IDEOLOGY, SUBJECT, ARCHITECTURE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ARCHITECTURAL THEORY AND THE ARCHITECT-SUBJECT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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RABİA ÇİĞDEM ÇAVDAR

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submitted by RABİA ÇİĞDEM ÇAVDAR in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture Department, Middle East Technical University by,

Prof. Dr. Halil KALIPÇILAR  
Dean, Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Prof. Dr. F. Cana BİLSEL  
Head of Department, Architecture

Prof. Dr. Güven Arif SARGIN  
Supervisor, Architecture Dept., METU

Examing Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Celal Abdi GÜZER  
Architecture Dept., METU

Prof. Dr. Güven Arif SARGIN  
Architecture Dept., METU

Prof. Dr. Selahattin ÖNÜR  
Architecture Dept., Atılım University

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bülent BATUMAN  
Urban Design & Landscape Arch. Dept., Bilkent University

Assist. Prof. Dr. Bilge İMAMOĞLU  
Architecture Dept., TED University

Date: 01.08.2018
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Rabia Çiğdem ÇAVDAR

Signature: 

ABSTRACT

IDEOLOGY, SUBJECT, ARCHITECTURE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ARCHITECTURAL THEORY AND THE ARCHITECT-SUBJECT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Çavdar, Rabia Çiğdem
Ph.D., Department of Architecture
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargin

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This thesis will concentrate on how architecture is reproduced by ideology to structure/constitute the mind. I think that dominant ideologies ceased to structure the physical world (or perhaps it is easier for them to play over the physical world - power already has done it) and their new target is the human mind, where they have the potential to make radical inceptions. This thesis asks the question of how architecture affects the human mind with the transformation of late capitalism: how late capitalism uses architecture as an agent (or apparatus) to change the construction of the human mind in order to impose its ideology, through the transformative tools presented in the twenty-first century.

The thesis will be structured over three conceptual domains: subject, ideology and architecture. These three domains have a profound epistemological relation to the definition. The main argument is that “architecture” is a kind of “point de capiton”, in Lacanian terms, between “the subject” (human mind), which is defined as the sublime object of ideology by Zizek, and “ideology”; the role of architecture in transformation of the mind.
The reason behind this statement is that especially after the digital turn, not only in architecture but also in all life patterns, free-floating meanings began to invade the complete social structure; every concept that constitutes societal life was displaced. Everything began to be described with the prefix “post”, such as post-historical, post-humanist, post-political, post-ideological, post-theory and even, astonishingly, "post-truth". Under these circumstances, in which truth becomes “meaningless”, I propose a neo-structuralist argument which is that to fix these fluid surfaces, it is possible to reactivate the Lacanian term “point de capitone” for re-constituting “meaning” and “truth”. In Lacanian terminology, “point de capitone” works to fix meaning between two different fields. In this dissertation, my claim is that “architecture” as a cultural form could be used as “point de capitone” between ideology and the subject in the “post-truth era”.

I think that epistemologically re-structured architecture as an “interface” has potential to turn into a “meaning-fixer” in a place flooded with a multitude of free-floating concepts. Meanwhile via this “point de capitone”, a redoubling procedure that re-creates the lost otherness will re-constitute an “incommensurable dialectic” for providing social antagonism. With the awareness of new digital agents on space structuring/perceiving, I claim that “architect-subject” can re-configure itself for re-defining a new regime of architectural theory. It is clear that the object of theory has changed, and the new object of architectural theory is the “architect-subject”.

**Keywords:** Architecture, Architectural Theory, Ideology, Subject, Agent, Power, Sublime Object, “Point de Capitone”, Late-Capitalism, 21st Century.
ÖZ

İDEOLOJİ, ÖZNE, MİMARLIK: YİRMİBİRİNCİ YÜZYILDA MİMARLIK KURAMI VE MİMAR-ÖZNE’NİN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ

Çavdar, Rabia Çiğdem
Doktora, Mimarlık Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın

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To My Mother and
To the Memory of My Father
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“…much of modern social reality is illegible to the people trying to make sense of it.”

R. Sennett, The Culture of The New Capitalism (Introduction, p: 12)

The contemporary architectural milieu that was blurred after the digital turn and at the threshold of the new “paradigm” necessitates an inner-legible-different re-evaluation. Although it is clear that to read contemporary situations is hard, this dissertation aims to propose a parallax view to the “architectural praxis” via giving a new position to the “architect-subject” in the place where every concept has lost its “dialectical other.”

It is obvious that in Lacanian terminology, the “symbolic realm” – the social construction of every life – has lost its clear “appearance” and turned into something “fluid-dynamic-rhizomatic” manipulated by “subject positions”. This dissertation, by revisiting post-war theory, attempts to open up a discussion on the definitive transformations of three domains that are effective on each other’s epistemic levels: ideology, subject and architecture. These three domains are conjointly analysed for determining a new position to “the
architect-subject” which is treated as “ideologically-produced-architectural agent”.

The new position of “architect-subject” will be scrutinized and structured for reconstructing “architectural praxis”. This study proposes a Neostructuralist approach in which a “point de capitone” - Lacanian terminology used for fixing meanings – is needed for stabilizing two floating conceptual surfaces in a “post-truth age” (the age in which “truth” lost its “true appearance”). At this point, this dissertation will scrutinize “architecture” as a cultural form – a material form of ideology; it will suggest that architecture could work as a “point de capitone” between the gaps of reality and the Real, ideology and the subject, and “political unconscious” and “immanent intensity”.

1.1 Scope of the Dissertation

Is the architectural milieu lacking in theory now? If theory is not underpinning the praxis, what is the new apparatus for the 21st century? Is it parametric knowledge tools or computer programs? How are new “–isms” constituted in the 21st century without theory? On the other hand, is it possible to constitute an “–ism” without theoretical infrastructure? All these questions move forward through the question of why (or whether) theory-laden paradigms are broken in the 21st century.

Terry Eagleton begins his book, “After Theory”, with the sentence that “The golden age of cultural theory is long past”¹, to emphasize that the “classical” period of theory has already passed. He continues, “If theory means a reasonably systematic reflection on our guiding assumptions, it remains as

indispensable as ever. But we are living now in aftermath of what one might call high theory, in an age which, having grown rich on the insights of thinkers like Althusser, Barthes and Derrida, has also in some ways moved beyond them.”

It is possible to mention a definitive transformation on what theory is or what theory will turn towards in the 21st century. Although this statement seems very general, it is also very specific to the field of architecture, because architecture is also in a kind of lack of theory, or face to face with a new definition of architectural theory. To open a discussion on architectural theory of the 21st century, it ought to be considered what the architect-subject is in the 21st century. The argument is that without deciphering the architect-subject in the new era, it is not possible to understand what the architectural theory will turn to. The question is, what kind of thinking will guide the new era in the architectural milieu within the shape of the “architect-subject”?

The triadic framework - ideology-subject-architecture - suggested in this dissertation could be a form of reading the era in which architectural theory has been transformed. The problematic could be defined as what the architectural theory of the 21st century is in the context of ideologically structured “architect-subject”.

Why is this triadic framework chosen? In searching for a new form of architectural theory, initially the architectural discourse needs to be discussed. Moreover, it is clear that for a discussion about architectural discourse, the architect-subject should be analyzed within an ideological framework. Thus, ideology (in the terms of definitive transformations in the 21st century), as being deterministic on real relations, has a direct impact on constructing the

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“architect-subject”, who constitutes architectural theory. Here the term “architect-subject” is referring to a subject engaged in the praxis of architecture. The nexus - relation between ideology and subject - creates an architectural praxis and then the praxis creates its theory. This claim - looking for the relation between subject and ideology for architectural praxis extended to architectural theory - is also a contribution to the discussion of whether architecture is autonomous or not.

Architecture is the former of the self-image; the self-image of the architect-subject embodied in the architectural praxis of the subject. Discourse as an acting - practicing architecture - signifies this self-image. For reading the transformations in architectural theory, it is necessary to first analyse the “architect-subject” discursively. H. Heynen and G. Wright described the latest position of “architectural theory” as

“Architectural theory now recognizes diversity, discontinuity, contingency and inevitable if unpredictable changes over time. Many people seem to celebrate these qualities as inherently liberatory. Topics like gender, race and culture have shifted from oppositional dichotomies to include and embrace a spectrum of differences. Interest in cities and ecologies has further amplified these ideas. The present condition is often described as an archipelago or a patchwork, evoking both multiplicity and fragmentation. Pragmatism has re-emerged as one sign of this effort to take account of diversity, ‘things in the making’ over time, and experimentation within a system.”

Nevertheless, the claim of this dissertation is controversial to this description; this diversity and fragmentation are reasons not to read the architectural theory because it is blurring architectural episteme; using the term “discourse” instead of the term “theory” is preferable. At this point, it is important to recall that to conceptualize the epistemic context and to constitute the epistemic consensus are “sine qua non” for a “theory”. Thus, it is possible to call these fragmented or diversified theories “quasi-theory” or just “discourse”. This dissertation proposes alternative meanings in the definitions of theory, discourse and ideology. The re-emergence of pragmatism shows that just tools are activated and the thought retreats. This means that instead of ends, means are on the stage. The reasons for this situation (which is that the age we live in is controlled by powerful means) have been pursued in historical reality. As Eagleton pointed out,

“Cultural ideas change with the world they reflect upon. If they insist, as they do, on the need to see things in their historical context, then this must also apply to themselves. Even the most rarefied theories have a root in historical reality.”

After the 1960s and cultural liberation, new theories were constituted in the form of revisiting Marxist ideology. The connection between culture and capitalism formalizes the era of theory, from 1960s to 1990s. Here it is important to emphasize that transformations in capitalism reformulate the theory. Actually, theory is a kind of critical self-reflection in crisis periods. Maybe that is why nowadays, architectural institutions are turning to theory again. Although the end of meta-narrations declared, in the multiplication of fragmented narrations, all the “quasi-theories” tried to constitute themselves with a foundation based on a meta-narration. Meanwhile, architectural

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institutions are looking for theories, which are supervened by practice, at the peripheral territories for legitimizing and articulating them in the mainstream. The dissertation scrutinizes mainly two questions: why and how meta-theories are being revisited in post-industrial capitalism’s crises (it is possible to think that capitalism is also in crisis nowadays), and secondly, how and in which conditions the peripheral “architect-subject” transferred to the mainstream as the sample of rising theory. This legitimization process is the displacement of architectural discourse with architectural theory.

In this respect, there are six main questions to be scrutinized as the aims of this dissertation. The questions have a direct nexus with the three domains of the dissertation, which are ideology, subject and architecture. They are:

1. Why is it not possible to conceive a clear-cut “ideology” in the present time? (What constitutes the present time’s societal structure?) It is obvious that the concept of “ideology” is ambiguous in the 21st century, at the present time; this blurriness could be understood as the result of the phase changes of capitalism. Actually, capitalism is at the threshold of a counterturn; it will be witnessed as a switch from late capitalism toward a new form of it. This situation necessitates a re-reading and re-definition of what “ideology” – the constitutive apparatus of societal structure - is.

2. How will it be possible to emancipate from this ideological blurriness in the “post-truth age”? (Which agent(s) will stabilize the societal structure?) The main reason behind the ideological blurriness is that to live in multitude of unstable meanings. For stabiling the free-floating signifiers – meanings - the Lacanian term “point de capiton” (nodal point) could be activated. To stitch a floating signifier to the plane of ideology, a third agent (here it is architecture) could be used. Via this agent, or the “point de capitone”, two unstable surfaces
of concepts could randomly pinpoint to each other for creating a “true-appearance” at the theoretical level.

3. How will it be possible to re-configure the dialectical tension between the subject and the object in the post-humanist era? (How and in which conditions do the subject and the object become interchangeably used?) The theoretical and physical gap between the subject and the object has become narrower. In a physical manner, the “man-made” apparatuses, things and objects are embodied to “man” like organs. In a theoretical manner, the subject is transformed into object, as a commodity. As Zizek pointed out, the subject turns into “the sublime object of ideology”. Under these conditions, it is inevitably necessary to revisit the dialectic of object and subject for re-naming the current situation.

4. What is the new definition of “theory” in the place where the gap between subject and object disappeared? (How will it be possible to redefine the theory with the subject instead of the object?) It is obvious that “theory” is a kind of mechanism that “operates on the object”; but in this dissertation, the previous question is considered: it is inevitable to redefine what the theory is under the condition of “objectification process of the subject”.

5. How will it be possible to posit the concept of “alienation” to the field of architecture in the post-truth era? (Why are alienated processes influential in post-truth architecture?) It is obvious that the “alienation process” experienced in “production” leaps to the field of “design”, which means that the “alienation process” switches from the dialectic of producer and the product towards the dialectic of manual and mental labour. This question embraces the question of “how will the “architect-subject” be posited in 21st century?”
6. Why is the unequivocality of space lost? (What are the effects of new technological agents on perception of space?) This question scrutinized the interaction between the subject and the space where many technological agents are re-structuring the “space of everyday”. How the insignificant everyday life became visible via new agents will be discussed. Actually, the new technological agents will change the “reality” of the space.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

This dissertation is structured across three domains: ideology, subject and architecture. When these three domains are scrutinized, profound epistemic links can be followed. The relations between these domains have intersected especially after the linguistic turn in the epistemic milieu. The concept of ideology and the subject is interpreted in structuralism in the form of referring to each other for the sake of the re-definition of ideology with the individual and vice versa. This situation caused a reshaping process in material form(s) of ideology, one being that of architecture. The theoretical framework of this dissertation has settled on the structural(ist) transformations of these three domains after the post-war period, from the 1960s to the present.

1.2.1 Ideology: Architectural Apparatus of Societal Construction

Ideology is discussed as an architectural apparatus of societal construction. This statement determines that ideology is a constitutive element of society itself, where it dominates the minds of individuals for keeping them away from capturing the whole system. Ideology is a kind of construction, which prevents the deciphering of whole codes of societal structure. Eagleton grasped the precise meaning of ideology for Marxism by stating that:
“Ideology is not in the first place a set of doctrines; it signifies the way men live out their roles in class-society, the values, ideas and images which tie them to their social functions and so prevent them from a true knowledge of society as a whole.”

Ideology makes social reality unreadable for its members, by rearranging lived processes. In the Althusserian definition: “Ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”

The Althusserian definition of ideology recalls (or signifies) Jacques Lacan’s triadic system: it could be grounded in the Lacanian “Real/Imaginary/Symbolic” triad. Ideology is a system of representations that oscillate between “imaginary” and “real”, which means that ideological representations are situated in the “symbolic” realm.

Lacan defines “the Real” as a kernel, which cannot be enclosed by the “symbolic”: “the Real” is the impossibility. “Reality” is different from “the Real”; reality is an amount of “symbolized real”. The “symbolic” is a linguistic, grammatical and cultural structure where “I” is subjectified within the “ego” formed in the “imaginary” phase. The “symbolic” defines a closed linguistic/cultural order, which consists of signifiers that have a relationship with each other to create the meaning. In addition, Lacan depicts the “imaginary” as the first term of the triad before “the Real” and the “symbolic”. The “imaginary” is identifications formed by the “ego” which do not have linguistic qualifications in the mirror stage. In this sense, the “imaginary” is a

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unitary protected phase where it is not fragmented by categories, dichotomies or “neither/nor” positions.

At this point, it is possible to claim that ideology constructed the “symbolic order” to subjectify the “ego”. Therefore, it creates “meaning” via the signifiers; representations transformed into apparatuses for the reception of symbolic order. With the determinations of ideology, to see “the Real” has been impossible, the subject encounters with only the “symbolic order” where meaning is constructed in the form of representations.

Ideology is located in the symbolic order for presenting the “reality”- the symbolized real; and each subject is constituted in ideology by passing through the symbolic from the imaginary. In Lacanian terms, the subject is defined with the other, not within itself. As depicted by Eagleton, “it [ideology] is an indispensible medium for the production of human subjects.”

“Reality”- the symbolized real – is allocated in the material realm, and so ideology occurs in the material world. Although the relation of ideology with the mind is not ignored, for Althusser, ideology is material: ideology becomes identical with the lived experience. Althusser emphasized that:

“When we speak of ideology we should know that ideology slides into all human activity, that it is identical with the ‘lived’ experience of human existence itself: that is why the form in which we are ‘made to see’ ideology in great novels has as its content the ‘lived’ experience of individuals. This ‘lived’ experience is not a given, given by a pure

‘reality’, but the spontaneous ‘lived experience’ of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real.”

The theoretical framework of the term “ideology”, designated according to the Althusserian definition of ideology, becomes a starting point to conceptualize the whole timeline of the term because of having direct relations with the term “the subject”. With the Althusserian notion of ideology-theory, the two domains - ideology and subject - are interconnected, which means that Marx (hence all Marxist discourse) and Lacan (hence Freudian interpretation) are included in the frame.

### 1.2.2 Subject: Architect-Subject as Social Agent

After the linguistic turn, in structuralism, “individual” emancipated from being transcendental existence, and the “subject” was depicted in societal coherence. Althusser directly posits individuals in relation to ideology by calling individuals “subjects”. Althusser stated, “Ideology interpellates individuals as subjects.” This statement posits that any individual turns into a subject with ideology. The thesis that individuals are depicted in relation with ideology as subjects could be a sub-thesis of the Althusserian notion of the ideology-subject relationship, which is constituted as “there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects.”

The Althusserian definition of ideology is subject-centered. The subject-centered approach in ideology is a radical turn in the concept of ideology. As Eagleton pointed out:

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“Ideology exists in and through the human subject; and to say that the subject inhabits the imaginary is to claim that it compulsively refers the world back to itself. Ideology is subject-centered or ‘anthropomorphic’: it causes us to view the world as somehow naturally oriented to ourselves, spontaneously ‘given’ to the subject; and the subject conversely, feels itself a natural part of the reality, claimed and required by it.”

There is a double constitution between ideology and subject and this comes from the double definition of ideology itself. Etienne Balibar pointed out that ideology was formulated twice in historical context: first in The German Ideology by Marx and Engels as the ideas of the ruling class, and second by Engels as an appearance of a system determining real relations. In the first definition the “subject” appears as the “maker” of ideology, and in the second form the “subject” is subordinated to the ideology that coordinates real relations. Thus, it is clear that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.”

Ideology is a kind of “superstructure” which constitutes society and works for managing human beings’ lived experience; it reunites life cycles by hiding social reality.

1.2.3 Architecture: Theoretical Text as Architectural Praxis

Architecture is discussed as the third domain in which the thesis’ main argument is located. Architecture has a vigorous role in constructing the physical world, which consists of human and inhuman structures. All these

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structures are reproduced or organized by power to penetrate into the human mind to construct something. What is this “something” which uses architecture as an agent? It is possible to say that “something” – a given pattern - could be changeable depending on power and time. It is clear that ideology is the “something” in which the human mind is transformed. As Althusser stated “An ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material.”

Therefore, architecture is the practicing field of ideology, or in Althuserrian terms, architecture is the one of the material forms of ideology: “ideology” exists in “architecture”.

In this context, “architecture” can be understood as architectural praxis. However, in this thesis the focus is on both architectural discourse and practice. Remembering Laclau and Mouffe’s statement that “all practices are discursive”, architectural texts are discussed as discursive practices. Eagleton emphasized that:

“Heretically deviating from the mentor Michael Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe deny all the validity to the distinction between ‘discursive’ and ‘non-discursive’ practices, on the ground that a practice is structured along the lines of a discourse.”

Thus, architectural objects are not external to the realm of discourse, but internal, and the realm of architectural discourse is constituted by them. Here the chosen textual material - architectural texts - directly refers to the discursive realm, which is indicated by the ideological subject/architect-subject.

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In the structure of this thesis, the definitions of subject and ideology are allocated to the post-war theoretical framework, mostly structuralism through to post-Marxism, an era in which architectural practice is also in transformation. Kenneth Frampton\textsuperscript{16} evaluated that period under the title of “Critical Assessment and Extension into the Present 1925-1991” where he mentioned radical ideological conversions after World War II in his book “Modern Architecture, A Critical History”. He emphasized that “structuralism” manifested in architectural practice against the reductionist functionalism; some architectural practices follow Saussurean discursive approaches in the Taylorized age.\textsuperscript{17} Frampton depicted some architects as neo avant-gardes who are as effective as pre-war avant-gardes, such as the New York Five.\textsuperscript{18} These architects began to practice after the mid-sixties and to create a new theory to be remembered as neo avant-gardes. Interestingly, K. M. Hays called this neo avant-gardism late avant-gardism by referring to the Jamesonian term “late modern” in his book “Architecture's Desire: Reading the Late Avant-Garde”.\textsuperscript{19} Hays introduced his thesis thus:

“…having long since been deprived of its immediate use value, architecture in the 1970s found itself challenged as mode of cultural representation by more commercially lubricated media. Feeling the force of changed historical conditions and a developed consumer society the most advanced architecture of the 1970s retracted the frame

\textsuperscript{16} K. Frampton positioned himself in Marxist theory but also he emphasized that he wrote in critical theory. His major issue is reinterpretation of Marxism in the architectural realm; he focused on structure and agency dichotomy and assessed architectural practice not far from social productions.

\textsuperscript{17} Frampton, K., Modern Architecture: A Critical History, Thames and Hudson, New York, 1992, pp. 297-299.


\textsuperscript{19} Hays, K. Michael, Architecture's Desire: Reading the Late Avant-Garde, MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2010, p. 11.
of identity between the architectural object and the sociomaterial ground.”

According to Hays, this retraction contains a kind of “pragmatic negation” followed by the early 20th century’s avangardist resistance in which “change” has occurred; also, he continues that this new situation unexpectedly caused an impasse where resistance does not produce “change”. Hays prefers to emphasize Taffuri’s dissidence from this opinion. At this point, Hays mentions a new form of architecture:

“an architecture reflecting on Architecture… The object-in-itself becomes object-different-from-itself, a signifier directed toward the very disciplinary codes and conventions that authorize all architectural objects - it becomes Symbolic in Lacan’s sense. The object becomes a medium for a Real that it does not simply reproduce, but necessarily both reveals and conceals, manifests and represses.”

As Hays outlines, architecture after the 1970s not only reproduces ideology, but also signifies what is concealed in it. These transformations reflected the new understanding of architecture, and explored how architectural practice moved to the “symbolic” realm. It is a sign of the paradigm shift in the architectural realm.

The argument of the thesis pursues how architectural discourse and practice became interchangeably displaced after the conversions in the architect-

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subject. Along with Framptonian choice of acceptance of architects (or architectural institutions) as the agents or the subjects, this thesis also understands a theoretical text as architectural praxis produced discursively by an architect-subject, an agent. Many architect-subjects with many discourses reveal an architectural praxis; their mental constitution can be read from their textual architecture. At this point, it is important to remember L. Benevolo’s evaluation related to how publications are the relevant medium for making connections with the public. According to him, publications, established in the early 20th century, explore both the future ideal and the present situation of architectural practice. Most journals do not advocate new tendencies but document the present movement.\(^\text{23}\) However, in the post-war period, it can be witnessed that architectural publications not only express tendencies of present architectural movements, but also become a “discursive body” for theoretical textual architecture. The architect-subject (re)produces himself/herself as an agent/political subject in textually performed architecture.

1.3 Thesis Problematic - Research Questions and Hypothesis

The argument of this dissertation is that architecture is performed as “point de capitone” (in Lacan’s terms) between ideology and subject. Laclau and Mouffe use the term “nodal point” instead of “point de capitone”.\(^\text{24}\) A quilted ideology on the subject became a clear entity via discursively realized architectural practice. Here the fixation of ideology to the subject is realized by architecture, where deconstructivists’ non-fixity of discourses is denied. This fixation draws attention to the dichotomy of autonomy versus heteronomy in architecture. It is


possible to speak of the semi-autonomy of architecture between the ideology and the subject. In this dissertation, the possibility of constituting a new political subject within and against ideology via both the theory and the practice of an architect-subject is scrutinized.25

In this dissertation, architecture is described as an “interface”, and the Lacanian term “point de capitone” is preferred to explain the interface position of architecture between ideology and subject. Lacan structured the term “point de capitone” as the fixer of meaning between signifier and signified. Architecture is the interface where the meaning is stabilized for the reception of the subject. The aim of the thesis to signify/indicate how architecture can be constituted as “point de capitone” for societal existence, and how it works to fix meaning.

At this point, the term “discourse” is activated: floating meanings cause discourses in an ideology. Laclau calls discourse “a structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed.”26 He pointed out:

“The concept of discourse describes the ultimate nonfixity of anything existing in society. One must, of course, not reduce discourse to speech and writing but instead expand it to any kind of signifying relation. This concept of discourse is the terrain on which a concept of hegemony can be constructed. The closest use I find to the notion of discourse that I am proposing is in Derrida’s “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourses of the Human Sciences.” There he links the notion of the

discourse to the dissolution of any transcendental signifier. He argues that when the transcendental signifier is recognized as an illusion, when all we have is the constant sliding of difference, everything becomes discourse because discourse is precisely the moment of nonfixity. In other words, discourse is not a mental act in the usual sense. Material things, external objects as such also participate in discursive structures.”

As a material thing, architectural space could be specified as a discursive structure. In Laclau’s conceptualization, “discourse is not only mental act”, but is also something material. Thus, architectural praxis could be examined for searching/reading the 21st century’s architectural theory. Although discourse was characterized by “nonfixity” in Derrida’s sense, architecture (architectural space) is (re)produced by ideology for fixing meaning. This paradoxical position reveals the autonomy of the architectural realm. The discussion of autonomy versus heteronomy in the field of architecture is raised because of the discursive character of architecture, where it is used for fixing floating signifiers. In contrast, the architect-subject does not have a “fixed meaning” in itself; (s)he could only have a subject position located at the intersection of discourses. This thesis also focuses on how architecture works (or not) autonomously while it is an apparatus used by ideology to control aspects of meaning.

“Ideological space is made of non-bound, non-tied elements, ‘floating signifiers’, whose very identity is open, over-determined by their articulation in a chain with other elements - that is, their ‘literal’ signification depends on their metaphorical surplus-signification. The

‘quilting’ performs the totalization by means of which this free floating of ideological elements is halted, fixed - that is to say, by means of which they become parts of the structured network of meaning.”

In this ideological “quilting”, architecture has a role being a “point de capitone”. The claim of this dissertation is that “Architecture is an apparatus of the ideological quilt.” It is an apparatus to quilt the ideology to the subject. It has power to transform the physical environment; it is a material discourse. It can be experienced so that it can be remembered by the masses. Ideologies prefer to use/reproduce architecture for what they impose on the mind. Architecture as an embracing item conquers all mental structure in the perceptible world. Another aim of the thesis is to create an answer to the question of what kind of adjustments today’s “subject” as being an “object” has to face: how reality is reconstructed to take form in a symbolized world.

1.4 Method and Structure

Textual analysis and discourse analysis are used as the methodology of this dissertation. It is important to emphasize that discourse analysis includes “power relations” in society, which are discussed firstly as ideology and then as subject positions in this dissertation, especially the relationships in language and practices - for this dissertation this covers architectural praxis, both theory and practice. All the conceptual transformations of the “architect-subject” in architectural praxis, after the post-war period up to the present day, are discussed in the context of whole ideology-theory in the dissertation. The three domains of the dissertation - ideology, subject and architecture - will be discussed in three different chapters where these three domains interrelate.

As seen in the figure below, the structure of the dissertation is based on three fundamental domains: ideology, subject and architecture. This figure contains some clues about the transformations of the three domains after the post-war period within structuralist and post-structuralist approaches. In particular, it can be seen how peripheral theoretical notions changed the essence of the domain written in boxes.

The connection point that links these three domains is the Lacanian term, “point de capitone” - nodal point - that operates as a fixer in a fluid “ethos”. In this conceptual map, ideology and subject are located vis-a-vis; this means that these domains have a direct relationship with each other, and the third domain, architecture, works as supplementary structure, which is located at the suture of two interrelated domains. Actually, this figuration shows that both mental and physical “action” (and practice) is working as a materialization of discourse. In the Foucauldian sense, architecture works as a “dispositif” for fixing meaning. The names appearing in this structural map show some of the contributory names to these domains, who are mentioned in the dissertation. Actually, it is important to emphasize that the “null subject” in this figure is the “architect-subject” who takes a position at the intersection of two domains, architecture and subject. The position of the “architect-subject” is considered in Figure 2.

The second conceptual map, shown in Figure 2 below, contains relations among the fields; “culture” is added as a sub-domain of ideology. This map, as a secondary conceptual framework of study, shows how these domains and sub-domains correlate to each other. In the thesis, the domains of “ideology” and “culture” are discussed as “superstructures” where architecture is used as re-shaping apparatus. Moreover, the “architect-subject” is evaluated within the Haysian conceptualization of “the subject” discussed in Chapter 4.
Figure 1: Conceptual Mapping of Structure of proposal (designed by R. Ç. Çavdar)
Figure 2: Conceptual Mapping of relations between fields (designed by R. Ç. Çavdar)
In Chapter 2, the first domain, ideology, is revealed with its definitive transformations, and in the final part of the chapter new definition of ideology for the 21st century is discussed. Interpretation of the term in the post-war period occupies a reasonable part of the chapter. The connections between ideology and history are discussed under the sub-section “History, Anti-history, Post-history”. This chapter suggests reading history as “eventual” instead of “systemic”, thus turning ideology into an ahistorical superstructure. With the labelling in post-Marxist and post-Althusserian approaches the new societal apparatus – the new definition of ideology - was renamed as “truth-event”.

Chapter 3 contains the second domain, the subject, which correlates with ideology. The connections between the subject and humanism are discussed under the sub-section “Humanism, Anti-Humanism, Posthuman(ism)”. In addition, the legitimacy of the dialectic of subject and object is open to discussion in this chapter, when the new technological milieu is taken into account. With the digital turn, the dialectical distance between object and subject got narrower, and new “societal actants”, such as cyborgs and artificial living forms, came into the everyday life structure. Additionally, these transformations caused not only new definitions of subjectivity but also came to determine the creative-subject’s positions in “third nature”, that is the “cybersphere”. In the final sub-section, the “architect-subject” is depicted as an agent in the context of the new subjectivity of the 21st century.

Architecture, the third and final domain, is discussed in Chapter 4. The main statement of the thesis is presented in this chapter: that architecture, being a cultural form, works as “point de capitone” between ideology and subject. Architecture is located at the “void” between the first two domains, and works to fix floating signifiers. In this chapter, the connections between architecture
and the concept of “truth” are scrutinized. The reason for this scrutiny is that the relations between architecture and “truth” stem from the crisis in scientificity – the crisis in the epistemic field of architecture. Actually, with the digital revolution, the architectural episteme has shifted from “the symbolic” towards “the Real”. This displacement of the epistemic field and the “post-truth” phase of architecture are discussed in the final sub-section of Chapter Four.

In the conclusion chapter, six axioms are offered as the contribution of the dissertation. Preceding this, the economy-politic of the present day is discussed. The conclusion ends with an epilogue about how the new position of the “architect subject” in the 21st century has been assessed with an “anamorphic gaze”. The epilogue proposes a new label for the architectural production and architectural praxis of the digital revolution. This label contains a Lacanian triadic schema: the imaginary, the symbolic and the Real.

1.5 Concluding Remarks

This dissertation mainly focuses on the ideologically-produced “architect-subject” for scrutinizing how architectural theory has been transformed in the “post-truth era” in the context of discussions about the “end of theory”. The reason behind the focus on the “architect-subject” is that after structuralism, subject positions activated and formed the symbolic realm and discursive diversity was replaced with theoretical singularity. Redefining the “architect-subject” with changed definitions in the fields of both ideology and the subject can provide new expansions of architectural theory in which the “object of study of theory” is changed. The multitude of discourses and the gap in epistemic consensus led to evaluations such as reading the era as the “end of theory”, but in contrast, the present situation in architecture can be read as a
multitude of “quasi-theory”. Besides the multitude of “quasi-theory”, meta-narrations are revisited for creating legitimate ground in the post-critical era.

In this investigation, the position of the “architect-subject” was unravelled in three domains: first, the “ideology” which the "architect-subject" is subordinated to; second, the “subject” which correlates with ideology in the context of "interpellation”; and third, the “architecture” where the discursive act is materially realized. Ideology is treated as an “architectural apparatus of societal construction” in the dissertation. Ideology is loaded with a constitutive role in society because of its capability to structure the division of labour and the class struggle. The domain of "the subject" discussed how the subject is interpellated by ideology and how it turned into discursive function after post-structuralism. The “architect-subject” is treated as a social agent that works discursively as a "meta-subject" between ideology and the ordinary subject. In the domain of “architecture”, the discussion considered how theoretical text could be replaced with architectural praxis and how vice-versa is also true in pragmatist conventions.

The main claim of the dissertation is that in “off-production age” (or non-production age), the architect-subject has a discrete role as “point de capitone” that fixes free-floating signifiers on the surface of both the ideological realm and subjectivity, via his/her textual and physical production. Here in the fixation process between ideology and subject, architecture works as an “interface” - in Lacanian terms, “point de capitone”- located between two different realms to connect them. This fixation raises the question of whether architecture could work autonomously while it is used as ideological dispositif that controls aspects of meaning.

The outcomes of the dissertation concentrate on six main items:
• reconstructing the absent binary oppositions for escaping from displaced discourses;
• interpreting the Lacanian concept of “point de capiton” for fixing floating illegitimate grounds such as ideology and the subject in the “post-truth age”;
• contributing to the dichotomy of “Object” versus “Subject” where “objectified subject” has transmigrated via new technological developments;
• redefining “theory” in the context of “objectification of the subject” and vice-versa;
• contributing to the Tafurian alienated production process in “post-truth architecture”;
• re-evaluating the equivocal interaction between “space” and “subject”.

CHAPTER 2

ARCHITECTURAL APPARATUS OF SOCIETAL CONSTRUCTION

“Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”

K. Marx, Thesis on Feuerbach

One of the tasks of “architecture” could be to change the physical environment and another task could be to change social circumstances via structuring the physical environment. The power to change the current social circumstances of “architecture” stemmed from being a powerful element of “superstructure” that has not only an economic origin but also “subjective”-creative-political bases. By defining the “architect” as the “architect-subject”, this dissertation unravels its own position that “architectural praxis” is an ideological and socio-economic production. As Coleman pointed out, “all works – especially architecture – and all people are always already embedded within a wider web of associations, primarily social.”

This statement had been recognized in post-war architectural theory with the contribution of structuralism, post-structuralism and post-Marxism, where formalism lost its function and the

“architectural object” began to lose its hegemony. It is important to emphasize that the reinterpretation of ideology via psychoanalytic and structuralist methods shows that ideology is not only “systemic ideas”; it is an “operative” apparatus that directs the construction of social life. “Ideology” is actually a constructive apparatus that manipulates and yet structures the “unconscious everyday practice of human-being”; thus, “human-being” began to be “interpellated” by ideology and turned into a “subject”, an ideologically-produced entity. This Marxist rereading encircled a complete post-war theoretical framework, and naturally “architectural theory” has also shared in this (neo-)Marxist method.

“Architectural production” interconnected not only its inner technical methods but also productive forces. This interconnection structures “cities” as “architectural body” and vice versa. This is why Tafuri considered “cities” semi-autonomous “superstructures”. Tafuri stated, “the city itself, objectively structured as a machine for extracting social surplus value, reproduces, in its own conditioning mechanisms, the reality of the industrial modes of production.” For him, the “city” is a productive unit that coordinates the cycle of “production-distribution-consumption”.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that according to Tafuri, the city – superstructure - is nothing more than “conflicts that elude the plans of advanced capitalism”, which means that the city is the only place where the totalizing policies of capitalism collapse. In this respect, when his Marxist approach is considered, it is possible to claim that the city could be the only place of “resistance” against the dominant ideology – capitalism - because of

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its contradictory character. Actually, this statement could be the slogan of “critical architecture” that became popular in the 1990s. Actually, for Tafuri, without utopia – which could be depicted here as a process of critique of present ideology - architecture is “sublime uselessness”: “drama of architecture today: that is to see architecture obliged to return to pure architecture, to form without utopia; in the best cases, to sublime uselessness.” At this point, it is possible to argue, Tafuri claimed that “architecture” involving “critique of ideology” was identical to “utopia”. For him, without ideological critique of the present, without the utopian side, architecture would become an object of exchange. Here it is obvious that Tafuri foresaw that capitalist development inversion to neoliberal policies in which “null-ideology” works.

The effect of “null-ideology” in neoliberalism caused architectural practice to change, becoming reduced to only “problem-solving” and purified from all social and political contexts. Actually, the discussion of the “autonomy of architecture”, which intensified in the 1990s, stems from this argument. The autonomy project could be seen as a “band-aid” for architecture, which lost all significance as an apparatus that shapes society. Here it is important to remember what Coleman states about autonomy:

“Autonomy is not a revolution but rather a restoration of sorts in the sense that an empty architecture, whatever its claims to resistance, is an architecture fully coincident with the processes of the capitalist production of buildings. Without the edge of Utopia, of a sustained critique of the present that seeks to transform it, architecture is just another product to be exchanged.”

Coleman’s approach clearly indicates that although he supported Tafuri’s utopian-revolutionary reevaluation of architecture, he found critical architectural autonomy weak and not as powerful as solutions with utopian edges. Actually, with Tafuri, “architectural production” switches from “architectural object” towards “architectural process”, which consists of not only practice but also theory and as yet “non-realized critical utopian architectural thoughts”. Tafuri demonstrated that “architecture” depends on, in Marxist terminology, the “mode of production”; his pessimism stemmed from his concern that if “architectural praxis” lost its utopian edges then it would turn into only a “commodity”, a mere extension of the dominance.

In this respect, it is possible to claim that the negative criticality behind the Tafurian notion could stem from Weberian “liberation from values” that caused a new rationality in “the field of indeterminant, fluid, and ambiguous forces.” According to Tafuri, in avant-gardist production of the modernist movement, Weberian desacralization via “liberation from values” caused a “self-rationalization” process in intellectual activity that concluded with the “disposition of ideology”. Actually, this process could be re-evaluated with the Therbornian notion of ideological interpellation. He suggested three modes of interpellation for recognition of the subject. The first is “what exists”, which is based on the differentiation of true and real knowledge; the second one is “what is good”, which is based on ethical values and norms; the third and final one is “what is possible”, which contains “consequences of change”, hopes and fears. Although Therborn’s approach converged with the Marxist-

Althusserian interpellation of subject, the first proposal of modes of interpellation in Therborn corresponded with the Weberian desacralization of the subject via ideology. Here it is obvious that Weberian free valuation was in the tendency of emancipating intellectual activity from the world of “sacred” for linking to the social and terrestrial and becoming more “scientific” in the field of ideology. At this point, it is important to remember that the Weberian approach was already in the orthodox Marxist tradition; his notion grew out of a psychoanalytic-structuralist interpretation of Marxism.

It is possible to find some parallelization between the position of “architect-subject” in present time and the avant-gardes of the modernist movement of the early 20th century criticized by Tafuri; both have to produce in the “field of indeterminant, fluid, and ambiguous forces”. The current situation of intellectuals - not only the architect-subject but also all mental labourers - in the place where “self-rationalization” has not occurred, is widely different from the avant-gardes of the modernist movement. One of the aims of this dissertation is to re-situate both the terms “ideology” and “subject” in the 21st century, in the place where “phantasms” take place instead of “self-rationalization”. The reason for redefining both architect-subject as an agent and architectural praxis as a “point de capitone” between ideology and subject comes from the mental gap where much critical-rational thinking occurred at the threshold of a paradigm shift. From this standpoint, not only is the changed role of the architect-subject in society scrutinized in this dissertation, but also the changed position/mode of interpellation of the architect-subject is re-evaluated.

In this respect, the ideological role of the architect in society had to be considered because ideologies work as determinants to structure everyday life. At this point, the secondary inference Tafuri stated becomes important, which
is the decline of architects as “active ideologues”. He mentioned the “proletarianization of the architect” who is “inserted within the planning programs of production”. Via moving from this item, “proletarianization of the architect”, it is necessary to emphasize two important points: one is that if the terminology of “active ideologues” is evaluated, it is possible to say that the Tafurian subjectification of the architect would be far from the Althusserian interpretation of both ideology and ideological interpellation. Correspondingly, the second point is that after neoliberalism, it is not possible to differentiate “manual” and “mental labour” in ways that could be seen in early 20th century, or in orthodox Marxism. These two points show that the current conditions require a post-Tafurian re-evaluation.

The Althusserian interpretation of ideology and the neoliberal classless social order involve a post-Tafurian rereading of subjectivity - of division of labour. The post-Marxist concept of “immaterial labour” reveals that the tension between manual and mental labour was extinguished. Discussing “architectural praxis” with the term “immaterial labour”, she tried, in “The Architect as Worker, Immaterial Labor, The Creative Class and The Politics of Design”, to assess a post-Tafurian contribution in the ideology of architecture, and the book filled the void that settled on the contradiction of capital-labour. After recalling all Marxist contributions to the ideology of architecture, such as the Framptonian analysis of work and labour in architecture, the Haysian positioning of architectural production to not only the base but also to the superstructure, and Easterling, Martin and Scott’s redefinition of the boundaries of architectural production, Peggy Deamer stated that:

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“However, all of these exceptions spin around an empty center that still requires more focused attention, a center that examines architecture’s peculiar status of material embodiment produced by its immaterial work, work that is at once very personal and yet entirely social.”

This statement signifies a radical displacement of architectural praxis and the architect-subject in the post-Tafurian era. To dissolve the new position of the architect-subject in the ideology of architecture, it is important to scrutinize the new definition of “ideology” and correspondingly the new definition of “subject” in the place where capitalism is in a counterturn. It is clear that after neoliberalism many contradictions and dialectical positions changed phase. Moreover, it is also significant to remember the digital turn, which changed the mode of production and the definition of “truth” (scientificity and knowledge). Under these circumstances, it is necessary to redefine the architect-subject as a socio-political agent by revisiting Marxist ideology.

In this respect, at the threshold of paradigmatic changes, it is significant to remember Michael Sorkin’s statement that “all architecture is political” for understanding all approaches in architectural production. At this point, it is possible to claim that architecture is a “non-discursive act” capable of producing “the perception of truth” politically active in power relations. As Sargin pointed out, this “constituted perception of truth” has the potential to turn into de facto/common truth that disciplines the ordinary body and reason.

41 Sorkin, M., All Over the Map: Writing on Buildings and Cities, Verso, UK, 2013, p. 82.
via obligatory internalization processes.\textsuperscript{42} This potential makes “architectural praxis” an “ideological dispositif” used by power and counter-power for imposing thoughts and manipulating the masses. Here it is important to remember what Therborn stated: “Ideologies differ, compete, and clash not only in what they say about the world we inhabit, but also in telling us who we are, in the kind of subject they interpellate.”\textsuperscript{43} For this reason, in this dissertation three domains were chosen: ideology, which has the ability to structure and to dominate; the subject, which is prepossessed/dominated; and architecture, which is the apparatus to dominate. This chapter discusses what “ideology” is and its transformation to “what” in 21\textsuperscript{st} century is an apparatus that constitutes social structure.

The aim of this chapter is that to scrutinize two main questions. The first is: “Why is it not possible to conceive a clear-cut “ideology” in present time?” (What constitutes the present time’s societal structure?) The need to search for constitutive apparatuses of societal structure stems from the deficiency of the balance of social antagonisms in the current time. To find the causality behind the undecipherable ideology, it is obvious that there is a need to reread/reinterpret what the ideology is and how it has changed form in a historical process. This chapter suggests, on the one hand, a descriptive gaze to the concept of ideology; and on the other hand, a prescriptive model – proposing a new definition to ideology - to dissolve/revaluate the current ideological order. Actually, the second question attempts to open a discussion corresponding to the prescriptive model for naming the present day ideology, or for seeking the reason behind ideological blurriness. The discussed claim is

that ideology creates a “quasi-other” for clarifying/validating itself via the “redoubling procedure”.

The second question is: “How will it be possible to emancipate from this ideological blurriness in a post-truth age?” (Which agent(s) will stabilize the societal structure?) The principle of “null-ideology” in neoliberalism causes a radical rupture both in social strata and in the concept of class struggle. The dialectical zones of “division of labour” are intertwined; the separateness of mental and manual labour is lost. In this respect, in the place where dialectical tensions break up, it is possible to witness the displacement of “division of labour” in the social structure. This situation causes instability in the social structure, which refers to a new crisis of capitalism. To stabilize the floating signifiers (or meanings, or concepts), new agents have to be activated.

2.1 Definitions of “Ideology” in Marx and Engels

Marx and Engels uses the term “ideology” in different ways and contexts, but it is possible to sum up three main definitions from their usage. Firstly, an ideology-critical approach, “which interpreted ideology as inverted and reified consciousness”; second, a neutral concept of ideology, “which understood ideology as a class-specific conception of the world”; and third, the conception of ideology, “which understood the ideological as the ensemble of apparatuses and forms of praxis that organize real relation of individuals to the self and to the world.”

The first definition of ideology, which determines ideology as inverted and reified consciousness, actually has a direct relation to how Marx and Engels

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describe “consciousness”. According to Marx, consciousness is a “social product” and “life determines consciousness”. By defining consciousness as a social product, Marx separated “materialism” from its contemplative roots to give it a new form, which contains human activity. In the first thesis of “Theses on Feuerbach”, he claims that “old materialism” “conceived actuality in the form of objects or of contemplation but not as human activity, practice and not subjectively”. This attempt could be read as resolving the consciousness on a profane and secular basis.

After explaining the intrinsic contradictoriness of a contemplative understanding of consciousness by relocating it the secular world in Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx discussed the causal relations of this contradictoriness, namely the division between manual and mental labour, in German Ideology. As Rehmann pointed out, Marx and Engels’s ideology-theory made a decisive shift, which, “instead of clinging to a naive concept of ‘false consciousness’, conceived of the ideological as a material and institutional arrangement in society.” It is possible to read German Ideology as a transition from “discourse of consciousness” to “historical-materialist ideology-theory”. It is possible to trace the claim that the “class” who embody the material force also rules the intellectual force. According to Cunningham and Goodbun,

“For Marx, economic, political and social processes are articulated through dialectical relationships between three elements or moments: material productive forces (or the means/mode of production), actual social relationships (or the division of labour, ownership and law) and

spiritual consciousness (ideology: something ‘between’ the freedom of total man and alienated false consciousness).”

The neutral concept of “ideology” is mostly interpreted through a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Lenin defined social relations in two categories, namely “material” and “ideological” relations, which reduced the “ideological” to “ideas”. Actually, this reductionist approach has some contradictions when overall Marxian thought is considered: “forms of praxis” not only covered one side of the fundamental dialectics of Marxian thought, but also penetrated - yet determined – the superstructure of that ideological strata. When Marx’s statement that “Ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group” is evaluated, it is seen that the Leninist approach focuses on the first part of the statement which covers only the “system of ideas” constructed by mental labour. With the Althusserian School, the “unconscious” side of ideology, which reflects or subordinates both mental and manual labour, is deeply analysed and reinterpreted.

2.2 Interpretation of Ideology in Structuralism

The term “structuralism” as both a method and a philosophy applied to different domains, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. Dosse identified two fundamental reasons for the luminous success of structuralism: “First, structuralism promised a rigorous method and some hope for making decisive progress toward scientificity. But even more fundamentally, it was a

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particular moment in the history of thought, which we can characterize as a key moment of critical consciousness. “Structure” became constituted as “theory” to become an alternative to “metaphysics.” At its central core was modern linguistics and its founding figure, Ferdinand de Saussure. Simon Choat expressed the influences of Saussure on structuralism:

“It is possible to identify three key aspects of Saussure’s influence on structuralism. First, he shifted attention from conscious acts and intentions to the unconscious systems that limit, shape, or determine these acts and can only be revealed by careful study. Second, within those systems elements were analyzed not as self-sufficient units but as a set of related elements, which find their place only through differentiation from other elements: as Saussure put it, in a well-known phrase, ‘in language there are only differences without positive terms’. Finally he undertook a synchronic rather than a diachronic analysis which focused on the ‘essential’ rather than the ‘accessory’ or ‘accidental’.”

Unconsciousness, Difference and Synchrony could be seen as three major concepts in the constitution of structuralism. With structuralism, a return to Marx, Freud and Saussure’s theoretical foundations took place through reading and re-reading processes: Althusser interpreted Marxism in an “ahistorical” method, Lacan reversed Freud, and Barthes and Levi-Strauss reread Saussure. Constitution, interpretation and re-reading protocols developed structuralism mainly along three axes: scientifistic structuralism, represented by Levi-Strauss, Greimas and Lacan; semiological structuralism, represented by Barthes, Todorov and Serres; and finally historicized or epistemic

structuralism, represented by Althusser, Foucault, Derrida and such.\textsuperscript{53} Although Dosse divided structuralism into these three groups, he emphasized that there would be some intersections under these clusters. It is important to emphasize that historicized or epistemic structuralism in particular was effective on the interpretation of ideology-theory.

Besides Dosse’s divisions in structuralism, which reveal the intellectual milieu of the post-war period, there are different evaluations, which clarify the influences on the same period. Via quoting from Vincent Descombes, the influences of post-war French Philosophy were divided into two by Simon Choat; “the generation after 1945 that worked under the influence of ‘the three Hs’ (Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger) and the generation after 1960 influenced by the ‘three masters of suspicion’ (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud), broadly a distinction between phenomenology and structuralism.”\textsuperscript{54} After the 1970s this influence exposed itself in the three anti-H forms: anti-Hegel, anti-humanism and anti-history. With both the philosophical and economic changes in the post-war period, three new forms of “superstructure” were encountered.

- **Superstructure as “Ideology”: Althusser’s ideology-theory**

The term ideology-theory was invented by Louis Althusser in the 1970s. Althusser’s ideology-theory could be distinguished from three approaches which were the main determinations of orthodox Marxism; the first approach could be described as “class-reductionism”, the second was traditional ideology-critique known as “false consciousness”, and the final approach was


the “legitimacy theory”, which “posed the question of ideological integration in a ‘social-technological’ way from the perspective of domination and its self-justification.”

The need for the term ‘ideology-theory’ rose from these traditional explanations of ideology that did not cover stable bourgeois society and its state; with ‘ideology-theory’, it would be possible to fulfil the unconscious modes of functioning. The Althusser School understood Marxism as a ‘theoretical anti-humanism’.

Althusser based his ideology-theory on Gramsci’s analysis of civil society and hegemonic apparatuses; the model of Gramsci’s differentiation of political and civil society formed Althusser’s repressive and ideological-state apparatuses. Althusser’s state apparatuses are created according to Gramsci’s concept of the ‘integral state’, and the plurality of state apparatuses presupposes Gramsci’s plurality of superstructures in civil society, which bind individuals to power by consent instead of coercion. In Althusser’s approach, hegemony unfolds new ideological forms, one of which is the concept of the “subject”. The concept of the subject and voluntary subjection is new in Althusser in comparison to Gramsci. Althusser developed these concepts according to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan. With Gramsci and afterwards with Althusser’s interpretation of Gramsci, the term “ideology” extended from being a “system of ideas” to “lived social practices”.

“Psychoanalytical categories enabled him to understand the ideological as an unconscious, ‘lived’ relationship and to illustrate the dynamic and active character of ideological subjugation. At the same time, the integration of Lacanian psychoanalysis exposed Althusserian ideology-theory to the tension between the historically specific concept of ideological state-apparatuses and an unhistorically conceived ‘ideology in general’- a contradiction which led to divided receptions and finally contributed to the disintegration of the Althusser School.”

In Althusser, ideologies have relatively autonomous temporality. Instead of being mere expression, ideologies have their own ‘material existence’ and therefore temporality. Everyday practices of the subject cause material rituals, which produce ideological effects. Therefore, ideology exists in these material rituals acted by the subject consciously or unconsciously. This situation shows that ideology is not only something ideal but also has material forms. It contains praxis in itself as rituals and actions. In Althusser’s approach ideology is depicted as ‘lived reality’; this is a signifier that ideology is not only ‘false consciousness’ but also fundamentally something unconscious.

Here, it is important to emphasize that according to Althusser, ideology in general is out of history and is eternal like the unconscious, which refers to the Freudian ‘timeless’. It means that with its relative autonomy, ideology is trans-historical and omni-historical. Lacanian structuralist interpretation led to the Althusserian definition of ideology as lived experience within unconscious procedures. As Althusser pointed out, “Ideology represents the imaginary

relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence\(^6\); this definition of ideology exposed the unhistorical essence of his approach within the Lacanian terms of ‘imaginary’. Althusser used the dual terms of real/imaginary by referring to the Lacanian version of psychoanalysis.

**Lacan’s imaginary in Althusser’s ideology**

Althusser introduced the concept of ideology as eternal and omni-historical; this notion directly correlated with Lacanian terminology. Lacan’s concept of ‘imaginary’ developed with the concept of the ‘mirror stage’; as a formative function of the ‘I’, the concept came from the Freudian theory of narcissism.\(^6\)

By taking into consideration Althusser’s notion of ideology as the “representation of imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence”, John Rehmann reformulated ‘imaginary’ as “the individuals’ relationships to their life conditions [which] are mediated through unifying images, which are archetypically anchored in one’s psychological development, constitute homogenized identities and thus misconstrue reality.”\(^6\)

Rehmann constituted that ideology equated to an imaginary relation to real relations and stated that Althusser extended his concept of ideology to ego-formation in general; he continues his depiction that “ideology in general thus coincides with social praxis and the capacity to act as such, with all its

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‘conscious’ and (primarily) ‘unconscious’ dimensions. In the Lacanian conceptualization of the ‘mirror stage’, the mirror is used as the mere metaphor of the ‘other’. This ‘other’ causes the self-deception, which plays a role in the conceptualization of the ‘imaginary’. In the Lacanian notion of the “mirror-phase”, the function of mirror-phase is “to establish a relation of ‘Innenwelt’ (inner world) to ‘Umwelt’ (environment).” This process manufactures the “alienated identity” “subject” itself.

In both Lacan and Althusser’s theoretical approaches, the “imaginary” is a fundamental structure of “alienation”. “In contrast to Marx’, this alienation is no longer linked to specific societal structures of bourgeois commodity - economy and of class - and state domination, but rather describes a universal human destiny: the human infant is alienated by the “symbolic order” which tears it off its primary needs.” Here the definition of “symbolic order” was distinguished from Freud’s ‘biologism’ and tied psychoanalysis to structural linguistics. The “phenomenological subject” was out of circuit with psychoanalysis.

As Rehmann pointed out, “Lacan can describe the symbolic order as the constitutive reality, because in his approach the unconscious itself is structured like a ‘language’, its elements are inscribed ‘letters’, which in turn explains why Lacanian psychoanalysis can claim to overcome any reference to biological drives.” Symbolic order dwells in the “alienated body” as

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“absolute subject”, in the place where the “deflection of mirror I into the social I” occurs.

- **Superstructure as “Power”: Foucault’s Discourse as Ideology**

With the post-structuralist turn, the term “discourse” began to be used instead of ideology. According to Rehmann, “discourse-theory” was first developed in the Althusserian School by Michel Pecheux and Paul Henry; they brought together linguistics, Lacanian psychoanalysis and the Althusserian model of interpellation for explaining how the production of evidence of meaning is linked to constitution of the subject. Nevertheless, the radical transformational use of the term “discourse” as ideology improved under the influence of Foucault. “Ideology” was replaced with “discourse” as the paradigmatic principle, which constitutes social life.

Foucauldian anti-humanism came from Nietzsche’s philosophy; he rejected that human practices caused its worldview, this being the point where Foucault criticized Marx himself, and he depicted Marx as a humanist from this point of view. Foucault places Marx in epistemological arrangement, which is that modern, humanist episteme.

“[As] Foucault explains, an analysis based on representation gives way to what he calls ‘analytic of finitude’ and ‘man appears in his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows’. Man recognizes that he is limited by things outside himself, he is revealed as a

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finite being: yet this very limitation, this finitude, is at once the condition of possibility of man’s knowledge… Man is both constituted and constitutive, object and subject. It is Kant who first articulates this way of thinking, but Marx too is tied to this humanist discourse.”

For Foucault, just because Marx was in the modern humanist episteme, he had little to offer regarding post-humanist thought. Foucault tried to subvert Marx(ism) not only in terms of Marxist humanism but also in terms of the approach to ideology. In “Archeology of Knowledge”, he transferred the concept of ideology to the concept of knowledge and discursive practice.

Foucault describes both science and knowledge as discursive formations. “Foucault says he is looking for systems of formation: the complex groups of relations functioning as rules governing discursive practices. These systems are internal to the practices themselves: they are not ‘imposed on discourse from the outside’ as ‘determinations which formed at the level of institutions, or social or economic relations, transcribe themselves by force on the surface of discourses’.” Actually, it is possible to say that it is a kind of adaptation of the Althusserian definition of ideology to the concept of discourse. Foucault used the term “power” as a kind of superstructure instead of ideology as in the Althusserian School. The last step of the Foucauldian formative period is that everything is power. It is possible to encounter two different definitions of power between Marx and Foucault. As Choat pointed out,

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“Whereas Marx claimed that ‘political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another’, for Foucault power is strategic, ubiquitous, and productive: it is not a property belonging to a single individual or group, it is not located in a particular institution or class, and it is not exercised simply through prohibition and repression.”

Here it is possible to see that while Foucault was criticizing Marx himself, he also contributed to structuralist Marxist approaches. Foucauldian notions not only transformed the concept of ideology but also made definitive reconnections to the base/superstructure dichotomy.

- **Superstructure as “Culture”: Raymond Williams’s Cultural Materialism**

Williams is seen as the founding figure of cultural studies; his own perspective of Cultural Materialism is accepted as a paradigm in the field. While he was introducing and improving the concept of ‘cultural materialism’, Western-Marxist thought was seeking new paradigms such as post-structuralism and postmodernism. His objection to the orthodox model of the base/superstructure dichotomy was that the base has a super-power in determining the superstructure. This position correlates with Althusser’s critique of the base/superstructure dichotomy; he suggested semi-autonomy between base and superstructure. Analogous with Althusser, Williams pointed out that culture has semi-autonomy in relation to the base - economy itself.

According to Williams, culture is a kind of signifying practice: “signifying practice - that is culture in the making - is, in effect, material practice,

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Here it is possible to claim that in Williams’ approach, culture is interconnected with economy – base, superstructure - it is possible to say that, culture is not only a process signified by the base, but is a signifying practice which directly affects the base.

While Althusser suggested superstructure as ideology-theory, Williams suggested superstructure as culture. By connecting culture to base, Williams attempted to offer a solution to the ‘crisis of the subject’ that occurred after 1968; Althusser removed ‘consciousness’ from ‘individuals’ by defining them as ‘subjects’ determined by ideology in its new definition as ‘false consciousness’. This consciousness is “an experience, half-thought, half-felt, contradictory, unfinished: not a simple superstructure on a simple base; not a false-consciousness either, but that half-built, half-inherited, uncertain house in which, at most times, and in most places, most of us live and feel and think.”\footnote{Quotation from the article “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory” by R. Williams, Higgins J., The Raymond Williams Reader, edited book, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford & Massachusetts, 2001, p. 160.}

One of the main contradictions between Althusser and Williams was this point that the subject did not have ‘consciousness’.

**Base as a process**

In his seminal article ‘Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory’, Williams reassessed the “base” defined in Marxist orthodoxy. He stated,
“When we talk of ‘the base’, we are talking of a process not a state.”\(^{78}\) When he depicted the base as a process, “culture is far from being secondary and reflective; it has rather a constitutive force”.\(^{79}\) While Williams defined culture as a constitutive force, he gave vital importance to Gramsci’s hegemony. Williams pointed out:

“For hegemony supposes the existence of something, which is truly total, which is not merely secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the substance and limit of common sense for most people under its sway, that it corresponds to the reality of social experience very much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure.”\(^{80}\)

For Williams, hegemony is an active and ongoing process; “hegemony is determination at work, in process, and as such, it is a volatile, heterogeneous and mobile system, an economy of experience governed by the interplay of what are referred to as dominant, emergent and residual social forces and social meanings.”\(^{81}\) In Williams’ approach, in this ongoing process, “human practice” could challenge the determined limits, which means that human practice could be free from domination. This thought is another distinction between Althusser and Williams.

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Williams contra Althusser

Initially it is important to say that Raymond Williams is neither an anti-
humanist nor a structuralist. Eagleton depicted him as “socialist humanist” who
had a rapprochement with Marxism.\(^{82}\) Williams glossed the dominant mode of
critical structuralism in the 1970s; the central term of this dominant mode was
the “subject”, a term belonging to linguistic and psychoanalytical terminology,
which means the subordination of human agency. “In an extraordinary
diversity of the fields, from structural linguistics to structural anthropology,
from Lacanian psychoanalysis to Foucauldian power, from literature to cinema,
from fashion to the entire system of Western philosophy, the apparent
transparency of consciousness and agency was false: the subject was
constituted by language, self-consciousness is no more than an effect of
language.” \(^{83}\)

Here Williams is directly contra to Althusser. In Althusser, the “subject” was
aligned with ideological state apparatuses before becoming an individual;
therefore, individuality never could be possible. This is the point at which
Williams diverges from Althusser: “Where Williams differs from Althusser
and the critical structuralists are in his insistence that consciousness of
alignment means the possibility of overcoming it: critical structuralist theory
seemed to suggest a form of alignment and ideological determination so
powerful that it seemed impossible to resist.”\(^{84}\) At this point, it is obvious that
Althusser’s notion of the “subject” refers to the ideologically structured entity;

\(^{83}\) Higgins J., Raymond Williams, Literature, Marxism and Cultural Materialism, Routledge,
Massachusetts, 2001, p. 156.
his notion could be read as a Lacano-Marxist reinterpretation of the subject instead of Hegelian idealist consciousness.

2.3 History, Anti-history, Post-history

In structuralism, with the sublimation of synchronic analysis in the Sassurean sense, the rejection of diachrony brings with it the rejection of history. Consequently, the term “anti-history” began to be used by theoreticians.

In the late 18th century, with Hegel, the whole notion of history changed; history came to be defined as a field, which defines and limits the reason of human. With this understanding, two new consequences occurred: the first was that history began to be seen as a “process”, and the second was that “relativity” entered into history. “History is the process whereby the spirit discovers itself and its own concept.”85 The progression of history was dialectical in Hegel, with “each successive period absorbing the previous one and producing a new synthesis.”86 In Hegelian thought, the world system was seen as complex of processes instead of a complex of ready-made things. However, with the critique of Hegel by Marx in the middle of the nineteenth century; “process”, which had been based on teleology in history, had been redefined dialectically by social formations. After this transformation, "history" could not be considered apart from social factors and forces of production. As Dosse pointed out:

“According to Althusser, Marx rejected the notion of founding history and politics on an essence of man in 1845, when he adopted a scientific

theory of history based on entirely new explanatory concepts such as social formation, the forces of production, relationships of production, and so on.”

Dosse fundamentally opened up a line through the Althusserian structuralist theoretical approach that revealed how Marx structured the concept of history by rupturing himself from the Hegelian notion of history. Actually, the year 1845 is depicted as the indicator of the Marxian philosophy by Althusser. The book, “For Marx”, which consists of collected essays by Althusser, unravelled the “epistemological break” in Marxian thought. Althusser’s “symptomatic” reading distinguished two different periods in the corpus of Marx, Young Marx and Mature Marx. Althusser classified the corpus of Marx in four items: Marx’s Early Works, The Works of the Break (year 1845), Transitional Works, and Mature Works. According to Althusser,

“This 'epistemological break' concerns conjointly two distinct theoretical disciplines. By founding the theory of history (historical materialism), Marx simultaneously broke with his erstwhile ideological philosophy and established a new philosophy (dialectical materialism). I am deliberately using the traditionally accepted terminology (historical materialism, dialectical materialism) to designate this double foundation in a single break.”

Althusser advocated that until the “epistemological break”, Marx tried to discover a theoretical framework to form his concepts according to his own philosophy. Althusser evaluated the early works of Marx as a paradox of “having to learn the way of saying what he is going to discover in the very way

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88 Althusser, L., For Marx, Verso, 1990, p. 35.
he must forget." Althusser recaptured the Marxian conceptualization by re-reading Marx’s corpus, and he found that Marx’s theoretical culmination was in his mature works. By interpreting Marx’s “Capital”, Althusser not only scrutinized Marxian concepts (of philosophy) but also constituted his own conceptual theory of ideology as the relative autonomy of the base. This concept of “relative autonomy” not only had direct relations with ideology, but also originated from how Marx (and also Althusser) conceptualizes “historical time”. By dissociating from the Hegelian comprehension of homogeneity and wholeness in history, Althusser unravelled Marx’s relatively autonomous and independent “peculiar time”. Althusser argued for this heterogeneous temporality in his book “Reading Capital”, under the section “The Errors of Classical Economics: Outline of a Concept of Historical Time”, he claims that:

“As a first approximation, we can argue from the specific structure of the Marxist whole that is no longer possible to think the process of the development of the different levels of the whole in the same historical time. Each of these different ‘levels’ does not have the same type of historical existence. On the contrary, we have to assign to each level a peculiar time, relatively autonomous and hence relatively independent, even in its dependence, of the ‘times’ of the other levels.”

From this point, it is understood that Althusser and Balibar discovered that Marx’s approach to history was strictly different from the Hegelian notion of history; for Hegel, history was a continuous and permanent whole, whereas for Marx it was discontinuous and relative. Moreover, for Marx each mode of production had a “peculiar time” for itself, which had its own rhythms and

which could be separated by “revolutions” or “breaks”. As Althusser and Balibar clarified:

“We can and must say: for each mode of production there is a peculiar time and history punctuated in a specific way by the development of the productive forces; the relations of production have their peculiar time and history, punctuated in a specific way; the political superstructure has its own history; philosophy has its own time and history; aesthetic productions have their own time and history; scientific formations have their own time and history, etc. Each of these peculiar histories is punctuated with peculiar rhythms and can only be known on condition that we have defined the concept of the specificity of its historical temporality and its punctuations. (Continuous development, revolutions, breaks, etc.)”

Althusser transformed “temporality” by breaking it into heterogeneous parts with reference to Marx’s own theory of history. Actually, it is possible to claim that the term “historicized” in Marxian theory has not been truly understood; it is true that Marx suggested not continuous single history but, beyond this, he suggested “models in temporal sections”. To quote from “Reading Capital”:

“The fundamental criticism Marx makes of the whole of Classical Economics in texts from The Poverty of Philosophy to Capital is that it had an historical, eternal, fixed and abstract conception of the economic categories of capitalism. Marx says in so many words that these categories must be historicized to reveal and understand their nature, their relativity and transitivity. The Classical Economists, he says, have

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made the conditions of capitalist production the eternal conditions of all production, without seeing that these categories were historically determined, and hence historical and transitory.” 93

At this point, it is inevitable to claim that the Marxian conceptualization of “peculiar time” with its inner conditions, and the term “historicized”, have some parallelization with the Kuhnian term “paradigm”. Marxian “historicized” categories work as “temporal territorial models”, like “paradigms in science”. Marx’s uneven description of “historicized” specifies that of a groundbreaking Althusserian interpretation of “history”. Although it is known that Althusser did not read Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) before the 1970s, there are some resemblances between Althusserian and Kuhnian structural theories. 94 Here, it is important to emphasize that Alexander Koyre, especially his works on scientific revolutions, influenced both Althusser and Kuhn.

In addition, it is possible to read Marx’s idea of “revolution” as the proto-conceptualization of Kuhnian “paradigm shift”. The Marxian “revolution” could be evaluated with the term “event” in philosophy. If “events are those critical moments when we are forced to think and have a chance of thinking in new ways, when new questions arise, new aporias appear, translating new forces or conjunctures” 95, it is possible to see the “revolution” as a crisis moment when a shift becomes re-formed. This approach suggests discontinuity and sequential models in history; it is an ahistorical method of reading history.

This is why the Althusserian structuralist approach is anti-historical. As Foucault pointed out:

“The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis, and cycle, themes of the ever-accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the world. The nineteenth century found its essential mythological resources in the second principle of thermodynamics.” 96

While the 19th century’s resources were based on the concept of “entropy”, in the second half of the twentieth century, “space” and “simultaneity in time” become determinant.

“The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein. One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day polemics oppose the pious descendents of time and the determined inhabitants of space.” 97

In this aura, where “space” became a frontier factor in the notion of “history”, structuralism defined a different relation with time and history; it is not the

denial of time but a different conceptualization of time encountered in structuralism. As Foucault stated,

“Structuralism, or at least that which is grouped under this slightly too general name, is the effort to establish, between elements that could have been connected on a temporal axis, an ensemble of relations that makes them appear as juxtaposed, set off against one another, implicated by each other—that makes them appear, in short, as a sort of configuration. Actually, structuralism does not entail denial of time; it does involve a certain manner of dealing with what we call time and what we call history.”

On the one hand, “history” had been redefined with a new theoretical framework as “anti-history” in structuralism; on the other hand, a new term (thought) -“post-histoire” proposed by Auguste Cournot - began to be discussed within the phenomenon of “postmodernism”. “The ‘posthistorical’ phase, as Cournot called it, followed the prehistorical and the historical, and was an inevitable endpoint of all cultures.” Cournot’s “post-histoire” influenced the works of A. Gehlen and H. de Man after 1945. For them, “posthistorical” represented an endgame. Gehlen exposed his thoughts about the internal development of art in 1961: “the process of development has been completed, and what comes now is already in existence: the confused syncretism of all styles and possibilities - posthistory.” At this point, it is possible to find some parallels with Fukuyama’s Hegelian approach, the “end of history”:

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“The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual care taking of the museum of human history.”

The term post-historical became to be used by neoliberals (neoconservatives) in the 1980s, when a return to Hegelian thought was observed. At this point, the return to Hegelian notions arose from the disappearance of dialectical oppositions; two sided things turned into “one”, and lost the “other”. This dismissing procedure caused all “post-”situations; it could be read as a conceptual void caused by the absence of the “other” in binary opposition.

2.4 Bifurcations of Ideology in Post-Marxism

With post-structuralism, discourse began to be defined in correlation with ideology. In Foucault, ideology transposed knowledge, discourse and power. In both Foucault and the Althusserian School, divergences began to be seen for the sake of discursive formation.

Michel Pecheux has demonstrated the remarkable influence of structuralism on texts written in the early 1980s. He emphasized that “Today, a mode of work cannot be fixed merely by calling some proper names (Saussure, Wittgenstein,

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Althusser, Foucault, Lacan) or by mentioning areas of the real (history, language, the unconscious).”

He describes “structuralism” as “an antipositivist attempt to take into account the real that thought ‘bumps into’ at the intersection of language and history.” Additionally, his stress on the fact that the theoretical foundation of structuralism, constituted with Marx, Freud and Saussure, leads to a heterogeneous critical construction, which defines human order as a biosocial order. At this point, Pecheux’s radical critique is revealed: that the supporters of structuralism turned to “narcissism of structure” in the early 1980s; his evaluations of the texts of that moment are that a kind of “regression towards positivism and philosophies of consciousness.” After all these critiques, Pecheux asks whether discourse is a structure or an event. From that point, he depicted discourse thus:

“One should not pretend that any discourse would be a miraculous aerolite, independent of networks of memory and the social trajectories within which it erupts. But the fact that should be stressed here is that a discourse, by its very existence, marks the possibility of a deconstructing-reconstructing of these networks and trajectories.”

With this definition, Pecheux opened a discussion about whether discourse is a structure or an event. If an event is searching for new ways without being a fixed program, then it is possible to accept a discourse as an “event”; it is a

kind of taking position at the paradigmatic shift. To define discourse as an “event” could bring new expansions to depict the present time: it is a kind of era, in which it is not possible to read one single ideology because of a “multitude of discourses.” If event (discourse) could be defined as “the thing from which arises the New” and if this era is the epoch of “event”, then since the “event” is currently occurring, there is no “truth”; is this the reason why the present time is called the “post-truth” era?

This question could be answered with the concept of “truth-event”. Zizek explains the term “truth-event” without avoiding being contrary to Badiou. Zizek’s claim is that although Badiou and Deleuze have some parallels in the notion of “event”, there is a difference between them. Zizek exposed this difference thus: “while Deleuze remains a vitalist who asserts the absolute immanence of the Event to Being, the Event as the One-All, the encompassing medium of the thriving differences of Life, Badiou, in a ‘dualist’ fashion, posits ‘Event’ as radically heterogeneous with regard to Being.”

In Badiou, “truth-event” could occur in the four domains of science, art, politics and love; the first three domains have some similarities with the triad of “true-beautiful-good” in philosophy, but the fourth procedure could be seen in alterity, which, according to Zizek, actually covers “psychoanalysis.”

Although Badiou connected the concept of “event” with the dimension of “truth” by linking to Lacan, for Lacan, “the Event (or Act, or encounter of the Real) does not occur in the dimension of truth. For Lacan also, ‘truth is post-evental’, although in a different sense than for Badiou: truth comes afterwards.

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as the Event’s symbolization." From this perspective, “truth” is something that comes after the "Event", a post-evental situation. This approach could inform the discussions about the present time, and why present time has such a fluid character in terms of the concept of “truth”. The “post-truth” era could be evaluated with the question: “are we living in an ‘evental age’ where truth is eclipsed?”

Another form of re-reading the concept of “truth-event” propounded by Zizek is that the concept of “truth-event” in Badiou has some explicit parallels with the Althusserian term “interpellation”. For Zizek, “Badiou calls the language in which the “Truth-Event” is purportedly denominated the ‘subject-language’- langue-sujet ... The denomination of the Truth-Event is thus "empty" precisely insofar as it refers to the "fullness" yet to come.” Following this definition, Zizek explains that:

“From this brief description, one can already get a presentiment of what one may be tempted to term, in all naivete, the intuitive power of Badiou's notion of the subject, which effectively describes the experience each of us has when fully engaged, subjectively, in some Cause that is "our own." Isn't that when, in those precious moments, I fully am a subject? And doesn't this very feature make it ideological? That is to say, the first thing that strikes anyone versed in the history of

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French Marxism is how uncannily close Badiou's notion of Truth-Event comes to Althusser's notion of (ideological) interpellation."\(^{110}\)

Zizek unravelled the links between the Althusserian notion of subjectivity and the term “truth-event”. According to Zizek, this connection between subject and “truth-event” (here it covers the concept of “ideology”) is constituted by an unconscious link instead of a causal link. As Zizek clarified:

“Is the process Badiou describes as Truth-Event not that of an individual interpellated into a subject by a Cause? Is the circular relationship between Event and subject (i.e., the subject serving the Event, which is itself only visible as such to an already engaged subject) not the very circle of ideology? Prior to constraining the notion of subject to ideology, that is, identifying the subject as such as ideological, Althusser briefly entertained the idea of subjectivity as comprising four modalities: the subject of ideology, the subject of art, the subject of the unconscious, and the subject of science. Badiou's four "generics of truth" (love, art, science, and politics) would seem to clearly parallel these four modalities of subjectivity (with love corresponding to the subject of the unconscious-the focus of psychoanalysis-and politics, of course, to the subject of ideology).”\(^{111}\)

With this explanation, Zizek briefly reveals the similarities between “truth-event” and “ideology”. Thus, he enabled a reading of the “present time” as a “dislocated” or, in Deleuzian terms, an “out of joint” age. The “truth-event”


cannot be reduced to historical conditions; it is ahistorical. The truth-event is a luminous thing in reality; it is more than appearance, it is an “immortal Idea”. This Hegelian approach in Zizek emancipated itself by re-evaluating the “eternal Idea” with the Lacanian “point de capitone”. In Lacan, the “point de capitone” is the link between S(symbolic semblance) and J(the Real jouissance), a constitutive void/gap between the two. Thus, Zizek settled “drive - drive of death” between Being and Event as the void, which signified “point de capitone”. At this point, Zizek expounds the role of the “unconscious” in the “truth-event”; “only a living being with an Unconscious can become the receptacle of Truth-event.”

The present time (this moment people are living in) could be seen as an “event” according to the definition of an event as “something that cannot be foreseen or mastered and therefore cannot be made part of a fixed program - it redistributes the sense of what came before, what might yet happen, forcing us to behave in new ways.” If it is said in a Deleuzian format, this moment people are living in could be seen as “we become other, without being sure of quite who or what.” When Deleuzian “difference” - “re-forming a circle of the Other at the end of temporal series” occurs, it is possible to claim that an “event” has been revealed and “repetition” is broken. Actually, this position depicts a kind of blurriness or fluidity both in subject and in object.

2.5 Redefinition of Ideology in 21st Century

Before defining the concept of “Ideology” for the 21st century, it is important to structure what kind of transformations took place in the “experienced ideology” at the end of the 20th century. Parallel to theoretical transformations in the structure of the term “ideology”, which are seen in Althusserian School and in post-Marxism, the practice of economy-politics has changed since the 1980s.

Neoliberalism has since been on the stage as managerial and practiced ideology, which was also called an “ideology of no ideology”. Before designating neoliberalism, it is important to emphasize that the neoliberal thought in the first instance was pragmatically experienced in the peripheral territories of the world and then transferred to the central territories as hegemonic thought on its practice expanded after the 1980s. The reason behind this approach could be read as to increase the effects of new thought on the “base” – the economy of strong states. The real foundations of this new thought were constituted by market rules, which rule the whole system. Although neoliberalism claims to “liberate” the individual, it targets “free markets” in which subordinated individuals work for markets. As Harvey explained:

“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights,

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free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.”

Harvey describes neoliberalism as a kind of “creative distraction” process which is effective on divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments to the land and habits of the heart and which has its own ethics-value system to manage the global market. In addition, this ethic requires technology to guide decisions in the free market. The interesting point is that, as Harvey pointed out:

“These technologies have compressed the rising density of market transactions in both space and time. They have produced a particularly intensive burst of what I have elsewhere called ‘time-space compression’. The greater the geographical range (hence the emphasis on ‘globalization’) and the shorter the term of market contracts the better. This latter preference parallels Lyotard’s famous description of the postmodern condition as one where ‘the temporary contract’ supplants ‘permanent institutions in the professional, emotional, sexual, cultural, family and international domains, as well as in political affairs’.”

Harvey’s argument shows that technology-laden ethics work as a temporary contract in the political milieu and cause depolitization of politics as a new temporary value system. This temporary value system has been revealed by a

“spontaneous order” produced by the free market for people acting in it. In Hayek’s terminology, this is the “Catallaxy”, market order, a system of numerous interrelated economies without a unitary goal.121 “Catallaxy”, derived from the Greek term “katallattein”, has a double meaning, “to exchange money” and “to admit into the community”.122 The exchange of money in neoliberalism refers to or corresponds to the second phase of the mode of production, “money to money”. Without any production, money has been reproduced by the market. Commodification in every field works for the market order; even intellectual creativity, cultural forms and histories turn into commodities.

Subjects are articulated to commodification processes. Neoliberalism’s speculative character has led to this being called “financialised capitalism”; money turns into the only value and value producer. It is not astonishing to depict the financial crisis in the year 2008 as the end of neoliberalism. Here it is important to emphasize the Janus face of neoliberalism; in Foucauldian terms, it is a kind of “dispositif”, which produces itself not only on the base but also on the superstructure. It plays its role both as an ideology and as an economic order.

Neoliberalism is constituted as a “conceptual apparatus” embedded in common sense to become dominant thought, which consider the values such as dignity and individual freedom. With these two indispensable values, the consent of subjects will try to be captured not only by constituting hegemonic thought but also by weakening state power. Here, it is also possible to mention that the Marxian “trinity formula - Capital-Land-Labour” was used for the value

creation of neoliberal society by neoliberal vulgar economics.\textsuperscript{123} Thus, this trinity formula reproduced itself for the sake of the “free market”.

In this respect, it is possible to claim that not only economic constraints bypass ideological constitutions in reproduction processes in neoliberalism, but also that ideological apparatuses reproduce themselves on the side of diminishing ideology. This has caused blurred situations; it is a kind of invitation to the “non-ideological” into the field of ideology. Zizek defines this situation as the “third continent of ideological phenomena”:

“neither ideology qua explicit doctrine, articulated convictions on the nature of man, society and the universe, nor ideology in its material existence (institutions, rituals and practices that give body to it), but the elusive network of implicit, quasi-‘spontaneous’ presuppositions and attitudes that form an irreducible moment of the reproduction of ‘non-ideological’ (economic, legal, political, sexual...) practices.”\textsuperscript{124}

At this point, Zizek founded three continents of “ideological phenomena” to the Hegelian tripartite schema of “doctrine-ritual-belief”. The first continent of ideology is the system of ideas, where ideology is constituted “in-itself”. The second continent of ideology depicted the “material existence of ideology” epitomized by the Althusserian School, rituals where ideology moved from “in-itself” to “for itself”. Finally the third continent of ideology is that where ideology is “reflected into itself”, which means that it is a system of beliefs, both “in-itself” and “for itself”.\textsuperscript{125}

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From this standpoint, it is possible to make estimations for redefining “ideology” in the 21st century. The first step could be, in Zizekian terms, to emancipate the concept of ideology from “outdated epistemological implications”, which is a “relationship of representation between thought and reality”.\footnote{Zizek, S. “The Spectre of Ideology”, Mapping Ideology, edited book, Verso, London and New York, 1997, p. 3.}

This claim has substantial importance for structuring the present day’s ideology, because it shows that the clear cut between dualities becomes of ambiguous character. Ambiguousness designates the present day’s ideology; it is possible to say that a multi-faced ideological milieu encircles societal structure. The multi-faced character of new ideology supplies an easy modification to all spontaneous situations; it gives an experimental qualification on the modification processes of society.

Moreover, the multi-faced character runs on non-identical/contrast/heterogeneous dualities instead of identical/congruent/homogeneous dualities. “Change” is the only unchanging thing in new ideology; the only unambiguous thing is the “ambiguousness” itself. If Bauman’s description of “liquid modernity”, which also based itself on a dichotomy of solidity versus liquidity, is considered for re-evaluating the present day’s ideology, it can be seen that his approach is also a modernist critique of new ideology or new societal structure.\footnote{Bauman, Z., Liquid Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge and Oxford, first published in 2000, 2012, preface for 2012 print.}

It is important to emphasize that in contrast to conceptual oppositions based on contradictory oppositions – a binary opposition constructed by a contrast
condition in early modernity - in the present time the situation is totally
different: one concept and its appearance constitute the conceptual opposition,
which means that there is no true binary opposition. Instead, a “quasi-
opposition” is visible or immanent.

In this respect, it is possible to ask the question: is neoliberalism an economic
aspect (property) or a superstructure, which has its own apparatuses working
on society? Is it base or superstructure? Actually, this question could be
answered by saying “yes”: for both situations, neoliberalism works as both/and
mechanism. This situation is an example of the deconstructuralization of the
fundamental dichotomy. In the new era even base or superstructure, or both of
them separately, have to create their own “quasi-other” to submit themselves in
the form of “opposition”. In other words, since it eludes “liquidity”, “ideology”
as a superstructure firstly gets an “appearance” for constituting its own duality.

As visualized below, in Figure 3, the term ideology has been reproduced many
times since it was first described by Marx and Engels. This figure shows that
re-interpretation of the concept of ideology is continuous, and that, when the
present situation of ideology is considered, ideology internalizes all different
approaches into itself and becomes a “dynamic, floating, eventual apparatus”
instead of being static, fixed and historical. This new phase was a far-fetched
condition of ideology; all the orthodox definitions were insufficient to express
the present-day situation.

This radical transposition of the definition of ideology caused the claim for the
“end of ideology” which began to emerge after the 1980s with the effect of
neoliberalism, ideology of no-ideology. Post-Marxist and post-Althusserian
theories in particular showed that not only were ideology effective on the
“subject”, but also the subject had the potential to change the ideological
dispositif. Actually, this is discourse theory; subject positions begin to restructure ideology itself. Discourses are perceived as ideology; a network consisting of different discourses/subject positions is transposed as the ground of ideology. Discourse theory has tried to reproduce absent ideology by restructuring it in social antagonism.

This multitude of discourses served to augment the “appearance” of ideology, which is seen in the definition of “truth-event”. According to Zizek, Hegel and Schelling tried to explain the unravelling of appearance by attributing a tension, antagonism or contradiction, which had been in a previous being-order. The interesting point here is that while neoliberalism attempts to create a borderless, or blurred-bordered, folded society, post-Marxist theory has tried to unfold the deadlocks of this folded society by structuring the term social antagonism.

Actually, this tension supports/references to an ideological milieu, but the question is that, when the present situation is considered, what gives/creates the tension, which comprises the “appearance” of ideology? In this position, in order to make an “appearance”, ideology has to create a “quasi-other” where there is no “real” otherness.

Figure 3: New Definition of Ideology (designed by R. Ç. Çavdar)
2.6 Concluding Remarks for the Ideological Domain

In this chapter the first domain, ideology, which is in need of redefinition in the 21st century, was discussed in the context of being an apparatus that constructs societal structure. After structuralism, ideology in the Althusserian School became an apparatus, which organized unconsciously lived social practice rather than only a system of ideas. With this Lacano-Marxist definition, ideology folded into a relatively autonomous character as a superstructure.

According to the Althusserian interpretation of the dialectic of base and superstructure, not only does the base determine the structure, but a semi-autonomic superstructure also plays a role in structure. This approach led to raising new apparatuses that were accepted as superstructures, which shaped societal structures, such as Foucauldian Discourse theory and Raymond Williams's Cultural Materialism. This triadic schema - ideology, discourse and culture - reshaped the whole societal structure. With the effects of neoliberalism and post-structuralism, ideology began to change phase, and “discourse” has replaced ideology since the last quarter of the 20th century.

Althusserian ideology-theory, based on the synchronic analysis of Saussure, rejected the Hegelian notion of history in which ideology is defined as a-historical. Rather than originary time, a derived time was accepted by structuralists. Actually, it is possible to claim that to create a dialectic tension in the concept of “history”, Althusser constituted the “negative statement” of history; the term “a-historical” (or anti-history) was created for alleging to negate. This situation caused a new conceptualization of the term “history” - history as a system was replaced with history as event. In this respect, the Althusserian dialectical re-reading of the term “history” stems from the Marxian term “historicized” that appeared in mature works of Marx; it is
possible to claim that the term “historicized” was a proto-Kuhnian conceptualization of the “paradigm”. At this point, in an Althusserian interpretation, Marxist history could be read as eventual instead of systemic. This situation indicated that it can be possible to evaluate the Marxian term “revolution” in the same way as the Kuhnian term “paradigm shift”. This structure gave the opportunity to re-evaluate the two concepts in correlation; one was “ideology”, the other was “event”. Thus, post-Marxist and post-Althusserian approaches valorised these terms - ideology and event - for labelling/renaming the new societal apparatus called “truth-event”.

All these transformations in the term “ideology” show that a new valorisation procedure for the 21st century is necessary. Ideology has been transfigured into a “dynamic, floating, eventual apparatus”; all the orthodox definitions have become insufficient to express the present day’s superstructural apparatus. It is important to emphasize that discourse theory radically changed ideology-theory in the context of “the subject”. Just as ideology was working on semi-autonomously on structure, so the subject was working semi-autonomously on ideological dispositif. Thus, the network of discourses - the network of subject positions - began to “appear” as ideology in the present time. At this point, it is important to remember that neoliberalism extinguishes all rigid polarizations and consumes all dialectical tensions. There are only multiplicity and fluidity. In the multitude of discourses, ideology has to create a “quasi-other” to augment its “appearance”. In the place where subject positions determine power relations, the term “subject” had to be revisited beginning from the structuralist point of view in which it was defined as ideological interpellation.
CHAPTER 3

ARCHITECT-SUBJECT AS SOCIAL AGENT

“‘To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But, for man, the root is man himself.’” 129

Karl Marx

After structuralism, in the post-war period, orthodox definitions of ideology changed, and depending on these definitions, both the position and definition of human beings changed. Henceforth, the ideologically-constructed human being began to be called a “subject”, instead of “human”, “man” or “individual”. It is possible to think that the term “subject” carries a quality that shows that “human” is an ideological construction in social strata. This means that ideology structures the social pattern and each member of this pattern is called a “subject”. At this point, it is important to remember the previous chapter’s main argument, which is that ideology transformed into something “new” - “dynamic, floating, eventual apparatus”- in the 21st century, which means that the definition of the subject was also transfigured.

In this chapter, both the positional and definitive changes related to the term “subject” will be discussed. Here “subject” was treated as an entity who is

both formed by ideology and who has genuine positions where s/he stitches to
the ideological pattern. From this standpoint, to see the subject as entity that
affects and is affected by ideology, makes it important to consider what “social
agency” is.

A social agent - here the architect-subject - is capable of acting semi-
autonomously. This means that, with reference to Laclau’s “subject positions”,
a social agent can act not only according to ideology but also discursively -
“personally alter-ideological”. “Subject positions” mean that an agent could
posit himself/herself alternatively to the current order, could improve a critical
distance to current dominant ideology, and all his/her praxis could be formed
by his/her own discourse which is separated/altered from the dominant
ideology. Although the dominant ideology has apparatuses to manipulate the
social structure, a social agent could be capable of structuring an “alternative
socio-political discursive domain” with their own “praxis” in order to exit from
the effects of state apparatuses. Actually, structuralism revealed this potential
of the subject, who can act alternatively in the current given system. These re-
reading processes of the subject are outlined in the first two sub-sections.

With the digital-turn – the second groundbreaking point - a radical
transformation occurred in the relation between the subject and the object. Both
had their own domains with a dialectical distance between them up to the
digital revolution. The environment – the new social strata - in which all the
“things” (in the Latourian sense) lived began to be called “third nature”, where
not only natural and cultural things live but also artificial/cybernetic things
began to be seen. This situation caused a relative transformation of the dialectic
of subject and object. Subject and object began to combine to structure a new
“thing” which embodied characteristics of both. “Subjectified objects” will be
joined to the social life structure in the immediate future and will constitute a
new environment. Here the situation to be emphasized is that the narrowing distance between these two domains caused a change to the object of theory; the subject (the architect-subject) is the new research field of theory (architectural theory). This nexus has been discussed in the third and the fourth sub-sections of this chapter: how the architect-subject has been transfigured as the object of architectural theory.

After unravelling transformations of the subject, this chapter will attempt to clarify the position of the architect-subject in the 21st century. With a Deleuzian approach, it is possible to see architecture as an interaction between two bodies, anybody and the body (architect-subject). Without giving overvaluation to textuality, it could possible to see the inner “architectural subjectivity” of the architectural object, which is caused by the interaction between two bodies. A secondary approach to the architectural subjectivity contains the Deleuzian term “monad”, which could be conceived of as a “single self-replicable organization”. As a designer of “monad”, the architect-subject could gain a new “subjectivity”. It is possible to redefine the “architect” as the “architect-subject” that actually realizes architectural praxis in the ideological realm.

This chapter aims to scrutinize two main questions. The first is: how will it be possible to re-configure the dialectical tension between the subject and the object in the post-humanist era? (How and in which conditions can the subject and the object become interchangeable?)

In conditions where the dialectical interval between the subject and the object is becoming theoretically and physically narrow, it is inevitable to resolve the current situation regarding the dialectic of the subject and the object. After the Enlightenment, the link between the subject and the object was ruptured; they
have run as two separate items in a dialectical tension, until the cyber revolution. The digital turn caused the disappearance of this dialectical tension. In the current situation, it is possible to consider the “objectified subject” and “subjectified object” as creating a new social environment.

Under these conditions, a second question inevitably arises: what is the new definition of “theory” in the place where the gap between the subject and the object has disappeared? (How will it be possible to redefine theory with the subject instead of the object?) Initially, it must be remembered that “theory” is a kind of mechanism that “operates on the object”. Here the argument moves to the possibility of improving an “anamorphotic gaze” for conceiving/naming the current architectural praxis of the latest mode of capitalism via redefining the “theory” according to “the subject” instead of “the object” in the post-theoretical era.

3.1 Rise of the “Subject” in Interpretation of Ideology

The rise of the term “subject” has some parallels with the rise of the term “ideology-theory”, meaning that in structuralism, the term “subject” began to be used in correlation with the term “ideology”, especially in the Althusserian School. As shown in Figure 4 below, the Althusserian term “interpellation” determined the correlation between ideology and the subject. Before that, “human”, “man”, “individual” and similar terms were used instead of “subject”; the “subject” is the term, which explains an ideologically-constituted entity.
Figure 4: Definition of New Subjectivity (designed by R. Ç. Çavdar)
To discuss present-day subjectivity, it is important to consider neoliberalist impacts on subjectivity. Subjectivity has been reshaped in neoliberal politics. As Foucault argued, “truth games” have been implemented in the production of subjectivity for legitimacy of power. Douglas Spencer stated: “Truth games do not rule from outside or above, but by embedding themselves in forms of common knowledge and practice.”\(^\text{130}\) Spencer’s argument is that “Neoliberalism is a truth game.”\(^\text{131}\) Neoliberal forms of power use this game for producing "subjects" for the market; the market creates an entrepreneurial environment for these constituted subjects to survive in it, and these subjects believe that they produce genuinely in a free milieu, creating a kind of unconscious consent. Actually, the “subject” in neoliberalism can only articulate the ideas, which are led by the market; this is a kind of controlled game. It is clear that there is a “misrecognition process” in operation; the main characteristic of the neoliberal “dispositif” is a symptomatic contradiction that subjects’ liberty is actually bound to subjects’ obedience to the fateful order of the free-market. As Rehmann pointed out,

“Neoliberalism presents itself as liberating agency from a patronizing state-bureaucracy; it mobilizes its subjects by permanently interpellating them to be active and creative, to show initiative and to believe optimistically in the success of their efforts. At the same time, it calls upon the subjects to submit to the fateful order of the market that regularly and increasingly fails and frustrates the efforts of the many. It needs to permanently engender the faith in everyone’s success, and at the same time it has to prevent this faith from turning into a moral

claim, or even into a fundamental critique of the overall irrationality of capitalism."\textsuperscript{132}

The radical contradiction mentioned by Rehmann is actually a structured idea to conceal the fact that neoliberalism was constituted for creating an economic elite by flattering subjects with the concept of freedom. The emerging transnational bourgeoisie, where nation-states lose power, creates a new type of intellectual for constituting the superstructure. Spencer’s interpretative thoughts on Hayek’s essay “The Intellectuals and Socialism” shows that the intellectual in neoliberalism can be seen as a “second-hand dealer in ideas.”\textsuperscript{133} This means that they just expose the “media-proven” ideas; the human subject is a post-enlightenment being who is incapable of thinking critically. The intellectual or the subject is modelled as responsive to the horizontally-constituted relations that hide the governmentality of market order. They think that their conduct and behaviour, or even the ideas, develop in liberty; this is a kind of deception. Horizontally-constituted relations are managed by the “rhizomatic” networks of neoliberal associations for the sake of market order. As Spencer claimed: “Rather than understanding neoliberalism simply as the unbridled and extreme expression of capitalism, I understand it as an ideology, albeit an “ideology of no ideology.”\textsuperscript{134}

3.2 Humanism, Anti-humanism, Posthuman(ism)

To begin with stating that the question of humanism is ideologically and conceptually central to modernity is to the point. It is impossible to evaluate

anti-humanism as the total negation of humanism; it is a kind of deconstructed humanism. In comparing anti-humanism and posthumanism, Ferrando mentions the deconstructed approach:

“The deconstruction of the notion of the human is central to antihumanism: this is one of its main points in common with posthumanism. However, a major distinction between the two movements is already embedded in their morphologies, specifically in their denotation of "post-" and "anti-." Antihumanism fully acknowledges the consequences of the "death of Man," as already asserted by some post-structuralist theorists, in particular by Michel Foucault. In contrast, posthumanism does not rely on any symbolic death: such an assumption would be based on the dualism dead/alive, while any strict form of dualism has been already challenged by posthumanism, in its post-dualistic process-ontological perspective.”

Structuralists, especially Althusser and Foucault, by revisiting Nietzsche, labelled as the doyen of philosophical anti-humanism, critically reconstruct the term “humanism”. The Nietzschean “will to power” “drives every individual to the fullest possible self-realization.” Davies describes Nietzsche’s early writings as taking a contradictory position to nineteenth-century humanism; he prefers to emphasize the Nietzschean definition of “truth” as the base figure of “ultimate scepticism”:

“What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human relations which, poetically and rhetorically intensified, became transposed and adorned, and which after long usage by a people seem fixed, canonical and binding on them. Truths are illusions which one has forgotten are illusions, worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the sense.”

This “ultimate scepticism” can be followed not only in the “language games” of Wittgenstein, but also in Foucauldian “discursive formations” and in the “destructive excursions” of Derrida. On the one hand, aspects of Nietzschean scepticism in the Foucauldian notion of the human unravels with the “death of man”; on the other hand, Marxian humanism(s) opens the structure of anti-humanism with Althusserian interpretations connected with the term “history”. Althusser revealed a radical break in history and politics on the “essence of man” in Marx’s writings after 1845. Althusser claimed that:

“This unique rupture contained three indissociable elements. 1. The formation of a theory of history and politics based on radically new concepts: the concepts of social formation, productive forces, relations of production, superstructure, ideologies, determination in the last instance by the economy, specific determination of the other levels, etc. 2. A radical critique of the theoretical pretensions of every philosophical humanism. 3. The definition of humanism as an ideology.”

This conceptualization is Marx’s discovery, which changed the fundamental problematic of idealist philosophy that all domains and arguments settled on the problematic of “essence of man”; Marx constituted a new dialectical materialism of praxis. It is Marx’s theoretical anti-humanism, in which productive forces and relations dialectically took place. Revisiting Nietzsche, Foucault also defined “Man” as the “invention of the recent date”, which seen as an anti-humanist approach by Tony Davies.\textsuperscript{140} The point is that this anti-humanist wave turns into posthumanism, which can be seen as a turn against anti-humanism, within neoliberalist approaches. As Ferrando identifies, “although the roots of posthumanism can be already traced in the first wave of postmodernism, the posthuman turn was fully enacted by feminist theorists in the Nineties, within the field of literary criticism - what will later be defined as critical posthumanism.”\textsuperscript{141} Posthumanist thought can be defined as multicentered, multilayered, pluralistic and nomadic.

“The posthuman nomadic subject is materialist and vitalist, embodied and embedded – it is firmly located somewhere, according to the radical immanence of the ‘politics of location’ ... It is a multi-faceted and relational subject, conceptualized within a monistic ontology, through the lenses of Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari, plus feminist and post-colonial theories. It is a subject actualized by the relational vitality and the elemental complexity that mark posthuman thought itself.”\textsuperscript{142}

In one sense, it is possible to extend posthumanist thought towards structural naturalism where the Cartesian split of body and mind dissolved in matter with

\textsuperscript{140} Davies, T., Humanism, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{142} Braidotti, R., The Posthuman, Polity Press, UK & USA, 2013, p. 188.
the announcement of neuronal Man.\textsuperscript{143} Some researchers have related posthumanist thought to the term “anthropocene”:

“Posthumanism (here understood as critical, cultural, and philosophical posthumanism, as well as new materialisms) seems appropriate to investigate the geological time of the anthropocene. As the anthropocene marks the extent of the impact of human activities on a planetary level, the posthuman focuses on de-centering the human from the primary focus of the discourse. In tune with antihumanism, posthumanism stresses the urgency for humans to become aware of pertaining to an ecosystem which, when damaged, negatively affects the human condition as well. In such a framework, the human is not approached as an autonomous agent, but is located within an extensive system of relations. Humans are perceived as material nodes of becoming; such becomings operate as technologies of existence.”\textsuperscript{144}

Thus, with the term “posthuman”, many becomings are welcomed to a network of “things” in “nature”, such as artificial intelligences, cyborgs, biodigital and biotechnological bodies. “Posthuman theory extends the cyborg metaphor beyond the body and into the built environment, imagining designed space itself as a prosthetic and producing new understandings of a ‘nature’ that itself can no longer be conceived as an ordinary or neutral ground.”\textsuperscript{145} It is possible to consider a new way of understanding “matter”. In this respect, it is important to depict how “matter” is defined in New Materialism:

\textsuperscript{144} Ferrando F., “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms, Differences and Relations”, Existenz, Vol: 8, No: 2, Fall 2013, p. 32, accessed 24.07.2017, \url{https://existenz.us/volumes/Vol.8-2Ferrando.pdf}.
“New materialisms perceive matter as an ongoing process of materialization, elegantly reconciling science and critical theories: quantum physics with a post-structuralist and postmodern sensitivity. Matter is not viewed in any way as something static, fixed, or passive, waiting to be molded by some external force; rather, it is emphasized as "a process of materialization". Such a process, which is dynamic, shifting, inherently entangled, diffractional, and performative, does not hold any primacy over the materialization, nor can the materialization be reduced to its processual terms.”\textsuperscript{146}

Actually, in posthuman theory one encounters distortion of the dialectical positions such as body/mind, subject/object, nature/culture and I/other. This is why the complete modernist way of thinking is under pressure not to present an adequate base to be structured on it. What is the dialectical equivalent to the concept of “post-human”? It is clear that it is not a kind of binary opposition such as human versus machine, or human versus animal or such. It is possible to ask whether or not it is a kind of “incommensurable” dialectic. Fredric Jameson prefers to make a direct link between the terms “incommensurable dialectic” and Deleuzian “difference”: he clearly defined a binary opposition as a “spatial category”, while “incommensurable dialectic”, which could be defined as a juxtaposed unity of separate items, is related with “Event”.\textsuperscript{147} In this respect, it is possible to claim that a kind of rupture has formed in the dialectic of subject and object. Therefore, for evaluating “post-human” in the context of “incommensurable dialectic”, firstly the dialectic of subject and object needs to be reassessed and then the context of the new situation elucidated.

\textsuperscript{147} Jameson, F., Valences of The Dialectic, Verso Books, New York, USA, 2010, p. 36.
3.3 The Dialectics of Subject and Object

This dissertation rises the question of what kind of changes have occurred in the dialectics of subject and object, and suggests that this dialectic has caused an epistemological change. In Kuhnian terms, not only an epistemological shift can be seen with the changes to subject and object relations, but also the logical structure of the relationship changes. In Figure 5, the changes in the subject and object dichotomy from 1960s up to the 21st century are depicted. At the beginning, subject and object have their own auras and are not connected to each other; in the process the subject and object move closer and the distance between them becomes narrower; at the final stage the object is part of the subject. This radical shift is an expression of how dialectics on this issue have transformed.

Figure 5: Metamorphosis of the Dialectics of Subject and Object (designed by R. Ç. Çavdar)

At the first stage, although subject and object have their own auras, when they are together they constitute an environment, and this environment is familiar to human beings. However, during the process, as shown in the figure, this environment is squeezed, and at the final point, there is no gap in this dialectic.
The second stage is composed of a subject and a technological object called “cybernetic environment”, exemplified as mobile smart phones and wearable structures, and this environment is new for human beings. Douglas Spencer noted that this cybernetic environment is the spacing of neoliberal subjectivity.148 The narrower the distance between subject and object, the more the spacing of subjectivity is transformed.

The final environment shows the extraordinary spacing in which the object is embedded in the subject; it is not ubiquitous right now, but it contains future expectations, exemplified as injected microchips, cyborg facilities for the disabled, 3D printed organs etc. Moreover, this environment could be called the “cyborgnetic environment”.149 Some examples signify that the third stage is not far from daily life. Here it is possible to mention a conversion of the subject to the side of object in Cyborgnetic Environment; the “objectified subject” constitutes this cyborgnetic environment.

At this point, it is important to remember Donna Haraway’s definition of a “cyborg”: “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is lived social relations, our most important political construction, a world-changing fiction.”150 For Haraway, cyborg politics have some parallels with Foucauldian “biopolitics”; her diagnosis of “biopolitics” is of a kind of “flaccid premonition”. Actually, her thoughts could be seen as predictions, which lights today’s conditions; she claimed, “we are cyborgs. The cyborg is

149 Actually, the term “Cyborgnetic Environment” is created by me; it defines the environment where object(s) are embedded to subject, it is a kind of new body form.
our ontology; it gives us our politics”\textsuperscript{151} in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century. “To have an origin story” is not possible for cyborgs; this situation works as an illegitimate promise for cyborgs where they skip the concept of “original unity”, which is “represented by the phallic mother from whom all humans must separate.”\textsuperscript{152}

Initially it is clear that the dialectic as “binary opposition” disappeared when the “objectified subject” came onto the scene, while the gap between subject and object narrowed. At this point, it is important to draw attention to new research about reinforcing the human mind with new technological equipment (technological objects embodied in the human brain) alongside Artificial Intelligence, such as work by the firm Neuralink, which indicates that cyborgnetic environments could be “true”/“real” in the immediate future.

Haraway spoke of the blurred differences between “natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms and machines.”\textsuperscript{153} Here the problem is becoming animal or becoming machine, where the human (or the subject) takes a position. For contemporary machines, it is possible to consider a “miniaturalization” of the products; they turn into something invisible to transform human to cyborg, and it is hard to see “cyborgs” both materially and politically, which means they are “floating signifiers”. This point enables a return to the Lacanian concept of “point de capiton”, which works as a point for fixing signifiers. Here, the invisible signifier of the new entity, “cyborg”, necessitates an interface, which will be worked as “point de capitone”, for passing as having “appeared”, both politically and physically.

Actually, it is important to emphasize that Figure 5 – the trilogy of the environments of subject and object - considered the dialectic in a physical context. However, the question remains of whether this dialectic continues in the cognitive realm, which means that the physical conditions of subject and object relationships are the same in cognitive conditions? If there is similarly no gap between subject and object in the cognitive realm, there will be an epistemological break on this topic dialectically identical to human history. Thus, the discussion changes direction through creating both a new epistemological and a new ethical base. As Adorno stated:

“The separation of subject and object is both real and illusory. True, because in the cognitive realm it serves to express the real separation, the dichotomy of the human condition, a coercive development. False, because the resulting separation must not be hypostasized, not magically transformed into an invariant. This contradiction in the separation of subject and object is imparted to epistemology. Though they cannot be thought away, as separated, the pseudos of the separation is manifested in their being mutually mediated - the object by the subject, and even more, in different ways, the subject by the object. The separation is no sooner established directly, without mediation, than it becomes ideology, which is indeed its normal form. The mind will then usurp the place of something absolutely independent - which it is not; its claim of independence heralds the claim of dominance. Once radically parted from the object, the subject reduces it to its own measure; the subject swallows the object, forgetting how much it is an object itself.”\(^{154}\)

The projection of Adorno about the indirectly established separation of subject and object will be almost real under the conditions of the cyborgnetic environment, in which humans and non-humans are combined as in the one ‘thing in itself’. A new type of entity will be created in this environment. The norms and regulation, which link this entity to the present system, will have to be designed for constituting a new paradigm.

This new cyborgnetic environment constitutes a kind of ‘incommensurable dialectic’ between subject and object, so that the new status of relationship between subject and object necessitates scrutiny of the definition of ‘theory’. Since V. A. Lektorsky defines the concept of the theory through the object, the change of the relation of the object with the subject also requires the redefinition of theory. Lektorsky defines “theory itself as a pattern of potential means of operating with the object.” When the object is embedded in the subject, theory turns into a pattern of means, which operates on the subject. Thus, it is possible to claim that theory became a pattern of objective means programmed by subjects for operating on the subject. At this point the subject transformed into the object where it was operated by theory. The “objectified subject” became the new research field of theory. If it is possible to rewrite the definition of theory from this standpoint, it will be rephrased, as it will be possible to understand theory as a pattern of operating with the “objectified subject”.

3.4 The position of the “architect-subject” in 21st century

It is obvious that the definition of the “subject” has changed from Althusserian “ideological interpellation” to Deleuzian “immanent intensity” since the 1990s. Via the encounter between the cybernetic environment and everyday life, a destabilization occurred between subject and object, thus leading to a decomposed “traditional distinction” between the former and the latter. After the digital turn, with the effect of “parametricism” or “digital fabrication”, the production of the “architect-subject” has been transformed on the side not of the distraction of the viewer, but the internalization of the viewer. The unstable distinction between subject and object has come to be seen “as if the viewer and the architectural work were part of a single continuum.”

This new approach in architectural production, where the distinction between architectural work and the viewer is dissolved, could be defined with the Deleuzian “notion of affect”; “Affects occur at the surface of bodies, but knowing them is only a first step. What matters is ultimately what an encounter allows a body to do from now on.” Affects are constituted by direct relation with bodies and space-time. The “interactive” or “performative” architecture gives an “affect” to the viewer (though it may be better to say “experience” instead of “viewer”), and this bodily experience and the work itself become a “whole”. Manuel DeLanda prefers to use the term “assemblage”, with reference to Deleuze, instead of using “wholes”, which are irreducible and decomposable. By defining the whole, which consists of the subject and the architectural production as an assemblage, it becomes possible not to evaluate

architectural production as a superficial structure and not to call subject as a separate individual.

In this respect, “the Deleuzian reference reveals itself inseparable from an approach to the relation between the subject and the world based on their continuity. The subject, if one may still use this term, can no longer be envisaged as a separate substance; rather, it appears as a kind of inflexion or as a zone of peculiar intensity in a field.”\(^{159}\) From this perspective, it is clear that the new architectural production is a kind of “body” (or one may say “body without organs”) which is on the matrix or in the network. Thus, it is impossible to draw clear borders between subject and object, as where the former begins and the latter ends are blurred. At this point, it is no longer possible to speak of a representational architecture, but rather a “parametrized assemblage” in which architectural production and the body are embedded. This argument shelters a new kind of “subjectivization”, more than ideological interpellation. Simone Brott claims that:

“Architecture, in repeatedly surrendering to ideology, suffers from this inability to liberate free forms of architectural subjectivization from the embedded representational orders that are an unnecessary component of its historical and social condition.”\(^{160}\)

Brott suggested a Deleuzian “desubjectivization” for “liberation of purely immanent agency”.\(^{161}\) Actually, this “desubjectivization” process is not much more than structuring the architectural product as an interface between

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anybodies (any subjects) and the architect-subject. This interface, as transforming itself into a kind of new body, acts for the interaction between anybody, and the body (architect-subject). Architecture turns into an “anonymous encounter”, which “is an event that comes before the crystallization of all the things … the abstract surface of all singularities coming into being.” In the process of “anonymous encounter”, the need for giving a name to the subject becomes redundant; the subject becomes indistinct, turning into a Cartesian illusion. Meanwhile, the autonomy of the subject (autonomy of the architect-subject) has lost its stressed property against the “anonymous architectural encounter”.

Brott finds that the reasons for the crisis of architectural subjectivity, which lived in critical and yet in post-critical architecture, is not only misinterpretation of Lacan and Derrida, but also overvaluation of the textuality. Her suggestion is to re-evaluate Deleuzian “immanent subjectivity of the aesthetic object itself.” Brott also criticizes architects who declared the “end of theory”; she finds a fatal error in this attitude in that they also misunderstand Deleuze’s subjectivity, which is real rather than abstract.

Actually it is possible to claim that every interaction, between subject and object and between subject and subject, causes a kind of “inter-subjectivity” that generates both sides of the interaction. In the last instance, the object itself embodies an “immanent subjectivity”, just by virtue of being created by subjects. At this point, with reference to Deleuze and Karl Chu, it is possible to

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use the Leibnizean term “monad” instead of “object” designed by “subject”. Karl Chu depicted “the monad” as “the single bit of information, capable of replicating and organizing itself into increasingly complex networks of relations that reflect the order of its world.” Chu tried to purify the term “monad” from its theological origin and adapted it to the contemporary digital world to show how architectural theory could be used as “monadology” to construct a new world order. Here, the important point is that the whole nature of the world could be captured by an abstract means of understanding via “monadology”; a “monad” is an atomic entity on the irreducible level, which has the potential to self-replicate.

It is possible to read Chu’s suggestion for improving the role of the architect-subject. The relation between a monad and an architect-subject could be constituted with the help of the “self-replicating” feature of the monad. Chu suggested a “Universal Computer” containing a program, which coordinates the “Universal Constructor” that replicates both computer and constructor. The main idea is that creating/constructing a “monad” that has the potential to self-replicate would be the new role of the architect-subject. It is possible to claim that the new century’s architect-subject will be designing not the buildings but the “monads” which are capable of reproducing themselves.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that the “monad” does not have to be only “material” in itself; it could be an atomic unit of a cyber-living organism in the immediate future in the place where subject and object are encapsulated in one single monad. In this respect, the architect-subject will not only design

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second nature but also design “third nature” – the cybersphere.\(^{168}\) According to Graafland, although conscious that third nature is a “social product”, this third nature penetrates into first and second nature and transforms their ground.\(^{169}\) Graafland’s opinion is that contemporary architectural practice is not on the level of history, nor on the level of cognition, nor on the level of managerialization, but on the level of “a software-driven flattened out aesthetic reflexivity”\(^{170}\). This ahistorical-digitalized-superficial architectural production can be seen as the initial sign of the new paradigmatic shift of the epistemic world of architecture.

The architect-subject, who is at the intersection of Tafurian resistance architecture and pragmatist-projective architecture, works as a “Ptolemized mental labour” verifying the “epistemic tabula rasa” for creating a new world order - “third nature”. This is the reason behind the discourse of the “end of theory”; actually, the “old paradigm” will be closed by new “cyborgnetic environmental becomings” and the object of the “theory” will be changed. Here it is possible to claim that the architect-subject, who is grounded on an epistemic tabula rasa while a new paradigm is in formation, tries to construct that which is “phantasmagoric” via the help of new technologies, for preventing all logical, ideological and founded critiques and investigatory approaches. Because it is obvious that a “phantasm” does not need any “knowledge” or “episteme” to be grounded - if there is no architectural episteme for constructing a new paradigm - then two alternative paths will


appear, one which embraces the old paradigmatic approaches and the second which sails to the world of the “phantasm”.  

In this respect, one question could be raised: specifically, how can it be possible to make “free mental architectural production” in the place where the idea turns into a commodity and not to fall into a phantasmagorical world.  

Sargın suggested that a new Althusserian rereading could offer opportunities to re-evaluate the architect-subject as a political agent. It is obvious that for “free mental production”, a kind of re-ordering process is necessary; this re-ordering process could be demolished class-consciousness containing an ideological program. Although his proposal is reminiscent of “the resistant architectural subject”, to see the architect-subject as a “producer” instead of a “creator” could be, with reference to Peggy Deamer, a contemporary contribution to the re-evaluation of architecture theory.

Here it is important to emphasize that to structure the new architectural theoretical framework; the architect-subject could be chosen as a base, rather than the architectural object. In the situation where the architect-subject designs the “self-replicating monad”, everything – meaning all the things in second and third nature - will have an “immanent subjectivity” in reality.


3.5 Concluding Remarks for the Domain of Subjectivity

The main discussion of this chapter is structured on a triangular framework: transformations of the term “subject”, the dialectical repositioning of the subject-object dichotomy, and the new subjectivity in the post-humanist age. Under the first edge of the triangular framework, how the terminology related to the subject had changed was discussed. The first two sub-sections descriptively cover these historical transfigurations of the subject. The term "subject" is discussed as a socio-ideological term rather than an ontological term.

At the second edge of the framework, how the “subject” has relocated itself in relation to the object was treated. In addition, in this part of the framework, how the definition of “theory” has also transformed was addressed. The fundamental reason for the transformation of the definition of theory is that the attitude or dominance of the subject over the object returns to itself, that is, to the subject. The “objectified subject”, which can be verified in both physical and ideological contexts, increasingly becomes a “commodity” and turns into a “fetish object” in the domain of commodity fetishism. The process of commodification is a kind of mechanism which enables the “subject” to create or to arrange its own “replica”; with reference to Benjamin, in the “digital reproduction age”, not only objects are copied or reproduced, but also subjects have the potential to be reproduced. In the immediate future, the perception of reality will be reconstructed in the cyborgnetic environment, which is composed of original (or alive things) and replicated (or reproduced things) subjects and objects. While there are only artificial objects in cybernetic environments, cyborgnetic environments will consist of both artificial objects and objectified artificial subjects. The cyborgnetic environment does not refer
to the hybrid environment; it is different to hybrid, it is a kind of new category (or class) in social strata.

At this point, the third edge is added to the triangular framework, in which new subjectivity or the new position of the architect-subject is discussed. The important question is what kind of a position the architect-subject, being "creative", will occupy. The architect-subject will design not only physical/material space, but also artificial space. In fact, the architect-subject will be transfigured to become the designer of both replica-objects and replica-subjects. In the immediate future, it will be inevitable that the architect-subject will be alienated to the design processes, because the architect-subject has already not only been alienated from production processes since the post-war period, but has also lost control over creation procedures in the digital age. Therefore, the architect-subject will be the designer of the living environment of a “commodified artificial subject”, as it is possible to think that the architect-subject will design the “commodified artificial subject”.

Physical, material and even natural construction processes are already fulfilled in the world. This is why there is a kind of polarisation procedure functioning in the political milieu, which is quite similar to the interwar period. This procedure has appeared in the form of regional wars, which have caused destruction, invasions and migration. In this respect, the architect-subject must designate his/her own position; this political positioning is a kind of choice between being the designer of demolition or of creation. It is possible to claim that the former choice means to make architecture after destruction as already tried and tested in the 20th century, but it is obvious that the latter choice will be new for the architectural milieu; the new construction milieu will structure artificial rather than physical environments. Therefore, meta-narratives or
meta-figures will not take part in the symbolic realm of the 21st century. Instead, corporate identities will form the reality of the near future.

The implication of this chapter is that the object of architectural theory should be changed because of the transformations in the definition of theory. In the current situation, architectural theory has been focused on both the “product” of architectural practice and the “process” of this practice since the 1960’s; incidentally, the object (or the focal point) of the new architectural theory must be the architect-subject, instead of the product or process. This situation should not be understood as supporting or honouring the concept of the “star-architect” arising from neoliberal subjectivity. Conversely, it is possible to say that the concept of the “star-architect” contributed to the disappearance of the subject, which could be followed in the first decade of the 21st century. It is obvious that post-humanist and “new materialist” evaluations have a discrete role in the disappearance of the subject. In the Latourian conception of “things”, both human and non-human things combine in a coherent way for structuring a new society. This coherent relationship creates a new domain for theory.

At this point, it is important to remember this chapter’s implication that the new “object” of architectural theory is the architect-subject. The discourse, which formed the “end of theory”, is expired; theory is not ended, rather its domain is replaced with "the subject" rather than the object.
CHAPTER 4

THEORETICAL TEXT AS ARCHITECTURAL PRAXIS, AND VICE-VERSA

“They do not know it, but they are doing it.”

Karl Marx, Capital

“They know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.”

Peter Sloderdijk, The Critique of Cynical Reason

“Things” in the Latourian sense, which consist of both human and non-human entities, coherently structure a new social constitution, which could be seen as the new domain of theory. Recalling of previous chapter’s implication that the “object” of architectural theory shifted from the architectural object towards the architect-subject, the claim that “theory is ended” requires re-evaluation because of the changed definition of theory. In the 21st century, theory will encounter “the subject” rather than “the object” after the digital turn; theory’s research field will be “the subject” itself. Under these circumstances, the illegibility of the radical change on both the definition and the research field of theory has led to discourses such as the “end of theory”, but actually, the domain of theory has changed. From this perspective, in any attempt to

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improve a critical approach in the post-humanist age for conceiving new life patterns, theory must be revisited with the term “subject”.

In this chapter, architectural praxis is treated as an ideologically-directed “thought-act” that contains not only practising but also theorizing. Until the 1960s only “architectural objects” directed architectural theory, which means that a theoretical text could not be seen as an architectural production. With the effects of structuralism in architecture, “text” began to be seen as part of architectural praxis. Here it is important to emphasize that the Tafurian approach of seeing architecture as a process instead of a project had a radical effect on architectural praxis. Every production of the architect-subject could begin to be evaluated as part of architectural praxis and to be seen as a contribution to architectural culture. In this respect, it is possible to claim that architectural theory has changed position not only with the replacement of the object of theory but also with acceptance of the new subjectivity in architectural praxis.

At this point, it is important to remember how architectural production from the 1980s to the first decade of the 2000s was considered with the term “textuality”, and then with the digital turn architectural production turned into “parametricized-pragmatism”. This renewal in conceiving the architectural production caused a debate that determined two paths: critical architecture versus projective architecture. On the one hand, critical architecture, whose hot supporters include Hays and Eisenman, and on the other hand, projective architecture, whose cold supporters include Speaks, Somol and Whiting, have caused a new archi-theoretical discussion in the place where the “end of theory” discourses proliferated.
In this respect, this debate - critical architecture versus projective architecture - revealed that a paradigmatic change would be on the way for architecture. It is possible to state that every paradigm shift involves hard defenders of the old paradigm and an architectural epistemic void, which will be fulfilled by the new paradigm. At this point, to find a foundation for settling the “thought-act”, it is possible to suggest the Lacanian term “point de capitone” for fixing the free-floating meanings. “Architecture” that works as “point de capitone” provides joint movement of two separate fluid conceptual surfaces, such as ideology and subject, reality and the Real. This chapter engages in discussion of how “architecture” could be posited as a “stitch” at the intersected conceptual surfaces for stabilizing fluidity in the post-truth age.

4.1 Revisiting Architectural Theory with the Term “Subject”

Before revisiting architectural theory with the term “subject”, it is important to remember two determinative features of theory: the first is related to the definition of theory, and the second is the position of theory vis-a-vis practice. The first feature directly refers to what “theory” indeed is. J. Angermuller pointed out that the formations of “theory” as the “field” initially is a transferring process of French thought to North America - especially certain texts – through the “Science of Humanities”.\(^\text{175}\) This explanation shows that a group of texts were written in a period constituted as “theory”, which could be seen as exiled thought. In particular, the architectural theory, which evolved after the 1980s in North America, developed from the structuralism and post-structuralism of French theoreticians.

The second feature is related to the dichotomy of theory versus practice. In Deleuzian thought, the gap between theory and practice is closed. “Theory” has turned into a kind of practice, in which other practices intervene: “philosophical theory is itself a practice, just as much as its object. It is no more abstract than its object. It is a practice of concepts, and it must be judged in the light of the other practices with which it interferes.”

The dialectically distorted Deleuzian approach to “theory” contains networks of molecular practices intersecting with each other. In this respect, architectural theory could be evaluated as a “thought-act”, which is supported by and for practice. From this perspective, a theoretical text could be perceived as a kind of architectural praxis, and vice-versa is also true, especially when architectural praxis after the 2000s is taken into account.

If architectural theory is scrutinized in the context of the term “subject”, then it is possible to encounter three different approaches, as discussed by K. Michael Hays in his seminal book, “Modernism and the Post-humanist Subject”. The first is the subject as an "agent of meaning"; the second is the subject” as "discursive function"; and finally, the third is the subject as "ideologically-produced consciousness". Beginning from the first approach - “subject” as “agent of meaning” in humanism - Hays emphasized:

“In humanist thought the role of the subject vis-a-vis the object has been that of an originating agent of meaning. The subject enters the dialectic with the world as its source, as the intending manipulator of the object and the conscious originator of meanings and actions.”

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After the improvements in early Modernism, certain transformations occurred in the definition of “individual”; it began to be defined as a “discursive function” in anti-humanist approaches or in post-structuralism. Hays preferred to explain this condition of the “subject” as being a “variable entity interdependent to social practices”:

“What is important is that atonality, the renunciation of narrative time, the disprivileging of the purely visual, and the thematization of incompleteness and uncertainty are aesthetic corollaries of the disenfranchisement of autonomous individualism. The subject is no longer viewed as an originating agent of meaning, but as a variable and dispersed entity whose very identity and place is constituted in social practice. Objects and processes are seen as having a material existence independent of, and at times threatening to, the unity of the individual self. In this context, man is what Michel Foucault has called a "discursive function" among complex and already formed systems of thought which he witnesses but does not constitute.”

The third form in the definition of the subject is “ideologically produced consciousness”, as it is defined in post-humanism. Hays depicted it thus: “the term ‘subject’, meaning both particular individual consciousness and material-ideologically constituted consciousness in general, is inherently multiple and equivocal.” This final phase of the subject refers directly to the architect-subject who is effective in architectural production after the 1990s. In addition, this phase of the subject shows some parallels with the characteristic of ideological transformations. In particular, the concept of the “star-architect”

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corresponds to Haysian post-humanist subjectivity, which is discussed in the following sub-section.

4.2 Effectiveness of Textual Praxis on the Architect-Subject

Remembering Dosse’s trilogy of structuralism - scientific structuralism, semiological structuralism and historicized or epistemic structuralism - it is important to emphasize that it is mostly possible to follow the effects of semiological structuralism in architectural ideology, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Discussing architecture as a system of signs and as a result of synchronized elements has some limitations; this raises the concept of “type” at the level of both elements and objects in architecture. The paradox of the period in the context of architectural ideology is that, while on the one hand the concept of “type” was raised, on the other hand the genuine characteristics of architectural elements or place were looked for. Tafuri and Colquhoun have harshly criticized this paradoxical structure and semiological structuralism in architectural ideology.

An early critique of this approach came from Manfredo Tafuri. For Tafuri, historical preparation is a requirement for interpreting the past and transmitting it to the present\textsuperscript{180}; it is possible to fall back into copying styles in architectural expression without historical preparation and ideological commitment. This is why Tafuri preferred to “investigate the history of material production of cities and buildings.”\textsuperscript{181} Tafuri’s position in relation to the concept of “process” comes from the alienated procedures of obtaining an architectural object/product. As he explained:

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“From the standardized part and the cell to the single block, the Siedlung, and finally to the city: such is the assembly line that architectural culture devised between the wars with exceptional clarity and consistency. Each ‘piece’ in the line is fully resolved and tends to disappear or, better yet, to dissolve formally in the assembly. The result of all this was the revolutionization of the aesthetic experience itself. No longer is it objects that presented themselves for appraisal, but an entire process, to be experienced and used as such.”

Tafuri suggests that it is not possible to read the architectural production via only the “architectural object”, but the architectural process could be a signifier of deciphering the whole mode of architectural production; Tafuri resists the alienation of the architect-subject to his/her own work. At this point, both the praxis of Eisenman and the theory of Hays can be seen as the representatives of “resistance” in architecture; the praxis of Eisenman pursued the concept of “process” rather than “product”, in a Tafurian way. As Baird claimed:

“One of its most cogent and internally coherent renditions has been that of the practitioner—and no mean theorist himself—Peter Eisenman, accompanied by Hays. Together, over the past two decades, these two have developed a position that has consistently focused intellectually on concepts of “resistance” and “negation.” For Eisenman, the position derives primarily from the work of the Italian historian and critic Manfredo Tafuri, but it has been fleshed out in Eisenman’s own mind by other prominent figures in contemporary thought, including Jacques Derrida, Gianni Vattimo, and others. For Hays, Tafuri is as important a

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figure as he has been for Eisenman, but he is accompanied by additional figures such as Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, and Fredric Jameson.”

This quotation shows that critical architecture is based on structuralist approaches rooted in the 1960s, but it also takes into account that whether or not the debates of critical architecture are already over is very significant for the 21st century’s architectural discussions. The reason behind this debate is that through to the end of the 1990s, with the digital revolution and neoliberal ideology, the relationship between architecture and politics became weaker and more superficial. The nexus of architecture with the urban context and the political context broke off in post-critical architecture.

It is possible to think of Tafuri as a supporter of Marxist criticality instead of Hegelian representation. He paved the way for critical architecture. The Tafurian search for “crisis moments” marks an intrinsically paradigmatic search instead of a continuous history. Tafuri’s thought is mostly to be on the side of resisting the contradictions of the “capital”; as he stated, “[i]n assuming its historic, objective role as class critique, architectural criticism must become a critique of urban ideology, and avoid in every way the danger of entering into ‘progressive’ dialogue with the techniques for rationalizing the contradictions of capital.”

When the background of Tafurian advocacy of architectural criticism as a critique of urban ideology is scrutinised, it is possible to see that Tafuri evaluated the city as “superstructure”, which means that he saw the that

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city where the ideology took place transformed and affected all the productive forces in an Althusserian way.

After Tafuri, an important second critique for a semiological approach in architecture came from Alan Colquhoun in his 1972 article:

“Here we came to the root of the problem both of semiology and modern architecture. If a language of any sort is merely the arrangement of minimal structures, these structures must already be full of given meanings, as they are in language. This is the necessary condition of social communication.”

Indeed, it important to emphasize that critique of Colquhoun could be seen as an early-birth critique of the entire postmodernist architecture of the 1980s, in which historical eclecticism took place into which lost meanings flood. At this point, it is unavoidable to ask the question of whether architecture is working as a fixer of meaning while remembering that the early post-modernist period in architecture coincides with the discussions of “anti-history” in structuralism and post-structuralism. In this respect, it is possible to claim that postmodernism used historical architectural objects or elements for compiling “meaning” instead of reactivating the subject. The historically-loaded object is in the foreground instead of the subject in postmodern architecture. To see vice-versa, where the subject foregrounded in architecture, it was necessary to wait until the 1990s, when star-architects arose. It is possible to state that architectural production in the early postmodern period is the defect of semiological structuralism in architecture. The effects of modernism could be followed until 1980 in the mainstream production of architecture, in which the

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architect-subject was located at the intersection between “agent of meaning” and “discursive function”. Unfortunately, the postmodernist period in architecture could be defined as a black hole where the architect-subject is swallowed by the object.

From this perspective, it is possible to read a paradoxical condition in the dialectic of subject and object in architectural production; on the one hand the colossus of the culture industry, the object itself, and on the other hand a surplus of ideology-theory, the subject itself. This conflict, commodity fetishism versus the ascendant value of the non-commodity, continued until the middle of the 1990s and even up to the early 2000s, when the digital turn occurred. For the present day, as Adorno proposed, the “subject swallowed the object”; it turns into an “objectified subject”, which is the object of ideology.

In this paradoxical condition, theoreticians, such as K. Michael Hays, and practitioners, such as Peter Eisenman or late avant-gardes, following Taffuri, draw a way for the sake of the subject to resist postmodernist architectural production. They even published “Oppositions” to announce that they resist all alienated production processes. Critical architecture advocated that the discipline of architecture was autonomous, meaning that the architect-subject is able to resist and criticise the system in architectural the product and the architectural text. Baird argued for what critical architecture is, via Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting’s 2002 article “Notes around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modernism”:

“They [Somol and Whiting] summarize their concern about what they label ‘the now dominant paradigm’ by observing that in their view, in recent years ‘disciplinarity has been absorbed and exhausted by the project of criticality’. They employ the design production of Peter
Eisenman, together with the theory of Michael Hays to attempt to demonstrate this. In this respect, perhaps their most important claim is that ‘for both [Eisenman and Hays], disciplinarity is understood as autonomy (enabling critique, representation and signification), but not as instrumentality (projection, performativity, and pragmatics’).  

At this point, it is obvious that critical architecture was far from being the dominant stream in architectural theory in 2002; it began to be considered by theoreticians that the discipline of architecture was continuing to carry its autonomous character as being dialectical and representational. Baird continues:

“One could say that their definition of disciplinarity is directed against reification, rather than towards the possibility of emergence. And they conclude this part of their argument by observing: ‘As an alternative to the critical project—here linked to the indexical, the dialectical and hot representation—this text develops an alternative genealogy of the projective—linked to the diagrammatic, the atmospheric and cool performance.’”  

Here it is clear that Somol and Whiting are not merely criticising critical architecture; they are proposing projective architecture as an alternative. For Somol and Whiting, this new paradigm is more Deleuzeian than the structuralist approach. The “diagrammatic becoming” is distinguished from indexical structure: indexical structure was self-referential and territorial, but

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diagrammatic becoming contains the possibility of a new “reality”. At this point, it is important to remember how Deleuze defines diagrams:

“That is why, diagrams must be distinguished from indexes, which are territorial signs, but also from icons, which pertain to reterritorialization, and from symbols, which pertain to relative or negative deterritorialization. Defined diagrammatically in this way, an abstract machine is neither an infrastructure that is determining in the last instance nor a transcendental Idea that is determining in the supreme instance. Rather it plays a piloting role. The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality.”188

From this standpoint, the diagrammatical contributes to developing a “rhizomatic” program, which is unrepresentative, non-hierarchical and non-centred. Projective Architecture, in the form of suggested by Somol and Whiting, is not dialectical; instead it is claimed to be in a Doppler Effect, which proposes a relative change from co-actions between source and receiver. Rather than a unique autonomy, Doppler architecture focuses on multiplicities.189 It is possible to claim that this condition of the new architectural paradigm could be read as a direct attempt to concern the “things” - assemblages of humans and non-humans - rather than “objects”. As Baird claims from the perspective of Sylvia Lavin, who enters the debate of criticality versus projective:

“Sylvia Lavin has entered into the debate, and has made a distinctive contribution to it, calling for a new appreciation of and consideration for ‘the provisional’ and the ‘ephemeral’ in the world of contemporary architecture and design. Characterizing modernism as excessively preoccupied with the ‘fixed’ and the ‘durable’ in the world, she argued that reconsideration of such qualities in the environment could be both liberating and productive of new design possibilities.”

The new architectural paradigm suggested fluidity rather than fixity, dynamism rather than stability, and fundamentally provides ambiguousness instead of unequivocality. Actually, this proposal is depicted as projective architecture coincides with the new condition of both ideology and the subject, which are also ambiguous. At this point, it is possible to blame both neoliberal ideology and the digital revolution for the ambiguousness of the new paradigm in architecture.

The neoliberal constellation described a kind of transformation on societal structure, where societal structure shifted from collective representations to individual emancipation. This liberty could be defined as the “capacity to act” with the terms of Spinoza. Action in liberty means that all discourses were approved on a managerial level and differences and diversity became more explicit. Star-architects arose in this celestial “celebritiness”. Although star-architects were in not only collective but also multidisciplinary production, the end-product was remembered or named via the name of the star-architect. Besides this freely-active milieu, architects designed gated communities and

hyper-ghettos. When gated communities and hyper-ghettos are considered, it is possible to claim that panoptic surveillance was no longer bounded to spatial specifications; technological materials could easily assume the role of architectural formations of panoptic surveillance. Under these circumstances, it is possible to claim that liberties, differences and diversity were rearranged or reorganized in closed-controlled spaces. New free-floating boundaries were designed by freely-active star-architects.

Parallel to the liberation of the architect-subject, a liberation of forms of architectural product began to be seen. The reason behind these “fluid” or “continuous” forms came from the Deleuzeian vitalist conceptualization of “Baroque”. The term “folding” became effective in architecture; architectural elements could not be recognized in one gaze, and all elements intertwined with each other. Thus, architecture returned to the “form”, with departure from semiological or textual descriptions. The Deleuzian concept of “smooth space”, which described the nomadic realm of invention in which the subject could drift\textsuperscript{192}, was seen as alluring to “architectural folding”. The “smooth space” could be seen as a new regime of relations between the subject and her environment that constituted the symbolic realm; it was a shift from Derrida to Deleuze. This new environment consisted of interfaces and networks instead of borders; nodes are made of instead of parts; variability is replaced with modulation; superficiality is replaced with profundity. To perform in superficiality is the basic achievement in the new regime of relations, not only in architecture but also in whole life patterns.

In this respect, the “smoothness” of becoming heterogeneous and continuous was well accepted when the millennium came. This heterogeneous environment means that increasing discourses are dissolving in ideological rigidity; free-floating thoughts multiply free-floating meanings in life patterns. At this point, in this “smooth space” there must be “fixer(s)” for constituting logical networks.

4.3 Architecture as “Point de Capitone” Between Ideology and Subject

Architecture in its contemporary form cannot be distinguished from a kind of aestheticized image, which has impacts on the human perception of reality. This reality is not only structured by the dominant ideology but is also constituted by the architect-subject’s own subject positions. Therefore, the point to be emphasized is that the architectural product posits itself at the intersection of the subject position of the architect-subject and the political unconscious of the dominant ideology. If the architectural product is redefined in this respect, then it is an outcome of an ideological act (with reference to Jameson’s book “The Political Unconscious”). Here the architect-subject is no longer a representative of the dominant ideology; s/he becomes a non-autonomous transparent subject who imperatives the dominant ideology. In his edited book “The Political Unconscious of Architecture”, Nadir Lahiji discussed the term “political unconscious” with the changes in subjectivity oscillating from the Benjaminian “autonomous individual” under liberal capitalism to the Zizekian “pathological narcissist” in contemporary global capitalism. Lahiji prefers to encounter Benjamin’s “optical unconscious” over Jameson’s “political unconscious”; he emphasized that:

“In this second phase of psychosis, something radical has happened from the first instance: the subject has lost the distinction between
reality and the Real. This is the sine qua non of the condition of subjectivity in our culture. In this non-distinction, the subject is threatened with psychosis because the current technology of cyberspace presents this subject with the undifferentiated state of virtuality, the meaning of which is linked to the notion of the Real.”

The question raised at this point is what kind of ideology can form this type of subjectivity. When the answer to this question emerges, the type of ideological critique of architecture will be indicated. Lahiji tries to answer this question: a contemporary form of ideology is “cynicism”, referring to Zizek. According to the contemporary form of ideology discussed in the second chapter, it is important to emphasize two points: firstly, both culture and power could be defined as a superstructure like ideology, which refers to the unconscious for both Althusser and Zizek; and second is that architecture is a kind of cultural form. Culture (and cultural forms) hold an in-between position in the void of reality and the Real, like in ideology; if it is spoken of the distinction between reality and the Real is lost, and then the cultural form (architecture itself) is in a transition phase, where the gap is quilted in Lacanian terms. Thus, the “point de capitone” (nodal point) turns into the cultural form itself (here it is architecture) where it is located and where is fills the gap.

The concept of ideology in Althusserian ideology-theory moved from more than being a “system of ideas” to “the organization of consent” via the Gramscian term “hegemony”. Then the term “ideology” itself became distant and the era came to be called the post-political (or post-ideological) era, when neoliberalism became entangled in the social structure. According to

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Zizek, to countervail the proclamations of the “end of ideology”, two terms must be revived: “political economy of capitalism” and “problematic of the concept of class struggle”. In this respect, the subject position in a social reality is related to the “class antagonism”. At this point, it is important to remember the definition of “reality” in Lacan quoted by Zizek:

“reality is not the thing itself, it is always-already symbolized, constituted, structured by symbolic mechanisms – and the problem resides in the fact that symbolization ultimately always fails, that it never succeeds in fully covering the real, that is always involves some unsettled, unredeemed symbolic debt.”

According to Zizek, “spectre” “gives body to that which escapes (the symbolically structured) reality.” Actually, in Lacanian terms, the spectre is a form of “the Other”. This “symbolically structured reality” never becomes “whole”, because “class struggle designates the very antagonism that prevents the objective (social) reality from constituting itself as a self-enclosed whole.” Although this argument contains a contradiction with Marxist tradition, where “class struggle” works to “totalize” society, Zizek determined that the “ultimate paradox of the notion of class struggle is that society is held together by the very antagonism, splitting, that forever prevents its closure in a harmonious, transparent, rational Whole.” In this respect, it can be witnessed

that Zizek refers to Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of “social antagonism”. As Laclau pointed out:

“Society as a sutured space, as the underlying mechanism that gives reasons for or explains its own partial processes, does not exist, because if it did, meaning would be fixed in a variety of ways. Society is an ultimate impossibility, an impossible object; and it exists only as the attempt to constitute that impossible object or order. That is to say, the order of society is the unstable order of a system of differences, which is always threatened from the outside. ... Hegemonic relations depend upon the fact that the meaning of each element in a social system is not definitely fixed. If it were fixed, it would be impossible to rearticulate it in a different way, and thus rearticulation could only be thought under such categories as false consciousness.”200

Only hegemonic articulation could stop “non-fixed position of the meaning”. At this point Laclau gives attention to the Lacanian term “point de capiton”, “that partially fixes meaning, [and] is profoundly relevant for a theory of hegemony.”201

In this perspective, the term “ideological” refers not to “reality” but the “repressed real” of antagonism; in Zizekian terms, “the Real as social antagonism, which remains constant in all situations.”202 Although this social antagonism (class struggle) prevents perception of society as a stable

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harmonious whole, this distortion causes the emergence of the Real in the form of an “eventual-traumatic kernel”. Thus, without a “traumatic kernel”, the symbolically structured society dissolves. Social antagonism as an ultimate paradox in societal structure needs some nodal points/“point de capitone”, to rearticulate the state of societal order. As an ideological act, architecture can operate as a nodal point between “the Real” and “reality” in a “symbolically structured society”. Moreover, this ideological act, architectural praxis, is found at a nexus between discourses of architect-subject and ordinary subject. This is because praxis, in the context of both textual and practical, works as “material formation of discourse” runs itself as a node between two minds.

As seen in the figure below, in architecture, as a cultural form located at the “void” between the “reality” and the “real”, the task of “point de capitone” between two milieus is not only to close the gap but also to keep the void unequivocal. Not only architecture but also other cultural forms could work as “point de capitone” between two conceptual worlds, or one concept could use a “point de capitone” for stitching itself to one ideological construction. Zizek argued for the fundamental paradox of a “point de capitone”, in that “it is the element which represents the agency of the signifier within the field of the signified. In itself it is nothing but pure difference.”

Zizek indicates a structural role and a performative nature to a “point de capitone”. In present time the reason behind the need for a “point de capitone”, both as a cultural form and as a social agency, is that the definitions of concepts have dislocated and become ambiguous; meanwhile the gap between signifier and signified is broadening.

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“Point de capitone” – a nodal point - works to fix two unstable surfaces and to link two different patterns and networks to oscillate together. This fixing procedure does not prevent fluidity of one conceptual surface, but the stitch enables joint movement.

Figure 6: Architecture as Nodal Point (designed by R. Ç. Çavdar)
4.4 Truth, Truth Games (Lies), Post-Truth

In the preface of his 2012 book “Liquid Modernity”, Zygmunt Bauman mentioned that to be a post- of something is always an inseparable part of modernity. All post- situations have the possibility to be read as the rupture of dialectical processes; it is a kind of dissolving process of tensions related to binary oppositions. When the concept of “truth” is considered in term of post-situations, it is possible to begin by recalling the Hegelian sentence “Truth is historical”. If the word “historical” was thought or conceptualized as the Marxian term “historicized” or the Kuhnian term “paradigm”, then the sentence “Truth is historical” would become “truth is paradigmatic”, then it would be more profane, gain a scientific character, and turn its face towards the twenty-first century. The importance of this statement derives from the “fluid” or “blurred” character of “the truth” in present time. If the sentence “truth is paradigmatic” is re-evaluated in the condition where the paradigm is dissolving, then there will be blankness in truthfulness.

In this respect, to attempt to define “post-truth” is unavoidable. The word “post-truth” became the most popular and the most used new word of the year 2016 by the Oxford Dictionaries, and is defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.” From this perspective, it is clear that “truth” has been changing “phase”. The signs of this new phase of “truth” could be observed not only in theory (actually, it is the period of the “end of theory”) after the year 2000, but also in neoliberalist discourses. M. Speaks argued that:

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“Philosophical, political and scientific truth have fragmented into proliferating swarms of “little” truths appearing and disappearing so fast that ascertaining whether they are really true is impractical if not altogether possible. No longer dictated by ideas or ideologies nor dependent on whether something is really true, everything now depends on credible intelligence, on whether something might be true.”

At this point, the term “intelligence” used by Speaks has not only similarity with but also difference from pursuing “truth” in knowledge in the Kantian sense. After Kant, “the truth” got out of the line of “thought”; the link between “knowledge” and “objective truth” was constituted. This was a radical turn in the understanding and conceptualization of “truth”. The “appearance of fact” became/transposed the “fact” itself. Furthermore, actually, “appearance” is something perceived; it is a perception and all the perceptions are determined by mindset. This is why Marx suggested getting rid of the ideological curtain in the process of seeking the truth. Since then, therefore, truth has become something constructed by reason/intelligence. Unfortunately, in a world where multiplicity or the multitude is valid, to seek a uniform or one-dimensional “truth” is accepted as outdated; truth has lost its universal character. In the pool of multiple theses of truth, the mainstream or the valid truth is determined by the power. This is the “post-truth era”, where “beliefs” work as “truths”: instead of consensus, believing is the only activity, which provides formation of the truth, and “reason” is out of circuit.

In this respect, truth is no more the apparent thing; instead, it is the mental form of the thing, in the post-truth era. The role of neoliberal thought is

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indisputable in the process towards “post-truth”. In neoliberalism, the gap between “truth” and “post-truth” is filled with “truth games”. In “truth games”, subjectivity is produced. Lies begin to be seen as tools for manipulating the truth(s) and for folding reality. This folded reality consisted of truths and lies replaced with the system of truths. A “game of truth” could actually be defined as a set of rules constituted by power-knowledge for constituting subjectivity. Truth games were constructed by governmentality for forming the subject in society. An important difference between “truth games” and “post-truth” in which the quasi-truth was established is that in the former, the quasi-truth was established by power-knowledge, whereas in the latter, it is constituted with power-beliefs. This means that in the post-truth era, subjectivity is created and manipulated in a power-belief system, where both fictitious and unrealistic conditions are structured as the “quasi-truth”.

With the concept of “post-truth”, the element that connected the Real and the appearance of the Real was changed; up to Kant that element was the “thought”, and after Kant it turned to “knowledge”, but in the present time it is “the belief”, which is far from being reasonable. This is why, nowadays, there are people who believe that the world is flat, or debates on “whether science is necessary or not” can be witnessed. These kinds of nonsense or unrealistic conditions show that “post-truth” approaches have caused a “crisis” in the context of scientificity; it is possible to read this era as a kind of temporal void just before the new paradigm rise. It is very confusing that in the post-enlightenment age, humanity discusses scientific paradigm(s) of the pre-enlightenment period. Until both the scientific and ideological paradigmatic void is replaced with a new paradigm, it will be inevitable to try to live or to survive in an eclipse of reason.

4.5 Post-Truth of Architecture

Before discussing what “post-truth architecture” is, it is important to examine what the meaning of “truth” was in architecture. The concept of “truth” in architecture has been assessed in three different senses. First is the “expressive truth”, which means the truthfulness of a work with its inner essence. Second is the “structural truth”, which means that the appearance of the architectural product should comply with both the structural system and materials. Finally is the “historical truth”, which indicates that an architectural product should carry its own time's aura.208 The traces of these three different approaches related to “truth” can be followed to the mid-eighteenth century. Before this, during the Renaissance, “truth” referred to “imitating nature”.

Modern architecture also followed the same three paths of “truth” until the 1960s, when semiological structuralism in literary criticism challenged “truth”. This attack to truth came from outside architecture; structuralist literary critics, such as Roland Barthes, dissolved the one-dimensional/unique meaning by accepting the arbitrary separation of signifier and signified. The “subject” assumed the role of combining signifiers and signified to structure a meaningful whole. This shift toward the subject claimed that the truth (or the idea of a work) added by the author could be multiplied by the readers, because reading is rearranging the systems of signs. This attack on truth caused clusters of connotations on a work of architecture rather than a singular definitive denotation. This approach continued through to the end of the 1960s and brought postmodern architecture, where “truth” coexisted with “deception”. It is possible to define the situation in Foucauldian terminology, discursive practice articulated as “truth games”.

The rejection of “truth” that became embedded in the meaning of the architectural product bifurcated architecture. In one direction, truth is rejected via loading historical connotations for multiplying meaning(s) in the architectural work; in the second one, truth is rejected via the endless play of meaning(s) created by the reader, or by the user in the case of architecture. In the former, “the object” still assumes the role of creating meaning, but in the latter, “the subject” assumes the fundamental role of rereading and recreating meaning via experience. Advocates of the former path, such as Venturi and Jencks, were also the vanguard of postmodern architecture that established misrecognition of semiological structuralism. Advocates of the second path, such as Derrida (a philosopher who worked with architects), Tschumi and Eisenman, opened a new discussion for architecture - “experimental architecture”. Although the second strategy for integrating theory - structuralist literary criticism - and practice - Deconstructivist Architecture - could be considered more erudite than the first, the weakness of the second strategy was seen to be too “textual” rather than being “architectural”.

In this respect, the link between truth and architecture was weakened by misunderstanding of structuralist theory until the 1990s. This weakening process was seen not only in architecture but also in all societal structure; the neoliberal approach and its “truth games” were key factors in the loss of value of the concept of truth. In the present time, “post-truth architecture” is spoken of where people live in the multitude of connotations, and yet of periphrasis and of simulations. As M. Speaks argued:
“In architecture as in the other fields we have witnessed a shift in intellectual dominance from philosophy and its search for absolute truth, to theory and its retreat into the “truth” of negative critique.”

The theoretical negative truth emphasized by Speaks was seen at the end of the 20th century in architecture, but now a worse scenario is working - the building of facts is demolishing. It is evident that a shift from absolute truth to quasi-truth(s) has occurred. Virtuality and “virtual facts” is managing or dominating architecture in the “post-truth era.” Speaks pointed out that

“If philosophy was the intellectual dominant of early twentieth century vanguards and theory the intellectual dominant of late twentieth century vanguards, then intelligence has become the intellectual dominant of twenty-first century post-vanguards. While vanguard practices are reliant on ideas, theories and concepts given in advance, post-vanguard practices are more entrepreneurial in seeking opportunities for innovation that cannot be predicted by any idea, theory or concept. Intelligence is today the source of all value added and consequently the source of all that is innovative.”

Here, according to Speaks’ argument, to be innovative with intelligence in architecture indicates or investigates a more complicated field of philosophy; it is epistemology of architecture. His suggestion is to accept a thought or intelligent fiction as “truth” to begin to create or to invent, instead of using ideas, theories or concepts in the design process. This statement could be seen

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as a “pre-Kantian approach” in which truth appeared in the form of thought rather than knowledge. At this point, it is important to remember August and Schrijver’s statement that the philosophical domains of logic and epistemology were less visible than ethics and metaphysics in architectural thinking. Speaks’ argument proposed a pragmatist-epistemological thinking in architecture instead of intertextual-ethical (or intertextual-political) thinking.

This situation gave rise to a new discussion in architecture; after the digital turn (after the 2000s), architecture began a reckoning process with its epistemology, which led to a redefinition of “truth”. This process - searching for an epistemic base for architecture in the digital/virtual paradigm - is occurring parallel to debates in philosophy on the foundations of “truth”: either thoughts, or knowledge, or beliefs. For this reason, architectural thinking has to re-evaluate its own accumulation of knowledge of architecture that was not only brought from its praxis but also picked up at inter-disciplinary levels. The Venice Biennale 2014, curated by Rem Koolhaas, in which the fundamentals of architecture were discussed, could be read as an attempt to open a debate for turning back to the epistemic origins of architectural production. It is evident that this attempt has not had a profound effect on the architectural milieu. New attempts must arise to structure the architectural episteme in order to relocate architecture in the post-truth age. Actually, it is important to emphasize that this re-evaluation process will recreate an architectural theory for the “post-truth era”.

It is possible to analyse post-truth architecture in three domains: epistemic, discursive and practical. Instead of a separate discussion for each domain, the discussion will intertwine, because these domains are not discrete anymore.

The relation between epistemology of architecture and “post-truth” of architecture originated in the justification of knowledge; the question of the present day is to find a method to solve the validation of “truth”. Until this problem is solved, it will not be possible to achieve stability in all societal situations.

At this point, to look backwards toward to the beginning of the 20th century, where modern architecture had produced its own episteme, could be a step towards re-evaluating a new episteme for a new era. It is possible to claim that early modernist architectural thinking fed from the analytical philosophy of the early 20th century, especially the philosophy of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. When Frege’s analytical philosophy is scrutinized, it can be seen that his approach to dividing statements into functions or arguments to get a sensible whole212 became the starting point of the “functionalist” approach in early modernist architecture. If it was simply defined, denotation (or meaningful “truth”) became visible in the argument of “form follows function” in modernist architecture. The appearance of “truth”, via the “function” of the architectural object which had epistemic origins in analytical philosophy, lasted through to the post-war period, until the arrival of structuralist theory.

With structuralist theory, constituting the argument of “meaningful truth” shifts from “the object” toward “the subject”, from artefacts to discourses. The episteme gains a subjective/discursive qualification. At this point, it is significant to remember the argument of Steve Parnell in Architectural Review: “Buildings may be constructed on the building site, but architecture is

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constructed in the discourse.” Constructing an architectural discourse means producing architecture after structuralism. Knowledge away from being holistic and cumulative became fragmented and diversified within the post-structuralist subject positions. The episteme became identical with discourse; with the interpretation of Derrida in post-Marxism, praxis moved to the discursive field. This situation corresponded to an intertwining of the epistemic, discursive and practical fields. Complexity begins at this point where “truth” will not be defined with no longer either just knowledge, or just by discourse, nor just by action. In the present time, not only in architecture but also in societal structure, “truth” must be re-evaluated by the combination of three fields: epistemology (knowledge), ideology (discourse) and technology (practice).

The problem stems not from what kind of appearance the truth had, but from the blurriness of this multifaceted visibility of truth which suddenly appeared in all fields. For this reason, the age could be called a “post-truth age”. In architectural praxis (in technology of architecture), the truth is scrutinized via forms of digital production. In the field of epistemology of architecture, the truth is still, scrutinized via elements of architecture. Finally, in architectural discourse, the truth is beginning to be scrutinized via the position of the architect-subject in the design process. This final form of scrutiny actually covers one of the main arguments of this thesis; how the architect subject works as a “point de capitone” between ideology that dominates everyday life

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and the ordinary subject that experiences everyday life in a situation where every concept, even truth, has lost its unique meaning. At this point, it is possible to claim that an operation of fixing meaning could work via architecture, which could be seen as an interface located between two moveable conceptual surfaces, such as the ideology and the subject, or the symbolic realm and the Real.

4.6 Concluding Remarks for the Architectural Domain

With neoliberal impact, architectural practices organize/manage architectural theory, especially since the millennium. This chapter therefore re-evaluates how architectural texts lost their effectiveness on practice. Re-reading theory as a kind of practice in the Deleuzian sense, made it possible to discuss architectural practice as theoretical text, in which vice-versa was accepted in the period from the 1960s up to the end of the 1990s. Architectural practice was replaced with architectural text in the field of architectural theory. Consequently, discussions about the “end of theory” arose.

In the post-war period from the 1960s to the present, architectural praxis became interdisciplinary. This interdisciplinarity caused a loss of autonomy in architecture because architecture could not improve its own epistemological domain. It is clear that architectural theory fed not from its epistemic background but from the socio-political milieu of the post-war period. The reason behind this interaction of architecture with other disciplines is that with structuralism the architectural object lost its determinative role in structuring meaning; the role of the reader or of the subject will effectively constitute the meaning. This radical change signifies a groundbreaking turn when capitalism-dominant ideology began to prefer new media to penetrate into the masses. The Althussserian interpretation of the subject directly supported this change;
ideology began to interpellate individuals as the subject who would create meaning for the sake of the dominant ideology.

At this point, it is possible to see postmodern architecture as the last gesture of the architectural object via loading itself with historical eclecticism. Moreover, it is possible to claim that both critical architecture and deconstructivism could be read as looking for a new place for the architect-subject in which the subject positions have importance. But these two approaches chose two different lanes: in critical architecture, the architect had a “resistant” character for the sake of autonomy from dominant ideology, and s/he worked as the negative side of the dominant one; however, in deconstructivism, architects tried to create meaning via re-interpreting architectural elements, positing a semi-autonomy with designing an experimental architecture. Not all these approaches were adequate for satisfying the demands of capitalist ideology.

It is possible to claim that the only reply to the ascent of the subject can be found in Deleuzian philosophy applied to neoliberalism. Heterogeneity and continuity of the diagrammatic was suggested in architecture by rhizomatic-eventual Deleuzian philosophy, instead of the representation of the indexical. If the traces of both the concept of “folding” and the approach of “projective architecture” were followed, then it could be possible to see the shift from the dominance of the stable and homogenous object towards to the dominance of the heterogenic and fluid object, and even toward the intelligence of the architect-subject.

This shift occurred not only in the realm of architecture, but also in all life structures; differences, diversities and heterogeneity made all structures like “smooth spaces” that worked in continuity and fluidity. Everything began to work as a “smooth-rhizomatic-interface”; it lost its unique meaning and began
to be matched to each other freely. In addition, in this free-floating smoothness, pseudo-events occurred because of displacement in meaning. Moreover, the truth lost its meaning; scientific realities began to be questioned. Under these circumstances, I propose architecture as a “point de capitone” that works as “meaning-fixer” between two “smooth spaces”, such as ideology and the subject. Architecture as a “point de capitone” is located at the gap between two floating networks to stitch them to each other and provide that meaningful movement of different domains.

In this neo-structuralist argument, architecture as a “point de capitone” between ideology and the subject can create a potentially meaningful and logical fastening point in which eclipsed reason can live. In addition, a “point de capitone” that works as a connector – a nodal point - between ideology and the subject, makes it possible to emancipate the subject from “phantasmagoria” for connecting everyday life practices.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed to posit the architect-subject in the context of new ideology – the symbolic realm shaped according to the digital revolution. The reason for determining the new position of the architect-subject is the weakness and rupture in the architectural praxis. Here, the architect-subject could be treated – in Zizekian terms – as the “sublime object of ideology”, which has the potential to act as Master Signifier. It is possible to claim that the “sublime object of ideology” is the new “object of theory” in the 21st century.

This attempt/claim could be read as a neo-structuralist evolution for reconnecting binary oppositions in the place where they have lost their contradictory nexus. In the multitude and fluidity of meanings and discourses, it is obvious that there is a necessity to fix these free-floating meanings and discourses. At this point, these pseudo-contradictions could be stabilized – in a Lacanian sense - by a “point de capitone” that works as a pinpoint on two fluid conceptual surfaces. In the space-time where everything is explained with the prefix “post-”, such as post-ideological, post-political, post-human, post-history, and even “post-truth”, the problematic stems from the rupture of the dialectical tension that structures modern life. This neo-structuralist approach to configuring a “point de capitone” – in this study it is architectural praxis realized by the architect subject - could revise the current social crisis.
5.1 Counterturn - Critical Moment in a Play - in Capitalism (A New Crisis)

After the economic crisis in 2008, neoliberal ideology was discredited, and then in the present time, instead of neoliberal ideology, a new (neo) ideology has been sought to structure the base-superstructure dichotomy again. The question is how world economy-politics came to this point; is capitalism again in a transformation period? Before making a proposal for the transformation of capitalism for the present day, a brief history of economy-politics after the 1960s is needed.

The indicators of “post-Fordism” could be seen after the 1960s; the economies of both Europe and Japan began to change phase from Fordism to “flexible accumulation” because of the surplus output of the market. According to Harvey, “there has been a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since around 1972. This sea-change is bound up with the emergence of new ways in which we experience space and time.” With the economic crisis in 1973, it became apparent that maintaining the contradictions of capitalism was becoming more difficult in the Keynesian model. The embargo on oil exports, after the Arab-Israel War, had two effects: firstly, it

“changed the relative cost of energy inputs dramatically, and pushed all segments of the economy to seek out ways to economize on energy use through technological and organizational change, and secondly, led to a

recycling problem of surplus petro-dollars that exacerbated the already brewing instability in the world’s financial markets.”

This condition caused a profound financial and legitimization crisis, and the petrol shock of 1973 undermined the Fordist compromise. This time interval could be defined as a transition period from the Fordist-Keynesian period to neoliberalism, or, to use Harvey’s terms, to “flexible accumulation.” Zizek, citing Boltanski and Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism, stated the new figure of capitalism from the 1970s onwards thus:

“Capitalism abandoned the hierarchical Fordist structure of the production process and developed a network-based form of organization founded on employee initiative and autonomy in the workplace.”

A multitude of shareholders and mobilized workers, instead a hierarchical and centralized structure, legitimized capitalism as an egalitarian project. Consumption is a cogwheel in the new phase of capitalism, rather than production. Although neoliberal high-tech capitalism has lost its ideological capacity, neoliberalism somehow continues to determine the actual operating system of capitalism. According to Cole, the age lived in could be called “global capitalism” as the fourth mode of capitalism. He claims:

“Global capitalism is the fourth and current epoch of capitalism. What distinguishes it from earlier epochs of mercantile capitalism, classical

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capitalism, and national-corporate capitalism is that the system, which was previously administered by and within nations, now transcends nations, and thus is transnational, or global, in scope. In its global form, all aspects of the system, including production, accumulation, class relations, and governance, have been disembedded from the nation and reorganized in a globally integrated way that increases the freedom and flexibility with which corporations and financial institutions operate.”

After the “post-political” epoch, a critique has indeed been raised which contains reinvigorating left thought, radical equality with human emancipation and Marxist-materialist rupture. The years 2010-2013 in particular could be seen as uprising years where new political thoughts flourished against global capitalism. At this point, it is important to recall three conferences arranged by Verso related to the topic of communism; the conferences were called “The Idea of Communism” and were held in London (2009), New York (2011) and Seoul (2013). With this conference series, Marxist-materialist thought was both re-evaluated and reactivated for interpreting the present-day situation; communism was revisited as a structure against capitalism. Instead of accepting the created quasi-other of capitalism for the sake of protecting the permanence of capitalism itself, revitalizing communism, as a starting point, could be an exit from the current crisis.

5.2 Inferences and Propositional Statements

Under this sub-section, six main questions, which were introduced as aims of this dissertation, are interpreted as axioms. These questions were:

1. Why is it not possible to conceive a clear-cut “ideology” in present time? (What constitutes the present time’s societal structure?)

2. How will it be possible to emancipate from this ideological blurriness in the “post-truth age”? (Which agent(s) will stabilize the societal structure?)

3. How will it be possible to re-configure the dialectical tension between the subject and the object in the post-humanist era? (How and in which conditions do the subject and the object become interchangeably used?)

4. What is the new definition of “theory” in the place where the gap between subject and object has disappeared? (How will it be possible to redefine the theory with the subject instead of the object?)

5. How will it be possible to posit the concept of “alienation” in the field of architecture in the post-truth era? (Why are alienated processes are influential in post-truth architecture?)

6. Why is the unequivocality of space lost? (What are the effects of new technological agents on the perception of space?)

Here are the implications and propositional statements suggested for re-evaluating and interpreting these questions.

**Axiom 1: “Redoubling procedure”**

“Redoubling procedure” works for reconstructing the absent dualities or dichotomies. In modernity, binary oppositions construct systemic life. The main binary opposition could be read as the ancient versus the modern. The gap or contradiction between these two terms is constructed in the form of a “true appearance relation”, in the main dichotomy. Unfortunately, after neoliberalism or in postmodernity, this gap lost its legibility and turned to just “appearance” or “fictitious” situation. With hybridism - through hybrid forms,
which have their own characteristic properties - both in social life and in architecture, the dichotomies have attempted to be reconstructed as “appearance” again. At this point it should be remembered that hybridity is a neither/nor position. Although the final hybrid form contains both qualities of either side of the duality, it has its own character and can be called a “tertiary type” which is situated at the gap of the duality.

It is important to emphasize that after the digital turn, a new procedure was on the stage, which Zizek calls a “redoubling procedure”.\(^{219}\) A redoubling procedure could be seen as trying to create a “pseudo-other” to one concept for the sake of reinventing the dichotomy or the binary opposition. “Redoubling” works differently from “hybridism”, Hybridism could be read as a kind of fulfilment of the gap, but in this procedure, the claim is to restructure the dialectical tension in a contradiction. In the former, there is an attempt to to make legible the “appearance” which was lost, but in the latter “appearance” becomes a part of duality, which means that the “dialectical other” is structured as a “representation of the generative force” for redoubling the generative force itself. In the postmodernist approach, the gap between the generative forces is emphasized as “appearance”; in the redoubling procedure, one generative force and its representation works as a binary opposition as in the form of “pseudo-contradiction”.

The redoubling procedure works both in the sociological and in the architectural milieu/domain. In sociology, “social antagonism” both structures and unifies society. In the Communist Manifesto, societal structure is based on class struggle; it is founded on a binary opposition between bourgeois and proletariat. Not only this division, but also the division of labour into mental

and manual, was broken by neoliberal ideology. The economic crisis experienced after 2008 and urban uprisings seen after 2010 are the main signifiers of the rupture in dialectical contradictions.

**Axiom 2: “Point de Capitone”**

It is inevitable to reinterpret the concept of “point de capitone” in the “post-truth age” in which floating signifiers attempt to be located by weak or fake pinpoints. Evaluating Axiom 2, under the conditions of Axiom 1, could be more conceivable and more accurate. Axiom 2 could be assessed as a kind of neo-structuralist point of view in the post-truth age. Before explaining this neo-structuralist point of view, the connections with post-truth and pseudo-contradiction will be discussed. It is possible to claim that the concept of post-truth could be specified as a pseudo-contradiction, which lost its contradictory edge or the dialectical tension. In post-truth situations, the contradictory position between truth and lie has been broken, which is why it is impossible to settle on the truth or even a lie; the post-truth situation refers to a kind of conscious deception, which reflects a “quasi-truth”. The term “post-truth” does not have its “other” in terms of dialectical tension. This situation has caused a running of the redoubling procedure for the concept of post-truth: in the post-truth age, every statement needs a representative statement for verifying or validating itself. Here, a negative statement of the original statement is replaced with a representative statement, which means that the statement is redoubled with its representation instead of its negative or its other.

In the post-truth age, it is impossible to get a “truth” related to one situation or statement, because every situation or statement is constructed and restructured by subject positions or discursive formations. This is why the post-truth age cannot be conceived in a linear logical truthfulness. Definitively it is
rhizomatic; its rhizomatic formation has been hidden by a redoubling procedure for structuring societal unity within one “truth”. Thus, with the help of the redoubling procedure, a rhizomatic chain, which consists of truths and lies, is accepted as a truth with the consent of the subjects. Zizek prefers to call this rhizomatic chain “the chain of ordinary signifiers” which is treated as a “Master Signifier” - in Lacanian terms, it is the “signifier without signified”.220 Moreover, it is possible to claim that the post-truth age is the age of floating signifiers, which work as Master Signifiers; these floating signifiers try to be located to one truth-event (ideology) with a nodal point to get a finalized binary opposition. Lacan used the “point de capitone” as a nodal point, which stabilizes the floating signifiers.

At this point, if an in-depth analysis has been done, it should be clear that the present day’s situation regarding ideology has not been grounded to only one plane of consistency, which means that not only have signifiers been floating but also that ideology has a floating formation. While the Lacanian phrase “point de capitone” (nodal point) was working on one stable surface – ideology - and a floating surface in its definition of structuralism, here, in the post-truth age, the claim is that the nodal point works on two unstable floating surfaces; on both a fluid ideological surface and floating signifiers. This is why the process of fixing randomly occurs; this random matching has the possibility not to refer to the true meaning of the signifier or “appearance” of ideology in the post-truth age. Actually, this randomness is the main characteristic of the post-truth age; its eventual structure also derives from this randomness.

The neo-structuralist approach constructed here locates a rhizomatic chain on the plane of ideology with one or more than one “point de capitone(s)”. The

point de capitone provides the chain to pinpoint the reality, which does not separate from ideology; or it is possible to say that via the “point de capitone”, the rhizomatic chain holds on to the symbolic order. There are many types of “point de capitone”; all cultural forms, which are situated between ideology and the subject, could be read as “point de capitone”, and architecture is one of these. Reinterpreting the concept of “point de capitone” also necessitates the reinterpretation of “architecture” for reinventing the binary oppositions.

**Axiom 3: “Transposing Object”**

The object transposes itself through to the subject via new technological developments, besides where the subject is called the “sublime object of ideology”. It is possible to claim that Zizek implicitly reinterpreted the term “subject” by calling it “the sublime object of ideology”, in his seminal book of the same name. His re-reading of both Hegel and Lacan made a radical contribution to the ideology-theory; his interpretation of the term “the subject” was revolutionary. It is also possible to state that to locate the subject in ideology with a “point de capitone”/with a stitch by breaking all regular rules is contributory to the field of “commodity fetishism”. It is directly conducts whole discussions/theories on “commodity fetishism” in the field of the subject by defining the subject as the “sublime object of ideology”, where he breaks all dialectical positions between the subject and the object. In addition, this contribution is relevant if the conditions of neoliberalism are considered in the 1990s. Although the subject had been demonstrated to be a “free individual”, an “entrepreneur” and a “post-political entity” in neoliberalist approaches, it is obvious that neoliberalism, as an ideology, manipulated the subject.

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The nexus of the subject with ideology was openly discussed in the Althusserian School, and the subject materialised after the 1960s in both structuralist and post-structuralist approaches in which the subject became to be seen as “substance” based on the philosophy of Spinoza. The Zizekian notion of the subject, as the “sublime object of ideology”, could be read as “absolute objectivity” which settled on the rupture of structure and ideology, which means that the gap between ideology and the subject disappeared.

On the one hand, the gap between the subject and the object became closer or disappeared at the philosophical/theoretical level; on the other hand, “man-made things” began to be embodied to “man” in the physical world. When the subject began to be seen as commodity at the theoretical level, the objectification process began to be “real” in the physical manner. This situation means that the subject not only cognitively turned into “substance” but also explicitly became a material entity. As can be seen in new materialist or post-humanist approaches, all humans and non-human things began to be assessed in the same pot as “things”. This was especially so in cybernetic environments, and following this, “cyborgnetic environments” will be the arena of these transformations; the subject will be defined an assemblage of human and non-human things.

**Axiom 4: “Transforming Theory”**

It is inevitable to see changes in the definition of “theory” in the context of the dialectic of object versus subject within the process of objectification of the subject and vice-versa. Axiom 4 could be read as the result of Axiom 3: owing to the objectification of the subject, the definition of theory must be changed.

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As mentioned in chapter 3.4, V. A. Lektorsky depicts theory as a “pattern of potential means of operating with the object”\textsuperscript{223} in the dialectic of subject and object. From this point, it is obvious that there is a correlation between theory and the object. When Axiom 3 is dialectically scrutinized in the context of the definition of theory, it is necessarily indicated that in both situations - the objectification of the subject (the procedure of assemblage of humans and non-humans) and the “sublime object of ideology” (the procedure of becoming a commodity). Theory needs to be redefined in the form of a “pattern of potential means of operating with the subject. If Axiom 3 is verified, the definition of theory turns into something, which operates on the subject instead of the object; because Axiom 3 proposes that, the dialectical gap between subject and object has already disappeared.

In this respect, theory is converted to a pattern in which the subject to operates for the subject, which means that, in Hegelese terms, theory “reflects in itself’. This condition directly refers to the term “post-theory”, where the dialectical tension breaks. Reducing the new definition of theory to “post-theory” is a way of remaining within the borders of “paradigm”. Zizek depicted this situation as “Ptolemanization”\textsuperscript{224}, which means that the supporters of the old paradigm prefer to produce new complications and data for sustaining the current paradigm. For this situation, it is possible to claim that the content and matter of theory are totally changed; theory is in “crisis”, and here the question is how this transformation is considered a “revolution” or a “Ptolemanization”. The new situation necessitates a new renaming process and constitutes new rules and norms.

\textsuperscript{223} Lektorsky, V.A, “The Dialectic of Subject and Object and some Problems of the Methodology of Science”, accessed 19.05.2017, \url{https://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/lektorsky/essay_77.htm}.
Axiom 5: “Alienation”

Not merely alienated production processes have pervaded in architecture, but also alienated design processes are influential in post-truth architecture. The Industrial Revolution caused an “alienation” process between the producer and the product; this could be read as a gap of verification of the division of manual labour. All the modern production processes include this gap. In the post-truth age (or in the post-industrial age), the concept of “alienation” (or in Zizek’s terms, the concept of “desubjectivization”) leaps from the production process to the design process. Tafuri denied/negated the alienated production processes in architecture in the 1960s, and a more radical rupture in architecture was witnessed after the digital revolution; alienated design processes dominate the present day’s architectural milieu. Actually, alienated design processes could be called a constituted gap of verification of the division of mental labour. After neoliberalism, it is possible to claim that the dialectic between manual and mental labour dissolved; they both intertwined and interconnected with each other.

This intertwined position between manual and mental labour caused a radical transformation of the “social antagonism” that dominated societal structure by dialectical totalising. Moreover, the contradiction between these divisions of labour were lost, and the mental labourer was accepted as manual worker; the architect-subject began to be evaluated as architect-as-worker.225 The transformation of the division of labour that began under the conditions of neoliberal ideology rapidly increased in the societal structure with the help of the digital turn. The digital turn created new “mental-expertise-labour” that

worked as a sub-profession in professions, and new sub-divisions occurred in the architectural design process.

Architectural design began to be realised/materialise via cybernetic media, such as computer-aided design tools and digital fabrication methods, after the digital turn. Moreover, in the immediate future, with the help of artificial intelligence and augmented reality, all mental design activity will be transferred to production processes without using any representational milieu. This kind of new agency has caused the alienation of the architect-subject towards his/her own mental work. Actually, this process, the commodification of design labour, has a direct relation with the “reification process of reason” of the Baudrillardian simulacrum. 226 While reason was a place where freedom operated, the "reification process of reason" could be conceptualized as a "control mechanism on reason". The only place that was not yet invaded by power was "reason"- the human mind. However, it is possible to claim that power will begin to invade designing and creating processes via the "reification of reason" that captures all creative activity.

Axiom 6: “Unequivocality of Space”

Unequivocal interaction between space and the subject has cut off by the new agents, such as new technological media. Experiencing architecture has been transformed into something unfamiliar by the new technological agents, which break the direct interaction between the subject and the space. The gap, naturally filled by experience between spaces and subjects, is closed/ fulfilled by new agents, for example by social media. Everyday life, which is

constituted by bodily experience, has been transformed into cyber experience with new interfaces, such as smartphones, augmented reality glasses etc.

Experience in everyday life has begun to be articulated in commodity fetishism with new tools of social media, such as picturing a selfie and 360 degree photographing or picturing the dish. All these activities have added to the structure of everyday life. If the Lefebvreian definition of “everyday” is of “a kind of screen, in both senses of the word; it both shows and hides; it reveals both what has and has not changed ... it is insignificant and banal,” it is obvious that the “thing” in everydayness is unrecognized. New social media and its newly added activities destroy the unrecognisable quality of everydayness. The unique character of the experience in a repeated activity of everyday life turns into a commodity used for gaining “likes” or a reputation in the new media.

New media transforms everyday activity into something significant; although actually, it is just misleading. New media could be read as an attempt to make visible or to give an “appearance” to the invisible body in everydayness. Not only does architecture transfigure the banal reality, but also the image of mediated cyber experience configures everyday structure. At this point, the cultural form, which forms/modifies the everyday, changed: two separate dependent parts of acting, space and body, squeezed into one thing, a kind of reduction procedure, by new agents, which is known as social media and its tools. Here the claim is that “body-space” is captured by cybernetic tools for the sake of “visibility of the insignificant”.

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With this new mediated cyber experience, perception of space is also changed. Whereas the bodily experience is self-creational and unique in the context of perceiving the space, cyber experience breaks this uniqueness and turns it into something homogeneous and equivocal. The new agent cuts direct interaction. The new perception of space is bordered by the ability of the new agent; the open-ended character of the experience is absorbed by the tool, the agent itself, and experience loses its independence. From this standpoint, it is possible to claim that the new perception of space will be dependent on the transfiguration of reality by new agent(s) in a post-truth era.

5.3 Epilogue

Starting the epilogue with the definition of what “parallax” is has the potential to encapsulate whole discussions in the dissertation. The definition of parallax is “the apparent displacement of an object - the shift of its position against a background.” A parallax covers an “ontological shift” in the object that was reflected an “epistemological shift” in the subject. It is possible to conceptualize this as a kind of gap or passage between before and after; it could be read as the “appearance of probability.” In this framework the architectural parallax gap, according to Zizek:

“… is the inscription of our changing temporal experience when we approach and enter a building ... Through the parallax gap in the object itself, time becomes space.”

Here architectural parallax could be evaluated as a gap between two different positions of the architectural object, which could have the potential to create a tertiary type of space. At this point, the Lacanian trilogy - the Real-Symbolic-Imaginary - could be considered for scrutinizing the architectural object’s new position. Zizek applied the Lacanian trilogy to architecture in this way: for the Real, pragmatic and utilitarian panoply; for the symbolic level, the meanings a building is supposed to embody and convey; and for the level of the imaginary, experience and feeling. This kind of re-evaluation of architecture within the framework of the Lacanian trilogy has the potential to enable a re-reading of the whole of architectural praxis since the 1960s, via Zizekian labelling.

After structuralism, architectural production was mostly realised on the symbolic level; meaning was embodied in the architectural end-product, and even in critical architecture the resistant role of the architect-subject was loaded to the end product. The architectural product reflected the meaning of what was loaded by the ideologically-produced subject. Initially, in postmodern architecture, the architect-subject re-used historical pieces for giving meaning to the architectural object instead of creating by themselves, but then in critical architecture, it was witnessed that meaning complied from the political milieu for reflecting the critical approach of the architect-subject, loaded to the architectural object by themselves.

When the architectural production of the 1990s and of projective architecture designed after the digital turn is considered, it can be seen that the Lacanian level of the Real was on the stage. The whole architectural discipline was criticized by projective architecture and by the pragmatic and utilitarian way chosen to refresh and emancipate architecture from the symbolic realm. At this

point, it is important to emphasize that the digital revolution caused a new epistemic gap in the discipline of architecture and architect-subjects preferred pragmatic approaches in order to be on the safe side of radical rupture.

The third and final level was the imaginary level, in which architecture is involved in the base of experience and feeling. It could claimed that this kind of architectural production developed in two different ways: one is experimental approaches in deconstructivism in which space characteristics were constructed and deciphered according to bodily experience; the other is Deleuzian approaches, which were more phenomenal than deconstructivist approaches in architecture. In some architectural products, these two approaches could be intertwined.

In the framework where the Lacanian trilogy is used to scrutinize architecture, it can be seen that an architectural object produced in a certain time could be evaluated differently according to this trilogy. Nevertheless, it is clear that after the digital turn, on one hand the symbolic level lost its significance, and on the other hand critical architecture tried to be reloaded at the theoretical level. Moreover, pragmatist and experience-based approaches begin to wink at each other where a new tertiary space is created. At this point, it is possible to claim that architectural parallax – the appearance of architectural probability – has been changed/reshaped in the post-truth era; an epistemological shift occurred in the architect-subject, reflected as an ontological shift in the architectural object.

It is possible to claim that in the era of off-production – nonproduction - the (re)evaluation of architecture must be based on the architect-subject rather than on the architectural object. The object of architectural theory shifts from the architectural product towards the architect-subject, because of the radical shifts
occurring in the definition of the subject. After structuralism, the transfer of meaning via the architectural object began to be queried; the subject(s) multiplied meanings for the sake of verifying the dominant ideology. Moreover, this multiplication procedure not only multiplied meanings but also caused a multitude of subject positions, constituting discourses. It is also possible to state that with post-structuralism, ideology began to be defined as made up of practices rather than ideas\textsuperscript{232}, an approach reflected in the field of architecture when assessing architecture as a process. With the Deleuzian conceptualization of theory as a practice, theory became an ideological act. Under these circumstances, it was impossible not to witness the rise of the architect-subject who is an ideologically-produced practitioner. At this point, it is possible to state that “practice” became more powerful in the field of architecture, which has the nature of constructing. In this framework, if this era of architecture was to be labelled, then it might be named “Architecture if the Real”.

To identify or to label an architectural period could be very difficult. However, as an initial attempt to label “present time architecture”, it could be possible to suggest a path for it, which covers a collation of Corbusierien, Tafurian and Lacanian senses. This (re)reading or labelling includes the entire 20\textsuperscript{th} century’s and the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century’s architecture. In this proposal, three different periods are suggested: the first is “Architecture or Revolution”, the second is “Architecture and Utopia”, and the third is “Architecture if the Real”. It is very important to emphasize that these three territories of architectural production are not separate; sometimes they intertwine, as in the form of constituting intersectional sets. This is why they structure some grey zones between each other, where epistemological changes have occurred.

In this triadic proposal, logical conjunctions between two words play a significant role in defining the characteristics of an architectural period. The first period, “Architecture or Revolution”, which based on the notion of Le Corbusier, covers early modernist architectural production. Here it is possible to claim that the first word is threateningly replaced with the second word, or vice-versa. Here the conjunction “or” is used to explain the replacement of “architecture” with “revolution”, in reference to the social unrest of the 1920s. This argument – Architecture or Revolution - could be used to label the interwar period in which a new war-machine arose from social unrest. After World War II, architecture began to be re-used for re-structuring society. The second period, “Architecture and Utopia”, which based on the notion of Tafuri, covers the architectural production of the period from the 1950s to the 1990s. By titling his seminal book “Architecture and Utopia, Design and Capitalist Development”, Tafuri “conjoins the same content in its two modalities” via the conjunction “and”. As Zizek pointed out, in this conjoining procedure, “and” functions as a theoretical category, which encounters two terms in one ideological sense without necessitating a third term.233 Here, Tafuri used identically the terms “architecture” and “utopia”.

In this respect, it is possible to propose labelling architectural production from the 1990s to the present time via a new conjunction, “if”, rather than using “or” or “and”. The third period, which includes the present time’s architectural production, could be called “Architecture if the Real”. The Lacanian term “the Real”, defined as the third point of view of the architectural parallax at the beginning of this epilogue, could be the second term of this conjunction procedure; if whatever “the Real” is, architecture transforms accordingly. The

more “the Real” re-structures the probability, the more architecture embraces the pragmatist way of giving a response on an epistemic level. If the contexts of both the epistemic level and form-finding procedures are considered, then the superficiality of architecture necessitates re-evaluating tectonic issues in architecture. It is possible to claim that to gain depth to “surface architecture” at the epistemic level, the issue of "tectonics" is returning to the design field of architecture. The possibility of re-charging both the context and the content of architecture has been sought in the materiality of architecture. Nevertheless, the problem is still believing that saving "architecture" from being superficial could occur via the “architectural object”. It is impossible to escape from superficiality in architecture via only the materiality of architecture.

In the post-truth era, it is no longer possible to think the necessary solution for architecture as separate from the architect-subject. The discourse (subject-position) of the architect-subject has become significant to the end product of the architect-subject. Meanwhile, it is important to emphasize that the ambiguous subject position of the architect-subject causes ambiguous qualifications to the architectural product. The ideologically-produced subject, where ideology has lost its unequivocality, was wielded in her/his mind’s fantasy. With the motivation of creating space independent from the urban context, human proportions and political concerns, the architect-subject began to design the “phantasmagorical architectural object”.

With the denial of the symbolic (ideological) realm, the architect-subject can choose one of those bifurcated paths: one is "the Real", a utilitarian and pragmatic approach; and the other is "the imaginary", a phenomenal and feeling-based approach. As discussed above, the utilitarian and pragmatist approach was taken from the 1990s to the present time (up to the end of the first decade of the 21st century), but in the present time, it can be seen that
architectural objects are beginning to be produced in the field of the imaginary. Thus, “the phantasmagorical architectural object” begins to encircle the architectural milieu where the epistemic gap in the field of “the imaginary” has been seen. Phantasms of the architect-subject become material via architectural objects. Moreover, it is possible to follow efforts to create “apolitical architectural knowledge” from this phantasmagorical universe. It is sometimes witnessed that the architectural object shaped with these phantasms becomes “nonsense” while experiencing space. This is why, in the post-ideological era, where the place of ideological illusion is in the “unconscious doing” rather than in the “knowing”234, how the mindset of the architect-subject is structured becomes significant.

In the age of “post-” (in post-political, post-ideological, post-humanism, post-theoretical and even in post-truth), in which the loss of dialectical tension has taken place, it is necessary to structure the “point de capitone” in order to fix shifting meanings. Actually, in the oscillation between the Real – pragmatism - and the imaginary – phantasmagoria, the architect-subject, as an agent/actant, works as a “point de capitone” for stabilizing the oscillation. Although it is hard to keep the agent/actant in the field of reality, in the symbolic realm, where illusions structure the reality, the role of the architect subject, as agents in reality, must be improved by re-structuring the true knowledge of themselves.

This dissertation proposes an “anamorphotic gaze” – parallax - to the new position of the architect-subject in the place where the loss of dialectics has taken placed. It scrutinizes how architecture, as an interface, can be worked between two unstable/fluid surfaces, between ideology and the subject. This

“anamorphic gaze” is a necessity for both understanding and re-structuring new architectural theory because it can be stated that the object of architectural theory is the architect-subject in the post-truth era. To structure the mind of the architect-subject means to structure environments where human and non-human things live together. In the fluidity of the definitions of concepts, and in the multitude of ideological illusions, to reverse “unconscious doing” can be possible via forming an active agent (the architect-subject) who works as a fixer of the ambiguous process.

In the immediate future, the dialectical tension which has disappeared will be re-structured to provide social antagonism via the redoubling procedure, which produces a quasi-other for creating an incommensurable dialectic. The redoubling procedure in the field of architecture could be achieved via the anamorphic gaze through to the architect-subject; the architect-subject will be the reviser of current societal structure.
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BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR

Rabia Çiğdem ÇAVDAR was born in August 1976 in Ankara/Turkey. She graduated from Gazi University, Faculty of Engineering and Architecture Department of Architecture in 1999. From 1999 to 2003, she worked in architectural companies operating in the fields of interior architecture and housing design. She continued her career as Assistant Secretary of the Board at the Ankara Branch of the Chamber of Architects. She undertook projects such as “Child and Architecture” and “Aalto @ Turkey”. She has been a member of PLAYCE, an international association working on children's architectural education, since 2004. In 2006, she returned to the design field of architecture. From 2007 to 2010, she worked as project coordinator and technical consultant within the scope of the project "Modernization of Land Border Gates” at a firm providing architectural consultancy. She finished her MArch degree on Architecture at Middle East Technical University in September 2011 with the thesis “Literary Spaces as the Representation of the Dominant Ideologies in the Context of Dystopias Written between 1920 and 1950”, supervised by Prof. Dr. Güven Arif Sargın. She has been working as an instructor in Çankaya University Department of Architecture since 2011. Courses conducted are Modernist Texts (elective course), Critical Analysis of Architectural Documentaries (elective course), Critical Approach to Architectural Theory (elective course), Introduction to Architectural Design (ARCH102) and Architectural Drawing. She has been a member of the Ankara Branch of the Chamber of Architects and Architects Association 1927.