brought along.

Unlike Laçiner, Oran interpreted globalization as both an economic and political variable, transforming Islamism. According to him:

Expressed as international capitalism, globalization would be an economic variable because it has bourgeoisified these groups, Islamists, taking up foreign business. Meanwhile, thanks to bourgeoisifying, they would turn into religious Muslim, not Islamists so on. In a sense, they would cut loose from being Islamist as a political outcome which international capitalism has created.

Globalization was a quite complex process, involving not only modes of production but also images, information, communications, technologies, cultures, ideas, and religions. So, it might not be sufficient to just explain and interpret globalization in the economic context. On this point, Bayramoğlu remarked globalization as a far-

reaching process, composed of belonging, network, identity, and even socialization. He defined the post-1980 Islamism as a reflection of globalization with extensive processes. He asserted that:

After 1980, Islamism can be interpreted as emerging a new identity towards a new socialization, network, belonging, and identity-based-and -individualist movement. Such an Islamism would be reflection of a globalist Islamic language and outside world. If this new politics is wished to be understood, it will be, too, needed to look at globalization discussions.

Nevertheless, for example, quite the contrary to Bayramoğlu, Gültekin, another one among the interviewees, saw globalization more as advancing information and communication tools. The world was, he thought, changing according to this new situation. He explicitly stated:

For instance, in the past we were living in a village where we all generally share about same understanding in the matter of Islam. But, now the world became a village and communication tools gradually developed. What one understand from Islam is no longer same with other. One understand something else while reading a verse from the Quran, someone else does more something else when reading.

Generally, it can be said that, for all the interviewees, globalization expressed the changes and transformations taking place in economic, communicational and technological spheres. Most particularly, in economic field, along with changing the mode and means of production, they restructured society and politics in Turkey. In the course of this restructuring, Islamism underwent a major change as a result of a variety of class formations and capital accumulations in its social base or its own political actors. The engine motor of this change was neoliberal politics and economic liberalization, which had been implemented in Turkey from the 1980s onwards, as will be seen later on. To be sure, as noted above, the interviewees not only urged upon economic-structural changes and transformations, but also laid stress on developments in communication and technology fields, which had played an active role in shifting the identity, language, and outlook of the religiously-conservative groups, forming the social base of Islamism. On the whole, the interviewees argued that, all these changes, in accordance with globalization, brought

along differentiation, fragmentation, and even individualization in the foregoing groups.

#### **4.4. Democratization**

Democratization has been one of the most significant issues in Turkey on which the interviewees put emphasis, especially in the part relevant to the debates of the post-2000 Islamism and the JDP. They in detailed debated this during the interviews. They did not conceptually defined democratization. Rather, they expressed what they meant with this term when called democratization in Turkey. In the context of Turkey what they implied by democratization was mainly civil-military bureaucratic tutelage on the elected. More particularly, they overemphasized military tutelage as one of important obstacles taking a stand against democratization Turkey. Based on the general framework of liberal approach, which was comprehensively debated in the chapter three, they discussed democratization matter around a political cleavage between two main political actors, centre-periphery or religious/conservatives-secularists. According to them, the source of democratization was such political cleavage. However, they expressed this issue in different ways. Before proceeding to their views, I would like to briefly clarify what democratization is conceptually, how it is defined, and which elements it contains within itself.

Geddes attempts at making a definition of democratization by asking the question of ‘what causes Democratization?’ in her one paper, published in 2007. Before answering this question, she touches on several points. First is, states Geddes, that the concern about democratization became gradually multifaceted over the course of last decades. Second is, she think, that approaches to investigating democratization have substantially undergone a change since the mid-1990s. Third is that some approaches, based on economic model of democratization, and statistical investigations of its causes involving education, urbanization, individual mobility, and class position, for instance like middle class, have had a major role in its investigation (Geddes, 2007: 317). Except for those points, then ‘what causes democratization?’ As the causes of democratization, there have been two dominant views. One has been based on development. The other has been international factors.

The first view has asserted that there has been a close relationship between development and democratization. It indicated that some statistical studies related to development, including education, urbanization, individual mobility, and so on, clearly showed this relationship. The second suggested that international factors have played much greater role in clarifying democratization than others. The international forces had a primary effect on democratization, and particularly they have been an important step for democratization, considering so close interactions between international and domestic factors. However, although those two dominant views, Geddes especially stated that it would be vitally misleading that we should uncritically label democratization, by itself, as one process regardless of what we speak of historical and other differences (Geddes: 2007: 318-319, 336). By the way, I should tell that what explains my stance concerning democratization has been Geddes's emphasis on historical and other differences, absolutely without a one-way process comprising of either economy or international factors.

Considering Geddes's views and my standpoint regarding democratization, we can start by quoting Laçiner's, one of the interviewees, thoughts about the subject. Laçiner lays great stress on democratization. From his own perspective, he asserted that there were an issue of democratization in Turkey. He remarked that:

The most crucial point of the issue of democratization in Turkey has been a military tutelage. Due to military tutelage, in Turkey a strong civil society has not emerged. But, after 1980s, situation changed. Along with 1980s, in Turkey there were a serious awakening of provinces in respect to economy. There was at the same time a strong social base under this awakening. Exports and imports were continuously increasing in those times, which has risen to 400 billion dollars today whereas 10 billion dollars. We have met with the girls who go to university with headscarf from the men who did not send their children to school. The foreign trade has been half of the country economy at the present whereas a mere tenth of it once upon a time. An industrial and merchant class were rising, which consisted of those who had big companies with almond mustaches and Sunni background. They have formed the AKP's backbone as a -new- middle class.

To be sure, democratization was not an issue peculiar to Turkey. It was, as Geddes pointed out, an international wave in the context of either the studies on this subject and the debates made on its causes. This wave had a strong influence upon Turkey,

especially since 2000s. Having underlined democratization literature and perception, Taşkın specified that:

An analysis has been made under the influence of democratization since 2005. What has been meant by democratization? In some way or other, there have been an accumulation of wisdom and experience. That is to say, the masses have learned with wisdom, experience and accumulation as well. Put another way, it has been possible to be gone further with democratization. Most have been under the influence of one linear reading. Most have discussed this issue through such a reading.

There seems that the interviewees did just not pointed to this international dimension of democratization. Now and then, they also referred to some domestic events, like the coups or the military interventions, in Turkey. They established a connection between those events and Islamists', or more precisely, the JDP's disposition to democratize Turkey. For instance, Gültekin argued that:

The February 28 drew a greater part of Islamists to a democrat line. Islamists thought that what has been essential was democracy, and if democracy occurred they themselves would be at ease. Most Islamists thought that the headscarf would be free by giving a struggle for democracy in lieu of a struggle for headscarf. All these were democratizing them (Islamists). In this sense, they (the JDP) were closer to democracy than their predecessors.

The steps to democratize Turkey were not advocated and/or carried into effect by those with Islamist roots. Those steps had been first initiated by Özal in 1980s. Therefore, Turkey had important experiences on the subject of democratization in the past. Referring to those historical experiences, Oran particularly highlighted that:

In the Özal period, a significant democratization, not liberal, became. Özal took various measures for democratization, and this was exceedingly important. No one had done the goodness which Özal did for Turkey. It was he who had brought an individual appeal. Today all our hope are in Strasbourg. Özal brought it. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has at present made substantial reforms that were never done until this time.

Unlike all these, some interviewees, such as Bayramoğlu and Mert, emphasized forward democratization argument based on religious and conservative social base. For instance, Bayramoğlu spoke of a matter of 'equation' as an effort of struggle

initiated by the aforesaid social base to become equal economically and culturally with others. He underlined that:

The Erbakan movement was first experiment of 'equation'. This effort to become equal has carried more important sense than we suppose, and we have seen that. It has contained democracy, universal and liberal values in itself. For this reason, this has been based on equalizing that nation's, namely conservatives', opportunities with other.

Mert also mentioned from a democratic dynamics in the context of democratization. She expressed that:

This democratic dynamics has been composed of Islamists and conservatives who would gradually become more visible as a roust. However, it is required not to be perceived them as subjects to actualize democracy. Then, why democratic dynamic, a not subject? Because, they were interrogating the present status quo, that is to say, when looking through a realist perspective, they had a trouble with the present status quo. All dynamics or group, having a trouble with the present status quo, or all elements, compelling the system, have formed a democratic dynamics.

In the consideration of the views quoted above, it seems that the interviewees addressed the democratization issue in Turkey by starting from the perspective of historical-social Islamism. Framed by a liberal approach this perspective was based upon two fundamental arguments. One was the economic and cultural bases of the religiously-conservative groups. The other was also political cleavage between these groups and the secular establishment. On the basis of those two arguments, the interviewees stated that the realization of these groups' demands, which had been centered on economic and cultural bases, was the most important element of democratization. However, although all these views about democratization, as Geddes remarked, it is needed to look at other historical events and differences without considering democratization as one process. These events and differences have, for the most part, arisen and shaped in the boundaries of political society. The main actors of political society can affect how a path democratization would follow either positively or negatively. They can play an active role in shaping a democratic dynamics or/and subject, which would clear the way for democratization.

#### **4.5. Erdoganism and/or Erdoganist ‘Deviation’**

In Turkish politics today, with Erdoğan, the notion of leader’s role in history started to become an important-decisive element. This role has dominated society, politics, and political organizations. Having asked some questions, ‘what is individual’s role in history?’ Who is decisive-make? Is it society or history that creates individual?, and so on, Oran remarked that this was something debated much. According to him:

Of course, it has been history and social conditions that creates individuals. However, individuals changes history in some cases. Or, s/he gives a direction to history. Mustafa Kemal was one of those, but now Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been one of those, even if a too much bad direction. Therefore, here we are coming to individual’s role in history. For, if Erdoğan was not, quite likely, the AKP might have been a Muslim-democrat party like a Christian-Democrat one.

No doubt, one, defined as leader had at the same time a personality. This personality can also begin to predominate over time. Particularly, having laid weight on the personality of the leader, Gültekin indicated that:

There was a man whose neither head nor structure change. His culture and personality have not been allowing that. He was Tayyip Erdoğan. What has been implied when mentioning from personality was this, or in other words, it was expressing a dominant situation. The personality and leadership were such a thing. Leadership? Others had no leadership. So, it was something relevant to Erdoğan’s personality. His personality was dominant. Since others were so much weak, they surrendered, that’s it. There has been nothing else.

This personality at the same time came into prominence with its preferences giving direct to politics. They shows how a strategy the leader would follow. On this point, Taşkın pointed ou that:

There has been a close link between Erdoğan’s choices and the situation within which we have been. Those which have been in power saw something. We have ended military and juridical tutelage following the 2010 referendum. There has been two things. First would be an enormous power area able to do all everything with its own capitals and desires. An unlimited area. The other was idea to be always in power in the long run by a little renouncing from power, and perhaps even to become a more hegemonic-dominant party. They, namely the JDP power, have

made a preference between two. Erdoğan's political frontiers played an important role. In other words, unfortunately, the leader or leadership has been too much decisive.

Surely, those preferences had a pragmatist side as well. Put it another way, the leader might give a direction to politics by taking a more pragmatist stance. In Turkey, many political leaders showed this pragmatism with their politics and various political maneuvers. Bayramoğlu dwelt upon this aspect of the leaders in Turkey. He explicitly expressed that:

In conjunction with not being decisive, pragmatism has been all-important. All right-wing leaders were pragmatist, ranging from Özal, Demirel to Erdoğan. On the other hand, it was at all easy for one leader, Erdoğan, to allow to be read Öcalan's text in the squares by initiating the solution process. Excuse me! But, neither the leftist nor the rightist, nobody could do that. Here is arising what he says leadership talent. Erdoğan might be a pragmatist, yes. However, he was taking some chances. On the one side, he was giving a speech about laicism in Egypt. On the other side, he was playing for the leadership of Islamic world. Those were not easy things. When a little looking at Erdoğan's personality and biography, he has had a pragmatist side. Because there has been too little institutionalism in the east societies like ours. In this case, the person and its decisions have been coming into prominence. This time, its psychology has been activating either.

Taking into account all those opinions, there were an Erdoğanism and political deviation over which Erdoğan's personality had ruled. In a sense, Erdoğan, the party leader, started to dominate all everything. Because, as Bora stated,

Today's politics is to fed by Erdoğan's dynamic to develop his own charismatic power by cutting loose his power from first among equals.

Similarly, as a result of politics based on Erdoğan factor as a significant dynamic, Çakır laid stress on Erdoğan personality. He signified that:

Tayyip Erdoğan has exactly carried Turkey into an anti-democratic point. Once, Erdoğan has stood alone now, while first among equals at one time. At the moment, it transformed into a movement which one person would control. All the things were being delayed and later on cancelled in connection with a number of reflexes, instincts, and anxieties stemming from to a large extent Erdoğan and his inner circle, besides cyclical.

Thereby, Erdoğan as a leader appeared as a decisive factor with personality and charismatic strength in politics. This personality and charisma led up to authoritarianism. If there has been an authoritarian situation in Turkey, it can be told to have occurred depending upon Erdoğan's temperament and personality. Having drawn attention to the rise of such authoritarianism, Akyol emphasized that:

Today, if the leader of the movement were Gül, not Erdoğan, this authoritarianism could not come about. It is a bit interested in temperament. From the very beginning, Erdoğan has had an authoritarian temperament. But, as we have been seeing at the moment, Erdoğan was temperamentally authoritarian.

In the same way, Maḥcupyan, another interviewee, saw Erdoğan as a significant factor shaping or/and designing politics. However, rather than personality, charisma or temperament, he read Erdoğan and the party as an 'inability' moment. He spoken out that:

This –last- period has been different. What has hit its stamp to that period was this "inability". To fighting, hardening, and polarization are being compelled. Let's think the opposite. If Davutoğlu, Gül, or somebody else were elected and Erdoğan accepted to stand back, we would have spoken of a completely different AKP. Neither of characteristics about which was talked would have occurred. At this stage, what has been at stake would be a state of not being able to manage to which a too strong leadership and centrality gave rise.

All in all, it can be concluded that many interviewees had a powerful emphasis on Erdoğanism. This circumstance was openly becoming evident in their thoughts. Tuksal and Demirel, other two interviewees, have also made the emphasis in question by expressing Erdoğan's leadership and his charismatic parsonality. On this point, Tuksal particularly remarked that:

There were a matter of Erdoğanism. No one absolutely thought that the AKP would be a one man party in its foundation. However, Erdoğan shattered that.

Likewise, Demirel mentioned from an Erdoğanism either. He highlighted that:

This time began to form a circle around Erdoğan. He has stood out among others. He has been number one. Once upon a time, those old consultations, advisories, and conversations have ended.

Taking into account the citations above, there is a fundamental question needed to be asked. It is the question of "could Turkey nevertheless get to this point, which has been expressed as 'authoritarian, nationalist, statist, anti-democratic, and even totalitarian, if Erdoğan, the JDP' leader, was not?" Many interviewees asked a question similar to above, albeit in a different ways, and, for them perhaps such a question can explain this point which Turkey has come at the present. With this question, at first moment, I have come to mind Althusser's reply to John Lewis entitled "Note on 'The Critique of the Personality Cult'", which made a more criticism of Stalinism, published in 1973. In that reply, Althusser differently criticized Stalinism by objecting to fundamental theoretical arguments which he claimed was mostly based on humanism/economism. In his criticism, the basic issue or 'mistake' was not, he said, to 'reduce the grave events of the thirty years of Soviet and Communist history to this pseudo-explanation by "cult" under the name of Stalinism or/and "Stalinian deviation"'. On the contrary, he thought that it was a more one-sided way of explanation to put forward the problems, on the basis of a concept like 'Stalinian deviation'. Instead of explaining the issue under the concept of a 'personality cult', involving 'abuses', or/and 'errors', by referring to Stalinism or a 'Stalinian deviation', he basically propounded that it would be a more accurate approach and form of explanation to look into the whole of the state apparatuses forming the superstructure –repressive and ideological apparatuses, including the parties-, alongside the existing forms of production relations, class relations and class struggle (Althusser, 1976: 80-81, 85). As seen, his emphasis was more on certain some structures that have consisted of the state apparatuses and their repressive and ideological ones, considering our discussions in the context of political society. Contrary to this emphasis, the interviewees spoke of Erdoğan personality as a factor and urged upon the domination of this personality on the party. They highlighted that personality and leadership were a decisive factor to shape politics and political sphere. In a sense, at this place, the leader and its personality would come its role into play in history. However, after all those views, as Althusser stated, the terms personality, or 'personality cult' in his words would reflect an outlook that it has no value with regards to knowledge, that it clarifies nothing, and that it pushes us to the dark, regardless of the state and its apparatuses, and superstructure (Althusser, 1976). In a

sense, they do not, by themselves, explain why a politics or political movement changed. There have been ideologically and politically structural changes and transformations behind this. For, these terms do not take individual's political and ideological background into account relevant to the structures in question.

#### **4.6. Emphasis on the Changing Sociology of Religiously-Conservative Social Groups**

It might generally be told that the interviewees had a strong emphasis on sociology when talking about Islamism and the JDP. They have at times disclosed this emphasis by using the statement 'sociological change'. And sometimes, they have made the emphasis in question by referring to some sociological variables or/and factors, ranging from urbanization, education, and economy to class structure, and social mobility. These sociological variables would vitally matter for them in changing Islamist politics and arising a political organization such as the JDP. More particularly, after the 1980, in Turkey the interviewees manifested that it was required to look into those variables in order to be able to see how the post-1980 Islamism evolved. For instance, Keyman clearly expressed this on the behalf of both all the interviewees and himself, by highlighting that the post-1980 period symbolized a change for Islamist politics. He underlined the importance of such an Islamism in new period in his own words:

The post-80 has been a significant breaking point, considering Islamist movement or ideology, and that sociology.

Many interviewees pointed out to this break in different ways by referring to a variety of sociological factors which had lied behind the transformation of Islamist politics in Turkey. Even if not directly expressing as in Keyman, they have explicitly made it clear by laying weight on the new sociology of the post-1980 society with distinctive sociological elements, by and large from economy, urbanization to education. Apart from that, there was generally an emphasis on sociology based on a new sociology, sociological change, and internal group dynamic, and so on. Bayramoğlu openly put forward this emphasis by expressing that:

It must be cared about how any social movement or group moved forward with its own internal dynamics. It is rather important. What has been the most significant is probably this. It must be tried to be looked at Islamic movements from within. So, that must be supported. It must be seen that in Turkey the change would be just possible with the internal changing of social groups. This internal change characterizes overlapping culture with economy. However, if those groups were an economic move they could not be an Islamic movement. So, the cultural claim has been more important, but if there were no class breaks it could not be so much powerful. In other words, the carrier and driving force have been a cultural-political assertion. Nonetheless, economic motor behind this assertion has been vitally important.

Likewise, Laçiner highlighted some factors, paving the way for shifting social base in these groups. In his view, these factors from commerce, money movements, and large businesses, like factory, to financial world had created a new situation. He remarked that:

Now, we are mentioning from an Islamism and its new sociology that all those brought along. Before the 1960s and 1970s, Islamism was not relying on them.

Surely, as I have remarked earlier, there was a strong emphasis on sociology. But, the emphasis at issue was differently been expressed by the interviewees. One of them, Mağcupyan had directly spoke of a sociological change. He pointed out that:

In the first place, there were a sociological change in 1990s. Today, we have been speaking of a global and post-modern world.

Very differently, Keyman stated something else by combining economy and sociology. With this, above all, he signified that:

The unintended consequences have arisen in sociology. Besides politics, based on Islamism's political victory in local governments and municipal elections in the mid-1990s, more particularly in Islam economy and sociology were starting to become important. Economy and market were emerging as two significant factors giving rise to a separation –as Milli Görüş and the AKP, within Islamist politics in Turkey.

On the other hand, once more, in the context of this emphasis on sociology, Taşkın established a connection between sociology and cities in the post-1980 Turkey. He spoke of a new urban sociology following 1980s. He expressly indicated that:

Subsequent to 1980s, Islamism transformed into an urban movement from a peasant one in smaller provinces of Turkey, such as Sivas, Kahramanmaraş, and Konya, hand in hand with changing urban sociology. After that, the story was already this.

This emphasis had a quite long history. Except for the interviewees cited here, some interviewees stated this especially. One of them was Aksoy. Expressing that this emphasis begun to come in view in 1970s, he told that:

First of all, specially, by the way of Nilüfer Göle's studies and writings, and so on, we always believed that, from the 1970s onward, Islamist tradition or Islamists had an adaptation to secular life, that they have been able to use internet, or in the best schools of the world, and so on. At the same time, in business life, media, or educational institutions new middle classes and professional groups with religiously-conservative disposition were emerging there. Now, by the very reason of reading well that sociology, AKP came to power, and was founded by separating from Milli Görüş.

With the exception of such an emphasis directly on the changing sociology of the groups in question some interviewees highlighted certain sociological variables or factors in order to show that sociology. As remarked earlier, these have varied from urbanization, individualization to economy, capital, and social classes. For example, one interviewees, Oran, mentioned from money and wealth. He stated that:

There were an Anatolian that had started to change its superstructure, having, to a certain degree, a feudal infrastructure since Özal. This Anatolian had money, and golden under pillow, but was not productive. Özal put these on the market through the cheap credits of Halk Bank. One rich from Kayseri begun to open branch in İstanbul, or here and there. Afterwards, articulation to international capitalism. Already, the reason to enter into Anatolian's political scene was this potential which Özal brought out.

On the other side, another interviewee, Gültekin pointed out that an individualization among religious and Muslim groups emerged. He underlined that:

The world was anymore changing. Our understanding related to Islam gradually became different. Everyone no longer understand same thing from Islam. One understand something else while reading a verse from the Quran, someone else does more something else when reading. Thus, individual diversities and individualization have slowly arisen in the understandings of Islam.

Considering all these views cited, the foregoing sociological changes in the social base of Islamist politics or Islamism had substantial effects on politics. Having an impact on Islamist politics in Turkey, another important sociological variable or factor was the emergence of new social classes. Defined as small and medium-sized businesses, these new classes undertook an active role in changing Islamism's political orientation. The aforesaid political orientation was argued to have laid the bases of adopting a more moderate politics grounded on tendency to come close to the center. At this point, Bora saw this politics as a general moderation and remarked that the driving force behind the moderation in question was Anatolian capital as a source of power and significant element which had constituted the –social- base of Milli Görüş. Bora particularly underlined that:

Islamism has undergone an important change to become more acceptable in the eyes of either the state or the ruling classes. For example, it seriously revised Just Order programme in terms of seeming as a moderate party able to do business in order to be approved more by the state and the classes in question. There were a moderation, and disposition to come to the center. There were such a dynamic: Anatolian capital that has been expressed as small and medium-sized capital and made a significant progress. This capital grew large and rose to first league which big capital would dominate in Turkey. It was linked with globalization process, and opportunities which this process had provided. These also pushed Refah Partisi toward more liberalization.

Given the interviewees' emphasis on the changing sociology of the social groups mentioned above, it seems that there was their perspective of historical-social Islamism behind the emphasis in question. For, what lies behind the changing sociology was basically economic and cultural changes. However, the interviewees were not interested in how these changes had carried out and transformed in ideological and political structures. In keeping with their own perspective, they considered sociological variables in these social groups, which had been composed of economy, urbanization, class formation, capital accumulation, cultural differentiation and individualization. With a quite reductionist approach, they argued that all these variables had brought about a political change or transformation in Islamist politics, and thus the JDP.

#### **4.7. A Neoliberal Reading of Islam(ism)**

A neoliberal reading of Islam(ism)? To begin with, what do I mean with this statement? Once, it expresses re-reading and re-analyzing Islamism as political current and its social base according to new conditions arising in Turkey. As noted many times, these new conditions have been more commemorated with the comprehensive political, economic and social transformations following the 12 September military coup. On the economy side, for example, with the 24 January decisions, neoliberal economy policies and practices were one of the most decisive steps in economic transformation. All these brought about a new economic order based on competition, deregulation, minimal state, technological innovation, productivity, free market, and export-oriented economy. This economic order unavoidably generated new changes in Islamism or Islamist politics and its social base in Turkey. It laid the bases of a neoliberal reading to give direction to explaining and understanding these changes. In that reading, the fundamental components of the change in Islamism were looked for in these conditions with a full free-market economy, deregulation, competitive system, economic crises, and export-oriented economy, which the aforesaid new economic order created in the sphere of production. It expresses a more economy-centered reading, exceedingly far away from political and ideological structures or/and institutions, interferences, and actors in political society.

The 1980s for Turkey were all-important turn in terms of laying the bases of the global capitalist reorganization leaded by Özal's economy policies, under the support of the 12 September military ruling. Many interviewees placed a particular importance to this period simply because it was identified with a neoliberal economic order which had provided important opportunities and potentialities for new social groups or classes forming the social bases of Islamist politics with religiously-conservative disposition. On this point, Laçiner expressly emphasized this:

The 1980 was a break and jumping. A critical social base had begun to emerge. In 1980s, in Turkey a seriously provincial awakening became economically. In earlier times, in Anatolian the provinces like Denizli or Çorum were being ignored. But now?

From Kayseri to Gaziantep, the merchants turned into industrial things. They were carrying on business with handbags. The exports were increasing...etc. They began in 1980. In Turkey total foreign trade volume (exports plus imports) was 10 billion. It has been 400 billion at the present time. Furthermore, whilst all of these had been doing, in Turkey the traditional riches protected their industrial positions, but their shares in total decreased. The brand new actors were born. An industrial and merchant class were rising, which consisted of those who had big companies with almond mustaches and Sunni background. It was something that had lent a persuasiveness and seriousness to expressions which we were developing the country and either doing this or it. Those were forming the AKP's backbone as a -new- middle class." The AKP was taking an active role in this class' social leadership.

The Özal period was a critical point for a neoliberal reading of Islam(ism). As Laçiner stated, new social actors were rising. Behind the rising of those actors was Özal's economic policies. Bayramoğlu does attach particular importance to that period which Özal carried his own policies into effect. He clearly expressed that:

In the Özal period, in the pursuit of somewhat being prepared technological infrastructure and being incorporated into the small markets in the West (of Turkey), we passed from a time when the small and medium-sized capital ever-increasingly had a chance and demanded from either the bank, the economic system or the share in the centre. This period was also the economic infrastructure of the Welfare party and Islamic movement and one that those actors and the small and medium-sized capital had burst. That is to say, on the one hand, an Anatolian capital which has been reborn as a class. This at the same time was a formation to have arisen out of crowding most elements like socio-economic causalities, class factors, and so on together, in the world and Turkey, as we know.

Unlike Laçiner and Bayramoğlu, Keyman took advantage of a neoliberal reading to politically distinguish neoliberalization and the National View tradition from each other. In a sense, such reading was a breaking point between these two structures. Keyman remarked that:

Therefore, following 1980, being passed into a period which Islamism had intertwined with a neoliberal market is creating a breaking. When so looked at, there was a contrast between the National View tradition and this structure, namely neoliberalization. This tradition had no structure able to make it. At this point, for instance, Ziya Öniş made a distinction between

conservative globalists and defensive nationalists<sup>15</sup>. It made the breaking in question clear.

As a matter of fact, the main course that Islamists generally followed has been a modernization as capitalization, which has targeted capitalization as capitalism, an economic structure that modernization produced, rather than a political modernization based on equality, freedom, and democracy...etc. In other words, they have had no trouble with capitalism and capitalization at all. This was all the time so for Islamists in Turkey. Mert highlighted such a distinction, namely political modernization-economic modernization, but she used this to uncover the separation between the JDP and the National View movement. Most importantly, she urged upon economic liberalization, capitalization and enrichment while dealing with the post-1980 Islamism and its social base by bethinking Özal and his legacy. She expressed that:

It seems that in Turkey Islamists have had in any way no objections to capitalism. Put it another way, actually, despite Erbakan, Islamism annihilated its -previous- commentaries concerning capitalism by breaking away from its old line, toward a centre-right politics but not a political liberalization. The main thing in its social base was enrichment. In that politics, the adaptation to neoliberalism was so strong, although Erbakan's presence. Nobody believed in Just Order. After the establishment of MÜSİAD, a business organization which has consisted of Muslim businessmen, as if it, too, was close to the Welfare party, we understood that. However, their understandings were Özal's neoliberalism plus a bit conservatism. For, with the JDP, what is meant by being taken off 'National View shirt' was neoliberalism.

Just as Mert, Keyman pointed out a similar thing. He underlined that:

The place which the Ak Parti departed from the National View movement was that this movement took part in national development and national dimension. In the global context, the Ak parti has been a party to pioneer free market. In the Ak parti tradition, when glanced at the free market-Islam relationship, it is seen that free market has come before Islamism. It seemed to be more cared about free market in the liue of Islamism in Ak parti.

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<sup>15</sup> For more explanation with regard to the aforesaid distinction of which Keyman has spoken, also see , Ziya Öniş (2007), "Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkan*, Vol. 9, No. 3 : 247-261.

There was a dominant view as to that the enrichment and strengthening would be sufficient.

On another side of this neoliberal reading of Islam(ism) was international capitalism. It stressed the global processes of capitalism. These processes were the key to explain and understand the JDP. Oran pointed to this aspect of capitalism. He openly stated:

The main issue has been articulation to international capitalism. Already, the reason to enter into Anatolian's political scene was this potential which Özal brought out. Of course, as Erbakan, there were those who could not comprehend the matter. At the moment, as Saadet partisi, there were, too, those who could not apprehend this transformation. Those comprehending it have also founded the AKP. -At this stage-, the agent of the change or transformation was the AKP as well.

Slightly different from Oran, another interviewee, Demirel, forged a close link between capitalism and the AKP's new political position, conservative democrat, for understanding the change in the Islamist politics after its foundation. Depended on this position with capitalism, he fundamentally argued that the AKP has severed all ties with the National View. On this point, he intrinsically told that:

What has been the most significant different between Erbakan's National View and the so-called conservative democrat? Once, it - the JDP- was much more capitalist. There was reconciliation with a capitalism based on neoliberal and pro-market orientation. Yes, as a result, there was a reconciliation with capitalism. -Therefore-, we, Islamists, could not change the world, but the world has changed us. As being articulated with capitalism, what happened to the people who you define as Islamists? They have been changing. Erbakan was too archaic with the idea Just Order referring to a situation which stemmed from being able not to understand the mentality of the capitalist system.

On the whole, it appears that there was a strong emphasis on economism. This emphasis involved all components of economy or economic structure. Of those components, one has been quite often social class, class rationality, or capital accumulation, but sometimes global economy or capitalism has been directly itself. On this point, for example, Taşkın mentioned from having emerged a new class sociology and its business rationality developed through Özal period's policies. He explicitly denoted that:

There were a business rationality that Özal had created, inclined to adopt a more economy-based outlook and to interrogate why it was continuously in conflict with the state. Along with Özal, lots of conservative-Islamist bureaucrat, businessmen, journalist, and columnist had begun to arise, who was forgotten about in the Cold War. No one was seeing them. However, this sociology was revealed by Özal. Erbakan started not to suffice to that sociology since he had not addressed to new business and cultural elites. They were prone to the Motherland party. -The owners of- this business rationality at first invested in the spheres of economy and culture. -After this-, politics transformed. In economy, money had been spent on education, culture and media. These transformed political classes, and Ak parti came in view.

Bora had made a similar interpretation by referring to a new class and capital group in order to be able to clarify the post-1980 Islamism. He noted a neoliberal break within Islamism following the 1980s. He told that:

There were such a dynamic: Anatolian capital that was expressed as small and medium-sized capital and made a significant progress. This capital grew large and rose to first league which big capital would dominate in Turkey. It was linked with globalization process and opportunities which this process had provided. These also pushed Refah Partisi toward more liberalization. That is to say, for instance, the Just Order began to seem anachronic. A more pro-market and free market-focused transformation was saliently seen. There was a very clear break between Saadet Partisi and Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP). This is because Milli Görüş was so much close to a more Kemalist economy policy based on a pro-independence and pro-development economic view. The AKP's orientation has been overtly a disengagement directed to accommodate itself to new neoliberal globalization dynamic.

Aktaş pointed out that Turkish Islamism has begun to become its economic aspect more prominent from the 1990s onwards, by expressing that it has had a cultural side. He laid stress on that class aspect of Islamism in 1990s. He remarked that:

The changing produced somehow its own bourgeoisie. There was a new bourgeoisie. It was a class. But, it was a class that had had a cultural dimension. Nevertheless, it was primarily an economic class based on rent distribution in the cities. There was a class formation and enrichment depending upon this rent distribution.

In a similar vein, Bayramoğlu had such an emphasis on class, gradually developing within Islamist groups or/and elites, by signifying that the Ak Parti and its leader had

a class representation. However, at the same time, he added market factor to this emphasis. In a nutshell, he fundamentally expressed that:

Tayyip Erdoğan was the representative of a new generation, when looked at in class sense. –That is to say-, he was the class man of the market, even if at the present we had distinctly saw him with a more cultural background.

As a matter of fact, this neoliberal reading of the interviewees, in Althusserian sense, express an economism. By economism, I implied a more Althusserian definition, which he made when criticizing as an essential element of bourgeois ideology in his reply to John Lewis entitled “Note on ‘The Critique of the Personality Cult’”. In this reply, Althusser remarked that economism was a basic viewpoint of bourgeois ideology. He defined it as seeing everything from the point of view of commodity relations, capitalist accumulation, economic performance and development, capitalist organization, division of labor, and means of production. What is more, it was reflecting an economic standpoint by grounding on the development of the productive forces, the scientific and technical revolution, and the productivity, rather class relations and struggles, the state and its political and ideological apparatuses, and superstructure (Althusser, 1976:86, 88). It seems that a neoliberal reading was a product of perspective based on such an economism framed in Althusserian sense. In that reading, a number of the interviewees pointed out capitalist reorganization on the basis of free market, competition, and export-oriented economy in the global world. They read Islamism, its social base, and the JDP on this global capitalist reorganization. Their readings predominantly revolved around the foregoing economic condition, by never referring to class struggle and relation, political structures/institutions and relationships, and ideological-political processes.

#### **4.8. International Dynamics or/and Factors**

Composed of strong international dynamics like US, EU, and Russia, and of some efficient factors or events such as the Arab Spring, international forces played an active role in affecting Islamism and its new political-ideological orientations in company with the JDP for many interviewees. Along with the JDP and its political-ideological assertions, this effect contains all changes in the JDP power, ranging

from democratization, democratic reforms, and the party argument, ‘we ideologically and politically changed’, to authoritarianism, statism and Islamist and nationalist deflection. Most interviewees argued that the party’s steps for the European Union (EU) and the full membership formed the bases of democratic reforms and ventures. Some also suggested that a number of international dynamics, like US or the Arab Spring, negatively influenced the party’s political-ideological disposition, in sense of returning to authoritarianism, statism, and even an Islamist-nationalist politics. All these were expressed in various forms.

One of the foregoing forms would be the issue of European Union and Turkey’s full membership in it, and of the realization democratic reforms as linked with the membership. Many interviewees saw the EU as a way of being made democratic reforms real in Turkey on the eve of being accepting as a membership of the union. That was not all. Some interviewees told that the European Union has a fundamental component in changing Islamist politics’ political-ideological orientation in Turkey, particularly along with the JDP’s political initiatives concerning the EU. In other words, this was regarded as a basis of political-ideological change in the JDP, with Islamic roots, which had embraced the EU and the membership process as a target. One of those who emphasized both this change and the democratic reforms was İhsan Dağı, a Turkish academician and journalist. Dağı told that:

After the February 28 Process, as liberals, we had an opinion as to those groups, Islamists, changed, especially on the account of the oppressions of the Kemalist-authoritarian regime, and of fact that the regime excluded the groups in question. He was thinking that in Turkey the EU politics, the integration with international order, and the understanding of a global politics would bring significant changes in the sense of law, democracy, and individual autonomy. As a matter of fact, the AKP has, too, adopted and maintained such a politics by looking at political constraints in Turkey, and we have also supported that. Because, the liberals have seen and promoted this politics of Ak Parti as an important step and way out for getting rid of the present tutelage regime in Turkey. Behind all these, there was a Virtue party that represented much explicit and important change, and this party was a quite liberal movement, alongside important changes in sense of starting to do a mass politics in the Welfare party.

Similarly, Akyol mentioned from a new disposition in the AKP. He explicitly stated that:

It has been precise that the AKP emerged with a leaning of liberalization. So, everyone has also supported, along with the right-liberals and the leftist-liberals. It was in the AKP period that the adultery had been subtracted from the criminal code with the EU reference. The party has been eminently sincere about being proud of the EU and its values. It had two reasons: first, instrumental-pragmatic in sense of serving the purpose; second, a feeling change appearing with the excitement of doing something new. Liberal dispositions, EU reference, and conservative democracy were all-important for those reasons. Beside the EU reference and the conservative democracy, the AKP' leaning of liberalization would approximate Turkey to the EU and the rule of law.

The EU process was at the same time an essential part of a reformist politics adopted. This politics was believed to have changed lots of things with an EU-orientated perspective. So to say, this perspective had formed the bases of a reformist politics, which the JDP politics embraced. Çakır urged on this aspect of the EU process. He spoke out that:

While going well with its relationships with the European Union, the AK parti's reformist politics had changed many things. In those times, in an interview made with Nilüfer Göle, 'she told that the AK parti or the AKP was transforming itself while transforming - Turkey-'. That was a much accurate statement. In a word, it was also changing Turkey, but it itself was, too, changing.

On this point, unlike Çakır, for instance, other interviewees, Bayramoğlu and Demirel, generally underlined Islamism or Islamist politics' changing perception relevant to the West, the Western world, and the US, together with the European Union. Bayramoğlu expressly remarked:

When looking at a little more closely, you have seen that a change occurred in the grand themes. For example, ranging from the definition of the West to the opening doors to the EU, and the reconciliation with the concept, democracy, there has been no doubt that this new generation had such a project.

In a similar vein, Demirel signified that:

As a matter of fact, when anymore called the Western world, it, including the US, was emanating from being a great devil. Probably, they, namely the JDP cadres, were aware of such a thing. There have been needed a Muslim democrat and successful country, and a part of Western world promoted this. Let's strive for this. There was an opportunity window here. They broke away from their former tradition.

By and large, aside from the European Union, some interviewees, like Keyman, Taşkın and Aksoy, referred to international-cyclical developments throughout the world, included Turkey. These had played an important role in changing the JDP politics. At this stage, for instance, Keyman and Taşkın laid weight on having arisen a new populism based on a competitive authoritarianism around the world, notably US, Russia and Turkey. On the other hand, Aksoy asserted that the Arab Spring highly influenced Turkey, and thereby the JDP power, as a response why the JDP politics has changed. At this point, Keyman basically expressed that:

When called the rising of the ultra-right, slide from democracy, and Erdoğan factor, this was just no peculiar to Turkey. All these have been developments appearing in compatible with the world conjuncture. That is to say, because, for example, Trump is being elected the man of the year at the present, and Erdoğan is the fourth as well. When looking at the world, not only in Turkey, involving Brexit, Trump, Putin, and Chavez in Venezuela, there has been a new structure, a populism that we have expressed as authoritarian drift, or an existential presidentialism that we have remarked as competitive authoritarianism seen throughout the world. So, in this manner ought to look at these.

Similarly with Keyman, by referring to populism Taşkın briefly told that:

Populism has been a weapon for all the time. That is, there was a slogan popular in 2000s. One had written in one place that 'we are patient'. Conservative populism has contained a threat in itself but is a long-suffering populism. Now, this situation has begun to sit down somewhere else. It has transformed into a phenomena able to also come in view in the countries as rich as to produce welfare chauvinism. Also, there has been a relationality between all those, included Trump, Erdoğan, and Putin. Put it another way, it might be concerned with a new stage into which the world has entered.

Aksoy separated the JDP into two periods, before and after the Arab Spring, by emphasizing that it was a strong turning point in shifting the present political power.

He pointed out that the most critical point was the Arab Spring, considering that it had created two kinds of parties. He explained this situation in that way:

The AKP before and after the Arab Spring was anymore two parties in terms of its sociological goals and owing to its political practices. Therefore, all of what has been said are related to the post-2011 AKP's Turkey. There was something like this: the Arab Spring in 2011. In all studies, Turkey was a model country until 2011, included Iran, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and Tunisia. There were three things that made Turkey a model: one, its secular-democratic structure, other, its TV arrays, another, its relationships with the EU. Exactly, that democratic-secular structure at issue. However, along with the Arab Spring, it - that is AKP- pushed aside being model with those riches -or things- in question. With the Islamic-Ottoman heritage, it just engaged in assuming a leadership over pro-Ikhwan tradition.

Other interviewees, such as Laçiner and Aktaş, spoke of being reconsidered multi-dimensional international dynamics or factors in order to understand the current changes in the AKP politics. For them, these were crucial motivations giving direction to the changes in the party's political orientation. Among international dynamics forcing this party to change was argued to have been the EU, NATO, the US and political events like the Arab Spring. At this point, for instance, Laçiner pointed to three international fundamental dynamics in explaining reasons why the AKP power had to change its own politics. He expressed this as follows:

Once upon a time, men who told that the European Union had been infidel and a Christian Club were specifying to wish to be a member of this union. With that membership, you were obliged to do lots of things which Islam would not be able to easily propose. The EU is a social agreement. Those men told that they approve these. The chapters were being opened, and so on. -The union- told that they should change their laws according to these. The men said yes to all these. Within Islamic world, those men have been as Muslim as you, but they have lived in keeping with democracy. Afterwards, the US has shifted its attitude against the JDP power. It has had taken a rigid stance. Soon after, the Gezi Events. Erdoğan was thinking that the US has made its decision. The Gezi Events had begun. Oh shit! They -that is the US- pushed the button. Erdoğan thought that they were prepared to sacrifice himself. He reshaped his acts depended on the US' stance against him. Moreover, lastly, in 2011, what called the Arab Spring realized. Following the Coup in Egypt, or the developments in Syria, all everything had anymore changed.

Aktaş asserted that international forces have played an active role in designing Islamism, or/and Islamist politics in Turkey. For this, it was needed to be liquidated one generation, termed as ‘traditionalists’. He briefly told that:

The international forces, including NATO, the EU, and the US, preferred to work with a generation, consisting of Erdoğan and Gül, which we described as ‘innovationists’, replacing with it, by disbanding Erbakan generation. They have somehow tried to style –this politics. They succeeded in that.

Generally speaking, with their views cited above, the interviewees have linked the change, which has risen in Islamism and the JDP politics, to international dynamics and developments. Especially, having roots in the National View Islamism based upon anti-westernism and anti-European Union at one times, the JDP’s European Union move was interpreted by the interviewees as the most significant indicator of the change arising Islamist politics. It was seen as part of the JDP’ democratization steps. It has been believed that its support to Turkey’s full membership in the EU and attempts at making a number of reforms would abolish anti-democratic components of the political system, notably military tutelage, existing in Turkey. Some interviewees expressed to base their views upon current democratization theories. As Geddes noted above, in these theories, another important elements was international factors, out of development. These factors or dynamics wre regarded as a crucial sign of democratization or democratizations steps. In consideration of the theories in question, the interviewees principally argued that Islamism's, and thus the JDP’s political change in relation to the EU and other western international institutions, such as NATO, US, played an active role in democratizing Turkey and its political system.

#### **4.9. Liberal Academic-Intellectual Background**

I have stated earlier that there was a basic approach, which dominated the debates relevant to Islamism and the JDP, with strong academic and intellectual background. I termed this as a liberal approach in Chapter 3. I alleged that there has been very close ties between the liberal approach and the interviewees, and that the interviewees made important intellectual contributions to the approach mentioned

through their views. In the chapter 3, I showed this close tie between them, and expressed that the interviewees formed their opinions by mostly basing upon that approach. In the post-1980 Turkey, the debates with regard to Islamism and the JDP politics might be spoken of having had such intellectual background, taking into account the interviewees' standpoint and discussions, and the concepts and general framework which they have used. This intellectual background dominated social and political sciences in Turkey for the last three decades. It had a common and basic argument. Having expressed this argument with a rather simple and understandable, Tuğal remarked that it was an argument based on the idea which the religiously-conservative people represent the 'periphery' and 'civil society' as opposed to the centre and the authoritarian state tradition<sup>16</sup> (Tuğal, 2016). However, the interviewees differently expressed this argument with their own explanations, though not directly in this manner. For instance, Keyman accounted for this argument by defining the centre and the periphery in a more global and sociological framework. Principally, in the light of his own explanations he connoted concerning Islamism that:

On the basis of urbanization and -the formation- of middle classes in Anatolian, within the centre-the periphery, the periphery has had, in too serious sense, a force which it has obtained, by increasingly strengthening with globalization and Europeanization. We saw that its bearer and most important reference has been Islamism. Thereby, the period that a neoliberal market and Islamism had articulated much created a very critical break with the pre-1980.

Of the interviewees, Mağcupyan, unlike Keyman, explained the argument at issue by referring to the 'case' -dava in turkish- of Islamism. He alleged that Islamism in Turkey was a mass event and expressed the coming of collectively Muslims to the centre. This act to come to the centre was interpreted by him as a 'case'. In the context of the centre-the periphery, he told that:

This case would mean that in Turkey, the provinces and/or the periphery, by coming to the centre, against Kemalism, have sought

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<sup>16</sup> C. Tuğal, "Liberalized Islam, Post-Sufis, and the Military in Turkey", accessed June 15, 2018, available from <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2777-liberalized-islam-post-sufis-and-the-military-in-turkey>

its rights, rebuilt it, and said that the owners of these lands had been mainly itself. But, those are Muslim. Therefore, in this sense, there would be possible to produce an Islamism. There have been a religiosity and perception of religion not too much associated with Islamism, given generally Islamist politics and movements throughout the world. Once, it is needful to see that if it would be spoken of having been an Islamism in Turkey it has almost grounded on a literal –lafzi- piety not having too much depth. This Islamism might be told to have been an ideological past or fiction as a way of using Islam that Muslims resorted while walking towards the centre.’ Put it in a nutshell, it has been nothing more than aiming to collectively move Muslims to the centre, by creating moral ties and consolidating various forms of solidarity through religion.

Islamism was first step of the effort to equate with the centre. Erbakan’s National View tradition was preliminary signs to somewhat come inside in the face of the constitutive elements of the Modern Republic. This was a matter of ‘equation’. Bayramoğlu read this argument as the realization of an ‘equation’ between the centre and the periphery. On this point, he expressed that:

It was more focused on society, which represented periphery. Mostly, there was a great interest in a variety of religious orders, like the Naqshbandi or/and the Nurcu, defined as a core with networks which tried to control and propagate this ‘mumin’ and striving for people to be a ‘mumin’ (believer) with a more individual and people-based viewpoint, not ideology-based. They were a main core of Turkish Islamist movement. They were at the same time the centers of an elite production as an individualist (ferdiyetçi) movement endeavoring to maintain their existence within it without making an effort to substitute for the state. They had produced the National View movement. It was first test of the effort of an ‘equation’. This effort to become equal carries more important sense than we suppose, and we have seen that. It consists democracy, universal and liberal values in itself. Accordingly, this has been grounded on equalizing that nation’s, namely conservatives’, opportunities with other.

Çakır saw the foregoing argument as a natural outcome of normalization and democratization, though not an ‘equation’ as in Bayramoğlu, in sense of moving religionists into the centre. He clearly propounded that:

Together with the AKP, Islamism had carried the devotees to the centre. Their acts to the centre was to normalize and democratize Turkey.

More differently than the interviewees above, Laçiner addressed this argument over 'civil society'. He argued that it was crucial that such society has existed in Turkey. He highlighted that:

There was a weak civil society in Turkey. On the face of the coups staged in Turkish politics, we have asked the question, 'why was this society so weak?' For this reason, there has been an issue like the weakness of civil society in Turkey. As an assurance to at least remain within the civilized standards, such a society would form an essential part of democratization.

Another interviewee, Mert, told by confirming Laçiner's idea cited above, that the foregoing perspective was an outcome of an idea that narrowly defines 'political' with just state and its bureaucratic apparatuses. She alleged that Islamism and particularly Islamist -civil- organizations, and civil society strongly stood side by side. She clearly indicated that:

Islamists' going towards civil sphere has been a rather popular trend. This did not mean that with the coming of post-Cold War neoliberal society it was no longer interested in taking hold state power. In that society, for this reason, with ever-increasing civil society organizations, Islamism(s) or Islamist movements could not be claimed to have differently come into being, by renouncing from their political allegations to capture the state. They did not abandon that allegation. Just the meaning of 'political' changed. Because it has been already something political to be shaped society itself through those organizations, -including the state and its hegemonic and repressive apparatuses-.

Taking into account all the statements of the interviewees, albeit significant differences among them, it explicitly seems that there was a dominant liberal intellectual approach in the post-1980 debates in relation to Islamism in Turkey. However, this background was more indirectly expressed by some interviewees cited here, in line with their outlooks. Unlike all those interviewees, another interviewee, Erdoğan, more directly stated by addressing to a famous Turkish scholar, Şerif Mardin, and his major study, 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?'. Also, he argued that, aside from himself, all liberals had a similar view. Briefly stated, he fundamentally puts into words that:

We, liberals, have more interpreted relationships between religion and politics in the axis of 'centre-periphery' tension, which Mardin

popularized. The centre, state, was in the hands of a group of western and secular elites. The periphery was consisting of those who became excluded from the centre and saw themselves as 'secondary class' citizen in the face of the aforesaid group.

Briefly stated, this academic-intellectual background, which laid the bases of a liberal approach in the Chapter 3, played a decisive role in shaping the interviewees' thoughts. It established a strong ground for a liberal-conservative intellectual leadership by dominating their analyses and debates. It grounded this leadership on a historical-social Islamism. There was two fundamental components that had made such Islamism strong. One was historically academic-intellectual background, outlined in the Chapter 3. The other was historically its cultural and economic bases. The interviewees clearly expressed these two aspects of Islamism in either this chapter or the Chapter 3.

#### **4.10. Conclusion**

This chapter has fundamentally strived to put forward the interviewees' analyses and arguments related to the JDP and Islamism. These have directly been based upon interview data, which just consisted of the interviewees' replies. As seen above, there are two basic points in the analyses and arguments in question. The first is that they comprised the post-1980 period. The other is the interviewees' description of Islamism, which was termed as historical-social Islamism, while in general debating the JDP and Islamism. Considering these two points, it seems that the interviewees made a description of Islamism in accordance with the former chapter, which the literature and interview data were debated together. I expressed such an Islamism as a historical-social Islamism. It was a product of the liberal approach discussed in the chapter 3. We can readily see this from the content of the interview data.

There are two major reasons why the description at issue was the result of a liberal approach. The first is the analyses and discussions made by interviewees whilst addressing Islamism and the JDP. I classified these under certain titles to explain. Taking the discussions and analyses in those titles into account, it can be told that they generally expressed the far-reaching social and economic transformations taken place within the religiously-conservative social groups, which was seen as the

political actors of Islamism and/or the JDP politics, as an outcome of macro-changes, such as globalization, new neoliberal economic conditions, development, and education. Second is that the interviewees pointed to it by expressing frequently with their arguments and analyses and sometimes directly referring to the liberal approach with the concepts and/or scholars, as would be seen in last title, entitled “Liberal Academic-Intellectual Background”.

However, what is important here is that interviewees made a description of Islamism by looking to wide-ranging changes realized in the post-1980 period. In that description, there was two fundamental arguments. One was the transformation arising in the economic and cultural bases of the religiously-conservative groups, particularly considering the titles like globalization, neoliberal reading of Islam(ism), and the changing sociology of the groups in question. The other was democratization issue propounded by the interviewees on the basis of a political cleavage between the secular establishment and the religiously-conservative groups. Starting from these two arguments, which formed the general framework of analyses and discussions by the interviewees and was debated in a variety of titles in this chapter, I argued that they made a description of Islamism based on the liberal approach. I defined it as the historical-social Islamism.

During interviews, when I asked the interviewees reasons why they changed their positions and attitudes against the JDP politics and its power, their criticisms concentrated on two basic points. One of them was Erdoğan and his personality and temperament. Other was reconsideration of certain subjects, such as globalization or democratization. Most interviewees attributed the point, which the JDP had come today, to Erdoğan’s personality and leadership. Generally speaking, they asserted that the change in party and its authoritarian political stance stemmed from Erdoğan’s dominant and undisputed leadership in party and party politics. In addition, some interviewees stated that it was required to be reconsidered globalization and democratization, especially in theoretical context. They argued that globalization and democratization theories were rather disputable. In return for these critical assertions, I brought some critiques to a few points. These points were Erdoğan's personality and his leadership in the party, and democratization issue. My

criticisms were grounded more on Althusser and Geddes' explanations with regard to the points in question. In the next chapter, I will broadly try to put forward my own criticisms by explaining this study's perspective, termed as historical-political Islamism.

## CHAPTER 5

### A HISTORICAL-POLITICAL ISLAMISM: THE POLITICIZATION OF ISLAM

#### 5.1. Introduction

In this section, I will try to describe historical-political Islamism emerged as a result of certain ideological-political syntheses or compositions, political experiences, organizations and alliances, military coups and their ideological-political interferences. This Islamism basically refers that Islam has become a crucial tool of ideological-political struggle and political legitimacy and cultural-social cohesion by politicizing. What underlies its formation is the politicization of Islam by other actors, which have contained the centre-right politics, the ultra-nationalist NAP, some political youth organizations and the secular establishment, aside from Islamism as a right-inclined politics. The politicization of Islam above all expresses that religion has ideologically and politically risen in importance in political sphere, and ideological and political structures, ranging from the right-wing politics, some ideological synthesis and composition, and rightist youth organization to the secular establishment. In other words, Islam has arisen as an important ideological and political factor which would provide a basis for social cohesion, political-ideological legitimacy and struggle in Turkish politics. Some historical-political moments and periods have been, to a great extent, decisive for appearing such basis, which has led up to the politicization of Islam within Turkish political history. From the late 1960s, 1970s, the rise of the left-socialist (WPT) and social democrat politics (RPP) and the emergence of a variety of Marxist-socialist youth organizations played an active role in the politicization of Islam. Particularly, the right-wing politics was the leading actors of that politicization by politically and ideologically using in its struggle with

the Marxist-socialist politics and organizations. With a nationalist-conservative composition -terkip-, and the political experiences under the Nationalist Front governments this politics paved the way for the emerging of a historical-political Islamism by incorporating Islamist politics into the politicization in question. In this period, another political experience was the National Turkish Student Union (MTTB), a rightist youth organization, which had laid the bases of politicization of religion and politically and ideologically raised the political actors of Islamism. Besides, the 1980s was a significant political and ideological threshold, which Islam was politicized by the secular establishment, formed in under the leadership of the 12 September military coup, as a tool of culturally and ideologically social cohesion or/and cement and political legitimacy. After the 1980 military coup, the secular establishment changed its attitude against religion, Islam, accepted it as an essential part of the identity of Turkish state, and also applied to Islam as an important symbolic, cultural and moral means for redesigning the state and Turkish society within a generic understanding of national political-cultural unity and harmony. Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which had sought to combine Islamic morals, values and ideas and Turkish nationalism, and refashioned Kemalist understanding of secularism (Atasoy, 2009), was a considerable and official expression of the coup. Therefore, Islam was politicized by the state as a tool of constituting a significant cultural, moral, and symbolic unity in the service of Turkish nationalism. This official politicization shaped Turkish Islamism, since it had realized the political promises and/or goals of Islamist politics in the context of either turning Islam into a main element of identity of Turkish state or using it as a moral, cultural and symbolic force in political and social life, notably educational institutions. Taking into account of all these I will fundamentally allege that there has been a historical-political Islamism on the basis of various ideological-political compositions and syntheses, political experiences and organizations, and a number of political struggles and conflicts. This kind of Islamism has been shaped in political and ideological structures.

First and above all, having attempted at debating how Islamism was historically and politically constituted in definite political-ideological processes, my study will

highlight ideological and political structures in a Gramscian and Althusserian framework and how religion forms a basic for political and symbolic legitimacy in Bourdieuan sense. It has two fundamental frameworks, one, hegemonic, other, Bourdieuan. Their common characteristic generally refers to political and ideological structures when examining a political movement or group, without ignoring socio-economic transformations and class bases. On this point, for instance, a hegemonic analysis<sup>17</sup> separates itself from other two forms of analysis: first, an approach based on new social movement theories; second, another approach grounding on political opportunity and resource mobilization theory. It argues that religion and its political use can be explained in a hegemonic-political context, which underlines its moral, cultural and symbolic links with the state and society with a view to form and dominate a collective-political entity in Gramscian sense, beyond civil society, and political advantages and resources (Tuğal, 2009). When making such an analysis, Tuğal drew on a Gramscian framework, the basic concept of which is political society, involving state, state apparatuses, and also their constituent role of hegemony. In his idea, this political society mainly stresses the constitutive power of politics itself. From this point of view, he stated that what puts Islamists' political-

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<sup>17</sup> Hegemonic analysis is a framework of explanation used by Cihan Tuğal, a Turkish scholar and sociologist who is interested in religion, politics, everyday life, class transformation and national identity, in order to analyze Islamism and transformation of political Islam in Turkey in his one article entitled "Transforming Everyday Life: Islamism and Social Movement Theory". He embarks on making such analysis by particularly referring to Gramsci's significant one concept, political society, including the state, its governmental apparatuses, and the private apparatuses of hegemony. With the exception of hegemonic analysis, he states that there have been two ways of analysis: one, an analysis appealing to theory of new social movements to explain; other, another analysis based on theories of political opportunity and resource mobilization. In his opinion, new social movement theory would be one that focuses on creation of identity by asserting that new social movements have developed in civil society, whereas the former social movements opposed to the state and demanded state power. Other theory would also make an analysis of how social movements have strategically benefited from contingent opportunities provided by political structure, but especially by state, and of they have centered on strategic use of resources as a result of centralization of the state regarded as main actor by political process paradigm. It sees –political- actors as ones behaving more strategic and rational for using resources in the service of political aims. Lastly, he defines hegemonic analysis as a conceptual-theoretical scheme studying how power is formed in both state and society, by going beyond a simple separation like state and society (Tuğal, 2009:424-425, 426-427, 430, and Tuğal, 2016). At this point, in the context of hegemonic analysis I would make, it might be necessary to remark that, as will be seen later in this chapter, my analysis has been shaped in a more Gramscian-Althusserian theoretical line which take account of other political-ideological apparatuses or/and institutions, but not limited merely to the state, undoubtedly by having in mind social transformations, class conflicts and economic interests in line with their Marxist-theoretical views.

institutional structures into a form in contradictory ways has been the political platforms and organizations (Tuğal, 2016: 29).

In other respects, having considered religion as a field, capital and habitus, a Bourdieuan analysis basically associates it with political structures, including state, ideology, legitimacy, and political mobilization and domination, without reducing it into economic structures and interests, and class position. According to Bourdieu, religion as a field per se is place of political and symbolic struggles that produces and reproduces a dominant-political order by contributing to the symbolic manipulation of aspirations which has been apt to guarantee being in harmony of actual hopes with the establishment in question. It is a habitus defined as ‘set of dispositions’ which have oriented individuals to act in a certain fashion, and refers to a symbolic capital as a form of cultural and social capital ‘endowed with a symbolic efficacy’. With these aspects, religion, which symbolically reinforces the ideological-political divisions, makes a decisive and important contribution to the maintenance of political order by refashioning political tendencies and symbols (Bourdieu, 1991 and Rey, 2007). Thus, in Bourdieuan sense, it is an important symbolic-political source in the production of political unity and domination. So, Bourdieuan analysis<sup>18</sup> will be a basic framework for my explanations on how Islamism in Turkey has taken form, on account of asserting that religion has two constitutive functions which have far-reaching political ramifications: one, to consecrate the political-social order as legitimate; other, to provide people with a tool to make sense of their positions in the political-social order (Bourdieu, 1991: 14 and Rey, 2007: 77). Given all these explanations with regard to a hegemonic and Bourdieuan analysis, such an analysis provides us to think that religion has been always an important political –ideological

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<sup>18</sup> A Bourdieuan analysis manifest itself by rejecting and criticizing a ‘new paradigm’ emerging in the sociology of religion field. It opposes to this paradigm based on economic interpretation of religion dominant in North American sociology. “Unlike traditional European social theory that stressed on the centrality of secularization to modernization alongside urbanization, increasing literacy and democratic politics, the new paradigm focuses not on the meaning or importance of religion in the lives of individuals, but on the institutional framework within which religion is provided. It is therefore regarded in economic terms as a supply-side, rather than a demand-side, theory of religious growth and decline. This paradigm directs research attention towards the function of religious or spiritual markets in which there is a competition for “brand loyalty” from consumers of religious meaning, practices and objects”. See for a more detailed explanation, Bryan S. Turner (2011), “Pierre Bourdieu and the Sociology of Religion, In *The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essay*, Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner (edit.), New York: Anthem Press, pp. 223-245

tool which has ensured a political-symbolic legitimacy for dominant political order and constitutes a political-ideological hegemony in society, on condition of bearing its moral, cultural, symbolic relationships with political and ideological structures in mind.

In the foregoing analysis, religion is, above all, a political, ideological and symbolic force that has involved moral, cultural, symbolic and ideological components as a field of struggle beyond a pure economic interest and class relations. To put it another way, it has been a means of constituting a hegemony with the mentioning forces. It is something that overreaches a simple state-civil society distinction. At this point, for instance, in Turkey, religion, Islam, cannot be just seen as the source of a political current which has focused on capturing the state power via elections with political goals based on cultural demands and economic interests of its own social base. It has been a crucial symbolic, political and ideological tool politicized by some political actors – other constituents of the right-wing politics, the centre-right and ultra-nationalist politics, outside of Islamism- and the state as a way of conducting a political-ideological struggle and providing a political-symbolic legitimacy for the existing political-social order. In a sense, it has been exposed to a politicization, including Islamist politics, in Turkey. It is a politicization that has intertwined with nationalism, Turkish state and its ideological and political legitimacy. This politicization has basically formed a basis for the formation of a historical-political Islamism by virtue of its participation. What has made such an Islamism more understandable in a hegemonic and Bourdieuan analysis will be the politicization of Islam, which has integrated its moral, symbolic and cultural aspects with political and ideological structures in Turkey.

In order to be able to comprehend better and explain the politicization of Islam in Turkey, it can be necessary to, a bit more, elaborate the above discussions, particularly Tuğal's hegemonic analysis, through Gramsci and Althusser's theories, which has fundamentally highlighted ideological and political structures. To begin with, it should be stated that Gramsci and Althusser made important contributions to politics and ideology theory with their theoretical approaches. The most importance of those contributions is that each two Marxist theorists have rejected economic

reductionism and supremacy of class position and defended the autonomy of ideological and political structure, independently from economic structures. General speaking, they suggested that these two structures have had dynamics and structures peculiar to themselves, not capable of being determined by economic interest and class position. On this point, for instance, Althusser argued that society is a complex totality composed of political and ideological ones, not just economic structures, each with its own autonomous logic of development and contradictions (Althusser, 2014 and Martin, 1998: 153). These structures cannot be seen as a product of given economic structure, its antagonistic class contradictions and struggles. This given thing cannot be merely economy or economic experiences, but also cultural belongings or identities is given to us. However, according to Althusser, these things given cannot certainly explain our political and ideological positions. Known with his strongly contrast to empiricism or empiricist philosophy, which claims that experience itself provides a basis for knowledge, he objected to the assertion that knowledge through experience is possible, therefore, that class positions create 'class outlooks'. For, the social position of the subject cannot be the origin of its ideological position (Althusser, 2009 and Hirst, 1976: 386). Therefore, for him, ideology is something that has a material existence, rather than ideal, idea-dependent or spiritual existence of 'ideas'. It does not also correspond to class interests and consciousness. It always exists and is realized in an apparatus, which Althusser termed as ideological state apparatuses (Althusser, 2014:184). It expresses individual's imaginary relation to their real condition of existence. The individual, who lives such relation to these condition in an imaginary mode, is not given subject. S/he are constituted. It is in the imaginary that s/he is formed as a subject in a conservative, reformist or revolutionary way (Althusser, 181, Ricouer, 1994: 54 and Hirst, 1976: 386). Considering this Althusserian framework, it cannot be alleged that, in Turkey, Islamism has merely grounded on given economic interests, class position, and cultural demands of one social group, described as devout and conservative. It is something beyond a given economic or/and cultural situation. Put it another way, it is, I think, historically and politically a politics appearing as a product of certain political and ideological structure. Also, its subjects, which have been expressed as devout-conservative social groups with economic and class bases,

are not given, but have been constituted within ideological-political structures. I will define this Islamism as a historical-political Islamism shaped as connected with other political actors, including the state, which had politicized Islam as a way of ideologically and politically struggling and forming a basis for social cohesion, political legitimacy and class domination. It will be asserted that such Islamism, which had taken part in politicizing Islam in cooperation with the above-said actors, has had quite authoritarian, statist, nationalist, anti-communist, xenophobic, and intolerant bases.

Likewise, as in an Althusserian view, Gramsci pointed out that society is an organic totality that has to be explained in all its contradictory complexity, as special and fractional formations of base and superstructure, rather than a closed totality based on a single structure or mechanism. It has arisen from structures based on various relations of forces, notably political, economic, and military. For instance, at this point, for Gramsci, the political relations of force has been a sphere of struggle which corresponds to the varied moments of collective politics consciousness, not just expressing a class consciousness, but created by a professional group for forming a unity and homogeneity (Gramsci, 1992: 180-181, 183 and Martin, 1998: 141-142). Just as Althusser, Gramsci also refused an essentialist and reductionist stance, which would mean reading and interpreting society and other structures, involving politics, law, religion, state, culture and the like from the point of view of economic structure and class position. In his theory of politics and ideology, he basically highlighted the formative and constituent role of politics and its ideological-institutional apparatuses. He has been opposed to tendency to tendency to look at political institutions as a reflection of the economic structure (Simon, 1999: 13). In a Gramscian framework, politics has no relationship with Aesthetics, Economics, Logic and Ethics, which have been in the quest of respectively 'beautiful', 'useful', 'true' and 'good'. It is merely a 'composite entity' and 'passion', and has no philosophical value. Gramsci has comprehended it as a central human activity, and a fundamental political practice which human consciousness comes into contact with the social and natural world in all its forms (Gramsci, 1992: 22). For him, politics is a matter of hegemony. The formation of hegemony is a product of collective political consciousness, without

referring to one social class, and its economic interests and class position. Based on intellectual and moral reform, this consciousness can be just achieved by transforming popular consciousness, consisting of people's ways of thinking and feeling, of their 'conceptions of the world' and moral conduct, in a sharply contrast to the interests of the capitalist class (Simon, 1999: 28, 35). Such a thing would be possible by reconsidering the notion of ideology, which has not been able to be explained as a total of class interests. For this, Gramsci has set to work by rejecting an ideology theory in Classical-Marxist sense, which has been theorized around "accuracy and/or mistake" or class interests and contradictions and popularized as a "false consciousness". On this point, he has defined ideology as something more than a system of ideas. To the extent that it is required historically, it has a validity, simply because it 'organizes' human masses and constitutes a field which men move and obtain a consciousness regarding their positions and struggles.. So, ideology ought to be seen as product of a collectivity consciously 'embodied in collective and communal modes of living', not 'individual fancies'. Far beyond a 'truth and falsity', it has been defined with its efficiency in linking diverse social elements to one another as a bloc and in moving as a 'cement' or 'an agent of social unification'. In other words, it is to function as a cement holding the interests of distinct social groups together, rather than a single class, namely capitalist or working class. At the same time, it cannot be reduced to just economic structure and practices, since it is mostly a collective-political entity that has a material existence existing in political and ideological practices, composed of culture, commonsense, morality, and the like (Gramsci, 1992: 138, Simon, 1999: 66-67, 68, and Femia, 1981: 134). In Turkey, Islamism as a political-ideological current has constituted a collective-political entity, as mentioned above, which has been grounded on nationalist and conservative themes, and moral, symbolic and cultural elements of Islam. Basically, what has created this collective-political subject in a sense is that it has been politics beyond given economic interests and cultural bases of one social group with religious-conservative dispositions, by shaping in certain political and ideological structures. These structures contain a number of ideological-political compositions –terkip- and syntheses, and political socialization, experiences, and struggles in itself, alongside the state and its ideological and repressive apparatuses. The traces of politicization

of Islam should be looked for within ideological and political structures in question. This politicization, which has been actualized by other actors, cannot keep Islamism out. Islamism has got involved in it. The aforesaid politicization, including Islamism, has laid the bases of a historical-political Islamism. Such Islamism has provided a basis for the formation of nationalist-populist politics shaped around Turkish nationalism, and a culture-based populism, which would predominate its moralist, symbolic and cultural aspects, in Gramscian sense. The subject of Islamism at issue is not religiously-conservative groups defined with given economic and cultural bases. It has been constituted by a nationalist-populist politics in the course of the formation of a historical-political Islamism in Althusserian sense. It is a subject which has had nationalist, conservative, religious, and authoritarian and statist tendencies and has fed with hostility to communism and left-socialist politics and irreligion.

The last concept on which I will dwell on when explaining the formation of a historical-political Islamism during the politicization of Islam will be political socialization. It is a concept, the importance of which has gradually increased today. Hooghe has attributed this to its changing meaning as from 1950s and 1960s. According to him, in those periods the concept was being defined as a mechanism of guaranteeing political stability, in sense of referring to an intensive socialization process that the dominant values underlying the present system had been interiorized. However, in our time, the concept has, remarks Hooghe, concentrated on the question of where and how people obtain political knowledge, and of how much they are concerned with politics. But yet, as in the past, the major mechanisms of political socialization would no longer consist of just institutions or structures like family and schools. There have been also a variety of voluntary associations, mass media, peer groups, informal interactions. In such way of socialization, it has been more important to comprehend and explain how and where individuals have attained their knowledge with regard to politics, and how they have been shaped and socialized within political attitudes (Hooghe, 2004: 335). The reason has been that, as Almond and Verba stated, political socialization is mainly associated with political attitudes, since it has referred to political attitudes constituted within political experiences or

practices. To be sure, these attitudes concerning politics have formed by being relationally exposed to others' political attitudes. Based on this political experience it should be included the formation of attitudes which have originated from the transfer of attitudes, from non-political to political realm. But still, Almond and Verba have alleged that the institutions, -or structures- closer to the political realm, or within in political system are more crucial for the formation of political attitudes (Almond and Verba, 1989: 266, 269-270, 272-273).

Generally speaking, political socialization expresses a sum of processes related to questions of how people create their political skills, dispositions, and practices, and of how all these things in question mutually shape their politics. Briefly stated, it is a process that political groups have continuously created their own identities, values, and behaviours during their lives<sup>19</sup> (Hooghe, 2004 and Almond and Verba, 1989). When speaking of political socialization as a process, I there will use practice, more than behaviour or experience. It would be more accurate to use the term practice that expresses all everything included political socialization. For, practice is not only composed typical political activities, but also of how one has acted while deciding, what one has thought of a political fact or event, and which political arguments and political-ideological frameworks one has used in one political discussion. (Sapiro, 2004: 2). Politically, the term practice expresses the formation of the various attitudes and opinions being generated through political institutions or structures and ideological-political approaches in the process of a political socialization, far beyond a simple activity. Having provided a basis for shaping several political dispositions and attitudes as a product of such a political practice within process, political socialization will be one of important conceptual frameworks for me here to explain and show how Islamist political actors and cadres' ideas and attitudes have formed and which political processes have had influences in shaping their political worldviews. The most remarkable example has been the National Turkish Student

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<sup>19</sup> Anja Neundorf and Kaat Smets, "Political Socialization and the Making of Citizens", accessed September 01, 2017, available from: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935307-e-98>

Union (MTTB), a rightist youth organization, which raised Islamist political cadres on the one hand, and led up to the politicization of Islam on the other. It was an union in which the leading Islamist and rightist political figures, among of who was Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç, Cemil Çiçek, and Abdülkadir Aksu, had taken part<sup>20</sup>. The organization-MTTB- had displayed distinct political positions in different periods, when came to the fore with nationalist-conservative stance in 1960s. It embraced a more Islamist political position from 1970s up to the early 1980s (Okutan, 2004 and Duman and Yorgancılar, 2008). To conclude, I will try to put forward how this youth organization contributed to politicizing Islam and played an active role in shaping the attitudes of Islamist political cadres within the general framework of the concept political socialization outlined above.

The politicization of Islam, which has formed a basis for the emerging of a historical-political Islamism, is not made up of cultural and ideological dimensions. It has at the same time an economic dimension, which has led up to arising a clientalist and patronage system-based populism, as a result of political conditions and structures peculiar to Turkey. Sunar has defined this political condition and structure as a strong state tradition and bureaucratic state apparatuses with the integrated and centralized structure at one side, and weak Turkish society with traditional-conservative bases at other side. This bureaucratic state, mostly consisting of civil and military bureaucracies, has institutionalized its power in a political system designated by centralizing power at the top, and monopolized political power. It has been utterly autonomous and segregated from society. As for Turkish society, it has displayed a weak, heterogeneous and disjointed structure (Sunar, 1990: 746-747). This state has controlled economic opportunities and resource distribution, welfare and pension, grants, job chances, and industrial and agricultural subsidies. It would be single actor of public housing, and public services, like education and health. So, it would be an important political aim for all politics, included Islamism, to conquer

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<sup>20</sup> Fatih Yaşlı, "Anti-Komünizmden 15 Temmuz'a", Birgün newspaper, accessed September 15, 2018, available from: <https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/anti-komunizmden-15-temmuz-a-121682.html>, Nadire Mater, "Meclis Başkanı Kahraman'ın Başkanlık Yaptığı MTTB'yi Tanıyalım", Bianet, accessed September 15, 2018, available from: <https://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/169477-meclis-baskani-kahraman-in-baskanlik-yaptigi-mttb-yi-taniyalim>

state power in order to conduct a politics on the basis of clientalism and patronage system. With a pragmatist outlook, it would be a rather populist politics based on appealing the everyday life demands and values of people and de-emphasizing a -Kemalist-official- secularism (Sunay, 1990: 749). This has formed economic dimension of the politicization of Islam by highlighting the traditions, values and beliefs of certain social group and de-stressing Kemalist secularism. This politics has developed a pragmatist attitude to state power on the basis of a clientalist and patronage system-based populism which has politicized religion, Islam, in sense of using values and beliefs. In Turkey, Islamism has been the leading political actor of such politics with its pragmatist approach to state power.

## **5.2. The Politicization of Islam in the Mid-1960s and 1970s**

### **5.2.1. Nationalist-Conservative Composition –Terkip-**

Islam became one of important political-ideological arguments of the right-wing politics from the mid-1960s in Turkey. Islam was gradually begun to be politicized against the rise of the left-socialist politics within various ideological-formulations. One of the most remarkable political formations, which had contributed to shape a historical-political Islamism from the late 1960s and 1970s, was nationalist-conservative composition –terkip-, which had been constituted by the right-wing intellectuals as a political umbrella that gathered the Turkish right in those periods. This composition, which dominated Turkish right from the centre-right to extreme Islamist (NOP and NSP) to ultra-nationalist politics (NAP) in 1960s and 1970s, had designated the political-ideological elements of Islamism, led by an Islamist-rightist politician known as Necmettin Erbakan and organizing under a political organization termed as National View Movement (NVM). It was one of significant steps of politicization of Islam. At the same time, it formed a basis for the formation of a historical-political Islamism by incorporating this politics into its own political-ideological line.

The nationalist-conservative composition was a political development beyond a simple political strategy or tactics within the right-inclined politics. It was mainly a

product of the rightist intellectual movement which was founded as the Intellectuals' Club in 1962 but changed into the Intellectuals' Hearth in 1970s (Mert, 2007: 115). However, firstly, it would be commemorated with some prominent-popular rightist intellectuals, among who were figures like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Eşref Edip, Erol Güngör, Mehmet Akif (Ersoy), and Nurettin Topçu. They were important political-intellectual figures that in Turkey many right-wing politicians have got inspired, ranging from the centre-right politics to Islamist and ultra-nationalist one (Kara, 1998, Bora, 2012, and Çetinsaya, 2005). Having synthesized nationalism and conservatism with religion, Islam, these intellectuals had been architects of that political composition by describing a differently nationalism and conservatism, involving Islam. This composition has fundamentally been defined with the concepts nationalism and conservatism to be blended with Islam. They have been be at the same time major concepts of political arguments which have undertaken an active role in shaping Islamism in Turkey. For this reason, I will dwell more on nationalism and conservatism, formulated differently, while clarifying the aforesaid political composition.

In the first place, we might launch into this subject by highlighting that this nationalist-conservative composition was a political-intellectual interference. It tried to inject Islam into nationalism for the sake of dispelling spiritual gap in nationalism, which has had more secular-Kemalist bases, and of incorporating more a moral-communitarian spirit into it. It had framed Islam in more conservative form by underlining its ritualistic, traditional and communitarian elements (Bora, 2012 and Mert, 2007). In addition to this political meaning, by gathering all main constituents of right-wing politics based nationalist, conservative and Islamist aspects in political sphere, it had also been a product of a strong intellectual activity initiated by the right-wing thinkers, who argued that Turkish nationalism without Islam would be a hollow, senseless and alien thing. Among those thinkers, for example, is Eşref Edip, one of those who I will firstly express. Interestingly, having been name father of first Islamist party –NOP- of the National View and supported to the establishment of an Islamist party in Turkey, Edip has asserted that Islam was superior to all everything. He has stated that if a Muslim Turkism was made dominant, instead of an irreligious

Turkism, it would be one of the greatest services in enhancing its spiritual existence by rescuing our nation from alienation and degeneracy (Kara, 1998: 38, 45). Another one, Necip Fazıl, has highlighted the importance of Islam in a similar vein, but differently. According to him, “if the aim is Turkishness, what is absolutely necessary to be known is that a Turk can be just Turk after being Muslim. Put it another way, Turk is a Turk as long as it is a Muslim”. He has expressed that there were two kinds of nationalism, one of which was a fake nationalism (in dreg, crust and hollow sense); the other, a nationalism that spiritual content is Islam (Çetinsaya, 2005: 437, 439). Thus, Turkish nationalism and Islam has been twin political siblings. Apart from the fact that such thing has nationalized Islamism, Bora has, too, pointed out that Mehmet Akif, the writer of Turkish-national anthem, was among the preeminent nationalist-conservative intellectuals in terms of making Islamism a more conservative through the moral and communitarian aspects of Islam, in his words, “perhaps a irreligious community lives, but a religion without community does not” (Bora, 2012: 81 and Kara, 2014: 449). In spite of being taken into account as one of first and foremost figures of Islamism, Mehmet Akif was someone who did not have any poems criticizing nationalism till 1912, later on along with mercilessly criticizing Turkism. He would speak of ‘Turkish nation’ or ‘Turkish Muslims’, which dominated three great continents of world, by shifting his views in the period of War of Independence (Kara, 2014: 463 and Çetinsaya, 2005: 421, 424). Having been considerably impressed from Mehmet Akif’s ideas, Nurettin Topçu has indicated that at one time one who had not recognized nationalism was supposed to be devout and Muslim, but, on the other hand, those who had been opposed to religion were defined as nationalist. One devout or Muslim depicted a superstitious and stateless presence while a nationalist was termed as racist. In his thought, it was Mehmet Akif that had disentangled our soul from this fallacy expressing a delirium. It was him who taught us that a Turk would not abandon from Islam, by not disconnecting our nationalism from Islam. So, for him, it was quite natural that a nationalism, which had never departed from idea of history and land was linked with principle of conservatism (Kara, 1998: 190-191). Lastly, another nationalist-conservative intellectual is Erol Güngör who religion or Islam occupied an important place in his ideas. He has studied the issue of religion from three dissimilar

historical, social and sociological aspects, respectively composing of religion as a reply to moral problems, role of religion in building a new civilization (Islam and Civilization), and finally laicism and religion. He has mentioned as something based on more cultural and social aspects from religion, without a matter of faith. It has been spoken of necessity to be built a new civilization grounded on Islam, and in his opinion this was a task pertaining to intellectuals, not politicians. In other respects, as for nationalism, it was not opposed to Islam; on the contrary, expressing to be in harmony Islam with idea of Turkish nationalism. Güngör has dealt with religion as a cultural issue and seen Islam as one of basic components of Turkish nationalism (Güler, 2012: 6-7, 8). As would be also seen above, the main task that these right-wing intellectuals carried out was to show that Turkish nationalism and Islam were two fundamental elements inseparable from each other. In the end, the nationalist-conservative composition was a product of the foregoing intellectual effort that undertook to synthesize Islam with Turkish nationalism.

In this composition, Islam has been framed within a more conservative style. This conservatism referred to an Islamic ethos which had been described as sacred values, and among which were God, prophet, and holy scripture, i.e. Quran (Okutan, 2004: 167). As a political attitude, it has not seen as a whole of principles on which religion should be insisted, if so, religion would be nothing but religious fundamentalism. As in the conservative thought, which have shaped in Western societies, it has also defined religion as a unifying and illustrative feature of society without a case special to Turkey. From the viewpoint of conservatism, what has been important is to preclude the annihilation of stability generally expressing the maintenance of a social-political order on the basis of a common geography, language, religion, tradition, history and political establishment. It is the case for Turkish conservatism. As Mert would point out, it has also attributed to social order a sanctity, and it has not been against to it, provided that change has not threatened equilibrium of society. For it, the way to oppose such a threat has been to conserve 'moral' values and symbols. Mert does state that a conservative politics has cared about status quo, not religious principles. According to her, one of the most original directions of conservatism developing in Turkey has been its rigid authoritarian attitude and style,

in parallel with political culture. The idea of ‘holiness of state’ has been the pithiest expression of that style (Mert, 2007; 77, 88). In a similar vein, Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu have tried to outline Turkish conservatism in their one book entitled ‘The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey’, published in recent times. The book basically dwells on why conservatism has begun to become a political disposition rising in Turkey. In this book, they have argued that Turkish conservatism have had three fundamental dimensions. The first is its politically authoritarian and intolerant tendency, along with attaching important to old-fashioned values, like gender; second, its state-interventionist attitude and dogmatism; and lastly, a third, its religious conservatism, which manifests religiosity in either individual choices, or in generally religious practices, and its political disposition drawing attention to youth-related issues, mostly connected with old-fashioned values mentioned above. They have pointed out that the religious dimension of conservatism has been a basic component which shapes the authoritarian, intolerant, and even xenophobic dispositions of conservatism. These dispositions has, assert Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, ‘gone hand in hand with dogmatism, religious conservatism, and old-fashioned values on both youth and gender issues (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, 2009: 82-83). In this place, the most remarkable point that each two Turkish scholars have highlighted would be so close relationship that –Turkish-conservatism has established with religion, Islam. What has most explicitly expressed this relationship would be religious conservatism that Turkish conservatism has amounted to place importance to people’s religious feelings and values, and their faith and pietism. Mert remarks that, with this religious conservatism, the right-wing politics, particularly the centre right, has had abilities to channel religious reactions and demands, emerging within Turkish society, into nationalism. What makes this transition possible has been conservatism (Mert, 2007: 78). This indicates that Turkish conservatism cannot be debated without paying regard to its ties with a right-inclined nationalism in Turkey. For, that political attitude –conservatism- has come into being by feeding itself with nationalist elements, such as nation, flag, state, Turkish nation, and so on.

For one thing, it should not be surprised us to intertwine conservatism with nationalism. The reason is that this political current –conservatism- has been primarily formulated as a reply to reaction developed against to secular and western characters of establishment ideology and founders of a new-founded nation-state, by creating an alternative national identity with Islamic emphasis. It has paved the way for being overcome a fundamental problem with regard to secular nation-state identity, by building an alternative national identity and nationalism based on religious symbols. Thus and so, it has produced a right-wing nationalism shaped around ‘conservatism and Turkishness’ (Mert, 2007: 77, 103, 123). Such a nationalism has represented a new phase in national-religion policies from the 1940s-mid. From now onward, religion had started to institute as an official element of national morals. Bora links the emerging of rightist nationalism to not being created a social ethos by the Republican elites with secular and western nation-identity. He states that religion has been begun to be underlined either as a moral force or a main element to intensify national homogeneity, in company with some objections, like ‘a nation cannot live without religion’ or ‘a moral food is needed’. He signifies that this form of nationalism was shaped by some prominent right-wing intellectuals, amongst of who has been Eşref Edip, Mehmet Akif, and Necip Fazıl (Bora, 2012: 81, 125-126, 130). This nationalism has mostly challenged secular idea of nationalism, which has been defined as a way of nationalism removed from Islamist effect by breaking the bonds between Islam and nationalism through an intensive de-Islamization policies (Akgün and Çalış, 2008: 597). One of the essential elements, which has designated the attitudes and thoughts of advocates of Turkish nationalism, who have renovated the official ideology which had tried to separate from Turkishness by dismissing Islam from political sphere, has been Islam (Kösoğlu, 2008: 222 and Ayvazoğlu, 2008: 573). In a word, as Mert has insistently stressed, religious symbols and the idea of community special to traditional societies have been fundamental components of the right nationalism, kept out by the Republican nationalism (Mert, 2007: 66). Synthesizing such nationalism with conservatism has been an expression of nationalist-conservative composition on which I have dwelt here. This composition has represented one of the best examples of politicization of Islam pioneered by the right-wing politics in the service of nationalism. Islamism was not

able to remain out of the composition in question, and, moreover, gave a great support to it by taking its place in that composition.

Considering all these explanation above, it can be said that the nationalist-conservative composition was, as Bora has stated, a -political- umbrella constituted around a political-ideological struggle against the rise of the left-politics. This political umbrella, which had gathered all right-inclined politics, re-fashioned its political-ideological orientation, by dominating National View Islamist politics. For, this composition primarily showed itself by accepting religion, namely Islam, as a constituent element of national identity, regardless of proportionally Islamic emphasis within itself. Its core political orientation was Turkishness, which had formed major constituent of the aforesaid composition. (Bora, 2017: 390). Besides Turkishness, with authoritarian, intolerant, and statist political tendencies, this composition had various-common ideological-political directions just because it gave an ideological fight. What constituted those directions was be moralism (Taşkın, 2008), and anti-communist struggle against the left-socialist politics and leftist organizations and movements (Bora, 2017, Mert, 2007 and Taşkın, 2008, 2013), xenophobia (Belge, 2008), and anti-Semitism (Bora, 2017). Moralism was the most striking element of the nationalist-conservative composition. It was intrinsically opposed to sexual liberty, woman's body, and unpleasant relationships between young male and female without a 'religious nurture' and 'fear of honour' (Taşkın, 2008: 631-632). Again, within this composition, another decisive element was its anti-communist struggle. Bora remarks that this nationalist-conservative umbrella was a political initiative shaped with a view to battle against the threat of communism. Accordingly, it was defined within mutually ideological-political struggle with 'godless communism' (Bora, 2017: 390-391). Apart from these, anti-Semitism, acquiring a new appearance after the World War II and in conjunction with the transition to multi-party system, was another significant component of the composition. As a result of Palestinian problem, the establishment of Israel, and Israel-Arabic wars, it had juxtaposed with the claim to defend Muslims and/or Islam. Bora expresses that, in the institutionalization of anti-Semitism within a nationalist-conservative framework, the outstanding right-inclined magazines, such as

Sebilürreşad and Büyük Doğu, which had great effects in shaping the National View politics and ideology, and Necip Fazıl had too much important roles. For instance, in 1946, in one article Necip Fazıl, the follower of Islamist parties at times in Turkey but more importantly one of the leading rightist intellectuals who the Islamist politics drew inspiration and was impressed, disclosed Jews as a source of primary/essential malice (Bora, 2017: 383-384). As an end, there were two strong xenophobic movements in Turkey. They were Turkism and Islam(ism), two major political-ideological currents, which constituted the nationalist-conservative composition (Belge, 2008: 191).

### **5.2.2 Nationalist-Front Alliances or Governments**

To start with, it is required to state that Nationalist-front alliances, composing of the First Nationalist-Front and Second Nationalist-Front governments, were not an ordinary government of coalition founded among the right-wing political parties, included Justice Party (JP), Islamist Nationalist Salvation Party (NSP), and ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (NAP). In the late 1970s, as a significant political experience, the Nationalist-Front governments used Islam as a tool of political-ideological struggle against the left and socialist politics by incorporating Islamism and its religious-conservative mass into themselves. They had been one of the leading political organizations of anti-communist struggle by politicizing Islam. However, it would be more accurate to look at these alliances as a political entity of the nationalist-conservative composition, which have been in detailed discussed in the preceding one title. As far as we can see, they were expressing a more ideological-political domination of the right-politics against the left-politics and communism (Özdemir, 1997 and Ahmad, 2008) than the alliance of interests between the parties in question for sharing political power. No doubt, there were some ideological-political discrepancies among those right-leaning parties, but it is necessary not to exaggerate them on the account of fact that these political formations were, to a large extent, under the influence of the rightist intellectual' ideological dispositions which generated a nationalist-Islamist unity by combining nationalist and Islamist elements. For instance, it was Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, as one of the most prominent right-wing intellectuals and ideologue of the National Turkish

Student Union (MTTB) in the 1970s, who affected Islamist politics and its parties with his nationalist and Islamist tendencies. Moreover, Erbakan, leader of Islamist National View's parties, made an offer to be declared *İdeolojya Örgüsü*, one of the Kısarkürek's important works, as the party's ideology (Bora, 2017: 470). Except for Kısarkürek, there would be also other rightist-intellectual figures such as Eşref Edip and Nurettin Topçu among those who influenced the politics in question. As Yavuz has pointed out, one can think that these right-inclined intellectuals made it more ideological by politicizing Islam, because of arguing Islam as an antidote to leftist challenge (Yavuz, 2009: 125).

To be sure, the Islamist political party, the NSP, obtained important political acquisitions by sharing political power. But, it was more important for the NSP to participate in this nationalist-front because it wished to get rid of accusation of cooperating with leftists, particularly compared with the RPP-NSP coalition as political experience (Özdemir, 1997: 241). The thing to be targeted with this right-wing alliance was to destroy the left-politics' domination in the Turkish political sphere, comprising of a political line, ranging from socialist-communist politics to the RPP, though this party described itself as 'the left-of-centre' in the face of radical left-socialist politics. Therefore, in this nationalist-front alliance or coalition among the right-politics it seems that there was an ideological-political clash between two main political currents, such as the right and the left, whose their ideologies dominated political sphere. At the center of this ideological-political conflict was two fundamental political arguments based upon religion, namely Islam, and –Turkish-nationalism, which took shape common ideological-political line of the nationalist-front in question. As Ahmad has remarked, owing to the fact that the official ideology, Kemalism, albeit its secular base, had been unarguably successful in turning nationalism into one of the essential components of its political ideology, Islam, which internalized nationalism in political sphere, had been an irreplaceable and important political assertion for the rightist politics in order to use as a counterforce against the left. In this manner, Islam was one of the most fundamental ideological elements while forming a right-wing political alliance like the nationalist-front, by presenting itself as 'an antidote to communism' (Ahmad, 2008: 246).

Despite that, nevertheless, it is needed to remark that the Islamist National View's politics partly differentiated from other two right-politics in some points, although it was within a common struggle with other politics against the radical left and communist politics on the basis of Islam. It defined itself as a politics opponent to system by propounding that other politics imitated the West. It advocated the role of state in an economic and spiritual development of nation grounded on state interventionism, family, and state-oriented religious education, through especially Religious Vocational Schools, known as İmam Hatip in Turkish. It emphasized the role of the education in recreating traditional values and culture in society for constituting a new generation of Muslim Turks. Basically, this politics had aimed at a national culture and education, industrialization, and social justice in line with the principles of Islam, along with a strong idea of Ottomanism (Yavuz, 2009: 50, Yavuz, 2003: 213, Dağı, 2005: 4, and Eligür, 2010: 66-67). In the same vein, its nationalism was different from other two right-leaning parties' ones, by defending Islam and thought of Ummah with emphasis on anti-Europeanism and anti-Americanism (Özdemir, 1997: 242, Dağı, 2005: 5-6, and Ahmad, 2008: 247). But, above all, under the influence of an intellectual figure like Necip Fazıl with his views laying stress on exceedingly statist and militarist Turkish nationalism, the motto of which was 'Muslim Turk' formulated on an Islamic morality and belief, (Kara, 1998 and Çetinsaya, 2005), as Bora has pointed out, based on Ottomanism and the slogan 'Great Turkey' the National View's nationalism was same with that of nationalist-conservative right-politics as an political umbrella which dominated other three right-wing politics. (Bora, 2017: 470). Accordingly, Islamism was a political movement in organically coupled with other two right-politics, JP and NAP, because of having substantially similar emphasis on Islam and nationalism with others. In fact, in cooperation with other politics, this political experience inherently turned Islamist movement into an organic constituent of the nationalist-front in battle against the left-wing politics and communism. Thus, Islamism and its ideological-political framework had been reshaped by that political experience.

In Turkish political history, as an important political-ideological organization, the Nationalist Front experiences made an important contribution to shaping Islamist

politics. Among those contributions were a hostile attitude to the lefts-politics, anti-communism and its struggle, a powerful Turkish nationalism, and religious emphasis with strong moral forces. Consequently, there would be an Islamism or Islamist politics that internalized these political dispositions with contributions which this significant political experience had made. This politic would be organically tied to those dispositions, because of that it made them into essential elements of its own ideology by surpassing political opportunism and pragmatism irresistible for a party, regardless of what sort of possibilities and earnings a political power provides.

### **5.2.3. The Political Socialization of Young Islamic Cadres: MTTB (National Turkish Student Union)**

The MTTB is a significant youth organization that has depicted the political and ideological evolution of the three core politics, centre-right, ultra-nationalist and Islamist, which have formed Turkish right, rather than a simple student association. It has an eminently great importance in terms of explaining and understanding Islamism and Islamist politics, by virtue of politically and ideologically cultivating and training the foremost political cadres of Islamism. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been the founder leader and chairman of the JDP and elected the president of Turkey in the 24 June elections, took active charges in the youth branches of MTTB in his university and high school years. Not only Erdoğan, but also among the prominent names that had worked in the MTTB's administration in their youth years were Abdullah Gül, İsmail Kahraman, Bülent Arınç, Numan Kurtulmuş and Mehmet Ali Şahin<sup>21</sup>. It is an extraordinary example of political socialization as a repository of political practices or experiences which indicates how the political-ideological dispositions or/and attitudes of Islamist political cadres fashioned. Of course, it should be remarked that, having contained lots of political-ideological dispositions in itself, ranging from the advocacy of Kemalism, a republican state and secular nationalism to that of religious-inspired conservative nationalism, anti-communist struggle, -new- Ottomanism and Islamism, this

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<sup>21</sup> Aydın Hasan, "Erdoğan'ın O Sözü'nün 40 Yıllık Hikayesi: Başbakan Yardımcısı Numan Kurtulmuş Anlattı", Milliyet newspaper, accessed September 17, 2018, available from: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-in-o-sozunun-40-yillik-siyaset-2235135/>

organization had a quite long historical-political adventure more than half a century. (Okutan, 2004, and Duman and Yorgancılar, 2007). However, it is more important for me how it turned into a political organization which had merely defended Islamism by departing from a nationalist-conservative politics than it involved numerous ideological-political ideas and tendencies.

At this place, I will primarily debate how this organization gave shape to Islamism by raising the leading political cadres of Islamist politics as from the end of 1960s until the early 1980s. Firstly, we can begin by remarking that in the mid-1960s, a remarkable change, which different politics and ideological tendencies started to dominate, became in the MTTB. These were the right-wing politics, and their essential components of ideological orientations based on Turkish nationalism and religion. In other words, in those years, Islam and Turkishness had been two prevailing ideological elements of the MTTB, which had at one time advocated a secular and Kemalist state and republic. This change is possible to explain in two ways. First is that a nationalist-conservative political line –or, as stated earlier, a composition- dominated this organization, which hegemonized other three right-inclined politics including the centre-right JP, the Islamist NSP and the ultra-nationalist NAP. Second is that the NAP made Islam into one of the fundamental elements of its own ideological-political disposition by rejecting a Turkish identity and nationalism which have strict secular bases and been termed as Kemalist nationalism. As a result of these two changes, Islamism or/and Islamists was to arise as one of main constituents forming the nationalist-conservative hegemony (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 147 and Okutan, 2004: 142-143). To this, it is necessary to add that this youth organization did not come into prominence with the centre-right politics and its ideological-political tendencies related to especially economic and foreign policies. But rather, it had been dominated by the political dispositions of two radical right politics, like Islamism and nationalism, which was formulated in a more nationalist-conservative political form –or composition. We can understand better by separating this organization into two periods, which have been named respectively one as nationalist-conservative period, the other as Islamist one. (Okutan, 2004 and Duman and Yorgancılar, 2008).

The nationalist-conservative period, involving the mid-1960s and the late 1960s, represented a political version that aimed at reconciling -Turkish- nationalism with religion, quite simply Islam. There were two significant events needed to be indicated concerning that period. As stated earlier, the first of those was that the ultra-nationalist NAP had integrated Islam into its own radical nationalist politics towards pragmatist-political goals (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992 and Bora, 2012). The other was also that Islamists or/and Islamism had been got involved in the nationalist-conservative politics (Bora, 2012 and Okutan, 2004). With dominant nationalist tendencies, this politics had internalized it by seeing Islam as one of the basic components of Turkish identity. It defined itself as ‘conservative’ – mukaddesatçı-, which symbolized sacred-mukaddes- values, among of which has been God, prophet, and Holy Scripture, i.e. Quran, by totally taking Islamic ethos as a reference. According to it, “if what would resurrect ethos is Islamic morals, Islam should be never perceived as an obstacle to ‘progress’”. Accepted as the chief principles of Turkish nationalism, nation, fatherland, language, religion, and history love should be regarded as the commands of Islam, and even as itself. Thus, it has been impossible to think by distinguishing Turkish nationalism from Islam, or vice versa (Okutan, 2004: 143, 167). In this, NAP’s new political direction has been vitally decisive in shaping such a thought, which was adopted in the late 1960s, when Islam was incorporated into Turkish nationalism. By acknowledging Islam as an essential element of Turkish identity in its ideology, the NAP’s nationalism made less elitist and more populist. With Islamic emphasizes, Turkish nationalism thus was to more strongly battle against communism than ever before by politically radicalizing and mobilizing masses. Its opposition to the left-socialist and communist politics was grounded on anti-westernization, exactly like the Islamist NSP. This anti-westernization was a significant political orientation in conducting a moral and cultural campaign to dispel the influence of communism, because it ideologically formed more cultural and moral-emotional bases for the NAP’s nationalism. However, taking an anti-capitalist political stance would be certainly rejected by the NAP’s politics owing to its loyalty to capitalist idea of development, by distinguishing itself from the Islamists (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 145-146). From this place, it can be concluded that the anti-communist struggle, not anti-capitalist, was

one of the basic political-ideological lines during the nationalist-conservative period of the MTTB. It followed a politics on the basis of that ‘the left was the enemy of religion’, by advocating that Islam was ‘antidote to communism’ (Okutan, 2004: 153) Accordingly, what makes the NAP’s nationalist politics important in this period, when it played an active role in being framed a nationalist-conservative political composition, had been be its cultural and moral nationalist-political disposition with religious bases. As a matter of fact, in that period, which this political composition dominated a rightist youth organization like MTTB, the main issue was moral collapse, anti-communist struggle, and the lack of national and moral values, depending upon the disengagement with the Ottoman(ism) and its Islam-based political unity right after being founded a Kemalist- secular establishment (Okutan, 2004: 148).

From onwards of 1970s, especially leaded by İsmail Kahraman, who was a ‘nationalist-conservative child of Anatolian’ at one time, but later on completed his identity as an Islamist politician with being assigned to the ministry of culture in the Refah-Yol coalition, this organization evolved into a more Islamist political line with political actions or protests which it realized (Duman and Yorgancılar, 2008: 109, 110-111, Okutan, 2004: 174). Among those were the Memorial Day of Çanakkale Martyrs, the meetings for the conquest of İstanbul, the activities of the memorial night of Akif –Mehmet-, the writer of Turkish National Anthem, and the actions of performing prayer in the place so-called Hagia Sophia Museum (Duman and Yorgancılar, 2008: 109-110). Following this, some figures, who were situated in the nationalist-conservative circle before, had begun to make for Islamist line. It became an apparent disengagement from nationalist ideology towards the end of 1960s, and the sacred values started to dominate. In this way, as from the mid-1970s Islamist elements strictly directed the foregoing organization’s ideas and actions (Okutan, 2004: 173). The most explicit feature of the MTTB’s Islamism was that it had been a counter-stance developed as a reaction against the rejection of religion, religious identity, and traditional-conservative values and symbols. Also, it attached a great importance to religious education. In 1970s, along with starting to distinguish Islamism itself from other rightist and conservative politics, Islamist youth was more

at war with plenty of issues which had been comprised of spiritualism – maneviyatçılık-, the Westernism/Westernization question, the threat of modernism, the opening of mosque and prayer room, the transformation of Islamic Institute to academy, the building of İmam Hatip schools and Islamic colleges, the struggle with obscene publication, and the opening of Hagia Sophia to worship. (Duman and Yorgancılar, 2008: 119, 121). For, the MTTB’ Islamist orientation was trying to find their replies in this religion by thinking that Islam was an answer to all these issues. At this point, it was asserting that Islam proposed an original economic life for its follower, other than capitalism and socialism. Yet more, in a press meeting hold on the April 1967, the organization’s executives were clearly expressing not to believe that Turkey was able to overcome its economic problems with capitalism and socialism. In accordance with this new economic thought, they were arguing that it was impossible to go into economic relationships with the western world based on capitalism and materialism, and even to establish a common market. Taking into account all of these, for them, one solution was an Islam unity that Turkey leded all Islamic world, in line with cultural and historical mission of the Ottoman Empire as a faithful apologist of Islam for centuries (Okutan, 2004: 183). At the same time, during those days, this youth organization replied with a “rampancy”-şahlanma- to the “awakening” of the left, by generally declaring a jihad against communism in the demonstrations organized with the slogans, such as ‘allah with us’ –Allah Bizimledir-, ‘it is open Jihad to Communism’ –Komünizme Cihat Açıktır-, ‘Yippee Right’-Yaşasın Sağ-, ‘the waters will retreat, the communists will be harvested’ –Sular Çekilecek, Komünistler Biçilecek-, ‘our thesis is Islam’ –Tezimiz Islam-, and ‘Shoo Communist’ –Hoş Komünist-. Ideologically and politically, it alleged that the greatest three enemies were Zionism, Imperialism and Communism, by proclaiming that its goal was primarily an anti-communist struggle (Duman and Yorgancılar, 2008: 124 and Okutan, 2004: 188-189). Befittingly with Islamist politics, that organization shifted its emblem from ‘Grey wolf’ into ‘Book’, namely holy scripture-Quran (Duman and Yorgancılar, 2008: 125). Generally speaking, the 1970s’ Islamist MTTB had shared same views with the NSP. In keeping with this Islamist party’s anti-Westernism, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-communist/socialist, its aim was to constitute an Islamic unity and solidarity with other Muslim countries, by

alleging that the Ottoman Empire was identical with Islam and that the attitude the official history rejected the Ottoman and Islam heritage was a 'fiction', (Okutan, 2004: 200).

#### **5.2.4. Power Pragmatism**

The word power pragmatism means that power, mostly related to state power, is, for the most part, perceived in and grounded on pragmatism or/and a pragmatist outlook. It refers to benefiting politically and economically from it by conquering state power towards pragmatist goals, among of which have been various political opportunities, government contracts, earnings, economic resources, supports, and subsidies. Then, what is pragmatism? How have the bases of a pragmatist outlook been laid? Pragmatism expresses a philosophical viewpoint, which has a longer history than a century at present. When spoken of pragmatism, those who first bring to mind are thinkers like William James, John Dewey, and Charles Pierce. They have paved the way for developing a pragmatist idea by philosophically laying the bases of pragmatism. However, without in detailed discussing this philosophical thought, we will just point out some basic points of pragmatism or pragmatist outlook as to how it approaches to politics and power in the context of our debate.

Once, the philosophical tradition called pragmatism has been primarily action and practice-oriented, by making a criticism of theory and foundationalism (Mouffe, 2000), ideologies totalizing, essentialist explanations and objectives truths, and of abstractions and absolutes. Known as 'the essence of American politics, pragmatism has been mostly defined as a politics focused on goal without principle. It is a more philosophical idea rooted in reluctance to ideology and an intense desire for compromise or/and consensus. Considering the idea that they would be obstacle to a reconciliation or a consensus, cultural and religious authority are rejected by such an idea, on account of the fact that it has been entirely away from a stable definition of truth, totalizing systems and unified narratives. (Dickstein, 1999: 1-2, 4). For this reason, for example, it would, states Mouffe, criticize the cultural politics of the left, which developed soon after 1960s and centered upon more psychosexual motivations, 'politics of difference', identity and recognition than a real politics

directed into inequality, poverty, and money. On the other hand, Mouffe also expresses that, depending upon its philosophical and intellectual explanations above, the pragmatist idea has asserted that politics might be merely possible without antagonism. In its view, it is a quite argument removed from being defensible to assert that politics can have antagonistic bases, by virtue of being simply a matter of more pragmatic, short-term reforms and compromises (Mouffe, 2000: 441, 448). From this standpoint, it can be concluded that power pragmatism has been politically an understanding of non-ideological and non-foundational power, which abstains from totalizing ideas and targets, historical narratives, and antagonistic identifications, like capitalist-working class, globalist-nationalist, secular-devout, and the like. Such power pursues more pragmatic and short-run aims by grounding politics on a non-totalizing and non-ideological frame.

Having followed a non-ideological and non-totalizing politics, the parties or political movements at first glance seems to have been inclined to installing more clientalist relationships between themselves and their social bases, and constituting a party patronage system. One of the most embodied appearances to take a pragmatically stance toward power, wholly far from an ideological politics and unified political narratives is clientalism and party patronage system. The party patronage is a system based on the utilization of public resources between clients and party politicians. It is a more 'contract-like exchange relationship that the party politicians supply goods and services in the exchange for an electoral support than a programmatic linkages. A client, desiring to receive public goods and services, does know that his/her tie with the party has been all-important for those purposes. This system becomes a current issue during election campaigns. In the course of those campaigns, the voters replies to this promise by saying that they would politically support or vote in elections while politicians make the promise of economic aid, public jobs and protection. In a word, the patronage characterizes a particular relationship in a political party getting involved in such a system, as in a patron-client relationship, or –for instance, as in between 'boss' and 'worker' (Weingrod, 1968: 378-379, 380 and Müller, 2006:189). As for clientalism, it is in general a term that defines the distribution of optionally acquisitions providing to individuals or a particular social

group in return for political support. As state's role, which involves a far-reaching regulation of economic activity, and the supply of a broad array of financial benefits composed of welfare and pension, grants, government contracts, tax reliefs, industrial and agricultural subsidies, public housing, and public services like education and health, has increased throughout the world, clientalism as one of prerequisite tools for party politics paves the way for the parties' opportunity to manipulate and direct the resources in question in exchange of political support. So, it has been a type of 'special interest politics' that enables the political parties and their electoral bases to reciprocally obtain a wide range of benefits through state institutions (Hopkin, 2006:406, 410-411 and Müller, 2006: 190). In Turkey, many political parties have resorted to clientalist relationships to get in touch with the voter, and the patronage has become the most essential political tool of the parties in the election campaigns for forming a party politics based on patronage system. For this, it has been so important to be in power and retain it for Turkish political parties. The Islamist parties, for instance, have appealed to such political tools after 1980s, as it was before, by promising to provide the voters with definite material benefits from economic aids till public services.<sup>22</sup>

Taking into account all of these, can we assert that in Turkish Islamism or Islamist politics has politically tried to capture state power towards pragmatist targets in a non-totalizing and non-ideological sense? As far as I can see, in the late 1970s the coalition, which the Islamist NSP founded with the Kemalist-secular RPP, might be read as a good example of power pragmatism. But, it should not be forgotten that this

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<sup>22</sup> In the 1960s and 1970s' Islamism, the political clientalism and patronage in question would appear in the form of locating the supporters of this politics into public positions, sort of government jobs, by coming to –state- power alone through elections or becoming a partner of power through the coalitions, and also of the assertion of development, under the name of 'rapid industrialization', which aimed at developing economically and socially its own electoral base, in terms of access to more economic resources and government jobs, and at benefiting its supporters from the blessings of modernization, by preserving identity. See for more detailed explanations regarding the Islamist parties' clientalist and patronage-based politics, Ruşen Çakır (2005), "Milli Görüş Hareketi", within *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce –İslamcılık-*, Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinçil (edit.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, p.547, Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Milli Nizam Partisi'nin Kuruluşu ve Programının İçeriği", within *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce –İslamcılık-*, p. 586, Hakan Yavuz (2003), *Islamic Political identity in Turkey*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 210 and lastly see for more detailed explanations with regard to the post-1980's and the 1990s' Islamism, Sencer Ayata (1996), "Patronage, Party and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 40-56

coalition was a rather short-lived compared with the coalition known as the nationalist-front. For, in that coalition, power pragmatism had come into more prominent, taking into account the political history of Islamism. Nevertheless, it has been always crucial not to lost social base in trying to obtain state power with a pragmatist attitude. The parties, for this reason, has tended towards adopting a more political-ideological position. In Turkey, Islamism, which has tried to conduct an ideological politics and had a totalizing perspective by creating antagonistic identifications, such as Muslims-others, or seculars-pious people, has been usually a political current beyond power pragmatism. Particularly, religious orders have had a great effect upon this. For instance, simply because of having such political-ideological position, among those who supported this political movement have been some Nurcu groups, beside the Naskhibendi Order. It is because there was politically and ideologically a common political ground between the Islamist political organizations like NOP/NSP and a religious community as Nurculuk. Turkish nationalism has been the most important of those grounds. What makes them different in ideology from various cults and other religious organizations has been, as Poulton has stated, their views in the matter of Turkish nationalism. They have advocated a nationalism, known as 'Islamic nationalism' as well, which has mostly identified Turkish nationalism with Islam by underlining that Islam was a strong element in constituting the Turkish nation and that Turks were the prominent fighters of Islam (Poulton, 1997: 178). In consequence of this political-ideological defence, in the political setting of 1970s, which the left-wing political movements dominated and canalized masses in accordance with their ideological-political purposes, for example, Nurcu movement disconnected with the Islamist political current, on the ground that it formed a coalition with the RPP. It is so clear why this occurred so, considering that many members of the Nurcu group participated in 'the Associations to Fight against Communism (Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri). This group took part in a conservative-nationalist bloc, on account of the fact that the followers of Nursi alleged that Islam or/and Islamic faith was an 'antidote' opposed to the leftist movements (Yavuz, 2003: 174). The emerging of this ideological and totalizing outlook has not been limited to the Islamist politics' relationships to the religious orders, especially Nurcu movements. As stated earlier,

considering its ties with the Nationalist Front in the mid-1970s and later on its party alliance with ultra-nationalist NAP in 1990s, it clearly seems how Islamism ideologically and politically acted and conducted a totalizing politics in substantially tune with the nationalist-conservative dominance of the 1970s. However, instead of such politics, pragmatist attitudes have sometimes come forward and dominated politics. As remarked earlier, what has caused such a pragmatism is historical-political structure embodied in Turkey as a strong state on the one side, a weak society on the other. For this reason, it might be a tool of study in order to understand and explain Islamism and its political-ideological tactics and maneuvers.

#### **5.2.5. A Short-lasting Political Experience: The Case of RPP-NSP Coalition**

In the mid-1970s, right after the October 1973 election, the RPP obtained a vast majority in the parliament by winning 33, 3 percent of the vote and 185 seats, whereas other parties, consisting of the JP, the NSP, the NAP and the DP, shared the rest of votes among themselves, respectively 29, 8 percent, 11, 8 percent, 3, 4 percent, and 11, 9 percent in the election. Ecevit, the RPP' leader in those periods, had some attempts at forming a coalition with any right-wing party. However, Turkey's establishment, aiming to restrict Ecevit's radicalism, was wishing an RPP-JP coalition, by virtue of being an intense left-leaning emphasis fashioned around a new social democratic politics. But, Demirel had rejected the coalition offer by taking account of contingency of having to take unpopular economic measures so as to prevent growing economic crisis in all over the world, included Turkey. So, Ecevit decided to establish a coalition with Erbakan's party, the NSP. Erbakan accepted this coalition offer as a result of his pragmatist attitude on the basis of being in power and taking advantage of its political and economic opportunities, and a coalition government was founded in the January 1974. However, the RPP-NSP coalition had been grounded on a more pure political opportunism than any shared political programme (Ahmad, 2008: 251-252). The reason was so clear because there had been sharp ideological differences between those two parties. By looking at their core ideological cleavage one can easily see what the main political conflict between those parties were in political sphere. This cleavage revolved around the issues of secularism, religion, and Islam.

The foregoing cleavage had been considerably efficient in forming the crises of reliance between them. Moreover, according to Turkish press, the RPP explicitly expressed the potential conflict points, including anti-Westernization and anti-Europeanization, with other party, MSP, by attaching a great importance to secularism in the coalition agreement. Even though the MSP approved taking part in a coalition government pioneered by a secular party, RPP, its prominent political cadres asserted that such a coalition would not be 'useful and productive' in the present conditions. In this case, Erbakan needed to state what his party's stance was, before forming a coalition with the RPP. To him, if the RPP was eager to this, then it had to bear in mind his party's political attitude. By emphasizing that his party had a rather ideological stance, which expressed militantly Islamist-religious outlook, he argued that all members talked a similar language, in compatible with the party's stance in question, ranging from Edirne to Van, in all the regions of Turkey (Landau, 1976: 38-39). For this reason, it was immensely difficult, and even unthinkable, that the RPP, which founded a republican state and indisputably made secularism into an essential ideological element of the state and the party, entered into a power partnership with the political party which prioritized to Islam in politics (Özdemir, 1997: 238). This partnership was not supported by each two parties' social base due to distinctive ideological political stands and principles. For example, in the RPP some members objected to this coalition by saying that the NSP preferred a political opportunism and was located in a political position in opposition to Atatürk's Reforms and the basic principles of the republican state, whereas the social base of the NSP rejected a coalition with the RPP, simply because it was a leftist-communist politics (Özdemir, 1997: 237 and Landau, 1976: 39).

Despite the contrary ideological-political attitudes and principles between these two parties, there were certain common political approaches and standpoints in the matter of economic issues and solutions, since those who supported either the RPP or the NSP had same social class and economic conditions. For instance, economic oppression and poverty were fundamental economic problems that both two parties put on the agenda. Most particularly, the Islamist NSP underlined economic and social justice, and equitable distribution of national wealth (Özdemir, 1997: 237,

Yavuz, 2003: 210, and Landau, 1976: 38). However, the NSP violated the coalition agreement because of taking an opposite stance during being negotiated an amnesty proposal to those found guilty of ‘thought-crimes’ by moving along with other right-wing parties in the parliament (Landau, 1976: 41 and Özdemir, 1997: 238), and the coalition dispersed on 18 September 1974 when Ecevit submitted his resignation.

### **5.3. The Politicization of Islam in the 1980s and 1990s**

#### **5.3.1. The 12 September Military Coup**

It is needed to think of the 12 September military coup as a significant historical-political moment that has passed beyond a simply military intervention. It was a transforming military coup that engaged in rebuilding institutionally the structure of Turkish society and politics, by redesigning political sphere in Turkey via political, economic, and ideological forces. Apart from that, it was also coup that had officially taken the politicization of Islam much further through the state apparatuses. It served politicizing religion by turning Islam into an essential part of the identity of Turkish state and enhancing the role of Islam with cultural, symbolic, moral and educational aspects in public sphere and social life. It is the most important among the arguments of this dissertation. We will see why it is so in this and next title. But yet, many scholars, interested in contemporary Turkish politics, have specially pointed to the domestic political violence and the crisis of political system among essential factors behind the coup in question. In their opinion, there were also evidence sufficient to support this thought. Among them have been propounded as one of the main political issues that between 1976-1980 political parties, state bureaucracy, labor unions, student organizations, and other social groups politicized and ideologically factionalized. As it was impossible to overcome those issues with the present political parties, ranging from Demirel’s JP, Türkeş’s NAP, and Erbakan’s NSP to Ecevit’s RPP, it was a military intervention that had been brought forward as a second alternative able to cope with those. Thereupon, based on the military’s internal administration or service –İç Hizmet Kanunu-, General Kenan Evren declared that the Turkish armed forces interfere in politics in order to reestablish democratic order in the shortest possible time by tackling with disruptive and

divisive ideologies and rebuilding national unity and solidarity to preserve the country's unity and integrity (Karpat, 2004: 272, 277 and Yeşilada, 1988: 351). This would be one of the most fundamental justifications that the coup used to legitimize the military intervention. However, with those justifications in question the 1980 military coup took a much important opportunity to restructure politics and society.

The 1982 Constitution has been one of the crucial points of restructuring Turkish political sphere and society. As Toprak has remarked, what is the most significant to have to be point out while formed the 12 September Constitution has been that it was prepared to correct, among other things, what the 12 September military interference expressed as 'weakness of the 1961 Constitution', principally involving the guarantee of unprecedented individual and group rights and liberties without restriction. According to the commanders making the coup, it was this that had radically given rise to politicization of social groups, society and the state apparatuses themselves, including police force, educational institutions, and universities. The governments were not able to prevent and control ever-increasing violence (Toprak, 1988: 126 and Karpat, 2004). Thus, in order to preclude all these, there was prepared a constitution that set strict measures to freedom of organization and expression, and interest associations, and banned trade unions and professional organizations from political activity according to the 1983 Law of Associations. Likewise, these restrictions were extended to university campuses and academic research institutions, based on the articles 130-132 of the new constitution and the Higher Education Act of 1981, laying the foundation of Higher Education Council, known as YÖK -Yükseköğretim Kurulu in Turkish. This institution has annihilated the autonomous structure of universities. By this way, what was aimed at when forming such constitution was substantially a centralized state with a depolitized society (Yeşilada, 1988: 352, 353-354 and Toprak, 1988: 126). Taking into account all of these, they would be seen to have been the likely political outcomes and objectives that the 12 September military coup aspired after. But, the main point that I am interested in here is whether or not there has been a close relationship or/and an overlapping between Islam, nationalism, and the 1980 military coup. For, in my view, the distinguishing feature of the 1980 coup is that it applied to Islam in the

building of the identity of Turkish state and of the political use of religion as a way of consolidating and justifying the existing political order, and of creating a social-cultural cohesion by seeing religion as social cement. Also, the coup put Islam into effect as an ideological indoctrination in educational institutions through the compulsory religious courses, İmam Hatip school whose numbers were ever-increasing, and the encouragement of Quran Courses.

As stated earlier, under a title termed as ‘Recontextualizing Islamism or Political Islam as a Political Current’ in the chapter two, in Turkey, Islamism or/and Islamist politics itself has positioned in opposition to western moral values, spirituality and culture by rejecting the Kemalist/westernism-focused secularist reforms, which purged Islam as one of the basic elements of Turkish nationalism from common identity of nation based more on secular components (Mardin, 1991, Tunaya, 2007 and Lewis, 1952). In the early years of the Turkish Republic, the initiated reforms were fundamentally cultural and political ones which consisted of secular values, life-style and cultural elements, and the secular building of the identity of Turkish state. What lies behind the rise of a right-wing nationalism, including religious symbols and values and the understanding of a community peculiar to the traditional societies and of a religious revival under Islamism has been the understanding of secularism of the Kemalist establishment. Providing a basis for the formation of the aforesaid political currents, this understanding has had main aspects grounded on first, religion-state relationship and second, the place of religion in defining national identity. Only few Turks, not including some religious extremists, have problematized the first aspect, which deals with the relationship between religion and state. In other respects, especially, the groups with religious and conservative dispositions have taken a great interest in the effect of secularism and Islam on the Turkish sense of national identity, by arguing that religion has been the basis of the Turkish national culture (Karpat, 2004: 302-303). This interest has not remained limited to the right-wing politics and Islamism. Turkish state itself made such an interest official following the 12 September coup by politicizing Islam. What the military coup tried to do by working up Islam into one of the essential elements of Turkish nationalism and coming it with moral, cultural, and symbolic elements into

prominence shows this official interest. It attached a great importance to Islam in redefining Turkish national identity and creating a homogeneous cultural-moral community.

One of the most fundamental things that the 1980 military coup saw important when restructuring politics and society was to provide the stabilization of society and state by putting a end to terrorism, the anarchy and conflict among the leftist and the rightist organizations, the disagreements and crises between political parties, and the collapse of government authority. The 12 September' mentality believed that the way of realizing this was to unify society, by rejecting pluralism, and all ethnical and faith-based diversities in society without tolerating and supressing different ideological-political viewpoints. According to the coup's commanders, its best way was to pass from politically and ideologically reactivating Islam that they thought of having had an important role in holding Turks together. According to them, if Turkish children were trained by Islam, emerging a communist youth could be also precluded. For this reason, as Kaya has indicated, Islam would be the most essential tools used by the coup administration for redesigning society and politics on the basis of a 'nationalist Islam' (Kaya, 2004: 101). Thereupon, the 12 September regime initiated an extensively state-controlled Islamization (Sunnification) of society by waging war against the existing leftist and communist political currents and organizations for seeing as a primary threat to Turkish unity and integrity. In so doing, it made religious culture and ethics course compulsory with the 1982 constitution for primary, secondary and high schools, which had been arranged optionally in the 1961 constitution. For, it saw religious education as prerequisite for the reshaping of an 'ethico political life. Over the course of the three year military regime, the imam hatip schools, aiming at training those who would provide a religious service, numerically rose from 258 to 350, Koranic schools from 2610 to 4715. The number of student taking Koranic course in those schools gradually increased from 68,486 in 1980 to 155,403 in 1989 (Bardakçı & Freyberg-Inan & Giesel & Leisse, 2017: 100, Atasoy, 2009: 92, and Kaya, 2004: 101). Having been compulsory for all everyone in primary and secondary school, lots of lessons, which addressed the subjects, like 'I am a Muslim Turkish child' –in class one-, 'Turks and

Muslims' –in class eighth-, 'the love of the Prophet' –in class ninth-, and 'Turk-Islamic culture and civilization' –in class eleventh- were put (Poulton, 1997: 181-182). In so doing, the military regime was in a sharp opposition with Kemalism, by virtue of the fact that it strongly supported and encouraged Islamization. In the place of Kemalism, there would be anymore an Atatürkism that was framed to end cultural cleavage between the center and the periphery by making the ideas of the center into a form acceptable by the periphery. This new official formulation, Atatürkism, refers to intertwining the nationalist laik/secular ideology of Kemalism with Islamic moral values. It has refashioned the Kemalist understanding of secularism, rather than its elimination, for the purpose of being able to be more acceptable by the periphery. What renders this possible has been new unique role attributed to Islam that the 12 September military administration saw as a social cement in service of keeping the Turks together by turning into a sine qua non of the Turkish nationalism (Atasoy, 2009: 91, Evin, 1988: 211-212 and Kaya, 2004: 101). Thereby, without taking into account the 12 September regime' political and ideological involvements mentioned above, it cannot be comprehended reasons why Islamism after 1980s has transformed, and how it has accomplished to be politically on the rise in the eye of masses.

In other respects, following the coup, but also the military regime undertook a crucial role in initiating and implementing neoliberal economic policies. The former political powers was able to fail to cease its unfavorable trajectory by not taking necessary measures in economy. By carrying an economic package into effect, known as January 24 decisions in history, the 12 September administration had actualized a far-reaching transformations in Turkish economy. Most, included policy makers, IMF, and the coup administration, had believed that these decisions, based on several measures taken to straighten economy, succeeded the development of industrialization in Turkey through the export-led growth policies. Immediately afterwards the intervention, the coup's commanders proclaimed their complete commitment to the January 24 economic measures which they thought to be one and only realistic solution for recreating Turkish economy (Yeşilada, 1988: 351-352 and Atasoy, 2009: 76). These measures were 'revolutionary' ones due to the adoption

of a range of programs intrinsically embracing true creative entrepreneurship and rejecting state protectionism, by placing Turkey in the camp of the free enterprise capitalism. In this sense, the 1980 military coup has been a significant turning point in transforming Turkish economy and its structural conditions, because of adopting a neoliberal politics in order to reorganize economic relationships (Karpas, 2004: 279 and Atasoy, 2009: 80). Keeping in mind, it can be suggested that the 12 September coup restructured the existing political order in line with two basic fields, religion and economy. It had largely carried out Islamism's political arguments concerning Islam, in sense of both turning Islam into an essential part of the identity of Turkish state and making Islam with moral, symbolic, and cultural aspects more visible in public sphere and social life, by changing the radical stance which the secular establishment had taken against religion. As for economy, the 12 September regime accomplished Turkey economy's integration with global capitalist order grounded on neoliberal policies and free market economy, by restructuring economic sphere with the decisions it took.

### **5.3.2. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis**

The Turkish-Islamic synthesis might substantially be defined as a new ideological-political formulation that has reinterpreted the nationalist secular ideology of Kemalism and tried to restore Turkish nationalism on the basis of Islam (Atasoy, 2009, Mert, 2007, Bora, 2017, Eligur, 2010, and Poulton, 1997). It was a synthesis that was developed under the influence of the leading some rightist intellectuals, among of who were Eşref Edip, Necip Fazıl, and Nurettin Topçu playing active role in the shaping of the National View Islamism. In the aforementioned synthesis, Islam had undertaken a fundamental role in redefining collective identity, known as Turkish nationalism heavily built upon secular bases as a result of the efforts of the 1930s' Kemalist nationalism. To be sure, historically, it cannot be told that this synthesis emerged at the beginning of the 1980s. On the contrary, its bases had been laid in 1970s by combining the elements of Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam, with the initiatives of a organization, known as the Hearth of the Enlightened, which had been founded on 10 May 1970 by a group of university professors, hocas, and businessmen, who saw the rising the left-wing ideologies in Turkey as a threat,

particularly at universities (Eligür, 2010: 65, Poulton, 1997: 179 and Mert, 2007: 78). As a result of this, religion became an essential part of Turkish nationalism, either in struggling with the Marxist-leninist ideologies and their separatist purposes or in providing the unity and integrity of Turkish society and state, with the contributions that the above-organization made from onwards of 1970s by defining Islam with moral and cultural elements as a social cement.

Accordingly, in order to understand this synthesis, it is more appropriate to begin by addressing the intellectual bases and organizational structure of this organization and its organic relationships with the right-wing political parties, by the virtue of fact that one of the first institutions to come to mind when spoken of Turkish-Islamic sythesis is the Hearth of the Enlightened. As indicated earlier, this synthesis was prepared by a group of intellectuals, which had gathered around the Hearth of the Enlightened and mainly consisted of university professors from Istanbul University who had been got together as the Aydınlar Klubu (Thinkers Club) since 1962. Among the members of the club were İsmail Dayı, a former deputy of Motherland Party, Professor Ayhan Songar, Associate Professor Necmettin Erbakan, taking the lead of pro-Islamic polical parties the early 1970s to the late 2000s, and Dr. Agah Oktay Güner, the preceding parlimentarian of the ultra-nationalist NAP. At the focus of the debates realized in the club was Turkishness or/and Turkish nationalism's ties with Islam. In 1970 the club was turned into a organization under the name of the Hearth of the Enlightened. It was this organization, termed as the Hearth of the Enlightened, which formulated a ideological-political form such as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. The aforesaid organization attempted at redefining Islam so as to create a moral an symbolic base for the national identity (Atasoy, 2009: 94 and Poulton, 1997: 179). The prominent intellectual figures of the organization had a core idea suggesting that Islam has been a symbolic and cultural part of –Turkish- nationalism, and thus providing a important role to religion in creating a collective identity. Professor İbrahim Kafesoğlu, for instance, one of the presidents of the association and known among ideologues of the synthesis, asserted that Islam, Turkish nationalism and modernity have not been against to one another. He stated that the Turkish nation has had a certain faith system, and an original cultural background built on morality and

virtue, love of country, fear of god, obedience to state authority, and the holiness of custom in accordance with Islam. Therefore, Turkish culture has had two main sources: Turkishness and Islam. The ties between these two concepts had disappeared owing to Turkish intellectuals' mimicry of the West. They, thus, gave rise to disconnecting the existing links among the family, the mosque and the barracks, which paved the way for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (cited by Eligür, 2010: 97). Similarly, having made a criticism of the Kemalist-Republican modernization which undertook to build a secular national identity by challenging Islam and politically tended towards westernization, Süleyman Yalçın, another president of the organization, has suggested that a few who were adhered to the Kemalism and its secular Turkish nationalism used their positions to erase Islam from social and political life. For, the Kemalist modernization has been grounded on rejecting Islam and the Ottoman-Islamic legacy in Turkish history. Most especially, he has underlined that Islam has been one of essential and irreplaceable components in our roots. In this synthesis on the basis of Turkish civilization and culture as 'a mixture of being Muslim and being Turkish', he has described a Turk as a 'Muslim who speaks Turkish'. Thus, Islam has been regarded as 'the essence of Turkish culture', and it has been a major factor that played an active part in it from architecture and fine arts to customs (Cited by Göktaş and Çakır, 1991: 106-107 and Eligür, 2010: 98).

Turkishness and Islam has been two crucial categorizations, removed from all secular and western contents, for the organization. Mert points out that this synthesis basically aimed at combining Turkism and Islamism under a single roof. In her view, it was not a new idea, because of being propounded by some groups in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, but it failed off the agenda, after the foundation of Republican Turkey in a rigid secular line. According to this synthesis, Turkishness and Islam are equally two important components of national identity, and thus the aim must be 'to construct Muslim Turk' in education (Mert, 2007: 80-81). For, since 1970s, in its opinion, what lies behind all political and economic crises has been the failure of Turkish educational system that has purposed to train Turkish youth with a national culture based on mainly rejecting Islamic heritage and a Muslim identity by

excluding the Ottoman history and its Islamic background. So, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis would focus on writing a new history holding on an Islamic-Ottoman heritage, in strictly opposition to the early republican period, which erased Ottoman-Muslim cultural referents from the Turkish nation's memory (Atasoy, 2009: 95). It would be a per se ideology formulated by the leading rightist intellectual figures, in cooperation with the 1980 military regime to wipe away 'false western veneer', which was held as responsible for all illnesses of modern society, like drug addiction and crime, and western values and culture entirely foreign to Turkish history and Islamic legacy. For this reason, as Tapper remarked, it would have a more authoritarian framework, not an Islamic one, structured as a core element of culture and social control in society by being encouraged in the educational system without never being politicized. From this aspect, it has many resemblances with the Abdülhamid's use of Islam as a way of the 'social cement' (Atasoy, 2009: 95 and cited by Poulton, 1997: 184). One of the most principal reasons why this has been so has been the military ruling's efforts to consolidate –Sunni- Islam by putting it as a compulsory course in public schools and allowing the entry of 'İmam Hatip graduates' in all departments of universities. All institutions of the state, ranging from TRT –radio and television broadcasting, YÖK –Higher Education Council-, university rectors to the Education Ministry, has been first and foremost promoters of it by being employed the followers of this ideology in those institutions (Eligür, 2010: 24 and Poulton, 1997: 184-185). Through such religious bombing, it has been aimed both at being protected Turkish youth from the radical left-wing political ideologies and the separatist –ethnic or faith-based ideologies- movements and at being laid the bases of a new type of citizenship, Muslim Turk.

Hereafter, Islam has been a prerequisite for cultural belonging of the citizenships, making much significant contributions to the formation of citizens who are faithful and respectful to the state. For, the main issue of this synthesis, though highlighting religious symbols and values and equally accepting Turkishness and Islam as an important component of national identity, has been case of 'survival' –beka-, and thus at its focal point has been the state considered as nation and its protector. To this viewpoint, religion is principally a cultural element replying to the need of faith of a

nation. In addition to religion and language as the most powerful cultural elements, the state is sacred in Turkish worldview (Mert, 2007: 80, Eligür, 2010: 93, Bora, 2017: 401, and Atasoy, 2009: 92). Even though not strictly being adopted by the 12 September regime as an official doctrine, this synthesis has been fundamental political-ideological motto of the regime, by virtue of meeting the state's authoritarian-fascistic demand, and of producing a loyalty and consent by using religion. The 1980 military administration was the most ardent apologist of it by embracing this synthesis' main direction, which has targeted religion as a cement and cultural and moral component of national identity. (Bora, 2017: 403, Eligür, 2010: 85, 93, and Atasoy, 2009: 95). At the level of political parties, the advocates of that synthesis has been partly the Islamist NSP but principally the ultra-nationalist NAP. Erbakan and the NSP was less disposed to support this synthesis, in spite of 'the confluence of Islamic ideas'. The Islamist party's basic objection was directly concerned with why Turkish come before Islam, rather than the synthesis' content. Şevket Kazan, who was among the chief political figures of the Islamist parties and at one time in charge of the vice-chair of the Islamist VP, has objected to the synthesis for using Turkishness first and Islam afterwards. For him, Islam must be the one and only in this synthesis. However, the NAP was natural supporters of the synthesis by underlining Islam an integral part of the 'tradition, spirit, and beliefs of Turkish nation' and combining Islam with the pre-Islamic history of the Turks. Perhaps, in order to make relationship between the Islamist parties and this synthesis more visible, it can be taken a look at the Islamist İlim Yayma Cemiyeti –the Association for the Expansion of Knowledge-, founded in 1973 by a group of politicians and intellectuals getting involved in the Naqshbandi religious order to publicize the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, considering the Islamist parties' close ties to that order. To sum up, all these clearly show us how much a dominant religious component has been in Turkish nationalism for years to come (Poulton, 1997: 180,184, Eligür, 2010: 97, 100, and Atasoy, 2009: 95). Also, this synthesis has proven that Islam has been an important ideological-political tool for either the state or other right-wing politics by politicizing. Islamism has been never out of this politicization, which has realized its political assertions, since it has supported the politicization in question.

### **5.3.3. Islamism After the 12 September Military Coup and the Politicization of Islam Based on Economy and Foreign Policy**

Following September 12, 1980, a new period, which had been carried out political, ideological and economic transformations, started in Turkish politics. These transformations were considerably important for ideologically and politically restructuring Turkish political spectrum. For, the 12 September coup changed the official viewpoint of Turkish state in the matter of religion, Islam, by advocating the view that Islam has been one of the most essential components in forming Turkish-national identity. It also supported neoliberal policies and carried them into effect. Besides, by virtue of the fact that the conservative-religious businessmen have used Islam as a ethical-moral force and ideology in integrating with the global-economic world and neo-liberal economic policies, Islam, which has begun to play a important role in economic structure, has been a new constituent of Turkish identity. With getting changed the official view after the 12 September military coup, it consolidated the moral-ideological unity of Turkish society and re-establishing political order. In Turkey, the 12 September coup was a turning point in embracing new ideological-political strategies of Islamism or Islamic politics under the leadership of Erbakan and in changing its political orientation by designating new political targets for itself. The reason has been the changing position of religion, or Islam, in Turkish society and the reorganization of state, right after being staged the coup. This position was referring to the new role of religion in rebuilding Turkish society and state by turning Islam into new ideological-political element of Turkish state as a moral-ideological tool holding Turks together. It was representing a ‘totalizing attempt’ to redesign Turkish society on the basis of a ‘nationalist Islam’. In spite of expressing itself as a guardian of Kemalism, the coup administration brought compulsory religious and moral education in all schools, based on the Article 24 of the 1980 Constitution. In contrast with Kemalism, instead of ignoring Islam in society and state institutions by force of a rigid secular attitude, it took a number of steps to consolidate by opening new Qur’anic Schools -Kuran Kursları- and appointing new lots of preachers –imams- (Kaya, 2004: 101; Poulton, 1997: 181 and Yavuz, 1997: 67). In this way, Islamic institutions and symbols -Qur’an, mosque

and the like- have been the new tools of legitimation after 12 September military coup by being fused Islamic values with national goals. This attitude by the 12 September concerning religion deprived Islamists and Islamist politics of their political propaganda and ideological-political arguments which saw Islam as moral and cultural element unifying society and an essential constituent of Turkish identity. It reshaped the ideological-political assertions of Islamism reorganizing under the Welfare party after 1980.

These steps taken above concerning religion were insufficient for the 12 September ruling. In addition to the aforesaid steps, the coup administration pioneered to be formulated a synthesis, mostly known as new official ideology attached to Kemalism, for reuniting Turkish right, including the centre-right, Islamists and ultra-nationalist. As broadly explained before, this synthesis was a Turkish-Islamic ideological formulation constructed by the prominent conservative-nationalist intellectuals of the organization by combining Turkish nationalism with Ottoman and Islamic ideas to consolidate state power. Among the members of this organizations were not only ultra-nationalist intellectuals and political figures, but also there were a great deal of intellectuals and political figures, such as Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan, Korkut Özal, and İsmail Dayı, ranging from conservative and centre-right oriented politicians to Islamist ones (Poulton, 1997: 180, and Atasoy, 2009: 94). For this reason, this synthesis, as a totality of systematic ideas and values dominating Turkish right, has contained National View Islamism because of undertaking its political goals which has seen Islam as a moral and cultural component and an essential part of Turkish identity.

Following the 12 September military coup, Islamist Welfare party, established in under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, were in search of a new political orientation. This was, no doubt, a political-ideological tendency that had anymore abandoned from advocating that religion, i.e. Islam, has been a essential identity of Turkish state, and that it has been an irreplaceable moral and cultural element of the society, the state and its national identity. In this case, how did Islamist politics define their new political orientation? And, where did it exactly position in Turkish

political spectrum, considering the changing position of Islam in particularly Turkish state, the centre-right politics, and the ultra-nationalist NAP?

From 1980s onwards, the world at large was exposed to a major political and economic change. Politically, a bipolar world, shaped like western-capitalist and socialist bloc, came to an end, ideologically the left-politics and ideology fell into a decline after the Soviet Union, officially with the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Economically, neoliberal politics begun to dominate economic policies throughout the world. In other words, shortly after that the cold war (1947-1991) had ended up, a new political and economic order have been built up. At one time, anti-communism and counter-leftist politics, which in general consolidated the right-wing politics from the early 1960s up to the end of 1980s, in the favor of the western-capitalist bloc, had drawn to a close. In a sense, the 1960s and 1970s' right-politics with its anti-communist political stance and rigid and strong opposition to the Soviet bloc and the left-socialist politics had taken part in a western-American capitalist world in the face of the soviet-socialist one. In the new political-economic conditions, which have arisen with the triumph of the western bloc, Turkish-Islamist political party (WP) embarked on designating a new political-ideological line for itself. It focused on economy and foreign policy, which had formed the center of its political opposition. In its foreign policy, it embraced anti-Americanism and non-European Union politics (Çakır, 1994, Dağı, 2005, Yıldız, 2003, Dağı, 1998). In the face of the 'West', including all western imperialist-colonialist european countries, among of which has been the United States and Israel, and international organizations, like European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), NATO, IMF, this politics was a major political stance that designated the party's politics and political campaigns in the elections. As regards economy, it advocated social justice and egalitarian policies and promised a 'just order' as opposed to neoliberal economic policies. With this political stance, which fundamentally rejected neoliberal economic policies, the Welfare party was in a sharp contrast with the existing political order, which has been structured around neoliberal politics and global-capitalist economic world.

Based on anti-Westernism, anti-EU and anti-Americanism, the WP desired to constitute political, economic, cultural and military organizations to unite all Muslim world together under the leadership of Turkey in the face of the West and its imperial goals. Its contrast to the West and its international institutions had overlapped with its anti-Americanism and anti-siyonism, since the party considered that the western-imperialist states like US and Israel had been siyonist and masonic forces which controlled all national states and international organizations all over the world (Çakır, 2005: 565-566). The party principally suggested that the backwardness and failure of Islamic world were closely connected with global Western imperialism dominated by the states and organizations above (Yıldız, 2003: 189). This political stance came into more prominence in foreign policy. In other words, in accordance with its own ideological-political position, on the basis of anti-Westernism, anti-EU and anti-Americanism, the WP offered a different foreign policy from other mainstream parties, opposed to all values and principles which the West represents, by seeing the West as “a source of all the negativity” (Dağı, 1998: 22-23). However, as the party minimized its emphasis on Islamic identity, cultural and religious issues not to come face to face with the official Kemalist-secular establishment, this anti-Westernist attitude had no effect on domestic politics as well as foreign policy. Particularly, the WP acted prudently not to face with anti-Atatürkism accusations (Poulton, 1997: 188). Furthermore, taking the foregoing political stance into account, it seemed to be conspicuously in line with the official ideology of Turkish state, Atatürkism. For, among its political goals were “to elevate the Turkish Republic, to surpass the level of contemporary civilization, to establish a powerful and prosperous Turkey as a free state of law which is democratic, laic and respectful to human rights and to bring happiness to Turkish people” (Yıldız, 2003: 193-194). Put it another way, it preferred to conform with it by not problematizing the existing official establishment’s understanding of laicism and westernization. From now onward, in its view, religion was only one tool of creating a coherent Muslim community in itself among some groups, either in class sense –lower and middle classes-, or cultural –pious and conservative- and ethnic –Kurds one (Yavuz, 2003). From this aspects, it basically used Islam with common, ritualistic and solidaristic aspects

without politicizing, in sense of not constituting a political contrast, such as secular-religionist, against the secular establishment.

As an outcome of the approach to religion mentioned above, the party followed an identity politics (Yıldız, 2003 and Yavuz, 2003), which aimed at forming a common identity not politicized. It was mainly an identity not creating a conflict or confrontation among various social groups. This identity had fundamentally highlighted ‘a well-established theme of Islamic brotherhood’. This theme was in fact an expression of ‘coalescence of state and nation’ and ‘of brother of 60 million with one another’. In so doing, the WP tried to combine diverse religious, ethnic and regional identities by using Islam as a supra-identity shared by all everyone (Yıldız, 2003: 188). In one sense, by appealing to Islamic values and symbols in creating a common identity, its aim was to form a forum which various ethnical and regional differences coexist. Despite its appeal to Islamic symbols and mores, the party’s leader, Erbakan, and its prominent cadres kept away from identifying Islam with party, and propounded that their party had embraced everyone, without discriminating (Yavuz, 1997: 75-76). From this point of view, for the party, Islam had been something unifying all everyone, whatever religious, ethnic, regional and class, without making a distinction between the existing social groups by keeping the current pluralist structure of Turkish society in view.

To be sure, as noted above, the party’s anti-westernism and anti-EU were more decisive in its foreign policy without going into any political clash with the secularist-Kemalist center. Also, as a way of forming a solidarity and partnership among different social groups, rather than a cultural and political confrontation with the official-secular establishment, identity politics were not as much apparent as a ‘Just Order’ –Adil Düzen in turkish- in its ideological viewpoint. Alongside this political stance mentioned in foreign policy, the most distinguishing character of Islamism in 1990s, especially in the face of other right-wing political parties, has been the idea ‘just order’ as an economic program with religious implications (Dağı, 1998, Yavuz, 2003, Yıldız, 2003, Dağı, 2002, Yavuz, 1998, Çakır, 1994, Günalp, 2003). It was one of the most remarkable ways to explain the party’s main political orientation in those years. At this point, Yıldız states that the party’s foregoing

political dispositions were not able to present a sufficient explanation in order to understand the core of the party's major policies. In his thought, with more pragmatic and functional standpoint, the Welfare party concentrated on socio-economic issues, rather than cultural and religious ones. Making this pragmatism and functionality possible was its economic program which had been termed as 'just order' and masterly mobilized the reactions of voters who had more economically felt excluded by the dominant classes of so-called 'White Turks. Along with having vaguely religious references, the foremost supporters of the program were 'classes of deprived' (Yıldız, 2003: 187-188). At that time, this religious-rooted 'just order' was a quite hybrid-practical ideological program as if it was creating a divide between a free-market and state-led mixed economy. However, it appears that the just order had more theoretical bases formulated by some university professors under the leadership of Süleyman Karagülle and Süleyman Akdemir, who established 'first Muslim commune' in Turkey named as Akevler Cooperative in İzmir and prepared this program for the party in 1985. Also, interestingly, the main goal in the program was to create a pluralistic, democratic, and free market-based civil society (Yavuz, 2003: 221). What is more, even though seen as a rather simple and striking slogan based on a change of order built upon 'justice', one of important concepts of Islamic thought, the idea 'just order' was an exactly utopian, complicated, and eclectic project. Furthermore, some epithets were being made concerning the program, ranging from 'Clan Socialism', Arabic Socialism' to 'Soviet Socialism'. Termed as an alternative-interest-free economic system, this program was adopted as the party view. Later on, Erbakan, and some experts in the party, hand in hand with the Akevler circles, wrote up this project as the party programme. In the pamphlet entitled Adil Ekonomik Düzen, Just Economic Order in English, and published in 1991, there was being spoken of a slave order which oppressed by incarcerating the millions of people to unemployment, bad straits, hunger, poverty, and underdevelopment. The said order was transferring all everything, which had been unrightly seized by force, into imperialism and the world Zionism, and a little and happy minority at their service. In consequence, a large majority was more and more becoming poor, whereas a small group increasingly got wealth (Çakır, 1994: 132-133 and Çakır, 2005: 558-559). Thereby, as Çakır has stated, this program as a slogan usually used by the party's

leader and cadres, was appealing for the poors and lower classes, which lived in urban periphery, and middle classes who got tired of corruption in system. It referred to an order substituted for free-market economy described as wild capitalism, on the basis of collectivist assumptions in relation to production, distribution, and social interactions (Dağı, 2002: 14, 22). However, many people and groups never took this economic program seriously. Those who embraced the program made in-depth and hard criticisms. Another effective reaction came from conservative bourgeois. In their rising periods, these new enterprises, named as “green capital” by some and gradually flourishing with ‘transformation’ initiated by Özal in the 1980s, directly or indirectly supported the WP. Having internalized by rapidly adopting the rules of free-market economy, they were absolutely against the just order as a project, but not to object as a slogan to it. (Çakır, 2005: 563). However, despite the class objection, a just economic order, leaded by Erbakan as a part program, was to be brought into being by culturally and economically seven different major actors. Among those agencies were, as Yavuz stated, ‘devout people’, ‘religious authorities and leaders who will be the architects of a greater Turkey’, ‘scientists and university professors’, ‘engineers and economists who will prepare the projects to turn natural resources into developed industries’, ‘businessmen who will implement the projects’, ‘guilds’, and ‘labor, including workers, farmers, and white-collar workers’. According to Erbakan, it was they who had been committed themselves to constructing a strong industry, and technologically developing Turkey that had pioneered the Muslim World in the long run (Yavuz, 2003: 221). Despite all, this program or economic order was seen as a political project impossible to actualize because of having rather complex and contradictory arguments and containing a variety of antagonisms in itself among classes. So, it was an unrealistic economic program superficially formulated, rather than a feasible program with eclectic, naive, and anachronic apperances (Çakır, 1994, Yavuz, 2003, Yıldız, 2003, and Eligür, 2010).

Lastly, in order to show that in 1990s Islamism under the leadership of the WP tried to avoid of ideologically and politically clashing with the secularist establishment, I would like to dwell upon headscarf issue, one of the most controversial subjects of the 1990s. It gave rise to an important political conflict between the secular and

religiously-conservative groups. But, in those periods, having emerged as a ‘radical’ social movement initiated by Islamic women with religious-conservative orientations on the basis of the fundamental and universal principles of liberal democracy including freedom of religion and conscience, cultural and identity-based rights, and individual-democratic choices and freedoms, this issue was shaped as, in with Atalay’s word, an ‘Islamic-transformative politics’ around the women’s social fight in question in. The WP kept away itself from such a politics that tended towards struggling with and objecting to it in order to abstain from the establishment’s anti-secular charges. So, the party refrained from taking part in among those who led to this politics, which was grounded on the concept of ‘state responsibility to cultural difference’ as normative political values or a normative political objective (Atasoy, 2009: 166-167). What is more, It made an effort to change its political-public image from that of a traditionalist-religious party to that of a mass party. In the 1991 general election, which shifted all balances following 12 September coup and was extensively collaborated with advertising agencies on political campaigns, the party had kept away from appealing avowedly to religious symbols and idioms, and even had decided to use seven female faces in its advertisements, but only one of who was a veiled young university dismissed from the university (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008: 526). All these have indicated that the Welfare party moved away from likely cultural and religious conflicts with the secular establishment. It had usually displayed its political stance in economy and foreign policy sphere by using the moral, symbolic, cultural and religious elements of Islam. In this case, the only thing that provided basis for conflicting with the secular establishment would be primarily economy. In 2000s, the JDP would be main political actor that put an end to this conflict by embracing neoliberal politics and integration with global-capitalist world.

#### **5.3.4. A Soft Intervention: The 28 February Process**

Before coming to Islamism in 2000s, which has been pioneered first by the VP – Virtue Party-, and later on by the JDP –Justice Development Party, it might be useful to briefly take a glance at the 28 February military intervention as an important historical-political moment in the transformation of Islamist politics Turkey. It is a quite significant process in terms of explaining and understanding

how a change Turkish Islamism had to undergo in 2000s. The February 28 process has been one of the most decisive factors that fashioned how a path Islamism as a political current would follow. Perhaps, at this point, prior to our explanations relevant to this, there can be necessary to explain what the 28 February intervention, which would be mostly described as a post-modern or soft coup in literature, is, and its reasons. First of all, it should be remarked that this process was a military intervention which had overthrown an Islamist party, WP, from political power by compelling to resign Turkey's Prime Minister, Erbakan, who came to power by forming a coalition with TPP –True Path Party- on 28 June 1996. This intervention, described as 'a post-modern coup' , has become considerably different from other former military coups, respectively the May 27, 1960 and the September 12, 1980 ones. In the course of the intervention, the National Security Council (NSC) offered a list of measures having to be implemented to the coalition government –Refah Yol- led by the WP in order to eradicate the rising of anti-secular activities and the ever-increasing threat of Islamization. The intervention later on ended up with the resignation of Refah-Yol government (Cizre, 2008: 4). Among the reasons of the interventions have been showed some statements and actions of the WP's leading political figures, which have contrasted with the secular principles of state. These had brought about a soft military intervention (counter-mobilization), by mobilizing various civil associations and organizations, including media and some state institutions out of military ones, on February 28, 1997. If considering other military ones before this intervention at the institutional level, at that time the military interfered in 'the public opinion-making level', a sign of trying to mobilize people by using the tradition of directly calling out to masses through media in the same vein as a classical political party (Eligür, 2010: 214, 222, Çınar, 2008: 110, and Bayramoğlu, 2013: 101-107). This process resulted in the closure of Welfare party and the banning of Erbakan from politics. It brought several precautions in public sphere, ranging from the headscarf ban in all state as well as private universities, a firmly supervision of İmam Hatip schools, the extension of compulsory primary education from five to eight years, and the closure of illegal Quran courses to the control of traditional religious brotherhoods, the scrutinizing of transaction of Islamic

companies, and the monitoring of Islamic capital flow (Atasoy, 2005: 160, Eligür, 2010: 214, 221, and Çayır, 2008: 71-72).

We think that the February 28 process is a significant political event as it led to a change in Islamism in terms of political tactics and maneuvers. Following the intervention, the Islamist party, WP, softened its political attitude and stance concerning the use of Islamic symbols and idioms, ended the politically and ideologically abuse of religion, and started to be more careful by taking some lessons from its former political experiences. For, it noticed unable to maintain its own political presence in the existing political conditions without exactly democratic rights and freedoms. From now on, according to them, it was time to find other political partners that would pave the way for creating new political conditions to able to stay in power after coming to political power through democratic ways –namely elections-. These political partners have all the time changed for Islamism as an outcome of its power pragmatism, which it has developed on the basis of its political experiences in Turkish political history. For instance, in the 1970s, they have been coalition governments, which the parties with different political tendencies formed. In order to come to power and benefit from its political advantages, involving various grants, government contracts, tax reliefs, industrial and agricultural subsidies, public housing and public services, like education and health, Islamism maintained this pragmatism which it had developed as directed to state-power by taking in part within ideologically and politically distinct coalitions, the nationalist-front or the RPP-NSP coalition. Politically and economically, the present is time to opt for the EU and the western international institutions, such as NATO, IMF, World Bank, for the maintenance of –political- power obtained with democratic ways. For Turkish Islamism under the JDP leadership, these new partners would be a way of the adoption of neoliberal economic policies and the abolition of anti-democratic of political system, which has posed an obstacle to its own power, in Turkey. In other words, in economic sense, they would mean to putting an end to the conflict with the official-secularist establishment, since the JDP Islamism has embraced neoliberal politics and integration with global-capitalist world. In political sense, they would

create an opportunity for making away with the anti-democratic political conditions, such as military tutelage, existing in Turkey.

Based on anti-Westernism, anti-European Union (EU), and even anti-Americanism a political stance has come to an end in the Islamist politics. With its neoliberal political orientation, it would be absolutely in compatible with both a global economic world and the official secular establishment's neoliberal political structuring following the 12 September military coup. For, as Atasoy would point out, Turkey has exactly got chance to adopt neoliberal economic policies and put them into practice, after the 1980 military coup was staged. Through their programmes of restructuring economy, the international institutions, such as particularly IMF and World Bank, have expedited Turkish government's acts towards market-oriented policies. The coup has provided to integrate Kemalist state ideology and the unitary state concept with the neoliberal reorganization of society, in accordance with the programmes mentioned above (Atasoy, 2009: 75-76, 79). From now onward, in the JDP leadership Turkish Islamists would draw attention to Turkey's industrial and economic power which have gained an important acceleration in the region. They would argue that Turkey can play an active role in constituting Islamic World's closer relationships to the West as partners in a global economy. This situation has been strengthened with the JDP' move in the matter of Turkey's full membership in EU as a political possibility (Atasoy, 2005: 182). For, Turkish Islamism has anymore given up anti-European stance after the 28 February intervention and encouraged Turkey's integration with Europe. The underlying motive of this change has been the belief that the moves to integrate with European Union (EU) would be able to trigger Turkish political system to carry out important democratic changes which enable reforms to make the Kemalist ideology less repressive and intrusive (Çınar and Duran, 2008: 24).

## **5.4. The Politicization of Islam in the 2000s: The JDP' Neoliberal Move, and Liberal-Conservative Intellectual Leadership**

### **5.4.1. What Happened to Islamism After the 2000s?**

The 2000s has been a new turning point for Turkish Islamism and its political leading cadres. This has two fundamental reasons. One is the JDP's neoliberal move which has laid bases of the differently politicization of Islam. With this move, which means politically integrating Islam with neoliberal politics and free-market economy, the JDP has provided a class domination by articulating low-income and poor social groups and working class into its own politics. Other is liberal-conservative intellectual leadership that has characterized a new situation, which refers to Islam's marriage or/and compatibility with liberal democracy, values and principles within a democratization perspective, in the politicization of Islam. Based on a historical-social Islamism, this leadership has made an important contribution to the politicization of Islam towards democratization. By this politicization what I mean is that the liberal-conservative leadership has seen the religiously-conservative social groups as a main political actor which would democratize the political system, which has dominated by bureaucratic-military tutelage, in Turkey. This politicization has been grounded on the economic interests and cultural demands of those groups and their -democratic- struggles with the secular establishment mentioned before. In that struggle, the JDP, which has represented the aforesaid social groups, would be a leading political actor. Most importantly, the idea democratization would be more highlighted by this leadership due to this political actor's moves with regard to the European Union and its liberal-conservative political synthesis or conservative-democrat formulations.

However, before that, there have been some political developments. Once, the Islamist Welfare party was closed down by the Constitutional Court, according to the decision made on January 16, 1998, on account of its anti-secular activities. This politics would proceed on its way by founding a new political party. Established on December 17, 1997 under a new name, Virtue Party –Fazilet Partisi-, the party primarily aimed at providing an institutional organization for parliamentary deputies

from its predecessor, the WP. Under the leadership of his lawyer, İsmail Alptekin, a group of deputies from the WP, who were tightly tied to Erbakan, pioneered to the foundation of the party. However, during its foundation, the party had faced with a fundamental question of who would the party leader be? The reply to that question was considerably late since a political competition, which would make way for emerging a political division ahead in the form of ‘innovationists’-yenilikçiler- and ‘traditionalists’-gelenekçiler’, in the party had began. The group called ‘yenilikçi’ was mostly consisting of a younger generation, including the foremost political figures, like Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdüllatif Şener, and some conservative-inclined politicians from the centre-right politics, among of who were Cemil Çiçek, Abdülkadir Aksu, Ali Coşkun, and Nevzat Yalçıntaş, while other group, the traditionalists, contained a older generation with the leading political names, such as Necmettin Erbakan, Recai Kutan, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Fehim Adak, and Ali Oğuz. In the first grand congress of the party on 14 May 2000, which gathered to elect the party’s chairman, the group winning was the traditionalists under the leadership of Recai Kutan, who had represented an older generation known with his loyal to Erbakan, in the face of Abdullah Gül, the candidate of the innovationists. Kutan, the new chairperson of the party, displayed more moderate and careful political image than Erbakan (Mecham, 2004: 345 and Eligür, 2010: 183, 234-235). In line with the aforesaid political image, the party tried to redesignate its own political orientation. This orientation would represent a new political position entirely opposite to its predecessor in Turkish politics. Particularly, it would sharply differ from its predecessor by changing its views based upon anti-Westernism, anti-EU and anti-Americanism.

Generally speaking, the party would see that in Turkey the basic issue has been its anti-democratic political system, by taking much important lessons from the 28 February intervention. Its political arguments would shape around democratization issue. Turkey’s political problems, especially among of which have been military interventions and party closures, have been directly associated with democracy, basic rights and freedoms, and rule of law. So, there would be suggested that the party had just one agenda, which had focused on question of how Turkey’s political system

would be democractized? The party's chairman, Kutan, had drawn a special attention to this situation by underlining that Virtue party became different from the WP, by virtue of having not only a new name but also fundamentally a democratic agenda. The main issues on its agenda would be related to democractizing Turkey, ranging from the necessity of a real democracy in Turkey, and the importance of human rights, to expanding political liberties and rights (Mecham, 2004:345-346). Also, Kutan propounded that the party would no longer remember with the old concepts of the National View tradition, by expressing that some concepts, like 'national view' or 'just order', was misunderstood, misperceived and misinterpreted by most people. Having pointing out that political power cannot be obtained by non-democratic tools, he emphasized that in Turkey one deficiency was democracy by (Dağı, 2005: 8). The party continuously rejected the claim that it was a political party representing an Islamic identity. Defining itself as a 'nation movement' –millet hareketi- it asserted that its mission had promoted human rights and liberal democracy in Turkey. In this context, the VP stated to renounce from the just order and enhanced its emphasis on a number of western values and principles like democracy and secularism (Eligür, 2010: 235). Given the party's all political arguments, there seems to be a political party with Islamic credentials that supported western values and democracy, European Union and aimed at developing its relationships with U.S –United States-. The party changed its views with regard to the West, its international institutions and its basic values and principles, and deserted an anti-West, anti-EU, and anti-American stance existing in all National View parties from the 1960s and 1970s up to the late 1990s. This new views of the Virtue Party based on a pro-West, and pro-European Union (EU) politics became dominant political orientation which shaped its domestic and foreign policy (Dağı, 2002, Eligür, 2010, Yavuz, 2009, Usul, 2008 and Mecham, 2004).

Despite moderating its political image in the light of the party's changing views mentioned above, the secularist-wing continued its suspicions regarding the Virtue Party. With this political image the party, which participated in the 1999 national elections, was substantially on decline as the third largest party in parliament by taking only 15.4 percent of the votes. This apparent decline has been linked with lots

of reasons, because of considerably changing the party's political standpoints, ranging from more moderate and conciliatory stance taken in the party to the confusion taking in the National View's social base following closure of the WP. But yet, the VP' moderate stance was not able to prevent to being closed down the by the Constitutional Court the party in June 2000, owing to its political abuses and provocations concerning the headscarf ban implemented on universities (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 5). With the exception of the aforesaid suspicions and the closure case, the political disputes between two groups within the party gradually increased. Although Kutan had seemed like the party's leader, there was so evident that Erbakan, banned from politics for five years, went on his dominant position within the party by controlling the VP's rule and organization after being elected a political cadre composed of his close associates. So, the innovationists speeded up their struggles in the party by maintaining to challenge Kutan's leadership under Erbakan's influence. Especially, having enhanced his influence by starting from the first congress of the party, Gül's challenge to Kutan explicitly put forward the division within the party. Following the closure of the VP, the mentioning division between those two rivals known as innovationists'- 'traditionalists' completely disclosed itself. Of groups, one established the JDP –Justice Development Party- under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while other group laid the bases of FP –Felicity Party-, translated as Saadet Partisi –SP- into Turkish, by organizing under the leadership of Recai Kutan. The JDP has won the 2002 parliamentary elections by receiving 34.3 percent of the votes, and was in power by obtaining two-thirds of parliamentary seats. However, the FP remained under the election threshold by taking only 2.5 percent of the votes, and stayed out of the parliament. (Yeşilada, 2002: 69 and Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 5). After this, a new politicization of Islam has been initiated by the JDP's politica-ideological moves and liberal-conservative intellectuals' leadership. This politicization would have two aspects, one, neoliberalism, other, democratization. we will deal with the historical-political background of the rising of the JDP to power. Along with the politicization in question, Islam would be begun to be debated around new concepts and arguments, like democracy, civil society, free-market economy, conservatism, liberalism, European Union, basic rights and freedoms, and rule of law.

#### **5.4.2. Liberal-Conservative Public Intellectuals' Leadership**

Intellectual is not just an agency of a pure thinking, isolated from all spheres of society, whatever economy, politics or culture. The so-called intellectual figure is not also thinking individual who lives in ivory towers disconnected from all political and social reality by separating him/herself from large masses of people in society. In Gramscian sense, it does not refer to a thinking activity, at the same time it is one who organizes something in a close relation with some political or/and social groups. Put it another way, an intellectual cannot be defined by an intrinsic activity of thinking which is common to all people, but by function which s/he fulfill. For, in Gramscian sense, everyone can be intellectual, but no one can has the function of intellectuals. Accordingly, Gramsci does describe intellectual as one who has the functions of organizers in all fields of society, including production as well as politics and culture. According to him, the basic point would be that the intellectual provides a homogeneity to it, and an awareness of its own political and social position by organizing any political entity or/and social group around a definite idea or view. S/he organizes human masses and forms several political arguments as to how one would move and obtain a political awareness of its position or struggle. For Gramsci, this characterizes an organic intellectual whose the main function is to build a hegemony in society and create a domination through the state apparatus. This functional role of intellectuals originate from having their position to organize and lead others for producing consent and legitimizing a political order, group, or party. Such an intellectual would be not only composed of ones related to certain political party or social class, but also of politicians, prominent writers and academics, broadcasters and journalists, and even civil servants, bureaucrats, and judges. In other words, they exist in all levels of society, ranging from state, civil society to economy (Simon, 1999: 105, 108-109 and Martin, 1998: 46-47). As seen here, the intellectual is someone that has a public visibility owing to increasing mass communication tools. Today, independently from any party or class, an intellectual is able to affects people's ideas and worldviews, by using them. On this point, Bourdieu mentions from a public intellectual emerging as a result of the change taking place in French intellectual life. The reason for the change has been, he

remarks, the role of mass media, mostly consisting of television and newspaper, and the French intellectuals' increasing media orientation. He has seen the extending role of mass media and how important it gradually became in French political field since the last thirty years. In addition to this, he has noticed increasing interrelations between politics and media, between the journalistic field and the political field. This situation has created a new intellectual type, public intellectual, who plays active role in changing the structure of power and providing the control of political, ideological and cultural life, by going beyond the walls of the university. This public intellectual represents numerous well-educated ones that takes on multiple roles of writer, journalist, consultant, and opinion leader, by overturning traditional boundaries among the university, government administration and private and public enterprise (cited by Swartz, 2003: 801-802).

After 1980, in Turkey there has arisen a public intellectual predominating Turkish intellectual life with liberal-conservative orientations, following the 1960s and 1970s' left-intellectual domination. This public intellectual has in general advocated liberal and conservative values, among of which have been liberal economic policies, neoliberal structuring of state and society in liberal sense, and of family, tradition, religion, and religiously-conservative life style in conservative one. Its emergence ever-increasingly gained an acceleration in the Özal period, which usually represented a conservative-political line under a centre-right politics in the combination of four major political orientations, 'conservatism –traditional Sunni Islam', 'nationalism', 'economic liberalism', and 'social democracy' (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). The main political current effective in emerging this public intellectual has been conservatism under Özal's leadership. Furthermore, the liberal side of the aforesaid public intellectuals has had conservative implications embodying in Özal's politics. Because, his economic liberalism, which started to define Turkey's main political line, the post-1980 new centre- right, transformed Turkey's political and social structure since the early 1980s by integrating its economy with the global capitalist system. More importantly, these neoliberal-economic policies formed a basis for appearing new social classes in the religious-conservative groups. These new classes have been composed of highly-educated middle classes, including

engineers, technicians, politicians, academicians, senior bureaucrats and civil servants, and journalists and writers in Gramscian sense, and of a religiously-conservative capitalist class willing to integrate with global-capitalist world by emerging in the small and provincial cities of Anatolia with small and medium-sized enterprises . Göle defines those educated middle classes as Islamist-counter elites in the face of secular-Republican elites, namely progressive Kemalist intellectuals – ilerici Atatürkçü aydınlar-. In her opinion, the counter elites have been a product of the neoliberal structuring of the post-1980 period which the Islamist engineers met with power in the ranks of the Motherland Party, the veiled women struggled to become more visible on modern university campuses, and the Islamist periodical magazines, newspapers, and books had control over intellectual debates by shattering the dominance of leftist intellectuals. (Göle, 1997:54). All in all, Alaranta states that the neoliberal-economic structuring of state and society was believed would pave the way for a liberal-democratic political system. This conservative interpretation of liberalism believed that, with the religiously-conservative constituency integrated into the capitalist world economy, a liberal-democratic regime would take place. The conservative-orientated liberal stance has been largely embedded in the mainstream Turkish conservatism<sup>23</sup>. The conservative public intellectuals have represented such an interpretation and liberal stance within a more neoliberal line. For, Özal's conservatism with economic liberalism-focused liberal stance has been all the time closer to some Turkish Muslim intellectuals' interpretations of Islam, such as Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Nurettin Topçu and to various Sufi groups like Naqshbandi order the followers of Fethullah Gülen. His conservative-liberal politics gave a great support to these groups and intellectual interpretations, and pave the way for their formations. Moreover, for instance, Özal put an end to the bans introduced on his preachings for the encouragement of Gülen's views and activities against radical Islamic groups (Heper, 2013: 143). As Yaşlı has pointed out, these conservative public intellectuals have replaced with the 1960s and 1970s' nationalist-conservative intellectuals leaded by the Hearth of the Enlightened- Aydınlar Ocağı- and organizing the rightist student organization's ideas and actions under the name of

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<sup>23</sup> T. Alaranta, "The AKP's Shallow 'Liberalism' Exposed", accessed April 05, 2018, available from: <https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/239-the-akps-shallow-liberalism-exposed.html>

National Turkish Student Union –MTTB-. Following the 12 September, the foregoing conservative public intellectuals, which would reorganized under the roof of Birlik Vakfı<sup>24</sup>, –Foundation for Unity- composed of businessman, politicians, and academicians, have played an active role in the religiously-conservative capitalist class’ discovery of ‘civil-societism –sivil toplumculuk-’ (Yaşlı, 2010: 223-224).

Having termed as liberal intellectuals, the group is not a homogeneous one because of coming from divergent cultural, ideological and political background. Nevertheless, for appearing as an outcome of political, economic and ideological changes of the post-1980 period in Turkey, respectively the triumph of capitalist bloc against the socialist one, neoliberal economic policies, and the decline of leftist ideology, this group has had certain common points to share in itself. In the first place, it should be underlined that the liberal intellectuals have not certainly accepted a conservative worldview and life-style proposed by the religiously-conservative groups, unlike the conservative intellectuals supporting the Islamist and conservative political parties. They have a quite secular and western lifestyle, and named as ex-Marxists, some have come from the left-socialist and Marxist politics. They have mostly focused on anti-democratic political system and certain political issues. Among them are the military-civil bureaucratic tutelage, the reconstruction of a democracy and political system based political rights and freedoms, and ultimately the restructuring of state- (civil) society relationships. As noted above, this group have distinct ideological and political origins. Some, among of who have had Ali Bayramoğlu and Etyen Mahçupyan, are, for the most part, recognized with their liberal stances. The intellectuals, such as Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Altan, who have a leftist background but are more known as ex-Marxists, can be attached to them as well. Also, although coming from the left-socialist and social democrat origins, another intellectual group, which we can define as leftist-liberal and/or liberal-leftist, can be incorporated in this liberal-intellectual framework. Among them

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<sup>24</sup> Founded in 1986 by İsmail Kahraman, who was the leader of the National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, MTTB), and one of Erdoğan’s close associates and of outstanding political figures of the JDP, and by 40 ex-MTTB members, this organization would be the ideological and organizational heir of the MTTB. It would play a crucial role in shaping the religiously-conservative social groups and National View politics in 1990s. For this explanation, see Fulya Atacan, “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP”, *Turkish Studies*, 6 (2), (2005): 187-199

would be some prominent intellectual names such as Ahmet İnsel, Murat Belge, Fuat Keyman, Baskın Oran, Yüksel Taşkın, Ömer Laçiner, and the like. The above-mentioned framework would defend a political liberalism, which has consisted of political rights and freedoms, -liberal- democracy, civil government, and rule of law. Broadly speaking, this group approves the widespread use of the term, expressed as liberal and leftist-liberal and/or liberal-leftist intellectuals, for referring to ‘those who are not coming from the National Outlook Movement, but who are influential in leading public opinion in the matter of democratization and civilianization’, in conjunction with involving left-socialist and social democrat origins. (Ersoy and Üstüner, 2016: 406-407). Following 1980s, in Turkey, having asserted that the leftist ideology lost intellectual leadership in the face of the rightist ideologies and the left manufactured the rightist as a way of making peace with people since the mid-1990s, Hülügü indicates that with leftist backgrounds, these intellectuals, particularly leftist-liberals and/or liberal-leftists, willingly joined to the ideological field of the right. She thinks that this situation has had many reasons, the foremost ones of which have been composed of the left-legacy between 1974 and 1980 and the denial of that legacy, of insistence on civil society and its organizations as an agency of social-political transformation, and of lastly pragmatism based on external factors like EU for change in society and politics (Hülügü, 2010: 194-197, 198-200).

Having dominated the intellectual life of the post-1980, this liberal-conservative public intellectuals have had some prominent arguments that organize current ideas and beliefs and to lead politics and society in Gramscian sense. In one of their arguments, for the most part, they have claimed that the –political- history of Turkey might be read as a history of struggles taking place between the centre and the periphery or the bureaucratic elites and the broad conservative masses of people. To put it in a different way, their major common argument has been based on the claim that pious people represent the “periphery” and the “civil society” as opposed to the centre and the authoritarian state tradition, the main actors of which have consisted of civilian and military bureaucracy and Kemalist intelligentsia. Not only the Islamists or/and the conservatives but also many –secular- liberals and –liberalized-

ex-Marxists have been among the leading advocates of that argument<sup>25</sup>. With liberal implications, this argument has put the dichotomy of state-society, or that of the centre-periphery in Mardin's words, at the centre of its analysis (Tuğal, 2016: 10, Yaşlı, 2010: 224 and Sümer & Yaşlı, 2010: 12). Tuğal expresses that the foregoing argument, which has specially centered on Şerif Mardin's one work, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" as the beginning point, is an assertion dominating the social sciences of the last three decades. However, the establishment of this strong mainstream explanation, which has laid the bases of such argument, has been taken a long time. (Tuğal, 2016:19). Based upon this argument, these public intellectuals have argued that the main issue has been democratization, by problematizing state-society and military-civil government relationships in Turkey since 1980s. In a sense, in their leadership the basic doxa of Turkish intellectual sphere has been democratization issue which has dominated and organized intellectual and academic circles' ideas in the wake of 1980s. That doxa is one of the most significant thresholds for Turkish intellectual life as part of rewriting political and social history in the post-1980 Turkey, the motto of which has taken form around an idea like "lay claim to people's values", and "support the victim periphery's feelings in the face of a despot centre" (Hülagü, 2010: 178, 193-194). Seemingly, the fundamental motivation behind such an idea would be the assertion that the culturally and economically excluded conservative periphery has typified a democratic force in Turkey. Precisely, with the transition to democracy in 1950s, this periphery with religious-conservative appearances, which has been represented by numerous right-wing parties, whether the centre-right or the Islamist and the ultra-nationalist politics, from the DP-Democrat Party- to the JDP -Justice Development Party-, has been claimed to be new actor of a democratic transformation. The democratic transformation in question would express an 'equation' in a sense, which means politically, economically and culturally coming the periphery's same position with the centre. This would at the same time bring a normalization and democratization to Turkey, by overthrowing 'tutelary regime' that has been consolidated by various military coups since 1960s (Ersoy and Üstüner, 2016: 7).

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<sup>25</sup> C. Tuğal, "Liberalized Islam, Post-Sufis, and the Military in Turkey", accessed June 15, 2018, available from <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2777-liberalized-islam-post-sufis-and-the-military-in-turkey>

Having comprised new middle classes and a capital power, the religiously-conservative periphery would, as İnsel remarked, make a very important contribution to normalizing democracy under the JDP's leadership in Turkey, by ensuring a radical exit from the September 12 regime (İnsel, 2003: 300). As would be seen in İnsel's outlook, this intellectual leadership, from liberals, conservatives-Islamists to leftist-liberals and/or liberal-leftists, have dominated the debates over Islamism and the JDP politics by basing upon the assertion that in Turkey the basic problem is democratization. What underlies behind this assertion has been this leadership's description of historical-social Islamism.

As many times expressed earlier, this description has two fundamental arguments. One is the cultural and economic bases of the social group termed as religious and conservative. Other is this group's struggle with the secular establishment within a political cleavage. On the basis of such description, this intellectual leadership has undertaken an important role in shaping Turkey's political sphere and forming the JDP politics' hegemony. Also, it has made a fundamental contributions to the discussions with regard to the transformation of Islamism and the JDP' ideological and political arguments. In its contributions, the most essential assertion has been democratization carried out under the JDP leadership, which has been claimed to formed the backbone of the religiously-conservative groups and represent them. What provides basis for this democratization is that Islam has been discussed and analyzed around new arguments and concepts, ranging from democracy, civil society, conservatism, economy, class formation to neoliberalism.

#### **5.4.3. A Story of Transformation: The JDP and Neoliberalism**

The JDP's politics, and political tactics-maneuvers can be made, with the aim of able to remain long time in power in accordance with its power pragmatism, more understandable by being mentioned from a story of transformation. Before that, it is required to state that it has been more than 30 years until now Turkey has adopted a market-oriented neoliberal economic policies for decreasing the role of the state in economy (Atasoy, 2009: 109). In the second half of the 1970s, the ongoing import substitution-based economic policies for almost 20 years met with a great crisis.

Having faced with the worker activism in the one side, and with exchange problems continuing as related to the import substituting economy in the other, Turkish capitalism was at be critical crossroads. Seemingly, Turkish bourgeoisie had two alternatives: either to extend the existing import substituting economic policies or to liberalize economy through an outward-looking model. In the end of the 1970s, the big capital groups by Turkey explicitly directed to the second option in the line with the demands of the IMF, the World Bank, and other institutions of the process of such a capitalization all over the world. For instance, in 1978, Koç group ran a campaign for being ended “inward-oriented model of development’ while TÜSİAD (The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen) demanded the structural transformation of economy. Thus, in 1980 it was initiated a project of liberalization supported by the 12 September military coup, the most severe one of Turkish history. Turkey embarked on establishing a new, outward-looking and liberal model by putting an end to the inward-oriented development (Öztürk, 2014: 197).

In concert with the foregoing new policies of economy politically and ideologically in Turkey, the JDP embraced a neoliberal economy, the start of which has gone back to 1980s, by defending the predominant neoliberal themes of privatization of public corporations, liberalization of trade, entrepreneurship, and private investment. It pursued an IMF/EU-driven neoliberal route, instead of a National View-centred political line, by frustrating all apprehensions, especially many question marks arising in the TÜSİAD side (Sönmez, 2010: 265 and Atasoy, 2009: 109). As a matter of fact, as Savran has remarked, the ruling party, JDP, at the same time, laid the bases of splitting the alliance, shaping in the 28 February process and consisting of the United States, the TÜSİAD, and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), with the foregoing change emerging in economic policies. Thereby, the US, besides the European Union (EU), has cut loose from being the JDP’s target with Islamist roots. It was a partial softening in the relationships between the JDP and the TÜSİAD. The reason was that such a transformation in the party’s economic policies had been serving the big business circles’ economic interests in Turkey (Savran, 2014: 92). Also, the party’s neoliberal move was too closely connected with its support regarding Turkey’s membership in the EU. Because, in the first place there was a

dominant argument of globalization theorized around the neoliberal principles and policy ideas meaning to restructure capitalism and encourage an open world market economy. A theorized globalization in this manner was referring to a complex political process composing of the restructuring of capital and classes and the reorganization of states and political alliances. In other words, with an idea of globalization shaped by neoliberalism, including not only economic restructuring but also the retransformation of state, the JDP incorporated the EU into its own political tactic-maneuver in harmony with the politics of neoliberalism expressed in the EU's advocate of globalization, and democratization, by aiming at building a liberal democracy based on the basic rights and freedoms (Atasoy, 2009: 17-18, 109-110). The JDP's neoliberal politics was one of unique tools of justifying its new political orientation directed to a more moderate conservative politics from Islamism, or political Islam, in the face of the western world, particularly the US and the European Union, alongside restructuring Turkish economy. For this reason, as Tuğal indicated, it had taken the support of the secular business circles as well as that of different intellectual groups, ranging from conservative, ex-Islamist and liberal intellectuals to liberalized ex-Marxist ones<sup>26</sup> (Tuğal, 2016: 12). Taking into account of all these, along with being a transformation in its own politics, the neoliberal step for the party extended further the alliance which it applied as a political tactic-maneuver and comprised of the US, the EU, the secular business groups, the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore, this step was an important instrument of legitimacy for the JDP to prove its own moderate politics far beyond a transformation in economic sense.

By initiating a neoliberal move, the JDP, at the same time, became differentiated from the former Islamist tradition, National view. It might not be sufficient to explain and understand this story of transformation in just economic-ideological context from a more statist and developmentalist position to a more liberal and free-market oriented one. Because, such transformation had a political-ideological context. In a sense, it was one of the most remarkable tools of the party's political tactic-maneuver

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<sup>26</sup> C. Tuğal, "Liberalized Islam, Post-Sufis, and the Military in Turkey", accessed June 15, 2018, available from <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2777-liberalized-islam-post-sufis-and-the-military-in-turkey>

to form a broad alliance and demonstrate its own western-oriented moderate politics in that context. Put it another way, when called neoliberalism or/and neoliberal economic transformation, it is needed to think them together with globalization and democratization. Particularly, it is vitally important, since these two concepts, globalization and democratization, has been the dominant argument of debates made concerning either the transformation of the Islamist politics in the post-1980 Turkey, or in the changing of JDP's politics at present. Following the 1980s, what formed the main framework of the liberal-conservative public intellectual' leadership has been these two notions. The JDP has been the leading political actor of this intellectual leadership by blending its neoliberal move with the concepts mentioned above.

#### **5.4.4. The JDP's Ideological-Political Move as A Power Pragmatism: European Union (EU)**

The JDP's new move, advocating Turkey's full membership in EU, has been propounded as one of the evidences of ideological and political transformations appearing in itself. It was transformation because the party had seen its own future, along with the country, in a western organization –EU- and its political values and principles, as different from the former National View parties. It had two fundamental goals. The first was a search for supporter in struggle with the dominant secular civil-military elites of bureaucracy in domestic politics which the JDP's political elites assumed as an obstacle in progressing Turkey democracy further. The other was the desire to continue a political process in line with the party's neoliberal political orientation in economic sphere. Starting with the second one, we can say that this goal was directly associated with the party's neoliberal political line. Here the party fundamentally embarked on constructing an Islamic version of neoliberalism that conceptualizes an individual ethic, based on self-discipline and self-reliance and aiming to free actors in society who make their own rational choices. For the JDP, uniting neoliberal-capitalist economic system and European democratic normative standards with Turkish cultural values and moral precepts, a – social- ethic, which can appeal in all areas of the economy as a precondition for a lasting and continuously growth, was more likely to be produced. As Atasoy has stated, the main assertion was that ‘a more democratic system could serve as the

opportunity structure for the cultivation of a social ethic of self-realization'. An ensemble of individuals equipped with an Islamic ethos and morality had a strong position in the state which had been completely transformed, along with the changing position of the secular establishment towards religion, Islam. But, before all of this, what makes this possible would be Turkey's membership in the EU which has provided the establishment of a fully functioning democratic system. The EU membership laid the bases of a powerful promise of democratization, which had enabled to Turkey's economic and political stability and development with the European liberal principles of democracy, human rights and individual freedoms. It also provided that the party took the support of the big business groups, whether secular or religious-conservative, and of the international economic organizations, that is the IMF or the WB (Atasoy, 2009: 111) The first one was a set of political-legal reforms that the JDP had initiated against the secular-Kemalist state bureaucracy, military or civil, which had only focused on preserving its own political existence and its continuity in power, by restructuring the Kemalist-political regime based on civil-military tutelage. Stating that the party had a great deal of reason to launch the EU reforms, Yavuz pointed out that the most important among them was the military tutelage in Turkey and its dominant position on democratic-political system and processes. The party leadership has also seen Turkey's membership as a path to political survival and a way of minimizing the military's power (Yavuz, 2009: 3). It needed great international force, like EU, to civilianize the regime. At this point, Cizre put a same view into words by suggesting that the EU' reforms formed a basis for the JDP's enterprises to reconstitute military-civilian relationships and at the same time provided one external impetus to its struggle (Cizre, 2008:134). In a word, the party indeed wished to put an end to the dual-track government that, for the most part, restricted democratic practices. As it continuously lived the fear to interfere in its political presence and power with the Turkish military and the state bureaucracy's, especially judicial institutions,, and the suspicion that they might annihilate its own government and cancel its political reforms, it viewed the European Union (EU) and its political reforms as a significant political move that would help to survive its –political- power (Yavuz, 2009 and Yavuz, 2003: 255-156). For this reason, the JDP saw the EU as a guarantor of maintaining and conserving its

–political- power in the long run. The EU reforms thus were to pave the way for reshaping military-civilian relationships and judicial institutions able to end the party's political future, as in the former National View parties.

The party's ideological move towards the European Union (EU) was more interested in its new political identity, –known as 'conservative democracy'–, representing a new political position, not Islamist, in Turkish political spectrum. It was an ideological move that the JDP attempted at proving its own non-Islamist political position in national and international arena. Thus, with such a move the party was both to develop its relationships to the EU and to support Turkey's full membership, for being able to introduce the new identity across to abroad and to persuade the power centres in Turkey, which have largely consisted of the military and the civil-state bureaucracy. The reason was the there were quite a few doubts concerning its new identity between Islamism and the new orientation "conservative democracy," a term applied by the party leaders to demonstrate that it was not an Islamic party. Particularly, for this, the JDP used EU membership project to evidence that it was not Islamic in either domestic politics or foreign policy. Conforming to the Copenhagen criteria was an essential aspect of this identity-building (Yavuz, 2009: 3). Moreover, the JDP wished to overthrow 'radical doubt' with regard to its political identity. What lies behind such a doubt was the secular establishment's perception, which has been claimed to define Islam as an 'other' and a symbol of 'nonmodern orientalism', expressed the essentialist core of the establishment's 'legitimacy'. In opposition to this background, in order to say stop a potential conflict and/or struggle between its government and the military 'guardians' of Turkish democracy, the JDP masterly carried a Western-oriented design of the party's image and ideological agenda into effect. To conclude, the membership in the EU carried the party's signature –on the basis of the image and the new political identity in question- (Cizre, 2008: 134). This image and ideological-political identity under the design of 'conservative democracy' provided the JDP with a 'breathing space, removed from the interferences of the Kemalist elites and the Turkish military which were intensely insistent on their perceptions which have defined the JDP as a pro-Islamist and fundamentalist political party. (Coşar and Özman, 2004: 65).

#### **5.4.5. New Political Umbrella for the JDP Politics: The Post-1980 Centre-Right**

Following the 1980 coup d'état, which reorganized Turkish political system by closing down the pre-1980 political parties from the right up to the left and banning their leaders and cadres from politics, the rightist politics politically and ideologically reshaped and made new syntheses. Of course, the leftist politics was not free from those ideological and political changes which the right underwent. However, the main issue that I am interested in here is the reshaping of the post-1980 right politics in Turkey, particularly the centre-right. The reason was that the centre-right politics, which was reformulated after the 1980 military intervention, had been a source of political-ideological references for the JDP politics, taking into account the party's leaders and prominent cadres' statements and speeches during the establishment of the JDP, and afterwards a range of explanation made concerning its political position in Turkish political spectrum. The way to understand and explain the JDP and its new political identity was the reformulation of the post-1980 centre-right politics in keeping with the 12 September military coup's political and ideological credentials.

Priorly, it might be useful to make a brief explanation with regard to the word 'centre' or/and 'centre politics'. When defining the centre politics, whatever the right or the left, it would be more accurate to try to elucidate it by considering its functions. A politics at the centre of political spectrum propounds that its function is to firstly ensure the stability of political system. Having differentiated itself from the traditional right and left politics with goals and functions, it defines itself as connected with the existence or absence of polarization, on the ground that its fundamental function is to consolidate the stability of the established order, while, on the one part, adopting a somewhat moderated ideological identity (Coşar and Özman, 2004: 58). It functions by providing the formation and maintenance of a consensus-based politics. Strictly speaking, this function basically refers to a context-based situation that declared 'the end of ideologies' thesis in the early 1970s and the late 1980s, when both the left and the right equally discredited. For this reason, beyond the left and the right, this politics has been defined as a mid-point in line with the foregoing function. In this framework, the centre with the types of the left and the

right politics has been conceptualized as an ambiguous space in a certain predefined left and right spectrum (Özman and Coşar, 2007: 202).

In accordance with the definition of the centre or/and centre politics outlined above, in the post-1980 Turkey, the centre-right politics was reshaped under the leadership of Motherland Party –Anavatan Partisi (ANAP)-, led by Turgut Özal, a rightist politician with conservative background. This politics emerged as a new political movement, since the aforesaid party had no antecedents, and absolutely no roots that intertwined with the past struggles of Turkish politics. Begin with, the new party of the centre right, the Motherland Party, was not able to find no reason to become a radical movement, and strongly objected to extremism by advocating to represent the interests of the Orta Direk (the “main pillar of society, broadly speaking the middle classes of society), the core elements of which have been, states Wright (1976), composed of reformism, in sense of seeing the problem of capitalism as solvable rather than an anti-capitalist stance, of individualism, namely the promotion of career and upward mobility, and of power fetishism, a strong tendency based on seeing state as an inherently neutral force whose role is limited to arbitrating and regulating. Having quite ambiguous ideological implication in political space, this centre-politics combined four different and seemingly irreconcilable ideological orientations consisting of conservatism (traditional Sunni) Islam, nationalism, economic liberalism, and social democracy (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002:45). But it was not a social democracy in the sense that we know. Rather, it was an ideological component based on a combination of classical liberal emphasis on equality of opportunity and neoliberal appeal to ‘voluntary social solidarity’, particularly embedded in the norms of traditional social solidarity and relevant institutions, and in natural social solidarity that originated from love and compassion within the family system which would establish the bases of our society (Özman and Coşar, 2007: 211). It was a party that had aimed at being a symbol of unity among different ideological stances, by surpassing them. So, it embraced a political position that implied the curtailing of ideological extremism. As Coşar and Özman remarked, what mostly defines the post-1980 centre-right politics was its neoliberal disposition. They asserted that it was highly significant to refer to neoliberalism as a fundamental framework for

ideologically positioning the centre-right politics and parties. At the same time, it has been stated that the Motherland party, representing the post-1980 centre-right politics, was fashioned in line with what is called the ‘sensitivities of the state’ in Turkey (Coşar and Özman, 2004: 58).

After 12 September military coup rebuilt the state and society, in compliance with that rebuilding, the centre-right had three main political-ideological frameworks, namely nationalism, conservatism, and neoliberalism. It had embarked on synthesizing market modernism and Muslim identity. Under the leadership of the centre right, the Motherland party purposed a modern society held together by conservative values, the main framework of which consisted of cultural conservatism on the basis of Islam, tradition and nationalism (Yavuz, 2009), and of moral-religious (Sunni) values of the past, including Allah-fearing, and mosque-attending souls (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 45-46). The one of the most distinguishing features of such conservatism was to protect and strengthen the state. In it, the state and nation were an organic whole. The other was Islamic ethos of community comprising spiritual (Islamic) values (manevi değerler) and religious symbols, like Quran, mosque, family, piety, morality, concept of Hizmet (“rendering social services” in the name of Islam). The foregoing conservatism was seeing Islam as the social cement of society and as a key element of national culture (Yavuz, 2009: 34, 36-37, 83). In parallel with that framework of conservatism, the party’s approach to religion, Islam, became different from a ‘reactionary’ or/and ‘fundamentalist’ viewpoint, owing to emphasizing the traditional and conventional position of Islam as a system of belief fundamentally intertwined with Turkish-national history (Coşar and Özman, 2004: 60). On the other hand, its nationalism was embedded in the conservative sentiments among community. It was designed more with liberalism and conservatism. What is meant by liberalism was economic liberalism based on the party’s neoliberal ideology. It expressed an authoritarian liberalism. Ultimately, it was a ‘liberalized’ version of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Because, the ‘call to prayer’ and ‘flag’ as the national symbols which described Turkishness was the evocative of ANAP’s tendency to Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the reformulation of Turkish-national identity. Accordingly, the term ‘liberalized’ frequently referred to ‘the perception of

state' in service to the nation on the whole, on the ground that the party' outlook on liberalism exactly corresponded to its economic policy preferences focused on economic growth and development for prosperity of the nation and the country (Özman and Coşar, 2007: 207-208, 211, 218 and Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 46).

## **5.5. Conclusion**

In this section, my basic assertion has been about how Islam was politicized by other political actors, including Turkish state and its apparatuses, aside from the National View Islamism, within ideological and political structures, from the late 1960s up to the early 2002s. The politicization of Islam, which the Islamist politics itself has been inside, has produced a historical-political Islamism. It is key to explaining and understanding the JDP politics and its Islamism. In so doing, I have particularly drawn on a Gramscian and Althusserian theoretical framework. First of all, I have referred to Gramsci' conceptualization of political and political society. As regards these concepts, Gramsci defines political as a field of consent and force. In Gramscian sense, it consists of both force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and 'civilta' (Sassoon, 1987: 112). What makes such conceptualization of political in this manner possible has been his concept of political society. As stated earlier, Gramsci speaks of the state and its institutional apparatuses, including the armed forces, police, juridical power, and prisons, while theorizing political society. However, according to him, the state and its institutional structure expresses far more than these coercive apparatuses materialized in a state organization. State is a political-ideological apparatus undertaking an active role in leading and organizing consent. In a sense, by political society, he refers to the 'educative and formative role of state'. For, in Gramsci what called the state is not only composed repressive apparatuses, but also an ethical or cultural ones. In other words, all the states are at the same time an ethical and cultural apparatuses, on account of having fundamental goals and functions to 'raise the great mass of people to an ideological-moral level. For instance, the school and the courts as having either an educative function or goal are the most striking state apparatuses with initiatives and activities which provide engendering political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes. So, the state should be understood as well as the government apparatuses, ranging from political

parties, parliament, intellectual leadership, courts, armed forces, police, and prisons, also the private apparatuses of hegemony –with educational (school), communicative (press, radio or television), cultural (literature, the arts and sports), and religious institutions. For this reason, it is ‘political society plus civil society, that is to say, ‘hegemony armoured by coercion’. In building such hegemony, intellectuals play an active role in the production of consent, the main task of which is, for Gramsci, to lead and organize ideas. They are the organizers of hegemony with roles and functions in generating consent either in the political society –as civil servants, official of the armed forces, and judges- and the civil society as politicians, prominent writers and academics, and journalists- or in the field of production –as managers and technicians-. Their fundamental function where any political conflict occurs is the struggle over key concepts and definition that fashion the ways how people would think and act (Gramsci, 1992, Simon, 1999, Sassoon, 1987: 110, 115, 135, and Gramsci, 2000: 234). From this Gramscian theoretical framework, we can generally conclude that ideological and political structures is significant analytical tools in political study. An Althusserian political theory does expresses this significance. It makes this by highlighting ideological and political structures and re-framing ideology concept. In the context of this dissertation, Althusser makes two basic contributions. He rejects economism and economic reductionism, and states that ideology is not an output or/and outcome of given situation of one social group or class. Rather, it expresses an imaginary relationships with the existing political-social conditions. The individuals, who live these relationships, is not a given subject. Conversely, they are ‘constituted’ -political- subjects. By starting from these two theoretical frameworks, I have asserted that Islam is an important tool of ideological and political struggle, and an indispensable part of providing cultural-moral cohesion and political legitimacy. With these functions and role, religion, Islam has been politicized within ideological and political structures in Turkey, since the mid-1960, and the 1970s. As a result of politicization of Islam, this has provided a basis for the emerging of a historical-political Islamism.

In Turkey, Islamism and the JDP politics cannot be understood and explained from the standpoint of historical-social Islamism on which the interviewees grounded their

views within the general framework of the liberal approach. For, this political current, and thus the JDP, have not been able to stay out of the politicization of Islam. They have been at the same time the leading actors of that politicization. The aforesaid politicization has shaped Islamism and its political leadership and cadres. Therefore, within a liberal approach we cannot comprehend through neither Mardin's conceptualization of 'Center-Periphery Relations (1973) nor Küçükömer's that of the western-secular bureaucratic elites-Islamic –religious- people front (1994), both of which share a same view by locating religion as a tool of change or/and a source of opposition in society. However, generally, it can be said that the interviewees have based their views and analyses upon this approach. They have seen Islam as a just moral-cultural cement holding together this social group or community in sociological sense by putting too much stress on social, cultural, and identity elements of religion. In a sense, without considering how Islam has been politicized inside ideological-political structures, they have stated that such a perception of Islam has given direction to Islamism and the JDP politics. They have mostly defined this political movement as the name of a politics being shaped by a certain social group characterized as 'Muslims' who walk toward the centre, with different cultural and economic bases. However, they have ignored how Islam has been politicized with moral, cultural and symbolic elements in Turkish political history and turned into an indispensable tool of cultural-moral cohesion and political legitimacy.

I think that Islam has been a significant argument of the state and other rightist political actors by politicizing in ideological and political structures, ranging from the state's repressive and governmental apparatuses, such as the armed forces, law courts, police, politicians, political parties, parliament, to the ideological-political apparatuses, like educational institutions (schools, universities), religious institutions (the mosques, the prayer leaders, religious orders, or the Official Directorate of Religious Affairs as in Turkey) communicative institutions (TV, newspaper, radio), journalists, intellectuals, academicians. Therefore, it would not be possible to clarify Islamism as a political current existing in Turkish politics since the end of the 1960s without addressing religion in conjunction with those structures.

Considering the discussions in this chapter, we have basically tried to explain a historical-political Islamism appeared as an outcome of politicizing the moral, symbolic and cultural values of Islam. In the course of that politicization, such an Islamism has intertwined with other political and ideological elements, like nationalism, state, authoritarianism, anti-communism, and the like. With this aspect, it has also formed a basis for a nationalist-populist politics in Gramscian sense. Based on Turkish nationalism and a culture-based populism, this politics has embraced a religious-conservative and nationalist right-inclined mass and served to consolidate them. This mass, seeing Islam as an essential part of its identity, is a 'constituted' political actor within Turkish political history, in Althusserian sense, rather than a given situation of one class or group. It has rather strong nationalist, authoritarian, statist, conservative and xenophobic political dispositions. By grounding on such politics and mass, which has formed a major element of historical-political Islamism, the JDP has maintained its own politics and made it dominant in political sphere. The JDP politics has worked up its own Islamism into a part of the existing political-social order by bringing historical-political Islamism in a neoliberal political line. In a sense, it has provided historical-political Islamism's integration with the order in question.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

When starting to the thesis study, firstly, I looked at the discussions relevant to the JDP, and generally Islamism and its change and transformation. I observed that these discussions have both academic and intellectual dimensions. To be sure, the dimensions at issue are not disconnected from each other. Moreover, they supported and made important contributions to each other with their debates and analyses concerning the subject. They have provided a basis for forming a dominant perspective, which I termed as liberal approach in this dissertation. The liberal approach has dominated Islamism and the JDP debates and contributed to them with historically strong academic background since not the foundation of Justice Development party but the emergence of National View Islamism. I presented the academic and intellectual dimension of this approach by discussing either the academic literature or the intellectual groups, who I interviewed, in the chapter two. I classified those groups as liberal, conservative-Islamist and liberal-left or left-liberal. On the basis of a fundamental question, why did these groups change their views with regard to the JDP? I have posed various questions to the interviewees, who have been selected from the foregoing intellectual groups. The questions are related to Islamist politics, National View Islamism, and the JDP from the late Ottoman period to the secular-republican Turkey. In the consideration of the answer to those questions, I detected that there was a dominant approach behind the interviewees' opinions. I concluded that they changed their views about the JDP on the basis of the dominant liberal approach.

It seems that the liberal approach has two fundamental arguments, considering the interviewees' analyses and debates. The first is that there has been a political

cleavage between two actors, namely the secular establishment, and the religiously-conservative groups. This cleavage has been expressed by the interviewees under different conceptualizations, like centre-periphery, seculars-Muslims, and state-(civil) society. The second is directly interested in the reasons behind the cleavage in question. More precisely, it is most linked with how this religious-conservative groups are defined. The interviewees used two major concepts, culture and economy, when describing those groups. They defined a political actor by taking the given social situations of these groups grounded on economic and cultural positions into consideration. This political actor is devout-conservative groups identified with given economic and cultural positions. The economic position refers to a new middle class formation, capital accumulation, businessmen class, or new economic actors particularly composed of small and middle-sized enterprises. The cultural position expressed religious faith and morals, tradition, and conservative values and symbols of these social groups. Therefore, there are two important assertions, the first of which is the political cleavage, and the second of which is the definition of political actor based on culture and economy.

Considering these two arguments above, the interviewees made a description of historical-social Islamism. They defined this Islamism by relying on two fundamental concepts, like economy and culture. This description has a strong academic-intellectual literature, which I have tried to show in chapter two, along with the interviewees' opinions. Many scholars have made important contributions to this kind of an Islamism. The interviewees attempted at defining Islamism in line with the literature stated above. With this definition, they basically claimed that Islamism is a political current which has represented economic interests and cultural demands of the aforesaid social groups in Turkey. According to them, these cultural demands are an outcome of the understanding of the secular establishment's strict laicism. They have continuously put into words by the religiously-conservative social groups since the establishment of the secular Turkish republic. They have mostly originated from the construction of a secular-national identity, and secular-western cultural reforms historically erasing Islam from public sphere and social life. Therefore, the interviewees stated that these demands have a long history, reaching

out to the present from the first years of the republican period. As for economy, the situation is to change a little more. For, when emphasizing economy, the interviewees remarked that, for Turkey, the 1980s was a crucial threshold in the context of economy policies and economic transformation. Neoliberal policies, integration with global economy, deregulation, privatization, liberalization, and export-promotions substantially changed Turkish economy. Özal's economic policies and January 24 Decisions gave a new direction to economy from import substitution to economic liberalization. Particularly, Özal brought about long-lasting changes in the fundamental structure of economy. From the 1980s onwards, as economic structure shifted, new social classes and economic actors with religious-conservative dispositions emerged. These economic transformations altered class dynamics, and small and middle-sized conservative businessmen appeared as new economic actors as a result of economic re-structuring, which comprised privatization, deregulation, economic liberalization, and minimal state. Actually, when dealing with the years of the 1980, at the beginning of which the September 12 military coup carried out, it is required here to point out two important things. The military coup was the main actor of the change taking place in two significant fields, culture and economy, in Turkey. Firstly, in economic sphere, the coup was the most powerful leading actor that had initiated neoliberal economic policies and brought about the January 24 Decisions into force. Secondly, in cultural sphere, the coup's military leaders worked it up into an essential element of Turkish society and the identity of the state by politicizing Islam, in the sense of using its moral, cultural and symbolic aspects. From then onward, Islam was the most irreplaceable tool of social cohesion and legitimacy for Turkish state. The interviewees did not consider and interrogate political and ideological context of the change realized in these two field.

As a matter of fact, there is a fundamental problem in the interviewees' standpoint. It is that they ignored how culture, namely Islam, and economy transformed in political and ideological structures. For instance, in cultural context, from the viewpoint of historical-social Islamism, they saw Islam as a basic element of given cultural belonging and identity of one social group. They did not address and debate how Islam was politicized by both the state and other political actors in Turkish political

history. They did not regard how Islam become an important tool of political-ideological struggle and political-symbolical legitimacy in political sphere and the state apparatuses. They dealt with Islam as a given cultural situation, in a sense of being an essential part of a certain social group, regardless of its relationships with political and ideological structures in Turkey. They created a political actor, termed as devout-conservative, based on that situation, and claimed that there was a political cleavage between the secular establishment and this actor. Islamism has been a product of the political cleavage in question since its foundation in the late 1960s. In fact, it is a natural outcome of the interviewees' views which they grounded on their description of historical-social Islamism, at the heart of which existed the culture and economy and a political cleavage between the secular establishment and one social group with cultural demands and economic interests.

Likewise, this is the case for economy. The interviewees did not establish economy's connections with political and ideological structures. They expressed that crucial economic changes and transformations occurred in the 1980s in Turkey. In their opinions, these pulled down the existing economic and political positions in economy and politics. However, they did not regard the aforesaid changes and transformations' ties with the state apparatuses, in the context of state-class relationships, and with its ideological apparatuses on the basis of religion, capitalist economy and class domination. In other words, they never considered whether the state and its political-ideological apparatuses provided a basis for the economic changes and transformations given above or not. For example, as Tuğal (2009) has pointed out, there have been strong links between religion, Islam, and neoliberal capitalist system, in the pursuit of new economic actors with pious and conservative tendencies as a result of those changes and transformations in economy. Under the organization of MÜSİAD, these capitalist actors have tried to reinterpret Islam in the service of capitalist economic order, and claimed that Islam has been exactly in compatible with capitalism (Tuğal, 2009, Hoşgör, 2014 and Şen, 2010). Strong relationships have been founded between Islam and capitalism. Islam has been ideologically used as a fundamental means of providing class domination. However, the interviewees were not interested in these points. Rather, they cared about the

changes and transformations alone, which contained class formation, mode of production, and capital accumulation in economic infrastructure. They had a vulgar economist standpoint, regardless of political and ideological structures.

This economism has two aspects in their discussions. One is globalization, and other is neoliberal economy. On the side of globalization, the interviewees mainly emphasized the international capitalist system, financial world, global economic processes, and Turkey's integration with them. Globalization brought about differentiation, fragmentation, internalization, and individualization. All these gave rise to a change in the social groups which mobilized Islamism in Turkey. In those groups, particularly, new economic actors had intercourse with international markets and companies. They became a part of capitalist financial world and began to do great businesses. Furthermore, globalization as an economic variable removed them from being an Islamist and converted them into a religious Muslim or conservative. It created new identities and a global Islamist language in the groups mentioned. As regards neoliberal economy, the interviewees dwelt upon political actors and decisions more, putting neoliberal economic policies into effect. Most particularly, they underlined Özal's enterprises directed to neoliberal politics on the basis of privatization, deregulation, and economic liberalization. His economic liberalization encouraged urban growth and industrialization in small Anatolian provinces. Also, Özal supported small industrial production, composed of textile and foodstuffs, and accelerated capital accumulation and formation of new economic actors by opening organized industrial zones in medium-sized Anatolian towns and provinces. To be sure, in addition to the new actors of economy and capital development, Özal established a ground for emerging new professional middle classes, which consisted of conservative-Islamist bureaucrats, intellectuals, journalists, and columnists. In economic sphere, the aforementioned capital, that is money, was invested in education, culture and media. All these transformed politics and created new political elites. The JDP is a product of that political transformation, and also a representative of those social classes. Therefore, in Althusserian sense, we see that the interviewees have made a political analysis and conducted the debate with regard to Islamism and the JDP by reference to economic infrastructure and transformation alone, as a result

of neoliberal economy policies and global economic processes and developments. Given the Althusserian argument that an explanation, which has been grounded on just economic structure and changes without considering political and ideological structures would be nothing more than economism, I think that it is nothing but economism what the interviewees did.

We observe a similar situation in their discussions related to democratization. The interviewees disputed Islamism, but particularly the JDP and its politics, over democratization issue. They had a democratization assertion based upon political cleavage and/or struggle between the secular establishment and the religiously-conservative groups, which formed the backbone of the JDP politics. They claimed that the JDP was the most important actor of democratization. They attributed their allegations to democratization theories in recent years. These theories have two fundamental arguments. One is that democratization is much closely linked with development, which involves education, urbanization, individual mobility, and class position. The other is that international factors or forces played an active role in democratization (Geddes, 2007). However, I believe that the interviewees reckoned without two main points when debating democratization. The first matter is if the position that the secular establishment has had against religion, namely Islam, has shifted or not. The second is whether the religious-conservative group as political actors of the JDP politics, and thus Islamism, was a 'constituted' actor in an Althusserian framework. From the viewpoint of a historical-political Islamism, I argue that the secular establishment changed its attitude related to religion, Islam, and even accepted Islam as an essential part of the identity of Turkish state and stimulated religion as a tool of social cohesion and political legitimacy. Also, I allege that the foregoing group was the constituted political actors within Turkish political history, rather than a given political actor grounded on economic and cultural bases. Hence, in my view, this group was a leading political actor in the maintenance of the existing political-social order, not the realization of democratization, considering that religion, Islam has been an essential part of identity of the state and of class domination as a political and ideological means. More

importantly, it provides a basis for a nationalist and culture-based populist politics that engendered the backbone of the JDP politics and Islamism.

Generally speaking, all interviewees disregarded the historical-political background of Islamism and its successor, the JDP. Some interviewees have clearly put forward this by expressing that it is something wrong to reduce social movements to ideologies and confine to them. According to them, in the case of the JDP, society oriented politics. In their views, the result, which has emerged today, along with the party's changing political stance, was the product of a politics that, over again, encircles and polarizes society. We also see this in another outstanding argument expressed as Erdoğanism or Erdoğanist 'deviation'. They suggested it as the foremost reason of the rise of a nationalist, statist, authoritarian, oppressive, and exclusionist-intolerant politics appearing in the JDP's political stance. They expressed that the main reason behind the change in the JDP politics has been Erdoğan and his leadership. In the interviews, as far as I can see, the interviewees mostly attached this to 'leader cult' and/or 'charismatic leadership' which has been dominating Turkish politics from past to present. What is more, they propounded that the character of a leader can undertake an active role in politics, and ideologically and politically change one political party or movement's direction. Consequently, they completely personalized the political change taking place in the JDP politics by linking it to Erdoğan' character and idiosyncrasy. With this argument, they principally ignored political and ideological structures that, notably Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Islamist political actors and cadres experienced and historically passed through. They never cared about the political socialization to which Islamist political figures and leaders have been exposed. Apart from that, at the same time the leaders and cadres have politically and ideologically a historical background and identity that defines themselves and brings them into being far beyond a personal character. What generates this background and identity is the political and ideological structures in Althusserian sense. Thus, the ideological and political structures, which I have generally discussed from several political-ideological formulations/syntheses and political experiences to political socialization, in the chapter five, give form to political agencies and cadres and designate them. Political leaders and figures are

more historical-political personalities than a personal character. These personalities have been created in historical-political context. Therefore, it would be absolutely required to look at how they and their views have been shaped within ideological and political structures.

As stated above, the interviewees did not also address religion and Islam within political and ideological structures, except for political actors and cadres. They just tried to explain and debate Islam in the axis of class-religion in a Weberian framework, and social harmony-religion in Durkheimian sense. From such sociological viewpoint, they defined a more historical-social Islamism grounded on two basic concepts, culture and economy, regardless of political and ideological structures. Still, with economic and cultural bases, Islam is a politicized religion in Turkey. Culturally, it has been used by other political actors and even the state as a political-ideological legitimacy and struggle. Economically, it has been reinterpreted and formulated by the dominant classes in favor of capitalist economic order, considering the capitalist reinterpretation of Islam by new economic actors with religious-conservative disposition emerging as an outcome of neoliberal economic policies from 1980s onwards. To put it another way, Islam has been politicized as a tool of providing social harmonization and class domination in Gramscian and Althusserian sense. The politicization of Islam has formed a basis for the formation of a historical-political Islamism. Of course, it seems that the aforesaid cultural politicization has quite a long history, given the explanations made in chapter five. However, in economic sense, the politicization of Islam was actualized a short time ago. By forming a class domination, the JDP has been a significant political actor that has completed the economic side of that politicization. As matter of fact, as Tuğal (2009) has remarked, this is exactly the absorption of Islam in neoliberal-capitalist economic system. That the JDP has been a political actor originates from the achievement of such absorption by embracing neoliberal policies. It is not simply a marriage of Islam and secularism, of religion and democracy, and of East and West. Rather, the JDP politics and power are, I think, an Islamist political success that has economically carried out the politicization of Islam, in the sense of providing and consolidating class domination, by reason of the fact that the foregoing

politicization of culture, which has been relied on religious-Islamic components was realized before the JDP.

Accordingly, taking their arguments into account, what the interviewees overlooked is that there has been a historical-political Islamism shaped as a result of political and ideological structures in Turkey. This Islamism refers to the politicization of religion, Islam, by other political actors and the Turkish state as an important political-ideological legitimacy, cultural-social cohesion, and a means of struggle. The National View tradition, the most prominent actor of Islamist politics, got involved in such politicization in Turkish political history. In that politicization, there are two main things, culture and economy, which have been politicized. In Turkey, Islam has been seen as a significant cultural element of Turkish society and state with moral, symbolic and religious aspects. As a cultural component, it has been politicized as a tool of the realization of morally and culturally social cohesion, and ideologically and politically political legitimacy. In a more conservative form, those that first regarded Islam with cultural aspects were other right-wing politics, including the centre-right and the ultra-nationalist NAP, except for Islamism. Within this form, Islam has been accepted as an essential moral and cultural value of Turkish nation and society. We have seen this in the chapter five under a variety of political-ideological compositions –terkip-, and political experiences and struggles. In other respects, in a cultural-moral sense, the secular establishment, namely Turkish state, has played an active role in politicizing Islam. It has contributed to the politicization of Islam by turning Islam into a fundamental part of the identity of Turkish state and promoting religion as a cultural and moral element through religious education and other religious actives, Quran courses, in public sphere and social life. Thus, in that politicization process, religion, Islam, has become a significant part of Turkish state and nation. With conservative appearance, this politicization has provided a basic for a historical-political Islamism. This Islamism has gained a more nationalist, conservative, authoritarian and statist form as an outcome of the process, which has politicized Islam with moral, cultural and symbolic aspects in question. In the above-mentioned form, it has always been a nationalist-populist politics in Gramscian sense, at the centre of which would be Turkish nationalism and a culture-

based populism, like seculars-devouts, or Muslims-others. The political actors of this politics are a 'constituted' actor in Althusserian sense as a result of the politicization stated above, rather than given cultural and economic bases of the religiously-conservative social groups. In the context of my dissertation, this politicization, the importance of which comes from giving rise to the emerging of a historical-political Islam, basically means culturally politicizing Islam. In addition, it has an economic side. Within that politicization, Islam would also be a tool of class domination with being reinterpreted by the dominant classes, which have religious-conservative dispositions compatible with neoliberal-capitalist economy. In other words, as Tuğal has stated, this is absorption of Islam to capitalist economic order (Tuğal 2009). The JDP is a political actor that has completed this politicization with its neoliberal political-ideological orientation and policies in order to provide class domination. In this way, it has carried out the historical-political Islamism's integration with the existing political order. This way of Islamism expresses a two-way politicization. One is the politicization of Islam with moral, cultural and symbolic elements. The other is that of Islam in the sense of forming a class domination by becoming a political-ideological constituent of neoliberal politics and free market economy.

At present, the JDP is a political party that has maintained the historical-political Islamism, which has been a product of the politicization of Islam, outlined above. This kind of Islamism is a quite nationalist, conservative, statist and authoritarian politics. It has always been one of the leading supporters of the existing political-economic order. The political actors, who have supported such politics, are 'constituted' ones through ideological-political structures in Turkish political history, with nationalist, statist, and authoritarian political tendencies. The JDP politics has more depended on those political actors in order to continue its own political power and presence, and consolidate masses. Also, they have formed a basis for the JDP's nationalist-populist politics. This politics, which have had strong Turkish nationalist, moralist, cultural and symbolic bases, is a product of the historical-political Islamism upon which the JDP has built its own politics. What in general the liberal approach and particularly the interviewees have overlooked is such historical-political Islamism. They have fundamentally grounded their views on the given cultural

demands and the economic interests of the religiously-conservative social groups, and the political cleavage between those groups and the secular establishment. With this description of historical-social Islamism, they remarked that there was a strong democratic actor and/or dynamic to contribute to Turkish democracy under the leadership of those groups and their representative, the JDP. According to them, this actor would democratize Turkey by emancipating from the tutelage of civil and military bureaucracy dominating Turkish politics and society.

In contrast to the interviewees' assertion above, from the standpoint of a historical-political Islamism I alleged that Islam has been a substantial political-ideological tool of providing social-cultural harmony, political legitimacy and class domination by politicizing within Turkish political history. As a product of the politicization of Islam, this historical-political Islamism has obtained a rather nationalist, statist, anti-communist, authoritarian, conservative, and xenophobic form. The JDP has made a critical contribution to such Islamism by working Islam in the service of neoliberal capitalist order, and thus ensuring class domination. With that contribution, the JDP politics, which has undertaken the political actor of historical-political Islamism, has created an Islamism compatible with the existing political order and embraced it as a fundamental political goal for the continuation and consolidation of its own politics. Its political success is hidden in such an Islamism.

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## APPENDICES

### A.CURRICULUM VITAE

#### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: ERDEN, Özgür Olgun

Nationality: Turkish

Date and Place of Birth: 16 November 1981, Çorum

Marital Status: Married

Phone: + 90 312 210 31 22

Fax:

E-mail: ozgurerden1871@ yahoo.com

#### EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Ege U. Sociology	2010
BS	Kocaeli U. Political Science Public Administration	2006
High School	Eti High School, Çorum	1999

#### WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2010 – Present	METU Department of Sociology	Research Assistant

## FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Fluent English, Beginner German

## PUBLICATIONS

ERDEN, Özgür Olgun, (2015), New Middle Classes, Religion and Politics: The Case of JDP and the New Political Vision of Politicized Islam for the Transforming Positions within Class Structure in Turkey”, *European Perspective*, Vol: 7, No: 1(12), April, 2015

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## B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKE ÖZET

### AKP'YE YÖNELİK LIBERAL PERSPEKTİFİN BİR KRİTİĞİ

Bu çalışma, AKP'nin kuruluşunu takriben 2010-2013 yılının sonralarına kadar Türkiye'de hâkim farklı entellektüel grupların bu partiye ilişkin analizlerinin ve tartışmalarının incelemesine girişir. Liberal, muhafazakar-İslamcı, ve sol-liberal yada liberal-sol olarak adlandırılan bu grupların temel olarak bu analiz ve tartışmalarında neden bir müddet sonra AKP'ye ve onun iktidarına karşı eleştirel bir pozisyon aldıklarını sorgular ve araştırır. Bu tür bir sorgulama ve araştırmanın temelinde yatan aslında iki somut durum vardır. Bunlardan bir tanesi, güçlü ve hâkim entellektüel üretimleri, tartışmaları ve analizleriyle AKP'nin kuruluşuna yön veren ve önemli katkılar yapan bu entellektüel grupların bu partiye olan destekleri ve öncü rolleridir. Diğer de bir süre sonra bu destek ve öncülük rolünden tamamen vazgeçerek AKP ve iktidarına karşı aldıkları eleştirel pozisyon ve muhalif tutumdur. Ortaya çıkan bu iki somut durumun nedenleri araştırılan bu incelememiz iki şeyi yapmaya çalışacaktır. Birincisi, bu iki karşıt pozisyon ve tutumun neden ortaya çıktığını ve bunun temellerinde yatan şeyin ne olduğunu sorgular. İkincisi de bu pozisyon ve tutum değişimi ve onun arkasında yatan perspektifin/yaklaşımın ne olduğunu sorgulama ve araştırma esnasında geliştirilecek olan kendi bakış açımız ve yaklaşımımız doğrultusunda bu entellektüel grupların AKP'ye dönük yaklaşımların bir eleştirisini yapar. Bunun için de iki şeye dayanılacaktır. İlki, kapsamlı bir literatür araştırması ve tartışmasıdır. Diğer de bu entellektüel gruplar içerisinde yer alan birçok isimle yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelerdir. Bahsedilen literatür tarihsel olarak geç Osmanlı dönemi ve ulusal-laik bir cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan itibaren Türkiye'de İslamcılık ve Milli Görüş geleneği ile AKP ve sonrasına ilişkin bir dönemi içerisine alır. Derinlemesine görüşmelerde de bu tarihsel dönemle paralel olarak İslamcı siyaset, Milli Görüş ve AKP dönemine dair görüşmecilere çeşitli sorular yöneltilir. Böylece

söz konusu entelektüel gruplardaki değişim tarihsel olarak anlamaya anlamaya çalışılır.

Kısaca incelememiz ve onun söz konusu entelektüel grupların yaklaşımına getirdiği eleştiri, iki şeyi amaçlar. İlki, bu literatür ve derinlenmesine yapılan görüşmelerde alınan yanıtlar doğrultusunda bu entelektüel grupların yaklaşımını ortaya koymaktır. Bir diğeri de, bu yaklaşımın bir eleştirisini yapmamıza imkan veren bu çalışmanın kendi perspektifini ve yaklaşımını sunmaktır. Bu yapılırken AKP'yi tartışan ve analiz eden entelektüellerle yaptığımız derinlemesine görüşmelerde aldığımız yanıtlarla paralel giden oldukça geniş bir kavramsal çerçeve ve literatür tartışması ortaya konulur. Bu söylediğimiz çerçeve ve literatür, görüşmelerde sorularımıza verilen cevapların etrafında şekillenmiştir. Aynı zamanda, görüşmecilerin sorulara cevaplarından yola çıkarak nasıl bir kavramsal çerçeve ve literatüre dayanarak kuruluşundan itibaren AKP'ye destek verdikleri ve entelektüel üretimleriyle önemli katkılar yaptıkları ve sonrasında da eleştirdikleri ve karşı bir pozisyon aldıkları araştırılır. Bahsi geçen entelektüel gruplara ve onlardaki bu değişime olan ilgimiz, bu çalışmanın temel iddiası olan kendi perspektifini ve/veya yaklaşımını ortaya koymasını sağlar. Bunun için de görüşmecilerin sorulara verdiği yanıtlar ışığında kavramsal bir tartışmanın yürütüldüğü çerçeve ve literatür tartışması, bu çalışmada farklı başlıklar/bölümler altında görüşmecilerinin savlarıyla birlikte analiz edilerek bu entelektüel grupların AKP ve siyasetine nasıl bir yaklaşım geliştirdikleri ve sundukları gösterilmiştir. Ve bunun üzerinden de tarihsel olarak İslamcılık, Milli Görüş ve AKP'ye ilişkin kendi yaklaşımımızın ve perspektifimizin ne olduğu ifade edilmiştir.

Genel olarak, bu entelektüel gruplarla yaptığım görüşmecilerin bir sonucu olarak onların Türkiye'de tarihsel olarak İslamcılık, onun ortaya çıkışı ve evrimi ve AKP'ye olan bakış açısını liberal yaklaşım olarak ifade ettim. Bu yaklaşımın ayrıca Türkiye'de güçlü akademik ve entellektüel temelleri belirttim. Bu entellektüel grupların liberal yaklaşımı açıklarken hem kapsamlı bir literatür oluşturan akademik ve entellektüel temellere değindim hem de görüşmecilerin görüşlerini ifade ederken bu literatürle olan bağlarını tartıştım. Çünkü görüşmeciler, liberal yaklaşımın temellerini atan bu akademik ve entellektüel arkaplandan kendi düşüncelerini ve

bakış açılarını temellendirmek için olabildiğince istifade etmiş ve aynı zamanda görüşleriyle ona önemli entellektüel katkılarda bulunmuştur. Bu bize söz konusu akademik ve entellektüel literatür ile görüşmecilerin arasında sağlam bağların olduğunu göstermiştir. Onların arasında oluşan bu yakın bağı, bu literatür ile görüşmecilerin arasındaki paralelliği ortaya koyarak göstermeye çalıştım.

Liberal yaklaşımın temel çerçevesini, onun iki temel noktaya işaret ettiğini belirterek ortaya koyabiliriz. Ancak bunun öncesinde, bu yaklaşımın genel olarak temellerini atan bir ana argümanın olduğunu belirtmeliyiz. Bu argüman, dinin, İslam'ın seküler-laik cumhuriyetin kurumsallaşmasının ardından Türk siyasetinde en önemli çatışma alanı oluşturmuş olduğudur. Bu temel çatışmanın arkasında yatan şey de, cumhuriyetin kurucu kadrolarının dine, İslam'a karşı aldığı tutumun temellerini atacak olan seküler reformlar ve batılaşma hamlesidir. Bunlar dini, toplumsal ve siyasal yaşamdan silmiş ve dinin ve İslam'ın en önemli muhalefet odağı haline gelmelerine neden olmuştur. Laik-ulusal bir kimlik etrafında kurumsallaştırılmış olan cumhuriyet rejimine karşı İslam'ın siyasallaştırılmasıyla temel bir siyasal karşıtlığın ve onun toplumsal temellerinin oluşmasının önünü açtığı iddia edilmiştir. Liberal yaklaşım, bu iddiasını kendi temel çerçevesini de oluşturacak olan yukarıda zikrettiğimiz iki temel noktaya işaret ederek şekillendirmiştir. Bu iki temelden ilki, tarihsel ve toplumsal bağlamıyla güçlü bir muhalefet odağı olarak kültürel ve ekonomik temelleriyle beliren dindar-muhafazakar toplumsal grupların varlığıdır. Diğeri de laik-ulusal bir cumhuriyet olarak şekillenen rejimle bu gruplar arasında ortaya çıkan siyasal bölünmedir. Bir diğer deyişle, liberal yaklaşım temel çerçevesini oluştururken bir yandan tarihsel-toplumsal olarak belli bir kültürel arkaplanı ve ekonomik temelleri olan bu dindar-muhafazakar kitleye işaret eder; diğer yandan da ona göre bir siyasal karşıtlığın ya da onun ifadesiyle siyasal bölünmenin temellerini atacak olan laik-cumhuriyetçi rejim ile bu toplumsal gruplar arasındaki çatışmayı temel alır. Bu yaklaşım, burada esas olarak kültürel ve ekonomik temelleriyle öne çıkan bir toplumsal gruba ve bu grupla rejim arasında ortaya çıkan bir siyasal karşıtlığa yada bölünmeye dayandırılmıştır.

Yaptığım derinlemesine görüşmelerde görüşmecilerde liberal yaklaşımın temel çerçevesini çizdiğini iddia ettiğim iki ana noktanın ortak bir argüman olarak ortaya

çıkıldığını gördüm. Görüşmeciler genel olarak iki şeye işaret etmişlerdir. Bunlardan birincisi, ekonomik ve kültürel temelleriyle ortaya çıkmış dindar-muhafazakar toplumsal gruplardır. İkincisi de, bu grupların laik-ulusal cumhuriyet rejimi ile olan kavgaları ve çatışmalarıdır. Görüşmeciler, bu gruba öncülük eden ve onu bir anlamda temsil ederek rejimle kavgaya tutuşan siyasal aktörün de AKP olduğunu öne sürmüştür. Yukarıda temel hatlarıyla belirtilen liberal yaklaşımın çerçevesi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, görüşmeciler genel olarak ekonomik ve kültürel temelin iç içe geçtiği bir toplumsal grubun varlığına ve bu grubun siyasal omurgasını oluşturan AKP ile rejim arasında beliren bir siyasal bölünmeye işaret ederler. Dolayısıyla, liberal bir çerçeveye uyum içinde görüşmeciler görüşlerini temellendirmiştir. Ancak öte yandan da görüşleriyle bu çerçeveye önemli katkılar yapmış, ve hatta AKP ve onun siyasetine ilişkin olarak görüşlerinde ortaya çıkan değişimi de yine bu çerçeveye bağlı kalarak açıklamıştır. Mesela, bu çerçeve içinde Türkiye siyasetinde, belirtilen toplumsal gruplar ve onun siyasal temsilcisi olan AKP ile rejim arasındaki siyasal çatışma veya bölünme bir demokrasi perspektifi geliştirmeye imkan tanırken ve demokratikleşmenin temellerini atarken, parti liderliği ana kronik bir durum olarak belirebilir ve iddia ettikleri şeyler bir anda anlamını yitirebilir. Ancak, bu durum belirli bir perspektife -liberal olan- bağlı kalarak ekonomi ve kültür gibi toplumsal yapıları ve ondaki makro değişim ve dönüşümleri esas alan kendi bakış açılarını ve yaklaşımlarını geçersizleştirmez ve önemsiz kılmaz.

Söz konusu toplumsal yapılar, belirtildiği gibi ekonomi ve kültürdür. Görüşmeciler, ekonomiden bahsederken özellikle daha çok Türkiye’de 1980 askeri darbesinin ardından global-kapitalist ekonomik dünyayla bütünleşmek adına dindar-muhafazakar toplumsal gruplarda ortaya çıkan bir takım sınıfsal değişimlere, yeni ekonomik aktörlere, sermaye birikimine, eğitilmiş-profesyonel orta sınıflara ve bütün bunların temelini oluşturan küreselleşme olgusuna işaret ederler. Bunlar ve bahsi geçen tarihsel eşik (1980’ler ve sonrası) Türkiye için önemli makro değişim ve dönüşümü ifade ediyordu. 80-öncesi dönem sol siyasetin yükselişi, sağ-sol siyasal kutuplaşma ve sağın islamcı siyaset üzerindeki hegemonyasını sembolize ettiği için bu yapısal dönüşümlerin çok ötesinde birşeydi ve bu anlamda da fazla bir şey

söylemiyordu. Kültür derken de daha çok bu toplumsal grupların dindarlığı, müslüman kimliği, geleneksel-dinsel yaşam tarzı ve bu gruplar için toplumsal ve siyasal yaşamda dinin, İslam'ın önemli bir ahlaki, sembolik ve kültürel unsur olması kastediliyordu.

Görüştüğüm entellektüel gruplar, liberal bir çerçevede ekonomi ve kültür gibi iki toplumsal yapıyı temel alarak 1980 sonrası Türkiye'sinde ekonomik ve toplumsal dönüşümlerin sonucunda bu toplumsal gruplarda beliren değişime ve bu değişimle birlikte söz konusu gruplarda dindar-muhafazakar eğilimleriyle ortaya çıkan yeni toplumsal aktörlerin laik-cumhuriyetçi rejimle çatışmasına dayalı bir tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık tarifi yaparlar. Bu islamcılık, Milli Görüş geleneğinden AKP'ye kadar ideolojik ve politik yapıları gözardı eden tarihsel-toplumsal bağlamı içinde dindar-muhafazakar grupların ekonomik ve kültürel temellerine yapılan vurgu ve bu grupların sözü edilen temeller üzerinden rejimle olan mücadelesi ve çatışması ekseninde tanımlanmıştır. Bu çalışmada, görüşmecilerin Türkiye'de İslamcılık ve AKP'yi değerlendirirken liberal bir yaklaşımla uyum içinde yapmış oldukları bu İslamcılık tarifini tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık olarak tarif ettik.

Bu İslamcılık tarifi, Türkiye ile birlikte diğer müslüman toplumlarda yaşanan değişim ve dönüşümlerin bir sonucu olarak İslamcı siyaset ve hareketlerde ortaya çıkan değişimi yeniden tanımlamaya ve çerçevelemeye çalışan kavramsal-teorik tartışmalarla birlikte ortaya çıkmış ve gelişmiştir. Özellikle Fransız düşünür ve bilim insanı Oliver Roy'ın Siyasal İslamın İflası –the Failure of Political Islam- ve küreselleşmiş İslam –Globalized Islam- çalışmaları ekseninde ortaya koyduğu argümanlar ve bakış açısı ve Asef Bayat'ın müslüman toplumlarda, özellikle de İran'da ortaya çıkan değişimlerle birlikte yeni toplumsal hareketlere dayalı olarak post-İslamizm ve demokratikleşme<sup>27</sup> ekseninde yaptığı tartışmalar ve çalışmalar 1980'ler sonrası bu İslamcılık tanımına kaynaklık etmiş ve önemli katkılar yapmıştır. Elbette görüşmeciler, bu tür bir islamcılık tarifi yaparken doğrudan bu çalışmalara ve argümanlara atıfta bulunmasalar da yapmış oldukları bu tarifle bunların kendi

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<sup>27</sup> Asef Bayat (2015). *İslam'ı Demokratikleştirmek: Toplumsal Hareketler ve Post-İslamcı Dönüş*. Özgür Gökmen (çev.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

görüşlerine temel oluşturdukları, sorularımıza vermiş oldukları yanıtlarla çok açık bir şekilde ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışmada kavramsal bir tartışmanın yürütüldüğü ikinci bölümde bu hususlara yer verilmiştir.

Bu entellektüel grupların tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık tanımlaması, Türkiye’de güçlü akademik ve entellektüel arkaplanıyla liberal yaklaşımın bir ürünü ve sonucu olmuştur. Bu yaklaşım, Türkiye akademisinde ve entellektüel çevrelerde din, İslam, İslamcılık, Milli Görüş geleneği ve İslamcı siyaset üzerine oluşmuş olan oldukça geniş ve hâkim bir literatürün şekillenmesine de temel oluşturmuştur. Bu literatür, Türkiye’de siyaseti anlamının başat bir yolunu ifade eder. Türkiye ve Osmanlı siyasal tarihi üzerine çalışmalarıyla tarihçi Kemal Karpat ve din, İslam, dini tarikatlar, İslamcılık ve sekülerleşme alanındaki tartışma ve araştırmalarıyla sosyal bilimci, sosyolog Şerif Mardin bu tür bir literatürün oluşmasında öne çıkan, tanınmış isimlerdir. Bu çalışmada da hem görüşmeci olarak hem de atıfta bulunularak yer verilmiş olan bu isimlere daha sonra akademik ve entellektüel çalışma ve katkılarıyla Binnaz Toprak, Nilüfer Göle, Elisabeth Özdalga, Ali Bayramoğlu, Nuray Mert ve Fuat Keyman tutun da Cengiz Çandar, Etyen Mahçupyan, Hasan Cemal, Mehmet Altan, ve Baskın Oran’a kadar başka birçok isim eklenmiştir. Bu literatür, tarihsel bir perspektif içinde laik cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan itibaren (kısmen Osmanlı dönemi de dahil olmak üzere), toplumsal temelleriyle –kültür, ekonomi- İslamcı siyasetin ve bugün AKP’nin siyasal aktörleri olan dindar-muhafazakar grupların değişimi ve evrimini merkezine almış ve dinin, İslam’ın temel bir çatışma alanı olduğunu belirterek bu gruplar ile laik rejim arasında bir siyasal bölünmenin ve karşıtlığın ortaya çıktığını iddia etmiştir. Bu bölünme yada karşıtlık bazen devlet-toplum yada sivil/askeri bürokrasi-dindar-muhafazakar gruplar, bazen de laikler-İslamcılar biçiminde ifade edilmiştir.

Türkiye’de hâkim liberal yaklaşım doğrultusunda sözünü ettiğimiz entellektüel gruplar, 1980 sonrası Türkiye’inde küresel-kapitalist ekonomik sistemle bütünleşmek için gerçekleştirilen geniş kapsamlı dönüşümlerle üretim, sermaye birikimi ve sınıf yapısının değiştiğini ve yeni ekonomik toplumsal aktörlerin ortaya çıktığını belirtmişlerdir. Özellikle Özal’ın neoliberal ekonomi politikalarıyla küçük anadolu şehirlerinde kültürel ve yaşam tarzı olarak dindar-muhafazakar eğilimleriyle

öne çıkan yeni ekonomik sınıflar ve sermaye biçimlerinin ortaya çıktığını ifade etmişlerdir. Bu aktörler elbette sadece ekonomik temelleriyle tanımlanmamıştır. Onların aynı zamanda güçlü kültürel temelleri de olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Söz konusu kültürel ve ekonomik temellerin bu toplumsal aktörlerde üstüste çakıştığını ve bunun 1980 sonrasına özgü bir durum olduğundan söz etmişlerdir. Geleneksel ve dindar-muhafazakar kültürel eğilimleri ve yeni sınıf yapısı ve sermaye birikimiyle 1980 sonrasının bu toplumsal aktörlerinin bu kültürel ve ekonomik temelleriyle mevcut laik-vesayetçi rejimle olan çatışması üzerine kurulu tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık yaklaşımı, bu verili temeller üzerinden bir siyasal aktör inşa etmiştir. Bu siyasal aktör kültürel ve ekonomik savunusu ve talepleriyle dindar-muhafazakar kitlelerdir. Görüştüğüm entellektüeller, bu kitleler ile rejim arasında bir siyasal bölünme ve karşıtlık yaratarak bir demokrasi perspektifi geliştirmişlerdir. Siyasal olarak bu bölünmenin yada karşıtlığın bir tarafında çevreyi yada toplumu temsil eden dindar-muhafazakar siyasal aktörler ve onun yegane önderi AKP var. Diğer tarafında da merkezi yada devleti temsil eden ve askeri ve yargısal devlet aygıtlarıyla vesayetçi bir siyasal sistemi kurumsallaştıran laik-cumhuriyetçi rejim ve onun bürokratik ve siyasal elitleri var. Tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık, bu iki siyasal aktör arasında bir siyasal antagonizma yaratarak Türkiye’de siyasal sistemin demokratikleşmesini ve demokratik kurumların ve yapıların yerleşiklik kazanmasını bir siyasal aktörün (dindar-muhafazakarlar) verili kültürel ve ekonomik temelleri üzerinden yarattığı bir demokrasi mücadelesine bağlamıştır. Bu demokratikleşme yaklaşımı içinde söz konusu siyasal aktörleri bir demokratik özne olarak inşa etmiş ve vurgulamıştır. Türkiye’de vesayetçi ve anti-demokratik siyasal sistemi demokratikleştirecek olan bu siyasal aktörler önemli bir demokratik dinamik olarak görülmüştür. Bu demokratikleşmenin ve demokratik dinamiklerin liderliğini yaptığı iddia edilen dindar-muhafazakar siyasal aktörlerin yeni siyasal temsilcisinin AKP olduğu belirtilmiştir.

Hakim akademik ve entellektüel konumuyla bu entellektüel grupların benimsediği liberal yaklaşım, Türkiye’de İslamcı siyasetin toplumsal tabanını oluşturan dindar-muhafazakar kitlelerin ekonomik ve kültürel unsurlarının ve bu kitlelerle laik-cumhuriyet rejimin arasında oluşan siyasal bölünmenin altını çizerek temel olarak

bir tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık tarif eder. Bu islamcılık tarifi üzerinden de bir AKP ve İslamcılık tartışması ve analizi yapar. Görüşmelerde yapmış olduğu analizlerle bu entellektüel gruplar içerisinde yer alan isimler Türkiye’de dinin, İslam’ın nasıl bir siyasallaşmaya maruz kaldığı/bırakıldığını göz ardı etmiştir. Aslına bakılırsa bu tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık tarifi ve onun özellikle 1980’lerden sonra liberal-muhafazakar kamusal entellektüellerin liderliğinde Türkiye’nin siyasal ve entellektüel alanındaki hakimiyeti, İslam’ın Türk siyasal tarihi içinde farklı siyasal aktörler ve devlet eliyle nasıl siyasallaştırıldığını görünmez kılmıştır. Liberal yaklaşımı kendi analizlerinin ve değerlendirmelerinin merkezine oturtan liberal-muhafazakar entellektüel hakimiyet ve liderlik bu İslamcılık tanımıyla İslam ve onun sembolik, moral ve kültürel öğelerine dayandırılmış bir kültürel temele ve 1980 sonrası Türkiye’de global ekonomik süreçlerin gelişimiyle üretim biçimi, sermaye birikimi ve sınıf yapısında yaşanan değişimlerle ortaya çıkan yeni bir ekonomik temele odaklanarak bu iki toplumsal yapının siyasallaşma süreçlerini görmezden gelmiştir.

Bu siyasallaşma Türkiye’nin tarihsel-siyasal dönemlerinde farklı biçimler almış ve gelişmiştir. Mesela Türkiye’de 1960’ların ortalarından 1970’lerin sonuna kadar sağ-sol siyasal kutuplaşma ortamında İslam siyasallaştırılarak yükselen sol-siyasete ve komunizm tehdidine karşı ideolojik-politik bir mücadelenin aracı kılınmıştır. Bu siyasallaşma, dinin, İslam’ın her zaman sağ siyasetin önemli bir bileşeni olduğunu ve milliyetçiliğinden, devlet yanlılığından, ahlakçılığından, dışlayıcı ve hoşgörüsüz siyasal duruşundan tutun da otoriter siyasetine ve yabancı düşmanlığına kadar bu siyasetin bütün bu bahsedilen ideolojik kodlarıyla iç içe geçtiğini göstermiştir.

Türkiye’de İslam’ın siyasallaşma süreçlerini göz ardı eden liberal yaklaşıma dayandırılmış bu tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık tanımı ile söz konusu entellektüel gruplar, AKP siyasetinin bir dönem sonra (özellikle 2007 ve 2010 sonrası) tam da yukarıda sözünü ettiğimiz milliyetçi, devletçi ve otoriter bir siyasete kaydığını öne sürerek bu partiye olan desteklerini geri çektiler ve eleştirel bir konum aldılar. Bu çalışmanın temelinde de neden ‘bu desteklerini geri çektiler ve eleştirel bir pozisyon aldılar’ sorusu vardır. Çalışmamızın bu sorusu, onların bu pozisyon değişikliğinin nedenini ve bu değişikliğin arkasında yatan şeyin ne olduğunu sorgumuş ve

araştırmıştır. Bu entellektüel çevrelerden görüştüğüm isimler, onların bu pozisyon değişikliğine neden olan AKP siyasetindeki değişimi genel olarak parti liderliğine ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın kişisel karakterine dayandırmışlardır. Görüşmeciler, 'partinin liderliğini Erdoğan üstlenmeseydi, ya da Erdoğan olmasaydı yine de parti bu tür bir milliyetçi, devletçi ve otoriter siyasal değişime uğrar mıydı' sorusunu sorarak bu siyasal değişimin arkasındaki nedenin parti lideri ve onun kişisel karakteristik özelliklerinin olduğunu iddia etmişlerdir. Bazıları da bu değişimi, uluslararası konjontürel gelişmelere, şöyle ki Rusya'dan Amerika'ya tek adam siyaseti ve otoriter eğilimlerin gelişmesine, Arap Baharı'nın yaptığı etkiye ve dünyadaki otoriter eğilimlerle demokratikleşme teorisinin ve buna dayanan uygulamaların başarısızlığına bağlamışlardır. Ancak bu entellektüel gruplar, liberal bir yaklaşıma dayandırdıkları bu tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık perspektifleriyle dinin, İslam'ın siyasallaşma süreçlerinin yanısıra AKP ve onun liderliği ile siyasal kadrolarının tarihsel-siyasal arkaplanını ve ideolojik-politik yapılar ve süreçler içindeki deneyimlerini ve oluşumlarını analizlerinin ve tartışmalarının merkezine koymamışlardır.

Bu çalışma, tam da bu entellektüel grupların liberal yaklaşımlarının eleştirisine temel oluşturan bir tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık tanımını bu grupların tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık tariflerinin karşısına koyarak Türkiye'nin siyasal-tarihsel süreçlerini temel alan ideolojik ve siyasal yapılar merkezine alarak bir İslamcılık ve AKP analizi yapar. Bu tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık Türkiye'de Milli görüş İslamcılığının ve AKP siyasetinin oluşumunda aktif bir rol oynamıştır. Bunu ortaya koyarken de çalışmanın temel savı, İslam'ın Türkiye'nin ideolojik ve politik yapıları içinde oldukça kapsamlı bir siyasallaşmaya uğradığı ve siyasallaştığı argümanına dayandırılmış olan bu tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılığı belirtilen entellektüel çevrelerin göz ardı etmiş olduklarıdır.

Tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık perspektifimizle bu çalışmada Türkiye'nin ideolojik ve politik yapıları içinde dinin ve İslam'ın nasıl siyasallaştırıldığına odaklandık. Bahsi geçen bu ideolojik ve siyasal yapıların içerisine İslam'ın politikleşmesine zemin hazırlayan çeşitli ideolojik sentezleri ve oluşumları/terkipleri, siyasal gençlik örgütlerini, başka siyasal aktörleri (merkez sağ ve milliyetçi siyasetleri), ve devleti

ve onun kurumsal aygıtlarını dahil ettik. İslam'ın politikleşmesine temel oluşturan bu ideolojik ve siyasal yapılar, mevcut müesses nizamla son derece iç içe geçmiş ve onun siyasal meşruiyetinin ve toplumsal uyumu sağlama mekanizmasının temel aracına dönüşmüş bir İslamcılık yaratmıştır. Bu İslamcılık, Türkiye'nin belirli tarihsel-siyasal dönemlerinde farklı siyasallaşma süreçlerine maruz kalarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Tarihsel olarak Türkiye'nin ideolojik ve siyasal yapıları içinde İslam siyasallaş(tırıl)ması, bir din olarak İslam'ın ağırlığı gittikçe artan önemli bir ideolojik ve politik unsur olmaya başladığını göstermiştir. İslam, önemli bir ideolojik-politik mücadele aracı ve siyasal meşruiyeti ve toplumsal uyumu sağlamanın yegane yolu olmaya başlamıştır. Bunu Türk siyasal tarihinde 1960'lar ve 1970'ler döneminde çeşit milliyetçi-muhafazakar terkipler içerisine İslam'ın dahil edilmesi ve sağ siyasal aktörler tarafından önemli bir ideolojik ve politik mücadele aracı olarak kullanılması şeklinde gördük. Bu siyasallaşma sürecinde İslam milliyetçi bir form kazanmıştır. Türk milliyetçiliğinin ahlaki, sembolik ve kültürel temellerinin İslam ile yeniden formüle edilmesine imkan veren bu siyasallaşma, Türk milliyetçiliğini ve İslam'ı birbirinden ayrıl(a)maz iki temel unsur haline getirmiştir. Benzer bir siyasallaşma süreci 1980'ler ve 1990'larda da görülmüştür. Ancak, bunda İslam'ın siyasallaşmasının önde gelen aktörü devlet ve onun kurumsal aygıtları ve İslamcı siyasetin bizzat kendi olacaktır. Bu siyasallaşma sürecinde öne çıkan aktör devletin bizzati kendisidir. Çünkü Türkiye'de 1980 askeri darbesinin ardından İslam Türk devletinin kimliğinin en önde gelen unsuru haline getirilmiştir. Devlet, kurumsal-ideolojik aygıtlarıyla toplumsal ve siyasal yaşamda dinin, İslam'ın kamusal görünürlüğünü artıran önemli uygulamaları (zorunlu din dersleri, kur'an kursları, imam hatip okulları ..vs.) hayata geçirmiştir. Böylece İslam, Türk devletinin siyasal meşruiyetinin ve toplumsal birliğin ve uyumun en önemli aracı kılınmıştır. Bu girişimleriyle devlet, Türkiye'de İslamcılığın, İslamcı siyasetin temel siyasal vaatlerini de bir anlamda yerine getirmiştir. Bu yüzden 1980'ler sonrasında ve 1990'larda bir siyasal parti (Refah) altında yeni kurumsallaşan İslamcı siyaset yada İslamcılık, oldukça etkisiz bir siyaset olacaktır. İslamcılık, bu yıllarda ekonomi ve dış politikaya odaklanmıştır. İç siyasette din, laiklik ve kimlik etrafında gerilimleri

artırabilecek adımlardan uzak durmuştur ve mevcut müesses nizamla bu gerilim eksenlerinde herhangi bir kavgaya ve çatışmaya girmeyi reddetmiştir. Öte yandan parti bu yıllarda mevcut siyasal düzene karşı önemli bir muhalefet etme aracı olarak beliren ekonomik programıyla öne çıkmaya çalışmış ancak bunda da yeterince başarılı olamamıştır. Çünkü ekonomi alanında temelleri oldukça zayıf, eklektik ve anakronik yönüyle somut bir program olmaktan çok üstünkörü bir ütopyaı andıran ve hayata geçirilmesi oldukça zor olan ‘adil düzen’ vaadini bir slogan olmaktan öteye taşıyamamış ve parti iktidara geldikten sonra da söz konusu programın adı anılmaz olmuştur. Dış politika alanında da partinin öne çıkan batı-karşıtı söylemi tutarlılıktan son derece uzak bir siyaset olması nedeniyle oldukça etkisiz kalmıştır (Çakır, 2005). 2000’lerden sonra AKP’nin kuruluşuyla birlikte İslam’ın siyasallaşması, AKP’nin neoliberal siyasete dönük hamlesi ve liberal-muhafazakar kamusal entellektüellerin liderliği altında başka bir yönelim kazanmıştır. Özellikle liberal-muhafazakar entellektüellerin önderliğinde bu siyasallaşma, bir demokratikleşme perspektifi içinde İslam’ın liberal demokrasi ve neoliberalizmle bir araya getirilmesinin ve sentezlenmesinin bir sonucu olarak bir AKP iktidarı ortaya çıkarmıştır. AKP’nin neoliberal hamlesinin dışında özellikle bu entellektüel liderlik, İslam’ın siyasallaşmasının oldukça farklı bir vechesini ifade edecektir.

Türkiye’de tarihsel olarak yukarıda kabaca ana hatları çizilen İslam’ın siyasallaşma süreçlerini temel alarak bir tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık perspektifi geliştiren ve bunun üzerinden bir İslamcılık ve AKP analizi ve tartışması yapmaya girişen bu çalışmanın temel teorik hattında da Bassam Tibi’nin dine ve İslam olan yaklaşımı ve Gramsci ve Althusser’in siyaset teorileri olacaktır. Öncelikle belirtmeliyiz ki, Tibi’ nin dine ve İslam’a olan yaklaşımı bu çalışmanın temel perspektifi ve iddiası olan tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık’ ın temel çerçevesini oluşturmada son derece önemli olmuştur. Çünkü tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık, İslam’ın özellikle sembolik, ahlaki ve kültürel öğelerinin siyasallaşmasını ifade eder. Bu siyasallaşmanın aktörü sadece Milli Görüş ve onun İslamcı siyasal geleneğinden ibaret değildir. Bu siyasallaşma, şayet Türkiye’nin siyasal tarihi göz önünde bulundurulursa, İslam’ın siyaset ve toplumda öneminin giderek artmasıyla başka siyasal aktörler ve bilhassa devlet ve onun kurumsal yapıları tarafından temel bir siyasal meşruiyet, toplumsal uyum ve birliği

sağlamanın kaynağı ve ideolojik ve politik mücadelenin bir aracı olarak nasıl politikleştirildiğini gösterir. Bu politikleşme bağlamında Tibi’de temel olarak İslam’ın kültürel, sembolik ve ahlaki yönlerinin siyasallaşmasına dayanan İslam’ın politikleşmesi durumundan bahseder. Ona göre, bu yönleri ile İslam, zaman zaman muhalif bir siyasal hareketin temelini oluştursa bile, çoğunca meşruiyetin bir garantisi ve siyasal iktidarın aracı olagelmıştır. İslam, ahlaki, sembolik ve kültürel unsurlarının desteğiyle siyasal bir mobilizasyonu harekete geçirmiştir. Ve varolan müesses nizamının istikrarını bozmak yerine ona dinsel semboller atfederek onu meşrulaştırmıştır. Elbette, İslam’ın siyasallaşması sadece bu unsurların politikleştirilmesiyle sınırlı olmamıştır. Bunun bir de ekonomik boyutu vardır. Bu bir anlamda İslam ve ekonomi –kapitalist sistem- arasındaki ilişkinin yeniden formüle edilmesi ve İslam’ın bu tür bir ekonomik sistemin hizmetine nasıl sunulacağını ilişkin yeni bir durumu ifade edecektir. Özellikle, Türkiye’de 1980 sonrasında neoliberal piyasa ekonomisine geçişle birlikte dindar-muhafazakar eğilimli yeni sınıfsal aktörlerin ve sermaye yapılarının ortaya çıkışıyla İslam’ın piyasa ve kapitalist ekonomi ile uyumu ve birlikteliği önemli bir tartışma konusu olmuştur. Nihayetinde, bu tartışmanın sonucuna bakılırsa İslam’ı kimliğinin ve yaşam biçiminin vazgeçilmez unsuru kılan yeni kapitalist sınıfların ve sermaye gruplarının bu uyum ve birliktelikte oynadığı aktif rol ve Türkiye’de mevcut müesses nizamın yanısıra başta İslamcı siyasal gelenek –Milli Görüş- ve AKP olmak üzere sağ siyasetlerin neoliberal politik yönelimi, İslam’ı neoliberal piyasa ekonomisi ve kapitalist düzenle uyumlu kılmıştır. Bu uyumlu kılmanın en önemli siyasal çıktısı sınıf egemenliği olmuştur. Bir başka ifadeyle, İslam’ın neoliberal siyaset ve kapitalizmle uyumlu birlikteliği İslam’ı bütün sınıf çıkarlarını birleştiren temel bir araç haline getirmiştir. Dolayısıyla ahlaki, kültürel ve sembolik unsurlarıyla bir siyasal meşruiyet ve toplumsal uyum aracı olan İslam, bu unsurlarını kapitalist sınıfların hizmetine sokarak sınıf hakimiyetini sağlayan en önemli araç olmuştur. Bu noktada AKP’nin kendi içinde farklı toplumsal sınıfları bir araya getirerek bu sınıf hakimiyeti sağlamada önemli rol oynadığı görülecektir. Çünkü politikleşerek son derece hâkim bir ideolojik ve politik unsur haline gelen İslam, Gramsci ve Althusser’ci bir çerçevede bir sınıfın ekonomik çıkarının ötesinde yukarıda

bahsedilen unsurlarıyla temel bir toplumsal uyum aracı ve sınıf hakimiyetinin ana birleşenlerinden biri haline getirilmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın temel savı olan İslam'ın siyasallaşması bağlamında Gramsci ve Althusser'in siyaset teorisinde öne çıkan şey, ideolojik ve siyasal yapılardır. Genel olarak, her iki Marksist teorisyen de ideolojik ve politik yapıların önemini vurgularken toplumun sadece ekonomik yapıdan değil devleti ve onun kurumsal aygıtlarını, ideolojiyi, dini, kültürü, eğitimi ve siyasal partileri..vs. içine alan ideolojik ve politik yapılardan oluştuğunu söyler. Ve güçlü bir şekilde ekonomizmi redderek bu yapıların kendi içinde oldukça özerk politik ve ideolojik gelişmeleri, dinamikleri ve çelişkileri olduğunu belirtirler. Bu noktada özellikle devlet ve ideoloji meseleleri üzerine odaklanan Althusser, liberal bakışta olduğu gibi klasik bir devlet-(sivil) toplum ayrımının aksine devleti hukukun üzerinde toplumsal uyumun devamını ve sınıf hakimiyeti sağlama anlamında bir takım politik ve siyasal işlevleri olan bir şey olarak tanımlar. Ve empirizm karşıtı tutumunun bir sonucu olarak bu işlevleriyle siyasetin, üretim alanındaki verili bir toplumsal sınıfın ve onun ekonomik çıkarlarının ötesinde bir şey olduğunu öne sürer. Ve ona göre, siyaset ideolojik ve political mücadelelere dayanarak ekonomik yapıyı ve ilişkilerini şekillendiren bir alandır. Bu noktada Althusser için siyasal özneler de verili değildir, bu mücadelelerde 'oluşturulmuş'lardır. Bu mücadelelerde devlet de aynı zamanda ideolojik aygıtlarıyla 'toplumsal bütünün uyumu' için insanlar arasında siyasal ve ideolojik bağlar kurmaya çalışır. Din, bu bağların varlığın kanıtlar. İdeolojiler de din gibi bireylerin toplumsal yapı tarafından sabitlenen görevleriyle ilişkilerini düzenleyerek yukarıdaki bağları güvence altına alan ve toplumsal uyumu sağlayan benzer işlevlere sahiptir. Aynı şekilde, Althusser gibi klasik devlet-(sivil) toplum ayrımına karşı çıkararak Gramsci de devletin siyasal ve sivil toplumun bir toplamı olduğunu belirtmiştir. Sivil toplum da ideolojik ve politik mücadeleler aracılığıya egemen sınıfların hegemonyasının kurulduğu ahlaki yada etik bir toplumdur. İdeolojiye gelince, Gramsci bu meselede burjuva yada proleterya gibi tek bir sınıftan daha ziyade farklı toplumsal grupları bir araya getiren bir birleştirici yada çimento olarak ideolojiyi devletin bir kollektifi yaratmak için üzerinde hareket ettiği bir alan olarak tanımlar. Bu kollektifi, sadece ekonomik sınıfları ve çıkarları değil, milli,

dinsel, kültürel ve ahlaki unsurları içerisine alan milli-popüler bir oluşum ve kolektiftir. Bu, ayrıca Gramsci'nin hegemonya kavramını teorikleştirmek amacıyla kullandığı entellektüel-ahlaki liderliğin de bir ürünüdür. Sürekli olarak hegemonyayı yeniden inşa etmeye dayanan bu liderlik, bir toplumun temel ideolojik öğelerine hâkim olan entellektüel üretimlerin bir sonucudur. Sınıf ittifakı gibi basit bir düşüncenin ötesinde birşeydir. Çünkü o, insanların düşünme biçimlerini şekillendiren temel kavramlar üzerinde gerçekleşen entellektüel-ahlaki bir mücadeledir. Örneğin Thatcherizm, sosyal hizmetler ve ekonominin çerçevesini çizen temel bir kavram olan 'piyasa'yı popülerleştirerek büyük bir başarı kaydeden dikkat çekici bir siyasal liderlik örneği olmuştur. Bu tür bir liderlik ancak entellektüel-ahlaki bir liderliğe bağlıdır. Türkiye'de benzer bir durumu, 1970'lerin ortaları ve 1980'ler sonrasında liberal ve muhafazakarların entellektüel liderliğinde görüyoruz. Özellikle 80'den sonra bu entellektüeller Türkiye'de yukarıdaki gibi liberal-muhafazakar bir liderlik olarak tanımlanabilecek bir entellektüel-ahlaki liderliği üstlenmeye başlamıştır. Bu liderlik, Kemalist-seküler modernleşme karşısında dini, İslam'ı bir kimlik ve aidiyet biçimi olarak önemseyen ve onun ahlaki, kültürel ve sembolik unsurlarını Türk devletinin ve toplumunun olmazsa olmaz bir parçası olarak gören muhafazakar bir modernleşme çizgisini ve neoliberal bir siyaseti benimsediği için muhafazakardır. Aynı zamanda neoliberal bir ekonomi ve kapitalist düzenin savunusu yapan ve Türkiye'de din, demokrasi, laiklik, devlet, askeri ve yargısal vesayet, siyasal hak ve özgürlükler ekseninde entellektüel-ahlaki liderliğin temel çerçevesini kavramsal ve tanımsal olarak belirleyen ve akademik ve entellektüel bir arkaplanı da olan liberal bir liderliktir.

Türkiye'de sağ siyasetlerin siyasal liderliğine temel oluşturan bu liberal-muhafazakar entellektüel liderlik, AKP iktidarının yükselişinde aktif bir rol üstlenen liderlik biçimiydi. Bu liderlik biçiminin ana özelliği, temel olarak Türkiye siyasal tarihi içinde dinin devlet ve onun ideolojik ve siyasal aygıtlarıyla olan ilişkilerini göz ardı etmiş olmasıdır. Çünkü bizim perspektifimizde din, İslam, ve onun siyasallaşma biçimini ifade eden İslamcılık yada İslamcı siyaset dindar ve muhafazakar olarak adlandırılan bir toplumsal grubun sadece ekonomik ve kültürel taleplerinin bir ifadesi değildir. Aynı zamanda Milli Görüş İslamcılığı'nın dışında diğer muhafazakar ve

milliyetçi sağ siyasetler ve devlet için önemli bir siyasal-ideolojik sembol ve kimlik aracıdır. Bu noktada özellikle Türkiye’de dini nasıl anlamamız ve açıklamamız gerektiği hususunda Bourdieu’nun dine olan yaklaşımı güçlü bir açıklayıcı çerçeve sunar. Bir kere, herşeyden önce Bourdieu, dinin varolan siyasal düzenin meşruluğu ve devamının ve herhangi bir siyasetin sembolik inşasının önemli aracı olduğunu belirtir. Bourdieuan anlamda, şayet Türkiye’nin tarihsel-siyasal süreçleri göz önünde tutulursa, dinin, İslam’ın siyasal ve sembolik görünümünün daha fazla öne çıktığı görülecektir. Bunun arkasında yatan şey de Türkiye’nin tarihsel-siyasal koşulları olmuştur. Bu koşullar, Türkiye’de tarihsel-siyasal bir İslamcılığın oluşumunu sağlamıştır. Verili kültürel ve ekonomik temelleriyle sadece bir toplumsal grubun siyasal ifadesi olmaktan daha ziyade Türkiye’ye özgü siyasal dinamikler, antagonizmalar ve çelişkiler üzerine temellendirilmiş tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık olarak tanımladığımız bir İslamcılık ortaya çıkmıştır.

Bu islamcılık, yukarıda bahsedilen İslam’ın siyasallaşmasının bir sonucu olarak Gramscian anlamda milli-populist bir siyaset için de bir temel oluşturur. Gramsci, diğer sınıfların ve toplumsal grupların çıkarlarını ve amaçlarını göz önünde tutarak bu siyaseti, ekonomik çatışmaların ve sınıf çıkarlarının ötesine gitme olarak tanımlar. Bu anlamda, Gramscian bir çerçevede bahsi geçen islamcılık, milliyetçi bir forma bürünerek Türk milliyetçiliğine dayanan bir siyaset yürüten ve dindarlar/sekülerler yada Müslümanlar/diğerleri gibi ayrımlar üzerine oturan kültür-temelli popülist bir siyasal hareketin temelini oluşturan oldukça milliyetçi-popülist bir siyasettir. Ve bu siyasetin siyasal aktörleri yada özneleri bu entellektüel grupların liberal bir yaklaşıma dayanarak iddia ettikleri gibi verili değillerdir. Çünkü daha önce de belirtildiği gibi söz konusu entellektüel gruplar, islamcı siyasetin toplumsal tabanını oluşturan siyasal özneleri verili kültürel ve ekonomik temelleri olan özneler olarak tanımlamışlardır. Onlara göre dindar ve muhafazakar eğilimleri ve küçük ve orta ölçekli girişimleri, çeşitli sermaye biçimleri ve işadamlarını ve profesyonel orta sınıfları içerisine yeni ekonomik aktörleri ve toplumsal sınıflarıyla bu siyasal aktörler İslamcılığın ana siyasal özneleri olmuştur. Onlar kültürel ve ekonomik unsurların iç içe geçmiş olduğu politik öznelerdir. Ancak bu entellektüel grupların liberal bir yaklaşıma dayanarak öne sürdüğü bu görüşün aksine, bize göre siyasal bir özne

ve/veya aktör, Althusserian anlamda, verili değildir ve 'oluşturulmuş'lardır. İdeal ve manevi öğelerden uzak ve tek başına ve daima bir takım kurumsallaşmış aygıtlar içinde varolması nedeniyle de maddi bir temeli olan ideolojiler, bu öznelere gerçek yaratıcılarıdır. Özetle, bu Althusserian bakış açısından ekonomik bir sınıfa aidiyetin ve belli kültürel dinsel öğelerle özdeşleşmenin bir siyasal özne/aktör oluşturmak için yeterli olmayacağı sonucuna varabiliriz. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'de de dindar-muhafazakar kitlelerin, verili kültürel ve ekonomik temelleriyle bir siyasal özne oldukları söylenemez. Tam aksine, onlar siyasallaşma süreçleri içinde oluşturulmuş politik özneler ve aktörlerdir. Türkiye'nin tarihsel-siyasal süreçleri içinde dinin, İslam'ın politikleşmesinin bir sonucu olarak şekillenmiş tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılığın politik öznelere dir. Bu çalışmanın tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık perspektifinden yola çıkarak Türkiye'nin tarihsel ve siyasal koşullarında politikleştirilerek tamamen milliyetçi-popülist bir siyasete dönüşen bu tür bir İslamcılık sözü edilen siyasal öznelerde milliyetçi-populist bir siyasal bilinç yaratmıştır. Bu siyasal bilinç, Türk siyasal tarihi içinde başka toplumsal sınıflar, kültürel-dinsel ve etnik gruplar ve siyasal hareketlerle gerçekleşen ideolojik-politik mücadelenin bir ürünüdür. Bunun bir sonucu olarak son derece milliyetçi, anti-komünist, devletçi, otoriter, faşizan, zenofobik, hoşgörüsüz ve dışlayıcı siyasal içerimleri olan bir siyasal bilinçtir. Bu sebepten dolayıdır ki, söz konusu entellektüel gruplarda olduğu gibi, dindar ve muhafazakar grupların ekonomik ve kültürel temellerine atıfta bulunarak bu gruplar ile laik-cumhuriyetçi düzen arasında bir demokratik mücadelenin ve demokratikleşmenin olduğunu iddia etmek son derece zordur. Çünkü İslam'ın güçlü bir siyasallaşma süreci söz konusudur. Ve bu süreç, 12 Eylül Askeri darbesiyle Althusserian anlamda İslam'ın, dinin devletin en önemli ideolojik aygıtları haline getirilmesiyle zirveye çıkmıştır. Bundan sonra, bu siyasal özne ve onun politik bilinci, İslam'ın yukarıda bahsedilen türden siyasallaşmasının bir sonucu olarak sağ siyasal aktörler, devlet ve onun ideolojik ve politik aygıtlarınca sürekli olarak yeniden üretilmiştir. Dahası, 12 Eylül askeri darbesini takiben, laik siyasal düzenin resmi olarak dine ilişkin bakış açısını değiştirmesiyle nedeniyle İslamcı siyaset ideolojik ve politik olarak merkezin, Türk devletinin ve onun kimliğinin temel bir bileşeni ve önde gelen destekçileri arasında olmuştur.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışmanın temel savı ve perspektifi, İslamcılığın dindar ve muhafazakar olarak tanımlanan bir toplumsal grubun ekonomik çıkarılarının ve kültürel taleplerinin ötesinde olduğudur. Bu verili şeyler, İslamcılığın tarihsel-siyasal arkaplanı ve siyasallaşma süreçleri göz önünde tutulduğunda bu toplumsal grubu politik kılmaz. Bunun da ötesinde, İslam'ın politikleşmesi bize tarihsel-siyasal bir İslamcılığın olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu siyasallaşmada İslam, gerek kültürel-ahlaki uyumlu bir kollektife yaratma gerekse de hâkim sınıfların meşruiyeti için bir temel oluşturma bağlamında önemli bir ideolojik-politik faktör olmuştur. Tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılığı yaratan şey de Türk siyasal tarihinde hem sağ siyasetler hem de devlet için temel bir ideolojik ve politik unsur olarak beliren din, yani İslam olmuştur. Ancak, bunun aksine bu entellektüel gruplar, İslam'ın ideolojik ve politik önemi ve onun siyasallaşma süreçlerini ele almadan tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık üzerine temellendirilmiş olan bir İslamcılık ve AKP analizi ve tartışması yapmışlardır.

Özetle, bu çalışmada sözü edilen entellektüel grupların tartışma ve analizleri dikkate alındığında, temel olarak bu entellektüellerin İslamcılık ve AKP siyaseti üzerine geliştirdikleri argümanlara ve savlara odaklandım. Bunun yanında bu argüman ve savlara ilişkin olarak onların İslamcılığı ve AKP'yi tanımlarken ve Türk siyasal alanında onları konumlandırırken ne tür yaklaşımı benimsediklerini ve savduklarını ele aldım. Bunu yaparken onların hangi kavramsal çerçeveleri ve tanımları kullandığını ve hangi faktörlere ve değişkenlere bakarak İslamcılık ve AKP'yi tartıştıklarını inceledim. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, bu siyasal hareketi ve partiyi analiz ederken onlar tarafından ortak bir şekilde paylaşılan bir İslamcılık tariflerinin olduğunu öne sürdüm. Bu tarifi ekonomi ve kültür olan iki toplumsal değişkene ve dindar-muhafazakar kitleler ile laik-cumhuriyetçi siyasal düzen arasında bir siyasal bölünmeye dayandırılmış olan bir tarihsel-toplumsal İslamcılık olduğunu belirttim. Ayrıca, bu entellektüel grupların İslamcılığın dönüşümünü ve AKP'yi bu tür bir İslamcılık tarifi üzerinden anlamaya ve açıklamaya çalıştıklarını belirttim. Bu tezde, bu tarifi ve ona dayandırılmış olan görüş ve analizlerin ışığında çoğunlukla liberal bir çerçevede tanımlanan yaklaşımın bir eleştirisini yaparak bir tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılık tanımı üzerinden Türkiye'de İslamcılığı ve AKP'yi inceledim ve tartıştım. İslam'ın siyasallaşmasının bir sonucu olan bu tarihsel-siyasal

İslamcılığın oldukça milliyetçi, devletçi, otoriter, anti-komünist, muhafazakar, zenofobik ve kapitalist-piyasa düzeninden yana bir siyasal çizgi olduğuna işaret ettim. AKP'nin İslam'ı neoliberal kapitalist sistemin hizmetine koşarak ve böylece sınıf hakimiyeti de garanti ederek bu tür bir İslamcılığa kritik bir katkı yaptığını savundum. Daha da önemlisi, esas olarak bu entellektüelerin grupların görüşlerini ve bu görüşlerin temelini oluşturan liberal yaklaşımın eleştirisi üzerinden AKP'nin tarihsel-siyasal İslamcılığa, İslam'ı neoliberal piyasa ekonomisinin hizmetine sokma gibi, yeni şeyler ekleyerek bu tür bir İslamcılığın en önemli savunucusu olduğunu ileri sürdüm. Ve temel olarak, AKP'nin bir toplumsal-kültürel çimento ve siyasal meşruiyet aracı olarak İslam'ın ahlaki, sembolik ve kültürel öğelerinin siyasallaşmasına ve neoliberal kapitalist düzen ve piyasa ekonomisine dayandırılmış, varolan siyasal düzenle iç içe geçmiş bir islamcılığa yaslanarak kendi siyasetini pekiştirdiğini ve devam ettirdiği iddia ettim.

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### YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : ERDEN  
Adı / Name : ÖZGÜR OLGUN  
Bölümü / Department : SOSYOLOJİ

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