

EUROPE'S SECURITY CHALLENGES
AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

EUROPE'S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

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This thesis seeks to analyse the European Union's current security structure, by taking into account the roles of the United States of America (USA) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and then to explore potential implications of the changes in transatlantic relations. Since World War II, NATO, under the leadership of the USA, has been serving as the main security provider for Europe. Although NATO's relevance was questioned after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the Alliance, by re-visiting and re-defining its mandate and roles, has been able to remain important. NATO has offered Europeans multiple advantages. First, by relying on huge US investment in defence industries, including nuclear capabilities, European countries have been able to save significant resources and invest them in other areas. On the other hand, Europe's efforts and initiatives undertaken since the 1990s to develop its own

defence capabilities and achieve strategic autonomy have achieved some progress but have not been able to produce an alternative to the NATO deterrent. US President Donald Trump, who acts on the basis of a vague doctrine called “America First”, has been questioning the necessity for continuation of this model. US insistence on adherence to the requirement that every NATO member should spend 2% of GDP for defence, causes tensions and disagreements within the alliance. In addition, the USA and the EU increasingly pursue differing strategic interests and objectives. Under these circumstances, the main question, which this thesis seeks to answer, is as follows: “Has the changing nature of Transatlantic relations influenced the EU’s search for strategic autonomy?”

Keywords: Balance of Power, Donald Trump, NATO, Strategic Autonomy, Transatlantic Relations.

ÖZ

AVRUPA'NIN GÜVENLİK SINAMALARI VE TRANSATLANTİK İLİŞKİLER

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Bu tez Avrupa Birliği'nin mevcut güvenlik yapılanmasını, ABD ve NATO'nun rollerini de dikkate alarak, analiz etmeyi ve ardından transatlantik ilişkilerdeki değişiklikleri değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan beri NATO, ABD liderliği altında, Avrupa'nın güvenliğini sağlayan ana kuruluş olarak hizmet vermektedir. Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden, Sovyetler Birliği ve Varşova Paktı'nın dağılmasından sonra NATO'nun gerekliliğinin sorgulanmasına rağmen, İttifak, görev yönergesini ve rollerini gözden geçirmek ve yeniden tanımlamak suretiyle önemli kalabilmeyi başarmıştır. NATO, Avrupa ülkelerine, pek çok avantajlar sağlamıştır. En başta da ABD'nin nükleer yetenekler dahil savunma sanayileri alanında yapageldiği devasa yatırımlar ve bu suretle Avrupa'ya sağladığı koruma sayesinde Avrupa ülkeleri tasarruf ettikleri önemli miktardaki kaynaklarını başka alanlarda yatırım yapmak için kullanabilmişlerdir. Diğer taraftan, Avrupa'nın kendi savunma kabiliyetlerini geliştirmek ve stratejik otonomisi sağlamak amacıyla

1990'lardan bu yana hayata geçirilen çabalar ve girişimler neticesinde bazı ilerlemeler kaydedilmekle birlikte, NATO'nun caydırıcılığına sahip bir alternatifin ortaya çıkarılması mümkün olmamıştır. "Önce Amerika" olarak tanımladığı, içeriği tam olarak belli olmayan bir doktrin temelinde hareket eden ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, Avrupa güvenliğini sağlamak için tesis edilen mevcut modelin devam ettirilmesine duyulan ihtiyacı sorgulamaktadır. ABD'nin her bir NATO üyesi ülkenin GSMH'sının en az %2'sini savunma sektörüne harcaması şartına uyum konusundaki ısrarı İttifak içinde yeni gerginliklere ve görüş ayrılıklarına neden olmaktadır. Bunlara ilaveten, ABD ve AB uluslararası ilişkilerde giderek farklılaşan stratejik çıkarlar ve hedefler takip etmektedirler. Bu koşullar altında, bu tezin cevabını aradığı ana soru şudur: "Transatlantik ilişkilerin değişen doğası AB'nin stratejik otonomi arayışında etkili oldu mu?"

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güç Dengesi, Donald Trump, NATO, Stratejik Otonomi, Transatlantik İlişkiler.

To my beautiful children, Selin and Efe, and all those good people, who have helped me turn a most difficult period of my life into a unique educational opportunity and experience.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EII/E2I	European Intervention Initiative
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUGS	Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy
GDP	Gross Domestic Production
GMFUS	German Marshall Fund of United States
IO	International Organizations
IR	International Relations
MSC	Munich Security Conference
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PESCO	Permanent Structured Co-operation
RF	Russian Federation
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
WW	World War

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the end of World War I (WWI), the United States of America (USA), by promulgating the Wilson Principles, objected to great power politics, colonization and spheres of influence. Since then, the USA has promoted a rules-based liberal international system, and especially after World War II (WWII) has served as its global guardian, together with its allies and partners in Europe and around the world. After WWII, until the end of Cold War, the international order was largely bipolar, based on the balance of power between two different blocs/economic systems: the capitalist liberal order led by the USA and protected by the NATO, and the communist system led by the Soviet Union and protected by the Warsaw Pact. Mainly due to the Soviet threat and systemic confrontation, the members of the Western capitalist system enjoyed great harmony in their respective foreign policies and accepted US leadership without much questioning.

In the post-Cold War period, however, largely thanks to the suddenly disappearing Soviet threat, the *raison d'être* (reason for existence) of the NATO alliance has become subject to questioning and debate, particularly by some states outside of the alliance, namely the Russian Federation (RF).

On the other hand, in the NATO/Western bloc, the sharing of leadership and burdens has become a contentious issue. While the US has been asking its European allies to assume more of the burden resulting from their common commitment to Europe's security, it has been reluctant to share the political and military leadership and until today, has enjoyed a status of military hegemon in Europe.

In this set up, the European allies in the NATO have since WWII been seeking to develop their own military capabilities so that they can enjoy some degree of "strategic autonomy" from NATO and US hegemony. The United

Kingdom (UK), however, as a member of both NATO and the EU, has been putting a brake on the EU's efforts to undertake meaningful and large-scale defence and security initiatives, thereby obstructing the development of EU strategic autonomy. In this regard, the UK has been seen as the USA's "Trojan horse" within the EU.¹

With regard to US expectations from its European allies, the exact purpose and meaning of the US' repeated requests to its European allies to assume an increased share of the burden in relation to European security has remained subject to interpretation and debate on both sides of the Atlantic. Some argue that the US asks the EU to do more to provide its own security, whereas some others claim that the US expects EU countries to spend more on purchasing military hardware/equipment from the US. The latter interpretation appears to be holding true in the era of President Donald Trump, who since his presidential campaign has been questioning the relevance and usefulness of the NATO, calling the Alliance "obsolete"² and making statements that undermine the spirit of solidarity within NATO, deeply disturbing the USA's European allies and leading them to question the reliability of the security guarantees offered by the USA to Europe through NATO.

Furthermore, President Trump has been shaking the foundations of the rules-based international order and international organizations/arrangements, which have been established to maintain and manage this global order. While he puts the primary emphasis on US national interests, President Trump's statements, decisions and actions appear to his European counterparts somewhat irrational,

¹ "Donald Trump using Britain as 'Trojan Horse' to destroy the EU, says socialist politician". January 31, 2017. <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/761401/Donald-Trump-using-Britain-Trojan-Horse-DESTROY-European-Union-Brexit> (Accessed on 29 July 2018)

² Pamela Engel. "Donald Trump is dismissing NATO as 'obsolete' - and he might be playing right into Russia's hand". March 24, 2016. <https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-nato-russia-europe-ian-bremmer-2016-3> (Accessed on 29 July 2018)

weaken the transatlantic partnership and co-operation and make it difficult for the allies to pursue common interests.³

As a result, lively debates have been taking place on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere in the world as to the future of the Transatlantic ties.

Under these circumstances, a document with the title of “In Spite of All, America, a Transatlantic Manifesto in Times of Donald Trump – a German Perspective,” was issued by several think-tanks in Germany and the German Marshall Fund in the United States (GMFUS) in 2017, which, inter alia, noted the following:

“The liberal world order with its foundation in multilateralism, its global norms and values, its open societies and markets - is in danger. It is exactly this order on which Germany’s freedom and prosperity depends. The order is being challenged from various directions and sources: rising powers strive for influence; illiberal governments and authoritarian regimes are ascending; anti-modern thinking is gaining traction and influence even within Western democracies; Russia is challenging the peaceful European order; and new technologies are disrupting old economic structures.”⁴

Based on these observations, the main objective, which is promoted by the Transatlantic Manifesto, appears clear: Whatever happens, protect and maintain the transatlantic alliance and strong bonds, as the two sides of the Atlantic still need each other, even though their interdependence in the field of security and defence is asymmetric due to the unmatched defence budget and capabilities of the USA. The intention of those who prepared and issued the Transatlantic Manifesto was, one can argue, to encourage European leaders to navigate the stormy seas that are expected during the Trump era, by controlling and preventing the damage to transatlantic relations as much as possible.

On the other hand, NATO continues to symbolize the strength of transatlantic ties. On the American continent, it includes not only the USA but

³ Carl Bildt. “European security in the Trump era”. February 16, 2018. <https://global.handelsblatt.com/opinion/european-security-trump-era-888202> (Accessed on 30 July 2018)

⁴ In Spite of All, America, A Transatlantic Manifesto in Times of Donald Trump - A German Perspective, 2017. <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/spite-it-all-america-transatlantic-manifesto-times-donald-trump-german-perspective> (Accessed on 4 January 2018)

Canada as well. Its objectives were clear from the very beginning. NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay (1952-1957), once stated that "NATO was created to keep Americans in, Russians out and Germans down."⁵ By this definition, the transatlantic security organization has lived up to the expectations of its creators. All members of NATO on both sides of the Atlantic have benefited from the Alliance and at this point in time, despite the rhetorical statements to the contrary, none appears willing and prepared to undermine its deterrent function, let alone leaving it altogether.

Even though bipolar confrontation between the capitalist and communist blocs is long over, NATO has remained the strong guardian of the capitalist and liberal free world. This picture of NATO has, however, been undermined and shaken to some extent by President Donald Trump's critical remarks, which he has been making since his election campaign in 2016.

In this regard, as noted by Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairperson of the Munich Security Conference (MSC), the established US system and various parties in US, by referring to its checks and balances, have been making efforts to explain NATO's role and importance to the US President and guide him into the right direction with regard to the Alliance.⁶

Judging by President Trump's most recent statements and attitudes at the NATO Brussels Summit of 11-12 July 2018, it seems doubtful, however, whether these efforts of the US senior bureaucracy have made any effect on President Trump. The US President has not demonstrated much of a change in his opinion towards the NATO and its European members. His close communication and

⁵ "NATO Leaders". https://www.nato.int/cps/us/natohq/declassified_137930.htm (Accessed on 29 July 2018)

⁶ Wolfgang Ischinger. "For Allies, Trump's Behaviour Is Painful to Watch". July 21, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/opinion/sunday/trump-europe-nato-russia.html> (Accessed on 21 July 2018)

dialogue with the Russian President, with whom he met in Finland's capital, Helsinki, on 16 July 2018, few days after the NATO Summit, made the difference of opinion and gap of mutual understanding between the US President and his European allies even more striking. The European allies appear worried about the possibility that President Trump may be giving to his Russian counterpart the impression that he tolerates Russia's aggressive and revisionist security policies, particularly the situation caused in Ukraine due to Russia's military intervention in from 2014 onward. Apparently, this will remain a major issue on the agenda for both sides of the Atlantic, especially for those who care to keep transatlantic relations as close as possible and defend the view that NATO allies should take and maintain a tougher line against the Russian Federation (RF), which intervened in Ukraine and annexed Crimea in March 2014. This matter is further dealt with under Chapter 3.

At this point, looking at the history of European integration may also be helpful in putting together a fuller picture.

After the devastation of World War II (WWII), a war-torn Europe embarked upon an integration process, which at the time of initiation had relatively modest aims and was primarily intended to sustain and consolidate continental peace, harmony and welfare. In the subsequent years and decades, largely by having to respond to external and internal crises, threats and challenges, the European integration process has continued its journey. It has gone through several stages of integration, institutionally and geographically, moving step-by-step on its path toward an "ever closer union".⁷

The European integration process has experienced a gradual shift of sovereignty to the supranational institutions and the member states have developed a set of effective mechanisms that facilitate and call for closer intergovernmental co-ordination in many key areas. An open-ended integration process, marked by the transfer of authority to supranational structures and closer intergovernmental co-

⁷ "Ever Closer Union, The Legacy of the Treaties of Rome for Today's Europe". (2017). <https://www.eui.eu/Documents/Research/HistoricalArchivesofEU/Ever-Closer-Union-catalogue.pdf> (Accessed on 30 July 2018)

ordination, has over the years resulted in growing interdependence of the EU member states, not only on each other, but also on the EU as a supranational and intergovernmental institution. This was the dream of those visionaries like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, who gave the initial impetus to European integration process. European integration has so far reached such an advanced level that is demonstrated by the complexity of the EU, which is far beyond initial designs and expectations.

On the other hand, the departure of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU is going to take place in 2019. Despite the ongoing Brexit negotiations between the EU and the UK, the co-operation among the United States, the UK, France and Germany broadly determines the substance and structure of the wider transatlantic relationship. This co-operation has remained strong over the past years. Even though the new US President's initial statements caused some concerns on the side of Europeans, France and the UK have joined the US in conducting air strikes on some targets in Syria, with the last such operation carried out in April 2018.⁸ This suggests that the major European powers are making efforts to demonstrate the value of Europe's solidarity and co-operation to the apparently confused US administration. These joint strikes also confirm that if continued partnership is the objective on both sides of the Atlantic, a result-oriented co-operation may be possible even when differences of opinion and approach persist.

Meanwhile, since the issuance of St. Malo Declaration by the UK and France in December 1998, the EU's efforts to develop its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have gained a considerable momentum. However, the CSDP in its current format does not appear to be a tool that contributes significantly to the EU's "strategic autonomy," but instead seems useful for the US to sustain its hegemony in Europe, if it so wishes. Considering the civilian and military aspects

⁸ Zachary Cohen and Kevin Liptak. CNN. "US, UK and France launch Syria strikes targeting Assad's chemical weapons". April 14, 2018. <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/13/politics/trump-us-syria/index.html> (Accessed on 16 April 2018)

of the CSDP, in fact, the US ability to impose its strategic doctrine on the EU member states through NATO remains unaffected.⁹ The lack of EU military success stories and thus its lack of self-confidence in undertaking military operations beyond Europe reinforces this asymmetric relationship between the EU and the USA. The absence of commonly defined EU interests and objectives is another shortcoming in the EU's coherence. The uneven military capabilities and differentiated approaches to the use of military power among the major actors in the EU, like the UK, France and Germany, also make it difficult for the EU as a whole to resort to military means to achieve common objectives, if and when needed. In the face of any major crisis, therefore, the EU still appears confused and unprepared, and therefore looks to the US leadership.

On the other hand, current structure, arrangement and policies do not bring much success and credit to the EU and the EU's impact in addressing major issues in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond, such as irregular migration originating from Syria, remains limited. In the case of the protracted civil war in Syria and its grave consequences, the EU has proven to be inefficient and remained indifferent to the massive migration/refugee issue until the crisis knocked on its door in 2015-2016.

Yet, maintaining a rules-based international order remains a priority for the EU and its leading economic powerhouse, Germany. The EU operates on the basis of several decision-making procedures ranging from consensus to qualified majority voting. The foreign, defence and security policy decisions are among the politically most sensitive. Therefore, the EU cannot pursue ambitious common strategic interests when it makes decisions on the basis of lowest common denominators. Furthermore, given the large number of EU members, the decision-making mechanism moves ahead rather slowly, at times when the EU is expected to act quickly and effectively. In this respect, there are views that the member states

⁹ Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley. (2013). "The Common Security and Defence Policy as an act of American hegemony". *European Security*, p.55. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09662839.2012.726221> (Accessed on 18 April 2018)

are the main obstacles before the efficiency of the EU and reasons for the EU's apparent geopolitical underperformance. As a result, CSDP operations do not amount to strategic engagement, which truly satisfies the expectations from the world's most efficient soft power and second largest defence budget globally.¹⁰

Taking advantage of the upcoming Brexit, France and Germany appear to be developing and moving ahead with a number of defence and security initiatives. At the end of 2017 the EU launched a new initiative called the PESCO (Permanent Structured Co-operation). The Initiative aims to strengthen the defence capabilities of participating EU member countries and that of the EU as a whole. Only the UK, Denmark and Malta opted to stay out of PESCO. PESCO initially took 17 projects under consideration.¹¹ Time will show how much PESCO will contribute to the EU's and its individual members' defence capabilities.

Despite several EU initiatives, Europe's main security architecture remains unchanged in the post-Cold War security environment. NATO, the umbrella security structure in Europe, is in charge of hard security issues, in other words, territorial security and defence, that require the use of military power under the notion of collective defence, as defined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty or in the form of "Coalitions of the Willing,"¹² as has been the case in its recent efforts to fight terrorism.

When established in 1949, the main objective of the North Atlantic Treaty – NATO's founding treaty – was to form an alliance of mutual assistance to eliminate the threat posed by the Soviet Union. By this definition of its main role, the NATO's core mandate remained largely unchanged during the Cold War. In

¹⁰ Mark Bentinck. (2017). "Europe Stays at Home. The EU's commitment to a rules-based international order is hobbled by lack of strategy and political will by the member states". October 19, 2017. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/73474> (Accessed on 11 January 2018)

¹¹ "EU External Action Fact sheet on PESCO" (2017). [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20\(PESCO\)%20-%20Factsheet](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet) (Accessed on 18 December 2017)

¹² "Coalition of the Willing: A group of countries whose leaders have been persuaded by another to undertake a certain mission, usually through an invasion or war". https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/coalition_of_the_willing.

line with the famous statement of NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, quoted above, the creation of West Germany by reunifying the German territories held under the occupation of the Allied Powers was accomplished through accession of this country into the alliance in 1955. Keeping the U.S. engaged with European affairs, meanwhile, was primarily aimed at containing Soviet power. This objective was first included in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which foresaw aid for countries threatened by communism or totalitarian ideology. Its primary focus was on Europe. To that end, the U.S. has made an open-ended commitment to the NATO and thereby, to European security. For the next four decades, NATO's history ran parallel to the slow unfolding of the East-West rivalry. NATO strategy remained fixed on the threat posed by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. It thus undertook no missions "out-of-area" until the end of the Cold War.¹³

By signing the Washington Treaty, NATO member states agreed to the notion that solidarity lies at the heart of the Treaty, effectively rendering Article 5 on collective defence a key component of the Alliance. The principle of collective defence remains a unique and lasting principle that keeps the members together in a spirit of solidarity in the Alliance, committing them to each other's security.¹⁴

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty foresees that in case a NATO ally is facing an armed attack, other members of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an attack against all members. In this spirit, Article 5 reads as follows:

"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the UN Security Council. Such measures shall be

¹³ Webber, Mark. (2013). "NATO: Crisis? What crisis?. Great Decisions", p. 31. Foreign Policy Association. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4368251> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

¹⁴ "Founding treaty". https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_67656.htm (Accessed on 30 July 2018)

terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”¹⁵

Even though NATO has activated collective defence measures on several occasions, like its responses to the situation in Syria and in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the response foreseen under Article 5 was triggered only once in its history, after the 9/11 (2001) terrorist attacks against the US.

Since the 9/11 attacks, the Alliance has transformed itself in many ways so that it can respond more effectively to threats and challenges around the world, in regions far away from its core area of responsibility. The intervention and comprehensive operations undertaken in Afghanistan are examples of NATO’s revised mandate, with additional tasks and responsibilities.

In this regard, even though the reader may see throughout this thesis references to developments since the aftermath of the WWI, the temporal scope of the thesis covers basically the period from the end of the Cold War until the NATO Brussels Summit of 11-12 July 2018.

Currently, there are important issues on the agenda of the Alliance, such as how to handle enlargement, relations with Russia, and co-operation with the European Union. As President Trump keeps giving confusing signals to the Alliance and its members, the Alliance is still making efforts to prove its usefulness and seeking new approaches to be able to cope with the dramatic changes around the world, such as an assertive Russia and a rising China.¹⁶ New situations may lead to new tasks for the Alliance and in this regard, maintaining the spirit of solidarity among the allies may best serve the European and American interests in the period ahead.

In this regard, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 has served as a wake-up call and accordingly, put collective defence back at the top of the NATO agenda. Questions of defence spending and burden-sharing, however, have gained

¹⁵ “Collective defence” - Article 5. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm# (Accessed on 30 July 2018)

¹⁶ Adam Daniel Rotfeld. (2018). “The Future of NATO”. p.20. *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F) / Security and Peace*, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 20-25. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24231646> (Accessed on 17 January 2017)

a prominent place in public debates, particularly in some European countries like Germany. At the NATO Wales Summit in 2014, Allies committed that those Allies who were spending less than 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would “move toward” 2% by 2024.¹⁷ President Trump appears to argue, however, that this represented a firm commitment and Allies who have not achieved 2% already are somehow in violation of it. Therefore, the view promoted by President Trump can be considered a misperception. Although this guideline has existed in NATO for more than a decade, in Wales in 2014 the Allies made this defence spending pledge at the highest political level for the first time and reaffirmed it during the Warsaw Summit two years later. Although there has been an increase in defence spending in real terms since 2014, only a handful of countries fulfil the 2% threshold. Given that this guideline has been contested on several grounds ever since its introduction in 2006, the way in which the current burden-sharing debate is framed seems harmful for NATO’s cohesion and image.

Under these circumstances, the first NATO Summit that US President Trump attended on 25 May 2017 in Brussels, could not agree on an official communiqué. Instead, through a statement, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that the Summit focussed on two main agenda points: “stepping up NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism and fairer burden-sharing in the Alliance.”¹⁸ Therefore, instead of addressing the substantive issues on the agenda of the Alliance, this first NATO meeting of President Trump is remembered for his public criticism towards other member states for their relatively lower level of defence spending. Furthermore, President Trump also missed the opportunity to reaffirm the United States’ continued commitment to collective defence in his speech in Brussels, although he subsequently reaffirmed it in early June 2017 during

¹⁷ “The NATO Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond”, Article 5. 05 September 2014. https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112985.htm (Accessed on 30 July 2018)

¹⁸ “Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of the meeting of NATO Heads of State and/or Government”. 25 May 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_144083.htm (Accessed on 30 July 2018)

a press conference at the White House on the occasion of a visit by the President of Romania.¹⁹

Despite the US President's focus on the financial aspects of disagreements in the Transatlantic security co-operation, some approach the numerical burden-sharing narrative in NATO differently and consider it problematic. Even though it is easy to understand, the 2% defence budget target does not reflect properly other basic features of any contributory system: fairness and effectiveness. In this respect, the concept of distributive justice is put forward. By examining NATO's past debates on burden-sharing and considering their qualitatively differentiating national capabilities, the allies agreed on the principle of ability-to-pay. However, even though they agreed to this principle, many of the allies have not been able to implement it as it reflects a one-size-fits-all formula and each member state has its own financial and budgetary realities. Therefore, it may be argued that based on this principle, the allies failed to come up with a burden-sharing arrangement which is sustainable and can be implemented without exception. As a result, the endless debates on burden-sharing persist and prevent the Alliance and allies from focusing on its strategic objectives and multiple threats and challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic area.²⁰

As a striking example, there are arguments that, when it comes to pushing Germany to significantly increase its defence budget, the US needs to be careful what it is asking for. In case Germany invests an additional amount of close to 30 billion Dollars annually in its defence sector by going up from 1.2 % to 2% of its GDP, this may upgrade the country's military capabilities in a rather short span of time to the extent that soon it again becomes a major military power and upset the fragile balances in the architecture of European security.

¹⁹ Robbie Gramer. "Trump Discovers Article 5 After Disastrous NATO Visit". June 9, 2017. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/trump-discovers-article-5-after-disastrous-nato-visit-brussels-visit-transatlantic-relationship-europe/#> (Accessed on 30 July 2018)

²⁰ Dominika Kunertova. (2017). "One measure cannot trump it all: lessons from NATO's early burden-sharing debates". p. 552, 564. *European Security*, 26:4, 552-574. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1353495> (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

Looking at the other side of the coin, one may draw the conclusion that President Trump, like his predecessors, appears to have a fair point. By devoting enormous resources to its defence budget, the US may be transferring its taxpayers' money to fund the security of some wealthy states in Europe. On the other hand, President Trump has repeatedly mischaracterized European defence spending as "dues" payable directly to NATO (or the U.S.) and demanded "arrears" as well as increased spending. This may be interpreted that he has stumbled inadvertently onto the kernel of a legitimate argument. Another likelihood is, however, that he may be exploiting this matter for domestic political purposes, by describing a USA victimized by its "ungrateful" Allies.

As NATO remains the backbone of European security and the US defence budget is larger than the combination of all other NATO members' defence budgets, the debate on burden sharing among its members will likely stay on the agenda for some time to come and continue to overshadow discussions on how best the Alliance can fulfil its tasks and responsibilities in a continuously changing global environment.

On the other hand, the European Union (EU) has, over the past decades, developed various policies, tools and approaches to address the security challenges it faces in the post-Cold War era. The primary objective of the EU in these efforts, particularly since the issuance of St. Malo Declaration by France and the UK in December 1998 and subsequently the introduction of the CSDP, has been to advance its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the USA and NATO and acquire capabilities and common strategic culture to undertake military operations when NATO is not fully involved.

Nevertheless, in the EU document "A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)," issued by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the EU Commission, in September 2016, the EU recognizes the importance of close co-operation with NATO by stating that,

"The EU will invest further in strong bonds across the Atlantic, both north and south. A solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to

effective global governance. NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world. The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security.”²¹

Still, the concept of “strategic autonomy” is mentioned five times in the EUGS and this indicates how high an importance the EU attaches to achievement of this objective. Some argue that such an autonomy can only be achieved if the EU develops its capabilities by getting rid of its dependency on the USA and NATO. In this respect, EU-NATO co-operation should lead to the “Europeanization of NATO.” To this end, the EU will have to exercise leadership within the Alliance as the US focuses on its priorities elsewhere and lets its decisive role diminish over the years. In parallel, the EU will have to undertake the reform of its strategic decision-making processes and advance its defence capabilities significantly. In this context, some recall that Dwight D. Eisenhower said at the time of NATO’s creation in 1949: “If NATO is still needed in 10 years, it will have failed in its mission.” Along this line of thinking, it is proposed for consideration that at some point in the future, e.g., 2029, the 80th anniversary of NATO, be used as a good opportunity to mark the end of the Alliance by considering its mission accomplished. Such a scenario aims to encourage the EU to become completely self-reliant in terms of taking care of its own defence and security.²² In this likelihood, the position, which non-EU members of NATO would take in such a scenario, deserves further consideration, particularly given the fact that the UK is going to leave the EU in 2019.

²¹ “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” (2016). https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (Accessed on 27 April 2017)

²² Jolyon Howorth. (2017). “EU-NATO cooperation: the key to Europe’s security future”. *European Security*, 26:3, 454-459. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1352584> (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

While this comprehensive debate on various aspects of European security and transatlantic co-operation has been taking place, the EU had to deal with the upcoming separation of the UK from the EU (Brexit) as a result of a referendum held in June 2016 at the insistence of the then-UK Prime Minister David Cameron. Due to Brexit, the EU has a lot to lose, also in terms of the balance of power within the EU, even though the UK has always been reluctant in deepening European integration, considered itself as a major participant in the Transatlantic alliance and somehow refrained from supporting the EU enthusiastically in its efforts to develop its defence capabilities and achieve strategic autonomy.²³

On the other hand, Brexit may offer the EU the opportunity to move towards a more unitary organization, along lines favoured by President Emmanuel Macron of France. Traditionally, the French-German axis has since the very outset been the engine driving European integration forward. In this regard, the term “*Franco-German couple*” asserted itself in the 1950s, especially through de Gaulle and Adenauer, Giscard and Schmidt, Mitterrand and Kohl, Merkel and Macron (previously Sarkozy and Holland). These leaders all brought their own contributions to the European integration process.²⁴ Currently, however, there appears to be a mismatch between the visions of the French and German political leaderships with regard to the CSDP. French President Macron, who got elected in May 2017, is ambitious and wishes to reform the EU’s current structure and policies. On the other hand, German Chancellor Merkel got re-elected in September 2017, had difficulty in forming a sustainable coalition and is serving her 4th term in office, by leading a coalition government, which appears to be relatively weaker than her previous governments.

In addition, the Brexit process and US President Trump’s approach to transatlantic relations further complicate the picture at a time when Europe faces

²³ David Lane. (2018). “Could Brexit Be Defeated?”. *Eurasian Studies*, 05 March 2018. <http://greater-europe.org/archives/4438> (Accessed on 04 June 2018)

²⁴ Georges-Henri Soutou. (2012). “The Emergence of the Franco-German Couple: A Marriage of Convenience”. *Politique étrangère*, vol. winter issue, no. 4, 2012, pp. 727-738. https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_PE_124_0727--georges-henri-soutou-the-emergence-of.htm (11 June 2018)

many threats and challenges that may best be addressed by coherent Franco-German leadership. As a result, the pace and breadth of EU integration in areas related to defence and security may be affected. It is uncertain, though, how far the key actors in the EU will be able and willing to move ahead to deepen integration in a period when anti-EU movements gain ground across Europe.

Given the above and considering the benefits Europe has been enjoying thanks to the existence of NATO / US security guarantees, the main question of this thesis is as follows: “Has the changing nature of Transatlantic relations influenced the EU’s search for strategic autonomy?”. “Changing nature” may also be interpreted as “gradually differentiating strategic interests”. The answer to this main question will primarily be sought through application of the International Relations (IR) theory realism, but in order to better understand the broader global outlook, the theory of liberalism shall also be applied to the research and analysis of the subject matter.

Within this framework, the next chapter focuses on how major IR theories may be useful in making sense of the European security architecture and arrangements and the role of transatlantic co-operation in the overall equation.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN SECURITY, TRANSATLANTIC TIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

The International Relations (IR) discipline itself came into existence after World War I (WWI), as such an initially unexpected and destructive war pushed scholars around the world to think about how and why such a destructive war had occurred and what needed to be done to prevent its recurrence.

Against this background, as briefly explained in the very first paragraph of Chapter I-Introduction, the subsequent years witnessed international efforts to establish a rules-based and transparent order, which fostered free trade and globalisation, as well as decolonisation. The 1929 Great Depression and WWII came as deep shocks, which were interpreted as the failure of the kind of liberal system implemented in-between the two World Wars and after WWII a new bipolar international system based on balance of power between two major blocks, liberal capitalist Western bloc led by the US and communist block led by the Soviet Union, each driven by a politically and economically distinct ideology.

2.1. Realism

Realism is considered one of the oldest theories of the International Relations (IR) discipline. All its basic concepts and terminology revolves around the term “power”. Balance of power, relative power, security dilemma, self-help, anarchic international system and hegemony are most frequently used by realist scholars and thinkers.

Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer are among the most renowned realist scholars/thinkers in the IR world.

Hans Morgenthau developed six principles of political realism. He argued that 1) political realism is based on objective laws which have their roots in human nature, 2) the basis of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power, 3) realism's key concept of interest considered as power is an objective category that is universally valid, 4) political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action and also the inevitable tension between the moral values and the necessity of successful political action, 5) political realism refuses to identify the moral tenets of a particular nation with the moral principles that govern the global affairs, and 6) the difference between political realism and other schools of thought is real and profound.²⁵

In the view of realists like John J. Mearsheimer, great powers constantly seek opportunities to gain influence over their rivals and achieving hegemony is their final objective. They emphasize the importance of the concept of relative power. In order to explain why great powers compete with each other for power and strive for hegemony, Mearsheimer considers five assumptions: 1) The international system is anarchic, which means that the international system is comprised of independent states that have no central authority above them. There is no higher ruling body in the international system. 2) Great powers own some offensive military capability, through which they can hurt or even destroy each other. 3) States can never be certain about the intentions of others. 4) Survival is the primary goal of great powers. 5) Great powers act in a rational way.²⁶

As a basic assumption of realism, hegemony is about the distribution of power. In this respect, the end of the Cold War has initiated a comprehensive debate about the relative distribution of power in the international system following the

²⁵ Hans J. Morgenthau. "Six Principles of Political Realism". *International Politics, Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, pp 16-23, Tenth Edition (2011). From *Politics Among Nations*, Sixth Edition by Hans J. Morgenthau, pp 4-12, 14-15, (1985)

²⁶ John J. Mearsheimer. "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power". *International Politics, Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, pp 59-69, Tenth Edition (2011). From *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* by John Mearsheimer, pp. 29-40, 46-53 (2001)

collapse of the Soviet Union. Kenneth Waltz, known as a neorealist, describes the new system as “bipolarity in an altered state.”²⁷ Bipolarity continued because Russia was militarily self-sufficient, and no other powers have emerged. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the US has no longer been held in check by any other country or combination of countries and therefore the system leaned towards unipolarity with the U.S. as the dominant power.²⁸

As we approach the third decade of the 21st century, the unipolarity appears to be waning. Russia has re-emerged as a credible power regionally and globally, China has been getting stronger much faster than foreseen and many other regional rising powers seek their place in the international system of governance. On the other hand, the EU, which has been suffering from many successive economic, financial, and irregular migration crises in recent years, including, has started paying more attention to strengthening its military capabilities, particularly in light of Brexit and the apparently weakening US commitment to Europe’s security.

If one tries to analyse the approach and understanding of Europeans from the perspective of realism, we see that some neorealists appear to agree that relative decline of Europe offers a systemic incentive for European security cooperation. There appears to be a relationship between the relative decline of Europe’s power and European security cooperation. Europe’s relative decline lead to global and regional consequences and in many cases, it has been observed that security and defence co-operation among EU members is not enough to counter the many challenges facing the EU. Intra-European considerations of relative gains affect the

²⁷ Kenneth Waltz. (1993). “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”. *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall, 1993), pp. 44-79. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539097> (Accessed on 05 August 2018)

²⁸ Georg Sørensen. (1998). “IR Theory after the Cold War”, pp. 98. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24. *The Eighty Years' Crisis 1919-1999* (Dec., 1998), pp. 83-100 (Accessed 04 January 2018)

way in which Europe's main powers try to cope with Europe's relative decline and those considerations, in turn, affect security co-operation in the EU framework.²⁹

In this regard, it is also a fact that there are intra-European balances among the major EU countries, which may not be rivals, but still compete with one another. As will be explained in the following chapters, the linkage between the issues tends to further complicate the relationship among the EU countries. For instance, France is seeking to receive more funds from other EU countries to build up an EU that protects its members and citizens.³⁰ In response, despite Chancellor Merkel's supportive statements, Germany appears to be considering pros and cons of the French proposal, given the fact that the US commitment to European security is weakening.³¹ As a result, these two countries are making progress in implementing some of the EU security/defence initiatives.

As to long-term forecasts regarding whether Europe will "emerge as a unified political actor that operates in international politics on a dependable basis even in times of crisis and duress", the emergence of an efficient EU with strategic autonomy is considered possible only if it builds and maintains a stable and reliable capacity to act by resorting to the use of force or coercion, the preparation for the use of force, the threat of the use of force or the preparation for the possible threat of the use of force or coercion."³²

²⁹ Luis Simón. (2017). "Neorealism, Security Cooperation, and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma". pp. 185-186. *Security Studies*, 26:2, 185-212. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280297> (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

³⁰ Benjamin Kentish. "Emmanuel Macron calls for EU army and shared defence budget". September 26, 2017. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/emmanuel-emmanuel-macron-eu-army-joint-defence-budget-french-president-nato-britain-brexit-russia-a7968346.html> (Accessed on 17 April 2017)

³¹ Justin Huggler. "Merkel voices support for Macron's proposed European defence force". June 3, 2018. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/06/03/merkel-voices-support-macrons-proposed-european-defence-force/> (Accessed on 8 June 2018)

³² Christoph O. Meyer. (2011). "The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the European Union's Evolution as a Military Power", pp. 676. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 669-690 (Accessed on 15 November 2017)

President Trump has significantly changed the way in which the US defines and implements its foreign policy priorities. He is keen on frequently underlining US military power and nuclear capabilities and seems to prefer unilateral decisions and actions, which may be best explained by realism. As a result, in his first 1,5 years in office the US has been attaching less importance to multilateral arrangements and institutions and more to the national interests of the US under the motto of “America First”. The distance taken by the Trump administration from several multilateral arrangements such as the Paris Climate Accord, Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and international deal on Iran’s nuclear activities confirms this change. It is, however, not possible to argue that there is a coherence to President Trump’s foreign policy decisions and actions, which have ultimately ended up offending and alienating U.S.’ allies and partners around the world and particularly in Europe.³³

The way President Trump treats his country’s European allies, despite comprehensive interdependence and the necessity for close partnership between the two sides of Atlantic, leads to questioning of his personal and his country’s adherence to the rules-based liberal international order. Therefore, in the next section I will dwell on the basic principles of liberalism and how this theory helps us read and understand the global realities.

2.2. Liberalism

Liberalism embraces globalization, emphasizes the importance of international co-operation based on the rules-based international order. Multilateral co-operation is important as international organizations work to promote international co-operation and maintain the established international system. Given the fact that anarchy prevails in the international system among states, and there is no central authority over and above the national states, international organizations

³³ Sven Biscop. (2017). “Trump first”. *Global Affairs*, 3:2, 109-110, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2017.1336867 (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

and multilateral arrangements are instrumental in keeping states committed to an international order.

Among the most renowned thinkers and academicians of liberal thinking, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Ikenberry, Robert Keohane, Scott Burchill and Andrew Moravcsik may be listed, to name a few.

Unlike realists who believe that the rules of power politics are eternal and will not change, liberals argue that the basic principles of international relations slowly and gradually evolve and become more peaceful over time. Liberals are convinced that humanity can avoid repeated wars and conflicts, and that a more peaceful world is possible through co-operation. The role of domestic factors and individual preferences in determining state preferences and policies is also important in liberal theory. Interdependence is a key term in liberal international system. It means that states are mutually dependent on each other for ensuring their well-being.³⁴

Neoliberalism argues that through norms, regimes and institutions, even in an anarchic system of rational states, by emphasizing the benefits of long-term co-operation instead of short-term temporary gains, international co-operation can be ensured.³⁵

Democratic peace theory is an important conceptual contribution of liberalism to the discipline of international relations. The famous German thinker, Immanuel Kant, argued 200 years ago that continued peaceful world order (Perpetual Peace - 1795)³⁶ can be achieved if states have legislative bodies that supervise the ruler's authority to decide to go to war against another state. In this respect, democratic peace theory's main argument is that democratic states do not

³⁴ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse. "International Relations", 2013-2014 Update (10th Edition). p.134-135

³⁵ *ibid.*, p. 136, 174-175

³⁶ "Perpetual peace; a philosophical essay by Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804"; Smith, Mary Campbell. <https://archive.org/details/perpetualpeaceph00kantuoft/page/n9> (Accessed on 10 May 2018)

go to war against other democratic states, even though they may have war with authoritarian states.³⁷

Liberals argue that over time the international system will continue changing and be determined by interdependence, democracy, and liberal institutions (liberal institutionalism). In such a world, military power will be less important and 'soft power' will increasingly gain more importance and as a result democracy and free trade will be promoted across the world.

Therefore, in the opinion of liberals, zero-sum security rivalry, military force, and power balancing are no longer the key determinants in international relations. In fact, they tend to argue that the international system is positive-sum, which means that by co-operating, states may gain additional benefits, and therefore the rise of one or more states/regions should not be considered as a threat to other states' security. Liberals share, to some extent, the realist view that population and aggregate national income, military capabilities and budget still matter in the world politics, however, in their view, these concepts no longer play a central and decisive role. Instead, liberals promote the view that today global influence results from different kinds of civilian power, such as high per capita income, policies pursued in the areas of trade, investment and migration, actions taken in international structures, and appealing social and political norms and principles. From this perspective, it is argued that Europe is strong in all these areas and will remain so in the future. On this basis, in some ways the notion of Europe's relative decline is disputed, and it is argued that there exist two superpowers with global reach, namely

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 144

the US and Europe, because they have the capabilities to exert “smart power”³⁸ around the world.³⁹

Because “smart power” is defined as a “combination of hard and soft power,” the way in which the EU’s effectiveness and impact are described by some liberal thinkers as “smart power” appears somehow to contradict the liberal argument that military power is no longer important in international relations and the general liberal belief that co-operation not power politics plays increasingly significant role in world politics.

In this respect, the increasing focus the EU has been putting on developing its military capabilities and achieving its strategic autonomy from the USA and NATO also gives the impression that the EU is also moving closer to the idea of employing power politics in its foreign relations. We will need to wait and see whether this is a temporary reaction of the EU to the current circumstances in international relations or a reflection of the view that to become a credible actor in the world politics, projection of soft power alone is not adequate.

In case the EU has the aspiration to become a great power in international politics, it needs to become self-reliant in taking care of its own security and then develop the capabilities to deploy forces wherever needed to prevent, respond to or eliminate crises beyond its borders. Currently, the EU is not yet a great power in the classical meaning of the concept.

Liberals believe that realists overstate the importance of military capability as an instrument of international politics. In the twenty-first century, soft power seems to be more commonly employed for achieving the objectives than the threat

³⁸ Doug Gavel. (2008). “Joseph Nye on Smart Power”. Harvard Kennedy School Insight Interview, July 3, 2008. Joseph Nye: “Smart power is an effective combination of hard and soft power.” <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/joseph-nye-smart-power> (Accessed on 31 July 2018)

³⁹ Andrew Moravcsik. (2010). “Europe, the Second Superpower”. p. 91, 92. *Current History*, March 2010, pp. 91-98. https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/current_history.pdf (Accessed on 11 June 2018)

or use of force. The notion of self-help, as argued by realists, is no longer the only way of ensuring survival and security. It is time to discard the view that there is only one logic of action in international relations, namely that of self-help. Regional integration and co-operation in Europe have led to establishment of rules and institutions that gave the concept of sovereignty a new meaning. In this respect, some scholars argue that the EU should not aim to become a United States of Europe and seek to achieve an identity associated with military hegemony. It may be possible to find a middle way. The EU may play its most efficient role in international relations if it develops and integrates its military capability and deepens its commitment to the norms and values that have determined its identity.⁴⁰

For liberals, promotion of democratic peace in international relations and organizations is important. Well-designed and governed international institutions would serve as useful tools in managing frictions and potential conflicts between the states and prevent them from turning into wars. In this regard, international institutions may contribute to peaceful management of conflicts in several ways. They can help states overcome the security dilemma and keep power competitions in check and under control. They also ensure continuation of international cooperation, thereby preventing the recourse of states to unilateral self-help strategies. International institutions may also be helpful in separating issues from each other and thus making sure that disagreement on a certain issue does not affect co-operation in other areas. When international institutions consist of democracies and are constructed on the basis of democratic principles and procedures, they can perform all these functions.⁴¹

In view of the above, undermining and weakening transatlantic multilateral organizations, arrangements and co-operation, including NATO, may not serve US

⁴⁰ Tim Dunne. (2008). "Good Citizen Europe", p. 14, 15. *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 84, No. 1, "Ethical Power Europe?" (January 2008), pp. 13-28. Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25144712> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

⁴¹ Andreas Hasenclever, & Brigitte Weiffen. (2006). "International Institutions Are the Key: A New Perspective on the Democratic Peace", p. 563. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Oct., 2006), pp. 563-585. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40072171> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

nor EU interests in the long-run, as it may pave the way for serious conflicts between the US and its European partners. Given the decades-long US efforts and huge investments in westernizing Germany, any decision by US policy makers to disengage and distance from Europe may be counterproductive not only in security terms, but also in terms of harmony in economic and trade policies.

2.3. Paradoxical Pursuit of Realism in a Liberal World Order

President Trump appears to believe that the anarchic nature of the international system may better serve the US interests. Therefore, he tends to resort to the great power politics of the 19th century, which led to and ended with unprecedented destruction in the 20th century. In this regard, constructivist Alexander Wendt's famous phrase of "anarchy is what states make of it"⁴² may be useful in explaining current US policies in an international system with no multilateral rules, operating on the basis of power politics⁴³.

Still, the US under the leadership of President Trump does not wish to destroy the entire rules-based international order. It is just not happy with the outcomes and benefits it generates for the US. The US leadership seems to be of the opinion that compared to their country's military power, the benefits it gets from the current international order are not sufficient. In this respect, they aim to ensure a redistribution of international resources and economic benefits.

Therefore, US policies, which undermine and weaken the current multilateral arrangements in the international system, appear somewhat paradoxical, as the basic tenets of realism and liberalism contradict in many ways.

⁴² Alexander Wendt. "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics". *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858> (Accessed on 11 December 2017)

⁴³ Randall Schweller. (2018). "Three Cheers for Trump's Foreign Policy - What the Establishment Misses". *Foreign Affairs*, August 13, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-08-13/three-cheers-trumps-foreign-policy?cid=soc-tw> (Accessed on 23 August 2018)

Because realism puts emphasis on power, hegemony and national interests, whereas liberalism favours globalization, international co-operation and predictability in the international system.

In this apparently confusing scheme, what the US appears to be trying to achieve is to change or make adjustments to the current international order by drawing on its unique military power and capabilities, dependence of others on its provision of security through bilateral agreements or multilateral alliances like NATO. This way it aims to receive increased benefits and resources, thereby will be able to maintain its hegemony around the world and in Europe.

In conclusion, in the context of this thesis, both realism and liberalism have explanatory power to understand the current difficulties in the international relations, reasons behind these problems, motives behind efforts to resolve them, and strategies on the way forward if these issues cannot be solved fully or partially.

Due to radical changes in US policy towards European security and the relations between President Trump and Russia's President Vladimir Putin to the detriment of European security, the US itself risks becoming a security challenge for Europe. Therefore, EU leaders, also taking advantage of the UK's departure from the EU, are considering ways to strengthen the EU's capabilities to take care of its own security.

President Trump's remarks after the NATO Brussels Summit on 11-12 July 2018 in Brussels about withdrawing the USA from NATO have also sounded alarm bells in Europe. The reliability of transatlantic relations in ensuring Europe's security is becoming questionable after each visit President Trump makes to Europe.

Throughout the thesis, wherever it appears relevant and useful, references shall be made to realist and liberal theoretical concepts and conclusions to better explain empirical developments and observations. For instance, despite all the tension and disagreements between the USA and the EU, according to democratic peace theory, even if the USA leaves NATO and withdraws from Europe, common democratic values would continue binding the two shores of the Atlantic and prevent any major conflict. The USA and EU have enough experience, channels of

communication and tools at their disposal to address their differences in a peaceful manner. On both sides of the Atlantic, governments are under public scrutiny and democratic control, therefore, particularly the USA, as a great power, would not resort to the use or the threat of the use of force against Europe.

On the other hand, as the EU seeks strategic autonomy from NATO and the USA by strengthening its own military and defence capabilities, the outcome of these efforts, one can argue, can affect the balance of power and defence co-operation in transatlantic relations and in Europe. The talk about US disengagement from Europe or a significant reduction in its commitment to European security appears to have triggered a security dilemma in Europe, particularly after the separation of the UK from the EU, because the EU/Europe's combined relative military power vis-à-vis the RF will have diminished significantly. In this context, it may be further argued that, by observing the military capabilities of the RF as a benchmark, the EU/its member states can feel the necessity to strengthen its military capabilities as quickly and soon as possible. The EU states, especially the leading actors France and Germany, would find themselves relatively in a weaker position against the RF in terms of nuclear capabilities. In view of this new reality, Germany, which currently does not have its own nuclear capabilities, would start seeking to change the existing multilateral arrangements and limitations on proliferation nuclear weapons, so that it can acquire its own nuclear capabilities. This issue will be considered in detail under Chapter 5.

On the theoretical basis outlined above, I am going to conduct my research and seek the answer to my main question primarily from an EU/European perspective. In this framework, the next section- Chapter 3 – is devoted to Major Challenges Facing European Security.

CHAPTER 3

MAJOR CHALLENGES FACING EUROPEAN SECURITY

3.1. Overview

Europe has always faced multiple security threats and challenges, even though the combination of these threats and challenges may vary from one year to another.

The military threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War years was over by the end of 1980s and the old continent welcomed 1990s with a sense of relaxation, but at the same time the balance of power established through a two bloc-system of the Cold War has given way to an uncertain future in terms of European security.

As a result, the post-Cold War period has generated its own threats and challenges for Europe. Admission of the Eastern European countries (except Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus) into the EU and NATO has disturbed the RF so much that in order to hinder the further expansion of Western influence in its immediate neighbourhood, it has taken some actions to counter the West, particularly through its military interventions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014.

Largely thanks to the protracted or frozen conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria), in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the RF has been and is able to project its influence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. These countries / regions serve also as buffer zones between the RF and NATO countries.

On the other hand, while the EU and USA were very active in bringing Ukraine closer to Euro-Atlantic structures, they miscalculated the Russian reaction.

As a result, after the Russian intervention and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, a new protracted conflict appeared on the map of Europe.

In this broad picture, even though it will not be covered in detail in this thesis, a modest, yet vital component of the European security structure has been the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). As a key platform of dialogue between East and West during the Cold War as a conference, the Organization continue to carry out activities based on its uniquely comprehensive approach to security under three dimensions, human, politico-military and economic-environmental. In this respect, the OSCE serves as a valuable and dynamic platform of dialogue and co-operation with the RF, as well as the countries in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia on a broad range of security matters. The central role the OSCE has been playing in tackling the crisis in Ukraine since 2014 has once again underlined its relevance.

It was alleged in the media that Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to his American counterpart when they met in Helsinki/Finland on 16 July 2018 soon after the NATO Brussels Summit of 11-12 July 2018, that a local referendum be organized to determine the future of eastern Ukraine, and that this idea was rejected by the American side.⁴⁴ This proposal may be seen as an indication of the Russian mentality to decide the fate of some European countries through deals among the great powers. The dangerous consequences of this approach will be dealt with in the next chapters.

Against this brief background, today's major security challenges facing Europe/the EU may be listed as follows:

- 1) Revisionist Foreign Policy of the RF;
- 2) The UK's Departure from the EU (Brexit);
- 3) Civil war in Syria and irregular migration;
- 4) Terrorism; and
- 5) Threats in Cyberspace.

⁴⁴ "White House Rejects Putin Idea for Ukraine Referendum". July 20, 2018. <https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2018-07-20/trump-putin-ii-planning-fall-event-in-aftermath-of-helsinki> (Accessed on 02 August 2018)

3.2. Revisionist Foreign Policy of the RF

In contrast to the EU's relative military weakness, which is going to become even more obvious after the Brexit, the RF, by modernizing and upgrading its military capabilities in recent years, remains a major military power both at the European and global scale.

The interventionist and revisionist Russian foreign policy, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood, as observed in the case of its intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, has been a cause for deep concern in NATO and the EU. In response to Russian aggression, the USA and the EU have imposed sanctions on the RF.⁴⁵ Given the historical and strategic importance of Ukraine/Crimea for the RF and within the neo-imperial mindset of President Putin, these sanctions have not affected the Russian leadership's position on what they see as a vitally important matter. Strategically, the Crimean Peninsula, even when it was part of Ukraine, has been the main headquarters of Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. Therefore, by annexing Crimea, the Russian leadership has achieved multiple benefits and apparently thought that they could counter the possible reactions from the international community. The time elapsed since 2014 has demonstrated that the Russian strategy was based on some well-calculated assumptions.

Russian President Putin emphasized at a press conference on December 22, 2017, that Russia should have the best armed forces in face of the "aggressive" plans of the US and NATO. President Putin further underlined his vision to see Russia among the leading states and the absolute leader in some areas such as building the army of a new generation and new technological era. He added that although

⁴⁵“EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis”. https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en (Accessed on 06 August 2018)

Russian nuclear forces have a level that has provided "reliable strategic deterrence," they should be developed further.⁴⁶

In line with this strategic military vision, the RF under President Putin's leadership has increased its defence budget significantly. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said at the same press conference with President Putin on December 22, 2017, that the Russia's defence budget in 2018 will amount to 46 billion U.S. dollars, 2.8 percent of its gross domestic product. The country's military spending in 2017 was about 52 billion U.S. dollars, equalling 3.3 percent of GDP. The reduction in military spending is explained by the fact that the military modernisation process is nearing completion.⁴⁷

By 2021, the Russian ground-based nuclear forces aim to be equipped, up to 90 percent, with new missile systems that can overcome existing and prospective missile defence systems. Ahead of the Presidential elections held on March 18, 2018, President Putin has announced that Russia has produced a new type of advanced missile that can reach anywhere in the world. Russia's investment in these missile technologies carries the risk of triggering a new arms race between the USA and RF. US President Trump has already indicated his country's intention, through a new nuclear policy unveiled by the Pentagon⁴⁸ (US Defence Ministry/Chief of Staff), to take steps to counter Russia's new nuclear missile policy.⁴⁹

In December 2017, a comprehensive military exercise, which Russia has organized and called "Zapad (West) 2017", caused great concern in the West. Even

⁴⁶ "Russia must have best forces to resist aggression: Putin". December 23, 2017. <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/130512/Russia-must-have-best-forces-to-resist-aggression-Putin> (Accessed on 02 August 2018)

⁴⁷ "Russia to shell out \$46 bln on defence spending in 2018". (2017). December 22, 2017. <http://tass.com/defence/982575> (Accessed on 27 December 2017)

⁴⁸ Idrees Ali. "With an eye on Russia, U.S. to increase nuclear capabilities". February 03, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nuclear-russia-military/with-an-eye-on-russia-u-s-to-increase-nuclear-capabilities-idUSKBN1FM2J0> (Accessed on 04 August 2018)

⁴⁹ "Putin threatens US arms race with new missiles declaration". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/01/vladimir-putin-threatens-arms-race-with-new-missiles-announcement> (Accessed on 04 August 2018)

though it was presented officially as a counterterrorism exercise, the fact that 100 thousand troops took part was considered as an indication of its broader purposes and implicit messages.⁵⁰

Russian President Putin's statements, that he could reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union if he could, have been another reason for concern in the EU and NATO. Given the fact that in the Baltic states, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, a sizeable Russian minority lives, and considering how Russia has acted in case of Ukraine indicates that these concerns are not baseless.⁵¹

The RF's new advancements in missile technologies may inevitably result in relative reduction of the EU/Europe's defence capabilities, unless France and the UK, its two nuclear powers, also develop new nuclear weapons. Germany, the EU's economic powerhouse, has no nuclear weapons, other than those which might have been deployed by the USA as part of the NATO's defence scheme. This specific point is dealt with under Chapter 5.

3.3. The UK's Departure from the EU (Brexit)

As mentioned earlier, annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine, a sovereign country, by the RF in March 2014 caused deep concern in the EU/Europe, NATO and the USA, as it undermined the feeling that Europe enjoys well-established security and stability, and the territorial integrity of any state in Europe is not under any actual threat.

Further to that, in 2016 two major developments took place: 1) In June, the UK held a referendum whether to stay in or leave the EU. The result was by a narrow margin (51,9%) "to leave the EU" (Brexit). Since then, Brexit and its potential consequences have been subject to intensive debates inside and outside

⁵⁰ Keir Giles. "Russia Hit Multiple Targets with Zapad-2017". Carnegie Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Giles_Zapad_web.pdf (Accessed on 02 August 2018)

⁵¹ Reuters. "Putin, before vote, says he'd reverse Soviet collapse if he could: agencies". March 2, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-putin/putin-before-vote-says-hed-reverse-soviet-collapse-if-he-could-agencies-idUSKCN1GE2TF> (Accessed on 3 August 2018)

the EU, as it may lead to significant consequences for European security and defence. 2) Another important development in 2016, albeit outside Europe, had the potential to weigh heavily on European defence, security and stability. It was the election of Donald Trump as the US President in November.

Many observers regarded Brexit as damage the UK inflicted on itself. The outcome of the referendum is there as a reality and being implemented, although without much enthusiasm on either side, in the UK or in the EU.

Even though traditionally the UK has always preferred NATO as the main organization in charge of European security, its significant military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, and its permanent membership in the UN Security Council, permitted it to contribute significantly, together with France, to the image of the EU as a credible power on the world stage. Therefore, the absence of the UK will reflect negatively on the EU's regional and global image.

The Brexit negotiations are not yet finalized. Therefore, the EU would not like to appear that it attaches very high importance to the UK's military capabilities, at this might be used as a bargaining chip by the UK in the negotiations. Therefore, it is considered likely that the post-Brexit arrangements on security co-operation between the UK and the EU will be postponed until after the Brexit takes places. On the other hand, many consider the Brexit as an opportunity for the EU to deepen its defence co-operation. The overall implications of Brexit on the European capacity to deal with the major threats and challenges it is facing, therefore, are yet to be seen.⁵²

⁵² Patrick Keatinge. (2017). "Finding Our Bearings: European Security Challenges in the Era of Trump and Brexit". The Institute of International and European Affairs. <https://www.iiea.com/publication/finding-our-bearings-european-security-challenges-in-the-era-of-trump-and-brexit/> (Accessed on 09 November 2017)

3.4. Civil War in Syria and Irregular Migration

In Syria, a devastating civil conflict broke out in the first months of 2011. Gradually, it involved multiple states and non-state actors, each pursuing different interests and discourses. This presented a complex picture and led to prolongation of this civil war, as of 2018, for seven years.

The Western powers have failed to act efficiently and to undertake an international intervention, as they did in past decades in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

The USA, under the Obama Administration, had already been pursuing a restrained foreign policy, by avoiding military engagements in international crises to the extent possible. Instead, the Obama Administration chose to rely on international institutions like the UN Security Council and the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), rather than a US-led military intervention, to take the lead in addressing Syria's chemical weapons problem. Contrary to President Trump's frequent reference to realist terms associated with the use or threat to use of force, the Obama Administration's approach was a classically liberal approach. Therefore, even when its "red line" about the use of chemical weapons was violated in Syria in 2013, in co-operation with the RF, the US preferred to get the OPCW engaged in the process of eliminating Syria's chemical weapons (UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013)).⁵³ The US administration's attitude, which was interpreted as the result of its decade of military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, may also be described as the "intervention fatigue"⁵⁴ and it has led to a "power vacuum"⁵⁵ in the region. As a result,

⁵³ "Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2018". Arms Control Association. (June 2018). <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity> (Accessed on 06 August 2018)

⁵⁴ Andrew Dugan. (2013). "U.S. Support for Action in Syria Is Low vs. Past Conflicts". September 06, 2013. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/164282/support-syria-action-lower-past-conflicts.aspx> (Accessed on 04 August 2018)

⁵⁵ Ian Bremmer. (2013). "The global vacuum of power is expanding", May 3, 2013. Retrieved from <http://blogs.reuters.com/ian-bremmer/2013/05/03/the-global-vacuum-of-power-is-expanding/> (Accessed on 02 November 2017)

the conflict has intensified and got protracted in a way unprecedented in the 21st century.

A year after the Western intervention in Syria, in the form of Coalition of the Willing, to combat terrorism, namely DAESH⁵⁶, the RF, which already had two military bases in this country, also intervened in Syria from 30 September 2015 onward and announced that its forceful intervention aimed to contribute to the international fight against the terror organization DAESH.

As a side effect of the prolonged civil war and international interventions in Syria, the irregular refugee issue, has become a most important issue to be dealt with by the international society.

The EU, distracted by some other major issues such as the economic/financial crisis and Brexit, has once again proven unable to efficiently address a major issue in its immediate neighbourhood, even to properly counter some of its side effects, such as terror attacks and the irregular flow of refugees. It could not develop an effective response to the migration crisis, which became more visible in 2015 and 2016, other than seeking a deal with Turkey and working with NATO to deploy a mission to the Aegean Sea to help curb the irregular refugee flow.⁵⁷

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's humanitarian approach, a kind of open door policy toward Syrian refugees, turned into a most contentious issue in Germany and the EU. It played a significant role in the election campaign ahead of Federal Parliamentary elections held in September 2017, and in subsequent protracted coalition talks in 2017 and later in 2018. Due to the rising illiberal movements across Europe, the refugee policy remains a most controversial issue in many EU countries. Even President Trump criticized Chancellor Merkel for her migration/refugee policy, claiming that the migration/refugee flow in 2015-2016

⁵⁶ This terror organization is widely referred to as IS (Islamic State) or ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) as well.

⁵⁷ "NATO's Deployment in the Aegean Sea. Fact Sheet", July 2016. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-aegean-sea-eng.pdf (Accessed on 01 August 2018)

has deeply affected European culture, and Chancellor Merkel's policy was seen by potential immigrants and refugees in the Middle East and Africa as an incentive to seek ways to reach Europe.⁵⁸

According to UNCHR figures, by December 2017, the number of Syrian refugees seeking asylum in EU countries reached 1 million. As of March 2018, UNHCR estimated the number of Syrian refugees worldwide around 5.6 million.⁵⁹ 3,5 million of these refugees are in Turkey and, as part of the Turkey-EU refugee deal of March 2016, are being taken care of by Turkey, with the EU providing some financial assistance.⁶⁰

Redistribution of refugees within the EU has become another divisive issue among EU countries, many of which accused Chancellor Merkel of not consulting with them adequately and in advance. The refugee influx Europe experienced in 2015-2016 was described by some as the worst refugee crisis affecting Europe since WWII. It was also argued that a refugee crisis of this magnitude had the potential to destroy the entire European integration project as the EU's asylum policy had many shortcomings.⁶¹

According to a new survey carried out in 2018, while Europeans maintain diverging views about the security challenges facing Europe, the single security challenge that worries them most is irregular migration.⁶²

⁵⁸ Jon Stone. (2018). "Trump attacks Angela Merkel for giving sanctuary to refugees". (June 18, 2018). <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/trump-angela-merkel-germany-refugees-sanctuary-twitter-us-immigration-a8404501.html> (Accessed on 06 August 2018)

⁵⁹ "Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions". http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions (Accessed on 05 August 2018)

⁶⁰ "The EU-Turkey refugee agreement: A review". March 18, 2018. <https://www.dw.com/en/the-eu-turkey-refugee-agreement-a-review/a-43028295> (Accessed on 05 August 2018)

⁶¹ Arne Niemann and Natascha Zaun. (2017). "EU Refugee Policies and Politics in Times of Crisis: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives". *Journal of Common Market Studies*, JCMS 2018 Volume 56. Number 1. pp. 3–22 DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12650 (Accessed on 06 August 2018)

⁶² Pawel Zerka . (2018). "Destination unknown: The EU's many-faceted migration fears". ECFR, 31st July, 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_destination_unknown_eu_many_faceted_migration_fears (Accessed on 03 August 2018)

3.5. Terrorism

The “war on terror” has become a strong common denominator among the international community, and particularly in transatlantic relations since the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001. While this term was popularized by the George W. Bush administration, some European governments (especially Germany) have resisted using it.⁶³

NATO invoked its Article 5 collective defence mechanism for the first time in its history after these attacks. The specific steps taken in conjunction with Article 5 in September 2001 included backfilling U.S. capabilities that were diverted to Afghanistan and organizing naval patrols in the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavour). Subsequently, the USA, supported by its Allies, led an intervention in Afghanistan to combat and eradicate the terrorist organization, Al Qaeda/Taliban, which was believed to have perpetrated the terrorist attacks on the USA and based in Afghanistan.⁶⁴ NATO Allies offered a deep sympathy and solidarity to the USA and gave strong support to the US intervention in Afghanistan.

In supporting NATO or US-led Coalition of the Willing operations out of the NATO area, the two traditional military powers in the EU, France and the UK, have not had major problems in terms of national procedures and capabilities. Both countries, drawing on their historical experience of military interventions, maintain capable and deployable forces. Germany, however, due to its military history particularly in WWII, has been distant to the idea of sending its troops abroad. Nevertheless, despite the technical and legal obstacles that it has faced, Germany has changed its traditional position and stood by the USA. With a view to enabling such a change the German Constitutional Court passed a new decision in 2003

⁶³ "War on Terrorism". <https://www.globalpolicy.org/war-on-terrorism.html> (Accessed on 02 August 2018)

⁶⁴ "Collective defence - Article 5". https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_110496.htm (Accessed on 06 August 2018)

similar to the one it adopted in 1994 on deployment of the German troops abroad.⁶⁵ On the other hand, it would be incorrect to state that the major European powers have always been in full agreement with the US with regard to its international interventions. Therefore, at times, the US officials had to resort to divisive rhetoric, describing Europe in two camps like “Old” and “New” Europe and threatened the “old Europe (Western Europe)” to move ahead with the “new Europe (Eastern Europe)” in case the old Europe does not provide support to US policies and go ahead with the USA in carrying out international interventions, as was the case regarding the intervention in Iraq.⁶⁶

The fight against terrorism continues to serve as a strong common denominator for the international community. Two great powers, the USA and RF, have been co-operating very closely in Syria in their efforts to counter and eliminate the terrorist threat posed by DAESH. NATO and some of its members also support the Global Coalition against DAESH in Syria.⁶⁷

Coupled with the refugee crisis, the international community witnessed the birth and rise of a new terror organization, DAESH in Syria, which has perpetrated a series of terrorist attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016, namely in Paris, repeatedly in Ankara and Istanbul, in Brussels, and in Berlin. These attacks have been considered as attacks on all of Europe. In fact, combating terrorism particularly since 9/11 has been a high priority for the EU as well. Accordingly, the USA, the EU and NATO decided to act against this new terror organization. Once

⁶⁵ Ekkehard Brose. (2013). “When Germany Sends Troops Abroad - The case for a limited reform of the Parliamentary Participation Act”, p. 7. Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik (SWP) Research Paper 2013/RP 09, September 2013, 21 Pages. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/reform-of-the-parliamentary-participation-act/> (Accessed on 02 August 2018)

⁶⁶ Mustafa Türkeş. (2005). ““New vs. Old Europe”: Contested Hegemonies and the Dual Guarantee Strategy of the East European Countries”. *International Problems*, No. 3, 2005. IPE, Institute of International Politics and Economics. Retrieved from https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/mpro_sa05_3.htm#_ftn1.

⁶⁷ “Global Coalition against DAESH”. <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/home/> (Accessed on 29 July 2018)

again, the common denominator of fighting terrorism contributed to the strengthening of transatlantic relations.⁶⁸

3.6. Threats in Cyberspace

Cyber security is high on the respective agendas of both the EU and NATO as they constantly seek to identify and address new threats. It also appears prominently on the common agenda of co-operation between these two organizations, which in February 2016 concluded a Technical Arrangement, and on that basis are strengthening their joint work on cyber security, particularly in the areas of training, information exchange, research and exercises.⁶⁹

The EU Global Strategy of 2016 ascribes a priority to cyber security. It tries to strike a balance between its preventive work on cyber security including assistance to member states in protecting themselves against cyber threats, on the one hand, and maintaining a free and safe cyberspace, on the other.⁷⁰

When one looks at the other side of the Atlantic, cyber security issues appear very high on the agenda of politics and society. It is mainly because President Trump, since the beginning of his term, has been dealing with serious difficulties resulting from the allegations about the Russian involvement in the US Presidential elections held in November 2016. Multiple federal units have been undertaking inquiries regarding whether any foreign power interference in the US elections took place.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Frank Düvell. (2017). “The EU’s International Relations and Migration Diplomacy at Times of Crisis: Key Challenges and Priorities”. *Perceptions*, Winter 2017. <http://sam.gov.tr/category/publications/perceptions/> (Accessed on 04 August 2018)

⁶⁹ “Cyber defence”. https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_78170.htm (Accessed on 06 August 2018)

⁷⁰ “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, 2016, p. 21. <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>

⁷¹ Jonathan Masters. (2018). “Russia, Trump, and the 2016 U.S. Election”. Council on Foreign Relations, February 26, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-electionBackgrounder> (Accessed on 01 August 2018)

US intelligence and law enforcement officials believe that the RF was behind organized digital attempts to interfere in the 2016 Presidential elections and have warned that Russia will seek to disrupt the midterm elections to be held in November 2018. Senior intelligence also informed the US Congress that “hostile actors consider elections as opportunities to undermine democracy”.⁷² This type of digital attacks on the sensitive targets in the liberal states, whose systems and digital infrastructure tend to be more open to the world, thus more vulnerable, has led to the birth of a new term called “sharp power”.⁷³

In a special report on countering Russia's hybrid threats, Lord Jopling (UK), Special Rapporteur at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, suggested the Assembly in Warsaw/Poland on 26-27 May 2018, that the Alliance should consider a new collective "*Article 5B*" defence provision to trigger a collective response in the event of so-called "hybrid warfare" attack. Along a similar line, in March 2018, US General Curtis Scaparrotti, the commander of NATO forces in Europe, stated that NATO allies continue their joint work to decide when a cyber-attack should elicit a collective response under Article 5 from the allies.⁷⁴

The 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels came also against a backdrop of increasing concern about growing Russian assertiveness in the areas of hybrid and cyber warfare.

In NATO Joint Declaration issued by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit held in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018, the word “cyber” was

⁷² Jeremy B White. (2018). “Top US commander in Europe says Washington lacks ‘effective’ coordination on Russian cyber-attacks”. March 08 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/russia-cyberattacks-election-2018-curtis-scaparrotti-congress-a8246691.html> (Accessed on 01 August 2018)

⁷³ Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig. (2017). “The Meaning of Sharp Power-How Authoritarian States Project Influence”. November 16, 2017). <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power> (Accessed on 10 January 2018)

⁷⁴ “NATO should adopt hybrid warfare trigger: special rapporteur”. Agence France-Presse, May 29, 2018. <https://www.defencetalk.com/nato-should-adopt-hybrid-warfare-trigger-special-rapporteur-71706/> (Accessed on 02 August 2018)

mentioned 26 times and the word “terrorism” 24 times.⁷⁵ At the Summit, NATO Allies also reached an agreement to set up create a new Cyberspace Operations Centre as part of NATO’s strengthened Command Structure. These steps may be interpreted as signs of the importance the Alliance attaches to the issue of cyber security, in the face of allegations about Russian intervention in the political processes in the USA and European countries.

The list of major challenges facing the EU and NATO discussed briefly above is not exhaustive. Furthermore, each organization, due to its different characteristics, may pursue other objectives independently. In any case, on issues of common interest or concern they co-ordinate and co-operate closely. In the context of this thesis, a selected list of challenges is considered because it would not be possible to focus on all security items on the agenda of these organizations, ranging from North Korea to the Middle East, from preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet area.

In the following Chapter 4, EU security policies, arrangements and tools will be considered. The EU has been making efforts to develop its strategic autonomy and to acquire capabilities that would best correspond to such a notion. Ultimately the EU aims to have the in-house capabilities to launch and carry out military or peacekeeping or civilian operations without having to resort to NATO’s assets, capabilities and infrastructure. Accordingly, the next Chapter will examine how far the EU has gone in the direction of self-sufficiency.

⁷⁵ “NATO Brussels Summit Declaration”. (July 11, 2018). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm (Accessed on 14 July 2018)

CHAPTER 4

THE EU SECURITY POLICIES, ARRANGEMENTS AND TOOLS

4.1. Overview

Since 1949, EU defence and security policies have been developed under the shadow of NATO and within the limited space allowed by the Alliance and its leader, the USA. Since the 1990s, successive American administrations have, on the one hand, encouraged European states to develop their own capabilities, but on the other hand, always put a strong emphasis on the need to avoid duplication. In other words, aspiring to achieve its strategic autonomy and avoiding duplication of NATO's assets and capabilities have become a permanent dilemma for the EU.

In 1999, the then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright defined the parameters in which the EU could develop its defence and security framework, structure and capabilities. She announced the "3 Ds" to set the EU's framework. According to this US position, the EU's objective should not "duplicate" NATO assets, not "discriminate" against non-EU NATO members and not "decouple" the EU from the transatlantic security architecture.⁷⁶

It may be useful to keep in mind that the US position was declared in the form of the 3 Ds after France and the UK adopted the St. Malo Declaration in December 1998 in an effort to strengthen the EU's capabilities in the field of security and defence, and to ensure that the EU would play a more prominent role on the global stage.

⁷⁶ Can Buharalı. (2010). "Better NATO-EU relations require more sincerity". Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (October 2010). www.gmfus.org/file/2082/download (Accessed on 05 August 2018)

Under such a restrictive environment, the EU's defence and security pillar has remained among the least developed areas of integration. On the other hand, the EU's key countries like the UK, France and Germany had their own differences of opinion and unique approaches on what and how to develop under the EU's security and defence pillar. Despite all these challenges and obstacles, the EU has made a lot of progress and therefore, some described the creation of ESDP/CSDP as Europe's military revolution⁷⁷.

Thanks to the St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 and subsequently the introduction of new provisions in the Lisbon Treaty, such as a Mutual Defence Clause, Article 42 (7), inspired by NATO's concept of collective defence, the EU efforts in the area of CSDP have gained momentum, and the EU has been able to deploy several missions in the regions of primary interest. Therefore, when the outcome of the referendum in the UK on whether to leave turned out to be "leave" (Brexit), it came as a blow to the EU's plans and strategies, the implementation of which required strong participation by the UK. The UK is supposed to leave the EU in 2019, and some tough negotiations on the terms of the UK's separation from the EU are currently underway. On the other hand, the EU needs to undertake reforms, especially after the economic and financial crisis it has gone through since 2008/2009.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Donald Trump was elected as the new President in November 2016. During his election campaign and after he was elected, President Trump called NATO "obsolete", questioned the usefulness of the Alliance and the burden-sharing among the NATO members with regard to

⁷⁷ G. Andréani, C. Bertram and C. Grant. (2001). "Europe's Military Revolution", p.8, 38. Centre for European Reform, London. http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/p22x_military_revolution-1955.pdf (Accessed on 12 June 2018)

European security.⁷⁸ He has also demonstrated his lack of correct understanding of NATO financing, thus, frequently accusing Allies of owing “back dues” to the Alliance or the USA. This has shaken the confidence of NATO’s European members in the USA’s commitment to European defence and security.

Under such circumstances, in France, Emmanuel Macron, the former Minister of Economy, was elected as the new President. President Macron had ideas and proposals to reform the EU to enable it to play more prominent roles on the world stage. He came up with a motto, “the EU that protects.”⁷⁹ He was aware of course that such an EU would cost more to its member states and therefore need some additional budgetary resources. In this regard, he wanted to discuss the possibilities of reforms in the EU so that it would be possible to channel increased funds to the initiatives and projects aiming to reinforce the EU’s defence capabilities.⁸⁰ President Macron, however, had to wait, because his major counterpart in the EU, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was busy with her own election campaign, as federal Parliamentary elections were due to be held in Germany on 24 September 2017. Chancellor Merkel needed additional months after the elections to form a coalition government, and after very difficult negotiations, the new German government was set up with the signature of a coalition protocol on 14 March 2018.⁸¹

As a result, President Macron, after delivering his famous speech in Sorbonne University on 26 September 2017 about the role of the EU in the world,

⁷⁸ See footnote 1.

⁷⁹ Macron's portrait of a Europe that protects people April 17, 2018. <https://www.euronews.com/2018/04/17/macrons-portrait-of-a-europe-that-protects-people> (Accessed on 15 May 2018)

⁸⁰Dempsey, Judy. (2017). “Waiting for Berlin”. Carnegie Europe. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/74647?lang=en> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

⁸¹Koalitionsvertrag (“Coalition Agreement”) vom 14. März 2018. https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/2018/03/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6 (Accessed on 05 August 2018)

just two days after the German parliamentary elections, could not take meaningful action immediately, due to the absence of a truly engaged German counterpart.

On the other hand, some both in Germany and France believe that Germany has been risking the friendship of France. Referring to Adenauer and de Gaulle, Giscard d'Estaing und Schmidt, Mitterrand und Kohl, Merkel und Sarkozy, they recall that for decades French and German top politicians extended their hands to each other. Sister city relationships have been established, student exchange programmes have been implemented, the two peoples even had a joint TV broadcaster. This way it seemed that two archenemies had become close friends. Despite these efforts, in recent years in Germany, the French people have been criticized very heavily and attached a negative image. French opinion makers tend increasingly to believe that Germany has lost interest in bilateral friendship and co-operation and does not want to share its success with France, instead defining economic and social policies without regard to the sensitivities of its neighbour. Observers noted an anti-German tone in the French election campaign in 2017 for the first time in decades. Therefore, those who still find Franco-German relations important for all of Europe encourage the German government and people to make efforts to maintain the Franco-German friendship and note that only if Germany and France shore up their weakening bilateral relationship can the entire European integration project again be stabilized.⁸²

4.2. Evolution of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU was established in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty. CFSP aims “to preserve peace and

⁸² Georg Blume. (2017). *Der Frankreich-Blues, Wie Deutschland eine Freundschaft riskiert.* Körber Stiftung Publication, 224 pgs.

strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”.⁸³

In the 1990s, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was developed as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Its primary focus was on military and civilian crisis management operations and a coherent approach to creation of necessary structures and necessary capabilities.⁸⁴

In December 1998, the French-British Summit in St Malo set up the framework and main objectives of the ESDP. In that period, the ESDP was simultaneously developed within the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO.

Within this overall framework, with a view to clarifying common European objectives to be pursued under the ESDP, the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted on 12 December 2003, entitled “a secure Europe in a better world,” aimed to define the political framework of the ESDP.⁸⁵

The purpose of the ESP was defined as “add to the range of instruments already at the EU’s disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the CFSP, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged.”⁸⁶

Even though it was created to ensure that over time Europe could take care of its own security and play important roles at the global stage, soon after its introduction, it was recognized that the responsibilities foreseen through the ESDP

⁸³ “Common Foreign and Security Policy, preserving peace and security”. October 13, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/common_foreign_and_security_policy_en.htm (Accessed on 7 August 2018)

⁸⁴ “Common Foreign and Security Policy”. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-foreign-security-policy-cfsp/420/common-foreign-and-security-policy-cfsp_en (Accessed on 7 August 2018)

⁸⁵ “European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World”. <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world> (Accessed on 7 August 2018)

⁸⁶ “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP”. December 16, 2002. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm (Accessed on 7 August 2018)

were too ambitious for the EU considering its reach and capabilities. As a result, EU security had to rely on the USA / NATO as usual.⁸⁷

At the same time, ESDP became a controversial and problematic matter in transatlantic relations. Ambiguities in strategic thinking on both sides of the Atlantic have somehow undermined mutual confidence and trust. The traditional US dilemma about whether to emancipate and empower the EU in developing its own defence and security capabilities has been evident. On the European side, the uncertainty prevailed about how far they could go without duplicating NATO's assets, capabilities and functions.⁸⁸

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 01, 2009, the EU's ESDP became the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Treaty also introduced Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a new tool to improve the capabilities of member states interested in enhancing their military capabilities, so that they can advance military integration and co-operation within the framework of the EU. Moreover, the position of the High Representative was strengthened in an effort to expedite decision-making.⁸⁹

The Lisbon Treaty also took over the Western European Union's (WEU) mutual defence concept. The WEU, a European defence alliance of ten member states, founded in 1948 and modified in 1954, provided the framework for the creation of a European defence policy. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty,

⁸⁷ Saragkas Constantinos. (2010). "European Security and Defense Policy: Created with the United States or Against the United States?", p. 6. Research Institute for European and America Studies (RIEAS), Research Paper No. 147. November 2010. (Accessed on 17 March 2018)

⁸⁸ Ingo Peters. (2004). "ESDP as a Transatlantic Issue: Problems of Mutual Ambiguity", p. 381. *International Studies Review* (2004) 6, 381–401 (Accessed on 18 March 2018)

⁸⁹ Sven Biscop. (2009). "From ESDP to CSDP: Time for some Strategy". (December 2009). <https://www.diploweb.com/From-ESDP-to-CSDP-Time-for-some.html> (Accessed on 07 August 2018)

these functions were incorporated into the EU, and the WEU was abolished in 2011.⁹⁰

The mutual defence clause contained in the Lisbon Treaty's Article 42 (7) resembles the collective defence provision of Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty. In fact, such an understanding was included in the WEU's defence concept, and after the WEU was dissolved and incorporated into the EU, this fundamental notion was reflected in the Lisbon Treaty. The mutual defence clause deals with external threats, including an attack or armed aggression aimed at the territory of an EU member state. In such a case, other EU members bear an obligation to aid and assist the attacked member state by all means in their power. It is binding on every EU member. It must, however, be consistent with the commitments assumed by those EU states that are also NATO members. The reference to NATO commitments of EU members indicates that NATO was regarded as the foundation of European collective defence.⁹¹ As a supplementary provision, the solidarity clause set forth in Article 222 of the same Treaty stipulates that "EU members are committed to acting jointly where an EU country is the victim of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster."⁹²

In fact, the evolution of the EU's security and defence policy into the CSDP as its current form demonstrates a fundamental transformation from a purely civilian power into different kind of power combining civilian and military capabilities. In this regard, the EU appears to have moved closer to its goal of achieving strategic autonomy. With Brexit, it has the opportunity to enhance its

⁹⁰ "Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy". Western European Union. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en (Accessed on 07 August 2018)

⁹¹ "Mutual defence clause". https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/mutual_defence.html (Accessed on 07 August 2018)

⁹² "The Lisbon Treaty, Article 222". <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-union/title-7-solidarity-clause/510-article-222.html> (Accessed on 15 April 2018)

military capabilities further and change the nature of its relationship with NATO, by reducing its dependence on NATO assets and capabilities in planning and deploying its missions. Achieving this will surely take time and will depend on the political will of the EU members, as well as the strategic vision of the USA toward European security.⁹³

Some explain the lack of ambition with regard to the objectives and tools the CSDP as a “governance gap.” In this view, the main reason behind the EU’s ineffectiveness as a security actor in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond is not the absence of capabilities or budgetary resources, but the lack of political will on the part of a core group of member states. The member states have different strategic cultures, pursue different interests and have different visions of CSDP.⁹⁴

In an increasingly volatile neighbourhood, the EU’s recent record of CSDP deployments has not been impressive. The consequences of the prolonged civil war in Syria, like terror attacks, irregular migration and regional instability, suggest that the EU is not yet capable of responding to a major crisis where the deployment of large-scale, high-intensity operations is called for.

4.3. EU Security Strategy (ESS) and Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)

In December 2003, the EU adopted its first Security Strategy (ESS) at the end of a process led by its then-High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana (Spain). The document contributed to the definition of the EU ESDP’s political framework.

⁹³ Anne Deighton. (2002). “The European Security and Defence Policy”, p. 719. *JCMS* 2002 Volume 40. Number 4. pp. 719–41 (Accessed on 15 April 2018)

⁹⁴ Giovanni Faleg. (2013). “The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence”. *Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)*, No. 310, December 17, 2013 (Accessed on 30 January 2018)

13 years later, in September 2016, the EU adopted another milestone document: A Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (EUGS).

As a brief background to publication of the EUGS, it would be useful to consider an important event in summer 2016. In June 2016, a major development, which was the first of its kind and came as an earthquake in the European integration process, took place. It was the referendum held in the UK on whether to leave the EU (Brexit) or stay in the EU (Bremain). The Brexit camp won the referendum by a narrow margin (51.6%). Brexit has dealt a serious blow to the vision that the EU must irreversibly deepen its integration and remains attractive to potential new members. The impact of Brexit on CSDP will be examined in further detail in the next chapters. At this point, it is sufficient to note that the adoption and publication of the EUGS in September 2016, soon after the Brexit decision in the UK, was a message to EU citizens and the world outside the EU that the EU remains strong, despite the British decision to leave the EU, and determined to move ahead with deeper integration in the areas of foreign and security policy. In fact, the statements by Federica Mogherini (Italy), High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy, who took over the function from her predecessor Catherine Ashton (UK) in 2014, reflects the EU's concern about the negative light in which the UK referendum's outcome would cast the EU regionally and globally. High Representative Mogherini considers the EUGS instrumental in giving new momentum to European integration process after the British referendum, and a good response to those predicting the irreversible dissolution and inevitable collapse of the EU. As a result of intensified efforts, Mogherini in summer 2017 argued that "in the last ten months the EU has achieved more than what it has been capable of delivering in the past ten years. She listed the achievements as follows: establishment of a new command centre for EU military training and advisory missions, progress in coordinated annual review of national defence budgets and

advanced preparations Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence and security matters.”⁹⁵

In fact, in line with its ESDP / CSDP, the EU over the past decades has developed various policies, tools and approaches to address the security challenges it faces. The EUGS may have been a good response to the false expectations that the EU would collapse after the British referendum of June 2013. It has, however, given an uncertain and vague perspective in terms of the EU’s objective of achieving strategic autonomy, as it does not contain ambitious plans or a clear timeline to reach the ultimate target. On the contrary, the EUGS states that:

“The EU will invest further in strong bonds across the Atlantic, both north and south. A solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to effective global governance. NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world. The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security.”⁹⁶

On the other hand, the EUGS recognizes the importance of building up a credible defence capability for the EU in maintaining a sustainable and balanced transatlantic relationship with the USA in this area. The EUGS also reconfirms that it will take time and require increased efforts and resources to fulfil the target of strategic autonomy.⁹⁷

4.4. European Defence Agency (EDA) and European Defence Fund (EDF)

The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established on 12 July 2004 “to support the European Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the

⁹⁵ “The EU Global Strategy-Year 1”. <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union> (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

⁹⁶ “The EU Global Strategy (EUGS), Closer Atlantic”, p. 36-37. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 9, 21.

EU's defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as it stands now and develops in the future." Aiming to ensure the implementation of the relevant provisions in the Lisbon Treaty, on 12 December 2015, the necessary adjustments were made to EU legislation by a decision of European Council on the statute, seat and operational rules of the EDA. The EDA offers support to its 27 members in their efforts to advance their defence capabilities through European cooperation. It facilitates collaboration among Ministries of Defence with regard to development and implementation of capability projects. In this sense, the Agency serves as a "hub" for European defence co-operation.⁹⁸

Traditionally, however, defence industries in EU countries have been considered national assets. The member states have resisted close co-operation in this area and avoided sharing the technologies developed as the result of years-long research and investment. Therefore, many have argued that EU defence co-operation has not been cost-efficient and by application of economies of scale, significant improvements could be achieved in the defence industries and military capabilities of EU member states. From an economic perspective, improvements could bring benefits to the member states by alleviating the burden on their respective national budgets and their taxpayers to some extent. Further, given the broad nature of the transatlantic alliance, as a long-term project, the "creation of a transatlantic market for defence industries between the USA and EU" has also been suggested to improve the efficiency of European defence industries.⁹⁹

EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, on several occasions in 2017 and 2018, including at the Munich Security Conference (February 2018), has drawn attention to the same inefficiency problem facing European defence industries and emphasized the necessity of making better use of the tools provided

⁹⁸"European Defence Agency (EDA) - Mission". <https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Missionandfunctions> (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

⁹⁹ Keith Hartley. (2003). "The future of European defence policy: An economic perspective", p. 107, 112, 113. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 14:2, 107-115, DOI: 10.1080/10242690302921 (Accessed on 11 February 2018)

by the Lisbon Treaty. By this, he refers to the mechanism of Permanent Structured Co-operation (PESCO), defining it as a “sleeping beauty,”¹⁰⁰ whose potential should be used to the fullest to move from “patchwork co-operation to integration” in the area of defence. He also placed strong emphasis on the important role the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the newly established European Defence Fund (EDF-set up and announced in 2017) should play in further developing and deepening EU defence co-operation.¹⁰¹

The EDA also exercises an oversight function. The Agency is expected to oversee national defence budgets, evaluate whether participants in defence projects are meeting established criteria, and if not, decide whether to suspend them. In this regard, in the structure of EU defence co-operation and in developing the EU military capabilities for CSDP, the EDA has assumed a role similar to that of European Commission in regard to the single market.¹⁰²

The EUGS attaches high importance to the EDA. Naturally it does not contain any reference to the EDF as the latter was not yet set up when the EUGS was announced. It notes that “gradual synchronisation and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices can enhance strategic convergence between Member States. Union funds to support defence research and technologies and multinational cooperation, and full use of the European Defence Agency’s potential are essential prerequisites for European security and defence efforts underpinned by a strong European defence industry.”

¹⁰⁰ Joseph M. Hughes. (2018) “ ‘Sleeping Beauty’ Unleashed: Harmonizing a Consolidated European Security and Defence Union”. Discussion Paper, C248 2018. Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung Center for European Integration Studies Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn (Accessed on 02 August 2018)

¹⁰¹ “President Juncker at the Munich Security Conference: EU to become more capable of world politics”. February 20, 2018. News from European Union External Action. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/40100/president-juncker-munich-security-conference-eu-become-more-capable-world-politics_en (Accessed on 25 February 2018)

¹⁰² Anand Menon. “Much Ado about Nothing: EU Defence Policy after the Lisbon Treaty”, pp. 133-149. Chapter 10 of publication entitled European Security and Future of Transatlantic Relations. (April 2011) http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_01.pdf (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

The EUGS also underlines the importance of carrying out the EDA's activities in full coherence with NATO's defence planning process and yet notes that a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe's strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.¹⁰³

As an important step in translating the EU's ambitious defence co-operation vision, on 7 June 2017, the European Commission launched a European Defence Fund. Its objectives were presented as spending EU taxpayers' money more efficiently, reducing duplication among the member states and getting better value for money. The Fund will "supplement and amplify national investments in defence research and facilitate the acquisition of defence equipment and technology; act as a catalyst for a strong European defence industry, which develops cutting-edge, fully interoperable technologies and equipment." After 2020, the Fund is foreseen to generate a total investment in defence research and capability development of €5.5 billion per year. As one of the justifications for the creation of such a Fund, the Commission also referred to a Eurobarometer survey of April 2017,¹⁰⁴ which indicated that 3 out of 4 citizens are supportive of the CSDP.¹⁰⁵

4.5. PESCO: What Does It Aim to Achieve?

The EU member states spend a total of over €200 billion annually on defence, the second largest military budget in the world, after the USA. However, national defence budgets are not utilized efficiently. The main reasons for this poor performance are fragmentation of the European defence market, costly duplication

¹⁰³ "The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) - A Credible Union", p. 45-46. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

¹⁰⁴ "European Views: Clear support for a common security and defence policy". June 9, 2017. <https://medium.com/the-latest-eurobarometer/european-views-a-clear-support-for-common-security-and-defence-policy-56bab0ac31fb> (Accessed on 8 August 2018)

¹⁰⁵ "Defending Europe, the European Defence Fund (EDF), Fact Sheet". https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/defence_fund_factsheet_0_0.pdf (Accessed on 8 August 2018)

of military capabilities, insufficient industrial collaboration and lack of interoperability.¹⁰⁶

Well aware of this inefficiency, the EU since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty has been undertaking constant efforts and making progress towards more efficient defence co-operation among its able and willing members.

In this regard, the steps and initiatives like EDA and EDF taken in recent years have been explained above. As a further tool in this area, the Lisbon Treaty's Article 42(6) provides that a group of member states can strengthen their cooperation in defence matters by setting up a permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). PESCO is based on the Treaty of the EU (Treaty of Lisbon-2007) and is therefore, referred to as a treaty-based framework.

On this basis, on 22 June 2017, EU leaders reached an agreement to launch a permanent structured cooperation aimed at enhancing Europe's security and defence. On 11 December 2017, the European Council adopted a decision establishing PESCO. All EU member states except Denmark, Malta, and the United Kingdom are taking part in PESCO, Participating member states agreed on an initial list of 17 projects to be implemented under PESCO. The projects cover areas such as training, capability development and operational readiness in the field of defence. The EU Council formally adopted these initial projects on 6 March 2018. On the same day, the Council adopted an implementation roadmap for PESCO.¹⁰⁷

PESCO thereby allows willing and able member states to jointly plan, develop and invest in shared capability projects, and enhance the operational readiness and contribution of their armed forces. The aim is to jointly develop a coherent full spectrum force package and make the capabilities available to Member

¹⁰⁶ "European defence action plan". <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/> (Accessed on 7 August 2018)

¹⁰⁷ "EU cooperation on security and defence". <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/> (Accessed on 07 August 2018)

States for national and multinational (EU CSDP, NATO, UN, etc.) missions and operations.¹⁰⁸

As noted above, the quick progress achieved in launching PESCO may be interpreted as the first practical implication of Brexit on security and defence co-operation within the EU. Because the UK had been blocking or slowing down efforts to deepen defence co-operation in the EU, the Brexit process has given Germany and other interested EU members the opportunity to reinvigorate such efforts. Through PESCO, EU members will invest more in their own security, and the projects to be implemented under PESCO may contribute to the development of the EU's autonomous defence/military capacity.

PESCO does not aim to create a European army, but rather to strengthen the EU's capacity to act autonomously and react to security issues drawing on its own resources. In fact, the new mode of co-operation simultaneously pursues two aims: 1) support and complement NATO capabilities and 2) enhance the EU's capacity and strategic autonomy as a credible international security partner.¹⁰⁹

4.6. EU-UK Security and Defence Co-operation in the Post-Brexit Period

Building on the previous sections on the EDA and PESCO, it may be coherent to start this section by looking into the possible implications of Brexit on the future EU-UK defence and security co-operation after the Brexit process is completed.

The UK, together with France, has been a most prominent and credible military power within the EU. Even after Brexit, it will remain an important member of NATO and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, thus

¹⁰⁸ "Permanent Structured Cooperation". [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-\(pesco\)](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(pesco)) (Accessed on 03 August 2018)

¹⁰⁹ Gemeinsam stärker durch "PESCO". (2017). <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2017/11/2017-11-13-pesco.html>- (Accessed on 17 March 2018)

actively dealing with international security matters. Therefore, the separation of the UK will be a huge loss for the EU. On the other hand, as noted in the earlier Chapters, the UK's absence may offer the remaining members of the EU an opportunity to move faster to deepen their co-operation and integration in the field of security and defence.

Against this background, the future EU-UK relationship may have implications for the execution of existing common projects and the development and launch of some new ones. Therefore, important economic interests may be at risk, unless appropriate arrangements between the two parties on defence and security co-operation are agreed upon and put into effect. On the other hand, the UK has not been consistent in its policies toward pan-European research and development (R&D) projects under the EDA, and its inconsistent policies have been noted by other EU members. A few third countries like Norway and Switzerland concluded arrangements with the EDA, which give them the possibility to take part in some projects. Such participation depends on invitation by the member states on a case-by-case basis. As third parties, which the UK will become after Brexit, are not involved in project development or prioritization, the UK may face the risk of falling completely out of the European defence projects, because thanks to their improved capacities and increased funds, the EDA, EDF and PESCO may be able to move faster than usual and accordingly, European defence co-operation may gain new momentum. On the other hand, in terms of sensitive technologies, the UK and EU members are interdependent. The expertise of the UK's leading defence industry company, BAE Systems, for instance, in some areas of aeronautics, will be difficult for remaining EU members to replicate or replace. Co-operation on missile technology is another important aspect, and UK Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron, at their Sandhurst Summit in January 2018, particularly highlighted this area for deeper co-operation under the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ "Keeping Europe Safe After Brexit. Findings of a reflection group led by Marta Dassù, Wolfgang Ischinger, Pierre Vimont, and Robert Cooper". Edited by Susi Dennison (March 2018) https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/keeping_europe_safe_after_brexit.pdf (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

As to the co-operation at a more strategic and operational level between the UK and the EU after Brexit, because the UK will remain a key ally within NATO and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, analysts have suggested the creation of a permanent body like an informal European Security Council. According to this idea, this Council could bring the UK and EU members together, so that they could consider common issues of defence and security. Emphasizing the fact that the UK and the EU will continue facing similar threats and challenges even after Brexit, the two parties are also called upon to handle Brexit negotiations without damaging the possibilities of future co-operation particularly in the field of defence and security.¹¹¹

In this respect, the key challenge seems to be development of pragmatic approaches and practical arrangements to ensure the continuity of close security co-operation between the EU and UK. On the other hand, the British armed forces, together with those of France, are among Europe's most combat ready. The UK military maintains significant military facilities around the world. Some argue that a new kind of Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the UK, could offer this country a satisfactory way and level of future engagement, considering its importance for EU CSDP operations.¹¹²

In conclusion, much will depend on the conduct and outcome of the Brexit negotiations and on whether the two sides will identify defence and security as a strategically important area and make maximum efforts to ensure that their existing and possible future co-operation in this area is not affected or undermined.

Building on these debates about the possible impacts of Brexit on European defence and security, it may be useful to study which efforts France has been

¹¹¹ Janusz Onyszkiewicz. (2017). "How Brexit is likely to impact European Security and Defence". July 17, 2017. "The ELN. <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/how-brexit-is-likely-to-impact-european-security-and-defence/> (Accessed on 07 April 2018)

¹¹² Bastian Giegerich and Christian Mölling. (2018). "The United Kingdom's contribution to European security and defence". (February 2018), p. 2, 4, 14, 15. DGAP. <https://dgap.org/en/think-tank/publications/further-publications/united-kingdoms-contribution-european-security-and> (Accessed on 12 April 2018)

making, and whether it has been coming up with new and creative ideas to ensure a strong co-operation in defence and security field in the EU after the Brexit, if possible also by keeping the UK engaged. The next chapter addresses this topic.

4.7. European Security vs. EU Security

The European countries failed between 1950-54 to establish a European Defence Community (EDC-a project of Jean Monnet), one of the founding fathers of the EU), which was then supported by the USA in return for integration of West Germany into the Western European system. The EDC project was voted down by the French parliament in 1954 and then forgotten during the Cold War.¹¹³

French President Emmanuel Macron, elected in May 2017 in the second round of Presidential elections, gave a comprehensive speech at Sorbonne University on 26 September 2017 about how he sees the EU's current and future standing in the world. The timing of the speech was also noteworthy, as it was delivered just two days after Parliamentary elections in Germany. In that speech President Macron summarized his vision, similar to that of Jean Monnet, of "a sovereign, united, democratic Europe." To this end, President Macron wishes to see a Europe, *inter alia*, that guarantees every aspect of security. In the area of defence, he believes that Europe should "establish a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action." New defence initiatives, like the EDF and PESCO, should be complemented by a "European intervention initiative" that will ensure a better integration of European armed forces.¹¹⁴ The

¹¹³ R. Dwan. (2001). Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community, 1950-54. *Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community, 1950-54, Cold War History*, 1:3, 141-160. <https://doi.org/10.1080/71399932> (Accessed on 18 April 2018)

¹¹⁴ Emmanuel Macron. Initiative for Europe A sovereign, united, democratic Europe. September 26, 2017. <http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/> (Accessed on 12 April 2018)

French Strategic Review of Defense and National Security, released in October 2017, put the European Intervention Initiative (EII) on Paris' priority list.¹¹⁵

As emphasized in his speech at the Sorbonne, President Macron is of the opinion that because European integration has gone so far, and national and EU interests have become so interwoven, further and deeper integration would better serve French national interests. Therefore, by referring to the example of Robert Schuman, one of the initiators of the European integration, he emphasized that the times when France makes proposals about the European integration had returned.¹¹⁶ As France has traditionally been keen on its national sovereignty and defence capabilities, President Macron's new ideas and initiatives came as a welcome step for those who favour deeper European integration.

President Macron's ideas and proposed initiatives to deepen European integration in defence and security area seem to be a result of perceived US disengagement from European security. US disengagement inevitably leads to a security dilemma for Europe and triggers debates on how Europe can best take care of its own security. In order to achieve that, Macron also wants to reactivate the traditional Franco-German political axis as a driving force in European integration, based on their comparative advantages (if we can borrow this term from the discipline of economics). In this equation, France would lead on security issues, as Germany can take the leadership on economic matters. Macron sees an urgent need for Europeans to work closely together on defence matters, with a view to ensuring that Europeans can act autonomously as and when necessary. His vision of defence does not aim to replace NATO, but aims to supplement it, in discharge of its

¹¹⁵ Claudia Major & Christian Mölling. (2017). France Moves from EU Defense to European Defense. DGAP Standpunkt, No. 16, December 2017. <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/30276> (Accessed on 18 April 2018)

¹¹⁶ Ronald Tiersky. (2018). "Macron's World-How the New President Is Remaking France". Foreign Affairs, January/February 2018 Issue. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2017-12-12/macrons-world> (Accessed on 18 April 2018)

responsibility and duty for territorial defence, by enhancing Europe's collective capacity to intervene beyond its borders. Apart from his desire to intensify efforts to implement the new initiatives like EDF and PESCO, President Macron also encourages national European armies to remain open to soldiers from across the EU (European Intervention Initiative-EII). In a way, this particular proposal appears similar to the idea of the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) included in Germany's 2016 Security White Paper. In this picture, one should not underestimate the difficulty of drawing up a joint EU military doctrine, since France and Germany have distinct national approaches to the use of force in international relations and interventions abroad. As the history of European integration has on many occasions displayed, differences of opinion among EU members usually end up in agreements based on the lowest common denominator, and this may produce an inefficient EU military doctrine/strategy.¹¹⁷

There are indications that France and Germany have been exchanging views on the term intervention. French Defence Minister, in a speech delivered in May 2018, changed the acronym "EII" to "EI2 (Enable and Enhance Initiative, led by Germany)" and mentioned that the German "sensitivity around the intervention thing" was not yet completely solved. Therefore, some suggest that Macron's project be re-named the "European Security Initiative".¹¹⁸

Some argue that France's vision of "European defence" is somewhat broader than "EU defence." Such an approach seems to be aiming to bypass political and institutional obstacles inside the EU. In this sense, EII operations, if ever deployed, may look like a "European Coalition of the Willing" under French military leadership. Any European defence initiative bypassing the EU and control

¹¹⁷ Daniel Keohane. (2017). "Macron's European Defense Doctrine". September 28, 2017. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/73246> (Accessed on 18 April 2018)

¹¹⁸ Ulrike Esther Franke. (2018). "Pedantry in motion: European intervention hits the language barrier", p.3. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR-www.ecfr.eu), June 07, 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_european_intervention_initiative_hits_the_language_barrier (Accessed on 10 June 2018)

of other member states is, however, likely to be criticized as it may undermine the institutional capabilities the EU is aiming to build.¹¹⁹

In this context, it may be useful to keep in mind that Germany made a similar proposal in 2013, which was called the “Enable & Enhance Initiative (EEI)” and became the subject of German security policy debates. This initiative foresaw efforts to be made at the national and European level, as well as internationally in the context of NATO. At the EU level, Germany introduced its initiative at the EU Summit in December 2013, highlighting its possible contributions to the effectiveness of the CSDP. Since then, the EU has repeatedly stated its intention to expand its training missions and enable partners to prevent and manage crises.¹²⁰ The comparison of these two initiatives proposed by France and Germany demonstrate that Germany chooses to implement initiatives under the EU, whereas France is keen to take the lead on such defence matters.

On the other hand, some draw attention to the fact that former EU military initiatives like Eurocorps and EU Battle Groups have never been utilized as multinational intervention forces, implying that Macron’s EII proposal may share the same fate.¹²¹

On the other hand, EU matters are increasingly politicized in individual EU countries. In this regard, it is important that EU integration in the field of security and defence bear tangible and credible results in the eyes of European citizens. If the trust of EU citizens is gained, it may be possible to further deepen EU integration in this area; if not, public opinion in the member states may demand that

¹¹⁹ Claudia Major and Christian Mölling. (2017). “France Moves From EU Defense to European Defense”. DGAP Standpunkt, No. 16, December 2017. <https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/30276> (Accessed on 18 April 2018)

¹²⁰ Jana Puglierin. (2016). “Germany’s Enable & Enhance Initiative, What is it about?”. p. 1, 3. German Federal Academy for Security Policy, Security Policy Working Paper, No. 1/2016. https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2016_01.pdf (Accessed on 11 June 2018)

¹²¹ Nick Witney. (2018). “Macron and the European Intervention Initiative: Erasmus for soldiers?” Commentary, 22 May 2018. European Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_macron_and_the_european_intervention_initiative_erasmus_for_sold (Accessed on 25 May 2018)

these important areas are dealt with at a national level and an intergovernmental mechanism continue to exist solely for coordination of national efforts in this field.¹²²

In conclusion, even though the EU has adopted and publicized a document called EUGS in September 2016, it is not yet possible to speak about a jointly agreed definition of EU common interests on strategic defence matters, which would facilitate agreement on joint military action or intervention. In 2016, for example, in its efforts to curb irregular migration from Turkey to Greece and then into Europe, the EU remained inefficient and once again resorted to NATO's capabilities for deploying a military mission to the Aegean Sea. Therefore, apart from trying to discuss and converge their significantly different approaches to the use of military force/intervention abroad, which is the result of their respective national experiences, France and Germany will need to achieve much in their efforts to strengthen the EU's and its members military capabilities through new EU initiatives like EDF and PESCO.

¹²² Philippe C. Schmitter and Zo Lefkofridi. (2016). "Neo-Functionalism as a Theory of Disintegration", p. 16. *Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.* (2016) 1:1–29. Retrieved from http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/40332/Schmitter_Lefkofridi_2016.pdf?sequence=2

CHAPTER 5

THE NATO AND EUROPE'S SECURITY CONCEPT AND ARCHITECTURE

5.1. Overview

With a view to better understanding today's security architecture in Europe, with NATO as the dominant security structure, it may be useful to go back into recent history.

Within the overall framework of transatlantic relations, NATO, which was established in 1949 soon after WWII and expanded its membership over the next decades, remains a relevant international organization and plays the most prominent role in the European security concept and architecture. Even though it has enlarged by including new members since its inception, NATO has not accepted any member from any region outside Europe and in this respect has remained a "European" organization primarily focused on the European security, because Europe was most exposed to the Soviet military threat in comparison to other NATO members, the USA and Canada.

The beginning of 1990s witnessed a lively debate about the relevance of NATO given the fact that the sources of main threat to European security, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, were no longer there. Germany was reunified, and the Eastern European countries had new horizons like joining NATO and the EU. Under such circumstances, some Europeans/EU members (then the EC-European Community until 1993 Maastricht Treaty) indicated a preference to develop Europe's own defence capabilities and move closer to achieving its strategic autonomy and ultimately "Europeanizing NATO," the USA was not ready or prepared to disengage from Europe. Several different ideas and competing visions were put forward to shape the new and ideal security structure in Europe. In the

end, however, the US-British model for European security prevailed over the other options. That model was based on the primacy of NATO as the guardian of territorial security in Europe and further foresaw that, while NATO remains the main organization in charge of European security, a European pillar within NATO – ESDI - could be built and simultaneously the EU could consider ways and means to increase its separate and/or separable capabilities either to supplement NATO, or to carry out its own humanitarian or crisis management missions (ESDP).¹²³

In this spirit, over the past decades, the EU, as explained above, has also devoted significant energy and resources to developing its own defence capabilities, and been making quite significant progress towards achieving strategic autonomy from NATO and the USA.

Since NATO's establishment, there have been some major disagreements between its European members and the USA. Two such major differences have been and still are about sharing the leadership and burden.

Until the time of President Donald Trump, who got elected in November 2016, the USA has always been urging its European partners to assume more burden and responsibilities to ensure their own security and not to rely on the USA too much, as “free riders.”¹²⁴

In this context, as agreed at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, by 2024, those NATO members who spend less than 2% of their respective GDP on defence pledged to move toward the 2% target. However, the majority appear not to be in a hurry to meet this target before 2024. As of 2018 5 members (USA, UK, Greece, Estonia and Latvia) meet this benchmark. President Trump, on the other hand, ever since the start of his election campaign, has been reacting to this picture and urging the NATO's European members (and Canada) to meet the 2% target without

¹²³ Stuart Croft. (2000). “The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The return of architectural debate”, *European Security*, 9:3, 1-20, DOI: 10.1080/09662830008407459 (Accessed on 18 April 2018)

¹²⁴ Kim R. Holmes. (2018). “Before Judging Trump, NATO Allies Should Do Some Soul-Searching”. July 12, 2018. The Heritage Foundation. <https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/judging-trump-nato-allies-should-do-some-soul-searching> (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

waiting until 2024. At the last NATO Summit held in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018, President Trump even mentioned that 2% would not be enough and the member states should consider going up to 4%. The new target indicated by the US President reflected his own opinion, not a jointly agreed Alliance objective, and thus it is foreseeable that no other members will make serious effort to go up that far.

With regard to the debate on burden-sharing, the figures from the Cold War period are striking. Between 1975 and 1984, NATO members' defence budgets stood at an average of 4.7% of their respective GDP and the USA's defence budget was nearly 6% of its GDP. Currently, the defence budget of Germany, Europe's wealthiest nation, is about 1,2%, even after increases in recent years. This was above 3% during the Cold War as West Germany faced an imminent threat from the Soviet Union, which was keeping East Germany under its control and influence.¹²⁵ Today, due to the large size of Germany's GDP, going from 1,2% to 2% of its GDP would mean an increase of almost 30 billion Dollars in its defence budget. Yet, in an effort to forestall President Trump's expected criticism, Chancellor Merkel a few months before the NATO Summit stated that Germany is considering raising its defence budget to 1.5% of its GDP by 2025 and to 2% by 2030.¹²⁶ As expected, however, the preventive move from Germany fell short of satisfying President Trump's demand that all members should increase their defence budget to 2% of their GDP as soon as possible, preferably until 01 January 2019.¹²⁷ As a result, this issue remains subject to debate in Germany and other

¹²⁵ J. C. (2018). "Why Germany's army is in a bad state". *Economist*, August 09, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/09/why-germanys-army-is-in-a-bad-state?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/> (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

¹²⁶ "Germany Eyes Goal of 1.5 Percent Defense Spending by 2025". *Associated Press-Berlin*, May 14, 2018. <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-05-14/germany-eyes-goal-of-15-percent-defense-spending-by-2025> (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

¹²⁷ David M. Herszenhorn. "Trump rips into Germany at NATO chief breakfast". July 11, 2018. <https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-nato-summit-rips-into-germany/> (Accessed on 09 August 2018)

NATO countries, whose defence budgets are below the 2% threshold.¹²⁸ It is almost certain that as has been the case to date, President Trump will continue keeping this issue on the agenda and express his criticism privately and publicly to his counterparts in NATO countries. However, President Trump's approach does not appear meaningful due to his lack of proper understanding of how Allied defence budget works. It appears that he cannot see the difference between NATO's budget as an international organization and national defence budgets of the individual NATO members. Furthermore, the way he urges NATO Allies to meet the 2% target before 2024 and even to increase it to 4% also reflects that his approach does not take into consideration economic and financial realities in the majority of NATO countries. By this approach, he gives the impression that his primary objective is not to ensure achievable increases in the defence budgets of NATO Allies, but to demonstrate that he is the unquestionable political leader in the Alliance, whom the rest should just follow and to show to the American public that he is a strong and prominent leader in the international politics.

During the Cold War, NATO allies had other differences of opinion, like how to deal with the Soviet Union, with Europeans sceptical of nuclear deterrence. Some European allies, like France, were disturbed by the political weight and leadership of the USA in Europe. Therefore, France withdrew from the integrated military structure of the Alliance in 1966 and fully returned only in 2009 during the time of President Nicolas Sarkozy. Some thought during the Cold War years that these differences might lead to the collapse of the Alliance, but they did not. The Alliance has proven to be rather resilient and despite all internal and external challenges, firmly stood the test of time and managed to survive until today. The feeling among NATO allies that they are engaged in a common endeavour, represent an alliance of democracies, values and principles, and thereby are a unique

¹²⁸ Alexander Pearson. (2018). "German government feuds over military spending increases after NATO summit". Deutsche Welle, July 13, 2018. (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

political community, has contributed to the institutional stability of the Alliance and kept it solid as a security community.¹²⁹

Today, however, US President Trump is heavily criticized in the US and in Europe for being too tough on allies, whereas he treats Russian President Putin in a friendly way and praises him frequently, despite the fact that the RF violated the territorial unity of Ukraine in March 2014 and annexed Crimea, prompting US and EU sanctions.¹³⁰

On the other hand, with regard to how the EU has benefited from the existence of NATO, first, it needs to be noted that the EU's founding fathers believed that interdependence through integration in Europe mitigates the risk of conflict and even eliminates the danger of war.¹³¹ In line with this vision, the European integration process has been a success story mainly thanks to the US political and financial support and the security umbrella provided by the NATO/USA. Largely due to NATO's strength and resilience, the collapse of the Soviet Union was instrumental in the EU's eastward expansion. As a result, from the original 6 founding members, the EU has over the years expanded to include 28 members, even though the UK is in the process of leaving the EU in 2019. In other words, NATO has significantly contributed to the size and political and economic strength of the EU.

At the dawn of a new century, some argue that NATO has somehow lost its central role as a forum for dialogue and co-operation between Europeans and Americans regarding challenges around the world. In this respect, it is claimed that the USA and EU represent two main powers inside NATO and global issues are

¹²⁹ Mark Webber. (2013). "NATO: Crisis? What crisis?. Great Decisions", p. 32. Foreign Policy Association. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4368251> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

¹³⁰ "Trump Faces Tidal Wave of Criticism over Handling of Summit with Putin". July 17, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-faces-wave-criticism-handling-putin-summit-mccain-romney-gingrich-biden-/29371264.html> (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

¹³¹ Mark Leonard. (2016). "Europe seen from the outside - the British view", p. 3-4. European Council on Foreign Relations, August 04, 2016. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europe_seen_from_the_outside_the_british_view_7091 (Accessed on 12 June 2018)

discussed directly between them without including the other members.¹³² The regular frequency of NATO Summits and other meetings at Ministerial and expert levels, also institutional consultation and co-ordination meetings and mechanisms between NATO and the EU, however, do not seem to confirm the accuracy of this critical view.

Against this background, after examining the role of NATO in the European security concept and architecture, we will consider the potential implications of US withdrawal from Europe, and Brexit, on European security. As usual, in these interesting areas, a researcher of international relations finds an abundance of ideas, suggestions and proposals.

5.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

5.2.1. The Importance of NATO for Europe and the USA

After the end of the Cold War, the security environment changed significantly, but this did not lead to any reduction in NATO's importance. To the contrary, NATO expanded to include Eastern European countries that used to be a part of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, and broadened its area of responsibility significantly.

In contrast to the debate on the relevance of NATO in 1990s after the end of the Cold War, particularly following the re-emergence of an even more assertive Russia under President Putin's rule and the RF's intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, NATO's relevance and importance as a

¹³² Sven Biscop. (2009). "Time for a European Union grand strategy. Ideas on Europe-Geostrategy". <http://europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurop.eu/2009/08/18/time-for-an-eu-grand-strategy/> (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

collective security organization has once again been appreciated, because none of the European countries have the capabilities to deal with Russia alone.

As to the importance of the Alliance for the USA, the fight against terrorism, as announced by the then US President George W. Bush, the “war on terror,¹³³” became a common denominator after the 9/11 terror attacks in New York, and since its intervention in Afghanistan (and Libya), the NATO concept of “out of area” has no longer been seriously debated. None of the member states objected to this *de facto* revision of NATO’s area of responsibility. Some allies, however, expressed reservations over NATO’s transformation into a chiefly expeditionary alliance, both because they were not fully clear about the legal and resource implications (e.g., Belgium), or because they believed NATO’s “core mission” of territorial defence was being neglected (Central and Eastern European allies). In terms of attaching importance to NATO, President Trump’s administration appears to be no exception. Despite the President’s harsh rhetoric and criticism directed at his fellow counterparts from other NATO countries who, in his view, can do more for European security, but do not, the US official position remains unchanged. The first US National Security Strategy (NSS) prepared during President Trump’s term and unveiled in December 2017, strongly underlines the transatlantic ties and the importance of Europe and European security for the USA.¹³⁴

In recent years, NATO has assumed additional roles, like operations against illegal migration in the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas. In 2016, in the face of a massive flow of irregular migration resulting mainly from Syria, Germany together with Turkey and Greece invited the Alliance to deploy a naval mission at the Aegean Sea. NATO responded positively to this request, and under a German commander, the mission has successfully fulfilled its mandated tasks. NATO has

¹³³ See footnote 52.

¹³⁴ “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”. December 2017, p. 2, 25, 47, 48. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

described what was facing Europe as “the greatest refugee and migrant crisis since the end of WWII”.¹³⁵

Largely thanks to the assets and capabilities provided by the USA, NATO, as a collective security organization, is still unique and irreplaceable for Europe. That is why, in the absence of continued US engagement in and through NATO, without putting in place alternative arrangements and significantly strengthening its defence capabilities, the EU/Europe would not be in a position to deter the major threats to its security alone and would be unable to counterbalance the military power of the RF. This imbalance would be most obvious in terms of nuclear arms. Therefore, as noted in earlier chapters, a US decision to disengage from European security may lead to the most serious security dilemma facing Europe and its militarily weak geo-economic power Germany since WWII.¹³⁶

In short, the EU is not yet ready to continue its journey without the cost-efficient security umbrella provided by the NATO. On the other hand, the USA, in spite of all its criticism towards Europe on burden-sharing, still considers Europe a major partner in today’s liberal global order. A US withdrawal from Europe would be a big strategic gain for Russia and leaving Europe could damage the US role as a global hegemon in an irreparable way.

5.2.2. NATO-EU Synergy or Rivalry?

NATO has strong and deterrent military capabilities, and no one is in doubt that when there is political will and solidarity among its members, the Alliance is able to respond any threat coming from an external source.

¹³⁵ “NATO’s Deployment in the Aegean Sea. NATO Fact Sheet”, July 2016. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-aegean-sea-eng.pdf (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

¹³⁶ Constanze Stelzenmüller. (2018). “Germany faces its worst security dilemma since the 1950s”. August 6, 2018, Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/08/06/germany-faces-its-worst-security-dilemma-since-the-1950s/> (Accessed on 07 August 2018)

On the other hand, the EU is still in a soul-searching process in terms of its military role in the current European security architecture; still seeking to achieve strategic autonomy from NATO, it has been caught unprepared for the US President Trump's approach to NATO and European security.

Despite the progress achieved in the past decades, the EU integration process in the field of security and defence has not moved ahead as fast as progress in other areas. The reasons behind this are diverse, and include the UK's reluctance to invest in the EU efforts as it considered the NATO the primary organization in charge of European security, the USA's unclear position towards European integration in the area of security and defence, and differences of opinion among the major EU countries on how to deal with the RF.¹³⁷

In transatlantic relations, ensuring close co-operation and synergy between NATO and the EU in areas of common concern is important. These two key institutions have a common objective, namely ensuring peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Through regular meetings and contacts, they work together and co-ordinate closely to ensure that their activities are complementary and mutually reinforcing. NATO appreciates the EU's increased efforts to enhance its defence capabilities through new initiatives like EDF and PESCO, which will also contribute to the strength of NATO; the EU, on the other hand, values NATO's ongoing efforts, undertaken in a spirit of alliance and collective security, to ensure the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, including through its fight against terrorism. In this sense, the two organizations are aware of each other's important roles and contributions to the maintenance of security and stability in their respective areas of responsibility.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Jolyon Howorth. (2017). "European defence policy between dependence and autonomy: A challenge of Sisyphean dimensions", p. 13. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2017, Vol. 19(1) 13–28 (Accessed on 17 April 2018)

¹³⁸ "EU-NATO Joint Declaration" - Brussels, 10 July 2018. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

In the opinion of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the co-operation between NATO and the EU on military issues has never been closer. At the NATO Defence Ministers meeting held in Brussels at the end of July 2018, Secretary General Stoltenberg mentioned that in 74 areas, which range from cyber-security to joint naval operations and the fight against terrorism, the EU and NATO have been working together and making significant progress.¹³⁹

In the context of the EU's military projects, which are aimed at enhancing the EU's defence capabilities and supplementing NATO assets, the EU Commission proposed to invest 6.5 billion Euro over the next decade in Europe's highways so that armed vehicles could be transported easily around the continent. The priority given to military infrastructure results from lessons drawn from deployment of military vehicles from across Europe to the Baltics in 2018.¹⁴⁰

As they face common threats and challenges, pursue similar strategic objectives through close co-ordination and co-operation, NATO and the EU have achieved a significant level of complementarity in planning and developing their defence capabilities. It is thus fair to conclude that the relationship between the two organizations is characterized more by synergy than by rivalry.

5.2.3. Possible Erosion in the Strength of Transatlantic Alliance

NATO and the EU have been the two pillars of the European security architecture in Europe. The two organizations have been complementary, as NATO remained in charge of hard security and the EU has developed advanced soft-power capabilities to deal with peacekeeping and crisis management operations in Europe's vicinity and beyond, like the naval mission off the Somali coast. Some

¹³⁹ Nato und EU betonen Fortschritte bei Zusammenarbeit, Brussels (dpa), July 24, 2018. <http://www.trt.net.tr/deutsch/welt/2018/06/08/nato-und-eu-betonen-fortschritte-bei-zusammenarbeit-988810> (Accessed on 29 July 2018)

¹⁴⁰ "NATO and the EU have a plan to make it easier for troops to move around Europe quickly if war with Russia breaks out". Reuters, March 29, 2018. <https://www.businessinsider.com/r-with-nato-eu-sets-out-plan-to-enable-faster-troop-movement-across-europe-2018-3a> (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

tend to believe that US President Trump's attitude foreshadows the end of NATO, because his policies and statements undermine the strength of the Alliance and solidarity among its members. The credibility of the Alliance lies in its capability and political will to respond to protect its members whenever needed. President Trump, on the other hand, has even publicly pronounced the option for the US to leave NATO altogether. Possibly because there is no other option to replace NATO immediately, European leaders appear to deny the likelihood of further disagreements with the USA under President Trump's leadership.¹⁴¹

Even though further developments in 2017 and 2018 have not really corresponded to a level that may be described as the end of NATO, President Trump's initial statements have done a lot of damage to NATO's deterrence and undermined its credibility as a collective defence organization.

On the other hand, despite the damage caused by President Trump to mutual trust in Transatlantic relations, Europe's security architecture has not immediately undergone any major change. It remains based on NATO's deterrence and responsibility for territorial defence and the EU's developing "separate and separable" defence capabilities, which are under development through new CSDP initiatives like PESCO, EDA projects and EDF.

In this respect, the EU, as the main beneficiary of transatlantic security and defence co-operation, may need to make increased efforts to keep the USA engaged in Europe. Under current circumstances, let alone reaching the level of US defence budget/GDP ratio, 3,5%, most EU states do not appear to be in a position to make even moderate increases in their defence budget. Even Germany, the economic powerhouse of the EU, seeks an understanding from the US to go from 1.2% up to 1.5% until 2025.

¹⁴¹ Jan Zielonka. (2016). "Europe is no longer safe". Die Zeit, December 16, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-12/democracy-european-union-nato-brexit-donald-trump>.

The irony is that as mentioned above, in 1999, then-US Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced the USA'S "3 Ds" policy, no duplication, no discrimination and no decoupling (of the EU from NATO). After two decades, now it is the EU that is trying to prevent the USA'S decoupling from NATO.

From a theoretical point of view, an erosion of transatlantic security and defence co-operation will lead a serious security dilemma for Europe given the imbalance of military power between the RF and Europe/the EU.

Applying this theoretical observation to empirical developments, considering President Trump'S approach to NATO, of the EU, as a first priority, should do whatever it can to demonstrate to President Trump that having good relations with Russian President Putin does not eliminate the security threat emanating from the RF for Europe and the USA. In the meantime, the EU, as also preferred by Germany and France, needs to give momentum to the implementation of its joint defence projects and think about what the best security architecture in Europe in the absence of the US military capabilities would be. On the other hand, Brexit'S potential impacts may make the EU'S life easy, and therefore, it may be wise to listen to those who advocate that Brexit negotiations should be carried out and concluded in a manner that will not adversely affect the future security and defence co-operation between the EU and UK.

5.2.4. NATO'S "Dual Track" Policy Towards Russia

In December 1967, at NATO a document called the Harmel Report was adopted. It was named after its principal author, Pierre Harmel, Belgium'S then-Foreign Minister. It is considered as a key milestone in the evolution of this defence alliance. Given constant changes in international relations, particularly East-West relations in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the adoption of this report NATO was given a new role in the management of the East-West relations. The new role was of political nature: the Alliance would carry out military deterrence while also serving as a vehicle of political dialogue with the Soviet Union. This strategy proved to be more effective than expected at the end of the 1960s. It contributed to the

management of sensitive East-West dialogue, during the tense Cold War years and facilitated Detente (1967-1979) and ultimately the Helsinki Process, Helsinki Final Act (1975), the birth of Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE-after the end of the Cold War, which became an Organization and was renamed the OSCE). In hindsight, it is argued that the new approach introduced through the Harmel Report contributed significantly to bringing an end to the Cold War and the Soviet Union.¹⁴²

Given the aggressive foreign and security policy pursued by the RF in recent years, particularly since its interventions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been reviewing its policy towards this country and appears to have decided to apply both deterrence and dialogue. In 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed this policy on several occasions. At a press conference on 27 March 28, for instance, Secretary General stated that “NATO remains committed to our dual-track approach of strong defence/deterrence and openness to dialogue, including through the NATO-Russia Council.”¹⁴³ In fact, the Alliance has decided to give a broad response to the RF’s reckless, aggressive and dangerous policies followed in the past years.

Since the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 by the RF, NATO has deployed approximately 4 thousand troops to the Baltics and Poland, as a response to a renewed threat to the Alliance’s eastern borders.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Frédéric Bozo. (1998). “Détente versus Alliance: France, the United States and the Politics of the Harmel Report (1964-1968)”. *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 7, No. 3. Theme Issue: “Changing Perspectives on European Security and NATO's Search for a New Role”. From the 1960s to the Present (Nov., 1998), pp. 343-360. Cambridge University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20081677> (Accessed on 22 February 2018)

¹⁴³ “Statement by NATO Secretary General on further decisions following the use of a nerve agent in Salisbury”. March 27, 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/news_153223.htm (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

¹⁴⁴ “NATO to focus on deterrence, 'managing' Russia ties at summit”. May 29, 2018. <http://m.baltictimes.com/article/jcms/id/141334/> (Accessed on 5 June 2018)

The “dual track policy” towards the RF as announced and implemented by NATO recalls the policy the Alliance pursued in late 1960s and 1970s based on the Harmel Report. When applied for the first time, this policy paved the way for the *Détente* process, and other positive developments in East-West relations followed. Whether the rediscovered “dual track” policy of the NATO will bear comparable results is going to depend on multiple factors, including the course of unusually “friendly” communication between Russian and US Presidents and therefore, its results remain to be seen in the period ahead.

5.3. The EU’s Search for Strategic Autonomy and Transatlantic Relations

Since the very beginning of the European integration process after WWII, integration in the field of security and defence has not always been high on the agenda. Similarly, the progress achieved in the new century has remained limited. Mainly due to the closer linkage of these areas to national security and sovereignty, and perhaps even more importantly because of NATO’s presence, considerable integration under the EU roof in these areas has not been considered possible or likely. Since the end of the Cold War, especially from the 2000s onward, however, the EU has been gradually deepening its integration in security and defence. Security challenges like conflicts in the Balkans and other countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, terrorism and irregular migration, as well as other new threats and challenges like cyber-security that have demonstrated that no country can counter and eliminate these threats alone have given momentum to the EU’s further integration in these areas. The rising strength of the RF in international politics, demonstrated by its aggressive interventions in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond under the leadership of President Putin has been another major factor. The recent rhetoric of the US leadership about disengagement from European security and NATO also appears to have encouraged the EU its efforts to

quickly enhance its defence capabilities and accordingly new initiatives were undertaken.¹⁴⁵

Academicians, thinkers, analysts, observers, politicians, so on, who have been observing the development of EU security and defence policy and trying to understand why Europe felt the need to develop its own defence capabilities, while a robust collective security organization like NATO existed. Some explained this need through the IR theory of structural realism. They argued that “instead of balance of power, balance of threat” need to be focussed on. Even though the EU did not perceive an immediate threat from the USA, its decades-long hegemony in Europe, sustained through NATO, has started becoming disturbing and Europeans decided to take steps to balance the US, so that they could enjoy a balanced partnership in transatlantic relations and affect US decisions on actions it may take with regard to international security and stability.¹⁴⁶

In this respect, the concepts of “balancing” and “bandwagoning” have also been referred to in explaining European instincts as to when to side with or counterbalance the USA. When there was a most serious threat to all like the Soviet Union and expansion of communism, Europeans clustered around the USA (bandwagoning) and felt safer. Once the major threat disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the European states began moving in a different direction to balance the USA, so that they can maintain a healthier and balanced relationship with this global hegemon.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Hanna Ojanen. (2006). “The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy”. *JCMS* 2006 Volume 44. Number 1. pp. 57–76 (Accessed on 27 February 2018)

¹⁴⁶ Barry R. Posen. (2006). “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?”, p. 149. *Security Studies*, 15:2, 149-186, DOI: 10.1080/09636410600829356 (Accessed on 25 February 2018)

¹⁴⁷ Jens Ringsmose. (2013). “Balancing or Bandwagoning? Europe's Many Relations with the United States”. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 34:2, 409-412, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2013.808075 (Accessed on 28 February 2018)

In fact, the USA's attitude regarding the ESDP (CSDP) has remained unclear, because US decision-makers have been hesitant about how far the ESDP / CSDP should be developed and what level of duplication with NATO capabilities would not be considered "unnecessary duplication." Indeed, the USA has been facing a dilemma since the end of the 1940s: it has been pushing European countries/the EU to become a stronger partner by enhancing their military capabilities, while it has been concerned about the possibility that a well-developed CSDP could duplicate NATO and weaken transatlantic ties. Issuance of the Saint Malo Declaration by France and the UK in December 1998 has only deepened the US concerns. Although the EU, at its Helsinki Summit in December 1999, reassured the USA by confirming that it would act and undertake operations only if and when "NATO as a whole is not engaged", even this confirmation could not fully eliminate US worries about potential rivalry of the EU to the NATO over time. The debate held among France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg on setting up "a separate EU operational planning headquarters in Tervuren/Belgium" provoked further concern in Washington. This initiative has been blocked by the UK and a potential source of further disagreement in transatlantic ties has been eliminated, at least until Brexit. Whether the separation of the UK from the EU may lead EU members to revisit this idea remains to be seen. On the other hand, as noted also under previous Chapter, acquisition of more reliable European defence capabilities by the EU enjoys strong support among the European public and governments. The EU's efforts are likely going to be watched closely by not only the USA, but also other NATO allies that are not EU members, like Turkey and Norway. As the EU continues to develop its military and autonomous planning capabilities, it will be inevitable to have closer co-ordination between the EU, the USA and non-NATO European allies (and Canada), as three major components of the European security architecture. Within this framework, NATO would seem to be a potential forum for co-ordinating the interests and initiatives of these actors.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ F. Stephen Larrabee. (2004). "ESDP and NATO: Assuring complementarity". *The International Spectator*, 39:1, 51-70, DOI: 10.1080/03932720408457060 (Accessed on 17 April 2018)

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 and the Libya crisis in 2011, which once again exposed the EU's inefficiency as an institution in the face of such a major crisis, the EU, on the one hand, has been trying to streamline its internal decision-making processes regarding security and defence and come up with a common vision of strategic interests, as prescribed in the 2016 EUGS. Even in the existence of improved procedures and conceptual framework, it remains unclear whether the EU and its major powers will be able to act decisively and effectively in the face of a new crisis. After the international intervention in Libya, the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria have also shown that the EU is slow and relatively inefficient if the USA does not contribute and even lead. The US announcement of a foreign policy adjustment shifting its focus to East/South Asia has to some extent worried the EU and encouraged it to take some new steps, but it appears that it will take many years for the EU to become a major power, which would be taken seriously by the RF in terms of military strength. Especially, if and when the RF is involved in a major crisis, the EU immediately turns to the USA for its involvement and leadership. In this regard, the development of the CSDP and strategic autonomy may not affect the nature of transatlantic relations, as far as major conflicts involving the RF are concerned.¹⁴⁹

Brexit has the potential to expose the EU's military weaknesses and inability to act to respond to major crises in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Its ambition to achieve strategic autonomy is going to be undermined as well. At minimum, it will take time, increased efforts and more funds to achieve it, because Brexit is going to take away up to a quarter of the EU's defence capabilities. France may assume an increased role in this regard, however, it does not have the necessary financial resources and looks to Germany to provide much-needed funds to foster

¹⁴⁹Arnold Kammel and Benjamin Zyla. (2013). "Practising EU Security Governance in the Transatlantic Context: A Fragmentation of Power or Networked Hegemony?", *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. 9 (3), pp. 440-459. <https://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/509> (Accessed on 04 January 2018)

EU integration in the field of defence. Germany prefers to carry out projects aiming to enhance defence capabilities under the EU structural framework.¹⁵⁰

Accordingly, the implementation of the CSDP, after Brexit, would be a lesser concern to the USA, as it will take time for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy and develop a balanced interaction as an equal partner in transatlantic relations. Given President Trump's strong emphasis on the military might of the USA, the EU faces difficult times and stands at a crossroads whether to take tough decisions on whether to follow US political leadership as their strategic interests and approaches in international relations continue to gradually diverge. In this regard, if the CSDP turns out to be a success story by implementing its various projects and initiatives, the EU has the potential to become an increasingly disobedient ally of the USA pursuing its own interests. In fact, it is already possible to observe such differentiation in the approaches of the USA and the EU, by looking at their policies towards North Korea and Iran.¹⁵¹

At this point, in addition to what has already been considered above, it may be useful to take a closer look into the possible impact of Brexit on transatlantic relations.

5.4. Brexit's Potential Impact on Transatlantic Defence Co-operation

Under the previous chapter and section, I examined the possible impacts of Brexit on the security and defence projects and co-operation carried out under the EU's CSDP. In this section, applying a strategic approach, I will try to analyse

¹⁵⁰ Mark Bentinck. (2017). "Europe Stays at Home. The EU's commitment to a rules-based international order is hobbled by lack of strategy and political will by the member states". October 19, 2017. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/73474> (Accessed on 11 January 2018)

¹⁵¹ Barry R. Posen. (2006). "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?", p. 184, 185, 186. *Security Studies*, 15:2, 149-186, DOI: 10.1080/09636410600829356 (Accessed on 25 February 2018)

Brexit's possible implications on transatlantic defence co-operation, including relations between the EU and NATO.

The current major challenges to security in Europe underline the fact that geographical neighbours are interdependent on each other for ensuring their security from all kinds of threats and challenges. Even though the UK is leaving the EU, it is not going to move away from the EU. European security analysts find it important that the two sides are conscious of this reality and carry out Brexit negotiations accordingly, so that they do not weaken European and Euro-Atlantic defence arrangements.¹⁵²

Security analysts consider the implications of Brexit on European security very important. It is mainly because, for the EU, the Brexit will result in the loss of one of its two major military powers.¹⁵³ On the other hand, there is NATO to cushion the likely impacts of Brexit on European security.

In fact, thanks to its advanced military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, the UK has been a major contributor to European security and defence, which has increased the EU's weight and credibility in world politics. Some predict that that as a result of Brexit, the EU's power will be reduced by up to 25 percent. In any rate, it is a significant loss. Therefore, in case Brexit negotiations are not conducted in a spirit of mutual compromise and in a tidy manner, it may reflect negatively on the strength and security of both sides. The EU can be expected to move ahead with its old plan to set up a European operational headquarters, which

¹⁵² Jean Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016). "Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership", p. 2, 10. <http://bruegel.org/2016/08/europe-after-brexit-a-proposal-for-a-continental-partnership/> (Accessed on 22 April 2018)

¹⁵³ Janusz Onyszkiewicz. (2017). "How Brexit is likely to impact European Security and Defence". July 17, 2017. The ENL. <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/how-brexit-is-likely-to-impact-european-security-and-defence/> (Accessed on 07 April 2018)

has thus far been obstructed by the UK, which has viewed NATO as the primary military security organization in Europe.¹⁵⁴

Furthermore, the UK, thanks to its special relations with the USA, has been a leading voice within the EU for the interests of Eastern European countries, so called New Europe. These countries have been looking to the UK for guidance on many issues. In the absence of the UK, the EU will be a significantly different environment for them. The UK has also functioned within the EU as a counterweight to Germany and France, which traditionally favour closer and deeper integration in all possible areas, and its departure therefore worries some Eastern European countries, as they won their independence not long ago after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One can argue that in the post-Brexit period, the UK may still be able to intervene in EU defence projects and initiatives through these countries.¹⁵⁵

With the UK's departure from the EU, even though it will remain a NATO member and thereby committed to European security, France will be the only nuclear and significant conventional military power in the EU. In this regard, France has already started asking Germany to increase its financial contributions to the enhancement of Europe's defence capabilities. New EU initiatives like EDF and PESCO got underway, however, it is not year clear how the USA will react to these new steps. In case Germany provides additional financial contributions to European projects but refrains from making a noticeable contribution within the NATO framework, it is possible that it could elicit further reaction from the USA. As long as the USA remains as a member, the issue of avoiding duplication, on which the

¹⁵⁴ James Black et al. (2017). "Defence and security after Brexit: Understanding the possible implications of the UK's decision to leave the EU - Overview report". Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1786z1.html (Accessed on 15 April 2018)

¹⁵⁵ Mark Entin. (2017). "The European Union is Back in the Game", p. 20-21. Eurasian Studies. November 25, 2017. <http://greater-europe.org/archives/3761> (Accessed on 11 April 2018)

USA is sensitive, has the potential to cause further EU-USA frictions, as the latter expects EU members to purchase major defence products from US companies.¹⁵⁶

Under the current European security architecture, NATO and the EU, even though they co-ordinate to some extent, undertake their own planning in the areas of defence, capability enhancement and operations. The separation of a major player like the UK from the EU may bear consequences on the modalities of co-operation between these two organizations. It might strengthen the relative position of NATO within those modalities. On the other hand, as discussed extensively above, it might also permit deeper integration among remaining EU member states that could in turn allow the EU to become a more credible interlocutor in the NATO-EU relationship. Therefore, as a final point under this section, it appears important to note the fact that the Brexit will further expand the “power asymmetry” between NATO and the EU. A most feasible solution for the EU may be to keep pursuing “strategic autonomy” from NATO, by including the UK to the extent possible, through creative arrangements under EUGS / CSDP.¹⁵⁷

5.5. The US Security Umbrella and Nuclear Capability of the EU

In recent years, particularly between 2015-2017, the RF has modernized and upgraded its military capabilities, including nuclear missiles. Furthermore, particularly since the its intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, it has been pursuing a policy to destabilize its neighbours and to cause fear and anxiety across Europe.

The EU, therefore, may have to seriously examine the adequacy of its nuclear capabilities in case the USA withdraws from Europe/NATO or significantly

¹⁵⁶ Hans Kundnani and Jana Puglierin. (2018). “Atlanticist and ‘Post-Atlanticist’ Wishful Thinking”, p.3. GMFUS, Liberal International Order Project, Policy Essay, 2018 | No. 01. Retrieved from <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/atlanticist-and-post-atlanticist-wishful-thinking>.

¹⁵⁷ Sven Biscop. (2016). “All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit”, p. 443-444). *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37:3, 431-445, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2016.1238120 (Accessed on 25 April 2018)

reduces its commitment to European security. The prospect of Brexit only worsens the situation for the EU.

A major US withdrawal from its commitment to European security would upset the intra-European balances among the major powers in Europe, as could Brexit.

France will remain the only nuclear power in the EU after Brexit. It appears that President Macron intends to continue his country's traditional deterrence policy, based on self-reliance also on nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, under the current circumstances, France may accelerate its nuclear renewal programme, which was initiated under President François Hollande.¹⁵⁸

On the other hand, Germany, which does not have national nuclear capabilities, considers itself in a disadvantageous position both in terms of intra-European dynamics and national security. Therefore, it is argued that this country, which is referred to as “the geo-economic power in Europe”¹⁵⁹ or “economic giant, political/military dwarf,”¹⁶⁰ at some point start seeking nuclear capabilities. In this respect, another argument put forward in Germany is that even today, the French and British nuclear capabilities are insufficient to protect Europe in the face of a Russian attack, and therefore Germany needs to have its own nuclear weapons.¹⁶¹

In the absence of a strong US commitment to European security, with a view to preventing Germany from considering the option of national nuclear capabilities,

¹⁵⁸ Corentin Brustlein. (2017). “France’s Nuclear Arsenal: What Sort of Renewal?”, *Politique étrangère*, 2017/3 (Autumn), p. 113-124. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2017-3-page-113.htm> (Accessed on 21 April 2018)

¹⁵⁹ Hans Kundnani. (2011). “Germany as a Geo-economic Power”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 34:3, 31-45, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2011.587950 (Accessed on 25 January 2018)

¹⁶⁰ “Economic giant, political dwarf. Karl Heinz Bohrer despairs of Germany's conscious provincialism and radical pacifism”. 03 August, 2011. <http://www.signandsight.com/features/2157.html> (Accessed on 03 August 2018)

¹⁶¹ Christian Hacke. (2018). Eine Nuklearmacht Deutschland stärkt die Sicherheit des Westens (“A Nuclear power Germany strengthens the Security of the West”). *Die Welt*, 29.07.2018. <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus180136274/Eine-Nuklearmacht-Deutschland-staerkt-die-Sicherheit-des-Westens.html> (Accessed on 10 August 2018)

France and the UK, as Europe's two nuclear powers, may have to give Germany assurances that their nuclear capabilities will be there to protect the entire EU as a collective security measure, whenever needed.

Given Germany's place in the history of Europe and because Germany is a non-nuclear signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it appears unthinkable that this country will be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. In addition, domestic political environment in Germany is virulently opposed to such an option. The withdrawal of the USA from NATO/Europe and the outcome of the Brexit process may, however, make such unthinkable projections look reasonable.¹⁶²

An EU nuclear weapons programme is another possibility which is currently debated in the relevant circles. If it can be realized, such a plan would foresee the "Europeanization" of France's nuclear capabilities so that it can be expanded and strengthened to protect the entire EU. The command structure, funding and doctrine of this programme would need to be extensively discussed and agreed upon inside the EU. Realization of such a programme would strengthen the EU's sense of self-reliance in terms of nuclear arms and encourage it to further pursue its objective of strategic autonomy. This option may also be helpful for Germany to acquire nuclear defence capabilities through the EU on one hand, and not to violate NPT on the other.¹⁶³

In view of the above, we need to wait and see which road the EU, France and Germany will take in addressing the EU's security dilemma that may be caused by US military withdrawal from Europe, Brexit and threatening policies pursued by a militarily assertive RF.

¹⁶² Andrea Shalal. (2017). "German lawmaker says Europe must consider own nuclear deterrence plan". Reuters, November 16, 2016. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-usa-nuclearidUSKBN13B1GO> (Accessed on 16 January 2018)

¹⁶³ Max Fisher. "Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent" March 06, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/europe/european-union-nuclear-weapons.html>

CHAPTER 6

THE USA, TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND NATO

6.1. Overview

US global hegemony, which was established and maintained after WWII, appears to be ending, without being replaced by another hegemony of a single country.¹⁶⁴

The ideological confrontation between two ideologically distinct blocs no longer exists either. It is likely that the world is heading towards a multipolar order within the global capitalist system, with each major power implementing its version of capitalism.

As mentioned under Chapter I-Introduction, the USA itself is questioning the liberal international world order, which it took the lead in building and actively defending over several generations. International institutions like the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have been well developed. President Trump, the leader of current global hegemon, however, does not appear to believe that the current international setup serves its national interests.

In the opinion of the US President Donald Trump, NATO is obsolete and has become a burden on the USA; the EU is being used by its individual members, first and foremost by Germany, to extract trade concessions from and maintain an imbalanced trade with the USA. In line with this logic, the USA considers even withdrawing from NATO and its commitment to European security, unless European countries significantly increase their defence spending up to at least 2%

¹⁶⁴ Georg Sørensen. (1998). "IR Theory after the Cold War", pp. 99. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24. The Eighty Years' Crisis 1919-1999 (December 1998), pp. 83-100

of their respective GDP, preferably by increased spending on expensive defence hardware from the USA.

In this broad picture the UK's decision to leave the EU, which was taken because of a referendum held in June 2016, came as another shock to the EU and its member states.

In the east, the RF, particularly since 2014, pursues a militarily aggressive stance towards Europe and does not hesitate to destabilize its neighbours and violate their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Following its intervention in Georgia in August 2008, the RF recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia (two regions in Georgia) as independent states. In March 2014, this time it intervened in Ukraine and annexed Crimea, disregarding the warnings from international community and violating Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It further destabilized southern/eastern Ukraine by establishing facts on the ground. The only achievement of the international community was to deploy an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) on 21 March 2014, with a mandate "to observe and report in an impartial and objective way the situation in Ukraine and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the crisis."

In the meantime, the consequences of the prolonged civil war in Syria have finally started hitting Europe very hard. Terror attacks and a massive irregular refugee flow have affected European politics very deeply and influenced the social order and security policies of the EU and its individual member states.

Even though the EU has made significant progress over the past decades in achieving strategic autonomy from the USA / NATO and developing its own military / defence capabilities, it is not yet in a position to balance either the RF, or the USA. Therefore, the asymmetrical relationship between the USA and the EU is still noticeable.

Against this background, US President Trump, who got elected in November 2016, seems to be thinking that in the transatlantic relationship, he has the upper hand. As the EU has been struggling with a multitude of major challenges, President Trump, instead of assisting and helping US allies and partners, pursues transactional policies and tries to extract financial benefits from the EU countries,

targeting particularly Germany. President Trump views trade relations with Germany as unfair, because Germany has enjoyed a trade surplus over 60 billion Dollars in 2016 and 2017, while the USA covers the significant cost of European defence.¹⁶⁵

While President Trump may have a fair point in some ways, what he has been doing and saying has deeply shaken the spirit of alliance in transatlantic relations and institutions, primarily in NATO, and caused deep mistrust between the USA and the EU/European countries.

On this basis, I am going to analyse the current state of affairs in transatlantic relations and developments in European security from the US perspective. Even though in some ways, particularly as far as the burden-sharing debate and US political leadership and hegemony in the NATO are concerned, the Trump administration represents continuity in the US policies towards the transatlantic relations, President Trump's personal style and way of handling bilateral and multilateral foreign relations have been quite different from those of his predecessors and significantly changed the way the USA is perceived in Europe.

6.2. Trump Doctrine

As compared to those of his predecessor, President Trump's policies are based on a significantly different doctrine: *America First*. No formal "*Trump Doctrine*" has been officially announced, but one could be inferred from the statements, policy directions and actions of President Trump and his administration. It is not isolationist, but may be described as "self-interested,"¹⁶⁶ centred on pursuing American interests only, largely disregarding and disrespecting the established international order and multilateral co-operation arrangements. At its

¹⁶⁵ "Trade in Goods with Germany". The US Census Bureau. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4280.html> (Accessed on 11 August 2018)

¹⁶⁶ Jeremy Shapiro. (2018). "What "America First" Will Cost Europe?". June 12, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-06-12/what-america-first-will-cost-europe> (Accessed on 12 June 2018)

core, the new US doctrine foresees that the US should move away from its role as the leader and guardian of multilateral arrangements under the liberal international order, because it does not generate adequate benefits for the USA in exchange for the significant burdens to the budget of the global hegemon. President Trump describes this situation as the USA “being abused like a piggy bank” by other states, including its partners and allies.¹⁶⁷

President Trump seems to believe that unless radical changes are introduced to the current international system with a view to ensuring that it respects US national interests more and generates increased benefits for the US, the USA will gradually lose its privileged global position, which even today can hardly be described as “global hegemon.” Despite this observation, at any rate, the USA is still a great power and will likely remain so in the near future.

In line with the thinking behind it, the so-called *Trump Doctrine* is shaking the main pillars of the rules-based liberal international system. This presents an apparent paradox. The US, the country that promoted and defended this international system until 2016, no longer appears to consider itself responsible for ensuring its continuity. In this respect, Donald Trump is the first U.S. President since WWII to fundamentally question the ideas and institutions of the liberal international order. He opposes this order by advocating the superiority of power and national interests. In his thinking, small and medium-sized countries can only be secondary players, who are supposed to follow the decisions of great powers.

Accordingly, President Trump is sceptical of any and all of the United States’ commitments to multilateral institutions and norms, which in his view, bind the hands of the USA, reduce the anarchy in the international system and prevent it from maximizing its national interests. In President Trump’s opinion, the benefits the USA should gain from the international system must be proportionate to its power, other states must recognize the USA’s financial and material sacrifices to maintain the international order (and security in Europe) and accord the USA some

¹⁶⁷ Donald Trump at G7: “US is not a piggy bank to be robbed”. June 9, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/09/donald-trump-at-g7-us-is-not-a-piggy-bank-to-be-robbed> (Accessed on 11 August 2018)

concessions in trade and economic relations. For instance, he cannot accept the fact that the USA ensures the security of Europe, on the one hand, and finds itself in a disadvantaged position in its trade and economic relations with the EU, particularly its wealthiest member, Germany, on the other. In addition, President Trump, similar his incomplete understanding of budgetary issues of NATO and national defence budget of NATO allies, with regard to economic and trade relations, appears to put overemphasis on trade balances with the EU countries, by ignoring the broader and intertwined web of economic, trade, investment and tourism relations.

Even in his statements during the election campaign and after his election, Donald Trump has gone so far as to say that “NATO was not doing enough in the fight against terrorism, it was ‘obsolete’ and NATO allies were not spending enough on defence.”¹⁶⁸ President Trump’s lack of knowledge and understanding of NATO’s institutional budget, allied defence arrangements and national defence budgets of the individual NATO members has been considered and highlighted above. His accusation directed at NATO of “not doing enough in the fight against terrorism” does not reflect the reality either, given the efforts undertaken by NATO particularly after 9/11 terror attacks. Therefore, his statements and decisions to undermine transatlantic alliance and security co-operation cause deep frustration in Europe.

Those, who criticise the *America First* doctrine, question the rationality of President Trump’s unilateral foreign policy decisions, taken and implemented without consulting the USA’s European partners. In this regard, the EU/European states need to consider developing different policies and tools, enhance their defence capabilities and achieve strategic autonomy and weight in world politics as soon as possible, so that they can become a respected partner in their relations with the USA, and thereby secure their interests by affecting, to the extent possible, the

¹⁶⁸ “The Trump Presidency - Policy Outlook, Scenarios and Possible Implications for the EU”. February 14, 2017. EPSC-European Political Strategy Centre. https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/other-publications/trump-presidency_en (Accessed on 15 April 2018)

US administration's decisions and actions that may affect the international order / relations and their interests.¹⁶⁹

The frequent use of social media by President Trump to announce his foreign policy views and decisions also represents a radical change in the USA's handling of its international relations. On the other hand, since the early months of his term in office, he has been frequently at odds with the members of US Government. This may indicate that President Trump announces through social media his personal views and opinions, rather than co-ordinated and considered positions adopted by US Government. For instance, his constant Twitter messages including threats and military action against North Korea undermined the notion of a well-considered and coherent administration policy and thus somehow reduced the impact of the USA's otherwise strong position and global image.¹⁷⁰

President Trump's haste in making important statements on key policy issues through social media without truly understanding the core and substance of the matters has also given the impression that he is inconsistent in his foreign policy directions.¹⁷¹ For instance, during his election campaign and after his election, he called NATO obsolete. Later, he made statements confirming the importance of NATO as a military alliance. The American media has also criticised his inconsistencies and the calling of the US commitment to NATO into question.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Sven Biscop. (2017). "Trump first". *Global Affairs*, 3:2, p. 109-110. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1336867> (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

¹⁷⁰ Elizabeth N. Saunders. (2018). "Is Trump a Normal Foreign-Policy President? What We Know After One Year", p.4. *Foreign Affairs*, January 18, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-01-18/trump-normal-foreign-policy-president?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20180118 (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

¹⁷¹ Hal Brands. (2017). "The Unexceptional Superpower: American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump". *Survival*, 59:6, 7-40. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2017.1399722> (Accessed on 19 January 2018)

¹⁷² Peter Baker. (2017). "Trump's Previous View of NATO Is Now Obsolete". *New York Times*, April 13, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/europe/nato-trump.html> (Accessed on 13 August 2018)

In this connection, it is also argued that President Trump's worrying and confusing statements on such key matters raise questions about the credibility of US commitments, and thus may reduce trust in US security guarantees to Europe and lead its allies to try to acquire enhanced defence capabilities so that they can become self-sufficient. Such inconsistent attitudes may also cause de-coupling of allies and in the long-run may undermine the US ability to form alliances or coalitions of the willing. Finally, any reduction in the credibility of the US commitments, threats or sanctions may encourage its foes and rivals to test the boundaries of US resolve more often.¹⁷³

According to some analysts, the US shift from multilateralism towards unilateralism may potentially undermine the legitimacy and cost-efficiency of international interventions and initiatives undertaken by the US leadership, as they may cost significantly more and burden-sharing within a coalition of the willing or alliance will not exist.¹⁷⁴

On the other hand, the role of multilateral arrangements/international organizations in restraining the powerful states may generate benefits for all sides. Within alliances, powerful states exercise a kind of self-restraint and thereby do not provoke others' fears or security dilemma.¹⁷⁵ NATO has been performing these functions perfectly as far as transatlantic relations and balance of power are concerned. A US withdrawal from the NATO could trigger security dilemmas in Europe and in transatlantic relations. Even the fear of it has led the EU to accelerate its joint projects aimed at enhancing its defence capabilities.

¹⁷³ Keren Yarhi-Milo. (2017). "After Credibility, American Foreign Policy in the Trump Era", p. 6. *Foreign Affairs*, December 12, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-12-12/after-credibility> (Accessed on 05 January 2018)

¹⁷⁴ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. (2005). "International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism. *Perspectives on Politics*", p. 509. Vol. 3, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 509-524. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689021> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

¹⁷⁵ G. John Ikenberry. (2001). "After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars". Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press (Accessed on 16 January 2018)

Moreover, like NATO members, when a group of allied countries share the same values and norms, their common standards of legitimacy may be rather strong. Therefore, in case such an alliance intends to take coercive action, the intentions and objectives of the coercive policy may be better explained through an international organization. This would give stronger legitimacy to joint actions and interventions as compared to unilateral actions by a single state, no matter how powerful it is.¹⁷⁶

Therefore, if President Trump takes the road of unilateralism and unilateral interventions by alienating the USA's allies, the legality and legitimacy of US actions may face a stronger objection and criticism from the international community. The record of international interventions indicates that mobilizing support may be difficult and time-consuming, and thus may cause delay in undertaking the operations or interventions. However, once formed, a broad coalition may be much better in terms of efficiency and burden-sharing if a state-building process is to be undertaken in the aftermath of the intervention, as was the case in Afghanistan after 9/11 terror attacks.¹⁷⁷

Considering all the points above, it can be argued that explaining the benefits of multilateralism in terms of cost efficiency can be helpful in guiding President Trump to adjust his America First policy, which appears to give priority to unilateral use or threat to use force over multilateral co-operation and action. One can further suggest that the prospect of mutually beneficial transatlantic relations and security co-operation could improve significantly if President Trump

¹⁷⁶ Alexander Thompson. (2006). "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission", p. 4. *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 1-34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877866> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

¹⁷⁷ Deborah Avant. (2006). "The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory: The Democratic Peace, Late State Building, and the Nature and Frequency of Conflict", p. 518. *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 507-528. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446205> (Accessed on 17 January 2018)

appreciates the role of the NATO in fulfilling many critical functions as presented above.

6.3. The USA's Approach to European Security

The USA's new National Security Strategy (NSS) was unveiled in December 2017. President Trump's motto of "America first" is well-reflected in the revised NSS and is expected to impact US-European security dialogue and arrangements. President Trump's demand that NATO allies should reach 2% of GDP spending on for defence without waiting for the agreed deadline of 2024 is also reflected in the new NSS.

The chapter of the NSS 2017 devoted to Europe in summary includes following observations and roadmap:

"A strong and free Europe is of vital importance to the United States. We are bound together by our shared commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. Together, we rebuilt Western Europe after World War II and created institutions that produced stability and wealth on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the menace of Soviet communism is gone, new threats test our will. Russia is using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America's commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments. (...) Russia continues to intimidate its neighbours with threatening behaviour, such as nuclear posturing and the forward deployment of offensive capabilities. Europe also faces immediate threats from violent Islamist extremists. (...) Instability in the Middle East and Africa has triggered the movement of millions of migrants and refugees into Europe, exacerbating instability and tensions in the region. The United States remains firmly committed to our European allies and partners. The NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our great advantages over our competitors, and the United States remains committed to Article V of the Washington Treaty. The United States will deepen collaboration with our European allies and partners to confront forces threatening to undermine our common values, security interests, and shared vision. (...) The United States fulfils our defence responsibilities and expects others to do the same. We expect our European allies to increase defence spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2024, with 20 percent of this spending devoted to increasing military capabilities."

Comparing the main points in the US 2017 NSS to the empirical policies pursued and statements made by President Trump presents a contradictory and incoherent picture. Indeed, President Trump personally has hardly made any strong statements about the commitment to European well-being and security and the

smooth functioning of the international system along the lines formulated so clearly in the NSS.

In this regard, one may claim that NATO has served US interests as an effective organization to fight terrorism, especially since 9/11. Given the potential unilateral decisions about international interventions that may be taken by the US policy makers because of their confidence in the US military might, the existence of NATO may offer the US more good than harm, by restraining the US' use of force, helping it avoid costly unilateral military interventions, which would also suffer from a lack of international legitimacy, and giving priority to soft power, which the EU is better equipped in projecting. On the other hand, it is unclear how much of US defence spending goes to security of Europe. In fact, it may be the case that the huge US defence budget is spent to maintain global US hegemony, which in recent years has pivoted toward the Asia-Pacific region at the expense of Europe. This may change, of course, with the rise of an assertive Russian Federation, which in recent years has invested significantly in the modernization of its army and military capabilities. Indeed, President Trump has recently been giving the signal of increased investment in US defence capabilities.

On the other hand, an unusual pattern has been coming into existence in US-Russian relations. Whereas the established US bureaucracy, NATO and the EU consider the RF and its President as an adversary to the Western world order, values and principles, President Trump frequently praises Russian President Putin and is developing quite friendly personal ties with him. This approach has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of Western measures to counter Russia's aggression and expansionist/revisionist foreign and security policy. A new proposal, referred to in previous chapters, that according to media reporting, was put forward by President Putin to his American counterpart in their meeting in Helsinki on 16 July 2018, to hold a referendum in eastern Ukraine to determine the fate of this region may be just another sign of emboldened Russia.

Discussion of the fate of other countries between the Great Powers recalls practices before WWII and is not in line with the current international order as described in the UN Charter, according to which the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of states must be respected. The Russian President may be trying to exploit the gap between President Trump and his European allies. This may pose a great danger to the security, stability and territorial integrity of European states, particularly those sharing a border with the RF.¹⁷⁸

6.4. Conflicting Interests in Transatlantic Relations

The difference of approach to international issues between the US and the EU has become increasingly noticeable since President Trump came to power. In fact, due to the relatively restrained foreign policy pursued by President Obama because of “intervention fatigue” as explained above, this difference was rather obvious even before President Trump.

President Trump favours unilateralism to multilateralism, as he believes that the latter disadvantages the US in international relations, particularly trade and economic exchanges. The EU, however, prefers a stable and predictable rules-based international order and multilateral alliances.

In this respect, it was argued in 2002 that the EU and the USA should stop pretending they have “shared view of the world,” and should act as their worldviews and perceptions of interests necessitate.¹⁷⁹ Similarly in the same year, it was argued by Charles Kupchan that “the next clash of civilizations will not be between the West and the rest but between the United States and Europe.”¹⁸⁰

With President Trump in power, US policy toward Europe has displayed radical changes. President Trump has criticised governments made up of

¹⁷⁸ “Russia, Ukraine and international law”. Fondation Robert Schumann. February 16, 2015. European Issue no: 334. <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0344-russia-ukraine-and-international-law> (Accessed on 29 July 2018)

¹⁷⁹ Robert Kagan. (2002). “The great divide”. August 10, 2002. The Telegraph. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1404077/The-great-divide.html> (Accessed on 20 May 2018)

¹⁸⁰ Charles Kupchan. (2002). “The End of the West”. The Atlantic, November 2002 Issue. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/11/the-end-of-the-west/302617/> (Accessed on 16 March 2018)

mainstream parties, including the coalition government in Germany, for being inefficient in the face of massive and irregular refugee/migration flows and therefore causing changes to “European culture.” Consistent with President Trump’s unusual remarks on the internal affairs of EU states, the US Ambassador in Berlin, Richard Grenell, has also acted quite undiplomatically, making statements of sympathy and support for populist and anti-European integration movements across the EU.¹⁸¹ As a result, German politicians have called on the US Administration to withdraw the newly arrived Ambassador from Berlin as his interference with domestic politics was unacceptable.¹⁸²

Some relate this unusual US policy to the fact that President Trump’s administration looks at relations with Europe only from a transactional perspective, does not have a strategic vision for European integration and even considers the EU’s institutional entity a “foe” and a “German vehicle,” instrumental in extracting unfair and imbalanced trade benefits from the USA. President Trump’s hostile approach to the European integration project comes in a period when the EU is wrestling with multiple issues, ranging from Brexit and the rise of populist and anti-EU movements, to migration and institutional reforms.¹⁸³

As to the approaches of the EU and the USA towards the RF, despite their differing views, in general, EU countries consider the RF’s military power and recent interventions destabilising its neighbourhood a threat to European security and stability. On the other hand, President Trump regularly praises Russian President Putin and has made efforts to establish friendly relations with his Russian

¹⁸¹ “Trump’s ambassador to Germany suggests he will intervene in European politics to empower conservatives”. June 3, 2018. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/richard-grenell-conservatives-europe-ambassador-donald-trump-a8381821.html> (Accessed on 05 June 2018)

¹⁸² Benas Gerzduinas. (2018). “German politicians call on US to withdraw ambassador”. Politico, May 06, 2018. <https://www.politico.eu/article/richard-grenell-trump-germany-us-ambassador-recall/> (Accessed on 07 May 2018)

¹⁸³ Jeremy Shapiro. (2018). “What “America First” Will Cost Europe?”. June 12, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2018-06-12/what-america-first-will-cost-europe> (Accessed on 12 June 2018)

counterpart. After the NATO Summit in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018, he had a summit with President Putin in Helsinki on 16 July 2018. Particularly in a period when the USA and the EU have imposed and maintain sanctions on Russia after its annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Trump's policy towards Russia and personal high opinion of the Russian President have caused concern in Europe and added another area of tension to the transatlantic agenda.

EU leaders appear not to have given up on President Trump completely. On proper occasions like bilateral contacts or multilateral meetings like NATO Summits, they spare no efforts and try to change his perception about transatlantic relations, multilateral co-operation and rules-based international order. A main argument they use is that the USA and the EU are both stronger and more effective when they act together. President Trump, however, does not seem to be changing his view that European countries, hiding behind EU norms and regulations, have been enjoying an unfair and imbalanced trade relations with the USA and "robbing" his country "like a piggy bank," and that this must end. Therefore, the Europeans/EU have been coming to the terms with the fact that the nature of transatlantic relations is transforming into something that cannot be clearly described at this stage, and that they need to adjust their approach accordingly and engage with the USA in different way.¹⁸⁴

In terms of ensuring Europe's security, the EU/European countries do not yet have a credible alternative to NATO. Transatlantic relations remain asymmetric, in the sense that the USA has the upper hand and the ability to influence decision makers in Europe, although this influence varies from one country to another. Under these circumstances, after the NATO Brussels Summit of 11-12 July 2018, President Trump stated that he might withdraw the USA from the NATO but was not considering taking such a step at this point in time. Being aware of the privileged

¹⁸⁴ Julie Smith and Amanda Sloat. (2018). "Order from Chaos, The United States and Europe still need each other". Brookings, June 11, 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/11/the-united-states-and-europe-still-need-each-other/> (Accessed on 12 June 2018)

and even hegemonic position the USA enjoys in Europe thanks to NATO and the US commitment to European security, he may not really have meant to leave NATO altogether. In May 2017, the Alliance moved to its new headquarters in Brussels, which due to the generous use of glass and steel in its exterior design, is presented as “an image of power and renewal” and cost allies USD 1.45 billion.¹⁸⁵ The real objective of President Trump in making such statements must be to get NATO allies to where he wants in terms of burden-sharing, and also by taking advantage of Brexit, to strengthen US leadership within the Alliance and in Europe so that it can maintain asymmetric relations with Europe.

To sum up, inevitably, the time may have come up for Europe to make a strategic decision on whether to pursue its strategic interests, which, on some critical matters, differ significantly from the policy objectives of the USA. At the end of the 1990s, the USA was working to prevent Europe’s de-coupling from NATO. Nowadays Europe is making efforts to keep the USA committed to European security. It is clear, however, that for both sides, developments indicate increasing differentiation of strategic objectives and interests, which in time may lead to a “mutual de-coupling”.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Robin Emmott. (2018). “New home, but same worries, as NATO moves into glass and steel HQ”. Reuters, April 20, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-headquarters/new-home-but-same-worries-as-nato-moves-into-glass-and-steel-hq-idUSKBN1HR1HU> (Accessed on 14 August 2018)

¹⁸⁶ Jeremy Shapiro. (2018). “Too close for comfort: European geostrategy and the transatlantic alliance”. March 08, 2018. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_too_close_for_comfort_european_geostrategy_in_the_age_of_trump (Accessed on 08 August 2018)

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to research and analyse the EU's security strategy in view of its structure and several new initiatives and considering the major role of NATO in the European security architecture. Accordingly, it has been written drawing on an extensive research by collecting and analysing a broad and rich set of views and perspectives of major stakeholders, interested scholars and thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic.

The course of the past developments surrounding and shaping the European security architecture/arrangements and the substance of transatlantic relations has, in this thesis, been researched and analysed mainly through the application of a realist IR theoretical framework and concepts. "Balance of power," "great power," "hegemon(y)," "relative power," and "security dilemma" are realist concepts, which the reader would come across throughout the thesis in different contexts. The objective of achieving "strategic autonomy," which the EU has reflected in its major treaties and strategies and is seeking to achieve, can also be explained by application of realist theory. This search of the EU appears to result primarily from changes in global and intra-European balances of power. As an ultimate goal, the EU aims to elevate itself to the level of a major power in international politics and transatlantic relations, so that it does not have to follow US leadership each time, but instead is treated as an equal partner, able to pursue its own vision and interests.

Another observation, which appears at first glance like a paradox, is that the main actors analysed in this thesis pursue or intend to pursue their interests and objectives through realist means and approaches, but within a liberal international order. While the EU and other actors, who are comfortable with the current international system, try to ensure its continuation largely as is, the USA is making efforts to re-arrange it so that it better serves the US interests. In essence, however,

it appears that even the USA does not wish to completely destroy the current liberal international order, as it has not come up with a new proposal to replace it.

Again here, US foreign policy under President Trump's political leadership relies mainly on the basic tenets of *structural realism*. This sub-school of realism argues that international relations take place in an environment of anarchy, which means that there is no authority over and above sovereign and independent states.

In such an international environment, President Trump has been pursuing protectionist and transactional foreign policy by withdrawing his country from several multilateral arrangements. By doing so, he appears to be aiming to lead international economic and trade relations to a period of uncertainty and hoping that during such a period multilateral arrangements are re-constructed in a way that generates more benefits to the USA.

In accordance with this line of thinking, President Trump has been shaking the current international order and multilateral arrangements, because he believes that the current system does not adequately serve US national interests. In other words, as noted above, he aims to ensure a redistribution of power and economic benefits more generously for his country. His "*America First*" doctrine is mainly based on this reading of the current international order.

NATO, an alliance that has served as the main pillar of Europe's security architecture since 1949, has been no exception to President Trump's perception that in terms of their costs and benefits, multilateral organizations have become a burden on the USA. The most striking term he used to describe NATO during his election campaign was "obsolete." Even though he later changed his mind to some extent (thus rendering his own previous opinion "obsolete"), this has had the effect of a cold shower across Europe. Indeed, he won the elections and has pursued this line of thinking about European security and NATO.

In fact, President Trump has been voicing loudly and publicly his discomfort and uneasiness about burden-sharing with regard to European security, which his predecessors had already been stating, albeit in a more diplomatic and discreet manner.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Europeans/EU have already been seeking, particularly since the end of the Cold War, to develop autonomous capabilities so that the EU could undertake peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Accordingly, as part of its CSDP, the EU has deployed many overseas missions in several countries in Europe, Africa and Asia, by employing a combination of military and civilian elements.¹⁸⁷

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the efforts of the EU to achieve “strategic autonomy” have gained new momentum and a treaty basis. Concepts like a “mutual defence clause about supporting each other in the case of an armed attack against an EU member on its territory (Article 42 (7)),” a “solidarity clause (Article 222) about aiding each other in the case of natural or other kind of disasters,” and a clause about permanent structured co-operation (Article 42 (6) and Additional Protocol No. 10) formed a strong basis for enhancing the EU’s collective defence strategies and capabilities. Even though the UK’s Brexit decision as a result of a June 2016 referendum came as a shock to the EU and caused a brief hesitation in its efforts also in the CSDP areas, the EU came out of this shock rather quickly, and adopted and publicized its EUGS in September 2016. Building on the EUGS, it has taken effective follow-up steps, introducing the EDF and 17 projects under PESCO, and lending increased momentum to EDA’s work. All these efforts are intended to serve one purpose: the achievement of strategic autonomy and balanced transatlantic relations, and a healthier co-operation with the USA/NATO.

The reaction of the USA to the progress the EU will achieve in further developing and implementing its CSDP, EUGS and several projects, which aim to enhance its defence capabilities, will be important, perhaps decisive, in determining the limits of the CSDP’s practical implementation. In case the USA is sincere about its traditional and recently emphasized desire and vision that the EU should develop its defence capabilities and take care of its own security, the EU may have a good

¹⁸⁷ “European Union, External Action-Military and civilian missions and operations”. 3 May 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en (Accessed on 28 August 2018)

chance to achieve strategic autonomy in the medium to long term. In case the USA is just pushing the EU to strengthen its defence capabilities, by raising its defence budgets to a minimum of 2 percent of individual NATO members' GDP and to spend these increased budgets on military hardware from the USA, this approach may please the US President as a transactional gain for his country, and on the other hand, strengthen the EU's military power, but may not bring to the EU its long-desired strategic autonomy.

To conclude, the answer to the main question of this thesis would be affirmative. The US attitude and transatlantic relations have significantly affected the EU's desire and search for strategic autonomy. In other words, as expressed above, transatlantic relations and the US position on the EU's defence initiatives and projects may determine the outcome of the EU's renewed efforts to achieve its ultimate objective of strategic autonomy. In addition, intra-EU balances, particularly the harmony and common strategic vision to be achieved between its remaining major powers, France and Germany, may also play a decisive role in bringing these efforts forward. In the EU's efforts to further enhance its defence capabilities through European initiatives/projects, a key precondition remains the provision of increased financial resources and under current economic realities, the generosity of Europe's "geo-economic power"¹⁸⁸ Germany is important and called upon by France.

The research undertaken within the framework of this thesis has indicated that the US President Donald Trump has a consistent course of pushing his country's European allies to increase their defence budgets and in fact, the US Administrations even before President Trump has been pursuing a similar policy. The US President's emphasis on transactional relations with NATO allies and his impatience to see all allies meet the target of 2% of the GDPs to be spent on defence have become a cause of tension and friction at the high-level NATO meetings. Coupled with the US security strategy of pivoting to Asia by reducing its engagement to European security, a key conclusion of the research has been that

¹⁸⁸ See footnote 144.

the EU and its members states, particularly the EU's economic leader Germany, started moving to increase their respective defence spending. As a result, new developments in transatlantic relations have been urging the EU to adjust its attitude and commitment toward European security. The changes in this area could be subject of further studies by considering the main objectives and implications of the EU's security strategies and initiatives.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TÜRKÇE ÖZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

(Tezin tümünün özetidir.)

İkinci Dünya Savaşından (2. DS) sonra, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD), Wilson İlkelerini açıklamak suretiyle, büyük güç siyasetine, sömürgeciliği ve nüfuz alanları yaklaşımına karşı çıkan bir tutum izlemiştir. ABD o tarihten bu yana kurallara dayalı liberal bir uluslararası sistemi savunmuş, özellikle de 2. DS'ndan sonra, Avrupa'daki ve dünyanın başka bölgelerindeki müttefik ve ortaklarıyla birlikte, bu sistemin muhafaza edilmesi ve sürdürülmesi hususunda lider rolünü üstlenmiştir.

2. DS sonrasında Soğuk Savaşın bitimine kadar (1945-1990), uluslararası düzen iki kutuplu idi. Bu düzende iki farklı blok/ekonomik sistem arasında güç dengesine bağlı bir işleyiş hakimdi. Bir tarafta ABD'nin liderliğindeki ve NATO'nun güvenlik şemsiyesi altındaki kapitalist liberal düzen, diğer tarafta ise Rusya/Sovyetler Birliği'nin başını çektiği ve Varşova Paktı'nın askeri teminatı altında varlık gösteren komünist sistem bulunmaktaydı. Sovyet tehdidi ve sistemler arası çekişme nedeniyle, kapitalist Batı sisteminin üyeleri genel çerçevesi itibarıyla durağan dış politikalarında büyük ölçüde uyum sergileyebilmişler ve ABD'nin siyasi ve askeri liderliğini çok fazla sorgulamamışlardır.

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesini izleyen dönemde ise, Sovyetler Birliği'nin ideolojik yayılma ve askeri çatışma tehditlerinin aniden ortadan kalkmasıyla birlikte, NATO İttifakı'nın varlık sebebi sorgulanmaya başlanmış ve özellikle ittifak dışındaki Rusya Federasyonu (RF) gibi ülkeler bu konuda eleştirel

tutumlarını her vesileyle açıklamışlar ve yeni ortamda NATO'ya ihtiyaç olmadığını ifade etmişlerdir.

Diğer taraftan, NATO içinde ve Batı blokunda siyasi ve askeri liderliğin ve yükün paylaşımı her zaman tartışmalı bir konu olagelmiştir. ABD bir yandan Avrupalı müttefiklerinden Avrupa'nın güvenliğini sağlama çabalarında daha fazla yük üstlenmelerini isterken, öte yandan siyasi ve askeri liderliği paylaşma konusunda isteksiz bir tutum sergileyegelmiş, Avrupa ülkeleri ve kurumlarıyla kendisini daha yukarıda konumlandığı asimetrik ilişki çerçevesinde Avrupa'daki siyasi ve askeri hegemonyasını sürdürmüştür.

Böyle bir yapılanma içinde, NATO'nun Avrupalı müttefikleri zaman içinde değişik adlarla anılan ve halihazırda Avrupa Birliği adını alan Avrupa entegrasyon süreci kapsamında 2. DS'ndan beri kendi askeri yapılanmalarını oluşturma, ayrıca hem milli, hem ortak savunma kabiliyetlerini geliştirme ve bu suretle NATO ve ABD hegemonyasından mümkün olduğu kadar "stratejik otonomi" kazanma arayışı içinde olmuşlardır.

Avrupa'nın kendi savunma kabiliyetlerini geliştirmek ve stratejik otonomi kazanmak amacıyla özellikle 1990'lardan bu yana önce Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP), Lizbon Antlaşması'nın Aralık 2009'da yürürlüğe girmesinden sonra ise Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OGSP) adı altında AB çerçevesinde hayata geçirilen çabalar ve girişimler neticesinde bazı ilerlemeler kaydedilmekle birlikte, NATO'nun caydırıcılığına sahip bir alternatifin ortaya çıkarılması henüz mümkün olmamıştır. Bu süreçte, İngiltere, bir taraftan Fransa ile Aralık 1998'de yayınladıkları *Saint Malo* Deklarasyonu'yla OGSP'nin başını çekmiş, öte yandan ise NATO'yu Avrupa'nın ana savunma örgütü olarak görmesi nedeniyle AB'nin çabalarının hızlı ilerlemesini arzu etmemiştir. Bu yaklaşımıyla İngiltere, AB'nin anlamlı ve geniş çaplı savunma projeleri ve girişimleri geliştirmesini ve uygulamasını engelleyerek, görünüşte çelişkili, ancak kendi milli çıkar tanımlaması çerçevesinde tutarlı sayılabilecek bir tutum izleyegelmiştir. Bu bakımdan, İngiltere için ABD'nin AB içindeki "Truva atı" benzetmesi de yapılmıştır.

ABD'nin Avrupalı müttefiklerinden Avrupa'nın güvenliği konusunda daha fazla yük omuzlamaları beklentisi de Atlantik'in iki yakasında da farklı yorumlamalara ve tartışmalara konu olmaya devam etmektedir. Bazı gözlemciler ABD'nin AB'den kendi güvenliği için daha fazla sorumluluk üstlenmesini beklediğini ifade ederken, diğer bazıları ise ABD'nin bu talebiyle aslında AB ülkelerinden Amerikalı üreticilerden daha fazla savunma ürünü ve askeri malzeme satın almalarını istediğini dile getirmektedirler. Daha seçim kampanyası döneminden itibaren NATO'yu yararsız ve eski bir yapı olarak nitelendiren, bu kapsamda yaptığı açıklamalarla İttifak içindeki dayanışma ruhunun altını oyan, bu tutumuyla ülkesinin Avrupalı müttefiklerini derinden rahatsız eden ve müttefiklerinin ABD'nin NATO üzerinden Avrupa'ya sağladığı güvenlik garantilerini sorgulamalarına yol açan ABD Başkanı Donald Trump'ın Kasım 2016'da seçilmesi ve Ocak 2017'de göreve başlamasını izleyen dönemde bunlardan ikinci yorum gerçeğe yakın gibi görünmektedir.

ABD Başkanı Trump, mevcut uluslararası sistemin ABD'nin çıkarlarını yeterince dikkate almadığını, maliyet-fayda analizi yapıldığında çok taraflı yapıların ülkesi için yük haline geldiğini düşünmekte ve bu nedenle küresel ve bölgesel düzeylerde mevcut yapıları değiştirmek suretiyle gücün ve ekonomik yararların ABD'nin daha çok pay alabileceği bir dönüşüm sağlamayı hedefler görmektedir. Başkan Trump'ın "Önce Amerika" doktrini de büyük ölçüde uluslararası ilişkiler ve düzenin bu şekildeki okumasına dayanmaktadır.

Başkan Trump, bu nedenle, kurallara dayalı uluslararası düzenin ve bu düzeni yönetmek ve devam ettirmek için oluşturulan uluslararası kuruluşların/düzenlemelerin temellerini sarsmaktadır. ABD'nin ulusal çıkarlarını önceleyen bir yaklaşım izlediğini her fırsatta dile getirmekle birlikte, Başkan Trump'ın açıklamaları, kararları ve eylemleri bir şekilde irrasyonel görünmekte, transatlantik ortaklığı ve işbirliğini zayıflatmakta ve ABD'nin müttefikleri ve ortaklarıyla ortak çıkarlar tanımlama ve izlemelerini zorlaştırmaktadır.

ABD Başkanı Trump'ın göreve gelmesinden sonraki ilk Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi Aralık 2017'de yayınlanmıştır. ABD'nin küresel bakışını ve hegemonya anlayışını tutkularını açık şekilde yansıtan sözkonusu belgede, Avrupa'ya yönelik

son derece olumlu ve takdirkar ifadelere yer verilmiştir. Bu anlamda, güçlü ve özgür bir Avrupa'nın ABD açısından hayati öneme sahip olduğu, Atlantik'in iki yakasının demokrasi bireysel özgürlükler ve hukukun üstünlüğü gibi ortak ilkeleri paylaştıkları, 2. DS'ından sonra birlikte Batı Avrupa'yı birlikte inşa ettikleri, güvenlik ve refah yaratan kuruluşları yarattıkları, Sovyet tehdidi ortadan kalkmasına rağmen RF'nin hala komşularını tehdit etmeyi sürdürdüğü, terörizm ve düzensiz göç hareketlerinin de önemli tehdit ve sınamalar arasında bulunduğu, bu nedenle özgür ve egemen devletlerin oluşturduğu NATO İttifakı'nın üyelerine büyük bir avantaj sağladığı, ABD'nin NATO'yu kuran Vaşington Antlaşması'nın 5. Maddesine bağlı olduğu vurgulanmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Başkan Trump'ın Avrupa/AB ve RF'ye yönelik olarak izlediği politika ve yaklaşımlar Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji'sindeki güçlü ifadelerle karşılaştırıldığında çelişkili görünen bir tablonun ortaya çıktığı dikkati çekmektedir.

Önce Amerika” olarak tanımladığı, içeriği tam olarak belli olmayan bir doktrin temelinde hareket eden ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, esas itibariyle Avrupa güvenliğini sağlamak için tesis edilen mevcut modelin devam ettirilmesine duyulan ihtiyacı sorgulamaktadır. Başkan Trump'ın liderliğinde ABD'nin her bir NATO üyesi ülkenin GSMH'sının en az %2'sini savunma sektörüne harcaması şartına uyum konusundaki ısrarı İttifak içinde yeni gerginliklere ve görüş ayrılıklarına neden olmaktadır. Bunlara ilaveten, ABD ve AB uluslararası ilişkilerde giderek farklılaşan çıkarlar ve stratejik hedefler takip etmektedirler.

Yukarıda genel çerçevesi çizilen koşulları dikkate alarak, ana sorusu “Transatlantik ilişkilerin değişen doğası AB'nin stratejik otonomi arayışında etkili oldu mu?” şeklinde belirlenen bu tez kapsamında, Avrupa güvenliği ve Transatlantik bağlar uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinden realizm ve liberalizm perspektifinden değerlendirilecektir. ABD'nin, Avrupalı müttefikleriyle kurduğu ve bugüne kadar geliştirdiği kurallara dayalı liberal uluslararası sistemi, ABD'nin ulusal çıkarlarını önceleyen ve ABD'nin askeri gücüne vurgu yapmak suretiyle sarsan ve değişime zorlayan yaklaşımı bahsekonu iki teorinin de tez konusunu araştırmada önem taşımasına yol açmıştır. ABD'nin kendi kurduğu ve yakın geçmişe kadar özenle koruduğu liberal uluslararası düzende realist politikalar

izlemesi gibi kendi içinde çelişkili görünen mevcut tablonun okunmasında ve anlamlandırılmasında bu teorilerin yararlı araçlar olabileceği düşünülmüştür.

Halen Atlantik'in her iki yakasında da Transatlantik ilişkilerin ve işbirliğinin geleceğine yönelik canlı bir tartışma ortamı bulunduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Tüm bu tartışmalara rağmen 2. DS'ndan bu yana NATO, ABD liderliği altında, Avrupa'nın stratejik güvenliğini sağlayan ana kuruluş olmayı sürdürmektedir.

1952-1957 yılları arasında görev yapan NATO'nun ilk Genel Sekreteri Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay'in belirttiği gibi "NATO'nun kuruluş amacı "Amerikalıları Avrupa'da, Rusları Avrupa'nın dışında ve Almanları kontrol altında" olagelmıştır. Bu anlamda Transatlantik güvenlik örgütünün günümüze kadar kurucularının amaçlarına uygun hareket etmeyi başardığı söylenebilecektir.

NATO, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde Avrupa ülkelerine, özellikle de Almanya'ya çoklu avantajlar sağlamıştır. En başta da ABD'nin nükleer yetenekler dahil savunma sanayileri alanında yapageldiği devasa yatırımlar ve bu suretle Avrupa'ya sağladığı koruma sayesinde Avrupa ülkeleri tasarruf ettikleri önemli kaynaklarını başka alanlarda yatırım yapmak için kullanabilmişlerdir.

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden, Sovyetler Birliği ve Varşova Paktı'nın dağılmasından sonra NATO'nun gerekliliğinin sorgulanmasına rağmen, İttifak, görev yönergesini ve rollerini gözden geçirmek ve yeniden tanımlamak suretiyle önemli kalabilmeyi başarmıştır. İttifak, kapitalist ve liberal dünyanın güçlü koruyucusu olmayı sürdürmektedir. ABD Başkanı Trump'ın göreve gelmeden önce ve geldikten hemen sonraki dönemdeki bazı ifadeleri NATO'nun bu görüntüsünü biraz sarsmıştır. Bununla birlikte ilerleyen dönemde ABD'deki yerleşik düzenin yeni Başkanı NATO'nun rolü ve önemi konusunda doğru yöne sevk etme çabasında bir ölçüde başarılı olduğu gözlemlenmektedir.

Mayıs 2017'de ABD Başkanı Trump'ın ilk defa katıldığı NATO Zirvesi münasebetiyle İttifak'ın 1,45 milyar Dolar'a mal olan ve dış yapısında cam ve çeliğin yoğun şekilde kullanılmış olması nedeniyle NATO'nun yeni parlak imajını ve gücünü simgelediği düşünülen yeni karargâh binasının açılışı da yapılmıştır. İttifak Yazmanlığı ve üye ülke temsilcilikleri Haziran 2018'e kadar yeni binaya

taşınmışlardır. Sözkonusu gelişme NATO müttefiklerinin ittifaka uzun vadede de önem atfetmeyi sürdüreceklerinin işareti olarak yorumlanmıştır. Zira Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin liderliğindeki Rusya Federasyonu (RF) özellikle 2008 yılından beri komşularına yönelik saldırgan bir dış politika izlemektedir. Bu kapsamda RF, Ağustos 2008’de Gürcistan’a askeri müdahalede bulunmuş, 2014 yılında ise Ukrayna’da ortaya çıkan iç sorunları bahane ederek bu ülkeye askeri müdahale gerçekleştirmiş ve Mart 2014’de Kırım’ı ilhak etmiştir. Bu gelişmeler üye ülkeler nazarında NATO’nun yeniden önem kazanmasını sağlamıştır. Esasen NATO müttefiklerinin savunma harcamalarını arttırma ve 2024 yılına kadar Gayrisafi Milli Hasıllarının asgari %2’sine yükseltme yönündeki kararları da İttifak’ın 2014 Galler Zirvesi’nde alınmıştır. Sözkonusu kararın alındığı dönemde ABD’nin lideri olan Barack Obama’nın Ocak 2017’de görevini devrettiği Donald Trump ise 2024 tarihinin geç olduğunu düşünmekte, müttefikleri sözkonusu hedefe en erken tarihte, tercihen 2019 yılı içinde ulaşmaları konusunda zorlamakta, hatta %2 oranını az bulduğunu ifadeyle %4 hedefini dahi dile getirmektedir.

2017 yılında Almanya’daki çeşitli düşünce kuruluşlarında ve German Marshall Fund adlı Vaşington merkezli düşünce kuruluşunda çalışan bir grup analist “Transatlantik Manifesto, Herşeye Rağmen Amerika” başlıklı bir düşünce kâğıdı yayınladılar. Bahsekonu kâğıtta özetle, liberal dünya düzeninin temellerinin çok taraflılıkta olduğu, küresel norm ve değerlerin, açık toplum ve pazarların üzerine bina edilen bu düzenin tehlikede olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Almanya’nın özgürlüğü ve refah düzeyinin tamamen bu düzen üzerine inşa edildiği kaydedilen kâğıtta, bahsekonu düzenin çeşitli yönlerden ve kaynaklardan tehdit edildiği, bu kapsamda yükselen güçlerin nüfuz arayışında oldukları, Rusya’nın Avrupa’daki barışçıl düzeni zorlamakta olduğu gibi hususlara yer verilmiştir. Bu gözlemler ışığında Transatlantik Manifesto’nun ana hedefi açıktır: İki taraf da birbirlerine ihtiyaç duymaya devam ettikleri için, ne olursa olsun, Transatlantik ittifakın ve güçlü bağların korunması ve muhafaza edilmesi gerekmektedir. Transatlantik Manifesto’nun imzacılarının niyetinin Trump Yönetimi döneminde geçileceği anlaşılan fırtınalı denizde mümkün olduğunca hasar kontrolü sağlamak suretiyle ilerlenmesi şeklinde okunması mümkündür.

Avrupa güvenlik mimarisinin tam bir resmini görebilmek için Avrupa bütünleşme sürecinin tarihine bakmak yararlı olabilecektir. Avrupa’da büyük bir yıkıma neden olan II. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında benzer bir yıkımın gelecekte tekrarlanmasının önüne geçilmesi, kıtasal barış, uyum ve refahın temin edilmesi amacıyla Avrupa bütünleşme süreci başlatılmıştır. Mütevazı hedeflerle başlatılan bu süreç izleyen onyıllarda içsel ve dışsal krizlere verilen tepkiler ve geliştirilen önlemler yoluyla ileri seviyelere taşınmış ve “her zamankinden daha yakın birlik (ever closer union)” hedefi izlenmeye başlanmıştır. Ulusüstü yapılara çeşitli alanlarda egemenlik devri ve hükümetlerarası eşgüdümün güçlendirilmesi yoluyla ilerletilen Avrupa bütünleşme sürecinde geline aşamanın Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) kurucularından Jean Monnet ve Robert Schumann’ın hayallerinin ötesine geçtiğini belirtmek yanlış olmayabilecektir.

Günümüzde İngiltere’nin Haziran 2016’da yaptığı bir referandum sonucu nedeniyle AB’den ayrılma sürecinde (Brexit) bulunmasına rağmen, ABD, İngiltere, Fransa ve Almanya arasındaki ilişkiler ve işbirliği transatlantik ilişkilerin içeriğini ve yapısını büyük ölçüde belirlemektedir. ABD Başkanı Donald Trump’ın ilk açıklamaları Avrupalı ortaklarında kaygılar uyandırmış olsa da NATO müttefikleri Avrupa sınırlarının ötesinde terörizm gibi birlikte mücadele etmeleri gereken tehdit ve sınamalar bulunduğu bilincinde görünmektedirler. Günümüzde hiçbir ülkenin uluslararası ortamın getirdiği tüm tehdit ve sınamalarla tek başına mücadele edemeyeceği hususu da NATO belgelerine de yansıyan ortak bir kanaattir.

AB’nin savunma yeteneklerini geliştirmesi ve NATO’yla yapıcı ve tamamlayıcı işbirliği anlayışını sürdürmesi halinde, önümüzdeki dönemde Atlantik’in iki yakasında ortaklığı sürdürme konusunda gerekli irade bulunması halinde, Başkan Trump’ın göreve gelmesiyle iyice belirginleşen görüş ayrılıklarına rağmen iki taraf için de önem taşıyan ilişkileri ve işbirliğini devam ettirmek mümkün olabilecektir.

Halihazırda, transatlantik ilişkilerde, NATO ve AB’nin ortak ilgi alanlarındaki faaliyetleri kapsamında iki kuruluş arasında yakın işbirliği ve sinerji sağlanmasına önem atfedilmektedir. Bu iki kilit kurum, Avrupa-Atlantik bölgesinde güvenlik, barış ve istikrarı sağlamak gibi ortak bir amaca sahiptirler.

Düzenli toplantılar ve temaslar yoluyla birlikte çalışmakta ve çabalarının karşılıklı tamamlayıcı olması ve birbirlerinin etkisini artırması için yakın eşgüdüm halinde hareket etmektedirler. NATO, kendi gücünün artmasına da katkı sağlayacak AB'nin PESCO ve EDF gibi yeni girişimleri neticesinde savunma yeteneklerini geliştirme çabalarını takdir etmektedir. Öte yandan, AB de, NATO ittifakının terörizm dahil her türlü tehdide karşı Avrupa-Atlantik bölgesinin savunması sağlamasına değer vermektedir. Bu anlamda iki örgüt birbirlerinin değerinin ve sorumluluk bölgelerinde güvenlik ve istikrara katkılarının farkındadırlar.

NATO Genel Sekreteri Jens Stoltenberg, 2017 Temmuz ayında NATO ile AB arasındaki işbirliğinin her zamankinden daha yakın olduğunu, bu işbirliğinin siber güvenlik ve terörizmle mücadeleyi de içeren 74 alanı kapsadığını açıklamıştır. AB Komisyonu Avrupa'daki askeri lojistik altyapının gözden geçirilmesine yönelik çalışmalar başlatmıştır ki, bu çalışmalar NATO'nun Avrupa'da bir bölgeden başka bir bölgeye personel ve araç nakliyesini de kolaylaştıracak bir anlayışla yürütülmektedir.

Ortak tehdit ve sınamalarla karşı karşıya buldukları, Avrupa-Atlantik bölgesinde güvenlik ve istikrarı sağlamak için aynı veya benzer stratejik amaçlar çerçevesinde çalışmalar yürüttükleri, savunma kabiliyetlerinin planlanması ve geliştirilmesi yönünde bir tamamlayıcılık anlayışı içinde hareket ettikleri dikkate alındığında bu iki kuruluşun birbirleriyle rekabet değil, sinerji içinde faaliyet gösterdiklerini belirtmek mümkündür.

Öte yandan, Avrupalılar Brüksel'deki karmaşık dış politika mekanizmasından şikayetçidirler ve bunun AB'nin küresel jeopolitik düzlemdeki etkisine katkı sağlamadığını düşünmektedirler. AB'nin varlık sebebi kurallara dayalı uluslararası sistemdir. Hükümetlerarası düzlemde yürütülen müzakerelerin genellikle asgari müşterekler temelinde neticelenmesi nedeniyle AB'nin küresel düzlemde etkin rol oynama yönündeki iradesini hayata geçirebilmesi mümkün olamamaktadır. Bu açıdan OGSP iyi bir örnektir. Bugüne kadarki uygulamalar, OGSP operasyonlarının toplamda dünyadaki en yüksek ikinci savunma harcamalarına sahip bir bölgeden beklenebilecek stratejik müdahalelerin mümkün olmadığını göstermektedir.

AB'nin stratejik otonomi amacına katkı sağlaması beklenen OGSP'nin Birlik için özgürleştirici bir adım olmak yerine ABD'nin stratejik hegemonyasını sürdürmeye yarayan bir araç olduğu yönünde görüşler de ileri sürülmektedir. Bu kapsamda, ABD'nin AB ülkelerinin stratejik bakış açılarını etkileme yeteneğinin azalmadığı, bunda ABD'nin askeri kabiliyetleri ve başarılarının önemli rolü bulunduğu, bu durumun AB ülkelerinin zayıf stratejik kararlar almalarına yol açabileceği ve bu kararların AB kamuoyları nezdinde siyasi ve sosyal meşruiyetinin güçlü olmayabileceği hususları da bu kapsamda dile getirilmektedir.

İngiltere ve Fransa tarafından Aralık 1998'de yayınlanan St. Malo Bildirgesi'nin yayınlanmasından bu yana, AB OGSP'yi geliştirme yönünde çalışmalar yürütmektedir. İngiltere'nin AB'den ayrılması sonrasında Fransa ve Almanya kendi bağımsız görüşlerini ve projelerini daha rahat geliştirme ve hayata geçirme imkânı bulabilecekleri değerlendirilmektedir.

Esasen, AB, İngiltere'nin Birlik'ten ayrılma sürecinin sonuçlanmasını beklemeden, 2017 sonunda Daimi Yapılandırılmış İşbirliği (Permanent Structured Co-operation-PESCO) adlandırılan ve AB ülkelerinin savunma kabiliyetlerinin geliştirilmesini ve güçlendirilmesini hedefleyen bir girişim başlatmıştır. İngiltere, Danimarka ve Malta PESCO girişiminin dışında kalmayı seçmişlerdir. Başlangıç olarak 17 projenin değerlendirileceği PESCO sürecinin AB'nin ve üye ülkelerinin savunma yeteneklerine ne ölçüde katkı sağlayabileceğini görebilmek için bir süre beklemek gerekecektir. AB ayrıca, Avrupa Savunma Ajansı'nın (EDA) ve PESCO süreçlerindeki çalışmaları maddi olarak desteklemek amacıyla Avrupa Savunma Fonu (EDF) adlı bir imkânı 2017 yaz aylarında uygulamaya geçirmiş ve sözkonusu Fon aracılığıyla savunma projelerine önemli kaynaklar aktarılmasının öngörüldüğünü duyurmuştur.

Öte yandan, Mayıs 2017'de göreve gelen Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı Emmanuel Macron'un, 26 Eylül 2017 tarihinde Sorbonne Üniversitesi'nde yaptığı ve Avrupa bütünleşmesi sürecine ağırlık verdiği konuşması ilgili çevrelerde geniş yankı uyandırmıştır. Macron, AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma alanında atması gereken adımlara ilişkin aktif bir tutum izlemekte, özellikle İngiltere'nin ayrılma sürecini dikkate alarak OGSP kapsamındaki bütünleşme süreçlerinin hızlandırılması ve

derinleştirilmesi gerektiğini kaydetmekte, bu kapsamda AB'nin "jeo-ekonomik gücü" olarak da tanımlanan Almanya'nı bu alandaki çalışmalara daha fazla kaynak aktarmaya ikna etmeyi çalışmaktadır. EDF, Macron'un öneri ve çabalarının hayata geçirilebileceği önemli bir araç işlevi görebilecektir. Cumhurbaşkanı Macron'un OGSP'nin etkinliğinin artırılması bağlamında, AB ve NATO'nun kurumsal çerçeveleri dışında isteyen ülkelerin katılımıyla, bir tür "Gönüllüler Koalisyonu" formatında Avrupa Müdahale Girişimi (European Intervention Initiative-EII or E2I) adlı bir mekanizma oluşturulması önerisinde bulunmuştur. Bazı gözlemciler Almanya'nın önem ve öncelik verdiği PESCO ile Fransa'nın önerdiği EII arasında rekabet veya sürtüşme ihtimali bulunduğunu ileri sürseler de, başka bazı gözlemciler ise, iki girişimin birbirlerini tamamlayıcı ve destekleyici olduğunu, birinde kaydedilen başarıların diğerinde ilerlemeyi teşvik edeceğini, bu anlamda her iki girişimin de AB'nin savunma ve güvenlik alanındaki bütünleşme sürecinin ileriye taşınmasına katkı sağlayacağını dile getirmektedirler.

İngiltere'nin ayrılması AB'nin savunma kabiliyetlerini kaba bir tahminle dörtte bir oranında azaltacak ve küresel düzeyde aktif rol oynayacak bir aktör haline gelebilme çabalarını güçlendirecektir. Öte yandan, AB'den ayrılması, iki tarafın aynı coğrafyayı paylaşmaya ve ortak tehditlerle karşı karşıya kalmaya devam edecekleri gerçeğini değiştirmeyecektir. Bu nedenle, AB'den ayrıldıktan sonra İngiltere'nin AB'nin OGSP kapsamındaki girişim ve çalışmalarına nasıl katılabileceği sorusu da bugünlerde yanıt aranan önemli konu başlıkları arasında bulunmaktadır. Bu kapsamda AB'de Fransa'yla birlikte iki nükleer güçten ve BM Güvenlik Konseyi daimî üyesi iki ülkeden biri olan ve sınırları ötesinde askeri operasyonlar gerçekleştirme tecrübe ve yeteneklerine sahip olan İngiltere'nin Avrupa güvenlik ve savunma yapılanmasının içinde mümkün olduğunca sıkı bir şekilde bütünleşik tutulmasına öncelik veren görüşler de dile getirilmektedir. İngiltere'nin üye olmamasına rağmen AB OGSP faaliyetlerine katılabilmesini de kolaylaştırabilecek bir yaklaşım olarak, Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı Macron, AB güvenliğinin ötesine geçen "Avrupa güvenliği" kavramının öne çıkarmaktadır. Tabiatıyla böyle bir vurgunun AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki bütünleşmesini olumsuz etkileyip etkilemeyeceği ayrı bir soru olarak karşımıza

çıkılmaktadır. Ayrıca, bugüne kadar AB'nin güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki bütünleşme sürecinin hızlı bir şekilde ilerletilmesini ve derinleştirilmesini kendi yöntemleriyle engelleyen İngiltere'nin AB'den ayrıldıktan sonra da AB karar alma süreçlerindeki ağırlığını korumaya yönelik girişim ve beklentiler içinde bulunduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte AB Komisyonu 2018 yılı başında yaptığı bir açıklamayla İngiltere'nin üyelikten ayrıldıktan sonra AB'nin karar alma mekanizmalarında yer alabilmesinin, ayrıca OGSP operasyonlarını yönetmesinin mümkün olamayacağını açık bir dille duyurmuştur.

Muhtelif AB girişimlerine ve Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinin üzerinde 30 yıla yakın bir süre geçmiş olmasına rağmen Avrupa'nın güvenlik mimarisinin ana yapısı değişmemiştir ve NATO Avrupa savunmasının belkemiğini oluşturan bir örgüt olma rolünü sürdürmektedir. Askeri güç kullanmak suretiyle Avrupa'nın ve tüm müttefiklerinin savunmasını Kurucu Antlaşmasının V. maddesinde kayıtlı ortak savunma anlayışıyla taahhüt eden İttifak'ın son dönemde özellikle terörizmle mücadele alanında Gönüllüler Koalisyonu formatını öne çıkaran bir çalışma anlayışı benimsediği gözlemlenmektedir. NATO, Suriye'den Türkiye'ye yönelik tehditlere karşı alınan tedbirlerde olduğu gibi, çeşitli vesilelerle ortak savunma önlemleri almış olmakla birlikte, kuruluşundan bu yana V. Maddeyi sadece New York'a gerçekleştirilen 11 Eylül (2001) saldırılarından sonra ABD'nin çağrısı üzerine harekete geçirmiştir.

NATO'nun çalışma tarzının Fransa Cumhurbaşkanı Macron'un önerdiği ve geliştirmeye çalıştığı Avrupa Müdahale Girişimi'ne (EII) ilham kaynağı olduğu da gözlemlenmektedir. İngiltere'nin AB'den ayrılma sürecinde olduğu bu dönemde, Cumhurbaşkanı Macron ile ABD Başkanı Trump arasındaki yakın iletişim ve diyalog da dikkat çekmektedir. Bu nedenle, İngiltere'nin ayrılmasından sonra Fransa'nın ABD ile AB arasında bir köprü işlevi görebileceği yorumları yapılmaktadır. Nisan 2018 ayında ABD, İngiltere ve Fransa, Esad rejimi tarafından sivillere yönelik olarak kimyasal silah kullanıldığı gerekçesiyle, Suriye'ye birlikte üçlü bir müdahale gerçekleştirmişlerdir. Almanya, geleneksel yaklaşımına uygun olarak sözkonusu müdahaleye katılım sağlamamış, ancak müdahaleyi desteklediğini açıklamıştır.

Bir önceki Başkan Barack Obama döneminde ABD'nin dikkat ve enerjisini Avrupa'dan Asya-Pasifik bölgesine kaydıracağını duyurması, günümüzde RF kaynaklı güvenlik tehdit ve sınamalarının Soğuk Savaş dönemindikilerden daha düşük derecede görüldüğü şeklinde yorumlanabilecektir. ABD'nin bu yaklaşımı ve açıkladığı politika Doğu Avrupa'dakiler başta olmak üzere AB ülkelerinde genel olarak bir kaygı, 2014 yılında Ukrayna'ya müdahale etmek suretiyle Kırım'ı ilhak eden Rusya'da ise göreceli bir rahatlama yol açmıştır. Bu nedenle son dönemde, Avrupa güvenliğini güçlendirmeye yeniden önem veren Başkan Trump, NATO'nun rolünü ve Avrupa ülkelerinin İttifak'a yönelik katkılarının yeterliliğini sorgulamakla birlikte, 2014 yılında İskoçya'da gerçekleştirilen NATO Zirvesi'nde alınan ve 10 yıl içinde tüm NATO ülkelerinin savunma harcamalarını Gayrisafi Milli Hasıllarının (GSMH) %2'sine yükseltmeleri kararını mümkün olduğunca erken uygulanmasını sağlamaya çalışmaktadır. 2018 itibarıyla, ABD, İngiltere, Yunanistan, Estonya ve Letonya'nın tutturdıkları %2 harcama kriterinin uygulanmasına açıktan karşı çıkan İttifak üyesi bulunmamaktadır Bununla birlikte, Almanya başta olmak üzere bazı Avrupa ülkelerinin siyasi, mali ve sosyal gerekçelerle sözkonusu eşiği tutturma yolunda ayak sürüyecekleri gözlemlenmektedir. Örneğin, Almanya, uluslararası güvenliğe katkısının sadece savunma harcamaları ve NATO'ya sağladığı mali katkılarla ölçülmemesi gerektiğini, BM'nin barış gücü operasyonlarına da önemli katkılar sağladığını vurgulamaktadır. Almanya'nın halihazırdaki savunma harcamaları GSMH'sının %1,2'sine denk gelmektedir ve bu oranın %2'ye yükseltilmesi halinde yıllık 30 milyar Dolar kadar ilave bir savunma harcaması yapması gerekmektedir. Bahsekonu miktar Almanya gibi bütçe dengelerine büyük önem veren bir ülke için zorlayıcı bir rakam olarak görünmektedir. Ayrıca Almanya'nın bu miktarda bir savunma harcamasını yapmaya başlaması bu ülkenin çok uzak olmayan bir gelecekte yeniden askeri bir deve dönüşmesinin yolunu açabilecektir. Almanya Şansölyesi Merkel, bu kapsamda, 2018 Nisan ayından beri yaptığı açıklamalarda ülkesinin 2025 yılına kadar % 1,5 ve 2030'a kadar ise %2 hedefine ulaşmayı düşündüğünü açıklamaktadır. Almanya'nın 2014 NATO Galler Zirvesi'nde varılan uzlaşmadan da uzaklaşan bu tutumu beklendiği üzere ABD Başkanı Trump'ın

tepkisiyle karşılaşmış ve Başkan Trump 11-12 Temmuz 2018 tarihlerinde Brüksel’de gerçekleştirilen NATO Zirvesi bağlamında bu konudaki tepkisini kamuoyu önünde de dile getirmiştir.

Almanya bağlamında diğer bir önemli husus, ABD’nin Avrupa’dan daha fazla Asya-Pasifik bölgesine yöneleceğini açıklamasının ardından, silahlı kuvvetlerini büyük harcamalar yapmak suretiyle modernize eden bir Rusya ile hazırlıksız bir şekilde karşı karşıya kalmamak için nükleer silah edinmesi zorunda kalabileceği olduğu görülmektedir. Bu konu 2017 yılından itibaren Almanya’da ve diğer bazı ülkelerde tartışılmaya başlanmıştır. Sözkonusu önerinin ABD’ye Avrupa güvenliğini ihmal etmemesi yolunda bir uyarı mı olduğu, yoksa Almanya’nın nükleer güce sahip Fransa ve İngiltere karşısındaki bu eksikliğini gidermek amacıyla fırsatçı bir tutum mu izlemekte olduğu yoruma açıktır. Bu kapsamda AB çerçevesi içinde bir Avrupa Nükleer Programı geliştirilmesi düşüncesi de tartışılan seçenekler arasında bulunmaktadır.

AB’nin Dış İlişkiler ve Güvenlik Politikaları Yüksek Temsilcisi Federica Mogherini göreve geldikten kısa bir süre sonra AB, Eylül 2016’da “AB’nin Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası için Küresel Strateji (A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy) başlıklı bir belge yayınlamıştır. Bahsekonu belgede, AB’nin Atlantik’in öte yakasıyla yakın bağlara ilave yatırımlar yapacağı, NATO üzerinden sağlam temellere dayanan ABD ve Kanada ile transatlantik ortaklığın AB’yi güçlendirdiği, çatışmaların çözümü çabalarında yardımcı olduğu ve küresel düzlemde etkin yönetime katkıda bulunduğu, NATO’nun dünyadaki en güçlü ve en etkin askeri ittifak olmayı sürdürdüğü kaydedilmektedir. Sözkonusu belgenin kabul edilmesi ve yayınlanması konusundaki zamanlamada, İngiltere’nin AB’den ayrılma kararıyla ortaya çıkan olumsuz havanın dağıtılması amacının etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir.

AB Küresel Strateji belgesinde AB’nin “stratejik otonomi” kazanma amacına güçlü vurgu yapılmaktadır. Bazı yorumcular, bu amacın tam olarak ancak “NATO’nun Avrupalılaştırılmasıyla”, diğer bir ifadeyle ABD’nin NATO’dan ayrılması ve AB ülkelerinin NATO’yu devralmalarıyla başarılacağı argümanını ileri sürmüşlerdir.

Öte yandan, OGSP'yle ilgili olarak, AB'nin ortak bir güvenlik ve savunma politikası geliştirme ve uygulama arayışları geçmişte ABD'de tartışma ve kaygı yaratmıştır. Bu çerçevede, esasen ABD'nin bu konudaki yaklaşımının en başından beri ikircikli olduğuna dikkat çekilmekte, bu ülkenin bir taraftan daha güçlü bir Avrupa'yı ortak olarak görmek istediği ve bu amaçla askeri yeteneklerini geliştirme konusunda Avrupalı ortaklarına baskı uyguladığı, diğer taraftan ise, daha güçlü bir AGSP/OGSP'nin NATO'nun altını oymasından ve transatlantik bağı zayıflatmasından endişe duyduğu da belirtilmektedir. ABD'nin kaygılarının özellikle Fransa ve İngiltere'nin ortak deklarasyon yayınladıkları Aralık 1998 St. Malo Zirvesi'nden sonra belirgin bir hale geldiğine, bazı ABD'li yetkililerin bahsekonu Zirvenin Avrupa'da NATO dışında otonom askeri yetenekler geliştirilmesine yönelik bir girişim olduğuna inandığına, ancak bu kaygıların Aralık 1999'da Helsinki'de düzenlenen AB Zirvesi'nde büyük ölçüde yatıştırıldığına, zira AB'nin "NATO'nun bir bütün olarak müdahil olmadığı" durumlarda bu otonom yeteneklerin kullanılacağı ve OGSP'nin NATO'ya rakip olmayacağı hususuna açıklık getirdiğine işaret edilmektedir. Bununla birlikte, AB'nin giderek önemi artan bir güvenlik aktörü olduğu, gelecekte Avrupa savunmasına ilişkin politikaların ve kararların çoğunlukla Avrupa içinde belirleneceği, bu durumun NATO ve AB'nin güvenlik politikaları ve öncelikleri konusunda eşgüdüm içinde bulunmalarını gerekli kıldığı ve ABD'nin de AB ile daha güçlü güvenlik ilişkileri kurmasının elzem olduğu yönünde tespitler de yapılmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde ABD/NATO'nun güvenlik şemsiyesinden büyük faydalar sağlayan ve bu sayede tasarruf ettikleri kaynakları diğer alanlara aktaran Almanya ve diğer AB ülkeleri ABD Başkanı Trump'ın izlediği politika nedeniyle zor bir dönem yaşamaktadırlar. Liberal, ama artık o kadar da zengin olmayan AB ülkeleri, güvenlik ve savunma alanında realist politikalar takip eden ABD ve Rusya gibi iki büyük güç arasında sıkışmış bir görüntü vermektedirler.

ABD'nin askeri varlığı ve desteği olmadan Rusya'yı caydırıcı savunma kabiliyetlerine sahip olabilmeleri için AB'nin ve üyesi ülkelerin savunma sektörüne gelecek yıllarda büyük yatırımlar yapmaları gerekecektir. AB ülkelerinin birkaçı

hariç içinde buldukları ekonomik ve mali güçlükler dikkate alındığında bu boyutta yatırımların mümkün veya gerçekçi olmadığı görülecektir.

Yukarıda kayıtlı hususlar ışığında, mevcut koşullarda, bu tezin ana sorusuna yanıtım, konuyla ilgili araştırmalarım, analiz ve değerlendirmelerim neticesinde aşağıdaki şekilde oluşmuştur.

AB'nin stratejik otonomi kazanma yönündeki çalışmaları transatlantik ilişkilerdeki değişikliklerden etkilenmektedir ve ABD Başkanı Trump'ın ülkesinin Avrupa güvenliğine yönelik taahhütleri ve NATO'nun yararına ilişkin şüpheli yaklaşım ve açıklamaları nedeniyle AB bu yöndeki çalışmalarına ivme kazandırmışlardır. İngiltere'nin AB'den ayrılmasıyla birlikte ortaya çıkacak savunma yeteneklerindeki azalmanın da AB'nin bu çalışmalarına ivme kazandırmasında etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bununla birlikte, geçmişte AB çerçevesinde hayata geçirilmeye çalışılan savunma projelerinin yeterince hızlı ilerleyemediği dikkate alındığında, AB'nin yeniden ivme kazandırdığı mevcut çalışmalarının ne ölçüde başarıyla sonuçlanacağını beklenip görülmesi gerekecektir. Bu itibarla, Almanya ve GSYH'nın asgari %2'si oranında savunma bütçesi koşulunu karşılamayan AB ülkelerinin mevcut savunma vizyonları ve harcama kalıpları değişmezse, öngörülebilir gelecekte de ABD ve NATO'ya güvenmek, bu kapsamda ABD ile asimetrik ilişkilerini sürdürmek ve bu ülkenin tek yanlı ve buyurgan tavırlarına tahammül etmek zorunda olacaklarını belirtmek mümkündür. Öte yandan, ABD ve AB arasında pek çok alanı kapsayan bir karşılıklı bağımlılık bulunmaktadır ve Başkan Trump önümüzdeki dönemde Çin gibi yükselen güçlerden de kaynaklanan sınamalar gibi sayısız küresel sorunla başa çıkma çabalarında AB'nin güçlü bir ortak olarak yanında bulunmasının önemini daha iyi kavrayabilecektir.

APPENDIX B

TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

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SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master Doktora / PhD

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