

THE EMBODIMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELF: A  
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF BODY IN HEGEL'S *PHENOMENOLOGY OF*  
*SPIRIT*

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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## ABSTRACT

### THE EMBODIMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL SELF: A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF BODY IN HEGEL’S *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*

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The primary purpose of this thesis is to investigate and conceptualize the notion of “body” in the context of certain sections of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. While investigating the notion of “body” in the thesis, my intention is to see the possibility of reading the *Phenomenology* as “the science of the embodiment of consciousness”. By relying on this approach, I will try to thematize and give a comprehensive account of the “body” in the “Consciousness” and “Self-Consciousness” sections of the *Phenomenology*. I will address the question of individual embodiment of consciousness as to reveal how the bodily existence of consciousness is implicitly carried out in these sections. I will problematize the body in an attempt to show its implications from a Hegelian perspective. In this regard, here, the notion of body will be made explicit by introducing a detailed interpretation and implications of the movement of consciousness. At the same time, it is also shown that the movement of consciousness cannot be separated from the bodily existence of consciousness.

**Keywords:** Hegel, phenomenology, consciousness, self-consciousness, body

## ÖZ

### BİREYSEL KENDİLİĞİN VÜCUT BULMASI: HEGEL’İN TİNİN GÖRÜNGÜBİLİMİ’NDE BEDENİN KAVRAMSALLAŞTIRILMASI

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Bu tezin başlıca amacı, beden mefhumunu, *Tinin Görüngübilimi*’nin belirli kısımları çerçevesinde incelemek ve kavramsallaştırmaktır. Tezde, beden kavramını incelerken, yönelim, *Görüngübilim*’i “bilincin vücut bulmasının bilimi” olarak okumanın imkanını gözetmek olacaktır. Bu bakış açısına dayanarak, “beden” temalaştırılacak ve *Görüngübilim*’in “Bilinç” ve “Öz-bilinç” kısımlarında bedenın geniş kapsamlı bir açıklaması sunulacaktır. Bilincin bireysel düzeyde vücut bulması sorunu, bilincin bedensel varlığının bu kısımlarda örtük bir biçimde nasıl yürütüldüğünün açığa çıkarılması olarak ele alınacaktır. Beden, Hegelci bir perspektiften, anlamını açığa vurma çabasında sorunsallaştırılacaktır. Bu bakımdan, beden kavramı, burada, ayrıntılı bir yorumlama ile açık kılınacaktır. Bu, aynı zamanda, bilincin hareketinin, onun bedenli oluşundan ayrılamazlığının gösterilmesi olacaktır.

**Anahtar sözcükler:** Hegel, görüngübilim, bilinç, öz-bilinç, beden

To My Brother..



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

*“How could it be denied that  
these hands or this whole body are mine?”*  
(Descartes, “First Meditation”)

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is one of the revolutionary books in which the immanent examination of the consciousness is taken into consideration. The significant effect of the book, as Merleau-Ponty rightly says, leads to the beginnings of “all the great philosophical ideas of the last century- the philosophies of Marx and Nietzsche, phenomenology, German existentialism and psychoanalysis- .”<sup>1</sup> In the opening paragraphs, Hegel declares that the immanent treatment is required to be dealt with the whole book as “the science of the experience of consciousness”<sup>2</sup>. Accordingly, this means that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* begins with “natural consciousness” and proceeds to various shapes of consciousness that emerge in the experience of consciousness. The comprehension of these shapes of consciousness gives opportunity to examine the progression from the most primitive forms of consciousness to the absolute standpoint in which it becomes consistent with itself. So to speak, Hegel's *Phenomenology* can be read as a journey from a phenomenology of consciousness to a phenomenology of spirit. The first three chapters of the book are collectively designated “Consciousness” by which Hegel refers not to the concept of cognition or mind,

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<sup>1</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Hegel's Existentialism” in *Sense and Non-Sense* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 63.

<sup>2</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), § 36.

but rather to “the consciousness of something”. Moreover “Consciousness” part is not simply about knowing, but rather about the knowledge of the objects that consciousness claims to know. Hegel begins by stating that there is a common view of our knowledge of the world that is immediately given to our senses, which we call as naïve realism. In one sense, throughout the *Phenomenology*, Hegel’s examination of consciousness will always direct us to the question whether one comprehends the truth of its object in and through each shape that its experience takes. When any shape of consciousness fails to know the truth of its object, it necessarily turns into another shape through which it reclaims the truth of its object in a transformed way. In this regard, the journey of consciousness necessitates the immanent critique of its own certainties which results in undoing its particular positions to arrive at a more comprehensive one that could overcome the one-sidedness and the limitations of its experience. This is the progress to the philosophical standpoint or the “absolute knowing” that will be achieved at the end of the *Phenomenology*. Thus, self-transformation is the key point for all attempts of consciousness to know the truth of its object. My intention, in this thesis, however, is not to repeat the steps made in the *Phenomenology*. Rather my intention consists in finding the way in which we can trace the implications regarding the bodily existence of consciousness in the configuration of its experience. In other words, the purpose of my thesis is to question the individual embodiment of consciousness. In this regard, I will address this question as to reveal how the bodily existence of consciousness is implicitly carried out in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Here, my purpose is to make the notion of the body explicit by introducing a detailed interpretation of the *Phenomenology*. My interpretation aims to show how the internal dynamism of the self-transforming consciousness simultaneously paves the way for the transformation of the phenomenological meaning of the bodily existence<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Russon emphasizes that proper reading of a text depends on the exploration of the different ‘meanings’ within the text, so he writes that “the “reading” of Hegel’s text is not simply a matter of reconstituting an already fully accomplished sense but will always be interpretation, will always be transformative”. John Russon, “Dialectic, Difference, and the Other: The Hegelianizing of French

Before stating the structure of my thesis, let me briefly summarize one of the main problems that Hegel had inherited from the history of philosophy. The most basic characteristic of traditional thinking for Hegel is the distinction or separation between the mind and the body, and the mind and the world in which mind is taken to be prior to both the world and the body. Therefore, traditional philosophers hold a fundamental separation between consciousness and the body that raises one of the most important epistemological problems, i.e., “Cartesian dualism”. The ineluctable “destiny” of Cartesian dualism is that the mind and the body are two kinds of different substances, and exist independent of each other. Moreover, the duality of body-mind leads to dismissal of the body from Western philosophy and to the shifting of the emphasis from the body to rational thought. The problem for the dualist approach is how the mind can relate to its body. In other words, the question is here, from a Hegelian perspective, whether consciousness can ever experience itself without the bodily existence of it, or whether it can escape from experiencing the body. The separation between the body (or the world) and the mind, and the metaphysical character of “reality” in philosophy are the core points for the Hegelian critique of dualist philosophy. Throughout this attempt, the question of their unity remains one of the central problems of his philosophy. In other words, Hegel attempts to overturn the traditional Cartesian understanding of the world in which the idea of the mind “beyond” the body is preserved, and proposes a non-dualist relation of mind and body.<sup>4</sup> In this regard, Hegel’s *Phenomenology* will provide us a non-dualistic interpretation of the body-mind relation. In contrast to traditional conceptions which conceive the bodily experience of consciousness solely in Cartesian duality,

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Phenomenology” in *Phenomenology: Responses and Developments*, ed. Leonard Lawlor (Durham, UK: Acumen, 2010), p.20.

<sup>4</sup> Winfield points out the nondualist relation of mind and body in Hegel by writing that “mind, inherently embodied, exhibits the true relation of the universal and particular by being at one with itself in the body [...] So mind, relating to itself in the body, will equally relate to the body in a relationship contained within the whole that mind comprises.” Richard Dien Winfield, “Hegel’s Solution to the Mind-Body Problem” in *A Companion to Hegel*, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 234.



with phenomenological analysis of the notion of body, we will be able to trace the relation between the experience of consciousness and its bodily existence.

Although Hegel's views on the notion of the body is taken into consideration, as Judith Butler rightly says, it is "almost never to be found as object of philosophical reflection [...] and only referred to indirectly"<sup>5</sup> in the *Phenomenology*. Above all, in this thesis, I shall try to develop an interpretative approach to the study of the body within the context of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The primary purpose of my thesis is to investigate the notion of "body" in the context of certain chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and to comprehend the embodiment of the individual self that appears in these chapters of the book. The reading I propose here, which depends on Hegel's immanent examination of the shapes of consciousness, mainly focuses on probably the richest chapters of his work, namely, on the "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness" chapters of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In both these chapters I claim that Hegel implicitly writes about the body. However, my thesis depends on not only what Hegel says with respect to the question of body, but depends on what he should say about the body. In other words, I shall investigate the ways in which this question is systematically implied by his phenomenological analysis of the experience of consciousness. My concern is to reveal how the bodily existence of consciousness is implicitly carried out as a phenomenological concept in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the effort here will be directed to revealing the key phenomenological steps that make the comprehension of embodiment of consciousness possible. Throughout this study, I will show how the experience of consciousness requires a relation to its bodily existence, and how the journey of consciousness consists in a constant configuration of this relation in terms of the manifestation the truth with its various significance, i.e., as "here and now", as the unity of a perceived thing, as force and its expression, or as the world of a desiring, struggling, laboring, serving self that finds itself in its relation to the other. In particular, I will focus on the 'bodily existence of consciousness' in order to show

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<sup>5</sup> Judith Butler, *Psychic Life of Power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 34.

how it is the locus of the mediation between not only consciousness and the world, but the mediation of consciousness and itself. The dialectic of consciousness will make clear that its bodily existence is the very characteristic of consciousness, rather than an item that merely attaches to it. I believe that the exploration of the meanings and implications of the bodily existence of consciousness will lead to a transformative approach to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Regarding all these point, this study will be written with the motivation of making explicit the underestimated notion of the body in Hegel's philosophy. Certainly, the notion of the "body" arises as a logical presupposition of every experience of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, but this issue is not explicitly taken into consideration in Hegel's work. Although the sphere of influence of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is taken into account in terms of certain notions, such as life, desire, recognition or death with which his *Phenomenology* proceeds, the notion of the "body" is unexpectedly glossed over by most commentators. The body does not suddenly appear in the book, but arises as an essential moment of every experience of consciousness. In this regard, the reader cannot easily find a systematic and clear explanation of what Hegel means by the "body", and the main reason of this seems to be that Hegel defines his project as "the science of the *experience of consciousness*". Thus, while investigating the problem of the "body" in this study, my intention is also to see the possibility of reading the *Phenomenology* as the "science of the embodiment of consciousness"<sup>6</sup>.

The second chapter of this study will begin with the explanation of the shapes of consciousness that implies a certain conception of bodily existence. I will intend to explain Hegel's account of the shapes of consciousness in which the bodily existence of the world stands aside, and consciousness experiences this self-subsisting existence as a thing apart from it by way of the three moments which are titled as 'Sense-Certainty', 'Perception' and 'Understanding'. Throughout this

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<sup>6</sup> John Russon, *The Self and Its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997), 3.

chapter, my intention will be to show the self-improvement of the internal movement of consciousness and to reveal how the conceptualization of the body is required by means of these three shapes of consciousness.

The main concern of the third chapter will be to trace the problem of the “body” in accordance with the unity of “Self-Consciousness”. The notions of “self-consciousness”, “other”, “life” or “death” will be analyzed with respect to the problem of the “body”. In the first two parts of this chapter, I will try to show Hegel’s implicit understanding of the notion of the body in the context of “bodily life” and the “life and death struggle” while considering the question of what sort of an “attachment” to and “detachment” from the life and the body is possible. In shifting to “recognition”, we will see that consciousness is looking at the self proper in order to provide the unity with itself, which will lead to recognize the other’s self-certainty. In this context we have been lead to attend quite a bit more complicated meaning of the bodily existence of consciousness, namely, the bodily existence of master and slave. In what follows, I will consider the question of how the “master and slave relation” makes room for the possibility of reading the bodily existence of consciousness as the “embodiment of consciousness”. What is more, I will try to discuss some Hegelian commentator’s approaches to the issue and will discuss their contributions for both the master and the slave consciousness throughout the section.

In chapter four, I will follow the orientation developed in the third chapter to understand the notion of the body in the transition from “Stoicism” to “Scepticism” and to “Unhappy Consciousness”. The earlier sections of this chapter will explicate that how the body emerges in terms of the moments of “vacation” and “abrogation” of it. Then, when consciousness turns into the “Unhappy Consciousness”, I will try to give an account of the conceptualization of the body as the moment of ‘disembodiment of consciousness’. In this regard these three determinations of consciousness will show us how the bodily existence of consciousness reveals itself as an experience of the separation from bodily

existence and as an experience of re-finding the very existence of the body in this separation.

In sum, throughout all these chapters, I will try to explore the full implications of a rejection of a dualistic conception of consciousness and the body in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Although there is no systematic articulation of the body in the *Phenomenology*, we can still discern a way of reading Hegel's *Phenomenology* that can challenge the traditional understanding of consciousness and the body by providing a new understanding that takes into account the dialectical movement between consciousness and the body. Finally, I hope that focusing on the bodily existence of consciousness will contribute to making explicit some of its impressive features that are implicit in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

## CHAPTER 2

### INVESTIGATING THE POSSIBLE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE BODY IN THE FORMS OF *CONSCIOUSNESS*

#### 2.1 The Three Stages of the Experience of Sense Certainty

The first section of the “Consciousness” chapter of the *Phenomenology* is entitled “Sense-Certainty”: Or the ‘This’ and ‘Meaning’. At the most general level, when Hegel talks about “sense-certainty”, he always refers to the form of consciousness. Although it is a form of consciousness, Hegel does not focus on the question of what kind of form it is; rather, he intends to examine the experience of consciousness itself. The experience of sense-certainty is not merely on “knowledge”, but rather on the “object of knowledge” or “something” in the world. It immediately contacts with individual objects in the world through the senses. It is the view that individual objects are simply given to our sensations and we can gain knowledge by apprehending them immediately. Sense-certainty, according to Hegel, is “immediate knowledge itself” or “knowledge of what simply is”. It adopts its “immediate knowledge”<sup>7</sup>, which contains nothing but apprehension of the objects. Apprehension aims to grasp its object to be immediately given to the senses and also supposes that the object is identical to its truth. That is why Hegel calls consciousness as “natural consciousness” in this section. It also appears to be “the richest and truest form of knowledge”<sup>8</sup>, since it claims that objects in space and time are immediately given to seeing, hearing and so on. “Space” and “time” (or here and now) offer us infinite variety. I see (sense) the house (certainty) or I hear the sound, and by this way sense- certainty confronts

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<sup>7</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 90.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., § 91.

an “infinite wealth for which no bound can be found”.<sup>9</sup> At this point, Hegel precisely points out to us that sense-certainty holds apprehension to be more fundamental than comprehension.<sup>10</sup> It prioritizes direct, immediate and concrete experience. Although sense-certainty aims to “know” its object by apprehending it, indeed, its own activity is not “knowing” the object but rather “apprehending” it in its specific being. It appears to sense-certainty that individuality and specificity constitute the essence of the object or its unique nature. In other words, sense-certainty aims to grasp “thisness” of the object without feeling the need for any concepts. Sense-certainty, therefore, takes its individual object to be a “This”. Then, it tries to grasp the meaning of “This” and asks: “What is *This*?” Then, it responds to the question by asserting that “This” is simply present. It exists “here” and “now”. Sense-certainty claims that I take “this” individual thing which is given to me in space and time as simply here and now. However, it has merely an immediate awareness of here and now. It only sees this night or this house and it is only aware of the fact that it is not day or not tree. But, it immediately focuses on “pure this” and does not become aware of the opposition between night and day (or house and tree). So, it cannot say that “This is a house, not a tree”. Hegel points out that “All that it says about what it knows is just that it *is*; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer *being* of the thing”.<sup>11</sup> And, according to Hegel, sense-certainty is unable to propose anything about the object more than that it *is*. Then, he investigates the way in which the object reveals itself in the actual experience of sense-certainty, so that we can compare it with the initial claim of sense-certainty.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., § 91.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

### 2.1.1 The First Stage of the Experience of Sense-Certainty: The Now and the Here

At its first stage of its experience, sense-certainty does not take itself to be an essential moment of the “knowing”. It remains as a passive receiver when confronted with the question of “What is here and now?” It can only respond by saying that “Now is night” (or “Here is tree”). However, Hegel points out that the object of knowledge as ‘Here’ and ‘Now’ is preserved, but the truth of the object is converted into its opposite<sup>12</sup>. Its truth vanishes in the face of the day. It cannot preserve itself as the night and turns to “something that is not”. Similarly, the truth of the object is inaccessible in the case of the “Here”. Hegel states that “If I turn round, this truth has vanished [...] No tree is here, but a house instead”.<sup>13</sup> The truth of sense-certainty can only be kept for a while, and then it is no longer true. Both assertion of sense certainty cannot constitute the truth of the individual object, since its truth disappears in the other “Now”s or “Here”s. Sense-certainty does not experience only the “Now” as night or day, but also the variety of other moments or “Now”s. Nonetheless, as Hegel puts it, the “Now” preserves itself since it is “indifferent to what happens in it, indifferent to whether it is night or day”.<sup>14</sup> The experience of sense-certainty proves that the specificity or individuality of the object is indifferent to the Now or the Here. In other words, being this, now or here is far from the individuality of the object. It cannot be identified through *simply* this, now or here. Moreover, this, now and here can be applied to any number of individual objects. The indifferent character of the Now and the Here makes them universal. The first stage of the experience of sense-certainty, according to Hegel, demonstrates that “the truth of its object is the universal”.<sup>15</sup> It is to say that this immediate moment of sense certainty cannot reveal the truth of its object as it claims. And it does not grasp any determinate content when it takes an individual

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., § 98.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., § 96.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., § 97.

object as the “This”. Therefore, the first experience of sense-certainty demonstrates that “This” is an abstract universal.

### 2.1.2 The Second Stage of the Experience of Sense-Certainty: The “I”

After this first stage of the experience of sense-certainty, consciousness drives back into itself and asserts that the essential element in knowing is not *this* as individual object, but *this* as “I”. It tries to maintain its immediate certainty, and claims that the truth of the object does not lie in the object, but in the “I”. Sense certainty supposes that its object cannot be universal or indeterminate, but it is something that is specific. It asserts that “here is a house”, because I see it. It means that sense certainty thinks that the truth of its object is identical to seeing, hearing or the other senses of it. In other words, it proposes that, in my experience, *I*, this “I”, see that “here is a house”. It tries to provide immediate knowledge of its object through the immediate certainty of the *I*. However, the “I” is subject to similar experience as in the previous one. The truth of the object disappears, when it encounters with the other “I”s or experience of other subjects. When I declare that ‘Here is a tree, because I see it’, the other *I* can also maintain that ‘Here is a house, because I see it’. Hegel indicates that “I am a pure [act of] intuiting [...] I stick firmly to *one* immediate relation”.<sup>16</sup> The immediacy of the *I* makes the truth of the object unattainable because of the exclusion of the oppositions between the *I* and the other *Is*. Hegel emphasizes that like this, here and now, *I* is also “not immediate but mediated” and universal since “when I say ‘I’, this singular ‘I’, I say in general all ‘Is’”.<sup>17</sup> There is nothing ‘something’ specific to this “I”. Both of them have the same “authentication”. Like this, here and now, the “I” cannot provide the truth of its individual object, because every *I* is *this* singular *I*. And sense certainty cannot grasp anything about its individual object if it sticks to this singular *I* given that it proves itself to be an abstract universal. The second

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., §104.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., §102.



experience of sense certainty shows that the truth of the individual is neither in *this* object nor in *this I*.

### 2.1.3 The Third Stage of the Experience of Sense-Certainty: The Pointing-Out

Although sense-certainty asserts to know the truth of its object as *this*, as a result of previous experiences, its truth emerges as a universal. Now, sense certainty tries to prevent its object becoming a universal through the activity of pointing out or picking out. It ignores all other ‘nows’, ‘heres’ and ‘I’s by focusing only on *this* specific object. In the act of pointing out, sense certainty aims to prevent its specific object from turning into an abstract universal; therefore, it restricts itself to one ‘Now’ or ‘Here’. However, in every attempt of pointing out, sense certainty cannot capture *this* now, or *this* here and cannot escape from the “plurality of Nows” or “Heres”. As Hegel notes, *this* Now is “an absolute plurality of Nows” and *this* Here is “a simple complex of many Heres”.<sup>18</sup>

It tries to point out *this* now, but it finds out that it cannot distinguish one “Now” from the others. It cannot isolate *this* Now by simply pointing out to it. In being pointed out, *this* now vanishes and it becomes not *is*, but *has been*. It is no longer *this* now; rather, “the Now that *is*, is another now than the one pointed to”.<sup>19</sup> In the previous experiences of sense certainty, it takes its object as “*this is*” or “*now is*” or “*here is*”, but in the experience of being pointed out, it cannot apprehend its object as *this is*, since it no longer *is* but lies in the past. Therefore, for sense-certainty, *this*, *now* and *here* are not pure and simple. Moreover, their presences are not immediate presence, but they come to presence through their past. The presence of *this* Now lies in the past. For example, the presence of this day lies in the night as a past. Therefore, the object of sense-certainty turns to a unity of this and not-this or of different moments rather than simply a mere “*this*”. In respect to this, Hegel asserts that such a unity “consists in remaining itself in being what it is

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., § 107-108.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., §106.

and its negation”.<sup>20</sup> What emerges through the experience of pointing is not strange, since its experience proves that the truth of it is universal. However, this universal is not similar to previous universals, because it is not abstract and indeterminate but rather complex and differentiated. The emergent truth is the very opposite of what sense-certainty initially claims to know. While it was seeking to know its object as simply *this*, the result of its experience demonstrates that its object is a complex universal. This new object is the truth of sense certainty. And Hegel indicates that sense-certainty itself is nothing else, but its own experience or movement.

## 2.2 The Three Stages of the Experience of Perception

Above all we have investigated how the experience of sense-certainty demonstrates that its truth is a complex universal. This truth paves the way for a new form of consciousness which is called as “Perception”. Now, perception takes “its truth as a universal”<sup>21</sup>. Although consciousness learns its truth from the experience of sense-certainty, as Hegel puts, “equally it is always forgetting it and starting the movement all over again”.<sup>22</sup> In this manner, while perception is still at the level of sense certainty, the object of it still refers to a simple and immediate *this*. However, unlike sense-certainty, perception attempts to know *this* as a combination of sensible properties and as Robert Stern claims, “treats each individual object as a bundle of universals”<sup>23</sup>. In other words, the principle of the object is a complex or mediated universal with many sensible properties. Thus, Hegel emphasizes that the object of consciousness still fits for the level of sense-experience and it is merely a *sensuous universal*. Now, perception has an object with many sensuous properties. It apprehends manifold of sensuous properties which are held together in the same object. Perception firstly identifies the object

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., §107.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., §111.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., §109.

<sup>23</sup> Robert Stern, *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit* (London: Routledge, 2002), 51.

as “medium” in which there is no unity between different properties of the object; rather, it is a collection or “medium”. However, when consciousness treats the thing as a “medium”, it can merely reach a collection in which each property excludes one another, and it does not constitute a unity. It is nothing but the co-existence or occupation of the same “here and now”. This medium, Hegel writes, is thus the “simple togetherness of a plurality”, or “thinghood”.<sup>24</sup> Hegel gives an example, a grain of salt. It consists of several properties such as white, cubical and tart. For perception, the object combines being *this* white and not just being *this* white. It means that the object is white as long as it is not just white, but rather *also* cubical or tart. Being white is also not being red, or cubical, tart and something else. Thus, for perception, properties of the object are excluding each other. In this sense, properties within a grain of salt are said to be opposed to each other and they are the “moment of negation”.<sup>25</sup> As Hegel says, although they are separate and indifferent to each other, they are connected by an *Also*. At the same time, we have “One” object, the salt or the *this*. Now, how these separate properties get unified in the salt becomes the main problem for perception. Moreover, the problem is that although we perceive the color, shape or taste of the object, we cannot perceive the unity or the salt itself without these properties.

### **2.2.1 The First Stage of the Experience of Perception**

Like sense-certainty, experience of perception takes its object to be immediate and simple, as well. It is supposed to find an immediate ‘Also’ between the distinct aspects or the manifold of properties of the object. Moreover, it also takes the knowledge of the object to be immediate. For the movement of perception and the perceived object are the same. In other words, the truth of perception emerges as to be self-identical with the object, and the truth depends on this self-equal object. On the other hand, depending on the previous experience, perception knows the

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., §113.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., §114.

“possibility of deception”<sup>26</sup>. It sees that if it is not careful, it can fall into error or contradictions. Then, it does not claim that its object is *this* self-identical object, and there is no contradiction in it; but rather, it affirms that consciousness is responsible for these contradictions. Perception takes the object to be a simple unity in which contradictions do not emerge, and the object of it is considered as separate and self-identical. However, the problem emerges for perception. The object is taken as something that is ‘One’ and, also as a manifold of properties. Moreover, it sees that these properties as sensuous universals do not only attach to *this* object, but rather also attach to other objects. For perception, the object cannot be both one and many at the same time. And the universality of these properties conflicts with the singularity or the oneness of the object. These contradictions that emerged in the experience of perception teach that subjective perspective necessarily causes the error and paves the way for always being in error. It means that it “is also conscious of its reflection into itself, and separates this from simple apprehension proper”.<sup>27</sup> Now, perception claims that, as Stephen Houlgate explains, “it always has a twofold view of the object. One of them is untrue subjective view and the other is objective view which provides the truth.”<sup>28</sup>

### **2.2.2 The Second Stage of the Experience of Perception**

The first stage of the experience of perception has disclosed that perception has both a “subjective” and an “objective view” for the object. In other words, it also approves that the object presents itself to consciousness in a different way from what it is for itself. In this sense, while the manifold of properties belongs to the “subjective view”, the oneness of the object is in relation with the “objective” one. The unity is due to the object, and the diversity to the subject. It is to say that the object is one and many at the same time, but not in the same respect. Rather, “it is

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., §116.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., §118.

<sup>28</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Readers Guide* (London, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 52.

divided into what it is for itself, and how it shows itself to consciousness”<sup>29</sup>. For perception, the object is still *one* thing, but it is also “other for itself than it is for another”.<sup>30</sup> Now the object is taken both as “something for itself” and “something for another”. However, the diversity of the object emerges as a new contradiction for perception since the object exhibits doubled character. And perception cannot find any agreement in the object and claims that while the object reveals itself in a doubled character, this kind of doubling is independent of consciousness. It also claims that both being “for itself” and “for another” cannot just belong to the object, but it must depend on the other things to which the object relates. For perception, “the thing is self-identical, but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things”.<sup>31</sup> It means that perception must take the object in its relation to other objects.

### **2.2.3 The Third Stage of the Experience of Perception**

Now, the truth of the object involves the relation between other things or different things. For perception, while all objects have a single and separate character, they are always disturbed by distinct objects. Any object is “in its own self” the thing it is which separates it from other objects. Perception claims that it is the distinct character of the object which is essential for each object. However, this character makes the object of perception self-contradictory. While it was separating the object as “for itself”, it also connects the object to other objects, and makes it “for another”. The object is separate and one as long as there is another object. It is to say that the object gets the distinctness of its own if it is something in relation to the other. At this point, the relation simply means being “for another”. The other objects undermine the distinctness of the object. And equally, being for itself is also undermined by being for another. The object is “in one and the same respect the opposite of itself: it is for itself, so far as it is for another, and it is for another

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>30</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 123.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

so far as it is for itself”.<sup>32</sup> Thus the truth, for perception, is turn into a self-contradictory truth. It is a truth in a way in which the distinct aspects of the object raise the unity of opposing moments. This is a unity between the way the object is “for itself” and the way it is “for another” and, it is a unity between one and many. Therefore, in the experience of perception, the unity of opposites emerges as its truth. And, the experience of consciousness results in its failure to explain the object itself, and consciousness takes an attitude toward the object that carry outs its own internal relations. Now, it seeks the unity of these internal relations or opposing moments in which the immediate differences are undermined. This is why Hegel points out such a unity as “unconditioned absolute universal”<sup>33</sup> which contains a unity of opposites. It is also a self-relating unity that has contradictions which are intrinsic to the object itself. Unlike perception, the new form of consciousness will not attempt to free from the contradictions of the object, but it will try to discover them.

### **2.3 The Three Stages of Force and the Understanding**

At the beginning of this section, Hegel reminds us that the “unconditioned unity” is a unity that arises through the experience of perception in which being *this* and being *not-this* is combined. The “unconditional universal” appears as a unity in which the “being for self” and “being for another” of the perceivable object become one. In other words, it indicates both the unity of the oneness and the manifold character of the perceivable object. As Houlgate emphasizes, it is a unity in which each aspect of the object negates itself and “passes over into its opposite”, in this sense, it is a “dynamic unity”<sup>34</sup>. Perception would attempt to keep these aspects separate by claiming that the object is one “in this respect” and also it is a manifold “in that respect”. However, understanding does not attempt to keep them distinct; instead, it attempts to discover dynamic movement of the

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., §128.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., §129 .

<sup>34</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Readers Guide*, 58.

opposition. Now, firstly, understanding focuses on this “dynamic movement”. And, in Hegel’s own words, this movement “is what is called force [*Kraft*]”<sup>35</sup> for understanding. In this section, understanding of the “force” becomes crucial. The notion of “force” is used for a new way for solving the “one and the many problem”. Before investigating the “Force and the Understanding” section, we should understand what Hegel indicates by the notion of force.

### **2.3.1 The Notion of Force**

The notion of “force” is explained through the “movement” in which the matters of the object make “transition into one another”<sup>36</sup>. Understanding takes the notion of force in order to discover “unity in difference” and “difference in unity” of the object or, the phenomena. An observed movement in phenomena is counted as force. However, the manifold of properties and their oppositions are taken into consideration as the “expression of force”.<sup>37</sup> And by contrast, the unity in the object is counted as “force proper, force which has been driven back into itself”.<sup>38</sup> It means that the movement from the one to the manifold is the “expression of force”, while the movement from the manifold back into the one is “force proper”.<sup>39</sup> And, for the understanding, force must appear in its expression. In other words, ‘force’ can become apparent only in expressing itself. In that sense, the “force” and the “expression of force” remain only as the moments of the same process. And understanding asserts that the difference between the moments exist “only in thought”, not in reality. Understanding at this stage does not see the difference between force and its expression in reality. However, if understanding regards the difference between the force and its expression as something that exists only in thought; their conceptualization becomes contradictory. The reason is that if the two moments of force are to be different from one another, the expression of

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<sup>35</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 136.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., §135.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., §137.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., §136.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

force must be something other than the force. But, at the same time, understanding asserts that force implies nothing without expressing itself. Now, understanding attempts to know this contradictory conception of force.

### **2.3.2 The First Stage of the Experience of Understanding: The Play of Forces and the Inner Being of Things**

Now, understanding takes all the contradictions as a “play of forces”. Hegel explain us that the “play of forces”, which are in opposition to each other, refers to the dynamic relation between the objects. Unlike to perception wherein the world appears as a fixed or static world of things, in this experience, understanding stresses the movement of contradiction of the play of forces. It sees forces as “appearing” and “vanishing moments”<sup>40</sup>. Indeed these moments are a flux of forces. In other words, what the understanding grasps is that the “immediate transition of each into its opposite” occurs in the play of forces. So there is not so much force, but rather a flux from one to another. Through this flux, force proves to be “an immediate unity”<sup>41</sup> of the moments. The unity paves the way for undermining the difference between the moments. There is no longer a real difference between the force and the expression of it. As Hegel puts it, they are “driven back into” themselves to unity.<sup>42</sup> Thus, he emphasizes that such a unity is the negation of real difference. Hegel emphasizes that what the understanding merely experiences is the way in which the play of forces “collapse unresistingly into an undifferentiated unity”.<sup>43</sup> Thus, understanding takes this sort of unity beyond the play of forces itself. Consciousness assumes that something must be beyond the play of forces. Now, it is “the inner being of things”<sup>44</sup>. The term of inner is used for explaining the unity of forces. Understanding takes this inner being of things as a supersensible world, the true world. Now, proper object of

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., §137.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., §136.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., § 141.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., §136.



understanding is taken as inner being. the true object of experience of understanding. While the play of forces exposes itself in the realm of *appearance*, the truth of it lies in an *inner* or *supersensible world*. In other words, for understanding, sensible properties constitute mere *appearances* and what lies beyond them is the *supersensible world*. By doing so, understanding divides the world as sensuous or perceivable world and supersensible or intelligible world.

### **2.3.3 The Second Stage of the Experience of Understanding: Appearance and Law**

In the previous experience, through the play of forces, understanding claims that it has merely the representation of the object which is appearance, and what lies behind appearance is the supersensible world. It claims that the objects are not simply what they initially arises to be, so that understanding draws back to the realm of “inner being” of things. However, the inner being of things can only come to consciousness through the realm of appearance. It is to say that the inner being of things “comes from the world of appearance”.<sup>45</sup> In this sense, the inner being cannot be other than the realm of appearance. By means of the realm of appearance, the the inner being of things expose itself and the realm of appearance makes them explicit. As Hegel puts it, the supersensible inner being of the thing implies nothing, but the realm of appearance. In this sense, it is the “appearance of appearance”.<sup>46</sup> For this reason, understanding takes appearance itself as a unity in which law appears. In other words, such a unity is called as *law*<sup>47</sup>. Laws express themselves in and beyond the appearances. At this point, forces turn into the laws “that governs the natural phenomena, which both stand above the phenomena and are instantiated in them”.<sup>48</sup> In this manner, the unity in the flux of appearances refers to the concept of law. The law explains phenomenal diversity through an

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., § 147.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., § 147.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., §150.

underlying unity or stability in the flux of appearance. Thus, Hegel characterizes law as "the stable image of unstable appearance".<sup>49</sup> Now, understanding conceives that the inner unity can be found in and beyond the appearances, but only in the form of law. While the law is precisely the law of appearance, it also "has a different actuality in different circumstances".<sup>50</sup> It is to say that there cannot be one stable law, but there must be many different laws such as Galileo's law or Kepler's law. Different laws govern different circumstances of the unstable and fluxing appearances. Now, understanding sees that the realm of the law does not only consist of one unified law. And the unity of law is lost. Then, understanding seeks to reduce them to a single unity. Therefore, it introduces to the concept of law that all objects in the world are subject to law and every object is connected and expressed by the law itself. Related to this new generalized conception of it, the law turns the activity of *explanation* that expresses *lawfulness* of the objects. It means that the activity of explanation of law always falls within the law. For example, the law of gravity is explained by reference to the force of gravity or the law. Thus, as Hegel points out, the force and the law do not apply different content, but they are in the same content. In this way, understanding learns that while it was seeking the general conception of the laws, it cannot attain any content for the general conception of the law, if there is not any empirical phenomenon. Therefore, the expression of a general law is not an expression of what stands unchanging beyond empirical phenomena. In this sense, the conception of general law or the second law arises in which the realm of appearance. It means that the appearance and the inner being, change and unchange, the one and the many are now in the same realm. Then, understanding characterizes this new situation as the law of the *inverted world*.<sup>51</sup> This realm appears as an inversion of what understanding conceives.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., §149.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., §151.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., §157.

### 2.3.4 The Third Stage of the Experience of Understanding: The Inverted World

By presenting the idea of “inverted world”, understanding no longer makes a distinction between the law and appearance, supersensible and sensible world. In other words, now, understanding undermines all previous oppositions. Related to the law of inverted world, Hegel writes it impressively:

what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted world in-itself is sour, what in the former is black is, in the other, white. What in the law of the first is the north pole of the magnet is, in its other, [...], the south pole.<sup>52</sup>

Then, understanding perceives that the realm of appearance is up to these two different and opposed laws. However, the truth of understanding reveals that the first law depends on the law of inversion. In this sense, the law of inversion undermines the view that there are two opposed laws. Hegel points out that “the inverted world, i.e. the inversion of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity”.<sup>53</sup> Thus, there is just one world which is a world of law that is knowable only by the understanding. Then, the truth of the understanding falls into *one* simple process in which distinctions appear and then vanish themselves. As Hegel emphasizes it, we have to think “pure change or contradictions as such”.<sup>54</sup> Thus, he ends this section by telling us that understanding can overcome contradictions through the concept of “infinity”. And infinity becomes the proper object of consciousness. Hegel describes the concept of infinity as the “absolute concept” and also as “the simple essence of life”.<sup>55</sup> Infinity constitutes a unity in which the opposed moments become one. Moreover, when the law of inversion is itself conceived as the unity of itself and its opposition, it becomes “intelligible unity”. It is a unity in which “pure self-movement” occurs. It also constitutes “the essence of

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., §158.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., §160.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., §162.

life”<sup>56</sup> as “an autonomous process”. Hegel asserts that infinity implicitly includes the concept of force, but it can only become explicit through the play of forces. And also, the expression of force makes its structure explicit. In this sense, infinity is not the object of consciousness; but rather, it is the movement of consciousness itself. Now, what Hegel invites us to see is that in the experience of inverted world, understanding experiences only itself. It can find nothing except “itself” beyond the appearance. At this point, Hegel claims that consciousness is no longer consciousness, but self-consciousness.<sup>57</sup> Self-consciousness takes the stage when consciousness aware of the fact that there is nothing but itself in the infinity. Thus, Hegel notes that the movement of infinity makes the emergence of self-consciousness necessary<sup>58</sup>. Depending on the immanent movement of understanding’s own experience, self-consciousness is made necessary. In this movement, when consciousness explicitly affirms that the true object of consciousness is consciousness itself; thus it takes the shape of self-consciousness. Unlike the sections of sense certainty and perception, now, “what is true for consciousness is not something other than itself”.<sup>59</sup> To put it another way, when consciousness conceives itself as essential in its relation to its object, then it must become a new shape of consciousness, i.e. “self-consciousness”.

#### **2.4 The Problem of Appearance in the Shapes of “Consciousness”**

The conclusion that consciousness comes to realize at the end of this chapter is that each form of consciousness experiences that the object of it is not what it initially takes to be, that is, consciousness fails to know its object properly. And, both consciousness and its object necessarily appear into a further form. Each form of consciousness differs from the others and transforms itself in a certain way, but any form of it is not distinct from the other; but rather, they are required to be

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., §162.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., §163.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., §163.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., §164.

bound by necessary connections. And by this very reason, the new mode of consciousness includes the previous mode of consciousness and its object. Consciousness changes its way of understanding in order to be different from the previous one, and to grasp its new object. As Hegel states, “for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object: as knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge”.<sup>60</sup> However, what binds all these forms of consciousness together is the fact that all of them in some way attempt to capture what they assert about the truth of their object. The main focus, throughout the “Consciousness” chapter, is on the process of how consciousness conceives its objects. And, at the end of the chapter, any shape of consciousness realizes that the truth of its object cannot be something other than itself. As Hegel puts it, “there is nothing to be seen unless *we* go behind it ourselves [...]”<sup>61</sup>

According to some commentators, the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness can also be understood with regards to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. As Robert Stern states, although the transition from “Consciousness” to “Self-Consciousness” is quite unclear in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel’s account of this transition is to be clearly understood through “the shift from independent object as “in-itself” to the object as “constructed” by the subject”.<sup>62</sup> The Kantian view, however, relies upon the distinction between our cognitive structure and the thing-in-itself, or the knowledge of the object and the object itself.<sup>63</sup> For Hegel, the problem in Kant’s philosophy, resides in this difference between our experience of the things, and what things in themselves are. Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” offers that instead of holding the traditional supposition that our “knowledge or concepts conform to the objects”, we should

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., §85.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., §165.

<sup>62</sup> Robert Stern, *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit*, 67.

<sup>63</sup> Henry Allison, “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism” in *A Companion to Kant*, ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 112.

hold that “objects conform to our concepts”. Kant’s brilliant achievement is to change the meaning of objectivity by stating that “what is objective is not what exists outside us”, but that which is conceived to be universal and necessary for there to be any experience at all. On the other hand, Kant also holds that there is an aspect of reality which is “in-itself” and which cannot be known through the universal and necessary concepts of pure understanding. Concepts can only apply to the things that appear to us, not to the “things in themselves”. Thus, the object “in-itself” cannot be known; it is only thinkable. Hegel claims that “Kant is wrong to think that the “thing-in-itself” is unknowable”<sup>64</sup>. In the section “Force and Understanding” what Hegel tries to surmount is, in a sense, the separation between the objects that appear to us and the thing-in-itself. To put it another way, in this section Hegel deals with the theory that resides on a distinction between the knowledge of appearance and reality (or, for Kant, appearance and the thing-in-itself) which announces itself throughout the history of philosophy. In the “Preface”, Hegel writes that neither knowledge nor the substance of the object is distinct from each other. “To know something falsely means that there is a disparity between knowledge and its Substance”.<sup>65</sup> <sup>66</sup> It is to say that taking into account of the object as something other than its appearance is a mistake, which makes a room for a fundamental ground for the distinction between “what belongs to consciousness and what comes from the things themselves”.<sup>67</sup> As Houlgate points out:

Since the *Phenomenology* shows that, ultimately, no fundamental distinction between the determinations of thought and the determination of being can be made intelligible, what we understand to be the determinations of things are always to be understood- as Kant recognized- as the determinations of *our* thinking; but conversely- and contrary to what Kant believed- what we know to be

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<sup>64</sup> See, e.g. §44 in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, §39.

<sup>66</sup> Hegel’s analysis of substance can also be found in his *Encyclopaedia Logic*: “*Essence must appear...Shining [scheinen] is the determination, in virtue of which essence is not being, but essence, and the developed shining is [shining- forth or] appearance. Essence therefore is not behind or beyond appearance [...]*”, *Ibid.*, §§112- 159.

<sup>67</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *Freedom, Truth and History*, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 72.

the determinations of our thinking are always also to be understood to be the determinations of *things*.<sup>68</sup>

Hegel addresses the thing-in-itself as not something other than appearance. Therefore, according to Hegel, the structure of the object and its appearance reveal also the structure of world or reality; but, this does not mean the reduction of reality to objects; rather, the claim is that reality and the object have the same structure within conceptual form. As we have seen above, through the play of forces “appearances appear”. The play of forces shows that essence of the object (or thing-in-itself) cannot be conceived in its inwardness and has to be expressed by the appearance. What is necessary for thing-in-itself is that it must express itself in appearances, that is, “what is inner must become outer”. Unlike Kant, in Hegel’s view, the existence of thing-in-itself depends on its being related to the appearance of the thing. Now, the focus shifts from the distinct character of the appearance and the essence of the object to their relation. The root of Hegel’s objection to the “thing in itself” basically lies in his view that the concept of thing in itself is nothing but an “abstraction”<sup>69</sup> or a concept of “something alien and external to thought”.<sup>70</sup> As Houlgate states in his *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*:

He shows that the thought of a thing in itself, in abstraction from all relations, is *not* actually sustainable after all. From Hegel’s point of view, the problem with Kant’s concept of the “thing in itself” is thus that it is too abstract to count as the thought of any possible or actual *something* [...] It is too abstract to establish the real *or* logical possibility of the thing it pretends to conceive.<sup>71</sup>

In this sense, throughout the “Understanding” section, the focus switches from how consciousness attempts to know its object as “in itself” to how it conceives it in its relations.<sup>72</sup> This section exposes the claim that without the thing’s relation to

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (NY: Humanity Books, 1999), 60.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 59-60.

<sup>71</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity* (IN: Purdue University, 2006), 340.

<sup>72</sup> One of the most important points is that, as Paul Redding states, “what it had originally taken to be an independent thing “in-itself,” is now grasped as something entirely of its own making, an “appearance” wholly dependent upon it”. For this reason, in a ‘radicalized Kantian’ sense, Hegel

other things, there would be neither a proper character assignable to the thing nor any distinctive being that is conceivable in itself. The point we should keep in mind is that an object can be what it is in itself in its relation to other things. Moreover, this point must also be applicable to consciousness itself. Consciousness can be what it is in itself only in its relation to what is other than itself. As we shall see, consciousness will take itself to be the proper object of consciousness as an independent self-consciousness. For the first time in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, consciousness explicitly attempts to overcome disparity between itself and the world, that is, it finds itself in the world and has become “other” to itself.

## **2.5 The Implicit Remarks on the Bodily Existence in the “Consciousness” Chapter**

While passing from one shape of consciousness to the other, the world stands against consciousness as something other, as an “external object” [*Gegenstand*]. The world appears as a differentiated bodily existence like an object, and consciousness attempts to know its object as other than itself. Throughout the “Consciousness” chapter of the *Phenomenology*, consciousness is merely at a level in which it assumes that the world is essentially different from itself.<sup>73</sup> In distinguishing the world as different from consciousness, consciousness takes its truth as something other than itself. All previous shapes of consciousness are marked by the view that the sensuous and perceptual world they encounter is detached from consciousness. It is the view that the bodily existence of this world stands aside and consciousness experiences this self-subsisting existence as a thing apart from it. In this sense, this world has no need of consciousness. For

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takes the independent thing-in-itself, now as consciousness. Paul Redding, “The Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: The Dialect of Lord and Bondsman in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*” in *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Frederick C. Beisser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 95.

<sup>73</sup> Judith Butler points out that “Consciousness is different from the sensuous and perceptual world that it encounters, but this difference is not an external one; rather, consciousness is internally related to that which it seeks to know”. Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press), 30.



consciousness, the world is nothing more than a “physical world” as a self-generating and stable whole. The world it encounters is a stable world in which consciousness attempts to experience different empirical objects. In encountering with the world, consciousness sees a totality, and believes that it has no capacity to reflect on it. Consciousness sees itself outside of what it attempts to know and as other from the truth it reveals. Consciousness, in this manner, attempts to know any aspect of the physical world by distinguishing itself from the world. However, all shapes of consciousness fail to know the truth of its object which they take to be different from itself. If consciousness cannot give an account of its difference from the world, then knowing what the world really is becomes impossible. No shape of it can find any way to determine the existence of such a distinct world. Hence, a contradiction arises within the experience of consciousness when it tries to express itself as independent from the world. As Butler emphasizes, consciousness arises as “of” the world, therefore, it appears in the world. In this sense, when consciousness attempts to explain how it is ontologically different from the world, the result is nothing more than a contradiction.<sup>74</sup> To make it clear, it can be said that when consciousness attempts to express its own difference, it always falls within the world; therefore, participates in the truth of the world. Seen from this point of view, consciousness has learned through its experience that it cannot take itself to be other than the physical world, and has a major role that has manifested itself in the physical world. By presenting the contradiction, Hegel aims to show not only the truth arising out of it, but also indicates the disparity between consciousness and the empirical world. At the end of the chapter, we have seen that consciousness can find nothing but itself in its attempts to know empirical world. It is to say that truth is not other than consciousness, and the world is no longer remote from it and unrelated to it. For the first time, consciousness now finds itself as a being in the world and it “can directly engage with the world through its relation to it”.<sup>75</sup> From a phenomenological perspective,

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>75</sup> Stern, *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit*, 69.

we can assert that consciousness has learned through its experience that it has a reflexive structure to recognize itself within the world.

## CHAPTER 3

### SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS BODY: EMBODIMENT

In the preceding sections, consciousness consists in its claim to know the truth of its object that is held to be something other than itself. In the light of previous experiences of consciousness, as we have seen, the truth of the object that consciousness encounters is no other than itself; thus, the truth that emerges is that the object of consciousness corresponds to itself; and it is for self-consciousness that “being-*in-itself* and being-*for-an-other* are one and the same”.<sup>76</sup> Consciousness asserts its own activity as the truth of its object, and returns from “otherness” to itself; then, it becomes self-consciousness. However, insofar as this return of consciousness is immediate, Hegel states, it finds itself in “the motionless tautology of: ‘I am I’”.<sup>77</sup> And yet, consciousness cannot become a proper self-consciousness since any determinate content is graspable when consciousness takes itself as the object of its own. It is because it cannot give an account of what it knows when it states itself as ‘I am I’, and cannot attain its ‘self-certainty’. In order to become a proper self-consciousness, consciousness must present itself in its relation to otherness, and so must mirror or reflect back to itself. In Hegel’s words, self-consciousness “is essentially the return from *otherness*”.<sup>78</sup> Thus, in its following movement, consciousness must attain a confrontation with the ‘other’. However, consciousness takes this ‘other’ as ‘appearance’<sup>79</sup>, and for consciousness, the ‘other’ that belongs to the world that it faces has no independent being of its own. In its relation to the world, this world *appears* as

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<sup>76</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 166.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., § 167.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Hegel states the idea by saying that for consciousness “the sensuous world is for it an enduring existence which is only *appearance*”. Ibid.

“delineation”<sup>80</sup>; and, the truth of it lies not in the world, but in the self-consciousness. Now, the problem under consideration is how self-consciousness connects with the sensuous and perceptual world, or, how it is possible for self-consciousness to be conscious of itself alone while relating to the ‘other’. In order to solve this contradiction, consciousness needs for ‘unity’, that is, a unity of the world and itself through presenting itself in its unity by reflecting back to ‘itself’. It seems that this is the reason why Hegel identifies self-consciousness with desire by stating “the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is *Desire* in general”.<sup>81</sup> Hegel’s concept of desire figures that desire is the ‘reflexive’ movement of consciousness in which it intends the unity of the ‘I’ with itself. However, the concept of desire does not ‘casually’ emerge, as Judith Butler claims<sup>82</sup>; rather, Hegel introduces the concept of desire necessarily since if and only if desire makes possible the movement of reflection. In Hegel’s concept of desire, I think, the focus should be on the ‘reflexive character of desire’.<sup>83</sup> Without the reflexivity of desire, self-consciousness cannot present the ‘unity with itself’. In a sense, the reflexivity of desire is a mode of “being-in-the-world” in which it turns back to itself. Thus, “desire becomes a reflexive pursuit of self-consciousness itself”.<sup>84</sup> Through the reflexivity of desire, the world that the ‘I’ encounter gains a new relation to consciousness that is the negation of the world. Now, consciousness seeks the unity with itself by negating the world.

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<sup>80</sup> The term is used by Judith Butler in her *Subjects of Desire*, p. 25.

<sup>81</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 167.

<sup>82</sup> J. Butler attempts to criticize Hegel’s definition of concept of desire that is introduced in §167 by stating that “Hegel introduces the notion of desire casually, at the end of a complicated explanation, as if it were something we should already understand” Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century*, p.32.

<sup>83</sup> J. Butler emphasizes the crucial role of reflexivity of desire by asserting that “The reflexivity is enacted by desire [...] Desire is also reflexive in the sense that it is a modality in which the subject is both discovered and enhanced”. Ibid., p.25.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p.33.

### 3.1 Life and the Body

Self-consciousness is desire, but what it desires is not merely the sensuous object, but rather the unity with itself. Self-consciousness, in order to affirm its unity with itself that it is the essence of certainty of its own being, attempts to negate given objects. That is, self-consciousness aims to annihilate the independence of the world by negating the object of its desire. To put in another way, desire, firstly, attempts to find its unity with itself in the natural objects of the world. On the other hand, according to Alexandre Kojève, who makes influential interpretations of Hegel's concept of desire, desire as a negating activity is essentially "the presence of absence".<sup>85</sup> In his formulation of desire, the desiring subject implies "emptiness" that seeks content for the certainty of itself through negating the object. Reading the desiring subject as "emptiness" is quite crucial because his conceptualizing of it has influenced some of the post-Hegelian philosophies, especially existentialism and twentieth-century French philosophy.<sup>86</sup> Most of their main concepts are grounded on Kojève's interpretation of 'desire'. However, I claim the Kojévian conception of desire distorts its Hegelian meaning by interpreting it as the negating activity that leads one to fill a sense of one's own being. It is true that desire negates the object, but in this negating activity it does not seek to fill something empty in the desiring subject, but rather to prove the unity of the self with itself. If anything is a lack for the desiring subject, it is not the sense of its own being<sup>87</sup>; rather, what it lacks is the unity of the "I" with itself. In Kojève's formulation, it also means that the subjectivity is attributed to have desire for something, and the "I" emerges through the experience of this desire, but

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<sup>85</sup> Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trans. James H. Nichols, ed. Allan Bloom (NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 134.

<sup>86</sup> The lectures given by Alexandre Kojève have a huge impact on whole successors of Hegelian thought. All of them had deep influence on his lectures which is put together in a book called *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*. Kojève's reading of Hegel had created inevitable impressions especially on Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

<sup>87</sup> Houlgate opposes Kojévian concept of desire by reminding that the desiring subject is "too full of itself, for it regards everything around it as there for it alone." Stephen Houlgate, "G. W. F. Hegel: The *Phenomenology of Spirit*" in *The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy*, ed. R. Solomon (Oxford: Blackwell), 13.

in contrast to Kojève's view, I assert desire does not merely create its subject; but rather, it embodies the relation between its object and the subject by virtue of its intentional structure. In other words, if desire has a relational character of the object and the self in that stage of self-consciousness, it is always desire *of* or *for* something other than itself. When I desire, I desire *of* or *for* something; when I desire to eat, I desire *for* food; when I desire to drink, I desire *for* water or something liquid, etc. It means that my desire embodies the intentional relation of the desiring subject and the desired object. That desire is always desire *for* something other than consciousness itself explicitly reveals that desire has to have an object for reflecting back to itself. In this sense, if desire always binds me to the object and the experience of it, it is only possible through this object; the intentionality of desire is constitutive of desire itself. The intentional character and the connection of it with reflectivity of desire are emphasized by Judith Butler here as follows:

As the experience of desire, self-consciousness sustains a necessarily ambiguous relation to that which is other to itself. Desire is always desire "for" something other than self-consciousness. Moreover, the intentionality of desire is always also informed by its reflexive project; desire always reveals the desiring agent as intrinsically other to itself: self-consciousness is an ecstatic being, outside itself, in search of self-recovery.<sup>88</sup>

Clearly, to posit desire as intentional and reflexive, as Butler does here, means to accommodate it in the context of the world. To put in another way, in the first experience of desire, desire is "of" the world, in the sense that the proper object of desire proves to be the objects of sensuous world. Now, for Hegel, it is explicit that self-consciousness initially turns into a form of natural desire. In what follows, Hegel aims to demonstrate how self-consciousness engages with the object in the form of natural desire. In the process of desiring activity, Hegel emphasizes that self-consciousness has a double object which are opposed to each other: one is the immediate object of sensuous world, and the other is itself<sup>89</sup>. And now, natural desire is a desire to prove that self-consciousness is the true essence of the

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<sup>88</sup> Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, 39.

<sup>89</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 167.

otherness, and a desire to annihilate the independence of the immediate natural objects. Accordingly, self-consciousness seeks to realize its own independence by opposing itself to natural objects around it, and by negating the objects of its desire.<sup>90</sup> At this stage of desire, it is at the level of bodily desire, since it bears merely on natural objects of the world, and this is why desire here refers merely appetite.<sup>91</sup> In this sense, the term includes the meaning of bodily consumption. Hegel, on the other hand, does not restrict the meaning of the terms as only tendency for greed; rather, he makes the term spread out to all negations of the body, that is, bodily consumption. And it is clearly that all we as living beings encounter in everyday life is that we are consuming bodies requiring *other* sources to live. In this regard, Hegel emphasizes the necessity of the ‘other’ in the following passage:

Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession can take place, there must be this other. [...] It is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of Desire; and through this experience self-consciousness has itself realized this truth.<sup>92</sup>

This passage suggests that bodily desire in negating such objects is like a black-hole in which the objects are absorbed, and in their annihilation desire acquires a kind of temporary certainty for itself. However, this certainty cannot last long because of the satisfaction of the negated object is only momentary. For self-

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<sup>90</sup> One of the most important commentators of Hegel, Pippin, asserts that desire as a form of self-consciousness refers no longer to any theoretical relation to the object, but to practical one. “Such a relation must be understood as the result of an attempt [...] and it often requires some sort of striving”. Quoted in *Hegel on Self-Consciousness*, p.15-16. I would like to dwell on this assertion because of its implicit reference to the concept of the body. As we have seen, self-consciousness in the form of desire, in order to prove its independence, strives for others to negate. That is, the activity is rooted in the body, or in the character of bodily striving. All activities of desire imply adequately understanding how we come to know more about the bodily existence of self-consciousness, and the ways in which it is related to its body as its other.

<sup>91</sup> Originally, Hegel uses the German word *Begierde* through which consciousness’s relation to its object is implied. In English translation of the word, the term primarily refers to appetite or a tendency, so it is always required to be used with the preposition “for” [*nach* in German]. I think that the term of *Begierde* arises at this point, not because we have an organic nature, but because of the structure of desire itself.

<sup>92</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 175.

consciousness, satisfaction is only permanent on the basis of the long-lasting existence of a desired object, which it is capable of negating of its apparent independency. Furthermore, and more importantly, self-consciousness in the form of bodily desire finds itself in a contradictory position. If bodily desire is always a desire to negate the independence of the natural objects, it is, at the same time, bound by the necessity of preserving them. Put differently, self-consciousness becomes aware of the fact that it necessarily depends on the independency of the object which it attempts to overcome. Desire, in order to overcome its object, needs to destroy it in order to attain satisfaction and to make its self-certainty available. Self-consciousness in the form of desire, while consuming its object, dissolves and puts an end to the very existence of the object that would provide reflection back to self-consciousness. This is the very reason that desire and the object are constantly re-produced. Now the challenge, for self-consciousness, is to find a new form of object in order to provide permanent satisfaction for its self-certainty. Through negating the object, self-consciousness becomes aware of the fact that its desire is essentially related to Life. That is, in the negating activity of bodily desire, self-consciousness learns that it cannot just merely get rid of everything that which is not itself. If it continues to do so, it is just involved in a vicious circle, since, as we have seen shortly before, life constantly produces the object and also the desire. In the process of the negation of the object by desire and in its re-production, consciousness realizes that its object is nothing, but the determinate shapes of Life<sup>93</sup>. The incessant separation and incorporation of these shapes are, as Hegel expresses, “a movement of those shapes”<sup>94</sup> or is Life: “the simple substance of Life is the splitting up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences [...] life [...] is just as much an imparting of shape as a supersession of it.”<sup>95</sup> As a movement of access to those

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<sup>93</sup> I think that what happens in the stage of “play of forces” is similar to Hegel’s definition of Life at first glance. As we have seen above, the transition of each forces into its opposite occurs in the play of forces, and Hegel’s concept of Life “recasts” the play of forces at a more different level, as dissolution and consolidation.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., §171.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.



shapes, now, desire conceives that it is primarily attached to Life, and then the proper object of it proves to be Life. While self-consciousness seeks to realize the dependence of the object to itself, it discovers its dependence to Life. Yet, for self-consciousness, attachment to life is not fully acceptable, and this is because it keeps trying to find an unalloyed certainty of itself. Thus, with the concept of Life, self-consciousness attempts to prove its own certainty by opposing itself to life, and life appears as other that threatens its own independence and self-sufficiency. Hegel states that indeed, the object of desire is no longer any object, but a “living thing”<sup>96</sup>. For Hegel, life, as the totality of living beings, can only be thought as the principle of infinite division and reintegration into unity; it is the very movement of life. As a self-producing process within which these two moments of life turns into a “reflected unity”, life, in Hegel’s words, is a “self-developing whole which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself”.<sup>97</sup> In this regard, life exposes itself as an engagement with infinity. As we have seen in above (2.3.4), like infinity, life is one essential process in which distinctions arise and undermine themselves in the unity. This is why the concept of infinity is explained as “the simple essence of life”. In the *Philosophy of Nature*, Hegel also explains life as a “self-related negative unity”<sup>98</sup> in which individual living thing comes to existence and is negated. In this sense, the movement of life and the living thing cannot be separated from each other. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel declares that everything has a contradictory character, which spreads in all organic forms of life as well. Life is the process in which the living thing is inverting itself into its own contrary by negating itself. This also implies that it is the operation of death within life. It is necessarily doomed to death through exposing itself to the negation. Exposing itself to its own death belongs to the natural character of living body, or to the fact of natural life. While Hegel construes the essence of life as a process of self-negation, the word “self”

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid., § 168.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., § 171.

<sup>98</sup> Hegel, “Organism” in the *Philosophy of Nature*, ed. and trans. Michael J. Petry (London and New York: Allen and Unwin, 1970), § 337.

implies that living bodies are not subject to death from outside, but death is immanent in living bodies from the beginning. If living bodies, at the end of the day, are not able to preserve themselves from their own death, that is, if they do not persist through their self-negation, and can be “independent in this negativity of itself”<sup>99</sup>, then self-consciousness cannot achieve its own self-certainty through the ‘living thing’ that is desired. The problem for self-consciousness depends on the fact that it cannot achieve its self-certainty by merely annihilating the living thing. The living thing must also be able to negate itself and to persist in existence in the face of its self-negation.

Above all, I would like to note that, in this stage, the notion of the ‘body’ can be considered in relation to natural life. In fact, I think, the account of bodily desire in terms of the living body makes natural life actually more comprehensible. The living body, on the one hand, exposes itself as a finite process of self-negation and as having a life of its own, but on the other hand, it is this body that remains merely on the level of nature.<sup>100</sup> Through the experience of self-consciousness, self-consciousness comes to see that it is impossible to fully negate or annihilate life; indeed, it is essentially related to the independency of life and its own dependence on its object, i.e., Life. And, the other lesson gleaned from this experience of self-consciousness is that the permanency of self-certainty and the satisfaction of desire depend on the way in which the other is capable of reflecting the negative activity of self-consciousness, by rendering itself as dependent on this negation without being totally annihilated. Now, what is essential for self-consciousness is no longer the infinite ‘living things’; but, the finite other that

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., §175.

<sup>100</sup> John Russon, one of the contemporary commentators of Hegel, proposes that it is not simply that Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is also about the embodied character of consciousness. In that sense, Russon states that the whole of the “Self-Consciousness” section is to be understood as an important contribution to making the problem of the “body” explicit in the *Phenomenology*. In his *The Self and Its Body*, he explains the notion of the “body” through some basic Aristotelian concepts such as *phusis*, *hexis*, or *logic*. Russon, *The Self and Its Body*, 53. We will explore how Russon reads the notion of the body in the context of self-consciousness in the section 3.4.

negates itself in its independence, and so provides the path to the self-realization of consciousness in this otherness:

On account of the independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only when the object itself effects the negation within itself; and it must carry out this negation of itself in itself, for it is *in itself* the negative, and must be *for* the other what it *is*. Since the object is in its own self negation, and in being so is at the same time independent, it is consciousness.<sup>101</sup>

Consequently, the other that can provide self-certainty to consciousness and satisfy its desire in this context must be “another self-consciousness”, that is, in Hegelian terms, “self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness”.<sup>102</sup> The relation to another self is made necessary by the previous experience of self-consciousness. It inescapably needs another self-consciousness because of the fact that “only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it”.<sup>103</sup> We also should keep in mind that as we have seen in the previous experiences of consciousness, the other does not suddenly appear at the stage, but rather, it is always an essential structure for all the forms of its experience from “Sense-Certainty” to “Self-Consciousness”. To say that self-consciousness does not discover a new phenomenon that is called the Other, but it is only for now that the concept of the Other becomes more sophisticated form as the Other self-consciousness that proposes to satisfy self-consciousness. And, self-consciousness confronts this another self-consciousness as the explicit object of desire that is no more an object of bodily desire. Hence, this recent object of self-consciousness must negate itself in a way that can be still independent for the sake of having the initial self-consciousness reflected in the Other. Only in being related to another self-consciousness that negates itself, it can sustain its self-certainty, but the other must be “equally independent in this negativity of itself”.<sup>104</sup> In this sense, it is explicit that the logic of self-consciousness necessarily needs to attain

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<sup>101</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 175.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., §177.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., §176.

concrete satisfaction in relating not to bodily desire but to recognition.<sup>105</sup> The implicit remark that should be noted here is that self-consciousness no longer attempts to negate the other, but rather, it seeks this other in order to be recognized because of the fact that only in this way it can attain self-certainty of itself and also proves its independence. And for that reason the other must be a living self-consciousness in which the initial one seeks nothing but itself. While the other does not put an end to exist in the act of self-negation, at the same time, it is not to exist in its own right, but rather, it is to be “for another”. In desiring the other self-consciousness that is willing to exist for another, the necessary structure of self-consciousness appears, i.e., the “duplication” of self-consciousness. Within the section, one of the key developments that Hegel tells us about is that the very nature of self-consciousness is what he calls the “doubling” and the “ambiguity”<sup>106</sup> of it. Thus the relation to the other is at the same time being related to the self, because of the very fact of being related to another “I”. If self-consciousness is relating itself through the other self-consciousness, and it is doing it as a sort of another “I”, or somebody similar in structure to itself, they are similarly doing the same thing in relating the other as well. Hegel tells us that “Self-consciousness exist in and for itself” only “by existing as such for another”.<sup>107</sup> So, this means that self-consciousness cannot be what it is without existing in relation to another, and the other also relates itself to that self-consciousness. The unity with itself that self-consciousness seeks cannot be attained except by a kind of unity, i.e., a unity of self and the other. Self-consciousness cannot be certain of its being in and for

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<sup>105</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer states explicitly this necessary logic of self-consciousness by writing that “only consciousness is able to [...] cancel itself in such a fashion that it does not cease to exist”. Hans-George Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies*, trans. P. C. Smith (CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 61.

<sup>106</sup> The Greek word “*ambi*” means ‘both’ or ‘two’. So, in Hegelian manner, if we say something ambiguous, we do not mean that it is unclear; we mean that it could be interpreted multiple ways. Any unclarity then comes from that it is precisely because of that ambiguity. Strictly speaking, it means that there are multiple ways to interpret the situation to make sense of other things. The German word “Doppelsinn” really captures the meaning as well. The word “Doppel” means ‘double’, and the word ‘sinn’ means ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’. Then, the word ‘ambiguity’ refers nothing but the double meaning of self-consciousness.

<sup>107</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 179.

itself without existing for the other, and this brings us to the key notion of “recognition”<sup>108</sup>, or *Anerkennen* in Hegel’s German. At this point, Hegel’s concept of “Spirit” winks to us, introducing us to the realm of Spirit through the experience of recognition. This is why Hegel, at this point, writes “‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.”<sup>109</sup> So, Hegel points out that the process of recognition, even if it is one-sided for now, is a cornerstone for the emergence of Spirit, which will be later the consequence of mutual recognition among independent self-consciousnesses, or the ‘I’ and ‘We’ relation. Although self-consciousness needs to confront another self-consciousness, in order to be properly conscious of itself and achieve the satisfaction of its desire, it must exist “only in being acknowledged”<sup>110</sup>, or recognized. While self-consciousness is trying to figure out how it exists in relation to other self-consciousness, Hegel says, in a sense, “it loses itself”, because it goes out of itself, and then finds itself in another. On the other hand, it also recognizes the other self as other self-consciousness precisely by seeing its own self in that other. Thus, Hegel says, it loses itself, and finds itself as another being. In doing so, it tries to supersede<sup>111</sup> the other and also to negotiate its relationship to the other by figuring out the way in which it finds itself in the eyes of the other, in the action of the other, or in the desire of the other. Then, the

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<sup>108</sup> Robert R. Williams writes, in Hegel’s *Early Theological Writings*, the concept of “love” is the very condition of the emergence of the movement of recognition, it presupposes both different selves and a kind of unity. He claims that the Hegelian understanding of “love” approves the recognition of “identity in difference” and “difference in identity”, and points out that Hegel takes into account the movement of “love” that gives rise the role of mediator between “self” and “other” and does posit itself like desire. The essence of the relations between oppositions of “self” and the “other” emerges in the light of “love” that necessitates the mutual recognition. Robert Williams, “Love, Recognition, Spirit: Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion” in *A Companion to Hegel*, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 394. In my view, the primitive roots of the concept of recognition could be found in Hegel’s early idea of love, but at the same time finding them does not make clear the essential argument that ‘self-consciousness exists [ ... ] only in being recognized’.

<sup>109</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 177.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., §178.

<sup>111</sup> The Hegelian concept of superseding [*Aufhebung*] refers to the movement of consciousness in which it tries to negate its object in order to overcome its difference and absorb the object into itself. However, at the same time, the negation of the object also leads to preservation of it and paves the way for a dialectically developed concept.

supersession of otherness becomes another ambiguity for self-consciousness. Hegel implies that we could think of this as a situation in which multiple ways are suggesting themselves to the self-consciousness that is now engaging, hoping for something from its other.<sup>112</sup> In his view, self-consciousness constantly engages with the other in such a way as to try to remove the independence of the other, and forces it to fit into its own desire. It is important to see that this constant struggle stems from the desire to attain certainty of self-consciousness through the other. And the other has to be fixed in a place in order to provide the required certainty of self-consciousness. However, in this case, the other also exhibits the same desire and the same type of action. In superseding the other, self-consciousness supersedes its own self, and the other is doing exactly the same what the first does in relation to the second self-consciousness. Hegel exposes the duplication of self-consciousness that is precisely fundamental to it as follows:

This movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this way been represented as the action of *one* self-consciousness, but this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well [...] Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousness [...] Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both.<sup>113</sup>

What we have here is the “double significance” of the movement in which one of the self-consciousnesses is doing something, and the other self-consciousness is doing the same thing back. Then, in the relationship between the duplication of self-consciousness, the form of recognition exposes itself: “they recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another”.<sup>114</sup> To be a proper self-consciousness, it must not only to be recognized through the mediation of the other, but also recognize it in return, which can only take place by “mutual recognition”. However, this duplicated self-consciousness initially experiences one-sided recognition by claiming that I can prove that I am an independent ‘pure being for myself’.

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., §181.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., §182.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., §184.

### 3.2 Meaning of Life and Death Struggle for Bodily Existence

Self-consciousness is faced with a challenge through the necessary result of the experience that is required by the act of recognition.<sup>115</sup> Recall that, on the one hand, self-consciousness in relation to the other finds itself ‘over there’ and thus, feels itself lost in the other; on the other hand, it does not see the other as genuine self-consciousness, but what it sees in the eyes of the other is its own self. In other words, self-consciousness sees the other self as being essentially and intrinsically “there for me”. However, what it comes to know by the previous experience is that if it negates the other merely as an object of its desire, it loses the other in the process and does not attain its desire. Moreover, it sees that the supersession of the other will be the supersession of itself as well, then, it must find an object that negates itself and “is equally independent in this negativity of itself”<sup>116</sup>. Such a relation is still a negation, but in a different sense. Although later in the *Phenomenology*, the problem of recognition is engaged thoroughly, for now, we

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<sup>115</sup> Kojève argues that desire is the basis of recognition through which social and historical existence of human being emerge. In Kojève’s anthropological reading, the term ‘desire for recognition’ is used instead of ‘struggle for recognition’. By replacing the term of ‘struggle’ with ‘desire’ makes his reading central to the entrance into social relations. He claims that “the Action that is born of desire can be nothing but a life and death fight” and historical existence of human as human – at least at the beginning- depends on the ‘desire for recognition’. Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 40. From his perspective, recognition can be understood as a conceptual framework through which the self desires to become fully humanized being. He asserts that recognition provides for individual to exist as human beings. In this regard, he understands the ‘desire for recognition’ as a fundamental human desire, thus it is one of the main points which makes his reading ‘human-centered’. In other words, it is the result of his excessive focus on the concept of recognition and his effort to make recognition ground for social and historical existence of human being.

However, it is certain that Hegel never uses the term of ‘desire for recognition’ throughout the *Phenomenology*, so that pointing out to the Hegelian desire as ‘desire for recognition’ would lead to a misconception. In fact, it is not the case that self-consciousness merely desires to be recognized, but it essentially desires to be certain of itself. While Kojève states that “desire is directed not toward a thing, but toward another desire- thus, it was a desire for recognition”, for Hegel, desire is not ‘desire for recognition’, but it implies to be certain of itself. Ibid., 19. As Judith Butler rightly writes, “In the turn to another self-consciousness as a possible object of satisfaction, we can see that it is not desire itself that is superseded, but a peculiar form of desire”. Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, 44. In my view, while it is important to emphasize the different understanding of Kojévian conceptualization of Hegel’s ‘recognition’, Butler’s understanding the concept of recognition as a peculiar form of desire is closer to what Hegel really say in ‘the life and death struggle’ part.

<sup>116</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 176.

can say that the initial configuration of recognition shall be one-sided. This one-sided recognition turns out to be the inevitable outcome of the life and death struggle in which we observe the encounter of two self-consciousnesses to attain the certainty of their pure being. As we shall see, in this struggle, the other self inevitably reduces itself to nothing by negating itself in such a way that it could make it possible for the first one to relate to itself, that is, it negates itself for the sake of the other.<sup>117</sup>

The life and death struggle is an inevitable stage in the formation of self-consciousness given that to accomplish the truth of one's self-certainty, each self-consciousness must prove its selfhood as depending on nothing including life itself; that is, each must prove itself to the other as fully free and independent, and not being attached to life, that is, as being free from any determination that is given by nature. We also should note that, here, there is an implicit philosophical affirmation, which supposes that freedom is also a characteristic of self-consciousness. However, not only the negation of the other, but also the negation of the other's body promotes the assertion of self-consciousness. In other words, insofar as the meaning of the bodily existence of the other is determined by the initial self-consciousness, it captures its being as free. Both self-consciousnesses expect the other's living body to be determined by itself, not only in thought, but in the activity. Indeed, the concrete existence of the living body is co-emergent through the movement of recognition, and it starts to reflect its implicit meaning to self-consciousnesses. Both self-consciousnesses claim that they are not even attached to their own body, that is, to their own life, and hence to life itself. Thus, each one must also present itself to the other through the way in which their bodily action appears in its twofold sense as risking one's own life and seeking the death of the other, i.e., life-and-death struggle. Insofar as the life-and-death struggle is

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<sup>117</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasizes that the act of "self-negation" points out that the second self does not recognize itself as a pure 'I', but rather it conceives itself as nothing for itself, as that which does not exist in its own right, so it is just "for another". This reading of him makes clear the sense of self-negation of the second self-consciousness. Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies*, 61.



the way for both self-consciousnesses to attain the truth of self-certainty, it is also the way to seek a way for the destruction of each other's body.

Above all, we can refer to Judith Butler who states that desire, at this stage, returns to the form of destruction: "It is desire once again transformed to destruction, a project that assumes that true freedom exists only beyond the body. [...] desire endeavors to overcome bodily life altogether, i.e., to become abstract identity without corporeal needs".<sup>118</sup> Only in this way, self-consciousness presents itself to the other so that there is nothing essential for it except its own pure freedom or its being for itself. Indeed, each has precisely a primitive conception of freedom and subjectivity, so each declares that the other is wholly absorbed in the natural life as a natural body. However, what self-consciousness shall learn from its encounter with the other is that it should not let the other cease altogether in consequence of the life-and-death struggle. In other words, the death of the other should be kept in suspense as a possibility which one is capable to accomplish through killing. Obviously, the fact of killing the other cannot prove the recognition that one seeks in the other. Therefore, self-consciousness must subjugate the other while letting it live in this subjugation. Butler is right to say that this "is a way of forcing the other to die within the context of life".<sup>119</sup>

At the end of the "life and death struggle", the determinations of both the master and the slave emerge by the attitudes towards life, and by the ways in which they posit their own body in life. The master<sup>120</sup> is the self-consciousness that wins the struggle by proving its self as above life, and the slave is the one that regards life as above its self by showing its dependence. The master holds the slave in subjection in order to preserve its own independence of life and its own body. Unlike the master, the bodily existence of the slave remains at the level of bodily

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<sup>118</sup> Butler, *Subjects of Desire*, 52.

<sup>119</sup> Butler, *Psychic Life of Power*, 41.

<sup>120</sup>The alternative usage for the term of 'master' is 'lord'. The term of lord does not only have historical associations, but it is still used in order to refer God in German language.

life because of its “attachment”<sup>121</sup> to life. The result of the “life and death struggle” shows that the struggle is not only between two self-consciousnesses, but it is also a struggle with reference to the status of each body. To put it another way, the struggle is between the attachment to “natural life” and the detachment from it through a relation to one’s and the other’s “body”. The life-and-death struggle is impossible without bodies that are capable of fighting and of dying, or of living. To put it differently, the movement of recognition requires a body that can perform the struggle and risk its bodily life. The bodily existence of consciousness also encounters with its own actual death or, in Hegelian terms, with absolute negativity. Being an embodied self is significant and necessary when one thinks about why one of the self-consciousnesses appears as master and the other one as slave. While both self-consciousnesses are impelled to risk their life in order to gain the recognition of the other, one becomes the slave by coming to the awareness that life is essential to it, and death actually would lead to losing everything that was at stake. Thus, in the struggle between master and slave, the slave preserves and attaches to its own life, while the master, so to speak, replaces the risk of its actual death with the possibility of detachment from its life and the body. The risk of death allows us to understand how the slave arises out as a bodily life that is not “in-and-for-itself”, but “for-another”. The slave does not recognize itself as having the power to detach its self from life and its body, but, accordingly, recognizes this as what the master as such is capable of. It no longer considers itself as an independent self and, conversely regards itself as in attachment to its own body and life, that is, as a dependent self and as unfree in its living bodily activity. Although the truth of the certainty of the master is beyond its own body, it becomes aware of the fact that it cannot totally get rid of its body; however, it can still remain on its project of being a disembodied pure self through the mediation of the slave’s body. Thus, the master takes the slave to be a living body that exists *for* it. It is remarkable that the body of slave is captured by the

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<sup>121</sup> Throughout this section, I borrow the terms of “attachment” and “detachment” from Butler and Malabou. They use the terms in order to give an account of the relation between the concept of life and the body.

master; but, the relation between master and slave will expose to what extent it is possible.

### 3.3 The Bodily Existence of Master and Slave

*The body is with the king,  
But the king is not with the body.*  
(Shakespeare, “Hamlet”)

What characterizes the relation between the master and the slave consciousnesses is their bodily position in the process of life. The demand of ‘be my body’ stated by master is a means of identifying the relationship between master and slave that governs the emergence of the body as enjoyment and the work. The master expresses its identity and domination in the acts of consuming the objects around it and in its enjoyment. It enjoys the consumption of objects because of the emergence of the primitive sense of freedom in its ability of negating the objects. Hegel distinguishes this kind of enjoyment of the master from the previous natural desire because, while the master “takes to itself only the dependent aspect of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it”<sup>122</sup>, the slave works on is the independent aspect of the thing. It means that the enjoyment of master is only for the ready-made things that the slave prepares for it. However, through consuming the things, master is on the side of passive reception that cannot provide any satisfaction, which requires both an active negation and reflection. In other words, insofar as the master appears in the act of consumption of ready-made fruits of the world, it never indeed exhibits the active negation, and it cannot reflect on itself through this enjoyment. Given the fact that the master demonstrates its ownership on the objects that are prepared by the slave, the slave cannot identify the objects of the world as its own, but instead it produces and serves for the master by means of its bodily work. Even that the master gains recognition for its own identity, its

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<sup>122</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 190.

enjoyment could still be read as a sensuous relation to the objects, which is previously investigated at the level of sense-certainty.

The master is not aware of the fact that how its independence is in truth dependent on the laboring activity of the slave and the objects of the world that the slave produces for its enjoyment. It is also unaware that slave is the unique constitutive part of its masterhood. In other words, the master does not comprehend that its independence is dependent on bodily existence of the slave, and it is engaged with the objects of the world through the labor of slave. What the master does not also comprehend is that it is not merely dependent on slavery in general, but rather, it is dependent on a particular slave, i.e., the particular body of the particular slave. It is further also to realize that what it is actually attached to is the life itself. In my view, it is important to see that the master and the slave are connected through the objects of the world, or life itself.

The slave is not only forced to recognize the master without being recognized by it, but also the body of slave is instrumentalized within this one-sided recognition. The slave becomes a producer or laborer in order to ascertain the pure self-consciousness of the master because it is forced to produce the objects that the pure self-consciousness only wants to enjoy. It is the master who “enjoys” the ready-made products without the trouble of giving form to them, but it is the slave who works on the objects and shapes them in a particular form. Therefore, the activity of slave identifies the ‘reality’ of these objects through its laboring activity. What is displayed at the level of form giving activity is that it does negate the abstract indeterminacy of the objects and makes them determinate in turn. On the basis of its activity, it makes the objects its ‘own’. Through bodily form giving activity, the slave also makes a difference in the external world. In the same process, it also posits itself as its other. Thus, it becomes external and confronts itself in this externality. It finds its identity with itself in this externality<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>123</sup> The term of “externality” is one of the main ways in which the subject-object duality is overcome. In a Hegelian sense, laboring process is seen to be an answer to overcome the external

For the Kojévian reading, the concept of freedom can only be engaged with the capacity to negate and transform any determination that is given to slave. Thus, according to the Kojévian reading, the crucial emphasis is on the laboring activity through which a ‘social and historical’ account of Hegel’s formulation of “master and slave” is given. He attempts to give an account of bodily existence of the slave by claiming that slave’s labor mainly leads to the attachment to life and detachment from the human side of consciousness.<sup>124</sup> However, what is missed in Kojève’s point of view is that the acts of “attachment” and “detachment” are only taken into account from the perspective of slave’s labor. If the issue of “attachment” and “detachment” is only possible through slave’s labor, then what about the master? In other words, if the master is the one who only enjoys the fruit of slave’s labor, then, what about its bodily position in the process of masterhood? Whether its body arises as an “attachment” or a “detachment” is unclear in his interpretation. For this reason, his interpretation is not enough to bring to light the notion of the “body” in the *Phenomenology*.

It is true that the labor of the slave consciousness changes the relation of ‘attachment’ and ‘detachment’, and with its laboring activity it entirely changes the scene of the movement of recognition. As Hegel states, the slave firstly comes to recognize itself as master over the object that it forms, and realize that its own independence mirrors itself from the object that it produces. It recognizes itself in this state of being reflected from the object:

Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is [...] The negative relation to the object becomes its *form* and something *permanent*, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence [...] It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, *qua* worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its *own* independence.<sup>125</sup>

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character of the object, thus there is no longer a clear division between the slave and the object in this process.

<sup>124</sup> Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, 25.

<sup>125</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 195.

However, the laboring activity is not only the moment for the independence of slave consciousness, but this independence is implicit in the “fear of death”<sup>126</sup>, since as we seen above; the emergence of the laboring activity is grounded in the “fear of death”. Through the experience of life-and-death struggle, the slave has experienced the “fear of death” and has also learned the fact that its existence is not only “for-another”, but also “for-itself”. It becomes aware of the fact that it always already depends on its own existence. If it dies, it dies its own death, and thus its self only belongs to it, not to the master. Unlike the master who does not feel the “fear of death”, as Hegel states, with the “fear of death”, slave “becomes conscious of what he truly is”<sup>127</sup> in the process of laboring, which makes explicit to see that its being is independent of both master and the nature. Although the slave cannot find itself recognized by the master throughout the master and slave relation, what it finds in this relation is its freedom. While the slave embodies the active negation through working on the objects, and thus it proves that it is more than an attached body; rather, its body emerges as an expression of freedom through the experience of work. However, this sense of the freedom the slave sees in its laboring activity is still a primitive form of freedom, i.e., it only exists in the ability of transforming activity. Nevertheless, in contrast to the master, the slave is obviously more free than it initially thinks. Now, the slave’s consciousness while preserving its contradictory nature in which it is also independent from and dependent on the master turns into the new shape of consciousness, i.e., ‘thought’.

### **3.4 Some Approaches to the Bodily Existence for Each Consciousness**

As we just saw in the section “Lordship and Bondage”, the implicit meaning of the “body” becomes explicit in the relation between the developing notions of desire, life, and recognition. Thinking on these relations by means of some crucial

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<sup>126</sup> Houlgate points out that the fear of death leads a transformation in slave understanding of his labouring activity: “For he can now undersrtand his labor, not just as the exercise of a particular skill, but as the outward, active expression of the fact that his being as self-consciousness is not tied to being anything in particular [...] He can thus see himself as master not just over some things, but over “the whole of objective being””. Houlgate, *G.W.F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 24.

<sup>127</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 195.

secondary literature is the main concern of this section that will trace the problem of the “body” in accordance with the unity of this chapter. Before investigating the implications of the bodily existence of consciousness that could lead to a transformative approach to Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, we should bear in mind that the process of the *Phenomenology* is also the very process of “overcoming bodily existence”<sup>128</sup>. Butler asserts that “If desire is always a desire to overcome bodily existence, it is equally bound by the necessity of preserving it”<sup>129</sup>. In this sense, the central notions of this section presuppose the “bodily existence”. To discuss such a presupposition, I think, Butler’s and Malabou’s explication of “Lordship and Bondage” is crucial to provide a proper understanding of the section.

According to Butler and Malabou, the notion of the “body” could be investigated in terms of the Hegelian concept of “life” in which the implied structure of his views on the “body” is exhibited. They suggest that the concepts of “life” and its relation to the “body” should be considered in the context of “lordship” and “bondage”. From this point of view, Butler and Malabou assert that “[i]n the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the two substantives “Lordship” and “Bondage” appear to be conceptual names for “detachment” and “attachment””<sup>130</sup>. They think that a possible relation between the notion of the “body” and the concept of “life” can be constituted by taking into account both the “attachment” to and the “detachment” from life. Their reading centers on the interpretation of the “attachment” to one’s life and body, and the “detachment” from them. As we have seen, in this chapter, however, it firstly arises as “detachment”:

To able to prove itself to be a consciousness -and not a thing or an object- to another consciousness, consciousness will have to show that it is not attached to

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<sup>128</sup> Catherine Malabou and Judith Butler, “You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape, and Plasticity in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*” in *A Companion to Hegel*, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 620.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 633.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., 612.

any specific *existence*, not to the individuality common to existence as such, that it is not attached [*geknüpft*] to life.<sup>131</sup>

If detachment from life is a requirement to prove one's self-consciousness, then the detachment from life arises as a necessary condition to become proper self-consciousness. It will become an issue given that it is already attached to a body. Therefore, Butler and Malabou claim as follows: "Attachment to life means first of all attachment to one's own body. What Hegel calls the "objective mode of existence" can only be understood as bodily life".<sup>132</sup>

Butler and Malabou expand the account of the "body" by relating it to the discussion of the "life and death struggle". At the end of the "life and death struggle", the meaning of the master emerges beyond the bodily life, but not beyond its own bodily existence. The master preserves its bodily life through the slave: "The master is the one who is capable of such a detachment; the bondsman, on the contrary, is enslaved by his irretrievable attachment to life and consequently to his body".<sup>133</sup> Unlike the master, the bodily existence of the slave remains at the level of bodily life because of its "attachment" to life. While the master is related to the bodily life through the slave's "attachment" to life, the slave attaches to both bodily life and life itself through the mediation of its labor. Unlike the master, the slave works on bodily objects and negates them. At this point, Butler asks: "Can, then, the labor reflected back be said finally to be the bondsman's own?"<sup>134</sup> Then, she gives the answer as follows: "The bondsman discovers his autonomy, but he does not (yet) see that this autonomy is the dissimulated effect of the lord's."<sup>135</sup> It is not aware of the fact that its own "body" is attached to life for the master. What is more, the master supposes that it is detached from bodily life and it is also beyond its body. And from the perspective of the slave, it is crucial to understand

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 36

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 37.



that it is not “for-itself”, but “for-another”. In this sense, the bodily action of the slave belongs to the master; “for what the bondsman does is really the action of the lord.”<sup>136</sup> It is to say that the master is not fully detached from its own body. As Butler says:

In the lord and bondsman section, it is the laboring body that is elsewhere, that is a body for the lord, but the lord still consumes and in this way remains a body in relation to what his exteriorized body provides. The lord’s body is thus never fully evacuated, and it follows that nobody’s living body fully is: the very process of evacuating the body or loaning it out is inevitably partial and, hence, partially impossible.<sup>137</sup>

The impossibility of an ultimate detachment from the “body” and “life” for the master reveals that its body is partially attached to life and to his own body. It is also obvious that the master attempts to establish its mastership by means of “detachment”, but it fails. Butler points out the impossibility of “detachment” from the body and also from life:

It is impossible, first, because the operation of bodily substitution is denied by the master. The master claims to be able to detach himself from his own body but denies, in doing so, that he is only transferring it to the slave, asking him to be his body in his place while disavowing this very demand.<sup>138</sup>

From the perspective of the slave, what we see at the end of the “Lordship and Bondage” section is the way in which its bodily finitude emerges. The slave becomes aware of the fact that it does not only negate things, but it “is subject to a full and final negation in death”<sup>139</sup>. It is the “being towards death” by which he encounters its mortality and finitude. At his point Butler’s comment is close to the Heideggerian assertion that “no one can take the other’s dying away for him”<sup>140</sup>. In this sense, the slave brings to light the truth of the finitude of its bodily existence. “Being towards death” attaches the slave to its own body. The slave’s body is no

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<sup>136</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 191.

<sup>137</sup> Malabou and Butler, “You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape, and Plasticity in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*”, 633.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 614.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 618.

<sup>140</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 223.

more only “for-another”, but also “for-itself”. It becomes aware of the fact that it is always already attached to its own body. In this regard, the ultimate detachment from its own body is impossible, and its body belongs to it, not to the master. Butler shows that “finitude is discovered at the end of Lordship and Bondage as a definitive attachment [...]”<sup>141</sup> The crucial point for this section is that the “body” includes both an “attachment” and “detachment”; they go hand in hand from the viewpoint of Butler and Malabou. The result of the “life and death struggle” shows that the struggle is not only between two self-consciousnesses, but it is also a struggle within each body. To put it another way, the struggle is between the attachment to “natural life” and the detachment from it through the “body”.

In addition to the section on the “life and death struggle”, Butler and Malabou add another point to their reading of “Lordship and Bondage”. This point mainly suggests that the concept of the “Other” and its relation to the “body” could be considered in the context of this section. This indicates, for Hegel, that to become a proper self-consciousness, consciousness must present itself in its relation to otherness. On the ground of Hegel’s understanding of the section “Lordship and Bondage”, what Butler points out is that “The first lesson gleaned from the encounter with the ‘Other’ is that of the essential ambiguity of self-consciousness’ externalization. Self-consciousness seeks a reflection of its own identity through the other.”<sup>142</sup> The ‘Other’ makes possible a reflexive relation between the self-consciousness and its own identity. Thus, the “Other” is not to be understood in a one-sided relation to consciousness. It simultaneously reflects the “self” within its own otherness. For this reason, the attempt to overcome the otherness of the “Other” is simultaneously an attempt to overcome the bodily otherness of the ‘Other’. It means that self-consciousness aims to render the bodily existence of the ‘Other’ its own. However, this effort of self-consciousness is useless: “Although there is no body that is mine without the other’s body, there is no final

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<sup>141</sup> Malabou and Butler, “You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape, and Plasticity in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*”, 620.

<sup>142</sup> Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*, 48.

expropriation of one's own body, and no final appropriation of another's body."<sup>143</sup> In this regard, the main consequence of the 'Other' may implicitly reveal whether the "attachment" to the other's body and life, or the "detachment" from one's own body and eventually to one's life is possible. The discussion of the "body" throughout the section "Lordship and Bondage" reveals what sort of an "attachment" to or "detachment" from the "body" is possible. Thanks to the impossibility of an ultimate detachment from or attachment to the body, the body arises as an unfixed "process". It means that no permanent attachment to the body, or detachment from it is possible; rather, it is a process in which "ultimately unsuccessful attempts" come into existence. Butler also states that "there is no permanent attachment -or permanent detachment- but a series of withdrawals and reattachments"<sup>144</sup>.

The other point of view in the discussion of the "body" in the *Phenomenology* comes from John Russon's reading, who proposes a rational comprehension of the "embodiment" of consciousness by stating that "This will be a presentation not of the science of the experience of consciousness but of the science of the embodiment of consciousness"<sup>145</sup>. There is a possible compromise between the "embodiment of consciousness" and the "body" throughout Hegel's work. For Russon, it is not simply that Hegel's *Phenomenology* is only about the experience of consciousness; rather, his work also includes the notion of the "body" to the extent that we see the embodied character of consciousness: "[...] the conception of body that is systematically implied by his phenomenological analysis of the experience of consciousness"<sup>146</sup> In this regard, according to Russon, the whole of the "Lordship and Bondage" section is to be read as an important contribution to solving the problem of the "body" in the *Phenomenology*. Russon's analysis of

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<sup>143</sup> Malabou and Butler, "You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape, and Plasticity in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*", 611.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 614.

<sup>145</sup> Russon, *The Self and Its Body in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, 3.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

Hegel's notion of the body specifically focuses on the "Lordship and Bondage" section. Before proceeding to Russon's reading of the "body", it may be useful to define what he means by "embodiment". Russon mainly uses the term to clarify the meaning of a bodily existence for consciousness. In his *The Self and its Body*, he uses the shapes of consciousness presented in "Lordship and Bondage" to give an account of "three logical determinations" of the notion of the body. He calls these determinations *phusis*, *hexis*, and *logos*.<sup>147</sup> It is to say that the notion of the "body" is explained through these Aristotelian concepts: *phusis* as nature, *hexis* as habit, and *logos* as expression. Related to Russon's point of view, the notion of the "body" as *phusis* emerges as an essential notion in the context of "life", and it posits "feature of the logic of bodiliness that is the non-reflective system of activities that accomplish an immediate relation of desire to its object"<sup>148</sup>. His reading of the "body as *phusis*" is revealed through the analysis of Hegel's basic concepts of desire and life in the section "Lordship and Bondage". In the section, self-consciousness is only in the form of natural or bodily desire. At this stage, self-consciousness attempts to destroy or negate its object to show the independence of life. Bodily desire tries to supersede life in the process of consuming or negating the object. In this sense, self-consciousness merely arises as an organism or living being. Russon also remarks that life "remains merely natural"<sup>149</sup>. This is to say that, at this stage, self-consciousness indicates nothing more than a "nature" or "organism". As Russon states, "we must see how the logic of desire is precisely the logic of organism"<sup>150</sup>. The crucial point, for Russon, is to ask how the body as *phusis* is important in this stage. Later, he refers to the organic body as "self- maintaining system":

We have the notion of organism as an interactive totality, but we also need to notice that the unity of this totality is an activity; that is, the organic body is not a static whole, but is united only as a dynamic process and a process, precisely, of

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<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 55.

self-maintenance, that is, self-unification. Essentially, then, the organic body is the process of self-production or, indeed, self-production.<sup>151</sup>

In this regard, the organic body does not only remain at the level of the merely living body, but it also implies a “dynamic process of self-production” or “body-building”. Russon states that the “organic body” is the first principle for the second determination of the body which is named *hexis* or “habit”<sup>152</sup> (as second nature). According to Russon, the difference of master and slave appears as the consequence of their choice<sup>153</sup>. In other words, the characteristic of such a determination reveals itself through the choice of who is the master or the slave at the end of the “life and death struggle”. For this reason, Russon describes habit “as a product of self-conscious choice”<sup>154</sup>. As a result of this choice, while the slave is at the level of *phusis*, the life of the master is built on *hexis*: “This notion that the master-self really is built out of the slave’s life – that is, the notion that the life of the master really is a developed (*gebildet*) form of behavior that could not be carried out by the master simply through the operations of her own ‘natural’ body – allows us now to call the body a *hexis*”<sup>155</sup>. The meaning of *hexis* depends on a process of habituation and also the process of habituation needs to be independent from natural life. It means that it requires being a master. Through the independence from natural life (or bodily life), the master overcomes its “nature” and, creates a “second nature”. Therefore, while *phusis* implies a biological or natural body, *hexis* appears as habit or second nature. However, for Russon, it is important that as long as the bodily life of the master depends on the slave’s body,

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>153</sup> In Sartre’s famous book, *Being and Nothingness*, I think, he implicitly points out that the emergence of master and slave is based on ‘existential desire’. According to him, every desire indicates a ‘fundamental choice’ (or a radical decision) regarding how to reveal itself in the world. In his account, fundamental choice determines ‘a mode of being’ that refers to a way of life. Any particular desire presupposes this original choice that exposes the decision of how to live. In this regard, at the end of the “life and death struggle”, each consciousness announces their fundamental choices that make them master or slave. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. E. Barnes (London: Routledge, 2002), 562.

<sup>154</sup> Russon, *The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, 69.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 68.

its body is not only *hexis* but also *phusis*. After all the determinations of the body, Russon proposes the third determination of it as *logos* or expression. In the same part, Russon identifies the “body” as *logos* and also indicates its expressive character. Moreover, he focuses on the relation of the master and the slave through this expression. Russon states that the result of the “life and death struggle” can only be effective as long it is expressive: “In order for her choice to be effective, the slave-to-be must express her decision to her opponent. The only means at her disposal are those over which her will has control, that is, her living body”<sup>156</sup>. Expression is driven to the point of recognizing who is the master or the slave. Moreover, Russon also understands the “body” as an expression in which the gesture of both the master and the slave is presented. In this sense, the body of them implies a sort of “communication” through the way in which their gestures are presented to the other. Such a communication makes the slave’s body open to the understanding of the master. In other words, Russon considers that what it means to be the slave consists in being the starter of the communication. According to him, the master is a receiver who understands and reacts to what the slave expresses through its gesturing. It means that the master must “be able to recognize the body of the other *as* gesturing, and he must understand what the gesture expresses”<sup>157</sup>.

Moreover, Russon’s approach to the textuality of the “body” is another crucial aspect for the section “Lordship and Bondage”. For Russon, we can think of the “body” as a “text”<sup>158</sup> insofar as it seems to include both “reading and writing”<sup>159</sup>. According to Russon, “Self-consciousness is essentially reading one’s body, and it is the recognition of this which completes the development of self-

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid.,73.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.,p.74.

<sup>158</sup> John Russon, “Reading and the Body in Hegel”, 22:4 (1993), 322.

<sup>159</sup> It may be important to keep in mind that, for Russon, the whole of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* would then appear as a process of both reading and writing. He states that “Absolute knowing is the recognition that I can only ever read the autobiography I have always already been writing, or again, I can only ever write the autobiography I have always already been reading”. Ibid., 336.

consciousness”<sup>160</sup>. In this regard, he understands the role of the master as a reader of the expressions of the slave in the section. To be a master means not only to be the winner of the “life and death struggle”, but also to be an effective reader. And to be a slave means to be an efficient writer. It writes through its labor, because unlike the master, the slave works on objects and leaves its signature on them. The master attempts to read the signature on the objects on which the slave labors, however, the signature is disappeared by the master “who stamps it with his name, owns it, or consumes it in some way”<sup>161</sup>. At this point, the master is at the end of its role as an effective reader. By means of his consumption, there is no signature to read: “The signature is always already erased, written over, expropriated, resignified”.<sup>162</sup> The slave becomes aware of the fact that its signature belongs to the master and it does not mark its own labor: “The working of the slave is thus to be understood as a marking which regularly unmarks itself [...]”<sup>163</sup>. Moreover, at this point, the role of the slave cannot remain as an effective writer, then, the slave turns to what it writes, i.e., self-recognition. It is to say that it turns to its labor instead of offering the master to be a writer for it. At the end of the section, the slave becomes a reader of what it writes through its labor. It sees and reads the essential character of its labor:

[...] The bondsman, through working on the thing, embodies the principle of negation as an active and creative principle, and thus inadvertently dramatizes that he is more than a mere body, and that the body itself is an embodying or expressive medium for the project of a self-determining identity. Through the experience of work, the body is revealed as an essential expression of freedom.<sup>164</sup>

As I have tried to explore in this chapter of the study, the notion of the “body” is not only essential for the section “Lordship and Bondage”, but it is also the basis of many Hegelian concepts such as consciousness, life, the other, recognition, and

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 323.

<sup>161</sup> Malabou and Butler, “You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape, and Plasticity in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*”, 618.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*, 53.

desire. Each concept of the section presupposes the “body” or “bodily existence” in terms of its different aspects. As it seems to be more explicit now, we can understand more clearly what the meaning of a bodily existence for consciousness is in this section of *Phenomenology*.

Before passing to the next form of consciousness, above all, I would like to draw attention to an ambiguity that emerges at the end of ‘Lordship and Bondage’. As we have seen, throughout the relation between master and slave, Hegel puts a strong emphasis on work that is projected into the idea of actualization of freedom. It is the ground that makes a possible objective expression of the slave’s freedom, and the slave seeks to gain self-recognition through its work. While the slave gains the proper image of self-consciousness in an objectified form through its labor, the master lacks the proper external relation to independent objects and also an objective expression of its freedom. In other words, what is crucial in terms of the relation between master and slave is that with the working activity on the objects, the slave finds an objective expression to its independence and self-recognition through being in relation to independent objects that it forms. Even though the work seem to be a solution to the problem of both recognition and freedom, the slave remains in being un-recognized as a free self by another self-consciousness. It means that even if the slave finds any objective expression of its independence, its independence only depends on its work or slavery. Put differently, the relation between master and slave emphasizes the actualization of freedom in a way in which the slave becomes an independent self-consciousness through its bodily activity; on the other hand, it still depends on the master. Therefore the slave cannot fully free itself from its initial submission to the master (as for-another) and articulate its independence (as for-itself) into a more determinate way other than the form-giving activity to things by means of its labor, if it does not internalize and appropriate the independence in its transformative activity as the freedom of thought. However, this internalization, in the sense of its inner freedom, which emerges at the close of the ‘Lordship and Bondage’ section, turns into a more complex problem of freedom for the next shape of consciousness, i.e. “Stoicism”,



which will reveal the inherent contradiction between inner freedom and external unfreedom. In other words, in so far as the self-consciousness remains within the terms of the opposition between its independence and dependence, the problem of its freedom becomes more visible with all its inherent tensions as I shall articulate in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER 4

### FREEDOM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT THE BODY

Throughout the second section of Self-Consciousness chapter, which is called “Freedom of Self-Consciousness”, Hegel shows us the ways in which self-consciousness takes a new attitude to the world that which is divided into three modes: Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness. At the end of the preceding chapter, we have seen how the slave finds its ‘truly independent consciousness’ in its bodily activity through forming the object of nature. It finds itself in the form giving activity. By virtue of realizing the impossibility of an ultimate independency of both the master and the object, slave consciousness finds its own independence in the form of the object to which it relates.

#### 4.1 Vacating the Body in Thought: Stoicism

Before exploring these modes of self-consciousness, we should make explicit the transition<sup>165</sup> from the first section to second. In the previous section, the relation between the master and the slave was not symmetrical regarding the demand of recognition. While the master is unable to give objective expression to its freedom, the slave is conscious of itself, and finds its own freedom through its labor. Depending on its formative (labor or work) activity, consciousness finds itself in this form. In other words, by finding itself in the form of its activity, it also finds

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<sup>165</sup> According to Robert Stern, Hegel’s implicit account of transition from ‘Lordship and Bondage’ section to ‘Freedom of Self-Consciousness’ includes a shift from practical attitude of consciousness to the world to theoretical one. Stern explains the transition by asserting that it involves a sort of rationalism, which is primarily believed by Ancient Stoics who takes the universe governed by *logos* or reason. Thus, Stern states that Hegel probably refers to actual historical episodes in the three subsections of ‘Freedom of Self-Consciousness’: “In this text historical episodes have the place they do because they relate to particular stages in the *conceptual* development that Hegel is tracing out for consciousness.” However, at the same time, he reminds us that reading the whole *Phenomenology* as that includes merely historical episodes would distort Hegel’s account. Stern, *Hegel and The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 86.

its own self-consciousness in it. Hegel, thus, stresses the point that “the form of the object and self-consciousness of the slave have the same structure”.<sup>166</sup> The new form of consciousness sees not only its own formative activity over the object but also its own self-consciousness in it, that is, it recognizes itself in the form of the object. This is the reason that the slave has no longer a need for another self-consciousness in order to be recognized, and stands in relation only to the object that which provides the self-realization and recognition of it.<sup>167</sup> The form of the object belongs to self-consciousness itself as much as to the object; in fact, consciousness of the slave identifies itself with the very same substance of the object. Then, it takes a new form of consciousness called as Stoic “thought”. The criterion of slave consciousness for its own freedom emerges from the unsatisfactory relationship between the master and the slave, and as a result of this relationship, the Stoic self conceives freedom as a total independence from all determinations or limitations of the others, i.e., the other selves and the world itself. Thus, the Stoic consciousness positions itself as outside of the whole sensuous world that it actually depends upon. Moreover, it has a reaction against the unsatisfactory experience of the master-slave relationship because of the fact that it has experienced that total independence is not possible by remaining in relation to the master and the world. Thus, it takes primarily a position in which denial and negative attitudes emerge as central. Its rejection is not just against slavery; rather, it exhibits a rejection to any sense of limitation against its own consciousness. It means that stoic consciousness withdraws itself from master-slave dependencies, and becomes indifferent to all relations of the world. Its freedom of thought is also in a negative form by which it is free from all determinations of the world, and it is free to think what it pleases. Thus, the stoic

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<sup>166</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 197.

<sup>167</sup> If we ask about the master, it could be said that it has imprisoned itself in enjoying its own mastery without giving any objective expression to its freedom. Then, a kind of attitude of mastery to the world will again appear in the ‘Scepticism’ section. However, for now, the new shape of self-consciousness is presented by only the slave. As John Plamenatz rightly put it “[...] the future lies with the slave. It is his destiny to create the community in which everyone accords recognition to everyone else, the community in which Spirit attains its end and achieves its satisfaction”. John Plamenatz, *Man and Society*, (United Kingdom: Longman, 1992), vol.2.

self becomes identical with its own thought, and thought becomes identical with freedom. Stoic self believes that freedom is an isolated realm, in which any dependence to others is not required, and so thinking appears as a unique alternative to act freely. This is the way in which self-consciousness appears mainly as 'thought'.

In Hegel's point of view, Stoicism indicates a mode of thinking in which self-consciousness has nothing beyond its own thinking that which is both essential and self-relational. This mode of thinking is a version of "pure self-consciousness" that takes the self as a pure abstraction without any content and makes it the essential act towards other selves and the world. Thinking, for Hegel, primarily makes one self-relational through which self-consciousness takes everything in reference to its own thought. However, stoical thought, which arrives on its own insight, is not aware of the fact that its self-relationality is nothing, but an abstraction. From the stoic point of view, the world exists only in thought. Hegel states that "Its principle is that consciousness is a being that *thinks* and that consciousness holds something to be essentially important, or true and good only in so far as it *thinks* it to be such".<sup>168</sup>

For such thought, there is nothing essential beyond its own thought, and it always thinks by withdrawing itself from the outside. It is indifferent to the natural existence of the others, and mainly to the world. In other words, stoic consciousness becomes completely alien to the internally differentiated sphere of life because of the reason that the unstable sphere of life makes it feel uncontrollable. Thus, it has a negative attitude against to what it cannot control or what it cannot master. Stoic self thinks that it has no need of the particularities of the world, that is, it is a progressive renunciation of the sensuous world by means of 'thought'.

The theme of "withdrawal" indicates, I believe, an essential movement through which stoic consciousness ignores to be open to anything except its own self-

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<sup>168</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 198.

consciousness. It attempts to withdraw itself not only from the realm of life but also from the bodily existence of its own self. The act of withdrawal provides it to remain only in relation to its own self-consciousness. As noted above, it is the fact that slave consciousness realizes in the master-slave relation that its body is already dependent on anything other than itself, so that, it withdraws itself even from its body in order to be independent. Thus, it makes its own body alien to itself.<sup>169</sup> In this regard, the body appears in the way that it has been abandoned for the sake of pure self-consciousness of the stoic. As Butler properly states that becoming a pure self-consciousness “entails vacating the body and clinging to what appears to be most disembodied: thought.”<sup>170</sup> The reason of the act of vacating the body for stoic self-consciousness is that freedom merely indicates to be independent in thought, but not as body. However, this stoic thought is merely an “abstract thought of freedom”, or “a truth lacking the fullness of life”<sup>171</sup>. It means that the abstract thought can merely include “the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself”<sup>172</sup> since, its freedom does not depend on any content or any particular actuality. When it clings to abstract thought, it cannot give any content to what is true or real, then it cannot find any satisfactory and objective answers to independence assertion of its own self.

The True and the Good, wisdom and virtue, the general terms beyond which Stoicism cannot get, are therefore in a general way no doubt uplifting, but since

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<sup>169</sup> As John Russon makes explicit, stoic self-consciousness also attempts to get rid of its own body. According to the stoic self, its body is the distinguishable appearance. In this regard, stoicism could be understood as our ability to say “I” to the extent that this “I” distinguish “me” from “it” or “myself” from the world. Therefore, stoic consciousness can easily differentiate, and say “me” and “my body”. In connection to the point, Russon reminds us the story told by slave Epictetus, who is a Greek Stoic philosopher: “His master twists Epictetus’ leg and he says that ‘if you go on, you will break my leg, and when his leg becomes broken, Epictetus calmly says that ‘I told you so.’ By reminding this story, Russon states that for Stoic self “The pain of the breaking leg exerts no influence over the self; rather the pain is alien to the self [...] Epictetus differentiates and says ‘me and my pain’. Russon, *The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, 17.

<sup>170</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 43.

<sup>171</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 200.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

they cannot in fact produce any expansion of the content, they soon become tedious.<sup>173</sup>

So that, it fails to give any content to its own thought without depending on any object, since while stoic thought tries to reach substance of the object by withdrawing to its own thought, it only remains dependent on the object in order to give it any content. Then, self-consciousness becomes aware of the fact that the act of “withdrawing” itself from the world leads to remain as its own thought merely as an “abstract thought”<sup>174</sup>. Hence, then it leaves the withdrawal off, and necessarily makes transition to a new form of consciousness, which does not withdraw itself from the world.

#### **4.2 Abrogation of the Body: Scepticism**

Sceptical thought appears as an infinite capacity to negate everything in the object and “the many and varied forms of life as a real negativity”.<sup>175</sup> It annihilates them in thought and declares that there is nothing to be real in the world except thought. It annihilates things by undermining them in thought, so that, claims to achieve the freedom of thought in this negation. In that sense, sceptical self, like master, relates to the world as a pure self-consciousness, however, unlike master, the negation of the sceptic does not actually take place in the act of consuming, but it occurs in thought. Hegel writes that sceptical self “procures for its own self the certainty of its freedom [...] and thereby raises it to truth”.<sup>176</sup> What Hegel tells us about Scepticism is that it is “the realization of that of which Stoicism was only the Notion, and is the actual experience of what the freedom of thought is.”<sup>177</sup> Such

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Kojève takes the term of “abstract thought” as ideologies ( in a sense of Marxist point of view). According to him, all forms of abstract thought are at work in order to impose the enslavement on the slave. For example, for Kojève, the unhappy consciousness is nothing, but a process in which the ideology of it attempts to get the slave accept enslavement to the Unchangeable, i.e., God. Accordingly, while it appears as a rejection of the reality in Stoicism, and, in Scepticism, it appears as a negation of the whole world.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., § 202.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., § 204.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., § 202.

kind of thought presents itself and its relation to the world sceptically. Hegel calls sceptic self as a “medley of sensuous and intellectual representations”.<sup>178</sup> It is a single self opposed to multiplicity, and it has also a single power of negativity for all its experienced differences. While the stoical self presents itself freely in only thought, the sceptical self clings to the comprehension that if the objects of the world are revealed by virtue of thought, then negating of them also means to annihilate how they are in themselves, or negation of their ground.<sup>179</sup> Therefore, sceptic becomes doubtful for the ground of the objects, and asserts that the origins of the object can never be knowable. The main concern of the sceptical thought is certainly the negation of every origin, that is, sceptical thought essentially rejects any ground for the basic epistemological and ontological claims except the groundlessness of them.<sup>180</sup> In other words, such a sceptical thought implies nothing, but the purest nihilism. While it negates everything in thought around it, on the other hand, it negates its own negativity as well. It vacates any principle of reason, any principle for the truth, so that, as Hegel puts, it eventually finds itself in “pure nothingness”, and in the inability to overcome its vacillation between the concept of pure and unchangeable self and the fluxing self as changeable one. Then, as Hegel writes, it “cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss.”<sup>181</sup>

The experience of the freedom of thought becomes merely the absolute negation of any particular truth. It is the reason that the truth, for sceptical self, exists only to

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid., § 205.

<sup>179</sup> Kojève incorrectly asserts that that “Hegel says that Man abandons Stoicism because, as a Stoic, he is bored” *Introduction to the reading of Hegel*, p.53. The transition from stoic self-consciousness to sceptic one does not come to existence because of the boredom of stoic self; rather, stoic self-consciousness takes a new form in order to find the determinate content for its freedom of thought, even if the content that has found is groundlessness.

<sup>180</sup> Another commentator, Hyppolite, defines scepticism in a way that it “penetrates all the determinations of experience and of life; it shows their nothingness, dissolving them in self-consciousness” Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure*, trans. Samuel Chernak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 184.

<sup>181</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 79.

the extent that it is in thought. Scepticism is, thus, identified as a process in which all the particular truths become explicit insofar as they are destined to be vanished. All determinate origins are destructible in the eyes of the sceptic, who attaches itself to the nihilated world that is determined by the freedom of thought. So that, the world loses its character of being fixed and stable; everything in such a world flows in its groundlessness. In other words, through the sceptical claim about the groundlessness of the world, nothing can be comprehended as unchangeable or eternal. Unlike the stoic self, who conceives freedom as the self-determination of thought, the sceptic self conceives freedom as the vanishing of the ground for the fixed truth. Therefore, it can be said that the core point of stoicism inverted into scepticism regarding the issue of freedom. In this sense, sceptical self admits that the truth that it conceives is based on the state of being groundless, and its freedom of thought rests on the negation of any truth. As Russon rightly states it, “[i]n scepticism [...] freedom is recognized not as the source of meaning, but as the source of meaninglessness.”<sup>182</sup> The Sceptic self, thus, becomes aware of the fact that it has lost the distinctions between appearances because of the view that they exist at the same root of groundlessness. In other words, they are merely variations for the negativity of thought. However, at the same time, it cannot ignore the existence of these uncertain appearances since it realizes that what is groundless is initially to be presumed. Thus, even in the sceptic self-consciousness, there is a sense of unchanging existence. If there is no ground for the existence of objects, and the world is only nothingness, the sceptic cannot deny the fact that they exist in a way that they are both unchangeable and changeable. Sceptic self-consciousness, thereby, reveals its own contradictory character. Since, while it takes itself as unchangeable, self-identical and as the pure power of negation for all determinations, it essentially depends on the determinateness of what is negated, i.e., the world. As Russon writes that two sides of the sceptical self-consciousness oscillate “between the conception of the self as an independent, self-sufficient power of negation, and the self as a flux of non-self-subsistent

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<sup>182</sup>John Russon, “Infinite Phenomenology” (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2016), 128.



determinations.”<sup>183</sup> In contrast to anything it negates, skeptical thought takes itself as unchangeable and pure ‘I’. However, while sceptic self-consciousness takes itself as a pure unchanging ‘I’, it finds its changeable character in the process of his own negative thinking. Through this experience, it sees its own “internally contradictory” character, that is, now, it takes itself as both changeable and unchangeable. Sceptical self-consciousness, however, is not explicitly aware of its own internal contradiction, but it shifts from one to the other, and in a sense enjoys itself in it. Now, the difficulty for the sceptic self-consciousness is that it has to hold changeable and unchangeable character of the self together in one and the same self-consciousness. Then, these two sides of self-consciousness have to take a new form of self-consciousness, i.e., the unhappy consciousness in which the two contradictory characters of sceptic self-consciousness become explicit and go hand in hand.

Based on the discussion above, in my view, it is more obvious that how the bodies of both stoic and sceptic consciousnesses are ignored and deported throughout these sections. Through both vacation and abrogation of the body, consciousness, now, takes itself as if it has elevated itself over the changeability and individuality. In this regard, the emergence of the body in both stoicism and scepticism initially occurs as moments of disembodiment<sup>184</sup> and absence. While these self-consciousnesses recognize themselves only in thought and in groundlessness, they conceive their own body as a kind of ‘obstacle’ in which the changeable materiality of the self exists. The body of the self, which has explicitly emerged on the scene by master-slave relation, is evacuated by the “pure self-consciousness” of the stoic and the sceptic. For these sections, Butler points out that the body is “split off from consciousness. Reconstituted as an interior alien, the body is sustained through its disavowal as what consciousness must continue to

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<sup>183</sup> Russon, *The Self and Its Body*, 20.

<sup>184</sup> The conception of “disembodiment” of the body will also be an essential concern for the unhappy consciousness (in 4.3) in a more radicalized form.

disavow.”<sup>185</sup> Throughout these two sections, the body has been in exile in order to prove that these self-determinations are nothing but the pure freedom of its thought. In this regard, both their moments of self-determination reveal themselves in the realm of immaterial subjectivity, that is, out of the body. “If I have come “outside myself”, then I am no longer localized, and this tells me something new about who I am.”<sup>186</sup> It is to say that consciousness is, now, disembodied thought.

### **4.3 Bodily Suppression: Unhappy Consciousness**

The Sceptic’s comprehension of itself as both changeable and unchangeable paves the way for the emergence of its ‘duplication’. Consciousness, now, knows that these two characters of the self are opposed to one another, and they are inseparable from each other. Throughout this section, the question of “How can I reconcile my own changeable side and the unchangeable one” is tried to be answered by unhappy consciousness. Therefore, the overall position of the section, unlike Scepticism, does not attempt to show unchangeability of consciousness, but to imply the inescapability of the dialectic of the changeable and the Unchangeable. The experience of unhappy consciousness begins with the claim that if these two opposing self-consciousnesses take themselves to be one self, then, consciousness turns into the ‘immediate unity’ of these two self within one. It is the unity that what makes unhappy consciousness different from sceptic one. Hegel here puts the difference between them:

In Scepticism, consciousness truly experiences itself as internally contradictory. From this experience emerges a *new form* of consciousness which brings together the two thoughts which Scepticism holds apart...This new form is, therefore, one which *knows* that it is the dual consciousness of itself.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 42.

<sup>186</sup> Malabou and Butler, “You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape, and Plasticity in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*”, 625.

<sup>187</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 206.

Consciousness desires<sup>188</sup> to unite two opposing and dual consciousness in one self. For unhappy consciousness, there are two selves in one, and it makes consciousness “inwardly disrupted”.<sup>189</sup> In the first part of the section, where the awareness of its dual consciousness comes to the fore, the aim of consciousness is not mainly to show its contradictory sides as its true character, but rather to prove the claim that the unity of the sides is its own true character or ‘essence’. Although it takes the unity to be essential, the unhappy consciousness knows that it is already divided into two, and the two are “not the same, but opposites, [...] are alien to one another”.<sup>190</sup> Thus, the unhappy consciousness is aware of the fact that it is consciousness of this contradiction; thus, it can no longer identify itself with the unchangeable, and takes itself as an unessential and changeable being. For this reason, on the one hand, the unchangeable and the essential side of consciousness becomes an “alien being” for it; but on the other hand, the ‘inessential’ and the ‘changeable’ side of it appears as a ‘scorned’ consciousness. Butler emphasizes this point impressively: “As a dual structure, the unhappy consciousness takes itself as its own object of scorn”.<sup>191</sup>

In order to become one with the unchangeable, now, consciousness attempts to abandon its changeable self. For so doing, it attempts to free itself from the inessential, changeable side of it, and thinks that it must free itself from itself in order to be one with the essential and the unchangeable side that implies the ‘beyond’<sup>192</sup> or being ‘over there’. The unhappy consciousness sees this

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<sup>188</sup> According to my conviction, consciousness continues to “desire” the unity with itself through the movement of itself. In this regard, the concept of desire cannot be reduce to the ‘Self-Consciousness’ part of the *Phenomenology* since it has still constitutive role in the following experiences of consciousness. Thus, the concept of ‘desire’ permanently emerges as a persistent character of consciousness in the whole process of the *Phenomenology*.

<sup>189</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 207.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., § 208.

<sup>191</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 46.

<sup>192</sup> Russon discusses the conception ‘beyond’ in the context of a searching to find any meaning in our everyday life. He states that the ‘beyond’ appears as ‘meaning’ in the changeable flux of our lives; otherwise, as he claims, we would lost the flux of the world. This is the reason that drives us to find a way for the unity of the Unchangeable. Russon, “Infinite Phenomenology”, 130.

unchangeable as its own essence. Now, we should note that consciousness is also an unhappy religious consciousness in the context of the Christian thought<sup>193</sup>. However, it is still aware of the fact that each side belongs to its own self, for that reason, it cannot escape from them. If it abandons the unessential part of it, it will still be deprived of itself. Therefore, it feels itself in “a struggle against an enemy, and the enemy is nothing, but itself”<sup>194</sup>; thus winning the struggle is equal to the loss of itself. The religious unhappy consciousness conceives its own nature as a split, that is, as an enemy nature, while it has also a kind of spiritual nature, i.e., the Unchangeable one. These two are always in conflict to attain ‘oneness’ with the unchangeable essence which requires abandoning the first nature and denying bodily nature as well. Thus, the unhappy consciousness strives to attain the unity with the unchangeable and thereby hopes to reverse its unhappiness to happiness. In that sense, now, the problem that appears for unhappy consciousness is that it adopts two different realms and must reconcile them. In order to do so, it successively arises in the different three forms of unhappy consciousness, through which it tries to attain a communion of both the changeable and the unchangeable. In other words, it attempts to find three different ways in which the essential or the unchangeable being might be there. These ways are respectively devotion, gratitude and wretchedness, and the first way appears as pure devotional activity in which the changeable aspect of the self yearns for the pure objective point of view, i.e, the unchangeable, in order to be recognized in there. That is, it puts not only its own subjectivity aside, and takes on the devotional inclination, but also moves itself away from the bodily activity; thus, the first form of unhappy consciousness

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<sup>193</sup> One of the interpretations that stresses the Hegelian conception of ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ comes from Terry Pinkard. He claims that Hegel uses the term in order to “describe both medieval Christianity and the Hellenic and pre-Christian worlds in which the older Greek gods were gone with nothing yet having arisen to take their place.” Terry Pinkard, *Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 70. Most commentators spend a good deal of effort to make explicit the religious implications of the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ section. However, this implications are out of my scope, since, what I want to make explicit here is that how the bodily existence of the unhappy consciousness is suppressed.

<sup>194</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 209.

appears as a “movement towards thinking”.<sup>195</sup> In other words, it strives for the abandonment of whole material existence of its own self, i.e., the body in order to attain a way in which it can elevate itself to the unchangeable point of view. The various “thinking activities” are involved to achieve this self-elevation through the devotional activity. On the one hand, in order to attain self-elevation, the negation or the disavowal of the changeable body is required for the unhappy consciousness, but on the other hand, it knows the fact that the body cannot be fully negated so that it must be negated in the ritualistic activities such as rites, chants, or the smell of incense. Butler states that the body is suppressed ‘as the price of holiness’ and the devotee acts “religious practices whereby the entire body is ritualistically purged”.<sup>196</sup> While the devotee seeks to find a way to become one with the unchangeable through these activities which are the same with the early Christian church activities, consciousness merely becomes one with the ‘feeling’ that it “has fallen back into itself”.<sup>197</sup> It means that the first experience of the unhappy consciousness shows that any feeling of unity with the unchangeable refers merely to sense of its own self so that its essence remains alien to it. While it is seeking the reconciliation with the unchangeable, it only experiences its separateness from it through falling back into its own individuality. Through the devotional activity, it conceives the "truth" that it never actually succeeds to attain ‘beyond’ its own individuality. Moreover, this devotional attempt of consciousness implies to overcome the gap between the subjective and the objective points of view. In this regard, it reminds us the experience of ‘sense-certainty’ by which consciousness has gained only the immediate experience of particularity. When unhappy consciousness becomes aware of the fact that the devotion does not prove any satisfaction to become one with the unchangeable, then, it approaches to a second way that contains the gratitude – or thanks giving activity- through

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid., § 208.

<sup>196</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 51.

<sup>197</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 217.

consuming and working.<sup>198</sup> It turns to different kinds of activities because it finds itself falling back into its own individuality in the previous experience. The unhappy consciousness supposes that the unchangeable manifests its universality in the particularity of the world through the activities of consuming and working. As Hegel writes, “the unchangeable consciousness *renounces* and *surrenders* its embodied form, while, on the other hand, the particular individual consciousness *gives thanks* [for the gift].<sup>199</sup> It also knows that one can consume or work by virtue of the unchangeable, so the world as a whole becomes an expression of the Unchangeable. The activity of consuming and working become an affirmation and giving thanks for the unhappy consciousness. The unhappy consciousness comes to rely on its own everyday activities in order to have an access to the realm of unchangeable. In the everyday activities, it, therefore, hopes to find the union of universality of the unchangeable and the individuality of itself. However, as Hegel writes, “The hope of becoming one with it must remain a hope”.<sup>200</sup> To my mind, the concept of hope establishes a ground for the possibility of the unity with the Unchangeable. Through hope, unhappy consciousness envisions the possibility to elevate itself to the realm of the Unchangeable. In this regard, on the ground of hope, consciousness supposes that it has a possibility to convert its self-division into the unity. However, all attempts of the everyday activities, which kindle the hope for this unity, always remain defective and this defectiveness again leads to “hope”. Consciousness, in the second individual experience, thus, again remains unhappy.<sup>201</sup> In other words, such hope empowers divided consciousness to strive in order to reach the unity with the Unchangeable, but the experience of consciousness proves that the unity is always unattainable. Although the unhappy

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<sup>198</sup> Ibid., § 218.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., § 222.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., § 212.

<sup>201</sup> Merleau-Ponty understands the unhappy consciousness not as a being divided as the Unchangeable and the changeable, but as one being separated from the nature. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty writes that “all consciousness is therefore unhappy, since it knows it is a secondary form of life and misses the innocence from which it senses it came.” Merleau-Ponty, “Hegel’s Existentialism”, 67.

consciousness finds a sort of enjoyment in the activities of consuming and working, it rejects any responsibility for its own enjoyment. The rejection of the responsibility for these activities means the rejection that these activities do not belong to its own self, but to the Unchangeable. The disavowal of the self makes its own life 'nothing', and this leads to self-negation in a certain way. In this regard, through the experience of gratitude, it again gains the sense of itself, and also, it feels itself as in the sense of 'nothingness', or unessential individuality. The two previous experiences of unhappy consciousness show that consciousness attaches to them merely by being an individual, a thing. It is to say that it realizes not to be more than a material individuality and sees this individuality as something that cannot be denied. And, Butler states that "Here again the self to be renounced is figured as a bodily self, as "*this actual individual* in the animal functions"".<sup>202</sup> Then, the third form of the unhappy consciousness turns against itself as an enemy and declares itself in the form of "wretchedness". It abandons itself, surrenders and also alienates its 'animal functions', i.e., the bodily life. Through the suppression of bodily life, it alienates itself from itself. The unhappy consciousness believes that the existence of it is nothing, but the Unchangeable as an essence is the source of everything including itself. "Consciousness [...] is the merest particular; we have here only a personality confined to its own self and its petty actions [...] as wretched as it is impoverished."<sup>203</sup> However, while it takes itself as self-denial in the feeling of its wretchedness, it becomes aware of the fact that its self-denial makes its unity possible with the unchangeable. In order to attain this unity, it needs the other, a mediator, so that, unlike previous experiences of it, consciousness ceases to negate or deny the other; instead, it surrenders to the other, to the mediator. By means of the mediator, it attributes all doings to the other and recognizes them as the activities of the other and could not have any responsibility for its unessential being, and could contact with the unchangeable.

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<sup>202</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 50.

<sup>203</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 225.

The mediator<sup>204</sup> is the third element that mediates both the individual consciousness and the Unchangeable. It allows being reconciled with the individuality of it and the Unchangeable, then, consciousness appears as wholly the will<sup>205</sup> of the mediator by attaching itself to it. In this regard, the unhappy consciousness frees “itself from itself”, and from now on, it is determined by the will of the mediator. It is to say that consciousness is no longer a self, but a ‘thing’ or “objective existence”<sup>206</sup> which has no will. It is the highest form of alienation that appears as an objectification that consciousness seeks. In relinquishing the will of its own, as Hegel states, it also “renounces to regard itself as a free self-consciousness”<sup>207</sup>, and reduces itself to merely a ‘thing’ that is assumed to be determined by the will of the Unchangeable. In this way, while the wretched consciousness turns from the subjective individuality to a merely ‘objective existence’, a mere living being or a bodily life, the Unchangeable appears in the changeability of this objective existence or the bodily life of it. It is to say that for the unhappy consciousness, the ineluctability of the body becomes apparent. Accordingly, Butler points out the necessity of the body for such a consciousness by writing that “In Hegel, the suppression of bodily life is shown to require the very body that it seeks to suppress; in this sense, the body is preserved in and by

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<sup>204</sup> For a non-secular reading of the notion of “mediator”, most of commentators understand the mediator as the Christian church. The rest of them point out that the mediator could only be understood as “the Holy Spirit”. For example, according to Harris, whose reading really depends on the religious ground, the Unhappy Consciousness in the first experience searches for unity with “the Father”, the second implies the unity with the “Son”, and the third attempts to the reconciliation of the particular consciousness with the Unchangeable, or namely “the Holy Spirit”. Henry Sifton Harris, “Hegel’s Ladder” (Indianapolis: Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 409.

<sup>205</sup> Houlgate points out the similarity between the Kantian ‘schema’ and the conception of the mediator. He claims by saying that “Like the Kantian ‘schema’, the mediator emerges as a third thing that links the changeable and the unchangeable. Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Readers Guide* (London, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing), 118. However, Russon points out the unclear position of the relation to mediation through the ‘mediator’ by asking “How can the two aspects within the mediator themselves ‘communicate’ one with the other?” John, *The Self and Its Body*, 26.

<sup>206</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 229.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*, § 197.



the very act of suppression”.<sup>208</sup> It is true that the bodily life, which had been suppressed throughout the experience of the unhappy consciousness is irreversibly conserved in the emergence of the Unchangeable within the changeable being. The changeable individual, who attempts to detach itself from its body, comes to the awareness of the fact that the body is required in order to become one with the Unchangeable. This also exhibits the re-emergence of what is suppressed, which is inherent in the Hegelian dialectic. In other words, the Hegelian framework presupposes the impossibility of ultimate bodily suppression. Now, the changeable individual, who seeks the universal unchangeable, can commune with the Unchangeable, and thereby, such a consciousness also knows itself in its very bodily individuality, that is, as being in the world. Through the experience of the unity, what consciousness has learned is not only that it cannot find the Unchangeable somewhere beyond its particular subjectivity, but also it becomes aware of the fact that there is no ultimate way of suppressing its individual self. Therefore, it turns towards this particular existence in which the immediate unity of individuality and universality has already become one. In this respect, consciousness finally does not feel itself separated from the Unchangeable or the essence, but it knows itself as one with the Unchangeable. Now, consciousness recognizes itself in “the unity with this universal which no longer falls outside of it”<sup>209</sup>, and it becomes certain that this unity is to be found nowhere else than the world. In this regard, it finds its true self as its reflected objectivity in the world.

Consequently, at the beginning of the section, while the free self has the attitude of being opposite to the world, at the end of the section, it necessarily finds itself in the world that forms the problem of the next chapter of the *Phenomenology*. When the objective individuality of consciousness emerges in the unity as a moment that attaches necessarily to this world, the new form of consciousness, then, concerns to find itself in this world. In general, the movement of the unhappy consciousness

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<sup>208</sup> Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power*, 57.

<sup>209</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 230.

essentially can be read as an experience of the bodily separation from itself and re-finding its own body in this separation.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis, the conceptualization of the notion of body and the characterization of bodily existence of consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is articulated. Based on the investigations carried out in the previous chapters of this thesis, I define the intrinsic development of bodily existence of consciousness within the chapters of "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness". This development is from a primarily animalistic body to a fundamentally self-conscious body. The entire experiences of both consciousness and self-consciousness reflect the movement of body: it arises as a body that the appearance of it falls into the world; as a body that it is a part of natural desire; as a body that in which the self finds itself as being unrecognized and recognized; and as a body that consciousness attempts to get rid of. This study enables us to see that the movement of consciousness does not exclude the bodily existence of it; on the contrary, this movement can be understood better by rethinking it within the relationship of consciousness to its body. The notion of the body, like the notion of nature or the notion of art, is not excluded from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. However, it is not explicitly thematized in it.<sup>210</sup> Here, I have tried to bring into light a possible thematization of the corporeality or the bodily existence of consciousness by interpreting the chapters on "Consciousness" and "Self-consciousness" of the *Phenomenology*. Thus, in this thesis, the exploration of the bodily existence of consciousness approaches to the question of body from its phenomenological significance, that is, through its configuration in the science of

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<sup>210</sup> John Russon claims that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be read also as an implicit phenomenology of the body, and he states that this kind of a reading paves the way for non-Cartesian understanding of self and body: "The phenomenology of the body worked out implicitly in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* develops the full implications of a rejection of dualist conception of self and body." Russon, *The Self and Its Body*, 9.

the experience of consciousness. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the ways in which the bodily experience of consciousness is not an outsider's experience, but its own by providing an explicit analysis of the notion of body as it makes its appearance in the stages of the development of consciousness and the self-consciousness. Regarding all that was shown in the chapters, this thesis has been prepared in order to make explicit the developing phenomenological approach to the body by tracing the ways in which the notion of the "body" arises as a presupposition in each stage of the experience of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*. In this sense, from a Hegelian point of view, one of the prominent aims of this thesis is not only to interpret the notion of body for a better understanding of movement of consciousness, but also to interpret the movement of consciousness for a better understanding of how the bodily existence of consciousness appears in this movement. Thus, it can be said that this thesis rethinks the movement of consciousness throughout the chapters of "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness". However, the scope of this thesis does not extend to the chapters of "Reason" and "Spirit" because my principal aim is to comprehend the embodiment of the individual self that appears in the chapters of "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness" in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

As it is explored in the chapter two, I have, first, tried to give an account of how the body emerges in "Consciousness" chapter of the *Phenomenology*. The comprehension of the world as a differentiated bodily appearance that emerges as a result of consciousness' own immanent principle was central to this chapter. While consciousness is passing from one shape to the other, the world stands against consciousness as something other, as an 'external object' [*Gegenstand*]. Throughout the "Consciousness" chapter, the world appears like an object, and consciousness attempts to know its object as other than itself. Put differently, it is the view that the bodily existence of this world stands aside and consciousness experiences it as a bodily stable thing apart from it. Then, knowing what the world really is becomes impossible for consciousness without giving an account of its difference from the bodily externalized world. While the claim of consciousness

was that it is possible to know the truth of its object, i.e., the differentiated bodily existence that is held to be something other than itself, the truth that emerges is that the object of self-consciousness corresponds to nothing, but to itself. Thus, the subject-object problem of consciousness is required to be linked to consciousness and the problem turns into the issue of knowing itself as its true object.

The prevailing concern of the third chapter has been related to trace the notion of body in accordance with the unity of the “Self-Consciousness” section. When the notions of “self-consciousness”, “other”, “life” or “death” arise in this section, I have tried to analyze them in their relevance to the problem of the “body”. Firstly, I have emphasized the complexities of the desire and the connection of it with the life in Hegel’s text. In what follows, the emergence of the body requires an analysis of several transitions in the context of the self-consciousness: the transition from life to natural desire and the transition from the two encountering self-consciousnesses, whose desires carry them to the life and death struggle, and to the problem of recognition. The most apparent manifestation of the body takes its departure from the struggle for recognition in which the bodily existence of consciousness is co-emergent with the theme of recognition. The co-emergence of the body and the self also points to a possible reading of the body by taking into account of the dialectic of recognition. Like the previous movements of consciousness, this necessary movement of consciousness regarding the process of recognition leaves its marks on the bodily existence of consciousness. At the end of the struggle, the two opposing forms of consciousness -as master and slave- provide the ground for the further explorations of the emergence of the body in the text. Although, the bodily existence of master appears in the act of consuming the objects around it, the body of the slave is considered only in the “thing-like” character of enslavement. Through the instrumentalization of the bodily existence of the slave, the desire of master is fulfilled; yet the instrumentalization of the slave displays itself somewhat paradoxically as a precondition for the freedom of the slave. While the bodily existence of the slave was initially at the service of the master, and it signified the work done for the master, in this laboring

transformative activity which is grounded on the slave's attachment to life, the freedom of the slave consciousness first makes its appearance. While the slave attempts to get rid of itself from its attachment to life through its labor, it discovers and recognizes itself in the bodily form giving activity. Thus, this is why the bodily activity of the slave provides it not only the recognition in some partial sense, but also the very feeling of freedom. Although the slave is defined by its 'being-for-another', in its transforming activity, it realizes the independence of its self in the form that it gives to the thing, that is, it becomes aware of its own negative activity immanent in labor.

Through the transition to the last chapter, i.e., from 'the dialectic of master and slave' to the "Freedom of self-consciousness", as we have seen above, the emergence of the body occurs as the moments of vacation, abrogation and suppression. In this regard, the conceptualization of the body emerges as the moments of consciousness that seek different strategies of disembodiment. In this chapter, the two forms of consciousness as master and slave become one again, and consciousness comes to know itself in the duality, which makes consciousness unhappy. However, the figure of the unhappy consciousness provides reconciliation with the self-division of consciousness. At the end of the chapter, through the reconciliation, Hegel presents a scene in which consciousness becomes aware of the fact that there is no ultimate way to suppress bodily individuality.

Lastly, the exploration of the notion of body enables us to see that how the bodily existence of consciousness has deep roots in the chapters of "Consciousness" and "Self-Consciousness". This study has concerned the body as one of the non-negligible themes in *Phenomenology* in which the various emergent ways of the body is handled as explicit as possible. Throughout the study I have tried to explain that consciousness is always an embodied consciousness, and the experiences of consciousness and the bodily existence of consciousness are already inseparably connected. It is this problematization of the 'bodily existence of consciousness' that has provided an adequate reading for comprehending how body in each experience of consciousness appears in a unity with consciousness.

From a Hegelian perspective, as an end, it could be stated that being in the bodily existence is irreducibly definitive for each experience of consciousness. 'I' can exist as a self-conscious body only in being outside of myself, i.e., in the world. So to speak, the 'I', as a body, can only exist as a participant of the world. Throughout the journey of consciousness, being in the world has always been manifested in the bodily existence of consciousness, and in the ways in which consciousness articulates its embodiment in the development of its experience. Thus, the investigation has not simply included the exploration of bodily existence of consciousness, but conceives it within the relations of the world. In other words, any relation of consciousness to its body entails not only bodily existence of it, but also its relation to the world. Thus, the way consciousness experiences its bodily existence depends on how its body appears in the world. In order to reveal the bodily existence of consciousness throughout the study, the relation to the world that is experienced by consciousness has to be examined, and analyzing the relation between consciousness and the world has made the bodily existence of it apparent. In this sense, one of the most important insights we gain from the exploration of bodily existence of consciousness is the essential role of the dialectical movement of consciousness. Thus, these experiences are more than the movements of consciousness; they are instead the means of revealing the bodily existence of it. In both implicit and explicit senses, Hegel's *Phenomenology* accomplishes not only a journey of reconciliation between consciousness and the body, but also a journey about the meaning of this reconciliation. This kind of accomplishment is always to be done in the world, since one can only encounter with the other who provides recognition in the world. The implicit idea of this study is that the bodily existence that is initially immediate being transforms and exposes itself as to be a living subject in the world with others.

Regarding all that was mentioned above, I would like to point out that this study has been written with the motivation of calling attention to the underestimated corporeality of consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology*. The prominent point of this study has the sensibility to think together the experiences of consciousness and

the bodily implications of these experiences. In this regard, the conceptualization of the notion of body in Hegel's *Phenomenology* offers a critique of the misleading "disembodied thought" view that appears throughout the history of philosophy. It may be concluded that as a suggestion for further studies, it would be a great contribution to conduct a research displaying the connection between the *Phenomenology* and Hegel's other works in the context of body which, I believe, would lead to a brilliant contribution in order to offer a better understanding of the philosophy of Hegel.



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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Hegel, *Tinin Fenomenolojisi*'nin “Giriş” bölümünde bilincin ele alınış biçimini, bir tür içeriden bilme olarak anlaşılabilecek bir bilme biçimi olan “bilincin deneyiminin bilimi” olarak işaretler. Varlık ve düşünce hakkındaki geçmiş tüm varsayımlar ve metafizik yapma biçimlerinin terk edilmesi gerektiğini düşünen Hegel, *Fenomenoloji*'de bilincin en “doğal” (*natural consciousness*) ya da bir anlamda varsayımsız biçiminden başlar ve bilincin aldığı formlar ile ilerler. Bilincin bu biçim ya da formlarının farklılaşması, onun en ilkel formundan düşüncenin varlığının ya da varlığın düşüncesinin bir ve aynı süreçler olarak kavrandığı, kendiyle tutarlı olduğu mutlak varış noktasına değin ilerler. Deyim yerindeyse, Hegel'in *Fenomenolojisi*, bilincin fenomenolojisinden tinin fenomenolojisine doğru yolculuk eden bilincin hikayesidir. Tüm bu yolculuk boyunca, bilincin deneyimi, bilincin kendisi ve nesnesine ilişkin bir belirlenim sunarak onun aldığı farklı biçimler ile ilerler. Fenomenolojik bir bakış açısından, bilinç, bu yolculuğunu bilme iddiasında olduğu nesnesinin bilgisine erişim hamlelerinde, yani kendi deneyiminde kurmak zorundadır. Bu demektir ki, *Fenomenoloji* boyunca, karşımızda kendi deneyiminin koşullarına ve biçimlenişlerine tanıklık eden bir bilinç vardır. Bir başka deyişle *Fenomenoloji*, bilincin bilince bilinci anlatması, bilincin kendi yaşamı ya da hikayesi olarak karşımıza çıkar.

*Tinin Fenomenolojisi*, ne bir ontoloji, ne bir epistemoloji kitabıdır, fakat aynı zamanda tüm bunları da içinde barındırır. *Fenomenoloji*'nin bu denli zengin bir içeriğe sahip olması, bana bu çalışmada, bilincin bedenli varolmasının anlamı üzerine düşünme fırsatı verdi. *Fenomenoloji*'de bedene dair bir kavrayış, Hegel açısından ne salt antropolojik ne psikolojik be de biyolojik bir zeminden

yürütülebilir. *Fenomenoloji*'de bedeni düşünmenin imkanı ancak ve ancak bilinç ve onun dünya ile olan dolayımında açığa çıkar. *Fenomenoloji*, okuyucuya başında birbirine dışsal gibi görünen bilinç ve bedenin dışsal bir tarzda kurulabilir olmadığını, onları ayrımları içinde kuran ilişkinin ne tür bir ilişki olduğu sorusuna verilen, bilincin aldığı biçimler ile birlikte değişen yanıtlar ile ilerler. Bilincin aşamalarının her biri, farklı düzeylerde beden ve dünya ile kurulan ilişkiyi açılar. Bu bakımdan, bilincin aldığı tüm formlar ya da bilincin aşamaları, onun nesnesinin hakikatini bilme yolunda ilerlediği “kendi-dönüşümü”nün (*self-transformation*) de hareketidir. Bu çalışmanın amacı ise, bilincin dünya ile kurduğu ilişkide kendi değişim-dönüşüm aşamalarını adım adım takip etmekten ziyade, bilincin bedensel varlığının anlamını, onun aldığı her bir form ya da aşamada izini sürmek olmuştur. Bir diğer deyişle, bu çalışmanın amacı, *Fenomenoloji*'de bilincin bireysel düzeyde bedenli olmasının anlamının burada nasıl açığa çıktığını incelemektir. Bilincin kendi dönüşümünün içsel dinamiği, aynı zamanda onun bedensel varlığının fenomenolojik anlamının da değişimi olarak ele alınır. Bu bakımdan, çalışmada ortaya koyulan problem, bilincin kendini bedensiz bir bilinç olarak deneyimleyip deneyimleyemeyeceği problemidir. Dolayısıyla, beden kavramının fenomenolojik analizi, Hegel'in beden hakkında *Fenomenoloji*'de ne söylediğinden ziyade ne söylemesi gerektiğinin de ortaya koyulmasını gerektirir. *Fenomenoloji* üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, sıklıkla Hegel'in ‘arzu’, ‘öz-bilinç problemi’, ‘tanınma mücadelesi’ ya da ‘tin’ temaları üzerineyken, *Fenomenoloji*'de açığa çıkan beden teması çerçevesinden herhangi bir kavramsallaştırma ise çoğu zaman göz ardı edilmiştir. Bir diğer deyişle, bilincin bedenli oluşu, onun her aşamasında mantıksal bir varsayım olarak ele alınmasına rağmen açık olarak ortaya koyulmamıştır. Hegel Felsefesi'nin yalnızca belirli temalar üzerinden okunması, haklı bir okuma değildir ve çoğu zaman bu temalar, bilincin kendi ile bir olduğu aşamaya varışı için onun zorunlu uğraklarıdır. Bu çalışma ise, bilincin her zaman için bedenli olmasının anlamını soruştururken, *Fenomenoloji*'yi de “bilincin vücut bulmasının bilimi” (*the science of the embodiment of consciousness*) olarak okumanın imkanını soruşturur.

Bilincin bedensel deneyimini Kartezyen ikilik içinde anlayan, felsefe tarihindeki geleneksel kavramsallaştırmaya karşı *Fenomenoloji* bize, bilinç ve beden ilişkisini dualizme düşmeyen bir kavrayış içerisinde sunar. Platon ile başlayıp Descartes ile devam eden felsefi gelenekte bilinç ile beden birbirinden ontolojik olarak ayrı düşmekle kalmayıp aynı zamanda, bilinç ve beden ikiliği üzerinden bilince her zaman için ayrıcalıklı bir konum atfedilir. Beden, hem ayrılmış hem de ayıran olarak Kartezyen düşüncenin içine sıkışır. Bu gelenek içerisinde, beden ve bilinç ya Descartes Felsefesi'nde olduğu gibi birbirine zıt özellikler taşıyan ayrı 'töz'ler olarak belirir ya da bilinç her zaman için bedene boyun eğdiren bir konum üzerinden anlaşılır.

*Tinin Fenomenolojisi*'nde beden, birdenbire karşımıza çıkan herhangi bir felsefe sorunu değil, bilincin nesnesini bilme iddialarının sınıandığı hareketin içinde ortaya çıkan bilincin bedenli varolma biçimlerinin de bir sonucudur. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü, *Fenomenoloji*'nin "Bilinç" bölümünde açılan "Duyusal Kesinlik" (*Sense-Certainty*), "Algı" (*Perception*) ve "Güç ve Anlak" (*Force and Understanding*) uğraklarında bilincin bedenli var olmayı nasıl deneyimlediği üzerinedir. Bilinç, bu uğraklarının tümünde nesnesini ya da dünyayı kendisinden bağımsız olarak alır. Dünyanın nesne olarak, bilinç tarafından kendi karşısına koyulması, o dünyadan bağımsız olarak var olabilen bir bilinç iddiasını da taşır ki bilincin kendini bağımsızlığında ortaya koyma problemi *Fenomenoloji* boyunca devam edecek ve bu problem, *Fenomenoloji*'nin bilincin özgürleşmesinin serüveni olarak da okunmasına zemin sağlayacaktır. Fakat, şimdi tüm bu aşamalarda bilinç, kendi ile nesnesini yahut kendi ile dünyayı karşıtlık ilişkisi içinde ele alır ve kendini, bu dünyanın cismani varlığının bir "şey" olarak karşısına dikildiği üç farklı bilinç formunda bulur. Bilinç, tüm bu aşamalar boyunca, bu dünyanın nesnelerini en dolaysız gerçeklik ve bilgi olarak alır ve nesnesinin bu yolla ve dolaysızca bilinebileceği iddiasını taşır. Bu bilginin nesnesi, dünyanın verili bireysel ve somut nesneleridir. Bilincin dolaysız nesnesi olan ve bir "bu" olarak beliren duyusal dünyanın nesneleri, bilinçten bağımsız bir varoluşa sahip olmaları üzerinden düşünülür. Fakat, bilinç, kendinden bağımsız olarak kurduğu bu dünyaya dair

iddialarının nesnesiyle örtüşmediğini görür. Bir diğer deyişle, dünyanın bedensel ya da cismani varlığını kendinden menkul bir şey olarak karşısına koyan bilinç, kendi ve dünya ya da kendi ve nesnesi ayrımının tutarlı herhangi bir açıklamasını yapamaz, hesabını veremez. Bilincin, “duyusal kesinlikten” başlayan deneyimde, duyusal dünyanın nesnelerinin varlığının, bilinç için varlıklar olduğu ortaya çıkar. Böylece, bilincin, başlangıçta kurmuş olduğu kendi ve nesne ya da kendi ve dünya arasındaki ayrım ortadan kalkar.

Bilincin bütün bu uğraklarda ve kendisinden bağımsızlığını öne sürdüğü nesnellik iddialarında kendi hareketini keşfetmesi, bilincin farklı bir form almasını gerektirir. Başka bir deyişle, öz-bilinç, bilincin önceki uğraklarda nesnesi ile kurduğu ilişkinin hakikati olarak ortaya çıkar. Bilincin nesnesiyle kurduğu ilişkide, başkalık olarak beliren nesnesinden kendisine dönüş hareketinin hakikatinin belirttiği bu noktada, bilinç artık öz-bilinç formundadır. Deneyiminde, nesnesinin “kendi” olduğunu keşfeden bilinç artık kendi bilgisinin ya da kesinliğinin teminini sağlamak zorundadır. Fakat, bunun için kendinden başka olan ile bir karşılaşma ve başkalıktan kendine dönen (*reflection*) bir hareket gerekecektir. Fakat, bu hareket henüz herhangi bir belirli içerik taşımadığından dolayı “Ben bendir” totolojisiyle sınırlı kalır ve bu içeriksiz “ben” bilincin nesnesi haline gelir. Bilincin bu aşamadaki iddiası, nesnesinin ya da başkalığın hakikatinin kendisinde olduğu, başkalık veya dünyayla kurduğu ilişkide belirleyici ve özsel olanın kendisi olduğudur. Bilincin, başkalık olarak deneyimlediği duyusal dünyanın yanında artık “ben” olan ikinci bir nesnesi daha vardır. Arzu, bu noktada, tam da bu ikilik içerisinden ortaya çıkar. Dolayısıyla, bilinç, ben ve duyusal dünya karşıtlığını ortadan kaldırmak ve kendi bağımsızlık ve kesinliğinin teminini sağlamak adına negatif bir form alması bakımından arzu olmak durumundadır. Bu anlamıyla ise, arzu, olumsuzlama ediminden başka bir şey değildir ve bilincin nesnesinin tahribatı olarak ortaya çıkar. Dolayısıyla, bilincin nesnesini bilme iddiaları, öz-bilincin arzu olması bakımından, “pratik” bir alana taşınır. Duyusal dünyanın bağımsızlığını ortadan kaldırarak kendi bağımsızlığının ilanını arayan öz-bilinç, bedensel arzu (*bodily desire*) formunu alır. *Fenomenoloji*’de öz-bilincin bedensel

arzu formunda nesnesini tüketme yoluyla onu olumsuzlaması ise yaşam teması üzerinden açıklanır. Bedensel arzu formunda nesnesini tüketme eyleminde olumsuzlayan, ortadan kaldıran öz-bilinç, böylece nesnesinin bağımsızlığını da ortadan kaldırma iddiasındadır. Bilinç, bu aşamada henüz bunun farkında olmasa bile, ortadan kaldırmaya çalıştığı nesnesi, asıl olarak “yaşam”ın kendisidir. Bilincin tikel yaşamı ise, tam da yaşamın bir parçasıdır. Kendisi de bir yaşam olması anlamında bilinç, bu yüzden, giderek yaşamın bağımsızlığını keşfedecek ve bedensel arzu formunda nesnesini yok etmesiyle hem doyuma ulaşamayacağının hem de nesnesini ve arzusunu yeniden ürettiğinin farkına varacaktır. Bir diğer ifadeyle, ortadan kaldırmasıyla onun bağımsızlığını da ortadan kaldıracağını düşündüğü nesnesine yönelik olumsuzlama, yaşam döngüsünün sonsuzca yeniden üretiminden başka bir sonuç vermez. Bu bakımdan, Hegel’de “yaşam”, kendini kendinden üreten ve kendi hareketinde sürdüren, var eden olarak belirir.

Bilincin bedensel arzu formunda ulaşmaya çalıştığı doyumun yetersiz kalışıyla birlikte bilinç, “tanınma” probleminde sürüklenir. Öz-bilincin, yaşamın verili nesnelerini tüketerek onların bağımsızlığını ortadan kaldırmasının anlamı, asıl olarak kendi ile birliğini arzulamasında açığa çıkar. Arzunun, J. Butler’ın işaret ettiği üzere, tüm *Fenomenoloji* boyunca kalıcı olmasının sebebi de bu kendi ile birlik sorunun devam etmesi zemininden anlaşılabilir. Aynı zamanda, arzunun ancak bilincin dünya ile olan ilişkisinde ortaya çıkması dolayısıyla, arzu her zaman için “bir şeyin arzusu” olmak durumundadır. Fakat bu aşamada, doğal arzu ya da bedensel arzu olmak bakımından arzu, duysal dünyanın nesnelerini sonsuzca tüketip onları aşamaz. Öte yandan, tüketme ediminin kendisi, ortada nesnesinden bilincin kendine dönebileceği herhangi bir nesne bırakmadığından dolayı bilinç, nesnesinden kendine yansıma hareketinde bulunamaz. Bu hareket üzerinden kendi ile birliğin teminini sağlayamadığından dolayı, olumsuzlanmasında tükenmeyen bir nesneye, yani arzusunun bir başka arzuya yönelmesine ihtiyaç duyar. Bir başka ifadeyle, öz-bilincin nesnesi, olumsuzlandığında ortadan kaldırılabileceği bir şey değil, fakat, olumsuzlamasında bilince bağımsızlığını yansıtacak bir nesne olmalıdır. Böyle bir nesne ancak başka bir öz-bilinç olabilir. Hegel’in kendi



sözcükleriyle söylecek olursak, “öz-bilinç, doyumuna ancak başka bir öz-bilinçte ulaşır.” Bu demektir ki, öz-bilinç yalnızca başka bir öz-bilinç tarafından tanınma zemininden doyuma ulaşacaktır. Bilincin, kendinden başka olanı olumsuzlayarak kendi bağımsızlığını gerçekleştirme sorunu artık, kendinden başka olan tarafından tanınma sorununa dönüşmüştür.

Öz-bilincin arzu olarak ortaya çıkmasıyla, çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünde, arzu, öz-bilinç, öteki, yaşam, ölüm, köle, efendi temalarının ve tanınma probleminin beden ile olan ilişkisi, *Fenomenoloji*’nin “Öz-bilinç” bölümüyle paralellik içinde incelenmiştir. Bedenin, burada açığa çıkarılması; yaşamdan doğal arzuya geçişin ve karşı karşıya gelen iki öz-bilinçten tanınma problemine nasıl geçildiğinin de incelenmesini gerektirir. Yine de, bilincin bedenli olmasının anlamı, en açık haliyle, tanınma mücadelesinde ortaya çıkar. *Fenomenoloji*’de tanınma probleminin ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte, bilinç ve onun bedenli oluşu arasındaki ilişkinin yadsınamazlığı da eş zamanlı olarak karşımıza çıkar. Tanınmanın, öz-bilincin varlığının koşulu olduğu durumda, aynı tanınma koşulu bilincin de bedenli bir bilinç olma karakterinin açığa çıkarılmasını gerektirecektir. Dolayısıyla, tanınma problemi ile birlikte, bilinç ve onun bedenli oluşunu, onların karşıtlığı değil, birliği içinde düşünme zorunluluğu temel sorun haline gelir. Bu da tanınmayı, bilincin eylem ve pratikleri içinde düşünmemiz gerektiği anlamına gelecektir. Başka bir deyişle, öz-bilinç arzu olarak “kendisi ile birliğini” sürekli bir biçimde kendi eyleminde kurması, tanınmayı da bedende açığa çıkan eylem ve pratikler üzerinden kavrama zemini sunar. Böyle bir tanıma, yalnızca teorik bir tanımayı değil, tanımanın gerektirdiği eylemleri pratik bir biçimde belirli bir bedende gerçekleştirmeyi de gerektirir. Bedenin eylem ve pratikleri, tanınma deneyiminin de pratiği olarak karşımıza çıkar. Hegel’in *Fenomenoloji*’de köle ve efendi üzerinden açtığı tanınma deneyimi, bize köle ve efendi olarak beliren bilinç formlarının zorunlu olarak bilincin bedenli varoluşunun da formları olarak belirttiği bir kavrayış zemini sunar. “Yaşam ve ölüm mücadelesi” üzerinden ortaya çıkan köle ve efendi bilinç, karşı karşıya gelen arzuların ve “tanınma” uğruna girilen hamlelerin kaçınılmaz sonucudur. Bir başka deyişle, köle ve efendi,

arzunun yöneldiği tanınma mücadelesi sonucu ortaya çıkan birbirine zıt iki bilinç formudur. Bu noktada, birbirine karşıt olarak farklılaşan bu iki bilinç formu, bilincin bedenli var olmada da zorunlu olarak farklılaşması gerekliliği olarak karşımıza çıkar. Köle, “yaşam ve ölüm mücadelesi” içinde ölüm korkusu duyup yaşamı riske edemeyen ve dolayısıyla bağımsız bir bilinç olarak tanınmayan taraf olurken, efendi ise yaşamını riske etmesinde, yaşamın üzerine yükselerek bağımsızlığını ilan eden ve köle tarafından tanınan taraf olarak belirir. Bu eşitsiz tanınma ilişkisinde, köle bilinci, bağımsız bir bilinç formu olarak değil, fakat yaşama ve efendiye bağlı bir beden olarak karşımıza çıkar. Köle, çalışarak bedenini efendinin hizmetine sunar. Dolayısıyla, kölenin efendiyi tanınması, soyut bir tanıma değil, tam da kölenin efendinin hizmetine sunulmuş bir beden oluşu içinden anlam kazanan bir tanımadır. Bu tür bir tanıma, bilincin ve onun bedenli oluşunun pratik içindeki birliğini de kavramamızı sağlar. Efendinin bedenli varoluşu ise, tüketme (*consumption*) ve keyfini sürme (*enjoyment*) eylemlerinde kendini belirgin kılarken, kölenin bedeni ise bir başkası için, efendi için emeği üzerinden araçsallaştırılan bir “şey” olma biçiminde belirir. Fakat, kölenin bedensel eylemleri ya da etkinliği onun biçim verdiği dünyayı olumsuzlaması, verili olanı dönüştürmesi ve kendini emeğinde ya da çalışmasında tanınmasındadır. Bu anlamda, kölenin bedeni her zaman için bir olumsuzlama ve bu olumsuzlamadan kendine dönüş hareketini içeren bir beden olarak karşımıza çıkar. Dolayısıyla, köle bedeni, emeği yoluyla araçsallaştırılmasına ya da “şey”leştirilmesine rağmen, paradoksal bir biçimde onun özgürlüğünün de ön koşulunu oluşturur. Kölenin bedenli varoluşunun anlamı, başlangıçta “başkası için olma” olarak belirirken, olumsuzlayarak dönüştürme hareketinde ya da emeğinde kendi bağımsızlığının ve “kendi için” olmanın keşfine dönüşür. Kölenin artık, hem “kendi için” hem de “başkası için” olma uğraklarının ortaya çıkmasıyla, bilincin farklı bir aşamaya geçtiğine tanıklık ederiz. Öte yandan, yine başlangıçta bir bağımsızlık olarak beliren efendi, bedensel varolma biçimi bakımından bir bağımlılık ilişkisi içinde, köle bedene bağımlılıkta varolmaya devam etmek zorunda kalır. Köle bedeninin, efendideki anlamı ile efendi bedeninin köledeki

anlamının farklılaşması, köle efendi diyalektiği içinden ortaya çıkan tek taraflı bir tanınmanın sonucudur.

Hegel, “köle ve efendi diyalektiği” ile, tek taraflı bir tanınma deneyiminin sonuçlarına işaret eder. Efendi, köle tarafından tanınmasına rağmen, bu tanınma onu doyuma ulaştırmaz, onun kendi bağımsızlığının teminini sağlayamaz. Çünkü, kendi bağımsızlığını ona yansıtacak bağımsız bir öz-bilinci, onu köleleştirme yoluyla kaybetmiştir. Bu nedenle efendinin hakikati, ancak bağımlı bir bilinç ve bağımlı bedensel varolmadadır. Bağımsız öz-bilincin hakikati bu yüzden, efendide değil, başlangıçta bir bağımlılık olarak beliren kölede ortaya çıkacaktır. Köle, bedenini efendinin hizmetine sunarken, aynı zamanda bu hizmet ya da çalışma yoluyla kendini doğadan ayıracak, bağımsızlaştıracaktır. Burada, kölenin çalışmasının ve çalışan bir beden olarak var olmasının özgürleştirici rolü vurgulanıyor gibi görünse de, tanınmanın, ancak bir karşılıklılık içerdiği sürece öz-bilincin hakikatinin koşulu olması dolayısıyla, kölenin yalnızca bedensel var olma ile ya da çalışmada buna ulaşamayacağı açıktır. Bu anlamda, kölenin çalışmasıyla kendini yeniden keşfetmesi, onun bir başka öz-bilinçle karşılıklı bir tanınma ilişkisi içine girdiği anlamına gelmez. Tanınma deneyimi olmaksızın öz-bilincin de varolamayacağı iddiası, öz-bilinci, kendine dair bilgisine dolaysızca erişen değil, kendisini ancak diğer özneler aracılığıyla kuran ve ancak bu deneyim sonucunda kendisinin bağımsız bir bilinç olduğunu bilen olarak işaretler.

Köle, artık, bir yandan kendi bağımsızlığını, duyuşal dünyanın nesnelerini değiştirip dönüştürdüğü çalışmada bulurken, öte yandan biçim verdiği nesnesinin biçiminde kendini bulması yoluyla, kendini nesnesinin biçimiyle bir ve aynı görür. Bu nedenden dolayı, köle, artık tanınmak için herhangi bir öz-bilince ihtiyaç duymadığı iddiasındadır ve nesnesinin ona gerekli tanınmayı sağlayacağını umduğu noktada, bilinç artık, Stoic bilinç, Skeptik bilinç ve Mutsuz bilinç olarak belirecek olan “düşünce” formlarında kendini bulur. Başlangıçta, köle yalnızca soyut bir özgürlük kavrayışına sahiptir. Kölenin, soyut özgürlüğünü gerçek bir özgürlüğe taşıyabilmesi için efendiyi de olumsuzlaması gerekmektedir. Bir başka deyişle, gerçek anlamda özgürlüğünü gerçekleştirebilmesi için, dünyanın verili

nesnelere biçim vererek onları olumsuzlayıp dönüştürmesi yeterli değildir. Onun, aynı zamanda, başkalık ile ya da efendi ile olan ilişkini de olumsuzlayarak dönüştürmesi ve bir anlamda aslında kendi köleliğini olumsuzlaması gerekir. Bu nedenle, çalışmanın bir sonraki bölümünün konusunu oluşturan özgürlüğün gerçekleştirilmesi sorununun çözümü, yalnızca soyut “düşünce” düzeyinde kalır. Dolayısıyla, bu uğraklarda bilinç, hem bağımsız hem de bağımlı bir bilinç olması dolayısıyla yaşadığı çelişkiyi düşünsel düzeyde ortadan kaldırmaya çalışır. Bu ise, onu, bu aşamada özgür olduğunu bir anlamda bilmesine rağmen, özgürlüğünü gerçekleştirememesine ve onun özgür olmadan yaşamasına zemin sağlayacak ve çelişkiyi ortadan kaldıracak farklı dünya görüşleri öne sürmesine neden olur. Bu anlamda öz-bilincin “ben”i, artık, kendi içinde bir ikilik ya da bölünmüşlük olarak karşımıza çıkar. Bu tür bir öz-bilinç ise, kendiyle birliğini ya da özdeşliğini sağlamaktan uzak, tam olmayan bir “ben”dir. Öz-bilincin bu bölünmüşlüğü kendisine dair bir olumsuzlamayı içermekte, kendi özdeşliğini, kendi bedensel ötekiliğiyle karşıtlık içinde bulmakta, bu karşıtlığı ortadan kaldırmak için de bedensel varolma biçimlerini ortadan kaldırmak istemektedir. Bir diğer ifadeyle, öz-bilinç, kendi eksiklik ve karşıtlığını gidermek adına kendisini, kendisinin karşısına koyarak karşısına koyduğu kendisini sürekli olarak olumsuzlamak durumundadır. Bu nedenle, tüm bu aşamalarda öz-bilinç, hem kendine dair bir olumsuzlama içermesi bakımından bir yabancılaşma hem de bu yabancılaşmanın ortadan kaldırılması olarak olumsuzlamanın olumsuzlanması olarak belirir. Soyut özgürlük düşüncesinin uğrakları olan “Stoacılık”, “Kuşkuculuk” ve “Mutsuz Bilinç” aşamaları işte bu noktada ortaya çıkar. Çalışmanın bu kısmında, bilincin öz-bilince doğru evrilirken yaşadığı deneyim ve bu deneyim süresince hem kendini hem de dünyayı anlamada sergilediği farklı biçimler olarak karşımıza çıkan aşamalar ve bu aşamaların köleci bir bireysellik ve onun aşılma süreci üzerinden kendini bu biçimler altında nasıl bedenli varoluşundan koparmaya çalıştığı incelenmiştir. Öz-bilinç, tüm bu aşamalar boyunca, kendi bölünmüş, parçalanmış yapısını, yabancılaşma olarak adlandırılabilen bu diyalektik bilinç süreçlerinden geçerek birliğini temin etme çabasıdadır.

Bilincin yalnızca soyut bir özgürlük düşüncesi olarak belirmesi dolayısıyla onun bedenli olma karakterinin de bir tür yokluk olarak belirlediği bu süreçler, bilincin kendi bağımsızlık ve kesinliğinin teminini sağlamak adına bedenli varoluşundan kopma çabalarının aşamaları olarak da ortaya çıkar. Bu anlamda, bilincin *Fenomenoloji*'deki bu aşamaları “bedenden ayrılma” (*disembodiment*) ya da “bedensizleşme”nin farklı stratejilerle teminini sağlama girişimleri olarak ele alınabilir. “Mutsuz Bilinç” aşamasının sonunda ise, bilincin bedenli varolmadan kopuşunun, bilinç için herhangi bir nihai yolu olmadığı anlaşılır. Dolayısıyla, bilincin bu aşamalarda aldığı biçimler, onun tam da bedensel varlığını terk etme çabalarında bedenine yeniden bağlanması gerekliliği olarak karşımıza çıkar.

Bu çalışma boyunca, bilincin her zaman için bedenli bir bilinç olduğu anlatılmaya çalışılmıştır. “Ben”, bir beden olarak, ancak kendi dışımda, yani bir ötekinde ya da dünyada var olabilirim. Bedenli olmanın biçimleri, bilincin aldığı formların bir anlamda bedende olumlanmasıdır. Kendisinde özsel bir “şey” olmayan bilinç, her zaman için kendisini bedenli varolma içinde gerçekleştirir ve bedenli bir bilinç olarak, ancak, kendisinin bu dünya ile olan dolayımı üzerinden kendisiyle ve bedeniyle birliğinin teminini sağlayabilir. Beden de her zaman için bir bilincin bedeni olması bakımından kendi anlamını açar. Bilincin formlarının birbirinden farklılaşmasına bağlı olarak bilincin bedenli olmasının anlamı da onun aldığı her formda farklılaşır. Bilincin bu çalışmada incelenen tüm aşamaları boyunca, dünya ile ya da başkalık ile kurulan her ilişkinin bilincin bedensel varolmasına gönderme yapması gerekliliği açığa çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Dolayısıyla, bilincin bedenli oluşunu deneyimlemesinin yolu, onun dünya ile kurduğu ilişkidedir. Bu demektir ki, Hegel'in *Fenomenoloji*'de bize aktardığı öz-bilinç olma serüveni her zaman için bir dolayımı gerektirirken, bilincin bedenli varoluştan azade bir bilinç olarak kavranmaması gerektiğine de işaret eder. Bu anlayış üzerinden, öz-bilincin bedenli varolma karakteri, yalnızca dünya ile olan dolayımı üzerinden kurulabilir. Bu bakımından, *Fenomenoloji*'de bedensel olan ile bedensel olmayanın birbirini karşılıklı olarak belirlemesi anlamında, Hegel diyalektiğinin işlerliğine de tanık oluruz. *Fenomenoloji* boyunca karşımıza çıkan bilincin kendi ile birliği ya da

özdeşliğin sağlanması sorunu, Hegel Felsefesi'nde onun ayrımında bir birlik olarak kurulmasını gerektirir. Bu anlamda, Hegel'de bilincin, bedenli bir bilinç olarak kendi ile birliği sorunu, soyut bir özdeşlikten ziyade, özdeşliğin her zaman için bir ayrım ve olumsuzlama üzerinden kurulduğu diyalektik bir sürecin işlediği anlamına gelir. Bu nedenle, Hegel'in bilinç kavrayışı, bilinci bütünüyle bir özdeşlik olarak kuran ve bedeni de bu bütünlüğe karşıt olarak konumlandıran kendinden önceki bilinç felsefelerine karşı, bir olumsuzlama ya da eleştiriyi de içerisinde barındırmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın örtük anlamı ise, başlangıçta dolaysız bir varlık olan bedensel varlığın, kendini ötekilerle birlikte bu dünyada yaşayan bir özne olarak açmasıdır. Hegel'in *Fenomenolojisi*'nde bedenin bu kavramsallaştırılması, aynı zamanda felsefe tarihinde yanıltıcı bir biçimde ele alınan “bedensiz düşünce”nin de bir eleştirisini içerir. Bilincin deneyimlerinin, onun bedenli oluşu ile birlikte kavranmasının yanında, bedenin, bilincin tüm deneyimlerinde belirginleşen örtük anlamının açığa çıkarılması da Hegel Felsefesi'ne dair bizlere daha bütünlüklü bir kavrayış sağlayacaktır.

## APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Önder  
Adı : Sevi Emek  
Bölümü : Felsefe

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : The Embodiment of the Individual Self:  
A Conceptualization of Body in Hegel's  
*Phenomenology of Spirit*

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans ☒ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☒
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**