

AN ANALYSIS OF ROLE THEORY:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN CHINA'S ROLE CONCEPTIONS

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AN ANALYSIS OF ROLE THEORY
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ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF ROLE THEORY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN CHINA’S ROLE CONCEPTIONS

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Objective. This thesis illuminates a changing pattern of identity and discourse in Chinese Foreign Policy in the last three decades by employing role theory and its very core concept which is assumed to be the ultimate source of motivation: National Role Conceptions. As an inductive typology, National Role Conceptions are defined as policymaker’s own definitions of general kinds of decisions, commitments or rules suitable to their state. *Method.* Latent content analysis was conducted to four Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping. it was done by counting the recurring words which reflects the ideology or the role in one of those national role conceptions. *Main Argument.* A change towards self-contained, ideologically Communist to more assertive, active identity in China is observable where China seeks more regional power while getting away from its ‘development first’ policy. *Contribution to the literature.* The primary aim of this thesis is to contribute to the existing knowledge and literature of role theory by analysing the pre-existing “national role conceptions” of China and perhaps to find a regular pattern to explain the transformation in a rigorous framework. This will enable one to understand the presence of a change or continuity in Chinese decision-making processes of Chinese leaders and if there is a change, how can we interpret it?

Keywords: China, Content Analysis, Foreign Policy, National Role Conceptions, Role Theory.

ÖZ

ROL TEORİ ANALİZİ: ÇİN KAVRAMLARINDA DEĞİŞİM VE DEVAMLILIK

Çağla, Kılıç

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler

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Amaç Bu çalışma, devletlerin dış politikalarının yönetici elitlerin dış politika rol tasavvurları tarafından şekillendiği varsayımına dayalı olan rol kuramını kullanarak, 1982’den günümüze kadar süren Çin’in çeyrek asırlık dış politika davranışındaki ulusal rol kavramlarındaki değişimini gözler önüne sermektedir. Tümevarımsal tiplendirmeden gelen rol kuramı, yönetici elitlerin devletlerine uygun gördükleri en genel anlamda kararları, kuralları ve sorumluluklarını tanımlamalarıdır. *Yöntem* Rol kuramı ve içerik analizi uygulayarak, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin ve Deng Xiaoping’in dış politika rollerinin analizi yapılmıştır. İçerik analizi liderlerin konuşmaları içerisinde geçen, liderlerin ideolojilerini veya o ulusal rol kavramlarından birini yansıttığı düşünülen kelimeleri sayarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. *Bulgular* Daha içe kapanık ve ideolojik olarak Komünist değerlere yoğun bir şekilde bağlı bir Çin rolünden ziyade kendine daha çok güvenen, daha iddialı ve aktif olan bir Çin rolü tespit edilmiştir. *Yazın’a Katkıları* Bu tezin asıl amacı mevcut rol kuramı yazınına Çin’in rollerini inceleyerek katkıda bulunmak ve bu roller arasında devamlılık mı yoksa değişim mi olduğunu anlayarak, roller arasında belirli bir düzen olup olmadığını saptayabilmektir. Bu vesileyle bu roller arasındaki değişimin nasıl yorumlanabileceğini de ayrıntılı şekilde anlatabilmektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Çin, Dış Politika, İçerik Analizi Rol teori, Ulusal Rol Kavramları.

To my grandparents...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARİSM	iv
ABSTRACT	vi
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION.....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xi
LIST OF TABLES	xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiv
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ROLE CONCEPTION AS FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS.....	5
2.1. Social Constructivism.....	6
2.2. Foreign Policy Analysis and Role Theory	16
2.3. Literature Review and Foreign Policy Roles of China.....	21
2.3.1. Literature Review	21
2.3.2. Foreign Policy Roles of China.....	28
3. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING SYSTEM IN THE POST- MAO ERA	38
3.1. Foreign Policy Development in the Post-Mao Era.....	38
3.2. Foreign Policy Decision Making System	43
3.3. Foreign Policy Ideologies.....	45
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SELECTION	47
4.1. The Methodology of Content Analysis and the coding table	47
4.2. Sources of the Speeches and the Time Period.....	52
5. DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS	62

5.1. Internal Development National Role Conception	64
5.3. Defender of the Faith Role Conception	70
5.4. Tianxia National Role Conception	75
5.5. Nation State National Role Conception.....	79
5.6. Regional Leadership National Role Conception	84
5.7. Other (minor) National Role Conceptions.....	90
6. CONCLUSION	95
REFERENCES.....	100
1. Primary Sources.....	100
a. Speeches of Deng Xiaoping	100
b. Speeches of Jiang Zemin:	103
c. Speeches of Hu Jintao:	105
d. Speeches of Xi Jinping:	107
e. Other Primary Sources	108
2. Secondary Sources.....	108
APPENDICES	
A. CONTENT ANALYSIS RESULTS.....	115
A1. Content Analysis coding sheets for Xi Jinping (2013-...).....	116
A2. Content Analysis coding sheets for Hu Jintao (2003-2013)	131
A3. Content Analysis coding sheets for Jiang Zemin (1993-2003).....	147
A4. Content Analysis coding sheets for Deng Xiaoping (1978-1993).....	164
A5. General Statistics for Xi Jinping	185
A6. General Statistics for Hu Jintao	186
A7. General Statistics for Jiang Zemin.....	187
A8. General Statistics for Deng Xiaoping	188
B. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....	189
C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	199

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 1: Coding Sheet	63
Table 2: General Data of al Chinese Leaders.....	59
Table 3: The change in all role conceptions.....	64
Table 4: The change in the Internal Development Role Conception	68
Table 5: The Change in the Developer Role Conceptions.....	70
Table 6: Defender of the Faith Role Conception	75
Table 7: The Change in Tianxia Role Conception.....	78
Table 8: The Change in Nation-State Role Conception.....	84
Table 9: Regional Leadership Role Conception	88
Table 10: The Change in the Asianism Role Conception	92
Table 11: The Change in the Liberation Supporter Role Conception	92
Table 12: The Change in the Civilization Role Conception	92
Table 13: Most Common National Role Conceptions in the Chinese Leaders.....	93

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
US	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

'You never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.' R. Buckminster Fuller¹

The complex and many faceted role that is played by China still is a significant area of analysis for many scholars especially in contemporary international relations. Chinese politics which is developed over a period of nearly three decades, has always been an interesting area of research and debate. The need for the world to understand China is not much of a secret. Chinese economy is on the track to become the largest in the world already by 2030 while China will be the key actor in resolving many of world's conflicts and problems including North Korea, Middle-East, South China Sea and India. Today most of the international relations experts and scholars consider China as a politically rising entity mostly due to its economic rise where it came second in the International Monetary Fund's 2011 ranking of countries by nominal GDP². China is becoming a significant international actor and it is pivotal to the determination of world politics. In this respect, determination of Chinese foreign policy and understanding their next political move becomes cardinal. Simultaneously, this has created an awareness of comprehending China's political mindset where it has been

¹ This quotation was utilized in order to emphasize the Chinese foreign policy strategy. Mr. Fuller was a 20th century inventor and visionary who was born in Massachusetts in 1895. He has dedicated his life to solve the global problems of housing, shelter, education, poverty and transportation. He has held 28 patents, authored 28 books, received 47 honorary degrees so far. see "About Fuller" *bfi.org* last accessed: January 16, 2016. <https://bfi.org/about-fuller>.

² Kourish Ziabari, "China's role in International Affairs: an Interview with Professor Zhiqun Zhu," *foreignpolicyjournal.com* last accessed: June 2, 2017. <https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2012/05/31/chinas-role-in-international-affairs-an-interview-with-prof-zhiqun-zhu/>

viewed as a “threat” by some states while some countries praised China’s rise as an “opportunity” and finally an “alternative” depending on our angle. It is essential to realize whether China is actually a “threat,” a real “opportunity,” both a “threat” and “opportunity” or neither by interpreting and analyzing its foreign policy behaviors. The interest towards determining Chinese foreign policy also aid to the emergence of the literature on “Chinese role conceptions.” This literature which is analyzing the Chinese foreign policy decision making process could be considered as an answer to these proliferating demands and to increase the consciousness of the governing philosophy of the Chinese leaders by presenting the roles that they are casting for their own country in the near and remote future since it reveals the decision-making process of the Chinese leaders to an extent. Hereafter, all these variables make this area of analysis worth exploring.

What does the Chinese think? And Can Role Theory provide us the necessary tools to understand it? Being less ambitious for now, this thesis mainly focuses on four questions in this thesis: (1) what are the national role conceptions of the Chinese leaders? (2) Did these national role conceptions changed or continued? (3) If they changed, what kind of a change was that? Is it possible to find a pattern towards something meaningful? (4) How can this result be interpreted? Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to contribute to the existing knowledge and literature of role theory by examining the pre-existing “national role conceptions” of China and perhaps to find a regular pattern to explain the transformation in a rigorous framework to understand whether there is a change or continuity in the decision-making processes of China and if there is a change, how can we interpret it?

To find answers to those questions, this thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is introduction to thesis where the topic, aim, methodology, sources and the overall plan of the thesis is explained briefly. In the second chapter, the theoretical underpinnings which are drawn from role theory is explicated. The roles for China is determined by exploring Constructivism, the Chinese role theory literature and

Foreign policy role theory scholarship. Significant concepts such as role state, ego state, image, identity, role maker, role taker is examined in a rigorous framework. In the theory part, the effects of the Chinese philosophical background such as Confucianism and Taoism on role theory will be explained and the importance of a “Chinese” way of reading the role theory will be emphasized. What is more, this chapter also explains the sources of the Chinese national role conceptions. Both primary and secondary sources were utilized in this thesis. Primary sources included public speeches and press conferences of current President of People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, former presidents of PRC Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping. Within the secondary sources, there were related books, newspaper news, online and printed articles. The sources of “national role conceptions,” comes from two articles: Chih Yu-Shih’s “Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State versus the Ego State”³ article and Holsti’s “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” national role conceptions were utilized. From Chih’s article, “Nation-state,” “Asianism,” “Civilization” and “*Tianxia*” in addition to the “internal development,” “developer,” “example,” “defender of the faith,” “regional leader,” “active independent” and “liberation supporter” role conceptions from Holsti’s article were taken as a basis for the thesis.

In the third chapter, Chinese Foreign Policy decision making system in the Post-Mao Era is provided in order to understand the background of the Chinese leaders and their roles in a better sense. Although it is probable that Chinese leaders may have different affiliations, the roles that they ascribe upon their country might not be that different since the leadership seems to have a diverse ‘tradition’ that democratic countries lacks. if a regular pattern of change in national role conceptions were to be discovered, then it might also contribute to our existing knowledge and assumptions to an extend of how China positions itself within this larger structure in the long run and try to proceed to her aims.

³ Chih-Yu Shih, “Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State Versus The Ego State,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 (2012), 71.

In the fourth chapter, Methodology and data selection is explained. This chapter focused on the detailed explanation of content analysis (the methodology of the thesis), the coding table, the sources of the speeches, the time period of the study, literature review and the Foreign Policy roles of China. In the methodology part, significant concepts such as latent content analysis and the implementation of hand coding on the role theory for the Chinese case is explained in a rigorous framework. The methodological frameworks which are drawn from role theory is explicated. Methodologically, latent content analysis, or in other words, the hand coding is conducted to analyze the national role conceptions in the speeches of these four Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping in order to delimit the computer faults or deficiencies. The latent content analysis is performed by counting the recurring words which reveals the ideology in one of those national role conceptions.

The fifth chapter identifies the results of the content analysis conducted to four Chinese leaders, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping and Deng Xiaoping and is followed by their background information and comparison of their results. The purpose of this section is to examine their fractions and to realize their role tendencies to have a better grasp of the overall thesis. Then it will scrutinize the results that are derived from the content analysis in detail. It will try to find whether there is a regular pattern of national role conceptions in Chinese Foreign Policy from 1982 to 2015 or not by supporting it with concrete cases. The last chapter will be conclusion where it will overall summarize and remind the findings of the thesis. Thus it will answer the original questions of the thesis that were asked previously.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ROLE CONCEPTION AS FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

This chapter will be more conceptual and theoretical rather than being empirical. It will firstly summarize the theoretical background of the study in order to comprehend the logic and significance of understanding national role conceptions for foreign policy behaviors. Then it will summarize the conceptual framework of foreign policy analysis while including the fundamental terminologies used in the role theoretical literature by providing the theoretical underpinnings of the previous studies of the scholars who studied in this area previously. It will introduce Social Constructivism, Chinese School of International Relations and Literature Review and Foreign Policy Roles of China respectively.

Firstly it should be emphasized that the definition of foreign policy cannot be reduced to a single theoretical approach. The significant part in foreign policy analysis is usually the focus on the actor or the group. Hence, the focus on the decision-maker is usually more important than deciding the theory.⁴ Foreign policy analysis has an actor-specific focus rather than an actor-general focus. Actor-specific focus assumes that whatever occurs between nations is based on the single or group human decision makers⁵. Similarly, this thesis will focus on the leaders as the human decision makers. Instead of “black boxing” the state, a deep analysis will be conducted to the Chinese leaders.

⁴ Drury et al, “Note from the Editors,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6 (2010), 188.

⁵ Valarie Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005), 1.

This thesis will specifically focus on the role theory, Chinese School of IR and also social constructivist approach as its broader theoretical background rather than neoclassical realism, cognitive theory or rational choice. A brief knowledge about Constructivism will also be provided in order to comprehend the direction of the study since role theory and constructivism have a lot in common and it would be ignorant not to mention this approach. Even though the Constructivist approach does not provide what rational and cognitive approaches can provide, it focuses on the social creation not only in the “environment” but also it focuses on its effect on the “identity” problematic.⁶ Therefore, constructivism, role theory and National Role Conceptions provide a rich analysis of foreign policy. Considering the Chinese School of IR, a Chinese perspective is thought to be necessary in order to grasp the Chinese way of approaching International Relations and decision making process. A Chinese interpretation of role theory will also be provided in this chapter in order to interpret the results of the data analysis more properly and as objective as possible.

2.1. Social Constructivism

International Relations Theories not only enlightens us about the world problems by providing certain frameworks, systematic relations and regular correlations between different countries and cases, but also broaden our horizon and enable us to have a critical approach to the world as a whole. Every theory should be examined and analyzed with the awareness that there is no one, single theory that could explain everything happening comprehensively in the international realm of politics.⁷ While defining the concepts, historical and philosophical foundations in the approaches, it is unequivocal to approach how these concepts were handled, addressed and embraced by Constructivism is critical when explicating their depiction of the world, their

⁶ Drury et al, “Note from the Editors,” 189.

⁷ Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003) 311-347.

definition of the most fundamental problems of International Relations (IR) and their strategy or suggested “course of action” in handling these problems.⁸ Subsequently, this section will assess the approach by emphasizing the promises it made toward the resolution of world's challenges, its performance in fulfilling its promises, its audience and collaborators in solving these problems and finally its performance record so far. While critically engaging with this approach, meta-theoretical debates such as positivism and post-positivism or reflectivism and rationalism will be utilized as a better comprehended ontological, epistemological and methodological comparison entails. In this section, the conventional Constructivism will be taken into consideration rather than the Critical (holistic) Constructivism due to its unprecedented similarity with Post-Structuralism.

Constructivism was introduced for the first time by the scholar Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in 1989. It is still a controversial issue whether Constructivism is a ‘theory’ or not. In the light of Hopf’s and Kratochwil’s views, Constructivism cannot be regarded as a “theory” of its own. It would be more appropriate to label it as an ‘approach’ rather than a theory.⁹ Due to this controversy, in this thesis, Constructivism will be addressed as an ‘approach’ rather than a “theory.” According to Onuf, Constructivism's main purpose is to make 'it feasible to theorize about matters that seem to be unrelated'.¹⁰ It proposes alternative understandings of some of the IR concepts such as; anarchy, state identity, balance of power, elaboration of power and how the change can be acquired in international politics.¹¹ Although not denying that individuals and groups are the part of the international system, the main actors, the main relevant group or the main political groups in Constructivism are regarded to be the territorial states, today's

⁸Ersel, Aydınlı. “Theory of International Relations” Lecture, Bilkent University, Ankara, September 7, 2016.

⁹ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23:1 (1998), 196.

¹⁰ Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual”, in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf & P. Kowert (Eds), (London: N.E. Sharpe) 1.

¹¹ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, 172.

organized autonomous political communities.¹² It can be inferred that monopoly of force, its legitimacy, sovereignty and its corporate nature were conferred by the group of individuals, namely the society. In this vein, that is also why the main “decision-makers” of the state are regarded as the policymakers of the state.

When looking at the Constructivist's depiction of the world, the most fundamental proposition is that “human beings are social beings” and it is the social relations that construct us into who we are now.¹³ Most of the entities in the world are constructed by the human beings. However it should also be taken into consideration that it does not mean that there are no 'brute facts' independent of human construction.. It can be seen in Onuf's article that Constructivism is “minimal foundationalist.” Constructivists takes a minimum ground of truth as it does not deny the existence of the concrete world, certain facts and realities which enables us to view it closer to mainstream IR. By the same token, it does not ascribe a negative meaning to rules (which help agents to achieve their intended goals), standards, norms or even to the agents who construct the structure. What is more, it is emphasized that rules provide agents the opportunity to make rational **choices**.¹⁴ Hence, there is the freedom of either following the rule or not with its consequences of both. A negative connotation was not assigned to institutions as well which is considered to be the social arrangements with stable formations or patterns of the rules, with certain purposes and practices which reflects agents' interests.¹⁵ Nonetheless, that does not mean that Constructivists does not recognize that institutions may “work to the advantage of some agents at the expense of others.”¹⁶ Similarly, as Onuf suggests, “structure” or in his terms the “social

¹² Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” *European Journal of International Relations* 9,4 (2003), 504.

¹³ Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual”, in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf & P. Kowert (Eds), (London: N.E. Sharpe). 8

¹⁴ Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual”, in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf & P. Kowert (Eds), (London: N.E. Sharpe). 8

¹⁵ Onuf, “Constructivism,” 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

arrangement” has been formed by the stable pattern of rules, unintended consequences and institutions where the change is possible.¹⁷ In as much as it is understood, there is an unseen reality, structure or a phenomena which can affect the agents. But the reality or the structure is “what observers see” and it is the institutions that “agents act within” hence there is the existence of a structure where agents can “institutionalize” it.¹⁸ Constructivism's emphasize to the “rational conduct” of achieving goals and the rationality of agents facing with choices and its focus on “structure” makes it to share some common grounds with neo-realists. Even though most Constructivists have presented certain critiques to the rationalism, this was not the whole scale rejection of the scientific method unlike Post-structuralism.¹⁹ Wendt further argues for the inevitability of a world state which can be considered as the local realization of a “larger state” consisting the universal security community, a collective identity, universal collective security and a universal supranational authority within and depending on the teleological explanations consisting of material causation, efficient/upward causation, formal/downward causation and final causation.²⁰ Considering the question of how to achieve world peace, or for Constructivists, the world state, Constructivists are looking at the construction of history and its “end-states” to find a reliable answer to that question. Just as Hobbes' rationale which justifies that people wanted to form a “social contract” in order to escape the “brutal, nasty and short” state of nature, similarly states would also like to escape from the unstable and nasty structure of the international system. Hence, the world state would be achieved due to several reasons; the instability of the territorial states in the long run because of the struggle for recognition (caused by individual identities and material

¹⁷ Ibid., 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.,5.

¹⁹ K. M. Fierke, “Constructivism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 189.

²⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” *European Journal of International Relations* 9,4 (2003), 503.

competition) and anarchy,²¹ physical equality and vulnerability of human beings, increase in the violence interaction capacity (states cannot provide security for their members anymore), security dilemma, development of technology²² and most importantly, the need for an identity-change. The realist, Hobbesian arguments of why there would be the emergence of states and thus anarchy seems to be legitimizing the Wendt's argument of exactly why this would lead to a world state however it certainly is not enough to depict the formation of a world state without including the element of "identity-change."²³

Alexander Wendt constructs five stages before the construction of a world state; the system of states (stage of complete non-recognition just like Hobbes' state of nature), the society of states (recognition is in the state level in terms of legal sovereignty-citizens of those states are not recognized and there is the existence of certain rules, shallow collective identity, limited cooperation and constraints), world society (where the immediate problem of war resolved, emergence of the universal pluralistic security community and thicker form of solidarity), collective security (mutual recognition of both individuals and states, existence of non-violent dispute resolution, Kantian collective security but 'consent' still exists) and finally the world state through 'the progressive amplification of intentionality from individuals and groups. (where it would be a minimum condition for a just world order).²⁴ However while bearing in mind that subsequent forward movement would continue, it is not necessarily the case that these follow one another respectively during those processes. It is always possible to descend back as it can be seen in World War II.²⁵

²¹ Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable," 507.

²² Ibid., 508.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 525.

²⁵ Ibid., 520.

Constructivists use the language or discourse as a mean, a technique rather than as an end in itself or rather than taking it as the only variable. The discourses are addressed as the speech acts in Onuf's article.²⁶ As Onuf states "*saying is doing*": One way of constructing the world is through discourse or in other terms, speech acts.²⁷ The reiteration of speech acts constructs the conventions which are considered to be the weak form of normative rules and when they become legalized (agents are inclined to do that), they would be formal rules which makes the international politics clearer, stable and more predictable. Regimes, on the other hand, are defined as the families of rules and state practices.²⁸ The approach also has a "two-way process" or a mutual construction for most of the patterns and relations that make up each other in a continuous and reciprocal way such as "society-people", "society-rules" and "structure-agent."²⁹ This two-way process has been defined by the micro and macro perspectives in which in the former it emphasizes the bottom-up process of self-organization involving efficient causation and in the latter, it indicates the top-down process of structural constitution involving formal causation where "final causation" emerges from their interaction and thus making it intrinsically teleological.³⁰ What is more, Wendt suggest that if it a self-help world today, this is because of the process, not the structure.³¹ It is considered that the ignoring either the upward causation or the downward causation seems to be reductionist.³²

²⁶ Onuf, "Constructivism: A User's Manual", 9.

²⁷ Ibid., 1.

²⁸ Ibid.,12.

²⁹ Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," 172.

³⁰ Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable," 498.

³¹ Alexander Wendt "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." *International Organization* 46.02 (1992): 394

³²Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable," 499.

Most of the arguments of Constructivism consists rationalist essence, making it closer to mainstream IR theories in terms of its epistemology and ontology. But Constructivism's ontology emphasizes a “social ontology” rather than the individualist ontology of rationalism.³³ Wendt ontologically seems to drive conclusions from neorealism and accepts that some of his arguments are structural such as viewing security as the end point where the logic of anarchy is about that struggle but he includes “recognition” rigorously as the secondary element (assuming that security comes first since one cannot enjoy recognition when he is dead) to his argument as well.³⁴ He argues that this struggle for recognition which is considered to be the bottom-up aspect of his argument operates in two levels which could be addressed as between individuals (taking place within the global level like the global civil society) and between groups (taking place within states).³⁵ Whether it be thick or thin, asymmetrical or symmetrical recognition, it justifies that the maintenance or the construction of a distinct identity or the “self” depends on alter or exists via the “other.”³⁶ In the formation of identity, the importance of the other cannot be denied. It is also defined as the Ego and Alter by the Wendt which explains that their interaction may also result in the actor-observer bias and the attribution error.³⁷ Agents can be aware of their identities by the existence of other.³⁸ Hence, the mutual recognition or the emergence of collective identity entails the construction of the “we” understanding rather than “us” and “you” which could then lead to a “society of states” just like the EU countries exhibiting solidarity. Identities are necessary mostly to create a minimal

³³ K. M. Fierke, “Constructivism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 190

³⁴ Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” 510.

³⁵ Ibid., 516.

³⁶ Ibid., 511.

³⁷ Wendt “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,” 404.

³⁸ Onuf, “Constructivism,” 7.

level of predictability via the predictable patterns of behavior emerging from the state's identity and create a minimal level of order.³⁹

Constructivism has also introduced new terms such as “inter-subjective sociality,” “inter-subjective knowledge”⁴⁰ and mutual interaction of “agent-structure” relationship. The inter-subjective social context, produced by the social practices, enables the emergence of a meaningful behavior.⁴¹ Otherwise, the absence of it would result in chaos. Identities’ main functions are to maintain the existence of “self,” enable you to predict other's behavior and have an affect with respect to the choices of action, preferences in particular circumstances. The identities, as variables depending on historical, political and cultural context, are produced each and every day while others' identities simultaneously are perceived by the states' attributions to them. The significant point here is the fact that “identity” of other is independent of their own “making” where the state interests are formed accordingly due to the assumption that interests are part of the process of identity formation. It mostly depends on the state's perception and attribution in which “the inter-subjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning.”⁴² Hence, it can be inferred that the identity is a social construction itself as well where it will not exist without the presence of an “alter” which also justifies the Constructivist claim that human beings (their identity formation) cannot exist without a social other.

Returning to the “recognition” aspect, this recognition should be symmetrical (makes it more stable in the long run) via the mutual recognition of other's equality (which is also a precondition for freedom) and the thick recognition should not cause violence as well in order to realize a world state, otherwise it would continue to be one of the

³⁹ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 175.

⁴⁰ Wendt "Anarchy is what states make of it," 396.

⁴¹ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 173.

⁴² Ibid., 175.

causes of conflict and struggle.⁴³ What is more, this recognition should also be given “freely,” otherwise it would be not wise to call it as “recognition” at all.⁴⁴ States have a wider spectrum of choices where those choices are constrained by not only the structure itself but also the practices, identities and interests of other actors. In addition to that, it is argued that Constructivism not only argues for the importance of material power in the international arena but also for the discursive power.⁴⁵ Constructivism also brings a new taste to Waltz's “balance of powers” as well by assuming that states do not ally against powers. They balance against particular kinds of powers which are threats. Therefore they argue for the “balance of threats” theory.⁴⁶

Considering the concept of international-society, being ruled heteronomously, it was the role of states as the primary agents in addition to some secondary agents of some officers of international organizations where the actions of states can be inferred as more limited due to the existence of more formal rules and recognition of other states' independence.⁴⁷ “Anarchy” is defined as the condition of rule where there is the existence of sovereign states in the realm of world politics, not the absence of rule which would be termed as chaos.⁴⁸ As Wendt says “Anarchy is what states make of it.”⁴⁹ It is also considered as an imagined community due to its structural but mutually constituted nature.⁵⁰ According to Hopf, Wendt's famous saying “Anarchy what states make of it” does not necessarily imply or offer any promise of change in the international structure. Instead, it implies that there would be a wider array of state

⁴³ Wendt, “Why a World State is Inevitable,” 512.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 525.

⁴⁵ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 177.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 186.

⁴⁷ Onuf, “Constructivism,” 16.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁹ Wendt “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics.” 395.

⁵⁰ Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 174.

actions than only self-help due to the different understandings of 'anarchy' where anarchy needs to be interpreted to have a meaning.⁵¹ Considering the concept of change in world politics, Constructivists are more akin to the Neorealist understanding. Even though they do not offer any hope for change, they believe that change is possible since there is a potential for change but it is difficult to attain. Nevertheless, Constructivism does offer the “how” and “where” questions of change if it occurs.⁵²

On the one hand, there is the theoretical, methodological and epistemological distance between constructivism and some other IR theories like post-structuralism such as its common concerns with neorealism and “minimal foundationalist” essence but on the other hand, they share many foundational elements as well such as their constructed, contested, interactive and process-like assumptions.⁵³ For post-structuralists, language is not only ontologically significant but also emphasize the fact that “to understand language as political is to see it as a site for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while others are simultaneously excluded.”⁵⁴ Constructivism make a promise toward the resolution of world challenges via its analysis of the emergence of a world state. It can be seen from that the main audience in solving these problems for Constructivism have been the “states”. Their performance in fulfilling its promises have not been very successful considering the fact that a world state have not been realized yet. While deriving their depiction of the world from a more historical perspective, their most fundamental problems of IR have been the lack of thin and thick recognition among the states, different interpretations of identity and anarchy. Their strategy for solving these problems were mainly providing “free” recognition and a more positive interpretation of state identities.

⁵¹ Ibid., 180-181.

⁵² Ibid., 180.

⁵³ Ibid., 182.

Constructivism also differs from critical approaches with its “simultaneous engagement with *meta-theoretical scholarship* and emphasis upon employment substantive *empirical analysis*.”⁵⁵ In other words, it could be inferred that Constructivism is more prone to be addressed as a “minimal foundationalist” or “critical interpretist.” *The area of concern* for Constructivism shares more common grounds with Neorealism rather than critical approaches. The construction of “*knowledge*” is also of concern for Constructivism. Constructivists view the knowledge construction in a more teleological way from a mutual interaction of both bottom-up and top-down perspectives. The way how Constructivism embrace and inquire phenomena is that they conceive that the reality exists and there are some *objective* “facts” out there in the world. They use language as a mean, a technique or a tool for understanding the “real” world. There is the different interpretation of the same “reality” at issue. Considering the operations of *language*, according to Constructivism, states have certain identities which realize intentions through using language or discourse as a mean.

2.2. Foreign Policy Analysis and Role Theory

In this thesis, a conceptual framework in foreign policy analysis will be utilized: the role theory. Role Theory, being defined as social positions⁵⁶, is not only an interdisciplinary approach by including sociology, social psychology and anthropology, but also it has a descriptive conceptual language, an organizational value where it uses different levels of analysis such as individual level, system level and systemic level. It offers a new perspective on agents and structure by providing an innovative approach to Constructivism as well and thus provides an explanatory value

⁵⁵Mayam Behravesch “Constructivism: An Introduction” last accessed: December 25, 2015
<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/02/03/constructivism-an-introduction/> last modified: Feb. 3, 2011.

⁵⁶ Cameron Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.” ISA Compendium Project. Ed: Robert E. Denmark. Blackwell Publishing (2010), 30.

to the thesis.⁵⁷ Will United states be able to protect its superpower status co? Will China become a hegemonic power? Is European Union an ethical power or a haven for peace and stability? All these questions aim at the roles that states play in world affairs. The concept of “role” developed originally by sociologists. It is the assumptions or values that individuals accept and bring to their own behaviors and interactions with others.⁵⁸

When scholars began to ascertain the regular behavioral patterns of classes of states like “satellite state” or “allies” during the cold war, a new theory began to emerge and enter into Foreign Policy Analysis: the Role Theory⁵⁹ where this concept of “role” from sociology was for the first time borrowed to apply it to states by Holsti following his seminal article in 1970.⁶⁰ Since then, a growing number of scholars has emphasized the presence of an expanding number of social roles such as mediator, leader and counter roles like aggressor or follower.⁶¹ The first scholars in Role Theory scholarship focused on the ego part of the roles which were the self-conceptualizations of a state’s purpose by its leadership and as a result lied its foundations in sociology, anthropology and psychology.⁶² The works of Holsti’s (1970), Wish’s (1980) and Walker’s (1979) can be given as such. Recently, these roots has been rediscovered and even improved by including different perspectives from different parts of the world and angles. The scholarship transcended the individual and social levels and even began analyzing in the systemic level while including more complicated and complex

⁵⁷ Thies “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.” 30.

⁵⁸ Sebastian Harnish, “Introduction,” in *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analysis* ed. Sebastian Harnisch et al (London: Routledge, 2011), 1.

⁵⁹ Sebastian Harnish, “Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts,” in *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analysis* ed. Sebastian Harnisch et al (London: Routledge, 2011) 9.

⁶⁰ Harnish, “Introduction,” 2.

⁶¹ Wendt, 9.

⁶² Harnisch, “Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts,” 9.

roles into the analysis.⁶³ What is more, these roles are now over the Eurocentric understanding and transcended into different cultures and perspectives.

The role theorists of today differ with regard to the sources and factors that shape these roles.⁶⁴ On the one hand American role theorists prioritizes actor's material and cognitive traits as determinant factors and considering the causes for action, they propose the significance of the stability of roles. On the other hand, European role theorists employs a more constructivist understanding and proposes the significance of language and social interaction as reasons for action.⁶⁵

Role Theory offers a variety of advantages including a promising avenue for resolving the relationship of different states with each other and with the international system itself in its most unique and simple way. Yudan Chen defines role theory as a theoretical perspective deriving its bases from anthropology, psychology and modern sociology, though still not a 'grand theory' yet.⁶⁶ Role Analysis is an effective and essential tool to reflect the mindset and comprehend the grand casual map of the policymakers during their decision making process⁶⁷. Recent studies have lately recognized the impact of studying the national role conceptions as a possible source of foreign policy motivation. States have transformed from their pre-assumed object of being an abstract and undefined 'black box' into a precise entity. 'The state becomes the actions of those who are expected-and who expect of themselves...'⁶⁸ adds

⁶³ Harnish, "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts," 11.

⁶⁴ Harnish, "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts," 9.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Yudan Chen "Philosophy, identity, and role theory with Chinese characteristics" in *China's International Roles* Ed. Sebastian Harnisch et al (New York: Routledge, 2016) 77.

⁶⁷ Thies "Role Theory and Foreign Policy." 6.

⁶⁸ James Rosenau "Roles and Role Scenarios in Foreign Policy" in *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* ed. S. G. Walker , (Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1987) 50.

Rosenau. Throughout this thesis, a very core concept of role theory is assumed to be the ultimate source of motivation: the national role conceptions.⁶⁹

National Role Conceptions were introduced by Holsti for the first time as an inductive typology⁷⁰ by describing them as “the policymaker’s own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward or in, the external environment”⁷¹ Holsti, rigorously explicates the differences between “behavior” and “expectations.” The former one is derived from the psychological needs where the latter is derived from formal positions and international relations.⁷² Roles are a normative concept. Therefore, they cannot be occupied but they can be enacted in a specific situation. They can also be defined as a dynamic aspect of a status⁷³ where positions⁷⁴ are seized by states or individuals.⁷⁵ Role is a group of norms but norms are encompassing the roles. If we are to amalgamate the status and norms, we can then perform a role.⁷⁶ The role performance is equivalent to the decisions and actions. They can be segregated from role prescriptions which are described as the “norms, expectations, cultures, societies, groups attach to particular positions”.⁷⁷ The role performance is produced by the

⁶⁹ Chih-Yu Shih “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of Chinese Diplomacy” *Political Psychology*, 9, 4, (1988), 601.

⁷⁰ Shih “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation” 600.

⁷¹ K. J Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 14, 3 (1970) 245-246.

⁷² Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 237.

⁷³ It is defined as the expected/appropriate behavior.

⁷⁴ The words “position” and “status” are used interchangeably here.

⁷⁵ Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 238.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 240.

position of two joint variables: Ego's role conceptions (Interests, goals, attitudes and values, personality needs) and Alter's prescriptions (culture, social institutions, organizations and laws).⁷⁸ This thesis, as its research limitation, will neglect the impact of national role prescriptions which are externally derived such as the "treaty commitments, International system, the foreign policy decisions of other countries, world opinion or International organizations",⁷⁹ as it is done in the study of Holsti⁸⁰ where he presumes that national role conceptions are more prominent and influential in shaping foreign policy behavior than national role prescriptions themselves⁸¹. Otherwise, the thesis will compose of two variables that will impact on the foreign policy decision-making process and thus, complicate the thesis. The 'national role conceptions' have the ability to reveal the background agenda of specific foreign policy choices. Therefore, National role conceptions are more interested in emphasizing and highlighting the "identity" rather than the "image" of the state in contrast to national role prescriptions which reveals "image". Due to these reasons, this thesis chose to concentrate on the latter. What is more, this thesis' main focus is not the effect of 'domestic public' on the process of role creation. Nonetheless, the effect of the 'domestic concerns' on the role creation will be mentioned briefly in the following chapters. For Yudan Chen, not only role theory has potential to study China but also it goes along very well with the Chinese thought where not all IR theories are appropriate to study this area.⁸²

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 244.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Steven Walker, "Conclusion" *Foreign Policy, Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, ed. S. G. Walker, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1987) 242.

⁸² Chen "Philosophy, identity, and role theory with Chinese characteristics," 78.

2.3. Literature Review and Foreign Policy Roles of China

2.3.1. Literature Review

There have been previous studies introducing different roles or concepts to define China such as challenger, revisionist, revolutionary or stakeholder.⁸³ Nevertheless, this thesis do recognizes, as Yugang Chen and Sebastian Harnisch also argues that emergence of roles is a result of both domestic and foreign role contestation processes⁸⁴ emerging from self-identification, domestic role contestation and international interaction⁸⁵ which means that there is a mutual interaction between role making and altercasting.⁸⁶ Furthermore, Harnish also stresses the significance of a set of mechanisms explaining China's differentiated integration into the international order and examining evidence comprehensive enough in scope (meaning a diversity of policy fields) and in time (meaning over several past leadership generations) to arrive at their conclusions which is unfortunately lacking in the current literature.⁸⁷ This thesis also tried to pay regard to these concerns. This thesis benefited from Holsti's article by utilizing his national role conceptions in order to grasp the change in national role conceptions better historically and connecting it to China's past by including the roles that existed in 1970s. As, Harnisch emphasized, there are few studies who examined the historical self-identification on current role taking or making behavior where 'a nation's self-understanding... includes a distinction from a negative

⁸³ Yugang Chen, "China's role in the transformation of international system" in *China's International Roles* Ed Sebastian Harnisch, et al, (Routledge: New York, 2016) 110.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Sebastian Harnisch, "Role Theory and the study of Chinese Foreign Policy" in *China's International Roles* Ed. Sebastian Harnisch, et al (Routledge: New York, 2016) 3.

⁸⁶ Sebastian Harnisch "Role Theory and the study of Chinese Foreign Policy" quoted in Yugang Chen, "China's role in the transformation of international system" in *China's International Roles* Ed Sebastian Harnisch, et al (Routledge: New York, 2016) 110.

⁸⁷Harnisch, "Role Theory and the study of Chinese Foreign Policy," 4.

historical self.⁸⁸ There also two important variables in the co-variation of self-identification process that should be mentioned before going deep into the analysis of Chinese foreign policy since these will help when analyzing and interpreting the content analysis results. One of them is the degree of ‘commitment to a role’ (effort spent on a role) and the other is the role enactment which will be examined respectively in this thesis.

Chen introduces some Chinese “characteristics” into role theory like fantasy novel metaphor (explaining role and counter-role), Weiqi metaphor (explaining flowing role and uncertainty) and flower& butterfly metaphor (explaining subjectified other). The Weiqi metaphor, indicating the Chinese way of philosophical world view and strategic thinking, reflecting the rapid change, flowing nature rather than the fixed nature and an accepted uncertainty of Chinese roles. Just like in the Chinese game of Weiqi⁸⁹, the roles are not predefined or stable where each role depends on where, when and how it appeared in a specific circumstance.⁹⁰ In order to comprehend a role in Weiqi, one needs to speculate on a certain piece’s role by observing its “shi” (a momentum which can be grasped through experience and comprehension).⁹¹ Fantasy novel metaphor elucidates that Chinese philosophers believe in the harmony of intra and inter-roles rather than believing in role conflicts where opposite roles cannot “co-exist.” According to this metaphor, there is the openness of opposites or as one can also say, there is the ‘co-implication’ of polarities and mutually inclusive co-existence of counter-roles.⁹² In Chinese philosophy, there are no luminous differences between a “friend” and “enemy” or “teacher” and “student.”⁹³ In this case, teachers can continue

⁸⁸ Harnisch, “Role Theory and the study of Chinese Foreign Policy,” 4.

⁸⁹ The popular English translation derived from its Japanese name is “Go”.

⁹⁰ Chen, “Philosophy, identity, and role theory with Chinese characteristics,” 79.

⁹¹ Chen, “Philosophy, identity, and role theory with ‘Chinese characteristics,” 80.

⁹² Ibid., 81.

⁹³ Ibid.

to learn by maintaining their student role, and similarly, students learn from their teachers. Hence, Chinese roles most of the time and in most cases are roughly defined. In the final metaphor of Chen, both the “objectified” self and “subjectified” other⁹⁴ are significant in altering or constructing a role. Role Theory in general and also the Chinese understanding of “role” suggests that identity is created as a result of social interactions with others.

The fact that in Chinese foreign policy, democracy, diversity, respect, freedom of speech, mutual gain, freedom of expression, civilizations, peaceful co-existence, peaceful development, cooperation and economic prosperity may appear like they are in a role conflict with strong leadership, communism, security, firm ideology, national reunification and strengthening one party regime. Yet, circumstances may be more different and complicated. As explained by Yudan Chen’s “Fantasy Novel Metaphor,” the roles in fact are not in conflict when looking from a Chinese perspective. Instead these roles have a different relationship like complementing each other. First, It should also be reminded that the Chinese understanding of “Democracy” is somewhat dissimilar than its Western equivalents. Martin Jacques says “...the main problem we have in the West at the moment, by and large, is that the conventional approach we understand it [China] really in Western terms using Western ideas. We cannot.”⁹⁵ Hence, the terminologies must be well-defined and carefully understood in order to prevent any kind of confusion. Second, how the Chinese understand of “Marxism”, “Socialist modernization” and thus, “Communism” is too distinct than what one presume them to be. Finally, Chinese people attribute different meanings to “development” and the “progress” which should also be entirely comprehended. What is more, the connections between these conceptions (such as the one between the territorial reunification with Taiwan and peace among civilizations), their correlations with regard to Marxism must be studied. That is perhaps the reason of attaching the

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Martin Jacques, “Understanding the Rise of China” *ted.com* video, 2:48 last accessed: April 12, 2015 https://www.ted.com/talks/martin_jacques_understanding_the_rise_of_china

mysterious words of “with Chinese characteristics” is virtually near every “conflicting” concept.

Yudan Chen’s arguments can also be understood more wisely when one becomes more aware of China’s national identity building, impacts of China’s value system (including culture, belief such as Taoism and Confucianism) and China’s relationship with Marxist ideology as mentioned previously. Regarding the Chinese national identity building, it is significant to emphasize, first, the existence of some vital historical occasions such as the memory of “historical humiliation” happened during the Sino-Japanese war.⁹⁶ Considering the Chinese national-identity building, China does not want a repetition of this memory. This attitude of China is observed in some of its foreign policy behaviors such as its aggressive policies in territorial disputes. Likewise, this could also be interpreted as why China strictly reiterates the “friendship,” “mutual gain” and “good-neighborly relations” conceptions.

Second, “Middle Kingdom” complex which is the traditional self-perception of China should be emphasized as well. This traditional self-perception highlights the role of a “father” or a “king” in the region who treat its surroundings as his sons by protecting, punishing, forgiving and rewarding them.⁹⁷ China, in return, only wanted some gifts and respect as in the tribute system. The end of the 18th century caused a dramatic and tremendous role change for China from a role conception of “Central Kingdom” to an ordinary “Modern State.” Another turning point for the China was in 1949, the founding of the People’s Republic of China and then respectively 1970, 1980 and 1990 where its national role conceptions again changed.⁹⁸ This, led China to isolate itself from the rest of the world and then to a search of self-strengthening and self-cultivation.⁹⁹ Despite these extreme changes in national role conceptions, there were

⁹⁶ Chen, “Philosophy, identity, and role theory with ‘Chinese characteristics,” 87.

⁹⁷ Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation,” 623.

⁹⁸ Chen, “Philosophy, identity, and role theory with ‘Chinese characteristics,” 89.

⁹⁹ Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation,” 624.

still some traditional roles of China that did not completely faded like “developing country” since Deng Xiaoping period.¹⁰⁰ Another variable that affects China’s roles and an important tool to understand the meaning of those national role conceptions is “time” where these roles will make more sense when thinking and interpreting them on a broader scale by including time and space. As Chen states “The concepts used by China, however, are sometimes akin to specific points on a weiqi board where pieces (roles) are put on. Taken alone, the pieces’ positions are meaningless, but with the progress of the game, a piece, through fixed at a certain point, can play various roles, depending on the specific situation.”¹⁰¹

Regarding the Chinese way of life, a quasi-Taoist view in early Han Dynasty, Mao’s “isolationist policy” and a Budist view during Liang Dynasty embodied the policy of “do nothing’ism¹⁰²”.¹⁰³ Tao is perceived as the “essence of nature” which means that it can be found in everywhere and everything is made of it. The utmost behavioral norm for Taoists is “wuwei” (meaning inaction). It is believed that peace and nature can be preserved only through this understanding.¹⁰⁴ In Taoism it is also not natural to measure or judge goodness, beauty or acquire luxury and nobility since all those concepts are considered as man-made in a material world where isolationism is spiritually edifying.¹⁰⁵ From the Confucianism point of view¹⁰⁶, the society is hierarchly structured where heaven is at the top and below¹⁰⁷ is ruled by the son of

¹⁰⁰ Chen, “Philosophy, identity, and role theory with ‘Chinese characteristics,” 90.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Hu Jintao was criticized of “wuwei” (inaction)

¹⁰³ Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation,” 601.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 611, and Many of the revolts in favor of “equality” happened in the name of “Taosim” in Shih ‘National Role Conception as Foreign Policy, 614.

¹⁰⁵ Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation,” 611-612.

¹⁰⁶ It was mostly reflected by the “Tianxia” national role conception in the thesis.

¹⁰⁷ “Tianxia” (under the heaven) which belongs to the public.

Heaven. The society are the emperor's son-citizens, or *zimin*¹⁰⁸. What is more important is that the highest status of "son of heaven" must not be taken for granted. After all, the emperor can fail to live up with the required norms as well. If and when the emperor fails to abide by the required norms, a new leader who is able to show "the virtue of *ren*" will be able to replace him. This would also be consistent with heaven's will as well.¹⁰⁹ Heaven, earth, emperor, parents and teachers are considered as the "father" roles where officials who rule an area are called parent-officials (*fumu quan*) in a harmonious, reciprocal¹¹⁰, respectful, sharing¹¹¹, *guanxi*' full¹¹², obedient¹¹³ world. Moreover, the father role, or the superior one must show *ren*¹¹⁴ where his main duty in politics is to correct the wrongs and educate its citizens.¹¹⁵ If state is not on the right track, Confucianism would suggest either to retire or isolate since a continuation of such relationship where people are not able to follow their norms, would be self-degrading in this decayed environment. Following this retirement, a birth of a new "self" must emerge.¹¹⁶ If a split happens between the brothers from the same parent or teacher¹¹⁷, then both sides would fulfill their self-image only by considering

¹⁰⁸ Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation," 605.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 606.

¹¹⁰ The repetition of Chinese leaders on "reciprocity", "equality", "harmony" and "cooperation" can be due to their "Tianxia" role conception."

¹¹¹ It is cardinal to teach and discipline the sons and grandsons.

¹¹² In other words, "filial piety," "interpersonal connection" or "relations."

¹¹³ "Do not do what law forbids" in Shih "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation," 605.

¹¹⁴ Concern, kindness, forgiveness and love.

¹¹⁵ Shih "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation," 606.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 608.

¹¹⁷ It should also be noted that in Confucianism, whole is always more important than the individual. In Shih "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy," 616.

themselves as the single legitimate successor.¹¹⁸ Nonetheless, a wrongdoing by a friend¹¹⁹ can be forgiven.¹²⁰

Regarding the Chinese culture, *Gongfu* (notion of time and energy) should be explained which is considered as an important element in comprehending Chinese mentality. *Gongfu* is where Chinese virtues of patience, hard-work, industry and perseverance comes from. It signifies that any task can be accomplished and nothing is impossible as long as we expend sufficient time and energy on it.¹²¹ It is considered an honor to accomplish what is committed to where patience is crucial. If a task is not accomplished yet due to some obstacles, isolation may happen but never a change or deviation from the normative system.¹²² This behavior can also be viewed in Chinese foreign policy. The insistence on certain policies like “2 systems, 1 country” approach towards Taiwan or the “reunification policy” is the most apparent indicator.

Despite the “class struggle” understanding of Marxism does not seem to fit in the Confucian understanding, Confucian Marxists are not something rare in China. Confucian Marxists considered that human mind can be validated and corrected through education. According to them, Confucianism had the common virtues of courage, sincerity, high morality and self-respect with Marxism.¹²³ Taoism advocates the mind-labor difference¹²⁴ and the notion of dialectic is also not foreign to Taoists.

¹¹⁸ This understanding is also observable in China’s nationalistic foreign policy against “Taiwan.”

¹¹⁹ Friendship is controlled by a Chinese concept of “*yi*” which is the combined notion of sincerity, trust, commitment to justice and mutual assistance which is also mostly connected with the “revolutionary heroes” In Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation,” 615.

¹²⁰ Shih “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation,” 611.

¹²¹ Ibid., 618.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., 619.

¹²⁴ Taoists are against such difference because apart from being an artificial invention, it extracts resources from nature, hence it should not be exploited. Human society should return to nature.

Shih reminds an old Chinese saying by stating that Chinese-Marxist system is in fact “an old bottle containing new water.”¹²⁵

To summarize, this section intended to deliver some light on these discussions before focusing on the National Role Conceptions. Recognizing the theoretical background, this thesis intends to discover an overall strategy that Chinese leaders want to achieve or in Chen’s words, this thesis intent to find the “shi” of the roles by analyzing and interpreting the changes in China’s self-perceptions. Perhaps the words of Jiang Zemin reminds us the Chinese exceptionalism one more time: “That is one reason why we have remained opposed to dogmatism toward the theory of Marxism. Our Party made mistakes and even suffered serious setbacks in some historical periods. The most important cause for that was the fact that the guiding ideology of the Party was divorced from Chinese reality at the time.”¹²⁶

2.3.2. Foreign Policy Roles of China

As explained in the literature review section of the thesis, there are several academics who studies Chinese roles.¹²⁷ Some of those roles were regional leadership, hegemon, peaceful co-existence, independent, revolutionary power or great power. During the thesis period, the foreign policy roles of China were chosen as a result of the literature review. Foreign Policy roles from two scholars were considered to be utilized: K.J. Holsti’s and Chih-Yu Shih’s role conceptions. There were mainly five reasons for that; (1) the role theory literature is limited in scope and scale, therefore there were not

¹²⁵ Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation,” 621.

¹²⁶ “Jiang Zemin speech at the meeting celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Communist party of China” accessed in February 24, 2016, <http://www.china.org.cn/e-speech/a.htm>

¹²⁷ For more see Sebastian Harnisch “Role Theory and the study of Chinese Foreign Policy,” *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analysis* ed. Sebastian Harnisch et al (London: Routledge, 2011), Bart Dessein, “Historical Narrative, Rememberence, and the Ordering of the World: A Historical Assessment of China’s International Relations,” *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analysis* ed. Sebastian Harnisch et al (London: Routledge, 2011), Sebastian Harnisch, “China’s Historical Self and its Historical Role,” *Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analysis* ed. Sebastian Harnisch et al (London: Routledge, 2011).

many options to utilize role conceptions. (2) Holsti's role conceptions were detailed and well-structured and since he was the first scholar to propose such analysis, it is thought to use his role conceptions would be more appropriate. (3) Holsti was the first scholar to ever analyze role conceptions in the globe. Hence, utilizing his roles gave an eventual advantage of comparison of his work and gave a sense of continuity in role conceptions for the Chinese case. (4) Shih's work was one of the most recent works considering Chinese role literature and (5) Their combined roles were encompassing all the roles that were uttered to China by different scholars; Since Holsti's roles in his work were encompassing most of the countries in the world, by incorporating Shih's roles, a "Chinese essence" or a "Chinese understanding" of roles wanted to be included to the study; These roles were different than Holsti's and what is more, there were some interesting nuances that could not be explained by Western understanding of roles. The differences between these role conceptions will be explained in detail in the following part.

a. Chih's National Role Conceptions

The national role conceptions from Chih Yu-Shih's article were "Asianism," "Nation-state," "Tianxia" and "Civilization."¹²⁸ The thesis aimed at determining those national role conceptions which are present in Chinese foreign policy decision making process and to detect the most reiterating and influential national role conception. In Chih-Yu Shih's "Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State Versus the Ego State" article, the author utilizes a comprehensive role analysis to analyze and understand China's rise to power¹²⁹. This thesis proposes four different approaches as national role conceptions that are generated from role making and role taking. These are "nation-state," "civilization," "Tianxia" and "Asianism."¹³⁰ Shih offers an abridged

¹²⁸ Shih, "Assigning Role Characteristics to China," 71.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 75.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 76.

explanation of how “national identity” differs from “national image” in Chinese foreign policy¹³¹. He defines identity as something that originates within the society, as something “intrinsically oriented” while describing image as something “extrinsically oriented” which means that state recreates itself and acts according to the expectations of the audience in order to simply please the audience.¹³² The purpose in the former one is to recreate a “difference between the self and its other.” On the other hand, the aim in the latter is to associate “the self with its audience in a certain relationship.” A role state is assumed to be an image-driven state. However, an ego state is assumed to be an identity-driven state.¹³³

Chih-Yu Shih examines the traits of both role makers and role takers to explain how different the national role conceptions are from each other: “nation-state,” “civilization,” “Tianxia” and “Asianism.”¹³⁴ A role taker requires the “group belonging” whereas the role maker needs “self-centrism.” Hence, the former one usually feels the necessity to evolve into a social role that corresponds to social expectations or relationships.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, considering the latter one, it “has to decide how to enter a social role.”

Tianxia

According to Shih, if China is not an ego state but a role state, then it could be considered as Tianxia, which literarily means “all under heaven.”¹³⁶ It is not only a philosophy but also a life attitude which is shaped by values of responsibility, trust and mutual gain. Shih emphasizes Tianxia by stating that “moral appeal is composed of

¹³¹ Ibid., 75.

¹³² Ibid., 73.

¹³³ Ibid., 72.

¹³⁴ Ibid.,

¹³⁵ Ibid., 75.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 72.

peace and development in which the territorial nuance is morally dubious.” This philosophy indicates that country at the center must be selfless and caring about others in a harmonious world where “each country is an opportunity for each other” in terms of mutual gain. The states are therefore “hierarchically ranked in accordance with how well one is in compliance with the cultural ideal of selflessness,”¹³⁷ which encourages them to devote themselves to self-rectification. In this case, other countries or scholars would consider the development of China economically, politically or socially as an opportunity for themselves.¹³⁸ Scholars who have a “Tianxia” world view will praise China’s accession to power due to the affluence that it will bring to the world. China will be conceived as an authority that will split and distribute wealth, affluence and prosperity.¹³⁹

During the content analysis to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, the following words in their speeches mostly were counted to reflect the Tianxia national role perception. Those chosen words reminiscence of the “peaceful” or “harmonic” world order understanding of Tianxia.

- Peace, connectivity, dynamic exchanges, harmony, guidance, prosperity, friendship, cooperation (when utilized in this content), security (when used in this content), inter-personal relationships, connections, prosperous, harmonious, wisdom, Chinese dream and sincerity.

Civilization

In civilization role conception, China is considered neither as an ego state nor a role state. Therefore, in this situation China’s rise or development will neither pose a threat nor be an opportunity for other countries. In contrast to Tianxia role conception where China’s rise will bring peace and stability to world (and therefore it will be conceived

¹³⁷ Ibid., 74.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 71.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 75.

as an opportunity), this national role conception is neutral in its nature. Ultimately, Shih indicates that China's rise "could imply nothing significant about China as a whole" in this role conception.¹⁴⁰ While conducting the content analysis, the following words were counted for the Civilization national role conception.¹⁴¹

-neutral, historical bonds, humanity, culture, civilization, history and education, Five principles of peaceful co-existence, mutual benefit, fairness, justice, cooperation (when utilized in this content), Confucius.

Nation-State

The "nation-state" role conception takes place when China is perceived to be an ego or identity-driven state but not a role state or not an image-driven state. At this stage, China's social, economic and political rise will be perceived as a threat by other countries or scholars. This is primarily due to the understanding that China's rise "could threaten to overthrow the boundary of difference."¹⁴²

The following words were counted for this role conception. Considering nation-state role conception, mostly aggressive and patriotic words were selected from leaders' speeches.

- patriotism, attack, pragmatism, patriotic love, national, rise (it was mostly used as "the rise of China"), armament, defense, nationalism, combat, pride (when utilized as national pride), national territory (or just territory), realism, realistic, truth (when utilized in this content), Interest (especially when used as "national interest"), invincible, destiny (when utilized in this content), survival, national salvation, liberation (when used in this content), strength, power (as in "rise to power"), powerful, the great Chinese family (when used as the "Chinese nation"), homeland, unity, confidence,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 74.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 76.

¹⁴² Ibid., 75.

hegemony, sovereignty, Chinese nation, strong, rejuvenation of Chinese Nation.

Asianism

“Asianism” occurs when China is both an ego state and a role state simultaneously.¹⁴³ In this case, other states perceive this rise as both a threat and an opportunity. Afterall, “China’s rise could both revive the nationalist appeal (threat) and enhance transnational fluidity and hybridity (opportunity).” The words “destiny,” “neighborhood,” “co-existence” (when it was used in an Asian context) was identified during the content analysis process. Those terms were mostly utilized to demonstrate China’s neighborhood policies. The following words were counted for this role conception.

-Asia, region (when utilized in this content), Asianism, overseas (when used in this content), Eastern Civilization, Cooperation (when used in this content such as “Cooperation with these [Asian] countries”), Eurasian, Silk Road (When utilized in this content), Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia, Regional (as in regional cooperation/peace/development/benefit ect), traditional friendships, ancient friends (when used in this content), ASEAN, kinship, strategic partnership (as “with Asian countries”), common destiny, good-neighborly ties, neighborhood.

b. Holsti’s National Role Conceptions

Holsti has identified national role conceptions for seventy one (71) countries in the world in his article “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” Among the most inclusive and extensive research for content analysis methodology, the analysis for China was carried out in 1967-1968 Mao period in the revolutionary era. Hence, this thesis would be able to reveal the transformation of the leader’s national role conceptions and its transformation of Chinese foreign policy. Throughout

¹⁴³ Ibid., 76.

the thesis, this transformation will be exposed by comparing and contrasting the content analysis results of China's national role conceptions in the 1970s. This thesis was selective in terms of utilizing some of Holsti's national role conceptions and excluding others. This was done primarily due to the absence of some national role conceptions in the contemporary Chinese foreign policy today such as "Liberation supporter," "Anti-imperialist agent" and "example." No data was found for them during the content analysis of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao. Hence, they were mostly not included in the table excerpt for "example" national role conception which was found in a significantly low level (%0.1-%0.9) but included to the analysis despite that. Holsti could not find any data for some national role conceptions as well especially for the 1967-1968 period in China whereas some of those absent role conceptions were found in this thesis. These were independent, regional leader, developer, defender of the faith, and internal development role conceptions. In addition to these role conceptions, five more national role conceptions were analyzed which were identical in Holsti's role analysis for China: bastion of revolution, regional leader, independent, internal development, defender of the faith and developer.¹⁴⁴

Bastion of Revolution

"Bastion of revolution" role conception is described by Holsti as "some governments having a duty of organizing revolutionary movements abroad".¹⁴⁵ It means that states are providing an area where revolutionary leaders can acquire not only "inspiration" but also "physical and moral support" from that themselves.¹⁴⁶ The following words were counted for this role conception.

-Revolution (when utilized in this content), Freedom (when utilized in this content) Socialism (when utilized in this content), Communism (when utilized in this

¹⁴⁴ Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," 274.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 260-261.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 261.

content), Comrade, Brother, Support, Kinship regimes, powerful base, world revolution.

Liberation Supporter

Unlike “bastion of revolution” role conception, “Liberation supporter” does not indicate formal duties or responsibilities for leading or physically supporting the liberation movements abroad. Most statements in this national role conception are formal and routine.¹⁴⁷ The formal words that associate with “liberation movements” were selected in order to count in this thesis. The following words were counted for this role conception.

-Freedom, Liberation, Free from chains

Regional Leader

“Regional leader” refers to the themes that a country fulfills its responsibilities “which it identifies” to its region.¹⁴⁸ The following words were counted for this role conception.

-Leadership, regional leadership, region (when used in this content).

Independent

According to Holsti, in “independent” national role conception states give significance of “commitment” to non-alignment policies and they pursue their own national interests instead of other state’s objectives.¹⁴⁹ “Independent” national role conceptions

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 263.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 268.

is mostly regarded to be “passive” or “non-active” role by Holsti.¹⁵⁰ The following words were counted for this role conception.

-Independent, Independently, Free, Sovereign.

Internal Development

Those countries that espouse “internal development,” completely focuses on their own economic development, social-wellbeing, socio-economic needs and have a perception of threat through foreign involvement. These countries most of the time set their national agendas and create their foreign policy decisions as means for the country’s internal development.¹⁵¹ Similar to “Independent” role conception, “internal development” national role conception is regarded to be “passive” or “non-active” role by Holsti as well.¹⁵² The following words were counted for this role conception.

-Development, Reform, Opening up, Progress, Modernization, Innovative, Creative, Innovation, Creation, Growth.

Defender of Faith

In “defender of faith” role conception, these countries describe their foreign policy objectives as “defending (their) value systems from attack.” or they assume that some states see their foreign policy aims and commitments in terms of defending value systems (rather than specified territories) from attack. Holsti highlights the significance of “ideology” in this concept¹⁵³ as well as explaining that those who espouse this national role conception, are likely to undertake special responsibilities to

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 292.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 297.

¹⁵² Ibid., 292.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 264.

ensure ideological purity for a group of other states.¹⁵⁴ The following words were counted for this role conception. Considering defender of faith role conception, words that associate with the Communist and Marxist ideology were selected.

-Socialism, Communism, thought of the Three Represents, Marxist, Marxism, Communists, Revolutionary, Revolution, Mao Zedong thought, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping theory,

Developer

“Developer” national role conception postulates that it has a special duty of assisting less developed countries’ development processes. The following words were counted for this role conception.

-Developing, Developer, Assisting, aid, helping, Support.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 264.

CHAPTER 3

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING SYSTEM IN THE POST-MAO ERA

3.1. Foreign Policy Development in the Post-Mao Era

Lampton differentiates the government operation in China as pre-Deng and post-Deng periods.¹⁵⁵ That is also why this thesis preferred to start analyzing the change in Chinese foreign policy roles beginning from Deng Xiaoping period. Deng Xiaoping period seems to symbolizes a 'change' in Chinese foreign policy with his strong leadership. As also Lampton argues, Mao and Deng were strong leaders who were able to make radical decisions and change the course of the foreign policy as what they perceive as appropriate. What is more, For Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the notion of reconciliation or compromise did not exist. On the other hand, for their successors, these concepts were vital for the continuation of their legitimacy.¹⁵⁶ As Lampton states "Mao and Deng could decide; Jiang and the current leaders must consult"¹⁵⁷ Hence, this master thesis took Deng period, a strong leader and a revolutionary of his time, as the starting point to observe the change. Considering the background of the Chinese leaders, Cheng Li¹⁵⁸ argues that it is the period of "weak leaders, strong factions."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵David M. Lampton, "How China is ruled" *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2014), accessed: April 8, 2015 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/137505>.

¹⁵⁶Lampton "How China is Ruled,"5.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 2.

¹⁵⁸ He is a Professor at the director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings center.

¹⁵⁹ Cheng Li, "The End of the CCP's Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment of Shifting Power in China" *The China Quarterly* Vol. 211, (September 2012), 608.

The Chinese ruling system has become more collective ever since the single, more charismatic leadership eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Nonetheless, the later generation leaders (specifically the third, fourth and fifth generation leaders) were the generation of collective leadership, coalition-building and they also gave less reformist or radical foreign policy decisions than their predecessors. During his period, Hu Jintao was even criticized for his “inaction”¹⁶⁰ (wuwei) and Chinese public intellectuals accused his two-term period as China’s “lost decade.”¹⁶¹

Thus, this mentioned collective decision making apprehension made factional distinctions more apparent. It may also be inaccurate to assume the Communist party as a monolithic and united entity. All of these four leaders; Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, are very different from each other where factional politics matter and their background is cardinal in Chinese foreign policy. Chinese factions are part of the party politics which can be described as different political groupings. The party politics were too intense and intermingled that even one of the most famous princelings, Bo Xilai, was purged from the party in a very suspicious and controversial way where some regard it as a result of “factional politics.” Chinese leadership during the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping periods polarized around two informal factions, which are the “populist coalition” (which was headed by Hu Jintao and now headed by its protégé Li Keqiang) and the “elitist coalition”¹⁶² (which was first headed by Jiang Zemin and then Xi Jinping¹⁶³). A number of scholars consider this split in distinct ways who are “liberal minded reformists” and “conservative hard-liner

¹⁶⁰ Wuwei (in Chinese)

¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, Li indicates that these accusations were not common or wide-ranging among Chinese people. These accusations came mostly from the opposing interest groups in order to undermine Hu Jintao’s legitimacy. In Li “The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism?,” 609.

¹⁶² Li, “The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism?,” 609.

¹⁶³ Cheng Li, ‘Rule of Princelings’ *brookings.edu* last updated: February 10, 2013 last accessed: May 8, 2017 <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/rule-of-the-princelings/>

camps”¹⁶⁴. These are not political parties but perhaps can be categorized as informal groupings and these two coalitions (elitist and populist coalition) represent different socioeconomic and geographical constituencies¹⁶⁵. Xi Jinping was in the elitist strand, which emerged in the Jiang Zemin Era (used to be headed by Jiang Zemin and now by Xi Jinping)¹⁶⁶ and consists of princelings (taizidang-太子党) or Party’s Crown Princes), and the “Shanghai gang” (上海帮 shanghai bang or also named as the Shanghai clique or Jiang clique). Both groups are associated with Jiang Zemin but have differences especially in terms of the inheritance of their members¹⁶⁷. Xi Jinping was part of the princelings where most of the top leaders in the elitist coalition belong¹⁶⁸. What is more, four out of seven Politburo Standing Committee members are Princelings and most of those began their careers in the economically developed coastal cities¹⁶⁹. Hence, this group is mostly believed to represent the interests of China’s entrepreneurs and emerging middle-class¹⁷⁰. Princelings consists of the children of prominent and influential Communist leaders or highest ranking officials of 1949 revolution¹⁷¹. Today, the term symbolizes the children of Eight Elders-八老-(Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, Wang Zhen, Song Renqiong, Wan Li, Deng Yingchao, Xi Zhongxun) and other recent senior national and provincial leaders. Most of its members hold high level political and

¹⁶⁴ Alexis Lai, “One Party, Two Coalitions: China’s factional Politics” *edition.cnn.com* last updated: November 9, 2012. <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/23/world/asia/china-political-factions-primer/>

¹⁶⁵ Li, “Rule of Princelings.”

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ David Cohen “China’s factional politics” *thediplomat.com* last updated: December 08, 2012. Last accessed: May 5, 2017 <http://thediplomat.com/2012/12/chinas-factional-politics/>

¹⁶⁸ Li, “Rule of Princelings.”

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Bo Zhiyue, “Who are China’s Princelings?” *thediplomat* last updated: November 24, 2015 last accessed: May 8, 2017 <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/who-are-chinas-princelings/>

business positions in the country where most notable ones are Xi Jinping (son of Xi Jiongkun), Bo Xilai (son of Bo Yibo) as the sons of Eight Elders and Yu Zhengsheng (son of Huang Jing), Wang Qishan (son in law of Yao Yilin) and Zhou Xiaochuan (son of Zhou Jiannan) as the sons of senior national and provincial leaders and can be further subdivided into categories as princeling politicians, generals or entrepreneurs¹⁷². Nonetheless, princelings are not a coherent political faction unlike the popular belief¹⁷³ and they have differences from other groupings such as Shanghai gang or Youth League Clique (Tuanpai) which have some degree of affinity on policy issues and also resemble inter party factions¹⁷⁴. Shanghai gang and Princelings are also known as; the followers of Jiang Zemin and as the leaders who had their careers in Shanghai. The foreign policy priority of Shanghai gang were mostly business interests, increasing investments, economic development, GDP growth or shortly the “internal development.” Eventually, the “Internal development” role conception was predicted to be found higher in the thesis during his leadership where this expectation was not refuted due to the results of the thesis.

Hu Jintao belonged to the populist coalition. Unlike the elitist coalition, they came from less privileged families¹⁷⁵ and they are the leaders with Chinese Communist Youth League background (therefore garnered the label *tuanpai*, meaning “league faction”¹⁷⁶). Among their policy priorities, there are social justice and social cohesion¹⁷⁷ and they usually voice the concerns of vulnerable social groups¹⁷⁸. In contrast to elitist coalition, they also accumulated most of their leadership experience

¹⁷² Zhiyue, “Who are China’s Princelings?”

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Kerry Brown “China’s princelings and the CCP” *thediplomat.com* last updated: July 07, 2014. Last accessed: May 8, 2017. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/chinas-princelings-and-the-ccp/>

¹⁷⁵ Li, “Rule of Princelings”

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Li, “The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism?,” 609.

¹⁷⁸ Li, “Rule of Princelings”

in China's less-developed inland provinces¹⁷⁹. Nevertheless, factional politics in China are still lack transparency and opaque to public. Despite their differences, these two groups still understand the significance of compromise especially in times of crises¹⁸⁰. Even though it is not mistaken to consider the Communist party as a monolithic, united entity, a connection of foreign policy between the Chinese leaders can still be observed in that sense. Even though the fractions had a certain degree of effect on Chinese foreign policy, it seemed like this situation did not effected for an emergence of a pattern toward a certain goal as the degree of their impact could not be measured. It is true that all of the three leaders are different from each other and their background is significant in Chinese politics where fractions also matter, however, when it comes to the Chinese roles, an evolution toward a certain "goal" can be sensed from the data. Nonetheless, the degree of the effect is still unknown and considering this effect of the fractions on the Chinese roles, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Hence, this possible unknown and unmeasured impact can be regarded as a research limitation for now.

When the Chinese history examined, Deng Xiaoping's accession to power after Mao Zedong's death in 1976 can be considered as a significant turning point. Cultural Revolution came to an end in this period as well.¹⁸¹ Interestingly, Deng Xiaoping, being labelled as the "deputy commander in chief of the bourgeois headquarters" and "No. 2 Capitalist Roader" after Liu Shaoqi¹⁸², was purged and suffered persecution during the Cultural Revolution in 1966.¹⁸³ After Deng Xiaoping, his successor was

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Quansheng Zhao *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy Oxford University Press, 1996* 40.

¹⁸² Liu Shaoqi was a Chinese revolutionary, statesman and a theorist who lived between 1898 and 1969. He served to the country in several significant positions: Chairman of the NPC standing Committee from 1954-1959, vice president of the Communist Party of China from 1956 to 1966, and President of the People's Republic of China, China's de jure head of state from 1959 to 1968. He implemented policies of economic reconstruction. In Liu Shaoqi *global.britannica.com* last accessed: January 10, 2017. <https://global.britannica.com/biography/Liu-Shaoqi>

¹⁸³ "We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies" April 30, 1987 <https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

Jiang Zemin. Jiang Zemin, being born in Jiangsu Province of China in 1926¹⁸⁴ and being a member of the Shanghai clique, headed the Communist Youth League fractions. He became the president of People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003. The other former President of China was Hu Jintao. He was born in Shanghai in 1942. He was among of the youngest Chinese leaders of the country and represented the "technocratic reformist" wing of the party.¹⁸⁵ Born in 1953, Xi Jinping was a native of Shaanxi province¹⁸⁶ and he was the son of famous Xi Zhongxun, who was not only China's former propaganda minister but also Vice-premier and a well-known revolutionary¹⁸⁷.

3.2. Foreign Policy Decision Making System

People's Communist Republic of China is established in 1949 after a prolong civil war. The first constitution of Communist China was modified for seven (7) times where the turning point could be considered as 1982 since after this date, the number of modifications increased.¹⁸⁸ China has been defined as a "unitary" and "multi-national" state and it follows the guidance of Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping

¹⁸⁴ "Jiang Zemin" <http://www.biography.com/people/jiang-zemin-9354639>

¹⁸⁵According to Tkacik, Fewsmith and Kivlehan, Hu Jintao's accession to power was due to his reputation of being a reformist. Therefore, "factional politics" in China has enormous impacts in the leadership decision. in John, J. Tkacik. Jr. Et al. "Who is Hu? Assessing China's Heir Apparent, Hu Jintao" *heritage.com* last modified: April 19,2002, last accessed: April 28, 2015. <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/whos-hu>

¹⁸⁶"Xi Jinping" *Chinavita.com* Last accessed: April 27,2015 http://www.chinavita.com/biography/Xi_Jinping/bio

¹⁸⁷He had the support of "Shaanxi gang", Military princelings, former associates from Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and converts from Shanghai gang. In Evan Osnos "Born Red: How Xi Jinping, an unremarkable provincial administrator, became China's most authoritarian leader since Mao." *Newyorker.com* Last modified: April 6, 2015. Last accessed: April, 27 2015 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red> and Vaughan Winterbottom "China's Politics: Inside Xi Jinping's ruling clique" *lowyinterpreter.org* last updated: 12 February 2014, last accessed: 20.04.2016 <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/02/12/Chinas-politics-Inside-Xi-Jinpings-Ruling-Clique.aspx>

¹⁸⁸ Seriy Sezen, *Çin'in İkinci Uzun Yürüyüşü* (Ankara: TODAİ, 2009), 50.

theory and the thought of three represents in its constitution preamble.¹⁸⁹ According to the third chapter of Chinese Constitution which describes the structure of state bodies, China is described as a socialist state “under the people’s democratic dictatorship¹⁹⁰ led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.”

The National People’s Congress is considered as the highest organ of state power.¹⁹¹ In China, National Congress and Local Congresses are the bodies that people are able to exercise their state power. Those are the only ones that are able to change the constitution where National People’s Congress and National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee offers the amendments. Nonetheless, in practice, Chinese Communist Party usually have the power on these changes in the constitution where they decide the context of this change. Hence, it can be said that the power of the party and the leader cannot be undermined.¹⁹²

“Democratic Centralization” is considered to be the main principle in CCP’s organization which means that lower rankings have to abide and bound to the upper ones like domino. Eventually, all organizations abide to Party National Congress and Party National Congress standing committee which are the most authorized body. Through this does not mean that China does not have a party system where China has eight other political parties other than CCP.¹⁹³ China has a distinct political life as these

¹⁸⁹ “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” (Full text after amendment on March 14 2014) preamble *npc.gov.tr* http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm

¹⁹⁰ This article was amended in 1982 constitution where it was written as the “dictatorship of proletariat” perviously. In Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” (Full text after amendment on March 14 2014) preamble *npc.gov.tr* http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm

¹⁹¹ “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” (Full text after amendment on March 14 2014) Chapter III, Section 1, Article 57 *npc.gov.tr* http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm

¹⁹² Sezen, *Çin’in İkinci Uzun Yürüyüşü* 50.

¹⁹³ Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, “Is Democratization Compatible with One-Party System?” in Political Parties, Party Systems and Democratization in East Asia ed. Wilhelm Hofmeister et al. (London: World Scientific Publishing, 2011) 22.

were formed in 1949 during China's war of resistance. Despite the existence of different parties, there is hardly a competition between them as it is so much different than the Western understanding. Those parties abide by the consultation of CCP and this is the primary reason why this thesis chose to focus on the leader's role conceptions at the first place. There is not much of a party competition or opposition in the system as those parties contribute to state affairs as long as they do not oppose CCP leadership or do recognize its power.¹⁹⁴ China has more of an "oligarch competition" where this institutionalized competition is more likely to be seen from inside such as shanghai gang, elitist coalition or populist coalition. It is also significant to emphasize that the following Chinese presidents are chosen according to this consensus between different fractions. Hence, it can be said that studying the role conception of Chinese leaders is significant and leaders matter.¹⁹⁵

3.3. Foreign Policy Ideologies

In this section, only several schools of thoughts will be explained in order to comprehend the results of the analysis more appropriately and to indicate their foreign policy ideologies. According to David Shambaugh¹⁹⁶ Hu Jintao is part of the Major Powers School. This could be viewed due to Hu Jintao's tendency of concentrating "its diplomacy on managing its relations with the world's major powers and blocks"¹⁹⁷ and attending less significance to inter-state relations between Asian states. According to him¹⁹⁸ the advocates of this school of thought are majorly the government officials. China has been getting "nativist" and "realist" (which is

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 23.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 22.

¹⁹⁶ David Shambaugh. "Coping with a Conflicted China" *The Washington Quarterly* 34, 1 (Winter 2011), 14, last accessed February 24, 2016. DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2011.537974.

¹⁹⁷ Shambaugh, "Coping with a Conflicted China," 22.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

considered to be the predominant group that influences the decision makers)¹⁹⁹ especially after 2009.

Legalism, Nativism and Realism schools of thought are reflecting the realistic, pragmatic and more nationalistic side of China. Realism generally believes in the use of power, upholding the idea of state sovereignty, highlighting the significance of national interests and the necessity of being a powerful state in an anarchic international order. Realism is divided into two strands. These are offensive realism and defensive realism. While Offensive realists prefer a more assertive foreign policy in terms of enhancing national power to practice a more coercive diplomacy, defensive strand prefers a more passive one.²⁰⁰

Nativism can be described as a collection of Marxist, nationalistic, xenophobic and populist ideologies.²⁰¹ Legalism's basic advocacy is to control through punishment and reward. Also its objective is to reach wealth and strength. It is also clothed with moral justification as stated by Confucianism.²⁰² Offensive Realists expect Chinese foreign policy to be more active and assertive in terms of strengthening national power, utilizing this power to coerce other countries.²⁰³ According to David Shambaugh, China has become a more nativist and realist country since 2009. The elite opinion is mostly influenced by the most dominant and effective group in Chinese foreign policy which is Nativism.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 22.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 11.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 10.

²⁰² Shih, "National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation," 607.

²⁰³ Shambaugh. "Coping with a Conflicted China," 12.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 22.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SELECTION

This chapter focuses on the detailed explanation of content analysis (the methodology of the thesis), the coding table, the sources of the speeches, the time period of the study, literature review and the Foreign Policy roles of China. In the following section, the methodology of content analysis and the coding table will be explained.

4.1. The Methodology of Content Analysis and the coding table

The thesis aimed to detect the foreign policy roles that were emphasized the most by the four Chinese leaders in the last 41 years. In order to achieve that the national role conceptions in Deng Xiaoping's, Jiang Zemin's, Xi Jinping's and Hu Jintao's foreign policy speeches were analyzed by conducting latent content-analysis or in other words; the hand coding content analysis which is considered as a research method for studying communication artifacts and to interpret meaning from the content of text data as an empirically grounded method.²⁰⁵ When the computer languages and software suitable for literal data (as opposed to numerical) emerged in the late 1950s where this century has witnessed a significant interest among researchers in mechanical translation and information retrieval systems,²⁰⁶ the computers became a natural ally of the content analysis beginning with the first ever reported computer-aided content analysis by

²⁰⁵Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis An Introduction to its Methodology* (Sage Publications: London, 2004), 17.

²⁰⁶ Krippendorff, *Content Analysis An Introduction to its Methodology*, 12.

Sebeok and Zeps in 1958.²⁰⁷ The scholars were able to scan large volumes of documents with the aid of these software programs which made them increasingly attractive since they were not time consuming.²⁰⁸ Content analysis “by hand,” was considered as time-consuming and unreliable by some academics. In 1974, the attempts to apply this system revealed that the software could have some language obstacles. The computers were not sufficient enough to reflect society’s collective associative memory. Hence, some scholars proposed the idea of using a thesaurus instead of dictionary of relevant words in order to come over this obstacle. Nonetheless, in 1980s this enthusiasm with large systems began to fade away. There are also some other programs like ordinary word processing software which provides basic word counts and keyword in context analysis.²⁰⁹ Many scholars have made this comparison of computer-based content analysis with human-based content analysis.²¹⁰ Some scholars arrive at the conclusion that they were aids, “not replacements for the highly developed human capabilities of reading, transcribing, and translating written material.”²¹¹ In this vein, despite its time consuming nature, difficulty and required effort, this thesis chose to utilize human-based coding, or in other terms, hand coding in a rigorous framework. The primary reason for that was to achieve the most valid results in the thesis.

When looking at the history of content analysis, it can be seen that this methodology, being potentially one of the most important research techniques in the social sciences²¹² and a 60 years old term²¹³, views data as representations of texts, images

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 13.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 14.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 15.

²¹⁰ For more see, Schnurr, Rosenberg, and Ozman (1992,1993), Zeldow and Mcadams (1993), Nacos et al (1991).

²¹¹ Krippendorff, *Content Analysis An Introduction to its Methodology*, 14.

²¹² Ibid., 13.

²¹³ Ibid., 17.

and expressions that are created to be interpreted for their meanings instead of representations of physical events where its theoretical concerns lies in academic disciplines like anthropology, linguistics, sociology of knowledge, social psychology, and communication studies. What is the most important thing that distinguishes content analysis from other methods of inquiry is its method of analyzing texts in the contexts of their uses and concerned with the functions and effects of symbols, meanings and messages. In contrast to methods in natural sciences, content analysis (but it should also be emphasized that it is not the sole research method that is concerned with meanings but it is a powerful one) is concerned about the meanings, intentions, contents and references behind the words and expressions of the texts. Natural scientific methods of inquiry which excludes their conceptions from the object of their study by dismissing it as subjective, prevents them from addressing what matters most in social life such as communication between humans, the quantity of their knowledge, the reasons of their acts or the commitments that they make to one another.

In 1980s, content analysis was mostly used in Journalism and communication research and was quite new psychologically and social sciences as a research method. Content analysis was considered as a time consuming and labor intense effort considering the time spent on collecting the information, its transcription, coding process of the textual data and finally the interpretation process. Contemporary Content analysis has three features.²¹⁴ Firstly, it is an *empirically grounded model* as it was exploratory and inferential in intent. Content analysis analyzes data, images, sounds or texts in understanding what they mean to people. Secondly, it transcends *traditional notions of symbols, contents, and intents* where people's awareness of dialogue has undergone four main conceptual revolutions: the idea of messages, the idea of channels, the idea of communication, the idea of systems and the idea of computation.²¹⁵ Considering

²¹⁴ Ibid., 16.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 18.

the idea of messages, a message is the metaphorical container of content, more like a vehicle for shipping meanings, feelings, an idea or a desire from one place to another²¹⁶ which became ever more important with the information age. The knowledge is power and the words are the necessary vehicles to transfer them. The *idea of channels* metaphor reveals images of canals with restricted capacities for shifting messages with their contents as alphabet limits what one wants to express or as how telephone limits our communication to sound.²¹⁷ The idea of *communication* emphasizes the relational space between the senders and receivers where mass media became an agent of sharing.

The idea of *systems* refers to the idea that emerged with the growth of communication networks. The idea of *computations* indicates the awareness of algorithmic nature of certain routine cognitive processes and their implementation in strong computers. The introduction of computers into people's daily lives has significantly amplified people's collective understanding.²¹⁸ This sketchy history of communication indicates that researchers no longer limit themselves by focusing solely on symbols or representations where the notion of "content" has transcended its explanatory capabilities.²¹⁹ Content, as a terminology can be best explained as being the "What" of a communication. It is the material that authors put into their messages to convey their ideas from their mental walls into others. The content analysts reveals what these messages in these texts intended to convey or actually contain.²²⁰

As a widely used qualitative research technique, the content analysis, was conducted by counting the reiterating words which would reveal the ideology in one of those

²¹⁶ Ibid., 18.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 18.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 19.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 20.

²²⁰ Ibid.

national role conceptions. Hence, these speeches were read and analyzed accordingly. In addition to that; the thesis also aimed to quantify the presence of interesting patterns, estimate the proportions of these patterns in the text as well as correlations between them and to detect a connection, evolution or contrast between their role conceptions. Computers or popular qualitative data analysis programs are frequently and increasingly used in content analysis. Despite the advantage of machine learning classifiers, neither these nor simple computational techniques which provides descriptive data were used in this thesis.

Since the universe of available speeches is too many to be examined as a whole, the thesis needed to limit this research to a manageable amount of speeches by a sampling plan in order to minimize the specter of sampling bias. In this vein, “Systematic sampling” was utilized which is considered as a statistical method and a type of probability sampling. It involves the selection of elements from an ordered sampling frame containing a random starting point and continuing on a fixed periodic interval. According to this, only **general foreign policy** speeches of the leaders were chosen as sources with a “purposeful sampling” frame which is commonly used in selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon of interest.²²¹ Hence, only the speeches with a general foreign policy topic and longer than one page (approx. 500 words) were chosen for the samples. The speeches of the leaders were chosen on a yearly basis. The number of speeches for each leader was approximately around 10 to 15. The analytical aims were to establish: (1) how frequently foreign policy roles were attributed: (2) were there any change in these roles throughout this time interval: (3) Were there any detectable apparent pattern in these roles: (4) Were these roles in harmony or in conflict. Three main variables were coded: words, proverbs or themes that is assumed to have attributed to a certain role. In order to measure, “systematic measurement” was utilized. It involved three main parts; frequency, space and intensity. *Frequency* calculates the density and the existence of the attributed roles. It is the percentage of each attributed role of the leader in that specific speech. In addition

²²¹ Ibid.

to that, the total results and comparisons were provided as well. The *intensity* measures how strong a certain role was emphasized on a scale of 1 to 5. Finally, *space* was added in order to understand how long a role was explained in detail. It is measured by detecting how many times a role was attributed in a paragraph. Apart from these main variables, the name of the role and how many times it was counted were added (number). The following empty template was utilized during the coding. Before each coding, the correspondent leader's name, the source of the speech, the name of the speech, date of the speech, size of the speech (in pages), the subject of the speech, the focus of the speech and finally the coder (student herself) were written.

Table 1: Coding Sheet

Leaders Name:	Size:
Source:	Speech Subject:
Article:	Speech Focus:
Date:	Coder:

Role	Frequency %	Number	Intensity (1-5) 1-Very Weak, 2-Weak, 3-Neutral, 4-Strong, 5-Very Strong	Space

4.2. Sources of the Speeches and the Time Period

The analysis began with Deng Xiaoping's accession to power (1976) until Xi Jinping's Era (2016). Hence the period of 1979 to 2016 was chosen. The thesis ended the analysis with his speech at the opening address of G20 Summit in September 4, 2016. There were primarily two reasons; firstly the coding process had to end at some point in order to start interpreting the result. But most importantly, the coding process ended just before the American elections since Donald Trump's victory could have profound

and unexpected impacts on the international system and its reflections on Chinese role formation could be an interesting yet different topic of analysis. Hence, this study considered that if coding was to end at some point, it would be more appropriate to cease it at a significant event.

For the examination of role theory content, only primary sources were reviewed in this thesis (the direct words of the leaders). The primary sources were composed of the direct speeches and press conferences of People's Republic of China's President Xi Jinping and its former presidents Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping in related books, newspaper news or official government websites. Both Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping delivered a wide range of speeches on Chinese foreign policy. Secondary sources were significant to understand the reflections of the role conceptions on the countries practices. They have not only offered their perspective but also their logic and anticipation of subsequent foreign policy decisions. Hence, their speeches contributed greatly to offer insight into the subject of analysis.

Deng Xiaoping:

- 1) "We Shall Concentrate on Economic Development- Excerpt from a Talk with Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party, while the two men are on their way to Sichuan Province," September 1982, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*, <https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 2) "Excerpt from a talk with Leading Members of the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission and Departments in Charge of Agriculture," January 1983, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*, <https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>

- 3) “A New Approach to Stabilizing the World Situation-Excerpt from a talk with a delegation from the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University in Washington D.C.,” February 1984 *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 4) “Excerpt from a talk with President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo of Brazil,” May 1984 *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 5) “One Country, Two Systems,” June, 1984 *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 6) “Excerpt from a talk with the Japanese delegation to the Second Session of the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-governmental persons,” June 1984,
Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 7) “An Interview with Chinese and Foreign Delegates to a Symposium on China’s Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries,” October, 1984
Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 8) “Excerpt from a talk with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany,” October 1984, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 9) “Excerpt from a Talk with a Delegation from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry,” March 1985 *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,

<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>

- 10) “Excerpt from a Talk with Alfonso Guerra, Deputy General Secretary of the Spanish Worker’s Socialist Party and Vice Premier of Spain,” April 1987, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 11) “Excerpt from a Talk with President Ali Hassan Mywinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania,” April 1985, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 12) “Excerpts from a talk with (I.) Prof. Chen Ku-ying, Formerly of Taiwan University on May 20, 1985 and (II.) a Talk with the Committee Chairman of a Symposium on the Question of the Mainland and Taiwan on June 6 (1985),” May and June 1985, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 13) “Excerpts from a talk with Radovan Vlackovic, President of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” April 1986, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 14) “Excerpt from a Talk to a Members of a Visiting Delegation of the Rong Family, Some From Mainland China, and Others From the United States, Canada, Australia, Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, Hong Kong and Macau,” June 1986, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 15) “Excerpt from a Talk With United States Secretary of State George Shultz,” March 1987, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,

<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>

- 16) "Excerpt from a Talk with President Ali Hassan Mwintu of the United Republic of Tanzania," March 1987, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 17) "Excerpt from a talk with Premier Lubomir Strougal of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic," April 1987, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 18) "Excerpt from a talk with Milo Jake, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," May, 1988, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 19) "A Talk with Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Former President of Tanzania, Chairman of the Tanzanian Revolutionary Party and the Chairman of South Commission," November 1989, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 20) "Excerpt from a Talk with Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Former Prime Minister of Canada," July 1990, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>
- 21) "Addressed to the Leading Cadres of Shanghai," January-February 1991, *Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol 3*,
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up>

Jiang Zemin:

- 1) “At Luncheon by the America China Society and Five Other Organizations,” October 1997, *asiasociety.org*
- 2) “Speech in the Harvard University: Enhance Mutual Understanding and Build Stronger ties of Friendship and Cooperation,” November 1997, *chinainformed.com*
- 3) “Opening Session of Millennium Summit Hears Statements by 19 Heads of State, 10 Heads of Government, Two Vice Presidents-General Assembly, Press,” September 2000, *un.org*
- 4) “China and Africa-Usher in the new century together-Speech by President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,” October 2000, *fmprc.gov.cn*
- 5) “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People,” July 2001, *china.org.cn*
- 6) “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing-Correctly Understand and Comprehensively Fulfill the Requirements of the Three Represents,” July 2001, *china.org.cn*
- 7) “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China-Continue to strive for the fulfillment of the basic line and Historic Mission of the Party,” July 2001, *china.org.cn*
- 8) “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China-Strengthen and Improve the Party Building in Accordance with the Requirements of the Three Represents,” July 2001, *china.org.cn*
- 9) “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,” March 1999, *fmprc.gov.cn*
- 10) “Speech by Jiang Zemin at Opening Ceremony of Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual Meeting,” May 2002, *news.xinhua.net*

- 11) “Jiang Zemin’s Speech at Fortune Forum,” September 2001, *china.org.cn*
- 12) “Carrying Forward Generations of Friendly and Good-Neighborly Relations and Enseavoring Towards a Better Tomorrow for All (Islamabad, Pakistan),” December 1996, *fmprc.gov.cn*
- 13) “Excerpt from Remarks to US President Bill Clinton at a formal Meeting in Seattle, Washington, USA during the First Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leader’s Meeting,” November 1993, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*
<http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339>
- 14) “Excerpt from the Speech ‘Comprehensively Analyze and Correctly Assess the Present Situation, and Properly Balance Reform, Development and Stability’ delivered during an inspection in Shanghai,” May 1994, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*
<http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339>
- 15) “Speech at a Reception Celebrating Spring Festival Organized by the Taiwan Affairs Offices of the Central Committee and the State Council and Other Organizations,” January 1995, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*
<http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339>
- 16) “Excerpts from Remarks to Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Cuban Council of State during a visit to Cuba,” November 21-22, 1993, *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin* <http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339>
- 17) Excerpt from a Speech at a Meeting of Leading Party Members Participating in the Fourth Session of the Eight NPC and the Fourth Session of the Eight CPPCC National Committee,” March 1996, *Selected*

Works of Jiang Zemin <http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339>

Hu Jintao:

- 1) “Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind,” November 2012, *news.xinhua.net*
- 2) “Accelerating the Modernization of National Defense and Armed Forces,” November 2012, *news.xinhua.net*
- 3) “Enriching the Practice of one Country two systems and Advancing China’s Reunification,” November 2012, *news.xinhua.net*
- 4) “Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China,” November 2012, *news.xinhua.net*
- 5) “Keeping to the Socialist Path of Making Political Advance with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Reform of the Political Structure,” November 2012, *news.xinhua.net*
- 6) “Achieving New Victory for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” November 2012, *news.xinhua.net*
- 7) “Our Work in the Past Five Years and the Basic Experience we have Gained in the Past Ten Years,” November 2012, *news.xinhua.net*
- 8) “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” September 2005, *news.xinhua.net*
- 9) “At the Opening Session of the Second Round of the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogues in Beijing,” May 2010 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t696706.shtml
- 10) “Speech by President Hu Jintao of China at APEC CEO Summit,” October 2003 <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/ljzg/zgwjzc/t85897.htm>

- 11) “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, Boao-Hainan,” April 12, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/12/content_7966431.htm
- 12) “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004,” April 2004, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm>
- 13) “Remarks by HE. Hu Jintao President of the People’s Republic of China at the Welcoming Ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House,” January 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t789955.shtml
- 14) “Speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao at Yale University, Ne Heaven,” April 2006, <http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t259486.htm>
- 15) “The Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress-The Work of the Past Five Years,” October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm
- 16) “Hu Jintao’s Speech on Climate Change,” September 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23hu.text.html>

Xi Jinping:

- 1) “Build Up Our National Defense and Armed Forces,” 2012 *The Governance of China*
- 2) “Hong Kong, Macao and the Chinese Mainland are Closely Linked by Destiny” 2013 *The Governance of China*
- 3) “Build Strong National Defense and Powerful Military Forces,” 2012 *The Governance of China*
- 4) “Build People’s Armed Forces that Follow the Party’s Commands, are able to win and exemplary in conduct,” 2013, *The Governance of China*
- 5) “Walk Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt,” 2013, *The Governance of China*

- 6) “Work together to Build a 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road,” 2013, *The Governance of China*
- 7) “Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries Characterized by Friendship, Sincerity and Inclusiveness,” 2013, *The Governance of China*
- 8) “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” January 2013, *The Governance of China*
- 9) “Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought,” December 2013, *The Governance of China*
- 10) “The Chinese Dream Will Benefit not only the People of China, but also of other Countries,” May 2013, *The Governance of China*
- 11) “Right Time to Innovate and Make Dreams Come True,” October 2013, *The Governance of China*
- 12) “The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation Shared by All Chinese,” June 2014, *The Governance of China*
- 13) “Cultivate and Disseminate the Core Socialist Values,” February 2014, *The Governance of China*
- 14) Addressing the United Nations: “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” September 2015, <http://qz.com/512886/read-the-full-text-of-xi-jinpings-first-un-address/>
- 15) “China’s President Xi Jinping’s Opening Address of G20 Summit: A New Blueprint for Global Economic Growth,” September 2016, *The Governance of China*

CHAPTER 5

DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS

“It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.”²²²

Deng Xiaoping

In this chapter, firstly, the content analysis conducted to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping will be analyzed. Secondly, the pattern and the possible reasons of changes in these national role conceptions will be explained in a rigorous framework and some of those changes will be clarified with the help of the theoretical background that was provided to the reader in the first chapter. Finally, in this section, the national role conceptions from Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping will be analyzed whether a regular pattern appears. Overall, this chapter observes from the findings that there was an apparent transformation of foreign policy between Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping periods especially considering the Nation-State, Civilization, Regional Leadership, Internal Development, liberation Supporter, defender of the Faith, Asianism and Developer role conceptions.

In Chinese Foreign Policy, there especially are six significant changes throughout the Chinese leadership where it can also be observed in Table 1 (General data of all Chinese leaders) and Table 2 (The change in all National Role Conceptions). The tables indicate the results of the content analysis of this thesis conducted to the five


²²² Wen Liao “China’s black cat, White cat diplomacy” *foreignpolicy.com*
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/07/10/chinas-black-cat-white-cat-diplomacy/> last updated: July 10, 2009. Last accessed: January 17, 2017.

Chinese leaders; Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. when analyzing these changes, generally, it can be observed that this transformation seems to have a constant direction towards more regional leadership and developer, less internal development and with less emphasis on the Communist ideology each and every day. To be more specific, five different types of rupture from the previous policies is observable which indicates a clear pattern to certain Foreign Policy goals.

Table 2: General Data of all Chinese Leaders

Role Conceptions	Deng Xiaoping	Jiang Zemin	Hu Jintao	Xi Jinping
Nation-State	6,68	12,16	15,76	23,1
Tianxia	10,73	16,04	19,09	17,4
Asianism	0	4,74	2,87	3,44
Civilization	0,11	3,73	6,46	6,8
Bastion of Revolution	0,238	0,22	0	0,3
Regional Leader	0	0	2,44	9,1
Active Independent	2,505	2,84	1,07	1,14
Liberation Supporter	1,193	1,53	0,28	0,3
Defender of the Faith	26,84	23,58	15,29	8,79
Internal Development	48,32	28,32	26,99	16,44
Developer	3,34	9,22	9,54	12,93
Example	0	0,34	0,14	0,15

Table 3: The change in all role conceptions



5.1. Internal Development National Role Conception

Those countries that espouse “internal development,” entirely focus on their own economic development, social-wellbeing, socio-economic needs. They also have a perception of threat through foreign involvement. What is more, these countries most of the time set their national agendas as means for the country’s internal development. The first change in National Role Conceptions occurs in the Internal Development role conception. This decreasing trend of “internal development” triggers the interests into China’s priorities in her foreign policies. This decrease entail us to inquiry whether China intends to “clean the house” first, then to concentrate on its foreign problems respectively. The internal development role conception have a descending pattern where “nation-state” role conception and “regional leader” have an ascending pattern.

A rupture is observable when looking at the change in internal development role conception from Deng Xiaoping period to Xi Jinping. As can be seen from the previous

studies of Holsti²²³ considering the Chinese national role conception of Mao period, the internal development role conception began gaining significance during Deng Xiaoping period where it can also be seen that Deng period was its highest. Deng Xiaoping praised internal development and criticized any understanding that seemed to have conflict with it. Hence, he criticized the “two whatevers” and instead put forward the slogan of “We must emancipate our minds and use our heads” since internal development was the most sensible policy for China by then. Deng emphasized that they should combine theory with practice. Therefore they should advance from reality and practice as the one and only criterion for judging the truth and reestablishing the “ideological line of seeking truth from facts”. Those facts and realities of their time were the “poor” people of Chinese society

In a country as big and poor as ours, if we don't try to increase the production, how can we survive? How is socialism superior, when our people have so many difficulties in their lives? The gang of four...(are) declaring that communism was mainly a spiritual thing. That is sheer nonsense!...by 1978, the average monthly salary for our workers was still only 45 yuan...Can this be called the superiority of Socialism? That is why I insisted that the focus of our work should rapidly be shifted to economic development.²²⁴

Furthermore, China's new foreign policy was shaped by “the 28-character strategy” that was raised by Deng Xiaoping during 1989 Tiananmen Square events. In Deng Xiaoping's 28-character strategy, there was watching and analyzing, securing China's position, dealing changes with confidence, keeping China on a low profile, not pursuing aggression or hegemony, concealing China's capacities and making contributions to others while creating a win-win environment.²²⁵ As a result of this 28-character strategy, Deng Xiaoping's era followed a quasi-pragmatic state attitude

²²³ K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the study of Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly* vol 14, no 3 (1970), 274.

²²⁴ “We shall concentrate on Economic Development,” September 18, 1982
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n13/mode/2up>

²²⁵ Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy*, 53-54.

rather than an ideological or dogmatic one.²²⁶ According to Harris, this tendency still sustains. China currently is still expected to have a long term foreign policy or a grand strategy like Deng Xiaoping's "28 character guideline," "peace and development" or "China's peaceful rise."²²⁷ Nonetheless Lampton states that China's leaders and foreign policy do not provide indications about the presence of such grand strategies. Deng's guidelines are thought to suggest two distinct foreign policy strategies for China among the Western commentators and Chinese analysts. The first thought among scholars is for China to have a hidden or secret agenda. This hidden agenda is mostly thought of as maintaining a low profile strategy and therefore seeking to provide peace, more to say; a peaceful co-existence until it reaches sufficient power to claim hegemony and follow a more assertive diplomacy. Second thought is whether these guidelines of Deng Xiaoping really reflects the long-term moral principles of dealing with foreign countries. This understanding is still finds support from some Chinese analysts.²²⁸ Whatever this grand strategy is, it could be understood that it is "defensive" and aims to maintain a low profile China in the international system.²²⁹ Chinese leaders and Chinese foreign policy do not offer clues about the existence of such grand strategies. Nonetheless, the findings of this thesis seems to support the hand of the first argument. What is more, one of the reasons of why there was a patterned change in Chinese foreign policy can be explained as the attitudes of the Chinese leaders seems to follow the "Deng Xiaoping's guidelines" where Internal development is essential until the country can get enough resources and power for further foreign policy goals.

Deng Xiaoping was aware of the realities of his time. For one thing, he did put a great deal of emphasis on "internal development". He emphasized that socialism was the

²²⁶Ibid., 66.

²²⁷Harris, "China, the World and the International System," 51.

²²⁸Ibid.

²²⁹ Lampton, "How China is ruled," 2.

primary stage of Communism and “Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the productive forces”²³⁰. “Therefore, the fundamental task for the Socialist stage is to develop the productive forces.”²³¹ where “Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, less Communism”²³². Hence Deng Xiaoping believes that in order to achieve Communism, China needs highly developed productive forces and an overwhelming abundance of material wealth.²³³ That explains why the “internal development” national role conception was at its highest during his term of office. Deng Xiaoping’s most reiterated motto was “seeking truth from facts” as Mao Zedong puts it. In most of his speeches, he emphasized the importance of proceeding from reality. For him, theory needed to be combined with practice and only then, the “real” truth can be realized, or using his words, “seeking truth from facts” will be accomplished. His main concerns were primarily invigorating the domestic economy, eliminating poverty, quadrupling the GDP, abandoning the idea of “two whatevers” and comprehending and finding the core or nature of socialism not only in economic equality but also in economic power or growth. Hence, there could be the understanding that socialism will be deriving some but a significant part of its power from economic growth and prosperity.²³⁴

²³⁰ “Building a Socialism with a specifically Chinese Character” June 30, 1984
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>


²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ “Our Magnificent goal and basic policies” October 6, 1984
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

Table 4: The change in the Internal Development Role Conception



What is more, this decreasing trend of the developing country role conception can further indicate that China first “cleaned its house” before being actively involved into the international politics. During Deng Xiaoping’s period, internal development role conception was 48,32%. Then in Jiang’s period, it decreased to 28,32% and in Hu’s period, it again decreased to 26,99% (but the role conception was still maintaining its priority by being the highest national role conception above all). After Deng Xiaoping’s accession to power, new and different foreign policy priorities were presented like “opening up,” “reform,” “peaceful coexistence” and “go global” policies.²³⁵ During Hu Jintao’s period, here was a great international activity which was reflected in the “go global” and “strategic partnership” policies of China.²³⁶ “Go global policy” of China, also names as the “going out strategy” is aimed to supply China raw materials which is necessary for not only its internal growth, development but also to boost its economy by encouraging mostly state-owned Chinese enterprises

²³⁵Stuart Harris “China, the World and the International System” in *China’s Foreign Policy*, edited by Stuart Harris, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014., 47.

²³⁶Ibid.

to invest in different countries.²³⁷ Hence, it still was one of the most important factors that determined Chinese foreign policy during Hu era despite its lower significance compared to Deng's period. But Internal Development national role conception for the first time, not only decreased but also lost its primacy during the Xi Jinping period (It became the second highest national role conception and equal to 26,99%).

It should also be emphasized clearly of what we understand from "internal development". Not only the "internal development" role started to lose its importance but also it started to change meaning. The "internal development" of Deng Xiaoping era and "the internal development" role of Xi Jinping era are not identical. Just like Yudan Chen indicates, roles and concepts change their meanings depending on the time and space. Deng's era of development was more based on "cheap labor" (which can be understood through the words they were using) where Jinping was most of the time referring to "technology", "science" and "innovation" when talking about development (which also gave rise to the concept of scientific development).

4.2. Developer National Role Conception


Internal Development national role conception has a descending trend while developer role conception is continuously ascending which indicates that the perception of China for the Chinese leaders is experiencing a shift from a developing country to a developer one. As Hu Jintao emphasizes the significance of developing other countries in one of his speeches; "Given the vast difference in APEC member's level of development, promoting the development of its developing members should be an important mission of the organization."²³⁸ Or as implied in Xi Jinping's speech; "Rather, it is an invitation open to all. It is a pursuit not to establish China's own sphere of influence, but to

²³⁷Ibid.

²³⁸ "Speech by President Hu Jintao of China at APEC CEO Summit" October 19, 2003. Last accessed: December 1, 2016. <http://www.china-un.ch/eng/ljzg/zgwjzc/t85897.htm>

support common development of all countries.”²³⁹ When talking about the “Internal Development” concept, the Chinese usually includes an adjective to its type. The development is a “peaceful” one and continuously refers to the connection between the Chinese development, world stability, world peace and world development. Hence, it might be normal to notice a direct correlation between “developer” national role conception and the “internal development” national role conception.

Table 5: The Change in the Developer Role Conceptions



Developer role conception continued its increase and reached 12,93% from 3.34%.

5.3. Defender of the Faith Role Conception

“Defender of the faith” national role conception considers that some states observe their foreign policy objectives and commitments in terms of defending value systems

²³⁹ “A new starting point for China’s Development A new blueprint for Global Growth” chiangmai.china-consulate.org October 19, 2003. Last accessed: January 1, 2017. Last updated: 3 September 2016 <http://chiangmai.china-consulate.org/eng/zgyw/t1396112.htm>

from attack. It is explained as those who espouse this national role conception, are more likely to undertake special responsibilities to ensure ideological purity for a group of other states²⁴⁰. The second significant change occurred in Defender of Faith national role conception. It is significant to emphasize that in the “Defender of the Faith” role conception, the Marxist understanding changed with the Deng Xiaoping. His understanding of Socialism, Communism, the means to achieve, the motivations and the methodology was somewhat different from the “Gang of Four” where they were critically labelled as the “left” by Deng Xiaoping. That is also the reason why this thesis started from his term of office. As it can be understood from his speeches, for Deng Xiaoping, there is no such thing as socialism or communism with poverty in contrast to what gang of four promoted as “it is better to be poor under socialism than be rich under capitalism.”²⁴¹ Instead Deng Xiaoping put forward the slogan of “We must emancipate our minds and use our heads.” He declared that they should integrate theory with practice and proceed from reality and practice as the sole criterion for judging the truth and reestablishing the “ideological line of seeking truth from facts.”

According to Deng, the mistakes made by the “Left” ideology in 1957, in the economic domain lead to the Great Leap Forward. Then in 1966, those persisted mistakes led to the great disaster of “Cultural Revolution.”²⁴² Marxist ideology cannot be realized without the presence of productive forces where the Marxist ideology suggests the principle of from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”.²⁴³ For Marx, the step of Socialism is where there is overwhelming abundance of material

²⁴⁰ Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of foreign Policy,” 264.

²⁴¹ “We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies” April 30, 1987 <https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁴² “We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies,” April 30, 1987 <https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁴³ “We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies,” April 30, 1987 <https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

which will help to achieve the step of Communism.²⁴⁴ In contrast, Mao Zedong had Marxist-Leninist approach which allowed for a more revolutionary international system understanding. Deng criticizes what he termed as “left” ideology which plagued China and became dominant. Nobody knew how China will proceed until the Gang of Four was overthrown between 1976-1978. Deng also states “...But the problem is: What is Socialism and how is it to be built?” According to Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong made a grave mistake by neglecting the productive forces where the fundamental principle for Marxism is to develop the productive forces. Deng emphasizes that they have introduced a responsibility system (which is based on meritocracy. People will have to work hard and earn their food depending on their effort) while discarding the system whereby “everyone eats from the same big pot”²⁴⁵ because if they were to continue practice egalitarianism (in other words: eating from the same pot.), it would be impossible for them to raise the people’s standard of living.²⁴⁶ This explains the relatively high rate of “Defender of faith” national role conception of Deng Xiaoping in contrast to the other Chinese leaders.

Despite the general misperception that China leads to Capitalism, in fact, Deng never deviated from Communism (at a rhetorical level) as he also stated that “Some people ask why we choose socialism. We answer that we had to. Because Capitalism would get China nowhere.”²⁴⁷ For Deng, choosing the Capitalist road for China with a population of 1 billion (back then) would be a disaster and a retrogression of history. But he did think that it was necessary to re-interpret it. This also indicates the significance of including the Chinese characteristics into role theory as explained by

²⁴⁴ “We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies,” April 30, 1987
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁴⁵ “We shall expand Political Democracy and Carry Out Economic Reform.”
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁴⁶ “Keeping to Socialism and the Policy of Peace,” April 4, 1986.
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁴⁷ “Building a Socialism with a specifically Chinese Character,” June 30, 1984
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

Chen in the theoretical background chapter. Deng defined Marxism and Communism in a “Chinese way” or to be more precise, he included a “Chinese essence in it”. Therefore, the actions that the Chinese government are concerted and there is a harmony of intra and inter roles and this situation does not necessarily create a role conflict as argued by the fantasy novel metaphor of Chen. “...by Marxism we mean Marxism that is integrated with Chinese conditions, and by socialism we mean a socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has a specifically Chinese character.”²⁴⁸ Deng emphasizes that the nature of modernization is socialist.²⁴⁹ His socialism is described as a Chinese style Socialism²⁵⁰.

According to Deng, modernization of the economy, decrease in military spending and reconciliation with the USA, USSR and India attributed more relevance for the country as a whole. Emphasizing ideology and political campaigns were secondary for him. What is more, he offered 3 tasks for China: “oppose those who pursue hegemony” and “preserve world peace,” “work on China’s unification”²⁵¹ with Taiwan and expand effort for “China’s four modernizations.”²⁵² Similar to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin also proposes a different if not peculiar understanding of Marxism by including Chinese elements in it. One is again reminded of his words: “that is one reason why we have remained opposed to dogmatism toward the theory of Marxism. Our Party made mistakes and even suffered serious setbacks in some historical periods. The most

²⁴⁸ “Building a Socialism with a specifically Chinese Character,” June 30, 1984
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁴⁹ “China can only take the Socialist Road,” March 3, 1987
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁵⁰ “We must Carry Out the Socialist Construction in an Orderly Way under the Leadership of the Party,” March 8, 1987
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁵¹ The Deng era had “one country, two systems” policy in addition to the ‘peaceful unification’ policy which was introduced for the first time in 1983. What is more, the “one country, two systems” policy is still applied in Beijing. in Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy*, 70.


²⁵² Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy*, 51.

important cause for that was the fact that the guiding ideology of the Party was divorced from Chinese reality at the time.”²⁵³ Nonetheless, Even though it was preserving its significance, the defender of the faith national conception started to decrease during the Jiang period.

Being among the most reiterating national role conception, “defender of the faith,” indicates the importance and influence of the Communist “ideology” in their government. The underlying causes of the recurring ideological terminologies could be to preserve the national unity and emphasize the state ideology. Defender of Faith national role conception experienced a descending trend since Deng Xiaoping. As the results indicates, national role conception of “defender of the faith” is decreasing except for the Hu Jintao period while “nation-state” role conception is continuously ascending. In Deng’s era, being the second highest national role conception, it was equal to 26,84 but decreased to first 23,58% (During Jiang Zemin’s term of office) then to 26,99 (during Hu Jintao’s period), and finally to 8,79% in Xi Jinping’s term of office. These results indicates that China might be experiencing a shift from the Communist ideology and rhetoric. “Nation-state” role conception was the most dominant one in Xi Jinping’s speeches where Hu Jintao had “defender of faith” as his most dominant national role conception. This reflects the pragmatist, more assertive and nationalistic foreign policy approach of the leader.

²⁵³ “Jiang’s speech at CPC Anniversary Gathering” *Chinaembassy.cz* last updated: 2004.06.02
<http://www.chinaembassy.cz/cze/xwdt/t127028.htm>

Table 6: Defender of the Faith Role Conception



5.4. Tianxia National Role Conception

When looking at the Tianxia role conception, it usually happens when China is not an ego state but a role state where the word literally means ‘all under heaven.’ It is both a philosophy and life attitude shaped by values of responsibility, trust and mutual gain. It indicates that the country at the center is not selfless. It cares about other countries in this harmonious world where each country is an opportunity for each other in terms of mutual gain.²⁵⁴ The states are therefore ‘hierarchically ranked in accordance with how well one is in compliance with the cultural ideal of selflessness,’²⁵⁵ which encourages them to devote themselves to self-rectification.

The third change that should be mentioned in this thesis is considering the Tianxia national role conception. The ‘Tianxia’ role conception can explain the world about China’s positioning itself into the larger structure more than other roles. The turning

²⁵⁴ Shih,, “Assigning Role Characteristics to China,” 77.

²⁵⁵ Shih, “Assigning Role Characteristics to China,” 76.

point for China, as Deng emphasizes, was the Third session of their Party's 11th Central Committee where a series of new policies including reform and opening up to the world and principles were adopted.²⁵⁶ Deng says that 'If China, with its one billion people, abandoned the policy of peace or opposition to hegemonism or if, as the economy developed, it sought hegemony that would be also a disaster for the world and a retrogression of history.'²⁵⁷ Deng Xiaoping, in most of his speeches states that China will not participate in the arms race and instead will use that money to improve the education levels and the people's living standards.²⁵⁸ Adhering to the four cardinal principles is also among the significant decisions that was taken in the Eleventh Party Committee²⁵⁹. All of these can still be observed in the foreign policy decisions of both Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping but in a decreasing trend. Jiang Zemin, in his speeches opposes even the concept of 'hegemonism' and power politics.²⁶⁰ The idea behind Jiang seems to be: developing a 'passive' China²⁶¹ will bring peace and stability to the world while closing the unequal economic, cultural gap between the North and South, between the developed and under developed. This can be seen in his

²⁵⁶ "Keeping to Socialism and the Policy of Peace," April 4, 1986.

<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁵⁷ "Keeping to Socialism and the Policy of Peace," April 4, 1986.

<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁵⁸ "For the Great Unity of the Entire Chinese Nation," June 18, 1986

<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁵⁹ "We must Carry Out the Socialist Construction in an Orderly Way under the Leadership of the Party," March 8, 1987

<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁶⁰ Jiang Zemin "speech at the meeting", 25. He is criticized severely. President Jiang Zemin was protested during his speech at the Harvard University by some Chinese students studying in U.S. claiming "History has repeatedly taught us that appeasing dictators does not bring peace or prosperity... The Chinese communists are masters of manipulation and deception. . . . China wants Western money, advanced technology, management skills, and market share in order to modernize and fuel its military buildup in preparation for the inevitable confrontation that it must face on the road to becoming a world superpower. The West must accept this reality." In Jennifer Powell and Alvin Powell "Questions and Answers after President Jiang Zemin's speech" *The Harvard University Gazette* new.harvard.edu last updated: Nov 6, 1997, last accessed: 19. 04. 2016
<http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/1997/11.06/QuestionsandAns.html>

²⁶¹ not seeking world hegemony or applying a "low profile" diplomacy.

“Tianxia” role conception. Nonetheless, to achieve these, China will never lose its own characteristics, its own interpretation of socialist ideology and its own development path. It will always stick to its own ideology of Marxism-Leninism. In most of Jiang Zemin’s speech he emphasizes that China’s rise will bring equality to the world again, just like the ‘Tianxia’ concept. ‘The purposes of China's foreign policy are to safeguard world peace and promote common development.’²⁶² The national role conception of *Tianxia* for Hu Jintao was even lower compared to other national role conceptions. It can be seen in the fourth place after ‘defender of the faith,’ ‘internal development’ and ‘nation-state’ respectively. Nevertheless it also should be highlighted that due to the ‘internal development’ concerns of China, there has been an economic interdependence between China and other countries which eventually prevents possible wars.²⁶³

This was an unexpected result contrary to the hypothesis since Chinese leaders mention ‘peaceful development’²⁶⁴ and ‘harmonious world’ concepts almost in all of their speeches once. According to Harris, the ‘harmonious world’ by Hu Jintao was more of a narrative than a grand strategy for Chinese foreign policy due to its lack of operational measures.²⁶⁵ Harris’s argument seemed to be valid for the results of the content analysis in this thesis. When China started to be perceived as a ‘threat’ by the Western block in the late 1990s because of its enormous annual growth rates, China began to develop a vision around the concept of ‘peaceful rise’ which later turned into ‘peaceful development’ due to the problematic connotation of the word ‘rise.’²⁶⁶ Hence, according to Harris, the terminology ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘harmonious world’

²⁶² Jiang Zemin, “speech at the meeting,” 25.

²⁶³ Judy Dempsey, “The United States and China: The Return of a bipolar World,” *Strategic Europe* November 12, 2012. Accessed: January 7, 2015. www.carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=49969


²⁶⁴ *Zhongguo de heping fazhan (China’s Peaceful Development)*, Last modified: September 2011, Beijing, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_4.htm, Accessed in 20.04.2015.

²⁶⁵ Harris “China, the World and the International System,” 53.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

were created for the very intention of Chinese national interests in order to prevent China to be viewed as a ‘threat’ by other countries given the proliferating perception of ‘China’s rise’ rhetoric during the late 2000s²⁶⁷. Hence, as a result, firstly, the fluctuating results of Tianxia indicates that this concept is utilized mostly to justify certain attitudes and just like in Yudan chen’s ‘weiqi metaphor’ in the first chapter, Tianxia role conception is a ‘flowing role’. It changes meaning according to time and space. Secondly, it resembles a different ‘China’ understanding which reflects country’s image from its leaders. This understanding indicates that a harmonious world is possible with the Chinese leadership where China will make sure of world stability, peace and coherence.

Table 7: The Change in Tianxia Role Conception



In the final analysis, as it is stated previously, it can be seen that the Tianxia rhetoric peaks during the Hu Jintao period. The most important reason for that is the ‘harmonious society’ speeches. As it is explained in the theory chapter, this peak can be explained as a ‘pragmatic’ attitude where the meaning or the interpretation of

²⁶⁷ Ibid.,56.

Chinese roles can change and adapt to the present system. Hu Jintao advocated that "all nations live side by side in perfect harmony" during his speech at Yale University.²⁶⁸ The understanding of 'one central task and two basic points' (Central task is the Economic development and the other two were: the four cardinal principles²⁶⁹ and the policy of reform and opening up.) to guide policy making in the primary stage (Socialism)²⁷⁰ was also emphasized in Deng's speeches.²⁷¹

5.5. Nation State National Role Conception

Regarding the theoretical role characteristics, the 'nation-state' occurs when China is considered to be an ego or identity-driven state but not a role state or not an image driven state. In this case, China's economic, social and political rise will be perceived as a threat by other countries or scholars mainly because China's rise 'could threaten to overthrow the boundary of difference'²⁷².

Nation State national role conception can be seen that there is a continuously increasing trend. During the Deng period, the nation-state national role conception was the fourth most significant one with a percentage of 6.68. In Deng's period, this increases to 12.26 percent. When analyzing the results of Jiang Zemin²⁷³, it can be seen that the highest national role conception is 'internal development' after 'defender of

²⁶⁸ "Speech by the Chinese President Hu Jintao at Yale University," *ph.china-embassy.org* last updated: June 23, 2006. Last accessed: May 8, 2017 <http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t259486.htm>

²⁶⁹ The four cardinal principles were: The Socialist Road, The People's Democratic Dictatorship, the leading role of the Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought

²⁷⁰ "1987: One Central Task and Two Basic Points." http://www.china.org.cn/features/60years/2009-09/16/content_18535066.htm last updated: September 9, 2009. Last accessed: July 12, 2016.

²⁷¹ "We must adhere to Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution Towards Capitalism" November 23, 1989. <https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

²⁷² Shih, "Assigning Role Characteristics to China," 76.

²⁷³ It can be seen in table 1.

faith'. Then, the highest ones are Tianxia and Nation-State role conceptions. Considering his nation-state role conception, he seems rock firm in their foreign policy towards Taiwan and China's reunification with it. 'The status of Taiwan as a part of China shall in no way be allowed to change.'²⁷⁴ During Hu Jintao's period, the 'nation-state' role conception continues to ascend (it becomes 15.76) and becomes the third highest national role conception.

Hu Jintao's foreign policy prioritizes nationalism in the third place.²⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Shambaugh in his article reiterates the fact that Hu Jintao belongs to the Major Powers School which can be identified from his preference to 'concentrate its (China's) diplomacy on managing its relations with the world's major powers and blocs' such as the European Union or United States while attributing less importance to interstate relations between Asian countries. Including Hu Jintao, proponents of the Major Power School are mostly the government officials. Even though those officials do not have any trust in the USA due to their relations in the past, they are pragmatic enough to acknowledge the importance of the USA for Chinese foreign policy. This could be even observed from the ever increasing military spending starting with Hu Jintao period.²⁷⁶ Since the Deng era, it is argued by Harris that China might be maintaining a low profile.²⁷⁷ Nevertheless, this low profile view has been challenged to an extent by the Hu Jintao government by placing more emphasis on the need for greater international activity in Chinese foreign policy and especially by his successor, Xi Jinping.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁴ "Jiang Zemin speech at the meeting celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Communist party of China," <http://www.china.org.cn/e-speech/a.htm> , 24.

²⁷⁵ Shambaugh. "Coping with a Conflicted China," 14-22.

²⁷⁶ "China's military rise: The Dragon's new teeth," *The Economist* April 7, 2012. Accessed: January 6 2015. <http://www.economist.com/node/21552193>.

²⁷⁷ Harris, "China, the World and the International System," 51.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 52.

The upward trend of national role conception of Nation-State emphasizes a more 'assertive' Chinese foreign policy as it was stated by Jinping as 'establishing great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics'.²⁷⁹ Xi Jinping's national role conception becomes the most significant one with a percentage of 23.1. Nation-state role conception emphasizes the more pragmatic, realistic, national foreign policy tendency of the Chinese foreign policy. One can interpret these as a tendency towards a more pragmatic foreign policy. Hence, it indicates that Chinese foreign policy choices are most of the time determined by national interests. In terms of patriotism and nationalism, Chinese foreign policy is dominated by more assertive pragmatic decisions. For Xi Jinping, second most recurring concept was *Tianxia* and only the third was the 'internal development.'

The results considering the 'nation state role conception' indicates the Chinese assertiveness in the International system. What is more, Chinese assertiveness is strengthening the threat perception of the US authorities in the International system. According to Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, Xi Jinping's conceptual shift to big power diplomacy as well as revitalization of the Chinese nation is getting more obvious. The practical examples confirms that these results are not only rhetoric. Szczudlik-Tatar also indicates that China in addition to getting more active in its neighborhood and Asia-Pacific, it also constructs new international institutions as alternatives to their Western counterparts. Some examples to these are; New Development Bank²⁸⁰, Reserve Fund, Asian Infrastructure Bank, which not only disturbs US comfort zone by challenging its international order, but also creates tension as to emphasize China's escalating position and power in the region.²⁸¹ The Asian Infrastructure Bank, as a challenge to Bretton Woods system, was primarily designed as an Asian institution instead of an

²⁷⁹ Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, "Towards China's Great power Strategy under Xi Jinping," http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19622

²⁸⁰ It was established at the BRICS summit in 2014 and it is considered a the first step of reshaping the Western-dominated International Finance. In Szczudlik-Tatar, "Towards China's Great power Strategy under Xi Jinping," [6](#).

²⁸¹ Szczudlik-Tatar, "Towards China's Great power Strategy under Xi Jinping," 5.

international one. Nonetheless, with the inclusion of England, most European countries did also submitted applications.²⁸² USA have substantial worries over this proliferating Chinese influence. This Chinese influence can be seen from certain behaviours of USA. USA's attitude of reportedly persuading its allies not to join the China initiated AIIB is one example.²⁸³ China's agenda-setter potential, or using Shih's words its role-maker status, have been increasing with the newly signed agreements of FTA, RCEP, CICA²⁸⁴, China-CELAC forum²⁸⁵ and China's new domestic free-trade zones as well.²⁸⁶ The American reluctance to use the word 'Great Power' despite Xi's new description of Chinese-US relations as the 'new type of great power relationship', indicates USA's concerns over this more assertive foreign policy.²⁸⁷

What is more, 'nation-state' role conception, combining with 'Tianxia', seems to become an integral part of Chinese foreign policy. According to David Shambough, China does not know whether it wants to be a global hegemon (nation-state) or just be part of the system. What China wants from the world is still unknown by the Chinese leaders.²⁸⁸ What is more, he indicates that China's domestic sphere is a chief obstacle to China's external attitudes.²⁸⁹ Due to those domestic obstacles, China is not stable in terms of foreign policies which keeps the leadership preoccupied.²⁹⁰ This unstable

²⁸² Ibid., [6](#).

²⁸³ "China's New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: 'Peaceful Rise 2.0?'," 19.

²⁸⁴ Main Security Forum in Asia.

²⁸⁵ A forum to reinvigorate relations with the neglected countries and regions.

²⁸⁶ Szczudlik-Tatar, "Towards China's Great power Strategy under Xi Jinping," [6](#).

²⁸⁷ "China's New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: 'Peaceful Rise 2.0?'," 18.

²⁸⁸ "China's Communist Identity Crises," *youtube.com* video 2:07 last accessed: April 13, 2015.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jbosB4qnVvY>

²⁸⁹ "China's Communist Identity Crises" video 9:20.

²⁹⁰ "China's Communist Identity Crises" video 9:22.

foreign policy attitudes leads China towards identity crises or as role theory suggests; “role conflicts”. Despite these arguments, this thesis finds enough proof that in certain foreign policies of China there is in fact the existence of stability and even an evolution towards a certain goal. Shambough still includes that China definitely does not wish to follow a global hegemony and does not want to be a part of the global governing.²⁹¹ He proposes that China has a passive, risk averse conservative, and even confused foreign policy where it does not shape the actions of the others.²⁹² Throughout the multiple identities and a conflicting personality, it seems that China still is trying to find its way but in a more “pragmatic” manner.²⁹³ Harris says that China dedicates plenty of prominence to sovereignty, independence and national unity.²⁹⁴ Therefore, China’s management of international relations among global actors could be concluded as problematic in terms of implementing existing rules and regulations even though it adheres to western norms and China itself claims to be a ‘responsible power.’²⁹⁵

²⁹¹“China’s Communist Identity Crises” video 11:10.


²⁹²“China’s Communist Identity Crises” video 11:48.

²⁹³Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” 21.

²⁹⁴Harris, “China, the World and the International System,” 55.

²⁹⁵Ibid., 56.

Table 8: The Change in Nation-State Role Conception



5.6. Regional Leadership National Role Conception

‘Regional leader’ refers to the themes that a country fulfills its responsibilities ‘which it identifies’ to its region.²⁹⁶ ‘Regional Leadership role conception’ also has an ascending pattern. What is more, the ‘nation-state’ role conception can be connected with the ‘regional leadership’ role conception as well which indicates a sharp rise during the Xi Jinping period. Through Hu Jintao’s speeches, it could be understood that the priority of the Chinese foreign policy was more about the ‘regional’ and ‘local development’ through a ‘win-win’ strategy. During Hu Jintao’s period, the ‘regional leadership’ rhetoric was more about based on Asia’s ‘economic development’. Hence, Asianism and regional development role conceptions also were connected in one way. China prioritizing the economic development and stability in Asia. In one speech, Hu Jintao said that ‘Asia's development is important not only to Asia's future, but also to the future of our world.’ As Hu Jintao states. Jiang Zemin’s national role conception of ‘Asianism’ is slightly higher than both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Shambaugh emphasizes that the ‘Asia first’ school had a profound impact on Chinese foreign

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

policy in the late 1990s, during the Jiang Zemin period because 1997 Asian Financial crises indicated that China has not paid enough attention to its neighboring countries²⁹⁷. It should also be emphasized that as Harnisch also states: there is a connection between the historical self and the current self-identity where finding patterns enables us to see this relationship better.²⁹⁸

Regional Leader national role conception increases suddenly during the Xi Jinping period. This deviation, starting with the Deng period, is intensified as China developing itself more economically. Harris indicates that China's values and interests do not align with each other.²⁹⁹ China embraces international rules, norms and regulations as long as it does not clash with any of China's priorities. These priorities are "national unity," "economic development," "independence" "territorial unity," and "sovereignty,"³⁰⁰ even though Chinese leaders after Deng era do not undermine them as their predecessors did once.³⁰¹ When China's national interests are at stake, China would not even want to accept human rights which can be considered as the most basic international norm. This behavior can be traced back to its tendency of acting as an "ego state" rather than a "role state." The "ego state" behavior entails China to reject the given roles and encourage it to become a role maker instead of a role taker one. This situation can be observed in the case of "nation-state" role conception. Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin emphasizes that "China will never seek hegemony for itself. Always respecting other countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity, China also hopes that its position of achieving reunification and opposing national dismemberment will be understood and respected by others."³⁰²

²⁹⁷ Shambaugh. "Coping with a Conflicted China," 15.

²⁹⁸ Harnisch, "Role Theory and the study of Chinese foreign Policy," 12.

²⁹⁹ Harris, "China, the World and the International System," 54.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 54.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 56.

³⁰² "Carrying Forward Generations of good neighborly and friendly relations," fmprc.gov.cn last accessed: 2.04.2016 <http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2757/2758/t16111.htm>

When interpreted generally, China has entered into a new path where it is getting more active and assertive in its foreign policy and started to pose an alternative other than the existing status-co powers. This active foreign policy can be seen in China-US relationship in three levels of analysis. In the first level, there is an escalating Chinese leadership role in near Neighborhood (those roles were Regional leader and Developer) against US pivot strategy. In the Second level of analysis, Chinese foreign policy began to offer “Asian” alternatives against Western-dominated institutions. These were considered as a threat to the existing Asia-Pacific system. Finally, it is observed in the “new model of great power relations” framework of China as a threat in the International system. Thies argues that ‘The US and China have a long history of attempting to force their own self-conceived role identities onto each other, which, unsurprisingly, has led to periods of hostility between the two.’³⁰³ Following his argument, it can be stated that most conflicts between China and US happens due to the rejection of assigned roles to China by US³⁰⁴, or in other words, the ‘altercasting’ behavior. The aggressive behavior, thus, can be explained from China’s tendency towards a more self-conceived identity. From the content analysis results, it can also be seen that China tends to be going towards a ‘role-maker’ status than a ‘role-taker’ which effects Sino-US relations accordingly.

In the first level of analysis, the Chinese Foreign Policy is getting more assertive especially around its region where ‘regional leader’ role conception is dominant and have an upward trend. China seems to become a regional leader especially considering its interests around the South China Sea. China’s assertiveness does not only seen in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islets conflict, but also the recent conflict between Philippines and

³⁰³ G. Cameron Thies, “The US and China: Altercast roles and changing power in the 20th century” in *China’s International Roles* Ed. Sebastian Harnisch, et al (New York: Routledge, 2016), 98.

³⁰⁴ Thies “The US and China: Altercast roles and changing power in the 20th century,” 106.

China can be given as an example. The simmering crises since 2012³⁰⁵ where the indisputable sovereignty of Chinese territory have been emphasized more ever since, Chinese are acting more self-confident and aggressive. Recent developments regarding the tension between China and Philippines seems to be confirming these concerns. Even though the international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of Philippines in the Maritime dispute, China refused the decision of the Permanent court of arbitration.³⁰⁶ The disputes on the South China Sea does not only concern China but also Republic of Philippines, Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, Nation of Brunei and Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The others want South China Sea to remain as international waters. Apart from its being the busiest shipping road, its extensive reserves of crude oil (estimated to be more than Kuwait petroleum) and gas³⁰⁷, abundant fishing opportunities, it is also an area of practicing leadership traits. The country who controls the South China Sea could also lead the whole region with the material and psychological opportunities it will gain from this situation.

The sharp rise in ‘regional leadership’ could be interpreted as a threat by the US side and also a proof to this tendency. Nonetheless, on the one hand, this tension between US and China can also be viewed as a ‘Self-fulfilling prophecy’ due to the ‘power transition theory’ of US against a perceived ‘Chinese threat’ and the Chinese response where most of the Chinese elites³⁰⁸ embraced the idea of USA as a primary potential threat but on the other hand, it can be viewed as ‘reasonable’ since China might want to become a regional power due to its increasing interests in the area.


³⁰⁵ Sebastian Harnisch, “China’s Historical Self and it’s International Role,” in *China’s International Roles* Ed. Sebastian Harnisch, et al (New York: Routledge, 2016), 50.

³⁰⁶ Katie Hunt, “South China Sea: Court rules in favor of Philippines over China,” *cnn.com* last updated: July 12, 2016. Last accessed: October 5, 2016 <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/12/asia/china-philippines-south-china-sea/>

³⁰⁷ Bonnie Glaser, “Armed clash at the South China Sea” *Council on Foreign Relations Press*. Last updated: April 2012 <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>

³⁰⁸ Stuart Harris, “Askeri Tehditler ve Cevaplar,” *Çin Dış Politikası* Matbuat Yayın grubu (2014), 109.

Table 9: Regional Leadership Role Conception



Considering the ascending trend of regional leadership national role conception of China, Thies indicates that great powers most of the time tend to determine membership status in the interstate system.³⁰⁹ In October 2013, strategic goals for the next five to 10 years were defined in the unprecedented work forum on Neighborhood Diplomacy convened by Xi Jinping.³¹⁰ President Jinping unveiled the ‘Second Opening’ (after 1979 model), named as ‘One Belt One Road Project’ (OBOR) and as

³⁰⁹ Cameron Thies, *The United States, Israel, and the Search for International Order: Socializing States*, (New York: Routledge, 2013) quoted in Thies “The US and China: Altercast roles and changing power in the 20th century,” 102.

³¹⁰ Szczudlik-Tatar, “Towards China’s Great power Strategy under Xi Jinping,” 3.

the ‘China’s global pivot’³¹¹ by the West³¹², in 7 September 2013³¹³ where this idea was first formulated by Jiang Zemin. Then, it was reformulated by the current President Xi Jinping in terms of geopolitics.³¹⁴ OBOR was encompassing not only the near neighborhood but also the Central-Asia. The implementation of it began in 2014 with Euro-Asia Railways agreement between Russia and China .³¹⁵ It is viewed as a consequence of ‘Chinese Dream’³¹⁶ (where he calls for ‘fenfa youwei’, striving for achievement to realize the Chinese Dream³¹⁷) which offers the ‘Chinese-led framework for economic cooperation and development by constructing infrastructural network and new financial institutions.’³¹⁸

In the second level of analysis, at the core of the Chinese foreign policy right now is not only the closest neighborhood but also the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese-led economic integration project of Asia Pacific Free Trade Area (FTAAP) at the 2014

³¹¹ Michael Clarke indicates that in a wider context, domestic and geopolitical aims were interwoven where OBOR can be seen as a 'pivot' or 're-balance' to Asia under the relative power decline of US (especially after its withdrawal from Afghanistan) and Russia in Central Asia. It is considered to be a long-term, clear response to Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' strategy to prevent US being a Pacific Power where China is excluded even from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Galia Lavi., Jingjie He, and Oded Eran “China and Israel: On the Same Belt and Road?” *Strategic Assessment* 18, no. 3 (October 5) : 85, last accessed January 7, 2016. <https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/717/04/>

³¹² Szczudlik-Tatar, “Towards China’s Great power Strategy under Xi Jinping,” 4.

³¹³ “President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, last updated: September 7, 2013: 2 Last accessed January 9, 2016. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml

³¹⁴ Werner Fasslabend, “The Silk Road: A Political Marketing Concept for World Dominance,” *European View* 14 (December 21, 2015), 294.

³¹⁵ Lavi., “China and Israel: On the Same Belt and Road?,” 4.

³¹⁶ “Chinese dream” can be explained briefly as the “recalling the magnificence of Chinese rejuvenation”

³¹⁷ Masayudi Masuka “Why has Chinese foreign policy become more assertive?” *eastasiaforum.org* last updated: 20 February 2016. Last accessed: 28.04.2016 <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/20/why-has-chinese-foreign-policy-become-more-assertive/>

³¹⁸ Fasslabend, “The Silk Road: A Political Marketing Concept for World Dominance,” 293.

APEC conference where a Beijing Roadmap³¹⁹ for APEC's contribution to the realization of FTAAP was formulated is viewed as a counter-proposal of TPP.³²⁰ These policies caused China to be viewed as a de-facto strategical rival and potential challenger of US and its global supremacy.³²¹ China's certain actions during Xi period such as the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) which covered the disputed Diaoyu/Sensaku Islands were criticized severely by the USA in 23 November 2013.³²²

5.7. Other (minor) National Role Conceptions

'Asianism' occurs when China is an ego state and a role state simultaneously. This leads other states to identify this rise as both a threat and opportunity since 'China's rise could both revive the nationalist appeal (threat) and enhance transnational fluidity and hybridity (opportunity).'³²³ The influence of 'Asianism' role conception in Chinese foreign policy was very low during Hu Jintao period where his foreign policy was criticized of 'inaction'. However it increased in Jinping era.

When looking at the definition of 'Bastion of revolution' again, it states that some states feel a responsibility of organizing revolutionary movements abroad where those states not only physically support their compatriots but also emotionally support

³¹⁹ Beijing Roadmap was first putforward at the 2006 APEC conference. Tang Guoqiang and Wang Zhengyu 'Asia Pasific Free Trade Area: A roadmap and priority tasks' last updated March 3, 2015 <http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/asia-pacific-free-trade-area-a-roadmap-and-priority-tasks/>

³²⁰ Guoqiang Tang and Wang Zhengyu "Asia Pasific Free Trade Area" last updated March 3, 2015 <http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/asia-pacific-free-trade-area-a-roadmap-and-priority-tasks/>

³²¹ Masuka, "Why has Chinese foreign policy become more assertive?"

³²² "China's New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping: 'Peaceful Rise 2.00?'" <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14781158.2015.993958.13>.

³²³ Shih, "Assigning Role Characteristics to China," 76.

them.³²⁴ ‘Bastion of revolution’ (it was China’s most dominant national role conception in Holsti’s results), which is considered as a minor national role conception, was among the weakest (least effective) national role conceptions in this thesis. This was thought to be due to the transformation of the Chinese ‘mindset’ since the Deng era. Less emphasis was given to world revolution and more emphasis was given to ‘internal development,’ *Tianxia* and pragmatic policies of ‘nation-state’ by the Chinese leaders (Deng Xioping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping). This could be considered as an important paradigm shift for Chinese foreign policy.

Liberation supporter indicates that governments do support or appreciate the liberation movements abroad. Nevertheless, unlike ‘bastion of revolution’ role conception, ‘Liberation supporter’ does not indicate formal duties or responsibilities for leading or physically supporting the liberation movements abroad where the statements in this national role conception are formal and routine³²⁵. ‘Liberation Supporter National role conception’ was also on a descending trend except for the Jiang Zemin period when it experienced a sharp increase. Nevertheless, the change and quantity of it was so insignificantly small that this thesis did not make much inference out of it.

In the Civilization role conception, China is neither an ego state nor a role state where this indicates that China’s rise will neither be a threat nor an opportunity for other countries. The Civilization role conception was also on an ascending trend. Nonetheless, their percentages, significance and possible effect in the Chinese foreign policy role analysis were so low that they would not be discussed further in this thesis.

³²⁴ Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 260-261.

³²⁵ Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 263.

Table 10: The Change in the Asianism Role Conception




Table 11: The Change in the Liberation Supporter Role Conception




Table 12: The Change in the Civilization Role Conception




Table 13: Most Common National Role Conceptions in the Chinese Leaders³²⁶

Most Common Role Conception	Deng Xiaoping	Jiang Zemin	Hu Jintao	Xi Jinping
Role Conception 1	Internal Development	Internal Development	Internal Development	Nation-State
Role Conception 2	Defender of the Faith	Defender of the Faith	Tianxia	Tianxia
Role Conception 3	Tianxia	Tianxia	Nation-State	Internal Development
Role Conception 4	Nation-State	Nation-State	Defender of the Faith	Developer
Role Conception 5	Developer	Developer	Developer	Regional Leader
Role Conception 6	Active Independent	Asianism	Civilization	Defender of the Faith
Role Conception 7	Liberation Supporter	Civilization	Asianism	Civilization
Role Conception 8	Bastion of Revolution	Active Independent	Regional Leader	Asianism
Role Conception 9	Civilization	Liberation Supporter	Example	Active Independent
Role Conception 10	Asianism (non-existent)	Example		Bastion of Revolution & Liberation Supporter

³²⁶ The national role conceptions which have 0% effect were not included.

Table 13: Continued

Role Conception 11		Bastion of Revolution		Example
Role Conception 12				

To conclude, the high levels of ‘tianxia’ and ‘nation-state’ role conceptions should also not be seen as a role conflict as Yudan Chen suggests, the two opposing concepts can co-exist at the same time in contrast to the conventional arguments and this does not necessarily leads to ‘role-conflict’. This can be explained by his argument. The significant part here is the interpretation. Both roles can co-exist in China since China can both be in favor of a harmonious, peaceful country where it pursues its national interests and takes it as a priority. As Hu Jintao also says ‘The world peace is, in turn, enhanced by China's development.’

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

As it is stated in the introduction part, this thesis aimed at answering four main questions: (1) what are the national role conceptions of the Chinese leaders? (2) Did these national role conceptions changed or continued? (3) If they changed, what kind of a change was that? Is it possible to find a pattern towards something meaningful? (4) How can this result be interpreted? This thesis detected a variety of roles and a certain pattern of change towards different policies which explains Chinese foreign policy in different levels of analysis by utilizing role theory. The roles that Chinese leaders had: Tianxia, Civilization, Nation-State, Asianism, Bastion of Revolution, Example, Defender of Faith, Independent, Regional Leader, Liberal Supporter, Internal Development and Developer.

This thesis has derived five conclusions which indicates an apparent transformation of China's mindset in terms of foreign policy formation. It is also significant to highlight that, national role conceptions, only when they are interpreted together and in harmony by keeping in mind the "Chinese understanding," they create a sensible political framework for academics in the Chinese case.

Firstly, there seems to be a deviation from the old "Communist" understanding into a mix combination of "nation-state with Chinese Characteristics." The conventional Marxist understanding changed with the Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping interpreted Socialism, Communism, the means to achieve, the motivations and the methodology much different than "Gang of Four" and that was why Deng critically labelled them as "left." Some national role conceptions such as "Bastion of revolution" and "Liberation supporter" that were dominant during 1970s have decreased significantly. According

to Deng Xiaoping, Marxist ideology cannot be realized without the presence of productive forces. The Marxist ideology suggests the principle of from each according to his ability to each according to his needs.³²⁷ For Marx, the step of Socialism is where there is overwhelming abundance of material which will help to achieve the step of Communism.³²⁸ The understanding of “two whatevers” was criticized by Deng Xiaoping. This understanding emphasized that there is no such thing as socialism or communism with poverty in contrast to what gang of four promoted as “it is better to be poor under socialism than be rich under capitalism.”³²⁹ This was promoting “internal development” more than “pure ideology.” As the results indicates, this understanding prevailed in the party more with the each leader which explains the sharp and constant decrease in “defender of the faith.”

Secondly, there was an unexpected result considering the internal development role conception. Despite its priority among other role conceptions and lower rates of decrease when compared to “defender of faith” role conception, “internal development” role conception also has a decreasing pattern which can be interpreted as China first “cleaned its house” and now it is changing its attention to outside in order to pursue a more active foreign policy.

Thirdly, with the Tianxia role conception, China is positioning itself into the larger structure. Tianxia role conception seems to create a role conflict for China. Nonetheless, when keeping in mind the Chinese understanding of role harmony where Yudan Chen explains in the first chapter, “Nation-State” and “Tianxia” concepts complement each other. China appears to be giving itself the role of ‘Tianxia’ and “Nation-state” at the same time, giving the image of a country where with its

³²⁷ “We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies” April 30, 1987
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

³²⁸ “We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies” April 30, 1987
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

³²⁹ “We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies” April 30, 1987
<https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n45/mode/2up>

leadership, the world would be more equal, peaceful and in harmony. Harnisch says “historical self-identification stems from an instrumental need of the ruling communist elites to legitimize their rule by means other than economic benefits or brute force.” Similarly, “Tianxia” role conceptions is also utilized as a mean to achieve certain political goals by the leaders in their rhetoric. Hence, in the analysis, the notions of “Tianxia” were taken into consideration while analyzing the rise of “Nation State.” On the one hand and Xi Jinping’s proposal of a new type of great power relationship relied on “no conflict and no confrontation”, “mutual respect” and cooperation toward win-win results where it sounds sensible in an interdependent relationship where stability is significant for the Chinese on the other hand the words that indicate Tianxia role are used very flexible as it changed according to situation and time for legitimization purposes.³³⁰ This reminds one, the concept of “Weiqi metaphor” which indicates the flowing nature of the roles. This approach of “no conflict no confrontation” or “neither support nor condemn” gives west a nod that China respects the International law but also it gives China the flexibility to continue its relations with the problematic areas or countries. Hence those two roles of “nation-state” and “tianxia” are somehow connected in a sense that it can be interpreted as China considers itself as a different, if not peculiar, “nation-state” where she is “equal to none.”³³¹

Fourthly, Nation state and Tianxia role conceptions seems to become an integral part of the Chinese Foreign Policy. This may indicate that China wants a more peaceful, harmonious world of its own creation where its national interests will also matter from a pragmatic point of view. Reiterated emphasis on “peace,” “equality,” “harmony” and “co-existence” shows that even though the relevance of those role conceptions may increase or decrease throughout the time, they seem to maintain their importance or effect and seem to alter depending on the context.

³³⁰ Chen “Philosophy, identity, and role theory with ‘Chinese characteristics,” 90.

³³¹ Harnisch, “China’s Historical Self and it’s International Role,” 39.

Finally, given the results of the content analysis on Chinese national role conceptions, the tendency of China's foreign policy seems to be leading in a more "assertive" and "great power diplomacy" way. China does not seem willing to remain as a "role-taker" instead it seems to be more active in global governance in terms of being the "role-maker" in the international system. This challenge to the "role-maker" status of US is apparently creating a tension between Sino-US relations. With the recent developments, it seems it does not create a tension solely in Sino-US relations but also with its neighboring countries. The South China Sea tension between Philippines and China can be given as an example where China dismissed the arbitration court in Hague ruled on July 12 that China breached Philippines Sovereign rights in the busy waterway.³³² The unexpected assertive manner of China immediately created another tension in the region.

It can also be argued for further research that when the connection between Chinese foreign policy and national role conceptions are examined, the national role conceptions could have a profound impact on the formation of Chinese foreign policy and what is more, this impact reflects itself in a form of a "pattern" showing the direction of China's foreign policy behavior. Nonetheless, this thesis aimed to provide the changing patterns of roles of the Chinese leaders. It should also be reminded that the increasing abundance of human cultures can hardly be exclusively described where the national role conceptions specifically for an extremely multidimensional and complex country like China may remain inadequate to explain all the aspects of Chinese foreign policy behavior. This thesis tried to unearth the change and show the direction of Chinese foreign policy behavior by employing Chinese national role conceptions as much as possible. It is still a mystery whether the world will experience the rise of a different global power. Yet, this is a different question to respond and another topic to examine. But one should always keep in mind, as Arnold Bennett says,

³³² "Phillipines seeks formal talks with China amid South China Sea Tension: Ramos"
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-philippines-idUSKCN10N0CS> last accessed:
August 22, 2016 last updated: August 12, 2016

“Any change, even a change for the better, is always accompanied by drawbacks and discomforts.”³³³

³³³ Arnold Bennett is a British author and critic. He is also considered as a playwright and novelist being born in 1867. He is known to be a mainstream European realist. see; “Arnold Bennett” *knightstavern.org* last accessed: January 17, 2016. <http://knightstavern.org/any-change-even-a-change-for-the-better-is-always-accompanied-by-drawbacks-and-discomforts-bennett> and 'Arnold Bennett' *global.britannica.com* last accessed: January 17, 2016. <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Arnold-Bennett>

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APPENDICES

A. Coding Sheet for Each Speech

A.1. Content Analysis coding sheets for Xi Jinping (2013-...)

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 4 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: Defense
Article: Build up Our National Defense and Armed Forces	Speech Focus: Military development
Date: November 16, 2012	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	66.1	39	5
Tianxia	1.6	1	1
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0
Defender of the	16.9	10	4
Internal Development	15.2	9	3
Developer	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	59	

1) **Xi Jinping Speech, Hong Kong, Macao and the Chinese Mainland Are Closely Linked by Destiny**

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 6 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: 'One country, two systems'
Article: Hong Kong, Macao and the Chinese Mainland Are Closely Linked by Destiny	Speech Focus: Talk with Leung Chun-ying, chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Date: December 20, 2012, March 18, 2013,	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	20.3	13	4	4
Tianxia	11.1	7	2	4
Asianism	6.3	4	1	1
Civilization	4.7	3	1	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	1.5	1	0	1
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	3.1	2	1	1
Internal Development	22.2	14	4	3
Developer	31.7	20	5	5
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	54		

2) **Xi Jinping Speech, Build Strong National Defense and Powerful Military Forces**

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 4 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: National
Article: Build Strong National Defense and Powerful Military Forces	Speech Focus: The core values of the armed forces
Date: December 8 and 10, 2012	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	67.9	36	5	4
Tianxia	7.5	4	2	2
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	7.5	4	2	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	15	8	3	2
Internal Development	1.8	1	1	1
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	53		

3) **Xi Jinping Speech, Build People's Armed Forces That Follow the Party's Commands, Are Able to Win and Exemplary in Conduct**

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 6 Pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: National Defense
Article: Build People's Armed Forces That Follow the Party's Commands, Are Able to Win and Exemplary in Conduct	Speech Focus: speech at the plenary meeting of the PLA.
Date: March 11, 2013	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	68.5	37	5	4
Tianxia	5.5	3	2	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	3.7	2	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	5.5	3	2	1
Internal Development	16.6	9	3	3
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	54		

4) Xi Jinping Speech, Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 5 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: Neighborhood
Article: Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt	Speech Focus: Speech at Nazarbayev University
Date: September 7, 2013	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	8.5	8	2	2
Tianxia	32.9	31	5	9
Asianism	13.8	13	3	6
Civilization	3.1	3	1	3
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	6.3	6	2	3
Active Independent	1	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	2.1	2	1	1
Internal Development	7.4	7	2	4
Developer	24.4	23	4	8
Example	0	0	0	
Total	100	94		

5) Xi Jinping Speech, Work Together to Build a 21st- century Maritime Silk Road

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 4 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject:
Article: Work Together to Build a 21st- century Maritime Silk Road	Speech Focus: Speech at Council of Indonesia
Date: October 3, 2013	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	1.1	1	1	1
Tianxia	40	34	5	8
Asianism	11.7	10	3	7
Civilization	2.3	2	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	8.2	7	2	4
Active Independent	1.1	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	9.4	8	2	4
Developer	25.8	22	4	1
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	85		

**6) Xi Jinping Speech, Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries
Characterized by Friendship, Sincerity and Inclusiveness**

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 5 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: Neighborhood
Article: Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries Characterized by Friendship,	Speech Focus: Speech at a seminar on Neighborhood Diplomacy
Date: October 24, 2013	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	15.4	13	3	6
Tianxia	29.7	25	5	7
Asianism	21.4	18	4	5
Civilization	1.1	1	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	11.9	10	2	8
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Support	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	9.5	8	2	4
Developer	10.7	9	2	4
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	84		

7) **Xi Jinping Speech, Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics**

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 4 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: Socialism with Chinese
Article: Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese	Speech Focus:
Date: January 5, 2013	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	5.8	4	2	2
Tianxia	2.9	2	1	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	7.3	5	2	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	58.8	40	5	5
Internal Development	25	17	3	6
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	68		

8) Xi Jinping Speech, Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size:
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.
Article: Carry on the Enduring Spirit of Mao Zedong Thought	Speech Focus:
Date: December 26, 2013.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	1.6	1	1	1
Regional Leader	1.6	1	1	1
Active Independent	16.3	10	3	4
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	36	22	4	5
Internal Development	44.2	27	5	6
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	61		

9) **Xi Jinping Speech, The Chinese Dream Will Benefit Not Only the People of China, But Also of Other Countries.**

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size:
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: The Chinese Dream
Article: The Chinese Dream Will Benefit Not Only the People of China, But Also of Other Countries.	Speech Focus:
Date: May, 2013	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	22.2	12	4	4
Tianxia	44.4	24	5	6
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	3.7	2	0	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	1.8	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	5.5	3	2	1
Internal Development	1.4	8	3	3
Developer	7.4	4	2	2
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	54		

10) Xi Jinping Speech, Right time to innovate and make dreams come true

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 4 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: The Chinese
Article: Right time to innovate and make dreams come true	Speech Focus: Chinese innovation and development
Date: October 21, 2013	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	30.4	28	5	5
Tianxia	22.8	21	4	6
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	18.4	17	3	7
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	2.1	2	1	1
Internal Development	26	24	5	7
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	92		

**11) Xi Jinping Speech, The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation is a Dream
Shared by All Chinese**

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 4 pages
Source: The Chinese Dream	Speech Subject: Culturally Advanced
Article: The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation is a Dream Shared by All Chinese	Speech Focus: Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.
Date: June 6, 2014	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	34	17	5	4
Tianxia	36	18	5	5
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	14	7	3	3
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	2	1	1	1
Internal Development	10	5	2	2
Developer	4	2	1	1
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	50		

12) Xi Jinping Speech, Cultivate and Disseminate the Core Socialist Values.

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 2 pages
Source: The governance of China	Speech Subject: Culturally Advanced China
Article: Cultivate and Disseminate the Core Socialist Values.	Speech Focus: Cultivating the core communist values
Date: February 24,2014	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	17.5	13	3	4
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	43.2	32	5	7
Bastion of Revolution	4	3	2	1
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	25.6	19	4	4
Internal Development	6.7	5	2	2
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	2.7	2	1	2
Total	100	74		

13) Xi Jinping Speech, Working Together to Forge A New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind, New York.

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 5 pages
Source: http://qz.com/512886/read-the-full-text-of-xi-jinpings-first-un-address/	Speech Subject: Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping. President of the People's Republic of China At the General Debate of the 70 th Session of the UN General Assembly
Article: Working Together to Forge A New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind, New York.	Speech Focus: The importance of cooperation and equality at the UN.
Date: September 28, 2015	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	32,43	36	5	24
Tianxia	32,43	36	5	25
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	9	10	2	9
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0,9	1	1	1
Active Independent	0,9	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	3,6	4	2	4
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	11,71	13	3	11
Developer	9	10	2	7
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	111		

14) Xi Jinping, China's President Xi Jinping's Opening Address of G20 Summit: A New Blueprint for Global Economic Growth.

Leader's Name: Xi Jinping	Size: 9 pages
Source: http://www.globalresearch.ca/chinas-president-xi-jinpings-opening-address-of-g20-summit-a-new-blueprint-for-global-economic-growth/5543895	Speech Subject: The importance of win-win strategy in Economic Development
Article: China's President Xi Jinping's Opening Address of G20 Summit: A New Blueprint for Global Economic Growth.	Speech Focus: China has developed effectively in the past years and we should develop all together
Date: September 4, 2016	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	21,95	45	3	34
Tianxia	10,73	22	2	19
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0,49	1	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	1,46	3	1	2
Active Independent	0,49	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	1,46	3	1	3
Internal Development	29,26	60	4	38
Developer	34,14	70	5	41
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	205		

A2. Content Analysis coding sheets for Hu Jintao (2003-2013)

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 3 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: Peace and Development of Mankind.
Article: Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind.	Speech Focus: Peace and Development
Date: November 8, 2012.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	62.5	20	5	3
Tianxia	12.5	4	2	2
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	15.6	5	3	3
Internal Development	9.3	3	1	2
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	32		

1) **Hu jintao, Accelerating the Modernization of National Defense and Armed Forces.**

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 5 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: National
Article: Accelerating the Modernization of National Defense and Armed Forces.	Speech Focus: Modernization of Military
Date: November 8, 2012.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	72.3	55	5	5
Tianxia	13.1	10	3	5
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	6.5	5	1	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	14.4	11	3	5
Internal Development	0	0	0	0
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	76		

2) Hu Jintao, Enriching the Practice of ‘One country, two systems.’and Advancing China’s Reunification.

Leader’s Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 6 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: One Country, Two Systems.
Article: Enriching the Practice of ‘One country, two systems.’and Advancing China’s Reunification.	Speech Focus: Chinese Reunification.
Date: November 8, 2012.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	31	18	5	8
Tianxia	27.5	16	4	7
Asianism	1.7	1	1	1
Civilization	6.8	4	2	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	6.8	4	2	4
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	22.4	13	3	5
Developer	3.4	2	1	1
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	58		

3) Hu Jintao, Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China.

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 5 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: Developing Socialist Culture.
Article: Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China.	Speech Focus: Socialism
Date: November 8, 2012.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity (0-5)	Space
Nation-State	21.5	11	4	7
Tianxia	19.6	10	4	8
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	19.6	10	4	9
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	29.4	15	5	9
Internal Development	9.8	5	3	3
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	51		

4) **Hu Jintao, Keeping to the Socialist Path of Making Political Advance with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Reform of the Political Structure.**

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 5 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: Socialism with Chinese
Article: Keeping to the Socialist Path of Making Political Advance with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Reform of the Political Structure.	Speech Focus: Chinese Political Structure and Reforms
Date: November 8, 2012.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	6	4	2	3
Tianxia	34.8	23	5	8
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	6	4	2	4
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	1.5	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	25.7	17	4	7
Internal Development	25.7	17	4	8
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	66		

5) **Hu Jintao, Achieving New Victory for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.**

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 7 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.
Article: Achieving New Victory for Socialism with Chinese	Speech Focus: Socialism.
Date: November 8, 2012.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0.5	1	1	1
Tianxia	11.6	22	3	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	3.7	7	2	4
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0.5	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	61.9	117	5	12
Internal Development	21.6	41	4	4
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	189		

6) **Hu Jintao, Our Work in the Past Five Years and the Basic Experience We have Gained in the Past Ten Years.**

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 8 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: Chinese
Article: Our Work in the Past Five Years and the Basic Experience We have Gained in the Past Ten Years.	Speech Focus: Development
Date: November 8, 2012.	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	7.3	12	2	5
Tianxia	7.9	13	2	4
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	3.6	6	1	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	18.2	30	3	4
Internal Development	62.8	103	5	5
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	164		

7) **Hu Jintao, Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.**

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 10 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: Speech in United
Article: Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.	Speech Focus: Peace and Prosperity
Date: September 15, 2005	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	20.8	29	3	5
Tianxia	31.6	44	5	7
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	13.6	19	3	5
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	2.1	3	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	7.9	11	2	4
Developer	23.7	33	4	3
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	139		

8) Hu Jintao, At the Opening Session of the Second Round of The China-US

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 3.5 pages
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Policies and Activities, Speeches. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t696706.shtml	Speech Subject: Endeavour to Build a Positive, Cooperative and Comprehensive China-US Relationship for the 21 st Century.
Article: At the Opening Session of the Second Round of The China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogues, in Beijing.	Speech Focus: China and the US, as the major developing country and as the major developed country, must maintain the world peace and security.
Date: May 25, 2010	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Strategic and Economic Dialogues, in Beijing.

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	15.58	12	4	7
Tianxia	57.14	44	5	13
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	7.79	6	2	5
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	11.68	9	3	6
Developer	5.19	4	1	4
Example	2.59	2	1	1
Total	100	77		

9) Hu Jintao, Speech by President Hu Jintao of China at APEC CEO

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 4 pages
Source: http://www.china-un.ch/eng/ljzg/zgwjzc/t85897.htm	Speech Subject: We should work together in order to promote common development
Article: Speech by President Hu Jintao of China at APEC CEO Summit	Speech Focus: To achieve economic growth and better living standards is a goal shared by people of all lands.
Date: October 19, 2003	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Summit

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	1,25	1	1	1
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	2,5	2	1	1
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	7,5	6	2	5
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	5	4	2	2
Internal Development	38,75	31	4	14
Developer	45	36	5	14
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	80		

10) Hu Jintao, Full text of Hu Jintao's speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, Boao-Hainan

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 2.5 pages
Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/12/content_7966431.htm	Speech Subject: We should increase cooperation with Asia.
Article: Full text of Hu Jintao's speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, Boao-Hainan	Speech Focus: Asia's development is important not only to Asia's future, but also to the future of our world.
Date: April 12 , 2008	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0,87	1	1	1
Tianxia	13,15	15	3	5
Asianism	14,91	17	3	6
Civilization	2,63	3	1	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	
Regional Leader	9,64	11	2	5
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	3,50	4	1	2
Defender of the Faith	0.87	1	1	1
Internal Development	32,45	37	5	8
Developer	21,92	25	4	7
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	114		

11) Hu Jintao, Full text of Hu Jintao's speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 5 pages
Source: china.org.cn (Xinhua news agency) http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm	Speech Subject: China's development is an opportunity for Asia.
Article: Full text of Hu Jintao's speech at BFA Annual Conference 2004	Speech Focus: China's development cannot be isolated from Asia. Hence we will work harder to create further regional cooperation in a win-win strategy.
Date: April 24, 2014	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0,90	1	1	1
Tianxia	12,61	14	3	8
Asianism	17,11	19	3	16
Civilization	0,90	1	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	13,51	15	3	11
Active Independent	1,80	2	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	2,70	3	2	2
Internal Development	27,02	30	5	20
Developer	23,42	26	4	20
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	111		

12) Hu Jintao, Remarks by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People's Republic of China At the Welcoming Ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 1 page
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t789955.shtml	Speech Subject: Our cooperation with USA as partners should be based on mutual benefit.
Article: Remarks by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People's Republic of China At the Welcoming Ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House	Speech Focus: China-US Relations
Date: January 19, 2011	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	25,92	7	4	4
Tianxia	55,55	15	5	8
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	18,51	5	3	5
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	27		

13) Hu Jintao, Speech By Chinese President Hu Jintao at Yale University, New Heaven.

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 6 pages
Source: http://ph.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t259486.htm	Speech Subject: Understanding leads to trust. Today, I would like to speak to you about China's development strategy and its future against the backdrop of the evolution of the Chinese civilization and China's current development endeavor.
Article: Speech By Chinese President Hu Jintao at Yale University, New Heaven.	Speech Focus: Understanding China
Date: April 21, 2006	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	24,32	27	4	20
Tianxia	25,22	28	4	19
Asianism	0,90	1	1	1
Civilization	18,01	20	3	17
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional	0,90	1	1	1
Active Independent	2,70	3	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	27	30	5	21
Developer	0,90	1	1	1
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	111		

**14) Hu Jintao, The Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 17th Party Congress-
The work of the Past Five Years**

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 5 pages
Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm	Speech Subject: The five years since the Sixteenth Congress was an extraordinary period.
Article: The Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at 17 th Party Congress- The work of the Past Five Years	Speech Focus: The work of the five years
Date: October 15, 2007	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity (5-	Space
Nation-State	22,97	17	4	13
Tianxia	4,05	3	2	2
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	6,75	5	2	3
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	1,35	1	1	1
Active Independent	1,35	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	13,51	10	3	7
Internal Development	48,64	36	5	15
Developer	1,35	1	1	1
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	74		

15) Hu Jintao, Hu Jintao's Speech on Climate Change

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao	Size: 2 pages
Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23hu.text.html	Speech Subject: Climate Change
Article: Hu Jintao's Speech on Climate Change	Speech Focus: Global climate change has impact on the survival and development of mankind. It is a major challenge facing all countries.
Date: September 22,2009	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity (5-	Space
Nation-State	21,05	4	4	6
Tianxia	26,31	5	5	5
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	26,31	5	5	6
Developer	26,31	5	5	6
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	19		

A3. Content Analysis coding sheets for Jiang Zemin (1993-2003)

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 4 pages
Source: <i>asiasociety.org</i>	Speech Subject: China-US relations
Article: At Luncheon by the America China Society And Five Other Organizations	Speech Focus: brief information on China's domestic and foreign policies and some of Zemin's thoughts on
Date: October 30, 1997	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency %	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	18,23	29	3
Tianxia	19,49	31	4
Asianism	0,62	1	1
Civilization	8,17	13	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	10,06	16	2
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	10,69	17	2
Internal Development	29,55	47	5
Developer	1,88	3	1
Example	1,25	2	1
Total	100	159	

1) Jiang Zemin, Speech in the Harvard University: Enhance Mutual Understanding and Build Stronger ties of Friendship and Cooperation.

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 6 pages
Source: chinainformed.com	Speech Subject: Understanding China
Article: Speech in the Harvard University: Enhance Mutual Understanding and Build Stronger ties of Friendship and Cooperation	Speech Focus: Chinese intentions are peaceful and always supporting mutual cooperation, mutual understanding, building stronger ties and creating world peace.
Date: 1 November 1997	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	6,56	9	1
Tianxia	34,3	47	5
Asianism	0,72	1	1
Civilization	6,56	9	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	13,86	19	2
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	10,94	15	2
Internal Development	24,81	34	4
Developer	2,18	3	1
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	137	

2) Jiang Zemin, Opening Session of Millennium Summit Hears Statements by 19 Heads of State, 10 Heads of Government, Two Vice Presidents-General Assembly, Press Release

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 1 page
Source: un.org	Speech Subject: UN Reforms and
Article: Opening Session of Millennium Summit Hears Statements by 19 Heads of State, 10 Heads of Government, Two Vice Presidents-General Assembly, Press Release	Speech Focus: The imbalance in World development is becoming more acute. Hence we should take some measures as soon as possible.
Date: 6 September 2000	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	5,2	1	1
Tianxia	31,5	6	5
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	15,78	3	3
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	5,2	1	1
Liberation Supporter	10,52	2	2
Defender of the Faith	5,2	1	1
Internal Development	0	0	0
Developer	26,31	5	4
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	19	

3) **Jiang Zemin, China and Africa-Usher in the new century together—
Speech by President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China at
the Opening Ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.**

Leader’s Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 4 pages
Source: fmprc.gov.cn	Speech Subject: Chinese-African
Article: China and Africa-Usher in the new century together—Speech by President Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.	Speech Focus: Cooperation and Common Development between Sino-African relations.
Date: 10 October 2000	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	5,6	8	2
Tianxia	29,57	42	5
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	7,04	10	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	5,6	8	2
Liberation Supporter	15,49	22	3
Defender of the Faith	0,7	1	1
Internal Development	11,2	16	3
Developer	24,6	35	4
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	142	

**4) Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China.
(Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)**

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 6 pages
Source: china.org.cn	Speech Subject: Achievements and Basic Experience of the Communist Party of China in the 80-Year
Article: Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80 th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China. (Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)	Speech Focus:
Date: July 1, 2001	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	14,04	33	3
Tianxia	5,10	12	1
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	3,40	8	1
Bastion of Revolution	0,85	2	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	7,65	18	2
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	51,48	121	5
Internal Development	16,59	39	3
Developer	0,85	2	0
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	235	

- 5) **Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China.**
(Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 7 pages
Source: china.org.cn	Speech Subject: Correctly Understand and Comprehensively Fulfill the Requirements of the 'Three Represents'.
Article: Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80 th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China. (Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)	Speech Focus: To achieve development through Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.
Date: July 1, 2001	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	7,38	30	2
Tianxia	0,49	2	1
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	2,21	9	1
Bastion of Revolution	0,24	1	1
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	47,04	191	5
Internal Development	41,62	169	4
Developer	0,98	4	1
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	406	

6) **Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China.**
(Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 6 pages
Source: china.org.cn	Speech Subject: Continue to strive for the fulfillment of the basic line and Historic Mission of the Party
Article: Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80 th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China. (Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)	Speech Focus: The realization of communism will be an extremely protracted historical process. But through economic development, China will develop its socialism to a new stage
Date: July 1, 2001	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	17,29	46	4
Tianxia	18,42	49	4
Asianism	0,37	1	1
Civilization	5,26	14	3
Bastion of Revolution	0,37	1	1
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	3	8	2
Liberation Supporter	0,75	2	1
Defender of the Faith	18,04	48	4
Internal Development	31,95	85	5
Developer	4,5	12	3
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	266	

7) **Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China.**
(Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 9 pages
Source: china.org.cn	Speech Subject: Strengthen and Improve the Party Building in Accordance with the Requirements of the 'Three Represents'
Article: Jiang Zemin's Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80 th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China. (Location: Great Hall of the People in Beijing)	Speech Focus: The importance of the strong leadership and its benefits to maintain the modernization and development of the country. Also, the development of a merit-based cadre system, in addition to the maintenance of reform and opening-up is crucial for the future of the Socialist system with Chinese Characteristics.
Date: July 1, 2001	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	2,67	6	1
Tianxia	0	0	0
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	1,33	3	1
Bastion of Revolution	0,89	2	1
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	60,71	136	5
Internal Development	34,37	77	3
Developer	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	224	

8) Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin's speech at the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva)

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 4 pages
Source: fmprc.gov.cn	Speech Subject: Promote Disarmament Process and Safeguard World Security
Article: Jiang Zemin's speech at the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva)	Speech Focus: The prevention of Nuclear weapons and disarmament is necessary and can be achieved by the mutual understanding, good will and concerted efforts of developed countries where they should also quit their weapons while promoting non-proliferation treaties and disarmament to the developing
Date: 26 March 1999	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	26,66	24	4
Tianxia	50	45	5
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	1,11	1	1
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0
Internal Development	2,22	2	1
Developer	15,55	14	3
Example	4,44	4	1
Total	100	90	

9) **Jiang Zemin, Speech by Jiang Zemin at Opening Ceremony of Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual Meeting**

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 4 pages
Source: news.xinhua.net	Speech Subject: Unity and Cooperation in Asia for Peace and Development in the World.
Article: Speech by Jiang Zemin at Opening Ceremony of Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual Meeting	Speech Focus: The Chinese development is essential for (or an important cause for) the Asian and World peace and development.
Date: 10 May 2002	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	3,1	7	2
Tianxia	24	54	4
Asianism	20	45	4
Civilization	3,5	8	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0,44	1	1
Active Independent	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	2,22	5	2
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0
Internal Development	15,55	35	3
Developer	31,11	70	5
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	225	

10) Jiang Zemin, Jiang Zemin's Speech at Fortune Forum

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 4 pages
Source: china.org.cn	Speech Subject: Nest Generation Asia
Article: Jiang Zemin's Speech at Fortune Forum	Speech Focus: Peace is the key to Economic development and vice versa, we need economic development to achieve permanent peace.
Date: September 5, 2001	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	12,38	28	4
Tianxia	11,06	25	3
Asianism	14,15	32	4
Civilization	2,21	5	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	0,88	2	1
Liberation Supporter	0,44	1	1
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0
Internal Development	30,53	69	5
Developer	28,31	64	5
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	226	

11) Jiang Zemin, Carrying Forward Generations of Friendly and Good-neighborly Relations and Enseavoring Towards a Better Tomorrow for All (Islamabad, Pakistan)

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 7 pages
Source: fmprc.gov.cn	Speech Subject: Chinese-Pakistani
Article: Carrying Forward Generations of Friendly and Good-neighborly Relations and Enseavoring Towards a Better Tomorrow for All (Islamabad, Pakistan)	Speech Focus: As home to one third of Asia's population, South Asia is an important part of Asia. Without its stability and development, there can be no peace and prosperity in Asia as a whole.
Date: 2 December 1996	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	8,77	20	2
Tianxia	37,28	85	5
Asianism	19,29	44	4
Civilization	3,50	8	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	0,87	2	1
Liberation Supporter	2,63	6	1
Defender of the Faith	1,75	4	1
Internal Development	12,71	29	3
Developer	11,84	27	3
Example	1,31	3	1
Total	100	228	

12) Jiang Zemin, Excerpt from Remarks to US President Bill Clinton at a formal meeting in Seattle, Washington, USA during the first Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leader's Meeting.

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Jiang Zemin http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339	Speech Subject: Take a Peaceful and Prosperous World into the 21 st Century.
Article: Excerpt from Remarks to US President Bill Clinton at a formal meeting in Seattle, Washington, USA during the first Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leader's Meeting.	Speech Focus: Chinese-US Relations
Date: November 19, 1993	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	22.08	17	3	6
Tianxia	25.97	20	4	8
Asianism	1.30	1	1	1
Civilization	7.79	6	2	2
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	2.60	2	1	1
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	32.46	25	5	10
Developer	7.79	6	2	2
Example		0	0	0
Total	100	77		

13) Jiang Zemin, Excerpt from the Speech “Comprehensively Analyze and Correctly Assess the Present Situation, and Properly Balance Reform, Development and Stability” delivered during an inspection in Shanghai.

Leader’s Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 3 pages
Source: Selected Works of Jiang Zemin http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=339	Speech Subject: Properly Balance Reform, Development and Stability.
Article: Excerpt from the Speech ‘Comprehensively Analyze and Correctly Assess the Present Situation, and Properly Balance Reform, Development and Stability’ delivered during an inspection in Shanghai.	Speech Focus: Separation of government administration and enterprise management is significant.
Date: May 5, 1994	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity (5-0)	Space
Nation-State	1.37	1	1	1
Tianxia	6.85	5	2	3
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	17.8	13	4	4
Internal Development	73.97	54	5	6
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	73		

**14) Jiang Zemin, Speech at a Reception Celebrating Spring Festival
Organized by the Taiwan Affairs Offices of the Central Committee and
the State Council and Other Organizations.**

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 6 pages
Source: Selected Works of Jiang Zemin http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339	Speech Subject: Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland.
Article: Speech at a Reception Celebrating Spring Festival Organized by the Taiwan Affairs Offices of the Central Committee and the State Council and Other Organizations.	Speech Focus: Reunification of Chinese Nation.
Date: January 30, 1995	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	68.75	66	5	15
Tianxia	6.25	6	2	4
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	4.16	4	1	3
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	2.08	2	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	2.08	2	1	2
Internal Development	14.58	14	4	9
Developer	2.08	2	1	2
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	96		

15) Jiang Zemin, Excerpts from Remarks to Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Cuban Council of State, during a visit to Cuba.

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 4 pages
Source: Selected Works of Jiang Zemin http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerexpress.html?pn=339	Speech Subject: The Future of Socialism Remains as Bright as Ever
Article: Excerpts from Remarks to Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Cuban Council of State, during a visit to Cuba.	Speech Focus: Not all countries need to follow the Western development. The future of Socialism is bright.
Date: November 21-22, 1993	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	3.13	2	1	1
Civilization	10.94	7	3	3
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	62.5	40	5	10
Internal Development	23.44	15	4	7
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	64		

16) Jiang Zemin, Excerpt from a speech at a meeting of leading Party members participating in the Fourth Session of the Eight NPC and the Fourth Session of the Eight CPPCC National Committee.

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin	Size: 3 pages
Source: Selected Works of Jiang Zemin http://book.theorychina.org/upload/9912d625-487c-4b71-bc52-c514d6037af2/flipviewerxpress.html?pn=339	Speech Subject: Stress Politics
Article: Excerpt from a speech at a meeting of leading Party members participating in the Fourth Session of the Eight NPC and the Fourth Session of the Eight CPPCC National Committee.	Speech Focus: The importance of Politics.
Date: March 3, 1996	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	1.33	1	1	1
Tianxia	1.33	1	1	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	1.33	1	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	30.66	23	4	4
Internal Development	65.33	49	5	4
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	75		

A4. Content Analysis coding sheets for Deng Xiaoping (1978-1993 as the Paramount Leader)

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2 Pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We have reformulated the ideological line from 'two-whatevers' to 'We must emancipate our minds and use our heads' and shifting our focus of work to economic development.
Article: We shall Concentrate on Economic Development- Excerpt from a talk with Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party, while the two men were on their way to Sichuan Province.	Speech Focus: The need to concentrate on economic development
Date: September 18, 1982	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	2.44	1	0	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	51.21	21	5	4
Internal Development	46.34	19	4	6
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	41		

- 1) **Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with leading members of the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission and departments in charge of agriculture.**

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: Our Work in all fields should contribute to the building of socialism with Chinese Characteristics
Article: Excerpt from a talk with leading members of the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission and departments in charge of agriculture.	Speech Focus: To let some people and some regions become prosperous first is a new policy that is supported by everyone. We must develop our own agricultural production policies.
Date: January 12, 1983	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	100	8	5	4
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	8		

2) **Deng Xiaoping, A New Approach to Stabilizing the World Situation.-**
Excerpt from a talk with a delegation from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies of Georgetown University in Washington D.C.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 1 Page
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: New solutions to new conflicts are required in order to achieve world peace and stability
Article: A New Approach to Stabilizing the World Situation.- Excerpt from a talk with a delegation from the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University in Washington D.C.	Speech Focus: We want a unified China with the new solution: 'One country, two systems' where Taiwan can stay Capitalism while China will be Communist.
Date: February 22, 1984	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	68.75	11	5	4
Tianxia	25	4	3	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	6.25	1	1	1
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	16		

3) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo of Brazil.

Leader's Name: Deng	Size: 1 Page
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We Must Safeguard World Peace and Ensure Domestic Development
Article: Excerpt from a talk with President Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo of Brazil.	Speech Focus: China belongs to the third world countries and opposes hegemony. China wants to develop its economy, hence it will promote world peace and try to diminish the division between the third world and the developed countries in order to contribute to the global peace, economic growth and stability
Date: May 29, 1984	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity (5-0)	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	28.13	9	4	5
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	15.63	5	1	3
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	12.5	4	2	2
Internal Development	15.63	5	1	3
Developer	28.13	9	4	5
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	32		

4) Deng Xiaoping, One Country two systems

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: One Country two systems
Article: One Country, Two Systems	Speech Focus: China and Taiwan
Date: June 22-23, 1984	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	48.84	21	5	5
Tianxia	13.95	6	3	4
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	2.33	1	1	1
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	25.58	11	4	3
Internal Development	9.30	4	2	2
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	43		

5) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with the Japanese delegation to the Second Session of the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-governmental persons.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: (Invigorating Chinese Economy) Building a Socialism with a Specifically Chinese Character
Article: Excerpt from a talk with the Japanese delegation to the Second Session of the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-governmental persons.	Speech Focus: Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the productive forces where Socialism is the primary stage of Communism. Therefore, the fundamental task for the Socialist stage is to develop the productive forces where Socialism means eliminating poverty.
Date: June 30, 1984	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	3.41	3	2	0
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	59.10	52	5	8
Internal Development	37.5	33	5	7
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	88		

6) Deng Xiaoping, An Interview with Chinese and Foreign Delegates to a Symposium on China's Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: Our Magnificent Goal and Basic Policies
Article: An Interview with Chinese and Foreign Delegates to a Symposium on China's Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries	Speech Focus: Invigorating Chinese Domestic Economy by Opening Up the Chinese Economy.
Date: October 6, 1984	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	1.64	1	1	1
Tianxia	6.55	4	2	2
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	75.4	46	5	7
Developer	16.40	10	3	3
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	61		

7) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 1.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We Regard Reform as a Revolution
Article: Excerpt from a talk with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany.	Speech Focus: China has Changed since the Third Plenary Session of our Party's Eleventh Central Committee where a series of rectification measures were taken.
Date: October 10, 1984	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	39.29	11	4	2
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	60.71	17	5	3
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	28		

8) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with a delegation from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size:
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: Peace and Development are the Two Outstanding Issues in the World Today
Article: Excerpt from a talk with a delegation from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry.	Speech Focus: Development can be achieved by peace and vice versa.
Date: March 4, 1985	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	40	18	4	4
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	0	0	0	0
Internal Development	46.66	21	5	5
Developer	13.33	6	3	3
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	45		

9) **Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with Alfonso Guerra, Deputy General Secretary of the Spanish Worker's Socialist Party and Vice Premier of Spain.**

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We shall draw on historical experience and guard against wrong tendencies
Article: Excerpt from a talk with Alfonso Guerra, Deputy General Secretary of the Spanish Worker's Socialist Party and Vice Premier of Spain.	Speech Focus: We must not repeat the mistakes made by the 'Gang of four' and continue developing the productive forces.
Date: April 30, 1987	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	1.33	1	1	1
Tianxia	6.66	5	2	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	6.66	5	2	2
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	33.33	25	4	9
Internal Development	52	39	5	9
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	75		

10) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 3.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We Shall expand Political Democracy and Carry Out Economic Reform
Article: Excerpt from a talk with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania.	Speech Focus: We should continue and take the reform that we initiated in the rural areas into the urban areas as well.
Date: April 15, 1985	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	1.30	1	1	1
Tianxia	7.79	6	2	2
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	32.47	25	4	7
Internal Development	58.44	45	5	9
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	77		

11) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpts from a talk with (I.) Prof. Chen Ku-ying, formerly of Taiwan University on May 20, 1985 and (II.) a talk with the committee chairman of a Symposium on the question of the mainland and Taiwan on June 6 (1985).

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 1.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: Bourgeois Liberalization means taking the Capitalist Road
Article: Excerpts from a talk with (I.) Prof. Chen Ku-ying, formerly of Taiwan University on May 20, 1985 and (II.) a talk with the committee chairman of a Symposium on the question of the mainland and Taiwan on June 6 (1985).	Speech Focus: We should check the bourgeois liberalization in order to prevent another disaster like 'cultural revolution'.
Date: May and June 1985	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	10.52	2	1	1
Tianxia	5.26	1	1	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	26.31	5	4	4
Internal Development	57.89	11	5	6
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	19		

12) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with Radovan Vlakovic, President of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 1.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: Keeping to Socialism and the Policy of Peace
Article: Excerpt from a talk with Radovan Vlakovic, President of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.	Speech Focus: Socialism is the only way for China to maintain peace in the world. If China were to become a Capitalist country, it would be a disaster for the World and a retrogression of history.
Date: April 4, 1986	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	10	4	1	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	22.5	9	3	3
Internal Development	42.5	17	5	3
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	40		

13) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk to a members of a visiting delegation of the Rong family, some from Mainland China, and others from the United States, Canada, Australia, Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, Hong Kong and Macau.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 1.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: For the Unity of the Entire Chinese Nation
Article: Excerpt from a talk to a members of a visiting delegation of the Rong family, some from Mainland China, and others from the United States, Canada, Australia, Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, Hong Kong and Macau.	Speech Focus: China will not participate in arms race, instead it will use that money for her people. The Chinese living abroad and the people from Chinese descent should come visit their country to see the change themselves
Date: June 18, 1986	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity (5-0)	Space
Nation-State	12	3	1	1
Tianxia	32	8	2	3
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	4	1	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	8	2	1	2
Internal Development	44	11	5	4
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	25		

14) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with United States Secretary of State George Shultz

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: China can only take the Socialist Road.
Article: Excerpt from a talk with United States Secretary of State George Shultz	Speech Focus: The nature of modernism is socialism.
Date: March 3, 1987	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity (5-0)	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	9.37	3	1	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	37.5	12	4	6
Internal Development	53.12	17	5	6
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	32		

15) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We Must Carry Out Socialist Construction in an Orderly Way Under the Leadership of The Party.
Article: Excerpt from a talk with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of the United Republic of Tanzania	Speech Focus: To attain modernization and development, we should follow the Socialist way in addition to the presence of a peaceful environment and stability.
Date: March 8, 1987	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	6.12	3	1	2
Tianxia	12.24	6	2	3
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	28.57	14	4	5
Internal Development	53.06	26	5	7
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	49		

16) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with Premier Lubomir Strougal of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: To Uphold Socialism, We Must Eliminate the Poverty.
Article: Excerpt from a talk with Premier Lubomir Strougal of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic	Speech Focus: We have to eliminate Poverty.
Date: April 26, 1987	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	45.83	22	4	7
Internal Development	54.16	26	5	7
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	48		

17) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with Milo Jake, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 1.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We Must Continue to Emancipate Our Minds and Accelerate the Reform.
Article: Excerpt from a talk with Milo Jake, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.	Speech Focus: China should not copy other systems which was tried and seen to be mistaken in the past. China should abide by the common understanding of 'Practice is the sole criterion to test the truth'.
Date: May 25, 1988	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	11.42	4	1	1
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	20	7	3	3
Internal Development	68.57	24	5	5
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	35		

18) Deng Xiaoping, A talk with Julius Kambarage Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, Chairman of the Tanzanian Revolutionary Party and the Chairman of South Commission.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 1.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: We Must Adhere to Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution towards Capitalism
Article: A talk with Julius Kambarage Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, Chairman of the Tanzanian Revolutionary Party and the Chairman of South Commission.	Speech Focus: Western Countries criticizes us for violating human rights, but they are the ones who are violating by practicing hegemony on weak states in institutions or by doing colonialism and aiding Chiang Kai Shek in the Chinese civil war, causing many to die.
Date: November 23, 1989	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	30	9	5	3
Tianxia	6.6	2	2	1
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	6.6	2	2	2
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	16.6	5	3	3
Liberation Supporter	6.6	2	2	2
Defender of the Faith	26.6	8	4	4
Internal Development	3.3	1	1	1
Developer	3.3	1	1	1
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	30		

19) Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with Pierre Elliot Trudeau, former Prime Minister of Canada.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2.5 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: China will never allow other countries to intervene in its international affairs.
Article: Excerpt from a talk with Pierre Elliot Trudeau, former Prime Minister of Canada.	Speech Focus: Western states should not intervene neither China's internal affairs nor any other country since without stability, there wouldn't be any 'Human rights' to protect.
Date: July 11, 1990	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	18.1	6	4	4
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	15.15	5	3	4
Liberation Supporter	24.24	8	5	6
Defender of the Faith	12.12	4	2	5
Internal Development	24.24	8	5	6
Developer	6.06	2	1	2
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	33		

20) Deng Xiaoping, Addressed to the leading cadres of Shanghai.

Leader's Name: Deng Xiaoping	Size: 2 pages
Source: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 3. In https://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.3/Deng03#page/n1/mode/2up	Speech Subject: Remarks made during an inspection tour of Shanghai
Article: Addressed to the leading cadres of Shanghai	Speech Focus: Importance of development
Date: January 28- February 18, 1991	Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity	Space
Nation-State	0	0	0	0
Tianxia	0	0	0	0
Asianism	0	0	0	0
Civilization	0	0	0	0
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0	0
Regional Leader	0	0	0	0
Active Independent	0	0	0	0
Liberation Supporter	0	0	0	0
Defender of the Faith	13,79	4	3	5
Internal Development	86,20	25	5	9
Developer	0	0	0	0
Example	0	0	0	0
Total	100	29		

General Statistics for Xi Jinping

Leader's Name: Xi

Jinping

Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Speech: 13

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	%23,10	302	5
Tianxia	%17,4	228	4
Asianism	%3,44	45	1
Civilization	%6.8	89	2
Bastion of Revolution	%0.3	4	0
Regional Leader	%9,10	119	3
Active Independent	%1.14	15	0
Liberation Supporter	%0.3	4	0
Defender of the Faith	%8.79	115	3
Internal Development	%16.44	215	3
Developer	%12.93	169	2
Example	%0.15	2	0
Total	%100	1307	

General Statistics for Hu Jintao

Leader's Name: Hu Jintao

Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Speech: 16

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	15.76	220	4
Tianxia	19.09	266	4
Asianism	2.87	40	0
Civilization	6.460	90	3
Bastion of Revolution	0	0	0
Regional Leader	2.440	34	0
Active Independent	1.07	15	1
Liberation Supporter	0.28	4	0
Defender of the Faith	15.29	213	5
Internal Development	26.99	376	5
Developer	9.54	133	2
Example	0.14	2	0
Total	100	1393	

General Statistics for Jiang Zemin

Leader's Name: Jiang Zemin

Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Speech: 17

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	12.16	326	3
Tianxia	16.04	430	3
Asianism	4.74	127	2
Civilization	3.73	100	2
Bastion of Revolution	0.22	6	1
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	2.84	76	2
Liberation Supporter	1.53	41	1
Defender of the Faith	23.58	632	4
Internal Development	28.32	759	5
Developer	9.22	247	3
Example	0.34	9	1
Total	100	2680	

General Statistics for Deng Xiaoping

Leader's Name: Deng

Xiaoping

Coder: Çağla Kılıç

Speech: 21

Role	Frequency	Number	Intensity
Nation-State	6,682	56	2
Tianxia	10,73	90	3
Asianism	0	0	0
Civilization	0,11	1	1
Bastion of Revolution	0.238	2	1
Regional Leader	0	0	0
Active Independent	2,505	21	1
Liberation Supporter	1,193	10	1
Defender of the Faith	26,84	225	4
Internal Development	48,32	405	5
Developer	3.34	28	1
Example	0	0	0
Total	100	838	

B. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TRKE ZET

ROL TEORİ ANALİZİ: ÇİN ROL KAVRAMLARINDA DEĞİŞİM VE DEVAMLILIK

Çalışma alanı olarak, Çin uzun yıllardır tartışılan ve her geçen gün siyasi sahnede rolünü büyüten ve arttıran bir konu haline gelmiştir. Dolayısıyla Çin dış politikasının bir sonraki hamlesini görebilmek, tahmin etmek veya hesaplayabilmek uluslararası sistemdeki diğer ülkeler ve milletler için her geçen gün daha da hayati bir önem arz etmektedir. Bazı ülkeler Çin'i kendilerinin de gelişimi ve uluslararası sistemdeki denge için bir "avantaj" veya "fırsat" olarak değerlendirirken, bazı ülkeler ise Çini gerek kendi güvenlikleri gerekse uluslararası sistemin ve mevcut güç dengelerinin devamı için bir tehdit olarak görmektedir. Üç yıllık bir çalışmanın sonucu olan bu tez, son dönemki sırasıyla dört Çin başkanının konuşmalarına rol teori ve latent içerik analizi uygulayarak Çin dış politikasındaki rollerin değişimi ve evrimi gözler önüne sermek ve bu sonuçlar ışığında Çin dış politikasının evrildiği belli bir "hedefin" veya "rolün" varlığının olup olmadığını sorgulayacaktır. Metodolojik olarak latent içerik analizi uygulanan bu dört lider Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao ve Xi Jinping'dir. En sonunda ise, Çin dış politikasının gelecekte de ne yöne doğru gideceği hakkında varsayımlarda bulunacaktır. Ulusal rol kavramları'nın kaynakları ise Chih Yu-Shih' ın "Assigning Role Characteristics to China: The Role State versus the Ego State" adlı makalesi ve Holsti'nin "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" isimli makalesinden temin edilmiştir.

Dış Politika analizinin önemli özelliklerinden biri genelde spesifik olarak aktöre ya da gruplara odaklanmasıdır. Yani, teoriye karar vermekten ziyade, önce karar vericilere odaklanmak daha önemlidir. Benzer şekilde, bu tezde de karar vericiler olarak liderlere odaklanılacaktır. Devleti bir kara kutu olarak değerlendirmek yerine, Çinli liderlere ayrıntılı ve derin bir analiz uygulanacaktır. Kapsamlı teorik arka plana bakıldığında ise tez inşaacılık (konstrüktivizm) yaklaşımına yakın olduğu görülmektedir. Bu yaklaşımın bir "teori" mi yoksa "yaklaşım" mı olduğu ise günümüzde hala tartışılmaktadır. Hopft ve Kratochwil'e göre tek başına bir teori olarak

değerlendirilemeyecek olduğu için bir “yaklaşım” denmesinin daha uygun olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. İnşaatılık aynı zamanda Uluslararası İlişkiler kavramlarına (anarşi, devlet kimliği, güçler dengesi gibi) alternatif bir bakış açısı kazandırmıştır. İlk olarak Nicholas Greenwood Onuf tarafından 1989 yılında ortaya atılan İnşaatılık teorisi, her ne kadar kognitif ve rasyonel kuramların sunduklarını sunamasa da, sadece “çevremizdeki” sosyal yaratılışa değil, aynı zamanda bunun “kimlik problematiği” içerisindeki etkisine de bakar. Dolayısıyla, inşaatılık, rol kuramı ve ulusal rol kavramları dış politikaya zengin bir analiz ortamı sunar. Kuramsal arka plana daha özellikli bakmak gerekirse, dış politika analizinin kavramsal çerçevelerinden biri olan rol kuramı kullanılmıştır. Sosyal pozisyonlar olarak da tanımlanan rol kuramı, sadece disiplinler arası bir yaklaşım değil, aynı zamanda sosyoloji, sosyal psikoloji ve hatta antropolojiyi de içine almaktadır. Tanımlayıcı kavramsal bir dile ve birey düzeyi, devlet düzeyi ve sistematik düzey gibi farklı analiz seviyeleri kullanan organizasyonel bir değere sahip olan rol teorisi, ajan ve yapıya yeni bir perspektif sunmuştur. İnşaatılığa yenilikçi bir yaklaşım kazandırmış, dolayısıyla araştırmalara açıklayıcı değer ilave etmiştir. Yudan Chen’ e göre bir teorik perspektif olarak rol kuramı, henüz bütün alanları birleştirecek “büyük teori” olamamasına rağmen, temelini antropoloji, psikoloji ve modern sosyolojiden alan bir yapıya sahiptir. Dahası, rol kuramı karar verme aşaması sırasında, karar vericilerin kafalarındaki büyük yol haritasını anlamada ve kafa yapılarını yansıtmada kullanılan etkili ve mühim bir araçtır. Son çalışmalar da rol kuramının parçası olan ulusal rol kavramlarının etkilerinin dış politika isteklendirmelerinin (motivasyon) olası bir kaynağı olabileceğini kabul etmiştir.

Bütün bu araştırma boyunca, rol kuramının en çekirdek kavramı ve karar vericilerin nihai isteklendirme kaynağı olan “ulusal rol kavramları” kullanılmıştır. Ulusal rol kavramları ilk olarak Holsti tarafından tümevarımsal bir tipoloji olarak ortaya konmuş ve kendisi tarafından “karar vericinin ülkelerine uygun gördüğü ve buna uygun tanımladığı kararlar, bağlılıklar, kurallar ve eylemler, ve devletlerinin uluslararası sistemde ve alt sistemlerde oynamalarını istedikleri fonksiyonlar” şeklinde tanımlanmıştır.

Daha önce de değinildiği gibi bu tezde Hosti ve Chih-Yu Shih'in rol kavramları kullanılmıştır. Bu iki akademisyenin seçilme nedenleri ise; birincisi Holsti'nin rol kuramları tezini ilk ortaya atan, bu konu ile ilgili ilk araştırmaları yapan kişi olmasının yanı sıra Çin'deki rol kavramlarına bakan ilk akademisyen olması ve Chih-Yu Shih'in ise Çin'in rol kavramları ile ilgili son araştırma yapan ve en kapsamlı yapan kişi olmasıdır. Buna ilaveten iki akademisyenin bulduğu rol kavramları birbirini tamamladığı düşünülmüştür çünkü Chih Yu-Shih'in rol kavramları Çin özelinde daha etnik, kültürel ve spesifik olarak seçilmiş, öte yandan Holsti'nin rol kavramları ise daha küresel, “batı ideolojinde” denebilecek özellikte ve kapsamlıdır. Ne de olsa, Holsti bu rol kavramlarını yetmiş bir ülkeye (71) uygulamıştır. Chih Yu Shih'in rol kavramları Medeniyetçilik (Civilization), Ulus-devlet (Nation-State), Tianxia ve Asyacılık (Asianism)'dir. Eğer Çin rol devlet ise ve ego devlet değil ise Tianxia rol kavramına sahiptir. Tianxia Çince “Cennetin altındakiler” olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Çin hanedanlığı döneminde Çin hükümdarı “Cennetin oğlu” ya da “Tanrının varisi” olarak tanımlanmakta ve onun altındakilerin hepsi “Cennetin altındakiler” olarak görülmekteydi. Bu sebeptir ki Japonya, Çince de “riben” olarak isimlendirilmiş, yani güneşin ülkesi denmiştir. Çin'in etrafındaki ülkeler bu anlayışa göre tanımlanmış, ahenk oluşturmuş ve hepsinin Çin hükümdarına, yani cennete bağlı olduğu bir sistem kurulmuştur.

Bu sistem içinde sorumluluk, karşılıklı çıkar ve güven içeren harmoni ve barışın mevcut olduğu bir düzen kurmuştur. Çin diğer ülkeler için bir tehdit olarak görülmekten ziyade bir avantaj, bir fırsat ve faydalı bir ülke olarak görülmektedir. Medeniyetçilik rol kavramında ise Çin ne ego devlet ne de rol devlet olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu durumda Çin'in yükselişi diğer ülkeler için ne bir tehdit ne de fırsat niteliğindedir. Çin daha pasif politikalar yürütmekte, ancak kazan-kazan stratejisindeki gibi bir avantaj da gözetmemektedir. Ulus-devlet rol kavramına bakıldığında ise, Çin rol devlet olarak değil, ego devlet olarak hareket etmektedir. Bu ise Çin'in diğer ülkeler tarafından fırsat ülke olarak değil, daha çok bir tehdit olarak algılanmasına sebebiyet vermektedir. Bu rol daha agresif, milliyetçi, korumacı ve hegemonik ülke rolüne işaret etmektedir. Asyacılık rol kavramına bakıldığında, Çin'in hem ego devlet hem rol devlet olduğu görülmektedir. Yani, diğer devletler Çin'i hem

bir tehdit hem de fırsat olarak algılamaktadır. Holsti'nin rol kavramları ise Devrim kalesi (Bastion of Revolution), Örnek (Example), Bağımsızlık destekçisi (Liberation Supporter), Bölgesel Lider (Regional Leader), Aktif Bağımsız (Active Independent), İç gelişme (Internal Development), İnanç savunucusu (Defender of Faith) ve Geliştirici (Developer). Örnek rol kavramı diğer ülkeler karşısında “prestij arttırmak” ya da “etki sahibi olmaya” işaret etmektedir. Geliştirici rol kavramına bakıldığında ise devlet kendisinden daha az gelişmiş ülkelere yardım yapmayı kendine vazife edinmiştir. İnanç Savunucusu rol kavramında ülkelerin dış politika hedefleri “değer sistemlerini saldırıdan korumak” üzerine kuruludur. Bu rol kavramında Holsti “ideolojinin” önemine değinmektedir. İç geliştirici rol kavramında, ülkenin dış politikası tamamen ekonomik kalkınmaya, sosyo ekonomik ihtiyaçlara ve sosyal refaha odaklanmaktadır. Bu ülkeler ulusal ajandalarını ve politikalarını ekonomiyi geliştirme üzerine kurmaktadır. Bu rol Holsti tarafından pasif ya da aktif olmayan rol olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Aktif bağımsız rolüne bakıldığında, devletler kendilerini bağlayıcı politikara girmemekte ve diğer ülkelerin çıkarları yerine kendi çıkarlarını gözetmektedirler. Bu rol de Holsti tarafından aynı şekilde pasif olarak betimlenmiştir. Bölgesel lider rolünde devlet “bölgesi ile alakalı” sorumluluklarını yerine getirmektedir. Yani bir diğer deyiş ile bölgesinde liderlik etmektedir. Devrim kalesi rolünü Holsti “bazı devletlerin ülke dışındaki bağımsız hareketlerini organize etmeyi kendilerine görev bilmeleri” olarak tanımlamaktadır. Yani bu durumda devletler sadece devrimci liderlerin sadece “ilham” alabileceği bir ortam oluşturmaz, aynı zamanda “maddi ve manevi destek” alabileceği bir ortam oluşturur. Bağımsızlık destekçisi rolünde, “devrim kalesi” rolünün aksine, ülke dışındaki bağımsızlık hareketlerine fiziksel olarak destek vermez ve önderlik etmez. Bu roldeki çoğu ifade resmi ve rutindir.

Metodolojik olarak bakıldığında, daha önceden de belirtildiği gibi latent içerik analizi bu dört lidere (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping) uygulanmıştır. Liderlerin çok fazla konuşmaları olduğu ve hepsinin analizinin çok zor olacağı düşünüldüğü için, konuşmalar kısıtlanmak durumunda kalmıştır. Bu süreçte örneklem yanlılığını engellemek için örneklem planından faydalanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda istatistiksel bir method olarak tanımlanan ve olasılıklı örnekleme tiplerinden biri olan

“sistematik örneklem” kullanılmıştır. Rastgele bir başlangıç noktasından başlayarak sabit periodik aralıklarla devam etmektedir. Sadece bir sayfadan uzun (ortalama 500 kelime) **genel dış politika** konuşmaları seçilmiştir.

Data sonuçlarına bakıldığında ise, “İç gelişme” rol kavramının Çin’de 1979’dan son Çin lideri Xi Jinping’in dönemine kadar sürekli bir düşüş içinde olduğu görülmektedir. Bu sürekli düşmekte olan eğilim Çin’in dış politikalarındaki önceliğin sorgulanmasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu düşüşün sebebi Çin’in önce “evini temizlediği” ya da “evinini temizlemeye” yönelik politikalar yaptığı ve artık sıranın başka dış politika konularına geldiğine mi işaret etmektedir? Çin uzun süredir ekonomik olarak gelişmenin önemine vurgu yapmakta, bu hedefe ulaşabilmek için ise dış politikada daha pasif, barışçıl ve uzlaşmacı denebilecek politikalar gütmektedir. Buna karşın, bu düşüş diğer rol kavramlarının zaman içindeki değişimi ile birlikte yorumlandığında daha anlamlı bir bütün oluşturmaktadır. “Ulus devlet” ve “bölgesel lider” rol kavramlarına bakıldığında yükseliş içinde oldukları görüldüğünde Çin’in önceliklerinin değiştiği tezi daha da kuvvetlenmektedir. Dahası Deng döneminde “İç gelişme” rol kavramı diğer rol kavramlarına oranla en yüksek düzeydedir ve ilk sırayı almaktadır. Ancak bu durum Xi döneminde değişmiş ve “İç gelişme” rol kavramı önceliğini “ulus devlete” bırakmıştır.

Deng’in konuşmalarında da “İç gelişme” rol kavramına verdiği önem açıkça görülmektedir. Deng “Bizimki kadar büyük ve fakir bir ülkede, eğer üretimi artırmazsak nasıl hayatta kalabiliriz?” demektedir. “Bizim insanlarımız hayatlarında bunca zorluk çekerken, biz Sosyalizmin üstünlüğünden nasıl söz edebiliriz?...İşçilerimizin ortalama aylığı halen 45 yuan³³⁴ iken buna gerçekten Sosyalizmin üstünlüğü diyebiliriz mi? Ben bu sebeple hızlı bir şekilde dikkatimizin ekonomik kalkınmaya dönmesi gerektiği konusunda ısrarcıyım.” diyerek de ilave etmektedir. Bu sebeple Deng ekonomik gelişmeyi destekleyebilmek için çoğunlukla “low profile diplomacy” denebilecek pasif bir dış politika izlemiştir. Bu dönemde de Çin’in yeni dış politikası “28 karakterli Strateji” ile şekillendirilmiştir. Genel tanımı

³³⁴ Şu anki kura çevrildiğinde (2 yuan=1 TL) 20 TL’ye gelmektedir. O dönem Yuan’ın daha da değersiz olduğu düşünüldüğünde durumun vahameti ortaya çıkmaktadır.

ile bu 28 karakterli Strateji; pasif dış politika, egemenlik ya da saldırganlık içermeyen politikalar, Çin'in pozisyonunu güvence altına alma ve kazan-kazan ortamı içerisinde başkalarına da katkı sağlayarak büyüme olarak özetlenebilir.

İnanç savunucusu rolüne bakıldığında, bu rol kavramının sürekli olarak düşüşte olduğu görülmektedir. Bunun en önemli sebebinin ise devletin koyu ve radikal Komünist anlayıştan zaman içerisinde ayrılması olarak yorumlanabilir. Bu rol kavramı devlet içerisindeki ideolojinin önemini göstermektedir. Komünist ideolojiye verilen önem ve önceliğin azaldığı saptanmıştır. Tianxia rol kavramına bakıldığında ise bir düzensizlik görülmektedir. Genel anlamda sürekli düşüşte gibi görülen Tianxia rol kavramı Hu Jintao döneminde ani bir yükselişe sahne olmuştur. Dolayısıyla bu kavramın tek başına ve çevresel faktörlerden tamamıyla bağımsız yorumlanması çok doğru olmayacağı için diğer rol kavramları ile ahenk içerisinde yorumlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda Çin'in bu kavramı çoğunlukla eylemlerini mazur göstermek ve yükselişini daha iyi bir dünya için olduğu izlenimini göstermek amacıyla kullandığı düşünülmüştür. Hu Jintao döneminde ise, o dönem de ve sonrasında sık kullanılan bir kavram haline alan “barışçıl gelişme” söylemi örnek olarak verilebilir.

Bölgesel Lider rol kavramı da sürekli bir artış göstermekte ve artmakta olan ulus-devlet rol kavramı ile uyumu görünmektedir. Çin kendisini bölgesini kalkındırıcı ve lider bir ülke olarak yorumlamakta ve bu yönde politikalar üretmektedir. Bu rol özellikle Xi Jinping döneminde büyük bir artış yaşamıştır. Çin dünya liderliğinden önce bölgesinde etki ve söz sahibi olmak istemektedir gibi yorumlanabilir. Bunlar haricindeki rol kavramlarındaki değişimler çok az miktarda gerçekleşmiş ve Çin dış politikasında kayda değer bir değişim ya da etki sağlamadıkları düşünülmektedir. Buna rağmen bu kavram da yorumlanmıştır. Çin'in Asyacılık ve bağımsızlık destekçisi rolü düzensiz bir çizgi izlemektedir. Buna karşın medeniyetçilik rolünde sürekli bir artış gözlemlenmektedir.

Ulus devlet'in tanımına yeniden dönüp bakıldığında, ulus-devlet rol kavramı rol devlet olarak değil ego devlet olarak tanımlanmıştı ve bu durum diğer devletler tarafından Çin'in bir tehdit olarak algılandığını göstermişti. Dolayısıyla ulus-devlet rol

kavramının Deng Xiaoping’den Xi Jinping’e kadar sürekli olarak artış gösteren bir trend içinde olması, diğer devletlerin tehdit algıları üzerinde tahmin yapmamızı da sağlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla diğer devletlerin zaman içerisinde artan Çin tehdidi algısı bir anlamda sürekli olarak artmakta olan Çin’in ulus devlet rol kavramı ile de bağlantılıdır denebilir.

Daha önce değinildiği üzere bu tez 4 ana soruya cevap vermeyi amaçlamıştır. Bunlar; (1) Çinli liderlerin ulusal rol kavramları nelerdir? (2) Bu ulusal rol kavramları değişti mi, aynı mı kaldı? (3) Eğer bir değişim gerçekleştiyse bu nasıl bir değişimdi? Anlamli politikalara yönelik bir süreklilik gözlemlemek mümkün müdür? (4) Bu sonuçlar nasıl yorumlanabilir? Bu tez çeşitli roller saptamış, farklı politikalara yönelik bir dizi değişim çizgisi yakalamış ve Çin dış politikasını farklı analiz düzeylerinde “rol kuramını” kullanarak açıklamaya çalıştır. Çinli liderlerde saptanmış roller şunlardır; Tianxia, Medeniyet, Ulus Devlet, Asyacılık, Devrimin Kalesi (Bastion of Revolution), Örnek Ülke, İnancın Savunucusu, Bağımsız Ülke, Bölgesel Lider, Bağımsızlık Savunucusu, İç Kalkınma ve Kalkındırıcı Ülke.

Bu tez Çin’in dış politika zihniyetinin değiştiğini gösteren 5 farklı sonuca ulaşmıştır. İlk olarak, eski “Komünist” zihniyetten “Çin’e özgü ulus devlet” anlayışına yönelik bir değişim gözlemlenmiştir. Geleneksel Marksist anlayış Deng Xiaoping ile değişime uğramıştır. Deng Xiaoping Sosyalizme ve Komünizme ulaşma yollarını, motivasyonları ve yöntemleri “Gang of Four (Dörtlü Çete)”’den çok daha farklı şekilde yorumlamıştır ve bu nedenle de Gang of Four tarafından solcu (left) olarak etiketlenmiştir. Devrim kalesi ve Bağımsızlık Savunucusu gibi 1970’lerde oldukça popüler olan bir takım ulusal rol kavramlarının ciddi şekilde önemini yitirdiği görülmüştür. Deng Xiaoping Marksist ideolojiye verimli bir düzen kurmadan geçmeyi mümkün görmemektedir. Markisizm ekonomik paylaşımın sahip olma yeteneğine göre dağılımından ihtiyaca göre dağılımına evrilmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Deng Xiaoping, Gang of Four’un savunduğu “Kapitalizm altında zengin olmaksızın, sosyalizm altında fakir olmak daha iyidir” düşüncesini reddederek, yoksulluk ve fakirlik içinde komünizm bir anlam ifade etmediği düşüncesini benimsemiştir. Bu düşünce “İç Kalkınma” rolünün “saf ideoloji” rolünün önüne geçmesi anlamına

gelmektedir. Böylelikle yıllardır en güçlü rollerden biri olagelen “İnancın Savunucusu” rolünün yerini “İç Kalkınma” ve benzeri rollere bıraktığı görülmüştür. Buna karşın Çin’in ekonomik gelişmesinin hızlanmasıyla beraber bu rolün yerini daha agresif, milliyetçi ve pragmatist olarak tanımlanabilecek ulus-devlet rolü almaya başladığı saptanmıştır.

İkinci sonuca baktığımızda, ilk sonuçta gördüğümüz “İç Kalkınma” rolünün yükselişinin de artık zirve noktasından düşüşe geçtiğini ve Çin’in yüzünü daha fazla dışarıya çevirerek eskiye nazaran daha aktif bir dış politika izlemeyi kendine görev edindiği görülmüştür.

Üçüncü olarak, Tianxia rol kavramıyla, Çin kendini daha büyük bir yapı içinde konumlandırmıştır. Ayrıca bu rol kavramıyla Çin’in diğer rolleriyle çatışma içine girdiği de görülmüştür. Ancak buna rağmen Yudan Chen’in 1. bölümde açıkladığı gibi “Ulus Devlet” ve “Tianxia” rolleri birbirini tamamlayarak bu rol kavramlarındaki tezatlığı ortadan kaldırabilmiştir. Çin hem “Tianxia” hem de “Ulus Devlet” rollerini aynı anda benimseyerek, kendi liderliğinde dünyanın daha adil, barışçıl ve uyum içinde olacağının görüntüsünü vermeyi amaçlamıştır. “Tianxia” rolü aynı zamanda bazı politik hedeflere ulaşmak için liderler tarafından kullanılagelen bir söylem özelliği de taşımaktadır. Bundan ötürü “Ulus Devlet” rolünün analizi sırasında “Tianxia” kavramının da dikkate alınması gerekir. Xİ Jinping’in yeni süper güç ilişkisi önerisi “Çatışmasız”, “Karşılıklı Saygı” ve “İşbirliği” yoluyla istikrarın önem kazandığı kazan-kazan ortamının oluşturulmasıyla “Tianxia” rol kavramında kullanılan kelimelerin zamana ve duruma göre amacı mazur göstermek için kullanılmış gibi gözükmektedir. Çinli liderlerin “çatışmasızlık” ve “ne destekle ne de kına” tavırları Batı’ya Çin’in uluslararası hukuka saygılı olduğu görüntüsünü verirken aynı zamanda dünyanın problemli bölgeleri ile olan ilişkilerini sürdürme noktasında da imkân tanımaktadır. Bundan dolayı “Ulus Devlet” ve “Tianxia” Çin’in bir şekilde bağlantılı iki rolü gibi gözükmektedir ve Çin’in kendini “ulus devlet” olarak tanımlamasını sağlarken aynı zamanda başka hiçbir ulus devlet ile benzeşmemesini sağlamaktadır.

Dördüncü olarak, “Ulus Devlet” ve “Tianxia” rolleri Çin’in dış politikasının ayrılmaz parçaları olarak gözükmektedir. Bu durumun, Çin’in kendi yarattığı, daha barışçıl ve uyumlu bir dünyada, çıkarıcı bir bakış açısıyla kendi ulusal çıkarlarını da güdebildiği bir dünya sistemi olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Sürekli üzerinde durulan “barış”, “adalet”, “uyum” ve “birlikte var olma” kavramlarının kullanımı her ne kadar zaman zaman artıp, azalsa da bu kavramların duruma göre her zaman etkisi veya önemi olduğu görülmüştür.

Son olarak, içerik analizi sonuçları ışığında, Çin’in ulusal rol kavramlarının daha “sert” ve “süper güç diplomasisi” yönüne doğru ilerlediği açıktır. Çin’in daha fazla “rol üstlenen” bir ülke olarak kalma isteğinde olmadığı ve küresel yönetimde “rol üreten” bir devlet konumuna gelerek daha fazla söz sahibi olmak istediği görülmektedir. Mevcutta Amerika Birleşik Devletleri tarafından sahiplenilen “rol üreten” ülke rolünde paydaş sahibi olma çabaları daha şimdiden Çin-Birleşik Devletler ilişkilerinde gerilimlere sebebiyet vermektedir. Son gelişmeler ışında bu rol çatışmasının sadece Çin-Birleşik Devletler ekseninde bir gerilime sebebiyet vermediği, aynı zamanda çevre ülkeler ile de gerilime yol açtığı görülmektedir. Güney Çin Deniz’inde, Çin ve Filipinler arasındaki gerilim ve Çin’in 12 Temmuzda Hague’da verilen tahkim kararını yok sayması Çin’in saldırgan ve rol üreten bir rol üstlenmeye başladığının örneklerinden biri olarak gösterilebilir.

İleriki araştırmalar için Çin dış politikası ve ulusal rol kavramları arasındaki ilişkinin incelenmesi Çin’in gelecekteki dış politika davranışlarının öngörülebilmesi açısından faydalı olacaktır. Bununla beraber, bu tez Çinli liderlerin değişen dış politika rollerinin anlaşılmasını hedeflemiştir. Şu da belirtilmelidir ki, her geçen gün daha da zenginleşen ve birçok kültürün bir arada varolmayı başardığı dünyamızda Çin gibi kültürel anlamda zengin ve karmaşık bir ülkenin dış politika davranışlarının bütün yönlerinin açıklanabilmesi dahi onu anlamamızda yetersiz kalabilir. Dolayısıyla bu tez Çin politikasındaki değişimi ve evrilebileceği yönü ulusal rolleri elinden geldiği kadar inceleyerek açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Dünyanın yeni bir süper gücün doğuşuna sahne olup olmayacağı halen gizemini korumaktadır. Lakin bu başka bir soru ve araştırılıp bulunması gereken başka bir cevaptır. Ancak, Arnold Bennett’in söylediği şu sözü

unutmamak gerekir “Bütün deęişimler, hatta iyiye yönelik deęişimler dahi her zaman geri adımları ve rahatsızlıkları beraberinde getirir.”

C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

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Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : AN ANALYSIS OF ROLE THEORY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN CHINA'S ROLE CONCEPTIONS

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