THE MYSTERY OF RETURN TO BULGARIA: ANALYZING SELF-IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION OF BULGARIAN TURKISH IMMIGRANT WOMEN THROUGH THEIR EVERYDAY LIFE EXPERIENCES ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE BORDER

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

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ABSTRACT

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ANALYZING SELF-IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION OF BULGARIAN TURKISH IMMIGRANT WOMEN THROUGH THEIR EVERYDAY LIFE EXPERIENCES ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE BORDER

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This research is based on the fieldwork that was conducted in Kardzhali district, Bulgaria with nineteen Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women, who emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey and, then, returned to Bulgaria in various times. The aim of this study is to analyze the effects of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's experiences on the two sides of the border that spread three different periods on their decision of return to Bulgaria, and on their self-identity construction. The importance of this research lies in that it problematizes some settled assumptions about "the" culture, "the" woman, and "voluntary" migration. This research also reveals the flexibility of terms such as homeland and ethnic kinship.

Keywords: Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women, double burden, illegal migration, involuntary migration, homeland perception

ÖZ

BULGARİSTAN'A GERİ DÖNÜŞ MUAMMASI:
BULGARİSTAN GÖÇMENİ KADINLARIN SINIRIN İKİ YAKASINDAKİ DENEYİMLERİ ÜZERİNDEN ÖZ-KİMLİKLERİNİN OLUŞUMUNA DAİR BİR İNCELEME

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Bu çalışma, çeşitli zamanlarda Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye göçen ve daha sonra Bulgaristan'a geri dönen ondokuz Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınla, Bulgaristan'ın Kırcaali şehrinde yapılan saha çalışmasına dayanmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların üç farklı zamana yayılan sınırın iki yakasındaki deneyimlerinin geri dönüş kararları ve öz-kimlik oluşumları üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktır. Çalışmanın önemi ise belirli bir "kültür," belirli bir "kadın" ve "istemli" göç gibi yerleşik kavramları sorunsallaştırmasıdır. Bu çalışma ayrıca anavatan ve soydaş gibi kavramların da ne kadar muğlak olabileceğini göstermesi açısından önem taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar, çifte yük, kaçak göç, istemsiz göç, anavatan algısı

To my father,

his first twenty years in Kardzhali,

and his people...

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The return of Bulgarian Turks deserves special attention due to the fact that 154,937 immigrants, that is, half of those who migrated to Turkey in 1989, decided to return to Bulgaria after the collapse of the communist regime[1] (Elchinova, 2005: 87). Therefore, this research started with my curiosity about what happened in Turkey that triggered Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women to return to Bulgaria. This is especially important when we consider the fact that these women had experienced oppressions in Bulgaria before they migrated to Turkey. However, when I asked this question, my original assumption was that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women returned to Bulgaria *voluntarily*, which means that I ignored those who returned to Bulgaria *involuntarily*. Thus, I realized that I should focus on whether the immigrants in question wanted to return to Bulgaria, or, at least, whether they participated in the return-decision of their fathers and husbands. Hence, my aim in this study is to find out the role of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women in the decision of return to Bulgaria.

In addition, I am also curious about how migrating from where one was born into as well as living under two different regimes have an effect on one's self-identity construction. That is, I aim to focus on the self-identity construction of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women depending on their everyday life experiences on the two sides of the border. Therefore, as will be seen in further detail in Chapter 2, the research question of this thesis is: "How do everyday life experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women on two completely different regimes have an

[1] See also, Höpken, 1997:71; Parla, 2006:544; Vasileva, 1992:349

effect in the decision of return to Bulgaria and on the construction of their self-identity?"

I will begin with analyzing how their self-identity was constructed in Bulgaria before migrating to Turkey. Under the communist regime, their self-identity was constructed as a *worker, wife,* and *mother*. In Turkey, the construction of their self-identity was very much related to whether they were *soydaş, legal* immigrant, or *illegal* immigrant. Accordingly, my original focus was on Bulgarian Turkish immigrants who migrated to Turkey via 1989-mass exodus. Those who migrated via 1989-mass exodus were regarded as *soydaş*, and, therefore, invited to their *homeland* by the Prime Minister, Turgut Özal (Danış & Parla, 2009: 139). However, when I extended the scope of the study, I noticed the unfortunate situation of post-1990 Bulgarian Turkish immigrants. While those who migrated via visa application had to cross the border every few months, considering that Bulgarian Turks who got the visa were free to stay in Turkey only three months within six months period (Kasli & Parla, 2009: 203), those who had no opportunity to apply for the visa crossed the border via illegal ways. Thus, my aim in this study is, among others, to analyze the differences between 1989 migrants who were defined as *soydaş*, post-1990 migrants who migrated via visa application but were seen as *legal* immigrants, and those who were considered *illegal* immigrants by the state. Therefore, I did interviews not only with 1989-migrants but also post-1990 migrants due to the fact that being a *soydaş*, being a *legal* immigrant, or being an *illegal* immigrant are very important identity-constructions for Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women. After returning to Bulgaria, their self-identity was constructed through being *voluntary* emigrants or *involuntary* emigrants. Finally, their return experiences characterized how they perceived themselves in Bulgaria, which was partly determined by whether they returned to Bulgaria voluntarily or not. In other words, I also aim to find the answer of this question: Do they perceive themselves as *natives* or *foreigners* of Bulgaria?

To analyze their self-identity construction, I conducted the fieldwork in Kardzhali district in Bulgaria. The research technique I utilized is semi-structured in-depth interview. Accordingly, I did interviews with nineteen Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women who lived in Kardzhali district before migrating to Turkey, then migrated to Turkey in various times, and, then returned to Kardzhali, Bulgaria, mostly after the fall of the communist regime.

1.1. Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 2 presents the methodology of this thesis, which is, "ethnography of the particular." In this chapter, I will firstly focus on the importance of eliminating the boundaries between the researcher and the interviewees, thus preventing the authority of the author. To prevent this authority, creating intimacy with the interviewees is crucial. Although creating intimacy may lead to some problems, as will be mentioned in detail in Chapter 2, creating intimacy has prevented me from exploiting the interviewees. In this research, secondly, I will focus on the irrelevance of seeking objective answers while doing ethnography. In this sense, I will inquire into some criticism of objectivity both in feminism and anthropology. This will lead me to the conclusion that anthropologists with feminist concerns should problematize the concept of culture, and thereby go beyond the concept of sameness. Specifically, while doing ethnography, one should be aware of the fact that ethnographic truths are "partial, committed, and incomplete" (Clifford, 1986: 7). Hence, there is no such thing as absolute objectivity. The partial nature of ethnography indicates that anthropologists should go beyond the concept of culture due to the fact that the concept of culture has the connation of "homogeneity, timelessness, and coherence" (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 154). These connotations cause to make generalizations, and making generalizations while doing ethnography means that we ignore the partial nature of the ethnography. Therefore, anthropologists should write *against* culture. In this sense, for doing ethnography, I will follow one of the strategies of "writing against culture," which is "ethnography of the particular." That is, I will assume that there is no "the" Bulgarian Turkish

immigrant woman. This is the reason why the years of migration to Turkey among my interviewees vary. As I aim to show, their several migration experiences partly depends on the year they migrated to Turkey, a fact that unsettles the settled assumptions about Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women. In other words, "ethnography of the particular," by not making generalizations, unsettles the "conventional social scientific accounts" (Ibid.: 153).

Chapter 3 focuses on the history of ethnic Turks of Bulgaria. This chapter starts with the end of the Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans, and, then, continues with the constitution of the modern Bulgarian state. Secondly, I focus on the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which was established in 1946, and on ethnic Turks' situation under the communist regime. Thirdly, I inquire into the reasons behind the "Revival Process," and the sanctions that were imposed by the communist regime on ethnic Turks between 1984 and 1989. Then, I ask what happened in Bulgaria after the "Revival Process" as well as elaborate on the 1989-mass exodus to Turkey. I also ask about the situation of ethnic Turks who migrated to Turkey. Lastly, I present the end of the communist regime in Bulgaria, and the new arrangements of the new government, which facilitated the lives of the ethnic Turks who stayed in Bulgaria, or returned to Bulgaria.

In Chapter 4, I analyze the self-identity of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women. Under the communist regime in Bulgaria, the self-identity of the immigrants in question was constituted around being a worker, wife, and mother. Therefore, before focusing on the experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women, in the first section of the Chapter 4, I focus on gender politics under communist regimes in general. Since I regard comparison method as very important for the anthropology discipline due to the fact that each "so-called" different case illuminates the other, I address not only gender politics in Bulgaria under the communist regime but also gender politics in some other post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, and German Democratic Republic, as well as the former

Soviet Union. In this chapter, I analyze what is often called *double burden*, insofar as women under communist regimes were perceived not only to be mothers and wives but to be workers. This is because communist regimes *forced* women to work outside their homes under the guise of *emancipation.* However, it is worth noting that being exposed to "double burden" is not confined to women under communist regimes. As we will see in the Chapter 4, women are often exposed to "double burden" regardless of the political structure of the country that they live in. In the second part of the Chapter 4, I will address the experiences of the Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women returnees not only during the communist regime in Bulgaria, but also in Turkey after their migration. In this part, we will see that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women were exposed to "double burden" in Turkey, too. However, the "heaviness" of "double burden" that they were exposed to in Turkey change according to certain social and economic factors.

Before the fieldwork, the first thing that came to my mind about the identity of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women was their split identities as workers, wives, and mothers. When I did the interviews in Kardzhali, I realized that there were some other identities, too, that assigned to them depending on their experiences on the two sides of the border. In this respect, Chapter 5 analyzes these other identities of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women, such as *being* a legal immigrant, illegal immigrant, voluntary emigrant, involuntary emigrant, native, and foreigner. Being a legal or illegal immigrant depends on the changing attitudes of Turkish-state towards immigrants. This means that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's self-perception, e.g. whether they are legal or illegal immigrants are very much related to when the immigrants in question migrated to Turkey i.e., whether they migrated to Turkey before or after the Turkish-state closed its borders and stopped viewing Bulgarian Turkish immigrants as *soydaş.* Accordingly, in the first section, I will focus on the flexibility of being *soydaş,* and its relation to the distinction between legal and illegal immigration.

In the second section, I will focus on the experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women after their return to Bulgaria. Some of my interviewees participated in the return-decision of their fathers and husbands, and they returned to Bulgaria voluntarily. However, the rest experienced involuntary return migration, because nobody asked them whether they want to return, even though nobody *physically forced* them to return, either. This means that the term "involuntary" return migration needs to be problematized by making a distinction not only between *asylum-seeking* and *emotionally forced migration* but also between *individual* and *familial* migration.

In the last section of Chapter 5, I question how the immigrants in question regard themselves in the country where they are currently living. In other words, are they foreigners or natives of Bulgaria? Those who returned to Bulgaria voluntarily mostly see themselves as natives of Bulgaria, which means that they regard Bulgaria as their homeland. On the other hand, involuntary emigrants mostly regard themselves as foreigners of Bulgaria, and for them, Turkey is their homeland. In this section, I aim to show the uncertainty of the settled term homeland by giving references to diaspora studies. The diaspora paradigm is suitable to analyze the situation of these immigrants because all the interviewees yearn for one particular homeland. In the second part of the last section, I will analyze some *other* factors that affected Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women returnees' homeland perception, in addition to their voluntary or involuntary return.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1. Discussions about Doing Ethnography from Where I Stand as a Woman Researcher Studying Women

When I knocked the door of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women who migrated to Turkey, and, then, decided to return where they were born, namely Kardzhali, Bulgaria, there was only one question in my mind: "Can I make a difference as a woman researcher who studies Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women and utilizes in-depth semi-structured interviews as a research technique?" I knew that being a woman and being the daughter of a Bulgarian Turkish immigrant father would give me an advantage while I was conducting the fieldwork due to the fact that these kinds of identities are very important to create intimacy with the immigrants in question. This is because even though it was not me, but my father who experienced similar things (i.e., experiencing the hostile attitudes of the communist regime towards Turks in Bulgaria, and being a member of a ethnic minority group in Bulgaria) under the communist regime in Bulgaria. I assumed that due to this, they would feel close to me.

A female researcher who lived in Bulgaria under the communist regime could be much more lucky than me for creating intimacy with them, but I am still more lucky than a male researcher who experienced the communist regime in Bulgaria. Before the fieldwork, I could not say this. To explain with an example, one of the interviewees, Fatma, said that she was very excited about my research, and she felt ready to share her experiences with me. When she said these, she was preparing coffee for me, and we were alone in the room. Her excitement was over when her husband and the mukhtar entered the room. My conversation with Fatma

was the shortest one among the others although she had told me that there were many things to say about her life both in Bulgaria and Turkey before they entered the room. In other words, it seems that she did not want to share her experiences while two men were listening to us. If they did not enter the room, I believe, our conversation could be the longest one. At that point, I realized that being a woman had an effect on creating intimacy when the research's focus is the experiences of women.

Why is creating intimacy so significant for the process of fieldwork? According to Barbara Du Bois, "the actual experience and language of women is the central agenda for feminist social science and scholarship" (cited in Stacey, 1988: 21-22). Since the concern is to reach women's experiences and to focus on their language, most feminist scholars, as Judith Stacey argues, promote an "integrative, trans-disciplinary approach" to comprehend women's everyday lives (1988: 21). In order to achieve this, it is important to create intimacy; that is, to obliterate "the separation between subject and object, thought and feeling, knower and known, and political and personal" (Ibid.). Moreover, such an egalitarian research process, which is shaped through "authenticity, reciprocity, and intersubjectivity between the researcher and her 'subjects,'" may guarantee that there will be no such thing as the exploitation of women under research (Ibid.: 22). In other words, if a methodology opens up an interactive space for women who studying women, the exploitation of women under research may be over (Ibid.).

However, although creating intimacy and obliterating the boundaries between the researcher and the interviewees are very beneficial for the process of the fieldwork, it may also lead to some problems. It is worth stressing that fieldwork may necessitate some interventions into the relationship that ethnographic research must be based on. This intervention may lead to the manipulation of the research subjects by the ethnographer (Ibid.: 22-23). Moreover, this may place the ethnographer in some situations such as "inauthenticity, dissimilitude, and potential, perhaps inevitable, betrayal" (Ibid.: 23). For example, some of Stacey's

interviewees ask her to ignore some facts that were shared during the conversation, as a consequence of an intimate relationship between the researcher and the interviewees. Therefore, Stacey asks: "What feminist ethical principles can I invoke to guide me here" (1988: 24)? As a result, if the researcher creates intimacy and mutuality with interviewees instead of using more positivist and abstract forms of research methods, the danger may be greater for both sides. On the one hand, the interviewee may fear that the researcher shares the details of the interviewee's personal life with the public, and, therefore, feel regret that she shared so much personal information with the researcher. Hence, she may ask the researcher to ignore some of the things she revealed about herself. On the other hand, while the researcher may accept that sharing personal information is an unethical attitude, ignoring facts upon request may affect the process of fieldwork badly.

Moreover, it is important to note that creating intimacy may lead to some other unexpected situations. For example, by using abstract and positivist forms for this research's methodology, e.g. by using structured questionnaire, instead of in-depth semi-structured interview, I could not reach the results that I have acquired. This is because although I had expected from the interviewees to answer seventy-five questions[2] that I prepared before the fieldwork, the interviews with them passed in the mood of conversation as a result of creating intimacy. That is, the interviewees felt more comfortable while sharing their experiences with me. Our conversation with Mukaddes can be given as an example to some unexpected situations during the fieldwork as a result of creating intimacy with the interviewees. Mukaddes shared too many experiences with me both from her life in Bulgaria and in Turkey. Sometimes she got angry, and sometimes she laughed, while she was talking about her life on the two sides of the border. She told me that she was very satisfied about our conversation. After a while, she started to cry because her son who was died two years ago came to her mind. I was very much

[2] See, Appendix A for in-depth interview questions in Turkish, and Appendix B for in-depth interview questions in English.

upset because I blamed myself; because our intimate conversation as a result of the closeness that we constituted reminded Mukaddes of her son's death. The only thing that I could do was to finish our conversation, and share her grief.

In addition to such problems that creating intimacy may lead to, there is one more problem in doing ethnography, which is the relationship between fieldwork practice and ethnographic product. Although there is certain collaboration between the researcher and her interviewees in ethnographic work, ethnographic product is often the product of solely the researcher. Therefore, Stacey insists that it is impossible to prevent the problem of authority and argues that the one who writes about people's lives cannot exclude oneself from interpretation, evaluation, and judgment, which give authority to the author (1988: 23-24).

At this point, "critical and self-reflexive post-modern ethnography" brings solution to the paradoxes of doing ethnography, which is the authority problem of the author. Post-modern ethnographers say that ethnographic writings are "cultural constructions" that discursively produce not only the other but also the self; that is, they are not "cultural reportages" (Ibid.: 24). Critical ethnographers are aware of the limitations of their research and accept the inevitability of the interpretation and the authority of the author. This is, then, how post-modern ethnographers have tried to reduce, as much as possible, their authority in ethnographic writing.

> They [i.e., critical and self-reflexive post-modern ethnographers] have attempted ... to experiment with dialogue forms of ethnographic representation that place more of the voices and perspectives of the researched into the narrative and that more authentically reflect the dissonance and particularity of the ethnographic research process (Ibid.: 25).

That is, focusing on the multiplicity of the voices of the interviewees, which leads to "particularity of the ethnographic research process," reduces the authority of the author to some extent. Similarly, what I want to do in this thesis for reducing my authority as an author is to focus on each detail of each particular, and to interpret it. It is important to keep in mind that, anthropology is an interpretive science, as Clifford Geertz argues. Geertz claims that the analysis of culture as an interpretive science aims to investigate "meaning," instead of being an experimental

science that investigates "law" (1973: 5). This means that anthropology may be criticized due to its lack of objectivity from two points. The first one is related to the *reflexivity* of the process of the fieldwork, and the other is to the literal interest of the writer in written products (Abu-Lughod, 1990: 9).

Reflexive anthropology refers to the fact that social phenomena are constituted by "our personal interactions with particular individuals in specific social and cultural contexts," which means that "objectivity" is irrelevant to anthropology (Ibid.: 10). Moreover, there is a strong correlation between the language of objectivity and the authority of the anthropologist in classic ethnographies. As a result, reducing the authority of the anthropologist, by acknowledging that the voice of the anthropologist is only one among many voices, including research subjects, makes "objectivity" irrelevant to the anthropological work (Ibid.: 10-11).

As a woman researcher studying Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women, I also want to focus on the critiques of objectivity in feminism. Specifically, some first wave feminist scholars state that "the existing theory and knowledge" is not objective enough; that is, not only studies of society neglects gender or women but also scientific studies promote "the inferiority of women" (Ibid.: 11-12). If "the existing theory and knowledge" supports "the inferiority of women" by excluding women, how can it be said that this theory and knowledge are objective? However, as Abu-Lughod puts forth, rather than questioning the concept objectivity, the aim of these feminist scholars was to make the existing theory more "universal," more "complete," and, therefore, more "objective" which is only possible by including every experience of every woman. Hence, "partiality" was put against "objectivity" (Ibid.: 12). In the second-wave feminist scholarship, however, some scholars emphasize the significance of "partiality" by arguing that "all knowledge is partial," and all studies are "situated" (Ibid.: 15). This does not mean that they reject the idea of objectivity once and for all, but ask for redefinition so that "objectivity" includes and gives an account of "situatedness" (Ibid.).

Since there are common criticisms of objectivity, and there is a focus on partiality in both feminist theory and anthropology, one may expect that there is also a sort of convergence between them. Nevertheless, a convergence does not happen. One reason for this is that feminists want certain and *objective* answers to some questions, such as "whether women have always and everywhere been dominated, whether there ever have been matriarchies, whether there are sexually egalitarian societies anywhere" (Ibid.: 19-20). However, anthropologists became aware of the fact that any knowledge about "others" is never *absolutely* accurate. The second reason is about feminists' focus on "the woman." To be precise, anthropologist began to question "the woman" by asking "which woman" (Ibid.: 20-21). Focusing on "the woman" means ignoring the partial identity of women. If the "partial identity" of women is ignored, and "the" woman is taken as a point of reference, Eastern women may be regarded as the other to Western women; Western, black, lesbian women may be regarded as the other to Western, white, heterosexual women. Moreover, in feminism, women have been regarded as "the other to men's self" (Ibid.: 25). Then, it should be asked: Which men are taken as a point of reference to regard women as "the other to men's self?" If, for example, white and Western men are taken as a point of reference to define self in feminism, white and Western women should be seen as other in feminism. That is, the experiences of black and Eastern women may be excluded.

On the other hand, in anthropology, "ethnography in a different voice" is not so easy because of the fact that "Western cultural stereotypes of femininity" prevent any form of difference with regard to womanhood that undermines the experiences of those who are out of "Western cultural stereotypes of femininity" (Ibid.: 23). Hence, the "recognition of difference" and of the fact that each woman has different experiences become important for anthropology as well as for feminism (Ibid.: 23-24). "Recognition of difference" in both feminism and anthropology is only possible if we problematize "Western self" in anthropology.

In other words, if "Western self" in anthropology is not problematized, the "other" in feminist theory may be regarded as "white, middle class, heterosexual women," which excludes "difference" (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 140). Problematizing "Western self" leads to both crisis in feminist theory and the development of post-feminism. As Sandra Harding emphasizes, "Once the 'woman' is deconstructed into 'women' and 'gender' is recognized to have no fixed referents, feminism itself dissolves as a theory that can reflect the voice of a naturalized or essentialist speaker" (cited in Abu-Lughod, 1991: 140). After all, experiences of black lesbian women differ from the experiences of "white, middle class, heterosexual women" (Ibid.: 140). This crisis in feminist theory helps anthropology in two points. On the one hand, it shows that the self is "a construction," and, on the other hand, "the process of creating a self through opposition to an other" means suppressing and neglecting the difference (Ibid.). In this point, it should be noted that suppressing and neglecting the difference may lead to "the universal woman" because it depends on the concept of sameness (Moore, 1986: 10). Is it possible to assert that experiences of women are universal? By recognizing difference, we will see that difference can be seen in every aspect of human social life, is based on experiences and thus, always a construction (Ibid.: 196). According to Henrietta L. Moore, one should move away from "one particular form of difference," such as the difference between the feminine and the masculine, otherwise it becomes possible to ignore "others" (Ibid.). Hence, it is time to problematize *the traditional self/other distinction* in anthropology and to focus on *difference* by problematizing "the concept of culture" because this kind of distinction in anthropology is constituted through it (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 143).

To be precise, the concept of culture is a very significant instrument to entitle one as "other." That is, any difference in "development, economic performance, government, character, and so forth" is identified as the consequence of cultural differences (Ibid.: 144). As a result, the self is inserted into a privileged position; "the other" is inserted into a subordinate position. Moreover, as Jonathan Friedman

argues, the concept of culture causes "the essentialization of the world" by preventing "the production of meaning" in diverse ways, which could only be possible through converting "difference into essence" (1994: 206-207). In other words, the concept of culture has the potential "to freeze difference" as it is seen in the Orientalist scholarship[3], whose aim is to restore differences between the "East" and the "West" (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 144). Thus, "the culturalization of the world" enables one to define the world with reference to "a central scheme of things," as if cultures were monolithic and homogenous entities (Friedman, 1994: 208). The same thing can also be said for feminism. Some cultural feminists argue that it is significant to place sex differences not in biology or in nature but in culture that lead to the constitution of social life in the direction of "women's culture" (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 145) at the expense of ignoring a critical question: which women's culture?

As Clifford states, instead of being "contingent, syncretic, historical," the concept of culture is "enduring, traditional, structural" (1988: 235). Abu Lughod contributes to the discussion by arguing that the concept of culture ignores the fact that cultures are dynamic, and historical entities. In addition, cultural theories are also inclined to underline "coherence" by "organic metaphors of wholeness and the methodology of holism," which end up perceiving communities as "bounded and discrete" (1991: 146). Very similarly, Clifford says that the concept of culture allows us to consider the circumstances in such ways that give priority "the coherent, balanced, and 'authentic'" (1988: 232). Renato Rosaldo emphasizes that contradictions, inconsistencies, conflicts, and changes are eliminated by the concept of culture (1989: 28). Similarly, Arjun Appadurai not only points out the fact that culture gives priority to "sharing, agreeing, and bounding" but also makes "the worldviews and agency" of those who are subordinated within such cultures invisible (1996: 12). Moreover, in Tim Ingold's words:

> We are cultured and they are not *because* they live in a culture and we do not. ... In effect, the concept of culture operates as a distancing device, setting up a radical disjunction between *ourselves,* rational observers of the human

[3] See, Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism.* New York: Penguin Books.

> condition, and those *other people,* enmeshed in their traditional patterns of belief and practice, whom we profess to observe and study. ... Would it not be preferable to move in the opposite direction, to recover that foundational continuity, and from that basis to challenge the hegemony of an alienating discourse (Ingold, 1993: 212, 230)?

These are the reasons why some scholars suggest that we should go beyond the concept of culture as a monolithic and homogenous entity. Each society is composed of many particular individuals whose perception of culture may differ from one another. That is, there is no "the" culture and, therefore, it is crucial to focus on particulars. Hence, as Clifford puts forth, ethnographic truths are not only "partial" but also "committed and incomplete" (1986: 7), which means that taking the objective and complete picture of "the" culture of a particular group should not be a concern for the anthropology discipline. In this regard, doing *ethnography on the particular* as one of the strategies of "writing against culture," which, on the one hand, opens a way to obliterate the very problematical connotations of the concept of culture such as "homogeneity, coherence, and timelessness" (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 154). On the other hand, it prevents anthropologists from making generalizations. To avoid making generalizations is crucial because it unsettles the typicality of "conventional social scientific accounts," and it reveals that particular individuals are present and significant for the formation of experience by considering their particular relationships, the circumstances they are involved in, and their histories in detail. Last of all, to reconstruct the arguments, justifications, and interpretations of the particulars may help us analyze "how social life proceeds" (Ibid.: 149-154).

As is seen, trying to find some objective, universal answers to some questions to the point of not focusing on particulars may lead to some generalizations like "the woman," "the culture," or "women's culture." As Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson claims that new perspectives of post-modernism and feminism in theorizing space led to reconsidering some concepts in anthropology such as "culture" and "cultural difference." For example, divided representations of countries by different colors on the world maps may make us believe that each country in its own particular place has an idiosyncratic culture and society, which

may lead to the attachment of the terms "society" and "culture" to the names of nation-states (1992: 6-7). Such taken for granted assumptions make someone think that in Turkey, for example, there is only one culture, which is "Turkish culture" that provokes the marginalization of the "other" in Turkish dominant culture. Moreover, the assumption of "the culture" may trigger other generalizations such as "the woman," "the immigrant," "the Bulgarian Turkish immigrant woman." In this thesis, I am against these concepts, and my aim is to show the impossibility of "the" culture or "the" experience of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women. This research by Gupta and Ferguson also supports me to write *against* culture by indicating the dangerous nature of generalization.

By not assuming "the" culture, by being aware that "culture" is not monolithic and homogenous entity, thus, by *writing against culture*, by considering difference, by avoiding making generalizations, I aim to problematize three things. Firstly, I aim to problematize the term *soydaş*. In the case of Bulgarian Turkish immigrants, whether one is to be regarded as a *soydaş* or not partly depends on the year of migrating to Turkey and Turkey's unstable attitudes towards Bulgarian Turks. According to Helsinki Watch Report (1989), Turkey closed its borders on 22 August 1989, and imposed a visa requirement on Bulgarian Turks. Those who prepared themselves to migrate to Turkey stayed in Bulgaria or applied for the visa. As some of the interviewees said, while those who migrated to Turkey via 1989-mass exodus received – at least – rent help, which was actually a need to start a new life in a new country, those who migrated via visa application received no help. Later on, the government changed the visa requirements, and, therefore, it became very difficult to receive the visa and many Bulgarian Turks tried to cross the border via illegal ways (Danış & Parla, 2009: 142). Turkey's changing attitudes towards Bulgarian Turks caused the redefinition of the status of the immigrants in question: while 1989 migrants were embraced as *soydaş,* and therefore considered citizen; post-1990 migrants who received the visa to cross the border were regarded as *legal* immigrant. Moreover, others who could not apply for the visa were excluded as

illegal, although all of them experienced the same atrocities in Bulgaria between 1984 and 1989.

Secondly, I aim to inquire into the term *voluntary* migration. Some of my interviewees said that they really wanted to return to Bulgaria, and participated in their family's decision of return. Whereas, others felt very disappointed when their husbands decided to return without asking their wives' feelings about the return, *even though they did not physically force their wives.* That is, if one does not focus on particulars, it could easily be argued that their return, too, is voluntary.

Lastly, I aim to question the concept *homeland* since the interviewees' responses to the question "where is your homeland" differ from one another even though all of them are ethnic Turks and were born in Bulgaria. George Gmelch defines return migration as "the movement of emigrants back to their homelands to resettle" (1980: 136). Following this definition, it could easily be argued that Bulgarian Turks' return to Bulgaria means their return to their homeland. However, some of the interviewees see Turkey as their homeland although they returned to Bulgaria.

As a result, some are regarded as *soydaş;* some as legal; some as illegal; some returned to Bulgaria voluntarily; some not; some regarded themselves as natives; some as foreigners. These identities such as *being* soydaş, legal immigrant, illegal immigrant, voluntary emigrant, involuntary emigrant, native, and foreigner depend on each individual's everyday life experiences on the two sides of the border, and all of these help me analyze how self-identity of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant is constructed.

In the first page of this chapter, I asked: "Can I make a difference as a woman researcher who studies Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women and utilizes in-depth semi-structured interviews as a research technique?" Constituting intimacy with the interviewees for eliminating the possibility of exploiting them is the first difference that I make. Before the fieldwork, I did not assume that being a woman would make a difference for this subject, however, now, I know that the

interviewees were more relax when we were alone during our conversations, especially when the subject was very sensitive. This point will be further elaborated in Chapter 3, "Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria and the 'Revival Process.'" It is important to note that not only being a woman, but also being the daughter of a Bulgarian Turkish immigrant father helped me for creating intimacy during the process of the fieldwork. I was not a researcher from their point of view, and, therefore, they were not research "subjects." I was a daughter, whose questions were about her attempt to understand her father's visit to the place where he was born. I can easily say that they see me sometimes as their daughter, and sometimes as their sibling, which created more intimate relationship between us.

As is mentioned, there is a link between objectivity and the authority of the author in classic ethnographies. Therefore, as someone who wants to be a feminist anthropologist, I inquire into how feminism and anthropology deal with the problem of objectivity. Focusing on objectivity from the perspectives of both disciplines helps me problematize the concept of sameness. For recognizing difference, we should go beyond the concept of culture. As a result, "writing against culture" reveals that there is no "the" experience of "the" Bulgarian Turkish immigrant woman. This can be regarded as the second difference that I make.

Last but not least, doing ethnography on the particular as one of the strategies of "writing against culture" also makes differences for this thesis. By focusing on each detail of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's everyday life experiences on the two sides of the border, I take their voices with me, which is very crucial because, sometimes, they were silenced – as we will see in Chapter 5, which focuses on their experiences of involuntary return to Bulgaria. Their silence makes them a number in "conventional social scientific accounts." That is, they would be one of the 154,937 immigrants who returned to Bulgaria. Furthermore, Turkey would be regarded as their homeland, or Bulgaria would be seen as their homeland. However, again, in Chapter 5, we will see the differences about the perception of homeland among the interviewees. Similarly, *illegal* immigrants would be seen as

"undesirable individuals" if we would not empathize with them. Empathizing with them is only possible through focusing on particulars' experiences; in other words, through giving voices to them.

2.2. The Research Problem and The Research Question

This thesis explores how the self-identity of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women is constructed depending on their everyday life experiences on the two sides of the border. Therefore, during this study, I elaborate on Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's experiences not only in Bulgaria but also in Turkey, considering that they were exposed to more difficulties in comparison to men, regardless of distinctive regimes.

By their experiences I mean, those experiences with respect to compulsory labor under the communist regime, and their working conditions in Bulgaria before migrating to Turkey; second, the differences in their migration experiences in Turkey depending on their being perceived by the Turkish state as *soydaş*, *legal* immigrant, or *illegal* immigrant; and, third, their experiences of return to Bulgaria, which were shaped by the nature of their return, i.e., *voluntary* or *involuntary*. Might it be true that what these women experienced in Turkey was worse than what they experienced in Bulgaria? To answer this question, I focus on whether they participated in return-decision while this decision was taken in their families. I propose that their everyday life experiences will highlight the process of how they decided to return to Bulgaria or how they reacted to this decision. Moreover, their voluntary or involuntary return experiences highlight how they perceive themselves in Bulgaria, i.e., *natives* or *foreigners*.

Finally, by comparing their experiences that spread to three different periods on the two sides of the border, which are different from each other in consequence of distinctive regimes, I am planning to analyze the effects of Bulgarian Turkish women's everyday life experiences on their self-identity. I will particularly ask the following question:

- How do everyday life experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women on two completely different regimes have an effect in the decision of return to Bulgaria and on the construction of their self-identity?

2.3. The Research Setting and The Research Sample

The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in various villages of Kardzhali in southern Bulgaria. Kardzhali has a historical importance because the "Revival Process" – as will be seen in further detail in Chapter 3 – started in the eastern Rhodope region of Bulgaria where Bulgarian Turks mostly lived at the end of the 1984 (Eminov, 1990: 203). Kardzhali is one of the villages in the eastern Rhodope region. After the fall of the communist regime, almost half of the Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey decided to return to Bulgaria (Vasileva, 1992: 349) and Kardzhali district maintains its importance as a living space for Bulgarian Turks. The 2011 population census of Bulgaria shows that 588.318 persons identify themselves as Turks who are located in several districts such as Kardzhali, Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen, Silistra, Dobrich, Ruse, and Burgas; and 66.2% of the Kardzhali's population identify themselves as Turks.

I did interviews with nineteen Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women. Five of them live in *Yaylacık* (Visoka Polyana), four of them live in *Yelciler* (Zhinzifovo), three of them live in *Çiftlik* (Zbor), two of them live in *Sürmenler* (Shiroko Pole), two of them live in *Sofular* (Madrets), two of them live in *Çepelce* (Kokiche), and one of them lives in *Hamzalar* (Dobrinovo). All of them migrated to Turkey and decided or *forced* to decide to return to Bulgaria.

2.3.1. Profile of the Interviewees[4]

As will be seen in Table 1, Profile of the Interviewees, two of them (Reyhan and Aygül), who are the youngest of the interviewees, were born in 1970. The oldest

[4] Since the focus of this thesis is Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's return to Bulgaria after their migration to Turkey, Table 1 that gives information about the interviewees is arranged according to the duration of their stay in Turkey.

one (Remziye) was born in 1936. Four of them (Hayriye, Mukaddes, Meryem, and Remziye) lost their husbands and did not marry again. The rest are married, and live with their husbands. All of them have children who were also born in Bulgaria. While Saime has six children, which is the highest number, Mergül has only one child. The educational level of the interviewees is low. Twelve of them have a secondary school degree; three of them are uneducated; two of them have a high school degree; one of them have an associate degree; and one of them graduated from university. Eight of them have a double citizenship. One may ask whether to have double citizenship affect this study. Regardless of the reasons of the return, all of the interviewees settled to Bulgaria and rarely cross the border, just for visiting Turkey. Thus, to have a double citizenship has no effect on this study.

With respect to the occupations of the interviewees in Bulgaria, before migrating to Turkey, it is seen that twelve of them were tobacco workers before migration. In addition to working in tobacco industry, Vildan, Necmiye, and Bahise also worked in various factories, and Sebile worked as a school janitor. Reyhan, Nazmiye, Nebibe, and Naime worked in textile factories. Mergül, Gülümser, and Aygül worked as a cook, pre-school teacher, and telephone operator.

Twelve of the interviewees migrated to Turkey via 1989-mass exodus, five of them migrated via visa application, one of them migrated before 1989-mass exodus, in 1984 (Mergül), and one of them migrated through illegal ways (Elfide). In Turkey, eight of them worked in various factories. Differently, Naime quitted her job in a textile factory and started to work as a nanny. Six of them did not work. Fatma, Elfide, Nebibe, Mihriban, and Naime worked as a tailor, dishwasher, ladder cleaner, construction worker, and supermarket cashier. Eight of them stayed in Turkey less than a year, eleven of them stayed more than a year. Three weeks is the shortest period of time for staying in Turkey (Gülümser). Mergül stayed twenty-eight years in Turkey, which is the longest period of time among interviewees.

Ten of the interviewees returned to Bulgaria voluntarily. However, the rest did not. After their return to Bulgaria, their preference to work outside their homes

also varies. After returning to Bulgaria, Sebile, Saime, and Remziye continued to work in a tobacco industry and they are retired now. Six of them returned to Bulgaria after retirement. Mukaddes and Mergül did not prefer to work after return; while Mukaddes is retired now, Mergül is not. After return to Bulgaria, Reyhan worked in a textile industry until getting married. After getting married, she continued to work in a tobacco industry. Now, she looks after her children and she is not working. Fatma is still working in a conserve factory. Necmiye and Bahise worked not only in factories but also in a tobacco industry; they are retired now. Meryem and Elfide are still tobacco workers. After return, Gülümser could not work for a while as a pre-school teacher because the government did not allow them to work on their occupations. After a while she continued to work as a pre-school teacher and retired now. Aygül is the owner of a boutique hotel in Madrets.

Table 1 also shows that the interviewees' type of return i.e., whether voluntarily or not, affects how they perceive themselves in Bulgaria. Those who returned to Bulgaria voluntarily regarded Bulgaria as their homeland. On the other hand, according to involuntary returnees, Turkey is their homeland. However, this point needs to be further elaborated. Gülümser, for example, who stayed in Turkey for three weeks, regards Bulgaria as her homeland. This seems normal because she spent limited time in Turkey to construct a bond with it. Accordingly, Mergül who stayed for twenty-eight years in Turkey regards Turkey as her homeland, which is also expected. However, while six months is also a very limited time to construct a bond with Turkey, Meryem and Necmiye regard Turkey as their homeland. Maybe the most interesting thing is Naime's perception about her homeland, because she stayed in Turkey for twenty-four years, and see Bulgaria as her homeland although we may expect otherwise if Gülümser's perception is taken as point of reference. What are the reasons behind these? To answer this question, we should consider their experiences on the two sides of the border. Beside their experiences, I also inquire into how their educational level, occupations both in Bulgaria and Turkey,

and their migration status as *soydaş*, *legal* immigrant, or *illegal* immigrant affect their perception of homeland.

Table 1: Profile of the Interviewees

Names	Year of Birth	Marital Status	Number of Children	Education	Double Citizen-ship	Occupation in Bulgaria before Migration	Migrating to Turkey, When? How?	Occupation in Turkey	Returning to Bulgaria, When?	Type of Return: Voluntarily or not?	Occupation in Bulgaria after Return	Homeland Perception
Gülümser	1956	Married	2	Associate Degree	No	Pre-school teacher	1989 / Mass Exodus	Non-worker	3 Weeks Later	Voluntarily	Non-worker for a while, then, pre-school teacher / now, retired	Bulgaria
Bahise	1959	Married	3	Secondary School	No	Tobacco worker & worker in a conserve factory	1989 / Mass Exodus	Non-worker	40 Days Later	Voluntarily	Tobacco worker & worker in a conserve factory / now, retired	Bulgaria
Reyhan	1970	Married	2	Secondary School	No	Worker in a textile factory	1989 / Mass Exodus	Worker in a textile factory	2 Months Later	Voluntarily	Worker in a textile factory, then, as a tobacco worker / now, retired	Bulgaria
Fatma	1951	Married	2	Secondary School	No	Tobacco Worker	1989 / Mass Exodus	Tailor	2.5 Months Later	Voluntarily	Worker in a conserve factory	Bulgaria
Remziye	1936	Widow	3	Uneducated	No	Tobacco worker	1989 / Mass Exodus	Non-worker	3 Months Later	Voluntarily	Tobacco worker / now, retired	Bulgaria
Saime	1938	Married	6	Uneducated	No	Tobacco worker	1989 / Mass Exodus	Non-worker	5 Months Later	Voluntarily	Tobacco worker / now, retired	Bulgaria
Meryem	1957	Widow	3	Uneducated	No	Tobacco worker	1989 / Mass Exodus	Worker in a chicken industry	6 Months Later	Involuntarily	Tobacco Worker	Turkey
Necmiye	1956	Married	2	High School	No	Tobacco worker & worker in a textile factory	1989 / Mass Exodus	Worker in a textile factory	6 Months Later	Involuntarily	Tobacco worker & worker in a textile factory / now, retired	Turkey
Sebile	1945	Married	3	Secondary School	No	Tobacco worker & school janitor	1989 / Mass Exodus	Worker in a car factory	14 Months Later	Involuntarily	Tobacco worker / now, retired	Turkey

Table 1 continued.

Elfide	1958	Married	2	Secondary School	No	Tobacco Worker	1990 / Illegal Ways	Dishwasher	15 Months Later	Involuntarily	Tobacco worker	Turkey
Mukaddes	1939	Widow	3	Secondary School	No	Tobacco Worker	1990 / Visa Application	Non-worker	18 Months Later	Involuntarily	Non-worker / now, retired	Turkey
Aygül	1970	Married	2	University	Yes	Telephone Operator	1994 / Visa Application	Supermarket cashier	2004 / 10 Years Later	Voluntarily	Owner of a boutique hotel	Bulgaria
Vildan	1952	Married	2	Secondary School	Yes	Tobacco worker & worker in a dairy industry	1989 / Visa Application	Worker in a textile factory	2004 / 15 Years Later	Voluntarily	Retired	Bulgaria
Nebibe	1948	Married	2	Secondary School	Yes	Worker in a textile factory	1998 / Visa Application	Ladder cleaner	2013 / 15 Years Later	Involuntarily	Retired	Turkey
Hayriye	1938	Widow	4	Secondary School	Yes	Tobacco worker	1994 / Visa Application	Non-worker	2011 / 17 Years Later	Involuntarily	Retired	Turkey
Mihriban	1941	Married	4	Secondary School	Yes	Tobacco worker	1989 / Mass Exodus	Construction worker	2006 / 17 Years Later	Voluntarily	Retired	Bulgaria
Nazmiye	1955	Married	2	Secondary School	Yes	Worker in a textile factory	1989 / Mass Exodus	Worker in a textile factory	2011 / 22 Years Later	Involuntarily	Retired	Turkey
Naime	1965	Married	2	High School	Yes	Worker in a textile factory	1989 / Mass Exodus	Worker in a textile factory & nanny	2013 / 24 Years Later	Voluntarily	Retired	Bulgaria
Mergül	1965	Married	1	Secondary School	Yes	Cook in a hospital	1984 / one of migration waves	Worker in a metal factory	2012 / 28 Years Later	Involuntarily	Non-worker	Turkey

2.4. Limitations of the Research

As the daughter of a Bulgarian Turkish immigrant father, the process to find interviewees was not difficult for me. All of the nineteen interviewees from the various villages of Kardzhali shared their experiences of migration to Turkey and then return to Bulgaria with me without any hesitation. I believe that my father's role was huge in this.

Before conducting the fieldwork, most of the interviewees knew that I would come for my thesis and ask some questions about their experiences. However, I could not reach the people in one of the villages before the fieldwork. To ask for help from mukhtar seemed to me a very practical solution at that time. After we met, he continually expressed dissatisfaction with my research by asking: "What kind of questions do you plan to ask," "do you plan to focus on the communist period of Bulgaria in your research," "why do you do research on women although they know nothing what happened here?" Even though he stated that almost the whole village migrated and then returned to Bulgaria, after the second interview, he said that there is no one left who migrated to Turkey. Two of the interviewees (Fatma and Meryem) that the mukhtar introduce me to them, become very excited when they heard about this research. During our conversation with Fatma, the mukhtar enters to the room along with my interviewee's husband; she lost her excitement and changed her attitude against me by starting to give me very short answers. In the second conversation with Meryem, although the mukhtar did not enter the room and leave us alone, this time he kept knocking the door and asking me to finish it. She stroked the same attitude just like the first one after he knocked the door.

Moreover, the mukhtar was not liked by the villagers. I learned this after the interviews. Even though, I believe, this did not change how I was perceived by interviewees, some argue that there is a strong correlation between how the interviewer is perceived and how the medium through which the interviewer is introduced to the interviewee is perceived. Shulamit Reinharz claims, for example,

"the self is the key fieldwork tool" (1997: 3). Not only we are bringing the self to the field but also we are producing the self in the field. Reinharz argues that if the researcher goes to the field by the favor of a sponsor, the sponsor immediately influences how the researcher will be perceived in the field. Due to the fact that Reinharz's sponsor was not liked by the people, he became a burden instead of a guide and protector. The solution to the influence of the sponsor that affected the fieldwork was to create a new self that could conduct this fieldwork without any help of the sponsor (Ibid.: 8).

The second limitation of this research was the language. During the fieldwork, I spoke Turkish with the interviewees. Due to the fact that speaking Turkish was not allowed during the communist regime in public places in Bulgaria, they often inserted some Bulgarian words into our conversation, which resulted in some difficulties while we were communicating. Despite of this barrier, the interviews were not affected badly.

CHAPTER 3

ETHNIC TURKS OF BULGARIA AND THE "REVIVAL PROCESS"

The 1980s witnessed the abuse of the human rights of ethnic Turks by the communist regime in Bulgaria, whose end corresponded with the 1989-mass exodus from Bulgaria to Turkey (Vasileva, 1992: 342), which functioned as one of the triggering effects of the political changes in Bulgaria in the same period (Nitzova, 1997: 732). Bulgaria was the first communist country that changed the names of its ethnic minorities *as a way of assimilation*, which was regarded as the fastest and the broadest campaign, called the "Revival Process" (Dimitrov, 2000: 2).

3.1. The End of Ottoman Sovereignty in the Balkans and the Establishment of the Modern Bulgarian State

The history of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria started with the conquest of the Balkans by Ottoman Empire (Şimşir, 1990: 159). Thus, ethnic Turks have lived in Bulgaria since the end of the 14th century (Poulton, 1991: 119). The location of Bulgarian land is crucial because it is close to Istanbul, which might be regarded as "the way to the West" (Şimşir, 1990: 159). Many ethnic Turks were placed to the Balkans from Anatolia after conquest. Therefore, before Russo-Turkish war (in 1877-1878), the number of Bulgarian population fell behind the number of Muslim Turks. Russo-Turkish war has an historical importance due to the fact that it was the end of Ottoman sovereignty on the Balkans and that it was the establishment of Bulgarian national state (in 1878) (Ibid.: 159-161). The establishment of the Balkan states simultaneously signified the decline of ethnic differences because of "their one-nation political programs" (Vasileva, 1992: 344-345). One-nation political program raised difficulties for ethnic minorities due to the fact that one-nation political

program aligned public and private institutions in accordance with the nationalist ideology. However, Bulgarian national state was established where the population have "multi-racial" and "multi-national" characteristics (Şimşir, 1990: 161). As a matter of fact, it became very difficult to follow the idea of one-nation since there were various languages and religions, which can be regarded as the heritage of the empires (Vasileva, 1992: 345). Accordingly, the constitution of the modern Bulgarian state, following the idea of one nation, triggered the emigration waves from Bulgaria to Turkey (Höpken, 1997: 54; Şimşir, 1990: 161; Vasileva, 1992: 345). In addition to one-nation political program, it is important to notice that there was also an economic side of these emigration waves from Bulgaria. Due to the fact that the 70% of fertile soil was under the control of ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, Bulgarian Turks were forced to emigrate from Bulgaria (Şimşir, 1986: 200).

Table 2: Emigration Waves from Bulgaria

1878 – 1912	350,000
1923 – 1933	101,507
1934 – 1939	97,181
1940 – 1949	21,353
1950 – 1951	154,198
1952 – 1968	24
1969 – 1978	114,356
1989 – 1992	321,800
Total	**1,160,614**

Source: Eminov (1997: 79).

However, the population of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria remained considerable in number despite of emigration waves after the establishment of Bulgarian national state. Hence, Turks are still the largest ethnic minority in Bulgaria. As the largest and official ethnic minority of Bulgaria, the rights of ethnic Turks started to be protected by the Treaty of Berlin (1878) to Helsinki Final Act of 1975. That is, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences began to be recognized. Therefore, ethnic Turks in Bulgaria acquired a chance to establish some cultural and religious organizations that manifest their identity (Şimşir, 1990: 161-163).

There were no significant conflict between ethnic Turks and Bulgarians since the liberation of Bulgaria until 1944. Furthermore, Bulgaria had given autonomy to ethnic Turks (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 286). For example, before the communist regime, the identity of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria was associated with religion (Höpken, 1997: 56); and, accordingly, "Chief Mufti's Office, the Mufti Vicarage and the Spiritual Courts" were in charge not only in spiritual matters but also in administrative and judicial ones (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 286-287). Until the Second World War, ethnic Turks constituted an autonomous community, which was regarded as "under-developed," and "close ethnic and religious group" that mostly lived in rural areas (Höpken, 1997: 56). The literacy rate was low; until 1918, secondary schools did not exist. The primary education was mostly based on religion with limited secular education. The close community life was effective in children's education, which means that the children of ethnic Turks went to their own schools (Ibid.: 56-57). However, even though Turkish language was tolerated, community schools did not take any financial support from the Bulgarian state (Dimitrov, 2000: 4). This education system isolated ethnic Turks because Bulgarian language was not taught in community schools. That is, ethnic Turks lost their chance to enter into the larger labor market (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 287).

Religious differences was also tolerated and even promoted due to the fact that it might prevent the entrance of Muslim population into widespread secular society. The Bulgarian government highlighted the superiority of the Bulgarian

majority and the inferiority of its ethnic minorities; hence, integration as well as assimilation of the minorities were out of the agenda (Dimitrov, 2000: 4). In other words, in this period, the intervention into the internal affairs of minorities was not an issue (Höpken, 1997: 57). Instead, the government chose to ignore its minorities. Nevertheless, this situation changed with the establishment of the nation-state such that Islamic religion and Ottoman culture was targeted by the state for the sake of "Westernisation" (Ibid.: 59). Similar to the "Revival Process," in this period, there were some attacks to the communal life of minorities. For example, mosques were destroyed; earlier geographical names in Turkish were changed with Bulgarian ones. Although, this was seen as a way of "modernization" by Bulgarian elites, actually it was a discrimination against Turkish and Muslim minorities, damaging their ethno-religious identity. Despite these, religious and cultural autonomy of ethnic Turks continued (Ibid.). As British Foreign Office put it in 1920, "In general religious toleration prevails [in Bulgaria] to a greater extent than in any other state in Eastern Europe" (cited in Höpken, 1997: 60). However, the government kept ignoring the "social backwardness" of its minorities and gave a very limited support to the secular education of ethnic Turks (Ibid.). Höpken argues that the rise of Kemalism in Turkey also affected the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria[5], that is, they established a bond with the new secular Turkey (Ibid.: 61). Modern secular Turkish schools were established, and in these schools, the Bulgarian language, as well as Bulgarian history and geography were taught (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 287). Nonetheless, low rate of literacy among ethnic Turks, a few secular elites, the power of religious leaders, and Bulgarian government's support to anti-Kemalism would be regarded as the obstacle for the rise of Kemalism in Bulgaria. To conclude, in the case of Bulgarian Turks, religious identity dominated secular national consciousness among Turks and Muslims (Höpken, 1997: 62).

[5] This may be regarded as the departure point of the some organized attempts against religion and communism in Bulgaria among Bulgarian Turks that were covered by Turkist and anti-communist elements, supported by Kemalist and nationalist ideologies, promoted by the Republic of Turkey to politically instrumentalized them in the Cold War period (Danış & Parla, 2009: 137).

The situation of Bulgarian minorities in Macedonia, Thrace, and Dobrudzha immediately caused the rise of nationalist self-consciousness among Bulgarians (Ibid.: 63). This simultaneously affected the situation of the ethnic minorities of Bulgaria. Thus, anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim ideologies gained strength, and provoked ethnic conflict, starting in the early 1930s among Bulgarians and Turks. In the mid-1930s, the government imposed some sanctions on minorities. For example, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of Turkish schools, Turkish newspapers, Turkish parliamentarians, and local Turkish majors. Moreover, before WWII, Bulgarian and Turkish states were in conflict. This affected minorities badly. The conflict between these states as well as Turkey's active repatriation policy caused the emigration of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria in the 1930s. These situations have led, on the one hand, to the spread "secular ethnic consciousness" among ethnic Turks of Bulgaria and, on the other hand, to the strengthening of "nationalism" among Bulgarians (Ibid.). Hence, this period refers to the end of "the long-standing compromise between the Bulgarian government and the Turkish community" (Ibid.: 64).

3.2. The Establishment of People's Republic of Bulgaria

Social-political theories as well as economic models of Russia and Western Europe were very important for Bulgaria after Russo-Turkish war (Mineva, 2001: 61). After People's Republic of Bulgaria was founded in 1946, the Soviet policy *"national in form, socialist in content"* was implemented to ethnic minorities by Bulgarian authorities (Anagnostou, 2005: 94). The communist government followed this policy as a way of *voluntary* assimilation (Eminov, 1999: 31). In this regard, the government recognized its minorities and protected their rights (Eminov, 1997: 5). The first constitution of the communist regime (4 December 1947) declares "National minorities have a right to be educated in their vernacular, and to develop their vernacular, and to develop their national culture" (cited in Mahon, 1999: 155; Poulton, 1991: 120). To convert ethnic Turks into secular elites who were supposed to work for the Communist party's "ideological and social goals" was one of the

primary aims of the regime (Höpken, 1997: 64). Therefore, the Bulgarian state began to advance cultural as well as educational conditions[6] of the ethnic Turks. It was argued that socialist consciousness aimed to prevent the isolation of ethnic Turks (Parla, 2003: 562). While the educational and cultural competence of ethnic minorities was enhanced, there were some difficulties that ethnic Muslim minorities experienced with respect to their religious beliefs[7]. Although the restrictions towards Islam in this period cannot be considered as a direct attack, they were the indicators showing that religious freedom would be restricted among Muslims and Turks (Höpken, 1997: 64-65). Few decades later, in 1977, an official article was published in Sofia that indicates the attitude towards Muslims.

> The uncompromising struggle against Islam and its adverse consequences to some Rhodope Bulgarians is an important task at the present stage and a necessary prerequisite for their consolidation within the Bulgarian socialist nation and more active inclusion in building a developed socialist society (cited in Poulton, 1991: 125).

The idea of Bulgarian socialist nation also affected Turkish women. Turkish women in Bulgaria under the communist regime had to work with their husbands or fathers. Thus, the communist regime altered not only women's "traditional roles" but also the Turkish community's "conservative behaviour" (Höpken, 1997: 66). As is seen, "traditional, mainly religiously-based identity" was attacked by the regime in order to create a socialist as well as a secular identity (Ibid.). Nevertheless, this

[6] To increase literacy rate among Bulgarian Turks, Turkish secondary schools were opened. Thereby, the literacy rate increased during the 1950s (Höpken, 1997: 64). Approximately 1,000 schools that taught in Turkish were established by the late 1950s (Eminov, 1999: 44). The quality of Turkish teachers was advanced. Before they had no academic training however, in this period they were enabled to get training (Höpken, 1997: 64). Furthermore, Turkish language department was established in Sofia University (Mahon, 1999: 155; Poulton, 1991: 120). To convert ethnic Turks into "socialist Turkish intellectual elites," they easily entered to universities with the help of their privilege position (Höpken, 1997: 64). Libraries and theatres were opened, to publish Turkish literature were allowed if it fit to socialist ideology – for example, the poets of Nazim Hikmet (Ibid.: 64-65).

[7] The number of hodjas was reduced from 15,000 to 2,400 between 1944 and at the end of the 1950s. Theological high schools were secularized; instructing Quran was banned – only in 1952. In the early 1960s, there were only 460 hodjas. Cultural and religious traditions became a target; wearing shalvari was prohibited, some festivals and religious funeral ceremonies were changed completely (Höpken, 1997: 65-68).

policy did not succeed, and ended up with the emigration of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1950 (Ibid.: 66-67). In addition to these, Turkish landowners were complaining about the collectivization of lands in the name of communism (Eminov, 1999: 31; Parla, 2009: 757; Zhelyazkova, 2001: 288). As a result, in 1950, approximately 250,000 ethnic Turks applied to Bulgarian government to emigrate Turkey. However, a few months later, Turkey announced the impossibility of accepting all ethnic Turks. That is, Turkey closed its borders, and the government argued that closing the borders was very important to prevent entering the country via illegal ways. Then, Bulgaria and Turkey signed an agreement, indicating that those who had Turkish entry visa were welcome to Turkey. Nonetheless, Bulgaria violated the agreement and forced ethnic Turks to emigrate, which led Turkey to close its borders again in 1951 (Poulton, 1991: 119). To be precise, Stalin gave the order to Bulgarian authorities to deport ethnic Turks – that might shake Turkey's economy – in order to punish Turkey due to its joining NATO and participating in the Korean War (Karpat, 1990: 4). As a result, approximately 155,000 ethnic Turks emigrated from Bulgaria to Turkey in 1950 – 1951 (Poulton, 1991: 120).

After the emigration of ethnic Turks in the 1950s, the communist party changed its policy to "communist nationalism" which brought some barriers not only to religion but also to the possibility of creating the "separate ethnic identity of Turks and Muslims" (Höpken, 1997: 67). In 1956, the Bulgarian government gave up non-national ideals, namely "socialist internationalism" that it had followed since the establishment of communism – between 1944 and 1956 – (Eminov, 1997: 5). Rather, it embraced the idea of "becoming a [national] whole" with the ideal of "homogeneity" (Karpat, 1990: 4). Accordingly, they aimed to constitute "one-compact Bulgarian nation" (Ibid.), due partly to the fact that supporting Turkish language and institutions failed to satisfy the expectations of the government, which was to strengthen ethnic Turks' socialist identity (Eminov, 1997: 84). This policy

started in the 1960s, – the first target was the Pomaks [8] (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) (Karpat, 1990: 4) – continued in the 1970s, and reached its apogee in 1984 with the replacement of the names of ethnic Turks with Bulgarian and Slavic ones under the assimilation campaign called the "Revival Process" (Höpken, 1997: 67).

The 1971 party programme announced that it was important to establish the "unified socialist nation," which indicated that the pressure on ethnic minorities, namely Pomaks and Gypsies, would increase (Crampton, 1997: 203). The aim was to obliterate cultural differences via *assimilation* or *forced migration* of the ethnic minorities of Bulgaria (Eminov, 1997: 4). Although the traditional Bulgarian historiography claimed that the conversion of Pomaks from Christianity to Islam was voluntary, in the late 1960s the Bulgarian authorities changed this. The new historiography asserted that the conversion had been made forcefully. The name-changing campaign towards Pomaks was based on this. Nonetheless, Turkish government did not believe that this name-changing campaign that targeted Pomaks would reach to ethnic Turks of Bulgaria (Karpat, 1990: 4-7). Even though ethnic Turks did not experienced such pressures from the authorities yet, Bulgarian government promoted the emigration of Turks (Crampton, 1997: 203). It is well-known that the migration waves from 1944 to 1951 divided some families. Therefore, in 1968, a new agreement took place between Bulgaria and Turkey for those whose family members migrated to Turkey (Poulton, 1991: 120); that is, for approximately 130,000 Turks (Crampton, 1997: 203). Nevertheless, in 1979, Bulgarian government cancelled the agreement and announced that: "Since then between the two countries no agreement on emigration has existed" (Poulton, 1991: 120).

[8] Approximately 200,000 Pomaks forced to change their names between 1960 and 1976 (Eminov, 1990: 206). Many Pomaks who refused to take their new Slavic names were punished in the early 1970s; 500 Pomaks were sent to Belene labor camp in 1974 (Crampton, 1997: 203). Similar to the "Revival Process," Islamic rituals were forbidden: fasting during the Ramadan, slaughtering lambs during the Feast of Sacrifice, circumcision of male children. Mosques and religious schools were closed. Islamic funerary rituals were not allowed to perform. Pomak religious leaders were arrested, and, even worse, were killed. Pomak women were not allowed to wear traditional dresses (Eminov, 1990: 206).

Although the names of the Turks did not become a target in the 1970s, what Höpken calls "silent assimilation"[9] was targeting the mother tongue of ethnic Turks (1997: 68). Paradoxically, in 1964, Todor Zhivkov pointed out to the importance of mother tongue for the children of Turkish population[10]. Although there were some attempts to create socialist consciousness and some restrictions on the rights of ethnic minorities, Bulgarian authorities failed to infuse "the common Bulgarian socialist nation" into ethnic minorities (Ibid.: 70). The government realized that "customs, religion, and language" were integral parts of the "ethnic differentiation," which triggered "Revival Process" that – this time – targeted the *identity* of the ethnic Turks (Ibid.).

3.3. The Underlying Reasons of the "Revival Process"

Before focusing on the so-called "Revival Process," I believe that understanding what triggered this process needs to be explicated. Intermarriages as a part of an assimilation, international migration, and normal increase of the population are crucial for "the share of ethnic groupings in a country's population" (Vasileva, 1992: 345). Not only intermarriages between Muslims and Christians but also labor migration were forbidden in Bulgaria under communism (Ibid.: 345-346). On the other hand, high birth rates of ethnic Turks destabilized the balance between the population of Bulgarians and ethnic Turks (Crampton, 1997: 210; Eminov, 1997:

[9] After the plenum of Bulgarian Communist Party on 4 October 1958, Turkish schools were started to merge with Bulgarian ones (Poulton 1991: 121). In the early 1970s, Turkish lessons were closed in these united schools. The department of Turkish language in Sofia University did not accept students and after a while the department was replaced by Arabic studies (Mahon, 1999: 156; Poulton, 1991: 121). In the late 1970s, education in Turkish language was banned; instead, schools started to give a more "patriotic" education that aimed to strengthen the solidarity between Bulgarians and ethnic minorities by following "Christian culture" and "anti-Ottoman history" (Höpken, 1997: 68). Turkish theatres were closed; Turkish newspapers were published as bilingual until 1984 (Eminov, 1999: 45).

[10] "All possible opportunities have been created for the Turkish population to develop their culture and language freely… The children of the Turkish population must learn their mother tongue and perfect it. To this end, it is necessary that the teaching of the Turkish language be improved in schools. Now and in the future the Turkish population will speak their mother tongue; they will write their contemporary literary works [in Turkish]; they will sing their wonderfully beautiful songs [in Turkish]… Many more books must be published in this country in Turkish, including the best works of progressive writers in Turkey" (cited in Poulton, 1991: 120-121).

92; Poulton, 1991: 123; Vasileva, 1992: 346). To stabilize the population between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks, between 1878 and 1960, ethnic Turks forced to emigrate from Bulgaria to Turkey. However, this did not change the situation of Bulgaria. Bulgaria in the 1980s experienced the smallest birth rate among other socialist countries (Vasileva, 1992: 346). Last but not least, it could be said that ethnic conflict was used by Bulgarian authorities to cover economic problems throughout the country (Crampton, 1997: 210), and delay the political changes that was in progress in the socialist countries of East-Central European (Vasileva, 1992: 343). That is, the leaders of the communist regime decided the necessity of the "Revival Process" (Ibid.: 346).

Kardzhali (sometimes spelt as Kurdzhali) is one of the first places where the "Revival Process" started in late December 1984 (Poulton, 1991:144). Ethnic Turks mostly lived in Kardzhali, a place of significance for the government due to production of tobacco, and it became almost impossible to hear any Bulgarian word in this area (Poulton, 1991: 123). Turks in Kardzhali constituted "homogenous, compact, and often closed communities" (Elchinova, 2005:91). Moreover, the geopolitical position of Kardzhali was also important, since Kardzhali was very close to the Turkish border (Anagnostou, 2005: 91; Dimitrov, 2000: 13; Poulton, 1991: 123). This made the authorities fear that there might be a possibility of "irredentist movement" in the future (Poulton, 1991: 123).

Figure 1: The Map of Bulgaria



Source: http://www.turkey-visit.com/map/bulgaria-map

Modernization is another factor that triggered the "Revival Process." Bulgarian Communist Party aimed to convert Bulgaria into a "modern industrial state" (Poulton, 1991: 126). Therefore, they firstly specified the obstacles to "modernization." Minorities, who lived in isolated areas, spoke a different language, and adopted a traditional way of living was regarded as the main obstacle to "modernization" (Ibid.). During the communist period, ethnic Turks of Bulgaria were living in rural areas, that is, northeastern and southeastern Bulgaria. Kardzhali is from southeastern part of the Bulgaria, and southeastern part is not developed as the northeastern. The Communist regime firstly "modernized" the southeastern part, where ethnic Turks – in comparison to northeastern people – were regarded as "backward, more conservative, and traditional" by Bulgarian authorities (Elchinova, 2005: 90-92).

3.4. The "Revival Process"

The communist policy drew its strength from its refusal of the existence of religious and ethnic minorities (Nitzova, 1997:731). That is, the argument of Bulgarian Communist Party was that "there are no Turks in Bulgaria" (Eminov, 1997:13; Karpat, 1990:19; Laber, 1987:1). In order to reinforce this argument, the communist party claimed that there are only Bulgarians in Bulgaria, and that ethnic Turks are in fact ethnic Bulgarians who had been suppressed and converted to Islam during the centuries of Ottoman domination [11] (Crampton, 1997: 209; Elchinova, 2005: 96; Eminov, 1990: 205; Eminov, 1997: 14; Laber 1987: 12; Mahon; 1999: 157; Poulton, 1991: 130). Minister of Internal Affairs Dimitur Stojanov said:

> All our countrymen who reverted to their Bulgarian names are Bulgarians. They are the bone of the bone and the flesh of the flesh of the Bulgarian nation; although the Bulgarian national consciousness of some of them might still be blurred, they are of the same flesh and blood; they are children of the Bulgarian nation; they were forcibly torn away and now they are coming back home. There are no Turks in Bulgaria (cited in Eminov, 1997: 16).

Very similar to the argument of Stojanov, a commentary was published in the Newsletter of the East European Anthropology Group in 1988 that stated:

> The Bulgaria nation is pure and uncontaminated, and has remained unchanged since the Middle Ages. According to the anthropologists, the Bulgarian people took shape in the ninth and tenth centuries as a blending of Slavs, Thracians, and Asiatic tribes. The mixture evolved into homogenous entity, the people now called Bulgarians. The foreign invasions of the past 1,000 years left no racial mark, it seems. The implication is that members of the Turkish minority are merely Bulgarians who happen to speak Turkish (cited in Eminov, 1997: 12).

The aim was to integrate ethnic minorities to the "developed socialist society" (Vasileva, 1992: 346), which was "united and homogenous," and, therefore, is released from differences "along ethnic, religious, gender or social-status lines"

[11] The Bulgarian authorities supported the argument "There are no Turks in Bulgaria" by referring to the article by Midhat Pasha (the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire), which were published in 1878 in a French Journal that states: "Firstly, it must be borne in mind that among the Bulgarians who arouse so much interest there are more than one million Moslems. These Moslems did not come from Asia to establish themselves in Bulgaria, as is widely believed. They are themselves descendants of those Bulgarians converted to Islam at the time of the conquest and during the following years. They are children of one common country, from one common race, and share a common origin" (cited in Poulton, 1991: 149).

(Elchinova, 2005: 94-95). This integration meant the assimilation of ethnic minorities. In other words, it aimed to convert or even obliterate the *identity* of ethnic Turks ((Elchinova, 2005: 87; Mahon, 1999: 149). It is well-known that ethnicity is irrelevant for the socialist nation (Elchinova, 2005: 95), and Bulgarian Communist Party aimed to erase ethnicity for the sake of "common socialist identity" (Höpken, 1997:68) by focusing on the importance of "class unity" for the main principle of "the socialist nation" (Neuburger, 2004: 56). To be precise, "class" was used by Orthodox Marxists to make sense of social relations (Eminov, 1997: 1). Accordingly, all differences were associated with class differences. Moreover, it was claimed that ethnic differences did not represent social divisions. By reducing each and every difference to class, Orthodox Marxists aimed to remove ethnic antagonisms. However, the communist government forgot the importance of *self-identity* in the modern world. As a result, the "so-called" peace between ethnic majority and ethnic minorities, which the government brought, might trigger the fall of the communism and the rebirth of nationalism (Ibid.).

Bulgarian Turks experienced the worst violations between December 1984 and March 1985 (Laber, 1987: 1). Crampton says that the "Revival Process" as a military operation was the largest one that was seen since the WWII (1997: 209). The "Revival Process" was started by forceful replacement of Arabic and Turkish names with Slavic and Bulgarian ones[12]. The leaders of the Communist party justified the name changing campaign as a way of embracing "their re-born identity" (Elchinova, 2005: 96), and asserted that ethnic Turks changed their names voluntarily, even though, there is no evidence that supports this argument (Karpat, 1990: 1). Those who rejected their new names were either sent to Belene Labor Camp (Karpat, 1990: 1; Mahon, 1999: 158), or exiled (Eminov, 1990: 203), or imprisoned (Amnesty International Report, 1986: 272). Approximately 250 ethnic Turks were imprisoned between December 1984 and March 1985. Most of them were arrested as "prisoners

[12] See, Elchinova, 2005: 94; Eminov, 1990: 203; Eminov, 1997: 8; Höpken, 1997: 67; Karpat, 1990: 1; Laber, 1987: 1; Poulton, 1991: 130; Vasileva, 1992: 346).

of conscience." Those who accepted the new names were released (Ibid.: 273). In some instances, ethnic Turks were forced to accept the new names at their workplaces, and those who refused this lost their jobs. Some of those who did not change their names voluntarily were prevented from working in state enterprises (Poulton, 1991: 131-137).

Speaking Turkish in public places (Eminov, 1990: 203; Höpken, 1997: 70) or on the phone (Mahon, 1999: 157), as well as radio broadcasts, newspapers in Turkish (Crampton, 1997: 209; Laber, 1987: 3), and Turkish music were banned (Poulton, 1991: 136-137). Some Turkish teachers were sent to labor camps. Wearing traditional clothes were also banned, and those who continued to wear traditional clothes faced harassment in the streets (Ibid.: 137-138). They also did not get service from clerks and restaurant managers (Eminov, 1990: 203). Accordingly, in 1985, the major sent a letter[13] to ethnic Turks who lived in Kardzhali that informed them about how to dress "properly" (Poulton, 1991: 137).

All religious expressions were regarded as "anti-state and/or bourgeois nationalist propaganda" (Eminov, 1999: 40). That is to say, religious practices were extremely limited under socialism (Elchinova, 2005: 91). Circumcision of male children was also prohibited (Crampton, 1997: 209; Eminov, 1990: 203; Karpat, 1990: 1), and public officials were examining Muslim children regarding their circumcision status (Eminov, 1990: 203). Those who did the circumcision of male children were arrested up to three years or were served with fine up to 1,000 leva (Amnesty International Report, 1986: 273). Pilgrimage was also prohibited (Crampton, 1997: 209). Islamic architecture was destroyed (Crampton, 1997: 209; Eminov, 1999: 41); many mosques were closed (Karpat, 1990: 1; Poulton 1991: 132),

[13] "In accordance with Article 2 of Order No.1 of the (village name) People's Communal Council, it is prohibited to wear shalvari, pyjamas, veils, yashmaks (traditional Islamic veils) and other non-traditional Bulgarian clothes or to speak a non-Bulgarian language in a public place. This tradition, inherited from five harsh centuries of slavery, has been forever rejected by the whole people, including the Muslims. Therefore we remind you that the time has come to end conservative modes of life and to adopt more appropriate and pleasant clothing and the pure Bulgarian tongue. We hereby warn that after 7 October those who do not abide by these requirements will be sanctioned" (cited in Poulton, 1991: 137).

or turned into museums (Mahon, 1999: 157). The half-crescent on the top of the minarets was taken away because it was regarded as a symbol of Turkish nationality (Ibid.). At that time, in Plovdiv, only two mosques were left, which were open only on Fridays at noon, and those who went to mosques for prayer were arrested (Poulton, 1991: 133). Fasting in Ramadan was forbidden (Karpat, 1990: 1) such that those who had sheep's carcasses in their refrigerators were arrested for one year (Poulton, 1991: 136).

Burial of the deceased in Muslim cemeteries was also prohibited (Karpat, 1990: 1). Muslims and Christians were buried in the same cemeteries, and religious ceremonies for both Muslims and Christians were altered with a secular (Elchinova, 2005: 96) and socialist one (Eminov, 1990: 204). It was not allowed to wash the body of the deceased in that period (Poulton, 1991: 136), because officials argued that it was a threat to public health (Crampton, 1997: 209). Gravestones with Turkish and Arabic names were destroyed (Eminov, 1990: 203); names of the deceased were also changed into Bulgarian and Slavic names (Eminov, 1990: 204; Parla, 2003: 567).

Moreover, gathering of more than 8-10 persons in public places was banned (Elchinova, 2005: 96). Hence, it became impossible to organize a protest against these atrocities, and "peaceful demonstrators" were also sent to prisons (Amnesty International Report, 1986: 272; Mahon, 1999: 158). For example, in one of those protests that took place in Kardzhali district in a peaceful environment, tear gas was used, fire was opened; as a result, six ethnic Turks were killed by the security forces. Some of them aimed to go to Turkish embassy in Sofia to apply a visa to emigrate from Bulgaria to Turkey; however, they were arrested as "prisoner of conscience" by the police who encircled the building of the embassy. Freedom of movement and emigration were only rarely allowed, which led to leave the country without official permission. Accordingly, those who crossed the border without official permission were sentenced up to five years (Amnesty International Report, 1986: 273-275). Furthermore, Bulgarian authorities enforced ethnic Turks to signing a document that declares "They did not wish to emigrate to Turkey and that those who refused

were faced with internal exile" (Ibid.: 273). As a result, the Bulgarian government blocked the very basic human rights, such as "freedom of expression, religion, movement, assembly and association" (Laber, 1987: 4).

3.5. After the "Revival Process:" 1989-Mass Exodus

It was not a surprise, then that the "Revival Process" could not succeed, because violence was used to "modernize" the society for implementing "enlightening methods," which were seen as unsuccessful (Elchinova, 2005: 96). To summarize, the security forces were responsible of violence and rape (Poulton, 1991: 131); over 100 ethnic Turks were killed during the assimilation campaign (Amnesty International Report, 1986: 273). Two persons were sentenced to death; one was for treason and the other was for murder; and ten persons were executed, nine of them were for murder, one was for terrorism (Ibid.: 275). Secondly, the homogenization of the society was not embraced not only by ethnic Turks but also by some Bulgarians, because both of them were afraid of the loss of their specific identity (Elchinova, 2005: 96). That is, not only ethnic Turks in Bulgaria but also Bulgarians constituted some boundaries through distinct cultural traits. Hence, both groups were very sensitive to any attempt that aimed to obliterate the boundaries between them due to the fact that they might obliterate their own identities (Ibid.: 97). Elchinova says that for both Bulgarians and ethnic Turks, the "Revival Process" was regarded as a transformation of "long-standing traditions and patterns of friendly relations between Bulgarians and Turks, Christians and Muslims" (Ibid. :88) – a transformation in the strengthening of ethnic Turks' national sentiments (Dimitrov, 2000: 15; Karpat, 1990: 2).

The name-changing campaign as "a forced act" damaged Bulgaria contrary to what was expected (Karpat, 1990: 2). In the international arena, this campaign raises doubts about the "democratization of society" (Vasileva, 1992: 346-347) that ended up with the isolation of Bulgaria (Höpken, 1997: 71; Vasileva, 1992: 346). The United Nations, the European Court of Justice, and the Islamic Conference Organizations reacted to the "Revival Process" (Crampton, 1997: 209). The

Communist Party's attitude towards ethnic Turks created troubles with Middle Eastern and Western states, and, therefore, the damaged the relationship between Bulgaria and its neighbors, which affected Bulgaria's economy (Höpken, 1997: 71). Although a few years before the 1989-Mass Exodus, Todor Bozinov as Deputy Prime Minister announced that there would not be migration waves from Bulgaria to Turkey (Eminov, 1997: 16), Todor Zhivkov announced that "Turkey should prove its democracy by opening the borders to Bulgarian citizens, including Muslims, who had been given the right to travel wherever they wanted," which triggered the new emigration wave from Bulgaria to Turkey; that is, 369,839 Bulgarian Turks crossed the border (Vasileva, 1992: 347) between June and August in 1989 (Elchinova, 2005: 87). This was for covering the unsuccess of the "Revival Process" (Ibid.: 98).

Turkey might be the first country to raise the assimilation campaign towards ethnic Turks. Nonetheless, Turkey's attitude towards the Kurds opened a way for Bulgarian authorities to change the criticisms made by Turkey (Poulton, 1991: 161). Zhivkov stated: "It is not in Turkey's interest to make much noise, as they have a whole army fighting against the Kurds" (cited in Dimitrov, 2000: 13). In this regard, Turkey aimed to improve its image in the international arena, and prevent the accusations of the Western societies on this issue (Vasileva, 1992: 343) by embracing its ethnic kins (in Turkish, soydaş). However, Turkish government decided to close its borders in August 1989 (Dimitrov, 2000: 16; Mahon, 1999: 161) because of the huge numbers of migrants on the border (Parla, 2003: 563). Accordingly, over 13,000 ethnic Turks had to return to Bulgaria since they could not cross the border (Poulton, 1991: 159). Then, the Turkish government required ethnic Turks to apply for the visa in accordance with the purpose of reducing the number of people who waited on the border (Vasileva, 1992: 349), which means that it allowed Bulgarian Turks to stay in Turkey only three months within the six months period (Kasli & Parla, 2009: 203). Furthermore, the government insisted that this policy was necessary to pressure Bulgaria to sign an immigration agreement that allowed "the orderly emigration of the Turks" (Karpat, 1990: 19); and if the Bulgarian

government guaranteed the property rights of Turkish minorities, regardless of whether they migrated to Turkey or stayed in Bulgaria, Turkey would reopen its borders (Zang, 1989: 54).

How was the situation of Bulgarian Turks who succeeded to cross the borders of Turkey? Those who immigrated to Turkey left their properties in Bulgaria that led to financial problems after their migration to Turkey (Karpat, 1990: 19). In addition, since there were many political, economic, social, and cultural differences between Bulgaria and Turkey (Elchinova, 2005: 88), forming a new life in Turkey was not easy for many Bulgarian Turks. In fact, the adaptation of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey varied based on occupation, age and the level of education (Elchinova, 2005: 104; Vasileva, 1992: 349). However, it may be said that they were seen as foreigners, and named as *göçmen* by the local Turks (Elchinova, 2005: 103; Vasileva, 1992: 349), even though they were embraced as *soydaş* officially by the Turkish government (Parla, 2003: 562). This made difficult the adaptation of Bulgarian Turks to an "unfamiliar social setting" (Elchinova, 2005: 103). Moreover, they complained that they earned less vis-à-vis local Turks at the same job, or they were forced to work in unskilled part-time or dirty jobs (Vasileva, 1992: 349). Bulgarian Turks were considered as competitors of local Turks in terms of jobs (Elchinova, 2005: 104) because they were keen on working and well-educated (Parla, 2003: 567).

The importance of cultural and linguistical differences should not be ignored (Vasileva, 1992: 349). Although Turkish is widely spoken in Bulgaria, there are some dialectical differences (Elchinova, 2005: 105; Parla, 2003: 567; Vasileva, 1992: 349), which may end up with the difficulty of adaptation process, and even with the assimilation of them. In addition, Bulgarian Turks knew very little about Turkish society that simultaneously affected their everyday life from "how to do shopping" to "how to speak to be understood by locals" (Elchinova, 2005: 103). Moreover, Bulgarian Turks in Bulgaria under socialism experienced the homogenous social

setting, however, in Turkey they faced with the stratified one that boundaries between people are drawn through "property, education, and social status" (Ibid.).

Lastly, I will focus on "gender roles." While Turks in Bulgaria were considered as conservative, considering their attitudes towards women; in Turkey, they were regarded as "unacceptably liberal" because Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women had jobs even unqualified or underpaid (Elchinova, 2005: 105). Women's working was something very natural for Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women as a result of communist regime. As one of my relatives, Zeynep expresses her astonishment against the word *"housewife"* that she heard for the first time after she migrated to Turkey:

> There are many differences between Bulgaria and Turkey, which stems from system of education. Being educated and to have an occupation are vital in Bulgaria. After migrating to Turkey, I heard the word, "housewife" and I was really astonished. Not only for men but also for women, occupational life is very significant. If economic conditions of the family are in good shape, I may understand that women do not prefer to work. Nevertheless, it is very hard to understand for me if women do not work because of being rejected by the society. Unfortunately, this situation is very common in Turkey (Zeynep, Dentist).

Women's work was encouraged by the communist government; nonetheless, the same government also had some traditional expectations from working women as wives and mothers. In spite of communism's bringing what is usually called "double burden"[14] to women, it also provided women with some educational and occupational opportunities (Parla, 2009: 754-758). As Elchinova focuses, the only way to make a good life in an "unfamiliar social setting" was to work "together" since they could not bring property or capital with them (2005: 105). What was the reaction of local Turks to working women? It was thought that working women might obliterate the settled norms, and were seen as "not moral enough" and "not religious enough" (Ibid.). On the other hand, according to most Bulgarian Turkish immigrants, religion was regarded as a mosque attendance, which might be used as

[14] I will focus on this issue in Chapter 4, "'Double Burden' regardless of the Political Structure of the Country."

an excuse for not working, rather than as morality (Ibid.: 106). As a result, because of these significant differences between local Turks and Bulgarian Turkish immigrants, they were placed into a minority position again.

Elchinova divides the *other* into two groups: one is "alien other" and the other is "own other." Bulgarian Turks were the "own others" of Bulgarians but they were the "alien others" of local Turks. "Own others" refers to people with different ethnic or religious background that share the same local-societal codes (Elchinova, 2005: 101). It is important to note that "own others" is a category with positive connotations. On the other hand, Bulgarian Turkish immigrants were seen as "alien others" by local Turks in term of their "observance of Islam, drinking of alcohol, consumption of certain food, etc." (Ibid.: 107). Moreover, Bulgarian Turks identified themselves as "better, more civilised and 'European'" that constituted a separation between them (Ibid.). As a result, while Bulgarians excluded ethnic Turks in Bulgaria because of their ethnic identity, in Turkey, they were excluded by local Turks because they were seen as "Bulgarians" (Parla, 2003: 561), which is an unsolvable paradox. That is, ethnic Turks of Bulgaria got disappointed in their *homeland*[15] (Ibid.: 563). All of them might trigger the return to Bulgaria. In addition, "Turkey's capitalist economy and social conditions" (Höpken, 1997: 71) and the political changes in Bulgaria also affected the decision of return (Poulton, 1991: 159). Therefore, almost half of the Bulgarian Turks (154,937 persons) who migrated in 1989 decide to return to Bulgaria after the fall of the communist regime (Elchinova, 2005: 87; Höpken, 1997: 71; Parla, 2006: 544; Vasileva, 1992: 349).

According to the communist government, this mass-exodus was voluntary (Karpat, 1990: 19; Mahon, 1999: 159), and if ethnic Turks wished, they could return to Bulgaria (Karpat, 1990: 19). Nevertheless, the Bulgarian government punished returnees with heavy fines who stayed in Turkey more than three months. If they stayed more than six months, it meant the "loss of pension and other rights" (Ibid.).

[15] In the sub-section of Chapter 5, "Being a Native or Foreigner" I will focus on the uncertainty of the term "homeland."

For example, after return to Bulgaria, many ethnic Turks were not allowed to work on their professions, and were forced to do manual work until the resignation of Zhivkov (Poulton, 1991: 159). As one of the interviewees, Gülümser could not work as a pre-school teacher after returning to Bulgaria despite the fact that she stayed in Turkey for only three weeks. As she states: "The government punished me because I emigrated via 1989-mass exodus."

3.6. The End of the Communist Regime in Bulgaria

Zhivkov was isolated in the international arena after the "Revival Process;" even Moscow did not want to interfere by saying that it was "Bulgaria's national question" (Crampton, 1997: 215). Not only in the international arena but also in Bulgaria, many reacted against Zhivkov. For example, the minister for foreign affairs stated that the "Revival Process" dishonored Bulgaria internationally (Ibid.). Zhivkov resigned on 10 November 1989. On 18 January 1990, he was arrested with the charge of the "incitement of ethnic hostility and hatred" (Poulton, 1991: 165). As is seen, "nationality" damaged the "national" image of Bulgaria.

After Zhivkov, the new government after the fall of the communist regime took some steps to make easier the lives of those who returned to Bulgaria (Parla, 2003: 563; Vasileva, 1992: 350). These new arrangements even triggered the return of Bulgarian Turks to Bulgaria (Anagnostou, 2005: 92). The first thing to do was to restore and protect the rights of ethnic minorities that were violated by the previous government. The new government of Bulgaria paved the way for ethnic Turks' retrieving their original names (Eminov, 1997: 19; Nitzova, 1997: 733; Poulton, 1991: 169; Vasileva, 1992: 347). Approximately 600,000 ethnic minorities of Bulgaria – Turks, Pomaks, and Roma – retook their Islamic-Arabic names in 1991 (Höpken, 1997: 72; Zhelyazkova, 2001: 296). Those who were imprisoned due to rejecting their "new identity" were released (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 296).

Some arrangements were also made that brought religious freedom. For example, mosques were opened (Eminov, 1999: 42; Poulton, 1991: 169; (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 296). Even though circumcision was allowed, it was forbidden

still that hodjas came to the hospital and performed the ritual. Thus, many operations were done outside of hospitals under the risk of infection (Poulton, 1991: 169). It became free to publish religious literature (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 296). Furthermore, Islamic institute was established in Sofia and forty-five students began to study there. A Muslim secondary school in Shumen and a Muslim cultural and educational organization called Alev in Varna were also established (Poulton, 1991: 169).

Those who returned to Bulgaria faced accommodation problems. To be precise, some ethnic Turks claimed that if they did not sell their homes to the Bulgarian authorities, they could not get the documents from the Bulgarian government for emigration (Poulton, 1991: 159). Therefore, some of them sold their homes to Bulgarians for very low prices. Accordingly, the Council of Ministers addressed the problem of housing (Zhelyazkova, 2001: 296). Nevertheless, the initiatives of the new government to solve the problem of housing were not welcomed by the local authorities. That is, 77,000 ethnic Turks who returned to Bulgaria were regarded as homeless (Vasileva, 1992: 350). Only 3,000 houses were given back to their real owners (Nitzova, 1997: 733).

Other problems were related to the education in mother tongue. The new government planned to open Turkish classes in schools where the population was ethnically mixed (Eminov, 1997: 19). Thus, in November 1991, Turkish lessons took their place in the curriculum (Vasileva, 1992: 350). Many Bulgarians indicated their dissatisfaction with this since Turkish language could be used as a tool for "pro-Turkish propaganda and influence" (Ibid.: 351). Moreover, Bulgarian nationalists protested all these decisions by insisting that "minorities should either assimilate or emigrate," because they believed that the restored rights might cause cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities, and, therefore, Bulgarian culture might be obliterated (Eminov, 1997: 19-20). Cultural autonomy might also damage the territorial integrity of Bulgaria; thus, Bulgaria might be divided into two parts: "Turks and non-Turks." Due to the high birth rates among Muslims and Turks,

Bulgaria might be Turkified and Islamicised (Ibid.: 20). Contrary to the protestors, the new government aimed to indicate its democratic governance (Anagnostou, 2005: 92) by solving the problems which might rise through these dissatisfactions via "democratic and parliamentarian method" that blocked the "possible incentives for future emigration" (Vasileva, 1992: 351). The new government noticed that ethnic conflicts made Bulgaria unstable (Anagnostou, 2005: 92), as well as the abuse of human rights was one of the factors that triggered the fall of the regime (Nitzova, 1997: 732-733). Therefore, the issue of minority rights became the most important agenda topic. As Vasileva claims, it is comprehended once and for all that forced migration was not a way to solve "social and interethnic problems" and to advance "international and bilateral relations between countries" (1992: 352).

As a result, the new government not only restored the cultural rights of ethnic minorities but also asserted that the official language of Bulgaria is Bulgarian, which tranquilized nationalists and indicated the attitude of the new government against "autonomy and separatism" (Eminov, 1997: 20). The constitution obstructed "collective rights for minorities;" instead, the rights of ethnic minorities were protected as "rights of individuals" (Nitzova, 1997: 734), which means that territorial autonomy and those political parties that were based on ethnicity and religion were out of the agenda (Höpken, 1997: 79). Hence, it was not allowed to use Turkish language in political campaigns (Eminov, 1999: 49); all political parties had to present their party programs in Bulgarian language (Höpken, 1997: 79). Turkish was taught in Bulgarian schools but it was not in the regular curriculum (Nitzova, 1997: 734). That is, Turkish might be learned as an elective, which led to closing of the courses under the guise of lack of Turkish teachers, or it could be said that it was not demanded, and did not met the minimum number of students for opening of the course (Höpken, 1997: 79). In the Bulgarian army, Turkish language was not represented as a second language because it was regarded as opposed to "Bulgarian national interests" (Nitzova, 1997: 734).

Some Bulgarian Turks migrated to Turkey in different times and did not turn back to Bulgaria. Others returned to Bulgaria and broke with Turkey[16]. Nonetheless, some of them still live between two countries. Bulgaria experienced a very crucial shift owing to the fall of the communist regime. After the fall of the communist regime, the economy of the country was affected badly, which led to migration waves from Bulgaria to Turkey. Migrants aimed to improve their living conditions in Bulgaria through finding temporary jobs in Turkey (Parla, 2003: 563) or through making "suitcase trade" (Elchinova, 2005: 88). They are the post-1990s labor migrants who migrated to Turkey due to economic reasons, and they have only Bulgarian passports; even though those who migrated in 1989 have double citizenship (Parla, 2003: 564). Most of them are women and they have been looking for jobs as domestic workers or nannies in Turkey (Parla, 2007: 159). That is, post-1990s migrants missed the opportunity to be *soydaş*[17] due to the fact that they migrated to Turkey at the wrong time.

[16] This deserves special attention that sometimes return could be regarded as "voluntary migration" although it was not. In the sub-section of Chapter 5, "Being a Voluntary Emigrant or Involuntary Emigrant," I will aim to problematize the term "voluntary migration" by focusing on particulars who are Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women.

[17] In the sub-section of Chapter 5, "Being a *Soydaş*, Legal Immigrant, or Illegal Immigrant," I will inquire into the term "soydaş" because the classifications of Bulgarian Turks as legal or illegal migrants are changing due to the political landscape of Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

"DOUBLE BURDEN" REGARDLESS OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY

4.1. Being a Worker, Wife, and Mother

This section focuses on gender politics in Bulgaria under the communist regime. In addition, I aim to give specific examples from other post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, because, I believe, each case highlights one another. This is especially important if we consider the fact that comparison method is very crucial for anthropology discipline[18]. I will mainly focus on *double burden*[19] that women under communist regimes are exposed to. However, this does not mean that women in non-socialist states are not exposed to "double burden." Therefore, on the one hand, I will elaborate on "double burden" in state-socialist countries. On the other hand, I will analyze "double burden" in non-socialist states.

In Central and Eastern European countries, socialist ideology was regarded as "the realm of freedom" (Petrova, 1993: 22), and "gender equality" was started to be seen as one of the key terms of socialism (Ghodsee, 2004: 25). "Women's liberation through work" was theorized by Friedrich Engels and some early socialist thinkers (Massino & Penn, 2009: 1-2). Engels claimed that capitalism was an obstacle to the *emancipation of women* because it supported an economic model due to which

[18] See, Seema Arora-Jonsson's "Discordant Connections: Discourses on Gender and Grassroots Activism in Two Forest Communities in India and Sweden" to how comparison method is used by focusing on two "so-called" completely different worlds from each other that helps to illuminate and comprehend the "other."

[19] "Double burden" refers to the situation of women who are working outside their homes to earn money as well as who are regarded as solely responsible for household works and childrearing.

women were economically dependent on the salary of men (Ghodsee, 2004: 26). Similarly, Lenin stated at the "First All-Russia Congress of Working Women:"

> The status of women up to now has been compared to that of a slave; women have been tied to the home, and only socialism can save them from this. They will only be completely emancipated when we change from small-scale individual farming to collective farming and collective working of the land. That is a difficult task (cited in Schuster, 1971: 261-262).

The socialist leaders of Central and Eastern Europe embraced this idea for the newly established socialist governments (Massino & Penn, 2009: 1-2). However, by linking emancipation of women with their participation to labor force, Engels (and other socialist thinkers) forgot the "cruel" fact that women from working class were also dependent on their husbands, even though they were working outside their homes. Even before the communist regime, women in Bulgaria were not only defined as "wives and mothers" but also as "workers and citizens." For example, in 1934, a law was enacted against marital violence (Ghodsee, 2004: 25-26). Moreover, after the death of their husbands, women became the head of their family, instead of their elder son (Ghodsee, 2004: 25; Panova et al, 1993: 16). After divorce, women in question were allowed to retake their own properties (Panova et al, 1993: 16). On the eve of WWII, more than 85 percent of the Bulgarian citizens worked as agricultural laborer, and Bulgarian women also actively participated in the labor force; that is, their primary role was defined as "producers, partners in the labor process" (Todorova, 1993: 31). In other words, Bulgaria was not that much *patriarchal* unlike other countries of Balkans such as Albania even before 1944 (Brunnbauer, 2009: 81). Nevertheless, this did not change the reality of "double burden" and the nature of the society, which was still "male-oriented and male dominated" (Todorova, 1993: 31).

When communists became powerful in the Bulgarian government in 1944, the rights of women became one of the main topics of conversation (Todorova, 1993: 34; Ghodsee, 2004: 25). Following the precursors of socialist ideology, communists committed themselves to changing the situation of women in Bulgaria from "uneducated slavery," serving the members of their family as their primary duty,

(Panova et al, 1993: 17) to "the socialist Amazon – a woman-android, the mechanical woman, woman-heroine of a socialist modernization project – *and a woman as a mother and carer of children"* (Kotzeva, 1999: 83) through their participation in the labor force. Hence, before the establishment of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the communist-dominated government – based upon the "Decree of Marriage" of May 1945 – enabled not only husbands but also wives to choose their jobs, and compelled both spouses to contribute to the family income (Brunnbauer, 2009: 80). Thus, women in Bulgaria like those in USSR and in Central and Eastern Europe were emancipated from the "chains of capitalism" (Panova et al, 1993: 17). It should be noted that gaining social equality through the participation of women in the labor force shaped the People's Republic of Bulgaria in reaching the Soviet model in terms of rapid industrialization (Ghodsee, 2004: 26), which means that the participation of women in the labor force under the guise of emancipation was not only for the sake of women in Bulgaria, but also for their economic potential (Brunnbauer, 2009: 81-82). To support single mothers was the main indicator that Bulgarian communist state encouraged independence of women from men. It was easier for single mothers in Bulgaria to reach some opportunities for housing than married women (Ghodsee, 2004: 28). Even though single mothers were condemned as "irresponsible, careless, and egoistical" in the 1950s and 1960s, this situation changed towards the 1970s, and "premarital sex became the norm," which led to the "autonomy of women" (Brunnbauer, 2009: 92-94). Nevertheless, women became independent from men by being dependent on the state (Ibid.: 82).

Bulgarian women were enfranchised when communists took the lead in 1946 (Todorova, 1993: 34). Moreover, the People's Republic of Bulgaria supported the political activities of women through imposing a quota that predicted the rate of women in the Parliament would be between 20 and 23 percent of the work-force (Ghodsee, 2004: 29). However, this quota never fully filled by women because their vocational careers were not regarded as serious (Petrova, 1993: 23). This quota system was present in other socialist countries, too. Nonetheless, for example,

women in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s did not have access to higher political office, and for the reason of this Pollert argues that states were paternalistic and devalued the representation of women in politics, which simultaneously reduced the importance of women's emancipation in the society (2003: 334). Similarly, even though there were some quotas for women in Hungary (25 to 30 percent of the parliament), women were excluded from "real political power" (Bollobás, 1993: 203). In Poland in 1970, the percent of women in the Parliament was twenty; however, the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and the government held the power in the sense that the number of women in the party as well as in the government bodies was only for show, which was "only one at most" (Fuszara, 1993: 250). More importantly, nothing was changed after the Parliament became free, and the election of women got difficult, that is, the number of women in the Parliament was reduced (Ibid.). In Czechoslovakia in the 1960s, women's demands were accepted as long as they were in agreement with "pronatalist policies" (Pollert, 2003: 334).

"The social democratic and communist labor movements" expected from women to perform their "feminine" duties not only in their workplace environments but also in their homes, such as service work and reproduction (Nickel, 1993: 141). This policy imposed more than one burden to women that led to gendered job segregation, and powerful patriarchy. The opportunities on women's employment – and also their participation in politics – strengthened inequality between men and women due to the fact that state socialism could not transform the traditional division of labor in the household (Gal & Kligman 2000: 48; Meurs, 1998: 312). This was because the idea of egalitarian socialist family did not convince the public. That is, domestic works continued to be regarded as a very natural thing that women should do (Pollert, 2013: 333), and as "publicly invisible and devalued" (Gal & Kligman 2000: 48), which simultaneously affected women in every aspect of their lives. For example, a Bulgarian ethnographer, Raina Pesheva, shared the results of the fieldwork (published in 1962) on gender roles in the household in

Bulgaria that show that husbands regarded their wives as solely responsible for the household work in the family. This means that wives could not have a leisure time as opposed to their husbands (cited in Brunnbauer, 2009). Moreover, men did not take any responsibility when it came to childrearing (Gal & Kligman, 2000: 48; Ghodsee, 2004: 27; Nickel, 1993: 142), which means that while women were regarded as "workers and mothers[20]," men were not seen as "workers and fathers" (Ghodsee, 2004: 27).

Table 3: Division of Household Works in Bulgaria in 1977

	Wife	**Husband**	**Both**	**Other**
Cooking	84,2%	1,0%	6,3%	8,1%
Dishwashing	81,2%	1,0%	8,4%	9,0%
House Cleaning & Vacuuming	74,9%	1,2%	16,1%	7,5%
Laundry	92,2%	0,8%	4,0%	2,7%
Ironing	88,9%	0,9%	4,5%	3,8%
Shopping	33,0%	12,8%	42,6%	11,3%
Small Repairs	4,8%	81,3%	7,6%	4,5%

Source: Brunnbauer (2009: 85).

Since the traditional roles in the household did not evolve into a more egalitarian structure, the emancipation of women under socialist regimes caused "double – or even triple – burden," which are: "the obligation to be a devoted wife and mother, a dedicated worker, and an active member of the community" (Ghodsee, 2004: 27). These three roles were assumed as crucial parts of women's personalities. That is, it was assumed that if women fulfilled each role properly,

[20] The data from 1975 revealed that while 93 percent of women in Bulgaria were working outside the home, only 7.4 percent of them did not have children (Todorova, 1993: 32).

then they got a chance to reach their own complete personalities (Petrova, 1993: 23). In short, socialist regimes obliged women to combine "motherhood, housework, and employment" (Dölling, 1993: 174). To impose the idea that women were mothers, and solely responsible for household works, as well as participants in the labor force, some stereotypes were assigned to them, such as "motherliness, caring, and selflessness" (Ibid.). Thus, women were not allowed building careers unless the duties as related to motherhood and housework were performed properly by them (Ibid.). In a word, working women continued to their status as subordinate *just as before socialism* in spite of promises about the emancipation of women (Schuster, 1971: 267).

The first result of "double burden" was to lead to job segregation by gender. That is, women in Central and Eastern European countries *were forced* to work in "light manufacturing, the services and caring professions," and mostly worked in jobs that were regarded as "at the bottom of job hierarchies" (Pollert, 2003: 332). For example, in the 1950s, women in Romania were trained as good mothers and wives, and they were only educated in practical trade. Many Romanian women tended to work in so-called feminine sectors because of "double burden." On the other hand, Romanian men worked on more prestigious, professional, and difficult jobs that brought more income than women's jobs (Harsanyi, 1993: 44). Similarly, in Czechoslovakia, women earned only as much as half of the income of men (Šiklová, 1993: 75). The less income of women strengthened the ideas that man was "not the sole but the primary breadwinner" (Ibid.), and woman should carry out the household works on their own (Harsanyi, 1993: 44). Therefore, less income of women reinforced the male domination in the household (Ibid.).

Bulgaria was not different from other former communist states in term of gender-based job segregation that led women to work on lower level positions, which were "traditionally feminine" (Ghodsee, 2004: 28) with low income (Petrova, 1993: 23). In addition, working at night and in those kinds of jobs that were regarded as dangerous for women's "reproductive abilities" was limited by the

state through the law (Ghodsee, 2004: 29). Actually, it was impossible for women in Bulgaria, for example, to be specialized in petro-chemical factories (Ibid.). In addition, the rate of women in Bulgaria who worked in the areas of management, administrative, and decision-making was only 1.6 percent (Panova et al., 1993: 18). In the case of ethnic minorities of Bulgaria, it could be said that "cultural hierarchy" was not questioned under the communist regime. That is, the unquestioned conceptions such as the inferiority of "oriental backwardness" and the superiority "western civilization" led to the possibility that *ethnic Bulgarian men* were dominating *ethnic Turkish women* twice; one was for their gender identity, and one was for their ethnic identity, causing far worse job segregations in ethnic minority communities (Meurs, 1998: 312). In this regard, *ethnic Turkish women* may be called "minorities within minorities."

Table 4: Gendered Job Segregation in Bulgaria in 1988

Line of Business	**Women in Labor Force**
Farming	47,5%
Transport	21,6%
Trade	65,1%
Research and Academia	54,0%
Education	75,8%
Culture	58,0%
Health Services and Social Security	73,8%
Finance and Insurance	82,3%
Industry	49,4%

Table 4 continued.

Construction	20,5%
Metallurgy	32,5%
Textiles and Clothing	72,3%
Leather and Shoe Industry	73,6%

Source: Brunnbauer (2009: 82).

Even in the same line of business, women from Central and Eastern Europe earned less than men, because women did not get bonuses like men (Pollert, 2003: 333). As is mentioned above, women in the Soviet Union could not reach the highest levels in politics. The same could be said for university administrations. For example, women in the German Democratic Republic faced discrimination in universities in the sense that only 2 or 3 percent of women were department heads, deans, and presidents (Nickel, 1993: 141). Furthermore, in Bulgaria, for example, it was more difficult to get a promotion for women in opposition to men (Petrova, 1993: 22). It could be easily argued that "double burden" was regarded as a handicap for the professional advancement of women in Bulgaria (Brunnbauer, 2009:77).

In a nutshell, as Panova et al. say for women in Bulgaria under the communist regime: "She is not free, she is exploited twice, at home and at work, twice muted, twice excluded from history, politics, and social life" (1993: 19). More importantly, "double burden" divided the consciousness of women in Bulgaria under the communist regime as "mother and wife," on the one hand, and as "worker and intellectual," on the other (Ibid.). That is, it would not be wrong to regard women in Bulgaria as "super-toiling pseudo-emancipated women" (Ibid.) – even though there were some attempts in Bulgaria to "socialize" domestic works such as maternity leaves, childcare facilities, child allowances, public canteens, and

early retirement, which were put on public display as an advantage for the working women that aimed to remove the traces of "double burden" (Ghodsee, 2004: 27-28).

Maternity leave was one of the most important gains for working women. Women in Bulgaria under communism started to use maternity leave 45 days before birth, and it finished after the child got to age three (Ibid.: 28). The state withheld the payment for this leave after the child reached the age of two, but it was guaranteed that women would return the same jobs after three years (Ghodsee, 2004: 28; Panova et al., 1993: 20). Furthermore, there was the possibility that women return to their jobs earlier and gave the unused time of the maternity leave to the father or to the grandparents (Ghodsee, 2004: 28; Panova et al., 1993: 20). Nevertheless, Panova et al. emphasize that this did not happen in reality (1993: 20). In addition to maternity leave, child allowances were given until the child reached the age of sixteen, or eighteen if the child was studying; and childcare facilities were sponsored by the state (Ghodsee, 2004: 28-29). Moreover, medicine for children and medical assistance were free (Petrova, 1993: 22). Under communism, women and men were equal in marriage as well as in the process of divorce: while in marriage, men could not sell the family property without the signature of women; in the process of divorce, all family properties were equally allocated between women and men (Ghodsee, 2004: 29). However, because of low salaries of women as opposed to men, after divorce, women needed the help of their parents, or even remarry (Panova, et al., 1993: 20). The custody of the children was given to mother, and the expenses for the support of children were automatically deducted from the salary of the father, that is, assigned to the mother by the state (Ghodsee, 2004: 29). Nonetheless, there was no alimony, and child support was very low (Panova, et al., 1993: 20).

The second result of "double burden" was to strengthen patriarchy. Socialism could not manage to embody the significance of the equality of women. That is, to change the ownership of the means of production failed to alter the attitudes of the public towards women, which means that there was a realm of

"hierarchical decision making," and it was impossible to go beyond the patriarchy (Petrova, 1993: 22). As is mentioned above, there were three roles assigned to women under the communist regime. To be more specific, such roles like "the Oriental, the patriarchal Eastern Orthodox, and the totalitarian-socialist" were very effective on women in Bulgaria that led to the identification of them with "overburden" and "overexploitation" (Panova et al., 1993:15). In spite of the statements about the emancipation of women, Bulgarian patriarchy was very powerful in women's lives. The patriarchy in Bulgaria had the power to enact a law that determined "how many children a married women should have" (Ghodsee, 2004: 30). In other words, patriarchal codes could not fall over in Bulgaria under the communist regime such that women experienced, or *were forced to experience* more than one burden for the sake of their marriage and children that performed by them "free of charge" in their "free time" in addition to their working outside homes (Panova et al., 1993: 17). Similarly, in Romanian case, it will be seen that instead of erasing the traces of patriarchy, the communist regime strengthened it – maybe without even realizing it – because "patriarchal rural society" were not questioned by socialism even though the regime gave women a chance to participate in the labor force (Hausleitner, 1993: 56). This patriarchy, which was strengthened under Ceausescu regime, was seen in many families. Husbands' decision was never questioned in the families, and much worse, violence against women was seen even among educated couples (Ibid.).

I will elaborate on how women's body was used by paternalistic and patriarchal states. As is mentioned in the previous chapter, Bulgaria had the smallest population among other European countries while ethnic Turks and Roma had the highest birth and lowest abortion rates[21], which might cause geopolitical problems for the Bulgarian state (Ghodsee, 2004: 33). According to the statistics in 1986, because of "double burden," women in Bulgaria did not want to have more

[21] The rate of Turkish and Roma minorities of Bulgaria was over 15 percent of the total population (Petrova, 1993: 23).

than two children regardless of the type of their professions (Panova et al., 1993: 19). For example, only 16.3 percent of women who were manual workers had three children (Ibid.). Hence, the communist regime in Bulgaria promoted women to have more children. If women had fewer than two children, abortion was not allowed, and this continued until 1990 (Petrova, 1993: 23). As Tatyana Kotzeva puts forth:

> Women's reproduction was underlined as the "natural" function, rather than an activity of women, as their duty rather than as their right. The policy on abortion was extremely restrictive because the main duty of a woman was to give a birth to the Nation, to the State (1999: 86).

The stricter case was seen in Romania[22]. Paradoxically, to give a birth was regarded as not only "the renewal of the workforce" but also as "a fatal interruption of productive work" by the Romanian communist regime (Harsanyi, 1993: 41-42). Accordingly, an antiabortion law was enacted in 1966 under the leadership of Ceausescu by arguing that "giving birth is a patriotic duty" (Ibid.: 46). Abortion was also illegal in Hungary, and women were sentenced up to three years if they had an abortion (Bollobás, 1993: 204). Nevertheless, illegal abortion became widespread, and the Council of Ministers changed the law that granted "some" women the right to have abortion. That is, married women under thirty-five years of age with fewer than three children were not allowed to have an abortion (Ibid.). Differently, in Czechoslovakia, abortion was legalized in 1957. However, the huge decline in the birth rates triggered the communist regime to enact some laws to restrict abortion in 1970. Nonetheless, the number of women who got rejected to have an abortion was very few (Heitlinger, 1993: 101). All of these examples from Central and Eastern

[22] All methods of birth control were prohibited. It was allowed to have an abortion if she had alt least four children or she was forty-five, which led to illegal abortions that concluded with death. Furthermore, women were forced to get gynecological examinations for keeping the women's bodies under control. Women who were single at twenty-five and married couples with no children were punished with high taxes. Security police interrogated couples about their sex life if they had fewer than four children. In 1986, the minimum number of children that a family had was five. While the government encouraged more than four children, it did not met doctors, baby food, and childcare facilities for the newborn babies (Hausleitner, 1993: 54-55). Childcare facilities were available for children until the age of six, nevertheless, with very poor equipments, and there was food shortage in these facilities. On the other hand, many parents were complained about their education, which was very ideologized (Harsanyi, 1993: 43).

European countries show that "women's biological role of motherhood has been of crucial importance for carrying out state national project" (Milić, 1993: 112).

According to Kristen Ghodsee, the communist regime reformulated the gender relations in Bulgaria; accordingly, it brought gender equality (2004: 24). Although Ghodsee is aware of the fact that the Bulgarian patriarchy was still valid in the communist period, she righteously claims that there were many attempts in terms of women's education and their participation in the labor force between 1944 and 1989 (Ibid.: 25). Nevertheless, as Mieke Meurs calls, the reality was an "imagined equality" for women in Central and Eastern European countries (1998: 312). That is, women were not allowed to set the framework of their emancipation (Ibid.). Thus, women started to face "formal equality," which prevented them from reaching "real equality" between women and men (Meurs, 1998: 312; Šiklová, 1993: 75). In other words, "formal equality" altered the conditions of oppression, and yet it could not be perceived as "real" emancipation by women (Meurs, 1998: 312). Consequently, as Petrova says, "the everyday life of women was furrowed with ripples of formal equality and emancipation in a seemingly endless patriarchal ocean" (1993: 22). According to Kiczková and Farkašová, "formal equality" is based on the idea of sexual neutrality and universalism (1993: 93). They argue that sexual difference and "specific nature of female subjectivity and identity" must be considered to reach "real equality" (Ibid.). Otherwise, the statistics, data, and numbers could easily conceal the discrimination and disadvantages towards women that "formal equality" itself brings with it, and even legitimize it (Ibid.).

Thus far, I have focused on the "double burden" that working women were exposed to under the communist regime in detail, because state-socialism promised that it would emancipate women from the chains of capitalism by making sure that they participate in the labor force. However, it is worth stressing that women are also exposed to "double burden" in non-socialist countries. As Heidi Hartmann puts forth, a survey that was done with 1,296 families in New York between 1967 and 1968 by Kathryn Walker and Margaret Woods shows that 859 women who did

not work outside their homes spent fifty-seven hours a week for doing housework; whereas men spent only eleven hours a week (cited in Hartmann, 1981). On the other hand, even though it was expected that the husbands of working women help their wives for household works, the survey showed that this was not the case. Husbands of working women did not spent more time for household works than husbands whose wives did not work outside their homes. Walker and Wood's survey reveals that "the more wage work women do, the fewer hours they spend on housework but the longer are their total work weeks" (Hartmann, 1981: 379). That is, household works and childrearing may lead to "leisure gap" for working housewives (Hochschild & Machung, 2012: 4). To be precise, working wives did household work in their free time, mostly in the weekends, while housewives and working husbands had a time to enjoy their weekends. Therefore, it is important to note, according to the survey, working women spent eight hours more a week for household works (Hartmann, 1981: 385). Moreover, as Hartmann says that the burdens in the household that women are exposed to increase when they have children. Wives are responsible for childcare, and the help they get from their husbands does not change in parallel with how many children they have or how young their children are (Ibid.).

Very similarly, Carol Wharton claims that although women contribute to the family income by participating in the labor force, this does not change the reality that "women must arrange their paid employment around family obligations" (1994: 201). That is, if women want to work outside their homes, they have to acknowledge that participating in labor force should not affect their family routine (Ibid.). Therefore, it should be said that women in non-socialist countries, too, experience "double burden." Patriarchal codes are seen in families regardless of the regime of the country. Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung call this "second shift." In their words, "Most women work one shift at the office or factory and a 'second shift' at home" (2012: 4). This does not mean that no husband helped their wives for household works and childrearing. However, it is worth noting that even those men

who helped their wives for household works regarded their jobs as more important than that of their wives' (Ibid.: 265). This shows, on the one hand, that "settled patriarchy" is observed regardless of distinctive regimes. On the other hand, women's jobs are not seen in non-socialist states as serious like in socialism. If women's jobs are not taken as serious, it is not unusual for men to expect them to perform their duties "properly" at home. Just like the findings of the survey by Kathryn Walker and Margaret Woods, in Turkey, too, women are exposed to "double burden." The report of TÜİK about the time men and women spend all day long in 2006 gives an answer to such questions: Who is more responsible for household works and childrearing? Who has more free time for leisure time activities?

Table 5: Average duration of activity according to activity type, sex and working status

Activity Type	**Working Women**	**Working Men**	**Non-Working Women**	**Non-Working Men**
Eating & Personal Care	02.34	02.42	02.40	02.52
Working and Looking for a Job	04.19	06.08	...	00.07
Education	00.06	00.05	00.25	01.14
Household Works & Care	04.03	00.43	05.43	01.12
Voluntary Work & Meetings	00.31	00.29	01.02	00.57
Social Life	01.30	01.33	02.07	02.35
Sports	00.02	00.06	00.04	00.19
Hobbies	00.04	00.19	00.06	00.38

Table 5 continued.

Mass Communication	01.34	02.00	02.18	03.12
Travelling & Leisure Time	01.09	01.45	00.49	01.36
Sleeping	08.07	08.08	08.46	09.18
Total	**24.00**	**24.00**	**24.00**	**24.00**

Source: TÜİK (2008).

The table above indicates that while non-working wives spent approximately six hours for household work and household care, non-working husbands spent only an hour for such works. On the other hand, working wives spent approximately four hours for household works. However, working husbands spent only forty-three minutes. In this regard, in the next section, I will analyze the experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women related to "double burden," not only in Bulgaria under communism but also in Turkey. This section will be especially important to understand how "double burden" in Bulgaria as a result of *compulsory working* operates in Turkey, where there is no compulsory working.

4.1.1. Everyday Life Experiences of Bulgarian Turkish Immigrant Women as Workers, Wives, and Mothers on the Two Sides of the Border

In the light of the discussion about "double burden," I will focus on the narratives of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women with whom I did interviews in Kardzhali district in Bulgaria. As is mentioned above, compulsory working led to "double burden" for women. This was because the communist regime could not obliterate the settled patriarchy. That is, women became the only responsible agents of household works and childrearing during the communist regime. However, in this section, we will see that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women were not only exposed to "double burden" under the communist regime in Bulgaria but also during their stay in Turkey. However, the perception of "double burden" varies in

accordance with their occupations both in Bulgaria and in Turkey, and with respect to whether they received help from their household members for household works.

The interviewees' occupations on the two sides of the border vary as is seen in Table 1. Firstly, I will elaborate on tobacco workers' experiences. Secondly, I will focus on those who worked as tobacco workers, even though they had other jobs. Thirdly, I will elaborate on the experiences of those who did not work as tobacco workers, but worked in other jobs. While elaborating these experiences, I will especially focus on women's experiences of "double burden" in Bulgaria with the same experiences in Turkey.

As is mentioned, the communist regime compelled everyone to work outside home. Nazmiye told me that the government strictly controlled everyone whether they were working.

> We had identity cards with many pages. One of those pages showed where we worked, or how many decares of tobacco that assigned to us to plant by the government. If one worked or planted the assigned tobacco, the authorities of the government sealed that page. If there was not a seal on that page, they called us for account. It was obligatory to start to work at the age of eighteen (Nazmiye)[23].

The experiences of tobacco workers deserve special attention. This is because working as a tobacco worker may be regarded as one of the most difficult types of occupation. Moreover, in Bulgaria, communist regime compelled individuals, mostly ethnic Turks, to work as tobacco workers. This is the reason why the mass exodus of ethnic Turks in 1989 led to difficulties for Bulgarian economy[24]. As Mukaddes said, "We plant tobacco everywhere. In summer, we processed tobacco; in winter, we made tobacco dry. We gave them to the government, then the government sold the tobacco we grew, and paid to us in return." Very similarly, Hayriye's words below may be regarded as the summary of experiences of ethnic Turkish women in Bulgaria as tobacco workers during the communist regime.

[23] All quotations were translated from Turkish to English by the author.

[24] See, The Washington Post. (12.07.1989). "Exodus of Ethnic Turks Jars Bulgaria's Economy"

> Previously, the only thing that women knew was working in tobacco. I worked as a tobacco worker for twenty years before migrating to Turkey. Since my husband did not help me for household works and childrearing, I could not work in other jobs (Hayriye).

Eight of the interviewees worked in tobacco plantations. Remziye, Saime, and Meryem are uneducated; Fatma, Elfide, Mukaddes, Hayriye, and Mihriban have a secondary school degree. All of them lived in villages during the communist regime. That is, being a tobacco worker is mostly related to the educational level and where they were living under communism in Bulgaria.

Remziye told me that: "Until I could not work, I worked in a tobacco plantation. We started to work before sunrise, because tobacco was likely to burn due to sunlight. It was a very difficult job; my hands were wounded." Her husband was also a tobacco worker. Although her husband knew how hard being a tobacco worker was, Remziye did not receive any help for childrearing and household works from her husband. Therefore, according to her: "Earning money is very crucial for women, but becoming solely responsible for household works and childrearing in addition to be a tobacco worker unendurable that made me sick." Saime talked about almost the same things. She said that: "My husband, my children, and I went to the tobacco field before the sunrise. Our children were very young, and we could not leave them alone. Sometimes my children studied there." According to Saime's words cited below, patriarchal family was not questioned in Bulgarian Turkish families.

> Those times that we went to the field before the sunrise were very difficult for me. I woke up very early, and prepared some food for breakfast. Then, I woke up my children and my husband. We ate breakfast, and went to the field. We worked until sunrise. When I came home, I made preparations for lunch, and tidied up the house. It was much more difficult when the children were very young (Saime).

As is mentioned in the previous section, maternity leave may be regarded as one of the most beneficial policies of communist regimes. However, being a tobacco worker limited some rights for ethnic Turkish women, such as maternity leave.

> In every period of my life, I had financial hardship; I still have. In my opinion, maternity leave was for those who were in good financial situation. The

> government did not force me to work in tobacco plantation after the pregnancy, and made payment for maternity leave, but how could we support ourselves with the money that the government paid to us (Saime)?

Every year the government assigned tobacco workers a considerable amount of land to plant tobacco. If they could not process the assigned amount of land, the government imposed heavy penalties to them. Meryem took maternity leave during the communist regime, then, she learned that the government assigned her parents ten decares to plant tobacco. "They were old, and it was impossible for them to plant ten decares tobacco," she said. Then, she moved to parents' house for helping them with her newborn baby.

> If I did not have other difficulties, I would not regard household works and childrearing as burdens. It should be my responsibility. But, my life has passed through many difficulties. So I needed help. For example, our village had a water problem. I had to carry water from fountain to my home every day. Then, I continued to my routine works at home (Meryem).

We should ask how being a tobacco worker in Bulgaria affected the perception of "double burden" of ethnic Turkish women in Turkey? For example, Remziye stayed in Turkey for three months, and she did not prefer to work in Turkey. She told me that her husband and her sons started to work after their immigration, but Remziye did not. I asked her the reason of her preference.

> After the immigration, Turkish Government made a financial aid for us. When my husband and my sons decided to work, we realized that their earnings would be enough for a living in Turkey. I would work if I had to. But I was very content in Turkey as a non-worker. I started to work in tobacco plantation when I was a child. That was enough for me (Remziye).

When I asked whether Remziye received any help from other household members for household works after migrating to Turkey, she said that she was solely responsible for cooking, washing the dishes, or tidying up the rooms. However, she said: "Cooking or other household works is nothing if one did not send you to the field before the sunrise." Similarly, Saime as a non-worker who stayed in Turkey for five months told me: "Even if I could not make money in Turkey, I had a time to spend to myself. This was wonderful." Meryem stayed in Turkey for six months. Differently from Remziye and Saime, she worked in a

chicken industry. Although she worked outside home, her perception of "double burden" changed compared to that in Bulgaria. She did not receive any help for household works. However, she still believes that working from nine o'clock to five o'clock and working in less heavy jobs reduce the level of "double burden."

Fatma, Elfide, Mukaddes, Hayriye, and Mihriban could not continue to study after secondary school, and forced to work as tobacco workers under the communist regime in Bulgaria. Fatma stayed in Turkey for two and half months, and worked as a tailor. Elfide worked as a dishwasher in Turkey for fifteen months. While Mukaddes and Hayriye did not prefer to work in Turkey, Mihriban was a construction worker in Turkey. I will analyze their experiences both in Bulgaria and Turkey.

> It was compulsory to work in tobacco plantation. Our economic conditions were very bad before migrating to Turkey, but the possibility that the state provided us make money was very important. Actually, I would not want to work elsewhere because, in this period, there was an unkind relationship between Turks and Bulgarians, and, in the field, there were only Turks working. But, in Bulgaria, sometimes, I wanted to complain while cooking, because I was always tired as a tobacco worker. Complaining in Turkey could be my caprice because I worked as a tailor (Fatma).

> I had never been out of the village until migrating to Turkey. In the village, the only opportunity was to work in tobacco plantation. We had to support ourselves with the money that the government paid to us for tobacco that we processed. But in Turkey, the case was different. I worked as a dishwasher but I earned more money (Elfide).

In this regard, Elfide was not affected from "double burden" in Turkey. She said that: "The more you earn, the less you complain about household works." However, it is worth stressing that although they earned less, and they had financial difficulties during the communist regime, it may be said that the regime led to very beneficial policies. All interviewees agreed that health care services were very advanced under communism. For example, Elfide told me that she received treatments after her two pregnancies, and the government covered all the expenses.

Mukaddes as a tobacco worker during the communist regime said: "I stayed in Turkey for eighteen months. During this time, I observed women in Turkey.

Some women did not work, and I did not understand what did that mean. But I believe that it should be good."

> There were six people in the household; four children, my husband, and I. Before migrating to Turkey, our economic conditions were not in good shape. We scraped a living. I did not think about whether compulsory working good or bad. But I know that I would work if there was no such thing as compulsory working. In Turkey, my life was good. The only thing that I did was to looking after my grandchildren, cooking, and doing other routine works (Hayriye).

Mihriban's perception of "double burden" also changed, however, this time, in the opposite direction, because of the attitudes of Turks in Turkey towards her.

> In Bulgaria, I was a tobacco worker during the communist regime, and I had insurance. This is the most important thing for me. Now, I am retired. After migrating to Turkey, I worked in construction, but the boss employed me informally because I needed a job, because I was a migrant (Mihriban).

> Household works was always my responsibility both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. I have never taken it as offensive. Working gives me self-esteem, and I saw the power in myself to do everything. In Bulgaria, I had that power. But in Turkey, I did not get enough money for my work. This really affected me because I was reluctant against everything (Mihriban).

In the case of tobacco workers, we will see that the combination of being a tobacco worker and being solely responsible for household works led to what we may call "heavier double burden." However, in Turkey, Meryem, Fatma, and Elfide's cases show that working outside home but not as a tobacco worker reduces the heaviness of "double burden." Differently, Mihriban's experiences show that whether one is satisfied with the job or with the boss also affects one's perception of "double burden."

I will focus on the experiences of those who not only worked as tobacco workers but also worked in other jobs as a second job under the communist regime in Bulgaria. To be precise, if their financial difficulties continued in spite of working in tobacco plantation, they were allowed to work anywhere as a second job, which added one more burden to their lives in addition to "double burden." Bahise, Necmiye, Sebile, and Vildan worked in a conserve factory, in a textile factory, in a school as a janitor, and in a dairy industry in addition to working in a tobacco

plantation. While Necmiye has a high school degree, the rest have a secondary school degree.

> I worked in tobacco plantation and in a conserve factory. Working in a conserve factory was a very easy job compared to tobacco working. I wish I worked only in a conserve factory. When I was working in both tobacco plantation and in a conserve factory, even cooking was difficult for me (Bahise).
>
> Throughout my life, there was more than one burden [yük] on me. The communist regime compelled me to plant tobacco. Moreover, because of financial difficulties, I sold books; I worked as a librarian before getting married. After the marriage, it was only me who was responsible for childrearing and household works. If there were only childrearing and household works, I would not regard them as burdens, but I started to work in textile factory in addition to tobacco working. I could not even use maternity leave; only for six months I stayed at home after pregnancy, and, then, I started to work again. I had to (Necmiye).
>
> I had two jobs. One was working in tobacco, and the other was working as a school janitor. Planting tobacco was compulsory. If I stopped planting, they would fire me from the school. For lunch, I brought my daughters to the school because I had no opportunity to prepare a lunch for them. I had to look after my daughters, I had to tidy the house, I had to prepare the dinner, and I had to wash the dishes, so I had no social life. Sometimes, I returned home very late, and I was washing the clothes until midnight because I had no washing machine. My husband rarely helped me for childrearing but, even today, I do not know whether he helped me voluntarily (Sebile).
>
> After I finished secondary school, I could not continue to study. Then, the government assigned me two decares to plant tobacco. Then, I married at the age of seventeen. After getting married, I started to work on a dairy industry, and continued to work in tobacco. Nobody helped me for household works. It was very hard working (Vildan).
>
> I think women in Turkey were more emancipated than me because the regime did not force them to work outside home. I used to envy some women in Turkey who waited for their husbands' return from jobs. Of course, women should have a freedom of labor, but throughout my life I worked, and all household works were on my hands, which was the worst thing about compulsory working that prevented women from emancipation (Sebile).
>
> Of course earning money is very important. Everyone without exception, if they are capable, should work. But when I started to plant tobacco, I was fifteen years old. I have never experienced childhood because of compulsory working (Vildan).

Only Bahise was a non-worker after the immigration to Turkey. It is worth noting that being a non-worker was not her preference. Although some 1989-migrants said that the Turkish Government helped them finding a job, and made financial help, Bahise and her family did not receive financial help from the government. Sebile worked in a car factory. Necmiye and Vildan continued their occupational life by working in a textile factory. Vildan insisted that women should work, but neither as compulsory nor in two jobs at the same time.

Sebile said: "This time not the regime, but financial difficulties after migrating to Turkey forced me to work outside home. But there was nothing to complain about doing household works while working in only one job." Necmiye said:

> I worked in a textile factory in Bulgaria. So, I already knew the job. For six months, I was very comfortable with my workplace. But, then we returned, and I started to work in tobacco plantation in addition to working in a textile factory. There was nothing changed. So, I did household works. Still I do. I was relieved when I was retired (Necmiye).

Those who lived in downtown of Kardzhali did not work in tobacco plantation, but participated in the labor force by working in other branches of activity. Reyhan, Nebibe, Nazmiye, and Naime worked in a textile factory before migrating to Turkey. While Naime has a high school degree, the rest graduated from secondary school. After getting married, Nazmiye and her husband moved to the downtown. There, she started to work in a textile factory. Once again, Nazmiye's experiences shows that not being a tobacco worker reduces the perception of "double burden."

> If I lived in a village, I had to plant tobacco. But I knew that some of my colleagues went to plant tobacco after work. I was lucky that I did not work as tobacco worker because I could not cope with working in tobacco plantation in addition to childrearing and household works (Nazmiye).

Corresponding with compulsory working under the communist regime, Reyhan as a worker in a textile factory regarded it as the most beneficial policies of the government, considering the financial difficulties. Reyhan's words summarize how financial problems affected the perception of compulsory working under

communism. However, it is worth noting that Reyhan's family and her husband always helped her, especially when her children were very young. This is because, according to Reyhan, compulsory working was not an order of the regime but was a help of it.

> There was a reality that the communist regime forced everyone to work outside home. In my case, I may say that it was not the communist regime but financial difficulties that forced me to work. In this regard, communist regime helped me in terms of finding jobs (Reyhan).

Similar to Reyhan's experiences, some emphasized that their husbands did not regard the household work as a responsibility of women. This means that besides the type of job, receiving help form household members erases the traces of "double burden." Nebibe told me that:

> Not only during communism, my husband still helps me in terms of household works. Sometimes, he is preparing the dinner or washing the dishes. My family and me do not accept the division between women and men that predicted from women to do household works (Nebibe).

> I started to work very early, at the age of seventeen. Due to the fact that I was not at the lawful age, my workplace requested no objection certificate. I took it, and I started to work, in my opinion, when I was a child. In the same year, I got pregnant, and I worked until 45 days remained to the birth. For two years, I used paid maternity leave. After two years, unpaid maternity leave might be used for a year. But, I had to return to job because my husband's salary was not enough for a living (Naime).

In contrast to tobacco workers, Naime had a chance to use maternity leave for two years. Moreover, receiving help for household works changed her perception of "double burden."

> When I was working in a textile factory in Bulgaria, and then, in Turkey, my husband always helped me. But in Turkey, I quitted my job in a textile factory and started to work as a nanny. Working as a nanny was not a heavy job, and I did not request any help from him, and did not regard household works as burdens (Naime).

Mergül has a secondary school degree, and worked as a cook in a hospital during the communist regime. In Turkey, she started to work in a metal factory. She told me: "During the communist regime, in Turkey, and, now, my husband has helped me. Especially in Turkey, my husband helped more, because working in a

metal factory was more tiring." Very similar to Nebibe and Naime, and Mergül, Aygül who has a university degree, and manages a boutique hotel with her husband in Madrets now, stated:

> My husband is always supporter of me. According to me, migration was a trauma that led to many difficulties, and we overcame together. My husband looked after our children, prepared meals for them when I was very busy. So was I. He still does, I still do. Opening a hotel here was my idea, but for months we discussed whether "we" could do. We share all the responsibilities of this life (Aygül).

Gülümser has an associate degree, and was a pre-school teacher under the communist regime in Bulgaria. It is worth reminding the reader that in the very beginning of this section, I said that being a tobacco worker limited the usage of maternity leave. Gülümser's case justifies this claim. Gülümser, a pre-school teacher in Bulgaria, used paid maternity leave for two years, and for a year, she took unpaid maternity leave. As is seen, whether women used maternity leave effectively is very much related to the economic conditions of the family.

I will address whether the women in question faced discrimination in their workplace environment because of their gender, as well as ethnic identity. One of the tobacco workers, Bahise, said that in tobacco working there was no discrimination against women. As she told, women and men were equal in terms of salaries. However, she confirmed that in other line of occupations, women tended to work on jobs, which was regarded as "more suitable" for women as is mentioned in the previous section. Tobacco workers also did not face discrimination related to their ethnic identity, because there were no Bulgarians in their workplaces. The experiences of others who worked with Bulgarians vary. Naime who lived among Bulgarians, and worked in a textile factory talked about the attitude of her employer when the "Revival Process" started:

> My colleagues were mostly Bulgarians. The Bulgarian employer called me when the "Revival Process" started, and said that "Don't panic, be calm, and please accept your new name." I accepted my new name, and I did not face any problem. (Naime).

> I planted tobacco. I also worked in a tobacco shop. In the field, I was working with Turks; but in the shop, my colleagues were Bulgarian. There was no

> problem between my Bulgarian colleagues and me. We grew together; even the government did not have the power to change the relationship between us (Mihriban).

On the other hand, Nazmiye argued that the "Revival Process" changed the nature of the relationship between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks, and, in opposition to Naime and Mihriban, she talked about how the "Revival Process" affected her family and occupational life.

> Those who lived in Turkish villages might support each other during the "Revival Process" but we did not have this opportunity. We were alone in the downtown. For example, my children's Bulgarian friends from their school overheard us, and informed the authorities that we speak Turkish in our private sphere. My children were punished in the school by standing on one foot. In my workplace, I can say that the discrimination related to our ethnic identity started with the "Revival Process." Before it, we were friends (Nazmiye).

> I was exposed to discrimination not because I was a woman, but because I was a Turk. Not only in my occupational life, but also, for example, in hospitals, I faced discrimination. Doctors' behaviors were changing when they realized that I was a Turk. It is true that the "Revival Process" was very effective on this (Sebile).

> We migrated in 1984. Before the migration, I worked as a cook in a hospital. I had no problems with my colleagues and the employer. Everyone loved me. As far as I knew from my friends who lived in Bulgaria during the "Revival Process," they had difficulties. It was very hard to believe for me how our friendly relationship transformed into hostility by the government (Mergül).

In this regard, I will focus on Mukaddes's words, which touch me deeply. She told me that Bulgarian friends saw them as their siblings, so did they. She focused that after the name changing campaign, this situation did not change. Even their Bulgarian neighbors cried when the government forced them to migrate. Similarly, Vildan talked about occupational as well as social life:

> I worked in the dairy industry, and the majority of my colleagues were Bulgarian. There were no problems between us. They even looked after my children; they prepared meal for them. They saw me as their daughter. Moreover, I was awarded in the factory. My occupational life was perfect. But, in my social life, I faced difficulties. For example, I was doing shopping, and asked something in Bulgarian to the shop assistant. She said, "You speak Turkish." She took me to the police station. I did not convince them that I was speaking Bulgarian. So, I paid fine (Vildan).

Last of all, I asked about their thoughts on women's participation in the labor force. All interviewees agreed that women should work because it is very important for gaining self-esteem and "becoming emancipated." However, it is very paradoxical to be obliged to make a choice between "being non-emancipated" and experiencing "double burden."

As a result, the interviewees' experiences show that their level of education and where they lived in Bulgaria during communism (i.e., whether they lived in the downtown of Kardzhali or in villages of Kardzhali) partly determined where they worked. Those who had lower level of education and lived in villages of Kardzhali mostly worked in tobacco plantation. In general, not receiving any help from household members for household works led to "double burdenbut in the case of tobacco workers, this led to "heavier double burden," due to the fact that working in tobacco plantation is one of the most difficult occupations. As is mentioned, maternity leave was one of the most significant gains for working women that communism provided. However, the experiences of tobacco workers indicates that they could not use maternity leave for two full years, because of certain financial difficulties. On the other hand, Gülümser's experiences show that using maternity leave is also very much related to social class. Tobacco workers in question said that they did not feel that they were exposed to "double burden" in Turkey, because they worked in less heavier jobs with more salary, which reduced their perception of "double burden." However, being informally employed in Turkey has reduced the level of "double burden" in Bulgaria, as we have seen in the experiences of Mihriban – this, even though she was a tobacco worker. Those who had to work in two jobs during communism even experienced "triple burden." Even though they did not receive any help for household works from their husbands in Turkey, it is worth noting that working in one job also reduces the level of "double burden" for them. Moreover, not being a tobacco worker also has an effect on the perception of "double burden." Those who did not work as tobacco workers did not complain about being solely resposible for household works. Moreover, the meaning of

compulsory work also changed among the interviewees. According to Reyhan, for example, compulsory work was the most important advantage of working in the communist regime, considering financial difficulties. However, she might think so because she was not soley responsible for household works.

This section has mainly focused on how my interviewees perceived "double burden" on the two sides of the border. In the next chapter, I will analyze how, in addition to the working experiences on the two sides of the border, my interviewees' migration status (i.e., voluntarily or not) affected their decision of return to Bulgaria and their perception of homeland (i.e., whether they perceive Turkey or Bulgaria as their homeland.)

CHAPTER 5

BEYOND "DOUBLE BURDEN"

In the previous chapter, I have analyzed the construction of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's self-identity under the communist regime in Bulgaria, and after their immigration to Turkey, by focusing on their work experiences. However, as I realized after conducting my fieldwork in Bulgaria, the construction of their self-identity in Turkey was not only related to being a worker, wife, and mother; their self-identity was also constructed via their *legal* or *illegal* status as immigrants, the very status that was assigned to them by the state. Therefore, in the next section, I will focus on how their migration experiences affected the construction of their self-identity as *soydaş*, *legal* immigrant or *illegal* immigrant.

In "Being a Voluntary Emigrant or Involuntary Emigrant" section, I will elaborate on the experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women after returning to Bulgaria. In this section, we will see that the interviewees are divided into two groups in terms of their *voluntary* or *involuntary* return. Some of them returned to Bulgaria voluntarily, and the rest experienced the involuntary return migration. This section will be important for questioning "conventional social scientific accounts" by doing "ethnography of the particular." This is because if those who did not find in their hearts the desire to return are ignored, these migration waves can easily be regarded as voluntary return migration due to the fact that *their family members did not force them physically* to return to Bulgaria. More importantly, since the focus is women, I propose to do the "ethnography of the particular," especially in the Turkish context because of its patriarchal structure. That is, many times men's decision would be seen as the families' decision, making us believe that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women migrated voluntarily even though some of these women

did not want to return – hence the need to make a distinction between *individual* and *familial* migration and the need to focus on *particulars*. This section is also very important to understand their self-identity construction, because their voluntary or involuntary return will help me analyze how they see themselves in the country they are currently living in.

In this sense, in the last section, "Being a Native or Foreigner," I will problematize the term *homeland*. This is because after I asked about whether the immigrants in question returned to Bulgaria voluntarily or involuntarily, I realized that those who returned voluntarily regard their homeland as Bulgaria. On the other hand, for involuntary emigrants, Turkey is their homeland. In this section, "ethnography of the particular" will not only illuminates the differences between the interviewees about their perception of homeland but also shows the uncertainty of the definition of the homeland.

5.1. Being a *Soydaş*, Legal Immigrant, or Illegal Immigrant

Immigrants pass through some phases. The first one is settlement. Once the immigrant settled in the host country, they are expected to be assimilated. Then, the immigrants reach the last phase, which is to become a citizen (Volpp, 2004: 1595). However, these phases are valid only for *legal* immigrants. As Leti Volpp argues, "this social experience is accompanied by a teleology of legal categorization, whereby the immigrant is first lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, and then naturalizes to become a citizen" (Ibid.). On the other hand, as Linda S. Bosniak says, those who have settled in the host country without authorization, work in there without permission, or continue to live in the host country although their visas expired, are regarded as *illegal* immigrants (1991: 742).

In this sense, analysts and policy makers see illegal immigration as unarguably constituting a problem such that illegal immigrants are viewed in many studies as undesirable individuals (Luibhéid, 2008: 291). That is, they are isolated "from larger structural processes and long histories of inequality, and are instead individualized" (Ibid.). Very similarly, Jonathan Xavier Inda says that policy

analysts, social scientists, immigration reform organizations, and even the public have a huge role in the construction of illegal immigrants as "imprudent, unethical subjects incapable of exercising responsible self-government and thus as threats to the overall well-being of the social body" (2006: 21).

More importantly, while an illegal immigrant is constructed as an "undesirable person," a legal immigrant defined as "a sign of individual good character" (Luibhéid, 2008: 291). The crucial fact is, in these constructions, the role of the "structural advantage" is ignored (Ibid.). Illegal immigrants should not simply be regarded as referring to a particular type of person; instead, it is important to focus on illegality as a type of status that is assigned to certain individuals by certain centers of power, such as the state (Ibid. :292). As Mae M. Ngai says:

> Illegal alienage is not a natural or fixed condition but the product of positive law; it is contingent and at times it is unstable. The line between legal and illegal status can be crossed in both directions. An illegal alien can, under certain conditions, adjust his or her status and become legal and hence eligible for citizenship. And legal aliens who violate certain laws can become illegal and hence expelled and, in some cases, forever barred from reentry and the possibility of citizenship (2004: 6).

What was the "structural advantage" of Bulgarian Turks that led to their reception in Turkey as *soydaş?* Simply, their structural advantage was their migrating to Turkey via the 1989-mass exodus. Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister, set forth his final opinion by saying "Come all," which rendered them *soydaş* returning their *homeland* (Danış & Parla, 2009: 139). However, the mid 1990s is very crucial to see the changing attitude of Turkey towards Bulgarian Turks who were defined as *soydaş* by the state and invited to their *homeland* only a few years ago (Ibid. :142). In other words, *soydaşlık* seems a very flexible term that changes in accordance with Turkey's political landscape.

As is mentioned in Chapter 3, on August 22, 1989, Turkish government closed the border, and imposed a visa requirement on Bulgarian Turks, although Özal once said, "You are welcome here. Our border is open and will stay open until all the Turks in Bulgaria come home to Turkey" (Zang, 1989: 53). After the closing of the borders, many Bulgarian Turks decided to apply to the visa to cross the border.

However, the government aimed to prevent the entrance of Bulgarian Turks by making difficult to receive the visa, which triggered that many Bulgarian Turks decided to enter Turkey via illegal ways (Danış & Parla, 2009: 142). Moreover, the fall of the communist regime affected Bulgaria's economy badly, which simultaneously influenced Bulgarian Turks who stayed in Bulgaria. Therefore, many of them decided to migrate to Turkey in the hope of finding jobs (Ibid.). As a result, approximately 200,000 Turks and Pomaks crossed the border via illegal ways between 1993 and 1996 (Ibid.: 139). Then, the ministry of interior, Meral Akşener, issued a circular on 20 January 1997, which proposed that 400,000 *soydaş* who crossed the border via visa application, and continued to stay in Turkey after their visas were expired would be deported (Milliyet, 19.02.1997). Akşener supported this circular by arguing that it would obstruct another new and "unseen migration" [gizli göç] wave from Bulgaria to Turkey[25]. Even though this circular was not brought into force (Milliyet, 26.02.1997), it shows the flexibility of the term *soydaş*.

Firstly, I will focus on the experiences of those who migrated to Turkey after 1989-mass exodus via visa application. Secondly, I will elaborate on the situation of a Bulgarian Turkish immigrant woman, Elfide, who was considered an illegal immigrant by the state. Such a classification between *legal* and *illegal* immigration is crucial, because this classification that was done by the state affected the life of the immigrants by determining whether they are suitable or not to receive financial help from the state. However, it is worth noting that the perception of *soydaşlık* also changed in itself among the immigrants of 1989-mass exodus; while some of them received financial help from the state, some did not. As is seen in Table 1, twelve of the interviewees migrated via 1989-mass exodus[26]. For example, Gülümser stayed in Turkey for three months, and did not receive financial help form the Turkish Government. As will be seen in the next section, lack of financial help played a

[25] For more detail, see, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem20/yil2/bas/b060m.htm

[26] Gülümser, Bahise, Reyhan, Fatma, Remziye, Saime, Meryem, Necmiye, Sebile, Mihriban, Nazmiye, and Naime migrated in 1989 via mass-exodus.

significant role in Gülümser's decision of return. Very similarly, Reyhan, during her stay in Turkey for two months, could not receive help from the state. Sebile told me that "Only our relatives helped us after migrating to Turkey." Bahise, Saime, and Mihriban were also forgotten by the government in terms of financial help, which is, very important for the new start after migration. On the other hand, Fatma, Remziye, Meryem, Necmiye, Nazmiye, and Naime received financial help from the Turkish Government. This help covered the house rent.

Vildan is one of those who could not migrated to Turkey via 1989-mass exodus. She migrated to Turkey in December 1989; 4 months after the borders were closed. She told me that her seventeen years old son did not have a passport when they decided to migrate. Although her son applied for passport, he obtained it after the borders were closed. Then, they applied for visa. Vildan summarizes this experience by saying that "it was very hard to cross the border in every few months. Then, I do not know what happened, but we were granted with citizenship. Even so, being in a tight situation was so painful." Similarly, Mukaddes and her family's passports were prepared a day after the borders were closed. As she said: "My daughter migrated in 1989, and one day separated us." Hayriye had a passport, but could not cross the border because of huge masses on the border, and she said: "For weeks, we waited for crossing the border. Then, Turkey closed the border, and we applied for visa." Nebibe could not migrate in the mass-exodus because her eighteen years old son had to do his military service. Thus, he could not apply for passport. Those who had enough money to apply for the visa may not be regarded as *soydaş*, but they would be regarded as *legal*, and after a while, they would be granted with citizenship (except Mukaddes). However, what is the situation of those who did not have enough money to apply for the visa?

Elfide migrated to Turkey in 1990 via illegal ways; that is, she lost her choice to be defined as *soydaş* with a year. When I asked her why she could not migrate to Turkey via the 1989-mass exodus, she told me that Turkey closed its borders. She insisted that she and her husband could not live in Bulgaria because of the

oppression of the Bulgarian government as well as financial difficulties. Moreover, she did not have enough money to apply for the visa. Therefore, trying illegal ways to cross the border was the only chance for them. What she said to me was: "We [she and her husband] made a decision, then I went to the backroom, and started to prepare our bag." Elfide stayed in Turkey for fifteen months, and worked as a dishwasher. For a while, she worked as a cleaner:

> Since I am not a citizen of Turkey, since I could not apply for the visa, the only chance for me was to work as a dishwasher, or a cleaner. I could not get a job with social security benefits. But I was content with working in those jobs. Actually, working as a dishwasher or a cleaner was much more better than working in tobacco plantation (Elfide).

Elfide, after fifteen months in Turkey, was forced to return to Bulgaria because her and her family's *illegal* situation in Turkey became an obstacle in front of their lives.

> I left my house in Bulgaria. This could be traumatic, but when I crossed the border, I thought that I would live in Turkey. This thought made me feel good. I knew that I would have difficulties in Turkey. Of course I knew that it would not be easy to begin a new life in Turkey. But it was not important. For a year, in spite of difficulties that I faced, I was happy in Turkey. But, my husband became sick. If we went to the hospital, we made huge amount of payment to the hospital because we were not citizens of Turkey. Firstly, my husband returned. I waited for three months. I wrongly believed that the government saw the situation of the illegal immigrants. Then, I too returned to Bulgaria, in 1992 (Elfide).

Thus, their so-called illegality, which is defined by the state, may lead to exploitation, and this exploitation may cause illness, or even death. As Nicholas P. De Genova claims, the contradiction between undocumented immigrants' physical and social presence as a result of the official definition of them as *illegal* led to the social space of illegality, which means:

> The social space of "illegality" is an erasure of legal personhood – a space of forced visibility, exclusion, subjugation, and repression that materializes around the undocumented wherever they go in the form of real effects ranging from hunger to unemployment (or more typically, severe exploitation) to violence to death – that is nonetheless always already confounded by their substantive social personhood (De Genova, 2002: 427).

To conclude, those who had a chance to migrate in 1989 were seen as *soydaş*, and as a result of this recognition, they were granted with citizenship. Moreover, 1989-migrants received help from the government. For example, Nazmiye (1989-immigrant) told me that the government subsidized housing for a year. Similarly, Sebile who was also a 1989-immigrant said that the government helped her find a job, and, for a while, made food aid. This indicates that the government embraced them as citizens, who began to perceive themselves as citizens. Those who migrated via visa application had difficulties for a while, but, at the end, they received the Turkish citizenship. However, the so-called illegal immigrants were forced into isolation by the state. In other words, *soydaşlık* is neither about race or ethnicity, nor about blood or descent, but about the arbitrary will of the state. This is the reason why we should focus on particulars while conducting the fieldwork. It is important to analyze not only the situation of those who were regarded as *soydaş* or those who were seen as *legal* immigrants, but also we should elaborate on the situation of those who were considered *illegal* immigrants. Otherwise, we became statist because their status as *soydaş*, *legal*, or *illegal* was constituted via state policies. Therefore, we should refer to all kind of statuses that were assigned to them by the state, and focusing on particulars was the only possible way for analyzing these statutes. This is because I did interviews with 1989-immigrants and post-1990 legal immigrants as well as post-1990 so-called illegal immigrants for analyzing their self-identity constructions. Being a citizen, being a legal immigrant, or being an illegal immigrant are very important self-identity constructions because how they were perceived by the public affected how they perceived themselves in the host-country or in their homeland.

5.2. Being a Voluntary Emigrant or Involuntary Emigrant

As Jean-Pierre Cassarino (2004) puts forth, there are different approaches in conceptualizing return migration. It is possible to classify these approaches thus: "the neoclassical approach," "the new economics of labour migration approach," and "the structural approach." According to "the neoclassical approach," return

migration has negative connotations (Mensah, 2016: 305). That is, return migration is, on the one hand, related to one's experience of failure in the host country. On the other hand, if the immigrant says he or she did not fail in anything, the assumption is that the earnings did not meet the expectations' of the immigrant, and, therefore, he or she decided to return to his or her country of origin (Cassarino, 2004: 255). In accordance with "new economics of labour migration approach," return migration is seen "in a positive light" (Mensah, 2016: 305). Thus, as Cassarino says, "new economics of labour migration views return migration as the logical outcome of a 'calculated strategy,' defined at the level of the migrant's household, and resulting from the successful achievement of goals and target" (2004: 255). That is, in "new economics of labour migration approach," the immigrants decision of return results from their economic success in the host country and from their expectation that they would live in prosperity in their home country thanks to their former economic gains (Constant & Massey, 2002: 11).

By acknowledging the economic side of return migration, "the structural approach" argues that comprehending one's return to one's country of origin is not that easy, and should not only be based on personal experiences but also on "situational and structural factors" (Cassarino, 2004: 257). To explain this, I will focus on Francesco P. Cerase's study. Cerase (1974) divided returnees into four groups: "return of failure," "return of conservatism," "return of retirement," and "return of innovation." Acording to Cerase, the first type of returnees were not integrated to the host country, and, therefore returned to their country of origin. The second type also refers to those who were not integrated to the host country; however, differently from the first type of returnees, they decided to return to their home country with money to support themselves after their return to the home country (Cerase, 1974: 254). The third one includes returnees who decided to return after their retirement to enjoy their retirement in their home country. Cerase claims that retired returnees "look upon their return as the beginning of the last stage of their life" (Ibid.: 257). The last group of returnees is innovators. They returned to

their home country with the opportunity that the host country provides to them new abilities or new means. With these new abilities and means, their aim is to reach the intended life standard in their home countries (Ibid.: 251). As a result, "the structural approach" is very important due to the the fact that it provides wholistic understanding in analyzing the reasons of return (Mensah, 2016: 305).

However, whether or not these approaches successfully give an account of the reasons of return, they share a characteristic, which makes them limited. As Esi Akyere Mensah claims, these approaches assume that when immigrants decide to return to the country of origin, this return is voluntary (Ibid.). To conceptualize a return as voluntary, according to IOM (2012), it should be based on a *voluntary decision.*

> The concept of voluntary return requires more than an absence of coercive factors. A voluntary decision is defined by the absence of any physical, physchological, or material coercion but in addition, the decision is based on adequate, available, accurate, and objective information (IOM, 2012: 8).

In this regard, "the structural approach" and the others are not enough to understand the experiences of involuntary emigrants. This is because, following IOM's definition, individual decision without any coercion is important in determining whether a return migration is voluntary or not. My interviewees, according to their type of return to Bulgaria, are divided into two groups: voluntary emigrants and involuntary emigrants. Firstly, I will elaborate on voluntary emigrants' return migration experiences. Since they are voluntary emigrants, their experiences may be analyzed through "the neoclassical approach," "the new economics of labour migration approach," or "the structural approach." Secondly, I will elaborate on involuntary emigrants' experiences, which could not be analyzed through these three approaches. This means that to make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary return migration is crucial.

Gülümser is a voluntary emigrant. As a matter of fact, her experience of Turkey is the shortest one among my interviewees. She stayed in Turkey for three weeks. Although she migrated to Turkey via 1989-mass exodus, she complained

that she did not receive any financial help from the Turkish Government, contrary to the popular opinion that each *soydaş* received financial help from the Turkish Government after their migration to Turkey.

> In İzmir, there is a park called *Hasanağa Bahçesi.* The Turkish Government prepared a place for the immigrants to stay there. For three weeks, we slept there. The place that we stayed was very crowded. The Government did not make money help, but gave us food and a bed. But those three weeks were very traumatic. Then, some of the immigrants started to return. I talked with my husband about our childrens' future, and decided to return. We could not make a good life in Turkey (Gülümser).
>
> Starting from my early ages, they taught me that my homeland is Turkey. When the Turkish Government opened the door, we migrated. But we could not settle there. One of my relatives lived in İstanbul, and he said that he would help us. They did not. We could not find a home, we could not find a job. To make matters worse, I got pregnant. We stayed in a single room for a while, and then decided to return. After this decision, one of the neighbors told me the following: "You are Bulgarians." We are not. We just did not want to starve, and our so-called homeland did not meet our expectations (Bahise).
>
> There are two reasons why we returned to Bulgaria. Actually the first one is not very important. I could not adapt to Turkey. I had more freedom in Bulgaria, but I could get used to this. The second reason is about the economic conditions. Although the Turkish Government made financial help to us, it was not enough. We could not meet the educational costs of our daughters, and we returned (Fatma).
>
> We migrated without thinking what we would find there. My children worked, but they could not earn enough money. No one supported us, even the Turkish Government. My brother's son lived in İzmir, but he did not helped us. How could we survive without money (Saime)?
>
> It was very hard to live in Bulgaria between 1984 and 1989. We migrated via mass exodus. We stayed in Turkey for seventeen years. The Government did not make financial help. To make money, I worked in constructions. But I earned very less. I was not an insured employee. One day, when my husband and I talked, we were aware that we were old. In that time, we realized that working without insurance could make a trouble for us. Let's say we became sick, and we had to go to hospital. What can we do without insurance and without money? We returned. I am retired now, the Bulgarian Government pays my pension regularly (Mihriban).

The quotations above show that "the neoclassical approach" is suitable to analyze the return experiences of Gülümser, Bahise, Fatma, Saime, and Mihriban as voluntary emigrants. However, in some cases, as we will see below, "the neo-

classical approach" is not enough to comprehend the reasons of return. In this regard, "the structural approach" may help to analyze the return experiences of those who returned not because of financial difficulties, but because of some other triggering effects, such as retirement, as in the case of Vildan, and Naime.

> Here [i.e., Bulgaria] is the place where I was born. Yes, very bad things happened during the communist regime, and affected us. But some things do not change. I migrated via visa application, and for about ten years we did not come to Bulgaria. Then, we came here for applying to double citizenship. We took it. After ten years, I realized that I missed Bulgaria. We waited for five years for retirement, and, then, we returned permanently (Vildan).

> According to me, living in Bulgaria is always easier than living in Turkey. Maybe I say this because the "Revival Process" were not affected me. All aside, I knew one thing, that is, the communist regime gave me opportunities to improve myself. We decided to return but, first of all, we should have retired. Not only my husband but also I worked hard in Turkey, and with the money that we earned in Turkey, we constituted a good life in Bulgaria. We built this house. Now we enjoy our retirement by growing vegetables in this peaceful nature (Naime).

The experiences of Remziye, Reyhan, and Aygül are not suitable to analyze with "the neo-classical approach", "the new economics of labour migration approach", and "the structural approach." The reasons of their return includes: missing the place where one was born, not desiring to be a member of a divided family, and providing children with a better life.

> The life in Turkey was easier than the one in Bulgaria. I did not work outside home, the Turkish State supported us financially, and my children found jobs. But we might have loved the most difficult one: living in Bulgaria as a Turk. We returned, we missed this place where I was born, where I got married, where my children grew up (Remziye).

> We could not stand the oppression of the Bulgarian Government. My family and I migrated via 1989-mass exodus. In that time, my sister was married. She and her family could not cross the border while entering to Turkey, because the border was closed. For two months, we waited them. They could not come. Not only migrating to Turkey but also returning to Bulgaria economically affected us. But we wanted to return because we did not want a divided family. (Reyhan).

> We [i.e., my husband and I] worked in Turkey, and, in fact we earned enough money for living. But there were many cultural differences between those who lived in Turkey and us. We could not adapt to the life style in Turkey. After ten

> years, we returned for our children's future. We want to provide our children with a better and free life. We guess we did (Aygül).

However, every return is not voluntary. To analyze whether a return is voluntary or not, it is crucial to focus on "individual experiences and propensities that are virtually impossible to measure" (Black et. al., 2004: 12). This impossibility may be the reason why there is a strong tendency in the return migration literature to turn return migration into something objectively measurable, such as asylum-seeking. That is, there is a strong tendency to identify involuntary migrants (or forced migrants) with refugees, or with labour migrants who are affected from a political crisis or persecution in the host country (See, Blitz et. al., 2005; Chimni, 2004; Kleist, 2017; Schreuder; 1996; Van Hear, 1995; Webber, 2011). After all, whether one is a refugee or not is comparatively easier to determine than determining whether one is an involuntary emigrant or not. This is also the reason why some writers formulated a new category called "non-voluntary return" to understand the situation of refugees with respect to whether they are affected, for example, from xenophobic media in the host country, which may play a significant role in their decision of return (Blitz et. al., 2005: 197). To be clear, As Barry N. Stein puts forth:

> Refugees strive for an outcome that achieves relative security and some small degree of control over their lives. Other forces, however, particularly in the country of asylum, increasingly are trying to influence refugee decision-making and limit its voluntary character through pressure, harassment, and direct violence. Although refugee decision-making is under unprecedented pressure, refugees retain a modicum of choice (Stein, 1997: 2).

Nevertheless, Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women who returned to Bulgaria *involuntarily*, were not refugees. This means that their decisions of return were not affected by the xenophobic attitudes towards them in Turkey, or by the political conditions of Turkey. Given that Bulgarian Turks' decision of return were mostly taken in their families, it is crucial to make a distinction, not between refugees and involuntary migrants but between individual and familial decisions, to undestand the return experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women. Making

such a distinction however, makes it even more difficult to understand whether their decision of return was voluntary or not in contrast to refugee' decision. Specifically, the decision of return to Bulgaria was taken by their family members, and mostly by their husbands. At first, it may seem that their decision of return was voluntary due to the fact that none of the interviewees was physically forced to return to Bulgaria[27]. However, the quotations below show that they were silenced, i.e., they were emotionally forced to return to Bulgaria by their family members when the return decision was taken without considering the feelings of wives, mothers, or daughters. Therefore, we need to make a distinction between individual and familial decision in order to understand whether they voluntarily returned to Bulgaria, or not. To make a distinction between individual and familial decision is only possible when we focus on individuals' particular experiences. When we do not focus on particulars, i.e., when we do not do "ethnography of the particular," when we may assume that their familial decision is identical with each individual's decision, we can easily overlook their being not physically but emotionally forced. Moreover, ignoring this in analyzing their return may lead us to conclude, once and for all, that Bulgarian Turks' return to Bulgaria was voluntary. In this sense, "ethnography of the particular" gives us subjective answers, i.e., individual-oriented, instead of clear-cut generalizations about the return of Bulgarian Turks.

Moreover, making a distinction, or being attentive to the distinction, between voluntary and involuntary migration, between asylum-seeking and emotionally forced migration, and between individual and familial migration, is especially important when we consider the fact that the assumption that non-refugee migrants are voluntary immigrants (or emigrants) is made not only in the literature of return migration. That is, making clear-cut generalizations is not confined to migration studies. It is possible to find similar assumptions and generalizations in the minority right disccusions. Hence, at the expense of

[27] I preferred to use "forced" because the definition of "forced return," according to IOM, is "return that is not undertaken by the individual voluntarily" (2012: 7).

digressing from the main topic of this thesis, I will briefly focus on the theory of one of the most important, if not the most important, name in minority rights discussions, namely Will Kymlicka before presenting the return experiences of my interviewees, as well as how their experiences cannot be understood if we assume that they are either voluntary migrants or forced refugees.

From Will Kymlicka's perspective, minorities may be divided into two groups: "national minorities" and "ethnic groups" or "immigrants." By nation, Kymlicka understands "a historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture" (Kymlicka, 1995: 11). Therefore, by national minorities, Kymlicka refers to members of "incorporated cultures." That is, in the case of national minorities, "cultural diversity arises from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into larger state" (Ibid.: 10). Such minorities "typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture" (Ibid.). According to Kymlicka, national minorities should maintain their distinctive culture, and, therfore, they should be granted the right to "various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies" (Ibid.). However, ethnic groups are formed out of individual *and* familial immigration. Such groups usually "wish to integrate into the larger society, and to be accepted as full members of it" (Ibid.: 10-11). This does not mean that they should not have minority rights. However, they should not have self-government rights. That is, they should not have the right to the preservation of their distinct culture. Rather, they should be integrated into the dominant majority, but with the aid of immigrants rights, such as bilingual education rights, that facilitate their integration without having to shed their cultural specificity. For Kymlicka, the reason why immigrants have no right to preserve their distinct culture, but many legitimately integrated into the culture of host country, is that they *voluntarily* left their culture, and *voluntarily* immigrate to the host country (Ibid.: 96). However, I argue that it is not easy to define any migration as voluntary migration without focusing on the

particulars. It is also not easy to make a distinction between immigrants and national minorities.

Before focusing on the uncertainty of voluntary migration, firstly, I aim to focus on the uncertainty of the distinction between national minorities and immigrants. As Seyla Benhabib points out, Kymlicka's distinction between national minorities and immigrants is not always clear. For example, Puerto Rican immigrants in New York are neither immigrants nor national minorities, but both. This is because Puerto Rico was incorporated into the United States. Hence, Puerto Ricans became a national minority of the United States. Then, with the immigration waves from Puerto Rico to some cities such as New York, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angles, or via seasonal labor migration, as well as intermarriages between Spanish-speaking communities and Central Americans, "Puerto Ricans have become one of the largest ethnic immigrant groups in the United States, and not just a territorially 'bounded national minority'" (Benhabib, 2002: 62). Therefore it is necessary to focus on particulars to determine whether an individual Puerto Rican is an immigrant or a national minority.

The same may be said for the case of Bulgarian Turks. The question is whether they are immigrants or national minorities in Bulgaria. Starting with the Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans, ethnic Turks were placed on the Bulgarian land. They lived in "a given territory or homeland" for generations. Thus, they have a common history. Moreover, they are part of "concentrated" cultures, and their culture was based on a "shared language." In addition, they are "more or less institutionally complete." This shows that ethnic Turks are a national minority in Bulgaria. However, they were forced to emigrate, especially in 1989. But, then, some of the emigrants decided to return to Bulgaria, mostly after the collapse, and became immigrants who are also members of a national minority community. That is, it is *sine qua non* to focus on individual Bulgarian Turkish immigrant woman to analyze whether she is a national minority or an immigrant in Bulgaria. To conclude, the distinction between ethnic minorities and national minorities is not unambiguous.

Secondly, Kymlicka's assumption that immigrants *voluntarily* choose to leave the country they were born into is problematic. He argues that there is always an opportunity for the immigrants "to stay in their original culture."

> The expectation of integration is not unjust, I believe, so long as immigrants had the option to stay in their original culture. Given the connection between choice and culture which I sketched earlier, people should be able to live and work in their own culture. But like any other right, this right can be waived, and immigration is one way of waving one's right. In deciding to uproot themselves, immigrants voluntarily relinquish some of the rights that go along with their original national membership (Kymlicka, 1995: 96).

However, it is not always easy to say this. For example, many people in the world face poverty in their original cultures, and they leave their homeland for a better life (Young, 1997: 50). In this sense, these kinds of migration waves cannot be regarded as voluntary, even though nobody literally forces these people to immigrate. The quotations cited below that presents the results of my fieldwork show this ambiguity. For the Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's case, it should be asked: Supposing that they are immigrants, did they voluntarily return to Bulgaria?

Necmiye and Meryem are two of the involuntary emigrants. They stayed in Turkey for only six months, and, then, returned to Bulgaria[28]. Necmiye says that the reason of their return to Bulgaria was irrational. The reason was the accident that her mother-in-law and father-in-law had in Turkey. She told me about her emotional distress and of feeling emotionally forced to return without having a say in return decision of her mother-in-law and father-in-law. In her words, "Having an accident affected them psychologically, which left me helpless. I could not express my opinion about the return." In Meryem's case, it may be said that not only Meryem but also her husband could not withstand the patriarchal family while the decision of return to Bulgaria was taken by the elders. Her mother and her father with the support of her mother-in-law and father-in-law changed Meryem's and her

[28] Their return experiences will be mentioned in detail in the next section, "Being a Native or Foreigner."

family's life by deciding that they should return to Bulgaria. They could not resist their parents' decision out of respect. In such cases, it is difficult to say their decision was voluntary. However, it was also not involuntary, if we take involuntary to mean forced as in the case of refugees.

> After we emigrated from Bulgaria, I thought that I would stay in Turkey till I die. However, my husband decided to return here [i.e., Bulgaria] after a while. I was stumped and tried to change his mind by saying that his children were next to him. I asked the reasons for his decision; he did not tell the reasons but he said one thing, which rendered me helpless. He said that if I did not want to return [to Bulgaria] with him, I would stay in Turkey. How was this possible? My husband was sick and I could not leave him alone. You asked me whether I wanted to return to Bulgaria. My answer is; I did not want to return but I had to (Hayriye).
>
> We [i.e., my husband and I] returned to Bulgaria in 2011, and we have double citizenship. Actually, this changes nothing because my husband decided to return after being retired. We are rarely going to Turkey, just for visiting because he sold our house in Turkey. After migrating to Turkey, I worked very hard and this should be the time to enjoy in my *homeland* [i.e., Turkey]. But I could not resist my husband's decision (Nazmiye).
>
> We [i.e., my family and I] migrated to Turkey via visa application. My son had difficulties in his workplace. He could not adapt, and, then, he fired. It was already very difficult to adapt to a new environment. In addition to this, being fired made him depressed. He said that: "Please, let's go to Bulgaria." What could we [my husband and I] say? Then, we returned to Bulgaria. Only eighteen months we lived in Turkey, but I am not annoyed with him. He is my son. But I missed Turkey (Mukaddes).
>
> My husband told me that we should have a house in Bulgaria for our children's future. We bought a house here. At first, we mostly stayed in Turkey. Four years ago, he decided to rent our house in İzmir. When I wanted to return, I could not. There were tenants. Last year, he sold the house. The only house that we have is this house. So, there is no opportunity to go beyond from here (Nebibe).
>
> I am fifty-two years old, and I spent half of my life in Turkey [i.e., twenty-eight years.] When my husband decided to return, I was working, and he was retired. I guess he wanted to go to Bulgaria for enjoying his retirement. He wanted from me to leave the work. My job in Turkey was really tiring. But I earned money, which gave me self-esteem. Moreover, twenty-eight years means that I adapted to Turkey. After return to Bulgaria, a new adaptation process started for me. Worse, I am waiting for my retirement age to come at home (Mergül).

As is mentioned in Chapter 3, many Bulgarian Turks decided to return to Bulgaria[29]. If I did not ask whether Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women with whom I did interviews "really" wanted to return to Bulgaria, I could easily argue that all of them returned to Bulgaria voluntarily or, at least, that they participated in the decision of return, considering that none of the interviewees *were physically forced* to return to Bulgaria by their family members, specifically by their husbands. Moreover, they were not refugees, nor were they threatened by the xenophobic environment in Turkey.

The results of my fieldwork show that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's return to Bulgaria was voluntary or involuntary depending on individuals, which indicates that it is impossible to make a clear cut distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration without focusing on particulars, in other words, without doing "ethnography of the particular" that unsettles "conventional social scientific accounts" (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 153). In addition, "ethnography of the particular" helps us make a distinction between "individual" and "familial" decision. The story of Sebile may also be referred to as an example:

> My daughter was sixteen years old at that time [i.e., after migrating to Turkey]. She looked for a job for a while. Then, she found one. But her salary was very few, and my husband was demoralized. He was right because our daughter worked hard, but earned nothing. Moreover, she was an illegal worker. This was the last straw for my husband, and he was determined to return to Bulgaria. Neither my daughters nor me wanted to return. After returning to Bulgaria, I would not open my suitcases about a year because I was certain that we would return to Turkey. After a year, I understood that I would not return to my *homeland* (Sebile).

To be precise, in the Turkish context, with the help of settled patriarchy, husbands' decision can easily be regarded as the decision of family, and make us conclude that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's emigration to Bulgaria was voluntary. But when we focus on the particular situation of women, rather than on the situation of the family headed by the husbands, things may change. That is the

[29] See also, Bianet. (31.07.2001). "Soydaş Bulgaristan'a Dönüyor"

reason why "ethnography of the particular" becomes significant when the focus is "women" in academic studies.

5.3. Being a Native or Foreigner

As is mentioned in Chapter 2, return migration is defined as "the movement of emigrants back to their homelands to resettle" (Gmelch, 1980: 136). For the case of Bulgarian Turks who returned to Bulgaria, this means that their homeland is Bulgaria. However, the results of my fieldwork show that there is no unambiguous definition for the homeland, especially we take individuals' perception of homeland. As Zlatko Skrbiš notes, "homelands are spatial representations which are influenced by political and cultural factors, rather than a simple fact geography" (1999: 38). Moreover, it is important to notice that the homeland is an "imagined" entity (Ibid.). Accordingly, the perception of homeland of the interviewees varies based on their experiences both in Turkey and Bulgaria, and depending on whether they emigrated from Turkey to Bulgaria *voluntarily* or *involuntarily*. In this regard, while ten of the interviewees see Bulgaria as their homeland, the rest regards Turkey as their homeland, even though all of them were born in Bulgaria, and are ethnic Turks.

The situation of the interviewees can be divided into two groups. Those in the first group were *forced* to migrate to Turkey because of the regime of Bulgaria, stayed in Turkey for a while, emigrated from Turkey *voluntarily* when the attitudes towards Bulgarian Turks changed, and are currently living in Bulgaria. Though their return was voluntary, they ended yearning for their homeland, that is, Bulgaria. In this sense, they may be regarded as diaspora members during the period in which they stayed in Turkey. Those in the second group were also *forced* to migrate as a result of the political conditions of Bulgaria. Differently, however, their migration to Turkey ended their yearning for their homeland, Turkey. Moreover, they emigrated from Turkey *involuntarily*, and settled in Bulgaria. Therefore, it should be asked: May those who returned to Bulgaria involuntarily be counted as diaspora members due to the fact that they live in Bulgaria, and regard Turkey as

their homeland, even though they were separated from where they were born because of the political structure of Bulgaria?

Ayşe Parla argues that transnationalism is a much more suitable perspective to analyze the situation of Bulgarian Turks, instead of classical diaspora studies that suggest "yearning for a single homeland as fundamental" (Parla, 2006: 544). However, to make sense of the interviewees' experiences on the two sides of the border that highlight their perception of homeland, I will use the diaspora paradigm. This is important because, as is mentioned above, both groups yearn for one particular homeland: one yearned for Bulgaria after migrating to Turkey; the other one *still* yearns for Turkey.

According to Steven Vertovec, diaspora is "used today to describe practically any population that is considered 'deterritorialized' or 'transnational' – that is, which has originated in a land other than that in which it currently resides, and whose social, economic, and political networks cross the borders of nation-states or, indeed, span the globe" (1997: 277). Paul Gilroy distinguishes diaspora from any other movement by focusing on "forced dispersal." Therefore, Gilroy defines diaspora as "a relational network, characteristically produced by forced dispersal and reluctant scattering;" hence, diaspora is "not just a word of movement, though purposive, urgent movement is integral to it" (1994: 209). According to Gilroy, it is not a synonym of "peregrination or nomadism," which means that the "push factors" are significant in defining a movement as diaspora (Ibid.). In this regard the regime of Bulgaria that ended up with the "Revival Process" may be counted as the "push factor" that separated those in the first group from their homeland. Furthermore, involuntary return of those in the second group may also be regarded as the "push factors" that separated them from their homeland, that is Turkey.

On the other hand, Richard Marienstras (1989: 125) argues that it is not easy to define any movement as diaspora, and the time a population stays in the host country will specify a movement as to its being a diaspora or not. This is because

while a Turkish family in the United States, for example, maintains the characteristics of Turkish culture, their children may not perpetuate these characteristics in their lives. In other words, they may be assimilated, or even they wish to. Marienstras says that: "The maintenance of the feeling of belonging and the certainty of identity is, in minority situations, a matter of will, of conscious decision and, one might even say, determination" (Ibid.). As a result, even though diaspora is generally defined as "any community that has emigrated whose numbers make it visible in the host community," time is a very important factor in defining any movement as diaspora (Ibid.). Marienstras's argument shows that defining any movement as to whether diaspora or not differ from generation to generation depending on time. That is, the term diaspora may be not only objective but also subjective (Ibid.). In this sense, it may be said that to define any movement as diaspora or not may also depend on *individuals*. Hence, when subjectivity is involved in diaspora studies, *focusing on particulars* becomes significant.

Before analyzing the situation of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women, I will elaborate on the characteristics of diaspora members. William Safran specifies the characteristics of the members of diaspora as:

1. They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral," or foreign, regions.
2. They retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history, and achievements.
3. They believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partially alienated and insulated from it.
4. They regard their ancestral homelands as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate.
5. They believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity.
6. They continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship (Safran, 1991: 83-84).

Following these characteristics, I will firstly analyze those in the first group whom I take them to be diaspora members in Turkey. As is mentioned above, the political structure of Bulgaria, and mostly the "Revival Process" might be seen as some of the "push factors" that Bulgarian Turks were forcibly separated from their homeland, mostly via 1989-mass exodus, and they migrated, mostly to Turkey. According to those in the first group, Bulgaria is a "myth" of the promised land, and they "vision" themselves as natives of Bulgaria, and foreigners of Turkey. They expected that the attitudes towards Bulgarian Turks would change, which was starting with the "Revival Process." Therefore, they reached their homeland, that is Bulgaria. The results of the fieldwork show that cultural differences between ethnic Turks of Bulgaria and Turks in Turkey that led to they felt that they were alienated in their host country, in Turkey have an effect on them to regard Bulgaria as a "myth" of the promised land, and to see themselves as foreigners of Turkey. Vildan and Aygül who returned to Bulgaria voluntarily and see Bulgaria as their homeland told me:

> I worked in Turkey, in a textile factory. I had no group of friends. I went out of the house at 5.30 because my home was very far from my workplace. I came back home, sometimes, at 1 o'clock at night. My colleagues always excluded me by saying that I am a Bulgarian. One day, when I was crying, my boss saw me, and asked the reason why I was crying. I said, "They called me a Bulgarian. I left my home there [in Bulgaria], and came here because I am a Turk. If I am a Bulgarian, I would not experience the 'Revival Process.'" My boss got angry, and said to my colleagues, "They came, they are working, and they did not complain about the money that they earned. They are grateful for finding jobs. They are Turks, and if I hear that this kind of discrimination continues against our ethnic kins [soydaş], you will see the discrimination [ayrımcılık]." After that, they did not call me a Bulgarian anymore. But, I know, they did not embrace us. Shortly, I am a Turk in Bulgaria, and I am a Bulgarian in Turkey. Who am I? I preferred to be a Turk in Bulgaria (Vildan).

> Some of my *göçmen* friends and me were exposed to discrimination by our colleagues. My colleagues said that those Bulgarians came and stole our jobs. Yes, according to them, we were Bulgarians. Then, our boss made a meeting, and told that they are our ethnic kins, and you should know that, in the Ottoman period, Turks dispersed everywhere. After the meeting, I did not experience the discrimination against me because of my place of birth. But my colleagues always excluded me, this time, not because I was born in Bulgaria, but because I was a hardworking person (Aygül).

According to James Clifford, home culture and tradition is efficient on women in diaspora, and he argues, "Fundamental values of propriety and religion, speech and social patterns, and food, body, and dress protocols are preserved and adapted in a network of ongoing connections outside the host country" (1994: 314). That is the reason why some interviewees continued to work outside their home, and did not change the way they dress in Turkey in spite of the discrimination that they experienced not only in their occupational but also in their social life. This is because being a worker, as well as their dressing style, constitutes an important part of their identity, which was shaped thanks to their work and stay in Bulgaria.

> Turks in Turkey saw us as aliens. They excluded us, and this exclusion [dışlanma] frightened me at the very beginning. I kept quiet about what they said for about three years after migrating to Turkey. They said many things behind my back. For example, they gossiped about my dressing style. In Bulgaria, it is nobody's business to talk about my hemline. Moreover, my working life became a problem in my neighborhood [in Turkey]. Where I lived, only Bulgarian Turks were working. I can say that, after us, they became used to women working outside the home (Vildan).

Due to the fact that the first group emigrated from Bulgaria because of the regime of their homeland, they can be named as political migrants. Since they are political migrants, it is not surprising that there is a bond between those in the first group and Bulgaria. Furthermore, it should not be surprising that they maintain their life styles, which shape through their cultural environment and everyday life experiences in Bulgaria. Croatian emigrant writer, Korsky, summarizes the situation of political emigrants:

> The essence of the political migrant is that he [sic] opposes the political structures or regime in the homeland. He only lives in this new environment by default. Spiritually, however, he is in a dynamic relationship with his old environment. He lives in and for this old place (cited in Skrbiš, 1999: 40).

Those in the first group returned to Bulgaria as their true and ideal home *voluntarily* when the communist regime collapsed, which means when the conditions became more appropriate in Bulgaria in comparison with the period during the "Revival Process." As a result, their voluntary return to Bulgaria ended their involuntary exile in Turkey.

> Bulgaria is my homeland. Migrating to Turkey did not have an effect to change my homeland; migrating to Turkey did not make me *Türkiyeli*. Those who migrated to Turkey forgot, or even rejected the land they were born into (Naime).

Those in the second group, on the other hand, did not become members of diaspora during the period they stayed in Turkey. While the first group should be seen as diaspora members in Turkey, what is the reason behind the second group's not being regarded as the diaspora members after migrating to Turkey? Since they regard Turkey as their homeland, the "Revival Process" opens a way to end their yearning for Turkey. Although they were separated from where they were born as a result of the "Revival Process," at the same time, they reached their homeland, that is, Turkey. In other words, according to them, mass migrations from Bulgaria to Turkey were a chance to start a new life in their homeland. More importantly, they returned to Bulgaria not because of Bulgaria's more appropriate conditions after the collapse, but because they were *forced* to return by their family members. Since they saw Turkey as their homeland, and since they *involuntarily* returned to Bulgaria, I take them to be the diaspora members of Bulgaria.

> It is said that the place where you were born is your homeland. But in the place where I was born, I was oppressed; they changed my name. My homeland is Turkey because it embraced us. Our flag is the Turkish flag. It is not important to be born here, to live here. Now, I am living in Bulgaria again, but I still regard my homeland as Turkey (Nebibe).

> My homeland is Turkey. As might be expected, leaving the country where one was born was very traumatic, but I was very happy when Turkey opened the border. One month later after migrating to Turkey, I found a job, and my children started school. Everything had begun well at first. One day, my father-in-law and mother-in-law had an accident. That accident triggered their longing, and they decided to return to Bulgaria. I tried to persuade them, but I could not. Only for six months, I could live in my homeland. Now, we are here (Necmiye).

> I had difficulties in Turkey. For example, some children called me *gavur* when I went through the street. Then, I explained to them that I am Turk. How did they learn the word *gavur*, who knows? In spite of this kind of discriminations [ayrımcılık], my homeland is Turkey. One day, my mother and my father saw on the television that some Bulgarian Turks returned to Bulgaria. At that moment, they decided to return. We, my husband and I, did not want to return. Then, my father-in-law and my mother-in-law supported the decision of them,

> and my husband and I became alone. We returned to Bulgaria. Our family wanted to buy a house for our children in Bulgaria but I did not allow them because I believed that we would return one day, but this would not happen (Meryem).

Once again, following some of the characteristics of diaspora members that specified by Safran, I will analyze the situation of those in the second group. Because of *involuntary return* to Bulgaria, they were *forced* to leave their homeland, that is, Turkey. Since they regard their homeland as Turkey, they "retain a collective memory, vision, or myth" about Turkey. This is the reason why they felt alienated in Bulgaria, even though they were born there. As Sebile stated: "I was born here, I grew up here, I married here, I become a mother here, I speak Bulgarian very well, but Turkey is my homeland. It is very devastating to feel as a foreigner. Everywhere, I feel like that." Due to the fact that they yearn for Turkey, they are waiting for the day that they will start to live there although their hopes are about to be exhausted. Turkey functions for them as the "myth" of the promised land. Accordingly they "vision" themselves as foreigners of Bulgaria waiting for the end of their involuntary exile. This group is concerned about their homeland's safety, prosperity, and restoration. Even though they live in Bulgaria, they are watching Turkish channels there. They are always informed about Turkey, which means they are always concerned about what is happening in Turkey. Moreover, their relation with Turkey led to "ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity." This is the reason why they emphasized when they were in Turkey, and emphasize now, that they are Turks, as Turkish as others, or the *soydaş* of Turks living in Turkey. To conclude, those who returned to Bulgaria involuntarily regard their homeland as Turkey, even though they were exposed to the same oppressions during the "Revival Process" that led to the separation of them from where they were born. In this regard, are they foreigners, or natives of where they live now? It seems that they regard themselves as foreigners of Bulgaria, and natives of Turkey.

In this section, I have aimed to show that there is no certain definition of homeland by doing "ethnography of the particular." Although both groups were

born in Bulgaria and are ethnic Turks, and although they experienced the oppression towards ethnic Turks, migrated to Turkey, and returned to Bulgaria, "ethnography of the particular" that opens a way to analyze the situation of involuntary emigrants as is mentioned in the previous section, presents the flexibility of the term homeland, just as the flexibility of being *soydaş*. This section has mainly focused on the relation between the type of return (i.e., voluntary or involuntary) and the perception of homeland. As is seen, there is a significant relation between them. However, focusing on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary return is not enough to analyze the reasons behind Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's homeland perception. Therefore, in the next section, I will elaborate on *other* factors that affected their perception of homeland. These are their work, including household work experiences, as well as their legal status: "how does being a tobacco worker affect their perception of homeland," "how does working in two jobs under the communist regime affect the homeland perception," "how does being responsible for household works have an effect on this perception," "how does being a *soydaş,* legal immigrant, or illegal immigrant have an effect on this perception," "how does being soydaş without receving financial help from the Turkish Government determine their perception of homeland," and, finally, "how does returning to Bulgaria as being retired affect their perception of homeland?"

5.3.1. How do Experiences of Bulgarian Turkish Immigrant Women on the Two Sides of the Border Determine their Perception of Homeland?

In the previous section, we have seen that the perception of homeland among my interviewees varies. Generally, those who voluntarily returned to Bulgaria regarded Bulgaria as their homeland, while involuntary returnees take Turkey to be their homeland. However, it would be wrong to assume that it is *only* the voluntary or involuntary return of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women that affected their perception of homeland. After all, human beings are not social automata, which are *determined* by one, and only one set of factors. Thus, my aim in

this section is to ask what social, political, and economic factors, other than the voluntary or involuntary nature of the return of my interviewees, might have affected their homeland perception, as well as their decision of return. The aim of presenting the following narratives of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women is to show that each return experience is characterized by its own particularity—hence, the importance of ethnograpgy of particulars. My analysis of homeland perception will start from Gülümser's experiences who stayed in Turkey for three weeks, and will last with the Mergül's experiences who lived in Turkey for twenty-eight years.

Gülümser migrated to Turkey via 1989-mass exodus, and sees Bulgaria as her homeland. As a matter of fact, this is expected because she returned to Bulgaria after three weeks stay in Turkey. Three weeks is a very short period for adapting to Turkey and for constructing a bond with it. Moreover, she had an associate degree, and worked as a pre-school teacher in Bulgaria, which means that Bulgaria gave her an opportunity to live as a member of the middle-class. However, in Turkey, she had to stay in a park without financial support, and this miserableness was a very tough experience for her. That is, her life in Bulgaria was not so difficult compared to that in Turkey. Therefore, her Turkey experience ended with her voluntary return to Bulgaria. In Chapter 4, while focusing on the interviewees' "double burden" experiences on the two sides of the border, I have mentioned on Gülümser's experiences. As we have seen that Gülümser used maternity leave for three years, and received help from her husband for household works in Bulgaria. Maternity leave for three years was an opportunity that communist Bulgaria gave to mothers. This kind of opportunities, being a pre-school teacher, and, therefore, being a member of the middle-class, as well as being a *soydaş* without receving financial help from the Turkish Government, may be important factors that made people like Gülümser see Bulgaria as their homeland.

Very similar to Gülümser's experiences, Bahise – a 1989-mass exodus migrant – and her family returned to Bulgaria after forty days due to economic problems. Not finding a job, not finding a place to stay, and not receiving financial

help from the government triggered their return. These also determined the homeland perception of Bahise. She takes Bulgaria to be her homeland. It is important to note that Bahise was exposed to "heavier double burden" in Bulgaria under the communist regime, due to the fact that she worked in two jobs; one of which was tobacco working. As she said, even cooking was regarded as a burden by her because of her two jobs, and because of the heaviness of being a tobacco worker. However, not finding a job in Turkey changed her perception of "double burden." Hence, she voluntarily returned to Bulgaria, and started to work not only in conserve factory but also in tobacco plantation.

Reyhan also migrated via 1989-mass exodus. However, she and her family did not receive financial support from the state. She started to work after migrating to Turkey. In this sense, not receving financial help may not have an effect on their return. When I asked where is her homeland, she told me: "Where I live is my homeland." As is mentioned in the previous section, Reyhan's sister could not migrate to Turkey. In this sense, she returned voluntarily due to the fact that she did not want a divided family. Therefore, the decision of return to Bulgaria, and, thus, living in Bulgaria opened a way that whole family members came together. Thus, she regarded Bulgaria as her homeland. Moreover, if the Turkish Government did not make difficulties for her sister's migration to Turkey, if Reyhan's sister migrated to Turkey just like Reyhan, if they had a chance to live together in Turkey, Reyhan's perception of homeland would probably change. This means that there is a possibility that she could regard Turkey as her homeland. Furthermore, it is important to note that working as a tobacco worker for a while in Bulgaria after their return did not change her homeland perception. This is because her husband helped her for household works. In this regard, it may be said that not only her husband's help for household works but also the difficulties that the Turkish Government created had an effect on the homeland perception of Reyhan.

Fatma was a *soydaş* and Turkish Government made a financial help to her after her migration. However, this was not enough for making a life in Turkey. After

the migration, she worked as a tailor in Turkey. However, only two and a half month later, she decided to return to Bulgaria and started to work in conserve factory in Bulgaria. She is still working there. As she said, and as is mentioned previosuly, she could not adapt to Turkey. She told me that there are many cultural differences between local Turks and Bulgarian Turks. These cultural differences mostly concern how working women are treated by the locals. She said that Turks were not familiar with working women in those years. When financial difficulties were combined with not being adapted to the life style in Turkey, she returned. Moreover, Fatma regarded Bulgaria as her homeland. As a result, besides the type of return and financial difficulties, adapting to they host country is also significant for the homeland perception.

Remziye and her family members (1989-mass exodus immigrants) received financial support from the government after their migration to Turkey. According to Remziye, this help that covered house rent was a good start for supporting their lives in Turkey. Moreover, Remziye did not have to work, because her sons were working, and their earnings were enough. However, this time, missing Bulgaria become effective and they decided to change their lives for the second time after three months stay in Turkey. She and her family yearned for their homeland, Bulgaria, and returned.

Saime voluntarily returned to Bulgaria after five months stay in Turkey. Although she was considered as *soydaş*, she experienced financial difficulties after migrating to Turkey due to the lack of state support. Being a non-worker in Turkey seemed perfect to her, because she worked in the most difficult type of occupation in Bulgaria as compulsory i.e, tobacco plantation. However, being a non-worker also created financial difficulties for her consequently, Saime returned to Bulgaria. She is retired now, but after the return, she started to work in tobacco plantation. Although she said that working as a tobacco worker was very difficult, especially when it was combined with the household works, she regarded Bulgaria as her homeland. At first, this seems very unexpected because migrating to Turkey could

be seen as an opportunity for not working in tobacco plantation. However, financial difficulties in "foreign" country erased for her the traces of "double burden" in Bulgaria and the difficulty of the job. Therefore, she returned to Bulgaria voluntarily. Moreover, she sees Bulgaria as her homeland.

Meryem's perception of homeland is one of the most unexpected ones. She regards Turkey as her homeland. This is unexpected because she spent only six months in Turkey, and, then, returned to Bulgaria involuntarily, that is, in opposition to her desire. Specifically, she did not participate in the return decision of the elders of her family. She was a tobacco worker before migrating to Turkey. In Turkey, after her migration, she received financial help from the Turkish Government, and found a job in a chicken industry. However, after the return, she continued to work as a tobacco worker, and is still working. This may have affected her perception of homeland. In other words, the difficulty of working in tobacco plantation, as well as being accepted by the Turkish Government as a citizen, may have affected Meryem's perception of homeland.

Similar to Meryem, Necmiye stayed in Turkey for six months, and returned involuntarily. Differently from Meryem, however, she had to work in two jobs under the communist regime. In Turkey, she worked only in a textile factory. This might have reduced her perception of "double burden." Furthermore, she was eligible to receive financial support from the Turkish Government, because she was a *soydaş*. After her return to Bulgaria, she started to work not only in tobacco plantation but also in a textile factory. That is, she continued to be exposed to "heavier double burden." I believe that working only in one job in Turkey, and being accepted as a *soydaş* had a significant role in determining her perception of homeland that is, Turkey.

Sebile is also an involuntary emigrant. Her husband decided to return, in order to prevent her daughter from being exploited in her workplace in Turkey. To be precise, some employers wanted to employ Bulgarian Turks as illegal workers, because employers knew that Bulgarian Turks needed to work, even under illegal

and, therefore, miserable working conditions. They needed to work, because migration negatively affected their economic conditions. Sebile's daughter was employed as an illegal worker. Her husband believed that her daughter would find a better job with better salary in Bulgaria. However, neither Sebile nor her daughter wanted to return. Returning to Bulgaria led to difficulties for Sebile, because she started to work in tobacco plantation. Differently from the communist period, she had to work in one job. This reduced the intensity of her perception of "double burden." However, this did not prevent yearning for her homeland, Turkey.

Elfide was an illegal emigrant in Turkey. Differently from other involuntary returnees, her return decision was affected by the Turkish Government. That is, it was not her family members but the attitudes of Turkish Government towards illegal migrants, together with her husband's illness that forced her to return to Bulgaria. She concluded our discussion by saying that "There was no other chance for us except return to Bulgaria. The illness of my husband changed everything." Before migrating to Turkey, she worked as a tobacco worker. She is still working in tobacco plantation. In Chapter 4, I have mentioned that Elfide was not affected by "double burden" in Turkey because she earned more in Turkey compared to that in Bulgaria as a tobacco worker. Earning more money in Turkey may affect her perception of "double burden." According to her, Turkey provided to her a good life. Accordingly, the opporunities that Turkey presented to her affected her perception of homeland. In her case, the interesting thing is Turkey's neglect of the situation of those who missed being a *soydaş* with a few months did not change her perception of homeland although she had some complains about this negligence. It seems that being an illegal immigrant was preferable to her than being a tobacco worker in Bulgaria, despite of the difficulties of being an illegal immigrant.

Mukaddes migrated to Turkey via visa application in 1990. She was an legal immigrant but not a *soydaş* and, therefore, did not receive financial any help from the Turkish Government. Under the communist regime, she was a tobacco worker; but in Turkey, she did not prefer to work outside home. As is mentioned in Chapter

4, tobacco working should be regarded as one of the most difficult jobs. Therefore, being a non-worker might have an effect on her perception of homeland, which is Turkey. She returned to Bulgaria involuntarily because of her son's psychological problems. After the return to Bulgaria, she did not work. In contrast to communist Bulgaria, it seems that her life after the return was much more easier. However, this did not affect her perception of homeland.

Aygül is a voluntary emigrant. During our conversation, she said that her husband has always supported her. This means that when they migrated to Turkey via visa application, when they returned to Bulgaria, and when they opened a botique hotel in Kardzhali, they decided everything together. Their reason of return after ten years was the fear that they could not provide their children with a better life in Turkey. This is because, according to them, Bulgaria was more liberal, especially for women. In this sense, it is not unusual for Aygül to regard Bulgaria as her homeland.

Vildan also could not adapt to Turkey, because local Turks, according to her, could not accept working women. Moreover, she felt limited when their neigbours talked about her dressing style. However, she returned to Bulgaria after being retired. Since they applied to the visa for migrating to Turkey, they were not eligible for receiving the financial support from the government. However, she found a job in Turkey, and overcomed certain financial difficulties. In her case, being homesick for Bulgaria affected her decision. Although she and her family migrated to Turkey because of the "Revival Process," as she said, the attitudes of the communist government did not change the meaning of Bulgaria for her. Her sharings show that being forced to work in two jobs under the communist regime (one is tobacco working) also did not affect her perception of homeland. She acknowledged that these were the results of communist regime, and, after the collapse, with the money that they saved in Turkey, they enjoyed their retirement in their homeland.

Nebibe is an involuntary emigrant, too. She migrated to Turkey in 1998. She was a legal immigrant. That is, for making a life in Turkey, Turkish Government did

not gave her any financial help. However, working hard in Turkey provided a good life to her. Although she worked as a ladder cleaner, she told me that making money is easier than that in Bulgaria. However, after fifteen years, after Nebibe and her husband retired, her husband decided to return. First, he rent their house out in Turkey and, then, sold it, which made it impossible for Nebibe to live in her homeland, i.e., in Turkey.

In Hayriye's return, her husband had a significant role. Although she returned to Bulgaria after being retired, which means she did not have to work as a tobacco worker, she did not want to return. Hayriye's husband gave her a so-called right of choice to determine where she wanted to live by saying," If you did not want to return with me, you would stay in Turkey," which is, in my opinion, not a right of choice. This is because she told me that her husband was sick, and there was nobody in Bulgaria to look after him. She had to leave her homeland after seventeen years. It should be noted that, as is mentioned in Chapter 4, when Hayriye compared her life in Turkey to that in Bulgaria, she said that she had a better life in Turkey. Having a better life, I believe, had an effect on her perception of homeland, due to the fact that working in tobacco plantation and financial difficulties that she experienced prevented her from remembering Bulgaria as a good place.

Mihriban wanted to return to Bulgaria. The decision of return was taken by Mihriban and her husband. Her decision was mostly affected by her employers' attitude towards her in Turkey. Mihriban was employed informally as a construction worker. In addition, although she was a *soydaş*, she could not receive financial help from the Turkish Government. She and her husband waited for their retirement and, then, returned to Bulgaria. It may be assumed that being a tobacco worker under the communist regime was the reason to wait for the retirement for returning to Bulgaria. However, the experiences of Mihriban show that if they returned earlier, if Mihriban started to work as a tobacco worker after the return, the perception of homeland may not change, which is Bulgaria. This is because Mihriban did not regard tobacco working as the most difficult type of job. The

important thing for Mihriban was having an insurance. Morever, she said that working outside home, and earning money provided self-esteem to her. In this sense, being forgotten as a *soydaş* by the government, and being excluded by local Turks in occupational life determined how she perceived herself where she was currently living. She regarded herself as a native in Bulgaria.

Nazmiye is an involuntary emigrant. She and her family were *soydaş*. Accordingly, they received financial help from the government. They also found a job in Turkey. Moreover, the "Revival Process" affected her family very much, which played a significant role in her bonding with Turkey. After twenty-two years, because of the decision of her husband, she was forced to return to Bulgaria. She was forced because she did not return to Bulgaria. Furthermore, her husband sold their house in Turkey, which means there is no place in Turkey to stay for Nazmiye. Although, her relatives were in Turkey, she knew that she could not stay with them permanently. She could only visit Turkey, because she could not change her husband's mind. As a result, it may be said that bad experiences in Bulgaria, and regarding Turkey as the rescuer from the attitudes of the communist regime determined her homeland, i.e, Turkey.

Naime is a voluntary emigrant. She and her husband decided to return after their retirement. During our conversation, she said that the communist regime helped her improve herself intellectually. Naime and her husband, during their twenty-four years stay in Turkey, always yearned for Bulgaria. However, they did not want to return before their retirement. After the retirement, they had an opportunity to buy a house in Kardzhali to enjoy their retirement in their homeland.

Mergül's husband, after twenty-eight years, decided to return to Bulgaria without taking into account his wife's feelings. When her husband made a decision to return to Bulgaria, Mergül was working. She left her job in Turkey and began to wait for the age of retirement in Bulgaria. Immediately after the beginning of the "Revival Process," they decided to immigrate to Turkey, which means that she and her family did not experience the "Revival Process." Not experiencing the "Revial

Process" could affect her perception of Bulgaria as her homeland. However, she spent twenty-eight years in Turkey. Adapting to a new place is often a very difficult process, and Mergül has to adapt to a new place for the second time. The duration of her stay in Turkey might be very effective for her to perceive Turkey as her homeland. Staying in Turkey for twenty-eight years, and returning to Bulgaria after getting older might also render adapting to Bulgaria difficult for Mergül.

To conclude, there are various factors that may have affected Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women returnees' perception of homeland, such as social or economic class, whether or not they were accepted as *soydaş*, whether or not they were legal immigrants, and whether or not they were financially supported by the Turkish Government, as well as whether or not they were exposed to "double burden," whether they yearned for Bulgaria or for Turkey, whether or not they experiencied the worst side of the "Revival Process," and whether or not they participated in the decision of return. Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women returnees' perception of homeland is especially important, because it helped shape who they are, that is, being a native or foreigner in the country they are currently living. This justifies my conclusion that there is no "the" Bulgarian Turkish immigrant woman returnee. This is because just as many factors may affect one's perception of homeland, there are many factors that made each Bulgarian Turkish immigrant woman returnee who she is.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

My analysis of the self-identity construction of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women with the help of the "ethnography of the particular" has shown that there is no "the" Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women as well as "the" identity of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women. There are many different identities that were assigned to them depending on the political conditions of where they were born, as well as an changing attitude of the Turkish-state towards its immigrants, their voluntary or involuntary return to Bulgaria, and how they perceived themselves in the country where they are currently living.

Firstly, I have analyzed their identity as being a *worker*, *wife*, and *mother*, which were shaped through their everyday life experiences under the communist regime in Bulgaria. These identities were mostly based on political conditions of Bulgaria. This is because the communist regime forced not only men but also women to participate in the labor force, and this was done under the guise of the emancipation of women. Since women and men did not equally share some responsibilities such as household works and childrearing, working outside home could not refer to the emancipation of women, but referred to "double burden." For the case of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women, it might be said that some experienced not just "double burden," but "triple burden." This means that the Bulgarian government forced some Bulgarian Turks who lived in various villages of Kardzhali to work in tobacco plantation in addition to their jobs. However, this was not the case for all Bulgarian Turks. For example, those who lived in the center of Kardzhali did not work as tobacco workers.

For the immigrants in question, it might be said that some of them were regarded as solely responsible for household works and childrearing, which means that they did not receive help from their husbands. On the other hand, the rest shared the responsibilities of domestic life with their husbands. This shows that those who were left alone when it came to household works and childrearing constructed their self-identity as wives and mothers because of the expectation of the public from them, but not as workers because it was compulsory as a result of the communist regime. That is, if the communist regime would not force them to work, and if their economic conditions would be better after their migration to Turkey, they would not prefer to work outside their homes. Those who did not receive help from their husbands regarded working in tobacco plantation (as a second job) as "triple burden." Differently, those who shared the responsibilities of domestic life with their husbands constructed their self-identity as not only mothers and wives but also as workers, and what they said to me was that their husbands regarded themselves as workers, husbands, and fathers. Due to the fact that they were not left alone when it came to household works and childrearing, they did not regard working outside their homes as "double burden" or "triple burden" but as "emancipation." Even though this was the case under the communist regime in Bulgaria, the experiences of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women on the two sides of the border have shown that their "double burden" experiences were not concluded after their migration to Turkey. However, the perception of "double burden" changed. That is, they felt the "double burden" less in comparison to that in Bulgaria.

After migrating to Turkey, their identities were constituted through the changing attitude of the Turkish-state towards immigrants, which means that it was constituted around being *soydaş*, *legal* immigrant, and *illegal* immigrant. Those who migrated to Turkey via the mass exodus in 1989 were considered *soydaş* and granted citizenship. However, Turkey closed its borders afterwards even though the Prime Minister once said, "You are welcome here. Our border is open and will stay open

until all the Turks in Bulgaria come home to Turkey" (Zang, 1989: 53). After the closing of borders, there were only two options for Bulgarian Turks; one was to apply for the visa, and the other was to cross the border via illegal ways. Those who applied for the visa to cross the border were seen as *legal* immigrants, and they were forced to leave the country after their visas were expired. Nevertheless, those who had no money to apply for the visa crossed the border without any official permission. Their so-called *illegality*, which was assigned to them by the government, led to put them in the "social space of illegality," and this led to hunger, unemployment, violence, or death (De Genova, 2002: 427) – as one of the interviewees, Elfide experienced. "Ethnography of the particular" shows that being a *soydaş* and, therefore, being a citizen are very ambiguous terms.

Lastly, I have focused on the situation of *voluntary* and *involuntary* emigrants, and inquired into the relationship between being a voluntary or involuntary emigrant and how this shaped Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's self-perception. There are different approaches in conceptualizing return migration. In the scope of this thesis, the experiences of voluntary emigrants in question may have been analyzed through "neo-classical approach," "new economics of labor migration approach," and "structural approach." However, these aproaches are not sufficient for analyzing the situation of involuntary emigrants. Moreover, in the literature of return migration, there is a strong tendency to identify involuntary emigration with forced migration and involuntary emigrants with refugees. However, such an identification prevents one from understanding the situation of those who are not refugees but are *emotionally* forced to return to their country of origin. To understand their emotionally forced return, it is important to make a distinction between *familial* and *individual* migration, which is only possible by focusing on particulars' experiences in detail.

In order to problematize the concept of voluntary migration, I have also analyzed the philosophy of Will Kymlicka. As we have seen, Kymlicka divides minorities into two groups: "national minorities" and "immigrants." He argues that

immigrants voluntarily leave their original culture as a result of individual and familial immigration, and, therefore, they should be integrated into the culture of host country (Kymlicka, 1995: 96). On the other hand, according to him, the culture of national minorities refers to "previously self-governing" and "territorially concentrated cultures," and, therefore, national minorities should maintain their distinct cultures alongside the majority culture (Ibid.: 10). However, are Bulgarian Turks national minorities or immigrants of Bulgaria? There is no clear-cut answer to this question. Since they were placed on the Bulgarian land in the Ottoman period, and since they still live within a "territorially concentrated culture," they should be seen as national minorities. However, they emigrated from Bulgaria, mostly as a result of the "Revival Process," and, then, returned to where they were born. In other words, they emigrated from Turkey, and settled to Bulgaria, which means that they are immigrants in Bulgaria. Moreover, as is mentioned before, Kymlicka claims that immigrants leave their original culture voluntarily (Ibid.: 96). If we assume that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women are not national minorities, but immigrants of Bulgaria, we should also ask: Did they voluntarily return to Bulgaria?

Some interviewees said that they returned to Bulgaria involuntarily although *they were not forced physically by their fathers and husbands*, which shows that not only the distinction between "national minorities" and "immigrants" but also the distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration is difficult to make. This is especially important if we consider the fact that Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women's return to Bulgaria voluntarily or involuntarily was very effective on their self-identity construction, because their voluntary or involuntary return determined how they perceived themselves in Bulgaria. Moreover, are they natives or foreigners of where they are currently living? Some of the interviewees returned to Bulgaria voluntarily, and as a result, they returned to their *homeland*. Therefore, they should be seen as diaspora members during the time of their stay in Turkey due to the fact that they yearned for one particular homeland, namely Bulgaria. Involuntary returnees also yearn for one particular homeland. However,

that homeland is Turkey for them. Since they regarded Turkey as their homeland, their migration to Turkey was their finding themselves at home. Hence, their involuntary return to Bulgaria is the reason why we should call them diaspora members of where they are currently living, although they were born in there. This means that, the concept homeland should also be problematized. In the scope of this thesis, even though there is a strict correlation between type of return (i.e., voluntarily or involuntarily) and perception of homeland, I have aimed to show that there are some other factors that have a huge impact on Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women returnees' perception of homeland. The fact that there were different reasons behind return shows the impossibility to make a generalization about "the" type of Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women.

In short, in this thesis, firstly, I have aimed to problematize "the" Bulgarian Turkish immigrant woman by focusing on their different experiences depending on whether they faced "double burden," as well as on when they migrated to Turkey, whether they returned to Bulgaria *voluntarily* or *involuntarily*, and whether they perceived themselves as *natives* or *foreigners* of Bulgaria. Secondly, I have aimed to show the uncertainty of being *soydaş* by focusing on the situation of post-1990 *legal* immigrants and post-1990 *illegal* immigrants. Thirdly, I have focused on the ambiguity of "the" return migration by referring to the experiences of involuntary Bulgarian Turkish immigrant women returnees. Lastly, I have shown that there is no clear-cut definition for the term *homeland* by pointing out the fact that although all interviewees were born in Bulgaria, experienced oppressions by the Bulgarian government, migrated to Turkey, and returned to Bulgaria, they have different homelands.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN TURKISH

1. Doğum yeriniz? Doğum tarihiniz?

2. Eğitim durumunuz?

3. Medeni durumunuz?

4. Çocuklarınız var mı? Nerede doğdular? Doğum yılları?

5. Şu an çalışıyor musunuz?

6. Anavatanınızı neresi olarak görüyorsunuz?

"Yeniden Doğuş Süreci" ve Bulgaristan'da Yaşam

7. "Yeniden Doğuş" sürecini hatırladığınız kadarıyla anlatabilir misiniz?

Ev Hayatı:

8. Türkiye'ye göç etmeden önce hanede kaç kişi yaşıyordunuz?

9. Türkiye'ye göç etmeden önce Bulgaristan'da ekonomik durumunuz nasıldı?

10. Türkiye'ye göç etmeden önce ev işleri (çamaşır, ütü, bulaşık, yemek vb.) ve çocuk bakımı konusunda eşinizden yardım alıyor muydunuz? Çocuklarınız ev işlerine yardımcı oluyor muydu?

Çalışma Hayatı:

11. Zorunlu çalışma hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nelerdir? Komunist rejimde çalışmak zorunlu olmasaydı yine de çalışmak ister miydiniz?

12. Komunist rejim döneminde, Bulgaristan'da nerede çalıştınız? Eşiniz çalışmanızı nasıl karşıladı?

13. Komunizm ile yönetilen Bulgaristan'daki çalışma koşullarını öğrenebilir miyim?

14. Komunizm ile yönetilen Bulgaristan'da, aynı iş kolunda çalışan ve kıdemleri de aynı olan bir kadın ile bir erkek arasında maaşları bakımından bir fark var mıydı?

15. Komunist rejim döneminde, Bulgaristan'da kadınlar ve erkekler arasında tercih edilen çalışma alanları bakımından bir fark var mıydı?

16. Komunist rejim ile yönetilen Bulgaristan'da, işyerinizde etnik kimliğinizden veya kadın olduğunuzdan dolayı ayrımclılığa uğradınız mı?

17. Komunist rejim döneminde, Bulgaristan Devleti'nden çocuk bakımı adına yardım aldınız mı? Ne tür yardımlar aldınız?

18. Doğum izni kullandınız mı? Ne kadar izin kullandınız?

19. Doğum izninden sonra işyerinizde, çalışmaya ara verdiğinizden dolayı herhangi bir sorunla karşılaştınız mı?

Sosyal Hayat:

20. Zorunlu çalışmanın, ev işlerinin ve çocuk bakımının sosyal hayatınız üzerindeki etkilerinden bahsedebilir misiniz?

21. Arkadaş çevreniz var mıydı? Sosyal hayatınızda daha çok kimlerle ve nasıl vakit geçirirdiniz?

22. Bulgaristan'da sosyal çevreniz tarafından etnik kimliğinizden veya kadın olduğunuzdan dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradınız mı?

23. Komunist rejim döneminde, Bulgaristan'da bir kadının gece dışarı çıkması güvenli miydi? Gece dışarı çıkar mıydınız? Hayır ise neden?

24. Aileniz ile ya da kendi başınıza tatile çıkar mıydınız?

Türkiye'ye Göç ve Türkiye'de Yaşam

25. Göç hikayenizi anlatabilir misiniz? Neden göç ettiniz? Nereye göç ettiniz?

26. Göç ettikten sonra, Türkiye Devleti'nden yardım aldınız mı? Ne tür yardımlar aldınız? Siz tam anlamıyla Türkiye'de yaşamaya uyum sağlayana kadar bu yardımlar sürdü mü?

27. Bulgaristan Türkleri ile Türkiye Türkleri arasındaki kültürel farklara değinebilir misiniz?

Ev Hayatı:

28. Göçten sonra, hanedeki kişi sayısında bir değişiklik oldu mu?

29. Göç etmek ekonomik durumunuzu nasıl etkiledi?

30. Türkiye'ye göç ettikten sonra ev işleri (çamaşır, ütü, bulaşık, yemek vb.) ve çocuk bakımı konusunda eşinizden yardım alıyor muydunuz? Çocuklarınız ev işlerine yardımcı oluyor muydu?

Çalışma Hayatı:

31. Türkiye'ye göçünce çalıştınız mı? Nerede çalıştınız? Çalıştıysanız, neden? Çalışmadıysanız, neden? Eşiniz çalışmanızı nasıl karşıladı?

32. Türkiye'deki çalışma koşullarını öğrenebilir miyim?

33. Türkiye'de, aynı iş kolunda çalışan ve kıdemleri de aynı olan bir kadın ile bir erkek arasında maaşları bakımından bir fark var mıydı?

34. Türkiye'de, kadınlar ve erkekler arasında tercih edilen çalışma alanları bakımında bir fark var mıydı?

35. Türkiye'deki işyerinizde, Bulgaristan göçmeni veya kadın olduğunuzdan dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradınız mı?

36. Türkiye Devleti'nden, çocuk bakımı adına yardım aldınız mı? Ne tür yardımlar aldınız?

37. Doğum izni kullandınız mı? Ne kadar izin kullandınız?

38. Doğum izninden sonra işyerinizde, çalışmaya ara verdiğinizden dolayı herhangi bir sorunla karşılaştınız mı?

Sosyal Hayat:

39. Göç etmenin, ev dışı çalışmanın (varsa), ev işlerinin ve çocuk bakımının sosyal hayatınızdaki etkilerinden bahsedebilir misiniz?

40. Arkadaş çevreniz var mıydı? Sosyal hayatınızda daha çok kimlerle ve nasıl vakit geçirirdiniz?

41. Türkiye'de, sosyal çevreniz tarafından Bulgaristan göçmeni veya kadın olduğunuzdan dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradınız mı?

42. Türkiye'de bir kadının gece dışarı çıkması güvenli miydi? Gece dışarı çıkar mıydınız? Hayır ise neden?

43. Aileniz ya da kendi başınıza tatile çıkar mıydınız?

Bulgaristan'a Geri Dönüş

44. Bulgaristan'a geri dönüş kararı alma sürecinizden bahsedebilir misiniz? Neden Bulgaristan'a geri dönüş kararı aldınız? Ailenizin ortak kararı mıydı?

45. Komunist rejim yıkılmasaydı da geri döner miydiniz? Neden?

Ev Hayatı:

46. Şu an hanede kaç kişi yaşıyorsunuz?

47. Dönüş kararı ekonomik olarak sizi nasıl etkiledi? Şu anki ekonomik durumunuzu öğrenebilir miyim?

48. Bulgaristan'a geri döndükten sonra ev işleri (çamaşır, ütü, bulaşık, yemek vb.) ve çocuk bakımı konusunda eşinizden yardım alıyor muydunuz? Çocuklarınız ev işlerine yardımcı oluyor muydu? Bu yardımlar bugün hala devam ediyor mu?

Çalışma Hayatı:

49. Bulgaristan'a geri dönünce çalışmaya devam ettiniz mi? Nerede çalıştınız / çalışıyorsunuz? Çalıştıysanız, neden? Çalışmadıysanız, neden? Eşiniz çalışmanızı nasıl karşıladı / karşılıyor?

50. Rejim yıkıldıktan sonra, Bulgaristan'daki çalışma koşullarını öğrenebilir miyim?

51. Rejim yıkıldıktan sonra, Bulgaristan'da aynı iş kolunda çalışan ve kıdemleri de aynı olan bir kadın ile bir erkek arasında maaşları bakımından bir fark var mıydı / var mı?

52. Rejim yıkıldıktan sonra, Bulgaristan'da kadınlar ve erkekler arasında tercih edilen çalışma alanları bakımından bir fark var mıydı / var mı?

53. Rejim yıkıldıktan sonra, Bulgaristan'da işyerinizde etnik kimliğinizden veya kadın olduğunuzdan dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradınız mı / uğruyor musunuz?

54. Bulgaristan'a geri döndükten sonra, çocuk bakımı adına Bulgaristan Devleti'nden yardım aldınız mı? Ne tür yardımlar aldınız? Bu yardımlar bugün hala devam ediyor mu?

55. Doğum izni kullandınız mı? Ne kadar izin kullandınız?

56. Doğum izninden sonra işyerinizde, çalışmaya ara verdiğinizden dolayı herhangi bir sorunla karşılaştınız mı?

Sosyal Hayat:

57. Komunist rejimin yıkılması, ev dışı çalışma (varsa), ev işleri ve çocuk bakımının sosyal hayatınız üzerindeki etkilerinden bahsedebilir misiniz?

58. Arkadaş çevreniz var mı? Sosyal hayatınızda daha çok kimlerle ve nasıl vakit geçiriyorsunuz?

59. Bulgaristan'a geri döndükten sonra, sosyal çevreniz tarafından etnik kimliğinizden veya kadın olduğunuzdan dolayı ayrımcılığa uğradınız mı / uğruyor musunuz?

60. Komunizm sonrası Bulgaristan'da bir kadının dışarı çıkması güvenli mi? Gece dışarı çıkıyor musunuz? Hayır ise, neden?

61. Aileniz ile ya da kendi başınıza tatile çıkıyor musunuz?

İki Rejim, İki Devlet: Kadın-Erkek Eşitliği

Komunist Rejim ile Yönetilen Bulgaristan:

62. Sizce, komunist rejim ile yönetilen Bulgaristan'da, kadın ve erkek eşit miydi? Hangi konularda eşit, hangi konularda eşit değillerdi? Konu ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı olduğunda kadın – erkek eşitliğini görebiliyor muydunuz?

Göçten sonra Türkiye:

63. Sizce, Türkiye'de kaldığınız dönemde, Türkiye'de kadın ve erkek eşitliğinden bahsedilebilinir mi? Hangi konularda eşit, hangi konularda eşit değillerdi? Konu ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı olduğunda kadın – erkek eşitliğini görebiliyor muydunuz?

64. Türkiye'de kalsaydınız, Bulgaristan göçmeni ve bir kadın olarak hayatınız nasıl olurdu?

Günümüz Bulgaristan:

65. Sizce, şu an Bulgaristan'da kadın ve erkek eşit mi? Hangi konularda eşit, hangi konularda eşit değiller? Konu ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı olduğunda kadın – erkek eşitliğini görebiliyor musunuz?

Öz-Kimlik Soruları

66. Bir kadının refahı neye bağlıdır?

67. Bir kadının hayatındaki en önemli amaç ne olmalıdır?

68. Kendinize güveninizi ne sağlar? Ne kendinizi değersiz hissettirir?

69. Kadın ve erkeğin eşit eğitim alması önemli mi? Neden?

70. Kadınların çalışması hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi öğrenebilir miyim?

71. Bir kadın ne zaman olgunlaşır?

72. "Özgür kadın"ın tanımını yapabilir misiniz? Bu tanıma göre, özgür bir kadın mısınız?

73. Kendinizi kim ya da ne için feda edersiniz?

74. Ne yaparsanız kocanız, çocuklarınız ve akrabalarınız tarafından asla affedilmezsiniz?

75. En çok neyden korkarsınız?

APPENDIX B: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH

1. Place of birth? Date of birth?

2. What is your education status?

3. What is your marital status?

4. Do you have children? Place of birth? Date of birth?

5. Are you working now?

6. Where is your homeland?

The "Revival Process" and Life in Bulgaria

7. Can you tell me about the "Revival Process"as much as you remember it?

Domestic Life

8. How many people did live in your household before migration to Turkey?

9. How was your economic situation in Bulgaria before migration to Turkey?

10. Did you receive help from your husband for household works and childrearing before migrating to Turkey? Did your receive help from your children for household works?

Working Life:

11. What are your thoughts about compulsory working? Would you still like to work if it was not compulsory to work in the communist regime?

12. Where did you work under the communist regime in Bulgaria? What was your husband's reaction to your working outside home?

13. How was working conditions in Bulgaria during the communism?

14. Was there any difference in salaries between a man and a woman who had the same job and who had the same seniority in Bulgaria during the communism?

15. In the period of the communist regime, was there any difference in the preferred working areas of women and men in Bulgaria?

16. Were you exposed to discrimination in your working place due to your ethnic identity and being woman under the communist regime in Bulgaria?

17. Did you receive help from the Bulgarian State for childcare? What kind of help did you receive?

18. Did you use your maternity leave? How much time have you used it?

19. Have you encountered any problems in your workplace after your maternity leave because you have taken a break from work?

Social Life:

20. Can you talk about the effects of compulsory working, domestic affairs and childcare on your social life?

21. Did you have friends? How and when did you spend your time in your social life?

22. Were you exposed to discrimination in your social life due to your ethnic identity and being woman under the communist regime in Bulgaria?

23. Was it safe for a woman to go out at night in Bulgaria during the communist regime? Would you go out at night? If no, why?

24. Did you go on a holiday with your family? Did you go on a holiday alone?

Migration to Turkey and Life in Turkey

25. Could you tell me your immigration story? Why did you migrate? Where did you migrate?

26. Did you receive help from the Turkish State after migration to Turkey? What kind of help did you receive? Did it continue until you fully adapted to the life in Turkey?

27. Could you refer to the cultural differences between Turks in Bulgaria and Turks in Turkey?

Domestic Life:

28. After the migration, was there a change in the number of people in the household?

29. How did immigration affect your economic situation?

30. After migration to Turkey, did you receive help from your husband for household works and childrearing before migrating to Turkey? Did your receive help from your children for household works?

Working Life:

31. After migrating to Turkey, did you work outside home? ? Where did you work? If you worked, why? If not, why? What was your husband's reaction to your working outside home?

32. How was working conditions in Turkey?

33. Was there any difference in salaries between a man and a woman who had the same job and who had the same seniority in Turkey?

34. Was there any difference in the preferred working areas of women and men in Turkey?

35. Were you exposed to discrimination in your working place in Turkey due to your ethnic identity and being woman?

36. Did you receive help from the Turkish State for childcare? What kind of help did you receive?

37. Did you use your maternity leave? How much time have you used it?

38. Have you encountered any problems in your workplace after your maternity leave because you have taken a break from work?

Social Life:

39. Can you talk about the effects of migration, working outside home (if any), household works, and childcare on your social life?

40. Did you have friends? How and when did you spend your time in your social life?

41. Were you exposed to discrimination in your social life due to your ethnic identity and being woman in Turkey?

42. Was it safe for a woman to go out at night in Turkey? Would you go out at night? If no, why?

43. Did you go on a holiday with your family? Did you go on a holiday alone?

Return to Bulgaria:

44. Could you talk about your decision to return to Bulgaria? Why did you decide to return to Bulgaria? Was this decision taken together with your family members?

45. Would you return if the communist regime did not collapse? Why?

Domestic Life:

46. How many people are living in the household now?

47. How did the return decision affect you economically? Can I learn your current economic situation?

48. After return to Bulgaria, did you receive help from your husband for household works and childrearing before migrating to Turkey? Did your receive help from your children for household works? Are these helps still going on today?

Working Life:

49. Did you keep working when you returned to Bulgaria? Where did/do you work? If you worked, why? If not, why? What was/is your husband's reaction to your working outside home?

50. After the collapse, how was working conditions in Bulgaria? How is the current situation?

51. After the collapse of the communist regime, were there any difference in salaries between a man and a woman who had the same job and who had the same seniority in Bulgaria? How is the current situation?

52. After the collapse in Bulgaria, was/is there any difference in the preferred working areas of women and men?

53. Were you exposed to discrimination in your working place in Bulgaria after the collapse due to your ethnic identity and being woman? How is the current situation?

54. After return to Bulgaria, Did you receive help from the Bulgarian State for childcare? What kind of help did you receive? Are these helps still going on today?

55. Did you use your maternity leave? How much time have you used it?

56. Have you encountered any problems in your workplace after your maternity leave because you have taken a break from work?

Social Life:

57. Komunist rejimin yıkılması, ev dışı çalışma (varsa), ev işleri ve çocuk bakımının sosyal hayatınız üzerindeki etkilerinden bahsedebilir misiniz?

58. Do you have friends? How and when do you spend your time in your social life?

59. Were/Are you exposed to discrimination in your social life due to your ethnic identity and being woman after return to Bulgaria?

60. Is it safe for a woman to go out at night in Bulgaria after the collapse? Are you going out at night? If no, why?

61. Do you go on a holiday with your family? Do you go on a holiday alone?

Two Regimes, Two States: The Equality of Woman and Man

Bulgaria under the Communist Regime:

62. In your opinion, were women and men equal under the communist regime in Bulgaria? On which issues were they equal, on which issues were they not equal? Did you see gender equality when it comes to household work and childcare?

Turkey, After Migration:

63. Did you think men and women were equal in Turkey? On which issues were they equal, on which issues were they not equal? Did you see gender equality when it comes to household work and childcare?

64. If you stayed in Turkey, what would your life be like as a Bulgarian Turkish immigrant and as a woman?

Bulgaria, Today:

65. In your opinion, are women and men equal in Bulgaria now? On which issues are they equal, on which issues are they not equal? Do you see gender equality when it comes to household work and childcare?

Self-Identity Questions

66. What does a woman's welfare depend on?

67. What should be the most important purpose in a woman's life?

68. What gives you confidence in yourself? What makes you feel worthless?

69. Is it important for women and men to take equal education? Why?

70. What are your thoughts about women's work?

71. When does a woman mature?

72. Can you make the definition of "free woman?" According to this definition, are you a free woman?

73. For what and for whom you would sacrifice yourself?

74. What course of action would make you rejected by your family and render you unforgivable in their eyes?

75. What are you most afraid of?

APPENDIX C: ODTÜ İAEK ETİK ONAY BELGESİ

UYGULAMALI ETİK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ
APPLIED ETHICS RESEARCH CENTER

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Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

Sayın Yrd. Doç. Dr. Besim Can ZIRH;

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız yüksek lisans öğrencisi Gizem KILIÇ'ın "***Bulgaristan'a Geri Dönüş Muamması: Bulgaristan Göçmeni Kadınların Sınırın iki Yakasındaki Deneyimleri üzerinden Öz- Kimliklerinin Oluşumuna dair bir İnceleme***" başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülerek gerekli onay **2017-SOS-058** protokol numarası ile **05.04.2017 – 30.07.2017** tarihleri arasında geçerli olmak üzere verilmiştir.

Bilgilerinize saygılarımla sunarım.

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APPENDIX D: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bulgaristan Türklerinin Bulgaristan'a geri dönüşü özel bir önem arz etmektedir çünkü 154,937 göçmen – 1989 yılında Türkiye'ye göçenlerin yaklaşık olarak yarısı – komunist rejim yıkıldıktan sonra Bulgaristan'a geri dönmeye karar vermiştir (Elchinova, 2005: 87). Bu çalışma, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Türkiye'deki ne tür deneyimlerinin, onları Bulgaristan'a geri dönüşe karar vermeye sevk ettiği ile ilgilidir. Bu çalışma, özellikle bu kadınların Türkiye'ye göç etmeden önce Bulgaristan'da, 1984 ile 1989 yılları arasında, çeşitli baskılara maruz kaldıklarını düşündüğümüzde önem taşımaktadır. Fakat, araştırmaya bu tür bir soru ile başlandığında varsayılan, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Bulgaristan'a istemli olarak geri döndükleriydi. Kısaca, bu tür bir varsayım ile Bulgaristan'a istemleri dışında geri dönen Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar göz ardı edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, söz konusu göçmenlerin Bulgaristan'a geri dönmek isteyip istemediklerine veya en azından aile büyüklerinin ya da eşlerinin geri gönüş kararı alma süreçlerine katılıp katılmadıklarına odaklanmak gerekmektedir. Sözün özü, bu çalışmadaki amacım Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Bulgaristan'a geri dönüş kararında üstlendikleri rolü bulmaktır.

Buna ek olarak, doğduğun yerden göç etmenin ve iki farklı rejim altında yaşamının kişinin öz-kimlik oluşumuna etkisi de araştırılacaktır. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışma, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların sınırın iki yakasındaki günlük deneyimleri göz önünde bulundurularak, öz-kimlik oluşumlarını analiz etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu demektir ki, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların sadece Bulgaristan'daki değil ayrıca Türkiye'deki deneyimleri üzerinde de durulacaktır çünkü söz konusu kadınlar, ülkelerin politik yapısından bağımsız olarak, erkeklere göre daha fazla zorlukla mücadele etmek zorunda kalmışlardır.

Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların öz-kimlik oluşumunu analiz etmek adına, saha çalışması Bulgaristan'ın Kırcaali şehrinde gerçekleşmiştir. Bu

doğrultuda, Türkiye'ye göç etmeden önce Kırcaali'de yaşayan, belirli zamanlarda Türkiye'ye göç eden ve Bulgaristan'a, çoğunlukla komunist rejim yıkıldıktan sonra, geri dönen ondokuz Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınla mülakat yapılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın metodolojisi tikel etnografyadır. Öncelikle, araştırmacı ve araştırılan kişiler arasında kurulan yakın ilişkinin önemine değinmek gerekmektedir. Araştırmacı ile mülakat yapılan kişiler arasındaki sınırları kaldırabilmek, yazarın yani araştırmacının otoritesini de ortadan kaldırabilmektedir. Otoriteyi ortadan kaldırmak için mülakat yapılan kişiler ile yakınlık kurmak çok önemlidir. Yakınlık kurmak bazı problemlere neden olsa da, kurulan yakınlık mülakat yaptığım kişilerin sömürülmesinin önüne geçmiştir. Bu araştırmanın kapsamı dahilinde, ikinci olarak, etnografi yapılırken nesnel cevaplar aramanın anlamsızlığı üzerinde durulmalıdır. Bu bağlamda, hem antropoloji hem de feminizmde nesnellik kavramının eleştirilerine odaklanmak önemlidir. Bu eleştirilere odaklanmak, feminist kaygıları olan antropologların kültür konseptini sorunsallaştırmaları gerektiği gibi bir sonuca varmama neden olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, "aynılık" veya "benzerlik" gibi kavramların da ötesine geçilmelidir. Bu sebepledir ki, etnografi yapılırken farkında olmamız gereken şey, etnografik gerçeklerin kısmi ve tamamlanmamış olduklarıdır (Clifford, 1986: 7).

Bu demektir ki, mutlak objektiflik denen bir şey yoktur. Etnografinin kısmi doğası göstermektedir ki antropologlar kültür konseptinin ötesine geçmelidir çünkü kültür; homojenlik, zamansızlık ve bütünlük gibi bazı çağrışımları da beraberinde getirmektedir (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 154). Bu çağrışımlar, etnografi yaparken genelleştirme yapmamıza sebep olmaktadır. Genelleştirme yapmak ise, etnografinin kısmi doğasını göz ardı ettiğimiz anlamına gelmektedir. Dolayısıyla, antropologlar kültüre *karşı* bir tutum takınarak yazmalıdırlar. Bu bağlamda, kültüre karşı yazmanın bir stratejisi olarak tikel etnografya metodu izlenerek bu araştırma yapılmıştır. Kısacası, belirli bir Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadını olmadığını gerçeği üzerinde durulacaktır. Bu sebepten dolayıdır ki, mülakat yaptığım kadınların Türkiye'ye göç etme yılları değişiklik göstermektedir. Kişilerin göç ettikleri yıla

bağlı olarak çeşitlilik gösteren göç deneyimleri Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar hakkında yerleşmiş bazı varsayımları yerinden sarsabilecektir. Diğer bir ifade ile, tikel etnografya ile genelleştirme yapmadan "geleneksel sosyal bilim açıklamaları"nın yerleşmiş düzeni bozulabilecektir (Ibid.: 153).

Sonuç olarak, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların öz-kimlik oluşumlarına dair analizim, tikel etnografyanın yardım ile, göstermiş oluyor ki belirli bir Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadın olmadığı gibi aynı zamanda Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların belirli bir kimlikleri de yoktur. Söz konusu kadınlara yüklenmiş olan ve doğdukları ülkenin politik durumuna, Türkiye Devleti'nin göçmenlere karşı değişen tutumuna, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Bulgaristan'a istemli ya da istemsiz geri dönüşlerine ve son olarak da şu an yaşadıkları ülkede, yani Bulgaristan'da, kendilerini nasıl gördüklerine bağlı olarak değişiklik gösteren birçok farklı kimlik vardır.

Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların öz-kimlik oluşumua dair analiz, söz konusu kadınların sınırın iki yakasındaki deneyimleri göz önünde bulundurularak yapılmıştır. Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların deneyimlerinden kast edilen, ilk olarak, söz konusu kadınların komunist rejim dönemindeki zorunlu çalışmalarından ötürü şekillenen iş deneyimleri ve Türkiye'ye göç etmeden önce Bulgaristan'daki çalışma koşullarıdır. İkincisi ise, Türkiye Devleti tarafından soydaş, legal göçmen ve illegal göçmen olarak görülmeleri üzerinden şekillenen göç deneyimleridir. Sonuncusu ise, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Bulgaristan'a geri dönüş deneyimleridir. Geri dönüş deneyimleri ise söz konusu kadınların istemli ya da istemsiz olarak geri dönmelerine bağlıdır. Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Türkiye deneyimleri onların Bulgaristan deneyimlerinden daha kötü olabilir mi? Bu soruyu cevaplandırmak adına, üzerinde durulması gereken nokta söz konusu kadınların, geri dönüş kararı aileleri içinde alınırken bu karara katılıp katılmadıklarıdır. Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların günlük deneyimleri Bulgaristan'a geri dönüş süreçlerini aydınlatmanın yanı sıra bu karara nasıl tepki verdiklerini de açığa çıkaracaktır. Dahası, söz konusu kadınların istemli ya da

istemsiz geri dönüş deneyimleri, onların Bulgaristan'da kendilerini nasıl gördüklerini de ortaya çıkaracaktır. Sonuç olarak, üç farklı zaman dilimine yayılan sınırın iki yakasındaki deneyimlerini karşılaştırarak – ki bu deneyimler iki ülkenin farklı rejimlerinden dolayı farklılık gösterecektir – amacım, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların deneyimlerinin öz-kimliklerinin oluşumuna etkisini analiz etmektir.

Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların öz-kimlik oluşumunu sınırın iki yakasındaki günlük deneyimleri göz önünde bulundurularak analiz etmeye onların, Türkiye'ye göç etmeden önce Bulgaristan'daki deneyimlerine odaklanarak başlanmıştır. Komunist rejim altında, söz konusu kadınların öz-kimlikleri çalışan, eş ve anne olarak inşa edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Bulgaristan'daki deneyimlerine değinilmeden önce, komunist rejim ile yönetilmiş ülkelerin toplumsal cinsiyet politikaları üzerinde durulmuştur. Karşılaştırma metodu antropoloji disipline için önem arz etmektedir çünkü bu metod birbirinden farklı olduğu varsayılan iki konunun birbirini aydınlatabildiğini göstermiştir (Arora-Jonsson, 2009). Bu sebeple, sadece Bulgaristan'ın toplumsal cinsiyet politikalarına değil, aynı zamanda Orta ve Doğu Avrupa'nın post-komunist ülkelerinin ve eski Sovyetler Birliği'nin de toplumsal cinsiyet politikalarına değinilmiştir. Komunist rejim sadece erkekleri değil aynı zamanda kadınları da iş gücüne katılmaya zorlamıştır. Kadınların iş gücüne zorunlu olarak katılması ise kadınları özgürleştirmek adı altında yapılmıştır. Fakat unutulmamalıdır ki, eğer kadın ve erkek ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı gibi bazı ev içi sorumlulukları eşit olarak paylaşmazlarsa, ev dışı çalışma özgürlüğe değil ancak ve ancak çifte yüke işaret edebilir.

Kırcaali'de mülakat yapılan Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar için denebilir ki, bazıları sadece çifte yüke değil, üçüncü bir yüke de maruz kalmışlardır. Kısaca açıklamak gerekirse, Bulgaristan Devleti, Kırcaali'nin köylerinde yaşayan Bulgaristan Türkü kadınları, başka bir işleri olmasına rağmen, tütün işçisi olarak da çalışmaya zorlamıştır. Fakat, bu durum her Bulgaristan Türkü kadın için geçerli

değildir. Örneğin, Kırcaali şehrinin merkezinde yaşayan Bulgaristan Türkü kadınlar tütün işçisi olarak çalışmamıştır.

Mülakatların sonucunda ortaya çıkan ise, söz konusu kadınların bazıları, ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı konusunda eşlerinden yardım alamamışlardır. Diğer taraftan, bazıları ise ev hayatının getirdikleri sorumlulukları eşleri ile paylaşmıştır. Bu veri gösteriyor ki, ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı konusunda yalnız kalan kadınlar kimliklerini, toplumun onlardan beklentileri doğrultusunda, eş ve anne olarak kurarken, komunist rejimin getirisi olan zorunlu çalışmadan dolayı, kimliklerini çalışan kadın olarak kuramamışlardır. Bu demek oluyor ki, eğer komunist rejim onları çalışmaya zorlamasaydı ve eğer ekonomik durumları Türkiye'ye göçten sonra kötü etkilenmeseydi, ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı söz konusu olduğunda eşlerinden yardım alamayan kadınlar, ev dışında çalışmayı tercih etmeyeceklerdi. Bu sebeple, ikinci iş olarak tütünde çalışan ve eşlerinden yardım alamayan kadınlar tütün işçiliğini omuzlarında üçüncü bir yük olarak değerlendirmektedir. Farklı olarak, ev hayatının sorumluluklarını eşleri ile paylaşan kadınlar, kimliklerini sadece anne ve eş olarak değil aynı zamanda çalışan olarak da kurabiliyorlar. Mülakat yapılan kadınların aktardıklarına göre, ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı adına eşlerinden yardım alan kadınların eşleri kendilerini çalışan, eş ve baba olarak değerlendiriyorlar. Bu sebepledir ki, ev işleri ve çocuk bakımı söz konusu olduğunda yalnız kalmayan kadınlar ev dışı çalışmayı ne çifte yük ne de üçüncü bir yük olarak değerlendiriyorlar. Sonuç olarak, onlar için ev dışı çalışmanın tanımı özgürleşme olmaktadır.

Bu demek değildir ki, kadınların çifte yüke maruz kalma durumu sadece komunist rejim ile sınırlıdır. Kadınlar, yaşadıkları ülkenin politik yapısından bağımsız olarak da çifte yüke maruz kalmaktadır. Bu sebeple, mülakat yapılan Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların sadece komunist rejim altındaki çifte yük deneyimlerine değil aynı zamanda Türkiye'ye göç ettikten sonraki çifte yük deneyimlerine de değinilmiştir. Mülakat yapılan söz konusu göçmenlerin deneyimleri göstermiştir ki, Türkiye'de de çifte yüke maruz kalmışlardır fakat

maruz kaldıkları çifte yük algısı belirli sosyal ve ekonomik etkenlere göre farklılık göstermiştir. Mülakat yapılan Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar Türkiye'de çifte yüke Bulgaristan'a oranla daha az maruz kaldıklarını dile getirmişlerdir.

Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Türkiye'ye göç ettikten sonra kimlikleri, Türkiye Devleti'nin göçmenlere karşı değişen tutumundan oluşuyordu; bu da, soydaş, legal göçmen ve illegal göçmen olmaktan ileri geliyordu. Türkiye'ye 1989 zorunlu göçü ile göç eden göçmenler soydaş olarak kabul edilmiş, dönemin başbakanı Turgut Özal tarafından anavatana davet edilmiş ve bir süre sonra vatandaşlık hakkı kazanmıştır (Danış & Parla, 2009: 139). Dönemin başbakanının, Bulgaristan'daki tüm Türkler gelene kadar sınır açık kalacaktır beyanına rağmen, Türkiye Devleti bir süre sonra sınırlarını kapatmıştır (Zang, 1989: 53). Türkiye sınırlarını kapattıktan sonra, Bulgaristan Türkleri için yalnızca iki seçenek vardı; biri vize başvurusunda bulunmak, diğeri ise sınırı yasadışı yollarlar geçmekti. Vize başvurusu yapıp sınırdan geçenler legal göçmen olarak görülmüş, fakat vize süreleri bittikten sonra ülkeyi terk etmek zorunda bırakılmışlardır. Vize başvurusunda bulunacak parası olmayanlar ise resmi bir izin olmaksızın sınırı geçmişlerdir. Onlara hükümet tarafında atfedilmiş olan sözde yasadışılık onları "yasadışı toplumsal alana" sokmuş ve açlığı, işsizliği, şiddeti hatta ve hatta ölümü tecrübe etmek zorunda bırakılmışlardır (De Genova, 2002: 427). Bu demek oluyor ki, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların öz algıları yani legal ya da illegal göçmen olmak, söz konusu göçmenlerin Türkiye'ye ne zaman göçtükleri ile doğru orantılıdır. Kısacası, şu sorunun cevabına odaklanmak gerekmektedir: Bulgarsitan Türkleri, Türkiye Devleti sınırın kapısını kapattıktan ve Bulgaristan Türklerini soydaş olarak görmekten vazgeçtikten sonra mı, yoksa önce mi Türkiye'ye göçtüler? Bu bağlamda, tikel etnografya, soydaş olmanın ve dolayısı ile vatandaş olmanın ne kadar muğlak kavramlar olduğunu ortaya çıkarmıştır.

Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmadaki amacım, diğerlerinin yanısıra, 1989 zorunlu göçü ile göçen ve soydaş olarak adlandırılan Bulgaristan Türkleri, 1990 sonrası Türkiye'ye vize ile göçen ve legal göçmen konumuna gelen Bulgaristan Türkleri ve

vizeye başvuramadıkları için illegal yollarla 1990 sonrası göç eden ve devlet tarafından illegal göçmen olarak adlandırılan Bulgaristan Türkleri arasındaki farka odaklanmaktır. Bu sebepledir ki, mülakat yaptığım kadınlar sadece 1989 zorunlu göçü ile göçenlerden oluşmamaktadır. Mülakat yaptıklarım arasında 1990 sonrası göç eden Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar da bulunmaktadır çünkü soydaş olmak, legal göçmen olmak ve illegal göçmen olmak, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar için çok önemli kimlik oluşumlarıdır. Sonuç olarak, soydaş, legal göçmen ve illegal göçmen olmak Türkiye Devleti'nin göçmenlere karşı değişen tutumları ile ilişkilidir. Bu bağlamda, soydaş kavramının ne kadar muğlak olduğu üzerine odaklanmak bir yana, legal ve illegal göçmen arasındaki farka ve bu farkın soydaşlık kavramı ile ilişkisine değinilmelidir.

Bulgaristan'a geri döndükten sonra ise, söz konusu göçmen kadınların kimlik oluşumu istemli ya da istemsiz olarak geri döndükleri ile bağlantılı olarak kuruluyor. Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların geri dönüş deneyimleri, onların Bulgaristan'da kendilerini nasıl gördüklerini de belirliyor, ki bu da kısmen onların istemli veya istemsiz dönüşleri ile ilintilidir. Bu bağlamda, istemli ya da istemsiz göçmen olma durumunun Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların benlik algısı ile arasındaki ilişkiye değinilmiştir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, şu sorunun cevabını da bulmak amaçlanmıştır: Kendilerini Bulgaristan'ın yerlisi mi yabancısı mı olarak görüyorlar?

Dönüş göçünü kavramsallaştırmada farklı yaklaşımlar vardır. Bu çalışmada, söz konusu istemli göçmenlerin deneyimleri "neo-klasik yaklaşım," "iş göçünün yeni ekonomi yaklaşımı" ve "yapısal yaklaşım" ile analiz edilebilir. Fakat, her göç istemli olmadığı için bu yaklaşımlar istemsiz göçmenlerin durumunu analiz etmek için yeterli değildir. Dahası, dönüş göçü literatüründe istemsiz göç ile zorunlu göçü ve istemsiz göçmenler ile mültecileri eşleştirme gibi ciddi bir eğilim vardır. Böyle bir eşleştirme, mülteci olmayan fakat duygusal olarak, yani aileleri tarafından – fiziki müdahale olmasa da – ülkelerine geri dönmeye zorlanmış bireylerin durumunu anlamamızı zorlaştırmaktadır. Duygusal olarak geri dönüşe zorlanan bireylerin durumunu anlamlandırmak için, ailesel ve bireysel göç arasında bir ayrım yapmak

önem arz etmektedir. Bu da, ancak ve ancak bireylerin detaylı bir şekilde deneyimlerine odaklanarak mümkün olabilir.

Daha iyi bir ifade ile, bir geri dönüşün istemli olup olmadığını analiz edebilmek için, ölçülmesi neredeyse *imkansız* olan bireysel deneyimler ve eğilimler üzerine odaklanmak gerekmektedir (Black et. al., 2004: 12). Bu imkansızlık, dönüş göçü literatüründe, geri dönen göçmenleri sığınmacı gibi objektif olarak ölçülebilire dönüştürme yönünde bir eğilime sebep olmaktadır. Kısacası, istemsiz göçmenleri (zorla göç edenleri) mülteciler ile, ya da ev sahibi ülkede siyasi kriz veya zulümden etkilenen göçmenler ile eşleştirmek gibi güçlü bir eğilim vardır (Bkz, Blitz et. al., 2005; Chimni, 2004; Kleist, 2017; Schreuder; 1996; Van Hear, 1995; Webber, 2011). Ne de olsa, göç eden birinin mülteci olup olmadığını belirleyebilmek, göç eden birinin istemsiz göçmen olup olmadığını belirleyebilmekten çok daha kolaydır. Bazı araştırmacıların, mültecilerin, örneğin ev sahibi ülkedeki yabancı düşmanlığı yapan medyadan – ki bu da, geri dönüş kararı üzerinde önemli bir role sahip olabilir – etkilenip etkilenmediklerini anlamak için "istemsiz göç" adlı yeni bir kategori oluşturmalarının nedeni de budur (Blitz et. al., 2005: 197).

Unutulmamalıdır ki, istemsiz olarak Bulgaristan'a geri dönüş yapan Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar mülteci değillerdir. Bu demek oluyor ki, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların geri dönmelerinde, Türkiye'de kendilerine karşı gerçekleştirilen yabancı düşmanlığı kaynaklı bazı tavırların veya Türkiye'nin siyasi koşullarının etkisi olmamıştır. Bulgaristan Türkü göçmenlerin geri dönüş kararı çoğunlukla aile arasında alındığı için, sadece mülteciler ve istemsiz göçmenler arasında değil, bireysel ve ailesel kararlar arasında da ayrım yapmak, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların geri dönüş deneyimlerini anlamak adına çok önemlidir. Daha iyi bir ifade ile, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların geri dönüş kararlarının istemli mi istemsiz mi olduğunu anlamak adına mülteciler ve istemsiz göçmenler arasında yapılan ayrım, söz konusu kadınların istemli ya da istemsiz göçlerini anlamayı daha da zorlaştırmaktadır; özellikle, Bulgaristan'a geri dönüş kararı aile üyeleri tarafından – çoğunlukla eşleri ve aile büyükleri tarafından

alındıysa. Mülakat yapılan kadınların hiçbirinin fiziksel anlamda zorlanarak geri dönmedikleri göz önünde bulundurulursa, geri dönüşleri istemli olarak değerlendirilebilir. Fakat, yapılan mülakatlar göstermektedir ki, söz konusu Bulgaristan göçmeni kadınlar susturulmuş, yani dönüş kararı eşlerin, annelerin ya da kız çocukların duyguları göz önünde bulundurulmadan alınmış ve fiziksel olarak değil fakat duygusal olarak aile üyeleri tarafından Bulgaristan'a geri dönmeye zorlanmışlardır. Bu nedenle, gönüllü olarak Bulgaristan'a geri dönüp dönmediklerini anlamak için bireysel ve ailesel kararlar arasında bir ayrım yapmamız gerekmektedir. Bireysel ve ailesel kararlar arasında bir ayrım yapmak yalnızca bireylerin deneyimlerine odaklanarak mümkün olabilir. Bireylere ve onların deneyimlerine odaklanmadığımızda, diğer bir ifade ile, tikel etnografya yapmadığımızda, ailenin kararının bireyin kendi kararı olduğunu gibi bir varsayıma kolayca varılabilir ve fiziksel anlamda değil fakat duygusal anlamda zorlanlanarak geri dönmek zorunda bırakılmış olduklarını göz ardı edebiliriz. Dahası, Bulgaristan Türkü kadınların geri dönüşünü degerlendirirken bu ayrımın dikkate alınmaması, söz konusu kadınların kesin olarak istemli bir şekilde döndükleri gibi bir sonucu varmamıza da neden olabilir. Bu bağlamda, tikel etnografya, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların Bulgaristan'a geri dönüşleri ile ilgili kesin genellemeler yerine subjektif, yani birey odaklı cevaplar verir.

Sözün özü, istemli ile istemsiz göç arasında, sığınmacı ile duygusal anlamda zorunlu göçe maruz bırakılan göçmen arasında ve bireysel göç ile ailesel göç arasındaki ayrıma dikkat çekerek, mülteci olmayan göçmenlerin istemli bir şekilde ülkelerine geri döndüklerine dair varsayımlar ortadan kalkabilir. Unutulmamalıdır ki, bu varsayım sadece dönüş göçü literatürü ile sınırlı değildir. Azınlık hakkı tartışmalarında da benzer varsayımları bulmak mümkündür. Bu nedenle, çalışmamın ana konusundan biraz sapmak pahasına azınlık hakları tartışmalarının en önemli isimlerinden Will Kymlicka'nın teorisine odaklanmak isterim. Kymlicka azınlıkları "ulusal azınlıklar" ve "göçmenler" olmak üzere iki gruba ayırır. Kymlicka'ya göre, göçmenler kendi kültürlerini bireysel ve ailesel göç sonucu

istemli olarak terk etmişlerdir ve bu nedenle ev sahibi ülkenin kültürüne entegre olmaları ve hatta entegre edilmeleri gerekmektedir (Kymlicka, 1995: 96). Öte yandan, Kymlicka'ya göre, ulusal azınlıkların kültürü, "önceden kendi kendini yöneten" ve "bölgesel olarak yoğunlaşmış kültürler" anlamına gelir ve bu sebeple ulusal azınlıklar, çoğunluk kültürünün yanında kendi farklı kültürlerini korumalıdırlar (Ibid.: 10). Bu bağlamda sorulması gereken soru şudur: Bulgaristan Türkleri ulusal azınlık mı yoksa Bulgaristan'ın göçmeni midir? Bu soruya net bir cevep yoktur. Bulgaristan Türkleri, Osmanlı döneminde Bulgaristan topraklarına yerleştirildiklerinden ve hala "bölgesel olarak yoğunlaşmış bir kültür" içersinde yaşadıklarından dolayı ulusal azınlık olarak görülmelidir. Bununla birlikte, çoğunlukla "Yeniden Doğuş Süreci"nin bir sonucu olarak Bulgaristan'dan göç etmişler ve daha sonra doğdukları yere geri dönmüşlerdir. Başka bir ifade ile, Türkiye'den göç ettiler ve Bulgaristan'a yerleştiler; bu da, Bulgaristan'da göçmen oldukları anlamına gelmektedir. Dahası, daha önce de belirtildiği üzere Kymlicka, göçmenlerin kendi özgün kültürlerini istemli olarak terk ettiklerini iddia eder. Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların ulusal azınlık değil de Bulgaristan'ın göçmeni olduğunu varsayarsak şunu da sormamız önem arz etmektedir: Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar Bulgaristan'a istemli bir şekilde mi geri döndüler?

Mülakat yapılan Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlardan bazıları, aile büyükleri ve eşleri tarafından Bulgaristan'a geri dönmeye fiziksel olarak zorlanmasalar bile, istemsiz bir şekilde Bulgaristan'a geri döndüklerini belirtmişlerdir. Bu durum, sadece istemli ve istemsiz göç arasında da ayrım yapabilmenin değil, ulusal azınlıklar ile göçmenler arasında ayrım yapabilmenin de zor olduğunu göstermektedir. Türkiye'ye göç ettikten sonra Bulgaristan'a geri dönen söz konusu kadınların Bulgaristan'a istemli ya da istemsiz olarak geri dönüşlerinin kendi öz-kimlik oluşumlarında oldukça etkili olduğunu düşünürsek bu geri dönüş türü (istemli ya da istemsiz) özellikle önemlidir, zira mülakat yapılan kadınların istemli veya istemsiz geri dönüşleri Bulgaristan'da kendilerini nasıl algıladıklarını belirlemiştir. Kısaca, yaşadıkları yerin yerlisi midirler yoksa yabancısı

mıdırlar? Mülakat yapılan söz konusu kadınların bazıları istemli bir şekilde Bulgaristan'a geri dönmüşlerdir ve sonuç olarak, anavatanlarına geri dönmüşlerdir. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye'deki kalış süreleri boyunca, Türkiye'nin diaspora üyeleri olarak görülmeleri gerekmektedir çünkü söz konusu kadınlar belirli bir vatana, yani Bulgaristan'a özlem duyuyorlardı. Mülakat yapılan söz konusu kadınlardan istemsiz bir şekilde geri dönenler de *hala* belirli bir vatana özlem duyuyorlar. Fakat bu vatan onlar için Türkiye'dir. Bulgaristan'a istemsiz dönüşlerinden dolayı, orada doğmuş olsalar bile, onları şu an yaşadıkları yerin, yani Bulgaristan'ın diaspora üyeleri olarak adlandırabiliriz. Bu demek oluyor ki, anavatan kavramı da sorunsallaştırılmalıdır.

Her ne kadar geri dönüş türü ile anavatan algısı arasında sıkı bir bağ olsa da, Bulgaristan'a geri dönen Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların anavatan algısını belirleyen çeşitli etkenler de vardır. Bu etkenler hangi sosyal ve ekonomik sınıfa dahil olduklarına, soydaş olarak kabul edilip edilmediklerine, legal göçmen olup olmadıklarına, göçten sonra Türkiye Devleti'nden maddi destek alıp almadıklarına, çifte yüke maruz kalıp kalmadıklarına, Bulgaristan'a mı Türkiye'ye mi özlem duyduklarına, "Yeniden Doğuş Süreci"nin en kötü tarafını deneyimleyip deneyimlemediklerine ve geri dönüş kararı aileleri içinde alınırken karar ile ilgili olarak kendi fikirlerini söyleyip söyleyemediklerine bağlı olarak çeşitlilik göstermektedir. Geri dönüşün farklı nedenleri olduğu gerçeği, Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınlar hakkında bir genelleme yapmanın imkansızlığını gözler önüne sermiştir.

Sonuç olarak, bu tez çalışmasında ilk olarak, belirli bir Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadını olmadığını, onların sınırın iki yakasındaki *farklı* deneyimlerine odaklanarak gösterilmiştir. Bu deneyimler, çifte yüke maruz kalıp kalmadıklarına, Türkiye'ye ne zaman göç ettiklerine, istemli bir şekilde mi yoksa istemsiz bir şekilde mi Bulgaristan'a geri döndüklerine ve kendilerini Bulgaristan'ın yerlisi mi yoksa yabancısı mı olarak gördüklerine bağlı olarak farklılık göstermektedir. İkinci olarak, 1990 sonrası legal göçmenleri ve 1990 sonrası illegal göçmenlerin durumuna

odaklanarak soydaşlığın ne kadar da muğlak bir kavram olduğunu göstermek amaçlanmıştır. Üçüncü olarak, istemsiz bir şekilde Bulgaristan'a geri dönen Bulgaristan Türkü göçmen kadınların deneyimlerine değinerek, sadece mültecilerin değil göçmenlerin de istemleri dışında yaşadıkları ülkeden göçe *duygusal* olarak zorlanabileceklerini gösterilmiştir. Son olarak ise, mülakat yapılan tüm Bulgaristan Türkü göçmeni kadınların, Bulgaristan'da doğmalarına, Bulgaristan Hükümeti tarafından çeşitli baskılara maruz kalmalarına, Türkiye'ye göç etmelerine ve Bulgaristan'a geri dönmüş olmalarına rağmen, onların farklı anavatan algıları olduğu gösterilmiştir.

APPENDIX E: THESIS PHOTOCOPYING PERMISSION FORM

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ■

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Kılıçlı
Adı : Gizem
Bölümü : Sosyal Antropoloji A.B.D.

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): The Mystery of Return to Bulgaria: Analyzing Self-Identity Construction of Bulgarian Turkish Immigrant Women Through Their Everyday Life Experiences on the Two Sides of the Border

TEZİN TÜRÜ: Yüksek Lisans ■ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ■

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: