

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRINT MEDIA COVERAGE OF
NEO-LIBERAL POLICIES IN TURKEY: SELECTED COLUMNISTS
(1980-2010)

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ABSTRACT

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The thesis analyses key features and evolution of the print media coverage of neo-liberal policies in Turkey on the basis of a critical discourse analysis applied to selected columnists from different political perspectives. For the period of 1980-2010, the thesis aims to identify key themes, arguments and discursive selectivities used in the coverage of neo-liberal policies, their changes in time and conformity with the global neo-liberal discourse. Locating discursive elements in the neo-liberal transformation of the country, the thesis also examines articulation of different political discourses in the print media with neo-liberal hegemonic discourse. The thesis argues that the print media has actively been involved in the formation of a neo-liberal discourse in Turkey by an increasing positive bias from the late 1980s. In this regard, the thesis evaluates discursive selectivities of the print media by grouping them under seven main themes. The study also presents some findings on the language uses and a list of keywords used by columnists in the coverage of neo-liberal policies.

Keywords: Neo-liberalism, The Print Media, Columnists, Critical Discourse Analysis

ÖZ

NEO-LİBERAL POLİTİKALARIN TÜRKİYE’DE YAZILI BASIN TARAFINDAN ELE ALINIŞININ ELEŞTİREL BİR ANALİZİ: SEÇİLİ KÖŞE YAZARLARI (1980-2010)

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Bu tez, farklı siyasi perspektiflerden seçilmiş köşe yazarları üzerinde yapılan eleştirel bir söylem analizi temelinde neo-liberal politikaların Türkiye yazılı basınında ele alınışının ana özellikleri ve evrimini incelemektedir. Tez, 1980-2010 yıllarını kapsayan bir dönemde, neo-liberal politikaların sunulmasında kullanılan ana temaları, argümanları ve söylemsel seçiciliği, bunların zaman içindeki değişimlerini ve küresel neo-liberal söylem düzeniyle uyumunu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, bu söylemsel unsurların Türkiye’nin neo-liberal dönüşümündeki yerini göz önüne alarak, yazılı basın içindeki farklı politik söylemlerin hegemonik neo-liberal söylemle eklemelenme sürecini incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, yazılı medyanın Türkiye’de neo-liberal bir söylemin oluşumuna 1980’lerin sonlarından itibaren artan yanlı bir tutumla dahil olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, tez, yazılı medyadaki söylemsel seçiciliği yedi ana tema çerçevesinde gruplayarak değerlendirmektedir. Çalışma, neo-liberal politikaların ele alınışında görülen dil kullanımlarına ilişkin sonuçlar ve bir neo-liberal anahtar kelimeler listesi de sunmaktadır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Neo-liberalizm, Yazılı Medya, Köşe yazarı, Eleştirel Söylem Analizi

To Utku and Güneş

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	III
ABSTRACT	IV
ÖZ	V
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS	VIII
LIST OF TABLES.....	XIII
LIST OF FIGURES.....	XIV
LIST OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS.....	XV
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Setting the Problem	2
1.2 Research Questions and Outline of the Study	3
1.3 Theoretical Framework and Methodology	5
1.4 Structure of the Thesis.....	8
2. ON NEO-LIBERALISM, DISCOURSE AND MEDIA	13
2.1 Neo-liberalism and Discourse	13
2.1.1 A Brief Discussion on Neo-liberalism	13
2.1.2 Ideology, Hegemony and Discourse.....	22
2.1.3 Neo-liberal Discourse	34
2.1.3.1 Main Characteristics and Claims.....	34
2.1.3.2 Strategic/Discursively Selected Moments in the Production of Neo-liberal Hegemony	40
2.2 Neo-liberalism and Media	48
2.2.1 Structural Transformation of the Media Industry.....	48

2.2.2	The Case of Turkish Print Media	52
2.2.2.1	Neo-liberal Restructuring in Turkey	52
2.2.2.2	Milestones of Neo-Liberal Transformation of the Print Media	62
2.2.2.3	Columnists as 'Organic Intellectuals' of Neo-liberal Transformation	67
2.2.2.4	Main characteristics of Columnists in Turkey	69
3.	METHODOLOGY AND INTRODUCTION OF SELECTED COLUMNISTS.....	78
3.1	Critical Discourse Analysis as a Methodology	79
3.1.1	Introduction of the Critical Discourse Analysis	79
3.1.2	Dialectical-Relational Approach to CDA by Norman Fairclough	82
3.1.2.1	Main stages of the Dialectical-Relational approach to CDA	85
3.1.2.2	Key Concepts	87
3.2	Selected Columnists and Their Representations in Print media	89
3.2.1	Selection Criteria of Columnists	89
3.2.2	Introduction of the Selected Columnists	91
3.2.2.1	Güngör Uras	91
3.2.2.2	Mehmet Barlas	94
3.2.2.3	Hasan Cemal	98
3.2.2.4	Abdurrahman Dilipak.....	103
3.2.2.5	Fehmi Kuru	107
3.3	The framework of the Textual Analysis.....	109
3.3.1	Principles of Data Collection and Selection.....	109
3.3.2	Principles of the Textual Analysis	112
3.3.3	Sample Analysis by the Volunteer Group.....	113

4. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COLUMNISTS	115
4.1 Textual Analysis of Güngör Uras's Columns	115
4.1.1 Introduction	115
4.1.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies	116
4.1.3 Language use	134
4.2 Textual Analysis of Mehmet Barlas's Columns.....	136
4.2.1 Introduction	136
4.2.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies	137
4.2.3 Language Use	155
4.3 Textual Analysis Hasan Cemal's Columns	157
4.3.1 Introduction	157
4.3.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies	159
4.3.3 Language Use	176
4.4 Textual Analysis of Abdurrahman Dilipak's Columns	177
4.4.1 Introduction	177
4.4.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies	179
4.4.3 Language Use	194
4.5 Textual Analysis of Fehmi Koru's Columns.....	195
4.5.1 Introduction	195
4.5.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies	197
4.5.3 Language Use	209
4.6 Evaluation of the Sample Analysis of Volunteer Group	210
5. AN ASSESSMENT ON THE NEO-LIBERAL DISCOURSE OF COLUMNISTS	217
5.1 Main Conclusions	218

5.1.1	Glorification of Free Market Economy, Capital and Consumerism	218
5.1.1.1	Free Market Economy.....	218
5.1.1.2	Changing Attitude Towards Capital/Capitalists/Wealth.....	221
5.1.1.3	Consumerism	226
5.1.2	Articulation of Neo-liberal Discourse with Change/New World Order and Globalization Narratives	227
5.1.3	Privatisation and Anti-Statism	230
5.1.4	Discrediting Class Struggle, Class Demands and Left-wing Parties	234
5.1.4.1	Depiction of Neo-Liberal Policies as Necessary Measures for the Long-Term Well-Being of the Economy	235
5.1.4.2	Depiction of Class Demands As a “Burden” for the Society..	236
5.1.4.3	Degradation of Communism, Socialism and Left-Wing Parties.....	237
5.1.5	Changing Discursive Elements on the IMF anchor	242
5.1.6	Articulation of Islamist Discourse with Neo-liberal Discourse	245
5.1.6.1	Transition from an Anti-Systemic Discourse to “Inevitable Globalization” Narratives.....	246
5.1.6.2	Utilization of Eclectic Conceptualizations.....	252
5.1.6.3	Legitimization of Unjust Income Distribution from a Religious Perspective and Emphasis on Social Aid.....	254
5.1.6.4	Critiques on Changing Lifestyles of Enriched Muslims	258
5.1.7	Adaptation to Crises: Economic and Political Stability Narratives	259
5.2	Language Use.....	261
5.2.1	Lack of Elements of Opinion and Investigative Journalism	262
5.2.2	Frequent Use of Stereotypes, Popular Words and Neo-liberal Keywords	263

5.2.3	Frequent Use of Quotations from the Speeches of the Political Figures and Members of the Capitalist Class	264
5.2.4	Discrediting Left-Wing Parties, Trade Unions And Class Struggle	265
5.2.5	Interdiscursive Hybridity	266
5.3	Keywords of Neo-liberal Discourse in Turkey	267
6.	CONCLUSION	274
	REFERENCES	286
	APPENDICES	
A.	SURVEY SHEET	305
B.	INFORMATION NOTE FOR VOLUNTEER GROUP	309
C.	SOME EXAMPLES FROM THE ASSESSMENTS OF VOLUNTEER GROUP.....	311
D.	CURRICULUM VITAE	318
E.	TURKISH SUMMARY/ TÜRKÇE ÖZET	320
	TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU	336

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Core Claims of Globalism	36
Table 2: Discursively Selective Moments in the Production of Hegemony	44
Table 3: Key Actors, Discourses and Functioning Mechanisms in the Production of Neo-Liberal Hegemony	45
Table 4: Shares of Articles of Columnists in the Online Platforms	77
Table 5: Key Concepts Used in the Dialectical-Relational CDA	88
Table 6: Number of Analysed Articles of Each Columnist	112

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Number of Columns per day – Milliyet 1980-2005.....	70
Figure 2: Language use in Gungor Uras.....	134
Figure 3: Language use in Mehmet Barlas.....	156
Figure 4: Language use in Hasan Cemal.....	177
Figure 5: Language use in Abdurrahman Dilipak.....	195
Figure 6: Language use in Fehmi Kuru.....	210
Figure 7: Assessment of the Volunteer Group on Biases of the Sample Texts...	211
Figure 8: Assessment of the Volunteer Group on Messages of the Texts towards Political power-holders and the Spokepersons of the Capital.....	212
Figure 9: Assessment of the Volunteer Group on Messages of the Texts about Neo-Liberalism.....	214
Figure 10: Ratio of Different Language Uses.....	216
Figure 11: Overall Conclusions on Language Uses.....	262

LIST OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS

Clipping 1: Islamist Movement is retreating.....	105
Clipping 2: Interview with Vehbi Koç by Mehmet Barlas	224
Clipping 3: Cost of the cancellation is 618 Trillion Liras! (İptalin maliyeti 618 Trilyon Lira).....	233
Clipping 6: Workers are drawn to 1 May (İşçiler 1 Mayıs’a sürükleniyor).....	241
Clipping 7: DISK has left workers out in the wind (DİSK, işçilerini yüzüstü bıraktı).....	242
Clipping 8: Supporting the “free” is a must for export (İhracat için “serbest” takviye şart).....	251

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Despite the traumatic global economic crisis in 2008 and increasing income inequalities all over the world, it is still not possible to argue that “neo-liberal discourse” has lost its ideological impact on economic, political and social realms. This is largely because, although it emerged as a consequence of structural contradictions of capitalism, neo-liberalism has been relying on “strong” discursive elements in the production of its hegemony. That is to say, neo-liberalism as an ideology, going beyond legitimization of certain policies, has deliberately and substantially affected the meaning-making mechanisms in the social domain. In this sense, while neo-liberalism has been transforming state-market and state-class relations, its discursive elements have been resilient against several challenges it has faced. As a contemporary philosopher, Slavoj Žižek underlines that even left-wing parties today, whom he calls “Enlightened Social Democrat Fukuyamaists”, cannot save their political contemplations from the ideological dominance of neo-liberal hegemony¹. For that reason, at a time when the world is passing through a period of uncertainties, it becomes an important subject matter for the critical studies to make a detailed analysis of neo-liberal discourse.

The analysis of neo-liberal discourse is important for at least three reasons. First, for grasping which strategies have been used to make neo-liberal ideology all-pervasive and how those strategies evolve in time to adapt to new challenges; second, for understanding how those strategies have been recontextualized in

¹ Žižek, Slavoj (2016) *Why There Are No Viable Political Alternatives to Unbridled Capitalism*, <http://zizek.uk/why-there-are-no-viable-political-alternatives-to-unbridled-capitalism/>

different scales such as global, national and local, and lastly, for opening a way for counter-discourses and transformative action by applying a dialectical reasoning.

1.1 Setting the Problem

As is widely accepted, Turkey entered into a neo-liberal restructuring process from the beginning of the 1980s. As a matter of fact, Turkey has been one of the first developing economies that implemented a neo-liberal economic programme. In this regard, “structural adjustment” of the country was launched through a “shock treatment” under the so-called 24 January Stability Programme in 1980. It can be argued that the Stability Programme envisaged two strategic objectives, first was to change “mode of articulation” of Turkish economy with global economy and second was to strengthen the position of the capitalist classes against organized labour.

In this historical context, one of the significant challenges of critical studies on neo-liberalism has been to investigate and comprehend the support given by the working class to political actors who have been harsh implementers of neo-liberal policies. Although living conditions of the working class have been gradually worsened through systematic recommodification of labour and marketization of public services, right-wing parties despite being implementers of these policies have been victorious in the majority of elections in the last decades. In this regard, there is a considerable literature which rightly underlines the role of a widespread ideological campaign that was ran for legitimizing neo-liberal policies in Turkey. That is to say, in line with the strategic/discursively selective moments of the representatives of the capitalist class and political power-holders, certain discourses, projects and narratives have become influential on the social realm by the contribution of several actors.

In this conjunction, mass media in Turkey has become one of most important agents of the production of a neo-liberal hegemony in the post-1980 era. First of all, two structural transformations have been seen in the media itself from the early 1980s. Firstly, in line with the neo-liberal transformation of the country, the media has

itself entered into a structural transformation which has led to the emergence of a fusion among political power-holders, representatives of capitalist class and the media owners.² Secondly, due to repressive policies on the press and increasing monopolization in production and distribution of media products, oppositional or independent press has come to the edge of extinction.

The symbiotic relationship, which emerged among the businessmen, the media owners and the political power-holders, has resulted in an increasing support of the new mass media towards the neo-liberal transformation from the early 1990s. This support has not been limited to the advocacy or legitimization of certain neo-liberal policies but also included an effort to change meaning-making mechanisms in every aspect of social life from politics to consuming patterns, from working life to intimate relations. Moreover, articulation of neo-liberalism to different order of discourses in Turkey has been an important aspect of the production of neo-liberal hegemony. In this sense, particularly from the mid-1990s, neo-liberalism has gained a new set of discursive elements for legitimization and representation of neo-liberal policies “thanks to” its articulation to the Islamist discourse. In the Gramscian sense, neo-liberalism has passed through an articulation and disarticulation process in its ideological struggle in Turkey and produced its hegemony through establishing new coalitions. The Islamist print media has become a key actor of this articulation process at the discursive level.

1.2 Research Questions and Outline of the Study

In such a context, this thesis aims to problematize the role of mass media in the formation of a neo-liberal discourse in Turkey. The main purpose of the thesis is to examine main characteristics and evolution of the coverage of neo-liberalism/neo-liberal policies by Turkish print media during the period of 1980-2010, based on

² Raşit Kaya, *Iktidar Yumağı: Medya, Sermaye, Devlet*, Ankara, Imge Kitapevi, 2009, p.257.

the views of columnists from different political perspectives. In this sense, the study aims to identify key themes and “discursive selectivities³” used in the coverage of neo-liberal policies, their changes in time and their conformity with the global neo-liberal discourse as well as articulation of the Islamist columnists with these discursive elements.

For this purpose, an empirical textual analysis based on the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA) was designed and conducted on selected columnists. In this regard, following the selection of five columnists based on a set of criteria, more than 500 columns were collected and short-listed down to 186 columns. A survey sheet was formulated for the CDA to be applied to this shortlist and each column was analysed accordingly. For each columnist, the findings of the textual analysis were grouped under key discursive selectivities and themes. In addition to the analysis conducted by the researcher, a group of volunteers were asked to assess a sample of 39 columns using the same survey sheet in order to verify the findings reached by the researcher and to enrich and broaden the conclusions. Finally, according to the existing literature and findings of the study, an overall assessment was made regarding the neo-liberal discourse of the columnists in Turkey.

Even though there is considerable literature on the neo-liberal transformation of Turkey and the ideological role of mass media, this study aims to complement two fields of media studies in Turkey to which few academic studies have been devoted. The first aim is to apply a comprehensive critical discourse analysis (CDA) on columnists from different political perspectives covering a period of thirty years and the second aim is to focus on these columnists to investigate their role as organic intellectuals of neo-liberal transformation. Moreover, by including two prominent Islamist columnists in the textual analysis, it was attempted to shed light on some features of the articulation of Islamist discourse with neo-liberalism at the

³ The notion of discursive selectivity used by Bob Jessop and Ngai Ling Sum with reference to the studies of Colin Hay on media coverage of “Winter of Discontent” in the UK. The concept refers to the selection of certain discourses to support hegemonic objects, projects and imaginaries.

discursive level. More importantly, in this study, attention is drawn to specific and distinctive characteristics of the columnists in Turkey and the qualitative and quantitative transformation they have undergone in the post-1980 era. First of all, in the absence of western type think tanks, research centres and propaganda agents, the columnists in Turkey have a considerable visibility in the public scene. Not only through their columns in the print media, but also by being TV commentators, primetime anchor-men, loyal participants of TV and radio discussions, consultants of political parties, conference speakers etc., they have acted as a sort of “organic intellectuals” of the neo-liberal transformation. It can be argued that particularly columnists in the mainstream media have started to act as “binding agents” among media owners, political power-holders and businessmen. That is to say, by setting out organic bonds, columnists have contributed to the fusion among these structures.

1.3 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This study draws upon the contributions of the Strategic-Relational Approach (SRA) in its inquiry of understanding neo-liberalism and the relations between discourse, hegemony and ideology. The SRA is largely based on the works of Bob Jessop and other scholars from Lancaster University and benefits from four theoretical perspectives. These are namely regulation school, an approach to the political economy of the state as influenced by Gramsci and Poulantzas, and cultural political economy as well as CDA. In this regard, the SRA attributes a particular importance to the critical analysis of discourse and benefits from the CDA approach of Norman Fairclough.

In the analysis of media texts, in this study the Dialectical-Relational CDA approach of Norman Fairclough is used for two reasons. Firstly, Dialectical-Relational CDA approach, which is based on critical realism and cultural political economy perspective, successfully complements the theoretical perspective used to explore relationship between neo-liberalism, ideology and discourse in this study. Secondly, Norman Fairclough's particular attention on neo-liberal discourse and his

previous case studies on globalization and recontextualization of neo-liberal discourse in Romania provide a crucial starting point for this study. From this theoretical and methodological framework, this thesis evaluated neo-liberalism as a 'new form of capitalism' which emerged as a response to the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s. As a shift in the 'regime of accumulation' and 'mode of regulation'⁴, neo-liberalism did not emerge through spontaneous acts of market forces but instead as a result of deliberate efforts of certain actors initially in the US and Europe. That is to say, internal constraints of capitalism caused the imposition of a new ideological project by capitalist classes and the state, which has based itself on the economic theory of the “neo-liberals”.

This economic theory has been characterized by the glorification of free trade, free market and individual rights of private property and entrepreneurship as the best way of achieving human well-being.⁵ Private sector and competition are presented as driving forces of the growth at every scale. According to the core claims of neo-liberal theory, the state should not intervene to the economic domain, but it should only enable functioning of the market economy. As Bourdieu puts it, neo-liberalism has been a project “for destroying collective structures which may impede the pure market logic” as well as “imposition of a sort of moral Darwinism in every sphere of the society associating with an attack on class struggle based on individualization of performances and wage relations.”⁶

Moreover, following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, this neo-liberal ideology was 'successfully' articulated with the 'Fukuyamaist' end of history thesis and “indispensable and irreversible globalization narratives”. Eventually, neo-liberal

⁴ Bob Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, Chapter III, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.123.

⁵ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neo-liberalism*, New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2005, p.2.

⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *Utopia of Endless Exploitation, The essence of neo-liberalism*, <http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu>

ideology has entered into a hegemonic struggle to expand its hegemony on the global scale with the slogan of “there is no alternative”. The role of the neo-liberal ideology and their reflections in discursive practices in establishing, sustaining and reproducing the power relations have become more observable by its quick prevalence in the social realm.⁷

Having such considerations in mind, the study includes a brief discussion of the main characteristics and expansion of the neo-liberal discourse to establish a theoretical base for the textual analysis. It is underlined that the emergence of neo-liberal discourse has been largely based on strategic and discursive selectivities of members of the capitalist classes and political power-holders in a structure-driven process of capitalist re-structuring.⁸ Even though its key arguments/core claims are drawn from the neo-liberal economy theory, neo-liberal discourse has not been a homogenous and single-type discourse. This is because, neo-liberal discourse is composed of global, national and party-political variations stemming from its recontextualization at different levels and in different periods.⁹ In this sense, neo-liberal discourse should not be taken as a *fait accompli*, but it has adapted to the new challenges arising from crises and counter-hegemonic elements. Finally, it is stressed that neo-liberal discourse has been “successful” in creating a pervasive semiotic order which has not been transforming only economic objects and state-society relations but also the subjects. That is to say, neo-liberal discourse has been a part of a broader semiotic order which is composed of a system of signs, dominant discourses, genres and styles which affect the way people think and behave.

⁷ Norman Fairclough and Isabella Fairclough, *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students*, Routledge, London; New York, 2013, p.80.

⁸ Ngai-Ling Sum, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Discourses, Material Power and (Counter-Hegemony)”, *CPERC Working Paper* 2012-01, p.24.

⁹ Sean Phelan, *Neo-liberalism, Media and the Political*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014, p.15.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

This study is composed of six main chapters including introduction and conclusion chapters. The chapters are organized in an order to present a theoretical background and literature review on the main problems of the thesis, introduction of the methodological framework and selection criteria of columnists, presentation of results of the textual analysis and finally an overall assessment on the columnists' coverage of neo-liberal policies.

In this regard, the second chapter aims to provide a brief theoretical framework and literature review on the relationship between neo-liberalism, discourse and the media. Drawing upon the contributions of Gramsci and Volosinov, the neo-liberal ideology is evaluated as an uncompleted and on-going struggle which is constantly being reproduced in social relations. In this sense, language is identified as an “arena of the struggle of different ideologies” in which dominant ideology is articulated with different discursive elements.

Furthermore, in this chapter, it is underlined that neither constructivist accounts which overemphasize the role of discourse in the social reality, nor economic reductionist views which attribute their attention to “structure” can explain the role of discourse in the social structuration. From this perspective, the controversial point in the analysis of discourse stems from the understanding of the mutual relation between non-semiotic aspects of social structures and semiosis. In this sense, the study embraces the critical approach developed by Jessop and Fairclough, which defines semiosis/discourse as “the inter-subjective production of the meaning” which has a causal efficacy in the social processes.¹⁰ This approach, without falling into a discourse reductionism/imperialism, aims to put discourse

¹⁰ Norman Fairclough, Bob Jessop & Andrew Sayer, “Critical Realism and Semiosis”, *Journal of Critical Realism*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 05.2002, p. 4.

into its place within the dialectical relational framework of person, social relation and material world.¹¹ In this sense, semiosis/discourse is defined as “conjunctions of structures and causal powers co-producing specific effects.”¹²

The second chapter also focuses on the relationship between neo-liberalism and the media. It is underlined that the mass media has been involved in the neo-liberal transformation process in two ways. First, the mass media has itself turned out to be an important component of the capitalist structure and its reproduction as an economic enterprise. Second, it has been an important hegemonic apparatus in the formation of a dominant neo-liberal discourse. In this framework, the chapter touches upon milestones of the neo-liberal transformation of Turkish print media and main characteristics of the columnists in the post-1980. This part draws attention to the changing ownership relations in the mass media and the continuity of political parallelism in Turkey.

The third chapter aims to introduce CDA as a “methodology” and selected columnists along with their selection criteria. First of all, after briefly reviewing CDA methodology in general, the chapter presents key concepts and stages of Dialectical-Relational CDA approach of Norman Fairclough. It is underlined that the common characteristics of CDA approaches is their concern with domination, inequality and power relations in society and its relationship with discourse. In this sense, discourse is seen as a socially shaped and socially constitutive meaning-making order which can be used to reproduce current power relations.¹³ Moreover, it is argued that CDA can provide an interdisciplinary research method for the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.2.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹³ Norman Fairclough, Jane Mulderrig, and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, *Discourse Studies A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, ed. Teun A Van Dijk, Sage Publications, London, 2011, p. 358.

analysis of text, its production and explanation of the social reality. This is why, it is emphasized that apart from other types of textual analysis, CDA provides a dialectical and relational approach to language and meaning, going beyond focusing on “isolated words and sentences”.¹⁴

The third chapter also includes the introduction of the selected columnists and justifications on how they represent a meaningful sample for this analysis. A summary of professional careers, backgrounds, political perspectives of five selected columnists as well as their relations with media bosses, businessmen and political figures are presented. In this regard, the chapter introduces *Güngör Uras* as an economy writer and columnist; and four columnists who are deemed to reflect different political perspectives, namely *Mehmet Barlas* as a liberal central-right columnist, *Hasan Cemal* as a 'once leftist' then left-liberal columnist, *Fehmi Koru* as an Islamist-conservative columnist, and *Abdurrahman Dilipak* as a long-standing Islamist columnist who has been writing for Islamist newspapers such as *Milli Gazete*, *Akit* and *Yeni Şafak*.

Finally, this chapter refers to the principles of data collection and selection, framework of the textual analysis and sample analysis conducted by the Volunteer Group. In this regard, an important component of the textual analysis is conduction of a “sample analysis” by a Volunteer group. Volunteers have the backgrounds of political science, sociology, international relations and business administration with master or doctorate degrees. This group was asked to read a number of articles covering all five columnists and then to fill a survey sheet for each article. The survey sheet, composed of both open and close ended questions, aims to determine how the text are understood by the volunteer in terms of themes, biases, messages and language uses. The objective of this sample analysis is to control key

¹⁴ Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London, New Delhi, 2001, p.39.

conclusions of the analysis of the researcher as well as to feed overall perspective of this study regarding the working of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey.

The fourth chapter presents key results of textual analysis applied to the texts of selected columnists in a detailed manner. Textual analysis of each column focuses on columnist's bias towards neo-liberalism, spokesmen of the capitalist classes and the political parties, key discursive elements and patterns of argumentation, continuities and discontinuities vis-à-vis global neo-liberal order of discourse, uses of language and keywords of developing neo-liberal discourse. The analysis also seeks to find out articulation and disarticulation of neo-liberal discourse with different order of discourses such as Islamist, conservative and leftist discourses in Turkey. Where applicable, the analysis takes into account columnist's coverage of class struggle, demands and actions of working classes, leftist worldviews and socialist/communist ideologies. The fourth chapter also includes results of the sample analysis of the Volunteer Group. It is remarkable that the analyses of the researcher and the Volunteer Group offer similar findings in qualitative and quantitative terms.

The fifth chapter presents key findings of this analysis under three sub-chapters. Firstly, it aims to assess main characteristics and evolution of the print media's coverage of neo-liberal policies in Turkey on the basis of critical analysis of media texts and the relevant literature. This chapter can be read as a stage where critical discourse analyst makes an "explanatory critique" of the neo-liberal discourse by focusing on the relations between the discourse and the social reality. In this manner, it is attempted to locate the findings of the textual analysis in neo-liberal transformation of Turkey under seven main themes around which discursive elements are intensified. These seven themes are "glorification of free market economy, capital and consumerism", "articulation of globalization/change/new world order narratives with neo-liberal discourse"; "discrediting of class struggle, class demands and leftist worldviews"; "privatisation and anti-statism"; "articulation of Islamist order of discourse with neo-liberal discourse"; "changing

discursive elements on the IMF anchor; and crises: economic and political stability narratives”.

The chapter also presents some findings as to the language used by the columnists. In this regard, it is argued that the texts of columnist are generally lacking elements of necessary information and imperatives of investigative journalism. It is also underlined that the columnists have frequently used stereotypes, popular words and neo-liberal keywords as well as quotations from the speeches of the political power-holders and the spokespersons of the capitalist class. Negation of opinions of left wing parties and the class struggle through utilization of words with negative connotations is another observable property of language used in the analysed texts. The chapter also underlines that “interdiscursive hybridity” has been one of the key features of the texts of Islamist columnists from the mid-1990s. The chapter finally includes a list of neo-liberal discourses which are detected in the analysis of the columnists. These keywords are grouped under three periods of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.

CHAPTER 2

ON NEO-LIBERALISM, DISCOURSE AND MEDIA

Before moving on to examine media texts, specifically that of columnists, this chapter aims to provide a theoretical background on the understanding of discursive elements of neo-liberalism and the role of the mass media in the formation of neo-liberal discourse. For this purpose, the chapter is organized in two subchapters.

The first subchapter presents a theoretical debate on neo-liberalism and discourse. In this regard, it focuses on the conception of neo-liberalism, the role of language in neo-liberal era and how ideology and hegemony are acting in language.

The second subchapter examines the role of media in the making of neo-liberal hegemony, the case of Turkish print media and the main characteristics of column-writing in Turkey in the post-1980 era.

2.1 Neo-liberalism and Discourse

2.1.1 A Brief Discussion on Neo-liberalism

Since the main concern of this study is to analyse the media coverage of neo-liberalism, it would be a good starting point to provide a brief debate on neo-liberalism and how this thesis approaches its conceptualization.

In terms of its theoretical roots, neo-liberalism merges views from a broad range of sources including “Adam Smith, neoclassical economics, the Austrian critique of

Keynesianism and Soviet-style socialism and Monetarism”.¹⁵ In this sense, neo-liberalism is defined by Plehwe as a “thought collective” which was developed in the last seventy years.¹⁶ He underlines the role of Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS) in the development of this thought collective since 1947 under the leadership of Albert Hunold and Friedrich August von Hayek and a number of neo-liberal intellectuals in Europe and the United States (US). For him, MPS and “networks of neo-liberal partisan think tanks” can be seen as the basis of intellectual source of organized neo-liberalism.¹⁷ The main arguments of MPS was “monetarism, supply-side economics, and minimal government” which were based on the contributions from leading MPS members such as Milton Friedman, Karl Brunner, Sir Alan Walters, Martin Feldstein, James Buchanan, and Gary Becker and a “thought collective” of more than one thousand scholars, journalists, think tank professionals, CEO, political leaders.¹⁸

In other words, as Fairclough points out before the implementation of neo-liberal strategies, there has been an “imaginary” of neo-liberalism in the last seventy years which has eventually turned to be a “counter-revolution” against social democrat and statist forms of the capitalism.¹⁹ However, although some elements of this imaginary have been preserved in neo-liberal discourse, some of them have been altered or adapted to new challenges during the operationalization of neo-liberal

¹⁵ Alfredo Saad-Filho, “Introduction”, *Neo-liberalism: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005, p.2.

¹⁶ Dieter Plehwe, “Introduction”, *The Road From Mont Pèlerin The Making Of The Neo-liberal Thought Collective*, ed. by Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2009, p.4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.8.

¹⁹ Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, Longman, Oxon, New York, 2010, p.13.

policies across the globe in the last forty years. One of the well-known definitions made by David Harvey who formulates neo-liberalism as a “theory of political economic practices” that contends:

..human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.²⁰

State interventions in markets must be kept to a bare minimum because the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals and because powerful interests will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for their own benefit.²¹

In line with this assertion, this study embraces a critical approach towards neo-liberalism and examines it as a new form of capitalism which has not occurred through spontaneous operation of market forces but through deliberate efforts of the capitalist classes to redefine economy and to create appropriate accumulation strategies. Bourdieu points out that these efforts refer to the deployment of a political project which has “strong” discursive elements.²² Therefore, neo-liberalism can be regarded both as a new form capitalism and an ideological project which compromised essential discursive practices.

In this regard, investigating into the concept of neo-liberalism by critical studies, Marnie Holborow distinguishes four different approaches, each defining neo-liberalism either as “an economic theory, a new form of capitalism, an ideology, or

²⁰ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neo-liberalism*, New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 2005, p.2

²¹ David Harvey, “Neo-liberalism as Creative Destruction”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 2007; 610; p. 23.

²² Pierre Bourdieu, “Utopia of Endless Exploitation: The essence of neo-liberalism, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 1998, <http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu>

a discourse”.²³ However, in this study it is stipulated that the comprehension of neo-liberalism through “only” one of the above-mentioned categories would be insufficient.

First and foremost, as Saad-Filho argues, it is impossible to make a “purely theoretical definition” of neo-liberalism or analyse it as a mere economy theory because it is hardly possible to detach neo-liberalism from the practices of imperialism and the so-called process of globalization.²⁴ Moreover, the gap between main arguments of neo-liberal theory/discourse and the social reality that emerged after its operationalization in all scales of global economy makes any attempt of defining neo-liberalism as a mere economy theory insufficient.

Secondly, any definition of neo-liberalism from a “constructivist” perspective, which reduces neo-liberalism to an ideological contemplation and detaches it from the crisis and structural conditions of the capitalism in the 1970s, would also be incomplete.

In other words, revival of neo-liberalism cannot be assessed without an understanding of the crises of capitalism in the 1970s. After a twenty-five year of dominance of Keynesian economy policies, in the 1970s, the capitalism faced low profitability, low interest rates and crashes in the stock market. Thus, neo-liberalism was a response of the capitalism to its over-accumulation crisis in the 1970s when the “structural coherence” of the Golden age entered a period of crisis.

Bob Jessop presents one of the most profound analyses of this response in *the Future of the Capitalist State*. Jessop explains neo-liberal transformation as a shift

²³ Marnie Holborow, “Discourse, Ideology and the Real World”, *Neo-liberalism and Applied Linguistics*, David Block, John Gray, Marnie Holborow, Routledge, Oxon, New York, p.15.

²⁴ Saad-Filho, “Introduction”, p.2.

in the regime of accumulation and mode of regulation which has aimed a spatio-temporal fix²⁵ for the capitalism with an enormous expansion of finance capital. For him, this process can be evaluated as a shift from “Keynesian Welfare National State” to “Schumpeterian Competition State”.²⁶ If this assertion is put it in another way, neo-liberalism can be explained as a conversion in the regime of accumulation, from Fordist mode of accumulation to a flexible accumulation, and eventually a transformation in the mode of regulation.²⁷

In general, Jessop depicts his analysis as a Marxism-rooted strategic-relational approach. His analysis is based on three distinct theoretical perspectives, namely regulation school, an approach to political economy of the state influenced by Gramsci and Poulantzas and critical discourse analysis focusing on discursive constitution of political and economic relations.²⁸ In line with the combination of those theoretical elements, Jessop identifies three major features of the capitalist type of state. For him, first of all, the reproduction of capitalism and capital-labour relations cannot purely ensured by market relations but they need to be supplemented by mode of reproduction and regulation, secondly, the labour power cannot be reproduced through only labour market and wage form, and lastly, when an accumulation regime becomes pervasive in global scale, it also becomes dominant in shaping social system and lifeworld as well.²⁹ In a sense, Jessop

²⁵ The concept of “spatio-temporal fix” is introduced by David Harvey which refers to “many different forms of spatial reorganization and geographical expansion that serve to manage crisis-tendencies in capital accumulation.” David Harvey, “The search for a spatial fix”, *Spaces of Capital*, Routledge, Chapter 15, pp 335- 344.

²⁶ Bob Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, p.123.

²⁷ Thomas Ford Brown, “Ideology, Hegemony and Global Governance”, *Journal of World System Research*, Vol 3, p.251.

²⁸ Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, p.5.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.11.

underlines that the capitalist state takes a crucial part in the self-valorisation of capitalism by ensuring key inputs and “an effective control over labour power.”³⁰ From this perspective, Jessop states that “reproducing and regularizing capital as a social relation involves a social fix (mode of regulation) that compensates for the incompleteness of the pure capital relation.”³¹

Based on these conceptions, for Jessop, Atlantic Fordism, characterized by mass consumption and mass production, was based on a specific type of capitalist state namely the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS). KWNS was key to the continuation of this Atlantic Fordism through its intervention in favour of full employment, demand and decommodification of labour.³² KWNS was also characterized by intensified class struggle and trade unionism which were gradually turned to be a serious “problem” for the capitalist classes. Thus, after facing a series of crises in the 1970s as fisco-financial, social and political crises, this KWNS was transformed into a SCS.³³ Jessop identifies competition state as follows:

Competition state is used here to characterize a state that aims to secure economic growth within its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its border, even where they operate abroad, by promoting the economic and extra-economic conditions that are

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.22.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.48.

³² *Ibid.*, p.59.

³³ See Bob Jessop, *Althusser, Poulantzas, Buci-Glucksmann: Elaborations of Gramsci's Concept of the integral State*, <https://bobjessop.org/2014/02/01/althusser-poulantzas-buci-glucksmann-elaborations-of-gramscis-concept-of-the-integral-state/> where Jessop refers to the analysis of Buci-Glucksmann “The authors identify two possible exit routes from this organic crisis: a turn to liberal corporatism (Sweden) or the growth of authoritarian statism (Germany) (Buci-Glucksmann and Therborn: 149ff)”

currently deemed vital for success in competition with economic actors and spaces located in other states.³⁴

The emergence of the SCS has been closely associated with the “imaginaries” of a new global order under neo-liberal ideology. In this sense, another crucial aspect of Jessop’s analysis is the discursive elements used for the mediation of the crisis and for the transformation of state. Jessop uses the Gramscian notion of hegemony and focuses on how a struggle for a new hegemony comes along with new accumulation strategies, state projects and narratives.³⁵

Jessop also states that neo-liberalization process shows a “variability and heterogeneity” since it has been effective on four types of economic model which are Atlantic Fordism, import-substitution industrialization, export oriented growth in East Asia and state socialism in the Soviet Bloc and China.³⁶ In this sense, Jessop identifies three forms of neo-liberalization; first, neo-liberal *system transformation* in the successor states of the Soviet Bloc; second, neo-liberal *regime shifts* in advanced capitalist countries and neo-liberal *restructuring* in developing countries through external imposition of transnational economic organizations supported by leading capitalist powers and local powers.³⁷ In each case, neo-liberalization process based on several apparatuses which have been supported by discursive strategies in the social realm from working life to education, from finance to politics and economy. Therefore, in its hegemonic struggle, neo-liberal discourse has not been a homogenous discourse, but it has been rather fragmented, changeable and adaptable to different contexts and challenges arising from the contradictions of the

³⁴ Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, p.96.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p.6.

³⁶ Bob Jessop, “Putting neo-liberalism in its time and place: A response to the debate,” *Social Anthropology*, February 2013, p.9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.10

capitalism and counter-hegemonic movements. In the US and Europe, one of the key narratives of this transformation has been the “knowledge-based economy”. In this regard, Jessop underlines that knowledge-based economy has become a hegemonic strategy and an immense importance was attributed to “knowledge as a factor of production in the post-Fordist labour process, accumulation regime and mode of regulation”³⁸ In a similar vein, instead of an unskilled or a semi-skilled labour power with well-organized class demands, SCS has sought to create a “flexible and skilled labour” while shifting from “economy of scale” to “economy of scope in the West. In this sense, knowledge-based economy and innovation strategies in the US and Europe have required a new division of labour in the world system, open markets, and controlled class demands both within the national border and the abroad.

Moreover, Jessop points out the uncompleted characteristics of neo-liberal hegemony which can be seen in constant struggle. In this sense, Jessop stressed that “the transition from Fordism to a stable post-Fordism is not guaranteed, instead depends on complex trial-and-error search processes”.³⁹ In this hegemonic struggle process, a broad range of actors including national governments, international organizations, research centres, think tanks and mass media have contributed in re-invention of liberal assumptions and presentation of those arguments as a scientific economy model. In this regard, as Simon Clarke states, the efforts of advocates of neo-liberalism was not to make it an adequate model for the real world, “but to make the real world more adequate to its model”.⁴⁰ In fact, this was not only a fantasy of intellectuals but a tangible political and ideological project which aimed

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.97.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p.103.

⁴⁰ Simon Clarke, “The Neo-liberal Theory of Society”, *Neo-liberalism: A Critical Reader*, ed. By Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005, p.58.

to be pervasive on the global scale through mobilized global intellectuals, economic and political power-holders.⁴¹ It should also be noted that the struggle over the making of neo-liberal hegemony was not only about ideological apparatuses and discursive practices. Ideological struggle has been key to ensure an intellectual dominance of neo-liberal arguments, misrepresent neo-liberal economy policies and their consequences and ensure articulation of neo-liberal discourse with other discursive orders in national and local scales. However, coercive aspects of neo-liberal hegemony cannot be underestimated since deregulation of the state with new neo-liberal functions has come along with increasing repressive measures on working classes and class struggle.

In this context, a set of neo-liberal policies in the West and developing countries have become dominant under the influence of global capitalism. In industrialised countries, the neo-liberal economy policies have been shaped by the policies of the “the US model”. IMF-guided structural adjustment programmes aimed to achieve the mobility and free operation of capital, open market economy, deregulation, liberalization, and privatisation of public spheres as well as weakening of institutions of social protection, labour unions, and measures of labour market protection in developing countries.⁴²

On the other hand, Washington consensus has also become dominant in the global economy politics advocating “free trade, export-led growth, financial capital mobility, deregulated labour markets and policies of macroeconomic austerity.”⁴³ Thus, the rationale for neo-liberalism is also based on the theory of free trade which

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.58.

⁴² Thomas I. Palley, “From Keynesianism to Neo-liberalism: Shifting Paradigms in Economics”, *Neo-liberalism: A Critical Reader*, ed.by Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, London; Ann Arbor, MI : Pluto Press, 2005, p.25.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.25.

argues that “competitive free trade will automatically benefit all nations.”⁴⁴ As Harris and Robinson underline, neo-liberalism has aimed to “create conditions for the profitable renewal of capital accumulation through new globalized circuits and facilitate subordination and integration of each national economy into the global economy”.⁴⁵

Moreover, besides the transformation of “economic objects”, institutions and the state itself, neo-liberal ideology has caused profound changes in the labour market, labour-capital relations and consuming tendencies in the society. On the one hand, class-based politics and class struggle have been either suppressed or discredited. On the other hand, a new advertising culture and a new mass media have been used to inflate a consumerism which aimed to open new markets both within national borders and abroad. That is to say, neo-liberal ideology has also sought to reconfigure the social domain and produce new subjects by becoming pervasive in all segments of the society.

2.1.2 Ideology, Hegemony and Discourse

The notion of ideology and ideological aspects of hegemonic struggle have long been significant controversies of the political science, particularly that of the Marxism-oriented critical approaches. These controversies mostly stem from diverse interpretations and understandings of Marxism on two crucial debates as “base-superstructure” and “structure-agency” relationships. These interpretations differ in a wide spectrum of approaches from so-called economic reductionism to social constructivism. Although ideology can be a subject matter of a very long debate in terms of these two mentioned debates, it is beyond the aim of this study. However, it is necessary to briefly outline the approach used in this study to analyse

⁴⁴ Anwar Shaikh, “The Economic Mythology of Neo-liberalism”, *Neo-liberalism: A Critical Reader*, ed. By Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, London; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005, p.42.

⁴⁵ William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, “Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class”, *Science & Society*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), p.41.

ideology and hegemony and how they are reflected in language and discourse. First of all, in this study, Gramsci's concepts are used to grasp and conceptualize the relationship among ideology, hegemony and discourse. Secondly, contributions of Volosinov on language are drawn to explain the relationship between language and ideology. Finally, for putting discourse (or in broader term semiosis) into its place within the social structuration, the contributions of Norman Fairclough, Bob Jessop and Andrew Sayer who provides a substantial ground for the understanding of "causal effectivity" of semiotic/discursive orders benefiting from a critical realist account are used.⁴⁶

To start with, Gramsci's background in philology and emphasis on discursive elements of hegemonic struggle offer an essential starting ground for cultural and linguistic turn in social sciences. In his bachelor education on Philology in the University of Turin, Gramsci was inspired by works of his Professor Mattero Bartoli who developed a historical linguistics approach.⁴⁷ Moreover, Gramsci was a man of praxis and his analysis was not only based on the theory but also his direct experiences and observations on the social reality. Therefore, his concepts and analyses constitute one of the key intellectual sources for critical approaches which have sought to analyse ideology and discourse by avoiding both economism and idealism.⁴⁸

The "ideology" analysis of Gramsci is remarkable for at least four aspects which provides important conceptional tools for the understanding of neo-liberal ideology:

➤ *The conception of the ideology in Gramsci goes beyond a false-*

⁴⁶ Norman Fairclough, Bob Jessop & Andrew Sayer, "Critical Realism and Semiosis", p. 2.

⁴⁷ Bob Jessop, *Lectures On Gramsci*, Lecture One, p.11, <https://bobjessop.org/2014/04/21/lectures-on-gramsci/>

⁴⁸ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.61.

consciousness/distorted understanding of the reality or system of ideas, but as Buci-Glucksmann puts it “Gramsci extends his analysis from the most conscious aspects of ideologies to the unconscious and implicit aspects as materialized in the practices and cultural norms”.⁴⁹ For Gramsci, ideology was not also simply the imposition of ideas of the ruling class on the subordinated classes, but *a process of producing subjects*.⁵⁰ In this sense Gramsci states in Prison Notebooks that:

One might say “ideology” here...is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life. This problem is that of preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and to unify.⁵¹

➤ *A critique of economic reductionism without falling into an idealism*: For Gramsci, although, in the last instance, ideology is largely shaped by the ideas of the ruling class, every political and ideological element do not necessarily emerge as an immediate expression of the structure.⁵² Furthermore, ideological struggle is not seen as a replacement of one dominant ideology by another one but as an articulation process and a constant struggle. As Mouffe formulates, the aim of this struggle is not to reject the current ideological system as a whole, “but to rearticulate it, to break it down to its basic elements and then to shift through past conceptions to see which ones, with some changes of content, can serve to express the new one”

⁵³ Moreover, Gramsci argued that Marx also understood the conception of ideology

⁴⁹ Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, [translated from the French] by David Fernbach, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980, p.59.

⁵⁰ Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci”, *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Routledge&Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Henlay, 1979, p.171.

⁵¹ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, edited and translated by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Elecbook, London, 1999, p.634.

⁵² Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci”, p.185.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.192.

in the same vein⁵⁴ and a study of ideology should begin from Marx's sentence "men gain consciousness of their tasks on the ideological terrain of superstructure".⁵⁵

➤ *Ideology is a cement on a class base and key to ensure a hegemonic moment*
Gramsci identified three moments through which a class gains political consciousness. This analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the emergence of ideology of a certain class. The first moment is a primitive-economic moment when a member of a social group reaches consciousness of his common economic-corporate interests with other members of the group but this consciousness does not turn out to be an organized solidarity, the second moment is a political-economic moment in which consciousness of a group reaches a solidarity but only in the economic domain and third moment is a purely political moment in which one gain consciousness of one's own corporate interests and "transcend the limits of purely economic class".⁵⁶ The third moment is also defined by Gramsci as "passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures".⁵⁷ In this sense, Gramsci identifies this stage as not a simple reflection of ideas of this class but instead as a struggle in which those ideas confront with other ideological elements and eventually prevail. However, this struggle can also lead a combination of those different elements. Gramsci states that:

...it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become "party", come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society— bringing about not only a union of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate

⁵⁴ As Jessop pointed out Gramsci also did not read "The German Ideology" because it was published in 1932 he was also not interested in Marx's theory of fetishism as basis for ideology critique. Lectures on Gramsci, <https://bobjessop.org/2014/04/21/lectures-on-gramsci/>

⁵⁵ Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci", p.185.

⁵⁶ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, p.405.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.405.

but on a “universal” plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups. In other words, the dominant group is co-ordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest.⁵⁸

➤ The emphasis on the *material nature of ideology and its discursive/non-discursive character*: As it can be deduced from the citation above, the role of ideology and its role as a hegemonic apparatus is a significant aspect of Gramsci’s analysis. The concepts that he further developed to explain complex functioning of ideological sphere such as organic ideology, organic intellectual, hegemony, hegemonic apparatuses and historic bloc all serve to analyse material nature of ideology.⁵⁹ Moreover, Gramsci’s writings on language show that he rejects the idea of nomenclature, but considers language as “central to the production of meaning and creating the world”.⁶⁰ In this sense, in his study *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*, Peter Ives argues that Gramsci approaches language as a political issue and focuses on “the metaphorical power of linguistic concepts” as means of analysing the role of culture in shaping people’s beliefs.⁶¹ However, as Jessop points out, this does not mean that “Gramsci prioritized superstructure over the

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.405.

⁵⁹ Bob Jessop, *Althusser, Poulantzas, Buci-Glucksmann: Elaborations of Gramsci’s Concept of the integral State*, <https://bobjessop.org/2014/02/01/althusser-poulantzas-buci-glucksmann-elaborations-of-gramscis-concept-of-the-integral-state/>

⁶⁰ Peter Ives, *Language and Hegemony in Gramsci*, London, Pluto Press, 2004, p.136.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.5.

economic...[but] stressed interaction of base and superstructure mediated through language and imaginaries.”⁶²

Another important contribution of Gramsci to the study of superstructure was his conceptualization of *hegemony* which shows a transformation from its former use in Marxist tradition.⁶³ In fact, the notion of hegemony also used by Lenin but this usage was mostly focused on hegemony as it would be realized by the proletariat through class alliances.⁶⁴ In this sense, there are two major aspects of Gramsci’s contributions to the understanding of hegemony. First, the use of the notion is not limited to the acts of proletariat, but it is also used to understand the actions of the ruling class/bourgeoise and second, the analysis of hegemony went beyond seeing it as a simple class alliance, and conceptualized it as “a complete fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives which will be brought about one fundamental group or groups allied to it through the intermediary of ideology”.⁶⁵

In this sense, hegemony in Gramsci, is not only limited with a simple ideological domination of dominant class or its legitimization mechanisms but it also based on intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant class. The ruling class seeks to ensure an active consent of subordinated classes which also has a basis for coercion. More importantly, the notion of hegemonic apparatuses in Gramsci extends the understanding of hegemony and shows how everyday life of human is under the influence of cultural and political hegemony of the dominant class. For Buci-

⁶² Bob Jessop, *Lectures on Gramsci*, Lecture One, p.11, <https://bobjessop.org/2014/04/21/lectures-on-gramsci/>

⁶³ Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, p.47.

⁶⁴ Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci”, p.67.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p.181.

Glucksmann, the hegemonic apparatus is “as a set of institutions, ideologies, practices and agents including intellectuals”, which can be examined only through a class analysis.⁶⁶ This includes many sub-systems such as educational and cultural apparatus, the organization of information, the environment of everyday life, city planning and apparatuses which are inherited from the previous mode of production such as church and its intellectuals.⁶⁷ In this sense, the conception of hegemony as a process of struggle closely associated with discursive characteristics of ideology.

As mentioned before, Gramsci’s contribution in discursive aspects of hegemony is remarkable since he has been one of the first Marxists who approaches language as an historical meaning-making mechanism and a crucial element of hegemonic struggle. His ideology conception, which is more than a reflection of the ideas of the ruling class and refers to a constant confrontation and combination of different ideological elements, opens a way for analysing language as an arena of ideological struggle. However, one should also stress the importance of Volosinov’s Marxist theory of language as a more comprehensive analysis.

First of all, it should be noted that language had long been neglected in the Marxist tradition and there were a very limited number of studies in the beginning of the 20th century. As Raymond Williams states that “Marxism has contributed very little to the theory of language itself.”⁶⁸ Volosinov is remarkable due to his contribution on the understanding of language as a key ground for analysing material nature of ideology. He published *Marxism and Philosophy of Language* in 1930 which composed of crucial contributions in terms of setting up the link between the sign

⁶⁶ Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, p.48.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.48.

⁶⁸ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1977, p.21.

and ideology, socially-constructed nature of the sign, and the difference of the “word” from other ideological signs as a bearer of social changes in the historical sense. In this regard, the basic elements of Volosinov’s approach can be summarized as follows:

➤ *First*, for Volosinov, “everything ideological has a meaning” and without signs there is no ideology.⁶⁹ To put it in another way, every ideological process, for Volosinov, has a semiotic aspect.

➤ *Second*, Volosinov states that signs are reflecting or refracting reality, but they are also a material segment of the reality.⁷⁰ His analysis is based on the critique of idealistic philosophy of culture and language which, according to him, is located the ideology in the consciousness of the individual being. On the contrary, Volosinov underlines that the emergence of signs is inherently a social process. By his words, Volosinov states that:

Signs emerge after all only in the process interaction between one individual consciousness and another. consciousness became consciousness only once it has filled with ideological semiotic content consequently in the process of social interaction.⁷¹

In this sense, Volosinov is disengaging the ideology from the individual consciousness and links it with the social communication.

➤ *Thirdly*, as one of the most important aspects of his analysis, Volosinov posited that the philosophy of language is key to develop a perspective on the problematics of base-superstructure relationships and the distinctive features of “words” make it a very proper study area for seeing the material nature of ideology. In this sense,

⁶⁹ V.N. Volosinov, *Marxism and Philosophy of Language*, Seminar Press, New York, 1930, p.9.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.11.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.13

Volosinov's identified "word" as "the most sensitive index of the social change".⁷² The following passage clearly reflects Volosinov's approach on language as an arena of ideological struggle:

The word is implicated in literally each and every act or contact between people -in collaboration in the job, in ideological exchanges, in the contacts of ordinary life, in political relationships and so on. Countless ideological threads running through all areas of social intercourse register effect in the word...the word is the most sensitive index of social changes, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without definitive shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularized and fully defined ideological systems. The word is the medium in which the slow quantitative accretions of those changes which have not yet achieved the status of a new ideological quality, not yet produced a new and fully-fledged ideological form. The word has the capacity to register all the transitory, delicate, momentary phases of social change.⁷³

To summarize, Volosinov presents one of the first profound Marxist analyses of language. He points out semiotic aspect of ideology and how the sign is constructed on the social basis. More importantly, identifying words/language as a register of "countless ideological threads" and "social changes" lead him to conceptualize the ideology as an incomplete phenomenon without a definite shape. In this sense, the word can carry different meanings through its use by different social classes and groups. Thus, for Volosinov, although the dominant class may attempt to impose a single and dominant interpretation for a linguistic sign, "contradiction embedded in the word persists, but remains hidden".⁷⁴ In other words, since "words" are the bearer of changing meanings in the social change, language can be seen an ongoing arena of ideological struggle.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.19.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.17.

⁷⁴ Julie E. Gurdin, "The Dialogic and the Semiotic: Bakhtin, Volosinov, Peirce, and Sociolinguistics", *Journals at the University of Arizona*, Vol.11, 1994, p.65.

Volosinov's work on language had crucial influences on particularly critical linguistics studies due to its emphasis on the socially-constructed aspect of the word.⁷⁵ However, there is the other side of the coin, which has been one of the central debates in the so-called cultural -linguistic turn in the social science. This is the role of language in helping to generate the social structure. This again takes us, to one of the two main debates of critical studies, the relationship between structure and agency, hereby "discourse" as a social practice of human agent. In this sense, together with other prominent scholars in Lancaster school, Bob Jessop, Andrew Sayer and Norman Fairclough focus on the study of semiosis and its causal efficacy in the social structuration.⁷⁶

One of the distinctive features of the analysis of semiosis presented by Jessop, Sayer and Fairclough is their critical realist perspective which rejects certain lines of Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis. For them, these lines form a "discourse-imperialism" in the social sciences.⁷⁷ What distinguishes this critical realist approach of Jessop, Sayer and Fairclough from other linguistic approaches is its theoretical roots which draw on Roy Bhaskar's approach on the philosophy of science. First, this analysis makes a distinction between the real, the actual and the empirical. Although critical realists see semiotic structures dependent on actors on its reproduction, these structures are also seen as already pre-existing and having a relative autonomy from those actors as real objects even when not actualised.⁷⁸ Second, in terms of the understanding of causes in social processes, they make a distinctive causation definition: "Causation is about what produces change (the

⁷⁵ See Jiska Engelbert, "From Cause to Concern: Critical Discourse Analysis and Extradiscursive Interests", *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines*, Vol. 5 (2) p.58.

⁷⁶ Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer, "Critical Realism and Semiosis", p. 2-10.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.4.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.3.

activation of causal powers) not about (whether observers have registered) a regular conjunction of cause events and effect events”.⁷⁹

This critical analysis of semiosis/discourse underlines that discourse cannot be examined without considering its “extra-discursive conditions of existence and effectivity”. Therefore, “a purely rationalist or ideologist view of social relations” such as social constructivist account developed by Laclau and Mouffe are “blocked off” in their approach.⁸⁰ In a sense, for them, any attempt of idealizing the discourse/semiosis in the social event cannot grasp the “dialectical interpenetration of semiotic and non-semiotic facets” and materiality of discursive elements.⁸¹

Another crucial point of their investigation is to find out how semiosis produces effects. In other words, how “socially constructed” and “socially constructive” semiotic systems such as language create effects in social processes. In this enquiry, authors note that a critical realist account should analyse semiosis as “conjunctions of structures and causal powers co-producing specific effects.”⁸² For the analysis of semiosis, they propose to use a lower level of abstraction and more concrete terms such as “semiotic orders” instead of higher levels of abstraction. For authors, “a semiotic order is a specific configuration of genres, discourses and styles, which constitutes the semiotic moment of a network of social practices”⁸³ and three elements of semiotic orders, genre, discourse and style, are defined by them as follows:

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.7.

Genres are ways of acting and interacting in their specifically semiotic aspect; they are ways of regulating (inter)action...Discourses are positioned ways of representing—representing other social practices as well as the material world, and reflexively representing this social practice, from particular positions in social practices...Styles are ways of being, identities in their specifically semiotic (as opposed to bodily/material) aspect.⁸⁴

The authors also draw attention on tools of critical semiosis study, for instance on critical discourse analysis (CDA) which is already developed by Norman Fairclough. In this respect, they refer to the critical aspect of this analysis which stems from, in Habermasian terms, its concern on “the truth, truthfulness and appropriateness of the texts, their production and their interpretation.”⁸⁵ Based on this theoretical background, CDA approach of Norman Fairclough particularly focused on the neo-liberalism and presents a methodological approach for the analysis neo-liberal discourse.

To conclude, before specifically focusing neo-liberal discourse, this chapter deals with three sets of questions. First, it focuses on the conceptualization of ideology and hegemony in Gramsci and underlines that hegemony struggle can be seen as an ongoing confrontation and articulation of different ideological elements in which dominant ideology is not simply imposed or legitimized but also articulated to other ideological elements. Secondly, drawing on Volosinov’s contributions, as a semiotic structure “language” and in the narrower term “the word” is defined as a “an index of social changes” which is an ongoing arena of ideological struggle and has a socially-constructed aspect. Thirdly, in terms of analysing the impact of “socially constructive” character of semiotic structures, the chapter summarizes the approach of Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer who use a critical realist account to formulate the relationship between semiosis and social structuration. In this sense, although it is clearly stated that there is a dialectical relation between the latter two, and semiosis

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.6.

has a “causal efficacy” on social processes, it is also underlined that this effect cannot be assessed without considering its social and material conditions.

2.1.3 Neo-liberal Discourse

In light of the theoretical framework presented above, this chapter focuses on the neo-liberal discourse as a notion and the main problem of this critical study. Firstly, the main characteristics and claims of neo-liberal order of discourse are examined. Secondly, changing discursive elements of neo-liberalism in the post-1980 era are explored by drawing upon Bob Jessop’s and Ngai-Ling Sum’s analysis on structural, strategic and discursive selectivities in the production of hegemony.⁸⁶

2.1.3.1 Main Characteristics and Claims

From the early 1980s, the formation of neo-liberal hegemony has been underpinned by discursive practices of several actors in global, national and local scales. The following points can be considered as some features of the formation of the neo-liberal discourse in the post 1980 era:

➤ The emergence of neo-liberal discourse largely depends on strategic and discursive selectivities of globalists in a structurally-oriented process of capitalist re-structuring.⁸⁷ From the early 1980s, it has been developed and disseminated by the US and the Europe centric actors particularly through the US and the UK governments, multinational/national corporations, international organizations, mass media, think tanks, research centres etc. Moreover, the role of intellectuals in

⁸⁶ This notion is used by Ngai-Ling Sum and this part largely drawing upon her analysis.

⁸⁷ Ngai-Ling Sum, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Discourses, Material Power and (Counter-Hegemony), *CPERC Working Paper* 2012-01, p.24.

dissemination and creation of neo-liberal discourse has been crucial.⁸⁸ A set of discursive practices have been used by these actors to make the so-called Washington Consensus hegemonic; such as “speeches, policy documents, laws, journals, interviews, official reports, press conferences/releases, books by politicians and business gurus, statistics, news reports, TV programs, advert, slogans”⁸⁹ and so on.

➤ Following the collapse of Soviet Bloc, in the beginning of the 1990s, neo-liberal order of discourse has been “successfully” articulated with the narratives of globalization and “the end of history” thesis. These years can be marked as the times when neo-liberal hegemony rapidly expanded.

In fact, it is very rare to see the utilization of the notion of “neo-liberalism” by the advocates of free market. Instead, the conception of globalization and “unrivalled victory” of the free market have been widely used as key grounds of neo-liberal transformation of all domains. In other words, free market economy together with free trade and globalization of finance capital have been presented as an “irrefutable scientific” economy model. It is possible to exemplify the following six core claims of globalism which were identified by Steger in 2005.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen, Gisela Neunhöffer, “Introduction: Reconsidering Neo-liberal hegemony”, *Neo-liberal Hegemony: A Global Critique*, Taylor & Francis, 2006, p.5.

⁸⁹ Sum, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy”, p.17.

⁹⁰ Manfred B. Steger, “Ideologies of globalization”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, February 2005, 10(1), 11–30.

Table 1: Core claims of globalism

1. Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets
2. Globalization is inevitable and irreversible
3. Nobody is in charge of globalization
4. Globalization benefits everyone (...in the long run)
5. Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world
6. Globalization requires a global war on terror

Source: The table is formed on the basis of Steger's article⁹¹

➤ Although neo-liberal discourse has been closely associated with some key arguments/core claims drawn from neo-liberal ideology, and it is not possible to mention a single and homogenous neo-liberal discourse. Neo-liberal discourse is subject to global, national and party-political variations.⁹² In other words, neo-liberal discourse has been subjected to a recontextualization in different time, different scales (national/local) and different domains (business, education etc.) According to Harvey, two principles which remained unchanged in these variations were to ensure a good business climate for private sector and to safeguard finance capital.⁹³

In this regard, recontextualization processes on national and global scales are worth emphasizing. On the global scale, transnational capitalist classes who have been taking over the leadership of global neo-liberal hegemony show a fragmented nature. This fragmented structure of global historic bloc has been reflecting in the neo-liberal discourse of global capitalism depending on changing impacts of these

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.14-25.

⁹² Sean Phelan, *Neo-liberalism, Media and the Political*, p.15.

⁹³ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neo-liberalism*, p.70.

fractions on international institutions, corporations and governments.⁹⁴ As analysed in the next chapter, there are so-called neo-liberal conservative, regulationist and structuralist fractions in the global capital.⁹⁵

Arguably, responses of those fractions to the crisis tendencies in neo-liberal era have shown some differences which have reflected their discourses. For instance, as Steger points out, starting from the Asia Crisis in 1997, globally dominant neo-liberal claims entered a revision process. Following the invasion of Iraq by the coalition led by the US and the UK in 2003, the third claim positing that “nobody is in charge of globalization” challenged by its own creators.⁹⁶ Even more, during the global financial crisis in 2008, the saving plans of Obama administration was in a direct contradiction with key grounds for free market economy. Coming to 2017, by the election Trump as the President almost all of these six claims seem to lose their grounds considering Presidency speech of Trump.⁹⁷

On the national level, neo-liberal ideology has articulated with other order of discourses within specific historical contexts. In case of each country, there has been a recontextualization process in line with the strategic and discursive selectivity moments of the national state.⁹⁸ (For instance, in Central and Eastern European Countries it was mostly associated with transition narratives, in some developing countries with the narratives of modernization, in the West with a more emphasis on knowledge based economy.) Each political fraction on the national scale has

⁹⁴ William I. Robinson and Jerry Harris, “Towards a Global Ruling Class?”, p.43.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.44-46.

⁹⁶ Steger, “Ideologies of Globalization”, p.21.

⁹⁷ See Full text of the speech <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/28/full-transcript-donald-trump-presidential-address-congress>

⁹⁸ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.78.

been recontextualizing neo-liberal discourse with other order of discourses. That is to say, neo-liberal discourse used by conservative, social democrat, Islamist and so-called new right political parties can show some distinctive characters and different discursive selectivities on the national scale. Besides political parties, the mass media has played a key role in this recontextualization process.⁹⁹

In a similar vein, particularly in periods of hegemony crises, representatives of transnational and national capitalist classes need to make coalitions or articulate with some “allies” to produce hegemony.¹⁰⁰ Thus, instead of a sole neo-liberal hegemony, it is possible to talk about “neo-liberal hegemonic constellations”.¹⁰¹ This articulation is well-placed in the hegemony conceptualization of Gramsci as discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, in the making of neo-liberal hegemony, neo-liberal order of discourse has been subjected to different articulation/disarticulation with other ideological elements. As Sum puts it;

..[neo-liberal] hegemony is unstable and contingent. It relies on continual struggles to build coalitions and compromises in and between dominant and subordinate social groups. Especially in times of hegemonic crisis and intensification of underlying contradictions, splits within the power bloc may require changes that articulate hegemonic interests with those of potential allies...They can also capture counter-hegemonic discourses by subsuming them into broader categories and neutralizing resistance through the co-optation of radical intellectuals and potential leaders of subalterns by grants, institutional recognition, building partnership, and invited visits to the global heartland of “worldview” production.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.78.

¹⁰⁰ Sum, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy”, p.23.

¹⁰¹ Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhöffer, “Neo-liberal Hegemony: A Global Critique”, p.6.

¹⁰² Sum, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy”, p.23.

All these examples provide evidences of incomplete, fragmented and challengeable characteristics of neo-liberalism as well as the role of structural-strategic-discursively selective moments in the evolution of neo-liberal discourse.

➤ Neo-liberal discourse has not been *a fait accompli* but an ongoing process and struggle¹⁰³, which has been adapting itself to new challenges arising from crises and counter-hegemonic elements enacted by “social forces such as critical intellectuals, trade unions, movement-based NGOs, feminist/anti-racist groups, writers/journalists, workers/campaigners, alternative artists, peasants”.¹⁰⁴ In some cases, this struggle is also involved *articulation* of other ideological elements or even incorporating and absorbing some counter hegemonic elements in national or local scales. This theoretical framework provides a substantial ground for analysing articulation of Islamist discourse with neo-liberalism. This is a very crucial point to understand the capacity of the capitalism to overcome the social tension in the periods of crises. Again, Sum rightly points out that:

This absorption and incorporation of counter-hegemonic elements from different scales and sites enables at least some re-balancing of the deep social tensions in global capitalism. This process often involves deliberate deradicalizing of alternative worldviews and their absorption into a modified version of the dominant worldview (Gramsci 1971: 279-318); and/or the humanizing of the dominant worldview in a partial move towards an alternative worldview by injecting stronger ethico-political elements that stress rights, inclusion, social-ethical responsibility, or empowerment.¹⁰⁵

➤ The neo-liberal order of discourse has not only been effective on the restructuring of economic objects, but it has also targeted at producing new subjects. In a sense, the neo-liberal order of discourse has sought to transform the social domain to make it more proper for the strategies of capital accumulation. Among

¹⁰³ Norman Fairclough, “Language And Neo-Liberalism, *Discourse Society*, 2000, Vol. 11, p.147.

¹⁰⁴ Sum, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy”, p.22.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p.23.

all other strategies for creating neo-liberal individuals, two distinctive strategies have been crucial; glorification of consumerism (new advertising technologies and techniques etc.) and efforts to replace class politics with identity politics. In this sense, not only dominant discourses, but also certain dominant “genres” as ways of acting and “styles” as ways of being have been used through neo-liberal order of discourse to form new subjectivities.

2.1.3.2 Strategic/Discursively Selected Moments in the Production of Neo-liberal Hegemony

This part aims to discuss how neo-liberal order of discourse has become hegemonic through actions of certain actors. In this analysis, the researcher draws upon the contributions of Bob Jessop and Ngai Ling Sum to concretize structure-agency relations in the production of neo-liberal hegemony. First, Jessop, by referring Gramscian concepts, underlines that a new economic regime (in this case neo-liberal form of capitalism) does not occur merely by changes in labour process or technological developments but also an institutional innovation is needed.¹⁰⁶ This institutional change aims to “reorganize an entire social formation and the exercise of political, intellectual, and moral leadership” and one aspect of this, for Jessop, is a new “economic imaginary”.¹⁰⁷ Ngai Lim sum also formulates this approach as follows:

...agency has both material and discursive bases and, although economic power is grounded in control over economic resources and state power is grounded in coercion, struggles among competing forces and interests in

¹⁰⁶ Bob Jessop, “Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy”, *Journal Critical Discourse Studies*, Volume 1, 2004 - Issue 2, p.12.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.12.

these domains are normally waged as much through the battle for ideas as through the mobilization of primarily material resources and capacities.¹⁰⁸

In this regard, in the production of neo-liberal hegemony, actors from different scales including the state have taken part in this “battle of ideas”. Sum argues that material and semiotic nature of capitalism “involve structurally, strategically, and discursively selective structural-agency linkages that operate on all scales from the micro- to the world market.”¹⁰⁹ In understanding of those linkages, Jessop uses the notion of strategic selectivity which he developed by drawing upon Poulantzas’s state theory. This notion complements strategic-relational approach of Jessop that focuses on the strategic selectivities of the structural contexts. In line with Poulantzas analysis of the state, Jessop analyse the state as a social relation whose structure is to be analysed as strategic in its form, content, and operation.¹¹⁰ According to Jessop, this analysis involves:

how this given structure privileges some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, some actions over others; and the ways, if any, in which actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging through ‘strategic-context’ analysis when choosing a course of action. In other words, one should study structures in terms of their structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and actions in terms of (differentially reflexive) structurally-oriented strategic calculation.¹¹¹

From this perspective, some strategies can be privileged by structures. These strategic selectivity moments are followed by the selection of certain discourses

¹⁰⁸ Sum, “Towards a Cultural Political Economy”, p.1.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.24.

¹¹⁰ Bob Jessop, *The Strategic Selectivity of the State: Reflections on a Theme of Poulantzas*, 1999, <https://bobjessop.org/2014/06/16/the-strategic-selectivity-of-the-state-reflections-on-a-theme-of-poulantzas/>

¹¹¹ Bob Jessop, *The Strategic Selectivity of the State*.

particularly during transition periods and crises. In this sense, Both Jessop and Sum refer to the notion of discursive selectivity used by Colin Hay. Hay uses the concept in his analysis of media's coverage of "the Winter of Discontent" in the UK.¹¹² In this sense, the term discursive selectivity refers to the selection of certain discourses which will support hegemonic objects, projects and imaginaries. However, the notion is not limited to distortion of reality or bias of the media. It rather refers to "narrativization of certain events, construction of the subject positions and the resulting attributions of causality and responsibility".¹¹³ Hay points out the impacts of discursive selectivities on framing decoding processes of the people besides their clear impact on the encoding process.¹¹⁴ Hay also underlines that similar to strategic selectivities, discursive selectivities are imposed by the structure (context) and are only relatively autonomous of the material conditions.¹¹⁵

In case of neo-liberal hegemony, the crises of KWNS can be seen as the basis of strategic selectivity moment. As seen on Table 2, Sum illustrates six discursively selective moments in the production of hegemony linked with the mentioned crisis. The very first stage is "structurally-inscribed" moment when the actors from different scale face with economic crisis.¹¹⁶ This moment is followed by strategically selective moments of building new economic objects, discursively selective moments of certain meaning-making mechanisms and hegemonic signs, redefinition of subjectivities, consolidation of those subjectivities and every day

¹¹² Colin Hay, "Narrating Crisis: the Discursive Construction of the "Winter of Discontent", *Sociology*, 30 (2): 253-277.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p.265.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.266.

¹¹⁶ Sum, "Towards a Cultural Political Economy", p.6.

practices in new projects and appropriating certain “normative and ethical symbols” of counter hegemonic discourses.¹¹⁷

According to Sum, these moments in production of neo-liberal hegemony have led the evolution of neo-liberal discourse from new-constitutionism to new-ethicalism.¹¹⁸ That is to say, during the operationalization of neo-liberal policies, different moments of crises resulted in a change in strategic selectivities and eventually in neo-liberal discursive elements. In this process, they also appropriate some elements of counter-hegemonic discourses.

For instance, as a response to the discontent on the increasing social inequality development programmes were developed, or the corporate social responsibility concept became pervasive globally etc. Table 3, also a compilation of Sum, demonstrates key actors, discourses and their functioning mechanisms in the production of neo-liberal hegemony. This Table provides a very useful tool to see how certain actors could become influential on all segments of the social realm.

According to Sum, three main mediating arenas of this process have been international organizations, state (supra- and sub political organizations) and national/transnational civil society.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.13.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.7.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.10.

Table 2: Discursively selective moments in the production of hegemony¹²⁰

Six Discursively Selective Moments in Production of Hegemony: Locating Social Relations within Meaning-Making
A. Discursive-Strategic Moment of Crisis-Induced Discursive Variation
<input type="checkbox"/> Faced with economic crises and pressures to restructure, actors at different scales and sites seek new opportunities for economic action (which involves struggles and/or cooperation to remake extant objects of governance and/or introduce new objects and a new repertoire of discourses)
B. Structurally-Inscribed Strategically Selective Moment (applied to discourse)
<input type="checkbox"/> The embedding of actors in different sets of social relations affects their capacities to deploy discursive chains to build new objects of governance through the selective articulation of diverse discourses and signs;
C. (Inter-)Discursively-Selective Moment (applied to discourse)
<input type="checkbox"/> (Inter-)discursive chains select and limit what symbols or signs can be articulated, what meanings can be fixed upon a set of signifiers, and what relations can be established across different discourses to support or reinvent hegemonic objects, imaginaries and projects; Hegemonic discursive chains are mediated through key sets of economic, political and intellectual forces
D. Moment in the Remaking Dominant Subjectivities and Practices (Constituting Subjects and Regulating Performance)
<input type="checkbox"/> To be successful, these discursive practices must reconfigure subjects and redefine subjectivities; These forms of self-regulation encourage individuals and organizations to see themselves as subjects in ways that sustain and reproduce this order (e.g., competitive/world-class/entrepreneurial/mobile/flexible/ consumerist/ cool);
E. Moment in Consolidating and Re-Embedding New Social Relations
<input type="checkbox"/> These subjectivities and everyday practices also consolidate the new social relations entailed in the new projects, which become regularized through strategies, institutions and governance;
F. Counter-Hegemonic Resistance and Negotiation
<input type="checkbox"/> Hegemony cannot abolish legitimacy problems, social exclusions, and contradictions and is therefore likely to continue to provoke resistance at a tactical and/or strategic level; Counter-hegemonic discursive chains may emerge that transgress this regime through satirized subversions and/or promise of 'justice'.
<input type="checkbox"/> Actors in the hegemonic discursive chains may selectively appropriate some of their normative and ethical symbols to 're-moralize' neo-liberal common sense by adopting languages and practices of 'corporate social responsibility', 'stakeholdering', 'good governance', 'transparency' and 'democracy'.

¹²⁰ Sum, "Towards a Cultural Political Economy", p.6.

Mediating arenas	Actors embedded in the mediating arenas	Nature of discourse	Examples of microtechnologies of power
International/ Organizations and institutions	IMF, WTO, World Bank, UN, OECD, G8, NAFTA, APEC, etc.	Mainly co- constructing hegemonic discourses Some elements of counter-hegemonic challenges from within and across different organizations	Mainly deploying knowledging technologies of globalization, development, new public management, governance, and civil society
(Supra) /(Sub-) States	Governments on different scales (e.g., European Union, national/local governments), ministries, departments,	Mainly co- constructing (sub)hegemonic discourses (with legal & coercive domination) Some elements of counter-hegemonic challenges within and across different states	Deploying knowledging technologies of globalization, development, new public management, governance, and civil society. Regional/national/local governments negotiate and translate these knowledging technologies to their contexts (not necessarily without resistance)
(Trans-) National civil society	World Economic Forum, International Chamber of Commerce, standard-setting agencies, MNC think tanks, philanthropic organizations (e.g., Ford Foundation), business federations, financial	Both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic Constructions Deploying knowledging technologies of globalization, development, new public management, governance, and civil society	Deconstructing these organizations, consultancy firms, professional bodies, management/law schools, trade unions, schools, churches, political parties, NGOs, newspapers, TV programmes, Internet blogging, social movements, forums, cinemas, art, and popular culture, etc. technologies and giving well articulated or fragmented alternatives (e.g., 'Another World is Possible') Using counterhegemonic strategies/ tactics that include mass gatherings, demonstrations, alternative publishing, carnivals, music, films, folklore, rumours, gossips, sabotage, murmurs, silences, lies, etc.

Table 3: Key actors and discourses in the production of neo-liberal hegemony¹²¹

For explaining the production of hegemony in relation with the material forces, the only thing missing in Table 3 is the connection of these actors with the capitalist classes. In this enquiry, the analysis of William Robinson and Jerry Harris on transnational capitalist classes (TCC) can be used. First of all, Robinson and Harris underline the increasing influence of TCC on global means of production and international financial system as well as their politicization process between 1970 and 1990.¹²² They argue that TCC has been increasingly effective in pursuing neo-liberalism as a class project on global scale. Thus, for them, the world has witnessed emergence of a new global historic bloc who has taken the leadership of “Washington Consensus”.¹²³

Moreover, the analysis of Robinson and Harris allows us to see fragmented nature of this global historic bloc and changing weights of some groups in this bloc in different periods of neo-liberal hegemony. According to the authors, by the mid-1990s, this fragmentation in global capitalist class has become more observable and reflected to ideological coherence of neo-liberalism. In this regard, they state that:

The world recession of the 1990s and the sequence of crises, from Mexico in 1995, to Asia in 1997, followed by Russia and Brazil in 1998, exposed the fragility of the world monetary system and caused rising alarm and exposed important contradictions and growing splits in the globalist bloc. The more deeply rooted and complex global capitalism becomes the more each shock to the system generates tensions within the ranks of the TCC. The TCC has become increasingly fragmented in its globalist discourse, in its political vision, and in its ideological coherence.¹²⁴

¹²² Robinson and Harris, “Towards a Global Ruling Class?”, p.43.

¹²³ *Ibid.* p.43.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.43.

For the authors, there are three fractions in globalist bloc;

➤ *The Free-Market Conservatives*: support a “complete global laissez-faire” with an unspoiled version of the Washington consensus. This section can also be called as Friedmanist fraction.¹²⁵

➤ *The Neo-liberal Structuralists*: seek to build “a global superstructure that could provide a modicum of stability to the volatile world financial system, adjusting the Washington consensus without interfering with the global economy.”¹²⁶ For Carroll and Carson, this fraction can be related to Bill Clinton and Tony Blair who are “progenitors” of the Third Way.¹²⁷

➤ *The Neo-liberal Regulationist*: want “a broader global regulatory apparatus” which can ensure the stability of international financial and political system. They particularly gain influence following the Asia Crisis. They have also a full commitment to free market, privatization and free mobility of capital but they become more aware of social discontent over increasing poverty and inequality. Therefore, this fraction questions the deregulation of labour markets and reduction of social services. They seek a post-Washington globalist consensus but, for Harris and Robinson, “even the regulationist do not propose any sort of a global

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.43. The authors give the examples of some members of this fraction: “former Secretary of State George Schultz, former Citibank CEO and speculator Walter Wriston, former Treasury Secretary and international speculator William Simon, Reagan-era economists Lawrence Kudlow and Martin Feldstein, President of the Heritage Foundation Edwin Feulner, and Ian Vasquez of the Cato Institute. Deeply influenced by Milton Friedman, this sector sees any bureaucratic central planning as interference in the pure functioning of the market.”

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.43, examples for this group is “Former President Bill Clinton, George Bush (Junior and Senior), Newt Gingrich, World Bank President James Wolfensohn, IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, currency speculator George Soros, many Trilateralists and executives of TNCs and major financial institutions.”

¹²⁷ William K. Carroll and Colin Carson, “Forging a New Hegemony? The Role of Transnational Policy Groups in the Network and Discourses of Global Corporate Governance”, *Journal Of World-Systems Research*, ix, 1, Winter 2003, p.67.

Keynesianism that might involve redistribution or state controls on the prerogatives of transnational capital”.¹²⁸

Referring to the Table 2, it is possible to argue that those fractions are represented or become influential on the mentioned mediating actors with different weights in different times. They make alliances on the national level with several actors. Moreover, they have become increasingly effective on global and national communication channels and discursive practices through the neo-liberal transformation of press to the mass media and entertainment industry. In this regard, the next chapter focuses on the role of media in the making of neo-liberal hegemony on global and national scales.

2.2 Neo-liberalism and Media

2.2.1 Structural Transformation of the Media Industry

As discussed above, neo-liberal ideology has become pervasive through “strong” discursive elements which have sought to create a new semiotic order to transform meaning-making mechanisms in the society. In this context, the mass media, as a medium of communication and representation of signs, symbols and images, “plays a vital role in organising images and discourses which people make sense of the world.”¹²⁹ Therefore, the relationship between the mass media and neo-liberalism can be examined in terms of two key aspects. First, ideological role of the mass media in the production of neo-liberal hegemony and second, its structural integration to the capitalist mode of production via its neo-liberal transformation.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Robinson and Harris, “Towards a Global Ruling Class?”, p.43.

¹²⁹ Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, “Culture, Communications and Political Economy”, *Mass Media and Society*, Ed. Gurevitch Michael & Curran, James, London, Arnold, 1991, p.15.

¹³⁰ Phelan, *Neo-liberalism, Media and the Political*, p.16.

Although these two aspects are interwoven on the ontological level, they constitute two main themes of the critical media studies under political economy of communications.

First of all, a critical study of the mass media is inseparable from the investigation of its role in the reproduction of the capitalist system and neo-liberal transformation of the media institutions themselves in the last forty years.¹³¹ In this regard, Golding and Murdock identify two key concerns of critical political economy of communications:

[to understand] Firstly, how is public culture produced and how far are particular modes of production equitable rather than exploitative and ecologically sustainable rather than destructive? Secondly, how far does what is produced deliver the diversity of information, analysis, debate and insight into the lives of others required for effective participatory citizenship on a basis of respect and tolerance and are these resources available on an equitable basis without significant social exclusions?¹³²

According to Golding and Murdock, for critical studies on the mass media, “the starting point” should be “the recognition of the mass media as industrial and commercial organizations which produce and distribute commodities”.¹³³ Therefore, from this perspective, media production, media content, media representation and its consumption cannot be detached from their increasing articulation to the capitalist mode of production. neo-liberalism, as a new form of capitalism has also caused dramatic impacts on the mass communications.¹³⁴ To put

¹³¹ James Curran, “Central Issues”, *Media Organization in Society*, Hodder Arnold Publication, London, 2000, p.19.

¹³² Graham Murdoch and Peter Golding, “Political economy and media production: a reply to Dwyer. Media”, *Culture and Society*, 38(5), 2016, p. 762.

¹³³ Graham Murdock and Peter Golding, “For a Political Economy of Mass Communications”, *Socialist Register*, 1973, p. 206.

¹³⁴ By the increasing integration of the mass media to the capitalist system from the late 1970s, the mass media’s place in the capitalist mode of production has turned out to be one of the key focuses

it another way, main components of neo-liberal transformation, such as deregulation, liberalization and privatisation have also caused a dramatic transformation in the structures and content of the mass media. While concepts of public good, public service and public property have been emptied of their meanings both legally and discursively, the privatization and liberalization have become major policies in the mass media.

In this regard, deregulation process in the media has caused a dramatic change in ownership relations in the media institutions from the early 1980s starting from the US and Europe. Those policies opened a way for private corporations to enter markets which were once excluded from such as telecommunications and broadcasting.¹³⁵ Consequently, the main characteristics of this new media industry have been ownership concentration, vertical and horizontal monopolization and control of information. The deregulation process in communications sector has also been an important agenda item of international organizations such as the EU, the WTO and IMF. These organization played a vital role in dissemination of deregulation policies globally and opened a way for a re-scaling in the ownership relations.

of critical approaches to the political economy of communications. For Bernard Mieve, main sources of critical media studies can be traced back to the studies of Frankfurt School, particularly the analysis of Adorno and Horkheimer on the culture industry, and the studies of Dallas Smythe and Herbert Schiller who particularly examine the consequences of changing ownership relations, corporate concentration, expansion of telecommunications, mass media, mass market and control of information and culture. Even though these two lines of academic work have different conceptualizations and interests, the common point they present is the elaboration of the mass media as capitalist enterprises. For Mieve, both approaches become increasingly influential by the late 1970s since “strategic reorientation of industrial production” in mass communications has led the “emergence of information processing and cultural production as leading sectors in the new capitalism”.¹³⁴ Bernard Mieve, “Theorizing the Cultural Industries: Persistent Specificities and Reconsiderations”, *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications* / edited by Janet Wasko, Graham Murdoch, and Helena Sousa, Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, p.84.

¹³⁵ Graham Murdoch and Peter Golding, “Political economy and media production”, p.207.

Secondly, there are cultural and political implications of neoliberal transformation of the media.¹³⁶ It can be argued that “oligopolistic ownership in media” restricts consumer choice in leisure and entertainment and ensures that “the consensus” in society is established via information control.¹³⁷ Therefore, critical approaches in media studies draw attention that news media in capitalist democracies has gradually lost its objectivity since ownership and control relations of media industries have started to substantially affect the content of news.¹³⁸ It is also underlined that corporate takeover of news media focuses on attracting and entertaining consumers rather than informing citizens so that newspaper becomes more “colourful”.¹³⁹

From this perspective, as much as making news turns to be a business area, independent journalism is degenerated and affected by economic considerations. James Curran puts three aspects of this transformation¹⁴⁰; first of all, corporate elites has become either stakeholders or directors for media organizations while businesses are the key funders of news through advertising.¹⁴¹ Therefore, they can apply pressure to censor texts or to gain more coverage. Secondly, the cost of news production and distribution has considerably increased which makes large

¹³⁶ John D.H. Downing, *The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications* / edited by Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa, Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, MA : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, p.141.

¹³⁷ Murdock and Golding, “For a Political Economy of Mass Communications”, p.226.

¹³⁸ Curran, “Central Issues”, p.22.

¹³⁹ David Croteau and William Haynes, “Economics of Media Industry”, *Media Society*, SAGE, London, New Delhi, 2003, p.47.

¹⁴⁰ Curran, “Central Issues”, p.23.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

corporations economically more feasible.¹⁴² Thus, this caused the decline of alternative or critical news producers. And thirdly, as news become more privatized and commodified, editorial quality declines and its need to entertain has risen.¹⁴³ In other words, the content of the news itself become commodified in media industry. While the process of commodification integrates media industries into the total capitalist economy by creating ideologically determined products, it also seeks to produce audiences as well.¹⁴⁴

2.2.2 The Case of Turkish Print Media

Turkey has been one of the first developing nation-economies which launched an IMF and WB guided neo-liberal economic programme in the beginning of the 1980s. Over the last forty years, implementation of market-led adjustment policies such as deregulation and privatisation in communications sector has caused far-reaching impacts on the media industry in Turkey. In this regard, the country witnessed structural changes in the mass media such as changing ownership relations in the print media, privatisation of TV broadcasting, emergence of large-scale media groups, vertical and horizontal monopolization and increases in circulation numbers. Therefore, a critical analysis of columns in Turkish print media would be incomplete without considering the socio-economic context of the neo-liberalization process in Turkey and subsequent changes observed in the mass media. In what follows, a brief background of the neoliberal restructuring in Turkey and milestones of the transformation in Turkish media are presented.

2.2.2.1 Neo-liberal Restructuring in Turkey

Neo-liberalization process in Turkey was launched with a “shock treatment” under the so-called 24 January Stability Programme in 1980. In this sense, start of

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.137.

structural adjustment process in Turkey coincided with the early implementations of neo-liberal policies in the US and the UK. As a matter of fact, Turkey has become the first “volunteer” country to implement a medium-term stability programme which was based on multi-year stand-by agreements with IMF and structural adjustment loans provided by the WB.¹⁴⁵

It can be argued that the 24 January decisions¹⁴⁶ went beyond being a stability programme. The hegemony crisis that Turkish Bourgeoisie had failed to solve in the 1970s resulted in a dramatic neo-liberalization process in compliance with the imaginaries of the global and national capital.¹⁴⁷ As Boratav underlines, the 24 January decisions had two strategic objectives following the expectations of the national and global capitalist classes, first was to realize a free market economy both in domestic and external terms and second was to strengthen the position of national capital-owner vis-à-vis the labour.¹⁴⁸ In this sense, the programme envisaged significant changes both “in the mode of articulation of the Turkish economy with the world economy” and “in the nature of state-economy relationship” which has caused far-reaching impacts on the political and social domains.¹⁴⁹ In the following thirty years, Turkey has undergone a rapid and dramatic transformation in every aspect of economic, political and social spheres. While import-subsidized economy programme of the 1970s was left out, a market-

¹⁴⁵ Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, *2008 Kavşağında Türkiye: Siyaset, İktisat ve Toplum*, İstanbul, Yordam Kitap, 2008, p.61.

¹⁴⁶ 24 January 1980 Stability Programme is frequently called as “24 January decision” in Turkish political terminology, so hereinafter the phrase of “24 January decisions” can also be used.

¹⁴⁷ Sinan Sönmez, “Türkiye Ekonomisinde Neo-liberal Dönüşüm Politikaları ve Etkileri”, Ed. Nergis Mütevellioğlu - Sinan Sönmez, *Küreselleşme, Kriz ve Türkiye’de Neo-liberal Dönüşüm*, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yay., 2009, p. 71.

¹⁴⁸ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1905-1985*, İstanbul, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1998, p.121.

¹⁴⁹ Galip Yalman, *Transition to Neo-liberalism-The Case of Turkey in The 1980s*, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009, p.4.

led adjustment was launched through trade liberalization and export-oriented policies. Financial liberalization, deregulation in state-market relations and privatisation attempts followed these policies. In this regard, approximately thirty-year period between 1980 and 2008 is remarkable since neo-liberalization process in Turkey has been mostly completed during this era. This period can be partitioned into three phases: 1980-1988, 1989-1997 and 1998-2008.¹⁵⁰

➤ **The period between 1980 and 1988:** The years between 1980 to 1988 can be seen as the first period when neo-liberal economic model Has penetrated the Turkish economy.¹⁵¹ Following the adoption of 24 January Stability Programme, “necessary” socio-political environment for implementation of these policies was largely built up by the three-year military regime established after the 12 September 1980 Coup d’état.¹⁵² In 1983, Motherland Party gained a majority in the parliamentary elections so that Turgut Özal, who was also the architect of 24 January decisions, had reached means of implementing the programme as the Prime Minister. Although Özal deployed deliberate efforts to show “Stability Programme” as an authentic “Turkish model”, decisions taken by the programme was in a clear conformity with IMF-WB guided economy programmes. As a matter of fact, stand-by agreement signed with IMF for the years 1980-1985 has been one of the longest-term agreement in Turkey-IMF relations. After this agreement, external supervision and control was continued by the WB’s structural adjustment loans programme.

The main objective of the economic programme was to realize to “structural adjustment” through export promotion despite continuing “a regulated foreign

¹⁵⁰ Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, *2008 Kavşağında Türkiye*, p.328.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.62.

¹⁵² Korkut Boratav and Erinc Yeldan Turkey, *1980-2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)-Stability, And Patterns Of Distribution*, December 2001, p.4., <http://yeldane.bilkent.edu.tr/B&YCEPA2002.PDF>

exchange system and controls on capital inflows”.¹⁵³ As Yeldan states, “both the exchange rate and direct export subsidies acted as main instruments for the promotion of exports and pursuit of macroeconomic stability.”¹⁵⁴ In this phase, trade liberalization was the most important policy for integration into the international economy.

In these first years of neo-liberal era, organized labour faced severe conditions since the legal framework on the class struggle was substantially changed in favour of the capital-owners.¹⁵⁵ Trade unions were gradually weakened due to limitations of the 1982 Constitution on the rights of strike and demonstration. Moreover, working classes suffered from harsh suppression of wage incomes as a “classic mode of surplus creation”.¹⁵⁶

In this sense, one can easily argue that implementation of neo-liberal policies has required atomized, disorganized and apolitical citizens which was tried to be achieved through a widespread ideological campaign. As Yalman states following the 24 January decisions, “the transition period to an export-oriented free market economy has been advocated by a large segment of journalists, academician and businessmen”.¹⁵⁷ This structural adjustment programme was presented with the slogan of “there is no alternative”.¹⁵⁸ In this sense, Yalman points out that

¹⁵³ Erinç Yeldan, “Neoliberal Global Remedies: From Speculative-Led Growth to IMF-Led Crisis in Turkey”, *Review of Radical Political Economics*, Volume 38, No. 2, Spring 2006, p.196.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi*, p.122.

¹⁵⁶ Yeldan, “Neoliberal Global Remedies”, p.196.

¹⁵⁷ Galip Yalman, “AKP döneminde Söylem ve Siyaset: Neyin Krizi”, p.4.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.22.

elimination of class-based politics has become one of the key components of the hegemonic strategy in the post-1980 era.¹⁵⁹

➤ **The period between 1989 and 1997:** Adverse impacts of neo-liberal economy policies on income distribution reached their socio-political limits by 1988. Turkey witnessed the resistance of working class towards the neo-liberal agenda through local and country-wide strikes in the years 1988 and 1989. More importantly, the Motherland Party lost two referenda, local and general elections which caused a pause even regression in Party's economic programme.¹⁶⁰ In this regard, labour movements and changing dynamics in political arena resulted in a considerable recovery in wage incomes starting from 1989. The following coalition governments also continued to implement populist policies that meant a certain deviation from the neo-liberal agenda set out in 1980. The stand-by agreement with IMF that was signed in 1994 lasted only one year. This is why, the second phase (1989-1997) is widely accepted as an interval in full implementation of neo-liberal agenda and an interruption in external supervision of IMF and WB.¹⁶¹

Nevertheless, the adoption of a law (Law numbered 32) in 1989 which envisaged a capital account liberalization can be seen a crucial milestone of neoliberal restructuring of the country. In this respect, Altıok points out that increases in real wages, devaluations which were made to support export-oriented policies and increases in short-term liabilities caused a vicious cycle between inflation and devaluation by 1989.¹⁶² Therefore, financial liberalization was presented by the Government as the only remedy of balancing foreign trade and currency imbalances and the only way of creating financial resources for the public expenditures. By the

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.24.

¹⁶⁰ Bağimsız Sosyal Bilimciler, *2008 Kavşağında Türkiye*, p.326.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.327.

¹⁶² Metin Altıok, "Yeni Liberal İstikrar ve Yapısal Uyum Programları: Türkiye Ekonomisinde Sermaye Birikimi ve Kriz", *Praksis*, 5, Winter, p.103.

adoption of financial liberalization, Turkey has become fully open to the capital movements which caused gradual increases in interest rates in the following years. Thus, the entrance of short-term speculative capital was facilitated. Yeldan explains this policy as follows;

This policy maneuver paved the way for injection of liquidity into the domestic economy in terms of short-term foreign capital (flows of “hot money”). Such inflows enabled, on one hand, financing of the accelerated public sector expenditures, and provided, on the other hand, relief from the increased pressures of aggregate demand on the domestic markets by way of cheapening costs of imports. Consequently, the bonanza of cheap imported intermediates fueled the second wave of the “growth crisis” cycle between 1990 and 1994.¹⁶³

Moreover, for Yeldan, this policy opened a way for “speculative-led growth” which that caused a dilemma of becoming “addicted to short-term foreign finance that in turn necessitated relatively high real interest rates to be offered as a “new emerging market”¹⁶⁴ Under these conditions, Turkey witnessed an economic crisis in 1994. For Altıok, the most important reasons behind the 1994 crisis was increasing budget deficits which were resulted from the state’s intervention on capital accumulation processes to prevent low profit rates. In this regard, Altıok points out that utilization of short-term foreign capital movements to finance these deficits has increased domestic debts and eventually caused a huge burden of interest payments.¹⁶⁵

It is notable that the “privatisation” has entered into Turkey’s economic agenda in these years. In fact, privatisation was not a part of the shock treatment implemented by the 24 January decisions. In the 1982 Constitution, there was no provision

¹⁶³ Yeldan, “Neoliberal Global Remedies”, p.199.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.210.

¹⁶⁵ Altıok, “Yeni Liberal İstikrar”, p.108.

regarding privatisation.¹⁶⁶ As Boratav underlines, “privatisation” arguments have not been even raised by proponents of neo-liberalism in the international arena until the end of 1980s.¹⁶⁷ In Turkish case, the first privatisation attempt in 1988 coincided with the second Özal government, when a telecommunications company Teletaş’s shares were sold. Bedirhanoglu and Angin underline that “the initial confidence regarding the success of this privatization declined later with the steady fall of the value of Teletaş shares in the capital markets.”¹⁶⁸ Thus, after the end of Özal governments in 1991, the newcoming Demirel-Inönü coalition was not decisive about privatisation. However, privatisation concept has entered the recommendation lists of IMF and WB in these years and the first important steps were taken by Çiller government in 1994 in the crisis environment. One of the first large-scale privatisation attempts on TELEKOM became unsuccessful due to the decision made by the Supreme Court upon the application of Social Democratic Populist Party in 1994. Thus, the 1990s was frequently called as “lost years” by proponents of neo-liberal economic programme.

By the mid-1990s, Turkey also witnessed two important developments in political arena which had crucial impacts on the emergence of neo-liberal hegemony in the 2000s. First was the governmental instability. The 1990s was characterized by failures of coalition governments along with socio-economic problems. In this sense, six coalition governments and five prime ministers ruled the country which can be seen a clear sign of “the absence of a hegemonic political center.”¹⁶⁹ As will

¹⁶⁶ Korkut Boratav, *Dünya’dan Türkiye’ye, İktisattan Siyasete*, Istanbul, Yordam Kitap, 2015, p.58.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.58.

¹⁶⁸ Angin and Bedirhanoglu, “Privatization processes as ideological moments: The block sales of large-scale state enterprises in Turkey in the 2000s,” p.146.

¹⁶⁹ Raşit Kaya and Barış Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, 11:4, p.530.

be discussed in the following chapter, these years can be marked as traumatic moments for public opinion which were frequently used during the 2000s to support single-party government of the JDP with a strong narrative of “political stability”.

The second important development was the rise of political Islam with the victory of Welfare Party in the 1994 local elections and the 1995 general election. In fact, these development can be seen closely linked with “the rise of medium-scale Islamic-conservative Anatolian capital” which engaged in global production chains “thanks to its specific role in post-1980 industrialization.”¹⁷⁰ It can be argued that the emergence of new economic gravity in many cities apart from Istanbul and Marmara region opened a “new phase of proletarianization and the rise of Islamic capital”.¹⁷¹ As Özçetin points out, these years can be marked as a period when the Political Islam responded a set of changes on local and global scales such as “the fall of communism, globalization, the rise of post-rationalist and anti-positivist/post-modern philosophies, transformation of social composition of Islamist movement, 28 February 1997 and so on.”¹⁷² Özçetin underlines that this adaption actually meant a shift from an oppositional stance to a compliance vis-à-vis neo-liberalism in terms of the Islamist discourse.¹⁷³ Thus, from the mid-1990s, the rise of political Islam and its increasing engagement with neo-liberal agenda have turned out to be key developments that determined the socio-political environment of the 2000s.

➤ **The period between 1998 and 2008:** As discussed above, Turkey suffered significant economic and political crises during the 1990s. Although structural problems in the economy were mostly caused by the “speculative-led growth” in Yeldan’s terms, there was a wide-spread campaign which attempted to explain the

¹⁷⁰ Özden, Akça and Bekmen, *Antinomies of Authoritarian Neo-liberalism in Turkey*, p.190.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Burak Özçetin, *Making of New Islamism In Turkey*, p.20.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

crises with inefficient implementation of neo-liberal agenda. As analysed in this study in detailed, the mass media also deployed great efforts to present increases in wage incomes as a burden for the economy and the reason behind the inflation problem. Under these conditions, Turkey signed the “Close Monitoring Agreement” with the IMF which opened a new era for Turkey’s neo-liberal restructuring in 1998. This ten-year period is crucial since it has been the longest and uninterrupted term in which Turkish economy administration was under the IMF supervision.¹⁷⁴

First of all, the Agreement included a “Memorandum of Economic Policies” besides familiar neo-liberal “recipes”. This Memorandum identified a set of decisions in five sectors namely banking, social security, arbitration, privatisation and agricultural subsidies. According to these decisions, the 55. Government¹⁷⁵ envisaged to make “structural reforms in banking and social security sectors, to make constitutional amendments in arbitration, to privatise POAŞ, THY, ERDEMİR and (partially) TELEKOM and to abolish agricultural subsidies”.¹⁷⁶

In line with this Agreement, in 1999, Turkey signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF for the years 2000-2002. Despite changing governments, IMF supervision and the core elements of this economic programme remain unchanged in the following years. In this regard, despite 2001 crisis and election periods, the IMF supervision continued until 2008 through 2001 “Transition Programme to a Strong Economy” and 2005 Stand-by agreement signed under the JDP government.

It is remarkable that by the start of JDP government, neo-liberal economic programme has gained “the desired political stability”. In 2002, the JDP gained a

¹⁷⁴ Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, *2006 Yılı Raporu: IMF Gözetiminde On Uzun Yıl, 1998-2008: Farklı Hükümetler, Tek Siyaset*, June 2006, Ankara, p.12.
http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/22ed7eafe03b631_ek.pdf?tipi=36&turu=X&sube=0

¹⁷⁵ Coalition government of the Motherland Party and Democratic Left Party

¹⁷⁶ Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, *2006 Yılı Raporu*, p.13.

majority in the general elections and continued to implement already started IMF-guided economic policies decisively. As the only party which has succeeded to form a single-party government since the 1990s, the JDP implemented “effective” privatisation policies in public sphere and realized large-scale privatisations. In this regard, Coşar and Yegenoglu explains the “success” of the first JDP government as follows,

The JDP’s success has also maintained its political base and convinced voters of the indispensability of neoliberalism by using a liberal discourse, especially in its first term in office. This liberal accent was shown in the party’s commitment to Turkey’s accession to the European Union and the promises that the JDP government included in its National Programs....Meanwhile, the party’s conciliatory attitude toward pro-military circles and its opposition to hawkish secularists has allowed it to garner support from conservatives, liberal intellectuals, and youth.¹⁷⁷

Coşar and Yegenoglu also point out that the JDP’s success in elections in 2007 was closely linked with “its synthesis of Islam and nationalism which appeals to the conservative majority of the Turkish electorate” and its pursuance of charity-based policies in the eve of elections.¹⁷⁸

In this sense, Bozkurt suggested the use of “neo-liberal populism” to understand the “use of the symbolic/ideological sphere” by the Party to build a neo-liberal hegemony.¹⁷⁹ Bozkurt argues that the Party used some values of “conservatism,

¹⁷⁷ Simten Coşar and Metin Yegenoglu, “The Neo-liberal Restructuring of Turkey’s Social Security System”, *Monthly Review*, Volume 60, Issue 11, 2009 (April), <https://monthlyreview.org/2009/04/01/the-Neo-liberal-restructuring-of-turkeys-social-security-system/>

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Umut Bozkurt, “Neo-liberalism with a Human Face: Making Sense of the Justice And Development Party’s Neo-liberal Populism in Turkey,” *Science & Society*, Vol. 77, No. 3, July 2013, p.372.

Islamism and nationalism” and linked them with some elements of popular culture to build its hegemony.¹⁸⁰

Nevertheless, it can be argued that deregulation in the labour market during this period caused marketization of public services and significant losses for the working classes in the social security system. In this sense, Yücesan-Özdemir states that workers have become gradually deprived of their social security rights and forced to accept a life dependent on social aid-charity due those policies.¹⁸¹ That is to say, the working classes have faced severe conditions of recommodification due to the “commodification of social security and public health ”¹⁸²

2.2.2.2 Milestones of Neo-Liberal Transformation of the Print Media

Turkey’s abovementioned subordination to the neo-liberal economic order has caused some immediate impacts on the Turkish print media by the beginning of the 1980s. In the very first years of neo-liberal structuring, Özal made particular efforts to develop close relations with some leading journalists and newspaper owners in the mainstream media. Hıfzı Topuz points out that Özal was frequently having phone calls with his “fine” men in the print media and inviting them to his Residence for private meetings and dinners.¹⁸³ These years can be marked as the start of a new period when having close relations with the political power-holders

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.372.

¹⁸¹ Gamze Yücesan-Özdemir, “AKP’li Yıllarda Sosyal Politika Rejimi: Kralın yeni Elbisesi” , *İktidarın Şiddeti: AKP’li Yıllar, Neo-liberalizm ve İslamcı Politikalar*, Ed. By. Simten Coşar, Gamze Yücesan Özdemir, Metis Yayıncılık, 2014, p. 117-139.

¹⁸² Coşar and Yegenoglu, “The Neo-liberal Restructuring”, <https://monthlyreview.org/2009/04/01/the-Neo-liberal-restructuring-of-turkeys-social-security-system/>

¹⁸³ Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*, p.271.

turned to be a reason of pride for journalists.¹⁸⁴ In this regard, prominent columnists of the mainstream media showed a very clear positive bias in covering Özal's policies.

On the other hand, particularly in the first half of the 1980s, the print media suffered an increasing oppression and censorship. Not only during the Military regime, but also during the governments formed under Parliamentary regime after 1983, opponents of neo-liberal policies in the print media were subject to severe pressures. Hıfzı Topuz provides the details of oppression that the print media suffered between the years 1980-1990. In this “dark period of the press history”, thousands of journalists were judged and arrested, hundreds of publishing ban were imposed and even some prominent journalists lost their lives in unidentified murder cases.¹⁸⁵ On the other hand, the High Council of Radio and Television, which was established on 1984, was basically functioning as a censorship body on broadcasts of TRT during the coup regime.¹⁸⁶ In this context, opponents of the neo-liberal transformation of the country were substantially deprived of rights of expression and communication. In the following years, independent newspapers also faced difficulties in surviving due to the increases in costs of printing and distribution.

It can be also suggested that structural transformation of the media in Turkey has accelerated by the end of 1980s.¹⁸⁷ As Cakmur and Kaya point out by the late 1980s and early 1990s, “Turkey has quickly moved from having a poor media environment to a new and rich media landscape through a process of transformation in communications infrastructure.”¹⁸⁸ Moreover, Rıfat Bali points out that from the

¹⁸⁴ Tılıç, *Utaniyorum ama Gazeteciyim*, p.293.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.273.

¹⁸⁶ Beybin Kejanlıoğlu, Çelenk, Adaklı; “Yayıncılıkta Düzenleyici Kurullar ve RTÜK”, *Medya Politikaları – Türkiye’de Televizyon Yayıncılığının Dinamikleri*, Imge yayınevi, 2001, p.110.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁸ Kaya and Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey”, p.525.

beginning of the 1980s, the print media has passed through rapid changes in terms of its printing and advertisement techniques and played a significant role in creation of demand towards imported goods. In this sense, the number and circulation of newspapers have considerably increased and promotions of newspapers by books, various imported goods, encyclopaedia boomed.

More importantly, by the mid-1990s, privatisation and deregulation policies in the media sector have caused considerable increases in the number of media outlets and significant changes in ownership relations of national newspapers and TV channels.¹⁸⁹ In this sense, the first private establishments on Radio and TV Broadcasts started up in 1990s with Star TV-Magic Box. As a matter of fact, on this date, the 1982 Constitution had a clear clause on TV and radio broadcast at its 133rd Article which envisaged State ownership and monopoly in broadcasting services with an objectivity basis. Therefore, it can be argued that the legal framework has been violated and even more transformed in favor of capital in the deregulation process of the media sector. That is to say the legal framework on the media and communications, while expected to be “regulatory”, has showed a “following” or “allowing” characteristic for the capital. Due to the lack of a legal framework which prevent large capital merging and inclusion of media companies in state tenders, an organic and symbiotic relation has occurred between large capital groups and the state.

In this regard, since the deregulation in the media sector has led to the involvement of large capital groups with the media sector, journalist bosses in the print media like the Simavi family started to leave out the sector. Eventually, Turkey witnessed “a rapid move from commercialization towards conglomeration, and the media

¹⁸⁹ Ahmet Serhat Kaymas, “Media Policy Paradigm Shift in Turkey: Rethinking Neo-Authoritarian Media Systems in the Age of Neo Liberalism”, *Acta Universitatis Danubius Communicatio*, Vol 5, No 1, 2011, p. 41.

market has come to be dominated by a very few groups through buyouts” by the end of 1990s and the 2000s.¹⁹⁰ Major capital groups who have played a significant role in media sector can be listed as Doğan Group, Çukurova Group, Doğu Group, Ciner Group, Dinç Bilgin Group, Uzanlar Group, Erol Aksoy Group, Ihlas Group, Albayrak Group and Çalık Group.¹⁹¹ In this regard, Kaymas noted that 70 percent of the media “including national newspapers, radio stations and television channels and national internet services are owned by few cross-media groups”.¹⁹²

It is also notable that 1994 and 2001 crises and the failures of weak coalition governments during the 1990s has increased the “efficacy” of media groups to change public opinion and consequently strengthened their influences on the political power-holders. Therefore, these years became the start of unofficial matching between certain media groups with certain political parties, involvement of media bosses in large-scale state tenders in different sectors and provision of the first state subsidies to the media sector. In other words, by the 1990s, a symbiotic relationship among the state, capital and the media in Turkey has been established.

Moreover, by the mid-1990s, in parallel with the rise of political Islam, Islamist print media has also passed through an articulation process with the neo-liberal agenda and started to benefit from advertisement revenues. In this regard, Sencer Ayata argues that “the area where the rise of religiosity as well as Islamic fundamentalism is most visible in the world of communication”.¹⁹³ It is remarkable

¹⁹⁰ Kaya and Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey”, p.526.

¹⁹¹ Kaya, *İktidar Yumağı*, p.248.

¹⁹² Kaymas, “Media Policy Paradigm Shift in Turkey”, p.52.

¹⁹³ Kaya and Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey”, p.529 cited in Sencer Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework,” in Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yeşilada (eds.) *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey* (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1993), p. 52.

that “the daily circulation of Islamist newspapers as reaching five thousand and monthly periodicals as “over 700,000.”¹⁹⁴

The 1990s can also be marked as the years when Turkish print media’s support on neo-liberal policies become much more crystallized. Structural adjustments and deregulation policies, privatization, public administration reform, social security reform, liberalization and IMF-guided economy programmes as a whole were supported by the mainstream print media.

Coming to the 2000s, as examined by this critical analysis in detailed, the mainstream media and the big capital in Turkey supported the JDP in 2002 and 2007 general elections. The neo-liberal agenda of the JDP governments and the “virtue and gains” of the single-party governments have had a fully-fledged support from the mainstream media. The government also adopted a generally positive attitude towards the mainstream media and related media groups.

This tendency has continued until 2008. After the well-known controversy between Aydin Dogan and Prime Minister Erdogan on “the land of Hilton” in 2008, political dominance over the mass media has gradually increased. During the 2009 local elections, JDP government based its election campaign, to a large extent, on a critique of the mainstream media.¹⁹⁵ This can be seen as the beginning of a new configuration in ownership relations in the mass media throughout the 2010, which has led to the emergence of a partisan media organically linked to the government.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ L. Doğan Tılıç, *Utaniyorum ama Gazeteciyim: Türkiye’de ve Yunanistan’da Gazetecilik*, İstanbul, İletişim yayıncılık, 2009., p.401.

2.2.2.3 Columnists as 'Organic Intellectuals' of Neo-liberal Transformation

Throughout the 20th century, column-writing continued to be an important aspect of journalism in Turkey. However, column-writing in Turkey has undergone a fundamental transformation from the beginning of 1980s. Within the abovementioned context, columnists in Turkey have played a distinctive and vital role for the neo-liberal transformation of the country.¹⁹⁶

In this thesis, Gramscian notion of “organic intellectual” is used as a well-suited concept to understand the role of columnists in the production of liberal hegemony.¹⁹⁷ It is possible to argue that columnists in Turkey formed one of the most “influential” and “important” strata of the organic intellectuals of neo-liberal era. In fact, traditionally, Turkish print media showed a certain degree of political parallelism also in the pre-1980 era.¹⁹⁸ However, in the post-1980 period, Turkish print media has been itself rapidly transformed into a key component of the capitalist structure and started to undertake a vital role in the production of hegemony in the civil and political society. What was needed during the neo-liberal transformation of the country was the degradation and removal of established opinions and discursive elements on the social state, social security, etatism,

¹⁹⁶ A column can be defined as “a newspaper writing of opinion journalism that discusses current news, makes up the lack of comment in news texts and is written by specialised people periodically. Onur Dursun, “*Köşe Yazarlığından Medya Filozofluğuna Ertuğrul Özkök Ve Ahmet Hakan’ın Köşe Yazıları Üzerine Bir İnceleme*”, http://www.sdergi.hacettepe.edu.tr/makaleler/KoseYazarligindanMedyaFilozofluguna-MART_2015.pdf

¹⁹⁷ In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci attributed particular importance to the formation of intellectuals, their relations with certain social classes and their role in the production of hegemony by ruling classes.¹⁹⁷ Gramsci underlined that “every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals”. According to Gramsci, the relation between intellectuals and the world of production is not as clear and direct as of ruling classes. However, they have a significant role in ensuring consent in the society. In this sense, he identified two super structural levels in which intellectuals’ function. These levels are corresponding with “civil society” and “the political society/state”. In this sense, Gramsci defined intellectuals as “deputies” of the dominant classes who are “exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, p.134.

¹⁹⁸ Kaya and Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey”, p.521.

equality, freedom and workers' rights. It can be argued that, in the absence of western-type partisan "think tanks", research centres, agencies and a fully-fledged support from the academia, a majority of columnists in the mainstream media showed a political parallelism with the political authorities and their media groups.

In fact, particularly from the beginning of the 1990s, working conditions of columnists in Turkey substantially changed and resulted in the emergence of a new generation of columnists who are largely dependent on the priorities of their media bosses and the political power-holders. As Christensen points it out journalists faced with three challenges in Turkey, first is "the concentration of media ownership in Turkey", second is "the efforts to break the power of unions"; and third is "government legislation affecting the rights and working environments of news workers".¹⁹⁹

Moreover, as G ng r Uras states in his memories about the TUSIAD, the capitalist classes have made efforts to change images of the rich and to support neo-liberal agenda through two strategies. First of all, they have started to use new advertising techniques and professional advertising agencies and second, they have established closer links with journalists.²⁰⁰ In this sense, the mentioned new generation of columnists have been included in the upper-class lifestyle of businessmen, invited private dinners and developed close relations with those businessmen. Furthermore, they have started to provide an organic link between their media bosses and the political power-holders including following up issues regarding state tenders or subsidies of their media groups.²⁰¹ Column-writing and columnism in Turkey have fundamentally changed in Turkey in the post-1980 in various aspects. This

¹⁹⁹ Christian Christensen, "Concentration of ownership, the fall of unions and government legislation in Turkey", *Global Media and Communication*, 2007 3: p.179.

²⁰⁰ Feyyaz Berker and G ng r Uras, *Fikir  reten Fabrika: T SIAD'ın ilk on yılı 1970-1980*, Istanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2009, p.139.

²⁰¹ Tılıç, *Utaniyorum ama Gazeteciyim*, p.413.

transformation included changes in their numbers, qualifications, functions, contents and visibility in the society as discussed below.

2.2.2.4 Main characteristics of Columnists in Turkey

Drawing upon the current literature on journalism in Turkey and the discourse analysis of this study on the selected columnists, the thesis identifies some characteristics of column-writing and columnists in Turkey in the post 1980 era as follows:

➤ **Increased number of columnists in the post-1980 era:** The number of columnists in Turkey has showed a sharp increase in the post 1980s era as already stated. In 1995, 547 columnists were writing in 26 national newspaper²⁰², in 2004 a study found 695 columnists in 20 newspapers²⁰³, in 2010, total number of columnists writing periodically was 789.²⁰⁴ In 2010, the average number of columnists per newspaper is 32.87²⁰⁵

Moreover, Tayfun Uçar points out that the number columnists in Turkey is more than the total number columnists writing in all Europe.²⁰⁶ In this regard, an archive scanning on the number of columns in Milliyet for the period of 1980-2005 shows a steady increase in the number of columnists in the newspaper. The following Figure indicates the number of columns in the first Wednesday of the year in five-year intervals.

²⁰² Kaya, *İktidar Yumağı*, p.352.

²⁰³ Onur Dursun, *Köşe Yazarları Yaşam Dünyamızı Sömürüyor Mu?Sermayenin ve Siyasetin Denetiminde Köşe Yazarlığı Alanı*, Siyasal Kitapevi, Ankara, 2013, p.187.

²⁰⁴ Sevim Koçer, “Ulusal Basın Köşe Yazarlarının Kariyerlerinin Sınırsız Kariyer Yaklaşımı Açısından İncelenmesi”, *Global Media Journal TR Edition*, 6 (11) Fall 2015, p. 319.

²⁰⁵ Koçer, “Ulusal Basın Köşe Yazarlarının”, p. 320.

²⁰⁶ Kaya, *İktidar Yumağı*, p.352 cited in Tayfun Uçar, *Economist*, 18.06.1995.




Figure 1: Number of Columns per day (Milliyet 1980-2005)

Source: Researcher's own analysis

According to Bali, starting from the 1990s, newspapers have started to go beyond their essential duty of providing objective information and focused to increase circulation and make profit.²⁰⁷ In order to create a young and middle-class reader profile, they started to transfer showcase columnists whose columns highlights individualism, luxury consuming tastes and apolitical “easily” readable issues.²⁰⁸ In this regard, Ergun Aydınoğlu points out that most of the columnists have not been acting as a journalist anymore, even some of them were previously journalists. Aydınoğlu also underlines the different characteristics of column-writing in Turkey

²⁰⁷ Bali, “Yeni Aristokratlar: Köşe Yazarları”, <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/birikim-yazi/5326/yeni-aristokratlar-kose-yazarlari#.WkaxQd-WbIU>

²⁰⁸ Rıfat N. Bali, “Doksanlı Yıllar - Medya Temelli Bir Bilanço Denemesi”, *Birikim*, No:184-185, August September 2004, http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/doksanli_yillar.pdf

and the West. According to Aydınöğlu, columnism in Turkey have turned to be a institutionalized problem which sabotages real journalism.²⁰⁹

In this sense, columnists have begun to make comments on several aspects of everyday life on a wide of spectrum of issues. In this context, Onur Dursun conducted an empirical study on columnists in Turkey. The study contended that columnists have started to “exploit life worlds of their readers” since they can directly influence their everyday life under the supervision of the capital and the political power-holders.²¹⁰

➤ **Columnists as “binding agents” among the capital, political power-holders and media:** In the post-1980 era, an important number of columnists in the mainstream media started to set up very close links with business world, political figures and media owners. In fact, proximity with these groups has turned out to be a matter of pride for journalists.²¹¹ Particularly during the 1990s, columnists started to use their close relations with the political power-holders as a mean of conveying demands of their media bosses to the government. From the late 2000s, representatives of the political power began to use columnists to impact the content and tone of the columns and news in the print media.

In this regard, Mehmet Barlas can be shown as one of the first examples of columnist who has developed close and intimate relations with the political leaders. Barlas was very close to Özal and had many private meetings and family dinners with Özal family. Barlas has also developed close links with businessmen. In his memory book, he refers to several occasions such as private parties, dinners and

²⁰⁹ Ergun Aydınöğlu, “Köşelerde Çok Kötü Şeyler Oluyor”, *Bianet*, <http://bianet.org/bianet/medya/43983-koselerde-cok-kotu-seyler-oluyor>

²¹⁰ Dursun, *Köşe Yazarları Yaşan Dünyamızı Sömürüyor mu?*, p.13-14.

²¹¹ Tılıç, *Utaniyorum ama Gazeteciyim*, p.293.

meetings, which he has attended with businessmen representing the big capital.²¹² Barlas also explains that well-known columnists from leading newspapers have attended foreign visits of Özal to follow up issues regarding state tenders or subsidies of their media bosses.²¹³ Similarly, Tılıç provides an example of conversation between Ertuğrul Özkök and State Minister Güneş Taner in which Özkök follows up a state-subsidy application of his media group.²¹⁴

Another important consequence of columnist's increased proximity to the political leaders and the capital is the privileged access to the information. Privileged "access" of some groups to "various genres, forms or contexts of discourse and communication" can be identified as a power source.²¹⁵ Particularly from the late 2000s, columnists in the partisan media have gained an increased access to the government sources as well as an increased visibility and reputation. Fehmi Kuru, in his book "*Ben Böyle Gördüm*", states that a group of columnists have daily briefing meetings with President Erdoğan.²¹⁶ On the contrary, increasing pressures of the mainstream media have resulted in the marginalization of some opponent columnists. For instance, Emin Çölaşan, Oktay Ekşi, Bekir Coşkun, Can Dündar, Hasan Cemal and Yılmaz Özdil had to leave their columns in the mainstream media.

➤ **Increased income levels of columnists:** In the post 1980 era, columnists have begun to earn high salaries and get transfer payments for changing their institutions. It is hardly possible to reach a systematic or transparent information regarding the

²¹² Mehmet Barlas, *Rüzgar Gibi Geçti*, p.28.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p.53.

²¹⁴ Tılıç, *Utaniyorum ama Gazeteciyim*, p.413.

²¹⁵ Teun Van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis", *Discourse & Society*, 1993 SAGE, London. Newbury Park and New Delhi, p.254.

²¹⁶ Fehmi Kuru, *Cemaat'in Siyasetle Sınırı: Ben Böyle Gördüm*, İstanbul, Alfa, 2016, p.34.

incomes and transfer payments of the columnists in the print media. Most of the information on this issue is based on own statements of the columnists. Akpınar in his book “*Nasıl Gazeteci Oldular*” gathered some information about 33 prominent columnists. For instance, he states that Barlas was transferred to Gunes newspaper in 1987 for a monthly salary of 5 Million TL, one Mercedes car and 300-Million transfer payment, while he was earning only 500.000 TL at that time.²¹⁷

According to an analysis made by Koçer on 100 columnists’ career path in 2014, “getting a transfer tender with high pay from a newspaper or a television has become one of the important reasons for columnists to change organizations”.²¹⁸ For this analysis, other important reasons are “leaving abide by the group decision, disagreement with the owner of the newspaper, power oppression, and newspaper passes in other hands.”²¹⁹

➤ **Increased political parallelism and support for neo-liberal agenda:** As Kaya and Cakmur underline “the relationship between politics and media in Turkey has always been very close”.²²⁰ Moreover, as the authors point out this situation have not change in the post-1980. In fact, high degree of political parallelism has continued in the Turkish press despite the “increased commercialization of the media” and it has eventually caused “the instrumentalization of the media outlets by the corporate interests.”²²¹ It can be argued that columnists have turned out to be key actors of this political parallelism. They have not only performed as communication channels among the media owners and the political power-holders, but also, they have also used their columns for political bias more blatantly. In fact,

²¹⁷ Hakan Akpınar, *Onların Hikayesi / Nasıl Gazeteci Oldular? Nasıl Gazeteci, Oldular*, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 2008, p.113.

²¹⁸ Koçer, “Ulusal Basın Köşe Yazarlarının”, p.305.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ Çakmur and Kaya, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey”, p.522.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p.523.

under the guise of presenting their “point of views” in their columns, more and more columnists have started to rephrase opinions of political figures and used their columns to praise and advocate government. That is to say, differently from the news that requires much more careful encoding for political bias, columns have provided with opportunities for the print media to manipulate political issues.

As this critical study presents a plenty of examples, most of the mainstream columnists have had a positive bias towards neo-liberal transformation of the country and recontextualized neo-liberal agenda by using certain discursive elements in Turkey which are historically strong. They have used a very strong “negation” towards opponents of the neo-liberal agenda and depicted neo-liberal ideas as the only rational way of managing economy and modernization. On the other hand, following the mid-1990s, the Islamist columnists have played a crucial role in recontextualizing neo-liberal discourse through articulation of certain conservative and Islamist elements to it.

➤ **Enlarged spectrum of subjects of columns:** In the post-1980 era, contents of the columns have also changed. In line with the general tendency of tabloidization in the print media, columnists started to write about a wide spectrum of issues. These subjects even include individual experiences, lifestyles, consumption preferences, travels and private lives of the columnists. Some of columnists even occasionally enter bullying debates among each other on issues including their private lives.

For instance, Rifat Bali provides a very comprehensive archive scanning and study on the columnist’s coverage of consumption culture, luxury life style and bourgeois gusto.²²² Similarly, Ahmet Insel states that in the post-1980 era the number of

²²² See Rifat Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a. Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, İstanbul, İletişim, 10. baskı, 2013.

columns and their subjects have been expanded and columnists have begun to write on many topics from culture to sport and politics.²²³ Kaya also cites an article of Tayfun Uçar in which Uçar classifies columnists with their changing functions and areas of interests such as columnists who present news, provide information, act as consciousness of the society, make comment, write essays, write on their personal impressions, contemporary lobbyists, ideologists, economists, private life consultants, gossipmongers, tv commentators and sport writers.²²⁴

Moreover, an overall assessment of selected columns by this study also reveals that some social issues such as class struggle, class demands, and related political issues have been excluded in the columns. Instead, even political debates have intensified on the speeches and acts of political leaders and identity-based politics. This is why, in the post-1980 column-writing in Turkey has been dominated by “personalization” of politics and “branding” of political leaders.

➤ **Increased visibility of columnists:** It is also notable that columnists have not only written columns, but they have gained a high level of visibility in the public scene. From the beginning of the 1990s, they have filled the absence of western-type neo-liberal intellectual strata in Turkey for instance actors like think-tanks, research centres and similar agencies. They have acted as anchor-men, news commentators, radio programmer, conference speakers and political consultants etc. Mehmet Barlas and Engin Ardiç can be shown as first examples of news commentators in the 1990s. Similarly, Reha Muhtar, Tuncay Özkan, Mehmet Ali Birand acted as anchor-men in the primetime news. These developments can be related with the start of private TV broadcasting and increased importance of advertisement revenues in the mass media. As it is the case for the print media, TV

²²³ Kaya, *İktidar Yumağı*, p.352. cited in Ahmet İnsel, *Radikal İki*, 28.08.2005

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.355. cited in Fatih Uçar, *Ekonomist*, 18.06.1995.

channels aims to have showcase names in the primetime news or related programmes.

More importantly, columnists have become unchanged names of debate programmes on TV channels from the beginning of 1990s. A clear majority of participants of political discussion programmes are composed of leading columnists. It can be observed that columnists usually participate in radio and TV programmes of their media groups.

➤ **Columnists in the Digital Era**

Since the mid-2000s, due to the boom in information technologies, internet utilization in Turkey has dramatically increased. This has led to a considerable increase in the usage of social media and enabled internet users to reach information, communication and news channels in a very short time. Today, daily newspaper can hardly publish “fresh” news in their printed versions since most of the news become already “old” in the following day.

Most of the readers prefer to use online web portals of newspaper and social media platforms to reach news and information. It can be argued that these developments caused significant changes in advertising techniques of the print media. First of all, online portals of newspapers are now designed to have more “clicks” to attract more advertisements. Therefore, tabloidization of content of online portals of newspaper is increasing. Moreover, since “news” are now accessible through several channels and online platforms, online newspaper portals make efforts to create a difference by commentary articles. This is why, the importance of showcase and mediatic columnists for online portals of newspapers is also increasing for advertisement incomes.

Table 4 shows a sample from the daily analysis prepared by MediaCat which shows shares of articles of columnists in the online platforms such as facebook, linkedin,

for 4 November 2017.²²⁵ According to a study carried out by Nielsen for Mediacat in December 2008, almost one third of the newspaper readers were reading columnists. Although developments in social media opened a new era where even ordinary people can create news content or commentaries, a similar study by Nielsen in 2011 again showed that columnists have not lost their importance and continued to be followed by 27% of the newspaper readers which was 29 % in 2007.

226

Table 4: Shares of articles of columnists in the online platforms²²⁷

		f	tw	in	G+	Toplam
1	Yılmaz Özdil / Sözcü Yerli otomobil ...	16115	4189	71	0	20375
2	Uğur Dündar / Sözcü Bir şehir, iki politikacı!.. ...	4940	3246	0	0	8186
3	Hikmet Genç / Akşam Otomobil, egzoz, beyin!.. ...	427	4290	0	0	4717
4	Ahmet Hakan / Hürriyet Atatürk'ün anasına hakaret ettin mi işte böyle yırtta ...	783	3771	0	0	4554
5	Can Ataklı / Sözcü Bir araba için bu kadar babayiğit gerekmez ki ...	1039	3364	0	0	4403
6	Kürşad Zorlu / Vatan Sakin unutmayın, biz onları unutmayacağız! ...	1111	3256	0	0	4367

²²⁵ MediaCat Index for Columnists, <http://www.mediacaonline.com/mediacat-kose-yazarlari-endeksi/>

²²⁶ A survey conducted by Mediacat and Nielsen on columnists, <https://pt.slideshare.net/MediaComInsights/mediacom-view-enn-ok-okunan-ke-yazarlar?nomobile=true&smtNoRedir=1>

²²⁷ MediaCat Index for Columnists, <http://www.mediacaonline.com/mediacat-kose-yazarlari-endeksi/>

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND INTRODUCTION OF SELECTED COLUMNISTS

This chapter on methodology aims first to trace briefly the “Critical Discourse Analysis” (CDA) as the methodology of the textual analysis of this study. For this purpose, the first subchapter will introduce the CDA’s theoretical roots, key principles and different approaches in contemporary CDA studies. It will also briefly present the Dialectical-Relational approach of Norman Fairclough as the basis of textual analysis carried out in this study.

Secondly, it will try to underline the selection criteria of the selected columnists for the textual analysis. In this regard, the second subchapter includes short resumes of the columnists, their positioning and perspectives in the print media institutions and justifies why they provide a meaningful sample for the textual analysis. More importantly, it will aim to show positions of those columnists in the network of relations among the political parties, the mass media and representatives of the capitalist class in Turkey and how those columnists were embedded in this network of relations in the post-1980 era.

The last subchapter presents the summary of the framework of textual analysis conducted in this study, principles used in data collection and selection of the texts. Finally, the objectives and methods of the complementary sample analysis of Voluntary Group of Researchers and how it is used for the purposes of this study will be portrayed.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis as a Methodology

3.1.1 Introduction of the Critical Discourse Analysis

From a broad perspective, the critical analysis of the language, communication and discourse has been a long-standing interest in the social sciences which can be traced back to Aristotle, Enlightenment philosophers, Marx, Frankfurt School and Habermas, as well as representatives of contemporary cultural studies largely in the UK and France as continuing lines of Gramscian, Althusserian and Foucauldian perspectives.²²⁸ However, as a methodological approach, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a relatively new area of research, which was introduced in the early 1990s.²²⁹

CDA can be defined as an interdisciplinary research methodology which focuses on socially-constructed and constitutive discursive practices and their role in sustaining and reproducing power relations in society. In other words, it aims to “develop ways of analysing language which addresses its involvement in the workings of contemporary capitalist societies.”²³⁰ There are certain distinctive features of CDA, which differentiate it from other discourse analysis approaches. In explaining these differences, Wodak states that instead of “isolated words and sentences”, CDA focuses on larger units such as texts, discourses, conversations, and speech acts, while it extends its analysis of linguistic beyond grammar and deals with non-verbal communication ways such as multimodal and visual.²³¹

²²⁸ Teun Van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis”, p. 251.

²²⁹ Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London, New Delhi, 2001, p.40.

²³⁰ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.1.

²³¹ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, p.39.

In this regard, it can be a good starting point to mention how CDA identifies “discourse” and what makes CDA “critical”. First of all, it should be noted that there are different approaches under CDA, which have different theoretical roots and conceptualizations. However, there are certain common grounds of major CDA approaches in defining discourse and the critical stance of CDA. In this sense, CDA approaches mostly conceptualize the term “discourse” as an equivalent meaning of semiosis, as “vast array of meaning-making resources available to everyone.”²³² Although discourse is defined as a meaning-making mechanism open to everyone, CDA theorists also underline the importance of privileged “access” of some groups to “various genres, forms or contexts of discourse and communication” and identify this privilege as a power source.²³³

On the other hand, the elements which makes CDA “critical” are its normative stance against the inequality and domination in the society and its aim to contribute to transformation of these inequalities. Therefore, critical discourse analyst, when identifying his/her research problem, determines a stance against a social status quo and its reflections in the society. In other words, CDA does not only provide a descriptive analysis of the social reality but also looks for ways of changing it.²³⁴ However, these normative elements do not necessarily vitiate scientific aspect of the CDA since each CDA approach sets out a framework, certain principles and methods of research for ensuring a scientific analysis including engaging some qualitative analysis in the CDA study. Having said that, it can be argued that the most important feature of CDA is its focus on the role of discourse in sustaining and reproducing as well as challenging existing power relations in contemporary societies through analysing language as an arena of ideological struggle. In a sense,

²³² *Ibid.*, p.39.

²³³ Van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis”, p.254.

²³⁴ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, p.40.

CDA approaches attribute a constitutive role to discourse in social processes besides being a socially constructed element. According to Jessop, critical semiosis/discourse analysis under cultural political economy “steer a path between “soft cultural economics” and “hard orthodox economics”²³⁵ In other words, CDA aims to examine performative role of discourse in social reality without falling into a semiotic reductionism. Jessop states that:

First, insofar as semiosis is studied apart from its extra-semiotic context, resulting accounts of social causation will be incomplete, leading to semiotic reductionism and/or imperialism. And, second, insofar as material transformation is studied apart from its semiotic dimensions and mediations, explanations of stability and change risk oscillating between objective necessity and sheer contingency.²³⁶

As mentioned before, there are different approaches to CDA, which are based on different theoretical backgrounds. To illustrate the major ones, one might mention the Socio-Cognitive Approach based on the studies of Teun Van Dijk, Discourse-Historical approach mainly developed by Ruth Wodak, the Dialectical- Relational Approach developed by Norman Fairclough and the studies of Van Leeuwen and Chilton on argumentations and rhetoric.²³⁷

In this regard, for Socio-Cognitive approach of Teun Van Dijk, CDA needs “the cognitive interface of models, knowledge, attitudes and ideologies and other social representations of the social mind”²³⁸ to relate power and discourse in an explicit way. Van Dijk's analysis mostly focuses on knowledge, racism, and ideology with particular emphasis on migration, discrimination, ageism and sexism issues.

²³⁵ Bob Jessop, “Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy”, p.17.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.16.

²³⁷ Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, p.40.

²³⁸ Van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis”, p.249.

Similarly, Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical approach also pay more attention to racism, anti-Semitism, sexism and identity issues.²³⁹ On the other hand, the studies of Van Leeuwen and Chilton mostly deal with the examination of language in terms of persuasion and justification.²⁴⁰

3.1.2 Dialectical-Relational Approach to CDA by Norman Fairclough

Dialectical-Relational CDA can be seen as an important element of Cultural Political Economy (CPE) which is discussed in a broader framework in the second Chapter of this study. Fairclough's analysis shares the perspectives of CPE in conceptualizing ideology, power and discourse. In a sense, Fairclough places the Dialectical-Relational discourse analysis into a CPE perspective which combines elements of three disciplines; Neo-Gramscian state theory (mainly developed by Bob Jessop), Regulation School and critical discourse analysis.²⁴¹

When compared to other CDA approaches, two distinctive features of Dialectical-Relational approach can be stated; the first is its Marxism-oriented theoretical perspective and the second is its particular focus on the social processes in the neo-liberal version of capitalism. By describing his analysis as a Marxism-grounded approach, Fairclough argues that Marx can be seen as one of the first critical discourse analysts. In their joint work, Fairclough and Phil Graham argue that the method used by Marx includes elements of what is now generally known as CDA. According to them, Marx started his analyses with the critiques of the language and discourses of the political economists and demonstrated their contradictions to identify problems for a systematic inquiry.²⁴² In this context, there are two reasons for selection of the Dialectical-Relational approach as the methodology of this

²³⁹ Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis", p.43.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.44.

²⁴¹ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.231.

²⁴² *Ibid.* p.303.

textual analysis. First of all, beyond being a research methodology, Dialectical-Relational CDA provides a substantial analysis framework with its “dialectical reasoning” which is well-placed in critical and CPE perspectives. Since this study embraces a CPE perspective in understanding the social processes in neo-liberal transformation, critical analysis of selected columnists can be conducted at best with such a complementary methodological approach. Secondly, with its particular focus on neo-liberalism and language, Fairclough's Dialectical-Relational CDA presents important case studies on neo-liberal discourse and CDA examples from the transition of Central and Eastern European Countries, which make it clearer to understand the research method.

In this sense, Fairclough states that reproduction and re-scaling tendencies of capitalism, as in the case of neo-liberalism, have a significant semiotic aspect.²⁴³ In fact, development of the Dialectical-Relational Approach clearly coincided with the neo-liberal transformation of the global economy and the rise of neo-liberal discourse in the early 1990s. Fairclough's analysis on the role of semiosis in neo-liberalism can also be seen in his works on the narratives of globalization.²⁴⁴ In his understanding of neo-liberalism, globalization, and globalism, Fairclough refers to the studies of Jessop and Steger.²⁴⁵ Jessop's analysis on the dialect between structure and agency provides a substantial ground for the development of Fairclough's CDA. In fact, in his article, “Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy”, Jessop underlines the studies of Fairclough and stresses that CPE is different from

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.244.

²⁴⁴ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Globalization*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p.21.

²⁴⁵ Norman Fairclough, “Strategy and discourse in globalization and development”, In P. Dobrescu, A. Taranu, & A. Bargaoanu (Eds.), *Globalization and Policies of Development*. Bucharest: National School of Political Science and Public Administration. p.1.

other “cultural turns” due to its focus on the mechanisms which results in “the co-evolution of the semiotic and extra-semiotic aspects of political economy.”²⁴⁶

It can be suggested that Jessop's conceptualizations on the relationship between structure and “strategic selectivities” are completed by the CDA's inquiry of discursive selectivities and moments in which appropriate discourses are identified. To be more precise, Jessop argues that semiosis/discourse takes an important part in the rise of post-Fordist economies, particularly in the contestation of different “economic imaginaries” of accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic perspectives. However, structural/material preconditions have been determining factors in the selection of knowledge-based economy as a discursive selectivity.²⁴⁷

Similarly, Fairclough draws attention to the capacity of capitalism to overcome crises. For him in case of neo-liberalism, the state and capitalist classes have taken radical measures to overcome the crisis in the late 1980s, which has discursive characteristics.²⁴⁸ In this sense, Fairclough explains how discourses constitute imaginaries which then become hegemonic visions and are operationalized:

...discourses which constitute “imaginaries” (Jessop 2004,2008), “imaginary projections” for new relations of structure and scale in economies, government, education and so forth; these may become hegemonic, or dominant, and may be widely recontextualized; in so far as they do become hegemonic, they may be “operationalised” in new structures, practices, relations and institutions; and the operationalisation itself has a partly semiotic aspect in the emergence and dissemination of genres and “genre networks”, which enable the governance of these complex new networks, as well as styles.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ Bob Jessop, “Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy”, p.2.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.3.

²⁴⁸ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.281.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.244.

Having provided a brief introduction of Fairclough's CDA and its theoretical roots, it is also beneficial to mention its main stages which draw on the dialectical reasoning of critical realism.

3.1.2.1 Main stages of the Dialectical-Relational approach to CDA

In explaining main stages of his CDA approach, Fairclough particularly refers to the studies of Roy Bhaskar and his theorization of critical realism.²⁵⁰ In fact, in their joint work, Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer discuss the relation between critical realism and semiosis in a broader perspective which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

In a general sense, Dialectical-Relational CDA is based on neither an inductive nor a deductive analysis; rather, it embraces an “abductive” approach as it is reflected in the work of Fairclough as “dialectical reasoning”. Fairclough argues that critical social science in a broader sense, including CDA, can be seen as a form of dialectical reasoning which is composed of four elements.²⁵¹ These elements are listed from A-D by Fairclough as follows:

- A. (Normative) critique of existing discourse
- B. Explanation of discourse as effect and cause in the existing state of affairs
- C. (Explanatory) critique of existing state of affairs
- D. Advocacy of action to change existing state of affairs ²⁵²

For Fairclough, A and C include epistemological, while D includes ontological and

²⁵⁰ Norman Fairclough, *Dialectical Reasoning In Critical Social Analysis And Critical Discourse Analysis*, Lancaster University, accessed on https://www.academia.edu/8207447/Dialectical_reasoning_as_a_method_in_critical_social_analysis_and_CDA

²⁵¹ Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer, *Critical Realism and Semiosis*, p.2.

²⁵² Norman Fairclough, “Dialectical Reasoning in Critical Social Analysis”, p.3.

practical elements. The following quote significantly includes grounds of Fairclough's CDA approach and the main stages he suggests for a critical analysis:

Dialectical reasoning is an epistemologically-based constellation of epistemological, ontological, practical and relational dialectics. It is epistemologically based because it is a form of (primarily practical) reasoning, realized in practical argumentation and deliberation. It diagnoses through critique, beginning with a critique of discourse, “absences” in discourse, in states of affairs, and in terms of “ills”, as a basis for advocating action to eliminate (“absent”) such absences. ...But it also has embedded within it ontological dialectic, the correction of absences in states of affairs, and is directed towards practical dialectic, the elimination and replacement of “ills”; and it includes relational dialectic, the elimination, and replacement of existing relations (including cause/effect relations) between discourse (and more broadly “ideas”) and material facets of existing reality.²⁵³

In this sense, Fairclough argues that emancipatory/practical goals of critical social science cannot be achieved by a mere discourse analysis, however, without identifying “absences and ill” in the discourses of a social wrong, we cannot reach an adequate understanding of the social reality to transform it. In the light of these explanations, Fairclough suggests four stages for the methodology of a CDA.²⁵⁴

- The first stage: This stage is dedicated to the identification of a social wrong and its semiotic aspect which refers to a “normative critique of discourse” in terms of its truth, rightness, and truthfulness.

- The second stage (a): This stage includes identification of obstacles to correct the social wrong and semiotic aspects of these obstacles, thus, an “explanation” of features of the discourse in relation with the existing social reality. At this stage, analyst focuses on examination of dialectical relations between semiosis and other

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.3.

²⁵⁴ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.226.

social practices and elements, orders of discourses. This is followed by selection of texts, and its analysis in terms of interdiscursive features and linguistic aspects.²⁵⁵

➤ The third stage (b): As a continuation of the second stage, critical discourse analyst makes an “explanatory critique” of the discourse in a relational way by focusing on the relations between the discourse and the social reality.

➤ The fourth stage: At this stage, based on the previous stages, CDA defines and suggests possible ways of overcoming the obstacle and changing the social wrong in an emancipatory direction.

3.1.2.2 Key Concepts

After stating main stages of Dialectical-Relational CDA approach, it would be also useful to briefly define key concepts used in this analysis. For Fairclough, the contribution of CDA to the analysis of ideology stems from its capacity to enable to reach tangible results on the discourse, its relations with other discourses and its recontextualization in structural preconditions and historical context. In this sense, Fairclough uses some distinctive concepts which this study benefits from. In this regard, descriptions of some of the significant concepts are presented below:

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.237.

Table 5: Key Concepts used in the Dialectical-Relational CDA

Discourse (abstract)	Language use conceived as social practice
Discursive event	Instance of language use, analysed as text, discursive practice, social practice
Text	The written or spoken language produced in discursive event
Discourse practice	Production, distribution and consumption of a text
Interdiscursivity	Constitution of a text from diverse discourses and genres
Discourse (count noun)	Way of signifying experience from a particular perspective
Genre	Use of language associated with a particular social activity
Order of discourse	Totality of discursive practices of an institution and relations between them

Source: The figure is based on direct definitions of Fairclough²⁵⁶

Besides these definitions, there are two other important concepts that should be emphasized. The first is “interdiscursive hybridity”, which has a close meaning with the abovementioned interdiscursivity. This concept refers to the articulation of different discourses, genres and styles in the text as well as “disarticulation” and “re-articulation” of relationships between different discourses, genres and styles.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.96.

²⁵⁷ Norman Fairclough, *Discursive hybridity and social change in Critical Discourse Analysis*, 2011, p.1. accessed on

And, secondly, the concept of “recontextualization” is an essential element of Dialectical-Relational CDA. Fairclough states that in the moments of discourse practices in social change, discourse can be recontextualized.²⁵⁸ For him, “this recontextualization of meanings is also the transformation of meanings, through decontextualization (taking meanings out of their contexts) and recontextualization (putting meanings in new contexts).”²⁵⁹ Fairclough underlines that certain discourses can be recontextualized in “structural boundaries” of different topics such as education, politics or health, while it can be also recontextualized in “scalar boundaries” as in the case of dissemination of certain discourses from the West to the East.²⁶⁰ More importantly, by referring to Chouliaraki's works, Fairclough argues that media discourse is a key recontextualization mechanism since it brings a certain discourse with other “appropriate” discourses for the aim of dissemination and mass consumption.²⁶¹

3.2 Selected Columnists and Their Representations in Print media

3.2.1 Selection Criteria of Columnists

In line with the identified objectives of the textual analysis, the following four criteria were used in the selection of the columnists:

➤ *Representation of relatively different political perspectives in the mainstream media:* In order to reach comprehensive results on the coverage of neo-liberal discourse/policies and to obtain a more meaningful sample which can represent different perspectives in print media in Turkey, the analysis aimed to include not

https://www.academia.edu/3776026/Discursive_hybridity_and_social_change_in_Critical_Discourse_Analysis_2011

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.1.

²⁵⁹ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.76.

²⁶⁰ Fairclough, “Discursive hybridity and social change”, p.1.

²⁶¹ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.78.

only the columnists with liberal/rightist background, but also the ones with different backgrounds such as leftist and Islamist worldviews. The analysis has also sought to include an economy writer in the analysis, who has a specific focus on the economy policies, in order to reveal common and/or distinctive grounds of these different perspectives in covering neo-liberalism. This criterion is also necessary to be able to analyse articulation of neo-liberal discourse with other orders of discourse in Turkey in the process of recontextualization.

➤ *Continuity in column-writing for the analysed period of 1980-2010:* Another selection criterion is their continuity in column writing for the covered period of the analysis. All selected columnists, to a large extent, have continued to write columns in national wide newspapers for this period.

➤ *Privileged access to discourse practices and communication means:* This privilege can be identified as columnists' engagement with the production and dissemination processes of neo-liberal discourse on national and global scales, as well as their access to the nation-wide communication channels. Selected columnists have not only been writing columns in national newspapers with a considerable readership, but they have also been making commentary programs on TV and attending discussion programs, national and international conferences and meetings, through which they could access high number of audience. Moreover, selected columnists have gained the privilege of access, through several channels, to the policy-making processes of neo-liberal transformation of Turkey. To be more precise, in different periods, they attended closed meetings of government officials or representatives of the capitalist class, to which only a limited number of people had access, such as private dinners or meetings with politicians/leaders/government officials'/media bosses. They also participated in as well as international meetings such as Davos Summits and Bilderberg where neo-liberal discourse has been produced on the global scale.

➤ *Popularity and symbolic importance:* The last selection criterion was to have popularity in Turkey's public opinion and symbolic importance in terms of

representing their political views, perspectives, and diverse backgrounds.

In this regard, the following columnists are selected for the textual analysis:

- Mehmet Barlas –a liberal/right-wing columnist,
- Hasan Cemal – a left-liberal columnist/intellectual with a leftist/activist background
- Abdurrahman Dilipak - an Islamist columnist/intellectual and activist
- Fehmi Kuru – Islamist columnist /intellectual with an academic career
- Prof. Güngör Uras – a liberal columnist/economist with academic career and professional background as the General Secretary of TUSIAD.

In what follows, analysed columnists will be briefly introduced to discuss their conformity with the selection criteria.

3.2.2 Introduction of the Selected Columnists

3.2.2.1 Güngör Uras

Güngör Uras is one of the long-standing economy writers in the print media, who is also a professor of economics. Besides several bureaucratic tasks and private sector experience, Uras has been writing articles on Turkish economy since the 1970s.

First and foremost, a critical analysis of his articles is important to identify how a liberal economist/academician has legitimized neo-liberal policies in Turkey and to what extent his discourse has reflected/distorted social reality and scientific data. His short biography is as follows:

Güngör Uras was born in 1933. He graduated from TED Ankara College and Ankara University Political Science Faculty/Finance department in 1955. He earned his Assoc. Prof degree from Boğaziçi University and became a professor at Marmara University in 1994. He started column-

writing in 1968 for Turkey Economy Journal. He also wrote for respectively Rapor/Report (1983), Tercüman/Interpreter (1986), Güneş/The Sun (1982-1988), Sabah/The Morning (1988-1998), Sabah Star Journal (1991-1995), Yeni Yüzyıl/The New Century (1996-1998), Dünya/The World (1983-..) and Milliyet/The Nationality (1998-...) newspapers. He currently writes columns for Milliyet and economy newspaper Dünya. Uras had also a parallel professional career, which started at Halk Bank/People's Bank (1956-1962), State Planning Organization (1962-1974), General Secretary of TUSIAD (1974-1980), AK Insurance Head of Administrative Board (1980-2001), Professor at Faculty of Economy (1992-1993), Professor at Marmara University Faculty of Communication (1993-2001).²⁶²

Güngör Uras is a very interesting case study for this thesis due to his multi-directional career. He has been an economy writer, economist and academician for a long time, but he has also taken various public and private offices in Turkey. For certain reasons noted below, it can be suggested that Uras has been a prominent example of “organic intellectuals” in Turkey, which makes him a very significant case study.

First of all, Uras can be seen as a long-standing writer with an uninterrupted column-writing experience in the post 1980 era. Uras is also one of the prominent economy writers in Turkey who closely followed neo-liberal transformation of Turkey as a liberal economist. Secondly, Güngör Uras has been a popular economy writer. He has used several nicknames as Güngör Uras, Tevfik Güngör, Prof T. Güngör Uras, Ali Rıza Kardüz and Ayşe Hanım Teyze (Aunt Ayse).²⁶³ What makes Uras a remarkable economy-writer has been his efforts to develop an alternative genre by using a simpler and convincing language to affect “ordinary people of the streets”. For instance, in a considerable number of his columns, he sets a dialogue between him and a man from the street or Ayşe Hanım Teyze to convince them on

²⁶² Gungor Uras's official website, <http://www.gungoruras.com/>

²⁶³ Interview with Güngör Uras, “Güngör Uras'ın Ayşe Hanım teyzesi”, *T24 Portal*, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/gungor-urasin-ayse-hanim-teyzesi.20615>

the virtue of neo-liberal recipes.²⁶⁴ He had also made programmes on radio with the same title.²⁶⁵ In this regard, features of language uses in Uras's texts provide important implications for this thesis.

Finally, Uras is an important figure in Turkish print media due his close relations with the big capital in Turkey and his professional background as the General Secretary of TUSIAD between the years 1974-1980. TUSIAD was established in 1971 by the initiative of a limited number of big capitalists. It was a time when the capitalists were heavily “suffering” from the rise of class struggle and trade unionism. These years are remarkable since they paved a way for January 24 decisions in 1980 as the first step of neo-liberal transformation of Turkey.

In this process, Uras was responsible for developing organizational structure of TUSIAD.²⁶⁶ In his joint work with Feyyaz Berker²⁶⁷, Uras explained in detail the “agonizing” conditions of the big capital in Turkey in the pre-1980 era. For him, during the initial years of its foundation, TUSIAD aimed to emerge as a pressure group which could exert more organized pressure on the political authorities and to change the image of “the rich” in the society. Uras played a significant role for the realization of these objectives.

To summarize, in the book “*The Factory Producing Ideas- the first ten years of TUSIAD 1970-1980*”, Uras and Berker mentions three important strategies. First is to change the bad image of the “rich” in the society by mobilizing advertising agents

²⁶⁴ G ng r Uras, “IMF Ay e Hanım Teyzeme  ok  ey Yazar”, *Milliyet*, 11.6.1999.

²⁶⁵ *Regular Radio programmes by G ng r Uras*, “Ayse Hanım Teyze ne yapsın?”, <http://www.ntvradyo.com.tr/Programlar/12129/yogq2hka/ayse-teyze-ne-yapsin>

²⁶⁶ Berker and Uras, *Fikir  reten Fabrika: T SIAD*, p.139.

²⁶⁷ One of the founders of TEKFEN grup which is one of the biggest capital groups in Turkey.

²⁶⁸ and professionals and preparing economy bulletins which can be used by the print media²⁶⁹, second is to develop links between representatives of the capital and print media, particularly by bringing together the big bosses and the columnists²⁷⁰, and third strategy is to use newspaper advertisements as a means of political pressure on the government for the first time in an organized way and with the professional help of advertising agents.²⁷¹ It is highly remarkable that Uras and Berker also argued that between the years 1970-1980, the print media was either disconnected from the business world or was depicting it in a negative way.²⁷² In this regard, three meetings were organized by Uras and Oktay Ekşi -a columnist from *Hürriyet*- in 1979 and in 1980 to bring together representatives of big capital groups and well-known columnists in leading newspapers.²⁷³

3.2.2.2 Mehmet Barlas

Mehmet Barlas is a well-known and long-standing journalist in Turkish print media who has been writing columns since the 1970s in several national newspapers. It can be argued that Barlas is also one of the typical examples of “organic intellectuals” of neo-liberal transformation of Turkey. Therefore, the articles of Barlas provides a very beneficial sample for this critical analysis. In this brief introduction, four aspects of his journalism are mentioned, which make Barlas's texts a meaningful sample data for the analysis of the print media. Firstly, Barlas has shown a fully-fledged political parallelism with the changing political powers in Turkey in the post-1980 era, which makes it useful to follow up

²⁶⁸ Berker and Uras, *Fikir Üreten Fabrika: TÜSIAD*, p.174.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.158.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.157.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.* p.66.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p.158.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.159.

continuities/discontinuities in neo-liberal argumentations in his texts. Secondly, Barlas has been a vigorous advocate of neo-liberal transformation of the country, particularly in terms of legitimizing neo-liberal economy policies and glorifying private sector. Thirdly, Barlas has made great efforts to flatter a new consumerist lifestyle and hegemonic identity by using his columns, and lastly, Barlas has been one of the first examples of columnists in Turkey who has acted as a “binding agent” among businessmen, political power-holders and media bosses, which has granted him a considerable degree of privileged access to the discursive practices.

Before making a more focused analysis of his columnist background, a quick look to Barlas’s Curriculum Vitae will be helpful:

Mehmet Barlas was born in 1942 and graduated from the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. He started journalism in his father Cemil Sait Barlas's “Son Havadis” as a student and continued his professional journalism career in Cumhuriyet. He acted as a consultant in TRT during the office of Ismail Cem. He wrote columns in most of the national wide newspapers in Turkey, from a wide range of political perspectives such as: Son Havadis, Cumhuriyet, Resmî Gazete, Günaydın, Milliyet, Güneş, Tercüman, Hürriyet, Türkiye, Sabah, Yeni Şafak, Zaman, Star, Akşam, Show Press, again Sabah and Posta. He also made daily commentary programs on different TV channels in different periods, such as Star1, ATV, Show TV and TGRT. In 2008, for a short time, Barlas acted as a prime-time newscaster in ATV. Barlas also made a daily discussion program with Prof. Emre Kongar on NTV. He is married to journalist Canan Barlas. He is son of former CHP MP and Minister Cemil Sait Barlas and brother-in-law of Can Paker.²⁷⁴

As it can be observed from his short bioFigurey, Barlas has written columns in many national newspapers in Turkey. Interestingly, Barlas prides himself that he is a “rodeo rider” in the Turkish mass media since he has succeeded “not to fall from

²⁷⁴ Consolidated from his own book “*Rüzgar gibi geçti -Gone like the wind*” and BioFigurey, Mehmet Barlas, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/mehmet-barlas/>

the horse” despite four Military Coup d'etat in Turkey.²⁷⁵ For instance, although Barlas shows a positive bias towards social democrat policies and Ecevit during the 1970s, he glorified the 1980 Military Coup and Kenan Evren as a chief editor of *Milliyet* in 1981.²⁷⁶ Barlas was also known as one of the journalists closest to Özal and he continued to develop such close relations with the political leaders in the 1990s and 2000s. As one of the most popular incidents, Barlas stroked cheeks of Erdoğan in February 2007, which occupied the agenda of the country for a week.²⁷⁷ Moreover, in one of his statements about the issue, Barlas argued that he stroked the cheek of Özal as well and its his father's legacy to him to have many links in the political arena, which has enabled him to develop close relations with political leaders.²⁷⁸

The second important feature of his type of journalism is his full support to the neo-liberal transformation of Turkey. From the very beginning of the neo-liberal transformation process since January 24 decisions, Barlas has supported neo-liberal policies implemented by the governments.²⁷⁹ He has used anti-statist views which have been articulated with the so-called virtue of free market economy and the “supreme features” of private sector. Barlas has been attending Davos Summits regularly from the beginning of the 1980s and he reflects those meetings through

²⁷⁵ Interview, “Canan-Mehmet Barlas Ciftinden Ilginc Aciklamalar Komsularimiz Bizi Medyaya Ihbar Etti”, *Tercüman*, 09.05.2005, <http://www.habervitrini.com/medya/canan-mehmet-barlas-ciftinden-ilginc-aciklamalar-komsularimiz-bizi-medyaya-ihbar-etti-157748> accessed on 01.09.2016.

²⁷⁶ Mehmet Barlas, “Birinci Yıl”, *Milliyet*, 12.09.1981.

²⁷⁷ “Barlas'ın yanak okşaması medyanın gündeminde”, *Habertürk*, 25 February 2007.

²⁷⁸ Interview by Şirin Sever, “Mehmet Barlas: Yanak Okşayan Değil, Yanağını Okşatan Gazeteciden Ürkün”, *Günaydın Pazar*, http://www.medyatava.com/haber/mehmet-barlas-yanak-okşayan-degil-yanagini-okşatan-gazeteciden-urkun_22622#sthash.UW9NQW4x.xDiJEpKC.dpuf accessed on 15.03.2016.

²⁷⁹ Mehmet Barlas, “24 Ocak Bayramı”, *Milliyet*, 24.01.1982.

his columns.²⁸⁰ It is also notable that “liboş”, one of the terms used mostly by leftist-Kemalists to define the supporters of economic liberalism, was coined for the first time by well-known leftist journalist Uğur Mumcu to describe Mehmet Barlas.

Thirdly, Barlas has been one of the prominent advocates of consumerism in Turkey in the post-1980 era. Turkey's transformation from an import-substitution economy to a free and open market required constitution of a new “subject” with different consuming habits. In this sense, one of the rare analyses on the print media's role in building a consumerist discourse was made by Rıfat Bali, where Barlas occupied a considerable place.²⁸¹ The glorification of consumerism has been one of the striking characteristics of Barlas's discourse as he identifies consumption an indicator of civilization and modernization.²⁸²

And lastly, one of the most important aspects of Barlas is the binding role which he plays in the fusion of the political figures, members of the capitalist class and media bosses in Turkey, going beyond journalistic actions. As mentioned above, Barlas establishes very close relations with politicians, particularly with leaders. For instance, he describes Özal as a close friend of him and explains having family dinners with Özal family, listening to Turkish Classical Music and even celebrating their birthdays together.²⁸³ On the other hand, in his book “*Gone with the wind*”, Barlas states his memories with several businessmen and media bosses, which

²⁸⁰ Mehmet Barlas, *Rüzgar gibi geçti*, p.51.

²⁸¹ Rıfat Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a. Yeni Seçkinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yaşamlar*, İstanbul, İletişim, 10. baskı, 2013.

²⁸² Mehmet Barlas, “Büyük kentte yaşama ayrıcalığı”, *Sabah*, 14.01.1994.

²⁸³ Interview, “Canan-Mehmet Barlas Ciftinden Ilginc Aciklamalar Komsularimiz Bizi Medyaya Ihbar Etti”, *Tercüman*, 09.05.2005, <http://www.habervitrini.com/medya/canan-mehmet-barlas-ciftinden-ilginc-aciklamalar-komsularimiz-bizi-medyaya-ihbar-etti-157748> accessed on 01.09.20165

includes attending their private dinners and yacht tours.²⁸⁴ Similarly, Barlas Family is also famous for their villa parties where party leaders, prominent journalists, media bosses and other important figures occasionally gather for dinners.²⁸⁵ In fact, Barlas argued that he organized such a dinner during the 28 February process to “press the button for launching a new political project” and he invited Tansu Çiller, Recai Kutan, Hasan Celal Güzel and Besim Tibuk in his home for dinner.²⁸⁶

Moreover, there were more serious allegations on Barlas claiming that he was involved some tender processes between his media group and local governments in 1987. On 21 April 1987, Sabah newspaper argued that a chief editor of a newspaper was following-up business deals and tenders of his media group in Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, and one day later, announced that this was Mehmet Barlas.²⁸⁷ Mehmet Barlas replied to this news by publishing corruption allegations in Güneş newspaper about Yeni Asır and Sabah newspaper on 23 April 1987.²⁸⁸

3.2.2.3 Hasan Cemal

Hasan Cemal is also a very well-known columnist in Turkey who is a journalist since 1969. Cemal can be identified as a “left-liberal” columnist who had a leftist/activist position until the late 1980s. Before his transfer to the mainstream print media in 1992, Cemal has undertaken different tasks and written columns in newspapers and journals which were representing socialist perspectives during the 1970s and 1980s such as the Devrim (Revolution) and Cumhuriyet (The Republic).

²⁸⁴ Mehmet Barlas, *Rüzgar Gibi Geçti*, p.28.

²⁸⁵ Emin Çölaşan, “Allah Kimseyi Düşürmesin”, *Hürriyet*, 8 Eylül 1998.

²⁸⁶ Mehmet Barlas, *Rüzgar Gibi Geçti*, p.67.

²⁸⁷ Suat Sezgin, “Türk Basınındaki Polemiklere Tarihsel Açıdan Genel Bir Yaklaşım”, *İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi*, p.14.
<http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iuifd/article/download/1019014654/1019013870>, accessed on 01.11.2016

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.14.

Moreover, Cemal was the editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet for the years 1981-1992. His short bioFigurey is as follows:

Hasan Cemal was born in 1944. He is the grandson of Cemal Pasha, one of the leading names in Ittihat ve Terakki party. He graduated from the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University in 1965. He started journalism in weekly published magazine Devrim in 1969 as an editor alongside with Doğan Avcıoğlu. After working in Yeni Ortam Journal, Anka Agency, and Günaydın, he began to work for Cumhuriyet newspaper in 1973, and become Ankara representative in 1979. Cemal acted as an editor-in-chief in Cumhuriyet for the years 1981-1992. He was a board member of International Press Institute between the years 1983-1992. Cemal transferred to Sabah in 1992 and wrote columns in Sabah until 1998 when he started to write columns for Milliyet. In 2013, his columns were suspended due to his columns criticizing the JDP government and he left the newspaper when his returned columns were not published. Since 2013, Cemal has been writing articles in T24 internet portal newspaper.²⁸⁹

It can be argued that Cemal's discourse has dramatically changed after his transfer to Sabah newspaper as a columnist in May 1992. He disarticulated his discourse from the ideals of the socialist left and turned to be a dedicated supporter of neo-liberal recipes in Turkey during the 1990s. Moreover, he supported emergence of JDP as a political actor as well as its governments all through the 2000s apart from a few instances. Ironically, he was also one of the “sufferers” of suppression of the political power-holders on the mass media.

In this context, as a representative of the left-liberal line in the print media, this brief introduction of Hasan Cemal aims to mention three aspects of his journalistic journey which make his articles a meaningful data for the current analysis. Firstly, it can be argued that Cemal's career path as a journalist interestingly coincides with the key milestones of Turkish print media and its neo-liberal transformation. During the 1970s, when the class struggle, student movements and social movements led

²⁸⁹ Consolidated from “*Kimse kızmasın kendimi yazdım*” and Hasan Cemal BioFigurey, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/hasan-cemal/>

by the Socialist Left were intensified in Turkey, Cemal was one of the leading leftist journalists who was prosecuted after 1971 Turkish Military Memorandum.

In the post-1980 era, Cemal was a chief-editor in Cumhuriyet. In his memory book, he states that in these years he has started to review his ideas but could not reflect them to his discourse since he hesitated to get too many reactions from his colleagues in his newspaper.²⁹⁰ In fact, these years can be also marked as a period of reorganization of the Left in Turkey after the 1980 military Coup d'etat, in both organizational and ideological ways. In 1992, he was transferred to Sabah newspaper and started to work for this mainstream newspaper all through the 1990s and 2000s. This transfer coincided with the intensification of changes in ownership relations in the mass media as well as horizontal and vertical monopolization. Coming to 2013, despite his support for the JDP governments in both political and economic terms in the 2000s, Cemal had to quit column-writing in the print media and started to write at T24 web portal due to the political pressures on Milliyet. In a sense, Cemal has been one of the “victims” of the re-designing of the mainstream media by the government starting from 2009.²⁹¹

The second crucial point is that Cemal's texts provide an opportunity to analyse the transformation of the Turkish left in the late 1980s and its separation into two main lines in the print media as Left-Kemalist and Left-Liberal fractions. In the 1980s, while the Right passed through a transformation process with Özal and neo-liberalism, the left also dramatically affected by the 1980 Military Coup d'etat and entered a restructuring process both in organizational and ideological domains.²⁹²

²⁹⁰ Hasan Cemal, *Kimse Kızmasın Kendmi Yazdım*, İstanbul, Everest, 2013, p.217.

²⁹¹ Ümit Alan, *Saraydan Saraya Türkiye’de Gazetecilik Masalı*, İstanbul, Can Sanat Yayınları, 2015, p.210.

²⁹² Doğan Gürpınar, “The Trajectory of Left-Liberalism in Turkey and Its Nemesis: The Great Rupture in the Turkish Left”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14 / No. 1 / 2012, p.150.

As Gurpinar noted, the left-liberals in Turkey “gradually disassociated themselves from the Left and became critical of its flaws and affinity to the Turkish Republican ideology.”²⁹³ In terms of economy policies, Cemal frequently declared the collapse of communism and the victory of the free market economy. Therefore, a critical analysis of Cemal's text may present important results on what grounds left-liberals disarticulated their discourse from their previous emphasis on labour-capital contradictions and how they recontextualized neo-liberal policies in Turkey.

And lastly, due to his explicit support to the JDP governments as an implementer of neo-liberal policies in the 2000s, Cemal is also a very suitable case study for identifying how the left-liberals made efforts to build a social consent towards JDP governments. Cemal supported the JDP governments in two ways. Firstly, he explicitly glorified the success of JDP in the implementation economy policies which could not be achieved by coalition governments in the 1990s.²⁹⁴ And secondly, as noted above, after leaving aside the class struggle, the *raison d'être* of left-liberals was reduced down to their opposition against “authoritarian state tradition” in Turkey, in which they showed an explicit convergence with the Political Islam's agenda of restructuring the state. In this regard, both in the first years of the JDP government and during the 2010 Constitutional Referendum, Left-liberals including Cemal gathered to support the JDP with the narratives of “Yes, but not enough”.²⁹⁵ In this sense, Yalman points out that liberal intellectuals who

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.156.

²⁹⁴ Hasan Cemal, “Evet, ekonomik gidiş iyi ama”, *Milliyet*, 20.01.2011.

²⁹⁵ Hasan Cemal, “Yetmez ama evet’in bazı gerekçeleri”, *Milliyet*, 09.09.2010.

defined themselves in the left acted as organic intellectuals of neo-liberal transformation.²⁹⁶

Moreover, during the Ergenekon and SledgeHammer cases against Turkish Armed Forces, they sustained this support and even rejected to listen to any critiques on the inconsistencies about the cases. Dani Rodrik, a well-known academician/economist at Harvard University, noted that Hasan Cemal did not reply his calls and messages when he attempted to contact him in order to discuss the inconsistencies in the Sledgehammer case that he detected.²⁹⁷ Rodrik stated that although Cemal and he had known each other and had met a few times beforehand, Cemal was not interested in meeting him despite the attempt of a common friend of Rodrik and him to arrange a meeting.²⁹⁸

This “happy” engagement of Hasan Cemal with the JDP governments started to break down by the beginning of the 2010s. However, even in 2011, Cemal noted that although he was writing some critical columns in recent cases, he was neither wrong nor disappointed about his previous support of Erdoğan and his government.²⁹⁹ Moreover, for him, “the good deeds of the JDP were more than his sins”.³⁰⁰ The rupture point for Cemal was his column on the publication of Imralı minutes in Milliyet. This incident resulted in his dismissal from Milliyet newspaper in March 2013. Having started to write in T24, Cemal's discourse during Gezi

²⁹⁶ Galip Yalman, “AKP döneminde Söylem ve Siyaset: Neyin Krizi”, *İktidarın Şiddeti: AKP'li Yıllar, Neo-liberalizm ve İslamcı Politikalar*, Ed. By. Simten Coşar, Gamze Yücesan Özdemir, Metis Yayıncılık, 2014, p. 31.

²⁹⁷ Dani Rodrik, *The Plot Against the Generals*, June 2014, p.24.
<http://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/plot-against-the-generals.pdf>

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.24.

²⁹⁹ Hasan Cemal, “‘Liberal’di, ‘entelektüel’di derken”, *Milliyet*, 28.01.2011.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

protest in June 2013 was also remarkable. Although Cemal was criticizing Erdoğan for “turning” into a politician like Demirel, he argued that if Özal had been alive, he would have gone to the Gezi Park, engaged with the young generation of the 1990s and tried to understand them.³⁰¹ It is a striking point that Özal, about whom Cemal was vehemently critical during his office, has turned to be a statue of democracy and toleration. Hayri Kozanoğlu explains this statement of Cemal as follows:

When a regime problem or crack occurs, ruling classes become very afraid of the involvement of the left to this problem, any increase in struggle motivation of people or refreshment of their hopes to be able to change the life. Their horizon, with their saying their vision, is limited to “the heroes of the right”. They can even send their gratitude to someone like Özal when they are criticizing the attitude of Tayyip Erdogan to Gezi protests. But as people who lived through these years, we remember how Özal closed his doors to the workers at strike and ended up dialogues.³⁰²

3.2.2.4 Abdurrahman Dilipak

As a well-known Islamist intellectual, Abdurrahman Dilipak has been writing in several Islamist newspapers and journals since 1969. Dilipak can be deemed as one of the most popular and prominent Islamist columnists, who has a certain impact on the development of the Islamic discourse in Turkey.³⁰³ A short bioFigurey of Dilipak is as follows:

Dilipak was born in 1949 in Duziçi/Osmaniye. He completed Konya Religious High School in 1969. He attended at Istanbul University to study Arabic and Persian languages, but two years later, he started to study at the Institute of Journalism and Public Relations of Istanbul Academy of

³⁰¹ Hasan Cemal, “Erdoğan'ın yerinde Özal olsaydı ya da Erdoğan Demirel'leşirken”, *T24 portal*, 13.07.2013, accessed on <http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-cemal/erdoganin-yerinde-ozal-olsaydi-ya-da-erdogan-demirellesirken,7050>

³⁰² Interview with Hayri Kozanoğlu, *Kullanışlı Tamam, Peki Aptallar Mı?*, 9.02.2014 accessed on <http://www.muhalefet.org/haber-kullanisli-tamam-peki-aptallar-mi-hayri-kozanoglu-12-9575.aspx>

³⁰³ Sena Karasipahi, *Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism And The Revolt Of The Islamic Intellectuals*, London; New York: I.B. Tauris ; New York : Distributed in the United States and Canada exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. p.53.

Commercial Sciences and graduated in 1980. Dilipak started writing articles in 1964 in *Duži Kasırğa* journal. He wrote articles for several newspapers, *Milli Gazete* (1972-1993), *Akit* (1993-1996), *Yeni Şafak* (1996-?), and is currently writing columns for *Yeni Akit*. Beside newspapers, he has been also a founder and chief-editor of several journals and weekly magazines since the 1970s. He wrote for *Adım*, *Foreign Policy*, *Bazın Hicret*, *Seriyye*, *Cum'a*, *Selam*, *Pir* and *Yeni Zemin* journals. Dilipak is a member and founder of MAZLUMDER. Dilipak was also a member of “the Committee of Wise Men” established by the JDP government to support the so-called “Peace Process” in 2013. He also made several commentaries and discussion programmes on TV channels, such as *Ateşten Gömlek/Shirt of Fire* (Channel 7), *Haber Yorum/News Comment* (Channel D), *2x2* and *Analysis* (Channel 6), *Beyin Fırtınası/Brain Storm*, *Tartışa Tartışa/By Discussing* (NTV), *Bıçak Sırtı/Knife Edge* (Ülke TV)³⁰⁴

There are three aspects of Dilipak, which make him a prominent representative of Islamist ideology in Turkey and meaningful sample for the current analysis. First of all, Dilipak is one of the long-standing Islamist intellectuals, who has been writing in major Islamist newspapers and journals. Dilipak shows a continuity in column-writing, which enables to follow his perspective for a considerable period. Moreover, Dilipak was not only popular among the readers of Islamist media but also one of the most visible Islamist columnists in the mainstream media due to the TV programs he attended in the 1990s and 2000s. Particularly, Abdurrahman Dilipak's discussion program with Kemalist Academician/Columnist Prof. Toktamış Ateş from *Cumhuriyet* newspaper on Channel 6 in 1997 made Dilipak visible to the public.³⁰⁵ Secondly, Dilipak's texts provide an appropriate case study for analysing the changing discursive selectivities and patterns of Islamist intellectuals during their articulation with neo-liberal discourse in Turkey, particularly in the 1990s. Islamist discourse in Turkey entered into a transformation

³⁰⁴ Consolidated from his own book *Vahdet ama Nasıl?* and Dilipak's BioFigurey on http://www.yeniakit.com.tr/kimdir/Abdurrahman_Dilipak

³⁰⁵ Rıfat N. Bali, *Maziyi Eşelerken: Tarih, Basın Ve Popüler Edebiyat*, Dünya Kitapları, İstanbul, 2006. p.77.

process and gradually disassociated from anti-systemic narratives which were explicit in the 1980s. This process paved the way for creation of a New-Islamist ideology by some Islamist intellectuals.³⁰⁶ Dilipak was one of the prominent figures among those intellectuals. For instance, in 1988, in *Nokta* journal, Dilipak and Ali Bulaç -another prominent Islamist intellectual- noted that Islamist currents should review themselves and it was time to go beyond slogans.³⁰⁷



Clipping 1: Islamist Movement is retreating

Source: Milliyet, 09.10.1988

It can be argued that this revision has started to produce its first results in the mid-1990s. Coming to 1994, in parallel with the rise of the Political Islam, Dilipak was one of the major reference points of economic and social projections of the Islamist ideology. Milliyet published a half-page news titled “Islamist model in the

³⁰⁶ Burak Özçetin, *Making of New Islamism In Turkey Transformation of The Islamist Discourse From Opposition To Compliance*, Unpublished Phd. Thesis, METU, February 2011, p.336.

³⁰⁷ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Hava Döndü, İslami Hareket Geri Çekiliyor”, *Nokta*, No: 41, 16.10.1988.

economy”, signed by Rıdvan Akar in September 1994, which discussed Abdurrahman Dilipak's proposals and projects on building an institutional infrastructure for an Islamist economic model.³⁰⁸

And thirdly, it can be argued that Dilipak was more than a thinker for the Islamist movement in the 1990s, he also acted as a “binding agent” among Islamist-conservative businessmen and the Islamist media. He was directly involved in the management of the so-called green capital. Dilipak was a member of High Consultancy Committee of Ihlas Holding³⁰⁹ and a founder member of some other companies. According to the news published in *Milliyet*, Dilipak was the founder and executive member of OR-PA Foreign Trade, TE-HA Copyright and Printing and OR-BAY Press-publishing and Tourism companies which were founded by Mehmet Emin Aksay who is the cousin of Abdurrahman Dilipak.³¹⁰ Mehmet Emin Aksay was the son of Hasan Aksay (uncle of Dilipak) who was an MP and State Minister in 1977 from the National Order Party.³¹¹ Allegedly, those companies had a business relation with Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality during the Welfare Party office.³¹² Dilipak was also one of the founder members of Lonca Co. between the years 1994-1996, which was the key company in the IGDAS corruption case opened against Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality under Welfare Party office.³¹³

³⁰⁸ Rıdvan Akar, “Ekonomide Islami Model”, *Milliyet*, 10.09.1994.

³⁰⁹ News by Şule Demirci, “Bu ne perhiz bu ne lahana turşusu”, *Milliyet*, 02.11.1995.

³¹⁰ Mehmet Demirkaya, “Milli Görüş Holding!”, *Milliyet*, 24.01.2001.

³¹¹ “Hizmet için önce siyasetçi sonra gazeteci oldum,” *Yeni Şafak Pazar*, 26.02.2012, <http://www.yenisafak.com/yenisafakpazar/hizmet-icin-once-siyasetci-sonra-gazeteci-oldum-369480>

³¹² “İğdaş’ı Çarpan Lonca’dan Dilipak Çıktı”, *Hürriyet*, 23.10.2001.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

3.2.2.5 Fehmi Koru

Fehmi Koru is one of the leading Islamist intellectuals, who has become known particularly for his involvement in Zaman newspaper which was once a major line in the Islamist media. Koru also has an academic career from Harvard University; thus, the follower of foreign press and publications, which can be seen as a rare characteristic among Islamist columnist for a long-time. A brief bioFigurey of Koru is as follows:

Fehmi Koru (aka Taha Kıvanç) was born in Izmir in 1950. He completed Izmir Religious High School and then graduated from Institute of High Islamic Studies/Izmir in 1973. He spent 15 months to learn English in the UK (1977-1978) and went to Damascus/Syria to improve his Arabic in 1979. He earned a master's degree at Harvard University/Middle Eastern Studies program in 1982. He also attended journalism program at London City University. He started journalism by writing foreign news for Islam Journal in 1983. Koru then wrote columns for Milli Gazete/National Gazette in 1984 and for *Zaman*/Time from the inception of the newspaper for long years as a chief-writer (1986-1998). Koru wrote English columns for Turkish Daily news (1999-2000). In 2000, Koru started to wrote columns for Yeni Şafak/New Dawn and also served as Ankara representative of this newspaper. He then was transferred to Star newspaper (2011-2014) and Haberturk newspaper (2014-2016). He also made several discussion programmes such as Başkent Kulisi/The Capital's Backstage (Channel 7), Beyin Fırtınası/Brain Storm (Atv), Politik Açılım/Politic Opening (TRT-1), Enine Boyuna (In detail) on several TV channels. Koru quitted writing as a columnist in January 2016 and now writes articles in his own website.³¹⁴

Koru has been selected as a case study of the current analysis for three reasons. First, similar to Dilipak, Koru has been a long-standing Islamist columnist whose articles can be traced back to the 1980s. After his return from the US in 1982, Koru started to write on foreign relations for the journal *Islam*.³¹⁵ Allegedly, this Journal

³¹⁴ Edited from author from *Yazarlar Ansiklopesi*, <http://www.biyografya.com/biyografi/5312>

³¹⁵ Koru, *Cemaat'in Siyasetle Sınırı: Ben Böyle Gördüm*, p.116.

was a media organ of Naqshbandi Tariqa's Iskenderpasha dervish convent.³¹⁶ He wrote columns in *Zaman/Time* for almost 12 years from the inception of the newspaper (1986-1998). Nevertheless, in his book, *This is how I saw it*, Koru frequently underlined that he was not “within” the Cemaat but he was “close” it.³¹⁷

Koru also argued that during his time, editorial board of *Zaman* was composed of the representatives of several sects of the Islamist movement and was trying to reflect different views of those sects.³¹⁸ Until transferred to Star and Haberturk, Koru wrote columns for Islamist newspapers and also worked as Ankara representative of some of them. In a similar vein with Dilipak, Koru's discourse on the neo-liberal transformation of Turkey shows a shift by the mid-1990s. Therefore, Koru can be seen as one of the prominent representatives of Islamist intellectuals in Turkey, who has contributed in recontextualization of neo-liberal discourse and its articulation with Islamist discourse.

Secondly, Koru has been also one of the most visible and popular conservative columnists of the print media.³¹⁹ He has made several TV programs on national TV channels. Due to his academic career and English knowledge, he has been also following foreign press and reflecting them to his columns. Interestingly, despite his several articles on criticizing its meetings, Koru is also one of the rare Turkish columnists to have been invited to the Bilderberg in Ottawa.³²⁰

³¹⁶ Soner Yalçın, “İslam Dergisi’nin idealist gençlerine ne oldu,” *Hürriyet*, 28.09.2008.

³¹⁷ Koru, *Cemaat’in Siyasetle Sınavı: Ben Böyle Gördüm*, p.10.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.173.

³¹⁹ According to a survey conducted by Mediacat and Nielsen on 14.723 reader in 2011, Koru was the 6th mostly read columnists. <https://pt.slideshare.net/MediaComInsights/mediacom-view-enn-ok-okunan-ke-yazarlar?nomobile=true&smtNoRedir=1>

³²⁰ Fehmi Koru, “Ben Bilderberg’teyken”, *Yeni Şafak*, 21.06.2006.

Thirdly, Koru has close links with high-level politicians, which enable him to have a privileged access, before many of his colleagues, to communication and discursive practices in Turkey. Koru was the roommate of former President Abdullah Gül during Gül's Ph.D. study at Exeter University in the UK. In his book, Koru argues that he is committed to Anglo-Saxon journalism rules, thus he paid great attention to set a distance between him and Gül after he become Prime Minister.³²¹ However, Koru's fellowship with Abdullah Gül became more mediatic during Koru's mediation attempt between the JDP government and the so-called “Cemaat” during the 17-25 December events in 2013.³²² To conclude, Koru has been one of the important figures in Turkish print media as a representative of Islamist discourse for a long time. Although, his columns have been mostly dedicated to the political debates, he has written a considerable number of columns on economy policies.

3.3 The framework of the Textual Analysis

In line with the methodological approach mentioned above, this study focuses on the texts of the selected columnists, published in 1980-2010 period. This sub-chapter aims to present principles of data collection and selection, framework of the textual analysis and the sample analysis made by the Volunteer Group.

3.3.1 Principles of Data Collection and Selection

The analysis required a comprehensive archive scanning of a 30-year period, including many newspapers. Data collection was carried out in two steps.

- In the first step, an archive scanning (hardcopy and online) and data

³²¹ Koru, *Cemaat'in Siyasetle Sınırı: Ben Böyle Gördüm*, p.17.

³²² *Ibid.*, p.39.

collection (newspaper articles of the columnists) were made.

- In the second step, all collected columns of the selected columnists were reviewed to reach a final sample of the analysis.

In this context, in the first step, a number of columns (500+) was collected using two kinds of archive scanning methods as hardcopy and online scanning. The National Library archive was used to scan hardcopy archives for the years before 1995 (since most of the related newspapers have an online archive starting from the mid-1990s), as well as for the newspapers with no online archive after 1990s.

Considering high numbers of articles of each columnist, during the hardcopy scanning, data collection was made on the basis of some identified dates of significant milestones of neo-liberal transformation in Turkey. In this context, hardcopy scanning of related newspapers covered the period starting two months before and ending two months after actual dates of events considered as milestones for the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. In defining these dates, significant moments when strategic and discursive selectivities became more crystallized in the discourses of political parties and leaders as well as the print media are considered. In this sense, the following events were identified as the basis of hardcopy scanning for each of the columnist for pre-1995 period;

- The Decisions of January 24, on January 24, 1980
- The 1980 Military Coup d'état, on September 12, 1980
- Anniversaries of the Decisions of January 24 in 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988
- The Zonguldak Workers Strike in spring 1989
- 32 No. Law on Financial liberalization, 11 August 1989
- The 1994 Financial Crisis and the April 5 Economic Stability Package, on 5 April 1994

➤ 4046 no. Law on Amendments to Privatisation Law, on 27 November 1994

However, during this hardcopy archive review, articles of the selected columnists with other themes, which were seen in relation to the neo-liberal transformation of Turkey -such as consumerism, private sector, suppression on the class struggle etc., were also collected.

A more comprehensive scanning was made where online archive was available, particularly for the period after the mid of the 1990s. That's why, besides important milestones of Turkish economy's cycles such as the 2001 Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Crisis, almost all articles written by selected columnists during the election periods, stand by agreements with IMF and large-scale privatisation were also reviewed.

By the end of this first stage of the data collection, a total number of 507 articles of selected columnists were recorded. In the second stage, a selection was made among those articles to reach a final sample list. As a part of a critical analysis, rather than random sampling, data selection prioritised texts in which argumentations of the columnists on neo-liberalism have intensified. This selection aimed to detect articles which reflect perspectives of each columnist towards:

- Neo-liberal ideology (for instance their coverage of free market economy, liberalization, private sector, capitalist mode of production, globalization),
- Specific neo-liberal implementations and de-regulation process of the state (in economic realm; privatization and liberalization in several sectors, as well as the role of the state in the economy),
- Impacts of neo-liberal transformation in Turkey on labour-capital contradictions and the class struggle,
- Impacts of neo-liberal transformation on the social domain, particularly unjust income distribution and consumerism.

As a result of this selection, the following final data was prepared:

Table 6: Number of analysed articles of each columnist

Columnist	Number of Analysed texts
Mehmet Barlas	42
Hasan Cemal	35
Abdurrahman Dilipak	34
Fehmi Kuru	35
Güngör Uras	44
Total	186

3.3.2 Principles of the Textual Analysis

In line with the abovementioned data collection stage, textual analysis covered 186 columns which were published in the following newspapers between the years 1980-2010; Cumhuriyet, Dünya, Milliyet, Milli Gazete, Rapor, Sabah, Yeni Akit, Yeni Şafak, Vakit, Zaman.

In the framework of the Dialectical-Relational Approach to CDA, the textual analysis of each column was made by utilization of a survey sheet (Appendix A.) which aimed to identify the following points:

- Bias of the text towards neo-liberalism, neo-liberal economy policies, neo-liberal transformation of Turkey, its impacts on social and political domains,
- Bias of the text towards actions and discourse of the representatives of the capital class and the political power owners,
- Discursive selectivities and strategies of developing argumentations regarding neo-liberalism/neo-liberal economy policies: Key themes, key argumentations, relations of the texts with other texts (intertextuality) and order of discourses,

➤ Language uses: Genres drawn on in texts, the interdiscursive hybridity of genres and discourses, themes associated with particular discourses, particular argumentative genres, fallacious arguments, narratives, inclusive exclusive “we”, “they”, passive voices, usages of metaphors, stereotypes etc.³²³

During the analysis, results on each article were recorded on the survey sheet for every columnist. Following this step, an overall evaluation was made for defining biases, key discursive selectivities and strategies, as well as language uses.

3.3.3 Sample Analysis by the Volunteer Group

As discussed before, CDA is characterized by its normative stance which identifies a social wrong, analyses its discursive elements and seeks ways to contribute to the correction of it. However, this does not necessarily mean that CDA methodology has to be subjective. In the processes of data collection, selection and assessment, CDA can benefit quantitative and qualitative methods as well as control groups for double-checking the overall results.

In this respect, a key component of this textual analysis was a sample analysis carried out by a Volunteer Group. Five volunteers with either master's or doctorate degrees in political science, sociology, international relations and business administration were asked to read 39 articles covering the texts of all five columnists. The group was composed of 2 men and 3 women volunteers from a age range of 25-35.

There are two objectives of the sample analysis. The first is to control the results of the textual analysis carried out by the researcher and; the second is to benefit from the analysis of the Volunteer Group in the overall assessment of the thesis on the recontextualization of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey by the print media. By adding

³²³ Fairclough, “Language and globalization,” p.63.

such a sample analysis, the researcher also had the opportunity of reaching an impression on how people with a certain degree of education are decoding the texts.

In this regard, the Volunteer Group was asked to fill a survey sheet for each article which can be seen in Appendix A. The survey sheet was composed of open and close-ended questions and aimed to determine how the text was decoded by the volunteer in terms of themes, biases, messages and use of language. To explain the aim of the study, an explanatory note was also provided for the Group. In this sense, the survey sheet asked some questions as exemplified below:

- Is there any bias towards neo-liberalism (or a specific neo-liberal implementation)? Please mention the position of the author towards those policies.
- Have you noticed any implicit or explicit message which supports the discourse/acts of those who hold power or capital?
- Have you noticed any striking word selection which is used to name/label or qualify a social actor, group, event, action, process etc.?
- In the text, can you detect any of the following message(s) about neo-liberalism (or about a specific neo-liberal implementation)?
- Can you detect any message/s about working class?
- Can you detect any of following language uses, which are used to strengthen the idea of the text?
- Is there any specific word which is frequently used or emphasized?
- Any other comment about of the text?

In this framework, the survey sheets filled by the volunteer group are assessed in the next chapter with the outputs of the textual analysis of the total data.

CHAPTER 4

TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COLUMNISTS

This chapter presents key findings of textual analyses on selected columnists G ng r Uras, Mehmet Barlas, Hasan Cemal, Abdurrahman Dilipak and Fehmi K ru in a detailed manner. Each subchapter provides conclusions of the textual analysis applied to the articles of the columnists including a general introduction, discursive selectivities, strategies and language uses observed in the texts.

4.1 Textual Analysis of G ng r Uras’s Columns

4.1.1 Introduction

In this study, G ng r Uras was selected as an economy writer who has been writing columns since the 1980s. Uras positioned and introduced himself as an economist and scientist who must “tell the truth” to the society.³²⁴ More importantly, G ng r Uras has made efforts to be “understood” by “the man in the street” and has become one of the most followed economy writer and columnists not only through print media but also on TV programmes.

In addition, Uras is also one of the remarkable examples of columnists who have direct organic bonds with spokesmen of the capitalist class in Turkey. G ng r Uras, as mentioned before, acted as General Secretary of TUSIAD for 7 years. He also worked for one of the national banks, AKBANK. In this sense, CDA on Uras has provided important findings for understanding the making of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey from a perspective of a liberal academic/economist. The following

³²⁴ G ng r Uras, “Memur maaslari ve enflasyon”, *Sabah*, 15.07.1993.

textual analysis of Uras's columns, which covers 48 texts among 67 shortlisted articles, reveals that Uras has shown an explicit positive bias towards neo-liberalism starting from the 1980 Coup d'état and the January 24 decisions. Throughout the 1980s, Uras advocated the virtue of free market, the importance of private sector, foreign capital and liberalization. It can be also suggested that Uras's efforts to recontextualize neo-liberal discourse in Turkey shows a rough parallelism with changes in global neo-liberal order in the post-1980 era. Although his columns reflected a clear "Friedmanist - free market conservative" approach during the 1980s, his discourse has gone through a change in line with "neo-liberal structuralist" and "neo-liberal regulationist" approaches in the 1990s and 2000s.

As analysed below, Uras has been also one of the rare columnists who closely followed neo-liberal agenda in the rest of the world in the post 1980 era. Although privatisation did not emerge as a discursive selectivity of print media until 1990, Uras was one of pioneer columnists emphasizing the virtue of privatisation policies in the 1980s. Utilization of statistical data to provide grounds for argumentations and apparent effort of using a "language" which can be seen as "closer" to everyday concerns of readers can be noted as distinctive features of texts of Uras.

"Intertextuality" through making references and direct quotations from speeches and statements of NGOs representing capitalist class such as TUSIAD, Chambers of Commerce and YASED were also one of the distinctive characteristics of Uras's genre. Moreover, in the 1980s and 1990s, his columns were characterized by the attempts of discrediting working class struggles and legitimizing adverse impacts of economy policies in practice. Uras's discursive selectivity on those elements was also articulated with introducing and glorifying a new lifestyle and consumerism.

4.1.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies

Critical analysis of columns of Uras reveals six themes on which his discursive selectivities and strategies have been intensified:

- Advocacy of free market economy, liberalization, privatisation and glorification of consumerism
- Depiction of globalisation as an irreversible, inevitable and incontestable “change”
- Discrediting of class struggle and leftist views
- Utilization of IMF as an anchor
- Personalization of political debates by highlighting leaders
- Economic and political stability and achievements narratives

Advocacy of free market economy-liberalization-privatisation and the glorification of consumerism are frequently seen in Uras’s texts. The “need” of reconfiguring the Turkish economy, glorification of free market economy, liberalization and privatisation were nodal points of Uras’s articles particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. His support towards Turkey’s transition to neo-liberalism can be traced back to the January 24 decisions and the 1980 Coup d’état. In his column introducing the Government Programme of Özal in 1983, he underlined that the programme would be better implemented under “peaceful climate provided by Turkish Armed Forces.”³²⁵ Güngör Uras also explicitly emphasized that there would be no hinders before the decisive implementation of the government programme and stated that “Özal will implement this programme. Moreover, he will implement it without any obstacle.”³²⁶

³²⁵ Güngör Uras, “Özal’ın şansı”, *Dünya*, 10.11.1983.

³²⁶ Güngör Uras, “Hükümet Programı”, *Dünya*, 20.12.1983.

In his column “*Believing in Private Sector and Free Market Economy*” dated 1985, although military regime was ended, Uras again emphasized “respect and trust of Turkish people to the Army”.³²⁷ Moreover, he explained that steps taken by Özal were irreversible and could be seen as a continuation of free market approach embraced by Democrat Party. For Uras, Özal opened “a road of no return” and free market economy was an unchangeable “habit” of Turkey.³²⁸ Özal was also praised by Uras due to his close relations with international economic organizations.

In this sense, domestic liberalization and Turkey’s opening to foreign capital were among the frequently used themes of Uras’s articles. On the occasion of the adoption of “Law on Promotion of Foreign Capital” in 1984, Uras stressed that this law would eliminate “ongoing concerns of foreign entrepreneurs” and “reflects the liberal philosophy of the government on foreign capital.”³²⁹ Uras also quoted a briefing of YASED to provide detailed content and benefits of the Law in the same column.³³⁰

For Uras, those who opposed liberalization were living “in a world of dream”.³³¹ Promoting the opening of the mining sector to private sector, in his column dated 1985, Uras argued that everybody loves his country, but this should not cause him to be blind to realities.³³² According to him, this reality -inevitability of the change- was urging Turkey to reconsider the role of the state in the economy. In his article

³²⁷ Güngör Uras, “Özel sektöre ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine inanmak”, *Dünya*, 17.01.1985.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ Güngör Uras, “Özel sektöre ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine inanmak”, *Dünya*, 17.01.1985.

³³⁰ Güngör Uras, “Yabancı sermaye”, *Dünya*, 10.04.1984.

³³¹ Güngör Uras, “Madenler özel sektöre açılmalıdır”, *Dünya*, 30.03.1985.

³³² *Ibid.*

dated 1990, the role of the state was defined in parallel to dominant neo-liberal agenda of “Friedmanist” free market approach;

In free market economy, the power which ensures the balance [in the economy] and determines the prices and tendencies is the power of market. In this system, the only responsibility of the state officials is to remove obstacles which hinder the free functioning of market forces³³³

In 1990, Uras wrote a very “informative” column which summarized all important steps taken by Özal in the economic realm. The nodal points of the mentioned column were Özal’s efforts to meet expectations of the private sector in terms of liberalization and to limit “extreme” demands of workers:

What did Özal do between 1980 and today? He was there during January 24 Decisions. Then, he was in the first government of 12 September. And in 1983, he became to power as a one party. Here is a list of Turgut Özal’s actions in the economic arena: ... Between 1980 and 1990 Mr. Özal did many things in the name of solving complaints repeated by the private sector before 1980.³³⁴

Moreover, he made efforts to sympathize “private sector” and its ‘contributions’ in the economic governance, particularly their representation by TUSIAD. This pattern showed a continuity for all studied period from 1980 to 2000s. For instance, in one of his columns, he noted that Özal successfully solved the problems which were constantly raised by the private sector in the pre-1980 era. Even more, he stated that Özal realized “all” demands which were on the list of the private sector.³³⁵ That is why, for Uras, it was very natural that private sector had a

³³³ Güngör Uras, “Ekonomideki değişim devlet adamı tipini de değiştirdi”, *Sabah*, 29.07.1990.

³³⁴ Güngör Uras, “Özal, 1980 yılından bugüne neler yaptı?”, *Sabah*, 24.01.1990.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

sympathy and support for Özal since he was so respectful to the right of private property and was believing in free market economy.³³⁶

Even though privatisation policies were not introduced in Turkey until the 1990s, Uras was one of the pioneers in the Turkish print media who followed privatisation practices in the West. His columns in the 1980s were included arguments about the “dominant view” in the West as state enterprises should be managed with private sector principles and professionals instead of public-paid bureaucrats.³³⁷

As mentioned before, neo-liberal transformation of Turkey was not only limited to deregulation or liberalization policies, but it also aimed to change the consuming behaviours of the people. This study identifies clear patterns of glorification of consumerism in Uras’s columns. Uras introduced and glorified a new luxury lifestyle, “brands”, the opening of shopping malls and promises of capitalism to young people. For instance, as one of the first big shopping malls of Istanbul, Galleria occupied a whole column of Uras in 1988. In his column, “*To Galleria*”, Uras explained his experiences with his family visit to Galleria and how magnificent the Galleria project was. He described Galleria as a “world class” great work of art.³³⁸

According to Uras, Galleria, unprecedented project in Turkey, was a product of “only but only” one person “Hüseyin Bayraktar”.³³⁹ Although Uras underlined employment opportunities created by Galleria, the construction and functioning of a large shopping mall was depicted as a success and architect of only a “capitalist”

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ Güngör Uras, “Helal Olsun”, *Dünya*, 30.05.1986.

³³⁸ Güngör Uras, “Galleria'ya”, *Sabah*, 11.12.1988.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

investor. In a sense, labour force behind a work of art ignored by Uras and reduced to the capital factor on it.³⁴⁰

In his column namely “*Nations are Becoming Capitalist, Communists-Socialists are Losing*”, he defined consumption as an opportunity provided by the capitalism, which was seen “more realistic” by young generations than the promises of socialism.³⁴¹ For Uras, young generations had already started to taste “bourgeoisie” gusto and liked it.³⁴² In this context, the introduction and praising of an emerging generation called “Yuppies”, who were described as young executives of capitalism by Uras, was one of the striking themes in his articles.³⁴³ In another column, he introduced new generation “young urban professional’s -yuppie’s” in America and their European versions so-called (Euroyuppies).³⁴⁴ Uras identified three characteristics of those young professionals as “helping implementation of a ‘capitalism without border’, an adulterated individualism and an increasing right-wing worldview.”³⁴⁵ Uras described consuming patterns of the Yuppies with an implicit positive bias:

Yuppies were wearing English Burberry coats and Church shoes or American Nike sneakers and La Coste-Polo shirts with Rö len watches. They preferred small sports type cars like Fiat Uno, Peugeot 205 or Wolkswagen Golf. Mercedes 190E was a new goal for them. They would spend their holidays in Greek islands or in Africa. But India is becoming popular today. American and British yuppies like sports and attended

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ Güngör Uras, “Milletler kapitalist oluyor komünistler-sosyalistler kaybediyor”, *Dünya*, 23.06.1983.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ Güngör Uras, “Euroyuppies”, *Dünya*, 6.5.1985.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

fitness clubs. French yuppies on the other hand, engaged in “sitting down for intellectual masturbation” and criticizing everything as a sport.³⁴⁶

For Uras, although new banks, export companies, advertising firms and entertainment industry contributed in the emergence of many Yuppies in Turkey, “unfortunately”, the Turkish economy could not provide widespread opportunities for further increasing of their numbers.³⁴⁷

Globalisation as an irreversible, inevitable and incontestable “change”: It can be argued that neo-liberal discourse in Turkey has become mostly articulated with the concepts of “globalisation”, “new world order” and “the change” particularly following the collapse of Soviet Bloc. In this sense, neo-liberal economy policies were also presented as inevitable and incontestable changes by Uras. In his column, “*Those who resist the change*”, he criticized opponents of the change of Turkey and warned the reader about consequences of this resistance.³⁴⁸ Uras’s warnings towards Turkish people included an implicit “threat” that the world has turned to be a new place where Turkey was not allowed to do what it wanted even in its own borders. By his own words, Uras stated that:

The world is constantly changing... Change brings development and riches... Turkish people are watching this external change and development with “a drooling mouth and envy”. But it is resisting change. Resisting passively... Today there is a fact that those that resist cannot realize. The world is not the old world. No one will forget Turkey in the corner saying “Let them do whatever they want inside their borders.... The age of “We can do whatever we want inside the Misak-ı Milli borders, no one can intervene...” is over. There is a “new order” and “common values” in the

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ Güngör Uras, “Değişime direnenler”, *Sabah*, 1.4.1994.

world now... Turkey will have to conform to this new order and respect the common values. If we cannot change, they will force us to change.³⁴⁹

Interestingly, the exact above-mentioned text was re-published under a new title as “*Who will end the resistance of the society to the change?*” in 1995 in another newspaper.³⁵⁰ In this column, Uras argued that “desires of change” of young generations and those who migrated from rural to cities “lighted a fire” which was caught by Turgut Özal.³⁵¹ In a sense, Uras implied that neo-liberal transformation was not imposed to the society but it was rather a consequence of the demands of society.³⁵²

Discrediting of working class struggle and leftist views: As is widely accepted, by the mid-1980s, structural adjustment of Turkey through the January 24 decisions caused crucial impacts on the working classes. However, it can be argued that the mainstream print media showed a political parallelism with strategic selectivities of the state to legitimize neo-liberal policies. This study identifies two key argumentations that Uras used for discrediting class struggle and convincing the suffering masses of the necessity of neo-liberal policies.

Firstly, neo-liberal policies were introduced as policies which would show their positive impacts not immediately but in the long run. Uras frequently used this argument and exemplified it from other countries’ cases. For instance, in his column namely, “*What does Thatcher want to do?*” in 1983, Uras argued that “today’s people” prefer economic order which were safe and stable in the long run – by which Uras implied the neo-liberal economic order- instead of temporary and

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ Güngör Uras, “Toplumun değişime direncini kim kıracak?”, *Sabah*, 25 Eylül 1995.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² *Ibid.*

deceiving welfare.³⁵³ In this regard, Uras emphasized that Thatcher was implementing policies to reach that goal without any concessions.³⁵⁴ In another column, he pointed out that the transformation process of Turkey may have caused some negative impacts in the short-term but eventually future would be better. Uras stated that:

Turkey is in a (process of) change. It is obvious that this change has created some problems in terms of income distribution and social structure. Everything is not good. However, there is something good. Turkish people can choose the good among all problems. The good thing is the belief towards democratic, liberal parliamentary regime and belief towards free market economy. Today, nobody discusses freedom of entrepreneurship and sacredness of private property. Today, nobody can sign the songs of expropriation. Those are sources of belief and trust that Turkey will reach a better future.³⁵⁵

Secondly, the coverage of news regarding class struggle included a high tone of degradation. In this sense, language uses and word selection for identifying class struggle and trade union practices reflected a clear negative meaning in Uras's articles. For instance, "the storm of strikes", "terrifying figures", "(strikes) are very bad things for the country whatever their reasons are", "disastrous situation of pre-1979 period" and "companies under strike pressure" can be shown as some examples of this "negative" meaning making on working class struggle.³⁵⁶

Moreover, Uras frequently used statistical data to show adverse effects of workers strikes on the economy and developed a discourse of "figures" without any human

³⁵³ Güngör Uras, "Thatcher ne yapmak istiyor?", *Rapor*, 16.06.1983.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ Güngör Uras, "Özel sektöre ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine inanmak", *Dünya*, 17.01.1985.

³⁵⁶ Güngör Uras, "Grev", *Dünya*, 20.04.1991.

element. For instance:

The 793 thousand people that have the power to effect economy via strike are not even 1 in 57 of Turkish population. It constitutes 1.4% of the population. However, the 10.576 businesses that are under the pressure of a strike produce 80% of goods and services in Turkey.³⁵⁷

Uras also criticized “ill temper” behaviours and statements of trade union representatives and workers.³⁵⁸ For him, although it was understandable to ask for a raise in wages, it was not acceptable to develop an anti-IMF discourse.³⁵⁹ Moreover, trade unions were defined as “mills which are grinding subscriptions”.³⁶⁰

On the other hand, some of Uras’s columns on the class struggle included the utilization or direct quotations of arguments developed by spokespersons of the capitalist class. However, it was a clear pattern that Uras preferred to reflect those ideas within a “passive voice”, as it can be exemplified in the following example in which he was mentioning successful performances of Özal:

He put a limit on the severance pay which the large businesses continuously complained about, saying that “There is nothing else to do but hand over the keys to the factory to the workers”. He simplified the order of law agreements which is asserted to hinder production in the industry.³⁶¹

Another striking point of Uras’s coverage of class struggle was the depiction of working classes in the West as they were in a “compromise” with the capitalism. Uras argued that the Iron Lady (Thatcher) did not use its “iron punch” on working

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ Güngör Uras, “İşçi-isveren ilişkileri”, *Dünya*, 25.09.1995.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ Güngör Uras, “Özal, 1980 yılından bugüne neler yaptı?”, *Sabah*, 24.01.1990.

classes but they rather embraced and learned rules of “free market” thanks to the privatisation programme and rising incomes.³⁶²

Utilization of IMF as an anchor: The political parallelism of the mainstream media has not been limited with coverage of news on neo-liberal policies in a positive bias but also columnists have played a significant role in developing arguments and making efforts to convince the masses on the benefits of those policies. The critical discourse analysis applied on Uras reveals his efforts to rationalize IMF programmes as “scientific and wise”³⁶³ and to depict International Money Fund (IMF) “as a friend of Turkey”³⁶⁴. On the other hand, some changes are seen in justifications used by Uras regarding IMF’s supervision in the studied period. While during the first years of 1980s IMF-guided programmes were presented as “authentic” programme of Özal which was argued to reflect his experiences, belief and ideals³⁶⁵, by the mid of 1990s, economic administration of Turkey was described as a weak structure which needed a “IMF stick”, “slap” and “beating” by IMF.³⁶⁶

In this regard, in the early 1980s, in some instances, Uras warned his journalist colleagues not to emphasize pressures of IMF on the government. For instance, in his column dated 1983, he criticized Mehmet Ali Birand who made an interview with IMF Washington representatives before the composition of the new government following the election of 6 November 1983. He underlined that Washington office of the IMF made a timing mistake by proposing Özal certain

³⁶² Güngör Uras, “Sendikalar”, *Dünya*, 6.08.1997.

³⁶³ Güngör Uras, “IMF para yetiştiremiyor”, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 2.6.1998.

³⁶⁴ Güngör Uras, “IMF iyilik mi istiyor kötülük mü?”, *Dünya*, 23.11.1983.

³⁶⁵ Güngör Uras, “Hükümet Programı”, *Dünya*, 20.12.1983.

³⁶⁶ Güngör Uras, “IMF para yetiştiremiyor”, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 2.6.1998.

recipes before the announcement of the Government Programme while Özal's commitments on economy policies were already so obvious. He noted that recommendations of IMF published in Birand's interview were measures which were already going to be implemented by Özal without any hesitation and Özal himself was "carrying the banner of" those policies since January 24 decisions.³⁶⁷ The point raised by Uras here is the adverse impacts of such policy recommendations on domestic politics since those recipes could be regarded as an "external imposition" to the government and could cause the emergence of critiques towards Özal as "blind obedience" of the IMF.³⁶⁸

However, coming to 1990s, Uras's support towards the IMF programmes became clearer and comfortable. It can be argued that changing ownership relations in the Print media in the 1990s and hegemony crisis due to constantly changing coalition governments increased relative autonomy of the mainstream media vis-à-vis the political parties. This textual study shows that columnists critiques on economic administration of the government clearer and more severe by the mid-1990s. In this regard, the reasons behind economy crisis in 1994 was grounded on inefficient and insufficient implementation of "scientific and wise recipe" of the IMF. In his column, "*It will be useless to beat the chests in the future, implementations of today will shape the future*"³⁶⁹, he noted that:

How can Turkey or another country enter an economic crisis? I will explain this to my dear readers backwards. You know about the thing being called the IMF prescription, when in fact it is the "Smart Prescription/Prescription of Science". See what is written in this prescription: (1) Limit public spending. Decrease the budget deficit. (2)

³⁶⁷ Güngör Uras, "IMF iyilik mi istiyor kötülük mü?", *Dünya*, 23.11.1983.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁹ Güngör Uras, "İleride dövünmek işe yaramaz bugünün uygulamaları geleceği belirleyecek", *Sabah*, 7.12.1996.

Retirement fund and Social Security Institution will not overspend. (3) Banks and equity houses shall be strengthened. (4) Farming will not be supported financially. (5) The Market shall be let free, interest and exchange rates shall follow the market without protective measures. (6) Privatization shall be completed as soon as possible.³⁷⁰

On the other hand, as an economy writer, Uras frequently used “Ayse Hanım Teyze” a traditional addressing to “ordinary old ladies” in street in Turkey which can be translated as “Auntie Ms. Ayşe” in his columns. He constructed dialogues between himself and “man and woman in the street” as in the case of “Auntie Ms. Ayşe” to change their views on economy and convince them benefits of IMF policies;

Auntie Ms. Ayşe resisted.” “- what if the IMF opens the taps of foreign credit? Will I use foreign credit? “Please try to see Auntie Ms. Ayşe” I said, “Don’t say you don’t care about the credit... It will affect you a lot... Look, you can’t sell your house, the grandkid can’t get a job, you can’t handle the kitchen expenses. When the taps of foreign credit open, the Treasury will get into less debt, interest rates will plummet, but with-it inflation will decrease as well. With inflation in check businesses will thrive. The son-in-law will be able to do business. There will be a buyer for your house. The grandkid will get a job.”³⁷¹

Ironically, coming to 2006, Uras assessed impacts of the IMF policies after ten years of the above-mentioned column. In a sense, he made an evaluation of the “future” he mentioned years ago. This can be seen marked as a new phase of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey in which adverse impacts of the IMF policies were admitted but also taken granted. Uras confessed that economy is no longer related with the production but finance capital which is dominated by the foreigners:

Turkish economy is not based on production but the market. The ropes of the market, however, is in foreign hands... the government lost its power to direct the economy after the application of “High Interest Rate, Cheap Foreign Currency” in the scope of the IMF supported economic stability program. This is what is happening in Turkish economy. Today the economy is not based on production. It is based on the market. The

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁷¹ Güngör Uras, “IMF Ayşe Hanım Teyzeme Çok Şey Yazar”, *Milliyet*, 11.6 1999.

government doesn't care about production not growing healthily. It is afraid of the market. Because the destiny of the government is connected to the market as much as the economy. The ropes of market, on the other hand, is in foreign hands.³⁷²

Personalization of political debate by highlighting leaders: As a general pattern in the mainstream media, particularly during the single-party governments, the Motherland Party governments in the 1980s and JDP governments in 1990s, political-economic debates were largely presented based on the speeches, positions, personal insights of political leaders instead of reflecting positions of parties, class struggle or public opinion. Uras seemed to follow same pattern in his columns for Özal and Erdoğan.

In his columns portraying Özal, the most frequently used keyword was “success”. There were also notable expressions used by Uras for Özal such as “fascinating”, “admiring”, “well done -helal olsun” “unrivaled and without alternatives”, “capable of governing”. In one of his early columns, “The Fortune of Özal”, Uras praised Özal’s experiences and expertise in economy, “his multi-dimensional perspective on economic problems”, his close relations with international economic organizations and finance groups which were “admiring” him.³⁷³ In another column, he underlined the structural changes Özal had started:

In the face of Özal’s “governmenting ability” there is only one thing to say: ...(helal olsun) good job.”...”Turgut Özal, (by leading his party) has made very important changes to the establishment in Turkey in accordance with his personal beliefs. These changes are “structural changes.”³⁷⁴

Uras also frequently made long lists of “successful implementations” of Özal in his

³⁷² Güngör Uras, “Ekonominin Kaderini Yabancılar Belirliyor”, *Milliyet*, 10.2.2006.

³⁷³ Güngör Uras, “Özal'in Şansı”, *Dünya*, 10.11.1983

³⁷⁴ Güngör Uras, “Helal Olsun”, *Dünya*, 30.05.1986.

columns by using performative verbs with “positive meanings” such as “(he) created opportunity”, “made a brave move”, “realized the dreams of businessmen”, “solve the problems”.³⁷⁵

Economic and Political Stability and Achievements Narratives on the JDP: After a decade of coalition governments in the 1990s, during the 2000s, election victories of JDP were largely supported by political campaigns which stressed the importance of political-economic stability for the country and ‘achievements’ of the party. It can be argued that this argument has also been supported by the columnists in the mainstream media. Even in the first days of 2002 general election, Uras stated “optimistic winds” in the market due to the result of the election. Interestingly, Uras highlighted that “big capital groups immediately gathered around the JDP” and public opinion was “starving” for such a development.³⁷⁶ Uras further stated that:

The wind of optimism that covered the market a week after AKP taking majority of votes showed how the country was waiting for a boost of “moral”. AKP did no work during this week. But the market was revived. Domestic circles of big capital gathered around AKP... These did not happen by themselves. The people, public opinion and business circles were “hungry” for a development of this kind but by seeing this hunger AKP gave successful messages.³⁷⁷

In a similar manner, only fifteen days before general elections of 22 July 2007, Uras wrote a column with the title of “the JDP is selling its achievements well”.³⁷⁸ He explained that he was curious about to what extent the JDP fulfilled its promises and called the office of Akif Beki, speaker of Prime Minister, to have information.

³⁷⁵ Güngör Uras, “Özal, 1980 yılından bugüne neler yaptı?”, *Sabah*, 24.01.1990.

³⁷⁶ Güngör Uras, “AKP Morali”, *Milliyet*, 11.11.2002.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸ Güngör Uras, “AKP icraatını iyi satıyor”, *Milliyet*, 7.07.2007.

Uras underlined that “a day after his call”, he found an election brochure on his table and was writing this column to say “well done” to producers of this booklet.³⁷⁹ Moreover, he stated that he was influenced under the “bombardment of propaganda” presented by the booklet and listed a number of “achievements” in his column as well.³⁸⁰ Going beyond a praise of the propaganda means of the JDP, it is a striking point that a column in a mainstream newspaper was reserved for directly quoting election brochure of a political party. To illustrate, Uras stated that:

I’m writing this piece to say “well done” to those that prepared this brochure. A propaganda brochure that sells AKP’s performance very well has been prepared. This kind of brochure can only be prepared by a professional team that knows what they are doing... We supplied 1.2 million families with free coal. We distributed a total of 4.3 million tons of coal, with at least 500 kg per family. We sent 330 million YTL to the poor during festivals. We served 70 thousand people hot food from 78 soup kitchens daily. We shortened military service duration by 3 months. We constructed 6.6 thousand kilometres of divided roads. We constructed 29 organized industry zones and 48 small industry zones.³⁸¹

In his article “*The way of being happy is being a supporter of JDP (Or happy people are becoming the supporter of the JDP)*”, Uras noted that this was not his saying but the result of a survey made by a research institute.³⁸² Uras shared results of the research conducted by Bahçeşehir University. The column constituted a very good example of interpreting statistical data with a bias attitude. Although survey results showed that only 37 of 100 Turkish voters and 44 of 100 the JDP voters happy,

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² Güngör Uras, “Mutlu olmanın yolu AKP’li olmak (...Veya mutlular AKP’li oluyor)”, *Milliyet*, 13.02.2008.

Uras did not mention or discuss the majority of unhappy voters but instead selectively reflected the JDP voters as “happy” than the total average.³⁸³

“62 of every 100 people are happy and 75 of every 100 are hopeful” was another column in which Uras used statistical data to support JDP government.³⁸⁴ Based on a survey made by TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institution), Uras argued that Turkish people are happy since they were benefiting from health and social aid policies of JDP government and the JDP has successfully grasped this reality.³⁸⁵ One of the most striking points of this column was the advocacy of increasing state expenditures on social policies as well as on wages of public servants and workers. Contrary to his neo-liberal Friedmanist approach in the 1980s and 1990s, in the post-2008 global crisis era, Uras seemed to change his views on expansionary fiscal policies:

The majority of people benefiting from health and welfare policies do not languish over problems of life and the apply and support the government. AKP took advantage of this truth. This is why AKP is focusing on health and social services. And it is being successful in defining and applying these policies.³⁸⁶

On the other hand, positive bias towards the JDP was not limited by the praise of “achievements” of the JDP but it also included a clear negation towards the opposition parties. In his column, “*It is beneficial to look the (state) budget to understand the JDP’s voting rate*”, Uras again stressed that public services are key for people’s choices and the JDP ‘cleverly’ understood this reality.³⁸⁷ Despite

³⁸³ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁴ Güngör Uras, “Her 100 kişinin 62’si mutlu 75’i umutlu”, *Milliyet*, 12.03.2012.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁷ Güngör Uras, “AKP’nin oyunu anlamak için bütçeye bakmakta yarar var”, *Milliyet*, 6.12.2007.

“limited opportunities of the state budget”, for Uras, the JDP “made expenditures which were making low income groups happy”.³⁸⁸ In this sense, the notion of “social aid” emerged as one of key nodal points of supportive texts on JDP governments. Although Uras admitted that the JDP partisans were quarrelling but also knew how to provide services to the people, opposition parties were just debating but cannot produce any projects or suggestions.³⁸⁹

Uras also emphasized the harmony between the big bourgeois in Turkey and the JDP on several columns. On the occasion of 41. General Assembly of TUSIAD, Uras wrote two columns on the same day, one published in *Dünya* and one in *Milliyet*, namely “*TÜSIAD meeting: a meeting which is sweeter than honey*”³⁹⁰ and “*TÜSIAD affiliates look like happy and hopeful*”³⁹¹. Uras emphasized the mutual understanding and harmony between Erdoğan and members of TUSIAD during the meeting. For Uras, both parties made efforts not to surface constraints. and nobody was expecting that the parties would be so “snuggled up” (*sarmaş dolaş*) and it became a meeting “sweeter than honey”.³⁹²

According to Uras, neither heads of TUSIAD nor Erdoğan used a invidious words to each other and Erdoğan was “applauded enthusiastically” by the audience.³⁹³ The text explicitly reflected the compromise of big bourgeois with the JDP and their

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁰ Güngör Uras, “TÜSIAD toplantısı ‘baldan tatlı’ bir toplantı oldu”, *Milliyet*, 22.01.2011.

³⁹¹ Güngör Uras, “TÜSIAD’cılar mutlu ve umutlu görünüyor”, *Dünya*, 21.01.2011.

³⁹² Güngör Uras, “TÜSIAD toplantısı ‘baldan tatlı’ bir toplantı oldu”, *Milliyet*, 22.01.2011.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

support to the party for the next election. By his words, Uras stated that:

Members of TÜSIAD are satisfied with the economy and the governments' policies. They wish for the continuation of this rule. They believe that AKP will stay in power after the election. If some of them had any requests or criticism they wished to air, they chose not to speak.³⁹⁴

4.1.3 Language use

An important aspect of the CDA is the examination of language uses including on narrative techniques, grammar and word selections. As mentioned in Chapter II, in this analysis, each text of the selected columnists was reviewed with a check list of language uses. The CDA on the selected essays of Güngör Uras shows that the author dominantly used some narrative techniques. The following table shows quantitative results of this analysis.




Figure 2: Language use in Güngör Uras

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

In this regard, the most frequently used narrative technique in Uras's text was "evidence". This refers to the utilization of quantitative data and information gathered from some reports, academic texts and statistical data. Uras frequently used statistical data as evidences of his arguments and argued that this is his responsibility as a "scientist".³⁹⁵ It is notable that, in a general sense, the use of statistical data in the neo-liberal era has systemically served the "dehumanization" of economic realm and concealing the impacts of economic factors on living conditions of the people. For instance, in one of his articles on strikes by the working classes, Uras preferred to make a comparison with the total number of workers on strike and the entire population. He criticized that 1.4% of the population "endangered" the production of businesses which covered 80% of goods and services in Turkey.³⁹⁶ Similarly, Uras defined "markets" as the most important actor of economy in his article "The markets are pleased with Gül".³⁹⁷

Secondly, in Uras' texts, advocacy of neo-liberal agenda and transformation is seen to be supported by a limited number of popular words and stereotypes which is analysed in detailed under the chapter on neo-liberal keywords. These words can be exemplified with the following phrases in Uras's articles; SOEs as black holes, the model of Arpalık, structural reform, Father State, being late in privatisation, successes and achievements of the JDP, neo-liberal recipe. Word games and metaphors also used by Uras to support his arguments. In particularly his essays on the IMF, Uras used metaphors such as the IMF stick and the IMF recipe. Similarly, SOEs were defined as black holes, arpalık model, hunchback, and cumbersome.

Finally, in Uras's texts the use of sarcasm is mostly seen regarding the class struggle and demands of the working class. Instead of making direct criticisms on class

³⁹⁵ Uras states that "Fakat bir iktisatçı olarak da, 1,5 milyon memurun maasına yapılan zammın Türk ekonomisine, memurlar disındaki 58,5 mil-yon Türk insanına getirdiği yükün büyüklüğünü anlatmak durumundayım", Güngör Uras, Memur maaşları ve enflasyon, *Sabah*, 15.07.1993

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁷ Güngör Uras, "Piyasalar Gül'den memnun", *Dünya*, 25 April 2007.

actions, Uras preferred to use a sarcastic language. Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that the author used direct and long quotations from the speeches of the representatives of capitalist classes, political leaders and reports prepared by these segments. For instance, he used long texts from Özal governments' programmes, YASED and TUSIAD reports and speeches and even from the JDP Election Campaign Brochures.

4.2 Textual Analysis of Mehmet Barlas's Columns

4.2.1 Introduction

Mehmet Barlas can be marked as one of the key figures of the Turkish print media who has vehemently supported neo-liberal transformation of Turkey from the very beginning of the process. As analysed below, the positive bias of Mehmet Barlas can be traced back to the 1980 Coup d'état and January 24 decisions since Barlas praised both developments going beyond a purported support.³⁹⁸ On the second anniversary of the decisions, the title of Barlas's column in *Sabah* was "The Festival of January 24/24 Ocak Bayramı" under which he identified January 24 decisions as an anniversary of undisputable success.³⁹⁹ Barlas used this metaphor of "Bayram" in this article to compare 24 January decision with national days of Republic such as 23 April, 19 May and 29 October as well as 12 March and 12 September.

Moreover, his direct and personal relations with political leaders and businessmen can be seen as one of the first examples of the new generation of columnists in the 1980 era. In this sense, it can be argued that as a typical example of organic intellectual of neo-liberal transformation of Turkey, Barlas took a part role in building connections among political leadership of Özal, media owners and businessmen. Throughout the analysed period of 1980-2010, Barlas demonstrates

³⁹⁸ See Mehmet Barlas, "24 Ocak Bayramı", *Sabah*, 24.01.1982, Mehmet Barlas, "Birinci yıl", *Sabah*, 12.09.1981, Mehmet Barlas, "Evren'in sözleri", *Sabah*, 20.06.1983.

³⁹⁹ Mehmet Barlas, "24 Ocak Bayramı", *Sabah*, 24.01.1982

an explicit political parallelism with changing governments. However, limited cases of criticism towards the political parties were mostly based on “delays” in the implementation of neo-liberal agenda which particularly became evident in the period of coalition governments of 1990s. Barlas's support the JDP governments and its neo-liberal agenda was also explicit.

Among 100 short-listed columns of Barlas, a CDA was applied to 41 selected articles. overall assessment of Barlas's articles which cover the years 1980-2010 reveals an explicit positive bias towards neo-liberalism. Qualitative and quantitative results of assessments of core group of researchers indicates similar results. As analysed in detail below, discursive selectivities, genre and strategies used by Barlas shows a clear conformity with strategic selectivities of the state in Turkey during the process of deregulation in Turkey. In this sense, glorification of the free market economy, liberalization, privatisation, globalisation and consumerism were some key nodal points of Barlas's texts. The textual analysis of Mehmet Barlas's columns also reveals that certain themes, arguments and patterns have been repeatedly used in his articles to advocate the implementation of neo-liberal economy policies.

4.2.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies

Discursive selectivities and strategies identified in Barlas's articles can be grouped in six main themes. Each discursive selectivity and strategy can be also seen to be articulated with other certain narratives, repeated keywords and patterns of argumentation. In this context, CDA on Barlas reached the following results:

- Advocacy of free market economy-liberalization and glorification of the capital /foreign capital and consumerism,
- Depiction of globalization as an irreversible and inevitable positive “change”,
- Advocacy of privatization and degradation of state's involvement in economy as

well as leftist and nationalist views,

- Efforts to adapt to new challenges and circumstances caused by economic crises,
- Personalization of politics through highlighting political leaders
- Legitimization of illegal actions and law violations of the governments

Advocacy of the free market economy-liberalization and glorification of the capital /foreign capital and consumerism: have been one of the nodal points of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey and it was also at the very centre of Barlas's argumentations. Free market economy was presented by Barlas as a way of eliminating hinders set by the national state on the creativity and potential success of the people.⁴⁰⁰ "State" was depicted as a threat towards all benefits of capitalism and as an inefficient agent. For Barlas, the world became a "sparkly" place and people are only expecting security and less intervention from the state.⁴⁰¹ To exemplify, in his column namely *"Foreign capital is an indispensable resource"*, he mentioned an anecdote from the Ottoman Empire period to show how traditional views about the expectations from and the understanding of the "state" in Turkey are mistaken:

In an instruction which came from the Sultan in Istanbul to governor of Baghdad there was the order "urgently package and send to the capital 100 thousand tons of tea". When the governor received this order he sent this reply to the palace: The message your worship has sent to the Chinese Emperor has accidentally been received by your subject the governor of Baghdad. Yours sincerely. Sometimes expectations of the people from the state are above what the Sultan expects from the governor of Baghdad. Maybe a reason for this is the centuries old knowledge that is implanted in the memory of society about what the "state" is.⁴⁰²

In addition to that, this column provides crucial examples of the articulation of free

⁴⁰⁰ Mehmet Barlas, "Büyük kentte yaşamak ayrıcalığı", *Sabah*, 17.04.2010.

⁴⁰¹ Mehmet Barlas, "Ne olacaksa olacak bu memleketin hali!..", *Sabah*, 04.01.1997.

⁴⁰² Mehmet Barlas, "Yabancı sermaye vazgeçilmez bir kaynaktır", *Sabah*, 10.08.2006.

market economy narratives with glorification of capital/foreign capital in Turkey. In conformity with strategic selectivities of the state in the post-1980 era, the creation of favourable conditions for private sector and capital/foreign capital was one of the key selectivities in Barlas's discourse. The arguments were particularly based on efficiency, rationality and the vital importance of private sector and the capital for economic development.

In this sense, “capital” and “foreign capital” were frequently praised and depicted as the driving forces of wealth and economic growth. Barlas identified foreign capital as an “indispensable resource” for which Turkey should ensure ‘stability’ and remove bureaucratic hinders.⁴⁰³ For instance, he quoted to a statement of Charles Sanford, President of Bankers Trust Company, where Sanford defined private sector as ‘the best machine creating welfare based on personal interests and individual satisfaction’.⁴⁰⁴ Barlas also highlighted that those who want to contribute the society at most can undertake missions in finance sector and support the rise of welfare.⁴⁰⁵

Foreign capital was also encoded as the remedy of economic problems in Turkey. Barlas noted that “if we want to increase welfare, employment and provide better public services”, foreign sector should not be a subject of “ideological and obsessive” debates.⁴⁰⁶ For Barlas, since it was impossible to pause “the change”, the only rational choice was the fulfilment of requirements of “modernization” and re-structuring the state.⁴⁰⁷ In other words, it was impossible to go back or stop the

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁷ Mehmet Barlas, “Geriye dönmek imkansız o zaman reformları yapalım”, *Sabah*, 3.06.1994.

change, one should obey “universal rules of reason”.⁴⁰⁸

This pattern of qualifying neo-liberal policies as the only “rational way of doing” or “modernization” was also accompanied with humiliation with, even insulting to, opponents of the process as “morons” or “idiots”. In many instances, opponents of free market and capitalism were labelled as irrational morons. As it is analysed detailed below, this offensive discourse towards opponents of neo-liberal policies became more apparent during the periods of privatisation debates.

‘A new world order’ is being established. Because everything and all concepts has changed. The train can be missed. We say, ok, we again continue to fight each other for ridiculous things. Idiots again provoke the agenda... but those who are clearheaded shall not miss the main agenda. Otherwise, Turkey can miss the train.⁴⁰⁹

Another argument used to advocate the free market economy was its so-called “correcting” characteristics. For Barlas, dynamics of free market can fix the problems not only in the field of economy but also politics. From this perspective, free market was described by Barlas as a must for well-functioning of the economy and also a “shock absorber” for political crisis.⁴¹⁰

Barlas’s advocacy of the capital and foreign capital was not limited to their involvement in the economy. He also tried to legitimize increasing wealth and consuming patterns of the capitalist classes. In fact, consumption was depicted as a way of “modernization” which would benefit all of the society. Therefore, one of the frequently highlighted themes in Barlas's articles was the glorification of consumption, luxury lifestyle and import-oriented goods selection. First of all,

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁹ Mehmet Barlas, “Farkında mıyız? Yeni bir dünya düzeni kuruluyor!..”, *Sabah*, 18.02.1997.

⁴¹⁰ Mehmet Barlas, “Serbest pazar sayesinde siyasi krizlerimiz kolayca fonlanıyor”, *Sabah*, 10.07.2008.

consumption was introduced as a sign of welfare, civilization and modernization. This nodal discourse was also based on the argument that increases in consumption and wealth of upper classes of the society would be beneficial for everyone. For instance, in one of his columns, he explained his journey to London. He described the city as a metropole “which was composed of markets, malls and shopping centres” and defined “privilege of living in a metropole” with increasing opportunities of “consumption”.⁴¹¹ For Barlas, the only goal of finance capital was to create demand in the market and the state (in this case the UK) was also aware of the importance of consumption.⁴¹² By his words, Barlas stated that:

Contemporary criterion of the civilization is consumption. Markets, stores and showcases are giving the selection culture to modern human for selecting tools and equipment that will facilitate their lives. The only goal of the industry, technology and finance-capital is to create demands to those products on the showcases. The state also knows when those goods are not sold, it cannot collect tax.⁴¹³

In the next paraFigure, Barlas criticized ongoing debates in Turkey on democracy and the Constitution with a sarcasm on Turkish politicians and bureaucrats using the adjectives of “famous Turkish politicians” and “great bureaucrats” and how they were “ignorant” about these developments in the world.⁴¹⁴ Moreover, in the same sentence, he included Turkish intellectuals to his critique and defined them as “elite Turkish intellectuals who fight with each other since Tanzimat reform era”. For Barlas, political and intellectual elites in Turkey were far away to understand the importance of consumption and developments in the world. As another example, in his column “*To Be a Country Where Money is Both Earned and Spent*”, he

⁴¹¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Büyük kentte yaşamak ayrıcalığı”, *Sabah*, 14.01.1994.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*

explained how wealthy families in Turkey went abroad for new year holiday and they generally preferred skiing centres in Switzerland.⁴¹⁵ He also referred experiences of his own friends in Switzerland and how they adored the quality of services and excellence. His main argumentation here was the significance of wealth and rich people for the growth of a country. He argued that because of “enemies of the wealth” in the country, rich people were spending their money abroad. He argued that:

If in your country, the voice of morons, enemies of wealth are louder, then the money earned will be spent in remote places...Rational countries protect the rich and successful people and profitable firms are praised by the society. ... One yacht, one private plane, one villa, one painting collection will provide income and employment to numerous sectors...Rational countries do not rush up hostility towards wealth and consumption... Now, we should not leave the floor to a handful of fools.⁴¹⁶

In the same column, he referred Turgut Özal and how his policies and thoughts opened new opportunities for Turkish people. Thanks to these policies, for Barlas, rich people can now buy private planes and yachts. Additionally, in his definition of “rational countries”, press and public opinion were asked to follow “the same rational line” to cover these issues.

As a result, Barlas’s discourse on consumption was built on two grounds. Firstly, he frequently praised “wisdom” of the market and defined the increasing consumption of even only some segments of the society as the benefit of all. And second, he made deliberate efforts to use the concept of consumption as equivalent to modernization, civilization and growth.

Depiction of globalization as an irreversible and inevitable positive “change”: In parallel to the evolution of global neo-liberal discourse, neo-liberal discourse in

⁴¹⁵ Mehmet Barlas, “Hem para kazanılan hem de harcanılan ülke olmak”, *Sabah*, 6.01.1994.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Turkey has articulated with the “globalization” concept from particularly the onset of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc was followed by a narrative of the end of the history which was articulated with the ultimate victory of open market economy and inevitable changes for all nations in the world.

In this context, in Barlas’s articles, ‘globalization’ was used to legitimize implementation of neo-liberal policies which were presented as inevitable and irreversible. The words “new world order” and “the change” were highlighted in his columns during the 1990s. CDA applied to Mehmet Barlas's selected articles shows, both in qualitative and quantitative results, that the notions of ‘change’, ‘new world’, ‘new’ were frequently used for defining, qualifying and glorifying neo-liberal policies.

In fact, Barlas’s definition of “new world order” and “globalization” included key discursive elements of global neo-liberal order of discourse. In his column “*Are we aware? A new world is being built..*”, he mentioned democracy and free market economy as rising values of the new world where knowledge and capital can circulate without borders.⁴¹⁷ The new world was described as a universal market. According to Barlas, the world faced with a “multi-dimensional new world” where all institutions including the army and the judiciary should be globalized.⁴¹⁸ For Barlas, all segments of politics including conservative parties had suffered the difficulty of achieving a “transition to a liberal discourse”.⁴¹⁹ If a foreigner was asked to assess crises in Turkey, Barlas argued, he would reply that you could not adapt to “the change” and still think that you could solve problems with old

⁴¹⁷ Mehmet Barlas, “Farkında mıyız? Yeni bir dünya düzeni kuruluyor!..”, *Sabah*, 18.02.1997.

⁴¹⁸ Mehmet Barlas, “Ordu da, yargı da globalleşmek zorunda”, *Sabah*, 4.01.1994.

⁴¹⁹ Mehmet Barlas, “Geriye dönmek imkansız o zaman reformları yapalım”, *Sabah*, 3.06.1994.

concepts and tools.⁴²⁰

On the other hand, in some of his columns, the nodal concepts of “globalization/change/new world order” were accompanied with threatening the reader by exemplifying sequels of nations who resisted “the change”. In a sense, the neo-liberal transformation was identified as a compulsory and inevitable “change”, while any resistance to this “change” was repeatedly degraded and the readers were explicitly warned that Turkey would be punished if “it resists the “change””. In this regard, Barlas stated that:

Local powers (for example Iraq and Yugoslavia) who deemed themselves superior and who opposed change were punished by international circles... We saw the collapse and dissolution of superpowers (Like the Soviets) who could not adapt to ‘change’.⁴²¹ Similarly, Barlas’s used the metaphors of “missing the train” and “missing a historical opportunity” arguments. As he noted in his column, “*If we miss the globalization, we will be a farmhand nation (İrgat Ulus)*”, a number of crucial problems should be solved to adapt to the globalization.⁴²² Interestingly, “integration-articulation of Welfare Party to the system”.⁴²³ Furthermore, “rule of law” and “democracy” were conceptualized as guarantees of the property rights and free competition. For Barlas, Turkish capital learned the sacred place of property rights and free competition in the regimes based on rule of law.⁴²⁴

Advocacy of privatization and degradation of state’s involvement in the economy as well as leftist and nationalist views: It can be argued that privatisation has been one of the most problematic issues for neo-liberal implementations in Turkey. Due

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴²¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Yeniden Yapılanma Her Alanda Şarttır”, *Yeni Şafak*, 2.02.2001.

⁴²² Mehmet Barlas, “Globalleşmeyi ıskalarsak ırgat ulus oluruz!”, *Sabah*, 1205.2005.

⁴²³ Mehmet Barlas, “Geriye dönmek imkansız o zaman reformları yapalım”, *Sabah*, 307.1994.

⁴²⁴ Mehmet Barlas, “Sermaye burjuva olmasa da eskisinden daha bilinçli...”, *Sabah*, 22.11.2006.

to some judicial decisions and political disputes, large-scale state enterprises could not be effectively privatised during the 1990s. This is why, from the mid-1990s, privatisation has turned out to be major discursive selectivity for print media's coverage of neo-liberal policies. Similarly, debates on privatisation was at the hotspot for columnists like Barlas.

In a general sense, the advocacy of privatisation in Barlas turned to be a way of “defying” the state. Privatisation policies was based on the anti-statist arguments and narratives on the “losses of the country” due to the delays in the process. Barlas's texts included stereotypes of neo-liberal keywords in Turkey such as the use of SOEs as they were “Arpalık”, which is a term used for “allowances of Ottoman officials” a way of the benefice.⁴²⁵ The notion of “Arpalık Model” turned to be one of the keywords of the print media to discredit SOEs from the mid-1990s. In this regard, as a general pattern in the mainstream print media, the depiction of the state's inefficient economic role was frequently articulated with implementations from the Ottoman Empire which has negative meaning and implications in the Turkish language. Another notable argumentation ground was the inflationist effect of SOEs and Statism.⁴²⁶

On 23 July 1994, on his column in Sabah, Barlas harshly criticized the decision made by Supreme Court about privatisation with a high tone of sarcasm and irritation under the title of “*Can you make privatisation in such a beautiful country?*”⁴²⁷ The key grounds of the text were based on “economic inefficiency of SOEs”, “how Turkish political parties were far away to understand the need of

⁴²⁵ See Mehmet Barlas, “Balıklar da Bazen denizi anlamayabilir”, *Sabah*, 24.01.1994., Mehmet Barlas “Ordu da, yargı da globalleşmek zorunda”, *Sabah*, 4.01.1994.

⁴²⁶ Mehmet Barlas “Ordu da, yargı da globalleşmek zorunda”, *Sabah*, 4.01.1994.

⁴²⁷ Mehmet Barlas, “Bu güzel vatanda özelleştirme yapılırmı”, *Sabah*, 23.07.1994.

“change”” and “how anti-neo-liberal views were failed to grasp the reality”.⁴²⁸

The “language use” in the text, from beginning to the end, reflected an interdiscursive character. Barlas repeatedly distorted, misrepresented and caricatured anti- neo-liberal, leftist as well as nationalist discourse in Turkey. Barlas stated that:

So, did we, as Turkish nation, find SOEs in the street? Didn't we bring them from Central Asia and Altay? What is it written in Orhun monuments? Don't you dare to privatise SOEs. Don't engage with Chinese spies and open them to the foreign capital... There was neither bribe nor burglary in Turks in the past. Before this free market economy has been invented by Özal, Turkey was a pure clean country. Look at the dictionaries, the concepts like “burglary” and bribe has entered in Turkish after 1980.⁴²⁹

Barlas was also critical about the leaders of coalition governments during the 1990s as well as Bülent Ecevit. In fact, during the 1990s and by the beginning of the 2000s, print media's coverage of privatisation in general reflected the concerns about hegemony crisis in Turkey. Coming to 2000, Barlas again complained about Turkey's failure in the realization of privatisation policies. The political leaders were accused of being ignorant of the necessity of change and preparing country to the future, and as long as they failed to so, some people would overrun the routine and the law:

We could not just privatise SOEs, in no way. If we were able to private “T” of PTT in the beginning of the 1990s (with its current name TELEKOM), with the money we had, there would be no “internal debt” problem of Turkey. Same barriers were set in the 1980s when Özal liberalized foreign trade and making TL convertible. Politician should, by foreseeing the days beyond today, prepare the state and society for tomorrow. If you do not make necessary reforms by catching the resonant

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*

of the change, some people pass over both the law and the routine.⁴³⁰

In Barlas's column titled "*Historical values should be preserved. TUPRAS is Turkish and will remain Turkish*", he used the term of "Kökten-devletçilik" which can be translated as "fundamentalist-etatism" or "fanatic-etatism" to describe the anti-privatisation views.⁴³¹ Moreover, judiciary decisions were accused of causing economic losses for the country and distorting the economic balance:

If privatisation is disturbing both our laws and public opinion so much, let us expropriate everything. Consequences of the suspension of the execution decision of Administrative Court on TUPRAS privatisation are obvious. Didn't the administrative court adopt a similar decision to return Demirbank to its previous owners, which was sold to the British and renamed as HSBC? We have a fundamentalist-etatism in our genes. It is so obvious.⁴³²

In the same column, he developed a sarcastic argument to discredit and humiliate anti-privatisation views and decision of the Court on TUPRAS privatisation by using recently marketed traditional Turkish delicatessen "cacık" cucumber-yoghurt. He proposed to expropriate "cacık" as a "historical, strategic, and cultural asset" so that judiciary would have this kind of "more important tasks" to deal with in the future.⁴³³ He implicitly condemned the Court for causing a 1.3 Billion Dollar loss due to TUPRAS privatisation decision.⁴³⁴

Major discussions on privatisation were intensified around the resolutions of courts/supreme court and delays resulting from coalition governments during the 1990s. In this context, Barlas has been a vigorous supporter of the privatisation policies in Turkey since the 1990s. As some examples presented, particularly during

⁴³⁰ Mehmet Barlas, "Sizin gerçek çapınızı, bütün insanlar biliyor!", *Sabah*, 17.02.2000.

⁴³¹ Mehmet Barlas, "Tarihi değerler korunmalıdır... TÜPRAŞ Türk'tür, Türk kalacaktır!", *Sabah*, 26.05.2004.

⁴³² *Ibid.*

⁴³³ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

the first years of the JDP governments in the 2000s, Barlas also made great efforts to discredit legitimacy of judicial decisions on privatisation as well as opponent views coming from the left and nationalist groups. In this sense, large scale privatisations during the JDP governments such as TUPRAS and TELEKOM was especially at his focus. It can be argued that language use in developing such arguments was sarcastic even humiliating.

Similarly, in his column dated 7 July 2005 “*It sickens to start alphabet every day again*”, he degraded oppositional views on privatisation as “socio-politic masochism” and “behavioural disorder”.⁴³⁵ For him, delaying the implementation of privatisation policies left the country behind the developments of the world. Barlas articulated anti-privatisation views with previous debates in Özal period such as the construction of highways and Strait bridge as well as the start of private TV broadcasting in Turkey. The striking point is that mentioned events were also subjects of legal disputes and created constitutional debates in Turkey as a part of privatisation and to discredit and humiliate economic etatist views.

In addition, CDA on Barlas’s articles shows that presentation of debates on the “state” was based on dichotomies of positive and negative concepts and their confrontation such as new vs. old, reformers vs. status quo, wasters of public sources vs. rational liberals, outdated-irrational, ignorant statist vs. modernization. These dichotomies were also frequently used to develop argumentations about views in public opinion in two lines, and negated statist views as old, local, sloganist, obsessive and ignorant:

There are two Turkeys...One is the “speaking Turkey”, the other one is “chatterer Turkey”. One section of the same Turkey accustomed to see the State as a source of “employment”, “office”, “cheap credit” and “wealth”. They believe that money, reputation and power can only be provided through the hands of the state. The other section of the same Turkey is expecting only justice, security and stability from the state. This section only says, “stand out of my sunlight”. These two Turkeys are separated by

⁴³⁵ Mehmet Barlas, “Her gün alfabeye yeniden başlamak bıktırıyor”, *Sabah*, 07.07.2005.

neither “right-left ideologies” nor “secular-follower of seria” and “peasantry-urbanity” differences. But the main reagent is “statism”. Sub-criteria of this reagent are the contradictions arising from the concepts of “old-new”, “local-global”, “information-ignorance”, “free mind-obsession” and “vision-slogan”.⁴³⁶

In another column “*It is impossible to go back... let’s do the reforms now!*”, he assessed the 1970s elections and choices of voters. He noted that in the pre-1980 era electors voted for “peasantry, protectionism and statism”.⁴³⁷ The results were obviously terrible for Turkey that governments wasted resources of the state with subventions.⁴³⁸ The humiliation towards “peasantry” here was a crucial point since it was defined as an old/past and inefficient economic area which did not reserve support from the state.

On the other hand, during the initial years of the first JDP government when privatisation implementations were accelerated, Barlas wrote a column which could be seen as a confession of rent-seeking behaviour in privatisation practices. Barlas expressed his expectations from the JDP government that it would not “exceed the bounds of creating policy rent” in implementing privatisation. It can be argued that this expression implicitly naturalized and legitimized rent-seeking attempts:

We saw both benefits and adverse side effects of privatization in Turkey. Both creators and victims of these adverse side effects are among us. While the AK Party government is stepping hard on the gas pedal of privatization, it can be heard that some of them are saying “Let us have some of the riches”. But experience proves the disgrace that this mentality will bring to the political staff. In this sense, we hope that AK Party won’t go too far on the creation of political rent-seeking.⁴³⁹

Efforts to adapt new challenges and circumstances caused by economic crises: economic and political stability narratives: The periods of crisis in Turkey,

⁴³⁶ Mehmet Barlas, “21’inci yüzyıl, “Türk asrı” olacaktır!..”, *Sabah*, 22.01.1997.

⁴³⁷ Mehmet Barlas, “Geriye dönmek imkansız o zaman reformları yapalım”, *Sabah*, 3.06.1994.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁹ Mehmet Barlas, “Özelleştirmenin kötü yan sonuçları olabilir”, *Sabah*, 15.8.2005.

particularly the hegemonic crisis during the 1990s, the 2001 crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis required adaptation of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey to new challenges. It can be argued that the 2001 Banking Crisis was a milestone for Turkish political economy which was followed by the “Transition to the Strong Economy Programme”. This programme was also implemented by JDP governments.

As examples provided below, an overall assessment of Barlas’s discourse revealed that the hegemony crisis of the 1990s resulted in emergence of an “economic and political stability” concept as a keyword for legitimizing neo-liberal economy policies in the 2000s. This concept was used to remind of public opinion “dangers of coalition governments” and turned to be one of the key propaganda means of the JDP all through the 2000s. Barlas praised the “performance” of the JDP governments:

Growing Turkey, do you see the numbers that emphasize the results of the governments 7.5-year long activities? AK Party is still strong due to its strong activities. “Turkey is rising like the sun” “Turkey needs to find solutions to its problems that are turning into crises, and leaving these problems behind, it needs to enter a new development and civilizing period. For this purpose, there is the necessity of a re-structuralization ahead of us.” We will succeed in this re-structuralization either way. There is no alternative.⁴⁴⁰

Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, there were certain strategies in Barlas’s articles which aimed to resist the challenges of crises. In fact, it should be said that Barlas’s responses to the Global Financial Crisis were not consistent. Critical analysis of Barlas's selected articles found out some repeated arguments which were dedicated to resist and adapt to new challenges and circumstances of crises of capitalism. However, those arguments showed a confusion and considerable

⁴⁴⁰ Mehmet Barlas, “AK Parti'nin hâlâ güçlü olması icraatından kaynaklanıyor”, *Sabah*, 19 June.

changes in time. For instance, Barlas had criticized the saving plans of the US Government and stressed that everything should be left to the market functioning in the early periods of the crisis.⁴⁴¹ And it would only take one or two years for global economy to recover.⁴⁴² According to him, the global crisis was not a phenomenon that “earthlings” faced the first time and even the most pessimistic commentators were arguing that world economy would turn to its previous tendencies.⁴⁴³ However, in one of his previous columns, Barlas stated that even more support could be necessary for saving certain corporations in the US, by saying “May God help Obama”. According to Barlas, “a restructuring is a must in every area” and if “the prodigy of creative capitalism is not turned out by the statism, tomorrow will be definitely will be better than today”.⁴⁴⁴

In a general sense, Barlas used three arguments in his columns to explain the 2008 Global Crisis. First and foremost, for Barlas, the “crisis” happens due to insufficient and inefficient implementation of neo-liberalism. Barlas wrote a column with a detailed analysis for the crisis from his point of view:

The most surprising result of this last global economical crisis is the understanding that the brands most deemed steady and strong are actually bankrupt...1- The crisis happened because the most basic rules of capitalism were not followed...2- It is a crisis of inability to manage. In other words, the external interventions on economy turned lame the main foundation of capitalism which is liberality and finally the system collapsed. 3- there should not have been any rescue operations. Like in 1929, these operations will only postpone the crisis to a future date. THOSE WHO SINK SHALL SINK, THOSE THAT REMAIN WILL SURVIVE. Otherwise the mechanism of reward will be damaged. It is against the essence of the system. 4- In capitalism MANAGEMENT is

⁴⁴¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Kurtarmalar kapitalist ekonomiyi şirazesinden çıkartıyor”, *Sabah*, 14.02.2009.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴⁴³ Mehmet Barlas, “Bizde ekonomik krizler geçici siyasi krizler ise kalıcıdır”, *Sabah*, 12.12.2008.

⁴⁴⁴ Mehmet Barlas, “Ekonomik kriz zenginleri de bankaları da vurur...”, *Sabah*, 28.01.2009.

done by the market. The market is the boss. Each intervention creates a paradox. The opposite CREATES SUPPLY THAT CANNOT BE CONSUMED. This is called the REVERSE PYRAMID EFFECT in economy and it is toppled with only a nudge.⁴⁴⁵ (highlights by Barlas)

Secondly, by Barlas, the crisis was depicted as an ‘opportunity’ since new global rules and measures would solve the problems and further develop international economy.⁴⁴⁶ Barlas also stated that we should not blame all the structure of the banking system or global finance because of the crisis but we must make a re-assessment since all the system could gain a healthier functioning with new reforms and rules adopted in global scale.⁴⁴⁷ By his words;

We all know that “Crisis” also means “Opportunity.” “Crises create opportunities to think again, detect and correct mistakes and look to the future with optimism” “For example while we are living through the shock of global economic crisis, it is not possible to accuse the banking system or the global financial structure and ignore it.” “as seen in many countries some think-tanks are considering the crisis an opportunity and making an assessment of the situation, re-evaluate their past experiences, determine the mistakes and correcting them” “With new global rules, these will become more healthy businesses.” Didn’t our export rise above a hundred billion dollars with the capabilities of global finance? Due to the crisis neither banking nor international capital movement will end..⁴⁴⁸

And thirdly, Barlas tried to attract the attention of the reader on the losses of businessmen by giving examples of figures of their losses due to the financial crisis and invited the reader to understand that the rich lost more than the ordinary citizen. For instance, in one of his columns, he sympathized loss of a businessman due the crisis, Barlas stated that "a businessman has ordered a private jet by paying 22

⁴⁴⁵ Mehmet Barlas, “Kurtarmalar kapitalist ekonomiyi şirazesinden çıkartıyor”, *Sabah*, 14.02.2009.

⁴⁴⁶ Mehmet (2008) “Krizlerimizi kronik hastalık gibi sürekli hale getirmeyelim”, *Sabah*, 10.10.2008.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

million dollars. The price of the plane decreased to 17 million dollars during its delivery. It can hardly be sold in the second-hand market for max. 15 million dollars.⁴⁴⁹

Personalization of political debates by highlighting leaders: There are two strategies used by Barlas while covering issues regarding political power-holders in Turkey. First is the personalization of politics which includes reduction of political debate to statements, actions and decisions of political leaders and exclusion and degradation of actions, statements and arguments raised by trade unions, left-wing parties and working class. And Secondly, the legitimization of illegal actions of the governments through discrediting current legal requirements and introducing them as hinders before development.

To start with, personalization of politics has been one of the important characteristics of Barlas's discourse. Starting from "Özal" governments, Barlas' articles frequently praised political leaders particularly Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and their families. He also wrote about his own close relations with politicians and did not hesitate to reflect his close relations with businessmen, media bosses or political leaders to his columns. In fact, these relations were implicitly presented as a privilege. Barlas was one of the prominent columnist “fans” of Özal. As understood from Barlas’s books and other writings, he had very close relationship with Özal as a journalist. Barlas wrote many columns to support and flatter Özal on many occasions. By Barlas, Özal was defined as a milestone of the “change” of the country and one who brought the concepts of “vision”, “mission” and “execution” in Turkey. Barlas states that:

Turgut Özal was the milestone of “Change” in politics. With Turgut Özal concepts of “Mission”, “Vision” and “Activity” (İcraat) entered into our vocabulary. “It is told that when asked a question, politicians of the old

⁴⁴⁹ Mehmet Barlas, “Ekonomik kriz zenginleri de bankaları da vurur...”, *Sabah*, 28.01.2009.

would take out the constitution from their pocket and look at it. However, when asked a question Özal would take out his calculator from his pocket.
450

Moreover, Özal was described as a politician who was influential in international arena as well. For instance, Barlas his dinner with Özal family. He particularly mentioned the telephone call from the US president George Bush during the dinner, how sincerely Özal and Bush talked each other and how Özal was effective on Bush.⁴⁵¹ Barlas also argued that Özal embraced a “Japan model lifestyle” by thinking globally but living locally.

Legitimization of illegal actions and law violations of the governments: Neo-liberal transformation of Turkey has left substantial impacts on social, economic and political domains in Turkey. However, above all, this transformation required a change in the Constitution and the legal framework to ensure a restructuring in state’s involvement in the economy, to regulate labour-capital relations and to open the Turkish economy to the global economy. When the state faced the challenges of changing mode of regulation, either repressive apparatuses or violations of law were used. As an example of a repressive state apparatus in the Althusserian sense, 1980 Coup d’état was one of the initial steps of neo-liberal transformation of Turkey. Turkish Military forces commanded by Kenan Evren took first steps of change which was followed by January 24 decisions. Mehmet Barlas who is now a vehement proponent of military coups has showed a full respect and support to 12 September Military regime including the personality of Kenan Evren.

The following quotation can be given as an explicit example of supportive attitude of Barlas. By his words;

From the highest-ranking officer to the lowliest private, our gratitude to Turkish Armed Forces is endless. They have once again proved that they deserve the traditional care shown to them by the people. Is there greater

⁴⁵⁰ Mehmet Barlas, “Turgut Özal “Değişim”in siyasetteki miladıydı”, *Sabah*, 17.04.2010.

⁴⁵¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Özal”, *Sabah*, 19.02.1991.

service to the state and the people” For this reason in this first anniversary of 12 September I would first like to express my gratitude. “Our greatest assurance is that the Turkish Armed Forces has accepted democracy as an irrevocable philosophy.”⁴⁵²

The characteristic of President Evren that made the masses love him is, like all of us, he grew in and was conditioned in the Turkish environment...Evren is aware of the extraordinary responsibility that he has undertaken...Our President’s identities of director and citizen, which balance each other, are noticeable in his public speeches...In politics, economics, and management, beginning from scratch with a new route is not easy.⁴⁵³

Moreover, Barlas made efforts to legitimize policies and actions of Özal which were contradicting with the Constitution and laws. For instance, in his column namely “Big Mistake of Özal” dated 1991, Barlas again used a sarcastic language and tried to show that how critiques on Özal’s violations of the Constitution were meaningless.

For Barlas, big mistake of Özal was not to disregard the Constitution but to tell the truth before everyone.⁴⁵⁴ Since Özal was an extraordinary statesman and responsible leader, he was intervening serious issues even if it was not direct responsibility. Özal as a foresighted statesman “grasped” that Turkish people could achieve many things if the hinder put by the state would be removed.⁴⁵⁵

4.2.3 Language Use

The CDA on Barlas’s texts also shows that certain narrative techniques were frequently used by the author. As seen in the following Figure, Barlas mostly used analogies, adages and idioms, popular words and stereotypes, western words, evidences and quotations to support his arguments. It can be suggested that his

⁴⁵² Mehmet Barlas, “Birinci yıl”, *Sabah*, 12.09.1981.

⁴⁵³ Mehmet Barlas, “Evren'in sözleri”, *Sabah*, 20.06.1983.

⁴⁵⁴ Mehmet Barlas, “Özal'ın büyük hatası”, *Sabah*, 9.01.1991.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

genre is based on a harsh “negation” towards opponents of neo-liberalism and the mentioned techniques are seen to be used in this negation approach.




Figure 3: Language use in Mehmet Barlas

For instance, he defined opponents of neo-liberalism as idiots, enemies of wealth, closed-minded and status quo supporter. Similarly, he humiliated representatives of working classes or leftist leaders. For instance, Barlas called Lenin as “sapı silik/drifter Lenin” and leaders of workers as weak minded.⁴⁵⁶

In compliance with the general conclusions of this analysis on the columnists, Barlas texts are lack of elements of investigative journalism and new ideas. Instead, it is observed that popular words, stereotypes and quotations are used to support the arguments.⁴⁵⁷ Barlas also preferred to write about his own experiences, lifestyle, consumption and implications when he praised neo-liberal transformation of the country. Advocacy of wealth and capital accumulation was mostly depicted as a

⁴⁵⁶ Mehmet Barlas, “1 Mayıs’ı böyle kutlamak sanki kaderimizde var...”, *Sabah*, 2.05.2009.

⁴⁵⁷ Following articles can be shown as examples: “Balıklar da Bazen denizi anlamayabilir”, “Globalleşmeyi ıskalarsak ırgat ulus oluruz!”, “Uygarlık yolunda hep engelli mi koşmalıyız”, “Bu güzel vatanda özelleştirme yapılır mı”, “Ne olacaksa olacak bu memleketin hali!..”, “Farkında mıyız?” “Yeni bir dünya düzeni kuruluyor!..”

necessity of westernization and modernization. Therefore, he frequently used western words in his narrations.

In a similar manner with Uras, Barlas used direct quotations from representatives of the capitalist class, political leaders and supporters of neo-liberalism, for instance from western experts' speeches and reports.⁴⁵⁸

Another noteworthy characteristic of Barlas texts is the use of sarcasm. As analysed in detailed in the above chapter, his two articles can be shown as examples of this narrative technique; "Historical values should be preserved... TUPRAS is Turkish and will remain Turkish" and "We will explain you if you haven't understood".⁴⁵⁹ In the first example, he rephrased a commonly used slogan of leftist-nationalist sections in Turkey "Turkey is secular and will remain secular". In this text, he also referred to historical monuments of Orkhon Inscriptions and argued that nationalists in Turkey treated SOEs as if they were historical assets.

4.3 Textual Analysis Hasan Cemal's Columns

4.3.1 Introduction

Hasan Cemal is one of the interesting columnists in Turkish Press History who has been writing columns as well as undertaking editorial tasks since the beginning of the 1980s. In the studied period of this research (1980-2010), Hasan Cemal wrote as a columnist in *Cumhuriyet*, *Sabah* and *Milliyet* and acted as editor-in-chief for *Cumhuriyet* (1981-1992) and *Sabah* (1992-1998). In the period of 1980-1992, as a columnist in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, he was mostly critical on neo-liberal policies and their implementation in Turkey. However, by the beginning of the 1990s, he turned out to be a vigorous advocate of neo-liberalism and its implementation in Turkey following his transfer to the mainstream media as a chief- editor In this

⁴⁵⁸ Mehmet Barlas, "Büyük kentte yaşamak ayrıcalığı", *Sabah*, 17.04.2010.

⁴⁵⁹ Mehmet Barlas, "Balıklar da Bazen denizi anlamayabilir", *Sabah*, 24.01.1994.

sense, critical analysis of Hasan Cemal's columns reveals remarkable results in terms of articulation of neo-liberal discourse into the texts of a columnist who arguably comes from a "leftist" background. Moreover, Cemal was supportive for the JDP particularly in its first and second governments in the 2000s. Although he turned to be more critical towards the JDP governments in the early 2010s in political terms, this did not include a prominent turning from his support to economy policies. He was only reviewing his attitude towards the state and emphasizing the need for state's involvement as a regulator in some economic areas. However, in the 2010s, Cemal had to quit his tasks in Milliyet due to a number of columns in which he contradicts with the political authorities. In this context, it can be argued that the milestones of Cemal's career as a journalist coincide with some crucial turning points of the transformation of print media in Turkey.

In general, one of the striking features of Hasan Cemal's coverage of neo-liberalism was his sharp turn from his "leftist" stance. By the mid-1990s, the most dramatic change in Hasan Cemal's views was observed in terms of his stance towards working classes. As some examples provided below, Hasan Cemal's emphasis on adverse impacts of neo-liberal policies on working classes, unjust income distribution and legal and practical pressures on class struggle were replaced with some discursive elements which depicted class demands as a "burden for the country". Working classes were invited to sacrifice for the sake of long-term stability and recovery of the economy. The major ground for legitimizing this shift in his discourse was the loss of "communism" and ultimate victory of the capitalism and market economy in global scale.

That is to say, globalisation and neo-liberal economy policies were presented by him as indispensable, inevitable and indisputable developments. In addition, Cemal used the IMF-Turkey relations as an anchor for legitimizing for the economy policies in practice. In most of his articles, he presented neo-liberal policies and the IMF "recipes" as to do lists for economic recovery. He also made an apparent

emphasis on privatisation policies and the need of contradictory fiscal policies.

4.3.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies

It can be argued that the career path of Hasan Cemal showed a close parallelism with the milestones of neo-liberal transformation in the print media in Turkey. In this regard, overall assessment of analysed 40 columns revealed seven main themes around which discursive selectivities and strategies were shaped.

- Critiques on unjust distribution of income and repression of the class struggle (1981-1992)
- Advocacy of free market economy and liberalization
- Depiction of globalization/change/new world order as unrivalled and irreversible process without alternatives
- Advocacy of privatisation and degradation of the state's involvement in the economy
- Utilization of the IMF as an anchor for neo-liberal transformation
- Discrediting of the class struggle and class demands
- Highlighting “the importance” of political and economic stability

Critiques on unjust distribution of income and repression of the class struggle (1981-1992): Hasan Cemal, as the chief editor of Cumhuriyet, showed an explicit negative bias towards policies and actions of 24 January decisions and their implementation of Özal governments. Cemal frequently covered adverse impacts of those policies on the working classes and criticized pressures on the wage. On 25.01.1984, in his column in Cumhuriyet, he criticized legal restrictions imposed on the activities of trade unions and the right of collective bargaining. He also underlined the increasing inequalities in income distribution. In these years, Cemal used opinions and reports of oppositional economists in his texts. For example,

benefiting from such an oppositional report, he defined the views, which advocated “rushing-up impact of wage increases on inflation”, as unreal “legends”.⁴⁶⁰

In another column, namely “A letter” dated 8 November 1987, he wrote a column addressing to the Turkish People. He criticized the adverse impacts of economy policies implemented by Özal. His main concern was the result of public opinion polls which showed the Motherland Party as the first party, he asked the reader “is it your real opinion or are you deceiving us?”⁴⁶¹ After listing policies and expected mark-ups by Özal government, he ridiculed Özal’s promise of “stepping into a new age” and warned the reader that if Özal government would come to the office again, they should be “opening new holes to their belts”.⁴⁶² In a sense, this article represented one of the explicit examples of Cemal’s negative bias towards contractionary fiscal policies which was promoted by the mainstream media by the need of “tightening the belts”.

Similarly, in his column titled “*Wage, Salary and Income Distribution*”, he summarised the difficulties that low income working classes faced with. He stated that economy policies of the last ten years had distorted income distribution in Turkey. He stated that:

Economy politics of the last decade have immensely disrupted income inequality. Real income of those who earn their keep by wages have been deliberately diminished. Funding of public education, health and social security has been reduced. This economic model has been Prime Minister Özal’s choice going back many years. I wonder, when will wage earners

⁴⁶⁰ Hasan Cemal, “Demokrasi olacaksa”, *Cumhuriyet*, 25.01.1984.

⁴⁶¹ Hasan Cemal, “Bir mektup”, *Cumhuriyet*, 8.11.1987.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*

be able to breathe in this country? When?⁴⁶³

In terms of workers' rights and class struggle, he also embraced a critical stance towards the Motherland Party governments and the 1981 Constitution. Cemal underlined that Turkey was still a second-class democracy and restrictions on trade unions and workers' rights could not be deemed in democratic regimes.⁴⁶⁴ He particularly criticized laws and regulations which banned trade unions to have political activities. Cemal defined trade union law as a "sword of Damocles" on workers. He further noted that:

Let's say that the government is depriving the working class of their rights and freedoms, bringing limitations to their labor agreement and strike rights, and by the economic models it is putting in effect increasing inflation and decreasing real wages. Faced with this, the workers are bound hand and foot. Because the legal situation prevents them from fighting with the governments in an organized way.⁴⁶⁵

In this regard, for the period of 1980-1992, word selection and language uses of Cemal showed a clear conformity with leftist "order of discourse". For instance, Hasan Cemal preferred to use the following expressions more than once to depict working class struggle; (*alinteri kavgası*) struggle for sweat blood, (*iktidar odakları*) power groups, (*Halk hareketi*) people's movement, considerable demands of workers, pages that are added to the history of labour, (*bıçak kemiğe dayandı*) it is not bearable anymore, nothing to lose but your chains, "are you ready to tighten your belt?", (*geçim sıkıntısının pençesinde kıvranan insanlar*) people in bad straits,

⁴⁶³ Hasan Cemal, "Ücret Maaş Gelir Dağılımı", *Cumhuriyet*, 16.06.1989

⁴⁶⁴ Hasan Cemal, "Türk-İş'in Tutumu", *Cumhuriyet*, 25.11.1987.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

(jilet gibi bir kesimin varsıllığı) wealth of social section thin as blade.⁴⁶⁶

Moreover, in 1990, Cemal identified neo-liberal economy policies “as a way of implementing the capitalism in its wildest manner without concession”.⁴⁶⁷ This expression clearly reflects a leftist discursive element with its reference to “wild capitalism”. Cemal, in his column on the resignation of Margaret Thatcher, criticized the way Iron Lady implemented economy policies, who can be seen as one of the architects of neo-liberalism in political realm. Although he did not use the term “neo-liberalism”, Cemal particularly underlined “social costs” of her policies such as minimizing the state, privatisation, reduction of health and social aid expenses and rasping trade unions activities.⁴⁶⁸ He concluded although he had no “sympathy” to Thatcher’s policies, he appreciated her decision to resign as an important indicator of her democracy culture.

Advocacy of free market economy and liberalization: In 1994, after two years of his resignation from Cumhuriyet, Hasan Cemal displayed a very sharp turn from his anti-neo-liberal discourse. Moreover, his advocacy of neo-liberal economy policies was fully-fledged and reflected key discursive elements of neo-liberal order of discourse of the early 1990s. In his column, “*Privatisation: You cannot reach anywhere without minimizing the state*”, for him, it was important to get rid of “SOEs Hunchback” and to cure “structural illnesses of the state” to make it more efficient. Cemal argued that although the state had positive impacts in terms of accumulation of capital and human resources once upon a time, it was economically

⁴⁶⁶ Hasan Cemal, “Büyük Yürüyüş ve Sayduğu”, *Cumhuriyet*, 5.05.1991.

⁴⁶⁷ Hasan Cemal, “Demir Leydi'nin Gidişi”, *Cumhuriyet*, 23.11.1990.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

“millstone around the neck”.⁴⁶⁹ In this sense, one of the highlighted themes of the text was immediate need of minimizing the state.

Although Cemal admitted that adverse economic conditions on working classes were the reality, for him, the history showed that increasing wages could not provide a solution. Moreover, for him working classes must behave more responsibly and consider long-term well-being of economy when they demand an increase in their wages.⁴⁷⁰ Cemal also used the phrase of “the sea has run out/ended” which was commonly used by the print media to refer end of the resources of the state. In this regard, Cemal noted that “Sad but true. It is a fact which should be understood by public servants, workers and trade unions of the state. The sea has run out.”⁴⁷¹

Furthermore, Cemal seemed to “swiftly” adapt to the dominant neo-liberal discourse and showed a considerable creativity to use the Turkish language to develop keywords and idioms for his neo-liberal argumentations. He used a made-up word: “labour-phil” *emekseverlik* to discredit oppositional views on privatisation. Cemal noted that preventing privatisation has nothing to do with labour-phil or protecting working class. In the abovementioned article, Cemal also frequently used stereotypes of the print media which were dominant in the 1990s such as “making two ends of the state meet”, “SOEs Hunchback”, “banknote publishing house”, “the sea has run out”.⁴⁷²

In his column “*Those, whose minds are not confused, don’t read this text*”, he tried

⁴⁶⁹ Hasan Cemal, “Özelleştirme: Devleti ekonomide küçültmeden bir yere varılamaz”, *Milliyet*, 23.06.1994.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

to make a self-critique of his leftist past but it was, in fact, an “epitaph” for the revolutionist-leftist worldviews. With reference to his discussions with students from the Middle East Technical University during a panel, he described his leftist years as times when he was not reading and but just speaking with “slogans”. In other words, this self-criticizing was based on reducing his leftist worldviews to repeated recitations and clichés that he gained without any knowledge and reading. He described those years as “the years I enslaved my brain to slogans”.⁴⁷³ Moreover, he seemed to be quite determined that there is no alternative to the market economy and the competition is the driving force of the century. By his words, Cemal stated that;

Then I repeated: In economics and politics there is no alternative to open competition, or in other terms market economy and democracy. In this century, the driving force of humanity and civilisation has been competition. But of course, competition was no magic wand. To decrease inequality and injustice, supervision is as important as freedom. In this regard, it is also important to form supra-national institutions that will eliminate the negativities of globalisation.⁴⁷⁴

In another article, “*We should hold the future in our hands*” he reflected his impressions from 2000 Davos meeting. In general, Hasan Cemal was one of the consistent followers of Davos Summit in the Turkish media.⁴⁷⁵ He argued that during Clinton administration the US economy reared up and this was the manifestation of the “new economy”.⁴⁷⁶ For Cemal, the US’ economic model proved its supremacy over Japan and German models. In this sense, Cemal’s suggestions for Turkey was to reach “liberal open market economy, democracy,

⁴⁷³ Hasan Cemal, “Kafası karışık olmayan bu yazıyı okumasın”, *Milliyet*, 26.12.1999.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁵ Hasan Cemal, Geleceği avucumuzun içine almalıyız”, *Milliyet*, 2.02.2000.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

human rights and rule of law”. He noted that Turkey’s destination was on the right track and in conformity with the globalization.⁴⁷⁷

Depiction of globalization/change/new world order as unrivalled and irreversible process without alternative: Similar to Barlas’s and Uras’s discursive selectivities, the change/new world order and globalization concepts constituted key grounds for legitimizing neo-liberal economic implementations in Cemal’s texts. In fact, those concepts were also used by Cemal to justify his “turn” from leftist worldview. Cemal did only not accept “the ultimate victory” of the capitalism, but he also emphasized that free market economy has proved its unrivalled supremacy.

For instance, in his column “*Don’t let the information age to be missed, catch-up the history!*” in which he reported from Davos Summit 1999, he explained how Russian Prime Minister Primakov, a former communist and former Chief of Russia’s Intelligence Unit KGB, enjoyed with Russian Vodka and caviar and sang songs cheerfully in Davos.⁴⁷⁸ Cemal argued that what made Primakov signing songs in Davos was “the power of change”?⁴⁷⁹ Cemal described participants of Davos as “most powerful, richest and most vigilant people of the world” whose main messages were “the change”, as if they wanted to say “there is no food to unchanged in this world”⁴⁸⁰

On the other hand, Cemal, in his column titled “*Are we richer than France and Germany?*”, Cemal explained developments in France regarding social security reform and country-wide strikes supported by public servants in transport and

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁸ Hasan Cemal, “Bilgi çağı kaçmasın, tarihi yakalayalım!”, *Milliyet*, 2.02.1999.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

communications sector as well as students and teachers all over the country.⁴⁸¹ Although Cemal retained to explicitly express his views on conflicts in France, he implicitly reflected his views by giving Germany example. Cemal underlined that Germany came over such problems because trade unions understood the “importance of competition” and voluntarily relinquish from their demands.⁴⁸² For Cemal, the western world was witnessing wars in the arena of politics due to “budget deficits” and the welfare state was taking a major blow. For Cemal, in other words, impacts of “extreme demands” on the economy which expected everything from the state were eliminated.⁴⁸³

It can be argued that Cemal’s opinions on the free market economy have evolved in parallel with the tendencies in global economy and changing dominant discourses on neo-liberalism. While Cemal identified the state as a “millstone around the neck” and a resource of “corruption, bribery and distorted politics” in 1994, coming to 1999, he complained about approaches which regarded free market economy as “irregularity”. and underlined the need for a “structural reform”.⁴⁸⁴ As he noted in his column during the Davos Summit or “World Economic Summit” in 1999, the market economy was “unrivalled” but it required to be reformed to struggle with poverty.⁴⁸⁵

Advocacy of privatisation and degradation of the state's involvement in the economy: Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, privatisation was one of the major concerns of Cemal in terms of economy policies. Main arguments were the state’s

⁴⁸¹ Hasan Cemal, “Fransa'yla Almanya'dan daha mı zenginiz”, *Sabah*, 7.12.1995.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁴ Hasan Cemal, “İflas eşiğine gelmeden olmuyor”, *Milliyet*, 22.06.2002.

⁴⁸⁵ Hasan Cemal, “Bilgi çağı kaçmasın, tarihi yakalayalım!”, *Milliyet*, 2.02.1999.

inefficient involvement in the economy and “burden” of SOEs for the economy and Turkish people. Cemal identified a direct conditionality between privatisation and the combat against poverty and injustice, as he noted that without saving the state from the hunchback of SOEs, it was impossible to get rid of the poverty.⁴⁸⁶ For Cemal, privatisation was a “vital struggle” and the prerequisite for economic recovery.⁴⁸⁷

During Çiller Prime Ministry, in his column on 23.01.1999, Cemal criticized coalition government for not giving confidence in economy administration. Cemal also suggested a list measures for economy survival in bold characters; as closing loss-making SOEs, realizing a widespread privatisation policy, minimizing state in economy, industry and banking, increasing taxes, fulfilling market economy requirements in agriculture, reforming social security and local governments and implementing a performance-based wage system.⁴⁸⁸

In his column, “*Turning from the edge of an abyss*”, another repeated argument for advocating privatisation was the costs of being late in economic terms. ‘Nationalism’ or critiques on privatisation from a viewpoint of worker’s rights were also discredited by Cemal.⁴⁸⁹ He argued that by the realization of privatisation in banking sector, corruption would end, Turkey would be saved from a hunchback and this would mean the end of populism. By his words, Cemal stated that:

Privatisation... Starting with Telekom, privatisation needs to be triggered from now on. There is no patience remaining with running late in this subject. The bill of running late is very high: 6 billion dollars! Surely ‘Nationalism’ isn’t allowing 6 billion dollars to run away from this

⁴⁸⁶ Hasan Cdemal, “Hesap Kitap”, *Milliyet*, 4.06.2005.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁸ Hasan Cemal, “Ekonomide iyimser beklentiler yükselirken”, *Milliyet*, 23.12.1999.

⁴⁸⁹ Hasan Cemal, “Bir uçurumun kenarından dönerken”, *Milliyet*, 6.12.2000.

country.⁴⁹⁰

To squash the head of the snake of corruption... First re-structuralization and then privatisation of Ziraat Bank, Halk Bank and Emlak Bank is envisioned. This is a matter of life and death. Because, on one hand corruption and bribery will be dealt a blow, on the other hand one of the humps on the Turkish economy's back will be gone. The meaning of all these is clear: an end to populist politics! The economy going back on track will at the same time be a development that will eradicate inflation and high cost of living. By this means, the economy will be growing stable. And this means food and work.⁴⁹¹

Utilization of the IMF as an anchor for neo-liberal transformation: It can be argued that columnists, particularly those employed in the mainstream media, contributed in building a discourse in the print media to support political power's engagement with the IMF policies, programmes and agreements. In most cases, columnists preferred to legitimize neo-liberal policies by the need of an "the IMF stick" on Turkey, which were presented as acknowledged by many other countries.

In a similar manner with G ng r Uras, Hasan Cemal frequently used the need of "the IMF stick" on economy administration of the country from the mid-1990s and 2000s. Cemal's utilization of the IMF anchor based on two arguments. First of all, he used an explicit negation on being late to implement the IMF guided policies. For him, belated implementation of structural reforms pulled Turkey to the edge of bankruptcy and abyss.⁴⁹²

Secondly, he tried to legitimize contractionary fiscal policies, or as he formulated "bitter recipe of the IMF", privatisation, social security reform etc. by presenting

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹¹ Hasan Cemal, "Yolsuzluk yılanının başını ezmek için", *Milliyet*, 27.06.2001.

⁴⁹² Hasan Cemal, "Başkente ekonomi kulisi", *Sabah*, 16.06.1994.

them measures necessary for the long-term recovery of Turkish economy.

In 1994, during the Coalition government headed by Tansu Çiller, Hasan Cemal appreciated the “Intention letter” given by the government to the IMF and underlined how the content of the letter was vital and indispensable. For Cemal, it was a dream to recover economy without budget balance which was key for putting the two ends of the state.⁴⁹³ He argued that the “intention letter” reflected the framework of this approach but there were several key areas which required continuous attention and political determination. In this regard, in line with the general tendency in Cemal’s discursive selectivities on neo-liberal policies in the mid-1990s increases in wages of public servants, subsidies in agriculture and privatisation were highlighted as issues which should be in close watch of the government.⁴⁹⁴ In the meantime, Cemal preferred to use two negative adjectives “retarding” and “slowing down” for defining the attitude of coalition partner SHP on privatisation.⁴⁹⁵

The metaphor of “bringing two ends of the state” was frequently used by Cemal to justify contractionary fiscal policies and increases in taxes. This justification was also linked with the struggle with the inflation. In this regard, the need of ensuring a “harmonization” between the economy administration and the IMF was underlined by Cemal on several occasions.⁴⁹⁶ In his column, “*Hard days/times are waiting for Turkey, but..*” Cemal again stressed the importance of combating with the inflation as a mean of development, economic growth and becoming wealthier and repeated that there was only one recipe for this struggle, a “bitter struggle” of

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁶ Hasan Cemal, “Can yakmak”, *Milliyet*, 1.12.1999.

the IMF.⁴⁹⁷ By saying “If I would repeat this recipe”, Cemal listed a to do list:

Without balancing the budget, putting two ends of the state, minimizing the state in economy, privatising SOEs and state banks, increasing competitiveness of the economy, opening channels for putting the export on the right track, ensuring a robust system for banking, making reforms for prevalence of market principles in agriculture, inflation monster cannot be overthrown, and the economy cannot be recovered.⁴⁹⁸

In 1999, Cemal made a comparative assessment of Bulent Ecevit’s, Prime Minister of the time, and attitude towards the IMF as he observed in 1978 and 1999. In his column, “*The year 1978, Ecevit was prime minister*”, he argued that in 1978 Ecevit could not show a political determination to open foreign credit channels for Turkey.⁴⁹⁹ For Cemal, in these days, the only way for opening those channels was an the IMF recipe which meant “tightening the belts, saving Turkey from mixed economy etatism and embracing market economy principles”.⁵⁰⁰ However, the failure of Ecevit to implement this recipe was disappointing and Turkey turned to be “a country of black market and ques.”⁵⁰¹

It is noteworthy that economic crisis of 1978 was directly linked to Ecevit’s avoidance of implementing the IMF guided policies without any mention of global economic constraints on Turkish economy resulting from cyclical crises of the capitalism in the 1970s. In addition, Cemal glorified the start of Turgut Özal’s office and described his policies as “a revolutionary jump” in making Turkish economy as an open market economy, which showed a clear contradiction with its column

⁴⁹⁷ Hasan Cemal, Türkiye’yi zor günler bekliyor ama..., *Milliyet*, 7.12.2000.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁹ Hasan Cemal, “Ecevit 20 yıl önce 20 yıl sonra”, *Milliyet*, 25.12.1999.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*

writing in the 1980s. However, Cemal complained that Özal's achievements were limited since he failed to realize privatisation, agriculture, banking and social security reforms. Although the recipe was also clear then, the absent element was political will and political determination.⁵⁰²

Coming to 2002, economic agenda of Cemal seemed to remain undistorted. As he noted in his column, "*Not without coming to the edge of Bankruptcy*"⁵⁰³, he was complained that Turkey postponed taking necessary steps to make structural reforms, privatisation, banking reforms and struggling with the inflation. With reference to Ecevit government's economy plan, Cemal underlined that thanks to "the IMF stick" eventually Turkish government embraced a reformist perspective but 'unfortunately' "the sea has run out".⁵⁰⁴ In this sense, Cemal's approach on implemented policies provides an example of "dehumanization" and "marketization" of language used for economy policies. That is to say, repercussions of economic packages were presented in line with their impacts on "markets" and "indicators" not humans.

One of the common points identified in columns of Cemal, Uras and Barlas was "the utilization of economic terms and implementations from Ottoman Empire" in criticizing "inefficient involvement of the state in the economy". Similar to the utilization of *Arpalık Modeli* and *Ulufe* by Uras and *Arpalık* by Barlas for particularly identifying SOEs, Cemal used "*Ulufe*" to criticize the JDP's economy policies in its first day. In his column "*It is the time to look into financing, not the time for Ulufe*"⁵⁰⁵ Cemal warned the JDP due to increases in salaries of retired and

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*

⁵⁰³ Hasan Cemal, "İflas eşiğine gelmeden olmuyor", *Milliyet*, 22.06.2002.

⁵⁰⁴ Hasan Cemal, "Bir uçurumun kenarından dönerken", *Milliyet*, 6.12.2000.

⁵⁰⁵ Hasan Cemal, "Ulufe değil, hesap kitap zamanı", *Milliyet*, 7.01.2003.

minimum wage. Cemal was anxious about the resources of those expenditures in the budget and asked, “where is the water of the mill?”⁵⁰⁶ He was also underlining the importance of financial discipline and fulfilment of the list made by the IMF:

And the IMF is waiting! The fourth review with the IMF was going to end in October and funding worth 1.6 billion dollars was going to be released. However, there was 3 November. The IMF committee came after the election. When they were leaving in 22 December they left a to do list to the government which included subjects like fiscal discipline, lay-offs in the public sector and privatisation. These have not been completed yet. The government is waitin. the IMF is waiting as well..⁵⁰⁷

Discrediting of class struggle and class demand: It can be suggested that one of the remarkable aspects of Cemal’s changing political discourse was seen in his efforts to discredit demands of working classes as well as to legitimize wage pressures on those classes. Although he stated that claims linking wage increases with inflation are “legends” in the 1980s, coming to the mid-1990s, Cemal argued that inflation cannot be beaten without “hurting” people, and the state cannot continue to distribute its sources with “full ladles”.⁵⁰⁸ Moreover, he argued that Turkey was only country in the world who could not eliminate the “inflation monster”. The following example illustrates a clear wording which discredits demands of working classes:

Inflation cannot be fought against without pain. A hard brake to inflation is only possible with a scream... **Without pain, without screams, inflation will not decline!** Do we want to get rid of the problem of inflation? Yes. Because inflation is encouraging instability, injustice, immorality and corruption... If the government maintains its determination, this time at new year workers and civil servants will be screaming. If the government can realize the agriculture reform it is

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

envisioning in the new year, it will be farmers' turn to protest. If the struggle with inflation is serious, there will inevitably be many screamers. Inflation will not decline without hurt!.. Giving without taking applies only to God!.. There is no other way out to beat inflation, to start solving the problem of food and work, and to make a deal with the IMF and put foreign resource flow back on track..⁵⁰⁹ (Highlights by Cemal)

With similar phrases and word selection, in his column "For Human Being", Cemal asserted that although the economy is, first and foremost, for well-being of humans, this goal cannot be achieved without eliminating the inflation. He also underlined that in the struggle against the inflation, everyone should take on responsibility and every segment of the society should sacrifice for the long-term recovery.⁵¹⁰

Highlighting the "importance" of political and economic stability: It is possible to argue the notion of "stability" was one of the major discursive selectivities of the mainstream media throughout the 2000s. The "failure" of coalition governments in implementing neo-liberal agendas during the 1990s was also a resilient memory for columnists. As examples provided from columns of Uras and Barlas, 'the significance of political and economic stability, achievements and virtue of single-party governments' were used as discursive selectivities for supporting the JDP governments in the 2000s. In this sense, Hasan Cemal showed very clear examples of this tendency as he explicitly glorified the political stability ensured "thanks to the JDP governments".

Typical examples of this approach can be seen in Cemal's articles "*The magical word: Stability*", and "*Stability or Death*".⁵¹¹ Hasan Cemal did not only remind the reader of Turkey's failures and losses due to the coalition governments of the 1990s,

⁵⁰⁹ Hasan Cemal, "Can yakmak", *Milliyet*, 1.12.1999.

⁵¹⁰ Hasan Cemal, "İnsan İçin", *Milliyet*, 4.03.2000.

⁵¹¹ See Hasan Cemal, "Ya İstikrar Ya Ölüm", *Milliyet*, 8.03.2006 and Hasan Cemal, "Sihirli Sözcük: İstikrar", *Milliyet*, 16.02.2006.

but he also established a direct link between ‘economic-political recovery’ of the 2000s and single party government.⁵¹² This article was started with an effort of proving economic successes which were ‘gained’ in the first three years of the JDP government with some statistical data and continued with a citation from Mehmet Şimşek who was an economist at Merrill Lynch at that time.⁵¹³ As seen below, Cemal used direct phrases of Şimşek about the danger of coalition governments for Turkey and underlined that “the stability comes first”:

In this regard, as OECD indicators also show, things have not been going bad for the last three years. Why? The answer consists of two words: Political stability! Turkey lost the 1990’s due to political instability and weak coalitions. If it has started to win a little during the last three years, make no mistake, this is due to stability and the single party government that is able to do work. So, the magic word is stability! As economist Mehmet Şimşek of Merrill Lynch, one of the world’s leading financial management and consultancy firms, says: “The biggest risk for Turkey is political instability. If political stability is protected and EU membership process is kept alive Turkey will show more progress, then other developing countries. The greatest risk in the medium term is a scattered cabinet and coalitions.” (Hürriyet, 3 February 2006, p.11) This is the big picture. If we do not or can not see the big picture, it means alarm bells have started to ring. It means stability is being grabbed by the throat. No one should forget this. Stability comes first!⁵¹⁴

In this sense, the concept of stability was emphasized by Cemal as a key factor for political and economic well-being of Turkey. On another occasion, Cemal was defined “the real stability” as the remedy of development, democracy, rule of law and employment problems. He re-stated that “if we believe the primacy of political stability above all other items”, we had to support the transformation process

⁵¹² Hasan Cemal, “Sihirli Sözcük: İstikrar”, *Milliyet*, 16.02.2006.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Turkey was going through.⁵¹⁵ Referring to Ergenekon cases, Kurdish problem and military issues on the agenda, he reiterated that the steps taken by the government were first in the last thousand years. Cemal argued that the walls which have prevented the change of Turkey were “cracking at the seams”.⁵¹⁶

If we want real stability in this country, especially if we believe that political stability comes first, then we have to help this process of change. There is no other way out. Everything hangs on the tip of stability. Without real stability our food and work problems will not be solved, we will not have proper progress and we will not have democracy or rule of law with all its institutions. However, for a while now somethings have been changing in Turkey. It can finally be seen that the walls that prohibit Turkey from changing its shell has started to crack.⁵¹⁷

Although Hasan Cemal’s columns on the JDP included a more critical stance by the mid-2010s due to the political objections of Cemal in some cases, in 2011, Hasan Cemal was still supporting economy policies of the JDP and depicting them as a great success.⁵¹⁸ Cemal was again clearly underlining the “weaknesses” of coalition governments and their lack of political determination and will. He also made a list of “achievements” of the JDP which could not be realized by several governments from the 1980s. This list obviously reflected a neo-liberal agenda. He noted that:

For many years starting from the 1980’s, we have been repeating the same arguments about economy. It would never change. Because in those years economy was writhing in a vicious circle. This was a dead-end that weak governments with a lack of political willpower could not save Turkey from. The monster of inflation... The hunch of KIT... Black holes... Gigantic fiscal deficits... privatisation making no head way... the crookedness of banking... waiting for structural reforms... When talking with statesmen about economy, these were the subjects. Today, thanks to

⁵¹⁵ Hasan Cemal, “Yarbay’ın intiharıyla demokrasi ve istikrar, *Milliyet*, 22.12.2009.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁸ Hasan Cemal, “Evet, ekonomide gidiş iyi ama”, *Milliyet*, 20.01.2011.

political stability and determination, a new future in economy is unfolding and economic growth is gaining continuity. There is not much doubt that we are one of the few countries that has pulled through the economic crisis with the least damage.⁵¹⁹

4.3.3 Language Use

The assessment of language used in Cemal's text shows a rough parallelism with general results of the selected columnists. Hasan Cemal frequently uses "stereotypes", "popular words", "quotations from texts or speeches of "experts", "evidences" such as statistics and reports and "metaphors/word games" in his columns.

It is notable that stereotypes and popular types used by Cemal reveals a sharp change by the beginning of 1990s. Cemal seemed to abandon leftist discursive elements in his columns just after his transfer to the mainstream media from Cumhuriyet. For instance, popular words in leftist order of discourse such as labour, struggle for sweat blood, power groups, people's movement, considerable demands of workers, pages that are added to the history of labour, it is not bearable anymore, nothing to lose but your chains, "are you ready to tighten your belt?", "people in bad straits" have disappeared from Cemal's columns by the mid-1990s⁵²⁰ That is to say, Cemal's "leftist" -"activist" years did not result in a interdiscursive hybridity in texts of Cemal.

On the contrary, Cemal started to frequently use neo-liberal stereotypes in his texts such as structural adjustment, minimizing the state, benefice model (Arpalık modeli), father state, the wealth of the state is not a sea etc.

It is also seen that Cemal's utilization of references and quotations has a continuity in time. However, while his writings in Cumhuriyet referred to leftist-nationalist experts or academics during the 1980s, his columns in the 1990s included

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁰ Hasan Cemal, "Büyük Yürüyüş ve Sayduğu", *Cumhuriyet*, 5.05.1991.

references to the experts from international financial organizations, Davos meetings and representatives of economic administration of governments.




Figure 4: Language use in Hasan Cemal

4.4 Textual Analysis of Abdurrahman Dilipak's Columns

4.4.1 Introduction

Abdurrahman Dilipak is a well-known Islamist columnist who has been writing in several publications since 1969. Dilipak is acknowledged as one of the leading intellectuals who has a certain impact on the formation of the Islamist discourse in Turkey. It can be argued that evolution of Dilipak's major arguments and grounds regarding Turkish economy and its neo-liberal transformation since the 1980s reflects, to a considerable extent, general tendencies of Islamist discourse in Turkey. In this regard, CDA applied to the columns of Dilipak shows that his anti-systemic and anti-capitalist discourse in the 1980s has transformed into a more concurrent approach towards neo-liberalism by the mid-1990s. For the studied period from 1980 to 2010, constant features of discursive selectivities of Dilipak are the religious references and anti-western elements in his texts. For that reason, Dilipak's columns provide very typical examples of interdiscursive hybridity of

neo-liberal discourse due to its articulation with the Islamist discourse in Turkey. This research provides some clues about the changes in the discourses of Islamist columnists in the 1990s and 2000s. First of all, it is notable that Dilipak embraced “irreversible and inevitable globalization” narratives by the late 1990s and particularly 2000s and drawn upon neo-liberal arguments on the need of “re-structuring the national state”. Secondly, Dilipak’s texts on so-called Conservative-Islamist capital includes his expectations from the newly emerging Islamist capitalist class as an organic intellectual. As exemplified below, his columns on MUSIAD include explicit demands calling members of MUSIAD to move beyond from the economic-corporate moment to a political moment.

It can be also argued that articulation of his discourse with neo-liberal claims caused an apparent ambiguity and eclectic conceptualizations in Dilipak’s texts. Although all kinds of the western values and policies were categorically rejected by Dilipak, basic core of neo-liberal ideas such as free movement of capital, goods, knowledge and concepts of interdependency was depicted as undeniable and inevitable facts of the new age by Dilipak in the 2000s. In a sense, anti-western elements in Dilipak have not included an oppositional stance against the capitalist system and its neo-liberal implementation, but instead, they have been reduced to a value-based, moral and religious rejection of the West and its exploitation of the Islamic world.

Another noteworthy finding is his concern about the repercussions of dramatic increases in capital accumulation of some Islamist segments. It is an interesting point that Dilipak underlines the absence of an equivalent development in lifestyles, art and literature products of conservative groups compared to their increasing influence in the politics and capital accumulation.

In this sense, Dilipak complained that lifestyles of conservatives were engaged with the western lifestyle and consumerism, degenerated and far from constructing its own cultural products, while he acknowledged neo-liberal economy policies which have created this lifestyle.

4.4.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies

Overall textual analysis of selected columns of Dilipak identifies the following discursive selectivities and strategies;

- Anti-systemic and anti-capitalist discourse and the rejection of western values and rationalism (1980-1994)
- “The Evil West” vs. “the Islamic World” dichotomy in explaining every national and international contradiction,
- Legitimization of unjust income distribution and the capital from a religious perspective and emphasis on the social solidarity and aid,
- Depiction of globalization as an irreversible and indispensable process
- Critiques on changing lifestyles of enriched Muslims and the lack of cultural products developed by Muslims

Anti-systemic and anti-capitalist discourse articulated with the rejection of western values and rationalism (1980-1994): The analysis of Dilipak’s columns from the early 1980s demonstrated his negative bias towards neo-liberal economic policies following the January 24 decisions and the office of Özal in general. Dilipak used anti-western, anti-capitalist and anti-systemic argumentations which were based on religious references, moral values, anti-rationalism and anti-individualism.

In one of his columns dated 16.04.1984, “*Where is the country going?*”, he sarcastically criticised Member of Parliaments who demanded imported guns for their personal security instead of Turkish made Kırıkkale guns.⁵²¹ He argued that

⁵²¹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Memleket nereye gidiyor”, *Milli Gazete*, 16.04.1984.

this instance was “a part of the whole” which indicated a degeneration in Turkish society due to the implemented economy policies. According to Dilipak, it was important to make a careful analysis of increasing instances of “suicides, prostitution, games of hazard, dementing and excessive alcohol consumption”.⁵²² For him, as a result of the economy policies of Özal, people were starving, businesses were shutting down and, “the interest crushed the labour”.⁵²³ Moreover, he related this “social degeneration” with the IMF’s supervision on economy policies and identified the IMF as a “dubious organization which is a contemporary outstation of exploitative mentality”.⁵²⁴

On the other hand, his column dated 23.12.1983, “*Is Mr. Friedman a fraud?*”⁵²⁵ provides an explicit example of his position against neo-liberal arguments and philosophical basis of economic liberalism. Dilipak made references to a report of the Bank of England which found out that Friedman had distorted some statistical figures in developing his economic approach.⁵²⁶ For Dilipak, Özal’s economy policies, which were inspired on Friedman’s theories and aimed at controlling the inflation via monetary policies, were resulted in a fiasco. Increases in dollar currency rates, unemployment, budget deficits and inefficiency in industrial policies were at the heart of Dilipak’s critiques towards Özal.⁵²⁷ Moreover, Dilipak was critical about philosophical roots of mentioned liberal policies and identified them as “pragmatism” as asserted by Özal. The essence of his objection towards

⁵²² *Ibid.*

⁵²³ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁵ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Bay Friedman bir sahtekar mı”, Milli Gazete, 23.12.1983.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

pragmatism was its utilitarian basis which was, for Dilipak, based on the assumption that “reason itself is sufficient for reaching the truth”.⁵²⁸ According to Dilipak, this kind of conceptualizations are, by his words, “Trojan Horse of the Western culture and culture imperialism”.⁵²⁹

Similarly, he continued to criticize Özal’s economy policies in his two subsequent columns “Financial Calculation of Özal-1” and “Financial Calculation of Özal-2”. First of all, Dilipak defined Özal as “an engineer pretending to be an economist” who was in favour of a “western type economic model” based on the calculation of cost and a so-called rationalism/scientific claim.⁵³⁰ For Dilipak, even though Özal had a moralist background, it was dubious that there were certain claims identifying him as “ratified from somewhere”.⁵³¹ Dilipak argued that “there is a cost of everything in the capitalism and you can even buy a man”, however, Özal should know that there are supreme values in “our history” that cannot be sold.⁵³² Another striking point of this article was Dilipak’s reference to Prof. Neccar’s (Head of Islamic Development Bank of this time) proposal of providing 10 Billion Dollar credit to Turkey in return for quitting relations with Israel and interest banking system. Dilipak harshly warned Özal that he should make a serious calculation for being in the same axes of Israel and the West, which he found more important than “selling the bridge and stadiums”.⁵³³

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁰ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Özal’ın maliye hesabı 1”, *Milli Gazete*, 16.12.1983. and Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Özal’ın maliye hesabı 2”, *Milli Gazete*, 17.12.1983.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*

⁵³² *Ibid.*

⁵³³ *Ibid.*

In this sense, the “interest” was at the centre of Dilipak’s criticism towards Özal. For him, the people of Turkey believed that the interest consumes the capital day by day.⁵³⁴ Dilipak was in a negative bias towards Özal’s economy policies that he could not understand what was the purpose of “contaminating” millions of people with “interest”. The only pleasant group those policies can be only foreign financial organisation and the IMF.⁵³⁵

More importantly, coming to 1989, in his column “*Everything is for sale*”, Dilipak explicitly condemned the first ten years of Turkey’s neo-liberal transformation as the period which had witnessed a widespread and unprecedented plunder and abuse in the Republican history.⁵³⁶ He vehemently opposed privatisation attempts, increasing prevalence of multi-national companies in Turkey as “hungry wolves”. By his words;

Do you want an airport? If you like, we have dams, cheap girls for you to enjoy... everything is for sale... Motherland, religion, belief... I don’t know of another time period in the history of Republic in which pillaging, and abuse was as rampant as they have been in the past ten years. Both the masses and the few who have become rich are dizzy - some of them because of getting rich, others because of hunger.⁵³⁷

“The Evil West” vs. “the Islamic World” dichotomy in explaining every national and international contradiction: One of the resilient elements observed in Dilipak’s columns is the explanation of every national and international contradiction within a framework of dichotomy between the “evil” West and the Islamic world. The West is described as the source of all inequalities and exploitation. First of all, it should be noted that Dilipak explicitly identified the West as the exploitation of the Muslim. In his column “*Two faces of the West*”, he

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁶ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Herşey satılık”, *Milli Gazete*, 2.03.1989.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*

stated that the wealth of the West was raised on the exploitation of Muslims' tears and elbow grease. By his words:

Behind the prosperity and happiness of the West lies our stolen sweats, tears and spilled blood. There are poor, ignorant people living in the Muslim world, their lives we unfathomable, who search the trash for food... The richness of the West is as big as our poorness. We know how our material and spiritual values have been pillaged. The sound of the whips of the pro-westerners, cracking on our necks are still in our ears. In the name of westernizing, our language, history, culture, dressings, law and customs have been oppressed.⁵³⁸

This study also shows that Dilipak's anti-western discourse was articulated with a more anti-systemic stance and even with some keywords of the leftist discourse such as exploitation, western imperialism, the crush of the labour and elbow grease in the period from 1980 to mid-1990s. This anti-western stance also included criticism towards neo-liberal economy model as examples provided above. Nevertheless, this discourse turned out to be a more compliant one in terms of its acknowledgment of "globalisation" and free market economy as an unchangeable reality.

Although Dilipak continued to depict the West as an "evil" and as the reason of poverty of the Islamic world in the 2000s, this opposition did not include a structural objection towards the neo-liberal economic model. Strikingly, coming to 2011, Dilipak underlined that a revision was needed for international economy and Turkey should actively participate this process along with China, Russia, Japan, Latin America and India since the US and the EU could not succeed this task alone.⁵³⁹

On the other hand, it can be suggested that the anti-western discourse was largely based on a moralist approach and mostly depicted the Western societies at the doom of individualism, alcohol and prostitution etc. Even 2008 Global Crisis was

⁵³⁸ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Batının iki yüzü!", *Yeni Akit*, 14.09.2009.

⁵³⁹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "EP", *Yeni Akit*, 19.10.2011.

explained by Dilipak with ‘moral degeneration’ in the Western societies, he stated that:

The West has everything but not fairness or mercy. Their desires are greater than their wisdom (minds). Drugs, gambling, alcohol and promiscuity have struck their minds. They are masses who mistake slavery of one’s ego for freedom. The young generation is lost, family is dispersed. People think of suicide as salvation, who can’t manage themselves without psychological therapy... This is the point the West has arrived. Don’t pay attention to the rise of the Dollar and the Euro. This rise is because of the social, economic, political and cultural tsunami that the crisis caused. They have fallen into a deep void in theological sense and are ready for suicide. As the sun sets at the West, it is getting ready to dawn from the East. You will see, the coming days will be worse than the past days for the West.⁵⁴⁰

In fact, Dilipak’s discourse towards the West reflects a “conceptual turmoil” in the late 1990s and 2000s due to his efforts of defining some notions with a religious perspective, which eventually resulted in an eclectic discourse. Dilipak made effort to identify key concepts in a different way from their contemporary utilizations, as he argued that it is important for “Muslims to save themselves from incorporating western notions and institutions in explaining their views”.⁵⁴¹

For instance, in one of his columns about the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, he conceptualized “Islam” as an equivalent concept to Communism and Capitalism, as it was an ideology and mode of production.⁵⁴²

Therefore, in this column, it remained ambiguous whether Islam was seen as a religion, an ideology, an economic or political system, a theory or a certain geoFigurey. To illustrate by his words, Dilipak argued that:

Communism has failed. Now it’s capitalism’s turn (time to fail). But what is next? This is not an easy question to answer. Is it Islam? “yes”, but will the Islamic World achieve this? There is no other option. That’s the reason

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴¹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Sağcı Müslüman Olursa Solcusu da Olur!”, *Yeni Akit*, 22.06.2012.

⁵⁴² Abdurrahman Dilipak, “EP”, *Yeni Akit*, 19.10.2011.

why the answer to the question is yes. So we need to solve our problems and act according to the responsibility that the history has put on our shoulders. Theories are failing. We have a tough job to do. We won't sit back and say "not my problem". We are the followers of a prophet who has been sent as mercy (rahmet) to the worlds. A new journey to Taif starts for us. "Oh my Lord, they are ignorant, they don't know".⁵⁴³

Legitimization of unjust income distribution and capital accumulation from a religious perspective and emphasis on the social solidarity and aid: By particularly from the mid-1990s, the Islamist discourse entered a transformation process as well as an articulation with neo-liberal discourse. As mentioned before, this articulation coincides with a set of developments in changing political economy in Turkey, the rise of Political Islam, its 'election victories' in local and central elections and increases in capital accumulation of so-called Islamist-Conservative Capitalists. These developments were reflected in the discourse of Dilipak with an effort of legitimizing unjust income distribution, capital accumulation and the increasing wealth of some segments of "Muslims". In terms of "unjust income distribution", there is a single expression used by Dilipak by several times which especially reserves to be noted:

God gives and takes wealth and power, and redistributes them among countries and people. He will test us with our properties, lives and loved ones by sometimes giving and sometimes taking.⁵⁴⁴

In this sense, increases or decreases in wealth of people were defined as a judgement and testing of Allah on earth. One of the other striking arguments raised by Dilipak was the definitions of "capitalism" and "capitalist" which also caused eclectic and amorphous conceptualizations. In his article, *"The Debate on the place of the*

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁴ See Abdurrahman Dilipak, "İslam'da Servetin Yeri" Tartışması", *Yeni Akit*, 18.12.2010, Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Kim daha dindar", *Yeni Akit*, 16.10.2011., Dilipak, Abdurrahman, "Zengin Olmak", *Yeni Akit*, 3.12.2011.

Wealth in Islam”, first of all, he argued that there is a clear emphasis in Koran on the poor and the rich and there is not any negative attribution to the wealth the Prophets Suleiman, Eyyup and Ibrahim.⁵⁴⁵ Moreover, Dilipak explicitly expressed that wealth of a person should not be made a matter of debate if he fulfils the requirements of being a Muslim, by his words, Dilipak stated:

I don't think the wealth of a person should be made a matter of debate as long as he earns and spends it in halal way, gives his fitre, zakat and sadaka, and watches out the debts, family, neighbours, orphans, the poor, the travellers and the people who fight the cruel in the name of god.⁵⁴⁶

Furthermore, Dilipak made an alternative definition for the notion of ‘Capitalist’ by detaching it from all its social, economic and political contexts. This definition also revealed that anti-capitalist/capitalism narratives of this Islamist discourse was far from being a systemic criticism but much more focused on whether the holder of the capital is Muslim or not. In this regard, Dilipak stated that:

I call a man a capitalist if he is acquisitive (*paracı*), not if he is rich. Even a poor person is a capitalist if his only focus is Money. As long as someone follows the values I have listed above, even if he is the richest guy in the World, is not a capitalist in my book.⁵⁴⁷

A very similar argumentation can be exemplified from his column “*If a rightest Muslim can be, a leftist one can become as well*”, as he noted that it is not possible to explain Islam with being “anti” of something. Dilipak argued that if one wants to emphasize anti- of any concept, he should define this concept in a comprehensive way.⁵⁴⁸ According to Dilipak, if “capital” means “*sermaye*” in Turkish, then anti-

⁵⁴⁵ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “İslam’da Servetin Yeri” Tartışması”, *Yeni Akit*, 18.12.2010

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁸ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Sağcı Müslüman Olursa Solcusu da Olur!”, *Yeni Akit*, 22.06.2012.

capital means to be against capital. However, he stated that this was not what he meant from the concept since he was not concerned with the “capital”, but the suffix of “-ist”.⁵⁴⁹ That is to say, Dilipak seemed to explain that being anti-capitalist for him is not to be against to capital, but to the people who attribute much importance to money. If, said Dilipak, one who lives even with minimum wage sells out his friend for money, then he is a “capitalist”, while a wealthy man who earns and spends his money in Halal way is not an acquisitive and not a capitalist.⁵⁵⁰ Thus, the term “Capitalist” in Dilipak’s conceptualization clearly used for a person who is acquisitive and money grubber.

Religious references were used by Dilipak with examples of wealthy prophets such the Prophets Suleiman and Eyyüp. In his columns in which he described an ideal state, he again stressed that a just order, a just state and a just administration can only be achieved by ensuring a balance between “blessing and burden”.⁵⁵¹ Dilipak reiterated his argument on the conceptualization of the capitalist and implied that the wealth does not make governors capitalist if they rule within a just order.⁵⁵²

Strikingly, in his column namely “*Who is more devout?*”, Dilipak contended that the poor and oppressed people feel themselves much closer to the God, or feel the necessity of being closer to the God.⁵⁵³ However, for Dilipak, it was an illusion that the poor seemed to be more devout because “not their proportion but their number are bigger than the devoted rich people.”⁵⁵⁴ In another column namely “Being rich”,

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵¹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Anti Emperyalizm Ve Bağımsızlık Üzerine”, *Yeni Akit*, 15.12.2008.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵⁵³ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Kim daha dindar”, *Yeni Akit*, 16.10.2011.

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Dilipak asserted that being a rich person is much harder than to be the poor because it is hard to earn and spend the money in a halal way.⁵⁵⁵ After stating the same capitalist definition, he repeated that not every rich person is a capitalist.

To conclude, it can be argued that by the late 2000s and the beginning of 2010s, Dilipak's effort to examine the subject of wealth intensified. At the same time, for all mentioned columns on the wealth and capitalist debate, one of the key grounds of advocacy of a "proper wealthy Muslim" is his fulfilment of requirements, particularly the ones regarding social aid and solidarity such as giving the zakat, helping the poor, paying the taxes and spending in a halal way.

As he noted in his column "*Would you like to make loan to the God?*", Dilipak made effort to call the readers to increase their social aids to become good Muslims. His main concern was to naturalize the impacts of adverse economic conditions on small enterprises, craftsman and the poor in general.⁵⁵⁶ By his words, Dilipak asserted that:

We are developing rapidly but some people are hurt in the process. Some of the small business owners face serious crises if they can't adapt to the changing situation. All transition periods are painful. Some people gain, some people lose. Allah redistributes wealth and power in this way. Wishing for patience is not enough for someone who has been suffering trouble (*musibete uğrayan*.) If a relative, neighbour, colleague, congregation friend; or in the case of a foundation-association a member; is in need, the congregation is responsible for satisfying the basic needs of that brother. This is different from zakat and fitre.⁵⁵⁷

Depiction of globalization as an irreversible and indispensable process: Dilipak's perspective on neo-liberal economy policies and Turkey's transformation process

⁵⁵⁵ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Zengin Olmak", *Yeni Akit*, 3.12.2011.

⁵⁵⁶ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Allah'a (CC) borç vermek ister misiniz", *Yeni Akit*, 3.02.2012.

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

has changed dramatically by the late 1990s. One of the interesting examples of this change can be seen in his writings on Özal and its legacy. Even though Dilipak harshly criticized Özal and economy policies of him in the 1980s, coming to the 2000s, Özal was described as a leader “who made an irreversible breakthrough in the Republic history”.⁵⁵⁸ For Dilipak, the Motherland Party’s political legacy has been hidden in the conscience of a whole society.

Another explicit example of his compliance with the global dominance of capital in the form of neo-liberalism can be seen in his column namely, “*On Anti-imperialism and Independence-2*” where he clearly recognized the undeniable and irreversible aspects of globalization and free movement of capital, goods, knowledge and labour, and impossibility of full independence.⁵⁵⁹ For him, inter-dependency is the tendency of the day, by his words, Dilipak noted that:

According to me, such a full and absolute independence didn’t exist yesterday, doesn’t exist today, nor will it exist tomorrow. Today’s trend is “interdependence”. Having a “complete independence” is a utopia. This is not possible anymore, whether we like it or not, and it’s true for everyone... We live in a time in which money, knowledge, labour, property and people are subject to free movement and identities are being destroyed... Now there is an international order of law, an international market, and international pacts. Today’s trend is interdependence.⁵⁶⁰

As discussed above, the eclectic interpretation and conceptualization of “capitalism” and “capitalist” by Dilipak is making it difficult to analyse his stance against neo-liberalism when combined with anti-western narratives. However, this study reveals that Dilipak does not have any objection towards the capitalism as a mode of production or a source of inequality and exploitation in the society but just

⁵⁵⁸ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Özal’ın mirası”na kim el koydu?”, *Vakit*, 2.12.2009.

⁵⁵⁹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Anti Emperyalizm Ve Bağımsızlık Üzerine (2)”, *Yeni Akit*, 16.12.2008.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

interested whether the owner of the capital is a Muslim or not. This argument can also be supported by his columns on MUSIAD in which he glorified the organization and identified responsibilities for it. For instance, as he noted in his column “*You are 22 years old*”, he called the MUSIAD to be quicker to establish economic relations with new countries and 47 countries were not enough.⁵⁶¹ He also made an analogy with Fatih Sultan Mehmet who conquered Istanbul at the age of 22 and MUSIAD’s 22nd anniversary.

Dilipak attributed some tasks for MUSIAD such as to revive and construct the Islam Civilization again, while he congratulated them and prayed for their success.⁵⁶² He described MUSIAD as “brothers saying that they will be conscience of the capital.”⁵⁶³ According to Dilipak, MUSIAD should define higher goals and become more equipped to open up to the global market. He also underlined that MUSIAD should be more collaborative with other Muslim business networks in Turkey, establish networks and also think a more “global manner”.⁵⁶⁴

Moreover, in his column “*Leave the IMF, look Switzerland*” he complained about 100 Billion Dollar assets of Turkish citizens in Swiss Banks and discussed potential remedies to bring them back to Turkey.⁵⁶⁵ Interestingly, Dilipak criticized Turkey’s economic past since it was “a closed economy and had scary reflexes” in contradiction with his hostile discourse towards foreign capital in the 1980s.⁵⁶⁶ After exemplifying Dubai’s free financial centre, Dilipak stated that the

⁵⁶¹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “22 Yaşındasın”, *Yeni Akit*, 30.05.2012

⁵⁶² *Ibid.*

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁵ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “IMF’yi bırak İsviçre’ye bak”, *Vakit*, 5.10.2009.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

establishment of an international free-financial zone in Istanbul is a must. For him, there is an opportunity to attract more capital to Turkey, but the legislation is not appropriate.⁵⁶⁷ Dilipak also argued that if Turkish assets in foreign countries returns to homeland, it would trigger other financial flows, thus, Turkey would be more powerful to overcome major problems such social security. In this regard, Dilipak identified Social Security Institution (SGK) as a “hunchback” and a problem which should be solved. It is remarkable that Dilipak used one of the stereotypes of neo-liberal vocabulary of the mainstream media in Turkey to define SGK.⁵⁶⁸

Critiques on changing lifestyle of conservative people and lack of production of cultural products: By the late 2000s, one of the noteworthy discursive selectivities of Dilipak was his concern on changing lifestyles of enriched “Muslims”. Dilipak was frustrated with their engagement with ‘the Western lifestyle and consumerism’ as well as excessive waste and vanity. In fact, this criticism was not only limited to wealthy Muslims but also ones who are involved in political power. By his words, a new “White Muslim” class was emerging which he described them as “our bourgeois”.⁵⁶⁹

The column namely, “*Testing of White Muslims with Money and Power*”, represents his general views about his concerns. First of all, Dilipak mentioned transformative impacts of wealth and reputation on Muslims and claimed that they started to resemble to “them” by implicitly referring to the White Turks.⁵⁷⁰ Dilipak directed a set of critiques towards Muslims who were getting rich and becoming a part of

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁰ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Beyaz Müslümanlar’ın para ve iktidarla imtihanı...”, *Yeni Akit*, 11.08.2011.

political parties as well as changing representation of Islam in the mass media. According to him, while Muslims were once complaining about “TSE stamped” Islamic approach imposed by the state in the past, now they faced with a kind of Neo-Islamism presented by the media even media organizations who are close to the JDP.⁵⁷¹ Dilipak also made remarkable definitions for this so-called White Muslims and their mistakes, Dilipak noted that:

Gaudiness and luxurious feasts for breaking fasting have become the target of societal anger. Tv programs to which some of our businessmen are sponsor, the advertisement language, wall flowers (*konu mankenleri*), and the messages they give are not pleasant. They shouldn’t forget that one day their sons and daughters can become similar to the models in the product catalogues. This weapon hits their own children first. It will be too late when they become aware of the danger. Brand addict, nouveau-riche, spoiled, wannabe people hurt the religious people with their behaviour. It seems that those who shares positions in political power put the lifestyle of their positions before the lifestyle of their religion.⁵⁷²

Interestingly, in his column, “Aww! *What has been happening in our neighbourhood?*”, he speculated that while the Islam’s own bourgeois, capital, bureaucrats and politicians were emerging, there was also an operation of “domestication” going on to put these Muslims into a position of “nouveau-riche”.⁵⁷³ Due to his implicit language uses and passive voices, it’s hardly possible to identify who made this operation. Dilipak argued that some people were trying to give modernity lessons to “girls and boys of their neighbourhood” as well as to teach them which brands they had to wear etc.⁵⁷⁴ For Dilipak, it was an operation of “atomization” and creating a “high society” among Muslims, which he had

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*

⁵⁷³ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Ayy! Bizim mahallede neler oluyormuş neler!”, *Yeni Akit*, 25.08.2012.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

“warned” for a long time. The aim of this operation was to demonstrate “modernization journeys” of a few Muslim, who are in a position of nouveau-riche and have inferiority complex, as representing a whole Muslim community.⁵⁷⁵

In the same column, Dilipak raised another notable issue that Muslims failed to produce their own “intellectuals”, to invest in art and to have a civilisation project since their social responsibility aspects such as social aid dominated their intellectual development.⁵⁷⁶ Dilipak again underlined the challenges of changing lifestyles among Muslims and described them as an attempt of domestication. Dilipak stated that:

Take a look at the TV series sponsored by our capital, the imagery and slogans they use at their advertisements and catalogues. You may adapt your lifestyle to these models presented to you, then they may include you in the “accepted” people. These look like a compromise proposal to me. They will see the degree to which you adapt to the Western lifestyle. They want to be sure that you are not a threat to their lifestyles. This is an attempt of domestication. Can you cage your religion to your conscience in your personal life and to the mosques in your social life? Or will you reflect your religion in your economic, social, cultural and political relations? This is the only question whose answer is being sought. Do you want to stay Black, or will you be able to become a “White Turk”?⁵⁷⁷

In another article, “*MUSIAD Where to!*” Dilipak expressed his expectations from MUSIAD in terms of developing moral, aesthetic and philosophical aspects of Muslims. He also reminded MUSIAD their slogan of “we will be conscience of the capital” and underlined the ‘importance’ of becoming rich without being a capitalist and not reducing richness to money and assets.⁵⁷⁸ Dilipak highlighted that “our

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁸ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Müsiad nereye!”, *Yeni Akit*, 29.04.2012.

political power and wealth is more than our money” in which we “our” refers to Political Islam and increasing involvement of its representatives in the political power and the capitalist class. For him, “their faith” should move ahead before “their wealth and power”, otherwise “they would start to believe in the way they live, not live in the way they believe” ⁵⁷⁹

4.4.3 Language Use

As it can be seen on Figure 5, religious references are most frequently used discursive elements in Dilipak’s texts. Elements of Islamists order of discourse such as references to verses of the Koran, hadiths and religious phrases dominate Dilipak’s texts. Although religious references remain an unchanged property of Dilipak’s texts, their utilization manners have changed in time. For instance, while “protection of religion, values and purity” was used as arguments against Turkey’s integration with international economy and privatisation of Turkish assets, Dilipak started to use some religious explanations to advocate wealth and differences in income levels of Muslims.

Another striking point is the utilization of some stereotypes of leftist-socialist order of discourse by Dilipak during his anti-systemic/anti-capitalist years in the 1980s. Dilipak’s anti-western discourse was articulated with some keywords of the leftist discourse such as exploitation, western imperialism, the crush of the labour and elbow grease in the period from 1980 to mid-1990s.

As explained in detailed above, particularly from the late 1990s, Dilipak tried to legitimize increasing capital accumulation of some conservative segments by making religious explanations. Moreover, he conceptualized notions such as

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

capital, capitalist or imperialist by assessing them with the “prerequisites” of Islam.

It is notable that Dilipak has made efforts to conceptualize many contemporary notions from a religious perspective, which causes an eclectic conceptual structure in his columns. In other words, by the late 1990s, Dilipak’s columns included elements of “interdiscursive hybridity” which compromises both Islamists references and core neo-liberal claims such as liberalization, open market economy, virtue of private sector and interdependence.




Figure 5: Language use in Abdurrahman Dilipak

Dilipak also used eastern wording in his texts which are mostly from Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. Popular words, stereotypes and evidences can also be seen in Dilipak’s columns.

4.5 Textual Analysis of Fehmi Koru’s Columns

4.5.1 Introduction

Fehmi Koru is one of the leading Islamist columnists and intellectuals in Turkey who has also a considerable impact on the development of the discourse of political

Islam in the post-1980 era. One of his important features is his academic studies in the UK and Harvard University which enable him to follow foreign press and English publications on contemporary issues. He involved the establishment of *Zaman*, acted as an editor-in-chief of this newspaper for a long time, then wrote columns in *Yeni Şafak* and *Habertürk*. He wrote English articles for *Daily Zaman* and also published a book in English. Koru has been also known in the public opinion with his ties with Feza Group and personal relations with former President Abdullah Gül as they were roommates in the UK during their graduate education.

In a general sense, the analysis of Koru's selected articles, which covered 39 articles among 125 scanned articles, reaches some similar results with the analysis of Dilipak's columns. In a similar way with Dilipak, Koru's discourse shows a clear shift in terms of its approach to neo-liberal transformation of Turkey from the mid-1990s. Despite his explicit negative bias towards neo-liberal economy policies in the 1980s, Koru was in a more compliant position by the late 1990s and 2000s. Although Koru preserved his anti-western argumentations, "inevitable and irreversible characteristics" of globalization was acknowledged by him. In a sense, the analysis of Koru's texts provided another case of articulation of political Islamist discourse with hegemonic neo-liberal discourse.

The noteworthy features of this articulation were the legitimization of increasing unjust income distribution, changing discursive elements towards the capital and emphasis on the need of restructuring the state. He also attempted to develop arguments to legitimize acts of the JDP in the 2000s, which has been a harsh implementer of these policies. Koru also paid attention to cover social aids made by central and local governments in the 2000s and praised the "benefits of political stability".

It can be argued that Koru wrote fewer columns which focused on economy matters than political issues. In his columns about political debates, Koru reflected his anti-western attitude in a stronger way. In line with the general tendencies of Islamist discourse in Turkey, the imposition of any value or policy by the West was rejected

by Koru. However, it is remarkable that in terms of economy policies, global economic system and free market narratives, Koru displayed an explicit compromise and acquiescence.

4.5.2 Discursive Selectivities and Strategies

The current textual analysis of Koru identified five main discursive selectivities and strategies which were used as grounds of developing arguments.

- Utilization of anti-western and anti-capitalist elements and emphasis on the need of protection of tradition, religion, purity against the Western values
- Depiction of globalization as an irreversible and inevitable change
- Changing discursive elements regarding the presentation of the capital and the representatives of the capitalist class
- Highlighting “the importance” economic and political stability and “achievements” of the JDP governments,

Utilization of anti-western and anti-capitalist elements and emphasis on the need of protection of tradition, religion, purity against the Western values: Fehmi Koru has started column writing as a chief-editor in *Zaman* in 1986. In a similar vein to Dilipak and leading Islamist columnists of the time, Koru showed a clear negative bias towards the transformation of Turkish economy to an open and free market economy. On the one hand, the economy policies implemented by Özal, their impacts on working classes, “degeneration of traditions, values and morality” were criticized with a harsh genre. On the other hand, class struggle and leftist worldview were depicted as dangerous tendencies with a particular emphasis on the need of developing Islamist trade unionism.

First of all, it can be argued that adverse impacts of neo-liberal economy policies on income distribution were highlighted by Koru several times during the 1980s. The major themes of his arguments were based on unequal income distribution, the

malignity of interest and banking system and degeneration caused by the promotion of luxury lifestyle in the society. For instance, in his column, “*If Banks earn too much*”, he used the “cancer cell” metaphor to define “interest” as killing all healthy cells in the economy.⁵⁸⁰ For him, economic system implemented in Turkey was in the eve of a collapse, where high profits of banks and distortion in income distribution were foreshadowing the falsity of economy policies.⁵⁸¹ In this sense, while stressing the difficulties faced by manufacturers, Koru established a direct link between January 24 decisions and increasing profits of finance capital which were defined by him as “parasites”.⁵⁸²

Similarly, Koru criticized the January 24 decisions and its effects on “large masses” and particularly underlined the fallacy of Friedmanist tight monetary policies in his column namely “*The meaning of mark-ups*”.⁵⁸³ According to Koru, the January 24 decisions imprisoned ‘large masses’ to poverty while making only a few in the society much richer.⁵⁸⁴

Koru was also highly critical about the promotion of consumerism and luxury lifestyle by Turkish print media. In his column “*Discomforts have just begun*”, Koru argued that despite wide-spread economic challenges faced by working classes, the Turkish print media had continued to promote luxury consumptions of a few people in the society. He gave the examples of news on “a melon for 100.000 liras” and “farm of Princess Ulusoy”.⁵⁸⁵ By his words, for Koru, “the free market

⁵⁸⁰ Fehmi Koru, “Bankalar Çok Kazanırsa”, *Zaman*, 12.07.1989.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*

⁵⁸³ Fehmi Koru, “Zamların anlamı”, *Zaman*, 9.07.1987.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁵ Ulusoy family can be deemed as a member of big bourgeoisie in Turkey.

economy introduced by the January 24 decisions caused “immoderate shamelessness”, in the society, while workers hardly afforded their families lives.⁵⁸⁶

In addition, in this article, he attempted to take attention to the discomfort of masses and the potential rise of working class struggle by showing a headline from “Cumhuriyet” newspaper. In this sense, it can be easily argued that Koru used an explicit negative wording for leftist views and trade unions. For instance, in one of his columns “*Without pouring into street*”, he noted that actions of student and workers reminded him “undesirable” climate of the pre-1980s and argued that those actions caused “anxiety of many segments in the society”.⁵⁸⁷

On another occasion, in his column about one of the important strikes of the 1980s in SEKA, he described the strike as “the cause of the loss of hundred thousands of dollar” which deeply affected Turkish economy as a “dubious action.”⁵⁸⁸ In his explanations about the class struggle and the emergence of trade unions, he argued that by the disappearance of slavery in human history, slaves were substituted by working men who have no working guarantee. Thus, the struggle of workers to gain some insurances resulted in the emergence of trade unions.⁵⁸⁹ Koru hereby underlined insufficient attention of Muslims on trade unions and praised the efforts of Hak-iş trade union in Turkey.⁵⁹⁰

Moreover, Koru was highly concerned about changing dynamics of working life and increasing involvement of women in the labour force. In his column written on

⁵⁸⁶ Fehmi Koru, “Sıkıntılar yeni başlıyor”, *Zaman*, 11.04.1989.

⁵⁸⁷ Fehmi Koru, “Sokağa Dökülmeden”, *Zaman*, 8.11.1986.

⁵⁸⁸ Fehmi Koru, “Bir dolaptır döndü”, *Zaman*, 16.01.1989.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁰ Fehmi Koru, “Tarihi Misyon”, *Zaman*, 20.11.1986.

the occasion of May 1 Worker's Day in 1989, he described Turkey as a country "emulating capitalism" where the January 24 decisions caused adverse impacts on unjust income distribution.⁵⁹¹ Kuru identified two key problems arising from the changing economic structure in Turkey:

The first is: From a social structure where previously only men of the families have been working, the society is now quickly going towards a structure in which the number of working women are gradually increasing. Even though we don't desire at all, more women and girls are entering the business life every day. Since a new system of values has not been formed to replace dissolving family bonds, difficulties are being experienced in every level of society... The second point is also as vital as the first one. The population of workers is increasing and struggle for rights is becoming an indispensable element. However, believer segments are still looking trade union and unionising with cross-eyed. Because an Islamist theory of working life order has not been developed, workers are becoming open to leftist views or abuse... Hak-iş is now being showed as a new example."⁵⁹²

Depiction of globalization/change irreversible and inevitable process: In compliance with the general tendency in Islamist discourse, Fehmi Kuru's approach towards neo-liberal economy policies and globalization demonstrated a clear shift by the mid-1990s.

A very short time after the 1994 crisis, for instance, contrary to his anti-systemic discourse in the late 1980s, Kuru stressed the "need" of structural changing for Turkey and how the "new world" presented opportunities and challenges for countries. Kuru, after listing domestic and foreign policy problems, argued that there were two alternatives for Turkey, either "realizing a renewing from top to bottom or closing itself":

These kinds of deadlocks offer two completely opposite choices for countries. The first is to reform yourself by exploring the structural reasons of this deadlock from head to toe, the other one is to close yourself more and implement exceptional radical recipes. In recent times, while the voice

⁵⁹¹ Fehmi Kuru, "Gelecek Yıl 1 Mayıs'ta", *Zaman*, 1.05.1989.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*

of proponents of the second choice is becoming louder, those who wants change from top to bottom are being by-passed through several ways. However, a new world is ahead of us where classic recipes and short-cut solutions have lost their validity.⁵⁹³

Another notable article of Koru was about the election results of 1994 in which he argued that Turkey “was passing through a process of becoming more religious” (*dindarlaşma*) in line with the general tendency seen in the world.⁵⁹⁴ For Koru, people in Turkey expected to see hard working and trustable persons in management positions who integrated these qualifications with “religiousness”⁵⁹⁵ He criticized Mesut Yılmaz of the Motherland Party since he tried to “deceive conservative voters” by some showcase candidates.⁵⁹⁶ It can be argued that this column provides an example of the changing position of political Islam from an anti-systemic discourse to a more compromised stance by aligning and preparing itself for implementing neo-liberal policies. As another example, in a column dated 1994, Koru criticised the belated adoption of the privatisation law and its insufficient implementation.⁵⁹⁷ In this sense, compared to his oppositional attitude towards liberalization and open market economy in the 1980s, an explicit shift can be observed in Koru’s approach towards neo-liberal agenda.

The shift has become more apparent in terms of his coverage of labour-capital contradictions. In one of his columns, he assessed the country-wide strike organized by three trade union confederation Turk-iş, Hak-iş and Disk and warned the reader about the risk of these kinds of strikes to turn into “political problems which

⁵⁹³ Fehmi Koru, “Yuf olsun”, *Zaman*, 5.12.1994.

⁵⁹⁴ Fehmi Koru, “İhtimaller Sınırlı”, *Zaman*, 13.07.1994.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

devastate social peace”.⁵⁹⁸ Koru also argued that in a world where trade unions lost their powers, it was dangerous to see three trade unions from different ideological backgrounds coming together.⁵⁹⁹ Making an assessment of the ongoing class struggle towards the impacts of April 5 decisions, Koru underlined the importance of “sacrifices” of all segments of the society for the success of the economy package.⁶⁰⁰ This argumentation is also frequently seen in the articles of Hasan Cemal, Mehmet Barlas and Güngör Uras. This is why, this column is also remarkable since it constitutes one of the first instances of articulation of Koru’s Islamist discourse with mainstream neo-liberal discourse in Turkey.⁶⁰¹

Moreover, coming to 2006, Koru’s arguments on economy seemed to be more crystallized. In his column “*What is happening in the Economy*”, he argued that globalization has been an indispensable and irrepressible process which has turned the “butterfly effect” into a reality.⁶⁰² According to Koru, contemporary “globalized” economy has caused national economies to become more interrelated. Moreover, for Koru, there was no measure to prevent this interaction since capital can move without boundaries and affect the countries on its way. After listing a set of neo-liberal policies in Turkey such as the opening up to foreign capital movements and privatisations which were mostly acquired by foreign investors, Koru noted that “we have no objection to [those policies]”.⁶⁰³ For him, although the entrance of foreign investors in Turkey did not turned into a just distribution of

⁵⁹⁸ Fehmi Koru, “Mesajı aldık”, *Zaman*, 21.07.1994.

⁵⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰² Fehmi Koru, “Ekonomide olan, *Yeni Şafak*, 24.06.2006.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*

resources for all, it made “our rich people” richer and the poor have benefited from what was gained by the rich.⁶⁰⁴ It is notable that Koru preferred to use word “nimetlenmek” for benefits of the poor which is a religious word referring blessing or benefaction from the God. This column can also be seen as an example of manifestations of Koru’s compliance with neo-liberal implementations in Turkey.

In another column in 2011, he again underlined the “importance” of being adapted to a new world which was rapidly transforming. As an assessment of 10-year office of the JDP governments, Koru stated that the establishment of the JDP coincided with a global transformation period and JDP has successfully kept pace with the “change”.⁶⁰⁵ For Koru, thanks to the measures taken before and during the JDP governments, Turkey could resist the pressures of global economic crisis. He also argued that the regimes which did not take into account the transformation of the globe were being forced to change by their own people.⁶⁰⁶

As analyses of other selected columnists also revealed, the recontextualization of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey was largely based on the depiction of the state as a problematic and inefficient agent. The same tendency can be seen in Koru’s columns. Although Koru continued to preserve his anti-western discourse and raised some objections on the imposition of neo-liberal policies by the Western “institutions”, he admitted that deregulation of the state and restructuring of the economy are remedies for eliminating “bulky state structure”.⁶⁰⁷ By his words,

The situation is the same for us who are believing the need of getting rid of bulky state structure and yearning for a country where democracy, rights

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁵ Fehmi Koru, “AK Parti ile 10 Yıl”, *Star*, 16.10.2011.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

and freedoms and rule of law are better implemented. Even though “structural reform” will eventually create a country a country in accordance with our desires, we do not like its fulfilment through oppressing political wills and pressure.⁶⁰⁸

The above-mentioned column is important for several reasons since it was written one month after the adoption of “Transition to the Strong Economy Programme” the 2001 Crisis. First of all, despite preserving anti-western elements in his texts, Koru compromised with the essence of the IMF-guided programme. Secondly, as it is seen in his later columns during the JDP governments, Koru tended to play down the role of the IMF in changing economy policies. Koru also justified those policies by saying that the IMF-guided programmes were already admitted by previous governments and the JDP had to follow the agreements to ensure economic and political stability.⁶⁰⁹

Last but not least, Koru’s argumentations about the causes of the 2008 global financial crisis showed a clear convergence with arguments of the mainstream media. Koru, in his column named “*A country in the crisis*”, stated that the US has “given the gift of capitalism to the world, which is based on individual success and private enterprise”.⁶¹⁰

Moreover, for Koru, the economic crisis in the US was a foreseen disaster which occurred due to some wrong implementations in the finance sector. In a sense, Koru seemed to abandon his views about the “structural weaknesses of the Western

⁶⁰⁸ Fehmi Koru, “14 Mayıs düşünceleri”, *Yeni Şafak*, 14.05.2001.

⁶⁰⁹ Fehmi Koru, “Ekonomide olan”, *Yeni Şafak*, 24.06.2006.

⁶¹⁰ Fehmi Koru, “Kriz içinde bir ülke”, *Yeni Şafak*, 24.09.2008.

capitalism” but rather he criticized mistakes in its implementation.⁶¹¹

Changing discursive elements regarding the presentation of the capital and the representatives of the capitalist class: Koru’s approach towards the capitalist class in Turkey has also transformed in time. It can be argued that Koru was critical about TUSIAD for an extended period from the 1980s to the mid-2000s. Particularly during the 1980s, Koru used a very harsh and hostile wording for describing TUSIAD. He depicted TUSIAD as the exploiter of the society. For instance, in his column namely “*Fat cats are on the attack*”, he resembled TUSIAD to a group of fat cats.⁶¹² He also defined TUSIAD as the club of the rich and the Dukedom of Istanbul which “took the gilt of the ginger” (işin kaymağını yiyen).⁶¹³ Koru underlined the power reached by TUSIAD which was even capable of changing the governments in Turkey. One of the interesting analysis of Koru on TUSIAD was that representatives of TUSIAD were getting rich both on the import-substituted and liberal economy periods.⁶¹⁴

In his column namely “*Are the Capitalists Smart?*”, he complained about the attitude of business world towards the JDP government. He clearly stated that 4.5 years of the JDP office was most beneficial to the big bourgeoisie in Turkey since they become much richer. That’s why, for Koru, statements of TUSIAD representatives and particularly those of President Arzuhan Yalcındağ Doğan on the JDP and secularism were not understandable.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁶¹² Fehmi Koru, “Şişman kediler saldırıda”, *Zaman*, 15.08.1989.

⁶¹³ “İşin kaymağını yemek”

⁶¹⁴ Fehmi Koru, “Şişman kediler saldırıda”, *Zaman*, 15.08.1989.

⁶¹⁵ Fehmi Koru, “Kapitalistler akıllı mı?”, *Yeni Şafak*, 10.06.2007.

However, coming to 2006, Koru's approach on TUSIAD also became more moderate. Although Koru continued to use some negative wordings, his main concern was not TUSIAD itself but again its approach towards the JDP. Koru criticized TUSIAD since it was not sufficiently supporting the JDP despite all their gains in the JDP governments. In fact, Koru explicitly stated that the JDP mostly pleased TUSIAD members instead of large masses who made the JDP a governing party.⁶¹⁶

In another column, Koru praised economy policies of the JDP and how it succeeded to open a way for the rich and its further enrichment.⁶¹⁷ Although he mentioned the continuation of unjust income distribution in the society, he affirmed the wealth of the capitalist classes. It is also notable that Koru preferred to use a religious expression as "May God bless your prosperity" to state his consent on the increasing wealth of the rich. Koru stated that "there is no reason to be disturbed about this picture" and "If the wealth of its citizens turns into the wealth of the country, Turkey can even succeed to become an economic giant of the world."⁶¹⁸

The abovementioned compliance can be clearly seen in Koru's columns in 2010. In this sense, from defining TUSIAD as a group of fat cats, Koru came to the point of seeing TUSIAD as an organization which is composed of bourgeoisie who are not just the rich but also well-educated and open-minded people of the country.⁶¹⁹ He also argued that "change and transformation" have always been achieved by the leadership of bourgeoisie all over the world.⁶²⁰ Similarly, from the position of

⁶¹⁶ Fehmi Koru, "İş dünyası ayıp ediyor", *Yeni Şafak*, 28.06.2006.

⁶¹⁷ Fehmi Koru, "Züğürdün çenesi" *Yeni Şafak*, 11.03.2007.

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁹ Fehmi Koru, "Dengeler yeniden oluşurken TUSIAD", *Yeni Şafak*, 18.02.2010.

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*

criticizing women's involvement in labour force, Koru explained how he was pleased with the election of Ümit Boyner as the president of TUSIAD. He stressed that TUSIAD had become aware of the deep-rooted transformation and change occurring in the society during the JDP governments and also finally understood the benefits of supporting the efforts of government for them.⁶²¹

Highlighting “the importance” economic and political stability and “achievements” of the JDP governments: In the 2000s, Koru's coverage of economy policies implemented by the JDP showed a positive bias. Although, in some cases, Koru raised objections about the IMF-guided economy policies and unjust income distribution, he glorified the “achievements” of the JDP in general. For Koru, Turkey was passing through revolutionary changes and transformation under the JDP government.⁶²² Koru explicitly praised the performance of the administration in economy.

In his column, “*Can we become hopeful in the economy?*” in 2007, he defined the economic performance of the country in the last five years as “eye-brightening”.⁶²³ According to him, Turkey performed a sustainable economic development trend which has been rare in the Republic history. He also argued that the Turkish economy has become much more attractive for foreign investment.⁶²⁴

Remarkably, in 2010, Koru stated although the JDP governments paved the way for Anatolian entrepreneurs, it did not damage capital groups in Istanbul and 300 rich

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*

⁶²² *Ibid.*

⁶²³ Fehmi Koru, “Ekonomide umutlanabilir miyiz?”, *Yeni Şafak*, 2.01.2008.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*

families of TUSIAD raised their wealth a few times ⁶²⁵ That is to say, the main argument of this column was to call big capital groups in Turkey to be more supportive for the JDP.

Similarly, in his column, “*The sun cannot be covered with mud*”, he made references to a column of G ng r Uras and used some statistical data to demonstrate achievements of the JDP governments.⁶²⁶ According to Koru, despite harsh conditions of post-Global crisis period, Turkish economy showed a great performance. In this sense, Koru argued that Turkey was World’s second fastest-growing country with an increasing GDP and decreasing unemployment rates.⁶²⁷ Since the picture of the economy was so clear, for him, columnists and commentators who criticized the JDP could only be understood by their ideological obsessions and long-standing political disputes with the views represented by the JDP.⁶²⁸ That’s why they could not accept the defeat and try to subvert the reality.

⁶²⁹

For Koru, even though only some sections of the society were getting rich due to the implemented economy, the JDP government and municipalities made efforts to consider the poor by providing with them social aids and homeless shelters through Social Solidarity Fund. Koru praised social aids of the JDP municipalities such as

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁶ Fehmi Koru, “G ne  Bal ıkla sıvanmaz”, Star, 15.12.2011.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁹ *Ibid.*

coal distribution, life learning courses and foodbanks.⁶³⁰

4.5.3 Language Use

As seen on Figure 6, although he can be seen as a Conservative-Islamist columnist, Koru uses considerably less religious references when compared to Dilipak. Koru, similar to mainstream columnists, frequently uses popular words, stereotypes and evidences (references to statistics and reports etc.). Koru also uses adages, analogies and idioms to support his narration.

It is noteworthy that the tone of religious references has also changed in Koru's texts in time. During the 1980s, Koru criticised neo-liberal policies implemented by Özal since they cause an "erosion" in "traditions, values and morality". However, by the late 1990s and 2000s, Koru seemed to embrace a more moderate language.

⁶³⁰ Fehmi Koru, "Zügürdün çenesi" *Yeni Şafak*, 11.03.2007.




Figure 6: Language use in Fehmi Koru

4.6 Evaluation of the Sample Analysis of Volunteer Group

Findings of this study were controlled by a sample analysis which was carried out by a group of volunteer researchers. Volunteer Group evaluated a total of 39 selected columns of the columnists by using a survey sheet provided by the researcher. (Appendix A.) The main objectives of this sample analysis are to verify the results of CDA made by the researcher, to provide additional insights to the overall assessment of the media texts and to complement the analysis through some quantitative data. Although CDA is generally known as a qualitative analysis method, it is also possible to improve the analysis by quantitative analysis. This is why, the survey sheet provided to the volunteer group includes both open-ended assessment questions and Yes/No questions to ensure a measurement of the overall results.

In this regard, it is possible to argue that quantitative and qualitative results of the sample analysis show a close parallelism with the analysis of the researcher. In terms of the assessments regarding biases of the columns about neo-liberalism, attitude/support towards the discourses and acts of political power-holders and

spokespersons of the capitalist class, language uses and repeatedly used keywords and phrases, the sample analysis provided compatible outcomes with the textual analysis conducted by the researcher as shown below.

In this regard, quantitative data reached by the sample analysis include answers to following questions;

1. Is there any bias towards neo-liberalism (or a specific neo-liberal implementation)? Please mention the position of the author towards those policies. (positive, negative, neutral)

As seen on Figure 7, Volunteer Group has detected a positive bias in the majority of the sample texts with a ratio of 61%. Only 21% of the selected columns shows a negative bias. It should be noted that articles with negative bias largely corresponds with the assessment of the researcher on the columns of Koru, Dilipak and Cemal for the years between 1980-1994. In 27% of the articles, volunteer group did not find any bias towards




Figure 7: Assessment of the Volunteer Group on biases of the sample texts

2. Have you noticed any implicit or explicit message which supports the discourse/acts of those who hold power or capital?




Figure 8: Assessment of the Volunteer Group on messages of the texts towards political power-holders and representatives of the capitalist class

Similarly, in 61% of the survey sheets, Volunteer Group stated that there is an implicit/explicit which supports the discourses and acts of the political power-holders and members of the capitalist class. It can be also noted that the columns which do not include a bias mainly coincides with opponent years of Koru, Dilipak and Cemal during the 1980s.

3. In the text, can you detect any of the following message(s) about neo-liberalism?

Benefiting from a similar CDA study on neo-liberal transformation of Romania⁶³¹ and Steger's analysis on the claims of the globalism, the survey sheet included a set of neo-liberal argumentations and discursive selectivities and asked the Volunteer Group if they detected any arguments/messages regarding neo-liberal economy

⁶³¹ Norman, Fairclough, "Neo-liberalism – a discourse-analytical perspective", 2005, <http://periodicoscientificos.ufmt.br/ojs/index.php/polifonia/article/view/1099/868>

policies. The aim of the question is to find out which discursive elements of the global neo-liberal order of discourse were frequently used by Turkish print media. These questions included:

- Neo-liberalism/free market economy (or a specific neo-liberal policy) is the best economic model/choice.
- Change-reform to neo-liberalism is inevitable and globally accepted.
- There is no other alternative to neo-liberal policies.
- Alternative approaches are wrong and void.
- Turkey will suffer harsh conditions or “miss the train” if it does not implement neo-liberal polic(y)ies.
- Neo-liberalism will boost freedom, equality or democracy in Turkey.
- Capital/capitalist/capitalism/wealth/businessmen is good for the country.
- The state’s involvement in the economy is inefficient.
- The state should regulate and facilitate functioning of the free market.
- Neo-liberalism/neo-liberal policies will cause negative consequences.

In the text, can you detect any of the following message(s) about neoliberalism (or about a specific neoliberal implementation mentioned in the footnote)?




Figure 9: Assessment of the Volunteer Group on messages of the texts about neo-liberalism

As seen on Figure 9, survey sheets filled by the Volunteer Group show that the following four argumentations have been the most frequently used “grounds” to legitimize neo-liberalism.

- Change-reform to neo-liberalism is inevitable and globally accepted.
- Capital/capitalist/capitalism/wealth/businessmen is good for the country.
- Neo-liberalism/free market economy (or a specific neo-liberal policy) is the best economic model/choice.
- There is no other alternative to neo-liberal policies.

These results also show a high level of conformity with the overall assessment of this critical analysis which is presented in detailed in Chapter III.

4. Can you detect any language uses which is used to strengthen the idea of the text?

The analysis of language uses, word selections and sentence structures are also important components of the CDA methodology. In order to measure observations of the Volunteer Group on the language used in the columns, the survey sheet included a list of language uses such as Passive voice, Word Games (Metaphor), Sarcasm, Idiom, Adage, Jokes, Storytelling, Evidence, Vague Reference, Quotation, Religious references, Eastern Words, Western Words, Stereotypes, Popular Words, Extraordinary words, Analogy.

As illustrated by Figure 10, the assessment of the Volunteer Group shows a clear parallelism with that of the researcher. According to the analysis, the most frequently used language uses are stereotypes and popular words, adage, analogy and idioms, evidences and quotations.




Figure 10: Ratio of different language uses

Some examples from the qualitative results of the Sample Analysis can be seen on Appendix C.

CHAPTER 5

AN ASSESSMENT ON THE NEO-LIBERAL DISCOURSE OF COLUMNISTS

Following the presentation of discursive selectivities identified in the textual analysis of selected columnists, a general assessment will be illuminating for the comprehension of them in the socio-economic context. For this pupose, seven main themes are discerned regarding the coverage of neoliberal policies by columnists. These main themes are;

- Glorification of Free Market Economy, Capital and Consumerism
- Articulation of Globalization/Change/New World Order Narratives with Neo-liberal Implementations
- Discrediting of Class Struggle, Class Demands and Leftist worldviews
- Privatisation and anti-statism
- Changing discursive elements on the IMF anchor
- Articulation of Islamist Order of Discourse with Neo-liberal Discourse
- Adaptation to Crises: Economic and Political Stability Narratives

Secondly, findings on word selections, grammatical characteristics and styles in studied texts are examined together with the results of sample analysis conducted by the volunteer group.

Finally, a list of neo-liberal keywords, which have been frequently used by the print media in Turkey for the periods of 1980-2010, is presented.

5.1 Main Conclusions

5.1.1 Glorification of Free Market Economy, Capital and Consumerism

5.1.1.1 Free Market Economy

Advocacy of free market economy and particularly the 24 January Decisions have been crucial nodal points of Turkish print media's neo-liberal discourse particularly during the 1980s. Findings of this empirical study reveals that, for particularly the mainstream columnists, the 24 January Decisions and the 1980 Military Coup turned into symbolic signs of the neo-liberal discourse. It can also be observed that the coverage of the 24 January Decisions was not limited to event pertinent rather, it is presented as one of the celebrated milestones of Turkey's neo-liberal transformation through all attempts during the 1990s.⁶³²

Furthermore as exemplified below, economic measures of the 24 January decisions were presented as a continuation of free market approach embraced by the Democrat Party and considered as irreversible steps.⁶³³ According to Uras, free market economy was an "unchangeable habit" of Turkey.⁶³⁴ Uras underlined the "respect and trust of Turkish people to the Army" which would enable Özal to implement economic measures without any hinder.⁶³⁵ Similarly, Barlas celebrated the 24 Decisions anniversary as a Festival⁶³⁶ and expressed his gratitude to the

⁶³² See Hasan Cemal, "Ekonomide iyimser beklentiler yükselirken", *Milliyet*, 23.12.1999, Hasan Cemal, "Ecevit 20 yıl önce 20 yıl sonra", *Milliyet*, 25.12.1999, Mehmet Barlas, "Balıklar da Bazen denizi anlamayabilir", *Sabah*, 24.01.1994.

⁶³³ Güngör Uras, "Özel sektöre ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine inanmak", *Dünya*, 17.01.1985.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁵ Güngör Uras, "Hükümet Programı", *Dünya*, 20.12.1983.

⁶³⁶ Mehmet Barlas, "24 Ocak Bayramı", *Sabah*, 24.01.1982

Turkish Army regarding the Military administration's successes.⁶³⁷

Moreover, changing patterns in the advocacy of free market economy in the print media shows a parallelism with the evolution of dominant global neo-liberal discourse. As discussed before, the dominant neo-liberal discourse has not been a *fait accompli* but it has passed through a set of changes. Neo-liberal Conservative discourse which was based on Friedmanist pure free market motto became dominant particularly during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Following Asia and Latin America Crises in the late 1990s, neo-liberal structuralist and regulationist accounts started to gain weight in particularly international organization's agenda such as World Bank and the IMF. These accounts aimed to promote deregulation policies and establishment of regulatory bodies and control mechanisms to protect "competition" environment by the state.

In line with the abovementioned changes in dominant neo-liberal discourse, this empirical study on Turkish print media reveals that advocacy of free market in Turkey also has changed in time. Until the mid of 1990s, the power of market⁶³⁸ and "the power of competition"⁶³⁹ were praised by columnists in the mainstream media as the main driving forces of the economy, prices and development. The only role to be played by the state was depicted as to remove the obstacles before the functioning of the free market.⁶⁴⁰ As Yalman also states, the existence of a state tradition was presented as an impediment on the development of private sector and

⁶³⁷ Mehmet Barlas, "Evren'in sözleri", *Sabah*, 20.06.1983

⁶³⁸ Güngör Uras, "Ekonomideki değişim devlet adamı tipini de değiştirdi", *Sabah*, 29.07.1990.

⁶³⁹ Hasan Cemal, "Kafası karışık olmayan bu yazıyı okumasın", *Milliyet*, 26.12.1999.

⁶⁴⁰ Güngör Uras, "Ekonomideki değişim devlet adamı tipini de değiştirdi", *Sabah*, 29.07.1990.

structural adjustment of the economy, which prevents “internal and external equilibrium” and efficient use of resource.⁶⁴¹

In this sense, Barlas’s case shows that free market economy was described as a way of removing limits set by the state on “creativity and potential success” of people.⁶⁴² Following the collapse of Soviet Bloc, tones of texts on free market turned to be much more confident. For instance, those who opposed to free market economy and liberalization were even called as “idiots”, “morons”, “old”, “ignorant” and “obsessive”.⁶⁴³ Cemal identified the state as a “millstone around the neck” and a resource of “corruption, bribery and distorted politics”.⁶⁴⁴ For Cemal, “there is no alternative to market economy” and competition is the driving force of the century.⁶⁴⁵

However, coming to the late 1990s, regulationist neo-liberal discourse replaced those views with the advocacy of a strong, efficient and effective state. In parallel with these developments, the “need” of reforming market economy came to the agenda of mainstream columnists. For instance, in contrast to his anti-statist pure free market advocacy in the early 1990s, Cemal started to complain about the accounts which understood free market economy as “irregularity”.⁶⁴⁶ While Cemal asserted that free market economy was unrivalled in 1994, he flattered the reform

⁶⁴¹ Yalman, *Transition to Neo-liberalism*, p.9.

⁶⁴² Mehmet Barlas, “Büyük kentte yaşamak ayrıcalığı”, *Sabah*, 17.04.2010.

⁶⁴³ See Mehmet Barlas, “Hem para kazanılan hem de harcanılan ülke olmak”, *Sabah*, 6.01.1994.

Mehmet Barlas, “Yabancı sermaye vazgeçilmez bir kaynaktır”, *Sabah*, 10.08.2006.

⁶⁴⁴ Hasan Cemal, “Özelleştirme: Devleti ekonomide küçültmeden bir yere varılamaz”, *Milliyet*, 23.06.1994.

⁶⁴⁵ Hasan Cemal, “Kafası karışık olmayan bu yazıyı okumasın”, *Milliyet*, 26.12.1999.

⁶⁴⁶ Hasan Cemal, “İflas eşiğine gelmeden olmuyor”, *Milliyet*, 22.06.2002.

agenda of the global capitalism in 1999 as a loyal follower of Davos Summit.⁶⁴⁷ For him, the only words of champions of the globalization were “reform” and to ensure “smiling/happy” globalization.⁶⁴⁸ In another column, Cemal mentioned the need of supranational bodies which would check over the competition to prevent inequalities and injustice developments in the world.⁶⁴⁹

Free Market Economy was also presented as a way of achieving democracy, human rights and freedoms. It has been observed that free market economy and democracy were occasionally covered as two inseparable/interbedded components of the new world order.⁶⁵⁰

In this sense, another important argumentation for advocating free market economy was its so-called “correcting” impact not only on the economy but also on the politics. For instance, Barlas argued that thanks to the free market, political crises were being funded easily.⁶⁵¹ Barlas described free market economy as a “shock absorber of a car” and a “steam release vent of the pressure cooker” which prevents adverse impacts of political crises.⁶⁵²

5.1.1.2 Changing Attitude Towards Capital/Capitalists/Wealth

It can be argued that in the climate of rising class struggle, the visibility and image of richness and businessmen were portrayed as causing adverse effects on

⁶⁴⁷ Hasan Cemal, “Bilgi çağı kaçmasın, tarihi yakalayalım!”, *Milliyet*, 2.02.1999.

⁶⁴⁸ Hasan Cemal, “Davos'tan”, *Milliyet*, 30.01.1999.

⁶⁴⁹ Hasan Cemal, “Kafası karışık olmayan bu yazıyı okumasın”, *Milliyet*, 26.12.1999.

⁶⁵⁰ Mehmet Barlas, “Farkında mıyız? Yeni bir dünya düzeni kuruluyor!”, *Sabah*, 18.02.1997, Hasan Cemal, “Kafası karışık olmayan bu yazıyı okumasın”, *Milliyet*, 26.12.1999.

⁶⁵¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Serbest pazar sayesinde siyasi krizlerimiz kolayca fonlanıyor”, *Sabah*, 10.07.2008.

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*

democratic developments by considerable segments of the Turkish media during the 1970s. As Rifat Bali states, the visibility of businessmen was also quite restricted in the print media in the 1970s.⁶⁵³ In this sense, the current analysis on columnists shows that the changing ownership relations in the media, as well as the strategies of the capitalist classes to increase their visibility, have dramatically affected the coverage of members of capitalist classes and richness in the print media. To put it another way, glorification of the capital, capitalist class and wealth of some segments of the society have been major concern and subject matter of the print media for the whole analysed period of 1980-2010. In this regard, mainstream columnists played a key role. Moreover, this analysis also shows that Islamist columnists have made efforts for legitimizing increasing income inequalities in the society and wealth of certain segments from the mid-1990s and particularly in the 2000s.

To start with, as Uras underlined in his book “*The Factory Producing Ideas- the first ten years of TUSIAD 1970-1980*”, the period between 1970 and 1980 were the years when the business world and the media were relatively disconnected.⁶⁵⁴ Uras explained the strategies that he implemented as the General Secretary of TUSIAD to change the bad image of the “rich” in the society.⁶⁵⁵ Two of these strategies were to develop links between business world and print media particularly by bringing together the big bosses and the columnists and to use newspaper advertisements as a political pressure on governments with the help of advertising agents.⁶⁵⁶

Besides attempts of TUSIAD to become more visible in the print media, the key element which has affected the coverage of capital/capitalist classes and wealth in the print media has been the changing ownership relations in the post-1980 era.

⁶⁵³ Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a.*, p.35.

⁶⁵⁴ Berker and Uras, *Fikir Üreten Fabrika: TUSIAD*, p.158.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.157.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.174.

Changing ownership relations as well as the emerging fusion among the media and the representatives of the capital class and political power have been crucial factors on the increasing representation of the capital and the rich in the print media.

There have been two main themes of this coverage. First, the capital and foreign capital were frequently described as driving forces of wealth and economic growth which were depicted as “the most rational and effective” agents in economic terms. For instance, Barlas defined foreign capital as “indispensable resources” for which Turkey should remove all bureaucratic obstacles.⁶⁵⁷ Barlas argued that “if one wants to increase welfare and employment and to offer better public services, foreign sector should not be a subject of “ideological and obsessive” debates”.⁶⁵⁸ Similarly, in his column supporting the opening of mining to private sector, Uras argued that those who opposed liberalization were living “in a world of dream” and could not understand the realities of the time.⁶⁵⁹

The second theme was the praise of the wealth and businessmen in the print media. As Rıfat Bali rightly underlines, “being rich” has turned into a glorified objective in the print media.⁶⁶⁰ For instance, starting from 1980, Barlas published interviews with businessmen and their recommendations on the country. (Clipping 2) He also frequently emphasised his close relations with businessmen, and his dinners, yacht tours and holidays that he spent with rich people. For Barlas, wealthy families in Turkey were going abroad for new year holiday because “the voice of morons, enemies of wealth are louder” in Turkey. Barlas stated that rational countries should protect rich and successful people and profitable firms should be supported by the society since they have become crucial for the growth of the country.⁶⁶¹ Moreover,

⁶⁵⁷ Mehmet Barlas, “Yabancı sermaye vazgeçilmez bir kaynaktır”, *Sabah*, 10.08.2006.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁹ Güngör Uras, “Madenler özel sektöre açılmalıdır”, *Dünya*, 30.03.1985.

⁶⁶⁰ Rıfat Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a.*, p.33.

⁶⁶¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Hem para kazanılan hem de harcanılan ülke olmak”, *Sabah*, 6.01.1994.

the case studies of Uras and Barlas provided a plenty of examples which show the role of columnists in establishing organic bonds between the media bosses, the representatives of the capital class and the political power.



Clipping 2: Interview with Vehbi Koç by Mehmet Barlas

Source: 21 January 1980, Milliyet

Interestingly, this study shows that Islamist columnists have also been concerned with the legitimization of increasing income inequality in the society and increasing capital accumulation of the capitalist “Muslims”. In line with their changing discursive selectivities towards neo-liberalism in the 1990s, Islamist columnists developed religious references to advocate increasing capital accumulation in conservative segments. For instance, Dilipak wrote lots of columns in the 2000s to discuss the place of wealth in Islam.⁶⁶² As it was noted in Chapter II, Dilipak

⁶⁶² See Abdurrahman Dilipak, “İslam’da Servetin Yeri” Tartışması”, Yeni Akit, 18.12.2010, Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Kim daha dindar”, Yeni Akit, 16.10.2011., Dilipak, Abdurrahman, “Zengin Olmak”, Yeni Akit, 3.12.2011.

himself was allegedly at the centre of business relationship of the so-called green capital in the post-1990s era.

Dilipak's effort on legitimizing wealth has become apparent in his eclectic conceptualization of "the capitalist" during the 2000s. Dilipak defines a capitalist as the one who attributes much importance to money.⁶⁶³ According to Dilipak, one who lives with minimum wage but sells out his friend for money is a "capitalist", while a wealthy man who earns and spends his money in a Halal way is not an acquisitive and not a capitalist.⁶⁶⁴ In other words, the term "Capitalist" has been used for a person who is acquisitive and money grubber.

In this sense, income inequalities among people have been described as a testing of Allah on the earth. In his column, "*The Debate on the place of the Wealth in Islam*", he argued that Kuran-ı Kerim consists of references and explanations on the poor and the rich and there is not any negative attribution to the wealth of the Prophets Suleyman, Eyyup and Ibrahim.⁶⁶⁵ Moreover, Dilipak argued that the wealth of a person should not be made "a matter of debate" if he fulfils the requirements of Islam and earns and spends in a Halal way.⁶⁶⁶ Similarly, Fehmi Kuru seemed to change his stance towards the rich and increasing wealth of capitalist classes in the society by the late 1990s and 2000s. While Kuru attacked harshly on big businesses in Turkey, for instance TUSIAD by calling them "fat cats" in 1989,⁶⁶⁷ he attempted to legitimize wealth of businessmen coming to the JDP governments' era. It is also

⁶⁶³ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Sağcı Müslüman Olursa Solcusu Da Olur!", *Yeni Akit*, 22.06.2012.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁵ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "İslam'da Servetin Yeri" Tartışması", *Yeni Akit*, 18.12.2010

⁶⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁷ Fehmi Kuru, "Şişman kediler saldırıda", *Zaman*, 15.08.1989.

remarkable that he used a religious expression as “May God bless your prosperity” to state his consent on the increasing wealth of the rich in 2007.⁶⁶⁸

5.1.1.3 Consumerism

Development of neo-liberal discourse in Turkey has not been limited to advocacy of certain neo-liberal policies or praise of the capital. Integration of Turkish economy to the global markets also required production and development of new themes to introduce new consuming habits. For that purpose, utilization of new advertising techniques has been combined with the mass media’s fully-fledged consumerist propaganda. Particularly during the 1990s, the mainstream newspapers acted as a sort of marketing bulletins with daily coupons of a wide spectrum of goods.

Columnists’ role played in introducing and flattering consumerism in the 1990s and 2000s is very striking. One of the frequently highlighted themes in mainstream columns were the consumption of luxury items and import-oriented goods. This empirical study conducted in this thesis identifies two main argumentations regarding glorification of consumerism. First of all, consumption is introduced as a sign of welfare, civilization and modernization.⁶⁶⁹ And secondly, it is argued that increasing consumption and wealth of upper classes of society is for the benefit of everyone.⁶⁷⁰

In this regard, Uras and Barlas provided most typical examples of the consumerist propaganda. Barlas stressed “privilege of living in a metropole” as increasing

⁶⁶⁸ Fehmi Kuru, “Züğürdün çenesi” *Yeni Şafak*, 11.03.2007.

⁶⁶⁹ Mehmet Barlas, “Büyük kentte yaşamak ayrıcalığı”, *Sabah*, 14.01.1994.

⁶⁷⁰ Mehmet Barlas, “Hem para kazanılan hem de harcanılan ülke olmak”, *Sabah*, 6.01.1994

opportunities for “consumption”.⁶⁷¹ According to Barlas, the only objective of finance capital was to create demand in the market and “the criterion of civilisation was consumption.”⁶⁷² Similarly, Uras frequently introduced and glorified a new lifestyle based on consumption of new brands that provided by new shopping malls. He argued that consumption opportunities were the promises of capitalism to young people which was more realistic than promises of communism.⁶⁷³ Rıfat Bali’s previously-mentioned study also provides a lot of examples from columnists’ glorification of luxury lifestyle, which support the findings of this current analysis.⁶⁷⁴

5.1.2 Articulation of Neo-liberal Discourse with Change/New World Order and Globalization Narratives

As widely observed, following the collapse of Soviet Bloc and the end of cold war, on both global and national scales, neo-liberal discourses were articulated with a strong narrative on the “irreversible and indispensable globalization”.⁶⁷⁵ Combined with “the end of the history” thesis,⁶⁷⁶ proponents of neo-liberalism declared the ultimate victory of the capitalism as the only rational way of human’s economic activities. It can be argued that by the start of 1990s, neo-liberal discourse entered its most powerful era. Findings of this thesis and empirical evidence confirms that this was also valid for the Turkish case.

⁶⁷¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Büyük kentte yaşamak ayrıcalığı”, *Sabah*, 14.01.1994.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*

⁶⁷³ Güngör Uras, “Milletler kapitalist oluyor komünistler-sosyalistler kaybediyor”, *Dünya*, 23.06.1983.

⁶⁷⁴ Rıfat Bali, *Tarz-ı Hayat'tan Life Style'a..*

⁶⁷⁵ Steger, “Ideologies of globalization”, p.13.

⁶⁷⁶ See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, 1-18.

In fact, in Turkey, the years 1990s were challenging for the production of neo-liberal hegemony in Turkey. The country passed through a hegemony crisis in the environment of changing coalition governments. However, neo-liberal transformation of the mass media and increasing ownership of big capital groups in media sector resulted in an increasing political parallelism in the print media in the 1990s. Although support of the mainstream media towards Özal's neo-liberal agenda was not yet fully assured during the 1980s,⁶⁷⁷ as Adaklı underlines, by the 1990s, media's attitude in this respect almost completely changed.⁶⁷⁸

As previously pointed out, number of the print media outlets had witnessed a boom. Similarly, socio-economic situations and income levels of the columnists during the 1990s also significantly increased. Columnists in the print media actively supported the implementation of neo-liberal policies in Turkey. In this respect, this research displays that the coverage of neo-liberal economy policies changed dramatically during the 1990s. In other words, tone of texts on neo-liberal policies has become much clearer and almost fully supportive in the mainstream media. This pattern was also valid for the Islamist media as it will be analysed.

Findings of this thesis, as well as the sample analysis by the volunteer group, reveal that the concepts of *change/new world and new world order* become key discursive selectivities of the neo-liberal discourse of Turkish print media by the 1990s. By the collapse of Soviet Bloc, proponents of free market declared that “the globalization is an undeniable, irreversible and indispensable change.” This argumentation turned into a repeatedly used slogan and had been a common point for the mainstream and Islamist media in Turkey.

In this regard, the word “change” has been frequently used with a positive, progressive meaning to legitimize and depict the structural adjustment policies such as; deregulation, integration to the world economy, public management reforms,

⁶⁷⁷ Kaya, *İktidar Yumağı*, p.256.

⁶⁷⁸ Adaklı, *Türkiye'de Medya Endüstrisi*, p.

and privatisation and almost for all neo-liberal implementations. All analysed columnists presented “globalization” as an irreversible change that one should adapt to. Cemal’s following sentence, which he wrote in one of Davos’s summit visits, can be seen as a very typical example of this argumentation:

All these people that I listen to and ask questions stated how fast the world is changing, and the importance of adapting to this change as a business, as an organisation, as country and people. Their common denominator was change and reform... The word that they couldn’t do without is “change” as I said before.⁶⁷⁹

Not only the state but also all companies, institutions and the whole society were expected to adapt to the “change”. Columnists called young people to adapt their career objectives and lifestyles to the changing world order and to become more flexible candidates for the labour market. In this sense, Uras mentioned about a new generation of professionals, so-called “Yuppie”s, in his columns and explained in detailed their lifestyles and professional career paths with a positive bias.⁶⁸⁰ Moreover, the arguments on “globalization” have been also important discursive elements for Islamist columnists in justifying their changing approaches towards neo-liberalism and their compliance with the capitalist mode of production. The textual analyses on Dilipak and Koru show that their arguments globalization in the 1990s and 2000s are quite similar with their colleagues in the mainstream media as discussed below.

Another important aspect of the utilization of “globalization/change/new world order” narratives *was to warn/threaten readers about the danger of resisting the “change”*. This study reveals that the readers were warned about the consequences of not “changing” in differing tones. Columnists argued that Turkey would either

⁶⁷⁹ Hasan Cemal, “Bilgi çağı kaçmasın, tarihi yakalayalım!”, *Milliyet*, 2.02.1999.

⁶⁸⁰ See Güngör Uras, “Milletler kapitalist oluyor komünistler-sosyalistler kaybediyor”, *Dünya*, 23.06.1983, Güngör Uras, “Euroyuppies”, *Dünya*, 6.5.1985.

“miss the train” or would be punished for not adapting to this “new world order”. In a sense, the process of globalization was depicted as a must step for Turkey’s economic and social development. In this regard, Barlas showed the examples of Iraq and Yugoslavia as countries which resisted the “change” and “were punished by the international community”.⁶⁸¹ He also argued that even a super power like the Soviet Union collapsed since it could not adapt to “change”. Similarly, Uras argued that Turkey “cannot do what it wanted in its Misak-ı Milli” anymore and the new world would not allow this as well.⁶⁸² Cemal and Barlas also frequently used the metaphor of “missing the train” and “missing a historical opportunity” arguments. Similarly, Cemal in his article, “*Don’t let the information age be missed, catch-up the history!*”, exemplified Russia’s adaptation to the new world order. Cemal also argued that “there is no food to the unchanged in this world”⁶⁸³

5.1.3 Privatisation and Anti-Statism

By the early 1990, privatisation policies turned into one of the most controversial issues in the print media. Contradicting approaches of political parties, cancellations of privatisation tenders by judicial decisions, and increasing involvement of the owners of the mass media were key elements of the debates. As Bedirhanoğlu and Arın point out privatization process can be evaluated “as political and ideological moments within which a particular perception of social reality is reproduced in opposition to others.”⁶⁸⁴ In this sense, “the ideological

⁶⁸¹ Mehmet Barlas, “Yeniden Yapılanma Her Alanda Şarttır”, *Yeni Şafak*, 2.02.2001.

⁶⁸² G ng r Uras, “Deđiřime direnenler”, *Sabah*, 1.4.1994., G ng r Uras, “Toplumun deđiřime direncini kim kıracak?”, *Sabah*, 25 Eyl l 1995.

⁶⁸³ Hasan Cemal, “Bilgi  ađı ka masın, tarihi yakalayalım!”, *Milliyet*, 2.02.1999.

⁶⁸⁴ Merih Arın and Pınar Bedirhanođlu, “Privatization processes as ideological moments: The block sales of large-scale state enterprises in Turkey in the 2000s,” *New Perspectives on Turkey - Special Issue on Turkey’s Experience with Neo-liberal Policies and Globalization*, No. 47 | Fall 2012, p.142.

power” of neo-liberal claims on privatisation have not only stemmed from their reproduction by neo-liberals theoretically, but several actors also “internalized in the real processes of privatization” in many cases.⁶⁸⁵ It is possible to argue that the Turkish print media and particularly columnists have been key actors of this “internalization” or “recontextualization” process.

In such as context, privatisation has also become one of the most controversial issues for columnists. Particularly from the mid-1990s, privatisation has turned into a major discursive selectivity for their coverage of neo-liberal policies. Two aspects of the presentation of privatisation policies by columnists are remarkable. First of all, “anti-statist views” were crystallized and mostly utilized in privatisation discussions, and secondly, privatisation has become one of the first issues on which judicial decisions were discredited and degraded in the last three decades (see an example on Clipping 3).

In this regard, anti-statism has been one of the central elements of print media’s coverage of privatisation policies. Allegations on the state’s inefficient involvement in the economy and the burden of SOEs on the national economy have also become main arguments of the columnists. It is observed that columnists set a direct conditionality between privatisation and combatting against poverty and injustice.⁶⁸⁶ For instance, Cemal asserted that without saving the state from the “hunchback” of SOEs, “it is impossible to get rid of poverty”.⁶⁸⁷ For him, privatisation was a “vital struggle” and “sine qua non” for Turkey’s economic growth.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.143.

⁶⁸⁶ Hasan Cemal, “Hesap Kitap”, *Milliyet*, 4.06.2005.

⁶⁸⁷ Hasan Cemal, “Yolsuzluk yılanının başını ezmek için”, *Milliyet*, 27.06.2001.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

It has been also observed that antagonisms such as old/new, rational/irrational, effective/cumbersome and ignorance/broad vision were used to depict the differences between the state and private sector.⁶⁸⁹ Strikingly, columnists employed in the mainstream media depict economic “inefficiency” of the state by making references to implementations from the period of Ottoman Empire. In columns of Cemal, Uras and Barlas, involvement of the state in the economy was degraded by examples of “Arpalık” which is a term used for “allowances of Ottoman officials” a way of the benefice.⁶⁹⁰ Similar to the utilization of “Arpalık”, “Ulufe” was used to criticize the increases in salaries of retired and the minimum wage, which has negative connotations in the Turkish language.⁶⁹¹

On the other hand, decisions of administrative courts and Supreme Court during the 1990s were systematically degraded by the print media. They were accused of delaying privatisation process and causing a large amount of deficit in the economy. Particularly the decision of Supreme Court in 1994 was harshly criticized by the print media. In this regard, textual analysis on Barlas’s columns provides a plenty of examples about the degradation of judicial decisions. Barlas criticized the Supreme Court due to its decision on the cancellation of Telekom privatisation with a high tone of sarcasm and irritation.⁶⁹² The main arguments of Barlas were “economic inefficiency” of SOEs, “ignorance of Turkish political parties” about the changes in the world, “insufficiencies” of the judicial system and how anti-neo-liberal views were causing damages to the economy.⁶⁹³ For Barlas, views against

⁶⁸⁹ Mehmet Barlas, “21’inci yüzyıl, “Türk asrı” olacaktır!..”, *Sabah*, 22.01.1997.

⁶⁹⁰ Mehmet Barlas, “Balıklar da Bazen denizi anlamayabilir”, *Sabah*, 24.01.1994., Mehmet Barlas “Ordu da, yargı da globalleşmek zorunda”, *Sabah*, 4.01.1994.

⁶⁹¹ Hasan Cemal, “Ulufe değil, hesap kitap zamanı”, *Milliyet*, 7.01.2003.

⁶⁹² Mehmet Barlas, “Bu güzel vatanda özelleştirme yapılır mı”, *Sabah*, 23.07.1994.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid.*

privatisation were based on old-fashioned and sceptical clichés.⁶⁹⁴ Similarly, Cemal wrote columns about the cost of delays in privatisation. He argued that there had left no endurance to any even minor delay in privatisation.⁶⁹⁵ In this sense, Cemal stated that the cost of the delay was 6 Billion Dollar and nationalism should not cause the escape of 6 Billion Dollar from the country.⁶⁹⁶



Clipping 3: Cost of the cancellation is 618 Trillion Liras! (İptalin maliyeti 618 Trilyon Lira)

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁵ Hasan Cemal, “Bir uçurumun kenarından dönerken”, *Milliyet*, 6.12.2000.

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Source: 9 July 1994, Sabah

Moreover, this study reveals that privatisation issue is the first and most important element of the articulation of Islamist discourse with neo-liberal claims. Even in 1994, Koru complained about the late adoption of privatisation law and its inefficient implementation. Koru stated that “Privatisation law is finally adopted; however, it has not still attained a profound implementation. Political power cannot overcome the problems and the opposition cannot go out of its own agenda.”⁶⁹⁷ Similarly, in a comparative news in *Zaman*, privatisation was also covered a must for Turkish economy on which Turkey had even behind Bulgaria.⁶⁹⁸ (Clipping 4)

Ekonomik reformları gerçekleştirmekte zorlanan ülkemiz, özelleştirmede Bulgaristan'ın gerisinde kalacak

Bulgaristan özelleştirmede cesur

ABDÜLHAMİD SİRDARLI
İSTANBUL (ZAMAN)- Doğu Avrupa ve Balkanlar'da çok yakın zamanda kültür ekonomisi alanında atılacaklar örnek alan bir ülke komünizm ekle oler Türkiye, artık üzerinde yapılan bir komisyon tarafından oluşturulmuş bu birleşiklikleri gerçekleştirmekte çok hızlı, bulgar ülkelerine örnek olma özelliğini giderek kaybediyor.

Yatırı serim komisyonu jürisiyle altında beş onen ülkelerin özelleştirme konusunda kanunların maddesi ve bu süreçte gerçekleştirilen kanunlar, tabiri caza, bulgaristan, bu konuda yavaş ilerleyen Türkiye'nin uluslararası piyasalarda karşılaştığı rekabette artırmak bekleniyor. Şimdi zorunlu devleşiklik denemesinden geçen büyük ülke ülkelerini bir an önce ülke seküler devşirdi, ekonomideki devlet payını azaltmayı istemeyi bekliyor.

DEVLETÇİLİKTEN DAHA KOLAY VAZGEÇTİLER
50'li yıllarda açılan sağız olan ve artık dünya bir emperyalara karşı vermiş bütün illahilerin birde gerçekleştirmeye çalıştığı projeler arasında birinci sırada yer alan özelleştirme komisyonu Bulgaristan'ın bile Türkiye'den daha azak ve kararı dikkatle gözetim kaçıyor. Bulgaristan Maliye Bakanı İsmail Alexandrov, en yavaşlık fiyat seküleri beklerken, özelleştirme gerçekleştirmeye kararlı oldukları söylüyor. Maliye Bakanı 100 işletmeyi kapsayan bir özelleştirme listesi hazırladılar. İhtaki bu listeye girenlerin işletmelerine yönelik herhangi bir talep vardı çıkıyorsa, liste dışında da özelleştirme sürecinin hızlandırılmasını bekliyor.

Bulgaristan'ın özelleştirme süreci tabii emeli emelleri göre, işletmelerin yüzde 20'ni çıkararak satılmak zorunda. Devlet ancak Milli Hava Yolları gibi çok büyük işletmelerde yüzde 20 de 50 oranında devşim kaçık bir para satıp çıkılabilecek. Bulgaristan'da bankaların da özelleştirme süreci tamamlandı, kanun Meclis gündeminde bekliyor.

4 AYDA ÖZELLEŞTİRME
Bulgaristan'da özelleştirme işlemleri arasında

TÜRKİYE HÂLÂ TARTIŞIYOR:
Son 10 yılda ağızlarına sakız olan özelleştirme konusunda Türkiye'de henüz şeffaf ve tutarlı bir politika ortaya konamaz, özelleştirmeyi savunular vatana ihanetle, karşı çıkımlar dinazorlukta suplanırken, ülkemizin gerçekleştirdiği ekonomik atılımın kendisine örnek alan Bulgaristan bu konuda Türkiye'den daha cesur çıktı.



Bulgaristan Devlet Başkanı İsmail Jelyu

devredilebiliyor. Özelleştirmeyle ilgili kanun, kanun yönetimine yavaş ve keyfi kanunlar eme imi vermiyor. Kanuna göre, ilgili bakanlık veya Özelleştirme Acentası kendisine ulaşan bir teklifi en geç 1 ay içinde değerlendirmek, onaylar veya reddetmek zorunda olmak zorunda.

YUNANISTAN TÜRKİYE'Yİ SOLLADI
Yaklaşık 8.5 milyon nüfusa sahip Bulgaristan'da nüfus rakamları göre 850 bin Türk buluyor, aynı Türkler ve diğer Müslüman grupların toplam nüfus nüfusunun yüzde 12.7'nini oluşturuyor. **Bulgar Cumhuriyetçileri Jelyu,**

Karadeniz Ekonomisi İşbirliği çerçevesinde de ortak çalışmaları Bulgaristan'ın ammanındaki iyi bilgileri sadece Bulgaristan'a değil, bütün dünyaya örnek olmasın gösterdiğini söylüyor. Bunun bu olmasın harayın rağmen Bulgaristan'ın 1993 yılı da ticaretinde Yunanistan'ın Türkiye'yi soldaması Türk işadamlarını üzmesi gerekten bir tablo ortaya koyuyor. 1993 yılında Türkiye-Bulgaristan toplam ticaret hacmi 129 milyon dolarken, aynı yıl içinde Yunanistan-Bulgaristan ticaret hacmi 400 milyon dolar olarak gerçekleşti. Ayrıca 1994'den bu yana Yunanistan'ın bu türkiye ticareti lehine faaliyetlerini, Türkiye'nin ticareti aleyhine açık veriyor.

KÖTÜ İŞADAMLARI İMAJ KAYBETTİRİYOR
Bulgaristan Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanı **Bogdan Bogdanov**, ülkede yatırımlar yapmak isteyen Türk firmaların köklü negatif görüşlere tabii olarak atıldıkları söylemlerine, onların arzularıyla çalışmaları gerçekleştirmeye çalışıyor. Bogdanov'un Türk firmaların bir başka tavsiyesi de Bulgar firmalarıyla ortaklık kurmaları.

Bulgaristan Maliye Bakanı Alexandrov da ülkede tabii olarak çalışan Türk işadamlarından şikayetlerini söylüyor. Bu tür köklü negatif görüşlerin gerçek Türk işadamlarının ticareti gerçekleştirmeye beklenen Bakan Alexandrov, Bulgar piyasalarını gösteren taraftan zayıflığını da belirtiyor. Üstelik, Türk işletmelerinden Bulgaristan'da çok fazla kumkayın, engelemlerinde bulunan işletmelerin ifade ediyor.

çalışmaları yapacakları teklifler bulabiliyor. fakat son 50 yıldır kapıları yabancı yatırımcıya kapalı tutan bu ülkede yabancı yatırımcılara da özelleştirme sürecini bulmaları imkânı tanıyor. Bulgaristan'daki işletmelerin ilgili yabancı yatırımcılar ya dışardan devşim bulabiliyor, ya da dolaylı olarak işletme yöneticileri veya çalışanları tarafından satın alınıyor. Ülkede mahalleden sürekli olarak işletmelerin satın alınıyor. Bulgaristan'da çok hızlı devşim satıp işletmeler için bile yabancılar köklü veriliyor, çalışmaları ayrıca parlaya satılmadığı takdirde yabancılar tarafından alınabiliyor ve işletmelerin üzerinde kurulduğu şirketlerin emeliyle yabancı bir şirkete

kurulan adı Özelleştirme Acentası. Bu kurumda önemli kararlar 6'nı Meclis, 5'i hükümetin atadığı yetkililerle oluşan Yönetim Kurulu tarafından alınıyor. Özelleştirme Acentası'nın gerçekleştirdiği satışlar, satın almak ve emsal kanunlar kanun önce Parlamento Özelleştirme Komisyonu'na, daha sonra da Parlamento Genel Kurulu'na sunuluyor. Özelleştirme projelerini hazırlanması, karar verilmesi, satım ilan edilmesi, işletmeye resmen devşim, emsal kanunlar ve satım emsal kanunları 6-8 ay kadar zaman alıyor.

YABANCI LARA SUNULAN AVANTAJLAR
Bulgaristan'da normal olarak özelleştirme süreci işletmelerin bağladığı idareler ve diğer

Clipping 4: Bulgaria is brave in privatising (Bulgaristan özelleştirmede cesur)

Source: 11 July 1994, Zaman

5.1.4 Discrediting Class Struggle, Class Demands and Left-wing Parties

The analysis of columns both by the researcher and the Volunteer Group has shown that discrediting of the class struggle has been a common discursive element in the

⁶⁹⁷ Fehmi Koru, “Yuf olsun”, *Zaman*, 5.12.1994.

⁶⁹⁸ “Bulgaristan Özelleştirmede Cesur”, *Zaman*, 11.07.1994.

selected columnists. In this sense, the columnists, particularly those employed in the mainstream media showed a political parallelism with the strategic selectivities of the state and political authorities to discredit class struggle, class demands and leftist views. For instance, columnists deployed efforts to discredit actions of class, particularly strikes and attempted to present them as a burden for the rest of the society. With regards to the Islamist columnists, same pattern is observed in their columns in the late 1990s and 2000s.

In this regard, this study identifies three discursive selectivities regarding the degradation of the class struggle by columnists;

- Neo-liberal policies are depicted as necessary measures for the long-term well-being of the economy so working classes should be more responsible in their demands,
- Demands of the working classes are presented as a burden for the rest of the society
- Communism, socialism, trade unions and left-wing parties are shown as “no longer alternative”

5.1.4.1 Depiction of Neo-Liberal Policies as Necessary Measures for the Long-Term Well-Being of the Economy

First of all, cuts in public expenditures and pressures on wage income were covered as policies which would show their positive impacts in the long term. In this sense, working classes were asked to sacrifice for the sake of long-run stability and recovery of the economy by columnists. As a “left-liberal” columnist, even Cemal argued that increasing wages could not provide a solution for the poverty. For him, working classes must behave “more responsibly” and consider “long-term well-being of economy” when they demand an increase in their wages.⁶⁹⁹ Cemal stressed

⁶⁹⁹ Hasan Cemal, “Özelleştirme: Devleti ekonomide küçültmeden bir yere varılamaz”, *Milliyet*, 23.06.1994.

that to defeat inflation, all members of the society take responsibility and sacrifice. Similarly, by giving the example of the UK, Uras argued that instead of a short-term deceiving welfare, “today’s people” prefer an economic management which will be stable in the long run.⁷⁰⁰ Uras underlined that Thatcher implemented neo-liberal policies without any concessions to reach a long-term stability.⁷⁰¹ In another column, Uras again asserted that the change (neo-liberal transformation) in Turkey could result in some negative impacts in the short-term, but eventually future would be better.⁷⁰²

5.1.4.2 Depiction of Class Demands as a “Burden” for the Society

Particularly from the beginning of the 1980s, the impact of strikes and wage increases of the working classes were explicitly presented as hinders on the economic growth by the selected columnists. It is observed that columnists criticized demands of the working classes for causing deviations from the economy programmes and creating extra tax burdens for the rest of the society. For instance, Cemal argued that inflation could not be eliminated without “hurting” people, and the state cannot continue to distribute its sources with “full ladle”.⁷⁰³ Barlas, on the other, asserted that unhappiness of masses in Turkey did not occur due the income problems of the workers but the dissatisfaction depression of the middle class.⁷⁰⁴

As a remarkable example, Uras who has direct and close relations with the big capital in Turkey, made direct references to the arguments, speeches and reports prepared by the spokespersons of the capitalist class regarding the working class.

⁷⁰⁰ Güngör Uras, “Thatcher ne yapmak istiyor?”, *Rapor*, 16.06.1983.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰² Güngör Uras, Özel sektöre ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine inanmak, *Dünya*, 17.01.1985.

⁷⁰³ Hasan Cemal, “Ulufe değil, hesap kitap zamanı”, *Milliyet*, 7.01.2003.

⁷⁰⁴ Mehmet Barlas, “Hepimiz Sınıfta Kaldık”, *Sabah*, 05.01.1991.

In some columns, he referred to the arguments of businessmen from their several discursive acts such as “we have no choice but to give the keys of factories to the workers due to the severance allowances”, “simplification of collective bargaining which hinders industrial production”, “strikes which paralyse the production”.⁷⁰⁵ Moreover, as an economist, Uras frequently used the statistical data to show the “disastrous impacts” of the workers strikes on the economy.⁷⁰⁶ In a sense, selective utilization of statistical data overemphasized the impacts of the class struggle and reduced the economy to numerical figures without human factor.

5.1.4.3 Degradation of Communism, Socialism and Left-Wing Parties

In most cases, the degradation of communism, socialism, trade unions and left-wing parties was supported by the narrative of “ultimate victory of capitalism and the impossibility of another economic order” in the selected columns. In this regard, one of the most repeated arguments is the “death of communism, socialism and the loss of the left”. To exemplify, Uras argued that the benefits of capitalism and bourgeoisie pleasures were much more attractive for young generations than the promises of communism and socialism.⁷⁰⁷ Similarly, Cemal adopted key claims of neo-liberalism and almost completely left his previous “language” based on a leftist order of discourse. In his self-critiques, he accused communism, socialism and leftist views to be sloganist.⁷⁰⁸ In this sense, he defined the years that he spent as a leftist/activist as times when “he was not reading and just speaking with slogans”

⁷⁰⁵ Güngör Uras, “Özal, 1980 yılından bugüne neler yaptı?”, *Sabah*, 24.01.1990.

⁷⁰⁶ See Güngör Uras, “Grev”, *Dünya*, 20.04.1991, Güngör Uras, “Sendikalar”, *Dünya*, 6.08.1997, Güngör Uras, “İşçi-isveren ilişkileri”, *Dünya*, 25.09.1995

⁷⁰⁷ Güngör Uras, “Milletler kapitalist oluyor komünistler-sosyalistler kaybediyor”, *Dünya*, 23.06.1983.

⁷⁰⁸ Hasan Cemal, “Kafası karışık olmayan bu yazıyı okumasın”, *Milliyet*, 26.12.1999.

and “he enslaved his brain to slogans”.⁷⁰⁹ Cemal clearly stated that “there was no alternative to the market economy” and the competition was the driving force of the century.⁷¹⁰

A second pattern observed by the study is the discretisation of trade unions. In a general sense, trade unions were accused of making wage unionism and behaving irresponsibly. Barlas argued that “if the minds and consciousness of workers and their representatives were enough to solve the problems, East Europe and Soviets would not be in this situation.”⁷¹¹ Similarly, Uras criticized “aggressive” actions, behaviours and statements of trade union representatives and workers. Uras stated that it was understandable to ask for wage increases but they should not attack the IMF-guided agenda.⁷¹² Moreover, he defined trade unions as “mills which are consuming workers’ subscriptions”.⁷¹³ For Uras, the market showed that knowledgeable, skilled and efficient worker would have more power to bargain individually than collectively.⁷¹⁴

As exemplified in clipping 5, the left-wing parties and views were also depicted as an obstacle before the progression of the economy and the society.⁷¹⁵ The study detected several expressions in the selected columns which can be exemplified by the following phrases: “the storm of strikes”, “extreme demands of workers”, “terrifying figures”, “(strikes) are very bad things for the country whatever their

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁷¹² Güngör Uras, “İşçi-isveren ilişkileri”, *Dünya*, 25.09.1995

⁷¹³ Güngör Uras Sendikalar, *Dünya*, 6.08.1997.

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁵ Şimdi Yandık, *Sabah*, 24.07.1994.

reasons are” , “disastrous situation of the pre-1979 period” and “companies under strike pressure” ⁷¹⁶ Similarly, Barlas used the following expressions, “farmhand nation”, “drifter Lenin”, “discomfort of workers” “totalitarian communist regime”, “obsession of Taksim” and sarcastic phrases such as “Turkey is socialist and will remain so”, “fundamental statism”.⁷¹⁷



Clipping 5: Şimdi Yandık! (Now we are toast!)

Source: 24 June 1994, Sabah

On the other hand, findings of the study with regards to the Islamist columnists are also striking. Although Islamists columnists positioned themselves as anti-communist and anti-leftists, they used “leftist” discursive elements such as “labour

⁷¹⁶ Güngör Uras, “Grev”, *Dünya*, 20.04.1991

⁷¹⁷ Mehmet Barlas, “1 Mayıs'ı böyle kutlamak sanki kaderimizde var...”, *Sabah*, 2.05.2009.

struggle”, “elbow grease”, “exploitation”, “western imperialism” and “crush of the labour” in depicting class struggle during the 1980s.⁷¹⁸ However, they were highly oppositional regarding the left-wing parties and trade unions. As seen on the clipping 7, Zaman argued that “the leftist trade unions exploit the justified demands of the workers”. Similarly, Koru argued that student and workers actions reminded him of “undesirable” climate of pre-1980s and those actions were also causing “anxiety in many segments of the society”.⁷¹⁹

⁷¹⁸ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Yeni bir dönem başlarken”, *Milli Gazete*, 25.12.1983, Abdurrahman Dilipak “Memleket nereye gidiyor”, *Milli Gazete*, 16.04.1984.

⁷¹⁹ Fehmi Koru, “Sokağa Dökülmeden”, *Zaman*, 8.11.1986.



Clipping 6: Workers are drawn to 1 May (İşçiler 1 Mayıs'a sürükleniyor)

Source: Zaman, 18 April 1989

In his column about SEKA strike in 1986, Kuru also accused the strike to be “the cause of the loss of hundred thousand dollars” which affected Turkish economy as a “dubious action”.⁷²⁰

⁷²⁰ Fehmi Kuru, “Bir dolaptır döndü”, *Zaman*, 16.01.1989.



Clipping 7: DİSK has left workers out in the wind (DİSK, işçilerini yüzüstü bıraktı)

Source: 26 July 1994, Zaman

There were also certain efforts to call the workers to the “conservative” trade unions such as Hak-iş.⁷²¹ Kuru stated believers should develop an Islamic “working order” theory and argued that Hak-iş was a crucial example with its believer cadre. For Kuru, since an Islamist theory of working life was not developed by believer workers, they became open to “leftist views” and exploitation.⁷²²

5.1.5 Changing Discursive Elements on the IMF anchor

The relationship between Turkey and the IMF can be traced back to the early 1960s. However, in parallel with its changing missions in neo-liberal agenda, the IMF turned into a significant actor and an anchor for the neo-liberal transformation of Turkey starting from January 24 Stability Programme.⁷²³ In this process, the IMF has also become a nodal point for the Turkish print media. Moreover, it is observed

⁷²¹ Fehmi Kuru, “Tarihi Misyon”, *Zaman*, 20.11.1986.

⁷²² Fehmi Kuru, “Gelecek Yıl 1 Mayıs'ta”, *Zaman*, 1.05.1989.

⁷²³ Galip Yalman and Pinar Bedirhanoglu, “State, Class and Discourse: Reflections on the Neo-liberal Transformation in Turkey”, in A. Saad-Filho & G. Yalman (eds.), *Economic Transitions to Neo-liberalism in Middle Income Countries*, London: Routledge, 2010, p.121.

that discursive selectivities on the IMF have changed in time.

During the 1980s, columnists employed in the mainstream media generally depicted the IMF-guided neo-liberal agenda as an authentic programme of Özal by praising his “successes, capabilities and insights”. In this regard, Uras was concerned about coverage of the IMF policies as an “imposition” on the Turkish government. Therefore, in one of his columns in 1983, Uras criticized his colleague Mehmet Ali Birand for making an interview with the IMF Washington representatives before the composition of the new government after the 1983 election.⁷²⁴ Uras argued that it was a timing mistake to publish this interview before the announcement of the government programme since measures proposed by the IMF in this interview were already be going to implemented by Özal without any hesitation. For Uras, Özal himself was “carrying the banner of” those policies since the January 24 decisions.⁷²⁵ Uras’s main concern was “potential negative impacts” of this interview on domestic politics. Uras underlined that those recipes could be regarded as an “external imposition” to the government and could cause the emergence of critiques towards Özal as “blind obedient” of the IMF.⁷²⁶

Moreover, in his column introducing the Government Programme in 1983, he depicted the programme as an “authentic” success of Özal by stating: “This Programme (Government Programme) reflects experiences, beliefs and objectives of a person who is a candidate for being a leader. For this reason, this Programme is an authentic programme.”⁷²⁷ He also argued that “desires of change” of young generations “lighted a fire” which was caught by Turgut Özal. In this column, Uras

⁷²⁴ Güngör Uras, “IMF iyilik mi istiyor kötülük mü?”, *Dünya*, 23.11.1983.

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁷ Güngör Uras, “Hükümet Programı”, *Dünya*, 20.12.1983.

implied that “the change” was not imposed to the society but it stemmed from the demands of society. Furthermore, he argued that the IMF published a book to show Turkey’s case a successful example to the other countries and although we do not recognize the good situation of our economy.⁷²⁸

It can be argued that, by the 1990s, the coverage of the IMF recipes and neo-liberal economy policies by the print media has changed. Particularly after the 1994 crisis, the mainstream media which was mostly dominated by certain capital groups started to present the IMF-Turkey relations as a vital requirement for economic well-being. These years were also characterized by changing ownership relations in the mass media due to increasing domination of big capital groups in the media sector. As Kaya and Çakmur note, “the “crisis-proneness” of the times enabled the media owners to acquire an autonomy which has not previously been readily granted to them.”⁷²⁹ It can be suggested that this relative autonomy was reflected to the tones of the texts of columnists in the mainstream media. By the mid-1990s, positive bias towards the IMF programmes was increased and those programmes were represented as instruments which would “discipline” administration of the economy.

For legitimizing adverse impacts of the IMF-guided economy programmes on the working classes, columnists used to a set of arguments. It is observed that “the IMF stick” metaphor was used frequently while administration of economy was depicted as a weak structure which needed the IMF “stick”, “slap” and “beat”⁷³⁰. In this regard, Uras stated that “sometimes we need the IMF to “beat” us” because the

⁷²⁸ Güngör Uras, “Özal’ın yaptıkları diğer ülkelere ders olsun diye IMF kitap bastırmış”, *Dünya*, 9.06.1987

⁷²⁹ Kaya and Çakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey”, p.530.

⁷³⁰ See Güngör Uras, “IMF para yetiştiremiyor”, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 2.6.1998, Hasan Cemal, “İflas eşliğine gelmeden olmuyor”, *Milliyet*, 22.06.2002.

reason behind the “disgraceful” situation of Turkish economy was not scarcity of foreign currency but “disgraceful” administration of economy”.⁷³¹ As an economy writer, Uras attempted to convince ordinary people that the IMF-guided programmes serve for the long term well-being of the country.⁷³² Furthermore, Uras argued that inefficient and insufficient implementation of “scientific and wise recipe” of the IMF was the major reason of economy crises of the 1990s.⁷³³

5.1.6 Articulation of Islamist Discourse with Neo-liberal Discourse

As mentioned before, the research identified some discursive elements pertinent to the articulation of Islamist columnists with neo-liberal order of discourse. First of all, the study revealed that the Islamist columnists made clear and harsh criticisms on initial implementations of the neo-liberal policies during the 1980s. However, this negative bias seemed to be gradually abandoned by the mid-1990s. In this sense, there are several arguments in the columns which show a compliance with the core claims of neo-liberalism. Moreover, “recontextualization” of some elements of neo-liberal discourse by using religious references can be clearly in the studied texts. In this respect, the following four themes are remarkable:

- Transition from an anti-systemic/anti-capitalist discourse to “inevitable globalization narratives”
- Utilization of eclectic conceptualizations going between “the Evil West vs. the Islamic world antagonism” and acknowledgment of new world order,
- Legitimization of unjust income distribution and capital accumulation from a

⁷³¹ Güngör Uras, “IMF para yetiştiremiyor”, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 2.6.1998.

⁷³² IMF “Ayşe Hanım Teyzeme” çok şey yazar, *milliyet* 11.6 1999.

⁷³³ Güngör Uras, “İleride dövünmek işe yaramaz bugünün uygulamaları geleceği belirleyecek”, *Sabah*, 7.12.1996.

religious perspective and increased emphasis on social aid and charity

- Critique on changing lifestyles of enriched “Muslims”

5.1.6.1 Transition from an Anti-Systemic Discourse to “Inevitable Globalization” Narratives

In his unpublished dissertation, Özçetin suggests a periodization for the understanding of Islamism in Turkey which includes “the period of modernist Islam, the period of forced withdrawal and retreat, the period of incubation, the period of confrontation and challenge, the period of compliance and accommodation”⁷³⁴ In this sense, it can be suggested that the last two periods of this periodization, namely “confrontation and challenge” and “compliance and accommodation” coincides with the studied period under this textual analysis. In this sense, the critical analysis of columns in this study reveals similar findings with the abovementioned periodization of Islamist discourse. While the analysis of Dilipak’s and Koru’s columns written in the 1980s shows an explicit negative bias towards the neo-liberal transformation of the country, it is seen that from the mid-1990s, the columnists have gradually left their oppositional stance against particularly the neo-liberal form of capitalism. Although they have preserved anti-western elements in their texts throughout the 1990s and 2000s, they seem to take globalization wave of capitalism granted and inevitable.

In this regard, during the 1980s, Koru and Dilipak frequently developed anti-western, anti-capitalist and anti-systemic argumentations which were based on religious references, moral values and anti-individualism. It has been observed that the concepts of “liberal”, “interest” and “capitalist” were repeatedly criticized. Dilipak harshly criticized the first ten years of Turkey’s neo-liberal transformation since for him Turkey witnessed “a widespread and unprecedented “plunder and

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.19-20.

abuse” in the Republican history”.⁷³⁵ Dilipak stated that “Do you want an airport? If you like, we have dams, cheap girls for you to enjoy... everything is for sale... Motherland, religion, belief “. ⁷³⁶

Dilipak criticized Özal’s economy agenda in his columns “Financial Calculation of Özal-1” and “Financial Calculation of Özal-2” and defined Özal as “an engineer acting as if he were an economist” who was in favour of a “western type economic model”.⁷³⁷ Dilipak argued that Özal was mistaken to base his policies on “cost calculation” and a so-called “rationalism” and, the economy policy implemented by Özal was a “fiasco”.⁷³⁸ He highlighted the adverse impacts of economy policies such as increases in dollar currency rates, unemployment, budget deficits and inefficiency in industrial policies.⁷³⁹ In fact, philosophical roots of mentioned liberal policies were problematic for Dilipak, which he defined as pragmatism and utilitarianism.⁷⁴⁰ He rejected the idea that “reason itself is sufficient for reaching the truth” and described rationalism as “Trojan Horse of the Western culture and culture imperialism”.⁷⁴¹

Dilipak also opposed privatisation attempts and increasing interest of multi-national companies in Turkey and called them “hungry wolves” in 1989.⁷⁴² In one of his

⁷³⁵ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Herşey satılık”, *Milli Gazete*, 2.03.1989

⁷³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁷ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Özal’ın maliye hesabı 1”, *Milli Gazete*, 16.12.1983. and Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Özal’ın maliye hesabı 2”, *Milli Gazete*, 17.12.1983

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴² Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Herşey satılık”, *Milli Gazete*, 2.03.1989

columns, “*Is Mr. Friedman is a fraud?*”, Dilipak referred to the arguments that Friedman had misused statistical and economic data to advocate his neo-liberal views.⁷⁴³

In a similar vein, Koru embraced an explicit anti-western and even anti-modernization discourse which rejected the social and economic order of the West. According to Koru, neo-liberal transformation was a component of Westernization and caused a “degeneration of traditions, values and morality” in the society.⁷⁴⁴ Koru also highlighted negative impacts of neo-liberal economy policies on income distribution and particularly attacked on “the malignity of interest”, banking system and “degeneration” caused by the promotion of luxury consumption.⁷⁴⁵ Emphasizing difficulties of manufacturers, Koru argued that January 24 decisions increased profits of finance capital which was defined by him as “parasites”.⁷⁴⁶ Religious references were also the backbone of his critiques. For instance, in his column, “*If Banks earn too much*”, he used the “cancer cell” metaphor to define “interest” as killing all healthy cells in the economy.

Koru accused the January 24 decisions of imprisoning ‘large masses’ to poverty while a few in the society to more richness.⁷⁴⁷ He also criticized glorification of consumerism and luxury lifestyle by the print media. In his column “*Discomforts have just begun*”, Koru stated that “free market economy introduced by the January 24 decisions caused immoderate shamelessness, while workers hardly afforded

⁷⁴³ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Bay Friedman bir sahtekar mı”, *Milli Gazete*, 23.12.1983.

⁷⁴⁴ Fehmi Koru, “Sıkıntılar yeni başlıyor”, *Zaman*, 11.04.1989.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁶ Fehmi Koru, “Bankalar Çok Kazanırsa”, *Zaman*, 12.07.1989.

⁷⁴⁷ Fehmi Koru, “Zamların anlamı”, *Zaman*, 9.07.1987.

their families lives”.⁷⁴⁸

However, coming to the mid-1990s, Koru’s and Dilipak’s texts on the process of globalization, free market economy, liberalization and privatisation gradually changed. Islamist intellectuals found important overlapping meaning-making mechanisms in dominant neo-liberal discourse in terms of their identity and value-based discursive selectivities and anti-statist views in the 1990s. It can be argued that globalization and post-modernism had important impacts on the changing discursive elements in Islamist discourse.⁷⁴⁹ In this sense, two nodal points observed in the texts of Islamist columnists are their admittance of “inevitable globalization process” and emphasis on the “need of reforming the national state”.

First signs of this transformation can be traced back to 1994. In 1994, Koru stressed the need of structural change to adapt a “new world which presents opportunities and challenges”.⁷⁵⁰ Koru listed a set of domestic and foreign challenges and asserted that Turkey had two alternatives either “realizing a renewal from top to bottom or closing itself.”⁷⁵¹ He argued that “globalization is an indispensable and irreversible process which has turned the “butterfly effect” into a reality”.⁷⁵² Koru confirmed that the modern “globalized” economy has made national economies more interrelated and there has been no way to prevent this interaction due to capital’s free movement without boundaries.⁷⁵³ Koru also listed neo-liberal policies in Turkey such as the opening to foreign capital movements as well as privatisation of

⁷⁴⁸ Fehmi Koru, “Sıkıntılar yeni başlıyor”, *Zaman*, 11.04.1989.

⁷⁴⁹ Burak Özçetin, *Making of New Islamism*, p.20.

⁷⁵⁰ Fehmi Koru, “Yuf olsun”, *Zaman*, 5.12.1994.

⁷⁵¹ Fehmi Koru, “Ekonomide olan, *Yeni Şafak*, 24.06.2006.

⁷⁵² *Ibid.*

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.*

SOEs to foreign investors and added that “he has no objection to [those policies]”. In another column, Koru complained about “the late adoption of the privatisation law and its insufficient implementation”.⁷⁵⁴

In the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Global Crisis, Koru’s approach towards the crisis demonstrated a clear convergence with the mainstream media. Koru, in his column “*A country in the crisis*”, defined capitalism as a gift of the US to the world, “which is based on individual success and private enterprise”.⁷⁵⁵ For him, the economic crisis in the US occurred due to the “wrong” implementations in the finance sector.

It can be argued that Koru’s anti-systemic and anti-capitalist accounts which were based on his arguments about structural weaknesses of the western capitalism were totally replaced by his critiques on mistakes in its implementation. Koru’s views can also be seen as a reflection of the Islamist media’s changing approach towards the neo-liberal agenda. As seen on image 4 opening to the global economy and free trade zone were covered as a must for an export oriented economy.

⁷⁵⁴ Fehmi Koru, “İhtimaller Sınırlı”, *Zaman*, 13.07.1994.

⁷⁵⁵ Fehmi Koru, “Kriz içinde bir ülke”, *Yeni Şafak*, 24.09.2008.

25 Temmuz 1994 Pazartesi ZAMAN 7

Dışa açılma kapılarında birisi olan serbest bölgeler yeniden gündemde İhracata 'serbest' takviye şart

EKONOMİ SERVİSİ

Ekonomide krizin atılması ve sağlıklı ve hızlı bir büyümenin gerçekleştirilmesi için tek çıkar yolun dışa açılmak olduğu herkesçe kabul edilirken, ihracata yönelik yatırımların ve işletmelerin artarak devam etmesiyle kurtulan serbest bölgeler, yeniden gündemde. İlk 1987'de Mersin'de faaliyete geçen serbest bölgelerin sayısı bugün 5'e ulaştı. Bu sayı, açılma işlemleri devam eden bölgelerle birlikte önümüzdeki bir kaç yıl içinde 9'a çıkacak.

Mayıs ayı sonu itibarıyla bugüne kadar toplam 7 milyar 325 milyon dolarlık ticaret hacminin gerçekleştirildiği serbest bölgelere ihracatın artırılmasında şimdiki daha fazla görev düşüyor. Dışa açılmada kırımlardan yeterince istifade edilemeyen serbest bölgelerin yeniden gözden geçirilerek, dış ticaretteki paylarının artırılması isteniyor. En çok üzerinde durulan hususlar şunlar:

- Açılma çalışmalarını devam eden bölgelerin en kısa zamanda faaliyete geçirilmesi.
- Müteahhbidlerin bu bölgelerde yatırımlarını sağlayacak çabalarının artırılması.
- Ticaret hacminin ihracat ağırlıklı değil, ihracat ağırlıklı olmasını sağlayacak tedbirlerin alınması.
- Serbest bölgelerin dışa açılmada sağladığı bazı imkanlar, reddedilmeyecek kadar azaltıp görünüyor.

SERBEST BÖLGELER NEDEN CAZİP?

- Bölgede yapılan faaliyet neticesinde elde edilen gelirler, gelir vergisi, kurumlar vergisi ve KDV gibi her türlü vergiden muaf.
- Bölgede elde edilen kazançlar istenilen ülkeye serbestçe transfer edilebiliyor.
- Bölgenin bölgede modern altyapı, haberleşme, ulaşım ve diğer hizmetler hazır.
- Takas yoluyla ticaret serbest.
- Yatırımcı kurulların inisiyatifleri Serbest Bölgeler.
- Her Serbest Bölgenin açılışından itibaren 10 yıl süreyle grev ve lokavt yasağı.
- Her türlü bürkane ve azat edilmiş durumda.
- Kurumlar bölgede 99 yıla kadar faaliyette bulunabilme imkânına sahip.

ANTALYA SERBEST BÖLGESİ
Bulunduğu yer: Yeniliman/Antalya
Faaliyete geçiş tarihi: 14.11.1987
İşletici firma: Antalya Serbest Bölge İşleticisi A.Ş.
Faaliyet konusu: Sanayi, ticaret, depolama, makine parkı, sigortacılık, bankacılık ve hizmet faaliyetleri.
Brüt açık alan: 573.536 m²
Tahsis edilebilir açık alan: 191.427 m²
Ulaşım: Karayolu, havayolu ve deniz yolu
Hizmetler: Yükleme, boşaltma, bölge içi taşıma ve tüm liman hizmetleri

MERSİN SERBEST BÖLGESİ
Bulunduğu yer: Mersin Limanı bitişliği
Faaliyete geçiş tarihi: 3.1.1987
İşletici şirket: Mersin Serbest Bölge İşleticisi A.Ş.
Faaliyet konusu: Sanayi, ticaret, depolama, bankacılık, sigortacılık ve hizmet faaliyetleri
Brüt açık alan: 461.77 m²
Tahsis edilebilir açık alan: 277.030 m²
Ulaşım: Karayolu, deniz yolu, havayolu ve deniz yolu
Hizmetler: Yükleme, boşaltma, bölge içi taşıma ve tüm liman hizmetleri

EGE SERBEST BÖLGESİ
Bulunduğu yer: Güzeltepe, Adnan Menderes Havalimanı yanında
Faaliyete geçiş tarihi: 14.8.1990
Kurucu-İşletici firma: Ege Serbest Bölge Kurucu ve İşleticisi A.Ş. Firma, yüzde 96-4 oranında yabancı sermayeli
Faaliyet konusu: Sanayi, ticaret, depolama, bankacılık, sigortacılık ve hizmet faaliyetleri
Açık alan: 2.200.000 m²
Tahsis edilebilir açık alan: 142.264 m²

TRABZON SERBEST BÖLGESİ
Bulunduğu yer: Trabzon Limanı bitişliği
Faaliyete geçiş tarihi: 4.6.1992
Kurucu-İşletici firma: Trabzon Serbest Bölge Kurucu ve İşleticisi A.Ş. Firma, yüzde 94 yabancı sermayeli
Kapasite: 150'ye kadar 10 adet hazır işyeri ve 3.500 m²'lik kapalı depolama alanı var
Faaliyet konusu: Her türlü alım satım ve depolama
Ulaşım: Karayolu, deniz yolu
Hizmetler: Yükleme, boşaltma ve her türlü liman hizmetleri

ATATÜRK HAVALİMANI SERBEST BÖLGESİ
Bulunduğu yer: Atatürk Havalimanı bitişliğinde
Faaliyete geçiş tarihi: 24.8.1990
Kapasite: 1. km'de ortalama 10'ar m²'lik 33, 2. km'de 40-125'er m²'lik 47 işyeri ile 1.152 m² kapalı depo bulunmaktadır
Faaliyet konusu: Tekstil, konfeksiyon malzemeleri ile elektronik ve optik alya alım satımı ve depolama

SERBEST BÖLGELERDE KURULUŞLARINDAN BUGÜNE GERÇEKLEŞEN TİCARET AKIŞI (1988-1994-5) (ABD DOLARI)

Türkiye'den bölgeye	725.559.405
Bölgeden Türkiye'ye	1.111.995.148
Yurtdışından bölgeye	972.718.313
Bölgeden yurtdışına	514.825.777
TOPLAM:	3.325.098.643

Clipping 8: Supporting the “free” is a must for export (İhracat için “serbest” takviye şart)

Source: 25 July 1994, Zaman

Similarly, Dilipak's coverage of neo-liberal policies and particularly his stance towards Özal have changed by the mid-1990s. Although Dilipak opposed to Özal and his economy agenda in the 1980s, coming to the 2000s, he depicted Özal as a leader “who made an irreversible breakthrough in the Republic history”.⁷⁵⁶ Dilipak also described globalization as an undeniable and irreversible process.⁷⁵⁷ For him,

⁷⁵⁶ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Özal'ın mirası”na kim el koydu?”, *Vakit*, 2.12.2009.

⁷⁵⁷ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Anti Emperyalizm Ve Bağımsızlık Üzerine (2)”, *Yeni Akit*, 16.12.2008.

interdependence was the tendency of the time since free movement of capital, goods, knowledge and labour made full independence impossible.⁷⁵⁸ Dilipak also criticized the years when Turkey was “a closed economy and had scary reflexes” in a complete contradiction with his hostile discourse towards the foreign capital in the 1980s.⁷⁵⁹ For instance, after showing the case of Dubai’s free financial centre, Dilipak argued that an international free-financial zone should be constituted in Istanbul.⁷⁶⁰ Moreover, Dilipak complained about the insufficiencies of the legislation to attract more capital to Turkey.⁷⁶¹

5.1.6.2 Utilization of Eclectic Conceptualizations

In a general sense, the rise of political Islam is characterised with important dichotomies due to the inconsistencies between the discursive elements and implementations of certain policies in the social reality.⁷⁶² However, the most important dichotomy observed in the columns of Islamist columnists was the utilization of “anti-western elements” together with a “concurrent discourse towards neo-liberalism”. As a matter of fact, “anti-westernism” has been one of the major discursive selectivities of the selected Islamist columnists. For particularly the 1980s, the Islamist columnists explained all national and international challenges by an “antagonism” between the “evil” West and the Islamic world. In this sense, the western countries, values, institutions were covered as the reason of inequalities and exploitation in the society which was supported by the interior

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶² Simten Coşar and Gamze Yücesan-Özdemir, “AKP Türkiye’si’nde Neo-liberalizmin İslamcı Politikalara Eklemlenmesini Çözümlemeye Yönelik Bir Girişim, *İktidarın Şiddeti: AKP’li Yıllar, Neo-liberalizm ve İslamcı Politikalar*, Ed. By. Simten Coşar, Gamze Yücesan Özdemir, Metis Yayıncılık, 2014, p. 11.

traitors.⁷⁶³ Dilipak explicitly identified the West as the exploiter of the Muslim. In his column “*Two faces of the West*”, he stated that the wealth of the West was raised on the exploitation of Muslims “tears and elbow grease.”⁷⁶⁴

Despite their increasing compliance with neoliberal policies by the mid-1990s, Islamist columnists have preserved the anti-western discursive elements in their columns. However, increasing compliance of Islamist discourse with neo-liberal agenda and globalization narratives has caused utilization of *inconsistent discourse and eclectic conceptualizations* by the Islamist columnists. That is to say, the use of religious references for understanding and conceptualizing social and economic developments and the advocacy of neo-liberal implementations by particularly the JDP governments have caused an eclecticism in Islamist discourse as seen in the examples of Koru and Dilipak. This eclecticism can be seen as a result of “interdiscursivity” which is defined as “constitution of a text from diverse discourses and genres” by Fairclough.⁷⁶⁵

Typical examples of these eclectic conceptualizations are observed in Dilipak’s efforts to identify the notions of capital/capitalists/wealth. Dilipak’s understanding of “capitalist” person is limited to one’s fulfilment of Islamic requirements during earning and spending money. He argues that if one complies with the Islamic requirements, no one should discuss his/her wealth.⁷⁶⁶ It is remarkable that in a column written after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, he defined “Islam” as an equivalent concept of communism and capitalism, thus, as an ideology and mode

⁷⁶³ Birol Başkan, “Siyasal İslâmcı Tahayyülde İç Düşman/Hain Figürü,” *Birikim*, January 2016, http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/7472/siyasal-islamci-tahayyulde-ic-dusman-hain-figuru#.WY8u_IejFpm

⁷⁶⁴ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Batının iki yüzü!”, *Yeni Akit*, 14.09.2009.

⁷⁶⁵ Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p.96.

⁷⁶⁶ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “İslam’da Servetin Yeri” Tartışması”, *Yeni Akit*, 18.12.2010

of production but at the same time as a religion.⁷⁶⁷ It is also remarkable that Dilipak aimed to show Islam as a kind of order distinct from capitalism, although he has been long advocating key policies of neo-liberalism such as privatisation, liberalization and free trade zones. Dilipak argued that after the collapse of communism, capitalism has begun to collapse, and this is the time of Islam to rise, which should be achieved on way or another.⁷⁶⁸

To sum up, although Islamist media preserved anti-western elements, globalization and main neo-liberal policies such as free movement of capital, goods, knowledge and concepts of interdependence have been depicted as undeniable and inevitable facts of the new age in 2000s. This tendency causes an eclectic and inconsistent discourse which bears some elements of interdiscursive hybridity.

5.1.6.3 Legitimization of Unjust Income Distribution From A Religious Perspective and Emphasis on Social Aid

This study also indicates that Islamist columnists deployed efforts to legitimize increasing income inequalities through the advocacy of the wealth with religious references. In this sense, Dilipak wrote many columns to discuss the place of wealth in Islam. For Dilipak, differences in the wealth of people were defined as a decision and testing of Allah on earth. As mentioned before, the following expression was repeated by Dilipak many times as a template part of his texts;

God gives and takes wealth and power, and redistributes them among countries and people. He will test us with our properties, lives and loved

⁷⁶⁷ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "EP", *Yeni Akit*, 19.10.2011

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

ones by sometimes giving and sometimes taking back.⁷⁶⁹

Similarly, definition of the notions of capitalism and capitalist were ambiguous in Dilipak. He identified those concepts with referring to Islamic requirements, which also caused an amorphous conceptualization. The “capitalist” is defined by Dilipak as a person who is acquisitive and money grubber.⁷⁷⁰ He underlined references of Kuran-ı Kerim to “the poor” and “the rich”, and the wealth the Prophets Suleyman, Eyyup and Ibrahim.⁷⁷¹ Thus, he argued that the wealth or wealth of a specific person should not be made a matter of debate if one carries out the requirements of being a Muslim. Dilipak noted that “with the condition of earning and spending Halal way”, if one gives his *zakat, fitre and sadaka*, it means that he protects the poor.⁷⁷²

In another column, Dilipak defined “the capitalist” as the one who attributes much importance to money.⁷⁷³ He provided the example that if one lives even minimum wage and “sells out” his friend for money, and then he is a “capitalist”, whereas a rich man cannot be called as a capitalist if he earns and spends in a halal way.⁷⁷⁴ Another emphasis of Dilipak’s columns was the need of social aid and solidarity. Dilipak called the readers to increase their social aids to become good Muslims. In this column, he attempted to naturalize the impacts of economic crises on small enterprises, artisan and the poor in general.⁷⁷⁵

Koru’s approach towards the wealth has also changed in particularly the 2000s. Moreover, his coverage of big bourgeoisie has also substantially shifted. For

⁷⁶⁹ See Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Kim daha dindar”, *Yeni Akit*, 16.10.2011, Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Zengin Olmak”, *Yeni Akit*, 3.12.2011, Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Zengin Olmak”, *Yeni Akit*, 3.12.2011.

⁷⁷⁰ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Sağcı Müslüman Olursa Solcusu Da Olur!”, *Yeni Akit*, 22.06.2012.

⁷⁷¹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “İslam’da Servetin Yeri” Tartışması”, *Yeni Akit*, 18.12.2010

⁷⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷⁷³ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Sağcı Müslüman Olursa Solcusu Da Olur!”, *Yeni Akit*, 22.06.2012.

⁷⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁵ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Allah’a (CC) borç vermek ister misiniz”, *Yeni Akit*, 3.02.2012.

instance, while Koru defined TUSIAD as Dukedom of Istanbul and its statements as “attacks of fat cats” in 1989, coming to 2007, Koru confessed that the JDP government had mostly increased incomes of TUSIAD members and he had no rejection to that. These three quotations from Koru reflect the changes in his discourse:

These are the people who have started their journeys with state tenders under far-statism, have benefited from bureaucrats having the philosophy of “creating a millionaire in every district”, have got stronger and rich (palazlanan) by the advantages of import-substitution and have turned into cartels by monopolizing thanks to the policies implemented in the last nine years.⁷⁷⁶

Which segment has been mostly taking the advantage of the nearly four-year the JDP government? The shortcut answer of this question is business world, particularly the big businessmen...The JDP could not please the social segments who voted for it in no way, but it made happy the giants of the business world by the policies it implemented, of whom a very few of them voted for the JDP.⁷⁷⁷

(From a column explaining increasing wealth of the big capital) They say, “talking about the property of the rich tires the chin of the poor”. Nevertheless, there is no reason to be disturbed about this picture. May God give plentifulness to their pockets and fruitfulness to their works. If the wealth of its citizens turns into the wealth of the country, Turkey can even succeed to become an economic giant of the world.⁷⁷⁸

A second aspect of the legitimization of wealth by Islamist columnists was the emphasis on the role and tasks of rich Muslims in the development of Islamic world. In this sense, Dilipak attributed particular importance to MUSIAD. He praised the

⁷⁷⁶ Fehmi Koru, “Şişman kediler saldırıda”, *Zaman*, 15.08.1989.

⁷⁷⁷ Fehmi Koru, “İş dünyası ayıp ediyor”, *Yeni Şafak*, 28.06.2006.

⁷⁷⁸ Fehmi Koru, “Zügürdün çenesi” *Yeni Şafak*, 11.03.2007.

“successes” of the organization and identified new responsibilities for it. In his column, “*You are 22 years old*”, he made an analogy between MUSIAD and Fatih Sultan Mehmet who conquered Istanbul at the age of 22. Dilipak asked the MUSIAD to establish further trade relations with foreign countries and stated that already established relations with 47 countries were not enough.⁷⁷⁹

Moreover, Dilipak identified new missions for MUSIAD. For him, MUSIAD should set higher objectives and become more prepared to integrate with the global market.⁷⁸⁰ He also underlined that MUSIAD should be in solidarity with other Muslim business networks in Turkey and think a more “global manner”.⁷⁸¹ On the other hand, he described MUSIAD as the “conscience of the capital.”⁷⁸² According to him, MUSIAD should revive and construct the Islam Civilization again.⁷⁸³ Similarly, in his column “*MUSIAD Where to!*”, Dilipak expected MUSIAD to make more efforts for developing moral, aesthetic and philosophical aspects of the Islamist world.⁷⁸⁴ It is remarkable that Dilipak complained about the lack of an equivalent development in lifestyle, and art literature products of conservative groups compared to their increasing role in politics and business.⁷⁸⁵

It can be argued that the above-mentioned views of Dilipak show his efforts to call Islamist-conservative entrepreneurs to take a step towards being a class⁷⁸⁶ since Dilipak called MUSIAD contributed in ideological sphere of Islamism by

⁷⁷⁹ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “22 Yaşındasın”, *Yeni Akit*, 30.05..2012

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁴ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Müsiad nereye!”, *Yeni Akit*, 29.04.2012.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁶ In Gramscian terms, the third moment in the formation of class is about passing to a purely political moment in which one “transcends the limits of purely economic class” Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, p.405.

supporting the development of art, philosophy, aesthetics and morality in the Islam Community.

5.1.6.4 Critique on Changing Lifestyles of Enriched Muslims

By the late 2000s, luxury lifestyle of the Islamist capitalists has become a matter of concern for the Islamist columnists. Although Islamist intellectuals made efforts to legitimize increasing income inequalities in the society, “ostensible” consumerism and luxury lifestyle of members of Islamist capital class and political parties were criticized both by Koru and Dilipak. It can be argued that “living a Muslim life” has been and one of the major discursive elements for Islamist columnists even after articulation of their discourse with neoliberal claims.

In this sense, Dilipak complained about a new “White Muslim” class which he described as “our bourgeois”.⁷⁸⁷ In his column, “*Aww! What has been happening in our neighbourhood?*”, he argued that in parallel to the emergence of Islam’s own bourgeois, capital, bureaucrats and politicians, an operation of “domestication” was started to put these Muslims into a position of “nouveau-rich”.⁷⁸⁸ Dilipak argued that he was warning Muslims about this danger for a long time and it was an operation of “atomization” to create a “high society” among Muslims.⁷⁸⁹ For him, this operation aimed to show examples of a few nouveau-riche few Muslim as if they were representing the whole Muslim community.⁷⁹⁰

Although Dilipak emphasized that wealth of a person can be made a matter of debate if he/she fulfils Islamic requirement, he was concerned about the changing

⁷⁸⁷ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Beyaz Müslümanlar”ın para ve iktidarla imtihanı...”, *Yeni Akit*, 11.08.2011.

⁷⁸⁸ Abdurrahman Dilipak, “Ayy! Bizim mahallede neler oluyormuş neler!”, *Yeni Akit*, 25.08.2012

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

lifestyle of the conservative “rich” since it may cause discomfort in the society.

5.1.7 Adaptation to Crises: Economic and Political Stability Narratives

It can be suggested that the hegemonic crises of the 1990s, particularly 1994 and 2001 crisis and failures of the coalition governments, have become traumatic moments in Turkey which deeply affected the political discourse in the 2000s. These hegemonic crises led to the emergence of “strong” discursive selectivities on the “benefits” of single-party governments and opened a way for the legitimization of neo-liberal policies of JDP governments. In this context, “the importance” of political stability has been one of “the strongest” elements of the election campaigns of JDP throughout the 2000s and 2010s.

The concept of “political stability” has been praised as an essential element of economic development by a wide spectrum of actors in Turkey from party members⁷⁹¹ to representatives of the big capital⁷⁹², from the mainstream and partisan media⁷⁹³ to the partisan think tanks.⁷⁹⁴ For instance, Ahmet Nazif Zorlu, owner of one of the big capital groups Zorlu Holding, stated that:

Please look at the progress that Turkey achieved. Before, politicians were fighting each other and establishing coalitions. The 1990s are lost years for Turkey. Now in the last 10 years, Turkey has a political stability...Do

⁷⁹¹ “Siyasi istikrar, ekonomik istikrarı getirdi, o da bize demokratik istikrarı getirdi”, AKP Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Öznur Çalık, <https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/calisanlarimizi-ezdirmemek-ve-sosyal-haklarini-vermek-icin-elimizden-gelen/91835#1>

⁷⁹² İşadamları Kişiliği: Siyasi İstikrar Ekonomik İstikrarı Beraberinde Getiriyor, 19 Şubat 2011, <https://www.haberler.com/isadami-kigili-siyasi-istikrar-ekonomik-istikrari-2546364-haberi/>

⁷⁹³ Türkiye’nin bitmeyen arayışı: Siyasi İstikrar, 21.04.2015 <http://www.star.com.tr/politika/turkiyenin-bitmeyen-arayisisiyasi-8200-3bistikrar-haber-1022469/>

⁷⁹⁴ Hatice Karahan, Erdal Tanas Karagöl, “Ekonomik Performansın Temel Taşı: Siyasi İstikrar”, *Seta Perspektif*, Sayı: 41 Mart 2014.

not misunderstand me, I am not making politics, the important thing is the stability.⁷⁹⁵

In this regard, there are some academic studies which draw attention to the utilization of “political stability” discourse in the advocacy of the government during the 2000s.⁷⁹⁶ For instance, Yeldan underlines how the concept of political stability were used during the election periods. According to Yeldan, JDP is itself an “coalition party” which composed of different political Islamist fractions and interest groups. Moreover, Yeldan points out that political stability cannot be achieved without economic stability, which is impossible to be realized with fragile and foreign-dependent neo-liberal economic model embraced by the JDP.⁷⁹⁷ Similarly, some representatives of opposition parties criticized political stability narratives time to time. Ahmet Kenan Tanrıkulu, for instance, argued that there is a “political stability fetishism” in Turkey.⁷⁹⁸

In this context, this study reveals that columnists in the mainstream and Islamist media have also involved in the emergence of dominant messages on the “virtue” of single-party government and its “economic achievements”. It is observed that “vital” importance of political stability for economic recovery, reforms and economic growth in Turkey was frequently emphasized in the columns. For instance, in the first days of 2002 general election, Uras drew attention the

⁷⁹⁵ Zorlu: “90’lı Yılları Türkiye Artık Kaybetti, Şimdi Son 10 Senede Siyasi İstikrar Var” , 21.11.2014 <https://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-zorlu-90-li-yillari-turkiye-artik-kaybetti-simdi-6708160/>

⁷⁹⁶ A. Ersoy Kontacı, “Siyasî İstikrar Temelli Koalisyon Eleştirileri: Anayasa Hukuku Açısından Ampirik Bir Analiz”, *TBB Dergisi* 2016 (123) <http://tbbdergisi.barobirlik.org.tr/m2016-123-1556> accessed on 11.12.2017.

⁷⁹⁷ Erinç Yeldan, “Ekonomik istikrar olmadan...”, *Cumhuriyet*, 04.11.2015 http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/405177/Ekonomik_istikrar_olmadan....html

⁷⁹⁸ Ahmet Kenan Tanrıkulu, “Türkiye’deki siyasi istikrar fetişizmi!”, *Milliyet* <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/dusunenlerin-dusuncesi/turkiye-deki-siyasi-istikrar-fetisizmi--1647074/>

“optimistic winds” in the “markets” due to the result of the election and argued that public opinion was “starving” for such a development.⁷⁹⁹ Similarly, before 2007 general election, Uras argued that “the JDP is explaining its achievements well”.⁸⁰⁰ Hasan Cemal also provided clear examples of this tendency as he explicitly praised the “political stability” . Cemal’s articles “*The magical word: Stability*”, and “*Stability or Death*” can be shown as typical examples of this approach.⁸⁰¹ Hasan Cemal stressed the “losses” of Turkey due to the coalition governments of the 1990s. According to Cemal, there was a direct relation between ‘economic-political recovery’ of the 2000s and single party government.⁸⁰² Cemal stated that “...things have not been going bad for the last three years. Why? The answer consists of two words: Political stability! Turkey lost the 1990’s due to political instability and weak coalitions...So, the magic word is stability!”⁸⁰³ He also argued that “the real stability” is the remedy of development, democracy, rule of law and employment problems.

5.2 Language Use

As already discussed, the analysis of language use is an important component of CDA approach developed by Norman Fairclough. This includes the analysis of genre drawn in texts, interdiscursive hybridity of genres and discourses, themes associated with particular discourses, argumentative genres, fallacious arguments, narratives, inclusive-exclusive language (“we”, “they” usages), passive voices, usages of metaphors, stereotypes etc.⁸⁰⁴ In this regard, the survey sheet used to

⁷⁹⁹ Güngör Uras, “AKP Morali”, *Milliyet*, 11.11.2002.

⁸⁰⁰ Güngör Uras, “AKP icraatını iyi satıyor”, *Milliyet*, 7.07.2007.

⁸⁰¹ See Hasan Cemal, “Ya Istikrar Ya Ölüm”, *Milliyet*, 8.03.2006 and Hasan Cemal, “Sihirli Sözcük: Istikrar”, *Milliyet*, 16.02.2006.

⁸⁰² Hasan Cemal, “Sihirli Sözcük: Istikrar”, *Milliyet*, 16.02.2006.

⁸⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁴ Norman Fairclough, “Language and globalizaton”, p.63

analyse columns in this study has a separate part to identify key features of language uses as well as richness of the texts in terms of the narration techniques.

In this framework, as seen on Figure 11, the results of the analysis of the researcher and the Volunteer Group show a close proximity in terms of the detected narration techniques used by the columnists. In this regard, popular words and stereotypes, adages, analogies and idioms, evidences, quotations and word games – metaphors are the most frequently used narration elements in the texts.

Moreover, the research also reached some other conclusions about the linguistic properties and narration richness's of the analysed texts as explained below:




Figure 11: Overall Conclusions on Language Uses

5.2.1 Lack of Elements of Opinion and Investigative Journalism

It can be argued that column-writing in Turkey is in general lack of elements of investigative journalism, objectivity, new ideas and authentic/academic creation. Most of the columns are used for “commenting” on a wide spectrum of issues especially on daily political and economy-related issues. Even more, the columnists have gradually become more comfortable to share their own experiences, private

lives and personal debates with other journalists in their columns. The CDA also shows that analysed columns in general do not hesitate to show a positive or negative bias towards the governments rather than being keen in objective or neutral reporting. It is hardly possible to see examples or references to authentic investigations or academic perceptions in the analysed mainstream and the Islamist columnists. They preferred to “report” local and foreign studies, statistics and statements to support the neo-liberal implementations. Columnists such as Barlas, Cemal and Uras have also reflected the concepts used by international financial organizations and Davos Meetings etc. in the Turkish print media. Moreover, in some cases, it is seen that Uras used the very same text in different newspaper in different time by direct copy-pastes.

Moreover, since neo-liberal economy policies have created crucial changes and adverse impacts on economic, political and social domains in Turkey, there has been a constant gap between argumentations of dominant neo-liberal discourse and the actually existing social realities in Turkey. One of the important discursive strategies has been the “dehumanization and marketization of language” in particularly limitation of the explanation of economic domain with the statistical data.

5.2.2 Frequent Use of Stereotypes, Popular Words and Neo-Liberal Keywords

This study has concluded that a set of pre-determined neo-liberal notions have been used by the selected columnists even by columnists from different political perspectives. It is easily observed that some popular words, stereotypes and concepts have been frequently used to support the arguments about neo-liberal policies in Turkey. In this sense, the analysis reveals that a stock of neo-liberal keyword has been gradually emerged in Turkey on the basis of discursive acts of the political power-holders, the capitalist class members and the mass media. The texts of columnists display clear example of this stock neo-liberal keywords since under the guise of “opinion journalism” they could use certain discursive elements

in a more comfortable manner compared with the texts of news in the print media.

This stock of neo-liberal keyword is consisted of certain stereotypes, popular words and slogans about the neo-liberal policies and shows a clear parallelism with the global dominant neo-liberal order of discourse. Moreover, some of these keywords have changed their connotations and/or frequencies in time in line with the tendencies of neo-liberalism in the global scale and with the crises in the Turkish economy. For instance, while free market economy, private sector and liberalization were frequently highlighted in the 1980s, during the 1990s the concepts of globalization, new world order, reform, change and privatisation were dominant. During 2000s, regulation, structural reform, privatisation and stability have turned out to be important and repeatedly used concepts.

It is also notable that some concepts have been recontextualized in terms of the past events of the Turkish history. For instance, it is observed that “inefficiency” of the state in the economy has been frequently conceptualized by the mainstream media with some words reminding some implementations during the Ottoman Empire such as qualifying SOEs as Arpalık/Benefice Model or increases in salaries of public staff as Ulufe. On the other hand, Islamist columnists preferred to refer “state’s inefficiencies” and “shortages in the economy” during the single party government of CHP of the 1940s.

5.2.3 Frequent Use of Quotations from the Speeches of the Political Figures and Members of the Capitalist Class

The analysis of the columns shows that columnists frequently use direct quotations from the speeches and other written texts delivered by the political authorities and spokespersons of the capitalist class. Declarations and speeches of the Prime

Minister, Ministers and responsible bureaucrats of the Economy Administration⁸⁰⁵ as well as party programmes, party brochures and government programmes⁸⁰⁶ have been directly used by columnists.

As for the views of the capitalist class, the columnists use quotations from the reports of TUSIAD and YASED and “eminent” speeches of businessmen and CEOs. During the 1980s, Mehmet Barlas prepared special pages including interviews with the representatives of big capital. From the 1990s onwards, the speeches and reports prepared by TUSIAD and its members become popular reference points. Columnists also write about their own media groups and make frequent references to media owners. The analysed Islamist columnists, Dilipak in his turn praised and referred to the works of MUSIAD. It is remarkable that Dilipak has made efforts to attract attention of MUSIAD to not only dealing with economic cooperation issues but also developing cultural and intellectual aspects of “the conservatives”. On the other hand, Koru’s harsh and oppositional language towards TUSIAD has gradually softened by the years 2000s.

5.2.4 Discrediting Left-Wing Parties, Trade Unions and Class Struggle

An important discursive element of the analysed texts is their negation of the leftist’s views. Particularly during the 1980s, mainstream columnists made effort to depict class struggle and strikes as a vital and heavy burden for all working classes in the country. In this sense, columnists used words with “negative” connotations to qualify actions of the working class and trade unions. Communisms, socialism and other leftist worldviews have been also clearly discredited especially after the 1990s.

From the mid-1990s, the analysed columnists including the Islamist columnists

⁸⁰⁵ Columnists use not only official statements of the political figures but also use their states taken during private meetings.

⁸⁰⁶ For instance, Uras directly uses texts of Özal Government programmes and JDP’s party propaganda brochures.

invited working classes to sacrifice and to become more responsible in their demands for the long-term well-being of the economy. Increases in the salaries of the civil servant, excess public servants and workers of public sector were shown as responsible hindering the economic development. Trade unions and their representatives were discredited and accused of excessive demands.

5.2.5 Interdiscursive Hybridity

As previously tried to be explained, the notion of interdiscursive hybridity refers to the articulation of different discourses, genres and styles in the text as well as “disarticulation” and “re-articulation” of relationships between different discourses, genres and styles.⁸⁰⁷

The clearest and striking examples of interdiscursive hybridity was detected in the texts of the Islamist columnists from the mid-1990s. As discussed above, the Political Islam has undergone an articulation process with neo-liberalism in Turkey which has also become evident in the discourse used by the Islamist media. Although the Islamist columnists preserved “anti-western” elements, an increasing compliance with neo-liberal agenda and globalization can be seen in their texts.

The research shows that main neo-liberal claims such as free movement of capital, goods, knowledge economy and concepts of interdependence have been presented as undeniable and inevitable developments. Moreover, the use of religious references and key neo-liberal claims for conceptualizing social and economy developments in the same text has caused an eclecticism in the Islamist discourse. As several examples provided above, the conceptualization of wealth, capital,

⁸⁰⁷ Norman Fairclough, *Discursive hybridity and social change in Critical Discourse Analysis*, 2011, p.1. accessed on https://www.academia.edu/3776026/Discursive_hybridity_and_social_change_in_Critical_Discourse_Analysis_2011

capitalists, interdependence and even Islam is problematic in the studied texts.

5.3 Keywords of Neo-liberal Discourse in Turkey

In line with the CDA methodology, the survey sheet used to analyse columns also focused on the “word selections” of the columnists. In this regard, for each column “repeated and highlighted words” were noted both by the researcher and the Volunteer Group. As a result, a list of keywords is identified which can be separated into each ten-year period of neo-liberal structuring in Turkey. The lists are as follows:

Repeatedly used/highlighted words and phrases between 1980-1990

- 24 January Decisions /24 Ocak Kararları
- Turkish Army /Türk Ordusu
- Peaceful atmosphere /Huzur ortamı
- Özal - Success – Milestone – Brave /Özal Başarı – Dönüm noktası – Cesur
- Özal - Step into a new age/Özal -Çağ atlamak
- Money/Para
- Interest/Faiz
- Wealth/Servet
- Consumption/Tüketim
- Strike/Grev
- Strike Pressure/Grev baskısı
- Landlords of Trade Union/Sendika ağaları
- Storm of Strike/Grev Fırtınası

- Rehearsal of General Strike/Genel Grev Provası
- Wage Unionism /Ücret Sendikacılığı
- Foreign Capital/Yabancı Sermaye
- Capital/Sermaye
- Bank- Banking/Banka –bankacılık
- Change/Değişim
- Change and transformation/Değişim ve dönüşüm
- Free Market/Serbest Pazar
- Liberalization/Serbestleşme
- Dollar Millionaires/Dolar Milyoneri
- Businessmen/İşadamı
- Getting rich/ Zenginleşme
- Capitalist/Kapitalist
- TÜSIAD
- TÜSIAD - Istanbul Dukedom -Istanbul Dükalığı
- TÜSIAD –Fat cats - Şişman Kediler
- Yuppi – new generation/ Yeni nesil -Yuppiler
- Collapse of Communism – Komünizmin Çöküşü

Repeatedly used words and phrases between the years 1990-2000

- Inflation/Enflasyon

- Inflation Monster/Enflasyon canavarı
- Inflation cannot be reduced without hurting/Enflasyon can yakmadan düşmez
- the IMF Stick/IMF sopası
- the IMF Recipe/IMF reçetesi
- Intention Letter/Niyet Mektubu
- SOE as Black Hole/KIT – Kara Delik
- SOE Hunchback/KIT Kamburu
- SOE Benefice Model/KIT - Arpalık Modeli
- “State’s properties are like a sea and who doesnt eat (take advantage of) are pigs”/Devletin Malı Deniz, Yemeyen Domuz
- State is running out of its sea /Devletin Denizi Bitti
- Devletin İki Yakası/Make both ends meet (for the state)
- Expecting everything from the Father State/herşeyi devlet babadan beklemek
- Excess public staff/Kamuda Personel Şişkinliği
- Only God can give without taking/Almadan vermek Allah’a mahsus
- Sacrifice of all segments of society/Toplumun her kesiminin fedakarlığı
- Burden of Public expenditure/Kamu harcama yükü
- Believers/İnanan kesim
- TUSIAD
- Business world/İş dünyası
- Enemies of Wealth/Servet Düşmanları

- Markets/Piyasalar
- Democracy/Demokrasi
- Reform/Reform
- Globalization/Küreselleşme
- Change/Değişim
- Structural Reform/Yapısal Reform
- Competitiveness/Rekabet edebilirlik
- Progress/İlerleme
- Privatisation/Özelleştirme
- Efficiency/Verimlilik
- Private Sector/Yabancı Sermaye
- Global/Küresel
- New/Yeni
- Modernization/Modernleşme
- Minimizing the state/devleti küçülmek
- Kemalism/Kemalizm
- Statuo quo lovers/Statükocular
- Nationalist/Ulusalcılar
- Consumption/Tüketim
- New world Order/Yeni Dünya Düzeni

- Coalition/Koalisyon
- Nationalism/Milliyetçilik
- Yargı kararı/Judicial Decision
- Missing the globalization/Küreselleşmeyi Iskalamak
- Missing the Train/Treni kaçırmak
- Missing a historical opportunity/Tarihi fırsatı kaçırmak
- Populist/Populist

Repeatedly used words and phrases between the years 2000-2010

- Foreign Capital/Yabancı Sermaye
- Globalization/ Küreselleşme
- Privatisation/Özelleştirme
- Stability/Istikrar
- Political Stability/Siyasi Istikrar
- Financial Discipline/Mali Disiplin
- Structural Adjustment/Yapısal Uyum
- Progress/İlerleme
- Happy Globalism/Güleryüzlü küresellik
- Restructure/Yeniden yapılanma
- Regulation/Düzenleme
- Crisis/Kriz

- Structural Reform/Yapısal Reform
- Market economy/Piyasa Ekonomisi
- Expectations/Beklentiler
- Positive Expectations/Olumlu Beklentiler/
- Innovation /Inovasyon
- Entrepreneurship/Girişimcilik
- Information age/Bilgi çağı
- Knowledge based economy/Bilgiye dayalı ekonomi
- Sacrifice/Fedakarlık
- Social Aid/Sosyal Yardım
- Prerequisites of Islam/İslamın gerekleri
- Erdoğan -Success- Strong Leader/ Erdoğan – Başarı- Güçlü Lider
- the JDP -success-stability/ AKP – Başarı- İstikrar
- the JDP performance/AKP İcraat
- God’s judgement /Allah’ın takdiri
- Power/İktidar
- Tax/Vergi
- Expectations about the Economy/Ekonomiye ilişkin beklentiler
- Calculation/Hesap
- Crisis

- Conservative/Muhafazalarlar
- Interest Lobby/Faiz Lobisi
- Interdependency/Karşılıklı Bağımlılık
- Tight Money Policy/Sıkı Para Politikası
- White Muslims/Beyaz Müslümanlar

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In the post-1980 era, neo-liberalism caused a dramatic transformation in almost every aspect of political, economic and social realms in Turkey. It has changed the way people are governed, the way they work and the way they consume, whilst it strove to change how the people think about themselves and about the world. In other words, it resulted in significant changes in state-class, state-market and labour-market relationships. Although there are several attempts and perspectives to define it, drawing upon the concepts proposed by Bob Jessop, this study evaluated neo-liberalism as a response of the capitalist classes to the political, economic and fiscal crises of the Keynesian national welfare state with an ideological class project which has relied on strong discursive elements. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that in the production of neo-liberal hegemony, actors from different scales including the state, international organizations, political actors, and the mass media have taken part in this “battle of ideas”. In this sense, the mass media, besides its increasing articulation to the capitalist structure in the post-1980 era, has played a vital role in building a neo-liberal hegemony on both national and global scales.

Involvement of the print media in the production of a neo-liberal discourse in Turkey for the period of 1980-2010 is tried to be problematized in this thesis. In this regard, the thesis analysed development and evolution of neo-liberal discourse of Turkish print media based on elaborations and views of columnists from different political backgrounds. It aimed to identify key discursive selectivities in the coverage of neo-liberal policies, changing patterns in these selectivities in time, their continuities and discontinuities with the global neo-liberal order of discourse and articulation of the Islamist media to the neo-liberal discourse. To that end, a textual analysis was formulated and applied to columns of five selected columnists

based on the methodology of CDA. The findings of this textual analysis were also verified and broadened by a sample analysis of a group of volunteers.

In this context, this conclusion aims to present key findings and arguments of this thesis by firstly touching upon key assumptions, theoretical framework and methodology on which this critical analysis is based. Secondly, it presents main conclusions reached through the textual analysis of the columns. Thirdly, it tries to discuss relevance and contribution of this analysis to the media studies in Turkey.

Before specifically focusing on the media texts on neo-liberalism, the thesis started with discussing three questions to set a profound theoretical framework for the analysis. First, it aimed to conceptualize neo-liberalism, material conditions of its emergence and its discursive characteristics. It has been underlined that although neo-liberal order of discourse has largely based on key arguments/core claims drawn from neo-liberal ideology⁸⁰⁸, it is hardly possible to refer to a homogenous neo-liberal discourse. In other words, neo-liberal discourse has been subjected to a “recontextualization” on different scales (global/national/local), in different periods (periods of crises etc.) and domains (business, education, and media.) Therefore, in the thesis it is underlined that the neo-liberal discourse has adapted itself to new challenges arising from crises and counter-hegemonic elements and thus, it has not been *a fait accompli* but an on-going process and struggle together with Fairclough.⁸⁰⁹ Finally, it has been argued that besides its objective of re-structuring economic objects, neo-liberalism has also aimed to produce new subjects. In a sense, it has transformed the social realm to make it more appropriate for the strategies of capital accumulation.

Secondly, the study presented a brief discussion on ideology, hegemony and the role of discourse in the social structure. In this debate, language has been defined as an arena of ideological struggle in which different discursive elements articulated

⁸⁰⁸ Steger, “Ideologies of globalization”, p.11–30.

⁸⁰⁹ Norman Fairclough, “Language And Neo-Liberalism, *Discourse Society*, 2000, Vol. 11, p.147.

with each other. Discourse, as the use of language in the social practice for certain way of representing, has been also identified as a “socially constructed” and “socially constructive” element. In this sense, drawing on the contributions of Ngai Ling Sum and Jessop, the thesis contended that discourse has played a crucial role in the rise of post-Fordist economies, particularly in the contestation of different “economic imaginaries” of accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic perspectives”.⁸¹⁰ However, it has been underlined that structural/material preconditions have been ultimate determining factors in the selection of certain discourses. Therefore, in its analysis of the print media, this study aimed to locate “discursive elements of the media texts” in the material conditions of neo-liberal transformation of Turkey and the mass media.

On the basis of the current literature and textual analysis, it has been argued that a large number of columnists, both in the mainstream and Islamist media, are involved in the making of a hegemonic neo-liberal discourse and acted as primary “binding agents” among businessmen, political power-holders and the media owners. To substantiate this claim, a list of distinctive features of columnists in Turkey in the post-1980 era is proposed. First, attention is drawn on the increased number of columnists in the post-1980 era and their changing roles as organic bounds among the mentioned structures. Secondly, it has been underlined that in line with this changing role, income levels of columnists, their political parallelism, and their support for neo-liberal agenda have increased. Thirdly, the chapter pointed out that the contents of columns have also substantially changed, and columnists have started to write about an enlarged spectrum of subjects in their columns including their private lives, experiences, travels, hobbies and debates with other columnists. Fourth, it has been contended that the columnists in Turkey distanced themselves from investigative journalism and adapted general tendencies of tabloidization in the mass media. Finally, increased public visibility of columnists in the post-1980 era has been emphasized. That is to say columnists have not been

⁸¹⁰ Bob Jessop, “Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy”, p.3.

writing only in their columns, but they have become unchanged “faces” of all the mass media, particularly TV and radio channels of their media groups. They have begun to act as anchor-men, news commentators, moderators and participants of discussion programmes, magazine programmes and radio programmes. This is why; this thesis argued that columnists in Turkey have formed one of the important strata of organic intellectuals of the neo-liberal transformation. Furthermore, it has been underlined that the role and the position of columnists during the digital era has not been hampered.

Thirdly, methodology of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the selection criteria of analysed columnists have been presented in Chapter III. In this regard, this dissertation has benefited from Dialectical-Relational CDA approach of Norman Fairclough who is a scholar from Lancaster University and had contributed to the Strategic-Relational approach developed largely by Bob Jessop. In this sense, it is underlined that one of the most significant aspects of CDA is its concern about the role of discourse in sustaining and reproducing as well as challenging existing power relations in contemporary societies. In this sense, key concepts used by this approach such as discursive selectivity, recontextualization and interdiscursive hybridity have been useful tools for the analysis of the media texts on neo-liberalism in Turkey, particularly the articulation of Islamist discourse to the neo-liberal discourse.

In this regard, the survey sheet prepared by benefiting from the CDA methodology was used by the researcher to evaluate 186 columns. The questions in the form can be divided into three groups. First, the form aims to reveal the columnists' bias towards neo-liberalism, the spokesmen of the capitalist classes and political parties as well as their basic discursive selectivities and arguments. Secondly, the questions on the survey sheet aim to determine the properties of language used in columns, particularly narrative techniques and grammatical features. Third, the survey sheet aims to determine frequently used of highlighted words, concepts and phrases in each column, that is, the “word selections” of the columnists. It is noteworthy that the findings of the Researcher and the Volunteer Group provide qualitative and

quantitatively similar findings as a result of the analysis.

First of all, in conformity with the relevant literature in critical media studies in Turkey, this research revealed the positive bias of the mainstream media in their coverage of neo-liberal policies in the post-1980 era. Furthermore, it proposed that changing tones and arguments of this positive bias, main themes around which key discursive selectivities had intensified and how already existing discourses such as Islamist discourse integrated into and articulated with the neo-liberal discourse.

In a general sense, the tone of the observed positive bias towards neo-liberalism was much stronger in the 1990s and 2000s when compared with that of 1980s. The arguments and language used in the media columns indicated a strong advocacy of free market economy, liberalization, globalization, reform and privatisation whereas views pertinent to class struggle such as views of leftist parties and trade unions were degraded. Acceleration of the globalisation process, the increasing involvement of capital groups in the media industry and the completion of the symbiotic relationship among the capital class, the media and political parties were the the prominent factors that underlined the observed attitudes.

Moreover, in Turkey, by the mid-1990s, the rise of Political Islam and increasing capital accumulation of the conservative/Islamist capital have caused gradual articulation of the Islamist media with the neo-liberal agenda. In this regard, this analysis detected a clear shift in the bias of Islamist columnists towards neo-liberal policies, which meant a transition from an anti-systemic and anti-capitalist discourse to a more concurrent approach to neo-liberalism starting from the mid-1990s.

In light of these general conclusions, the results of the textual analysis applied to columnists were evaluated from three aspects. First, the discursive selectivities and arguments used in columns are grouped under seven main. Secondly, the characteristics of the language used in the columns, the style and the richness of the narration are evaluated. Finally, since it was determined that the "word selections"

made by columnists contained significant repetitions, a “neo-liberal key word inventory” composed of these words was created.

The research indicates that columnists, particularly those employed in the mainstream media, deployed great efforts to praise “virtue” of free market economy and private sector as well as to improve “images” of representatives of the capitalist classes all through the studied period. Moreover, this study showed that Islamist columnists have also attempted to legitimize increasing capital accumulation of Islamist-conservative businessmen and inequalities in the society.

Another important discursive selectivity of the print media was consumerism. In this regard, consumption, luxury lifestyle and imported goods have turned to be nodal points in the columns. Two arguments are deployed for the promotion of consumerism, Firstly, consumption has been described as a sign of welfare, civilization and modernization and secondly, increasing consumption and wealth of the rich has been presented as something for the benefit of general interest.

Particularly from the beginning of the 1990s, a “strong” narrative about the “irreversible and indispensable globalization” also emerged as a nodal point of columns. In this sense, during the 1990s, the concepts such as “change, new world order, new world and globalization” were frequently highlighted in the support of structural reform, deregulation, liberalization, public management reforms and privatisation. Similarly, this theme has also been used by the Islamist columnists to justify why the Political Islam should adapt to the “new world order”. Moreover, in the columns, apart from the agencies of the economy, members of the “civil society”, individuals and particularly young people were asked to be prepared to “change”. Columnists also occasionally warned or even threatened the reader about the risks and danger of resisting the “change” by evoking the examples of Yugoslavia and Iraq.

Concepts of privatisation and anti-statism have rapidly entered into the Turkish print media’s agenda by the mid-1990s. Although privatisation was not a high priority of the political authorities and the mass media during the 1980s. by the

1990s, it has turned out to be one of the most controversial debates in the public opinion. Columnists harshly criticized “inefficient” involvement of the state in the economy and “burden” of SOEs for the country. It has been observed that, in the mainstream media, recontextualization of privatisation policies were tried to be justified by showing examples of the unsuccessful practices in economy administration in Turkish history, particularly of the Ottoman state. The research indicated that advocacy of privatisation was based on a strong negation of and attack towards opponent views and judicial decisions. In this sense, debates on privatisation have become one of the first public controversies in neo-liberal era in which the print media systematically discredited the judicial decisions. More importantly, privatisation policies can be seen as the first and a significant element of the articulation of Islamist discourse with the neo-liberal agenda since privatisation was even covered by the Islamist media as a necessary objective for Turkey in the mid-1990s.

Discrediting class struggle, class demands, and leftist worldviews has also been one of major themes of the analysed columns starting from the early 1980s. In this regard, the study revealed that the mainstream media has shown a close political parallelism with the strategic selectivities of the state as to suppression of class struggle, class demands and leftist views. Three main discursive elements have been frequently used in this parallelism. First, neo-liberal policies were depicted as necessary measures to assure “the long-term well-being” which cannot show their impacts immediately. Secondly, demands of the working classes such as wage increases, and social security rights were covered as burden for the rest of the society hindering before the economic development. Lastly, communism, socialism, trade unions and left-wing parties were degraded and presented as political movements without prospects for the future political arena. On the other hand, the coverage of class struggle by Islamist columnists shows changes in time. Although they clearly positioned themselves as anti-communist and anti-leftists, they embraced a positive stance towards the demands of the workers during the 1980s. However, by the mid-1990s, Islamist columnists have begun to use very

similar arguments with the mainstream media and emphasized the importance of “making sacrifice” for the well-being of the economy.

A fifth main theme seen in the media texts was the utilization of the “IMF as an anchor”⁸¹¹ of neo-liberal restructuring. In this respect, the analysis revealed that discursive elements regarding the use of the IMF anchor showed some different characteristics in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. First of all, during the 1980s, the IMF-guided government programmes were frequently depicted as “authentic” programmes of Özal with an emphasis on his “successes, capacities and insights”. The mainstream columnists tried to “personalize” political debates about the neo-liberal policies and highlighted Özal’s actions. However, during the 1990s, weak coalition governments and changing ownership relations in the mass media seemed to affect the coverage of the IMF anchor. After the mid-1990s, image of the IMF is more positively portrayed. From then on, the IMF was mostly presented as a “wise and scientific” “friend” which would discipline the administration of economy. In this sense, columnists frequently used “the IMF stick” metaphor in their columns. On the other hand, coverage of the IMF by the Islamist media showed a clear negative bias in line with anti-western elements of the discourse in all studied period. However, it is observed that implementation of the IMF-guided programmes during the 2000s was legitimized as the “compulsory continuation” of structural reforms launched by previous governments.

The research also reached a set of discursive elements with regards to the articulation of Islamist media with neo-liberal discourse. First of all, a clear shift has been observed in the texts of Islamist columnists in terms of their biases towards neo-liberal policies. Although they harshly criticized liberal ideology, individualism, integration of the country with the international economy and the increasing inequalities in the society during the 1980s, they have gradually adopted “inevitable and irreversible globalization” argument and the supremacy of free

⁸¹¹ Yalman and Bedirhanoğlu, “State, Class and Discourse:”, p.121.

market economy by the mid-1990s. Islamist columnists also preferred to draw upon some key elements of dominant neo-liberal discourse such as identity and value-based discursive selectivities and anti-statist views. However, the findings also revealed that Islamist columnists preserved their anti-western stance throughout the studied period of 1980-2010. In fact, “anti-westernism” has been one of the major discursive selectivities of the Islamist columnists, which is used to explain national and international challenges Turkey faced with. In this regard, it can be argued that articulation of Political Islam with neo-liberalism has caused emergence of a set of *inconsistent and eclectic conceptualizations* in the Islamist media due to the combination of strong and persistent anti-western narratives with the neo-liberal claims of interdependency, free market economy, globalization and liberalization of trade. This is why; it has been argued that neo-liberal discourse of the Islamist media can be explained by the “interdiscursive hybridity” concept of Dialectical-Relational CDA approach which refers to the “constitution of a text from diverse discourses and genres”.⁸¹²

In this sense, one of the nodal points observed in the texts of Islamist columnists was the effort of legitimizing income inequalities in the society and increasing wealth of Islamist-conservative bourgeois by using religious references. In order to normalize income inequalities and the wealth, religious references were used with particular mentions to the need for social aid and solidarity. The notions of “capitalism” and “capitalist” were detached from their socio-economic concepts and explained theologically by referring the fulfilment of Islam’s requirements in earning and spending the money. Apart from providing social aids to the poor, Islamist-Conservative capitalists were asked to “revive and construct the Islam Civilization” and “to develop moral, aesthetic and philosophical aspects of the Islamist world again”.

Finally, a seventh major discursive element which dominated the coverage of neo-liberal policies is the “economic and political stability narratives” particularly in the

⁸¹² Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p.96.

2000s. It can be argued that particularly 1994 and 2001 economic crises have been traumatic moments for political actors, public opinion and Turkish bourgeois which also influenced the print media. A broad spectrum of actors including political parties, the mass media, NGOs, think tanks, members and representatives of capitalist class harmoniously contributed to the development of a dominant narrative on the need of political stability. In this regard, particularly during the first and the second JDP government, the “vital importance” of political stability was presented as an essential element of economic well-being and development of the country both by the mainstream and Islamist media. In other words, a “strong” narrative has emerged emphasizing “benefits” of single party governments”, which has been also used to legitimize neo-liberal policies pursued under these governments.

As an important component of the CDA approach, the research also reached a set of conclusions in terms of the language used by the columnists. In this context, five features are identified both by the researcher herself and the Volunteer Group. First, it has been seen that column-writing in Turkey lacks generally accepted elements of investigative journalism, need for objectivity, introduction of new ideas, concepts and inedited/academic creation. Instead, the language used in the texts showed the examples of clear biases, stereotypes and tabloidization. This bias is clearly seen in the uses of statistical data to explain economic impacts of neo-liberal policies since they were portrayed without any mention to their reflections in the social domain. Secondly, repeated use of certain stereotypes, popular words and neo-liberal keywords in the advocacy of neo-liberal policies has been a constant characteristic of the contents of columnists’ media production. In the mainstream media, key slogans deployed on neo-liberal transformation showed almost complete conformity with the global dominant neo-liberal discourse. However, a set of neo-liberal keywords have also emerged through recontextualization of developments in Turkey. Thirdly, it has been observed that columnists frequently made references to discursive acts of the political authorities and representatives of the capitalist classes. In some cases, direct quotations with copy-pastes were used in the columns. The fourth element is the “negation” of left-wing parties and trade

unions and class struggle by the use of “negative” meaning-loaded words, adjectives and phrases to qualify them. Left-wing parties, acts of trade unions and working-class movements were also depicted by words with negative connotations. They are covered with references to historical incidents that have produced damaging effects for the whole of the society during the pre-1980 era. Lastly, interdiscursive hybridity as the articulation and disarticulation of different discourses, genres and styles in the texts have frequently been seen in the articles of Islamist columnists. Together with anti-western and religious references, the Islamist media used the arguments of “inevitable and irreversible globalization narratives” to explain articulation of the Political Islam with neo-liberalism.

Finally, every column examined in this research was evaluated in terms of “word selections”. In this context, the study revealed that certain vocabulary and expression patterns are frequently used in the columns. As a matter of fact, inventory revealed by the research indicates that dominant neo-liberal discourse in Turkey showed great parallels with the global neoliberal narratives and the concepts. On the other hand, it is noted that these concepts are also subject to a “re-contextualization” in the print media. In this sense, some concepts and events in political history of Turkey, various stereotyped phrases and proverbs in Turkish are frequently used in this re-contextualization attempts.

There is a considerable literature about the development of neo-liberal policies in Turkey and the transformation witnessed in the structures of the mass media. These studies provide profound critical analyses on a wide spectrum of issues such as changing ownership relations in the media industry, the role of media in the production of neo-liberal hegemony, its political parallelism and changing conditions of journalism. However, it can be argued that role of columnists in Turkey is one of the overlooked aspects of neo-liberal transformation of the country and, a very limited number of critical discourse analyses have been dedicated to their texts. In this regard, this thesis aimed to contribute to critical media studies in Turkey through its focus on the media coverage of neo-liberal policies for a long period of time from 1980 to 2010, with its methodological approach of Dialectical

Relational CDA and its particular emphasis on the columnists coming from different political perspectives. In this study, scope of the analysed period enables the researcher to see changing discursive elements and arguments of the neo-liberalism by the media. Secondly, Dialectical Relational CDA approach provides a methodological approach which particularly facilitates the analysis of neo-liberalism and the articulation of Islamist discourse to it.

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APPENDICES

A. Survey Sheet

1. Name of the Researcher:	
2. Name of the Columnist:	
3. Headline of the Text:	
3. Name of the Newspaper:	
4. Date of the Newspaper:	
5. Is there any <u>bias</u> towards neo-liberalism (or a specific neo-liberal implementation)? Please mention the position of the author towards those policies.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Positive <input type="checkbox"/> Negative <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable	
6. Have you noticed any implicit or explicit message which <u>supports the discourse/acts</u> of those who hold power or capital?	
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
If yes: <input type="checkbox"/> implicit <input type="checkbox"/> explicit	
7. Have you noticed any <u>striking word selection</u> which is used <u>to name/label or qualify</u> a social actor, group, event, action, process etc.?	
Please mention:	
8 . In the text, can you detect any of the following message(s) about neo-liberalism (or about a specific neo-liberal implementation mentioned in the footnote)?	

- ☐ Neo-liberalism/free market economy (or a specific neo-liberal policy) is the best economic model/choice.
- ☐ Change-reform to neo-liberalism is inevitable and globally accepted.
- ☐ There is no other alternative to neo-liberal policies.
- ☐ Alternative approaches are wrong and void.(for instance statism, socialism, communism)
- ☐ Turkey will suffer harsh conditions or “miss the train” if it does not implement neo-liberal polic(y)ies.
- ☐ Neo-liberalism will boost freedom, equality or democracy in Turkey.
- ☐ Capital/capitalist/capitalism/wealth/businessmen is good for the country.
- ☐ The state’s involvement in the economy is inefficient.
- ☐ The state should regulate and facilitate functioning of the free market.
- ☐ Neo-liberalism/neo-liberal policies is/are wrong / will cause negative consequences to x.
- ☐ Other (please mention):

9. Message/s on working class.

Is there any mention of the working class?

☐ Yes: ☐ No:

If yes:

What is the word selection:

☐ işçiler ☐ işçi sınıfı ☐ emekçiler ☐ çalışanlar ☐ halk kitleleri ☐ düşük gelirliiler
☐ yoksullar ☐ other:

Is there any implicit or explicit message which discredits working class struggle,

trade unions or leftist political stance? ☐ Yes ☐ No **If yes:** ☐ implicit ☐ explicit

Is there any implicit or explicit message which shows demands of the working class as a burden for the country? ☐ Yes ☐ No **If yes:** ☐ implicit ☐ explicit

Is there any message which starts with empathy for the working class and follows with counter-arguments? (some of their demands are reasonable BUT..) ☐ Yes ☐ No

Is there any message about necessity of charities or social aid? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Any other message you can mention:

10. Can you detect any of following language uses which is used to strengthen the idea of the text?

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Passive voice | <input type="checkbox"/> Religious references / Dini referans |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Word Games (Metaphor) | <input type="checkbox"/> Eastern Words / Doğu Kökenli Sözcükler |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Sarcasm | <input type="checkbox"/> Western Words / Batı Kökenli Sözcükler |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Idiom / Deyim | <input type="checkbox"/> Stereotypes / Kalıplaşmış Sözcükler |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Adage / Atasözü | <input type="checkbox"/> Popular Words / Popüler Sözcükler |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Jokes / Fıkralar | <input type="checkbox"/> Extraordinary words / Sıradışı sözcükler |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Story telling / Hikaye | <input type="checkbox"/> Anology / Örneksime |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Evidence / Kanıt | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vague Reference/ “ex. bir yetkili” | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quotation / Alıntı | |

11. Is there any specific word which is frequently used or emphasized?

(ex. new, change, reform, market, free market, structural reform,

deregulation, nation, freedom, people, privatization, liberal, equal, Turkey, state, morality, Turkish, religion, conservative, inflation)

12. States of the researcher (any other comment about the discourse of the text)

B. Information Note for Volunteer Group

Bu çalışma, ODTÜ Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü Doktora öğrencisi Kadriye BODUR GÜMÜŞ tarafından yürütülmektedir. Bu form sizi araştırma koşulları hakkında bilgilendirmek için hazırlanmıştır.

Çalışmanın Amacı Nedir?

Bu çalışmanın amacı, 1980 sonrası dönemde Türkiye’de yaşanan neo-liberal dönüşümün medyada sunumunu köşe yazarlarının söylemleri bağlamında incelemek ve bu amaçla seçilmiş medya metinlerine eleştirel bir söylem analizi uygulamaktır.

Bize Nasıl Yardımcı Olmanızı İsteyeceğiz?

Araştırmaya size iletilecek 39 köşe yazısına ilişkin değerlendirmelerinizi almak üzere hazırlanmış analiz formlarını doldurarak katkı vermeniz beklenmektedir. Analiz formu, söylemin incelenmesinde yararlı olabilecek sorular içermektedir ve “Eleştirel Söylem Analizi” olarak adlandırılan niteleyici bir analiz yönteminin farklı yaklaşımlarından faydalanılarak hazırlanmıştır. Ancak, araştırmacılar bu formla sınırlı değildir ve formda belirtildiği noktalarda ucu açık olarak eklemeler yapabilirler. Ayrıca analiz formu, daha önce bu alanda farklı ülkelerde yapılmış söylem analizlerinde elde edilen temel argümanları-mesajları içermekte ve Türkiye’deki kullanımlarını sorgulamaktadır. Ancak bu soruya Türkiye özelinde eklemeler yapmanız çalışmaya önemli katkı sağlayacaktır.

Katılımınızla ilgili bilmeniz gerekenler:

Bu çalışmaya katılmak tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayalıdır. Herhangi bir yaptırıma veya cezaya maruz kalmadan çalışmaya katılmayı reddedebilir veya çalışmayı bırakabilirsiniz. Araştırma esnasında cevap vermek istemediğiniz sorular olursa boş bırakabilirsiniz.

Araştırmaya katılanlardan toplanan veriler tamamen gizli tutulacak, veriler ve kimlik bilgileri herhangi bir şekilde eşleştirilmeyecektir. Katılımcıların isimleri

bağımsız bir listede toplanacaktır. Ayrıca toplanan verilere sadece araştırmacılar ulaşabilecektir. Bu araştırmanın sonuçları bilimsel ve profesyonel yayınlarda veya eğitim amaçlı kullanılabilir, fakat katılımcıların kimliği gizli tutulacaktır.

Bazı metinlerde arşiv taramasının zorlukları nedeniyle netlik sorunları mevcuttur, okumakta zorladığınız metinlerde açıklama isteyebilir, ya da okumamayı tercih edebilirsiniz.

Çalışma, genel olarak kişisel rahatsızlık verecek sorular içermemektedir. Ancak, analiz formlarını doldurmanız sürecinde sorulardan ya da herhangi başka bir nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz cevaplama işini yarıda bırakabilirsiniz.

C. Some Examples from the Assessments of Volunteer Group

Volunteer	Columnist	Article	Repeated/highlighted words and phrases	Comment of the volunteer
Volunteer A	Güngör Uras	Piyasalar Gül'Den Memnun <i>(Markets are pleased with Gül)</i>	Markets	Market is taken not as a social relation, but as an ontologically separate and superior realm that has its own rationality which is capable of shaping all other social relations efficiently as well.
Volunteer B	Güngör Uras	Milletler Kapitalist Oluyor Komünistler – Sosyalistler Kaybediyor <i>(Nations Become Capitalist Communist - Socialists Lose)</i>	Communist, socialist capitalism	Güngör Uras is clearly positioning himself against leftist politics. He claims that the victory of the capitalist system over communist system was a result of the logical choices of the people, which replaced supporting politicians as if supporting a football club.
Volunteer C	Güngör URAS	Sendikalar <i>(Trade Unions)</i>	"property", "the principle of free competition", "bargain", "worker", "trade union", "information", "competence", "output", "strike", "collective bargaining"	Trade unions are discredited by constantly labelling "collective bargaining" process as "taking by force"
Volunteer C	Güngör URAS	AKP'nin oyunu anlamak için bütçeye bakmakta yarar var <i>(It is good to look at the budget to understand JDP's voting rate)</i>	"JDP", "people", "budget", "opposition", "service"	JDP partisanship stands out in the articles by Güngör Uras. Policies pursued by JDP are supported. On the other hand, some criticisms against Erdoğan attract attention.

Volunteer	Columnist	Article	Repeated/highlighted words and phrases	Comment of the volunteer
Volunteer D	Mehmet Barlas	Balıklar Da Bazen Denizi Anlamayabilir <i>(Even fish may sometimes not understand sea)</i>	Change, neo-liberal, new world order, free market	It is the fault of the Turkish people not to understand the benefits of neo-liberalism.
Volunteer D	Mehmet Barlas	Uygarlık Yolunda Hep Engelli Mi Koşmalıyız? <i>(Do we always have to jump race in the way to civilization?)</i>	New, modernization,	An explicit degradation of Turkish citizens and turkey
Volunteer D	Mehmet Barlas	Bu Güzel Vatanda Özelleştirme Yapılır Mı? <i>(Could Privatization Be Made In This Beautiful Country?)</i>	Privatization	An explicit degradation of Turkish citizens and turkey
Volunteer A	Mehmet Barlas	Bu Güzel Vatanda, Özelleştirme Yapılır Mı? <i>(Could Privatization Be Made In This Beautiful Country?)</i>	SEE, privatization	Author codifies each and every opposition to neo-liberal transition as “old-fashioned” and equalizes “free market economy” with “modernization.”
Volunteer A	Mehmet Barlas	Siz Anlamadıysanız Biz Size Anlatalım <i>(We Can Tell If You Cannot Understand)</i>		Author portrays himself as a neutral commentator who objectively acknowledges successful outcomes of government’s economic policies.

Vounteer B	Mehmet Barlas	Türkiye’Nin Yükselişini Gözden Kaçırmamalıyız <i>(We Should Not Miss The Rise of Turkey)</i>	Privatization	Barlas thinks the rise of the Turkish economy is the result of privatization and successful political decisions. He totally misses the global conditions.
Vounteer E	Mehmet Barlas	Globalleşmeyi Iskalarsak Irgat Ulus Oluruz. <i>(If We Overshot Globalization We Would Be A Capstan Nation)</i>	New world, globalization, privatization, foreign capital.	
Volunteer	Columnist	Article	Repeated/highlighted words and phrases	Comment of the volunteer
Volunteer A	Hasan Cemal	Evet, Ekonomik Gidiş İyi Ama... <i>(Yes, The Economic Course Is Good; But...)</i>	EU, economic improvement	Author repeats vulgar mainstream/liberal approach which can be traced back to Lipset that marketization automatically brings democratization in Western liberal-democratic terms.
Volunteer D	Hasan Cemal	İnsan İçin <i>(For Human)</i>	Inflation, people, worker, scarification	The text normalizes the social costs of the combating inflation even though the heading and main focus is people.

Volunteer A	Hasan Cemal	Can Yakmak! <i>(To Hurt!)</i>	Inflation, IMF, tax, state	Article is a great example that shows how neo-liberal transition need not “small state”, but rather, a strong state, roles of which are redefined in line with needs of capital in even an authoritarian way in order to suppress opposition comes from popular classes if it is needed.
Volunteer C	Hasan Cemal	Can Yakmak! <i>(To Hurt!)</i>	“inflation”, “economy”, “IMF”, “tax”, “employment problem”, “real interest”, “bill”, “bond”, “to hurt”, “government”	The sentence “Giving Without Taking Pertains to God” is also used in his another article. Moreover, “no pain no inflation drop”, “increase income and decrease expenditures”, “to make state both ends meet”, “foreign resource flow” are the sentences, expressions and phrases frequently repeated in his articles.
Volunteer D	Hasan Cemal	Bilgi Çağı Kaçmasın, Tarihi Yakalayalım <i>(Let's Not Miss the Information Area, Catch the Time)</i>	Rich people, change, knowledge, global capitalism , industrial revolution	The quotations of rich people around the world are used to convince the readers about the benefits of change come with the neo-liberalism

Volunteer	Columnist	Article	Repeated/highlighted words and phrases	Comment of the volunteer
Volunteer D	Fehmi KORU	Dengeler Yeniden Oluşurken Tüsiad <i>(Tüsiad When the Balances are Redressed)</i>	TÜSİAD, change, bourgeoisie, freedom , conservative	A strong commitment to power of capital is very obvious in the text
Volunteer C	Fehmi KORU	Dengeler yeniden oluşurken TÜSİAD <i>(Tüsiad When the Balances are Redressed)</i>	"TÜSİAD", "change and transformation ", "wealthy", "bourgeois", "conservative", "the rich open to world and well-educated ", "democracy", "freedom"	While supporting the government, he stigmatizes the opponents as “conservatives”
Volunteer A	FEHMI KORU	Gelecek Yıl 1 Mayıs'Ta <i>(On March 1 Next year)</i>	Trade union, worker, unionism, worker rights, Hak-İş, Muslim	Main concern of the author is necessity of creating an Islamist alternative to previously left dominated trade unionism in order to give response to rising problems of workers as an outcome of neo-liberalism without questioning private property as a whole on the basis of employer-employee solidarity on an Islamic ground.
Volunteer B	Fehmi Kuru	Züğürdün Çenesi <i>(Poor Man's Jaw)</i>	Billionaire, enrichment	He is pointing the problem right, unfair share of the wealth.

Volunteer	Columnist	Article	Repeated/highlighted words and phrases	Comment of the volunteer
Volunteer D	Abdurrahman Dilipak	Kim Daha Dindar <i>(Who Is More Religious)</i>	God, poor-rich, help, will of God	Makes the social costs of neo-liberalism invisible with religious focus - Appreciates being docile with the will of God
Volunteer C	Abdurrahman Dilipak	İslam’Da Servetin Yeri Tartışması <i>(Discussion on The Place of Wealth in Islam)</i>	“Muslim”, “wealth”, “Allah”	
Volunteer B	Abdurrahman Dilipak	Allah’A (Cc) Borç Vermek İster Misiniz? <i>(Would You Like To Loan to Allah (Cc))</i>	Aid, debt	In the first paraFigure of the article, he is stating that there could be bankruptcy or shrinkage for some merchants and mid-size enterprises because of the fast development.
Volunteer D	Abdurrahman Dilipak	<i>(Discussion on The Place of Wealth in Islam)</i>	Consent of God, money, Islam, capitalist, wealth	

Volunteer B	Abdurrahman Dilipak	<i>(Who Is More Religious)</i>	Prayer	I think the reason why this article was written is to keep the poor under control. Besides, he is not focusing on the unfair share of the wealth. Worse, he thinks that the reason of poverty is because poor are not praying enough!
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D. CURRICULUM VITAE

KADRIYE BODUR GÜMÜŞ

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Nationality: Turkish

Date of birth: 07/06/1982

EDUCATION

2016 - 2017 Visiting Phd. Researcher, Oxford University, School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies

2009- Doctor of Philosophy in “Political Science and Public Administration”, Middle East Technical University, Turkey, CGPA. 3.63

2005-2008 Master of Arts in “European Studies”, Middle East Technical University, Turkey, CGPA 3.71, The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) Scholarship

2000-2004 Bachelor of “International Relations”, Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University, Turkey, CGPA. 3.66

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES

- 07.2008 –.... Senior EU Expert, Directorate General for EU And Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transport, Communications and Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Turkey
- 01.2007 - 07.2008 ProjectAssistant, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, British Embassy in Ankara
- EU-TESK “Supporting Women Entrepreneurship Project”: Project assistant

(Pre-accession Financial Aid Programme 2005)

LANGUAGE SKILLS

- Advanced Communication skills in both written and spoken Turkish and English

COMPUTER SKILLS

Windows applications,

Microsoft Office Programmes: Excel, Word, PowerPoint, Access.

E. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TRKE ZET

Trkiye’de 1980 sonrası dnemde uygulanan neo-liberal politikalar siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal alanlarda kkl dnmlere neden olmutur. Bu politikalar, bir yandan insanların ynetilme, alıma ve tketim biimlerini deęitirirken, dięer yandan da bireylerin kendilerini ve dnyayı algılayı biimlerini etkileyen toplumsal anlam-yapma mekanizmaları zerinde nemli deęiimlere yol amıtır. Neo-liberalizmi kavramsallatırmaya ynelik birok giriim bulunmakla birlikte, bu alıma, konuya Bob Jessop tarafından nerilen kavramlardan yararlanarak yaklamıtır. Bu baęlamda, neo-liberalizm, Keynesci Ulusal Refah Devleti’nin siyasi, ekonomik ve mali krizini amaya ynelik oluturulan ve gl sylemsel unsurlarla tm dnyaya yayılan ideolojik bir sınıf projesi olarak deęerlendirilebilir. 1980 sonrası dnemde, ABD ve Avrupa’dan balayarak kresel lekte bir hegemonya mcadelesine giren bu proje, farklı lke rneklerinde farklı neo-liberalleme sreleri balatmıtır. Ancak bu srelerin ortak noktası, devlet, uluslararası rgtler, siyasi partiler ve kitle medyası dâhil olmak zere birok aktrn bir “fikir mcadelesi” zaman zaman da “fikir dayatması” iinde yer almasıdır. Bu anlamda, kitle medyası, kapitalist retim biimine giderek artan eklemlenmesinin yanı sıra, ulusal ve kresel lekte neo-liberal bir hegemonyanın inası iin kritik bir rol oynamıtır.

Bu tarihsel baęlamda, tez 1980-2010 dneminde Trkiye’de hakim bir neo-liberal sylemin retilmesinde yazılı basının yerini sorunsallatırmıtır. Tezin temel amacı, Trkiye yazılı basınında kullanılan neo-liberal syleminin ana zelliklerini ve evrimini farklı siyasi perspektiflerden seilmi ke yazarlarına uygulanan eletirel bir sylem analizi baęlamında incelemektir. alıma, yazılı medyada neo-liberal politikaların ele alıında kullanılan sylemsel seicilięe, bunların zaman iindeki deęiimlerine ve kresel dzeyde hâkim neo-liberal sylemle uyumluluęuna odaklanmakta ve yazılı medyada hâlihazırda mevcut farklı siyasi sylemlerin neo-liberal sylemle eklemleniini incelemektedir. Bu amala, Eletirel Sylem Analizi (ESA) metodolojisinden yararlanarak oluturulan bir

metin analizi seçili beş köşe yazarının köşe yazılarına uygulanmıştır. Bu metin analizinin bulguları ayrıca, bir grup gönüllü tarafından yapılan bir örneklem analizin sonuçları ile doğrulanmış ve genişletilmiştir.

Bu özet, tezi üç ana başlık altında ele almaktadır. İlk olarak, tezin ana varsayımları, teorik çerçevesi ve metodolojisine değinilecektir. İkinci olarak, köşe yazıları üzerinde yapılan metin analizinden çıkan ana sonuçlar sunulacaktır. Son olarak ise, mevcut çalışmaların Türkiye’deki medya çalışmalarına katkısı üzerinde durulacaktır.

Teorik Çerçeve, Metodolojik Yaklaşım ve Tarihsel Arka Plan

Seçili köşe yazılarının analizinden önce, incelemede esas alınan teorik çerçeve, metodolojik yaklaşım ve tarihsel arka planın ele alınması önem taşımaktadır. Çünkü eleştirel bir söylem analizinin asıl amacı, söylemsel unsurların sosyal gerçeklik içindeki yerlerinin ve mevcut toplumsal ilişkilerin devamlılığında oynadıkları rolün ortaya çıkarılmasıdır. Bu doğrultuda, bu tezin İkinci Bölümü’nde neo-liberalizmin kavramsallaştırılmasına ilişkin yaklaşımlar, neo-liberalizmin ortaya çıkışının maddi koşulları ve söylemsel özellikleri üzerinde kısa bir tartışma sunulmuştur. Bu bağlamda, neo-liberal söylemin büyük ölçüde neo-liberal ekonomi teorisinin ana argümanları ve iddialarına dayanmakla birlikte, homojen bir söylem olmadığı ve farklı ölçeklerde (yerel, ulusal ve küresel) ve dönemlerde “yeniden bağlamaştırılmaya” uğradığının altı çizilmiştir. Bu nedenle, neo-liberal söylemin karşı karşıya kaldığı krizler ve karşı-hegemonik unsurlarla sürekli bir mücadele içinde olan tamamlanmamış bir yapıda olduğu söylenebilir.⁸¹³

Bu noktada, neo-liberal dönem içinde söylem, ideoloji ve hegemonya arasında nasıl bir ilişki olduğuna değinmek gerekir. Söylem, “toplumsal ilişkiler içinde inşa edilen” ve “toplumsal yapıyı dönüştürebilen” bir unsur olarak, dilin sosyal pratik içinde belli temsil biçimleri için kullanımı olarak tanımlanabilir. Dil ise, farklı söylemsel unsurların birbirleriyle eklemlenip ayrıldığı ideolojik mücadelenin bir

⁸¹³ Norman Fairclough, “Language and Neo-Liberalism, *Discourse Society*, 2000, Vol. 11, p.147.

alanı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma Jessop ve Ngai Ling Sum'un çalışmalarına atıfta bulunarak, "söylemin" post-Fordist ekonomilerin yükselişinde ve özellikle de neo-liberal dönemde birikim biçimi, devlet projeleri ve hegemonya arayışlarına ilişkin farklı "ekonomik tahayyüllerin" mücadelesinde önemli bir role sahip olduğunu vurgulamıştır.⁸¹⁴ Bununla birlikte, belli söylemlerin toplum üzerinde etkin olmasında yapısal/maddi koşulların nihai belirleyici faktör olduğunun da altı çizilmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, bu çalışma kültürcü yaklaşımlarla ekonomik indirgemeci yaklaşımlar arasında bir yol izleyen, kültürel siyasi iktisat yaklaşımını benimsemektedir. Bu nedenle, bu araştırmada yazılı basının kullandığı söylemin Türkiye'nin ve kitle medyasının neo-liberal dönüşümünün maddi koşulları içinde değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır.

Bu kapsamda tez, Türkiye'deki neoliberal yeniden yapılanma sürecine ve medya'daki yapısal dönüşümlere ilişkin kısa bir tarihsel arka plan sunarak, köşe yazılarının analizi için sosyo-ekonomik bir çerçeve oluşturmayı amaçlamıştır. Yaygın olarak kabul edildiği gibi, Türkiye'de neo-liberalleşme süreci, 1980'de oluşturulan 24 Ocak İstikrar Programı ile başlatılmıştır. Bu anlamda, Türkiye'de yapısal uyum sürecinin başlaması, neo-liberal politikaların ABD ve Avrupa'daki erken uygulamalarıyla aynı dönemlere denk gelmektedir. Nitekim Türkiye, IMF ile yapılan stand-by anlaşmaları ve DB tarafından sağlanan yapısal uyum kredilerine dayanan orta vadeli bir istikrar programını uygulayan ilk "gönüllü" ülke olmuştur.

Öte yandan, 24 Ocak kararlarının bir istikrar programı olmanın ötesine geçtiğini vurgulamak gerekir. Esas itibarıyla, Türk Burjuvazisinin 1970'lerde çözemediği hegemonya krizi, küresel ve ulusal sermayenin tahayyüllerine uygun bir neo-liberalleşme süreci ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda program, hem Türk ekonomisinin küresel ekonomi ile eklemlenme biçimini, hem de devletin piyasa ile olan ilişkilerini değiştirirken, siyasi ve sosyal alanlarda da kapsamlı etkiler yaratmıştır.

⁸¹⁴ Bob Jessop, "Critical Semiotic Analysis and Cultural Political Economy", p.3.

Takip eden otuz yılda Türkiye, ekonomik, politik ve sosyal alanlarda hızlı ve dramatik bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir. 1970'lerin ithal-ikameci ekonomi programı terk edilmiş, ticaretin serbestleşmesi ve ihracata yönelik politikalar yoluyla “piyasa uyumlu” düzenlemeler yapılmıştır. Mali serbestleşme, devlet-piyasa ilişkilerinde deregülasyon ve özelleştirme girişimleri de bu politikaları takip etmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'de neo-liberalleşme sürecinin büyük ölçüde 1980 ile 2008 yılları arasındaki yaklaşık otuz yıllık dönemde tamamlandığını söylemek mümkündür. Bu kapsamda, söz konusu otuz yıllık dönem 1980-1988, 1989-1997 ve 1998-2008 olmak üzere üç alt-döneme ayrılarak tezde kısaca ele alınmaktadır.

Tezin araştırma konusunu oluşturan yazılı medyadaki değişimler de bu genel çerçeveye içinde ele alınmıştır. Ülkenin neo-liberal dönüşümüne paralel olarak, işadamları, medya sahipleri ve siyasal iktidarlar arasında ortaya çıkan simbiyotik ilişki, 1990'ların başından itibaren yeni kitle medyasının liberal dönüşüme artan desteğiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu destek, neo-liberal ekonomi politikalarının savunulması veya meşrulaştırılmasıyla sınırlı kalmamış, aynı zamanda sosyal hayatın her alanında, siyasetten çalışma hayatına, tüketim alışkanlıklarından aile ilişkilerine kadar uzanan bir yelpazede yerleşik düşünce ve söylemleri değiştirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Dahası, neo-liberalizmin Türkiye'de farklı söylemlerle eklemlenmesinde de yazılı medya önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu anlamda, özellikle 1990'ların ortasından itibaren neo-liberalizm, neo-liberal politikaların meşrulaştırılması ve temsil edilmesi için yeni söylemsel unsurlar ve argümanlarla desteklenmiştir. Gramşici anlamda, neoliberal söylem, Türkiye'de ideolojik mücadelesinde bir eklemlenme sürecinden geçmiş ve yeni koalisyonlar kurmuştur. İslamcı yazılı basın, söylemsel düzeyde bu eklemlenme sürecinin önemli aktörlerinden biri olmuştur.

Bu teorik çerçeve içinde ve mevcut literatür çalışmaları ışığında, Türkiye'deki köşe yazarlarının hakim neo-liberal bir söylemin oluşturulmasında kaydadeğer bir rol oynadıklarını ileri sürmek mümkündür. Dahası, 1980 sonrası dönemde köşe yazarlarının Türkiye'de siyasi iktidar, medya ve sermaye arasında oluşan füzyon için “birleştirici bir ara unsur” olarak işlev görmeye başladığı görülmektedir. Bu

tespiti desteklemek üzere, 1980 sonrası köşe yazarlarının geçirdiği niteliksel ve niceliksel dönüşüm şu noktalarla özetlenebilir. İlk olarak, 1980 sonrasında gazetelerde görev alan köşe yazarlarının sayısı kademeli ve önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Bu anlamda, 1980 yılında ana akım medyada göre yapan köşe yazarı sayısı 10'un altındayken, 2000'li yıllarda bu sayı 25'in üzerine çıkmıştır. İkincisi, gazetecilik görevlerinin de ötesine geçen roller üstlenmeye başlayan köşe yazarlarının siyasi iktidar ve sermaye gruplarıyla yakın ilişkiler kurduğu gözlemlenmektedir. Üçüncü önemli nokta, 1980 sonrası dönemde köşe yazılarının içeriklerinde görülen değişimdir. Köşe yazılarının içerik yelpazesi oldukça genişlemiş, köşe yazarları ülke gündemi, siyaset ve ekonomi haberleri kadar kendi yaşam deneyimleri, gezileri, tüketim zevkleri, özel hayatları ve diğer köşe yazarlarıyla görüş atışmaları dahil olmak üzere bir çok konuda yazar olmuşlardır. Bu durum, yazılı medyadaki genel magazinleşme eğilimiyle örtüşmektedir. Dördüncü olarak, Türkiye'de köşe yazarlarının araştırmacı gazetecilikten giderek uzaklaştığı söylenebilir. Bu anlamda, özgün ve araştırma kaynaklı köşe yazısı sayısı oldukça azdır. Son olarak, köşe yazarlarının kamuoyunda görünürlüklerinde önemli değişimler yaşanmıştır. Köşe yazarları, 1980 sonrası kitle mediasındaki değişimlerle uyumlu biçimde, içinde bulundukları medya gruplarında haber spikeri, haber yorumcusu, TV ve radyo programı sunucusu olarak görev yapmaya başlamış, tartışma programlarının ve açık oturumlarının değişmeyen yüzleri haline gelmiştir. Bütün bu değişimler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda köşe yazarlarının neo-liberal dönüşüm sürecinin organik entellektüelleri haline geldiğini savunmak mümkündür.

Tezde ele alınan diğer bir konu da, köşe yazarları üzerinde yapılan metin analizinde kullanılan ESA metodolojisi ve analize konu olan köşe yazarlarının seçim kriterleridir. Bu bağlamda, literatürde farklı ESA yaklaşımları bulunmakla birlikte bu tezde Norman Fairclough tarafından geliştirilen Diyalektik-İlişkisel ESA yaklaşımından yararlanılmıştır. Bu yaklaşımın en önemli özelliklerinden biri, söylemin modern toplumlarda mevcut iktidar ilişkilerinin devam ettirilmesi, yeniden üretilmesi ve aynı zamanda karşı gelinmesinde oynadığı role odaklanmasıdır. Bu anlamda, Diyalektik-İlişkisel ESA yaklaşımında kullanılan “söylemsel seçicilik”, “yeniden bağlamaştırma” ve “söylemlerarası melezlik” gibi

kavramlar Türkiye'deki neo-liberal söylemin mevcut siyasi söylemlerle eklemlenme sürecinin incelenmesinde fayda sağlamaktadır.

Öte yandan araştırma konusu olan köşe yazarlarının seçimi için bazı kriterler belirlenmiştir. İlk kriter, *seçilecek köşe yazarlarının ana akım medyada göreceli olarak farklı politik perspektifleri temsil etmesidir*. Neo-liberal politikaların ele alınışına ilişkin kapsamlı sonuçlara ulaşmak ve yazılı basında farklı bakış açılarını temsil edebilecek anlamlı bir örneklem elde etmek için, sadece liberal-sağcı arka plana sahip köşe yazarları değil, aynı zamanda sol-liberal ve İslamcı dünya görüşleri gibi farklı perspektiflere sahip olan köşe yazarlarının da analize dahil edilmesi amaçlanmıştır.

İkinci ölçüt, *seçilecek köşe yazarlarının 1980-2010 yılları boyunca köşe yazarlığı görevlerinde süreklilik göstermeleridir*. Böylelikle, yazarların ele alınan dönem boyunca kullandıkları söylemin değişimini değerlendirmek de mümkün olabilecektir.

Üçüncü kriter, *seçilecek köşe yazarlarının söylem ve iletişim araçlarına ayrıcalıklı erişimlerinin bulunmasıdır*. Bu ayrıcalık, köşe yazarlarının neo-liberal söylemin ulusal ve küresel ölçekte üretim ve yayılma süreçlerine katılımları ve iletişim kanallarına erişimleri olarak tanımlanabilir. Seçilmiş köşe yazarları sadece ulusal gazetelerde önemli bir okuyucu kitlesi bulunan yazarlar değil, aynı zamanda televizyon kanallarında yorum ve tartışma programlarına katılan, ulusal ve uluslararası konferanslar ve toplantılarda konuşmacı olarak yer alan görünürlüğü olan yazarlardır. Dahası, seçilmiş köşe yazarları, çeşitli kanallar aracılığıyla, Türkiye'nin neoliberal dönüşümünün politika oluşturma süreçlerine erişim imtiyazı olan yazarlardır. Başka bir ifadeyle, ele alınan yazarlar farklı dönemlerde, hükümet yetkililerinin veya kapitalist sınıfın temsilcilerinin kamuya kapalı toplantılarına katılma imkanı bulabilmişler, ayrıca, küresel ölçekte neo-liberal söylemin üretildiği Davos Zirveleri ve Bilderberg gibi uluslararası toplantılara katılabilmişlerdir.

Son ölçüt ise, *seçilecek köşe yazarlarının belli bir popülerliğe ve sembolik öneme sahip olmasıdır*. Bu kapsamda seçilen yazarların temsil ettikleri medya grubu ve

siyasi perspektif içinde belli bir yere sahip, kamuyoyunda bilinirliği olan yazarlar olmasına dikkat edilmiştir.

Bu kriterler kapsamında, bu araştırma, bir ekonomist/akademisyen ve köşe yazarı olarak seçilen Güngör Uras ve farklı siyasi perspektifleri yansıttığı düşünülen dört köşe yazarı; liberal merkez-sağ köşe yazarı Mehmet Barlas, aktivist solcu bir geçmişli olmakla birlikte sol liberal bir köşe yazarı olarak tanımlanabilecek Hasan Cemal, İslamcı-muhafazakâr bir köşe yazarı olarak Fehmi Kuru ve yine Milli Gazete, Akit ve Yeni Şafak gibi İslamcı gazeteler için yazmış uzun soluklu bir İslamcı köşe yazarı olarak Abdurrahman Dilipak ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bu beş köşe yazarın mesleki kariyerlerinin, geçmişlerinin, siyasi perspektiflerinin ve medya patronları, işadamları ve siyasi figürlerle ilişkilerinin bir özeti de tezde yer almaktadır.

İncelenen köşe yazılarının toplanma ve seçim ilkeleri, metin analizinin çerçevesi ve Gönüllü Grubu tarafından yürütülen örneklem analizi de kapsamlı şekilde açıklanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, metinsel analizin önemli bir bileşeni, bir Gönüllü grubu tarafından yapılan “örneklem bir analiz”dir. Gönüllü Grup, siyaset bilimi, sosyoloji, uluslararası ilişkiler ve işletme yönetimi dallarında yüksek lisans veya doktora derecelerine sahip, 25-35 yaş aralığında ve 3 kadın 2 erkek katılımcıdan oluşmuştur. Bu gruptan beş köşe yazarının tümünü kapsayan bir dizi makaleyi (39 makale) okumaları ve ardından her bir makale için bir araştırma formu doldurmaları istenmiştir. Açık ve kapalı uçlu sorulardan oluşan araştırma formu, metnin gönüllüler tarafından tema, önyargı, mesaj ve dil kullanımları açısından nasıl anlaşıldığını belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu örneklem analizinin temel amacı, araştırmacının analizinin sonuçlarını kontrol etmenin yanı sıra, bu çalışmanın Türkiye'deki neoliberal söylemin çalışmasına ilişkin genel perspektifini de beslemektir.

ESA yaklaşımından yararlanılarak oluşturulan araştırma formu, araştırmacının kendisi tarafından da 186 köşe yazısının değerlendirilmesinde kullanılmıştır. Formda yer alan sorular esas itibarıyla üç gruba ayrılabilir. İlk olarak bu form, köşe yazarlarının neo-liberalizme, kapitalist sınıfların sözcülerine, siyasal partilere

yaklaşımlarını, kullandıkları temel söylemsel seçiciliği ve argümanları ve küresel neo-liberal söylemle uyumluluklarını ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Uygun olan yerlerde analiz, köşe yazarının sınıf mücadelesi, işçi sınıflarının talepleri ve eylemleri, solcu dünya görüşleri ile sosyalist / komünist ideolojileri ele alışı da dikkate almıştır. İkinci olark formda yer alan sorular, köşe yazılarında kullanılan dilin özelliklerini, anlatım teknikleri ve gramer özellikleri tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Üçün olarak ise, araştırma formu incelenen her bir köşe yazısında sıkça tekrarlanan ve vurgulanan kelime, kavram ve ifade kalıplarını yani yazarların kelime seçimlerini belirlemeyi öngörmektedir. Bu çerçevede, yapılan analiz sonucunda Araştırmacı ve Gönüllü Grubu'nun değerlendirmelerinin niteliksel ve niceliksel olarak benzer bulgular sunması dikkat çekicidir.

Ana Bulgular

Bu teorik ve metodolojik çerçeve içinde gerçekleştirilen eleştirel metin analizi, Türkiye’de 1980 sonrası dönemde neo-liberal politikaların ana akım medya tarafından yanlı bir şekilde ele alındığını savunan mevcut eleştirel medya çalışmalarıyla uyumlu sonuçlar ortaya koymaktadır. Bununla birlikte, mevcut çalışma, bu taraflı yaklaşımda kullanılan temel argüman ve vurgulara, söylemsel seçiciliğin yoğunlaştığı ana temalara ve bunların zaman içinde farklı siyasi söylemlerle eklenmesine ilişkin sonuçlara ulaşmıştır.

Genel anlamda bakıldığında, 1990’lı ve 2000’li yıllarda neo-liberal politikaların ele alınışında görülen yanlı tutum 1980’li yıllara göre daha güçlü tonlarla ifade edilmektedir. Köşe yazılarında kullanılan argümanlar, serbest piyasa ekonomisi, serbestleşme, küreselleşme, reform ve özelleştirme gibi neo-liberal uygulamalara güçlü şekilde destek verirken, sınıf mücadelesine ilişkin konular, özellikle sol kanat partiler ve sendikal eylemler itibarıyla tartışılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Öte yandan, 1990’ların ortalarından itibaren Siyasi İslam’da görülen yükseliş İslamcı medya’da yazan köşe yazarlarının söylemlerine de yansımış ve bu yazarların neo-liberal politikalara yönelik tutumlarında açıkca gözlemlenebilir değişimlere neden olmuştur.

Bu genel sonuçlar ışığında, köşe yazarlarına uygulanan metin analizinin sonuçları 3 farklı açıdan değerlendirilmiştir. İlk olarak, köşe yazılarında kullanılan söylemsel seçicilik ve argümanlar yedi ana tema altında gruplanmıştır. İkinci olarak, metin analizinin, köşe yazılarında kullanılan dilin özelliklerine, üslûba ve anlatım zenginliklerine ilişkin varlığı sonuçlar değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak ise, köşe yazarlarınca yapılan “kelime seçim”lerin kaydadeğer tekrar ve vurgular içerdiği tespit edildiğinden, bu kelimelerden oluşan bir “neo-liberal anahtar kelimeler envanteri” oluşturulmuş ve 10 yıllık dönemlere ayrılarak listelenmiştir.

1. Ana temalar ve argümanlar

Bahse konu yedi ana temanın ilki, serbest piyasa ekonomisinin, özel sektörün ve tüketimin kutsanmasından oluşan bir grup argüman altında ele alınabilir. Araştırma, özellikle ana akım medyada çalışanlar başta olmak üzere köşe yazarlarının incelenen dönem boyunca serbest piyasa ekonomisini güçlü şekilde savunduklarını ve sermaye sınıfı temsilcilerinin “imajını” iyileştirmek için büyük çaba sarf ettiklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu anlamda, özel sektör ve serbest piyasa ekonomisi ilerlemenin itici gücü olarak sunulmuş, iş insanları ve şirketlerin görünürlüğü önemli ölçüde artmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, yazılı basının bir diğer söylemsel seçiciliği ise tüketimin övülmesidir. Tüketim alışkanlıkları, lüks yaşam tarzı ve ithal mallar özellikle 1990’ların başından itibaren köşe yazılarının odak noktası haline gelmiştir. Tüketimi desteklemek için iki argümanın sıkça kullanıldığı görülmektedir. Birincisi, tüketimin bir refah, medeniyet ve modernleşme göstergesi olarak tanımlanması ve ikincisi ise zenginlerin artan tüketim ve refahının genel çıkara hizmet eden bir durummuş gibi sunulmasıdır.

İkinci olarak, özellikle 1990’ların başından itibaren, küreselleşmeyi “geri döndürülemez ve kaçınılmaz” bir süreç olarak sunan “güçlü” söylem, Türkiye yazılı basınının önemli savlarından biri olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda, 1990’lar boyunca, “değişim, yeni dünya düzeni, yeni dünya ve küreselleşme” gibi kavramlar, yapısal reform, serbestleşme, kamu yönetimi reformları ve özelleştirmeyi desteklemek amacıyla sıkça ön plana çıkarılmıştır. Bu temanın, İslamcı köşe yazarları tarafından da, Siyasal İslam’ın “yeni dünya düzenini”

benimseyişini haklılaştırmak için kullandığı görülmektedir. Ayrıca köşe yazılarında, sadece ekonomi içinde faaliyet gösteren kurumların değil, tüm bireylerin ve özellikle gençlerin “değişime” hazırlıklı olmaları istenmiştir. Köşe yazarları sıkça okuyucu, Yugoslavya ve Irak örnekleri üzerinden “değişime” direnmenin risk ve tehlikeleri hakkında uyarılmış ve hatta tehdit etmişlerdir.

Üçüncü olarak, özelleştirme ve devletçilik-karşıtlığı, 1990’ların ortalarında Türk yazılı basınının gündemine hızlı bir giriş yapmıştır. Özelleştirme, 1980’lerde siyasi otoriterin yüksek önceliklerinden biri değilken, 1990’larla birlikte konu Türkiye gündeminin en ateşli tartışmalardan biri haline gelmiştir. Bu çerçevede, özelleştirme ve devletin ekonomideki rolü yazılı basında sıkça ele alınmıştır. Köşe yazarları devletin ekonomik açıdan “verimsizliğini” ve KİT’lerin ülkenin sırtına yüklediği “yükü” sert bir biçimde eleştirmiştir. Ana akım medyada, özelleştirmenin ele alınışının, Türkiye tarihinde özellikle Osmanlı başta olmak üzere devletin ekonomi alanındaki yanlış uygulamaları örnek gösterilerek meşrulaştırıldığı gözlemlenmektedir. Araştırma aynı zamanda, Türk yazılı basınında özelleştirme karşıtı görüşlerin ve yargı kararlarının “Kemalist, ulusalcı, komünist, statükocu” gibi kavramlarla etiketlenip olumsuzlandığını ve sert bir üslupla eleştirildiğini ortaya koymuştur. Bu anlamda, özelleştirme, yazılı basının yargı kararlarını sistematik olarak itibarsızlaştırdığı başlıca kamusal tartışmalardan biri haline gelmiştir. Daha da önemlisi özelleştirme, daha 1990’ların ortalarında İslamcı medya tarafından Türkiye için gerekli bir amaç olarak sunulmuş, bu açıdan neo-liberal gündemin İslami söyleme eklenmesinde ilk ve önemli bileşeni haline gelmiştir.

Sınıf mücadelesi, sınıfsal talepler ve sol dünya görüşünün itibarsızlaştırılması, 1980’lerin başlarından itibaren incelenen köşe yazılarının ana temalarından biri olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma, ana akım medyadaki köşe yazılarının, devletin sınıf çatışması, sınıfsal talepler ve sol görüşlerin bastırılmasına yönelik stratejik seçiciliği ile paralellik gösterdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu paralellikte üç temel söylemsel unsur sıkça kullanılmaktadır. İlki, neo-liberal politikaların etkileri hemen görülemeyecek ve “uzun vadeli refahı” sağlamak için gerekli olan önlemler

olarak sunulması; ikincisi, maaş artışı ve sosyal güvenlik hakları gibi işçi sınıfı taleplerinin, ekonomik kalkınmayı engelleyen ve toplumun sırtındaki yük olan istekler olarak tanıtılması, üçüncüsü ise komünizm, sosyalizm, sendika ve sol partilerin itibarsızlaştırılarak, siyasi arenaya ilişkin geleceği olmayan hareketler ve düşünceler olarak sunulmalarıdır. Diğer yandan, İslamcı köşe yazarlarının sınıf çatışmasına yaklaşımında zaman içinde değişiklikler olmuştur. Bu yazarlar, kendilerini açıkça komünizm ve sol karşıtı olarak konumlandırırsalar da, 1980’lerde işçilerin taleplerine karşı olumlu bir tutum sergilemişlerdir. Ancak, 1990’ların ortalarına gelindiğinde, İslamcı köşe yazarları ana akım medya ile oldukça benzer argümanları kullanmaya ve ekonomik refah için “fedakarlık yapmanın” önemini vurgulamaya başlamışlardır.

Köşe yazılarında dikkati çeken beşinci ana tema ise “IMF’nin” neo-liberal dönüşümün “çapası”⁸¹⁵ olarak kullanılmasıdır. Bu bağlamda, araştırma, IMF’nin çapa olarak kullanılmasına ilişkin söylemsel unsurların 1980’ler, 1990’lar ve 2000’lerde farklı özellikler gösterdiğini ortaya koymuştur. Öncelikle, 1980’lerde, IMF destekli hükümet programları sıkça Özal’ın “başarıları, kabiliyetleri ve öngörülerine” vurgu yapılarak O’nun “özgün” programları olarak tasvir edilmiştir”. Ana akım köşe yazarları, neo-liberal politikalar hakkındaki siyasi tartışmaları “kişiselleştirmiş” ve Özal’ın eylemlerine yoğunlaşmıştır. Bununla birlikte, 1990’lar boyunca, zayıf koalisyon hükümetleri ve kitle basınında değişen mülkiyet ilişkileri, IMF’nin ele alınışını önemli ölçüde etkiler görmektedir.

Bu kapsamda, 1990’ların ortalarından itibaren, IMF daha pozitif bir imajla tasvir edilmeye başlanmıştır. O tarihten itibaren, IMF ekonomi yönetimini disiplin altına alabilecek “bilge ve “bilimsel” bir arkadaş olarak sunulmuştur. Bu bağlamda, köşe yazarlarının sıkça “IMF sopası” metaforunu kullandıkları gözlenmektedir. İslamcı basının IMF’yi ele alışında ise açık bir önyargı dikkati çekmektedir. Bununla birlikte, bu yazarlar 2000’ler boyunca IMF destekli programların uygulanması, eski

⁸¹⁵ Yalman ve Bedirhanoglu, “State, Class and Discourse:”, p.121.

hükümetlerin başlattığı yapısal reformların “zorunlu devamı” olarak savunulmuştur.

Metin incelemelerinden elde edilen bulgular, neo-liberal söylemin İslamcı medyaya eklenmesi ile ilişkilendirilebilecek bir dizi söylemsel unsur da açığa çıkarmıştır. İlk olarak, İslamcı köşe yazarlarının neo-liberal politikalara yönelik tutumlarında açık bir yön değişikliği görülmektedir. İslamcı köşe yazarları, 1980’ler boyunca liberal ideolojiyi, bireyselliği, ülkenin uluslararası ekonomi ile entegrasyonunu ve artan toplumsal eşitsizlikleri katı bir şekilde eleştirseler de, 1990’ların ortalarında “kaçınılamaz ve geri döndürülemez küreselleşme” argümanını ve serbest piyasa ekonomisinin üstünlüğü tezini benimsemiş görülmektedirler. İslamcı köşe yazarları aynı zamanda, baskın neo-liberal söylemin kimlik ve değer-temelli söylemsel seçiciliğini ve devlet karşıtı görüşleri de kullanmayı tercih etmiştir.

Bununla birlikte, İslamcı köşe yazarlarının incelenen 1980-2010 dönemi boyunca Batı karşıtı duruşlarını koruduğu görülmektedir. Aslında, “Batı karşıtlığı” İslamcı köşe yazarlarının temel söylemsel unsurlarından biri olarak Türkiye’nin karşı karşıya kaldığı ulusal ve uluslararası zorlukları açıklamakta kullanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, neo-liberalizmin İslamcı söylemle eklenmesi sürecince, bu güçlü Batı karşıtı söylemin karşılıklı bağımlılık, serbest piyasa ekonomisi, küreselleşme ve serbestleşme gibi neo-liberal argümanlarla bir arada kullanılmasının köşe yazılarında *tutarsız ve eklektik bir kavramsallaştırmanın* ortaya çıkmasına neden olduğu savunulabilir. Bu nedenle, İslamcı basının neo-liberal söyleminin, Dialektik-İlişkisel ESA yaklaşımının “bir metnin farklı söylem ve türlerden üretilmesi” anlamına gelen “söylemler arası melezlik”⁸¹⁶ kavramı ile açıklanabileceğini öne sürmek mümkündür.

Bu bağlamda, İslamcı köşe yazarlarının metinlerinde görülen kilit noktalardan biri, toplumdaki gelir eşitsizliğini ve İslamcı sermaye sahiplerinin artan zenginliğini dini

⁸¹⁶ Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p.96.

referanslar kullanarak meşrulaştırma çabasıdır. Gelir eşitsizliklerini ve zenginliği normalleştirmek için, özellikle sosyal yardımlaşma ve dayanışma ihtiyacına vurgu yapan dini referanslar kullanılmıştır. “Kapitalizm” ve “sermaye sahibi” kavramları sosyo-ekonomik bağlamlarından koparılmış ve parayı kazanma ve harcamaya ilişkin İslami hükümlerin yerine getirilmesine atıfta bulunularak teolojik açıdan açıklanmıştır. Fakirler için sosyal yardım sağlamanın yanı sıra, İslamcı-Muhafazakar sermaye sahiplerinden “İslam Medeniyetini yeniden canlandırmaları ve inşa etmeleri” ve “İslam dünyasının ahlaki, estetik ve felsefi yönlerini geliştirmeleri” istenmiştir.

Son olarak, neo-liberal politikaların ele alınışında göze çarpan yedinci tema, özellikle 2000’lerde sıkça kullanılan “ekonomik ve siyasi istikrar” anlatısıdır. 1990’lar boyunca kurulan koalisyon hükümetlerinin başarısızlıkları ve özellikle 1994 ve 2001 ekonomik krizleri Türkiye’deki siyasi partilerin, iş adamlarının ve yazılı basının söylemleri üzerinde önemli etkiler bırakmıştır. Siyasi partiler, kitle medyası, STK’lar, düşünce kuruluşları ve işadamlarından oluşan geniş bir yelpaze, “siyasi istikrarın” gerekliliğine ilişkin baskın bir söylemin oluşmasına katkı sağlamıştır. Bu bağlamda, özellikle birinci ve ikinci AKP iktidarlarında, siyasi istikrarın “hayati önemi” hem ana akım hem de İslamcı medya tarafından ülkenin ekonomik refah ve kalkınmasının temel koşullarından biri olarak ele alınmaktadır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, tek parti hükümetlerinin “faydalarını” vurgulayan ve aynı zamanda bu hükümetlerce uygulanan neo-liberal politikaları meşrulaştıran “güçlü” bir söylem ortaya çıkmıştır.

2. Dil Kullanımları

Yukarıda değinildiği gibi, köşe yazıları üzerinde yapılan analizin odaklandığı diğer bir konu da dil kullanımlarıdır. Bu bağlamda, hem araştırmacının kendisi hem de Gönüllü Grubu tarafından yapılan metin incelemeleri, dil kullanımına ilişkin beş ana özellik belirlenmiştir.

İlk olarak, Türkiye’de köşe yazarlığının araştırmacı gazeteciliğin genel kabul görmüş bileşenlerinden, nesnellik ihtiyacından, özgün fikir ve kavramların ortaya

atılmasından ve akademik yaratımdan yoksun olduğu görülmüştür. Tam aksine, metinlerde kullanılan dil açık önyargı, basmakalıp düşünceler ve magazinleşme örnekleri sergilemektedir. Bu önyargı, neo-liberal politikaların ekonomik etkilerini açıklamada istatistiksel verilerin sosyal alana yansımalarına yer verilmeden kullanılması ile açıkça görülmektedir.

İkinci olarak, belirli basmakalıp düşüncelerin, popüler sözcüklerin ve neo-liberal anahtar kelimelerin neo-liberal politikaları savunurken tekrar tekrar kullanılması, köşe yazarlarının ürettiği medya ürünlerinin içeriğinin değişmez bir özelliği olagelmıştır. Ana akım medyada, neo-liberal dönüşüme atfedilen kilit sloganlar, küresel baskın neo-liberal söylem ile neredeyse birebir örtüşmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye’deki gelişmelerin yeniden ele alınışıyla birlikte bir dizi neo-liberal anahtar kelime de ortaya çıkmıştır.

Üçüncü olarak, köşe yazarlarının siyasi otoriterler ve sermaye sınıfı temsilcilerinin söylemsel eylemlerine sıkça atıfta bulunduğu da görülmüştür. Bazı durumlarda, köşe yazılarında kopyala-yapıştır ile doğrudan alıntılar kullanılmıştır.

Dördüncü özellik, sol partilerin, sendikaların ve sınıf çatışmasının “olumsuz” anlam yüklü kelimeler, sıfatlar ve tamlamalar kullanılarak “olumsuzlanması”dır. Sol partiler, sendikal faaliyetler ve işçi sınıfı hareketler çoğunlukla olumsuz çağrışımları olan kelimelerle ifade edilmiştir. Bu hareketler, 1980 öncesi dönemde toplumun tamamı için yıkıcı sonuçlar doğuran tarihi olaylara atıflarda bulunarak ele alınmışlardır.

Son olarak, farklı söylem, tür ve tarzların metinlerde eklemlenmesi olarak tanımlanan “söylemler arası melezlik” de İslamcı köşe yazarlarının makalelerinde sıkça rastlanmaktadır. Bu anlamda, İslamcı medya, Batı karşıtı ve dini referanslarla birlikte neo-liberalizmin kaçınılamazlığı ve geri döndürülemezliği gibi argümanları birlikte kullanabilmiştir. Öte yandan, “biz’e karşı onlar” ve “şeytan Batı’ya karşı İslam Dünyası” karşıtlıkları da sosyal dünyadaki eşitsizlikleri haklı göstermede ve meşrulaştırmada kullanılmıştır.

3. Neo-liberal Anahtar Kelimeler Envanteri

Bu arařtırmada incelenen her köőe yazısı “kelime seimleri” aısından da deęerlendirilmiřtir. Bu kapsamda, gerek arařtırmacı gerekse Gönüllü grup tarafından yapılan incelemeler, belli bařlı kelime ve ifade kalıplarının köőe yazılarında sıka kullanıldığını ve bu kullanımların da zaman iinde deęiřimler gösterdiğini tespit etmiřtir.

Esas itibariyle, arařtırmanın ortaya koyduęu envanter, Türkiye’deki neoliberal söylemin hakim küresel neo-liberal anlatılarla ve kavramlarla büyük paralellik gösterdiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Öte yandan, bu kavramların bir “yeniden bağlamlařtırmaya” da tabi olduęu dikkat çekmektedir. Bu anlamda, Türkiye siyasi tarihinin çeřitli dönemlerine iliřkin olumlu ve olumsuz olay ve kavramların, kalıplařmış deyimlerin ve atasözlerinin bu yeniden bağlamlařtırmada sıka kullanıldığı göze arpmıřtır.

Tezin Eleřtirel Medya alıřmalarına Yapacaęı Katkılar

Türkiye’nin geirdiğı neo-liberal dönüşüm ve kitle medyasının yapısında meydana gelen deęiřimler konusunda oldukça geniř bir yazın bulunmaktadır. Bu alıřmalar, medya endüstrisinde deęiřen mülkiyet/sahiplik iliřkileri, neo-liberal hegemonyanın kurulmasında basının rolü, siyasi paralelliğı ve deęiřen gazetecilik kořulları gibi ok geniř bir konu yelpazesinde eleřtirel analizler sunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye’de köőe yazarlarının rolünün, az sayıda akademik alıřmada ele alındığı ve köőe yazarlarının metinlerinin oldukça sınırlı sayıda eleřtirel söylem özümlemesine konu olduęu söylenebilir.

Bu bağlamda, bu tez, mevcut medya alıřmalarında görece az yer verilen Dialektik İliřkisel ESA metodolojik yaklařımını kullanarak, farklı siyasi perspektiflere sahip köőe yazarlarını inceleyerek ve 1980-2010 gibi uzun bir döneme odaklanarak bu alandaki alıřmalara katkı saęlamayı amaçlamıřtır.

Öncelikle, Diyalektik İliřkisel ESA yaklařımı, Türkiye’deki farklı siyasi söylemlerin neo-liberal söyleme eklemlenmesi sürecini analiz etmeyi kolaylařtıran

kavramsal ve yöntemsel bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. İkinci olarak, incelenen dönemin uzunluğu, medyada neo-liberal söylemin gelişimi ve evrimi argümanlarını görme imkanı sağlamaktadır.

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