THE IMPACT OF LISBON TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY ACTORNESS: THE CASE STUDY OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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BY

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF LISBON TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION FOREIGN POLICY ACTORNESS:
THE CASE STUDY OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

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The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of Lisbon Treaty on foreign policy actorness of the EU. Within the context of historical evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, four actorness criteria of recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion are main instruments of this thesis to investigate the foreign policy actorness of the EU. Considering the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has been framework of the most comprehensive institutional changes serving to the aim of having an EU foreign policy, it is chosen as the point of comparison. Hence, in this thesis it is analyzed whether the promising institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty about developing a coherent and autonomous European foreign policy have really contributed to EU’s actual foreign and security policy actions. In order to build this analysis on a solid ground, the consistency between EU’s foreign policy performance in the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Lisbon Treaty changes is tested as a case study. As a result of the analysis, this thesis supports the realist perspective on the EU actorness in the literature by arguing that the EU is not able to gain international actorness through the Lisbon Treaty. The
major reason for this failure is the inefficacy of the Lisbon Treaty amendments to provide an EU foreign policy, independent from the member state policy preferences.

Keywords: The European Union, International Actoriness, Common Foreign and Security Policy, The Lisbon Treaty, The Arab-Israeli Conflict
ÖZ

LİZBON ANTLAŞMASI'NIN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ DİŞ POLİTİKA AKTÖRLÜĞÜ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ:
ARAP-İSRAİL ÇATIŞMASI ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tezin amacı, Lizbon Antlaşması'nın AB'nin dış politika aktörülüğü üzerindeki etkisini değerlendirmektir. Dört ana aktörülük kriteri olan tanınma, otorite, özgürlük ve uyum, bu tezde AB'nin dış politika aktörülüğünü araştırmak için Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının tarihsel gelişimi bağlamında kullanılan ana araçları oluşturmaktadır. Lizbon Anlaşmasının bu tezdeki araştırmanın karşılaştırma noktasını olarak seçilmesinde, AB’nin üye devletlerinden ayrı bir dış politikaya sahip olma amacıyla hizmet eden en kapsamlı kurumsal değişikliklerin çerçevesi olması önemli rol oynamıştır. Bu nedenle, bu tez çalışmasında, Lizbon Anlaşmasının tutarlı ve özerk bir Avrupa dış politikasının geliştirilmesi konusunda umut verici kurumsal değişimlerinin, AB’nin uluslararası arenada uygulanagelen dış politika ve güvenlik politikası eylemlerine gerçekten katkısı olup olmadığı incelenmiştir. Bu analizi sağlam bir zemin üzerine inşa etmek için, AB’nin Arap-İsrail Çatışmalarındaki dış politika performansı ile Lizbon Antlaşması değişiklikleri arasındaki tutarlılık bir örnek olay incelemesi olarak seçilmiştir. Yapılan analiz sonucunda, bu tez, AB'nin Lizbon
Antlaşması ile uluslararası aktörlük elde edemediğini öne sürerek, AB aktörlüğune dair realist perspektifi desteklemektedir. Bu başarısızlığın başlıca neden ise, Lizbon Antlaşması değişikliklerinin üye devlet politika tercihlerinden bağımsız olarak bir AB dış politikası sağlamadaki etkisizliğidir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Uluslararası Aktörlük, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Lizbon Antlaşması, Arap-İsrail Çatışması
To my precious sister Zeynep Irmak YANIK
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) is a unique success story among all regional integration attempts, which has gradually boosted its institutional structure and complexity in almost seventy years. However, actorness and effectiveness of the EU cannot be taken for granted, given the nature of the EU as a multi-level and semi-supranational polity encompassing 28 Member States with diverse foreign policy preferences and positions. (Niemann & Bretherton, 2013, p. 261) Consequently, the research question of this thesis is whether the EU is a foreign policy actor after the Lisbon Treaty. In order to evaluate the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on the EU actorness, dynamics of the EU foreign and security policy before and after the Treaty will be compared and contrasted. In addition, the EU’s mediator role in the longstanding Arab-Israeli conflict will be used as a case study to concretize this analysis. Based on the information about general development of the EU foreign policy and its reflection in the Arab-Israeli conflict resolution, it will be argued throughout the thesis that the EU is not able to gain international actorness through the Lisbon Treaty. The major reason for this failure is the inefficacy of the Lisbon Treaty amendments to provide an EU foreign policy, independent from the member state policy preferences.

The intergovernmental nature of the common and foreign policy institutionalization has continued after the Lisbon Treaty, through maintenance of unanimity rule and consideration of member state sensitivities, which resulted in the failure of one voice Europe ideal. Many examples of uncoordinated policy, executed by the member states themselves, as opposed to official EU policy and vice versa is still prevalent after the Lisbon Treaty. (Dror, 2014, p. 11) Therefore, it is clear that the member states are not willing to give autonomy to the EU that is also necessary for coherence in the foreign and security policy. The mentioned lack of autonomy and coherence in the EU are also
two significant elements that keep the EU from being an international actor. As a result, the Lisbon Treaty has not been able to provide international actorness to the EU, through formulating a common foreign and security policy that converges conflicting member state policies.

As long as this divergence continues, it is not possible to have a unified foreign and security policy with institutional changes. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty is not an effective tool to make the EU an international actor neither in the Arab-Israeli conflict nor in the international affairs in general. To put it differently, so long as the member states maintain their determination to keep foreign and security policies in their area of national sovereignty, it is not possible to change intergovernmental nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Additionally, as long as the decision-making procedures remains intergovernmental, it is not possible to talk about an independent actorness of the EU from its member states. As a result, national interests and priorities of the member states have been continuing to restrain the EU’s international actorness in more than sixty years, by preventing the European effort to have a one voice Europe in foreign and security policies.

The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the existing literature on the international actorness of the EU with an efficient autonomous and coherent foreign policy. In the literature, there are three main stances on the EU actorness: the EU as a sui generis entity, the EU as a regular international actor like states and the EU without actorness capacity. For the first one, the EU is described as an entity “less than a state, more than an international organization” (Hlavac, 2010). Similarly, the EU is defined as “hybrid form of actor” (Rosamond, 2005, p. 465), “distinctive non-state” (White, 2004, p. 45) actor or “trading state” (Hill & Smith, 2005, p. 12). According to this understanding, the EU has sui generis structure of governance that is more integrated than an international organization. Especially its current economic governance is definitely a sui generis one with a common currency and supranational structure of aid, trade and economic cooperation arrangements. On the other hand, its deficiency in external capability to act independent from its member states make it ‘less than a
state.’ Its external relations are governed by unanimous decision of member states under an intergovernmental structure. There is no central decision-making authority responsible from making the EU foreign policy and the divergence among the member states is the greatest obstacle for the EU external capability. In addition, the EU’s compulsory reliance on economic and diplomatic means in the absence of an efficient military force constitutes the second reason of its lesser position than a nation state.

According to the second perspective, the EU is accepted as an actor that has a foreign policy, which can be analyzed in pretty much the same way with as any nation-state. (Smith H., 2002, p. 7) Likewise, Ginsberg criticizes many academics, who overlook the EU as an international policy actor, by accepting that foreign policy is associated with nation states. (Ginsberg, 2001, p. 12) In addition, Karen Smith focuses on what the EU has contributed so far to promotion of regional cooperation, human rights etc. and argues that what the EU has done should be enough to accept it as an international actor. (Smith K., 2003, p. 2) Consequently, the second stance criticizes the first perspective by arguing that the EU is an equal actor with a nation state that has an external capability. In this perspective, the EU is not subordinate to its member states’ interest, since it has both capacity to conduct and force to implement an independent foreign policy. Hence, it is an odd question to ask whether the EU is an international actor.

Especially realist academics constitute the third stance by rejecting to recognize the EU as an international actor. According to some of them, due to the intergovernmental decision making procedure in foreign policy, the EU will always face some limitations in terms of its actorness. (Bauer & Hanelt, 2010, p. 116) Some other academics also focus on inability of the EU to work as a united actor with one voice. (Hollis, 2010, p. 38) (Dror, 2014, p. 11) (Musu, 2010, p. 83) As a result, the realist proponents of the third perspective argue that the EU is neither a state nor a constituted political entity and is not in a position to act rationally. (Lavenex & Merand, 2007, p. 6) Therefore, it cannot be a complete actor in international relations. (Rosamond, 2005; Hveem, 2000)
and should not be called an actor under any circumstances (Diez, 2005; Sjursen, 2006) (Richard & Hamme, 2013, p. 16)

Consequently, all these three stances are based on different definitions of actorness in international relations. While the third perspective is based on the presumption that actorness is only applicable to nation states that have one single decision making authority; the first and second stance define actorness with the capacity to influence and change international events. In this manner, it is appropriate to match the third view with realist perspective, while matching the first and second view with pluralist approaches. Implementing this theoretical perspectives to the EU, only in the second perspective the EU can be named as an international actor, whilst in the first and the third one the EU is lacking in the required qualifications of international actorness.

Therefore, it is significant to underline how actorness is defined in this thesis to answer the research question. There are various definitions of actorness in the literature. Sjöstedt describes actorness as “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system.” (Sjöstedt, 1977, p. 16) According to Hill, “actorness provides us with a theoretical perspective which can incorporate both the internal dynamics of institutional development and the changing nature of the international environment in which it has to operate.” (Hill C., 1993, p. 309) In this manner, Hill emphasizes the distinctiveness of the entity from the other entities and the autonomy to be an actor in international relations. Furthermore, for David Allen and Mike Smith, actorness is based on the presence in the international arena in terms of external action and recognition by the other international actors. (Allen & Smith, 1990) More recently, Bretherton and Vogler analyze actorness based on the notions of presence, opportunity and capability. According to their definition, opportunity signifies factors in the external environment which constrain or enable actorness; presence refers to the ability of an entity to exert influence beyond its borders and capability refers to the internal context of EU external action to exploit opportunity and capitalize on presence. (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006)
As it has been exemplified above, there are various definitions of actorness in the literature. Nevertheless, Jupille & Caporaso’s definition of actorness is the most comprehensive one. Their four criteria of actorness have been the most preferred one in the academic studies, due to its easiness to comprehend and efficiency in testing. Hence, Jupille & Caporaso version of actorness has been chosen as the basis of this thesis. Their definition is a composition of four structural criteria of recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. Accordingly, an entity must meet all of these four criteria at the same time in order to be an international actor. For the first criterion, it should have the institutional capacity to interact with other actors, as well as the acceptance by them. The second one is related with the legal personality of the entity that allows it to act in the field of international law. In terms of autonomy criterion, independence from all other international actors and competence to have a distinct institutional structure should be understood. Last but not least, cohesion refers to design and implement internally coherent policies. (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 214)

In this manner, these four criteria will be the main guideline to evaluate the international actorness of the EU. Since these four criteria are ‘all-or-nothing’ for actorness, the EU should meet all these four at the same time to be accepted as an international actor. Regarding satisfaction of the first two criterion, namely recognition and authority, the Lisbon Treaty is believed to be an effective instrument. Indeed, Article 47 of the Lisbon Treaty states that “the Union shall have legal personality.” (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007) Since this legal personality has provided the EU with a “legal competence to act externally” (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 216), the EU has fully satisfied the authority criterion.

Considering the definition of legal personality by the EU law, Article 47 of the Lisbon also satisfies the first criterion. According to the EU law:

“The conferral of legal personality on the EU means that it has the ability to:

- Conclude and negotiate international agreements in accordance with its external commitments;
- Become a member of international organizations;
Join international conventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, stipulated in Article 6(2) of the TEU.” (European Union Law)

Hence, having a legal personality helps the EU to satisfy the first criterion by being recognized as an equal partner in negotiating and signing agreements with the third parties, as well as gaining membership in the regional and international organizations and joining international conventions. In addition, representatives of the third parties pay official visits to their counterparts in the EU and vice versa. Consequently, the EU has gained “acceptance of and interaction with the others” through the Lisbon Treaty. (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 214)

Contrary to the efficiency of the Lisbon Treaty to satisfy the first two criterion, it remained ineffective to meet the last two criterion, namely autonomy and cohesion. To start with autonomy, the EU is expected to be a ‘‘corporate’’—rather than a ‘collective’—entity, which has, or at least can have, causal importance that is more than the sum of its constituent parts” (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 217), in order to satisfy autonomy criterion. To gain autonomy, the EU needs to have a distinctive decision-making power, independent from its member states. Consequently, the autonomous EU is able to take an external action, based on the decisions taken in the supranational institutional structure, without getting approval of the member states. On the other hand, the EU still is not an autonomous actor even with the introduction of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs (HR) by the Lisbon Treaty, replacing the troika in the EU’s international representation.

Despite the significance of this new post for the EU’s external representation and removal of tensions that previously existed between the roles of the High Representatives and the rotating EU presidency, the member states did not delegate any major decision-making power to the High Representative. Hence, the decision-making structure remained intergovernmental that contradicts with the autonomy criterion. The EU is still bounded with the member state interests in its foreign policy actions, through maintenance of unanimity rule in decision-making. Consequently, the EU fails to meet the third criterion of autonomy.
In a similar manner, Mueller argues that the High Representative’s role as “full-time chair of the Foreign Affairs Council has also not necessarily enhanced the Union’s potential to generate policy consensus on conflict resolution and crisis management policies.” (Mueller, 2013, p. 31) This argument of Mueller is directly related with the fourth criterion of actorness, which is cohesion. Hence, it can be argued that the EU is still not able to “formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences” (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 214) in the post-Lisbon period. According to Jupille and Caporaso, cohesion can be undermined by horizontal and vertical conflicts. While horizontal conflicts refer to disagreements between institutions at the same level of authority, e.g., between the EU Council and the EU Commission, or between member-states; vertical conflicts can be defined as disagreements between the member-states and EU institutions. (Koops, 2011, p. 123) Hence, "where such conflicts are present, we expect to find the EU less able to act." (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 220)

In order to meet cohesion criterion of Jupille and Caporaso, both horizontal and vertical cohesion is required. For the horizontal cohesion, coordination among the EU institutions and/or the member states should be provided. Divergence between the same level of authorities should be eliminated. In addition, the member states should be loyal to the institutional policies of the EU to have a vertical coherence. The member states fully and accurately transpose into national law the Community Directives within the deadlines in order to ensure the coherence and unity of the process of European construction. Therefore, speedy and uniform implementation of the EU law by the member states is an inevitable aspect of cohesion. (Koops, 2011, p. 125)

Despite high expectations from the Lisbon Treaty to increase both horizontal and vertical coherence in EU external action via HR and the European External Action Service (EEAS), it has so far failed to meet them. Not disregarding the lack of horizontal coherence in the coordination of the CFSP and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) instruments, the major problem of coherence is vertical. Due to the member state unwillingness to fulfill their obligation to avoid the contradiction
between their national policies and the EU level policies, the EU has failed to become an international actor. Since the member states continue to take actions that are not in line with their obligations on the implementation of CFSP policies, the Lisbon Treaty has not been successful to provide vertical coherence. Thus, the member states’ struggle for power and visibility in the foreign affairs have continued after the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force that prevented development of cohesion in the EU. The EU cannot prevent the member states from taking such sovereign actions in the post-Lisbon period, which also means that the EU failed to develop a common foreign and security policy towards the international events. (The European Parliament, 2015, pp. 21-22)

As a result, the EU cannot be accepted as an international actor, due to its failure to meet autonomy and cohesion criteria. In this manner, the main structural critique directed towards the EU’s actorness is based on the fact that the Union is not a sovereign entity, it is subordinate to the wishes of its member states and it does not have a centralized decision-making authority with a single executive. (Smith, 2002, p. 1) Even in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, divergent national interests’ of the member states are still the most significant element that govern the EU in its external relations. So long as the EU continues to be controlled by the member state foreign policy preferences, through intergovernmental decision-making structure, it will not be able to gain international actorness.

However, the EU integration process starting from its foundation has been evolved around the objective of being an international actor. All institutional changes since then aimed to provide the EU with autonomy and coherence, through creating a common foreign and security policy. The Lisbon Treaty is the latest significant attempt towards this objective with its various amendments. The pillar system of the Maastricht Treaty was eliminated, the EEAS was created under the authority of a new post, titled High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Furthermore, the EU acquired a legal personality. Nonetheless, continuation of intergovernmental decision-making structure became the preeminent limitation for the
development of the EU actorness due to lack of having common foreign and security policy.

1.1. Methodology

In order to reveal this argument in the thesis, a comparative analysis will be conducted, in which the Lisbon Treaty is the base of comparison. It will be examined whether the Lisbon Treaty provides an actorness to the EU by creating a common foreign and security policy, as it is often claimed to do so. In terms of application, an applied research will be conducted, since the research question is related with a specific real-life problem. Especially, action (also known at times as evaluative research) research type of applied research will serve the purpose of this thesis the best. Indeed, the action research involves “the application of fact finding to practical problem solving in a social situation with a view to improving the quality of action within it, involving the collaboration and co-operation of researchers, practitioners and laymen.” (Burns, 1990, p. 252) It also provides opportunities for a researcher to actively monitor and evaluate the effects of policy changes. (Adams, Khan, Raeside, & White, 2007, p. 27) Hence, this thesis does aim to apply the research findings to the actual EU policies in order to provide a solution to actorness problem, which has been experienced by the EU for decades. By pointing out the actual reason of the problem, this thesis objects to contribute the quest of the EU for actorness in the international relations.

Furthermore, a qualitative type of information is sought for at the end of research, since the research is interested in the quality analysis of the representative sample, not the quantity of it. Hence, the research will provide a better understanding about the reasons for the failure of various attempts to provide an international actorness to the EU and ways to solve problems in this regard. Consequently, an explanatory research will be conducted, in terms research objective. An explanatory research aims at advancing knowledge about the structure, process and nature of social events, linking factors and elements of issues into general statements and building, testing or revising a theory. (Adams, Khan, Raeside, & White, 2007, p. 20) Consequently, the research
in this thesis will explain the current situation of the EU in search of an international
actor-ness and explain why it has failed so far. In this framework, the research will link
Jupille and Caporaso version of actor-ness definition (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998) with
the EU institutional structure to test the EU actor-ness.

In terms of research methods, the qualitative research method will be used in general.
Indeed, archival research and document analysis will be conducted in order to evaluate
chronological development of the European common foreign and security policy as
well as its involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict. While primary resources are
aimed to be analyzed in archival research, secondary resources will be the instruments
of document analysis. Therefore, relevant books, articles, research papers, book
chapters will be used in the document analysis; whilst several EU Treaties, especially
the Lisbon Treaty, the official statements and/or declarations of the EU as well as
speeches and/or arguments of the EU officials will constitute the sources of archival
research.

Furthermore, the case study method will be the major methodological tool of the
research in this thesis. In order to analyze particular phenomena in particular settings,
case study is the most appropriate method to apply. Indeed, case study method
involves an in-depth study of exploring issues, present and past, as they affect one or
more units (organisation, group, department or person). Within this method, either a
single case study design or multiple case studies as a comparative approach can be
chosen. The significant point in the case studies is to find the ‘best practice’ to
determine if a certain approach works in a particular setting. Therefore, the
observation of empirical data is used to evaluate the efficacy of particular theoretical
frameworks. (Adams, Khan, Raeside, & White, 2007, pp. 112-113)

Consequently, through analyzing the involvement of the EU into the Arab-Israeli
Conflict as a case study, the thesis aims to introduce valuable and comprehensive
account of the EU actor-ness in the international affairs. In fact, the decade’s old EU
involvement into one of the “most enduring and explosive of all the world’s conflicts”
(BBC News, 2010) is an ideal case study to evaluate the hardship experienced by the EU in creating a common foreign and security policy. Analyzing the period before and after the Lisbon Treaty in terms of the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict will be sampler to evaluate whether the Lisbon Treaty make the EU an international actor through creating the EU foreign policy.

As Smith argues, the Middle East has been a foreign policy priority for the EU, since its first attempts to act as an international actor. (Smith H., 2002, p. 167) It is also essential to note that resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was defined as “a strategic priority for Europe”, unlike other conflicts, in the 2003 EU Security Strategy. Indeed, it was stated that without resolving this Conflict, “there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved.” (The European Union, 2003)

Furthermore, Kaya refers to an interview made with John Gatt-Rutter, who was principal administrator in General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, in which the Arab-Israeli conflict is identified as “mother of all conflicts in the Middle East”. Rutter also argued that it is a single strategic threat to Middle Eastern security for the EU, with which the solution of other conflicts is bound up. (Kaya, 2012, p. 32) There are various reasons that explain this strategic priority of the mentioned Conflict for the EU. The first reason is related with the fact that various the EU member states have special relationship and historical ties with the conflictual parties. Besides colonial past of Britain and France in the region, Germany’s historical responsibility towards Israel partly explains their bid to find a durable solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

In addition, geographical proximity of Europe to the Middle East became the second reason to explain intensive involvement of the EU to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In fact, it is almost certain that any threat to political and/or social stability in the region directly affects the security environment in the EU. Therefore, it is significant for the
EU to prevent any conflict or take a direct role in any conflict resolution in the Middle East, like Arab-Israeli Conflict, in order to sustain European political and social stability. Furthermore, the EU is highly dependent on energy resources of the Middle East for production. So long as they secure flow of oil and gas from the Middle East to Europe, they can maintain their production level. Any interruption in this flow will cause serious damages in the member state economies. Bilgin also directs attention to the reasonable prices of the Middle Eastern oil and natural gas that makes European states more dependent on the regional energy sources in the Middle East. (Bilgin, 2005, p. 140) Hence, the EU member states need to resolve any Conflict in the region that threatens their energy supply security. In this manner, their involvement in the resolution of ‘mother of all conflicts in the Middle East’ is critical.

1.2. Literature Review

The literature on how the EU involves into the Arab-Israeli Conflict can be divided into three, which are the EU-Israel relations, the EU-Palestine relations and the Normative Power Europe debate. The trend shared by all these sub-titles is to follow historical development of these two relationships and the role of the EU in the conflict. In addition, the divergence among the member state interests and its negative impact on the efficiency of the EU foreign policy is underlined in all these three categories. Indeed, conflicting interests of the member states prevent the EU from implementing what it articulates in the declarations. Especially analyzing the gap between the EU rhetoric and actions in the Arab-Israeli Conflict contributes significantly to ‘normative power Europe’ debate in the literature.

In this manner, the EU declarations have consistently supported a norm-based solution in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, yet an analysis of the EU’s actions highlights the gap between the Union’s stated goals and its conduct in practice. European policymakers have done little in order to translate their normative statements into concrete political actions. (Tocci, 2009, p. 387), (Seeberg, 2009), (Bouris & Reigeluth, 2012) Likewise, according to Harpaz and Shamis there is a need for more conscious, cautious, self-
reflective, politically and historically sensitive notion of normative Europe towards Middle East politics backed with effective, down-to-earth practical assistance and with a shrewd use of instruments of positive and negative conditionality to enhance the EU’s legitimacy and buttress its external relations. (Harpaz & Shamis, 2010, p. 609)

Furthermore, in the article written by Gordon and Pardo, weakness of normative power Europe argument is explained with the dichotomy between the economic and the normative spheres. Consequently, Gordon and Pardo conclude that EU’s normative position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been informed by a gap between the normative iterations and economic practices over a 40-year period. (Gordon & Pardo, May 2015, pp. 265-267)

Moreover, in a collective study of Lazarou, Gianniou and Tsourapas, the EU is criticized due to its implementation of double standards when dealing with Israelis and Palestinians, despite its claim to be a normative power. (Lazarou, Gianniou, & Tsourapas, 2013, p. 184) Hence, the EU is suggested to continue to bring financial and economic aid to Palestinians, but also not to politically orient and condition this aid. (Boubakri & Lindahl, 2009, pp. 72-74), (Pace, 2007, p. 1056) Consequently, the EU’s real commitment to democracy is questioned because of the gap between policy and action. In fact, the EU is perceived as protecting the status quo for short-term economic and security gains, in the expense of democratic principles. Hence, the EU suffers from a huge gap between what is stated on paper and the policies implemented on the ground, sometimes referred to as the de jure-de facto gap. (Boubakri & Lindahl, 2009, p. 72), (Saif & Hujer, 2009, p. 4)

In more specific terms, consistent development in the economic and trade relations between the EU and Israel, contrary to several ups and downs in political relations is one of the major criticism towards the rhetoric-action gap of the EU. (International Trade Center, 2016) Indeed, starting from 1973, the EU has severely criticized Israeli actions in its declarations. On the other hand, economic relations between Israel and the EU shows a steady increase. Therefore, several people in the literature takes attention into a public debate on mismatch between political turmoil and economic
abundance in the EU-Israel relations. For instance, Pardo argues that the EU and Israel are playing double game of economic passion and political hostility. (Pardo, 2004, p. 9) Furthermore, Miller believes that “despite the fact that political relations between Israel and the EU reached an all-time low in the last five years, cooperation between the EU and Israel in the R&D and hi-tech sphere increased significantly over the same period.” (Miller, 2006, pp. 657-658)

Similarly, Musu underlines the fact that the EU has been accused of not making sufficient use of political conditionality on Israel. There have been pressures, not only from the public but also from the European Parliament itself, for the EU to impose sanctions on Israel or at least make the strengthening of ties conditional upon progress on the front of the peace process. (Musu, 2010, p. 134) Likewise, Kaufman reminds what War on Want has stated as "a trade policy could provide a key mechanism for exerting pressure on Israel. A full economic embargo would be in line with article two of the EU-Israeli association agreement, which states that trade restrictions can be enforced in deference to a country's poor human rights record." (Kaufman, 2014) On the other hand, the EU Commission argued that the EU’s policy is based on partnership and cooperation, and not exclusion. It is the EU’s view that maintaining relations with Israel is an important contribution to the Middle East peace process and that suspending the Association Agreement…would not make the Israeli authorities more responsive to EU concerns at this time. (Musu, 2010, p. 134) Consequently, it is convenient to suggest that EU–Israeli disagreements over Middle East peacemaking accompanied the qualitative improvement of bilateral economic relations on the ground. (Sarto, 2011, p. 130)

In fact, the mentioned gap between the rhetoric and actions of the EU is one of the results of its lacking in common foreign and security policy. The EU does not have external political power to implement what it argues in the declarations, without regarding the member state stance. It is bounded by the member states’ interest in its external action. Therefore, whenever the member states perceive developed economic relations with Israel exploitive, the EU has no other option but to implement the
unanimous decision of the member states. In this manner, there is a divergence between the EU policy preferences and individual concerns of the member states, in which the latter weights over the former.

Therefore, the ‘Normative Power Europe’ discussion in the literature is the indicator of more complex problems experienced by the EU. Indeed, from the bigger picture, the problem of the EU is to develop a coherent EU voice towards the conflict. (Boubakri & Lindahl, 2009, p. 72) Furthermore, Müller argues that the Union has developed a common foreign policy, but not a single foreign policy. European foreign policy results from the interplay between national foreign policies and a multifaceted system of collective diplomacy, in which common European institutions and supranational actors play an increasingly important role. (Müller, 2012, p. 3) Al-Fattal also argues that there was no ‘made in the EU’ foreign policy. (Al-Fattal, May 2010, p. 7) Likewise, Hollis argues that Europe is constrained by the fact that the Union is not a unified actor. Achieving a common policy on any issue requires the harmonization of twenty-seven different positions, with the result that agreement is based on the ‘lowest common denominator’. Each Member State is influenced by various calculations to do with local and regional economic interests, transatlantic relations, and history. (Hollis, 2010, p. 38)

From the perspective of the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict, greatest weakness is the EU inability to work as a united actor with one voice. Dror exemplifies this argument with the fact that the EU’s 2009 policy paper for the Middle East region did not include anything specific on the peace process, as member states could not reach an agreement on it. Indeed, the EU member states are believed not to agree on a policy towards the Middle East, both due to an institutional tangle and their historical or current political relations with both Israel and Palestine. For example, France has historic ties with Syria and Lebanon, and these close linkages affect French support for the Palestinian side of the conflict. On the other hand, Germany, due to its history in the Second World War, tends to be more supportive of Israeli interests. (Dror, 2014, p. 11) In a similar manner, Musu believes that “behind the façade of this common
approach there lies the enduring reality of distinctly different national approaches to the issue, conflicting priorities and diverse and sometimes diverging interests.” (Musu, 2010, p. 83) Pace also believes that many EU Member States have very complex individual ties to countries or entities involved in a conflict. This may be the case, for example, for historical reasons and/or due to issues of importance to the Member States so that they differ in the emphasis they choose to put on certain aspects of a particular conflict case. (Pace, 2007, p. 1047)

Some academics argue that institutional complexity of the EU in the realm of foreign and security policy is the main reason for not having a single voice is. (Dijkstra, 2011, p. 2) (Dror, 2014, p. 9) (Persson, 2015, pp. 46-47) From another perspective, Gordon argues that the EU’s lack of developing unified and effective foreign and security policy lies in the member states reluctance to permit delegation of sovereignty to centralized institutions. (Gordon, 1997) Likewise Müller states that “although the CFSP’s supranational features have been progressively strengthened in the European integration process, European foreign policymaking generally remained organized along intergovernmental lines, Member States remain primary actors in the decision-making process.” He mainly refers to the unanimity principle as the general rule in CFSP decision-making. (Müller, 2012, p. 7)

Consequently, when it comes to formulation of the Lisbon Treaty, expectations were high from it to bring solutions to institutional problems of the EU and lack of action in foreign and security policy. Voltolini summarizes the changes what has changed with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Firstly, the EU’s pillar structure was eliminated and all aspects of EU external relations placed under external action heading. Secondly, a legal personality was acquired to the EU, with a view to making foreign policy more coherent and unified. Third, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was established, under the control of the High Representative for Foreign Policy. This High Representative had a double-hatted role, as he/she is also vice-President of the Commission, thus combining the former positions of High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and of Commissioner for External Relations. In addition, the ESDP changed to the CSDP. (Voltolini, 2013, p. 88)

Together with these changes, the main aim of the Lisbon Treaty was to strengthen the Union’s role in the world. (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009) Consequently, some in the literature believes that the institutional changes brought with the Lisbon will provide unity to the Union and be helpful for the EU to play an effective role in conflict resolution. (Youngs, 2010) (Gaspers, 2008) However, Dagan argues that many provisions contained in the Lisbon Treaty do not challenge the essential intergovernmental nature of foreign and security policy decision making. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty represents an attempt to overcome the impasse caused by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and it is far from being revolutionary. It only enhanced institutional architecture to have a strengthened collective action. This continuation of intergovernmental character of the Lisbon was due to the divergences between the national policies of 27 Member States on how best to manage common security concerns and their reticence in seeing their sovereignty challenged by a supranational EU institution. Finally, despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty contains a number of important institutional changes, it still preserves national security interests of the Member States. (Dagand, 2008, p. 7)

Moreover, Keukeleire and Delreux believe that although the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar system in terms of presentation, old habits die hard. Hence, it retained the division between the policy-making methods for CFSP/CSDP on the one hand and the EU’s external action and Union policies on the other. Moreover, in the annexes of the Treaty, the promise not to curtail Member States' capacity to conduct national foreign policies was underlined. Furthermore, with a change from ESDP to CSDP, it is believed to lost part of its dynamism, as its most staunch supporter, France, demonstrated less interest in CSDP. (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 57-58) From perspective of Missiroli, the Lisbon Treaty and the resulting structures are only a necessary but still insufficient condition for a more effective external action of the EU. To have a more effective ‘Europe’, it needs the Lisbon Treaty as its starting point, yet
the actual need is fewer Europeans and more the EU in order to retain (or regain) its influence in international conflicts. Thus, even with the Lisbon Treaty, Missiroli believes that the EU is still have no single telephone number, nor it speaks with one voice. (Missiroli, 2010, pp. 446-448)

Additionally, Gaspers states that the Treaty of Lisbon is doubtless a step in the right direction. However, it is not the great leap in terms of creating a more coherent European foreign policy and defragmenting the Union’s external representation that many had hoped for, since horizontal, institutional, vertical and interstate inconsistencies in European foreign policy will persist. Likewise, because the representation of the Union in international affairs will not necessarily become more unitary after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the credibility of the Union as an international actor will not automatically increase. (Gaspers, 2008, p. 47) Similarly, in 2012, Vogel wrote an article with a title “A year on, and still failing”, regarding the performance of the EEAS, which has had under expectations in its first 12 months. He also quotes Jan Wouters, a professor of international law and EU studies at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, who believes that EEAS is, even after a year, not at full speed and still not working according to expectations. (Vogel, 2012)

Persson focuses on the security strategy of the EU under Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Lisbon Treaty, which asks for developing a special relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, based on close and peaceful relations. He argues, hence, that security strategy of the Lisbon Treaty is more explicit than in previous EU documents. In addition, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the strategic priority to deal with other problems in the region. (Persson, 2015, p. 51) On the other hand, he recognizes that despite its ambitious agenda on the Treaty, the EU has been neither willing nor able to enforce these declaratory policies. Perrson explains this situation with unanimity of the 28 members on the overall framework for ending the conflict, yet their failure to approach the conflict on a more every day and practical level. He compares the EU stance on the 2006 Second Lebanon war and the 2008-2009 Gaza war with the 2011 and 2012
Palestinian bids for statehood in the UN and more generally in matters related to Israel, hence he concludes that fundamental differences between EU members still exist. (Persson, 2015, p. 146) Therefore, it is obvious from the perspective of Perrson that the Lisbon Treaty has not overcome differences in national interests and historical relationship of the EU member states with the conflictual parties on the ground.

Considering the role of the EU in Palestine-Israel conflict, Dror also argues that even together with changes came with the Lisbon Treaty, the different views of member states and their independent interests and relationships with its main protagonists has continued that weakens the EU as a whole. Thus, many examples of uncoordinated policy, executed by the member states themselves, as opposed to official EU policy and vice versa is still prevalent. Even after the changes that have taken place under High Representative Ashton and the Lisbon Treaty, it is clear that the member states are not willing to give the EU the political power needed to accomplish its objectives. (Dror, 2014, p. 11) In a similar manner, Bauer and Hanelt believe in the role of the Treaty of Lisbon to overcome some of the EU’s shortcomings and strengthen the EU’s foreign policy institutions, applied in its Middle East policy. However, they also point out the continuous role of intergovernmentalism in the EU’s foreign policy and hence, the EU is believed always to face some limitations in terms of its ‘actorness’. (Bauer & Hanelt, 2010, p. 116)

As a conclusion, Müller argues that Europe's Middle East policy suffers from the fact that the EU is still not an international actor, despite institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, diverging national priorities, loyalties and agendas have challenged and undermined the EU’s ability to react to fast-paced events in the conflict situation in a timely and decisive fashion. Therefore, it is still hard for the EU to speak with one voice in order to develop a timely response to immediate crisis and developments. Although the EU displayed a considerable imagination and resourcefulness to develop common policies, national interests and priorities will continue to constrain the EU’s capacity as an external actor in the Israeli—Palestinian arena also in the years to come. (Müller, 2012, pp. 140-142)
1.3. The General Structure of the Thesis

Following this introductory part, a general information will be provided on historical development of European common foreign and security policy. In fact, this chapter will be divided into five sub-chapters to illustrate this development. Hence, the Maastricht Treaty’s, the Amsterdam Treaty’s, the Nice Treaty’s and lastly the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force will be cornerstones in the division of these sub-chapters. Without regarding the significance of the preceding process, the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty will be the focal point of this chapter in a way to create the EU foreign policy.

Based on this informative background, the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli conflict will be evaluated in the coming two chapters. Indeed, the evaluation will be a chronological one, in which the EU involvement is compared and contrasted in periods. For this end, the period before the Lisbon Treaty will constitute the backbone of the Chapter III and the period after the Lisbon Treaty will be the main subject of the Chapter IV. In each of these periods, the developments will be illustrated under two categories. In the first category the most significant developments in the Arab-Israeli Conflict will be briefly presented, which will be helpful to apprehend the EU involvement into the Conflict, explained under the second category.

Throughout these two chapters, the main aim will be to test whether there is any change the EU policies towards the Conflict before and after the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty will be evaluated in terms of its contribution to the EU actorness, through explaining the EU involvement into the Conflict in a historical manner. Hence, the EU principles and actions towards the Conflict will be compared and contrasted, based on the Lisbon Treaty amendments, with regard to their determinacy in the EU actorness.

In the conclusion, comprehensive remarks on the EU actorness and how it has been measured throughout the thesis will be presented with a specific reference to its position in the case of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Hence, it will be summarized how a
critical point of view has been adopted in this thesis to answer the main research question of the thesis: Whether the EU is a foreign policy actor after the Lisbon Treaty. At the end, it will be argued that the EU is not able to gain an international actorness through the Lisbon Treaty. The major reason for this failure is the inefficacy of the Lisbon Treaty amendments to provide an EU foreign policy, independent from the member state policy preferences.
CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

One of the most complex issues in the European integration is its foreign and security policy. Besides multifaceted authority-sharing mechanism between the EU institutions and nation states, several actors take part in both policy formulation and implementation. In addition to structural complexity, it has been the hardest area to develop a common perception. Highly diversified priorities and interests of the member states have been the primary reason for this lack of harmonization. Therefore, member states have been reluctant to transfer all their authority to the EU institutions in a way to create a common foreign and security policy. To serve this purpose, all relevant efforts through treaties, conferences, declarations, documents, strategies, plans etc. to achieve a coherent European stance in the realm of the foreign and security policy has had been unsuccessful.

In fact, since 1950’s the EU has the desire to be an effective and credible actor in the areas of foreign and security policy. (Kaya, 2009, p. 107) However, until the end of the Cold War, attempts to institutionalize the CFSP could not be realized, due to crash of interest among member states. Nevertheless, together with the end of Cold War in 1990’s, security perceptions of the EU has changed and its desire to be a more credible international actor has increased. Consequently, member states have opted to develop a more integrated foreign and security policy, which leads to the new institutional regulations under the Maastricht Treaty. Following the Maastricht Treaty, provisions on decision-making procedure and institutional design of CFSP were included in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty and lastly the Lisbon Treaty. Regardless of several structural and procedural changes brought with these Treaties to put the EU interest over the member state interest, CFSP has so far continued to be ‘domaine réservé’ of the member states.
2.1. From the 1950’s to the Maastricht Treaty

The European states’ attempt to harmonize their foreign and security policies are as old as the roots of European integration. Following the end of the Second World War, both external and internal factors played role in development of the first steps of CFSP. From perspective of external factors, the most striking one was the rivalry between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU). The common and close Soviet threat shared between the US and Europe resulted in introduction of the Marshall Plan, which was offered by the US to economically support war-torn European states, and not to allow spread of Soviet influence. European states, in return, were expected to develop an internal cooperation mechanism to be beneficiary of this Plan. Hence, the Marshall Plan acted as an external driving force needed by the European states to harmonize their foreign and security policies. (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 35-38)

Considering internal factors, establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), based on Schuman Plan created a habit of cooperation among European states. The ECSC was especially critical for its success to include both France and Germany under the same initiative. Consequently, following the establishment of the ECSC, it was presented that mortal enemies can sit on the same table, if they have a common interest. This understanding also helped to develop hopes for having a common European policy on external relations.

As a result, between 1950’s and 1990’s, three major initiatives prepared the road to CFSP. The first one was the establishment of European Defense Community (EDC), the second one was initiation of Fouchet Plans and the last one was the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC). With the help of these attempts, necessary background was arranged to the future European CFSP. Accordingly, briefly presenting these three initiatives is vital to understand the development of CFSP in a better way.
2.1.1. The European Defense Community (EDC)

Despite its first appearance as an idea in 1949, due to production of the first SU atomic devices, rearmament of West Germany was not a policy objective of the US until 1950’s. However, in the face of Korean War, German rearmament became a predominant theme in the US policy towards the Western Europe. The clear reason for this predominance lies in the fear that the SU might repeat its policies towards the South Korea in Europe. In this manner, President Truman supported the idea of West Germany rearmament, in the framework of the militarized containment policy towards Europe. As a part of this policy, West Germany was proposed to be included into an integrated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force, under centralized command with a supreme commander. (Dedman, 1996, pp. 70-72) The US belief that it was time for Europeans to be in charge for their own defense mechanism was another consideration in supporting German rearmament. (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999, p. 200)

On the other hand, the memories of Second World War was so close that many Europeans were afraid of rearmament of Germany, especially its mortal enemy France. From French perspective, this fear was two-fold. First of all, reviving a military force that devastated the Europe twice was not in accordance with security interest of France. In addition, France feared that German rearmament might destroy ECSC. When the Germans got the rehabilitation they wanted through rearmament process, they would no longer support the idea of an integrated coal and steel community. Therefore, Jean Monnet created a solution to German rearmament problem, based on ECSC model. (Dwan, 2001, pp. 141-142)

The main aim of Monnet’s solution was to integrate Germany into Europe by means of a broader Schuman Plan within a European framework, rather than the NATO framework. (Fursdon, 1980, pp. 84-85) It was significant for Monnet to keep Germany in the sphere of a European initiative, rather than an US initiative. To achieve this aim, Pleven Plan was introduced, under which EDC was created. The French Cabinet and the National Assembly approved this Plan on 24 October 1950 and signatures of
France, Italy, Benelux and West Germany in 1952 created a European centered foreign policy and defense mechanism, under a common roof with ECSC. (Hill & Smith, 2000, pp. 15-16)

Consequently, the EDC was a scheme to protect economic integration in the ECSC, a device for delaying West Germany's rearmament and its complete control of national and foreign affairs. (Dedman, 1996, p. 70) However, the EDC Treaty went beyond this purpose by stating that the EDC is “supranational in character, consisting of common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget.” (The Committee on Foreign Relations, 1952, p. 167) However, it was an interesting point to be underlined that this French proposal based initiative could not be realized, due to French failure to ratify this Treaty. This failure can be explained with supranational claims of the Treaty that caused a French fear to loose its national sovereignty. As a result, the first attempt to have a European common foreign and security policy collapsed, due to French desire to keep its national sovereignty.

2.1.2. Fouchet Plans

In France, Charles De Gaulle’s Presidency marked an era of European policy, whose aim was to establish a political authority that would institutionalize political and foreign policy cooperation between West European states in an intergovernmental form, separate from the Brussels-based institutions of the EEC. (Smith H., 2002, p. 48) Consequently, the desire was to recuperate a leadership role to France in Europe liberated from both US and SU. A ‘Europe des patries’ approach was adopted by De Gaulle that aims to create an independent Europe as a third force in international relations. (Hill & Smith, 2000, p. 47)

Nevertheless, this aim was expected not to force France to make any concession from its national sovereignty. Hence, De Gaulle’s proposal was to create an intergovernmental structure, not a supranational one. To decide how to formulate this organization, De Gaulle, in 1959, suggested that the foreign ministers of the six EEC members should meet regularly to discuss foreign policy issues and a secretariat should
be established in Paris to undertake administrative work of this political cooperation. Despite the rejection of secretariat idea, the EEC partners accepted to arrange periodical meeting of the foreign ministers. Following the start of these meetings, De Gaulle once more tried to achieve his initial goal to have regular summits of the heads of state and government of the Six and the establishment of a Paris-based secretariat for this organization. (Smith, 2002, p. 49)

Upon agreement among member states to discuss French proposal, a conference was convened in Paris in 1961 with the participation of EEC head of states and governments as well as foreign ministers. Within this Conference, a committee was established under leadership of French diplomat Christian Fouchet to develop proposals and recommendations on how to formulate a common foreign and security policy for Europe. As a result, first Fouchet Plan was articulated in 1961, based on French proposal to the Committee. In this Plan, the establishment of a European Political Union was suggested to develop and improve a common foreign and security policy. However, this first Plan was rejected by member states on the basis of its possible outcomes on national sovereignty. Even the second Plan that takes member state sensitivities into consideration was not agreed on, due to diversity of state interests among member states. (Smith H. , 2002, pp. 49-50), (Hill & Smith, 2000, p. 47)

As a result, negotiations on Fouchet Plans suspended in 1962. It was firstly, due to the fact that De Gaulle prevented the United Kingdom (UK) from participating to the discussions, despite insistence of the Netherlands. In addition, he rejected the idea, together with Germany, that a reference to NATO should be added to establishing treaty. (Vanke, 2001, p. 108) Therefore, crash of national interests created unegotiable conditions among member states to formulate a common foreign and security policy. Their nationally driven priorities and unwillingness to make any compromise for having a common institutionalization played a great role in this outcome. Consequently, another attempt to create a European common foreign and security policy failed, due to dominance of national interests in decision-making mechanism.
2.1.3. The European Political Cooperation (EPC)

Despite these two failures, member states repeated their willingness to have a common European foreign policy both in 1969 Hague Summit and in 1970 Luxembourg Summit. Especially the “Davignon Report”, which was drafted at Luxembourg Summit, was significant to underline desire of member states to harmonize foreign policies and create the base for the establishment of the EPC.

The Davignon Report created a framework for establishment of the EPC. It was stated in the Report that the EPC should be supported “to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems and to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonization of their views, the coordination of their positions and where it appears possible or desirable, common actions.” (Smith, 2004, p.72) It can be suggested that Davignon Report had the same aim with Fouchet Plans, yet its formulation was less binding on member states. Hence, this loosely formulated structure helped member states to accept the terms of this Report, besides the impact of some internal and external factors enabled acceptance.

In terms of internal factors, accession negotiations with the UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway required intensification of the cooperation among the existing member states. In addition, end of De Gaulle’s Presidency in France and the emergence of Willy Brandt as West German chancellor can also be named under internal factors. (Smith, 2002, p. 67) With new persons in charge in the big two member states, chances for closer integration in the field of foreign and security policy increased.

Considering external factors, the beginning of detente era and developments in the Middle East were two significant determinants. Together with detente era, European states realized the fact that they no longer get benefits from the rivalry between the US and USSR. Hence, their willingness to develop a European cooperation mechanism increased. Moreover, political, economic and security concerns stemming from the
1967 Arab-Israeli War made the European Communities (EC) member states more determinant to achieve a common foreign and security mechanism. Besides these concerns, this War was seen as an opportunity by the EC member states’ to play more effective role in the Middle East politics. In this regard, their need to have a common foreign policy was immediate. (Dedman, 1996, p. 112), (White, 2001, p. 72)

Considering all these factors, the EC members realized the fact that diversified national foreign policies had the potential to damage the internal strength of the EC as well as its policies and relations with the rest of the world. (Smith, 2004, p. 72) Consequently, the member states were at last able to commence the foreign policy cooperation that had been eluded for a couple of decades, due to suspicion, mistrust and false starts. As a result, the EPC was created to increase integration in external affairs.

Its main decision-making authority was the conference of member states’ foreign ministers, which was expected to meet in every six months or upon the call of the President. The Presidency would change also in every six months and be held by the same foreign minister, which held the presidency of the EC. (Smith H., 2002, pp. 69-70) Besides the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Presidency, new institutions were created in the body of the EPC. The most important was the Political Committee, which was composed of national political directors of foreign ministries of the EC. The duty of this Committee was to report to the Presidency and were to meet at least four times in a year. Moreover, every member state was to appoint a ‘correspondent’ to help organize the practical aspects of coordination. (Smith H., 2002, pp. 69-70)

It is obvious from this institutional structure that the EPC had an intergovernmental character, which makes it easy to be accepted by member states. In addition, several articles of the Luxembourg Report on the cooperation of the EPC with the European Parliament and the European Commission facilitated implementation of the EPC. For instance, the president of the EC was to prepare a report on annual progress of the EPC and submit it to the European Parliament. In addition, the European Commission was
allowed to present its ideas with the EPC, if the activities of the EC was affected by the EPC activities. (Smith, 2004, p. 73)

Together with 1973 Copenhagen Report, foreign policies of member states became more coordinated in the changing structure of the EPC. According to this Report, member states gained the habit of joint decision-making and common political action within three years. Therefore, the ‘reflex of coordination’ occurred among the member states made the each state accept prior consultation with its partners before taking up final foreign policy decision. (Hill & Smith, 2000, pp. 73-84) In addition, it was decided in this Report that the EPC meetings should increase from two to four and the place for meeting was allowed to be determined other than country holding the Presidency. (Hill & Smith, 2000, p. 74) It was also agreed that the Commission was to participate in the all-level EPC meetings, in addition to the increase in discussions with the European Parliament from two to four per year. (Smith, 2004, p. 96)

Another significant development adding to harmonization of foreign policies under the Copenhagen Report was adoption of a document ‘on the European identity’ in December 1973. In point of fact, it was a respond to the US policy, which tries to conclude bilateral agreements with the EC states to settle down their foreign policy disagreements on Vietnam and 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Consequently, this document was concluded to articulate that the EC members had a unified foreign policy towards the rest of the world, so that the US policy was not appropriate. (Smith, 2002, p. 77)

In this regard, the EC members agreed to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries, in their external relations. They believed that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They were also convinced that building up this policy will help them to tackle with confidence and realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe, thus making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their relations into a European Union.” (Document on the European Identity, 1973)
In the light of the developments since the establishment of the EPC, significant progress had been observed in the road to have a common European foreign policy. Concrete articles of the Copenhagen Report on the functioning of the EPC was supported with the definition of European Identity. Moreover, these two enabled the London Report to be issued in 1981, as the third progressive step in the structure of the EPC. The London Report was significant in a manner underlining the need for “a coherent and united approach to international affairs by the members of the European Community is greater than ever”. Once more, the importance of consulting each other before adopting final positions or launching national initiatives was emphasized. Moreover, the President was accompanied with the authority to represent the EPC and meet with representatives of other countries. In addition, a “crisis mechanism” was agreed on to convene within 48 hours upon the request of at least three member states. (The London Report, 1981)

Therefore, a more comprehensible EPC mechanism was created with the London Report and the EPC’s strength was increased to intervene into international conflicts. This development was actually related with the EC ineffectiveness in the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1980. The EC’s inability to act cohesively in these crises made the member states realize the need for amplified commitment to the EPC. Hence, they tried to provide the EPC with efficient tools to deal with international crisis. This very immediate need was also the reason lying behind 1983 Stuttgart Declaration.

The Stuttgart Declaration added political and economic aspects to the security understanding of the EPC. It was underlined in this Declaration that the elaboration and adoption of joint positions and joint actions on the basis of intensified consultations, in the area of foreign policy, were preconditions to strengthen and develop the existing EPC. This coordination should include the positions of member states on the political and economic aspects of security, so as to promote and facilitate the progressive development of such positions and actions in a growing number of foreign policy fields. (The Stuttgart Declaration, 1983) Subsequently, as it was in the
previous Reports, Stuttgart Declaration was a direct reflection of the EC’s desire to be accepted as a foreign policy actor by acting more actively in the face of international developments. In order to achieve this, they added new dimensions to the structure of the EPC, which was believed to lead more coherent European foreign policy.

One of the most noteworthy milestones in the organization of the EPC was the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. The significance of the SEA was partly stemming from being a treaty, rather than a declaration or report, and its inclusion into the Founding Treaty of the EC. Initially, being a treaty makes the SEA legally binding for all the Parties that increases its impact on the member states. In addition, being included in the Founding Treaty provided the EPC and the EC under the same legal structure. Hence, Simon Nuttall appreciates the SEA for bringing foreign policy as the second pillar to the Founding Treaty, which will be followed by the third pillar under the Maastricht Treaty. (Nuttall, 1992, p. 249)

According to Title 3, Article 30 of the SEA, member states were called to cooperate on foreign policy issues and consult each other on these matters. In more specific terms, it was stated in the SEA that the EC member states are under a commitment to “inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions on the implementation of joint action.” (The Single European Act, 1986) As a consequence, in short period of time before the end of the Cold War, a concrete and legally binding step was taken in the route to one voice Europe, for foreign policy issues. The EC member states agreed to act jointly towards international events to protect their common European interest.

In conclusion, reviewing the period between 1950 and 1990 revealed the fact that supranational formulations on the common European foreign policy is doomed to fail. The EC member states prioritized their national interests over a European interest, so that they were not willingly to transfer their sovereignty to a supranational body. In addition, this period showed that even intergovernmental designs of common foreign
policy should not be restrictive in nature. Their articles should only be recommendatory in nature. The member states should not be commented either to do or not to do something in their foreign policies.

The third conclusion of this period is based on the acceptance that the EC had some progress in the way to establish a European common foreign and security within decades. However, all of these attempts were realized due to their harmony with nation state interest. Above explained international developments made the member states believe that the most beneficial option was to act jointly to satisfy their national interest. Subsequently, not to serve to a common European interest, but to maximize their national interest convinced the member states to develop a common foreign policy action. Even the SEA, the only legally binding arrangement, was a product of a common concern about the international uncertainty, in the face of approaching end of the Cold War. As a conclusion, superiority of national interests over the European interest in the foreign and security policy was prevalent between 1950 and 1990.

2.2. The Maastricht Treaty

2.2.1. The Period Preceding the Maastricht Treaty

Regarding the fact that member states was in favor of keeping foreign policy making under their national sovereignty, adoption of CFSP was a surprising development. Until 1990’s, it was hard to imagine member states to allow such an organization with the fear of a loss of competency at the national level. This is partly the reason why integration in foreign policy making has been painfully slow and remained largely intergovernmental. However, facing with the systemic changes in the international order since 1989, the EC member states agreed to deepen foreign policy integration with the adoption of the CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, the end of the Cold War provided the momentum and the stimulus to move European integration further by taking the steps towards a political union, most notably in the area of foreign and security policy making. (Müftüler-Baç, 2007, p. 3)
From similar perspective, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver argues that with the end of the Cold War, the EC members were to decide between their two fears that were the threat of the supranationalism over national interest/sovereignty and the fear of fragmentation. Hence, the second fear of fragmentation weighted more than the first one and the member states opted for closer integration to have regional stability and peace. (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 367) To put it differently, the end of bipolar world, came with the end of the Cold War, required structural reorganization to handle with new uncertainties of the international relations. In this regard, European states were left with serious challenges of the new world order, in which they had to decide how to deal with German Reunification and transformation of the Central and Eastern European Countries as well as how to restructure their relationship with the rest of the world.

In terms of German Reunification, largest member states of the EC, the UK and France, aimed to include Germany into a strictly integrated European structure, not to allow the unified Germany to increase strength as much as to pose any threat to them. One of the most significant components of limiting Germany’s power was developing the European common foreign and security, which limits unilateral foreign and security actions. (Aybet, 2000, p. 80) As for transformation of the Central and Eastern European Countries, “the Balkans has served as Europe’s ghost reminding it of the risks of war, and defining Europe’s own identity in terms of no longer being susceptible to internecine war”. (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, pp. 556-557) Namely, the outbreak of the Yugoslavian War, together with the First Gulf War were two main crises that highlighted the need for restructuring the already existing institutions of the EC to successfully deal with new challenges of the Post-Cold War Era, such as instability in all areas, international terrorism, ethnic conflicts, etc. (Hill & Smith, 2000, p. 168)

Likewise, Hill argues that both Yugoslavian Crisis and Gulf War brought out that the EC failed to act as an effective international actor, in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and impact on events. (Hill, 1993, p. 306) Superiority of
diversified national interests and internal considerations resulted in the EC states’ failure to take a joint action upon these events. Therefore, member states realized the limits of the EPC to deal with new security challenges of the new world order that also reminded them the need to develop more integrated common foreign and security policy structure. Hence, self-reliance of the EC states, in the era of the reluctance of the US in involving international conflicts, and common threats helped the EC states to develop common foreign interests. As a result, in the new international order of the Post-Cold War, the EC member states agreed to develop stronger structure for foreign and security policy. (Cameron, 1999, p. 23)

2.2.2. The CFSP under The Maastricht Treaty

In the light of all above explained regional and international developments, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and came into force in 1993. With this Treaty, the EC became the European Union and three pillar structure was created. The first pillar was covering the areas, which were left to the control of the EC; such as trade, cooperation on development, and humanitarian aid. While the CFSP was placed under the second pillar, the third pillar was about Justice and Home Affairs.

It is significant to underline that the first pillar has supranational character, whereas the other two pillars were formulated according to intergovernmental ideas. So that, national interests were once more so strong in the new formulation that the CFSP remained intergovernmental, like its predecessor the EPC. Holland, in this manner, argues that, “the CFSP was the result of intergovernmental bargaining and compromise. In places, the text is intentionally, if frustratingly, vague and existing practices were either confirmed or complicated unnecessarily by the creation of the second pillar. (Holland, 1993, p. 7)

Therefore, the member states did not transfer the whole authority on foreign and security matters to the supranational EU institutions. The EU was left with the minimum necessary involvement to the decision-making procedure. In addition, there
was no enforcement mechanism designed in the CFSP that requires compliance. Likewise, Deighton argues, “the pillared structure itself was in part considered as the member states' firebreak against excessive supranationalism in the still sensitive area of external relations”. (Deighton, 2002, p. 725) In contrast with limited institutional authority transferred to the CFSP, its objectives were highly ambitious as:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. (Treaty on the European Union, 1992, p. 58)

In order to achieve these aims, the member states were asked to “support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action, which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.” Besides emphasizing significance of solidarity among member states, “joint action” and “common position” were strictly defined and their significance to achieve the Union’s aims were explained, in order to improve the effectiveness of the CFSP. (Treaty on the European Union, 1992, p. 58)

Therefore, despite its intergovernmental structure, foreign and security policy decision-making became more European oriented than the formulation of the EPC. Hence, Duke and Vanhoonacker state that “The merging of the EPC/CFSP Secretariat with the Council counterpart not only strengthened the secretarial support that had
existed hitherto, but provided professional staff who could ensure continuity between different chairs, master dossiers and provide intimate knowledge of the procedures.” (Duke & Vanhoonacker, 2006, p. 170) Hence, the Maastricht Treaty increased the role of the European Parliament, the European Council and the European Commission in the CFSP decision-making, instead of leaving all decision making power to the conference of the foreign ministers of member states. It also introduced a Permanent Secretariat into the institutional structure of the CFSP, besides the Committee of Permanent Representatives. Consequently, European elements of the CFSP increased in the disadvantage of national powers.

As a conclusion, the Maastricht Treaty was a turning point in the evolvement of European common foreign and security policy. Its general aim was to augment integration among the member states in their foreign and security policies. Single institutional framework that compromises all three pillars was thought to increase the Union’s actorness in international arena and its effectiveness in external policies. In addition, by signing and ratifying the Treaty, member states accepted proposed changes in foreign and security policy decision-making and promised to involve into joint actions or common positions, instead of looking for unilateral actions. They also undertook the responsibility to comply with the provisions of the Treaty in the field of external and security policy. Indeed, establishing a coherent mechanism in foreign and security policies had been the enduring aim of the EU, motivated from the EPC to the SEA and from the SEA to the Maastricht Treaty.

Unfortunately, none of above explained structural changes was enough to accomplish the long-desired goal of “one-voice-Europe” in foreign and security policy actions. The main case study that supports this argument was the EU’s failure to take a joint action/common position in the Bosnian War, in which the EU showed its ineffectiveness to undertake the responsibility of an international crisis. Accordingly, Müftüler-Baç argues that the greatest strength of the EU still lies in its soft power tools, such as the trade agreements, financial aid packages, association agreements and enlargement. The EU, even with the CFSP could not act as an international power with
its hard power capabilities. Therefore, a declaratory diplomacy developed together with the CFSP that represents the EU rather than the separate member states on issues relating to foreign policy. That is because the EU relies on economic measures and incentives to realize its foreign policy objectives. (Müftüler-Baç, 2007, p. 8)

2.3. The Amsterdam Treaty

The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997, which came into force in 1999. The main aim of this Treaty was to improve provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in order to reinforce the European foreign and security policy integration. (Bindi, 2010, p. 34) Despite the fact that the CFSP remained intergovernmental in structure, the Amsterdam Treaty amendments were proposed as a solution to the EU foreign and security policy failures experienced since implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. In fact, Cameron argues that the CFSP failure in meeting the expectations, especially in the case of the fighting in Yugoslavia, was one of the major reasons that required a reform to the CFSP. (Cameron, 2007, p. 19)

With the aim of improving the efficiency of the CFSP, it was stated in the Amsterdam Treaty that: “Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.” (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 11) Despite stating similar recommendations for efficiency and similar objectives to be gained, the Amsterdam Treaty can be accepted as an improvement for the CFSP, regarding its new instruments. Besides joint action and common positions, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced common strategies to achieve its objectives.

It was agreed that in the mentioned Treaty that, “the European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.”
As a comment on this new instrument, Michael Smith argues that common strategies completely changed the scene of the CFSP, in a way towards more operational capability. (Smith, 2004, p. 227) However, like joint actions and common positions, common strategies were designed as an instrument, based on common important interests of the member states. It was not a supranational design, yet was a complementary intergovernmental instrument, added to previous ones. Therefore, Smith’s comment is a highly optimistic perspective, disregarding the member states role on the operational capability of the CFSP.

Another change brought by the Amsterdam Treaty was on voting procedure. Qualified majority voting (QMV) and majority voting was added to unanimity procedure. Decisions on joint actions, common positions and common strategy were proposed to be taken with QMV. Although this new type of voting procedures can be seen as a step to undermine the impact of national interests on decision making, compared to the unanimity framework, the member states were also careful to add a back door to this new arrangement. It was stated in the Treaty that “if a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.” (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 15)

Moreover, ‘Constructive Abstention’ was introduced to decision making procedure by the Amsterdam Treaty. Accordingly, if any member the Council qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration in the decisions to be taken unanimously, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes, the decision shall not be adopted. (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 14) As a result, even in the new voting procedures, introduced with this Treaty, significance of national policies was taken into account in the CFSP decision-making procedure. Member states’ national policy priorities were regarded as an exception to
the general rule, which once more emphasizes prevalence of national interest over the EU interest, despite all these efforts.

One other significant change of this Treaty was establishment of the post of the High Representative for CFSP. (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 15) The aim of this post was to support the idea that the EU is an international actor with a single voice. With naming a representative of the EU in international arena, the EU tried to strengthen the cohesion of its external representation. Since being represented by the Presidency, which rotated in every six month, weakened the power of the EU in its international relations, creating a permanent post for external representation aimed to increase actorness of the EU. Likewise, Duke states that the role of the High Representative was both to be responsible from the EU coherence in external matters and to be the spokesperson on CFSP matters for the EU. (Duke, 2000, p. 144)

Furthermore, a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was introduced in order to ensure full coherence with the Union’s external economic and development policies. They were to monitor and analyze developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; provide assessments of the Union’s foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas where the CFSP could focus in future; provide timely assessments and early warning events, including potential political crisis; and produce papers as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council and which may contain analyses, recommendations and strategies for the CFSP. (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 132)

Besides above explained changes, several other changes were introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty in the realm of security and defense. First of all, it was emphasized that the Western European Union (WEU) was an integral part of the development of the Union, providing the Union with access to an operational capability. In addition, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking were included in the sphere of action. (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, p. 12) These tasks actually refers to integration of Petersberg Tasks,
which was adopted in 1992, into the Founding Treaties. (Bindi, 2010, p. 35) Accordingly, Amsterdam Treaty authorized the EU to take an action in peace related operations. Consequently, several innovative steps were taken with the Amsterdam in terms of coherence and efficiency in the CFSP. Introduction of new instruments, such as common strategies and the High Representative was supported with institutional amendments, such as the establishment of Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and inclusion of the WEU and Petersberg Tasks. Nevertheless, structural and procedural changes were not alone sufficient to create the single voice EU in the CFSP, without real intention of member states to use them in the face of international events. In order to achieve the aimed coherence at the EU level, the member states must agree that their national interests will be served better, if they take part in joint action, common position or common strategy, than it is under a unilateral action. (Cameron, 1998, p. 76)

The first case study that tested new institutional structure of the EU after Amsterdam Treaty was 1998 Kosovo War. In this case, the EU once more showed its incapability to solve an international crisis, which took place in a neighboring country to its borders. (Müller, 2012, pp. 6-7) Therefore, following the failure in Kosovo Crisis, the EU was persuaded that increasing military aspects of the CFSP was necessary to reassert the EU’s identity by enhancing its capability. (Young, 2002, p. 106) Adding to this feel of necessity among the member states, the change in the UK government speeded up efforts to include military instruments to the already existing ones. Contrary to previous government’s reluctance to give support to military wing of the CFSP, new government of Tony Blair was in the idea that the EU must be provided with major military force in order to be a more equal partner in the transatlantic alliance. (Sloan, 2003, p. 171)

Consequently, France and the UK released a Joint Declaration on European Defense in 1998 Saint Malo Summit. As a result of this, the idea of the European Security and Defense Policy (EDSP) emerged to represent the defense aspect of the CFSP. In this declaration, two leaders stated that the EU needs to be in a position to play its full role
on the international stage. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. (The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom, 1998) Despite some comments on this initiative as demonstrating the determination of the UK and France, as the two important military actors in the EU, to provide the EU a degree of actorness in the security field (Howorth, 2001, p. 769), they actually disregard the emphasis of these two powers on “to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis.” (Franco–British St. Malo Declaration, 1998)

As a complementary to this Declaration, Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense Declaration was released at the end of the Cologne European Council in 1999. In this summit, the EU member states decided to introduce the ESDP. The aim was to strengthen the CFSP by the development of a common European policy on security and defense…The EU was committed to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris. (Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 1999)

With the help of Cologne Declaration, 1999 Helsinki and 2000 Santa Maria da Feira Declarations were issued, in which integration of the WEU to the capacity of the CFSP augmented military capability of the EU. However, Sangiovanni lists some points in order to show why it is bad for the EU to have the ESDP. In this manner, the ESDP was seen as a waste of money that the Europeans would spent, regarding political divisions within the EU. Nevertheless, the primary danger arising from the ESDP was stemming from unlikeliness that Europeans will agree on a common strategic concept or an effective institutional framework for the ESDP any time soon. The reason for this unlikeliness was primarily related with diverse interests of member states that will fuel plans for ‘enhanced’ cooperation, which will allow a core group of EU members to proceed down the road to closer defense cooperation, without the explicit consensus of all member states. (Sangiovanni, 2003, pp. 200-202) As a result, the new
arrangement on defense was believed to serve to national interests of the bigger European states, rather than serving to the EU interest.

2.4. The Nice Treaty

Together with the Nice Treaty in 2001, new instruments were added to the CFSP. It is believed that the Nice Treaty was completed what had been left from the Amsterdam Treaty. (Smith, 2004, p. 233) The first striking change of the Nice Treaty was elimination of dominance of the WEU in defence aspects of the CFSP that advantaged the EU. Indeed, Article 17 of the Treaty emphasized that “the CFSP shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union… which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.” In addition, the responsibility of political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations were given to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Article 25, replacing the Political Committee. (Treaty of Nice, 2001)

One of the most significant changes of the Nice Treaty was introduction of enhanced cooperation. According to Article 27a of the Treaty, enhanced cooperation aimed to “safeguard the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene. It shall respect: the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy; the powers of the European Community, and consistency between all the Union’s policies and its external activities.” (Treaty of Nice, 2001) Therefore, Missiroli argues that the mentioned Article refers to two types of consistency, as within the CFSP and between all the EU’s policies and external activities. (Missiroli, 2001, p. 192)

However, a serious limitation to enhanced cooperation was introduced with Article 27b that “enhanced cooperation…shall relate to implementation of a joint action or a common position. It shall not relate to matters having military or defense implications.” (Treaty of Nice, 2001) Hence, a potential of inconsistency was created
with this Article of the Treaty, since the most cooperation needed area was excluded from enhanced cooperation. Missiroli also underlines the fact that this exclusion made implementation of enhanced cooperation into crisis management impossible due to separation of its military component from other components. (Missiroli, 2001, p. 192)

As a conclusion, the Nice Treaty introduced some significant amendments to the CFSP by completing what was missing in the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty. However, regarding continuous intergovernmental nature of new policy instruments and nationally driven political will of the member states, it can be suggested that the structural foreign and security policy problems of the EU was not solved with the Nice Treaty. There was still an immediate need for more supranational structure and the EU interest centered policy suggestions to make the EU a real actor in international affairs.

2.5. The Lisbon Treaty

Just within a few months after signature of the Nice Treaty, an internationally striking development happened in the US that changed the security perception of the whole world, including the EU. Upon the attack of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization to the US on 11 September 2001, the EU declared its position on the side of the US against international terrorism. (Cameron, 2007, pp. 91-95) In order to present their support to the US effectively, the EU leaders convened in Laeken in December 2001, where they released the Laeken Declaration.

According to this Declaration, Europe was finally unified to have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilizing role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples. In addition, “the European Union derives its legitimacy from the democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses”. (Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, 2001) Accordingly, the EU emphasized its willingness to be accepted as an international actor, based on its claim of European unification. It also
underlined its potential role to fight against international terrorism by using its normative power capability.

Moreover, Article 15 of the Declaration stated that “Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.” (Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, 2001) Nevertheless, it was striking to realize that not the EU as a unified international actor, as claimed, but individual member states were on the stage in the post 9/11. Howorth, hence, argues that each member state of the EU offered help to the US through its national military assets, based on bilateral relations. (Howorth, 2002) In addition, Brezinski states that “we cannot talk about a Europe in this war, we can only talk about European states.” (Akgül, 2002, p. 2) Consequently, the member states of the EU was in the search to satisfy their individual national interest in the new security environment following the 9/11, contrary to the declared CFSP objections in the Laeken Declaration.

Disregarding these internal divergences, the EU continued its efforts to make the CFSP more efficient through introducing new agreements. One of these was signed in Rome, called “The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe”. Like it had been in the previous agreements, one of the main objectives in this Treaty was to create coherence in common foreign and security policy. Therefore, some other amendments were proposed to the CFSP in order to provide the EU with a single voice in its external relations and turn it into a more coherent international actor. For instance, the post of EU Minister of Foreign Affairs and a European External Action Service were introduced to increase reliability of the EU in the external affairs. In addition, Solidarity Clause and Closer Cooperation provisions were added to the Treaty as well as expanding the Petersberg Tasks to include both civilian and military means. (Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004)
Introduction of the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs was especially significant in terms of merging supranational functions of Commissioner for External Relations, responsible one under the 1st pillar, and intergovernmental functions of the Council’s High Representative for the CFSP, responsible one under the 2nd pillar. Everts and Keohane explains this marging with the aim of creating single representation mechanism in the CFSP and ensuring that European interest would be served, not the member state interests. (Everts & Keohane, 2003, p. 171) To serve the same purpose, the elected and long terms Presidency was proposed in the Treaty, besides gaining the EU a legal personality.

On the other hand, the above mentioned Treaty never came into force, since rejection of its ratification in the Netherlands and France. Therefore, “Draft Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community” was signed in 2007, with its less ambitious articles than the EU Constitution Treaty. It is also known as the Lisbon Treaty, from which the expectations were high to bring all long desired goals to the EU in the realm of the CFSP. Several structural and procedural changes were introduced to the CFSP and the ESDP with the Lisbon Treaty.

The objective of the Union’s external action was stated as to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organizations, which share the normative European principles, such as democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms etc. The Union shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems. (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007) In order to achieve these aims, firstly, a new separate chapter was created, with the title of “Provisions on the Common Security and Defense Policy”, with which the ESDP was merged into the Treaty.

Under this title, it was stated that “the common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.” (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007) So that, all capacities of the Union was aimed to get combined in order to be more efficient in external action.

Moreover, other major changes brought with the Lisbon Treaty was well summarized by Voltolini. Firstly, the EU’s pillar structure was eliminated and all aspects of EU external relations placed under external action heading. Secondly, a legal personality was acquired to the EU, with a view to making foreign policy more coherent and unified. Third, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was established, under the control of the High Representative for Foreign Policy. This High Representative had a double-hatted role, as he/she is also vice-President of the Commission, thus combining the former positions of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and of Commissioner for External Relations. In addition, the ESDP changed to the CSDP. Furthermore, unanimity in voting procedure of the CFSP remained with small changes for budget voting. (Voltolini, 2013, p. 88)

In more specific terms, the division between the policy-making methods for CFSP/CSDP on the one hand and the EU’s external action and Union policies on the other retained, despite elimination of pillar system. Moreover, in the annexes of the Treaty, the promise not to curtail Member States’ capacity to conduct national foreign policies was underlined. (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 57-58) Considering the EEAS, its performance did not satisfy the expectations and remained under its potential, due to lack of political will. (Vogel, 2012) From perspective of the security strategy of the EU under Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Lisbon Treaty, which asks for developing a special relationship with neighboring countries, the EU has been neither willing nor able to enforce these declaratory policies. Disappointment with it, contrary to ambitious formulation of it in the Treaty, could be explained with the member states unwillingness to turn what they have promised in declaration into practical level. (Persson, 2015, p. 146)
Furthermore, Mueller focuses on the role of the High Representative with the Lisbon Treaty and argues that he/she became less dependent on the administrative and diplomatic resources of the member states. Nevertheless, he underlines the fact that the Lisbon Treaty did not involve any major transfer of decision-making power from the member states, which remained in charge of decision-making, to the supranational level. Hence, Catrine Ashton’s role as full-time chair of the Foreign Affairs Council has also not necessarily enhanced the Union’s potential to generate policy consensus on conflict resolution and crisis management policies. (Mueller, 2013, p. 31)

As a conclusion, the permanent aim of the EU in its external affairs has been to strengthen its role in the world affairs through increasing its actorness. All declarations, summits, treaties, structural and procedural changes have been done to achieve this goal. However, the main enemy of the EU in this process was the member states’ fear to lose their sovereignty and their willingness to satisfy national interests, as a foreign and security policy priority. Hence, they have done their best to keep the foreign and security policy out of supranational regulations, within the intergovernmental design. Both decision-making and instrument implementation in this realm have been kept under the authority of nation states, regardless of procedural and structural changes introduced with several agreements. In this manner, the EU is believed always to face some limitations in terms of its ‘actorness’. (Bauer & Hanelt, 2010, p. 116)

Therefore, contrary to the expectations that the Lisbon Treaty would provide unity to the Union and be helpful for the EU to play an effective role in conflict resolution. (Youngs, 2010) (Gaspers, 2008), institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty have not been enough to make the EU an international actor. The EU’s foreign and security policy remained intergovernmental in terms of decision making and implementation, even after the Lisbon Treaty changes. It failure to evolve into an independent international actor mainly lies in the fact that the member states do not want to lose their national sovereignty in a way to intensify the EU actorness. Their constant determinacy to keep sovereignty and serve to their national interest, combined with
divergent national interest and security concerns of each member state has been preventing the development of a European common foreign and security policy. None of these above explained changes has been successful to overcome this problem.

Consequently, despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty contains a number of important institutional changes, it still preserves national security interests of the Member States. (Dagand, 2008, p. 7) In addition, it is still hard for the EU to speak with one voice in order to develop a timely response to immediate crisis and developments. Although the EU displayed a considerable imagination and resourcefulness to develop common policies, national interests and priorities will continue to constrain the EU’s capacity as an external actor in the years to come. (Müller, 2012, pp. 140-142)

2.6. Chapter Summary

It is significant to evaluate what has been argued in this chapter from the perspective of Jupille & Caporaso’s four criteria for actorness and the debate in the literature on the EU actorness. To start with the period preceding the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was far behind to meet any of four actorness criteria until the establishment of the EPC in 1970. From the beginning of the 1970’s, and especially after the SEA in 1987, third parties started to negotiate directly with the Community. Hence, since then the EU managed to satisfy recognition criterion of actorness. In addition, the member states gave authority to the EU in the area of trade and environmental issues. The authority given to the EU, however, was limited only to power of negotiation in trade agreements and environment related trade measures with the third parties in the name of the member states. This relationship between the EU and the member states can also be explained with a ‘principal-agent’ logic, where the states (principal) outsource some authority to the ‘agent’ (EU Commission, EU Council Secretariat, High Representative, etc.) within well-defined boundaries. (Koops, 2011, p. 120) Therefore, this limited authority of negotiation given to the EU cannot be accepted as a power of acting externally. Since the power of negotiation solely means eligibility of representation, not conducting an external action, the EU was not enough to meet the second criterion of authority.

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Regarding the third and fourth criteria, the EU failed to satisfy both of them. Indeed, starting from the EPC, all institutional developments in the field of foreign and security policy suffered from intergovernmental design. While the EPC was an intergovernmental process with no institutional base; the SEA, which provided treaty basis for the EPC remained as an intergovernmental process. Even the CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty established as intergovernmental pillar of the Union. Despite several improvements with Amsterdam and Nice Treaties in horizontal cohesion, the EU continued to suffer from the lack of vertical cohesiveness. From the perspective of autonomy, the EU could not manage to appear as an independent entity from its member states. It could not have an autonomy vis-a-vis its member states, due to pervasive intermingling of levels of political authority. Thus, the EU remained to be a collective entity, which was no more than the sum of its member states, rather than a corporate one. (Koops, 2011, p. 122)

Upon the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, an improvement was seen in the EU in a way to satisfy the first two criteria. Since the Lisbon Treaty Article 47 provided the Union with a legal personality, the EU both achieved a legal base for recognition and gained a “legal competence to act externally.” (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 216) Hence, the EU gained an opportunity to become a member to international organizations, join international conventions and sign international agreements, besides its previous capacity to negotiate. Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty became an effective step to meet recognition and authority criteria.

On the other hand, it did not make any tremendous change in the EU’s position vis-à-vis autonomy and cohesion criteria. The key factor in this failure is consistency of intergovernmental institutional structure in the foreign and security policy of the EU. The member states’ determinateness to preserve their independence in matters of foreign and security policy, and to ensure that the more supranational Community institutions, in particular the Commission, are distanced from CFSP processes can be named as major mentality surrounding this failure. Therefore, it is evident that, despite institutionalization of supranational cooperation in some areas, the CFSP still agonizes
over intergovernmental structure, in the absence of assured, well-functioning links between the making of policy and its implementation. If the CFSP is to provide more effective political direction, there is a need for further reform. (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, pp. 169-172)

As a result, the EU cannot be defined as an actor both before and after the Lisbon Treaty, due to its failure to meet all four actorness criteria. Despite its success in the first two, the EU is far behind to satisfy autonomy and cohesion. As a result, this observation leads to the conclusion that the EU is an entity without actorness capacity. Therefore, the third stance within the literature debate seems appropriate to define EU actorness. Indeed, institutional development of the EU foreign and security policy verifies both criticisms towards intergovernmental decision making procedure (Bauer & Hanelt, 2010, p. 116) and its inability of working as a united actor with one voice. (Hollis, 2010, p. 38) (Dror, 2014, p. 11) (Musu, 2010, p. 83) Consequently, the EU should not be called as an actor in international relations, under any circumstances. (Rosamond, 2005; Hveem, 2000); (Diez, 2005; Sjursen, 2006); (Richard & Hamme, 2013, p. 16)
CHAPTER 3

THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
BEFORE THE LISBON TREATY

Based on the background information provided in the previous chapter, it is clear that the expectations from the Lisbon Treaty was high to lead to one voice Europe dream. In order to evaluate whether the Lisbon Treaty helped to realize this dream or not, the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most relevant case study to investigate. According to Gerring, a case study as an in-depth study of a single unit where the scholar's aim is to clarify features of a larger class of similar phenomena. (Gerring, 2004, p. 341) Accordingly, it is believed that the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the European CFSP could be better understood through comparing and contrasting the European involvement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the period before and after the Lisbon Treaty.

The active involvement of the EU to the Arab-Israeli conflict has gradually continued in parallel with the evolution of the European foreign policy system. (Gianniou, 2006, p. 20) Furthermore, the European states have strong relations with conflicting Parties in terms of history, identity and economics. While France and Britain could be held responsible from beginning of the conflict, due to their policies towards the Parties during their realm; Germany has historical responsibility towards the Jews, due to the Holocaust. In addition, the EU has been the largest financial contribution to Palestine, whilst being the number one trade partner of Israel. Accordingly, the EU indicates that “resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved.” (European Union, 2003, p. 8) Therefore, analyzing the role of the
EU in the Arab-Israeli conflict will help to reach some broad conclusions about the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the evolution of European CFSP.

3.1. The First Period: 1967-1979

Considering the developments in the first period, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was a turning point. At the end of this war, the Israeli land in the region expanded four times as much as before the war, which contributed to evolvement of identity-based conflict to a territorial one. (Tocci, 2007, p. 103) At the end of 1948 War, a Jewish state was established in an area beyond what was allocated to Israel in the 1947 UN Partition Plan. However, the significance of this development was more identity related than territory related. The main issues remaining after the establishment of the State of Israel was about its ethnic make-up, Palestinian minority living in the land of Israel, and its relationship with neighboring Arab states. (Bickerton, 2009, p. 81)

On the other hand, the conflict became more territory based after the 1967 War, since Israel occupied the West Bank, the East Jerusalem (administered by Jordan since 1948), the Gaza Strip (administered by Egypt since 1948), the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai. Strategic and historical significance of these areas for Arabs and initiation of Jewish establishments in there escalated the tension between the Parties and the Conflict acquired a new character. As a result, lesser room for regional peace, increased insecurity for Israel and more militant Palestinian discourse under the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) were main characteristics of post-1967 period. Furthermore, this war stimulated the Palestinian national identity, separate from Arabs. (Tocci, 2007, p. 103)

In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted in the aftermath of the Six-Day War, in which it was underlined that the establishment of a just and lasting peace should include the application of two principles. First, Israel armed forces should withdraw from territories occupied in the recent conflict. Second, all claims or states of belligerency should be terminated and the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area should be respected and
acknowledged as well as their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. The resolution also affirmed the territorial inviolability of every State in the region and called for “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.” (The UN Security Council, 1967) Accordingly, the Palestinian issue was referred as a refugee issue in the Resolution, in which just peace was based on mutual respect of the Parties to territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence.

Different Parties reacted differently to the Resolution. While Egypt and Jordan accepted Resolution and considered Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the 1967 war as a precondition to negotiations, Syria rejected the Council action by maintaining that the resolution had linked the central issue of Israeli withdrawal to concessions demanded from Arab countries. In addition, The PLO strongly criticized the resolution, due to its equation of the question of Palestine with a refugee problem. Israel accepted the resolution, yet it made direct negotiations with the Arab States and the conclusion of a comprehensive peace treaty as preconditions to solve the questions of withdrawal and refugees. (The UN Security Council, 1967)

The severe defeat of the Six-Day War resented Arab states and resulted in the desire for regaining the lost territories, especially by Egypt and Syria. Being unable to find a diplomatic solution in any way, these two stated conducted a surprise attack on Israel that is known as Yom Kippur War of 1973. Following the Arab victory at the end of this war, the peace discussions brought Arab and Israeli officials at the same table for the first time since the end of the 1948 war. Accordingly, Arab honor was restored with the victory at the Yom Kippur War, which was particularly significant for Egypt and let to a peace agreement with Israel. From point of Israel, 1973 War caused a great anger in the society that leaded to more rightest tendencies in Israel’s military and political leadership with significant changes. (Bickerton, 2009, pp. 135-137)

Similar to Resolution 242, the UN adopted another Resolution following the 1973 War. In Resolution 383, all parties were called to cease all firing and terminate all
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy. In addition, the principles of Resolution 242 reaffirmed and implementation of these principles were urged. Furthermore, the Security Council decided that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. (The UN Security Council, 2017)

The most significant development after 1973 Yom Kippur War was Camp David Accords signed by Egypt and Israel through initiative of the US President Carter in 1978. In 1979, both countries approved these Accords, which are accepted as the origin of all successive peace negotiations. These Accords actually consisted of two agreements. The first one is called as “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East”, which was about the question of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It was foreseen that a self-governing Arab authority would replace the Israeli military forces for five years during negotiations on the ‘final status’ of the two areas. The second accord was called as “A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel” that was a draft proposal for a peace agreement to be negotiated and signed within three months. It asked for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai over three years and a full restoration of the area to Egypt. Consequently, there was no reference to the status of Jerusalem and the future of the Golan Heights. (Bickerton, 2009, pp. 142-143)

As a result of these Accords, Egypt was excluded by Arab states, for conducting a separate peace agreement with Israel and blamed with betrayal to Palestinian cause. After a few days after the signature of Camp David Accords, Egypt was also expelled from Arab League. In addition, Egypt was expelled from the Islamic Conference and ousted from a number of Arab financial and economic institutions, such as the Federation of Arab Banks and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). (Bickerton, 2009, pp. 142-143)
3.1.1. European Involvement in the First Period (1967-1979)

In 1950’s and 1960’s, neither the individual European states nor the Community itself was actor in the Middle Eastern affairs. Therefore, contrary to the direct American and Soviet involvement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Europe was not a player. This situation can be explained with their attempts to relieve from consequences of the Second World War. Due to their internal recovery period economically and politically, the European states were not able to act actively in the Middle East politics. Even if they desire to involve in the affairs in the Middle East, growing Arab nationalism was an obstacle to former colonial European powers to be favorably welcomed by Arab States. Hence, Yacobi and Newman argue that in the first decade following the Treaty of Rome, the original six members of the EC were generally supportive of Israel. (Yacobi & Newman, 2008, p. 181)

However, 1967 War was a point that remarked the changing attitude towards Israel and revived individual national European interest towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the eve of the War, Germany insisted to take Rome Summit as an opportunity to develop a single European voice towards the coming war. However, the Six failed to realize it, especially due to De Gaulle’s resistance. At the end, German chancellor Kurt Kiesinger articulated that “I felt ashamed at the Rome summit. Just as the war was on the point of breaking, we could not even agree to talk about it.” (Ifestos, 1987, p. 420)

Consequently, Smith evaluates the failure of Rome Summit to illustrate three important circumstances facing EU governments as they began to think more seriously about coordinating their foreign policies: “First, their positions on important global issues such as the Middle East conflict were clearly, and almost embarrassingly, at odds with each other. Second, the EU lacked any procedures or mechanisms of its own at the time (other than occasional intergovernmental summits) to coordinate such positions. And third, it was not even agreed that the EU was the most appropriate forum for such coordination…” (Smith, 2004, p. 63)
Before 1967 War, the EU was even unable to discuss developing a single European voice towards to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The failure to do so was partly due to their economy-oriented nature of institutionalization, not being a political regional institution, and was partly due to divergences in member state priorities towards the conflicting Parties. Likewise, during the war, some European countries sided with Israel, such as Germany and Holland; whereas others, like France, imposed an arms embargo on the belligerents including Israel that was shocking after years of support to Israel. (Khader, 2013, p. 4) Moreover, some of the member states, such as Belgium, preferred the UN track instead of a European track to guide the peace process. (Soetendorp, 1999, pp. 97-98)

Nevertheless, the failure of having a common European position in the face of 1967 War set the motion to develop a mechanism to coordinate foreign policy positions and increase consultation within the EC. Thanks to promising environment of 1969 the Hague Summit, the EPC was established in 1970. In this manner, Pardo & Peters argue that one of the initial aims of the EPC was to draw up a common set of principles to guide European policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence, Europe’s historical legacy, its geographical proximity to the region and its extensive network of political, economic and cultural ties could explain priority of the Arab-Israeli peace for European common foreign policy initiatives. Therefore, the initial desire of European states to carve out a distinct and common stance toward the Middle East, independent of the superpowers, and to promote a collective role in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be traced back to the early 1970s. (Peters & Pardo, 2010)

Besides the impact of the failure in the 1967 War, the EPC was a result of the French desire to increase its international power through improving the EC’s political coordination. (Smith, 2008, pp. 31-32) If the EC had provided a single voice towards one of the hardest conflicts in international affairs, namely the Arab-Israeli conflict, the actorness of the Community would increase in the eyes of the international community. (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 46) Increasing actorness of the EC
was believed to serve the French interest, considering the dominant role of France in shaping the EC policies. Therefore, France was the most enthusiastic and supportive member of the EC for the establishment of the EPC.

Regarding the intergovernmental nature of the EC, the most suitable policy instrument was issuing declarations under the newly established EPC. Thus, the EC preferred to conduct declaratory policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the first period of the involvement. The first three EC declarations on the Conflict was the 1971 Schuman Paper, the 1973 Brussels Declaration and the 1977 London Statement. To start with the Schuman Paper, there was no convergence among member state policies towards the Conflict at the time it was issued. Despite establishment of the EPC, divergence among member states priorities and preferences continued on issues, such as the status of refugees and Jerusalem. Nevertheless, mainly resulting from France desire to make the Europe as a third major power in the conflict, the Six European members proclaimed the first joint paper reflecting a common perception on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within this Paper, Israel was asked to withdraw from the occupied territories, while Arabs were expected to recognize Israel, based on the UN 242 Resolution. (United Nations Security Council, 1967) As it was in the UN 242 Resolution, the EC did not refer to the Palestinians as a nation, yet defined them as Arab refugees. This very first example actually revealed the fact that the EC declarations in the coming periods would be in line with the UN Resolutions, especially with 242 Resolution.

Another significant point about the Schuman Paper was the internal controversy among the member states on the status of the Schuman document. On the one hand, France argued that it was an official European policy and should be published; while on the other hand, Germany and the Netherlands perceived it as an informal working paper as an informal paper and should not be made public. (Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p. 84) This reservation of Germany and the Netherlands could be interpreted from the perspective of their pro-Israeli stance and possibility of deterioration of their relationship with Israel. Greilsammer and Weiler argued that upon disclosure of its content by German press, despite the agreement on being remained unpublished, the
Paper caused significant amount of opposition among German people, who were generally pro-Israeli. Consequently, German Foreign Minister described it as a working paper rather than an official document, which disturbed France and revealed the limits of a common European policy towards the conflict. (Greilsammer & Weiler, 1987, p. 28)

Enlargement of the EC through membership of Britain, Denmark and Ireland in early 1970’s was prone to serious changes in the foreign policy agenda. Especially admission of Britain to the Community was a factor that complicated decision-making process in the EPC, besides controversies of Germany and France. Accordingly, general support for Israel in the first period of the conflict became questionable with these new memberships, especially with British membership that was neither on the side of Israel nor on the side of Arab states, as well as with the maintenance of Israeli occupation and expanded settlement in the occupied territories. As a result, between 1967 War and 1973 War, "each of the Nine continued to develop a positive reassessment of Arab demands [...] and relations with Israel continued to deteriorate.” (Greilsammer & Weiler, 1987, p. 28)

Actually, there was no difference between 1967 War and 1973 War in terms of divergence among member states’ interest and foreign policies. Whereas France and Italy had a pro-Arab position, West Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands were in support of Israel. However, some developments changed the initial fragmented and considerably varied member state reactions. (Soetendorp, 1999, p. 101) The most significant development was Oil Crisis experienced following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Since the nine EC members were dependent on energy supplies from the Middle East, both to stabilize oil price and ensure supply security (Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p. 85), the oil embargo in a manner forced the member states to take a pro-Arab stance.
More specifically, the EC member states were divided into three by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to implement oil embargo. A ban on oil export was applied to countries in the first category, which were named as “hostile countries”. They were the Netherlands and the US. Countries under the second category was called as neutral states, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg, to which %5 cut-back sanction was implemented. In addition, no sanction was applied to France and Britain, which were categorized as friendly countries under the third category. (Jawad, 1992, p. 67) Accordingly, the oil embargo changed the pattern of relationships with both Israel and the Arab world, and brought about a dramatic shift towards more pro-Arab attitudes; it revealed the extent of European external disunity and generated calls for more integration because of this experience. (Ifestos, 1987, p. 421)

Consequently, 1973 Brussels Declaration was made, which was the first joint declaration of the nine member states that was about the legal rights of Palestinians and common European position towards the Conflict. Hill and Smith list four major points of the future peace agreement, mentioned in the Declaration. They were; inadmissibility of the acquiring of territory by force, the need for Israel to end territorial occupation, respect for each state’s territorial sovereignty and security (right to live in peace within secure and recognized territories) and respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. (Hill & Smith, 2000, p. 300) Besides being clear reflection of Arab demands, it was a turning point after Schuman Paper, since for the first time the term “Palestinian people” was used, instead of “Arab refugees” and Israel openly criticized for the process after 1967 by stating “the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967”. Therefore, the Arabs welcomed this Declaration, while Israelis blamed Europeans for placing their interest in oil over the peace in the Middle East. (Allen & Pijpers, 1984, p. 135)

With the positive wind created by this convergence, the Arab states were welcomed to 1973 Copenhagen Summit, in which the Brussels Declaration was adopted. It was the first time that non-European states were accepted to a European Summit, which was
described by Feld as “ultimate in fawning at the feet of the Arab leaders.” (Feld, 1978, p. 69) At the end of this Summit, the European intention to conduct the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) in order to have comprehensive arrangements comprising cooperation on a wide scale for economic and industrial development, industrial investments, and stable energy supplies to the Member Countries at reasonable prices (The European Communities, 1973) was proclaimed and welcomed by the Arab States. However, there was a salient difference between what the Parties understood from this arrangement. Whereas the EC was interested in providing flow of oil at a reasonable price, the Arab states aimed to gain support for the Palestinian issue. (Çetin, 2005, p. 14) Hence, contrary to economic considerations of the EC, Arab states’ motivation was a political one.

These divergences in motivation prevailed itself from the first ministerial meeting of the EAD in 1974 to the suspension of it in 1979, due to Camp David Accords and expulsion of Egypt from the League. Despite Arab states showed the internal crack in the Arab League as a reason to suspend the EAD, the real reason was their dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Dialogue. Economically oriented perspective of the EC was far away from meeting the political expectations of the Arab states. Moreover, the EC Member States were determined to exclude two significant issues for Arab states from the agenda of the EAD that were the oil problem, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Ifestos, 1987, p. 435) Despite determination of the EC not to politicize the EAD, Arabs put pressure on European states to recognize the PLO and to give up the free trade agreement negotiations with Israel. (Jawad, 1992, p. 94)

Besides the failure of the EC-Arab rapprochement in the framework of the EAD, the period between 1975 and 1977 was not promising for the EC-Israel relations. Despite the fact that a free trade agreement was signed between Israel and the EC in 1975, in which the EC agreed to eliminate all existing trade barriers on Israeli manufacturing good until the end of 1979, political relations were not that promising. Even traditionally pro-Israel countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, adopted more pro-Arab perspective, through harshly criticizing continued Jewish settlements in
occupied territories and supporting legitimacy of Palestinian rights, in the period after 1975. (Greilsammer & Weiler, 1987, p. 35) This intensive change in the European attitude was partly due to the new challenges created by France and Italy. These two put strict pressure on the other member states to have a common Community stance that would call for the explicit realization of the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination. (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 77)

In this manner, what deteriorated the EC-Israel relations more was election of right-wing leader Likud in 1977 elections. Upon this election, the EC issued 1977 London Declaration, which can be classified as a step further than 1973 Declaration, in terms of recognition of Palestinian people and the pro-Palestinian stance of the EC. Significantly, this Declaration remained as the document of the EC official position on the Arab-Israeli conflict, until 1980 Venice Declaration. Together with the London Declaration, the conflict became more oriented to Israeli-Palestinian relations, rather than Arab-Israel one. Hence, the very core of the conflict became the rights of the Palestinian people.

In London Declaration, the EC reemphasized the need to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians “in the establishment of a just and lasting peace”, the significance of the UN 242 and 383 Resolutions for peace settlement, as well as the Arab recognition of “the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.” Moreover, for the first time nine members of the EC called for “the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people” in order to “give effective expression to its national identity”. In addition, they considered that “the representatives of the parties to the conflict including the Palestinian people must participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner to be worked out in consultation between all the parties concerned.” (The European Council, 1977, p. 93)

Consequently, the general content of the Declaration was in the line with Arab demands, since the Palestinian problem became the very core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, instead of secure and recognized borders of Israel. French pressure on the
member states proved to be successful in the London Declaration that leaded more pro-Palestinian perspective of the EC. Hence, 1977 London Declaration was frustrating for Israel and was not satisfactory for the Arab side, due to non-recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people.

Another striking point was Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977 and the following Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. These Accords were actually remarkable to exemplify that bilateral peace dialogues, among conflictual Parties, was prone to provide more successful outcomes than the mediation of external forces. In addition, the US took the foremost role during the rapprochement that advanced the US power in the peace process, in the expense of the EC. Accordingly, the Camp David process was threatening for the EC role in the peace process and the significance of the London Declaration. Though it was not sincere, the EC declared its support to the Process, yet emphasized the significance of the Palestinian problem for a successful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict by describing Camp David as “a first step in the direction of a comprehensive settlement.” In addition, they added that “such a settlement must be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and must translate into fact the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland.” (Hill & Smith, 2000, p. 302)

Accordingly, the EC greeted the “courageous initiative” of President Sadat, whereas it called for a “global settlement” which takes into consideration “the rights and preoccupations of all parties”. Likewise, in the December 1978 meeting of the UN General Assembly, the EC re-affirmed that the “Palestinians Problem” is crucial to the conflict and that “it is increasingly linked to the overall solution of the conflict in the Middle East. (Khader, 2013, p. 6) Hence, the EC support to the Camp David was conditional to be a part of comprehensive peace settlement, based on the principles of the London Declaration.
However, in the late 1979 the EC was in a conviction that there was a need for independent European proposal for peace, separate than the US policy and the Camp David Process. Some other developments in the region, such as 1979 Revolution in Iran, increase of Islamic radicalism, 1979 Invasion of Afghanistan by the SU, upcoming Iran-Iraq War etc., was also played a role for the initiative of European Middle East Peace Initiative. In fact, in the face of these events, European concerns over the oil supply security increased that reemphasized incredibility of the US as the guarantor of security and stability in the Middle East and the necessity of developing a European peace project. (Ifestos, 1987, p. 452) Likewise, Dieckhoff refers to political vacuum created by priority of the situation of Iran and internal developments in the US to explain the context, in which the European Middle East Peace Initiative was initiated. (Dieckhoff, 1987, pp. 262-263)

To sum up, European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the period between 1967 and 1979 was limited to declaratory policy. 1971 Schuman Paper, 1973 Brussels Declaration and 1977 London Declaration were three main instruments used by the EC, in the mentioned period. Other than these statements, no concrete policy instruments were developed to involve into the peace process. Moreover, it is significant to underline that the EC perspective to the conflict changed significantly from Schuman Paper to London Declaration. Namely, the Palestinians were referred as Arab refugees in 1971 Paper, which turned into recognition of legitimate Palestinian rights in 1973 Declaration and the call for Palestinian homeland in 1977 London Declaration to have a long-lasting and just peace in the Middle East.


Despite the fact that Lebanon had played little part in the conflict over Palestine until 1980’s, the presence of the large numbers of Palestinian refugees in the country dragged Lebanon into the center of the conflict in 1980’s. It reached at a point that Begin’s cabinet began to consider an invasion of Lebanon in spring 1982. Upon increasing Palestinian rocket attacks from southern Lebanon to Israel, the Israelis
began a large-scale invasion there in June 1982. The first stated goal of the operation was halting rocket attacks from that area against northern Israel and eliminating the Palestinian fighters there. In addition, Israel hoped to destroy the PLO and other Palestinian resistance in Lebanon altogether and to dismantle its political power. However, Israel achieved none of its goals, except for deaths of many Palestinians and Lebanese and the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut to Tunis. It made the Lebanese political scene was more turbulent than ever, with non-elimination of the PLO and emergence of more radical Islamic resistance against Israeli occupying troops and their Lebanese allies. Indeed, that resistance eventually grew into Hezbollah, backed by Syria and Iran. (Bickerton, 2009, pp. 148-152), (Roberts, 2014, p. xxvi)

The second significant event in the period between 1980 and 1990 was the outbreak of the First Intifada. While intifada means shaking off, it refers to violence in December 1987 initiated by young Palestinian civilians against Israeli forces in the context of Arab-Israeli conflict. The main aim of Palestinians was to establish an independent Palestinian state, yet the outcome of the First Intifada was increased alienation. Besides alienation, Roberts underlines some other outcomes of the Intifada, such as creation a Palestinian national consciousness, making Palestinian statehood a clear objective. In addition, especially the deaths of Palestinian children helped revive international efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and increased pro-Palestinian attitude in international affairs. It also helped return the PLO from its Tunisian exile. Nevertheless, the major outcome of the First Intifada was the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). (Roberts, 2014, p. xxvi)

3.2.1. European Involvement in the Second Period (1980-1990)

As it was stated in the previous section, between 1967 and 1979 the EC perspective towards the Arab-Israeli conflict underwent a notable change. Especially, the Palestinian perception of the EC significantly changed in time from being referred as refugees to recognition of their legitimate rights. At the end, the EC became the defender of the quest for Palestinian homeland. Therefore, the Palestinian problem
became the center of the conflict for the EC within the first decade of its involvement into the conflict. Likewise, Time magazine’s six-page cover story titled with “The Palestinians-Key to a Mideast Peace” in April 1980 indicated the significance of Palestinian cause for the Europe. (Time Magazine, 1980)

In following period, between 1980 and 1990, the EC continued its declaratory policy towards the Conflict in accordance with the UN Resolutions. However, in this period the internal divergences among the member states of the EC were so obvious that the period was characterized by individual member state activism, in line with their national interests, rather than the EC initiatives. Moreover, this conflict of interest between the Nine made the EC initiatives ineffective and unreliable. Consequently, from the early 1970’s to the end of the Cold War in 1990, the EC continued its efforts to develop a common European position regarding the Conflict. Nevertheless, the inconsistency between national state interests and the EC interest became the major reason for the failure of playing a special role and working in a more concrete way towards the Middle East peace. (The Venice Declaration, 1980)

As it was revealed in the previous section, several developments in 1979 convinced the EC to adopt an independent European initiative towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this manner, the EC agreed that “growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.” (The Venice Declaration, 1980) Thus, the Heads of State and Government of the member states met in Venice in 1980 and issued a joint resolution, known as the Venice Declaration. This Declaration is still accepted to determine the European position regarding the conflict. (Peters & Pardo, 2010, p. 7) The most significant points featured in the Declaration, regarding the Palestinians, were the reference to Palestinian right to self-determination, the PLO’s association with the negotiations and the need for basing a just solution to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. On the other hand, the EC underlined its deep concern over continuation of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Thus, it was stated that “the Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in
population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law” and “the Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem.” (The European Council, 1980)

Consequently, the “most fundamental and most far-reaching common policy statement on the Arab-Israeli dispute” at that time was the Venice Declaration. (Soetendorp, 1999, p. 103) Especially inclusion of the PLO to peace negotiations, while it was defined as terrorist organization by Israel and the US, was a step further towards an independent European perspective to the peace process and “contributed to the upgrading of the European role as a diplomatic actor in the international scene.” (Gianniou, 2006, p. 5) Nevertheless, some factors prevented to put what was stated in Declaration into action.

The first reason for this ineffectiveness was dissatisfaction of Palestinians and frustration of Israel and the US with the Venice Declaration. Hence, one of the best explanations regarding the Venice Declaration was “the principal obstacle to peace moves in the region” (Greilsammer & Weiler, 1987, p. 61) The dissatisfaction on the Palestinian side was due to the fact that the PLO was not recognized as the sole representative of Palestinians, as it was demanded by them, yet it was just stated as a party to participate into peace negotiations. In addition, there was no reference in the Venice Declaration to the need for replacement of the word “refugees” with “Palestinians” in the UN 242. (Greilsammer & Weiler, 1987, p. 45)

In addition, Israel and the US harshly criticized the Declaration, which in the eyes of Israelis confirmed Europe’s anti-Israeli bias. (Hollis, 1994, p. 125) Moreover, upon the Venice Declaration Israel harshly stated that: “Nothing will remain of the Venice Resolution but its bitter memory. The Resolution calls upon us, and other nations, to include in the peace process the Arab S.S. known as ‘The Palestine Liberation Organization.’ . . . Israel does not seek a guarantee for its security from any European nation. . . .Any man of good will and any free person in Europe who would examine
In the post-Venice period, the Palestinians were in suspicion of sincerity of the EC and Israelis were persuaded that the EC would pursue an anti-Israeli policy in the coming period. Likewise, the EC made a statement upon Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which was a restatement of the Venice Declaration that called for a “just and lasting peace” and “justice for all peoples, including the right of self-determination for the Palestinian with all that this implies.” (Pardo & Peters, 2012, pp. 168-169) Hence, this statement verified the conviction of Israel that resulted in the loss of the EC’s impartiality and reliability as an actor the Arab-Israeli peace process. Similarly, Peters & Pardo quote Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, who stated that Israel did not regard Europe as a partner and saw it as playing no part in the political process in the Middle East on account of its pro-Palestinian bias. (Peters & Pardo, 2010, p. 9) In addition, the Arab side was convinced about incapability of the EC to take a concrete action in the line with Arab demands, which reduced favorability of the EC as a partner to defend rights of the Palestinians. Consequently, by the end of 1982, the Arabs were criticizing the EC policy, for not going too far in punishing Israel for its illegal practices; the Israelis were convinced that the Europeans were turning their back to them and the Americans were furious at Europe’s quest of autonomy. (Khader, 2013, p. 9)

In the face of another development of the period, which was the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987, the EC did not break its previous line and preferred to stick to the UN framework for the solution. Upon Declaration of Independence of Palestine in 1988, the EC underlined the importance of this proclamation, which “reflects the will of the Palestinian people to assert their national identity and which include positive steps towards the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.” (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 173) Furthermore, in 1989 Madrid Declaration, they indicated their readiness to undertake an active role in mediating between conflictual parties to meet them at the same international negotiation table. (Ifestos, 1987, p. 528) Consequently, the EC tried...
to be an active actor in the peace settlement and do something more concrete than issuing declarations.

On the other hand, the EC was in a lack of required legal and institutional autonomy to act like an actor in the peace process. Its competence was limited to issue declarations and made statements on behalf of its member states. It did not have capacity to take decisions and action independent from its member states that also reduced its credibility in the eyes of the conflictual parties. Consequently, none of the Parties was satisfied with the Venice Declaration and for a decade, the EC was “virtually non-existent”. (Dosenrode & Stubkjaer, 2002, p. 106)

During this period, the EC member states took part in some initiatives to pursue their own national initiatives, rather than supporting a European initiative. The first crack came from Britain, when Margaret Thatcher sided with the US and refused any European initiative, which would be at odds with the US. In addition, France under the Presidency of Mitterrand started to carry out its own national diplomatic initiatives, through which it was seeking to carve out a specific role for itself, eclipsing European Common Policy. (Khader, 2013, p. 8). France, also, together with the UK, Italy and the Netherlands decided to participate in the Multinational Sinai Force and Observers, based on the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Peace Treaty. Therefore, the emergence of a European peace initiative in the Middle East further prevented by individual state actions, independent from the EC. (Kaya, 2012, s. 84)

To sum up, the EC attempt to appear as an independent actor in the peace process of the Arab-Israeli conflict ended with no success in the years between 1980 and 1990. The individual efforts of the member states, especially France, was the preeminent determinant during this period, rather than a collective European initiative. Therefore, there was a continuation in the EC policy between the first period (1967-1979) and the second period (1980-1990), in terms of issuing declarations and releasing joint statements. As Kaya argues, declarations and call to action was the main base of 1980’s European policy. (Kaya, 2017, p. 144) As a result, in the second period, a major role
of mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict could not be attributed to the EC and it was not a visible actor in the Middle Eastern politics. (Laipson, 1990, p. 7), (Greilsammer & Weiler, 1987, p. 103), (Peters, 1999, s. 300)

This failure was mostly due to the institutional and legal inability of the EC to implement what was argued in its declarations. Dieckhoff in this manner rightly argues that the lack of central, supranational and permanent institutional structure that deals with the foreign policy was the major reason that leaded the EC loose power in the face of international conflicts. For instance, the Venice Declaration was not clear through which steps the Palestinian right to self-determination and involvement of the PLO to peace negotiations would be provided. (Dieckhoff, 1987, pp. 275-277) Furthermore, Israeli perception that the EC was pro-Arab and Palestinian perception that the EC was not capable of realizing their demands were two other reasons leading the failure of the EC to achieve its aims in the second period.

Nevertheless, Musu correctly states that the first ‘enemies’ of European foreign policy in most cases were the member states themselves, which turn to EPC and promote it when this is in line with their national foreign policy priorities. However, the member states also did not hesitate to revert to bilateral contacts and initiatives when this was convenient for their national interest. In order to come to this conclusion, he gives examples of France’s insistence on promoting a closer relationship with the Arab States and an independent role for Europe in the Middle East, distancing the EC’s position from the United States’ as much as possible. Consequently, in the second period, “control over foreign policy was obviously still very far from being considered something that could be relinquished in the name of the higher objective of furthering European integration.” (Musu, 2010, p. 42)

3.3. The Third Period: 1991-2004

The two internationally significant events of the third period were the end of Cold War and the end of Gulf War. Besides the fact that the end of the Cold War left the US as
the only super power in the world and in the in the Middle Eastern politics, the end of the Gulf War made it easier for the US to focus into the Arab-Israeli conflict in the regional politics. It was one the first goals of the US government in the post-Cold War era was to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Carbone, 2007, p. 40)

Consequently, 1991 Madrid Conference was convened to get the conflictual parties around the same negotiation table, in which multilateral talks were the method. Besides the sponsorship of the US, Russia was the co-sponsor of the Conference and the EC was responsible from Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). Moreover, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan took part in the Conference together with Israel and Palestine. The PLO did not have an independent representative in there, yet it was a part of Jordanian delegation. During the multilateral talks, Israeli government was replaced by the Labor Party, under Yitzhak Rabin’s leadership, that transformed the environment of negotiations and led to the signature of the Oslo Accords in 1993.

These Accords ended the extended damage in the region and human suffering, stemming from the 1987 First Intifada. The Oslo Accords, sometimes known as Declaration of Principles, were consisted of two parts. In the first part, the PLO and Israel mutually recognized each other and in the second part, the procedures of peace negotiation were listed. After decades of intensive violence between the Parties, the Oslo Accords were a significant development, due to producing a readiness in the both Parties to recognize each other and accept one another's legitimacy, a measure of working trust between the parties, and an openness to cooperation. (Kelman, 2007, p. 291) In this regard, the Parties agreed on that “it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process.” Accordingly, it was stated in the Declaration that a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority would be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 1993)
In the framework of 1993 Oslo Agreement, an Interim Agreement (Oslo II) was signed in 1995, whose main objective was “to broaden Palestinian self-government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority -- the Palestinian Council.” For this end, holding democratic elections to the Palestinian Council, for an interim period no later than May 1999 and redeployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank according to the timetable set out in the agreement and division of the West Bank into three areas were agreed on. (The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 1995)

Nonetheless, contrary to the promising nature of the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, assassination of Israeli Prime Minister in 1995 deteriorated it once more. The main factor under this deterioration was election of Benjamin Netanyahu, who was known for his more conservative and hawkish stance on the peace process, to replace Rabin. (Mahler & Mahler, 2010, p. 26) In a similar manner, Musu argues that between May 1996 and May 1999, Netanyahu’s period in office, the peace process slowed down significantly almost coming to a complete standstill. Furthermore, the new Israeli Prime Minister, Likud, did all he could to delay further Israeli redeployments and to hinder the process towards a definitive peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. (Musu, 2010, p. 58)

Despite the fact that Ehud Barak’s short-lived term in the Israeli Prime Ministry augmented hopes for solution to the Middle East conflict, Ariel Sharon’s leadership destroyed all hopes for peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict in September 2000. Especially his visit to the top of the Temple Mount with approximately 1,000 members of the Israeli police force and proclamation of Israel’s sovereignty over the al-Aqsa and Temple Mount area caused a great reaction among Palestinians. Therefore, Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada) occurred among Palestinian protesters that was confronted with violence by Israeli police. As a result, the Conflict intensified once more and the cycle of Israeli and Palestinian violence spun out of control. When it comes to 2004, Israel decided to leave Gaza to govern itself by withdrawing entirely from Gaza, yet surrounding it thoroughly locking it on its borders. Furthermore, the death of
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in the same year leaded to the term of Mahmoud Abbas in Palestinian Presidency, who promised to advance negotiations with Israel. Thereafter, a cease-fire was achieved that ended the Second Intifada. (Mahler & Mahler, 2010, pp. 26-27)


As it was mentioned, the EC was not an actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1980 and 1990. This was mainly a result of individual efforts of the member states to maximize their national interest, through involving into the Conflict actively, in a way at the expense of the EC. After 1990, the world was changing with the end of the Cold War and the region was changing with the end of the Gulf War. In this context, in the third period between 1991 and 2004, the EC had the opportunity to go beyond just issuing declarations and take an active involvement in the Conflict. Therefore, the bipolar structure of the Cold War ended in 1990 that could provide the required context to the EC to appear as an actor in the Conflict.

On the contrary, in this new environment the EC was only able to secure a minor role for itself as an observer, a clear sign of its marginalization. (Gomez, 2003, p. 124) The US appeared as the sole superpower in the context of the Conflict, besides the preeminent role in the world and in the Middle East. Taking the significance of ending the Arab-Israeli Conflict for the US, following the end of the Gulf War, 1991 Madrid Conference was convened under its sponsorship. While Russia was the co-sponsor of the Conference, the EC was only participant into the multilateral talks, which were on economic, social and environmental issues, contrary to political nature of the bilateral talks. The EU’s task was to chair the REDWG; hence, the EC took upon financial responsibility of the peace process. It supported financially several grandiose aid projects, especially regarding the setting up of the Palestinian Authority. (Youngs, 2006, p. 146) The EC was the financial sponsor of almost half of the total economic aid granted to the Palestinians throughout the peace process. (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 282)
Nevertheless, the EC was not a successful in turning this economic power into a political power. The real reason for this outcome was internal conflict among the EU members. Even during the Gulf War, the EC announced to launch a European peace initiative for the Arab-Israeli conflict once the war was over. However, the member states were divided over its substance. On the one side, there was a proposal based on the principles of Venice, which was supported by France; while on the other side, there was a proposal supported by Britain and Germany that was based on joining the newly emerging American initiative. Therefore, the member states divided among themselves whether to walk in an independent European path or join the American initiative. Consequently, internal diversification in the EU in the period preceding the Madrid Conference reduced the European political power during the Conference. Likewise, in a report published by the European Parliament it was admitted that internal division and conflict of interest among member states were the first and main reason that prevented the EC turn its economic power into the political one. (European Parliament Directorate General for Research, 1999, pp. 26-27) Another factor that diminished the power of the EC as an actor of the peace process was the US desire of multilateralism in the Middle East. Under this new design, greater role for Arab states and new actors, such as Japan and Canada, were planned that was in the expense of the EC power. (Soetendorp, 2002, p. 286)

Almost one year later it was clear that the peace process started with the Madrid Conference was about to collapse. However, a secret negotiation platform was active between Israel and the PA, which leaded to the signature of Oslo Accords in 1993. As it was in the Madrid, the EU adopted a suggestion that the Oslo Accords would not be successful unless they would result in a practical improvement of the day-to-day life of the people in the region. In this manner, the EU contribution to the peace process over 1.68 bn European Currency Units (ECU) between 1994 and 1997. (European Parliament Directorate General for Research, 1999, p. 32) In addition, following the Oslo Agreement, EU was the most important donor for a peaceful settlement of Palestinian-Israeli dispute. In fact, the EU provided 45% of the financial aid to the Palestinians within the framework of peace process. (Özcan, 2005, p. 157)
Consequently, the EU’s role as the economic benefactor of the peace process was augmented with the Oslo process.

Upon 1993 Oslo Accords, the EU issued a declaration, in which the European financial contribution to the peace process was emphasized and political support and participation into further international arrangements for the MEPP were offered to the Parties. The EU also reiterated its commitment to a comprehensive peace through bilateral negotiations and in the multilateral talks on future cooperation by underlining its role as a chairman of the REDWG. Finally the EC stated its intention to maintain its substantive contribution to the peace process. (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 194) In a similar manner, the EU wanted to be the coordinator and the manager of aid to the Palestinian Authority, considering its huge amount of financial contribution the peace process. In this regard, the EU offered to handle the coordination under a sub-committee within the REDWG. However, the US convened the donor’s conference, in which the World Bank became the coordinator, instead of the EU. (Altunışık, 2008, p. 108)

Hence, as it was in the Madrid Process, the EU was politically sidelined from the peace process, while it was the most significant actor in terms of financial contribution. As a result, both in Madrid and in Oslo processes the EU was not able to act like an actor. It was the one to pay the bill and contribute to the implementation of the agreement, without taking part in decision making mechanism. (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 286) By believing that the main obstacle to the EU actorness was its lack of military capabilities and sufficient political instruments (Özcan, 2005, p. 156), the EU indulged in a process of institutional development. The first one was the Maastricht Treaty, in which the EC evolved into the EU and the CFSP was established. While creation of the EU contributed to political integration, the CFSP was believed to increase actorness of the EU. The CFSP was especially significant for the EU’s aspirations of playing a more relevant role in the Middle East, by creating one voice Europe in foreign and security affairs. (Musu, 2007, p. 17)
For the same aim with the CFSP, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), widely known as the Barcelona Process was initiated in 1995. Although the stated aim of the EMP was to increase partnership with the Mediterranean countries in general, its link with the European aim of being an actor in the MEPP was clear. Consequently, Persson argues that the main objective the EMP was to improve the Union’s actorness in the peace process in political, economic and social-cultural terms. (Persson, 2015, p. 119)

Together with this initiative, the EU tried to lead an independent peace process from the US, thus its aim was to consolidate its power in the Middle East politics. To achieve this, a European path was preferred, in which the importance of support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society were emphasized and the essential contribution of civil society to development was explicitly acknowledged. (Schlumberger, 2011, p. 140)

Therefore, a peaceful solution was offered in the EMP framework to the Arab-Israeli conflict, through supporting European norms and values as an achievable target. The European Commission began to allocate money to the peace process, as part of its assistance under the Mediterranean Economic Development Area (MEDA) program, within the context of the EMP. The objective of MEDA was to support the peace process economically so that Israel and Arab countries would increase their regional cooperation in environment, health, legal matters, economics, education, media etc. Consequently, similar to its role as the financial sponsor of Madrid and Oslo processes, the EU’s economic power constituted the backbone of the EMP. (Altunışık, 2008, p. 109)

Peters, in this manner, argues that the Barcelona process was a mirroring initiative of the US initiatives, due to the Post-Cold War security concerns of the EU. (Peters, 1998, p. 71) The EU aimed to imitate multilateral approach of the Madrid and Oslo processes in the EMP to achieve its security interests in the region. In addition, it tried to make use of its existing non-military capacity, such as proving economic aid and stressing the significance of European norms and values, to have a sustainable peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Despite the fact that it became an alternative platform to bring conflictual Parties together to negotiate, election of Netanyahu broke the rapprochement. Unwillingness of the EU members to use the EMP as an instrument to change Netanyahu’s policies towards the Palestinians and statements distinguishing the EMP from the MEPP reduced its impact. (Hollis, 1997, p. 25) From other perspective, the main reason for inefficiency of the EMP was its limited impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict. (Asseburg, 2003, p. 174) As a result, the first independent initiative of the EU did not go beyond the impact of issuing declarations. The EMP was not successful to meet the expectations and totally failed with the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

Nevertheless, the EU was still ambitious to turn its payer status to player in the MEPP, thus another initiative was initiated that would make the EU more noticeable actor in the region. Therefore, a special European envoy to the peace process was appointed in 1996 Luxembourg meeting. The special envoy was Miguel Angel Moratinos, who had a knowledge about the Arab-Israeli conflict and experience in the field as the former ambassador of Spain to Israel. Besides his personal potential to augment the EU’s reliability in the region, the presence of a special envoy allowed European Middle East policy to become more visible to regional and extra-regional actors. In addition, the special envoy helped the EU policy became more responsive to developments in the peace process. Moreover, thanks to the special envoy, specific areas were identified, where Europe can undertake practical measures to help build confidence between the parties and support agreements reached. (Peters, 2000, p. 160) Contrary to all these positive contribution of Morantinos to the EU involvement in the Conflict, he remained as a complementary actor to the US special envoy, not a challenge to the US political power on the Parties. As a result, Peters and Pardo argue that even with the appointment of the special envoy, the EU was unable to achieve any defined role for itself to influence events. Likewise, in the Camp David meeting, which was about to discuss final status issues, the EU played no part in the proceedings, and watched firmly from the sidelines. (Peters & Pardo, 2010, p. 13)
Upon the failure of special envoy to give the desired results, the EU took more concrete steps. Adding to the establishment of the CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty, establishing the CFSP, the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999, introduced a further CFSP instrument, which was the common strategy. The Mediterranean, including the peace process and the Barcelona process, had been identified as one of the four regions on which this new instrument should focus. (European Parliament Directorate General for Research, 1999, p. 104) Moreover, in 1999 Javier Solana was appointed as the High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, which increased the EU involvement in the peace process with more solid representation mechanism.

The office of High Representative was established in accordance with Article 26 of Amsterdam Treaty, together with an authority to command a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit that would jointly monitor and analyze international developments. Moreover, the High Representative was to provide assessments on events, which may have significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy, including potential political crises. (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997) Obviously, the aim of appointment of Solana was to improve the capacity of the EU to speak with one voice and to operate on the international stage as a unified actor. (Soetendorp, 2002, p. 284) Therefore, the EU policy towards the peace process became more solid in terms of institutionalism in the late 1990’s.

On the other hand, institutional changes and attempts for visibility in the region could not be supported with policy instruments. The EU continued to use the same instruments with the previous decades, namely issuing declarations / statements and providing financial aid. One of these statements was within the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, titled with the “Call for Peace in the Middle East”. In this statement, the member states called on the people and governments of the Middle East to renew the spirit of mutual confidence in Madrid and in Oslo that raised hopes of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region. Besides giving reference to 1995 EMP initiative, the member states underlined the necessity and urgency of peace in the Arab-
Israeli conflict for the security of all. The peace should be based on the principles stated in the previous the EU declarations, such as the right of all States and peoples in the region to live in peace within safe, recognized borders; respect for the legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people to decide their own future; the exchange of land for peace; the non-acceptability of the annexation of territory by force etc. (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997)

Additionally, the EU called upon the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to continue the negotiations to further the implementation of the Interim and Hebron Agreements and to resume talks on the Permanent Status. While the member states were calling the Israel to recognize the right of the Palestinians to exercise self-determination, without excluding the option of a State, the Palestinian people were asked to reaffirm their commitment to the legitimate right of Israel to live within safe, recognized borders. The EU also reemphasized its determination to continue its efforts for the peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict through, diplomatic relations and economic involvement, relations of friendship and trust with the parties. (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997)

In a similar manner, in 1998 the EU issued a statement, in which it warmly welcomed the signature of the Wye River Memorandum between Netanyahu and Arafat. The leaders of Israel and the Palestine were congratulated for their courage and sense of responsibility that was expected to open the door to the early resumption of the negotiations. The EU reemphasized its firm commitment to a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East based on the Madrid and Oslo Accords, by underlying positive contribution being made by EU Special Envoy Ambassador Moratinos to the peace process. Therefore, it was argued that “The European Union has much to offer to the success of the Peace Process and is determined to continue playing its full part, enhancing it in all its aspects. Furthermore, recognizing the importance of a sound economy to social and political stability among the Palestinian people, the European Union will continue its considerable economic and technical assistance and looks to Israel to meet its responsibilities in promoting conditions for economic development.” (The European Union, 1998)
Indeed, above-mentioned declarations were a mere repetition of what had been articulated so far by the EU. However, 1999 Berlin Declaration was a critical point for the EU policy towards the peace process. The member states promised to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles on the condition to reflect the principles of ‘land for peace’ and ensure the security both collective and individual of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. Through this promise for recognition, the EU tried to prevent unilateral declaration of Palestinian state and keep the Parties within the track of mutually agreed peace conditions. As a result, the EU called upon the parties to reaffirm their commitments to the basic principles established within the framework of Madrid, Oslo and subsequent agreements, in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Nevertheless, it was underlined that the Palestinian right to a state was not subject to any veto. (Berlin European Council Presidency Conclusions, 1999) At the end, the declaration of Palestinian statehood was postponed, which made the Berlin Declaration as one of the rare occasions, upon which the EU had direct diplomatic impact. (Stetter, 2007, p. 118)

Considering usage of financial aid as an instrument, the EU continued to be the biggest donor of the peace process. This continuation is explained by Al-Fattal with a combination of the Palestinian need for money, the US and Israeli desire to find someone to pay the bills and the EU desire to act actively in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (Al-Fattal, The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory, 2010, p. 12) Since the EU’s political power is limited by the member states’ willingness to share their national power with the Union, economic power was the only one that could help the EU provide to the peace process. Accordingly, contrary to institutional strengthen of the EU between 1990 and 2000; it could not change the situation from “aid instead of politics” (Le More, 2008, p. 84) to aid for the sake of politics.

Political limitations of the EU policy between 1990 and 2000 was once again the result of internal conflict among member state policies. More specifically, the French President Jacques Chirac initiated “new Arab policy”, which aimed reasserting an
active and influential role for France in the region. The French way to implement this new policy was through affecting the EU policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in accordance with its new Arab policy. Whereas, some EU members expressed their disapproval of France’s active diplomacy on their behalf. The more France get political power would mean the less the other member states able to realize their national interest in the region. Thus, particularly Germany and Great Britain have been reluctant to allow the EU to develop its Middle East policies in the line with French priorities. Consequently, the EU actions in response to the impasse in the peace process in the late 1990s remained extremely modest. (Wood, 1998, p. 569)

The failure of Camp David Summit, the change in the US priorities in the Middle East after 9/11 terrorist attacks and outbreak of the Second Intifada weakened the hopes for the perpetual peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 2000’s. Consequently, from the very beginning of 2000’s, it was clear that it would be a hard decade for the EU in the Middle East, despite the Arab tendency in the region that favored much stronger EU involvement in the peace process. Besides regional turbulence, the EU’s internal split on many of the relevant issues was another factor that made it hard for the EU achieve its regional aims. For instance, President Chirac’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in October 2000 set it back rather than advancing the EU’s chances of exerting any immediate influence on the peace process.” (Allen & Smith, 2001, p. 107) Furthermore, in 2002 France took the initiative for Palestinian elections and the declaration of a Palestinian state as a catalyst for the peace process. Under this initiative, France proposed two new ideas to break the political deadlock and re-establish a real dynamic for peace in the Middle East. The first one was about the organization of elections in the Palestinian territories based on the theme of peace and the second one was about the recognition of the Palestinian state as a starting point of a negotiating process. (Non Paper on the Revival of a Dynamics of Peace in the Middle-East, 2002)
However, the other member states did not welcome this initiative, especially Germany and Britain. While Germany was underlining the significance of security concerns over the political problems, Britain was in favor of acting in the line with the US policies. In addition, Italy and Belgium was supporting to adopt an international approach to the Conflict, whereas Spain was in the idea to develop more the EU based approach. (Islam, 2002) Accordingly, internal conflict of the EU member prevented them to adopt a common policy in the beginning of 2000’s. Similarly, Musu argues that due a number of clashes among member states, the EU was not able to agree on a common strategy for the peace process. In addition, a diplomatic mission, the CFSP High Representative and the Spanish Presidency were not allowed by Israel to meet Arafat in Ramallah. Consequently, the EU decided to renounce launching another independent peace plan and to back the US peace initiative that led to the creation of the Madrid Quartet. (Musu, 2010, p. 66)

Therefore, the internal disagreements and failures of proposed meditation added to already unstable nature of the Conflict in the early 2000’s. Consequently, in the Seville Declaration of 2002, the EU emphasized the significance of multilateral framework to find a durable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was stated that: “The crisis in the Middle East has reached a dramatic turning point. Further escalation will render the situation uncontrollable…There is an urgent need for political action by the whole international community. The Quartet has a key role to play in starting a peace process. (The Council of the European Union, 2002) In this regard, the EU preferred to enter into multilateral framework of the Middle East Quartet in 2002, instead of pursuing another unilateral initiative. The Quartet was composed of the EU, the UN, the US and Russia. The EU’s participation into Quartet is described by the International Crisis Group as a Faustian bargain, which means sacrificing autonomy for a place at the table. Likewise, a European diplomat argued that “the best they (the EU) could do was to try to ‘civilize’ the US”. (The International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 35) Therefore, through this membership to the Quartet, the EU accepted to achieve a secondary role to the US in the peace process, for the sake of having a political role.
The foremost action of the Quartet was declaration of “The Roadmap for peace in the Middle East” in 2003. The Roadmap had three phases to achieve the two-state solution in 2005, with strict timelines and due dates for each phase as well as mutual duties for each Party. For the first phase, the Palestinians were called immediately to undertake an unconditional cessation of violence; in return, Israel was to take all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life, withdraw from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and freeze all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report. The second phase was thought to start after Palestinian elections and end with possible creation of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Consequently, permanent status agreement between Israel and Palestine was planned to be in 2005, through consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions and sustained efficiency of Palestinian security performance. (The Quartet, 2002)

Despite its ambitious agenda, the Road Map actually did not offer practical solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, since it was just a multilateral repetition of what had the EU done unilaterally so far. In other words, it was more declaratory policy than practical. Likewise, Phillips argues that “the roadmap is more of a wish list of negotiating goals than a blueprint for achieving peace. Although the Israelis and Palestinians have conditionally accepted it, much arduous diplomatic spadework is necessary to flesh out the details of its vague outlines.” (Phillips, 2003) Furthermore, Nabulski criticizes non-practical nature of the Road Map with her article titled with ‘a road map to Mars’, in which she argues that “after several hours of careful analysis of the strategic, practical, tactical and ethical viability of this initiative…still unable to find a single positive indicator that it could be successfully implemented.” (Nabulski, 2004, p. 221) As a result, its detailed list of phases and timeframes to achieve the final goal of permanent peace in the region were not supported with concrete practical steps that were possible to implement. Consequently, in the two years’ period until the determined date for the final agreement, the Roadmap did not get somewhere, which made the multilateral initiative for peace meaningless.
The Road Map was actually an initiative based on German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s ‘seven-point plan’ to achieve what the US President George Bush called for in his July 2002 speech. The Danish EU presidency added substance and timeframe to the Fischer seven-point plan to operationalize Bush’s two-state vision. (Musu, 2010, p. 70) Therefore, the EU achieved for the first time a political role in the peace process under the Quartet, despite being only a complementary one to the US. On the other hand, the EU’s political role in the formulation of the Road Map did not continue in the aftermath of its declaration. For instance, the EU was not allowed to be a part of 2003 Aqaba meeting or the 2007 Annapolis conference or the 2009 direct negotiations in Washington or the 2013–2014 direct negotiations between the parties under U.S. leadership. (Persson, 2015, p. 119) Thus, even the complementary actoriness of the EU under the Quartet framework was questionable.

Besides the US unilateral actions under the framework of the Quartet that sidelined the EU, deterioration of relations between the US and two influential members of the EU, namely France and Germany, due to tensions over Iraq, made it harder for the EU to keep the US track on the peace process. (Altunışık, 2008, p. 111) Accordingly, in the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, the EU reinitiated “its readiness to contribute in all aspects of the implementation of the roadmap… and to take initiatives aiming at the creation of the necessary bridges among representatives of the civil society of the two sides.” (Thessaloniki European Council Presidential Conclusions, 2003, pp. 22-24) Hence, after its experience in a multilateral initiative and its inefficiency to provide the desired results for the EU, it returned its unilateral declaratory policy.

Consequently, the EU adopted a new initiative in 2004 towards the Mediterranean region that was the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The objective of the ENP is “to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation.” In addition, the ENP was believed to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Strategic
Partnership for the Middle East. (European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, 2004) Action Plans developed and implemented under the ENP supported the Israel-EU partnership in terms of economics, whose provisions are reflective of the scope and growing importance of Europe to the Israeli economy. (Peters & Pardo, 2010, p. 62) In addition, they contributed to Palestine-EU relations through supporting Palestine to meet the Road Map requirements. For instance, a representative of the ENP was ready on Palestine Presidential Elections in 2005, upon the death of Arafat in 2004, to make sure that the elections were contribute to democracy and stability in the Palestinian territories, as it was determined in the Road Map.

As a conclusion, the end of the Cold War and bipolarity experienced in the Middle East politics was an opportunity for the EU to pursue more active foreign policy in the peace process and increase its actorness. Hence, the EU had a chance to take more concrete steps in the Arab-Israeli conflict than issuing declarations and providing aid. On the contrary, the EU’s opportunity for actorness was prevented by the active US policy in the region and the internal division between the member state interests. Despite the fact that the EU was much more active in the peace process in the third period, it was not able to achieve an independent actorness.

Starting with the Madrid Process in 1991, the EU was excluded from the bilateral political dimension of the peace process and became responsible from financial issues. The EU was expected to undertake financial sponsorship of the Madrid within multilateral track, without a room for maneuver to turn its economic power to a political one. In 1995, the EMP was initiated as an alternative forum to bring conflictual parties together in the framework of peace process. Despite its partial success to provide a complementary platform to the US led initiatives, conjectural developments and internal disagreements among the member states resulted in its collapse. In the line with the Union’s aim to increase its actorness in the peace process, firstly a Special Envoy and then a High Representative of CSFP were appointed. These posts were significant in contributing to visibility of the EU in the region and its desire of the one voice Europe in foreign affairs.
Actually, these new posts were a part of general institutional change in the EU starting with the Maastricht Treaty. The CFSP was established with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as the biggest step towards creating a common European foreign policy, which was strengthened with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, through introducing new further CFSP instruments. On the other hand, institutional changes and attempts for visibility in the region could not be supported with policy instruments. The EU continued to use the same instruments with the previous decades, namely issuing declarations / statements and providing financial aid. For instance, “Call for Peace in the Middle East” in 1997, 1998 statement upon the signature of the Wye River Memorandum and 1999 Berlin Declaration were issued as policy instruments in the third period. In addition, the EU continued to be the biggest donor of the peace process.

The biggest challenge for the EU to adopt more concrete policy instruments in the peace process was internal conflict among member states. The individual initiatives of member states to maximize their national interest highly prevented the EU from developing new and tangible policy instruments. In order to overcome this deadlock, the EU decided to take part in a multilateral initiative. Thus, the EU participated the Quartet, together with the US, Russia and the UN, instead of developing new unilateral initiatives. Despite the fact that the EU gained some political presence within the Quartet, its role remained secondary to the US and did not involve actual mediation role on the ground. In addition, the EU was not even able to play its secondary role within the Quartet, due to preeminence of the unilateral US actions that reduced the motivation for the EU to keep multilateral track. Furthermore, the tension between the US and some the EU member states over the Iraqi War in 2003 made it harder for the EU to maintain its multilateral policy. Therefore, the EU returned its unilateral initiatives towards the peace process with the establishment of the ENP in 2004.

As a result, the EU’s unassertive existence in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the previous periods started to change in the third period with an increase in visibility, representation and institutional structure. Nevertheless, it was still not possible to identify the EU as an independent and prominent actor in the Middle East politics.
Musu explains this situation by stating, “European influence in the conflict has been hampered by the cumbersome structures of Brussels’ diplomacy and even more by the continued predominance of different and diverging national agendas.” (Musu, 2010, p. 73) The consistency in using traditional policy instruments and the member state resistance to developing more tangible instruments were main limitations of the EU to acquire political actorness. Therefore, in the third period, the US was still the only prominent actor of the Arab-Israeli conflict resolution, despite conjectural changes in the region and institutional changes in the EU.


The first significant development in the fourth period was the election of Mahmoud Abbas in 2005, upon the death of Yasser Arafat. During the election campaign, he promised to advance negotiations with Israel and shortly thereafter his Presidency; the militant groups in the al-Aqsa Intifada agreed to a cease-fire with Israeli troops. (Mahler & Mahler, 2010, p. 30) Another promising development in 2005 was the implementation of Israeli unilateral withdrawal plan. In August 2005 all settlers were evacuated from the Gaza Strip (and four settlements in the West Bank), ending thirty years of Jewish presence. (Bickerton, 2009, p. 200) Therefore, the security situation in Israel and the West Bank improved significantly in 2005, due to Arafat’s death, Abbas’ declaration of an end to the intifada/ to armed confrontation with Israel, Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and the building of the separation barrier/wall. (Persson, 2015, p. 97)

However, 2006 would be the year of crisis in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Firstly, Israel lashed out at Hezbollah on the Lebanese border after the kidnapping of several Israeli soldiers. Despite Israeli success in the military terms, the kidnapped soldiers kept missing that was perceived as the failure at a major military objective that rocked the government internally. In the same year, Palestinians went to the poll for the Palestinian legislative elections. The result was shocking for the West, since the radical Islamist terrorist organization won the majority and became the prime minister. In fact,
the Palestinians were frustrated with the lack of infrastructure, rampant graft, and an ongoing and apparently insolvable enmity with Israel in the previous governments and many of them perceived Hamas as a grassroots organization embracing reassuringly Muslim values. In addition, the Palestinians needed Hamas for returning pride and honor to Palestinians who feel humiliated for decades of subjugation. (Mahler & Mahler, 2010, p. 30)

Most of the West promptly shunned the Hamas-led government and cut off all funding to the Palestinians. With the lack of financial aid, a crash started between Fatah under Abbas and Hamas. In June 2007, Hamas took over Gaza completely, leaving only the West Bank to Abbas. Western governments resumed their aid to the PA, but not the Hamas, while radical Iran provided substantial financial assistance to the Hamas rulers in Gaza. However, Gaza was prevented from international aid, due to control of Hamas. (Roberts, 2014, p. xxvii) In 2007, the US articulated its plans for an Annapolis Peace Conference, in which for the first time both sides came to negotiations agreeing upon a two-state solution. Annapolis Conference was also noteworthy for the number of participants who appeared and the inclusion of a number of Arab nations that had not actively participated in the peace process before. (Mahler & Mahler, 2010, p. 31)

Taking the advantage of the positive environment in the conflict after the Annapolis Conference, in early January 2008 George Bush arrived in Israel and the Palestine, where he stated that they were in the era of a ‘new opportunity’ for peace between Israelis and Palestinians. However, in mid-April 2008 the Israeli housing ministry invited tenders for the construction of 100 new homes at the settlements of Ariel and El Kana in the northern-occupied West Bank, despite the agreement on a freeze on settlement activity. (Bickerton, 2009, p. 207) Furthermore, Gaza continued to be under blockage with the burden of closed borders, no income, and no infrastructure, whereas the PA was busy with its own issues of poor organization, corruption, and Israeli interference. From other perspective, Israeli citizens continue to live with the constant
threat of suicide bombs and complete annihilation from bombastic leaders of neighboring countries. (Mahler & Mahler, 2010, p. 31)

Despite six-month ceasefire in 2008, Hamas and Israel confronted in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009, called as Operation Cast Lead. Contrary to the military victory of Israel, this war harmed international reputation of Israel and turned international public opinion against Israel, due to high Palestinian casualties. It also allowed Hamas to escape the impending failure of its governance in the Gaza Strip and to improve its position by withstanding the Israeli attack. Furthermore, Hamas managed to prevent a major split in the movement and to maintain its cohesion into a hardliner faction, which is more willing to continue the fight. (Walther, 2010, pp. 123-124) In February 2009, the hardline Likud politician Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister in Israel that marked a period of lessened hopes for peace. Despite his endorsement of the concept of a Palestinian state publicly, his vision of Palestinian state was a demilitarized one, not an acceptable option for the Palestinians. (Roberts, 2014, p. xxviii)

3.4.1. European Involvement in the Fourth Period (2005-2009)

The European perception towards the developments in the fourth period was positive at the beginning. The EU Commission stated in a communication: “Following a period of almost five years of terrorism, violence, destruction of infrastructure and economic decline in the West Bank and Gaza, 2005 has witnessed a concerted effort to advance the peace process.” (Commission of the European Communities, 2005) They especially evaluated Israel’s decision on disengagement from the Gaza Strip and parts of the Northern West Bank as a significant step for a sustained peace in the region. (Commission of the European Communities, 2005) However, the EU support for disengagement was conditional on its compliance with the provisions of the Road Map. For the EU, the disengagement must meet the five conditions of taking place in the context of the Roadmap; being a step towards a two-State solution; not involving a transfer of settlement activity to the West Bank; having an organized and negotiated
handover of responsibility to the Palestinian Authority; the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Gaza by Israel. (Council of the European Union, 2004)

Likewise, on 15 November 2005, the EU High Representative for the CFSP and the EU Presidency issued a joint statement, in which signature of “Agreement on Movement and Access from and to Gaza” between Israel and Palestine was welcomed. Besides emphasizing the significance of this agreement for peace in the conflict, they expressed the EU’s willingness in principle to provide assistance with the operation of crossing at Gaza’s borders. (Pardo & Peters, 2012, p. 389) Furthermore, the EU continued to be the biggest donor to the Palestinians in the fourth period, increasingly humanitarian aid after the Second Intifada. As a trend in EU funding from 2002 to 2008, it nearly doubled between 2002 and 2003, before quadrupling the following the year. In 2004, it tremendously increased almost to 7 Million Dollars of direct funding. While it started to decrease in 2005, upon victory of Hamas and its non-compliance with the Quartet’s principles, the aid to the PA freeze in 2006. (Voir & Tartir, 2009, p. 57)

Consequently, the beginning of the fourth period showed consistency in terms of the EU policy instruments towards the Conflict with the previous periods, as the EU continued to issue declarations and provide financial aid. Nevertheless, the fourth period also witnessed some novelties in the European involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Namely, the first European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) mission was launched in the region, following the 2005 Agreement between Israel and Palestine in the framework of the Council of the EU declaration on 21 November 2005. In this declaration, the Council of the EU agreed that the EU should undertake the third-party role proposed. Consequently, the EU decided to launch the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah crossing point, code-named EUBAM Rafah, to monitor the operations of this border crossing point. The aim of the mission was to contribute to the opening of the crossing point and to build confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in co-operation with the European Union's institution building efforts. (The European Union, 2010)
The roots of the ESDP dated back to 2000 as a key element of the CFSP, yet its first employment in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was possible in 2005 with the surprising agreement between conflictual Parties. As a result, with EUBAM Rafah in 2005, the EU took a step to change its traditional declaratory policy with an action policy through actual deployment of its security forces for crisis management and conflict resolution. Though the first ESDP mission was limited in scope, it remarked a turning point in the EU CFSP, with being the first military deployment under the command of a European general. Musu argues that “only a few months before such a proposal would have been unthinkable: the EU had long voiced its wish to be involved more directly in the security dimension of the peace process, but both Israeli and American opposition had rendered this by and large unfeasible.” (Musu, 2010, p. 74)

Despite the fact that it became suspended on June upon undertake of Hamas’s over Gaza and closure of the Rafah on June 2007, EUBAM Rafah was an unprecedented success in the CFSP of the EU.

Adding to EUBAM Rafah, another EU mission under the CSDP was employed in the Palestinian territories in 2005, named EUPOL COPPS (Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support). The EU defined EUPOL COPPS as an expression of the EU's continued readiness to support the Palestinian Authority in complying with its Roadmap obligations, in particular with regard to ‘security’ and ‘institution building’. It was the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, to assist the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future State of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice under Palestinian ownership and in accordance with the best international standards. Currently, the EUPOL COPPS is working with the key Palestinian Criminal Justice Institutions (CJIs) in developing a coherent legal framework. (The European Union, 2013)

Therefore, a security perspective was added to the EU policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Within this dimension, the continuous emphasis of the EU both in EUBAM Rafah and in EUPOL COPPS was remarkable to point its commitment to multilateral aims through using unilateral means. Actually, it is an understandable devotion,
considering the fact that three years’ membership in the Quartet increased reliability of the EU in the eyes of the conflictual parties. Through taking the advantage of this position, the EU had a chance to take some steps towards realizing its long desired dream of being an actor. Without disregarding the impact of promising nature of relations between the Parties on the EU’s advanced role in the peace process, what contributed most to the EU actorness was its Quartet membership.

In terms of economic involvement of the EU to the conflict, the ENP constituted the framework of the fourth period. The trade relations between the EU and Israel improved after 2005 in the framework of the ENP, while relations between the EU and Palestine acquired a new context other than aid with the help of the ENP. Both of these conflictual Parties were in the first round of countries agree on the ENP Action Plans. According to Action Plan, Israel became eligible to receive funds from the new financial instrument of the ENP, called ENPI, and as of 2007, 2 Million Euro per year was allocated to it. (Altunışık, 2008, p. 113)

From perspective of Palestinians, the implementation of the Action Plan was conditional on continuity of reforms to develop respect for democracy, human rights and financial accountability. Therefore, Tocci argues, “the ENP benefits to Palestine are hardly discernible. At best, the Union, through its Action Plans with both Israel and the PA, could push for the implementation of the trade aspects in the existing EC–PLO interim agreement.” (Tocci, 2007, p. 114) Consequently, ambivalence in the implementation of the ENP between Parties and more conditional nature of the Palestinian Action Plan reduced the reliability of the EU as an actor and made its sincerity in the conflict resolution questionable.

Victory of Hamas in Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 and its office in prime ministry constituted a turning point for the EU involvement into the Conflict. The first reaction of the EU was actually positive about the way elections were held. The EU High Representative Solana issued a statement on 26 January 2006, in which he argued “the Palestinian people have voted democratically and peacefully. I welcome this. The
European Union has supported the smooth running of these elections.” (Solana, 2006) Likewise, at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting on 30 January 2006, the foreign ministers of EU Member States welcomed the elections and congratulated President Abbas and the Palestinian people on an electoral process that was free and fair. They also added “violence and terror are incompatible with democratic processes and urged Hamas and all other factions to renounce violence, to recognize Israel's right to exist, and to disarm. The Council expects the newly elected PLC to support the formation of a government committed to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict with Israel based on existing agreements and the Roadmap as well as to the rule of law, reform and sound fiscal management.” (Council of the European Union, 2006) Consequently, the EU underlined the significance of implementing the Road Map principles for Hamas in order to be recognized as a legitimate governor.

However, Hamas ruled government in Palestine refused to comply with what the EU and the Quartet asked to do. Therefore, at the GAERC meeting on 10-11 April 2006, the EU foreign ministers put forward their concern “that the new Palestinian government has not committed itself to the three principles laid out by the Council and the Quartet in their statements of 30 January: nonviolence, recognition of Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of existing agreements. It urged the new Palestinian government to meet and implement these three principles and to commit to President Abbas' platform of peace.” (Council of the European Union, 2006) Since, the EU indicated compliance with these three principles as a condition for future financial aid, it suspended further direct aid to Hamas-led Palestinian government after its refusal to implement these principles.

This suspension deteriorated already bottlenecked economic situation in the Palestinian territories that led to a humanitarian crisis for the Palestinian people. By observing this situation, the Quartet expressed serious concern about deteriorating conditions, such as delivery of humanitarian assistance, economic life, social cohesion, and Palestinian institutions, in the West Bank and Gaza, particularly in Gaza.
Therefore, establishment of a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) was proposed by the Quartet, which would be limited in scope and duration, operate with full transparency and accountability, and ensure direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people. In this manner, the EU became voluntary to develop and propose such a mechanism. (The Quartet, 2006) Accordingly, TIM was established on the one hand to prevent a total collapse of the PA, while on the other hand to make sure that money should not reach to the pocket of Hamas. Indeed, through TIM, 455.5 Million Euro from the EU budget; and 188 Million Euro from EU Member States and Norway, Canada, Switzerland, Australia was provided to the Palestinian people until March 2008. (Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department on Budgetary Affairs, 2010)

In March 2008, TIM was replaced with a new mechanism of the European Mechanism of Support to the Palestinians (PEGASE), which collapsed with 2008-2009 Gaza War. The initial aim of PEGASE was to provide support for the three-year Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) (2008-2011) and the subsequent Palestinian National Plan (2011-2013), through creating a shift from emergency assistance to sustainable Palestinian development in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. In this regard, it had four priorities, governance, social development, economic and private sector development and public infrastructure development. Within the scope of PEGASE, direct support to the salaries and pensions of PA-Fatah employees in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip and direct cheques to vulnerable families and issued payments for the fuel bill of the Gaza power plant were provided by the EU. (Bouris, 2014, pp. 55-56)

Together with December 2008-January 2009 Gaza War, all above-mentioned the EU efforts to assist the Palestinian people and end humanitarian crisis failed. A six months truce between Hamas and Israel in Gaza ended with Operation Cast Lead (Gaza War) that aimed to militarily and politically weaken Hamas. How the EU reacted during this War is actually significant to evaluate, since it was the latest major development in the Arab-Israeli Conflict before the entry of the Lisbon Treaty into force in 1 December
2009. The first observation regarding the EU stance was internal conflict among the member states, whether Israeli attack was offensive or defensive.

In this manner, while the Czech presidency in the EU and Italy defined the Israeli act as defensive, Sweden and Irish foreign ministers called it as offensive. Likewise, Germany blamed Hamas not Israel for the outbreak of the War. Nevertheless, France indulged in mediation between Parties, despite having no official title representing the EU. Consequently, like it was in the previous periods, France pursued a unilateral foreign policy initiative, other than the EU, in order to maximize its national actorness in the region. French President Sarkozy’s efforts made it the hero within the Gaza War, separate from the institutional level EU representation. As a result, Gaza War made it obvious on the eve of implementation of the Lisbon Treaty that the EU could not manage to speak with one voice and suffer from internal division on its policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, Musu argues that the membership to Quartet secured the EU some involvement in Middle East diplomacy, which it might not otherwise have, while possibly enhancing the EU’s actorness in the Middle East. The Quartet became an important vehicle to refine EU policy, cement EU cohesion, and effectively speak with one voice on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. (Musu, 2010, p. 79)

Nevertheless, the EU issued another declaration on 8 December 2009, a week later the Lisbon Treaty entered into the force, in which it re-expressed its concerned about the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process. It was stated, “The European Union calls for the urgent resumption of negotiations that will lead, within an agreed time-frame, to a two-state solution with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.” Not surprisingly, the EU also expressed its readiness to take an active part in the post-conflict arrangements to contribute into state-building, regional issues, refugees, security and Jerusalem. (Council of The European Union, 2009)
To sum up, the beginning of the fourth period showed consistency in terms of the EU employment of declaratory and economic instruments. In the first half of 2005, the EU tried to achieve its aims in the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict through its traditional instruments of issuing declarations and providing aid. Nonetheless, the rest of the fourth period was a turning point for the EU to start employment of operational instruments besides declaratory and economic ones. In this manner, initiation of EUBAM Rafah and EU COPPS were two significant steps that for the first time the EU managed to use operational instruments. Despite the fact that they were limited in scope and time, they remark a change in the EU policy instruments towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict. However, Musu is right to argue that these missions “did not result in any real improvement or consolidation of the EU’s credibility as a security actor in the eyes of both the Palestinians and the Israelis.” (Musu, 2010, p. 128)

Besides the failure of these operational instruments to contribute to the actorness of the EU in the region, the EU decision to suspend direct aid upon rejection of Hamas to comply with three principles of the Quartet reduced the already shaking credibility of the EU in the eyes of the Palestinians. In spite of its attempts to make up for this losing face through aids provided under TIM and PEGASE, the Gaza War between 2008 and 2009 wasted all the EU efforts. Especially the internal division among the member states during the Gaza War made any EU attempt ineffective. Differentiation in the individual interests of the member states prevented development of a common European voice towards the Parties in war and resulted in unilateral national policies.

Although the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force was a promising development in terms of having a common European strategy for conflict resolution, the first EU policy following Lisbon was to issue a declaration, like the previous periods. Therefore, even from the beginning, the Lisbon Treaty was not successful to change traditional EU policy instruments with more concrete instruments. In fact, both the context and the content of this declaration were exactly the same with the previous declarations of the EU. Consequently, the first EU action after the Lisbon Treaty created disappointment
both for the conflictual Parties and other regional powers that believed in the Lisbon Treaty to increase actorness of the EU in the involvement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3.5. Chapter Summary

From evaluation of the EU’s involvement into Arab-Israeli Conflict before the Lisbon Treaty, it is obvious that the EU fails to meet all four criteria at the same time. In this period, the EU developed several contacts with both Conflictual Parties and other countries that were active in the region. By conducting both bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries, the EU proved its institutional capacity to interact with other actors and gain their acceptance. Hence, the EU is accepted to meet the first criterion of recognition. Considering the second criterion of authority, the EU was in a need for authorization by the member states in its each external action. For instance, before the EU concluded an Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation with Palestine and Free Trade Agreement with Israel, it had to turn back to the member states and get authorization to conclude these agreements. Since it did not have a legal personality on its own, the EU acted as a representative of the member states in external affairs. Hence, the EU was not in a position to meet authority criterion.

Moreover, the EU failed to fulfill the third and fourth criteria, namely autonomy and cohesion, in the period before the Lisbon Treaty. Especially, its high reliance on issuing declarations as a policy instrument was due to lack of autonomy. Since the member states were not willingly to transfer autonomy to the EU institutions in the sphere of foreign and security policy, the EU could not employ operational instruments for conflict resolution. Hence, strictly intergovernmental institutionalization of external affairs was the major restriction for development of the EU autonomy. Despite all institutional changes to provide autonomy to the EU in 1990’s and 2000’s, the EU continued to act as an agent of the member states in the conflict resolution, who could only effectively represent the EU with one voice in instances where national governments had agreed on a common stance. (Mueller, 2013, p. 28)
Adding to lack of autonomy, lack of cohesiveness was another dimension that damaged the EU actorness in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In this manner, vertical conflicts between the member states and the EU institutions were the major source of restrain. From 1970’s to 2009, the situation did not change in the Conflict for the EU, since the member states’ distinct national foreign policy traditions, bilateral relations, and political priorities often generated diverging ‘short-term’ responses to novel and unexpected developments and crisis management situations. (Mueller, 2013, p. 24) For instance, between 1980 and 1990, individual activism and conflict of interest among the member states created an ineffective and unreliable image of the EC in the eyes of Conflictual Parties. Other than issuing common declarations on the developments in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the member states could not harmonize their external policies in the implementation. Especially during crisis times, such as Intifada, Gaza Wars and other hot conflict, the EU cohesiveness was fragmentized by the member state interests.

Accordingly, the EU’s involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict in the period preceding the Lisbon Treaty revealed that the EU could not meet autonomy and cohesion criteria that prevented its actorness in the Middle East Affairs. Hence, the EU’s performance in the Arab-Israeli Conflict before the Lisbon Treaty fits to the third stance in the literature debate, in which the EU is not accepted as an actor. Marginal direct impact of the EU declarations on the Arab–Israeli conflict and limited operational policies in the field, such as EUBAM Rafah and EU COPPS, without coherent political mentality directing these missions were major reasons of placing the EU under this category of literature debate. Thus, failure in creating one-voice Europe towards the Conflict and continuation of intergovernmental design governed by individual state sensitivities were leaded to the conclusion that the EU should not be named as a foreign policy actor.
4.1. The Fifth Period: 2010-2017

The fifth period was the period of the dramatic changes all across the Middle East, called as the Arab Spring. Starting from 2010, the Middle East witnessed the confrontation between popular movements and enduring autocratic governments especially in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, called as the Arab Spring. Protesters demanded radical reforms for democratization in political, economic and social areas. In this turbulent situation, the conflict between Israel and Palestine fell to the secondary. Nonetheless, the Arab Spring significantly affected the negotiation framework, demands and concessions of the Parties as well as the Western perception on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As it is underlined by Shabaneh, the impact of the Arab Spring on the question of Palestine was not different than what the Lebanese civil war of 1976-1989, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the American occupation of Iraq in 2003 did. All of these incidences reminds the fragility of the Palestinian issue and deep dependence of the Palestinian cause on stability in the Arab world, which is also necessary for any attempt to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leading to real results. (Shabaneh, 2013)

Even before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the negotiations for peace between Palestinians and Israelis was not promising. The initial optimism created by US President Barack Obama’s Cairo speech in June 2009 was not long standing. Despite his promise to personally follow developments to reach two-state solution, Obama’s meeting with Abbas and Netanyahu in September 2009 failed to provide any progress. The reason for failure was due to the insistence of the both sides about pre-conditions
to start direct negotiations with each other. While Israel was insisting for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state by the PA, the PA was asking to solve border issue even before sitting at the negotiation table. (Indyk, Lieberthal, & O'Hanlon, 2012, p. 124) Outbreak of the Arab Spring in the environment of this deadlock in the peace process resulted in different reactions by the different Parties. From Israeli perspective, the initial response was to avoid commenting publicly on the uprising in Egypt and to send a message to the US and the EU about the significance of stability in Egypt. (Ravid, 2011) However, upon the resignation of Mubarak, Israeli security (Hauslohner, 2010) and economic concerns (Bradley & Mitnik, 2012) increased. Especially, the interim Egyptian government’s decision to permanently open the Rafah crossing at the border between Egypt and Gaza alarmed Israel. Even worse for Israel came in May 2011 by signature a historic reconciliation accord here between Hamas and Fatah against Israel.

All these developments were the immediate results of the environment created by the Arab Spring that led Israel to adopt a policy of protection and isolation. It indulged in protecting its borders by taking excessive new security barriers. In addition, Stevenson argues that both security and economic concerns of Israel outlasted the initial surge of the initial concerns about the Islamic wave as a consequence of the Arab Spring. Interestingly, in Egypt and to a lesser extent in Syria, “Israeli leaders have quietly welcomed the strong counter-revolutionary forces that precipitated the Muslim Brotherhood’s fall from power and that continue to weaken Sunni terror groups as well as Bashar al-Assad, Hezbollah, and Iran in Syria’s civil war.” (Stevenson, 2014, p. 22)

From the Palestinian perspective, the Arab Spring is believed to be counterproductive towards the Palestinian cause. Leaders in Fatah and Hamas agreed that the Arab engagement in their own national security concerns left the Palestinians alone in their struggle against the Israeli occupation. Likewise, Mahmoud Zahar, as the top leader in Hamas, stated that Arab Spring deviated the Arab world’s attention away from Palestine as being the core cause in the Middle East. From public perspective, an opinion poll among Palestinian youth revealed that 55% of youths in the West Bank and 60% of youths in the Gaza Strip believe that the Arab Spring and the regional
changes, negatively impacted Palestine. Even the hopes raised by the opening of border to Gaza dashed with non-allowance of Gazans and Syrians to enter Egypt, despite the fact that Egypt is the only access and exit point to the world for the Gazans. Consequently, Alijla argues that “the next phase will carry more losses for the Palestinians rather than gains. Pessimism takes over the scene when correlating the Arab Spring with the Palestinian question. The pro-Palestinian rhetoric is fading. And again, what did the Arab Spring bring to Palestinian? Nothing, but more pain, suffering and diaspora.” (Alijla, 2014)

In this regard, Palestinian president Abbas tried to get the advantage of the new environment of the Arab Spring. He tried to create an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, through diplomatic ways. He asked the popular resistance to support the Palestine’s initiative for full membership in the UN by recognition of a Palestinian state. Abbas articulated, "In this coming period, we want mass action, organized and coordinated in every place. This is a chance to raise our voices in front of the world and say that we want our rights.” (Reuters, 2011) However, this diplomatic initiative failed due to rejection of the US in the UN Security Council, despite the backing of all other members. Likewise, the US was the only state to vote ‘no’ in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) voting to undertake an inquiry on Israeli settlements and their impact on Palestinians in March 2012. (Smith, 2013, p. 263)

As a result, the impact of the Arab Spring on the Arab-Israeli conflict was negative. The Parties’ became distant from mutual commitment to the peace process and direct negotiation in the atmosphere of new security concerns and political calculations. The latest direct negotiations was in July 2013, which collapsed due to expiration of its nine-month deadline for finalization. The greatest challenge of the Arab Spring to the peace process was related with the fact that “the Palestinian issue has almost transformed into an internal issue.” (Mousa, 2014) Internal turmoil experienced by the Arab states during the Arab Spring made them turn inwards and leave the Palestinians
alone in their cause. Hence, the Palestinian question became the problem of the Palestinians, not a part of Arab nationalism.

Besides the loneliness of the Palestinians in their cause following the Arab Spring, the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, also known as Operation Protective Edge, resulted a huge destruction of the Gazans. According to the UN, more than 96,000 homes were damaged or destroyed by the bombing (AFP, 2015) and the cost of this War was between $4 billion and $6 billion. (Asher, 2014). Adding to their physical destruction and economic bottleneck, the latest action of the US marked the political devastation of the Palestinians. Namely, in December 2017, the US recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, despite several UN Resolutions referring to the international status of Jerusalem. Upon this proclaim, a voting was held in the emergence session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), in which member states showed their intention for compliance with Security Council resolutions regarding the status of Jerusalem.

According to Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 2017 the high majority of countries (128 in favor to nine against and 35 abstentions) reaffirmed all the previous resolutions of the Security Council relevant to the status of Jerusalem in addition to emphasizing inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. They also stressed that Jerusalem is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations in line with relevant United Nations resolutions. In this regard, they called the US action as null and void that has no legal effect.

It was also underlined that recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel must be rescinded in compliance with relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Hence, all States were called to refrain from the establishment of diplomatic missions in the Holy City of Jerusalem, pursuant to Council resolution 478 (1980). Furthermore, it was reiterated that are the only way to solve the Conflict is to achieve the two-State solution without delay on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions and the Madrid terms of reference. In addition, the permanent solution should include the principle of
land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map, and an end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967. (United Nations General Assembly, 2017)

Contrary to the UN emphasis on the significance of the two-state solution for a permanent peace in the Conflict, the realities in the ground shows that it is not relevant anymore. Especially the mediatior role of the US ended with its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel that reduced the chances for the peace through arbitration. The most active international actor in the conflict resolution, namely the US, lost its reliability after the late 2017. Accordingly, Ignatius maintains that the space for compromise seems to be vanishing after the US President Trump’s decision to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem. He also quotes Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, who argued that the two-state solution is over by referring to Israeli nonbinding resolution urging annexation of parts of the West Bank and unlimited construction of settlements. (Ignatius, 2018)

4.1.1. European Involvement in the Fifth Period (2010-2017)

As it was explained in detail in the previous chapter, the EU failed to speak one voice during the 2008-2009 Gaza War. While one group of member states were condemning Israel for the War, the other group of member states were supporting the Israeli action. In addition, some member states, such as United Kingdom and France condemned both sides for the War. This diversification among the member state policies towards the Conflict continued in the aftermath of the War. One of the most obvious examples of conflicting member states policies was their attitude during the voting of the Goldstone Report.

The UNHRC established a Fact-Finding Mission in April 2009 “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.” Richard Goldstone, who was South African
judge, leaded this mission and his name was associated with the report of this Fact Finding Mission. According to the Goldstone Report, both Israeli and Palestinian forces were accused of committing war crimes and violating international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, the criticism towards Israel with the allegations of misconduct was harsher than the one towards Palestine. (UN Human Rights Council, 2009, p. 5)

Accordingly, Israel was accused of “intentional attacks against the civilian population and civilian objects” in Gaza. In addition, it was stated in the Report, “the conduct of the Israeli armed forces constitutes grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention in respect of willful killings and willfully causing great suffering to protected persons and, as such, give rise to individual criminal responsibility.” (UN Human Rights Council, 2009, p. 16) Hence, Israel was accused of deliberately using disproportionate force designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population and attacking directly against civilians with lethal outcome. From the other perspective, the Mission found that the rocket and mortars attacks, launched by Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, have caused terror in the affected communities of southern Israel and in Israel as a whole. Furthermore, while firing of rockets and mortars, the Palestinian armed groups fail to distinguish between military targets and the civilian population and civilian objects. Therefore, the Palestinian groups also committed war crimes during the Gaza War. (UN Human Rights Council, 2009, p. 541)

Accordingly, both Israel and the Palestinians were recommended in the Report to prevent the development of a climate of impunity and to investigate allegations of violations as a duty under international law. Furthermore, the Parties were urged to conduct investigations in the framework of international law impartially, independently, promptly and effectively. (UN Human Rights Council, 2009) The UNHRC voted the Report on October 16, 2009 and accepted it by a majority of members. (25 ‘yes’ out of 42)
Consequently, the UNGA adopted a Resolution on 1 December 2009, in which it expressed its appreciation to the Goldstone report, affirmed the obligation of all parties to respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It also indicated its concern about serious human rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed during the Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. By endorsing the Goldstone Report, the General Assembly called upon both sides to implement what was recommended in the Goldstone Report. Furthermore, the Secretary General was asked to transmit the document to the Security Council. (United Nations General Assembly, 2009) Likewise, a second resolution was adopted in March 2010, in which the findings of the Goldstone report was appreciated and the Parties were called upon to implement the Report’s recommendations. (United Nations General Assembly, 2010) In the meantime, September 2010 and March 2011 Resolutions were adopted in the UNHRC about the findings of the Goldstone Report. Consequently, from December 2009 to March 2011 four voting were held in the framework of the UN concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

These voting procedures in the UN offers an appropriate setting to examine EU external action after the Lisbon Treaty, because both the Union and its member states are officially present in UNGA meetings. Since the Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with legal personality and replaced the international representation of the EU by the six-monthly presidency with a new troika of the President of the European Council, the High Representative and the European Commission, the EU was expected to be a more cohesive actor with regard to its external representation and a more transparent actor that is able to communicate clearly with its international partners. (Johansson-Nogués, 2014, p. 5)

Moreover, with the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative became responsible from coordinating the policies of the member states in international organizations. Hence, the member states’ statements, voting preferences, relations with the third countries were expected to be coherent. Thus, how the EU and its member states acted during the voting procedure of the Goldstone reports provide an assessment of the EU’s
performance in foreign affairs after the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty. Revealed voting behavior actually shows to what extent EU states have coordinated their positions on politicized resolutions. (Jin & Hosli, 2013, p. 1274)

For instance, before the adoption of the first Resolution in the UNGA in December 2009, a voting was held in UNHRC, as a part of the UNGA, in October 2009 to adopt a resolution on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. Appropriate with the general tendency in the UNHRC, Israel’s all policies and measures taken against Palestinians were strongly condemned in the mentioned resolution. In the procedure of voting to adopt it, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands and Slovakia voted against; Belgium and Slovenia used abstention; France and Britain did not vote. (The General Assembly of the United Nations-Voting Records)

Likewise, in the adoption of December 2009 Resolution of the UNGA, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Slovenia and Portugal were in favor; Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia were against; the rest preferred abstention vote. Moreover, in the UNGA voting on the adoption of Second Resolution on the Goldstone Report in March 2010, 16 member states, including Germany, Britain and France, used a vote in favor, while the rest used abstention. (The General Assembly of the United Nations-Voting Records)

Hence, all of these experiences in the UN voting clearly revealed that the Union was still operating under the control and guidance of the member states after the Lisbon Treaty. Heterogeneity in member state preferences continued in the post-Lisbon period, despite the promise of the Lisbon Treaty to provide a common European response towards international events, such as the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Likewise, Jin and Hosli argue that “EU member state preferences in foreign policy tend to be heterogeneous and clearly, for the new ‘agents’ post-Lisbon, it is not much easier than for the earlier rotating presidency to take positions reflecting the views of their ‘collective principal’”. (Jin & Hosli, 2013, pp. 1288-1289) Accordingly, in the post-
Lisbon context, the main players of the game remained as the member states in the UN, in terms of representation and voting preferences.

The more interesting part of this lack of internal consistency in the EU foreign policy was seen in the several EU declarations, calling for implementation of the Lisbon Treaty provisions. For instance, in February 2010 Resolution of the European Parliament, it stressed “the importance of EU common positions on issues to be discussed during the 13th session of the UNHRC, even though the modalities regarding the actions of the EU Member States in the UNHRC following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty are not yet fully clear.” (The European Parliament, 2010) Moreover, on March 10, 2010, the Parliament called the High Representative and the member states “to work towards a strong EU common position on follow-up to the report of the fact-finding mission – led by Judge Goldstone – on the conflict in Gaza and southern Israel, publicly demanding the implementation of its recommendations and accountability for all violations of international law, including alleged war crimes.” (The European Parliament, 2010) Nevertheless, none of these calls for a common European position in the UN voting procedures could provide the desired outcome. Once more, the national interests of the member states squeezed the attempt of the EU institution to create comprehensible foreign policy stance.

Furthermore, Gowan and Brantner argues that all of the above mentioned splits on the EU member state votes concerning Israel and Palestine in the UNHRCUH accounted for nearly all the bloc’s rare divisions on human rights resolutions at the General Assembly in the last five years. In addition, due to European divisions over how to address the Israel-Palestine issue, the EU’s reputation for coherence on fundamental values at the UN seriously weakened. Hence, the EU’s struggles to find common positions on the Palestinian question at the level of UN showed the Union’s limits for cohesiveness in the external action. (Gowan & Brantner, 2011, p. 8)
Gaza blockage of Israel in 2010 was the another significant instance that the Parliament announced the urgent need for “a comprehensive reshaping of EU policy towards the Middle East to perform a decisive and coherent political role, accompanied by effective diplomatic tools, in the interests of peace and security in this neighboring region of vital strategic interest to the EU.” (The European Parliament, 2010) Furthermore, after Israeli commandos killed pro-Palestinian activists on the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, the President of the European Parliament condemned it as "an unjustified attack" and argued, "It is a clear and unacceptable breach of international law, especially the fourth Geneva Convention. We demand that Israel explain its actions immediately, with the utmost transparency, and guarantee full accountability by co-operating with any full inquiry that is to be set up." (AFP, 2010) In addition, the ambassadors of the 27 EU members issued a common press release, in which they said, "The EU condemns the use of violence that has produced a high number of victims among the members of the flotilla and demands an immediate, full and impartial inquiry into the events and the circumstances surrounding it. EU does not accept the continued policy of closure, it is unacceptable and politically counterproductive, we need to urgently achieve a durable solution to the situation in Gaza." (Al Jazeera English, 2010)

On the other hand, the member states once more showed heterogeneity in the UNHRC voting on creation of a UN Panel to investigate violations of international law that could be occurred during the flotilla raid. This voting was another instance for the EU to experience lack of internal coherence in the UN framework. In this regard, Italy and the Netherlands opposed the creation of a UN panel to investigate the incident, while Slovenia supported the initiative and other EU members abstained. Furthermore, after the establishment of the panel, it produced a report, known as Palmer Report, in which Israel was accused of using “excessive” force. All the EU member states abstained on a vote to endorse the report, which weakened the EU’s reputation on fundamental values at the UN. (Gowan & Brantner, 2011, p. 8) Thus, individual concerns of the member states played role in their vote for abstention that gave harm to the EU credibility and actorness in the UN structure.
Discrepancy of the member state interest in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict became more severe in the face of the UNGA sessions to vote for recognition of the Palestinians as a state in 2011 and “non-member observer” status in 2012. The Palestinian President Abbas applied for full-membership in the UN in 2011. Upon the veto of the US in the UN Security Council, Abbas took his second chance and asked to be recognized as ‘non-member observer’ in 2012. As it was in the previous years, the European Parliament asked the member states to be united in addressing the legitimate demand of the Palestinians to be represented as a state at the United Nations by calling them “to continue their efforts to find a common EU position… and to avoid divisions.” (The European Parliament, 2011)

Nonetheless, in September 2011, the level of confidence in a unified European position concerning Palestine’s status in the UN dropped, as the press started to uncover contrasts. While Latvia, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg and the EU High Representative were regarding the resumption of direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority as a top priority, Greece and Belgium underlined their countries’ significant role to be played in the peace process besides the EU efforts. On the other hand, Britain, the Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, Finland, Cyprus and Estonia did not make any clear reference to EU’s role in the Palestinian issue. (Morselli, 2013, pp. 81-84) Hence, in the course of 2011, some EU members, especially France apparently leaned towards Palestine, yet the others, such as Germany and the Netherlands pointed out their opposition to any resolution that could damage Israel’s interests. Israel itself also indulged in a diplomatic campaign to win over wavering smaller European states. (Gowan & Brantner, 2011, p. 8)

In the voting for Palestinian ‘non-member observer status’ in 2012, sixteen of the member states voted in favor while the others abstained and the Czech Republic voted against. Consequently, the EU once more failed to vote as a single block that reduced reliability of the EU as an actor, despite the call of the European Parliament for supporting “the High Representative in her efforts to create a credible perspective for
relaunching the peace process.” (The European Parliament, 2012) Consequently, the voting preferences of the member states in the UN clearly indicated that national policy priorities overweight the European ones, contrary to obligations of member states under the Lisbon Treaty.

Consequently, Morselli argues that the failure of the EU to act as a block in dealing with Palestine’s requests underlined the difficulty of reaching consensus when the issue at stake has historical roots and outcomes might spillover to bilateral and multilateral situations. She also refers to some interviews, in which interviewees explained that Member States in 2011 took into consideration their bilateral relations with the parties to the conflict and other key players, the question of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, as well as the Palestinian membership to related UN-agencies and multilateral fora. (Morselli, 2013, p. 85)

Accordingly, how the EU member states acted in the UNGA on the status of Palestine is a clear example of contrasting interests of the member states upon the international events. Each member state decided according to its own national agenda in the voting preferences, which is contrary to what was aimed with the Lisbon Treaty. Whenever the EU policy has enhanced the national policy, the member states have supported the European stance, as it was the case for the states that voted according to what was proposed by the High Representative in 2011. Therefore, the voting preferences of the member states in the UN is in the line with the Schmid’s idea that foreign policy is still an area the less “Europeanisable” and more the sphere of “national diplomatic traditions and priorities.” (Schmid, 2007, pp. 96-98)

In May 2012, the EU turned to its traditional policy instrument of issuing declarations regarding the Middle East Peace Process. Since it failed to be one voice Europe in the context of the UN, the EU tried to strengthen its reliability through using its traditional instruments. In this regard, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to a two-state solution, based on the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the Madrid principles including land for peace, the Roadmap, the agreements previously reached by the
parties and the Arab Peace Initiative. Furthermore, the EU reiterated its position in accordance with the conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council in December 2009, December 2010 and May 2011 that settlements remain illegal under international law, irrespective of recent decisions by the government of Israel. Consequently, it reaffirmed the commitment to fully and effectively implement existing EU legislation and the bilateral arrangements applicable to settlement products. (Council of the European Union, 2012) In fact, this reaffirmation was a hidden message given to Israel indicating the suspension of preferential treatment to Israeli settlement products, if Israel continues illegal settlements.

Consequently, seven months later, the Council issued another declaration, in which it expressed its commitment to ensure that – in line with international law – all agreements between the State of Israel and the European Union must unequivocally and explicitly indicate their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, namely the Golan Heights, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. (Council of the European Union, 2012) In this regard, the EU threatened Israel in its declarations with lowering the trade relations and preferential treatment to Israeli goods, in case of continuation of settlements beyond 1967 borders. However, Hans van den Broek, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and former EU Commissioner for External Relations, argues that as settlement construction continued and accelerated, the Europeans failed to move from words to action. The EU refrained from deploying its considerable political and economic leverage vis-à-vis Israel to contain developments on the ground that contradict its basic values and that undermine its strategic interests. (Broek, 2012, p. 5) Likewise Sherwood indicates that the EU position that Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory are illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible is undermined with the fact that the EU is sustaining the settlement project. (Sherwood, 2012)
Regarding all these criticisms, the EU issued some guidelines in 2013 to operationalize what Israel was warned about in 2012 declarations. The aim of guidelines was to ensure the respect of EU positions and commitments in conformity with international law on the non-recognition by the EU of Israel’s sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. They set out the conditions, under which the Commission would implement key requirements for the award of EU support to Israeli entities or to their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. The EU made it clear that it does not recognize the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem as a part of Israeli territory. Therefore, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council underlined the importance of limiting the application of agreements with Israel to the territory of Israel, as recognized by the EU. Hence, the failure to meet these guidelines resulted in prohibition of grants, prizes and financial instruments from the EU to the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. (The European Union, 2013)

These guidelines created a political turmoil in Israel and increased hopes in Palestine. Haaretz’s diplomatic correspondent Barak Ravid wrote upon these guidelines that it was the "biggest scoop" he had ever had. Moreover, the prominent Israeli commentator, Dan Margalit, commented, "Make no mistake, this is an important document. Not because of its content...Its importance stems from its function as a dangerous stepping stone for further boycotts." Senior Israeli government officials described the new guidelines as an "earthquake" and Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was even quoted in the Israeli press as saying that Israel’s failure to stop the EU from issuing the guidelines represented the biggest failure he had encountered in 30 years of dealing with diplomatic and security issues. From other perspective, Palestinian commentators, from the PA to Hamas, were generally supportive too of the guidelines, even if many saw them as coming too late and consisting of too little to actually roll back Israel’s occupation. (Persson, 2018)
On the other hand, several calls for the EU member states to comply with their responsibility to respect human rights through implementing the guidelines was not effective to prevent many European companies from preserving their bilateral relations with partners located in Israeli settlements. For instance, at least five Israeli companies with ties to the settlements and Israeli rule in the West Bank are registered as participants for the launch event of the Netherlands-Israel Cooperation Forum. Despite the fact that the participation of these companies contradicts the guidelines set forth by the European Union with regard to cooperation with Israeli companies active in the West Bank, there is no national regulation that prohibits this participation. (Hass, 2013) Indeed, Dutch government did not attempted to change domestic law in a way providing implementation of the guidelines and contented with discouraging its companies to trade with companies beyond the Green Line, since it was in line with Dutch national interest.

Thus, Lovatt indicates that there are at least 350 bilateral agreements between Israel and member states. These deals, 31 of which were concluded in the last ten years, relate to bilateral cooperation on social security, labor, tourism, investment, and research and development. Consequently, the member states chose to maintain bilateral preferential relations with Israel, disregarding the stance of the EU. Accordingly, the EU’s considerable progress in ensuring that settlement entities and activities are effectively excluded from the EU’s relations with Israel could not overweight the development of trade relations between the member states and Israel. (Lovatt, 2017, pp. 6-7)

Upon this inability of the EU to take a collective action, former politicians and bureaucrats of the EU, such as Vice-President of the European Commission, European Commissioner for External Relations, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, and foreign ministers, ambassadors, prime ministers of the member states established “European Eminent Persons Group on the Middle East Peace Process”. They wrote an open letter to Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, in which they stated that, “We have watched with increasing
disappointment over the past five years the failure...of the international community under American and/or European leadership to promote such discussion (for peace). We have also noted with frustration and deep concern the deteriorating standards of humanitarian and human rights care of the population in the Occupied Territories... The concern of the European Union at this deterioration, clearly expressed in a series of statements, not least the European Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012, has not been matched by any action likely to improve the situation." Thus, they asked the EU to undertake a realistic but active policy, set in the context of current regional events. (Gharib, 2013)

The upshot of this letter, which calls the EU to increase its role in finding a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, can be summarized as, “what we're doing isn't working. In fact, it's making things worse.” (Gharib, 2013) In particular, these nineteen former senior politicians and statesmen from across Europe were adamant that the EU must “play a political and not just a funding role” in the conflict. Their criticism towards the EU lies in the idea that “Europe’s leaders may claim that they are united in their desire to become Middle East peacemakers, and over the last decade there has been growing consensus over what a common policy for joint and effective European action in the Middle East might constitute. But colonial baggage, local jealousies and domestic political considerations still play too much of a role. So does the tendency of Europeans to use the Palestine issue in the service of their own agendas.” (Miller, 2013)

Therefore, the Group argues that the impact of several statements made for decades have been undermined by the EU inactivity in the field. The EU claim for a permanent peace in the region has lost its significance for both the Parties and the international community in the face of stagnation to take a collective action. Hence, the main advice of the Group to the EU member states was to leave the historical and political considerations as well as national competition among each other aside and focus on the take prompt action to alter this intolerable situation. Accordingly, Khalil and Del Sarto underlined two significant actions demanded from the EU to be realized, which
were recognition of the current status of the Palestinian Territories as one of occupation, with Israel being responsible for this condition as the occupying state under international law and not recognizing Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 lines. (Khalil & Sarto, 2015, p. 129)

What complicated the role of the EU in the peace process more was 2014 Gaza War, known also as Operation Protective Edge. During this War, the mediation role of the EU strictly restricted by national policies of the member states and lack of resources available to the High Representative. O’Donnell actually emphasized the role of the Lisbon Treaty that made the EU actorness harder by introducing the High Representative in charge of foreign affairs, instead of the rotating presidency. He also argues that its much more difficult for the High Representative to act than a rotating presidency, as a rotating presidency had access to independent national resources, while the High Representative cannot use its resources completely independently. The High Representative is still subject to accountability by the member states and the Commission. Consequently, in the 2014 Gaza War, Egypt was in the driving seat in mediation, and the EU simply provided political and diplomatic support. There was no acute pressure on Egypt from the EU to push the parties towards a ceasefire. (O’Donnell, 2009, p. 18)

However, in the post-Gaza War period, positions in Europe vis-à-vis Israel hardened, since both the member states and the EU institutions became increasingly frustrated by Israel’s settlement policy. In this regard, some member state inclined to use the recognition of Palestinian statehood as a tool to influence Israeli policies. As a result, 2014 witnessed a series of non-binding votes in key member state parliaments recommending the recognition of Palestine, including the British, French, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish parliaments. The European Parliament also held a vote on a non-binding motion at the end of 2014 supporting the recognition of Palestine. Furthermore, Sweden was the first EU member state that formally recognized the Palestinian state. On the other hand, some member states rejected the idea of threatening Israel with sanctions, considering the possibility that a tougher line on
Israel might boost the far right in the upcoming Israeli elections. Thus, more right-wing governed Israel was not in the line with their national interests. (Juncos & Whitman, 2015, p. 202)

Therefore, these actions remained in national level and constituted another discrepancy among the member states. There was no common European policy towards the recognition of Palestinian statehood. Interestingly, the new foreign relations chief of the EU, Federica Mogherini, articulated that the EU has no mandate to co-ordinate Palestine recognition by the member states. She also admitted the fact that “there’s no common approach to recognition of Palestine”, yet the EU “could at least agree to share the main lines of thinking on these matters. We did talk about the need to have exchange of information on steps taken by national parliaments so we can at least prepare reactions”. In addition, she denied the EU is in talks on Israel sanctions, despite a leaked paper on the issue, due to rejection of some member states. (Rettman, 2014) Hence, the EU’s stance on the guidelines and threat of sanctioning lessened with the inadequate enthusiasm and actual opposition of the some member states to challenge Israel. The significance of bilateral relations with Israel to realize their national interests was the major factor lying under this opposition and narrow appetite.

Nonetheless, in November 2015, the EU decided to label some goods produced on land seized in the 1967 war, as “made in settlements.” The main aim of this labeling was to sanction Israel, due to continuation of illegal settlements. However, the products to be labeled actually amounted to less than 1 percent of Israel’s $13 billion in annual exports to the bloc’s 28 countries. Thus, there could a minimal economic impact on Israel. On the other hand, Israel was in the fear of expanding logic of sanctioning to the broader economy by targeting businesses that have operations or affiliates in the contested areas. For example, Israeli banks that provide mortgages to homeowners in the West Bank could become vulnerable to divestment from Europe, retail chains with outlets in settlements could be barred from the Continent and manufacturers that use parts made in factories there could face labeling or sanctions. Hence, Israel summoned the European Union ambassador, Lars Faaborg-Andersen, to
the foreign ministry and informed him that Israel was suspending diplomatic talks scheduled for various forums in the coming period. (Rudoren & Chan, 2015)

Conversely, the Israeli reaction came too early, since implementation of both 2013 guidelines and 2015 labeling requirement was left to the member states. The producer, exporter and importer are responsible for complying with the regulations, but it is up to member countries to ensure that the rules are followed. (Rudoren & Chan, 2015) In this manner, all of these attempts created a little difference in the ground in terms of the capability of the EU to lead the peace process. The main reason for this failure of the EU in affecting the Israeli policies, despite its operationalization period through guidelines, was unwillingness of the member states to implement the guidelines at the national level. In this regard, McDowall argues that, “If they genuinely treated Israel's settlements as illegal they would not trade with them, since trade sustains their economic viability. EU members import approximately 15 times more from illegal settlements than they do from the captive population under occupation, over 100-fold more per settler than per Palestinian. EU states import an estimated 66 per cent of settlement agricultural products, thus vitiating the EU's formal position of non-recognition.” (McDowall, 2016)

Consequently, European Eminent Persons Group wrote another letter to High Representative and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU in May 2015, in which they asked for the urgent reassessment of EU policy on the question of a Palestinian state upon re-election of Binyamin Netanyahu and the construction of a new Israeli coalition government. In this letter, the Group insisted that Israel must be held to account for its actions in the occupied territories. The text highlighted, inter alia, the inequality in international status between Israel and the Palestinians as a serious flaw that has compromised the integrity of the peace process. (Abdel-Shaf, 2015, p. 3)

Recommendations included a resumption of negotiations – with recognition of the equality of the parties – with a mandatory deadline for the completion of an agreement establishing a two-state solution. The letter also included a recommendation on close
and proactive involvement in the process of encouraging Palestinian reconciliation as a prerequisite of that solution. (Abdel-Shaf, 2015, p. 3) They argued that, “it is time for the European Council of Ministers to construct a policy on Israel-Palestine that both reflects the nature of the threat to European interests of a totally collapsed peace process and meets the EU’s responsibility to take a comprehensive, independent and effective position on this primary foreign and security policy issue.” (The European Eminent Persons Group, 2015)

Hence, the Group asked for implementation of 2013 Guidelines and the European directive that would require the labelling of all imported products from Israeli West Bank settlements. They also explained their belief that “the EU and its Member States have been held back from a more proactive stance on Israel-Palestine by three major considerations: their lack of consensus on the issue, their focus on newer and apparently more urgent Middle East crises and their reluctance to get out in front of the United States in an area where Washington has always insisted on prime ownership…These three drawbacks now need to be addressed directly.” (The European Eminent Persons Group, 2015)

Actually, the first one is the most urgent one to be addressed in these three considerations. If the EU became successful in creating an internal consensus on the Palestinian Question, it will cover a great distance in the other two considerations. Accordingly, Juncos and Whitman argue, “The EU’s capacity for crisis management, and most especially the institutions created by the Lisbon Treaty, proved to be insufficiently capable of responding in spirit or substance to a neighborhood which is being remade largely without the influence of the EU.” (Juncos & Whitman, 2015, p. 213) The main reason for this insufficiency can be found in the fact that each member has continued to have its own policy regarding the Palestine-Israel conflict and to pursue their trade interests, which they did not want disturbed. McDowall believed that roughly 30 per cent of Israel’s exports are to the EU, worth 13.137 billion euros in 2014, while EU exports to Israel were worth 16.979 billion euros. That same year
total trade between the EU and Palestine was worth 154 million euros. Consequently, the arithmetic is self-explanatory. (McDowall, 2016)

Due to this structural deficiency continued even after the Lisbon Treaty changes, some member states came together and took a collective action towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance, in October 2017, under the mobilization of Belgium; France, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland, and Denmark started an initiative after the destruction of school equipment and the confiscation of solar panels they had financed in the West Bank, by Israel. They asked Israel to compensate for the damage suffered, approximately 31,000 Euro by writing a letter to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, in which they articulated, "We are still hopeful that our requests for restitution can be fulfilled without preconditions as soon as possible, otherwise Israel will have to provide compensation without delay." (Smolar, 2017) Therefore, the only opportunity for the EU to act in the Middle East Peace Process is to be supported by likeminded group member states. Otherwise, the institutional structure of the EU is the biggest obstacle for the EU gain actoriness in the Middle East.

The latest example of coherence among the member states was seen in the UNGA voting on rejection of the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU, underlined the existence of full EU unity in support of the status quo and declared, “I want to reassure President Abbas of the firm commitment of the European Union to the two-state solution with Jerusalem as the shared capital of the two states,”, during a press conference alongside the Palestinian Authority president. (Gehrke, 2018) Nonetheless, the EU is not able to response the call of Abbas to immediately and officially recognize the state of Palestine, which won little support by the foreign ministers of the member states. Some member states’ economic and political interests prevent them to take the side of Palestine by officially recognizing its statehood.
In addition, there is contradiction among member states whether or not develop closer trade ties with the Palestinians, as proposed by France, through a so-called EU association agreement. This proposed agreement is an EU treaty covering unfettered access to the bloc’s 500 million consumers, aid and closer political and cultural ties. However, Germany Foreign Minister expressed some reservation about this agreement, besides Ireland’s Foreign Minister Simon Coveney, who said the EU would need to offer something similar to Israel. (Emmott, 2018) Since the current institutional structure of the EU requires the agreement to be agreed by all the member states, it seems hard for the EU to pass this agreement. Consequently, the future of the EU actorness in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict highly depends on the reconciliation between member state interests.

To conclude, elimination of the pillar structure, gaining legal personality and establishment of the European External Action Service under the control of the High Representative for Foreign Policy, which has a double-hatted role together with the Vice-President of the Commission, did not contribute to actorness of the EU. In fact, the fifth period shows a solid consistency with the previous periods. Despite the new institutional structure under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU could not manage to be an actor in the Middle East Peace Process, since the weakness was not an institutional one. The Lisbon Treaty did not change the member-state based structure of the EU decision making that requires agreement among all the member states to take an action in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The most obvious example of this weakness was seen in the stance of the EU under the UN structure. How differences among the member states reduced reliability of the EU was experienced in the voting for adopting the Resolution based on implementation of the Goldstone Report, for recognition of the Palestinian statehood and the for the Palestine ‘non-member observer’ status. In all these cases, there was discrepancy among the member states as well as between some member states and the EU institutional perspective. In addition, the EU’s declarations that threaten Israel to suspend its preferential treatment in the EU market became ineffective due to
unwillingness of the member states to implement the guidelines drawn by the EU. The member states have continued to pursue their national interest, rather than the EU interest. In this manner, the reduced reliability of the EU as an actor in the Middle East caused the lesser position of the EU to Egypt in the mediation to end 2014 Gaza War. In 2017 December, all member states agreed to reject recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, yet in the coming period their divergence in interests came to light once more. While some member states were in favor of having an association agreement with the Palestinians, some others did not welcome this proposal with regard to the significance of relations with Israel contributing to their national interest.

Therefore, as long as the member states cannot agree on a policy towards the peace process, it is still impossible for the EU to be an actor in the Middle East. Even the several institutional changes under the Lisbon Treaty have not been enough to alter this intergovernmental structure of the EU in the foreign policy area. The greatest limitation of the EU to act in the Middle East politics is divergent national interests of the member states, based on their historical ties and current political and economic relations with the conflictual Parties. Hence, the most harmful thing to the EU policies in the region is implementation of the independent member state policies. Even after the modifications with the Lisbon Treaty, it is clear that the member states are not willing to give up their sovereignty in the area of foreign policy to the EU institutions that prevents the EU from achieving its objectives. As a result, not only traditional instruments of issuing declarations and providing financial aid, but also operational instruments of the EU have been failed so far to deliver the desired result of the EU actorness in the Middle East Peace Process.

4.2. Chapter Summary

The Lisbon Treaty contributed to the first and second criteria of actorness. Legal personality granted with the Lisbon Treaty provided the EU with authority and increased its recognition. It actually allowed the EU to not only negotiate but also conclude agreements with the third parties, without the need for prior authorization by the member states. Therefore, the EU gained legal competence to act through the
Lisbon Treaty, which was an improvement compared to the previous period. In addition, this legal personality augmented recognition of the EU, by enhancing its participation rights in the UN, such as right to speak, reply, to make proposals and submit amendments etc. Despite it has had an observer status in the UN since 1974, these new rights in the UN made a great contribution to its recognition in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, especially in the time of increasing Palestinian attempt to achieve formal recognition by the UN members.

Unfortunately, the EU did not show similar improvement in compliance with autonomy and cohesion criteria after the Lisbon Treaty amendments. For instance, highly diversified voting preferences of the member states on Palestinian bid for membership is a great indicator of how increased EU recognition in the UN did not lead to increased EU cohesiveness. This instance revealed the fact that the Arab-Israeli Conflict is still an area of rivalry for the member states to increase their national interest via the Middle East politics. What is worse, the new post of the High Representative under the Lisbon Treaty was not in a position to create a common stance towards the Palestinian desire in the UN. She was restricted by the lack of autonomous decision making power to decide on behalf of the EU member states. Contrary to decreased dependence on the administrative and diplomatic resources of the member states, the decision making power was left in the hands of the member states in the Lisbon Treaty. Hence, the member states were not under a legal commitment to comply with the common European stance in the UN. Consequently, the EU was not in a position to comply with the third criterion of autonomy.

In addition, the EU has continued to employ declaratory policy instruments towards the Conflict, rather than operational ones. This limitation in policy instruments actually stems from the fact the EU’s authority and recognition did not backed up with autonomy in decision-making process and cohesiveness. Hence, there is a tension between the member states' right in decision-making procedures and the requirements of unity in the Union’s external representation, which is ultimately based on the duty of sincere cooperation among the member states. Thus, in the current position, ad hoc
solutions are searched in each implementation of operational instruments, which
damage the effective international presence of the Union. (Cremona, 2015, p. 14) A
critical example of this prevalent problem was observed in implementation of 2013
guidelines and 2015 EU declaration on labeling the products from Israeli settlements.
Contrary to what was argued in these declarations, various member states continued
their bilateral relation with Israel.

Consequently, the EU’s failure to achieve autonomy and cohesion even after the
Lisbon Treaty resulted in its inability to be defined as an actor in international
relations, despite its satisfaction of recognition and authority criteria. As a result, the
performance of the EU as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli Conflict after the Lisbon
Treaty verifies the rightfulness of the third stance in the literature debate. The EU’s
lack of creating one voice Europe towards the Palestinian bid for membership in the
UN as well as various attempts to sanction Israel for its illegal settlement are major
examples of supporting the idea that “the EU is neither a state nor a constituted political
entity.” (Lavenex & Merand, 2007, p. 6)
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to analyze actorness of the EU from the perspective of foreign and security policy. It asked whether the EU is a foreign policy actor after the Lisbon Treaty. In order to answer this question, the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli conflict has been examined as a case study. Moreover, Jupille and Caporaso’s four actorness criteria have been the main reference point of this analysis. This thesis aimed to contribute to the literature debate on the EU actorness, depending on whether the four criteria, namely recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion, are met. At the end of the research conducted throughout the thesis, it is seen that the EU is not able to gain an international actorness through the Lisbon Treaty. The major reason for this failure is the inefficacy of the Lisbon Treaty amendments to provide an EU foreign policy, independent from the member state policy preferences.

Maintenance of unanimity rule and consideration of the member state sensitivities in the decision-making process in the post-Lisbon period lead to the conclusion that the intergovernmental nature of the common and foreign policy institutionalization in the EU has continued after the Lisbon Treaty. This conclusion can also be defined as the failure of 'one-voice Europe' ideal in external relations. As a result, the Lisbon Treaty has not been able to provide international actorness to the EU, through formulating a common foreign and security policy that converges conflicting member state policies. Therefore, so long as the member states maintain their determination to keep foreign and security policies in their area of national sovereignty, it is not possible to change intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, and as long as the decision making procedures remains intergovernmental, it is not possible to talk about an EU actorness.

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Indeed, the EU’s bid for actorness has started just from the very beginning of its establishment. Realizing the need for autonomy and cohesion in the area of external relations to gain an actorness, having a common European foreign and security policy has been one of the major goals of the integration process. The first step to achieve this aim was taken in the first half of the 1950’s, with the formulation of the European Defense Community. However, this initiative failed in 1954, due to French refusal to ratify. This French attitude actually was the first crash between national interest and the European interest in the area of common foreign and security policy, in which national interest prevailed. Fouchet Plan was another initiative to have a common European foreign and security policy that suspended in 1962. The main reason for its failure was crash of national interests among the member states, together with their unwillingness to make any compromise for having a common foreign policy institutionalization. Consequently, in 1960’s another attempt to create a European common foreign and security policy failed, due to dominance of national interests in decision-making mechanism.

Despite these failures, the EU did not give up its common foreign and security policy goal and it led to the development of the European Political Cooperation in 1970. The EPC was an intergovernmental structure to coordinate member state foreign policies. Apparently, the EPC was a significant development to have a common European foreign policy, yet its intergovernmental formulation was its biggest challenge. The rule for unanimity and well-preserved sensitivities of the member states prevented the EPC from taking concrete foreign policy steps. Therefore, the EPC policies remained declaratory. In 1987, the Single European Act acquired the EPC a treaty base, through codification of customized procedures. Under the SEA, the member states agreed to act jointly towards international events to protect their common European interest. Consequently, in the eve of the end of the Cold War, a concrete and legally binding step was taken in the route to one voice Europe in foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental decision making mechanism continued under the framework of the SEA.
The CFSP was established with 1992 Maastricht Treaty in the post-Cold War. The EU opted to increase its actorness and political influence around its borders and in the world, by taking the advantage of the new opportunities came with the end of the Cold War. Therefore, they tried to formulate more solid foreign policy structure than the EPC in the post-Cold War. However, it was not an easy task, due to the major disagreement among member states whether intergovernmental nature of the common foreign and security policy should be kept or not. While some member states were supporting to have a more supranational structure, others were insisting to keep foreign and security policy in the ‘domaine réservé’ of the member states. In the end, the Maastricht Treaty created a pillar system, in which the CFSP placed under the second pillar that was based on intergovernmentalism.

Consequently, the CFSP showed a consistency with the EPC, in terms of unanimity based decision making mechanism and strong influence of member state interests on the European foreign and security policies. Another point of consistency was the continuation of its declaratory policy in the face of international events, rather than employment of instrumental policies. Besides issuing declarations, the EU increasingly started to employ financial instruments to increase its international actorness. Nevertheless, even under the framework of the CFSP, the EU could not act as an independent actor, independent from its member states.

In 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, several amendments were made to intensify the coherence and efficiency of the CFSP. Introduction of new instruments, such as common strategies and the High Representative was supported with institutional amendments, such as the establishment of Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and inclusion of the WEU and Petersberg Tasks. Nevertheless, structural and procedural changes were not alone sufficient to create the single voice EU in the CFSP, without real intention of member states to use them in the face of international events. In order to achieve the aimed coherence at the EU level, the member states must agree that their national interests will be served better, if they take part in joint action, common position or common strategy, than it is under a unilateral action. (Cameron, 1998, p. 76)
Likewise, the Nice Treaty introduced some significant amendments to the CFSP in 2001 by completing the missing pieces of the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty. Nonetheless, regarding continuous intergovernmental nature of new policy instruments and nationally driven political will of the member states, it can be suggested that the structural foreign and security policy problems of the EU was not solved with the Nice Treaty. There was still an immediate need for more supranational structure and the EU interest centered policy suggestions to make the EU a real actor in international affairs.

In this manner, the Lisbon Treaty was believed to be off-hook led. It entered into effect in December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty improved consistency in the common foreign policy through eliminating the pillar system of the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Commissioner for External Relations merged under a new post of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This new High Representative became responsible from the European External Action Service (EEAS), which was also created by the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the EU acquired a legal personality. Nonetheless, the rule for unanimity in decision-making remained in the CFSP that constitutes the preeminent limitation of the development of a common foreign and security policy.

According to Regelsberger and Wessels, the difficulty for the EU to have a common foreign and security policy lies in the ‘Discrete, Discretionary, Sovereignty’ (DDS) syndrome. Hence, whenever the EU attempts to institutionalize common foreign and security policy, it raises the issue of national sovereignty requires discrete and discretionary foreign and security policy for each member state. (Regelsberger & Wessels, 1996, p. 31) This argument was actually true for the Lisbon Treaty, which was a promising initiative towards one voice Europe. Nevertheless, just a few member states were ready to hand over their national foreign policy for the sake of the EU foreign policy. The majority of them were not willingly to subordinate their national
preferences for the common European policy. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty had no choice but to maintain unanimity rule, instead of the majority voting.

The institutional development of the EU raised the hopes for a strengthened CFSP at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Its economic achievements through introduction of Euro and success in converging educational, health, energy etc. policies highly improved the self-confidence of the Union. At this full blast, the EU opted to have the Constitutional Treaty in 2004, which was expected to change the EU foreign policy in more supranational direction. However, French and the Dutch referendums rejected to ratify this Treaty that showed the significance of sovereignty in the realm of foreign and security policy.

Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty amendments remained as cosmetic changes that kept the most sensitive issues untouched. Several institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty did not challenge the intergovernmental structure of the decision-making and priority of the member state foreign policies over the common policy. Accordingly, the most significant constraint for the EU foreign policy continued to be divergent member state interests. This divergence can be observed in special bilateral relationships of the member states with third parties and/or economic expectations from the outside powers, as well as in the internal dynamics of the member states.

The ambitious agenda of the Lisbon Treaty was in the similar path with the EPC, the SEA, the Maastricht and the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, in a way to enhance coherence in European foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty is bound to fail to achieve its goal, as its ancestors. Whilst previous treaty revisions also had obvious shortcomings, they were nominally concluded in a more favorable spirit of general optimism about the European project. In contrast, the Lisbon Treaty lacks any sign of surrounding enthusiasm even from the beginning. This can be explained through a decade of lost economic competitiveness at the global stage and a long-drawn out negotiation marathon that saw severe political and institutional setbacks preceding its signature. Its very nature of replacing the failed Constitutional Treaty in a financial
and political turmoil situation indicates that there was already a sense of exhaustion even before its amendments and new institutions began to operate. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty is a product of a bigger clash between desires and realities from the very start. (Mayer, 2013, p. 116)

Upon tackling the political crisis of negotiating and agreeing on the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was immediately confronted with new challenges. These included the 2008 economic crisis, the Arab uprising, global international economic and political developments, as well as negative attitudes towards Europe in third countries. (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 58) The most deteriorating of all these factors on the EU foreign policy the European financial crisis and its political impact on the member states. Therefore, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force it was already clear that the Lisbon Treaty is not capable of realizing what is expected from it. In the face of severe crisis, rightist tendencies gained support among the Europe that promise for less integration and more nationalist orientation to recover from the negative effects of the crisis. Hence, the member states preferred inward-oriented and interest-driven policies towards the regional and global problems. In this regard, their reluctance to run the EEAS and to allocate the required resources to the EU foreign policy institutions increased.

Consequently, the EU was not in a position to meet any of four actoriness criteria until 1970. Nevertheless, the establishment of the EPC in 1970 and legal framework provided to the EPC under the SEA in 1987 enabled the Community to negotiate directly with the third parties. Since then, the Community has been able to meet the first criterion of recognition. For fulfillment of the second criterion of authority, the EU has to wait until the Lisbon Treaty. Thanks to legal personality provided to the EU via the Lisbon Treaty Article 47, the EU gained the authority to act externally. Therefore, in the post-Lisbon period, the EU’s recognition has been strengthened with a legal base, besides the authority provided to the Union.
On the other hand, neither before nor after the Lisbon Treaty the EU has been able to satisfy the third and fourth criteria. Starting from the EPC to the Lisbon Treaty, all institutional developments in the field of foreign and security policy suffered from their intergovernmental design. The mentioned intergovernmental nature prevented the EU from appearing as an independent entity from its member states. Consequently, the EU’s failure to transform into an entity more than sum of its member states means nonfulfillment of the autonomy criterion. In terms of cohesion criterion, the main obstacle for the EU has been vertical cohesion, rather than the horizontal one. Contrary to several improvements in horizontal cohesiveness with Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties, by regulating the realm of authorities among the EU institutions, the EU continued to suffer from the lack of vertical cohesiveness. Due to persistence of intergovernmental decision-making procedure and unanimity rule, conflicting member state interests still weight more than the EU interest.

In order to understand whether the Lisbon Treaty has an impact on the EU actorness, the best indicator is the EU policies towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, to which the EU has involved for almost fifty years. It is by far the largest donor to the Palestinians, and all member states support a viable two-state solution. However, the EU has failed to transform this investment on the ground into political influence both before and after the Lisbon Treaty. Divergent attitudes among member states towards the conflictual Parties and the fragmentation of external competencies between the European Commission and the EEAS were continuous limitations that the EU faced. (Lehne, 2017, p. 11) Thus, the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force did not help the EU to develop an efficient and independent foreign and security policy towards the Arab–Israeli conflict. Hence, it did not enhance actorness of the EU in the region and in the eyes of the Parties.

To start with, in 1950’s and 1960’s, neither the individual European states nor the Community itself was actor in the Middle Eastern affairs. In this manner, 1967 Six-Days War was critical for the member states that underlined the need for a common foreign and security policy to gain international actorness. The lack of coordination
and coherence among the member states towards the conflictual parties reduced the respectability of the EC in the region. Hence, this failure contributed to the establishment of the EPC in 1970. Due to the intergovernmental nature of the EPC institutionalization and domination of the member states in the foreign policy decision making process, the EC was not in a position to employ operational instruments for conflict resolution. Thus, the only most suitable policy instrument available to the EC was issuing declarations. The first period of the EC involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, accordingly, is characterized by declaratory policy. 1971 Schuman Paper, 1973 Brussels Declaration and 1977 London Declaration were three main instruments used by the EC between 1967 and 1979. Since the direct impact of issuing declarations on the conflict resolution is marginal, if it is not supported with solid actions, the EC is not an actor in the Conflict in the first period.

Considering the second period of the involvement between 1980 and 1990, the EC continued its declaratory policy towards the Conflict in accordance with the UN Resolutions. However, individual activism of the member states in conflict resolution characterizes the second period, instead of a collective EU policy. The conflict of interest between the nine member states resulted in an ineffective and unreliable EC initiatives towards the Conflict. Thus, the EC failed to appear as an independent actor in the Middle East Peace process between 1980 and 1990. In the second period, consequently, a major role of mediation can be attributed to individual European member states, especially France, contrary to invisibility of the EC as an actor in the regional politics.

The third period of the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict was between 1991 and 2004. In this period, the EU started to assume a financial role in the Middle East Peace Process. Since this Process was under the leadership of the US, which was the sole superpower both in the world and in the Middle East after Cold War, the EU only gained a minor role for itself as a financial contributor to the conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the EC was not a successful in turning this economic power into a political power and actorness. In fact, the EU concentrated all its effort into the
institutional strength to develop a common foreign and security policy through the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam treaty and the Nice Treaty in this period. In addition, it appointed a Special Envoy to the Conflict and a High Representative of CSFP to increase its visibility as an actor in the region. However, the EU could not manage to support these institutional changes with concrete foreign policy actions on the ground. It maintained its tradition declaratory policy, complemented by an instrument of providing financial aid.

None of these instruments was actually sufficient to increase the EU actorness in the Conflict, without coherence and autonomy to take real action. The biggest challenge for the EU to adopt more concrete policy instruments in the peace process was internal conflict among member states. The individual initiatives of member states to maximize their national interest highly prevented the EU from developing new and tangible policy instruments. Even the membership in the Quartet and initiating innovative projects such as the EMP and the ENP did not significantly contribute to the EU bid for actorness. Thus, the member state resistance to develop more tangible policy instruments for a collective EU action was the main limitation for the EU to transform its financial role to a political actorness. Therefore, in the third period, the US was still the only prominent actor of the Arab-Israeli conflict resolution, despite conjectural changes in the region and institutional changes in the EU.

In the four years preceding the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into the force, between 2005 and 2009, the EU was still suffering from the lack of cohesion in its policies towards the Conflict. Especially the internal division among the member states during the 2008-2009 Gaza War caused the failure of any EU attempt for conflict resolution. Therefore, initiation of EUBAM Rafah and EU COPPS did not contribute to the EU actorness, as there was no coherent political mentality directing these missions as an instrument for gaining political power. Other than these two missions, the EU instruments for conflict resolution show consistency with the previous periods, as depending on issuing declarations and providing financial aid, without accompanied by any tangible foreign policy action.
The last period of the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli conflict starts with the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force and continues to 2017. It is striking to realize that fifth period do not show any remarkable development in the way to the EU actorness in the region. In the contrary, it shows a great consistency with the previous periods, in terms of lack of cohesion and autonomy. One of the best indicators of this can be seen in the contradicting responses of the member states towards the Palestinian bid for the UN membership. The diversified interests of the member states prevented the EU from acting as a block, instead, the UN voting became the scene of rivalry among the member states for individual influence and visibility in the Middle East politics. Both in 2011 and 2012 voting in the UNGA, the EU failed to develop a collective reaction to the Palestinian bid.

Another example of the EU failure to develop a coherent external action towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict was experienced in 2013 guidelines that threaten Israel to suspend its preferential treatment in the EU market, if it continues illegal settlement in Gaza. This initiative of the EU became ineffective on Israel, due to unwillingness of the member states to implement and the persistence of their bilateral relations with Israel. Therefore, once more national priorities of the member states prevailed over the EU interest in 2013, despite their promises in the Lisbon Treaty to follow the EU track in foreign policy preferences. In addition, this lack of autonomy and coherence resulted in the lesser position of the EU to Egypt in the mediation to end 2014 Gaza War. Thus, all institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty were proved to be ineffective in creating a difference in the EU actorness in the face of 2014 Gaza War, compared to the previous wars or confrontations.

As the latest example, upon the US decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017 December, all member states agreed in the UNGA that it is null and void. Nevertheless, this promising coherency among the member states was not long-running. In the period succeeding the voting in the UN, conflicting national interests of the member states appeared on the scene once more. Whilst the willingness of the some member states for concluding an association agreement with the Palestinians,
some others rejected this proposal considering its possibility to damage their bilateral relations with Israel.

Comparing and contrasting the EU’s involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict before and after the Lisbon Treaty shows similarity with the development of the common foreign and security policy in terms of four actorness criteria. The Lisbon Treaty’s success in contributing to compliance with the first two criteria and its failure to contribute to the other two criteria are obvious in this case. In the period before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s bilateral and multilateral relations with the Conflictual parties and other active countries in the region shows its institutional capacity to interact with other actors and gain their acceptance. Hence, the EU was in a position to meet only the first criterion of recognition before the Lisbon Treaty.

Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty increased already existing recognition. Especially the augmented rights of the EU in the UN, together with the legal personality given by the Lisbon Treaty amendments, enhanced its recognition in the Middle East politics. Since it coincided with the Palestinian desire of membership to the UN, the EU’s enhanced participation rights increased its significance for the Conflictual Parties. Moreover, the legal personality came with the Lisbon Treaty allowed the EU conclude agreements with the Conflictual Parties without prior authorization with by the member states. Therefore, the EU gained authority through the Lisbon Treaty, which was an improvement compared to the previous period.

On the contrary, the EU did not show similar improvement in compliance with cohesion and autonomy criteria after the Lisbon Treaty amendments. For instance, highly diversified voting preferences of the member states on Palestinian bid for membership is a great indicator of how increased EU recognition in the UN did not lead to increased EU cohesiveness. Furthermore, the new post of the High Representative under the Lisbon Treaty was not in a position to create a common stance towards the Palestinian desire in the UN. Due to maintenance of unanimous decision-making procedure with the Lisbon Treaty, the member states were not under
a legal commitment to comply with the common European stance in the UN. Consequently, the EU was not in a position to comply with the third criterion of autonomy.

Another problem stemming from the lack of autonomy and cohesion in the EU involvement into the Arab-Israeli Conflict was experienced in implementation of 2013 guidelines and 2015 EU declaration on labeling the products from Israeli settlements. The EU could not go beyond issuing declarations and continued to be dependent on declaratory policy instruments. Accordingly, what was argued in its declarations could not be supported with operational instruments, due to conflict of interest among the member states. Besides the fact that member states did not give autonomy to the EU institutions in the Lisbon Treaty, the priority of their national interest over the EU interest restricted the development of the EU cohesiveness.

Therefore, considering the fact that developed institutional capacity of the EU with the Lisbon Treaty does not correspond to an actorness in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the authenticity of third stance in the literature debate was validated. Despite the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty, not only traditional instruments of issuing declarations and providing financial aid, but also operational instruments of the EU have been failed so far to deliver the desired result of the EU actorness in the Middle East Peace Process. The EU failed to take any concrete step for conflict resolution as an actor. For that reason, the problem of the EU is not the inadequacy of the policy instruments, yet the member state will to employ these instruments for conflict resolution.

The foremost reason that condemns the EU to the political will of the member states is the intergovernmental nature of the Lisbon Treaty. Due to the continuation of unanimity rule for the EU external action in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is bounded by the bilateral relations of the member states with the conflictual parties. In order to develop a coherent collective action in conflict resolution, it needs the permission of the all member states. Therefore, the main obstacle for the EU in the way to be an actor
in the Arab-Israeli conflict is continuous desire of the member states to keep foreign and security policy in their national domain.

Although the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, all member states continued to set their own foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and to employ their national policy instruments to achieve these goals. Adding to historical ties of the member states with the Conflictual parties, energy dependency on the region and security threats coming from there make it clear that the only way for the EU to take a concrete action in this Conflict is to reach unanimity among individual interests and policy preferences of the member states. Hence, the EU is believed to “sink in the quicksands of this (Arab-Israeli) conflict, with its myriad of local, regional and international ramifications” (Musu, 2010, p. 172), due to maintenance of the intergovernmental cooperation in the external relations.

As a result, two significant factors explain the lack of the EU actorness in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, which are the member state unwillingness to give autonomy to the EU in the foreign and security policy decision making and the absence of coherence among the member states. What is observed in this case study also helps to support the hypothesis of this study. Indeed, these two reasons can be carried forward to explain why the Lisbon Treaty failed to provide an actorness to the EU. Whilst proving recognition and authority to the EU, the Lisbon Treaty does not provide cohesion and autonomy to it. Hence, the absence of these two criteria prevents the EU from becoming an actor. So long as the member states continue their determinacy to keep foreign and security policy issues in their national sphere, it does not seem possible for the EU to gain an actorness.

As a prediction for the future, increasing tendency of the member states to glorify their national sovereignty in the expense of the EU membership can be read as a very little room left for the development the EU’s foreign policy actorness in the near future. Therefore, the recent political trend in the member states evolve around ‘us vs. them’ understanding that prioritize the national interests over the communal interests. The
member states bid for prioritizing their national interest in the context of significance of national sovereignty was firstly experienced in the UK decision to leave the EU. In the meantime, the EU has been plunged into a fresh crisis with the rise of right-wing-populism within its member states. The recent national elections in the member states revealed surging Euroscepticism, which could result in more countries leaving the EU. (Kirby, 2017)

For instance, in October 2017 Andrej Babis, who is named as ‘Czech Donald Trump’ won the leadership election in the Czech Republic. The victory of a Eurosceptic, anti-immigration and pro-Russian billionaire was a big strike to the EU. Furthermore, in September 2017, the rightwing Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) party surged to third place in the German election by taking 13 per cent of the vote. It was a remarkable development in the election history of Germany, since it was the first time in almost 60 years that an openly nationalist party has secured seats in the Bundestag. In addition, Sebastian Kurz became the new chancellor in Austria, who is known as a Eurosceptic and for his anti-EU feelings. What threatens the EU more is his decision to form a coalition with the second-placed, far-right nationalist party, the Freedom Party. (Kirby, 2017)

Elections in France and the Netherlands earlier in 2017 also shows similarity with these three countries in terms of popularity of right-wing parties. Anti-EU candidates of Marine Le Pen in France and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands came close to snatching the leadership. Moreover, major rifts have emerged between Poland and the EU after the election of President Andrzej Duda in 2015, who is known for his conservative values and anti-immigrant discourse. The similar trend can be observed in Hungary, under the leadership of Victor Orban. Even in Scandinavia, the Sweden Democrats and the True Finns threaten the EU relations with Sweden and Finland, considering anti-immigration movements of these parties. (Kirby, 2017)
The most recent development was the Italian elections on 4 May 2018, which resulted with a victory the centre-right alliance. Five Star Movement, under the leadership of Luigi di Maio, was the true star of the elections. It is argued to “represent the biggest threat to the EU” (Kirby, 2017), with its Eurosceptic understanding. (Lansford, 2013, p. 716) Nevertheless, the latest news on the leader and party program argues, “the Five Star Movement has also been deeply misunderstood, at home and abroad, partly as a result of biased media coverage in Italy… Far from advocating an exit from the Eurozone, the movement calls for greater cooperation with Brussels to address common challenges to the EU, from the migrant and refugee crisis to the phasing out of fossil fuels and the development of renewable energy.” (Firmian, 2018) Hence, the EU should pursue a ‘wait-and-see’ policy towards the new leadership of Italy with skepticism.

As a result, all above given examples, reflecting the preferences of the European people, reveal that the people in the EU member states are in favor of prioritizing their national interest over the EU interest. For this reason, the Lisbon Treaty will remain the highest integration point in foreign and security integration in the near future. The most optimistic scenario for the EU, considering the recent developments in the EU member states, will be the continuation of recognition and authority given to the EU by the member states, rather than gaining cohesion and autonomy. Hence, the future is the dark for the EU’s bid for actorness.
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Avrupa Birliği, neredeyse yetmiş yılda kurumsal yapısını ve karmaşıklığını kademeli olarak hızlandiran tüm bölgesel entegrasyon girişimleri arasında eşsiz bir başarı öyküsüdür. Bu nedenle birlikte, AB'nin farklı dış politika tercihleri ve pozisyonları olan 28 Üye Devleti kapsayanopsis dikkate alındığında üyelerinden ayrı bir aktör olarak ele alınıp anlaşılamaçağı literatürde tartışmalıdır. Literatürdeki bir görüşe göre AB, uluslararası bir örgütlenmeden daha bütünleşik bir yönetim yapısına sahiptir. Özellikle

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET


Avrupa Birliği, neredeyse yetmiş yılda kurumsal yapısını ve karmaşıklığını kademeli olarak hızlandiran tüm bölgesel entegrasyon girişimleri arasında eşsiz bir başarı öyküsüdür. Bu nedenle birlikte, AB'nin farklı dış politika tercihleri ve pozisyonları olan 28 Üye Devleti kapsayanopsis dikkate alındığında üyelerinden ayrı bir aktör olarak ele alınıp anlaşılamaçağı literatürde tartışmalıdır. Literatürdeki bir görüşe göre AB, uluslararası bir örgütlenmeden daha bütünleşik bir yönetim yapısına sahiptir. Özellikle
Bu andaki ekonomik yönetişi, ortak para birimi ve yardım, ticaret ve ekonomik işbirliği düzenlemelerinin uluslararasını çalıştırığından nevi şahsına münhasır bir aktör olarak kabul edilmektedir. Öte yandan, üye ülkelerden bağımsız olarak hareket edebilme kabişyetindeki yetersizliği ile ekonomik ve diplomatik araçlar dışındaki politika enstrümanlarından yoksun olması onun aktörlük bağlamında ulus devletin aşagina ancak uluslararası organizasyonların yukarısında bir yerde konumlanmasına neden olmuştur.

Bir başka görüşe göre ise AB, herhangi bir ulus-devlet ile aynı şekilde analiz edilebilecek bir aktör olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bu görüş, birinci görüşe karşı olarak AB’nin aynı ulus devletler gibi bağımsız bir dış politika kabişyeti sahip bir aktör olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu perspektiften, AB’nin üye ülkeler tarafından herhangi bir kısıtlamaya tabi olmamak kendi politikasını kurup yürütebileceğine dair inanç, onun uluslararası aktörlerin temelini oluşturmaktadır.

Literatürde ayrıca realist akademisyenler tarafından savunulan ve AB’yi uluslararası aktör olarak tanımayı reddeden üçüncü bir duruş da vardır. Bu duruşun içerisinde bazıları dış politikada hükümetler arası karar alma süreçleri nedeniyle, bazıları ise tek ses olarak bir politika belirlenmesindeki güçlükleri dikkate alarak, AB’nin her zaman aktörlük açısından bazı sınırlamalar ile karşılaştığına inanmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, üçüncü perspektifin savunucuları, AB’nin ne bir devlet ne de bir siyasi varlık olduğunu ve rasyonel olarak hareket edebilecek bir konumda olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Bu nedenle AB bir uluslararası ilişkiler aktörü değildir ve hiçbir koşulda aktör olarak adlandırılmamalıdır.

Sonuç olarak, AB aktörlüğine ilişkin tüm bu farklı bakış açıları aslında uluslararası ilişkilerde farklı aktör tanımlarına dayanmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu tezin araştırma sorusunu ceplamak için aktörlüğün nasıl tanımladığını altını çizmek önemlidir. Literatürde birçok aktör tanımlaması olmasına rağmen, Jupille & Caporaso’nun tanımları bu tezin temelidir. Bu tanıma göre bir varlığın uluslararası bir aktör sayılması için
tanim, otorite, özverklik ve uyumdan oluşan dört yapısal kriterinin aynı anda karşılanması gerektiğini.

İlk kriterin sağlanması için, diğer aktörlerle etkileşimde bulunmayı ve bu aktörler tarafından kabul görmeyi mümkün bir kurumsal kapasiteye sahip olunmalıdır. İkinci kriter olan otorite ise, kurumun uluslararası hukuk alanında bağımsız bir şekilde hareket etmesini sağlayan tutel kişiliği ile ilgilidir. Bunların yanında, özverklik kriterinden diğer tüm uluslararası aktörlerden bağımsızlık ve bağımsız bir kurumsal yapıya sahip olma yeterliliği; uyumluluk kriterinden kendi içinde tutarlı politikalar belirlenmesi ve uygulanması anlaşılmalıdır.

Bu kriterleri AB’nin aktörlüğü açısından ele aldığımızda, Lizbon Anlaşması’nın ilk iki kriterin karşılanması anlamında etkili bir araç olduğu ancak diğer iki kriter açısından herhangi bir değişiklik getirmediği düşünülmektedir. Lizbon Anlaşması öncesi yalnızca tanınma kriterini sağlayan AB, Lizbon Anlaşması’nın 47. Maddesi ile sağlanan tutel kişilik sayesinde hem bu kriteri sağlamadaki becerisi artırmış hem de otorite kriterini sağlayabilecek bir noktaya ulaşmıştır.


Dahası, AB, sürdürülebilir sanayi üretimi için Orta Doğu'nun enerji kaynaklarına büyük ölçüde bağlıdır. Üye ülkeler ancak Ortadoğu'dan Avrupa'ya petrol ve gaz akışını sağladıkları süreci üretim seviyelerini koruyabilirler. Bu akıştaaki herhangi bir kesinti, üye devlet ekonomilerinde ciddi zararlara yol açacaktır. Ayrıca Orta Doğu petrol ve doğal gazının diğer bölgelere kıyasla daha makul fiyatlı olduğu da AB'nin bölge enerji kaynaklarına olan bağlılığını artırmaktadır. Bu nedenle, AB üye devletlerinin enerji arz güvenliğini tehdit eden bölgedeki herhangi bir çatışmayı evləviyetle çözme啼 ciddi çıkışı vardır.


Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası oluşturma yolundaki en kapsamlı çalışma Lizbon Anlaşması ile ortaya konulmuştur. Lizbon Anlaşması, 2003’ün Anayasa Anlaşması’nın yürürlüğe girmesi sürecinde yaşanan olumsuz durumlar ve nihayetinde reddedilmesi ile birlikte ikinci bir bütünleşme girişimi ortaya çıkmış ve bu defa üye devletlerin hassasiyetlerini de dikkate alan bir yapı öngörülmiştir. AB için bir yeniden tasarlama
çalışması olan bu Anlaşma, Anayasa Anlaşmasından çıkarılan dersler çerçevesinde oluşturulmuş ve uluslararası yapısı dışlayan bir düzenleme olmuştur. Bir başka ifade ile, Lizbon Antlaşması AB Federasyonu olarak tanımlanabilecek bütün düzenlemelerden uzak tutulmuş ve önemli konularda hükümetlerarası sistem merkeze alınmıştır.

Bu kadar hassas davranışlı noktalardan birisi de dış ve güvenlik politikası konulardır. AB tarafından belirlenen dış ve güvenlik politikası kararlarına tüm üye devletlerin uyması ve buna aykırı bir tutum içine girmemesi ilkesi Lizbon Anlaşması’nda açıkça yer almasına karşılık, üye devletlerin bu konulardaki egemenliklerinin öneminine vurgu yapan devamındaki maddeler Lizbon Anlaşması’nın yumuşak karnını işaret etmektedir. Söz konusu alanlarda alınacak kararlar için AB Zirvesi’nin yetkili kılınması ve oluşturulacak politikalarda hükümetlerarası yapının esas olacağını, ancak hangi alanlarda nitelikli oy çoğunluğu ilkesini devreye gireceğinin açıkça belirtilmesi bu hassasiyetin göstergelerindendir. Ayrıca yapıcı çekimserlik uygulamasının devamına karar verilmesi ve her bir üye devletin yerel hassasiyetleri dikkate alınarak bazı konularda oylama yapılmasını engelleme hakkının tanınması gibi düzenlemeler de Lizbon Anlaşması’nın yukarıda atf yapılan özelliklerini doğrular niteliğindedir. Bu savı destekler başka bir Lizbon Anlaşması maddesi ise nitelikli oy çoğunluğu ile karar alınmasının askeri ve savunma konularında yasaklanmasıdır.

Sonuç olarak, Lizbon Antlaşması bir takım önemli kurumsal değişiklikler içermesine rağmen, üye devletlerin ulusal çıkarlarını ve güvenlik hassasiyetlerini AB’nin birlik olarak ortaya koyduğu çıkarlara yeğ tutmaktadır. Ayrıca, acil kriz ve uluslararası gelişmeler karşısında ortak bir dış politika tutumu geliştirmesi süreç almakta ve bu durum da AB’nin birlik olarak güvenilirliğini tehlkeye sokmaktadır. Bütün bunlar dikkate alındığında, üye devletlerin ulusal çıkarları ve kendi öncelikleri AB’nin önemzdeki yıllarda bir dış politika aktörü olarak tanımlanmasını engellemeye devam edecektir.

Lizbon Anlaşması sonrası dönemde otorite kriterinin sağlanması ve tanınma kriterinin genişletilmesi konusunda gelişmeler sağlanırsa da AB’nin uyumluluk ve otonomi kriterlerini sağlama konusundaki başarısızlığı devam etmiştir. Bu başarısızlıkta kilit faktör, AB’nin dış ve güvenlik politikasındaki hükümetlerarası kurumsal yapının devamlılığıdır. Üye devletlerin, dış politika kararlarındaki bağımsızlıklarını koruma kararlılığı ve daha uluslar üstü bir yapılanmayı reddetmesi de bu başarısızlığı çevreleyen temel zihniyettir.


Soğuk Savaşı sonrası dönem tekabül eden üçüncü dönem (1990-2005), AB’nin barış sürecinde daha aktif bir dış politika izlemesi ve aktörlüğünü artırması için bir fırsatı. AB bu dönemde Arap-İsrail çatışmasının çözümü için bildirimler yayınlamaktan ve maddi yardım sağlamaktan daha somut adımlar atma şansına sahipti. Ancak AB bu aktörlük fırsatını, bölgedeki aktif ABD politikası ve AB üyesi devletler arasındaki çıkar çatışmaları nedeniyle gergi gibi değerlendiremedi. AB bu üçüncü dönemde barış sürecinde çok daha aktif olması rağmen yine de üye devletlerden bağımsız bir aktör olmayı başaramadı. 1991’deki Madrid Süreci’nden başlayarak AB, barış sürecinin ikili politik boyutundan dışlandığı ve yalnızca yetki alanı yalnızca mali yardım sağlakla sınırlanmıştı.

Sağlanan maddi yardımları politik bir gücü dönüştürmesinin ve bu yolla Arap-İsrail Çatışmasında bir dış politika aktörüolsonunun ön ise özellikle ABD tarafından kesildi. Bunun üzerine çatışan partileri bir araya getirmek için Madrid sürecine bir alternatif olarak sunulan Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklığı girişimi de tamamlayıcı bir platform olma yönündeki kısmi başarısına rağmen, üye devletler
arasındaki konjonktürel gelişmeler ve iç anlaşmazlıklar nedeniyle başarısız oldu. Ayrıca, AB’nin barış sürecindeki aktörlüğünü artırmaya hedefiyle uyumlu olarak, Arap-İsrail Çatışması özellikle önce bir Özel Elçi ve daha sonra bir Yüksek Temsilcisi atanması AB’nin bölgedeki görünenliğe katkı sağlamakla birlikte tek-ses Avrupa idealini gerçekleştirmekten uzaktı.

AB’nin üçüncü dönemde barış sürecinde daha somut politika araçlarını kullanmasını önündeki en büyük engel, üye devletler arasındaki çıkar çatışmasıdır. Üye devletlerin kendi ulusal çıkarlarını en üst düzeyeye çıkarmaya yönelik bireysel girişimleri, AB’nin yeni ve somut politika araçları geliştirmesini engellemiştir. Bu çıkmazın üstesinden gelmek için AB çok taraflı bir girişime katılmaya karar vermiş ve böylece AB, yeni tekn taraflı inisiyatifler geliştirmek yerine ABD, Rusya ve BM ile birlikte ‘Quartet’ olarak anılan girişimin bir parçası olmuştur. Ne var ki bu yeni girişim içinde da AB’nin aktörlüğü ABD’nin baskın rolü tarafından engellenmiş ve AB’nin gerçek bir politik güç elde etmesine imkan verilmemiştir. Ayrıca, ABD ve bazı AB üye ülkeleri arasındaki 2003 yılında Irak savaşını öncesinde yaşanan gerilim, AB’nin çok taraflı politikasını sürdürmesini zorlaştırmıştır. Bu nedenle, 2004 yılında Avrupa Komşuluk Politikasının kurulmasıyla AB tek taraflı politikalarla barış sürecini yönetme fikrine geri dönmüştür.

Ancak bu operasyonel araçlar AB'nin bölgedeki aktörliğine beklenen katkıyı sağlayamadı. Ayrıca, Hamas'ın ‘Quartet’ kararlarına uymayı reddetmesi üzerine AB'nın doğrudan maddi yardımları askıya alma kararı, AB'nin halihazırda sekteye uğramış olan güvenilirliğini iyice azaltmıştır. AB’ın TIM ve PEGASE kapsamında sağlanan yardımlarla bunu telafi etme çabalarına rağmen, 2008 ve 2009 arasındaki Gazze Savaşı tüm AB çabalarını boşuna çıkarmıştır. Özellikle Gazze Savaşı sırasında üye devletler arasındaki çıkar çatışması ve AB içerisindeki bölünme, AB’nin bölge aktörlüğü yolundaki bütün bu girişimleri etkisiz hale getirmiş ve.


Dahasi, AB Lizbon Antlaşması'ndan önceki dönemde üçüncü ve dördüncü kriterleri yani özerklik ve uyumluluğu da yerine getirememiştir. Özellikle, üye devletlerin dış politika ve güvenlik politikası alanında AB kurumlarına özerkliği devretme konusundaki istekszizliği nedeniyle AB, Arap-İsrail Çatışmasında politika aracı olarak deklarasyonlar yayınlanması ve maddi yardımlar sağlanması ile sınırlı kalmıştır. Özerklik eksikliğine ek olarak, uyumlulukta yaşanan sıkıntılar AB’nin Arap-İsrail Çatışmasındaki aktörüğüne zarar veren başka bir boyuttu. Her iki eksikliğin de temel nedeni üye devletlerin dış politikadaki egemenliklerinden vazgeçmekeş istememesi ve bu nedenle, dış ilişkilerin sıkı sıkıya hükümetlerarasi olarak kurumsallaştırılmıştır. 1990'larda ve 2000'lerde AB'ye özerklik ve uyumluluk sağlamak için yapılan tüm
kurumsal değişikliklere rağmen, AB yalnızca ulusal hükümetlerin üzerinde anlaşmaya varıldığı durumlarda etkili bir varlık gösterebilmiştir.

Buna göre, AB’nin Lizbon Anlaşması’ndan önceki dönemde Arap-İsrail Çatışması’na katılım, dört aktörülük kriterinden yalnızca tanınmayı karşılamalarını ve diğer üç kriteri yerine getiremeyeceğini ortaya koydu. Bu nedenle, AB’nin bu dönemde Arap-İsrail Çatışmalarındaki performansı, literatür tartışmaları açısından AB’nin aktör olarak kabul edildiği üçüncü görüşü doğrular niteliğindedir. Böylelikle, tek-ses-Avrupa yaratmadaki başarısızlık ve her bir üye devletin hassasiyetleri dikkate alınarak oluşturulan hükümetlerarası tasarımın sürdürülmesindeki başarısızlık, AB’nin bir dış politika aktörü olarak adlandırılması gerektiğini sonucuna yol açmıştır.


Bu nedenle, Lizbon Anlaşması sonrası dönemde açıkça ortaya çıkan bir gerçek şu oldu: Üye devletler barış sürecine yönelik bir politika üzerinde anlaşamadıkları sürece, AB’nin Orta Doğu’da bir aktör olması imkânsızdır. AB üyesi ülkelerin çatışan taraflarla olan tarihsel bağları ile mevcut siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkilerine dayanan farklı ulusal çıkarları arasındaki çatışma hala AB’nin en büyük düşmandır. Dolayışıla, bölgedeki AB politikalarına en çok zarar veren şey, bağımsız üye devlet politikalarının uygulanmasıdır. Lizbon Antlaşması ile yapılan değişikliklerden sonra bile, üye devletlerin dış politika alanındaki egemenliklerini AB kurumlarına bırakmaya istekli olmadığını açıktır. Sonuç olarak, yalnızca geleneksel politika araçları olan bildirgelerin yayınlanması ve mali yardım sağlanması değil, aynı zamanda AB’nin operasyonel
araçları da, AB’nin Ortadoğu Barış Sürecinde sahip olmayı arzuladığı aktörlüğü sağlamada başarısızdır.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEZİN ÖNEMLİ BULGULARI</th>
<th>TEZ ÖNEMLİ ÖNERMELERİ</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uluslararası bir aktör olarak kabul edilebilmek için, tanınma, otorite, özerklik ve uyum kriterlerinin aynı anda yerine getirilmesi gerekliidir.</td>
<td>Lizbon Antlaşması'na kadar, AB sadece tanınma kriterlerini yerine getirebildi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lizbon Antlaşması ile çeşitli kurumsal değişiklikler getirilmiştir.</td>
<td>Bu kurumsal değişikliklerin diğer üç kriterin karşılanması konusunda etkili olacağı düşünülmüştür.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lizbon Antlaşması, yalnızca tanınma kriterinin karşılanması sağlanmasında ve otorite kriterlerinin karşılanmasında etkili olmuştur.</td>
<td>Özerek ve uyum kriterleri Lizbon Anlaşması sonrası dönemde de karşılanamamıştır.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB'nin Arap-İsrail Çatışmasına katılması, Lizbon Antlaşması'nın tüm aktörlük kriterlerini yerine getirip getirmediğini test etmek için en iyi örnek olaydır.</td>
<td>Bu örnek olayın incelenmesi de, AB'nin Lizbon sonrası dönemde bile uyum ve özerklik kriterlerini karşılamadaki başarısızlığını doğrulamaktadır.</td>
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B. TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU/ THESIS PHOTOCOPY PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics
Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

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Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English) : The Impact of Lisbon Treaty on the European Union Foreign Policy Actoriness: The Case Study of Arab-Israeli Conflict

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master ☐ Doktora / PhD ☐

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