POLITICAL MEANING OF FRIENDSHIP:
THINKING FRIENDSHIP AS A WAY TO COLLECTIVITY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

GÜNCE HAFIZOĞLU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

DECEMBER 2018
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICAL MEANING OF FRIENDSHIP: THINKING FRIENDSHIP AS A WAY TO COLLECTIVITY

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December 2018, 121 pages

This study aims at rethinking the political meaning of friendship and interrogating the possibility of considering friendship as a way to collectivity. For this purpose, Rancièrian conceptualization of politics as an aesthetic matter and as a presupposition of equality is examined. It is suggested that Rancièrian theoretical framework provides insights for considering friendship as a community of equals and thus as a way to collectivity by bearing the original paradox of politics within itself.

Keywords: Friendship, Rancière, Community of Equals, Equality
ÖZ

DOSTLUĞUN SIYASİ ANLAMı: KOLEKTİVİTEYE BİR YOL OLARAK DOSTLUغو DÜŞÜNMEK

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MS., Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
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Aralık 2018, 121 sayfa

Bu çalışma dostluğun siyasi anlamını yeniden düşünmeyi ve dostluğu bir tür kolektivite olarak ele almanın imkanını tartışmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda Rancière tarafından eşitlik varsayımı olarak ele alınan siyaset kavramı incelemektedir. Ranciérci teorik çerçevesinin dostluğun, siyasetin kurucu paradokşunu kendinde taşıyarak, bir eşitler topluluğu ve dolaysıyla kolektiviteye bir yol olarak düşünülmesine olanak sağladığı ileri sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dostluk, Rancière, Eşitler Topluluğu, Eşitlik
to all my friends whoever they are
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Ömür Birler for her guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.

I also wish to thank Tolga Uzun for his loving support and encouragement throughout my study.

Finally, I am also indebted to all my friends who inspired me throughout this study with lasting conversations and sharing the whole life process with me.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims at thinking on the political meaning and the significance of friendship, thus the possibility of envisaging it as a way to collectivity. In the introduction part, the main motivation for writing such a thesis will be stated. To put in a different way, where the main idea of this thesis comes from will be at stake: these are mainly my personal experiences, and feelings aroused from these experiences. Afterwards, a particular kind of understanding of politics will be briefly presented. At the same time, the place of this type of politics within the contemporary debate on the political and the politics split will be considered. Further elaboration in the second chapter will be on the Rancière’s understanding of the politics as an aesthetic matter and a presupposition of equality. This will provide us seeing the friendship as a community of equals. The discussion will continue with how the political meaning of friendship has been handled so far; and what all these discussions imply us for friendship’s relation with the notions of equality, sameness, and the relationship between the self and the other. Finally, in the last chapter in what regards Rancière’s understanding of the politics meets with the political meaning of friendship and thus with the thinking it as a way to collectivity will be in our consideration.

The main motivation for writing this thesis is considering that whether we may think friendship as a political kind of collectivity/community to resist or struggle with the dominant political order. This concern dates back to the times that I was imagining with my friends building a commune/collectivity as opposed to the system in which we are living. I had always felt that being with friends has a special kind of energy or power to act in a creative, trustful and courageous way. Even, within our current condition in which nothing purports a feeling of home, security, trust and so on friendship seems as a significant way of standing together as opposed to both abyss of existence itself and also to the political order, and infusion of it into our lives.
It was the four years before I had begun to live with different communes in the Turkey. At the same time, in those years we were imagining creating a commune among close friends. Also, I have begun to get contact with various collectivities and involved in various networks of solidarity. People within these networks, indeed, rather than seeing politics as party-politics, tend to understand it within more wholistic way. In other words, politics has to do with the different realms of life despite apparent distinctions they are settled on. So, changing one’s way of life, creating alternative forms of living as opposed to suggested ones and hence being in solidarity with these kinds of organizations was for me a valid political action that cannot be totally reduced to escaping from the real. Still, they have a significance for me but I think that they must be questioned as opposed to implicit belief regarding being the most appropriate, pure or final form of struggling or resistance. Moreover, this may be valid for friendship too. Rather than searching such a desire for security as the political meaning of the friendship, now it seems to me that friendship as a practice or relation may share with the political some particular ways of doing, presuppositions and so on. Then, what kind of a relationship would friendship and the political have? Maybe there is no such an affirmative kind for relation or even would be a conflicting one, although my intuitive thoughts, feelings had implied the first before.

Soon after some particular commune experiences, the political meaning of these communes, which see themselves as an alternative way of living as opposed to what the political and economic system suggest, intrigues me very much. What would the political meaning and significance of such various attempts for realizing the alternative collectivities/communities? Shared experiences, values, and practices within these communes are basically related with daily life: creating alternative economies, and education models and so on. So, for most people, these efforts do not have any connection with politics as they are not in the form of conventional political practices (e.g. voting, law making process, political parties’ activities, partisanship and so on). Indeed, these are considered as simply being a kind of social matters, necessities to survive. Although I do not think in such a way, yet I have begun to question these communes’ way of struggling, because it seems to me that sometimes in these communities there is not thing fundamentally different from the large-scaled communities in which we have already lived. Most of the constituents of the communes that I partially experienced have ideals in their
mind regarding how a just\(^1\) world is possible. Besides, many members of these communes were involved in the realization of these ideals with their friends, or comrades. However, what is the meaning of being tied with friendship in such communities/collectivities? Is it just a kind of companionship that individuals accompany each other for the particular end? If so, then what is the difference between their political meaning and the conventional partisanship’s or comradeship\(^2\)? Or, does being with friends purport itself a political meaning without tied with any particular aim? By occupied with such questions, I did not feel as belonging to these ideals and their certain way of doings, although these communities/collectivities declare that they are open to anybody and they equally treat anyone as far as they are “similar” or sharing the common perception towards the life. Because of these thoughts and feelings, I had been thinking that if me and my friends gather together and constitute a commune, those problems aroused from encountering of different persons might be solved. Since sometimes I observed exclusion of some people because they were not same in thought or shape with the constituents of the communes. But, does it really differ to be with one’s own friends? Does being among friends, having been tied with friendship with the constituents of communities/collectivities differs in essence? Can we create different collectivities/communes with the persons who we tied with friendship to cope with the inequalities imposed on us by the economic and the political system? Or, is it condemned to fall short to its own claims of equality, being different mode of collectivity/community and politically hopeful attempt as an alternative to the conventional ways of doing of politics? So, in this thesis, the political meaning of the friendship

\(^1\) I basically appeal to the “just” with regards to the equality and this matter will be in our consideration in more detailed way in the next chapter.

\(^2\) Blanchot makes a distinction between friendship (amitié) and comradeship (camaraderie). For him, while friendship has an intimate kind of secrecy and distance, camaraderie is “essentially public and which stems from military vocabulary”; “Camaraderie is esprit de corps and tends towards an exclusivist collectivity.” (Critchley, 1998, p. 260). Therefore, in this thesis comradeship is taken in this sense and sometimes interchangeable with partisanship.
as a kind of togetherness\textsuperscript{3} will be in a consideration. However, this thesis’ focal point is not how friendship may help us to change the certain ways of doing politics or it does not offer us some amendments to the democratic politics\textsuperscript{4} is a focal point in this thesis. Though these may be also significant questions to be reflected on. Rather, why and how friendship as a togetherness itself would propound a political meaning has occupied my mind very much.

Moreover, despite having an intuition for the significance of feelings, affections of the friendship for the politics, this point remains for me very blur and conflicting to be reflected on in such a thesis. For example, joy and love within the friendship and their contribution to one’s energy to act politically seem to be very effective and fascinating. Furthermore, I tend to think that these, feelings or affections change one’s usual way of intention to the world hence changing the relations with the others. So, thinking on these matters seems to designate a political significance. On the other hand, traditional political concepts such as justice, and reciprocity seem to have meaningful relations with the friendship but rather than focusing on these I would like to focus another one, i.e. namely to equality. In doing so that Rancière’s understanding of the politics seems plausible because he tends to see politics not as a matter of government or, allocation of the sources within a specific way to achieve the just society. This would be police in Rancierian terms. In a very plain manner, for him politics rather is to show, to make appear the wrong that is done through the prevailing distribution. This is realized through one’s practicing the equality within the process of subjectivization. Although we cannot simply suggest that Rancière’s theory is one of the theories of the political because he abstains from defining the what the political is exactly. The distinction he made between police and politics still provide us means for consider him in this regard; at least for the purpose of understanding him via comparison with above-mentioned tendency. In other words, the split

\textsuperscript{3} I use the word “togetherness” as a form of collectivity. It seems to me that this word connotes a “gathering together” without falling into the liberal individualism by bearing the sense of collectivity.

\textsuperscript{4} “Democratic politics” is seen as a not appropriate usage because as it will be discussed in the next chapter, democracy is suggested as the politics itself or as the condition of possibility of politics to be from the Rancièrian viewpoint.
he made, I think, is fruitful for making a sense of obscured phenomena, which is politically out of the concern just because they are seen as politically irrelevant. Also, equality as the center of his understanding of the politics will be helpful for us when the political meaning of the friendship as a community of equals is at stake.

Politics has been mostly seen as a matter of transcendence without taking daily experiences into consideration. Thanks to the debates within the political thought/philosophy literature emphasizing the significance and the value of these experiences while not necessarily by putting aside seeking the truth, political meaning of singular experiences has become more visible and has begun to be seen as deserving more attention. However, there have been already such political events, practices, resistances, conducts and struggles without the importance of whether or not the theoretical gaze is available or ready to catch them within their limited conceptual tools. This kind of practices have taught me that politics must not be a matter of grasping the truth but a matter of aesthetic (aisthesis). While “aesthetic point of view” surely includes the thought on art, also it refers to “broader field of perception” (Robson, 2005, p. 78). That is to say it is a matter of perceiving how the things are perceived, allocated, and how we make a sense of them. It is a “specific sensory experience,” which is not the “specific capture of art by philosophy. It is not the catastrophic overflow of art into politics. It is the original knot that ties a sense of art to an idea of thought and an idea of community” if we use Rancière’s words (2005, p. 78). If we treat aesthetic as an “articulation between art, the individual, and the community” as Robson suggests by alluding to Rancière, then, this aesthetic way of intention must be valid for detecting the political meaning of the phenomena (2005, p. 79). If we attribute politics a specific site and a particular way of conduct, all other actions, practices outside of these borders have to be seen either as free from politics or determined by the politics. Therefore, we may need another approach for examining politics to see political
experience in a different manner. Perhaps a kind of distinction between politics and political is a necessity without obscuring the political meaning that traverses our daily life experiences as well as the conventional political ones. Personally, I need this kind of an analytical distinction for not creating an ontological gap between these hence keeping them separate but exploring the political meaning that can be visible in any kind of practices of human life as opposed to reduction of politics into the conventional way of doings or simply assuming that “everything is political”.

A tendency for this ontological interrogation that dissociates the politics and the political seems to be a not very recent concern for both political philosophy and political thought. Those who study this distinction also seem to emphasize political thought’s difference from the first. Since the second one abstains from attributing any foundational, metaphysical essence to the politics and the political phenomena as against to political philosophy’s manner (Bosteels, 2014, pp. 42-44). “The foundation of politics is… the lack of foundation, the sheer contingency of any social order. Politics exists simply because no social order is based on nature, no divine law regulates human society” (Rancière, 1999, p. 16). This concern regarding the split between the

5 Above-mentioned distinction is at the very center of the current debates within the political thought/philosophy literature and will be discussed in the next chapter in more detailed way.

6 Bruno Bosteels warns us regarding the split between politics and political in his afterword to Strathausen’s edited work A Leftist Ontology by saying that “two terms are not external to one another, nor should one all too hastily to be used to designate the superficially or inauthenticity of the other” (2009, p. 246). Moreover, he thinks that this split is related with Heidegger’s fundamental distinction between being and Being, i.e. ontic and the ontological. So, names such Lefort, Nancy, Badiou and so on is considered by Bosteels as parts of “Left-Heideggerianism”. Politics for such names are “the term for the ‘ontic’ practices of conventional politics while the political designates “the dimension of institution of the society.” (2014, pp. 63-66). The thing what deserves an attention, for Bosteels, is that “nothing is pure”, as well as the political that is tried to be disassociated from politics (2014, p. 66). Where Rancière stays in this picture is disagreement with this attempt to define what exactly the political is, for Bosteels (2014, p. 85). However, Rancière’s distinction between police and politics still, I think, creates not much difference from above mentioned names at some particular points (e.g. blurring the distinctions between the borders of the social and the political and hence politics becomes disagreement to drawing these borders) and this will be discussed in the second chapter more in detail.
political and the politics is converged with what the democracy is. Furthermore, this distinction, whether it is ontological or not, says us something significant about why we still turn back to the democracy. Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia experiences brought another aspect of the democracy to the agenda. It is argued that democracy bears the limit or aporia within itself. Also, this immanent quality corresponds to the blur distinction between life and politics, which may immediately involve into a totalitarianism (Agamben, 1998, p. 121). Some call this immanence of the democracy as “void”, “perplexity”, “dual body”, or “enigma” associated with “the rise of the social” or modernity (e.g. Arendt, 1998; Lefort, 1986). However, what is new or deserving an attention is how and why these assumed qualities of democracy are to be associated with the split between politics and the political.

For Rancière, this quality of the democracy (“dissensus” in his words) is in question even from the outset, and hence not a newly emerged phenomenon. The treatment of democracy as a regime that is derided by those who have an authority to govern in Ancient Greek refers to a paradox from the very beginning: the power of “those who rule are those whose only commonality is that they have no entitlement to govern” (Rancière, 2014, p. 32). In other words, this is neither a peculiar quality of modern democracy/politics nor referring to any ontological turn in our times. Indeed, this void or paradox is the institution of the politics/democracy itself. This paradox or in Rancièrian words “scandal of politics” cannot be

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7 “The social” and “the political” is conflated unconsciously and hence the original meaning of the Greek word politics has disappeared according to Arendt (1998, pp. 23,27). The social, for her, is a phenomenon that has appeared and emerged as a modern one in parallel with the emergence of the nation states (p. 28). The social corresponds to “neither private nor public” (p. 28). With modernity these two separate realms, indeed, “constantly flow into each other” and “admission of household” and “housekeeping” activities which are related with the life process itself and other realms which before belong to the political and the private are treated as the social now (pp. 33,45). Moreover, by this confusion, sphere of intimacy has appeared as the secret life of individuals and the social becomes the realm that administration of it is seen as both necessary and as a content of the politics (p. 33). “The emergence of society-the rise of housekeeping, its activities, problems, and organizational devices- from the shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred the old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of two terms and their significance for the life of the individual and the citizen.” (p. 38).

8 I use the word “institution” or to “institute” for indicating the politics’ way being, its own constitution.
left behind, surpassed or overwhelmed. Otherwise, mourning for conflated realms of the social, private and the political with each other leads to a need of a theory, which is based on a kind of purification of politics. This becomes “eviction” of politics, because of the fact that “democratic logic, on the contrary, consists in blurring and displacing the borders of the political” with the social and not associating these spheres to some a priori determinations (Rancière, 2014, pp. 54,58). Therefore, some recent arguments regarding the nature of the democracy, which refers to a paradox, void, or a contradiction, misunderstand the very institution of the politics and its intrinsic link with the democracy. Therefore, they launch it as distrustful and there arises a “hatred of democracy” which bears the danger of desiring to put an end to politics itself (Rancière, 2012, p. 76).

When these above-mentioned qualities of the politics or democracy are thought as newly emerged, there appear questions regarding the conditions that urge us to reinvent political-ontologies, and the possible advantages and disadvantages of these in relation to the idea of communism, democracy or to politics itself today (Bosteels, 2014, p. 42). Not meeting the urgent need of a new leftist ontology but thinking and acting on our relationship with the sensible again and again might be a more plausible attempt for both our theoretical capacity and practical needs. Even if we attribute neither a purified nature nor a ground to what the political is as Strathausen suggests, the constitution of all-embracing political ontology seems not having a final specific form (2009, pp. xxv-xxvi). This means that we may continuously try to find out an appropriate ontology that corresponds assumingly newly emerged phenomena

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9 Strathausen in the preface of A Leftist Ontology (whose editor is Strathausen himself) tries to elaborate why we need a leftist ontology today. He tries to identify what the political philosophy’s current aim would like. Then he reaches to the idea that without the anxiety of being labeled as Leftist or the Relativist, we must think on the internal (not external) limits or boundaries of the political as an ontological work (Strathausen, 2009).

10 By the word “sensible” I simply mean the phenomenon or the appearance of a thing or an event which is mediated by our sensory experience with them and with their interwoven relations within their ecology.
if we follow this path. Rather than this above-mentioned way, maybe a different kind of intention\textsuperscript{11} would be plausible for understanding the politics and the political distinction by not falling into the philosophical tendency as attributing an essence to the phenomenon intrinsically related with meaningful design or transcendental quality. However, “put[ting] essences back to the existence and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of [human being] and the world from any starting point other than that of their facticity” seems plausible (Smith, 1995, p. ix). However, this essence or the truth may never be reached and this interrogation may turn into an ongoing process. Furthermore, this intentional act may be understood as seeking an essence “as a fuel, gasoline that one put in a car” in Lefort’s words (as cited in Flynn, 2012, p. 21).

Why is the presupposition of equality as the politics/democracy itself in Rancièrian way used for studying the political meaning and significance of the friendship? Since it is understood in the Rancièrian way, which suggests that equality is simply here without any reason and it must be not defended but “reposited endlessly” without supplying any essential proof (Rancière, 2007, p. 83). Inequality not the equality must be rationalized for Rancière. Thus, the basic disrupt which institutes the politics is this endless reposited equality as opposed to the rationalized inequalities. So, the question is that would equality, in Rancièrian sense, be seen as the presupposition which belongs to the institution of both friendship and politics. Rancière may be not talking on friendship and its political meaning, implications but his ideas on “community of equals” may provide us some inspiring implications for establishing the link between his understanding of politics and friendship. Since, as we will see in the third chapter, friendship is imagined, thought as an ideal community of equals. For Rancière, “…community of equals can never materialize without some cement plugging the cracks of image, without some obligation to keep tallying members and ranks and retranslating the terms of the formula.”

\textsuperscript{11} The word intention is used in this thesis often as referring the particular philosophical school; namely phenomenology. For this school within “intentional act [the] world appears as an intelligible system of distinct and interrelated things” (Copleston, 1999, pp. 350-51). It means that the appearance of the phenomenon cannot be thought as distilled from this intentional act itself. It appears within this intention.
While he criticizes the “dream” a community of equals in general, he sees two conditions regarding its realization:

First, it is not a goal to be reached but a supposition to be posited from the outset and endlessly reposed. . . . The second condition which is much like first, may be expressed as follows: the community of equals can never achieve substantial form as a social institution. It is tied to the act of its own verification, which is forever in need of reiteration. No matter how many individuals become emancipated, society can never be emancipated. (2007, p. 83).

Therefore, friendship as a relation and practice by itself seems to create a process of subjectivization in a very common way to politics and community of equals in general. So, friendship can be seen as a kind of togetherness that may appear as a political action by its own dynamics. Of course, friendliness within the relations such as companionship, partisanship and so forth may be interrogated in this regard and indeed purports a political meaning. Also, some ways of doing can be inferred or developed from within friendship for “making politics more democratic”. However, despite possible importance of these approaches I would like to think on the political meaning of friendship through a different kind of understanding of the politics (without seeing politics and democracy as separated realms), and try to think on the political meaning of the friendship itself.

In sum, in the next chapter, I would like to investigate the distinction between the politics that we understand as a matter of governing, locating the things and allocating the sources properly, and the political that manifests itself when we try to intent to phenomena in a different manner. Indeed, this is a matter of “not inventing but interpreting” the phenomenon if we would like to establish a new relationship with it (Lefort, 1986, p. 262). Therefore, it may be significant to pursue the distinction between the politics and the political for expanding our horizon in order to relate the assumed different or distinct realms of life with each other. In doing so, especially Rancière’s understanding of politics (as he finds it quite different from “police order”) will be our focal point yet his theory will be discussed as one of the theories of “the political” for interpretive reasons. Moreover, names such Lefort and hence partially Merleau-Ponty’s ontology for understanding his student Lefort and partially Arendt by their original understandings of the politics other than of traditional ones will help us in this regard.
Especially, their “aesthetico-political” (if we use Plot’s words) way of understanding will help us to make a sense of Rancière’s refutation of drawing borders by defining what the political and the social is exactly.

In the third chapter, by considering the discussion on the politics and the political split, the political meaning of friendship will be interrogated. How and why it is considered as a politically significant phenomenon will be the stake. In addition to that, not assimilating friendship to the citizenship, comradeship, partisanship or any other civic type of relationship will be significant task for us. Since appealing friendship not as a metaphorical relation that is differentiated from what friends have among themselves seems significant to me for the purposes of this thesis. Aristotle as one of the key figures in the history of philosophy regarding handling the friendship as an ethico-political phenomenon will be also our main figure to appeal. Then, briefly Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s ideas on friendship will be mentioned. They seem to handle this phenomenon as may lead morally and ethically partial and discriminatory attitudes towards other. Rather they seem to suggest a kind of neighborhood for ethics and politics, yet they accept the vital position of friendship to make one’s life worth to be lived. After these two names, we will continue with Arendt’s ideas on the political meaning of friendship. She does not use Kant’s moral theory for pursuing his political philosophy’s traces.

In the case of the political meaning of friendship, Arendt again turns her face to Kant’s aesthetic works. She finds political value in friendship something related with aesthetic as in the case of politics. Moreover, her folding Kant’s aesthetic theory, process of thinking and political meaning of friendship together will open us new horizons because she associates friendship with the plurality, difference and hence politically significant as opposed to handling it as simply “Oneness”, “Sameness” or praising deontological kind of relationships in politics and ethics. Then, we will question the found hermeneutic value in friendship by Arendt by referring to Proust’s ideas on friendship especially. What kind of a difference do the friends have? Do we have to think these differences in terms of intellectual ones? What about the existential differences? Alternatively, does friendship under any circumstances assume a kind of ontological sameness? Does equality imply sameness? By asking such questions, our main purpose will be tackling with the inherent tension regarding friendship: That is a blur distinction between friend and the other. Rather than aiming at deciding or solving this tension,
seeing friendship as a practice by sharing the life itself (with the presupposition of equality) rather than of ontological status will move our discussion to the fourth chapter.

For the fourth chapter, thinking the political meaning of friendship, via Rancière’s understanding of the politics as suggested in the second chapter, as a community of equals and a very spontaneous way to collectivity remains to be considered. Indeed, Rancière does not have any study on the concept of friendship. Therefore, in this chapter his ideas on friendship will not be examined. However, via Todd May’s insightful reading of Rancière and the conceptual framework and inspirations that Rancière provides, friendship as a way to collectivity will be in consideration. For understanding the friendship as a community of equals the very term community as sharing or without a share will be discussed by the help of the thinkers within the literature such as Delanty, Esposito, Mentinis, Webb et al. We need this kind of interrogation because friendship is suggested by May as being one of the significant ways to resist to or struggle with the prevailing “distribution of the sensible” through the process of “subjectivization” and the presupposition of equality (in Rancière’s words) within a particular society. Through our previous discussion in the third chapter, appropriateness or inappropriateness of this suggestion will be considered. Can friendship really provide us this kind of “safe heaven” for coping with inequalities of the system as May suggests? To the what extent friendship may be thought as a way to collectivities/communities? Is it plausible to consider friendship as bearing inherently a political meaning, rather than thinking it as a kind of school helping us practicing for the politics? These are the main points that will be discussed in the fourth chapter. Finally, in the fifth chapter last remarks will be stated for the conclusion.
CHAPTER 2

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND THE POLITICAL

In this section, we will try to elaborate Rancière’s understanding of politics in the light of the discussion on the ontological interrogation regarding what the political is. As we introduce before, Rancière is against this ontological division marched by political philosophy and as such he tries to insert politics as challenging the assumed or drawn borders between politics and other realms of life. Nevertheless, the distinction between the police and the politics has indeed intimate ties with Lefort’s understanding of what the political is. Of course, this may not make Rancière the thinker of the political but at least provides us useful realms of comparisons to make a sense of his theory. Hence, to better grasp the relationship between the social and the politics and thus democracy referring to Lefort seems meaningful. He will help us as a medium to understand politics as endlessly blurring borders between the social and the politics, i.e. politics as a process and rendering the void appear within the symbolic. Of course, his teacher Merleau-Ponty’s existential ontology should be mentioned to understand both Lefort’s ideas on the social and the political and also to lay the ground for introducing Rancière’s theory of aesthetico-political.

Why within the literature of the politics and the political split does the Rancièrian understanding of politics purport a significance for reconsidering the political meaning of friendship? Rancière’s conceptualization of politics is thought as implying a kind of communism which needs no actualization of it as a program but still lets us envisage the friendship as practicing the equality. This implies a kind of new type of communism as a process. On the one hand, we have the basic goal of the communism, i.e. equality, in our daily experiences via friendship, on the other hand still we cannot grasp it a full-fledged model.

12 At this point by the term “the social” it seems plausible to understand Arendtian conceptualization which is explained at the footnote in the introduction section. However, on this original conceptualization of the social Rancière and Lefort add more which will be presented following part of this section.
Friendship gives us this basic process of the politics in Rancièrian way and vice versa. Moreover, he approaches to politics in a way that everything is not being politicized but everything potentially may appear as a political. These are the very basic reasons for why Rancierian conceptualization of politics is chosen in this thesis to suggest that friendship has a political meaning in regards to becoming a collectivity. In sum, his way of handling the politics, equality and communism is quite inspiring for rethinking the political meaning of friendship. However, because he does not say a word on friendship, by his understanding of politics, and community of equals we have to create a new fiction regarding his theory. Therefore, in this chapter we will be searching for such traces.

If we consider Rancière as a thinker of the political (although himself may oppose this suggestion) because of his distinction of police and the politics, then what would this handling provide us regarding his understanding of politics? Since, rather than focusing one's theory’s internal consistency and coherence (which is very significant and valuable effort also), I would like to see them as an inspiration to say something on to or expanding the way of looking to the concerned matter, i.e. friendship’s political meaning and significance in this thesis. Because of this reason before handling him as suggesting a kind of the political, first of all, it is significant to begin with his suggestion of politics as “an aesthetic regime” and after that explaining his understanding of politics as distinguished from the police order.

Rancière suggests three distinct modes of the distribution of the sensible which are “ethical regime of images”, “poetic regime of arts” and “aesthetic regime of arts”13. For him these modes are not equivalent to historical epochs. According to Rancière “distribution of the sensible” is “a generally implicit law that defines the forms of partaking by first defining the modes of perception in which they are inscribed.” (Rancière, 2014, p. 36). He characterizes “ethical regime of images” by its two main distinctions between “true arts” and “artistic

13 Rancière uses the word “regime” in a sense of Michel Foucault’s episteme which is suggested in the The Order of the Things and with his archaeological method which would be understood as that “[a] given distribution thus delimits, in advance, forms of participation and subjectivity, by first defining what is visible or invisible, audible or inaudible, and said and unsaid.” (Tanke, 2010, p. 5).
simulacra” which are defined by Plato. Rancière states that “art does not exist for [Plato] but only arts” and it is a matter of knowing in accordance with the certain way of life, ethos (2004, p. 21). In this understanding, ends and corresponding skills are significant. Moreover, as everything there is also place for arts, and persons devoted to arts via having the corresponding skills. For instance, “poem’s images provide the spectators, both children and adult citizens, with a certain education and fit in with the distribution of the city’s occupations.” (Rancière, 2004, p. 21). To Plato, artistic simulacra is not a very much concern or simply it is neglected by him; it is just imitating simple appearances as opposed to truth given by nature itself. Art is concerned by its impact upon parts of the city, besides it has no internal relationship with the truth for him (Robson, 2005, p. 83).

The second regime of the distribution of the sensible is “the poetic regime of arts” which we may call also as “representative regime of arts”. It is “a regime of visibility” for Rancière as it arranges a certain way of doing/making and “enters into a global analogy” in a hierarchical way; that is, being visible is tied with that “global analogy” which is done by the logic of representation (2004, pp. 21-22). In other words, art is seen in this type of regime not as an autonomous but belonging to the general realm of techne, hence treated as certain way of imitation (Robson, 2005, p. 86). Thus, the artwork in here still judged regarding its appropriateness to the certain way of doing/making; it is again as in the case of “ethical regime of arts” disassociated from the truth itself (Robson, 2005, p. 86).

Lastly, he mentions “an aesthetic regime of arts” which is “based on distinguishing a sensible mode of being specific to artistic products” (Rancière, 2004, p. 22). Aesthetic regime of arts frees art from certain way of doing/making, rules (hence gains a kind of autonomy) and “strictly identifies art with singular”; i.e. by giving reference to Kant and Schiller14, Rancière says that

14 In Kant’s “Critique of Judgement”, aesthetic is not a branch of the philosophy that examines the art work. Art conduces or forces the philosophy to open itself to the world that is outside of its conceptual determinations, i.e. to the realm that it cannot dominate and hence this is the where the political and aesthetic meet and cannot be thought as belonging to the political philosophy easily. By Romanticism in philosophy (with the great influence of Kant), particularly with Schiller, the aesthetic has been treated as perception regarding the relationship between art, individual and the community rather than its narrow
in this regime “form is experienced for itself” (2004, p. 23). “Insisting exclusively upon art’s autonomy turns it into mere art; denying the differences between the aesthetic experience and the practices of life turns into mere life” (Tanke, 2010, p. 10). There is no attempt for tampering the art for its any specific relation with the source or represented object in order to understanding its relation with the truth. Rather, the emphasis is on the way of getting related with the art, the way of perceiving the things, and internal relationship between this immediate relationship and the world that is assumed as outside the aesthetic.

Following Rancière’s conceptualization regarding the distribution of the sensible, it is necessary to examine his, yet again, tri-partite division of politics. Although the three modes of politics seem to correspond to the three modes of the distribution of the sensible, Rancière warns us against such a tendency. Since he is strictly against the linear understanding of time (Rancière, 2004, pp. 24-25; Tanke, 2010, p. 4). Otherwise, each regimes of art would correspond to the particular approach to the politics exclusively according to the time sequence in which they appear. However, these all may coexist according to Rancière. These three tendencies of handling the politics are namely “archi-politics”, “meta-politics”, and “para-politics”. According to Rancière, these have inner relations with the regimes of “distribution of the sensible”. Of course, it would be wrong to argue that these three distinct categories of politics and modes regarding the distribution of the sensible correspond to each other in an exclusive way. Rather for Rancière, these different ways of perceiving politics and the sensible indeed have similar effects on life because there is a misunderstanding or reduction about the relationship of politics and appearance. Although they seem at first sight different from each other, they indeed share the very core. For him, a “desire to establish harmony between names and things” is common to all (1999, p. 107).

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sense as examining the artwork. (Robson, 2005, pp. 78,79). So, this turns out to be a mainly discussion on the perception of the sensible, i.e. aisthesis, and overcoming of the restricted relation with life via artwork but interrogating the perception of the sensible and revealing the inner relationship between aisthesis and the community, collectivity hence the political.
“Archi-politics” may be seen as related with “ethical regime of images” which ignores appearances or sees them as mask but pursues the real behind them. Art is seen as having no autonomy in this regime: “[Art works] are viewed as images to be questioned for their truth and for their effect on the ethos of individuals and the community” (Corcoran, 2014, p. 15). Plato’s political philosophy and his Republic is suggested as the perfect example of this type of understanding by Rancière. For him, Plato is not merely the founder of archi-politics because he created a kind of “ideal city life” but also “the anthropological conception of the political” which is “identified with the deployment of the properties of a type of man or a mode of life” (Rancière, 2014, p. 41). That is, there is a kind of desire to build society on the single foundation and thus distributing the places, occupations or functions of the people in compliance with this foundation or ethos. Rancière explains arkhè as following:

An arkhè is two things: it is a theoretical principle entailing a clear distribution of positions and capacities, grounding the distribution of power between ruler and the ruled; and it is a temporal beginning entailing that the fact of ruling is anticipated in the disposition to rule and, conversely, that the evidence of this disposition is given by the fact of its empirical operation. (2014, p. 51).

At this point, archi-politics appears as “the antipolitical dream of a hierarchical, good, geometric order” (Plot, 2014, p. 100). Indeed, this desire to end politics is common with the “meta-politics” because both of them, in a way, look for the truth behind appearances. Both of these tendencies of handling the politics establish an opposition between these two. Politics for them is about having a grasp of the real and deciphering the mask that reality takes by appearing in different forms. This explanation may be seen as an exaggeration but the appearance is seen as mere illusion for instance in Marx’s “Jewish Question”, in Arendt’s “Perplexities of the Rights of Man”. There is an “obsession” with the “true subject of the rights of man”, i.e. truth regarding the subject of representation, one to one correspondence to this category (i.e. correspondence with the form and the content) (Lefort, 1986, p. 252). Their aim or motivation is of course different. Marx himself is critical to such disposition. While in Plato (or in archi-politics) there is a suggestion of harmony and equation between the name and the thing, in Marx (i.e. meta-politics) there is an attempt for deciphering of an entanglement of representation with false appearances that cover the reality. Then it is quite clear that in meta-politics there is a disturbance or an obsession with the representative relation’s non-
correspondence with reality. This means for Rancière that for “meta-politics” “if there is two subject, one of them must be fake” (2014, p. 56). Representation cannot exhaust all meanings of a thing through collapsing the distinction between name and the thing. It always bears a paradox, void within itself. According to Rancière this paradox is not the thing that must be solved. Indeed, this is what the institution of the politics is. Lastly, in para-politics, this time we face with the loss of the meaning of appearance although things seem to be free from obscurity and the yoke of representation:

[T]he regime of the all-visible, of the endless presentation to each and every one of us of a real indissociable from its image, is not the liberation of appearance but its loss, the loss of the real is in fact a loss of appearance and case. (Rancière, 1999, pp. 103-104).

In other words, for Rancière, “the reign of simulation” and the motto that “everything is fiction” refers to Plato’s archi-politics’ paradoxical realization since “the equality of anyone and everyone becomes identical to the total distribution of the people into its parts and sub-parts.” (1999, p. 105). All these, for Rancière, mean that liberation of appearances indeed does not mean forgoing about reality. Of course, he does not attempt to grasp the reality in a concrete sense nor does he try to conceptualize politics with the help of the duality of form and content. Rather he seems to suggest another one, which oscillates beyond those. Rancière sees politics and action within and for equal intelligence of all but not as a matter of reality. Nevertheless, he suggests that putting aside the real is also a loss of politics because not equating actual human condition with politics but the very impossibility of equating these, i.e. appearance/form of expression and the real, is the politics itself and what demos means. In other words, it is a bearing of two bodies and affirmation of a claim of equal intelligence of all in each instance and case. Appearance, for Rancière, is an “introduction of a visible into the field of experience. It is not opposed to reality. It splits reality and reconfigures it as double.” (1999, p. 99). So, for Rancière those people who are occupying the site of appearances do “not coincide with the parties of the state and society but [they are] floating subjects that deregulate all representation of places and portions.” (1999, p. 99). He suggests democracy as “a way for politics to be”; it is for Rancière “politics’ mode of subjectivization, the name of a singular disruption of the order of distribution of bodies as community/police” (1999, p. 99). As opposed to archi-politics
and meta-politics, Rancière is against seeking the meaning of the democracy and politics within the duality of the relationship between real and appearance/illusion. Moreover, he refuses the para-politics’ identification of everything with fiction and hence loss of real. Rather he seems trying to show the meaning of politics, democracy, singularity, and the process of subjectivization. Perhaps, he is doing this with the help of the liberating effects of para-politics through its relation with the aesthetic regime of arts which frees the images, art works from the underlying meaning and design, thus, treats them as a singular experience. However as opposed to para-politics, he is doing that neither by refusing the so-called reality or holding on to the reign of names that refuses things.

2.1 Rancière as a Thinker of the Political: Thinking Rancière with Claude Lefort

Lefort as thinker of the political\(^\text{15}\), rather than focusing on and seeing the state and its functions as the political, suggests looking to the institution of the social and its relationship with the representative/symbolic order to perceive the political. For him, the very institution of the social itself, which cannot come to the particular definition(s)/name(s) without gaps, voids, gives us the sentiments to understand the political. The social is never equal to itself hence an understanding of world can be done only symbolically and the political arouse from this oscillation between the concrete and the symbolic order (Doucet, 2013, pp. 161-164). Since

\(^{15}\) Lefort suggests a separation between the social and the political which is different than the Arendtian way. For him this distinction emerges as a modern phenomenon but the duality between “institution of the social” (i.e. non-political social) and “discourse on the social” (represented social) condition the indeterminacy of modern democratic politics and the political itself as a phenomenon (Singer, 2006, pp. 88,89). By the term the social, he designates a phenomenological interrogation to its being and he concludes, by the influence from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, that “society is not closed on itself, that its identity makes a reference to an outside” (Flynn, 2008, p. 223). The social for him is not a body, always within an indeterminate shape and internal conflict so that he borrows from Merleau-Ponty the term “flesh of the social” which suggests a kind of shift from determinate shape to plurality of divisions not the single and the essential one (Gerçek, 2017, p. 5).
difference and alterity for Lefort do not meet the mere divisions/conflicts within the social but they refer to distinction within the political level (Mazzocchi, 2013, p. 35). The political, for him, must be distinguished from the way of governing the interests, conflicts between the parts of the social, which are seen as social unities. Rather, it is a regime that can make visible these pre-political cracks by rising above these (Gerçek, 2017, p. 3; Mazzocchi, 2013, p. 32). Lefort sees democracy as a “form of society” and a sole regime, which cannot be assimilated by any specific relation of power. It is indeed condemned to be indeterminate for it conditions the equal visibility of all without any reduction; society is “uncircumscribable” and the political may come to the fore by the appearance of any kind of difference within the institution of the social itself (1986, p. 256). Lefort seems to understand the political as only conditioned by indeterminacy, void, paradox of the democracy, which always “works against itself” and this reversibility (if to use Merleau-Ponty’s word) follows the institution of the social itself. Moreover, this indeterminacy is valid for the relationship between the power and the other spheres of life such that the latter cannot be absorbed by the former even if this is intended to do so. On the other hand, this never implies that there is a complete break among these (Lefort, 1986, p. 255). In Lefort’s understanding of the political, the necessary disembodiment of the power and other realms of life allow the emergence of a scene that makes differences, pluralities perceivable and “to catch a glimpse of a dimension of the social space which is generally obscured” by the state-centered understanding of the politics (Lefort, 1986, p. 270). It is quite clear that unlike, some ontological turn theoreticians do, he does not suggest that “everything is political” which blurs the limits of the social/political phenomena to reflect upon. However, he still agrees with some other theoreticians of totalitarianism (such as Arendt)

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16 This term is very central to the Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the perception and mainly refers to multifaced alterity (Mazzocchi, 2013, p. 23). He suggests reversibility of the visible from being an object of the perception and “reciprocates with the subject” and thus we cannot mention subject’s intentional act to the object to grasp it wholly but the assumed object also, indeed, shares and conditions this intentional act together with the other (Gerçek, 2017, pp. 7-8). This is his understanding, an ontological interrogation regarding the world, and in our case institution of the social. Therefore, in his understanding, there is always indeterminacy, reversibility within the relations of the world which implies us a kind of openness, abundance of conditions or situations for “new collective beginnings” (Gerçek, 2017, p. 14).
to the extent with the idea that a danger of totalitarianism is aroused if there is no distinction between which is public and which is not (1988, p. 48). However, for Lefort, drawing the clear-cut and authentic/ontological distinctions between what is public and what is private- in a sense- means creating a kind of irreversibility that dismisses the effect of the symbolic, political deed/action onto the real. He writes that “Arendt, for her part, suggests that even if politics, as she understands politics, can no longer embodied in the real, it is still politics” (Lefort, 1988, pp. 49,55).

Moreover, according to Lefort the above-mentioned type of understanding the politics implies us “a radical understanding” in which politics “either exists or does not exists” and “…is the sign of a radical beginning and, moreover it appears and then disappears without a trace” (1988, p. 54). As opposed to this kind of understanding, Lefort suggests that

[T]he political is thus revealed. . , in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of society appears and is obscured. It appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and unified across its divisions become visible. (1988, p. 11).

Hence, for Lefort politics, i.e. modern democracy, bears the paradox within itself that never lets society’s closure upon itself. Therefore, rather than “society’s identification of with itself” or “closing of the social around itself” if we use Lefort’s words, there appear different forms of expression within conflict over the very count of parties. “The body never decisively achieves its own closure. At most, the closure is a temporal closure always threatened by the indeterminacy of the body-in-the-world.” (Gerçek, 2017, p. 11).

Lefort sees modern democracy as emerged by “the historical mutation” that leads to the disincorporation between king’s natural and divine body, i.e. dissolution of his unity and thus divine source of legitimacy. For him modern democracy no longer refers to an order of the “theologico-political” or unitary “body politics” where power, knowledge, and rights necessarily overlap and refer to a sacred source of power (Flynn, 2012, pp. 20-21). Because this disincorporation occurred, all absolute claims for legitimate use of power, indeed, fall to be an imaginary relationship with the world. Now, the political is a sheer indeterminacy and “conflict traverses democratic society” for him (Bataillon, 2013, p. 98). Yet seeing the political
emancipation different from Marx is crucial according to Lefort: “It is better to talk on political emancipation not as if it were a moment of political illusion but rather as an unprecedented event constituted by this separation.” (1988, p. 255). Modern democracy is rather a scene that cannot be assimilated by any specific relation or place of power and it is indeed condemned to be indeterminate. Thanks to this “empty place of power” we cannot mention covering the conflicts, diversities, and pluralities within society but this emptiness makes them visible without any reason in doing so (Weymans, 2012, p. 70). For Rancière this type of disincorporation is not the essence of politics/democracy and this void that is appeared after assumingly disincorporation of king’s two body is not specific to modern age. Rather democracy, which traverses the king’s body in two, is in fact the politics itself and it does not emerge from the split of the sovereign’s body but it belongs to the community itself from the very beginning (Rancière, 2014, p. 34). Because of his phenomenological investigation, Lefort has a different understanding from that of Rancière’s whose suggestion maybe seen as ahistorical in comparison to Lefort’s analysis. On this point, both their similarities and differences begin to appear regarding the political. Yet rather than their apparent differences, in this thesis their understandings that cultivate each other’s concept of the political as “a process” and as aesthetic regime, i.e. related with sensibility, perception, visibility and the distribution of these is at stake.

To take this discussion on politics as an aesthetic further, it may be appropriate to mention Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetico-political understanding. Lefort distinguishes political from politics but he does not see them as fundamentally distinct and pure realms as other the political thinkers would suggest. Lefort poses “the political” as referring to the regime, Rancière does not need such a regime or “the political” that makes the emergence of the democracy possible as a sole condition for politics to be. At this point, if we interrogate the possible effects of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology on Lefort, this will inspire us regarding understanding Rancière. Indeed, Lefort’s distinction between “theologico-political” (body-politics) and modern democracy refers to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion on the aesthetic regime. The main concept in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is flesh. He thinks that flesh is the element of the Being (Mazzocchi, 2013, p. 24; Plot, 2014, p. 29). We perceive and think in terms of flesh; the social is instituted by the flesh. The a priori condition of perceiving things is instituted through this
element for Merleau-Ponty. He proposes this as opposed to the handling of the being as homogeneous unity and in terms of the dichotomy of the I and the other. Rather, his ontology suggests us that “the flesh as a being that was non-identical with itself, constantly in the process of its own short-circuited realization.” (Mazzocchi, 2013, p. 35). As contrary to this understanding, all theologico-political theoreticians attempt to build up the indivisible body/One/Oneness as against the plurality. However, both Merleau-Ponty and Lefort states that in the aesthetico-political regime or modern democracy there is no more body-politics but a plurality, alterity; there can be no re-establishing the body from that shapeless flesh for them, i.e. “shaping the flesh of the social” (Plot, 2014, pp. 23-24). The flesh of the social makes for both Merleau-Ponty and Lefort democracy as an enigma and not a way of government but “a form of society” that is neither determinate nor does bear the “markers of certainty” in itself. In modernity, there is no hierarchical disposition of plurality to build up an indivisible body but “an equal appearance of all”, distribution of the plurality. Another reason for why Merleau-Ponty sees flesh as an element of the sensibility is that it is “a midway” between the subject and the idea; it cannot be reduced, assimilated to the notions of empiricism and idealism namely subject and the object because of its indeterminate and reversible character (Plot, 2014, p. 29). In other words, we perceive via flesh but it never reaches to or becomes the thing that is intended; there is always a gap between these. There is “the non-identity of self with itself, and with others”; and this creates different constellations and relations between particles of the social (Mazzocchi, 2013, pp. 25,39). So, between the corporeal and the inter-corporeal relations there remains always a distance. This relation and distance, which is created by the flesh, institute a chiasm, a web. So, there is no settlement but rather there is always a reversibility between visible/invisible, touchable/untouchable, since the flesh is the institutor of this relationship both within corporeal and inter-corporeal (Plot, 2014, p. 32). For there is no classical subject/object distinction there is also no for-Oneself, for-the Other distinction for Merleau-Ponty, rather “there is Being as containing all of them.” (as cited in Plot, 2014, p. 37; Mazzocchi, 2013, p. 26). So, individuals and collectivities do not share their form, i.e. they are not isomorphic, but their elements, i.e. flesh, they are not structured equivalently (Plot, 2014, p. 37). “Far from being an autonomous entity, the flesh-as-being is split within itself, simultaneously impartial and formless in its very essence and pregnant with and formed by others with which it co-exists.” (Mazzocchi, 2013, p. 30). Therefore, this relation creates a kind
of self-reflective quality of the social hence, through this, a reversible situation regarding the distribution of the sensible via politics.

If we turn back to Rancière, we may easily trace these above-mentioned themes in his understanding of politics and democracy hence the significance of the reversibility between visible/invisible, heard/unheard as opposed to the body-politics which supposes that collectivities share their shapes. Therefore, not the body-politics but the aesthetico-political understanding can provide us what the politics is, i.e. the constitutive paradox. “There is politics- and not just domination- because there is a wrong count of the parts of the whole.” and so “…the people are always more or less than the people” for Rancière (1999, p. 10). In other words, politics is inevitably here and owes its existence to the demos, which gives us no ground for power; “the very ground for the power of ruling is that there is no ground at all.” (2014, p. 50). There is no arkhè or specific power relation that determines the power of demos and providing a “shape” or a “form” to it. There is no divine law, natural order or class struggle as the “secret motor of politics or hidden truth behind appearances” but only politics that is simply based on a wrong done by the prevailing distribution of the sensible (1999, p. 18). Interruption to this wrong via “reversibility” of the sensible itself is the politics, democracy. Rancière calls this as class struggle as the institution of politics itself and this may be seen as revenge from the past, interruption to its allocation, distribution meanings to one's’ life, making them visible in a certain manner (1999, p. 11). The concern in the political struggle is not seeking a security in the future for some reasons and according to particular positions but interrupting the past (Baker, 2015, p. 70). As it is already clear in his criticisms against archi-politics and meta-politics, which have been always searching for the real behind the appearances, or in criticisms against the advocates of pure politics, which also searches for a positioned subject who demands his/her rights, politics is not about consensus but about the democratic paradox. These are related with governmental issues. For Rancière, politics is the “displacing the limits of the political by re-enacting the equality of each qua vanishing condition of the political” and “democratic logic…consists in blurring and displacing the borders of the political” (2014, pp. 39,55). So, Rancière refuses to think politics, democracy and class struggle as in the sense of the classical Marxist understanding within a meta-political way, which suggests “categories that correspond to functions” as “True classes” (1999, p. 18).
Rather, what Rancière suggests is “the difference of each class from itself”, which as some suggest does not come from outside but everybody and anybody carries it within itself. Actually, this makes politics and democracy a process: A process of “creating forms of subjectivization in the interval between two identities; creating cases of universality by playing on the double relation between the universal and the particular against relentless privatization of public life.” As he claims “the whole democratic process is about the displacement of that boundary” (2014, pp. 57-58). Rancière emphasizes that this is a process of subjectivization and creating continuously “new commers” and “new worlds” from within for/by demonstrating the equal intelligence of all and anybody. This is indeed the thing that does not make the democracy disappear as a practice (Rancière, 2014, p. 59). Democracy as a process suggests us that a political demonstration is an appearance in a moment and the subject of a political demonstration always paves the way for its own disappearance (2014, p. 39). Thus, discussions regarding the political have always been about aesthetic distribution of the sensible and solving the assumed tension between the appearances and the truth. Rather for Rancière “essence of the politics is the dissensus” or indeterminacy and appearing when there is no reason to do so. It is not being visible among the same ones but appearing as a difference, which is always on the shore of its disappearance, with the claim of equal intelligence of all to create a meaningful life by signifying the dual body of the politics itself or the “void in the sensible itself” (2014, pp. 38-39). In other words, there is no need to appeal to an idea, utopia or outside; the void (or the distance in Merleau-Ponty’s word) is in the sensible itself, and attempting to end this means to annihilate the very reason of the politics itself. Realizing this aesthetic regime belonging to politics itself is the stake for Rancière.

By the term aesthetic Rancière does not imply a realm for judging the artwork or it is not suggested as a “perverse commandeering of politics” as in Benjamin’s understanding so that seeing the relationship between politics and aesthetic does not have to do with that defining proper relationship between these two by politicizing the artwork (Robson, 2005, p. 82).
Aesthetic, in a quite Kantian way, is the condition of the possibility of the visibility of parts of the community hence their appearance (Rancière, 2004, p. 13). While aesthetic and politics are considered together in relation to their quality of rendering the things appear, and distributing the sensible, this becomes also “the sharing of the sensible” because “these arrangements are ‘shared’, that is, that they are ways of defining a world that is common” (Tanke, 2010, p. 6). In this picture, politics seems to be related with playing with this distribution of the sensible; what is common to a community and seeking for equality, equal intelligibility of all. There is not void, aporia or incoherence specific to modernity for Rancière as contrary to what Lefort suggests (2004, p. 24). There is no confrontation of the new and old, indeed in the aesthetic regime of art there is a kind of “swarming of words behind words, thoughts behind thoughts” (Merleau-Ponty as cited in Plot, 2014, p. 32). So, he suggests restaging these invisible supplements, the past in the new as opposed (Rancière, 2004, p. 24). Therefore, it is significant to understand what kind of the social that we face rather than seeing the social and the political mutually exclusive or, as crossing in some particular realms; the concern is here to pursue the limits, shores of the relationship between these that might give birth to the emergence of unprecedented political meaning.

In Rancière’s understanding of “aesthetic regime of arts”, we see the idea that it is not caused by rupture, disincorporation or mutation in the form of the social as in the case of Lefort. Rather, it is a kind of reinterpretation, “a new regime to relating to past” (2004, p. 25). Idea of modernity assumes one direction in the history, while aesthetic regime of arts assumes “co-presence of heterogeneous temporalities” (Rancière, 2004, p. 26). Therefore, according to Rancière modernity prevents us from understanding the relationship between the arts and other spheres of collectivity. Then we can say that by this quality of modernity, an unrest regarding the distribution of the sensible appears once more to us and; indeed, this is the democracy or “institution of the politics” itself; appearance of invisible, insensible as a supplementary part. Therefore, dissensus is related to this unrest, gap/void in the sensible. While representation

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17 “Aesthetic, as it was for Kant, pertains to the a priori forms of sensible intuition-that is, the factors-time and space- that occasion the way things appear.” (Tanke, 2010, pp. 5-6).
means presenting things as simply they are, it sometimes renders things present by representing them (Singer, 2013, s. 187). According to Lefort, there is a “historical mutation” from the body politics of theologico-political to the aesthetico-political of modern democracy which replaces the regime of representation with the kind of “enigma”. In other words, the flesh of the social cannot be represented as one to one correspondence. There will be always a void, paradox regarding this method of representation. However, the sole regime makes this enigma and indeterminacy alive and politics possible is democracy for Lefort. In other words, democracy is the condition of possibility of the politics that must be distinguished from a way of governing or administration of things. Lefort sees democracy as a form of society and indeed defines it as a regime unlike Rancière, but these conceptualizations or usages do not change the main ties between their understandings, suggestions regarding the political and the democracy. Though this difference would appear as significant because one mentions an “ontological turn” of a form of society, other sees a change regarding the conditions of the perceiving the things. Still, their basic emphasis is common: there is no possibility of creating a body-like community, collectivity but only temporary ones. That is why politics is rare in Rancière and merely democracy let it to become.

So, what is the relationship between the distribution of the sensible, aesthetic regime of arts, and the politics? As opposed to the Aristotle’s “representative regime” which describes “correct” ways of representing the things in accordance with form-matter relation, in aesthetic regime there is a destruction of all established hierarchies that are established by the first (Tanke, 2010, pp. 8-9). By the latter, there emerges “an unprecedented series of borrowings” and hence “new forms of existence can be found” reflexively (Tanke, 2010, p. 14). Rancière thinks that through this regime the borders of the logic of facts and the logic of fictions are blurred and fiction arises as a genre of this revolution. It played with the visible/invisible, meaning that may not be seen without changing the way of perceiving, i.e. in Rancière’s terms fiction seeks “the potential meaning inherent in everything silent” (2004, pp. 36-37). More vitally, this regime paves the way for changing the way of perceiving, interpretation of the social phenomena/thing from that of logic of order does. In other words, the aesthetic revolution did not change the institution of the social, as in the case of Lefort; thus, democratic indeterminacy is neither a form of modern societies nor regime that has been newly appeared
as tied with this aesthetic revolution. What do all these say to us? They do not say us that everything is fiction but there is “definition of same models for connecting the presentation of facts and forms of intelligibility”. There is now “reconfiguration the map of the sensible”, i.e. “material rearrangement of signs and images, relationships between what is seen and what is said, between what is done and what can be done.” (Rancière, 2004, pp. 39-40). This quality of aesthetic regime of arts, rather than the representative regime of arts, is indeed very institutive of the politics for Rancière. The latter is only a way of stabilizing the artistic expression by treating it in the realm of techne. Moreover, it institutes the politics within a similar way and handles it as a matter of government of the things for pursuing particular ends (2004, p. 43). This idea is parallel with that of Lefort’s distinction between “body-politics” and the symbolic dimension of modern democracy that is always indeterminate. Thus, for both of them “political collective is not an organism or a communal body” (2004, p. 40). Or to put in a different way:

[C]ommon worlds is never simply an ethos, a shared abode that results from the sedimentation of a certain number of intertwined acts. It is always a polemical distribution of modes of being and occupations in a space of possibilities. (Rancière, 2004, p. 42).

Thus, considering these two thinkers together despite their differences provides us a framework for thinking the politics- as an aesthetic matter that is related with the condition of perception- with the social- which has been seen as totally or partially outside of the genuine political so far. This might allow us to discover a new relationship with possibilities of collective life that suggests new “sensitivity to reality’s indeterminacy” and “openness to institutional creativity” (Singer, 2006, p. 91).

2.2 Searching for the Limits of Collectivity in Rancière’s Aesthetico-political Understanding

When the social and the political are handled as different realms, there is a danger of seeing the first as if it is “encompassing all of collective life in all its aspect”, i.e. as if it is nothing more than what it is in an empirical way (Singer, 2006, p. 91). However, as Rancière and Lefort
do, facticity of the social always tells us more with the political, which traverses the social. In fact, according to Rancière the political or occurrence of new sensitivity regarding the distribution of the parts of the society emerges in terms of “the presupposition of equal intelligence of all”. This presupposition will be significant for us for pursuing the traces of the limits of collectivity in relation to equality within Rancière’s above discussed understanding of the politics. Furthermore, it will be helpful to us in order to understand the political meaning of the friendship in following chapters.

Equality appears as the basic and constitutive quality of the political itself whether it appears at the particular time in history or belongs to the antiquity or has been always the principle of it. However, when its political meaning is considered, being visible or apparent among others becomes naturally what is at stake. According to Rancière, for instance, “politics. . . frames a sensory world that is its own.” and “is a specific form of the implementation of intelligence” (2014, p. 80). Equality connotes its full-fledged meaning in a collective life with the idea of equal intelligence of all (without qualification) for creating a meaningful life but this does not mean an objective aim, program or actuality that is to be achieved through institutionalized form of collective intelligence. Rather “politics will always fail to deliver on promises to implement freedom and equality integrally” (2014, p. 80). Therefore, rather than institutionalized way of doing politics, politics and revealing the equal intelligence of all by acting or acting with this presupposition are very related with the distribution of the sensible, and how uncounted within the institution of the social comes to the scene, or appears.

At this point, we must state that community and equality matters are in such a relation that cannot be settled, solved by the single formula or particular distribution of the sensible. This relation is always here and indeed a “never-ending settling of accounts” which cannot fit into any formula (Rancière, 2007, p. 64). Because of this reason, the paradox within this relation cannot be fulfilled. For the communist tradition, however, solving the paradox and so materializing the equality for emancipation of all is possible. In addition to this dream, they may propose some kind of program for this emancipation from the original paradox of the politics itself. However, for Rancière, emancipatory politics does not need “to found a counterpower susceptible of governing a future society” (2007, p. 49). In other words, on the
contrary to what communist tradition suggests, there is no need in any case for grasping the power to govern the factory, for example. One’s self-affirmation as a “joint-sharer in a common world” is enough for emancipatory politics for Rancière by bearing in the mind that this is a matter of collectivity (2007, p. 49). Rancière thinks that “democracy merely represents freedom and equality” however communist tradition tends “to turn them into a sensory experience”. To put it in a different way communism is seen as “an actual form of life” rather than being an Ideal (2014, p. 76). Politics is possible only with dissensus for Rancière. By an attempt to actualize communism as a program, he says, inevitably there appears the logic of capitalism or inegalitarian understanding. However, democracy for Rancière is “a specific and paradoxical power of the unqualified people” hence demonstrating the equal intelligence of all and even from the beginning this is valid (2014, pp. 79-80). Then politics for Rancière is

[T]he configuration of a specific ‘totality’ that emerges as a supplement to every collective body: that is, the totality of the uncounted, which does not mean the ‘excluded’ but simply anybody at all. It is a specific form of implementation of intelligence and collective form of implementation of an intelligence defined as that of anyone at all –of implementation of the equality of intelligence. (2014, p. 80).

This may be considered by the term flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology; you cannot establish a body while perception is formed within the flesh. It may only be a “totality without qualification” without a geometric order. Politics is always to act with the collective power of intelligence. On the other hand, it is condemned not to realize this demand, or to come to an end in this regard. This is not for there is an appropriate way of doing politics but the political always means wallowing within this paradox. This is the politics itself and so that communism will always remain inactual and as an attempt to annihilate itself. So, Rancière seems as turning his faces to the praxis by seeing democracy as a process not to the imaginary relation with the social. He emphasizes the sharing of singularity without any telos; for him it seems that community is impossible while it would be seen as possible temporarily only by the communication of the various singularities (as cited in Schnabl, 2008, p. 178).

For both Lefort and Rancière politics is “a process” rather than being a program. Lefort as a theoretician of totalitarianism is very critical to the idea (or phantasma) of “Oneness” or of “People-as-One”. “Totalitarianism tries to dissolve the democratic paradox or it is against the
democratic dissolution of the markers of certainty” (Plot, 2014, p. 6). He says that any claim for settling everything properly or believing the autonomy of society within the proper way of making politics secretly “fantasizes” and “chases” the Oneness and destruction of plurality however there are different forms of sociability which are not determinable (1988, pp. 270-71). According to Lefort “the imagination of free development and free flowering of collective energies secretly conveys the representation of the same and non-division” (1988, pp. 270-71). Although Rancière does not talk totally with the same concern or on the same topic, i.e. totalitarianism, his line of argument is indeed very similar with that of Lefort’s. For Rancière there is no “objective communism”, for him communism is always inactual because communism as a program does not let to politics to be. Therefore, believing objectivity of a communism “would lead to a new form of totalitarianism that involves trying to fuse the various worlds.” (Rancière, 2014, pp. 82-83). On the other hand, “communism as a process”, for Rancière, “is forming a sensory world of communist intelligence”, is “the network framed by our affirmations and demonstrations of the capacity of anybody” (2014, p. 83). In contrast to the advocates of communism as a way/form of life in an objective or concrete manner, Rancière suggests “intempestive/a-topian communism” that has no specific space/realm or topos but appears as “a power of separation” and this is the only communism that exists for him (2014, pp. 82-83). Thus, “any and every given social order is inherently irrational and ultimately contingent” for Rancière (May, 2012, pp. 99-100).

At this point, it may be appropriate to state that politics appears rarely in Rancière’s theory and when it appears this means that there is a collective resistance to the police order (May, 2012, p. 127). This resistance seems “a movement that ceaselessly displaces the limits of the public and the private, of the political and the social” (Patton, 2012, p. 138). Moreover, Rancière’s claim on equality may be seen as a kind of principle or presupposition (even as a kind of negative equality) which democratic politics and collective actions depend on, and this radical equality is both singular and without content (Patton, 2012, pp. 138-139). This equality is a pre-supposition that must be verified in each instant but it is not an end to politics that is to be achieved (Arnall, Gandolfi, & Zaramella, 2012, p. 8). As we mentioned earlier, Lefort had criticized the Arendtian understanding of politics by saying that political action shines among equals and may disappear without a trace on the real in her theory. With bearing this criticism
in the mind, it is tried to approach the rarity of Rancière’s politics for being cautious with regard to seeing any matter of community as a political. Nevertheless, there appears a need to canalize this subtle definition of politics to make a sense of our daily practices’ political values within communities or collectivities. Also, searching for the limits of political action within the communities and collectivities would be crucial to think on.

*The Ignorant Schoolmaster* exhibits clues regarding how Rancièrian envisage of collectivity would be. It implies a claim of equality that is not tried to be achieved or reached as an end. It does not bind us with any proper way of being community. This equality is merely a starting point and presupposition because our intelligence’s ability is doing rather than knowing the foundations of the equality (1991, p. 138). So, a collectivity or a community based on the knowledge of the reality is impossible as opposed to the assumptions of the various “community of equals” (cf. 2007, pp. 63-92). Therefore, any claim for harmony within a community is wrong and indeed functional for maintaining the specific collective fiction for him. States, communities will be always irrational. There can be no party, assembly or community of the emancipation. It is a process, which is possible through not a way or a method but with a principle; i.e. claim for equal intelligence of all as against to all claims of inequality. An emancipated person cannot provide a knowledge to the other but merely can show what also other can do (1991, pp. 39-41). This creates an endless process as opposed to the wrong, which is done by the police order. There is always a poetic expression of oneself because there exists no knowledge regarding reality; the speech is impossible. Only different wills use the intelligence to try to express themselves, and others try to make a sense of this poem (1991, pp. 64-65). Therefore, political speech is not a pre-established subjects’ legitimate debate related with their concerns, interests and so on grounded on equal conditions as communication and democracy theories’ suggestion. Rather, this process is “a struggle to have one’s voice heard and oneself recognized as a legitimate partner in debate”, i.e. “the genuine political speech above all entails a dispute over the very quality of those who speak.” (Corcoran, 2014, pp. 8-9). This process implies us the idea of collectivity in Rancière’s mind. There are always different ways/modes for expression and different predictions regarding those expressions. A truth assumption regarding any expression of will makes us establish an order again. The only thing that one can do is that giving an expression by the intuition of reality but this is always a
process of prediction and participation of all with the principle of equality. This principle of equality is not valid for fictional entities but merely for concrete ones as individuals so that not law, or rights but a way of life by the force and movement of equal intelligence of all renders the invisible or apolitical realms of life the political. In any community or collectivity, not ends’ proper ways but endless demands of the presupposition of equality function as a “vita democratica” (Ranciere as cited in Plot, 2014, p. 148).

Within an aesthetic regime of arts, there is no discovering something rather redefining, redistributing the sensible and hence creating new meanings, which has been always lack and will be always lacking of the certainty and completeness. Moreover, this regime of arts always renders some parts invisible but as contrary to others also lets politics to be. Perceiving does not come out by itself without any condition of possibility in these regimes of arts for Rancière. There are prevailing principles that make some things appear and others not. In aesthetic regime of arts, this is the equality of all meanings and this, in fact, makes the politics exist. A particular meaning regarding any collectivity is always on the shore of its own disappearance based on this equality claim or principle. Nevertheless, Rancière’s understanding of the politics may help us to infer or flourish another way of being together, collectivity via friendship, which will be our focal point in flowing two chapters.

On the other hand, some people are critical and indeed cautious for the above-mentioned tendency of the political theory/philosophy. Flynn in his work titled as The Philosophy of Claude Lefort: Interpreting the Political (2006) makes a distinction between “political philosophy” and “politicized philosophy”, which is thought as reflecting the current tendency in the literature for him. By making this kind of distinction he tries to say that rather than examining the classical political concepts/problems themselves for grasping their meaning as they are given, philosophical concepts politicized18 (Flynn, 2006, p. xv). For Flynn, in this sense, Lefort is the political philosopher par excellence because he interrogates the classical political concepts and what they mean in their givenness. Lefort intends to or reflects upon the

18 He gives Derrida’s The Politics of Friendship (2005) as an example.
political experience itself (Flynn, 2006, p. xviii). As opposed to this claim, Rancière’ arguments would be posed. He is very critical to political philosopher’s method that seeks the meaning of the politics within the poor discussion of the best regime and to their attempts for pursuing the appropriate way of government accordingly to the nature of the social (2014, p. 34). Moreover, seeking “the origin of power”- even if it is seen as an enigma by Lefort- is also considered as political philosopher’s part of the “unjust” job. This means that there is an attempt to make the “scandal of the politics” which is “a paradoxical appearance of those who does not have a part” (in Rancièrian terms) disappear and to reduce the politics merely to the relationship between individuals and the state (Bosteels, 2014, pp. 81, 88). Although Flynn has an affirmative attitude for being a political philosopher and on the other Rancière criticizes this above-mentioned attitude, Lefort still tries to change the perception regarding what the political is and he does so by interrogating the origin of power in modern society and relationship between forms of society and the legitimate state power historically. At the end, he is a philosopher but such a philosopher he is who finds an enigma, paradox regarding the relationship between institution of the social itself and the power relations; that is “democratic indeterminacy” which emerges with the “democratic revolution”. Those, via help of the flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, implies us both “a dimension of totality (i.e. flesh as ‘a milieu’) and divisiveness (i.e. the ‘internal division’) (Gerçek, 2017, p. 4). While this indeterminacy signifies the “possibility of creating democratic collectivities”, on the other hand emphasizes the very impossibility of achieving it (Gerçek, 2017, p. 2). Since the democratic revolution does not mean complete break with the meaning regarding collectivities or situations, identities that gather people around them, yet it cannot offer a program (Gerçek, 2017, p. 4). At this point both Lefort’s and Rancière’s understandings come across. To put in a different way, this encountering is related with Lefort’s being a political philosopher as in a way that Flynn claims. Nevertheless, he interprets the phenomena in such a way that he finds as a result the paradox inherent within the democracy itself, and the relationship between the political and the claim of the equal visibility of each within the social chiasm via the phenomenology of flesh.

In summary, Lefort does not define what the political is or creates a scale for it that measures the validity of the given or assumed political action but he tries to changing the way of looking to the political itself, which may render us seeing the cores within any realm of life, appearance
regarding their potentiality of transforming energy. Political philosophy must consider the very possibility of the political itself rather than just focusing on distinct/particular concepts, phenomena that are seen as clearly belonging to the realm of politics (Baker, 2015, p. 14). At this point, Flynn’s assumed distinction between “political philosophy” and “politicized philosophy” may restrict the political realm. Moreover, to the certain extent, this understanding would be in compliance with the practical\theoretical attitude that pushes things that is related with individuals (or singular lives) to the realm of psychology and create a kind of discrepancy between handling the phenomena related with individuals and their relation with collective life (Baker, 2015, pp. 18-19). What Lefort and Rancière do for expanding this restricted, purified political realm is, however, showing how these assumed exterior phenomena would be related with the indeterminacy of the political itself. Then, when there may appear a kind of similar or common understanding regarding the political, is it plausible to make distinction between what the gaze intends, i.e. whether it is classical, traditional concept of the political philosophy or any such concepts that always have the potentiality of shining within the void of the representative regime itself?

Bosteels seems to criticize in his book The Actuality of Communism the attitude that focuses on potentialities, emancipation that will not be actualized. For him, advocation of pure political deeds, or potentiality of emancipation cannot go beyond being merely the definition of “our given state of affairs under late capitalism and its attendant cultural logic” (2014, p. 62). Maybe, he says, what we need is a “true emancipatory politics” and because we lack this we always come up with interrogation of ontology, i.e. what the political is:

[W]hat is at stake now that the classical models of political activism and partisanship have entered into a profound crisis, closely ties to the crisis of the party form and politics and the state, is finding new ways of relating to the primordial antagonism” (2009, p. 249).

However, he obscures that interrogating the phenomenon as they are given (this intention may also be very impossible) or questioning the very constitution of them does not mean simply sticking within the ontological problems and then resulting in creation of the definitive studies regarding the social and the political. Rather, this manner of interrogation would be seen as not substituting the today for the future, for the sake of politics as a program but discerning the
alterable rules, orders of the visibility (Lefort, 1986, p. 267). In other words, rather than being merely an empty radicality or “ontologizing of leftism” which attempts to erase any base/principle by referring to any humanitarian anthropologies, and almost praising the purified form of politics and ambiguous future as a quality of politics as process, these create a perception regarding the actual which is also what Bosteels himself cares about. This interrogation regarding to actuality, however, has nothing to do with the actualization of a plan or a program or sculpting the social according to a specific design. Moreover, it cannot be seen as an any “hegemonic desire of philosophy over politics”, if we use Bosteels’ words, but providing a chance for changing the way of perceiving the social and the political meaning, significance of any invisible part aroused from assumed social body in an unprecedented way (2014, p. 32).

In this chapter, we tried to search for in what respects Rancière’s understanding of politics lets us think on the limits of collectivity within its position in the politics and the political split literature. His understanding of politics as a process working by the presupposition of equality and his criticism on the matter of communism will be helpful for us thinking friendship as way to collectivity. However, we will turn back to this matter in the 4th chapter. Therefore, in the next chapter an anthology of the political meaning of the friendship will be presented. Has its political meaning been considered in terms of the classical partisanship, or just friendliness among citizens or in what other regards? The distinction that is studied in this chapter via Rancièrian understanding of the politics and its significance and place within the recent “ontological turn” debates have significant contribution for our coming discussions. Since, friendship’s political meaning cannot be studied without thinking on what kind of understanding of the politics it is related with. In a quite contrary way to friendship’s handling as a merely personal, individualistic phenomenon related with the specific realms of life and hence sciences, in the next chapter it will be elaborated via its being a mode of togetherness or “community of equals” for very possibility of making appear the politics itself.
CHAPTER 3

ON FRIENDSHIP AND ITS POLITICAL MEANING

Friendship has been one of the very intriguing contents for the philosophical writings, conversations, and literary works since Antiquities due to its delicate place in human life. Its political meaning has been also considered but seems to remain as limited to metaphors and analogies mostly presented in relation to regimes or citizenship through the categories of sameness and similarity which are thought as the essence of the friendship. However, the political meaning within the phenomenon as a way of relationship, togetherness (instead of being seen as bearing particular implications for some other kinds of relationship, e.g. citizenship) does not attract much of an attention. However, tracing certain influences from the literature on friendship helps us to see its political meaning and the significance as a way of being together; spontaneous way to collectivities, which makes the politics appearing as a process rather than being a program.

Friendship's political meanings or implications are examined almost outside of the realms of sociology and political science because of the lacking qualities required to be the object of these realms. For instance, the influential sociologist of the modernity, Simmel, thinks that “dyadic” relations are in dark depths for merely being between two persons and therefore it cannot be, for example, a proper object of sociology which needs the third party, i.e. being a “triad”, to have a proper understanding of it (Simmel, 1950, pp. 122-133). Through different insights but consequently in a very common way, political meaning of the friendship is ignored by these kinds of tendencies at least by certain areas of the academia. Since, for them friendship is not a relationship to be externalized from its parts. So, it is impelled to remain within the realm of psychology for it does not indicate the clear and obvious characteristics of certain political phenomena such as to be related with justice, law, and regimes. Therefore, it has been condemned to remain as a part of the opaque realm of interpersonal relationships in the private sphere. Then, friendship for those people may be related with politics only vis-à-vis its exterior relationship with the political phenomena. Involving in political action -that is a posteriori
phenomenon- together, or as similar/identical attitudes of friends in front of the particular political situations are considered and treated as the political facet of the notion of friendship. However, despite the significance of these questions, they still cannot go beyond being a merely exterior ones regarding the political meaning of the friendship. We will not be aiming at establishing analogies between the internal nature of the friendship and the relationships between political subjects. Or, constructing a category of “political friendship” will not be the stake (e.g. Lu, 2009). Instead, in this thesis thinking the political meaning of the phenomenon of friendship itself will be at stake and hence making a sense of the very possibility of the political via friendship as a way of togetherness.

Thus, in this chapter the political meaning of the friendship will be handled especially in terms of what it implies us regarding equality. In the first place, different approaches to it will be examined in the history of political thought/philosophy and accordingly the manners in which its ties with the politics is established and in what respect they inspire or limit us in our understanding of the politics will be considered and discussed. At the beginning, it is crucial to briefly introduce and discuss Aristotle’s ideas on friendship as an ethico-political relationship. He reflects on the problem of equality/justice regarding the friendship in his great and influential work of *Nicomachean Ethics*. As a philosopher, he does not overlook reflecting on friendship and its political meaning. He establishes relationships between categories of friendship and regimes and also with some other political concepts such as equality, justice and so on. While revealing the political implications of friendship, he also comes up with the “the political friendship” which is distinct from personal friendship but also analogous to it (Lu, 2009, s. 42-44). His reflection on these points is so powerful that it is very essential and convenient to follow this path to rethink on friendship. Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s conceptions of friendship and hence their political implications will follow Aristotle. Continuing with them is significant because they try to draw another path for friendship’s ethico-political implications. For both, if friendship is treated as in the way which ancient thought follows, it may lead to a kind of partiality within moral or ethical attitude. While for Kierkegaard with the underlying desire of being One and Same with friend, friendship is an ethically problematic relation that obscures the differences between “I” and “the other”; for Kant it must be pushed towards more universalistic kind of relation by overcoming the partialities it has. This tendency
is significant to be mentioned because while we come to Arendt, we will see that friendship does not have to be such a relationship that obscures the differences, pluralities. However, does friendship purport this value and meaning in dialog and hence within the process of thinking? Does the dialogic value make friendship politically meaningful and significant? After questioning and raising some objections to this claim, which finds political value of friendship in the dialog, (by alluding to names such as Proust), we will try to reflect on the question of whether there is merely a metaphorical political meaning of the friendship. Or, can it tell us something different when we approach it as a practice of sharing the life itself?

3.1 Sameness or Equality as the Institution of the Friendship

Friendship is examined by Aristotle widely in two chapters (in Book VIII and, Book VIX) of his monumental work *Nicomachean Ethics*. Understanding the political meaning of the friendship as questioned generally in the Greek philosophy and specifically in Aristotle who treats it as a merely personal or private relationship do not seem possible. For Aristotle man is a “zoon politikon” whose essence requires living together (Aristoteles & Brown, 2009, p. II69b 15). He is an animal, i.e. living being, who renders what belongs to him as koinon with the other (Basut, 2015, p. 33). It needs others (who are not merely friends or even very hardly and rarely perfect/genuine one) but still friendship is not only necessity in this respect but also the noble or good thing because of the fact that “with friends, men are more able both to think and to act.” (2009, p. II55a 10). This idea is complementary to his theory of the happiness, which tells us that the significance and distinctiveness of human life lies in actualizing the potentialities in accord with the good without qualification and virtue (Konstan, 1997, p. 164).

The matter of having virtue of friends has a direct link with Aristotle’s discussion on the good and the happiness (Cooper, 1999, pp. 336-39). Thus, because happiness is an activity of this political animal not a property, it is necessary to notice that it comes to the existence if and only if human beings are among others, especially friends without qualifications, i.e. with the virtue of friendship, rather than being among strangers for Aristotle (2009, p. II69b 10). Aristotle’s understanding of friendship has close tie with his understanding of human being as a political animal. “Natural capacity and tendency [of human being] to form communities in which the life of all agreed in pursuit of a common good” is central to Aristotle’s understanding
of flourishing of human being as a political animal (Cooper, 1999, pp. 76-77). Then, while thinking on how friendship is posed in Aristotle's philosophy, it is significant to bear in the mind distinguishes human beings as species from others.

In accordance with human being’s tendency to come together in various forms, Aristotle qualifies mainly three forms of friendship, which are distinguished from each other by considering the possible objects of love in the personal friendship: based on utility, based on pleasure, and a perfect form which simultaneously means having a virtuous/noble character (2009, p. II56a 5). Aristotle reveals the connections between these three distinct forms of friendship and different political phenomena (such as justice, forms of government and constitution and so on). In doing so, he establishes analogies between these corresponding categories of friendship and the political phenomena. For him there is a relation between kinds of friendship and the distinct kinds of community, or association, and sense of justice (2009, p. II61a 30). That “[A]ll forms of community are like parts of the political community” implies a particular perception of justice, and distribution of it, whether it is done in terms of proportion or arithmetic, intending to common purpose and sacrificing particular, present advantages for the common one is relevant for all kinds of community (2009, p. II60a 10). Aristotle never reduces friendship to the intimate, emotional or passion-based relation such as love (Yack, 2002, p. 27). “Aristotle’s major point seems to be that our natural sympathy for others grows out of and is shaped by the kinds of ends and activities we share with them.” (Yack, 2002, p. 27). He identifies community (whether political or not) with the kinds of sharing in the same way he does concerning the virtue of friendship. This is also because of the fact that there appear problems of different in kind about the distinct forms of friendship in their relation to equality and the matter of justice within a community.

Aristotle defines these three forms of friendship (based on utility, pleasure and perfect one) as equal friendship. However, he suggests one of them as virtuous: “perfect friendship” based “on a certain resemblance” which means, at the same time, being “alike in virtue”. For him this type of friendship does not emerge in an incidental manner (2009, p. II56b). Because they are alike both in their nature and virtue, there is no instrumental reason or purpose for this kind of friendship although pleasure, usefulness or utility may arise afterwards. “Good men” for
Aristotle become friends “without qualification”, while the rest are incidentally and inferiorly friends based on the virtue of superiority (2009, pp. II57a 30, II57b). Therefore, for Aristotle, the other two forms of friendship seem to bear the traces of general category friendship such as living together, loving, equality and shared activity because “friends get the same things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for another.” Never the less the ones that the perfect kind has are enduring in time and rareness (2009, p. II58b 5).

Emphasis on virtuous friendship or friendship without qualification is also repeated by other Roman thinkers such as Cicero. In his famous and influential work On Friendship, Cicero, too, sees this kind of friendship as the genuine one that exists only among “good men” who “[are] look upon [him]self as self-sufficing and regard the changes and the changes of mortal life as powerless to affect [his] virtue.” (1993, p. 9). This approach tells us that “good men” within ethico-political world may also be a good citizen but the reverse is not a necessary proposition for Aristotle in Politics. So, virtuous, or “perfect friendship” in Aristotle and Cicero seems to refer to another perfectness, goodness in politics/public realm (although we know that in Ancient Greece and Rome political equality, freedom and understanding of perception of public may differ). Then, is it plausible to say that, considering the distinction between public and private (or in Greek polis and oikos) realms and their exclusion of one other, friendship is the permeable phenomenon that transmits qualities of one realm to the other and hence this oscillation creates its political meaning? Later Arendt will restate this point by saying that friendship’s political value is based on this distinction. Furthermore, in modern times, friendship’s political meaning is related with “enlarged mentality”19 for being free of

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19 Aristotle does not suggest learning from others by exchanging opinion, i.e. doxa, within the specific form of togetherness (i.e. society) (Bryan, 2009, pp. 756-57). Rather his conceptualization of friendship might be seen, to a certain extent, related with Arendt’s handling of the Kantian “enlarged mentality”, a central term in Kant’s aesthetic theory. Enlarged mentality is not merely fed by others’ judgements for becoming truly human or by any other expectation but simply arises from “how we approach them and what approaching others shows of how we already belong together (p. 757). In other words, we do not “gain our excellence” among others but we shine by performing among them without any future expectation (p. 759).
purposeful, interest-oriented sphere of the private life and private use of reason. However, in Greek, friendship does not seem to bear merely the traces of private life but mostly public, at least in its perfect form. Nevertheless, in this or that way friendship for those people bears a crucial political meaning by being based on the distinction between these realms, i.e. political and the private (not only in its modern sense).

At this point, it is possible to raise the question whether it is plausible to link the political with this type of “perfect friendship”. To what extent can we think the political as separated/isolated from usefulness, and pleasure or from any other kind of feeling that may be seen as lacking from virtuous characteristics? Perhaps understanding of politics today suggests instrumentality, seeing others as a means to promote the specific individualistic or collective ends (Frank as cited in Bryan, 2009, p. 759). Moreover, imagining communities, which are established by sharing some particular objects, may also be included to this above-mentioned tendency20. Besides this general assumption, examining the political meaning of friendship as a way of being together is crucial if politics is understood as the above-mentioned manner and “mere exercise of power” (Devere & Smith, 2010, p. 343). Since, this discussion on the political meaning of friendship shows us that there is a tension regarding how or in what way we encounter the relationship between the self and the other. This also helps us questioning the association of the politics with exercising the vertical power relations or any other specific design regarding the way in which we involve into relation with others (Devere & Smith, 2010, p. 352). Moreover, this paves the way for the possibility of pursuing another way than that of individuals through the ethico-political meaning of the friendship. So, if we treat Aristotle’s suggestion of “true friendship”, i.e. friendship without qualification, as a potentiality rather than of actuality, it may help us to carry the discussion further on (Bryan, 2009, p. 756).

When the “internal nature” of it is at stake, Aristotle seems to delve into the psychology of the friendship that conditions the appearance of the phenomenon. He thinks that “the internal

20 Aristotle himself suggests us another kind of friendship, i.e. civic/political friendship, which is “distinct from but analogous to personal friendship” (Lu, 2009, s. 43). We will come to this point later.
nature of the friendship” is related with men’s self-relation with himself and hence based on his “self-love” (2009, pp. II65b 35, II66a 10). For him, perfect kind of friendship implies men’s relation with itself in such a way that “his opinions are harmonious and desires the same things with all his soul.” (2009, pp. II66a 10-30 emphasis belongs to me). Aristotle’s understanding of friendship is intrinsically related with self-knowledge according to Cooper. According to him, “the good and flourishing” human being needs friends as a mirror for it is easier to observe the friend easier than examining oneself (Cooper, 1999, p. 344). Friendship makes the “truly satisfactory” human life possible by not only making life bearable through sharing the activities of mere survival but also the contemplative ones, i.e. sharing the life wholly. This is possible truly by virtue-friendship for Aristotle (Cooper, 1999, pp. 350-5).

[O]ne must regard the association with one’s friend, through which one first comes to know him and in which one constantly renews one’s knowledge thereafter, as an association with some who is objectively good and whose life is worthwhile in precisely the same as one’s own. (Cooper, 1999, p. 354).

Therefore, human being involves into a relation with other in such a way that he wants to preserve himself; “wishes himself to live and be preserved”. In other words, for Aristotle “man wishes to live with itself” because he desires the same things with his soul. He seeks “another self”, since it is harmonious in himself, at the same time, content with himself. Therefore, Aristotle’s understanding of perfect friendship suggests a “concord” with friends. Being in concord with the other and the relationship with “another-self” have to be established since Aristotle, to the certain extent, postpones the question of whether one can be friend with himself and decides that one would restrict herself to the idea that the condition of being a friend necessitates being two or more (2009, p. II66a 30). Aristotle stresses the point that being in

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21 Arendt, as we will mention later, understands friendship in her later works, by considering the significance of “thinking” that was before condemned by her by praising of praxis, as also occurring in one person only if this assumes the other voices. In other words, if human being in itself would split into parts and creates a kind of dialog, communication hence plurality of ideas, thoughts and so on as in the case of appearing and having a speech in the public realm then, we may call this relationship as a kind of friendship for Arendt (Williams, 1998, p. 939). However, Aristotle postpones answering to this question.
concord never implies “an identity in opinion” because this would be present incidentally between friends but indeed concord implies for the city, or the political community that “city is in accord when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest and choose the same actions and do what they have resolved in common.” (2009, pp. II67a 25, II67b). In other words, *doxa* for Aristotle does not mean simply a view but it may be merely seen as which is not reflected on yet; “[d]oxa is not necessarily untrue but simply unthought” and “it is that which we hold in our view, that is, the content of this view” (Bryan, 2009, p. 761). Based on this, perfect friendship does not assume sameness in *doxa* about all matters of life but being the same in virtue of acting, i.e. within same manner.

Whence Aristotle mentions the internal nature of the friendship, he makes a distinction between friendship and “friendly feelings”, “goodwill” towards others and hence a kind of “proximity” in Cicero’s sense (2009, pp. II66b 30-35). Inclination to friend is assumed as natural and spontaneous by both Aristotle and Cicero, who shares insights regarding the content with him. According to Cicero, “genuine and spontaneous” “friendship springs from a natural impulse rather than a wish for help.” and “nature has so formed us that a certain tie unites us all, but [friendship] becomes stronger from proximity” (1993, pp. 14,18). Friendship means, to both of them, more than having merely good feelings and intentions for others. In this sense, this is quite different from the Christian and the modern perceptions that treat the friendship as neighborhood defined in relation to “goodwill” and “friendly feelings” towards the other rather than taking this relation as “exemplary heritage” (if we put it in Derrida’s words) based on virtue (Derrida, 2005, p. 3).

Up until to now, we have tried to pursue what friendship implies us politically beyond being merely a personal and private relationship. However, as we stated before, Aristotle also adds “political friendship”, i.e. civic friendship, to this chart. It is not literally a personal virtue-friendship; and justice may be treated not as exactly as what it is in virtue-friendship despite the assumed equality between friends. “Civic friendship” requires a kind of special bond between fellow citizens for sharing the activities regarding the city and involving into a relation with the other for the common good of the city. However, it is a form of utility friendship, which is distinct from the personal one yet still it is a truly form of the friendship not a friendly
feeling. It involves a good will, trust, well-wishing and mutual interest for Aristotle (Cooper, 1999, pp. 368, 370-71). This point seems to lead Aristotle to the examination of the relationship between forms of friendship and the regimes in an analogical way, though he does not establish an external relationship between the city, justice and the friendship: “Not justice but friendship binds the city together”. Aristotle strongly suggests that justice alone will not remedy injustice; rather, justice requires friendship to counter injustice” (Stortz, 2002, s. 226, 227). Rather than focusing on his conceptualization of the civic friendship, which ties the members of the city to each other and “helps one to understand just what it means to say a city is a community and what would be involved in the common advantage of the citizens who make up such a community”, Aristotle’s understanding of the personal friendship seems to be our concern (Cooper, 1999, p. 373). Since the crucial point here is that rather than regimes that implies unequal forms of friendship; “equal friendship” is the only type which is related with democracy in which there is no master so that “everyone has license to do as he pleases” (2009, p. II60b 5). Aristotle defines an “unequal friendship” between father\mother-child and sovereign- subject as not a true friendship but only showing “likeness to the friendship” (2009, p. II58b 5). In this likeness to friendship, there arises “a sense of equality” and “the proportion to the merit” in love is maintained, but this sort of equality differs from the justice and equality between friends. For Aristotle, in this unequal friendship “proportion to merit” is at stake rather than quantitative equality, which lies in the essence of the friendship. If we put this formulation in a different manner; Aristotle does not seem to signifying a geometrical distribution of the justice in all sorts of equal friendship. Furthermore, he thinks that parties of the specifically perfect friendship are the very same in nature and virtue and hence no need to qualify justice according to merit of the parties, because arithmetically one is equal to other, as posing the sense of justice: “when [human beings] are friends they have no need of justice, while they are just they need friendship as well and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.” (2009, p. II55a 25).

Herein, we may pose questions as what is the relationship between democracy and modes of togetherness whose constituents are tied to each other by the friendship, which assumes equality? Or, how may friendship’s political meaning be not reduced into “sameness” redolent with “fraternity” as a kind of equal friendship? Since, “the figure of friend. . . so regularly
coming back on stage with the features of the *brother*” whether in an explicit or today mostly implicit way while citizenship is suggested as friendship (Derrida, 2005, p. viii). So, in this sense, there is no reason for not thinking that the equal friendship as the nature of democracy is conveyed with fraternity. This appears as so especially when we consider Aristotle’s handling of the issue of “difference” as a phenomenon related with the proportional distribution of the justice. This refers to the principle of friendship between unequal ones; and this friendship might be preserved by creating a “sense of justice” because there is no equality ontologically at the outset (2009, p. II63a 20). What do all these imply us to see other way for politics to be or appear as a matter of community, collectivity and equality?

Settling the forms of the friendship and handling according to specified conceptualization of justice is not much concern here. However, thinking on Aristotle’s compelling reflection on friendship as a “community of equals” causes a kind of cautious approach to this understanding. Since, we know that understanding of friendship as the community of equals creates such situations as Agamben rightly puts it:

> Friends do not share something (birth, law, place, taste): they are shared by the experience of friendship. Friendship is the con-division that precedes every division, since what has to be shared is the very fact of existence, life itself. And this is sharing without an object, this original consenting, that constitutes the political. How this original political ‘synaesthesiæ’ became over time the consensus to which democracies today entrust their fate in this last, extreme, and exhausted phase of their evolution, is, as they say, another story, which I leave you to reflect on. (2009, pp. 36-37).

Aristotle does not ignore the fact that friends may be differing in their ideas or opinions and this does not affect the perfect friendship's sameness in terms of virtue and hence natural inclination to each other. However, thinking the political meaning of the friendship as a dialogical or related with encountering of different judgments is also a significant point and must indeed be questioned. Since, we are tackling with the understanding of justice, which is related with a certain manner of acting independent of the contexts and situations (Derrida, 2005, p. 8). This also leads a further conflation between the questions of who and what the friend is and indeed subjection of former to the latter (Derrida, 2005, p. 6). Implicitly assuming such an ontological foundation regarding what the friend is, prevents us seeing the constellations within singular events or situations, which makes who the friend is visible.
Therefore, it seems plausible to handle constitution of the friendship not as a fixed ontological relationship among same ones, or equals in virtue but as living the equality which also creates the political itself (May, 2008, p. 59).

To put in a nutshell, in most time when the political meaning of the friendship is at stake, equality is treated as it is emerged from sameness. However, equality is seen in this thesis in the Rancierian way, i.e. as the presupposition of politics to be. So, would this assumption regarding the existence of politics be seen as valid for friendship also? If so, this similar institution of two must tell us something political regarding friendship rather than some of its implications for citizenship, regimes, etc. However, before the delving into the seas of this difficult and sometimes challenging relationship, it might be better to examine modern thinkers’ reflections on the relationship between equality and friendship in more in detail. Arendt will be the key thinker at this point for us for she creates a kind of constellations of those theories within the examination of the experience of thinking. She suggests that everyone is capable of judging with the effect of the sensible world, i.e. raw materials supplied by it, and henceforth thinking with those materials within herself by not assuming herself as One but by splitting in two, i.e. being the two-in-one (Arendt, 1978, pp. 184-85, 187, 192-93). Aristotle’s unanswered question about possibility of one’s being friend with oneself seems to become focal point in Arendt’s ideas particularly concerning the political meaning of the friendship.

### 3.2 Friends as Other-Selves or Simply as the Others

Our previous discussion on the equality shows us that a kind of sameness in this relationship may be suggested as an equality. For some, this matter of equality is also a problematic one, for because it means being exactly equal in terms of conditions, results, and qualities rather than equality in reciprocity, must be the concern of the friendship. According to Arendt, friendship is treated as an active love (loving rather than being loved) in a similar way with that of the love of knowledge and truth, which could only be achieved through by being the friend of Gods (1978, p. 13). However, the kind of reciprocity, which involves the active love of all parties, is neglected or omitted in this approach. Rather, we may think or create another kind of vision regarding this issue which assumes not sameness in virtue or thinking friends as
an “ideal double” (in Derrida’s words) but difference and also equal capacity of all to create/build a meaningful life (Derrida, 2005, p. 4).

In this section, our main reference point will be Arendt’s ideas on friendship however before moving on her ideas, we will touch upon Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s theories for their possible contributions on what friendship is and whether it is a discriminatory kind of relationship. Both of them question the exemplar heritage and try to suggest not exactly the virtuous in Greek/Roman sense but a modest kind of friendship or neighborhood for moral and ethico-political concerns. It seems that the matter of choosing the friends is not the center of ethics but rather a kind of unconditionality must be the stake. Otherwise, a kind of arbitrary and partial, hence discriminatory kinds of togetherness may exist. This implies definitely not the universally valid ethics, which equally treats all in spite of their differences.

Kant and Kierkegaard suggest a form of friendship and neighborhood, which may transcend the discriminatory particularities. To put in another way, Kant sees friendship as an Idea whose empirical examples may deceive us to see its genuine mode, i.e. Idea of friendship, or universal friendship, “in which self-love is superseded by a generous reciprocity of love.” (Kant, 1991, p. 211). Furthermore, Kant argues that “as [society] develops morally, particular friendships give way to universal friendship” (1991, p. 209). This “universal friendship” connotes his “kingdom of ends” and intention of human being to each other not as a means but as an “end in itself” so that he conceptualize this kind of friendship as an Idea and tries to disassociate possible ends and interests that may be articulated with it. Socrates’ famous phrase that “Oh my friends, there is no friends” reflects the discrepancy between empirical realm and the Idea for him (1991, pp. 211-12). Because of this reason, and because friendship belongs to the earth rather than perfection of the heaven, it lacks the universality of moral perfection. Its nature appears as being a peculiar relation between persons (1991, p. 215). Persons, for Kant, tend to make friends because they cannot trust their fellows and try to constitute a communion in which these anxieties merely occur. But this also may lead to the sectarian type of society as opposed

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22 Kant seems to treat this quote as belonging to Socrates.
to the Idea of friendship or universal one (1991, p. 215). Kant does not depreciate making friends, rather he sees it as “laudable purpose” “through which [human being] can enjoy its existence” (1991, pp. 209-215). However, for him “civilized men [also] seeks universal pleasures and a universal friendship, unrestricted but special ties” (1991, p. 216). Kant sees a possibility within particular friendships as being against the non-discriminatory universal idea of it. Therefore, he does not find appropriate to ground ethics on the personal type of friendship. Rather, he seems to suggest that what we need is a transcendental form of friendship for overcoming the difficulties of an ethics of particular forms friendship. Later, Arendt will not establish the link between friendship and politics via Kant’s explicit ideas on the relationship between friendship and ethics but through his suggestions on the experience of thinking. So that we are able to derive from her thoughts on the judgement and the process of thinking a more egalitarian tone in which plurality, and particularities are not omitted. However, why friendship is received as discriminatory relationship or as an obstacle to politics when it is not handled as sameness or universal category is a significant question to pose but we postpone it to be answered. Now, it is better to look more to Kierkegaard who sees friendship as conflicting with the differences before passing to Arendtian position.

With a quite similar tone to Kant, Kierkegaard thinks that praise of friendship and erotic love, which arise from passions and inclinations, is indeed related with paganism but “love your neighborhood” belongs to the Christianity and the tradition of self-renunciation, which has a true ethical meaning (1991, pp. 235-47). We must praise this kind of relationship for its nature of equalization. Friendship and erotic love are conditional and partial whereas loving neighbor means loving all human being unconditionally. Passions and inclinations, for Kierkegaard, always exclude third parties and relationships arisen from those are indeed conditioned by the fluctuations of these feelings and they do not have an enduring and all-embracing nature. Making passionate preference for Kierkegaard is a kind of “self-love” and this ignores others and love of humanity. However, there is no preference and hence no confusion in the love of neighbor. Consequently, because the other is also your neighbor, there is no exclusion either. We can see in “love your neighbor” phrase similar with Kantian understanding of “love of humanity” or “idea of cosmopolitanism”. Kierkegaard also seems to refrain from heteronomy but tries to reach a universal category that is abstained from particularities. Moreover, for
Kierkegaard suggests that this kind of relation makes differences possible. For him in erotic love and friendship, at the peak there is becoming a single self, one I, i.e. absorbing the other in “one I” based on a self-love (1991, pp. 243, 244). Whereas, there is salvation in the love of neighbor because there is no possibility “to make me one with the neighbor in a united self” for Kierkegaard. Therefore, we can conclude that there is also a concern for the preservation of differences in Kierkegaard. However, for him “in erotic love and friendship the two love one another in virtue of differences or in virtue of likeness which are grounded in differences “on the basis of the likeness by which they are different from other men or in which they are like each other as different from other men” (1991, pp. 243-44). To put differently there is an analogy stemming from an exclusive relation regarding the friendship, i.e. approximating the two by pushing aside the other, i.e. third party. Difference that Kierkegaard tries to maintain is the one in which there is no any single case of absorption, desire to become one I/same but “eternal equality in loving” (1991, p. 245). Love of neighbor for him seems to have a wider scope than the praise of virtuous inclination between ontologically the same and equal persons. This view seems to neglect friendship as a way of life by reducing it widely to the domain of erotic love and hence sees its ethico-political meaning as a discriminatory. Yet, it is very influential about demonstrating the discriminatory attitudes and difficulties of the usual understanding of friendship about difference and equality. However, is there not any possible way of seeing friendship as non-discriminatory ethico-political relation without substituting it other concepts such as neighborhood, which seems universal and independent from particularities at first sight?

Up to this point, we have reflected on the ideas about friendship as an ethico-political concept. Yet, the names that we have referred so far tend to do so either by attempting the solving what the friend is or replacing it by another form of relationship such as neighborhood, citizenship etc. Aristotle was the first name in this chapter who examines the friendship as an ethico-political matter. Although he handles friendship without separating ethics from politics, he tries
to find a solution what the friend is. Following this, we have briefly touched upon the Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s understanding of friendship and their hesitations regarding its possible ethical consequences. Both see the friendship bearing the possibility of giving a way to discriminatory kind of ethics. Therefore, while Kant suggests a universal kind of friendship, i.e. friendship as an Ideal, Kierkegaard suggests us to turn our face to the neighborhood which is free from particularities in ethics but also letting differences to flourish. It seems that all these above-mentioned approaches do not meet our wish to see friendship as an ethico-political way of relationship without substituting it with another kind of relationship. Moreover, if they do so, we still cannot mention a kind of regarding the differences and considering the friends as not identical with ourselves. Thus, an understanding of friendship as a universal idea, which is riddled from pluralities for the sake of or instead of the equality needs to be questioned. Moreover, not to understand friends as absolutely equal and the community of equals as an end that is to be achieved might be the proper way of thinking the relationship between politics and friendship. Then, we may continue with how Arendt understands friendship for she may help us to think on the appropriateness/inappropriateness of defining friends as “other selves” by handling the friendship with the process of thinking, and aesthetic instead of treating it as a matter of justice but still as a matter of community and collective action.

Arendt, in her fascinating work *The Life of Mind*, states that experience of thinking needs solitude. However, solitude for Arendt is different from loneliness. While “solitude is that

Aristotle does not seem to suggest “a political friendship” as modern thinkers usually tend to do so by maintaining the distinction between ethics and politics. In a quite different manner from Plato’s “anti-politics”, in Aristotle there is a “para-political” understanding, according to Rancière. This does not ignore the aesthetic quality of the politics but tries to offer a kind of ethical solution to “the scandal” of the politics by “intertwining the egalitarian disruptive logic of freedom with the establishment of police order”, which reflects on details of life and renders things to appear in a particular way and as in a specific relation with the whole but he does this in a way that other possibilities are as non-existent or lacking the appropriate form (as cited in Plot, 2014, p. 100). Thus, this attempt to solve the matter of equality, justice, and freedom in a certain way by abolishing the original paradox, indeed abolishes similarly the political itself and hence unpredictability of both the phenomena that may gain the political meaning or their very similar institutions with the political itself, i.e. friendship in our case.
human situation in which I keep myself company”, “[l]oneliness comes about when I am alone without being able to split up two-in-one” (Arendt, 1978, p. 185). Solitude thinking involves in a dialog for Arendt. It duplicates the self or parts it in two and thinking becomes a dialog of these two. You are in the company of yourself in solitude; you take yourself as a friend in other words (Nixon, 2015, pp. 162-3). She is quite opposed to the both Platonic and Heideggerian thinking, which purport that plurality, difference does not come from the outside but “is inherent in every entity in the form of duality, from which comes unity as unification.” (Arendt, 1978, p. 184). Rather for her, difference or plurality comes from the outside and we are in the face of this endless world of appearances. However, by producing judgements, meanings regarding these appearances, bearing in the mind that truth and meaning are not the same things, is significant for her (Arendt, 1978, pp. 16,184). According to Arendt, we must examine relationships between things via their relation with the outside if we are looking for the difference: “To take a mere thing out of its context with other things and to look on it only in its “relation” to itself ... that is, in its identity, reveals no difference, no otherness” (1978, p. 184). Then, for her, activity of thinking does not unify the differences in One. Rather it is the very activity that splits One in two and involves in a dialog between these as in the case of friendship (1978, p. 185). Activity of thinking through friendship (with me and myself and, I and other), in this case, provides us difference, duality and otherness (1978, p. 187).

Arendt, in Kant’s Political Writings, is trying to emphasize the notion of plurality, when she suggests that his political ideas do not lie in his work on the morality as commonly thought, but in his ideas on aesthetics, i.e. critique of judgment, (1989, p. 17). Kant, in his writings on aesthetics, uses the concept of “sensus communis”, i.e. commonality of the sense and affection. Philosopher in Kant is a solitude being and his political attitude is commonly being a spectator, i.e. being a spectator in one’s own company. At this point, “inter-subjective” realm and friendship may appear as an expression of this plurality within dialog. It is a kind of duty that

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24 His attitude in French Revolution might be considered as an example for such a situation.
we should bear both for others and ourselves. By using imagination, Arendt ties the solitude with that of sensus communis, i.e. being among others. This implies that

[By the force of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of Kant’s world citizen. To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one’s imagination to go visiting. (1989, p. 43).

However, for Arendt, this never means that one can grasp what exactly occurs in other’s mind. Even if we put aside the question of whether empathy is possible or not, this imaginary act is not an absolute empathy among persons (1989, p. 43). If we put this in a proper way, with the help of the faculty of imagination we try to represent other’s thoughts/ideas to ourselves and think within plurality, hence we come closer to the Kantian conceptualization of “world citizen” that goes beyond the particularities for being able to think publicly. When one is in solitude, thinking publicly does not work with truth and knowledge, but merely by doxas; the ways in which other’s thoughts appears to one (Arendt, 1989, p. 55). For Arendt, knowledge of truth and the thinking regarding the truth should not be conflated since the former is related with the subordination of politics to the particular knowledge/truth, while latter implies a creation of meaning via imagination that “makes present what is absent, transforms the objects of objective senses into ‘sensed’ objects’” and hence thinking with the other (Bernstein, 2000, pp. 283-84; Arendt, 1989, p. 65). In her understanding similar to Kant, it is necessary to overcome (not annihilate) the subjective tastes, for sensus communis implies us that “the nonsubjective element in the nonobjective senses is intersubjectivity” (1989, p. 67). This is a kind of search for truth but what is valuable in here is the activity of thinking itself. Thus, besides the question of whether imagination leads to something new or it is merely the repetition of what have been already existed, Arendt seems to suggests that this indicates the other sense of the human being as Kant suggested: sense of community, i.e. sensus communis (1989, pp. 70-71). For Kant, according to Arendt, “sense of community” means a specific sense peculiar to human being, which “fit us into community”. It inevitably necessitates the coming closer with others when process of thinking occurs with the help of faculty of imagination regarding other’s judgement. Sense of community makes us getting out from ourselves, being and judging with others while creating a meaning within the act of thinking by liberating
ourselves from the “private conditions” of our own perceptions that conditions us (Arendt, 1989, p. 73). For her, this judging with others never means that judgements are produced by others’ concrete/real arguments. Rather for her “one acts with others, one judges by oneself”

In other words, she believes that other’s thoughts are represented to one who thinks in an imaginary fashion and this is a very public-spirited activity in its nature (Beiner, 1989, p. 92). Although in the last instance this is a solitary work, it is still clear that it cannot stem from solitude. “[T]hinking is Janus-faced, turning both inward towards solitary reflection and outwards towards dialog and discourse” (Nixon, 2015, p. 163).

Arendt states that “I have never in my life ‘loved’ any people or collective. . . . I indeed love ‘only’ my friends and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the love of persons.” (as cited in Nixon, 2015, p. 1). In other words, the object of love cannot be a kind of totality of people or collectivity but persons. She seems to say that the love which is identified with the nation or other kind of collectivities implies a mistake. Love which is directed to the Oneness might be destructive for politics because for she assumes plurality for politics to be. It needs being One for achieving the equality; whereas love of friendship assumes equality within plurality (Nixon, 2015, p. 28). On the other hand, human condition and being worldly necessitate plurality so that this kind of love is apolitical and even antipolitical according to her25. However, love between friends as opposed to the love of people or collective may be considered as a way to the collectivities, which never exhausts the singularities and difference, even feed by those singular relations between friends. Therefore, without reducing the politics into the blind attachment to the particular goals, identities of the collectivities, i.e. ideologies, friendship may suggest us another spontaneous way to politics which includes Arendtian

25 This needs a bit more explanation, I think. Arendt mentions three kinds of love in general: neighborly love (caritas), intimate love and love of friendship. She thinks that except the third one, the other two forms of love might fall short to considering the plurality and worldliness. The first one implies loving the other by being indifferent to her differences for Arendt. So, it is an antipolitical love for her. Although the intimate love bears the possibility of demonstrating “who somebody is”, one’s uniqueness and thus plurality, because one does so within a total unworldly concerns, it is a kind of apolitical relationship if not an antipolitical, for Arendt (Butorac, 2018, pp. 2-3). However, as we mentioned before Kierkegaard thinks in the opposite way. He thinks that neighborly love makes differences alive, whereas the intimate or erotic love make those disappear by desiring to be One, merging within the same body.
activity of thinking and also involving into the action with others. Of course, assuming that activity of thinking may also exist among concrete friends in the form of this above-mentioned suggestions seems possible. Only in this way, it seems that friends appear as the other not as mirror-like “other selves”.

According to Nixon, Arendt in a quite different way from Aristotle, is not concerned with friendship either as a concept or its different pure forms. Rather she treats friendship as a practice, “as something she did” (Nixon, 2015, p. 160). Because of this reason, it is seen as very pro-political phenomenon indeed. On the one hand, it is a practice, which one experiences with oneself within the activity of thinking, and on the other hand, it establishes the intersubjective realm by an activity of thinking together, i.e. within a dialog in world of plurality. So, beyond being a metaphor that implies the activity of thinking, as a practice friendship creates a public realm, a collective power through a “boundless dialog” aroused from the plurality. Therefore, it is a deed that oscillates between public and the private realm (Nixon, 2015, p. 173).

Against the implicit individualism of cogito ergo sum, friendship provides us with an image of the world as both a collective endeavor and a collective achievement. It is only because we are thinking beings that we are able to achieve a sense of collective purpose beyond the immediate ends and short-term outcomes of individual survival. (Nixon, 2015, p. 173).

Arendt sees friendship as a practice, which is different from the “transient” ones belonging to the sphere of the social (Nixon, 2015, p. 190). Although human condition is an immense plurality and hence suggests an uncertainty, for her as mentioned by Nixon, friendship (without the importance of its categories) is a vital element for human-flourishing by providing a trust, security, and continuity in the face of the endless plurality of worldly living (2015, pp. 58-59). Indeed, friendship also needs this plurality and mist of uncertainty for flourishing as “the power of promise of continuity” (2015, p. 59). She suggests in a flourishing of friendship trust and continuity exist despite the differences between friends. Indeed, this signifies us a kind of assumption of equality that friendship needs without the assumption of seeing the friends as other selves. She does not suggest for friendship as kind of precondition other than of mutuality, equality: “The equality between friends relies on the recognition by each of what is distinctive
and unique in the other” (Nixon, 2015, p. 171). “Friendship reaches out to the world. It refuses enclosure and exclusivity” (Nixon, 2015, p. 190).

It appears that friendship purports a kind of hermeneutic value and hence being a pro-political phenomenon for Arendt (Nixon, 2015, p. 28).

Conceived as a voluntary and mutual relationship -within which each friend recognizes and respects the equality and distinctiveness of the other- friendship becomes the microcosm of a pluralistic world based on the equal worth of each unique individual. (2015, p. 28).

This suggests a quite divergent understanding of public realm and hence politics as against one, which is caused by the rise of the social. Therefore, friendship gives us the sentiment of flourishing together and the possibility of collective action in spite of and thanks to our differences, distinctiveness in the age that public realm is invaded by the private realm and politics is not differentiated from the management/administration for Arendt according to Nixon (2015, p. 189). So, politics and collective action, according to Nixon in the Arendtian sense, may be understood as being practiced among the friends not in only metaphorical way but also literally.

Up until now, this kind of relation refers to citizenship and friends as “other selves” from Aristotle to Arendt (1978, p. 189), whether they relate these two by appealing to sameness in virtue, or communicability of human being via plurality. However, can friendship say something different to us? It seems that we stuck within the pro-political meaning of friendship derived from involving into dialog although it is quite obscure to state that a dialog between “other selves” assumes truly differences. Moreover, when friendship is the stake distinctions between I and other, also friends and other are presupposed. Instead of such distinctions, a kind of reversibility between self and other, and other and friend might be considered as Merleau-Ponty has reminded us in the previous chapter. Thus, we will try to follow this kind of traces for the remaining part of this chapter by mainly referring to Proust, and Derrida.

Marcel Proust in his magnificent novel In Search of Lost Time asserts that friendship is not a relationship in which we discover something new regarding the truth. For him, friendship
merely seeks a “self-confirmation” by dialog and conversation, which is involved with the other; it teaches us nothing regarding “the true difference” and it “is nothing but a lie that consists in making us believe that there are two of us” (as cited in Beistegui, 2013, p. 10). For Proust, friendship reveals a dull repetition and “indulges us with the illusion of a communication between souls” (Beistegui, 2013, p. 11). Only artistic expression, for him, and being exposed to sheer difference within the love (not a Christian otherworldly love, i.e. *caritas*, but *eros*), we may intend to the truth properly (2013, pp. 10-11). Therefore, we may conclude that besides seeing a hermeneutic value in friendship for the sake of difference, Proust sees it as a superficial experience bearing the significance for one’s self-confirmation within these superficial dialogs. Indeed, this “traditional pairing of friendship” is very poor in the face of plurality of the signifiers for Proust. Love, on the other hand, gives us a sea of significations to be reflected upon when we are in solitude. Artwork, also affects us in a similar way. Therefore, these experiences can change our perception and make us confront with the truth rather than poor discussions, in which assumes the other only as the self and hence consensus is assumed, with the friend (by alluding to Deleuze Karadağ, 2014, p. 70).

Deleuze (2000) in his work titled as *Proust and Signs* tells us that friendship “based on a community of ideas and sentiments” and this need conservation as a medium for emerging (pp. 29-30, 94-95). For this medium, agreement on the signs of the things must being agreed on for Proust and Deleuze (2000, p. 30). According to Deleuze, Proust thinks that this is like a swimming in known seas. Friendship and philosophy share this attitude for them because mind must be works with familiars, commonalities, established relationships and so on (Deleuze, 2000, pp. 94-95).

[P]hilosophy, like friendship, is ignorant of the dark regions in which are elaborated the effective forces that act on thought, the determinations that force us to think; a friend is not enough for us to approach the truth. Minds communicate each other only the conventional; the mind engenders only the possible. (Deleuze, 2000, p. 95).

What we need for the truth is not the communication, a dialog but interpreting signs that are being exposed (2000, p. 95). It appears that both Proust and Deleuze do not believe in any hermeneutic value of friendship as opposed to Arendt. However, we know that Proust in his above-mentioned work mentions friendship in its face value rather than focusing on the matter
deeply. In fact, he even talks within the framework, which traditionally advocates the friends as other selves. His approach is significant for deciphering how this traditional kind of understanding of friendship has no place for difference and truth. However, we need a kind of attitude that goes beyond this traditional understanding of friend as other selves, which is based on simply consensus by disenabling the creativity of the perceiving. This suggestion does not mean that we need another conceptualization of friendship in accordance with our understanding of politics. The question here is the appropriateness of this approach and it is believed that friendship indeed may suggest another way of relating with the other. Nevertheless, Proust’s approach to the matter of truth, love and art shows us a kind of relationship between aesthetic reception and truth in a different way from Arendt and Kant. Then, how and in what regards does friendship provide us a significant political meaning and hence political function rather than of assigned deliberative role among other selves? This seems possible via not only understanding friend as the other but also otherness in each, i.e. heterogeneity of the self (Karadağ, 2014, pp. 75-77). Without an assumption of particular subject, then, what makes us to think on the plausibility of thinking friendship as a way to collectivity as bearing the political significance? This seems as significant questions to be reflected upon in the next chapter.

Moreover, after mentioning the relationship between friendship and truth it is also significant to state that these names do not assume that politics is done through truth. Indeed, approaching the issue in this regard becomes quite wrong. However, as we discussed in the second chapter, we know that politics is related with intending to, searching for the truth without assuming a particular one as an absolute and thus administering or governing accordingly and then reducing politics to the latter. However, we have seen that Proust defends the idea that friendship does not provide us a hermeneutic value for searching the truth. Yet, this argument may be seen as obscure. Since he bases this argument on the very traditional, common way of understanding the friendship and even on the metaphor regarding the relationship between the self and the friend. So, seeing friendship as an outside to the politics as a distinct set of relations by assuming that it leads a consensus seems also not appropriate. Is it appropriate to see friendship as completely devoid of any kind of encountering regarding creativity and possibility of changing the perception? On the other hand, it seems that friend must tell us
something different than simply encountering with the other because of its place within our life, practices and so on. Then, how can we interpret the political meaning and hence function of the friendship though we cannot reach to a pure, compact conclusion?

In a similar way to Proustian understanding of friendship, some argues that friendship is a relationship that solely serves to the self-confirmation within the “community of ideas and sentiments” (if we use Deleuze’s words) hence seems bearing no political value beyond consensus or at least for our discussion of politics in the second chapter. They think that friendship is a biased and an irrational relationship that applies different standards to friends by partial epistemological intention (e.g. Stroud, 2006). This idea, actually, reflects a fear of a mode of togetherness that may converge into a tribal kind, which is composed of friends in an exclusionary way. We have pursued traces of this kind of concern in Kant’s and Kierkegaard’s understandings of friendship. Stroud thinks that persons may act toward their friends in a discriminatory way. This creates a kind of “epistemological bias” and partiality that is arisen from the will as an irrational type of the relationship; politics has to do with merely reason in this case for Stroud (2006, pp. 518-519). She continues her argument by saying that we justify, tolerate our friends’ wrong attitudes that of otherwise we would judge immediately (Stroud, 2006, p. 516). Indeed, this is arisen from the very essence of the friendship as a phenomenon for her; in other words, it must be partial by nature (2006, p. 449).

In a very similar vein, regarding the relationship between compassion and politics, it is thought that compassion or any emotion such as love can easily lead to a political paternalism, a sectarian understanding of politics. Henceforth, these may transform politics into a narrow and polarizing way of doing if they are not educated or controlled (for Faulkner, and Nussbaum as cited in Ure & Frost, 2014, s. 13-14). However, can we simply say that rationality gives us the universal, unbiased categories, and viewpoints regarding the politics and while emotions or personal relations “distort” the assumed nondiscriminatory politics? Indeed, there are many theories against the kind of understanding of politics that pushes the feelings, impulses, and desires outside of the “proper” way of politics.

Todd May in his book entitled as _Friendship in an Age Economics: Resisting the Forces of Neoliberalism_ by referencing Robert Lane mentions a tendency between friendship and
democratic politics (cf. 2014, pp. 125-127). In a very similar way with Stroud, Lane also suggests that democratic politics and public deliberation need to be distinguished from partiality of the personal relationships and to reach impartiality between fellow citizens (May, 2014, p. 126). A community of friends indeed conflicts with the practice of political solidarity by being private and hence exclusive according to this view (2014, p. 126). In other words, “[f]riendship can turn inward” (May, 2014, p. 127). Since, others who are not my friends does not seem as being a part of creating a meaning regarding my life because we do not exactly share the particular things among us (2014, p. 126). To conclude, Todd May thinks that these concerns are regarding a tension between friendship and egalitarian politics besides being a complementary to each other by not agreeing with them (2014, p. 125).

These arguments seem to be worth to bear in the mind because they are related with the specific understanding of politics that underestimates the relationship between different realms of life. However, maybe the political meaning of the friendship needs to be interrogated within this web of relations by questioning the understanding of the politics of those who abstain from associating the politics and the friendship for the sake of democratic politics. It seems that they mostly understand politics as the police (in Ranciérrian sense) by underestimating the effects of different realms of life on various ways of doing politics. Even, the appearance of politics within practices of those ignored realms of life and relations may be also the stake. By not agreeing totally with above-mentioned concerns, reconsidering the friendship as a spontaneous way to collectivities by handling the obscure limit that between friends and others without reducing the friendship to the other/enemy/stranger or treating it as a comradeship or civic friendship seem significant to be reflected on.

Derrida in his influential and subtle work The Politics of Friendship (2005) shows us how the understandings of friendship shape our doings in politics. Usually, it is regarded as a relationship between same ones (or as fraternity) and hence certain kind of distribution of justice and democracy are based on particular equality and reciprocity assumptions regarding the ontological relationship between friends. For Derrida, there is a non-foundational but also non-arbitrary relationship between ethics and politics, that is, he searches limits for proper derivation of understanding of politics from ethics (Critchley, 1998, p. 271). He suggests a kind
of understanding of politics that is based on decisions and taking the risk. However, this decision is nothing to do with belonging to the will of the subject or one’s consciousness but other’s decision in one, and there is no place for any plan in this kind of politics but merely open-ended process (Critchley, 1998, p. 263). Therefore, friendship helps us in this regard by suggesting a kind of aporetic relationship, i.e. by bearing within itself the decision of other, i.e. friends’. He finds inappropriate to ask what the friends is. The question of who the friend is is the one that opens us a way of seeing the democratic process that does not assimilate the political meaning of friendship to the ontological sameness. For Derrida, there arouses a kind of understanding, in conclusion, which proposes an endless openness to the other-in-me by seeing democracy as to come or tied with “perhaps”, i.e. “non-ecstatic experience of future” which is let by the experience of friendship that he suggests (Critchley, 1998, p. 260). In other words, he suggests a kind of “New International” which excludes all the understanding of friendship that are based on the reciprocity between similar or same ones rather poses a new relation between ethics and politics “as the art of a response to the singular demand of the other” (emphasis is original, Critchley, 1998, pp. 271, 274).

May objects Derrida’s claim by saying that the tension, which he establishes via his method of deconstruction between the friend and the other, or the enemy: “In the name of opening a space for the other, he deconstructs one of the social tools by which that space can be opened” (2014, p. 136). For his suggestion of friendship as carrying the enemy within itself, he sticks with in our age’s understanding of friendship and indeed deconstruct it instead of the friendship in general or the deep friendship (May, 2014, p. 134). So, as he cannot open the way for flourishing of the friendship for the sake of the democracy, also he repeats the insecurity and loneliness which are imposed upon us in our age, i.e. the neoliberal one, by understanding the democracy as never to come (2014, pp. 133-135). May elaborates very significant critique to Derridean understanding of democracy and friendship, which also reflects our reason to turn our face to the Rancièrian understanding of the politics and handling the political meaning of the friendship through it. However, Derrida’s thesis or aim will be influential for us and has some overlapping concerns at some points with ours. Interrogating the notion of friendship within its relation to the other, in order to reconsider whether it really provide us trustful, and peaceful relations and hence a community as such, is significant point to reflect on. Since,
trustful relationship means handling friend via its past, what the friend is. Thus, rethinking the transposing limit or semi-permeable practices within the relationship between friend and the other yet not understood within Derridean perspective will be significant for us. This is nutritious because helps us to appear how an equality as a presupposition which belongs to both friendship and politics creates interwoven practices. Thanks to this tension, as a community of equals, friendship gains the political characteristic and meaning by itself and hence implies us a kind of way for democratic/political struggle. Therefore, in the next chapter we will be discussing this relation and its significance for perceiving the already existing ties provided by friendship, which may pave the way for emerging new democratic collectivities.
CHAPTER 4

RETHINKING FRIENDSHIP AS A WAY TO COLLECTIVITY

In the previous chapters, the meaning of politics different from what is commonly described as politics and the political meaning of the friendship from different perspectives have been discussed. It was necessary to consider the meaning of the politics first, since without this effort, the political meaning of the friendship remains irrelevant to us. This attempt has significant effects on rethinking the friendship as occasioning new forms of togetherness or as a way to collectivity. Therefore, it was crucial to examine the political meaning of the friendship through different lenses. Furthermore, thinking about these points may expand our horizon since the possibility of these new communities is imagined through the intrinsic relation of friendship within them. Thus, without falling into the trap of considering ways for democratic participation to the process of governing from a one-dimensional perspective, noticing the political meaning of the practice or experience of our daily life, i.e. friendship in our case, seems significant for us. If we consider politics as a “process of subjectivization” and as a matter of equality, friendship would not only make us experiencing the dilemmas of the community of equals without the importance of its scale. In addition to this, it also enables us to envisage another way to community/collectivity rather than of “police order” that encapsulates us because process of subjectivization cannot be separated as a process from friendship.

26 The relationship between the politics and the friendship will be interrogated for its implications on creating the new communities/collectivities. However, there arises a need for making a distinction between collectivity and community yet it will be a weak one but enough for our purposes for now. While community is usually treated as a unity that is assumed as constituted by organically linked parts, collectivity is used for referring more flexible togetherness which is constituted for transient and spontaneous interests, purposes and so on. However, it is thought that, in this thesis, thinking both is possible without maintaining the dichotomy and clear-cut distinction between modes of togetherness and individual parts. Thus, attributing them a common interest that is to be achieved, identity or subjectivity, is not the stake (cf. Delanty, 2010; Tönnies, 2001).
It might be plausible to begin with raising some arguments regarding the concept of community. Some (e.g. Delanty, 2010) argue that renouncing foundations, subjectivities, and symbolic ties in relation to communities is related with the postmodernity. In this sense:

[Community] is to be found in a re-enchantment of everyday life and no longer in the margins of society; in postmodern society, marginality is everywhere. Postmodern communities are nomadic, highly mobile, emotional and communicative. (Delanty, 2010, p. 104).

In other words, it must be received, or thought as an “aesthetic sensibility” rather than of symbolic totality, or unity (Delanty, 2010, p. 104). However, as we discussed in the first chapter, rather than associating the issue with a certain time period, Rancière refers this heterogeneity and liminality of the community not as a matter of a certain era but sees the institution of the community itself from the very outset. Communities have been begun to be thought as always falling short to their political programs and hence on the shore of their own disappearance, if they are treated not as process but as a sensory reality (Rancière, 2014, p. 76). While for Rancière they bear this quality due to the very institution of the politics from the very beginning, Derrida sees this as a risk of the political decision, which does not ultimately lead to progress or success. Although Delanty treats these reflections on community as an outcome of postmodernity rather than of thinking it as intrinsic to this relation itself, his reflections, which are based on several critical thinkers, such as Blanchot, Nancy, and Derrida, on the issue might help us to connect the ties between the friendship and the community. Thus, let us now look more in detail to this issue by referring names who discuss the possibility and the meaning of a community without sharing anything but as an experience or a practice of the sharing itself.

4.1 Community as a “Sharing without Anything to Share”

According to Delanty, Derrida, Blanchot, and Nancy are among the thinkers who see a core within the friendship regarding the experience of the community “as a loss” and “unlike nostalgic pleas for the recovery of community, [such conceptualizations of community as a loss] see community as impossible to realize.” (2010, p. 107). “Subjectivity” is not the center of this kind of understanding of community, and for Delanty, this position (which we owe to
Foucault and Derrida according to him) leads another one, which bases community on “neither individualism nor collectivity but is based on sharing.” (2010, p. 109). “Temporary groupings” that emerge by the flux of the everyday life and experiences are thought as the “new” mode of being a community (by alluding to Maffesoli, Delanty, 2010, pp. 110-111). Besides thinking “groundless” community within the flux of everyday life as the sole postmodern way of being together as in the case of Delanty’s analysis, is it possible to think the friendship as a relation or a practice, which enables different communal/collective energies to flourish? Without either treating friendship as sameness or reducing it to the otherness and comradeship by forgetting about the experience of the friendship itself, can it make us see another possibility of being together that is different from before? Delanty thinks that friendship is an appropriate form of relationship for post-modern communities because it is both “flexible” and “de-territorial” as oppose to the familial, communitarian bonds (2010, pp. 114-5). These assumed qualities of friendship might purport significance for some for establishing a relationship between friendship and “post-modern” communities. At this point, it seems significant to state that political meaning of friendship in its relation to community or collectivity must not be reduced to the needs of certain time period. In other words, friendship purports a political significance not because it corresponds to the needs of post-modernity but because it bears within itself the same presupposition with politics: equality. Can we not think that forms of togetherness may be linked with a kind of emancipatory politics without any assumption of sameness of its parts, transcendental meanings, specific roles assigned to its parts within a particular political program? It seems to be very hard mission to be completed yet friendship, which bears within itself the presupposition of equality, and therefore similar to the institution of politics in Rancière’s thought, may enable us to reconsider becoming together in this regard.

Instead of thinking friendship as a relationship for creating the (postmodern) communitarian forms of togetherness as has done so far, still carrying this discussion by referring to the relationship between community and friendship will help us for thinking friendship as a way to new forms of being together. Moreover, this approach is also meaningful particularly within the age of individualism. For this concern, first of all community in terms of sharing, commonality will be interrogated. Next, the difference between sharing property and sharing nothing as a community and what this difference designates in its relation to political meaning
of the friendship will be the focal points for coming part of this chapter. Finally, we will search for how friendship as a way to community designates us as a political significance. While thinking on this matter, we will try to suggest an equality, for it is both presupposed by friendship and Rancière’s understanding of the politics, as a way to community/collectivity because it helps us to handle friendship and its political meaning as a relation and practice rather than of ontological status of sharing the same qualities. In this manner, Esposito, will help us for canalizing the previous discussion on the political meaning of friendship to the community discussion.

Esposito thinks that we have to rethink community however it should be done so in a manner that is different from treating it as “a ‘property’ belonging to subjects that join them together [accomuna]: an attribute, a definition, a predicate that qualifies them as belonging to the same totality, or as a substance that is produced by their union.” (2010, p. 2). For him, commonality is seen as a property among persons that is already shared or planned to be so but it may be plausible to think community without sharing anything, an expectation of equal turn, i.e. giving without equal turn, a void, distance (2010, pp. 3, 5, 7). He suggests a kind of understanding of community that is not a “mode of being” and “totality of persons” which persons are tied to each other via a common property, or an addition to what they are but merely by giving without an equal turn, i.e. subtraction, a sheer openness to other (2010, pp. 6, 7).

Neither is community to be interpreted as a mutual, intersubjective ‘recognition’ in which individuals are reflected in each other so as to confirm their initial identity; as a collective bond that comes at a certain point to connect individuals that before were separate. (Esposito, 2010, p. 7).

Then, if rather than understanding community as sharing the common or as coming across in a context how could a community, and also collectivity for our concern, be reconsidered? He suggests us a new way of considering the nihilism and community together for putting aside both above mentioned understanding of community that ties individuals to each other (2010, p. 137). Considering these two together reveals that members of the community are no longer identical with their themselves but are constitutively exposed to a propensity that forces them to open their own individual boundaries in order to appear as what is ‘outside’ themselves. From this point of view, the figure of the other returns to full
view, breaking with every continuity between ‘common’ and ‘proper,’ linking the ‘common’ instead to the improper. If the subject of community is no longer the ‘same,’ it will by necessity be an ‘other’; not another subject but a chain of alterations that cannot ever be fixed in a new identity (emphasis added 2010, p. 138).

This quite long quotation, rather than suggesting “a supplementary subject” or meaning which is aroused within a process of the subjectivization within community, attempts to reveal the absence of subjectivity, identity and property (2010, p. 138). In other words, “[it is] never a point of arrival but always one of departure”; community always bears the risk of “suddenly falling into the nothing of the thing” (Esposito, 2010, p. 140). Thus, without coming to terms with a kind of nihilism that purports the impossibility of the community and without renouncing the necessity of purpose, property or identity that are thought as shared for being a community or collectivity, it in fact seems impossible to notice being enveloped by pre-established roles, conducts, meanings or identities. This vision seems to be helpful for comparing it with Rancièrian understanding of the politics and the community, thus rethinking friendship as a way of community and a new way to collectivity. Since, equality as presupposition of the politics in Rancièrian terms seems to render friendship also as a way to collectivity, which lets “the sharing without sharing” anything at all (Agamben, 1998, p. 121). Rather than emphasizing “the loss” as Esposito does, Rancière chooses bringing the process of subjectivization, i.e. appearance of the supplementary subject, in to the front as opposed to the settled communities governed by the police order. However, these subjectivities are also condemned to be disappear and against the established ones.

Rancière’s emphasis is on the process of subjectivization and the force of this process on the police order rather than of simply holding on particular appearance of the subject. Then, friendship appears as the key way of relation and practice because it assumes from friends a recognition of equal capacity of all. Moreover, friendship dissolves if there is no such a presupposition of equality because in this case one of them attributing herself/himself a superior quality for creating the true meaning regarding a life. Therefore, what seems significant in this regard is that friends have this insight among themselves and spreading this via practices and experiences, which friendship precedes or by which friendship engenders, may create an atmosphere and new way for emerging of the collectivities as a process not as a
mode of being. Since, friendship as a relation provides us if not an aporetic but open process of becoming and practices, which in each instant presupposition of equality of all has to be considered. Therefore, without an imposition of one’s truth on the other, non-destructive forms of togetherness and collectivities may flourish. Also, friends as ones experiencing the life itself via practices in which they involve together have the power of revealing the wrong that has done within the police order. Still, the distinction that whether through these above-mentioned practices friendship occurs or friendship precedes these practices (although these may not be seen as mutually exclusive to each other) is quite conflicting. Choosing either this or that may deceive us from seeing how a complex relationship the friendship is and its various implication on the politics. It even revives, in a sense, a poor discussion that we mentioned in the previous chapter concerning whether citizens because of sharing some practices may be seen as friends.

Up until now, it appears so that these names somehow may agree on the idea that community cannot be treated in itself as an objective end. Also, they are not a mode of being which can put forward an end, purpose for themselves. Therefore, sharing property is essentially seen as never possible for community. Community in our case, thence, suggests if not literally “the border” or “the point of transit between. . . immense devastation of meaning and the necessity that every singularity, every event, every fragment of existence make a sense in itself” as Esposito states but in a sense implies, in Rancièrean sense, being on the shore of its own disappearance (2010, p. 149). In other words, “[it] refers to the singular and plural characteristic of an existence free from every meaning that is presumed, imposed, or postponed” rather there needs always an appearance of what is unthought (Esposito, 2010, p. 149).

Todd May, by examining the friendship with the help of the shared practices among friends and “the process of subjectivization”, suggests another insight regarding the community of equals mostly by reflecting on the importance of trust and collective solidarity for the democracy/politics in a Rancièrean sense. May, in his book Friendship in an Age of Economics, examines the themes of relationship between friends and possible contribution of these for the political action or solidarity. He has chosen friendship as an object of inquiry not because it is a free realm from the injection of neoliberal life styles in our lives but for its being a “common aspect of human life” (2014, p. 59). For him, there is no need to look further revolutionary
change to resist current dominations of both economic and political systems. Rather change
can be possible through looking closer to our home, daily practices. So, “whether friendship
provide us tools not only to create an alternative to neoliberal values and lifestyles, but
whether it can begin to found an active resistance to it” is his concern (2014, p. 121). While
doing that, he firstly examines the categories of friendship established by Aristotle (cf. May,
2014, pp. 57-79). Yet, May’s concern is not examining “the broader question of how friendship
and politics interact” (2014, p. 124). Therefore, he sees examining the “deep friendship” or
“close friendship” as more plausible in relation to democracy and collective solidarity although
other forms also cannot be reduced into the market relations (pp. 62-63). However, deep
friendship provides us something different from the other types of friendship, which are similar
to the Aristotelian categories of utility and pleasure friendships (cf. pp. 79-107). “Living
together”, “shared experience”, “communication”, and “shared history”, therefore, by the
effects of these “trust”, “no accounting”, no “replaceability” of deep friends (i.e. emphasis on
their singularities) are some of those above-mentioned themes of deep friendship. These may
be seen as destructive for today’s economic and political domination, which make us lonely,
desperate and folding up to our private spheres and individualistic lives for May.

Deep friendship, according to May, provides us “safe havens” for reflecting upon a life, being
preserved from the values of the prevailing order through its above-mentioned qualities (2014,
p. 128). May thinks that deep friendship by deepening, intensifying the life through living
together and communication creates a radical alternative form of community as contrary to the
current neoliberal one, which advocates no commitment, unavoidable risk, insecurity and so
on (by referring to Little, pp. 65, 90-91, 99-100, 117). For May, there is no space for accounting
in deep friendship and hence no “expectation of return” as in the case of the age of economics
(pp. 108-109). For him, Derrida is wrong when he derives the conclusion from the relationship
between “gift-giving” and friendship. Derrida thinks that “[t]here would be no friend that, in
giving to another, would not already have involved herself in the economy of debt and return”
in May's words, 2014, p. 111). In other words, for Derrida according to May, this quality is an
embedded part of the friendship. That is, there is a kind of accounting in friendship. May
objects this understanding by saying that deconstructing the gift giving activity without
consideration of close friends’ all shared history, their creation of meanings regarding life via
living together is indeed irrelevant (2014, p. 111). For May, “[f]riendship can develop an interpersonal realm in which the economy of gift and return begins to lose its grip” (2014, p. 111). All these, for May, are related with a kind of misunderstanding of the deep friendship and thus deconstructing the kind of friendship that neoliberalism suggests us, i.e. not the deep one. These qualities such as accounting, insecurity, and loneliness, which are seen as embedded to the friendship, are indeed because of the misinterpretation of the phenomenon for him. Indeed, this deconstructive approach to the concept of friendship is mostly aroused from taking seriously the metaphor of love and friendship, which treats lovers and friends as “a single entity” (2014, p. 115). There are, of course, borders, distances between friends and even between lovers. What happens in friendship is that these borders are little effacing because of the shared activities or sharing the life itself. May emphasizes that notions such as absolute distance, being incapable of touching other’s life or insoluble loneliness mislead us to see friendship as an alternative and as a way of resistance to the neoliberal forces. Rather, “deep friendships lend meaningfulness to the lives of friends”; “[w]e not only inhabit our own lives, but can step into the stream of other lives” (May, 2014, p. 116). Therefore, these basic qualities of close friendships must tell us something regarding the resistance to the prevailing order and creating the collective solidarity. Both by preserving its internal dynamics as opposed to the infusion of the ways of relating which are supposed by the economic and the political order and spontaneously transferring its way of relating with the other to the politics, we can draw an alternative route for democracy according to May.

If we summarize what these transferable characteristics of friendship for the politics are, for May, they can be gathered under the presupposition of equality in Rancièrean sense. For him, thinking friend as an equal does not mean that being an equal in measure or characteristics (2014, p. 128). Aforementioned kind of equality, indeed, lets people differentiate from each other. Disagreement or conflict are also not ignored in this type of equality. There is no possibility of being “immune” to one’s mistakes (May, 2014, p. 131). Still, “[t]o act democratically is to act collectively on the presupposition of the equality of anyone and everyone” for Rancière (May, 2014, p. 130). Therefore, deep friendships provide us a “training of trust” for democracy and the politics in the Rancièrean sense, which is “to act with a sort of collective trust” (May, 2014, p. 130). Furthermore, we can imagine the expansion of this web
of friends so that as in the case of the close friendships, we can involve in relationship or action with “those whose stakes are importantly our stakes”. This creates a web of solidarity, which is “the collective presupposition of equality” (May, 2014, pp. 130, 131). Deep friendship as a relationship between equals may help us to overcome our loneliness in this system and the trust embedded in the relation may lead a collective solidarity as opposed to the dominations, and the particular “wrongs” that we face within the police order (2014, pp. 131, 137). As opposed to the Proustian understanding of the friendship which connotes no hermeneutic value, according to May, close friends open themselves to each other and share/discuss their hopes, regrets, and so on intimately (2014, p. 139). They imagine another world together by changing the current social norms within deeply trust, which they build within their community of equals. These practices may make people involve into collective political action easier because they have already accustomed to live and act together by assuming other as an equal. In sum, rather than understanding friendship as merely a distance that cannot be overcome and thus a negative political meaning, May sees it as a home or school in which we learn how to relate with others and about collectivity, and solidarity. Therefore, he suggests a kind of maxim regarding the relationship between friendship and the democracy/politics: “I can display a readiness to trust others, to respect them, that stems from my experience with my close friends but need not rise to the level of that experience.” (2014, p. 138).

On the other hand, some (e.g. Mentinis, 2015), pose a kind of critique of thinking the political meaning of friendship with the implications of Rancière’s theory, i.e. thinking it through the presupposition of equality and sharing. Instead of thinking friendship as a kind of solidarity which implies a kind of sharing of the “similar values, common interest or trust”, we must consider on its being an act as “a new grammar” of relating with the other that “disturbs the established rules of relating” (2015, pp. 67, 71, 73). Moreover, this implies not a comfort or trust within the warm womb of the friendship but a sheer risky act which always open to losing both the self and the other (2015, p. 64). In addition, this is possible only through Derridean understanding of friendship, for Mentinis, which tones in an anarchistic way by suggesting both “disidentification of the individual”, i.e. losing the “subject’s wholeness”, and “dislocation of community” (2015, pp. 64,69). When friendship is seen as an act without an essence, perfect form and hence as a radical way of relating with the other, the need of
appealing to it by reducing it to the feeling of friendliness for its implications for politics is dismissed. For Mentinis this tendency indeed leads to a “psychological kit” for consolidating already established ties and relationships, and hence “standardized phrases and behaviors” as in the case of citizenship (2015, pp. 65-66). Therefore, posing the first one and mentioning its radical implications as “a new grammar of relating” and hence as a “site of resistance” indeed necessitates dismissing the feeling friendliness but treating the friendship itself as a way to the political without a proper form. Then, there appears another significant confusion, i.e. treating the friendship as a “comradeship”, which according to Mentinis still “fails to examine the broader psychological constitution of the contemporary subject and its relational fabric” (2015, p. 67). In other words, Mentinis compares the Derridean understanding of friendship and its political constitution with that of Rancière’s but he does this using the May’s suggestion of “deep friendship” through inspiration by Rancière’s political theory, which will be dealt with. “Deep friendship” for May “negates utility and the predominant economic logic and in doing so constitutes a site of resistance”; and one which “based on ‘other -regarding,’ ‘affection,’ ‘shared past,’ and ‘meaning,’ ‘trust,’ ‘mutual self-development,’ and ‘self-invention’” (Mentinis, 2015, p. 67). Understanding the friendship as such seems to mean, for Mentinis, that it is treated as a kind of contribution to the general understanding of the politics. To put in a different way, its political meaning is disregarded. Rather, it is treated as a means to be used in the politics and hence its own political meaning is disregarded. Thus, Mentinis sees these kinds of approaches as also reducing the friendship's political meaning to the comradeship (although it may still be significant effort) but not intending to the intrinsic political meaning of the friendship (2015, pp. 67,69). So, he suggests “re-inventing” the friendship and “what it means to be a person and what it means to be in a community with others” instead of choosing the proper form of it among already categorized ones, i.e. perfect friendship (2015, p. 69). This “re-inventing” is significant for “different understanding of friendship is tightly linked with the project of building a different kind of community” (Mentinis, 2015, p. 69). Therefore, he prefers to understand community in a way that Esposito suggests and argues that friendship “as an act of relating that opens up the self, blurs its boundaries, and engenders a certain leakage of subjectivity” (2015, p. 70). Therefore, friendship is seen as having the potentiality of creating a leakage within both subjectivity and hence a kind of understanding of community that is based on shared values and common interests. Derridean risk and uncertainty of friendship may
indeed pave the way for community, which does not have rules, purposes, and laws that are beforehand decided, established and promoted in a sense. By producing its own law, conduct and meaning friendship shows a kind of anarchistic way of relating. Friendship in this understanding “exposes us to the most extreme risk: that of losing, along with our individuality, the border that guarantee its inviolability with respect to others” (Mentinis, 2015, pp. 74,75).

So, above mentioned risk creates the radical relating to the other and hence a kind of community, which is enveloped with this risk; and this risk-taking nature of friendship indeed engender a kind of resistance by “disturbing the individual closure and immunity” (2015, p. 75). In other words, only within this risk of losing the self is the “condition of thinking and resistance” and the only relationship that can bring these two together is the friendship for Mentinis (2015, p. 76). In conclusion, friendship is the sole way of relating with the other because in essence it does not suggest an essence. Do sharing and solidarity have to conclude in a kind of reductionist understanding regarding the political meaning of friendship? Indeed, is not it possible to handle friendship as “sharing without sharing” as Agamben reminds us before? Maybe, sharing not a property, purpose and so on but a life process itself and hence becoming within a process of subjectivization together reminds us the political meaning of friendship as a way to collectivity. In this way, maybe, it is possible not to associate friendship with some ontological sameness and we see the friendship as a way of relating that “break[s] from the rigidness of the norms defining who can relate with whom in what terms” (Mentinis, 2015, p. 74). Why does Mentinis’ approach need to conflict with the implications of Rancière’s understanding of politics for the political meaning of friendship? From now on, thinking on the possibility that there is not such a conflict and hence similar institution of both the politics and friendship therefore plausibility of thinking friendship as a way to community, which is different in kind from as it is understood in an essential way will be our concern. By thinking on the political meaning of the friendship in this manner, Webb’s (2003) understanding of friendship as “a practice”, or “shared experience makes us to see the links between Rancière’s understanding of the politics and friendship as another way to collectivity. Since he handles
the relationship between politics and friendship by not holding on some ontological presumptions about the latter but merely by seeing friendship as practicing together\textsuperscript{27}.

Webb criticizes the examining friendship by reducing it to “a single formal determination”, i.e. an aporia, or contretemps, as in the case of Derrida’s understanding (2003, p. 137). In other words, Webb thinks that besides seeing one’s relationship with her friends as undecidable, Derrida’s understanding attempts to define friendship as if it needs to be actualized within a single form. For him, seeing friendship as having “no form of its own” is more plausible because it is a way of relating with the other but this appears within a complex web of relations and conditions (2003, p. 138). So that, “there is no essence of friendship, no true friendship, and no true friend. What comes first the shared experience” (2003, p. 138). Therefore, the matters of undecidability and singularity of friendship appear as arising afterwards this shared experience or practice for him. He understands friends as “whom we share the practice of becoming who we are.” (2003, p. 120). Since, he finds this understanding quite closer to our daily life experience of friendship but in Derrida’s account political meaning of the friendship is obstructed (2003, pp. 120,135). Rather than “exacerbating such difficulties”, which are posed in Derridean sense of friendship, for him “[f]riends may share a similar relation to the conditions” within the process of self-examination, experience of “the care of the self\textsuperscript{28}” (2003, p. 135). Friendship as “the care of the self” remains, indeed, not a static relationship that can be treated as “a direct relation between friends” but the one which appears within the complex web of relations and as a part of the experience of becoming the self “enriches and partially

\textsuperscript{27} Webb does this with the help of Foucauldian understanding. We did not mention Foucault’s understanding of friendship in the previous chapter because he does not take the friendship as a main object of interest but only examines the role of it on the matter of “self-technologies” and “the care of the self” and hence some political premises within it. Of course, this tiny but meaningful understanding makes our work much easier to see friendship as a practice. Yet doing this through Webb’s understanding seems more appropriate than directly using the Foucauldian framework by its own (cf. Webb, 2003; Foucault, 1997, s. pp.135-40).

\textsuperscript{28} “The care of the self” is used by Foucault as one’s intensification of the relation with herself through different kind of activities, practices, that is, “cultivating the self through a daily practice of reflection and self-examination.” (Webb, 2003, pp. 131-32).
shapes a contingent becoming” (2003, pp. 126,127). Rather than seeing the friend as being open to the other, exterior as conditioned by certain way, he seems to suggest by sharing the experience, involving into practice of self-examination, friendship becomes as a way to becoming of oneself. Thus, this kind of relation is seen as a kind of “transformative” because “contribution of [each’s] future history” is at stake rather than of emphasizing the aporetic, indeterminate nature of it (Webb, 2003, p. 134). In this type of understanding, each friendship is peculiar, and emerges as a singular experience: “Friends itself will always be more than its conditions of possibility” (Webb, 2003, p. 123); and therefore, it may conduce to singular constellations of meanings and practices via this experience of the friendship. In sum, if we are to restate Webb’s understanding of friendship, it may be plausible return to his words with this quote:

Friends are. . . those whose paths of becoming are most closely aligned with my own. In contrast to the classical formulation of the problem of friendship, it is a matter of secondary importance whether my friend is like me or unlike me. What matters most is the practice we share and the paths that we follow. (2003, p. 136).

Although Webb, through Foucault’s framework, suggests us very inspiring approach to the friendship as a practice, we may question whether seeking the condition of possibility of friendship or choosing the believing it as tied with certain kind of presupposition means reducing it to the certain way of doing, and preventing political significance of the friendship to appear. If we assume the equality as the sole condition of possibility of politics, in Rancièrian way, and indeed holding on it as the politics itself, then, thinking friendship as a shared experience, practice, and hence as a way to community/collectivity, instead of an aporia, seems plausible. Also, this may imply, by the Rancièrian understanding of the politics, “sharing the wrong” within the order and making other distribution of the sensible possible by the experience of friendship through the process of subjectivization. However, while thinking in this regard, trying to show that this kind of understanding of friendship does not mean necessarily reducing it to comradeship (as opposed to Mentinis’ critique as mentioned before) but also not assuming friend merely the other will be an important task for us. Since, in this thesis internal political meaning of the friendship is our concern rather than of using it as the political means.
Before reflecting on the above-mentioned points, and questions, it is significant to remember that equality in Rancièrian terms must be understood in a quite different way from understanding it as being equal in condition or. Rather, as we elaborate it in the first chapter accordingly with the aesthetic regime of arts, it emphasizes that each has the capacity, and power of creating the meaning, which is equal in value even those who have the power to govern suppose and declare the opposite. This equal capacity to create meaning regarding the world, one’s life or the sensible in general and asserting the equal visibility of all are applicable to both friendship and the politics. Whereby this kind of equality literally living together with our friends and assuming a distance or a leak by which others and other selves may be articulated to this practice are enabled hence being visible the new way to communities and political collectivities.

4.2 Rethinking on the Limits of Political Collectivity within the Limits of Friendship

Up until now, we face with a kind of convergence upon points as not assuming sameness in friendship and not necessarily sharing a thing such as identity, property, and purpose and within the friendship. Moreover, similarities do not belong to the friendship for those because it is thought that, in the last instance, sharing a thing assumes some kind of assumptions of subjectivity. Therefore, understanding the political meaning of the friendship through sharing both neglects the heterogeneous becoming of the individual and the friendship itself. Whether friendship is an act, a practice, or a relation is also another point of discussion but it seems to be roughly accepted that friendship cannot be assumed as a static relation, which is outside of the practice or the experience itself. In other words, there is no true essence of friendship that is established merely between the souls of the ontologically equivalent persons. Hence, different encounters occasion different beginnings and experiences of friendship. According to Elizabeth Telfer, friendship is “a quasi-aesthetic attitude” and most of the time related with “finding a person to one’s taste” (1991, pp. 253,254). Yet, this liking does not necessarily conclude in shared-experience and hence friendship. For her part, this quasi-aesthetic manner is related with the “desire to be other selves” instead of finding the perfect match (1991, p.
267). Not seeing the other as oneself (hence calling friends as “the other selves”) but desire to be another person within a different world, and thus creating this another world together are at stake here. Therefore, not the political implications of different understandings of friendship but what friendship in itself as a relation, and practice implies us politically is our concern. Because of this reason, without refusing sharing, commonality, and hence solidarity merely because they remind us peculiar kind of doing politics, we will try to show the links between those and the friendship of course by keeping the all above mentioned approaches and critiques in the mind.

The relationship between solidarity and friendship becomes usually a problem when the political meaning of the latter is at stake. Solidarity is thought as the notion, which renders friendship politically relevant because it is treated as translatable to the language of collectivities. However, Brunkhorst states that solidarity is a matter of society [Gesellschaft] not a community [Gemeinschaft] (2005, p. 4). This seems to imply the idea that there may be a need for establishing or constituting the lines of solidarity between the citizens, or creating a kind of friendliness/friendly relation among them. Then, in friendship, if we see it as a community of equals, there may exist another kind of relation, which does not entail solidarity. Only by the medium of solidarity, a kind of friendliness can be created within societies. Solidarity seems to be as remedy to the “lost organic relations” among friends. Yet, Walhof suggests that we can mention also solidarity among friends. Noticing or discovering the temporary and partial solidarities and hence emphasizing the transitivity of the bonds of solidarity between friends to fellow citizens seems more proper for some phenomenological viewpoints (2006, p. 571). He handles friendship and its relation with the solidarity not as a matter, which is merely between two persons, but as related with a kind of exploring the commonalities between the parts of the whole (2006, p. 572). However, as he quotes from Gadamer, solidarity is nothing to do with a consciously shared political interest or it does not assume necessarily any likeness, or being same with the other (2006, pp. 573,574-575). Rather it is a matter of practice and besides creating them for some political reasons, political

29 He refers to Durkheim.
communities for Gadamer rest on these solidarities and “democratic politics can and ought to help disclose them, bringing them to awareness” (Walhof, 2006, p. 575). However, neither understanding these solidarities as naturally given or organically existing nor creating the new ones is the stake. For them these similarities are the prevailing ones although not preventing the differences. So, for Walhof, it seems plausible to handle Gadamerian understanding of friendship as a “life together” (in a literal sense) and “reciprocal co-perception” with the solidarity. Although friends are different and distinct individuals, by the practice of living together and the effort for understanding the other, they are already in a process of disclosing the ties. Actually, this process is intrinsically related with the literally living together (Walhof, 2006, pp. 576-77). For instance, if there is an assumption of knowing the other in a complete way, this may indeed put an end to this relation because “friends have an unpredictable quality about them.”; “a friend must be other” (2006, p. 582). “Co-perception” within a life together seems then an infinite process. In sum, for Walhof, “the phenomenon of friendship highlights and makes us attuned to the disclosure of new ways in which fellow citizens’ lives are intertwined.” (2006, p. 584). This understanding seems to derive norms belonging to the friendship and transfer them to the citizenship rather than reducing it to the first one or besides establishing the analogy between these two (2006, p. 583). In other words, handling the solidarity as a mediating concept between friendship and citizenship is more plausible, for Walhof, “especially when conceptualized in Gadamerian terms as referring to historically contingent manifestations of particular things that is shared” (emphasis belongs to me, 2006, p. 583). Since, as friends, in a way, being exposed (not used in a pejorative way) to each other within the life together, and “through this mutual exposure we come to see each other and ourselves in new, sometimes surprising ways, thereby helping the reveal previously unrecognized bonds of solidarity.” (2006, p. 585). In this way according to Walhof, the other remains not completely other or treated as the same and this is a significant political task that we have to perform (2006, p. 588). Then, there may again arise the confusion, which is mentioned before as conflating the political meaning of friendship with the kind of feeling of friendliness. Although this is a significant matter to be discussed for the politics, instead of suggesting this transitivity of the borders of solidarity from friends to fellow citizens, focusing on the role of the solidarity within the process of subjectivization, which is weaved by the practice of friendship seems more proper for our concern.
May suggests that solidarity seems to make the process of subjectivization as against to the police order more visible by claiming being equal with those who uproot the order (2008, p. 117). However, what is the relationship between solidarity and the process of subjectivization, which cannot be seen separate from the practice of friendship? Would not it be possible to think that friendship as a way to collectivity makes us experience this process within the friendship itself? Would not the practices within the friendship make one appear as the political subject? Solidarity seems appearing afterwards to this process of subjectivization in Rancièrean term. To put in a different way, I partially agree with Walhof because of his handling solidarity as aroused from the experience, practice of the friendship. Hereafter solidarity seems having the implication for more general struggles and hence maybe for occasioning to new collectivities for him. Solidarity may be the significant medium between friendship and collectivity because it reminds us the contingent distinction between the friend and the other and working as a glue that ties various processes of subjectivization together. Still, we do not need such a medium for revealing friendship’s internal ties with the collectivity and hence with the politics/political. Assuming of equality which is at the beginning of friendship seems strong enough for not necessitating the solidarity among friends and also appealing it as the sole link among friendship and collectivity yet might be the significant one.

Todd May studies Rancière’s political thought through taking the presupposition of equality as the center and he distinguishes Rancière’s understanding from other philosophers/theoreticians who study the relationship between distribution and the equality by separating equality in two different categories: a “passive equality” and an “active equality” (2008). For May, demanding equality by laws, state regulations or assuming it as having been already provided by the community of equals is a passive equality. On the other hand, demonstrating/asserting equality by interrupting or disrupting the order without demand of any corresponding right, regulation is the “active equality” which is at stake in Rancièrian political thought (Baiocchi & Connor, 2013, pp. 90-91; May, 2008, pp. 47,49,70). As we mentioned before, in Rancière’s understanding of presupposition of equality, there is nothing beyond showing or asserting this equality without any essential proof. By this demonstration itself the political subject becomes visible as opposed to the wrong, i.e. prevailing distribution of the sensible. For May, then, this shining as the political subject in a temporary way but of course with a powerful effect is only
for showing this equality to oneself, i.e. for the sake of her own dignity yet this does not mean that this process is emerged outside of any community and collectivity (2008, p. 70). So, “practice of democracy, is a matter of community”, demonstration of equality as opposed to assumed equality of the prevailing distribution within community (May, 2008, p. 71). If we put this in Rancière’s words: “A community of equals in an insubstantial community of individuals engaged in the ongoing creation of equality.” (as cited in May, 2008, p. 71). At this point it is significant not to understand “community of equals”, i.e. friendship in our case, as literally being equal in terms of conditions or properties. In fact, it is a matter of acting with the presupposition of equality from the very beginning without assuming it as having been already established or as a purpose that is to be achieved soon after some amendments. For May, rather than handling equality as an end that is to be achieved thanks to the other kind of distribution, it is put forward at the very beginning of the political process (2008, p. 47). If we consider in this way, subjectivization as a process might be seen as flourished by this presupposition of equality and as a process involved into with friends by sharing the life itself. This happens not through approving the friend by attributing to her a particular identity, or subjectivity or at least the political significance seems to belong to the other way around: i.e. practicing together as members of the community of equals. Therefore, by sharing the life itself, practicing together subjectivization as an ongoing process emerges and helps one’s political becoming. “The test of democracy must ever be in democracy’s own image: versatile, sporadic and founded on trust” says Rancière (2007, p. 61). As May’s suggestion friendship can be seen as a relation verifying the equality and so that “emancipation has taken a new meaning, transcending its legal sense, and come to connote a new individual and collective experience.” (Rancière, 2007, p. 51).

As we mentioned before indeed not having the tendency of approving the other, friendship attends to the conditions of the process of subjectivization, i.e. appearing one as the political subject in Rancièrian words. Therefore, friendship may be understood as the very spontaneous way to collectivity; while presupposition of equality conditions this relation, at the same time makes friendship as ascribed with a political meaning and significance. Friendship leads this, as Mentinis has reminded us before, not only by deriving lessons from the experience of the friendship per se. That is not solely because friendship teaches us sharing and trust and hence
establishing a friendly relation with those who we are not friends but we are in solidarity with because their declaration of a wrong and their equal dignity as May may suggest (2008, p. 181). This may also show us very significant effects of friendship on the politics that we cannot ignore because of providing us another vision of the friend as not simply the other or the same. However, in this thesis it is tried to approach the political meaning and significance of the friendship in its possible relation with the process of subjectivization. In other words, appropriateness of thinking friendship as the very experience of the community of equals by putting aside, for now, the significance of its scale for being a proper kind of community is at stake. At the same time, within this experience of community of equals, it is considered that there are indeed shared experiences of subjectivization because they always emerge thanks to the presupposition of equality as against to assumption of having been equal and the distribution of the sensible which has seemed to be accomplished. Although Rancière himself would not agree with the understanding of friendship in this thesis, it seemed plausible to handle friendship not within the complete trust as May suggests but as bearing the dual body as in the case of community of equals, politics, and democracy in Rancière’s thought.

To sum up, friendship may be considered as collecting the matters, which we think as political in its “dual body”: On the one hand, it assumes being a community of equals, on the other hand it must verify this equality continuously. Also, it must be a scene to the process of subjectivization. This is because for the reason that it is not free from the police order (and its infusion into our lives) and indeed we make a sense of the world or the life within the practice of friendship by sharing the life itself. This seems so not because of the fact that everything is political but at the outset friendship suggests itself as a community of equals which is the trajectory of the politics itself in Rancièrian sense. Owing to assuming equality at the outset, friendship provides us a web of relations and practices in respect to a new kind of emancipatory politics. That is, there is no complete emancipation of all, i.e. community, as suggested and indeed friendship gives way to politics to be thanks to occasioning the singular experiences of subjectivization and then weaving these processes together. To put in a nutshell, it is tried to be interrogated that whether it is plausible to suggest friendship as have been already a kind of political experience in itself. Then if it seems so, is it plausible to envisage it as a way to
political collectivities? Yet, the second is pigeonholed to be answered for further researches through different readings and experiences.

What need to be restored is not a project for a new egalitarian society, but the very basis for any socialization of equality: the idea of the capacity of anonymous people, a feeling of the contingency of systems of exploitation and domination, and the capacity of anyone to participate in the collective destiny. (Rancière, 2014c, p. 142).
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

We have discussed heretofore the political meaning and significance of the friendship in order to reconsider it as a togetherness and hence as a way to collectivities. We have done this because friendship is a relation with the other which steer our lives, practices, perceptions in such a way that otherwise it would be different. As opposed to those who think that friendship is a kind of relation or practice that implies consensus, and sees its political meaning and significance within the consensual understanding of the politics, we have suggested to look this community of equals through different lenses. In addition to that, doing this without assimilating the political meaning of friendship to some political kinds of togetherness such as citizenship was significant for us. For handling the political meaning of the friendship itself, rethinking it as a community of equals seemed appropriate. Therefore, we can envisage it as a way to collectivity, which is the kind of web of relations whose borders and missions are not drawn and hence branches and influences cannot be controlled totally.

For this above-mentioned purpose, first of all, we thought on the concept of the politics through the political and the politics split which has been being discussed approximately by the second half of the 20th century. This distinction is suggested as necessity because politics had been seen as the administration of the population, distribution of the roles and stakes accordingly until names such as Arendt, Lefort, Rancière and et al. begun to discuss another facet of it. For all, politics (or the political per se) must mean something different from the way in which it had been considered before. Therefore, the usual distinction between public and the private and restricting the political phenomena to the certain sphere of life are overturned by discussions launched by those significant figures within the literature. Rethinking the political meaning and the significance of friendship within this context is the stake in this thesis. Since, doing this by the other way around might reduce it into the traditional political relationships such as citizenship. However, we needed to interrogate this relationship through friendship’s internal implications in terms of equality. At this point, Rancière’s understanding of politics and
democracy was emphasized. Moreover, this approach to the politics seems to make the political meaning of friendship visible neither by reducing it simply to the relationship with the absolute other nor partisanship or comradeship.

Politics for Rancière is an aesthetic matter and therefore it is different from seeking the proper and final way/form of distribution. In addition, there is an emphasis on the impossibility of building the encapsulating meaning for all outside of the presupposing the equality of each for creating their own meanings in the process of subjectivization. “I understand the aesthetic of the political as a fracture in a system of constituted identities: an opening” says Rancière (2014c, pp. 158-159). The political appears contingently in unexpected way for Rancière only when those who are not counted have the capacity to demonstrate their equality as all others. Alternatively, it appears when the uncounted performs or asserts their equality as opposed to the police order. Therefore, within the political process, which means democracy and demonstration of the equality of each according to Rancière, without a proper subject assumption one may arise as a political subject. However, this does not occur within an arbitrary distinction between the social and the political. In other words, defining what the political exactly is is overlooking to the different meanings of phenomena and the various sites of resistances.

[T]here is no specific sphere and no specific competency for politics. Politics is precisely the permanent questioning of the established divisions that make one thing political and other social, one side public and the other one private (Rancière, 2014c, p. 138).

By bearing this understanding of politics emphasizing the meaningfulness of singular life practices, in the third chapter we reflected on how hitherto the political meaning of friendship is handled within the literature of friendship. This is tried to be done through rendering the reversibility of the relationship between other and friend, and also self and other visible. Also, in this picture equality has emerged as the key notion to make a sense of the political meaning of the friendship. In this direction, Aristotle was the first thinker that is addressed. His understanding of friendship, i.e. philia, and its civic value and form may be beyond of our current envisages of the term. This is because in Aristotle’s philosophy, there is not a distinction between ethics and politics. However, as Rancière warns us regarding this overlapping, there
was also a kind of attitude that attempts to harmonize distinct realms of life in accordance with this tendency. Rancière states that

Political philosophy has always tended to conceal [the] paradox behind visions of the political as the fulfillment of a communal essence of human being, a knowledge of the common good, a capacity to bring together and lead men etc. (2014c, p. 137).

Friendship was also considered in this way. In other words, in its perfect form its political meaning appears as analogically to the citizenship: being equal in terms of similarities.

Afterwards, we continued with philosophers such as Kant, Kierkegaard who understands friendship as an exclusionary way of relation and hence having the partial ethical way of relation. Both suggested to translate this relationship into a kind of universal kind, i.e. “universal friendship” for Kant, “love of neighbor” for Kierkegaard. Kant seems to elaborate this kind of approach for making the friendship being based on his “Kingdom of Ends”, while Kierkegaard turns his face to the Christian love. Both seem uncomfortable with the idea that friendship produces its particular, singular laws according to peculiar relationship between two or more. Besides being distanced to friendship because of this partiality that it leads, there remains from Aristotle to nowadays the idea that flourishing together among equals. This is seen as possible within the public sphere through free political deed.

In Arendt’s ideas on the process of thinking, we find implications on the political meaning of friendship in terms of its role in dialog. With the metaphor of being-two-in-one Arendt thinks that we need to be a friend with ourselves. Otherwise, we forget about the plurality, which means being in the world simply. In other words, metaphorically or literally being among friends as equals is the very condition of the flourishing of one’s within political sphere is stake here. However, the question that does friendship really teach us something via dialog is asked frequently. For instance, according to Proust, it demonstrates merely a repetition and confirmation of the self, which never make us perceive the depths of the seas. Although politics should not work with the absolute truth claim, it seems never putting aside the thinking, searching for it. Therefore, whether friendship can provide this voyage for truth or not seems very obscured point, at least for the sake of this thesis aim. Even if these discussions are very valuable to think on, still they discuss the issue by seeing friendship as a relation, practice that
helps the private and the public realms communicating with each other by oscillating between these two. However, this means preserving distinctiveness of one from the other. In other words, the political meaning which friendship purports appears as its contribution to the political sphere.

Then, we mentioned Derrida and his handling of this issue in terms of how understanding of friendship leads particular type of doing politics. He deconstructs the concept of the friendship and mainly suggests that indeed seeing the friend as the same instead of seeing her as the other is the meaning that has been articulated to the friendship. Therefore, this perception leads a kind of exclusionary doing politics and hence democracy for him. However, indeed friendship is an *aporetic* type of relationship. Friend is the other, bears within itself the enemy and democracy must mean facing with this enemy and endless process of inclusionary deed, changing the threshold of this relation. Derrida’s deconstruction of the concept of friendship reminded us the tension between the friend and the other. In other words, there is not such a thing as being in safe heaven with friends. There may of course feeling of rest, safe, trust but this never appear by assuming the friend as being similar with oneself or by ignoring her differences but through accepting, seeing her differences whether they are ontological or not. Therefore, it seems that friendship needs, if not an *aporetic*, a kind of process, or duration. There is a kind of contingent relationship between the other and the friend and this tension is very helpful for seeing the political meaning of the friends as equals.

Finally, in the last chapter we have tried to pursue the political implications of friendship as a community of equals regarding whether it is possible to see it as a different way to collectivities by referring to figures such as Esposito, Mentinis, May and et al. In this regard first of all, the meaning of being a community or togetherness was discussed. It is suggested that there is always a contradiction between sharing a particular thing and being a community of equals but on the other hand politics or democracy is conditioned by this endless process. For the community of equals whether it is composed of friends or not there will be a need for beginning with the presupposition of equality and always performing the equality rather than of attempting to achieve the equality as if it can be so. Indeed, this process seems inescapable and necessary for both friendship and politics as a condition of possibility.
Hereafter, we have continued to think on the pale difference between the friend and the other and the possible impacts of this on what being a community of equals means. Friend seems as contingently or by chance differing from the other. Since it is suggested that there is no need for an ontological assumption for being a friend as sameness in virtue and so on. This feeling may be aroused within the process by living together. It seems flourishing by sharing the life and involving in it together without any proper match. Friendship and its flourishing, indeed, seems depending on an encountering within the web of relations. So, we suggested to rethink the relationship between politics and the friendship not in terms of the category of the perfect one and seeing friendship as the complete form of the being together which leads to perfect harmony or safe heavens. Instead, it seems that friendship and community of equals never is what it suggests exactly. However, this needs not to be understood in a pejorative sense or seen as a problem. Even, this kind of understanding of friendship suggests us a very open horizon for both living the equality as a process with friends and hence struggling with the infusion of meanings and values that is produced by the police order into our worlds as May suggests. But how is this possible? Or, why are we still thinking on and searching for it while stating the very impossibility of the community of equals?

Friendship does not seem as being a free from the outside world and thus from the processes of subjectivization even if it is suggested us as being the community of equals per se. By sharing the life itself via practices which are involved into together with friends, there may not merely disagreements regarding the particular ideas just because of the fact that human condition is the plurality. Or in a similar way, we may not mention simply a consensus among friends for they are standing together. However, this standing together, by noticing that indeed there is no need to assume an ontological difference between the other and the friend, may change our perception for the others, other forms of togetherness that do not need to be enclosed on itself. In other words, simple and plain presupposition of equality as a starting sentiment to relate with the friend seems enough for imagining it as bearing the political meaning and significance. This may occasion different kind of communities, and thinking, performing friendship as a way to collectivities, which are different from the forms that we are accustomed to. Consequently, this may lead other encounters and intersecting different types of processes of subjectivization and hence solidarity which opposes to the wrong of the police order. Even
without demanding anything but merely performing the equality, this web of relations may enlarge and indeed demonstrate what the political is.
REFERENCES


APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

DOSTLUĞUN SIYASI ANLAMI: KOLEKTİVİTEYE BİR YOL OLARAK
DOSTLUĞU DÜŞÜNMEK

Bu tez bir takım komün kurma girişimleri ardından oluşan bir fikrin peşinden gitmektedir: dostluk kolektiviteye giden bir yol olarak düşünülebilir mi? Bu temel soru elbette peşinden dostluğu bir özel alan ilişkisi olarak görmemenin dışında bir bakış açısı gerektirecektir. Bir diğer deyişle, dostluğun yalnızca belirli disiplinlerin (örneğin; psikoloji) üzerine düşünebileceğimiz özel alana ait bir ilişki biçimi olmadığı önerilmektedir. Hatta, eğer siyasetin ne olduğunu dair bir bakış açımızı değiştirdiksek, dostluk siyasi bir ilişki ve hatta siyasi bir deneyim olarak karşımıza çıkabilirdir. Bu nedenle bu tezde öncelikli olarak yerleşik siyaset anlayışımızın yani parlamentoyla, seçimlerle eşdeğer olan bir yönetim meselesi olarak siyasetin sorgulanması gerekmektedir. Daha sonra dostluğun siyasi anlamı belirginleşir ve onu bir kolektiflik veya anlamlı bir siyasi beraberlik hali olarak görmek mümkün olabilir.

Yukarıda belirtilen amaç doğrultusunda ilk olarak siyaset ve siyasal (olan) ayrımından kısaca bahsedilecektir. Bu ayrım siyasetin günlük hayatımızda anlamlandıraptığımız halini sorgulatarak, dostluğun siyasi anlamı belirginleştirecektir. İlkinci olarak Rancièrci bir siyaset kavramsallaştırma tartışılacaktır. Rancière dostluk üzerine herhangi bir çalışmaya sahip değildir fakat bu tezde onun siyaset önerisi ve dostluk birlikte düşünülmesine çalışacaktır. Rancière siyaseti bir yönetim mevzusu olarak görmekte ziyade, bir estetik meselesi olarak ele almaktadır. Ona göre siyaset duyulabilir olanın (sensible) dağılımıyla ilgilidir. Toplumda belirli bir biçimde yerleştirilmiş, dağıtılmış roller, sorumluluklar, özellikler veya özenekler karşısında
hep bir eşitlik varsayımyla hareket etmek ve herhangi bir eşitlik kabulündeki eşitsiz
durumu ortaya çıkarmak Ranciérci anlamda siyasettir. Daha sonra bugüne kadar
dostluğun nasıl bir siyasi anlam ve önem taşığına dair Aristoteles, Arendt, Proust ve
Derrida gibi figürlerin önerilerini tartışılacaktır. Bunu yaparken tipki Ranciérci
anlamladığı eşitlik varsayımyla işlemeyen bir siyaset gibi, dostluğun da bu varsayım ile
hareket ettiği önerilecektir. Dostluk bu eşitliğin bitimsiz uygulanışı olarak
düşünülmeye çalışılacaktır. Fakat bu eşitliğin ne bir koşulların eşitliği ne de nihai
olarak eşit olma arzusu veya ülkesi olarak anlamlandırılamayacağı tartışılacaktır.
Aksine, aynılığı ve benzerliğinin değil farklılaşmaların dostluğun siyasi anlamına dair
olduğu önerilecektir. Nihai olarak, bütün bu tartışmanın bir eşitler topluluğu olarak
düşünülüğünde dostluğun siyasi anlamını ne anlamda belirlenmeyi gerektiği ve
dostluğun ne ölçüde kolektiviteye bir yol olarak düşünülebileceğini odaklanılacaktır.

Siyaset ve siyasal (olan) ayrımı temel olarak bir yönetim pratiği olarak siyasetin
araştırılmasından öte, siyaseti kuran veya olmasının mümkün kılan ontolojik bir siyasal
olanın arayışını belirtektedir. Bu ayrım her ne kadar geleneksel siyaset anlayışımızı
sorgulamamıza ve ufkumuzu siyasal olana dair genişletmemize vesile olsa da
Bosteels’e göre aynı zamanda siyasal olanı belirli bir ontolojik alana kıstırma
egilimindedir. Bir başka deyişle, bu ayrırm siyaset felsefesinin Antik Yunan’dan beridir
arzusunu duydüğü gibi siyasal olanın ne olduğunu belirleme ve siyasi edimi bu alana
skıtırma tehlikesini de barındırmaktadır. Lakin, bizim için bu ayrırm siyasetin yalnızca
görüldüğü gibi kaynakların bölüşümüyle, nihai bir eşitlik veya adalet modeli
oluşturumayla ilgili olmayan, aslında bütün bu anlayışı yaarıp geçen başka türlü
anlaşmazlığı işaret etmesidir. Hatta bu anlaşmazlık, Rancière’e göre, algıda zuhur eder
ve siyaseti estetik bir mesele olarak ortaya koyar. Estetikten kasıt bir sanat eserini
yorumlamak veya bir sanat dalına dair güzellik kriterlerini belirleme değil, duylabilir
olanı belirli bir biçimde yerleştirek duylabilir, görünebilir veya fark edilebilir
kilmaktır.

Bu noktada, Lefort ve onun hocası Merleau-Ponty Rancière’in sosyal ve siyasi olan arasında neden bir ayrım görmediğini ve demokrasının siyasetin varolma koşulu olduğu önerisini anlamamız için yardımcı iki isim olarak görülebilirler. Merleau-Ponty bize varlığı bir teklik ve temsil ilişkisi biçiminde değil bir estetik çokluk biçiminde anlamamız gerektiğini söyler. Ona göre varlığı farklı fonksiyonların bir araya gelerek bir amaç için oluşturduğu homojen bir beden veya Birlik (Oneness) olarak değil, her zaman bu varsayılan tansilerin tersiniriliğini (reversibility) varsayan bir heterojenlik olarak görmek gerekir. Totaliter rejimler karşısında demokrasi onun için tam olarak bu çokluğu ve tersinirliği varsayar ve herhangi bir işlevle veya görevle belirlenen unsurların değil sonsuz farklı anlamlara vesile olabilecek ilişkisellikleri ortaya koyar.

Estetik bir mesele olarak demokrasi ve siyaset kendine ayrılmış hususları bir alanda işleyen bir tür yönetim meselesi olmaktan ziyade bütün bu çokluğu ve sonsuz farklı anlamların ve öznellik hallerinin görülmesini olanaklı kılayan bir rejimdir hem Merleau-Ponty hem de öğrencisi Lefort’a göre. Böylece, Lefort demokrasinin günümüzde siyaseti mümkün kılabilecek tek rejim olduğunu söyler. Her ne kadar Rancière değil, Rancière açığında bir şekilde demokrasinin siyaseti mümkün kılan bir rejim değildir, siyasetin kendi kendisi olduğunu söyleyerek Lefort’a karşı çıkırsak da demokrasiyi temel olarak tüm estetik rejimde olduğu gibi evrensel bir analojiye kurban edilmemiş bir eşit anlamlar dünyası olarak nitelemesi her ikisini bu noktada bir araya getirir. Ancak Rancière, bu süreci beden
siyasetinden (*body politics*), onun temsil ettiği ve sosyal olan arasında yarattığı yarıkıntı ve dolayısıyla ikili bir bedenden demokrasiye giden evrimsel bir iyiye gitme süreci olarak algılamaktan ziyade asılarda en başından itibaren siyasetin bu ikili bedenden oluştuğunu öne süren. Yani temsil edilen ve asılada olan arasındaki boşluk ve dolayısıyla bu boşluğu yok etme değil, bireylerin bu paradoksu açığa çıkarma sürecidir siyaset Rancière’e göre.


Dostluk insan yaşamının anlamlı bir parçası olarak Antik Yunan’dan bu yana hem günlük yaşam muhabbetlerinde hem edebi hem de felsefi külliyatta önemli bir yer
dostu öteki bir ben olarak değil, bir öteki olarak görmenin önemini vurgulamak büyük bir önem arz etmekteidir.

eşit olduğumuz hem de birlikte düşünerek, muhabbet ederek kendimiz dışına çıkabileceğimiz inanışı hakikatı yansıtmaz. Kişisel dostlardan hep bir onaylanma ister ve esasen bu isteği de alır. Aşkın aksine dostluk güvenilir ve yüzeySEL bir ilişki sunar bizzat. Yenilik, derinlik ve gerçek aşık ilişkisinin de gösterge denizininde bulunabilir ancak. Her ne kadar şu ana kadar ele aldığımız dostluk övgülerini sorgulamamız için bize ilham verici düşünceler sunsa da bu yorumun yine de benzer bir dostluk varsayımya üzerinden oturduğu kolaydır. Dost ve sefer öntojojik bir diğer ben değildir ama yine de dostluk görünürde ya da pratiğe böylemiş gibi davranmayı gerektiren bir ilişki biçimidir. Peki esas fark nedir? Bu noktada ben, diğeri ve dost, diğeri arasındaki silik ayrıma bakmak nasıl bir anlam arz eder?

anlamda hakiki dostluğu yapı-sökümüne uğratamamış, tam da aksine günümüz neoliberal ekonomi toplumundaki karşı tarafa ne güven ne de beraberce yaşama hissi veren basitçe risk dolu ve sonsuz yalnızlık içindeki bir arkadaşlık biçimi üzerine konuşmuştur. Bu eleştiri akıllarda soru işaretleri bırakacak denli kuvvetlidir. Fakat bu tezde yaratılan eşitler toplumunu nihai bir form olarak görmemek ve hatta bir şekilde farklılıkların ve anlaşmazlıkların hasır altı edilmediği bir bakış açısına ulaşmak için Derrida’nın bu yaklaşıma bize yardımcı olacaktır.


May’in bahsettiği dostluk biçimi ve siyasi anlamı pek tabii etkileyici ve hatta umut vericidir. Halbuki dostluk ilişkisine dair herhangi bir sorgulamadan uzak durmaktadır. Bizlere dostun herhangi bir ötekinden farkı olduğunu hayatımızda ampulla olarak gösterir ancak bu tür bir dostluk varsayımın daha önce literatürde nasıl göz ardı edilmiş tehlikelere yol açabileceği dikkat çekmez. Eşitlik varsayımları dostlarla birlikte bir hayat süresken de yalnızca varsayılamayacak bir tür öneridir bu teze göre. Bu naktada dostluğun küçük ölçekli bir toplum deneyiminin yanı sıra ontolojik bir aynılıkla değil olumsal bir şekilde bir araya gelmiş ve beraberçe yaşamsal faaliyetlerde bulunarak iç içe geçmiş bir ilişkili bisim olarak düşünmek mümkün görünmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra gündelik hayatın birlikte örüldüğü bu ilişkili bisim esit olduğunu her seferinde kabul etmeye mahküm olduğumuz dostlara birlikte, beraberçe yaratığımız anlam dünyasının karşısında bizer yerine yaratılmış olan anlam ve özneliklere karşı çıkarak siyasi bir süreç yaratabilir. Fakat bu siyasi süreç asla bir
amaç veya program doğrultusunda yan yana gelmek değil basıçte hayatı paylaşarak örülen bir süreçtir. Böylece siyasetin dostluk ilişkisi içinde belirmesi gözlemlenebilir.

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TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : The Political Meaning of Friendship: Thinking Friendship as a Way to Collectivity

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master  
Doktora / PhD

1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.

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