

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TURKISH LEFT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
WORLD ORDER AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TURKISH LEFT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD ORDER AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

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This thesis offers a critical analysis of how Turkey’s socialist movement interpreted “the post-war world order and paradigm shifts in the foreign policy of Turkey” between 1945 and 1980 by mainly basing on “primary sources”. The thesis also explores the relationships between socialist groups’ theoretical frameworks and IR theories and the meta-theoretical bases of their theoretical frameworks. The main argument is that Turkish leftists’ analyses were dominated for the most part by realist assumptions and tended towards a positivist ontology and epistemology. The thesis reaches the conclusion that the leftist groups under analysis employed realist assumptions to account for the explanandum mainly because of Marxism’s inability to advance a theoretical framework for analysis of international relations and foreign policy. It was seen that despite offering some insight into Turkish foreign policy analysis, the prevailing realist assumptions embedded in their analytical frameworks resulted in the production of a state-centric nationalist stance which stood in complete opposition to their historical materialist position. This is evident from their use of the well-known realist terms without subjecting them to critical consideration. As a reflection of a “realist moment” in their theoretical framework, their meta-theoretical stance bears the stamp of positivist ontology and epistemology.

Keywords: Turkish left, Socialist movement, Foreign policy, World order, Student militancy.

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE SOLUNUN TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI VE DÜNYA DÜZENİNİ YORUMLAMASININ ELEŞTİREL BİR ANALİZİ

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Bu tez, Türkiye sosyalist hareketinin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında oluşan yeni dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasındaki paradigma değişimlerine ilişkin yorumlarının “birincil kaynakları” esas alan eleştirel bir analizini sunar. Bu tez, ayrıca, sosyalist gruplarca benimsenen kuramsal çerçeveler ile Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri arasındaki ilişkiyi, onların kuramsal çerçevelerinin meta-teoretik temelini araştırır. Tezin temel savı Türk solunun analizlerine çoğu kez gerçekçi (realist) varsayımların hâkim olduğu ve bu analizlerde bir pozitivist eğilim bulunduğu şeklindedir. Tez şunu sonuca ulaşmıştır ki Marksizmin uluslararası ilişkiler ve dış politika analizi için bir kuramsal çerçeve geliştirmedeki yetersizliği nedeniyle bu çalışmada incelenen sol gruplar araştırma konusunu açıklarken gerçekçi (realist) varsayımlara başvurmuştur. Türk dış politikasının analizine birtakım anlayış sunmakla beraber analitik çerçevelerinde saklı hâkim gerçekçi (realist) varsayımlar kendi tarihsel materyalist duruşlarıyla tamamen zıt bir şekilde devlet merkezci milliyetçi bir tutumun üretimi ile sonuçlanmıştır. Gerçekçi (realist) terimleri eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutmaksızın kullanmaları bu durumun kanıtıdır. Kuramsal çerçevelerinde bulunan “gerçekçi (realist) uğrak”ın bir yansıması olarak bunların meta-teoretik tutumları pozitivist ontoloji ve epistemolojinin izini taşır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk solu, Sosyalist hareket, Dış politika, Dünya düzeni, Öğrenci hareketi

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|------|
| PLAGIARISM..... | iii |
| ABSTRACT..... | iv |
| ÖZ..... | v |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..... | vi |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS..... | viii |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..... | xi |
| CHAPTER | |
| 1.INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 2.HISTORICAL MATERIALIST APPROACHES TO IR..... | 14 |
| 2.1. Classical Marxism..... | 14 |
| 2.2. Classical Theories of Imperialism..... | 16 |
| 2.2. The Second Generation Theories of Imperialism..... | 22 |
| 2.1.1. The Dependency School..... | 23 |
| 2.1.2. The World System Perspective..... | 36 |
| 3.THE TURKISH LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN THE POST-SECOND-WORLD- WAR ERA (1945-1960)..... | 39 |
| 3.1. Introduction..... | 39 |
| 3.1.1. The Era of the Second World War..... | 40 |
| 3.1.2. The Post-War Period..... | 45 |
| 3.2. The Socialist Party of Turkey (TSP)..... | 53 |
| 3.2.1. Introduction..... | 53 |
| 3.2.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy..... | 56 |
| 3.3. The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP)..... | 69 |
| 3.3.1. Introduction..... | 69 |
| 3.3.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy..... | 73 |
| 3.4. Fatherland Party (Vatan Partisi, VP)..... | 88 |
| 3.4.1. Introduction..... | 88 |
| 3.4.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy..... | 90 |
| 3.5. Conclusion..... | 101 |
| 4.THE TURKISH LEFTIST MOVEMENT BETWEEN COUPS D'ÉTAT (1960- 1971)..... | 110 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 4.1. Introduction | 110 |
| 4.2. Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Worker's Party of Turkey) | 114 |
| 4.2.1. Introduction | 114 |
| 4.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 119 |
| 4.3. Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Communist Party of Turkey) | 145 |
| 4.3.1. Introduction | 145 |
| 4.3.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 147 |
| 4.4. The Yön Circle | 155 |
| 4.4.1. Introduction | 155 |
| 4.4.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 160 |
| 4.5. The Milli Demokratik Devrim (MDD) Circle | 170 |
| 4.5.1. Introduction | 170 |
| 4.5.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 173 |
| 4.6. Conclusion | 185 |
| 5.THE STUDENT MILITANCY OF 1968-73 | 193 |
| 5.1. Introduction | 193 |
| 5.2. Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment (PDA) Circle | 199 |
| 5.2.1. Introduction | 199 |
| 5.2.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 201 |
| 5.3. People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO) | 211 |
| 5.3.1 Introduction | 211 |
| 5.3.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 213 |
| 5.4. People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C) | 223 |
| 5.4.1. Introduction | 223 |
| 5.4.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 228 |
| 5.5. Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) | 241 |
| 5.5.1. Introduction | 241 |
| 5.5.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 246 |
| 5.6. Conclusion | 253 |
| 6.THE TURKISH LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN THE 1970s (1974-1980) | 259 |
| 6.1. Introduction | 259 |
| 6.2. Maoist Groups | 262 |
| 6.2.1. The Aydınlik Circle | 263 |
| 6.2.1.1. Introduction | 263 |
| 6.2.1.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 264 |
| 6.2.2. The People's Liberation | 270 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 6.2.2.1. Introduction | 270 |
| 6.2.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 272 |
| 6.3. Pro-Soviet Sects | 279 |
| 6.3.1. The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) | 280 |
| 6.3.1.1. Introduction | 280 |
| 6.3.1.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 281 |
| 6.3.2. The Socialist Workers Party of Turkey (TSİP) | 288 |
| 6.3.2.1. Introduction | 288 |
| 6.3.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy | 289 |
| 6.3.3. The Second Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) | 295 |
| 6.3.3.1. Introduction | 295 |
| 6.3.3.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 296 |
| 6.4. Independent Groups | 301 |
| 6.4.1. The Revolutionary Path (Dev-Yol) | 302 |
| 6.4.1.1. Introduction | 302 |
| 6.4.1.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 303 |
| 6.4.2. The Liberation (Kurtuluş) | 309 |
| 6.4.2.1. Introduction | 309 |
| 6.4.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 310 |
| 6.4.3. The Socialist Party | 316 |
| 6.4.3.1. Introduction | 316 |
| 6.4.3.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 317 |
| 6.4.4. Birikim Circle..... | 323 |
| 6.4.4.1. Introduction | 323 |
| 6.4.4.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy | 324 |
| 6.5. Conclusion..... | 333 |
| 7.CONCLUSION | 338 |
| REFERENCES..... | 344 |
| APPENDICES | |
| A. CURRICULUM VITAE | 417 |
| B. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET..... | 418 |
| C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM/TEZ İZİN FORMU..... | 436 |

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------------|---|
| ANZUS | Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty |
| AP | Justice Party |
| CENTO | Central Treaty Organization |
| CHP | Republican People's Party |
| CGP | Republican Trust Party |
| CPC | Communist Party of China |
| CPSU | Communist Party of the Soviet Union |
| Dev-Genc | Federation of the Revolutionary Youth (of Turkey) |
| Dev-Yol | Revolutionary Way |
| DİSK | Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions |
| DP | Democrat Party |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| FKF | Federation of Ideological Clubs |
| HK | People's Liberation |
| IISH | International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| İTC | Committee of Union and Progress |
| KOMINFORM | Communist Information Bureau |
| KOMINTERN | Communist International |
| MBK | Committee of National Unity |
| MDD | National Democratic Revolution |
| MGK | National Security Council |
| MHP | Nationalist Action Party |
| MLSPB | Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit |
| MNP | National Order Party |
| MSP | National Salvation Party |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| ODTU (METU) | Middle East Technical University |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |

| | |
|---------|--|
| OPEC | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| OYAK | Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund |
| PDA | Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment |
| SALT | Strategic Arms Limitation Talks |
| SEATO | South East Asian Treaty Organisation |
| SP | Socialist Party |
| STMA | Encyclopaedia of Socialism and Social Struggles |
| TDKP | Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey |
| THKO | People's Liberation Army of Turkey |
| THKP-C | People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey |
| TİP | Worker's Party of Turkey |
| TİİKP | Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey |
| TİKKO | Worker Peasant Liberation Army of Turkey |
| TİKP | Worker and Peasant Party of Turkey |
| TKP | Communist Party of Turkey |
| TKP/ML | Communist Party of Turkey/ Marxist-Leninist |
| TSP | Socialist Party of Turkey |
| TSEKP | Socialist Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey |
| TSİP | Socialist Workers Party of Turkey |
| Türk-İş | Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions |
| TUSLOG | United States Logistics Group |
| TÜSTAV | Social History Research Foundation of Turkey |
| UN | United Nations |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| VP | Fatherland Party |
| YTP | New Turkey Party |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to critically analyse and assess how Turkey's socialist movement interpreted the world order¹ and Turkey's foreign policy² for a period of time ranging from the end of the Second World War to the coup of the 12th of September in 1980. The main issue is neither a historical interpretation of Turkey's foreign policy nor a history of Turkey's left;³ rather, the aim here is to describe the socialist circles that existed and critically examine their views on the "the post-war world order and paradigm shifts in the foreign policy of Turkey" through "primary sources", as well as explore the relationships between their theoretical frameworks and IR theories and the meta-theoretical bases of their theoretical frameworks.

In the aftermath of the First World War, IR arose as an academic discipline used to help us develop a better understanding of international affairs as a way to make enduring peace possible (Kurki and Wight, 2007: 16). Idealism, which dominated the inter-war years (Halliday, 1995: 40) with the aim of developing "a set of institutions, procedures and practices that could eradicate war", was challenged for being "unsystematic" and "value-driven" by the adherents of Realism (Kurki and Wight, 2007: 16), which involved "the systematic study of international conflict and cooperation" to explore "the origins of major war and the conditions of lasting peace" (Teschke and Lacher, 2007: 565-566). With the outbreak of the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War, IR became "part and parcel of a wider ideological conflict" between the great powers "over the course of world politics" (Teschke and Lacher, 2007: 565-566), and Realism came to the forefront (Halliday,

² Drawing on Hudson's (2012: 14) definition, Turkish foreign policy can be defined as the strategy or approach chosen by the Turkish government to achieve Turkey's goals in its relations with external entities.

³ Throughout this dissertation the term "Turkish left" will be used to encompass the socialist left.

1995: 40). Because of the strong influence of the geopolitics of the Cold War bipolar world order, “a strategic conflict [emerged] in which capitalism confronted its authoritarian socialist other” (Halliday, 2002: 79), and the predominance of positivism, the discipline of IR, was “an American social science” (Hoffmann, 1977; Smith, 2000) that confined itself to international politics and foreign policy (Yalvaç, 2017: 64). It conceptualised “international relations” as a category which is abstracted from societal relations through “ontological exteriority”, thereby treating “the state, civil society and the economy as always-already separate spheres” (Morton, 2013: 129). Mainstream theories of IR define the particularity of international relations through differences from internal society (Yalvaç, 2018: 13) and by means of the separate dynamics of capitalism and geopolitical rivalry; in that way, they analyse international relations as a struggle for survival in a timeless and spaceless anarchical system (Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg, 2010: 359) solely through political dynamics. As a result of the ontologically mutual exclusion of sociology and IR, social relations are not analysed in a holistic manner, and the social sciences are thereby deprived of the analytical instruments needed to grasp society’s impact on the international and the international’s effect on the development of societies (Rosenberg, 2013: 570).

The discipline of IR, widely known as “an American social science”, and Marxism⁴, which was associated with the ideology of socialist states (Yalvaç, 2017: 64), mutually neglected each other (Maclean, 1987). Marxism was subjected to dismissal and caricature, and its arguments were ignored and oversimplified (Halliday, 1987: 163). Given that mainstream theories of IR reduced international relations to an inter-state power struggle and studied those relations through such categories as “great powers, anarchy, and the balance of power”, they looked askance at the explanatory power of Marxism, which was silent about “conventional political science and economics upon which much International Relations drew” (Halliday, 1987: 163)

⁴ In this thesis, Marxism and historical materialism will be used interchangeably. It should be noted here that there is neither only one Marxism nor a single definition of Marxism, but throughout the thesis a definition provided by Yalvaç will be referred to as a means of clarification: “[It is] a critical theory which provides historical analysis of social structures and envisages how these structures are socially constructed and how they could be changed, as well as provides emancipatory alternatives” (Yalvaç, 2017: 17).

and which they saw as a “theory of domestic society” (Wight, 1995: 23). Since Marxism accounts for the external behaviour of states through their internal structure and assumes that the conflict between states will be eliminated with the rise of socialist regimes as opposed to capitalist ones (Linklater, 2005: 110), Waltz referred to it as a “second image” theory (Waltz, 1959: 63). In addition, the existence of socialist countries which espoused Marxism as the foundation of their political structure kept Marxism from holding intellectual appeal for the capitalist world (Yalvaç, 2018: 33).

Although “Marxist thought on international relations pre-dates [IR’s] formal establishment as an institutionalized field of study” (Teschke, 2010: 163), classical⁵ Marxism’s interest in international relations remained “secondary and derivative” (Berki, 1971: 81) and it focused on assessing “the possibilities of revolutionary political action” (Davenport, 2011: 28). The theory of imperialism arrived on the scene as a way to develop Classical Marxism’s analysis of the relationship between nationalism and internationalism, as well as globalization and fragmentation (Linklater, 2005: 121). Thus, historical materialism in the 20th century was associated with imperialism, which was prevalent first in the period of 1900-1920 and later in the period of 1950-1970 (Halliday, 2002: 79). The former, known through the works of Lenin, Bukharin, Luxemburg, Hilferding and Kautsky, focused on inter-capitalist state rivalries and the causes of the First World War, whereas the latter, made popular through the works of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Andre Gunter Frank, Harry Magdoff, Bill Warren and so on, focused on north-south relations, dependency and underdevelopment (Halliday, 2002: 79).

Despite “the intellectual strictures imposed by the geopolitics of bipolarity” and “doctrinal party lines” during the Cold War (Teschke, 2010:163), “a necessary encounter” came to pass between historical materialism and international relations in the late 1970s (Halliday, 1994). The refractoriness of the state in the face of socialist revolutions thus led to the abandonment of “the withering away of the state” thesis and the collapse of the socialist bloc, and the passing of the age of bipolarity and the

⁵ Classical Marxism refers to the theory which was expounded directly by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in their lifetime.

emergence of globalization all increased Marxism's interest in the states-system and implied a recognition of the contributions of Marxism to the study of IR (Linklater, 2005: 112), hence heralding "the renaissance of historical materialism in IR" (Anievas, 2010). Since the 1980s, a number of Marxist-inspired perspectives (e.g. Cox, 1981; Gill, 1993; Halliday, 1994; Rosenberg, 1994; Teschke, 2003) have been developed as a means to develop a more historically aware conception of the development of modern international relations (Linklater, 2005: 111). Historical materialist approaches attempt to understand modern geopolitics via analyses of capitalism's structural features (Yalvaç, 2017: 50) by internally relating the modern state system and geopolitical competition to capitalism without reducing the former to an effect of the latter (Allison and Anievas, 2009: 47-48) and dealing with the question⁶ of why the political form of the world capitalist system has not created a world state but a plurality of states (Yalvaç, 2017: 53).

However, historical materialism is caught up in a dilemma about whether to assign causal power to the state system and give explanatory power to capitalist forces and relations of production (Callinicos, 2009a: 99). The relationship between the capitalist economic system and the international state system presents a "theoretical anomaly" to historical materialism (Callinicos, 2007: 534) because the existence of international relations, which presuppose the horizontal division of mankind into nations or states, poses a serious and perhaps intractable problem for Marxism, which takes the absolute unity of mankind as its ideal (Berki, 1971: 80). Because it saw classes as the basic units in history, Marxism focused on the struggle between the classes (Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1980: 45) and "largely ignored geopolitics, nationalism and war" (Linklater, 2005: 118). It dealt with the issue of vertical fragmentation, i.e. the vertical division of mankind into classes, not on horizontal diversity (Berki, 1971: 94), thereby seeing international relations as "the expression of a particular division of labour" (Berki, 1971: 82; Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1980: 48). As Lynch illustrated, in his journalistic writings Marx generally resorted

⁶ This question was intensely debated in the 2007 (20(4)) and 2009 (22(1)) issues of the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. The main contributors to this debate were Callinicos (2007); Pozo-Martin (2007); Teschke and Lacher (2007); Morton (2007); Allison and Anievas (2009), Callinicos (2009); and see also Anievas (2010).

to a “state-centric approach” which employed “power politics” and a “balance of powers” and made “little reference to social and economic forces” in construing global political developments (Lynch, 1989: 10-11 quoted in Özlük, 2017: 91). Therefore, the international represented a lacuna in Marxist theory (Callinicos, 2009a: 91), as Callinicos admits, and “Marxism is incapable of explaining military competition and the state system” (Callinicos, 2009a: 96). Some scholars have tried to make up for this deficiency by incorporating a “realist moment” in Marxist analyses of international relations (Callinicos, 2007: 542), a move which does not, however, represent the wholesale import of Realist concepts into Marxism (Callinicos, 2009a: 103) but “occasional reliance on Realist literature and terminology” (Pozo-Martin, 2007: 553).

Realism has made strong claims about “the nature of the particularist political communities that form divisions of inside and outside, and claim a right over a territory and the resources contained therein” (Davenport, 2011: 33), whereas Marxism undertheorizes the political - the form of the political, how and why a bounded political space is created - though it is adept at exploring the content of politics by disclosing the antagonistic nature of society’s mode of reproduction and the organisation of the exploitation of nature (Davenport, 2011). Consequently, due to a “lack of any substantive Marxist theory of the state” (Pozo-Martin, 2006: 237) and its failure to develop an adequate critical theory of “the political”, Marxist IR theory is inevitably condemned to “a realist fate” (Davenport, 2011: 28). Thus, because of this “theoretical blind spot”, Marxist IR theories cannot convincingly grasp the international without resorting to Realist assumptions of the political; that is, the simultaneous creation of internal unity and external division, the changeable hierarchical organization of inner space as opposed to the invariably conflictual and fractured condition of the international (Davenport, 2011: 33) and hence “the perdurable fragmentation and anarchy of international politics” (Davenport, 2011: 40).

As Turkish leftists were said to be true followers of Marxism, they construed international and foreign policy through the lens of historical materialist IR

approaches. By taking into consideration a “realist moment” in Marxist analyses of international relations (Callinicos, 2007: 542), this thesis posits that the Turkish leftist could not escape a “realist fate” in their analyses of international relations and Turkish foreign policy. Thus, the thesis argues that:

- i) In the Turkish left’s discussions about the world order and Turkish foreign policy, realist assumptions dominated the Turkish left’s IR perspective.
- ii) Since the Turkish left’s theoretical framework was grounded on Marxist IR theories, involving a generally positivist and determinist account of Marxism, leftists were condemned to adhere to the tenets of postivism.

The historical materialist perspective developed by Yalvaç (2014), which enables an analysis of the social origins and determinants of foreign policy and the way that the state–society complex effects foreign policymaking, offers a heuristic tool for simultaneously examining these hypotheses and the Turkish leftists’ interpretations of the changing dynamics and directions of Turkish Foreign Policy and the international arena. This perspective offers up a social theory of foreign policy and rejects the general tendency of foreign policy analyses to naturalize and universalize social and historical categories (Yalvaç, 2014: 131). It therefore conceptualises foreign policy as part of a structured totality of social relations that includes both the domestic and the international (Yalvaç, 2014: 131). Unlike the Realist state-centric perspective, it sees the shift to class agency as affecting the formation of foreign policy in the structural context of foreign policy-making (Yalvaç, 2014: 93). Such a perspective establishes a link between structures and agents through the concept of the “hegemony project”, which makes it possible to avoid a purely structural or agential approach to the analysis of structures and agents. It defines the structural basis of foreign policy as the struggle of different classes to control the state apparatus in line with specific “hegemonic projects” that are pursued both nationally and transnationally. Thus it suggests that we explore a trajectory of foreign policy in

terms of different “hegemonic projects” which are put into place as a consequence of domestic class struggles for hegemony that occur at the economic, political and ideological levels (Yalvaç, 2014: 130).

The positivist account of IR identifies “totality as either the concept of system or (international) society” (Yalvaç, 2010: 178). Contrary to the atomistic nature of positivism, which takes the object under study as a given and as abstracted from the socio-historical relations that constitute itself (Yalvaç, 2017: 27), historical materialism does not separate the whole from its parts (Heine and Teschke, 1996: 417) and tries to show how the different parts of a whole simultaneously create the whole and how the whole shapes those parts (Yalvaç, 2017: 27-29). In this sense, historical materialism differs from system approaches to IR which, by assuming that equality exists between the system’s sovereign units (states) in attempts to identify the regularities generated by mutual interplay between the units through a positivist account, shows how the system restricts the behaviour of states (Yalvaç, 2017: 26). Historical materialism takes capitalism as being a “historical totality to the conceptualization of the system of sovereign territorial states” (Lacher, 2002: 162). In contrast to the predictive nature of positivism, which casts a passive and fatalistic role for human beings, historical materialism provides an explanatory account of the science by laying bare the generative mechanisms, internal development logics and conflicts within capitalism, thus making “change” possible through conflictual relations between different classes (Yalvaç, 2017: 20-21).

In the literature, a number of works have discussed the historical development of the socialist movement in Turkey. Some of them are broad in scope but they tend to be somewhat superficial, providing mere encyclopaedic knowledge (e.g. Şişmanov, 1978; *Sosyalizm Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi (The Encyclopaedia of Socialism’s Social Struggles)*, 1988; *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopaedia of Republican-era Turkey)*, 1983; *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: The Left)*, 2007; and Bora, 2017). Some of these studies take up the socialist movement as a form of counter-propaganda based on the testimony of individuals who broke with it (e.g. Sayılğan,

2009) and others who were rightists drawing on the tradition of “the fight against communism” (e.g. Darendelioğlu, 1961 and Tevetoğlu, 1967). Despite the fact that the Turkish left of the 1960s has garnered much attention in academia (Sertel, Y., 1969; Yetkin, 1970; Landau, 1978; Belge, 1985; Belge, 1989; Özdemir, 1986; Yerasimos, 1989; Dinler, 1990; Lipovsky, 1992; Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994; Ünsal, 2002; Babalık, 2005; Atılğan, 2008; Gültekingil, 2008; Güvenç, 2008; Zücher, 2010; Doğan, 2010; Ulus, 2011; and Aydınöğlu, 2011), none of the works pay particular attention to how the movement saw the world order and interpreted Turkey’s geopolitical strategies. They generally only outline the socialist movement and its particularities (such as its founders, publications, distinctive features, and demise), and its main arguments.

However, there has been little scholarly interest in the socialist movement of the period of time lasting from 1945 to 1960. Notably, the researchers who worked on a critical history of the Turkish left from the Ottoman Empire to the mid-1970s (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994) and an academician who wrote a critical history of the TKP (Turkish Communist Party) (Babalık, 2005) failed to discuss the socialist movement of 1945 to 1960. The studies on this period are generally devoted to the history of the socialist movement and the divisions and polemics within it. Whilst some examine the history of the TKP (Üstüngel, S. 2004; Salihoğlu, Muhsin *et al.* 2004; Babalık, 2005), others investigate factions and figures outside of the TKP (Karaca, 2008; Ünsal, 1996; Gökmen, 1998; Ünlü, 2002; Gökhan Atılğan, 2007; Vayni, 1997; Meral Demirel, 2014). Other studies discuss intra-left rifts with a primary focus on the views of people active in this period (e.g. İleri, 1976; İleri, 2003; Topçuoğlu, 1976; Nesimi, 1977; Nesimi, 1979; Müstecaplıoğlu, O., 1970; Akar, 1989). Similarly, only a few scholars have comprehensively analysed the leftist movement of the 1970s, as it was a complex period for the left (Samim, 1981; Lipovsky, 1992; Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994; Alagöz, 2005; Gürel, 2006; Aydınöğlu, 2011; Bursa, 2011; Ersan, 2014), but none of them have examined how the socialist movement construed the post-war world order and Turkey’s place therein. For the most part, they examine the ideology of particular circles within the

movement through a historical perspective including their genesis, development, and demise.

A survey conducted for the purposes of this thesis in the national thesis archive via a search motor available through the Council of Higher Education's webpage with search criteria such as the "Turkish left" (*Türk solu*), "Turkish communist movement" (*Türkiye komünist hareketi*), "Turkish socialist movement" (*Türkiye sosyalist hareketi*), "socialist" (*sosyalist*), "socialism" (*sosyalizm*), "leftist" (*solcu*), "left" (*sol*), "communist" (*komünist*), and "communism" (*komünizm*) indicated that no work has thus far focused on a critical analysis of the socialist movement's conception of international politics or its interpretation of Turkey's geopolitical strategy, and there is also a lack of scholarly research about the left's theoretical framework and its meta-theoretical disposition. Some scholars (Doğan, 2010) have examined nationalist tendencies within the leftist movement, while others (Bursa, 2011) have dealt with developmentalism, and yet others have taken up the relationship between the army and the left (Ulus, 2011). Yet other works are devoted to the Turkish left's views on certain foreign policy issues. For instance, Güvenç (2008) analysed the TİP's (Worker's Party of Turkey, TİP) foreign policy perspectives in the 1960s, but that mainly expositive analysis of the TİP's approaches to certain foreign policy issues dealt with the matter of bilateral agreements with the US, NATO, the Common Market, and Cyprus. Similarly, Gökay (2006) documented and analysed Soviet-Turkish relations for the period of 1921 to 1991 and also the role played by the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) in shaping that relationship. None of those studies, however, critically analyse the socialist movement's views on international relations and foreign policy, nor do they examine its theoretical framework or that framework's relationship with IR theories.

Although some "thematic" studies have analysed Turkish leftist views on "anti-Americanism" (e.g. Bilgiç, 2015), "pro-Sovietism" (e.g. Gökay, 2006), "anti-imperialism" and "independence" (e.g. Atılgan, 2007), "anti-imperialism" (e.g. Korkmaz, 2015), and "the Cyprus Question" (e.g. Korkmazhan, 2017) within certain historical periods, they largely situate those themes within the literature on the left

without the critical analysis that this thesis provides. Apart from those studies, the remainder of works that pertain to that time period deal with “Turkish intellectual and press history” (Kaynar and Ak, 2017: 12), meaning that the views of the socialist movement concerning the new world order and Turkish foreign policy after the Second World War have not been subjected to an extensive and holistic analysis through primary sources.

To fill this gap, this thesis investigates the interpretations and perspectives of the Turkish socialist movement on the world order and Turkish foreign policy in the period of 1945–1980 through a descriptive historical analysis. To this end, a textual analysis is employed to examine the discourses and perspectives of each leftist group that was active in the period under question. Such a textual analysis reveals not only how the Turkish left construed international politics and Turkish foreign policy but also its relationship with historical materialist approaches to IR and as well as mainstream theories of IR. This thesis will mainly analyse primary sources including books, journals, party programmes, manifestos, written pleas and other publications put out by socialist circles to determine the socialist movement’s conception of international politics and interpretations of Turkey’s geopolitical strategy, including likely original contributions to the international relations (IR) literature. I will lay bare the theories by means of which they understood and explained the world order and reflect on the developments in leftist IR literature that are related to international politics and Turkey’s geopolitical strategies, including shortcomings and weaknesses in explaining changes in Turkish policy. At the same time, secondary sources will be of use in this research as a means of exposing the main characteristics, figures, differences, polemics, and history of leftist circles.

The socialist movement that was active in Turkey between the coup of 1960 and the coup of 1980 is generally seen as being the most dynamic and productive of its kind, even though it was subjected to government pressure for a few years following the 1971 coup. After the coup of 1980, however, the socialist movement was brutally suppressed and witch hunts, torture, executions, and mass arrests were used to silence it, as was the case in the 1950s. Just as the 1960 coup is often held up as the

harbinger of the “golden age” of the leftist movement, the 1980 coup can be seen as the inception of a “dark age” for the movement. For that reason, the scope of this study is limited to the leftist movement’s so-called “golden age”. All the same, the scope was broadened to include the leftist movement from the end of the Second World War until the 1980 coup to make possible a holistic analysis of “how the socialist movement saw the post-war changes in world politics and the paradigm shift in Turkey’s foreign policy”, as that will bring to light changes and continuities in leftist ideologies. The periodization of the socialist movement (1945-1960, 1960-1971 and 1971-1980) has been done in accordance with the socialist movement’s outstanding features (the TKP-led underground organisation of the left, TİP-led engagement in legal politics, student-led militancy, and the multi-partite nature of the left in the mid-1970s) and the periods’ conspicuous political atmosphere (e.g. anti-communist witch-hunts in the late 1940s and 1950s, the relatively liberal political environment of the post-1960 coup, and the burgeoning youth movement all around the world, including in Turkey, in the late 1960s).

In the late 1960s, the Kurdish socialist movement began to come to the fore within the context of the TİP in the form of the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları* (DDKO), 1969). It then became a fully-fledged socialist movement independent of the Turkish socialists in the second half of the 1970s. During this period, a number of Kurdish socialist factions emerged, including Turkey’s Kurdistan Socialist Party (*Türkiye Kürdistan Sosyalist Partisi* (TKSP), 1974), Liberation (*Rızgari*, 1976), the Kurdistan National Liberationists (*Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları* (KUK), 1978), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (*Kürdistan İşçi Partisi* (PKK), 1978), *Kawa* (1978), the Flag of Liberation (*Ala Rızgari*, 1979), and the Struggle (*Tekoşin*, 1979) (for a detailed overview of the Kurdish socialist movement, see Özmen and Türkmen (2015)). The TKSP published a monthly newsletter called *Özgürlük Yolu* (*The Path of Freedom*), while other groups published journals using their names, e.g. *Rızgari*, *Tekoşin*, *Kawa*, *Denge Kawa* and so on. Some of these journals were published in Kurdish, so the Kurdish socialist movement has been excluded from this dissertation due to a language barrier.

The structure of this dissertation is as follows: In chapter 2, Marxist theories of IR (including their characteristics, different strands, main premises and critiques), which were topical and popular in the period under concern, will be briefly discussed as a way to reveal, if possible, their relevance, impacts on and contributions to the Turkish left's understanding of international relations and foreign policy analysis. Following chapter 2, in each chapter, I trace the general internal and external contours for the period in question and the socialist movement within that context, and following that I critically analyse the Turkish socialist movement in terms of how its adherents construed the world order and Turkish foreign policy. Lastly, at the end of each chapter in a conclusion section I explore and discuss the relationship between their theoretical frameworks and theories of IR in general and Marxist-inspired theories regarding IR in particular, as well as the meta-theoretical bases of their frameworks. In line with that approach, chapter 3 covers the post-war era up until the 1960 coup. The socialist movement in this period was mainly dominated by the TKP, but there is not a clear affiliation of leftists who were either detached or displayed transitive attitudes (*i.e.* moving from one circle to another). In categorising those socialists and their journals, for analytical purposes all of them are depicted as being sympathetic to the TKP. In addition to offering up an analysis of the TKP's interpretation of the world order and Turkey's foreign policy, I examine the views of the Socialist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*, TSP) and the Vatan Party.

Chapter 4 focuses on the socialist movement in the years between the 1960 coup and the coup of 1971. Since the socialist movement was centred on the TİP through the mid-1960s, leftist factions' views were more or less much reflected in the TİP's views and there was not a salient difference among them as regards the world order and Turkey's foreign policy. Consequently, I primarily examine the TİP's views and to avoid repetition I only take up other factions' contrasting views and notably different opinions.

Chapter 5 takes up the Turkish student movement which emerged in 1968 and ended in 1973. Even though it emerged within the scope of the leftist movement in the 1960s, the student militancy of the early 1970s broke from the leftists in terms of the

timing and methods to be used in the revolutionary struggle and overshadowed them, thereby becoming a primary force in determining the foundations and direction of the leftist movement in the 1970s. In this way, student militants led the transition of the leftist movement of the 1960s into the leftist movement of the 1970s, and as such that issue demands special treatment. For that reason, this chapter examines the student militancy of the early 1970s through a historical perspective from 1968 to 1973, comprehensively covering its genesis, development and demise.

After the 12th of March in 1971, the socialist movement was actively suppressed and leftists were imprisoned, meaning that the period of legal politics for leftists was brought to a close. Only illegal student militancy remained active until it was suppressed in 1973. Following the 1974 amnesty, the leftist movement resumed its activities but it was more divided along multi-partite lines than ever before. Chapter 6 analyses the post-amnesty leftist movement which, roughly speaking, followed three different paths: “pro-Sino”, “pro-Soviet”, and “independent”. This chapter examines the most popular factions of these three paths as a means of drawing conclusions about the leftist movement as a whole.

Chapter 7, the final chapter, offers a critical discussion of observations regarding the hypotheses and research questions raised in the introduction. By presenting a comprehensive examination of the findings in the previous chapters, which covered a broad spectrum of time for the subject at hand, it presents the general conclusions that can be drawn from the study as a whole.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL MATERIALIST APPROACHES TO IR

This chapter will present an overview of historical materialist approaches to IR which were popular in the period of 1945-1980. First, classical Marxist thought on IR will be discussed, then attention will turn respectively to classical theories of imperialism, dependency theory and World System Perspective.

2.1. Classical Marxism

Marxists have interpreted capitalism with two differing approaches: one attributed a progressive role to capitalism in developing the forces of production as it creates the material preconditions needed for a socialist society, while the other concentrated on the retrogressive role of capitalism in generating development in a few places at the expense of the “development of underdevelopment” in most of the world, which, it was argued, makes revolution necessary (Brewer, 1990: 16).

Classical Marxism and Marxist theories of imperialism in their first stages just before the First World War as formulated by Kautsky, Hilferding, Luxemburg, Bauer, Bukharin, and Lenin fit with the first category (Warren, 1980: 84). Later, Lenin broke with his earlier assertion that “foreign capital plays a progressive role in industrialization” based on the idea that “the advent of monopoly capitalism marked the end of those progressive aspects of capitalism” (Warren, 1980: 46-50). That new position became the official view of the world socialist movement at the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928 (Warren, 1980: 107), and thus the declaration of the end of the historic mission of capitalism made socialist revolution necessary (Sutcliffe, 2002: 45). Subsequently, imperialism increasingly was regarded as a major obstacle to industrialization in the Third World (Warren, 1980: 83), and the second generation of imperialism theories (the dependency school and neo-colonialism) which appeared after the Second World War took up the second model.

It has been broadly argued in the literature that Marx and Engels “never systematically” reflected on IR and developed “a single theory to explain the behaviour of systems of states”⁷ (Gills, 1989: 265; Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1980; Smith, H., 1994; Callinicos, 2004; Teschke, 2006; Callinicos, 2009; Yalvaç, 2010; Teschke, 2010; Yalvaç, 2017). Notwithstanding his initial intention to write a critique of the political economy in 6 books (Capital, Landed Property, Wage Labour, State, International Trade and World Market), Marx was unable to study the world market’s determining relations with the capitalist system’s other elements in his voluminous work *Das Kapital* (Callinicos, 2007: 541). Marx saw inter-state relations as involving the games of diplomats because he thought that such relations “belonged to the category of capitalism’s epiphenomena” (Booth, 2007: 52) and that international relations would also wither away with “the eventual disappearance of the state”,⁸ which was, in fact, the basic unit for IR with the shift to communism (Yalvaç, 2005). Despite capitalism’s maintenance of horizontal divisions and regular creation of conflict, Marxists believed that “[t]he intrinsic globalizing dynamics of capital[ism]” (Davenport, 2011: 28) would eventually remove such divisions (Berki, 1971: 83), as they believed that they were “only a surface projection of the basic conflict between classes and serve only to conceal the real struggle underneath” (Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1980: 50).

Classical Marxism discounted geopolitical dynamics and domestic class struggle as it attributed “an automaticity to a transnationalizing process” (Teschke, 2010: 165). Marxists “seemed to under-problematize the effect of international relations on the course and development of capitalism” (Teschke, 2016). Marx and Engels’s interest in geopolitics was linked to “the tactical consequences of alterations in world politics for communist strategy” and retained “interventions of a journalistic or party-political character” (Teschke, 2006: 332). Similarly, Classical Marxism’s interest in

⁷ It should be noted here that not only Marxism but also classical sociology neglected the international sphere, which played a role in the historical and societal changes which emerged with industrialisation, and the latter analysed that change with reference to the internal dynamics of societies (Teschke, 2014: 7) inspired by “methodological nationalism” (Chernilo, 2010; Rosenberg, 2013).

⁸ For a conception of the “withering away the state” see Engels, “The Origin of Family, Private Property and State” and Lenin, “State and Revolution”.

nationalism was confined to its projected contribution to realising revolutionary possibilities, and therefore, despite the fact that it offered up critiques of colonialism, at times Marx and Engels backed it for its potential contributions to the development of international socialism (Yalvaç, 2017: 16). Because its assumption that capitalist globalization would eventually remove national differences (Halliday, 1999: 79) was disproved by “the revival of nationalism and the increased danger of war” in the early twentieth century (Linklater, 2005: 120), some scholars criticised Marxism for failing to grasp “nationalism” (Nairn, 1975).

2.2. Classical Theories of Imperialism

The first generation of imperialism theoreticians, which included Lenin, Bukharin, Luxemburg, Hilferding and Kautsky, formulated different theories of imperialism to account for the transformation of free competition capitalism to monopoly capitalism and its development dynamics (Yalvaç, 2017: 37). Nevertheless, they all converged on one point, namely the increasing productivity of labour and the falling rate of profits brought about monopoly capitalism, and they therefore argued that the concentration and centralisation of capital created changes in the structure of capitalism (Yalvaç, 2017: 37). Lenin claimed that national accumulations of surplus capital were the chief reason for the demise of a relatively peaceful international system (Linklater, 2005: 121) and that the militarisation of relations between imperialists was for the sake of protecting their monopolies’ interests (Yalvaç, 2017: 38). Yet, while Kautsky criticised Lenin for establishing “the necessary relations between developed capitalism and war”, he suggested that the relation was contingent (Halliday, 2002: 81). Kautsky predicted that imperialism would not be the last stage of capitalism and that it would live on through an ultra-imperialist phase (Şenalp, 2012: 37) in which “the global integration of capital would tend to make interstate conflict obsolete” (Callinicos, 2009: 94).

The classical imperialism theorists (Lenin, Bukharin, Luxemburg, Hilferding and Kautsky) appeared just before and after the First World War, and they all converged on the idea that the increasing productivity of labour and the falling rate of profits

brought about monopoly capitalism; therefore, it was argued, the concentration and centralisation of capital created changes in the structure of capitalism (Yalvaç, 2017: 37). However, they formulated different imperialism theories to account for the transformation of competitive capitalism into monopoly capitalism and the development dynamics of capitalism (Yalvaç, 2017: 37). In his work *Finance Capital*, Hilferding emphasised the rise of finance capital and the growth of capital exports. The concentration of capital emanating from competition under industrial capitalism instigated (Warren, 1980: 50), he argued, “a tendency towards the formation of huge blocs of capital organized in a hierarchical way” (Brewer, 1990: 108), thus leading to the emergence of finance capital – a fusion of financial and industrial capital under the control of banks (Brewer, 1990: 93). He pointed to the concomitant rise of monopolies and protectionism (Brewer, 1990: 100). In their pursuit of extending their protected markets as far as possible, monopolies thus needed the support of finance capital (Brewer, 1990: 108). For Hilferding, since the start of the domination of finance capital, the state became its representative (Hilferding, 1981: 220 quoted in Yalvaç, 2017: 37), so the changes in the nature of capitalist corporation and state led to imperialism (Sutcliffe, 2002: 49) and hence “diplomacy” was nothing but “the representation of finance capital” (Hilferding [1910] 1981: 330 quoted in Sutcliffe, 2002: 46).

Luxemburg’s account of imperialism, developed mainly in her book *The Accumulation of Capital* published in 1913, was predicated on “underconsumption”. Luxemburg’s analysis focused on the distinction between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. For Luxemburg, the survival of capitalism was contingent on the continual expansion of the capitalist mode of production into ever-shrinking non-capitalist markets (Yalvaç, 2017: 38), and the need and the drive for new markets and outlets to overcome underconsumption led to “a struggle between capitalist states to establish spheres of interest and to bind them to the ‘mother country’ with protective tariffs” (Brewer, 1990: 71). Since capitalism was rapidly running out of non-capitalist regions into which they could expand (Sutcliffe, 2002: 49), world crises, wars and revolutions became a foregone conclusion of that process (Yalvaç, 2017: 38). By taking up the issues of international loans, protective tariffs and

armaments expenditures, she related her analysis of imperialism to the state system. Like Bukharin and Lenin, she attributed the shift to a struggle for cheap labour and raw materials in explaining inter-imperialist rivalry (Brewer, 1990: 71).

Bukharin, in his book *Imperialism and World Economy*, expanded Hilferding's analysis of "developments inside the advanced capitalist countries" to generate a coherent picture of "the transformation of the world economy" (Brewer, 1990: 88). Bukharin referred to the term "imperialism" as an indicator of a characteristic of the world economy at a particular stage of development (Brewer, 1990: 110). Bukharin focused more on the internationalisation of capital and pointed to the simultaneous move of internationalisation and the nationalisation of capital's interests (Brewer, 1990: 134). For Bukharin, the "relative autonomy of the state" as well as the "withering away" of the anarchy of capitalist competition at the national level largely faded out with the unification of capital in the form of finance capital (Brewer, 1990: 115). Unlike competitive capitalism, the competitive struggle among capitalists in the era of finance capital morphed into geopolitical rivalries between capitalist states on behalf of their national capital (Yalvaç, 2017: 37). By detaching the outward drive of capitalism in the imperialist epoch from underconsumptionist explanations, Bukharin located it in Marx's conception of the circuit of capital (Callinicos, 2009: 52), which "represents the process of producing and reinvesting (accumulating) profit, i.e. the expanded reproduction of capital" (Sutcliffe, 2002: 42).

A heated debate between Lenin and Kautsky on whether "the antagonisms among the Great Powers represent a passing phase" or "arise from the dynamic of capitalist development, above all from the tendency of concentration of capital" (Callinicos, 2009: 44) created two antagonistic lines of thought in the Marxist approach. Lenin claimed that national accumulations of surplus capital were the chief reason for the demise of a relatively peaceful international system (Linklater, 2005: 121) and the militarisation of relations between imperialists for the sake of protecting their monopolies' interests (Yalvaç, 2017: 38). The classical theory of imperialism is generally associated with Lenin's theory of imperialism, which was formulated in his seminal pamphlet *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* written in 1916.

Lenin developed the theory of imperialism as a means of searching for an appropriate strategy and tactics of “world revolution”⁹ (Warren, 1980: 85) and sought to explain the causes of the war and the reasons why the nationalist proletariat supported it (Warren, 1980: 49). In addition, he offered a convincing explanation for the outbreak of the First World War and as well as a justification for socialist revolution (Sutcliffe, 2002: 45).

Drawing on Hilferding, Lenin started with capitalist concentration – including the establishment of trusts, cartels, holding companies, etc. – as well as banking concentration and the appearance of finance capital to characterise the new stage of capitalism. The main premise of Lenin’s theory of imperialism was based on the structural changes in capitalism in the late nineteenth century – the emergence of finance capital and its interweaving with the state and the external drive for new investment outlets caused by the depletion of domestic profitable investment fields – which led to geopolitical struggles among imperialist countries (Callinicos, 2009: 5; Warren, 1980: 50). He pointed out four principal manifestations of monopoly capitalism: (1) the growth of monopolies out of the concentration of production at a very advanced stage of development; (2) the accelerated seizure of the most strategic raw materials by monopolies; (3) the emergence of finance capital out of the fusion of banking capital with industrial capital; (4) the addition of new motives (the struggle for sources of raw materials, the export of capital and spheres of influence) to the extant colonial policy (2010 [1916]: 156-157). By means of setting out a number of trends and tendencies in capitalism (Warren, 1990: 117), Lenin defined imperialism through five points: (1) the decisive role of monopolies in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital (the emergence of “finance capital”); (3) the predominance of exports of capital over the export of commodities; (4) the division of the world market between competing international capitalist monopolies; and (5) the completion of the territorial division of the world among the largest capitalist powers (Lenin, 2010 [1916]: 110-111). Of these five points, which

⁹ World revolution meant “a fusion of the movement of the working class against its bourgeois rulers in the West and the revolt of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples against the major imperialist powers” (Warren, 1980: 4).

have been criticised for not establishing a link between those issues (Marshall, 2014: 326), the predominance of the export of capital over the export of goods was a central theme for Lenin (Sutcliffe, 2002: 45). Lenin saw the export of capital as the underlying cause of imperialism because it became more important than that of commodities for capitalist countries as a result of the superabundance of capital accumulated in advanced countries (Lenin, 2010 [1916]: 74-75). Lenin analysed the expansionism of monopoly capitalism primarily through the export of capital, which was depicted as “a safety valve” for over-capitalized monopolist trusts (Germain, 1955).

Kautsky concurred with Lenin regarding the structural transformation of capitalist states with the rise of finance capital, and held to Lenin’s first four points of the five-point definition of imperialism (Willoughby, 1979: 94 quoted in Şenalp, 2012: 39). Kautsky criticised Lenin, however, for establishing “the necessary relations between developed capitalism and war”, even though that relation was contingent (Halliday, 2002: 81) and the global accumulation process would do away with the possibility of war. Kautsky predicted that imperialism might not be the last stage of capitalism, but rather that it may go through an “ultra-imperialism” phase (Kautsky 1970: 46 quoted in Brewer, 1990: 130) in which “the global integration of capital would tend to make interstate conflict obsolete” (Callinicos, 2009: 94). Kautsky saw imperialist wars as a passing phase for the reason that he predicted that the concentration and centralization of capital would proceed to a further stage in which inter-imperialist antagonisms could be peacefully reconciled within the framework of globalized capitalism (Callinicos, 2009: 62).

Kautsky defined imperialism in terms of the relationship between advanced capitalist countries and underdeveloped countries and saw it as the product of industrial capitalism (Yalvaç, 2017: 38). Since industrial capital could not sell the sum total of its production in an industrialized country, Kautsky argued that it engaged in colonial wars of expansion to acquire new markets consisting of non-industrialized countries (Germain, 1955). For Kautsky, the monopolisation of capital would clear out free competition and lead to the formation of cartels among

the most powerful monopolies, as a result of which competition between imperialist states would be diminished (Yalvaç, 2017: 38). Although the Kautskian conception has been critiqued for being blind to the contradictory dialectical character of capitalist evolution, in the post-Second World War era the increasing integration of advanced capitalism under the hegemony of the United States increased appeal for Kautsky's idea among the world's left (Callinicos, 2009: 63).

While acknowledging the possibility of the creation of a world trust by finance capitalists, Lenin ruled out the idea by claiming that the uneven development nature of capitalism increased the contradictions inherent in the world economy (Lenin, 2010 [1916]: 117-118). Thinking that Kautsky's ideas about imperialism purposefully targeted revolutionary movements instead of theoretical reflections, Lenin directed fierce criticism towards Kautsky and his theory of ultra-imperialism. Lenin accused Kautsky of making a number of errors, including: reducing imperialism to the desire for annexations by industrial capitalism (2010 [1916]: 113); departing from Marxism by advocating a reactionary ideal of peaceful democracy (2010 [1916]: 142), thus espousing bourgeois reformism ((2010 [1916]: 116); concealing the vital connection between periods of imperialist peace and those of war to pacify the workers' movement and thus reconcile them with social-chauvinists (2010 [1916]: 151-152); playing down the deepest contradictions of imperialism (2010 [1916]: 153). By the same token, Lenin critiqued Kautsky's ultra-imperialism for being "irreconcilable with Marxism" (2010 [1916]: 155) and "a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present era, and directing them towards illusionary prospects of an imaginary 'ultra-imperialism' of the future" (2010 [1916]: 149). Lenin saw the ultra-imperialist phase as "nothing more than a 'truce' in periods between wars" (2010 [1916]: 151).

Classical theories of imperialism have been criticised for taking the state system as a given and for their failure to question why nation states were "relevant units" (Brewer, 1990: 123), thus offering an analysis of imperialism without considering the theoretical problems posed by the pluralist state system (Yalvaç, 2017: 50). In

addition, they have been critiqued for: deducing a general theory of capitalist international relations based on country-specific developments (only European countries) at a particular juncture (1873-1917) of capitalist international relations (Teschke, 2010: 168); being Eurocentric; their failure to address social and political agency more generally (Teschke, 2010: 169); being reductionist, mechanistic and functionalist as a result of their theorization (particularly by Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin) of the role of the state both domestically and internationally (Teschke, 2010: 169) on account of their treatment of the state as a mere vehicle for predefined class interests (Callinicos, 2009: 70).

2.2. The Second Generation Theories of Imperialism

The world after the Second World War witnessed a “much more interconnected” phase with the Soviet Union’s increasing clout, the rise of the United States to a position of leadership in the West, and the appearance of newly independent countries (Warren, 1980: 111). Movements for national independence that coalesced with demands for a better life “grew vigorously in the post-war geo-political competition between the USSR and the US in the Third World” (Warren, 1980: 111). In the Stalinist era, Lenin’s notions about imperialism were reproduced by pointing out the “overripeness” of capitalism and imperialism was reinterpreted in an underconsumptionist sense (Brewer, 1990: 136). Of two divergent views on the post-war world order, the first of which was put forward by Varga, who, reminiscent of the Kautskian line of thinking, claimed that inter-imperialist war was obsolete and advocated for a peaceful transition to socialism instead of revolution, and the second of which was posited by Jdanov and Voznesenskiy, who asserted that capitalism would plunge into a severe economic crisis as a result of the US’s inability to successfully make the transition from a war economy to a peace economy, Stalin chose the latter (STMA, 1988: 1005). Sticking to a Leninist line, Stalin argued that there would be a contraction of the world capitalist system brought about by the emergence of the socialist market and that would inevitably lead to both a deepening of capitalism’s general crisis and an eventual inter-imperialist war (STMA, 1988: 1005).

A two-stage strategy for revolution which required the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution before aiming for socialism –thus requiring cooperation with the national bourgeoisie – was embraced by the Soviet Union in the later years of Stalin's life (Warren, 1980: 120), since by then collaboration with the national bourgeoisie had become a distinctive feature of the Communist movement (Warren, 1980: 121). With its emphasis on parasitism and the pillaging of the Third World, the Leninist theory of imperialism was transformed by Third World nationalists into a theory of neo-colonialism to suit the requirements of the post-war era of decolonisation (Warren, 1980: 8). However, the inter-war period produced no notable innovations in the Marxist theory of imperialism developed in the first two decades of the twentieth century (Brewer, 1990: 136), and Marxist approaches to IR held little importance in the discipline of IR in the first period of the Cold War (Şenalp, 2012: 25). That point leads us to the theories developed in the post-war period.

The second phase appeared in the 1960s and '70s within the context of “dependency theories” as an alternative to the existing modernisation theories (Yalvaç, 2017: 40). In the second phase of imperialism, the focus on political anti-imperialism shifted towards economic and cultural anti-imperialism (Sutcliffe, 2002: 49). The dependency school, known through the works of Andre Gunter Frank, Henrique Cardoso, and so on, claimed that developed centre countries condemned those that were underdeveloped to backwardness and precluded the latter from achieving independent development (Linklater, 2005: 123). The World System Perspective, which was introduced in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, for the first time took an interest in the question of why multi-plural states and the world capitalist system exist (Teschke, 2010: 170).

2.1.1. The Dependency School

In the 1960s and 1970s, a lively debate led by Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Wallerstein was prompted by the totality of relationships binding the periphery to the metropolis and subordinating the former to the latter, which

resulted in the emergence of second generation imperialism amongst the leftist intelligentsia that came to be known as “dependency theory” or “dependency school”. This school thus focused more on the unequal relations between central and periphery countries, the unequal exchange relations in the capitalist world economy, and alternative development models (Yalvaç, 2017: 40). It should be noted here that while dependency theory emerged from the debates on development economics, “by no means all of its adherents claimed to be Marxists” (Brewer, 1990: 162; Warren, 1980: 3). Inspired by Lenin’s ideas about the export of capital to underdeveloped countries, the dependency school “tended to equate modern imperialism with the prevailing relationships of domination and exploitation between advanced capitalist and underdeveloped economies” (Warren, 1980: 49). However, there was little continuity between the classical theories of imperialism and the second generation imperialism theories of the 1960s, as they had different concerns about the issue as a result of shifting historical circumstances (Sutcliffe, 2002: 44). Dependency theory recasted the concept of imperialism in the form of “the dominance of more developed over less developed countries” (Brewer, 1990: 88; Callinicos, 2009: 5), thereby sliding its emphasis “from political anti-imperialism to economic and cultural anti-imperialism” (Sutcliffe, 2002: 49). In fact, however, although classical theories of imperialism implicitly touched on the domination of developed over underdeveloped countries, they primarily focused on the geopolitical rivalries (in political and military as well as economic terms) between major capitalist countries, which eventually led to inter-imperialist wars (Brewer, 1990: 88-89). As Sutcliffe rightly notes, “the relations between developed and underdeveloped countries” were not the primary focus of Lenin’s theory of imperialism (Sutcliffe, 2002: 49-50), but rather it pointed to the radical multipolarity of imperialism (Marshall, 2014: 327) and became entirely concerned with imperialism’s “sources and repercussions in the advanced capitalist world” (Warren, 1980: 48). In contrast to classical imperialism theories, which considered imperialism to be a new stage, all¹⁰ variants of dependency theory claimed that the polarization of the centre-periphery had been a feature of capitalism for centuries (Sutcliffe, 2002: 50).

¹⁰ Except for Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, who are associated with the theory of the monopoly stage of capitalism (Sutcliffe, 2002: 50).

Since the world of the 1960s was reminiscent of Kautsky's prediction that imperialism was merely a passing phase which would lead to an era of global peace, some detected a Kautskian perspective in dependency theory (Sutcliffe, 2002: 50). However, there were a few main positions in the debates on the character of imperialism in the 1960s: (1) American super-imperialism in which all other capitalist states fell under the hegemony of the United States, which acted as the organizer and protector of world capitalism in the face of socialism; (2) Ultra-imperialism in which a dominant coalition of relatively autonomous imperialist states performed the organizing role necessary to preserve the unity of the system; (3) Imperial Rivalry in which relatively autonomous states no longer performed the necessary organizing role, or performed it so badly that serious conflicts occurred between them and the unity of the system was threatened (Rowthorn, 1971: 31-32 quoted in Callinicos, 2009:63). Marxist economist Ernest Mandel argued with those scholars who supported American super-imperialism, particularly those associated with the journal *Monthly Review*, by claiming that US hegemony was in decline and a new era of inter-imperialist rivalries was coming into being (Callinicos, 2009: 63).

Some scholars saw the genesis of the dependency school as a reaction to the idea that the end of direct colonialism closed the book on imperialism (Sutcliffe, 2002: 49), while others identified the shift to Modernisation theory's naturalisation of the underdevelopment of the periphery as a necessary stage (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2017: 34) and to the unilinear evolutionism and one-size-fits-all approach of the Modernisation School (Olukoshi, 2017: 22) which envisaged that development within the system could be brought about by mimicking the experiences of developed countries (Amin, 2017: 17). In contrast to modernisation theory, which saw underdeveloped countries' cultural characteristics as the cause of their underdevelopment and their lack of adherence to specific economic policies that followed given "stages of growth", dependency theory drew attention to the role colonialism played in constructing the positions of countries within the global economy (Kufakurinani, Ushehwedu *et al.*, 2017: vi). Dependency theory assumed the existence of alternative "paths of development" which were, however, suppressed by external influences (Warren, 1980: 169) with the aim of preventing periphery countries from catching up in their

attempts to renegotiate their position in the international division of labour (Olukoshi, 2017: 22).

Dependency theory offers “a structuralist analysis of the obstacles to capitalist development in the third world” (Leys, 1977: 97). Its unit of analysis is the “world capitalist system”, of which nation states are component parts (Brewer, 1990: 18). The world system based on the underlying polarization between the centre/core/metropolis and peripheries/satellites created a division into centre and periphery (Brewer, 1990: 196). Capitalism is thus not defined by a specific relation between classes, but by production for profit in a world system of exchange and the exploitation of some areas by others (Brewer, 1990: 18). Dependency theorists defined the world capitalist system accordingly, as “primarily a system of unequal exchange linking social formations” dominated by pre-capitalist modes of production “to those dominated by capitalist modes of production”, and therefore far from destroying pre-capitalist modes of production it consolidated them (Leys, 1977: 103). Thus the relations among the constituent parts of the system reproduces “inequality among the countries of the world by creating a dominant, wealthy core and a subservient, impoverished periphery” (Hout, 1993: 1). Dependency theory asserted that countries in the periphery lacked healthy internal roots and a vigorous dynamic of their own due to forms of externally imposed capitalism on their pre-capitalist structure (Warren, 1980: 189). They saw underdevelopment as the outcome of the external imposition of a particular pattern of specialization and exploitation in the periphery (Brewer, 1990: 18). This external influence also put into place a certain class structure and organization of production in the periphery, including the ruling classes, which are intermediaries in the system of exploitation that maintains and reproduces such patterns of production (Brewer, 1990: 19).

Dependency theorists referred to underdevelopment as a unique type of socio-economic structure brought about by the integration of the society at hand into the sphere of advanced capitalist countries. They assumed the existence of an international division of labour enabling Western multinationals to exploit the cheap labour of underdeveloped countries for assembly industries or the manufacture of

components (Warren, 1980: 179). They characterized dependence by the limited development of a manufacturing industry (especially capital goods) and reliance on primary products for the generation of foreign exchange (Warren, 1980: 181). For them, the integration of Third World economies into the world market as suppliers of primary products (minerals, agricultural raw products and so on) created distortions in the pattern of Third World development and the exploitative international division of labour that constantly reproduces itself (Warren, 1980: 151). They thus defined dependence as a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others (Warren, 1980: 160). The Dependency school identified three interwoven processes which created “underdevelopment”: (1) the drain of surplus from the periphery to the centre; (2) the creation of a self-reinforcing international division of labour that generates further self-reinforcing structural imbalances in the colonial economy; (3) the conservation of precapitalist modes of production in a way that arrests the advancement of productive forces (Warren, 1980: 140). The surplus drain is thus completed: profits flow from foreign investments in the periphery back to the metropole and there is unequal exchange and monopolistic control over trade (Warren, 1980: 141).

Still, there is no single unified theory of dependency but different strands of it. Some scholars (Kufakurinani, Ushehweu *et al.*, 2017: vii) cite three variants of dependency school along the lines of Andre Gunder Frank’s theory of “the development of underdevelopment” and “dependent development” à la Cardoso, Faletto, Peter Evans and Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems analysis; others (Brown, 1985: 63 quoted in Hout, 1993: 6) identify three variants of the dependency school in terms of “dependencia theory” (Theotonio dos Santos, Henrique Cardoso, and Celso Furtado), “centre-periphery theories” (Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Johan Galtung, and Giovanni Arighi), and “world system analysis” (Immanuel Wallerstein); yet others (Amin, 2017: 12-13) identify three varying strands by referring to the school of “global historical materialism” of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Amin, the “dependencia school” associated with Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio dos Santos, and Andre Gunder Frank, and lastly the World Systems School of

Immanuel Wallerstein, to which Giovanni Arrighi contributed. There are some who see two main currents in dependency theory; for Evans, there is the structuralist seeking out development policies for the sake of locating more desirable paths and there are the Marxists who propose that socialism is a panacea that can overcome the distortions and limitations of development in the periphery (Evans, 2017: 27). In contrast, Grosfoguel cites the version of “development of underdevelopment” formulated by Andre Gunder Frank, Theotonio dos Santos, Vânia Bamberra, and Rui Mauro Marini, and the “dependent development” à la Cardoso and Falleto (Grosfoguel, 2017: 54).

In terms of these variations in the dependency school, those developed by the most influential figures such as Baran, Frank, Amin, Warren, and Wallerstein will be discussed in the following section. Since this thesis is about historical materialist approaches to IR, this part will primarily explore their ideas which relate to the context at hand. After discussing the main premises of these strands by drawing extensively on secondary sources, I will turn my attention to critiques of dependency theory.

Paul Baran created an important shift in Marxist theory by altering the subject matter from rivalry and war to underdeveloped countries with his eminent book *The Political Economy of Growth*, which was published in 1957 as a response to bourgeois development theory (Brewer, 1990: 137). His theory and ideas contributed to the revival of Marxist economics in the 1960s and his text became a very popular reference book in Marxist circles in the 1970s. Together with Sweezy, Baran published another seminal book in 1968 titled *Monopoly Capital*. The journal *Monthly Review* (edited by Sweezy *et al.*) was the main outlet for dependency school writers (Brewer, 1990: 137). Baran stated that monopolies were the underlying cause of stagnation in both advanced and underdeveloped countries on the grounds that it diverted the surplus of output away from productive investment towards wasteful uses (Brewer, 1990: 160). Contrary to classical Marxism’s expectation of full capitalist development in due course throughout the world, Baran asserted that the destiny of underdeveloped countries was distinctive from the development process

undertaken by developed countries (Brewer, 1990: 21). In the monopoly stage, Baran argued, capitalism was transformed from a force for development into a cause of stagnation, both in advanced countries because of chronic shortages of demand caused by the declining purchasing power of workers and high monopoly profits and in underdeveloped countries because of the problem of the siphoning away of increasing surplus through the luxury spending of the ruling class or profit transfers to advanced countries (Brewer, 1990: 21-22). Because underdeveloped countries have not gone through a stage of competitive capitalism, Baran claimed that, “they are ‘frozen’ at a low level of production and income” (Brewer, 1990: 22).

For Baran, the exploitative relations between advanced and underdeveloped countries have come into being through flows of trade (the export of the cheap resources of primary products to advanced countries and the import of manufactured products from advanced countries), flows of surplus (in the form of profits and dividends), and political-military influence (governments that cling to power) (Brewer, 1990: 150-151). Baran defined the main elements of the social and economic structure of underdeveloped countries in terms of “a large and very backward agricultural sector with small-scale peasant production and a parasitic landlord class; a small but relatively advanced industrial sector, partly foreign owned, producing for the restricted local market; a number of enterprises producing for export, typically foreign owned and producing primary products; and finally a large sector of traders, including large-scale merchants who control foreign trade and have close links with foreign capital, as well as petty traders who penetrate into the remoter rural areas” (Brewer, 1990: 152). As far as the political structure of underdeveloped countries is concerned, Baran put greater emphasis on “foreign capital” because of its economic and political power within the country and its ability to call on the support of its home country, as well as “comprador bourgeoisie” and the local suppliers/agents/subcontractors of foreign capital, which function as the “transmission belt” of the exploitation of underdeveloped nations by foreign capital (Brewer, 1990: 158). The comprador bourgeoisie represent both their own interests and to a large extent the interests of foreign capital as well. Baran also depicted feudal lords as being an ally of foreign capital and therefore representative of the

status quo (Brewer, 1990: 158). Baran noted that there are three different kinds of government in underdeveloped countries: colonial administrations, comprador governments and “New Deal” governments (Brewer, 1990: 159). Comprador governments, which are run by privileged members of the local population, seize power through foreign capital to serve its interests but they are deposed if they stop doing so, whereas “New Deal” governments come into being as the result of a popular coalition to demand independence (Brewer, 1990: 159).

Another influential figure in the dependency tradition is Andre Gunder Frank, who critiqued the “orthodoxies of the Marxist evolutionary stage theory upon which the Communist Parties’ political strategies of ‘popular front’ and ‘bourgeois democratic revolution’ had been predicated” (Brenner, 1977: 90), and also disagreed with those parties’ assumption that Latin America was feudal, or at least semi-feudal. Frank based his argument on the notion that Latin American countries had been capitalist since the 1500s when they were integrated into the capitalist system as a periphery (Amin, 2017: 13). Such a claim makes it clear how Frank conceived capitalism. Frank thought of capitalism as a world-wide system of monopolistic exchange and exploitation that channels surplus from the satellites to the metropolis (Brewer, 1990: 198). As Frank argued:

The metropolis expropriates economic surplus from its satellites and appropriates it for its own economic development. The satellites remain underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus and as a consequence of the same polarization and exploitative contradictions which the metropolis *introduces and maintains* in the satellite’s domestic structure. (Frank, 1969: 9 quoted in Brenner, 1977: 28)

Frank and his followers argued that backwardness was insufficient as a concept for fully defining underdevelopment, as integration into the world capitalist system in a subordinate position was the factor which restricted development (Brewer, 1990: 19). Frank claimed that the problem of underdevelopment arose not from imperialism’s preservation of pre-capitalist social structures but from peripheral countries’ integration into the world capitalist system, as their capitalist nature hindered their progress (Warren, 1980: 121). He insisted that the internal structure and development of different parts of the world economy was primarily determined by their place in

the whole and that the organization of production at a lower level (enterprise, sector, nation state) was secondary (Brewer, 1990: 198). Frank predicted the national bourgeoisie's likely response in the case of occurrences of "development of underdevelopment" as supporters of "precisely the class system of production and surplus extraction which fettered economic advance" but not as advocates of "revolution for development" (Brenner 1977: 90).

Frank's concept of the "development of underdevelopment" posits that "underdevelopment is a *sui generis* state of distorted development caused by imperialism" (Warren, 1980: 189). He saw development and underdevelopment as two sides of the same coin:

...economic development and underdevelopment are relational and qualitative, in that each is actually different from, yet caused by its relations with, the other. Yet development and underdevelopment are the same in that they are the product of a single, but dialectically contradictory, economic structure and process of capitalism. Thus they cannot be viewed as the product of supposedly different economic structures or systems... One and the same historical process of the expansion and development of capitalism throughout the world has simultaneously generated—and continues to generate—both economic development and structural underdevelopment". (Frank, 1969: 9 quoted in Brenner, 1977: 28)

Frank thus argued that development in core countries always produces underdevelopment in the periphery. For him, in addition to a process of original surplus creation in the periphery and surplus transfer to the core, the accumulation of capital in the core entailed "the imposition of a raw-material-producing, export-dependent economy upon the periphery to fit the productive and consumptive requirements of the core" (Brenner, 1977: 29). Therefore Frank claimed that peripheral industrialisation would not chip away at underdevelopment (Grosfoguel, 2017: 54).

This leads us to the "dependent development" concept formulated by Henrique Cardoso, which was in a sense aimed at addressing the increasing criticism directed towards the dependency school in the 1970s. Arguing against Gunter Frank's notion of "development of underdevelopment" which appeared in his famous article (Cardoso, 1972) published in *New Left Review*, Cardoso stressed that a dynamic

process of industrialization was possible in dependent situations (Warren, 1980: 162). Cardoso argued that dependency is not mechanistically determined by external forces but rather arises when external forces become internalized in the struggles and contradictions of indigenous social forces (Warren, 1980: 161). While acknowledging the unequal international division of labour, Cardoso proposed that a limited form of developmental catch-up is possible within the system (Kufakurinani, Ushehweu *et al.*, 2017: vii). Arguing that since the exponents of dependent development are the equivalent of industrialisation, they staked out a claim for the possibility of industrialisation in the periphery despite its integration into the world capitalist system. Although the extent of modernisation is hemmed in by imperialism, Cardoso thought that “the range of possible responses to” underdevelopment “depends upon internal political alliances and creativity” (Warren, 1980: 161).

Another attempt to overcome the deficiencies of the dependency school was made by Samir Amin through the inclusion of the explicit treatment of “unequal specialization” in his two main works, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (1974 [1970]) and *Unequal Development* (1976 [1973]). Amin associates himself with Paul Baran’s version of dependency, which is based on the manifestation of unequal exploitation in unequal exchange (Amin, 2017: 12). Amin fused an analysis of international exchange with that of accumulation on a world scale. He argued that the advanced capitalist centre imposes a pattern of specialization on the periphery that constrains its future development. He saw accumulation and development as a single process on a global scale, but different accumulation types divided the capitalist world economy into two distinct types of social formation; while social formations with self-centred accumulation exist at the centre, others with dependent accumulation lag in the periphery (Brewer, 1990: 182-183). Because of their earlier capitalist development based on their own internal dynamics, the countries of the centre took the lead in industrial productivity. Amin’s explanation of unequal specialization hinges on the notion of relative levels of productivity in the centre and the periphery which was undertheorized (Brewer, 1990: 199). For Amin, such supremacy in productivity established a pattern of unequal specialization which he conceived of as “both cause

and consequence of unequal development”. Whilst the pattern of unequal specialization made it possible for capitalist development at the centre to demolish pre-capitalist modes of production, it hindered capitalist development in the periphery because of the competition of the more advanced industries of the centre, so pre-capitalist modes persisted for a long time (Brewer, 1990: 183). He emphasised the impossibility of catching up within the system and saw “delinking” from the system as “a prerequisite for the development of productive forces (i.e. a pattern of development which leads to higher living standards for the majority of people)” (Amin, 2017: 17). However, for Amin, delinking did not entail autarky but compelling the system to adjust to the periphery’s needs (Amin, 2017: 17). Delinking thus requires prioritising the social, economic and political needs of each country, trying to guide investments and attempting to control the activities of foreign investors and their engagement in a way that benefits society as a whole (Taylor, 2017: 81).

In the 1970s, Bill Warren directed criticism towards both dependency theory and neo-colonialism from within the dependency tradition. His comprehensive analysis was published posthumously in 1980 in a book titled *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*. Warren argued that the requirements of bourgeois anti-imperialist propaganda and the security requirements of the encircled Soviet state undermined the Marxist analysis of imperialism (Warren, 1980: 8). The struggle for political liberation from imperialism resulted in the domination of the working-class movement of Third World countries through populist nationalism, as was the case with Peronism in Argentina and Nasserism in Egypt (Sender, 1980: xi). Neo-colonialism and dependency theories were accused of subordinating the working-class and socialist movement to ideologies of nationalist, anti-imperialist unity (Warren, 1980: 171), thereby “divert[ing] and dampen[ing] internal class struggles by orienting discontent towards external alleged enemies” (Warren, 1980: 185). Warren blamed second-generation imperialism theories for submerging socialism in a morass of nationalism (Sutcliffe, 2002: 52). Warren countered the persistent citing of underdevelopment in the Third World argument, dubbing it an “underdevelopment

fiction” by claiming that “a process of development has been taking place - at least since the English industrial revolution” (Warren, 1980: 113). As Warren put it:

Direct colonialism, far from having retarded or distorted indigenous capitalist development that might otherwise have occurred, acted as a powerful engine of progressive social change, advancing capitalist development far more rapidly than was conceivable in any other way, both by its destructive effects on pre-capitalist social systems and by its implantation of elements of capitalism. Indeed, although introduced into the Third World externally, capitalism has struck deep roots there and developed its own increasingly vigorous internal dynamic. [...] The general economic relationships of [imperialist] countries with the underdeveloped countries actually favours the industrialization and general economic development of the latter. (Warren, 1980: 9-10).

To the extent that political independence is real, Warren claimed that private foreign investment offers a means of fortification and diversification of the economies of the host countries, even helping reduce “dependence” in the long run (Warren, 1980: 176). Warren criticised dependency theory for excluding the possibility that less developed countries have been becoming progressively more developed, in terms of both the expansion of productive forces and material welfare as a result of their increasing integration into the world market, partially because of imperialism (Warren, 1980: 169).

Warren also criticised Stephen Hymer (1979) and Robin Murray (1971), representatives of the Kautskian line in the second generation of imperialism theorists, who posited that internationalisation of capital has weakened nation states, thus creating a territorial divergence between the nation state’s activities and multi-national corporations (Şenalp, 2012: 57). For Hymer, in the process of the internationalisation of capital, interstate struggles arising because of intercapitalist competition on the national scale has increasingly faded away (Şenalp, 2012: 57). The overseas expansion of multi-national companies has impaired nation states’ regulatory power over such firms and their control over the national economy (Şenalp, 2012: 57). Warren, on the other hand, challenged this idea by asserting that nation states still maintain control over multinational corporations (Warren, 1971).

Even though they accepted the validity of Leninist notions about imperialism for a particular era, in the early 1970s a group of Marxists (e.g. Sklar, 1976) developed the idea of “postimperialism” in response to the assumption about which classical and second generation imperialism theories concurred, namely that capitalism had ceased to be progressive (Sutcliffe, 2002: 51). They argued that the globalisation of capital had reached such an extent that national borders had lost their relevance and that “nation-to-nation conflicts were being replaced by class struggle at the global level” (Sutcliffe, 2002: 51). They made the claim that the nationality of the capitalist class had faded away and that it was “fused into a single international corporate bourgeoisie” by taking on the form of a network of multinational corporations (Sutcliffe, 2002: 51).

Dependency theory has been criticised for the “romanticisation of nationalism and pre-capitalist society that had underlain the dependency literature” (Halliday, 2002: 81), as well as for neglecting existing developments in the underdeveloped world, concentrating merely on capitalist exploitation but ignoring Soviet exploitation, overplaying external factors (Yalvaç, 2018: 25), playing down class relations in their analyses of economic development and underdevelopment (Brenner, 1977: 27), using the pretext of external influence, i.e. imperialism, to excuse domestic failures (Warren, 1980: 171), not adhering to mainstream Marxist thought (Brewer, 1990: 198), being static as it takes dependency as a *given* with only its form changing and for not examining the centre-periphery paradigm on which the entire theoretical structure rests (Warren, 1980: 163), producing a revision of bourgeois development theory (Leys, 1977: 94) simply because it reproduces the relations of production and exploitation in the Third World in a way which still idealises and mystifies them (Leys, 1977: 98), inheriting the concepts of national interests and national development from bourgeois development economics (Brewer, 1990: 198), having left unanswered the question of why certain nations needed the underdevelopment of other nations for their own process of development (Laclau, 1977: 35-6), for its tendency to treat underdeveloped countries as a collection of homogeneous units without attending to the complex class relations underpinning both domestic and global accumulation processes (Kufakurinani, Ushehwedu *et al.*, 2017: x), for contradicting itself by proposing national solutions to the problems with the global

system, for getting the mistaken impression that a radical transformation of the system was possible by making a change in a particular nation-state (Grosfoguel, 2017: 54), for reducing capitalism to exchange relations and neglecting production relations, and failing to account for the capitalist industrialisation of the Asian tigers (Sutcliffe, 2002: 50-51; Brewer, 1990: 199).

2.1.2. The World System Perspective

In the mid-1970s, a major breakthrough in dependency theory was made by Immanuel Wallerstein's *The World System Perspective* (WSP), which was mainly developed in his books *The Modern World System* (1974) and *The Capitalist World Economy* (1979). Within this tradition, for the first time the multi-plural existence of states and the world capitalist system was brought into question (Yalvaç, 2017: 40), and Wallerstein drew attention to how the world system was not just a theatre on which interstate power struggles were staged but also how it accommodated global socio-economic inequalities (Yalvaç, 2010: 30). Whilst Frank and others attempted to "find the sources of underdevelopment in the periphery in its relationship with the core", Wallerstein tried to explore "the roots of development in the core of its relationship with the periphery" (Brenner, 1977: 29). The WSP's unit of analysis is the world economy, which is thus argued to be an integrated totality defined by a single international division of labour based on different regimes of labour control among multiple states (Teschke, 2010: 169). Wallerstein distinguished between the pre-modern and modern age in terms of the prevailing world system: the former was associated with a unicentral world empire whereas the latter was bound up with a multi-central world economy (Yalvaç, 2009: 169). The emergence of capitalism changed the structure of the world empire and capitalist world economy, which came into being through economic rather than political power (Yalvaç, 2009: 169-170). Wallerstein claimed that capitalism has dominated the world system since sixteenth century (Yalvaç, 2009: 170). He conceived of capitalism as "profit-oriented production for the world market" within the framework of exchange relations (Teschke, 2010: 170). For Wallerstein, these exchange relations led to a division of the world into a centre, periphery and semi-periphery (Yalvaç, 2009: 170). The

centre arose in accordance with powerful states, skilled workers and high wages, whereas the periphery was identified with weak states and unskilled workers, and the semi-periphery bears features common to both the centre and the periphery (Yalvaç, 2009: 170).

The WSP stressed the transnational nature of capitalism and the transnational structure that linked the centre to the periphery (Yalvaç, 2017: 40-41). In this way, the world capitalist system demonstrates “a strong tendency toward a self-reinforcing system maintenance” (Teschke, 2010: 170). The key premise of the WSP is that the world capitalist system enables the existence of an unequal structure which transfers surplus from the periphery to the centre (Yalvaç, 2009: 170). For Wallerstein, states are hierarchically positioned within an unequal exchange system and are a vehicle of surplus transfer from the periphery to the centre (Teschke, 2010: 169). The state system helps the reproduction of capitalism through surplus transfer and capitalist expansion (Yalvaç, 2017: 42). Wallerstein explained the underlying reason behind this transfer from the periphery to the centre by referring to the existence of powerful states in the centre. Similarly, he claimed that powerful states were necessary for realisation of unequal exchange relations (Yalvaç, 2009: 170). For the WSP, the most powerful state in the system is the one with hegemonic power. Unlike realism’s requirement of military-political superiority, in the WSP’s conceptualisation the rise of a hegemonic power hinges on competitive supremacy first in production, and then in commerce and in finance, and a decline of hegemonic power is caused by a loss of that competitive supremacy (Yalvaç, 2009: 170). For Wallerstein, to date the Netherlands, the British Empire and the USA have risen to hegemonic power, and the US maintained that status from 1945 to 1967. The concomitant decline of the economic power of a hegemonic state and rise of a challenger entails a reorganisation of production relations in a way that reflects a new balance of power. Such a reorganisation is realised through hegemonic intra-core conflicts between rising challengers and declining status quo powers (Teschke, 2010: 170). According to the WSP, since the global system shapes the conditions of each country’s development at the national level, any national attempts to move out of the system would

automatically fail because of the operations of the global system itself (Amin, 2017: 13).

The WSP was criticised for assigning a deterministic role to the world economy in analyses of the state system, for ignoring internal class structures, for its inability to explain development differences between states (Dunn, 1981), for its ambiguity about whether states are powerful because of their place in the centre of the world economy or whether they are in the centre because they are powerful (Gourevitch, 1978), for treating wages as an “independent variable” without adequately explaining them (Brewer, 1990: 184), for conceiving “capitalism as a worldwide commercial network that transfers surplus from the periphery to core” (Teschke, 2010: 170), for reducing state interests to trade-dependent ruling classes rather than reflecting the diverse class-contested strategies of reproduction (Teschke, 2010: 171), and for reducing the state system to a structural feature of the capitalist economy, thereby becoming entrenched in a deep structural functionalism in which the function, strength, and location of specific states on the core-semi-periphery-periphery model are determined (Teschke, 2010: 172).

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKISH LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN THE POST-SECOND-WORLD-WAR ERA (1945-1960)

This chapter will analyse how Turkey's socialist movement interpreted the world order and Turkish foreign policy from the end of the Second World War to the 1960 military coup. After the war, as Turkey joined the capitalist bloc in the emergent bipolar world order, it became very difficult for the socialist movement to undertake political activities, even illegally. The banning or confiscating of their publications, the closing of their journals and parties under martial law, physical attacks on their printing houses (e.g. the Tan Raid), the transformation of martial law¹¹ (declared at the beginning of the war) into a permanent form of rule, and the constant arrests of socialists under articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code¹² all affected that period's publications quantitatively (they could issue only a few journals/newspapers for a very short time) and qualitatively (they could not freely express socialist ideas in what was published).

3.1. Introduction

This section focuses first on world politics and the internal and foreign politics of Turkey during the Second World War, including the new world order that emerged after the war. It then situates Turkey within that order, discussing the internal and

¹¹ Martial law was declared in Istanbul, Edirne, Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Çanakkale and Kocaeli in October 1940 and it continued interrupted until December 1947 (Ahmad, 2015: 153).

¹² By drawing on the New Penal Code of Mussolini's Italy (Alacakaptan, 1965-1966: 5), in 1936 Turkish lawmakers changed the "Offences against the Security of the State" of the Turkish Penal Code, and class-based politics were banned under articles 141 and 142 of the revised penal code (Tunçay, 2009: 158). Article 141 criminalised the domination of one social class over others and attempts to change the existing economic and social order through "violence", and article 142 criminalised political propaganda to that end (Örnek, 2014: 117-118). Those articles were further amended in 1938, 1946, 1949 and 1951, with each amendment the penalty and scope were enhanced. Finally in 1991 they were abolished.

foreign policy developments in Turkey in the post-war period and, more briefly, examining how the multi-party democratic order developed and the position of the socialist movement therein. Lastly, developments in world politics during the rule of the Democrat Party (DP) will be discussed in detail along with internal and foreign political developments in Turkey.

3.1.1. The Era of the Second World War

In 1938 after the death of the “Eternal Chief” Atatürk, İnönü, who was known as the “National Chief”, took over leadership of the CHP government and remained in that position until May 1950. In the first years of İnönü’s rule, friendly relations with the Soviet Union continued in line with a foreign policy based on Atatürk’s principle of “neutrality”, and good relations were sought with Britain to the extent that they would not harm Turkish-Soviet relations (STMA, 1988:1930). The Italian occupation of Albania in April 1939 and its expansionist and aggressive foreign policy in the Mediterranean (Armaoğlu, 1958: 140; Deringil, 2015) along with the similarly aggressive foreign policy of the Germans drove Turkey to seek an ally (Ataöv, 1965: 131; Koçak, 2013a: 152-165; Timur, 1994: 173).

The Soviet Union, which thought that England and France were provoking Germany to launch an attack, signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939 (Oran, 1970: 48; Koçak, 2012: 269; Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 2013: 275). On 1 September 1939, the Second World War began when Germany invaded Poland (Oran, 2013: 387), and the Soviets then occupied the eastern part of Poland and the Baltic republics on 3 September (Koçak, 2013b: 201). Despite the unease created by the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Turkey continued to mediate between the West and the Soviets (Deringil, 2015: 80-82) and had talks with both in an indirect attempt to bring them together (Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, 2013: 275). However, the Soviet Union tried to convince Turkey to shun the triple alliance of the Western Powers and ally instead with the Axis countries (Koçak, 2013b: 201). Soviet insistence on joint control over the Straits undermined Turkey's attempts to ally itself with them (Aydın, 2013: 416-22), whereupon Turkey signed an agreement with the UK and France in October

1939 (Koçak, 2012: 270). However, Turkey added a protocol to the agreement to avoid this new military alliance from leading to a conflict with the Soviets (Koçak, 2013b: 202; Timur, 2003: 51). In June 1940 when Italy declared war against the Allied Powers, Turkey avoided war by invoking this protocol (Deringil, 2015: 116).

When Bulgaria joined the Axis in March 1941, Turkey feared that the Germans might attack from the west as they had done in Poland and that the Soviets might encroach from the east in a land grab (Armaoğlu, 1958). However, after it became clear that the Germans "chose to reach the Middle and Near East through the Soviets" (Koçak, 2012: 534), a process of rapprochement was launched between Turkey and Germany (Koçak, 2012: 547) and a Turkish-German non-aggression and friendship pact was signed a few days before the Germans attacked the Soviets in June 1941 (Armaoğlu, 1958:159; Ataöv, 1965:93; Deringil, 2015:147). The German attack was a relief to Turkey because it moved the threat of war away from its borders (Koçak, 2012: 600). Whilst initially Turkey had allied itself with the UK and France in an attempt to avoid the conflict, it now embraced a pro-German stance because of the Soviets' hidden agenda for the Straits, German promises to hand over the Twelve Islands to Turkey, and German encouragement of pan-Turanism (Armaoğlu, 1958: 161, Aydın, 2013: 448).

In parallel with the military successes of the Germans against the Soviets, "warmongering" increased in Turkey (Belge, 2012: 612) and the media, aside from the pro-left *Tan* and pro-American *Vatan* newspapers, quickly became pro-German (Koçak, 2013b: 171). The Nazis used Pan-Turanism as a diplomatic and political instrument to mobilise Turkey against the Soviet Union (Deringil, 2015: 165; Özdoğan, 2004: 131-141) and, under the single-party government, Turkey was sympathetic to the racist-Turanist trend and tolerated its rise (Oran, 1970:53; Timur, 2003:54; Özdoğan, 2004:132; Koçak, 2013b: 205). Also, during the war the German role in Turkey's foreign trade was as effective as it had been in the pre-war period (Oran, 2013: 395). Despite the Allies' warnings, Turkey continued to sell chrome ore to Germany (Oran, 2013: 395-6) and allowed German ships and submarines to pass freely through the Straits (Koçak, 2013b: 205). During the war, Turkey's strategic

goal was to stay out of the conflict so it could have a stronger position in the balance of powers that would inevitably emerge after the war; in addition, Turkey's military had been weakened during the First World War and did not want to become entangled in the fighting in Europe (Koçak, 2013a: 163). The best scenario for such a strategy involved a German-British peace agreement that did not dictate the absolute superiority of one party over the other (Koçak, 2012: 697; Deringil, 2015: 173), the presence of Germany as a power to curb the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Central Europe (Erkin, 1968: 189-90) and the UK maintaining cool relations with the Soviets (Deringil, 2015: 173). The worst scenario for that strategy was seen as a German defeat by the Soviets who would then dominate Central and Eastern Europe (Armaoğlu, 1958: 163).

The Allied powers insisted that Turkey join the war during the numerous conferences from Casablanca to Yalta (Armaoğlu, 1958: 165-178). Turkey, however, insisted that its army needed to be equipped before entering the war (Armaoğlu, 1958: 167). Upon realising in 1944 that Germany was losing the war, Turkey, which was being shunned by the Allies for refusing to join the fighting, once again tried to approach them with conciliatory gestures (Koçak, 2013a: 236-274). For instance, Chief of Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, whom the Allies saw as being pro-German, was removed from office in January 1944 (Koçak, 2013a: 238), chrome shipments to Germany were stopped in April (Deringil, 2015: 249), Turanists were arrested in May (Koçak, 2013a: 247), Numan Menemencioğlu, the architect of Turkey's pro-German foreign policy, was dismissed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in June (Deringil, 2015: 245), and the passage of German ships through the Straits was banned (Koçak, 2013a: 250). However, those efforts did not change the Allies' negative stance regarding Turkey.

When the Allies decided during the Yalta conference in February 1945 that states which did not declare war on Germany and Japan by 1 March 1945 would not become founding members of the United Nations (UN) (Esmer and Sander, 1987: 184), Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945 (Armaoğlu, 1958: 176). In April 1945, Turkey attended the UN conference held in San Francisco

and signed the UN's charter (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987). On 8 May 1945, the Germans surrendered and the European war ended.

Even though Turkey had not participated in the war, its economy had suffered (Oran, 1969: 238, Tekeli and İlkin, 2016: 11) because of its policy of "armed neutrality" (meaning that it was ready at all times to enter the conflict) (Ahmad, 2015: 134). Compared to the pre-war era, there was a major decrease in national income and agricultural production (Erişçi, 1951: 25-27). The government granted broad powers to the administration in its attempts to reorganise the economy through the National Protection Law which came into force at the beginning of the war (Timur, 1994: 177) to deal with price increases (Koçak, 2013b:170). However, strict price controls by the Refik Saydam government (1940-1942) led to black-market activities and profiteering, which in turn increased inflation (Boratav, 1983: 219, Tekeli and İlkin, 2016: 435). When the Saraçoğlu government (1942-1946) abandoned those policies, it not only failed to control inflation but also enabled speculators to make even more money (Boratav, 1983: 219). The government levied special taxes such as the "Wealth Tax" and the "Tax on Agricultural Produce" to get a share of the speculative profits made by the trade bourgeoisie and land owners (Tekeli and İlkin 2016: 39). In practice, however, the former led to the transfer of capital from the non-Muslim bourgeoisie to the Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie (Boratav, 1983: 219; Keyder, 2011: 144) and the latter became a tithe tax collected from the peasantry (Koçak, 2013b: 171). In addition, given the under-pricing of grain produced by the peasants as stipulated by the Turkish Grain Board (*Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi*), which was actually founded to protect peasants (Karpas, 1967:94), and the decrease in agricultural production caused by the conscription of over a million peasants (Keyder, 2011: 141, Tekeli and İlkin, 2016: 83), the CHP government largely shifted the financial burden of the war to the peasants themselves (Karpas, 1967: 95).

Against this background, the socialist movement was inactive (Çetinkaya and Doğan 2007: 312) because of the policy of "decentralisation" (*separat*) implemented by the

Comintern¹³ in 1936 (Akar, 1989: 151). For some scholars (e.g. Salihoğlu, 2004: 22), in the face of the rising Nazi threat the Comintern made that decision to create a sense of democracy and peace to oppose fascism, whereas for others (e.g. Tunçay, 2009: 163) it was a means of supporting the CHP government which held a pro-Soviet foreign policy. After the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Comintern readopted an anti-fascist policy, and the TKP was re-activated under Reşat Fuat Baraner so it could follow an anti-fascist front policy (Çetinkaya and Doğan 2007: 312).

In this period, TKP circles countered the Pan-Turanist claims that the Soviet Union represented the greatest threat to Turkey and argued the real threat was the Nazis. They claimed the Soviet Union represented peace, sought to secure friendship between Turkey and the Soviets, and railed against the extreme poverty and price increases instigated by the CHP's wartime economic policies (STMA, 1988:1932). In response to “the fascist and Pan-Turkist journals such as *Bozkurt*, *Çınaraltı*, *Gökbörü*, and *Orhun*” (Şişmanov, 1978:141), TKP supporters published two booklets, *The Greatest Danger* written by Faris Erkman in 1943, and *Why I am a Friend of the Soviet Union* written by Suat Derviş¹⁴ in 1944 (STMA, 1988: 1932). TKP activities were interrupted with the arrest of the party's cadres in 1944 (Çetinkaya and Doğan, 2007: 312). Similar propaganda efforts were continued by the "Progressive Youth Union" formed by Mihri Belli, a member of the Central Committee of the TKP who escaped the 1944 arrests, but those activities ended when

¹³ Cominform is the Communist Information Bureau, which was established in 1947 by the communist parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France and Italy to coordinate the activities of all communist parties in Europe. However, in 1948 the Yugoslavian communist party was dismissed from Cominform in a row with the USSR. In April 1956 Cominform was closed (Keskin, 2013: 500).

The Comintern was founded as “the formal link between the Soviet state and the national [communist] parties and provided the theoretical rationale for the policies adopted by both the new state and the national parties” (Warren, 1980: 95), and thus it inextricably fused the requirements of the world revolution and the Soviet Union's security requirements (Warren, 1980: 108). The Comintern supported the anti-imperialist struggle in the Third World which would strike at the socio-economic roots of the world capitalist system, thus lending nationalism greater scope for influencing Marxism (Warren, 1980: 108).

¹⁴ Both Erkman's and Derviş's books were reprinted by TÜSTAV in a book titled *Kırklı Yıllar-1 [the 1940s-1]* (2002).

an investigation was launched against the Progressive Youth Union in 1945 (STMA, 1988: 1933).

3.1.2. The Post-War Period

Through a "balance of power" policy implemented as a result of military developments during the Second World War, the CHP government kept Turkey out of the conflict (Deringil, 2015: 275-276); but Turkey found itself alone when the war ended (Koçak, 2013a: 577). Turkey's participation in the democratic front in an attempt to cast off that "loneliness" could not alleviate the negative impacts of the policy it had pursued with the Soviet Union. In March 1945, the Soviets informed Turkey that they would not extend the "Turkish-Soviet Friendship and Non-Aggression Agreement" of 1925, which would expire in November 1945. Instead they wanted a new agreement reflecting the new conditions of the post-war era (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 191). Turkey accepted this offer in April 1945 (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 192). However, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov told Selim Sarper, Turkey's ambassador to Moscow, that a new agreement should amend the existing Turkish-Soviet borders in favour of the Soviets, set up joint defence of the Straits and open bases to the Soviets along their shores (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 193). These requests, known as the "Soviet demands" in Turkish foreign policy literature, are seen as a turning point in relations between the two countries (Açıkalın, 1947; Sadak, 1949; Erkin, 1968; Oran, 1970; Sander, 1979; Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987; Saray, 2000; Karpat, 2012; Aydemir, 2013; Koçak, 2010; Timur, 2003). However, some (Küçük, 2005 [1979]) dispute that the Soviets made such demands.

The Soviets raised similar issues at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 (Gönlübol and Ülman 1987: 196). While the US and the UK defended the "internationalisation" of the Straits without any changes, the Soviet Union insisted on the "special status" of the Straits, and thus the allies decided to report to Turkey separately their opinions on the Straits (Timur, 2003: 57). Moreover, since Soviet requests for territory from

Turkey concerned only the two states, it was decided they should solve the issue on their own (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 196).

Post-war cooperation among the Allies continued for a while but soon degraded into conflict as the result of disagreements over the partition and re-establishment of Germany (Eroğul, 2003: 16). After a report by US diplomat George F. Kennan in February 1946, US-Soviet relations, which had been based on cooperation during the war, collapsed and the US adopted a strategy of “containment” to prevent “Soviet expansionism” (Kissinger, 1995: 447). The US, with its strong economy and monopoly on nuclear weapons, assumed the leadership of the "free world" (via a capitalist system) and set out to establish “world peace” under its own hegemony by abandoning its traditional policy of “isolation”. That ultimately produced a bipolar new world order (Timur, 2003: 85-87; Sander, 1979: 34).

In February 1946, the US showed growing interest in developing relations with Turkey (Turan and Barlas, 2004: 154). For example, the body of Turkish Ambassador Münir Ertegün was taken to Istanbul in April 1946 by the US Navy (Gönlübol and Ülman 1987: 201). When the UK, reeling from a severe economic crisis, announced it would end military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece after March 1947, the US launched its “Cold War” against the USSR by taking over that aid within the framework of a “containment” through the “Truman Doctrine” on 12 March (Sander, 1979: 18). Afterwards, the Cold War became “a determining element in Turkey’s foreign policy” (Karpas, 2012: 162). In July 1947, a “Military Aid Agreement” between Turkey and the US (Gönlübol and Ülman 1987: 216) said Turkey would not use any military equipment covered by the agreement without US consent¹⁵ (Gönlübol, 1987: 218).

Following the “communist coup” in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 (Kissinger, 1995: 457), the US founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April

¹⁵ As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, this issue was used by US President Johnson in 1964 to prevent Turkey from making an armed landing in Cyprus (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 218). This marked a turning point in Turkish-American relations.

1949 in line with the Truman Doctrine to protect and consolidate the “free world” (i.e. the Western capitalist system) in the “political and military fields” (Oran, 2013a: 486). Turkey’s application to be a founding member was rejected by the US and the UK because of its “limited geographical area” (Bağcı, 2007: 10-11). Also, Turkey was unable to become a founding member of the Council of Europe, established after NATO, so the Turkish leadership felt it was being shunned by the West (Turan and Barlas, 2004: 155). In August 1949, however, Turkey was invited to join the Council, which meant that it was seen as a European country (Hale, 2008: 117). After Italy, a fellow Mediterranean country, became a founding member of NATO, the CHP government’s application in May 1950 was rejected again (Saray, 2000: 102). The DP, which replaced the CHP a few days after the application, insisted on pursuing NATO membership by maintaining the CHP’s foreign policy (Bağcı 2007); but its application for membership was rejected in August 1950 (Sander, 1979: 76).

After the war, Turkey abandoned the “neutrality” it had maintained from 1923 to 1945 to join the “Western capitalist system” in the new bipolar world order (Oran, 2013; Tekeli, 1979-1980). After participating in the Bretton Woods Conference where the foundations of the new economic order were laid, the Peker government made the “September 7 1946 decisions” (e.g. the devaluation of the Turkish currency against the dollar and the liberalisation of foreign trade) before joining the Bretton Woods system¹⁶ (Tekeli, 1979-1980: 292; Boratav, 2013:342). In addition, Turkey joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the main institutions of the Bretton Woods system.

After deciding to integrate into the Western capitalist system, a foreign trade deficit drove Turkey to seek “external funds” and “Turkey saw its relations with the West as the only way to push forward its economic development” (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 319). The US introduction of the Marshall Aid Plan in June 1947 (Karakas,

¹⁶ The Bretton Woods system, established as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference which was organised upon the call of US President Roosevelt and held on 1-23 July 1944 with the participation of 44 countries (Tekeli, 1979-1980: 291), survived until 1971. The value of the US dollar was determined according to the price of gold and member countries started to keep their reserves in dollars; in this way, their currencies became pinned to the dollar (Oran, 2013: 480).

2013: 320) affected Turkey, even though Turkey was not initially to be a recipient (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 222). In return for aid, Turkey was asked to provide agricultural products and natural resources to help reconstruct Europe, so it ended up not receiving very much aid (Erhan, 2013: 540).

It was not just the pressure of foreign powers that influenced the post-war political liberalisation of Turkey (Koçak, 2013a: 561); internal conditions played a role as well (Karpat, 1967; Timur, 1994). Rapid capital accumulation during the war forced the CHP “to renounce an understanding of seeing society as a classless united mass” (Karpat, 1967: 90) and “to admit the end of the republic’s top-down ‘establishment’ period” (Belge, 2007: 24). The single-party dictatorship tried to decrease internal and external pressures resulting from the wartime economic and foreign policies by introducing multi-party democracy to give a “bourgeois parliamentary outlook” to the established order (Eroğul, 2003: 17). Those efforts also included lifting the ban on class-based politics in the Law on Associations and taking measures to protect workers’ rights (e.g. the establishment of the Ministry of Labour, the Workers’ Insurance Institution, and the Institution of Jobs and Employees) (Erişçi, 1951: 28; Güzel, 1997: 52; Timur, 2003:68). In fact, by introducing multi-party democracy, the CHP hoped that any opposition party coming to power would hold similar political beliefs (Demirel, 2014: 167; Boratav, 2013: 320). Therefore, the most frustrating issue for the single-party regime was that a broad-based socialist-opposition front was founded (Salihoğlu, 2004:24; Sertel, S., 1987; Sertel, Z., 1977). That front was to be formed by joining the core cadre (Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü), who were to establish the Democrat Party (DP), and leftist circles (including Cami Baykurt, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Behice Boran, Zekeriya and Sabiha Sertel, Niyazi Berkes and Adnan Cemgil) in the journal *Görüşler (Opinions)*; the CHP organised the “Tan Raid” on 4 December 1945 by urging university students to disperse the opposition front (Gevgilili, 1981: 37; Gökmen, 1998: 164; İleri, 2003: 9; Timur, 2003: 112; Demirel, 2014: 182; Boratav, 2013: 320). Leftist newspapers such as *Tan*, *Yeni Dünya* and *La Turquie* and journals such as *Görüşler* and *Gün*, as well as the printing houses that published them, were destroyed during the raids (Koçak, 2010: 794). In that new atmosphere of fear, Celal Bayar and his colleagues were

forced to back down to avoid being labelled “communists” (Koçak, 2010: 811). In this way, the single-party regime sought US aid by dispersing the broad-based opposition front and fighting communism (Sertel, S. 1987: 314).

No criminal investigation was launched into the Tan Raid (Cantek, 2007: 853), and Sertel and Cami Bayburt were arrested for their writings in *Tan* (Demirel, 2007: 191). In addition, socialist academics Pertev Boratav, Niyazi Berkes and Behice Boran were dismissed from the Language, History and Geography Faculty, the operations of the Human Rights Association, founded in October 1946 by Marshal Fevzi Çakmak to unite rightists and leftists, were halted based on claims that it was a communist organisation, and penal code amendments were made to exert pressure on class-based politics. These all helped the CHP government establish a multi-party democratic order that had been “cleared of the left” (Gevgilili, 1981; Timur, 2003; Çetinkaya and Doğan, 2007; Boratav, 2013; Koçak, 2010). As discussed in Chapter 3, Turkey’s multi-party “democratic” order would come to be referred to as “cute democracy (*cici demokrasi*)” and “Philippine-style democracy” by the MDD and Yön in the 1960s socialist movement (Timur, 2003: 114).

In the “relatively democratic” environment during the transition to multi-party democracy and the removal of the ban on class-based politics, the socialist movement, which had been forced to operate illegally for many years, joined legal politics (Karaca, 1988: 1930). Nine leftist parties were established, notably including the Socialist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*, TSP) in May 1946 led by Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu and the Socialist Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*, TSEKP) in June 1946 led by Şefik Hüsnü (Tunçay, 1983: 1954). Since the socialist movement had not developed a popular base when it was banned, it had resorted to “petty bourgeois radicalism” to try to realise its dream of socialist transformation (Belge, 2007:31). After the ban was lifted, the movement sought to create a socialist society under proletariat rule by rapidly developing a base amongst workers through union activities, known as “1946 Syndicalism” (Atılgan, 2007: 671).

However, the CHP government, disturbed by “the organisation of the working class beyond its own guidance and control” (Güzel, 1996:152, 153; Çetinkaya and Doğan, 2007: 314) and “the workers’ rush to unions led by socialist parties” (Güzel, 1996: 152), closed the socialist parties and their affiliated unions and publications in December 1946 and imprisoned their leading cadres (İleri, 2003: 278). Some claimed that the CHP had intentionally allowed class-based politics so it could purge the “left” by imprisoning the TKP members who revealed themselves by joining open politics (Müstecaplı, 1970: 5 and Fişek, 1969). Others (Güzel, 2016: 152) argued that when civil war erupted in Greece in October 1946 between government forces under British sway and local communists, the CHP government grew fearful and decided to close socialist parties, unions and publications.

Numerous factors are said to explain why Turkey was admitted to NATO: the 1949 communist revolution in China, the emergent China-Soviet alliance, Soviet development of nuclear weapons, Turkey’s deployment of 4,500 soldiers to Korea to join US forces against North Korea in 1950, the US strategy to strengthen the south-eastern flank of NATO in case war erupted in Yugoslavia when it was dismissed from Cominform,¹⁷ the US’s need for strong bases in Turkey, and the opening of US bases in Turkey (Gönlübol ve Ülman, 1987; Sander, 1979; Saray, 2000; Bağcı 2007; Hale, 2008; Karakaş, 2013). Turkey became a NATO member in March 1952 along with Greece (Sander, 1979: 80).

In return for military and economic aid, Turkey signed several bilateral agreements with the US starting in 1947 and promised to grant to the US access to various military and economic facilities (Sander, 1979: 103). Most of those agreements entered into force when they were signed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the General Staff even though they were not approved by parliament. They were based on Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the provisions of the Status of Forces

¹⁷ Cominform is the Communist Information Bureau, which was established in 1947 by the communist parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France and Italy to coordinate the activities of all communist parties in Europe. However, in 1948 the Yugoslavian communist party was dismissed from Cominform in a row with the USSR. In April 1956 Cominform was closed (Keskin, F. 2013:500).

Agreement among states that are party to the treaty (Sander, 1979: 104). As noted in Chapter 3, the Military Facilities Agreement, a secret agreement that came into force in June 1954 without parliamentary approval, was the basis of the “bilateral agreements” (Sander, 1979: 109). This was one of the main points of contention for the socialist movement in the 1960s. Through that agreement, Turkey agreed to the establishment of a strategic US air base in Turkey, free access for US airplanes and ships to Turkish airports and ports, and the granting of Turkish territory to the US free of charge to establish various facilities (Sander, 1979: 109). Turkey thus allowed the US to establish an effective military presence on its territory and enjoy certain privileges as well (Sander, 1979: 113).

US President Dwight Eisenhower, inaugurated in 1953, embraced a new defence strategy, the “New Look”, based on “massive retaliation” to counter the Soviets with nuclear weapons (Sander, 1979: 127). In that context, the US and its allies founded the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 to contain the USSR and China in the Asia-Pacific region (Erhan, 2013: 563). In February 1955, the US established the Baghdad Pact, a Middle East SEATO-like defence alliance (Erhan, 2013:563) of Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and the United Kingdom under the leadership of Turkey to curb the Arab nationalist movement of the 1950s (Sander, 1979: 128-129). The US contained the USSR through its air bases in the Northern Tier which consisted of members of the Baghdad Pact (Erhan, 2013: 562). An unintended consequence of the pact was the Soviet infiltration of the Middle East through economic and military aid agreements with Egypt and Syria (Sander, 1979: 134).

The mid-1950s witnessed: West Germany’s entry into NATO, the establishment of the Warsaw Pact by socialist states led by the USSR (Tellal, 2013: 510), the Soviet invasion of Hungary when it proclaimed neutrality (Gevgilili, 1981: 88), the Cyprus issue becoming an international problem (Bağcı, 2007: 106), the emergence of the “Non-Aligned Movement” as an alternative to the bipolar world order (Bağcı, 2007: 60), the introduction of “peaceful coexistence” by the Soviet Union which initiated East-West dialogue in an atmosphere of “détente” (Tellal, 2013: 511), and the failed attempt of Israel, France and the UK to invade Egypt (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987:

282). The late 1950s were equally full of international developments: King Faisal was overthrown by a Nasserist coup in Iraq (Firat and Kürkçüoğlu, 2013: 632), Iraq left the Baghdad Pact and subsequently the pact was transformed into the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) (Bağcı, 2007: 101), the US intervened in Lebanon under the Eisenhower Doctrine (Sander, 1979: 167), the Cyprus issue was resolved with the establishment of an independent Cyprus state under the guarantorship of Turkey and Greece through the London and Zurich Agreements (Bağcı, 2007: 127), and the European Economic Community (the EEC) was established by six Western European states (West Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg) (Vardar, 2004: 442).

After the Second World War, the CHP and DP governments had sought foreign aid for economic development (Ahmad, 2015: 142). However, since foreign capital did not flow into Turkey as expected, the DP enacted a Law on Foreign Investment Incentives and a Petroleum Law to integrate the country's economy into the world economy through "free trade" and an "open economy" (Boratav, 2013: 343). The results were disappointing so Turkey sought to integrate into the European economy by applying to join the EEC in July 1959. The Turkish economy, which had grown by an annual average of 13% from 1950 to 1953, started to slow in 1954 (Eroğul, 2003: 206; Boratav, 2013: 348). The DP government asked the US for economic aid, but the US declined by making aid contingent upon certain structural changes (Ahmad, 2015). To fight high inflation, black market activities and price speculation, the DP government enacted the National Protection Law to regulate the economy (Ahmad, 2015: 152). When this did not work, the DP government accepted the US aid conditions by putting into practice a "stabilisation program" in August 1958 (Boratav, 2013: 350) which included devaluing the Turkish currency against the dollar (Sander, 1979: 140). Consequently, Turkey received a loan worth \$359 million (Eroğul, 2003: 221).

Technological advances by the USSR (i.e. successfully sending Sputnik into space and building intercontinental ballistic missiles) increased Turkey's importance in US strategic plans (Sander, 1979: 144-145). The US proposed the deployment of mid-

range Jupiter missiles in allied countries near the Soviet border; the only countries that agreed were Turkey, Italy and the UK (Erhan, 2013: 572). After a secret bilateral agreement between Turkey and the US in October 1959, 15 Jupiter missiles were deployed in Turkey (Erhan, 2013: 573).

The DP government continued to follow the CHP's pro-American foreign policy (Sander, 1979; Bağcı, 2007) and a capitalist development model with a more "liberal" slant (İnsel, 1996). With its more salient pro-American stance, the DP had no patience for the socialist movement (Salihoğlu, 2004: 25; Belge, 2007: 32; Çetinkaya and Doğan, 2007: 315). The Turkish Pacifist Association, established by Behice Boran and her colleagues to protest the DP government's sending troops to Korea, was shut down in late 1950 and its founders imprisoned (STMA, 1988: 1960). In 1951, most members of the secret TKP were arrested, thus ending that party. When the TSP, which was reopened in 1950, was closed down in 1952, the socialist movement was completely paralysed. The Vatan Party established in 1954 by Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, an ex-member of the secret TKP, was closed after failing to build much of a following. Moreover, a few socialists who managed to avoid the arrests of TKP members in 1951 were imprisoned for allegedly having carried out the 6-7 September 1955 pogrom against the Greek minority (Eroğul, 2003: 177). So until the 27 May 1960 coup, the socialist movement was completely silenced.

The following section examines three prominent socialist parties of the era (the TSP, TKP and Vatan Party) and offers a critical analysis of their interpretations of the world order and Turkey's foreign policy.

3.2. The Socialist Party of Turkey (TSP)

3.2.1. Introduction

Due to the increasing democratisation globally and in Turkey after 1945, leftists sought to establish a legal socialist party (Nesimi, 1977: 232; Nesimi, 1979: 207; Karaca, 1988: 19-30; İleri, 1976: 56-59; İleri, 2003: 276-280; Topçuoğlu, 1976). In

seeking a leader among popular left-leaning figures outside the TKP, names such as Marshal Çakmak, Cami Baykurt, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Sadrettin Celal Antel, and Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel came up. Some who were offered leadership positions declined and others were seen as unsuitable (Karaca, 1988:1930; İleri, 1976: 56-59; İleri, 2003: 276-280; Topçuoğlu, 1976; Müstecabi, O., 1970: 5). Esat Adil Müstecaplıoğlu, finally accepted the leadership and work began to establish the party (İleri, 2003: 277, Karaca, 1988: 1930, Topçuoğlu, 1976). After a decision at the CHP's extraordinary convention on 10 May 1946 to lift the ban on class-based politics, the TSP was established by Macit Güçlü, Aziz Uçtay and İhvan Kabacıoğlu under the leadership of Esat Adil on 14 May 1946, even before the amendment lifting the ban came into force (Gökmen, 1998: 166-167). However, Şefik Hüsnü, the leader of the secret TKP, established the Socialist Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*, TSEKP) a month after the establishment of the TSP.

The reasons behind the division in the socialist movement are debated in leftist circles. Some blame Hüsamettin Özdoğu and Mustafa Börklüce from the secret TKP because they encouraged Esat Adil to found a party (Sayılğan, 2009:232; Nesimi, 1977: 232; İleri, 1976: 57; İleri, 2003: 277); others attributed it to Şefik Hüsnü's careerism (Karaca, 1988:1931), envy (Nesimi, 1977: 232), distrust of Esat Adil (Müstecabi, O., 1970:5), and treason (Topçuoğlu, 1976: 32). Others saw the establishment of the TSEKP as a pre-emptive move made to counter Esat Adil's likely anti-Leninist deviation (Erişçi, 1951: 29; İleri, 2003: 277).

The TSEKP started negotiations to unify the socialist base under its roof despite initial disagreements with the TSP (STMA, 1988: 1935). However, before this could happen, on 16 December 1946 the Martial Law Command of Istanbul closed the TSP and the TSEKP and the leading cadres of both parties were arrested and tried for engaging in communist politics (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 538). Apart from former TKP members Hüsamettin Özdoğu and Süleyman Taki, all of the TSP cadres were acquitted in July 1948 (Landau, 1974: 117). Because those TKP members were in the TSP, the prosecutor alleged that the TSP had been established for communist

purposes and was simply an extension of the secret TKP; but that allegation was rejected by the court (İleri, 2003: 202). In upholding that verdict, the Court of Appeals confirmed that Article 141 of the Turkish Penal Code closed legal politics to communist parties but not socialist parties (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 539). Esat Adil started to issue a weekly titled *Gerçek (Real)* in February 1950 (Landau, 1974: 117), and as İleri claimed, he tried to conduct legal socialist politics by showing his new anti-Leninist orientation (İleri, 2003: 280). In addition, Esat Adil harshly criticised the TKP as “a troublemaker mole gang that made the proletariat antagonise its own case, undermined social struggle, and turned against national and international realities” (Müstacaplıoğlu, 1950: 3), thereby clearly distinguishing his cadres from the TKP and pre-empting attempts to associate him with it. The TSP cadres escaped the arrests of communists in 1951 unscathed (Karaca, 2008: 306).

Esat Adil revived the TSP in mid 1950 (Landau, 1974: 117). In the second TSP, Esat Adil was again the secretary general, and the central executive committee consisted of Örfi Akkoyunlu, Asım Bezircioğlu, Vahit Kıvılcım, Şinasi Erken, Nurettin Sütkan, Sıtkı Eser (Şişmanov, 1978: 171), Hasan Tanrıkut, Mustafa Börklüce, and Salih Alboran (Vaniy, 1998: 10). However, in June 1952 Esat Adil and other party administrators were arrested for allegedly “engaging in politics with communist purposes” and the TSP was closed (İleri, 2003: 280). Esat Adil and his colleagues were acquitted in December 1955, but the trial regarding the closure of the TSP continued until September 1960 (İleri, 2003: 280). Esat Adil died in 1958 (Alpat, 2003: 100). Topçuoğlu blamed Şefik Hüsnü for the closure of the party for the second time. For him, Hüsnü, who was imprisoned in the 1951 anti-communism case, was helping undercover police infiltrate the party through TKP member Cezmi Aktimur, who managed to evade the 1951 arrests (Topçuoğlu, 1976: 33).

The journal *Gün* and daily *Gerçek* were the TSP organs. Esat Adil started to publish *Gün* on 3 November 1945 before the establishment of the TSP, and it became the party organ after its establishment (Gökmen, 1998: 164). After four issues, *Gün* stopped because of the attacks during the Tan Raid but it resumed on 16 February 1946 (Karaca, 2008: 136). TSP members began publishing *Gerçek* prior to the July

1946 elections but it was closed by the Martial Law Command on 25 July 1946 because of a news article about election rigging (Gökmen, 1998: 178) and Esat Adil, the owner and editor-in-chief, was sentenced to three months in prison (Müstecabi, 1950a). In analyses of this circle, the journal *Dikmen* has also been included in the publications of the first TSP period since Fehmi Yazıcı and Behçet Atılgan, from the editorial board of *Dikmen*, were founding members of the TSP (Nesimi, 1977: 221). Esat Adil revived *Gerçek* as a weekly in February 1950 and it was published until 24 May 1950 (Vaniy, 1998: 12). He resumed publishing it as a daily on 27 September 1950; after 84 issues, *Gerçek* was closed on 18 December 1950 because of financial issues (Karaca, 2008: 306) and to avoid the DP government banning the party because of its articles (Vaniy, 1998: 17).

3.2.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

TSP members' opinions about world politics before the 1946 arrests were clearly Leninist, as indicated by their affiliation with the TKP's approach to imperialism and socialism. Their views became more "Classical Marxist" after their acquittal in 1948. This section will explore the TSP's interpretation of the world order mainly based on their writings in the second period, but when necessary, the differences between their earlier work and later articles will also be discussed.

The TSP argued the world was divided into three camps (Müstecabi, 1950b: 1): the "communist camp", represented by the Soviet Union; the "capitalist camp", represented by the US (Müstecabi, 1950c: 1); and the "neutral group", consisting of socialist states and states that recently gained independence (Müstecabi, 1950b: 1). Whilst the communists and capitalists were trying to bring each other down, the neutralists opted out as they believed that the two major camps would eventually engage in armed conflict (Müstecabi, 1950b: 1). The TSP saw the communist camp, which had been strengthened by China, as protecting its new social system against capitalist and imperialist aggression, strengthening its defence by ideological expansion (Müstecabi, 1950c: 1).

The TSP argued that after the death of Roosevelt, the US viewed the USSR as an existential threat because the communist order threatened the survival of the capitalist regime (Müstecabi, 1950b: 1). Although the US and the other capitalist states presented a united front against “communism”, the TSP predicted that once they recovered from the Second World War competition amongst capitalists would increase and the current “pseudo friendship” would disappear (Müstecabi, 1950c: 1). In the pre-1948 period, some writers emphasised that imperialism differed from colonialism by exploiting through “capital transfers¹⁸” in the post-war era. For example, Atılgan (1945: 11) defined imperialism as the exportation of capital towards raw materials. He argued that in the monopolistic phase of capitalism, capital accumulation reached such a point that finance capital had to flow to “backward” countries (Atılgan, 1945: 11). In capitalism’s monopolistic age, colonies were no longer only sources of raw materials but places to build factories through capital export (İleri, 1946: 2). Imperialist countries controlled less developed nations by capital transfers rather than military occupation, thus making the latter economically semi-colonies (İleri, 1946: 2). Imperialism tried to penetrate markets abroad by such means as economic aid, foreign direct investment, and royalties from mined resources (Hikmet, 1945: 10); the big international corporations/cartels that “shared the world amongst themselves by establishing zones of influence through capital exports” (Atılgan, 1945: 11) were thus the biggest obstacles facing underdeveloped countries (Bakış, 1946: 5). These big corporations/cartels suppressed national liberation struggles through local collaborators who cloaked themselves in nationalism (Bakış, 1946: 5). Imperialism changed both the economic bases of underdeveloped countries and their superstructures to mask exploitation through such instruments as the press, music and cinema (Hikmet, 1945: 11). Atılgan argued that the peaceful sharing of the world market by international corporations could only occur if led by a single corporation, i.e. in Kautsky’s terms, super-imperialism (Atılgan, 1946: 2). However, since the uneven development law of capitalism (Atılgan, 1946: 2) and conflicting capitalist interests prevented that, war was

¹⁸ Because of a translation error, Turkish leftists often used the term “capital transfer” in lieu of Lenin’s “export of capital” though both had the same meaning.

inevitable in the imperialist phase of capitalism, and thus Kautsky's super-imperialism¹⁹ thesis was invalid (Atılğan, 1945: 16).

The TSP's Classical Marxist understanding of "socialism through evolution" after 1948 meant that the transition to socialism only came through increasing class conflicts created by the peak of the development of the capitalist mode of production (Müstecabi, 1950a: 1, Müstecabi, O., 1950a: 3). Since feudalism dominated Eastern social structures due to their belated establishment of land ownership, the underdeveloped national bourgeois needed foreign capital to replace feudalism with capitalism (Müstecabi, O., 1950a: 3; Müstecabi, 1950e: 1; Müstecabi, 1950f: 1). Therefore, the "transfer of capital" in the operation of imperialism was intentionally glossed over.

To explain imperialism, Börklüce, for example, argued that after reaching the apex of its development in the liberal economic system, capitalism entered the imperialist stage and then began to decline (Börklüce, 1950a: 2). Capitalism, which experienced inherent cyclical crises due to its anarchic nature, now had to tackle chronic crises with the shift to imperialism (Börklüce, 1950b: 2). The concentration of capital in a few big corporations/cartels (Börklüce, 1950a: 2) in the imperialist stage led them to compete fiercely for new markets (Müstecabi, 1950c: 1). This struggle between rising imperialist states and those states inevitably ended in war (Börklüce, 1946: 12). War was a means of acquiring new markets and surviving economic crises thanks to the greater profits that the war industry could produce (Müstecabi, 1950g: 4). Consequently, the TSP argued that capitalism in the 1950s would try to start a new world war to overcome its economic crisis (İnsancı, 1950: 4). In this context, Esat Adil argued that the bourgeoisie wanted war for its own class interests which conflicted with national interests while socialists sacrificed their class interests for the "general interests" of the nation (Müstecabi, 1950g: 4).

¹⁹ In the original Turkish, the word "superimperialism" was used but the actual intended meaning was Kautsky's notion of ultraimperialism.

As with their pre-1948 interpretations, in their later writings the TSP noted that in the face of national liberation movements the imperialists could no longer apply old-style colonialism (Müstecabi, 1950c: 1). However, they were unable to explain how new forms of colonialism would operate. Although they noted that capitalists no longer used economic expansion through political means and political expansion through economic means (Müstecabi, 1950c:1), they did not describe these means or how they functioned. This, of course, was consistent with their “anomalous” attitudes which embraced foreign capital.

The TSP saw the Marshall Plan “not as a means of the exploitation of imperialism” (Müstecabi, O., 1950b: 3) but as a means for the US “to keep the capitalist camp alive” (Müstecabi, 1950c:4), “to eliminate the danger of its collapse in the face of the struggles of the peoples of the world for the transition to socialism” (Müstecabi, O., 1950b: 3), and “to establish its economic and political hegemony” (Müstecabi, O., 1950b: 3; Müstecabi, 1950c: 4). For Orhan Müstecabi, American imperialists now pursued political expansion to sustain capitalism which, they believed, would soon disappear rather than lead to economic expansion (1950b:3). Börklüce argued that the Marshall Plan was a US instrument to prevent an economic crisis due to the post-war drop in demand and to open world markets to its own goods (1950b: 2). The US would both revitalise its own industry and turn countries devastated during the war into markets by increasing their purchasing power (Börklüce, 1950b: 2).

The TSP and the TKP fiercely debated about foreign capital. In its polemic against the TSP to counter articles in *Gerçek*, the TKP accused the TSP of turning to American imperialism and the Marshall Plan. In response, the TSP stated that the TKP supported the local trade bourgeoisie and accused it of being chauvinist in its nationalism (Müstecabi, 1950h: 3). The TSP also stated the TKP was hindering Turkey’s development and its industrial revolution (Müstecabi, 1950i; Müstecabi, 1950l: 3) by: defending its exploitation as a purchaser of manufactured goods and a supplier of raw materials (Müstecabi, 1950j: 1), favouring English capital (Müstecabi, 1950k: 2), only challenging American capital (Müstecabi, O., 1950c; Müstecabi, 1950l: 3), desiring the maintenance of the feudal order by objecting to

agricultural mechanisation which ran contrary to “historical materialism” (Müstecabi, O., 1950a: 1), seeking a socialist revolution in a country where feudalism was dominant without passing on to capitalism (Börklüce, 1950c: 4), being gauchist and “pseudo” Marxist (Müstecabi, 1950l: 3), and dreaming that it could defend communism in a society which had not yet completed its bourgeois democratic revolution (Müstecabi, 1950d: 4; Müstecabi, 1950n: 4). The TSP claimed there was no difference between investing Soviet technology and capital in Turkey and the local bourgeoisie collaborating with American capital (Müstecabi, 1950l: 3).

Referring to Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s book *New Democracy* (Müstecabi, 1950m: 2), Esat Adil said the Chinese revolution was an “anti-imperialist national liberation movement” that destroyed imperialist exploitation through the repressive Chiang Kai-shek regime (Müstecabi, 1949a: 1; Müstecabi 1949b: 1). Mao aimed first to save China from imperialism and thus ensure national independence and then replace feudalism with capitalism to establish modern industries (Müstecabi, 1950m: 2). Inspired by Mao, Esat Adil therefore claimed that underdeveloped Eastern societies should first demolish feudalism and then encourage capitalism to rapidly develop industrial production (Müstecabi, 1950m: 2). The transition to socialism would be unlikely without a bourgeois democratic revolution (Ruşenoğlu, 1950a: 2). Socialists should therefore support the transition from feudalism to capitalism through a bourgeois democratic revolution to make the transition to socialism possible through interclass conflict by indoctrinating the proletariat with class consciousness (Ruşenoğlu, 1950a: 2; Müstecabi, O., 1950d: 3).

The TSP stressed that foreign capital and technology, regardless of their source, and their concurrent use with national capital were necessary for the rapid development of capitalism in underdeveloped countries (Müstecabi, O., 1950a: 3; Müstecabi, 1950m: 2). Yet, the TSP agreed with the TKP on opposing the exploitative aspects of American imperialism, while supporting American capital which did not lead to political misadventures or have “exploitative purposes” to end the feudal mode of production that Turkish capital had been incapable of eliminating (Müstecabi, O., 1950a: 3; Müstecabi, 1950m: 2). Concessions to foreign capital in the development

of capitalism would not result in imperialist exploitation because the growing national bourgeoisie would monopolise the exploitation of the internal market, thereby preventing imperialism's colonial policies (Müstecabi, O., 1950a: 3; 1950d: 3). Moreover, they argued that a free trade regime would decrease colonialism (Müstecabi, 1950i: 3). Nevertheless, the TSP contradicted itself by "accusing the bourgeoisie who rose to power via the DP government of participating in the Korean War by means of establishing a relationship with Anglo-Saxon capital for its own interests and in opposition to national interests, and of not being nationalist and cooperating with international capitalism at the expense of the exploitation of the country" (Tanrıkut, 1950: 6).

The TSP described society as an ever-changing entity that passed through various stages within the general laws of nature (Börklüce, 1950d). Eastern societies, including Turkey and China, were not about to transition to socialism because their belated establishment of land ownership prevented them from developing capitalist modes of production (Müstecabi, O., 1950a: 3; Müstecabi, 1950i: 4). Eastern societies could not attain the same level as the West if they skipped evolutionary stages that Western countries had completed (Ruşenoğlu, 1950b: 2). Therefore, Eastern socialists had to find a "short cut" to advanced civilisation (i.e. the capitalist social order) by examining Western development (Börklüce, 1950d: 3).

Viewing socialism as a "developmental approach", which would become more evident in socialist analyses in the 1960s, can also be detected in the TSP's model. For instance, Esat Adil asserted that "socialism" was "the most appropriate developmental approach for Turkey's economic and social interests" (Müstecabi, 1950o: 1) and that Turkey would become an advanced nation through socialism (Müstecabi, 1946: 2). Socialism was a system of private ownership without exploitation thereby correcting the defective production systems of capitalism and maximising production so everyone would get an equal share (Müstecabi, 1950p: 4). Esat Adil argued that since socialism was known as a "non-national ideology" in Turkey because of the mistakes of the TKP, socialism needed to be clearly differentiated from communism (Müstecabi, 1950o: 1). The TSP claimed that since

socialism opposed communism so the DP government should permit the socialist TSP to operate to fight communism (Müstecabi, 1950q: 1). Moscow Radio's Turkish Broadcasting Service therefore accused the TSP of being anti-communist and an American supporter. In response, Esat Adil stated that the TSP did not regard socialism as an imported commodity and that the TSP aimed at turning socialism into a "national cause" that the people would embrace, thereby ensuring the re-establishment of Turkish-Soviet friendship (Müstecabi, 1950aa: 1).

The TSP applied a historical materialist perspective to the changes in Turkey's post-war internal and foreign policies. The changes were attributed to a shift in the class composition of the government, which was an important step for "capitalism to take root". By underlining that there was no difference between the CHP government and the DP (Müstecabi, 1950r: 1; Müstecabi, 1950s: 3; Ruşenoğlu, 1950c: 2), they considered that change to be a transition from an oligarchic bourgeoisie administration to a more liberal administration (Tanrıkut, 1946b: 2). As the classes created by production relations had different interests, they sought to move society in line with their own interests (Börklüce, 1950d: 3). While the history of the West was one of interclass struggles, in Turkey it was the struggle between the military-civil bureaucracy and all the other classes (Ruşenoğlu, 1950c: 2).

The TSP argued that Turkey tried to catch up with developed Western countries by engaging in "industrialisation through politics" since it moved from feudalism to a "nation-state", skipping the absolutist monarchy phase (Tanrıkut, 1946a:2). Due to the inadequacy of capital accumulation, the bourgeoisie tried to grow under the wings of the military-civil bureaucracy (the oligarchy) (Tanrıkut, 1950b:4). The oligarchy's party (the CHP) sought to create a "national bourgeoisie"—but one that was unsound— by means of statism through merchants, contractors and high-level bureaucrats (Tanrıkut, 1946b:2; Ruşenoğlu, 1950c: 2). For the TSP, the state bourgeoisie had always suppressed movements launched by the middle and lower classes (Ruşenoğlu, 1950d: 2), and it maintained its dominance by introducing "so-called reforms" (Ruşenoğlu, 1950d: 2) that did not create "structural change" (Ruşenoğlu, 1950b: 2) that responded to the needs that engendered those movements

(Ruşenoğlu, 1950d: 2). The state bourgeoisie owned industry by virtue of statism (Ruşenoğlu, 1950a: 2). The TSP argued that TKP followers who defended national industry were in fact unwittingly defending the state bourgeoisie (Ruşenoğlu, 1950a: 2). It criticised the TKP for thinking the CHP's statism, which was in fact state capitalism, was socialism, and the TSP emphasised that in a capitalist society, statism worked against the people (Bezircioğlu, 1950: 3).

These explanations raised the question of why the state bourgeoisie, which had long ruled Turkey under a single-party dictatorship, had allowed the bourgeoisie to seize power. According to Tanrıkut, the unsound bourgeoisie that had burgeoned under the "state bourgeoisie" let the latter rule until more favourable conditions for its rule emerged (Tanrıkut, 1950a: 4). In 1945, the bourgeoisie was ready to rule without the help of the "military and, supported by "the post-war world conjuncture, which was dominated by economic and political liberalisation tendencies" (Tanrıkut, 1950a: 4), and "American capital" (Ruşenoğlu 1950c: 2), the bourgeoisie would oust the state bourgeoisie (Tanrıkut, 1950b: 4). To maintain power, the oligarchy let the unsound bourgeoisie establish the DP, thereby introducing a "pseudo-democracy" (Müstecaplı, 1948: 1).²⁰ That led the oligarchy to brush aside "pressure for democracy coming from outside" (Müstecaplı, 1948: 1) and "the rising outcry of the workers and the peasants that had suffered from poverty brought about by the black market, profiteering and the high cost of living in the war years" (Börklüce, 1948: 4). Esat Adil described the 1950 power shift as the rebirth of the Turkish bourgeoisie and the taking of power with full class consciousness (Müstecabi, 1950t: 1). For Nesimi, the CHP government, which was heavily in debt after the war, enabled the DP to be established by introducing multi-party democracy and liberalising foreign trade in exchange for foreign aid (Nesimi, 1949: 1).

While the state bourgeoisie had been in conflict with international capital from 1923 to 1946, a time marked by such developments as the abolition of the Capitulations

²⁰ This article was published in *Başdan* without a name. It was likely written by Orhan Müstecaplıoğlu [Müstecabi] since he was the owner and editor of *Başdan*, so that's how it is cited here. Müstecaplı, Orhan (1948) "Reform in Turkey has not Begun", *Başdan*, issue: 7, 21 September, p.1.

and the nationalisation of foreign companies (Tanrıkut, 1950c: 6), pressure from international and national capital after 1946 forced it to establish connections with international capital and abandon its old nationalist character (Ruşenoğlu, 1950d: 2), thus dragging Turkey into a struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps (Ruşenay, 1946: 3). Given these new post-war conditions, the state bourgeoisie party (the CHP) and the bourgeoisie party (the DP) espoused the same pro-American foreign policy even though their class backgrounds were different, “placing Turkey in the capitalist camp led by the US” (Müstecabi, 1950u: 4). The TSP opposed this foreign policy because the growing conflict between the US and the USSR would lead to a third world war (Müstecabi, 1950u:4) and, while Turkey joined the capitalist camp, American capitalism excluded Turkey from the Atlantic Pact (Müstecabi, 1950u: 4; İnsancı, 1950a: 3). Nesimi attributed its exclusion to CHP foreign policies which indicated to the US that Turkey would not deal with the Soviets against Anglo-American interests even if the US did not offer any aid (Nesimi, 1949:1). If the CHP government had followed the traditional “balance of power” policy, Anglo-American imperialists would have feared the re-establishment of Turkish-Soviet relations and accepted Turkey into the Western alliance (Müstecabi, 1950z: 5). Furthermore, though it sided with the West to protect its economic and political integrity against the USSR, Turkey made itself vulnerable by defending the West against the Soviets while only being regarded as a “diversionary defence station” in US defence strategy (Müstecabi, 1950w: 1). Lastly, although the UK and the US had to defend Turkey because of their oil politics (Müstecabi, 1950v:1), the TSP argued that when they had more important interests they would abandon Turkey (Müstecabi, 1950v: 1).

Consequently, they argued that Turkey should adopt neutrality to avoid being drawn into a third world war (Müstecabi, 1950x: 1; 1950u: 4) because a defensive alliance with the US was desirable but unlikely (Müstecabi, 1950v:1; 1950u: 4). The TSP claimed that they advocated neutrality not because they were socialists but for “national interests” which were independent of and superseded ideologically the particular positions of individuals (Müstecabi, 1950v:1). Siding with either Soviet or American interests was treason (Müstecabi, 1950v: 1) so they rejected all imperialist

aggression against the independence of Turkey (Müstecabi, 1950y:3). But they also argued that “the national interests of Turkey” would only be served if friendship between Turkey and the USSR was re-established on an equal basis (Müstecabi, 1950w: 1).

In the debates over the dual-stage or single-stage transition to socialism in socialist movements of the 1960s inspired by Mao (discussed in detail in the next chapter), the TSP embraced a two-stage transition like the MDD; but unlike the MDD, the TSP intended to bring socialism to power through parliamentarians after the bourgeois democratic revolution. An embryonic form of “socialism particular to Turkey” was proposed by Mehmet Ali Aybar in the late 1960s and it caused divisions within the Worker’s Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP), situated as it was in Esat Adil’s concept of a form of socialism appropriate to “national realities”.

Classical Marxism’s teleological perspective was apparent in TSP’s arguments. The TSP argued that moving from feudalism to capitalism would lead to socialism within a pre-ordained scheme. They expected the bourgeoisie, who had the task of developing capitalism, to modernise Turkish society. The TSP attributed Turkey’s feudal production relations to subsistence agriculture carried out with primitive tools and to the fact that capitalist production had yet to obtain a foothold in agriculture. The TSP focused on immediately replacing the existing pre-capitalist relations of production with a capitalist one to end Turkey’s backwardness. Therefore, they regarded “foreign capital” as important to attain economic development and develop the forces of production. Their conception of foreign capital contradicted the theory of imperialism as it ignored the dependency relationship that existed between underdeveloped and developed countries.

The TSP, which emerged when the dependency theories that would deeply influence the foreign policy views of the 1960s socialist movement had yet to be formulated, argued that underdeveloped countries could advance by integrating into the international capitalist system, an idea which runs contrary to the main assumptions of dependency theory. They asserted that building economic relations between

imperialist powers and less developed countries would not necessarily lead to exploitation but would replace feudalism with capitalism. They mistakenly thought that the national bourgeoisies of lesser developed nations would use technological and economic support and international capital transfers to industrialise and the national bourgeoisies would not share their markets with international capital. The TSP also mistakenly thought that the providers of international capital and the national bourgeoisie supported Turkey's development of capitalism in accordance with their class interests, and they would eradicate feudalism and replace it with capitalism. However, they contradicted themselves by stating that China's anti-imperialist national liberation movement had fought against the external exploitation of imperialism and the internal exploitation of feudalism.

The existence of "normative" and "realist" IR understandings in the TSP's view of world politics is notable. As a reflection of the former, the TSP maintained that every nation should establish relations with other countries on equal terms in line with its national interests. Even though international relations seemed to be anarchic, world peace would prevail since countries would establish relations on an equal footing. Despite this "internationalist" approach, the TSP did not foresee that inter-imperialist conflicts would end, contrary to Kautsky's ideas about ultra-imperialism; rather, like Leninist notion of imperialism they maintained that war would break out among imperialist powers sooner or later. Despite their "normative" vision of world politics, a "realist" struggle for "survival" underpinned their account of foreign policy. In that chaotic international environment which demanded that everyone look out for themselves, they argued that pursuing national interests through an accurate calculation of power and military capabilities would be the best means of "survival". Because of their realist analytical frameworks, the TSP took the "nation-state" and the "states system" to be givens. The way they treated the states system as "unchangeable" and saw international relations as states acting rationally under the guiding principles of "*realpolitik*" revealed the TSP's "ontological implications of positivist assumptions". Like the realists, they also ranked national interest above class politics and emphasised the decisive influence of the geopolitical position of a country regarding its political decisions and interests. Unaware of the realist theories

in IR, the TSP nonetheless utilised the “depoliticised theoretical grasp and explanatory scope” of realist accounts (Teschke, 2003: 31).

Realism also had an effect on the TSP’s foreign policy. For instance, they claimed that Turkey would attract foreign capital and aid if it effectively marketed its geopolitical position. Turkey could define its foreign policy through a traditional “balance of power” policy and the country’s strategic importance. For the TSP, a realist approach to the “balance of power” was a tool to obtain “relative gains” in Turkey’s relations with more powerful states. Since the CHP government had unwisely disclosed its pro-American stance early on, it lost foreign aid and was refused entry to the military alliance (NATO). The TSP believed that Turkey should enter into a military alliance with the US, with which it had already established economic relations; however, they suggested “neutrality” be adopted because a military alliance with the US seem unlikely in the early 1950s. In another world war, Turkey would be an “outpost” that could be used against the USSR and so would be at risk of being overrun by the Soviets.

Although TSP followers tried to analyse shifts in Turkey's internal and external politics after 1945 from a historical materialist viewpoint, their explanations fall short and contain contradictions. They asserted that military-civil bureaucrats had ruled Turkey for centuries; however, they did not explain how they survived different modes of production and reproduced their order for centuries. In fact, the concept of “state bourgeoisie” resembles the concept of “state class” used by recent Marxist IR theorists (e.g. Cox, 1986; van der Pijl, 1998). Whilst the latter explicitly described “state class” as “a fusion of ruling class and governing class” (Overbeek 2000:175) and “a combination of party, bureaucratic and military personnel and union leaders, mostly petty bourgeois in origin, controlling the state apparatus” (Cox, 1986: 239), the TSP’s conceptualisation of the “state bourgeoisie” was vague. Moreover, in less developed countries lacking a strong bourgeoisie, the “state class” aims to develop the country through “catch-up strategies” and develop capitalism through “passive revolutions” (van der Pijl, 1998: 80, Teschke, 2010: 175), whereas the TSP saw it as an obstacle to a bourgeois democratic revolution. While the TSP conceptualised the

state bourgeoisie (i.e. military-civil bureaucrats) as a transhistorical category, the state class was defined as a social force that emerged in the capitalist period and in places such as Third World countries. Even though they sought to carry out a historical materialist analysis, the TSP contradicted historical materialism by explaining the development of Turkish society through the transhistorical military-civil bureaucrats. In addition, they argued that the state's military-civil bureaucrats were in conflict with international capital from 1923 to 1946, claiming that after 1946 the group began to cooperate with international capital due to external pressure; however, the TSP did not explain why they were in conflict before 1946 or why international capital did not force it to cooperate before that time. Similarly, they did not demonstrate empirically how the symbiotic relationship between the state bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie turned to conflict or how a fully-fledged bourgeoisie arose from that symbiotic relationship.

As IR had only recently emerged and Marxist IR theories were in their infancy and largely unavailable in Turkey, we cannot expect the TSP a detailed historical materialist analysis. In addition, Cold War tensions ran high because of the leaders' pro-American attitudes and the CHP and DP governments' repressive approach to the socialist movement, which prevented socialists from freely declaring their ideas. While they contributed to journals which published for limited periods, the TSP's interpretation of the world order and Turkey's foreign policy was lacking in historical materialist terms because of its ineptitude in approaching the explanandum with a holistic analytical framework that considered international capital accumulation strategy, Turkey's geopolitical position, the dominant class's relations with the state and international capital. Moreover, the positivist meta-theoretical leanings of the TSP contributed to a reproduction of the international capitalist system, worsening the state of inequality.

3.3. The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP)

3.3.1. Introduction

This section will elaborate on the formation of the Socialist Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*, TSEKP) which, as mentioned in the previous section, came out of the cracks in the socialist movement in 1946. It will discuss the closure of the TSEKP in December 1946, how the TKP was organised, the activities it engaged in, and its members' writings and publications.

The TSEKP, the legal party of the outlawed TKP, was established by Fuat Bilege, İstofo Papadopulos, Ragıp Vardar, Habil Amado, Aydın Vatan, Haraç Akman, and Müntakim Öçmen under the leadership of the TKP's secretary general, Şefik Hüsnü Değmer, in Istanbul on 19 June 1946 (Sayılğan, 2009: 231; Karaca, 1988: 1931). The TSEKP's publications included the weekly journal *Sendika (Trade Union)*²¹ and the monthly journal *Yığın (Mass)*.²² In addition, pro-TKP periodicals included, for example: *Ses (Voice)*,²³ a journal published by Yusuf Ahıskalı in Istanbul; *Söz (Word)*,²⁴ a journal published by Zeki Baştımar in Ankara; *Başak (Ear of Grain)*,²⁵ a journal published in Adana and *Havadis (News)*,²⁶ and a newspaper published in Izmir (Sayılğan, 2009: 232). *Marko Paşa*, a satirical magazine published by

²¹ Between 31 August and 14 December 1946, 16 issues were published; it was closed by the Martial Law Command of Istanbul on 16 December 1946.

²² Between 1 October and 15 December 1946, six issues were published; it was closed by the Martial Law Command of Istanbul on 16 December 1946.

²³ The first issue came out on 9 October 1946; after 10 issues, the journal was closed by the Martial Law Command on 16 December 1946. *Ses* was revived on 14 January 1948 and two issues were published.

²⁴ *Söz* published 7 issues between 15 May and 1 December 1946.

²⁵ The journal was taken over by TKP followers starting with its second issue, which was published on 15 April 1946. Its fourth and final issue was published on 15 June 1946.

²⁶ The daily *Havadis* was first published on the 20th of July. The first 45 issues are available and were examined for this research.

Sabahattin Ali and Aziz Nesin, was often shut by the CHP, and new magazines were released in its place under different names (e.g. *Hür Marko Paşa*, *Ali Baba*, *Merhum Paşa*, *Malum Paşa*, *Medet*, and *Öküz Mehmet Paşa*). There were also Mehmet Ali Aybar's newspapers *Hür (Free)*²⁷ and *Zincirli Hürriyet (Chained Liberty)*,²⁸ as well as *24 Saat (24 Hours)*,²⁹ a newspaper published by Mediha-Niyazi Berkes who worked for the Faculty of Language History and Geography. All of these journals were sympathetic³⁰ to the TKP related to its influence on leftist-opponent intellectuals even though they did not have organic links with the TKP. Any views which deviate from the TKP line will be noted as well. Apart from those, in the 1950s the monthly journal *Tek Cephe (One Front)*³¹ was published by TKP cadres abroad, the satirical magazine *Nuhun Gemisi (Noah's Ark)*³² was published by TKP members in Turkey and *Yeryüzü (Earth)*³³ and *Beraber (Together)*³⁴ by pro-TKP

²⁷ *Hür* was first published on 1 February 1947. Because its articles strongly criticized Turkey's pro-American foreign policy, it was shut down after its sixth issue on 8 March 1947 by the Martial Law Command of Istanbul. Aybar was subsequently banned from publishing newspapers in İstanbul (Ünlü, 2002:109).

²⁸ After being banned in Istanbul, Aybar began to publish *Zincirli Hürriyet*, a weekly newspaper, in Izmir on 5 April 1947. After publishing three issues, on 19 April 1947, a few days before the US Senate approved a bill for American aid to Turkey, university students who were members of the 9 September Youth Association under the guidance of the CHP raided the printing house that printed *Zincirli Hürriyet* (Kurdakul, 2003: 39). About a year later, Aybar published one more issue of *Zincirli Hürriyet* in Istanbul (Ünlü, 2002: 119), but after that he could not find a printer to publish the newspaper (Ünlü, 2002: 127).

²⁹ This newspaper only published 13 issues between 22 February and 6 March 1947.

³⁰ Given the detached attitude of Aziz Nesin, Sabahattin Ali and Mehmet Ali Aybar regarding the Soviet Union and also Aybar's account of "socialism being particular to Turkey", an attitude reminiscent to the views of Esat Adil, some scholars (e.g. Cantek, 2015:24) see them as being closer to the TSP. However, it is almost impossible to find a clearly pro-Soviet statement by the TKP published in Turkey at that time or in any pro-TKP publications. As Küçük pointed out, the left-wing intellectuals of the period were either TKP members or TKP sympathizers (Küçük, 1990:31). Even, some scholars see Aybar affiliated with the TKP (Belli, 1988; Sargın, 2001; İleri, 2003; Satılğan, 2006; Aren, 2006; Aydınoglu, 2011).

³¹ Only two existing issues of this publication could be accessed. I was able to locate them at TÜSTAV (The Social History Research Foundation of Turkey). I extend my gratitude to Erden Akbulut for providing me with copies.

³² It was first published on 2 November 1949; after 31 issues the editors stopped production on 31 May 1950.

³³ *Yeryüzü*, a fortnightly intellectual and artistic journal, ran 11 issues between 15 September 1951 and 15 March 1952.

figures. During the research for this thesis, no other publications by TKP members or sympathisers were found, apart from Hikmet Kıvılcımlı's newspaper *Vatandaş*, which will be analysed below.

The TSEKP excelled at establishing roots in the working classes. During the six months that it legally operated, it established offices in 10 provinces, including large cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir (STMA, 1988:1935). However, the TSP, TSEKP and their trade unions, as well as their periodicals, were closed by the Martial Law Command of Istanbul on 16 December 1946 (Sayılğan, 2009: 232). The leading cadres and members of the two parties were tried for engaging in "communist activities" (Şişmanov, 1978: 157). While the TSP cadres, except for Hüsamettin Özdoğu, were acquitted, the TKP members were sentenced to prison for varying terms (İleri, 1976: 136).

After 1946, TKP activities were carried on by the Turkish Youth Association in Ankara, the Higher Education Youth Association in Istanbul, members of a campaign to free Nazım Hikmet, and the Turkish Peace Association (Sayılğan, 2009: 231). The Istanbul Higher Education Youth Association was established by Adil Giray, Vahdettin Barut, Nevzad Özmeriç, and İlhan Berktaş in July 1946. This association remained active until November 1950 and published such journals as *Hür Gençlik (Free Youth)*³⁵ and *Nazım Hikmet* during this period (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 579, Şişmanov, 1978: 158). The Turkish Youth Association was established by Nabi Dinçer, Şevki Akşit, Melahat Türksal, Mümtaz Göktürk, and others in Ankara in December 1946 (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 582). In May 1950, the Turkish Peace Association was established by Behice Boran, Vahdettin Barut, Nevzad Özmeriç, Adnan Cemgil, and others in Istanbul (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 624) and published the fortnightly magazine *Barış* (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 626). In July 1950, the association's executives and members were sentenced to prison for publishing articles protesting Turkey's

³⁴ *Berber* published 9 issues between 15 September 1952 and 1 January 1953.

³⁵ The journal was first published on 8 November 1946, and on 6 June 1947 production was stopped after four issues. Later, the journal resumed publishing on 1 November 1949 and had a print run of 10 issues until 5 August 1950.

decision to send troops to Korea, and the association and *Barış* were closed (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 626).

The 1946 socialist trials did not uncover all the TKP members because it was organised in cells, and those under Zeki Baştımar and Muzaffer Şerif Başoğlu remained in hiding in Ankara (Sayılğan, 2009: 241). Zeki Baştımar, who became its secretary after the 1946 arrests (İleri, 1976:22), initially organised in Ankara but undercover police infiltrated it (Sayılğan, 2009:241). In 1949, Baştımar went to Istanbul and continued his organising with the *İleri Jön Türkler Birliği* (Union of Forward Young Turks), the Paris branch of the TKP (STMA, 1988:1935). Similarly, Mehmet Bozışık, who escaped the 1946 arrests, continued illegal activities which were infiltrated by undercover police and in October 1951 new arrests included all the leading TKP cadres (İleri, 1976: 137). Initially, 167 people were arrested (Şişmanov, 1978: 175) but that number rose to 187 when the trial started in October 1953 (BDS Yayınları, 2000: 5). As a result of the trials, in October 1954, 131 people including members of the TKP Central Committee such as Şefik Hüsnü, Zeki Baştımar, Reşat Fuat Baraner, Mihri Belli, Mehmet Bozık and Halil Yalçınkaya were imprisoned or exiled (Tevetoğlu, 1967: 654), ending TKP activities in Turkey. Şefik Hüsnü died in 1959 while in exile in Manisa province of western Turkey (Gürel and Nacar, 2007: 132). After the 1951 trials, a split emerged between the followers of Zeki Baştımar and those of Mihri Belli, the TKP cadres who confessed and those who refused to testify under interrogation (BDS Yayınları, 2000: 6; Satılğan, 2006:41; Çetinkaya and Doğan, 2007:316). While the TKP was silenced in Turkey, its activities continued in East Germany through *Bizim Radyo* (*Our Radio*), which was broadcast to Turkey (Salihoğlu, 2004:26).

The following section will examine the journals *Sendika*, *Yığın*, *Söz*, *Ses*, *Başak*, *Dost*,³⁶ *Nuhun Gemisi*, *Barış*, *Hür Gençlik*, *Tek Cephe*, *Marko Paşa*, *Hür Marko Paşa*, *Ali Baba*, *Öküz Mehmet Paşa*, *Yeryüzü*, *Beraber*, and the newspapers *Havadis*, *Hür*, *Zincirli Hürriyet*, and *24 Saat* published by the TKP or its sympathisers. In

³⁶ The first issue of this journal was published on 1 December 1946; the journal was shut on 16 December 1946 by the Martial Law Command of Istanbul.

addition, it will explore Nazım Hikmet's speeches broadcast on *Bizim Radyo*, which were compiled by Anjel Açıkgöz in *Bizim Radyoda Nazım Hikmet* [*Nazım Hikmet on Our Radio*]. These sources facilitate a critical analysis of their interpretations of the world order and Turkey's foreign policy, the theoretical framework they utilised in construing international relations, and an investigation of their theoretical frameworks' relationship with IR theories and meta-theoretic approaches.

3.3.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

The TKP interpreted the world order through Lenin's theory of imperialism. Imperialism was an inflow of monopoly capital towards sources of raw materials and new markets (Kırcalı, 1946a:11). For the TKP, capital acquired during the free competitive stage of capitalism became monopoly capital (Gökler, 1946:9); large corporations then took over small industrialists and dominated monopoly-finance capital (Kırcalı, 1946b:4). "Capital transfer" [export of capital] was the characteristic feature of imperialism (Nuh, 1950a:3). Given that "foreign capital" sought investments aggressively, the TKP associated imperialism with war (Nuh, 1950a:3). It argued that the inability of capitalist countries to find new markets for their growing capital first led to economic depression, then rivalries and ultimately world wars (Şırlı, 1948:1). It was argued that the imperialist states representing the interests of corporations (Gökler, 1946:9) had competed for new markets and access to raw materials, causing two world wars (Kırcalı, 1946:4). Although millions of people lost their lives and property during those conflicts, surprisingly the industrial capacity of the corporations was undiminished (Tuna, 1946:1).

The TKP saw US President Roosevelt as a guardian of world peace and democracy, and even as a great anti-imperialist leader (Söz, 1946: 2; Başak, 1946: 4; Havadis, 1946: 1; Altan, 1946: 3; Aybar, 1947a: 4; Berkes, 1947a: 2; Tosun, 1948: 1). However, they also noted that the capitalist social order forced Roosevelt to deviate from his initial progressive ideals (Söz, 1946: 8). Harry Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt, continued Roosevelt's foreign policies (Aybar, 1947b: 4; Berkes, 1947a: 2) until his Republican opponents, who had gained a majority in both US houses of

Congress from Truman's Democrats (Berkes, 1947a: 2), and monopoly capitalism forced him to the right (Sendika, 1946a: 3) and the US became an imperialist state seeking world domination (Tuğrul, 1946: 2; Berkes, 1947a: 2). The TKP (TKP, 1952b: 1) stated the Second World War divided the world into the Anglo-Saxon capitalist camp and the Soviet communist camp; subsequently, the rest of the world was forced to take sides (Berkes, 1947b: 1). Berkes pointed out that the two sides tried to establish security zones and score strategic points by accusing each other of aggressive imperialism (1947b: 2). In the end, the US emerged as the world's strongest country (Berkes, 1947a: 2; Barış, 1950a: 10) owing to the atomic bomb, industrial superiority (Berkes, 1947a: 2) and capital transfer (TKP, 1952b: 1).

Unlike the TKP, Berkes, who saw international relations through a more realist lens, argued that the world reverted to pre-war "power politics" (Berkes, 1947b: 2). In contrast, the TKP regarded the US post-war imperialism as more dangerous than the pre-war multi-polar imperialism (TKP, 1952b: 1) by arguing that US arms corporations, which earned billions during the war, used new wars to continue their lucrative trade (Nuh, 1950c: 3; Barış, 1950a: 1). Moreover, imperialism turned science and universities into tools for warfare (*Hür Gençlik*, 1950a: 3). American imperialism in peacetime had to overcome structural problems such as overproduction, diminishing mass purchasing power, shrinking markets, unemployment (Denizli, 1950: 5), and leftover weapons (Barış, 1950c: 7). Asian and African nations resisted US military occupation and the buying off state officials to find cheap raw materials and secure new markets under the best possible conditions (TKP, 1952b: 1). The US conditioned such nations to accept private capital by aid or pressure from international institutions (e.g. the World Bank) under its control (TKP, 1952b: 1).

Unlike the TKP's imperialism theory interpretation of US post-war foreign policy, Berkes used "classical realism" to argue that US hegemonic foreign policy was determined by "hubris" and "glory" because the US saw itself as the only winner in the war (Berkes, 1947a: 2). Meanwhile, Berkes claimed Soviet foreign policy was also determined by "hubris" as it joined the great powers in winning the war (Berkes,

1947c:3). For Berkes, US-USSR rivalry was caused by the belief that the other was pursuing imperialist policies (1947c: 3). Berkes, who had no doubts that US policy was imperialist, stated that the Soviet claim of a security-oriented foreign policy might have been true as long as they did not violate the sovereignty of other states (Berkes, 1947c: 3).

The TKP claimed American imperialist foreign policy created global “war hysteria” (TKP, 1952b: 2) and established military bases abroad to prepare for the “inevitable” conflict (TKP, 1952b: 2; Barış, 1950b: 1). It turned the Mediterranean into an inland sea for its navy (TKP, 1952b: 3) and used local reactionaries to turn countries in which it established bases into arms depots (Barış, 1950a: 1). The TKP claimed that NATO violated the UN Charter to prepare Europe for another world war in the guise of “defence” (Sezener, 1950: 10). NATO was an aggressive military extension of the US (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 88) established outside the UN and opposed to the friendship agreement between the UK, France, and the USSR (Barış, 1950b:7). NATO required full obedience to the US from all member states (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 89).

The TKP saw the Marshall Aid program as a preparation for war that paralysed economic life in the receiving countries (Barış, 1950b: 1). The US seized the markets of other imperialist and small capitalist states which it then “marshalled”³⁷ by making them acquiesce to free trade (Barış, 1950a: 10) and making them subservient to its economic and finance policies (Barış, 1950c:10). The program imposed on Truman by American monopoly capitalism (Kaşer, 1948: 3) caused the US to dominate weaker Western capitalist states to control the world’s oil resources (Barış, 1950d: 7). According to the TKP, the US used free trade to protect its zones of influence, shrink the UK’s market by reviving the economies of Germany and Japan, and curtail the influence of British imperialism in world trade by establishing the European Payments Union (Barış, 1950c:10). Despite inter-imperialist conflicts such as that between the US and UK over Middle East oil resources (TKP, 1952:1), the

³⁷ The verb “to marshal” was made up by the TKP in reference to what they called the “Marshall Exploitation Plan” (see, for example, Nuh (1950)).

TKP asserted that the imperialists united to incite a new world war (Barış, 1950c: 10).

The TKP therefore saw a third world war as the most important issue in world politics in the early 1950s (Barış, 1950b: 6). They believed the US relied on its monopoly on nuclear weapons (Sezener, 1950: 10), a bipolar world policy and establishing anti-communist movements against the Soviets (Aybar, 1947c: 4). The Soviets, who viewed world politics based on realities and power (Ahıskalı, 1946a: 1), initially sought peace out of fear of America's nuclear arsenal (Ahıskalı, 1946a: 7). Anglo-American imperialism encountered resistance in wars for national independence (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Madagascar, Vietnam, Malaya, and Korea) and tried to brutally suppress those struggles (TKP, 1952: 3-4; Barış, 1950e: 3; Hür Gençlik, 1950b: 1). The Korean War was not a fratricidal quarrel started by a mindless attack on the South by the North (Barış, 1950f:4), but an anti-imperialist war of national liberation by the entire Korean people to break free from American capital, which controlled the economy of South Korea (TKP, 1952c: 4). They claimed the war was started by the South Korean Syngman Rhee puppet government under US control (Barış, 1950f: 4).

Whilst the TKP was preoccupied with the danger of another global conflict in the early 1950s, its focus shifted towards world peace towards the late 1950s because the US was forced to accept the Soviet peace offer because a "balance of power" emerged as the USSR overcame US military supremacy (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 139) and the American people feared nuclear war (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 136-137). The TKP praised the peace talks between the US and the USSR and pointed to a thaw in relations as a sign that the Cold War could be ending (2004: 116). The TKP claimed the Soviet Union under Khrushchev had no designs on other nations' lands or imperialist intentions toward Middle East oil as it occupied a vast territory and had its own large oil fields (Nazım Hikmet, 2004:103). In contrast, the US meddled in the internal affairs of Middle Eastern countries such as Lebanon and Iraq (2004: 45) and installed missile silos in countries surrounding the USSR (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 56).

The TKP interpreted Turkey's foreign policy in the context of Turkey's relationship with American imperialism so the following section primarily focuses on its views on Turkey's social structure and state-society relations, and it discusses their analyses of Turkey's relationship with imperialism. The section then elaborates on the TKP's interpretation of Turkey's relations with the West and the Soviets and how they perceived the change in government after the war. Lastly, it comments on the TKP approach to Turkish foreign policy.

For the TKP, as for the majority of Eastern societies, Ottoman society had been unable to industrialise and hence it became a market for Western capital (Kırcalı, 1946b: 5). The feudal class was the largest and a "national bourgeoisie" did not develop for a long time because trade was concentrated in the hands of non-Muslim traders and because of the Capitulations (Kırcalı, 1946b: 5). For TKP followers, after Ottoman lands were purged of imperialists through a national liberation struggle with the "moral and material support of the Soviets" (Nazım Hikmet, 1977[1951]:6) following the First World War, feudal elements were eliminated from society through the "republican revolution" launched by Atatürk (Yığın, 1946: 3). However, industrialisation failed to produce the desired results and a working class conscious of its rights did not emerge (Kırcalı, 1946b: 5). Most of the Turkish population consisted of peasants engaged in subsistence agriculture with primitive tools on small plots of land (Kırcalı, 1946b: 5). The country was ruled by a coalition of speculators, profiteer bourgeoisie, land owners, contractors and high-level bureaucrats (Denizli, 1950: 5). The trade bourgeoisie was not transformed into an industrial bourgeoisie nor did it cast off its feudal mind-set, despite acquiring massive amounts of capital during the war (Kırcalı, 1946: 5) through the economic policies of the Saraçoğlu government (Ahıskalı, 1946: 1). The Turkish bourgeoisie betrayed the nation and the independence of Turkey in imperialist markets by pushing their own class interests (Üstünel, 1977[1951]: 74) and opening the country's resources and labour to imperialist exploitation in return for a small share of the profits (TKP, 1952d: 2). At the same time, they expected this class, together with the masses, would cast off imperialist exploitation to develop Turkey (Nuh, 1950e: 3).

After liberation, Turkey closed its doors to foreign capital and started to build up a national economy (Denizli, 1950: 5). However, at the beginning of the Second World War Turkey first joined the imperialist front via the Anglo-French alliance (TKP, 1952d: 2; Ali, 1947a: 1)³⁸ and then the powerful classes, which had common interests with fascist Germany, led Turkey into German imperialism “under the cloak of neutrality” (Üstünel, 1977[1951]: 51), which was contrary to Turkey’s national interests (Denizli, 1950: 5; Ali, 1947 b). Despite appearing to support the Allies, Turkey supported the Germans against the USSR during the war (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 104). The powerful classes, which had greased the war machine of Hitler Germany, were surprised to see how the war turned out (Denizli, 1950: 5) and later switched loyalties to American imperialism through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact, eventually opening up Turkey to foreign capital (TKP, 1952d: 3), hence becoming a “little America” (Üstünel, 1977 [1951]: 116). Turkey became a watchdog of American imperialism tasked with protecting the latter’s interests in the Near East and the Middle East (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 109).

The national cadre who achieved independence in 1923 (Nuh, 1950f: 3) freed Turkey from foreign capital slavery by abolishing the Capitulations, founded a new state through the Lausanne Peace Treaty (Ali, 1946a: 1; Aybar, 1947d: 4), and nationalised companies owned by foreign capital in the 20 years following the war of liberation (Ali, 1946a: 1). It now opened Turkey to imperialism by striving to attract foreign capital (Ali, 1946a: 1; *Markopaşa*, 1946: 1; Aybar, 1947e: 1), transforming Turkey into an open market and an outpost of American imperialism (Nuh, 1950f: 3; Nuh, 1950g: 1; Nuh, 1950h: 4). The CHP would reduce Turkey to a semi-colonial country by letting foreign capital back into the country (Ali, 1946b: 1), resulting in a situation not unlike what was experienced under the Capitulations (Aybar, 1947d: 4). Getting rid of foreign capital was much more difficult than casting out foreign troops (Markopaşa, 1947: 1; Ali, 1946a: 1). American imperialism adopted the Truman Doctrine to make Greece and Turkey loyal guards, as the US could not ensure the

³⁸ Of the anonymous writings that appeared in *Markopaşa* and in its successor magazines, those penned by Sabahattin Ali can be found in a compilation of writings called *Markopaşa Yazıları ve Ötekiler* [Markopaşa’s Writings and Others]. See Ali, Sabahattin (2017) “Markopaşa Yazıları ve Ötekiler” compiled by Hikmet Altınkaynak, 14th edition, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

security of the Middle East, which it had taken over from the UK (Aybar, 1947g: 4), and the Mediterranean due to public pressure and financial limitations (Aybar, 1947h: 4; Aybar, 1947i: 2; Aybar, 1947a: 4). Turkey and Greece were given military aid in the form of outdated weapons from the Second World War (Aybar, 1947i: 2). For Aybar, the CHP accepted American aid to consolidate its rule, and the trade bourgeoisie had agreed to profit from foreign capital (Aybar, 1947j: 2). The TKP underscored that American imperialist aid through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was not free as recipients lost some of their independence (Hür Markopaşa, 1949: 3). Moreover, they argued that aid agreements signed under the Truman Doctrine breached Turkey's sovereign rights and limited its independence (Aybar, 1947k: 1; Aybar, 1947f: 4; Ham, 1949: 4) as, for example, American military and civil officials who committed crimes in Turkey could not be tried by Turkish courts (Aybar, 1948).

For the TKP, Anglo-American imperialism's highly aggressive campaigns against socialist countries involved Turkey because of its geopolitical situation, abundant resources, and large population vulnerable to exploitation (Denizli, 1950: 5), as evidenced by the way the US built airports, ports and roads according to its strategic plans (*Tek Cephe*, 1952: 2). The TKP said the DP government's commitment of 4,500 troops to the Korean War proved that American imperialism would drag Turkey into perilous adventures (Barış, 1950g: 11). It was argued that the DP government violated both the Turkish constitution and the UN Charter by joining the Korean War (Barış, 1950h: 11; Barış, 1950g: 11). For the TKP, joining NATO indicated that Turkey had been designated as the most convenient place to launch yet another global conflict (Barış, 1950g: 11).

The party maintained that Turkish defence costs had dramatically increased since it became a US outpost and that Turkish industry went bankrupt after the market was flooded by American goods as the result of Marshall aid and free trade (Nuh, 1950j: 1; TKP, 1952d: 2), leading to balance of payments deficits, a foreign trade deficit (Nuh, 1949: 1) and Turkey becoming a semi-colonial dependent country (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 32). The TKP condemned the TSP for claiming that Turkey lacked

adequate capital accumulation. The TSP was “making propaganda for [development through] foreign capital and imperialism” (Nuh, 1950a: 3), “trying to conceal the American war preparations” (Nuh, 1950b: 3), and “facilitating the work of those who wanted to wage a war” (Nuh, 1950a: 4). In contrast to the TSP’s position, the TKP asserted that the US perpetuated Turkey’s pre-capitalist mode of production by sending agricultural machinery through the Marshall Aid program (Nuh, 1950k: 2). Even if agricultural mechanisation could be realised, Turkey could not reach “a level of contemporary civilisation” or cease to be a colony unless the heavy industries producing such machines were established here (Nuh, 1950k: 2).

The Soviet demands on the Straits did not receive much coverage in socialist publications. Little mention was made of the issue in *Ses* or *Zincirli Hürriyet*, but a few articles mentioned it. Ahıskalı stated that the CHP regularly used supposed external threats to secure its power such as Soviet Russia supposedly seeking territorial concessions in Kars and Ardahan, which was merely a comment from a Russian professor not a real Soviet claim (Ahıskalı, 1946b:1). Likewise, Şefik Hüsnü Değmer³⁹ argued that the issue was not about Ardahan, Kars or the Straits but rather about the CHP staying in power (Değmer, 1945). Similarly, Ali asserted that a “tale of communist danger”⁴⁰ had been invented to secure more American aid (Ali, 1948: 2).

Ahıskalı claimed that the Soviets sought bases along the Straits to create a cooperative defence network with Turkey for its own security, not imperialism (Ahıskalı, 1946b: 1, 3). An anonymous article in *Ses* argued that if the issue was examined without prejudice, leaving historical Moscovite hostilities aside, there was no need to be concerned about threats of war or requests for land (*Ses*, 1946: 2).

³⁹ This was quoted in the text of a speech made by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Sökmensüer, on January 29, 1947 in parliament in response to a question about the trial in 1946 of members of the socialist movement. Değmer, Şefik Hüsnü (1945) "The Union of Opposition", in T.B.M.M. Tutanak Dergisi, D. 8, vol 4, 29 January 1947, p. 75.

⁴⁰ A similar view was later put forward by Yalçın Küçük (2005 [1979]) in his voluminous book titled *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler* [Theses on Turkey]. For Küçük, Turkey constructed the tale of the “Soviet threat” as a way to sidle up to American imperialism after the Second World War, just as it had invented the “Italian threat” to approach British imperialists before the war (Küçük, 2005[1979]: 99).

Unlike Anglo-American imperialism, which was based thousands of miles away and set up military bases in the Mediterranean for “imperialist” purposes, the USSR request was a natural connection to its territory prompted by “defensive motives” and “security concerns” (Ses, 1946: 2). Since the Straits could not be defended by Turkey against forces travelling from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, the Soviets would naturally be concerned about “security” (Kurt, 1946: 1). Furthermore, the author noted that Russia had not pursued imperialist goals since the October Revolution (Ahıskalı, 1946b: 3). Aybar claimed that the “Soviet threat” was a “political bluff” by the CHP to legitimise American aid. The USSR lacked the military force to force Turkey to accept its demands (Aybar, 1947j: 2). Consequently, negotiations with the USSR should resume re-establishing their friendship (Kurt, 1946: 3).

In the late 1950s, the TKP’s stance on the issue shifted. First, they said that the Soviet request for Kars and Ardahan was reasonable retaliation for Turkey pushing the US to bomb Moscow with nuclear weapons (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 103). Second, by accepting the wrongdoings committed under Stalin and the İnönü administration, they argued that the Khrushchev administration was seeking a return to the friendly relations that had existed between Lenin and Atatürk (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 103). However, the DP government prioritised US interests over Turkey’s (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 23) and turned down the offer (Hikmet, 2004: 104), transforming Turkey into a Cold War pawn and pitting it against socialist nations and those waging national liberation struggles (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 101). The TKP argued that Turkey had, for example, massed troops along its Iraqi border after the July 1958 coup which overthrew the pro-American Nuri al-Said administration (Hikmet, 2004: 45). Similarly, Turkey stirred up a Turkmen revolt in the Iraqi province of Kirkuk which had only just gained independence after the coup (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 109-110). At the same time, the TKP asserted that the Cyprus crisis had been created by Turkey and Greece in the name of British imperialism so the UK could maintain its grip on the island (Hikmet, 2004: 109). The TKP suggested Cyprus become an independent, neutral, pacifist Cyprus Republic with equal representation for both communities (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 36).

The TKP claimed that the post-war global winds of democracy were a capitalist ruse to deceive the working class (Dosdoğru, 1946: 7), as democracy would not be possible in a class society which rejected “economic” equality (Kırcalı, 1946b: 5). US aid to the fascist Franco regime in Spain, which just two years earlier it had described as “an enemy of democracy”, illustrated how the capitalist account of “democracy” actually worked (*Hür Markopaşa*, 1949a: 2). Capitalism’s “pseudo democracy” was also at work in Turkey, argued Şefik Hüsnü, who stated that the CHP had changed from a single-party dictatorship so Western democracies would provide more aid (Değmer, 1945). Western democracies knew this change was a façade but they wanted to deal with a loyal party that wanted to retain power (Ali, 1947: 2). The CHP introduced “multi-party democracy” but only the DP, which it created and which held the same policies, stood in the elections (Nuh, 1950l: 2; Barış, 1950l: 2). The two parties representing the same class base would therefore rule Turkey in turns (Ali Baba, 1947b: 2; Barış, 1950m: 11) as there was no difference between them (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 59, 61 and 126).

The TKP explained the power shift in 1950 on the basis of internal factors (i.e. social structure) as well as external factors. Internally, the dominant classes established the DP to exploit the masses’ deep dissatisfaction with CHP rule (Denizli, 1950: 5). The post-war (1945-1950) rivalry between the CHP and the DP was over which party would better serve Anglo-American imperialism (Denizli, 1950: 5). Externally, the imperialist powers brought the DP to power by whipping up the antagonism of the Turkish people to CHP oppression, thereby creating a more favourable climate for a new set of political machinations required for an upcoming war by convincing global public opinion that Turkey was truly a democracy (Barış, 1950m: 11). For the TKP, the CHP was the enemy of liberty and democracy and hence could not lead the way to democracy, so the imperialist powers swapped the CHP for the DP (Barış, 1950m: 11) as they realized they could not convince other countries of the legitimacy of “democratic” rule by the CHP (Berkes, M., 1947: 1).

For the TKP, although world politics required a small state to be a satellite to a major power (Aybar, 1947l: 4), some small states like Turkey and Sweden were exceptions

that could follow a “neutral” foreign policy owing to their unique geopolitical position (Aybar, 1948a: 3). They argued small states should come together to establish a balance of power with the great powers to prevent a third world war (Ali, 1947c: 1). Standing in opposition to foreign capital making Turkey a semi-colonial country, Atatürk had pursued the concept of “independence” (Ali, 1946b: 1) “which completely disregarded domestic capitalism” and “was wary of capital coming from outside” (*Hür Markopaşa*, 1949: 3) and the TKP argued for that stance. Moreover, Turkey should refrain from being a satellite⁴¹ of other states (Ali, 1947d: 1). Turkey should adopt the “balance of power” policy of Ottoman times (Aybar, 1947d: 4) and revert to Atatürk’s approach to foreign policy (Nazım Hikmet, 2004). By following a foreign policy based on “independence”, Turkey would obtain its rightful “honourable place” among the world’s nations (*Sendika*, 1946b:4). They emphasised the need to build a robust, developing national economy and industry to consolidate “independence” (Üstünel, 1977[1951: 137). Moreover, they argued Turkey should maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union to maintain its independence (Nazım Hikmet, 1977 [1951]: 6). The TKP saw American imperialism as an external enemy and pro-American governments in Turkey as a domestic enemy (TKP, 1952f: 8). They called on workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, soldiers and civil servants to unite against these enemies to eliminate them (TKP, 1952f: 8). Nevertheless, with the US-USSR peace initiative in the late 1950s, the TKP softened its language and did not object to Turkey’s pursuit of good relations with capitalist countries provided they did not interfere in its internal affairs or colonise Turkey (Nazım Hikmet, 2004: 101).

Marxism’s inability to develop its own analytical framework for “foreign relations” (van der Pijl, 2007: viii) created a realist tendency in Marxist circles’ foreign policy analysis. Similarly, the TKP interpreted foreign affairs through the lens of Lenin’s theory of imperialism; but their theoretical framework was influenced by realism and hence ultimately became eclectic. They claimed that after the Second World War

⁴¹ It should be noted here that Aybar’s slogan “*Ne Sovyet peykliği ne Amerikan köleliği* [Neither a satellite of the Soviets nor a slave of the US]” went against the grain of the TKP position, which was conspicuously pro-Soviet. See Aybar, 1948a.

imperialists gave up the “classical mode of exploitation” through “military occupation” and embraced a new approach based on “export of capital”. This generation of socialists who had witnessed the economic and political dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the imperialist invasions of their country after the First World War drew an analogy between the Capitulations and imperialist capital exports.

The TKP argued that imperialism sought to determine both domestic politics and the foreign policy of less developed countries through capital transfers facilitated by local collaborators. This structural functionalist understanding renders foreign policy analyses in terms of “different configurations of relations of production, social classes and the state” (Yalvaç, 2014: 120) invalid because the dominant classes and the state agency are instruments of imperialism in reproducing dependency relations. Once an instrument becomes dysfunctional, as with the CHP, imperialism replaces it with a new one, hence the DP’s rise to power. Implementing an independent foreign policy was the TKP’s approach to removing imperialism; but, contradictorily, they assigned the task of dismissing imperialism to, among others, the bourgeoisie whom they regarded as imperialism’s collaborators.

The TKP claimed that the “political crisis of representation” of the bourgeoisie caused the transformation of politics in Turkey after 1945. The bourgeoisie presented the DP, which was created by the CHP, as the saviour of the public, while in fact it was a fiction created to pre-empt⁴² an uprising, transform unrest into social action and thus sustain⁴³ the existing exploitative order. The TKP attributed this change in government to the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and other classes. They did not examine it as an underdeveloped part of the international capitalist system related to such developments as the emergence of a new division of labour, the Fordist accumulation strategy, the Bretton Woods system, and so on. Consequently, the TKP

⁴² This resembles the “production of social cohesion” (Yalvaç, 2016: 9) in Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony.

⁴³ Again, this echoes “the reproduction of underlying social relations” (Yalvaç, 2016: 9) in Gramsci’s concept.

did not see “class as a causal ‘nexus’ between the capital accumulation strategy and the state’s geopolitical strategy” (Apeldoorn, 2014: 13), so they contradictorily accounted for Turkey’s post-war transformation by treating internal and external dynamics as unrelated variables. However, compared to the MDD which emerged from the TKP tradition in the 1960s, the TKP took a more historical materialist stance from 1945 to 1950 by showing the continuity between the CHP and the DP and interpreting the 1950 power shift as a change between two parties with the same class background.

The TKP’s understanding of international relations was based on “realism”, as noted in Faris Erkman’s brochure “*Programım* [My Programme]” (Erkman, 1945 quoted in İleri, 2003: 29).⁴⁴ However, the TKP did not employ the concept of “realism” based on extensive knowledge of International Relations literature as IR had only recently emerged as a discipline and “realism” as an IR theory was fairly new. Given that the main focus of TKP journals in the 1940s were on culture and art, they may have borrowed “realism” from the art world.⁴⁵ Irrespective of how they acquired the concept, their analysis focused on power politics and they argued that “reality” and “power” shaped international relations, just like the IR realists. Also like realists, the TKP defined “power” as “the material capabilities that a state controls” and “the balance of power” meant “military assets that states possess such as armoured divisions and nuclear weapons” (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72). The TKP’s realist interpretation of the post-war world order labelled US post-war imperialism as more dangerous than the pre-war imperialism which had been based on a balance of powers. For the TKP, American imperialism was more aggressive in world politics, no other country balanced the US and its nuclear power, and its policies were guided by the arms industry. The party argued that if small states chose to be satellites of

⁴⁴ TKP member Faris Erkman, who participated as an independent candidate in the 1945 elections, published a brochure titled “*Programım* [My Program]” for his election campaign to share his views on economics, culture and foreign policy. The brochure has been re-published in a book titled “*Kırklı Yıllar 4: 1947 TKP Davası* [The 1940s 4: The TKP Case of 1947]” compiled by İleri, R. Nuri (2003). In fact, this brochure was a pared down version of the program of the TKP, as indicated by İleri (2003: 184).

⁴⁵ For a debate about “realism” in the journal *Yeni Edebiyat* [New Literature], which was the TKP’s legal publication in the early 1940s, see İleri, Suphi Nuri (1998).

great powers rather than allying with other major powers to balance the world, then such aggressive world politics would eventually result in another global conflict. Like pro-multi-polarity realists, the TKP argued that multi-polarity was more conducive to peace and that deterrence and balancing out aggressive states would be easier in a multi-polar system (Mearsheimer, 2007: 79-80). In addition, some (e.g. Berkes, 1947b: 2) took a classical realist approach to explain power politics through feelings such as “pride”, “hubris” and “desire for glory” (Donnelly, 2013: 33). For Berkes, foreign policy events were in fact a reflection of struggles over power and interests between the two polarised sides of world politics (Berkes, 1947b: 2).

The TKP’s realist foreign policy approach was based on national interests, not the ebbs and flows of international political exchanges (*uluslararası siyaset borsası*) (Erkman, 1945, quoted in İleri, 2003:29). The TKP found anti-Soviet propaganda, which started in Turkey after the war and was built on the historical notion of “Moscovite enmity”, to run counter to Turkey’s national interests (Erkman, 1945, quoted in İleri, 2003: 30) because interests mattered in international relations, not eternal friendships or enmity. The TKP argued that Turkey’s national interests required friendly relations with the USSR. They claimed that the CHP had fabricated the “Soviet threat” in the post-war period to secure its grip on power. They did not believe that the Soviets sought territory from Turkey or that the collective defence of the Straits was an imperialist move; rather, it was based on security concerns. However, they revised that stance after Stalin’s death, conceding that the Soviets had requested territory but only as compensation for Turkey’s aggressiveness. Both Khrushchev and the political leadership in Turkey agreed that they had overstepped the line after the war. The TKP was guided by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Üstüngel, 1977 [1951]: 44), so its views of the world and Turkey’s foreign policy were a conceptualised form of Soviet realpolitik. An idealised past (Cantek, 2015: 187), which was represented by the foreign policy of the Atatürk era based on the notions of “independence”, “neutrality”, and “friendship with the Soviets”, delimited their conceptions about Turkey’s foreign policy.

The TKP treated “nation-states” and “states systems” as givens within a realist perspective that focused on how the states system could function in a smooth and peaceful manner when the balance of world power had deteriorated in favour of America. In the states system, Turkey did not occupy the place it deserved, i.e. the “civilised world” of the great states; but this would be resolved by pursuing a neutral foreign policy and achieving economic development free from imperialism so it could reintegrate into the international capitalist system as a developed state. However, by seeking to solve the “problem” by equating an underdeveloped part of the international capitalist system with developed countries, the TKP unwittingly reproduced the inequality underlying the capitalist system.

In terms of the TKP’s meta-theoretical stance, Oktay Deniz [Fethi Naci] proposed in *Beraber* that the form of science which presented society as “unchangeable”, “absolute”, and “an eternal entity” was “pseudo-science” (Deniz, 1952: 1). It enabled the main social structure to continue by finding “solutions” to its problems. “Real science” led to social change by identifying the general laws of development and movement to change the world according to the interests of the people rather than simply knowing the world (Deniz, 1952: 1-2). However, Naci’s account of real science was not reflected in the theoretical framework of the TKP. The TKP’s meta-theoretic position oscillated between positivist and critical theoretic stances because it lacked an eclectic theoretical framework. Their realist treatment of the nation-state and the states system as unchangeable with states as absolute “unitary actors engaging in rationality” guided by *realpolitik* reveals “the ontological implications of positivist assumptions” (Wight and Joseph, 2010: 17) in their theoretical framework. Similarly, their predictions for world politics based on observable patterns of regularities in the balance of power indicates a prevailing positivist epistemology in their theoretical framework. However, their analytical framework also exhibits a social relational meta-theoretic position as it illustrates how world peace depends on an end to imperialist exploitation. They described how imperialist exploitation worked, how and why it caused world wars, and how imperialists intended to achieve world domination under the guise of spreading democracy.

Given that for the TKP the world order was “a contest between communism and capitalism” (Teschke, 2010: 163), and they explained the change in Turkish foreign policy without revealing the class nature of the differing foreign policy strategies at work, the explanatory power of their analytic framework was weak. Because of their pro-Soviet attitudes, the TKP did not expose the class-based nature of the Kemalist “neutral foreign policy” which was consonant with “Soviet realpolitik”. They did not consider how class interests created a causal nexus between the processes of capital accumulation or how the state’s geopolitical strategy (Apeldoorn, 2014: 13) was reflected in a “neutral foreign policy”. They depicted Turkey’s transition to the US orbit, which ran contrary to Soviet realpolitik after 1945, as a choice by the İnönü administration to consolidate its rule and by the bourgeoisie to benefit from economic aid. They thus provided two different interpretations of foreign policy in different periods: Atatürk-era foreign policy was shaped by “national interest” that was above class politics (*sınıflarüstü*), but the next era’s foreign policy was determined by the interests of the ruling class. The TKP emphasised the contradictions of the ruling cadre, who defeated the imperialist occupation in the early 1920s yet opened Turkey to imperialism after the Second World War. However, since the TKP’s theoretical framework ignored the fact that ruling classes’ interests form a causal nexus between a state’s geopolitical strategy and global accumulation strategies, it only partly accounted for Turkey’s changing geopolitical strategy.

3.4. Fatherland Party (Vatan Partisi, VP)

3.4.1. Introduction

Although it may appear to be a political party, Vatan Partisi was actually the one-man show of Dr Hikmet Kıvılcımlı. Almost all of its publications, e.g. the party program, party by-law and its draft constitution, were prepared by Kıvılcımlı (Ünsal, 1996). As one of the most productive names in the socialist movement, Kıvılcımlı first joined when he was a student at the Faculty of Medicine in the early 1920s. During his imprisonment from 1929 to 1933, he prepared a history of the TKP

entitled “*Yol [Way]*” upon the direction of the Central Committee of the TKP (Ünsal 1996: 45-46). In 1935 he founded the *Marxism Bibliothèque* and the *Labourer’s Library* and he translated and published Marxist classics⁴⁶ (Ünsal, 1996: 53). His most original work was a book titled “*Emperyalizm Geberen Kapitalizm [Imperialism, Dying Capitalism]*” (Kıvılcımlı, 2007 [1935]), which was inspired by Lenin. In the book, Kıvılcımlı tried to prove the existence of finance capital in Turkey through the example of İş Bank. Kıvılcımlı’s relationship with the TKP apparently ended after the TKP was closed by the Comintern in 1936 (Ünsal, 1996: 59).

In the so-called “navy trial” in 1938, Kıvılcımlı was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for inciting the army to rebel, but he was pardoned by the DP in July 1950 (Karaca, 1988: 1962). Because almost all TKP members were jailed in the 1951 case against the socialist movement and the TSP was closed down in 1952, the socialist movement was silenced for several years (Karaca, 1988). Kıvılcımlı, who was not part of the 1951 trials, attempted to break that silence by establishing the Vatan Partisi (Fatherland Party) with a small number of workers on 29 October 1954 (Bilgiç, 2007:591). In the previous May he had prepared a brochure titled “*Kuvayi Milliyeciliğimiz Neden Başka Parti Lazım? Gerekçe [Why is Another Party Needed? A Rationale]*”. Kıvılcımlı stated the party’s goal was to help Turkey reach the same level of modernisation as the West. The VP took part in the 1957 elections⁴⁷ but received very few votes (İleri, 1988:1959). Kıvılcımlı was arrested in November 1957 for an election campaign speech at an Eyüp Sultan meeting, and in December 1957 he was banned from politics and 24 party members were arrested (Ünsal, 1996: 84). In December 1959, Kıvılcımlı was released, and he and other party members were acquitted in February 1961. The ban on the VP was lifted in May 1962 (Ünsal, 1996: 89). After his release, Kıvılcımlı’s only political activity were his telegram of

⁴⁶ For the full list of Kıvılcımlı’s publications and the books that he translated and published, see Fegan, Fuat (1977) “Dr Hikmet Kıvılcımlı Bibliyografyası [Bibliography of Dr Hikmet Kıvılcımlı]”, İstanbul, Murat Matbaacılık.

⁴⁷ Among the other mistakes in the book, Şişmanov (1978:173) also said that the VP did not participate in the 1957 elections.

celebration and two letters⁴⁸ sent to the National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*, MBK) which overthrew the DP government in a military coup on 27 May 1960 (Ünsal, 1996: 94-95). Kıvılcımlı later continued his political activities with a narrow circle of people in the socialist movement in the 1960s until his death in 1971.

The VP's newspaper *Vatandaş*⁴⁹ [Citizen] was first released in May 1955 but only four issues were published. Kıvılcımlı prepared the newspaper virtually on his own, publishing articles under his name as well as under various pen names such as Ali Cengiz, Abalı, Dokuz Köyden Kovulan, Hıdır Kırık, and Hacı Kırşehirli (Ünsal, 1996:76). He also published brochures such as *VP's Proposal of Constitution, Our Policy, Speech in the Eyüp Sultan Meeting*, and *Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz (Gerekçe)* (Fegan, 1977:62). The following section discusses the VP's interpretation of the world order and Turkish foreign policy based on its publications.

3.4.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

Kıvılcımlı argued that after the Second World War, the world was divided into the Western capitalist camp led by the United States and the Eastern communist camp headed by the USSR (Kıvılcımlı, 1955a: 1). The most pressing foreign policy issue in May 1955 was the struggle between the great states over who would establish dominance in the Far East and the Middle East (Kıvılcımlı, 1955b: 1). The oil-rich Middle East occupied a pivotal place in the global strategies of the West (Kıvılcımlı, 1955b: 1). For Kıvılcımlı, the West established NATO and SEATO to prevent communism from spreading (Kıvılcımlı, 1955a: 1). To link NATO and SEATO, the Baghdad Pact was created, and the signatories were Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan, far fewer than had been anticipated because Iran and several Arab states did not sign (Kıvılcımlı, 1955a: 1).

⁴⁸ Kıvılcımlı re-published *Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz (Gerekçe)* which he had first published in 1957 and those two letters in a single book titled *Kuvayimilliyeciliğimiz ve İkinci Kuvayimilliyecimiz* in 1965.

⁴⁹ Its first issue was released on 11 May 1955, the next (2-3) was issued on 1 June 1955 and the last (3-4) was published on 18 June 1955. All of these issues can be accessed at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam.

Notably, Kıvılcımlı refrained from asserting pro-Soviet views because his goal was to take up legal politics for a socialist party. However, in the indictment which alleged that the VP was involved in communist activities, it was claimed that Kıvılcımlı boasted that the USSR was far superior to Westerners in every regard, offering peaceful coexistence and a ban on nuclear weapons, but the latter rejected the offer. It was also said that he described NATO as an aggressive entity targeting the USSR (Dirik,⁵⁰ 1958: 10). Interestingly, although *Vatandaş* was released several months after the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, it did not cover it at all. Similarly, no news or views on Cyprus appeared in the VP's publications even though in the indictment against him Kıvılcımlı was said to have claimed that the UK tried to set Turkey against Greece over Cyprus (Dirik, 1958: 12).

For Kıvılcımlı, the geopolitical assumption that the centre of the world was Europe and Europe's centre was Austria was proven by the fact that the First and Second World Wars began and ended there (Kıvılcımlı, 1955c: 1). He argued that since a "balance of power" existed by 1955, so world peace was achieved (Kıvılcımlı, 1955c: 1). Even though the US reputedly had many more nuclear weapons than Russia, Kıvılcımlı noted the USSR was triple the size of the US with a widely scattered population so the US required more weapons to destroy its arch-enemy (Kıvılcımlı, 1955c: 1). Similarly, most of the US population was concentrated in three large cities so it could be destroyed with fewer nuclear weapons (Kıvılcımlı, 1955c: 1). For Kıvılcımlı, this balance of power left the great powers with no alternative but to stop the arms race (Kıvılcımlı, 1955c: 1). Kıvılcımlı argued that the two great powers knew that nuclear deterrence would likely prevent war (Kıvılcımlı, 1955a: 1); but they needed an "impartial third party"—the non-Aligned Movement—to be a "mediator" as neither side was seen as having backed down (Kıvılcımlı, 1955d: 2). The Non-Aligned Movement also came about to enable lesser developed nations to assist each other to develop (Kıvılcımlı, 1955d: 2). Kıvılcımlı noted that as

⁵⁰ For referencing purposes, the author of the indictment is listed as Cemal Dirik: Dirik, Cemal (1958) "Esas Hakkındaki İddianame", İstanbul. The indictment can be accessed on the website of the International Institute of Social History, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı Archive, the Vatan Partisi Trial, folder 1, 6/43,44. The document can be accessed online at: < <https://search.socialhistory.org/Record/ARCH00723/ArchiveContentList#A12f8d890ae>>.

such nations began to cooperate for their own development (Kıvılcımlı, 1955d: 2), the US began granting economic aid to countries in need as a result of the backlash against its provision of aid to Fascist Spain (Kıvılcımlı, 1955e: 1; 1955d: 2).

Kıvılcımlı avoided using “imperialism” in his writings, preferring “foreign capital”, “Westerners”, “Western civilisation” and “Western Europe”. Kıvılcımlı focused on ways to help lesser developed countries attain the same level of development as Western countries (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a [1965]: 37). He explained development in terms of a high proportion of industrial production in a national economy, and associated Western modernisation with the strong presence of civil society (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 93). He stressed the historical role of the bourgeoisie in Western modernisation by distinguishing between modern Western capital (i.e. industrial capital) and the old-style capital of developing nations (trade bourgeoisie with a pre-capitalist mind-set) (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 58). He attributed the “backwardness” of Eastern societies to the reactionary nature of old capital and to a lack of civil society (2007a: 58). For Kıvılcımlı, Western modernisation began with capital plundered from overseas colonies (2007a: 47). For Western capitalism to sustain its developed status, developing countries had to remain as suppliers of raw materials (2007a: 46). Kıvılcımlı therefore argued that since underdeveloped countries were the *raison d’être* of Western capitalism, it would strive to prevent their development at all costs (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 47).

Kıvılcımlı emphasised not only the contradiction between developed and underdeveloped nations, but also intercapitalist conflict in world politics. He divided the capitalist camp into two monetary regions: sterling and dollar. America’s world politics was built upon maintaining the artificial price of the dollar at twice its true worth (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 74). His theory was that the monetary worth of countries demanding dollars at that artificial price would always be lower than the US dollar by half and, by trading in dollars, such countries raised the value of the dollar (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 75). This created an invisible economic capitulation which prevented underdeveloped countries from developing unless they broke free (2007a: 75). He maintained that Western nations were competing through military and

economic aid for influence over newly independent countries as there was nowhere else to exploit and the world market was contracting (Kıvılcım, 2007a: 47). Kıvılcımlı claimed that military aid forced the recipient country to recruit more soldiers than it could afford, thus making it even more dependent on donor countries (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 81). In his view, the West provided aid to underdeveloped countries to transform them into consumers for Western goods by raising living standards in the latter and returning profits to their own countries (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 83).

For Kıvılcımlı, the political repercussions of the economic conflict among the great powers of the West arose in the Middle East. While after the First World War, the UK and France dominated in the Middle East, after the Second World War France was replaced by the US (Kıvılcımlı, 1955b: 1). Even though the UK set up the Arab Union to ensure its dominance in the region, the US demanded a stronger zone of influence. The UK increased the security of its bases in Iraq by bringing pro-British Nuri Said Pasha to power. Kıvılcımlı even saw the participation of Egypt in the Non-Aligned Movement as a British plot (Kıvılcımlı, 1955b: 1)

The VP's interpretation of Turkey's place in the world order revolved around the problematics of modernisation/development. They discussed these problems along the axis of the differences between Western modernisation and Turkey's attempts at modernisation, the failures of Turkey's catch-up strategies dating from Ottoman times, the transformation of Turkish politics after the Second World War, the failure of the development model of the DP, and the requirements for the Second *Kuvayimillîye* movement.

For Kıvılcımlı, heavy industry was the foundation of Western civilisation (Kıvılcımlı, 1955f: 1). The transition from "absolute" exploitation to "relative" exploitation of the labour force due to the organisation of people drove the bourgeoisie to mechanisation (*makineleşme*), the establishment of heavy industry to reduce costs (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 94). In Turkey, public hostility (*halk düşmanlığı*) and distrust made it difficult for people to organise and that led to the establishment

of an expensive state apparatus⁵¹ (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 89). Kıvılcımlı claimed that if the absolute exploitation of labour was possible because people were not organised, the bourgeoisie or feudal classes would not mechanise because human labour would be cheaper (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 94). Turkey was among the most backward capitalist societies (Kıvılcımlı, 1955g: 2, Kıvılcımlı, 1955f: 1, Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 16). Since the reign of the Ottoman sultan Selim III, reforms to achieve Western-style civilisation (Kıvılcımlı, 1955g: 2) had been hampered by usurer profiteer trade capital which was a party to the plundering of foreign capital through the Capitulations (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 17-18 and 58). The trade bourgeoisie, who were the commercial agents of the West's industry, pushed Turkey to accept foreign goods rather than industrialise so it maintained pre-capitalist relations of production (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 58).

The first *Kuvayi Milliye* (National Forces) movement that led Turkey to regain its independence embarked on a modernisation project “to bring Turkey to the level of advanced nations” (Kıvılcımlı, 1955g: 2), but the project failed because of the “expensive state apparatus” which had been set up to lessen the influence of the pre-capitalist classes (the trade bourgeoisie and *usurer haciağa* (land owners)) whom they wanted to keep under a watchful eye (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 27). For Kıvılcımlı, the CHP's 50-year dictatorship endured because it made the pre-capitalist classes its political basis and it kept them under its tutelage because it did not trust them (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 20). Turkey avoided becoming a colony of foreign capital under the single-party dictatorship (2007a: 21) but it failed to establish even light industry, unlike Israel which was founded long after Turkey but still managed to establish heavy industry in a short time (Kıvılcımlı, 1955h: 1). Between the First and Second World Wars, the trade bourgeoisie did not escape the tradesman mind-set (*esnaf zihniyeti*) because of the CHP's “economic constipation” and stubbornness about distorting Turkey's “classless” social structure (Kıvılcımlı, 2014 [1957]: 4).

Kıvılcımlı argued that during Turkey's liberation war some local racketeers did business with the invading imperialists, but for the most part the pre-capitalist classes

⁵¹ Kıvılcımlı here meant red tape, a cumbersome bureaucracy which employed many redundant officials and made unnecessary and expensive state expenditures (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 23-25).

raised no objections to the CHP's single-party dictatorship until after the Second World War (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 28). Because the CHP levied a "wealth tax" on the profiteer trade bourgeoisie during the Second World War and attempted to introduce land reform targeting landlords after the war, the profiteer and usurer classes who had acquired enormous economic and social power took action to get rid of the CHP so they could wield power alone (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 28). İnönü, who was forced to step down as prime minister over attempted land reform in 1937, tried another land reform after the Second World War and again lost power (Kıvılcımlı, 1956: 6). For Kıvılcımlı, the usurer classes took action against the CHP, which had actually made them rich, because of their historical opportunistic nature (2007a: 25) and they preferred to use the people's discontent with the CHP and its expensive state apparatus—which the people blamed for unemployment and the high cost of living—to seize power alone (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 25). The third reason was that the usurer classes understood that the CHP was losing external support (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 26). The profiteer trade bourgeoisie took advantage of the situation and forced the CHP to liberalise the foreign trade regime in retaliation for the CHP's "wealth tax" (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 28), thereby destroying the emerging domestic industry (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 28). With this turn towards liberalisation, the increasing influx of foreign goods created an ever-growing annual foreign trade deficit, and Turkey, which had to borrow heavily from Western countries to pay its debts, became paralysed (2007a: 29).

Late in its rule, the CHP sought US aid (Kıvılcımlı, 1956: 8) but was forced to introduce "multi-party democracy" which, it was assumed, would transform the "unchangeable chieftdom" into a "changeable chieftdom" (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 49). Similar to US politics, a Republican-Democrat tilting board was created in Turkey by pitting the DP against the CHP, and the DP rose to power (Kıvılcımlı, 1956: 8). For Kıvılcımlı, the usurer profiteer pre-capitalist classes understood that the power shift was a mere continuation of the existing order providing "excessive profits and unfettered profiteering" via another party's rule (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 27). Although both the CHP and the DP embraced capitalist production relations, Kıvılcımlı argued that the former supported sharing profits with a few people while the latter opted to

share them with more (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 36) and the former advocated an urban-based accumulation model while the latter promoted a rural-based model (Kıvılcımlı, 1956: 11).

In a report about Turkey in 1949 by Thornburg, an American expert, the Turkish leadership was advised to maintain an agricultural economy rather than industrialise; the report also equated Turkey with a semi-colonial “Latin American” country that could do nothing without the permission of the US (Kıvılcımlı, 1955i: 1). The DP government, drawing on Thornburg’s report, adopted “in good faith” (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 29) “agricultural development” and a “raw material-producing” light industrial program (Kıvılcımlı, 1955h:1) to end the country’s underdevelopment (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a:29). Kıvılcımlı criticised the agricultural development model, which relied upon imported machines, because it did not establish heavy industries (Kıvılcımlı, 2014: 28). He argued that foreign companies made the most profit through agricultural mechanisation, and their agents (the local trade bourgeoisie) also acquired enormous amounts of capital. In the process, feudal land owners became tractor owners (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 36). A few years after the DP came to power, it realised that the economy had been devastated by continuing the CHP’s liberalised foreign trade regime, so the DP government cut off nearly 100 per cent of foreign trade, which had been open 70 per cent (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 29). However, the hoarding trade bourgeoisie then created inflation by means of the black market, paralysing the economy (2007a: 29). The DP government was aware of the fact that internal and external powers were harming the economic and political independence of Turkey but failed to begin a second *Kuvayi Milliye* movement (i.e. a war of economic independence) against them (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 8-14).

The DP mistakenly left the struggle for economic independence to a “normal and peaceful process” (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 8) and even mobilised state apparatuses so popular discontent did not culminate in an uprising, going so far as to bring in US troops via NATO and CENTO (2007a: 95). Nevertheless, Kıvılcımlı argued, the National Unity Committee (MBK) overthrew the DP via “the 27 May 1960 revolution” and then launched the second *Kuvayi Milliye* mobilisation (2007a: 8-9).

For Kıvılcımlı, when the bourgeoisie could not play the progressive role assigned to it, the working class would lead the country to become a modern nation (2007a: 41). However, Kıvılcımlı argued that the driver of progress in Turkey was always the military, which was run by the sons of the nation (2007a: 59). Kıvılcımlı stated that it was the members of the second *Kuvayi Milliye* movement who would implement the populist program (democratisation, industrialisation, and land reform) by sending letters to the MBK, a program that the leaders of the first *Kuvayi Milliye* movement had first postponed and later left behind (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 67) (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 8-9).

Kıvılcımlı attributed Turkey's state of underdevelopment to its failure to make a breakthrough in heavy industries as a country that could not make its own machines would always remain dependent on those that could (Kıvılcımlı, 1955h: 1). The latter would then exploit the former (Kıvılcımlı, 1974: 47). Since its colonial past drove the West's modernisation, Kıvılcımlı argued that the model for the accumulation of capital in lesser developed countries should differ from that of Western Europe and should be based on a "local approach" (2007a: 47). As the CHP's state capitalism and the DP's liberalism had both failed to industrialise Turkey (Kıvılcımlı, 1974: 47), Kıvılcımlı advocated "a cheap state, conscious trade, and land reform" to bring about a breakthrough in heavy industries (Kıvılcımlı, 1974; Kıvılcımlı, 2007a). Since the West would not promote development, he proposed that Turkey could catch up with the West through the use of "atomic energy" (Kıvılcımlı, 1955j: 1).

Kıvılcımlı, who thought the biggest obstacle facing Turkey's modernisation was insufficient capital accumulation, "like the TSP" he suggested that this could be overcome through "foreign capital", which he argued would bring the most advanced industries to Turkey (Kıvılcımlı, 1974: 47). However, foreign capital should be strictly controlled to prevent the problems created by uncontrolled foreign capital inflows during the DP's rule (2007a: 85). Foreign capital sources must not therefore demand a voice in running the country or economic privileges; rather, they should provide technical assistance to build the country's heavy industries. In addition, inflows should not lead to poorer working conditions or lower wages than those in

the country of origin, interest rates and profits should be the same as in developed countries, and any related enterprises should be left to Turkey after a 10-year depreciation period (Kıvılcımlı, 1974: 47; Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 85). With their realist foreign policy approach, the VP pledged that it would only develop friendly relations with countries that would agree to those conditions and support the development of Turkey's heavy industry (Kıvılcımlı, 1974:44). For Kıvılcımlı, "idealism" in foreign policy could only work if it was based on national interests; otherwise, "realism" should guide foreign policy (Kıvılcımlı, 1955b: 1). Kıvılcımlı, who saw Turkey as a bridge between NATO and the Non-Aligned Movement, interpreted Turkey's participation in the Bandung Conference as a nascent form of Turkish "realist" foreign policy, rather than following the socialist movement's criticism that Turkey attended the conference to advocate imperialism (Kıvılcımlı, 1955b: 1).

Kıvılcımlı, who discussed finance capital in Turkey in his mid-1930s book *Emperyalizm Geberen Kapitalizm* (Kıvılcımlı, 2007 [1935]) and critiqued the tenets of Kemalism through his book series *Yol*, chose to engage in legal politics after having spent a long time in prison. Starting in the 1950s, he seems to have "reconciled with Kemalism" (Bilgiç, 2007: 590) and provided a "leftist interpretation" of Kemalist ideology (Ünsal, 1996: 70). Given that the VP presented itself as a party with a developmentalist, "left-nationalist" stance (Ünsal, 1996:77), it could not be classed as a legal extension of the secret TKP. Although Kıvılcımlı illustrated the DP leader Menderes, who released him from prison, as an anti-imperialist (Emekçi, 1974: 79), his attitude towards the DP changed dramatically, however, after the government laid criminal charges against the VP in 1957. Kıvılcımlı then accused the DP of being "a degenerate gang that was able to remain in power thanks only to land owners" (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 88), "a robber gang" (2007a: 89), "a political gangster" (2007a: 95), and "a beggar for dollars" (Kıvılcımlı, 1978: 16). Because of his conjuncture-driven analytical framework, however, Kıvılcımlı's explanations were flawed by numerous inconsistencies. For instance, he argued that the second *Kuvayi Milliye* (economic independence) movement should be led by the army, which would overthrow the DP government by manifesting its loyalty to NATO and CENTO, which in turn had earlier agreed with

the DP government to suppress any popular uprisings that could lead to a second economic independence movement (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 95). His reliance on the army squares with his view of “history through barbarism” (Belge, 1975: 53). According to Kıvılcımlı, who claimed that barbarians started capitalist modernisation by destroying the pre-capitalist order through a “historical revolution” (Belge, 1975: 54), the army was a social force that had the power to drive historic revolutions to modernise Turkey (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 99).

Kıvılcımlı wrote very little during the period under review, resulting in a paucity of information about how he interpreted Turkey's foreign policy. He avoided concepts such as imperialism and capitalism and preferred terms like “foreign capital”, “Western civilisation”, and “Western modernisation”. Although this was seen as a form of political flexibility and a tactical move to enable him to engage in politics legally in the oppressive atmosphere of the 1950s (Emekçi, 1974a: 61; Emekçi 1974: 70), Kıvılcımlı was criticised for preparing a “liberal bourgeois” party program proposing such measures as “a cheap state” and “conscious trade” to develop Turkey without ending the country’s dependent relationship with imperialism. He was also criticised for ignoring Turkey’s exploitation by the imperialist world system (Belli, 1974: 76).

Even though he did not overtly refer to imperialism, Kıvılcımlı argued that the developed West had established a secret system of capitulations in its relations with less developed countries and as a consequence direct foreign investment and the direct investments of foreign capital exploited the latter. He argued this system was reproduced by the partnership between foreign capital and the local trade bourgeoisie. However, Kıvılcımlı’s avoidance of imperialism cannot be explained only with reference to the repressive political atmosphere of the period. What he questioned was not imperialism and the states system but Turkey’s disadvantaged position in that system. He defined the problem as follows: Turkey joined the capitalist states system as an underdeveloped country, so it had to counter inadequate capital accumulation within the capitalist system and raise Turkey to the level of advanced nations. He thought that modernisation (i.e. capitalist production becoming

dominant in society) could be realised by eliminating pre-capitalist production relations, which he saw as an obstacle to modernisation. Kıvılcımlı sought to raise Turkey to the level of Western civilisation by establishing heavy industries in the fastest way possible via the peaceful use of “atomic energy”, using foreign capital in a tightly controlled manner, and through downsizing the state and rationalising foreign trade to accumulate capital. Turkey could then produce its own machinery and take its share of imperialist exploitation by exploiting those who did not have the capacity to produce machinery: “first of all, HEAVY INDUSTRY is essential—because a country that produces machines can exploit those that cannot” (Kıvılcımlı, 1974: 47; emphasis in original; my translation). As in the West, workers and peasants share the prosperity created by development, and by developing civil society (the organisation of the people), those classes would establish their own government because they would no longer be “applauding slaves (*alkış kölesi*)” or “voting sheep/unconscious masses casting votes irrationally (*oy davarı*)” (Kıvılcımlı, 2007a: 93).

Kıvılcımlı asserted that less developed countries could develop with a “national” method which ran contrary to modernisation theory’s path-dependent approach by which countries developed by following the same path as countries that were already developed. Even though Kıvılcımlı’s national development model is reminiscent of dependency theory, it was not based on “independent development” in an autarchy by ending dependency relations with imperialism. Rather, his model allowed for the entry of foreign capital under controls and not used to extract political or economic privileges. His attitude to foreign capital shaped his understanding of realist foreign policy in that friendly relations could be established with countries that supported Turkey’s breakthrough in acquiring heavy industries.

Although he analysed superficially the development of capitalist production relations in Turkey through a historical materialist perspective, Kıvılcım’s foreign policy analysis was entirely based on a “realist” theoretical framework, unlike the eclectic theoretical frameworks of the other socialist circles. Kıvılcımlı saw international relations as “power politics” and analysed foreign policy with such concepts as

“geopolitics” and “balance of power”. Like the TKP, he agreed with Mearsheimer’s definitions of power and balance of power (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72). US superiority in nuclear weapons was shattered in the mid-1950s and so a balance of power was established. Kılıncımlı saw this balance as “a force for peace” (Mearsheimer, 2007: 82). Like some defensive realists who thought that the offence-defence balance always favoured the defence (Mearsheimer, 2007: 82), he claimed neither the US nor the USSR would disrupt the balance of power due to the existence of nuclear weapons, so the competition over security would wither, thus making world peace a reality. Consequently, Kılıncımlı’s theoretical framework, which was based on realism’s positivist ontological and epistemological assumptions, is far from able to explain the world order and the historical development of Turkey’s foreign policy from a historical materialist perspective.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter explored that the period (1945- 1960) was strongly impacted by the Cold War so the socialist movement bore the brunt of the CHP and DP governments’ aggressive stance against communism and the repressive measures unleashed against any signs of communist activity. It also observed the socialist movement could only operate legally (TSP and TSEKP: 1946, TSP: 1950-52, VP: 1954-57) for very short periods. In addition, some in the socialist movement were also engaged in illegal activities (i.e. the activities of the TKP in 1946-51), which resulted in the mass arrest of TKP members, and in the end the movement was ultimately silenced. The only sounds breaking that silence were the broadcasts of *Bizim Radyo* run abroad by the TKP.

Because of the anti-communist atmosphere in those years, socialist ideas, including “the word Marxism”, could not be loudly proclaimed in journals. The pro-TKP periodicals mainly focused on literature, art, and culture (such as *Başak*, *Beraber*, *Dost*, *Söz*, *Yeryüzü*, and *Yığın*) or syndicalism (*Union*). Therefore, international relations and foreign policy issues were rarely articulated. For instance, whilst the pro-TKP newspaper *Havadis* covered foreign policy developments, it did not contain

analyses or interpretations of foreign policy. Publications containing foreign policy analyses were the newspaper *Gerçek*, run by the TSP, *Vatandaş* of the VP, and the newspapers *Hür*, *Zincirli Hürriyet*, and *24 Saat* run by TKP sympathisers, as well as some satirical magazines like *Markopaşa* and *Geveze*, which were published by TKP sympathisers, and *Nuhun Gemisi*, which was put out by TKP followers. Since none of the socialist circles survived throughout this period, very few foreign policy developments in this period were subjected to comprehensive analysis in socialist publications. A few comments about the foreign policy developments from 1950 to 1960 can be found in the available two issues of *Tek Cephe* published in 1952 by TKP members abroad, and in four issues of *Vatandaş*. Since no other periodicals were published by followers of the socialist movement after 1955, it was impossible for it to voice ideas about the major developments of the time, such as the Common Market, bilateral agreements with the US, the peaceful coexistence principle of the USSR, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Cyprus issue. The only exceptions were the speeches by Nazım Hikmet on *Bizim Radyo* in the late 1950s which covered such developments as Cyprus, peace efforts, and the Eisenhower doctrine.

This chapter observed that as Marxist texts were generally unavailable or difficult to access, members of the socialist movement suffered from a lack of knowledge of Marxism. Nevertheless, socialist circles provided some valuable insights into the political changes that occurred in Turkey after 1945. Unlike some leftist groups (e.g. the MDD circle and its later incarnations) active in the next decade which analysed post-war political change in Turkey through the “revolution/counter-revolution” dichotomy, the socialist groups (TSP, TKP, and VP) active between 1945 and 1960 offered more original analyses that explained issues through a historical materialist perspective. These three groups attributed the post-war transformation and the loss of the CHP’s legitimacy in the eyes of the outside world to external pressure for democratisation and the risk that the dominant classes would lose power if the people’s dislike of the single-party dictatorship led to a social uprising. They argued the DP was in fact simply the CHP in a different package. The TSP considered the post-war change to be a “transformation of the state form in a capitalist direction” (Teschke, 2010: 165). The TKP interpreted it as a “change of guard (*nöbet değişimi*)”

between two parties with the same class basis. The VP construed it as a shift to the party best able to “maintain” and “reproduce” the existing order, which offered “excessive profits” and “unfettered profiteering” to the dominant classes. All these groups had differing views about the composition of the power bloc in the single-party regime and the DP regime. The TSP maintained that the bourgeoisie had accumulated enough capital by the end of the war to wield power on its own without the military-civil cadres, which they referred to as “state bourgeoisie”. The VP held similar views but claimed that the dominant classes (i.e. the trade bourgeoisie and the usurer land owners) had been loyal to the single-party dictatorship not only because of their economic weakness but also because these classes, which had sided with imperialism during the liberation war, lacked social legitimacy in the eyes of the cadres that had led the liberation movement. The TKP saw all the bourgeois factions in the CHP as a homogenous whole and claimed that the bourgeoisie that established the DP was just a copy of the CHP, which had become exhausted after ruling for so long.

These groups attributed the transition to a multi-party democracy to an internal “crisis of political representation” and external “pressure to democratise”. These socialist groups failed to see, however, that the crisis in Turkey after the war was not just an “electoral crisis” but in fact “a serious crisis of hegemony at quite a deep structural level undermining capital accumulation” (Joseph, 2002: 97). The changes were not only the result of a struggle to hold onto power, but also the result of a reorganisation of the structural functions of the state to provide the necessary “conditions for economic reproduction and capital accumulation” (Joseph, 2002: 187). They ignored the fact that classes with different economic (national or international) orientations and ideological tendencies have different relations with the state and international capital (Yalvaç, 2016: 7) and that these different relations change the structure of the state and foreign policies. These socialist groups did not discuss the relationship between the domestic bourgeoisie and international capital in the changes introduced by the emergent liberal capitalist regime of the post-war era. They thus failed to examine the changes in Turkey’s internal and external politics

related to the post-war “Fordist⁵² accumulation model”, underlying structural developments such as “the new world economic system” (Bretton Woods and US-led international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and GATT) and the Americanisation of international relations (both political relations and relations of production) (Joseph, 2002: 184) that this model introduced. Moreover, they ignored structural developments in Turkey concomitant with these underlying structural developments such as membership in the IMF and the World Bank and the decisions made on 7 September 1946⁵³ (including devaluation of the Turkish lira prior to joining the Bretton Woods system and economic liberalisation). For this reason, they reduced post-war economic liberalisation, which held to a strict statist economic model, to trade bourgeoisie opportunism in taking advantage of the CHP’s “crisis of political representation”. Moreover, they did not explain why the world capitalist system in the post-war conjuncture did not allow Turkey to maintain a statist economic model, which was “an insulated pattern of capitalist development with an essentially closed economy” (Keyder, 1979: 21).

Inspired by Lenin’s theory of imperialism, the TKP placed greater emphasis on the export of capital, which they considered to be the primary insidious imperialist instrument that was used to seize control of a country to which capital was exported. However, the TSP and to a certain extent the VP followed a classical Marxist approach which assumed a linear model of evolutionary development insofar as capitalism takes root in the social structure, as that would displace pre-capitalist modes of production and eventually pave the way for socialism. These circles argued that if used correctly and in a tightly regulated manner, controlled foreign capital would contribute to an underdeveloped country’s development. Warren was the most prominent proponent of this view in the 1970s when the dependency school was at

⁵² The term itself is based on Gramsci’s writings and is associated with new mass production, new wage structures, and mass consumption in the post-Second-World-War era (Joseph, 2002: 189). Gramsci defined “[f]ordism as the ultimate stage in the process of progressive attempts by industry to overcome the tendency of the rate of profit to fall” (Gramsci 1971: 280, quoted in Joseph 2002: 185).

⁵³ The only piece that covered this decision is a news article by Emin Karakuş in the daily *Havadis* on 9 September 1946. This article saw this decision as a total transition to a peace economy. See Karakuş, 1946.

its peak of popularity. Since Lenin's theory of imperialism, the main Marxist reference in the period, did not offer a theoretical analysis of the states system and saw it "merely as an instrument in the expansion and universalisation of capital" (Yalvaç, 2010:181), socialist groups accepted the "states system" and "nation-states" as a given.

The central object of their research seems to have been how to develop an underdeveloped country. These groups, which identified the problem as the "backwardness" of Turkey, aimed to raise Turkey to the "level of the most advanced states" in the quickest manner possible; but each group proposed different ways to achieve "economic development". Although all of them blamed "insufficient capital accumulation" for Turkey's failure to industrialise, they had differing views of "foreign capital". For example, while the TKP opposed the entry of foreign capital and called for the termination of all economic and military ties with the US, the TSP and the VP did not hold to such a strict view of foreign capital. Due to its organic relationship with the Soviet Communist Party, the TKP's foreign policy priorities focused on the pursuit of a "neutral" foreign policy to replace US control. This was why the TKP asserted that the precondition for pursuing a neutral foreign policy was the protection of the country against the economic and political influence of foreign capital. In contrast, the TSP claimed that the entry of foreign capital, whether American or Soviet, would be permissible if it was free of exploitative intentions as it would help to develop Turkey, which lacked adequate capital accumulation. The TSP also argued that the national bourgeoisie would not allow foreign capital to seize its own market. Likewise, the VP also favoured the entry of foreign capital provided that it was strictly controlled. Because of its "realist" approach to foreign policy, this party suggested that Turkey should establish friendly relations with countries that would provide low-interest loans and technology transfers. Another point that distinguished the VP from the others was its emphasis on "atomic energy" to produce development (*kalkınma hamlesi*) in the shortest possible time.

By ignoring the structural changes that shaped the post-war world order, like "classical realists" (Donnelly, 2005: 33) the socialists made the mistake of thinking

that the political preferences of individuals (e.g. US President Roosevelt) determined international relations and foreign policy. The anti-communist paradigm shift in US foreign policy in the post-Roosevelt era and its repercussions on Turkey in the form of the suppression of socialist ideas led the socialist movement to idealise the American foreign policy of the Roosevelt era. Similarly, they idealised the “neutral” foreign policy and friendly relations Turkey had had with the Soviets during Atatürk’s rule because of the İnönü administration’s espousal of an anti-Soviet foreign policy built on the “old Muscovite hostility” model after the war. Contrary to the common view that Turkish relations with the USSR soured due to Soviet territorial demands, the TKP said the “Soviet threat” was a ruse by the İnönü administration to shape internal and external politics and also secure Western aid. The TKP claimed the Soviet request concerning the Straits was solely about “security concerns”, not imperialist intentions. But after de-Stalinisation in the USSR in the mid-1950s, the TKP acknowledged the Soviet demands and saw both Turkey and the USSR as having been wrong in breaking off friendly relations after the war. The TSP blamed Turkey’s adoption of a pro-American foreign policy after the war on both the İnönü administration and the USSR, whose demands paved the way for that shift in loyalties. The VP did not comment on this in the sources available. The socialist groups repeatedly emphasised that the “balance of power” after the Second World War had been upset by the US monopoly over nuclear weapons and this would drag the world into a third global conflict.

However, a few socialists (e.g. Ahiskali, 1946a: 3, and Berkes, 1947a: 2) claimed the struggle over zones of influence would not lead to war. The TKP claimed that by relying on its nuclear supremacy the US was dragging the world into a global conflict and that Turkey, then a US outpost, would be one of the countries most devastated by hostilities. Therefore, the TKP stressed that Turkey’s “national interest” required a shift away from the American orbit and a return to the neutral, Soviet-friendly foreign policy of the Atatürk era. The TSP, which also thought war was imminent, held to a more pragmatic view: Turkey’s economic cooperation with the US meant it should be a NATO member to ensure its security. However, if Turkey was excluded from this military alliance, then it should resort to more

traditional “balance of power” politics which would be strengthened by its geopolitical position so Turkey would survive by “commodifying its geopolitical position”. The VP seemed to be silent on the new world order after the war but instead focused on the issue of world peace in the mid-1950s, which it argued would come from the re-establishment of the “balance of power” when the USSR ended US nuclear supremacy. All the socialist groups argued that Turkey was constantly the site of struggles between the great powers because of its geopolitical position so it should adopt a more traditional “balance of power” policy, in other words a realist policy based on “neutrality”. This supported the hypothesis put forward in the beginning, i.e. that socialist groups succumbed to realist assumptions.

Like Hilferding (Brewer, 1990: 107) Kızılcımlı tended to use some other phrases instead of imperialism though he noted the exploitation of the undeveloped by the developed countries through foreign trade and capital transfershe regarded this as the inevitable result of different levels of development. The TSP’s positive attitude regarding foreign capital went against the socialist movement’s tradition of interpreting foreign policy through imperialism theory. However, the TSP’s analytical framework returned to imperialism when it came to inter-imperialist relations. The leftists identified the underlying reason behind imperialism’s belligerence in the post-Second World War era as a contraction of world markets brought about by the expansion of the socialist bloc and newly independent states, so they emphasised imperialist integration against a common enemy and imperialist aggression towards the socialist bloc and the Third World. In line with the Soviet thesis, they argued that this integration among imperialists was ephemeral they would start quarrelling sooner or later.

All three groups converged on generally equating international relations with realist “power politics”: international relations consisted of unitary actors (states) engaging rationally under the guiding principles of *realpolitik*; power was seen in military terms; explanatory power was attributed to geopolitics as an independent variable in their foreign policy analyses; “national interest” was above class politics and class interests drove countries to war; the decisive influence of a country’s geopolitical

position was its national interests; and if the balance of power was upset by small states bandwagoned one power rather than balancing powers, war would break out. Moreover, some views (Berkes, 1947b: 2; 1947c: 3) were reminiscent of those of classical realists in describing power politics between the US and the USSR in terms of “arrogance”, “superiority” and “pride”, national sentiments which dominated the foreign policy of the states which won the Second World War.

The chapter detected a causal relation between the geopolitical deficiency of Marxism in neglecting “inter-spatial relations and alterations in political geographies for processes of social reproduction” (Teschke, 2010: 163) and the socialist groups’ eclectic theoretical frameworks that combined Marxism and realism with meta-theoretically differing ontological and epistemological assumptions in their explanations of international relations. Their treatment of the international capitalist system and the states system as “two autonomous spheres of social action independent of each other” and a reflection of a “Weberian separation of the economic and the political” (Yalvaç, 2013: 15) underpin their eclectic theoretical frameworks. They therefore explained the world through unobservable social structures in a non-positivist stance; but they also attempted to predict world politics through empirical regularities in the “balance of power” with a positivist epistemology. They tried to unite the social relational ontology of Marxism and the atomistic ontology of realism in the same analytical framework. Using Marxist analysis focusing on inequality and exploitation underlying the current states system and realist power politics focusing on visible foreign policy developments, they sought to advocate strengthening the state in its struggle for survival “in a decentralised anarchic states system” (Yalvaç, 2010: 182). They attempted to theorise industrialisation and elevate Turkey to developed status so it could survive in world power politics through a “neutral” foreign policy and through ending imperialism via an independent economic model (for the TKP) or fettered foreign capital (for the TSP and the VP). Although they correctly diagnosed the defect, just like dependency theory did in the 1960s, they thought they would compel the system to change by altering its single unit. They sought to create a “leftist” alternative to the bourgeois “modernisation theory” which stymied the development. In fact, what was meant by

developed status, as revealed in the party program of the VP, was the transformation of a country from one that is exploited to one that exploits. By adopting an alternative theoretical framework that Cox would describe as “problem solving”, they sought to solve the issue by equalising a backward part of the states system with the advanced areas. Moreover, they were unaware of “the function of the states system in reproducing capitalism itself” (Yalvaç, 2013:11) so they likely lacked a vision of a socialist world. Consequently, because their theoretical frameworks did not incorporate the world economy, the states system, and domestic class structures in a holistic way, they could not adequately explain international relations from a historical materialist perspective.

CHAPTER 4

THE TURKISH LEFTIST MOVEMENT BETWEEN COUPS D'ÉTAT (1960-1971)

This chapter analyses how Turkey's socialist movement interpreted the world order and Turkish foreign policy from the 27 May 1960 military coup to the 12 March 1971 coup. The introductory section summarises the period's main external and internal political developments. The socialist circles are then described and their views on the "the post-war world order and paradigm shift in the foreign policy of Turkey" are examined, as are the relationships between their theoretical frameworks and IR theories, and the meta-theoretical basis of their theoretical frameworks.

4.1. Introduction

This period was seen as the "golden age" of the socialist movement (Belge, 1985) owing to the "relatively liberal atmosphere created by the 1961 constitution", which ironically was introduced by the military junta (Lipovsky, 1992). Several developments stand out: the "détente" between the two superpowers because of the nuclear balance of power (Oran, 2013: 657); the beginning of the dissolution of the Western and Eastern blocs; and the increasing number of Third World countries (Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 491-92). The bipolar world order was becoming multipolar (Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 537). With the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, NATO replaced its "massive retaliation" strategy with "flexible response" (Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 516). The superpowers started the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1969 in Helsinki; then in the early 1970s they engaged in "mutual and balanced force reduction" talks (Orkunt, 1972: 338). In the 1965-1970 period, the Non-Aligned Movement in the Third World regressed due to the death or overthrow of the leaders who initiated it (Oran, 2013: 660).

The superpowers sought to prevent other bloc members from developing nuclear weapons to avoid them acting independently (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 334; Erhan, 2013: 691). France opposed the US proposal of a “multilateral nuclear force” (Erhan, 2013: 692) as this would halt its efforts to develop nuclear weapons (Orkunt, 1972: 325). France blamed the US for using the chain of alliances for its own interests and jeopardising the security of other allies, and withdrew from the NATO integrated military structure in 1966 (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 333-334). The 1960s also witnessed a Sino-Soviet conflict in the Eastern bloc. Contrary to the Soviet’s “peaceful coexistence”, China claimed that socialism could not coexist peacefully with capitalism and, late in the 1960s, asserted that the USSR was a greater threat to world peace than the US (Tellal, 2013: 770). The superpowers tried to extend their influence beyond their blocs through economic aid (Oran, 2013: 658), but still held their blocs together by force when necessary, as evidenced by the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to suppress the Dubcek administration’s democratic socialism (STMA, 1988: 1680).

In October 1962 when the USSR began installing nuclear missiles in Cuba in response to American deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, the US blockaded the island resulting in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the prospect of a nuclear war (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 328). The crisis was resolved when the superpowers agreed on mutually dismantling missiles (Erhan, 2013: 684). The mid-1960s witnessed: US President Kennedy’s assassination, his replacement with Vice-President Lyndon Johnson, the replacement of Khrushchev by Brezhnev in the USSR (Tellal, 2013: 769), the US joining the Vietnam War (STMA, 1988: 1512), a military coup in Greece (Firat, 2013: 718), the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq (Gevgilili, 1981: 324-329), the rise of the student movement in France and its spread around the world (Oran, 2013: 659-60), the subsequent resignation of French President Charles de Gaulle (STMA, 1988: 1514), and the US withdrawal from Vietnam due to great losses after the Tet Offensive and to growing domestic public pressure (Oran, 2013: 658).

In Turkey, the military junta Milli Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Committee (MBK)) that toppled the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party (DP)) government promised to adopt a constitution which would prevent a majority party in parliament from acting alone, and to hand over power to the party winning the subsequent election (Zürcher, 1998: 357; Ahmad, 2015: 171). After liquidating an internal radicalist faction, the MBK established the Constituent Assembly in December 1960 to prepare the new constitution and electoral law (Ahmad, 2015: 177). Following a partial lifting of the ban on political party activities in January 1961, 10 new right-wing parties (including some linked to the closed DP (*e.g.* Adalet Partisi (Justice Party (AP)) and Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party (YTP)) and a socialist party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Worker's Party of Turkey (TİP)) were established (Zürcher, 1998: 358). A new constitution including a bicameral system, a Constitutional Court, university autonomy, economic planning and certain freedoms of thought and expression (Zürcher, 1998: 357) was accepted by a 60% vote in the July 1961 referendum (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 87). While the overthrown Premier Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Zorlu and Minister of Finance Polatkan were executed in September 1961 (Ahmad, 2015: 180), ex-President Bayar's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to his advanced age (Zürcher, 1998: 362). In the 1961 election no single party won a majority in parliament (Ahmad, 2015: 180-182), thus until the election of October 1965 four different coalition governments ruled (Zürcher, 1998: 364). MBK Chief Cemal Gürsel was elected as President by parliament in October 1961 (Ahmad, 2015: 185). A group of military officers led by Colonel Talat Aydemir conducted two failed coups in February 1962 and May 1963 (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 116).

In December 1963, a conflict arose between Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the constitutional rights of the latter (Bilge, 1987: 376-378). As a guarantor state, Turkey was planning a military intervention in Cyprus; but the US opposed any military intervention using military equipment it provided to Turkey within the 1947 military aid agreement (Erhan, 2013: 685-687). The USSR advocated Cypriot independence, non-interference in its internal affairs and the peaceful coexistence of islanders (Bilge, 1987: 423). The USSR's position came close to Turkey's federation thesis

(Karpat, 2012: 271). However, non-aligned countries, particularly Arab countries, and even Israel supported Makarios-led Cyprus (Firat, 2013: 731).

The US dismantling of Jupiter missiles in Turkey without consultation (Hale, 2008: 136) and its opposition to Turkey's intervention in Cyprus not only drove Turkey to change its "NATO orbiting foreign policy" (Yavuz, 2004: 240) into a multifaceted foreign policy which would not alienate the West (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987; Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1987; Karpat, 2012; Oran, 2013), but it also created anti-American sentiment among the public. Turkey therefore tried to revise the Status of Forces Agreement (Erhan, 2013: 693), the status of US bases (Gönlübol ve Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 505) and bilateral agreements (Gönlübol ve Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 508). In July 1968 the US sixth fleet's visit to İstanbul was met by student protests, and in January 1969 US Ambassador Robert Komer's official car was burned at Middle East Technical University (METU) (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 163-164).

Turkey's antagonistic relations with the USSR after the Second World War started to normalise and entered in an economic cooperation period (Sezer, 1987: 479; Gönlübol ve Kürkçüoğlu, 1987). Western Europe became the main focus of Turkey's multifaceted foreign policy (Zürcher, 1998: 402) and the 1964 Partnership Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) set Turkey's accession to the EEC through a three-phase process (Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, 1987: 480). As to the Middle East, instead of a "leadership role imposed on itself by NATO during the 1950s" (Karpat, 2012: 210), Turkey pursued "neutrality" in the 1960s (Özcan, 2004: 333), leading to improved Turkish-Arab relations but declining relations with Israel (Özcan, 2004: 334).

In November 1964 Süleyman Demirel became chairman of the AP (Ahmad, 2015: 196). In July 1965, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party (CHP)) moved its political line to the "left of centre" (Zürcher, 1998: 368). The AP polled around 52.9% of the vote in the October 1965 election and came to power alone (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 136-139). The TİP won 3% and, because of the national remainder electoral system, a socialist party entered parliament for the first time

(Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 136). In March 1966 due to illness President Gürsel was replaced by Cevdet Sunay, Chief of the General Staff, by parliament (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 144). In August 1966 ex-President Bayar and other DP cadres were released in a general amnesty (Zürcher, 1998: 366). In the October 1969 election, the AP retained majority rule and, due to electoral system reforms and a slight decrease in its votes, the TİP won only two seats in parliament (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 178). Towards the end of 1960s, anti-communist nationalist/Islamist developmentalist radical rightist parties (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party (MNP)) emerged (Zürcher, 1998: 374-375).

Turkey adopted a planned economy and a development model based on import substitution industrialisation to decrease dependency on foreign aid (Oran, 2013: 662-663). However, this produced a foreign exchange bottleneck and Turkey devalued its currency in August 1970 (Oran, 2013: 663). Turkey reached an economic and political impasse (Ahmad, 2015: 280). The Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tağmaç thwarted a 1971 Ba'ath-type “leftist” coup by a radical-reformist army clique, liquidated a “radical-reformist” clique and the army forced the AP government to step down on 12 March 1971 (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 203-204).

4.2. Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Worker’s Party of Turkey)

4.2.1. Introduction

The TİP was founded in February 1961 by unionists seeking solutions to working class problems (Varuy, 2010: 19). A leftist party formed out of the TKP line (Ünsal, 2001:2; Aydınoglu, 2011: 108), it was founded to participate in the forthcoming election (Aybar, 2014: 160) but the founders were unable to organise it in conformity with the electoral law so the party was unable to contest the 1961 election (Aren, 1993: 36). The first party leader, Avni Erakalın, therefore left the TİP to stand on the list of a rightist party (Aydınoglu, 2011: 104) and the party remained inactive for a year due to lack of leadership (Lipovsky, 1992: 12). Realising the limitations of a

party dominated by unionists, the lack of an intelligentsia leadership, the imminent establishment of the rival Employees' Party (Çalışanlar Partisi) by a group of intelligentsia from the Yön circle and unionists from the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Türk-İş) (Aydınöğlu, 2011: 107), the TİP founders in February 1962 offered the party leadership to Mehmet Ali Aybar, a lawyer and former associate professor of international law (Varuy, 2010: 34). Aybar accepted and was elected party leader (Aydınöğlu, 2011:107). Following its "second establishment" (Varuy, 2010: 30; Aydınöğlu, 2011: 107), a number of socialist intelligentsia (including Behice Boran, Sadun Aren, Fethi Naci, Yaşar Kemal, Adnan Cemgil, Selahattin Hilav and Cemal Hakkı Selek) joined the TİP (Kurdakul, 2003: 95), thus it became socialist and soon generated interest (Ünsal, 2001: 3; Aren, 1993: 44).

Various leftists came together in the TİP's second establishment. Three main groups – unionists, intelligentsia and Kurds – were represented in its administration (Aydınöğlu, 2011: 108). The disparate sources of those in its intelligentsia (Marxists not from the TKP tradition, old-hand Marxists from the TKP tradition, progressives who were not Marxists, university students and others) led to cleavages in the TİP (Ünsal, 2001: 4). In the first party convention in 1964, conflict over the equal representation of workers and intelligentsia led to the dismissal of such members as İsmet Sungurbey, Fethi Naci, Doğan Özgüden and Edip Cansever (Varuy, 2010: 112; Kurdakul, 2003: 102-103).

Poor results in the June 1966 senate election ignited a hot debate in *Yön* seemingly on the TİP but really on parliamentarism. The Yön circle criticised the TİP administration's emphasis on "socialism" for breaking the anti-imperialist line of those from different classes (Avcıoğlu, 1966: 3).⁵⁴ In the second party convention in 1966 in Malatya, a debate over revolution strategy⁵⁵ between the party administration and the Milli Demokratik Devrim (National Democratic Revolution) (MDD) clique

⁵⁴ Avcıoğlu, Doğan (1966). "TİP'e Dair", Yön, issue: 168, 17 June, p. 3.

⁵⁵ For the full account of this debate see: İleri, R. Nuri (1987); Belli, Mihri (1990: 71-104); Sargın, Nihat (2001); Aybar, M. A. (2014); and Çelenk, Halit (2003).

of old-hand TKP members led by Mihri Belli resulted in the rejection of the MDD thesis (Ünsal, 2001: 6) and the expulsion of around 200 MDD followers (Aren, 1993: 109).

However, real problem arose when the party administration coalition collapsed (Ünsal, 2001: 10). After the 1965 election, Aybar said the “TİP will struggle to get the best result” in the next election (Aren, 1993: 126) and the disappointing 1968 by-election result led him to pursue new ways to win votes (Aren, 1993: 126) by opening the party to include peasants (Aren, 1993: 135). However this “populist shift” created unease among intellectuals at the centre of the party coalition (Şener, 2007: 362). The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 revealed the split between the Aybar and Aren-Boran cliques (Şener, 2007: 362) and in October Behice Boran, Sadun Aren, Nihat Sargın, Şaban Yıldız and Minnetullah Haydaroglu submitted to the party’s central executive a motion, known as the “memorandum of five”, which accused Aybar of “one-man rule” and deviating from the party’s socialist line (Şener, 2007: 363; Aybar, 2014: 536). Aybar thought that the real reason for the opposition to his leadership was his fierce condemnation of the Soviet invasion and his criticism of Soviet socialism for being oppressive which revealed a hitherto unseen pro-Soviet group within the TİP (Aybar, 2014: 460, 655). Aybar claimed this group knew the TİP was grounded from its inception on a “socialist line peculiar to Turkey” by being influenced by Marxism and rejecting Leninism’s top-down approach (Aybar, 2014: 652-653). He argued that Boran also criticised the Soviet invasion (Aybar, 2014: 459) and she even supported “socialism peculiar to Turkey” in her book *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları* (Turkey and Socialism Problems) (Aybar, 2014: 658).

On the other hand, the Aren-Boran clique argued that the rift was over the “definition of socialism” (Aren, 1993: 247) and claimed that Aybar devised the slogan “socialism peculiar to Turkey” but did not conceptualise it (Aren, 1993: 247). It maintained that Aybar wanted to turn the party into a democratic mass party like the European socialist parties by sacrificing the socialist struggle to gain power through populist appeals on “poverty”, “the oppressed people” and the “despotic state”

(Altan, 1969: 3; *Emek*, 1970: 71). The Aren-Boran faction accused Aybar of heading towards “petty bourgeois pacifism, populism and reconciliationism” (*Emek*, 1970: 71). Similarly, Aybar criticised the Aren-Boran faction for trying to transform the TİP into a Leninist party, an organisation of professional revolutionaries advocating a bureaucratic socialist state (Aybar, 2014: 543). He also criticised other socialist circles in general and the Aren-Boran clique in particular for turning Marxism from “science” into “credo” (Aybar, 2014: 485), and accused them all of “dogmatism” and “Tanzimat mimicry” (Aybar, 1970a: 5). The Aybar group argued that revolutionary practice cannot be predicated on theories and models based on other countries’ conditions (Aybar, 1970a: 5). Each society had different bases and superstructures, internal and external conjunctures, and contradictions between social classes and therefore specific problems and structures (*Forum*, 1970: 3). Therefore, argued Aybar, Turkey’s *sui generis* “cursory capitalist order” must be changed not in accordance with “an imported model” but through a method of obtaining power to introduce a form of socialism peculiar to Turkey (Aybar, 1970a: 5).

The party’s General Administration Board in October 1968 sided with Aybar and rejected the “memorandum of five” (Aybar, 2014: 567-568). In the third party congress of November 1968 Aybar was re-elected as leader with the support of unionists and Kurds and despite the Aren-Boran clique’s opposition (Varuy, 2010: 211). However, this congress could only postpone the “revisionism versus dogmatism” rift within the party until after the October 1969 general election (Ünsal, 2001: 16) when the TİP’s vote decreased from its 1965 vote so only Mehmet Ali Aybar and Rıza Kuas won seats in parliament (Varuy, 2010: 222). The end of the “national remainder” election system, which aided small parties, paved the way for this disappointing result (Şener, 2007: 364). Growing unrest over the result forced Aybar to resign as leader in November 1969 (Aren, 1993: 136). First, Mehmet Ali Arslan, from the Kurdish group, was elected as leader but he resigned after a month. The Aren-Boran clique agreed with unionists and Kurds on Şaban Yıldız’s leadership and seized control of the TİP, changing its “Turkish-style socialism” to the “pro-Soviet line” (Varuy, 2010: 224). Finally, in the fourth congress of October 1970 Behice Boran became the party leader (Ünsal, 2001: 16-17). The Aren-Boran clique

replaced Aybar's popular mass party strategy with a left "cadre party" advocating "scientific socialism" (Ünsal, 2001: 17). The new leadership concentrated on organisation and training issues (Aren, 1993: 141), but this did not last long as, following the 12 March coup, the TİP was closed by the Constitutional Court in July 1971 (Ünsal, 2001: 21).

The TİP leadership's views first appeared in the daily *Vatan* (Sargın, 2001:157) and in the Yön circle's weekly *Yön* (Sertel, Y. 1969: 293). Although not an official party organ, the opinions of the TİP's leading cadre were reflected in *Sosyal Adalet* (Social Justice) which appeared as a weekly from March 1963 till its closure in July 1963 (Sargın, 2001: 164) and as a monthly from April 1964 till November 1965 (Landau, 1974: 136-137). *Dönüşüm* (Transformation) was published by some students from Ankara University's Political Science Faculty from April 1965 to February 1967 and reflected the views of the TİP and its leaders (Sertel, Y. 1969: 293). *Ant* (Oath) was published "as a weekly from January 1967 to April 1970 and as a monthly from May 1970 until its closure by court martial in May 1971" (Landau, 1974: 64-65) by Doğan Özgüden, Fethi Naci, Yaşar Kemal and others who called themselves a "third way" but who supported the TİP though keeping a distance from its administration (Ünsal, 2001: 247-250). *Forum* emerged in 1954 as a platform for DP liberals and CHP social democrats to discuss such issues as democratisation and the rule of law; but it became a socialist journal reflecting TİP views in the late 1960s. *Forum* was closed following the 1969 election (Ünsal, 2001: 73). Because of the rift in the party, the Aybar group issued the fortnightly *Forum* (February to April 1970), the Aren-Boran group first published four issues of the weekly *Tüm* (All) (December 1968-January 1969) before issuing *Emek* (Labour) (fortnightly from May 1969 to April 1970 and monthly from June 1970 to April 1971).

The TİP circle's interpretations of the world order and Turkish geopolitical strategy are revealed through a critical analysis of these journals, the party programme and leading cadres' books. As the party factions had, in general, similar interpretations, their views will only be examined separately when they disagree.

4.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

The imperialist age, argued the TİP circle, completed the formation of the global capitalist system (Naci, 1965a: 68). However, after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution capitalism lost its uniqueness and entered the “first stage of general crisis” that politically and economically affected the entirety of the capitalist world system (Naci, 1965a: 85-88). Thus, “classical imperialism” prevailed until the end of the Second World War (Kutlay, 1969a: 8) along with an embryonic neo-imperialism (Naci, 1965b: 67). After the war, the second stage of the general crisis of imperialism began: the world divided into socialist and capitalist systems, the colonial system dissolved, newly independent countries emerged, markets contracted and subsequently production decreased and unemployment increased (Naci, 1965a: 88). Capitalism then had a rival system called socialism (Boran, 1968a: 288): the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union versus the capitalist camp led by the US (Naci, 1965a: 149). The TİP thought that national liberation wars waged by underdeveloped countries against imperialism expedited the conflict between these blocs (Hassan, 1966: 5).

Given the national liberation wars and contracting markets, imperialists, “which had to ever enlarge their markets” (Küçükömer, 1966: 17), saw they could not continue old-style colonialism (Naci, 1965a: 108; Boran, 1968a) so they devised a new imperialism to exploit underdeveloped countries by retaining economic and military influence without touching their sovereignty or political independence (Aren, 1965: 7; Boran, 1968a: 83-84). This new form was called “neo-imperialism” (Aren, 1965: 7; Hassan, 1966: 5; Boran, 1968; Küçükömer, 1969), or “neo-colonialism” (Naci, 1965a: 16) or “super imperialism” (Günçe, 1968: 13). Imperialism did not completely abandon military invasion (Naci, 1965a: 109; Küçükömer, 1966: 16), resorting to it in such countries as Congo and Vietnam as necessary (Naci, 1965a: 111). For instance, after the establishment of the People's Republic of China and America's defeat in Korea, the US invaded Vietnam because of its importance to America's strategical plans in Asia (*Dönüşüm*, 1966: 6). The TİP circle asserted that the skirmish in the Middle East was not an Arab-Israel conflict but one between anti-

imperialist Arab regimes and the reactionary Arab alliance (Jordan and Saudi Arabia) representing imperialism and Israel. It saw no fundamental contradiction between imperialism's pawn reactionary Arab alliance and Israel (Alpay, 1966: 12).

To prevent other countries from establishing socialism and further contracting capitalism, the US assisted Western European countries devastated by the war to recover rapidly and it helped underdeveloped countries, which could not develop via capitalism due to their social structure, by strengthening local bourgeoisie and promoting capitalist development (Boran, 1968a: 288). Imperialism replaced "conflictual relations" with underdeveloped countries with "cooperation based on mutual benefits" (Kutlay, 1969a: 8) via the local dominant classes (landlords, trade and industrial bourgeoisie) which collaborated with foreign capital to maintain the existing order (Boran, 1968: 270). By controlling underdeveloped countries' economies and politics (Küçükömer, 1966: 19) through local big bourgeoisie, imperialism tried to preclude development to perpetuate exploitation (Aren, 1965: 7; Emek, 1970: 77; Kutlay, 1969a: 8). Consequently, the TİP regarded neo-imperialism as both an external factor and an internal force (Aren, 1993: 67) by virtue of the collaboration of local capital to sustain the existing capitalist order (Aren, 1965: 7). The anti-capitalist struggle against local and foreign capital replaced the anti-imperialist struggle (Aren, 1965: 7). Thus it regarded the socialist and anti-imperialist struggles as "an inseparable whole" (Eroğlu, 1970: 11).

Drawing substantially on Charles Bettelheim, Aybar argued that monopoly capital slowed and distorted economic development in a deliberately underdeveloped country through various methods of exploitation: indebtedness, low prices for resources, support for only light industry and discouragement of heavy industry, terms of trade favouring imperialism, exploitation of natural resources of backward countries, foreign investment and aid that created foreign trade dependency (Aybar, 2014: 239; Naci, 1965a: 112-122). Moreover, neo-imperialism began to employ new far-reaching instruments such as: creating consumption societies in backward countries, creating a world market including socialist countries, brainwashing and creating a dependent production structure in backward countries (Kutlay, 1969b: 14;

Kutlay, 1970: 6). In this new division of labour, imperialism allowed backward countries to have labour-intensive industries (light industry based upon agriculture, consumer goods manufacturing and assembly industry of durable consumer goods) (Kutlay, 1969b: 14). Imperialism cooperated with the local bourgeoisie by enabling it to invest its capital accumulation thus ensuring the development of capitalist production relations in backward countries (Kutlay, 1969c: 11), while “relative welfare” maintained demand for monopoly capitalism’s goods and converted the working classes’ “revolutionary potential” into “reformism” (Kutlay, 1969b: 14). Neo-imperialism also perpetuated its economic exploitation through cultural imperialism (Altay, 1965a: 7). Advanced technologies such as satellites, television and films promoted the American lifestyle globally. Moreover, the US tried to americanise the world (Altay, 1965b: 7) with “American and Christianity propaganda through its agents called the Peace Corps volunteers” (*Dönüşüm*, 1965: 1).

Given that Western capitalism gained its “first capital accumulation” through “colonialism”, its capitalist path of development was not applicable to underdeveloped countries which suffered from inadequate capital accumulation (Boran, 1968a: 250) and so could not use capitalism to reach socialism (Boran, 1968a: 249-250; Aybar, 1968: 391). The TİP circle asserted that underdeveloped countries could not solve inadequate capital accumulation with foreign loans and foreign capital investments (Boran, 1968a: 250) because these would cause a constantly increasing spiral of foreign trade deficits and foreign loans (Aybar, 2014: 239). This spiral prevented those countries from following an “independent” foreign policy (Aybar, 2014: 239) “set and implemented without any external influence” (Çelik, 1969: 5-6). Inspired by Dobb, Boran claimed that using national income rationally and investing it in productive fields would expedite development and break this vicious circle (Boran, 1968a: 253). Foreign direct investment should not be allowed but foreign loans could be accepted provided they did not carry any political conditions (Boran, 1968a: 255).

The TİP circle argued the capitalist path of development imposed by neo-imperialism militated against the development and the economic and political independence of

underdeveloped countries (Ümit, 1965: 8). Their backwardness could only be corrected by economic independence from the capitalist-imperialist world system (Boran, 1967a: 5). Therefore, it advocated a mixed economy on planned foundations with a dominant role by the state sector for socio-economic development (Lipovsky, 1992: 14). This was “a transitional period before socialism by omitting the capitalist period” (Hilav and Naci, 1965: 97) through radical reforms in such areas as land holding and finance and the nationalisation of banking, insurance and foreign trade (Boran, 1968a: 259; Aybar, 1968: 403). Yet, these radical reforms were contingent on “national independence” (Aybar, 1968: 403). Socio-economic development meant the possession of a nation’s economic structure to increase its national income without foreign help (Aren, 1965: 7). This development would be financed by its own means within an open economy but not in autarchy (Aren, 1965: 7).

After the two devastating inter-imperialist world wars, imperialists put aside their internal conflicts (Günçe, 1968: 13) to combat the expanding socialist bloc, the contracting confines of capitalism and the industrialisation efforts of the emerging independent states (*Sosyal Adalet*, 1965: 2; Naci, 1965a; Boran, 1968: 82; Kazgan, 1970: 17). They embarked on economic integration (*e.g.* World Bank, International Money Fund, European Economic Community (Common Market), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) and politico-military integration (*e.g.* NATO, CENTO and SEATO) (Hassan, 1966: 5; Günçe, 1968: 13; Boran, 1968a: 131). The TİP circle defined economic integration as the finance oligarchy’s strategy to tie the capitalist mode of production and the contemporary non-capitalist production forces into a wider economic sphere (Naci, 1965a: 140). Kazgan argued that the production capacity of Western capitalism increased so much that domestic consumption could not keep up. While the US overcame this by expanding external markets and conducting regional wars and space exploration programmes, Western European countries tackled it through “the expansion of their internal market to reduce production costs” (Kazgan, 1970: 14-5). Given that European capitalism fell behind the US in “research and technological development” and suffered from “small-scale and high-cost production”, individual European countries could not compete with the US globally (Kazgan, 1970: 58). Since capitalist firms with large-

scale production were taking over world markets, “EEC countries urged their firms working in the same fields to merge to match US production” (Kazgan, 1970: 58) so the actual economic aim of the EEC was not free competition but the “strengthening of monopoly” (Kazgan, 1970: 58) and the “continuation of colonialism with new methods” (Aybar, 1968: 289). Consequently the TİP argued the Common Market sought to make underdeveloped countries continue as producers of raw materials and to impose unfavourable terms of trade on them (Sarıca, 1964: 3). Nevertheless, it claimed that European integration, contrary to expectation, would not lead to European union but would deepen divisions and so dismantle Europe and the entire imperialist camp (Naci, 1965a: 140).

As periodic crises were a characteristic of capitalism, claimed the TİP, it resorted to the militarisation of economies by selling weapons and accelerating the arm race as Germany did before the Second World War and the US after it (Naci, 1965a: 97-98). The TİP circle argued that the Cold War was deliberately created by the US (Halil, 1968; Ataöv, 1969; Cem, 1970). Some went even further to claim that the Second World War was devised by US imperialism to “overcome its periodic economic crisis” and to “demolish the Soviet Union and therefore the expansion of socialism” (Tansuğ, 1967: 12). In the post-war period, while the war-weary American people wanted peace, the big monopolists aspired to maintain the giant profits generated by the war economy. Therefore US policy-makers developed a new form of ideological leverage involving economic and military confrontations without armed clashes, thereby keeping the big monopolies profitable and not upsetting the people. The Cold War was a cover to drive its allies to pursue its interests and policies without question (Ataöv, 1969: 5) and to obtain concessions from other states (Ataöv, 1969; Boran, 1968) including building foreign military bases (Günçe, 1968: 13). Thus the Cold War was “a two-sided strategy to avoid an economic crisis” (Boran, 1968a; Halil, 1968; Cem, 1970) and to “obtain new markets by expediting the dissolution of the old colonial empires” (Halil, 1968: 81-82). TİP leaders stressed that the US ensured its new world hegemony through “dollar diplomacy” which functioned like a water pump (Küçükömer, 1969: 105): financial aid and credits, the Marshall Plan, bilateral agreements, NATO and international organisations primed

the pump so the US could exploit other nations (Küçükömer, 1969: 104). The US provided security to its allies who aligned their defence policies with it, including subjecting their armies to the Pentagon and American standards, from uniforms to weaponry (Küçükömer, 1969: 105).

They argued that the imperialist bourgeoisie sought to sustain the exploitative world order with bilateral agreements, military bases and military and political alliances (Ataöv, 1969: 287). NATO was an instrument for Western, particularly US, imperialism, global hegemony and “the prevention of any change in the global *status quo*” that would disadvantage capitalism and imperialism, especially “thwarting leftist movements” (Halil, 1968: 105; and Ataöv, 1969: 211; Boran, 1968; Küçükömer, 1969). Military and political alliances like NATO were merely safeguards to protect an exploitative order (Ataöv, 1969).

Nevertheless, the TİP circle argued that the gradual replacement of tension with détente between the US and the USSR would lead to the end of NATO (Naci, 1965a: 154). But despite strict control by US imperialism, some found a way out of US hegemony thanks to the uneven development law of capitalism. Thus, in the 1960s the capitalist camp became multi-centred with the US, Western Europe and Japan (Naci, 1965a: 149). The ever-increasing number of imperialist states in an ever-shrinking sphere sharpened rivalry among imperialists (Naci, 1965a: 154) and capitalism entered in its third stage of general crisis which was still ongoing (Naci, 1965a: 88). Rising French imperialism, for instance, caused General Charles De Gaulle to espouse an independent foreign policy premised on a “new European order without America” (Naci, 1967: 7), turning Europe into a “third power” equal to the USSR and the US by uniting European nations under the leadership of France, and making France an independent nuclear power (Naci, 1965a: 152). Moreover, France saw the US war doctrine of “escalation” as designed to confine any war to its allies surrounding the socialist bloc so it ended before reaching America. It therefore removed US bases from its territory and established its own striking power (Dino, 1967: 12). All this resulted in a crisis in NATO (Naci, 1965a: 153). Thanks to De Gaulle’s realist foreign policy, the leftists said Europe realised that “the so-called

Soviet threat” was simply “a cloak used by US imperialism” to maintain American economic hegemony (Baş, 1967: 12).

Some TİP exponents thought that imperialism was confined to capitalist societies because a socialist country could neither transfer capital to a foreign country nor transfer back surplus created in the latter by its capital (Günçe, 1968: 13). They argued that inflation did not exist in the Soviet economy so its foreign policy was based on peaceful coexistence instead of militarising the economy and war to avert economic crisis (Tansuğ, 1967: 12). However, Aybar and Boran challenged this view by pointing to conflicts between the socialist states (Aybar, 1970b: 5). Given that the socialist revolution did not spread to the Western developed capitalist countries after the Bolshevik revolution, argued Aybar, in the face of the existential threat of capitalist aggression (Aybar, 1970c: 5) Stalin’s “socialism in one country” thesis ended up with a bureaucratic Soviet state (Aybar, 1970d: 5). Stalinism, which deviated from socialism (Aybar, 1970c: 5), aimed to ensure the survival of this bureaucratic state as evidenced by such foreign policies as the friendship agreement with Hitler, the abolition of Comintern and the negotiation of zones of influence at the Yalta Conference (Aybar, 1970d: 5). Although by definition international relations between socialist states were based on “independence” and “equality” rather than exploitative relations, in fact they were grounded on countries being forced through various ways to obey the majority’s decision (Boran, 1968a: 126). Such coercion led to Yugoslavia, China and Albania breaking from the USSR socialist camp (Boran, 1968a: 121). While the USSR professed peaceful coexistence with the capitalist camp and especially the US, it was said to concur with the US on preventing China from having nuclear weapons (Boran, 1968: 128). Consequently, they claimed that Soviet realpolitik turned socialist internationalism into socialist “supra-nationalism” (Boran, 1968a: 129) to preserve Soviet hegemony over the socialist states (Aybar, 1970e: 5).

The TİP circle placed Turkey in the Third World since its social structure was “an underdeveloped capitalism based on semi-feudal remnants”. Turkey’s foremost problems were imperialist exploitation and external economic and politico-military

dependence resulting from its backwardness (Ünsal, 2001: 140). Therefore the TİP intertwined “development” and “independence” and attributed utmost importance to “a fully independent foreign policy and security policy” (Erik, 1969: 4). It argued an underdeveloped country like Turkey could not develop through free capitalist entrepreneurship as the West had (Aybar, 1968: 202). It needed an independent development strategy, a “non-capitalist path of development”, which involved industrialisation with central planning and an anti-Western stance (Aybar, 1968: 391; Boran, 1967a: 5). Because of the coinciding interests of local and foreign capital, capitalism and imperialism merged in underdeveloped countries (Aren, 1965: 7) so the primary contradiction occurred between labour and capital (Aren, 1970: 4). The conflict between the exploited classes and imperialism was “indirect” as the anti-imperialist struggle could only be conducted through a class struggle against imperialism’s local partners (Çulhaoğlu, 1970: 4) and the socialist and anti-imperialist struggles were “an inseparable whole” (Eroğlu, 1970: 11). Imperialism could only be dismissed through a socialist revolution or it would return as it did with the Kemalist revolution (Aybar, 1966: 6). Since capitalist Turkey “had virtually completed its bourgeois democratic transformation” (Baykal, 1966: 3), the TİP circle advocated a one-stage socialist revolution by taking power through democratic elections within a parliamentary system (Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968a; Aren, 1993).

Later the Aybar and Emek (Aren-Boran) factions split over the primary contradiction. The former asserted it occurred between the bureaucrat-land owner-comprador bourgeoisie and the working classes (Aybar, 1968: 657). Aybar assigned a social class quality to the ruling military-civil bureaucrat cadre and called them “bureaucrat bourgeoisie”, given that their control and regulatory role over the production process denoted virtual ownership of the means of production (Aybar, 1968: 646). The struggle between the bureaucrat class, which advocated centralist, absolutist “Ottoman-type state” and let capitalism develop under its tutelage, and the comprador bourgeoisie and land owners which defended the establishment of a liberal capitalist order without “bureaucratic tutelage” (Aybar, 1968: 10) had determined the direction of politics in Turkey for decades (Aybar, 1968: 12; see also Küçükömer, 1969). As the single-party CHP rule lost credibility both inside and

outside Turkey after the Second World War (Aybar, 1968: 329), the comprador bourgeoisie and land owners (Aybar, 1968: 7) wanted to control the state (Aybar, 1968: 330). In spite of the CHP's efforts to maintain power by adopting economic liberalisation and multiparty democracy (Aybar, 1968: 331), the comprador bourgeoisie and land owners reduced the bureaucrat bourgeoisie to a subordinate position within the dominant classes through the 1950 election (Aybar, 1968: 10-11). Aybar believed that the struggle between the bureaucrat bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie and land owners was muted when Turkey fell under the yoke of US imperialism (Aybar, 1968: 12), and these classes' parties, the CHP and the DP, pursued the same dependent foreign policy (Aybar, 1968). Aybar claimed the bureaucrat bourgeoisie's Kemalist faction (Aybar, 1968: 651) overthrew the governing alliance of land owners and compradors, the DP, in the 27 May 1960 coup, thus the bureaucratic class regained its dominant place in the government (Aybar, 1968: 649). The modernisation efforts of the ruling bureaucratic bourgeoisie were dismissed as "rootless superstructural reforms" conducted as "a way of saving the state" (Aybar, 1968: 8).

However, the Emek circle claimed that since the 1908 bourgeois democratic revolution the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress (İTC)) and the CHP, DP, MBK and AP governments tried to transform "pre-capitalist production relations into Western-style capitalist production relations" (Kutlay, 1969d: 10). The CHP simply removed the pre-capitalist superstructural institutions which no longer suited the new capitalist production relations (Kutlay, 1969d: 10). Subsequently, unlike the DP, the CHP resisted the development of capitalist production relations (Kutlay, 1969d: 10). Then the CHP compromised on its petty bourgeois radicalism to win support from the big bourgeoisie; however, its dominance by "conservative bureaucrats" made it unsuccessful *vis-à-vis* the DP (Kutlay, 1969d: 10). Contrary to the MDD circles' position that the DP victory was a "counter-revolution", the Emek circle maintained that a counter-revolution had never interrupted or reversed capitalist development in Turkey (Ertan, 1969: 8; Selik, 1969: 11). It argued the post-war changes in Turkey's social structure were reflected in its

foreign policy, and its new foreign policy orientation, in turn, influenced its domestic politics (Boran, 1968a: 46).

Boran criticised Aybar for mistakenly assuming that the bureaucracy had been a class for centuries in the various Ottoman statist production relations (Boran, 1969a: 6). Production relations had changed and the ruling group did not directly share land rent any more (Boran, 1969a: 6). The bureaucracy was no longer a class but a stratum which was inconsistent and elusive (Boran, 1969b: 5). Since 1950, conditions had forced this stratum, which was in growing conflict with the land owners and comprador bourgeoisie, towards a line which was anti-imperialist, populist and pro-social justice. The military-civil bureaucracy overthrew the DP government, which could not effect industrialisation, in the 27 May 1960 coup, thus bureaucracy regained its ascendancy among within the dominant classes (Boran, 1968a: 52).

In common with its revolution strategy, description of social structure and development model, the TİP circle discussed Turkey's foreign policy through such concepts as "independence" and "neutrality". It argued that Turkey had pursued an independent foreign policy, called Atatürk's foreign policy, from the beginning of the republic until 1945. Its main premises were nationalism and total independence, including strictly protecting that independence (Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968a; Halil, 1968). Like all other leftist circles, the TİP saw a break from this line in foreign policy after the death of Atatürk. Turkey's independence was first weakened by the 1939 military and economic agreement with the UK and France (Aybar, 1968: 601-602; Boran, 1968) through which Turkey acquired £25 million in military equipment and a £15 million loan (Boran, 1968a). Later the military and economic cooperation agreements of 1947 and 1948 with the US further weakened its independence (Aybar, 1968: 602). The entry of Turkey into NATO and the bilateral agreements with the US made Turkey much more dependent, severing its last tie with Atatürk's foreign policy and the traditions of the National Liberation War (Aybar, 1968: 323-4).

The TİP circle criticised the prevailing interpretation of the post-war paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy which blamed the Soviet diplomatic notes on the Straits for driving Turkey to the West. It argued these notes simply disguised the bourgeoisie's aspiration to integrate with Western capitalism (Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968; Halil, 1968; Ataöv, 1969; Eroğul, 1969). As some (Boran, 1968; Ataöv, 1969) pointed out, Turkey had already joined the West before the notes were sent. Moreover, these notes were the consequence of the decision taken by the US, the UK and the USSR at the Potsdam Conference (Boran, 1968a; Ataöv, 1969). The first diplomatic note on the Straits was dispatched by the US, then the UK followed suit. The diplomatic note from the USSR was the third one (Ataöv, 1969; Boran, 1968a). Most importantly, the USSR was devastated by war and so could not realise its land and bases demands which were only a "political bluff" (Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968a; Ataöv, 1969; Dönüşüm, 1967: 2). This was further evident from the facts that Turkey stood alone against the Soviet threat for two years after the US and the UK refused a Turkish request for help (Ataöv, 1969; Halil, 1968; Cem, 1970), and that US aid was offered 18 months after the Soviet demands (Aybar, 1968: 334). If the USSR had attacked Turkey for rejecting the Soviet request to control the Straits, the US and the UK would have backed Turkey for their strategic interests (Aybar, 1968:99). Hence Boran blamed the political leaders for being short-sighted.

In international relations, the predominant concept is national interest. Every state makes demands that suit its national interests. Political leaders should assess whether the state making a demand has enough means and capabilities to materialise it. For instance, when the USSR made the demand regarding the Straits by threatening to invade, it was not in a position to act on its threats since it was devastated in the Second World War. Indeed it was obliged to retreat from Iran, it could not prevent Yugoslavia from acting independently and it was forced to expel Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM). (Boran, 1968a: 282-3, my translation).

When the country was converting to a multiparty system, the Soviet demands played into the hands of the dominant classes which utilised them as a pretext "to facilitate and expedite the transformation of foreign policy" (Boran, 1968a: 49; Dönüşüm, 1967: 2), to suppress leftists and to "justify US aid". The post-war changes in Turkey's social structure reflected in its foreign policy in turn influenced its domestic politics because they were both determined by the class composition of the

government (Boran, 1968a: 46-47). For Boran, the dominant classes failed to bring the country to the “level of contemporary civilisation” (*i.e.* industrialised capitalist society) because they followed a capitalist development path (Boran, 1968a: 49). Therefore they sought foreign aid and investment to resolve the development issue (Boran, 1968a:50; Halil, 1968). They opened the country to Western military, economic and political influence, pursuing a pro-West (particularly US) foreign policy and attaching the Turkish army to NATO (Boran, 1968a: 50).

Nevertheless, others saw the Soviet request for land as the clear motive behind the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy. Soviet imperialist demands for land were incompatible with Turkey’s independence and forced Turkey to accept American aid (Kemal, 1964; Gabbay, 1964). Similarly, Aybar rejected the argument of some leftist circles that the Soviet post-war demands were invented by those who desired to turn Turkey into an American satellite. Aybar asserted that the Soviet demands were real because the Soviet Union did not deny news appearing in Turkish papers. Therefore, Aybar accused those leftist circles of confusing advocating socialism with defending the USSR (Aybar, 2014: 236).

The TIP circle drew attention to the contradictory shifts in the historical development of Turkish foreign policy. It tried to address why Turkey became a dependent country notwithstanding its 1920s anti-imperialist liberation war (Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968a; Küçükömer, 1969; Aren, 1993). To Aybar, any national liberation movements which were not led by the working class eventually collapsed into the traps of imperialism and capitalism (Aybar, 1968: 223). The petty bourgeoisie, anti-imperialist during the liberation war, took inconsistent and elusive positions after the war and adopted the bourgeoisie ideology (Boran, 1968a: 19). Thus, at the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress the capitalist development path, a concession to imperialism, was adopted (Kemal, 1970: 6). Nevertheless, Atatürk’s Turkey pursued an independent foreign policy (Aybar, 1970f: 7). The transition to capitalism had been tried through the leadership of civil and military bureaucrats who assumed that the transfer of certain Western superstructural institutions would take Turkey to the level of Western societies. However, the revolution from above could not take root

(Aybar, 1970f: 7) because the economic base that led to Turkey's backwardness had an underdeveloped capitalism ingrained in its traditional feudal economy (Aybar, 1968: 201). Boran attributed Turkey's second return to imperialism to its attempt to create a "national bourgeoisie" after the national liberation war (Boran, 1967b: 6; see also Başaran, 1966: 12). Due to inadequate capital accumulation in underdeveloped countries, she argued that creating a national bourgeoisie could not effect an industrial revolution (Boran, 1967b: 6). The emergent bourgeoisie was not "national" but a "collaborator" of imperialism (Başaran, 1966: 12).

Although initially the TİP circle attributed Turkey's entry into the US orbit to the ideological preference of the dominant classes which sought to maintain and even strengthen their privileged status rather than pursue Turkey's national interest; after the intra-party cleavage appeared the emergent factions diverged on this. Whilst the Emek faction stuck to this original view, the Aybar faction changed its views. For the former, imperialism entered Turkey neither at gunpoint nor through deception (Emek, 1969a: 10), but rather it was invited by the local bourgeoisie that was integrated into imperialism (Selik, 1969a; Çulhaoğlu, 1970; Aren, 1970). The Aybar faction saw Emek's position as an "exorbitant error" since it was based on "surface appearance" which it mistakenly considered to be an "underlying factor" (Aybar, 1970b: 5). Aybar argued that local classes did not voluntarily adopt imperialism; rather, because of the Second World War the local bourgeoisie found itself within American imperialism's plan for hegemony (Aybar, 1970b: 5).

The TİP circle claimed that becoming a satellite of Western imperialism deprived Turkey of its reputation with Third World states as the first national liberation war of the modern era (Halil, 1968: 147) and sentenced it to "international isolation", which was deeply felt "when the Cyprus question came up" (Halil, 1968: 155). Thus, like the other leftist circles in the 1960s, the TİP saw the Cyprus issue as a turning point in Turkish foreign policy dependency on the US (Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968a; Halil, 1968). Upon US President Johnson's letter to Turkey indicating US opposition to Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus using military equipment provided through the 1947 Military Aid Agreement, the statesmen, who deemed Turkey a strong castle

of the West and expected NATO to curb Greece, were disenchanted (Halil, 1968). Aybar, therefore, accused statesmen of consenting to the country being a US satellite, thereby leaving it unable to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Statesmen, who have been unable to see the real view of the world under the US umbrella for years, anticipated that the US would resolve the Cyprus question in favour of Turkey by making it a matter for NATO. However, time proved this incorrect (1968:318) The Cyprus crisis exposed both the urgency of invoking an independent foreign policy and the fact that NATO serves US interests (1968: 335) This is evident from the fact that when US interests conflict with Turkey's interests, NATO does not protect Turkey. (Aybar, 1968: 340, my translation).

The Cyprus issue taught Turkish statesmen that each nation should take care of its security without expecting external help (Boran, 1968a: 42). In addition, the TİP argued the Cyprus issue also taught the people that Turkey could not pursue an independent foreign policy let alone secure the independence of Cyprus (Yücel, 1967: 6). In fact, notwithstanding the Turkish people's inability to help the Cypriots, this issue helped Turks to understand how the shackles of NATO hindered their independent action (Yücel, 1967: 6). Kemal had concluded that as long as Turkey's relations with the US continued as they were, Turkey could not solve the Cyprus issue in its favour (Kemal, 1967: 5). Some even suggested that Turkey could capitalise on "the Cyprus checkmate" by initiating an "anti-imperialist war" while people were conscious of the dependent status of their country (Baş, 1967a: 7).

As Güvenç rightly observes, the TİP circle adopted two different approaches to Cyprus: a "pacifist" approach and a "nationalist-militarist" approach (Güvenç, 2008: 162-168). The pacifist approach was first revealed in Aybar's May 1964 speech⁵⁶ in Bursa (Sargın, 2001: 221-224). His emphasis on Turkey's commitment to the National Oath and no expansion of its current border was "distorted by a newspaper, *Milliyet* (Nationality)" to mean "we do not have a cause called Cyprus" (Sargın, 2001: 224). Following this report, the TİP was subjected to harsh criticism and nationalist-populist pressure and obliged to release a booklet to deny the report, to present Cyprus-related parts of Aybar's speech for public assessment and to

⁵⁶ Full version of this speech can be accessed from Güvenç, (2008: 256-263).

announce that it cared about Cyprus more than other parties (Sargın, 2001: 224). Aybar's speech pointed to the Turkish "minority's" support for the constitution and Greek Cypriots' opposition. The TİP argued that the misuse of their veto power by Cypriot Turks played into the hands of Greek Cypriots who wanted proof of a dysfunctional constitution (Sosyal Adalet, 1964: 44). Aybar asserted the Turkish "minority" did not seek annexation to mainland Turkey, whereas Greek Cypriots sought annexation to mainland Greece since Britain took the island from the Ottomans in 1878 (TİP, 1964: 6). Aybar stressed that the Turkish "minority" historically had sided with the UK, and implicitly criticised the pro-imperialist attitude of Turkish community leaders (TİP, 1964: 6-7). Similarly, Ünal claimed that the rights granted to Turkey and Cypriot Turks through the London and Zurich agreements and the Cypriot constitution demonstrated the DP government's pro-British-imperialism foreign policy, and he criticised the İnönü government for continuing it (B.C.Ü. [Burhan Cahit Ünal], 1964: 4).

When Greece took the Cyprus issue to the UN General Assembly in 1955 to win "self-determination" for the Cypriot people, Aybar argued that the UK sought to overcome its own global isolation by pressing Turkey, which had been indifferent to Cyprus since the UK took it in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (TİP, 1964: 6; Boran, 1965: 4), to intervene in Cyprus in opposition to Greece (TİP, 1964: 7). Aybar argued that the DP government placed Turkey in political gridlock over Cyprus because its foreign policy was dependent on Britain instead of Atatürk's foreign policy grounded on the National Oath (Misak-ı Milli) (TİP, 1964: 10). Thus the UK pitted Turks against the Greek Cypriots, thereby translating the issue into a conflict between Turks and Greeks (Aybar, 1968: 318). This gave the wrong impression that the UK presence was compulsory for peace (Aybar, 1968: 348).

The tremendous nationalist pressure following this speech (Sargın, 2001; Aybar, 2014) forced the TİP to accept the prevailing nationalist militarist view. It never again mentioned Cypriot Turks' collaboration with imperialism, the Turkish "minority" or support for Makarios's criticism of the Cypriot constitution (Güvenç, 2008: 168). TİP MPs in parliament supported military intervention in Cyprus and

not recognising the illegitimate Makarios government, and even criticised the AP government for giving up the Cyprus intervention in contravention of the parliamentary mandate (Dinler, 1990: 83-84). Mirroring the nationalist discourse of the dominant classes, Boran tried to justify TİP support for the intervention as a “fight against imperialism” and asserted that socialist did not mean “pacifist” so when Turkey’s national interests were in question the TİP would respond (quoted in Dinler, 1990: 85).

To bolster their anti-imperialist stance, the TİP circle sought reasons behind imperialism’s interest in Cyprus. The changing balance of power in the Middle East and the rising Arab socialist movement seriously jeopardised Anglo-American interests, so Cyprus became a key geopolitical location protecting Anglo-American imperialism’s economic stake (oil companies and control of the Suez channel) and political interests in the Middle East (Baş, 1967b: 13; Dönüşüm, 1967: 4). On the other hand, some pointed to inter-imperialist rivalry over domination in the eastern Mediterranean (B.C.Ü. [Burhan Cahit Ünal], 1964: 4). They argued the debate between Turkey and Greece centred on “how Cyprus would move from English domination to American domination” ((B.C.Ü. [Burhan Cahit Ünal], 1964: 4). Another motive behind imperialism’s aspiration to control Cyprus was its rich copper mines that the US wanted to exploit (Günçe, 1969: 13).

The TİP considered two solutions: Enosis, annexation to mainland Greece, advocated by Anglo-American imperialism (Boran, 1965: 4), and a federal independent Cyprus supported by the USSR (Dönüşüm, 1965a: 5). The TİP circle’s solution was close to the latter: a neutralised, independent and federal Cyprus free of arms and bases (Dönüşüm, 1966a: 3). It suggested that the Cyprus issue be solved through quadrilateral negotiations among the “real” parties (Turkey, Greece and the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus) and that the great powers (US, UK and USSR) be excluded (Aybar, 1968: 319). The TİP argued that Turkey’s engagement in Cyprus via the UK led the USSR and the Third World to see its intervention as Anglo-American imperialist (Boran, 1965: 4). Therefore, unless Turkey stood against Anglo-American imperialism’s use of Cyprus as a springboard for its Middle

East interests, neither the USSR and nor the Third World would support Turkey over Cyprus (Boran, 1965:4).

The TİP circle claimed the US sided with Greece not because they were both Christian but because they were both capitalist. Because of the rich Greek lobby and the American bourgeoisie's interests, the US preferred Greece's developed capitalism over Turkey's less developed capitalism (Aybar, 1968: 454; Dönüşüm, 1965b: 5). It gave landing ships to Greece and had armed it since 1955, while it did not give landing ships to Turkey (Dönüşüm, 1965c: 9; Dönüşüm, 1965d: 1). This provoked such strong anti-American sentiments among leftists that the TİP backed a peaceful “‘second national-liberation war’ against the American presence in the country” (Lipovsky, 1992: 45). Aybar launched a “passive resistance” campaign to translate anti-Americanism into a mass movement, thereby turning Turkey into a place where Americans would be isolated and hated (Dönüşüm, 1966a: 3).

After Turkey's row with its allies over Cyprus, foreign policy issues were no longer taboo and could now be discussed freely (Boran, 1968a: 326). For instance, the TİP challenged the argument of the dominant circles that NATO protected Turkey from the “Soviet threat” as Cyprus demonstrated that threat would not come from the USSR but might come from within NATO, *i.e.* Greece (Boran, 1968a: 326). US President Johnson's notorious 1964 letter to Turkish Premier İnönü showed NATO would not protect Turkey against aggression (Boran, 1968a: 299). Independence should therefore be defended against not only the USSR but also all other countries including the US (Boran, 1992: 334-335 quoted in Güvenç, 2008: 107). NATO members may have a voice proportionate to their powers, but the final word belonged to the US which controlled military commands and had the nuclear monopoly (Aybar, 1968: 580). NATO's US-dominated integrated military command structure deprived Turkey of its sovereign power to declare war and make peace as shown in the Cuban missile crisis when the US dismantled its nuclear missiles in Turkey after US-USSR negotiations and without Turkish agreement (Boran, 1968a: 302). Similarly, if this crisis had become a war, argued Boran, Turkey would have found itself at war over a problem which did not concern it (Boran, 1968a: 302).

NATO's strategy of "rational escalation" and "flexible response", adopted in 1967 at US insistence, and its NATO nuclear bases meant Turkey would be the first target in any war between the US and USSR since the US would fight through its allies rather than at home, claimed the TİP (Boran, 1968a; Aybar, 1968; and Sargın, 2001).

The TİP circle saw NATO not only as a military alliance (Boran, 1968a; Ataöv, 1969) but also as a tool of American imperialism (Ataöv, 1969) to protect and extend the capitalist social order and find new spheres of influence (Boran, 1968a; Ataöv, 1969). Through its "open door" policy, NATO and similar international organisations, the US forced other countries to open their markets to American imperialism, thereby becoming a "world empire" (Ataöv, 1969: 143-144). The Cold War was a US cover to control its allies and obtain concessions under the guise of fighting against communism (Ataöv, 1969: 5). They argued that NATO strategies were "determined in accordance with US imperialism's global interests" (Aybar, 1968: 582) and were not congruent with Turkey's which was a dependent and backward country (Ataöv, 1969: 223). NATO membership forced Turkey to maintain a large standing army it did not need (Boran, 1968a: 306). Despite this incongruence, the circle argued Turkey joined NATO so the dominant classes could block the socialist order in Turkey and sustain the existing order and its privileges (Ataöv, 1969: 177-179). NATO was a "military façade for Turkey's economic and financial attachment to imperialism" (Boran, 1968b: 473).

Given that Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty allowed signatory states to cease to be a party after 20 years provided they informed the US government a year prior to leaving, the TİP circle launched a campaign called "No to NATO" to stimulate debate on Turkey's membership (Sargın, 2001: 559). US opposition to Turkey over Cyprus in 1964 and the French withdrawal from NATO's military wing in 1966 sparked a wider debate on Turkey's relations with NATO. For instance, a declaration signed by 308 scientists restating the TİP's objections and asking the government to reconsider NATO membership was published in the pro-TİP journal *ANT* in 1968 (Baş 1967b; Özgüden, 1967).

The TİP circle also criticised the bilateral agreements forming the legal basis of American military and civil presence in Turkey. Although these agreements were already the subject of debate in the early 1960s, President Johnson's letter greatly enflamed the debate. The main leftist concerns (Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968; Halil, 1968; Ataöv, 1969; Küçükömer, 1969) centred around:

- 1) Turkey becoming a colony due to the bilateral agreements;
- 2) These agreements being put into effect without approval of the TGNA or the Council of Ministers;
- 3) Most of them being concealed from the public;
- 4) US rights and privileges harming Turkey's sovereign rights and security;
- 5) US bases and facilities;
- 6) These bases threatening the security of Turkey and;
- 7) The US consequently invading 35 million square metres of Turkish territory.

Leftist journals devoted particular efforts to reveal the details of the bases.⁵⁷ The TİP circle emphasised that the rights granted to the US infringed on Turkish sovereign and territorial rights and reduced Turkey's independence (Aybar, 1968: 323). Bulutoğlu attributed the agreements to the DP government's economic policy which relied mainly on foreign loans (Bulutoğlu, 1967: 10). Therefore the leftists dubbed the DP foreign policy as "dollar diplomacy". Naci illustrated how the DP government's concessions to foreign capital and imperialism fettered Turkey's industrial development and kept it an agrarian country (Naci, 1967a: 7).

Likewise, TİP writers saw the 1963 Ankara Agreement (the partnership agreement with the EEC) as the last example of the Turkish bourgeoisie's struggle to connect Turkey to capitalism and thus fortify its own internal status while turning the country into a semi-colony (Boran, 1968a; Aybar, 1968; Kazgan, 1970). They underscored

⁵⁷ See for instance: Gönenç, Mekin (1967); Ant (1967); Ant (1967a); Gönenç, Mekin (1967a); Gönenç, Mekin (1967b); Baş, Hüseyin (1967d).

the similar motivations and consequences of the 1963 agreement and the 1838 Free Trade Agreement⁵⁸ between the Ottoman Empire and the UK (Kazgan, 1970: 109). A nationalist protectionist sentiment that underpinned their opposition to integration with Europe can be discerned from their argument that EEC membership would likely pave the way for “the revival of the old class structure and exploitation, and the return of the Greek, French and German bourgeoisie who had been expelled from the fatherland” (Kazgan, 1970: 210).

The TİP circle challenged the motives of the dominant classes’ assumptions regarding Turkey’s accession to the Common Market. Kazgan argued “the dominant classes’ fear of the rising revolutionary movement was the motivation” as they saw “the accession to the EEC as an assurance for their survival” (Kazgan, 1970: 297). Similarly, TİP leaders blamed the comprador bourgeoisie and the large land owners for Turkey’s policy on the Common Market, and maintained that the comprador bourgeoisie specialised in imports so opposed industrialisation, while the large land owners’ interest lay in keeping Turkey as an agrarian country and an exporter of agricultural products (Boran, 1968a: 322). For them, the Ankara Agreement would badly affect the small and middle-scale farmers, small manufacturing and nascent industry, particularly heavy industry, who could not compete with Europe (Aybar, 1968: 289). This would result in unemployment for the working classes (Emek, 1969b: 7). Given that in world economic history there was no instance of development based on foreign capital (Kazgan, 1970: 272), they asserted that joining the Common Market would lead to Turkey’s remaining a backward capital-importing dominated state (Kazgan, 1970: 295-7) that would export cheap raw materials and import expensive finished manufactured goods, making up its trade deficit by selling off its rich natural resources (Aybar, 1968: 290). Moreover, they claimed that Turkey was a “developing country” that could not integrate into this “developed community” (Boran, 1968a: 320) so accession would make it “a satellite of European capitalism” (Aren, 1969: 10; Kazgan, 1970: 295). Consequently, they claimed this agreement was incompatible with Turkey’s “national interests” (Aybar, 1968: 289).

⁵⁸ In the leftist literature this agreement is presented as an infamous milestone in the development of capitalism in Turkey for turning Turkey into a semi-colonial state.

The Emek circle claimed that while the US was exploiting Turkey, it was also providing economic aid to sustain the existing order because imperialism's interests in Turkey were more for geopolitical reasons (keeping Turkey in the capitalist camp) than for economic exploitation. (Emek, 1969a; Aren, 1969a). Therefore, Turkey had used its geopolitical position as a marketable asset⁵⁹ in designing its foreign policy, "granting military bases to the imperialists in return for financial aid" (Aybar, 1964: 24). Since the centre of gravity of world politics shifted to the Middle East in the late 1960s, Turkey's geopolitical importance grew further in the US-USSR contest for world hegemony (Aybar, 2014: 312). Aybar argued that such a strategic position, hazardous but exceptional, called for a non-aligned foreign policy (Aybar, 2014: 150) so Turkey could stay out of any nuclear war (Aybar, 2014: 322) as it stayed out of the Second World War (Aybar, 2014: 430). Turkey should take advantage of its location much like the Ottomans did in the 19th century (Tansuğ, 1967a; Aybar, 1968; Boran, 1968a) because neutrality provided enough room for manoeuvre in international relations (Özgüden, 1967). An independent foreign policy, achieved by France owing to its superior capabilities, could be attained by Turkey because of its geopolitical position (Tansuğ, 1967b).

Like other leftist circles, the TİP paid particular attention to the rightist AP government's visits to Moscow and the agreement with the USSR to establish certain heavy industry plants in Turkey. Despite viewing these developments warily, the TİP generally evaluated them as a positive sign of thawing relations. It stated the "Russian spectre" invented by Turkey's bourgeoisie (Korkmazgil, 1966: 8) began to

⁵⁹ This line of thinking has been prevalent in the leftist literature. For instance, Nesimi (1976: 189) labelled it a geopolitical rant. For him, since 1844 Turkey received rent and credit by using its geopolitical location within inter-imperialist rivalry. To increase this rent to an optimal level, argued Nesimi, Turkey pitted imperialist powers that desired to benefit from its geopolitical location against each other; but with the emergence of intercontinental missiles Turkey's geopolitical location lost its importance. See Nesimi, Abidin (1976). This line is still discernible in the current leftist literature, see for instance Gerger, Haluk (1998). Gerger stresses the emergent foreign trade deficit from 1946 onwards and how this problem was solved by "beggar diplomacy" (Gerger, 1998: 173). He maintains that due to this increasing trade deficit Turkey came into the service of imperialism by generating militarism (Gerger, 1998: 210). Given the backwardness of the Turkish bourgeoisie, its lack of wealth accumulation and weakness, the Turkish economy suffered from an acute chronic foreign trade deficit. To address this problem Turkey commodified its geopolitical position (Gerger, 1998: 124) and adopted a foreign policy based on generating enemies and violence to get hand-outs (Gerger, 1998: 204). It used depression in the Middle East as a lever to extract money (Gerger, 1998: 90, 91).

fade due to the pushing of historical conditions (Dönüşüm, 1967a: 2). It claimed that President Johnson's letter made the Turkish bourgeoisie, which had been unconditionally a US satellite, aware that Turkey was isolated by its allies over Cyprus so in desperation so they hastily established relations with the Soviet Union (Dönüşüm, 1967a: 2). Similarly, Boran argued that Turkey's inability to export its goods to European markets pushed the AP government to develop economic relations with the socialist bloc notwithstanding its pro-American foreign policy (Boran, 1966: 12). For Boran, Turkey's foreign policy did not change, détente between the superpowers facilitated Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union (Boran, 1968b: 469). Baş approached this issue from a structuralist perspective. While seeing it as a positive development within a dependent foreign policy perspective, he claimed it was in line with the existing foreign policy whose confines and extent were defined by NATO (Baş, 1967e: 12; see also Çelik, 1969). As long as Turkey was economically dependent on outsiders, they claimed that factors beyond its control would determine its foreign policy (Naci, 1967b: 7).

The TİP circle defined Turkey's full independence as a precondition for "reaching the contemporary civilisation level". It based foreign policy on placing national defence and security in Turkey's own power and capabilities, drafting this strategy in tune with its national interests, abstaining from any military alliances, pursuing 'peaceful relations with neighbouring countries' and zealously protecting full independence (Boran, 1966: 7).

Like the leftist circles in the preceding era, the TİP circle's foreign policy analysis was based on an eclectic approach combining two contrasting positions: Marxism and realism. Whilst through a Marxist analysis its writers drew attention to the inequality and exploitation underlying the current states system and illustrated how this was reproduced, through realist power politics they sought to explain how significant economic development was for survival in the anarchic states system. They examined the world order through the expanded version of imperialism by such Marxist economists as Maurice Dobb, Charles Bettelheim. They challenged dogmatizing the theory of imperialism as formulated by Lenin and pointed to the

need to adapt imperialism into the changing conjuncture. They emphasised the changing nature of post-war imperialism from direct invasion through “army” to indirect invasion via “transfer of capital”. As they considered imperialism an internal phenomenon because it coalesced with the local bourgeoisie, they claimed the anti-imperialist struggle was inherent in the socialist struggle (for the Aybar faction) and in the anti-capitalist struggle (for the Emek faction). While underdeveloped capitalism and imperialism nourished each other, without overcoming the former Turkey’s dependence on imperialism could not be tackled.

This reveals the teleological vision and economic determinism of orthodox Marxism in the TİP’s theoretical framework, as its theorists attached importance to the advancement of capitalist production relations as a path to development and socialism. Considering the dichotomy of the “progressive capitalist classes” that advocated the advancement of capitalist production relations and the “reactionary trans-historical bureaucrat class” that hindered the development of these relations (*İlke*, 1974: 61), the Aybar faction (see also Küçükömer (1969)) blamed the “bureaucrat class” for underdevelopment and therefore the presence of imperialism in Turkey. However, the Emek circle did not crystalize a dichotomy between the bureaucrat bourgeoisie and the other capitalist classes. Irrespective of these classes’ economic models of state capitalism or liberalism, it thought that all these classes advanced the development of capitalist production relations. It further claimed that “imperialism” contributed to the development of capitalist production relations and the completion of the bourgeois democratic order in Turkey (*İlke*, 1974: 65), though they criticised it.

TİP writers related foreign policy formation to domestic social classes and their relations with imperialism. They therefore accounted for the post-war transformation of Turkey through the transformation of the strengthened trade bourgeoisie into a comprador bourgeoisie (see Ataöv, 1969; Boran, 1968a). For them, the post-war changing internal social structure and changing class relations transformed Turkish politics. The new dominant classes (bourgeoisie and large land owners) and their governments invited imperialism because they could not industrialise the country due

to inadequate capital accumulation (Boran, 1968a). Although they pointed to dialectic relations between changes in the social structure and foreign policy (see Boran, 1968a: 47), their analysis ignored how class agency affected the formation of foreign policy within “the structure of social relations formed around a dominant social property relationship where different class interests materialize” and, in turn, “how foreign policy decisions reproduce or transform this structural complex” (Yalvaç, 2014: 12). They accounted for Turkey’s post-war transformation only in terms of domestic social forces, thereby ignoring those changes (such as the emergence of a new division of labour, the Fordist accumulation strategy and the Bretton Woods system) in the international capitalist system to which Turkey belonged. Consequently, they espoused a contradictory account of foreign policy formation in Turkey: the “neutral” foreign policy of Kemalism was in the general interest of all, but Turkish foreign policy after 1945 reflected the particular interests of the dominant classes, though both policies were advanced by CHP governments.

In addition to this voluntarist view, structuralist views were aired in the TİP circle. For instance, Aybar argued that the global division of labour designed by imperialism for the post-war world order left Turkey no choice but to integrate into the capitalist camp as an underdeveloped country. Likewise, Kutlay from the Emek faction explained the post-war changes in relation to the changing nature of imperialism (Kutlay, 1969a: 10). Whilst pre-war classical imperialism required a relatively “independent” unit so the national bourgeoisie and imperialism were in conflict over control, the new post-war imperialism necessitated a “dependent” unit due to the expansion of socialism, hence imperialism and the national bourgeoisie cooperated to sustain imperialist exploitation, ensure the development of capitalist production relations and prevent proletariat rule in underdeveloped countries. However, all these views suffered from “functionalism” as they conceptualised imperialism as a system which determined domestic and foreign policies of nation states in accordance with its needs (van der Pijl, 2009: 149).

The TİP circle, be it from voluntarist or from structuralist perspectives, did not analyse the post-war change “in terms of a stratified and differentiated totality of

social relations” (Wight and Joseph, 2010: 19). Instead they reduced the shift to a “single determinant” of explanandum (Yalvaç, 2010: 171) “within a complex set of structural relations” (Wight and Joseph, 2010: 19). They therefore missed “the agential moment of structural change, in which agency transforms pre-existing structures, while at the same time being enabled and constrained by those structures” (de Graaff and van Apeldoorn, 2011: 406). Consequently, either by overstating the structure/agency or by downplaying them, all TİP factions ignored “class as a causal ‘nexus’ between the capital accumulation strategy and the state’s geopolitical strategy” (Apeldoorn, 2014: 13), so they contradicted themselves over Turkey’s changing geopolitical strategy.

Despite analysing every issue from a class perspective (Eroğul, 1969a: 9), TİP writers explained world politics and Turkey’s foreign policy using realist concepts such as “self-help”, “survival”, “balance of powers” and “relative gains”. For instance, borrowing the self-help concept from realism, they claimed the Cyprus dispute proved that a state must secure its own interests “lest the survival of [the state] be in jeopardy” (Waltz, 1979: 134), and this self-help was not limited to capitalist states. Reminiscent of Waltz’s second image critique,⁶⁰ they claimed that regardless of being socialist or capitalist all nation states were basic social units like “black boxes” (Mersheimer, 2007: 72) and they would try to “ensure their survival regardless of their ideological leanings” (Boran, 1968a: 128). Like realists, the TİP circle put greater emphasis on “relative gains”⁶¹ in the formation of foreign policy, therefore they suggested “balance of powers” for small states because in foreign policy, and generally in politics, amity was based on “unity of interests” which was

⁶⁰ Waltz criticised Marxists’ assumption that international relations among socialist states would be peaceful because the ideology of the state was the decisive factor in determining states’ behaviour on the ground that irrespective of their political system states behave in the same way under anarchy, hence they engage in “the unending competition for power and security” (Burchill and Linklater, 2005: 21).

⁶¹ In realist thinking, a state’s priority in the self-help system is to seek its own survival and security by maintaining its power position in the system (Waltz, 1979: 91). The power of states is measured in terms of their relative capabilities; therefore states aim to “prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities” (Grieco, 1990: 39), and they are “preoccupied with relative gains” (Reus-Smit, 2005: 191; see also Donnelly, 2005: 38). Therefore the realist approach favours balancing over bandwagoning because the former pursues relative gains (Donnelly, 2005: 38).

“hardly in question between great powers and small states” (Aybar, 1968: 334). Therefore the latter should abstain from military and political alliances like NATO and CENTO and ensure its national security with its own forces.

The eclectic theoretical framework of TIP theorists created a perplexing meta-theoretical stance. They distinguished between the bourgeois (positivist) account of science aimed at describing perceived social phenomenon empirically and the Marxist (critical) account aimed at understanding and explaining social phenomena to change them (Altıok, 1970: 11). Although they distinguished between these accounts and exposed defects in the positivist account (*e.g.* ahistorical, static, an instrument of domination (Ertan, 1969: 9)), a positivist bias can be detected from, for example, their definition of science as the “refutation or affirmation of hypothesis and theory by objective reality, experiences and observation” (Boran, 1968a: 113). Similarly, they claimed that “like in nature [natural science], in society [social science] as well there are laws which are objective and independent of human volition” (Eroğul, 1969a: 9) and “free from class interests” (Aybar, 2014: 49). As they conceived of interactions between states “in a positivist fashion” (Kurki, 2007: 363 quoted in Yalvaç, 2010: 169) they referred to law-like generalisations to predict the behaviour of states (see Aybar, 1968: 437). This reveals “positivist epistemology” in their eclectic theoretical framework. Their treatment of the nation state and the states system as unchangeable and how they saw states as absolute “unitary actors engaging in rationality” under the guiding principles of *realpolitik* reveals “the ontological implications of positivist assumptions” (Wight and Joseph, 2010: 17) in their theoretical framework. Nevertheless, when they addressed how imperialist exploitation worked, as well as how and why it caused world wars and fettered the development of underdeveloped countries, their analytical framework fell back upon a social relational meta-theoretic position.

Because they attributed national “survival” to “economic development” in the anarchic states system (Küçükömer, 1964: 10), they reduced Turkey’s problems to underdevelopment. They advocated the non-capitalist path of development to “get the desired outcome” (Keyder, 1979: 37), *i.e.* to elevate Turkey, a small state in the

states system, to the league of the developed great nations. Contradicting their Marxist views, whilst they were solving Turkey's underdevelopment problem through this "instrumental rationality", they unwittingly helped reproduction of unequal world capitalist system.

4.3. Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Communist Party of Turkey)

4.3.1. Introduction

As stated in the previous chapter, almost all the TKP cadres in Turkey were imprisoned following the 1951 arrests. During the 1950s, it was forced to cease activities in Turkey and limit itself to actions abroad by expatriate members of its Central Committee (İsmail Bilen, Abidin Dino and others) through an external bureau founded in Prague and later moved to Leipzig, and through radio broadcasting (Bizim Radyo (Our Radio)) from Budapest in 1958. In the late 1950s, TKP leader Şefik Hüsnü died in exile and other TKP cadres completed their imprisonment (Salihoğlu, 2004: 26-27). TKP cadres abroad called for a party conference to rebuild the TKP. Except for Zeki Baştımar, other leading figures including Reşat Fuat Baraner, Mihri Belli and Hikmet Kıvılcımlı ignored this call (Salihoğlu, 2004: 27). At the 1962 conference, a TKP Central Committee of its foreign bureau included Nazım Hikmet, Zeki Baştımar, İsmail Bilen, Aram Pehlivanian and Abidin Dino (Babalık, 2005: 82). Baştımar became the first secretary of the party (Babalık, 2005: 82) and remained until his removal by the TKP Central Committee Politburo in May 1973 (Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 13). Old guard communists such as Reşat Fuat Baraner, Mihri Belli and Hikmet Kıvılcımlı never accepted the foreign bureau as continuing the TKP tradition (Ulus, 2011: 133). In the mid-1960s there appeared an intra-party cleavage in the foreign bureau over the TKP's position on Cyprus and the party's negative attitude towards the 1961 constitution. This eventually resulted in the dismissal of Bilal Şen and Gün Benderli-Togay from the Central Committee (Akbulut, 2004).

In the 1960s the TKP did not organise in Turkey but implicitly supported the TİP as the only legal socialist party (Nazım Hikmet, 1962, in Açıköz, 2004: 190). Although the TKP concurred with the TİP on the unity of the “anti-imperialist” and “anti-capitalist” struggles, the TKP differed with it over the existence of a national bourgeoisie. It criticised the TİP for prematurely talking about “socialist revolution” in a country which had not completed its democratic revolution (Demir⁶², 1964: 25; Demir, 1964a: 563; Akıncı, 1965: 162) and for ignoring the balance of powers, the level of consciousness of the masses and imperialism’s economic, political and military domination (Demir, 1964: 26). TKP writers argued against a socialist slogan as it would harm “the possibility of creating a broad national, democratic, anti-imperialist front” (Demir, 1964: 25-26). Due to the leadership row between Baştımaz and Belli, the TKP constantly blamed Belli, the leader of the MDD circle, for being a Maoist-Trotskyite liquidator and *agent provocateur*, as it believed he had plotted the 1951 arrests (TKP, [1969]: 6-7; see also Akbulut and Tosun, 2017) and was currently plotting the liquidation of the TİP either by playing into the government’s hand to close it as a continuation of the illegal TKP, or by seizing the party (TKP, [1969]: 8-9). Besides, the TKP criticised the MDD faction and its “national democratic revolution” thesis for downplaying the proletariat’s leadership role in the national liberation revolution (Salihoğlu, 2004: 30), though interestingly the TKP advocated a “national democratic revolution” (Babalık, 2005: 83; Satılğan, 2006: 44). TKP leaders maintained the “15-16 June Great Proletariat Resistance”⁶³ signalled the bankruptcy of the MDD (Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 137). Given that the proletariat would never cooperate with imperialism and reactionary classes, the success of a national liberation revolution required proletariat leadership (TKP, [1969]: 16). They underlined the risks of a national democratic revolution without proletariat leadership by pointing to their own experience⁶⁴ during the 1920s national

⁶² TKP First Secretary Zeki Baştımaz used Yakub Demir as a pen name.

⁶³ On the 15-16 June 1970 over 100,000 workers protested against a government bill on amendments to the Law on Unions, and the government was obliged to call the army to suppress the protest march.

⁶⁴ The TKP supported the Kemalist petty bourgeois revolution, assuming that it would evolve into a socialist movement; but the result was disastrous for TKP members who were subjected to torture and long imprisonment: “Keep in mind that we once tried a national liberation revolution without the leadership of the proletariat; it came to a bitter end. We do know that current external and internal conditions of the country were not much the same in 1919.” (Demir, 1964a: 563).

liberation movement (Demir, 1964a: 563). In addition, the TKP circle blamed the MDD circle, which was inspired by French reformist socialist Jean Jaures, for seeing bourgeois nationalism and proletariat internationalism as compatible and complementary (TKP, [1969]: 26).

The TKP began publishing *Yurdun Sesi* (Voice of the Homeland) in 1963 and *Yeni Çağ* (New Age) in 1964. It also broadcast its views through radio channels *Bizim Radyo* (Our Radio) and *TKP'nin Sesi* (Voice of TKP). The TKP's views on the world order and Turkey's place in it come from these primary sources and books⁶⁵ that compiled manuscripts of TKP radio programmes, party conferences, party programmes, discussions, seminar notes *et cetera*. As the leftist circles mostly shared similar views on the world order and Turkey's place in it and these views were discussed in detail whilst examining the TİP circle, only the divergent views of the TKP circle will be analysed.

4.3.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

Like the other leftist groups, the TKP circle mainly construed the world order through the lens of Lenin's imperialism theory, but it used a version edited by the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) (Demir, 1964: 26). For the TKP circle, world politics revolved around the contradiction between socialism and capitalism (TKP, [1969]: 40). As a reflection of Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s, they criticised "Maoism" for belittling this contradiction, for viewing the labour-capital contradiction as a contradiction between "poor nations" and "rich nations" (TKP, [1969]: 42), and for reducing the struggle against imperialism to "national liberation movements" (Sayılğan, 2009: 434). The TKP distinguished between relations among capitalist nations and among socialist nations: capitalist nations had irreconcilable

⁶⁵ See for instance: Akbulut, Eren and Tosun, Ersin (2017). "TKP'nin Sesi Radyosu", İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih Yayınları; Açıköz, Anjel (2004). "Bizim Radyoda Nazım Hikmet", İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları; Akbulut, Erden (2003). "1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP", İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları; Akbulut, Erden (2004). "TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1965 Tartışmaları", İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları; TÜSTAV (2002). "TKP MK Dış Bürosu 1962 Konferansı", İstanbul: TÜSTAV Yayınları.

interests and resorted to power politics while socialist nations shared the common interests of mutual development and enrichment and cooperated freely as equals (TKP, [1969]: 45). The TKP considered nationalism as incompatible with socialism (TKP, [1969]: 26) because nationalism ignored the contradiction between socialism and capitalism, rejected a united socialist front against imperialism and refuted a class position in resolving social phenomenon (TKP, [1969]: 34). The TKP argued imperialism supported nationalism globally (TKP, [1969]: 34) and criticised Mao's China for pursuing "superior nation" chauvinism in the wake of imperialism (TKP, [1969]: 38).

Imperialists exploited backward countries' natural resources and thriving markets, argued the TKP, thus forcing them to remain poorly industrialised, dependent and perpetual suppliers of raw materials (Akıncı, 1965: 175). Because of its pro-Moscow line, the TKP ardently supported the non-capitalist development thesis formulated for backward countries. As with other leftist circles, the TKP saw non-capitalist development as "a shortcut in the transition to socialism" (Demir, 1964a: 561). Non-capitalist development was neither capitalism nor socialism, but a struggle to establish socialism by destroying capitalist and pre-capitalist production relations in the social structure (Akıncı, 1965: 164). TKP writers considered "neutrality" as the foreign policy for non-capitalist development. For them, a "neutral" foreign policy meant economic development, decreased defence expenditure, a solid honoured place in world politics and freedom from foreign capital pressures that carried political conditions (Nazım Hikmet, 1961 in Açıkgöz, 2004: 170-171). Neutrality was the first condition for national independence (Nazım Hikmet, 1961 in Açıkgöz, 2004: 170-171).

The TKP circle interpreted Turkey's foreign and domestic policies also through Moscow lenses (Demir, 1964: 26). It highlighted the friendly relationship between Turkey and the USSR in the 1930s and the latter's contribution to Turkish development, and to its independent foreign policy. The "national bourgeoisie" was reformist during the national liberation war because its interests were threatened by the monopoly bourgeoisie. Kemalist statism, a kind of state capitalism peculiar to

Turkey, aimed at fortifying the national bourgeoisie's place against foreign capitalists (Akıncı, 1965: 171). However, when it came to realising radical economic reforms (land reform, nationalisation of foreign trade, *et cetera*) that the masses sought, the national bourgeoisie became a reactionary class. Thus the anti-imperialist Kemalist revolution lost popular support and stalled (Demir, 1964 in Akbulut, 2003: 81). Moreover, statism did not escape the capitalist way of development and it managed to establish only light industry but not heavy industry so the national bourgeoisie was not able to free Turkey from dependence on foreign capital (Akıncı, 1965: 173) notwithstanding its political independence (Akıncı, 1965: 168). After the demise of Atatürk, however, the dominant classes developed a rapprochement with imperialist countries and particularly Hitler's Germany. They claimed Turkey's so-called "neutral" foreign policy during the Second World War actually supported Hitler's Germany against the Soviet Union. Unlike other leftist circles, the TKP ignored the Soviet diplomatic notes demanding land and control of the Straits after the Second World War as the reason behind the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy. Rather the TKP accused Turkey of damaging its good relations with the USSR and of ending Soviet 1930s' contributions to Turkey's industrial development (Akıncı, 1965: 176-177).

The TKP circle linked Turkey's post-war move to US imperialism to the severe economic crisis stemming from its great dependence on German military needs. Since the national bourgeoisie could not realise economic reforms that would maintain political independence, it turned to imperialism (Akıncı, 1965: 165). Increasing public discontent after the war caused the government to seek imperialist support (Başımar, 1962 in TÜSTAV, 2002: 49). The US responded because Turkey's geopolitical position provided it with a foothold to oppose socialist countries and to stifle Middle East national liberation movements (TKP, 1971 in Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 168). Therefore US economic and military aid from 1947 imposed US imperialist political, economic and military domination so Turkey became a US ally in the Middle East, a training camp and military base for aggressor Western blocs and a market for foreign monopolies (Demir, 1964: 15-17). The reactionary local bourgeoisie and the big land owners had seized power well before

the war and had established close relations with foreign capital during the war. When Turkey fell into the American trap of economic aid plans and aggressor military pacts like NATO after the war, the close relations between the big bourgeoisie and foreign cartels were further strengthened (Demir, 1964a: 559). For its own class interests but against Turkey's national interests the big bourgeoisie made the country join NATO and CENTO (Akıncı, 1965: 178). Although the TKP circle did not focus on Turkey's accession to the Common Market as much as the TİP circle did, the TKP stated that the Common Market would disrupt Turkey's industrialisation and turn it into an agriculture plantation (Gündüz, 1964 in Akbulut ed., 2003: 176).

The TKP circle argued that the Cyprus issue disproved imperialists' and their local partners' "Soviet threat" argument and demonstrated the real danger came from US imperialism and NATO (TKP, 1967 in Akbulut and Tosun 2017: 44). The subordination of the Turkish army to NATO not only jeopardised national security but also placed a heavy economic burden on Turkey's budget. It halted economic development as it disrupted Turkey's foreign trade and prevented Turkey from establishing advantageous trade relations with socialist countries (Demir, 1964: 19). The mobilisation of 500,000 soldiers to satisfy NATO (Akıncı, 1965: 175) increased military expenditure (Üstünel 1965: 264; Açıkgöz, 2004: 154) and thereby increased inflation (TKP, 1970 in Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 123). Citing examples of France, Denmark and Norway that pursued independent foreign policies while remaining in NATO, the TKP proposed a "realist" foreign policy (Demir, 1966: 323; Sabri, 1964: 3) which included ending Turkey's one-sided relations with imperialism (Demir, 1964: 21), adopting a "neutral foreign policy" and initiating relations with socialist states, thereby "reverting back to Atatürk's foreign policy" (Sabri, 1964: 3). A neutral and independent foreign policy with improved relations with the Soviet Union would promote Turkey's industrialisation by providing capital, investment and credits.

The TKP circle agreed with the other leftist circles that the imperialists wanted to control Cyprus as an "armoury and military post against" the socialist bloc and the Middle Eastern countries which were fighting for national liberation. Parallel to the

USSR's position, the TKP suggested that Cyprus become a fully independent country with the removal of all foreign occupying forces (TKP, 1964: 110). But the TKP's arguments and position on the Cyprus issue differed from the other currents on several aspects. First, it argued that since the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence eased Cold War tensions, developing countries like Turkey, caught in the imperialist trap, had some chance for economic and social development. However, as the imperialists saw this development as a threat, continued the TKP, they invented the Cyprus issue to create a crisis (TKP, 1965: 537). Secondly, while the other leftists took a nationalist stance and criticised the US for opposing a Turkish intervention, the TKP criticised Turkey for interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state on behalf of the US. For the TKP, Turkey had been used by the imperialists (the UK) to undermine Cypriot independence by instigating a "fratricidal quarrel". Thirdly, whilst the others thought that Turkey's defence capability was limited by US imperialism and NATO, the TKP accused Turkey of attacking the island with napalm and of violating the territorial integrity of a sovereign country to obey an order from NATO.

On 8th August 1964, imperialists made the Turkish air force and navy, which were attached to NATO, attack Cyprus. Villages were set on fire with incendiary bombs and raked with machinegun fire over several days. Hundreds of unarmed, innocent Greek and Turkish women, children and the elderly were shot dead. Hundreds of others were left homeless The villages that were bombed represented the peaceful coexistence of [Turks and Greeks] This must have been the main reason behind the villages being razed to the ground with napalm. (*Yurdun Sesi*, 1964: 1, my translation).

Fourthly, the TKP maintained that the Turkish claim over Cyprus was contrary to the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) (Çelik, 1964: 6) and against Turkey's national interests even though Turkish leaders tried to depict it as a "national cause" (TKP, 1964: 110). TKP leaders accused the Menderes government of implementing the British plan to convert a dispute between Cyprus and English imperialism into a Greece-Turkey dispute, masterminding the 6-7 September anti-Greek pogrom in İstanbul in 1955 and labelling independent Cyprus as a threat to Turkish national interests (*Yurdun Sesi*, 1964a: 2). Although the 27 May military junta initially condemned the claim over Cyprus as a betrayal of the National Pact and took steps to spoil "the British

policy of divide-and-rule”, it was obliged to step back to remain loyal to NATO (Çelik, 1964: 6-7).

Fifthly, given the self-determination right of Cypriots and the espousal of Enosis by AKEL (Communist Party of Cyprus), the TKP did not oppose Enosis (Demir, 1965 in Akbulut, 2004: 51). Bilal Şen, a member of the TKP Central Committee, criticised this position as running counter to the overwhelming nationalism in Turkish public opinion (Demir, 1965 in Akbulut, 2004: 50). For him, the existence of a Turkish minority in the island gave Turkey the right to intervene. Thus he proposed a nationalist stance, akin to the TİP’s position, so as not to distance the masses from the party (Demir, 1965 in Akbulut, 2004: 51). But the TKP rejected his argument as nationalist and contrary to proletariat internationalism. For the TKP, its views could not contradict a sister party’s views (AKEL), and also as the vanguard the party should lead not be led by the people (Demir, 1965 in Akbulut, 2004: 51). The Zurich and London agreements making Turkey a guarantor state should be abolished since they gave the guarantors the imperialist right to intervene in the internal affairs of an independent state (TKP, 1968 in Akbulut and Tosun, 2017:48).

Free from government oppression and criminal investigations, the TKP foreign bureau freely expressed opinions (Demir, 1965 in Akbulut, 2004: 53). Its leaders outspokenly interpreted how and why the 27 May coup came about and collapsed because it was not based on the people (Nazım Hikmet, 1961 in Açıkgöz, 2004: 167). They argued that the emerging détente thanks to the Soviet Union’s peaceful coexistence policy in the late 1950s paved the way for both the 27 May movement and subsequent liberal political atmosphere. For them, a bourgeoisie faction which was not benefitting from the plunder of the country used the army to overthrow the DP government to prevent a public uprising against imperialism and the reactionary order (TKP, 1962 in TÜSTAV, 2002: 91). Unlike the other leftist circles, the TKP criticised the MBK for contradicting itself in supporting aggressive blocs like NATO and CENTO and Atatürk’s pacifism and anti-imperialism (Akbulut, 2016: 75). They thought that Atatürkist foreign policy paralleled Soviet foreign policy which championed disarmament and peaceful coexistence, but the MBK and subsequent

governments acted against this policy (Nazım Hikmet, 1960 in Açıkgöz, 2004: 158; Baştımaz, 1962 in TÜSTAV, 2002: 59).

For the TKP, bourgeois parliamentarism, an instrument of imperialism and collaborator bourgeoisie, was in crisis in Turkey (TKP, 1970a in Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 125). This crisis could not be resolved within the confines of bourgeois parliamentarism since it was designed to avoid the peoples' rule. It could only be resolved by bringing national forces and socialists to power and removing US imperialism's bases, bilateral agreements and NATO (TKP, 1970b in Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 125). They assumed the 12 March coup would bring progressive forces to power (TKP, 1971a in Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 182). However they later changed their stance and labelled the coup as an imperialist plot (TKP, 1971b in Akbulut and Tosun, 2017: 187).

Given that national communist parties globally were subjected to the national and world interests of Soviet realpolitik (Wenlock, 1981: 143), the TKP construed the world order and Turkey's foreign policy in line with Soviet dictates. The USSR's foreign policy towards the Middle East was based on either creating satellite states through nationalist leftist juntas (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994) or ensuring they take a neutral position between the blocs. Soviet realpolitik necessitated Turkey's staying neutral so the TKP was an ardent supporter of a neutral foreign policy which the party equated with economic development and becoming a great state. It added such principles as pacifism and anti-imperialism to the six principles of Kemalism (populism, nationalism, republicanism, statism, laicism and reformism) so Turkey could be neutral and improve its Soviet relations. Improving Soviet relations would promote industrialisation because the Soviet Union would provide the capital, investment and credits that an independent and neutral Turkey needed, as it had in the 1930s.

Since all leftist circles advocated neutrality which was conducive to Soviet strategic plans, the TKP supported developing progressive currents through its periodicals and only debated with the MDD. While the TKP and the MDD actually agreed over

Soviet realpolitik, they clashed over leadership as each demonised the other for collaborating with the police during the 1951 TKP prosecution and for betraying the TKP and its members. In fact, both supported the same national democratic revolution theses with only some nuances separating them.

The TKP differed from the other leftist circles on some issues. For instance, the TKP criticised Turkey's so-called "neutral" foreign policy during the Second World War by claiming it disguised Turkey's support for Hitler's Germany contrary to others' claim that Turkey pursued a "balance of power" to avoid war. Unlike other leftist circles, the TKP did not consider the post-war Soviet diplomatic notes as the reason behind the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy. The party attributed the shift to overlapping interests of the local bourgeoisie and imperialism. Similarly, due to its overt pro-Soviet stance the TKP did not adopt the other circles' nationalist view over Cyprus, instead advocating the islanders' right to "self-determination". It did not oppose the espousal of Enosis by AKEL, but did oppose Turkey's military intervention as it followed the Soviet policy of a fully independent country with no foreign occupying forces.

The TKP circle based its explanation of the historical development of Turkey's foreign policy on the wavering attitude of the "national bourgeoisie": when threatened by the monopoly bourgeoisie it was anti-imperialist with an independent foreign policy, when not threatened it was reactionary. Since the national bourgeoisie lacked the capital accumulation to complete Turkey's post-war capitalist transformation, it was obliged to seek imperialist help, thus becoming dependent. Although the TKP's theoretical framework involved the ruling classes' interests which formed Turkey's geopolitical strategy, it failed to relate this to global accumulation strategies. Therefore it lacked a holistic analytical framework to link internal and external dynamics for Turkey's changing geopolitical strategy.

Reminiscent of Waltz's criticism of Marxists, the TKP found the major cause of war "within the structure of separate states" independent of anarchy at the system level (Waltz, 1959: 12). The TKP assumed the state's ideology determined its behaviour.

Since socialist states would freely cooperate, the TKP argued international relations among them would be peaceful. Due to their irreconcilable interests, capitalist states would always clash. Like the other leftist circles, the TKP treated “nation states” and “states systems” as givens and focused on how the states system could function peacefully when states followed socialist ideology. Its writers confined anarchy at system level to capitalism. Consequently, the TKP’s Soviet realpolitik perspective prevented it from interpreting the power politics nature of superpower rivalry because the Soviet Union was involved. Although it provided some insights which helped overcome the prevailing nationalist perspective within leftist circles, overall the TKP’s interpretations of the world order and Turkey’s place in it failed to explain the explanandum from a historical materialist perspective. Rather given its state centric and power politics perspective inspired by Soviet realpolitik the TKP’s interpretations neatly fit in the realist framework which “focus[ed] on recurring relations between formally equal units” (Joseph, 2010: 64). The TKP’s theoretical framework interpreted international politics “through the positivist lens of discovering and explaining law-like regularities” (Joseph, 2010: 64).

4.4. The Yön Circle

4.4.1. Introduction

“Development” has been of significance to Turkish intelligentsia for over a century since the Ottoman state fell into the status of an “underdeveloped” country compared to the developing Western capitalism (Sertel, Y., 1969: 9-10). The rapid expansion and economic development of socialism around the world and the espousal of many underdeveloped countries of a “socialist” or “non-capitalist way” of development had a marked impact on the Turkish intelligentsia who sought to remedy underdevelopment (Sertel, Y., 1969: 396). In this context, a group of academics and journalists including Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mümtaz Soysal, İlhan Selçuk, İlhami Soysal, Hamdi Avcıoğlu, and Cemal Reşit Eyüpoğlu founded the journal *Yön* in December 1961 (Atılğan, 2002: 257) as a discussion platform for intelligentsia from different leftist origins (from left side of the CHP to the TİP to the MDD circle) (Ünsal, 2001:

74) to provide a leftist “direction” to Turkey’s quest to escape backwardness (Atılğan, 2002: 256; Sertel, Y., 1969: 216). This is evident in the manifesto signed by a number of academics, journalists and military/civil bureaucrats⁶⁶ and published in the first issue of *Yön*. This manifesto mainly emphasised “rapid development” as the sole way to turn Turkey into a “modern society” and to realise “social justice” (Özdemir, 1986). Although this journal was “a broad-based forum for the expression of different radical and leftist views” (Zücher, 2010: 254) until its closure in 1967, the dominant view it represented was the idea of a “national liberation revolution” (Lipovsky, 1992: 95). Following the failed coup attempt in May 1963 *Yön* was closed by the Martial Law Command for giving tacit support to the coup (Atılğan, 2002: 278). It was allowed to be published again amidst rising anti-American sentiments due to President Johnson’s infamous Cyprus letter (Yön, 1964a: 9).

Articles published in *Yön* covered a broad range of issues: 56% were related to domestic politics, 21% to foreign policy and 13% to economics (Özdemir, 1986: 62). As this circle claimed, “by breaking down the ‘foreign policy taboo’ *Yön* opened it up for discussion” (Yön, 1964b: 2). The prominent foreign policy issues discussed were: the absence of an independent action capacity for the army because of Turkey’s NATO membership, the negative US stance against Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus, how Turkey became a US satellite due to a misguided foreign policy after the Second World War, the abrogation of bilateral agreements with and bases granted to the US that endangered Turkey’s security, the emergent Soviet threat and its impact on the entry of Turkey into the American orbit, the Third World ideology and independent (non-capitalist) development, Westernisation and so forth. *Yön* functioned to “relate people on the street to foreign policy issues” (Soysal, 1964: 276) by translating complex and technical issues into the “language of people on the street (bread, water, accommodation, wellbeing, welfare, *et cetera*)” (Soysal, 1964: 274) to prevent “the selfish rulers from dragging the country into external adventures

⁶⁶ Kılıçlı (2008[1970]: 38) labels *Yön* as a journal of door servants (Kapıkulu, literally meaning the Sultan’s slave army), given the signers of the manifesto. For him, an intelligentsia that was not a social class in modern socialism constituted 96.5% of the signers. Of them 34.8% were overt bureaucrats, 37.05% self-employed (serbest meslekli) (covert bureaucrats) and 28.25% students (prospective bureaucrats). Kılıçlı also drew a parallel between the *Yön* circle and the Kadro circle which was a popular leftist movement in the 1930s.

and selling out the country in external markets” (*Soysal*, 1964: 276). It thereby built a relationship between the masses and the nationalist revolutionary cadres on “nationalism” (Eroğlu, 1970: 11).

The Yön circle advocated “new statism” – an understanding of rapid development in a planned economy grounded on social justice (Avcıoğlu, 1962: 3). It was the struggle of the petty bourgeoisie who acted for the “national interest” against the bourgeoisie who pursued private interests (Sertel, Y., 1969: 211). Despite certain attempts, like the Employees Party (*Çalışanlar Partisi*) and Socialist Culture Association (*Sosyalist Kültür Derneği* (SKD)), the Yön circle could not organise in a political party (Ünsal, 2001: 88). It considered the TİP’s socialist strategy under the leadership of the proletariat as “romantic” and so did not join it (Atılğan, 2002: 291). However, in the run-up to the 1965 election Yön gave full support to and TİP circle to present a united front against imperialism, the “democratic national front” (Sayılğan, 2009: 473; Atılğan, 2002: 202).

However, after the election the Yön circle began to criticise the TİP because the results affirmed Yön’s view that in a backward country progressive forces could not come to power via democratic elections (Atılğan, 2002: 209). Thus there emerged a keen debate between them on power strategy: “revolution from above” versus “revolution from below” (STMA, 1988: 2072). Yön argued that the Kemalist revolution which was stalled by a counter-revolution because Kemalists grafted industrial capitalism to a feudal structure (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 1) so a fully independent and really democratic Turkey could not be established through a Western-type parliamentary system (Devrim, 1969a: 8). Turkey’s parliamentary system was not acquired through a class struggle but was introduced by Anglo-Saxon imperialism to mask its dominance with a “democratic outlook” (Devrim, 1969a: 8). They therefore disparagingly labelled it a “Philippine-type” or “sweet” democracy (Timur, 1969: 5). In underdeveloped countries embracing a Western political system, political parties opposing a “coalition of reactionary forces” to change the order cannot win (Devrim, 1969a: 8; Devrim, 1969b: 7; Avcıoğlu, 1971a: 7) because the system constantly reproduces the rule of imperialism and its collaborators (Selçuk, 1969: 2).

The Yön circle proposed a democratic national front under the leadership of nationalist revolutionary cadres who would bring various classes and factions together under the banners of “nationalism” and the fight against imperialism and reactionism to complete the “unfinished Kemalist revolution” (Sertel, Y., 1969: 217-218; Eroğlu, 1970: 10-11). It believed the national democratic revolution was the goal because it considered socialism equal to “the way of developing and advancing the Kemalist revolution” (Avcıoğlu, 1962a: 3). They tried to develop a wide progressive front by exposing how the comprador bourgeoisie from the Christian and Jewish minorities undermined national industry and the development of a national bourgeoisie (Devrim, 1969c; Devrim, 1969d). While the TİP advocated the anti-imperialist struggle, it also weakened “the anti-imperialist wide front” by emphasising anti-capitalist slogans from developed Western countries. Since Turkey’s conditions were different, Yön prioritised the anti-imperialist struggle (Avcıoğlu, 1966: 3).

The Yön circle devoted *Yön*’s pages to the discussion of a “national liberation revolution” from above until its closure in May 1967, and waited for the outcome of the 1969 election before publishing another journal (Ulus, 2011). In the meantime, Avcıoğlu published a seminal book *Türkiye’nin Düzeni* (The Order of Turkey) in 1968 to indoctrinate the military-civil bureaucrats with the national liberation revolution thesis (Atılğan, 2002: 234). The frustration of the 1969 election for the TİP, whose vote decreased notwithstanding claiming its best result (Atılğan, 2002: 215), led to the genesis of the journal *Devrim* (Revolution), which “devoted its pages to showing how and why democracy in Turkey did not work” (Ulus, 2011: 52). It also instigated the Madanoğlu junta progressive military coup plot by the Yön circle and Cemal Madanoğlu, a retired general and senator for life who led the 27 May 1960 coup (Ulus, 2011:51). Since political parties that were instruments of big bourgeoisie and land owners would not end the domination of these classes and implement radical reforms, the Yön circle embraced “petty bourgeoisie radicalism” as a “shortcut” to seize power and introduce reforms to reach the masses (Sertel, Y. 1969: 382).

Contrary to the Marxist view of armies as repressive tools of the dominant classes, the Yön circle claimed that in countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Libya the historic task of the army was to lead the people against imperialism and reactionary rule (Devrim, 1969e: 7; Devrim, 1971: 8; Avcioğlu, 1971a: 7). Since the proletariat was embryonic, Yön identified the “nationalist revolutionary intelligentsia”, who “acted as a progressive force in the century-long history of Turkey” (Avcioğlu, 1970: 3), as the leader of the revolutionary struggle.

Nevertheless, the nationalist revolutionaries were not able to assess “Turkey’s internal and external relations” and “lacked a societal basis” (Eroğlu, 1970: 10), so after carrying out certain socio-economic reforms they returned power to “sweet democracy” political parties and the elected governments diluted the reforms by the nationalist revolutionaries (Avcioğlu, 1971b: 1). The Yön circle saw the 27 May movement as a missed opportunity, and yet it maintained a movement like it was inevitable in Turkey’s circumstances (Selik, 1969b: 13). To take advantage of this new opportunity they advocated convincing the military-civil intelligentsia to support socialism “which was cloaked by Kemalist cover” (Atılgan, 2002: 272). This would mobilise them for socialism and safeguard them from bourgeois ideology (Selik, 1969b: 13).

For the Yön circle, “army” and “party” constituted two pillars of a “revolution from above” (Avcioğlu, 1970: 3). After seizing power, the army should install a “revolutionary party” formed by the military-civil intelligentsia (Avcioğlu, 1969: 486-503) which would carry out socio-economic reforms and non-capitalist development (*i.e.* nationalisation of banking, insurance, foreign trade and assembly industry and conduct radical land reform) (Devrim, 1969a: 8). Economic and social measures benefitting the labourer masses would galvanise them and eventually they would form the social basis of nationalist revolutionary rule. However, this circle’s plan to seize power via a military coup backfired since the army did not conduct a progressive coup on 9 March 1971 but a reactionary one on 12 March and this circle thus ended (Atılgan, 2002: 323).

Yön's interpretation of the world order and Turkey's place in it are explored below through an analysis of Yön, Devrim and Avcıoğlu's seminal books *Türkiye'nin Düzeni* (Organisation of Turkey) (Avcıoğlu, 1969a) and *Devrim Üzerine* (On Revolution) (Avcıoğlu, 1971c).

4.4.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

Similar to the TİP and TKP, Yön also saw world politics as a contest between two rival economic systems, the Soviet Union's communist – or at least non-capitalist – system versus the US-led capitalist camp (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 375). To justify its stance in the international arena, the US invented the threat of “international communism” so it could ensure the protection of the capitalist world system and the interests of the collaborator classes in underdeveloped countries (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 376). Because of the expanding socialist bloc, the contracting confines of capitalism and the industrialisation efforts of the emerging independent states following post-war decolonisation, Yön argued that inter-imperialist rivalry was replaced by military alliances and economic integration (Avcıoğlu, 1965: 3). This was more than a classical alliance of two states against a common enemy; the US forced its allies to follow a certain way of development and to adopt a certain economic system (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 375). The US strengthened the big land owners and the trade bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries through economic aid and foreign capital, thereby building its hegemony on solid foundations (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 14). While these reactionary classes industrialised developing countries help by multinational firms, the US ensured a secure business environment free from socialist revolutions (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 575).

The Yön circle also paid attention to inter-imperialist rivalry and its consequences. It argued that initially American imperialism supported petty bourgeois regimes in the Middle East to compete with British imperialism for influence (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 199). US support played a significant role in establishing the Nasser regime in Egypt, but as these regimes became anti-imperialist US policy shifted to oppose them (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 199). The Yön circle pointed to antagonisms in the capitalist bloc

due to the law of uneven development (Yön, 1965: 8). The US sought to form an Atlantic community covering the entire capitalist world so it helped Europe to recover from the Second World War through the Marshal Plan. However, this led to a rivalry between American and European imperialists when the latter became equal to the former (Avcıoğlu, 1965: 3). Whilst American monopolies tried to seize the European market, European ones tried to open up the American market. European imperialists therefore created the Common Market to confront their American counterparts (Avcıoğlu, 1965: 3).

Like other leftists, Yön leaders emphasised the changing nature of imperialism in the post-war era. Although backwardness was a foregone conclusion in both old and new imperialism, they argued the latter supported industrialisation in underdeveloped countries (Avcıoğlu, 1969a) providing it was dependent on foreign capital. Keeping underdeveloped countries on the capitalist development path in line with multinational firms was significant to new imperialism (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 653). The Yön circle therefore placed particular emphasis on the genesis of multinational corporations and its impact on the post-war shift in US foreign and security policy. It argued that high profit returns from overseas investments and shrinking domestic profits made American companies expand into multinationals. These firms sought to obtain strategic raw materials such as oil, iron and aluminium (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 646). Multinational companies pursued two goals: geographical expansion of their activities and business-friendly environments to yield maximum profit so they were free to reinvest this profit around the world. Therefore multinational companies lobbied the US government to expand the borders of the “free world” (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 650-651). They needed the US military to secure their investments, hence where flag and navy went, capital followed (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 647, 747). To Yön, the US was obliged to pursue world hegemony (Avcıoğlu, 1969a) as multinationals’ profits came mainly from foreign markets and arms sales (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 648). The US had to create increasing demands for its ever-growing war industry otherwise overproduction would lead to a severe economic crisis (Aydemir, 1965: 6). Therefore the US started wars around the world (Aydemir, 1965: 6) so military

expansion, bases and alliances, and increases in defence expenditure became indispensable to US foreign and security policy (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 648).

Like the other circles, Yön often praised Atatürk's foreign policy which was built on a balance of power and neutrality in the relatively peaceful environment of the interregnum period between two great wars. While Turkey maintained friendly relations with the USSR, Yön argued it took a compromising stance with the UK for "realist" reasons (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 363). Turkey took advantage of the balance of power struggle among the European great powers in the run-up to the Second World War, thus enabling it to solve certain long-running issues (e.g. the Straits question – the passage of combatant vessels and rearmament of the Straits – and the Hatay question) and even to build an iron and steel factory in Karabük that otherwise could not be realized (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 366). However, Yön identified a cleavage in the ruling cadre: a conservative wing of the bureaucracy supported relations with the UK, whereas the leaders of the war of independence advocated friendly relations with the USSR (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 363) because they rose against becoming a satellite nation and colonisation starting with Tanzimat which some regarded as "Westernisation" (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 1).

Yön critically analysed how Turkish foreign policy changed from "balance politics" to "dollar diplomacy" in the post-1945 era. Its leaders argued that until 1945 the single-party rule was revolutionary, followed an independent foreign policy, and engaged in radical reforms despite opposition from the conservative classes. Due to both external and domestic pressures the CHP government adopted a satellite foreign policy and liberal economic model *et cetera*. (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 354-55). For them, imperialism entered Turkey mainly for military reasons (Avcıoğlu, 1965a: 8-9). But imperialism used economic and military aid to build a capitalist class in collaboration with foreign capital, thereby it aimed to base its hegemony over Turkey on a solid foundation (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 14). However, Turkey accepted imperialism for both security and economic reasons. The Turkish government believed that security against Stalin's threatening attitude would be ensured by a Western alliance whereas isolation created insecurity (Avcıoğlu, 1964). Severe deficiencies in terms of modern warfare were observed during the war years. After the war, while the Soviet threat

continued, this need was again felt strongly and Turkey looked to American military assistance. Similarly, economic assistance was attractive after the gruelling war years (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 372). Although Turkey avoided becoming a Soviet satellite, Yön criticised the government for attaching itself to the West unreasonably instead of pursuing the traditional “balance of power” policy (Çamlı, 1968: 29-30). Had Stalin chosen to assist in its development, might Turkey have continued to follow an independent foreign policy? “We do not know,” said Avcıoğlu. “But what is certain is that Stalin’s attitude had an impact on Turkish foreign policy, and hence domestic policy” (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 373).

The nationalist revolutionaries’ coalition with land owners, usurers and comprador bourgeoisie under CHP rule cracked towards the end of the war. With the transition to a multiparty system the land owners, usurers and comprador bourgeoisie came into prominence within both the CHP and the DP (Avcıoğlu, 1969a: 354). The coalition of reactionary forces organised mass dissent against the failed superstructural revolutions and ended Kemalism (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 583) by a free election in 1946 when bourgeois parliamentarism was adopted (Devrim, 1969a: 8) and seized power to move Turkey to imperialism under the pretext of Soviet demands for bases in the Straits (Selçuk, 1969a: 2). The Yön circle distinguished between Western and Turkish bourgeoisie: Western bourgeoisie strengthened their own countries’ economic independence, but the coalition of reactionary forces in the Turkish bourgeoisie made Turkey subject to foreign capital and developed capitalist countries in economic, political and military terms and perpetuated this external dependent order (Selçuk, 1969b: 2; Devrim, 1969a: 8). The integration of an underdeveloped country economy with imperialism produced trade balance deficits and foreign debt (Devrim, 1969a: 8). This burden shaped Turkey’s foreign policy and prevented it from adopting a foreign policy and defence strategy that gave precedence to national interests (Devrim, 1969a: 8).

The Yön circle distinguished between Turkish foreign policy based on a rapprochement with the US prior to the 1950s, when the CHP was in office, and that after the 1950s when the DP was in power. They argued that the rationale behind the

former policy was Stalin's pressure, the benefits of US aid, the upgrading of the army with modern weaponry and the education doctrine (Avcioğlu, 1969: 399). Although it was predicated on rapprochement with the West, it shied away from a provocative stance against the Soviets. Had the CHP stayed in power during the 1950s, Yön writers argued it would have resisted the US request for bases and to deploy nuclear weapons, and the intervention in Middle Eastern politics (Avcioğlu, 1969a: 399). The Menderes (DP) government, Avcioğlu further argued, accepted what the US asked at the expense of putting Turkey in a dangerous position (1969a: 399). They called Menderes' foreign policy "comprador diplomacy" since its motto was "everything for the dollar" (Yön, 1965a: 8-9). Comprador diplomacy disguised under the Muscovite threat was more Americanist than Americans themselves (Avcioğlu, 1965: 3). Turkish foreign policy was based on pleasing its allies, particularly the US. This was evident from Turkey's opposition to taking the Algeria question to the UN, its attendance at the Bandung Conference to advocate imperialism, its attitude towards the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and its opposition to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt. Therefore, Avcioğlu argued, the DP's foreign policy turned Turkey into a satellite state (Avcioğlu, 1969a: 399). Menderes missed the fact that the US pursued an imperialist policy and was not bound to assist Turkey. The basic cycle of classical imperialism was to obtain political, economic and military concessions from a state to which an imperialist granted loans, making that state continuously dependent on loans and making concessions. Eventually this undermined Menderes' rule in that when he could not get what he wanted from the US he tried to pit the Soviet Union against the US.

As with the other leftist circles, the Yön circle saw Turkey's relations with foreign capital and imperialism as the main obstacle to Turkey's development and independence (Lipovsky, 1992: 91). Yet, unlike the others, the Yön circle maintained that independent foreign policy came not from establishing good relationship with the Soviets but from seeking solutions to world peace in cooperation with the Third World and outside of any alliances (Çamlı, 1969: 6). To Yön, Turkey "should side with the Third World" (Avcioğlu, 1965: 3) and especially not with the EEC as Turkey could only westernise through economic development and the Turkish

industrial bourgeoisie was then unable to compete with Europe. Joining the Common Market would not westernise Turkey but make it a servant of the West (Bilal, 1963: 16). In the words of Avcıoğlu (1969b: 1, my translation):

The Common Market ... means putting the Turk, who terrified Europe with his belligerency in the past, into the service of wealthy European masters. By this means, Turkey will westernise, not as a master but as a servant.

Similarly the Yön circle saw NATO not only as a military alliance, but also a protector of the capitalist social order (Avcıoğlu, 1969a). As Soysal put it:

While we have a big enemy in underdevelopment, we do not have the right to assign an army of half a million men to the service of NATO so that industrialists in New York, traders in London, money brokers in Paris and ship owners in Rotterdam sleep soundly in their beds. Furthermore, placing in our hands power that operates not according to our national interests but in accordance with great Western interests has resulted in a failure to act even in cases where we were right. (Soysal, 1965: 3, my translation).

The Yön circle complained that Turkey needed a national defence strategy instead of NATO's "flexible retaliation" strategy which did not ensure Turkish security because NATO's strategy was to divert a Soviet attack to the Middle East and away from the US (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 175-190). Moreover, it believed Anglo-American imperialism discriminated against Turkey as it armed "Hellenism" with landing ships, warplanes and new equipment because it saw Greece as a representative of its own interests (Selçuk, 1965: 3). To Yön writers, "The Nation Does It (Millet Yapar)" campaign and the establishment of national forces demonstrated the importance of self-reliance (Selçuk, 1965: 3). They claimed that the great powers only regarded small states that challenged them such as Nasser's Egypt and Tito's Yugoslavia (Avcıoğlu, 1965: 3). The extent that Turkey struggled for independence would mark its place in world politics and get its position accepted by the great powers (Avcıoğlu, 1965: 3). Turkey's position over Cyprus could only be won through "diplomacy" not "use of force" (Avcıoğlu, 1965: 3). Unlike the other circles, they also suggested that Turkey should improve the Turkish Cypriot community's economic conditions because this would provide the community with more security than guarantees in the Zurich and London agreements (Avcıoğlu, 1963: 11). The Yön circle criticised the TIP for

misinterpreting the Cyprus issue as an independence movement for Greek Cypriots (Avcıoğlu, 1966: 3). Yön writers argued that Turkey erred in siding with Western imperialism whose position converged with Hellenic imperialism (Enosis) against Makarios, an advocate of “neutrality” (Yön, 1964c). They criticised Turkey’s stance against amendments to the Zurich and London agreements on the status of Cyprus. Turkey should have accepted constitutional amendments in return for guarantees to improve the Turkish Cypriot community’s economic, cultural and social conditions (Yön, 1964c). Yön advocated abolishing the Zurich and London agreements which they saw as the main obstacles before the socialist camp and the Third World’s support of Turkey’s federal Cyprus solution (Yön, 1964b; Çamlı, 1965).

For Yön, foreign policy should adapt to the changing conjunctures of world politics since there was no permanent amity nor enmity in international relations (Selçuk, 1965c: 3). Therefore Turkey should adjust its Cold War-based foreign policy to the détente of the mid-1960s (Selçuk, 1965c: 3) which emerged when the superpowers agreed not attempt to change their zones of influence (Avcıoğlu, 1967: 3). The Yön circle found Turkey’s establishing relations with the Soviet Union to be positive but timidly inadequate because the US approved of it as stabilising the Middle East (Avcıoğlu, 1967: 3). However, shifts in the balance of power away from the US in the region increased Turkey’s political and military importance. Hence the US forced the conservative AP government, which moved partially away from “satellite” foreign policy, to return unconditionally to this policy (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 17).

Inspired by Third Worldism,⁶⁷ the Yön circle adapted Marxist economist Oscar Lange’s “national revolutionary development” (non-capitalist development) model which stemmed from his empirical observations of some underdeveloped counties, particularly Nasser’s Egypt (Ertan, 1969; Atılgan, 2002a). They tried to find remedies for Turkey’s social and economic backwardness and identify ways to achieve rapid economic and technological development. By regarding the 1920s

⁶⁷ “Third Worldism [is] ... the political theory and practice that saw the major fault-line in the global capitalist order as running between the advanced capitalist countries of the West and the impoverished continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and saw national liberation struggles in the Third World as the major force for global revolution” (Nash, 2002:95).

National Liberation War as the initiator of anti-imperialist decolonisation movements after the Second World War, the Yön circle found connections between Kemalism and Third Worldism. Turkey had blazed a trail for Third World countries, which had been suffering from imperialist oppression, by rising against it and attaining national independence.

Third Worldism was influential in shaping the ideological orientation of the Turkish left in general and “in defining the characteristic form of radicalism” (Nash, 1993: 105) in the Yön circle in particular. Since the Yön circle primarily focused on development and underdevelopment, it was profoundly influenced by the Third-Worldist dependency theory which arose as a reaction against the modernisation theory and contended that “the replication was being blocked by the imperialism of the developed countries” so modern civilisation was only possible through “independence” (Gülalp, 1998: 957). The dependency theory’s “independent development” refers to the coexisting but separate development of underdeveloped societies by escaping from the backwardness that resulted from relations with imperialist developed countries. However, the development fetishism⁶⁸ of the Yön circle made it oblivious to the social property relations that would bring about development. They did not therefore provide a critical interpretation of capitalism. Similarly, how they would solve exploitative production relations and achieve rapid development without exploiting producers remained open questions. Since the problem for Yön was the absence of an “indigenous national industrialisation” not capitalism itself, and since their solution was “protection of the national economy” and the adoption of a capitalist catch-up strategy, they might be dubbed, as Gellner might say, “crypto-Listians” (Gellner, 1995: 7).

Whilst in the Kemalist era of the 1930s Turkish society was classless, unprivileged and homogenous because of its statist economic model, the Yön circle argued that the development of capitalist production relations generated social conflict in the

⁶⁸ An interesting quote from Avcioğlu shows how they were obsessed with development. Uprisings of workers who demanded wage increases, Avcioğlu stated, had been bloodily suppressed by French governments until the Third Republic. No matter how painful from a humanitarian perspective, Avcioğlu argued, this facilitated Western development (quoted in Özdemir, 1986: 202).

form of social injustice (Sertel, Y., 1969). It therefore sought reforms to prevent class conflicts instead of changing production relations (Sertel, Y., 1969). This circle contradicted itself by calling for revolutionary changes in society but balked at pushing class conflicts to a revolution, thereby reducing socialism to “social justice” (Sertel, Y., 1969: 291-292). By advocating social justice by means of non-capitalist development but within capitalist production relations, they in fact unwittingly ended up with a jumbled ideology: “a developmentalist ideology articulated with Kemalism” (Belge, 1993); an eclectic combination of “Kemalism”, “social democracy” and “socialism of underdeveloped countries” (Sertel, Y., 1969: 217-218); “petty bourgeois socialism” (Kıvılcımlı, 1970); or an eclectic combination of “radical” and “moderate” bourgeois reformism (İlke, 1974a: 63).

Their explanations about post-war political and economic transformations in Turkey centred around the premature replacement of petty bourgeois radicalism with bourgeois parliamentarism. The inability of the petty bourgeois rule to change the infrastructure (such as land reform to end feudalism), the mass reaction against failed superstructural revolutions, and the untimely transition to bourgeois parliamentarism were the ruin of the petty bourgeoisie. Without completing the Kemalist revolution by attaining fully-fledged capitalist production relations, Yön writers claimed bourgeois parliamentarism would constantly reproduce rule by reactionary forces (comprador bourgeoisie and land owners) which aimed to maintain an external (imperialism) dependent order. This explanation is predicated on the dichotomy of a “progressive” petty bourgeoisie represented by the CHP and the “reactionary” classes organised in the DP. They did not investigate: the class structure of the CHP before its transition to bourgeois parliamentarism; any continuity between the CHP and the DP which originated from the former; and Turkey’s post-war transformation by interrelating internal and external dynamics. Consequently, they contradicted themselves by claiming the DP was more pro-American although the CHP transformed Turkey’s foreign policy after the war, applied for NATO membership, signed economic and military aid agreements with the US, and benefited from Marshall Aid. Since their revolutionary strategy was petty bourgeois radicalism, it

seems that they interpreted the political history of Turkey through the petty bourgeois lens.

As a reflection of their Third Worldist perspective, this circle gave precedence to “acquisition of full independence” which they saw as necessary for development (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 1). However, its emphasis on “self-help”, “material capabilities” and “relative gain” in gaining and preserving independence revealed realism in their theoretical framework. For Yön leaders, real independent foreign policy lay in protecting national interests by relying on Turkey’s own power. Equally, another realist concept – “balance of power” – was instrumental in their foreign policy analysis because they argued that Turkey had exploited its balance of power prior to 1945 to solve long-standing issues. Like the other leftist circles, the Yön circle often praised Atatürk’s foreign policy, which was built on a balance of power and neutrality. For Yön, Turkey’s paradigm shift from “balance power” to “satellite foreign policy” created a spiral of trade deficits and foreign loans which resulted in a pro-American “comprador diplomacy” instead of Turkey relying on its own capabilities.

Like other leftist circles, Yön writers took the states system for granted and only questioned the place of their state in the system. With their positivist meta-theoretical disposition they first diagnosed a defect (underdevelopment) and tried to solve it through a non-capitalist path of development and a neutral foreign policy. Their target of reaching “the level of contemporary civilisation” meant, in fact, becoming a developed state in the international capitalist system. Despite being dominated by Third Worldist terminology, realism underlay their eclectic framework. But since they did not incorporate the world economy, the states system and domestic class structures in a holistic way, they could not adequately explain international relations and Turkey’s foreign policy shift from a historical materialist perspective.

4.5. The Milli Demokratik Devrim (MDD) Circle

4.5.1. Introduction

Contrary to popular belief, the National Democratic Revolution (MDD) movement was not homogeneous but had two strands: one associated with Yön as discussed above, and the other with the group of Mihri Belli who contested the TKP leadership against Zeki Başımar in the 1950s yet remained outside the party accredited by the USSR (Belge, 1988: 162; Belge, 2007: 33-34). For some scholars, the MDD concept⁶⁹ was formulated by Belli (Aydinoğlu, 2011; Özdemir, 1986) and it did not have any ideological connection with *Yön* (Ulus, 2011:165). He promoted his ideas in *Yön* where he introduced the concept of a national democratic revolution, writing under pen names Mehmet Doğu (1962) and E. Tüfekçi (1966). For others (Atılğan, 2007a: 553), the concept was introduced and advanced by Avcıoğlu, but later adopted by Belli's group, composed of Mihri Belli, Suphi Karaman, Reşat Fuat Baraner, Şevki Akşit, Rasih Nuri İleri, Erdoğan Berktaş, Vahap Erdoğan and so on.

The Yön circle and the MDD movement agreed the main conflict in Turkish society was between the national bourgeoisie (the progressive industrial bourgeoisie) and imperialism and its local collaborators (the trade and agricultural bourgeoisie) (Yerasimos, 1989). Since the so-called counter revolution of the 1950s⁷⁰ ended the Kemalist national democratic revolution, their aim was to complete this unfinished revolution (Yerasimos, 1989). Yet, the MDD differed from Yön in seeing the national democratic revolution only as a compulsory step toward the final goal of socialism, not the goal itself (Belli, 1970). Although Belli and Avcıoğlu seemingly put forward similar arguments regarding the social and economic revolution in Turkey, their ideological formulations differed. The former was a Stalinist Marxist,

⁶⁹ Some associated this term with Şefik Hüsnü, the General Secretary of the TKP from 1925 to 1959. For Akdere and Karadeniz (1994:248), Hüsnü was the originator of this term since he believed that a Kemalist dictatorship that could accomplish a democratic revolution.

⁷⁰ For Belli (1970:101-104), the counter revolution started in 1942 when the Saraçoğlu government took office.

whereas the latter was affected by Marxism but was not a Marxist (Aydınöglu, 2011; Belge, 1985; Aybar, 2014; Sertel, 1969; Kutlay, 1969d).

Since Belli was a convicted member of the illegal TKP, he was not legally allowed to join the TİP; yet his adherents were active members. After the 1965 parliamentary election, however, the MDD circle began to argue that winning power was virtually impossible through democratic elections since most people were not yet enlightened, so they started drifting towards a new option, national democratic revolution (Aren, 1993: 215-6). In the TİP's second convention in 1966 the debate occurred between the leading cadres of the TİP and the MDD clique over revolution strategy (Ünsal, 2001: 6). This debate resulted in rejection of the MDD thesis and dismissal of MDD followers from the TİP (Ünsal, 2001: 7).

The MDD clique, arguing that the underlying structure that ensured the entry of imperialism into Turkey was pre-capitalist production forces, maintained that imperialism could not be replaced by an anti-capitalist struggle (Kutlay, 1969a: 9). As the MDD circle accepted the Stalinist revolution by stages, its leaders objected to the TİP's assertion that Turkey was in one stage of a socialist revolution. Since tying national liberation to socialism would undermine the national cause, the MDD favoured a wide unified front of nationalists against imperialism (Belli, 1967: 5). In a country whose economy, politics, military and culture were under American influence, argued the MDD, revolutionaries should pragmatically conceal their socialist revolution goal and unite a wide group of classes that are not socialist in an anti-imperialist struggle (Belli, 1967:4). Only after accomplishing a national democratic revolution could a socialist philosophy be advanced (Karaman, 1968: 3). The MDD circle sought a democratic revolution to: end imperialist influence and exploitation; break Turkey's military, political and economic ties with imperialism which were incompatible with national independence; nationalise collaborator local bourgeoisie's businesses; and liquidate feudal classes which were an ally of imperialism (Türk Solu, 1968a).

MDD writers considered the TİP's program as a national democratic revolution although they noted the TİP had been anti-imperialist and anti-feudal until the 1965

election. However, the prevailing petty bourgeois clique in the TİP administration attempted to give non-socialist insight to its socialism by naming it “Turkish socialism” (*Aydınlık*, 1968: 93). Contrary to its thesis of uniting anti-imperialist national liberation movements as in Vietnam, the MDD argued the TİP embraced examples such as Yugoslavia which the MDD dismissed as an imperialist counter-revolution in the socialist bloc (*Aydınlık*, 1968: 95).

The TİP blamed the MDD clique for formulating a theory for Turkey’s socialist movement which borrowed heavily from Mao’s analysis of pre-revolution Chinese society in his book *On New Democracy* (Boran, 1969: 2; Selik, 1969a: 12). However the Chinese revolution occurred in two stages, argued the TİP, since Chinese society combined colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal elements. Mao combined the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist struggles since he saw the feudal class as the most significant social support for imperialism in China (Somer, 1969: 13). The TİP accused the MDD followers of deliberately overstating the significance of feudalism in Turkey’s social structure to validate their national democratic revolution thesis (Somer, 1969: 13), and of portraying imperialism and capitalism as two distinct phenomena to justify the two-staged revolution (Çulhaoğlu, 1970: 4). Strikingly, in the mid-70s Belli was critical of the MDD: its faults precipitated the 1971 coup (Emekçi, 1974b: 19); it failed to take root in the working class but was preoccupied with academic debates; and it failed to organise a proletarian party. He confessed their journal *Aydınlık* was ideologically inconsistent because it published articles hostile to the movement’s ideology thereby unwittingly allowing other factions to grow in their ideological garden (Emekçi, 1974b: 19-20).

The views of the MDD circle were first reflected in *Yön*. Upon its closure in 1967, the group established its own weekly journal *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left) which remained active until 1969 when it started the monthly journal *Aydınlık* (Enlightenment), which remained active until mid-1971. They also published the booklet *Milli Democratic Revolution* (Türk Solu, 1968) to give insight about national democratic revolution. The factions that stemmed from the MDD will be analysed in

the next chapter; here only the MDD's interpretation of the world order and Turkey's place in it will be explored through an in-depth analysis of these publications.

4.5.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

Drawing heavily on Lenin's imperialism theory, they defined the current world order as an age of transition from capitalism to socialism as national liberation movements and socialist revolutions dealt a blow to imperialism (Aydınlık, 1968a: 1). In the imperialist age, those who monopolised finance capital – the merger of industrial capital with banking capital – dominated the capitalist state and produced state capitalism (Aydınlık, 1968a: 2). Imperialist countries exploited pre-capitalist nations through lending and exporting industrial capital in return for obtaining interests and profits (Aydınlık, 1968a: 2). Imperialism created a dependent social and economic structure in pre-capitalist societies which it exploited (Aydınlık, 1968a: 3). Imperialist exploitation hampered capital accumulation and thus prevented the development of national industries in the underdeveloped world (Erdost, 1968: 5). Local collaborator bourgeoisies which could not compete with the metropolitan industrial bourgeoisie became agents of imperialism. Moreover, imperialism allied with the feudal classes to preserve a pre-capitalist dependent social structure. However, under capitalism's uneven development law the balance of power shifted among imperialists and required two world wars to repartition the world market (Aydınlık, 1968a: 3).

In the face of national liberation movements after 1945, argued the MDD circle, imperialists employed "neo-colonialism" to conceal exploitation: imperialists conferred sovereignty and political independence on exploited countries, but in reality the latter's economy, political power and armies served imperialism. The system reproduced itself with the help of the collaborator bourgeoisie and international organisations. The MDD saw the post-war world as composed of the socialist camp, the capitalist camp and non-aligned countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (Aydınlık, 1968a: 5). After the war the establishment of socialist camp covering one third of the world confined imperialist exploitation (Aydınlık,

1968a: 4), thus creating a rivalry between these camps. The US, with nuclear weapons and the world's most powerful army, dominated the capitalist camp and sought to halt the expansion of the socialist camp by encircling it through aggressive pacts such as NATO, CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS (Aydınlık, 1968a: 5). Imperialism controlled resources and labour through political and trade agreements, claimed the MDD, and opposed the nationalisation of the market and the withdrawal of any national market from the world capitalist chain. To the MDD circle, NATO protected imperialist interests in the market and hindered nationalisation (Erdost, 1968: 5).

The MDD asserted that imperialist camp maintained its political and military unity until the 1960s when European imperialism had recovered from the Second World War sufficiently to challenge the US (Aydınlık, 1968a: 6; Aydınlık, 1968: 113). European imperialism founded the Common Market as a new form of “collective colonialism” to expedite the concentration of production and capital in its member states and increase the competitiveness of their monopolies against US monopolies. However, the MDD argued that divisions began to occur in the Common Market such as France's objection to Britain's accession to the Common Market because it saw Britain as controlled by American capital so it would pull France down *vis-à-vis* American capital. For the MDD, this demonstrated that imperialists could never compromise their contradictions. It claimed that the economic balance of power shifted in the imperialist system depending on the imperialists' struggle to share the world market (Aydınlık, 1968: 114). The MDD stated that chronic US foreign trade deficit broke up the Bretton Woods system which was grounded on stability of the dollar and sterling (Aydınlık, 1968: 110). The US overcame its trade deficit by minting money without having the equivalent gold, thus cheating the countries in the system. In retaliation, France translated its \$900 million in reserves into gold so as to undermine the US dollar (Aydınlık, 1968a: 15). The MDD blamed this inter-imperialist struggle for market and economic superiority as causing the crisis in the world monetary system (Aydınlık, 1968: 113).

Although US economic dominance was threatened by Japan and the Common Market countries, MDD followers argued that US military hegemony was still intact (Aydınlık, 1968a: 16). However, from 1960 the emergent nuclear balance between the superpowers and the development of long-range inter-continental ballistic missiles profoundly changed US military strategy to a “flexible response”. MDD writers argued this led France to drift away from NATO’s military wing because it thought the US abandon the defence of Europe to ensure its own security (Aydınlık, 1968a: 17). Nevertheless, they argued that when imperialism was threatened, imperialists put aside their differences. Thus the 1968 student movement and the ensuing working class movement in France united all imperialist powers to help France’s bourgeoisie thereby maintaining the imperialist group (Aydınlık, 1968a: 36).

As to the socialist camp, they argued that it preserved its unity till the early 1960s when the Soviet Union and China diverged over the dominant contradiction in the world and the scope of peaceful coexistence (Aydınlık, 1968a: 6). The USSR claimed that the dominant contradiction occurred between the socialist and capitalist camps, whereas China argued it was between suppressed nations and imperialism (Aydınlık, 1968a: 7). The former supported fighting a socialist struggle in capitalist countries and suppressed nations, while the latter argued it was inapplicable to relations between suppressed nations and imperialism, and to the proletariat and bourgeoisie relations in capitalist countries (Aydınlık, 1968a: 7). Concomitant with its foreign policy thesis of “peaceful coexistence”, argued the MDD, the USSR formulated the concept of “non-capitalist development” between 1956 and 1961 for the peaceful transition to socialism both in capitalist and suppressed countries (Alpay, 1968). The non-capitalist way was not a third way but a transitional step to socialism bypassing the capitalist development stage in the countries where capitalism was either underdeveloped or undeveloped (Alpay, 1968). Unlike other circles, the MDD circle argued that non-capitalist development was only suitable for countries without industry (Belli, 1967: 5).

The MDD circle characterised the developments in Dubcek's Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a counter-revolution to turn Czechoslovakia into a Yugoslavia-like pseudo-socialist country (Aydınlık, 1968a: 9). It did not regard Yugoslavia as socialist because its neutrality was actually alignment with capitalism (Aydınlık, 1968a: 10). It asserted that the centre of the revolutionary movement switched to Asia, Africa and Latin America because the main contradiction of the late 1960s happened between the suppressed nations and imperialism (Aydınlık, 1968a: 11). Imperialism fabricated propaganda that portrayed the main contradiction as occurring between socialist-capitalist developed countries and underdeveloped countries in order to prevent anti-imperialist movements from pursuing the right revolutionary line (Aydınlık, 1968a: 12). The MDD criticised peaceful coexistence for being based on cooperation with imperialism, and argued that socialist states should support anti-imperialist movements (Aydınlık, 1968a: 14).

In the new imperialist age, argued the MDD, the contradiction between capital and labour was replaced with contradictions between the underdeveloped nations and developed imperialist nations (Erdost, 1968; Konur, 1968). Thus the "national question", *i.e.* the nationalisation of the market that was under imperialist occupation and the removal of the national market from the world capitalist chain (Erdost, 1968: 5), gave a nationalist character to this age (Konur, 1968). At the same time, the war against imperialism, seen globally as the cause of national impoverishment, contained a class element. Consequently, nationalism and socialism were inseparable (Konur 1968: 1). The bourgeoisie lost its revolutionary power in the imperialist age when it became an agent of the monopolies, hence it lost its nationalist character (Belli, 1970). Therefore, in the imperialist system the exploiter countries' bourgeoisie was cosmopolitan, whereas exploited countries' bourgeoisie was national (Erdost and Kaymak, 1971: 296). In MDD thinking, when the industrial bourgeoisie refused to share its national market with the imperialist bourgeoisie, it retained its nationalist character (Erdost, 1968). The proletariat was the vanguard of nationalisation in colonies and dependent countries, so it was profoundly nationalist whilst achieving national independence and internationalist in dismantling imperialism. In this imperialist age, internationalism and nationalism were separate

but complementary (Konur, 1968; Erdost, 1968a: 6). The MDD often used nationalist⁷¹ rhetoric to create a wider united front against imperialism, particularly US imperialism.

The MDD circle placed Turkey in this world order in accordance to its relations with imperialism. Like others, they thought Turkey had pursued an independent foreign policy from the beginning of the republic until 1945, and saw a break from this line in foreign policy after the Second World War.⁷² While other leftist circles pointed to Soviet land claims and its threatening stance after the Second World War as the main reasons for allying with the West, the MDD treated the paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy as a cause rather than an effect of relations with imperialism. Baraner, for instance, argued that its post-war foreign policy made Turkey increasingly dependent on imperialism (Baraner, 1968: 4). Nevertheless, some attributed the shift to economic difficulties. For instance, Yıldız defended Turkey for accepting US help against Stalin's aggressiveness while grappling with a severe economic depression and a political crisis (Yıldız, 1968:16). Although they acknowledged that the CHP launched the paradigm shift in foreign policy, they distinguished between the CHP and the DP in terms of their pro-American attitudes (Türk Solu, 1968b). They asserted that CHP leader İnönü was a nationalist who could not be compared with DP leader Menderes who was a traitor who sold out Turkish interests to the US (Türk Solu, 1968a).

During the first national liberation war of the 1920s, the MDD circle argued the working classes led by the petty bourgeoisie fought against imperialists, their servant Greek army, non-Muslim collaborator bourgeoisie, the Calipha and some feudal elements. After winning the war the petty bourgeois bureaucrats could not continue the anti-imperialist struggle due to absence of a "national bourgeoisie" (Aydınlık, 1968a: 20-21). They saw the Kemalist revolution as an uncompleted "national

⁷¹ To justify this rhetoric they often cited an excerpt from French socialist Jean Jaurès to make clear the relationship between nationalism and internationalism (Belli, 1967a; Erdost, 1968; Türk Solu, 1968: 1).

⁷² For Belli (1970: 101-104), the counter revolution started in 1942 when the Saraçoğlu government took office.

democratic revolution” because it could not achieve land reform or nationalise foreign trade, but pursued capitalist development to create a “national bourgeoisie” in the age of imperialism (Erdost and Kaymak, 1971: 289). Since the working classes did not have class consciousness, the petty bourgeois bureaucrats had no choice but to join with the weak Turkish bourgeoisie, yet this alliance never had an anti-feudal quality (Aydınlık, 1968a: 21). Thus the republican administration was composed of the upper layer of petty bourgeoisie bureaucrats, the nascent bourgeoisie and, on a limited scale, feudalism (Aydınlık, 1968a: 21). However, the Kemalist revolution allowed reactionary factions to develop, argued the MDD circle, which ousted the Kemalists from power when they gained strength and thus Turkey became a semi-dependent country (Erdost and Kaymak, 1971: 298).

To the MDD, imperialism separated national and non-national classes in societies which had yet to realise a national democratic revolution (Aydınlık, 1968a: 22). With imperialism, a contradiction appeared between the bourgeoisie, land owners and petty bourgeois bureaucrats (Aydınlık, 1968a: 22). The bourgeoisie that profited during the war collaborated with international monopoly capital to further exploit the working classes. This alliance collaborated with the land owners that gained more profits during the war (Aydınlık, 1968a: 23). The inability of the petty bourgeoisie to effect radical reforms (such as land reform) ended in its defeat by imperialism. Upon the petty bourgeoisie’s attempt to gain popular support through “land reform” and “village institutes”, the big land owners, profiteering bourgeoisie and imperialism forced the CHP to accept a multiparty system. The CHP gave birth to the DP and both parties fought for US favour. The CHP lost due to its past anti-imperialist record (Aydınlık, 1971: 276). The MDD argued the alliance of imperialism collaborator bourgeoisie and feudal land owners increasingly controlled the state from 1946, (Aydınlık, 1968a: 23). From 1946 to 1950 a political struggle occurred between the CHP and the DP both of which represented imperialism and its collaborators’ interests (Aydınlık, 1968a: 23). To the MDD, the counter revolution which began with the multiparty system was clinched by the 1950 election (Aydınlık, 1971: 276). Each party’s ideological orientation became clear: the DP represented the collaborator classes whereas the CHP represented the petty bourgeoisie (Aydınlık,

1968a: 23). Both in the early 1920s and 1960s when the petty bourgeois bureaucrats seized power, argued the MDD circle, they could not ally with the working classes because the latter did not have a class consciousness.

The collaborator bourgeoisie and the feudal land owners seized power from the petty bourgeoisie through a counter-revolution, and accepted the demands of imperialism in return for handouts after the Second World War, thus pursuing a satellite foreign policy. Imperialism dominated Turkey's economy through goods and capital exports. Imperialism seized the national market, minerals and resources, earned vast profits through foreign direct investments in assembly industry and consumer goods industries, and transferred their profits to imperialist centres (Aydınlık, 1968a: 24). Turkey became an underdeveloped producer of industrial raw materials with collaborator classes dependent on imperialist exploitation and the repression of national democratic forces to keep Turkey capitalist, debt-addicted, submissive to US Middle East policy and opposed to the socialist camp (Aydınlık, 1968a).

The MDD circle argued that Turkey had a pivotal place in world politics from geopolitical and military strategic perspectives (Türk Solu, 1969: 6). As Turkey was close to both the USSR and the Middle East the US granted Turkey membership in NATO, hence Turkey became an outpost of American imperialism while remaining unable to protect its security (Erdost and Kaymak, 1971). The MDD saw NATO as "the buttress of the parasitic classes that have a stake in keeping Turkey in the imperialist system as a dependent country" (Belli, 1969: 3). Imperialism so dominated Turkey that "it cannot wage a war in line with its national interests unless imperialism allows it to do so" (Erdost, 1968: 5). MDD writers therefore argued that Turkey should prepare a national defence strategy considering its geopolitical position, demographic features, economic conditions, rich natural resources, likely enemies, national character and so on (Karaman, 1967: 2).

Similarly, they drew attention to the disappearance of the original reason for Turkey's participation in NATO (the so-called Soviet threat) and questioned why Turkey still remained in NATO despite improving relations with the Soviet Union

(Türk Solu, 1967a: 2). They argued that if Turkey left NATO it could follow an independent foreign policy based on its national interests (Türk Solu, 1968b: 1). If it did not leave, Turkey could not determine its enemies or use weapons provided by its “allies”. They challenged putting Turkey’s army under NATO control because “predicating national defence and security on a great power is untenable” (Yıldız, 1968: 16). They also argued that NATO created dangers not security for Turkey which should leave NATO and solve its “national causes” from a national perspective (Türk Solu, 1967a: 2). The MDD shared the TİP’s and Yön’s views⁷³ on US bilateral agreements and military bases in Turkey and did not offer any new arguments.

The MDD differed from the TİP in its treatment of the Soviet Union. Although the MDD circle rejected the claims that it pursued a pro-Soviet line, in its journal *Türk Solu*⁷⁴ MDD supporters disclosed their pro-Soviet views whilst criticising the TİP circle. For instance, Akşit criticised the TİP for insisting that the internal political and economic order of a great power is not important because small states are always forced to sacrifice their independence when entering an alliance. Akşit argued that internal order matters since socialist countries, no matter their size, do not exploit other nations so cannot be treated like imperialist countries (Akşit, 1968: 4). Revolutionaries cannot regard the USSR and the US as the same (Akşit, 1968a; Türk Solu, 1968c). Relations with these superpowers should be assessed separately in terms of Turkey’s national interests (Türk Solu, 1968d). In order to sustain political and economic dependency, imperialism provided Turkey with credits only for light industry and prevented the latter’s attempts to establish heavy industry. However, the USSR was not imperialist but rather supported industrialisation to enable underdeveloped countries to become independent. Başar pointed to the congruence of interests between Turkey and the Soviet Union by showing how Turkey’s aim of rapid industrialisation matched the USSR’s economic system. Turkey as an

⁷³ The MDD circle gave considerable place to the articles on this issue in *Türk Solu*. See for instance Ali, (1968); Belli, (1969); Tunçkanat, (1969).

⁷⁴ They stressed that standing against American influence did not mean consenting to become a satellite of Russia (e.g. Türk Solu (1969a)).

independent, industrialised, truly democratic state free from external interference would reassure the Soviet strategic position (Başar, 1968: 4).

With regard to Cyprus, like other circles the MDD argued that the underlying issue was that British imperialism wanted to keep its bases there since it had interests in the Middle East (Fegan, 1969: 287). Therefore it used the classical “divide and rule” policy to prevent an anti-imperialist front by creating an artificial conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Fegan, 1969: 287). The MDD circle claimed that the UK sought to protect its bases in Cyprus by Enosis – uniting Cyprus with Greece (Aydınlık, 1968a: 35). Unlike other circles however, the MDD circle used provocative nationalist language to urge the government and the army to deploy in the island at least as many troops as Greece in defiance of US warnings. Neither US imperialism nor the Greek junta could afford to prevent Turkey from doing this, claimed the MDD circle, because Turkey had superior military and psychological power (Türk Solu, 1967b: 1). However, this view was not unanimous in the MDD circle. Akşit, for example, asserted that the Cyprus issue was between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and Anglo-American imperialism, therefore Turkey should “abstain from a Greco-Turk conflict” and “struggle against the real enemy” (imperialism) (Akşit, 1968b: 8). Some thought of Cyprus in connection with Turkey’s membership in NATO, arguing that it could not be resolved unless Turkey quit NATO (Türk Solu, 1967c: 1). But overall the MDD circle advocated an independent Cyprus free from foreign military bases to provide security and freedom for Turkish Cypriots and fit neatly with Turkey’s national interest (Türk Solu, 1967d: 1).

This circle proposed an independent, neutral, anti-imperialist and internationalist foreign policy and a “national” security policy that included closing US and NATO bases, quitting NATO and signing a non-aggression pact with the USSR and other socialist countries (see Karaman, 1967: 2).

MDD writers analysed the world order and its impact on Turkey to justify their national democratic revolution strategy (İlke, 1975: 140). Inspired by the dependency school, their main premise was the replacement of the contradiction between capital

and labour with that between underdeveloped and developed imperialist nations. Third Worldism was much praised in their discourse as it was likened to the Turkish trailblazing national liberation war. They focused on exploitative relations between states at the system level but ignored them at the unit level because their revolution strategy needed the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Imperialism and capitalism were two distinct phenomena to justify their two-stage revolution (Çulhaoğlu, 1970: 4). They saw imperialism as an external force and ignored the fact that the bourgeoisie coalesced with imperialism (Kıvılcımlı, 1970).

To the MDD, imperialism exploited underdeveloped countries through its alliance with local bourgeoisie and pre-capitalist classes to hinder development of an industrial bourgeoisie, hence capitalism, in the underdeveloped countries. Thus the MDD circle construed Turkey's political history in accordance with the existence or absence of a collaborative bourgeoisie class in power. The petty bourgeois rule in the republic's first two decades was shown as an imperialism-free period and Turkey was said to pursue an "independent foreign policy" with friendly relations with the USSR until the emergence of a collaborative bourgeoisie in the early 1940s. Its leaders saw Turkey's relations with imperialism in the mid-1940s as the "rational choice" of the collaborative bourgeoisie, though this voluntarism contradicted their systemic approach. The post-1945 changing "configuration of relations of production, social classes and the state" (Yalvaç, 2014:120) was considered a "counter-revolution" and politics was simply reduced to the power struggle between the "progressive" petty bourgeoisie and the reactionary collaborative bourgeoisie and land owners. They associated the petty bourgeoisie with anti-imperialism but could not explain why it gave in to the collaborative classes and shifted its foreign policy towards imperialism in the post-war era, or why it did not change the collaborative classes' foreign policy strategy when it seized power in coups. Although they acknowledged that the petty bourgeoisie's CHP vied with the collaborators' DP for imperialism's favour, they depicted DP as a subcontractor of imperialism to lure the petty bourgeoisie to the anti-imperialist front.

They mistakenly assumed that getting rid of American bases, bilateral agreements, NATO and so on would eject imperialism from Turkey (Kutlay, 1970: 6). Consequently, like Yön, the MDD circle reduced foreign policy formation to external factors (dependency relations between capitalist-imperialist developed states and the underdeveloped countries. They prioritised the anti-imperialist struggle because they reduced global imperialism to unequal exchange relations so an anti-imperialist national democratic revolution would end Turkey's underdeveloped and dependent status (İlke, 1975: 137).

The MDD modelled Turkish revolutionary strategy on the Chinese revolution without taking into account the different social structures of these societies (Boran, 1969: 2; Selik, 1969a: 12). Inspired by Maoist China, the MDD described Turkey as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country under imperialist tutelage, thus overstating the significance of feudalism in Turkey's social structure to validate their national democratic revolution thesis (Selik, 1969a: 13). MDD followers advocated an anti-imperialist struggle under the leadership of military-civil cadres on the basis of "nationalism" and abstained from using "socialism" to broaden the anti-imperialist front. However, since this contradicted the MDD's socialism position, they reconciled their nationalist stance with socialist internationalism by frequently citing French socialist Jean Jaurés.

The MDD stressed "national pride" in their socialist order and in joining the "first class nations" (Belli, 1970: 96) as a powerful influential state in the international hierarchy. This can be better explained by their appreciation of a rightist French President De Gaulle (Türk Solu, 1968e; Karaman, 1968a). The MDD followers praised De Gaulle for his "nationalist" and "realist" foreign policy in accordance with French national interests; but their anti-US preoccupation prevented them questioning what French national interests represented. They acknowledged that De Gaulle favoured the bourgeoisie in domestic politics, yet they strangely believed he would align his domestic politics with his anti-American foreign policy. Contradictorily, the MDD earlier argued that no government can have a bourgeois

domestic policy and an anti-imperialist foreign policy because each government has only one policy (*Türk Solu*, 1968f: 1).

The MDD's analytical framework also suffered from eclecticism. Relations between the socialist and capitalist camps used the "logic of anarchy" while interstate relations in the capitalist camp used the "logic of capital". Applying the "logic of anarchy" to geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers revealed "an empiricist epistemology based on an eventist conception of foreign policy" (Yalvaç, 2014: 120). To explain states' foreign policies, each issue of *Aydınlık* analysed foreign affairs based on observable current internal and external political events such as diplomatic visits, agreements, trade relations and arms deals. This revealed the epistemological implications of a positivist meta-theoretical stance in their analytical framework. Besides, "the ontological implications of positivist assumptions" (Wight and Joseph, 2010: 17) manifested themselves in their assumptions about unitary actors (states) engaging rationally under the guiding principles of *realpolitik*.

However, the MDD employed the "logic of capital" to overcome the "reified social ontology" of "logic of anarchy" in analysing "the exploitative basis [the international capitalist system] underlying" the states system (Wight and Joseph, 2010: 17). Strongly influenced by system theory and functionalism, they saw imperialism as a system in which "all behaviours, relations and goal" were "defined from the need of system maintenance" (van der Pijl, 2009: 149). The system required underdeveloped countries to run its unequal exchange relations with imperialist countries and it determined their policies through its local allies (van der Pijl, 2009: 149). The MDD proved this assumption by examining how the CHP was ousted by imperialism in the mid-1960s due to differences over Cyprus. Consequently, MDD writers asserted that Turkey pursue an independent foreign policy and achieve industrial development by leaving the imperialist system. State capitalism would bring socialism to Turkey so they considered 1930s Turkey to be closer to socialism than 1970s Turkey (Kıvılcımlı, 1970: 117).

The MDD's lack of a holistic analytical framework that considered international capital accumulation strategy, geopolitical position and dominant class relations with the state and international capital meant their theoretical framework was weak to explain the world order and the historical development of Turkey's foreign policy from a historical materialist perspective. Although the MDD circle set out to analyse the explanandum from a historical materialist viewpoint, their interpretation contained contradictions. Since it interpreted the rising of France against the US as anti-imperialism, it thought Turkish foreign policy should be patterned after the "realist" and "nationalist" French foreign policy.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter found that given the emergent state of détente among the superpowers, the government was lenient vis-à-vis the socialist movement compared to its aggressive stance against socialism and the repressive measures put into place against any signs of communist activity in the preceding era. With the introduction of a new constitution under the military junta, the anti-communist atmosphere faded away and socialists were able to freely establish a socialist party, publish journals, and translate Marxist classics. There was also an increase in anti-American sentiment because of the Cyprus dispute, which increased people's interest in foreign policy. Socialist journals, particularly *Yön*, were the main platforms used to discuss international relations and foreign policy issues, and they were central to expressing anti-American sentiment for an anti-imperialist front on the basis of nationalism. In contrast to the previous period, numerous works on international relations were produced.

One of the main findings of this chapter indicated that the foreign policy analyses of the socialists of 1960s were based on an eclectic approach that combined two different and contrasting positions: Marxism and realism. The realist understanding of foreign policy became manifest in their conception of "national interests". Although they argued that national interests were used by the dominant classes to veil the social relations underlying changes in foreign policy, in the end the issues

that they criticised and proposed were the same, i.e. the realist account of national interests. For the socialist circles, national interests needed to be free from the interests of any particular class but should reflect the “general will” of all—“the survival” and “well-being of the nation”. In this way, the TKP differed from the others because it identified the national interests of Turkey by staying neutral between two camps in line with the dictates of Soviet *realpolitik*. Since turning Turkey into a socialist country would be a difficult task, it was argued that staying neutral would be the optimal choice so that the Soviet Union could break the capitalist encirclement.

In socialists’ accounts of foreign policy, national interests were key to becoming a powerful state and taking an “honourable position” in the international hierarchy. This can be better explained by socialists’ appreciation of French president De Gaulle, a rightist politician (see for instance Yön, 1965; Sabri, 1964; Türk Solu, 1968e; Baş, 1967b; Baş, 1967d). By defining national interests as being immune to class interests, like realists the socialists tried to “conceptualize foreign policy as an autonomous level of political activity” (Yalvaç, 2014: 4). They claimed that a state’s survival was endangered when the interests of the dominant classes overreached national interests. The transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy in the post-World War II era was often held up as an example of this in the socialist literature. For those thinkers, the ideological preference of the dominant classes pushed Turkey into the US orbit by drifting apart from a traditional policy of a “balance of power”, thereby endangering Turkey’s national interests for the sake of their own interests. Just like the realists, the socialists claimed that a state should act according to its national interests “lest the survival of [the state] be in jeopardy” (Waltz, 1979:134), so states themselves had to secure their interests, as they could not expect that task to be carried out by another state or through a common security pact. In that way, it was argued that smaller states should avoid military and political alliances and protect their national security with their own forces, otherwise they would find themselves in a difficult situation, like the one Turkey faced during the Cyprus dispute in the mid-1960s.

Again like the realists, the leftists of the 1960s placed greater emphasis on “relative gains”⁷⁵ in the formation of foreign policy, which led them to be preoccupied with “nationalism” and “independence”. Socialists’ interest in “nationalism” was not only based on their realist perspective but also their Third Worldist perspective, which became manifest in their concerns about why Turkey was underdeveloped and how to find remedies for the country’s social and economic backwardness and ways to achieve rapid economic and technological development. In this period, in one way or another each socialist group employed notions from various strands of the dependency school. Baran’s thesis had a major influence in the Turkish left’s analysis in terms of how the left identified political structures, socio-economic structures, and consumption and production patterns, with an emphasis on the comprador bourgeoisie. They championed the concept of “neo-nationalism”, which was modelled on a “non-capitalist path of development” (Dinç, 1965: 23) as a means of extracting the national market from the world capitalist chain. According to the socialists, underdevelopment could only be countered by economic independence from the capitalist-imperialist world system and a number of radical reforms (such as land reforms, financial reforms and the nationalisation of banking, insurance and foreign trade). As a result, Turkey would become more prosperous and an increase in income would guarantee “social justice”, as had occurred in Western capitalist states. Socialism was therefore seen by the leftists of the 1960s as a model for “rapid national economic development” and a strategy for reaching the level of Western capitalist countries. In effect, “the level of contemporary civilisation” was seen as corresponding to the level of Western capitalism, but the leftist discourse deliberately refrained from employing such terms.

However, the development fetishism of the Turkish left of the 1960s rendered the movement oblivious to the social property relations that would bring about development. Since they reduced capitalism to imperialism, they created the false

⁷⁵ In realist thinking, a state’s priority in the self-help system is to seek its own survival and security by maintaining its power position in the system (Waltz, 1979:91). The power of states is measured in terms of their relative capabilities; therefore, states aim to “prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities” (Grieco, 1990:39), and they are “preoccupied with relative gains” (Reus-Smit, 2005:191; see also Donnelly, 2005:38). Therefore, the realist approach favours balancing over bandwagoning because the former pursues relative gains (Donnelly, 2005:38).

impression that the production relations of their development model were not capitalist. Since they equated capitalism with industrialisation, markets, and trade, they were preoccupied with the production side of capitalism and ignored its “disabling, exploitative and undemocratic” aspects (Rupert, 2007: 152). That form of development fetishism drove the socialists to use Marxism “to protect late industrialisers by providing them with a national political shell” (Gellner, 1995: 13). Due to their desire for development, they did not offer a critical interpretation of capitalism. Their plan was to first set up industrial capitalist property relations and emancipation from exploitation would then follow. Similarly, how the left would solve exploitative production relations and how it would achieve rapid development without exploiting producers remained open questions.

The socialists analysed the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy strategies after the Second World War in terms of the shift in those social classes who took control of the state apparatus in order “to use it to promote particular class interests” (Jessop, 2007: 147). The general trend in the socialist literature was to describe the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy in parallel with the transformation of the trade bourgeoisie, which had become stronger during the war years, into a comprador bourgeoisie. For the socialists, the changing internal structure of society and changing class relations from 1945 to 1960 led to the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The Yön, MDD and TKP circles concluded that the main conflict in Turkish society was between the national bourgeoisie (the progressive industrial bourgeoisie) and imperialism and its local collaborators (the trade and agricultural bourgeoisie). Since the so-called counter revolution of the 1950s supposedly came close to ushering in an end to the Kemalist national democratic revolution, their aim was to complete that revolution. However, the MDD and the TKP differed from the Yön in seeing the national democratic revolution only as a compulsory step toward socialism, which was the ultimate goal, whereas the Yön considered socialism to be equal to developing and advancing the Kemalist revolution. Similarly, the TKP differed from the MDD in the sense that it did not ascribe a leadership role to the petty bourgeoisie given that it misled the revolutionary movement in the early 1920s.

In contrast, for the TİP the main conflict in Turkish society was between the exploited classes and the capitalist class who owned the means of production as either direct or indirect allies of imperialism. While the Yön and the MDD circles reduced foreign policy to external factors (the unequal relations between capitalist-imperialist developed states and underdeveloped countries) and the TKP connected it to the requirements of Soviet realpolitik, the TİP conceived of foreign policy as being related to the domestic social classes and their relations with imperialism. However, this was not the sole view within the TİP. The structuralist view held by the Aybar clique attributed the shift in the global division of labour to the designs of imperialist forces for the post world order. This structural change relegated Turkey to the role of a satellite country. In a similar way, the Emek clique argued that the shift in paradigms which had occurred in Turkish foreign policy after 1945 was the result of a change in imperialism. Classical forms of imperialism, which had dominated until 1945, led to the emergence of relatively “independent” units in the world capitalist system, meaning that the CHP could pursue a form of foreign policy that was more or less neutral; however, with the expansion of socialism and a rise in national liberation movements, the “new imperialism” that came into being in the post-war era called for the existence of “dependent” units to pave the way for the development of capitalist production relations in underdeveloped countries and to make sure that the proletariat did not come to power. Thus, the CHP had no choice but to opt for a foreign policy that took into account the country’s satellite status. However, it should be pointed out that such “functionalist” views which reduced the domestic and foreign policies of nation-states to the system’s own demands (van der Pijl, 2009: 149) shunted aside the fact that “systemic pressures were mediated by states” and were “responded [to] by social classes within states” (Teschke, 2016).

The TİP reduced that change to a “single determinant” of explanandum logic “within a complex set of structural relations” (Wight and Joseph , 2010: 19) regardless of whether or not they took up a voluntarist or structuralist perspective. As a result, in a manner similar to the other socialist circles in existence, all of the factions of the TİP tended to ignore “class as a causal ‘nexus’ between the capital accumulation strategy and the state’s geopolitical strategy”, and they did so either by overemphasizing the

issue of agency or by brushing it aside (Apeldoorn, 2014: 13). Socialists paid no attention to the close relationship that existed between the global accumulation strategy, i.e. “a strategy for the realisation of a specific growth model” (Jessop, 1990: 198) and hegemonic projects. Therefore, this led them⁷⁶ to misinterpret Kemalism’s position vis-à-vis capitalism: most of them saw it as anti-imperialist and to a certain extent anti-capitalist; some (Avcıoğlu, 1969; Belli, 1970) even thought that it very close to socialism. They separated the development of capitalist property relations from the “geopolitical dimension of any hegemonic project” (de Graaff and von Apeldoorn, 2011: 407), such as its vision regarding the world order and Turkey’s position therein.

Socialists overlooked the connection between the rise of the Keynesian accumulation strategy in the West and the transition from liberal economic policies to statist policies in Turkey in the 1930s, as well as the concomitant rise of liberalisation in Turkey and the Fordist accumulation strategy that became prominent around the world after the Second World War. They assumed that “neutrality” had been adopted as a foreign policy objective by Kemalists and that a “satellite foreign policy” had been implemented by the DP government without bowing to any particular structural influence. For that reason, they were unable to explain the relationship that existed between the rise of the new Fordist accumulation strategy and the İnönü administration’s attempts to link the Kemalist hegemonic project to an emerging strategy to overcome the crisis of hegemony brought about by the incongruence between strategies of accumulation and the hegemonic project. They therefore offered a contradictory account of foreign policy formation in Turkey; while on the one hand they saw the “neutral” foreign policy of Kemalism as being in the general interest of everyone, on the other hand they argued that the foreign policy of Turkey after 1945 reflected the particular interests of the dominant classes, even though both policies were pushed forward by CHP governments that championed the Kemalist hegemonic project.

⁷⁶ It has to be noted here the only exception was Kızılcımlı who depicted this era as the beginning of monopoly capitalism and integration of bourgeoisie with imperialist system (see Kızılcımlı, 1970; Kızılcımlı, 2007b).

Notably, in spite of their harsh critiques of the creation of forms of national interest in the post-Second World War era, they did not say anything about how those interests would be formulated when socialism was established, whose interests would be taken into account, how the nation's interests were articulated prior to the Second World War, or whose interests were prioritized in the pursuit of neutral foreign policy from 1923 to 1945. This was mainly because of the traditional juxtaposition of the Turkish left with Kemalism and socialists' alliance with the petty bourgeoisie in their pursuit of a bourgeois democratic revolution; for that reason, the socialists purposefully avoided a critical analysis of the Kemalist era. Given the Kemalists' successful articulation of certain particular interests as a project that took into account general interests⁷⁷ through "material concessions and symbolic rewards to subordinate social forces", the socialists claimed that the pursuit of foreign policy objectives set out by such a hegemonic project represented "the interests of the nation as a whole" (Jessop, 1983: 100). Drawn in by the Kemalist hegemonic project, the leftists failed to see that "the pursuit of this 'national-popular' programme favours the long-term interests of the hegemonic forces" (Jessop, 1983: 101); in fact, they saw it as "the pursuit of non-class objectives" (Jessop, 1983: 109).⁷⁸ Instead of seeing the post-war transformation in Turkey as a passive revolution that could "organise the superstructure in line with structural developments" (Joseph 2002: 33), they regarded the DP's rise to power as a "counter-revolution" and held it responsible for the establishment of US imperialism in Turkey.

In this way, the TİP offered some differing views which differed from the prevalent counter-revolutionary views. Aybar and Boran interpreted the DP's rise to power as the people becoming conscious and seizing power from the petty bourgeois bureaucrats. However, they contradicted themselves by praising the coup of the 27th

⁷⁷ For a detailed analysis of this concept see Jessop, 1983 and Jessop, 1990.

⁷⁸ This actually verifies how Kemalists were successful in making the people believe Turkish society was classless, unprivileged and homogenous. As M. Kemal put: "We do not have classes that struggle with each other for their interests. Existing classes are necessary for each other. Therefore the CHP tries to ensure rights, welfare and the progress of classes... The CHP involves not a part but the whole nation" (quoted in Cem, 1970: pp. 302-3).

of May which toppled the DP government and provided a constitutional order that was conducive to the realisation of socialism. The Emek clique was the only group which saw the DP's rise to power as "transforming pre-capitalist production relations into Western-style capitalist production relations" (Kutlay, 1969: 10), and thus the transformation of foreign policy was perceived to be a means of adapting developing capitalist production relations to the changing nature of imperialism in the post-war era. The CHP lost power to the DP because it had started to fetter the development of capitalist production relations (Selik, 1969: 10).

Because of Marxism's inability to develop its own analytical framework for "foreign relations" (van der Pijl, 2007: viii), socialist circles analysed the world order and Turkey's place therein through eclectic theoretical frameworks that combined Marxism and realism with meta-theoretically ontological and epistemological assumptions that varied in their explanations of international relations. They therefore explained the world through unobservable social structures in a non-positivist stance, but they also attempted to predict world politics through empirical regularities in the "balance of power" with a positivist epistemology. What they attempted to do was combine the social relational ontology of Marxism and the atomistic ontology of realism within one framework of analytics. Through the use of Marxist analyses that focused on the inequality and exploitation that underpinned the existing system of states and realist power politics that focused on foreign policy developments that were tangible, they argued that the state should be bolstered as it struggled to survive in an anarchic system. As such, the particular frameworks they employed could not take into account the world economy, the state system, and domestic class structures in a manner that was holistic, and as a result they could not adequately explain international relations from a historical materialist perspective.

CHAPTER 5

THE STUDENT MILITANCY OF 1968-73

This chapter analyses how Turkey's student militancy movement interpreted the world order and Turkish foreign policy from the 1968 student protests to the end of the movement in 1973. The introductory section summarises the period's main external and internal political developments as well as the origins of student militancy among Turkish leftists. Student militant groups are then discussed and their views on the "the post-war world order and the paradigm shift in the foreign policy of Turkey" are critically examined, as are the relationships between their theoretical frameworks and IR theories, as well as the meta-theoretical basis of their theoretical frameworks.

5.1. Introduction

From 1968 to 1973, the world bore witness to a number of major events, including but not limited to the Vietnamese defeat of the US in the 1969 Tet Offensive, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the development of a détente between the superpowers, the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system, the devaluation of the US dollar, the student protests in France and their worldwide expansion, the resignation of French President De Gaulle following the student protests, the increasing antagonism between China and the Soviet Union and the rapprochement between the US and China, Mao's China becoming a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, the diminishing public presence of the US military and civil staff in Turkey, the signing of the Turkish-American Joint Defence Cooperation Agreement in 1968, the opium poppy plantation crisis that strained relations between Turkey and the US from 1968 to 1971, the decreasing popularity of the Worker's Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*, TİP) following the 1969 elections, the biggest workers' protest to occur in Turkey (in June of 1970), the devaluation of the Turkish currency in August of 1970, the toppling of the AP government by a military coup in

March of 1971 and subsequent technocrat governments that held power until 1973, the suppression of the leftist movement following the coup, and the constitutional amendments that restricted what had been a relatively free political environment (Gönlübol *et al*, 1987; Oran eds. 2013).

In the 1960s international socialist movement, the rivalry between the USSR and China over the character of revolutions (i.e., a peaceful transition or armed struggle) had a remarkable impact on the development of student militancy in Turkey. Considering the Cold War, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) opposed armed struggle since it could lead to a new world war, whereas China advocated setting the world on fire as its motto was “a single spark can start a prairie fire”. CPSU support for parliamentarist pacifism for the communists in developed countries and progressive putschism and non-capitalist development for backward countries drove the revolutionary youth to Maoism and Guevarism (Altınoğlu, 2006). The youth preferred the voluntarist perspective of the latter over the structural and objectivist viewpoint of the former (Çubukçu, 2002:60).

Successful examples of armed struggle against imperialism in different parts of the world (such as Palestine, Vietnam and Latin America), Che Guevara’s call for the creation of more Vietnam-like revolutionary successes in 1967 and the suppression of the Turkish leftist movement through both legitimate (courts or police) and illegitimate means (paramilitary groups backed clandestinely by the state) all lay behind the 1971 revolutionary beginning (Samim, 1981; Altınoğlu, 2006; Kürkçü, 2007; Aydınoglu, 2011). For the generation that participated in the 1968 student movement, the Vietnam People’s Liberation Army defeat of American imperialism encouraged the genesis of a guerrilla movement in the form of a “people’s war” against imperialism that stressed “people’s liberation” (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994:300). However, the idea of a protracted people’s war was ruled out in favour of a “quicker route to revolution” grounded on “Guevarist ideas of urban-guerilla focoism” in the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO)) and the People’s Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C)) examples and “rural guerrillas” in the Communist Party

of Turkey-Marxist Leninist (Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist Leninist (TKP-ML)) example (Samim, 1981:71; Erkiner, 2007; Laçiner, 2007). Books written on the focoist guerrilla movement such as Régis Debray's *Revolution in the Revolution* (1968), Douglas Bravo's *National Liberation Front* (1969) and Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (1969) were immensely popular among leftist students (Kürkçü, 2007).

In the 1960s, young leftists belonging to student unions or “ideological clubs” (*fikir klüpleri*) who tried to “learn socialism on their own” (Zileli, 1994:10) brushed aside the debates among intelligentsia as “idle talk” (Çayan, 2013; Kaypakkaya, 1976) and embarked on developing a class consciousness among the proletariat and peasant masses (Karadeniz, 1975). As Karadeniz, one of the student leaders of the 1960s, pointed out, the youth became more socialist whilst dealing with issues pertaining to the country, such as the protection of underground resources—particularly oil—against imperialist exploitation, the establishment of heavy industry, abolishing the assembly industry, and being an “honourable” nation that enjoyed independence within the given system (Karadeniz, 1975: 7, 8). Towards the end of the 1960s, however, as they understood that “mobilising the popular masses” was not easy to achieve in the short term, they favoured “hasty and simplistic solutions” such as a “vanguard war” which they thought would be followed by a “progressive coup” (Zileli, 1994:5-6).

Between 1960 and 1965, the youth movement was a progressive movement that was committed to Atatürk's principles and the 27th of May movement, and it associated “development” with “freedom” (Karadeniz, 1975: 35). From 1965 onwards, the youth sought to analyse “development” from an “economic” perspective, and socialism started to take root within the youth movement (Karadeniz, 1975: 55). In 1965, ideological clubs that had been established at various universities formed the Federation of Ideological Clubs (*Fikir Klüpleri Federasyonu* (FKF)) (Lipovsky, 1992; Ünsal, 2001; Ünüvar, 2007). Until the end of the 1960s, the FKF remained under the influence of the TİP and supported its position on the indivisibility of socialist and national democratic goals in Turkey (Lipovsky, 1992; Ünsal, 2001;

Ünüvar, 2007). From 1967 onwards, the youth started to look at every issue through the lens of class politics and sought to learn more about Marxism (Karadeniz, 1975: 220-224), and leftist students held peaceful protests against American imperialism. In 1968 and 1969, student socialists were bolstered by their belief that they had a solid grasp of Marxism and they thought that it was time to engage in a power struggle (Karadeniz, 1975: 246), and hence student militancy was a foregone conclusion. The theory of socialism did not attribute a seizure of power to student socialists, and as Karadeniz argued, this can be seen as a kind of Young Turk (*Jön Türk*) tradition (Karadeniz, 1975: 229). In addition, the crisis in the TİP leadership about how to approach the Czech invasion in August 1968, the failure of the TİP in the 1969 general election, its passive position on mass mobilisation and its discouragement of the student movement following the May 1968 student riots in Paris (Samim, 1981; Lipovsky, 1992; Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994; Akin, 2007; Ünüvar, 2007; Gürpınar, 2011), and the MDD circle's call for student socialists to join in a power struggle (Karadeniz, 1975) all drove leftist youth inexorably to putschist circles (MDD and Yön).

At its October 1969 congress, the FKF renamed itself “the Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey” (Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu (Dev-Genç)) and broke with the TİP, despite hitherto “acting as a youth branch of it” (Ünüvar, 2007:824). Since the FKF leadership was held by MDD advocates, it came under the influence of the MDD circle (Lipovsky, 1992:118). Dev-Genç was the first student organisation to promote revolution (Ünüver, 2007:830), but it failed to form a united body as its various students groups argued over tactics and methods for a national democratic revolution (Lipovsky, 1992:119). Eventually the disputes led to the emergence of several factions of student militancy.

Turkish leftists have admitted that they have always appealed to petty bourgeois radicalism⁷⁹ because of the long-standing petty bourgeois dictatorship and hence its

⁷⁹ This was evident from the writings of the leading leftist figures of the era. For instance Kılıncımlı, originally coming from the TKP tradition but later changing to an independent path, formulated theses of history stressing the role of the army in a revolution (Laçiner, 2007: 531). “In Turkish history almost all revolutions were done by the army. The army has always saved the underdeveloped

ascendancy in the state apparatus (Çayan, 2013[1978]:357; Atılgan, 2007a:567; Somay, 2007:649). In line with this historical tendency, the MDD and Yön circles espoused the same revolutionary strategy based on petty bourgeois radicalism: “progressive” military officers would take power by a *coup d’état* (Kaypakkaya, 1976:211). Whereas the Yön circle agitated among radical officers in the army, MDD leader Mihri Belli organised its power base in Dev-Genç (Samim, 1981: 70). Dev-Genç was one of the tactical tools of Belli’s revolutionary strategy: student militancy would prepare the ground for the national democratic revolution (Kaypakkaya, 1976:211) and the radical officers would accomplish it by a *coup d’état* (Samim, 1981; Kürkçü, 2007; Ünüvar, 2007).

Avcıoğlu tried to legitimise the guerrilla movement initiated by the student militants by stating that for Atatürk, who was one of the first to use the word, “guerrilla meant the liberation weapon of oppressed nations in their fight against imperialism” and “the Liberation War started also as a guerrilla movement” (Avcıoğlu, 1971d: 1). And if this legitimate movement was supported by the army, argued Avcıoğlu in his editorial in the weekly *Devrim*, then “it would turn out to be an invincible power” (Avcıoğlu, 1971e: 1). Avcıoğlu objected to the TİP circle calling student militancy “adventurism” because he said the rationale behind this movement was not the adventurism of daredevil youngsters but their legitimate revolt against severe economic and social depression. To Avcıoğlu, the era of manifestos, meetings and demonstrations had been replaced by guerrilla war as the only route to liberation (1971d: 1). On the other hand, Kızılcımlı, a prominent figure among older leftists, labelled Belli and Avcıoğlu as careerist, opportunist socialism traders and accused them of inciting “armed struggle at once” and exploiting “revolutionary excitement” among the youth (Kızılcımlı, 1971a). Kızılcımlı argued that student militancy was

countries that were locked in economically and socially as a striking power” (Kızılcımlı, 1970:187). He continued to argue that nowhere else in the world were the youth and the army as closely involved in social revolutions as in Turkey (Kızılcımlı, 1971). In a similar vein, Doğan Avcıoğlu tries to bolster his radicalism by referring to Atatürk’s statement “when the Turkish nation wanted to take a step for progress it has always found its revolutionary army as the vanguard of this step” (Avcıoğlu, 1971c:18). Likewise Çayan echoes Kızılcımlı’s ideas: “The history of revolution in Turkey is in a way the history of petty bourgeois revolutions.” (Çayan, 2013: 88).

deliberately designed by imperialist intelligence services which incited “left adventurism” by plotting sabotage and bank robberies (Kıvılcımlı, 1971b).

In the literature, there are opposing views on the nature of the 1968 youth movement. While some argued the worldwide focus of this movement was “anti-American imperialism” (Zileli, 1994:2), others pointed to the differing stances in Turkey and in the West. To Erten, for instance, the differences between the student movement in the West and in Turkey (Erten, 2007: 839) outweighed the similarities. In the West, the student movement constituted a turning point for questioning the establishment, it criticised the Communist Parties which became a part of the established order, it desired direct democracy and it took part in anti-war actions. In Turkey, however, it did not question authority or the state but rather who was controlling the state and so it tried to put the state, which had been derailed by imperialism, on the right track to complete the modernity project (Erten, 2007: 837-840). Due to the “prevailing dogmatism” of the Turkish socialist movement the “’68 youth movement in Turkey took an anti-American imperialist stance”, whereas “Western youth in a critical way rose against” all forms of organisation, including “the bourgeois order and Soviet bureaucratism” that destroyed freedom (Aybar, 2014:550). Similarly, Ünüvar contrasts the two movements: while the Western one rose against power, questioned society and took a negative stance against Communist parties, the latter supported independence from Western imperialism while pursuing the development level of Western civilisation (2007:831). As a result, Gezmiş, one of the leaders of the Turkish student movement, argued that student movements in developed countries sought “emancipation in sexual and societal relations”, those in underdeveloped countries sought “independence of their countries from imperialism” (THKO, 2000:11).

However, irrespective of their differences, scholars of this period all agreed that the 1968 student protests globally were all “anti-American” and “anti-imperialist”. In this anti-imperialist environment, Turkish student militant factions also believed in the existence of revolutionary conditions in Turkey. Therefore the “1971 revolutionary beginning” was widely accepted as a “break with the 50-year-long

socialist movement of Turkey” (Altinoğlu, 2006; Kayaoğlu, 2006) which had expected the dominant classes (the petty bourgeoisie) to evolve Turkey into socialism (Kayaoğlu, 2006). In their break with the revisionism and reformism of the TKP tradition and its off-shoots, which were seen as “incapable of leading the proletariat to the conquest of power” (Quartim, 1970:65), the youth “discovered a reliable guide” in the Latin American guerrilla war (Quartim, 1970:66) or in the Maoist people’s war.

5.2. Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment (PDA) Circle

5.2.1. Introduction

This clique was created by a group of assistants from the Political Science Faculty and Law School of Ankara University (such as Doğu Perinçek, Erdoğan Güçbilmez, Cüneyt Akalın, Ömer Madra, Halil Berktaş, Şahin Alpay) and a group of students (including Gün Zileli, Atıl Ant, Ömer Özerturgut, Bora Gözen, Oral Çalışlar, Hasan Yalçın and Ferit İlsever) (STMA, 1988:2189; Ersan, 2014:53). They held positions on the editorial boards of the MDD journals *Türk Solu* and *Aydınlık* and wrote articles in defence of a national democratic revolution. However, although they remained in the MDD movement, over time they left the national democratic revolution line and became affiliated with Maoism. In 1969 they founded an illegal party, the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi* (TİİKP)), based on Maoist ideas (Perinçek, 1988:2186). This clique “called themselves ‘proletarian socialists’” to differentiate themselves from the MDD (Lipovsky, 1992:114) and they criticised the MDD in line with their Maoist views. This group was known as *Aydınlık*, the TİİKP and the PDA, with *Aydınlık* being the most commonly used term starting in 1974.

Şahin Alpay’s article “On the Order of Turkey”, which was published in *Aydınlık*, was the last straw, as it drove these Maoists away from the MDD movement. Alpay challenged the MDD about its revolutionary strategy which was predicated on the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie (precisely the military-civil elites). He asserted

that, given the unreliable nature of the petty bourgeoisie, unless a vanguard of the proletariat was in place a democratic revolution would not translate into socialism. Alpay criticised Avcıoğlu, a leading figure in the Yön circle, for assuming that the petty bourgeois revolutionaries had an ideology, their own class objectives and a consistent revolutionism (Alpay, 1969: 468). Contrary to Avcıoğlu, Alpay asserted that the petty bourgeois revolutionaries had a social base but lacked the active support of the masses during both the national liberation war and the 27 May Movement (1969/12:469). The military-civil elites, because of their class nature, could not pursue a consistent revolutionary line as they would always align with imperialism sooner or later (Alpay, 1969/12:470). İnönü's staggering behaviour towards imperialism since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 best exemplified the inconsistent nature of petty bourgeois revolutionism (Alpay, 1969/12:468).

Subsequently, under the leadership of Doğu Perinçek, this group split from the MDD towards the end of 1969 and began a new journal *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlik* (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment (PDA)) as an alternative to *Aydınlık*, (Kaypakkaya, 1976; Samim, 1981; Lipovsky, 1992; Aydınoglu, 2011; Laçiner, 2007). However, Çalışlar, a leading figure in this clique, argued that the TİİKP's ideology developed over time as it learned Maoism while preparing its daily newspaper, *İşçi-Köylü* (Worker-Peasant), which started publication in the summer of 1969 (Çalışlar, 1988:2194). They also published "an illegal journal *Şafak* (Dawn) as following the 1971 coup" the other journals were closed down (Ersan, 2014:54). Compared to other factions within the student movement, this clique was the most productive intellectually.

Notwithstanding their strong emphasis on a people's war under the leadership of a proletarian party, "their blind side was a lack of militancy" (Samim, 1981:77). This was apparent from the departure of one group in 1971 and then the Kaypakkaya schism in 1972 (to be spelt out below) (STMA, 1988:2193). With revolutionary movements rising globally, argued the PDA, conditions in Turkey were conducive to strengthening the revolutionary struggle (1970a: 440). The PDA therefore called for a socialist congress in 1970 to bring together all the fragmented socialist sects to

discuss the long-standing/chronic problem, namely political organisation, of the Turkish socialist movement (PDA; 1970a: 440). However, this initiative failed. Eventually, following the March 1971 *coup d'état* almost all TİİKP activists were jailed by court martial in June 1972 except for some leading figures such as Ömer Özerturgut, Bora Gözen, Cengiz Çandar and Şahin Alpay who had gone to the Palestine guerrilla training camps (STMA, 1988:2193). Its activities came to a halt until the 1974 amnesty.

Whilst in prison they prepared a joint written plea which was both their answers to the allegations by the military prosecutor and their theses on international politics and Turkish politics from a historical perspective. Furthermore, it would constitute the foundation of their revived organisation after the 1974 amnesty.

5.2.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

A detailed analysis of this clique's journals and its plea in terms of its views on the world order and Turkish foreign policy shows that their thoughts are nothing more than a re-organised version of 1960s leftist literature to bring it into line with their Maoist views. Nevertheless their thoughts differed from this literature in some respects. First, in the analysis of the Kemalist era they primarily relied on the thoughts of Şefik Hüsnü, then the leader of TKP, on the class nature of the Kemalist regime. In this way, unlike the MDD and the Yön circles' writings, they claimed to expose the "real" class character of the regime. They argued that the anti-imperialist national liberation war was waged by the peasants under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie (TİİKP, 1974:146,147). The national bourgeoisie rose against imperialist occupation in order to survive. In this sense the national liberation war was a struggle of survival for the national bourgeoisie and some landlords (TİİKP, 1974:147).

The TİİKP attributed the cessation of the bourgeois democratic revolution to the development of the Kemalist bourgeoisie which had already reconciled with imperialism by signing the Lausanne Peace Treaty (1974:163). Although Kemalist

rule was a petty bourgeois rule, the big merchant bourgeoisie and the industrial bourgeoisie actually controlled it (1974:163). The more the Kemalist bourgeoisie grew the more it compromised with imperialism (1974:165). The Aydınlık circle attached particular importance to the İş Bank (Business Bank) circle in this respect. For instance, the İş Bank circle collaborated with British and French imperialists so Turkey participated in the Balkan Pact and the Saadabad Pact which were designed to safeguard British interests (1974:179). Improving relations with imperialism meant turning its back on Soviet friendship. This aloofness towards the Soviet Union eventually turned into hostility and anti-communism became the foundation of Turkish foreign policy (1974:179). After the death of Atatürk, the İş Bank circle retreated and the bureaucrat bourgeoisie, which collaborated with German imperialism, rose to power. From then on, claims the Aydınlık circle, İnönü's fascist dictatorship began to rule Turkey and adopted a pseudo neutrality policy which actually served German imperialism's expansionist ambitions (1974:179).

The TİİKP published a series of articles by Dr Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, a veteran socialist, called "Deccal nasıl kapımızı çalıyor? [How is Deggial knocking on our door?]" in its journal PDA; however, later Kıvılcımlı dubbed the Aydınlık circle as "CIA socialism". Kıvılcımlı saw as a fairy tale the assertion that Turkey pursued neutrality during the Second World War because of the astuteness of the President İnönü. He maintained that in an imperialist war an underdeveloped country like Turkey could not remain neutral unless imperialism decided it should (Kıvılcımlı 1970a: 149). In other words, the structure of imperialist system casted Turkey in the role of being neutral during the war. Consequently, this "neutrality policy" brought Turkey into the orbit of American imperialism after the war (Kıvılcımlı, 1970a: 149). But, strikingly when it came to Atatürk's era, his structural analysis faded away. He maintained that Mustafa Kemal clearly came out against imperialism and Turkey emerged (1970a: 149).

Another point of difference with the common leftist interpretation of Turkish political history was their analysis of the power shift in 1950 when 27 years of uninterrupted CHP rule ended and the DP rose to power. Contrary to the common

leftist assumption, the Aydınlik circle asserted that this was not a “counter-revolution” that put an end to petty bourgeois rule, but a handover of power from one clique of imperialism collaborators to another (1974:186). Like Avcioğlu, they argued that after the war the fascist dictatorship of İnönü approached American imperialism to secure its rule. This was congruent with the US Middle Eastern and Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical strategy to establish attack bases against socialism and the rising peoples’ movements (1974:183,184). In this win-win deal, American imperialism forced Turkey to introduce a multi-party regime so the big trade bourgeoisie, which had close relations with imperialism, and the landlords would come to power on their own. The multi-party regime was the maintenance of the dominant classes’ dictatorship (1974:185). They channelled the hatred and discontent of the masses in the “right direction” away from regime change (*e.g.* a socialist revolution). Consequently, the CHP fascist dictatorship, which lost credibility in the eyes of both the dominant classes and imperialism and was hated by the broad masses, lost power in the 1950 election to a DP composed of those sections of the dominant classes that were the most loyal to imperialism (1974:186).

The Aydınlik circle’s interpretation of the post-Second-World-War transformation of Turkey was basically the reiteration of known leftist theses. They argued that Turkey came under the yoke of American imperialism which defined Turkey’s development path as an agricultural country in accordance with the international division of labour (1974:187). American imperialism gained control of Turkey’s rich natural resources and internal market and turned Turkey into a source of cheap resources (1974:189). Whilst already having an economic stronghold in Turkey, American imperialists began to exercise political and military domination as well. The entire state apparatus and the army became dependent on the US via NATO, bilateral agreements, military aid and other methods. Turkey grew into an auxiliary gendarmerie force of American imperialism in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean (1974:276). Likewise, the Aydınlik section regarded the agreements with the European Economic Community (EEC) as new capitulations which increased the imperialist exploitation of Europe over Turkey. Not only was Turkey an open market for the European monopolies to sell their overproduction, but it was also unable to exercise its

sovereign rights and was instead obliged to conduct its international relations in line with the EEC (1974:308).

Contrary to the picture of the imperialist system painted by the leftist tradition, the Aydınlık clique included the Soviet Union among the imperialists. It accused the Soviet Union, in which the revisionists replaced the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the monopolist bureaucrat bourgeoisie, of being an accomplice of the US (1974:281). Although the clique critiqued the Soviet Union for being social imperialist in its approaches, its understanding of socialism, like the MDD and TİP, concurred with the Soviet account of socialism as a means of development. While their explanation of the operation of imperialism squared with the dependency concept, their main concern was the poverty of the dependent nations *vis-à-vis* the metropolitan countries. Imperialist exploitation operated through unequal trade relations, credit and aid, capital transfers and so forth, consequently hindering the industrialisation of backward countries and keeping them backward (1974:292) and economically, politically and militarily dependent. As long as the dependency continued, “independent development” for underdeveloped countries was impossible (1974:297).

So, to achieve industrial development and catch up with developed capitalist states, the dependency on imperialism had to be abolished and the revolutionary struggle was redefined as an anti-imperialist struggle. They all converged on the same concept of revolution: abolish dependency on imperialism, abandon the EEC and other imperialist institutions, annul agreements that created dependency, and nationalise banks, insurance companies and foreign trade (1974:316) to achieve independent development. Their socialist economic order was actually “autarchy”.

The last difference was over Kurdish policy. Contrary to the dominant nationalist current in the left, the Aydınlık circle maintained that the backwardness of the Kurdish region stemmed from a long-lasting systematic and conscious policy of class exploitation and domination by the Turkish ruling classes (1974:343). The circle

therefore advocated Lenin's principle of self-determination to give the Kurdish people the right to determine their political fate.

This clique's criticism of the MDD circle and the leading cadre of Dev-Genç⁸⁰ centred around three issues. First, the PDA advocated worker-peasant initiatives instead of the MDD's petty bourgeois radicalism⁸¹ and the youth movement's focoist adventurism (Perinçek, 1988:2186). The PDA circle rejected an internationalism subject to the national interests of the Soviet Union. Perinçek claimed that its internationalist stance was evident in the PDA's support of Kurds in the face of nationalist suppression (Perinçek, 1988:2186). Unlike the MDD, the PDA clique pointed to "the danger of capitalist restoration in socialism" and thus underlined the importance of a proletarian dictatorship in the foundation of socialism (Perinçek, 1988:2187).

The PDA group identified three different revolutionary lines: modern revisionism's (the USSR's) non-capitalist way, the Latin American (or the Castro-Guevara-Debray line) socialist revolution and the Maoist national democratic revolution (Alpay, 1970: 367; Berktaş, 1970). Modern revisionism's non-capitalist way was predicated on a national democratic revolution led by the military-civil intelligentsia. After achieving a democratic revolution, this class would adopt socialism for some time. Countries which applied this strategy eventually gave in to imperialism, became pacifist, were trapped in parliamentarism (Berktaş, 1970: 298) and, even worse, restored capitalism as was the case with Algeria and Egypt (Alpay, 1970: 386). They criticised the Soviet Union on the ground that it opposed a people's war as a spark which might ignite a nuclear war (PDA, 1970b: 266-67).

⁸⁰ The main targets of the PDA circle were Mihri Belli, the leader of the MDD movement, Mahir Çayan and Yusuf Küpeli, who increasingly dominated Dev-Genç, the union of student movements. The PDA clique called them "İlkesiz Birlik Cephesi (Front of Unprincipled Unity)" (Perinçek, 1988:2186). The PDA circle accused this front of detaching the socialist movement from the masses (Çalışlar, 1988:2194).

⁸¹ Although this circle distinguished itself from the MDD movement by attributing the primary revolutionary role to the proletariat, it also still optimistically expected young army officers to participate in an anti-imperialist struggle (see PDA, 1970c: 342; PDA, 1970d: 5-8).

They criticised the Latin American guerrilla foco for being an army of petty bourgeois intellectuals advocating armed struggle against imperialism (Berktaş, 1970: 321; Alpay, 1970: 367). This characteristic, argued Berktaş, detached it from the masses (Berktaş, 1970/2:321). A revolution could only be possible where objective conditions (the existence of a proletariat) coexisted with subjective conditions (the development of a proletariat class consciousness). Hence, raising consciousness was significant to a revolution as nothing could stand against the organised and conscious power of the people (PDA, 1970c: 345). Thus the PDA saw an aware population as more powerful than nuclear weapons because it made history. Consequently, they claimed to advocate a revolutionary line which was grounded on scientific socialism and held true for all exploited countries. They challenged the MDD's attempt to invent a revolutionary strategy peculiar to Turkey (Berktaş, 1970:296). The right way was to adopt the only accurate revolutionary line and synthesise it with the actual conditions existing in Turkey (Berktaş, 1970/2:296). The right strategy, argued Alpay, was a Maoist national democratic revolution which was recommended for all those countries that were dependent on imperialism and still had the remnants of feudalism (Alpay, 1970/3:357). This method of revolution was formulated in light of a combination of principles of scientific socialism and concrete practices from the Chinese revolution, and was successfully used in the Vietnamese revolution (Alpay, 1970:357). This method conducted the national democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat and the peasants were the basic force, whereas Belli's MDD movement confined the revolutionary movement to the youth movement and relied mainly on the petty bourgeois intelligentsia to power the revolution, ignoring the revolutionary power of the people (Alpay, 1970: 354-357). The PDA clique's concept of a national democratic revolution was not only to end American imperialism in Turkey and introduce land reform but also to clear away capitalism and the remnants of feudalism and remove all the obstacles in the way of the transition to socialism (Alpay, 1970: 386). It advocated "the ceaseless revolution theory" (Alpay, 1970: 387) while the MDD movement placed a "Chinese wall" between a national democratic revolution and socialism because a national democratic revolution did not guarantee socialism.

They also criticised the MDD movement for reducing the difference between “genuine” Marxists (China) and the modern revisionists (USSR) to a difference over nuclear strategy (Alpay, 1970/3:354). For the PDA circle, the ideological struggle between the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Soviet Union was not about classes as claimed by Belli but about the proletariat (represented by the former) versus the bourgeoisie (represented by the latter). The bureaucrats, who gained strength due to defects in the construction of socialism, usurped power after Stalin’s death and liquidated the proletariat dictatorship (Perinçek, 1970/10:483). Thus the Soviet Union turned into monopolist state capitalism controlled by the bureaucrat bourgeoisie (Perinçek, 1970/10:484). They cited Lenin to support this argument: “the rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie”⁸² (1970/8:265).

The PDA clique, like the other leftist groups, defined the structure of Turkey as “semi-feudal and semi-colonised”. Nevertheless in their definition of imperialism the PDA differed from the others by defining it as both an external and an internal phenomenon since imperialism used external exploitation mechanisms placed in an internal structure (Berktaş, 1970/2:315). Because of its relation to imperialism, Turkey became a semi-colonised country which was militarily and politically sovereign but dependent in economic terms (Perinçek, 1970/10). This relationship with imperialism generated a retarded capitalist structure that impeded the development of an independent capitalism. Consequently, the PDA identified four basic contradictions: between imperialism and the people; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; the great masses and semi-feudal classes; and contradictions within the dominant classes (TİİKP, 1974:500). They specified the contradiction between the great masses and semi-feudal classes as the principal contradiction. They put the struggles against imperialism and capitalism in different historical periods and saw

⁸² However this excerpt, in fact, belongs to Mao Zedong. It is a statement Mao made in August 1964 (quoted in editorials of the *People’s Daily*, *Red Flag* and *Liberation Army* (1970) “Leninism or Social imperialism?”, Foreign Languages Press: Peking, p.14. It can be accessed on (<http://www.bannedthought.net/China/MaoEra/GreatDebate/LeninismOrSocial-Imperialism-1970.pdf>).

the working class as the “vanguard” and the peasants as the “primary force” against imperialism (TİİKP, 1974:503; Alpay, 1970/3; Berktaş, 1970/2).

The Aydınlik circle’s analysis of international politics and Turkish foreign policy was grounded on an eclectic combination of realist geopolitics and dependency theory, which was underpinned with Chinese foreign policy objectives. Parallel to Chinese policy in the early 1970s, the circle placed emphasised the revolutionary struggle against US imperialism and harshly criticised the Soviet Union for improving relations with the US and supporting US foreign policy initiatives (see for instance PDA, 1970e: 177-184). Like China, the Aydınlik sect saw American imperialism as “the prime enemy of the world’s peoples” and defined revolution as “hostility against American imperialism” (Alpay, 1969: 472). They rightly objected to an internationalism which was merely disguised Soviet national interests but, in a contradictory way, they defended Chinese national interests as internationalism.

Although they analysed the world order with a bias towards China to justify their foreign policy objectives, they became bogged down in realpolitik. Along with its Third World narrative of the world order, the Aydınlik circle viewed international politics through realist geopolitical thinking which saw “geopolitical change as a function of the rise and fall of great powers” and “the uneven distribution of power across the system’s conflict units” (Teschke, 2003:4). Its interpretation was grounded in the Sino-Russian confrontation so the Soviet Union was a social imperialist threat to the Third World. Their understanding of international politics centred on Chinese foreign policy objectives and altered in line with any paradigm shift in Chinese foreign policy. As will be seen whilst analysing the post-1974 era, in the mid-1970s the increasingly hostile relations between China and the USSR had an overwhelming influence on the Aydınlik circle’s views of the world order. This sect engaged in fierce debates with other cliques on the USSR’s position in the world order from 1974 onward.

In addition to realism, geopolitics, “the determining influence of geographical location on political decisions and interests” (Lacher, 2005:48), took its place in the

debate between leftist circles. Geopolitics was discussed within the context of the geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and China in the conduct of the revolution. In this debate, Perinçek accused the Çayan-Küpeli group (the Front of Unprincipled Unity) of determining the principles of revolution according to the proximity of one of the big churches of socialism. Given the distance between Turkey and China, the Çayan-Küpeli group thought China could not provide logistical support to Turkish revolutionaries so they should rely on the Soviet Union and should ignore its defects (such as social imperialism, capitalist restoration and improved relations with American imperialism) (Perinçek, 1970/10:488-89). Perinçek asserted that principles of revolution were universal and could not change in accordance with a country's geopolitical position although he accepted its importance (Perinçek, 1970:489).

When it came to Turkey's position in the world order, the Aydınlık sect and the other leftist groups described Turkey as an underdeveloped country dependent on imperialism and so had backward capitalism and feudal and semi-feudal modes of productions (PDA, 1970f: 427). Turkey was portrayed as a cheap resources depot for imperialism. Although imperialism enabled economic development of underdeveloped countries to a certain extent, it constrained their development to a greater extent to keep them dependent on imperialism (PDA, 1970f: 430). As a result, the Aydınlık clique diagnosed Turkey's basic economic problem as the "constrained development of the productive forces". Since Turkey had been politically, economically, militarily and culturally dependent on imperialism, a policy change that aimed at rapidly increasing the development of the productive forces was economically impossible (PDA, 1970f: 427). The only way to solve this problem was to ensure "independence" from imperialism. They adopted "autarchy" as an economic model and "neutrality" as a foreign policy objective. Consequently, like the other leftist groups, the Aydınlık sect praised the Kemalist era of the 1930s in which Turkey had experienced a remarkable rate of development because of statist economic policy. They thought that Kemalist foreign policy, predicated on the principle of neutrality, enabled Turkey to achieve "independent capitalist development".

Against this background, after the Second World War Turkey embraced a capitalist development model dependent on imperialism. In the period of 1945-50, a non-inflationary development model was adopted; however this model resulted in a very slow rate of development. Aydınlik depicted the 1950 election as a watershed in Turkish political economic history, since a paradigm shift occurred in the development model. With the coming of the “collaborator bourgeoisie” to power in 1950, they introduced an inflationary development method and implemented it with “a fancy of independent capitalist development” under the tutelage of imperialism (PDA, 1970g: 242).

This interpretation implied that Turkey had pursued “independent capitalist development” for some time. As they equated imperialism with US hegemony in the post-war era, the structural analysis of imperialism in their interpretation began after 1945. This gives the impression that Turkey was free from the influence of imperialism prior to 1945. Even in this structural picture they emphasised voluntarism to account for the transformation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy. They attributed a transformative role to the rising bourgeoisie in changing Turkey from neutrality to collaboration with imperialism. They did not approach the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the post-war era by reflecting on the “reorganisation of the superstructure in line with structural developments” (Joseph, 2002:33) because they were oblivious to the global capital accumulation process and its likely impact on domestic accumulation strategy. Therefore their works offered only partial explanations about Turkish foreign policy. They were content with surface appearances, thus did not go beyond such developments at the empirical level as the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan aid and bilateral agreements with the US to determine which deeper structural relations transformed Turkey’s foreign policy and to explain how and why they came about.

5.3. People's Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO)

5.3.1 Introduction

After the FKF became Dev-Genç in October 1969, some leading student movement figures such as Hüseyin İnan, Sinan Cemgil and Yusuf Arslan (all from the Middle East Technical University (METU) Socialist Idea Club) broke away to organise an armed struggle against American imperialism so the revolutionary struggle could follow the creation of a revolutionary proletarian party (STMA, 1988:2168). Unlike the Cuban experience, they proposed the precedence of army over party: the army would create the proletariat party (STMA, 1988: 2168; Akın, 2007). They therefore criticised both Dev-Genç and the MDD movement for supporting parliamentary pacifism and embraced a focoist guerrilla war (Çubukçu, 2007:724; Akın, 2007). Some students led by Hüseyin İnan went to the Palestine Liberation Organisation's camp in October 1969 (STMA, 1988:2168). After receiving guerrilla training, the idea of starting a rural guerrilla movement crystallised in this group.

After his return from the PLO camp in the summer of 1969, Deniz Gezmiş had tried unsuccessfully to generate interest in a guerrilla war (Ersan, 2014:38). He was arrested in December 1969 and was held in prison until October 1970 (Ersan, 2014:38). Upon his release, he and friends from İstanbul participated in Hüseyin İnan's group that deployed at the METU dormitories (STMA, 1988:2168). Contrary to popular belief, the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluşu Ordusu (THKO)) was not founded by Deniz Gezmiş but by Hüseyin İnan in October 1970 (STMA, 1988:2168) with the aim of freeing Turkey from American imperialism and making it fully independent (Atılgan, 2007). However, Gezmiş's charisma⁸³ was such that THKO became known through his name.

⁸³ Several news stories about Gezmiş appeared on *Devrim* and *Türk Solu* which persistently presented him as "the leader of revolutionary youth". See for instance: "Devrim Suçu [Offence of Revolution]", *Devrim*, 28 October 1969, p. 2; Gürkan, Uluç (1969). "Öğrenim Yılı Başlarken [Whilst Academic Year Commences]", *Devrim*, 11 November, p. 2; "Deniz Gezmiş Tahliye Edildi [Deniz Gezmiş Was Released]", *Devrim*, 2 December 1969, p. 7; Gürkan, Uluç (1969). "Gençlik Lideri Deniz Gezmiş ile Bir Konuşma [An Interview with the Leader of Youth Deniz Gezmiş]", *Devrim*, 23 December, p. 2.

The founding cadre did not seriously contemplate “the programmatic of the organisation”; rather, the “THKO developed within practice” (Töre, 1988:2170). Since their ideological upbringing in the MDD movement had given them the revolutionary skills to grapple with imperialism, they embarked on action to restore Turkey’s full independence. While the leftist intelligentsia had already spent a decade debating “how an underdeveloped Turkey would develop”, these revolutionaries were inspired by Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach and sought to “change the current situation instead of interpreting it”. In the revolutionary crisis of the 1970s, the THKO borrowed language, names and slogans from the past “to present the new scene” (Marx, 2013:30) for Turkey. Seeing continuity between the National Liberation War of the 1920s and their guerrilla war (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994:314), they called their armed struggle against imperialism the “second liberation war”.

The THKO’s political struggle was based on a “people’s war” which would begin in rural areas and develop from rural to urban regions (İnan, 1991[1976]: 48). İnan criticised Régis Debray’s focoist revolutionary struggle for the way it saw “guerrilla warfare” as an end in itself (İnan, 1991: 47). The THKO saw guerrilla warfare as a legitimate means of organising the public masses in a people’s war (İnan, 1991: 47). The THKO leaders thought that Latin American modes of urban guerrilla warfare did not fit with Turkey’s socio-economic structure (İnan, 1991: 55), though they embarked on the anti-imperialist struggle by robbing banks and kidnapping American soldiers stationed at NATO bases (Ersan, 2014:40). Urban guerrilla practices were intended to provide them with money and arms to start the rural guerrilla movement (Ersan, 2014: 39). However, their actions led to catastrophic results for the THKO. While Hüseyin İnan, Deniz Gezmiş and Yusuf Arslan were on their way to join an attack on the NATO base in a rural area of the eastern province Malatya, they were arrested by the security forces in March 1971 (Ersan, 2014:40). Two months later, the gendarmerie killed three militants including Sinan Cemgil and arrested others while some fled (STMA, 1988:2173). Gezmiş, İnan and Arslan were court martialled and executed in May 1972, and the other members were imprisoned, thus ending this clique (STMA, 1988).

5.3.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

“Immediacy of action” overshadowed the theoretical development within the THKO. Instead of engaging in intellectual “idle talk”, this faction embraced the MDD circle and Yön circle’s political thoughts. Moreover, unlike the other factions, this clique did not debate with other circles but focused on only revolutionary action. As a result, they produced three documents: a manifesto issued after kidnaping American soldiers in March 1971, a booklet called *Türkiye’de Devrimin Yolu* (*The Path of Revolution in Turkey*) prepared by Hüseyin İnönü in prison just before his execution, and their plea at the court martial (Töre, 1988: 2171; Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994). All three were written after they began their anti-imperialist struggle. Despite the fact that they were theoretically inchoate, the booklet and their plea were the only sources by means of which they construed the world order and Turkey’s place in it.

The THKO leaders were not concerned with the world order. They were only interested in the political developments occurring in the vicinity of Turkey. Therefore, they only commented on the Middle East and Europe (particularly the Common Market). They argued that following the end of the Second World War the gap created by the Anglo-French retreat from the Middle East was partly filled by the coming to power of nationalist governments in countries like Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Algeria and partly by US domination (İnan, 1991: 57). They argued that the remainder were countries under the control of imperialist powers such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon (İnan, 1991: 57). The US backed up Turkey, Israel, and Iran as bases so that it could protect its interests in the whole region. Turkey was tied to Europe and the US within the scope of NATO and to Iran and Pakistan within the context of CENTO in terms of economic and military interests (İnan, 1991: 58). Turkey was strategically significant for the US as regards the protection of its interests in the Middle East and as a buffer state against the Soviet Union (İnan, 1991: 58). Furthermore, as a Muslim country Turkey acted as a mediator that could protect US imperialist interests in the region, as the majority of nations there were predominantly Muslim. All of this showed that the American bases in Turkey and Turkey’s massive standing army (particularly its

land forces) were not matters of coincidence (İnan, 1991: 58). Since the revolutionary movement sought to escape from American imperialist control in Turkey, imperialism assumed a hostile attitude regarding the movement (İnan, 1991: 58).

They pointed to an ongoing rivalry between the Common Market and the US, but given the presence of a socialist bloc, they predicted that this rivalry would not likely become a political conflict in the foreseeable future (İnan, 1991: 60). The collaborator bourgeoisie changed its orientation vis-à-vis the Common Market and tried to become a member of Common Market, and it also targeted the revolutionary movement that hindered the exploitation of the internal market to a certain extent.

The THKO leaders discussed the 12 March 1971 coup in relation to imperialism's presence in the Middle East and developing relations with the Common Market (İnan, 1991: 56). For them, the maintenance of imperialist interests in the region and the collaborator bourgeoisie's plan for integration with the Common Market underpinned the coup of the 12th of March. The coup set out to suppress the revolutionary movement, restore unity among the reactionary classes, and overcome the economic and political crisis that the existing political parties could not tackle within the confines of a seemingly democratic order (İnan, 1991: 62). They acknowledged that the leftists had welcomed the coup because of their experience of the 27 May 1960 coup (İnan, 1991: 62).

At their court martial for threatening to overthrow the constitutional order, THKO leaders prepared a joint written plea of not guilty by asserting that they were continuing the 1960 revolution and complementing the 1961 constitution. They argued that Turkey had successfully waged a liberation war against imperialism under Atatürk in the early 1920s; but following his death it gradually entered in the orbit of American imperialism and eventually in 1950 imperialism's collaborators staged a "counter-revolution" against Atatürk's anti-imperialist rule and thus Turkey completely came under the yoke of American imperialism.

Avcıoğlu's seminal book *The Order of Turkey* was influential in their plea, as it discussed why Turkey could not develop after its anti-imperialist war of liberation, and how and why it became a dependent backward country (THKO, 2000: 40). Like the MDD movement, inspired by dependency theory they saw the history of societies and particularly the political economic history of Turkey as a struggle between oppressors and the oppressed, or currently between suppressive imperialism and poor nations (THKO, 2000: 37). For them, Turkey—which was semi-dependent in terms of economics and politics, as well as its military and culture—was being subjected to imperialist exploitation (İnan, 1991: 5).

The progressive military officers of the Ottoman Army had mobilised the people via an anti-imperialist movement and achieved independence by fighting imperialism in 1923 (İnan, 1991: 25). However, it only managed to achieve a form of political independence, the maintenance of which was contingent on economic and political reforms to achieve economic development (THKO, 2000: 76, 77). The THKO militants described the era of 1923-1950 as a period of vacillation during which pre-capitalist production relations were dominant and the petty bourgeoisie made alliances with the reformist bourgeoisie who embraced a capitalist path of development (İnan, 1991: 8). Despite some superstructural reforms (the abolishment of the Caliphate, the introduction of a modern legal system, and so on), economic reforms could not succeed due to the resistance of feudal landlords who hindered land reforms and the trade bourgeoisie who preferred easy profits from foreign capital over industrial development (THKO, 2000: 86). Notwithstanding these parasitic classes, the policy of statism was adopted in the 1930s to realise industrial development through state enterprises to resolve unbalanced foreign trade (THKO, 2000: 86). By means of statism, the petty bourgeoisie succeeded in liquidating some of the collaborator bourgeoisie, and the remainder engaged in brokering and construction (İnan, 1991: 7). In the statist era, a number of economic privileges that were granted during the Ottoman Empire were revoked through the nationalisation of foreign companies (THKO, 2000: 88). Business circles vehemently objected on the grounds that development required foreign capital and their opposition resulted in the 1937 replacement of the İnönü government with a government led by Celal Bayar,

the former general director of İş Bank and part of İstanbul business circle (THKO, 2000: 88). Thus the incoming government withdrew from statism and moved away from neutrality in foreign policy, which had been pursued since 1923. Atatürk was the biggest obstacle to establishing contact with imperialist states (2000: 88, 89). Upon his death in 1938, this obstacle was partly removed, and in 1939 Turkey signed a treaty with France and the UK. Although İş Bank was established by Atatürk, Gezmiş argued that over time the bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords infiltrated it (THKO, 2000:13). İş Bank first opened Turkey to imperialism through a partnership with foreign capital, and ultimately it ended petty bourgeois radicalism by taking the DP to power in 1950 (THKO, 2000: 16,17). Thus, as argued by Yusuf Arslan, the THKO set up the US and İş Bank as targets of its armed struggle (THKO, 2000: 10).

Although rapprochement with France and the UK stalled during the Second World War, the THKO argued this issue reappeared after the war because the bourgeoisie and the landlords that had gained strength during the war years wanted to rule the country in accordance with their interests (economic and political liberation, free entrance of foreign capital, etc.) (THKO, 2000: 92, 93). The THKO leaders described the period of 1945-1950 in terms of the decline of German fascism and the rise of American imperialism, which was seeking new markets under the cover of democratisation (İnan, 1991: 8). In addition to these emergent conditions, increasingly strong socialist revolutions and the Soviet Union's successes and negative attitude towards Turkey due to the latter's slippery foreign policy during the war years paved the way for the reactionary classes to strike an alliance with imperialism (İnan, 1991: 8). Moreover, discontent among the masses obliged the ruling CHP to partially meet the increasing demands for democratisation (THKO, 2000: 93). The THKO criticised the development of economic relations with the US under the pretext of the Soviet threat because they asserted that the Soviet Union was devastated and could not afford to attack Turkey and, even if it could, it would not do so (THKO, 2000: 94). The THKO contended that "the Soviet threat was 'not real' but rather a 'pretext' used to legitimise the presence of American imperialism in Turkey and its overwhelming dominance in economics, politics and culture" (THKO, 2000: 98).

Adopting the national democratic revolutionary position, the THKO described the situation in the 1945-1950 period in line with petty bourgeois radicalism. The ruling CHP was said to have tried to convince the US to give credits and aid for Turkey's industrial development, whereas the opposition DP accepted the US economic plan based on agricultural development (THKO, 2000:135). They argued the CHP unwillingly accepted the American plan, compared to the DP's eagerness to implement it, because the former did not want to risk displeasing the US and the business circle in the run-up to the 1950 election. Yet with the support of American imperialism, the İstanbul bourgeoisie (which dominated İş Bank), the landlords and the provincial bourgeoisie came to power in the 1950 election (THKO, 2000:137). The DP government became a staunch ally of American imperialism. With its economic development grounded on US aid and credits, and with an eye to getting more money from the US, "Turkey pursued a "submissive" foreign policy that did not conform to its national interests" (THKO, 2000:138). DP rule embarked on a project of Americanising Turkey in terms of economics, politics, culture and the military (İnan, 1991: 25). For instance, military agreements with the US meant that the Turkish army was organised, indoctrinated, trained, equipped, and dressed in line with the US army (THKO, 2000: 150), and thus the US invaded Turkey by means of the Americanised Turkish army (THKO, 2000: 206).⁸⁴ Since the US understood from the 1960 coup that the Turkish army represented a threat against imperialism's domestic allies, it sought to change the class structure of the army through the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (*Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu*, OYAK), pay increases, and other ventures to prevent it from coming to power and to make it work for imperialism's ends (İnan, 1991: 25).

The THKO identified the presence of American imperialism in Turkey as the main issue. As long as Turkey was dependent on American imperialism, it could not develop:

⁸⁴ Although a contradiction, the THKO attributed a progressive role to this so-called pro-American army in bringing about a national democratic revolution by pointing to the 1960 *coup d'état* by which "progressive" officers toppled the DP rule.

Insofar as American imperialism exists in Turkey, imperialist plunder will continue. In order for Turkey to develop, the only and necessary condition is to dismiss the US [imperialism] Development is a social problem. As long as the US [imperialism] exists in Turkey the society will not develop, but on the other hand there will be extremely rich people, commission merchants and servants [of imperialism]. As long as the US [imperialism] exists in our country there will not be development, instead there will be poverty and misery. Without gaining independence, development is not likely... For this reason, the issue is the struggle to expel American imperialism (THKO, 2000: 206, 207 (my translation)).

Like the MDD circle, THKO militants did not believe in parliamentarism because the “seemingly” democratic order of the bourgeoisie would not allow progressive actors to rise to power. So long as the feudal landlords remained, the economic and social development of the peasants could not be achieved (THKO, 2000: 200). Peasants did not act or think independently from landlords, so the reactionary political parties that the landlords supported would always rule (THKO, 2000: 201). The reactionary trinity of imperialism, the collaborator bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords tried to maintain this “pseudo-democracy” to maintain the exploitation which militated against Turkey’s development (THKO, 2000: 201). As the bourgeoisie did not fulfil its “historic task” of establishing a bourgeois democratic order, those classes with revolutionary potential – the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and particularly the military-civil elite stratum of the petty bourgeoisie – should rise against this reactionary trinity to establish a “totally independent and really democratic Turkey” (THKO, 2000: 201). The THKO advocated the national democratic revolution strategy to abolish the reactionary order and institutions of imperialism and its allies, thus emancipating the proletariat and the peasants who would emerge as conscious individuals to exert their impact on historic developments for Turkey (THKO, 2000: 202). For them, a national democratic revolution was an anti-imperialist struggle led by the proletariat which was particular to backward countries like Turkey that were semi-dependent and under imperialism’s hegemony (İnan, 1991: 30).

The THKO also discussed the Kurdish question. For them, development of Turkey’s economic structure, its geographic conditions, underground and aboveground sources necessitated unification of economic life within territorial unity of Turkey (İnan, 1991: 28). Kurdish secessionism, which would maintain the dominance of Kurdish

bourgeoisie over Kurdish working classes, did not certainly square with the working classes' interests (İnan, 1991: 28). A Kurdish state which resulted from bourgeoisie's struggle would be dominated by bourgeois nationalism which would build a barrier between other nations' working classes and Kurdish working class. Therefore, they proposed "regional autonomy" as the best solution suiting well with all the working classes in Turkey (İnan, 1991: 29).

As this clique's philosophy echoed that of the MDD and Yön circles, the criticisms directed at these groups also applied to the THKO. Like the MDD, the THKO reduced socialism to a method of development. As it diagnosed the presence of imperialism as the main obstacle to development, it prioritised becoming fully independent in order to attain the level of developed countries. It therefore reduced socialist revolution to an anti-imperialist struggle. Yet, this anti-imperialist struggle was nothing but dismissing US soldiers from Turkish soil, quitting NATO, abolishing US/NATO bases and annulling bilateral agreements with the US. This would move Turkey up to the distinguished place in the world that it deserved.

Traditionally the Turkish left has been affiliated with both Stalinism and Kemalism (Firat, 1988:2118). A leftist first became a Kemalist then converted to socialism. Thus the dominant Kemalist ideology, as Aral might say, "drew the mind horizon" of these young revolutionaries (1988:2109). They presented socialist concepts and thoughts with official ideology's images (Aral, 1988:2109). They often used certain phraseology (*e.g.* traitors, patriots, internal and external enemies and so on) of the official ideology. This was also manifest in their plea where nationalism was a continuing theme. Given their limited knowledge of Marxist literature⁸⁵ and the Third World inferiority complex, they became stuck in a Stalinist version of nationalism which ignored Marxist "internationalism". Based on Stalin's definition of nation, though without giving explicit reference to it⁸⁶, THKO militants defined a

⁸⁵ For instance, Gezmiş argued that Marxism-Leninism was not an order but a world view and a dialectical method of analysis that analysed the conditions in which analysis existed and made assessments according to these conditions (THKO 2000:19).

⁸⁶ This is quite understandable because this was a plea not an academic work. Moreover, as they were on trial for replacing the current order with a Marxist-Leninist order and they faced the death penalty,

nation as “a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (THKO, 2000:197; it appeared in Stalin, 1953:307).

They perceived imperialist cultural expansion as a threat to “national identity”. Imperialism reconfigured a backward country’s national identity through cultural imperialism (replacing the native language with imperialism’s language and spreading its values and lifestyle through cinema, literature, the mass media, Peace Corps volunteers, brainwashed scientists and artists, and so on) so the people did not to discern exploitation and did not rise against it (THKO, 2000:126). The protection of national identity, therefore, was significant to independence and constituted one of the main components of the anti-imperialist struggle. THKO militants opposed the existence of schools, such as METU⁸⁷, founded by American imperialism whose education language was English because they brainwashed young people to serve imperialism’s interests (THKO, 2000:164). Furthermore they used nationalist agitation as a tool of anti-imperialist propaganda. For example, criticisms of lawless behaviour by US soldiers and of the privileges granted to them were common in the leftist discourse. They gave examples of US soldiers receiving immunity for killing or beating Turkish citizens (THKO, 2000:148). Nationalist agitation reached a point where they were not only nationalist⁸⁸ but also moralist. The attitude toward the visit of the US Navy 6th Fleet to Turkey exemplified their assessment on the basis of national and moral values. They criticised the rulers of Turkey for, among other things, letting American soldiers visit Turkey to satisfy their sexual desires (THKO, 2000:187).

one could not expect them to make an explicit reference to Stalin. (Stalin, Joseph (1953) “Marxism and the National Question”, in *Works*, Moscow, Vol. 2, pp. 300-381).

⁸⁷ Ironically, as Kürkçü puts, many of the revolutionary practices and revolutionary cadres appeared in this American university of Turkey (1988:2107).

⁸⁸ For instance, in one of the letters that Gezmiş addressed to his father, he reveals his nationalist disposition and his Kemalist ideology: “Dad, I’m always grateful to you. Because you’ve brought me up with Kemalist thoughts. Since my childhood I have grown up with the memories of the liberation war. And since then I have hated the foreigners” (STMA, 1988:512).

The THKO argued that the nationalist classes, whose interests were allied with national interests, were attempting to turn Turkey back to its honourable past (THKO, 2000:194). A corollary of this nationalist stance was an analysis of international politics based on a state-centric and ahistorical realist understanding. Instead of questioning the historical and social origins of the concept of state, they accepted it and even went a step further to “save” it. The THKO distinctly followed in the Turkish historical tradition of the creation of an underground organisation to “save the state”. They attached particular importance to the underground organisations (such as the Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), the Karakol Cemiyeti (the Sentinel Society), M. Group, etc.), which they saw as “patriotic organisations” (THKO, 2000:50) because they were striving “to save the state from the mire that it had gotten into” (THKO, 2000:53). Kürkçü stated “they did not die for the state in the name of revolutionism” (1988:2107); however, they reduced “professional revolutionism” to ensuring Turkey’s independence at all costs (THKO, 2000:19).

Similarly, the realist account of geopolitics was conspicuous in their interpretation of the political history of Turkey. For example, the THKO identified the strategic importance of the Straits as the main motivation behind the Turkish, German and Russian decisions to enter the First World War. In the run-up to the war, Turkey’s strengthening of its position under the rising influence of Germany and likely German control over the Straits disturbed Russia because the latter saw them as obstacles in its route to the Mediterranean (THKO, 2000:55). Thereupon Russia allied with the UK and France against Germany. Its historical Muscovite hostility drove Turkey to ally with Germany (THKO, 2000:55). Likewise, they discussed the entrance of US imperialism into Turkey after the Second World War on the basis of realist geopolitics. The US accepted Turkey’s call for economic and military assistance by taking into account Turkey’s “geopolitical position” which enhanced its strategic aim of exploiting the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean (THKO, 2000:131).

Their meta-theoretical position apparently was modelled on a positivist account of science. This positivist stance was visible in the THKO plea where it stressed how natural and social laws led the history of humanity:

The conditions in which we are entail us to make a comprehensive plea and to defend the truths and the science that is wanted to be fettered in our personalities. Our aim is to explain how natural and social laws, whose truth we believe in, have given direction to the history of humanity rather than precluding a sentence that shall be imposed on us (THKO, 2000:37, my translation).

The impact of the modernity project on the THKO circle's ideology was evident in its main concerns over development and the liberating potential of reason which were different expressions of the promises of modernity, "freedom" and "progress". The THKO criticised feudalism for shackling the peasants in the bonds of irrationality through religious institutions such as sects, sheiks and their dervishes that conveyed primitive, dogmatic and superstitious beliefs to reinforce the traditional societal order. "General suffrage" would not work as in "true democracies" because the masses were mesmerised by these dogmatic religious beliefs.

As it was impossible to come to power through elections in a country which had not realised its democratic revolution, it was necessary to take over the state forcefully to complete its unfinished modernisation project. Therefore, the THKO asserted that the uncompleted modernisation project of Kemalism, which was destined to free the masses from dogmatic beliefs, should be furthered by the national democratic revolution, which they saw as simply a different name for the modernity project. In this context the imperialist yoke would be broken and there would be total independence in foreign relations. Then, the feudal yoke would be smashed by land reform and the large masses of people under the oppression of the reactionaries would be transformed into "free citizens". In other words, a society left ignorant under feudalism in a totally isolated country free from the effects of imperialism would be transformed through top-down social engineering. This was how a "totally independent truly democratic Turkey" would be established. However there was no

implicit or explicit clue as to whether there was a socialist vision for the coming period.

5.4. People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP-C)

5.4.1. Introduction

Despite the fact that they obtained control of the *Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu* by dismissing the “opportunists”⁸⁹ (TİP delegates) at the fourth FKF congress in 1969, the MDD movement split over the national democratic revolution strategy and the signification of the revolutionary youth movement practices and its relations with the proletarian movement (STMA, 1988:2140). Mahir Çayan and Münir Aktolga criticised one group (Doğu Perinçek, Şahin Alpay, Erdoğan Güçbilmez and Cengiz Çandar who would later, as shown in the previous section, split from the MDD and form the PDA circle) for presenting a “rightist aberration”. Çayan and Aktolga stressed the need to make the socialist movement independent from Kemalism and proposed the establishment of a proletarian party prior to the formation of a “national front” (STMA, 1988:2140). Notwithstanding concurring with the Perinçek group in this debate, Mihri Belli seemingly sided with the Çayan clique. However, this did not last long and Belli's group and Çayan's clique later split.

“The great proletarian resistance”⁹⁰ of 15-16 June 1970 was a litmus test in the MDD movement. While Belli was still not eager to espouse the socialist struggle in lieu of petty bourgeois radicalism notwithstanding the proletarian resistance, the Çayan clique (Mahir Çayan, Yusuf Küpeli, Münir Aktolga and Ertuğrul Kürkçü) began to

⁸⁹ In leftist terminology, opportunism is defined as distortion made by anti-socialist forces who infiltrate revolutionary ranks by disguising themselves in the scientific socialist theory (Çayan, 2013: 40). Briefly, an opportunist is seemingly a leftist but essentially a rightist person.

⁹⁰ In the leftist literature, the 15-16 June 1970 workers' movement was described as a milestone for the leftist movement. A great number of workers loyal to the leftist union DİSK staged a strike in major industrial zones like Istanbul and Gebze to protest against the government's proposal to amend the law on strikes and collective bargaining agreements in order to allow, in practice, only the pro-government union, Türk-İş, to strike and to conduct collective bargaining. As a result, many leftists argued that this event indicated the presence of a working class with class consciousness upon which a revolutionary strategy could be built.

think seriously of leaving the MDD movement. Anticipating the likely success of the Aren-Boran clique at the TİP congress in October 1970, the “revolutionary opposition” (the MDD movement) broke with the party and organised an alternative congress, the Proletarian Revolutionary Congress, on the same day as the TİP congress (STMA, 1988:2160). In this alternative congress, a disagreement between the two currents in the MDD over the establishment of a party as an alternative to the TİP became evident (STMA, 1988:2160). Since Mihri Belli, the leading MDD figure, refused to establish the alternative party, the Çayan clique decided to break with the MDD movement by issuing an open letter to Belli in the very beginning of 1971.⁹¹

Çayan *et al.* attributed their split with the MDD circle to their inability to eliminate “rightist ideology” from the movement (2013:191). Their criticism of the MDD circle centred on differences over the “understanding of revolution, *modus operandi* and understanding of the organization” (Çayan, *et al.*, 2013:201). The MDD circle relied on radical officers instead of its own power and rejected “armed struggle” for the sake of legality; thus, the Çayan clique blamed Belli for becoming bogged down in “rightist revisionism” (Çayan, *et al.*, 2003: 202-204). They asserted that Belli’s understanding of revolution was influenced by modern revisionism and so was based in the cities where the proletariat would seize power (Çayan, *et al.*, 2013:203). The tight control of the cities by imperialism and the local dominant classes forced the revolution to rely on forces other than the proletariat (Çayan, *et al.*, 2013:204). Because Belli’s understanding of revolution relied on petty bourgeois radicalism, he had created the concept of “revolutionary nationalism” (Çayan, *et al.*, 2013:208) to unite the proletarian revolutionaries and the nationalist revolutionary petty bourgeois under the common cause of nationalism to widen the revolutionary front. However, Çayan *et al* challenged this concept because “looking pleasant to the nationalist revolutionaries” underpinned “the nationalist distortion of the Marxist internationalism” (Çayan, *et al.*, 2013:209). To appease the nationalist

⁹¹ They published this open letter as a brochure in January 1971. It was also republished in *Collected Writings*, which was a compilation of all Çayan’s writing, on pages 191-211. Throughout the dissertation all the references to this open letter are to the book entitled *Collected Writings*.

revolutionaries, argued Çayan *et al*, Belli agreed to seek a solution to the Kurdish question within the confines of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli, *i.e.* within the current territorial borders of Turkey) at the expense of contradicting the Leninist principle of the right of nations to self-determination (Çayan, *et al.*, 2013:209).

Under these circumstances, Çayan and Aktolga quit the editorial board of *Aydınlık* and started a new journal *Kurtuluş* (Liberation). From its inception, this circle was known as Kurtuluş until it was renamed the THKP-C after May 1971 (STMA 1988: 2176). The core cadre that founded the THKP-C mainly came from the Idea Club of the Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi (SBF- Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University) including Mahir Çayan, Yusuf Küpeli and Hüseyin Cevahir, and from the Idea Club of ODTÜ (METU) including İrfan Uçar, Münir Ramazan Aktolga and Ulaş Bardakçı (STMA, 1988:2176).

Inspired by Marx's famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, Çayan harshly criticised Turkish leftist intellectuals for spending too much time on interpreting the social structure of Turkey that did not shed any light on revolutionary practice (Çayan, 2013: 295). Theoretical debates in the 1960s that "centred on the prevailing mode of production" in the Ottoman Empire (Asiatic or feudal) and on "the social structure of Turkey" (whether feudalism or capitalism dominated production) (Çayan, 2013: 296) were nothing but "intellectual chattering" (Çayan, 2013: 146). However, Çayan claimed that the revolutionaries should learn Marxist theory for practical reasons, *i.e.* to "change the world" (Çayan, 2013: 146). Accordingly, the THKP-C circle, as students of socialism, slowly escaped the influence of revisionism and sought to learn theory with an eye to "making a revolution" (Çayan, 2013: 296).

In the run-up to the 1971 *coup d'état*, argued Çayan, two opposing currents in the leftist movement crystallised: a "pacifist revisionist revolutionary line" that opposed armed struggle, and the advocates of revolution by "guerrilla war and armed propaganda" (Çayan, 2013:358). Çayan regarded the coup as the defeat of a leftist movement stuck in revisionism and made complacent by limited democratic

freedoms allowed by the oligarchy. Therefore he labelled the post-coup era as “the era of retreat to reinvigorate and to collect strength” (Çayan, 2013:365).

However they did not retreat but increased “revolutionary violence”. After the coup, this circle set the revolutionary goals as deepening the crisis, leading the emergent mass movement and recruiting new cadres from the workers and the peasants. They defined their method as “politicised military struggle” (STMA, 1988:2176). While initially embracing a Maoist people’s war, they later adopted Latin-American-type urban guerrilla warfare and directed “revolutionary terror” against American imperialist targets: the Consulate General of Israel, certain branches of The United States Logistics Group (TUSLOG) in Turkey, American computer company IBM, and representatives of financial capital, including by kidnapping Kadir Has partners or owners of such firms as Coca Cola Turkey, Mercedes Benz Turkey, Otomarsan and Akbank (Çayan, 2013:369). The first serious example of the THKP-C’s urban guerrilla campaign was the kidnapping of the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul, Ephraim Elrom, on 17 May 1971, who was seen as an agent of Zionist Israel and thereof a pawn of American imperialism which was the main enemy of Middle Eastern peoples (STMA, 1988:508). When the government rejected their demands, the THKP-C militants shot him dead (STMA, 1988:2181). Subsequently, in a large-scale police campaign against the THKP-C, Çayan was captured, Cevahir was killed and some other militants were arrested.

This led to serious dissent within the leading cadre over the method of revolutionary struggle. Yusuf Küpeli and Münir Aktolga accused Çayan’s “urban guerrilla method of being adventurism” and “Narodnik terror” (STMA, 1988:2183). Çayan and his fellows dismissed these dissidents from the party for plotting to replace the THKP-C revolutionary line with the international social pacifist line (STMA, 1988:2184). Arguing that playing down one of three class struggle fronts (ideological, political and economic) leads to deflection from the revolutionary line, Çayan contended that the THKP-C opposed the focoist view that class struggle was the same as guerrilla war (Çayan, 2013:374). However, the THKP-C’s revolutionary strategy was nothing but focoist urban guerrilla warfare (Erkiner, 2007:540; Laçiner, 2007). They

patterned Turkish revolution strategy after the urban guerrillas of such Latin American countries as Uruguay and Brazilian which had relatively industrialised and significant urban populations since they thought conditions in these countries resembled those in Turkey (Erkiner, 2007; Kürkçü 2007; Akın 2007).

In March 1972, the THKP-C decided to join THKO militants to prevent the execution of THKO leaders Gezmiş, Arslan and İnan by kidnapping three NATO staff. However this had catastrophic results for the THKP-C as all the leading cadre except Ertuğrul Kürkçü were killed by military forces. As Kürkçü put it, contrary to the hit-and-run strategy of guerrilla warfare, the THKP-C hit but could not run (Kürkçü, 2002:50). Nevertheless this circle established such a strong reputation in the socialist movement that from the mid-1970s several leftist factions (to be analysed in the next chapter) appeared claiming to be its genuine successor and Çayan became an idol within the leftist movement.

The THKP-C differed from the other guerrilla movement, the THKO, because the former engaged in both practical and theoretical matters (Erkiner, 2007). Here Çayan stood out from the others through his efforts to “ground the necessity of the armed struggle on a theoretical foundation” (Laçiner, 1976/22:9). Çayan’s articles, which were compiled in the book *Toplu Yazılar*, and in THKP-C’s court martial plea constitute its sole theoretical references. The book has four parts: Çayan’s writings in the journal *Türk Solu* in the late 1960s which attacked the TİP’s so-called opportunism, be it Aybar’s or Aren-Boran’s (Emek); his polemics in *Aydınlık* dedicated to the criticism of the PDA circle; his writings in *Kurtuluş* that criticised Belli and the MDD movement; and a pamphlet on uninterrupted revolution that sought to deepen and enrich Leninist theses of imperialism. The following analysis of the plea and Çayan’s book explains how they interpreted the world order and how they placed Turkey in it.

5.4.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

The THKP-C circle held that it was no longer possible to assess the countries' positions in world politics on an individual basis and to consider Turkey free from the complicated relations of the imperialist era. They believed that it was, first of all, necessary to draw "a general world panorama" and to consider "in what kind of a world we live" in order "to make a correct assessment of the circumstances that Turkey is in" (THKP-C, 1979:9). This circle argued the world was divided into three camps: "the capitalist bloc, the socialist bloc and the bloc of deliberately underdeveloped countries" (THKP-C, 1979:10). It analysed each camp and their relations with the others in a comprehensive way in its plea.

While imperialism was defined as an economic regime embracing the whole world before the First World War, the emergence of the first socialist state, the Soviet Union, by the end of that war had reduced this somewhat (THKP-C, 1979:11). US imperialism after the Second World War so dominated the other capitalist economies with its overwhelming capital exports and transfers that "the world capitalist bloc turned out to be an American empire" (Çayan, 2013:309). The socialist bloc of one third of the world limited the borders of imperialism and the emergent anti-imperialist nationalist movements, which resulted in decolonisation, caused a further contraction of the market for metropolitan capital (THKP-C, 1979:11).

American imperialism did not feel any threat to its hegemony from within the capitalist bloc until the rise of European and Japanese imperialism in the mid-1960s as required by Marx's uneven development law of capitalism (Çayan, 2013:311). The rise of the latter created a new crisis for capitalism which Çayan defined as the "third depression period" of general crisis of capitalism that prevailed in the mid-1960s onward in which "imperialist invasion has changed its form from an overt invasion to a covert one" (Çayan, 2013:309). The worldwide prevalence of nuclear weapons and the existence of the socialist bloc prevented the deepening differences between imperialists from becoming a military conflict. They opted instead to integrate, though Çayan asserted that this would not change the fact that the

“capitalist crisis is going through the most lethal phase” (Çayan, 2013:310). The exploitation of the resources and wealth of the semi-colonised countries delayed the dissolution of capitalism (THKP-C, 1979:139). For this reason “capitalism [would] not withdraw from any semi-colonised country in its own accord” (THKP-C, 1979:139) but would invent new methods to secure its position. In order for the “amicable” exploitation of the world in proportion to their powers to sustain it, the imperialist countries (international monopolies) became partners in “neo-colonialism” and the semi-colonized countries were markets (THKP-C, 1979:12). Accordingly, imperialism placed capitalist means of production “from above” into underdeveloped feudal production economies through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, military pacts and bilateral agreements.

However, since “capitalism (*i.e.* production for market)” (Çayan, 2013:313) could not develop on the basis of “internal dynamics”, the emergent local monopoly bourgeoisie integrated with imperialism, making it “an internal phenomenon (*i.e.* covert invasion)” (Çayan, 2013:314). The local monopolist bourgeoisie, imperialism, the feudal classes and the trade bourgeoisie established “oligarchic rule”. Since neo-colonialism allowed underdeveloped countries to have light and medium industries, “emerging relative prosperity seemingly softened the contradiction” and created an “artificial balance” between the oligarchy and the masses (Çayan, 2013:314,315).

When it came to the socialist bloc’s relations with the Third World, after the Second World War two revolutionary lines vied with each other to win over the underdeveloped countries: the modern revisionist revolutionary line of the Soviet Union and the Maoist revolutionary line. Given the contradictions between capital and labour, the former saw the Western capitalist countries as the theatre for socialist revolutions. The modern revisionist line said the economic and social superiority of socialist countries and their peaceful foreign policy would roll back the anti-communist propaganda of imperialism and the European working class would come to power through a parliamentary struggle with the support of all people (Çayan, 2013:154). The modern revisionist line played down proletarian revolutions in the colonised and semi-colonised countries and it did not care whether these revolutions

were carried out under the leadership of socialist parties or petty bourgeois organisations. Çayan stressed the “realpolitik” rationale behind the Soviet Union’s support of revolutionary movements in underdeveloped countries where, he said, that the Soviet Union was only concerned that “national governments” were elected that did not fully engage with imperialism but pursued an “ostensibly ‘neutral’ foreign policy” (Çayan, 2013:155).

The Maoist line, however, foresaw a world revolution which was grounded in the encirclement and final capture of the cities (the North America and Europe) by the rural areas (Asia, Africa and Latin America) (Çayan, 2013:154). Revolutionary success would therefore be determined by the suppressed nations’ revolutionary struggles. The struggle in the cities of the world was of secondary importance in terms of determining the result (Çayan, 2013:154). The principal conflict in the semi-colonised and colonised countries was between the feudal lords and the peasants. Whenever the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat wrested control of the country from the local feudal authorities, imperialism invaded the country to secure its exploitation. Then the principal conflict was between the whole nation and imperialism and the democratic class struggle of the people turned into a national struggle against imperialism on the “national” scale and with “nationalist” slogans (Çayan, 2013:352). Consequently, because imperialism resorted to militarism, national democratic revolution in semi-colonised and colonised countries “grows out of the barrel of a gun” (Çayan, 2013:76).

For Çayan, the Soviet, Chinese and Cuban revolutions were accomplished by armed struggle, but each in different historical period and with different methods (respectively, riot, people’s war and guerrilla war). A national democratic revolution characterised the second stage of the imperialist crisis when imperialism was an external phenomenon and feudalism was the dominant production system in backward countries. However, in the third depression period of capitalism, imperialism became both an internal and an external phenomenon for backward countries (Çayan, 2013:351). Therefore the strategic objective of the revolutionary struggle needed to be adjusted because the imperialist invasion was disguised and its

control was no longer merely economic but also political and ideological, thereby the “nationalist” and “revolutionary” reactions of the masses were neutralised. Armed Propaganda became essential, maintained Çayan (2013:342), to shed the popular image of the “irresistible state” (Çayan, 2013:301). In other words, the vanguard guerrilla movement would become a political mass struggle to mobilise the people who had unconsciously reproduced the existing order and thus maintained both imperialism and the oligarchy. The revolutionary war would proceed on a class basis and as a nationalist plan (Çayan, 2013:352).

Against this backdrop, the THKP-C circle depicted Turkey as “a semi-colonised” and “deliberately underdeveloped country” with an “undignified foreign policy”. It was ruled by the collaborating dominant powers and was “positioned as a satellite of the imperialists” (THKP-C, 1979:15). They analysed the genesis and development of capitalism in Turkey from a historical perspective and interpreted Turkey’s relations with imperialism on the basis of a class structure and class relations. They first examined the Ottoman Empire’s means of production and ownership, its social classes and the direction of the interests of these classes, and then discussed its transformation into Turkey through an anti-imperialist war before investigating the republican era by dividing it into distinct periods.

Çayan viewed the social structure of the Ottoman state in two different historical phases: a “central military feudal Ottoman Empire” followed by a “comprador-feudal Ottoman state”. Property relationships in the former were mainly based on, as Teschke (2003:220) might say, “external geopolitical accumulation” and control over trade routes, argued Çayan. By emphasising its difference from classical feudal production relations predicated on domestic exploitation of the peasants, he softened the internal contradictions to a certain extent. As a result, conflicts between the forces of production and feudal producers lacked an “auto-dynamism” that would overthrow the feudal system and create capitalism (Çayan, 2013: 330; THKP-C, 1979: 26). Instead, European pressure suppressed embryonic capitalism in the pre-capitalist Ottoman Empire which rapidly became a colony and a “comprador-feudal state”.

In the early nineteenth century, this comprador-feudal state introduced certain reforms that transformed it into a new colonial regime, a development to the benefit of Western capitalists. For instance, the Free Trade Treaty of 1838 eventually turned Ottoman society into an open market for “raw-material-hungry and market-needy” European capitalism (THKP-C, 1979: 28). Thus the comprador-feudal state in collaboration with imperialism kept the gates of the domestic customs walls closed to the national bourgeoisie but open to the imperialists who thereby captured the domestic market. As the nation was at the same time a “market”, the reformist bourgeoisie (national bourgeoisie) came out against the comprador-feudal state with the aim of capturing the domestic market or at least having a say over it (THKP-C, 1979: 37). The THKP-C considered the Movement of 1908 as a reaction of this reformist bourgeoisie. However, the underdeveloped and feeble Ottoman reformist bourgeoisie did not have the strength to assume power on its own and to oppose the comprador bourgeoisie and its feudal ally (THKP-C, 1979: 38). At this juncture, the “bureaucracy” and the nationalist-progressive intellectuals within the army (especially the young military officers), “acting as sort of a social class” (Çayan, 2013: 330), comprised “the striking force of the reformist bourgeoisie to carry out the historical task of bourgeois democratic revolution and a nation-building project” (THKP-C, 1979: 38). Yet, as the Movement of 1908 was tied to imperialism, it was not able to develop independently and eventually failed despite adopting some national economic measures in line with the interest of the reformist bourgeoisie (THKP-C, 1979: 39).

The THKP-C divided Turkey’s republican era into five distinct periods based on its relations with imperialism. In this analysis and in common with previous currents, they also sought to explain why Turkey reverted to semi-colonised status despite its military and political victory against imperialism. As with the other leftist circles, the THKP-C clique depicted Turkey as the world’s first victorious nation in a war against imperialism. The Kemalist revolution of 1923 was not a “national democratic revolution” but a “bourgeois democratic revolution” that repelled the imperialist invasion and purged the comprador bourgeoisie. The feudal-comprador state mechanism was dismantled and in its stead a petty bourgeois dictatorship governed

under single-party rule. The ruling bloc of the republican administration was composed of all sections of the bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords, yet the leading figure was the national bourgeoisie (*i.e.* the reformist bourgeoisie). However, due to the nature of its leading class, the revolution couldn't be perpetuated and the reformist bourgeoisie eventually lost to the comprador bourgeoisie (Çayan, 2013: 332).

In the first phase, 1923-32, Turkey was an “independent” sovereign state with a national consumption economy. The petty bourgeoisie adopted the “national capitalism project” to ensure “full independence” of Turkey. Accordingly it used the oppressive state mechanism to create a “national bourgeoisie” by means of the İş Bank (Çayan, 2013: 333-34) which generated a monopolistic bureaucrat bourgeoisie dependent on external funding (THKP-C, 1979: 61).

The ensuing period, 1932-42, witnessed the gradual transformation of the bureaucrat bourgeoisie into the monopoly bourgeoisie because of its merger with the trade bourgeoisie and foreign cartels. As the capital accumulated through the exploitation of the workers and farmers had not been transformed into productive investments, the desired capitalist development was not achieved (THKP-C, 1979: 75). Consequently, semi-colonialism continued because the capitalist path to development embraced during the İzmir Economic Congress in 1923 made development impossible (THKP-C, 1979: 54).

This became further evident in the third phase, 1942-50, when the process of becoming a colony of imperialism began. The “Independent Development” policy of Atatürk was replaced in the 1940s by economy dependent on external finance as Turkey joined the world monopoly capitalism (THKP-C, 1979: 65). The THKP-C claimed that even though Turkey had encountered similar economic difficulties after the liberation war and during the Second World War, the change in policy was due to a new balance of power among the classes leading the state (THKP-C, 1979: 69). The economic policy of the Saraçoğlu government during the war strengthened the collaborating bourgeoisie and the landlords and merchants who established a second

political party as an alternative to the CHP (Republican People's Party). Because of the severe economic conditions, American imperialism infiltrated the country under the guise of military and economic aid, foreign capital gained immense privileges and the process of turning into a colony started.

This process culminated in the 1950 election through which the “reactionary” alliance of the Anatolian bourgeoisie (the usurer merchants) and the remnants of feudalism overthrew the petty bourgeois dictatorship and briefly became the oligarchy. Like the other circles, THKP-C regarded the rising of the Anatolian trade bourgeoisie as a “counter-revolution” (Çayan, 2013: 363; THKP-C, 1979: 74). The oligarchy used Soviet animosity and anti-communist propaganda as an ideological cover to conceal their aim of integration with foreign capital (THKP-C, 1979: 72). In the aftermath of the war, the Soviet demand for land and a military base was presented as a justification to take refuge in imperialism. The US had no intention to provide aid to Turkey during the years that the Soviets demanded a base in Turkey, and the initial US step was taken long after the Soviets gave up their demand (THKP-C, 1979: 73). Moreover, had the Soviets not made these demands, Turkey's relation with imperialism would have been the same because of its class structure. Yet, the THKP-C also criticised the Soviets for demanding land from Turkey as it was against the spirit of socialism (THKP-C, 1979: 74).

During the 1950-71 period, American imperialism became an “internal” phenomenon as “imperialist production relations” “penetrated to the every single bit of Turkey” (Çayan, 2013: 335,336). As the petty bourgeois dictatorship gave way to the oligarchic dictatorship, the “national economy” was replaced with the “non-national economy”. Although the reformist bourgeoisie had led the ruling bloc of dominant classes since the early 1920s, there had been an ongoing relative balance between the oligarchy and the petty bourgeoisie in the state apparatus (Çayan, 2013: 336). However the *coup d'état* of 27 May 1960, which Çayan called a “revolution”, tipped this relative balance in favour of the reformist bourgeoisie. The reactionary classes could not take economic, administrative and social measures to reinforce the

development of the monopoly bourgeoisie, so imperialism allowed the reformist bourgeoisie to overthrow them (Çayan, 2013: 364).

The THKP-C claimed that the National Unity Committee (Millî Birlik Komitesi (MBK)) in the first six months after taking power demonstrated its class basis by siding with the reformist bourgeoisie against the collaborating bourgeoisie and its allies (THKP-C, 1979: 104). It took such radical economic and political measures as stopping banking transactions, taking control of the stock market, stopping or limiting bank loans, ceasing the state and private sector enterprises and imposing new taxes (THKP-C, 1979: 88). However, since these radical measures created market stagnation, the MBK made economic concessions and the monopoly bourgeoisie began to regain the upper hand (THKP-C, 1979: 91). Interestingly, the MBK's restrictive measures had led to the consolidation of capital in fewer companies and further strengthened the monopoly groups, thus explaining why imperialism turned a blind eye to the movement (THKP-C, 1979: 92).

Especially after 1963, the leading role of the reformist bourgeoisie was further transferred to the monopoly bourgeoisie under pressure from US imperialism and this was further solidified with the AP (Justice Party) winning the 1965 elections. Thus, political thinking and organs and their influence on society in the relatively free atmosphere after 27 May slowly disappeared and the social structure was changed to suit imperialist exploitation (THKP-C, 1979: 95).

Yet, the monopoly bourgeoisie still was not powerful enough to establish its hegemony, so it formed a coalition with the reformist bourgeoisie and the Anatolian bourgeoisie (the usurer merchants) (Çayan, 2013: 336). Again a period of "relative balance" commenced. During this period, American imperialism and its international organisations (OECD, IMF) asked Turkey to take certain economic measures that would increase monopolist profit and exploitation and political measures that would suppress the growing democratic struggle (Çayan, 2013: 337). However the Demirel government could not agree because it included the non-monopoly Anatolian bourgeoisie and the feudal remnants as well as the monopoly bourgeoisie (Çayan,

2013: 337). It was toppled in the March 1971 military coup backed by the monopoly bourgeoisie and imperialism which ended the relative balance and implemented the reforms required to increase monopolistic exploitation and suppress popular reaction (Çayan, 2013: 337).

For the THKP-C, the post-March 1971 coup era constituted the last epoch. The coup dealt a big blow to the nationalist revolutionaries in the army and civil bureaucracy. After the coup, the right and centre sides of the petty bourgeoisie sided with the oligarchy which then dominated the state apparatus (Çayan, 2013: 336). The tradition of petty bourgeois radicalism in the army came to an end, and the army became an instrument of the oligarchy, and hence imperialism, to oppress the people (Çayan, 2013: 336). The emergent oligarchic dictatorship of the monopoly bourgeoisie, its government, the army and imperialism fully established its hegemony (Çayan, 2013: 365). Contradictions among the various sections of the monopoly bourgeoisie were minimised, therefore the “counter-revolution” front was in its most powerful period. Turkey became a country like Latin American states: the limited democratic atmosphere of 1960-1971 vanished, the relative balance was upset, revolutionary politics was silenced by terror and the legal ways of doing politics were blocked (Çayan, 2013: 340).

The THKP-C argued the most distinctive strategic character of this epoch was that the Middle East became the new focus of US imperialism which had lost Indochina (THKP-C, 1979: 13). US imperialism sought to build buffer zones in the Middle East against the rising threat of “national liberation struggles” (people’s wars) and to control these regions. “The strategic objectives of US imperialism” necessitated controlling Turkey because of “its critical geopolitical position in the Middle East” (THKP-C, 1979: 209), so the March 1971 coup prevented a shift to the left and thus promoted the strategic priorities of US imperialism (THKP-C, 1979: 209).

Taking into account the contradictions and relations of the third depression period of the imperialist crisis and their effects on Turkey, Çayan defined a “vanguard war” as the sole method of Marxist-Leninist political action. Given the historical

circumstances and certain distinctive features of Turkey, he argued the people's war would be a THKP-C-led guerrilla war waged first by urban and later rural guerrillas targeting imperialist forces, the monopoly bourgeoisie and its henchmen (Çayan, 2013: 353, 374). Thus armed struggle would upset the artificial balance⁹² between oligarchic dictatorship and the masses in favour of the latter (Çayan, 2013: 321).

Çayan set out several reasons for choosing a “politicised military war strategy”. First, the Leninist thesis of revolution based on violence maintained its validity in the third depression period of imperialism because imperialist exploitation had changed (Çayan, 2013: 317). Secondly, Turkey's geopolitical location helped the revolutionaries given their proximity to the socialist bloc, although anti-communism propaganda based on historical Muscovite hostility was a drawback (Çayan, 2013: 340). Thirdly, the “centuries-long political pacifism” that Anatolian people had suffered due to rigid centralism in a despotic state with a powerful state apparatus and weak civil society (Çayan, 2013: 342) could “only be removed by armed propaganda” (Çayan, 2013: 343) by people who already had anti-imperialist sentiments, were “allergic” to foreigners (Çayan, 2013: 346) and therefore sympathetic to revolution (Çayan, 2013: 343).

The THKP-C analysed the world order and Turkey's social structure in relation to the world order through the lenses of a Stalinist version of Lenin's theory of imperialism underpinned by Çayan's new concepts and his divisions into periods. Çayan argued that the “universality of Leninist revolutionary theory was still valid in the third depression period” of the general crisis for imperialism and would be so “until imperialism as a system collapsed” (Çayan, 2013:317). Nevertheless, he claimed the third depression period invalidated the Leninist thesis that the separation of financial capital from productive capital led to “an imperialist foreign policy reflected in wars and state rivalries” (Joseph, 2002) because the imperialists integrated rather than fought and expanded their market in the colonies where they

⁹² Çayan borrowed this term from Che Guevara and applied it into revolutionary practice of Turkey: “At present there is in America a state of unstable balance between oligarchical dictatorship and popular pressure”, Che Guevara, Ernesto (1964). *Guerrilla Warfare: A Method*, Foreign Languages Press: Peking.

imposed capitalist production relations “from above” through neo-colonialist methods.

Like Lenin, Çayan approached “international relations through the question of the market” (Engin, 1981:10) and defined capitalism as “production for the market” (Çayan, 2013: 313). For Çayan, a “nation” was also a “market”. Çayan argued “incorporation into the world market” would “automatically” “breed underdevelopment” (Brenner, 1977: 91). Only when an underdeveloped country severed its links with imperialism would self-sufficiency develop. A voluntarist perspective of the dependency theory was also conspicuous in the THKP-C circle’s assertion of the possibility of independent development for underdeveloped countries by ignoring the structural constraints of the global system.

Contradictorily, he had recourse to structural determinants. Given the worldwide development of capitalism and drawing heavily on Stalin, Çayan posited that individual countries were no longer “autarchic units” but rather components of “the world economy” (Çayan, 2013: 100). Instead of seeking objective conditions for revolution in a single country, Çayan pointed to existing conditions in the entire world imperialist economy: if they existed in the whole system, they existed in its parts and “a revolution is just a matter of the appearance of a revolutionary initiative at the right time” (Çayan, 2013: 270).

Contrary to the common leftist view of imperialism formulated by Lenin in the early 1900s, Çayan tried to modify it to fit the 1970s. However, he “purposefully divided imperialism into three different stages” and made assumptions on them to “prove that these stages [corresponded] to a distinct method of armed struggle” (Laçiner, 1976/22: 9) in general, and the third depression period entailed a “politicised military war strategy” (Engin, 1981: 9) in particular. Capitalising on a number of very different sources ranging from Marx and Engels to Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Che Guevara, Clausewitz and so on, his analysis seems to be nothing but an eclectic work to achieve the desired outcome: a theoretical basis for guerrilla war.

Because student militancy in 1968 and the THKP-C circle focused on the “immediate seizure of power” through a revolutionary struggle, they only touched on foreign policy to develop a theoretical basis for armed struggle. The circle’s theoretical framework is an eclectic combination of imperialism and realism. Accommodating class politics, they politicised the “depoliticized theoretical grasp and explanatory scope” of a realist account (Teschke 2003: 31). They relied on two variables, namely the geographical influence of location and class interest, in political decisions. Turkey’s foreign policy was designed in accordance with the latter, whereas imperialist foreign policy was determined by the former. This dichotomy was apparent in their writings. For example, while on the one hand Çayan examined how and why Turkey entered into the orbit of the US imperialism with reference to class, on the other hand in their plea they used realist geopolitical understanding to illustrate how Turkey’s geopolitical location made it important for US strategic interests in the Middle East.

Moving from analysis of the concrete (Turkish social structure in a historical perspective) to the abstract, Çayan devised a general formula to account for the foreign policy orientation of underdeveloped countries. Although Çayan emphasises dialectic relations between internal and external conditions (Çayan, 2013: 58,59), external conditions such as the Cold War or the interwar period characterised by a balance of power were missing from his interpretations. Rather, internal conditions stand out in his formula as the “national bourgeoisie” was seen as the “key explanatory variable”. Accordingly, if a national bourgeoisie was absent, then the economic development model would be non-independent and its foreign policy would follow imperialism.

However, when a national bourgeoisie led the transition from feudal production relations to capitalism, the country pursued an “independent foreign policy”, adopted an independent economic development model and ensured its “full independence”. This was actually the “transformation of the pre-capitalist form of small merchandise production into capitalist production”, hence “bourgeoisification of the petty bourgeoisie in an autarkic unit” (Engin, 1981: 12). Nevertheless, to avoid turning a

national bourgeoisie into a monopoly bourgeoisie, the country should sever all ties with imperialism so it developed “independently”.

This brings us the ideological development of the THKP-C circle. Given the strong historical tradition of petty bourgeois radicalism in Turkey, acknowledged Çayan, there was “a marked tendency among the socialists to rely on petty bourgeois radicalism” and a “socialist movement developed under the aegis of the petty bourgeoisie” (Çayan, 2013: 357). Despite the THKP-C’s obvious differences from the MDD circle, they regarded petty bourgeois radicalism the same way and saw the Kemalist petty bourgeoisie as allies (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994: 308). Çayan counted the Kemalist petty bourgeoisie as direct reserves in the revolutionary struggle (Çayan, 2013: 355). He defined Kemalism as “national liberationism” (milli kurtuluşçuluk) and saw it not as a “bourgeois ideology” but as leftist because of its anti-imperialist aspect.

Nevertheless, the THKP-C circle seemed quite confused in its attitude towards Kemalism as it provided contradictory stands on Kemalism’s relations with the working classes. For example, while their plea asserted that “capital accumulation was acquired through extreme exploitation of the workers and farmers” (THKP-C, 1979: 75), Çayan argued that Kemalism’s economic policy alternated between labour and capital, sometimes embracing a liberal economic model while at other times adopting a statist economic model (Çayan, 2013: 120-124). However they did not explain how and why Kemalism could adopt different development models of capitalism if it was not a bourgeois ideology. They did not analyse the degree to which historically specific class structures of production, the pattern of capital accumulation and the prevailing production method within a given stage of world capitalism (Fordist production method, post-Fordist one, and so on) might impact on the shifts from one development model to another. Instead they attributed the shifts to “inconsistent” behaviour by the ruling petty bourgeoisie. They also failed to see the “consistency” in these paradigm shifts which were actually done to sustain relatively stable capitalist production relations. This was because statist development

was associated with leftism and as long as state capitalism ensured economic development, extreme exploitation of the workers and farmers would be justifiable.

This demonstrated that their sympathy towards Kemalism sprang from its achievement of a “national unity project” against imperialism through which it established “inter-class peace”, mobilised all the social classes on the basis of nationalism that “actually served the interests of the bourgeoisie” (THKP-C, 1979: 27), and most importantly ensured full independence of Turkey, for which all the leftist circles praised it. Similarly the THKP-C circle emphasised a national unity project to upset the artificial balance between the oligarchy and the masses created by imperialism. Their project would be led by the proletariat. In the monopolist era, the main difficulty was that “capitalism replaced nationalism with cosmopolitanism” (Çayan, 2013: 316), thereby “neutralising the nationalist reaction of the people” (Çayan, 2013: 342). Çayan advocated guerrilla war to alert the pacified masses to the imperialist invasion (Çayan, 2013: 322). The military side of a revolution was inseparable from its political and ideological sides because, inspired by Clausewitz, Çayan argued “war is the continuation of politics by means of arms” (Çayan, 2013: 227) so it would eventually mobilise the masses into revolutionary action (Çayan, 2013: 344).

5.5. Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML)

5.5.1. Introduction

Another guerrilla movement of the early 1970s that had sharply differing views from the previous leftist groups’ positions on Kemalism and other issues (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994: 303) was the Communist Party of Turkey-Marxist Leninist (Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist Leninist (TKP-ML)).

İbrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader and the theoretician of this faction, was an active member of the MDD circle and published several articles in *Türk Solu*. However, when the MDD circle polarized, he joined the PDA group and they left the former in early 1970. Despite taking part in the PDA circle, as the head of Eastern and South-

eastern Regional Committee of TİİKP which was the illegal party of the PDA circle, he often accused its leaders for being revisionist and for ruling out “armed struggle” (Laçiner, 2007; Erkiner, 2007). Kaypakkaya harshly criticised the discrepancy between the revolutionary theses in the circle’s journals and the pacifist practices of the TİİKP Central Committee. These criticisms culminated in the “February Decision of the Eastern Anatolia Regional Committee” on 7 and 8 February 1972 advocating “the main duty of building a party and an army within an armed struggle” (STMA 1988: 2194). Although both the TKP-ML and the PDA circles pursued a Maoist line, the former supported immediate armed revolutionary struggle in the regions where conditions were suitable, whereas the latter advocated waiting until conditions were right in the all regions because for a single spark to start a prairie fire, all the prairie must be dry (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 470).

This decision led to a rupture and expedited the founding of the TKP-ML. To distinguish itself from Communist Parties dependent on Soviet social imperialism, it added the Marxist-Leninist suffix (STMA, 1988: 2194). Kaypakkaya’s views rallied support from within the TİİKP including Ali Haydar Yıldız, Ali Mercan and Cem Somel, and also from his colleagues (*e.g.* Muzaffer Oruçoğlu, Arslan Kılıç and Ali Taşyapan) at the Çapa College of Teacher’s Training (Çapa Öğretmen Okulu) where he studied (Ersan, 2014: 56). They constituted the Central Committee of the TKP-ML.

Just like most of the other circles, Kaypakkaya tried to distinguish between his clique and the others. By showing their petty bourgeois origins and how revisionist and pacifist they were, he claimed that there was no difference between the TİP circle that supported parliamentarism and the MDD circle that sought a military coup as they both advocated a “non-capitalist thesis of modern revisionism” (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 404). These movements were political currents of “national bourgeoisie” and cloaked their revisionist ideas in socialism (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 405).

Kaypakkaya exposed the real motivation behind the MDD and Yön/Devrim circles’ incitement of student militancy in an alliance with the national bourgeoisie. By using

student militancy as leverage, maintained Kaypakkaya, these circles masterminded a military coup (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 404). Despite the fact that they had left the MDD circle, these groups still supported Mihri Belli's analysis of Kemalism and Turkish political history and his thesis of counter-revolution (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 407). Belli's theses, which were designed to justify his putschism, drove them to the wrong positions regardless of whether they were Maoist or Guevarist.

The petty bourgeois, as well as the THKO and THKP-C, gravitated towards the MDD and Yön circles by following false political and ideological lines based on "urban guerrilla practices (kidnapping, bank robbery, and so forth) which superseded revolutionary struggle" and substituted the class struggle of the masses with a "conspiracy of a small number of intelligentsia" (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 489-490). Moreover, urban guerrillas would not be effective because the repressive state (the enemy) was so strong in the cities. Instead, Kaypakkaya suggested a "peasant guerrilla war" to encircle the cities from the rural areas where the enemy was relatively weak. The guerrilla war would be an instrument to prepare peasants to rebel and an instrument for the transition to a regular army which was a *sine qua non* because guerrilla war weakens the enemy but cannot ensure a final triumph (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 484). Guerrilla groups that would constitute the nucleus of a people's army would not only engage in armed struggle but also would publish propaganda, organise and arm the masses (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 480,481).

He refuted the assumptions of the MDD and Yön circles and their extensions (the THKO, THKP-C and particularly the PDA circle) that the petty bourgeois dictatorship of Kemalism had created a "national bourgeoisie" and that the "progressive army" led revolutions in Turkey. For Kaypakkaya, these were erroneous since they ran counter to the Leninist theory of the state according to which the state was a repressive and exploitative apparatus of the dominant classes which held power and used the state for their own benefits, not to create another class (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 301). What Kemalist rule had done was "not the creation of a national bourgeois but the empowerment/enrichment of the comprador big

bourgeoisie and the landlords by means of mobilizing all state facilities” (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 134).

However, Kaypakkaya’s writings were contradictory. On one hand, he criticised the creation by the state apparatus of a national bourgeoisie out of petty bourgeois bureaucrats, while on the other hand he took the very same viewpoint: “a section within the middle bourgeoisie, which participated in the liberation war, used the state apparatus as leverage to get rich” (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 108). By such means as obtaining credits from state-owned banks either interest-free or illegally, seizing the goods and assets of Armenians and Greeks who had been forced to leave Turkey, bribery and putting state power at the service of imperialist countries’ capitalists they acquired massive amounts of capital, became the new comprador big bourgeoisie and broke away from the middle bourgeoisie that still retained the national character (Kaypakkaya, 1976:108). If the comprador bourgeoisie and the landlords were the dominant powers, how the middle bourgeoisie controlled the state apparatus and how and why the dominant classes allowed the latter to use the state apparatus for its benefit were left unanswered.

He asserted that the dominant classes “deliberately concealed the class nature of Kemalism” because this would undermine their revolutionary strategy based on the petty bourgeois. In the same way, the Yön group, the MDD, the PDA, the THKO and the THKP-C tried to conceal the real character of the Kemalist revolution which actually, for Kaypakkaya, gave courage and hope to the cowardly bourgeoisie of Asia and the finance oligarchy of imperialist countries but not to the Asian peoples (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 298).

Similarly, and contrary to Leninist state theory, the petty bourgeois movements assigned a revolutionary role to the army which was in fact part of the repressive state apparatus. For instance, Çayan argued that after the 12 March coup the army became an instrument of the oligarchy to suppress the people (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 336). Kaypakkaya challenged this argument by stating that the army had always been an instrument of the dominant classes. The army’s attitude towards the

proletariat during the Great Workers Resistance of 15-16 June 1970 proved that these revisionist circles were wrong to expect the army to liberate the people.

Kaypakkaya's ideological development occurred in three phases (Altinoğlu, 2006). In the first phase (1968-1970), he was an adherent of Belli's national democratic revolution thesis. In the second stage (1970-1971), his analysis was based entirely on Lenin, whereas in the final phase (1971-1973) he followed Mao and particularly Charu Mazumdar, the leader of the Naxalite movement, a Maoist insurgency in the Bengal region of India⁹³. Influenced by Mazumdar, Kaypakkaya overestimated the immediacy of armed struggle and the efficacy of armed propaganda. Seeing a revolutionary struggle as "a protracted people's war" which began in the rural areas, the TKP/ML founded the Worker Peasant Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (TİKKO)) as its armed guerrilla wing (STMA, 1988: 2193) out of which a peoples' army would grow.

From May 1972 to January 1973, the TKP-ML movement concentrated on an armed campaign aimed at military and civil targets comprising so-called denouncers, fascists and collaborators in the eastern province of Tunceli (STMA, 1988: 2194). However, the security forces killed Ali Haydar Yılmaz, captured Kaypakkaya (Ersan, 2014: 57) and arrested almost all the central committee by May 1973 (Ersan, 2014: 58). Whilst awaiting trial in Diyarbakır prison, Kaypakkaya was tortured to death and the TKP-ML movement also died.

Kaypakkaya's theses underpinned the TKP-ML circle and also its offsprings' positions in the renewed revolutionary movement after 1974 (STMA, 1988: 2194). His writings were compiled in a book *Bütün Yazılar I* (Complete Writings). His writings are critically analysed below to find out how the TKP-ML viewed the world order, how it analysed Turkish foreign policy, which theoretical framework it used in this analysis, and what its meta-theoretical disposition was.

⁹³ Altinoğlu claimed that he himself witnessed the influence on Kaypakkaya of Charu Mazumdar, who interpreted Maoist theses and applied them to conditions in India (Altinoğlu, 2006).

5.5.2. Interpretations of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

Kaypakkaya's Maoist formation revealed itself in his general view of the world and his assessment of the state Turkey was in. Kaypakkaya defined the distinctive feature of the early 1970s as the "total downfall of imperialism and the worldwide march of socialism towards triumph" (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 297). In the 1960s, the Soviet Union lost its revolutionary leadership in the world socialist movement and became an imperialist power. He saw Soviet social imperialism as an accomplice of US imperialism and the great enemy of the people (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 339).

Kaypakkaya thought that the development of the market and of capitalism were contingent on each other. As national markets coalesced worldwide and constituted the world market in the epoch of imperialism, domestic markets were opened up to monopoly bourgeoisies (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 293). Contrary to the TKP and TIP circles, Kaypakkaya argued imperialism did not help the development of capitalist production relations in backward countries, but rather it impeded them by alliances with feudalism (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 294) and tried to preserve feudal means of production (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 511) and the reactionary classes with military and other aid (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 505).

His account of how imperialism works was much the same as the other circles'. Imperialist countries exported capital to underdeveloped countries with highest interest rates and low prices for land, labour and raw materials. Their goals were to own land and raw materials, colonise underdeveloped countries, enslave their people and consolidate the rule of reactionary classes (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 294). He differed from the others on the position of the national bourgeoisie. To Kaypakkaya, as the national bourgeoisie of backward countries could not compete with giant imperialist monopolies, rule by the national bourgeoisie was unlikely, if not impossible. Therefore either it collaborated with imperialism to get a share from exploitation and so became a comprador bourgeoisie, or it was overthrown by economic, politic, social and military suppression of the comprador bourgeoisie and landlords.

Kaypakkaya asserted that the “relatively neutral foreign policy” of nationalist socialist regimes of such Arab countries as Syria, Egypt and Libya did not stem from national bourgeoisie rule, but from the “delicately balanced influence and penetration of American imperialism and Soviet social imperialism” (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 521). Their ruling classes used relations with one side against the other to increase their share of the exploitation. In addition, this balance gave them some room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. However, when the balance of power tilted in favour of one of the imperialists, the relatively neutral position of the backward countries evaporated (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 522). Kaypakkaya said the revisionist circles praised the nationalist Arab regimes’ “independent foreign policy” because the putschist strategy of these circles tried to emulate them by taking power through military coups (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 523).

Against this background Kaypakkaya made very critical assessment of Kemalist foreign policy which was much praised by the other leftist circles. Whilst doing so, he also critically analysed Kemalism, its class character and the nature of its revolution, primarily drawing on Şnurov’s chapter “Türkiye Proletaryası” (Proletariat of Turkey)⁹⁴. He criticised the other leftist circles, which incorrectly saw Kemalism as a “leftist section of the petty bourgeoisie”, for ignoring both the realities of Turkey and Marxism (Kaypakkaya, 1976:146). Kaypakkaya directly challenged this common misconception by asserting that “Kemalism is the ideology of the right wing of the Turkish comprador big bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie” (Kaypakkaya, 1976:149).

Similarly, contrary to most leftist circles’ view that the military-civil intelligentsia section of the petty bourgeoisie lead the Kemalist revolution, he argued that the middle bourgeoisie was only an “auxiliary force” (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 119). The leading forces were the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlords who later became the dominant classes. The leaders of the revolution cooperated with

⁹⁴ Şnurov, A. and Rozaliyev, Y. (1970). “Türkiye”de Kapitalistleşme ve Sınıf Kavgaları [Capitalisation Process in Turkey and Class Struggles], İstanbul: Ant Yayınları (quoted in Kaypakkaya, 1976:99). Kaypakkaya believed that Şnurov’s views reflected Stalin’s and the Soviet Union’s views on the character of the Kemalist revolution (1976:99).

imperialism by stealth during the war years so imperialism consented to Kemalist rule (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 303). Following agreements with imperialists, this relationship increased and Kemalist Turkey submitted to British and French imperialism (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 303-304).

Although much praised by all other leftist circles, Kaypakkaya exposed the bedrock of Kemalist “total independence” and “national liberationism (milli kurtuluşçuluk)”. Kaypakkaya argued that the former meant willingly consenting to the status of a semi-colony because it submitted first to British-French imperialism and later to German imperialism (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 394). It was “supposedly independent” but in effect was “politically semi-dependent on imperialism” (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 303). Kemalism’s “national liberationism” actually meant reconciling itself to the replacement of colonial status with semi-colonial status through economic and political cooperation with imperialism (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 395).

Also unlike the other circles, Kaypakkaya did not see the Kemalist regime’s relationship with the Soviets as anti-imperialist and therefore leftist. The regime had a “realpolitik” motivation toward the Leninist Soviet Union from 1919 to 1923. The Kemalist government used its relations with the Soviet Union as a negotiating position with British and French imperialism to change lethal provisions of the ill-fated Treaty of Sevres (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 350). Prior to the February 1921 London Conference, the Kemalist government assassinated Mustafa Suphi, leader of the TKP, and 14 party members (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 350). In addition, during the conference the government asked the Soviet Union to leave Artvin and Ardahan, northeastern provinces bordering the SU, and attempted to conquer Batum (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 350). However, the Kemalist government did not succeed in London and so turned back to the Soviets. After stopping the Greek invasion, however, Kemalists oppressed communists since they no longer needed Soviet help (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 350). Contrary to the revisionist view that Kemalism cooperated with imperialism after Atatürk’s death, Kaypakkaya asserted it had collaborated with them all along, explaining why Turkey was liberated much faster than China and Vietnam (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 350).

Similarly, Lenin supported the Kemalists to isolate British-French imperialists who were then more reactionary and the greater enemy (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 394), not because the Kemalists were leftist but because he wanted to contain imperialist expansion and to break imperialist containment.

Kaypakkaya argued that the dominant comprador bourgeoisie and landlords united in the CHP (Republican People's Party) because of single-party rule, yet separated into two factions. The power struggle did not occur between the national bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie, but between the two factions of the comprador bourgeoisie and the landlords (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 109). He did not, however, explain why one section of the comprador bourgeoisie and landlords opposed Kemalist rule while the other took part in it, why one was progressive and the other reactionary, and how these classes came into being. Although his thesis was evocative of İdris Küçükömer's *Düzenin Yabancılaşması* (Alienation of the Order), he does not go that far to depict the rightists as "progressive forces" (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994).

The first clique that dominated the state apparatus collaborated with British and French imperialism till the mid-1930s, and then collaborated with German imperialism. Although they overtly supported Nazi fascism, they could not go to war alongside Germany due to the global "balance of power" and the existence of the Soviet Union (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 122). Prior to the Second World War the middle bourgeoisie supported this clique (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 126). The reactionary second clique in the CHP seemed to play a relatively "progressive" role as a front for democrats (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 123) and gained strength with the defeat of Germany. In the post-war era, American pressure obliged Turkey to move to a multi-party system. Thus the second clique, a loyal servant of US imperialism, organised in the DP and came to power (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 389).

Again in contrast to the MDD and Yön circle's interpretation of the DP gaining power as a "counter-revolution" in which the big bourgeoisie ended petty bourgeois rule, he posited that this was a shift of "the rule of comprador big bourgeoisie and the

landlords that had served the German imperialism” to “the rule of those in the service of US imperialism” (Kaypakkaya, 1976: 127). However, this was just a transition from military fascist dictatorship based on single-party rule to a multi-party dictatorship. The democratic opposition of the working classes was used to bring this new clique to power since a popular movement lead by the proletariat was not created by the TKP circle (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 305).

Kaypakkaya diverged from other circles over the 27 May movement too. Contrary to the bourgeois with a socialism mask (Belli and Avcıoğlu) who maintained that the middle bourgeoisie seized power and the MBK government represented it (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 313), Kaypakkaya claimed that the clique overthrown in 1950 seized power again from the second clique in 1960 by mobilising middle bourgeoisie discontent and the youth against the DP government’s fascist oppression (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 314). After seizing power, this CHP clique accepted the middle bourgeoisie’s demand for democratic rights on a limited scale (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 314).

According to the revisionist leftist circles’ interpretation, argued Kaypakkaya, since the petty bourgeois rule embraced a capitalist development model thereby creating a national bourgeoisie by means of state support, Turkey could not achieve development. As these circles misinterpreted state capitalism as socialism, they criticised the Kemalist rule for adopting a capitalist liberal economic order instead of state capitalism (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 381). Similarly, they viewed Kemalism as a leftist ideology because it embraced state capitalism in the 1930s.

As “immediacy of action” was the basic motivation of the TKP-ML, almost all its intellectual thinking focused on explaining the “exigency of revolutionary struggle”, “justifying its revolutionary strategy”, and “separating it from other circles’ strategies”. Like the THKO and THKP-C circles, this circle did not deal extensively with international relations and Turkish foreign policy, so this section has dealt with only very limited TKP-ML sources.

Kaypakkaya, the circle's theorist, transposed Mao's analysis of Chinese classes and social structure to Turkey without examining their relevance (Akdere and Karadeniz 1994: 305). This was seen in his use of the Maoist middle bourgeoisie, comprador and the national bourgeoisie dichotomy, and his description of pre-Kemalist Turkish society as colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal. His analysis of international relations and their reflection in national politics echoed Mao's views in *Selected Works*. Comprador big bourgeoisie and imperialist powers were two significant variables, the former always the "running dog" of imperialism, divided into factions adhering to different imperialist powers and raising no objection to imperialist plunder of the country as long as it takes its share (Kaypakkaya, 2013: 383).

Control of the market was central to Kaypakkaya's understanding of international relations. While it was supposed to be "the interactions between ... sovereign and equal states" (Lacher, 2006: iix), imperialism created distortions. Once a country joined the world economic system, local classes could not compete with the monopoly bourgeoisie and so collaborated with imperialist powers. Conflicts among imperialists over control of backward countries turned into war. If an imperialist power lost ground in that war, its comprador bourgeoisie faction would not only lose its market but also lose power to the winning imperialist's faction.

Kaypakkaya depicted Turkish political history as "continuous splits and wars within the ranks of the comprador and landlord classes and of the international bourgeoisie" (Mao, 1967: 66). He defined two comprador big bourgeoisie factions in Turkey. The first, in power from 1923 to 1950, adhered to British-French imperialism until the mid-1930s when it shifted to German imperialism. However, he did not mention the allegiance of the second clique until the Second World War. Similarly, he did not explain how and why the second sided with British-US imperialism and why the first changed to German imperialism in the mid-1930s. Since German imperialism was defeated by the Allies, the first clique that supported the former was overthrown by the latter clique. However, he ignored historical facts at the empirical level that undermined his interpretation, such as: the Turco-Anglo-French Tripartite Alliance Treaty of 1939; receiving military aid within the scope of US Lend-Lease aid via the

UK in 1941; the participation of İnönü, then the president of Turkey, in the Second Cairo Conference of 1943 organized by the UK and the US to address Turkey's contribution to the Allies; and the signing of the Turco-American Lend-Lease agreement in 1945. He therefore failed "to examine deeper structures and mechanisms that may generate these events" (Joseph, 2002:6).

Although he associated the first clique with the CHP government, he neglected the fact that the CHP remained in power in the post-war era until May 1950. To prove his Maoist view, he argued that establishing relations with US imperialism brought the second circle to power, without mentioning the CHP governments' efforts to establish relations with the US, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. He did not address who composed these factions, how they came into being and how a faction survived in opposition. Equally, he did not explain which imperialist power the first faction allied with after the war and how it rose to power in 1960 notwithstanding the second circle's full allegiance to US imperialism.

The rivalry between the USSR and China in the international socialist movement in the 1960s impacted on Kaypakkaya's views on international relations. He stuck to the Maoist account of international relations which was driven by China's foreign policy strategy. Thus he depicted the Soviet Union as social imperialism, an extension of Russian imperialism competing with the US for world hegemony; therefore it was as perilous as US imperialism. He resorted to realist, balance of power terms to explain relations among imperialists and between them and backward countries in the context of combined and uneven development.

Nevertheless, Kaypakkaya tried to analyse international relations in terms of the international capitalist system. He rightly saw the relations between national and international structures; but he simplified "the complex relations between national and international structures and strategies" (Joseph, 1998:104) by reducing them to the reflection of international power politics at the state level. In identifying capitalism with "production for profit on the market" (Brenner, 1977:32), he saw international trade as the key structure and imperialist powers/international

bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie as the key agents. To Kaypakkaya, the state was the instrument of the comprador classes. However, he neglected to address why the bourgeoisie's control oscillated between its factions and how other classes and factions consented to its rule. This was mainly because he failed to see the nature of the capitalist state which had a "structural function in securing the conditions for economic reproduction and capital accumulation" (Joseph, 2002:187). Consequently, he did not explain changes and continuity in Turkish foreign policy through the lens of "conflict between hegemonic projects, structures of regulation and [the] economic generative mechanism" (Joseph, 2002: 206). He attributed foreign policy to imperialist conflicts shifting the allegiance of the comprador bourgeoisie. This resulted in weak explanatory power that proceeded from the eclectic nature of his theoretical framework combining realism and Maoism to explain international relations and Turkish foreign policy strategy as with the other circles.

5.6. Conclusion

In this chapter one of the main findings was the continuity between the student movement and the socialist movement of the 1960s in terms of their eclectic theoretical frameworks mixing realist geopolitics and Marxist class analysis to explain international relations. Accordingly, Turkey's foreign policy was seen as being aligned with class interest, whereas imperialist foreign policy was determined by geopolitics: Turkey entered into the orbit of US imperialism because of class interest, while for the US it was Turkey's geopolitical location.

This chapter explored the fact that while student militancy was seen as a "break" with 50 years of reformism and revisionism in the TKP tradition which lacked a perspective on revolutionary rule and was a kind of leftist wing of Kemalism, it was far from a real "break" from the traditional socialist movement (Altınöglü, 2006). The debate amongst the old-school socialists of the 1960s about whether Turkish society was feudal or not did not contribute to leftist students' theoretical development because they lacked "a tradition of proven political theory to draw upon" (Samim, 1981:74). Rather, they studied Marxism on their own and for their

own purposes, i.e. “immediacy of action” as a means of seizing power. As a result, their assessments were based on conjunctural developments and trendy conceptions and hence varied greatly (one day a pettybourgeois radicalist, another day a Maoist, and later a proponent of Enver Hoxha). Thus, in defining their political and ideological orientation, they drew upon socialist countries’ foreign policy as regards American imperialism.

As with the 1960s left, the leftist students and their clandestine organisations did not criticise the existing societal system from the standpoint of “social property relations” but from the perspective of “development”. They either reduced socialism to merely a “method of development” or literally adapted ready-made analyses for totally different social formations (such as Maoist China) into the Turkish context. Similarly, they did not reflect on how the left would solve exploitative production relations or how it would achieve rapid development without exploiting producers. They did not question the historical and social origins of the state, but instead accepted the nation state and the states system as given. Consequently, they reduced revolution to seizure of the state through an anti-imperialist struggle against the US presence in Turkey in order to better position it in the (capitalist) states system

This chapter also discovered that just like the old leftists, the socialist students misconceived petty bourgeois rule and its statist economic model, thus implicitly and explicitly seeking an alliance with it. “The prevailing pro-enlightenment mindset in the socialist movement of Turkey” (Kayaoğlu, 2006) held that the task of revolution was relinquished by the bourgeoisie and taken up by petty bourgeois intellectuals. This legitimised the socialists’ alliance with Kemalism which represented enlightenment and a bourgeois revolution (Kayaoğlu, 2006). Consequently they set out to finish the modernisation project of Kemalism to break the feudal yoke through land reform and to transform the masses into “free citizens”, thus achieving their well-known objective “Totally Independent Truly Democratic Turkey”. Since the people were not “free citizens” due to the prevalence of feudal production relations, this could not be realised through parliamentarism which worked only in “true democracies”. The state had to be seized by force through a national democratic

revolution strategy. The only exception to this line was, again, the TKP/ML. It ruled out an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie and harshly criticised Kemalism. Oddly, however, it assigned the anti-feudal struggle to the proletariat as part of a capital-labour conflict; so the most propitious conditions for the emergence of socialism depended on the end of feudalism (Kaypakkaya, 2013:511).

Irrespective of whether they were pro or con Kemalism, all factions were so dominated by the “pro-enlightenment mindset” that they stressed and modelled their revolutionary strategy on an “enlightened vanguard” revolutionary group which would give consciousness to the masses. To them, a revolutionary vanguard could change the course of history and the masses, impressed by its heroism and self-sacrifice, would be mobilised (Altınoğlu, 2006). As Çayan put it, guerrilla war would awaken the masses which unconsciously reproduced the existing order, thus activating a neutralised nationalist reaction among the people. Given the importance of human agency among leftist students, it is legitimate to conclude that the existentialism of Sartre, which assumed the “development of society proceeds from the isolated individual” (Novack, 2002: 265), might have impacted on the leftist students’ ideological development. Therefore, although similar to the traditional socialist movement intellectually, student militants diverged with the former in practice. Contrary to orthodox Marxism’s insistence on the necessity of objective conditions for revolution (*i.e.* structure), the leftist students emphasised human agency. As “immediacy of action” was the basic motivation of these factions, they engaged in intellectual endeavour only when necessary and devoted their efforts largely to revolutionary practice. They touched on foreign policy issues only to put their armed struggle on a theoretical basis. This resulted in the paucity within student-led leftist literature of comprehensive research into international relations and Turkish foreign policy.

Student-led leftist literature viewed international relations and Turkish foreign policy through the lenses of either Maoism (PDA and TKP/ML cliques) or the Stalinist version of Leninist imperialism (THKP-C and THKO factions). The impact of Leninist imperialism was apparent in all these factions’ conception of the world

order where “control of the market was central to their account of international relations”, international trade was the key structure and imperialists and comprador bourgeoisie its key agents. While they adhered to Lenin’s imperialism theory, they thought it should be adapted to the post-war conditions. Some groups followed the Leninist line, which focuses on inevitable inter-imperialist wars, while others pursued a Kautskian line by stating that inter-imperialist war was obsolete. In defining “nation” as a “market”, they stressed the domination of the “national market” by imperialism. When the local monopoly bourgeoisie integrated with imperialism, the country joined the world market, development stalled and imperialism dominated the country’s foreign policy. As dependence on imperialism constrained the development of productive forces, and therefore Turkey’s development, it was necessary to sever all ties with imperialism and become an “autarchy”. The voluntarist perspective of dependency theory came into play in their explanation of the possibility of independent development for underdeveloped countries. Therefore “autarchy” as an economic model and “neutrality” as a foreign policy were idealised by these factions.

Since leftist circles generally associated these principles (autarchy and neutrality) with Kemalism, a “return to the Kemalist golden age” stood out in this literature, excluding the TKP/ML which asserted that a neutral foreign policy for an underdeveloped country required an imperialist balance of power. In a fully integrated world system, an underdeveloped country could not pursue an independent foreign policy by itself. If it did, the country would be a transient state resulting from a “balance of power” between imperialist powers. For the THKP-C, independent economic development and an independent foreign policy were possible only if capitalism developed on its own in an underdeveloped country. The national bourgeoisie emerging in this autarchic unit would ensure “total independence”. To avoid the national bourgeoisie becoming a monopoly bourgeoisie, the country should sever its economic, political and military ties with imperialism so it could develop independently.

Another finding of the chapter was that the traditional socialist movement's instrumentalist conception of the state was also an influential theoretical tool for student militancy. They analysed change in Turkish foreign policy strategy after the Second World War in terms of the shift in the social classes who captured the state apparatus, whereas the TKP/ML saw it as a shift in factions of comprador bourgeoisie. Kaypakkaya pointed to a regularly occurring pattern of power shifts between factions of the comprador bourgeoisie in Turkish politics. He schematised and reduced the shifts to siding with the right imperialist power at the right time. Because of the voluntaristic nature of their analysis, which focused on changing the dominant classes that controlled the state apparatus, they ignored underlying structural mechanisms that caused this transformation to emerge. They rather dealt with "observable social relations" without "provid[ing] explanations of the mechanisms that generate the observable phenomenon" (Yalvaç, 2010:170). Due to this theoretical tool, they also failed to see the structural function of a capitalist state in securing economic reproduction and capital accumulation (Joseph, 2002:187). They neither analysed the state as "a strategic terrain on which different groups compete to implement their hegemonic projects" (Joseph, 2002:33) nor approached the transformation of Turkish foreign policy after 1945 by considering the reorganisation of the superstructure pursuant to "structural developments" (Joseph, 2002:33). They ignored global capital accumulation strategy and its impact on domestic accumulation strategy, so their eclectic theoretical framework seemingly politicised their "realist account" by incorporating class politics into their foreign policy analysis.

Çayan's uncovering of the realpolitik basis underlying the Soviet Union's non-capitalist development model for underdeveloped countries and Kaypakkaya's seeing realpolitik motivation in Kemalist Turkey's rapprochement with Leninist Russia had some validity; but their analysis in its totality did not have real explanatory power to fully explain the variations in Turkish geopolitical strategy due to their eclectic analytical framework combining two different and contrasting theoretical positions: Marxism and realism. In their analysis, different factions of the bourgeoisie struggled to control the state apparatus to realize their class interests nationally and to pursue a

foreign policy in the imperialists' interests. They confined their vision to a domestic class struggle over control of the state apparatus thereby falling into the trap of "focusing exclusively on a domestic social model and failing to understand or theorize the interactions amongst states" (Allison, 2011: 36). Similarly, along with its Third World narrative concerning the world order, the Aydınlık circle employed realism in its interpretations of international politics. Inspired by the MDD and Yön circles, the THKO circle also used an eclectic theoretical framework. Consequently, socialists' meta-theoretical positions oscillated between the social relational ontology of Marxism and the atomistic ontology of realism.

Since they were obsessed with isolated development, they did not even consider the possibility of "combined" development. They failed to approach change in Turkish geopolitical strategy from the perspective of the relationship between late development and geopolitical alignments or the relationship between the catch-up strategy of any hegemonic project and external military-geopolitical and economic pressures. What they did was cut off the development of capitalist social property relations from the "geopolitical dimension of any hegemonic project" (de Graaff and von Apeldoorn, 2011:407) in terms of its vision of the world order and the position of Turkey therein. As a result, "ignoring the dialectical relation between structure and agency" (Yalvaç, 2014:131) they mistakenly attributed a voluntarist character to the "independent" foreign policy of the Kemalists and the "satellite foreign policy" of the DP government. This was mainly because of their failure to examine the geopolitical strategy in relation with global accumulation strategy. Their "problem solving" theoretical frameworks sought to push a "backward" Turkey into an honourable position in the hierarchy of states without paying attention to whether or not they were naturalising a state system which "reproduces the worldwide system of capitalism, along with its structured inequalities" (Yalvaç, 2010:167). Consequently, such eclectic frameworks, which did not possess an all-encompassing perspective that took into account the world economy, the state system and domestic class structures, could not explain in a satisfactory manner the issues at hand via a perspective that was based on historical materialism.

CHAPTER 6

THE TURKISH LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN THE 1970s (1974-1980)

This chapter will assess how Turkey's socialist movement from the 1974 amnesty to the 1980 coup construed the world order and Turkey's foreign policy. This study investigates the leading and most popular factions to draw conclusions about the entirety of the movement. First, the introductory section summarises the period's main external and internal political developments, then each clique's basic characteristics are examined: their identities, ideological leaning, publications and whether they maintained continuity with the student militancy of 1971. Then attention turns to their theoretical framework and meta-theoretical dispositions, whether historical materialist approaches to IR (such as dependency, the world system analysis) were incorporated into their conception of the world order and Turkey's foreign policy.

6.1. Introduction

Notable external politico-economic developments from 1973 to 1980 were, *inter alia*, the retreat of the US from Vietnam, the northern enlargement of the EEC (which brought in the UK, Ireland and Denmark), the increasingly tense Sino-Soviet rivalry over global hegemony, the 6-day Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the oil embargo of the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) against Western countries, the soaring oil prices brought about by the energy crisis and ensuing stagflation in the US and European economies, the resignation of US President Richard Nixon as a result of the Watergate Scandal and the succession of Vice President Gerald Ford as president in 1974, the culmination of the détente with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the strained relations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Angolan civil war of 1975, the election of Jimmy Carter as the president of the US in 1976, the demise of Chinese leader Mao, the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel, the abolishment of the Shah regime by the

Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the establishment of Islamic Republic of Iran by Ayatollah Khomeini, the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty by the US and the USSR to halt the spread of nuclear weapons (but which was left unratified), the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR and subsequent breakdown of the détente and emergence of the second Cold War, the establishment of a tripartite alliance consisting of China, the US and Pakistan against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Iraqi invasion of Iran, and the beginning of the longstanding Iran-Iraq war (Gönlübol *et al.*, 1987; Oran eds. 2013).

Concomitant with this rocky external politico-economic landscape, Turkey was run by short-term coalition governments from the 1973 elections until the 1980 coup, during which time the era of the newly elected CHP-led government witnessed a general amnesty in 1974, and there were a number of other developments as well, including the freeing of political prisoners which led to the re-emergence of leftist groups, the toppling of Cyprus President Makarios by a Greek-backed coup in July 1974 following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the withdrawal of Greece from the military wing of NATO to protest Turkish military aggression, the US arms embargo on Turkey in February 1975, Turkey's cancelation of the Joint Defence Cooperation agreement of 1969 in July 1975, the strained relations between Turkey and the EEC brought about by the EEC's launch of accession negotiations with Greece in 1976, the Greek-Turkish continental shelf dispute, the lifting of the US arms embargo on Turkey in 1978, the signing of a Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement between the US and Turkey in March 1980, the increasing violence between radical leftist and ultra nationalist groups in Turkey, the political instability caused by the uncompromising attitudes of Turkish political leaders, and the concurrent economic crisis and subsequent military seizure of power via another coup in September 1980 (Gönlübol *et al.*, 1987; Oran eds. 2013; Aydın and Taşkın, 2014).

Agitation by the NDR and Yön/Devrim circles in the army and their instigation of a guerrilla movement resulted in the military coup of March 1971. However, contrary to their expectation it was not a "leftist" coup but a "fascist" one as it dashed the plan of these circles that the military-civil intelligentsia would take power to realise a

national democratic revolution. Not only did the suppressive environment following the coup bring about the closure of their journals – the main outlets of the leftist movement (such as *Ant*, *Devrim* and *Aydınlık*) – and of the TİP and the imprisonment of leftist intellectuals, but also it led to the suppression of leftist plotters in the army by their superiors (Samim, 1981:72; Çayan, 2003:313). By early 1973, the guerrilla groups had been utterly suppressed by the security forces and student militancy ended. The leading cadres and their adherents were killed in armed conflicts, executed or jailed by court martials or fled abroad (Ersan, 2014:68). Nevertheless, the “1971 student militancy became the launching pad for the rise and development of other leftist organizations” (Lipovsky, 1992:117) in the second half of the 1970s when the youth as professional revolutionaries became the “motor of the social opposition” and “bearer of socialist thoughts to the masses” (Ersan, 2014:71).

Imprisonment was a brewing period for a new revolutionary phase as “the leftists underwent political self-criticism” that gave birth to two types of behaviour: some undertook a “radical self-criticism about the past” and “walked away from militancy” whereas others made “tactical concessions to preserve continuity” (Samim, 1981:73). Self-criticism and growing leftist numbers did not, however, achieve a major breakthrough which might have brought along “the formation of a new mass socialist party with democratic norms and a grasp of the originality of the Turkish social formation” (Samim, 1981:77). Rather, the Turkish socialist movement was bogged down in “a field of sectarian politics” (Samim, 1981:77). Aydınoglu put it succinctly (2008:324): “The more it grew, the more it crumbled into pieces; the more it crumbled, the more the new pieces drifted apart from each other.” Although the socialists organised in only one socialist party in the 1960s, the second half of the 1970s witnessed five different parties “all claimants to the role of avant-garde of the Turkish labouring people” (Lipovsky, 1992:164), and all “accused each other of splitting the socialist movement” (1992:148). Furthermore, the 1960s NDR-SR rift over determining the “right” revolutionary strategy widened in the 1970s to include the progressive democratic revolution and the democratic popular revolution (Lipovsky, 1992:131).

The post-amnesty leftist movement was divided into many fractions which roughly traced three different paths: “pro-Sino”, “pro-Soviet” and “independent” (Aydınoğlu, 2011; Samim, 1981). The deepening Sino-Soviet ideological conflict in the mid-1970s was the main determinant for most Turkish leftist circles (Aydınoğlu, 2011:385). The most important development was the reorganisation of the TKP which had not been active since the 1951 arrests (Ersan, 2014:70). Interestingly, the concurrent “Euro-communism” uprising, in which Western European Communist Parties searched for autonomy from the Soviet and Chinese parties, “hardly [made] any impact on the Turkish left”⁹⁵ (Aydınoğlu, 2011:386). Unlike the 1960s, each circle’s journal consolidated its cadres and functioned as a propaganda machine to prove how erroneous other groups’ premises were, how correct their own was, or how they were the true followers of the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

6.2. Maoist Groups

In the international order, the 1970s is associated with “*détente*” in which the geopolitical tension between the US and the USSR eased. It was also the onset of the feud between Moscow and Beijing as China started to accuse the Soviet Union of “social imperialism”. Given the leftists’ growing disillusionment with the USSR’s more moderate foreign policy, China’s successful Cultural Revolution and its belief in immediate action, Maoism became more attractive to some. As Maoism, albeit temporarily, attracted leftist groups, some existing Maoist sects (Aydınlık and Halkın Birliği (the Union of People), a successor of the TKP/ML) secured their places. Others converted to Maoism such as Halkın Kurtuluşu (People’s Liberation), a successor of THKO, and Halkın Yolu (Path of the People, formerly Militant Youth), a successor of THKP-C which later coalesced with Aydınlık (STMA, 1988; Ersan, 2014). The second half of the 1970s, therefore, witnessed an intra-Maoist feud (Samim, 1981) as well as antagonism between Maoist, Soviet and independent groups. Of them two prominent Maoist sects, the Aydınlık circle and People’s Liberation, will be analysed below.

⁹⁵ However, Lipovsky claimed the opposite by arguing that Aybar’s views resembled those of Euro-communist parties (1992:166).

6.2.1. The Aydınlik Circle

6.2.1.1. Introduction

As shown in the previous chapter, the Aydınlik circle composed of university assistants and students⁹⁶ espoused Maoism and split from the NDR movement in 1970. This circle founded an illegal party called the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi (TİİKP)) in 1969. Following the 1971 coup, TİİKP members were jailed or fled abroad and its journals were banned by court martial.

After the 1974 amnesty, this circle re-organised and resumed to publish the journal *Aydınlik* in November 1974, though some members abandoned both the circle and political activism. Because it got off lightly in the aftermath of the 1971 coup, it retained its leading cadres, maintained experienced cadres with ideological unity and decisively advocated Maoism, this sect had the edge over new Maoist factions after the amnesty (Ersan, 2014:169). The TİİKP became a legal party, the Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi (TİKP)), in January 1978. Its ideological fight with other Maoist cliques resulted in Halkın Yolu joining it in 1978, and in Halkın Kurtuluşu changing its ideological line to follow the Albanian Labour Party (Hoxha's views) in order to counter the TİKP (Ersan, 2014:179).

The TİKP ideological monthly *Aydınlik* was published until March 1978 when it became a daily until the 1980 coup. It also published a weekly organ titled *Halkın Sesi* from October 1975 to February 1978 (STMA, 1988:2269), and a monthly central organ called *Türkiye Gerçeği* that was released in March 1979. However, its juxtaposition with the state could not save the TİKP and its leading cadre from sharing the fate of other leftists after the 1980 coup. The party was closed down and its leading cadre imprisoned by court martial (STMA, 1988:2271; Ersan, 2014:186).

⁹⁶ For its social origin, members of this faction were described as “campus Maoists”.

6.2.1.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

The rift between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) reflected in Turkey as early as 1970 when Aydınlık became the first Maoist group. In the early 1970s, the Aydınlık circle mainly focused on which class would lead the national democratic revolution, whether Turkey's social structure was feudal or semi-feudal, whether there existed objective conditions for a revolutionary struggle and so on. In the mid-1970s they shifted their focus onto the CPC's criticism of the Soviet Union. On the CPC's formulation of the Maoist three worlds theory in 1974, the Aydınlık circle became an ardent supporter of this theory which they argued explained the world order through a fully "Marxist lens" predicated on "Leninist imperialism theory" (Aydınlık, 1975a: 2). Its publications served as "the main outlet of the application of this theory to the conditions of Turkey" (Aydınoğlu, 2011: 368). Each leftist faction which did not characterise the USSR as "social imperialism" was a "servant of the Soviets" or "pseudo left" (STMA, 1988: 2269).

Aydınlık argued that in the mid-1960s the world witnessed the decline of peaceful relations among imperialist powers and American hegemony which emerged after the Second World War to contain the socialist camp. In this new stage of international order, they stated that western capitalist countries and Japan rose against US hegemony owing to the uneven development law of capitalism and the capitalist camp broke up. The decolonisation movement was also launched in Africa, Latin America and Asia (Aydınlık, 1975a: 1). "Revisionist" Khrushchev's seizure of power after Stalin's death launched a capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union which became a "social imperialist" country pursuing very similar goals to the classical imperialism, *i.e.* acting with expansionist and hegemonic motives (Aydınlık, 1975a: 1).

Despite their motto "neither American imperialism nor Soviet social imperialism but independent Turkey", they distinguished between the imperialists as to which one was more aggressive. They saw American imperialism as a "falling power" and a

maintainer of the status quo, hence a “defensive” and “benign” power (Perinçek, 1980:13-14), whereas Russian social imperialism was a “rising power” that demanded redivision of the world and so was “more dangerous and aggressive” (Aydınlık, 1975b: 2) and “the real war threat” (Aydınlık, 1975c: 1). Consequently they prioritised the “fight against the insidious and more aggressive Soviet social imperialism” (Aydınlık, 1976a: 9).

This provoked the question of how and why the Soviet Union came to be a social imperialist country. The Aydınlık circle pointed to the expansionist and hegemonic nature of Soviet revisionism’s political system (fascist dictatorship) and its economic base (monopolist state capitalism) (Aydınlık, 1975d: 17). Predicated on Leninist imperialism, they maintained that a rising imperialist country always posed a greater threat to world security since it endeavoured to shift the balance of power in its favour, such as Germany did in two world wars. The Aydınlık, therefore, blamed the Soviet Union for following the trail blazed by Hitler (TİKP, 1978:11; Perinçek, 1980:16). They also took the historically imperialist motives of Russia into account as they likened the successors of Stalin to the “old tsars” in that both embraced “imperialist foreign policy” that used “the Black Sea as a springboard and tried to establish its hegemony over the Mediterranean and Europe” (Aydınlık, 1976b: 2).

The Aydınlık group maintained that countries such as China, Albania, Korea and Vietnam were “real” socialists that constituted an “anti-imperialist camp of the world” (Aydınlık, 1975c: 1). They claimed that the changing global balance of power left the US no choice but to give a place to a powerful China in its global power configuration (Perinçek, 1980: 13). They argued that the Soviet revisionists aimed at hindering the development of China’s “independent” socialist economy (Aydınlık, 1976c: 34) because a backward socialist country would become a colony of a relatively developed socialist country. China, however, embarked on a theoretical and geopolitical confrontation with the USSR, and formulated the three worlds theory: the United States and the USSR superpowers constituted the first world, the second world contained Western and Eastern Europe and also Japan, and the Third World comprised underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America

(Aydınlık, 1975a: 1-2). This theory seemed to be a consequence of China's confrontation with the USSR first to expose Soviet expansionist activities on its doorsteps in South-east Asia where Soviet social imperialism sought to hide its aggressive intentions under the guise of "peace, disarmament and *détente*" (Aydınlık, 1975e: 41), and secondly, among other reasons, to overcome China's fear of isolation by bringing other dissident countries into the anti-Soviet camp.

Although they were said to still consider NATO as an instrument of imperialism, they argued that due to cleavages within the alliance (*e.g.* the withdrawal of French and Greek military forces from NATO's integrated military command, Turkey's closure of American bases following the Cyprus intervention, Spain's attempt to increase rent on American bases and so on) it lacked the power to be aggressive (Aydınlık, 1975f: 9). Consequently, this faction now opposed quitting NATO because it had become a defence pact against Russia (Perinçek, 1980: 17).

The Aydınlık clique argued that the masses could not identify the primary enemy so a vanguard proletariat party should define it and inform the masses (Aydınlık, 1976d: 25). Distinguishing between the two primary enemies (*i.e.* the superpowers), "determining the more dangerous" one and thus "taking advantage of the contradictions" between them was mandatory to achieve a revolution and to "isolate" the more dangerous and aggressive one (Aydınlık, 1976d: 29). They offered a "tension strategy" in lieu of *détente*. Revolutionaries should convince American imperialism to implement a "tit for tat" policy instead of compromise and to abandon a "pseudo-*détente*" policy (Aydınlık, 1976d: 29).

The Aydınlık group argued that "semi-feudal and semi-colonised" Turkey was "under domination and exploitation of imperialism and social imperialism" (STMA, 1988: 2269). Moreover, to Aydınlık Turkey's geopolitical location relative to Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East made it one of the hottest points of the world where the struggle of two superpowers took place in an intensified manner over the control of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern oil (Aydınlık, 1975g: 4). They attributed a crucial role to the Turkish straits which "historically had always

been of significance to Russia to reach the hot waters of the Mediterranean” (Aydınlık, 1976b: 1; Aydınlık, 1975g: 4). To stop Russian expansionism and a new world war, they advocated closing the straits to the new tsars’ warships (Aydınlık, 1976b: 4; TKİP, 1978: 12) and annulling the Montreux Treaty which they argued restricted Turkey’s sovereign rights (Aydınlık, 1976b: 3; TİKP, 1978: 12).

Despite Turkey’s critical geopolitical location, they stated that President İnönü kept Turkey out of the Second World War by means of a “pseudo neutrality policy” that in fact reconciled with the Nazi imperialists (Aydınlık, 1976e: 22). Yet he was unable to prevent Turkey from falling into the orbit of US imperialism after the war (Aydınlık, 1976f: 15). Contradictorily, the Aydınlık group found İnönü’s foreign policy as “realist” at that time (Perinçek, 1980: 16); however, they claimed that neutrality would not work in the late 1970s because the USSR did not have Hitler’s alternative route to the Middle East (Perinçek, 1980:16). Therefore Turkey could not abstain from a likely inter-imperialist war (Perinçek, 1980:16).

Soviet social imperialism endeavoured to infiltrate into Turkey to supersede the declining status of American imperialism (Aydınlık, 1975c: 2; Aydınlık, 1976f: 14). They dismissed a Soviet threat after the Second World War as propaganda to make Turkey a US satellite and argued that anti-US propaganda was now being spread by pro-Soviet leftist currents and the CHP tried to drag Turkey under the domination of Russia (Perinçek, 1980:15). Aydınlık argued that in the mid-1960s Turco-American relations started to deteriorate due to such events as the global decline of American hegemony, the Cyprus issue and the opium production crisis (Aydınlık, 1976e: 17). They even claimed that Turkey was imposing its conditions on the US as evidenced by the latest Defence Cooperation Agreement between them (Perinçek, 1980: 13).

The Aydınlık circle blamed the Soviet Union for precipitating an Eastern Mediterranean war in which the new tsars pitted Turkey, Greece and Cyprus against each other to heighten tensions, create a split in NATO and encourage anti-American sentiment in Turkish society (Aydınlık, 1976g: 30). They argued the military intervention in Cyprus drew Turkey into the hegemonic struggle between the two

superpowers (Aydınlık, 1975g: 4; Aydınlık, 1976e: 20). Therefore this circle looked upon the Cyprus issue as the prime issue for Turkey at the time (TİKP, 1978: 8).

The Aydınlık group accused the pro-Soviet TKP, TİP and TSİP of working as a “fifth column” of Russian imperialism “to assist Soviet social imperialism from within the country to turn Turkey into a colony of this imperialism just like the Eastern European countries” (Aydınlık, 1975b: 4; TİKP, 1978:11-12), and to disseminate the revisionist theses of the USSR. Peaceful coexistence, *détente*, disarmament and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Aydınlık, 1975h: 10) were seen as foreign policy efforts to disguise the Soviet threat (Perinçek, 1980:15). Turkey should turn a deaf ear to *détente*, adopt a decisive foreign policy against the new tsars and strengthen its national defence (TİKP, 1978:11) ally with European countries, the second world, based on national independence and equal relations (Aydınlık, 1976h: 27).

Although other leftist circles (see below) saw Turkey as a dependent country, this circle viewed Turkey as politically independent but without full economic independence (Aydınlık, 1976f: 8). While the former stressed “struggling to acquire” full independence, the latter emphasised the “maintenance of political independence”. Aydınlık claimed that Turkey was not in a “national liberation war” but in a “national independence struggle” which involved “protecting” Turkey’s political independence and territorial sovereignty against the two superpowers particularly Russian social imperialism, ending all relations with the superpowers in politics, economics, culture, military, *et cetera* that impaired independence, and fortifying national defences against the threat of a likely inter-imperialist war and particularly a Russian social imperialist attack (Aydınlık, 1976g: 31).

The Aydınlık circle viewed the world and Turkey’s place in it through the Maoist three worlds theory. Its publications disseminated Maoist views based on this theory. It published either its own views which were mechanical applications of the theory to Turkey’s circumstances or translated articles from the *Peking Review* to prove the three worlds theory. This sect’s views became so identical to the CPC that theoretical and meta-theoretical analyses of the three worlds theory were automatically true.

Chinese attitudes were its touchstone for genuine leftist foreign policy behaviour (Aydınlık, 1976h: 27).

The three worlds theory was formulated in accordance with an utterly realist perspective of Chinese foreign policy concerns in the 1970s. It refuted the Soviet classification of the world into economic systems (capitalist, socialist or non-capitalist) and foreign policy orientation (American, Soviet or nonaligned) (Amin, 1980:223). The theory was a realist geopolitical power politics account of the struggles between a “revisionist” great power and “status quo” great powers (Mearsheimer, 2007:73). The “security dilemma” (Herz, 1951) created by the Soviet pursuit of hegemony and its growing military capability drove China to feel insecure. In order to ensure its survival, China attempted to offset the shifting “balance of power”.

Perinçek, the leader of this circle, emphasised a realist perspective and stated that international relations should be assessed in terms of “balance of powers” (Perinçek, 1980:14-15). Just like neorealist Waltz, they stressed “balance” rather than “bandwagon” (Donnelly, 2005: 37) in international relations and argued that any great power that tried to change the “balance of power” should be opposed by other states to avoid “plac[ing] their security in jeopardy” (Waltz, 1979:126). The Aydınlık group, therefore, claimed that it was “legitimate” to ally with American imperialism and the second world which was an anti-hegemonic power. They accused the pro-Soviet factions and the CHP for bandwagoning in realist terms. These groups ignored the fact that the USSR “later may turn on [Turkey]” (Donnelly, 2013:38).

To prove the theory, the Aydınlık circle referred to historical facts selectively. For instance, while it compared Lenin’s and Stalin’s support for Turkey’s claims on the straits during the Lausanne Peace Treaty and the Montreux Convention negotiations with the Brezhnev clique’s so-called social imperialist attitude since 1956 (Aydınlık, 1976b: 2), it ignored Stalin’s demand on the straits after the Second World War to “demonize” the latter. To justify an alliance with American imperialism, Aydınlık characterised the 1970s world order as analogous to that prior to the Second World

War when Stalin allied with the US against Nazi Germany. These examples show the divergence between the reality of international relations and its biased representation in the Aydınlık circle's view based on the three worlds theory. The circle's work also had a contradictory character: the USSR was both a mightier military power than the US and a "paper tiger" on the brink of economic collapse (Halkın Sesi, 1976/79).

The Aydınlık circle had an eclectic theoretical framework, the three worlds theory combining realism with Marxist phraseology. Although they claimed this framework was Marxist, its main premises easily fit in the realist template. This framework "does not question the present order" but tries to legitimise it (Cox, 1981:128), thus all their intellectual efforts were "to make the existing order work smoothly" (Devetak, 2005:142) to resolve particular Chinese or Turkish foreign policy issues. Their "tendency to legitimize prevailing social and political structures" (Devetak, 2005:142) revealed a positivist meta-theoretical nature. This nature also manifested itself in the "flat ontology" (Wight and Joseph, 2010:18) provided by the three worlds theory. They mainly focused on such surface appearances as rapprochement between the US and the USSR, *détente* and diplomatic visits at the empirical level in critical realist terms without digging out underlying reasons or generative mechanisms that created prevailing social and political structures (Wight and Joseph, 2010:18). Consequently, their theoretical framework lacked the explanatory power to account for the world order and Turkish foreign policy from a historical materialist perspective.

6.2.2. The People's Liberation

6.2.2.1. Introduction

Another Maoist group, People's Liberation (Halkın Kurtuluşu (HK)), was critical of its THKO (Liberation Army) past during the imprisonment period. Some released militants founded a Temporary Central Coordination Committee, composed of Semih Orcan, Atilla Keskin, Gökalp Eren, Teslim Töre and others, in May 1975 (Ersan, 2014:194) to revive the THKO in the form of "a proletariat party equipped

with Marxist-Leninist principles” (Ersan, 2014:195). The HK claimed that it adopted the THKO petty bourgeois radicalist and anti-imperialist legacy but rejected its ideology to become a Marxist organisation (Parti Bayrağı, 1978a: 25).

In October 1975 the temporary committee started to publish an illegal journal called *Yoldaş* (Comrade) to discuss new views (Ersan, 2014:196). In its first issue, HK criticised the THKO for not establishing a proletariat party, a top priority for socialists (Ersan, 2014:195). Moreover its leading cadre and adherents could “not grasp Marxist-Leninist principles” and carried on the revolutionary struggle “unattached to the masses” (Ersan, 2014:194). In its second issue, in accord with Maoism, the HK accused the Soviet Union of social imperialism, thereupon Töre and his adherents drifted away from the HK (Ersan, 2014:196). Scholars attributed international developments in the mid-1970s to the conversion of this faction to Maoism after the amnesty (Samim, 1981; Çubukçu, 2007; Ersan, 2014). The CPC’s apparent defence of Stalin against criticism of him by the CPSU, observed Çubukçu, played a decisive role in moving the HK towards China (Çubukçu, 2007:728). The HK clique blamed the successors of Stalin for adopting a revisionist line that would eventually return the USSR to capitalism (Çubukçu, 2007:728). To Ersan, it was the incongruity between the militants’ radical guerrilla background and the CPSU’s “peaceful co-existence” with US imperialism that drove them to Maoism in their pursuit of new politics (Ersan, 2014:199).

However, the growth of pro-Sino sentiment on the Turkish left did not last long due to Chinese foreign policy’s rightist aberration (such as its support of such fascist dictators as Pinochet and the Shah and its ignorant stance on Palestine) (Akın, 2007:101). This resulted in the growth of a pro-Soviet stance, *i.e.* the increasing significance of the TKP for the first time, and caused some Maoist groups such as the HK to convert to a pro-Hoxha line (Samim, 1981; Akın, 2007; Çubukçu, 2007). According to Ersan, however, the HK converted to Hoxha to escape the pull of the Aydınlık clique in the Maoist current (2014:198). Strikingly, despite substantial shifts in its views between 1975 and 1978, the HK was able to remain united during the turmoil as it crystallised its ideology (Ersan, 2014:193).

After defining its political views and organisational principles, the HK made inroads towards becoming a party at a conference in October 1978, and changed its name to the Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey-Construction Organisation (Türkiye Devrimci Komünist Partisi-İnşa Örgütü (TDKP-İÖ)). The conference assigned the task of transforming the petty bourgeois THKO to a Marxist-Leninist party (Yalçiner, 1988:2270). Eventually the TDKP was founded as an illegal organisation in February 1980 at an establishment congress (Yalçiner, 1988:2270) where Ercan Öztürk, Mustafa Yalçiner, Metin Güngörmüş, Yavuz Yıldırım Türk and others were elected as members of the central executive board (Ersan, 2014:209). Yet the military coup of 12 September 1980 hindered its political struggle and police arrested all its leading cadres and some militants in April 1981, thus ending the TDKP (Ersan, 2014:214).

The HK disseminated its views through *Yoldaş*, the official organ of the party, till 1980 when it was replaced by *Devrimin Sesi* (Voice of Revolution) at the TDKP establishment congress (Ersan, 2014:210). It also had a weekly newspaper, *Halkın Kurtuluşu*, started in February 1976 for politic agitation and discussions of daily politics, and an ideological monthly, *Parti Bayrağı* (Party Flag), published from March 1978 till its closure under martial law in January 1980 (Yalçiner, 1988:2270). Due to being “clandestinely published”, *Yoldaş* and *Devrimin Sesi* (Yalçiner, 1988:2271) are unavailable to researchers through library collections, second-hand bookstores and the internet. To explore this faction’s views on foreign policy this study will rely on its theoretical journal, *Parti Bayrağı* (Party Flag), which covers the period from their espousal of the pro-Hoxha line in 1978 till the 1980 coup.

6.2.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

For the HK, successive fundamental shifts in its views in a very short period complicated its endeavour to prove its theses conformed with Marxist-Leninist principles. Showing itself more Marxist-Leninist than the others and exposing the others’ revisionist theses dominated *Parti Bayrağı*. The HK journal challenged the Maoist currents, *e.g.* Aydınlık, Halkın Birliği, and Halkın Yolu circles, and harshly

criticised their views based on the three worlds theory, accusing them of serving American imperialist interests (Parti Bayrağı, 1978b). This circle provided a comprehensive historical analysis of the Turkish left to reveal the revisionist views of Şefik Hüsnü, the TKP's long-serving leader, and show how other leftist sects followed him rather than Lenin and Stalin.

The HK circle claimed to analyse the world order and Turkey's position through the exegesis of Lenin's imperialism theory as their primary basis (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 55). To this clique, the age of imperialism was dying but imperialist theory was not yet obsolete (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 55). Its distinctive feature was the replacement of progressive competitive industrial capitalism with reactionary monopolist capitalism and the rise of capital outflow. Upon the transformation of competitive capitalism into imperialism, industrial capital merged with bank capital to form finance capital. Thus bourgeoisie dominance was replaced by the dominance of the finance oligarchy which had to export its excess capital since the development of capitalism was substantially completed (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 36). Not only did finance capital outflows create capitalism after its own image in backward countries, but it also limited their development of national industrial capitalism (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 36).

Although the HK circle acknowledged the pillage of underdeveloped countries through unequal trade with the imperialist bourgeoisie, they identified finance capital rather than trade as the basis for imperialist exploitation (Parti Bayrağı, 1978b: 21). Unequal terms of trade and brutal exploitation of cheap labour and resources hindered industrialisation in colonised and semi-colonised countries (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 50). Furthermore, since capitalism was developed by imperialists allied with the pre-capitalist classes (feudal landlords and the trade bourgeoisie), it did not evolve into industrialisation (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 51). These reactionary classes hindered the development of productive forces, hence creating underdevelopment.

Due to the expansionist character of finance capital, imperialist countries tended to expand their sphere of influence and to pursue world hegemony (Parti Bayrağı,

1978e: 92). This instinctive drive gave rise to a partition of the world by a few imperialist countries and to the turning of each national economy into a link in the world economic chain. However, imperialist countries were not equal because of the uneven development law of capitalism, so they could only expand in proportion to “their powers”. When the balance of power among the imperialists shifted the only way to test the power was war (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 16).

In the first half of the 20th century, the imperialist states tested their powers twice through the two devastating world wars. However, after the Second World War, the capitalist-imperialist world witnessed a relatively stable period based on the ascendancy of American imperialism. This ended in the 1960s due to the uneven development law of capitalism and the emergence of the USSR as an imperialist superpower pursuing world hegemony (Parti Bayrağı, 1978b: 26). The 1970s witnessed global struggles between two superpowers to plunder and exploit backward nations (Parti Bayrağı, 1978e: 92). In the 1970s’ world economic depression, Soviet monopolist bureaucrats pursued the annexation of new lands to plunder cheap labour and raw materials to profit from the outflow of capital and goods (Parti Bayrağı, 1978e: 102).

Against this backdrop, the HK group accused the Çayanite continuous revolution thesis of distorting Leninist imperialism theory and advocating the revisionist Kautsky’s ultra-imperialism thesis of a single world monopoly, the disappearance of imperialist rivalry and conflict and the realisation of exploitation in a peaceful environment (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 17). Contrary to the Çayanite thesis that an imperialist war was unlikely in the third depression stage of imperialism because of the existence of a strong socialist bloc, nuclear weapons and inter-imperialist integration (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 13-14), the HK clique argued that war and peace were determined not by the imperialists but by the structure of capitalism (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 14-5). The HK clique challenged the idea of peace among imperialists since imperialism denoted the sharing of markets, resources and influence in proportion to countries’ economic, political and military power, so peaceful development was unlikely (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 22). Similarly, the HK

criticised the Çayanite thesis that the militarisation of economics was a solution to a lack of demand because it argued the requirements of a hegemonic struggle lay behind the militarisation of economics in imperialist countries (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 22).

Just like the Maoists, the HK circle identified the two imperialist superpowers as the primary enemies of the world's people because they conspired against progressive classes and nations and because they constituted the main cause of wars (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 26). However, the HK clique diverged from the Maoists on classifying which imperialist state was more aggressive. For this circle, the theorists of the three worlds and its devoted proponents, such as the Aydınlık and the Halkın Yolu circles, created a deceptive division in imperialism by showing some as aggressive and some as peaceful (Parti Bayrağı, 1978h: 80-81). The HK challenged that American imperialism was as aggressive as Russian imperialism (Parti Bayrağı, 1978e: 96) because aggression was inherent in imperialism, and because all imperialists tended to expand their areas of influence and exploitation (Parti Bayrağı, 1978e: 100), a tendency that altered according to national and international circumstances (Parti Bayrağı, 1978e: 100). Similarly, the HK sect also criticised the three worlds theory for portraying the EEC as an anti-hegemonic power because its anti-hegemonic struggle could not be separated from its struggle to exploit other nations (Parti Bayrağı, 1978g: 53).

The HK clique argued that Maoists incorrectly likened the world order in the 1970s (*i.e.* China's alliance with US imperialism against Soviet social imperialism) to the order prior to the Second World War (*i.e.* the USSR's alliance with US imperialism against the rising Nazi Germany imperialism) to prove their anti-Marxist theses (*i.e.* three worlds theory) (Parti Bayrağı, 1978g: 46). The HK circle asserted that Leninism entailed decrying both forms of imperialism equally (1978g: 50) and defined a Marxist stance as trying to prevent an imperialist war by staging a socialist revolution in all countries irrespective of which imperialist country started the war (1978f: 80). Consequently, the HK sect described Mao's three worlds theory as

revisionist as it disavowed Marxism-Leninism, ministered to imperialism and social imperialism and was counter-revolutionary (Parti Bayrağı, 1978g: 28).

Given that imperialism meant an armament race, the HK saw such international developments as the Helsinki Final Act, *détente* and the SALT Conferences as window dressing to show imperialism as peaceful (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 20-21). Despite criticising the Soviet Union, the HK opposed the idea of non-alignment because non-alignment meant being a “servant of imperialism”. A well-known example of this, argued the HK, was Yugoslavia which left the socialist camp to join the capitalist-imperialist. The HK interpreted non-alignment as reconciling the socialist and capitalist systems, rejecting cooperation with socialist countries and pushing newly independent countries to American imperialism (Parti Bayrağı, 1978g: 40).

The HK schism portrayed Turkey as a semi-feudal, semi-colonised backward agricultural country dominated by imperialism and its collaborator classes (TDKP, 1980). They argued Turkey had been in a democratic revolution since the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Because the bourgeoisie lost its progressive nature during imperialism, the proletariat should complete the process and so liquidate monopolist capitalism which hindered the development of productive forces (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 15; TDKP, 1980), disconnect national capitalism from imperialism and remove the remnants of feudalism (Parti Bayrağı, 1978h: 78). The national bourgeoisie would play a minor progressive role under the leadership of the proletariat (TDKP, 1980). Because they thought the existing ruling comprador bourgeoisie and landlords could not be replaced peacefully by a democratic popular dictatorship, they advocated the Maoist “protracted” people’s war waged by a peasant army under the revolutionary proletariat (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 19).

The HK circle adopted the Stalinist interpretation of the Turkish national liberation war in the 1920s as one waged against the imperialist goal of colonising Turkey under the feudal and capitalist classes (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 34). To them, it was also an incomplete bourgeois revolution. In the absence of a strong proletariat and its

party, and of a peasants' movement, the feudal-bourgeois leadership led the anti-imperialist movement and used it to resolve its differences with imperialism (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 37). HK argued that the trade bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords attempted to reconcile with imperialism; however, since their attempt was turned down by imperialism, they had to resist imperialism to preserve territorial unity and prevent the establishment of a colonial administration (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 35). They opposed the imperialist partition of the Ottoman land into Greek, Armenian and Kurdish ethnic groups and the confinement of the Turkish population in landlocked inner Anatolia as a colony of imperialism (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 40). Although this revolutionary war dealt some blows to imperialism and the comprador bourgeoisie, and it secured some political independence, the semi-colonised structure could not be eradicated as the imperialist countries still enjoyed some economic privileges (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 35). The classes that led the liberation war strengthened their ties with imperialism and the semi-colonised structure was cemented (Parti Bayrağı, 1978d: 35). Consequently, this bourgeois democratic revolution could not go further due to the bourgeois-feudal leadership nor did the socio-economic structure of Turkey change profoundly (Parti Bayrağı, 1978c: 17).

This circle did not account for Turkey's relations with imperialism in any detail. The only source that mentioned it was the TDKP party programme⁹⁷ that merely noted Turkey moved from Anglo-French imperialism to German imperialism to Anglo-American imperialism and then American imperialism, where it still remained (TDKP, 1980).

HK did not see any difference between American imperialism and social imperialism and so considered that Turkey was under the threat of imperialist expansion from the former and the latter. Both exploited Turkey through debts, foreign direct investments, loans, joint investment partnerships and the acquisition of privileges. For instance, Soviet imperialism rescued the fascist dictatorship of Turkey whenever

⁹⁷ It is accessed at the following link on 14/09/2016:
<http://kutuphane.halkcephesi.net/Devrimin_sesi/1980/yoldas_17.htm>. Throughout this dissertation reference to this programme will be shown as (TDKP, 1980).

it needed help, thereby obtaining footholds within this dictatorship and creating economic, political and cultural dependency (Parti Bayrağı, 1978b: 28). The HK group criticised the Soviet Union for proposing non-capitalist development that created ideological confusion in the working classes thereby undermining their revolutionary struggle (Parti Bayrağı, 1978i: 71).

This circle's interpretation of the world order is literally a translation of Hoxha's writings which were, in fact, nothing but the exegesis of the Stalinist version of Leninist imperialist theory. For instance, like Hoxha, the HK clique blamed the Maoist three worlds theory and the non-alignment approach as serving imperialism. Its criticisms of the three worlds theory, the term "non-aligned states", the Helsinki Conference, *detenté*, the Common Market and so on were translations from Hoxha's "Report to the 7th Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania" later published in *Selected Works*⁹⁸ (volume 5) of his writings between 1976 and 1980.

In its analysis of international relations, conflict and state-centric features of Leninist imperialism theory were clear. This clique took the nation state as given. In this sense, its analytical framework was an eclectic combination of the Waltzian logic of anarchy (endless conflict and war) and the logic of capital (distributional struggle). To the HK, capital advanced the "national interests" of the imperialist state to which it belonged through international cartels, trusts, *et cetera* at the international level and tariff walls, dampening and credits at the national level (1978c: 15). Similarly, the logic of anarchy "regulated" interstate relations. As inter-imperialist rivalry sharpened into geopolitical competition (Teschke and Hannes, 2007:566), imperialist wars seemed unavoidable so world politics was overwhelmed by the struggle between American and Soviet imperialism and underdeveloped countries were threatened by both. Since they did not see any changes in the "forms of states and the changing dynamics of inter-state competition" (Teschke and Hannes, 2007:577) since Lenin's time, they opposed any attempts "to develop an understanding of different types and patterns of geopolitical competition and cooperation that goes

⁹⁸ It can be reached online at <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hoxha/works/ebooks/sw/vol5.pdf>.

beyond [Leninist imperialism]” (Teschke and Hannes, 2007:577). They even criticised Çayan for changing Lenin’s theory to adapt it to current conditions.

Its interpretation of Turkey’s position in the world order was overshadowed by its endeavour to prove that other leftist currents repeated non-Marxist and revisionist theses of Şefik Hüsnü, the founder of the TKP. It did not explain how and why Turkey came into the orbit of American imperialism after the Second World War, or how Turkey’s geopolitical strategy was formulated. Moreover, contrary to other leftist currents, this circle ignored the normative side of Marxism in that it did not advocate an alternative direction for Turkey’s foreign policy, except for advocating in its party programme the right to self-determination of Cypriot people from both ethnicities, the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from the island and the removal of imperialist bases and privileges (TDKP, 1980). It pledged to end to the Turkish army’s invasion of Cyprus (TDKP, 1980).

Lastly, in spite of accusing other leftist factions of Hüsnü revisionism, the HK stuck to the MDD’s theses on the social structure and revolutionary strategy of Turkey. Nearly all its positions, including the urgent need for a national democratic revolution, conformed to the MDD view. The only differences were its rejection of a petty bourgeois role in the revolution and its emphasis on the leadership of the proletariat.

6.3. Pro-Soviet Sects

“The Turkish left has always been”, said Aydınoğlu, “affected from “the outside” (2008:382). The TKP, for example, was known through its pro-Soviet stance from its inception in the early 1920s. Whilst evaluating the position of the Turkish socialist movement in 1974-1980, Lipovsky highlights “the influence of the Marxist and pro-Soviet groups in it as compared with the 1960s” (Lipovsky, 1992:161). The right-wing direction of Chinese foreign policy in 1974-5 resulted in the Turkish left sympathising with the international stance of the USSR. Consequently, several Moscow-oriented groups emerged such as the TSIP (Socialist Workers Party of

Turkey) and the second TİP (revived after the amnesty). Their interpretations of the world order and Turkish geopolitical strategy are revealed through a critical analysis of their journals and party programmes.

6.3.1. The Communist Party of Turkey (TKP)

6.3.1.1. Introduction

Since its inception in the early 1920s, the TKP, which had been the only organisation of the left in Turkey for a long time, pursued the Soviet line. The TKP ceased its organisation in Turkey after the mass arrests of its members and proponents in 1951, and continued its activities abroad in a foreign bureau (Kanat, 1988; Ersan, 2014). It did not reactivate during the general secretariat of Zeki Baştımar.

In the 1960s, the TKP supported the TİP from abroad and its followers in Turkey joined the TİP until it closed following the 1971 coup. The TKP began organising again in Turkey, though underground, in 1973 (Kanat, 1988; Çetinkaya and Doğan, 2007) when İsmail Bilen became general secretary. Ersan noted that the TKP resumed activities on the failure of the TİP and leftist coup plot following the 12 March 1971 coup (2014:115). Although the reactivated TKP was not initially popular among leftists, it secured a foothold in the DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union, then Turkey's most militant union) in 1975 and this led to "the massification of the TKP for the first time" (Samim, 1981:79). Nevertheless, the 1980 military coup ended its organisation and activities, some of its leading cadres were arrested and most fled abroad (Ersan, 2014:148).

The TKP disseminated views through its central organ, the monthly *Atılım* (Leap), which was illegally published in Turkey from January 1974 to 1987, and through a legal monthly journal, *Ürün* (Product), published from July 1974 till its closure by martial law in January 1979 (Ersan, 2014:119). The TKP's views on foreign policy were revealed in these journals⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Their back issues can be reached at <<http://tustav.org/4283-2/>> and <http://tustav.org/urun/>.

6.3.1.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

The TKP circle argued that according to Marxism social relations occurred in two distinct spheres: national and international (Şimşek, 1978a: 77). To them, national and international relations were grounded on an objective basis because they were determined by social order and dominant property form. Therefore there were two types of social relations: capitalist and socialist national/international (Şimşek, 1978a:78). Due to its dominant property form, private property, capitalism categorised nations as oppressors and oppressed (Şimşek, 1978a:78). The Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 not only ended imperialism's monopoly on determining international relations but also altered international relations by making the contradiction between socialism and capitalism the dominant contradiction in international relations (Özgüven, 1978/54:36-41) and by starting the first stage of the general depression of capitalism during which oppressed nations' liberation movements came into prominence (Şimşek, 1978b:94).

The second stage of the general depression of capitalism period, from the late 1930s to the late 1950s, argued the TKP, brought about significant changes in content of international relations parallel to the changing world balance of power (Şimşek, 1978c:70). After the Second World War, imperialism became neo-imperialism under US hegemony and it regulated the world capitalist system through such institutions as the World Bank, the IMF, NATO and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (Gürsan, 1975/8:28). The establishment of a world socialist system and the rising national liberation movements after 1945 led imperialists to change the form and methods of exploitation (Şimşek, 1978c:72). To conceal their exploitation, imperialists employed "neo-colonialism" which created a new international division of labour through capital exportation, unequal foreign trade, debts, credits and so-called aids (Şimşek, 1978c: 73; Ortaç, 1978a: 90). In this new order, imperialists were obliged to confer sovereignty and political independence on exploited countries, but the latter fell into imperialism's trap and hence became dependent on the imperialist system (Ortaç, 1978a: 90) and in reality, notwithstanding seemingly

being sovereign states, the latter's economy, political power and armies served imperialism (Şimşek, 1978c:73).

By means of neo-colonialism, the imperialist-capitalist system aimed at: implementing, universalising and perpetuating its worldwide military and political plans; facilitating multinational monopolies' seizure of markets and resources; guaranteeing underdeveloped countries' espousal of the capitalist way of development; subjecting underdeveloped countries to imperialist states and their multinational monopolies; militarising the economies of underdeveloped countries by taking them into imperialist military pacts thus using them against the world socialist movement and national liberation movements (Ortaç, 1978a: 91). The TKP identified the imperialist system's world strategy as keeping those countries which were situated on the outward bounds of the system as dependent elements, and stimulating and helping the economic and politic development of capital forces in them (Çalışkan, 1974:27). Imperialists sustained the dependency of underdeveloped countries on imperialism through the local monopoly bourgeoisie (Ürün, 1978/54:10). As the collaborator-monopoly bourgeoisie emerged within the conditions of dependence to imperialism, they supported a capitalism dependent on imperialism (Ürün, 1978/54:10).

The TKP argued that since its inception the Soviet Union's foreign policy was grounded on the principle of peaceful coexistence (Özgüven, 1978/54:37). After the Second World War, capitalist-imperialist countries in the anti-fascist coalition stopped cooperating with the USSR on the basis of peaceful coexistence and launched the Cold War against the socialist countries (Özgüven, 1978/54:38). In the face of the rapid development of socialist countries, the achievement of a nuclear balance between socialist and capitalist systems, the scientific-technological revolution and the success of national liberation movements, imperialism was obliged to accept world peace movement led by the USSR in the 1970s (Özgüven, 1978/54:38-39). Yet, imperialism used every possibility to turn *détente* into a Cold War (Özgüven, 1978/54:44), maintained the TKP, because imperialism's cold-

warism and NATO, the imperialist aggression pact, played a key role in its neo-colonial exploitation of underdeveloped countries (Ürün, 1978a: 10).

The TKP argued that the formation and development of capitalist relations in Turkey was distinct from the classical development process in Europe because from the very beginning Europe's capitalist relations developed in the stage of monopoly capitalism and within dependency relations (Ortaç, 1978b:84). They asserted that the development of capitalism in Turkey from the 1900s on was in tune with the aforementioned imperialist world strategy (Çalışkan, 1974:27). The TKP identified the period from the early 1900s to 1946 as a primitive accumulation period during which the nascent bourgeoisie was nourished by the Kemalist rule to create a fully-fledged bourgeoisie so that it could collaborate with foreign capital (Çalışkan, 1974:28). Unlike some other divisions of the socialist movement, the TKP circle maintained that given its class basis and post-war economic policy and political line the national liberation war could not be classified as an anti-imperialist war (Öztürk, 1974: 77). Despite the Turco-Soviet friendship that burgeoned during the national liberation war and the 1930s economic crisis, they argued the bourgeoisie pursued an anti-Soviet and anti-communist foreign policy particularly in the run-up to the Second World War and during the war (Araklıoğlu, 1978/47:47) and concealed Soviet support during both the liberation war and the 1930s, even expunging it from history textbooks to legitimise its dependency relations with imperialism (Araklıoğlu, 1978/47:48). To the TKP, in 1946 primitive accumulation of capital was replaced with capital accumulation in that the former came into fruition by generating a fully-fledged bourgeoisie. With the consequent power shift in politics the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, stopped sharing power with the petty bourgeoisie, hence becoming the sole holder of power (Çalışkan, 1974: 28). Therefore the TKP did not see a marked paradigm shift in Turkey's foreign policy after the Second World War, as, they believed, Turkey had always been in a relationship with imperialism since the early 1900s (Çalışkan, 1974: 28). This was evident from the concomitant development of capitalism in Turkey and its dependence on imperialism (Ortaç, 1978b: 84). After 1945 through the comprador bourgeoisie's "wide open door" policy to the multinational imperialist monopolies,

serfdom agreements with the US and American military bases (Bilen, 1979: 4), the TKP circle asserted that neo-colonialism implemented all its instruments in Turkey as it had in other underdeveloped countries and thus Turkey was exploited by multinational monopolies and their local collaborators (Ortaç, 1978a: 91).

From 1950 onward, the imperialist system put its tailor-made method, aid programmes and foreign capital, for the development of underdeveloped countries into practice in Turkey (Ortaç, 1978a: 91). Although foreign capital was initially invited to invest in Turkey, the TKP argued this affected Turkey's balance of payments negatively because this capital forced Turkey to adopt an assembly industry for the capitalist way of industrialisation (Ortaç, 1978a: 93), thus Turkey became dependent on imperialism in terms of capital and other inputs (Ortaç, 1978b: 79). Similarly Turkey accepted imperialist foreign aid to bridge foreign exchange deficits and to finance investment in 1948 in return for becoming a member of the imperialist system's economic and finance organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (Ortaç, 1978b: 81). However foreign aid ended up taking out more than it had brought in (Ortaç, 1978b: 82). Furthermore, the application of the rapid "capitalisation" strategy of the imperialist system in an agrarian backward country like Turkey generated a discrepancy between the "superstructure" and the "base" (Çalışkan, 1974: 26). As the old superstructural institutions could not keep up with the base, this led to periodic political crises which were resolved by imperialism through military coups (Öztürk, 1974a: 71; Çalışkan, 1974: 40-41).

The TKP opposed the integration of Turkey into the European Economic Community which only wanted Turkey to remain a supplier of agricultural products and raw materials for imperialist monopolies, not Turkish industrial development (Öztürk, 1974a). They asserted that siding with Europe against American imperialism would oppose socialism (Ürün, 1975/7:28) and result in the inexorable integration of Turkey into the capitalist bloc (Ürün, 1975/7:17). However, the foremost foreign policy issue of Turkey, for the TKP, was membership in NATO, an aggressive anti-socialist arm of imperialism that dragged it into imperialist military adventures like

the Korean War and the invasion of Cyprus and opposed national liberation movements. Given Turkey's geopolitical location, it was exposed to the negative impact of the struggle between national liberation movements and imperialism (Bilen, 1979:4). NATO was behind the economic demolition of Turkey and the rise of fascism. The strengthening of the socialist bloc, *détente*, the rise of national liberation movements, the deepening depression of capitalism and a change in the balance of global power made Turkey one of the weakest links in the imperialist chain (Bilen, 1979:4).

With joining NATO and CENTO and making bilateral agreements with the US, Turkey was pushed into a rapid armament race and became a valuable market for defence industry monopolies due to its militarised economy (Ortaç, 1978b: 82). Because of its massive military expenditure arising from its military dependence on American imperialism, Turkey's economic development was hindered (TKP, 1978/54: 9). Besides its economic effects, "the inserting of Turkey into imperialist military blocs" resulted in the Turkish army becoming "an outpost of imperialism against the socialist bloc" and "a guardian of the established order and neo-colonial exploitation" (Ortaç, 1978b: 83). The TKP pointed to the significance of Turkey's geopolitical location, which provided a buffer zone between the USSR and the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, in the imperialist system's world strategy (Çalışkan, 1974: 26). To the TKP, the existence of 61 bases in Turkey out of 199 NATO bases in the Mediterranean evinced the extent of imperialism's strategic interests in Turkey (Söylemezoğlu, 1978:64; Ürün, 1978a: 9). Therefore, they saw Turkey as a pivotal country in the expansion strategy of imperialism. To the TKP, this imperialist strategy aimed at keeping Turkey away from its neighbouring socialist countries, using it as a springboard against these countries and the Arab liberation movement, and attaching it more closely to NATO and to the imperialist exploitation policy (Ürün, 1978b:18).

Continuity between the first TİP's foreign policy and the TKP's was clear from their extensive use of anti-imperialist slogans: "quit NATO, tear up bilateral agreements with the USA and close down the bases granted to NATO and the US". Just like the

first TİP, the TKP severely criticised Turkish foreign policy for being a “tailist” policy that followed imperialism not Turkey’s “national interests”. The comprador bourgeoisie turned Turkey into a stronghold of imperialism against the USSR, a true friend of Turkey, and other socialist states and also Arab peoples who struggled for independence. Reactionary governments driven by militarist, nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments grounded their foreign policy on increasing tension in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Mediterranean and on undermining peace efforts. This caused the invasion of independent Cyprus and the infringement of Cyprus’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Tuna, 1977/37:29).

The TKP differed, however, from the first TİP on the Cyprus issue since the latter had widely used this issue to show “the real face” of American imperialism when the US opposed Turkish intervention. The TKP was the only leftist circle which openly opposed Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus as a NATO machination to transform the island into a NATO base (Ürün, 1978c: 13-14). Turkey and Greece had supported this imperialist plan, therefore the TKP asked Turkey and Greece to withdraw from the island (Atılım, 1974a; Atılım, 1974b, Atılım, 1974c). Echoing the CPSU’s foreign policy, the TKP proposed a fully independent, peaceful/pacifist and honourable foreign policy which detached Turkey from NATO and American imperialism, cleared its territory of NATO and US bases and unified and demilitarized Cyprus. Justifying Soviet foreign policy and blaming the US and NATO for instigating an unwarranted arms race to benefit the imperialist warfare industry appeared throughout *Atılım* and *Ürün*¹⁰⁰.

The TKP’s interpretation of the world order and Turkish foreign policy entirely equated Turkey’s national interests with Soviet foreign policy objectives. Naturally anti-Americanism was the main theme. Unlike most of the left, the TKP refuted the assertion that Stalin’s request for land caused Turkey’s foreign policy change after the Second World War. Rather, it was contrived by the comprador bourgeoisie to

¹⁰⁰ See for instance Atılım (1977a) Atılım (1977b) “Atılım (1977c) Atılım (1978a) Atılım (1978b) Atılım (1979a) Atılım (1979b) “Atılım (1979b) “Atılım (1974d). See also Ürün (1976); Arıkoğlu, Ahmet (1978).

justify this change. The USSR sought to break the containment policy of US imperialism by supporting “autarchy” as an economic model and “independence” and “neutrality” as foreign policy objectives for its neighbours. It preferred anti-imperialism over anti-capitalism to woo Third World countries or at least ensure their neutrality. Thus all ideological efforts focused on overcoming backwardness through economic independence, *i.e.* leaving the capitalist world economy in order to fight against imperialism. Without economic independence, claimed the Soviet ideologists, development was just a bourgeois dream.

In TKP’s interpretation of the world order theory of imperialism turned into a vehicle for the justification of Soviet foreign policy objectives and Soviet imposition of independent foreign policy on the Third World. As a corollary of this stance, the TKP became stuck in *realpolitik*. The prevalent duality in leftist analyses – attributing Turkey’s behaviour to class interest while explaining US behaviour through “the determining influence of geographical location on political decisions and interests” (Lacher, 2005:48) – stands out in the TKP’s analysis as well. They started by stressing social relations at the individual level but ended up with *realpolitik* antagonism between superpowers over spheres of influence at system level anyway. Therefore its explanatory power suffers from this eclectic theoretical framework combining realism with Marxism.

The TKP harshly criticised non-Soviet leftist groups. Maoist, Trotskyites, gauchists and proponents of Kuvılcımlı, Aybar and Belli were depicted as aberrant leftist currents and ideological instruments, like fascism, of imperialism to suppress working class liberation movements¹⁰¹. Maoists were a particular threat to the leftist movement because of their espousal of “fascist” China’s support for the fascist Pinochet rule in Chile, opposition to the national liberation movement in Angola, their anti-Soviet foreign policy, collaboration with imperialism, undermining *détente* and their promotion of an arms race. However, the TKP and the Aydınlık cliques dealt with foreign policy issues more than other leftists because they championed the foreign policies of, respectively, the USSR and China.

¹⁰¹ Some examples of this can be found in Atılım (1974e); Atılım (1975a); Atılım (1975b).

The TKP interpreted Turkey's relations with the imperialist system through the development of capitalist production relations in Turkey. They claimed that since the inception of capitalist relations in the early 1900s Turkey had been in a relationship with imperialism. After 1945, increasing relations with imperialism did not mean a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy but in fact it was an indicator of the advancement of capitalist relations in Turkish society. Whilst interpreting the development of capitalism they pointed to the discrepancy between the superstructure and the structure due to becoming capitalist rapidly. Military coups resolved political crises stemming from this discrepancy. This analysis bears a marked resemblance to a Gramscian one that envisages a passive revolution, "an attempt to organise superstructure in line with structural developments" to solve the crisis of a historical bloc (Joseph, 2002:33). Nevertheless, the TKP circle failed to relate this analysis to changes in foreign policy because their explanation, while seemingly shaped by the "world outlook of [the proletariat]" (Joseph, 2002:11), was in fact the *realpolitik* stand of the Soviet Union and so its theoretical framework was incapable of accounting for the explanandum from a historical materialist stand point.

6.3.2. The Socialist Workers Party of Turkey (TSİP)

6.3.2.1. Introduction

The Socialist Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi (TSİP)), the second pro-Soviet group, was the first legal socialist party in the post-amnesty period. It was founded in June 1974 by İbrahim Seven, Hidayet Kaya and Mehmet Yücel, followers of the ex-TKP member Hikmet Kıvılcımlı who died in exile in 1971, together with ex-TİP supporters such as Ahmet Kaçmaz, Çağatay Anadol and Oya Baydar, and former THKP-C and THKO militants (Ersan, 2014: 73; Samim, 1981). They sought to assemble all socialists in a single party, thus "addressing the working class's historical question of political organisation" (Kaçmaz, 1974:47). They claimed to have learned from the leftist movement's experiences prior to the 1971 coup, so they rejected Aybar's understanding of socialism, the Maoist version

of socialism, the putschist tendency and focoist guerrilla adventurism (Kaçmaz, 1974:47). Equally, they asserted the TSİP would neither confine the movement to parliamentarism, as the TİP had done before, nor engage in revolutionary adventurism disconnected from the masses (Ersan, 2014:75). Rather it would pursue “proletariat and masses-centred politics within the framework of classic Marxist-Leninist principles” (Ersan, 2014:75).

Kıvılcımlı’s understanding of socialism (particularly his views on political organisation and Turkey’s social structure) had remarkable impact on the first party programme (Kaçmaz, 1974). Over time, Kıvılcımlı’s effect on the TSİP’s programme became a problem in the face of the TKP’s harsh criticism. His views were critically analysed in *İlke*, and they were found as petty bourgeois socialism (İlke, 1975a). Therefore in its first congress in March 1976, the TSİP “modified the programme in tune with the programmatic principles of the CPSU” (Ersan, 2014:81; Aydınoglu, 2011: 337). Because of this change, the Kıvılcımlı group left the party (STMA, 1988:2233). In addition, some (Oya Baydar, Aydın Engin and others) thought the party’s historical function ended and so joined the TKP (STMA, 1988:2233). After the 1980 coup, the leading cadres fled abroad and the party continued its activities as an illegal organisation (Ersan, 2014:86).

The TSİP had a number of organs: *Birlik* (Unity) a weekly central organ, *Gerçek* (Truth) a weekly agitation organ, *Kitle* (Mass) an ideological and political weekly journal, and *İlke* (Principle) an ideological monthly journal published from January 1974 to September 1980 (Kaçmaz, 1988:2259). How the TSİP construed the world order and Turkish foreign policy are seen in a critical examination of *İlke* and party programmes.

6.3.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkish Foreign Policy

The TSİP’s conception of the world order and the trajectory of Turkey’s foreign policy differed over time: initially influenced by the views of the old-hand socialist

Kıvılcımlı¹⁰² on finance capital and Sweezy and Baran's¹⁰³ monopoly capitalism, after the first congress it resembled other pro-Soviet divisions' views.

The TSİP circle distinguished between classical and contemporary imperialism. They argued that to grasp contemporary imperialism one should consider the emergence and expansion of socialism, the hierarchic structure of imperialism, the success of national liberation wars and multinational corporations (Baydar, 1974:83). They refuted the assumption that imperialism underwent a qualitative change with the rise of multinationals (an issue examined whilst analysing the Birikim circle) which transcended state-monopoly capitalism and caused the national monopoly state to wane (Baydar, 1974:83). The TSİP circle asserted that the supreme importance of financial capital led to state-monopoly capitalism and the state determined the economic strategy of monopoly capital (Baydar, 1974:76). Multinational corporations were created to end the devastating effects of inter-monopoly rivalry and were dominated by certain national capital groups (Baydar, 1974:85).

The TSİP said finance capital existed in developed capitalist and underdeveloped countries (İlke, 1974b: 67). Imperialism turned the nascent bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries into monopoly capital (İlke, 1974b: 68) through joint investments, foreign credits, foreign trade and big tenders given to imperialism, though it was neither imperialist nor an exporter of capital and weaker than capital in developed countries (İlke, 1974b: 69), as seen by the dominance of a few firms in banking and industry in some underdeveloped countries (İlke, 1974b: 68). To them, imperialism was an external power and an internal enemy (İlke, 1974c: 58), maintaining its political and military presence in underdeveloped countries through organic partnerships with local finance capital (İlke, 1974d: 117) which implemented imperialism's objectives (İlke, 1974d:119). Third World countries were not independent because they were financial satellites of the world capitalist system's international finance capital (İlke, 1974a: 67). Independence from imperialism

¹⁰² Particularly his views in the book *Emperyalizm: geberen kapitalizm* (Imperialism: Dying Capitalism).

¹⁰³ Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran's seminal book *Monopoly Capital*.

required separating international finance capital from local finance capital and pre-capitalist classes (1974d: 117).

In the face of harsh criticism from the other factions¹⁰⁴, the TSİP programme of 1976 dropped the term “local finance capital”, a concept of Kıvılcımlı, though they still insisted on the monopolist nature of the bourgeoisie. This new programme mainly focused on an anti-imperialist struggle stressing the anarchic structure of a capitalist economy which continually led to economic crises and stronger monopolies and fettered the development of productive forces (İlke, 1976a: 9). Productive forces could only be developed through socialism which would also produce a fully independent and anti-imperialist foreign policy at the superstructural level (İlke, 1976a: 11).

Like other leftist groups, it is notable that the TSİP analysed international events as *realpolitik* struggles between the socialist and capitalist systems. Socialism was fed by peace whereas imperialism was fed by war (İlke, 1977a: 81). Thus, “just wars” were national and social liberation wars, whereas “unjust wars” were imperialist wars (İlke, 1976b: 34). Growing tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East was blamed on US imperialism’s goal to shift the balance of power (Şerif, 1978), thereby threatening peace regionally and worldwide (İlke, 1976b:35). Imperialism began declining in the 1970s in the face of the world revolutionary process, so it endeavoured to hold on in the Middle East (İlke, 1976c: 20) and to transform in its favour the order that increasingly developed against it (Burçak, 1974:52). As such, Cyprus was seen as a fortified post in the Eastern Mediterranean to threaten Middle Eastern peoples (Burçak, 1974:54) and make the Middle East a main conflict area between socialism and imperialism (Şerif, 1978: 66).

The USSR countered imperialist aggression with “*détente*” (İlke, 1977c: 82). The TSİP faction argued that *détente* was not a reconciliation with imperialism but part of the struggle against imperialism. However Pentagon militarism, which retreated

¹⁰⁴ For instance, certain articles in *Emekçi* of the TEP circle were devoted to criticism of finance capital: Özkan, 1975a; Emekçi, 1974a; Özkan, 1975b.

following the US Vietnam defeat, reappeared in the late 1970s to pursue new profit through an armament race (Evren, 1978:19) to change the balance of power under the pretext of a possible Soviet military threat (İlke, 1978a: 43). The TSİP contended that the hard-line foreign policy of then US President Jimmy Carter's administration aimed to sabotage *détente* and restart the Cold War (İlke, 1978a: 49-52). They argued that Carter national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski played the Chinese card to heighten tension with the USSR (Evren, 1979: 111). The TSİP criticised China's counter-revolutionary three worlds theory which it said legitimised US efforts to increase nuclear and conventional weapons in the capitalist camp (Evren, 1978: 23-24).

The TSİP circle depicted Turkey as a backward capitalist country dependent on the world capitalist system (İlke, 1976a: 7). As imperialism was the root cause of its backwardness, they analysed how Turkey's relations with imperialism started and developed historically. In the republic, a faction of the local bourgeoisie which eliminated the comprador bourgeoisie and was strengthened through statism increasingly became "local finance capital". The development of İş Bank reflected the development of local finance capital in Turkey (1975:69) and the circle analysed the role of big banks (İş Bank, Akbank and Yapı Kredi Bank) in the development of local finance capitalists (such as Koç Holding, Sabancı Holding and Yaşar Holding) (see for instance İlke, 1974b; İlke, 1974e). The anti-imperialist struggle in the early 1920s was led by the burgeoning national bourgeoisie, argued the TSİP; the national bourgeoisie founded an independent state by defeating the comprador bourgeoisie but it soon lost its national character and surrendered to imperialism (İlke, 1974c: 59). Yet the local bourgeoisie, frightened by the Great Depression of 1929, ceased its integration with imperialism until the mid-1940s (İlke, 1974c: 64). The national bourgeoisie mainly aimed at creating primitive capital accumulation through the state (1976c: 31), so the TSİP circle termed the 1923-50 period as "state capitalism" in which the foundations for capitalism were laid (1976c: 34).

They interpreted the paradigm shift in Turkey's foreign policy after the Second World War as a change forced by imperialism. They argued that US imperialism's

Cold War strategy imposed certain roles on Europe, Greece and Turkey through the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine (İlke, 1974c: 64) to prevent socialism from expanding (Kaçmaz, 1976: 34). Turkey's dominant classes did not oppose it (Kaçmaz, 1976: 34-35). Local monopoly capital was integrated with imperialism (İlke, 1974c: 65).

The TSİP group dismissed the changes in the power configuration in 1950 as simply steps in the development of capitalism based on the hitherto primitive capital accumulation (Kaçmaz, 1976: 35). Dependence on imperialism was strengthened thus Turkey's economic development was shaped by imperialism (Kaçmaz, 1976: 36). This economic base determined other forms of superstructural dependency that ensured imperialism's dominance over Turkey via NATO, CENTO, the EEC, various bilateral agreements and military bases.

Like other leftist factions, the TSİP defined its foreign policy as anti-imperialist that aimed at quitting NATO, CENTO and the EEC, thus ceasing to be a satellite of imperialism (İlke, 1974d: 135). As a reflection of their pro-Muscovite line, the TSİP put greater emphasis on peaceful co-existence, *détente*, disarmament, equality of nations, the right of nations to self-determination, support for national liberation movements and the Helsinki Final Act (see for instance Ustinov, 1979; İlke, 1976d; İlke 1977b; İlke 1977c; İlke, 1978b; İlke, 1979). They even launched a peace campaign against US imperialist aggression and against imperialism's local collaborators' ultra-nationalism (İlke, 1976e: 3-4). They praised the Ecevit government's effort to develop friendly relations with the USSR in 1978, notwithstanding that it fell short of quitting NATO and signing a non-aggression treaty with the USSR (Şerif, 1978:79). As Turkey's inclination to support *détente* disturbed both the imperialist circles and China, they argued that the Chinese foreign minister's visit to Turkey just before Prime Minister Ecevit's visit to Moscow and the US comment on lifting the arms embargo on Turkey were intended to spoil the Turco-Soviet rapprochement (Evren, 1978:26-27). Like the CPSU, the TSİP's position on Cyprus was indecisive. It first supported Turkey's military campaign

(İlke, 1974f: 41) then later called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the territorial unity and independence of Cyprus (İlke, 1976c: 32).

TSİP's analysis was contradictory. While it was grounded on the classical economic profit-based definition of capitalism (İlke, 1976a: 8), the TSİP combined it with the classical Marxist "strong form of productive forces determinism" (Joseph, 2006:112). It adopted Smith's definition of capitalism but also objected to development associated with economic growth. They ignored the conditions for the reproduction of capitalism but tried to account for historical developments with such key variables as the anarchic structure of capitalism and its inherent crisis tendency. They argued that real development was possible through socialism's development of productive forces. In adopting a mechanical determinist view, this circle gave productive forces primacy over social relations. However, as the development of productive forces was not "embedded within social relations", the TSİP circle considered productive forces to be separate from "social structures, political strategies, class struggles and other features of the social world" (Joseph, 2002:185).

Similarly the TSİP circle's eclectic theoretical framework mixed realism and imperialism in their foreign policy interpretation. They reduced this interpretation to the dichotomy of imperialism and socialism. Just like the TKP, this circle also used imperialism to justify the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. Thus all their theoretical efforts focused on explaining how imperialism maintained underdevelopment and how political and economic independence from imperialism brought development. CPSU foreign policy was the gold standard against which other countries' foreign policies were assessed. They mainly assessed observable "foreign policy events" (Yalvaç, 2014:127) such as high-level visits just before Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's signing of a friendly relations "political document" with the USSR. They interpreted world politics as geopolitical competition among rational actors (states) in reference to such realist concepts as "balance of power" and "security dilemma". Therefore their analytical framework contained both "the epistemological" and "ontological implications" of a positivist meta-theoretical stance (Wight and Joseph, 2010:17). Consequently, they justified an independent

and neutral Turkish foreign policy in line with the Soviet Union's *realpolitik* stand while failing to explain change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy from a historical materialist perspective.

6.3.3. The Second Workers Party of Turkey (TİP)

6.3.3.1. Introduction

The year 1975 witnessed an upsurge of leftist parties as the Labour Party of Turkey (Türkiye Emek Partisi (TEP)), the TİP and the Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti (SP)) were founded (Lipovsky, 1992). The TİP is the best known because of the closed TİP's popularity in the 1960s (Samim, 1981). It was revived after the amnesty by the last leading cadre of the first TİP, Behice Boran, the leader, and Nihat Sargın, Tarık Ziya Ekinçi and Sadun Aren. They brought the new TİP into a Moscovite line without any formal affiliation (Ersan, 2014:89).

The second TİP continued the old TİP's views on underdevelopment, development, the capitalisation process in Turkey and non-capitalist development (Çulhaoğlu, 1978/9)¹⁰⁵. The TİP claimed it would "preserve the unity of the proletariat movement" (STMA, 1988:2234) and, although it rejected the TSİP's call for unity (Lipovsky, 1992:128), the disappointing result of the 1977 election reinforced a TİP tendency towards rapprochement with the TKP and the TSİP (STMA, 1988:2234). Towards the end of the 1970s, the party administration was trying to resolve a conflict between those who advocated joining the TKP and those who rejected submissiveness and proposed unification on an equal footing (STMA, 1988:2234). This conflict got TKP adherents Orhan Silier, Yalçın Cerit, Yavuz Ünal and others removed from the TİP (STMA, 1988:2234). While it was considering unification with the TKP, the TİP and all political parties were closed following the 1980 coup (Ersan, 2014:111).

¹⁰⁵ As Çulhaoğlu (1978:427) puts it, "The TİP is not a rootless tree and not a product of the year 1975 either. It is the coming into leaf and branching out of a tree whose root goes down to 1961".

The TİP's publications included such organs as: *Çark Başak* (Wheel Ear of Wheat), a central organ published fortnightly from February 1976 till September 1980; *Yürüyüş* (March), a weekly journal published from April 1975 to July 1980, and *Yurt ve Dünya* (Fatherland and World), a bimonthly theoretical journal published from January 1977 to March 1980. The TİP's view of the world order and Turkey's place is seen in these journals, the party's programme and its other publications.

6.3.3.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

The TİP argued that "inter-societal relations are so interwoven that no single society can be analysed by abstracting it from world politics/affairs" (TİP, 1975:3). Therefore TİP ideologists first drew a world panorama and then placed Turkey in it. They presented the historical rivalry between the capitalist and socialist systems as the impetus for the development of an international relations system (*Yurt ve Dünya*, 1978: 8), thus international relation was nothing but relations between the two rival systems. Labour-capital contradiction at the unit level manifested itself in the systemic level in the form of a contradiction between the capitalist and socialist systems (TİP, 1975:4).

While capitalism was bellicose, socialism was the permanent defender of peace (Çulhaoğlu, 1978:405) because the TİP leaders assumed that the "ideology" of states was the decisive factor in determining their behaviour. The capitalist system, which was at the imperialist stage, had to constantly expand its market, raw material sources and spheres for its investment and capital export (Çark Başak, 1976a: 10). Despite its drive to expand, capitalism faced a shrinking sphere of influence due to socialism and decolonisation (TİP, 1975:3-4). Capitalist international relations meant dependency, dominance and resolution of disputes through either "force" or "intimidation", while they argued that socialism advocated international relations grounded on peaceful coexistence, respect for territorial integrity and sovereign rights of states, nations' right to choose their social and political systems, refraining from the threat or use of force and non-interference in every state's internal affairs (*Yurt ve Dünya*, 1978: 9). To the TİP, international relations was the struggle for

survival of socialist states and underdeveloped capitalist states against imperialist powers.

The TĪP circle emphasised the logic of capital whilst assessing the world order. After the Second World War, the monopolies of imperialist countries sought new investment places and foreign markets. Capital outflow started as international investments and loans to underdeveloped countries (TĪP, 1978: 27). The TĪP circle gauged the “power” of imperialist countries in terms of their “international private investments”, empirically analysing how the UK, the pre-war international investment leader, gave way to the US (TĪP, 1978: 28).

The US successfully spread the American *modus vivendi* worldwide, creating a consumption culture so world trade outweighed world production (TĪP, 1978: 73). Post-war economic stability caused imperialist powers to integrate, argued the TĪP, so the EEC was set up (TĪP, 1978: 91). The TĪP circle saw the EEC as an institution that regulated its members’ foreign trade and whose dominant members used small members as tools for their development (TĪP, 1978: 72). Given capitalism’s uneven development law, the TĪP doubted the EEC’s political union project (the European Union) (TĪP, 1978: 68).

The conflict between two rival systems did not alleviate rivalry and conflicts within the capitalist system (TĪP, 1975:5). Integration did not change the nature of imperialism and inter-imperialist relations did not become ultra-imperialism contrary to the prediction of Kautsky (TĪP, 1975:5). Economic stability reached its limits in the late 1960s and conflicts between imperialist powers occurred due to the capitalist law of uneven development (TĪP, 1975:5). Inter-imperialist rivalry reached a point in the mid-1970s that the imperialist powers had to curb trade wars in the imperialist system and redistribute the world market in equal shares (Dinler, 1978:335). To present a united economic, political and military front against socialism, they founded the Trilateral Commission led by the US and including the EEC and Japan (Dinler, 1978:335).

The continued development of the socialist system while capitalism declined, argued the TİP, indicated a shift in the balance of power in favour of socialism (TİP, 1978:79). Socialism provided rapid development because national income was channelled into investment, especially industrial investment (TİP, 1978:80). In addition to the rising popularity of socialism, the US defeat in Vietnam and increasing conflicts among imperialist powers forced American imperialism to accept *détente* (Dinler, 1978:332). The TİP advocated the Soviet *détente* policy as neither a retreat in the face of imperialism (Çark Başak, 1976b: 8) nor a pause in the anti-imperialist struggle. To them, *détente* aimed to prevent another world war thus creating a more suitable setting for anti-imperialist struggles and national liberation movements (Çark Başak, 1976b: 8).

Turkey was seen as dependent and underdeveloped but more developed than many underdeveloped countries (TİP, 1975:6). The TİP circle attributed Turkey's backwardness to the imperialist imposition of capitalism on pre-capitalist Turkey, thus unnaturally developing capitalism resulted in an underdeveloped country (TİP, 1975:8). Since Kemalist rule chose the capitalist way of development due to its class basis between the national liberation war and the Second World War, Turkey could not end its dependency relationship to imperialism (TİP, 1975:9). While the Kemalist administration established close relations with the Soviet Union to ensure Turkey's independence from the West, it was very authoritarian and anti-democratic in domestic politics to keep Turkey capitalist (TİP, 1975:10). Therefore its domestic and foreign policies constantly contradicted (TİP, 1975:10).

The TİP circle said Turkish capitalism integrated with imperialism in a voluntarist way. Turkish bourgeoisie chose to share the national market, which it could not develop and exploit alone, with the western bourgeoisie from the late 1930s to increase their appropriated surplus (TİP, 1978:89). After the war, imperialism entered Turkey through NATO, CENTO, *et cetera* through the volition of the dominant classes and their governments (TİP, 1978:90). Turkish capitalism integrated with the capitalist world, thus Turkey came under the political, economic and military repression of imperialism (TİP, 1975:9). Imperialism's interest in

Turkey was driven by Turkey's geopolitical position (TİP, 1975:11) related to American imperialist interests in the Middle East (TİP, 1978:90), as shown by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (TİP, 1975:11). Consequently, the overlapping motives of imperialism (geopolitics) and the dominant classes (profit) integrated Turkey into the imperialist system. Since then, the dependence on imperialism and capitalism's material and social obstacles to the development of productive forces (TİP, 1978:105) constantly strengthened the dependent nature of its economy.

The TİP circle challenged the dominant classes' desire to join the EEC based on an allegiance to the West and a nationalist fear of falling behind Greece (TİP, 1978:94). They said the real reason was the overlapping interests of the big monopolist bourgeoisie and the imperialist monopolies (TİP, 1978:104). This integration attempt was, argued the TİP, an imperialist project to secure the *status quo* in the region by creating a "capitalist development miracle" to attract socialist and anti-imperialist Arab countries (TİP, 1978:104). The Turkish bourgeoisie desired to play a bridgehead role for American and European imperialism in the region.

Given the development differences between Turkey and EEC countries, the TİP argued joining the custom union would exacerbate the former's dependent and backward status (TİP, 1978:92), diminish its economic and political independence (TİP, 1978:103), hinder industrial development, exacerbate its dysfunctional economic structure and make Turkey a market for European imperialism (Çark Başak, 1976c: 8).

Continuity with the socialist movement of the 1960s manifested itself in the second TİP's negative stance towards NATO, CENTO, bases and US bilateral agreements. The existence of bases on Turkish soil would jeopardise Turkey's security in case of a war (Çark Başak, 1976d: 1). In that case, NATO would not protect Turkey. Dependence on imperialism hinder Turkey's development and shaped Turkish foreign policy in line with imperialism's general interests and world policy (TİP, 1978: 159), thus isolating Turkey over the Cyprus issue because non-aligned

countries regarded Turkey as an abettor of imperialism (TİP, 1978: 165). The TİP argued Turkey's geopolitical position required an independent foreign policy (Çark Başak, 1976d: 1) predicated on "peaceful coexistence", "anti-imperialism", "*détente*", "neutrality", "disarmament" and "good neighbour relations" (Çark Başak, 1976d: 1).

Their analysis of the world order and Turkey's place in it was grounded on advocating the Soviet Union's global hegemonic struggle (Akdere and Karadeniz, 1994: 290). They espoused Leninist imperialism theory revised in line with the CPSU's geopolitical strategy. Therefore the TİP circle suffered from "intellectual strictures" because it was imprisoned in a "doctrinal party line" (Teschke, 2010:163). They saw international relations as the struggle of socialist states for survival against bellicose imperialist states. The TİP's views on international relations fit perfectly in a Waltzian classification of "second image" theories that attached explanatory power to the "internal structures of states". However, they resorted to realism periodically to explain imperialist powers' behaviour. For them, geopolitics drove imperialist strategies. Thus they conflated the "logic of anarchy" and the "logic of capital" in a theoretical framework. Realism also manifested itself in their separation of domestic and foreign policy. While they analysed the Kemalist government's domestic politics sociologically, they assessed its foreign policy on the realist concept of "balance of power" and neglected the government's class basis. Thus they claimed Kemalist domestic and foreign policies constantly contradicted each other as if both were not chosen by the same classes and foreign policy was forced on them by "the autonomous logic of [geopolitical] competition" (Allinson and Anievas, 2009:48). Consequently, it is legitimate to blame them for "attaching [a] realist conception of the international" (Rosenberg 2006: 310) to a Marxist theoretical framework.

The TİP's eclectic theoretical framework also accommodated certain premises of dependency theory. It based its analysis on "exchange relations" and described international trade as a prominent imperialist exploitation mechanism that automatically produced underdevelopment (Brenner, 1977: 91) because developed countries produced industrial products while the underdeveloped produced

agricultural goods and raw materials (TİP, 1978: 21). Although development was not a topical subject among 1970s leftists, the TİP prepared an alternative development programme for Turkey. It pointed to the capitalist development model as the reason why Turkey did not attain “the level of contemporary civilisation” (TİP, 1978: 88). While they were mainly concerned with exploitation in exchange relations, they were against capitalism because it hindered the development of productive forces not because of exploitation in capitalist production relations. As a result, they presented socialism as an “antidote to capitalist underdevelopment” (Brenner, 1977: 91).

6.4. Independent Groups

Without adhering to Chinese or Soviet doctrines, several legal and illegal socialist organisations tried to produce original authentic ideas on a revolutionary strategy for Turkey. Devrimci-Yol (Revolutionary Way (Dev-Yol)), Kurtuluş (Liberation), the SP, the TEP and Birikim (Accumulation) followed an independent path. Except for Militan Gençlik (Militant Youth, later called Halkın Yolu ((People’s Way)) which joined the pro-Sino camp (Sayın, 1988:2262), all the offspring of the THKP-C tradition (Dev-Yol, Kurtuluş, THKP-C Acilciler (THKP-C the Urgent Ones), Marksist-Leninist Silahlı Propaganda Birliği (Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLSPB)) and their further splinter groups (such as Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)) took the independent path. Within the scope of this study two major lines in the descendants of THKP-C, namely Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş, will be examined. Given that the TEP’s views on the world order and Turkey’s place in it exactly echoed the NDR circle’s views (particularly Belli’s) in the 1960s, the decline in the popularity of these views and Belli in the socialist circles and the examination of these views in Chapter III, this circle will not be analysed here.

6.4.1. The Revolutionary Path (Dev-Yol)

6.4.1.1. Introduction

THKP-C militants were critical of their past during their imprisonment following the 1971 coup. Immediately after the 1974 amnesty, the THKP-C went through a dual crisis of leadership and strategy (Samim, 1981). Although two groups were in contact to unite THKP-C followers, this failed and two major lines in the independent path resulted: Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş (Ersan, 2014). THKP-C militants Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, Nasuh Mitap, Ali Başpınar, *et al* and several new younger militants including Taner Akçam, Melih Pekdemir, Mehmet Ali Yılmaz and Ali Alfathlı (Bostancıoğlu, 2011), created the Devrimci Yol (the Revolutionary Path) as a third way for Turkish socialism by distancing itself from the “revisionist” and “nationalist” elements within the international socialist movement. Dev-Yol rejected Sino-Soviet polemics because a right ideological solution at the international level seemed outside of this contradiction (Dev-Yol, 1977a: 9).

The Dev-Yol group followed socialist development after the 1968 student movement and emerged as a student organisation which aimed at organising and giving “socialist conscious” to the people (Ersan, 2014:280). It started the journal *Devrimci Gençlik* (Revolutionary Youth)¹⁰⁶ in November 1975, progressed from a youth organisation to a people-oriented one and in April 1977 issued a manifesto *Devrimci Yol Bildirgesi* (Revolutionary Path Manifesto, hereafter called the Manifesto) (Ersan, 2014) which defined the “basic political duty” of revolutionaries as the “creation of a proletarian party”. They started a fortnightly journal *Devrimci Yol* in May 1977. This circle was the most widespread organisation in the 1974-80 period (Ersan, 2014:299) and its leader, Müftüoğlu, claimed it surpassed the THKP-C (Müftüoğlu, 1988:2250); yet it could not shed the criticism of being a student movement (STMA, 1988:2258).

¹⁰⁶ All the publications of the Dev-Yol circle can be accessed at < <http://devrimciyolarsivi.org/category/devrimci-yol/dergiler-devrimci-yol/>>.

Istanbul cadres accused the Ankara-based Dev-Yol leadership of rightist policies and planning to liquidate the THKP-C line and its proponents, and they saw the views in *Devrimci Yol* as seriously contradicting Çayan (STMA, 1988:2258). In May 1978 they broke with Dev-Yol and formed Dev-Sol (Ersan, 2014:284). Despite its success in political activism and appealing to the masses, Dev-Yol failed to transform itself into a political party (Müftüoğlu, 1988: 2251) as its leadership and most of its militants were captured and jailed following the 1980 coup and this circle came to an end (Müftüoğlu, 1988: 2251-53; Ersan, 2014:313).

6.4.1.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

As comprehending the whole and its parts were inseparable (Dev-Yol, 1977a: 9), the Dev-Yol clique first analysed: how the imperialist system worked; the relationships between imperialist, socialist and deliberately underdeveloped countries; and the state of play within the socialist system (Dev-Yol, 1977a: 8). Dev-Yol analysed foreign affairs through a Çayanite interpretation of Leninist imperialism (Dev-Yol, 1978a: 17) because the inter-imperialist redistribution struggle remained unchanged and only its methods may have changed (1978a: 17). War as the tool of the struggle could be joined by the energy crisis and currency devaluation (1978a: 17). Capitalism remained anarchic, imperialism was in general depression and uneven and spasmodic development continued so imperialists' integration tendency therefore would not stop conflicts (1978a: 17). However, inter-imperialist war was not now possible because of national liberation movements and nuclear weapons, they said (Dev-Yol, 1977:9-10).

They stressed the Çayanite term "covert occupation" to explain how imperialism operated in its third depression period. Imperialism applied neo-colonialism to form the economic basis of deliberately underdeveloped countries in line with monopoly interests (Dev-Yol [no date]:11). Imperialists exploited the proletariat's labour and the country's resources through their local collaborators (Dev-Yol [no date]:11), hence "covert occupation". This imperialist exploiting mechanism was internally maintained and reproduced by the local collaborators, and was supervised by such

imperialist institutions as the IMF and OECD (Dev-Yol [no date]:11). If economic depressions in underdeveloped countries became crises, the countries' own armies would seize power temporarily until the neo-colonial order overcame the problem (Dev-Yol, 1977b: 16).

As the Dev-Yol leadership believed that its principal and basic contradictions revealed the world view of a political current (Dev-Yol, 1977c: 12), they identified labour-capital as the basic contradiction of the late 1970s, and imputed an important role to the principal contradiction between the imperialist-capitalist system and the colonised/semi-colonised countries in the resolution of the basic contradiction (Dev-Yol, 1977c: 11). However, they argued that Sino-Soviet contradiction deflected the national liberation movements in accordance with their "national interests" and halted the revolutionary struggle in individual countries and the collapse of imperialism (Dev-Yol, 1977c: 10-11).

The CPSU identified the contradiction between socialism and imperialism as the basic contradiction, and reduced it to the Soviet-American conflict. While the CPSU reduced national liberation struggles and peoples' wars to secondary status, it attributed the most importance to the rivalry between the USSR and the US (Dev-Yol, 1977c 1977: 11). The Soviet Union saw itself as the centre of the world and so sought to maintain the balance of power rather than strengthen the international revolutionary movement (Dev-Yol, 1977c: 12; Dev-Yol [no date]:25). Soviet revisionism pursued a nationalist foreign policy rather than applying proletarian internationalism to its foreign policy (Dev-Yol, 1979a: 10). Its "non-capitalist development" thesis, argued Dev-Yol, contradicted Leninist revolutionary theory. To the Dev-Yol, the USSR aimed at solving economic problems of underdeveloped countries, which chose the non-capitalist way of development, with credits/loans and technology transfers, thereby rescuing them from imperialism without revolution and contracting imperialists' markets (Dev-Yol, 1977d: 7). Soviet non-capitalist development solved the problems of the dominant classes of the Third World rather than liberating their people (Dev-Yol, 1977d: 7). The USSR was therefore a bourgeois nation state whose geopolitical strategy sought to secure its national interests at the expense of US interests and to expand its sphere of influence (Dev-

Yol, 1977d: 7). Its support was conditional on joining or remaining in the Soviet sphere (Dev-Yol, 1979b: 8), as seen in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Dev-Yol, 1980a: 8).

The CPC's view was also a nationalist petty bourgeois stance (Dev-Yol, 1979a: 10). The Dev-Yol clique harshly criticised the three world theory for subordinating the world proletarian movement, for omitting the contradiction between the socialist and imperialist systems, and for focusing on the "level of development" instead of "class differentiation" (Dev-Yol, 1977e: 10-11). This theory meant favouring whatever was anti-Soviet, such as the EEC and NATO, and opposing national liberation movements assisted by the USSR (Dev-Yol, 1977f: 12).

Consequently, Dev-Yol claimed that neither the USSR nor China aimed at building a classless society but pursued nationalist foreign policies to expand their spheres of influence (Dev-Yol, 1979a: 10). Despite its severe critiques of revisionists, Dev-Yol argued the Albanian Labour Party also followed a foreign policy based on its national interests (Dev-Yol, 1978b: 8).

Against this background of the "whole", the Dev-Yol clique put Turkey in the world order mainly following Çayanite theses: dependence on imperialism and covert occupation by imperialism (Dev-Yol, 1978c: 2). The clique blamed Turkey's backwardness on dependence and its distorted capitalisation process which constantly produced economic crises and political instability (Dev-Yol, 1977g: 2). Although Turkish social formation was dominated by capitalism, its economic development was based on "assembly industry" (Dev-Yol, 1978c: 2). It imported semi-manufactured products and technology, producing continuous foreign exchange bottlenecks which caused foreign indebtedness (Dev-Yol, 1977:2; Dev-Yol, 1978c: 2). To break this vicious circle of imperialist exploitation, Dev-Yol suggested immediately ending dependency, exploitive relations (Dev-Yol, 1977h: 2) and the dominance of foreign monopolies, and nationalising resources. Turkey should quit imperialist institutions such as NATO, CENTO, IMF, EEC, and the International

Energy Agency, abolish all US bilateral agreements and seize all foreign bases in Turkey (Dev-Yol, 1977h: 2).

Dev-Yol argued that imperialism put the neo-colonial order (covert occupation) in Turkey through an oligarchic dictatorship, a reactionary alliance of the local monopolist bourgeoisie, landlords and usurious traders with international monopolies (Dev-Yol, 1977f: 17). The basic contradiction was between imperialism and the people, and the principal contradiction was between the people and the oligarchy, thus a revolution should be anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic (Dev-Yol, 1977f: 19).

Dev-Yol pointed to a repeated pattern of military coups in Turkish politics. The army seized power temporarily on behalf of imperialism to overcome crises as with the 27 May 1960 and the 12 March 1971 coups and Dev-Yol predicted it would do so again because Turkey's strategic significance dramatically increased with regional developments in the late 1970s (*e.g.* the US intervention in Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan) so the US would not allow a political crisis in Turkey to deepen (Dev-Yol, 1980b:4; Dev-Yol, 1978d: 3; Dev-Yol, 1980c:2). Similarly, Dev-Yol argued that US imperialism needed a Cyprus solution (Dev-Yol, 1978c: 3) which would not push either Turkey or Greece towards the Soviet Union (Dev-Yol, 1978c: 3). It tried to use Turkey's foreign exchange crisis to secure a political compromise on Cyprus along with economic ones (Dev-Yol, 1979c: 12). The US would therefore establish a military fascist dictatorship to overhaul the existing exploitative order in Turkey which was key to US regional interests following the loss of Iran (Dev-Yol, 1979d: 2). Dev-Yol said the 12 September coup proved them right (Dev-Yol [no date]: 3).

Dev-Yol criticised the established political parties for reproducing the exploitative order despite sometimes resorting to anti-imperialist language but within the confines drawn by imperialism (Dev-Yol, 1978e: 4). Statesmen like İnönü, touted as an anti-imperialist leader by petty bourgeois radicals following the 1964 Johnson letter, and Ecevit, praised as anti-imperialist after the 1974 Cyprus intervention, could not pursue an independent policy despite imperialism (Dev-Yol, 1978e: 4). Arguing that Turkey

could not gravitate towards an independent policy but only rearrange and consolidate its relations with imperialism, Dev-Yol asserted only when the people came to power would a new world order be established and Turkey would find its place in it (Dev-Yol, 1978e: 4).

Because the anti-fascist debate dominated leftist circles, international relations and Turkey's foreign policy rarely attracted Dev-Yol's attention. When it did, they used an eclectic combination of realist geopolitics and a Çayanite interpretation of Leninist imperialism. As Pekdemir, one of its leaders, acknowledged, Dev-Yol ideologists had sought appropriate references from within Marxist literature (both Marxist classics and neo-Marxist writers such as Baran, Sweezy and Wallerstein) to bolster their theses on the exigency of the revolutionary struggle (Pekdemir, 2007: 748). However, it is quite hard to see any overt impact of neo-Marxists because only one article (see for instance Dev-Yol, 1977i) was dedicated to underdevelopment throughout *Devrimci Yol*. Dependency, neo-colonialism and covert occupation were stressed as objective conditions for an anti-imperialist and anti-fascist peoples' war in Turkey.

The Dev-Yol group had disparate accounts of Turkey's emergent fascist authoritarian rule: sometimes they stressed the inability of the dominant classes to make concession to the masses (Dev-Yol, 1978c: 2), at other times they focused on American imperialism's strategic Middle East plans. Domestic developments were all attributed to the covert occupation of Turkey (Dev-Yol, 1978f: 3) and the likely forms that US-Turkey relations could take (Dev-Yol, 1978d: 3). This explains the strong tendency within socialist circles to see an imperialist plot in every social event.

Their world order analysis had some explanatory power as they exposed the *realpolitik* nature of other currents' Chinese- or Soviet-based foreign policy. However, they ignored a historical analysis of Turkish foreign policy in light of "different configurations of relations of production, social classes and the state" (Yalvaç, 2014:120) because any paradigm shift could not come from the dominant

classes who were already committed to a dependent structure. In their structural determinist theoretical framework, both the collaborator classes' and imperialists' interests were "always served by (foreign policy) actions of the state agency" (Yalvaç, 2014:128). Ignoring that "counteracting processes and tendencies" are influential in foreign policy formulation and thus "different configurations of power are conjuncturally manifested" in foreign policy (Yalvaç, 2014:129), the Dev-Yol clique became bogged down in structural determinism. Strongly influenced by system theory and functionalism, they saw imperialism as a system in which "all behaviours, relations and goal" of its nations were "defined from the need of system maintenance" (van der Pijl, 2009:149). Thus dependent states which constantly suffered from foreign exchange crisis so the dominant classes were obliged to adopt a foreign policy in line with imperialist interests. Class agency was reduced simply to an element of the structure with very limited room for manoeuvre. An independent foreign policy could not happen unless Turkey left the imperialist system. Consequently, by reducing stratified social reality to dependency relations in the world imperialist system, they partially accounted for the trajectory of Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s.

Regarding the meta-theoretical disposition, their focus on "regularities and predictable outcomes" (Colin and Wight, 2010:17) revealed the positivist premises that underpinned Dev-Yol's analytical framework. Considering such realist concepts as "deterrence" (nuclear weapons) and "balance of power" shift in favour of European and Japanese imperialism, they predicted a third world war was unlikely in the third stage of imperialist depression. Similarly, observing a regular pattern of foreign exchange bottlenecks leading to political crises and two coups in the post-war era, they predicted further foreign policy concessions to imperialism and another coup to ensure the exploiting order continued to reproduce itself. Applying the "logic of anarchy" to geopolitical rivalry between the superpowers revealed "an empiricist epistemology based on an eventist conception of foreign policy" (Yalvaç, 2014:120). To explain states' foreign policies, they mainly focused on observable "foreign policy events" (Yalvaç, 2014:127) such as Kissinger's visits to Turkey or Greece, the US arms embargo and Turco-American negotiations over defence and economic

cooperation. These examples revealed the epistemological implications of a positivist meta-theoretical stance in their analytical framework. Besides, “the ontological implications of positivist assumptions” (Wight and Joseph, 2010:17) manifested themselves in their assumptions about unitary actors (states) engaging rationally under the guiding principles of *realpolitik*.

6.4.2. The Liberation (Kurtuluş)

6.4.2.1. Introduction

Some THKP-C militants (Mustafa Kaçaroğlu, Mahir Sayın, Şaban İba, İlhami Aras, *et al*) organised separately from Dev-Yol as the Kurtuluş group (Ersan, 2014:325). They first prepared a leaflet, *Yol Ayrımı* (Parting of the Ways)¹⁰⁷, to outline basic views on their past and on the socialist movement. They became known through a monthly journal, *Kurtuluş Sosyalist Dergi* (Liberation Socialist Journal (*KSD*)), started in June 1976 (Sayın, 1988; Aydınöğlu, 2011; Ersan, 2014). They started a weekly newspaper, *Kurtuluş*, in January 1978.

The Kurtuluş clique set out to be the real representative of scientific socialism to put Marxist-Leninist theory into practice and change the world (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 45). As with other leftist circles which claimed to be scientific socialists, they tried to prove how genuinely Marxist their views were and how revisionist and opportunist were others (Ersan, 2014: 336). Kurtuluş strongly criticized the prevailing reformist line in Turkish socialism for being either petty bourgeois radicalist (traditional line) or pacifist (a relatively new line that limited the struggle for socialism to the bourgeois order) (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 23) and for reducing revolution to the “quantity” of proletariat due to their suspicion of its revolutionary power (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 37). The socialists gravitated towards the closest class (the petty bourgeoisie), ideologically positioned on their right, as a shortcut to a socialist revolution (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 32). This misled them to impute “erroneous significations” to

¹⁰⁷ It was reprinted as an article: “Yol Ayrımı [Parting of the Ways]”, *KSD*, issue: 1, June 1976, pp. 16-48.

Kemalism and even to affirm it. They argued a revolutionary line was launched in 1971 by younger socialists (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 40), though it suffered from affirming Kemalism, reducing class struggle solely to armed struggle and being detached from the masses (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 45-46).

The Kurtuluş clique discussed how armed struggle would occur in Turkey (STMA, 1988:2265). The foremost task of the socialist movement was turning an intelligentsia movement into a class body (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 19) as a Leninist proletarian party (Ersan, 2014:331). They therefore focused on organising the proletariat instead of students, stressing political struggle to convince the masses of the need for armed struggle (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 47). Although they made some progress, the September 1980 military coup intervened and Kurtuluş followers either fled abroad or were arrested and eventually this circle ended (Ersan, 2014:348-351).

6.4.2.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

The Kurtuluş group critically analysed the capitalist camp through Leninist imperialism theory as well as the theses of the socialist camp. They attached particular importance to critical analyses of “revisionist” Soviet and Chinese theses because their adherents in the Turkish left harmed the socialist movement by trying to fit Turkey's social realities into the Sino-Soviet lines (Kurtuluş, 1976b: 3). They criticised the CPSU for reducing revolution to merely a shift in government (Kurtuluş, 1976c: 22). Kurtuluş argued that post-war changes caused Soviet ideologists to revise the Leninist revolution strategy with separate strategies for the imperialist countries’ “advancement of democracy” and the Third World’s “non-capitalist development” (Kurtuluş, 1976c: 22). However these ideologists distorted the Leninist revolution strategy since their revisionist strategies reduced revolution to the democratisation of the old state apparatus producing a “peaceful transition to socialism” (Kurtuluş, 1976c: 22). Kurtuluş accused the TKP of being a passive servant of the CPSU, and of ignoring Lenin's destruction of bourgeoisie state power by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Similarly, Kurtuluş blamed the Aydınlık circle for following Chinese theses and thus helping American imperialism by instigating Muscovite hostility to counter growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey over Cyprus (Kurtuluş, 1976b: 12-13). Chinese theses were an expression of China's opposition to Soviet foreign policy. Sino-Soviet antagonism began in the late 1950s when the Soviet Union reneged on its promise to construct nuclear facilities in China (Kurtuluş, 1977a: 5-10). The Soviets blamed China for the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. China started to paint the Soviet Union as a social imperialist country and accused Soviet leaders of revisionism, though it had congratulated them on abolishing the Stalinist myth (Kurtuluş, 1977a: 5).¹⁰⁸

Based on Leninist categorisations, Kurtuluş divided the world capitalist system into three: metropolitan countries, countries with incomplete bourgeois democratic revolutions, and semi-colonised and colonised countries (Kurtuluş, 1977a: 34). Unlike the metropolitan countries, the last two lacked a finance oligarchy and finance capital; instead they had oligarchies constituted by the collaborator monopolist bourgeoisies and feudal landlords (Kurtuluş, 1977a: 34).

After the "Second Redistribution War", the single capitalist world market collapsed and the socialist camp emerged (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 35). This prompted colonial and semi-colonial countries to develop liberation movements (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 35), thereby further weakening the imperialist system (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 35). Influenced by Stalin, they argued these developments exacerbated the general depression of imperialism and destabilised the capitalist-imperialist market (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 35). Imperialism retained "the most brutal form of violence and exploitation in domestic and foreign policy" (Kurtuluş, 1977c: 29), changing only its forms of exploitation: for instance imperialism used neo-colonialism to expand existing markets (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 36).

¹⁰⁸ The 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 is depicted by China's contradictory discourse as a watershed in the Soviet Union's historical development. The CPC attributed contrasting meanings to the congress in accordance with the changing *realpolitik* of China: the congress was praised by Mao at the time; but later, after Chinese-Soviet conflicts, it was defined as the beginning of Soviet revisionism (Kurtuluş, 1977a: 5).

Imperialism allied with the reactionary monopoly bourgeoisie and big landlords to change the semi-colonial capitalist states into oligarchic capitalist states (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 37) ruled by imperialism, local monopoly bourgeoisie and big landlords (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 38). The oligarchic dictatorship relegated the country to an economically and culturally backward part of the imperialist capitalist system (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 39). Each semi-colonial state in the imperialist-capitalist system became “a caricature of the developed capitalist states” (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 24-25). Imperialism also inserted a new institution, a National Security Council, in such semi-colonial countries as Turkey and most South American states to rule those countries more directly (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 45).

The Kurtuluş group said external pressures from European capitalist states starting with the 1838 Free Trade Agreement eventually forced the feudal monarchic Ottoman state to adopt reforms resulting in distorted and dependent local capitalism (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 28). Despite several attempts to reform society “from above”, the bourgeoisie could not seize the state apparatus until the establishment of the republic in 1923 (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 28-33). This changed the feudal monarchic state into a bourgeois republic.

This bourgeois republic completed its democratic revolution after the Second World War when the US imposed parliamentary democracy on the semi-colonised countries in the face of increasing numbers of people’s democracies (socialist countries) (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 36). The transition to a multiparty parliamentary democracy in Turkey in 1946 changed the capitalist state into an oligarchic state (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 35) led by the new dominant classes composed of the monopolist bourgeoisie- the upper strata of bourgeoisie created by the Kemalists during single-party rule- and the big landlords (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 37). The overlapping interests of imperialism and the monopolist bourgeoisie further integrated Turkey into the imperialist capitalist system as a backward link in the neo-colonial period (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 39). Imperialism concealed its existence in Turkey, argued the Kurtuluş faction, but it was part of the oligarchic dictatorship (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 39).

The Kurtuluş circle observed a strong correlation between imperialist depressions and Turkish social crises (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 40) the 1957-58 world depression and the 1967 world depression brought about the 1960 and 1971 coups in Turkey. The inflationary economic model of the DP government resulted in ruthless imperialist exploitation of the country and hence poverty for the middle and working classes. Their reactions caused the military and civil bureaucracy to seize power in the 1960 coup (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 40). Local monopolist capital strengthened its power after the 1960 crisis and led the oligarchic dictatorship together with international finance capital (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 41). Following the 1962 US economic crisis, the local monopoly bourgeoisie in 1963 received European economic and financial aid through the Ankara Agreement on integration in the Common Market which expedited monopolization (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 42).

As capitalism developed in Turkey from external pressures rather than internal dynamics (Kurtuluş, 1976d: 35), this distorted the economic base which contained both pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production and was reflected in the political superstructure as an oligarchic dictatorship (Kurtuluş, 1976b: 8). Whilst the Kurtuluş circle identified the primary contradiction at the system level between the colonised countries and imperialism (Kurtuluş, 1976d: 44), they defined it in Turkey as being between the people and the oligarchy (Kurtuluş, 1976e: 13) because imperialism shaped Turkey's economics, politics, culture, *et cetera* through the oligarchic dictatorship (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 39). Kurtuluş thus called for an anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic democratic people's revolution (Kurtuluş, 1976d: 38; Kurtuluş, 1976e: 14).

Lastly, the Kurtuluş group exposed a common mistake of the leftist assessment of Kemalism as Kurtuluş claimed that since the trade bourgeoisie's interests were at stake through imperialism, the national liberation war was anti-imperialist but not anti-capitalist (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 25-29). This was evident from the Kemalist government's close relations with imperialism (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 29). By rejecting the Çayanite assumption that Kemalism was leftist and anti-imperialist, the Kurtuluş

claimed it was nothing but “a different term for ‘bourgeois ideology’” (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 25).

Since Kurtuluş emphasised theoretical development, its theoretical publication *KSD* disseminated its views on substantial political issues (revolution strategy and organisation, Kemalism, the Kurdish question, and so on) and criticised other socialist groups’ views. Unlike the dogmatic socialist accounts of the pro-Soviet and pro-Sino circles and despite Kurtuluş’s attempt at ideological renewal and development through scientific socialism (Kurtuluş, 1976a: 4), it “failed to sustain its initial critical attitude” and became “trapped in orthodoxy” by reproducing the Stalinist exegesis of Lenin’s theses (Samim, 1981:76; Aydınoğlu, 2011: 430) and becoming stuck in continuous polemics with other leftist groups over Leninism (Ersan, 2014:344). Foreign policy issues hardly found any place in *KSD*, whereas in their weekly *Kurtuluş* they generally dealt with international relations through “an eventist conception of foreign policy” (Yalvaç, 2014:120), focusing chiefly on such conjunctural developments as US President Carter’s or Foreign Secretary Vance’s visits to the Middle East in the context of the Palestine-Israel conflict. To detect their interpretations of the world order and Turkish foreign policy, it was necessary to read between the lines in their articles.

Influenced by Marx, the Kurtuluş circle accurately posited that the forms of the state varied with changes in the mode of production and particularly in the relations of production. However, they neglected to analyse “the way that international relations operate[d] in any particular era” through “an examination of the mode of production” (Hobden and Jones, 2008:155). Rather they engaged with international relations merely through Leninist imperialism and seemed to have closed themselves to other sources of Marxist-inspired IR theories such as those of neo-Marxists scholars Frank, Baran, Sweezy and Wallerstein.

Based on Leninism, they claimed that imperialism was falling due to its deepening crisis and national liberation movements. National liberation wars in the weakest links of imperialism (Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Angola) heralded the end

of imperialism and the inevitability of a new world order (Kurtuluş, 1978: 1). They argued that Turkey's place in this world should be assessed through its dialectical relations with the whole (the imperialist world system) and the part (Turkey) (Kurtuluş, 1978: 1). However, by describing Turkey as a semi-colonised capitalist country (strangely with a colony (Kürdistan)) dependent on imperialism (Kurtuluş, 1976d: 35-37), they reduced the state agency's actions to a dependent variable determined and constrained by an independent variable, imperialist-capitalist structure. They in fact adopted a determinist theoretical framework which schematised the relationship between the whole and the part. Their instrumentalist account saw the state as "an instrument of the dominant classes for keeping the dependent classes under domination" (Kurtuluş, 1976f: 25), by means of "continuous and systematic violence" (Kurtuluş, 1977b: 48). As they ignored the "consent" side of holding power, the state agency did not have to grant any compromises to the dominant classes. Consequently, the oligarchic state would always adopt domestic and foreign policies congruent with the dominant classes' and imperialism's interests. Like the Dev-Yol faction, they reduced stratified social reality to dependency relations in the world imperialist system so in this schematised theoretical framework unless a part broke away or the whole system changed, the behaviour of dependent states was determined by the structure, imperialist world system. Consequently their explanatory power was very weak in accounting for stratified and complex social reality.

Another problematic area was their interpretation of state-society relations in different historic periods when different configurations of power appeared. From the inception of the republic in 1923 to the end of the Second World War, they argued the state type was capitalist but the state form was a reactionary republic ruled by the dominant classes-all factions of the bourgeoisie and landlords. After the war, however, the big landlords and monopoly bourgeoisie, created by the Kemalists from the higher strata of the bourgeoisie, took over. The Kurtuluş circle's views on why Turkey was a backward part of the imperialist world system and why changes in class relations transformed the state form into an oligarchic dictatorship suffered from schematised views. Without any empirical study of classes, they linked the

founders of the DP, Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, with respectively the monopoly bourgeoisie and the big landlords. They did not address how and why the state form changed to an oligarchic dictatorship without any essential changes in social formation, and did not define such concepts as monopoly bourgeoisie, oligarchic dictatorship and reactionary republic. They did not analyse empirically whether a monopoly bourgeoisie existed in Turkey, how and why the Kemalists created it and how there was an allegedly politically mediated process of monopoly capital accumulation.

Their account was also contradictory: the military and civil bureaucracy was an instrument of the ruling oligarchy, but the impoverished petty bourgeoisie staged a coup in 1960 due to the development model of the dominant classes. If the oligarchy ruled through systematised violence without granting any concessions to the dependent classes, why it needed the army to seize power in the 1971 coup to solve its problems was not explained.

6.4.3. The Socialist Party

6.4.3.1. Introduction

The Socialist Party (SP) was founded as an independent organisation in May 1975 by: Mehmet Ali Aybar, the former leader of the first TİP; a group of unionists including Kemal Nebioğlu, Cenani Bıçakçı, Uğur Cankocak and others; and members of the working class (STMA, 1988:2236; Lipovsky, 1992:126). In its first congress in 1977 the party's name was changed to Sosyalist Devrim Partisi (Socialist Revolution Party) (Lipovsky, 1992:126). Espousing an independent socialist path, this circle rejected the imposition of Soviet or Chinese views in favour of combating imperialism through international socialist solidarity (SP, 1975:27).

The strong impact of Aybar's views on the party programme was seen in its emphasis on "democratic socialism" and a "struggle against bureaucracy" which differentiated it "from the other divisions of the socialist movement in Turkey"

(Lipovsky, 1992:153). The SP programme resembled the first TİP in its emphasis on backwardness, dependence and non-capitalist development. However, the SP rekindled the debate of the 1960s¹⁰⁹ on the social structure of Turkey in a historical perspective tracing back to the Ottoman era. In adopting an Asiatic mode of production, the underlying feature of Turkish politics was the division between the central state (and its bureaucracy) and the people. Although its nascent version appeared sporadically in Aybar's writings during the 1960s, the struggle against bureaucracy, one of the dominant classes of Turkish social formation, stood out in the SP programme as equal to the struggle against imperialism and capitalism (SP, 1975:7).

Like other parties, the SP was abolished by the junta following the 1980 coup. This circle conveyed its views through the party programme, the weekly *Sosyalist Yarın* (Socialist Future) started in November 1976 and the monthly *Sosyalist Yol* (Socialist Path) from July 1975, including its position on the world order and Turkey foreign policy.

6.4.3.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

The SP circle said the imperialist-capitalist system of industrialised capitalist countries and underdeveloped countries made the former, which universalised the system, stronger by channelling all its wealth to them (Sosyalist Yarın, 1976:10). Underdeveloped countries were the source of the wealth and the market for products and so were kept underdeveloped by the imperialist countries' monopoly over technology (Sosyalist Yarın, 1976:10). Underdeveloped periphery countries were developed to meet the requirements of the core capitalist countries (Sosyalist Yarın, 1977a:11). Imperialism shaped their economies, politics, culture, arts, philosophy, *et cetera* (SP, 1975:41).

¹⁰⁹ During the 1960s this debate was very intense. One group including TİP leader Aybar said the Ottoman social structure was based on the Asiatic mode of production whereas another supported feudalism.

Because underdeveloped countries were economically and politically dependent on imperialism (SP, 1975: 5), they could not reach the level of developed states (Sosyalist Yarin, 1977a:11) so they first had to leave the system (Sosyalist Yarin, 1976:10). Therefore, liberation movements based on underdeveloped countries' own dynamic constituted the soft spots of imperialism (Sosyalist Yarin, 1976:10). Imperialist powers and their local collaborators therefore sought to control domestic developments in these countries (Sosyalist Yarin, 1976:10).

While influenced by developments in Marxist literature, the SP circle also used other sources to explain the world order. For instance, they resorted to Ernest Mandel's views based on Trotsky's theory of uneven and combined development, but without citing his work. They argued that "the capitalist world economy is an articulated combination of capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist economies"¹¹⁰ (Sosyalist Yarin, 1977a:10). These economies were linked by capitalist relations of exchange and dominated by the capitalist world market (Sosyalist Yarin, 1977a:10). Various nations' places within the world system were determined both by their place in the world market and by variations in relations of production (Sosyalist Yarin, 1977a:10). Ignoring the latter wrongly identified them as "proletarian nations" and reduced exploitation to only external to which all classes of underdeveloped countries were vulnerable so changing only the world system actually perpetuated it (Sosyalist Yarin, 1977a:10).

The SP attributed the misunderstanding of underdevelopment to seeing the world capitalist economy as an arithmetical sum of national capitalist economies (Sosyalist Yarin, 1977a:10). The capitalist system must be treated as an organic whole that recognized unity, complementarity, dependency and exploitation relations (Sosyalist Yarin, 1977a:10). Therefore they turned to "uneven and combined development" to understand the system. Whilst uneven development proceeded from the system's anarchic structure and its expansionist dynamic, combined development stemmed

¹¹⁰ Mandel (1975 48-49) wrote that "the capitalist world economy is an articulated system of capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production, linked to each other by capitalist relations of exchange and dominated by the capitalist world market."

from capitalism's continuously global expansion (Sosyalist Yarı, 1977a:10). Pre-capitalist nations had different modes of productions ranging from primitive to very modern, and so different consumption models within the same social formation (Sosyalist Yarı, 1977a:10).

The SP said the growing US economy after the Second World War drove US imperialism to find new investment fields and external markets (Aybar, 1975a: 15). It first created such international institutions as the World Bank, the IMF and World Trade Organisation to revive international trade (Aybar, 1975a: 15) and it granted funds (*e.g.* Marshall Plan aid) to turn devastated European states into consumers of US products and so maintain its existing market against the socialist market (Aybar, 1975a: 15). American imperialism prioritised Europe, the Middle East and South-east Asia (Aybar, 1975b: 6) and designated them as "life spaces" against the Soviet Union (Aybar, 1975a: 15). Within "a semicircle starting from the northern Atlantic and covering Europe and northern Mediterranean reaching out to the Far East" (Aybar 1975a: 16), American imperialism created such military alliances as NATO, CENTO and SEATO (Seviğ, 1976: 47) and built military bases to protect these life spaces from the socialist bloc (Aybar, 1975a: 16).

The SP circle argued that underdeveloped and dependent Turkey was as important as the other states in the world capitalist system (Sosyalist Yarı, 1976: 10). Its geopolitical location gave it a pivotal role in US strategic planning with its common border with the USSR, its proximity to the latter's soft spot and its control of routes to Middle Eastern oil resources and Central Asia (Aybar, 1975a:16; Aybar, 1975b:8). While Aybar asserted that *détente* reduced Turkey's geopolitical importance to the US (Aybar, 1975a:17), as seen by the US arms embargo against Turkey over Cyprus, he argued it remained significant within overall US strategic plans (Aybar, 1975a:17).

Similar to the first TİP, the SP argued that victorious national liberation war did not give Turkey economic independence (Sosyalist Yarı, 1975:2). Atatürk's independent foreign policy faded after his death and after the Second World War

Turkey became a satellite of American and European imperialism as its rulers used the Soviet land demand as a pretext (SP, 1975:66). The SP clique claimed that the underlying reason for this paradigm shift was the overlapping interests of Turkey's dominant classes and imperialism (SP, 1975:48). Aybar argued the war-weary Soviets were not powerful enough to fight Turkey, and US aid reached Turkey two years after the Soviet demand (Aybar, 1975a:14).

Turkey had become a passive component of the imperialist system entirely cobwebbed by imperialism's international institutions (Aybar, 1975a:18; Sosyalist Yarı, 1977b:4). As long as Turkish foreign policy remained dependent, Aybar said it would remain backward and would always face the danger of war (Aybar, 1975b:18). Like the first TİP, the SP adamantly opposed alliances with big powers and integration with imperialist countries (SP, 1975:65). Reflecting the realist concept of "self-help", it emphasised that each nation had different interests and should safeguard them on its own without relying on a military alliance (Aybar, 1975a:18). Agreements with the EEC, the US, NATO and CENTO threatened Turkish independence (SP, 1975:65; Aybar, 1975b:18). Foreign policy should reflect Turkey's legitimate national rights and interests, full independence, territorial integrity, equality, non-interference in its internal affairs, mutual interest and respect (SP, 1975: 67-68).

The continuity between the SP and the first TİP stemming from Aybar meant this circle's theoretical framework was also an eclectic mix of incompatible accounts, realism and Marxism. While construing the world order from a dependency perspective, they also referred to such realist conceptions as "self-help", "relative gain", "national interest" and "balance of power". Their Marxist theoretical framework was also eclectic. They retained the dependency theory in the world order, but also incorporated progress in the Marxist literature on IR in the 1970s such as their accommodation of the Trotskyite uneven and combined development. They criticised dependency theory and world systems analysis for viewing the world economy as exchange relations while ignoring production relations, thereby seeing external exploitation but neglecting domestic exploitation. They accused socialists

who reduced socialism to a development model as not being socialist (Köymen, 1976: 3). As the aim of socialism was the emancipation of the people not industrialisation (Köymen, 1976: 3; Sosyalist Yarı, 1977a: 11), they criticised “contemporary civilisation”, which dominated the discourse of the first TİP, as Western capitalist development was incompatible with socialism (Sosyalist Yarı, 1977a: 11).

Despite these criticisms in two articles (Köymen, 1976, and Sosyalist Yarı, 1977a), dependency theory thoroughly dominated the party programme and other articles in their journal. Even contradictorily on the one hand they introduced the Trotskyite concept of “uneven and combined development” but still supported the detached autarchic development model, “non-capitalist development”, on the other hand. They linked Turkey’s problems to underdevelopment, and industrialisation would give Turkey the level of developed countries and full independence (SP, 1975: 51). Because capitalist development was the main obstacle to Turkey’s becoming an advanced developed industrial country (SP, 1975: 14), like the other cliques they aimed to replace capitalism with socialism for rapid and stable development (SP, 1975: 31). Consequently, while they talked about production relations, they stressed unequal exchange relations which produced trade deficits, foreign indebtedness, dependency and domination by whichever imperialist country controlled its politics. Similar to Dev-Yol and Kurtuluş, the SP clique argued that imperialist countries through their local collaborators controlled the domestic politics of underdeveloped countries to keep them in the world capitalist system. Therefore, contrary to the uneven and combined development thesis, the SP suggested coexisting but separate development of underdeveloped societies by the non-capitalist development model to escape backwardness.

The SP faction saw anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist views in Kemalism by referring to Atatürk’s speech¹¹¹ in parliament in 1921 (Aybar, 1975b: 3; SP, 1975:

¹¹¹ Atatürk said that “we are such people who pursue a doctrine that approves struggle against imperialism that threatened to destroy us and against capitalism [that] wanted to swallow us”. For more on Atatürk’s anti-imperialist views see: Ataöv, Türkkaya (1975). “Anti-Imperialistic Ideas in Mustafa Kemal’s Writings and their Importance for Asia”, *Journal of Political Science Faculty*, issue: XV, pp. 1-10.

11; Kocagöz, 1976: 40). Since Kemalist foreign policy reflected the whole nation's interest, they argued it was independent from classes and therefore from imperialism. The hitherto classless society turned into a class-based society after the Second World War, and the emergent classes determined foreign policy in accordance with their interests. However the SP failed to address: why and how these classes had not been in power, how the whole nation's interest was reflected in Kemalist foreign policy, why and how the classes emerged after the war and why their interests did not overlap with the imperialists' before the war. Since they equated independent foreign policy with equitable foreign trade, they mistook Kemalist foreign policy as anti-imperialist. Similarly, their analytical framework for the post-war period was also problematic because the behaviour of dependent states was reduced to a dependent variable of an independent variable, the imperialist world system. The SP circle equated the structure with an "external determinant of foreign policy" (Yalvaç, 2014:119) – the imperialist system. Besides, they resorted to security-oriented realist geopolitics to explain conjunctural changes in relations between imperialism and Turkey as changes in Turkey's geopolitical importance to US strategic plans. From a meta-theoretical perspective, the SP circle rejected the complexity of social reality and embraced ontological simplicity to achieve "predictable outcomes" and "to reveal the laws of motion of history" (Cox, 1986:248). Similar to other leftist circles, they also retained the epistemological and ontological implications of a positivist meta-theoretical stance in their analytical framework due to conception of foreign policy through observable "foreign policy events", structural functionalism and *realpolitik*. Because the ill-formed analytical framework drew on an eclectic mix of Marxism and realism, it did not fully explain variations in Turkish foreign policy.

6.4.4. Birikim Circle

6.4.4.1. Introduction

In the mid-1970s when practice was exalted over theory and those who ignored practice were accused of pacifism (Argın, 2007: 971), the Birikim group, composed of Murat Belge, Ömer Laçiner, Can Yücel and Onat Kutlar, set out to form a socio-political movement along socialist lines without pursuing political power (Birikim, 1978a: 121). Emphasising the Sino-Soviet polarity's fundamental difference from Marxist revolutionary theory (Birikim, 1978a: 120), Birikim pursued an independent socialist path (İpek, 1975:8).

Shunning inter-sectarian debates and anti-fascist struggles, the Birikim circle made considerable room in their journals for theoretical developments in the Marxist literature on IR during the 1970s¹¹², and published translations of articles from foreign journals (mainly the *New Left Review*) (Birikim, 1976: 21) through its publishing house, Birikim Yayınları, and academic journals *Toplum ve Bilim* (Society and Science) and *Birikim*¹¹³ (Accumulation). The former, a three-monthly journal, discussed theoretical developments and new debates in the social sciences from its inception in 1975. *Birikim* was published monthly from March 1975 till its closure by court martial in March 1980, having published articles on social, political, economic and cultural issues (Argın, 2007:967). *Birikim* dealt at length with, among other things, criticisms of the Turkish socialist movement (the structure of the country, the NDR movement, nationalist leftist views, petty bourgeois radicalism, armed struggle), the division in the international socialist movement (abandoning an internationalist perspective, Sino-Soviet antagonism, real socialism), the true interpretation of Lenin's imperialism theory and the question of state (translations of Poulantzas, Miliband, and Gramsci, *et cetera*). Several books were published by

¹¹² Emmanuel, Arghiri (1975); Emmanuel, Arghiri (1976); Laclau, Ernesto (1975); Birikim (1975a); Laçiner, Ömer (1975a); Birikim (1976); Warren, Bill (1976); Tonak, Ertuğrul and Nişanyan, Sevan (1979).

¹¹³ *Birikim* resumed publication in 1989, and since then it has been published uninterrupted.

Birikim on development, imperialism and dependency issues¹¹⁴. The Birikim circle's conception of the world order and Turkish foreign policy will be explored through *Birikim*.

6.4.4.2. Interpretation of the World Order and Turkey's Foreign Policy

Birikim saw imperialism as a world system (İpek, 1975: 16; Laçiner, 1976a: 37) that opened the entire world to capitalist production relations (Laçiner, 1976a: 35), property owner classes were dominated by finance capital and multinational corporations became the basic unit of imperialism (İpek, 1975: 16; Laçiner, 1976a: 35). It was “the process of the universalisation of capital relations” as relations among all countries enabled the reproduction of capital (Birikim, 1975b: 46). Therefore other Turkish socialist cliques were wrong in approaching imperialism and underdevelopment as opposing poles (Laçiner, 1976a: 37) because the latter was part of imperialism.

Birikim argued that uneven development made the imperialist system hierarchic (Laçiner, 1976a: 35) as metropolitan countries at the upper end controlled relations and occasionally struggled with each other to move to the top (Laçiner, 1975a: 60). Individual countries developed to the extent that the system allowed, but at different rates (Laçiner, 1976a: 35). The circle criticised the dependency school for not contextualising backwardness within a hierarchical system. They challenged Paul Baran, whose writings influenced the Turkish left in the 1960s and 1970s, on his “underdeveloped country model” for not distinguishing between historical and structural elements of imperialism (Birikim, 1975a: 32). The main task of imperialism was “to control” not “prevent the economic development of the underdeveloped countries” as Baran claimed (quoted in Birikim, 1975a: 32). As the essence of imperialism was “the worldwide reproduction of capital relations” (Birikim, 1975b: 46), imperialism allowed underdeveloped countries to develop “relatively” *vis-à-vis* the imperialist states (Birikim, 1975a: 33) who controlled the rate (Birikim, 1975a: 32). The Birikim group argued that as imperialism imposed

¹¹⁴ See for instance Gülalp, Haldun (1979); Albrecht, Ulrich, *et al* (1980); and Keyder, Çağlar (1980).

capitalism “from above”, the emergent integration of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production constantly reproduced “distorted development relations”, hence development created underdevelopment (Birikim, 1975a: 34).

Prior to 1945, the world was divided among national imperialist hierarchies (Laçiner, 1976b: 56) but subsequently nation-based divisions became obsolete and imperialism became based on “international monopolies” (Laçiner, 1976b: 56). To Birikim, internationalisation mixed capital from both underdeveloped and metropolitan capitalist states (Laçiner, 1976c: 35). Identifying to which country any international monopoly belonged was not easy, as capital became stateless (Laçiner, 1976d: 25). Monopolies had a network of enterprises competing for investment, distribution and commerce throughout the imperialist hierarchy (Laçiner, 1976c: 36, 37). The imperialist structure was built on a “class basis” as the monopolies competed for partnerships with the bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries (Laçiner, 1976c: 37). Therefore, economic activity areas rather than national borders mattered in the system (Laçiner, 1976a: 36). Conflicts between international monopolies superseded conflicts between imperialist nations so Birikim asserted an inter-imperialist war was unlikely (Laçiner 1976b; 1976c; 1976d). When nation states became a straitjacket for the international monopolies, the monopolies invented new polities like the EEC (Laçiner, 1976c: 35) to promote the free movement of capital (İpek, 1975: 16). Yet Birikim maintained the nation state had not yet completely lost importance (Laçiner, 1976a: 38). Contradictorily, they also claimed the internationalisation of the economy was concurrent with the increasing fragmentation of nation states (Belge, 1977a: 52). Social formations operated in tune with imperialism at the economic level, argued Birikim, although each of them was also a specific unit with political and ideological practices and its “nation state” which controlled and reflected the class struggle (Laçiner, 1976a: 38; Belge, 1977a: 61).

Whilst capitalist states started to become obsolete, the socialist camp completely nationalised Marxism which was inherently international (Belge, 1980: 36). The Birikim circle, therefore, criticised socialist countries for likening peoples’ states to capitalist nation states and for reducing socialism to a method of development

(Belge, 1977b; Laçiner, 1977). This was attributed to Stalin's "socialism in one country" thesis, though they maintained this thesis was right in the mid-1920s. However this thesis inevitably brought about "militant economism" and "realist" accounts of international politics (Belge, 1977b: 19; İpek, 1975: 9). In time a "non-state" state (the USSR of the 1920s), they argued, became a nation state on the pretext of "survival" in the face of imperialism (İpek, 1975: 8), thus its primary preoccupation became the development of the productive forces and technology to become more powerful in a *realpolitik* sense (İpek, 1975: 8; Laçiner, 1977: 32). This drive for "self-protection" determined the behaviour of socialist states (İpek, 1975: 8).

Their interpretation of the post-Second-World-War order was largely congruent with other leftist views of imperialism imposing capitalist relations "from above" (Laçiner, 1975a: 58), the US leading the capitalist bloc, reviving the capitalist countries through aid, building imperialist system through international financial institutions, new military organisations and bilateral agreements (Laçiner, 1976c: 33). Birikim pointed to "neo-colonialism", a new imperialist method of exploitation which was based on "domination without annexation", leading to political independence but economic dependence (Birikim, 1979a: 15). Considering the spread of communism after the fall of China, imperialists founded puppet administrations dependent on imperialism in former colonies with local dominant classes developed through economic aid (Laçiner, 1975a: 58). Birikim also saw US hegemony being challenged by the European and Japanese monopolies in the mid-1960s (Laçiner, 1976c: 36) and the US being forced to devise "supranational" rules for the international system (Laçiner, 1976c: 33) and establish institutions and mechanisms such as the OECD, the Trilateral Commission, and the G-7 (Birikim, 1979a: 16) to maintain its hegemon status as *primus inter pares* (Birikim, 1979b: 15).

The protection of imperialism was sought through Cold War ideology, politico-military regional alliances and US bilateral agreements (Laçiner, 1975a: 58). The Birikim circle said this safety net was created because capitalist relations were not yet developed enough to entrench the system in deliberately underdeveloped

countries (Laçiner, 1975a: 58). When capitalist relations took root solidly, imperialism could partially withdraw as American imperialism partially retreated from the Middle East on strengthening Iran in economic and military terms (Birikim, 1975c: 48). While the Cold war was designed to stop the expansion of socialism and the USSR, the emergent new balance of power in the early 1970s led to *détente* (Birikim, 1979b: 15). However, from the mid-1970s, Brzezinski's hard line brought new dimensions to Cold War military aggression (Birikim, 1979b: 14-15). Thus with the "second Cold War" imperialism attempted not only to contain the Soviet Union militarily but also to weaken it through economic, ideological, cultural and political instruments (Birikim, 1979b: 16). In the 1970s, the US lost its leadership to the EEC countries and Japan in industries such as automotive, iron and steel, and some branches of electronics, but developed a great advantage in cutting-edge high technology production, argued Laçiner (Laçiner, 1980: 17). The US used "neo-liberalism" to remove obstacles to the international flow of capital and goods and reorganise the division of labour among national economies to accommodate its high-tech industries (Laçiner, 1980: 17). Birikim predicted this new economic order would change international relations in the 1980s (Laçiner, 1980: 17).

The Birikim group did not particularly analyse Turkey's foreign policy but focused on how other Turkish socialists in the 1960s and 1970s misconceived imperialism, distorted it with their nationalist accounts and misinterpreted Turkey's relations with imperialism. Whilst doing this, they occasionally expressed their views on contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

First, they criticised the nationalist leftist conception of imperialism for assuming "historical" forms and institutions of dependency were "unchangeable" and attributing "causality" to the superstructural determination (*i.e.* politico-military agreements or institutions) of the underlying economic relations (the capitalist mode of production) (Laçiner, 1975a: 57). As the nationalist leftists considered international dependency institutions, politico-military pacts and bases as necessary for imperialism and its local collaborators, they erroneously assumed that terminating them would automatically remove capitalism and introduce socialism (Laçiner,

1975a: 57). However, for Birikim, Turkey was dependent on imperialism not due to politico-military ties but to “structural determinants” (developed capitalist production relations) (Laçiner, 1975a: 58). The circle noted Latin American countries lacked politico-military relations but were still as dependent as Turkey (Laçiner, 1975a: 59). As Turkey had strong social forces that would defend imperialist relations for their own class interests, the US could rely on Turkey to defend itself (Laçiner, 1975a: 58). Furthermore, due to recent developments in warfare technology which overcame the distance barrier, the “belt countries” surrounding the socialist bloc, like Turkey, lost their strategic importance (Laçiner, 1975a: 58). The US arms embargo on Turkey after Cyprus and changing the status of US military bases in Turkey did not fundamentally affect Turkey’s relations with imperialism (Laçiner, 1975a: 59).

The Birikim circle described Turkey’s relations with imperialism as “the development of capitalist production relations” and the development of corresponding productive forces in Turkey’s social formation. The dominant military-civil bureaucrat class, inherited from Ottoman society (Laçiner, 1980: 14), developed the capitalist mode of production under the auspices of the state until 1950 (Laçiner, 1975b: 19). From the 1930s until 1950s the statism project transferred resources from agriculture to industrialisation and suppressed peasants, so Birikim argued that peasant dissatisfaction was organised by the rising trade bourgeoisie and big landlords in the DP who came to power in 1950 (Laçiner, 1975b: 20, 21; Laçiner, 1980: 14). Subsequent Turkish political history was a power struggle between the dominant classes of the feudal and capitalist modes of production. The military-civil bureaucracy opposed social transformation and so staged two military coups to ensure bureaucratic control (Laçiner, 1975b: 32); however, the monopoly bourgeoisie made the military-civil bureaucracy give way in 1973 (Laçiner, 1975b: 17). The accelerated development of capitalism replaced the pre-capitalist societal relations with capitalist relations, thus Turkey became an integral part of the imperialist system. As long as capitalist production relations prevailed, Turkey would chose domestic and foreign policies within the system’s structural constraints (Laçiner, 1975a: 59).

Secondly, the Birikim circle said other leftists erroneously identified the basic unit of imperialism as the nation state (Laçiner, 1976c: 35) and proposed alliances with the “national bourgeoisie” against imperialism (Birikim, 1975b: 46), thereby incorrectly equating socialism with anti-imperialism and ignoring anti-capitalism (Laçiner, 1976d: 23). An anti-imperialist struggle to end capitalism could not succeed in an alliance with a bourgeoisie which was capitalist. Furthermore, Birikim rejected attributing a national character to the bourgeoisie because capital was transnational (Laçiner, 1976c: 37). For Birikim, Turkey’s nationalist leftist tradition had a “Third Worldist inferiority complex” which generated a “reactive nationalism” using socialism as a “development method” to overcome the gap between itself and imperialist nations (Laçiner, 1976b: 53).

Birikim argued that nationalist leftists opposed Turkey’s place in the international hierarchy but not the hierarchy itself, thereby remaining trapped in the imperialist hierarchic order (Laçiner, 1976b: 54). Capitalism and independence from the imperialist system were not compatible, claimed the Birikim group, because the capitalist-imperialist system sought to spread capitalism globally (Laçiner, 1975a: 59). As other leftists based their theories on the “nation”, as a unit of analysis, they accepted the class relations in the nation as given (Laçiner, 1976b: 54) and mistakenly believed in an independent foreign policy. However, this contradicted Lenin’s account of imperialism in which class relations were the primary explanatory factor and nationalism only an auxiliary factor in certain circumstances (Laçiner, 1976b: 36). Birikim argued foreign policy was determined by domestic politics (Laçiner, 1975a: 61), which were in turn based on class interests (Laçiner, 1975a: 60) as evidenced by the varied foreign policies of different political parties in the mid-1970s.

Laçiner observed two approaches to foreign policy with differing degrees of independence (Laçiner, 1975a: 60-61). The first approach, advocated by the right-wing parties (the AP (Justice Party), the CGP (Republican Trust Party), the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and the MSP (National Salvation Party)), envisaged indirect dependence on imperialism and the US through regional alliances with

Middle Eastern countries (Laçiner, 1975a: 60). Parallel to their pursuit of new markets for their class basis, the developing industrial bourgeoisie, these parties advocated Turkey becoming a Middle East power (Laçiner, 1975a: 61). The second approach, the founding principle of Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk and represented by the CHP, was based on: “knowing its limitation” in power hence “non-assertive”, “multifaceted” and “pacifist”; supporting the continuation of “relations with the West”, particularly Europe; and supporting military independence (Laçiner, 1975a: 60). The CHP government leaned towards non-alignment in the late 1970s by negotiating Soviet military aid and criticising the West. This seemingly independent foreign policy was driven by an economic policy (Laçiner, 1980: 18). Considering Turkey’s geopolitical position, this government adopted a flexible economic policy which would be conjuncturally altered in line with “national interests” (Laçiner, 1980: 18). Both foreign and economic policies failed.

However, the AP-led nationalist front coalition government, which replaced the CHP, embraced full integration with the imperialist system (Laçiner, 1980: 18) and the neo-liberal economic order and took the 24 January 1980 decisions on a “transition to a free market economy” which was regarded by the Birikim circle as turning the societal structure into a “pure form of capitalism” (Laçiner, 1980: 18). They claimed these decisions squared with neo-liberalism and the structural requirements of capitalism in Turkey (Laçiner, 1980: 17). The government accepted Turkey’s place in the new global division of labour by opening its market to international monopolies and foreign capital (Laçiner, 1980: 18), Birikim argued, because it wanted to replace the “traditional statist economic order” (Laçiner, 1980: 18).

Unlike other leftists, Birikim followed developments in Marxist literature on IR and provided original interpretations of the world order. They criticised the Third World theories for ignoring exploitation in production relations and seeking exploitation in exchange relations, abandoning class-based analysis and differentiating between countries on a poor-rich division. They attacked other factions’ inability to distinguish historical and structural elements of imperialism and their static

understanding of imperialism which failed to explain the current world order. Influenced by Althusser's structuralism, they interpreted Lenin's imperialism theory and tried to show that it still explained the world order in the 1970s. As imperialism exceeded the sum of imperialist countries (Laçiner, 1976a: 37), they attributed more importance to the "totality" of relations in the system than to "individual parts" so they did not analyse Turkey's foreign policy in different periods. Rather, they tried to figure out how the imperialist system worked and reveal the "objective relations" and "deeper logic" that "structure practice and representations of practice" (Ashley, 1984:234) (*i.e.* foreign policy actions) of parts of the system. They therefore emphasised structure over historical developments.

Birikim defined the world system as a level of analysis and attributed ontological status to the international monopolies, but left the ontological status of the state uncertain. They approached the political implications of the internationalisation of capital through a mechanistic contradiction "between the base (internationalisation of production) and a superstructural cover (national state) which no longer 'correspond[ed]' to it" (Poulantzas, 1975:78), thereby arguing that the post-war internationalisation of capital brought about "the 'territorial non-coincidence' of statehood and world economy" (Lacher, 2006:117; Murray, 1971: 85). Nation states – a historical moment in the development of capitalism which was transnational in nature – had been the historical political unit of the era of national monopolies but it became obsolete in the post-1945 era¹¹⁵. However, they did not address "why, if there is a world economy in which class interests operate transnationally, there is [still] a need for states at all" (Halliday, 1994: 91), and did not specify if "capital stop[ped] being organized on national principles" then "what form of state correspond[ed] to global capitalism" (Wood, 2002:29). Likewise, they provided little guidance on how to conceptualize relations between international monopolies and states, and the complex relations between international monopolies and nation state bourgeoisies were left underexplored. The Birikim group failed to conceptualize the

¹¹⁵ It is possible to find a contradictory view. For instance, considering the rising nationalist separatist movements in Europe, Belge pointed to "concurrent processes of internationalisation of capital and nationalisation of the communities" (Belge, 1977a: 52).

nexus between the hierarchic economic system and the anarchic states system, thus their analytical model wavered between “the structural functionalisms of a de-socialised logic of anarchy” and “a depoliticised and degeopoliticised logic of capital” (Teschke, 2010:184). Although they stressed the transnational nature of capital and hence the universalisation of capital relations through international monopolies, their empirical analysis mainly focused on interstate military-strategic competition (such as US relations with Japan, Iran and Turkey). Consequently, similar to the other leftist factions, their analysis suffered from an eclectic theoretical framework that aligned realist power politics with Marxism. Their analytical model was far from being “a holistic approach which combined the world economy, the state system and domestic class structures” (for more detailed information on conception of a “social theory of foreign policy” see Yalvaç, 2012; Yalvaç, 2014 and Yalvaç, 2016), thus its explanatory power was weak in accounting for the world order, though it was far more advanced compared to the other socialist divisions.

Also problematic was the duality of their analysis of the socialist and capitalist camps. They illustrated how “the logic of anarchy’s homogenizing effect” (Waltz, 1979:93) turned the USSR into a bourgeoisie nation state with *realpolitik* behaviour and realist foreign policy determined by “survival”. However, while examining the capitalist camp they stressed “the logic of capital” leading to internationalisation and forcing nation states to conform to the imperialist system. Since the imperialist system operated via international monopolies, they argued imperialism could no longer be identified with “states” (Laçiner, 1976b: 56). However, they unintentionally exposed the same realist logic behind the foreign policy of bourgeois nation states when they examined post-war politico-military integration in the capitalist camp against the expansion of the socialist bloc that appeared in the form of the Cold War, NATO and so on, or *détente*” and the second Cold War. The Birikim faction asserted that class interests determined foreign policy actions within structural constraints imposed by imperialism. While they maintained that the right-wing parties advocated Middle Eastern cooperation to become a regional power and open new markets for the industrial bourgeoisie, they did not specify on which class the CHP based its neutral, Western, pacifist foreign policy. Furthermore, although

they assumed the right and the CHP represented the monopoly bourgeoisie (Laçiner, 1975a: 59), they neglected to explain why they supported different foreign policy alternatives. Therefore they offered only partial explanations to the trajectory of Turkey's foreign policy in different periods.

The Birikim circle analysed the development of capitalist production relations in Turkey in parallel to the transformation of the state from an "idealist form of statism" (*i.e.* the state had the will and ability to change the system while perpetuating its essential structures) to an "instrumentalist form of economism" (*i.e.* state was simply an instrument of the dominant classes) (Ashley, 1984:283). Military coups were an instrument of the idealist state's managers, the military-civil bureaucracy, in their power struggle with the capitalist classes. Following the 1971 coup, the bureaucracy bowed to the monopoly bourgeoisie. However they could not explain how and why it consented to the post-war transformation of the idealist state. Secondly, the 1980 military coup undermined their assumption that the bourgeoisie gained supremacy over the bureaucracy in 1973. In a functionalist way they argued that "capitalism's economistic dynamic" swept "the persistence of pre-capitalist survivals" (Laffey and Dean, 2002:98) in Turkish social formation and successfully moved towards "pure forms of capitalism" (*i.e.* 1980 redesign of the Turkish economy in accordance with the neoliberal global accumulation strategy) (Laçiner, 1980: 18). Given this sort of teleological thinking and a strong immutable structuralist theoretical framework, they seemed to have "the positivist tendency to universalize and naturalize the given order" (Ashley, 1984:226).

6.5. Conclusion

In this chapter it is observed that the post-amnesty socialist movement was divided into many fractions which roughly traced three different paths: "pro-Sino", "pro-Soviet" and "independent". The chapter also explored that the prominent characteristics of the movement in the 1970s were: sectarian divisions, the constant tendency to split, making a fetish of immediacy of action, the paucity of involvement of the intelligentsia and therewith a lack of theoretical development, the absence of

ties with the masses, problems of organisation, the decisiveness of Stalinism and the anti-fascist struggle (Aydınoğlu, 2011: 382; Lipovsky, 1992: 166; Samim, 1981).

This chapter's main findings are that the post-amnesty (1974-1980) pro-Sino, pro-Soviet and independent leftist circles' theoretical frameworks suffered all from: eclecticism and hence inadequate explanatory power, an inability to integrate the separate logics of capital and anarchy into a holistic framework hence theorising international relations without international politics, and eventist conceptions of foreign policy and structural functionalism hence schematised views on imperialism. These deficiencies stemmed from Marxism itself because Marxism "never systematically" reflected on "international relations" (Teschke, 2010:164) and Marxists "seemed to under-problematize the effect of international relations on the course and development of capitalism" (Teschke, 2016). Most leftist circles relied on orthodox versions of Leninist imperialism theory and Third Worldist theories (Maoist three worlds theory, Stalinist non-capitalist way and dependency), while the SP and Birikim incorporated recent developments in the Marxist approaches to IR. All these circles interpreted the world and Turkey's foreign policy through Marxist lenses, so their explanatory power was only as strong as that of Marxist approaches.

Many leftist divisions attached a realist framework onto Marxism while the Aydınlık and TKP circles covered a realist framework with Marxist phraseology, thus being unable to adequately explain international relations from a historical materialist perspective. The Aydınlık and the pro-Soviet circles mainly tried to justify Chinese or Soviet foreign policy. Therefore they tried to analyse the world politics through such realist conceptions as "self-help", "survival", "security dilemma", "relative gain", "national interest" and "balance of power". They always saw a revisionist great power trying to change the "balance of power" in its favour, while the balancers challenged this in the name of protecting "peace". The Maoist Aydınlık circle saw the USSR as the great enemy of world peace so they suggested Turkey ally with the US and European imperialists against the USSR, and the pro-Soviet circles advocated that Turkey should avoid US imperialism and embrace a neutral foreign policy as Soviet interests dictated. Consequently, their "doctrinal party line"

reduced their intellectual effort to interpreting international relations as a struggle for survival in compliance with Soviet or Chinese *realpolitik*. Thus their views were imprisoned by *realpolitik*.

Another finding was that all leftist circles suffered from a schematised analysis of the post-1945 transformation of Turkey's power configuration and foreign policy. Their explanations seemed to be shallow, problematic and symptomatic of sympathy towards Kemalist rule (with some exceptions) as its neutral foreign policy conformed with Soviet foreign policy. Except for Kurtuluş, the HK and Birikim, the leftist groups wrongly equated an independent foreign policy with equal foreign trade, thus misconceiving Kemalist foreign policy as anti-imperialist. Nevertheless they all saw Stalin's request of land as a pretext for putting Turkey into the orbit of US imperialism. For them, the overlapping interests of the comprador bourgeoisie and the imperialists were the *raisons d'être* behind the paradigm shift in Turkey's foreign policy strategy.

Yet, the HK and TSİP circles interpreted Turkey's relations with imperialism differently. For the HK, Turkey was always linked with an imperialist power but which one changed with shifts in the global balance of power. However they failed to show how the local bourgeoisie changed its allegiance from one power to another smoothly and seamlessly. Influenced strongly by the system approach, the TSİP circle conceived the paradigm shift in Turkey's foreign policy as the "imposition" of imperialism. They ignored dialectical relations between the system and the parts, and reduced the latter to a passive bearer of the structure. The TİP, however, saw the post-war arrival of imperialism in Turkey as a "volitional" act of the big bourgeoisie to increase profit, while imperialism accepted Turkey for geopolitical motives. The Birikim group rightly attributed explanatory power to the developing capitalist production relations to account for Turkey's dependency on imperialism. Birikim implicitly assumed Turkey was relatively autonomous from imperialism from 1923 to 1945 when the development of capitalist production relations was controlled by the ruling military-civil bureaucrats. Although each of these views might offer some insight into the post-1945 transformation of Turkey's power configuration and

foreign policy, this issue was not a distinct object of scientific inquiry but remained at the journalistic level.

Eclecticism also affected the independent circles. They analysed international capitalist system through the “logic of capital” and interstate geopolitical competition through the “logic of anarchy”. The nexus between these logics was the control of the world market. However they could not incorporate the international capitalism, the state system and the domestic class structure into a holistic approach so their analyses fluctuated between realism and Marxism. This duality appeared in their analysis of contemporary fluctuations in Turkey’s relations with US imperialism as reflecting class interests or security-oriented realist geopolitics.

A structuralist influence manifested itself primarily in independent groups’ analyses of societal relations as a system. Conceiving imperialism as a world system, they tried to define its operational rules and demonstrate how these rules governed the actions of its parts. Apart from Birikim, they focused on “unequal exchange relations”. They fell into the structural-functionalist trap as they saw imperialism imposing “its requirements on states and their foreign policies” but failed to conceive of capitalism “as a politically contested social relation” (Teschke, 2016). In their schematised views, unequal trade generated dependency and brought underdeveloped countries trade deficits, foreign exchange bottlenecks and foreign indebtedness. This analysis downgraded foreign and domestic policy to dependent variables of imperialism and ignored “how systemic pressures were mediated by states” and were “responded [to] by social classes within states” (Teschke, 2016).

Echoing structural-functionalism, Birikim saw capitalism as a hierarchic system in which international relations were reduced to a “requirement” of the worldwide reproduction of capital. Multinational corporations competed to ally themselves with the bourgeoisie of underdeveloped countries, thereby making an inter-imperialist war unlikely. While Birikim accurately saw the internationalisation of capital and the rising importance of multinationals, they failed to relate this to the state system. Moreover, Birikim’s “economistic and totalizing conception of the

transnationalisation of capitalism” (Teschke, 2016) misled them to see “the vertical deepening and horizontal widening of capitalism” as “homogenizing national differences socio-politically” (Teschke, 2010: 164), thus mistakenly seeing nation states as obsolete. States became passive bearers of systemic pressures, thus accounting for international relations without international politics. All these structuralist groups tried to overcome this defect by adding “power politics”, analysed through “an eventist conception of foreign policy”, onto their economic and structural theoretical framework. Eventually they all inextricably ended up with eclecticism.

Another finding of this chapter was the prevalence of a positivist meta-theoretical stance among the leftists. Through observing regular patterns in the system and in state foreign policies, they tried to reach predictable outcomes. Therefore they all stuck to an “eventist conception of foreign policy” (Yalvaç, 2014: 120). While their focus on observable foreign policy events disclosed “epistemological implications” of a positivist meta-theoretical stance, their state-centric perspective, underpinned by *realpolitik*, showed “ontological implications” of positivist assumptions. By reducing stratified social reality to either surface appearance or an underlying layer, they avoided the complexity of social reality to get predictable outcomes and “to reveal the laws of motion of history” (Cox, 1986: 248). Although, while the Birikim group accused the others of being positivist because socialists were said to obsess over diagnosing illness (analyses of Turkey’s social structure) and devising a suitable recipe (a necessary revolution strategy) (Birikim, 1978b: 18), their structural determinist perspective gave them “the positivist tendency to universalize and naturalize the given order” (Ashley, 1984: 226), they lacked a vision of “change” and fell into the fallacy of idealizing the advancement of capitalist production relations towards pure forms.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides a discussion of the findings revealed by this study's comprehensive examination of the hypotheses and research questions raised in the introduction and an overview of the general conclusions as a whole. In this thesis I attempted to analyse how various Turkish leftist groups active between 1945 and 1980 interpreted the world order and Turkish foreign policy. The main argument is that Turkish leftists' analyses were dominated for the most part by realist assumptions and tended towards a positivist ontology and epistemology. The findings confirmed the hypotheses put forward at the outset. As expected, the socialist groups under study employed the historical materialist approaches which were popular in the period under question, and provided class-based analyses of the world order and foreign policy, but all the same they had a theoretically uninformed "realist moment" in their analysis of the international. The underlying reason for that realist tendency in Marxist analyses, as discussed in the beginning, is Marxism's inability to advance a theoretical framework for analyses of international relations and foreign policy. In analyses of the Turkish left, in particular leftist groups' strategies for revolution were another reason behind their state-centric realist perspective as they aimed to seize the state to realise a socialist transformation. Their strategies, whether they were pacifist or based on armed struggle, determined *a priori* the way they construed, understood and analysed socio-economic structures and the international. The only exception in this respect was the Birikim circle, which did not have a power perspective or ambitions for power, and thus they produced more academical texts and internationalist class analyses.

Departing from the dependency school perspective, they intended to transform the underdeveloped country into a self-reliant one with an independent foreign policy, hence securing the nation a "distinguished place" in the (capitalist) state system; as such, they ended up with an analysis of international relations that was based on

state-centric ahistorical realism. They reduced international relations to the struggle of survival for socialist states and underdeveloped capitalist states against imperialist powers. It was seen that although Turkish leftists' analyses based on historical materialist approaches made valuable contributions to and enriched Turkish foreign policy analysis and political thought, the prevailing realist assumptions embedded in their analytical frameworks resulted in the production of a state-centric nationalist stance which stood in complete opposition to the proletarian internationalist approach, which would be expected of Marxists. This is evident from their use of the realist terms "balance of power", "relative gain", "material capabilities", "power politics", "self-help", "survival" and "national interest" without subjecting them to critical consideration. Besides, drawing mainly on second-generation imperialism theories (i.e. the dependency school, neo-colonialism) which championed "populist nationalism", Turkish socialists became further bogged down in nationalism. This is evinced by how they praised and suggested following rightist French President de Gaulle's "realist" and "nationalist" foreign policy. Like the realists, they also ranked national interest above class politics and emphasised the decisive influence of the geopolitical position of the country regarding its political decisions and interests. Thus they could not avoid "the naturalizing and universalizing social and historical categories with which it is customary to analyse and explain foreign policy" (Yalvaç, 2014: 131).

Among the leftist groups active at the time, only the TSP overtly followed a classical Marxist path in attributing a progressive role to capitalism in developing the forces of production so it could create the material preconditions needed for a socialist society. The others pointed to the retrogressive role of capitalism in generating development in a few places at the expense of the "development of underdevelopment" in most of the world. Interestingly, two decades later the TSP's ideas were echoed in an analysis put forward by Warren (1980), who maintained that it was possible for development to occur with foreign capital. Among the latter groups, however, some of them (the Birikim circle and the Emek circle) did point to the progressive role that capitalism could play to a certain extent in their analyses. Unlike the others, the Birikim circle was inspired by the post-imperialism discussions of the 1970s which focused on the

globalisation of capitalism and also Hymer and Murray's postulation that the state could be replaced with multinational firms. Under the leadership of Aybar, the SP circle referred to the Trotskyite thesis concerning uneven and combined development but its analytical framework ultimately slipped into neo-colonialism.

It was found that most of these leftist groups pursued a Leninist line which saw inter-imperialist rivalry as an essential feature of imperialism. There were some circles, e.g. the THKO and the THKP-C and its offshoots, which followed a Kautskian line by seeing inter-imperialist rivalry as being obsolete. The Soviet formulation of non-capitalist development, which involved a two-stage strategy for revolution and collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, as well as Stalin's underconsumptionist reinterpretation of Lenin's imperialism theory, had a salient impact in the Turkish left's analysis. Paul Baran and Andre Gunder Frank's notions of dependency theory could be detected in leftist circles' emphasis on the external imposition of underdevelopment, the impossibility of development whilst remaining in the system, the importance of delinking in the process of development, seeing development and underdevelopment as the obverse side of the same coin, and the polarization of the periphery and the core.

The analyses offered by some of the groups were shaped by the security requirements of Soviet realpolitik and Chinese realpolitik, as they disguised their "realist" arguments with Marxist terminology. Most of the others who were under the strong influence of either the dependency school or neo-colonialism used a "systems" approach in their analyses and ended up with a functionalist determinism by reducing the behaviour of nation states to the system's needs. Whilst leftist groups criticised the exploitation of underdeveloped countries, which suffered from a lack of capital accumulation for development because developed countries siphoned it off through the export of capital (which was identified by Lenin as the essential feature of imperialism), they wound up naturalising and reproducing the existing international capitalist system, as they sought to better position their country in the state system. Nevertheless, in contrast to the systems approach they considered transforming the system by making a change in a particular nation-state through

socialism as a model of development. Consequently, as a reflection of their nationalist stance leftists did not question the hierarchical structure of the capitalist world system but focused on their country's position therein. Because of the realist power politics embedded in their theoretical framework, they were led to argue that the state should be bolstered as it struggled to survive in an anarchic system. For that reason, they were driven to "naturalise a reified view of the social world [i.e. the states system]" (Wight and Joseph, 2010: 17) and "reproduce the worldwide system of capitalism, along with its structured inequalities" (Yalvaç, 2010: 167).

As with the dependency school, underdevelopment was seen as the outcome of the external imposition of capitalism onto a pre-capitalist country. Inspired by Baran's analysis, they attributed a role to the comprador bourgeoisie, which acts as a means of transfer between a (peripheral) country and the core. Such a system determines the socio-economic structure and domestic and foreign policy of an underdeveloped country. Since this determinist perspective reduces foreign policy to the system's requirements, foreign policy analyses become meaningless if such an approach is adopted. In their schematised views, unequal trade generated dependency and burdened underdeveloped countries with trade deficits, foreign exchange bottlenecks and foreign indebtedness. That analysis downgraded foreign and domestic policy to dependent variables of imperialism and ignored "how systemic pressures were mediated by states" and were "responded [to] by social classes within states" (Teschke, 2016). Moreover, they were unable to analyse the extent to which historically specific class structures of production, patterns of capital accumulation and prevailing models of production within a given stage of world capitalism (Fordist production, post-Fordist models, and so on) might impact paradigm shifts in foreign policy. Instead they attributed those shifts either to agents (an inconsistent petty bourgeoisie or strengthened comprador bourgeoisie) or to a structure.

None of the groups defined the structural basis of foreign policy as the struggle of different classes to control the state apparatus in line with specific "hegemonic projects" that are pursued both nationally and transnationally (Yalvaç, 2014: 130). By focusing on hegemonic projects, they might have been better equipped to explain

how and through what configurations of relations of production, social classes and the state were at work behind the formulation of the “foreign policy strategy” of various hegemonic projects in different periods of Turkey’s history, which held to a vision of the world order and the position of Turkey therein, e.g. taking part in inter-imperialist rivalry, pan-Turkic expansionism and nation-state formation in the İTC’s hegemonic project, as well as balance of power, neutrality and pacifism in the Kemalist hegemonic project and post-war changes in the Kemalist hegemonic project’s foreign policy strategy. Without having a concept like a “hegemonic project” to rely upon, they could not establish a link between structures and agents, so their analyses either wound up being purely structuralist or agent-centric. For that reason, they failed to explore a trajectory of foreign policy in terms of different “hegemonic projects”. Consequently, they did not possess an all-encompassing perspective that took into account the world economy, the state system and domestic class structures, and they could not explain in a satisfactory manner the issues at hand via a perspective that was based on historical materialism.

The results of this thesis confirm my second hypothesis concerning the positivist tendency in the leftists’ theoretical framework. Since only the TSP overtly embraced a linear model of evolutionary development, which classical Marxism assumed is a typical example of positivist and determinist account of Marxist thought, its theoretical framework exhibits a positivist meta-theoretical stance. Other than this, for the most part they explained the world order and foreign policy through unobservable social structures in a non-positivist framework and resorted to the social relational ontology of Marxism. Nevertheless, because of their realist analytical approaches, they treated the “nation-state” and the “states system” as a given. The way they treated the states system as “unchangeable” and saw international relations as a schematic in which states act rationally under the guiding principles of “*realpolitik*” revealed the “ontological implications of positivist assumptions” in their theoretical framework. Along with an atomistic ontology of realism, a positivist epistemology was prominent in their analysis because the majority of them were eager to attempt to predict the foreign policy behaviour of states and future world order by drawing upon regular patterns of foreign policy

events. In that regard, the main independent variable they used was the concept of the “balance of power”, and by trying to identify empirical regularities therein, they sought to foresee how world politics would unfold.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION

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|-------------|--|--------------------|
| MA | University of Essex European Integration | 2007 |
| BS | METU Political Science Public Administration | 2000 |
| High School | Ankara High School, Ankara | 1995 |

WORK EXPERIENCE

| Year | Place | Enrollment |
|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 2017-Present | British Petroleum (BP Turkey) | External Affairs Manager |
| 2015-2017 | Prime Ministry Inspection Board | Deputy Chairman |
| 2012-2015 | Prime Ministry Inspection Board | Chief Inspector |
| 2012-2013 | NATO Defense College | Researcher |
| 2002-2012 | Prime Ministry Inspection Board | Inspector |
| 2001-2002 | Undersecretary of Customs | Assistant Expert |

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS

1. Kirchner, Emil and Berk, Can (2010). "European Energy Security Cooperation: between Amity and Enmity", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 48, issue 4, pp. 859-880

HOBBIES

Running, Football, Fitness, Movies, Travelling.

B. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, İkinci Dünya Savaşının sonundan 12 Eylül 1980 askeri darbesine kadarki dönemde faaliyet gösteren Türkiye sosyalist hareketinin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında oluşan yeni dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasındaki paradigma değişimlerine ilişkin yorumlarının “birincil kaynakları” esas alan eleştirel bir analizini sunar. Bu tezin asıl amacı ne Türkiye’nin dış politikasının tarihsel bir yorumu ne de Türkiye solunun tarihçesidir, daha ziyade bu dönemde aktif olan sosyalist grupları betimlemek, bu gruplarca benimsenen kuramsal çerçeveler ile Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) teorileri arasındaki ilişkiyi, onların kuramsal çerçevelerinin meta-teoretik temelini araştırmaktır.

Genellikle bir Amerikan sosyal bilimi olarak bilinen Uİ disiplini ve Sosyalist devletin ideolojisi ile özdeşleştirilen Marksizm karşılıklı olarak birbirini dışlamışlardır. Uİ tarafından Marksizmin argümanları genellikle göz ardı edilmiş ve aşırı bir şekilde basitleştirmiştir. Ana akım Uİ kuramlarının uluslararası ilişkileri devletlerarası güç mücadelesine indirgediği ve bu ilişkileri “büyük güçler, anarşi ve güç dengesi” gibi kategoriler vasıtasıyla incelediği göz önüne alındığında, bu kuramlar iç toplumun teorisi olarak gördükleri Marksizmin açıklayıcı gücüne şüphe ile yaklaşmışlardır. Marksizmin devletlerin dışsal davranışlarını onların iç yapıları ile açıklaması ve devletlerin birbiri ile olan çatışmalarının sosyalist rejimlerin yükselişi ile ortadan kalkacağını savlaması nedeniyle, Uİ disiplinde “ikinci imaj” kuramı olarak görülmüştür (Waltz, 1959: 63). Ayrıca, Marksizmi siyasal yapılarının temeli olarak benimseyen Sosyalist devletlerin varlığı, Marksizmin kapitalist dünya için entelektüel cazibesini ortadan kaldırmıştır.

Her ne kadar Marksizmin uluslararası ilişkilere ilgisi Uİ’nin bir disiplin olarak ortaya çıkmasından önceye rastlasa da, klasik Marksizmin uluslararası ilişkilere ilgisi hep ikincil ve dolaylı olmuştur, zira o devrimci eylemi yaratma ihtimali dolayımında uluslararası ilişkilere yaklaşmıştır. Emperyalizm teorisi ise klasik Marksizm’in ulusalcılık ve uluslararasııcılık (internationalism) ilişkisine dair analizini geliştirmek

üzere ortaya çıkmıştır. Böylece, yirminci yüzyılda tarihsel materyalizm 1900-1920 dönemi ve 1950-1970 dönemi olmak üzere iki farklı dönemde başat olan emperyalizm teorisi ile anılmıştır. Bunlardan ilki, ki bu genellikle Lenin, Bukharin, Luxemburg, Hilferding ve Kautsky gibi Marksist düşünürlerin çalışmaları ile bilinir, kapitalist devletlerarası rekabet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşının sebeplerine odaklanmış, oysa ki sonuncusu, ki bu da Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Andre Gunter Frank, Harry Magdoff, Bill Warren ve diğerlerinin çalışmaları ile popülerlik kazanmıştır, daha ziyade kuzey-güney ilişkileri, bağımlılık ve azgelişmişlik konularına eğilmiştir.

Soğuk Savaş süresince iki kutupluluk jeopolitiği ve doktriner parti çizgisinin dayattığı entelektüel sınırlanmaya rağmen 1970lerin sonunda tarihsel materyalizm ile uluslararası ilişkiler arasında bir gerekli karşılaşma meydana gelmiştir. Sosyalist devrimlere rağmen “devletin” mefhumun ortadan kaybolmaması ki bu Marksizmin sonunda “devletin sönmüneceği” tezinin geçersizliğini ortaya koyması, sosyalist blokun bir bütün halinde çökmesi, ve son olarak iki kutuplu dünya düzenin yıkılması ve küreselleşmesini ortaya çıkması gibi bütün bu gelişmeler Marksizmin devletler sistemine ilgisini artırmış ve Marksizmin UI’ye katkısının tanınmasını sağlamış, böylece tarihsel materyalizmin UI’de yeniden doğuşunu müjdelemiştir. Modern uluslararası ilişkilerin gelişiminin daha tarihsel olarak farkında bir kavramsallaştırmasını ilerletmek için 1980’den beri birçok Marksist yaklaşım (örneğin Cox, 1981; Gill, 1993; Halliday, 1994; Rosenberg, 1994; Teschke, 2003) geliştirilmiştir. Tarihsel materyalist yaklaşımlar, içsel olarak modern devletler sistemini ve jeopolitik rekabeti kapitalizmle ilişkilendirerek ama ilkinin ikincisinin bir sonucuna indirgemeksizin modern jeopolitiği anlamaya çalışmış ve dünya kapitalist sisteminin siyasal formunun neden bir dünya devleti şeklinde belirmeyip birden çok devletin biraradalığı şeklinde belirlediği sorusu ile ilgilenmiştir.

Ancak, tarihsel materyalizm devletler sistemine nedensel bir güç verme ve kapitalist güçlere ve kapitalist üretim ilişkilerine açıklayıcı güç verme çelişkisine yakalanmıştır. Kapitalist ekonomik sistem ile uluslararası devletler sistemi arasındaki ilişki tarihsel materyalizme bir “kuramsal aykırılık” sunar, çünkü uluslararası ilişkilerin varlığı ki bu insan topluluğunun yatay olarak uluslara veya devletlere

bölünmesini farz eder, insan topluluğunun birliğini bir ideal olarak alan Marksizm’e çok ciddi ve belki de zorlu bir sorun teşkil eder. Çünkü Marksizm sınıfları tarihteki temel birim olarak görür ve bu sınıflar arası mücadeleye odaklanmıştır, işte bu yüzden büyük ölçüde jeopolitik, milliyetçilik ve savaşı göz ardı etmiştir. Marksizm insanlığın sınıflara dikey bölünmesini ele almış, yatay bölünme ile ilgilenmemiş, böyle uluslararası ilişkileri belli bir işbölümünün ifadesi olarak görmüştür. Literatürde gösterildiği gibi, gazete yazılarında Marks da genellikle güç politikası ve güçler dengesi kavramlarını kullanan “devlet merkezci” bir yaklaşıma başvurmuş ve küresel politik gelişmeleri yorumlarken sosyal ve ekonomik güçlere çok az referans vermiştir. İşte bu yüzden, Marksist kuramda “uluslararası” bir boşluğu temsil eder ve Marksistlerce de ikrar edildiği üzere Marksizm askeri rekabeti ve devletler sistemini açıklamada yetersizdir. Bu eksiklik uluslararası ilişkilerin Marksist çözümlemelerine bir realist uğrak ekleyerek çözülmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu hamle aslında realist kavramların toptan bir şekilde Marksizm’e aktarılması değil ama ihtiyaç hâsıl oldukça realist literatüre ve terminolojisine bel bağlama şeklindedir.

Realizm iç ve dış ayrımını yapan ve bir ülke ve buradaki kaynaklar üzerinde hak iddia eden bağımsız siyasal toplulukların doğasına ilişkin güçlü iddiaları vardır. Oysaki Marksizm siyasalın formu, nasıl ve niçin sınırlandırılmış siyasal mekânın yaratıldığı gibi konuları çok az kavramsallaştırmış, ama daha ziyade siyasalın içeriğini doğanın sömürsünün örgütlenme şekli ve toplumun yeniden üretim şeklinin zıddiyete dayalı doğasını keşfetmede beceri sahibidir. Sonuç olarak, sağlam bir Marksist devlet teorisinin olmaması ve Marksizmin yeterince eleştirel siyasal teori geliştirememesi gibi nedenler yüzünden, literatürde gösterildiği üzere, Marksist Uİ kuramı kaçınılmaz olarak bir “realist kadere” mahkûmdur. Böylece, bu kuramsal kör nokta nedeniyle Marksist Uİ kuramları realizmin siyasala ilişkin varsayımlarına (iç toplumun birliği ve dışsal bölünmenin eşzamanlı yaratılması, iç mekânın hiyerarşik örgütlenmesinin değişebilirliği, buna mukabil uluslararası siyasetin değişmez bir şekilde parçalanmışlığı ve anarşiye dayanması) başvurmadan “uluslararası” ikna edici bir şekilde anlayamazlar.

Türkiye sosyalistleri Marksizmin gerçek takipçileri olduğunu söylediklerine göre, onlar da “uluslararası ilişkileri” ve dış politikayı tarihsel materyalist Uİ yaklaşımlarının merceğinden yorumlamışlardır. Yukarıda açıklanan uluslararası ilişkilerin Marksist çözümlemelerindeki kaçınılmaz “realist bir uğrak” dikkate alındığında, bu tez Türkiye solunun da uluslararası ilişkiler ve Türk dış politikası analizinde bu realist kaderden kaçınmadığını iddia eder. Böylece, bu tez şunu tartışır:

- i) Türkiye solunun dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasına ilişkin tartışmalarında, realist varsayımlar Türkiye solunun Uİ perspektifine hâkim olmuştur.
- ii) Türkiye solunun kuramsal çerçevesi genellikle Marksizmin determinist ve pozitivist bir yorumunu içeren Marksist Uİ teorilerine dayandığından, sosyalistler pozitivistin ilkelerine bağlı kalmamışlardır.

Yalvaç tarafından geliştirilen dış politikanın belirleyicileri ve sosyal orijininin analizini ve devlet-toplum kompleksinin dış politika yapımını etkilemesini olanaklı kılan tarihsel materyalist perspektif keşifsel bir alet olarak hem yukarıdaki hipotezlerin hem de Türkiye solunun Türk dış politikasının değişen dinamikleri ve yönünü ve uluslararası arenayı yorumlamasının incelemesinde kullanılacaktır. Bu perspektif dış politikanın sosyal teorisine kendisini adar ve tarihsel kategorilerin evrenselleştirilen ve doğallaştıran dış politika analizi genel eğilimini reddeder. Bunun için dış politikayı iç toplumu ve uluslararası içerik sosyal ilişkilerin yapısal bir bütünlüğünün parçası olarak kavramsallaştırır. Devlet-merkezci realist perspektiften farklı olarak, bu perspektif, bu perspektif sınıfsal failliği değişim ve açıklayıcı güç olarak görür zira bu fail dış politika yapımının yapısal bağlamında dış politika formasyonunu etkilemektedir. Böyle bir perspektif yapı ile fail arasında “hegemonik proje” kavramı vasıtasıyla bir bağlantı kurar. Hegemonik proje kavramı tamamen yapısal veya faile dayanan yapı ve fail analizinden kaçınmayı olanaklı kılar. Bu perspektif, dış politikanın yapısal temelini belli bir hegemonik proje ile uyumlu bir şekilde devlet aygıtını kontrol etmek için farklı sınıfların mücadelesi

olarak tanımlar. Ekonomik, siyasal ve ideolojik seviyelerde meydana gelen iç sınıfların hegemonya mücadelesinin sonucunda yürürlüğe giren farklı hegemonik projeler bakımından dış politikanın yörüngesini keşfetmemize yardımcı olur.

Pozitivist IR anlayışı “bütünlüğü” ya “sistem” kavramı ya da uluslararası toplum olarak belirler. Pozitivizmin inceleme konusunu verili kabul eden ve onu oluşturan sosyo-tarihsel ilişkilerden soyutlayan atomistik doğasının tersine (Yalvaç, 2017: 27), tarihsel materyalizm bütünü parçasından ayırmaz ve bir bütünün farklı parçalarının aynı zamanda hem bütünü yaratması ve hem de bütünün bu parçaları nasıl şekillendirdiğini göstermeye çalışır. Bu bağlamda, tarihsel materyalizm pozitivist bir anlayışla birimler arasındaki karşılıklı etkileşimin yarattığı düzenlilikleri belirlemede sistemde var olan egemen devletler arasında eşitlik varsayımından hareket eden ve sistemin nasıl parçaların davranışlarını sınırladığını gösteren Uİ’deki sistem yaklaşımlarından farklıdır. Tarihsel materyalizm egemen ülkesel devletler sisteminin kavramsallaştırmasında kapitalizmi tarihsel bütünlük olarak ele almıştır. İnsanlara kadere ve pasif bir rol çizen pozitivistin kestirimci doğasına karşın, üretici mekanizmaları (generative mechanism) kapitalizme içkin iç gelişme mantığı ve çelişkileri ortaya koyarak tarihsel materyalizm açıklayıcı bir bilim anlayışı sunar, böylece farklı sınıflar arasında çatışmacı ilişkiler vasıtasıyla değişimi mümkün kılar.

Literatürde bir dizi çalışma tarihsel olarak Sosyalist hareketin Türkiye’deki gelişimini incelemiştir. Bunlardan bazıları geniş kapsamlı ama genel olarak yüzeysel ve daha çok ansiklopedik bilgi mahiyetindedir (bakınız Şişmanov, 1978; *Sosyalizm Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988; *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 1983; *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Sol*, 2007; ve Bora, 2017). Bunlardan bazıları ise sosyalist hareketi sosyalist hareketten kopanların tanıklığı şeklinde karşı propaganda maksadıyla ele almış (bakınız Sayılğan, 2009) ve diğerleri ise komünizmle mücadele geleneğinden gelen sağcı kişilerin sosyalist hareketi yorumlamasıdır (bakınız Darendelioğlu, 1961 ve Tevetoğlu, 1967). 1960lardaki Türkiye solu akademik çevrelerin dikkatini üzerine çekmişse de (Sertel, Y., 1969; Yetkin, 1970; Landau, 1978; Belge, 1985; Belge, 1989; Özdemir, 1986; Yerasimos, 1989; Dinler, 1990; Lipovsky, 1992; Akdere ve Karadeniz, 1994; Ünsal, 2002;

Babalık, 2005; Atılgan, 2008; Gültekingil, 2008; Güvenç, 2008; Zücher, 2010; Doğan, 2010; Ulus, 2011; ve Aydınöğlu, 2011), bu çalışmaların hiçbirisi Türkiye Sosyalist hareketinin dünya düzenini nasıl gördüğünü ve Türkiye'nin jeopolitik stratejilerini nasıl yorumladığını özellikle ilgilenmemiştir. Bunlar genellikle sadece Sosyalist hareketin genel bir taslağını çizmiş ve onun özellikleri (kurucuları, yayınları, ayırt edici özellikleri, ve son bulmaları gibi) ve hareketin temel argümanlarını incelemiştir.

Ancak, 1945'ten 1960'a kadar geçen dönemde faal olan Sosyalist harekete çok az bir akademik ilgi olmuştur. Dikkat çeker bir şekilde, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan 1970lerin ortasına kadar Türkiye solunun eleştirel tarihini yazan araştırmacılar (Akdere ve Karadeniz, 1994) ve Türkiye Komünist Partisi'nin (TKP) eleştirel tarihini yazan bir akademisyen (Babalık, 2005) 1945-1960 arası sosyalist hareketini tartışmayı ihmal etmişlerdir. Bu dönemle ilgili çalışmalar genellikle sosyalist hareketin tarihi ve sol içi polemiklere adanmıştır. Bazıları sadece TKP'nin tarihinin incelenmesi (Üstüngel, S. 2004; Salihoğlu, Muhsin *et al* 2004; Babalık, 2005), bazıları ise TKP dışındaki diğer fraksiyon ve kişilerin incelenmesi (Karaca, 2008; Ünsal, 1996; Gökmen, 1998; Ünlü, 2002; Gökhan Atılgan 2007; Cafer Vayni 1997; Meral Demirel 2014); diğerleri ise dönemin tanıklarının (örneğin İleri, 1976; İleri, 2003; Topçuoğlu, 1976; Nesimi, 1977; Nesimi, 1979; Müstecaplıoğlu, O., 1970; Akar, 1989) sol içi çekişmelerin kendi meşreplerine göre anlatımı şeklindedir. Benzer şekilde, sadece bir kaç araştırmacı (Samim, 1981; Lipovsky, 1992; Akdere ve Karadeniz, 1994; Alagöz, 2005; Gürel, 2006; Aydınöğlu, 2011; Bursa, 2011; Ersan, 2014) 1970lerdeki Türkiye solunu kapsamlı bir şekil inceleyebilmiş, zira bu dönem solun en karmaşık dönemidir. Ancak, bunlardan hiç biri sosyalist hareketin savaş sonrası dönem dünya düzenini ve Türkiye'nin bunun içindekini yerini nasıl yorumladığını incelememiştir. Ekseriyetle, bunlar sosyalist hareketin içindeki belli çevrelerin ideolojisini bu çevrelerin ortaya çıkışı, gelişimi ve ortadan kayboluşunu içeren tarihsel bir perspektifle incelemiştir.

Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu'nun web sayfasında yer alan tez arama motorunda *Türk solu*, *Türkiye komünist hareketi*, *Türkiye sosyalist hareketi*, *Sosyalist*, *sosyalizm*,

solcu, komünist, komünizm gibi tarama kriterleri ile yapılan araştırmada şimdiye kadar Türkiye solunun uluslararası politikayı kavramsallaştırmasının veya Türk dış politikasını yorumlamasının eleştirel bir analizine odaklanan bir çalışmaya rastlanılamamıştır. Aynı şekilde, Türkiye solunun Türkiye’nin jeopolitik stratejisini yorumlamada kullandığı kuramsal çerçeve ve bu çerçevenin meta-teoretik eğiliminin de bilimsel bir analize konu edilmediği görülmüştür. Bazı araştırmacılar (Doğan, 2010) sol harekette yer alan milliyetçi temayülü çalışmış, bazıları (Bursa, 2011) ise kalkınmacılık eğilimini ele almış, yine bir diğeri (Ulus, 2011) ise ordu ve sol ilişkisini irdilemiştir. Bunların dışında bazı çalışmaların ise Türkiye solunun belli dış politika konularına ilişkin görüşlerinin ortaya çıkarılmasına vakfedildiği müşahade edilmiştir. Örneğin, Güvenç (2008) 1960larda TİP’in dış politika perspektifini incelemiş, ama bu çalışma daha ziyade TİP’in Amerika ile ikili anlaşmalar, Kıbrıs meselesi, NATO üyeliği, Ortak Pazar üyeliği, Türkiye’deki Amerikan üsleri gibi o dönemin belli başlı dış politika konularına yaklaşımını konu edinmiştir. Aynı şekilde, Gökay (2006) 1921-1991 döneminde Türk-Sovyet ilişkilerini belgeler ışığında incelemiş, ve ayrıca TKP’nin Türk-Sovyet ilişkisinin şekillenmesinde oynadığı rolü araştırmıştır. Ama bu çalışmaların hiç biri ne sosyalist hareketin uluslararası ilişkiler ve dış politikaya ilişkin yorumlarını eleştirel bir analize tabi tutmuş, ne de Türkiye solunun uluslararası ilişkileri ve Türk dış politikasını yorumlamada ve anlamada kullandığı kuramsal çerçeveyi, bu çerçevenin Uİ teorileri ile ilişkisini ve bu kuramsal çerçevenin meta-teoretik eğilimini araştırmıştır.

Bunlara ilaveten, bazı tematik çalışmalar belli bir tarihsel kesitte Türkiye solunun “anti-Amerikanizm” (Bilgiç, 2015), “pro-Sovyetizm” (Gökay, 2006), “anti-emperyalizm” ve “bağımsızlık” (Atılğan, 2007) ve “Kıbrıs meselesi” (Korkmazhan, 2017) gibi konulara ilişkin görüşlerini incelemişse de bu çalışmalar genel olarak bahsi geçen temaların solun retoriğinde yer aldığını tespit eden betimleyici çalışmalardır. Bunların dışında bu döneme ilişkin çalışmalar daha ziyade Türk entelektüel ve basın tarihinin büyük bir hassasiyetle araştırılması ve incelemesi şeklindedir. Dolayısıyla hassaten sosyalist hareketin İkinci Dünya Savaşından sonra oluşan yeni dünya düzenine ve Türk dış politikasına ilişkin görüşleri “birincil kaynaklar” üzerinden kapsamlı ve bütüncül bir analize tabi tutulmamıştır.

Bu boşluğu doldurmak için, bu tez betimleyici bir tarihsel analizle Türkiye sosyalist hareketinin 1945-1980 döneminde dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasına dair yorumları ve perspektiflerini soruşturur. Bu amaçla, çalışılan dönemde aktif olan her bir sol çevrenin söylemini ve perspektifini incelemek için bir metin analizi kullanılmıştır. Böyle bir metin analizi sadece Türkiye solunun uluslararası siyaseti ve Türk dış politikasını nasıl yorumladığını ifşa etmekle kalmaz ayrıca Türkiye solunun Uİ'deki tarihsel materyalist yaklaşımlar ilişkisi ve de ana akım Uİ teorileri ile ilişkisini de göz önüne serer. Bu tez temel olarak sol grupların veya bu gruplara mensup kişilerin yayınladığı kitaplar, çıkardığı dergiler, gazeteler, parti programları, bildiriler, mahkemelerde yaptıkları yazılı savunmalar gibi birincil kaynakları inceleyerek sol grupların dünya düzeni, uluslararası siyaset ve Türk dış politikasına ilişkin görüşlerinin eleştirel analizini ve bu grupların Uİ literatürüne her hangi bir orijinal katkısının olup olmadığını araştırmayı, sol çevrelerin dünya düzenini anlamak ve açıklamakta kullandığı teorileri ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamıştır. Aynı zamanda, bu tezde sol grupların temel karakteristik özellikleri, bu gruplarda etkin olan kişiler, sol grupların farklılıkları, birbiri ile yaşadıkları polemikleri ve sol çevrelerin tarihlerinin ortaya çıkarılmasında ikincil kaynaklar kullanılmıştır.

1960 askeri darbesi ile 1980 askeri darbesi arasındaki dönemde Türkiye'de faal olan sosyalist hareket, 1971 askeri muhtırası sonrasındaki birkaç yıl ciddi baskılara maruz kalmış olsa da, literatürde genel olarak diğer dönemdeki Sosyalist harekete kıyasla çok dinamik, çok üretken olarak addedilir. Fakat 1980 darbesi sonrasındaki dönemde sosyalist hareket çok sert bir biçimde bastırılmış, tıpkı 1950lerde olduğu gibi solculara karşı başlatılan cadı avı, işkence, idam ve kitlesel tutuklamalar ile sol hareket sessizliğe mahkûm edilmiştir. Tıpkı literatürde 1960 darbesinin sol hareketin altın çağının habercisi olarak görülmesi gibi 1980 darbesi de onun karanlık çağının başlangıcı olarak görülür. Tezin kapsadığı dönem solun en üretken olduğu 1960-1980 arası dönem olarak belirlenmiş, fakat tezin inceleme konusu İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasındaki dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasının yorumlanması olduğu için, bir bütünlük arz etmesi bakımından İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonundan 1980 darbesine kadar ki dönemde faaliyet gösteren sosyalist hareket tezin kapsamı olarak belirlenmiş, böylece Türkiye solunun görüşlerindeki değişim, farklılaşma ve

devamlılık aydınlatılmak istenmiştir. Bu tezin kapsamına giren sosyalist hareketin bölümlendirilmesi sosyalist hareketin öne çıkan özellikleri (TKP'nin güdümünde illegal yer altı örgütlenmesi ile faaliyet gösteren sol hareket, TİP'in öncülük ettiği yasal siyasal zeminde faaliyet gösteren sosyalist hareket, öğrenci militanlığının öncülük ettiği illegal çalışmayı esas alan sol hareket, binbir renk ve parçaya ayrılmış sol hareket) ve dönemin belirgin siyasal atmosferi (1940ların sonu ve 1950lerdeki komünist cadı avı, 1960 darbesi sonrasındaki görece özgürlükçü siyasal ortam, dünya çapında gelişen gençlik hareketi) esas alınarak yapılmıştır.

Tez giriş bölümü dâhil yedi bölümden oluşmaktadır. İkinci bölümde Marksist Uİ teorilerinin genel karakteristiği, farklı kolları, temel argümanları ve bunlara yöneltile eleştiriler kısaca tartışılarak bu teorilerin Türkiye Sosyalist hareketinin dünya düzeni ve dış politikaya ilişkin yorumlarına ne ölçüde yansıdığını keşfetmede faydalanılmıştır. İkinci bölümün devamındaki her bir bölümde, öncelikli olarak incelenen dönemin iç ve dış siyasal ve ekonomik gelişmeleri mercek altına alınarak Sosyalist hareketin gelişimi, yorumları bu bağlama oturtulmuştur. Bunun akabinde incelenen dönemde faaliyet gösteren sol grupların dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasına ilişkin görüşleri eleştirel bir şekilde çözümlenmiştir. Her bir bölümün sonunda, başta ortaya atılan hipotezlerin geçerliliği ve araştırma sorularının cevapları tartışılmıştır. Bölümlendirmenin bahse konu yapısal örgüsü ile uyumlu olarak, üçüncü bölümde İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonundan 1960 darbesine kadar devam eden dönem incelenmiştir. Soğuk Savaşın en şiddetli yaşandığı bu dönemde gerek 1945-50 arasında CHP iktidarının gerekse ondan sonraki 10 yıllık dönemde DP iktidarının başlattığı komünist süre avı yüzünden sosyalist hareket çok kısa sürelerde (1946 TSP ve TSEKP; 1950-52 TSP; 1954-57 VP) legale çıkabilmiş, onun dışında ya yer altında faaliyet (1946-51 döneminde TKP'nin faaliyetleri) göstermiş ya da tamamen sessizliğe mahkûm olmuştur. Genel olarak TKP'nin sosyalist harekette hakim durumda olduğu bu dönemde TKP ile açıkça organik bir bağı olduğuna dair bir bilgi ve belge bulunmayan solcu aydınlar da analizi kolaylaştırmak adına TKP sempatzanı olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Yine bu dönemde TKP'nin yanı sıra Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi ve Vatan Partisi'nin dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasına ilişkin görüşleri de incelenmiştir.

Dördüncü bölüm 1960 askeri darbesi ile 1971 askeri muhtırası arasındaki döneme odaklanmıştır. Bu döneme TİP'in katıldığı ilk seçimde meclise 15 milletvekili ile girmesi sonucu Türkiye Sosyalist hareketini kendi çatısı altında birleştirmeyi başarması damgasını vurmuştur. TİP'in dış politikaya ilişkin görüşleri genel olarak sol hareketin görüşlerini yansıttığından, bu bölümde ağırlıklı olarak TİP'in görüşleri çözümlenmiş, aynı görüşlerin gereksiz tekrarından kaçınmak için diğer sol çevreler incelenirken genel olarak bu çevrelerin TİP'in görüşleriyle çelişen, belirgin bir şekilde farklılaşan görüşlerinin tartışılması ile yetinilmiştir.

Beşinci bölümde ise 1968'de tebarüz eden ve 1973'te sönmölen Türkiye öđrenci hareketi incelenmiştir. Öđrenci hareketinin içinde doğduđu ve geliştđđi sol hareket ile devrimci strateji bağlamında bir kopuş yaşaması, 1970lerde gelişen sol hareketin devrimci çizgisini ve yönelimini belirlemesi bakımlarından ayrı bir inceleme konusu olarak ele alınmış, bu dönemde faaliyet gösteren sol öđrenci fraksiyonların doğuş, gelişim ve hitama ermeleri kapsamlı bir şekilde incelemeye tabi tutulmuştur. Bu dönemi ayrı bir inceleme konusu kılan bir başka etmen de 1971 askeri muhtırası sonrasında sol legal siyasetin yasaklanması, solcu aydın, aktivist ve siyasetçilerin hapse atılmaları, baskı ve işkenceye maruz kalmaları sonucunda sadece illegal olarak faaliyet gösteren, sansasyonel eylemleri ile kamuoyunun dikkatini çeken sol öđrenci grupların sessizliğe mahkûm olan sol hareketi canlı tutmalarıdır.

Altıncı bölümde ise 1974 affıyla tekrar canlanan ve 1980 askeri darbesiyle sessizliğe gömölünceye kadar geçen sürede faaliyet gösteren sosyalist hareket irdelenmiştir. Bu dönemde sol geçmişinde hiç olmadığı kadar çok fraksiyona bölünmüştür. Bu çok parçalı haliyle bu dönemde aktif olan sol fraksiyonların her birini incelemek olanaksız değilde bile çok zor olduğundan, Çin yanlısı, Sovyet yanlısı ve Bağımsız olmak üzere üç farklı akımının gerek taraftar kitlesi, gerek yaptığı yayınların kitlelerce benimsenmesi, gerek liderlik kadrosunun popölerliği ile öne çıkan belli başlı fraksiyonları analiz edilmiştir.

Son olarak yedinci bölümde, giriş bölümünde ileri sürölen sorulara ilişkin gözlemlerin eleştirel bir tartışması yapılmıştır. Araştırma konusunu geniş bir zaman

aralığında ele alan önceki bölümlerdeki bulguların kapsamlı bir incelemesi yapılarak, çalışmanın bütünü için genel sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır.

Türkiye solunun dış politika ve dünya düzenine ilişkin analizlerinde genellikle realist varsayımlara başvurulduğu ve dolayısıyla pozitivist bir ontoloji ve epistemolojiye eğilimi olduğu şeklindeki temel argüman ışığında tezin önceki bölümünde tartışılan ampirik bulgularda gösterildiği üzere tezin giriş bölümünde ortaya atılan hipotezler teyit edilmiştir. Beklenildiği gibi, bu çalışmaya konu sosyalist gruplar tezin kapsadığı dönemde popüler olan tarihsel materyalist IR yaklaşımlarını kullanarak dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasının sınıfsal analizini yapmışlar, ancak yine de bu analizlerinde farkında olmaksızın realist bir uğrağa yer vermişlerdir. Tezin giriş bölümünde mufassal bir şekilde tartışıldığı üzere, Marksist uluslararası ilişkiler ve dış politika analizlerindeki realist eğilimin altında yatan sebep Marksizmin uluslararası siyaset ve dış politikanın analizi için kuramsal bir çerçeve geliştirmedeki yetersizliğidir. Buna ilaveten Türkiye özelinde ise, Türkiye solunun analizlerinde sol grupların devrim stratejileri devlet merkezci realist perspektiflerinin arkasındaki bir diğer sebeptir, zira bu gruplardan her biri sosyalist dönüşümü gerçekleştirmek için devleti ele geçirmeyi hedeflemiştir. Bu devrim stratejileri ister barışçıl olsun ister silahlı mücadeleyi esas alsın *apriori* olarak bu grupların sosyo-ekonomik yapı ve uluslararası ilişkileri nasıl anladıkları, açıkladıkları ve yorumladıklarını belirlemiştir. Bu noktada tek istisna iktidar hedefi ve hırslı olmayan Birikim grubudur. Bu grup daha akademik metinler ve daha enternasyonalizme dayanan sınıf analizi ortaya koyabilmiştir.

Bağımlılık okulu perspektifinden hareketle, Sosyalist gruplar azgelişmiş ülkelerini kendi kendine yeten, bağımsız bir dış politikası olan bir ülkeye dönüştürmeyi hedeflemiş, böylece milletin kapitalist devletler sisteminde seçkin bir konuma yükseltmeyi istemişlerdir. Ancak devleti ve devletler sistemini verili varsayan analitik çerçeveleri devlet merkezci tarihdışı (ahistorical) realist analizle sonuçlanmıştır. Sosyalist gruplar uluslararası ilişkileri Sosyalist devletler ve azgelişmiş kapitalist devletlerin emperyalist güçlere karşı beka mücadelesine indirgemıştır. Genel olarak Marksist kaynakların sınırlı olduğu ve bu sınırlı kaynaklara bile erişimin zor olduğu ve dolayısıyla sosyalist çevrelerin Marksizme

ilişkin bilgi birikiminin yetersiz olduğu bu dönemde Türkiye solunun tarihsel materyalist yaklaşımlara dayanan çözümlemeleri her ne kadar siyasal düşünceye ve Türk dış politikası analizine değerli katkılar sunmuş ve onları zenginleştirmişse de analitik çerçevelerinde içeyerleşik hâkim realist varsayımlar Marksistlerden beklenen proleter enternasyonalizmi ile taban tabana zıt devlet merkezci milliyetçi bir pozisyonu doğurmuştur. Türkiye solunun analitik çerçevelerine içeyerleşik realizm, solcuların “güç dengesi”, görece kazanç”, “kendi başının çaresine bakma”, “beka” ve “ulusal çıkar” gibi realizmle özdeş kavram ve terimleri eleştirel bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutmadan kullanmalarından bellidir. Dahası, solcuların milliyetçi popülizmi destekleyen bağımlılık okulu, neokolonyalizm gibi ikinci nesil emperyalizm teorilerini kullanmaları onları daha da milliyetçilik batağına saplamıştır. Bu da yine onların Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı De Gaulle’ün realist ve milliyetçi dış politikasını methetmelerinden ve Türkiye için önermelerinden anlaşılabilir. Realistler gibi, bu çevreler gücü “ülkelerin sahip oldukları askeri varlıklar” olarak tanımlamışlar, jeopolitiğe bağımsız bir değişken olarak dış politika analizlerinde açıklama gücü atfetmişlerdir. Tıpkı realistler gibi, sosyalist çevreler de “milli menfaat”i sınıflar-üstü bir kavram olarak görerek sınıfsal çıkarların ülkeleri savaş ve felakete sürüklediğini belirtip jeopolitik konumun milli menfaat üzerindeki belirleyici etkisine dikkat çekmişlerdir. Yine realistler gibi, bu çevreler de dünya siyasetinde güç dengesinin bir büyük güç lehine bozulması ve küçük devletlerin büyük devletler arasında güç dengesini sağlamak (balancing) yerine güçlü olan büyük devletin peşine takılmalarının (bandwagoning) savaş ile sonuçlanacağını tahmin etmişlerdir. Bunlara ilaveten, Classical realistler gibi, savaş sonrasında ABD ve Sovyetler Birliği arasında yaşanan güç siyasetini İkinci Dünya Savaşının galibi bu devletlerin dış politikasına egemen olan “kibir”, “üstünlük” ve “gurur” ile açıklayan görüşlere de rastlamak mümkündür. Sonuç olarak, dış politika analizinde ve açıklamasında kullanılan sosyal ve tarihsel kategorileri evrenselleştirmek ve benimsemekten kaçınamamışlardır.

Tezin inceleme zaman aralığında bulunan sosyalist gruplar arasında sadece TSP açıkça klasik Marksist bir yol izleyerek, üretim güçlerinin gelişmesinde kapitalizme ilerici bir rol oynayıp böylece kapitalizmin sosyalist bir toplum için gerekli olan maddi ön koşulları yaratacağını savunmuştur. İlginç bir biçimde, TSP’nin yukarıdaki

görüŖünden yaklaşık yirmi yıl sonra yabancı sermaye ile kalkınmanın mümkün olduđu yolundaki benzer görüŖler Batılı Marksist düşünürler tarafından da tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Diğer sol gruplar ise, Leninist bir bakış açısıyla, dünyanın çoğunda azgelişmişlik yaratma pahasına dünyanın çok az bir yerinde kalkınma sağlaması hasebiyle kapitalizmin gerici rolüne vurgu yapmışlardır. Bu sonuncu gruptan bazıları (Birikim ve Emek çevreleri) analizlerinde zımni bir biçimde kapitalizmin ilerici rol oynayacağını işaret etmişlerdir. Diğer gruplardan farklı olarak Birikim çevresi 1970lerde uluslararası Marksist literatürdeki yer alan kapitalizmin küreselleşmesine odaklanan post-emperyalizm tartışmalarından ve Hymer ile Murray'ın ulus devletin yerini çok uluslu şirketlerin alacağı yönündeki tezlerinden esinlendiğı görülür. Benzer şekilde, Aybar'ın yönetimindeki Sosyalist Parti Troçki'nin Birleşik ve Eşitsiz Gelişme kuramını esas alan yorumlara yer verse de sonunda bu çevre tarafından yapılan analizin neokolonyalizme kaydığı görülür.

Bütün bu sol çevrelerde Ŗu gözlenmiştir ki, bu çevreler emperyalistler arasındaki çekişmeyi emperyalizmin en temel özelliğı olarak gören Leninist bir çizgiyi izlemişlerdir. THKO ile THKP-C ve onun altsoyları emperyalistler arası çekişmeyi modası geçmiş bulan Kautsky çizgisini takip etmişlerdir. Sovyetlerin geliştirdiğı iki aşamalı devrim stratejisi ve milli burjuvazi ile işbirliğini içeren kapitalist olmayan yoldan kalkınma modeli ve Lenin'in emperyalizm teorisinin Stalin'in eksiktüketimci (underconsumptionist) bakış açısıyla yeniden yorumlaması Türkiye solunun analitik çerçevesinde belirgin bir etkiye sahiptir. Keza, Paul Baran ve Andre Gunder Frank geliştirdikleri bağımlılık kuramlarının üzerinde yükseldiğı, azgelişmişliğin dışarıdan zorla dayatıldığı, sistemde kalarak gelişmenin mümkün olmadığı, sistemden koparak gelişmenin mümkün olduğı, gelişmişlik ve azgelişmişliğin aynı paranın iki farklı yüzü olduğı, merkez-çevre kutuplaşması gibi temel öncüllere Türkiye solunun analizlerinde çok sık yer verildiğı rahatlıkla saptanır.

TKP ve Aydınlık gibi bazı çevrelerin sunduğı analizler Sovyet ve Çin reelpolitiğinin güvenlik gereksinimlerince şekillendirilmiş, bu gruplar analizlerindeki realist argümanları Marksist terminoloji ile örtmeye çalışmıştır. Diğer grupların çoğunun ya bağımlılık kuramı ya da neokolonyalizmin etkisi altında kaldığı, analizlerinde sistem

yaklaşımını kullandıkları ve bu yaklaşımdan mütevellit ulus devletlerin davranışlarını sistemin ihtiyaçlarına indirgeyen işlevsel determinizmden malul olduğu göze çarpar. Sol gruplar bir yandan kalkınması için gerekli olan sermaye birikiminin yetersizliğinden muzdarip az gelişmiş ülkelerin sömürülmesini eleştirirken, ki bu ülkeler biriktirdiği sermaye Lenin'in emperyalizmin temel özelliği olarak belirlediği sermaye ihracı vasıtasıyla gelişmiş ülkelere çalınmaktadır, diğer yandan bu gruplar devletler sisteminde ülkelerini daha bir yere konumlandırma çabaları ile mevcut uluslararası kapitalist sistemi kabul etme ve yeniden üretme durumunda kalmışlardır. Bununla birlikte, bu gruplar sistem yaklaşımının aksine sistemin bir parçasında yapılacak değişiklik ile sistemin dönüştürüleceğini düşünmüşlerdir. Sonuç olarak, milliyetçi tutumlarının bir yansıması olarak sol çevreler kapitalist dünya sisteminin hiyerarşik yapısını sorgulamamış, ülkelerin bu hiyerarşik yapı içindeki konumunun düzeltilmesine odaklanmıştır. Analitik çerçevelerine içkin realist güç siyaseti dolayısıyla sol çevreler anarşik uluslararası sistemde hayatta kalabilmek için devletin güçlendirilmesi gerektiğine vurgu yapmışlardır. Bu sebeple, bu türden analitik çerçeveleri sol grupları ister istemez devletler sisteminin şeyleşmiş görüntüsünü kabul etmeye ve yapısal eşitsizlikleri ile birlikte dünya kapitalist sistemini yeniden üretmeye itmiştir.

Bağımlılık okulu gibi, Türkiye'deki sol gruplar da azgelişmişliğin pre-kapitalist bir ülkeye kapitalizmin dışarıdan dayatılmasının bir sonucu olarak görmüşlerdir. Baran'dan mühlhem sol gruplar çevre ülke ile merkez arasında bağlantı kayışı olarak hareket eden komprador burjuvaya kapitalist sistemin işleyişinde önemli bir rol atfederler. Sol gruplara göre bu şekildeki dünya sistemi azgelişmiş ülkenin iç politikasını, dış politikasını ve sosyo-ekonomik yapısını belirlemektedir. Bu determinist perspektif dış politikayı sistemin gereksinimlerine indirgediğinden bu perspektifle dış politika analizi anlamsız hale gelmiştir. Bu grupların şematize edilmiş görüşlerinde, merkez ile çevre ülkeleri arasındaki eşit olmayan ticaret bağımlılık ilişkisi yarattığı gibi gelişmemiş ülkelerin sırtına cari açık, döviz darboğazı ve dış borç sarmalını yükler. Bu şekildeki analiz dış ve iç politikayı emperyalizmin bağımlı değişkenine indirger ve sistemsel baskıya sosyal sınıflar tarafından nasıl karşı konulduğunu ve devletler tarafından bu baskıya nasıl aracılık

edildiğini göz ardı eder. Dahası, sol gruplar genel olarak tarihsel olarak üretimin belli bir sınıf yapısı, sermaye birikim modeli ve dünya kapitalizminin verili bir aşamasında geçerli hakim üretim modelinin (Fordist üretim, post-Fordist üretim modeli, ve sair) ne dereceye kadar dış politikada paradigma değişimine etki etmiş olabileceğini analiz edememişlerdir. Bunun yerine daha çok ya aktörlere (tutarsız küçük burjuvazi ya da güçlenmiş komprador burjuvazi gibi) ya da yapıya değişiminde rol atfetmiştir. Sol çevreler ulusal veya uluslar arası farklı ekonomik yönelimlere ve farklı ideolojik eğilimlere sahip sınıfların devletle ve uluslararası sermaye ile farklı ilişkilerinin olacağını ve bu farklı ilişkilerin devlet formunda ve dış politika stratejisinde değişiklik yaratacağını gözden kaçırmışlardır. Bu yüzden sosyalist çevreler, savaş sonunda ortaya çıkan liberal kapitalist düzenin beraberinde getirdiği değişiklikler karşısında yerli burjuvazi ile uluslararası sermayenin ilişkisini tartışmamışlar, dolayısıyla parçayı parçanın bütünle ilişkili olarak incelememişlerdir. Bir başka deyişle, sosyalist çevreler Türkiye'nin iç ve dış politikasındaki değişimi, savaş sonrasında ortaya çıkan Fordist birikim modeli ve bu modelin getirdiği yeni dünya ekonomik sistemi (Bretton Woods sistemi ve Amerika'nın güdümündeki IMF, World Bank ve GATT gibi uluslararası kurumlar ve mekanizmalar), hem siyasal ilişkiler hem de üretim ilişkileri bağlamında uluslar arası ilişkilerin Amerikalılaştırılması çerçevesinde tartışmamıştır.

Dönemin temel Marksist referans kaynağı olan Lenin'in emperyalizm teorisi devletler sisteminin kuramsal bir analizini yapmadığı ve devletler sistemini sermayenin evrenselleşmesinde ve yayılmasında sadece bir araç olarak gördüğü için sosyalist çevreler de devletler sistemini ve ulus devletleri verili kabul etmişlerdir. Sorunu Türkiye'nin geri kalmışlığı olarak belirleyen sosyalist çevreler Türkiye'yi en hızlı şekilde "en ileri devletler seviyesi"ne taşımayı amaçlamışlar, ancak "ekonomik kalkınma" ortak hedefini gerçekleştirmek için her bir çevre farklı yol benimsemiştir. Hepsi Türkiye'nin sanayileşememesinin yetersiz sermaye birikiminden kaynaklandığını teşhis etmesine rağmen aralarındaki farklılık onların yabancı sermayeye bakışından kaynaklanmıştır. Örneğin, TKP çevresi yabancı sermayenin Türkiye'ye girişine ve ABD ile ekonomik ve askeri yardım ilişkisine son verilmesi gerektiğine vurgu yaparken, TSP ve VP çevresinin yabancı sermayeye bakışı bu

kadar katı değildir. Kapitülasyonlar yüzünden devletlerinin yıkılmasına ve ülkelerinin emperyalist işgale uğramasına tanıklık eden bu kuşak sosyalistlerin büyük bir kısmı, özellikle TKP çevresi, yaşadıkları travmanın etkisiyle daha ziyade kapitülasyon çağrışımı yapan Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı gibi ekonomik yardımlar ile yabancı sermayenin Türkiye’yi yeniden bir yarı-sömürge ülke haline getirmesi tehlikesine odaklanmıştır. Sovyet Komünist Partisi ile organik ilişkisi dolayısıyla TKP’nin dış politika önceliği Türkiye’nin ABD’nin güdümünden çıkarak “tarafsız” bir dış siyaset izlemesi olmuştur. Bu yüzden, TKP çevresi tarafsız dış politika izlemenin ön şartını, yabancı sermayenin ekonomik ve siyasi nüfuzuna karşı ülkenin izole edilmesi olarak belirlemiştir. TSP çevresi ise sömürücü gayeyle gelmemek şartıyla yabancı sermayenin (Amerikan veya Sovyet sermayesi fark etmez), sermaye birikimi sorunuyla malul Türkiye’nin kalkınma hamlesine katkı sağlayacağını, ayrıca zaten milli burjuvazinin de kendi pazarını yabancı sermayenin ele geçirmesine müsaade etmeyeceğini iddia etmiştir. Benzer şekilde, VP çevresi de dizginlenmek ve siyasi ve ekonomik imtiyaz talep etmemek koşuluyla yabancı sermayenin ülkeye girişine olumlu bakmıştır. Hatta teknoloji transferi yapacak ve düşük faizle yardımda bulunacak ülkelerle dostluk ilişkisi içine girilmesini “realist” dış politika gereği olarak görmüştür. VP çevresini diğerlerinden farklı kılan bir başka husus da, kalkınma hamlesini en kestirme yoldan sonuçlandırmak için “atom enerjisi”nden yararlanılmasına yaptığı vurgu olmuştur.

Bu grupların hiç biri dış politikanın yapısal zeminini ulusal ve küresel ölçekte izlenen belli bir hegemonik proje uyarınca farklı sınıfların devlet aygıtını kontrol etmek için mücadelesi olarak tanımlamamıştır. Hegemonik projelere odaklanarak aslında bu sol çevreler Türkiye tarihinin farklı dönemlerindeki değişik hegemonik projelerin dış politika stratejilerinin formülasyonunda nasıl ve hangi üretim ilişkileri konfigürasyonu aracılığıyla sosyal sınıflar ve devletlerin iş başında olduğunu açıklamada çok daha iyi donatılmış olabilirlerdi. Bu değişik hegemonik projeler içinde bulundukları dönemin dünya düzeni ve bu düzen içerisinde Türkiye’nin konumuna ilişkin tasavvuru içerir. Bu sol gruplar hegemonik projeler üzerinden bir dış politika analiz yapmış olsalardı, örneğin, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti’nin hegemonik projesinin dış politika stratejisinde ulus devlet formasyonu, Turancı

yayılmacılık, emperyalistler arası çatışmanın bir parçası olma gibi hedeflerin yer aldığını, Kemalist hegemonik projenin dış politika stratejisinde ise güç dengesi, tarafsızlık ve pasifizm gibi unsurların yer aldığını sınıf analizi temelinde realist varsayımlara başvurmadan gösterebilirlerdi. Hegemonik proje kavramı gibi dayanaktan yoksun olduklarından, sol çevreler yapı ile aktör arasında bir bağ kuramamış, dolayısıyla bunların analizleri ya tamamen aktör merkezli ya da safi yapısalcı olmuştur. Bu sebeple, dış politikanın yörüngesini farklı hegemonik projeler bakımından keşfetmekte başarısız olmuşlardır. Sonuç olarak, dünya ekonomisini, devletler sistemini ve iç sınıf yapısını dikkate alan kapsayıcı bir perspektife sahip olmadıklarından dünya düzeni ve Türk dış politikasına ilişkin açıklamaları tarihsel materializm bakımından yetersiz kalmıştır.

Yine tezin bir diğer sonucu sol çevrelerin kuramsal çerçevelerinde pozitivist eğilimin olduğu yönündeki ikinci hipotezi de doğrular niteliktedir. Sol çevreler içinde sadece TSP açıkça klasik Marksizmin lineer evrimci gelişim modelini, ki bu model Marksizmin pozitivist determinist yorumunun tipik örneğidir, benimsemiş olduğundan, bu çevrenin kuramsal çerçevesinin pozitivist bir meta-teoretik duruşu olduğu kolaylıkla görülür. Bunun dışındaki çevreler, genel olarak dünya düzeni ve dış politikayı pozitivist olmayan bir çerçevede gözlemlenemeyen sosyal yapılara vasıtasıyla açıkladıklarından bu grupların Marksizmin sosyal ilişkisel ontolojisine başvurduğu görülür. Bununla birlikte, kuramsal çerçevelerine içkin realist varsayımlar dolayısıyla, bu çevreler ulus devleti ve devletler sistemini verili olarak muamele etmiştir. Bu grupların devletler sistemini “değişmez” olarak görmeleri ve uluslararası ilişkileri şematik bir biçimde devletlerin reelpolitiğin temel ilkelerine göre rasyonel olarak hareket ettiğini düşünmeleri bunların kuramsal çerçevelerinde yatan pozitivist varsayımların ontolojik etkisini ifşa etmektedir. Realizmin atomistik ontolojisinin etkisinin yanında, bu çevrelerin analitik çerçevelerinde pozitivist epistemolojinin etkisini görmek de mümkündür, zira bu çevrelerin çoğunun dış politika olaylarındaki düzenli kalıplara binaen devletlerin dış politika davranışı ve dünya düzeninin gelecekte alacağı şekli tahmin etmeye can attıkları görülür. Bu konuda sol çevrelerin en çok kullandıkları bağımsız değişken güç dengesi kavramı

olmuştur ve dünya güç dengesindeki ampirik düzenlilikleri belirlemek suretiyle sol çevreler dünya siyasetinin nasıl şekil alacağını tahmin etme arayışında olmuştur.

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