

THE RISE OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE:  
THE CASE OF THE ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY (AfD)

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE RISE OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE: THE CASE OF THE ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY (AfD)**

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This thesis aims to show that the Alternative for Germany displays a good combination of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism, which are three core ideological features of populist radical right parties. This thesis also aims to find out what the rise of the Alternative for Germany means for the future of Europe. This thesis claims that the populist radical right ideology that the Alternative for Germany stands for is a serious threat to the European integration project which has provided a framework for peaceful resolution of political and economic differences in Europe. In particular, the key ideology of the Alternative for Germany, nativism, is in sharp contrast to European integration and European values.

Keywords: Populist Radical Right (PRR) Parties, Alternative for Germany (AfD)

## ÖZ

### AVRUPA'DA YÜKSELEN POPÜLİST RADİKAL SAĞ PARTİLER: ALMANYA İÇİN ALTERNATİF (AfD) ÖRNEĞİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları

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Bu tez, Almanya için Alternatif'in popülist radikal sağ partilerin üç temel ideolojik özelliği olan popülizm, yerlilik ve otoriterizmin iyi bir bileşimini sergilediğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez aynı zamanda, Almanya için Alternatif'in yükselişinin Avrupa'nın geleceği için ne anlama geldiğini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez, Almanya için Alternatif'in savunucusu olduğu popülist radikal sağ ideolojinin, Avrupa'daki siyasi ve ekonomik farklılıkların barışçıl çözümlenmesi için bir çerçeve sunan Avrupa entegrasyon projesi için ciddi bir tehdit olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Özellikle, Almanya için Alternatif'in anahtar ideolojisi olan yerlilik, Avrupa entegrasyonu ve Avrupa değerleriyle keskin bir tezat oluşturmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülist Radikal Sağ Partiler, Almanya için Alternatif

To my beloved mother and father,  
without whose endless love and unconditional support  
all my accomplishments would be impossible.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative for Germany
BNP	British National Party
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSU	Christian Social Union
DF	Danish People's Party
DVU	German People's Union
DRP	German Reich Party
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
EP	European Parliament
FN	National Front
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
Jobbik	Movement for a Better Hungary
LN	Northern League
NA	National Alliance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany
NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers' Party
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party
PiS	Law and Justice Party
PRR	Populist Radical Right

PS	Finns Party
PVV	Party for Freedom
REP	Republicans
SD	Sweden Democrats
SNS	Slovak National Party
SPD	Social Democratic Party
SRP	Socialist Reich Party
SVP	Swiss People's Party
Syriza	Coalition of the Radical Left
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
VB	Flemish Interest
WTO	World Trade Organization

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

“Populist radical right”<sup>1</sup> (PRR) parties, which began to appear in Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s are becoming increasingly influential political actors across Europe (Spierings et al., 2015: 3). Their electoral support is growing, their impact on policy-making is becoming important, and in recent years several of them have risen to power, which makes them an interesting and significant case study for political scientists, policy-makers, and politicians alike. One reason why PRR parties attracted scholarly attention in the recent years is that the core characteristics of such parties, i.e. populism, nativism, and authoritarianism, as argued by Mudde (2007), pose a serious threat not only to the fundamental values within the country that the party is located, but also to the European values of peace, freedom, democracy, justice, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Empirical evidence on these parties also show that they endanger some of the constitutional foundations of liberal democracies such as pluralism and the protection of minorities.

In recent years, European politics witnessed emergence and rise of political parties from this party family, such as National Front (FN) in France, Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in Austria, Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, Danish People’s Party (DF) in Denmark, Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in Switzerland, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, Finns Party (PS) in Finland, Northern League (LN) in Italy, Law and Justice

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<sup>1</sup> Different terms such as ‘extreme right’ (Ignazi, 1992), “radical right-wing populism” (Betz 1994), “new populism” (Taggart, 1995), “radical right” (Kitschelt, 1997), “anti-immigrant” (Fennema, 1997) and “far right” (Golder, 2016) are used by scholars in the literature. In this thesis, I prefer to use the term “populist radical right” (Mudde, 2007).

Party (PiS) in Poland, Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) in Hungary, Flemish Interest (VB) in Belgium, National Alliance (NA) in Latvia, Sweden Democrats (SD) in Sweden and, last but not least Alternative for Germany (*Alternative für Deutschland*, AfD) in Germany. The year 2017 was particularly significant for the electoral gains of PRR parties in many European countries. In the parliamentary election held in the Netherlands in March 2017, Geert Wilders' PVV increased its share of the vote and now has more seats. It is now the second biggest party in the parliament and the official voice of the opposition. To give another example, in the French presidential elections held in April and May 2017, FN's leader Marine Le Pen lost the presidential race; however, she increased her party's support, getting the party's highest vote share in the second round of the presidential elections. Similarly, in the legislative elections held in Austria in October 2017, the centre-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) won a plurality which was significantly stronger than in the past election of 2013. The populist radical right FPÖ came third in the election and increased its vote share. The ÖVP and the FPÖ will form a coalition government. Germany's Alternative for Germany, the political party which constitutes the main focus of thesis, is also among the parties which made a historic breakthrough in the 2017 federal election.

Against this background, the research question of this thesis is how the AfD could be classified in the political spectrum and what the rise of the AfD means for the future of Europe. Through examining party programs, documents, statements, speeches of the party officials and the party's presence on the internet, I aim to analyse the populism, authoritarianism, and nativism of the AfD within a six-year period between 2013 and 2018.

In this respect, the core claim of this thesis is that the selected case, AfD, perfectly fits the description of the populist radical right party as it combines populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. In particular, I claim that nativism is the core ideology of the AfD. The party tactically uses populist rhetoric to increase the popular discontent which arises from Merkel's open-door policy on

refugees. The main motivation of the party is based on cultural concerns especially in case of migration issue. The party sees migration as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the Germans. According to the party, the purity of the nation must be preserved. This claim is also fed by anti-Islam sentiments in the party's propaganda. Similarly, the economy policy of the party is based on nativist arguments. According to the party, German money should be used for German interests.

Thus, in line with its nativism, migration is perceived by the AfD as a threat to national identity, culture, welfare, and national and European security. The AfD's anti-migrant political discourse is of importance as it influences both the general public's perception of migration and the policies which regulate the act of migration. Moreover, the AfD poses a challenge to the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), pro-European establishment parties, and puts pressure on mainstream leaders to embrace some of its positions. The rise of the AfD will probably continue to mean much for German politics in the foreseeable future. The party would probably pose great pressure on the German federal government to make adjustments in German and European refugee and immigration policy. In order to minimize the party's influence, the government in power will most probably adopt tighter rules on migration issues in the future.

As this thesis claims, this picture also has a meaning for the future of the European project. As will be scrutinised in the forthcoming chapters, the AfD is in favour of the return to the nation state and the national identity. The party believes that Germany has to give priority to its own national, rather than international, interests. In this regard, the AfD holds negative views on the European Union. The party believes that national sovereignty has been relinquished to Brussels as a part of the EU membership. I argue that the PRR ideology that the AfD stands for is a threat to the European integration project and "unity in diversity" motto. As I will discuss in detail, the core ideology of the AfD, nativism, is in sharp contrast to European integration. The rise of the

AfD strengthens the prospect of “multi-speed Europe” which is the term used to describe the idea that any member state can integrate at different levels and pace.

By the same token, the AfD’s quarrel with some aspects of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities, also poses a great challenge to the European project since the target of the EU is to guarantee peace in Europe by furthering liberal democracy through economic integration.

All in all, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on populist radical right by inquiring how the AfD establishes its PRR discourse. In the literature, there is limited research on Germany’s AfD. For example, there are many studies which analyse populist radical right parties such as the Freedom Party of Austria or France’s National Front probably because these parties have a longer history. The FPÖ was founded in 1956 and the FN was founded in 1972. These parties have increased their support since the 1980s. The AfD, on the other hand, was established in 2013, which sets quite a recent example. Therefore, I aim to contribute to the literature by providing a detailed analysis of the AfD.

The reasons behind the case selection is numerous: Germany is one of the founding countries of the European Union and is also the core member of the European Union. It is also the country where Nazism was born. Thus, there is a certain sensitivity in German politics against far right politics due to the German experience with National Socialism. The Federal Constitutional Court and cross-party consensus have been successful in preventing the spread of far right parties since the end of World War II (Öner, 2014: 98). In Germany’s post-war history, no far right party succeeded to pass the 5% electoral threshold. Therefore, I attach great importance to the rise of the AfD in Germany.

The AfD was founded in 2013 as a reaction to the Euro crisis. The party’s name stems from Merkel’s remarks that “there was no alternative” to her Eurozone policy. The party was created by Bernd Lucke, Alexander Gauland, and Konrad Adam, who predominantly aimed to criticise the measures of the

German government to rescue the Euro in the aftermath of the financial crisis in Greece. Besides the rejection of the euro, the party aimed to attract voters frustrated with the established parties and political elites. The party program for the September 2013 federal election included an important section stressing the significance of democratic rights, direct democratic instruments, and the limits of the power of parties (AfD 2013, cited in Reher, 2017). At the same time, party leaders insisted that their party was located neither on the left nor on the right in economic and social terms (Reher, 2017: 41). Nevertheless, election posters featured slogans like “immigration requires strict rules” (Schmitt-Beck 2014, cited in Reher, 2017: 41). The party also expressed its standpoint clearly in its 2014 European Parliament program: “Immigration to gain free access to the German social systems must be prevented,” “The external borders of the EU must be monitored to prevent uncontrolled immigration into EU countries,” “An immigration policy must take national interests into account” (AfD, 2014). Therefore, although the AfD was not yet as critical toward immigrants, particularly Muslim ones in 2014 as in 2015, it was clear that the party stood for more than just the dissolution of the Euro (Reher, 2017: 41).

In the 2013 federal election, the AfD garnered 4.7 per cent of the votes, the best result for any party competing for the first time since 1953 (Arzheimer, 2015: 541), but failed to reach the electoral threshold. In the 2014 European Parliament election, the AfD garnered 7.1 per cent of the votes, which entitled them to seven seats in the European Parliament.

The AfD experienced a party split in mid-2015. As a result of an intra-party conflict, the chair of the AfD changed in July 2015. Lucke, the economics professor, resigned as party leader. Lucke said that he left the party because it was becoming “Islamophobic and xenophobic” (Reuters, 2015). Lucke also said that “it called Germany’s ties to the West into question, particularly its membership in NATO, but also the EU positioning itself clearly against free trade agreements like TTIP and CETA” (Deutsche Welle, 2017a). Frauke Petry, spokesperson for the AfD Saxony, became the AfD’s new party leader. Petry

capitalized on rising public anger over the German Chancellor Angela Merkel's 2015 decision to open the borders to more than a million refugees, which increased its anti-immigrant position. In 2016 state elections, the AfD became the second largest party in Saxony-Anhalt and the third-largest in both Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. Currently, the AfD is represented in 14 out of Germany's 16 state parliaments. In the latest federal elections on 24 September 2017, the party made a historic breakthrough and won 12.6% of the vote, which meant a 7.9 percentage point increase from the last election in 2013. As a result, the AfD has entered parliament as the third-largest party. The party has won 94 seats; however, two MPs<sup>2</sup> left the party.

Since its founding, there have been different views in the literature on how to position the AfD in the political spectrum. For instance, Scicluna claims that the AfD is not a far right party in the mould of Geert Wilders's Dutch Party for Freedom and Marine Le Pen's National Front. Scicluna states that the AfD appears to be occupying the space to the right of the CDU (Scicluna, 2014: 296). On a different note, Lewandowsky states that the AfD is not a straightforward right-wing populist party in the traditional sense. He claims that the AfD functions as a centre-right protest party (Lewandowsky, 2014). For Arzheimer, the AfD indeed occupies a position at the far right of the German party system, but it is currently neither populist nor does it belong to the family of Radical Right parties (Arzheimer, 2015: 535). On the other hand, Berbuir et al. claim that the AfD is neither just another right-wing populist party nor an ordoliberal<sup>3</sup> bourgeois party free from populist and nationalist ideas (Berbuir et al., 2015: 173). For Lochocki, "it is neither right-extreme, nor conservative, nor a centre party, nor a liberal party. The AfD is a clear-cut right-wing populist party" (Lochocki, 2015: 5).

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<sup>2</sup> Petry left shortly after the election due to a disagreement with other leaders. Petry's husband Marcus Pretzell also quit the party and became an independent member of parliament.

<sup>3</sup> German ordoliberalism developed after World War II is an attempt to find a way to combine liberal market ideas and Christian ideals (Franzmann, 2017).

The literature on the AfD also sheds light on the shift of the party's political orientation by time. According to Jankowski et al., Petry's leadership denoted a fundamental change in the positioning of the AfD, shifting from ordoliberal economic views toward nationalist conservative views (Jankowski et al., 2016: 2). Schmitt-Beck does not qualify the AfD as a full-fledged right-wing populist party and states that it remains to be seen whether the AfD will go all the way and transform itself into a full-fledged right-wing populist party (Schmitt-Beck, 2016: 21-22). Jäckle and König state that the AfD started out as a market-liberal single-issue anti-Euro party but the party turned into a populist right-wing and nationalist party that integrates extreme right sentiments (Jäckle & König, 2016: 5). For Franzmann, this shift in the party's discourse towards populism owes to the economists in power within the party (Franzmann, 2016: 458). He asserts that the AfD approached the 2013 German federal election with extensive populist appeals, but it abandoned them in its approach to the 2014 EP election. He says that the economist wing tactically introduced the populist discourse into the AfD's rhetoric. As an unintended consequence, this attracted supporters of right-wing populism towards the AfD (Franzmann, 2016: 458). According to him, after Lucke and several members left, the remaining majority of the AfD transformed the party into a right-wing populist one (Franzmann, 2016: 461).

Indeed, there were two contrary camps within the AfD emerged at an early stage: the economist camp and the nationalist conservative camp. Bernd Lucke was the leader of the economist camp. According to the party's co-founder and first leader Lucke, through the euro, Germans were paying for the dysfunctional economies and states of countries such as Greece. For him, the solution was to dismantle the Eurozone, and to return to the Deutschmark and a national economy that trades with the world but which is based on few but strict rules. More importantly, he called for more direct democracy and an immigration system limiting the possibility of "immigration into the German welfare state" (Göpffarth, 2017). This point shows that the anti-immigration position was

already in the AfD's original structure. Lucke was defeated by Petry in 2015 and left the party. Petry led the party to where it is now. Petry did not run as the party's lead candidate in September's election. Petry's withdrawal from running as the AfD's candidate shifted the party's centre of power further to the right. Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel became the leading candidates for September's federal election. Gauland who is known for his radical views was one of the founders of the party. In short, from the start, there has been a nationalist conservative camp within the party. This camp succeeded to dominate the party by capitalizing on the public anger over Merkel's open-door policy on refugees in 2015. Gauland called the refugee crisis a "gift" for the party (Zeit Online, 2016). At the AfD's convention in Hanover in December 2017, Alexander Gauland and Jörg Meuthen are elected as co-chairs. The AfD continues to move further to the right.

It is important to examine how AfD is positioned in domestic politics. Since its formation in 2013, the German political establishment has treated it as an essentially antidemocratic party (Kundnani, 2017). The AfD has been compared to the Nazis by some members of mainstream parties. Former foreign minister of Germany Sigmar Gabriel, a member of the SPD, equated the AfD with the Nazis (Reuters, 2017a). Berlin's mayor Michael Mueller, a member of the SPD, warned that double-digit gains for the AfD would be interpreted worldwide as a "return of the right and the Nazis in Germany" (NBC, 2016). Heiko Maas, new foreign minister and a member of the SPD, stated that "at least some groups within the AfD appear to have set themselves up to become a new political home for neo-Nazis" (The Local, 2018). Cem Özdemir, former leader of the Greens, compared the AfD to the Nazis. Greens member of parliament, Volker Beck, said that state authorities should more closely monitor the right wing of the AfD for neo-Nazi content (Deutsche Welle, 2017b). Members of the CDU and CSU described the AfD as an extreme right party. Christian Lindner, leader of Free Democratic Party (FDP), did not compare the AfD to the Nazis. He described the AfD as an anti-liberal and authoritarian party that was

completely at odds with his own (Reuters, 2017a).

Germany has an institutional structure to prevent the spread of far right parties that represent a threat to the German constitutional order. The Federal Constitutional Court bans a party if it violates democratic principles and is hostile to Germany's basic constitutional order. Similarly, the government can ban associations that violate the penal code and oppose the constitutional order or the principles of international understanding (Braunthal, 2009: 24). The minister of the interior has the power to ban extremist organizations. Far right parties are kept under observation by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Despite this institutional structure, the AfD has obtained a historic success. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has not labelled the AfD as extreme right and the Federal Constitutional Court has not declared it unconstitutional and undemocratic. The Interior Ministry has said it does not regard the AfD as unconstitutional, and the party is not kept under constant surveillance by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Deutsche Welle, 2017c).

This thesis consists of seven chapters. The thesis starts with the introduction of the research question. The first chapter also reviews the existing literature on the AfD. The second chapter gives information about the methodology, case selection, and data collection. The third chapter presents a literature review on populism and populist radical right. The fourth chapter gives information on important milestones and historical developments of populist radical right parties in Europe and Germany. The fifth chapter examines the AfD as an example of a populist radical right party. It analyses the populism, authoritarianism, and nativism of the AfD. The sixth chapter discusses what the rise of the AfD means for the future of Europe. The last chapter summarizes the main results of the thesis.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **METHODOLOGY**

#### **2. 1. Introduction**

As explored before, the main objective of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the populism, nativism, and authoritarianism of the AfD, and find out what the rise of the AfD means for the future of Europe. In order to do this, I analyse the party's standpoint on democracy; the European Union and the Euro; national security and justice; families and children; culture, language, and identity; immigration, integration, and asylum; foreign and security policy. Since the AfD was founded in 2013, the time-span of the study is the period from 2013 onwards.

The study aims to show that the AfD belongs to the populist radical right party family, and nativism is the core ideology of the party. The study tries to demonstrate that the AfD tactically uses populism, and the predominant motivation of the AfD is based on cultural concerns, in line with its nativism. The study also aims to show that the rise of the AfD poses a serious threat for the European integration and European values.

#### **2. 2. Case Selection and Data Collection**

The reasons behind the case selection is numerous: Firstly, Germany is one of the founding countries of the European Union. It is the one indispensable member that the EU simply cannot do without. Since Germany is the locomotive of the EU, it is important to scrutinise the AfD's negative views on the EU. The party believes that national sovereignty has been relinquished to Brussels as a part of the EU membership. For the first time, a significant proportion of voters

support a party which wants to claw back powers from Brussels and regain national sovereignty. Since Germany plays a crucial leadership role in shaping Europe's future, the rise of the AfD has a meaning for the future of the European project.

Secondly, the AfD has gradually increased its attractiveness by capitalizing on the frustration perceived by German citizens. The party garnered 4.7 per cent of the votes in the September 2013 federal election. In the 2014 European Parliament election, the party garnered 7.1 per cent of the votes, which entitled them to seven seats in the European Parliament. In 2016 state elections, the party became the second largest party in Saxony-Anhalt and the third-largest in both Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. Currently, the party is represented in 14 out of Germany's 16 state parliaments. In the latest federal elections on 24 September 2017, the party obtained a historic success and won 12.6% of the vote, which meant a 7.9 percentage point increase from the last election in 2013. As a result, the party entered into parliament as the third-strongest force. Since the party became the first far right party to enter the parliament in more than five decades, the presence of the party in the parliament represents the start of a new era in German politics.

Thirdly, there is a certain sensitivity in German politics against far right because of the historical legacy of Nazism. Political parties, the media, state organizations, and civil society groups in Germany have effectively stamped out far right parties that tried to grow beyond the political margins. The German Constitutional Court has prevented the spread of these parties (Öner, 2014: 98). Therefore, the rise of the AfD in this system gains importance.

Lastly, the issue of immigration, integration and citizenship has become more important in German politics since the 1990s (Öner, 2014: 94). In this regard, the recent refugee crisis has strongly affected German politics.

As for the data collection, I collect data from the party programs, interviews, statements, speeches of party officials, and the party's presence on

the internet to gain a better understanding of the party's standpoint on issues such as democracy, the European Union, immigration, and national security. I rely on qualitative analyses of party documents and party officials' statements. The primary source of the thesis is the official website of the AfD. The website is not published in English, but there are documents published in English. News websites constitute a significant source for the study. I gather data from news websites such as Deutsche Welle and BBC. The secondary sources of the thesis are articles about the AfD which are quite limited.

The following chapter presents a literature review on populism and populist radical right.

## CHAPTER 3

### LITERATURE REVIEW ON POPULISM AND POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT

#### 3. 1. Introduction

In this chapter, I present a literature review on “populism” and “populist radical right” to provide a background for the analysis of the AfD. In order to properly analyse the case of the AfD, it is essential to comprehend what populism is. Thus, firstly, I examine the concept of “populism” and three main conceptual approaches in the literature which define populism. At this point, the central argument of this chapter is that “populism-as-an-ideology” approach is more appropriate to understand the case of AfD as the party fundamentally divides the ‘people’ into two distinct groups: “the pure people” and the “corrupt elite”, which is a core characteristic of the emergence of populism as an ideology.

Secondly, I examine the term “populist radical right” because it is the key term I use throughout the thesis. As told before, the AfD combines populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. The latter two, when combined, are characteristics of the radical right specifically. That’s why the term “populist radical right” is used rather than “far right,” which encompasses extreme right parties (such as Golden Dawn in Greece, British National Party in the UK) that are not included in this thesis.

#### 3. 2. Populism

Populist politics have emerged in different historical periods: scholars distinguish between different waves of populism, beginning with the farmers’ movements in Russia and the US in the late 19th century, through the emergence

of Latin American populism in the mid-20th century, and the recent resurgence of populism in Europe.

According to many authors, populism is a vague concept that lacks a coherent definitional basis. As Ionescu and Gellner pointed, “no one is quite clear just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean” (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969: 1).

Despite its lack of shared definitional basis, there is a broad consensus in the literature that populism has three core components. As Jagers and Walgrave (2007) noted, “populism always refers to the people and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people; it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; and it considers the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories who are subject to an exclusion strategy” (cited in Woods, 2014). As Canovan (1981) observed, “all forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation of and appeal to ‘the people’ and all are in one sense or another anti-elitist” (cited in Bowler et al., 2016). In the literature, there are three main approaches which define populism differently.

### **3. 2. 1. Three Main Approaches to Populism in the Literature**

It is widely accepted that there are three main conceptual approaches in the literature, which define populism (1) as a discursive style, (2) as a political strategy, and (3) as an ideology (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013; Woods 2014; Kriesi & Pappas 2015). Within these three main conceptual approaches, I prefer to approach populism as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology. I believe that this approach is more influential in understanding and explaining the populism of the AfD. According to the AfD, there are two homogeneous and antagonistic units in the society: in Manichean terms, ‘the good people’ versus ‘the evil elite’. And, the will of the good people should dominate the country’s evil elite. AfD’s populism is thin-centred and attached to nativism.

### **3. 2. 1. 1. Populism as a Discursive Style**

This approach defines populism as a discursive style. Laclau approaches populism as a discursive style. According to Laclau, the symbolic distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ constitutes populist discourse. This distinction is an example of relational ‘empty signifiers’ that can take on varied content, depending on social context. These categories gain their meaning through a process of “identification”, whereby specific social groups are construed as ‘the people’ and pitted against oppressive ‘others’ (Laclau 2005, cited in Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013: 10).

Hawkins conceptualizes populism as a Manichaeian discourse that assigns a binary moral dimension to political conflicts. Hawkins (2010) defines populism as “a worldview and is expressed as a discourse”. Kazin (1995) defines populism as a language used by those who claim to speak for the majority of the people (cited in Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013: 8).

According to de la Torre, working on Latin America, “populism is a political style based on a Manichaeian rhetoric that constructs the struggle between the people and the oligarchy as an ethical and moral confrontation between good and evil, redemption and downfall” (de la Torre, 2007: 389). de la Torre stresses that populism cannot be reduced to the words, actions, and strategies of leaders. The autonomous expectations, cultures, and discourses of followers are equally important in understanding the populist bond. In order to comprehend the appeal of populism serious attention should be paid to the words, communications, and conversations between leaders and followers (de la Torre, 2007: 392).

### **3. 2. 1. 2. Populism as a Political Strategy**

Some scholars advocate for an understanding of populism as a mode of political strategy. This approach comprises three variants that focus on different aspects of political strategy: policy choices, political organization, and forms of mobilization.

When populism is defined as a form of political organization, the identity of the political leaders has been important. For instance, Taggart (1995) argues that populist parties are characterized by a centralized organizational structure headed by a strong charismatic leader. Pappas asserts that “leadership offers a key analytical variable in both understanding populism and assessing its successes, or failures” (Pappas, 2012: 2). On a different note, Barr states that charismatic leadership is not a constitutive element of populism. According to him, there have been successful populists having personal charisma, however there have been notable non-charismatic populist leaders such as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori (Barr, 2009: 41).

According to Weyland, who is working on Latin America, “populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers” (Weyland, 2001: 14). According to Roberts, who is also working on Latin America, populism refers to “the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established elites (either political or economic) on behalf of an ill-defined *pueblo*, or ‘the people’” (Roberts, 2007: 4).

### **3. 2. 1. 3. Populism as an Ideology**

An influential minimal definition of populism as an ideology that I employ in this thesis was suggested by Mudde:

Populism is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people (Mudde, 2004: 543).

Populism is defined by Mudde as a thin-centred ideology. Mudde says, “as a thin-centred ideology, populism can be easily combined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism

or socialism” (Mudde, 2004: 544).

Ben Stanley has also seen populism as a thin ideology. In the words of Stanley, populism “is diffuse in its lack of a programmatic centre of gravity, and open in its ability to cohabit with other, more comprehensive, ideologies” (Stanley, 2008: 99-100). Stanley states that the core of populism consists of four distinct but interrelated concepts:

- The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’.
- The antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite.
- The idea of popular sovereignty.
- The positive valorisation of ‘the people’ and denigration of ‘the elite’ (Stanley, 2008: 102).

According to Kriesi and Pappas, populism’s ‘thinness’ is a product of the vagueness and plasticity of its core concepts, which allows it to be combined with a variety of ‘thick’ ideologies, such as nationalism or socialism, that add more specific content to it (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).

Albertazzi and McDonnell define populism as:

an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008: 3).

Martinelli states that populism is both an ideology and a strategy of consensus organization. According to him, while thin, this ideological core is very strong, since it consists of a fundamental opposition between the people and the elite, both as undifferentiated wholes, without internal rifts, conflicts of interest, different identities and loyalties (Martinelli, 2016: 15).

### **3. 2. 2. Right-Wing Populism and Left-Wing Populism**

There are differences between right-wing and left-wing populism. It is essential to reveal the differences between them to better understand the case of AfD which belongs to right-wing populism.

As Taggart pointed, populism lacks core values. He says that populism is attached to some very different ideological positions from the left to the right. Thereby, populists have been left-wing, right-wing, authoritarian, or libertarian (Taggart, 2004: 275). In similar vein, March (2007: 64), Kriesi (2014: 362), Spierings et al. (2015: 8), Bowler et al. (2015: 3), Kriesi and Pappas (2015) state that populism can be left-wing as well as right-wing. They indicate that needs to be associated with ‘fuller’ ideologies such as nationalism, conservatism, or socialism.

As Greven indicated, right-wing populists based on a definition of the people as culturally homogenous. For right-wing populists, ‘the people’ are said not only to be under attack by the elites, but also by the presence in society of ‘others’ (e.g., immigrants) who do not share the values of the people (Bowler et al., 2015: 3). They juxtapose its identity and common interests, with the identity and interests of ‘others’ (Greven, 2016).

Most scholarly attention has been paid to the right-wing populism. However, there are scholars who try to define left-wing populism. March, who works on left-wing populism, states that the ‘moral people versus corrupt elite’ dichotomy is central to the ideology of left-wing populists. According to March, left-wing populists emphasise egalitarianism, and identify economic inequity as the basis of existing political and social arrangements (March, 2007: 66). Kriesi says that the notion of ‘the people’ as a class is characteristic of left-wing populism (Kriesi, 2014: 362).

‘The people versus the corrupt elite’ discourse is central to both right-wing and left-wing populism. In addition to the elites, right-wing populists exclude ‘others’ such as immigrants and “welfare abusers” because their emphasis is on cultural exclusion. As for left-wing populists, they are concerned with socioeconomic injustice. They criticise neoliberal economies. Left-wing populists exclude the political elite and the economic elite. They believe that the political elite is in the service of the business elite and neglects the interests of the common working man (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015: 61-62). They exclude those

who are supporters of neoliberal global corporations. For left-wing populists, the key inequalities between people can be overcome. However, for right-wing populists, the main inequalities between people are inherent. Therefore, right-wing populists are more exclusionary than left-wing populists.

The AfD, the PVV, the FPÖ, and the FN are some prominent right-wing populist parties in Europe. Anti-immigrant stance is their key feature. Although right-wing populist parties are dominant in Europe, populist movements can also be found among left-wing parties. Syriza in Greece is a case of successful left-wing populism in Europe; a kind of populism that has been both inclusionary and egalitarian (Katsambekis, 2016: 399). The party appealed to the common man against the corrupted elite. The antagonisms playing out in Syriza's discourse were signified in political and socioeconomic terms. "The people" was portrayed as a plural and heterogeneous collective subject (Katsambekis, 2016: 400). Another case which represents left-wing populism is Podemos in Spain. Podemos embraces the project of a politically integrated and solidary Europe, it defends immigrants and socially marginalized sectors, it presses a strong social rights agenda and it targets not only political but also economic and social elites (Kioupkiolis, 2016: 100).

Left-wing populism has been particularly prevalent in twentieth-century Latin America. In this respect, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador are left-wing populist presidents. Populist leaders depicted themselves as "the people" and they were against "rapacious elites". They branded rivals "enemies of the people". They undermined pluralism and trampled institutional safeguards, by turning politics into a struggle of "us against them". They used populism in order to transform established institutions, dismantle checks and balances, concentrate power in the hands of the president (Weyland, 2013: 21-22).

### **3. 3. Populist Radical Right (PRR)**

As mentioned before, Mudde (2007) developed the term “populist radical right”. In his book entitled *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Mudde argues PRR parties’ features. He identifies three core ideological features shared by this party family: populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. (Mudde, 2007: 22). The first element of PRR parties is populism. As cited before, populism is understood by Mudde as “a thin-centred ideology”. Since populism is a thin-centred ideology, populism is almost always combined with one or more other ideological features (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2011). When populism combined with nativism and authoritarianism, populist radical right parties come to exist.

The second element of PRR parties is “nativism”. “Nativism” is defined by Mudde as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007: 22). The third element that PRR parties share is authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is defined by Mudde as “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde, 2007: 23).

Scholars are increasingly employing this term and the corresponding definition. For example, Alonso and Kaltwasser (2015) who follow the definition developed by Mudde state that the electoral appeal of PRR parties is related to a set of different ideas (populism, welfare chauvinism, etc.) rather than one driving idea (e.g. anti-immigration).

Rooduijn uses this term and labels parties such as the National Front in France, the UKIP in Britain and the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Finns in Finland, and the Freedom Party of Austria as PRR parties (Rooduijn, 2015: 4).

Rooduijn states that negativity towards immigrants from other European countries and non-EU countries as well as the EU elites can be found among

virtually all PRR parties' programs in Europe. Negativity towards immigrants from other European countries is particularly true of Western European populists, who dislike immigrants from Eastern European countries. Rooduijn points out that PRR parties can differ from each other in some aspects. For instance, different PRR parties can take different positions regarding attitudes towards homosexuality or foreign policy (Rooduijn, 2015: 5).

Relying on Mudde's term and definition, Pirro (2014) examines PRR parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). He indicates that Ataka in Bulgaria, Jobbik in Hungary, and the Slovak National Party in Slovakia are PRR parties (Pirro, 2014: 246). Pirro states that the historical legacy of Communism and the EU accession process have impacted the nature of populism in CEE. It is believed that post-communist context has provided opportunities for the rise of PRR parties (Pirro, 2014: 247). PRR parties in the region are generally deemed a phenomenon addressing post-communist issues such as ethnic minorities, corruption, and the European Union (Mudde 2005, cited in Pirro, 2014).

Pirro and van Kessel employ this term and describe the Flemish Interest (VB) in Belgium, Jobbik in Hungary, the Northern League in Italy, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and Slovak National Party (SNS) in Slovakia as PRR parties (Pirro & van Kessel, 2017: 409). Adopting Mudde's definition, Muis and Immerzeel (2017) discuss causes and consequences of the rise of PRR parties and movements in Europe.

In the literature on the PRR, scholars generally focus on why PRR parties are successful and who vote for them. Liang (2016) focuses on a different aspect of the PRR. She tries to describe the European PRR's foreign and security policy objectives. Spierings et al. (2015) also focus on a different aspect of PRR parties. They scrutinise the relationship between gender and the PRR.

### **3. 4. Conclusion**

This chapter provides the theoretical background for the analysis of the AfD by presenting a literature review on "populism" and "populist radical right".

For the sake of the central argument of this thesis, I take populism as an ideology since I argue that this approach is more helpful in understanding the populism of the AfD. As indicated by this approach, for the AfD, there are two homogeneous and antagonistic units in the society: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’. The will of ‘the pure people’ should dominate the country’s ‘corrupt elite’. As argued in the forthcoming chapters, the AfD as a right-wing populist party, not only excludes the elites but also excludes refugees, immigrants, and the undeserving beneficiaries of the welfare state. Secondly, I present a literature review on “populist radical right” because it is the key term I use throughout the thesis.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **IMPORTANT MILESTONES AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE AND GERMANY**

#### **4. 1. Introduction**

This chapter presents a historical background of the emergence and rise of the PRR parties in Europe and Germany, which would constitute a starting point for the forthcoming chapters of the thesis. In this chapter, firstly, I present a general perspective about the rise of PRR parties and examine important milestones in the rise of PRR parties in Europe. Since the AfD belongs to the PRR party family, it is essential to look at the rise of PRR parties in European politics in order to better understand the current success of the AfD. Secondly, I scrutinise the recent rise of PRR parties in Germany in order to understand the rise of the AfD in the country.

#### **4. 2. The Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe**

In Europe, PRR parties began to appear in the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Spierings et al., 2015: 3). Since then, PRR parties have increased their electoral support and parliamentary presence across Europe. They have also entered national governments. In this respect, historical development processes such as globalisation, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the 9/11 attacks, and the 2004 enlargement of the European Union are important milestones in the rise of PRR parties, which this chapter will explore in detail. Recent developments in Europe such as the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, the scourge of terrorism, and the Brexit have also provided a suitable atmosphere for the PRR parties.

#### **4. 2. 1. Globalisation**

Globalisation is one of the main causes of the rise of PRR parties in Europe. They manage to win support because of growing uneasiness in the plural, conflicting, multicultural, and globalising society (Ignazi, 2003: 217). Beeson and Bellamy state that “one of the most striking qualities about globalisation is the persistence of difference and the continuing centrality of notions of ‘we and they’ in the construction of identity” (Beeson & Bellamy, 2003: 344). Similarly, PRR parties rely on “us and them” or “good and evil” notions in the construction of identity, values, interests, norms, and action. For example, after the Nice attack, PVV leader Geert Wilders said: “This is a war. And it will not stop until we close our borders for Islam and de-Islamize our societies. No more terror. No more Islam!” (New York Times, 2016a).

PRR parties are also among the greatest opponents of globalisation. They profit from their opposition to the consequences of globalisation. For these parties, globalisation threatens the purity and sovereignty of the nation-state (Mudde, 2007: 197). They believe that globalization has caused a devolvement of traditional economic and political powers of states to international institutions, international companies, and other non-state actors (Liang, 2016: 9).

Immigration is associated with globalisation by most PRR parties (Mudde, 2007: 189). Immigration, which has become a major issue in European politics since the 1980s, is said to lead to unemployment and economic stagnation by the PRR parties. Immigrants became targets of the xenophobic accusations such as stealing jobs by those parties. For instance, according to Marine Le Pen, French workers should be favoured in the job market. Le Pen argues that France’s prosperity depends on ending globalisation and replacing free trade with “a new patriotic model” of “intelligent protectionism” that will radically reduce unemployment (Smith, 2017).

By the same token, the European Union is associated with globalisation by most PRR parties (Mudde, 2007: 189). Various PRR parties had been moderately pro-European integration in the first years of their existence.

However, this changed radically with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Mudde, 2007: 190).

#### **4. 2. 2. The Maastricht Treaty**

After World War II, European integration was seen as an escape from the extreme forms of nationalism which had devastated the continent. The aim of European integration was to put an end to the bloody and devastating wars between neighbours. Economic interests of European nations contributed to the process of European integration. As Ash (2012) emphasised, however, the most important driving force across the continent was the memory of war. Europe's founding fathers believed that their countries had first to define their common interests if they want to overcome their culture of conflicts. Founding fathers made no reference to religious beliefs or cultural notions. In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community was established to coordinate coal and steel production within Europe. This Community started to unite European countries economically with a view to secure lasting peace, security, and prosperity. The six founding countries were Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The six countries expanded cooperation to other economic sectors. They formed the European Economic Community by signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The six members expressed in its preamble that they were "determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (EEC Treaty). Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), and Portugal and Spain (1986) accepted this goal by joining them.

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, was designed to expand the scope of European integration. With this Treaty, member states took a significant step in the process of achieving "ever closer union". It formally established the European Union in 1993 on the basis of three pillars (one supranational and two intergovernmental pillars). While the first pillar comprises the Communities (the EC, EURATOM, and the ECSC), the second and third pillar comprise

intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The Treaty introduced qualified-majority voting in the EU, established EU citizenship and paved the way for the European common currency.

After Maastricht, the European Union became a target of PRR parties in some member states. These parties claim that they are staunch supporter of democracy. For them, the Maastricht Treaty signified a violation of constitutional principles such as the principle of democracy and the separation of powers (Liang, 2016: 11). For them, the Treaty also signified an unacceptable loss of national sovereignty. For these parties, priority should be given to safeguarding national sovereignty. For example, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) opposed to the Maastricht Treaty and this became a founding principle for the party. The UKIP was founded in 1993 to campaign for the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

As mentioned before, PRR parties had been moderately pro-European integration in the first years of their existence. Nevertheless, this changed radically in the 1990s (Mudde, 2007: 190). The Maastricht Treaty meant a change in the parties' position on the European issue. Therefore, it was a turning point. Populist radical right parties started to see the EU as a major threat to the sovereignty of their nation because they were opposed to the idea of "ever closer union". For instance, before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the FN in France and the FPÖ in Austria were supportive of the EU. The FN was stating that "the European Union is to remain a utopia as long as the Community will not dispose of sufficient resources, of a common currency and of a political will inseparable from defence capacity" (Le Pen, 1985: 191, cited in Almeida, 2010: 241). But later, Le Pen compared Maastricht to the "infamous Treaty of Troyes" (Mudde, 2007: 160). France's withdrawal from the EU became one of the FN's major political aims. Similarly, the FPÖ was a supporter of Austria's EC accession. But, on the eve of the 1994 referendum on EU accession, the party changed its European policy. Majority of the party's MPs voted against the

constitutional amendment on EU accession (Almeida, 2010: 242). Another example can be given from Germany's populist radical right Republicans party. During the 1980s the Republicans considered "European unification . . . the historical task of our generation" (REP 1983, cited in Mudde, 2007: 159). But then, the Republicans described the Maastricht Treaty as "Versailles without weapons" (REP 1989, cited in Mudde, 2007).

The electorate's lack of trust in political elites, at both the European and national levels has become instrumental for PRR parties. The belief that established parties are insufficient in finding solutions to existing problems constitutes an opportunity for the party claiming that it is an alternative. Some of the voters of PRR parties vote to reflect a dissatisfaction with these traditional parties and give them a kind of message. Corruption and scandals also affect the views of the electorate. As for lack of trust in elites at European level, the integration process has been usually seen as an elite project and elite consensus. For instance, elections to the European Parliament have been unable to capture the public's interest and thus turnout in elections to the European Parliament has been consistently low.

#### **4. 2. 3. The 9/11 Attacks**

Another historical milestone which influenced the orientation and organisation of PRR parties has been the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (also called 9/11 attacks). During the Cold War, the world was divided in two and there was a bipolar struggle between the Soviet and American blocs. In the bipolar world order, there was a "you're either with us or against us" logic. For the American bloc, threat was stemming from the Soviet bloc, and for the Soviet bloc, threat was stemming from the American bloc. With the end of the Cold War, this logic ended. However, after the 9/11 attacks, this logic is revitalized by the USA president George W. Bush. After the attacks, the USA declared its war against terrorism. Bush said this: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists". He stated that either you stand with civilization and good

(us), or with barbarism and evil (them) (Hirsh, 2002). Similarly, PRR parties in Europe divide the world into friends and foes (Mudde, 2007: 89). Therefore, they found a fertile breeding ground in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. They played upon the fears of people.

The PRR parties deepened and extended their Islamophobic sentiments after the 9/11 attacks. Migrants of Muslim origin started to be conceived as potential terrorists by those parties. They increased their authoritarian stance on Islam and Muslims. They advocated strict measures against the Muslim community. PRR parties such as Flemish Interest in Belgium and Northern League in Italy called for strict controls of mosques and the closing of the borders for Muslim migrants (Mudde, 2007: 149). PRR parties started to make emphasis on Christianity due to their Islamophobic discourse. They stressed the alleged incompatibility of Islam with their culture.

#### **4. 2. 4. The 2004 Enlargement of the European Union**

As is well known, the EU has enlarged a number of times throughout its history. But, the most important one was the 2004 enlargement which was the largest single expansion in EU's history. In 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the European Union. As part of the same wave of enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania became members of the European Union in 2007. The objective of the enlargement was to consolidate EU power and to promote political and economic reform in Eastern Europe.

Since they believed that Europe should include all the Christian nations of Eastern Europe, there was broad support among the PRR parties for the Eastern enlargement. Most of the new countries were former communist countries and their independence was greeted with great enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of several Western European PRR parties decreased when date of accession came closer. They were worried about political and economic stability of the new states. They were worried about the free

movement of people. They had fears of being overwhelmed by workers from poorer new member states. The 2004 enlargement led to a rise in xenophobia in the original member states of the EU. For example, the PRR Finns Party (PS) expressed its standpoint clearly in its 2015 election program: “Finland, as well as other west European countries, have seen since the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, a migration of a large number of Roma people engaging in solicitation. This solicitation is, more or less, associated with a great deal of street crime, shoplifting and burglaries” (PS, 2015). On the other hand, the newcomer states had fears of the loss of sovereignty in favour of the EU. For example, in its 2006 program, the PRR Jobbik party associated Hungarian entry to the EU with a loss of national self-determination in favour of a non-democratic institution (Pirro, 2014: 259).

Among the EU population there were citizens who opposed the 2004 enlargement. The rhetoric of PRR parties found resonance among them. For example, the Constitutional Treaty failed to win popular approval in the Dutch and French referenda in 2005. The failure had a symbolic meaning because France and the Netherlands were among the six founding member states of the European Communities. Opponents of the treaty feared the loss of their own national sovereignty and national identity. The famous figure of the “Polish Plumber” became a symbol of cheap labour coming from Eastern Europe. The figure was used for the “no” campaign in the referenda.

#### **4. 2. 5. Recent Developments: Euro Crisis, Refugee Crisis, Terrorism, and Brexit**

In recent years, Europe is undergoing a process of change and transformation. It has experienced multiple and inter-related crises: The Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, threat of terrorism and the Brexit. These factors are related to peace, security, and prosperity of the EU. And, PRR parties have capitalized on all these developments.

As a result of the economic and financial crisis that began in 2008, some European countries were badly shaken. Thanks to large scale state aid, the European financial sector could survive. Measures taken by governments to strengthen their economies have caused public uproar in Europe. There is a widespread belief that economic downturn and hardship is the primary factor responsible for the recent rise in popularity of the PRR parties in Europe. The Euro crisis has provided new opportunities for PRR parties; however, it is not the only reason behind their rise. On the one hand, some of the economically shaken countries such as Greece and France have seen a considerable rise in the vote share of the PRR parties. On the other hand, some of the badly shaken countries such as Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Iceland have not seen the emergence of the PRR parties in the time span 2009 to 2013. Moreover, some European countries such as the Netherlands and Finland did not suffer from the crisis. However, they have seen an increase in the vote for the PRR parties. For example, in the Netherlands the Party for Freedom nearly tripled its vote share during the economic crisis from 5.89 percent obtained in 2006 to 15.45 percent obtained in 2010 (Stockemer, 2013: 12). The Finns Party, formerly known as the True Finns, increased its vote share by more than 4 times from 4.05 percent in 2007 to 19.04 percent in 2011 (Stockemer, 2013: 12). Therefore, the economic crisis has had a psychological impact that larger than real impact. As Anduiza and Rico correctly explained, “crises may be real or imaginary, but the sense of threat and emergency they give rise to may be vividly perceived by a significant portion of the people” (Anduiza & Rico, 2017).

However, the predominant motivation of the European voters has been based on cultural, rather than economic, grounds. Perceived threats to the cultural unity and to values have been noteworthy concerns for the support of the PRR parties. As argued by Norris and Inglehart, the rise of populist parties reflects a reaction against a wide range of rapid cultural changes (Norris & Inglehart, 2016: 30). The perfect storm for PRR parties emerged with the refugee crisis in 2015. The refugee crisis certainly helped fuel PRR parties’ agenda. PRR

parties applied xenophobic, Islamophobic and discriminatory programs by using anti-Muslim, anti-Islam and anti-migration rhetoric. In periods of the refugee crisis, most of the EU countries showed nationalist and protectionist tendencies. The EU countries are divided on the refugee crisis and could not take a common stance. Some European countries constructed barbed fences to prevent refugees fleeing oppression, persecution, and death. For example, Hungary enacted harsh measures against refugees. A Hungarian member of the European Parliament and member of Hungary's ruling Fidesz party went as far as to suggest pigs' heads could be put on border fences to deter refugees (BBC, 2016a). Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban is vehemently opposed to migration and refuses to adhere to an EU refugee allocation scheme. The PRR parties depict refugees and Islam as an attack to the European identity. "We do not see these people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim invaders," Orban said in an interview (Deutsche Welle, 2018).

The terror attacks in Europe have also emboldened PRR parties. By virtue of the waves of terror attacks, the EU countries have focused on securing their borders and protecting their citizens. PRR parties and movements obtained the opportunity to push their own agenda. Migrants especially Muslims living in Europe have become the target of suspicion and are increasingly seen as an enemy.

Brexit is another important development, which had created a suitable atmosphere for PRR parties. The United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union in June 2016. The process is still on, but it is clear at this point that Brexit is likely going to provoke similar nationalist and secessionist reactions in Europe. The supporters of this kind of movements embrace the view that national interests and responsibilities have priority over international concerns and responsibilities. The Brexit campaign was not really about the economic losses from EU membership. It was primarily motivated by anti-immigrant sentiment. Brexit campaign gave hope to many other PRR politicians who asked for a similar referendum in their countries. Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and

Marine Le Pen asked for ‘Nexit’ and ‘Frexit’ – abbreviations of ‘Netherlands exit’ and ‘France exit’.

#### **4. 3. Historical Development of Populist Radical Right Parties in Germany**

This section will explore the historical development of PRR parties in Germany, which sets the main scenery in terms of the AfD. Germany was devastated after the First World War. Adolf Hitler who founded the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) in Munich in 1920 became chancellor of Germany in 1933, capitalizing on the social, political, and economic climate of the interwar period in Germany. The Great Depression that lasted from 1929 to 1939 helped Hitler to rise to power. The Nazis ruled the country from 1933 to 1945. Hitler and the paramilitary groups *Sturmabteilung* (SA) and *Schutzstaffel* (SS) played a key role in suppressing dissent. Many of the regime’s opponents were sent to concentration camps. Racism and anti-Semitism played a defining role in Nazi ideology. Jews and other persecuted minority groups were forced to emigrate or were murdered in the Holocaust (Braunthal, 2009: 21).

There was a Germany ideal that Hitler intended to create. The NSDAP aimed to create a racially homogenized German society. Adolph Hitler and the NSDAP used the concept of the “master race”. According to their ideology, the “Aryan race” was a superior and “pure race”. The Jews, the gypsies and those who did not belong to the “Aryan race” were excluded from German society. Nazis exterminated approximately six million Jews and four million other people who did not belong to the “master race”.

The Nazis were defeated in the Second World War. The legacy of Nazism made Germans sensitive to manifestations of far right politics. In the post-war period, far right parties had restricted political space in Germany. After World War II, “guest workers” (*Gastarbeiter*) were invited to live and work in Germany. These workers came from Mediterranean countries to help rebuild the

country's infrastructure. Xenophobia is directed against the guest worker population. Far right parties successfully exploited the fears and anxieties of citizens. Populist radical right parties in Germany began to appear in the 1980s. These parties profited from the issue of immigration, integration, and citizenship.

#### **4. 3. 1. From 1945 to 1980**

Following the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, the Nazi regime came to an end. The victorious states of the war prohibited the revival of Nazi parties and racist discourse. The victorious states drafted a constitution to ensure that far right would never be strengthened in Germany. In 1949, with the presence of the Allied powers, the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (*Grundgesetz*) entered into force. It included clauses designed to maintain the democratic system and to guarantee the inalienable rights of individuals, whether Germans or foreigners. The Federal Constitutional Court, under Article 21 of the constitution, had the right to ban anti-democratic political parties. The minister of the interior had the power under Article 9 to ban extremist organizations. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, created in 1950, and its *Länder* (state) counterparts had the power to collect and distribute information on unconstitutional political activity (Braunthal, 2009: 169-170).

The German Conservative Party-German Rightist Party (*Deutsche Konservative Partei-Deutsche Rechtspartei*, DKP-DRP) was formed in 1946 (Braunthal, 2009: 23). The DKP-DRP gained strength among former Nazis. In the 1949 federal election, the party sent five deputies to the *Bundestag* (the German parliament). In 1949, the DKP-DRP's nationalist majority expelled former Nazis. Thereupon the ousted Nazis founded the Socialist Reich Party (*Sozialistische Reichspartei*, SRP). In 1951, the SRP obtained 11 percent of the *Landtag* (state parliament) vote in Lower Saxony (Braunthal, 2009: 23). The SRP gained support from ultra-nationalists and anti-Semites. Consequently,

upon the request of the Bonn government, the Federal Constitutional Court banned the party in 1952 (Braunthal, 2009: 24). It was a landmark ruling because the SRP was the first party to be banned by the Court (Schellenberg, 2013: 36).

After the party was banned, many of its former supporters joined the German Reich Party (*Deutsche Reichspartei*, DRP) which was established in 1950. The DRP received only about 1 percent of the vote for most of the 1950s (Paxton, 2004: 176). The DRP passed the 5 percent in provincial elections in Rhineland-Palatinate in 1959 (Paxton, 2004: 176). The DRP was banned in Rhineland-Palatinate.

Because of severe labour shortage in Germany, Germany needed guest workers for the reconstruction efforts following World War II. Labour migration to West Germany began after the mid-1950s when agreements were signed with Mediterranean countries. Guest workers came from Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia amongst others, but the biggest group of workers came from Turkey. The bilateral guest worker agreement was signed between Turkey and West Germany on 30 October 1961. The agreement initially permitted Turkish individuals to enter West Germany on temporary one- or two-year work contracts, and was later expanded to permit the entry of families (İçduygu, 2012: 12).

During the early phases of migratory movements from Turkey to Europe, female participation was extremely low<sup>4</sup>. Migrants were mostly single men. There were German citizens who believed that single male guest workers were prone to indiscipline. Thus, there was a significant discontent among citizens. This opened up opportunities for the far right parties. These parties successfully exploited the fears and anxieties of citizens. A similar example can be given from today's Turkey. Syrian single men are not welcome in Turkey. So, coming back to the original point of discussion, the single men phenomenon was

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<sup>4</sup> While only nine per cent of the emigrants to Germany were females in 1962, this proportion had increased to more than a quarter of all emigrants in 1974 (İçduygu, 2012: 14).

seen as a threat to German society. On the other hand, the discontent among German citizens continued when guest workers were allowed to bring their families with them. Because, according to discontented Germans, the arrival of their families meant that guest workers would settle permanently in Germany. Xenophobic antagonism toward guest workers also grew more prevalent during the 1966–1968 recession West Germany experienced (Jurgens, 2010: 349).

The National Democratic Party (NPD) was established in 1964 by many former Nazi members. The NPD party program placed an emphasis on the supposed danger posed by the presence of foreign guest workers and on the importance of the reunification of Germany (Ramet, 1999: 69). The recession and serious economic downturn helped the NPD to gain votes. Since its founding, the NPD has never reached the 5 percent threshold to enter the Bundestag. The party came closest in the 1969 federal election, with 4.3 percent of the total vote (Paxton, 2004: 176). After 1969, once the recession ended, the NPD vote sharply decreased (Braunthal, 2009: 25). The party obtained the necessary 5 percent minimum in some local elections and entered state parliaments. Udo Voigt, the former leader of the NPD, became the first member of the European Parliament from the NPD in the EP elections in 2014 (Schellenberg, 2013: 40). The NPD was the most successful far right party in Germany until the establishment of the AfD.

The Free German Workers' Party was formed in 1979 by a former Hitler Youth leader. Its members put up posters and distributed flyers, with slogans such as “German Jobs for German Workers” (Braunthal, 2009: 25). Many party members took part in violent acts against foreigners. The party was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 1995 (Wise, 1998: 314).

#### **4. 3. 2. From 1980 to Present**

Post-1980 period in Germany is particularly important as the PRR parties began to appear in German politics during this period. The Republicans (*Die Republikaner*, REP) which was founded in 1983 is an important PRR party in

German political history (Mudde, 2007: 42). The party characterized itself as a “community of German patriots” (Braunthal, 2009: 26). The slogan of the party, i.e. “*Deutschland den Deutschen*” (Germany for the Germans) exemplifies the party’s perspective (Mudde, 2000: 43). The party also rejected an ideal of a multicultural society.

As mentioned before, the REP was supportive of the process of European integration during the 1980s. The party’s position changed with the Maastricht Treaty. The party described the Maastricht Treaty as “Versailles without weapons”. The party campaigned with the slogan “Yes to Europe, No to this EC” (Mudde, 2007).

The REP advocated limits on foreigners admitted into the country. A pamphlet of the REP (see Figure 1), which reads: “The boat is full. Stop the asylum sham” shows that the REP used nativist arguments against the acceptance of asylum seekers and refugees. For the REP, there was no place for them in Germany.

Many voters supported the REP position on Germany’s obligation to restrict immigration. In 1993, the three establishment parties (CDU/CSU, FDP, and SPD) voted to amend Article 16 of the Basic Law. In effect, they limited the right of political asylum seekers to enter the country (Braunthal, 2009: 48). This development robbed the REP of a major campaign issue.



“The boat is full. Stop the asylum sham.”

Figure 1. A Pamphlet of the Republicans

The REP was also in favour of German unification. The REP was one of the few PRR parties in Western Europe which openly expressed the wish for “external exclusiveness”, i.e. all people and territories of the nation should be part of the state (Koch 1991, cited in Mudde, 2007: 140). The party considered the 1990 unification only a first step in the process of full unification that would eventually lead to a Germany having the borders of 1937, referring to areas in the current Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine (Mudde, 2000: 42). A pamphlet of the REP (see Figure 2), which reads: “The whole Germany is what it should be!” shows that the REP expressed the wish for external exclusiveness. Once unification had been achieved, the party lost a major campaign issue (Braunthal, 2009: 48). In the first parliamentary election after the 1990 unification the REP gained only 2.1 per cent of the votes (Mudde, 2000: 34).



“The whole Germany is what it should be!”

“Humane Social Patriotic”

Figure 2. A Pamphlet of the Republicans

A closer look in REP’s election campaigns and slogans shows that the party had populist and authoritarian sentiments. The party’s emphasis on law and order shows the authoritarian tendency. In the words of the REP, “We Republicans are the party of law and order” (REP 1990: 13, cited in Mudde, 2000: 52). The party called for a better equipped police force and higher sentences. According to the party, the victim instead of the perpetrator should be protected (REP, 1993: 16–22, cited in Mudde, 2000). Similarly, the party’s harsh criticism of both government and opposition parties and its designation of parties and politicians as corrupt and anti-national shows that REP had populist tendencies too. For instance, the party<sup>5</sup> accused the CSU, the CDU, the SPD, the FDP, the Greens and the DVU of selling out the interests of the German people

<sup>5</sup> The REP was unable to overcome the electoral threshold and could not enter the Germany’s federal parliament. The REP won seats in elections to various local, city, state councils and parliaments. The REP made the electoral breakthrough in 1989. The party won 7.8 per cent in the West Berlin Senate election in 1989. The party also won 7.1 per cent in the European election of 1989 (Mudde, 2000: 33).

(Mudde, 2000: 53-54).

The German People's Union (*Deutsche Volkunion*, DVU) which was founded in 1987 is another significant PRR party in German political history (Mudde, 2007: 306). According to the DVU, "Germany should remain the country of the Germans" (DVU 1993, cited in Mudde, 2000: 67). The party opposed immigration. Xenophobia was directed at immigrants and asylum seekers. According to the DVU, national identity and full sovereignty should be protected. Thus, the party rejected any membership of supranational organisations like NATO and the EU.

Similar to the REP, the DVU displayed both authoritarian and populist sentiments. The Party called for higher sentences for serious crimes and a more capable and well-equipped police force. According to the party, more attention should be given to the victim instead of the criminal. The DVU also wanted a well-equipped and sovereign German army (Mudde, 2000: 76). This focus on law and order was intertwined with a harsh criticism of left-wing parties. The DVU accused them of being anti-national. The most fierce criticism was directed by the DVU<sup>6</sup> against the REP (Mudde, 2000: 77).

Another case for the PRR parties in Germany has been the Freedom Party, which was founded in 2010. The agenda of the party resembles Dutch politician Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom. The Freedom Party receives support from Wilders. It carries out campaigns against Islam and Muslims. In the 2011 election for the Berlin House of Representatives, the Freedom Party captured only 1% of the vote (Schellenberg, 2013: 43).

PRR parties in Germany have so far failed to make breakthroughs on the national level. Although PRR parties in Germany have been weak and fragmented in federal elections (Minkenberg, 2011: 47), they have recorded

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<sup>6</sup> The DVU was unable to overcome the electoral threshold and could not enter the Germany's federal parliament. The DVU won seats in regional elections. The DVU obtained its biggest electoral victory in 1998, winning 12.9 per cent and sixteen seats in the Saxony-Anhalt state election (Mudde, 2000: 63). The DVU dissolved in 2012.

successes at the municipal and regional levels. Right-wing attitudes are pretty widespread throughout the general population.

#### **4. 4. Conclusion**

This chapter provides a background for my analysis on the AfD. I follow a general-to-specific approach by moving from a broad examination about the rise of PRR parties in Europe to specific details about the historical development of PRR parties in Germany in support of my topic.

In this chapter, firstly, I present a general framework about the rise of PRR parties in Europe. I examine important milestones in the rise of PRR parties in Europe. I look at recent developments in Europe which have provided a suitable atmosphere for PRR parties. The Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, terrorism, and the Brexit are very important to comprehend the AfD's election success.

As will be demonstrated in the forthcoming chapters, all these developments have been propaganda materials for the AfD. The Euro crisis has presented an opportunity for the formation of the AfD. The party stated in its 2014 party program that "the single currency Euro has led to disaster" (AfD, 2014). The party calls for the dissolution of the euro. The other development is the terrorist attacks. The terrorist threats and the attacks in the heart of Europe have augmented the power of PRR parties. Party leaders talked about protecting nationals against foreigners. The terror attacks in Europe have provided legitimacy for arguments of PRR parties including the AfD. The other development is the Brexit which triggered similar nationalist demands. PRR party leaders began to voice their demands more loudly. For them, national interests and responsibilities should have priority over international concerns and responsibilities. Anti-immigrant sentiments and xenophobia dominated the Brexit campaign. In similar vein, the AfD advocates returning the EU to an economic union based on interests of nation-states. Otherwise, the party will seek Germany's exit from the EU. The most important development is the

refugee crisis. It has become a major campaign issue for PRR parties. The refugee crisis was a “gift” for the AfD, as Gauland said. Thanks to the refugee crisis, the AfD has played upon the fears of electorate. The party claims that refugees are the biggest threat to the cultural unity and values of Germany.

In this chapter, secondly, I present a specific perspective about the historical development of PRR parties in Germany in order to support my subject. It has been essential to understand the background where the AfD is risen. After the World War II, far right potentials were under strict control of the Allied forces in Germany (von Beyme, 1988: 8). Far right parties’ ideologies were discredited because of the recent existence and defeat of Nazism. Due to their links with Nazi Party, far right parties were banned by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Since the 1980s, immigration has become a major issue in European politics (von Beyme, 1988). PRR parties in Europe have started to increase their support since then. Similarly, the REP and the DVU appeared in German politics in the 1980s. Asylum seekers became the major issue for the REP and the DVU, after their number had increased dramatically. Similarly, today, the issue of immigration and refugee crisis are the main campaign issues of the AfD. When analysing the AfD in the fifth chapter, we will see that the political demands of the AfD remind the demands of the REP and the DVU.

Historical, political, and constitutional reasons in Germany have made far right parties, including PRR parties weak in federal elections. But, these parties have obtained good results in local and regional elections. Despite all sensitivities and mechanisms to prevent the spread of far right parties, the AfD has obtained a historic success. The party became the first far right party to enter the Bundestag in more than five decades.<sup>7</sup> This means the AfD’s presence in the Bundestag will represent the start of a new era in German politics.

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<sup>7</sup> The far right German Party (*Deutsche Partei*, DP) was a coalition partner of the CDU, the CSU and the FDP in the government of Konrad Adenauer from 1949 until 1960.

The results of the 2017 German federal elections shows that the cross-party consensus of the German post-war era to suppress far right parties has begun to disappear. The political discourse of the AfD has been used by mainstream parties to win right-wing voters. The party has had an important role in pushing mainstream parties to the right. A good example in this respect is Horst Seehofer, country's new interior minister, who said "Islam does not belong to Germany. Germany is shaped by Christianity" (Telegraph, 2018). Similarly, Merkel stated that Germany should ban full-face veils "wherever legally possible" (New York Times, 2016b). She also agreed to implement a type of refugee cap, a policy she had explicitly rejected (CNN, 2017a). Another example is Martin Schulz, former leader of the SPD, who criticised Merkel's open-door refugee policy. He said that: "In 2015, more than one million refugees arrived in Germany - mostly uncontrolled" (Politico, 2017a).

As mentioned before, the AfD has been labeled as an extreme right party like the NPD by mainstream German politicians. The German political establishment has believed that the AfD is an essentially antidemocratic party. Mainstream German politicians describe it as "hostile to democracy" (Kundnani, 2017). As will be exemplified in the next chapter, the AfD's party programs and remarks of party officials are certainly full of nativist arguments. But, its program also pledges to preserve the democratic order. The party advocates direct democracy rather than representative democracy. The party's position on democracy differs it from extreme right parties because extreme right parties reject democracy altogether (Mudde, 2014: 98). The AfD is occupying the space to the right of the CDU and to the left of the NPD. In other words, the position of the AfD in the political spectrum is between the extreme right party NPD and the conservative right party CDU.

## CHAPTER 5

### ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY: AN EXAMPLE OF A POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTY

#### 5. 1. Introduction

As argued before, the AfD fits the definition of populist radical right party, which is the central departure point of this thesis. The party combines three ideological features (populism, nativism, and authoritarianism) of the PRR party family. However, populism is secondary to the party. The party uses populism only as a tactic. ‘The people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ rhetoric is of great importance for populism. But, this rhetoric does not lie at the centre of the AfD. As this chapter will demonstrate, nativism is the core ideology of the party. Therefore, it is the nativist policies that are advocated first and foremost by the AfD, rather than the populist ones. Many issues like economy are instrumentalized in the primary nativist ideology of the AfD. As for authoritarianism of the party, authoritarian policies that the party defends are closely linked to the key nativist ideology of the party.

#### 5. 2. Populism of the AfD

As I mentioned before, I rely on Mudde’s definition of populism throughout the thesis. “Populism is a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2007: 23). Since populism is a thin-centred ideology, particular expressions of populism are almost always combined with very different ideologies, such as conservatism, nationalism, liberalism, nativism, or socialism (Mudde, 2004:

544; Stanley, 2008: 99-100; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2011: 5). The AfD's populism is combined with nativism and authoritarianism. The party's populism not only implies the antagonism between the people and the elites, but also opens the possibility of the exclusion of 'others' who do not belong to 'the people'. The 'others' lie at the heart of the AfD. They are understood as 'the enemies of the people' by the party.

### **5. 2. 1. 'Others' of the AfD**

As mentioned before, the PRR parties divide the world into friends and foes. Foes are more prevalent than friends in their propaganda. Since they capitalize on the fear, the PRR parties are clear examples of the politics of fear. For them, there are internal and external enemies (Mudde, 2007: 89).

The key internal enemy of all PRR parties is 'the elite'. The elite is criticised in both populist and nativist terms, i.e. as traitors to the nation and as corruptors of the people (Mudde, 2007: 65). For example, the UKIP states that "politics is corrupted by self-interest and big business. An unaccountable elite revels in mutual back-scratching and cronyism" (UKIP, 2017: 58). According to the SVP, "the sale of Swiss sovereignty and self-determination by the political elite must be stopped" (SVP, 2015: 10). Likewise, FN's Le Pen said the Socialist Party and Republicans "are crumbling" and "the French people are sick and tired of that old political world" (BBC, 2015). Similarly, the biggest threat within the state and within the nation is also the elites for the AfD. The AfD positions itself against the country's established parties. The AfD's twitter post says: "Established parties are responsible for the people's disenchantment with politics. AfD brings fresh air to the political landscape!" (The Local, 2016a).

AfD's campaign platform for Baden-Württemberg called the governing parties "saboteurs of our state and our society" (Bloomberg, 2016). At a rally in June 2016, Gauland accused "the parties represented today in the Bundestag" of "the attempt to gradually replace the German people with a population from all parts of this earth" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2016, cited in Kim, 2017:

7). AfD's member of parliament, Martin Reichardt, collectively described the Greens and the Left party as "constitutional enemy No. 1" (Deutsche Welle, 2017d).

Especially Chancellor Angela Merkel's CDU is vehemently criticised by the AfD. It can be observed in many statements of party officials. For example, during an interview, Alice Weidel said that Merkel and her conservative party have "betrayed their own values". Weidel called Merkel and her government "pigs and puppets" in an email (The Guardian, 2017). The email said: "The reason why we are overrun by culturally alien peoples such as Arabs, Sinti and Roma is the systematic destruction of civil society as a possible counterweight from the enemies of the constitution who govern us." "These pigs are nothing other than puppets of the victorious powers of the second world war, whose task it is to keep down the German people" (The Guardian, 2017).

Frauke Petry said that "it is on us to take the CDU's place as a people's party" (The Local, 2016a). AfD members call Merkel's Christian Democrats "lemmings" and refer to Berlin as a "swamp" (Deutsche Welle, 2017e). Andre Ponnenburg, AfD leader in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt, described Merkel as the "worst Chancellor in German history" (Independent, 2016). During an election campaign rally of the CDU, many supporters of the AfD protested against Merkel with the slogans "Merkel must go," "Traitor to the people," and "We are the people" (Telegraph, 2017). Jürgen Pohl who is on the AfD's candidate list in the state of Thuringia refers to himself as an "attorney for the people" (Spiegel, 2017). The party states that government and all its institutions should become "servants to all citizens" (AfD, 2017: 5).

AfD's slogan is '*Mut zur Wahrheit*' ('Courage for the Truth'). With this slogan, the AfD indicates 'corrupted' and 'dishonest' professional politicians (Berbair et al., 2015: 165). In its political program, the AfD states that Germany has a "class of career politicians whose foremost interest is to retain their own power base, status, and material well-being" (AfD, 2017: 7). Another good example in this regard is UKIP's former leader Nigel Farage, who says that "my

contempt for career politicians knows no bounds”. In fact, he is the career politician. Farage has been contesting elections since 1994. Both the AfD and the UKIP tactically use the populist discourse to attract broader public support.

The national elites are linked to the issue of mass immigration (Mudde, 2007: 66). For instance, Trump accuses political elites of supporting a massive immigration. Trump’s wall project along the US-Mexico border to prevent immigration can be given as an example of conspiracy theory. Similarly, the AfD sees Merkel as “traitor” for opening German borders to an “invasion” of migrants since 2015. The AfD’s conspiracy theory is that political elites allow mass-migration to compensate for low German birth-rates as political elites are selling out the interests of the German people (Greven, 2016: 4). “In order to fight the effects of the negative demographic development, political parties currently in government support mass immigration, mainly from Islamic states, without due consideration of the needs and qualifications of the German labour market”, writes in the party program. The party claims that the birth rate amongst immigrants is much higher than that of Germans and therefore, the ethnic-cultural changes in society will accelerate (AfD, 2017: 41).

Populists present themselves as taboo breakers, the fighters who attack political correctness (Mudde, 2004: 554). A good example in this respect is UKIP in Britain, which stated that “strong actions, not political correctness, are needed” (UKIP, 2017: 38). Similarly, FN’s Le Pen accuses the ruling political class of being bound by political correctness. Therefore, the AfD’s firm rejection of politically correct language guidelines (AfD, 2017: 47) does not come as a surprise for the followers of PRR parties in Europe. “It can no longer be that people who draw attention to problems in our country are dealt with more severely than the problems themselves. And we as democrats and patriots will not be silenced. Because political correctness belongs to the dustbin of history,” Weidel said in a party congress (Reuters, 2017b).

Many populist radical right parties consider the media to be instruments of the established parties (Mudde, 2007: 67). The media is also one of the ‘others’ of the AfD. Like Donald Trump, the leaders of the AfD display a conspicuous hostility toward the mainstream media. Journalists are regularly excluded from party events. The term “*Lügenpresse*” (liar press) became a popular term used at rallies held by the AfD. The party campaigned against “fake news coverage” by mainstream media outlets (Deutsche Welle, 2017c).

Homophobia is another significant characteristic of many PRR parties. Homosexuality is seen as a threat to the survival of the nation. Yet all PRR parties are not homophobic (Mudde, 2007: 67). Different PRR parties can take different positions regarding attitudes towards homosexuality (Rooduijn, 2015: 5). For example, the UKIP claims that it stands up for true equality in the face of misogynistic and homophobic attitudes (UKIP, 2017: 37). FN leader Le Pen pledges to abolish same-sex marriage. She promises to create an “improved” form of civil unions for gay couples (Express, 2017). Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) rejects a separate legal institution for same-sex relations. For the FPÖ, the family is a partnership between a man and a woman with common children (FPÖ, 2011). Likewise, for the Danish DF, the ties of intimacy between husband and wife and children and parents are the pillars of Danish society (DF, 2002). The Finns Party supports a “traditional concept of family” (PS, 2011). In similar vein, the AfD sees itself as a defender of the “traditional family model” and is against same-sex-marriage (AfD, 2017: 40). Thus, homosexuals are ‘others’ for the party.

According to the PRR, offspring are very important for the survival of the nation (Mudde, 2007: 92). For example, the Finns Party states that children are the future of the Finnish nation (PS, 2011). The FPÖ advocates a family policy centred around births. Similarly, the AfD wants to encourage families to have more children (AfD, 2017: 41) and is naturally anti-abortion. For instance, Petry called for all women to have at least three children (Independent, 2016). Petry also criticised Merkel for not having children and said “Kids help you see

beyond your own periphery. And that is what Merkel does not do” (The Local, 2016b). Figure 3 shows that the AfD tries to encourage women to have more children. The party advocates that, instead of migrant women, more German women should give birth. This campaign poster proves that nativism is the core ideology of the AfD.

Women are seen as either mothers or mothers-to-be by traditional parties. They are discouraged from working (Mudde, 2007: 93). For instance, the FPÖ is against gender mainstreaming (FPÖ, 2011). Similarly, the AfD argues that day-care facilities and full-time schools for children, the implementation of gender mainstreaming projects, and the general focus on individuality undermine the family (AfD, 2017: 40). The party supports policies that keep the mother at home such as an incentive to marry and raise children; the provision of interest-free loans for parents; facilities for young students who want to marry; special state support for large families and a split tax for families (AfD, 2017: 40-41, 73).



“And what is your reason for fighting for Germany? Trust yourself, Germany!”

Figure 3. AfD Campaign Poster in the 2017 General Election Campaign

Within the state and outside the nation, the major threat is the ethnic minority for PRR parties (Mudde, 2007: 69). Muslims are targeted most vehemently in their propaganda. Non-Muslim immigrants are also targeted

(Mudde, 2007: 70). All kinds of ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees are ‘others’ for the AfD. The preservation of German culture, language, and tradition is one of the primary political goals of the party (AfD, 2017). For example, Petry argued in an interview that “German politics has a responsibility to ensure the survival of its own people, of its own nation” (Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung 2014, cited in Kim 2017: 5). The party considers refugees as “invaders” and “attackers”. They are the cause of unemployment, crime, and terrorism for the AfD.

The Turks living in Germany constitute the largest Turkish community outside of Turkey. Since they are both ethnic minority and religious minority, the Turks living in Germany are ‘other’ for the AfD. For instance, Andre Poggenburg, AfD head in the state of Saxony Anhalt, called Turks living in Germany “camel drivers who should go off to where they belong, far, far beyond the Bosphorus to their mud huts and polygamy”. He called Turks “camel traders” and an “unpatriotic rabble” (Reuters, 2018). For example, Kay Gottschalk, AfD deputy leader and member of the Bundestag, made a call to boycott local Turkish shops in Germany. For instance, Petry criticised Turkish-German soccer star Mesut Özil for not singing the national anthem. “It is a shame that Mesut Özil, someone who so many children and young people identify with, does not sing the national anthem,” Petry said (Eurosport, 2016). She also accused Özil of hypocrisy and of promoting a political agenda by posting a picture of himself on social media on a pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca. “He does not live according to the rules of Sharia. At any rate, the women who he appears with in public, do not wear a veil,” she stated (Eurosport, 2016). Gauland said that integration minister Aydan Özoğuz, a Turkish-German, should be “disposed of” back to Anatolia. Weidel described Aydan Özoğuz as a “stain” and a “disgrace” (Deutsche Welle, 2017d).

Outside the state and outside the nation, foreign countries and international organizations like the European Union constitute external enemies for PRR parties (Mudde, 2007: 74). For instance, the SVP states that “our

country must no longer be insidiously integrated into international structures such as the EU” (SVP, 2015: 10). The French FN, the Dutch PVV, the Danish DF, the Austrian FPÖ and the British UKIP are all against the EU. Similarly, the European Union is the ‘other’ for the AfD. The AfD positions itself against the European Union and “unaccountable, undemocratic bureaucrats” in the EU institutions. A party spokesman branded Brussels a “bureaucracy monster” and said: “Next year the AfD will enter the German parliament and Dexit will be top on our agenda” (Express, 2016). The AfD’s Björn Höcke expressed: “I know the German people want to be free of EU slavery” (Express, 2016). Since the AfD claims that they are “staunch supporters of democracy”, the party describes the EU as an “undemocratic entity” whose policies are determined by bureaucrats who have no democratic accountability” (AfD, 2017: 16). It is indicated by the AfD that a fundamental reform of the EU is necessary. The party is in favour of returning the European Union to an economic union (AfD, 2017: 15). The party claims that enforcing the transformation of the EU into a centralised state is against “the majority will of the people in the EU” (AfD, 2017: 16). The party calls for national referendum on the Euro and the orderly termination of the Euro (AfD, 2017: 17). An election poster of the AfD says “‘Euro rescue?’ Not at any price! Trust yourself, Germany!” (Politico, 2017b). Nigel Farage, a key Brexit supporter and former leader of the UKIP, took part in AfD’s election campaign to support the AfD’s anti-Euro stance.

### **5. 2. 2. Populist Democracy**

PRR parties’ view of democracy is a combination of populist, nativist and authoritarian democracy (Mudde, 2007: 138). Therefore, this section discusses the AfD’s view on populist democracy together with the other PRR party examples.

A core element of populist democracy is the belief that the general will should be implemented without any limitations. The general will of the people is more important than everything. The main targets are established political

parties (Mudde, 2007: 151). For example, the UKIP states in its party program that the old parties let the public down (UKIP, 2017: 3). Similarly, as mentioned above, the AfD positions itself against the country's established parties, especially the CDU.

According to Mudde, populist democracy “is based on three key features: plebiscitary politics, personalization of power, and primacy of the political” (Mudde, 2007: 151). According to PRR parties, the contemporary political system in their country is not really democratic. They assert that the political elite controls all power through the system of representative government. They claim that only through the introduction of elements of plebiscitary democracy can power be given to “the people” (Mudde, 2007: 151). The referendum is the most popular instrument of plebiscitary democracy. The referendum encourages clear yes or no answers, while discouraging compromise (Eatwell 2004, cited in Rydgren, 2007). Virtually all PRR parties call for its introduction or increased use (Mudde, 2007: 152). For instance, the Dutch PVV supports direct democracy and a binding referendum. The PVV claims that power should be given to the citizens (PVV, 2016). Likewise, the Austrian FPÖ expressed its standpoint clearly in its program: “We are committed to building a direct democracy” (FPÖ, 2011). The Danish People's Party (DF) calls for more direct democracy (DF, 2002). Many parties even go a step further and advocate a people's initiative (Mudde, 2007: 152). A good example in this respect is UKIP, which wants the people to initiate binding referenda on the issues of most importance to them (UKIP, 2017: 60).

Like many PRR parties, the AfD embraces methods of direct democracy to challenge the political elites. The party believes that “general will of the people” can only be achieved through the means of direct democracy. It indicates that “only direct democracy exercised by the electorate can return political parties to the democratic system” (AfD, 2017: 10). As Figure 4 shows, the AfD advocates the introduction of referenda in Germany based on the Swiss model. The election poster of the AfD says “‘The voice of the people?’ Direct

democracy like in Switzerland”. The party advocates “lean government for free citizens” (AfD, 2017: 8). The party states that government should only provide a framework within which its citizens can thrive. It describes itself as a “party of good common sense”. The party emphasises that the German people themselves should be able to determine the run of political events (AfD, 2017: 9).



“The voice of the people? Direct democracy like Switzerland.”

Figure 4. AfD Campaign Poster in the 2017 General Election Campaign

Most PRR parties support an increase of the powers of the main political figure in their system (Mudde, 2007: 153). For instance, the AfD calls for the introduction of a directly elected president to increase the power of president. The president will be able to say that “my power comes from ‘the people’” to legitimate his/her actions. In the words of the AfD, “to decrease the influence of political parties, we want to have the Federal President elected directly by the German people” (AfD, 2017: 12).

A key notion of populist democracy is the primacy of the political (Mudde, 2007: 154). In the populist ideology “the general will of the people,” which is the basis of democracy, cannot be limited by anything, not even the law. Nevertheless, the subordination of the judiciary to the will of the people is not usually expressed in the official party literature. Instead of this, the opposite i.e. political independence of the judiciary is emphasised (Mudde, 2007: 154). Similarly, the AfD does not mention the subordination of the judiciary to the will

of the people in its program but the party states that political independence of the judiciary has to be strengthened (AfD, 2017: 24).

### 5. 3. Nativism of the AfD

Nativism is “an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state”. (Non) “nativeness” is identified on the basis of cultural traits such as race, ethnicity, or religion (Mudde, 2007: 22).

Nativism constitutes the core of the ideology of the AfD. A twitter post of the party says: “What is so wrong about being German?”. The party wishes “to be and remain German”. “We want to permanently maintain human dignity, families with children, our Western Christian culture, our language and traditions in a peaceful, democratic and sovereign nation state for the German people” the party states in the preamble to its political program for 2017 (AfD, 2017: 5). “Our Country, Our Rules”, “Our Country, Our Values” and “Our Country, Our Homeland” are some campaign slogans used by the AfD. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that the party has nativist discourses. These figures point that nativism is the core ideology of the party.



“What is so wrong about being German?”

Figure 5. Twitter Poster of the AfD



“Our Country, Our Homeland. You are my Germany.” “Our Country, Our Rules!”

Figure 6. AfD Campaign Posters in the 2017 General Election Campaign

There are clear examples that AfD politicians use nativist and offensive remarks. For instance, AfD’s member of parliament Martin Reichardt said that he had no problem with the phrase of “Germany for the Germans” (Deutsche Welle, 2017d). Gauland said that Germans would not want to have national football star Jerome Boateng as a neighbour (The Local, 2016a). Boateng was born in Berlin and whose father is Ghanaian. Gauland also said the national team was “no longer German in the classical sense” (The Local, 2016a). Gauland warned that Germany would be dissolved in a stream of foreigners (Badische Zeitung 2015, cited in Jäckle & König, 2016: 5). During a campaign speech in August 2017, Gauland said that Social Democrat parliamentarian and Germany’s integration commissioner Aydan Özoğuz, a Turkish-German born in Hamburg, should be “disposed of” back to Anatolia. He used the German term “*entsorgen*”, a word that Nazis used about Jews (Deutsche Welle, 2017c). Weidel described Aydan Özoğuz as a “stain” and a “disgrace” (Deutsche Welle, 2017d). AfD’s member of parliament, Jens Maier, said that the “creation of mixed nationalities” are “destroying national identity” (Deutsche Welle, 2017d). AfD’s Höcke is known for his openly racist arguments. He argued that Africans and Europeans were biologically different (Hurtz 2015, cited in Jäckle & König, 2016: 5).

The AfD wants the Germans to be proud of their people and heritage. The AfD politicians use expressions reminiscent of National Socialist terminology. Höcke used expressions such as ‘thousand year-long German future’ and ‘thousand year-long Empire’. Höcke called the Holocaust memorial in Berlin a “monument of shame” and said history books should be re-written to focus more on German victims of the Nazis (Euractiv, 2017). He told supporters that Germans were the “only people in the world who planted a memorial of shame in the heart of their capital”. He called for a “180-degree turn” in Germany’s attitude to World War II (Deutsche Welle, 2017b). Höcke rejected the idea Hitler was “absolutely evil”, arguing that the issue was not “black and white” (Independent, 2017a). Another example is Petry, who suggested German policy is driven by “Holocaust guilt” (Bloomberg, 2016). In a September 2016 interview, Petry mentioned the need “to ensure that the term *völkisch* is again positively occupied,” maintaining that “*völkisch*” is in fact “an associated attribute” of “*das Volk*” (Die Welt 2016, cited in Kim, 2017: 7). The term *völkisch* comes from the German word for people but was used by the Nazis to define those they saw as belonging to the German race (BBC, 2017a).

Jens Maier called for an end to Germany’s “culture of guilt” surrounding the country’s actions in the Second World War (Deutsche Welle, 2017d). Gauland said Germany should “be proud of the achievements of German soldiers in two world wars” (Deutsche Welle, 2017c). AfD’s member of parliament, Wilhelm von Gottberg, wrote in a newspaper in 2001 that the Holocaust was a “myth” and an “effective instrument to criminalize the Germans and their history” (Deutsche Welle, 2017d). The head of the AfD in Leipzig, Siegbert Droese, had a car with the license plate: “AH 1818.” “AH” are the initials of Adolf Hitler. 1 and 8 are considered a code for Adolf Hitler among neo-Nazi groups. These numbers refer to the first (A) and eighth (H) letters of the alphabet (Deutsche Welle, 2017d).

### 5. 3. 1. Nativist Democracy

The nativism of the AfD also gives an idea about the party's stance on nativist democracy. Nativist democracy opposes key elements of liberal democracy, most notably the protection of minorities and the centrality of individual rights (Mudde, 2007: 155). A nativist democracy is based upon either forced monoculturalism or ethnocracy (Mudde, 2007). Monoculturalism is a utopia of the pure nation-state. Most PRR parties unwillingly accept some degree of ethnic diversity within the nation-state. That is to say, they accept a more attainable ethnocracy (Mudde, 2007: 138-139). A significant example of a state with strong ethnocratic elements was the Federal Republic of Germany, before the change in citizenship laws from an exclusive *jus sanguinis* to a combination with *jus soli* (Wimmer 2002, cited in Mudde, 2007: 144). The AfD calls for the reinstatement of the status quo of the *jus sanguinis*, which was valid until 2000 (AfD, 2017: 25). According to the principle of *jus sanguinis* (right of blood), citizenship is determined by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state. On the contrary, according to the principle of *jus soli* (right of soil), citizenship is determined by place of birth.

The guiding principle of all PRR parties and the basis of ethnocratic rule is “national preference” (Mudde, 2007: 144). According to this, a democratic nation-state belongs to one ethnic group and other ethnic groups can only live there if they accept this group's dominance. The second key feature of ethnocracy in the programs of most PRR parties is an ethnic leading culture. For them, there can be only one official national culture (Mudde, 2007: 144). For instance, in the words of the Austrian FPÖ, “we are prepared to take action to maintain and develop our dominant culture” (FPÖ, 2011). For the Danish DF, “Denmark belongs to the Danes” and “Danish culture must be preserved and strengthened” (DF, 2002). The PS expressed that, “Finnishness is a unique element of the world's culture. It is something to be valued as the cornerstone of Finnish society. It must be preserved” (PS, 2011). In similar vein, the AfD advocates German culture as the predominant culture. The party is against

multiculturalism (AfD, 2017: 46). “Germany for the Germans”, a slogan used by AfD politicians, displays the nativist goal of the party.

Almost all populist radical rightists accept the possibility of assimilation of nonnationals, usually referred to by the less negative term “integration” (Mudde, 2007: 145). For example, according to the UKIP, “integration is as important as immigration” (UKIP, 2017: 34). Likewise, the Finns Party states that Finland must remain an open society for those who live with the principle “when in Rome, do as the Romans do” (PS, 2015). Similarly, the AfD states that “integration is indispensable in order to live in peace with immigrants in the future” (AfD 2017: 62). The party expresses its standpoint clearly in its program: “Assimilation as the most advanced form of integration is worth striving for, yet, it cannot be enforced” (AfD, 2017: 62).

PRR parties oppose special facilities for cultural minorities, particularly for the Muslim community (Mudde, 2007: 145). For instance, the Dutch PVV promises to close all mosques and Islamic schools (PVV, 2016). Similarly, the AfD wants to end foreign funding of mosques in Germany (AfD, 2017: 48). The party advocates the ban on minarets and the muezzin call. In the words of the party, “the AfD rejects the minaret as a symbol of Islamic supremacy, as well as the muezzin call that proclaims that no god exists beside the Islamic Allah” (AfD, 2017: 49).

### **5. 3. 2. Islamophobia**

Islamophobic discourse is central to PRR parties (Mudde, 2007: 84). For example, the populist radical right PVV party promises to “de-Islamise the Netherlands”. The party pledges to implement measures such as closing all mosques and Islamic schools, banning the Koran, closing asylum seeker centres, banning Muslim migrants, and forbidding women from wearing headscarves (PVV, 2016). Likewise, the UKIP promises to ban wearing of the niqab and the burqa in public places. According to the UKIP, they are barriers to integration and pose security risks (UKIP, 2017: 37). The Swiss SVP also calls for a ban on

the wearing of veils in public spaces by alleging the security risks it poses (SVP, 2015: 45). The French FN is also closely associated with Islamophobia. These parties stress that all the values Europe stands for are incompatible with Islam.

In similar vein, for the AfD, the main threat today comes from “Islam”. The AfD states that “Islam does not belong to Germany” (AfD, 2017: 48). The party calls for the ban on the full-body veiling, male circumcision, minarets, and the muezzin call. AfD politicians have repeatedly seen Islam and Muslims as a threat. This is clear from many of Gauland’s statements, including the following: “Islam is not only a religion, but also a political doctrine seeking to penetrate all areas of society”. He also claimed that it is “incompatible” with democracy. “The growing Islamization of Germany poses an urgent challenge for its public and state order; cultural identity and internal peace,” said Gauland. He also stated that “a widely used differentiation between Islam and Islamism that is presented as a distortion of the Islamic religion [within the framework of this approach] should be rejected,” as Islamist rhetoric and ideas are all “rooted in the Koran” (RT, 2017). After the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo, “this bloodbath proves that those who laughed at or ignored the fears of so many people about a looming danger of Islamism were wrong,” said Gauland (The Guardian, 2015).

Beatrix von Storch, AfD politician and a member of the European Parliament, called Islam “a political ideology that is not compatible with the basic law” (RT, 2017). Islam is an ideology and an Islamic takeover of Germany is the greatest danger the country has faced since the Cold War, said another AfD politician Klaus Riedelsdorf. He went as far as to say that “Germany has no special responsibility for Arab refugees just because 80 years ago we persecuted the Jews” (New York Times, 2017). In a television interview, Weidel called Germany’s Muslim population “a great danger to our state” and advocated shutting the borders to refugees (Bloomberg, 2017).

“We are for religious freedom,” Albrecht Glaser, AfD’s member of parliament, said. He expressed that “Islam is a construction that does not recognize religious freedom and does not respect it. Wherever Islam has power

it suppresses religious freedom. Whoever treats basic rights like that should have this basic right taken away from them” (The Local, 2017). “Islam is foreign to us and for that reason it cannot invoke the principle of religious freedom to the same degree as Christianity,” said Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, an AfD lawmaker from the state of Saxony-Anhalt (Reuters, 2016).

Because of their Islamophobic discourse, PRR parties make an emphasis on the Christian essence of Europe (Mudde, 2007: 85). For instance, the FPÖ stresses that Europe was decisively shaped by Christianity (FPÖ, 2011). Likewise, for the DF, Christianity “has been honoured in Denmark for centuries” (DF, 2002). In similar vein, according to the AfD, German culture is derived from “the religious traditions of Christianity” (AfD, 2017: 46). The party states that Islam is against “the Judeo-Christian and humanist foundations of our culture” (AfD, 2017: 47). In the words of the party, “minaret and muezzin calls contradict a tolerant coexistence of religions, which the Christian churches of modernity do practice” (AfD, 2017: 49). Interestingly enough, one of its politicians, Arthur Wagner, converted to Islam, and he resigned from the party.

Whereas an Islamophobic and xenophobic movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) was quickly condemned by German mainstream parties, the AfD’s position is more favourable. Gauland described PEGIDA as a “natural ally” of the AfD and Petry invited PEGIDA into Saxony’s Parliament in Dresden in January 2015 for discussions about cooperation (Grimm, 2015: 273). Some scholars (Grabow, 2016; Jäckle & König, 2016) argue that the AfD and PEGIDA are “two sides of the same coin”.

During election campaign, the party used slogans and posters showing its xenophobic and Islamophobic position such as “It is about us, our culture, our home, our Germany,” “Get your country back!”, “Burkas? We like bikinis”, “Islam does not fit our kitchen”, and “Stop Islamisation” (see Figure 7). These posters declare that Islam has no place in Germany. Figure 7 illustrates that nativism is the core ideology of the AfD.



“Stop Islamisation. Elect the AfD!”



“Islam? It does not fit our kitchen.”



“Islam does not belong to Germany.  
The freedom of the woman is not negotiable!”



“Burkas? We like bikinis.”

Figure 7. AfD Campaign Posters in the 2017 General Election Campaign

### 5. 3. 3. Anti-Immigrant Attitude

PRR parties in Europe have anti-immigrant positions (Mudde, 2007: 70). For example, Geert Wilders, the leader of the PVV, sees immigrants as people

who endanger the country's citizens. According to him, the Dutch are swamped by immigrants. He says that "we have to take our country back". His slogan is "make the Netherlands ours again" which reminds Trump's "make the America great again" slogan. Like the PVV, the FN has tough anti-immigrant stance. For Marine Le Pen, mass immigration and multiculturalism are dangers to French identity. In similar vein, the UKIP wants to control immigration and reduce the numbers of immigrants coming to Britain. Anti-immigrant sentiment was the primary reason under the Brexit campaign. Likewise, the DF states that "Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been" (DF, 2002). The Finns Party believes that "immigration will change, irreversibly, the host country's population profile, disrupt social cohesion, overburden public services and economic resources, lead to the formation of ghettos, promote religious radicalism and its consequences, and foster ethnic conflicts" (PS, 2015). Similarly, anti-immigration rhetoric is one of the signature themes of the AfD. For the party, immigrants represent a huge threat to German culture, tradition, and language. "More German children instead of massive immigration" which calls for a higher birth-rate within the "native" German population, is one of the slogans of the AfD. The party claims that the ethnic-cultural changes in society will accelerate because of higher birth-rate amongst immigrants (AfD, 2017: 41).

During election campaign, the party used slogans and posters showing its anti-immigrant position such as "End asylum fraud!" and "Secure the borders. Protect the social state" (Politico, 2017b). A poster shows a group of migrants with the slogan "The Germans will not finance a better life for you" (CNBC, 2017a). The party claims that the German family is facing extinction. A poster shows a pregnant woman with the slogan "New Germans? We will make them ourselves" (see Figure 8). These posters spread beliefs that mass immigration threatens to destroy Germany. Like other figures, Figure 8 shows that nativism is the core ideology of the AfD.



“Colourful diversity?”

We have got enough already.”

“New Germans?”

We will make them ourselves.”

Figure 8. AfD Campaign Posters in the 2017 General Election Campaign

The AfD wants restrictions on political asylum, stronger enforcement of existing laws including deportations of refugees who do not qualify for asylum. The party states that the government should protect the national identity (Bloomberg, 2016). Marcus Frohnmair, the chair of the party’s youth organization (*Junge Alternative*), wrote in 2016 on Facebook that “our generation will suffer the most” from Merkel’s decision to “flood this country with the shoddy proletariat from Africa and the Orient” (Deutsche Welle, 2017d). Marcus Pretzell who was the head of the AfD in North Rhine-Westphalia advocated the legitimacy of border control officers’ use of fire arms to prevent refugees crossing the German border (Zeit Online, 2015, cited in Jäckle & König, 2016: 5). Petry suggested sending rejected asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants to islands outside of Europe (Deutsche Welle, 2016). AfD politician Heinrich Fiechtner spoke of an “attack on the German people” in reference to the refugee crisis (Independent, 2016). Beatrix von Storch said that “People who will not accept stop at our borders are attackers,” “And we have to defend ourselves against attackers” (Deutsche Welle, 2017c). Gauland argued Germany should close its borders and said of an image showing a drowned refugee child: “We cannot be blackmailed by children’s eyes” (Deutsche Welle, 2017c).

After winning its first parliamentary seats, AfD promised to fight “an invasion of foreigners” into the country (BBC, 2017b). Karsten Hilse, AfD’s member of parliament, said: “First and foremost, we must end the migration chaos”. He argued that German values were threatened by the arrival of people “who reject our way of life”. He expressed: “We are being heterogenized and diluted,” and “the German people ... are meant to silently accept this change and ultimately the loss of our homeland” (CNN, 2017a).

The AfD claims that Merkel’s refugee policies encourage terrorism. “Germany has become a safe haven for criminals and terrorists from all over the world,” Weidel said (Financial Times, 2017). Weidel demanded forced deportations of migrants and refugees who committed serious criminal offenses on German soil. She said that Germany should be exempted from a regulation issued by the European Court of Human Rights that bans European countries from deporting refugees back to their home countries if they are deemed “unsafe” (RT, 2017). The party blamed Merkel’s immigration policy for the Berlin Christmas attacks and recent European terror attacks. Marcus Pretzell wrote “These are Merkel’s dead,” after the Berlin Christmas attack (Deutsche Welle, 2017c). In August 2017, the AfD shared a Facebook image (see Figure 9): Bloody tire tracks criss-crossing European towns, each marked by the number of dead in terror attacks from Manchester to Barcelona. The online poster carries the slogan: “The tracks left by the world chancellor in Europe” (AfD Facebook page). Figure 9 shows that the AfD blames Merkel for the terrorist attacks in Europe. The figure points that the AfD establishes connections between immigration and the terrorist attacks in Europe.



“The tracks left by the world chancellor in Europe.”

Figure 9. Facebook Poster of the AfD

AfD politicians believe that Merkel broke the law when she opened the borders in September 2015. They want to see Merkel investigated. The party wants a commission set up to investigate Merkel’s “breaches of the law” in allowing migrants and refugees in (BBC, 2017a).

### 5. 3. 4. Nationalism over Internationalism

PRR parties believe that national interests should be put ahead of the international interests. In this regard, they are among the most vocal opponents of globalisation (Mudde, 2007: 184). To the PRR, globalisation is a multifaceted enemy (Mudde, 2007: 196). It can be mentioned cultural, economic, and political globalisation. All three major subtypes of globalisation are feared and rejected on the basis of the same nativist beliefs: they threaten the independence and purity of the nation-state (Mudde, 2007: 196).

PRR parties oppose cultural globalisation because they believe that globalisation annihilates the cultural diversities of nations and causes the homogenization of cultures (Mudde, 2007: 191). For instance, the FPÖ rejects

“any artificial synchronisation of the diverse European languages and cultures by means of forced multiculturalism, globalisation, and mass immigration” (FPÖ, 2011). In the election program of the AfD the term globalisation is mentioned only once in the context of cultural globalisation: It is one of goals of the AfD “to preserve the great cultural heritage for future generations . . . in an age of globalisation” (AfD, 2017: 46). Some PRR parties fear the use of English terminology (Mudde, 2007: 192). For example, the Austrian FPÖ states that mastering German as the language of instruction is essential (FPÖ, 2011). Likewise, the Finns Party is against the teaching of courses in English. According to the party, the teaching of courses in English usually results in foreign students not learning Finnish (PS, 2015). Similarly, in the words of the AfD, “the AfD is concerned about the trend to replace the German language with English, which is misconceived as a form of ‘internationalisation’” (AfD, 2017: 46).

PRR parties’ opposition to economic globalisation stems from the predominance of nativism in the parties’ ideology (Mudde, 2007: 186). For instance, FN’s Le Pen said that “the divide is not between the left and right anymore, but between patriots and globalists” and “financial globalisation and Islamist globalisation are helping each other out. Those two ideologies want to bring France to its knees” (Independent, 2017b). Similarly, the AfD seems to try to accommodate economic globalisation within its nativist ideology. The party program of the AfD states: “International trade relations should preferably be multi-lateral in nature and based upon treaties with the World Trade Organisation. Trade agreements must never undermine German safety standards” (AfD, 2017: 66). In the process of economic globalisation, states are bound by a variety of rules, and organizations such as the World Trade Organization. But, the AfD does not oppose the World Trade Organization.

The European Union is a topic through which economic globalisation features at the core of PRR campaigns (Mudde, 2007: 189). With the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, PRR parties believe that the EU has taken a step to become an

intrusive supranational body (Mudde, 2007: 159). In the words of the AfD, “with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and especially its amendment in Lisbon in 2007, the political elites have taken steps to permanently transform the EU into a centralised state” (AfD, 2017: 16). The party calls for “the strict retention of the principle of subsidiarity and the restoration of powers to the nation states” (AfD, 2017: 16).

Virtually the whole PRR party family agrees that the current European Union is bad and should be either reformed fundamentally or abolished (Mudde, 2007: 165). For example, the Swiss SVP is opposed to gradual accession to the EU (SVP, 2015: 15). The DF, the PVV, the FN and the UKIP oppose the European Union (DF, 2002; PVV, 2016; UKIP, 2017). These parties would like to be “independent again”. All PRR parties reject a federal “United States of Europe” (Mudde, 2007: 166). Similarly, the AfD is against the idea of the European Union as a centralised federal state. The party prefers a “Europe of Nation States” (AfD, 2017: 16). Given the predominance of nativism in the ideology of the PRR, it comes as no surprise that the AfD holds negative views on the European Union.

The AfD is in favour of returning the European Union to an economic union (AfD, 2017: 15). It wants to reclaim national sovereignty, specifically to control immigration and repatriate powers from the European Union. If a fundamental reform within the EU based on “consisting of sovereign nation states” does not happen, the party says that it will seek Germany’s exit, or a democratic dissolution of the EU, followed by the founding of a new European economic union (AfD, 2017: 15).

The AfD rejects a formal, common EU Foreign and Security Policy, as well as a common European Foreign Service (AfD, 2017: 17). The party rejects the idea of a combined European military force. Instead of this, the party advocates well-equipped and trained German Armed Forces as the “pillar of German sovereignty” (AfD, 2017: 30).

The AfD asserts that the rescue policies of the EU, the European Central Bank, and the European Stability Mechanism violate sovereignty rights. The party states that Germany should never be liable for the debts of other countries (AfD, 2017: 18). It advocates Germany's withdrawal from the Euro monetary union. It claims that all rescue mechanisms will expire for Germany as a result of Germany's withdrawal from the Euro (AfD, 2017: 18-9).

“The last thing we need is more EU,” says Joana Cotar, AfD's member of parliament. “We need less EU; we do not need paternalism of the nation states,” Cotar says. Cotar expresses that “we should all regulate our own issues at a national level. However, where we need to work together with the EU we should ... on the issue of border control, for example. This is a topic for the EU but it has failed so far” (CNN, 2017a). AfD's member of parliament Siegbert Drose wants to see “more sovereignty for nation states” within the EU. Drose is of opinion that the EU is “on the path to becoming a new Soviet Union” (CNN, 2017a). He expresses that “I want us, as a European nation, to keep our identity and our diversity, our differences. So for peaceful coexistence, there is no future for multiculturalism” (CNN, 2017a).

For PRR parties, Europe is a “civilization” shared by the different European nations (Mudde, 2007: 169). Most PRR parties see the roots of this civilization in three traditions: the Christian, Hellenistic, and Roman (Mudde, 2007: 170). In this regard, the exclusion of Turkey finds full consensus among PRR parties. For instance, in a video, subtitled in Turkish, the PVV leader Wilders addresses the Turkish people: “An Islamic state like Turkey does not belong to Europe. You are not welcomed in Europe” (PVVpers, 2015). Likewise, the UKIP played on the fears of the possibility of Turkey's EU membership during the Brexit campaign. Similarly, the AfD rejects “a participation of non-European countries for cultural and geographical reasons” (AfD, 2017: 17). The party is against Turkey's EU membership.

With regard to political globalisation, PRR parties fear the growing international political cooperation between states, in particular the involvement

of the United Nations (UN) (Mudde, 2007: 193). Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has become more active. Within Europe, the process of European integration has been a prominent example of supranational political cooperation. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has become more and more a political, rather than merely an economic project. The vision of PRR parties and the AfD in particular on European integration was discussed above. Thus, I will focus on the vision of PRR parties and the AfD on the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Since political globalisation is linked to a monopolar world system under American dominance, many European PRR parties have negative views towards the USA, the increased activity of the UN and the idea of the “New World Order” (Mudde, 2007: 194). For example, the French FN was unwillingly pro-American during the Cold War; however, the party became a radical anti-Americanism after the fall of the Berlin Wall (Mudde, 2007: 195). Jean-Marie Le Pen called the USA “the armed arm of the New World Order” (Schmidt, 2003: 106, cited in Mudde, 2007: 194). In similar vein, the AfD claims that Germany is becoming increasingly dependent on the protection and support of allies, particularly the United States of America, and cannot represent its own interests adequately. The party advocates a reform of the UN. It calls for a permanent seat for Germany on the UN Security Council (AfD, 2017: 28-29).

It is important to note that Donald Trump’s victory in the US election has created enthusiasm among European PRR parties. FN leader Marine Le Pen said Trump’s victory in the US election was “an additional stone in the building of a new world” (BBC, 2016b). She said that “Trump is a man free from Wall Street, from markets and from financial lobbies and even from his own party”. PVV leader Geert Wilders said that like the U.S. the Dutch “will conquer our country again” and used the slogan “make the Netherlands great again” that reminds Trump’s “make America great again” slogan. AfD’s Petry called Trump’s victory a “fresh start” and “historic” (Time, 2016).

With regard to NATO, many PRR parties prefer Europe to be independent from NATO (Mudde, 2007: 169). For instance, the French FN wants to leave NATO (Smith, 2017). The SVP rejects the forming of alliances and any further integration into NATO (SVP, 2015: 49). Similarly, the PS does not believe that defence of Finland would be better with NATO membership. Instead the PS believes that their flexibility in national defence matters would be narrowed (PS, 2015). According to the FPÖ, Austria must not be a member of a military pact (FPÖ, 2011). But, according to the DF, Denmark should be member of NATO (DF, 2002). As for the AfD, the party does not advocate Germany's withdrawal from NATO. The AfD supports a restoration of the military capabilities of the German Armed Forces to strengthen its national defence and the European component of NATO. It advocates that any engagement of NATO must be aligned to German interests (AfD, 2017: 29). It calls for the withdrawal of all Allied troops stationed on German soil, and in particular of their nuclear weapons (AfD, 2017: 30). The AfD also attaches great importance to the relationship with Russia regarding security issues. The reason is given by the AfD: "European security cannot be attained without Russia's involvement" (AfD, 2017: 30).

### **5. 3. 5. Nativist Economics**

Like so many other issues, economics is not a primary issue to the PRR parties. Most of time, PRR parties use their economic program to put into practice their core ideological position, i.e. nativism (Mudde, 2007: 125). For them, the economy should always be at the service of the nation. They defend a "nativist economic program" based upon economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism (Mudde, 2007: 136-137). The PRR supports an economy that benefits the "natives" and that is protected against "alien" influences (Mudde, 2007: 132).

Virtually all PRR parties accept the fundamentals of capitalism and the market economy. But, the level of state involvement in the economy preferred

by PRR parties varies (Mudde, 2007: 122-123). For example, the Swiss SVP strongly defends the free market economy and states that “the state must neither compete with nor impede the economy” (SVP, 2015: 14, 24). Likewise, the Austrian FPÖ advocates the principles of the market economy (FPÖ, 2011). Similarly, the AfD is close to the free market economy. “Free market competition produces the best economic results”, the AfD states. According to the party, state intervention which may be necessary should be limited to the minimum, and should be predictable to domestic and foreign investors (AfD, 2017: 66).

Most Western European PRR parties try to find a balance between protection of the national economy and access to external markets (Mudde, 2007: 126). According to the AfD, international trade is the foundation of their prosperity and peaceful coexistence. Thus, it calls for lower trade barriers in Europe and across the world (AfD, 2017: 67). Beside this, the party emphasises that German sovereignty must be taken into account by foreign trade initiatives. And, the AfD rejects TTIP, TISA and CETA. The reason is given by the AfD: They are negotiated in a “non-transparent, non-public manner and without the involvement of the German Federal Parliament” (AfD, 2017: 67).

All European PRR parties are characterized by an essentially nativist approach to economics. Two sectors of the national economy, small businesses and agriculture, are singled out for national protection by PRR parties. They advocate state protection and support for small businesses (Mudde, 2007: 127). For instance, the Austrian FPÖ wants to facilitate growth for small and medium-sized businesses (FPÖ, 2011). Likewise, for the UKIP, small businesses “are the lifeblood of our economy” (UKIP, 2017: 13). For the Swiss SVP, small and medium-sized enterprises “represent the virtual backbone of our economy” (SVP, 2015: 23). According to the Finns Party, the backbone of Finnish employment and economic growth is the myriad of entrepreneurs running small and mid-sized firms (PS, 2015). In similar vein, for the AfD, “small and medium-sized companies are the foundation of our economic strength”. The party calls for a new taxation policy for small and medium enterprises (AfD, 2017: 68).

PRR parties see the agricultural sector as vital for the survival of the nation (Mudde, 2007: 127). For example, the SVP wants to reinforce productive agriculture and family-run farms as well as minimise administrative regulations (SVP, 2015: 65). Similarly, according to the FPÖ, Austrian farmers should be free of subsidy constraints (FPÖ, 2011). The UKIP pledges to support the agricultural sector through grant schemes (UKIP, 2017: 53). Like these parties, the AfD also believes that an intact agricultural sector is very important for a liveable environment (AfD, 2017: 92).

Many PRR parties call for deregulation. These parties criticise and ridicule the red tape (Mudde, 2007: 128). For instance, the SVP is against restrictive state regulation and the party wants more freedom less bureaucracy (SVP, 2015: 25). The Finns Party wants to diminish regulation and decrease bureaucracy (PS, 2015). The UKIP also wants to abolish non-essential jobs and red tape (UKIP, 2017: 61). In similar vein, the AfD opposed to “excessive and inefficient regulations”. The party wants to deregulate and reduce bureaucracy on a broad level (AfD, 2017: 67).

PRR parties quite rarely call for the privatization of companies or economic sectors. Many PRR parties attach all sorts of limiting conditions to their calls for privatization (Mudde, 2007: 129). For example, the AfD offers referenda to decide upon planned privatizations, in particular if public services, public housing and public real estate are under discussion. It is against confidential privatization agreements (AfD, 2017: 68).

Most PRR parties are vote-maximizing parties. Thus, they promise tax cuts for the companies and middle classes (Mudde, 2007: 137). For instance, the Dutch PVV pledges to lower income taxes and halve car taxes (PVV, 2016). Like the PVV, the UKIP promises to cut taxes for middle earners, cut business rates for the smallest businesses and cut value added tax on household bills (UKIP, 2017: 5). The Austrian FPÖ also emphasises the importance of low taxes for a healthy labour market (FPÖ, 2011). The SVP supports lower taxes, levies, and fees for everyone and is opposed to any new taxes (SVP, 2015: 21). The Finns

Party promises to work for the revocation of the automobile tax (PS, 2015). Similarly, the AfD addresses taxes in its program: “We advocate a simpler and fairer taxation system, which primarily reduces the tax burden of middle and low-income earners” (AfD, 2017: 72). The party wants to abolish the wealth tax as well as the inheritance tax (AfD, 2017: 74).

Since offspring are vital for the survival of the nation for PRR parties, they support pension and tax systems for families as well as the family subsidies. For example, according to the FPÖ, families should be construed as an economic community in the tax system. The FPÖ states that the pension system must take account of years spent caring for children (FPÖ, 2011). Similarly, the AfD wants to introduce a split tax for families who elect to have children compared to couples without children (AfD, 2017: 73). According to the AfD, large families with lower and mid-level income should not live below the poverty line thus a reformed pension scheme and tax system is essential (AfD, 2017: 36).

Many PRR parties call for the protection of the welfare state including the increase of some social benefits and the introduction of new provisions. Nevertheless, this only applies to needy people (mainly pensioners and the sick) from the own nation. PRR parties advocate a distinction within the welfare system between “natives” and “aliens” (Mudde, 2007: 125). For instance, the SVP states that “social welfare must not become a gravy train”. According to the SVP, anyone who refuses to integrate or look for work should be refused assistance (SVP, 2015: 56). Likewise, the Finns Party claims that the structure of present immigration is weakening the level of services and the financial well-being of the welfare state (PS, 2015). Similarly, the AfD calls for the closure of German borders and an end to social-welfare access for people seeking asylum. “Merkel’s refugee policy will destroy our welfare state of the Federal Republic of Germany! We, as AfD, will make sure that this comes to an end. Because open borders do not work with a sustainable social state,” Weidel said in a campaign post (CNN, 2017b). Frank-Christian Hansel, parliamentary manager of the AfD in the Berlin State Parliament, said that “a social welfare state and open borders

do not go together” (CNBC, 2017b). Another example is Höcke’s remarks at a rally in October 2015: “With five million unemployed we bring millions of uneducated and illiterates into the country in order to employ them as wage pressers? That is the end of the welfare state and of social peace in this country! That is in fact a betrayal of our people!” (AfD Thuringia, 2015, cited in Kim 2017: 7). The party’s campaign posters defend the issue in these words: “Welfare state needs borders”, “Secure the borders. Protect the welfare state”, and “We are not the social welfare system of the world”.

The party’s election program for the 2014 EP election called for stricter immigration rules in order to prevent the “overwhelming of the social budget and the erosion of the welfare state” (AfD 2014, cited in Reher, 2017: 41). The party proclaimed in its 2014 program:

The German welfare state principle is at odds with the right of migrants to freely choose their place of residence as workers, the principle of non-discrimination, as well as the social inclusion of all citizens. In the long term there is the risk that the social services budget will not be able to handle this strain and that the welfare state will disintegrate (AfD 2014, cited in Geddes & Hadj-Abdou, 2016: 233).

#### **5. 4. Authoritarianism of the AfD**

As mentioned before, authoritarianism is a key element in PRR parties’ view of democracy and politics, which is the main topic of this section. Authoritarianism is “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely. In this interpretation, authoritarianism includes law and order and ‘punitive conventional moralism’” (Mudde, 2007: 23).

For the PRR, order is the basis of freedom. PRR parties believe that society should be structured according to strict rules. These parties call for tougher laws, effective and increased sentences, and consistent implementation. Most PRR parties call for the building of more prisons (Mudde, 2007: 145-147). For example, according to the Danish DF, preservation of law and order is of great importance in a society, and therefore there must be coherence between

crime and punishment (DF, 2002). The FPÖ expresses that, “law and order are fundamental values of our liberal ethos” (FPÖ, 2011). The FN’s Le Pen calls for tougher sentencing and 40,000 extra prison places (Smith, 2017).

The key issue of the authoritarian program of PRR parties is their zero tolerance policy on crime (Mudde, 2007: 146). For instance, the Finns Party states that punishment must be made more severe rather than more lenient (PS, 2011). The SVP calls for greater punishment for crimes involving violence. It also advocates the laws on juvenile crime should be tightened (SVP, 2015: 43-44). Similarly, the AfD promises to strengthen law enforcement and the judicial system in order to fight crime more effectively. In the words of the AfD, “it is appropriate to fully apply the criminal law devised for adults to all persons from the age of 18 years”. The party also wants to lower the age of criminal responsibility to 12 years (AfD, 2017: 24).

“We want to help the victims - not protect the criminals” is a prominent example of authoritarian claim of the PRR party family. For the PRR, victims should be at the centre of the legal system (Mudde, 2007: 147). For instance, the SVP demands that “the interests of victims be given consistently greater weight than those of the perpetrators” (SVP, 2015: 45). In similar vein, the AfD states in its program: “Protect victims, not offenders” (AfD: 2017: 25).

All PRR parties want more policemen, with better equipment and salaries, and greater competence (Mudde, 2007: 146). For example, the PVV pledges to allocate a lot of extra money for defence and police (PVV, 2016). Likewise, the PS advocates that the defence budget should be increased (PS, 2015). The FPÖ demands the best possible training and equipping of the bodies of the police force and the army (FPÖ, 2011). The UKIP also promises to spend a genuine two per cent of GDP on defence, plus £1 billion every year. Moreover, the UKIP pledges to fund 20,000 more police officers, 7,000 more prison officers, and 4,000 more border force staff (UKIP, 2017: 5). In similar vein, the AfD demands enhanced staffing plans and modernised equipment for policemen (AfD, 2017: 24).

The AfD calls for more police and security, especially when it comes to immigration. For the AfD, security is an indispensable requirement for freedom, independence, and prosperity. Its campaign poster defends the issue in these words: “No Passport – No Entry! Protect borders!” (see Figure 10). The party advocates “the establishment of a national German Border Police Force under the auspices of the German Federal Police”. According to the party, Germany should build protective fences or similar barriers to protect the border (AfD, 2017: 26). Similarly, the SVP states that Switzerland must control its borders systematically on its own. For this, the Swiss Border Guard must be equipped with the most technically advanced means of surveillance (SVP, 2015: 38). The DF mentions the need for a strong national defence, and secure and safe national borders (DF, 2002). The FN’s Le Pen wants to recruit an extra 6,000 frontier police (Smith, 2017). According to the UKIP, Britain must have full control of immigration and asylum policies, and border control (UKIP, 2017: 7). According to the PS, Finland must have a high degree of border control (PS, 2015).



“No Passport – No Entry! Protect borders!”

Figure 10. AfD Campaign Poster in the 2017 General Election Campaign

The AfD believes that there is a link between immigration and crime. “Millions of people from other cultural backgrounds, who do not have the skills needed for integration, are enticed to come to Germany on false promises. Disappointed hopes of prosperity carry the risk that many will turn to crime,” the party states, adding that because of a lack of border controls and mass immigration, “crime increases” (The Local, 2016a). According to the AfD, “the majority of offenders in the field of organised crime are foreign nationals” (AfD, 2017: 26).

PRR parties call for the expulsion of certain groups of nonnationals, mostly illegal aliens and criminal “foreigners” (sometimes including naturalized immigrants) (Mudde, 2007: 139). For example, the PVV advocates denaturalization and expulsion of criminals with a dual nationality (PVV, 2016). According to the PS, criminal immigrants must be deported to their home countries (PS, 2011). The SVP also calls for the consistent enforcement of the deportation of criminal foreigners (SVP, 2015: 45). According to the FPÖ, foreigners convicted of a crime in Austria must be deported to their homeland (FPÖ, 2011). In similar vein, the AfD states that “foreign criminals have to be repatriated expeditiously” (AfD, 2017: 25).

Several PRR parties defend citizens’ right to bear and use arms (Mudde, 2007: 146). For instance, the SVP demands an end to the harassment of gunnery. The SVP defends “the maintenance of autonomous, liberal weapons legislation” (SVP, 2015: 49). In similar vein, the AfD is strongly opposed to any limitation of the right to bear arms. The party expresses that “the state has to live with the fact that its citizens legally buy and own weapons” (AfD, 2017: 25).

Most PRR parties support compulsory military services (Mudde, 2007: 150). For example, the Finnish PS fully supports compulsory military service (PS, 2015). The FPÖ calls for general compulsory service for all male citizens (FPÖ, 2011). Similarly, the AfD considers military service to be the duty of all young men. Therefore, the party is in favour of the reinstatement of compulsory military service for all German males between the ages of 18 and 25 years (AfD,

2017: 31).

For many PRR parties the protection of the state requires not only a military struggle against an external enemy, but a cultural and political struggle against an internal enemy as well (Mudde, 2007: 150). In this regard, these parties mention ideological and practical vigilance against this enemy (e.g. Islamists). For example, the FN sees Islam as an ideological “enemy of France” (Independent, 2017b). Likewise, the PVV leader Wilders said, “Islam is not a religion, it is an ideology, the ideology of a retarded culture” (The Guardian, 2008). Similarly, the AfD sees Islam as a political ideology which harms Germany.

PRR parties call for a strengthening of the independence of the judiciary and police force. They want these institutions to be free from party political influence (Mudde, 2007: 146). They believe that the judiciary is controlled by their political opponents (Mudde, 2007: 155). Similarly, the AfD wants to limit the influence and power of political parties (AfD, 2017: 10). The AfD states that it wants to end the influence of political parties on the appointments and nominations of judges and prosecutors (AfD, 2017: 24). The party expresses that “the independence of the judiciary has to be expanded and strengthened” (AfD, 2017: 24). However, once in power the PRR’s emphasis on this independence disappears (Mudde, 2007: 155).

PRR parties emphasise the rule of law in theory, but their commitment is doubtful in practice (Mudde, 2007: 148). For instance, the FPÖ claims that they are committed to the rule of law (FPÖ, 2011). Similarly, the AfD states that “we believe in direct democracy, the separation of powers and the rule of law . . . as democracy and freedom are vested in our common cultural values and historical tradition (AfD, 2017: 5). There is no doubt that if the AfD rises to power, it will show its authoritarian face by forgetting its commitment to the rule of law.

PRR parties’ position on democracy is a prominent expression of their authoritarianism. PRR parties are (nominally) democratic, though they are at

odds with some aspects of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities (Mudde, 2007: 49). For example, in the words of the UKIP, “UKIP’s fundamental belief in radical democracy marks us out from the other parties” (UKIP, 2017: 58). Likewise, the FPÖ claims that it is committed to democracy (FPÖ, 2011). Similarly, the AfD argues that it represents true democracy. They declare themselves as “staunch supporters of democracy” (AfD, 2017: 5). The party states that it will fundamentally reform Germany “in the spirit of freedom and democracy” (AfD, 2017: 5). The AfD is hostile to representative democracy. Like PRR parties such as the SVP, the PVV, the DF, the FPÖ and the UKIP, it embraces methods of direct democracy like referenda. “The German people should have the right to vote on laws made by Parliament,” says the AfD (AfD, 2017: 8). The party states that issues including the constitutional amendment or putting into force an international treaty should be carried out with the direct approval of the German people (AfD, 2017: 8). It also advocates the direct election of the Federal President by the German people (AfD, 2017: 12).

Like most PRR parties, the AfD is against pluralism which is a principle of liberal democracy. In line with this understanding, it refuses political compromise. It demands radical solutions with regard to its core issues. For instance, Petry suggested that police “if need be” should threaten to shoot migrants seeking to enter the country (The Local, 2016a). AfD’s politician Pretzell also advocated the legitimacy of border control officers’ use of fire arms to prevent refugees (Zeit Online, 2015, cited in Jäckle & König, 2016: 5).

PRR parties have great difficulties with the concept of minority rights within “their” state (Mudde, 2007: 149). Similarly, the AfD does not attach importance to the protection of minority rights, which is fundamental value of representative democracy. The party is hostile to all kinds of ethnic minorities, immigrants, and refugees. According to the AfD, ethnic and religious minorities, immigrants and refugees pose a threat to German national identity. The party considers Muslims a big danger. Moreover, the AfD rejects criticisms on its

Islamophobia and says that it is freedom of expression (AfD, 2017: 48).

### **5. 5. Conclusion**

In this chapter, I analyse the populism, nativism, and authoritarianism of the AfD. I argue that the AfD displays a good combination of populism, nativism, and authoritarianism by pursuing a general-to-specific approach. By giving similar examples from other PRR parties such as the FPÖ, the PVV, the DF, the FN, the SVP, the PS, and the UKIP, I aim to show that the AfD is an example of a PRR party.

The significant point that the chapter demonstrated is the fact that the AfD tactically uses populist rhetoric to attract broader public support. As careful analysis of the program and propaganda of the AfD makes clear, populism is secondary to the AfD. The party's main policies are nativist policies, rather than the populist ones. Nativism plays a central role in the propaganda of the party. Authoritarianism also plays an important role in the ideology of the party. Authoritarian policies that the party advocates are directly linked to the nativist arguments of the party.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **WHAT THE RISE OF THE AfD MEANS FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE**

#### **6. 1. Introduction**

As the past chapters aim to display, the AfD is a unique case in many respects. Not least, it is historically hard for the PRR parties to win elections in Germany due to the historical legacy of Nazism and the joint efforts of Federal Constitutional Court and cross-party consensus in the country. However, the electoral success of the AfD shows that Germany is not immune to the PRR. In key EU member state such as Germany, where the PRR seems to have been unable to gain a substantial foothold, the rise of the AfD brings forward the question: What does the rise of the AfD mean for the future of Europe? This question is the main topic of this chapter.

#### **6. 2. What does the rise of the AfD mean for the future of Europe?**

The EU is facing a serious political challenge, exemplified by Germany's election. Across Europe, PRR parties are on the rise whereas social democratic parties are in crisis. The SPD, the CDU and the CSU which have dominated German politics for years lost support in the federal election. The AfD gained electoral profits through its PRR ideology.

Like other PRR parties, the AfD uses the politics of fear. In the face of fear, people want to feel safe. Since the AfD promised to ensure security and safety, the party increased its vote share in the recent German federal election, where the AfD became the third-strongest party in the Bundestag with 12.6% of the vote. After months of drawn-out coalition talks between the parties, the SPD

agreed to form “grand coalition” government with Merkel’s CDU. Hence, the AfD is now the main opposition party in the Bundestag.

As mentioned before, there are friends and foes for the AfD. The party uses ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric. The party is hostile to elites, mainstream media, homosexuals, all kinds of ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, and international structures like the EU. According to the AfD, these enemies are not with “the people”, they are against “us”. The party tries to divide the society. Thus, the AfD’s presence in the Bundestag will cause divisions to grow. For instance, discrimination against immigrants and refugees will probably rise. Violence against refugees and immigrants in Germany can escalate. The strength of the AfD boosts the probability of attacks on refugees and immigrants.

Migration is perceived by the AfD as a threat to national identity, culture, and welfare. The party’s anti-immigrant political discourses are of utmost importance as they influence both the general public’s perception of migration and the policies which regulate the act of migration. The rise of the AfD will cause great pressure on the government to make adjustments in German and European refugee and immigration policy. In order to minimize the AfD’s influence, the government in power will most probably adopt tighter rules on migration issues in the future.

Since the AfD has realized the political potential of the mass immigration from a predominantly Islamic region, Islamophobia lies at the heart of the AfD. The party perceives migration as a security issue, and conceives refugees as threats to their national security and European security. The party tries to establish connection between the immigration and the terrorist attacks. According to the party, refugees pose a danger to Europe, they are criminals, rapers and should be stopped from entering Europe.

This discrimination against Muslim refugees contributes to feelings of radicalization. The party’s Islamophobic and anti-immigrant political discourses and exclusionary migration policies may cause radicalization of refugees and

immigrants. Some of them who have Muslim background may generate a radical form of Islamist discourse. Hence, the party endangers national and European security when trying to “protect” Germany from Muslims.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the AfD is opposed to key features of liberal democracy. In this regard, AfD leaders are inspired by Hungary’s Victor Orban who is building an “illiberal democracy<sup>8</sup>” in Hungary. “The new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology the central element of state organisation, but instead includes a different, special, national approach,” Orban said in 2014 (Orban, 2014). Like Orban, the AfD politicians want to transform Germany into an illiberal democracy. Illiberal democrats want to shred the liberal values. They weaken institutional checks and balances, harass opposition, and use economic and legal pressure to domesticate the media. In illiberal democracy, there is no place for criticism. Illiberal democrats harass civil society and non-governmental organizations. Media outlets are used to disseminate their propaganda. Media outlets that criticise them are faced heavy sanctions and shutdown. In illiberal democracy, the rights of the minorities are suppressed. There is no place for academic freedom. Illiberal democrats want to undermine critical thinking. Since the purpose of the EU is to ensure peace and stability in Europe by furthering liberal democracy through economic integration, the AfD’s quarrel with liberal democracy is a serious threat to the European integration project which has provided a framework for peaceful resolution of political and economic differences in Europe. With the AfD’s presence in the parliament, the division between people who believe in openness and liberal democracy, and those who do not will grow.

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<sup>8</sup> The term “illiberal democracy” was used by Fareed Zakaria. Zakaria states that “democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms” (Zakaria, 1997: 22).

The AfD advocates the return to the nation state and the national identity and the rejection of the union. The party emphasises national values, national borders, and national interests. AfD politicians define themselves through their national identity. They have a strong anti-European sentiment and thus, they take pride in their own nation and national identity, rather than European identity. But, they mention the European identity when labelling Islam as the “other” of Europe. The party points an explicit enemy that must be hated and fought against: the refugees and migrants, particularly Muslim ones. Since the AfD uses European identity as a tool to increase hostility towards Muslim refugees and migrants, the AfD’s position is a real threat to the European integration project and “unity in diversity” motto.

It is important to note that the exclusionary discourse was used by the EU itself. For example, Jacques Delors, then European Commission president, said that “Europe was a product of Christianity, of Roman law and of Greek humanism” (de Vylder, 2008: 68). Commission of the European Communities in 1987 stated that:

The uniqueness of European culture, which emerges from the history of the diversity of regional and national cultures, constitutes the basic prerequisite for European Union (Commission of the European Communities 1987, cited in Stolcke, 2013: 69).

Another example of the EU’s exclusionary discourse is the Schengen Agreement, which calls non-EU citizens as ‘aliens’. In this regard, some scholars (Uğur 1995; Huysmans, 2000) argue that the EU has been constructing ‘Fortress Europe’, which refers to the state of immigration into the EU, where the free mobility of insiders is matched by an increasingly strict closure toward outsiders (Schlenker, 2015). According to Huysmans, the Schengen Agreement points that the European integration process is implicated in the development of a restrictive migration policy and the social construction of migration into a security question (Huysmans, 2000: 751).

The recent refugee crisis has showed that most of the EU countries demonstrated nationalist and protectionist tendencies. PRR parties across

Europe profited from the ineffectiveness of the EU to manage the refugee crisis and share the burden. Similarly, the issue of immigration and refugees was the number one issue in the German federal election. The AfD has expanded its room for manoeuvre because of the inability of the EU to agree on a common European refugee policy. Hence, the EU countries need to find solutions to shared problems. Otherwise, in the future there will be more support for PRR parties which campaign for an end to an “ever closer union” within the EU.

Whereas the CDU/CSU and the SPD are committed to European integration as Germany’s most important political framework, the AfD is against the supranational rules that form the basis of EU institutions. The party rejects a federal “United States of Europe”. The party defends a “Europe of Nation States” (AfD, 2017: 16). The party demands less EU and more power back to the nation states. The party sees the EU as a threat to national sovereignty and independence.

The AfD rejects a Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as a common European Foreign Service. The party rejects the idea of a combined European military force. The party is against the European Central Bank, the European Stability Mechanism, and the rescue policies of the EU. The party is opposed to the Euro monetary union. Since the AfD is opposed to the idea of “ever closer union”, the party does not want to deepen the European integration.

It comes as no surprise that the AfD rejects Turkey’s EU membership. The party uses European identity to object the membership of Turkey to the EU. According to the party, Turkey whose population is predominantly Muslim does not belong to Europe culturally and geographically. AfD’s position will likely reinforce the perception that the EU is a ‘Christian club’. AfD’s attitude towards countries branded as “non-European” casts a shadow upon the vision of an inclusive Europe.

The European Union is a cornerstone of European stability and prosperity. The rise of PRR parties like the AfD is feeding into a feeling of

scepticism about the future of the European Union. The widespread speculation is that the EU will disintegrate. In this regard, Brexit is given as an example that will accelerate the disintegration. British voters chose to reject European integration and leave the EU. Brexit campaign provides proof that PRR parties are real danger to the European project because the populist radical right UKIP's former leader Farage was the key figure in the Brexit victory. Immigration played a central role in the Brexit campaign. The leave vote was primarily driven by national identity and the desire to "take back control" from the EU. This implies an opposition to deep economic and political integration. Britain's vote to leave the EU has raised questions about the future stability of the EU. Some argue that the EU is now more likely to disintegrate. However, Brexit is not an indication for the disintegration of the EU. Britain has always remained distant from the EU. Britain has always been rather half-hearted about the EU. Britain is not already one of the six founding countries of the EU; the country became member state of the EU in 1973. In addition, many British people regret voting for Brexit because Brexit will lead to new barriers to trade and migration between the UK and the EU.

Some analysts view a complete dissolution of the EU as likely due to the rise of PRR parties. I believe that the EU will not disintegrate in the future. Instead, a possible scenario for the future of the EU will be 'multi-speed Europe'. Multi-speed Europe is one of the models of "differentiated integration". Differentiated integration is commonly defined as "a model of integration strategies that try to reconcile heterogeneity within the EU and allow different groupings of member states to pursue an array of public policies with different procedural and institutional arrangements" (Stubb, 1996: 283). 'Variable geometry', 'Concentric cycles' and 'Europe à la carte' are also some models of differentiated integration which often overlap.

Some member states seek an "ever closer union" through greater integration whereas some prefer to keep the EU on a more intergovernmental footing to better defend their national sovereignty. As a result, some EU member

states have opted out of certain aspects of integration. Multi-speed Europe is currently a reality within the EU: the Eurozone and the Schengen area. All EU member states are not members of the Eurozone and the Schengen area. 19 of the 28 EU member states use the Euro as their common currency. These countries are collectively known as the Eurozone. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden are not members of the Eurozone. Denmark and the UK have negotiated concessions in order to opt-out from taking part in the common currency. Similarly, 22 of the 28 EU member states are members of the Schengen area. There are also members of the Schengen area which are not EU member states: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. Four EU member states - Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania, and Croatia - are not yet fully-fledged members of the Schengen area. One EU member state - the Republic of Ireland - maintains opt-out. The United Kingdom which will leave the EU is not part of the Schengen area. The flood of migrants and refugees has raised doubt about open-borders. During their campaign, PRR parties have emphasised controls over borders, migration and security. For example, Viktor Orban refused any solidarity and proclaimed the demise of Schengen. I expect that more EU member states will implement their own domestic controls to protect their borders.

The French-German axis drove European integration forward in the past. The French-German axis can do so again. France's president, Emmanuel Macron, is in favour of greater European integration. However, Chancellor Angela Merkel has less manoeuvring room than she did previously. The AfD's success will most probably make her cautious when it comes to take decisions in issues related to the EU. The rise of the AfD will probably force Merkel to take further steps to stem immigration. If Merkel takes these steps, the AfD will most probably use this issue to prove its political power and success. The party will most likely argue that tight immigration policy is the result of the party's growing support and the consequent fear for electoral defeat by the mainstream parties.

Since Germany is the core member of the EU, the rise of the AfD will strengthen the prospect of multi-speed Europe for the future of the EU. Multi-speed Europe is the key factor that will enable the EU to maintain its dynamic structure. It provides to accommodate the heterogeneity of states' priorities. It allows the member states that want to deepen integration to move ahead. On the other hand, it respects the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further.

The following chapter, conclusion chapter, presents a summary of the main findings of the study.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **CONCLUSION**

PRR parties are becoming increasingly powerful political actors across Europe. Their electoral support is growing, their impact on policy-making is substantial, and in recent years several PRR parties have assumed office or supported minority governments. For example, the Freedom Party of Austria, the Netherlands' Party for Freedom, France's National Front, or the United Kingdom Independent Party are becoming influential in Europe. The Fidesz and the Law and Justice party (PiS) are already in power in Hungary and Poland.

Within these parties the AfD's rise in Germany is especially alarming since it raises questions about whether Germany has truly learned the lessons of its Nazi past. The party was established in 2013 with the primary aim of influencing the German government's policy on the euro, calling for the dissolution of the common currency. The party stood for more than just the dissolution of the euro. Since the founding of the party, it has advocated stricter immigration rules. With the refugee crisis of 2015, the party has increased its anti-immigration and anti-refugee position. The party has been the main political beneficiary of the refugee crisis and thus, the party has increased its popularity and support. As a result, the party entered the national parliament for the first time after taking 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 federal election. It was a stunning result for a party that was founded just four years ago.

The stunning success of the AfD has constituted the main focus of this thesis. This study has conducted an analysis of the populism, nativism, and authoritarianism (three core components of PRR parties) of the AfD and discussed what the rise of the AfD means for the future of Europe. The study has

argued that the AfD perfectly fits the description of the PRR party. In particular, it has claimed that the AfD's core ideology is nativism. The study has supported this argument with concrete examples from party documents, interviews, press statements, speeches, posters, slogans, and social media accounts. The study has analysed the party's standpoint on democracy; the European Union and the Euro; national security and justice; families and children; culture, language, and identity; immigration, integration, and asylum; foreign and security policy.

The study has analysed the populism of the AfD. It has tried to show that populism is secondary to the AfD. The party uses populism only as a tactic to attract voters. The key feature of the ideology of the party is nativism. In line with its nativism, the party feeds on the feeling of threatened German identity. As exemplified in the previous chapters, the AfD's party documents and campaign posters are certainly full of nativist statements. AfD politicians use nativist and offensive remarks towards nonnationals. The party believes that nonnational groups should be treated with hostility.

Many issues like economy, populism, or gender relations are secondary to the party. The party instrumentalize these issues to pursue its primary nativist agenda. The main motivation of the AfD is based on cultural concerns especially in case of migration issue. According to the party, the purity of the nation must be preserved. It is the nativist policies that are advocated first and foremost by the party, rather than the populist ones. Tight immigration policy, strictly integration measures and authoritarian policies are vehemently defended by the party.

In line with its nativism, the AfD sees immigrants and refugees as multifaceted threats: cultural, religious, security, economic, and political (Mudde, 2012: 9-12). The predominant frame is cultural for the AfD. Immigrants and refugees are seen as a threat to the cultural homogeneity of the Germans. According to the party, Germany belongs to the Germans and other ethnic groups can only live there if they accept the Germans' dominance. For the party, German culture must be leading culture and must be preserved. Consequently, the party

rejects an ideal of a multicultural society. A religious frame accompanies the cultural one. Especially after 9/11, Muslim immigrants and refugees became the most serious threat for PRR parties. The AfD has a virulent anti-Muslim stance. Islam is the main enemy for the party. According to the party, “Islam does not belong to Germany” and “Islam is incompatible with German culture”. AfD politicians claim that Islam is not a religion. The party wants to “protect” Germany from Islam.

With regard to security frame, according to the AfD, there is a connection between immigration and crime. The party further claims that there is a clear link between Islam and terrorism. The party sharply criticises Merkel’s refugee policies because it believes that these policies encourage terrorism. Regarding the economic frame, the AfD depicts immigrants and refugees as a financial burden to Germany. For the party, they are draining social benefits and taking jobs away from the natives. According to the party, the welfare state should be at the service of the German nation. The party calls for the closure of German borders and an end to social-welfare access for people seeking asylum. The party believes that Merkel’s refugee policy destroys welfare state of Germany. Regarding the political frame, the AfD sees immigrants and refugees as mere tools of sinister political forces. According to the AfD’s conspiracy theory, political parties currently in government allow mass-migration, mainly from Islamic states, to compensate for low German birth-rates. The party believes that these political parties are selling out the interests of the German people to strengthen their own position.

The party believes that society should be structured according to strict rules and that the rule of law should be upheld at all costs. The party advocates tougher laws and increased sentences. According to the party, victims should be protected, not offenders. The party calls for more police and security, especially when it comes to immigration. It calls for “more safety, less immigration”.

As discussed in this study, the PRR ideology that the AfD stands for, and the rise of the AfD in Germany, the EU’s core member state, have a meaning for

the future of the European project. As scrutinised in the previous chapters, the AfD is in favour of the return to the nation state and the national identity. The party believes that Germany has to give priority to its own national, rather than international, interests. In this regard, the party is against the supranational rules that form the basis of EU institutions. The party believes that the EU membership undermines national sovereignty and independence. Therefore, the PRR ideology that the party adopts is a serious threat to the European project. The core ideology of the party, nativism, is in sharp contrast to European integration. The party's interpretation of democracy, which stands in tension with fundamental principles of liberal democracy such as pluralism and protection of minority rights, also poses a great challenge to the European project.

The AfD's success is not limited with the election success. The party has a great impact on the mainstream parties. It has pushed mainstream parties to the right. The party has affected not only German politics but also European politics. A good example in this respect is Alternative for Sweden (AfS) which is a new political party established by Gustav Kasselstrand, former senior member of the PRR Sweden Democrats.

Primarily due to the ineffectiveness of the EU to manage the refugee crisis, not only AfD but also other PRR parties are becoming influential in many countries of Europe. The EU countries have shifted the burden to frontline countries rather than taking common responsibility for managing the flood of migrants and refugees into Europe. Some EU member states have expressed that their country can only accept Christian refugees and some have defended barbed wire fences to prevent refugees fleeing from oppression and persecution. Therefore, the dividedness of EU countries on the refugee crisis gave PRR parties the opportunity to consolidate their position. These parties use the politics of fear to gain electoral profits. They justify their arguments through the idea of security and protection for their citizens.

They pose a threat not only to the fundamental values within the country that the party is located, but also to the European values of peace, freedom,

democracy, justice, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Furthermore, the political discourse of the PRR parties has become embedded in the mainstream. The rise of their political discourse casts a shadow upon pluralistic democracies and peace in Europe.

PRR parties' quarrel with key features of liberal democracy also poses a great challenge to the European project. Leaders of PRR parties in Hungary and Poland have been constructing illiberal states within the EU. Illiberal democrats from Geert Wilders in the Netherlands to Marine Le Pen in France are inspired by Hungary's Victor Orban. They have become a serious threat to the European integration project. The EU must work to improve democracies in the member states and must not tolerate the decline of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland. If the EU does not take a stand against illiberal democrats, they will spread their ideology across Europe.

The PRR parties demand to "regain control over national borders" and to ignore European rules on human rights. Since they take anti-EU stance, the rise of the PRR parties is feeding into a feeling of scepticism about the future of the EU. Some analysts claim that the EU will disintegrate due to the challenges it is facing. I believe that the EU will not disintegrate in the future. Instead, a possible scenario for the future of the EU will be 'multi-speed Europe'. The rise of the AfD strengthens this idea. Multi-speed Europe provides that willing EU member states can go further and deepen their cooperation in certain areas. It also respects the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further.

The EU needs to defend its values more than ever and more strongly than ever so as to fight against xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism, discrimination, illiberal democracy, intolerance, and terrorism. It is important to embrace the diversity of cultures and religions. It is of great significance to prevent the negative discourse against migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers that feeds radical tendencies. The EU needs to take effective measures in compliance with its "unity in diversity" motto to confront these trends. The EU should not tolerate PRR politicians. As a locomotive of the EU, Germany needs to learn the lessons

from its Nazi past because Europe and Germany have suffered too much from Nazism. Against the PRR ideology that the AfD stands for, Germany needs to defend human rights strongly. The country needs to emphasise harmony between people belonging to different religious and ethnic origins. It is essential to resist the AfD's political arguments. Instead of hate and fear, understanding and respect should prevail.

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## APPENDICES

### A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKCÖ ÖZET

Popülist radikal sağ partiler, Avrupa çapında giderek daha etkili siyasal aktörler haline gelmektedirler. Bu partilerin seçmen desteği artmaktadır, politika oluşturma üzerindeki etkileri önem kazanmaktadır ve son yıllarda bu partilerin birkaçı iktidara yükselmiştir. Mudde (2007) tarafından ileri sürüldüğü gibi bu partilerin temel özellikleri olan popülizm, yerlilik ve otoriterizm, yalnızca bu partilerin bulunduğu ülkenin içindeki temel değerlere yönelik ciddi bir tehdit oluşturmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda barış, özgürlük, demokrasi, adalet, eşitlik, hukukun üstünlüğü ve insan haklarına saygı gibi Avrupa değerlerine de tehdit oluşturmaktadır. Bu partiler, liberal demokrasinin çoğulculuk ve azınlıkların korunması gibi ilkelerine de tehlike oluşturmaktadırlar.

Son yıllarda, Avrupa siyaseti Fransa'da Ulusal Cephe, Avusturya'da Avusturya Özgürlük Partisi, Hollanda'da Özgürlük Partisi, Danimarka'da Danimarka Halk Partisi, İsviçre'de İsviçre Halk Partisi, Birleşik Krallık'ta Birleşik Krallık Bağımsızlık Partisi, Finlandiya'da Fin Partisi, İtalya'da Kuzey Ligi, Polonya'da Hukuk ve Adalet Partisi, Macaristan'da Macar Yurttaş Birliği, Letonya'da Ulusal İttifak, İsveç'te İsveç Demokratları ve son olarak bu tezin ana odağını oluşturan Almanya'da Almanya için Alternatif (AfD) gibi popülist radikal sağ partilerin ortaya çıkışına ve yükselişine şahit olmuştur.

Bu çerçevede, AfD'nin siyasal yelpazede nasıl sınıflandırabileceği ve AfD'nin yükselişinin Avrupa'nın geleceği için ne anlama geldiği bu tezin araştırma sorusunu oluşturmaktadır. Parti programlarının, parti yetkililerinin açıklamaları ile konuşmalarının ve partinin internetteki varlığının incelenerek, 2013 ve 2018 yılları arasındaki altı yıllık süre içinde AfD'nin popülizm, yerlilik ve otoriterizminin analiz edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır.

Bu tez, AfD'nin popülist radikal sağ söylemini nasıl kurduğunu araştırarak popülist radikal sağ konusundaki literatüre katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. 2013'de kurulduğu ve yeni bir örnek oluşturduğu için AfD hakkında literatürde kısıtlı bir çalışma olduğu görülmektedir. Bu nedenle AfD'nin detaylı bir analizi yapılarak literatüre katkıda bulunmak amaçlanmıştır.

AfD'nin örnek olarak seçilmesinin altındaki nedenler çeşitlidir. İlk olarak, Almanya Avrupa Birliği'nin altı kurucu ülkesinden biridir. Almanya, Avrupa Birliği'nin lokomotif konumunda olduğu için AfD'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne karşı aldığı tavrın dikkatle incelenmesi önem taşımaktadır. Almanya'da ilk defa seçmenlerin önemli bir kısmı Brüksel'den güçlerini geri almayı ve ulusal egemenliği geri kazanmayı savunan bir partiyi desteklemiştir. Almanya Avrupa'nın geleceğini şekillendirmede önemli bir liderlik rolü oynadığından, AfD'nin yükselişi Avrupa projesinin geleceği için bir anlam ifade etmektedir.

İkinci olarak, AfD, Alman vatandaşları tarafından algılanan hayal kırıklığından yararlanarak desteğini kademeli olarak artırmıştır. Parti, Eylül 2013'deki federal seçimlerde yüzde 4.7 oy toplamıştır. 2014'deki Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerinde yüzde 7.1 oy alarak Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda 7 sandalyeye sahip olmuştur. Parti 2016 eyalet seçimlerinde Saksonya-Anhalt'ta ikinci parti ve Baden-Württemberg ve Rheinland-Pfalz'da üçüncü parti olmuştur. 24 Eylül 2017'de yapılan son federal seçimlerde tarihi bir başarı elde eden parti, oyların yüzde 12.6'sını kazanmıştır. Bu, 2013'teki son seçime göre yüzde 7.9'luk bir artış anlamına gelmektedir. Sonuç olarak, Federal Meclis'e girmeyi başaran parti, meclisteki en büyük üçüncü parti olmuştur. Elli yıldan fazla bir süreden beri meclise girmeyi başaran ilk aşırı sağ parti olan AfD'nin meclisteki varlığı, Alman siyasetinde yeni bir dönemin başlangıcını temsil etmektedir.

Üçüncü olarak, Nazizm'in tarihsel mirası nedeniyle Alman siyasetinde aşırı sağa karşı belirli bir hassasiyet vardır. Partiler arası uzlaşma ve Alman Anayasa Mahkemesi, aşırı sağ partilerin yayılmasını başarıyla sınırlandırmıştır

(Öner, 2014: 98). Dolayısıyla AfD'nin bu sistem içinde yükselbilmesi önem kazanmaktadır.

Son olarak, 1990'lardan beri göç, entegrasyon ve vatandaşlık meselesi Alman siyasetinde daha önemli hale gelmiştir (Öner, 2014: 94). Bu bağlamda, son mülteci krizi Alman siyasetini güçlü bir şekilde etkilemiştir.

Bu nedenler ışığında çalışmada örnek olarak seçilen AfD'nin popülizm, yerlilik ve otoriterizmi bir araya getirdiği ve böylece popülist radikal sağ partinin tanımına tam olarak uyduğu, bu tezin ana iddiasını oluşturmaktadır. İlk olarak partinin popülizmi analiz edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada benimsenen tanıma göre popülizm, “toplumu temel olarak ‘pürüpak halk’a, karşı ‘yozlaşmış elitler’ olarak iki homojen ve birbirine düşman gruba ayrılmış olarak gören zayıf merkezli bir ideolojidir; ve siyasetin toplumun genel iradesinin bir yansıması olması gerektiğini ileri sürer” (Mudde, 2007: 23). AfD’de de toplumu “pürüpak halk” ve “yozlaşmış elitler” olarak iki farklı gruba ayırdığından, bir ideoloji olarak popülizm yaklaşımının AfD’yi anlamada diğer popülizm yaklaşımlarına göre daha uygun olduğu düşünülmektedir. Mudde’nin ortaya koyduğu popülizm tanımına göre popülizm zayıf merkezli bir ideoloji olduğundan kolaylıkla diğer farklı ideolojilerle biraraya gelebilmektedir (Mudde, 2004: 544). Bu çerçevede AfD’nin popülizminin, yerlilik ve otoriterizm ile biraraya geldiği görülmektedir. Bu yüzden partinin popülizmi yalnızca “halk” ve “elitler” arasındaki düşmanlığı ifade etmekle kalmamakta, aynı zamanda “ötekilerin” dışlanmasını da mümkün kılmaktadır. Göçmenler, mülteciler, eşcinseller, ana akım medya ve AB gibi uluslararası yapılar partinin “ötekilerini” oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, AfD’nin popülist söylemi, Angela Merkel’in mültecilere yönelik uyguladığı açık kapı politikasından kaynaklanan memnuniyetsizliği körüklemek için bir taktik olarak kullandığı iddia edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla popülizm AfD’nin ideolojisinin özünü oluşturmamakta, partinin kendi yerlici argümanlarını savunurken kullandığı bir araç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

İkinci olarak AfD'nin yerliciği analiz edilmiştir. Mudde, yerliciliği “devletlerin içinde yalnızca yerli grubun üyelerinin yaşaması gerektiğini ve yerli olmayan unsurların homojen ulus devlete temel olarak tehdit oluşturduğunu savunan bir ideoloji” olarak tanımlamaktadır (Mudde, 2007: 22). Bu çalışmada, yerliciliğin AfD'nin ideolojisinin özünü oluşturduğu savı ileri sürülmektedir. Partinin temel motivasyonu, özellikle göç konusunda kültürel kaygılara dayanmaktadır. Parti, “Alman olmak ve Alman kalmak” istediğini ve çokkültürlülüğe karşı olduğunu dile getirmektedir (AfD, 2017: 5). Bu çalışmada, partinin kampanya posterlerinin, sloganlarının, politikacılarının kullandığı ifadelerin ve partinin sosyal medyada kullandığı dilin yerlici argümanlarla dolu olduğu görülmüştür.

AfD'nin göçmen ve mülteci karşıtı duruşu partinin temel ideolojisi olan yerliciliğin göstergesidir. “Kitlesele göç yerine daha çok Alman çocuk” gibi sloganlar kullanan parti, yerli Alman nüfus içinde doğum oranlarının artmasını savunmaktadır. Kadınları daha çok çocuk sahibi olmaları için teşvik etmek istemektedir. Parti, göçmenlere atfen “Yeni Almanlar? Biz kendimiz yaparız” başlıklı seçim afişi hazırlamıştır. Partinin eski lideri Frauke Petry, “Polis yasadışı yollarla ülkeye giren sığınmacıları gerekirse vurmali” diyecek kadar ileri gitmiştir (The Local, 2016a).

AfD, göçmenleri ve mültecileri kültürel, dini, ekonomik ve siyasi açılardan ve güvenlik açısından tehdit olarak görmektedir (Mudde, 2012: 9-12). Baskın çerçeve AfD için kültürel dir. Göçmenler ve mülteciler, Almanların kültürel homojenliği için bir tehdit olarak görülmektedir. AfD'ye göre Alman kültürünün lider kültür olması ve korunması gerekmektedir. Dini çerçeve kültürel olana eşlik etmektedir. AfD, Müslüman karşıtı bir duruş sergilemektedir. Parti için, bugün ana tehdit İslam'dan kaynaklanmaktadır. Parti, Almanya'yı İslam'tan “korumak” istemektedir. Burka, başörtüsü, minareler ve ezanın yasaklanmasını savunmaktadır. Partinin bazı politikacıları İslam'ı bir din olarak bile görmemekte, “siyasal bir ideoloji” olarak adlandırmaktadırlar. “İslam'ın Almanya'ya ait olmadığı” sloganını benimseyen AfD, “İslam?

Mutfağımıza uymuyor”, “İslamlaşmayı durdur” ve “Burka? Biz bikini seviyoruz” gibi seçim afişleri kullanmıştır.

Güvenlik çerçevesi ile ilgili olarak, AfD göç ve suç arasında bir bağlantı olduğuna inanmaktadır. Hatta daha da ileri giderek İslam ve terörizm arasında açık bir bağlantı olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Merkel’in mülteci politikalarını sert bir şekilde eleştiren AfD, bu politikaların terörizmi teşvik ettiğine inanmaktadır. Ekonomik çerçeve ile ilgili olarak, parti göçmenleri ve mültecileri Almanya’ya mali yük olarak görmektedir. Onların toplumsal faydayı tükettiklerini ve yerlilerin işlerini ellerinden aldıklarını savunmaktadır. Siyasi çerçeve ile ilgili olarak, AfD göçmenleri ve mültecileri “yozlaşmış” siyasi güçlerin araçları olarak görmektedir. Parti, bu siyasi güçlerin kendi konumlarını güçlendirmek için Alman halkının çıkarlarını sattığını iddia etmektedir.

AfD’nin yerlici ideolojisinin bir başka göstergesi, ulusal çıkarların uluslararası çıkarların önüne konması gerektiğine yaptığı vurgudur. Buradan hareketle parti, Avrupa Birliği’ne karşı bir tavır almıştır. Avrupa Birliği’nin temel olarak bir reforma uğraması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği içinde “egemen ulus devletlerin oluşturduğu” temeline dayanan bir reform gerçekleşmediği takdirde, Almanya’nın Avrupa Birliği’nden ayrılması gerektiği inancını taşımaktadır (AfD, 2017: 15). Bunun yanısıra, Almanya’nın “bir felakete yol açmış olan” Euro’dan ayrılması gerektiğini savunmaktadır.

Partinin ekonomi politikası da yerlici argümanlara dayanmaktadır. Merkel’in mülteci politikasının refah devletini yıkıma uğrattığını savunan AfD’ye göre, ekonomi daima ulusun hizmetinde olmalıdır. Alman parası Alman çıkarları için kullanılmalıdır. Parti, Alman sınırlarının kapatılması ve sığınma talebinde bulunan insanlara sosyal-refah erişiminin sona erdirilmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Parti, “Refah devletinin sınırlara ihtiyacı var”, “Sınırların emniyetini sağla, refah devletini koru” ve “Biz dünyanın sosyal refah sistemi değiliz” gibi başlıklara sahip seçim afişleri kullanmıştır.

Üçüncü olarak, AfD'nin otoriterizmi analiz edilmiştir. Otoriterizmde otorite ihlalleri ciddi bir şekilde cezalandırılır. Toplum sıkı bir şekilde düzenlenir (Mudde, 2007: 23). AfD'de de toplumun sıkı bir şekilde düzenlenmesi ve cezaların artması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Parti, kanun ve düzen vaat etmektedir. Daha iyi ekipman, maaş ve daha fazla yetkinlik ile donatılmış daha çok polis olması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Parti, özellikle göç konusunda, daha fazla polis ve güvenlik olması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Partiye göre Almanya, sınırı korumak için koruyucu çitler veya benzeri engeller inşa etmelidir (AfD, 2017: 26). Sınır kontrolü eksikliğinin ve göçün, suçu artırdığını savunan AfD'ye göre, "organize suç alanında suçluların çoğu yabancı uyrukludur" (AfD, 2017: 26). Bu yüzden, AfD, "yabancı suçluların süratle ülkelerine geri gönderilmesi gerektiğini" savunmaktadır (AfD, 2017: 25).

AfD'nin demokrasi anlayışı popülist, yerlici ve otoriter demokrasinin bir bileşimidir (Mudde, 2007: 138). Popülist demokrasi anlayışı çerçevesinde parti, doğrudan demokrasinin yöntemlerini benimsemektedir. Parti, "halkın genel iradesine" ancak doğrudan demokrasi yoluyla ulaşılabileceğine inanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, AfD referandumu savunmaktadır. Cumhurbaşkanının gücünü artırmak için doğrudan halk tarafından seçilmesi gerektiğine inanmaktadır (AfD, 2017: 12). Yerlici demokrasi anlayışı çerçevesinde, AfD çokkültürlülüğe karşı çıkarak Alman kültürünü baskın kültür olarak savunmaktadır. "Almanlar için Almanya", partinin politikacılarının kullandığı sloganlardan biridir. Parti, kültürel azınlıklar özellikle Müslümanlar için özel olanakların sunulmasına karşı çıkmaktadır. Minarelerin ve ezanın yasaklanması gerektiğini savunan AfD, Almanya'daki camilerin yabancı finansmanını da sonlandırmak istemektedir (AfD, 2017: 48). Otoriter demokrasi anlayışı çerçevesinde, kanun ve düzene vurgu yapan parti, toplumun katı kurallara göre yapılandırılması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Suçlular yerine kurbanların korunması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Suçlular için daha sert yasalar ve artırılmış cezalar talep etmektedir. Tüm bunlar ışığında partinin demokrasi anlayışının, liberal demokrasinin çoğulculuk ve azınlık haklarının korunması gibi ilkeleriyle bağdaşmadığı görülmektedir.

Bu tezde gösterilmeye çalışıldığı gibi AfD birçok açıdan önemli bir örnek oluşturmaktadır. Nazizm'in tarihsel mirasından dolayı Almanya'da popülist radikal sağ partilerin seçimlerde başarı elde etmesi zordur. Bunun yanısıra, Alman Anayasa Mahkemesi ve partiler arası uzlaşmanın aşırı sağ partilerin yayılmasını önlemedeki başarısı göz önüne alındığında AfD'nin elde ettiği başarının Almanya siyaseti için benzersiz bir örnek olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. AfD'nin seçim başarısı Almanya'nın popülist radikal sağa karşı bağışık olmadığını göstermektedir. Popülist radikal sağın şu ana kadar önemli bir yer edinemediği Almanya'da AfD'nin yükselişi, 'bu yükseliş Avrupa'nın geleceği için ne ifade ediyor?' sorusunu gündeme getirmektedir.

Avrupa Birliği, Almanya seçiminin de ortaya koyduğu gibi ciddi bir siyasi meydan okuma ile karşı karşıyadır. Avrupa genelinde, popülist radikal sağ partiler yükselirken, sosyal demokrat partilerin krizde olduğu görülmektedir. Alman siyasetine yıllardır hakim olan Sosyal Demokrat Parti (SPD), Hristiyan Demokrat Birlik (CDU) ve Hristiyan Sosyal Birlik (CSU) federal seçimlerde destek kaybetmiştir. AfD ise son seçime kıyasla oy oranını arttırmıştır.

AfD'nin korku siyasetini kullandığı görülmüştür. Korku karşısında insanlar kendilerini güvende hissetmek istedikleri için güvenliği sağlayacağı sözünü veren AfD destek görmüştür ve seçimlerden üçüncü parti olarak çıkmayı başarmıştır. Aylar süren koalisyon görüşmelerinden sonra SPD'nin CDU ile koalisyon kurmaya karar vermesiyle AfD, ana muhalafet partisi konumuna sahip olmuştur.

AfD için dostlar ve düşmanlar vardır. Parti, "biz ve onlar" söylemini kullanmaktadır. Parti, elitlere, ana akım medyaya, eşcinsellere, göçmenlere, mültecilere ve Avrupa Birliği gibi uluslararası yapılara karşı düşmanlık beslemektedir. Partiye göre, bu düşmanlar "halk" ile birlikte olmadıkları için "bize" karşıdırlar. Parti "biz ve onlar", "dostlar ve düşmanlar" gibi söylemleriyle toplumu bölmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu yüzden partinin parlamentodaki varlığı bu bölünmelerin büyümesine neden olacaktır. Göçmenlere ve mültecilere karşı ayrımcılığın ve şiddetin artacağı öngörülebilir.

Göç, parti tarafından ulusal kimlik, kültür ve refah için bir tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır. Partinin göçmen karşıtı politik söylemleri, hem kamuoyunun göç algısını hem de göçü düzenleyen politikaları etkileyebileceği için son derece önemlidir. Partinin yükselişi, Almanya ve Avrupa'nın mülteci ve göçmen politikasında düzenleme yapması konusunda hükümete büyük baskı yapmasına neden olacaktır. AfD'nin etkisini en aza indirmek için, iktidardaki hükümet büyük olasılıkla göç konularında daha sıkı kurallar benimseyecektir.

AfD, nüfusunun çoğu Müslüman olan bir bölgeden Avrupa'ya gerçekleşen kitlesel göçün politik potansiyelinin farkında olduğundan İslamofobi partinin merkezinde yer almaktadır. Göçü bir güvenlik sorunu olarak algılayan parti, mültecileri ulusal güvenliğine ve Avrupa'nın güvenliğine tehdit olarak görmektedir. Göç ve terör saldırıları arasında bağlantı olduğuna inanmaktadır. Mültecileri potansiyel suçlular olarak görmektedir.

Müslüman mültecilere yönelik bu ayrımcılık, radikalleşme duygularına katkıda bulunabilir. Partinin İslamofobik ve göçmen karşıtı politik söylemleri ve dışlayıcı göç politikaları mültecilerin ve göçmenlerin radikalleşmesine neden olabilir. Bazı Müslüman kökenli mülteciler radikal İslamcı bir söylem benimseyebilirler. Dolayısıyla parti, Almanya'yı Müslümanlardan "korumaya" çalışırken ulusal ve Avrupa güvenliğini tehlikeye atıyor olabilir.

Liberal demokrasinin bazı temel prensiplerine karşı çıkan AfD'nin liderlerinin Macaristan'da "illiberal demokrasiyi"<sup>9</sup> kurduğunu söyleyen başbakan Victor Orban'dan ilham aldığı görülmektedir. Orban gibi, AfD politikacıları da Almanya'yı illiberal demokrasiye dönüştürmek istemektedirler. İlliberal demokratlar liberal değerleri parçalamak isterler. Denge ve fren mekanizmasını zayıflatırlar, muhalefete rahat vermezler ve medyayı kendilerine bağlamak için ekonomik ve yasal baskı uygularlar. İlliberal demokraside

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<sup>9</sup> İlliberal demokrasi terimi, Fareed Zakaria tarafından kullanılmıştır. Buna göre, "çok defa referandum yoluyla yeniden seçilen veya tasdik edilen demokratik olarak seçilmiş rejimler rutin biçimde iktidarları üzerindeki anayasal sınırları görmezden geliyorlar ve vatandaşlarını temel hak ve hürriyetlerinden mahrum ediyorlar" (Zakaria, 1997: 22).

eleştiriye yer yoktur. İliberal demokratlar sivil toplumu ve sivil toplum örgütlerini rahatsız ederler. Medya kuruluşlarını propagandalarını yaymak için kullanırlar. Onları eleştiren medya kuruluşları, ağır yaptırımlar ve kapatılma ile karşı karşıya kalır. İliberal demokraside, azınlıkların hakları bastırılır. Akademik özgürlüğe yer yoktur, illiberal demokratlar eleştirel düşünceyi zayıflatmak isterler. Avrupa Birliği'nin amacı, ekonomik entegrasyon yoluyla liberal demokrasiyi ilerleterek Avrupa'da barışı ve istikrarı sağlamak olduğundan, AfD'nin liberal demokrasi ile olan kavgası, Avrupa'daki siyasi ve ekonomik farklılıkların barışçıl çözümü için bir çerçeve sunan Avrupa entegrasyon projesi için ciddi bir tehdit oluşturmaktadır. AfD'nin parlamentodaki varlığı ile, açıklığa ve liberal demokrasiye inanan insanlar ile inanmayanlar arasındaki bölünme büyüyecektir.

AfD ulus devleti ve ulusal kimliği savunmaktadır. Parti ulusal değerleri, ulusal sınırları ve ulusal çıkarları vurgulamaktadır. AfD'nin politikacıları kendilerini ulusal kimlikleriyle tanımlamaktadırlar. Avrupa Birliği'ne karşı bir tavır sergilemektedirler. Bu yüzden Avrupa kimliğinden ziyade kendi ulusları ve ulusal kimlikleriyle gurur duymaktadırlar. Fakat, İslamı Avrupa'nın "ötekisi" olarak etiketlerken Avrupa kimliğinden bahsetmektedirler. Parti, mülteci ve göçmenleri, özellikle Müslüman olanları nefret edilmesi ve savaşılması gereken açık bir düşman olarak işaret etmektedir. AfD, Avrupa kimliğini Müslüman mültecilere ve göçmenlere karşı düşmanlığı artırmak için bir araç olarak kullandığı için, AfD'nin pozisyonu Avrupa entegrasyon projesi ve "çeşitlilik içinde birlik" sloganı için gerçek bir tehdit oluşturmaktadır.

AfD'nin kullandığı dışlayıcı söylem yeni bir şey değildir. Bu dışlayıcı söylemin Avrupa Birliği'nin kendisi tarafından da kullanıldığı görülmüştür. Örneğin, 1989'da zamanın Avrupa Komisyonu başkanı Jacques Delors, "Avrupa'nın Hristiyanlığın, Roma hukukunun ve Yunan hümanizminin bir ürünü olduğunu" söylemiştir (de Vylder, 2008: 68). Schengen Anlaşmasında da bu dışlayıcı söylemin kullanıldığı görülmüştür. Tüm bunlar, Avrupa Birliği'nin

iç sınırları geçirgen hale gelen ancak dış sınırları ‘yabancılara’ kapalı olan Kale Avrupası’nı (Fortress Europe) inşa ettiği tartışmalarını gündeme getirmiştir.

Son olarak yaşanan mülteci krizinde de Avrupa Birliği ülkeleri bölünmüş ve ortak bir tutum sergileyememişlerdir. Avrupa genelinde popülist radikal sağ partilerin, Avrupa Birliği’nin mülteci krizini yönetme ve yük paylaşımını gerçekleştirme konusunda etkisiz kalmasından yararlandığı görülmüştür. Göç ve mülteciler meselesi, Almanya seçimlerinde de bir numaralı konu olmuştur. AfD, Avrupa Birliği’nin ortak bir Avrupa mülteci politikası üzerinde anlaşamaması nedeniyle manevra alanını genişletmiştir. Bu yüzden, Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin ortak sorunlara çözüm bulmalarının gerekliliği ortaya çıkmıştır. Aksi takdirde, Avrupa Birliği karşıtı tutum sergileyen popülist radikal sağ partiler gelecekte desteklerini arttırma fırsatı bulacaklardır.

CDU/CSU ve SPD, Avrupa entegrasyonuna bağlı iken, AfD, Avrupa Birliği kurumlarının temelini oluşturan uluslarüstü kurallara karşıdır. Parti federal bir “Avrupa Birleşik Devletleri”ni reddetmektedir. Parti, “Ulus Devletler Avrupası”ni savunmaktadır (AfD, 2017: 16). Avrupa Birliği’ni ulusal egemenliklerine tehdit olarak gören parti, daha az Avrupa Birliği ve daha çok güçlü ulus devletler olmasını istemektedir.

AfD, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası’nı reddetmektedir. Parti, birleşik bir Avrupa askeri gücü fikrini reddetmektedir. Parti, Avrupa Merkez Bankası, Avrupa İstikrar Mekanizması ve Avrupa Birliği’nin nin kurtarma politikalarına karşıdır. Parti, Euro’nun kullanılmasına karşıdır. “Daha yakın bir birlik” (“ever closer union”) fikrine karşı olduğundan Avrupa bütünleşmesinin derinleşmesini istememektedir.

AfD’nin Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine karşı çıkması da şaşırtıcı değildir. Türkiye’nin üyeliğine karşı çıkmak için Avrupa kimliğini kullanmaktadır. Partinin anlayışına göre, nüfusunun çoğunluğu Müslüman olan Türkiye, kültürel ve coğrafi olarak Avrupa’ya ait değildir. AfD’nin bu tutumu, Avrupa Birliği’nin bir “Hristiyan kulübü” olduğu yönündeki algıyı

kuvvetlendirebilecektir. AfD'nin "Avrupalı olmayan" olarak etiketlediği ülkelere yönelik tutumu, kapsayıcı bir Avrupa vizyonuna gölge düşürmektedir.

Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa istikrarı ve refahının köşe taşıdır. AfD gibi popülist radikal sağ partilerin yükselişi, Avrupa Birliği'nin geleceği konusundaki şüpheyi beslemektedir. Yaygın spekülasyona göre, Avrupa Birliği gelecekte dağılacaktır. Bu anlamda, Brexit dağılmayı hızlandıracak gelişmeye örnek olarak verilmektedir. Brexit ile seçmenler Avrupa entegrasyonunu reddetmeyi ve Avrupa Birliği'nden ayrılmayı seçmişlerdir. Brexit kampanyası, popülist radikal sağ partilerin entegrasyon projesi için gerçek bir tehlike oluşturduğunun kanıtıdır çünkü popülist radikal sağ UKIP'in o dönemdeki lideri Farage, Brexit zaferinin en önemli figürüdür. Göç, Brexit kampanyasında merkezi bir rol oynamıştır. Ayrılmayı savunanlar ulusal kimliğe ve Avrupa Birliği'nden "kontrolü geri alma" arzusuna vurgu yapmışlardır. Birleşik Krallık'ın Avrupa Birliği'ni terk etme yönündeki kararı, Birlik'in gelecekteki istikrarı konusunda soru işaretleri doğurmuştur. Bazıları AB'nin artık dağılma olasılığının daha yüksek olduğunu savunmuştur. Ancak Brexit, AB'nin dağılacağına bir göstergesi değildir. Birleşik Krallık, her zaman AB'ye karşı mesafeli olmuştur. Altı kurucu ülkeden biri değildir. Ayrıca, pek çok vatandaşın Brexit'e oy vermekten pişmanlık duyduğu görülmüştür çünkü Brexit, Birleşik Krallık ve AB arasındaki ticaretin azalmasına yol açacaktır.

Bazı analistler, popülist radikal sağ partilerin yükselişine bağlı olarak AB'nin tamamen çözülmesinin ihtimalini yüksek görmektedirler. Bu görüşe karşıt olarak, bu çalışmada AB'nin gelecekte dağılmayacağı ve AB'nin geleceği için olası senaryonun, üye ülkelerin farklı seviye ve hızlarda entegre olabileceği düşüncesi anlamına gelen "çok vitesli Avrupa" olacağı savunulmaktadır. Çok vitesli Avrupa, şu anda zaten AB içinde bir gerçekliktir. Tüm AB üye ülkeleri, Euro ve Schengen bölgesinin üyesi değildir. 28 AB üye ülkesinden 19'u Euro'yu ortak para birimi olarak kullanmaktadır. Benzer şekilde, 28 AB üye ülkesinin 22 tanesi Schengen bölgesinin üyeleridir. Ülkelerinin sınırlarının kontrolü konusu popülist radikal sağ partilerin vurguladığı konulardan biridir. Örneğin, Viktor

Orban Schengen'in ölümünü ilan etmiştir. Daha fazla AB üye devletinin kendi sınırlarını korumak için kendi iç kontrollerini gerçekleştireceği inancı bu çalışmada savunulmuştur.

Fransız-Alman eksenini geçmişte Avrupa entegrasyonunu ilerletmiştir. Fransız-Alman eksenini bunu tekrar yapabilir. Fransa'nın cumhurbaşkanı Emmanuel Macron, Avrupa entegrasyonunun ilerlemesini savunmaktadır. Ancak, Angela Merkel daha önce sahip olduğundan daha az manevra alanına sahiptir. AfD'nin başarısı, muhtemelen AB ile ilgili konularda karar alırken onu ihtiyatlı kılacaktır. AfD'nin yükselişi Merkel'i göçü önlemek için daha fazla adım atmaya zorlayacaktır. Merkel bu adımları attığı takdirde, AfD bunu kullanacak ve politik gücünün ve başarısının bir kanıtı olarak sunacaktır. AfD, sıkı göç politikasının partinin artan desteğinin ve ana akım partilerin seçimi kaybetme korkusunun bir sonucu olduğunu ileri sürecektir.

Almanya, AB'nin temel ülkelerinden biri olduğundan, AfD'nin yükselişi çok vitesli Avrupa ihtimalini güçlendirecektir. Çok vitesli Avrupa, AB'nin dinamik yapısını sürdürmesini sağlayacak temel faktördür. Entegrasyonu derinleştirmek isteyen üye devletlerin ilerlemesine izin verir. Öte yandan, entegrasyonu daha da derinleştirmek istemeyenlerin isteklerine saygı duyar.

Sonuç olarak, bu çalışmanın odağını oluşturan AfD'nin Almanya gibi AB'nin kilit bir ülkesinde yükselişe geçmesi hem Almanya'nın hem de Avrupa'nın geleceği için bir anlam ifade etmektedir. Çalışma boyunca analiz edilen AfD'nin popülist radikal sağ ideolojisi ve özellikle partinin ideolojisinin temelini oluşturan yerlilik, Avrupa'nın demokrasi, özgürlük, adalet ve insan haklarının korunması gibi değerlerine tehdit oluşturmaktadır.

AfD, sadece seçim başarısıyla sınırlı kalmamış diğer partileri de sağa çekmede önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Ana akım partilerin AfD'nin bazı siyasi söylemlerini kullandıkları görülmüştür. Örneğin, AfD'nin temel kampanya sloganlarından birini oluşturan "İslam'ın Almanya'ya ait olmadığı" iddiası Alman İçişleri Bakanı tarafından savunulmuştur. Angela Merkel, Almanya'da

“yasal olarak mümkün olan her yerde” burka yasağı uygulanması için çağrıda bulunmuştur. AfD, sadece Alman siyasetini etkilemekle kalmamış Avrupa siyasetini de etkilemiştir. Buna iyi bir örnek olarak İsveç’te kurulan ve AfD’nin ideolojisini benimseyen İsveç için Alternatif (AfS) partisi verilebilir.

Avrupa genelinde yükselen popülist radikal sağ partilere karşı Avrupa Birliği’nin değerlerini her zamankinden daha fazla ve daha güçlü bir şekilde savunması gerekmektedir. Yabancı düşmanlığına, İslam düşmanlığına, ırkçılığa, ayrımcılığa karşı daha kararlı bir tutum takınması gerekmektedir. Radikal eğilimleri besleyen ayrımcı dilin önlenmesi son derece önemlidir. Bu eğilimlerle mücadele etmek için AB’nin “çeşitlilik içinde birlik” sloganıyla uyumlu etkili önlemler alması gerekmektedir. AB, popülist radikal sağ partilerin politikacılarını tolere etmemelidir. AB’nin lokomotifi konumunda olan Almanya’nın ise Nazi geçmişinden ders çıkarması gerekmektedir çünkü hem Almanya hem de Avrupa Nazizm’den çok fazla acı çekmiştir. AfD’nin benimsediği popülist radikal sağ ideolojiye karşı Almanya’nın insan haklarını en yüksek sesle savunmaya ihtiyacı vardır. Nefret ve korku yerine anlayış ve saygı hüküm sürmelidir.

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