# THE ROLE OF NGOS IN NORTH LEBANON: EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AFTER THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

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## ABSTRACT

# THE ROLE OF NGOS IN NORTH LEBANON: EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AFTER THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

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The aim of this thesis is to analyze the role of international organizations in creating employment opportunities for Lebanese nationals and Syrian refugees living in North Lebanon by providing vocational training under the umbrella of resilience and development projects. In this framework, the current situation of the labour market in North Lebanon, the impact of the refugee crisis on the region and the international organizations' activities that aim to mitigate the negative impact of the crisis on the local actors and the individuals are analyzed.

**Keywords**: Non-governmental organizations, refugees, employment, vocational training

## ÖZ

# KUZEY LÜBNAN'DA STK'LARIN ROLÜ: SURİYELİ MÜLTECİ KRİZİ SONRASI İSTİHDAM FIRSATLARI

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Bu çalışmanın amacı, uluslararası kuruluşların kalkınma projeleri çatısı altında, Kuzey Lübnan'da yaşayan Suriyeli mülteciler ve Lübnanlılara mesleki eğitim vererek istihdam fırsatları yaratması konusundaki rollerini analiz etmektir. Bu çerçevede, Kuzey Lübnan iş piyasasının günümüzdeki durumu, mülteci krizinin bölgeye etkisi ve uluslararası kuruluşların, krizin yerel aktörler ve bireyler üzerindeki negatif etkisini azaltmayı amaçlayan faaliyetleri araştırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil toplum kuruluşları, mülteciler, istihdam, mesleki eğitim

To Syrian refugee youth

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AND	Akkar Network and Development
CCIAT	Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture of Tripoli and North Lebanon
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DGVTE	Directorate General of Vocational and Technical Education
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EMMA	Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis
ELMA	Employment and Labour Market Analysis
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDAL	Investment Development Authority of Lebanon
ILO	International Labour Organization
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KII	Key Informant Interview
LMA	Labour Market Assessment
LMTA	Lebanese Mountain Trail Association

- MEHE Ministry of Education and Higher Education MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises NEET Not in Education, Employment or Training NEO National Employment Office NGO Non-Governmental Organization North North Lebanon Local Economic Development Agency LEDA NRC Norwegian Refugee Council SC Save the Children United Nations Development Program UNDP United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency
- VT Vocational Training

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#### **CHAPTER 1**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The aim of this thesis is to analyze the role of international organizations in creating employment opportunities for Lebanese nationals and Syrian refugees living in North Lebanon by providing vocational training under the umbrella of resilience and development projects. The situation of the labour market in North Lebanon as of 2018, the impact of the refugee crisis on the region and the international organizations' activities that aim to mitigate the negative impact of the crisis on the local actors and the individuals are analyzed.

The issue of how to define and term the international organizations is quite controversial in the literature. These organizations are referred as non- governmental, non- profit, voluntary, philanthropist, third sector and many others (independent, developing etc.) due to the specific qualifications attributed to them. (Bayraktar, 2017)

Economists name these organizations as "non-profit organizations" in the sense of not maximizing their profits and not distributing profits; sociologists prefer to use the term "voluntary organizations" because of their social integration and cooperation based moral systems and the majority of their employees. Political scientists refer to "third sector organizations", in order to differentiate them from public institutions and private sector entities in terms of the activities they carry out (Evans & Shields, 1998; Jenei & Kuti, 2008). Nevertheless, the apparent increase in the "trans-national" characters of a significant part of these types of organizations, especially in the last thirty years, has made the use of the term "non-governmental organizations" quite widespread, especially for such organizations.

The most widely used definition of these organizations belongs to Salamon and Anheir: According to them, these organizations are "officially established; organizationally separate from state institutions; non- profit; self-governing; 'voluntary organizations to a certain extent'." However, although they are 'independent' at the organizational level, they are also 'public' organizations because they have a significant level of citizen participation voluntarily and act towards a broader understanding of 'public interest'; (Evans & Shields, 1998), which also guide the sector and distinguish it from the private profit-oriented business and public sector. Additionally, due to their qualifications, it is seen that not only public and private sector organizations. (Demirovic, 2003). In this thesis, the terms "international organization" and "non-governmental organization" were used interchangeably.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially those who have several offices/branches in different parts of the world, tend to replicate projects which they consider successfully implemented in other places (i.e. in Africa or South America) in the countries affected by the Syrian crisis. Many of these organizations bring the know-how, project designs including participant profiling and activities from these countries without exploring the country-specific context, the motivation of beneficiaries or the local structure and local entities. These are the factors that affect the success and viability of the projects that are implemented by international organizations with the aim of creating employment opportunities. As a practitioner in one of those international organizations, I combined the data collected during the field study in the guiding framework of the existing literature with my experience and observations in the field where I started to work on supporting the needs of Lebanese and Syrian youth that emerged as a result of the Syrian crisis.

The Syrian crisis, erupted in 2011 when thousands of Syrians went to the streets after the first protests in the rural town of Dara'a in March 2011. "As in other Arab countries, the uprising in Syria was triggered by a series of social, economic and political factors, including growing poverty caused by rapid economic liberalization and the cancellation of state subsidies after 2005, a growing rural–urban divide, widespread corruption, rising unemployment, the effects of a severe drought between 2006 and 2010 and a lack of political freedom." (Chatel, 2014, p. 521) There are different arguments in the literature on how the civil war has started in Syria. According to most writers, Syria's long-lasting civil war started with a local protest that began in 2011 and only later drew foreign nations into the escalating violence. Instead, Christopher Phillips argues that "the international dimension was never secondary but that Syria's war was, from the very start, profoundly influenced by regional factors, particularly the vacuum created by a perceived decline of U.S. power in the Middle East. This precipitated a new regional order in which six external protagonists -the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Oatarhave violently competed for influence, with Syria a key battleground."(Philipps, 2016). The focus of this thesis is not on the reasons behind the civil war but the results of it which caused the greatest human disaster of the twenty-first century.

Following the first protests and the involvement of external powers, the turmoil and violence have caused a mass movement to the neighboring countries and beyond. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 5.6 million people have fled Syria since 2011, seeking safety in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and beyond addition to the millions more who are displaced inside Syria.<sup>1</sup> The states' responses to the mass refugee influx have both commonalities and differences. A welcoming response from the beginning of the crisis until 2014 followed by a restrictive turn with the rise of ISIS from late 2014, and ended with different type of negotiations with Europe in early 2016 to ensure ongoing hosting which led to different forms of financial deals, and the involvement of the international organizations in the crisis response. However, there are key differences among these countries.

These neighboring countries applied different rules and regulations in response to the Syrian refugee influx. At the beginning of the crisis, all three countries adopted open door policies, meaning that they allowed all Syrians (including Palestinians from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For more information, see: http://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html

Syria) to enter their countries without any official documents such as passport or IDs. The refugees were allowed to enter from official and non-official border points. Lebanon and Jordan were discriminative against Palestinians from Syria due to their historical background. "All three countries gradually shifted from the initial open door policy to close door policy. During the transition period, Turkey used ad-hoc openings and closures of border gates, while Jordan used very limited daily quotas claiming that it tried to keep entries at 'manageable' levels. Until reaching critical juncture, Turkey and Lebanon tolerated circular migration in and out of the country, while Jordan was strict about it. When Syrians left to the country for any reason, they are not able to enter back Jordan. At the end, all of them fully prohibited border crossings except for humanitarian cases and business reasons. Compared to Turkey and Jordan, Lebanon has less strict on entries, because of not being capable of controlling the border by state security forces and the intense involvement of some Lebanese groups such as Hezbollah to the Syrian war across the border." (Mencütek, 2018, p.6) None of these countries granted Syrians the legal refugee status, although the international refugee regime defines them as refugees. They define Syrians as "guests, brothers, persons registered as refugees by UNHCR and de facto refugees." Additionally, in Lebanon, Syrians are treated as "foreigners, labourers, guests, displaced, while in Jordan, they are also treated as temporary or uninvited guests."(Chatty, 2017; Janmyr & Mourad 2018). Turkey has treated Syrians as guests in the political discourse. Legally, Syrians are granted the status of "persons under temporary protection".<sup>2</sup> Syrian refugees are able to work in all provinces in Turkey after obtaining a work permit, have access to the healthcare services all over the country, and have the right to attend primary and secondary education which is outlined by the Regulation on Temporary Protection (TP) passed in October 2014<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For in-depth discussions on Syrian refugees and the impact of refugee crisis on Turkey, see: Kirişci, K. (2014), Erdoğan, M. M. (2015), İçduygu, A., & Millet, E. (2016), Culbertson, S., & Constant, L. (2015), Saleh, A., Aydın, S., & Koçak, O. , Ilgıt, A., & Davis, R. (2013), Aras, N. E. G., & Mencutek, Z. S. (2015), Açıkgöz, M., & Arıner, H. O. (2014), İçduygu, A & Diker, E (2017), Balkan, B., & Tumen, S. (2016), Ceritoglu, E., Gurcihan-Yüncüler, B.,Torun, H., and Tumen, S. (2017), Corabatir, M. (2016), Del Carpio, X. V., & Wagner, M. C. (2015), Development Workshop (2016), Ela, M. (2013), İçduygu, A. (2007), İçduygu, A. (2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For the details please see: Law on Foreigners and International Protection, http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng\_minikanun\_5\_son.pdf

Jordan allows the Syrian refugees to live in urban areas, nevertheless, encourages them to reside in the camps and grants the work permit only for specific sectors, limits the refugee income to the aid from the NGOs and limits the free healthcare to the refugees who reside in camps. Even though neither Jordan nor Lebanon have signed the 1951 Geneva convention, and neither have specific refugee laws, eventually they have signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the cooperation with the UNHCR functions.

"In Jordan, UNHCR registers Syrians as refugees, giving them prima facie status without the status determination process. In Lebanon, the lack of an updated MoU concerning Syrian refugees implies that the Lebanese government does not recognize UNHCR registration as a type of legal status, and thus most Syrian refugees remain vulnerable as illegal immigrants. Indeed, the Lebanese government instructed UNHCR in May 2015 to temporarily suspend registration for both new arrivals and those already within the country. This helps explain, apart from refugees leaving Lebanon or not being able to enter, the slight reduction of UNHCR registered Syrian refugees over the past year." (Lenner & Schmelter, 2016, p.123)

Considering these different approaches, it is worth mentioning that the international donor agencies also interact differently with the governments in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon in line with their approaches.

In Turkey, the government navigates, plans and manages the whole processes and activities in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. In Jordan the government negotiates its policy priorities with agencies and the NGOs as the agencies' partners, and has a significant role in the planning process. In Lebanon, due to a largely non-functional government and weak state institutions, these agencies lead the crisis response. We can see this even in the measures taken as the state involvement in settlement and mobility of refugees. Each country had a different approach in these policy fields. Turkey established camps for the most vulnerable groups and generally supported self-settlement. It established control mechanisms by making residence permits tied to a certain province and mobility tied to permission from the governorates. Jordan applied both camp and self-settlement options. After first to two years, it mainly preferred the settling of refugees in camps, thus self-settlement (or leaving the camps) is made conditional upon the finding Jordanian sponsors and became more restrictive in the course of time. Lebanon has pursued a 'no camp'

policy in which Lebanese government neither established camps nor allowed international actors to do it." (Chatty, 2017, p. 37).

In particular, in Lebanon, the estimated 1.1 million Syrian refugee<sup>4</sup> influx has caused significant societal, economic and political pressures on the country, in addition to its existing environmental and infrastructural constraints. The conflict in Syria, a country closely linked to Lebanon through historical, social and economic ties is severely and negatively impacting the Lebanese economy. As Simon Tholens describes, "Lebanon's border with Syria has since long before the 2011 crisis exemplified a 'thin' border, with regular movements by Syrian workers, but has taken on new qualities with the arrival of more than a million Syrian refugees." (2017, p. 865) The related spill over into Lebanon has rapidly moved beyond a humanitarian response to the economic and social spheres, where large, negative and growing repercussions are occurring.

According to the recent studies, the Syrian Crisis had an important shock on the Lebanese economy as a whole. In fact, this impact is mainly due to the increasingly unstable security situation. The Lebanese economy is witnessing a decrease in investment, a significant loss of touristic activities and a decline in consumption. As a result, access to employment has become a challenging issue for both refugees and host communities in Lebanon.

The general features of the Lebanese labour market are the high unemployment rate among young people, low rate of female labour force participation, large size of the informal sector, influx of foreign labour force and refugees from Palestine and Syria, and large number of skilled Lebanese nationals searching and obtaining employment opportunities abroad.

Lebanon was already insufficient to provide basic services such as education, food, health care, and affordable housing to its own citizens. It has been defined as a 'weak state' by both security intellectuals and practitioners of statecraft (Gal-Or, 2008; Pan,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For all neighboring countries, see: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122

2006; Rabil, 2005; Talbot & Harriman, 2008) and now face new demands from huge numbers of non-nationals.

In order to better understand Lebanon's approach towards the Syrian refugees, it is important to analyze its dominant features which have had a significant impact on the shaping of modern Lebanon and previous experiences with the refugee context.

According to Fawwaz Traboulsi,

"Two distinctive features have had a significant impact on the shaping of modern Lebanon: its sizeable Christian population, on the one hand, and the country's long exposure to the West, on the other. Their combined effect largely accounts for the main themes around which Lebanon's modern history is articulated: (1) a political system based on the institutionalization of religious sects ('sectarianism'); (2) an extroverted liberal economic system based on the service sector; and (3) a problematic relationship with its regional setting."(2012, p.8).

"Prior to its civil war, Lebanon served as the principal commercial entrepôt and banking center for the Levant and the Arab states of the Gulf. It possessed the region's most developed physical infrastructure and human resources. And it was able to draw upon the skills and resources of its migrant communities across the globe." (Denoeux & Springborg, 1998, p.158).

Traboulsi emphasizes two major functions of sects in Lebanon: "first, their role as enlarged clientelist networks designed to resist the inequalities of the market, and compete for its benefits and for the appropriation of social wealth and services of the state; second, their long-standing habit of enlisting outside help in their struggle for power or for sheer survival." (2012, p.9). Another important point stated by Traboulsi is "the state–society relations in Lebanon which have long been strained due to the combined effects of extreme *laissez-faire* policies and the extensive political, legal and, often, military, autonomy enjoyed by Lebanon's sects." (2012, p.10). This sectarian system has a significant impact on Lebanon's response to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Following the World War II, within the new United Nations context, the states have established the refugee protection system. This system is universal in its scope with

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees<sup>5</sup> (the 1951 Convention). Despite the fact that the refugee domain is organized in the framework of a universal system, the refugee protection remains as a political issue by its nature. While the international rules, regulations and values inevitably influence governments' decisions about how to respond to refugees, so the power and interests do.

"Host and donor states' commitment to assist, protect and provide solutions for refugees are all shaped by whether and to what extent they perceive refugees to be a burden or a benefit in relation to security and development outcomes, for example. Evidence for this can be found in almost every aspect of the functioning of the refugee system: from donors' earmarking of humanitarian contributions to resettlement decisions to host states' decisions about whether to provide socio-economic freedoms to refugees." (Betts, Ali & Memisoglu, 2017, p.3).

Due to the prolonged refugee situation of Palestinians in the Middle East, Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. It essentially lacks the concrete rules and regulations on national level dealing with refugees. In line with that, Lebanon's approach related to more than one million Syrians seeking protection in the country is not very clear. At the same time, the current political instability, historical ties and thirty years of Syrian military presence in the past years, and the country's long-term Palestinian refugee presence has influenced Lebanon's policies towards refugees from Syria.

As neighboring countries had different rules and regulations for the refugees, they also had different approaches towards the NGOs dealing with Syrian refugee crisis in their territories.

"Over the past three decades, the world has witnessed the reconstruction of the models and practices of 'welfare state' or 'developmental state' in accordance with the neoliberal principles. This has resulted in an increasing trust in the micro tools and interventions such as 'non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) or '(development) projects' instead of traditional macro institutions and policies for welfare and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For the details, see: http://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html

development or against poverty. Throughout this period of time, projects and projectization have become the modus operandi not only of national or international development and credit institutions but also of their preferred 'partners' that is the NGOs." (Bayraktar, 2017, p.105.)

In line with that, many services needed by the locals and these refugees have been undertaken by the NGOs particularly in the North of Lebanon and funded by donor agencies and governments like European Union et al.

"In the northern city of Tripoli and the Governorate of Akkar of Lebanon, the ratio of refugees to host population is almost 32 percent and this area houses 29 percent of total refugees." (World Bank Group, 2017). These are cited as some of the most vulnerable areas in the country where the international and local NGOs are providing basic services and also aiming to create livelihood opportunities for Syrian and vulnerable Lebanese communities. Vulnerable Lebanese have seen their own circumstances deteriorate as the general state of the economy in general and the job market are negatively affected by the crisis. In parallel, rents are increasing, jobs are harder to find for Syrian refugees as well and the public services are overburdened. There is a need to support the resilience of refugees and their host communities by improving access to income-generating opportunities, as well as providing support at the institution/market level by addressing the broader business constraints.



Figure 1: Map of Lebanon and North Lebanon (Source: IDAL)

The key sectors in the North of Lebanon are traditionally cited as construction, agriculture, and hospitality. While on a regional scale, agriculture can be considered to be centered in Akkar and the services/hospitality sector centered in Tripoli, within the national context the region as a whole is specialized in agriculture. Outside of agriculture, the region also has a sizeable industrial economy, in particular, food processing and wood products. These sectors have experienced steep declines in activity starting from 2012, and have been significantly impacted by the crisis in Syria.

According to 2017 Annual Report of The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan  $(3RP)^6$  which brings together the plans developed under the neighboring countries of Syria – the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Lebanese Republic, and the Republic of Turkey – with NGOs and UN agencies to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and strengthen resilience; Lebanon received \$113M as funding from different donor countries to support the livelihoods and resilience of Syrians and vulnerable Lebanese which includes the allocation to the projects providing vocational training.

Granting Syrian refugees access to sustainable livelihood opportunities would lead to integration into the formal labour market for all neighboring countries as it can encourage the permanent settlement of refugees and cause the social tensions between host communities and refugees because of increasing competition for employment opportunities in these countries suffering from the instability in the region and the high unemployment rates. Even though Syrians have been working in the informal jobs intensively under hazardous conditions, for all countries, the donor agencies negotiated and pushed for the granting work permits. "Turkey granted the right in early February 2016, while Jordan granted in March 2016 after negotiation with donors in the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in February 2016. Lebanon also waived the "pledge not to work" requirement to Syrians. To prevent possible public repercussions, Jordan has put limitations on sectors in which Syrians may work, Lebanon has limited work permits in certain sectors where they will not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For the details, see: http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/3RP-2017-Annual-Report-01-May-2018-compressed.pdf

directly compete with Lebanese such as agriculture, construction and other labourintensive sectors. Moreover, Jordan gets the promise from the EU that would grant a financial aid for creation of jobs for refugees. Turkey has adopted a quota system in which only 1 out of 10 workers can be Syrian in a given workplace. All facilitates business creation by Syrians. The working permit has not been received the expected attention by refugee employees and employers." (Mencütek, 2018, p.5)

This study aims the identify and analyze the role of the NGOs in North Lebanon, where the state actors are not willing to integrate the refugees into society but willing to receive funding from donor agencies through NGOs under the umbrella of development projects with the aim of creating job opportunities in a crisis affected economy.

It begins with a brief background and context discussion in Chapter 1 which also provides a brief on the different quantitative and qualitative research methods used, as well as a description of the sampling methods, in addition to highlighting research limitations. The study then presents an analysis of the situation and legal status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon in Chapter 2; the Labour Market Information that is based on literature review and emerged from survey findings and were validated in the key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs), as forced migration's effect on labour market, promising sectors, hiring practices, skills gaps and constraints faced by youth in Lebanon in Chapter 3 and the Lebanese context, the local actors and individuals and a detailed analysis of vocational training providers in Chapter 4. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Chapter 5.

#### **1.1. The Research Question**

This thesis aims to analyze the current situation of the labour market and the role of NGOs in creating employment opportunities for Syrian refugees and host community in North Lebanon. The research question is: "What is the role of NGOs in response to assisting Syrian refugees in North Lebanon on finding job opportunities taking into consideration the crisis affected local economy, legal framework, MSME's approaches and the individuals motivations and expectations?" It examines the impact of the NGOs' activities in the region and on the individuals.

I have been working in the humanitarian development sector since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in Turkey. I have started to work in the North of Lebanon in 2016 to manage a project with an international organization which aims to create employment opportunities for Syrian and Lebanese youth by providing vocational training. This experience helped me to understand better the Syrian crisis in Lebanese context, the differences with Turkey and its effects on Lebanese labour market but at the same time made me question the work and the role of international organizations for creating job opportunities via their activities and projects.

Being a practitioner and working in the field helped me to easily interact with the youth from Lebanese and Syrian communities who are the potential beneficiaries of these projects. This interaction helped me to understand their motivations, benefits, challenges and even frustrations. At the same time, this experience helped me to establish the relationship with local actors and public institutions due to the fact that while implementing projects in the area it is important to gain the support of the local actors. The network I established with other NGOs' or UN agencies' employees helped me to understand their motivations and challenges.

When I decided to study this subject, it was easier for me to decide from where to start. I was working in the field as part of the implementation team of the vocational training projects and I was aware of the gaps and weaknesses of this type of projects. Being a practitioner and having field experience allowed me to easily access to the youth for the FGDs. The relationships I have established with the local actors such as governmental institutions; chambers or municipalities gave me the opportunity to conduct interviews with them in a comfortable way. Also, the relationship with the Chambers helped me to get connections with the private sector.

The main challenge of being a practitioner was to gather information from other practitioners who are the employees of other NGOs and UN agencies. They were keen to share their success stories and best practices but not willing to tell their challenges, weaknesses, and lessons learnt. All the NGOs conduct assessments in order to understand the region and they use these reports as the basis of their projects. During the interviews, almost all practitioners mentioned their reports but they were not willing to share these reports with me. All the projects which NGOs design have to be funded by the donor agencies so that these NGOs can implement their project activities. These funding mechanisms create competition between the NGOs which are working in the same region, for the same goals and targeting the same beneficiaries. This competition affects the mechanisms of sharing and amount of information and data among themselves. They were not keen to share the information they gathered with me because I was a practitioner. While this was affecting my fieldwork, it also made me to better understand why there were duplications in the same region. Besides, it made me understand the reasons behind the frustration of the youth because in a small country like Lebanon if you are working in a specific area like Akkar, you work mainly with the same beneficiaries.

Another fact which is worth mentioning as an enabler of this fieldwork and the data collection process was that I am neither Lebanese nor Syrian. It was relatively easy to discuss different aspects of the crisis and the challenges in the Lebanese labour market with both Syrian and Lebanese people. Also, as an Arabic speaker, I didn't need translation. The interviewees or the FGD participants were comfortable to express themselves.

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted between October and December 2017 in North Lebanon, specifically in Akkar and T5<sup>7</sup> with the aim to identify how the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> T5 is composed of 6 districts; Tripoli, El Koura, El Batroun, Bcharre, Zgharta, and El Minnie-Dennie, which are commonly referred to as 'Tripoli +5 (T5)'.

Syrian Crisis affected North Lebanon's economy, to provide an analysis of the current labour market in North Lebanon and to examine how to support the non-governmental organizations in developing their strategies in creating decent job opportunities by providing vocational training for Syrian and Lebanese communities in a crisis affected economy.

### 1.2. Methodology

The research consists of a quantitative survey targeting employers and a quantitative survey targeting consumers, providing a guiding framework for the development of the main qualitative research tools. Qualitative research is addressed towards men, women, and youth as employees and job seekers, in addition to the key socio-economic actors, including sector-specific MSMEs, UN agencies, NGOs, public and para-public institutions, and vocational training institutes. A total of four focus group discussions, forty key informant interviews, and ninety surveys were conducted for the study in North Lebanon. The study uses qualitative data collection including the FGDs and KIIs to validate the quantitative results.

#### 1.2.1. Data Collection Tools and Analysis

This data collection has been done by following a mixed method approach, which uses qualitative and quantitative research tools in combination. Prior to the fieldwork, a review of existing relevant literature and previous labour market assessments have been used to inform the design of the quantitative survey, as well as questionnaires to be used during key informant interviews and focus group discussions with target stakeholders.

Four tools have been used for this research: market/field observation, key informant interviews, survey questionnaires and focus group discussions.

Following the literature review, for the primary data collection, I have conducted:

- Forty semi-structured interviews with governmental authorities, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, key market participants and economic actors,
- Fifty survey questionnaires with sector-specific MSMEs,

- Forty survey questionnaires with consumers,
- Two focus group discussions with youth and women, and
- Two focus group discussion with men and women.

The fieldwork occurred in North Lebanon (Tripoli and Akkar) and Beirut. In Akkar, the target villages were Sahel Akkar, Dreib, Jord el Kayteh, Joumeh, and Wadi Khaled. The interviews with the United Nation Agencies and public institutions took place in Beirut; with the MSMEs, NGOs and para-public institutions in Akkar and in Tripoli. The Focus Group Discussions and survey questionnaires were conducted in Tripoli and Akkar.



Figure 2: Map of Akkar (Source: IDAL)

The KIIs were designed to gather data on the following topics: the coordination mechanisms and synergies in the region, the ongoing initiatives for job creation, the high potential growth sectors, the employment trends in North Lebanon, and the impact and role of the interviewed institutions in tackling the unemployment issue.

The surveys were designed to gather data on high potential growth sectors and employment trends in North Lebanon, and the current employment practices and skills in demand in the local labour market.

For the selection of interviewees, a stakeholder mapping was developed based on the secondary data review and their involvement and expertise in tackling the unemployment issue in Lebanon, as well as in the labour market and skills

development. The sectors were the only criteria for the selection of the MSME interviewees. The MSMEs were mainly micro enterprises which reflects the reality of the labour market in the region.

Regarding the focus group discussion participants, the profiling was done in coordination with the NGOs working in the region. The participants were identified with the support of the NGOs. The groups were twelve to fifteen participants, the group of youth was between the age of 18-27 years old, and the group of men and women were between the age of 27-55 years old, and Syrian and Lebanese mixed.

All the interviews were comprised of a single interviewee. Each interview lasted maximum one hour, and the questions were chosen according to the expertise and work assignment of the interviewed persons. The interviewees were contacted beforehand in order to inform them on the motive of the interview and potentially set up meetings. The interview often took place in the workplace of the interviewee. In order to ease the interviewee into the conversation, an introduction was always given explaining the reason behind the study and the way the results would be handled. Also, the interviews were not recorded without their consent and all names were changed upon request.

The analysis of the primary data has been done based on a segmentation of the "impacting factors" on three levels: the context and enabling environment, the organization, and the individuals. The enabling environment represents the legislative context and culture that facilitates the implementation, and the stakeholders who can benefit from the results. The organization represents the MSMEs and private sector, the relevant governmental entities, the Civil Society Organizations and NGOs that are directly involved in the implementation of vocational training projects in Akkar and North Lebanon. The individuals are the staff of MSMEs, the youths who represent potential beneficiaries of the VT courses, the existing manpower in the labour market, and the women targeted by home-based economic development and livelihood projects.

I tried to analyze each dimension which could provide a framework for identifying and analyzing the internal and external factors that could affect the viability of a project. At the enabling environment level, I focused on the legislative framework of Lebanon, the action plans, the strategies, modalities and the synergy between the actors. At the organization level, I focused on the coordination mechanisms, the institutional status and capacities, and the scalability and growth plan. At the individual level, I tried to analyze the skills, the motivation and the expectations of the potential beneficiaries.

#### 1.2.2. Limitations

The main challenges were the lack of official market data for North Lebanon, the lack of official validation on previous market assessments, the lack of an official national strategy for tackling unemployment, in addition to the general lack of coordination between the international NGOs in the field.

With regards to the available information about the labour market information for Lebanon, the market data and figures are severely outdated, especially for the North. Moreover, international organizations do not publish their own findings on a regular basis, nor do they update their information regularly. Information is not centralized, consistent or updated.

### **CHAPTER 2**

## SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON: "GUESTS? TERRORISTS OR REFUGEES?"

As the result of World War II, within the new United Nations context, the states have instituted a system for the protection of refugees. This system is universal in its scope and consisted of two pillars: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which was established in December 1950; and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Convention). The 1951 Convention is defining those who can obtain the refugee status, including the rights attached to it.

The 1951 Refugee Convention is "ratified by 145 State parties, it defines the term 'refugee' and outlines the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obligations of the Sates to protect them."<sup>8</sup>

The core principle is non-refoulement, which means that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they might face serious threats to their life or freedom. This is now considered a rule of customary international law. UNHCR serves as the 'guardian' of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. According to the legislation, States are expected to cooperate with UNHCR in ensuring that the rights of refugees are respected and protected.

According to the article 1  $(A)(2)^9$  of the 1951 Convention, "the term 'refugee' shall apply to any person who [...] as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-and-international-policy-protect-refugees-timeline

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For details, please see: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html

and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".

"In spite of its universal discourse, it is worth mentioning that this refugee definition had a temporal and a geographic limitation – one being recognized as a refugee only in relation to events occurred in Europe and before 1 January 1951. Such limitations were changed sixteen years later with the adoption of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees"<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, it is only with the 1967 amendments that the 1951 Convention has indeed become a valuable universal instrument for the protection of refugees.

The prolonged refugee situation of Palestinians is the main reason for a continued persistence of many states in the Middle East region not to sign the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Lebanon is no exception in this regard, and it is not a party to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. It essentially lacks the concrete rules and regulations on national level dealing with refugees. For that matter, Lebanon's approach related to more than one million Syrians seeking protection in the country is not very clear. At the same time, the current political instability, historical ties and thirty years of Syrian military presence in the past years, and the country's long-term issues related to Palestinian refugee have inevitably influenced Lebanon's policies towards refugees from Syria.

"Although Lebanon has long refused to ratify the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, it is deeply embedded with the international refugee regime. UNHCR has had a presence in the country since 1963 and is considered by the Lebanese government to be a useful tool in dealing with the country's non-Palestinian refugees. The heaviest burden of carrying out status determination, registration, health- care, education, nutrition and livelihood assistance has thus primarily been shouldered by UNHCR." (Kagan, 2012, p.307).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> For details, please see: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/protocolrefugees.pdf

"At the same time, UNHCR has taken a pragmatic approach towards the Lebanese government, rarely pushing for a Lebanese ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention, and rather focusing on establishing an acceptable 'protection space' for the country's refugees." (Janmyr, 2017, p. 438).

In October 2014, Lebanon's Council of Ministers adopted a comprehensive policy on Syrian displacement, one explicit goal of which is to decrease the number of Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to territory and encouraging the return to Syria. Lebanon, a country with an already fragile governance system and sub-standard infrastructure (Yassin et al. 2015), has had an ambiguous approach to Syrians seeking protection in the country. In Lebanon, where the long-standing Palestinian camps represent extra-territorial sites of radicalization and armed resistance (Hanafi & Long, 2010), the possibility of radicalization of Syrian refugees in the camps and the potential permanence of their presence have led to a rejection of formal camps. With the absence of refugee camps, the self-settled refugees depend mainly on the local and international NGOs and UN agencies to this day.

UNHCR's presence in Lebanon has also been challenging to formalize. When UNHCR wanted to open an office in Lebanon, it happened within the scope of a 'Gentleman's Agreement'. Only in 2003, a more formalized memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between UNHCR and Lebanon's General Security Office. This agreement concerned the 'processing of cases of asylum seekers applying for refugee status with UNHCR Office' and assigned the registration of asylum seekers and the conduction of refugee status determination in specific cases to UNHCR.<sup>11</sup>

"The MoU has notably been criticized by a number of legal scholars and human rights organizations; being negotiated only with the country's security agency, some have argued, it adopts a Lebanese perspective on refugees that is strictly one in which refugees are considered security threats. Claims have furthermore been made that the MoU not only legitimizes the notion of Lebanon not being a country of asylum but also helped introduce this approach as a central principle. Ever since, this principle has been incorporated into numerous official documents and even judicial decisions. Even more worryingly, the 2003 agreement contains a number of structural flaws and makes no mention of key refugee protection norms such as that of non-refoulement. UNHCR has naturally no authority to force resettlement

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For the details, see UNHCR, 'Memorandum of Understanding', art. 8.

countries to accept refugees, yet the agreement only accepts UNHCR's protection role against the expectation that refugees recognized by UNHCR be resettled within less than a year." (Zaiotti, 2006, p. 333).

"It is clear that UNHCR lacks both the authority and the actual capacity to deliver on its substantive commitments. (Kagan, 2012) This fact is also acknowledged within the organization, where UNHCR staff have admitted that the agreement fails to fulfill the standard normally required when negotiating such MoUs, some even referring to it as a 'mistake' on the part of UNHCR. The MoU has been subject to considerable disagreements about its interpretation and therefore essentially broke down shortly after its negotiation." (Janmyr, 2017, p. 395).

According to Lebanese law, "without the required entry or stay documentation to be in Lebanon, refugees from Syria are considered to be there 'illegally', giving them only limited legal status in the country. Either they crossed into Lebanon through unofficial border crossings or they have not been able to renew their residency visa." This "limited legal status" has acute effects on refugees in Lebanon. In fact, access to protection and assistance is practically nonexistent. Therefore, risk of exploitation, mistreatment and violence increases. (Janmyr, 2016, p. 58).

Consequently, Syrian refugees tend to limit their movements out of fear of being detained, expelled back to Syria or even abused. "Many refugees from Syria in Lebanon feel overwhelming concern about the potential risks they face from being in this situation. For refugees with limited legal status, their ability to access basic services, work, and UNHCR registration sites and to register births and marriages is severely limited. For Palestinian refugees from Syria, the situation is even more challenging, as the restrictions on entering Lebanon and on renewing their legal staty are much more severe." (Janmyr, 2016, p. 63).

Even though Lebanon is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and there is the limited legal protection for refugees and asylum seekers in Lebanon, although it is bound by the customary law principle of *non-refoulement* and by the obligations of the human rights treaties which it has signed and which are incorporated into its Constitution. International standards under these obligations recommend, at a minimum, the adoption of temporary protection measures to ensure the safe admission of refugees, to protect them against *refoulement* and to respect their basic human rights.

Although UNHCR has been permitted by the Lebanese government to register refugees, the protection offered by such registration remains limited; being registered with UNHCR in Lebanon can provide some legal protection and is important for access to services but it does not grant refugees the right to seek asylum, have legal stay or refugee status. This leaves refugees in a challenging situation.

In order to address the challenges that refugees with limited legal status face, they often adopt coping mechanisms which can lead to exposure to new risks. Some of the main ones are: returning to Syria in order to try to re-enter through an official border crossing and thereby get another entry coupon free of charge; paying high prices for retrieving identity documentation from Syria; buying fake documentation; or using other people's documents. Due to having limited funds and the high cost of visas, many families prioritize the renewal of the residency visa for the main incomeearner in the family, usually a male member of the household. This often leaves the other members of the family without legal stay documentation. The impact for refugees from Syria of being in a situation of limited legal status is pervasive and affects many aspects of their lives. More than 73 percent of the 1,256 refugees interviewed in a recent Norwegian Refugee Council assessment reported that freedom of movement was the main challenge faced by refugees with limited legal status. They could not move out of the area where they lived; fear of crossing checkpoints was prevalent, especially in locations where there had been an increase in ad hoc official checkpoints. (Aranki & Kalis, 2014)

"Limitations on their movement also impeded access to services, particularly health care. As men – who, in certain geographic areas of Lebanon, are more likely to be arrested – decrease their movements, women seem to increase theirs. Some women with limited legal status reported that their husbands prefer to send them to receive assistance because they themselves are afraid of being arrested at checkpoints, particularly in North Lebanon. While this is done so that the family can access assistance, it exposes women to risks of sexual harassment and exploitation, for example on the way to or at the distribution sites for humanitarian assistance. Due to their limited legal status, they rarely report this harassment to the police or other authorities for fear of being arrested. Adults with limited legal status often send their children to work instead of them, since children are less likely to be arrested. As a consequence, the children cannot attend school and are more likely to be exposed to abuse and exploitation." (Aranki & Kalis, 2014, p.18)
For the Syrian refugees in Lebanon as well as the Palestinian ones, many serious problems emerge due to their limited legal status, including reducing their ability to seek justice. According to the study ANERA conducted, "Since March 2011, most of the Palestinian camps and gatherings in Lebanon have been hosting an increasing number of Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) escaping the Syrian conflict. To date, more than 60,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria are registered with UNRWA and settled in and around the Palestinian camps in the country. Palestinian families in the camps have taken on the burden of hosting an estimated 45 percent of the PRS into their already overcrowded homes. The remaining households pay rent for shelter, which they perceive as very expensive. The majority of PRS live in overcrowded conditions (46 percent of households inhabited by more than 10 persons and 27 percent by more than 15), particularly in the Ain el-Helwe camp. A needs assessment by ANERA reveals that 28 percent of PRS households (approximately 8,500 persons) are housed in substandard conditions that are not designed for residence. The PRS population is economically vulnerable. Their livelihood status differs from the general Syrian refugees. By law, Palestinian refugees from Syria do not enjoy the same rights to employment as Syrians. Moreover, unlike Syrians, Palestinians from Syria lack the informal social networks related to employment that Syrians have managed to build as foreign labourers. Unemployment rates among the Palestinian refugees from Syria are very high (around 90 percent) with strict legal restrictions imposed on their employment and mobility. The majority have no Lebanese income and the very few who are employed (10 percent) work as labourer, with wages typically ranging between USD 100 and USD 300 per month. Women make up only 10 percent of those employed. Food and rent impose a heavy toll on the PRS household budget. Finally, and most importantly, PRS are not served by the UNHCR but rather by UNRWA, which suffers from prolonged under-funding and poor resources." (ANERA, 2013)

Regarding the labour force participation of Syrians in the Lebanese labour market, it is important to note that un- and semi-skilled Syrian workers have been comprising a significant proportion of Lebanon's workforce even long before the Syrian Crisis (Chalcraft, 2009). "Prior to the Syrian refugee crisis, the conditions of Syrian workers in Lebanon were governed by a set of bilateral agreements in respect with the Lebanese labour law. According to the Lebanese labour code, foreign workers required a work permit within ten days of entry, which should give them access to social security, the right to a minimum wage and security protections." (Akram et al.;2014, p. 22). The majority of Syrian refugees are living in hard socio-economic conditions with limited livelihood options and few connections or acquaintances; they have scant means of self-reliance, especially female-headed households who make up a good share of the refugee population. "Refugees' limited financial resources are usually spent on accommodation, often in poor conditions. Wealthier Syrians have responded to the crisis, in many cases, by transferring capital or relocating businesses to Lebanon. As for Syrian migrant workers already in Lebanon prior to the Syrian crisis, many have now brought their families and are striving to accommodate increased living costs." (ILO, 2014, p. 15).

ILO conducted an assessment to measure the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and to analyze their employment profiles. The assessment shows that the majority of Syrian refugees are youth and children.

"More than half are below the age of 24. Educational attainment of the refugees is generally low; one out of three is either illiterate or never attended school, 40 percent have a primary education, and only three percent achieved university education. Males and females seem to have similar education levels. In terms of employment, results indicate that around half of the working-age refugees (47 percent) are economically active, the majority of whom were active in Syria prior to the crisis. South Lebanon records the highest activity rate and Akkar the lowest. Syrian refugees are characterized by high unemployment levels, most notably amongst women at 68 percent. Given the absence of male heads in most refugee households, there is an impetus for women to seek work. However, they still face the additional burden of childcare, which impedes them from employment. In fact, out of all the Syrian refugee women aged above 15 years, only six percent are currently working in Lebanon. As workers, Syrians are mainly engaged in agriculture or in personal and domestic services and, on a smaller scale, in construction. These jobs provide little income and no security or protection, reflecting refugees' low skill capacities. The assessment shows that refugees tend to maintain the same kinds of jobs they used to occupy before the crisis. Most refugees work informally whereby 92 percent have no work contract and over half (56 percent) work on a seasonal, weekly or daily basis; only 23 percent earn regular monthly wages. Construction and agricultural tools were needed by males whereas females noted the need for sewing, hairdressing, and agricultural equipment." (ILO, 2014, p.8)

After the Syrian crisis and thus the arrival of a huge number of refugees, the legislation to obtain work permit has been changed. In February 2013, the Minister of Labour issued a circular allowing Syrian workers to work in a certain number of

sectors, including construction, environment, and agriculture and Decree 197 of the Ministry of Labour was put into force in December 2014.

While developing projects aiming to create job opportunities for Syrians in Lebanon, it is important to take into consideration above-mentioned legislative framework and the political environment in the country due to the fact that Syrian refugees are increasingly being accused for the poor economy and political challenges in the country.

Due to the protracted presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and competition for resources, tension is increasing, addition to the discrimination against Syrians. The refugees have been held responsible for wide range of issues that were in fact in place before their arrivals such as high unemployment, shortage in housing, inflation, stress on public infrastructure, overcrowd in hospitals, schools, and rise in criminality. (Dahi 2014; Meier 2014)

The refugee issue is highly politicized in Lebanon, and the government's stance towards Syrian refugees can be explained on the one hand by Lebanon's previous refugee experience with Palestinians, and, on the other, by the major antagonistic political parties' conflicting attitudes towards the conflict in Syria. (Janmyr, 2016, p. 58). In line with all those, Syrian refugees in the country are generally cited as a serious threat to the security, political, economic and social stability by the Government of Lebanon.

It is important mentioning the impact of the previous experience with Palestinians and the civil war on the situation. According to Traboulsi, the war did its job in establishing a new demographic equilibrium by the double means of death and emigration in Lebanon:

<sup>&</sup>quot;It has been estimated that the bloody 15-year purge in Lebanon resulted in 71,328 killed and 97,184 injured. The purge of the country's human surplus took three basic forms. The first, sectarian 'cleansing' to create religiously homogeneous enclaves (mainly involving expelling Shi`a Muslims from the Christian areas and Christians from the 'Druze' mountain), led to some 157,500 displaced Muslims and 670,000 displaced Christians. This sectarian 'cleansing' was coupled with a political one, the expulsion of political 'strangers' and those members of the community who did not comply with the policies or dictates of the dominant militia. Second, there was the expulsion of 'foreigners' or 'intruders', which in this case refers mainly to the Palestinians. Bashir Jumayil had a famous phrase for the Palestinians as 'a people

too many in the Middle East'. The massacres of Sabra–Shatila and the wars of Amal against the Palestinian camps, not to mention Israeli military operations and the two outright invasions of 1978 and 1982, can be seen as military procedures to get rid of that 'people too many'. Third was migration: nearly a third of Lebanon's population were driven out of the country. The economic and social consequences of this massive outflow of the working population, mainly the young, have been enormous: a majority of the Lebanese workforce are employed outside their country; the balance of power among the sectors of the economy has tipped even more in favor of tertiary and rentier activities at the expense of productive sectors (which suffered most from the destruction); the extroverted character of the economy has been intensified, and so has the specific logic of capital investment directed toward speculation in real estate and foreign currency." (Traboulsi, 2012, p. 24)

Most of the "Palestinian refugees" are born and raised in Lebanon, or have arrived as children but they are raised largely in enclaves, the young people keep the Palestinians' accent. The sense of having a different identity is reinforced by their limited legal status in Lebanon. Similar to other countries in the region, Lebanon does not grant citizenship to the Palestinian refugees. Beyond that, Palestinians in Lebanon are prohibited from owning property and from working in many skilled jobs, forced to live in camps and barred from formal education.

Lebanon is religiously diverse country, and the country's 15-year civil war, in which Palestinian factions were also part of it, was driven by sectarian divisions. As a result, it is not willing to make any steps which would lead to the integration of the refugees. Maronite and Shia Lebanese populations tend to define the mainly Sunni Palestinian refugees as a threat. Sunni population is more accepting.

"Today, Palestinians are competing with nearly Syrian refugees in Lebanon for jobs and aid.The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) deals with aid for Palestinians, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) covers Syrians - and the difference in the aid provided is stark. UNHCR gives 150,000 Syrians in Lebanon \$175 a month per family; UNRWA, however, can only give 61,000 Palestinians \$10 for each family member every three months."<sup>12</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> For details, see: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/palestinians-lebanon-living-prison-171215114602518.html

In the light of the previous experiences and due to the sectarian nature of Lebanon, the current political actors are concerned about the new changes in the demography with the arrival of 'Sunni Syrians' and the refugees are seen as a serious threat to the security, political, economic and social stability similar to Palestinians.

#### **CHAPTER 3**

#### LABOUR MARKET AND SKILLS GAP IN NORTH LEBANON

The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the labour market and skills gap in North Lebanon, to understand the impact of the migration on labour market and the NGOs' activities in the North.

#### **3.1. Labour Market Information**

This section has been used to inform the design of the quantitative survey, as well as questionnaires to be used during key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

#### 3.1.1. Forced Migration's Effect on Labour Market

Forced migration is a general term and it refers to "a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects)." (IOM, 2018). War has proven to be the main cause of forced migration surpassing economic problems and/ or political instability (Schmeidl 1997; Moore & Shellman 2004). The impact of forced immigration on the labour market, particularly in the host countries, has been difficult to determine for economists and is still relatively undeveloped. "There is ample evidence that governments are inclined to conduct indicative assessments to evaluate the economic and social burdens that these host countries have to shoulder due to the influx of refugees and the increase in hosting costs" (Chatty & Marfleet 2013). As it has been observed also in Lebanon, the influxes threatens the economic growth and the political structure; also increases the tensions among host communities, crime rates and insecurities. The paper of Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2013) explores the effect of forced migration on migrants as well as host communities. According to the authors, "the long-term impact of forced migration has been positive for many displaced groups. These positive outcomes include effective resettlement policies, increased future mobility for those who were displaced, and faster transition to other sectors for agricultural workers which is true only for Western countries. However, in the developing countries, the authors show that the consequences of forced migration lead to negative labour market outcomes as less income and less consumption. In some cases, which is the case in Lebanon, the agricultural producers, who are able to take advantage of the cheaper labour force represented by forced migrants, and the increase in demand for products (and potential increase in prices) are cited as the group who took the advantage of the situation. As the workers from host communities who have lost their jobs due to the supply of cheaper labour following the influx of job-seeking refugees are the ones who have been affected negatively."

According to D'Amuri, Ottaviano, and Peri (2010), "the 1990s immigrants had an important impact on the nationals' employment rates and salaries; however, there was a negative impact on the employment of old immigrants who arrived after the WWII. The authors state that there is a close competition among immigrants but not between immigrants and host community." In contrary, Borjas's (2003) findings suggest that "immigrants to the USA reduced the employment of workers from host community. According to Borja's study, an increase of 10 percent in the influx of non-nationals resulted in a decrease in the number of weeks worked by approximatelypercent for national workers who had the same skills. Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) underline that, among the people who has the same

education and skills, immigration reduced the wages of previous immigrants but with a weak effect on the wages of national workers in the UK. "

It is also important to differentiate economic immigrants and refugees in terms of their motivations. According 1951 Convention, "a refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion."

In his study, Chiswick (1978, 1986) argues that "in case of refugees' lack of education and labour market experience there are problems in signaling their skills. Moreover, these workers are characterized as having lower motivation compared to economic migrants, as well as lower skills, which makes it difficult their participation in the labour market. They are less likely to have transferable skills in the labour market. It has been documented that developing countries that host refugees for protracted periods experience long-term economic, social, political, and environmental effects" (Gomez et al. 2010). Baez (2011) states that "developing countries receiving a sudden and large number of refugees from neighboring countries", which Lebanon has experienced, may face the problem of overpopulation, which leads to higher competition for resources in the host country. De Groot (2010) mentions that "neighboring countries suffering from the spillover effects of conflict are likely to host the huge number of refugees, which negatively influences economic growth through the destruction of productive labour." According to De Groot (2010), "refugees in neighboring countries are attracted to less-productive activities in labour intensive jobs." Bah (2013) explains that "due to the refugees' flows, the host country is pressured to provide more necessary public services, which leads to increased resource scarcity. However, refugees may positively influence the country's economic growth if they have a high level of human or physical capital or because of the increase in international aid flows to the host country."

It is worth also mentioning that refugees forced to move due to wars and conflicts do not migrate in search of work opportunities. In other words, they are non-economic migrants, and their migration is push-driven rather than pull-driven (Ruist, 2013). Thus, there is less correlation between the influx of refugees and labour market outcomes in the host country. Lucas (2006) made "a literature review on migration in Africa. According to his study, approximately 75 percent of the African refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa stayed in the region. The study states that Djibouti, Zambia, Guinea, Ghana, and Tanzania are among the biggest countries that received refugees in terms of their ratio to the population. He argues that the effects of refugees in these countries were also similar to those observed in developed economies." Arthur (1991) finds that "the labour market in urban areas in Ghana did not absorb the rapid flows of refugees from other African countries, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the size of informal sectors and unskilled workers." In line with this, Zetter and Deikun (2010) argue that "refugees living in non-rural regions tend to increase competition with national workforce in the labour market, leading to conflict with the communities in destination countries."

Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) argue that "the refugees arrived Tanzania from Burundi (the neighboring country that witnessed the genocides of Burundi and Rwanda in 1994) became the cheap labour, resulting in an increased labour supply in Tanzania. So, the refugees supported small and medium enterprises to find workers." Chaulia (2003) argues that "the first influx of Burundi refugees to Tanzania had positive effects on the labour market by providing cheap workers in the agricultural sector. This could be explained by the government's policy to open the market without restrictions to integrate these refugees. The effects of forced migration on the labour market in host countries were also empirically examined in other economic regions." For example, Calderón and Ibañez (2009) find that "internal forced migration in Colombia had a greater effect on the informal sector labour market than on the formal sector. They also underline that the huge influxes of refugees had a negative impact on job opportunities of particularly low-skilled workers."

In the case of Jordan where the challenges and problems have been observed since the beginning of the Syrian Crisis as one of the neighboring countries, a recent assessment conducted by Lozi (2013) further explores "the effects of both Syrian and Iraqi refugees on Jordan. Using foreign direct investment and food pricing, Lozi state that the presence of refugees increased the food prices in Jordan. Moreover, the refugees in Jordan have had an impact on the national budget due to the considerable increase in school enrollment, use of public hospitals for health care, and the upsurge in consumption of government-subsidized fuel and water. Finally, Lozi (2013) expresses that the effects of refugees were overstated in terms of positive and negative effects, indicating that refugees could not be held accountable for most of the economic challenges in Jordan."

Another study by Olwan and Shiyab (2012) aims to understand the social, economic, and legal conditions of the Syrian refugees living in Jordan. It also observes the role of the government in hosting Syrian refugees and providing basic assistance, highlighting the challenges that the Jordanian Government faces, especially in basic needs sectors such as health care, housing, education, as well as the need for cash assistance.

In his study, Zetter (2012) discusses that "the concept of refugee burden has been widely used by the hosting states and the international/national NGOs. He states that the states tend to emphasize the adverse effects and costs of hosting refugees, but these effects, although undeniable and well documented, are only part of the story. He further argues that refugees can expand the productive capacity of the host economy by increasing consumption, which is measured as a percentage of the country's GDP. However, such results are more likely to be documented in the long term according to Zetter (2012)."

In the light of the above-mentioned literature on the impact of forced migration on labour market, the following chapters focus particularly on the impact of the Syrians' immigration to Lebanon on its labour market and Syrian crisis' effect on the Lebanese economy.

# **3.1.2.** Limitations and Challenges in the Lebanese Labour Market After Syrian Crisis

The dominant features of the Lebanese labour market are the high levels of unemployment among young people, the low rates of female participation in economic life, the large size of the informal sector, the influx of foreign workers and refugees from Palestine, those recently arrived from Syria and from other neighboring countries, and the large number of skilled Lebanese nationals seeking and obtaining employment abroad.



Figure 3: Unemployment Rate by Governorate (Source: IDAL)

With regard to the employed population, the ILO data indicate that "males constitute 77 percent of total employed in Lebanon (23 percent females), but with a higher rate of employment of males in the North (84.1 percent in Akkar and Miniyeh-Danniyeh districts, and 75.4 percent in remaining North Lebanon districts). The highest rate of female employment is in Beirut governorate, where almost a third of employed are women." (ILO, 2017, p.52).



*Figure 4: Working Age Composition – North Lebanon (Source: World Bank Group, Jobs for North Lebanon, September 2017)* 

Even before the Syrian crisis, the situation of the labour market in Lebanon was alarming. Lebanon's labour market was witnessing high unemployment rates, a major rate of skills mismatch and a high occurrence of low-quality and low-productivity jobs. The low-quality and low-productivity jobs increased significantly with the inflow of Syrian refugees. This had a major repercussion for women and unqualified workers. The majority of immigrant workers are succumbed acutely to the impact of the influx as they belong to the latter category; operating low-productivity economic activities (house-maids, construction workers, car repair staff or fuel station attendants, etc.) (ETF, 2015).

"The northern city of Tripoli and the Governorate of Akkar where the ratio of refugees to host population is almost 32 percent and which houses 29 percent of total refugees are assessed as some of the most vulnerable areas in the country." (World Bank Group, 2017). Vulnerable Lebanese have seen their own circumstances deteriorate as general state of the economy and the job market are negatively affected by the crisis. In parallel, rents are increasing, jobs are harder to find for Syrian refugees as well and the public services are overburdened. There is a need to support the resilience of refugees and their host communities by improving access to incomegenerating opportunities, as well as providing support at the institution/market level by addressing the broader business constraints. According to the World Bank, North Lebanon (including Akkar) is home to 31 percent of Lebanon's poorest households.



Figure 5: Concentration of poor households per governorate (%), 2014 (Source Ministry of Finance-IDAL)



Figure 6: Key Demographic Numbers by Governorate (Source: Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), 2009 Living Condition Survey)

A World Bank report provided an assessment of constraints and opportunities for the creation of an increased number of higher quality jobs for Lebanese in the more fragile and conflict-affected regions. The geographical focus of this World Bank report is North Lebanon, including the city of Tripoli. The World Bank Group Systematic Country Diagnostic of Lebanon highlights the disadvantaged condition of North Lebanon, where "36 percent of the population in the North are poor, which sits significantly above the national average of 27 percent. Areas of Tripoli and its immediate northern hinterland including some areas of Akkar, are assessed as some of the most vulnerable localities in the country. The evidence suggests that this region has high levels of inequality. Employment challenges for the Lebanese in this region have been exacerbated, particularly for the poorest segments, by the country's fragility and history of conflict, and more recently by the influx of Syrian refugees. This is strongly impacting Tripoli and the North, and is creating an increasingly unsustainable stress on social services and the job market. Access to employment is also an issue for Syrian refugees, as even before the crisis, the Lebanese labour market was already facing limited absorptive capacity." (2017, p.27) According to the World Bank estimates, Syrian refugees formed between 27 and 35 percent of the country's labour force in 2014.



*Figure 7: Labour Force Participation by Gender, Age and Education Level in North Lebanon (Source: (Source: World Bank Group, Jobs for North Lebanon, September 2017)* 

A GIZ Lebanon Employment and Labour Market Analysis report found that "refugee youth face the risk of becoming Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEETs) and/or turning to petty criminal activities to survive at a critical age. By keeping, for example, all registered Syrian youth refugees aged 16-20 in school or in schemes of vocational training, e.g. on the basis of subsidies tied to school attendance, it would be possible to relieve the labour market of the pressure exerted by 9 percent of the refugee population, i.e. 93,000 refugees eager to earn an income and keep themselves involved in some activity." (GIZ, 2016, p.52). According to the Skills Gap Analysis conducted by Leaders Consortium, "between 2011 and 2014 poverty rates are estimated to have increased by 61 percent. Child labour has also re-emerged, and the majority of children who do not attend school are Syrian refugees. This increases the need for public services, which cannot be met given the current inefficiencies and general malaise among public sector institutions and government branches." (LEADERS, 2017, p.13)

According to the World Bank report, there are important differences in the labour market between different groups, especially among men and women, women and youth. Thus, "only one in five working age women participate in the labour market, compared to 73 percent among working age men. The majority of active women are wage employees, while self-employment is more prevalent among men. For women,

80 percent are wage employees and only 20 percent are self-employed or employers, while the latter is 40 percent among men. Moreover, 23 percent of youth below the age 25 are not in Education, Employment or Training (NEETs), and 13 percent are unemployed. Age plays an important factor in the types of jobs and skills a worker attains. Although the active youth tend to be more educated than the older generation, there is also a high rate of idleness. The labour market indicators by age help to identify the constraints faced by youth in accessing the labour market. There is a high rate of idleness among youth as 23 percent of the youth aged below 25 are not in Education, Employment or Training (NEETs). This rate is even higher among young females (one third) compared to men (14 percent), and among low educated youth (41 percent). (2017, p.17).

The main causes that are refraining the Lebanese economy from requesting more labour are mainly due to:

- A fragile business environment conditions
- A slow Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate
- A small and saturated market,
- The inability of local companies to challenge the increasingly competitive and aggressive international markets.

They are estimated to account for more than 50% of GDP, to employ more than 50% of the workforce, and are also considered to have potential for employment and growth because most are labour intensive. In line with IDAL fact books, GIZ ELMA report explains the importance of agriculture and food processing and tourism sectors for North Lebanon.

"The agricultural and food processing sector contributes to 7 % of the GDP and employs around 9% of the Lebanese workforce. The food and beverages activities generate more than 25% of the manufacturing output, with an annual growth rate of 9% between 2007 and 2010. Specific niche activities/value chains by region were considered as still undervalued and having high potential such as agriculture extension in various crops (olive, stone fruits, pomme fruits, green house production), post-harvest, and agro-food processing (jams, pickles). Based on the findings of IRC assessment, also the local MSMEs in Akkar consider agriculture and value- added activities in peripheral industries to the existing agricultural sector as the most promising sectors addition to construction sector." (2015, p.28).

UNDP focuses on three strategic sectors on its labour needs assessment for Lebanon: agro-food production, residential construction, and ICT. (2016) According to UNDP

report, the agro- food processing industry is Lebanon's one of the most productive industrial sector.

"This sector has experienced growth in recent years and is a priority for the government who wants to help producers meet quality standards needed to access external markets. Northern Lebanon and Akkar is the third most important region (accounting for 14 percent of business), producing plumbs and prunes, alongside various vegetables. While the agro-food sector is predominantly composed of small family owned enterprises, government ministries have played a central role in developing the sector. The Ministry of Industry focuses on maintaining quality standards and promoting better production practices, the Ministry of Agriculture works on facilitating linkages between agricultural activities and the Agro-Food industries, and the Ministry of Economy and Trade has played an important role in developing partnerships with the European Commission. This last initiative led to the establishment of the Association Agripole, which is a business development centre that aims to develop agricultural and agro-industrial enterprises. In addition to these branches of government, the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL) is mandated by Law to assist in the support, promotion and marketing of Lebanese products, especially agricultural and agro-industrial products. Efforts made by public institutions have also been amplified through the contributions of private entities like the Syndicate of Lebanese Food (SLF) Industrialists." (2016, p.16)

Regarding tourism sector, Lebanon has the potential to become an important regional actor in hospitality and tourism services. In fact, Lebanon can lead in a number of tourism categories such as medical and wellness tourism, ecotourism, business and event tourism, etc.. Moreover, Lebanon has as well a high potential to develop traditional Lebanese and high end international cuisines. (GIZ, 2016).

OXFAM report emphasizes the importance of tourism sector in the region and indicates the feasibility of small grant projects targeting sectors like family run hostels, camping sites, and other eco-tourism with a market for small handmade crafts as well. (2016)

Lastly, it is important mentioning child labour in Lebanon which has traditionally been concentrated in the informal sector, street trades, and family-based agriculture. Child labour cases are increasing by the large number of refugee families fleeing the war in Syria. Findings from the ILO's study show that

<sup>&</sup>quot;8 percent of refugee children in the age group 10 to 14 are working and the majority of them do not attend school. These children are working mostly in agriculture and trade. Moreover, approximately 60 per cent of children of the same age group do not attend school and are thus vulnerable to future labour exploitation. More than half of the children within this age group stated that they are currently looking for work.

The principle reason for parents sending children to work is to provide essential financial support for the household; this was declared by all surveyed Syrian working children. The second reason given for working was the absence of a breadwinner (stated by 15 per cent of the Syrian working children). Finally, it is worth noting that almost all the Syrian working children were young boys with few cases of girls. Moreover, given the prolonged duration of the crisis and worsening living conditions coupled with the sharp increase in the total number of Syrian refugees fleeing to Lebanon, it is expected that the number of working children will rise." (2014, p.22)

#### 3.1.3. Hiring Trends, Practices and Opportunities

Concerning the current employment practices in North Lebanon, as indicated by several assessments, there is a heavy reliance on personal networking for hiring among business owners and managers. This is especially true for smaller businesses that require owners and managers to assume significant responsibility (for customer relations, managing finances and inventory, etc.).

In Lebanon, there are several organizations and agencies (public and private) that provide employment services. A list of fourteen organizations and seven private recruitment agencies in North Lebanon and other regions was drawn by ILO. Out of this list, eleven organizations that provide employment services in the North were mentioned in the ILO's Labour Market Assessment.(2016) They consisted of four categories: (1) livelihood service centers; (2) job matching; (3) development and job creation; and (4) self-employment. These organizations provide various employment services targeting Lebanese as well as refugee populations, youth, women, and people with disabilities. Services included life skills, technical training programs, career counseling, as well as targeted programs to address youth unemployment and women empowerment.



Figure 8: Agencies providing employment services in the North (Source: ILO, "Labour market information review and analysis")

Due to the impact of Syrian workers on the labour market, the Lebanese government has started to apply new policies concerning refugees to limit their work opportunities. Decrees from the Ministry of Labour restrain their engagement only to the construction, agriculture and environment (cleaning) sectors.<sup>13</sup> According to a key study recently conducted by the LEADERS Consortium,

"The restrictions of work permits and the introduction of the sponsorship system present additional constraints for Syrian refugees in the Lebanese labour market. These measures have led to a further decrease in the living conditions of Syrian refugees, 69 percent of which are currently estimated to be living on less than the minimum expenditure basket (less than \$114/capita/month), including 52 percent under the survival minimum expenditure basket (less than \$87/capita/month)." (LEADERS, 2017, p.76)

The low labour force participation rates and low education levels limit both the quantity and quality of the workforce in North Lebanon. The participation rate in North Lebanon is amongst the lowest in the country, while the actual labour force is amongst the largest given that the majority of its population is of working age. "This high inactivity is driven by the very low participation rates amongst women and youth in the labour market. Amongst these who are active, the majority have low levels of education, especially amongst the adults. 45 percent of the active population have elementary education or below, while 31 percent have completed tertiary education. Youth and adults less than 34 years of age achieve higher levels of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Decree 197 of the Ministry of Labour, implemented in December 2014, limits possible work for Syrian nationals to agriculture, construction and cleaning services (i.e. sectors traditionally depending on migrant workers).

education with 31 percent (youth) and 42 percent (adults), respectively, having a bachelor degree or higher. The fragility confronting Tripoli and the North has its origins well before the onset of the current Syrian crisis. The sense of economic marginalization of the indigenous community has played its part in this social conflict and proclivity to violence." (ILO, 2017) The World Bank report draws attention to the importance of "a pro-active policy of economic inclusion, through the creation of meaningful employment that provides not just an income, but also generates a range of social externalities. This includes both human capital development and the inclusion in employment of the most marginal groups, such as women and youth. On average, Syrian refugees have lower educational attainment levels than their Lebanese counterparts. Refugees tend to concentrate in low-skill activities such as domestic and personal services (27 percent), agriculture (24 percent), commerce (15 percent) and construction (12 percent). This influx has increased competition over these types of jobs and has particularly affected the most vulnerable populations (women, youth and low-skilled workers)." (2017, p.28)

The majority of jobs created in Lebanon in the last decade were in trade, services and construction. "Between 2004 and 2009, trade contributed to job creation by 61 percent, services by 33 percent, followed by construction with 10 percent." (ILO, 2016) According to the World Bank and the ILO, "most of the jobs created are located in low productivity sectors (wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, accommodation and food services, and real estate). The low productivity service sector provides employment to 35 percent of workers and 61 percent of self-employed whereas the high productivity sector (transportation, financial services and insurance) provides employment to only 14 percent of workers and 3 percent of self-employed. It is also worth mention that NGOs and international organizations have become an important source of employment in the region." (2017, 2016).

The Investment Law No.360<sup>14</sup> recognized a number of sectors that showed the most promising prospects in terms of their impact on socio-economic growth. These

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>For details, see:

https://investinlebanon.gov.lb/Content/uploads/SideBlock/130308125455184~IDAL-INVESTMENTpercent20LAWpercent20360.pdf.

sectors were then granted investment inducements. ICT, media, tourism, agroindustry are some of these promising sectors. They remain IDAL's focus. According to the GIZ ELMA report, "the following sectors, respectively some of their value chains, would be the most promising to create new job opportunities for Lebanese nationals:

- agriculture and agro-food,
- construction and real estate,
- transport and logistics,
- banking and financial services,
- tourism and hospitality,
- health care,
- ICT and media,
- fashion and jewelry,
- · green industries/ renewable energies, and
- waste recycling.

The following sectors were found to promise employment opportunities for Syrian nationals (subject to agreement of the Lebanese government):

- · agriculture and agro-food in areas where Syrian refugees are concentrated,
- construction as this sector is already traditionally employing Syrian nationals,
- solid waste industries as there is an increasing need for recycling and waste management in all regions coupled with the reluctance of the Lebanese to enroll in waste collection and sorting,
- tourism and hospitality eventually, where an increasing number of informal seasonal jobs are being filled by Syrians,
- specific services traditionally employing Syrians before 2011 as well as jobs open to foreign workers from other countries such as domestic services, cleaning and maintenance services, employees of gas stations, etc." (2015, p. 72).

As mentioned, the key sectors of North Lebanon are traditionally cited as construction, agriculture and hospitality. While the agriculture centered in Akkar and

services/hospitality centered in Tripoli; within the national context, the region is specialized in agriculture. Outside of agriculture, the region also has a fairly sizeable industrial economy, in particular, food processing and wood products. These sectors have experienced extreme decreases in activity in 2012, and have been acutely impacted by the Syrian crisis. While the agricultural sector is a key driver for job creation in the region; agro food could be a key sector from a development perspective as it establishes backward linkages with the traditional agricultural sector. Also it has the potential to create alternative labour opportunities especially for women and rural communities. According to GIZ (2016) market analysis findings, North Lebanon has the potential to lead regionally in the tourism sector.

ILO has conducted a study which details a value chain analysis of potatoes and leafy green vegetables, the most common products harvested in Akkar (2015). This study mapped all the key actors, described the different correlations that control the processes inside the chains; and depicted the limitations and prospects in the agricultural sector. According to ILO study, "agriculture in Lebanon is the third most important sector in the country after the tertiary and industrial sectors. It contributes nearly 6-7 percent to GDP. Assuming conservatively that agriculture contributed 6 percent to GDP (or US\$1.8 billion) and 20 percent of Lebanon's labour force of 1.5 million was employed in agriculture." (2015, p.43). As also emphasized on FAO Plan of Action for Resilient Livelihoods (2014), "in northern Lebanon and the Bekaa, agriculture is contributing up to 80 percent of the local GDP. Together with its directly related sub - sectors of input supply, processing, marketing and transport of farming produce, agriculture represents by far the most important livelihoods opportunity, especially in the poorest districts such as Akkar and Baalbek - Hermel. Agriculture is thus the primary source of income and employment. It is also one of the major livelihoods in Syria."

According to recent statistics provided by the UNHCR; more than 10% of refugees were involved in agriculture-related professions in Syria. In addition, according to ministry of agriculture, 25 percent of Lebanon's active population is involved in agricultural activities. In fact, Lebanon's most vulnerable families rely on this sector as their main source of revenue. Consequently, the agricultural skills of refugees can

either benefit and improve the agricultural sector in Lebanon or compete with it (FAO, 2014)

"The land area of North Lebanon accounts for nearly 19.5 percent of Lebanon's total of this, predominantly rural areas account for over 41 percent. Among the crops cultivated in such areas are vegetables, cereals, citrus, olives, almonds and grapes. An area with tremendous agricultural potential, North Lebanon's plains are rich with water, while its mountains are well suited to fruit tree cultivation. Apples and stone fruits are widespread at elevations of 800 metres and higher." (FAO, 2014, p.4).

"Women are cited as the primary labour force in agriculture, and largely responsible for seasonal agricultural activities which require patience and precision, such as sowing, weeding, and harvesting fruits and vegetables. Men are primarily responsible for handling heavy machinery, greenhouse construction and transporting crops. Wages, work conditions and the mode of payment differ according to the nationality and gender of agricultural workers, with some differences also noted per geographical region or crop." (EMMA, 2013, p.13).

According to numerous reports, Lebanese labour is always paid more than Syrian labour. This difference is due to the fact that the Lebanese labour is perceived as being of a higher quality. Also, statistics show that Lebanese are put in positions that require more responsibility and higher skills. In addition, women are paid twice as less than men because they do the "hard work" that is considered as non-suitable for women.

Another study; Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA - 2013), was led by the IRC, with involvement of team members from IRC, Save the Children, DRC, and Oxfam. The purpose of this study was to depict the main sectors that the host communities and refugees rely on to earn income. During this assessment; construction labour, service-sector labour, and agricultural labour were selected for analysis. In fact, according to EMMA, an important number of the population in the North of Lebanon currently depend on these three sectors for income, or consider that these are the key markets that offer opportunities for them to derive some income.

According to EMMA report on agriculture sector, in Akkar,

"there are 28,092 registered agricultural operators. Some 90 percent of agricultural operations are between 1 and 40 dunums (1 ha = 10 dunums), and the overwhelming majority of lands in the North are rented. In North Lebanon, around 25 sorting and packing facilities are available. They mostly handle fruit (80 percent of business) and vegetables (20 percent of business) for export markets or high-end shops in Beirut. The system is semi-automated. Sorting and packing facilities are concentrated mainly in Zgharta, 7 km away from Tripoli; others are found in Minnieh and Danniyeh. The sorting and packing facilities were increasing due to high demand in Akkar. These are principally family businesses of export traders who compete against each other. Sorting and packing facilities employ both Lebanese and migrant workers, males and females, generally at equal levels in terms of working conditions. Lebanese workers are paid 5 percent more than Syrian workers and are usually more trusted in handling sensitive products like apples. The level of activity of these facilities is directly related to the demand level in export markets. The higher the demand, the more workers are hired to fulfill orders." (2013, p.71).

EMMA agriculture report (2013) defines one of the main constraint on creating additional job and income-generating opportunities on agriculture sector as the cost of agricultural inputs. In fact, this cost was already high before the refugees' influx and no price regulation is set at national level. Also, these materials cannot be purchased from Syria due to strict regulations on the borders. In order to lower the cost of production in this sector and to create alternative labour opportunities for vulnerable families; EMMA report (2013) recommends to

- Boost small-scale farmers' market by giving them the materials needed to produce agricultural products via cash/ voucher approaches or directly.
- Initiate cash for work opportunities that targets some known limitations in the agricultural sector. These activities include trash collection, road construction, repair irrigation channel construction etc.

FAO report (2015) also focuses on ways to mitigate the impact of the Syria crisis and other factors on agriculture; in fact, it recommends to support farmers on their main agricultural needs as fertilizers, pesticides and machinery. Another recommendation on EMMA report (2013) is to encourage food processing to increase shelf-life of products and add value.

Another important sector according to The Investment Development Authority of Lebanon- IDAL, as one of the fastest growing sector in Lebanon, "with an average of 9% annual growth over the last 3 years and as one of the largest employer in the country by generating 123,500 direct jobs in 2016 and 338,500 direct and indirect

jobs in total (6.9% and 18.8% of total employment respectively) is tourism." (GIZ, 2014). Going back to 2001 when IDAL was established, its main focus was and continue to be on the promising sectors listed in the Investment Law No.360<sup>15</sup> (ICT, media, agro-industry, etc.).

According to the EMMA (2015), Lebanese are favored in the agriculture sector, as they are paid 5 percent more than migrant workers and they usually are relied on in managing sensitive products (apples, etc.). Also, sorting and packing facilities employ both Lebanese and migrant workers, males and females, generally at equal levels in terms of working conditions.

According to the ILO Labour Market Assessment (2017), there is high demand for technicians in Lebanon, particularly in the North.

"The skills in highest demand are in plumbing and electricity, IT, electro-mechanics, advanced car mechanics, and specific technical skills required for the food industry (namely quality assurance and chefs and waiters in the hospitality industry), and sales workers (particularly in retail). There is also a demand for artisanal skills in the furniture sector, including wood carving, which is declining to the point of extinction. There is a high demand for professionals, particularly in business and administration, such as accountants and ICT technicians. The majority of enterprises, particularly the larger ones, have difficulty finding technicians with relevant experience in various industrial fields, notably in the maintenance of machines that utilize the latest technology. Qualified applicants with managerial skills are also difficult to recruit, including those related to human resource management. Those who have expertise prefer to work in the Gulf, where remuneration is much higher than in Lebanon. Most newly appointed employees treat their positions as a temporary situation until a better opportunity arises, mostly abroad. Findings show that most of the enterprises, particularly the large ones, are interested in recruiting technicians with BT diplomas. Industrial enterprises, however, underline the need for VT graduates who can learn and practice on the job. This applies to all technical jobs required in the various manufacturing activities. Though most of the industrial enterprises complain about the lack of expertise and practice among VT graduates, only a few send technicians for training, as most of the training is done on the job. This is despite the fact that graduates of VT institutions are mostly in fields in high demand by firms, mainly in electricity, mechanics, business, services and health." (p.63)

#### 3.1.4. Skills Gap and Vocational and Technical Education Mapping in Lebanon

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For details, see:

 $https://investinlebanon.gov.lb/Content/uploads/SideBlock/130308125455184 {\sim} IDAL-INVESTMENT\%20LAW\%20360.pdf.$ 

Since the crisis erupted in Syria back in 2011, the Lebanese economy has witnessed a slowdown in its economic growth during a long period of six consecutive years. One of the effects of this slowdown, following the huge refugee influx, is the heavily congested market that has difficulties to provide people or MSMEs with the economic opportunities they need. In addition to the often-quoted figure that "the Lebanese economy needs to create six times as many jobs simply to absorb regular market entrants"(World Bank Group, 2017), there is a particular problem with youth employment. This is a product of inequality in the education system, which affects labour supply, and a lack of economic reforms that impacts on labour demand. Combined, the competition for jobs and the inadequate economic opportunities for young people have a detrimental impact on social relations. A major obstacle to economic growth and job creation stems from the existence of a 'skills gap' in the Lebanese marketplace.

According to a study published by Swisscontact (Swiss Foundation for Technical Cooperation),

"youth unemployment is of particular concern and lack of training is one of the main reasons. Various skills and proficiencies are necessary to gain a foothold in the labour market and find success later on as a thriving member of society. Skills development relevant to the labour market supports people securing their basic livelihood needs, thereby reducing poverty and facilitating the economic and social development of a region or country. In this sense, skills development represents all activities and systems that prepare people for the labour market and support them to thrive therein. This includes initial and continuing vocational training as well as labour market insertion." (2014, p.39)

In developing countries the value and social acceptance of VET are often low and the quality insufficient. The training and teaching curricula are often outdated and not tailored to the needs of the labour market. The training is mostly theoretical and takes place in classrooms. Well-trained VT specialized trainers are lacking. Adequate infrastructure and equipment are lacking, especially in VT workshops. Compared to general education, VET does not enjoy recognition in society. Financing is not secured.

Several studies on the Lebanese labour market emphasize the existence of a 'skills gap' between what employers demand and employees are able to provide. These gaps can be of various kinds. According to a research by the European Union,"qualitative discrepancies occur where there are both sufficient supply of labour and a sufficient number of vacancies, but where the demands and wishes of potential employees and employers regarding skills, job requirements, working conditions or work content diverge." (CEDEFOP, 2012, p.42). They also note that a second kind of skill mismatch can "exist without imbalances between skill supply and demand, as a result of information asymmetries or other matching frictions on the labour market". Findings on a UNDP report indicates that the Lebanese labour market encounters both types of obstacles. One of the main problems is that there is limited private sector coordination, including coordination on curricula amendments (2016, p.12). According to the World Bank report, training providers, public providers, and even private technical institutes do not partner with the private sector. Additionally, changes to the curricula are tightly regulated by the government. (2017)

"The formal VT system is governed by the Directorate General of Vocational and Technical Education (DGVTE) which falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE). The DGVTE manages 227 private and 108 public institutes, schools and training centers covering initial VT.

27 schools implement the dual system approach supported by GIZ. There are also 29 schools managed under the Joint Programme, a collaborative arrangement between private and public entities. The DGVTE does not cover continuing training, which is generally given insufficient attention, and is low on the list of priorities in public policy and expenditure; thus it cannot be said that a lifelong learning approach is adopted in Lebanon." (European Training Foundation, 2014, p.67).

The NEO (National Employment Office), under the tutorship of the Ministry of Labour, provides intensive vocational training only to Lebanese nationals with 500 hours technical training and a 250 hours internship program. The VT system does not produce sufficient numbers of graduates with adequate technical skills. The quality of existing programs is limited, and they are insufficiently coordinated.

Other than the formal vocational and technical education system, there are several international and local NGOs providing vocational training in North Lebanon under their livelihood programs. While local NGOs are implementing these activities directly, international NGOs and UN agencies are supporting refugee and host communities by providing these trainings through local implementing partners in general.

UNDP, UNHCR, UNIDO, ILO, FAO can be listed as UN agencies working in the North Lebanon. IECD, the Lebanese Social Movement, BIAT, North LEDA, the Feminism Association, Safadi Foundation, AND, Hadatha and MSL Lebanon can be named as local NGOs and service providers. NRC, DRC, IRC, SC, ACTED, Oxfam, Mercy Corps, Concern are the international NGOs working in the region. These stakeholders are providing skills training based on market assessments, but several of these also seem to be based on participants' demands, rather than the market needs. Moreover, the absence of coordination mechanisms and collaboration between those stakeholders providing VT, leads to inefficiencies and duplication of effort.

There are two different methodologies; while few of them are using the dual system, the others are providing short term informal vocational training courses. Few of them are including internship training to their programs. These actors are focusing on several training areas/sectors in line with the baseline studies and/or market assessments conducted prior to project launch. These areas/sectors can be listed as construction, agriculture, agro-food processing, hairdressing and beauty care, mobile phone maintenance, chocolate production and design, hospitality, sewing, and car maintenance.

Regarding the certification procedures, Lebanese nationals can obtain official certificates from the NEO, technical schools and the Chambers of Commerce within the formal system. Both Lebanese nationals and refugee community members can obtain attendance certificates from NGOs within the informal system.

If educational offers are combined with individual needs, as well as economic and social interests, then optimal conditions for high employment rates are in place. The

London Summit held in February 2016<sup>16</sup> represented a turning point for the management of the Syrian Crisis; since then, the international community, donors and NGOs' overarching goal has become to support people in their efforts to create the conditions for a secure livelihood and to actively participate in society. As VT is often not sufficient, interventions in labour market insertion have become increasingly important in recent years. Therefore, all national and international key players are committed to sustainably improve the effectiveness and demand orientation of skills development programs.

The dual apprenticeship training system known for international good practice for VT projects serves as a model of success to be applied also in Lebanon. Key to this is the connection between basic theory taught in the classroom and practical experience gained in businesses. The dual system bases its approach on the success factors such as involvement of the private sector in program development, learning processes, performance evaluation and guidance; including soft skills as part of the VT curricula; multifaceted, practice-based learning focusing on daily work; and VT as an attractive alternative to the academic education which often has more social recognition.

Besides supporting the fight against youth unemployment and skills shortages, a strong VT system contributes significantly to the structural and socio-economic development of a country or region. In addition, promotion of skills development together with measures to promote employment is an important factor in stabilizing fragile contexts.

According to the study published by Swisscontact (Swiss Foundation for Technical Cooperation),

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> "The Supporting Syria and the Region conference (London Summit) brought together world leaders from around the globe to rise to the challenge of raising the money needed to help millions of people whose lives have been torn apart by the devastating civil war. The UK, Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations co-hosted the conference in London on 4 February to raise significant new funding to meet the immediate and longer-term needs of those affected." For details, see: https://www.supportingsyria2016.com/about/

"in this situation, it is the disadvantaged populations who are barred from access to formal qualifications. Often they have no or at most insufficient basic education, are unemployed or take temporary stints to stay afloat. Their particular living situation requires adjustments to the training courses for their needs. Along with facilitating access to technical skills, it is important to provide support to the development of personal and social skills, entrepreneurship, access to information and networks, as well as overall labour market integration. The available skills development programs are adapted to the realities of these target groups." (2014, p.25)

Skills development programs must include VT based on the labour market due to the fact that the improved employability of people contributes to poverty reduction only if the economy is growing. This is as true for if skilled personnel are being placed in the labour market, and if both men and women alike are finding suitable work placements. As one of the main problems in Lebanon, international organizations are providing VT without taking into consideration of the realities of the country and the labour market. Vocational education and training might be the vehicles to equip people with employable skills for work and life, and can be provided by schools, training centers, higher education institutions or VT providers in informal and nonformal settings. Furthermore, VT is a system which can organize the skills acquisition processes for employability. For a successful VT system needs a number of different instruments and services, like counseling, internship and job placement services, employment incentives, occupational and life skills training, and start-up support. It is important to use different tools for the elaboration of the market linkages.

Also in Lebanon, VT related projects should be complemented with the projects targeting MSMEs empowerment, to provide sustainable decent job opportunities in order to achieve optimal results from the VT projects.

The factors that might have positive effects on the employment and therefore form the basis of successful VT programs in Akkar are suitable political and legal frameworks as well as the political will on individual level to modernize and reform, the readiness of state actors to involve societal partners, especially business organizations, directing the training courses on offer towards current and future demands of the professional world, economic potential, and the qualified actors offering and financing vocational trainings, as well as institutions and structures that ensure vocational training standards.

### **CHAPTER 4**

## IMPACTING FACTORS: THE ROLE OF NGOS AND THE FEASIBILITY OF VT PROJECTS

International organizations, especially those who have several country offices/branches in different parts of the world, tend to replicate the projects to be implemented in the countries affected by the Syrian crisis which they consider successfully implemented in other countries in Africa or South America years ago. Many of these organizations bring the know-how, project designs including participant profiling and activities from these countries without exploring the country-specific context, the motivation of beneficiaries or the local structure and local entities. These are the factors those affect the success and viability of the projects aiming to create employment opportunities.

The aim of this chapter is to draw a framework on the impacting factors for a successful VT project by presenting the data emerged from the focus group

discussions, key informal interviews and surveys. The context and enabling environment, the organization and the individuals are studied in this thesis as the factors impacting the feasibility of a project in the North of Lebanon.

#### **4.1. The Enabling Environment**

The enabling environment is presented in this chapter as the legislative context and culture that facilitates the implementation and the stakeholders who can benefit from the results of a successful VT project.

In this chapter, the legislative framework of Lebanon; synergy between the stakeholders; their vision and strategic orientations, the action plans and modalities in North Lebanon are analyzed in order to present the environment, to understand if the environment is enabling the implementation and to draw attention to the potential risks, barriers, and opportunities for a potential project in this environment. For this purpose, I tried to conduct the KIIs with all relevant stakeholders such as the representatives from Ministries, other governmental institutions, and the private sector, Municipalities, local NGOs, international NGOs. Involving several actors from different sectors helped me to understand the different sides of the same story.

During the interview with an official from the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the strategic orientation plan was cited as one of the most important development for the resilience programs due to the fact that it is developed to support the MSMEs in Lebanon. This was funded and technically supported by UNDP in 2012. This plan is very important because as mentioned above, providing VT would have a considerable affect only if there are job placement opportunities for the trainees after the training. The MSME development with this plan, can create job opportunities for the trainees for the trained youth but the Ministry of Labour and the Lebanese government have specified three sectors which can employ Syrian refugees: construction, agriculture and the environment, mainly in the waste management sector. This aspect should be considered as limitation for the development of international organizations' programs. It is important to take into consideration this limitation while designing the strategy.

However, the findings from the field showed that it is very difficult to create synergies between local stakeholders, in the absence of a national strategy for the employment which should have been developed based on a clear vision of available resources and potential growth for specific sectors. None of the interviewed governmental entities have mentioned the existence of a national socio-economic development strategy. Instead, all interviewed stakeholders, even the governmental entities, have mentioned the absence of clear boundaries, responsibilities and prerogatives when it comes to ministries and public entities: The Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Economy and Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture have shared responsibility for quality control and production standards, but it is not clear where they complement each other and what are the exclusive mandates of each. In a sectarian, politically and financially unstable country like Lebanon, the lack of synergy and clear boundaries brings the lack of the national overall strategy. Another example is that the Ministry of Tourism and the General Directorate of General Security rarely coordinate regarding their responsibilities and respective mandates for the management of the touristic sector in general, and bed and breakfast services specifically but also, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, and the local authorities are mandated to insure quality control, hygiene and food safety for restaurants and hotels.

For instance, if an international NGO decides to implement a project in the solid waste management sector in line with the permissions given for Syrian refugees, it would be very difficult to initiate the program by signing protocols due to the lack of clear division between ministries. The Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, and the local authorities do not have clear defined responsibilities in the solid waste management sector, and the Ministry of Administrative Reform is managing a large EU fund in the same sector. The waste management sector represents a serious issue at the national level, and the government has failed to find appropriate solutions and an efficient strategy.

The National Employment Office is currently working only on vocational training through contracts with local NGOs and CSOs, while its mandate is wider: developing national employment strategies according to market needs and opportunities, coordinating governmental initiatives in economic development and job creation, creating synergies and promoting public private partnerships. According to all KIIs, NEO is not fulfill its mandate and this creates the gaps. However, during the KII with NEO, the official was explaining the lack of sufficient budget and staff for fulfilling all these tasks.

All interviewed stakeholders (governmental entities, local CSOs and NGOs, international NGOs, service providers, and CCIAT) have qualified the coordination processes and channels to be "very weak", "insufficient" and "slow" which lead to duplication and overlapping.

Another aspect which can be seen as an opportunity that there is a large-scale investment from the international community into livelihood and economic development programs within the framework of the Syrian Crisis. This might support the system and environment and put pressure on the governmental entities to create synergies among themselves. For instance, ILO is currently supporting the Ministry of Social Affairs in the development of a national strategy to support nine handicraft products. Under a Japanese fund, the UNIDO is implementing a project with the Ministry of Industry supporting a branding and labeling strategy for agro-food processing in rural areas. The CCIAT is hosting a project funded by the EU, implemented by Expertise France, targeting two sectors in Akkar and North Lebanon: The agriculture sector (citrus fruits and avocado) and the wood sector.

The municipal law in Lebanon provides a wide range of prerogatives to the local authorities at the level of territory management (education, economic development, health, infrastructure, urban planning, security, food safety, etc.). In a highly possible situation where it might take long time to draw the clear boundaries between the ministries which would make difficult to decide to select a partner, the Municipalities in Akkar can be potential partners to the international organizations in the short term.

While designing a VT project in a crisis affected and fragile economy as Lebanese, it is very important to take into consideration the risks and barriers as well. At the same time, it is important to note that according to the findings from the field the Municipalities suffer from a general lack of human resources, as well as skilled labour, to put into action their responsibilities related to economic development, livelihood and employment.

#### Ali, Mayor of a Municipality in Akkar:

"They (NGOs) come to us with great project ideas, of course we want to work with them, support them. We also want to improve the living conditions of the youth here, they all want to leave the country. Wouldn't I want them to stay here but we have limited resources. Look, how many staff I have. We also don't have budget."

When it comes to the sectors which consist of an important part of the enabling environment, the CCIAT confirm that during 2016 and 2017, six labour market assessments in North Lebanon were developed under six different funds, but none of these have been validated by a competent authority. The CCIAT further confirms that in North Lebanon the informal sector represents 70 percent of the labour market, and 80 percent in Akkar. It is very important to mention this informality as an obstacle for creating decent job opportunities to the youth.

The interviewed stakeholders from the construction sector are foreseeing a remarkable growth in the coming five years.

Veli, owner a company in Akkar:

"You will see once these shootings stop everyone will go to Syria to build the new apartments. After all these bombings, no buildings remained. Lebanon is the closest one, it will affect our construction sector a lot. Everyone will need skilled workers."

The Syndicate of Engineers in Tripoli recommended the renewable energy as a priority sector to be addressed, the CCIAT recommended the car maintenance sector and the wood industry and the Lebanese Social Movement recommended the health care sector. Despite a series of sector suggestions expressed, the limitation imposed by the labour law regarding the authorized sectors for Syrians represents a serious obstacle in implementing projects in these sectors.

According to the findings of the survey questionnaires, when MSMEs were asked which sectors they believe will perform well in the coming twelve months other than their own business, the top selected three sectors were "agriculture and agro-food", "hospitality and tourism" and "construction" in line with the secondary data. It is important note that the information provided by the MSMEs is not evidence based but relies on market observation and their own experiences in the sector



Figure 9: Promising Sectors

According to the KIIs, the strategic sectors that will actively contribute to the economic development and job creation in Lebanon in general are agriculture, construction, education services, innovation and new technologies, oil and gas, environment, and eco-tourism, health, logistics and transportation, renewable energy and wood industry. For Akkar specifically, agriculture, logistics and transportation, environment and eco-tourism, agriculture transformation and food processing, renewable energy, handicraft, fish sector and health are the strategic sectors.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning the part of the surveys and interviews where the MSMEs were asked about their remuneration mechanism and salaries scale: the registered MSMEs refer to the official minimum salary fixed by the Lebanese

government, the non-registered ones were ambiguous and failed to mention figures. When it is considered the high percentage of informal sector in the region, it is also important to support and encourage the MSMEs in the registration process which would directly affect the potential beneficiaries in terms of accessing decent jobs.

#### 4.2. The Entities Involved in the Implementation of the Projects

The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the motivation, perception, and expectation of the MSMEs/ private sector, the relevant governmental entities, the civil society organizations and the NGOs as the entities which are directly involved in the implementation of local economic development projects in Akkar and North Lebanon.

In this chapter, the mandate and legitimacy, the coordination mechanisms, the institutional status and capacities, the scalability and growth plans are analyzed in order to present the above-mentioned aspects of the entities and to draw attention to the potential risks, barriers and, opportunities.

All local NGOs interviewed during this study have confirmed that they have experience in implementing development projects and are preparing to partner for new projects. The local CSOs and NGOs are highly motivated to serve the local community. The local CSOs and NGOs are trying to establish networks with international NGOs and donors by using their own channels. The international organizations should support the local organizations in terms capacity building and networking among them where they can also learn from each other.

When it comes to development projects, the main discourse of the international organizations is about the empowerment of the local organizations. The international organizations eventually will leave the country and local NGOs will take over their places. Without strong local NGOs and their interest of taking over the responsibility it would be difficult to realize this aim. In Lebanon, the local NGOs are highly motivated and are willing to take over the responsibility. However, the profiling exercise has shown a huge disparity between NGOs at the level of financial status,
human resources capacities, project management skills, and resource mobilizations. The local CSOs and NGOs are activity-oriented and rarely engage in strategic thinking.

The NGOs mainly follow trends and funding opportunities, and do not intervene based on the needs assessments. They design their activities based on donor agencies' demands. In a country like Lebanon, where there is no any coordination mechanism put in place and managed by the state and where there is a high competition among the NGOs, we see 10 different NGOs providing hairdressing courses in the same village targeting the same participant profile. In order to prevent this situation, there is a need for national and local authorities to support all actors working in the field to ensure the coordination and prevent the duplications.

The CCIAT, as another important local partner for the international organizations, currently hosts four technical entities working all over Akkar and North Lebanon: a business incubator, a local economic development agency, a quality control laboratory for agro-food, and a permanent vocational training center. The CCIAT launched a new initiative in November 2017 called "Tripoli Economic capital for Lebanon". The CCIAT relies on four large economic infrastructures in Akkar and North Lebanon: the Tripoli Harbour, the Kolayaat Airport, the Beddawi Oil Refinery, and the Rachid Karami National Expo. According to the Chamber official, these are capable of creating 20,000 job opportunities within five years. Additionally, all stakeholders from the private sector interviewed confirm that the labour market in North Lebanon and Akkar during the reconstruction phase in Syria will create job opportunities in the construction and the transportation fields.

All the interviewed MSMEs expressed lack of trust in governmental bodies. It is highlighted by exceptionally negative responses from all MSMEs from the informal sector in reply to the question: 'Are you willing to register your company?'. All answers were negative and the reasons were only two: lack of trust and fear of taxes. All interviewed stakeholders from Tripoli considered the CCIAT initiative as an opportunity, but not yet a concrete action plan. The stakeholders from Akkar had not previously heard about the initiative. The interviewed stakeholders did not seriously consider relying upon the Tripoli Harbour, the Kolayaat Airport, the Beddawi Oil

Refinery, and the Rachid Karami National Expo projects, as these require political will, an institutional readiness, and huge investments that are all currently unavailable.

The CCIAT, according to its records (the annual renewal of registered MSMEs), considers the average life cycle of an SME in North Lebanon and Akkar to be five years. Interviewed MSMEs have identified the access to finance as the major obstacle. Interviewed MSMEs were not able to identify technical needs, skills gap, and growth opportunities. 90 percent of the interviewed MSMEs did not provide any job opportunities during the last five years.

Akkar is well known with the agriculture sector. If an NGO would like to launch a VT project on agriculture sector, it can find a lot of opportunities. For instance, the Kobbet Chamra Agriculture Market host advanced equipment for post-harvesting and packaging. However, all interviewed farmers in Akkar stated that the Kobbet Chamra did not contribute to the agriculture sector development in Akkar: they sell imported products, the existing equipment are not being used to create job opportunities as it was planned. Another important actor is the Balamand University which has developed a pilot project and established a research center on its campus in Akkar in order to support the agriculture sector. These actors represent different sectors, they are all active and have motivation but there is lack of political will and institutional readiness.

As mentioned before, a VT project can be considered as successful if it can provide decent job opportunities for its participants. Regarding the hiring practices for Syrians, the participants of the field survey were asked how often they search for candidates who are not Lebanese nationals. The findings show that the need for a non-Lebanese workforce is very often. This question is asked to measure the priority given to either to Lebanese or Syrian manpower each time an opportunity occurs.



Figure 10: How often MSMEs search for non-Lebanese candidates

During the interview, I tried to understand the reason behind hiring Syrians. The main reason is that the remuneration and expectation of the Syrian man power is lower than Lebanese.

An owner of an MSME in Akkar:

"Syrians ask for lower salary and they don't complain. They are very hardworking and they don't escape from work."

This can be read as an opportunity from an employer's perspective but it is very important for the NGOs to pay attention not to do more harm by encouraging or supporting the exploitation of Syrians. The main objective for the NGOs should be creating <u>decent</u> jobs for all project participants including Syrians.

This can be prevented by establishing relationship with potential employers from the beginning of the project. Trained participants would be referred to these employers who agreed on the conditions prior to hiring. The organizations who are implementing the project can play the intermediary role.

Another point that is worth mentioning is the increasing competition between Syrian and Palestinian refugees in accessing to labour intensive low wage jobs.

"The Syrian workers are cheaper than the Palestinians" says Ramy, a Lebanese employer, "They are also escaping from a war in their country and they are coming here and want to work. This is not Germany or Britain. It is a small country, so it creates problems in the society for sure."

Already the hiring practices in North Lebanon rely on personal networks. In line with the secondary data review, according to the survey questionnaire findings, 50.9 percent of the respondents use their informal networks, while 20.8 percent rely on street advertising for hiring new employees:



Figure 11: Hiring practices

As explained above, decent job opportunities can be created for the youth in North Lebanon by providing vocational training, despite the barriers which are beyond the international organizations capability such as political will. These organizations can support the institutions for the capacity building and encourage them to take over the responsibility.

Also, even if it is difficult to abide by the supply and demand requirements, it remains feasible at the local level to engage the private sector in identifying opportunities and to develop the VT courses accordingly.

# **4.3.** The Motivation and Expectation of Project Participants: Host Community and Refugees

In this chapter, an analysis of the motivation and the expectations of the projects' potential beneficiaries are presented due to the fact that without these factors it is impossible to have successful results from a VT project.

Women, men and youth were invited to participate in the FGDs as the potential participants of the VT courses and also a sample of the existing manpower in the labour market. It was important to include the beneficiaries of previous VT projects to be able to understand the motivation behind their participation in this type of projects. The staff of the MSMEs were interviewed and were asked to participate in the surveys. The results helped me to understand their side of the story which reflects the expectation of the recruiter due to the fact that they would benefit from a VT project if they can recruit skilled people.

The FGD results demonstrated the different perspectives on the labour participation of men, women, and youth which is shaped by the society that the project would be implemented in. All men who participated in the FGDs were willing to enroll in any program which might guarantee a job or additional income.

A Syrian male participant (29 years old):

"If there is a job opportunity with an average salary at the end, I am ready to attend any training."

This is an important indicator for a VT project due to the fact that it shows the motivation of potential male participants, but when it comes to the groups with female participants or youth, the results showed negative results. For women, the lack of motivation to acquire new technical skills to be used outside of the house, is allowing and encouraging them to participate only in home-based economic activities. In line with cultural pressure from the society, having an income-generating activity outside of the house is a second priority for the FGDs' women participants. The first priority is taking care of the household.

#### A Syrian female participant (25 years old):

"We can't go to work, how will we go? Who will cook for the kids? Who will look after the kids?"

A Lebanese female participant (22 years old):

"Of course, we want to earn money to support the household but we have a lot of things to do at home. I have one baby and I need to take care of him. What will I say to my neighbors?"

According the survey questionnaire findings, when the respondents were asked to select the obstacles women are facing in finding jobs in North Lebanon, 22.7 percent of them stated that the agriculture, construction and hospitality sectors were not culturally and physically appropriate for women.



Figure 12: Obstacles Women are facing in finding jobs

Which does not correspond with the answers of the women who participated in the FGDs. Their main concern was taking care of their kids. All the participants were married and they have kids. They were willing to attend the trainings and work but didn't know what to do with their kids during working or training hours. This also does not correspond with the secondary data.

According to several studies, Syrian labour is waged less than Lebanese labour. This is strictly linked to the fact that Lebanese labour is considered as being of a superior quality. Also, Lebanese are given more responsibilities and appointed to positions which require higher skills. In general, men are paid double the amount of salary than women because they do the hard work that is not considered suitable for women.

In this situation, the organizations are implementing projects for women's homebased activities which are imprisoning women. Instead, these organizations should provide free of charge child care services or cooperate with other organizations who provide these services, so that these women can have access to these opportunities. In case women choose to be enrolled in home-based activities, then the projects should be designed for group of women that include a component dedicated to marketing, branding and labeling strategies to create real impact and to open up to new markets.

Concerning the motivation of the youth, 30 percent of them consider the VT as an opportunity to leave the house, and to have some contact with their peers. 50 percent were interested in the VT program for the financial incentives. Only 20 percent consider attending VT courses is the only way to find a job opportunity, allows them to earn an income and helps to plan for a better future. Also, they consider the agriculture, handyman and construction daily worker VT courses led to demeaning jobs instead of socially-rewarding jobs; schoolteachers, secretary work, engineers, etc. which require a different educational background.

The findings of the focus group discussions with a group of unemployed youth showed that the youth is fully aware of the lack of job opportunities and regard it as the main obstacle for them in the labour market in North of Lebanon. This finding corresponds to the finding of the survey. When the respondents were asked what are the obstacles youth face to work in their sector, according to 37.9 percent of them it was the lack of job opportunities.



Figure 13: Obstacles youth are facing in finding jobs

In line with that, during the surveys with MSMEs' staff, I asked what would they need in order to create more job opportunities for the youth. According to surveys conducted, 29.4 percent of the respondents stated that they require market protection and 29.4 percent of them need the markets to expand in order to create further job opportunities.



Figure 14: Needs of MSMEs to create more job opportunities

All employees working in the non- registered MSMEs stated that they developed the skills needed on the job. This shows the importance of on the job training programs. When MSMEs were asked which skills they would request in their sector for the recruitment, 27.3 percent of them highlighted technical experience related to sector. This shows that the theoretical trainings need to be followed with on the job trainings or internship practices.



Figure 15: Needed skills for MSMEs

When it comes to positions filled by Syrian and Lebanese workforce, survey findings show that competition from the Syrian workforce is mainly found in already vulnerable host communities, especially among semi-skilled employees



Figure 16: Positions filled by Syrians

The analysis above demonstrates the motivation of the women and men in attending VT courses. The organizations should support women by providing free of charge child care services. Concerning the youth participation, there should be awareness raising sessions on the linkages between VT courses and job opportunities which might encourage youth to attend the courses. Additionally, there are several NGOs providing psychosocial services for the host community and refugees in the region. Youth who lost their hope due to previous experiences can be referred to these NGOs which can be a complementary to VT projects.

The MSMEs should be supported to create more job opportunities for the trainees. The linkage with the MSMEs should be established from the beginning of the projects and the VT courses should be followed up by the internship programs in these MSMEs.

All VT courses target Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community and the NGOs aim to bring people from both communities together in the same classes.

Abdalla, Lebanese national male, working for an NGO:

"We have a quota for Syrians and Lebanese, all the classes ideally should have 50% Lebanese and 50% Syrian participants, otherwise the donor agencies are not happy with the results. The reason behind this is the donor agencies and NGOs' discourse: 'bringing people together in the same class learning something new will eventually lead to the social cohesion.' I don't believe in this."

It is very important for the NGOs working in the region to involve the host communities in their activities by making sure that they are benefiting from the project as well. Even though putting a quota for the nationalities does not have to lead to social cohesion necessarily, it wouldn't increase the tension at least. There is already a tension due to historical background in the region and the refugees are being accused for different challenges in the country that were in fact in place before their arrivals such as high unemployment rate or inflation. Locals are considering refugees as dependent on aid and receiving all the support from the international community without making any effort while they are also facing issues related to employment opportunities would increase the existing tension

#### 4.4. Vocational Training Providers as Potential Partners

In this chapter, the vocational training providers in Lebanon have been analyzed in order to indicate the processes, advantages and disadvantages of each provider to facilitate the selection of the implementing partners and to support the prevention of the duplications.

In Lebanon, there are four different groups of VT providers. First group consist of the public entities mandated by law which are the Directorate of Technical education under the umbrella of the Ministry of Higher Education and the National Employment Office under the Ministry of Labour. Second group represent the semipublic entities such as local Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. Third group consist of specialized training centers from the private sector. The fourth and last one represents the specialized NGOs.

The certification process for each group is conditioned by specific rules and regulations with its own advantages and disadvantages.

As one of the certificate providers, in order to be able to work with the Directorate of Technical Education, an official letter should be submitted to the Ministry of Education for approval including the project plan, the curricula and the list of beneficiaries. After the approval of the document will be transmitted to the Directorate of Technical education for validation. Once it is validated, the Directorate refers to the technical schools at the local level which can accept or refuse upon the availability of resources and time management. The Directorate has the mandate and the legitimacy, delivers an official and a recognized certification has a wide range of curricula but at the same time, it is flexible in hosting and validating new curricula. Given all the advantages it has, still working with the Directorate for the final decision. Therefore, the Directorate is the perfect implementing partner for long-term projects.

In order to be able to work with National Employment Office (NEO), an official letter should be submitted before November each year including the list of

beneficiaries, a personal profiling questionnaire for each beneficiary, a police record, a medical certificate and a school certificate for each one. There is a list of specific courses accompanied by the curricula for each course. If there is a new project idea with a new curricula, it will be subject to review and approval. Once the letter is submitted and approved, a contract should be signed obliging 560 VT hours including internship over a period of at least 6 months. Also, for each VT course, it is mandatory to have a list of at least 15 candidates. The advantages of working with NEOs are that they have the mandate and the legitimacy, they contribute financially and deliver an official and a recognized certification. Therefore, partnering with the NEO is strategic intervention can lead to the reform of VT sector in Lebanon but at the same time, it has a complicated and long process. They have cyclic contracts with specific local NGOs. Their curricula are not updated for all courses and they are very strict about new curricula. It is also very important to mention that they do not provide certificates to the non-Lebanese.

Working with the local Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture have a simple process that requires to be signed only a Memorandum of Understanding between partnering entities. They have the mandate and the legitimacy same as the public entities and also deliver an official and a recognized certification. The Lebanese Union of Chambers of Commerce is hosting the Arab Union of Chambers thus the certificate provided is valid for Syrians. The Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture in Tripoli owns a vocational training center, and hosts a business development service provider (North Leda), a Business incubator (BIAT), and an officially recognized laboratory for quality control (food and water), thus it is a good opportunity to partner with the Chamber. The main disadvantage of working with the chambers would be the monitoring process during the implementation. Chambers don't do monitoring which affects the implementation and post-implementation.

The specialized training center and private technical schools can be partnered with a simple service contract. The good ones are specialized mostly in IT sector. Their certificate has a limited recognition of the certificate and has a high cost. These entities are business and profit oriented.

In the last and fourth group, there are two different type of NGOs. The NGOs contracted by the National Employment Office has a simple coordination process where the local NGO becomes a service provider and includes the new contract as part of their contract with NEO. In line with this contract, they have the mandate and the legitimacy and deliver an official and a recognized certification. However, they have limited choice of the courses according to the existing contract with the NEO and limited quality of the delivered VT courses due to the limited budget contribution of NEO. The NGOs which are not contracted by the National Employment Office can be a partner by signing a simple service contract but their certificates are not recognized. They have low quality and limited courses. They provide basic education services and they don't follow up. Sometimes, it is useful to make use of their premises, their proximity, and accessibility to the beneficiaries.

All groups have their own processes which bring different advantages and disadvantages. The partnering institutions should be selected based on all these factors while designing a project. Most importantly, the coordination mechanism with all groups should be established from the beginning in order to avoid duplication.

#### **CHAPTER 5**

#### CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to analyze the role of NGOs in creating employment opportunities in the current situation of the labour market in North Lebanon by providing vocational training under the umbrella of resilience and development projects for Lebanese host community and Syrian refugees living in a region that is severely affected by the Syrian crisis.

I have been working in the humanitarian development sector since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. I have started to work for international organizations in Turkey and then in 2016 in the North of Lebanon as responsible for the implementation of a project which aims to create employment opportunities for Syrian and Lebanese youth by providing vocational training which would eventually would foster the 'social cohesion' between two communities. This experience helped me to better understand the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanese context, its effects on the labour market and to compare it with Turkish context but at the same time it made me question the work of international organizations on creating job opportunities for refugees and nationals via their activities and projects.

Being a practitioner and working in the field helped me to easily interact with the youth from Lebanese and Syrian communities who are the potential beneficiaries of these projects. This interaction helped me to understand their motivations, benefits, challenges and even frustrations. At the same time, this experience helped me to establish a relationship with local actors and public institutions due to the fact that while implementing projects in the area it is important to gain the support of the local actors. The network I established with other NGOs' or UN agencies' employees helped me to understand their motivations and challenges.

The fieldwork was conducted between October and December 2017 in North Lebanon, specifically in Akkar and T5 with the aim to identify how the Syrian Crisis affected North Lebanon's economy and to provide an analysis of the current labour market in North Lebanon.

As the result of World War II, within the new United Nations context, the states have instituted a system for the protection of refugees. This system is universal in its scope and consisted of two pillars: UNHCR and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The 1951 Refugee Convention is acknowledged as the key legal document for the refugee field.

The prolonged refugee situation of Palestinians is the main reason for a continued persistence of many states in the Middle East region not to sign the 1951 Convention. Lebanon is one of these countries and it is not a party to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees. It essentially lacks the concrete rules and regulations on national level dealing with refugees, so, Lebanon's approach related to more than one million Syrians seeking protection in the country is not very clear. At the same time, the current political instability, historical ties and thirty years of Syrian military presence in the past years, and the country's long-term Palestinian refugee presence has influenced Lebanon's policies towards refugees from Syria.

The refugee issue is highly politicized in Lebanon and the influx of over one million Syrian refugees has placed significant societal, economic and political pressures on the country, in addition to its existing environmental and infrastructural constraints. More precisely, Syrian refugees in the country are generally cited as a serious threat to the security and political, economic and social stability by the Government of Lebanon.

The impact of forced immigration on the labour market in general, particularly in the host countries, has been difficult to determine for economists and is still relatively undeveloped. As it has been observed also in Lebanon, the influxes put pressure on public services with increased population, stunted economic growth, strained political structures, increased tensions among host communities and environmental degradation, and increased crime and insecurity. However, before the Syrian crisis, the labour market conditions in Lebanon were already shocking. In fact it was already witnessing a high number of unemployment, a major rate of skills mismatch

in the labour market as well as a high occurrence of low-quality and low-productivity jobs. The influx of Syrian refugees appears to have increased labour supply in terms of low-quality and low-productivity jobs with major repercussions for women, young people and unskilled workers.

Thousands of refugees have fled to European countries as well. The difference here is the conflict in Syria, a country closely linked to Lebanon through historical, social and economic ties is severely and negatively impacting the Lebanese economy. Since the crisis erupted in Syria back in 2011, the Lebanese economy has witnessed an unprecedented slowdown in its economic growth, stretching over a long period of six consecutive years. One of the effects of this slowdown, following the huge refugee influx, is the heavily congested market that has difficulties to provide people or MSMEs with the economic opportunities they need.

Addition to that, the impact of civil war and the sectarian system in Lebanon and the previous experience with Palestinian refugees affects the approach towards the Syrian refugee crisis as well. For instance, during the field research, it was repeatedly mentioned that the Sunni municipalities are the most welcoming, Hezbollah-run Shia areas have become the least welcoming, with Christian areas ranging across the spectrum. This shows that the sectarianism in Lebanon had an impact on the response to the Syrian refugee crisis due to the predominantly Sunni identity of Syrian refugees.

I tried to analyze the country-specific context, the motivation of beneficiaries, the local structure and local entities as the factors impacting the feasibility of a vocational training project in the North of Lebanon which is highly affected by the Syrian Crisis.

Following the literature review, first of all, the enabling environment is studied as the legislative context and culture that facilitates the implementation and the stakeholders who can benefit from the results of a successful VT project. The legislative framework of Lebanon, synergy between the stakeholders, their vision and strategic orientations, the action plans and modalities in North Lebanon are analyzed in order to present the environment, to understand if the environment is

enabling the implementation and to draw attention to the potential risks, barriers, and opportunities for a potential project in this environment. For this purpose, I tried to conduct the KIIs with all relevant stakeholders such as the representatives from Ministries, other governmental institutions, and the private sector, Municipalities, local NGOs, international NGOs. Involving several actors from different sectors helped me to understand the different sides of the same story.

Secondly, I tried to present an analysis of the motivation, perception, and expectation of the MSMEs/ private sector, the relevant governmental entities, the civil society organizations and the NGOs as the entities which are directly involved in the implementation of local economic development projects in Akkar and North Lebanon. The mandate and legitimacy, the coordination mechanisms, the institutional status and capacities, the scalability and growth plans are analyzed in order to present the above-mentioned aspects of the entities and to draw attention to the potential risks, barriers, and opportunities.

Finally, an analysis of the motivation and the expectations of the projects' potential beneficiaries are presented due to the fact that without these factors it is impossible to have successful results from a VT project.

Addition to those, I presented a detailed analysis of the vocational training providers in Lebanon in order to indicate the processes, advantages, and disadvantages of each provider to facilitate the selection of the implementing partners and to support the prevention of the duplications.

Regarding the country-specific context, it is worth mentioning that the lack of synergy and coordination mechanisms creates an imperative for all stakeholders to improve coordination and to involve the governmental entities and the private sector in the design phase of all upcoming projects in Lebanon. There is a need for a national socio-economic development strategy, and clear boundaries, responsibilities, and prerogatives when it comes to the Ministries and public entities in tackling unemployment issues.

Especially for North Lebanon, it is crucial to involve the private sector from the earliest stages of each project and also public-private partnership should become an institutional culture. It is also important to create synergies with other interventions and projects due to the fact that there are many organizations working in the same area.

The participant outreach is a fundamental milestone for a successful VT project. It is important to highlight that the beneficiaries' motivation should be considered as a key element of the outreach as it clearly appeared during the FGDs.

The FGD results demonstrated the different perspectives on the labour participation of men, women, and youth which is shaped by the society that the project would be implemented in. All men who participated in the FGDs were willing to enroll in any program which might guarantee a job or additional income.

For women, the lack of motivation to acquire new technical skills to be used outside of the house is allowing and encouraging them to participate only in the home-based economic activities. In line with the cultural pressure from the society, having an income-generating activity outside of the house is a second priority for the FGDs' women participants. The first priority is taking care of the household. They were willing to attend the trainings and work but didn't know what to do with their kids during working or training hours. In this situation, the organizations are implementing projects for women as home-based activities which are imprisoning women more. Instead, these organizations should provide free of charge child care services or cooperate with other organizations who provide these services, so that these women can have access to these opportunities. For the home-based interventions, it should be designed for a group of women and should include a component dedicated to marketing, branding and labeling strategies to create real impact and to open up to new markets.

Concerning the motivation of the youth, they see vocational training as an opportunity to leave the house, to have some contact with their peers or they were interested in the VT program for the financial incentives. Only 20 percent consider attending VT courses is the only way to find a job opportunity, allows them to earn

an income and helps to plan for a better future. Also, they consider the agriculture, handyman, and construction daily worker VT courses led to demeaning jobs instead of socially-rewarding jobs; schoolteachers, secretary work, engineers, etc. which require a different educational background. They are fully aware of the lack of job opportunities and regard it as the main obstacle for them in the labour market in North of Lebanon.

When it comes to VT courses, it is important to optimize coordination in order to avoid duplications. It is essential to plan VT projects according to the dual system or the on-the-job training approach, taking into account the time needed to reach the expected result of increasing employability and developing skills in accordance with the market needs.

In Lebanon, there are four different groups of VT providers. The first group consists of the public entities mandated by law which are the Directorate of Technical education under the umbrella of the Ministry of Higher Education and the National Employment Office under the Ministry of Labour. The second group represents the semi-public entities such as local Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture. The third group consists of specialized training centers from the private sector. The fourth and last one represents the specialized NGOs.

The certification process for each group is conditioned by specific rules and regulations with its own advantages and disadvantages. The partnering institutions should be selected based on all these factors while designing a project. Most importantly, the coordination mechanism with all groups should be established from the beginning in order to avoid duplication.

Job opportunities can be created for the Syrian refugees and Lebanese host community in North Lebanon by providing vocational training, despite the barriers which are beyond the international organizations' capability such as the political will or national strategy. These organizations can support the local institutions in terms of capacity building and encourage them to take over the responsibility. The empowerment of the local entities would facilitate to plan the exit strategies for the NGOs in order to guarantee the sustainability. It remains feasible at the local level to engage the private sector in identifying opportunities and to develop the VT courses accordingly but it is crucial to understand the country-specific context; the motivation and the expectation of beneficiaries; the needs of MSMEs, the local structure, and the local entities.

Implementing VT projects can be useful with a short term impact but it cannot solve all the issues related to finding employment opportunities for Lebanese, supporting the resilience of refugees and fostering social cohesion between these two communities in North Lebanon. It needs the involvement of the state actors that would facilitate a national dialogue which would lead to having a national strategy tackling the unemployment issue.

In the long run, project based approach is not sustainable and as it is indicated in Lebanon example, without clear coordination mechanisms put in place by the state that would prevent the duplications in the same region and foster the cooperation among the actors, the impact would not be measurable. The weak and divided outlook of the elected government of Lebanon remains as its challenge in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis and managing the NGOs' response to it.

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# APPENDICES

# Appendix A: STAKEHOLDERS MAPPING

Institution
ILO
Ministry of Agriculture
Safadi Foundation
Rene Moawad Foundation
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Economy and Trade
IRC
ACTED
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
Head of Agriculture Cooperative and Mayor of Tel Abbas
Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute
Robinson Agry and Debbeneh Group
Directorate of Cooperatives in the North at MoA
BLOM Bank
Ministry of Tourism
LMTA
Discover Akkar
L'Artisan du Liban
MADA
Halbousa Eco Village
Live Love Lebanon

Institution
Mayor of Qobayat
President of Union of Municipalities in Jerd al Qaytaa
UNDP
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture
BEYOND
GIZ
Ministry of labour- NEO Tripoli
IECD
Bank du Liban Tripoli Branch
Agrytech-Berytech
BIAT
Service providers in tourism sector
IDAL
KAFALAT
Lebanese Social Movement
Sector Specific MSMEs
Agriculture Technical Schools
Free Trade Zone

#### **Appendix B: FGD AND KII GUIDELINES**

Hello everyone and thank you all for coming today. My name is Verda and I am conducting a research to identify employment and income-generating opportunities in North Lebanon and identify the promising vocational sectors. FGD Protocol:

- Introduce yourself
- State the FGD aforementioned purpose
- Inform FGD participants that the discussions will remain confidential
- · Inform participants that their names will not be mentioned in the report
- Let the participants know that their participation is voluntary; they can decline to participate or leave the FGD anytime
- · Ask for the participant's permission to record the discussion
- Inform participants that the FGD will last between 1 hour and 1 hour 30 minutes
- Ask participants if they have any question, inquiry or comment before the start of the FGD
- Ask for the participant's oral consent to participate in the focus group

#### • Unemployed Youth

#### 1. The purpose of the FGD was to:

- Assess perceptions and realities of the "unemployed youth" in North Lebanon, about the opportunities and challenges regarding current employment practices and skills in demand in the local labour market
- Determine constraints faced by vulnerable youth in the labour market
- Identify key direct factors and/or actors that affect and impact negatively or positively youth livelihood conditions

#### **FGD Guide:**

- 1. Please present yourself. What are you doing currently? Studying or searching for a job or ?
- 2. How would you describe the working conditions in this community?
- 3. Do you think It is easy for young people to work here? Why, why not? (probe on the main challenges for youth employment and on the main sources of job provision they can access to, probe between the local market needs and their willingness to do this type of work)
- 4. What do you think are the skills and capacities you need to find employment in this community? Have you ever enrolled in any technical vocational training course? Why or why not? If yes, what type/ which sector?
- 5. Have you ever worked before? What type of work? How did this job contribute to your personal and professional development? How did you find the job? Do you think It is easy for young people to find jobs here? What would be your main expectations from your job? (probe for what type of work they would like/want to do)
- 6. Do you think it is possible to generate new livelihood opportunities in this community? (Probes: Why or why not, what type of opportunities can be generated? What kind of skills and capacities are needed for these opportunities?)

#### 7. Did you ever think to create your own business/project?

a- If yes, what would it be and what would you need to do it?Can you give an example on access to finance mechanisms in North Lebanon?b- If not, why not?

> Do you have any questions or anything you would like to add?

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in the FGD. Your answers are valued, very much appreciated and will remain strictly confidential

#### **B.** Group of Women and Men

#### **FGD Guide:**

- 1. Please present yourself. What are you doing currently? Working or searching for a job or? If working, is it home based?
- 2. How would you describe the working conditions in this community?
- 3. Have you ever worked before? What type of work? Do you think It is easy for women to work here? Why, why not? What are the most "appropriate jobs" for women in Akkar? Why? How did you find the job? (probe on the main challenges for the employment and on the main sources of job provision they can access to, probe between the local market needs and their willingness to do this type of work)
- 4. Is your family involved in your work? What about your children? How would you describe the access to education in the region for your children? (supporting systems/ mechanisms)
- 5. What do you think are the skills and capacities you need to find employment in this community?
- 6. Have you ever enrolled in any vocational training course? Do you think it is easy to find sustainable jobs in North Lebanon? Can you give us examples?
- What would be your main expectations from your job? (probe for what type of work they would like/want to do)
- 8. Do you think it is possible to generate new livelihood opportunities in this community? If an opportunity created on household level and your wife/you need/s to be involved what would you consider? (Probes: Why or why not, what type of opportunities can be generated? What kind of skills and capacities are needed for these opportunities? ask wives as well)

#### 9. Did you ever think to create your own business/project?

- 10. a- If yes, what would it be and what would you need to do it? Can you give an example on access to finance mechanisms in North Lebanon?
- 11. b- If not, why not

> Do you have any questions or anything you would like to add?

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in the FGD. Your answers are valued, very much appreciated and will remain strictly confidential

# C. Group of Women

# 1. The purpose of the FGD was to:

- Assess perceptions and realities of the "women enrolled in handicraft/ artisanal vocational training" in North Lebanon, about the opportunities and challenges regarding current employment practices and skills in demand in the local labour market
- Determine constraints faced in the labour market
- Identify key direct factors and/or actors that affect and impact negatively or positively the livelihood conditions.

# FGD Guide:

- 1. Please present yourself. What are you doing currently? Working or searching for a job or? If working, is it home based?
- 2. How would you describe the working conditions in this community?
- 3. Have you ever worked before? What type of work? How did this experience affect your position in your community/ family? (probe on the economic self reliance and social position) How did you find the job? Do you think It is easy for women to work here? Why, why not? (probe on the main challenges for the employment and on the main sources of job provision they can access to, probe between the local market needs and their willingness to do this type of work)
- 4. What do you think are the skills and capacities you need to find employment in this community?
- 5. Do you think it is easy to find jobs in handicraft sector in North Lebanon?Can you give us examples?
- 6. What would be your main expectations from your job? (probe for what type of work they would like/want to do)
- 7. Do you think it is possible to generate new livelihood opportunities in this community? (Probes: Why or why not, what type of opportunities can be generated? What kind of skills and capacities are needed for these opportunities?)

# 8. Did you ever think to create your own business/project?a- If yes, what would it be and what would you need to do it? Can you give an example on access to finance mechanisms in North Lebanon?b- If not, why not?

> Do you have any questions or anything you would like to add?

Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in the FGD. Your answers are valued, very much appreciated and will remain strictly confidential

KII Guidelines:

Thank you for your time.

My name is Verda and I am conducting a research to identify employment and income-generating opportunities in North Lebanon and identify the promising vocational sectors.

- State the KII aforementioned purpose
- Ask for the informant's permission to record the discussion
- Ask informant if they have any question, inquiry or comment before the start of the KII

#### A. UN Agencies and NGOs

#### 1. The purpose of the KII is to:

- Identify strategies to tackle unemployment problems and support job creation
- Identify ongoing initiatives for job creation, high potential growth sectors and employment trends in North Lebanon
- Analyze current employment practices and skills in demand in the local labour market
- Identify potential employment and self-employment opportunities for vulnerable community members

Questions:

- 1. Is your institution working on tackling unemployment issue in the area?
- 2. What are the services your institution is providing in Akkar and North Lebanon?
- **3.** Have you ever conducted or requested to be undertaken any needs assessment or baseline study? If yes, what are the findings related to employment trends in North Lebanon? If no, how would you design your interventions?
- 4. While implementing your interventions on which coordination mechanism or network your institution rely at local level with the authorities and other implementing parties?
- 5. How would you reach your final beneficiaries? What are the criteria for local community members to access to your services?
- 6. From your perspective what are the high potential grow sectors in Akkar and North Lebanon?
- 7. Have you ever implemented projects on agriculture (agro-food and food processing) and responsible tourism sectors (handicraft, agro-/ecotourism etc.)? If yes, when you consider your lessons learnt and success stories what would you recommend to the organizations planning to work on the same sectors?
- 8. From your point of view what are the skills in demand in the local labour market?
- 9. What would you recommend to the organizations on providing vocational training in the area in terms of sectors, curricula development, job placement, modalities (on the job training, dual system)? How to link it to the governmental certification process?
  - > Do you have any questions or anything you would like to add?

Thank you very much for taking the time to answer the questions. Your answers are valued and very much appreciated.

# **B.** Public and Para-public Institutions

# 1. The purpose of the KII is to:

- Identify governmental strategies to tackle unemployment problems and support job creation
- Identify ongoing initiatives for job creation, high potential grow sectors and employment trends in North Lebanon
- Analyze current employment practices and skills in demand in the local labour market
- Identify potential employment and self-employment opportunities for vulnerable community members

# **Questions:**

- **1.** Is your institution working on tackling unemployment issue in the area within a national strategy- if exists?
- 2. What are the services your institution is providing in Akkar and North Lebanon throughout your regional offices?
- 3. Have you ever conducted or requested to be undertaken any needs assessment or baseline study? If yes, what are the findings related to employment trends in North Lebanon? If no, how would you design your interventions?
- 4. While implementing your interventions on which coordination mechanism or network your institution rely at local level?
- 5. How would you reach your final beneficiaries? What are the criteria for local community members to access to your services?
- 6. From your perspective what are the high potential grow sectors in Akkar and North Lebanon?
- 7. From your point of view what are the skills in demand in the local labour market?
- 8. What would you recommend to the organizations on providing vocational training in the region in terms of sectors, curricula development, job placement, modalities(on the job training, dual system)? How to link it to the governmental certification process?

> Do you have any questions or anything you would like to add?

Thank you very much for taking the time to answer the questions. Your answers are valued and very much appreciated.
# C. MSMEs- Agriculture Sector

# 1. The purpose of the KII is to:

- Identify job creation and employment trends in agriculture sector of North Lebanon
- Analyze current employment practices and skills in demand in the local labour market
- Identify potential employment and self-employment opportunities for vulnerable community members

# **Questions:**

- 1. How are agricultural lands distributed in the region? Has it changed after the crisis? Are lands generally small, medium-sized or large? What are the main crops produced? Can you give us a general geographical distribution of crops per area?
- 2. Can you tell us more about your business? What is the size of your farm or business? Are you also involved in beekeeping, livestock or poultry production? On-farm sorting, packing or processing? What are the crops planted?
- **3.** Where do you get your inputs or raw material from? Are these readily available?
- 4. Has the sector been affected by the crisis? How much and why?
- 5. What agricultural activity employs the largest number of workers? Has there been a change after the crisis? What was the average agricultural labour wage before the crisis? What is the average agricultural labour wage after the crisis?
- 6. How and where do you sell your products? What is the size and value of your sales? (Domestic or export) If domestic, ask for contacts of retail shops and food processing factories. Do you experience any constraints in selling your produce?
- 7. How many workers are employed? Do you have sufficient numbers of workers? Skilled/unskilled? Full-time or on a daily or monthly basis? In what seasons? Are you facing problems hiring workers? How are they hired? Where from? Based on any specific criteria? What is their nationality? Gender distribution? Can you give us a scale on the age of your workers? (between?) Is there any difference in terms of quality of work between Lebanese and non-Lebanese workers? Refugees?
- 8. Is the Ministry of Agriculture providing any support to you (for example: distribution of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, livestock, technical trainings, agricultural extension, pest or disease management, provision of loans or payment facilities, facilitating access to markets)?
- 9. Is there any quality control mechanisms both on local sales and export?
- 10. Are you foreseeing an expansion of your business? What kind of support (land, capital, technical support, machinery, of what form?) would you need to expand your business?
- **11.** Is there any legislation limiting the growth of the agricultural sector (related to land purchasing, rental or employment)?

# **Appendix C: SURVEY FOR MSMEs**

### A. General Background

- 1. Name of respondent:
- 2. Title/position of respondent at business establishment (collect business card if possible):
- 3. Name of owner (if different):
- 4. Respondent's Gender: a. Male b. Female
- 5. Respondent's Year of Birth:
- 6. Respondent's Nationality:
- 7. Name of business establishment:
- 8. Location/address:
- 9. Phone number:

# **B.** Technical Information

- 10. In what year did this business start operations:
- 11. Does this business establishment have operations at multiple locations? a. Yes. i. Where? b. No

12. Is your company registered at the Ministry of Finance or other local institutions (i.e. Chamber of Commerce, municipality)?

a. Yes.

- i. With whom?
- 1. Ministry of Finance
- 2. Chamber of Commerce
- 3. Municipality
- 4. Other
- ii. What were the main reasons you registered?
- 1. Access to bank accounts

- 2. Access to loans / capital
- 3. Access to markets (export licenses)
- 4. Lower harassment / corruption
- 5. Other
- b. No i. Why not?
- 1. Not required
- 2. Bureaucratic procedures (too complicated)
- 3. Taxes on registered
- 4. Time cost of registration
- 5. Compliance cost of registration
- 6. Other
- 13. If this business is not a sole proprietorship, is it owned exclusively in partnership with members of the same family?
  - a. Yes b. No c. Do not know d.Refuse to answer
  - 14. Who are the main buyers and consumers of the goods/services you provide?
  - a. Individuals or households
  - b. Small businesses/traders
  - c. Large businesses
  - d. Government agencies/public enterprises
  - e. NGOs
  - f. Other, please specify
- 15. Are your products or services sold primarily to:
- a. Locally, within an individual town or local area
- b. Regionally, across Akkar/North
- c. Nationally, beyond Akkar or Tripoli
- d. Outsidei. If yes, where are the main export markets?
- 1. Middle East

Lebanon

- 2. Europe
- 3. United States
- 4. Asia
- 5. Other (WRITE-IN)

16. How many other businesses do you consider your direct competitors (i.e. could/also serve your customers)?

- a. None
- b. Less than 5
- c. 5-20
- d. More than 20
- e. Not sure
- 17. What is the current status (in terms of sales, staff, production) of the company?
  - a. Expanding
  - b. Stable
  - c. Downsizing
  - d. Do not know
  - e. Refuse to answer
- 18. Compared to 12 months ago, how is your business performing?
  - a. A lot better
  - b. Somewhat better
  - c. Somewhat worse
  - d. A lot worse
  - e. Do not know (because the information is not recorded)
  - f. Refuse to answer

19. Other than your own business, which sectors do you believe will perform well in the coming 12 months?

- a. Agriculture (incl. hunting, forestry, and fishing) i. Please specify
- b. Mining and quarrying

- c. Manufacturing i. Please specify
- d. Electricity, gas, and water supply
- e. Construction
- f. Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
- g. Wholesale trade and commission trade (not motor vehicles and motorcycles) i. Please specify
- h. Retail trade (not motor vehicles and motorcycles) i. Please specify
- i. Retail sale of automotive fuel
- j. Repair of personal and household goods
- k. Hotels, restaurants, and tourism
- 1. Transport, storage, and communications
- m. Banking and finance
- n. Real estate, renting, and business activities i. Please specify
- o. Public administration
- p. Education and training
- q. Health and social work
- r. Community, Social and Personal services
- s. Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery
- t. Other
- u. None

20. Other than security or the political situation, how would you rate the following challenges/obstacles that the management faces in running this business?

Obstacles	None	Minor	Modarate	Major	Seve re
Lack of market information					
Competition in the market					

Obstacles	None	Minor	Modarate	Major	Seve re
Laws and/or regulations					
Cost of (or access to) appropriately skilled labour					
Cost of (or access to) technology/equi pment					
Cost of (or access to) land/office space (i.e. rent)					
Cost of (or access to) credit/finance					
Cost of (or access to) raw materials					
Cost of (or access to) energy (incl. electricity)					
Cost of (or access to) water					
Cost of transportation, or access to markets					
Cost of communications					



- 21. What is your primary channel for access to credit and financing?
  - a. Bank
  - b. Micro Finance Institution
  - c. Self-Finance
  - d. Friends and/or relatives
  - e. Local businessmen and private money lender(s)
  - f. Credit extensions from suppliers
  - g. Financial assistance from NGOs, other social organizations
  - h. Do not have one

22. Including yourself, how many people currently work directly for this business establishment?

	women	men	Leb	Syr	Other	Average salary(U SD) per month	Averag e age	Average Number of Years Employe d
Managers								
Professionals								
Skilled Employees								
Semi skilled employees								
Unskilled employees								

23. Does the business use employment contracts?

- a. Yes
- b. No

- c. For some employees, not all
- d. Do not know
- e. Refuse to answer
- 24. Are your employees registered at the social security?
  - a.Yes
  - b. No
  - c. For some employees, not all
  - i.Why are some not registered?
- 1. not required (consultants, exemptions)
- 2. Bureaucratic procedures (too complicated)
- 3. Taxes on registered
- 4. Time cost of registration
- 5. Compliance cost of registration
- 6. Other, please specify
  - d. Do not know
  - e. Refuse to answer
- 25. Are workers paid on a monthly/bi-monthly basis?
- a. Yes
- i. Is there an easy-to-read wage slip or receipt (or check)? 1. Yes 2. No
- b. No
- i. Daily payments ii. Irregular payments
- c. Do not know
- d.Refuse to answer
- 26. For the current employees, what are the skills to be improved?
- 27. In the last 12 months, has your company filled any vacant full-time or parttime positions? a. Yes b. No
- 28. How often are you able to find employees with adequate training and skills to perform their job?

- a. Always
- b. Most of the time
- c. Only sometimes
- d. Never
- e. Do not know
- 29. In your experience, could you please indicate the reasons why some positions are hard to fill?
  - a. Too much competition from other employers
  - b. Not enough people interested in doing this type of job
  - c. Poor terms and conditions (e.g. pay, benefits) offered for post
  - d. Low number of applicants with the required skills
  - e. Low number of applicants with the required attitude, motivation or personality
  - f. Low number of applicants generally
  - g. Lack of work experience the company demands
  - h. Lack of qualifications the company demands
  - i. Poor career progression / lack of advancement opportunities
  - j. Job entails shift work / unsociable hours
  - k. Seasonal work
  - 1. Remote location / poor public transportation
  - m. Other
  - n. No particular reason
  - 30. What recruiting methods do you use?
    - a. Government officials or local authority (municipality)
    - b. National Employment Office
    - c. Private employment agency
    - d. Contacts with secondary schools, universities
    - e. Contacts with technical or vocational schools

- f. Word of mouth/family, friend, or informal networks
- g. Newspaper advertisement
- h. Radio/TV advertisement
- i. Internet job search advertisement
- j. Street advertising (i.e. posting a notice)
- k. Other, please specify
- 31. How many new employees does your firm plan to hire in the next 12 months?
- 32. If you recruit someone what would be the skills that you request?
- 33. What would you need to be able to create more job opportunities?
- 34. How often do you find that you need to look for job candidates who are not Lebanese nationals when making a hire?
  - a. Very often
    - i. Managers
    - ii. Professionals
    - iii. Skilled employees
    - iv. Semi-skilled employees
    - v. Unskilled employees
  - b. Somewhat often
    - i. Managers
    - ii. Professionals
    - iii. Skilled employees
    - iv. Semi-skilled employees
    - v. Unskilled employees
  - c. Somewhat rarely
  - d. Very rarely
  - e. Do not know
  - f. Refuse to answer

35. If hiring Syrian labour, what are the main issues facing your business as a result?

- a. We do not hire Syrian workers
- b. Legal concerns (i.e. work permit, residency)
- c. Disputes within the business between Lebanese and Syrian workers
- d. Perception within the local community
- e. Other
- f. No issues
- g. Do not know
- h. Refuse to answer
- 36. Do women face particular obstacles to work in your sector?
  - a. Lack of opportunities
  - b. Lack of family permission
  - c. Lack of experience
  - d. Lack of qualifications (education)
  - e. Sector not appropriate for women
  - f. Low salaries
  - g. Lack of connections
  - h. Do not know
  - i. Refuse to answer
- 37. What are the obstacles youth face to work in your sector?
  - a. Lack of opportunities
  - b. Lack of experience
  - c. Lack of qualifications (education)
  - d. Low salaries
  - e. Lack of connections
  - f. Do not know
  - g. Refuse to answer

38. How much interest would you have in receiving training assistance for your employees?

- a. Very interested i. During regular business hours? 1. Yes 2. Maybe 3. No 4. Do not know
- b. b. Somewhat interested i. During regular business hours? 1. Yes 2. Maybe 3. No 4. Do not know
- c. Not very interested
- d. Not interested at all

### **Appendix D: SURVEY FOR CONSUMERS**

# **Responsible Tourism Sector**

# A. General Background

- 1. Name
- 2. Gender
- 3. Region
- 4. Family members (living in the household)
- 5. Educational level

#### **B.** Working conditions

- 1. Type of work
- 2. Number of hours per week
- 3. Vacations
- 4. Monthly income
- 5. Social support (NSSF), specify if other
- 6. External financial support, specify

#### **C. Sector Related Questions**

- 1. What relationship with the touristic sector?
- 2. What sorts of touristic activities do you do?
- 3. In which region do you have touristic activities?
- 4. What is your yearly budget for touristic activities?
- 5. How do you perceive working conditions in the touristic sector? (grade 1-5)
  - a. Financially
  - b. Environmentally
  - c. Socially
- 6. Do women face hardship in getting a job in the touristic sector? (grade 1-5)
- 7. Do women face hardship in working in the touristic sector? (grade 1-5)

- 8. Do you think special technical trainings are needed in this sector?
- 9. What is the role of Syrian refugees in this sector? (both positive and negative)
- 10. What skills are most valued in the touristic sector?
- 11. What skills need to be improved in the touristic sector?
- 12. Are you willing to pay more for touristic products respecting good working conditions? How much (%)
- 13. Are you willing to pay more for touristic products who's workers follow vocational or technical trainings? How much (%)
- 14. Do you think it is plausible to get finance for touristic projects? (specify from where)
- 15. Do you think investments in the touristic sector are safe? Explain why
- 16. What sort of touristic services are needed in Akkar?

# Agriculture-/Agro-food Sector

# A. General Background

- 1. Name
- 2. Gender
- 3. Region
- 4. Family members (living in the household)
- 5. Educational level

#### **B.** Working conditions

- 1. Type of work
- 2. Number of hours per week
- 3. Vacations
- 4. Monthly income
- 5. Social support (NSSF), specify if other
- 6. External financial support, specify

#### **C. Sector Related Questions**

1. What relationship with the agricultural sector?

- How do you perceive working conditions in the agricultural sector? (grade 1-5)
  - a. Financially
  - b. Environmentally
  - c. Socially
- Do women face hardship in getting a job in the agricultural sector? (grade 1-5)
- 4. Do women face hardship in working in the agricultural sector? (grade 1-5)
- 5. Do you think special technical trainings are needed in this sector?
- 6. What is the role of Syrian refugees in this sector? (both positive and negative)
- 7. What skills are most valued in the agricultural sector?
- 8. What skills need to be improved in the agricultural sector?
- 9. Are you willing to pay more for agricultural products respecting good working conditions? How much (%)
- 10. Are you willing to pay more for agricultural products who's workers are follow vocational or technical trainings? How much (%)
- 11. Do you think it is plausible to get finance for agricultural projects? (specify from where)
- 12. Do you think investments in the agricultural sector are safe? Explain why

#### Appendix E: TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı, uluşlararası kuruluşların kalkınma projeleri çatışı altında, Kuzey Lübnan'da yaşayan Suriyeli mülteciler ve Lübnanlılara mesleki eğitim vererek istihdam firsatları yaratması konusundaki rollerini analiz etmektir. Bu çerçevede, Kuzey Lübnan iş piyasasının günümüzdeki durumu, mülteci krizinin bölgeye etkisi ve uluslararası kuruluşların, krizin yerel aktörler ve bireyler üzerindeki negatif etkisini azaltmayı amaçlayan faaliyetleri araştırılmıştır. Sivil toplum kuruluşları (STK'lar), özellikle dünyanın farklı yerlerinde çok sayıda şubesi / şubesi bulunanlar, Suriye'den etkilenen ülkelerde diğer yerlerde (örneğin Afrika veya Güney Amerika'da) başarıyla uyguladıklarını düşündükleri projeleri çoğaltma eğilimindedirler. Bu kuruluşların birçoğu, ülkeye özgü bağlamı, faydalanıcıların motivasyonu veya yerel yapı ve yerel varlıkları incelemeden, katılımcı profil oluşturma ve bu ülkelerden faaliyetler de dahil olmak üzere know-how, proje tasarımlarını getirmektedir. Bunlar, uluslararası kuruluşların istihdam olanakları yaratma amacıyla uyguladıkları projelerin başarısını ve geçerliliğini etkileyen faktörlerdir. Bu uluslararası örgütlerden birinde uygulayıcı olarak, saha çalışması sırasında toplanan verileri, mevcut literatürün rehberlik çerçevesi içinde, Lübnanlı ve Suriyeli gençlerin ihtiyaçlarının desteklenmesi için çalışmaya başladığım alandaki deneyimim ve gözlemlerimle birleştirdim.

Suriye krizi, 2011 yılının Mart ayında kırsal kesimde Dara'a'da düzenlenen ilk protestolardan sonra binlerce Suriyeli'nin sokaklara çıkmasıyla patlak verdi. İlk protestoların ve dış güçlerin katılımının ardından, kargaşa ve şiddet komşu ülkelere ve ötesine kitlesel bir harekete neden oldu. Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği'ne (BMMYK) göre, 2011'den bu yana 5,6 milyondan fazla insan Suriye'den kaçarak Lübnan, Türkiye, Ürdün'de güvenlik arayışında bulundu ve Suriye'de yerinden edilen milyonlarca insanın ötesinde bir arayış başladı. Devletlerin kitlesel mülteci akınına verdiği cevapların hem ortaklıkları hem de farklılıkları vardır. 2014'ün başına kadar olan krizin başlangıcından itibaren hoş karşılama tepkisi, 2014'ün sonlarından itibaren IŞİD'in yükselişiyle kısıtlayıcı bir dönüşü izledi

ve farklı finansal fırsatlara yol açan sürekli barınmayı sağlamak için 2016 yılının başlarında Avrupa ile farklı türden görüşmelerle ve uluslararası örgütlerin kriz tepkisinde yer alması ile sona erdi. Ancak, aynı zamanda bu ülkeler arasında önemli farklılıklar vardır.

Bu komşu ülkeler, Suriyeli mülteci akınına tepki olarak farklı kurallar ve düzenlemeler uyguladılar. Krizin başlangıcında, her üç ülke de açık kapı politikalarını kabul ettiler, bu da tüm Suriyelilerin (Suriye'den Filistinliler dahil) pasaport ya da kimlik gibi resmi belgeler olmadan ülkelerine girmelerine izin vermeleri anlamına geliyordu. Mültecilerin resmi ve resmi olmayan sınır noktalarından girmelerine izin verildi. Lübnan ve Ürdün, tarihsel geçmişi nedeniyle Suriye'den Filistinlilere karşı ayrımcılık yapıyorlardı.

Uluslararası mülteci rejimi onları mülteci olarak tanımlasa da, bu ülkelerin hiçbiri Suriyelilere yasal mülteci statüsü vermemişti.

Suriyelileri misafir, kardeş, BMMYK tarafından mülteci olarak kayıtlı kişiler" olarak tanımlarlar.

Buna ek olarak, Lübnan'da Suriyeliler "yabancılar, işçiler, konuklar, yerinden edilmişler" olarak muamele görürken, Ürdün'de geçici veya davetsiz misafir olarak da muamele görürler.

Türkiye, Suriyelilere politik söylemde misafir olarak davrandı. Yasal olarak, Suriyelilere "geçici koruma altındaki kişiler" statüsü verildi. Suriyeli mülteciler çalışma izni aldıktan sonra Türkiye'deki tüm illerde çalışabilir, ülke genelindeki sağlık hizmetlerine erişebilir ve ilk ve ortaöğretime devam etme hakkına sahiptir. Tüm bunları düzenleyen Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği (TP) Ekim 2014'te geçti.

Bu farklı yaklaşımlar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, uluslararası bağışçı kurumların, yaklaşımları doğrultusunda Türkiye, Ürdün ve Lübnan'daki hükümetlerle de farklı etkileşimde bulunduğundan söz etmek gerekir.

Türkiye'de Suriyeli mülteci krizine cevap olarak hükümet tüm süreçleri ve faaliyetleri planlamakta ve yönetmektedir. Ürdün'de hükümet politika önceliklerini ajanslar ve STK'lar ile ajansın ortakları olarak müzakere etmekte ve planlama sürecinde önemli bir role sahiptir. Lübnan'da, büyük ölçüde işlevsel olmayan bir hükümet ve zayıf devlet kurumları nedeniyle, bu kurumların krizde en önemli rolü oynamasına yol açıyor. Bunu mültecilerin yerleşimi ve hareketliliğine devletin müdahalesi olarak alınan önlemlerde bile görebiliriz. Her ülke bu politika alanlarında farklı bir yaklaşıma sahipti. Türkiye, en savunmasız gruplar için kamplar kurdu ve genellikle kendi kendine sorunları çözmeyi destekledi. Belli bir ildeki oturma izinlerini ve valiliklerin iznine bağlı hareketliliği yaparak kontrol mekanizmaları kurdu. Ürdün, hem kamp hem de kendi kendine yerleşme seçeneklerini uyguladı. İlk iki yıldan sonra, kamplarda mültecilerin yerleşmesini tercih ettiler, böylece kendi kendini çözme (ya da kamplardan ayrılma) Ürdünlü sponsorların bulunması üzerine şartlı hale getirildi ve zaman içinde daha kısıtlayıcı hale geldi. Lübnan, Lübnan hükümetinin ne kamp kurduğu, ne de uluslararası aktörlerin bunu yapmasına izin vermediği bir "kamp" politikası izlemiştir.

Özellikle Lübnan'da, tahminen 1,1 milyon Suriyeli mülteci akını, mevcut çevresel ve altyapısal kısıtlamalarına ek olarak, ülkede önemli toplumsal, ekonomik ve politik baskılara neden olmuştur. Lübnan'a tarihsel, sosyal ve ekonomik bağlarla sıkı sıkıya bağlı bir ülke olan Suriye'deki çatışma, Lübnan ekonomisini ciddi ve olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir.

Son zamanlardaki çalışmalara göre, Suriye Krizi, Lübnan ekonomisini, güvenlik durumundaki artan dalgalanma, tüketim ve yatırımda önemli bir düşüş, ihracatın yüksek maliyeti ve güvenlik nedeniyle turistik faaliyetlerin kaybedilmesiyle bir bütün olarak yavaşlattı. Bu etkiler, artan talep ve mülteci akını kaynaklı yatırımlarla tam olarak telafi edilmemiştir. Sonuç olarak, istihdama erişim Lübnan'daki mülteciler ve ev sahibi topluluklar için zorlu bir konu haline gelmiştir.

Binlerce mülteci Avrupa ülkelerine de kaçtı. Buradaki fark, Lübnan'ın tarihsel, sosyal ve ekonomik bağlarla yakından bağlantılı bir ülkesinde olan Lübnan ekonomisini ciddi ve olumsuz yönde etkileyen çatışmadır. 2011 yılında Suriye'de yaşanan krizden bu yana, Lübnan ekonomisi ekonomik büyümesinde eşi görülmemiş bir yavaşlama geçirdi ve altı yıl üst üste uzun bir zamana yayıldı. Büyük mülteci akını sonrasında bu yavaşlamanın etkilerinden biri, insanlara ya da KOBİlere ihtiyaç duydukları ekonomik fırsatları sağlamada zorluk çeken yoğun bir pazardır.

Lübnan işgücü piyasasının genel özellikleri, gençler arasındaki yüksek işsizlik oranı, kadınların işgücüne katılım oranının düşüklüğü, kayıt dışı sektörün büyük bir kısmı, yabancı işgücünün akışı ve Filistin ve Suriye'den gelen mülteciler ve çok sayıda kalifiye Lübnan vatandaşlarının yurtdışında iş olanakları arama ve bulmalarıdır.

Lübnan halihazırda kendi vatandaşlarına eğitim, gıda, sağlık bakımı ve uygun fiyatlı konut gibi temel hizmetleri sağlamakta yetersiz kalmıştır.

Lübnan'ın Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik yaklaşımını daha iyi anlamak için, modern Lübnan'ın şekillenmesinde ve mülteci bağlamında daha önceki deneyimlerin üzerinde önemli bir etkisi olan baskın özelliklerinin incelenmesi önemlidir.

Fawwaz Traboulsi'ye göre, "İki farklı özellik modern Lübnan'ın şekillenmesinde önemli bir etkiye sahipti: Bir yandan büyük Hıristiyan nüfusu ve bir yandan da ülkenin Batı'ya uzun süre maruz kalması. Onların birleşik etkisi büyük ölçüde Lübnan'ın modern tarihinin dile getirildiği ana temaları açıklıyor: (1) dini mezheplerin kurumsallaşmasına dayanan bir siyasal sistem ("sekterlik"); (2) hizmet sektörüne dayalı dışadönük bir liberal ekonomik sistem; ve (3) bölgesel ayarı ile sorunlu bir ilişki. Traboulsi, Lübnan'daki mezheplerin iki temel işlevini vurgulamaktadır: "önce, pazarın eşitsizliklerine direnmek için tasarlanan ve faydaları ile devletin sosyal servet ve hizmetlerinin ödenmesi için rekabet eden genişletilmiş müşteri ağları olarak rolleri; ikincisi, uzun süredir devam etmekte oldukları güç mücadelesinde ya da tam olarak hayatta kalmaları için dışarıdan yardım alma alışkanlığı. "(2012, s.9). Traboulsi'nin belirttiği bir diğer önemli nokta, Lübnan'daki aşırı laissez-faire politikalarının ve Lübnan'ın mezheplerinin sahip olduğu geniş siyasi, yasal ve çoğu zaman askeri, özerkliğin birleşik etkileri nedeniyle uzun süredir gerilediği devlet-toplum ilişkileri. " (2012, s.10). Bu mezhep sisteminin Lübnan'ın Suriyeli mülteci krizine verdiği yanıt üzerinde önemli bir etkisi var.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından, yeni Birleşmiş Milletler bağlamında, devletler mülteci koruma sistemini kurmuştur. Bu sistem, Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği (BMMYK) ve Mültecilerin Statüsüne İlişkin 1951 Sözleşmesi (1951 Sözleşmesi) kapsamında evrenseldir. Mülteci alanının evrensel bir sistem çerçevesinde düzenlenmiş olmasına rağmen, mülteci koruması, doğası gereği politik bir konu olarak kalmaktadır. Uluslararası kurallar, yönetmelikler ve değerler, hükümetin mültecilere nasıl tepki verileceği konusundaki kararlarını kaçınılmaz olarak etkilerken, iktidar ve çıkarlar da aynı oranda etkilemektedir.

Ev sahibi ve bağışçı devletlerin mültecilere yardım, koruma ve çözüm sağlama konusundaki taahhüdü, mültecilerin güvenlik ve kalkınma sonuçlarına ilişkin bir yük veya fayda olarak ne ölçüde algılandıklarına göre şekillenmektedir. Bunun kanıtı, mülteci sisteminin işleyişinin hemen hemen her alanında bulunabilir: bağışçıların insani yardım katkılarından yeniden yerleşim kararlarına, ev sahibi devletlerin mültecilere sosyo-ekonomik özgürlükler sağlayıp sağlayamayacağına dair karar vermelerine kadar.

Ortadoğu'daki Filistinlilerin uzamış mülteci durumu nedeniyle Lübnan, Mültecilerin Statüsüne ilişkin 1951 BM Sözleşmesi'ne taraf değildir. Temel olarak mültecilerle ilgili ulusal düzeyde somut kurallar ve düzenlemelerden yoksundur. Buna paralel olarak, Lübnan'ın ülkede koruma talep eden bir milyondan fazla Suriyeliyle ilgili yaklaşımı çok net değil. Aynı zamanda, mevcut siyasi istikrarsızlık, tarihsel bağlar ve geçtiğimiz yıllarda otuz yıllık Suriye askeri varlığı ve ülkenin uzun soluklu Filistinli mülteci varlığı, Lübnan'ın Suriye'den gelen mültecilere yönelik politikalarını etkilemiştir.

Komşu ülkeler mülteciler için farklı kurallar ve düzenlemeler olduğundan, bölgelerindeki Suriyeli mülteci kriziyle ilgilenen STK'lara yönelik farklı yaklaşımlar da vardı. "Geçtiğimiz otuz yılda, dünya neoliberal ilkelere uygun olarak" refah devleti "veya" gelişimsel devlet "modellerinin ve uygulamalarının yeniden inşasına tanık oldu. Bu durum, geleneksel makro kurumlar ve refah ve kalkınma politikaları ya da yoksulluğa karşı politikalar yerine "sivil toplum örgütleri" ya da "kalkınma" projeleri gibi mikro araçlara ve müdahalelere olan güvenin artmasına neden olmuştur. Bu zaman zarfında projeler ve projelendirme sadece ulusal ve uluslararası kalkınma ve kredi kurumları değil, aynı zamanda STK'lar olan tercih edilen "ortaklarının da modus işleyişi haline gelmiştir. "(Bayraktar, 2017, s.105.)

Buna paralel olarak, yerel halkın ve bu mültecilerin ihtiyaç duyduğu birçok hizmet, özellikle Lübnan'ın kuzeyindeki STK'lar tarafından üstlenilmiş ve Avrupa Birliği ve diğerleri gibi bağış kurumları ve hükümetler tarafından finanse edilmiştir. "Trablus'un kuzey şehri ve Lübnanlı Akkar Valiliği'nde mültecilerin ev sahibi nüfusa oranı yüzde 32, bu alan toplam mültecilerin yüzde 29'unu oluşturuyor." (Dünya Bankası Grubu, 2017). Bunlar, uluslararası ve yerel STK'ların temel hizmetleri sağladığı ve ayrıca Suriyeli ve savunmasız Lübnanlı topluluklar için geçim fırsatları varatmayı amaclayan ülkedeki en hassas bölgelerden bazıları olarak gösterilmektedir. Savunmasız Lübnanlılar, genel olarak ekonominin genel durumu ve iş piyasası krizden olumsuz olarak etkilendikleri için kendi koşullarını kötüye gittiler. Paralel olarak, kiralar artıyor, Suriyeli mültecilerin işlerini daha da zorlaştırıyor ve kamu hizmetleri aşırı yükleniyor. Mültecilerin ve onların ev sahibi topluluklarının dayanıklılığını, gelir getirici firsatlara erişimi iyileştirerek ve aynı zamanda daha geniş iş kısıtlamalarını ele alarak kurum / pazar düzeyinde destek sağlayarak desteklemelerine ihtiyaç vardır.

Suriye'nin komşu ülkeleri (Mısır Arap Cumhuriyeti, İrak Cumhuriyeti, Ürdün Haşimi Krallığı, Lübnan Cumhuriyeti) tarafından geliştirilen planları bir araya getiren Bölgesel Mülteci ve Esneklik Planı 2017 Faaliyet Raporu'na (3RP) göre, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti - STK'lar ve BM kuruluşları ile koruma, insani yardım ve dayanıklılığı güçlendirmek; Lübnan, farklı donör ülkelerden, mesleki eğitim veren projelere tahsis edilen Suriyelilerin ve savunmasız Lübnanlıların geçimlerini ve dayanıklılıklarını desteklemek için 113 milyon dolarlık bir fon aldı.

Suriyeli mültecilerin sürdürülebilir geçim olanaklarına erişiminin sağlanması, bu ülkelerde istihdam olanaklarının artması nedeniyle mültecilerin sürekli olarak yerleşmesini teşvik edebilecek ve ev sahibi topluluklar ve mülteciler arasındaki sosyal gerilimlere neden olabileceğinden, tüm komşu ülkeler için resmi işgücü piyasasına entegrasyona yol açacaktır. Bölgedeki istikrarsızlık ve yüksek işsizlik oranlarından muzdarip. Her ne kadar Suriyeliler tehlikeli koşullar altında yoğun bir şekilde gayri resmi işlerde çalışsalar da, tüm ülkeler için bağışçı kurumlar, çalışma izinleri için müzakere edip ittiler. "Türkiye, Şubat 2016'nın ilk aylarında, Ürdün'ün Şubat 2016'da destek veren Suriye ve Bölge Konferansı'nda bağışçılarla görüştükten sonra Mart 2016'da onay verdi. Lübnan, aynı zamanda" çalışmayan işsizlik "gerekliliğini Suriyelilerden feragat etti. Mümkün olan kamuoyu yansımalarını önlemek için, Ürdün, Suriyelilerin çalışabileceği sektörlere sınırlamalar getirmiştir; Lübnan, tarım, inşaat ve diğer emek-yoğun sektörler gibi doğrudan Lübnan'la doğrudan rekabet etmeyecek bazı sektörlerde çalışma iznini sınırlamıştır. Ürdün, Ürdün'ün mültecilere yönelik işlerin yaratılması için mali yardım verecek olan sözünü AB'den alıyor. Türkiye, belirli bir işyerinde 10 işçiden sadece 1'inin Suriyeli olabileceği bir kota sistemi benimsemiştir. Hepsi Suriyeliler tarafından iş yaratılmasını kolaylaştırıyor. Çalışma izni mülteci çalışanları ve işverenler tarafından beklenen ilgiye ulaşmadı "(Mencütek, 2018, s.5).

Bu çalışma, devlet aktörlerinin mültecileri topluma entegre etmek istemedikleri, ancak STK'lar aracılığı ile finansman sağlama isteklerinin yaratılması amacını taşıyan STKların geçim kaynakları projelerini, Kuzey Lübnan'daki STK'ların krizden etkilenen ekonomideki rolünü tanımlamak ve analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bir uygulayıcı olmak ve sahada çalışmak, bu projelerin potansiyel faydalanıcıları olan Lübnanlı ve Suriyeli topluluklardan gençlerle kolayca iletişim kurmamı sağladı. Bu etkileşim onların motivasyonlarını, faydalarını, zorluklarını ve hatta hayal kırıklıklarını anlamama yardımcı oldu. Aynı zamanda bu deneyim, yerel aktörlerin ve kamu kurumlarının ilişkilerini kurmamda bana yardımcı oldu, çünkü bölgedeki projeleri hayata geçirirken yerel aktörlerin desteğini kazanmak önemliydi. Diğer STK'lar veya BM ajanslarının çalışanları ile kurduğum ağ, onların motivasyonlarını ve zorluklarını anlamama yardımcı oldu.

Bu konuyu incelemeye karar verdiğimde, nereden başlayacağımı kararlaştırmam benim için daha kolaydı. Mesleki eğitim projelerinin uygulama ekibinin bir parçası olarak sahada çalışıyordum ve bu tip projelerin boşlukları ve zayıflıklarının farkındaydım. Bir uygulayıcı olmak ve saha deneyimi olması, FGD'ler için gençlere kolayca ulaşmamı sağladı. Devlet kurumları, odalar ya da belediyeler gibi yerel aktörler ile kurduğum ilişkiler, onlarla mülakat yapmalarını bana rahat bir şekilde sağladı. Ayrıca, Odalar ile ilişki, özel sektörle bağlantı kurmam için bana yardımcı oldu.

Bir uygulayıcı olmanın temel sorunu, diğer STK'ların ve BM ajanslarının çalışanları olan diğer uygulayıcılardan bilgi toplamaktı. Başarı öykülerini ve en iyi uygulamalarını paylaşmaya hevesliydi, ancak zorluklarını, zayıf yönlerini ve öğrendikleri dersleri anlatmaya istekli değillerdi. Tüm STK'lar bölgeyi anlamak için değerlendirmeler yapar ve bu raporları projelerinin temeli olarak kullanırlar. Görüşmeler sırasında, hemen hemen bütün uygulayıcılar raporlarından bahsettiler ancak bu raporları benimle paylaşmaya istekli değillerdi. STK'ların tasarladığı tüm projeler, bu STK'ların proje faaliyetlerini gerçekleştirebilmeleri için bağışçı kurumlar tarafından finanse edilmek zorundadır. Bu finansman mekanizmaları aynı bölgede çalışan STK'lar arasında aynı hedefler ve aynı faydalanıcıları hedefleyen rekabet yaratmaktadır. Bu rekabet, bilgi ve veri paylaşım mekanizmalarını kendi aralarında etkiler. Bir uygulayıcı olduğum için topladığım bilgileri paylaşmaya istekli değillerdi. Bu benim saha çalışmamı etkilerken, aynı bölgede neden yinelenmeler olduğunu daha iyi anlamamı sağladı. Ayrıca, gençlerin hayal kırıklığının ardındaki nedenleri anlamamı sağladı. Çünkü Lübnan gibi küçük bir ülkede, Akkar gibi belirli bir bölgede çalışıyorsanız, esas olarak aynı faydalanıcılarla çalışıyorsunuz.

Bu alan çalışmasının ve veri toplama sürecinin etkin bir parçası olarak bahsetmeye değer diğer bir gerçek de ne Lübnanlı ne de Suriye olduğumdu. Krizin farklı yönlerini ve Lübnan işgücü piyasasındaki zorlukları hem Suriyeli hem de Lübnanlılarla tartışmak nispeten kolaydı. Ayrıca, bir Arapça konuşmacı olarak, çeviriye ihtiyacım yoktu. Görüşülen kişiler veya FGD katılımcıları kendilerini ifade etmede rahattılar.

Bu tezin saha çalışması Kuzey Lübnan'da özellikle Akkar ve T5'te Ekim ve Aralık 2017 arasında, Suriye Krizinin Kuzey Lübnan'daki ekonomiyi nasıl etkilediğini belirlemek, Kuzey Lübnan'daki mevcut işgücü piyasasını analiz etmek ve incelemek amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Krizden etkilenen bir ekonomide Suriyeli ve Lübnanlı topluluklara mesleki eğitim sağlayarak iyi iş fırsatları yaratma stratejilerini geliştirmede sivil toplum örgütlerinin rolü incelendi.

İç savaşın ve Lübnan'daki mezhep sisteminin ve Filistinli mültecilerin önceki deneyimlerinin etkisi, Suriyeli mülteci krizine yönelik yaklaşımı da etkilemektedir. Örneğin, saha araştırması sırasında, Sünni belediyelerin en misafirperver oldukları, Hizbullah tarafından yönetilen Şii bölgelerinin en az misafirperver olduğu ve Hıristiyan alanlarının yelpazede yer aldıkları defalarca belirtilmiştir. Bu, Lübnan'daki mezhepçiliğin, Suriyeli mültecilerin Sünni kimliği nedeniyle, Suriyeli mülteci krizine verdiği tepki üzerinde etkili olduğunu göstermektedir.

Ülkeye özgü bağlamı, yararlanıcıların motivasyonunu, yerel yapıyı ve yerel varlıkları, Suriye Krizinden çok etkilenen Lübnan'ın kuzeyindeki bir mesleki eğitim projesinin fizibilitesini etkileyen faktörler olarak incelemeye ve burada STKların rolünü anlamaya çalıştım.

Literatür taramasının ardından, her şeyden önce, uygulamayı başarılı bir şekilde gerçekleştiren yasama bağlamı ve kültürü ve başarılı bir mesleki eğitim projesinin sonuçlarından yararlanabilecek paydaşlar olarak çalışılmaktadır. Lübnan'ın yasal çerçevesi, paydaşlar arasındaki sinerji, vizyonları ve stratejik yönelimleri, Kuzey Lübnan'daki eylem planları ve modaliteler çalışılmıştır. Ülkeye özgü bağlamda, sinerji ve koordinasyon mekanizmalarının eksikliğinin, tüm paydaşların koordinasyonu geliştirmek ve hükümet kurumları ile özel sektörü Lübnan'daki tüm gelecek projelerin tasarım aşamasında dahil etmesi için bir zorunluluk oluşturduğuna değinmek gerekir. Ulusal bir sosyo-ekonomik kalkınma stratejisine ve bakanlıklara ve kamu kurumlarında işsizlik sorunlarının üstesinden gelindiğinde açık sınırlar, sorumluluklar ve ayrıcalıklara ihtiyaç vardır.

Özellikle Kuzey Lübnan için, özel sektörün her projenin en erken aşamalarından dahil olması çok önemlidir ve ayrıca kamu-özel ortaklığı da kurumsal bir kültür haline gelmelidir. Aynı alanda çalışan birçok kuruluş olması nedeniyle diğer müdahaleler ve projelerle sinerji yaratmak da önemlidir.

Katılımcı desteği, başarılı bir VT projesi için temel bir kilometre taşıdır. Faydalanıcıların motivasyonunun, FGD'ler sırasında açıkça ortaya çıktığı gibi sosyal desteğin temel bir unsuru olarak görülmesi gerektiğini vurgulamak önemlidir.

Odak grup görüşmeleri sonuçları, projenin uygulanacağı toplum tarafından şekillendirilen erkek, kadın ve gençlerin işgücüne katılımı üzerine farklı bakış açılarını ortaya koydu. Görüşmelere katılan tüm erkekler, iş veya ek gelir getiren her aktiviteye dahil olmak istediklerini belirttiler.

Kadınlar için, evin dışında kullanılmak üzere yeni teknik beceriler edinme motivasyonu eksikliği, onları yalnızca ev eksenli ekonomik faaliyetlere katılmaya

teşvik ediyor. Toplumun kültürel baskısıyla uyumlu olarak, evin dışında gelir getirici bir faaliyete sahip olmak, Görüşmelerin kadın katılımcıları için meslek edinmek ikinci bir önceliktir. İlk öncelik, hane halkının bakımıdır. Eğitimlere ve çalışmalara katılmaya istekliydiler ancak çalışma veya eğitim saatlerinde çocuklarıyla ne yapacağını bilmiyorlardı. Bu durumda, organizasyonlar kadınlar için kadınları daha fazla hapseden ev tabanlı faaliyetler olarak projeler yürütüyorlar. Bunun yerine, bu kuruluşlar ücretsiz çocuk bakım hizmetleri sunmalı ya da bu hizmetleri sağlayan diğer kuruluşlarla işbirliği yapmalıdır, böylece bu kadınların bu fırsatlara erişimi olabilir. Ev tabanlı müdahaleler için, bir grup kadın için tasarlanmalı ve gerçek etki yaratmak ve yeni pazarlara açılmak için pazarlama, markalama ve etiketleme stratejilerine adanmış bir bileşeni içermelidir.

Gençliğin motivasyonu ile ilgili olarak, mesleki eğitimi evden ayrılma, akranlarıyla biraz iletişim kurma veya finansal teşvikler için VT programına ilgi duyma fırsatı olarak görüyorlar. Sadece yüzde 20'si iş yaşamında bir fırsat bulmanın, gelir elde etmenin ve daha iyi bir gelecek için plan yapmanın tek yoludur. Ayrıca, tarım, el ulağı ve inşaat işçileri VT derslerinin sosyal açıdan ödüllendirici işler yerine işten çıkarmalara yol açtığını düşünüyorlar; Farklı bir eğitim altyapısı gerektiren okul öğretmenleri, sekreterlik çalışmaları, mühendisler vb. İş olanaklarının eksikliğinden tamamen haberdardırlar ve Kuzey Lübnan'daki işgücü piyasasında kendileri için en büyük engel olarak görürler.

Mesleki eğitim kurslarına gelince, tekrarları önlemek için koordinasyonu optimize etmek önemlidir. İstihdam edilebilirliğin artması beklenen sonuca ulaşmak için gereken süreyi ve piyasa ihtiyaçlarına göre becerilerini geliştirmek için mesleki eğitim projelerini ikili sisteme veya işbaşı eğitim yaklaşımına göre planlamak önemlidir.Lübnan'da dört farklı mesleki eğitim sağlayıcı grup vardır. Birinci grup, Yüksek Öğretim Bakanlığı ve Çalışma Bakanlığı bünyesinde bulunan Ulusal İstihdam Bürosu çatısı altında Teknik eğitim Müdürlüğü olan ve kanunla öngörülen kamu kuruluşlarından oluşmaktadır. İkinci grup, yerel Ticaret, Sanayi ve Tarım Odaları gibi yarı kamu kurumlarını temsil etmektedir. Üçüncü grup, özel sektörden uzmanlık eğitim merkezlerinden oluşmaktadır. Dördüncü ve sonuncusu, uzmanlaşmış STK'ları temsil etmektedir.

Her grup için sertifikasyon süreci, kendi avantajları ve dezavantajları ile belirli kurallar ve düzenlemeler ile koşullandırılmaktadır. Bir proje tasarlanırken, ortak kuruluşlar bu faktörlere dayanarak seçilmelidir. Daha da önemlisi, çoğaltmalardan kaçınmak için tüm gruplarla koordinasyon mekanizması başlangıçtan önce kurulmalıdır.

Siyasi irade ya da ulusal strateji gibi uluslararası örgütlerin kapasitesinin ötesindeki engellere rağmen, Mesleki eğitim sağlayarak Kuzey Lübnan'daki Suriyeli mülteciler ve Lübnanlı ev sahibi topluluk için iş olanakları yaratılabilir. Bu kuruluşlar kapasite oluşturma açısından yerel kurumları destekleyebilir ve sorumluluğu üstlenmeye teşvik eder. Yerel kuruluşların güçlendirilmesi, sürdürülebilirliği garanti altına almak için STK'lar için çıkış stratejilerini planlamayı kolaylaştıracaktır.

Özel sektörü fırsatların tespit edilmesinde ve mesleki eğitim kurslarının buna göre geliştirilmesinde yerel düzeyde mümkün kılınmakla birlikte, ülkeye özgü bağlamı anlamak çok önemlidir; yararlanıcıların motivasyonu ve beklentisi; KOBİlerin ihtiyaçları, yerel yapı ve yerel varlıklar.

Mesleki eğitim projelerinin hayata geçirilmesi kısa vadeli bir etki ile faydalı olabilir, ancak Lübnan için istihdam olanakları bulmak, mültecilerin direncini desteklemek ve Kuzey Lübnan'daki bu iki toplum arasındaki sosyal uyumu desteklemek ile ilgili tüm sorunları çözemez. Devlet aktörlerinin, ulusal bir diyalogu kolaylaştıracak ulusal bir stratejinin işsizlik sorununu çözmesine neden olacak şekilde katılımına ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

Uzun vadede proje temelli yaklaşım sürdürülebilir değildir ve Lübnan'da belirtildiği gibi, aynı bölgede çoğaltmaları önleyecek ve aktörler arasındaki işbirliğini teşvik edecek, devlet tarafından ortaya konan açık koordinasyon mekanizmaları olmadan, ölçülebilir değil. Lübnan'ın seçilmiş hükümetinin zayıf ve bölünmüş görünümü, Suriye'deki mülteci kriziyle başa çıkmada ve STK'ların buna verdiği tepkiyi yönetmede zorluk oluşturuyor.

# Appendix F: THESIS PERMISSION FORM/ TEZ İZİN FORMU

# ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

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