

US FOREIGN POLICY AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE 2000S
CASES OF HAMAS AND GAM

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ABSTRACT

US FOREIGN POLICY AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE 2000s CASES OF HAMAS AND GAM

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The Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) play a substantial role in post-Cold War international relations. They influence the social, political and security environment at regional and international context. In this thesis, two Islamist VNSAs with similar specifications; HAMAS of the Middle East and GAM of the Southeast Asia have been studied. The purpose is to investigate the reasons why did the US actively pursued a conciliatory/inclusive approach towards GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia) but not towards HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine)? The conclusion is that the US foreign policy has come up with two different solutions in Palestine and Aceh conflicts; while GAM has been persuaded to end violence and transit into a peaceful political organization in Indonesian political system, HAMAS has not been so far. The factor which affects these two conflicts is the complex interaction amongst the US, the VNSAs (HAMAS and GAM) and the Parent states (Israel and Indonesia). In this complex interaction, the core element is the nature of the relations between the US administration and the Parent States (Israel and Indonesia).

Keywords: Violent Non State Actors, HAMAS, GAM, US Foreign Policy, Global Terrorism,

ÖZ

2000'Lİ YILLARDA AMERİKAN DIŞ SİYASETİ VE ŞİDDET YANLISI DEVLET DIŞI AKTÖRLER-HAMASVE GAM ANALİZLERİ

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Şiddet yanlısı devlet dışı aktörler (VNSA) soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde uluslar arası ilişkilerde önemli bir rol oynamaktadırlar. Bu aktörler bölgesel ve uluslararası ortamlarda sosyal, siyasi ve güvenlik rolleri üstlenmektedirler. Bu tezde, benzer özelliklere sahip iki İslami VNSA; Ortadoğu'dan HAMAS ve Güneydoğu Asya'dan GAM incelenmiştir. Bu tezin amacı ABD dış politikasının Endonezya'daki GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Özgür Aceh Hareketi)'a karşı barışçıl/uzlaştırıcı bir yaklaşım sergilerken HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/İslami Direniş Hareketi)'a karşı aynı tutumu göstermemesinin nedenlerini araştırmaktır. Bu inceleme neticesinde ABD dış politikasının Filistin ve Aceh sorunlarında iki farklı sonuca ulaştığı ortaya çıkmıştır; GAM şiddeti terketmeyi kabul etmiş ve Endonezya siyasal yapısı içinde barışçı bir siyasal partiye dönüşmüş, ama HAMAS aynı sonuca ulaşamamıştır. Bu iki bölgesel sorunu etkileyen faktör ABD ile HAMAS/GAM ve hasım devletler (İsrail/Endonezya) arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiler yumağıdır. Bu karmaşık etkileşimdeki temel unsur da ABD yönetimi ile İsrail ve Endonezya devletleri arasındaki ikili ilişkilerin yapısı ve uyumlu/uyumsuz olma durumudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Şiddet Yanlısı Devlet Dışı Aktörler, HAMAS, GAM, ABD Dış Politikası, Küresel Terörizm

To my wife & my daughters

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LIST OF TERMINOLOGY

Acheh Region - Acheh is a special region of Indonesia. The territory is located at the northern end of Sumatra. Its capital is Banda Aceh. There are 10 indigenous ethnic groups in this region, the largest being the Acehnese people, and accounting for approximately 85% of the region's population. Aceh is thought to have been the place where the spread of Islam in Indonesia began, and was a key factor of the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia.

Achehnese Diaspora – These are people of Achehnese birth or descent who live outside the province of Aceh. Achehnese community lives mostly in Malaysia. There are also Achehnese communities significantly in Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the States, Canada, and Australia.

Acheh 2005 Peace Agreement – The agreement that ended the conflict between Islamist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM), and Indonesia for nearly 30 years. GAM militants turned their weapons to international monitors which was an important step for peace in Indonesia's troubled Aceh province after a nearly 30-year civil war.

Armed Conflict – Between several definitions, an armed conflict can be defined as a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict.

1967 Borders- The borders established between Israel and the Palestinian Territories after 1967 Arab-Israel War lasted 6 days.

Al Qassam Brigades - The military wing of HAMAS.

Civil War - Several definitions of civil war exist. Civil war can be defined as armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority. This definition stresses two key features: First, the militarization of conflict, requiring at least two competing sides. Second, Civil war differentiates from other violence types such as communal riots, terrorism, crime, and genocide.

Darul Islam movement in Indonesia - Darul Islam (House of Islam) is an Islamist group in Indonesia that aims for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. It was established in 1942 by a group of Muslim militias. The group recognized only Shari'a as a valid source of law.

Dawa - Hamas' social service programme based on Islamic education and training.

Democratization process in Indonesia - The democratization process in Indonesia has been progressing steadily over the past decade following the resignation of President Suharto in 1998. This was a process of free and fair elections, peaceful rotations of power, effective elected officials and separation of powers, freedom of expression, independence of the media and associational autonomy. In other words, within one decade, Indonesia has developed the main attributes of a democratic country, according to most theories of procedural democracy.

Dutch Colonial power in Indonesia – Dutch colonial power reigned over the Indonesian Archipelago between 1880s and 1940s. The Netherlands formally recognized Indonesian independence in 1949.

Fatah- Palestine National Liberation Movement (*harakat al-tahrir al-watani al-filastin*) Armed groups of Fatah Hawks, al-Assifa, Force 17, Black September, Tanzim and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade are under Fatah control.

GAM - The Free Aceh Movement (Indonesian: *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or *GAM*, Acehnese: *Geurakan Acèh Meurdèka*), also known as the *Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF)*, was a separatist group seeking independence for the Aceh region of Sumatra from Indonesia. GAM fought against Indonesian government forces in the Aceh insurgency from 1976 to 2005, during which over 15,000 lives are believed to have been lost.

GAM Charter – The political document on the Declaration of Independence of Acheh-Sumatra, released on December 4, 1976 by Hasan di Tiro, GAM leader.

Gaza Strip- A part of state of Palestine governed by Hamas. As of 2016 around 1.7 million people living in Gaza strip. Gaza is 139 square miles bordered to the west by the Mediterranean Sea, Israel to the north and east and Egypt to the south.

Global Civil Society – Global civil society is understood as a new environment, where non-state entities form up the conditions to challenge the state authority. This is a space beyond the governmental authorities. Civil society organizations may encompass; community groups, non-governmental organizations, social movements,

labor unions, charity and faith organizations, diaspora groups, think tanks, professional associations, and similar. Civil society organizations play effective roles in regional conflicts, human rights issues, environmental problems, refugee concerns etc. Due to the increasing roles of the civil society, the international relations cannot be thoroughly captured unless taking them into consideration

HAMAS - Islamic Resistance Movement/Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah. Islamic political party founded in 1987 by Sheikh Yassin.

Hamas Charter– The political document established in 1988 that identifies the responsibilities of the resistant movement, based principally upon Koran verses.

Indonesian Archipelago - The islands of Indonesia, also known as the Indonesian archipelago referring to the islands comprising the nation-state of Indonesia. The exact number of islands comprising Indonesia varies. According to a geospatial survey conducted between 2007 and 2010 by Indonesia has 13,466 islands.

International Organization (IO) - An International Organization is an organization with an international membership, scope, or presence. They may carry different names and roles such as Governmental Organizations, Non-governmental Organizations, and Intergovernmental Organizations.

Intifadah– An Arabic word which means uprising or resistance. In Palestine conflict two intifadahs took place. First in 1987 until 1991 as a reaction to the occupation of West Bank and Gaza by Israel. The second intifadah is also known as El Aqsa intifadah and started as a reaction to the visit of Ariel Sharon to Temple Mount in September 2000. This resistance lasted until December 2004.

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) -The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commonly known in Israel by the Hebrew acronym *Tzahal* are the military forces of the State of Israel. They consist of the ground forces, air force, and navy. It is the sole military wing of the Israeli security forces.

Malacca Strait –This Strait is a narrow stretch of water between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra (Acheh). The strait is the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, linking major Asian economies such as India, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Over 90,000 vessels pass through the strait each year, carrying about one-fourth of the world's traded goods, including oil and manufactured products.

Non-State Actor (NSA) –NSAs are the entities that participate or act in international relations. They are organizations with sufficient power to influence even though they do not belong to any established institution of a state.

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) –These are the entities that participate or act in international relations. They are organizations with sufficient power to influence economic, political, societal and even military spheres even though they do not belong to any established institution of a state.

Occupation- The term refers to the Israeli military in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas uses this term to criticize the existence of Israel in Palestine.

Palestinian Authority (PA)– Headed by Mahmoud Abbas is the current President, which is established in 1994 after the Oslo Accords. PA claims authority over all Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Gaza.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)– A Palestinian armed group founded after 1979 Islamic Iran Revolution. PIJ fights for the sovereignty of Palestine and funded by Iran.

Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) – The council is the legislature of the Palestinian Authority. It is composed of total 132 member selected in the West Bank and Gaza. The last election took place in 2006. The next election was intended to take place in 2014 but postponed due to the disagreements between Fatah and Hamas.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)– In order to create an independent Palestinian State PLO was established by the Arab States in 1964.Until 1991 it was the main actor for Palestinians in their fight with Israel.

Political Good Will - Political good will refers to the trust, cooperation, and influence of a politician and/or a government that inherits honesty and mutual interest between the parties. The Government of Indonesia has been loyal to the political good will it developed during Aceh peace talks between 1998 and 2005. This was the main drive that led to a permanent settlement of the conflict.

President Sukarno's (1950-67) Unitary Model - Sukarno was the leader of Indonesia's struggle for Independence from the Netherlands. Sukarno declared Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, and was appointed as first president. Sukarno was the only Asian leader of the modern era able to unify people of such differing ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds without shedding a drop of

blood. The political model he used during his presidency is named as Unitary Model.

President Suharto's (1967-1998) New Order Regime -On 11 March 1966 President Sukarno signed a decree which led army officer Suharto to received full power in Indonesia. Suharto became the second President of Indonesia and this marked the emergence of a new era which was called the 'New Order'. This was an anti-communist movement, aiming to create a nation-state with economic development and restoration of ties with the West.

Prolific Violent Attacks by Hamas– The top ten attacks perpetrated by Hamas determined by the most number of casualties.

Quartet – Referred to in respect to the Palestinian/Israeli Roadmap for Peace. Its members include the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States.

Suicide Bombings– A term used by many non-Islamists to describe one who dies in the act of bombing an enemy by wearing or driving the device to its intended target and voluntarily detonating it.

Tanzim – An armed wing of Fatah.

Violent Non State Actor (VNSA) –These violent entities are actors that have economic, political or social power and are able to influence national and sometimes international level relations. They employ violence in pursuit of their objectives but do not belong to or ally themselves to any particular country or state.

Waqf – This means the Palestinian historic trust land, which extends from the Jordan Riverto Mediterranean Sea.

West Bank– Officially recognized as part of the State of Palestine. The West Bank is 2,173 square miles just to the west of the Jordan River bordered on the North, West and South by Israel and to the East with the Kingdom of Jordan, though the Israelis have created a zone between Jordan and the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority governs the West Bank from Ramallah. There are approximately 2.1million Palestinians and 500,000 Israeli Settlers living in the West Bank. Major cities include Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus and Ramallah.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD-Achehnese Diaspora
AIPAC-American Israel Public Affairs Committee
AJC-American Jewish Congress,
AJLJ-American Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists
AJWS-American Jewish World Service
ANC-African National Congress
ANO-Abu Nidal Organization
APEC-Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF-ASEAN Regional Forum
ASAFR-Acheh Student Action Front for Reform
ASEAN-Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AZM-American Zionist Movement,
CHD-Center for Humanitarian Dialogue
CIAR-Central Information for Acheh Reform
CPNM-Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
CRAAS-Coalition for Reform Action of Achehnese Students
DFLP-Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
EIJ-Egyptian Islamic Jihad
EU-European Union
FMF-Foreign Military Financing
FMLN-Farabundo Martí Liberation Front
FMS-Foreign Military Sales
FTAA-Free Trade Area of Americas
FTO-Foreign Terrorist Organization
GAM-Gerakan Acheh Merdeka/Free Acheh Movement
GoI-Governmet of Indonesia
HAMAS-Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/The Islamic Resistance Movement
HIG-Hizballah Islamic Gama'at

HRR-Human Rights Reform
ICC-International Criminal Court
ICJ-International Court of Justice
IDF-Israel Defense Forces
IDIM-Islamic Darul Islam Movement
IMET-International Military Education and Training
IMF-International Monetary Fund
IMU-Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IO-International Organization
IR-International Regime
IRA-Irish Republican Army
IRI-International Republican Institute
ISF-Indonesian Security Forces
KLA-Kosovo Liberation Army
M19-19th of April Movement
MNC-Multi-national Corporations
MOU-Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA-North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI-National Democratic Institute
NDRCA-National Disaster Relief Coordination Agency
NGO-Non Governmental Organization
NSA-Non-State Actor
NSS-National Security Strategy
PA-Palestine Authority
PAC-Political Action Committee
PDFLP-Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PIJ-Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLA-People's Liberation Army
PLC-Palestine Legislative Council
PLF-Palestine Liberation Front

PLO-Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC-Palestine National Council
PNF-Palestine National Front
SDGT-Specially Designated Global Terrorists
SDT-Specially Designated Terrorists
SSP-Student Solidarity for the Peoples
START-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
UN-United Nations
UNGA- United Nations General Assembly
VNSA-Violent Non-State Actor
WB-World Bank
WTO-World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This dissertation is a study about how American foreign policy deals with violent non-state actors (VNSA) in the 2000s. As I focus on the interactions of the United States of America with HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/The Islamic Resistance Movement) and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement), the main subject matter of the dissertation will be the “violent” non-state actors but within the entirety of the dissertation “peaceful” non-state actors also will be referred. Based on the reality that peace and terror are two terms embedded inside the reality of a VNSA, just like two different faces of a coin, within the entirety of the Chapters, either Non-State Actor (NSA) or Violent Non-State Actor (VNSA) terms will be used interchangeably.

This dissertation focuses on the approach of US foreign policy towards two case studies as VNSAs from two different geographies inheriting identical backgrounds, identical targets and identical means of struggles; HAMAS from the Middle East and GAM from the Southeast Asia. In the wake of the Cold War and with the demise of Soviet Union in early 1990s, the US followed a two-fold policy for the promotion of democracy; first creating “new markets” and second creating “zones of peace” across the globe. This promising policy of American administration for a better world ended up with positive results for Aceh conflict in Southeast Asia but not for Palestine conflict in the Middle East. These two different results have direct relations with the existence of authoritarian or democratic regimes in conflict areas and the approach of American administrations towards the parent states that are the subject matter of this thesis (Israel and Indonesia).

As detailed in following chapters, the NSAs have a longer historical background and a larger role than estimated. As a kind of role players of global civil society, they inherit a longer historical background than they are imagined. Today we may simply think of them as products of globalization era of last couple decades, or as state controlled entities of the Cold War era, but actually they have a longer history extending to the origins of modern state system, i.e. the voyages of discovery and conquest of America. For example, Christof Colombus, Vasco de Gama and Martin Luther are deemed to be the leaders of old NSAs, sometimes receiving support from a state and sometimes fighting against the state authority.

The scale of NSAs effect on domestic or international political environments has differed in time, but the 2000s offered a fertile ground for them to conduct several roles in global politics. The advantages provided by globalization, have enabled the non-state actors (either peaceful or violent) to effect, direct and manage individuals and masses of people across the globe. Thus, the political, societal and economic dynamics of the new millennia forced the states to accept the increasing roles of violent non-state actors and to form a common understanding and cooperative relations with them. For instance, Fred Halliday (2001) argues about the effects of non-state entities on emergence of modern states. He posits that it would not be false to reach a statement how they played vital roles in domestic or international politics, either under control of the states or free from them. Throughout the history, the NSAs, besides challenging the state controlled international dynamics, have helped to shape and support the present international system. One strong feature of “non-state entities” is that it is the continuum of a reality that they were present before the emergence of the modern state system in 17th Century and they were structuring the normative and the material conditions of the individual and the society.¹

On the other hand, the number of non-state actors is increasing day by day in parallel with economic, political, social and cultural transactions amongst individuals, societies and states across the globe. Although “peaceful” NSAs have increased in

¹ Halliday, F. (2001), “The Romance of Non-State Actors”, in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace, eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, pp.27-28

the last two decades, in a form challenging the state authority, the “violent” NSAs have also flourished. The increasing roles of NSA/VNSAs in international politics fuel the debate about their definition, their aims, their strategies and their impact on states and societies.² In earlier times they have been defined in a narrow spectrum, limiting them functionally and timely to the description of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which can be simply defined as units operating either independently or under the financial and administrative control of a state for “good” aims. But, such a narrow definition would exclude transnational economic actors, criminal elements, churches, advocacy groups, think-tanks, or even diasporas.³ As detailed in Chapter 2, the contemporary literature is focusing on five different types of non-state actors. These are NGOs, business groups, political organizations, religious organizations and criminal organizations.⁴

When we look through the lenses of “terrorism” the VNSAs can be defined in a wider range. These actors are assumed to exist on different regions and geographies across the globe, but with similar targets. They are listed under several headlines such as; warlords, militias, paramilitary forces, insurgencies, terrorist organizations, criminal organizations and youth gangs fighting against state authority.⁵ The small or weak states and quasi-states across the world, particularly in Africa, South America and Asia, have been challenged by VNSAs either within their own territory or from the neighboring territories.⁶ Despite their divergent forms and tactics, these non-state

² Joselin, D. and Wallace W. (2001), “Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework”, in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace, eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, p.4

³ Joselin, D. and Wallace W. (2001), “Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework”, in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, p.5

⁴ Halliday, F. (2001), “The Romance of Non-State Actors”, in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, pp.27-28

⁵ Williams, P. (2008), ‘Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security’ *International Relations and Security Network*, pp.1-21, for details see <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf>, access date: 7 October 2013

⁶ In Europe Jihadist terrorist organizations (Madrid, London, Istanbul), in North America (Mexico) drug trafficking organizations, in South America (Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) militias, in Central America and United States youth gangs, in Albania, Italy and former Soviet Union the criminal

groups share similar characteristics in a form challenging national and international security and stability.⁷

The VNSAs operate across a wide spectrum in terms of their aims. Therefore the scope of this thesis will be limited to autonomy and/or independence seeking VNSAs. These VNSAs share identical specifications, ideologies and prove similar tactics, targets and organizational structures under the aim of autonomy or independence. Amongst others, some of these VNSAs are; Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, HAMAS), Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, GAM), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Sinn Fein and Irish Republican Army (IRA), Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*, FMLN), Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) and People's Liberation Army (PLA), 19th of April Movement (M19), and the African National Congress (ANC). All of these VNSAs have described their violent activism as a "legitimate form of self-defense" and they all, except for HAMAS, have reached a peaceful solution, and transformed into a political entity.

Research Question:

Why did the US actively pursue a conciliatory/inclusive approach towards GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia) but not towards HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine)?

It is interesting to find out that American diplomacy, together with other international partners, has assured a peaceful solution to Aceh problem in Indonesia. After a fierce struggle based on terror and violence for three decades, the Free Aceh

organizations, in many African countries and Central Asia warlords, and in the Middle East (Iraq) insurgents, terrorists, militias and criminal organizations are operating.

⁷As a consequence of their growing impact on contemporary global politics, some organizations have been established for identifying, categorizing and analyzing the VNSAs. Among these organizations the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Non-State Actors Working Group (NSAWG) and Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research are in the forefront. These organizations rise upon a growing awareness that, non-state actors are no longer minor players in global politics.

Movement/GAM has been persuaded to leave arms and violence, and transform into Indonesian political structure in August 2005. But, I observe that despite some promising developments, the American foreign policy has not so far persuaded HAMAS to leave arms and transform into a peaceful political entity in Palestine conflict. As detailed in following paragraphs of this Chapter, the substantial factor which affects Palestine and Aceh conflicts rests with the relations of the United States with Israel and Indonesia as parent states, and the reactions of parent states towards these VNSAs; HAMAS and GAM.

In this respect, as an early statement, I need to say that Indonesia has proved a democratic approach and a good will since early 1990s towards GAM to solve the Aceh problem, but Israel has stayed loyal to its traditional Cold-War term arguments at regional forums and to the principles of a colonial approach in its interactions with HAMAS as well as other domestic actors taking part in Palestine conflict.

1.2. Argument

In last century, the role of globalization has been substantial upon the non-state actors. In this sense, the transfer of power from the states towards the non-state actors is widely argued as one of the consequences of globalization. It is known that the international system includes several actors interacting with each other. States have been the primary actors with their certain domestic and international rights and duties. With its human power, economic, institutional and technological capability, the state has been the dominant entity of international system since several centuries. Today there are around 200 states in world politics reigning over a defined territory with a human population and a government to perform its internal and external relations. But, the non-state actors with a number of over 50 thousand units and more than half a million affiliates across the globe, control more resources than many of these states. They do not take over the roles of states but rather create a more complicated international environment. Although “good” NSAs have flourished due to the shared understandings of globalization, “violent” NSAs have also increased in

post-Cold War term, in a form challenging the state authority in legitimacy, capacity, and collective interest and shared identity.⁸

It is a reality that in last four decades, transnational relations run by non-state actors have gained rise and the states have lost a great deal of their authority in global system. There are several substantial reasons for this authority shift. First, the liberal forces in world economy have undermined the capability of the states over production, foreign trade, flow of capital and technology transfer. This was a structural change in global economy. In early 1990s, the flow of funds and global financial market was no more under the control of states.⁹ Second, with the demise of bipolar system, the meaning of security has changed and need for the wealth has moved forward. Economic success has become a vital actor for peace and prosperity. As Buzan (1991) argues economic, societal and environmental security need has superseded classical military security needs and this structural change has realized a transformation of duties from states towards the non-state actors.¹⁰ The global society is aware that world order is threatened by economic, environmental and societal disorder rather than political or military disputes. On the other hand, the possibility of inter-state war has decreased, but civil war, ethnic conflict and organized crime have increased in a way highlighting the importance of non-state actors. Third, change in economic structure and security understanding force the states to integrate under larger units for political (EU), economic (NAFTA) or security (NATO) aims. This integration has also forced the states to share their authority and tasks with non-governmental actors.¹¹

⁸ Joselin, D. and Wallace W. (2001), "Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework", in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace, eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, p.4

⁹ Kan, Hideki, Actors in World Politics, for details see; <http://www.eolss.net/Sample-Chapters/C04/E6-32-05-03.pdf> access date 22 December 2014

¹⁰ Buzan, B. (1991), "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century", *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.3, pp.431-451

¹¹ Kan, H. (2010), "Actors in World Politics", *Government and Politics*, Vol.II pp.246-48

In contemporary era, the approach of the US towards the NSAs is shaped basically by the idealists and realists. Idealist narratives often present the NSAs as the representatives of global civil society challenging the authority of the states and the private actors building networks and international solidarity across the borders. On the contrary, the realists see them as units under the service of state interests, or as adversaries trying to undermine the state authority and national solidarity. Despite such a strong difference between the idealist and realist camps, both accept the growing efficacy and the impact of NSAs upon the societies in post-Cold War period.¹²

On the other hand, Joselin and Wallace (2001) focus on different perceptions by different state types. They posit that in history, different states with different ideologies have reacted in a different way towards the NSAs. For example, the Anglo-American perception aiming to construct a more liberal and open international order for the world supported the principles of private property, individual rights, and international institutions. But, the revolutionary states such as old Soviet republics, which challenged the dominating rules of international society, have treated the NSAs as illegitimate units and tried to ban them. Dissimilar to these two state types, the totalitarian states, such as the Cold War's Middle Eastern states refused the distinction between the private and public entities and tried to control these private actors under tight restrictions.¹³ Above mentioned three reasons, that undermine the authority of state in front of non-state actors get their power from rising global civil society. The state-centric international society of 1960s and 70s which was originally composed of sovereign states has been replaced by a composition of states and non-state actors interacting within the Global Civil Society in the 2000s.

My argument that led to the making of my research question is that American national interests, domestic/international security concerns and the

¹² Joselin, D. and Wallace W. (2001), "Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework", in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace, eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, pp.1-2

¹³ Joselin, D. and Wallace W. (2001), "Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework", in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace, eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, p.6

democratic/authoritarian characters of the parent states (Israel and Indonesia) shape the foreign policy of the US in its relations with HAMAS and GAM. Although the US displays an idealist approach to peaceful Non-State Actors (NSA) under the principles of liberal economy, freedom, and globalization, it follows a realist approach towards Violent Non-State Actor (VNSA) under the principles of its realist foreign policy. Thus, the US foreign policy practices come up with different results when faced with identical regional problems as visible in Palestine and Aceh conflicts. National American interests and security concerns have guided the American administration to solve the Aceh conflict between GAM and the Indonesian government, but in the case of HAMAS, we see that the US administration could not reach the same result.

In this thesis, in order to demonstrate my argument, I studied two VNSAs from two different geographies; HAMAS from the Middle East and GAM from the Southeast Asia. By looking at these two examples, I aim to understand the relationship of the US with the VNSAs in the 2000s. It is clear that both GAM and HAMAS have commonalities and similar political aims as two VNSAs. International circles have reached a widely accepted finding that both VNSAs have proved a certain degree of transformation along the years they have operated and this transformation is clear in first decade of new millennium. This changing character of GAM and HAMAS has been a matter of debate between the scholars and international political circles.¹⁴

¹⁴ For a review of the controversial literature on the changing role of HAMAS, see; Gunning, Jeroen. 2007. *HAMAS in Politics-Democracy, Religion, Violence*, Hurst Publishers Ltd., London; Hroub, Khaled. 2010. *HAMAS- A Beginner's Guide*, Pluto Press, London; Byman, Daniel. 2005. *Deadly Connections-States that Sponsor Terrorism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Jensen, M. Irving. 2009. *The Political Ideology of HAMAS-A Grassroots Perspective*, I.B.Tauris&Co Press, New York; Geeraerts, Gustaaf. 1995. "Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics" *Centrum voor Polemologie Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen, VUB*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1-26, October; Milton-Edwards, Bewerley and Farrel, Stephen. 2010. *HAMAS- The Islamic Resistance Movement*, Polity Press, Cambridge; Janssen, Floor. 2009, *HAMAS and its Positions Towards Israel- Understanding the Islamic Resistance Organization through the Concept of Framing*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Press, Den Haag, pp.29-3; Johnson, Alan. 2008, *Global Politics After 9/11 The Demokratiya Interviews, New Wars and Human Security: An Interview with Mary Kaldor*, Foreign Policy Centre & Demokratiya, London, pp.274-297; Research report of Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CSPI), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2010. "Islamist Mass Movements, External Actors and Political Change in the Arab World" contributor *Khaled Hroub*, pp. 91-111; CRS Report for Congress.2010."HAMAS: Background and Issues for Congress" *Jim Zanotti*, December,

The explanatory power of this thesis lies in the interaction between two VNSAs (HAMAS and GAM), the parent states (Israel and Indonesia), and the global power (the United States). The thesis focuses on the composition of relations amongst these two VNSAs, their parent states and the US. S detailed in following section of this Chapter (Three Circle Formula- pillars of this thesis), three circles have been identified functioning at domestic, regional and international levels. These circles are; (i) the VNSA-its internal structure (domestic), (ii) the VNSA-parent/opponent state (regional) and (iii) the VNSA-the US (international). For a successful transition of the VNSA into a peaceful entity, certain conditions should be prepared at domestic/intra-VNSA circle, at regional/VNSA-parent state circle and at international/VNSA-the US circle. But it is vital that not only the VNSA but also the parent state and international role players/actors are expected to prove a positive approach to the conflict for an enduring solution. These conditions need to function at parallel and vertical lines of communication amongst the role players and should be kept warm at every stage of any peace process. Lack of mutual confidence, good will, democratic approach and similar positive features has undermined several peace attempts at both Palestine and Aceh conflicts and ended up with severe discords as detailed in following chapters. For instance, HAMAS is widely accused by global political circles as a fundamentalist organization for staying loyal to religious teachings, originating from Koranic verses, but Israel as a responsible state also conducts similar behaviors originating from Old Testament verses. The visit of Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to Temple Mount in September 2000, which aimed to show that Israel state had a right to control Temple Mount vicinity, fueled the fire of second intifadah.

pp.35-38; CRS Report for Congress. 2010. "Change in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Policy" *Christopher M. Blanchard*, March, pp.1-24; CRS Report for Congress. 2012. "Israel: Background and U.S. Relations" *Jim Zanotti*, November, pp 1-33; Walker, Justin and Golestani, Leila. 2009. "Threat Analysis: HAMAS and Hezbollah Sleeper Cells in the United States" *Urban Warfare Analysis Center*, pp 1.24; Kananen, Marko.2009. "Europe, Culture and Non-State Actors" *Peace Magazine*, April-June, pp.14-15; Noortmann, Math. 2002. "Globalisation, Global Governance and Non-State Actors: Researching beyond the State" *International Law FORUM du droit international*, No.4, pp.36-40.

So far, the relations between the domestic entities of the VNSAs, the relations between the VNSAs and their parent states and the relations between the VNSAs and the US have been studied by scholars. Throughout my study I have identified a fourth circle; the parent state-US relations and their effects upon the related VNSA under the shadow of international terrorism. My contribution to the literature will be on the “parent state-US” relations and how this relationship makes negative or positive effects upon the conflict and the reactions of that related VNSA. Because, the paradoxical outcomes of US foreign policy in these two conflicts are embedded in the nature of the relations of the parent states (Israel and Indonesia) with the US. For instance, the US administration has spent strong efforts (economic, military, educational etc.) to have positive relations with Indonesia in post September 11 term in order to prevent the proliferation of terrorist activities of international terrorist organizations in Indonesia and its near periphery. As a positive reaction to the US foreign policy initiatives in Southeast Asia, in the wake of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has also proved a democratic approach and good will towards GAM to solve Aceh problem. Thus GAM, which has used terror acts widely for its aims throughout years in Aceh and some other regions of Indonesia, has left terrorism and transformed into a peaceful actor within Indonesian political life, assuring autonomy to the Aceh region.

On the other hand, the tolerance of American Administrations towards the Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes and the special relationship between the US and Israel formed an obstacle on the way to an enduring peace. This obstacle encouraged Israel to be loyal to her traditional Cold War year’s security seeking policy arguments and prevented Israel as the parent state to accomplish her responsibilities and prove a positive approach towards HAMAS and Palestine conflict. In post September 11 term, the influence of Israel upon American foreign policy decision makers has continued and the US approach towards the Palestine conflict has been affected by the Israeli lobby under Israel states interests and giving no room for a peace.

One dominant factor which casts the paradoxical US political approaches in above mentioned two regional conflicts lie with the tolerance of American administration towards authoritarian Arab states in the Middle East that played substantial roles in

Palestine conflict and entered military engagements against Israel since its foundation in 1948. Since longer than half a century, unlike other regions, the Middle East has not been the target of American administrations for the promotion of democracy, human rights and free market, and stayed under the shadow of special American-Israeli relationship.¹⁵ Particularly after 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet centered US Middle East policy has been replaced by the Israeli centered US Middle East policy. This new American political approach has placed the security and survival of Israel into the first row and combined it with American national interests designing the Middle East accordingly.¹⁶

1.3 Three Circle Formula; Pillars of the Thesis

In order to explain the approach of American policy towards HAMAS and GAM and their reaction to the US foreign policy, I have used Veronique Dudouet's "three circle" formula. Dudouet (2012) argues that, certain conditions need to come to surface in order to realize the transformation of a VNSA into a peaceful political entity. This transformation is expected to come true at three levels; first, VNSA-its internal structure level, second, VNSA-opponent/parent state level and third, VNSA-international community level. For the success, certain conditions should be prepared at intra-VNSA circle, at VNSA-parent state circle and at VNSA-international actors' circle. It is vital that not only the VNSA but also the parent state and international role players/actors are expected to prove a positive approach for an enduring solution. These conditions need to function at parallel and vertical lines of

¹⁵ Telhami, S.(2002), *The Stakes: America and the Middle East: The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace*, Boulder, Colo, Westview Press pp.140-142

¹⁶ President Johnson's term (1963-1969) has been the continuation of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy throughout 1950s and 60s. In this term, Israel has become an able state under the economic and military assistance of the US. In 1950s, President Eisenhower followed a pragmatist policy, taking care of American interests and paid attention not to push Egypt to the hands of Soviets. The overriding US concern for the Middle East was to prevent Soviet penetration into the area and the flow of oil supplies. But during Johnson term, after the 6 days war, Israel rose to the position of "strategic partner". For details see Kathleen Christison (1999), *Perceptions of Palestine*, Chapter 5, pages 95-123, the comparison between Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson.

communication and should be kept warm at every stage of a peace process in order to reach a permanent agreement.¹⁷

Dudouet contends that, policy-makers and scholars cannot prove an efficient explanation to the question “what shapes the radicalization and de-radicalization processes of non-state armed groups”. Moreover, Dudouet says another misperception about the non-state actors is that, converting them into peaceful entities is believed to be done only by weakening, or completely dismantling the military structures of the non-state groups. The findings of Dudouet stem from a research project. This project was designed and carried out in Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Nepal, Aceh, El Salvador, Colombia, and South Africa. The research figures out that armed opposition groups of these seven countries shared a number of important features that qualify them as “resistance or liberation movements” and they have all transformed from violent entities into peaceful political parties. This process was conducted through negotiations, demobilisations, disarmaments, and democratic institutionalization steps.¹⁸

Dudouet drives our attention to a significant point that these armed movements justify their violence based on two reasons; (i) it is a self-defense in the face of human rights abuses and (ii) it is a reaction to the denial of democracy. For instance, Sinn Féin define armed struggle as “a legitimate part of a people’s resistance to foreign oppression” These armed groups also claim that their violent activities were supported by the society they struggle for. So that, they are the legitimate defenders of people’s interests. This question raised by Dudouet inherits also similarities with the concern of Math Noortmann (2002) about the determination of legal norms for liberation seeking armed groups. Noortmann argues that the states should not be deemed more important than the armed groups if the issue is about finding a solution

¹⁷ Dudouet, V. (2012), “Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation of Non-State Armed Groups”, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* Vol. 6 (1), p. 97 available at file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/179-1182-1-PB%20(4).pdf access date 11 March 2013

¹⁸ Dudouet, V. (2012), “Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation of Non-State Armed Groups”, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* Vol. 6 (1), p. 98 available at file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/179-1182-1-PB%20(4).pdf access date 11 March 2013

to an armed conflict. Insisting on traditional approach may result in considering the “states” and “non-state actors” on separate legal frameworks.¹⁹

In 4th and 5th Chapters, I focus upon these three levels and compare the outcomes of American foreign policy to HAMAS, a VNSA which has not realized the transition to become a non-violent NSA and to GAM, a VNSA which has realized its transition and turned into a peaceful political entity. First, I look at internal functions of these two VNSAs. There are three functions interacting; (i) their charters as a political document, (ii) their social movement capabilities within the society they are born, (iii) their political-military capabilities. Second, I study their relations with their parent states; Israel and Indonesia and their capabilities to transform into a peaceful political entity. This is vital because, in case the VNSA and the parent state do not share a common understanding upon peace, stability, justice, human rights and democracy, they will not find a compromise.²⁰ Third, I focus upon how the US deals with HAMAS and GAM and their capability to adopt themselves to the international environment.

In addition to these three circles, which are in line with Dudouet’s analysis, I add a fourth circle in order to understand the relations between the parent states (Israel and Indonesia) and the US. This part of the dissertation comprises my contribution to the literature. So far, a vast number of studies have been carried out on the VNSAs. But the majority of these works have focused on the internal/domestic structure of the VNSAs, such as; why do they use violence, how do they fight, what is their military power, how can they be forced to disappear, who are their leading figures and similar. A good amount of work has been conducted on the VNSA and its opponent state, generally focusing on the origin of the problem, and the phases of the dispute. In addition, particularly after the rise of global terrorism, some studies have focused

¹⁹ As thoroughly discussed in the “The Legal Status of NSA/VNSAs” section of this Chapter, Noortmann drives our attention to the legal status of the VNSAs. He contends that the legal status of VNSAs has strong implications upon their appearance at international level. Moreover he argues that the legal status of a VNSA impose strong effects upon domestic structure of a VNSA forcing it either to transform into a more peaceful or into a more fundamentalist appearance.

²⁰ Dudouet, V. (2012), “Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation of Non-State Armed Groups”, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* Vol. 6 (1), pp.100-1027 available at file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/179-1182-1-PB%20(4).pdf access date 11 March 2013

on the interactions of the hegemon state (the US) and the VNSAs. Such works, as explained in Chapter 2 (Literature review), focus on the dimensions of the threats caused by the violent non-state actors upon the US, and the precautions taken against them. Therefore, my contribution to the literature explores an area that was not studied satisfactorily so far. I aimed to fill this gap; why does the hegemon state (the US) in its relations with the parent states (Israel-Indonesia) can not pursue a conciliatory/inclusive approach to both of the VNSAs to transform them into a peaceful entity? Why GAM has transformed into a responsible political entity within the Indonesian political spectrum, but why HAMAS has failed so far and kept its loyalty to the violence?

The reason for choosing HAMAS and GAM as two VNSAs is mainly to explain the rationale where the United States, as the leading power of post Second World War era, has played a vital role upon these two conflicts, and these conflicts ended up with different outcomes. When we go in detail of Aceh conflict, we realize that the US has spent great efforts to reach a permanent peace. These efforts have come up with solid conclusions and have let no room for other regional powers such as China and/or Japan to involve with the situation. A permanent peace process was vital for the US from the point of the view of American strategic interests in South Asia. The conflict between Indonesia and GAM would not be let alone whilst 90 percent of energy sources to China and Japan flow through the funnel of Malacca strait, where Aceh region controls the entrance of this strait.

On the other hand, although the US administrations have spent efforts to find a lasting peace to Palestine conflict, not too much progress has been achieved. Thus, Palestine conflict has continued to make effect upon regional and global peace as well as the rise of fundamental religious terror caused by violent non state actors. The post-Cold war term extending to nowadays, has been blocked by huge international efforts to contain this new threat at almost every continent. In case a settled and fair solution is established in Palestine, probably the strongest argument of religious violent terror groups will turn out to be useless. The initial step for a feasible peace can be made by scrutinizing the traditional approach of the West to

HAMAS and setting the conditions to recognize it as a responsible actor in Palestine conflict.

1.4 Contribution to the Literature

The contribution of this thesis to the literature is based on Parent State-US relations as elaborated in fourth and fifth Chapters. This thesis is a composition of the interactions amongst two VNSAs (HAMAS&GAM), two parent states (Israel&Indonesia) and the United States. Throughout these interactions three circles function at domestic, regional and international levels. In my study, in addition to these three circles I have focused upon a fourth circle; the parent states-US relations and how these relations made negative and/or positive effects upon Palestine and Aceh conflicts. As detailed in fourth and fifth chapters, the fourth circles exert direct pressure over VNSA-US relations, ending up sometimes with more VNSA/Parent State terror acts as visible in HAMAS case, or sometimes surprisingly leading to some promising steps concluding with the transition of that VNSA into a peaceful entity, and permanent peace with the parent state as visible with GAM case in Indonesia.

In fourth Chapter, within the entirety of the dissertation, I explain the first, the second and the third circles, that elaborate the interactions amongst HAMAS with its domestic structure, with Israel as the parent state and the US. In the final section of the Chapter, I study Israel-US relations and its effects upon HAMAS and Palestine conflict. When studying this relationship and its weight upon Palestine conflict, I have focused on a composition of moral, cultural, political, economic and societal tenets which formed a strong bond between the US and Israel. This bond sometimes bends and proves a gradual plianthood according to regional and international political developments, but never broken, similar to a chord connecting the fetus to the mother. The cultural affinity between American and Jewish communities, perception of American presidents to Israel and Jewish society since the creation of Israel state, the role of Israeli lobby in the US and the multilateral American support to Israel constitute the cornerstones of this special relationship. This special relationship, no matter how much criticism gathers at post-Cold War American

political and academic circles based on the assumptions that it is seriously harming American interests, has also banished any possible opportunity for a peace settlement in Palestine.

For example, the UN resolution 242 (enacted in 1967) which sought the application of two principles; (a) withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories and (b) acknowledgement of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area is worth to mention in this respect. The initiative run by President Carter and his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 1977 which was aiming to start a comprehensive settlement to Arab-Israeli conflict, alarmed the pro-Israeli organizations, the congress and media in the US as well as the Menahem Begin administration of Israel. President Carter's efforts and good will in this respect, as the first American President who thus far broadly understood the political and humanitarian dimensions of the Palestine problem and who also recognized the sufferings of Palestinian refugees for a homeland, has not given any fruitful result. As elaborated in third Chapter of this study, the Arab-Israeli conflict inherits several examples, giving little room for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and HAMAS as a Violent Non-State Actor as well as other Palestinian entities, is influenced largely by such developments, and desperately return into its classical behavior pattern of violence and terror.

In fifth Chapter, similar to the fourth Chapter, I detail the first, the second and the third circles, that elaborates the interactions of GAM with its domestic structure, with Indonesia as the parent state and the US. In the final section of this Chapter, I study Indonesia-US relations and its effects upon GAM and Aceh conflict. When studying this relationship and its weight upon Aceh conflict, identical to Palestine conflict, I have focused on a composition of moral, cultural, political, economic and societal tenets which paved the way to the peace agreement in 2005. In this chapter when analyzing the conditions that led to peace agreement, three principles rise to front row; (i)political good will of Indonesia as the parent state and its reflections upon GAM and other regional and international role players, (ii)democratic developments in Indonesia after Suharto term, and (iii)the positive developments in US-Indonesia relations after 9/11. These three principles, particularly the promising

developments in the US-Indonesia relations urged GAM leaders to leave discord, to feel confidence as an equal party at the peace table, and transform into a peaceful entity. Of equal importance is the democratization process of Indonesia state in post Suharto term, beginning in 1998 onwards which created a peaceful climate in Indonesia and encouraged the use of soft power and diplomacy rather than hard power. For more than three decades, Suharto regime has used sole military and police force to crush GAM, but this has resulted more terror and economic loss across the region.

When comparing these two conflicts (Palestine and Aceh) and analyze the conditions underpinning them, the most distinguishing point shows up as the existence or non-existence of “political good will” under guidance of parent states (Israel and Indonesia) and the nature of US-parent state relations.

There is a need to investigate the origin and the nature of the goodwill in both conflicts in post-Cold War term. Accepting universal moral values on the threshold of anew age would constitute a strong base for emergence of the political goodwill between the parties and thus attract the interest and support of local and/or international public opinion. Therefore, rather than following the footprints of a Hobbesian perception that ignores trust towards the opponent, embracing idealist notions would lead the parties to an enduring solution. Effective political leadership and governance throughout the management of these two conflicts had direct relationship with promoting a mutual goodwill and ending the problem in a context meeting the expectations of both parties as well as local, regional and international communities. In this sense, the source of turmoil in global politics in the 2000s is argued to originate from the determined leaders of well-armed nations that seek security by employing hard power upon the adversaries. This means simply war, devastating the trust, not solely between the states, leaders, institutions but also the societies. Amongst so many “new” ideas describing the new world order of the 2000s, it is surprising to see how some politicians inhabit old motives, arguments and principles.

In all the conflicts which have been investigated in this thesis, there is a goodwill to a degree leading the parties to a peace agreement. It is possible contend that, the hotspots of Cold War have been treated through the lenses of well-armed nations that seek security by employing hard power upon the conflicts and benefiting from them. But since the end of the Cold War, modern technology, promotion of democracy, participating in global markets, innovative ideas have encouraged the rise of goodwill within international community. In a new world there is a strong need for new rules of international cooperation as well as new rules to organize international institutions. It was impossible to ignore the hotspots across the globe, because global public opinion was aware that such problems would fuel terrorism, racial hatreds and mass migration. National politicians and the partners of local hotspots felt responsible to make positive steps. For example, the initiative to solve Kosovo problem was taken by the US and NATO leaders without a UN mandate. During Cold War years, such a brave move was impossible for the risk of a catastrophic war with former Soviet Union. The new inspiration of new world order was a political goodwill embraced by progressive and well intentioned politicians. Thus, an integrated and robust international community would rise.

1.5 Methodology and Research Strategy

This thesis will investigate the hypothesis that the US actively pursued a conciliatory/inclusive approach towards GAM but not towards HAMAS. This argument will be detailed in 6 chapters by using a composition of comparative analysis and historical narrative depending primarily upon the secondary sources. Even though in some chapters I will go to the history for detailed narrative, the primary purpose will be qualifying my findings throughout analytic explanations. In my thesis, I examine histories, archival documents, personal interviews, official documents and declarations.

I have analyzed these primary sources under a critical approach in order to provide depth and evidence to my findings. The material I have used includes reviewed journals, texts published by universities, books and articles of related capable scholars. I structure my thesis in a way that I write general questions reflecting the

research objective. These questions will be used for the case that allows making a systematic comparison between HAMAS and GAM.

1.6 Organization of Dissertation

This thesis is composed of six Chapters. In first Chapter (Introduction) I explain the Research Question, my Argument, my Contribution to the Literature and the Methodology.

In second Chapter (Literature Review), I investigate the types and capabilities of the VNSAs under three headlines; the Domestic circle of the VNSAs, the Regional circle of the VNSAs, the International circle of the VNSAs, their growing influence in international politics. Within this respect, I investigate also their position in front of international law, the double standard they are subject to, the power of violent non-state actors and the societal forces that empower the violent non-state actors in front of their opponents. The NSA/VNSAs are not any more separate, state controlled, artificial entities of Cold War days used for the aims of state apparatus; rather they are empowered and supported by the local and regional societies they are born in. They participate in local and parliamentary elections and they are represented in democratic echelons. They tend to leave violence and prove a peaceful character when compared to the Cold War years. Also, the approach of different state types (liberal, communist, monarchy) to the VNSAs is analyzed in its historical schedule. Another point raised in this chapter is how the VNSAs try to adopt themselves to the conditions dictated by globalization and arrange their relations with the opponent/parent state and the US.

In third Chapter, the principles of American foreign policy are explained. Without understanding the background and the common wisdom of American foreign policy discourse it would be hard to grasp the soul of American foreign policy approach towards the VNSAs in the 2000s. It is important to understand it particularly for two reasons; first to comprehend the forces shaping the American foreign policy such as the educational background and the upbringings of American Presidents and their vital roles and influences upon foreign politics, the outlook of American society

towards the outer world particularly to Jewish, Palestinian, Indonesian and Acehese societies and the forces influencing their ideas such as the lobbies and the media, and the lessons learned by the US Department of State in its historical discourse moving amongst different principles such as isolationism, continentalism, exceptionalism, and idealism. The second reason is to comprehend the approach of the Middle East and Southeast Asian regional powers and the VNSAs towards the United States. This Chapter seeks to highlight how the US and the VNSAs have affected each other by making the use of realist actions towards each other and the regional powers. This chapter outlines also the principles that have constructed American common wisdom over foreign relations and the tasks for the United States in post- Cold War era; such as (i) the legitimacy of the unipolar world order, (ii) managerial tasks of the US as the uni-polar state and (iii) the strategic interests of unipolar state.

In fourth and fifth Chapters, I focus on HAMAS and GAM in a comparative way in order to clarify two different but national interest oriented and security seeking American approaches towards two VNSAs with similar specifications and similar aims. I form my argument upon four circles on VNSA's internal and external interactions. First circle is related to the internal functions of HAMAS and GAM with their societies and structural entities. These internal functions are; their charters as a political document, their social movement capacities, and their political, societal and military capabilities. In this respect, HAMAS charter inherits some difficulties when compared to GAM charter for its rigid statements based on Koranic verses against the presence of Israel state and Jewish society. Second circle is the relations of HAMAS and GAM with the parent states; Israel and Indonesia and their interactions with these states to transform into a peaceful political entity. This is vital because, in case the non-state actor and the parent state do not share a common understanding upon peace, stability, justice, human rights and democracy, they will not find a compromise. Third, I focus upon relations of HAMAS and GAM with the US under the light of capability to adopt themselves into the international conditions and the process of peace. Fourth, I focus upon the relations between the US and parent states (Israel and Indonesia). This fourth circle, which is my contribution to the literature, is vital, because the possibility to find a peaceful solution to related

conflict is linked to how much the US and Israel/Indonesia interests overlap, how much political good will survives, how much the parent states prove a democratic capability on the way to a peace agreement.

In sixth Chapter, I detail the conclusions I have reached and the findings for future studies.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Because, the NSA/VNSA entities function at a wide environment, the literature review of this thesis covers also a wide spectrum. I have paid attention not to go astray from the subject matter of the thesis. In this sense, first, I have focused on Armed Conflict literature and Civil War literature in order to explore the roles of non-state groups within the armed conflicts. Second, I have elaborated the types of NSA/VNSAs and their legal status in front of international and/or regional conflicts. And third, I have investigated the VNSA literature within the domestic, regional and international circles, in order to understand the domestic structure of the VNSAs, their relations with the parent states, and their relations with the hegemon state (the US). In this literature review, in addition to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya, HAMAS) and Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM), five more VNSAs from different geographies have been studied in three circles. These VNSAs are; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Farabundo Martí Liberation Front of El Salvador, (FMLN), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Party of God (Hezbollah).

2.1 Armed Conflicts and Civil Wars

According to Geneva Conventions there are two basic types of armed conflicts; (i) international armed conflicts, (ii) non-international armed conflicts. International armed conflict is defined as “an armed conflict between two or more states”, whereas non-international armed conflict is defined “armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of a state”. In parallel to 1949 Geneva Conventions, International humanitarian law also underlines two types of armed

conflicts: (i) international armed conflicts, opposing two or more states, and (ii) non-international armed conflicts, between governmental forces and nongovernmental armed groups, or between such groups only.²¹ As we see, the legal norms approach the issue from post-Second World War's statist perception.

Under the shadow of bi-polar international system, before 1990s, most research on the causes of armed conflicts focused on international conflicts. The causes of war have been investigated thoroughly by several scholars. Stephen Van Evera (1999) has worked on the issue from a broader perspective, aiming to find the answers to the questions such as; (i) what caused the great wars of modern times? (ii) of those causes, which were preventable? (iii) what are the likely causes of future wars, (iv) how can those wars be prevented?²² Actually, Van Evera has focused on the causes of international wars amongst the states using the realist perception. He concludes that causes of wars amongst states are affected by the structure of international power. States fight with each other when they think that they will survive, when they think that moving first will give advantage, when they think that their relative power is in decline, when they think that resource commutativity is high, and most important, when they think that they will have an easy victory.²³ On the other hand, Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli (2009) argue the same question; "Why do wars occur?" The authors state that there are two prerequisites for a war between the actors. One is related to the cost of the war. If the cost is not too high in terms of resources, territory, power, life, glory etc, war is possible. The other is related to the failure in bargaining and thus minimum one of the parties is unable to reach an agreement.²⁴ These two examples underline the causes of wars between international

²¹ As the legal base for armed conflicts, Geneva Convention constitutes a departure point for the classification of armed conflicts. For details see <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf> access date 08 May 2017.

²² Van Evera, S. (1999) *Causes of War, Power and the Roots of Conflict*, London, Cornell University Press, Introduction, p.1

²³ Van Evera, S. (1999) *Causes of War, Power and the Roots of Conflict*, London, Cornell University Press, Introduction, p.255

²⁴ Jackson M.O and Morelli M. (2009), *The Reasons for Wars – an Updated Survey*, Handbook on the Political Economy of War, Elgar Publishing, p.2

armed conflicts. But, the civil wars prove some other factors as the causes of armed conflict, as detailed in following lines.

The significance of civil wars has come forward since the end of Cold War and since 1990, the scope of scholarly literature on the causes of civil wars has impressively grown. The basic feature between the interstate wars and civil wars is that civilians are the primary target in the latter.²⁵ If the armed conflict is related to “interstate wars”, which refers to a conflict between the armies of two states or a group of states, the negative impact of the war upon the civilians is gradually less when compared to the “civil wars”. About the international and civil wars, one of the significant data belongs to David Singer and Melvin Small named as the Corralets of War Project: International and Civil War Data. The data covers the term between 1816-1992 funded by United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and National Science Foundation (NSF).²⁶ Moreover, as contended by James D. Fearony and David D. Laitinz (2014), the most recent data is COW (Corraletes of War) that covers the term between 1816 to 2010. COW gives details of the wars such as interstate, intrastate (civil), extra-state (colonial and imperial), and non-state (organized political groups).²⁷

In the 19th and the 20th Centuries, ten out of thirteen deadliest conflicts were civil wars. In contemporary civil wars across the world, 80% of the lives lost were civilians. Civil wars around the world since 1945 have killed over 20 million people and displaced at least 67 million.²⁸ Since 1945, civil wars, some at low level and some at intense and destructive long periods, have lasted for years. To name some of

²⁵ Kalyvas, S. (2006) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p.2.

²⁶ This data covers both classical state to state wars and civil wars of 19th and 20th Centuries. For details see <https://www.ddalliance.org/sites/default/files/09905.pdf> access date 9 May 2017.

²⁷ Fearon and Laitin have prepared a report titled “Does contemporary armed conflict have deep historical roots?” (August 2014) for delivery at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31. See details at <http://leitner.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/persistenceofarmedconflict3.pdf> access date 9 May 2017.

²⁸ Collier P. and Sambanis N. (2005) *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, Washington D.C. World Bank press, preface xiii.

them; Colombia (65 years), Myanmar (65), Philippines (53), India (57), Ethiopia (51), Chad (48), Indonesia (47), Sudan (40), Iraq (39), and Afghanistan (34), Somalia (32 years), Angola (30), and DRC (25).²⁹ Moreover, between 1990 and 1999, there were 118 armed conflicts across the world, resulting approximately 6 million human lives. It was clear that there was a rise in armed conflicts following the collapse of Soviet Union. More interesting aspect was that only 10 of 118 armed conflicts occurred between the states, only 5 of 118 were motivated by independence, the rest of the armed conflicts were basically internal conflicts.³⁰

The fundamental factor responsible for the rise and the frequency of post-Cold War term's civil wars is argued to be the ethnic competition suppressed then by the logic and the harsh conditions of the Cold War's bi-polar international system. This ethnic competition of post-Cold War decades shows the features of criminal, depoliticized, private, and predatory characters. Such features are distinct from civil wars of earlier years which are considered to be ideological, political, collective and even noble.³¹ Based on the reality that the VNSAs are an active participant in a domestic/ intrastate armed conflict, there is a need to investigate the literature on civil wars before detailing on the VNSA literature.

The VNSAs are the active participants of armed conflicts, but rather of civil wars. So that, rather than international conflicts, I will briefly investigate the features and the causes of internal conflicts/civil wars. A vast literature on internal/civil armed conflict studies the conduct and the organization of Civil Wars. In this sense, Kaldor (1999) and Kaplan (1994) study the factors that influence the formation of an armed group, their recruitment strategy, their fighting tactics and their domestic structure. Moreover, Beber and Blattman (2008), Gates (2004), Weinstein (2007) discuss on

²⁹ Fearon and Laitin (2014) "Does contemporary armed conflict have deep historical roots?", *American Political Science Association*, August 28-31, p.2

³⁰ See Table-1 referring the armed conflicts between 1990 and 1999 by Dan Smith in his article "Causes of Armed Conflict" available at http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2576/pdf/smith_handbook.pdf access date 9 May 2017

³¹ Kalyvas argues the features of the civil wars happened in pre-Cold War and post-Cold War terms in three dimensions; causes and motivations, support and violence. For details see <http://archives.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/Kalyvas.pdf> access date 6 May 2017.

how armed groups motivate and recruit their fighting individuals. The powerful role of group and the social identity derived from that group as well as the solidarity, commitment, and willingness to risk one's life was studied by Popkin (1979), Kenny (2008), Gabriel and Savage (1979). Rush (2001) and Van Creveld (1983) have focused on the command and control structure within the group. On the other hand, civil war termination was contended by Walter (1997) and Licklider (1993). Rich and Stubbs (1997) focus on the political and social results of civil war while the factors of success and/or failure have been argued by Race (1972), Leites and Wolf (1970). Several other scholars have studied the internal structures, the incomes, and the ideologies of fighting groups across different geographies. For example, the Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups, the armed groups in El Salvador, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka, the guerilla groups in Congo, Sudan, Uganda have been detected by Fearon (2007), Smith, Gambette and Langley (2004) and Keen (2005).

Moreover, Kalyvas (2006) argues that the majority of research on civil war has overlooked the issue of violence. No matter what type of characteristics they inherit, ending civil wars is hard and hatreds are deeper than estimated. An armed conflict between two states can end where it started with less harms to the civilians, but sides in a civil war feel obliged to carry on fighting if they want to escape survive. Kalyvas draws our attention to another aspect of violence; who produces it? It may be produced unilaterally, or bilaterally. Thus, four categories of violence are generated by the unilateral and/or bilateral attempts of the parties; (i) state terror, (ii) genocide and ethnic cleansing, (iii) reciprocal extermination, (iv) civil war violence.³²

The researchers focus on four fundamental causes that fuel civil conflicts; (i)ethnic reasons, (ii)political mobilization, (iii)economic factors (iv)environmental factors.

2.1.1 Ethnic reasons

Ethnic diversity, if not accompanied with economic and political causes, is not strong enough to become a cause of war. As argued by Smith (1997), the most war-prone

³² Kalyvas, S. (2006) *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 2-4

states are not the most ethnic societies. Moreover, Collier (1999) argues that ethnic and religious factionalization may even reduce the violence if divergent groups in a state if they can develop their skills of living together. But if this learning process fails, then the ethnic diversity may fuel the conflict and cause a serious escalation. Because, this situation then creates a fertile environment for political mobilization. Out of 118 armed conflicts between 1990 and 1999, only 5 of them were influenced by ethnic factors. And the disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s is an example for these ethnic armed conflicts. Gellner (1983) contends that the power of political mobilization is nationalism assuming that nations and states should be territorially congruent. Rather than historical experiences, religious beliefs or myths, in the formation of an ethnic identity, the basic factor is a “shared perception” amongst the group members.³³

The effects of ethnicity upon armed conflicts have been studied by other scholars. While Smith (1983) has studied the impact of modernity, Anderson (1991) has focused on the imposition of colonial rule, and Smith and Österud (1995) have investigated the collapse of state socialism. On the other hand, Copson (1994) argues how hard it is to remove the ethnic mask from a group in time of crisis and war. The contemporary example is seen in the Hutu/Tutsi clashes of Burundi and Rwanda. The seeds of hatred and grievance amongst ethnic groups were sown by the colonial administrators and starting with the moment of independence, political leaders continuously exploited the ethnic group grievance to seize power. The result is seamless wars and massacres. Uyangoda (1996) contends a similar ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese/Tamil conflict is similar to Burundi and Rwanda which led to a prolonged civil war after the independence.

2.1.2 Political reasons

Above lines I have stated that ethnic diversity, if not accompanied with political causes, is not strong enough to become a cause of war. James Fearon (2006) posits

³³ Smith, D. (2004) “Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict”, *Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management* - Edited version, Aug , pp. 10-13

that “ethnicity is politicized when political coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity.”³⁴In many democratic, or revolutionary countries, several ethnic groups exist; such as the USA, India, Russia. But in Latin American countries, social class understanding moves forward instead of ethnicity. As argued by Slezkine (1994) and Suny (1993) in Western countries (except for Belgium, Spain, Britain and Canada) ethnic based parties are less. But in sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia ethnic parties are common. In such countries, political and economic benefits are structured generally along ethnic lines.³⁵

Within the basis of politicized ethnicity, Breuilly (1993) states that until the last 100 to 2000 years ethnicity was not regarded as the source of political mobilization. For example, in Europe during 17th and 18th centuries rather than ethnicity, class and religion were main markers of politics. Moreover, along the 19th Century, European states implemented national homogenization projects with the hands of schools and military institutions, which created a secular structure. Gellner(1993) states that these projects have frozen the political mobilization by ethnic factors for a certain period of time. In Africa, some ethnic groups have been formed during the colonial period. But these are not natural but rather artificial ethnic groups with no common social or political identity. Horowitz (1985) and Bates (1983) have focused on such groups that were developed under the political and economic competition of colonial states in Africa. For sure, as argued by several scholars including Laitin (1995), Kaufmann (1996), Mueller (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2000b), violence and violent attacks upon ethnic lines resulted with extreme ethnic polarization in societies.

2.1.3 Economic reasons

With the support of World Bank, the book edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (2005) is a significant work; *Understanding Civil War, Part 1*

³⁴ Fearon J.D. (2006), *Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence*, *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.2

³⁵ Fearon J.D. (2006), *Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence*, *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.3

Africa.³⁶ Collier and Sambanis use a model named Collier and Hoeffler (C-H Model) to test civil wars in African states of Brundi, Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Sudan, Algeria, Senagal and Mali between 1960 and 1999. The C-H model is simply an economic model, arguing that the cause of civil wars is neither political nor social, but economic. Collier and Sambanis use the data that covers all related countries for about 40 years (from 1960 to 1999). They expect that C-H model should be useful for the design of a future policy by increasing the gross domestic product per capita in developing countries, thus the risk of civil war would be reduced.³⁷

Similarly, as argued by Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, the Civil war is likely to occur in poor countries that are subject to small income, that have weak institutions, and that are densely populated.³⁸ Blattman and Miguel (March 2009) contend that the incentives that feed economic causes of a Civil War are income inequality, trade shocks, raw material (such as oil) and unequal distribution of national income.³⁹ Amongst others, Avery and Rapkin (1986), Hauge and Ellingsen (1998) can be mentioned as the scholars who study on the economic incentives for civil wars. One point they raise is that in a country if the available economic surplus is small, the competition to control it may be intense.

2.1.4 Environmental reasons

Degradation of natural resources such as erosion, water pollution, and deforestation can contribute the likelihood of conflicts due to their unsuitable impacts upon economy, habitation and social order. Natural disasters may force masses of humans

³⁶ Collier, P. and Sambanis N. (2005), *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, Washington D.C., USA: World Bank. [A review of economic causes of civil war], preface xiii available at <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/7437/344110v10PAPER101Official0UseOnly1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> access date 8 May 2017

³⁷ Collier, P. and Sambanis N. (2005), *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, Washington D.C., USA: World Bank. [A review of economic causes of civil war], preface xiii-xiv

³⁸ Blattman C. and Miguel E. (2009) "Civil War, Center for Global Development Working Paper" , Number 166, p.30, available at https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1421335_file_Blattman_Civil_War_FINAL.pdf access date 8 May 2017.

³⁹ Blattman C. and Miguel E. (2009) "Civil War, Center for Global Development Working Paper" , Number 166, p.30, available at https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1421335_file_Blattman_Civil_War_FINAL.pdf access date 8 May 2017.

to migrate to the neighboring countries. But such environmental reasons are not central to the problem as it is with the political and economic determinants. Between the environment and civil wars, there is a bilateral interaction. For sure, all wars, international or civil, are environmental catastrophes. Lack of sufficient natural sources fuel armed conflicts and armed conflicts or wars destroy the nature, farms, livestock, forests etc. Epidemic diseases are also an outcome of armed conflicts, or armed conflicts result in epidemic problems. Homer-Dixon (1994) investigates the links between the environmental degradation and armed conflicts. Moreover, Homer-Dixon (1999) contends that armed conflicts in Haiti and the Philippines cannot be thoroughly understood without taking the environmental degradation into consideration. On the other hand, Gleditsch (1998) and Lipschutz (1997) challenge those perceptions which aim to signify a simple and direct link between environmental degradation and violent conflicts.

So far, as the first step of literature review I have briefly investigated the works done on the armed conflicts and the civil wars. In following sections, I will focus on the NSA/VNSAs in terms of their types, their legal status, and their relations and interactions with the domestic, regional, and international actors.

2.2 Types and Capabilities of NSA/VNSAs

This part of literature review details how the types and functions of VNSAs have flourished especially in post-Cold War term. The capabilities and types of VNSAs are extensive. Because even an individual person with a gun or with a private aim can be simply understood as a non-state actor. The work of Bremer and Palmer (2002) helped me to draw a limit in terms of their capabilities.⁴⁰ Bremer and Palmer argue that VNSAs that affect the regional and/or international politics should inherit four capabilities that distinguish them from other small/ignorable violent or non-violent entities. First, a VNSA must be a group, not lone terrorists, causing instability in a particular country and influencing an international conflict. Second, a VNSA must

⁴⁰ Palmer G. and Bremer S.A. (2002). "Non-State Actors and Interstate War: Coding Procedures for Identifying Armed Political Action Groups.", *Peace Science Society meeting*, Tucson, Arizona, Nov. 1-3, 2002.

direct its attention towards creating violence, not education or similar peaceful means. Third, a VNSA must seek a political goal not criminal. Fourth, a VNSA must engage in guerilla violence by means of bombings, kidnappings, sabotage, ambushes etc. By using these four criteria, I have tried to eliminate the groups or individuals that focus on non-violent behaviors, or criminal actions and organized crimes. The US administrations engage with the NSA/VNSAs that inherit such abilities and specifications.

Alan G. Stolberg (2006) argues that Non-State Actors can be grouped under four basic types; International Organizations (IOs), International Regimes (IRs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Armed elements and Terrorist groups that are named as Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA).⁴¹ Before detailing violent NSAs, it will be useful to briefly explain types of peaceful Non-State Actors that work either under control of states (IOs), or as an extension of states (IRs), or beyond the control of states (NGOs).

Baylis J. and Smith S. (2001) argue that International Organizations (IOs) operate as an extension of states and they possess organs similar to a government and they impose power similar to a state. The IOs are founded by a treaty limiting its legal borders and they depend on member states for financial and personnel support. There is a strong link between the national interests of member and/or supporting states and the IOs. United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU) are forthcoming samples for IOs.⁴²

Griffiths M. and O'Callaghan T. (2002) contend that after 2nd World War, the international community took steps for a stable and peaceful world. For this aim, International Regime (IR) institutions were established under widely accepted

⁴¹ Stolberg A.G. (2006), "US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy 2nd Edition", in Bartholomees J.B. Eds. *The International System in the 21st Century*, pp.3-7 available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB708.pdf> access date 18 January 2015.

⁴² Baylis J. and Smith S. (2001), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.258 / p.145-146

international norms open for any state to join.⁴³ These institutions can be in the form of treaties, legal conventions or agreements, working on human rights, arms control, economics and similar fields. IMF, World Bank, WTO (World Trade Organization), ICC (International Criminal Court), START (Strategic Arms Reduction, Treaties) are samples of International Regime.⁴⁴

Of equal importance and contrary to IOs and IRs that operate within the influence of states, NGOs are voluntary private organizations that have no organic ties with states holding a certain level of influence in the international system of 21st Century. NGOs can be categorized under two headlines. One is non-profit, non-commercial and non-partisan organizations in environmental, human rights or social movement groups. Greenpeace, the Red Cross, Amnesty International are typical examples for this type of NGOs.⁴⁵ The other NGO type is Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that run for private commercial aims at international level. In order to understand the financial capacity of such organizations, it is worth to say that largest 500 MNCs control two third of global trade. They operate at almost every field of economy from heavy arms industry to communication, from energy production to banking. General Motors, Mobil, Sony, IBM, Coca-Cola are just some examples of this type with their enormous effect on world economy.⁴⁶

In addition to above mentioned authors, Fred Halliday (2001) approaches the NSAs in a re-conceptualizing way; detailing them under four headlines with a broader perception. He stresses the need to define NSAs not only as NGOs in a narrower sense but as “non-state” entities i.e. “business and banks, religious movements, social movements and criminal organizations.” In addition to this wider definition, he pays

⁴³ Evans G. and Newnham J. (1998), *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London: Penguin Books, pp.471-472

⁴⁴ Griffiths M. and O’Callaghan T. (2002), *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, London, Routledge, p.272

⁴⁵ Griffiths M. and O’Callaghan T. (2002), *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, London: Routledge, pp.215-216

⁴⁶ Griffiths M. and O’Callaghan T. (2002), *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, London, Routledge, pp.199-201

attention to the historical background stating that NSAs are not the products of global era, or the Cold War, but has a longer past extending to modern system origins. Under another headline, Halliday focuses on the impact of NSAs. According to him, the impact of NSAs upon the individual, society, states and the society of states is getting deeper day by day. In every corner of the world, either national or transnational non-state entities take initiative for larger roles. The final point he focuses is the normative aspect of NSAs. He states that NSAs play normative roles not only “good” as NGOs do, but also “bad” as terrorist groups or criminal groups do.⁴⁷

Above mentioned three non-state actors types (IO, IR, NGO) represent the white face of non-state entities within the international system. The black face is represented by VNSAs (Violent Non-state Actors) which constitute the core of this dissertation. If we look through the lenses of “terrorism” the VNSAs can be defined in a wider range. These groups are assumed to exist on different regions and geographies over the globe, but with similar targets. They are listed under several headlines such as; warlords, militias, paramilitary forces, insurgencies, terrorist organizations, criminal organizations and youth gangs who are fighting against state authority. Despite their divergent forms and tactics, these violent non-state groups share some characteristics challenging national and international security and stability. This challenge is expected to grow in coming decades. In Europe; Jihadist terrorist organizations (Madrid, London, Istanbul), in North America (Mexico); drug trafficking organizations, in South America (Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro); militias, in Central America and United States; youth gangs, in Albania, Italy and former Soviet Union; the criminal organizations, in many African countries and Central Asia; warlords, and in the Middle East; insurgents, terrorists, militias and criminal organizations are operating. As we see, the Westphalian state is under siege by the VNSAs over several different parts of the world.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Halliday, F. (2001), “The Romance of Non-State Actors”, in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, pp.24-26

⁴⁸ Williams, P. (2008), ‘Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security’ International Relations and Security Network, pp.3-4, see details at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf> access date: 7 October 2014

On the other hand, Chellaney (2001) argues the capabilities of terrorist groups and contends that the developments that fuel international terrorism are categorized under five headlines; (i) diffusion of advanced technology, (ii) existence of states that employ export of terrorism, (iii) existence of sub-state actors that employ ethnic or sectarian aspirations to justify their violent acts, (iv) existence of an ideology that terrorists see themselves as a part of asymmetric struggle for a better world, (v) the existence of authoritarianism particularly in Muslim states which is fueled by lack of expression and lack of knowledge and technology across the society.⁴⁹

Robert Pape (2003) focuses on one of the most effective and commonly used capability of VNSA acts; suicide attacks. This type of violence is significant for causing massive shocks and strong effects upon the public opinion of target state and for assuring some advantages and also gains to the VNSAs in front of the global society. The massive suicide bombings of Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005 have caused hundreds of lives and made huge impact over the local and international public opinions. As a result of the pressure from Spanish public opinion, Spain has withdrawn its military troops from Iraq, fighting as a part of the US-led war in Iraq. Pape argues that suicide attacks were rare before 1980s, but intensified in 1990s, and Palestine is one of the conflict zones where such violence has been used to enforce Israel to abandon Gaza and West bank.⁵⁰ What Pape argues is important for the VNSAs (HAMAS and GAM) that I study in this thesis, for these two VNSAs have used suicide attacks against military and civilian targets. Five principles of suicide attacks fit the ideology and political aims of HAMAS and GAM as VNSAs.

These principles are; (i) suicide bombings are not individual acts but strategic, (ii) they aim to coerce the opposition state to give concessions, (iii) terror groups used such acts systematically because they benefited, (iv) suicide attacks aim to create

⁴⁹ Chellaney B. (2001), "Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History." *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 94-95.

⁵⁰ Pape, R. A. (2003), "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, p.342

moderate harms on the society of opponent state in order to pressure the government for concessions, (v) suicide attacks can be reduced by decreasing the self-confidence of suicide bombers by intense homeland security.⁵¹ After four strong suicide attacks conducted by HAMAS between 1997-1999 Israel government have taken some steps that can be considered as concessions.⁵² Of equal importance, suicide attacks pose a substantial threat to American domestic and international security. Since 1980s, the US military and civilian targets have been attacked by either terror groups or individuals. Until 2014, 40 terror acts have been carried out across the world against the US, and another 57 within American domestic borders by individuals either affiliated with states or VNSAs.

Kydd and Walter (2002) study another capability of terrorist groups.⁵³ They look at how extremists try to undermine a peace process between negotiating sides. They argue that when the extremists feel that they are edged out in a peace process between the sides, or when they are not confident with the peace process, they easily commit attacks on opposite side. Amongst several examples, two incidents in Israeli-Palestine peace process are directly related to this thesis. One incident happened in 1996 during Oslo II peace process. HAMAS committed a series of suicide bomb attacks in Israel killing more than 50 Israeli citizens. The aim of these attacks was to undermine peace process, and in less than 3 months HAMAS as the extremist group has achieved its goal. The negotiations between the sides stalled and these attacks have also convinced the majority of Israeli citizens to walk away from the peace process.⁵⁴ A similar negative reaction to the peace process has been done by Israeli government by rejecting to obey Wye Accord signed under the leadership of President Bill Clinton in 1998. According to Wye accord, Israel would return 13 %

⁵¹ Pape, R. A. (2003), "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, pp.343-344

⁵² Pape, R. A. (2003), "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, p.347

⁵³ Kydd A. and Walter B.F. (2002) "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence." *International Organization*, Vol.56, No.2 pp.263-296.

⁵⁴ Kydd A. and Walter B.F. (2002) "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence." *International Organization*, Vol.56, No.2 p.263

of West Bank to Palestinians, but Israel feared that such a decision would provide a territorial base to Palestinians to support their struggle against Israel, and rejected Wye accord.⁵⁵

The types and capabilities of the NSA/VNSAs are abundant. Taking this reality into consideration, in this section of the literature review I focused on the ones that support the argument of the thesis. In this sense, when reviewing the literature of Violent NSAs I have paid attention that they inherit four critical specifications; (i)causing instability in a particular country, (ii)creating violence, (iii)seeking a political goal, (iv)engaging in guerilla warfare. The US administrations engage with the VNSAs that inherit such capabilities. On the other hand, when studying the literature review under three circles in following sections, I chose the VNSAs from different geographies, with different ideologies and with different religions and/or moral norms. In following paragraphs of the literature review, I have focused on five VNSAs (FARC, FMLN, KLA, IRA, HEZBOLLAH) that have similar specifications with the subject matter two VNSAs of this thesis (HAMAS and GAM). In domestic circle, I have shed light on the domestic structures (military power, political aims, societal strength) of those five VNSAs, and underlined their commonalities, the strong and weak aspects. In regional circle, I have summarized their interactions with their parent states; FARC-Colombia, FMLN-El Salvador, KLA-Serbia, IRA-United Kingdom, HEZBOLLAH-Lebanon/Israel. In international circle, I have investigated their relations with the US, through the perceptions of several authors. In this circle, it is possible to figure out that, the relations of the US with the parent states have dominated the transformation of those VNSAs into peaceful political entities. Except for Hezbollah, other four VNSAs have left violence, reached an enduring peace with the parent states and transformed into political parties.

2.3 The Legal Status of NSA/VNSAs

As discussed by Math Noortmann (2002), the legal aspect of (Violent) Non-State Actors' roles needs to be taken seriously into consideration. The roles and impact of

⁵⁵ Kydd A. and Walter B.F. (2002) "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence." *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 2 p. 264

these entities have grown beyond the imagination of international legal entities such as International Court of Justice (ICJ). Beside International Organizations (IO), the Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) and Multi-national Organizations (MNO), also the armed opposition groups and criminal organizations have involved in economic, political and legal processes. If the legal staff of states insists to approach the non-state actors through the glasses of classical state perceptions, they will falsely lead the decision makers to see these(violent/peaceful) non-state actors as only “special cases” or “anomalies” which are not the case.⁵⁶

The striking part of Noortmann’s discussion is about the determination of relevant legal norms. He argues that not only the international and multinational economic, political and social organizations but also the opinions of liberation seeking armed groups such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) should be included into this process. The states should not be deemed as much more important than the armed groups if the issue is about finding a solution to an armed conflict. In global world, the states should not be deemed as sole decision makers to hold the rights and obligations. Insisting on traditional inter-state approach may result in considering the “state” and “non-state actors” through two different and separate legal frameworks. But actually, both actors need to be taken into consideration under the same legal framework.⁵⁷

But, where does international law come from and how is it made? As Christopher Greenwood argues, there is no “Code of International Law”, there is no international parliament and there is no international legislation.⁵⁸ Although there is an International Court of Justice (ICJ), it lacks the capabilities of national courts and its jurisdiction is primarily dependent upon the consent of States. Thus, the international law is dependent upon the actions, demands, influences of the states that are present

⁵⁶ Noortmann, M. (2002), ‘Globalisation, Global Governance and Non-State Actors: Researching beyond the State’, *International Law FORUM* No.4, pp 36–40.

⁵⁷ Noortmann, M. (2002), ‘Globalisation, Global Governance and Non-State Actors: Researching beyond the State’, *International Law FORUM* No.4, p.38

⁵⁸ Greenwood, C. (2008), ‘Sources of International Law: An Introduction’, see details at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/greenwood_outline.pdf access date: 7 July 2014

in international community.⁵⁹ In international community, not only the NSAs but also the states have been subject to unfair legal implementations.

Although it does not have a direct link to the US-VNSA interaction, the Nicaraguan Case is an interesting international law case decided by ICJ in 1986 which has decided in favor of a relatively weak state, Nicaragua vs. the United States. This was an important step in court's interpretation and development of International Law primarily depending upon the relationship between treaties and customary law. The ICJ made a decision on 26 June 1986 on the favor of Nicaraguan government blaming the US Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. The Court had 16 final decisions for this case. In these decisions the US was charged for recruiting, training, arming, financing and supplying military and paramilitary actions/operations in and against Nicaragua and has violated its treaty obligations to Nicaragua primarily under Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States. The US was accused for breaching international law by armed attacks against Nicaragua, incursions into Nicaraguan territorial waters and airspace, coercing the Government of Nicaragua using force and threat against Nicaragua and other similar unlawful actions. Based on these violations, Nicaragua demanded the US to cease such actions and to compensate the damage to Nicaraguan people, economy and properties.⁶⁰

On the other hand, since the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, a new norm emerged in international law, granting the states to evaluate the attacks of violent non-state actors as if these attacks were conducted by states and thus allow the use of military power with no limitation against the VNSAs. As a consequence of US

⁵⁹ The Statute of ICJ Article 39 identifies five sources to be used for ICJ jurisdiction: (a) Treaties between States, (b) Customary international law derived from practice of States, (c) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations (d) General international principles, (e) Judicial decisions and the writings of the highly qualified publicist.

⁶⁰ Czaplinski W. (Jan 1989), 'Sources of International Law in the Nicaraguan Case', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* Vol.38, No.1, pp.151-166 see details at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-and-comparative-law-quarterly/article/sources-of-international-law-in-the-nicaragua-case/03E3F12DA68C6FE0EDD9800A70BF828B> access date 8 July 2014

reaction in Afghanistan to remove Taliban from power, the use of force by states against violent non-state actors have been justified in international legal order. Here, the approach of states against violent non-state actors is through the window of state-to-state relations perceiving them as actors capable of a state's power. The states do not hesitate to take action and conduct an "armed attack" against the non-state actors they label as terrorist. We observe a paradox in the US approach towards HAMAS and GAM. The US labels HAMAS as a terrorist entity but, the US approach towards GAM, on the other hand, is more positive and encouraging..⁶¹

This double standard is argued by Eric A. Heinze (2009) stating that a new norm has emerged and accepted by international legal circles which ascends the VNSAs to the position of enemy states when it comes to security concerns.⁶² This double standard, as discussed by Noortmann (2002) empowers the requirement to approach the NSAs not under two separate international legal framework but the same legal framework. In this respect the threshold identified by article 51 of US Charter which legitimates the use of force for self-defense in case of a military attack by another state has been downgraded into a format to include the VNSAs. Similarly, the armed attacks by Israel against Hezbollah and Lebanon in July 2006 have been evaluated throughout this standard and Israel's right to self-defense was recognized by the majority of UN Security Council Members, G8 and UN Secretary General.⁶³

The legal status of the VNSAs has implications over the appearance of the VNSAs at international level. The legal status of a VNSA does have strong effects upon domestic structure of a VNSA forcing it either to transform into a more peaceful or into a more fundamentalist/violence promoting appearance. As a further step, global public opinion devoted more respect to the position of GAM as a violent actor

⁶¹ Noortmann stresses the need for the cooperation among the international relations scholars and the legal people to fully understand the roles and impact of non-state actors. He criticizes that sources of International law, i.e. the Statute of ICJ Article 38 is still interpreted as a state practice and excludes the non-state actor reality.

⁶² Heinze, E. A.(2009), 'Non-State Actors in the International Legal Order:The Israeli Hezbollah Conflict and the Law of Self-Defense' *Global Governance No. 15*, p 87-105

⁶³ Heinze, E. A.(2009), 'Non-State Actors in the International Legal Order:The Israeli Hezbollah Conflict and the Law of Self-Defense' *Global Governance No. 15*, p 98

representing Acehese society since 1970s, for its determination and sacrifice it paid in order to transform into a peaceful democratic entity in Indonesian political sphere holding the peaceful hand of Indonesian government. Time has worked for GAM and gave its fruitful results by the year 2005 and it is working for HAMAS, because identical to GAM, HAMAS also embraces the advantages of globalization and aims to gather more sympathy in front of global public opinion. The policies in the Middle East pursued by the states in general and the US in particular for sole security aims are not the predominant perceptions anymore and they are losing ground each day.

2.4 Domestic Circle of the VNSAs

As the domestic circle of a VNSA there are several sectors such as its military units, its spiritual/leading individuals, its ideology forming the political power, the community where its man-power comes from, and the written documents such as the Charters/Covenants that announce the philosophy of its cause to the domestic, regional and international public opinion. In the 2000s, the “domestic structure” of the VNSAs has been investigated broadly by several authors so that the body of literature on VNSAs has blossomed. They focus generally upon, the ideology, the military capabilities, the societal capabilities, and the political effectiveness of the VNASs. It is a reality that the militia, the local population, the social support facilities, and even the leading staff of a VNSA act all together in the same domestic environment interacting with each other. In this literature review these features of the VNSAs are not divided with sharp lines, rather I study them in an embedded form.

The ideology of resistant movements has been studied by many authors. These independent seeking VNSAs get their ideological roots basically from two sources. First is nationalist ideologies, second is the socialist ideology of Cold War years. For example, the insurgent movements throughout Latin America and the Middle East have been influenced by Cold War’s proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The poor and second-class communities in Latin America and the Middle East have been influenced by socialist ideology of Soviet Union with secular insights. The military governments that ruled Latin America between 1960s and

1980s have been the opponent actors for those resistant movements. After demise of Soviet Union, the secular-socialist ideology in the Middle East has been replaced by Islamist radicalism. In post-Cold War term, many of resistant movements in Latin America, Europe, Southeastern Asia, Balkans and Africa have left violence and became part of their countries' political systems. The subject matter of this literature review; Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Irish Republican Army (IRA) Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (FMLN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are amongst these VNSAs. On the other hand, radical Islam motivated VNSAs such as HAMAS and Hezbollah continue their struggle.

As a continuity of their ideology and political aims, VNSAs declare their 'Charters' to the public during their establishment period. Some of these resistance movements use a softer and rational language but some others radical and violent wording. Amongst the Charters of VNSAs such as Palestine Liberation Organization, Hamas, Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Irish Republican Army (IRA) and other various violent groups, HAMAS and Hezbollah Charters have been criticized by political circles due to their violent and controversial language. In parallel with political developments, Palestine Liberation Organization has amended its Charter several times. Hezbollah has also drafted a new Charter in 2009 and replaced the original one declared in 1985. On the other hand, as studied in 3rd Chapter of this thesis, HAMAS Charter of 1988 is composed of terms openly referring to Koran versus that attracts fierce critics. As argued by Davis (2016), HAMAS Charter identifies two items as the enemies of Palestinian cause; Zionism and Secularism. Zionism is blamed for local, regional and global domination, whereas secularism is perceived as the main reason that has weakened Muslims and Palestine.⁶⁴

The role of radicalization and its reflections upon the political targets of violent groups is investigated in a report prepared by European Commission's Expert Group

⁶⁴ Davis, R. (2016) *Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East*, New York, Routledge p. 43

on Violent Radicalization.⁶⁵ The report pulls our attention to the “socialization of violence” and defines terrorism a kind of political violence. The report argues that religious radicalism stands with political Islam and the violence penetrates the society leading them towards terror acts. The report also deals with the ideology of violent groups and argues how the word “terrorism” evolved in time, recently understood as the overlapping of two actions; “a special shock tactic linked usually to irregular warfare; an extreme form of protest and agitation.” The report underlines the reality that non-state actors are responsible for terror acts, and they use radicalism either religious or ethnic separation as the origin of their ideology and political targets. In this respect, the Charters of VNSAs constitute one of the criteria to be selected as a terrorist organization at international political circles, as well as by the United States. In the terrorist organization list prepared by US Department of State 78% of the violent groups (45 out of 58) are radical Islamist groups, who declare war to other states and/or non-Muslim communities.

In terms of military capabilities, all the VNSAs inherit similar features no matter on which continent they exist and what type of political aims they seek. The VNSAs do not possess any army, navy, air force units similar to the regular state armies. They use light infantry arms, domestically trained militants, explosives, guns, hand grenades and similar infantry tactics and devices. They do not own navy or air force units, materials, guns etc. Their armed personnel live within the society, and they generally do not have any regular barracks, regular troop formations in order not to become an easy target for the military of opponent state. They may easily disperse within the community in case of a threat, or come together under a hasty command for a certain time and carry out an attack or terrorist act against the adversary forces or buildings. Their militant numbers may change from couple hundreds to couple thousands. In this respect, there are many reports prepared by the US Government echelons detailing the military capabilities and manpower of the VNSAs. US

⁶⁵ The report was prepared under the guidance of Prof. Fernando Reinares as the Chairman and submitted to the European Commission on 15 May 2008, available at http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert%20Group%20Report%20Violent%20Radicalisation%20FINAL.pdf access date 26 March 2017.

Department of State Official Web site gives updated information about the terrorist organizations and their capabilities.⁶⁶

Some figures may be helpful to understand the manpower capacity of the VNSAs. For example, Hezbollah's manpower is around 20.000.⁶⁷ Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) held around 18.000 armed personnel under command during Kosovo crises before it transformed into a political entity.⁶⁸ HAMAS militants, as elaborated in fourth Chapter of this thesis, are around 15.000. GAM possessed maximum around 5.000 armed militia when the tension reached the peak in Aceh.⁶⁹ Irish Republican Army (IRA) strength differed between 1000 and 14.500 armed militia before the declaration in 2005 that the struggle will continue on political agenda. The US has removed IRA from the terrorist organization list, but in 2009 under the name of Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), it is once again in the list. Current militia strength of CIRA is fewer than 50 personnel, due to police counterterrorism operations.⁷⁰ Farabundo Martí Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, (FMLN) men/women power differs around 13.000 to 18.000 according to the rise and decline of the political tension.⁷¹ Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/FARC) had around 16.000 armed militia which were reduced to 7.000 in year 2015.

⁶⁶ See details of current terrorist organizations list at Chapter 6 of US Department of State Official Web site, available at <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm> access date 25 March 2017.

⁶⁷ Although the US Department of State FTO (Foreign Terrorist Organization) assessment states the manpower of Hezbollah as "tens of thousands worldwide", the active Hezbollah fighters reach the number of 20.000 in case of a military resistance.

⁶⁸ Bekaj, A.R. (2010), *The KLA and Kosovo War: From intra-state Conflict to Independent Country*, Veronique Dudouet and Hans J.Giesmann, Berlin, Berghoff Transition Series, p.27 available at http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3023/pdf/transitions8_kosovo.pdf access date 24 March 2017

⁶⁹ Sherlock S.(2003), *Conflict in Aceh: A military solution? Analysis for Australian Parliament*, see details at <http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/cib/2002-03/03cib32.pdf> access date 4 April 2017

⁷⁰ See details of current terrorist organizations list at Chapter 6 of US Department of State Official Web site, available at <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm> access date 25 March 2017.

⁷¹ Although an intelligence assessment of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2002 anticipates the manpower of FMLN between 6.000-7000, during the rise of armed conflict, the recruited militant number of FMLN has easily reached over 15.000 thousand. For details see https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000808521.pdf access date 4 April 2017

There is a need to mention about the state-community interaction of the conflict zones of the VNSAs. The communities which are living together with above mentioned VNSAs are generally governed by non-democratic regimes. This is visible for all VNSAs, which are the subject matter of this literature review. Although the conditions may show some changes, the societies of Colombia, El Salvador, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, and Lebanon share similar hardships in their relations with the states. Hinnebush (1994), Cox (1999), Gecas (2000) argue that the approach of authoritarian regimes towards the society is with the hands of military and bureaucracy. For instance the approach of Al-Fatah to Palestinians was similar to that of Soviet Russia with a top-down hegemonic order over the society. This resulted in the deprivation of the society by negative economic conditions and corruption. On the other hand, HAMAS's approach to the civil society is relatively similar to the West where there is a proper interaction between the citizen and the ruling power or the state.

Latin America has been home to several VNSAs since decades, generally emerging in the 1960 and so forth. The position of the individual in front of the state is the fundamental drive for rise of violent movements in Latin America and this also shapes the VNSA-Opponent/Parent state relations. About the nature of the state-individual relations and the background of violence in Latin America, there are several studies. As argued by John D. Martz (1997) the state is the prime regulator and coordinator of wealth, power and programs in the public life of Latin American countries. The realization of civil needs for each individual is carried out by the state and this enables the state apparatus to control the social and political life across the country. Martz argues that the factor which underlines the basic character in Latin America is "clientelism". Due to this clientelistic social and political environment, low-status and poverty stricken individuals are protected by a powerful patron. This patron is linked to a higher patron at national level and bears the responsibility to

defend the rights of low-class individuals. This social reality based on patronage and clientelism creates the fundamental cause behind the violent movements.⁷²

The patron-client relationship has been investigated by several Latin America experts, in order to identify the roots leading to separatist and violent movements. As Johnson argues (1968) there is a symbiotic link between the state and the individual. The state has a set of values and goals for the individual to obey.⁷³ Similarly, as S. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger contend (1980), the patron-client relationship is a common reality throughout the Mediterranean, Latin American and Southeast Asian communities. This was a social heritage that came to South America with Iberian colonial culture.⁷⁴ As it would be seen across this thesis the impact of global colonial culture is clear in Middle East and Southeast Asia where HAMAS and GAM were born. British colonial rule in Palestine and Dutch colonial rule in Aceh/Indonesia have made deep effects upon the VNSA and Parent state relations.

In Gaza strip, HAMAS social forces have constructed a “bottom-up” process, aiming to distribute the economic and social welfare equally amongst the Gazan citizens. In this process, similar to the civil societies in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in South America with their “bottom-up” reactions HAMAS has proved a reaction to the political forerunners of Al Fatah.⁷⁵ As argued by Gecas (2000) the societal power of HAMAS is its strongest arm. In terms of identity and ideology, similar to other social movements in the Middle East, HAMAS proves the characteristics of becoming a strong social movement that proves a system of beliefs and values. This ideology HAMAS possesses, casts the identity of the individuals it addresses, “telling them who they are, where they stand in this social hierarchy and what kind

⁷² Martz, J.D. (1997) *The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia*, London, Transaction Publishers, p.11

⁷³ Johnson, K.C (1968), “Latin American Political Thought: Some Literary Foundations”, in Ben Burnett and Kenneth Johnson, eds, *Political Forces in Latin America: Dimensions of the Quest for Stability*, Belmont:MA Wadsworth Publishing Company p. 6

⁷⁴ Eisenstadt S. and Roniger L. (1980), “Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, No 1

⁷⁵ Cox, R. (1999), ‘Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order’, *Review of International Studies*, No.25, p.13

of power and dignity they acquire in this system”. In this ideology the values originating from the Muslim religion occupy a significant place.⁷⁶ The most effective tool used by HAMAS is its effective and well organized and highly motivated social network amongst the Palestinians.

On the other hand, Austin T. Turk (2004) draws our attention to the sociological dimension of terrorist organizations which emerges as a substantial domestic capability. He contends that until September 11, the sociological face of terrorism has been ignored and researchers have studied mostly the negative outcomes of terror acts such as riots, revolutions, race and labor struggles, and criminal acts under the label of terrorism. Turk argues that the sociological dimension of VNSAs is ignored and pushes the state and violent non-state entities into two camps, in a way blaming each other with similar descriptions. For instance, what state calls “terrorist” is named as a “martyr or freedom fighter” by the society they are born in. As a striking example for becoming a freedom fighter, the activities of Hezbollah’s Social Unit can be mentioned. Through its construction company Jihad al-Binaa (Struggle for Rebuilding) it supplies water and maintenance to power networks for the suburbs of Beirut. Such kind of social services serve as the base of Hezbollah’s popularity amongst Lebanon society. The United States, as the hegemon power in world politics, tries to make a careful selection when listing terrorist organizations, their sponsors and supporters. But the pronouncement of US State Department does not always reflect objective evaluations; just own political and military considerations.⁷⁷

Augustus Richard Norton’s work *Amal and the Shi’a* (1987) offered some introductory information about Hezbollah. Norton analysis the radicalization of Shiite community by two factors; poverty and official neglect. He deeply questions the socio-economic origins of political movement backing Hezbollah as well as the

⁷⁶ Gecas, V.(2000), “Value Identities, Self-motives and Social Movements”,in S. Stryker, T.J.Owens, R.W.White, eds. *Self, Identity and Social Movements*, University of Minnesota Press, p. 93-95.

⁷⁷ Turk A.T. (2004) “Sociology of Terrorism.”*Annual Review of Sociology*. Vol. 30, p.272 available at <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110510> access date 23 May 2015

Israel's brutal treatment towards the Shiites in south Lebanon.⁷⁸ But, the organization, ideology and structure of Hezbollah were broadly investigated by Hala Jaber with *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* in 1997.⁷⁹ The organizational structure of Hezbollah is studied by also Nizar Hamzeh with *In the Path of Hezbollah* (2004). Hamzeh argues how the military operations of Hezbollah intersect with political and social aims.⁸⁰ On the other hand, Eitan Azani (2009) argues how Hezbollah developed its organizational structure in a way to become a stronger entity than a simple terrorist group.⁸¹

As a common specification of Islamist VNSAs, E. Perry (1994) argues that their political aims are similar to the methods used by Marxist/Leninist principles of Communist Party.⁸² This is named also as the "Islamized version" of Leninist ideology. Although Leninist ideology bases its argument on the fight between the exploiting class and the exploited classes within a community, Islamist VNSAs focus on the struggle between the arrogant elites and the downtrodden majority in that society. N. Sambanis (2004) argues another misconception that assumes the VNSAs are supported by poor and the poorly-educated law class people.⁸³ A survey in year 2002 indicates that, amongst pro-Hezbollah Shiite population, the degree of the lower class is around ten percent, whereas ninety percent belongs to medium and high socio-economic class. This proves that the structure of traditional Shiites of 1970s and 1980s have changed dramatically in the 2000s. If this is the reality, then, why Hezbollah continues to receive the support of the economically strong individuals who are not in need of its social support? The answer to this question is

⁷⁸ Norton, A.R. (1987) *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*, Austin, University of Texas Press, pp. 84-94

⁷⁹ Jaber, H. (1997) *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, New York, Columbia University Press.

⁸⁰ Hamzeh, A.N. (2004) *In the Path of Hezbollah*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press.

⁸¹ Azani, E. (2009) *Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

⁸² Perry, E. J. (1994) 'Labour Divided: sources of state formation in modern China', in Joael S. Midgal, Atul Kohli & Vivien Shue (eds), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and transformation in the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 143-173.

⁸³ Sambanis, N. (2004) 'Poverty and the Organization of Political Violence', *Brookings Trade Forum*, pp. 165-211.

that the state building capability of Hezbollah forms the idea of a good life in minds and hearts of the people through its infrastructure works, employment, funds, education and other services as a whole.

2.5 Regional Circle of the VNSAs

In this section of the literature review, the interactions of a VNSA with the “parent state” will be studied under the name of “regional circle”. The parent state is the prime adversary the VNSA must overcome to reach its political target. So that, the VNSA devotes much of its effort to the relations with its parent state. The relationship of a VNSA with its parent state is generally a kind of violent dialogue, which is a sort of relationship with many ups and downs extending from military operations and/or terrorist actions to peace talks. Saying that, the relations between the parent state and the VNSA are multi-dimensional, extending from terrorist acts against the civilians to targeted killings, from economic embargos to fierce military campaigns, from peace talks to coercive actions. In following lines, the relations of subject matter VNSAs (FARC, FMLN, KLA, IRA, Hezbollah) with their opponent states will be explained.

2.5.1 FARCvs Colombia

The relations between The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian State have been a violent interaction of terror acts and insurgency operations causing high degrees of human lives and economic loss. FARC is founded in 1964 as a wing of Colombian Communist Party and since 1997 keeps its position in the Foreign Terrorist Organization list of the US. It is the oldest, largest and most violent non-state actor of Latin America. At the beginning of the 2000s, its militant capability was over 16.000 armed men, but it is reduced to 7000 recently, due to effective military operations of Colombia.⁸⁴ In last 15 years, over 25.000 security forces, paramilitaries, criminal bands and guerrillas have lost their lives in Colombia.

⁸⁴ Details of latest information and status of FARC can be seen at the web site of the US Department of the state available at <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm>

In the 2000s, the annual human loss from both sides was around 3000 per year, and this number has decreased to only 216 in 2015 as a consequence of peace initiatives.⁸⁵

Since its foundation date, FARC and Colombia State came together three times for peace talks but no reconciliation was reached. In 2012, FARC and Colombian government once again began peace talks that continued throughout 2015. Both sides reached a partial agreement on some issues such as land reform, political participation, handover of FARC weapons to UN official and drug trafficking. Despite some challenges such as the refusal of the agreement by a public referendum in 2016 with a rate of 50.2 against, the final agreement has been concluded with the ratification of the Congress on November 2016.⁸⁶

There were lessons-learned from this half-a-century conflict which caused severe lives and material loss to the Colombian community. Both sides were convinced that it was impossible to attain a military victory. At the fourth attempt for a permanent peace both sides proved a good will not to lose this chance. The main drive behind the peace agreement between FARC and Colombian government was the “political good will” preserved during almost 5 years of peace talks despite ups and downs in the process. Both sides proved sincere loyalty to bilateral talks in order to end “a 52-year conflict that has killed more than 220,000 people and driven almost 8 million from their homes”.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ According to the figures of Ministry of Defence of Colombia these numbers do not include civilian, see details at <https://i2.wp.com/www.wola.org/files/images/170124co001.png>

⁸⁶ See Adam Isacson’s article “Confronting Colombia’s Coca Boom Requires Patience and a Commitment to the Peace Accords” for WOLA, available at <http://colombiapeace.org/> Access date 28 March 2017.

⁸⁷ After the signing ceremony of the agreement, Colombia’s President, Juan Manuel Santos addressed to the public saying; “This peace agreement will allow us to work together as a nation to recover the most affected regions due to the conflict, to reconcile ourselves, to make use of new opportunities for growth and progress” See details at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/01/colombias-government-formally-ratifies-revised-farc-peace-deal> access date 27 March 2017.

2.5.2 FMLNvs El Salvador

The fundamental reason behind the violent non-state actor movements in El Salvador was similar to that of Colombia; political and economic exclusion. Therefore, the massive repression of government forces against the leftist activists resulted in huge increase in number of guerilla groups in late 1970s. Under the ideological guidance of Marxism, five leftist organizations in El Salvador came together to form a front against the government. Thus, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed in 1980 in order to assure the defeat of El Salvador government and establish a socialist project.⁸⁸ As argued by Yvon Grenier (1991), FMLN succeeded to unite the military and the political-military groups under its leadership and proclaimed itself as the "vanguard" of the Salvadoran people. In fact, similar to other Latin American revolutionary movements of 1960s and 1970s, FMLN leaders and supporters have been influenced by the ideology of Fidel Castro.⁸⁹

The interactions between the FMLN and the El Salvador state were composed of terror acts and insurgency operations. Throughout the conflict years, parties searched for a feasible peace. First failed peace initiative between FMLN and El Salvador government dates back to October 1984, to the term of President Napoleon Duarte. After this unsuccessful peace attempt, FMLN increased terror acts towards the end of 1980s against some military and civilian targets such as US Embassy Marine Security Guards, several democratically-elected mayors and many high profile political victims to name; Attorney General, Minister of the Presidency, Supreme Court President etc. Following these terror acts, in November 1989 the FMLN

⁸⁸ As argued by A.M.Alvarez (2010) in "From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution" under the umbrella of Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) five revolutionary organizations came together in 1980.; Popular Liberation Forces Farabundo Marti (FPL), People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), National Resistance (RN), Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC), Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS). For details see http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3024/pdf/transitions9_elsalvador.pdf Access date 27 March 2017

⁸⁹ Grenier Y. (1991) "Understanding the FMLN: A Glossary of Five Words", The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol 11, No.2 pp.

launched a massive attack to San Salvador, the capital city of El Salvador, that costed more than 2000 civilian lives.⁹⁰

Following this massive armed conflict between FMNL and El Salvador security forces, parties reached a peace agreement on December 1991. According to the terms on cessation of the armed conflict FMNL and El Salvador agreed upon four issues that were envisaged to constitute a base for the future: i) the cease-fire, ii) the separation of forces, iii) the end of the military structure of FMLN and its integration into the civil, political and institutional life of the country, iv) the UN verification of all activities.⁹¹ Thus, the FMLN agreed to lay down its arms and transform into a political party within the political spectrum. El Salvador government has made required steps to legalize the FMLN as a political party so it would participate in politics without restrictions as detailed by the Peace Accord. Throughout its democratic struggle, FMLN proved great success as the leading political party in El Salvador politics. In 2009 municipal and legislative elections the FMLN won the plurality of the National Assembly seats. The same year, former FMLN rebel leader Salvador Sanchez Ceren was elected as the Vice-president of El Salvador. In 2014 presidential elections Ceren succeeded to be elected as the President of El Salvador.⁹²

The main drive behind the peace agreement between FMLN and El Salvador government was five peace talk offers by FMLN to the government in order to pave the way to become a political party in El Salvador political spectrum. Although FMLN did not quit using violence as a tool to force El Salvador government to accept its peace conditions, the “political good will” amongst the leaders of FMLN stayed vivid during 12-years violence. FMLN offered 4 more peace initiatives to the

⁹⁰ See details at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/fmln.htm> access date 27 March 2017

⁹¹ Based on the letter dated 27 January 1992, from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the UN Secretary General, about the the "Peace Agreement" signed at Mexico City on 16 January 1992 between the Government of El Salvador and FMLN, see Chapter VII page 40, available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SV_920116_ChapultepecAgreement.pdf Access date 28 March 2017

⁹² Former FMLN rebel leader Salvador Sanchez Ceren was elected as the President of El Salvador in 2009, promising to fight corruption and violence, and to serve as president of all Salvadorans, see details at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19401934> access date 28 March 2017.

government echelons during the conflict despite ups and downs in the peace process. Both FMLN and El Salvador administration showed loyalty to peace talks in order to end a 12-year conflict that costed more than 80,000 lives and massive material and economic loss.

2.5.3 KLA vs Serbia

In terms of its ideology and political aims, KLA differentiates from other five VNSAs that are the subject matter of this literature review. Although it inherited some socialist and/or Islamist motives, KLA was a movement inspired neither by socialist nor Islamist ideas but by strong nationalist ideas seeking independence of Kosovo from Serbia. The conflict dates back to 1912-13 when Kosovo was annexed forcibly and illegally by Serbia. Since then, until the Second World War, armed resistance by Kosovar Albanians was carried out against Serbia. Later, in post-Second World War order until the collapse of Yugoslavia; the conflict has frozen under Tito's administration and socialist ideology within the brotherhood project as a part of Yugoslavia. Kosovo conflict inherits some similarities with other liberation movements, but what makes this armed struggle unique is its full independence from Serbia, with the support of the international community.⁹³ When the conflict broke out in mid-1990s, international community widely involved with the situation; (i) NATO with the military operation of KFOR (Kosovo Force), and (ii) UN with protectorate mission of UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo).⁹⁴

Similar to other VNSAs investigated in this part of the thesis, it is possible to see the effects of Soviet ideology and colonization program of Serbia upon Kosovo conflict. First, Tito has used "socialist ideology" to form a unified society within Yugoslavia. Kosovo community has been also integrated into the system. Although some clashes

⁹³ Bekaj, A.R. (2010), *The KLA and Kosovo War: From intra-state Conflict to Independent Country*, Veronique Dudouet and Hans J. Giesmann, Berlin, Berghoff Transition Series, p.7 available at http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3023/pdf/transitions8_kosovo.pdf access date 31 March 2017

⁹⁴ An international protectorate mission aims to restore the functions of a government in a civil society broken by internal conflict and violence. In Kosovo the UN established an interim administration mission temporarily which has established many services from creation of police force to radio broadcasting and reopening post offices.

took place during Cold War years between ethnic Albanians and Serbian security forces, these violent movements were limited with student demonstrations asking for human rights and freedom. The new Yugoslavia Constitution of 1974 granted a greater autonomy to Kosovo which gave Kosovo an equal status with other entities within the federation. However new constitution did not remove the dissatisfaction of Kosovar Albanians. Second was the colonization program of Serbia, aiming to settle thousands of Serbian families into Kosovo which was effectively implemented between 1920s and 1930s. With the outburst of Second World War, this project was left uncomplete, which would deeply change the demographic structure of Kosovo.⁹⁵

When the intense liberation struggle of Kosovar Albanians reached 1980s, amongst the liberation seeking groups in Kosovo the most dynamic and active was People's Movement of Kosovo (Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës - LPK) established in 1982. LPK served as the core of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that was established in 1993 on the way towards independence.⁹⁶ KLA was the backbone of Kosovo independence movement between 1993 and 1999. During the violence between 1993-1999, KLA was accused as a terrorist organization by Serbia and the US. Moreover, when the US listed KLA into the Foreign Terrorist Organization List in 1988, the basic income source of KLA was identified as drug smuggling to Europe.⁹⁷ Similar to other freedom movements, the relations between the KLA and Serbia was shaped by the degree of the violence against the civilians within the conflict area (Kosovo) and the approach of the US to KLA and its income sources.

2.5.4 IRA vs United Kingdom

Similar to the ideology of KLA, Irish Republican Army (IRA) is also inspired by strong nationalist ideas. Although IRA's political wing Sinn Féin advocates

⁹⁵ See research paper by Mentor Agani for Konrad Adeneuer Stiftung, no 4/15, May 2015, "The Integration of Kosovo's Political Party Organizations: En Explanation of the Delay" pp. 4-5 available at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_42088-1522-1-30.pdf?150729091656 access date 2 April 2017

⁹⁶ Vickers, M. (2001). "Tirana's Uneasy Role in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999", Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov and Bülent Gökay, eds., Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion, pp. 30–36. London, Frank Cass.

⁹⁷ Klebnikov, P. "Heroin Heroes". Mother Jones (Jan–Feb 2000) pp. 64–67. See details at <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/01/heroin-heroes>

democratic socialism, Irish nationalism has been the fundamental inspiration for IRA movement. Scholars agree that both IRA and Sinn Féin embrace an ideology composed of nationalism and republicanism for the union of Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland.⁹⁸

Similar to other nationalist movements, we see that the troubles between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland extend to the 12th Century when England laid its initial roots in Ireland. Northern Ireland was founded under the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 that finalized the Irish War of Independence. But the conflict between IRA and England refers to a 30-years political violence and low intensity war of 1960s and 1990s. The conflict originates from the constitutional status of Northern Ireland that inherits two different societies. At one side, the Protestant Unionists who want to stay as a part of the UK, and at the other side, the Catholic Nationalists who want to join Republic of Ireland.⁹⁹ For half a century, until 1972 Northern Ireland became a part of United Kingdom as a self-governing region. Throughout these years, there was a fierce struggle not between the IRA fighters and armed police forces, but also between the Catholics and protestants of Northern Ireland over the education, housing, financial issues and civil rights. The republican unionists always complained about discrimination at schools over Irish language, Irish history, and Irish nationality. Throughout the conflict years of 1970s and 1980s the violence costed around 3,500 lives and 50,000 injuries. Although the numbers are not too high, when compared to the 1.5 million population of Northern Ireland, the percentage is too high.¹⁰⁰

The violence in Northern Ireland calmed down with a ceasefire in 1994 between IRA and government units, which paved the way to multi-party talks about the future of

⁹⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica, Sinn Féin; Political Party, Ireland and United Kingdom, by Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, Paul Arthur, last update 7 March 2017 see <https://global.britannica.com/topic/Sinn-Fein> access date 1 April 2017

⁹⁹ The Northern Ireland Conflict ; Peace by Piece by Chris Sibilla available at <http://adst.org/2015/03/the-northern-ireland-conflict-peace-by-piece/> access date 1 April 2017

¹⁰⁰ The Northern Ireland Conflict 1968-1998 – An Overview by John Dorney, see <http://www.theirishstory.com/2015/02/09/the-northern-ireland-conflict-1968-1998-an-overview/#.WOfuxiCLSM8> access date 1 April 2017

Northern Ireland. The conflict formally ended with an Agreement in 1998, named as Good Friday. As stated in the “Declaration of Support” section of the Agreement, the participants in the multi-party negotiations (United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and Republic of Ireland) declare their belief that this Agreement is a historical opportunity for a new beginning. The parties also declare their regrets for the tragedies of the past and their hopes for the future in order to promote reconciliation, tolerance, mutual trust, and the protection of human rights for all.¹⁰¹ About the status of Northern Ireland, the parties declared their commitment to “recognize the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or sovereign united Ireland.”¹⁰² As a condition of the agreement, while the large quantity of weapons, explosives and ammunition of IRA were destroyed under the supervision of international observers, the British Army dismantled its bases in Northern Ireland.

In the US there are around 40 million Irish-Americans and not the majority of them display sympathy to IRA. This lack of sympathy also affected the level of financial and political support of Irish diaspora to IRA.¹⁰³ During the conflict, the Republican leaders in Northern Ireland acknowledged that they expected the US administration to pressure the British government for a settlement. But during the conflict, the US approached the conflict as a matter between the UK and Northern Ireland.

¹⁰¹ The Agreement signed on 10 april 1998 between The UK, Northern Ireland, and Republic of Ireland ended the conflict between IRA and United Kingdom and opened a new era, for details see http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IE%20GB_980410_Northern%20Ireland%20Agreement.pdf access date 2 April 2017

¹⁰² See Article 1 (page 30) of the Agreement signed on 10 april 1998 between The UK, Northern Ireland, and Republic of Ireland, for details see; http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IE%20GB_980410_Northern%20Ireland%20Agreement.pdf access date 2 April 2017

¹⁰³ The IRA and Sinn Fein, America and the Conflict by Kevin Kullen, available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/reports/america.html> access date 2 April 2017

2.5.5 Hezbollah vs Lebanon and Israel

The position of Hezbollah (The Party of God) as a VNSA inherits some specific conditions when compared to others investigated in this literature review. It struggles against two opponent states; Lebanon and Israel.¹⁰⁴ Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist group formed up in Lebanon in 1985, aiming to defend the well-being of Shiites in Lebanon. The Shiite community, since 1920s has been marginalized by Sunnis and Maronites in Lebanon economically, politically and socially. Hezbollah has proved a capability to direct this injustice and deprivation into a movement to resist Israel, and thus form a feeling of Shiite pride and an ideological existence. During the long lasting invasion of Lebanon by Israel which ended in 2000, Hezbollah proved a considerable resistance against Israel Defense Forces (IDF), with casualties to the strong regular military forces of Israel. This strong resistance resulted for Hezbollah to be seen as a heroic organization in the eyes of its supporters, especially after the withdrawal of IDF from southern Lebanon in 2000.¹⁰⁵

Hezbollah's domestic power is not based on sole resistance acts against Lebanon and Israel but, also on internal non-violent methods. Hezbollah widely uses protests, mass rallies and other means as an indicator of its persuasive power upon the Shiite society. This is a fine strategy for Hezbollah while it displays its hard power externally against the opponent states; it uses its soft power through non-violent methods upon its domestic organs and society. But, Hezbollah does not refrain from using force in case of the conflicts originating from the groups within Lebanon, who undermine its authority.¹⁰⁶

Hezbollah struggles with opponent states in a double-headed ways. First, Hezbollah follows a political struggle against Lebanon, second it carries out an armed resistance

¹⁰⁴ Early, B.R. (2006) "'Larger than a Party, yet Smaller than a State': Locating Hezbollah's Place within Lebanon's State and Society', *World Affairs*, Vol. 168, No. 3, pp. 115-128. available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/20672740?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents access date 1 April 2017

¹⁰⁵ Berkovich, D. (2006) 'Hizbollah's Primary Agent of Change: The Role of the Lebanese Army', *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 9, No. 3, November. Pp.34-39 available at <http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/ADKAN%20-%209.3700269886.pdf> access date 1 April 2017

¹⁰⁶ Alagha, J. (2007) *The Shifts in Hezbollah's Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. p.56

against Israel. Hezbollah, in order to realize its political effectiveness against Lebanon, despite fierce opposition of Islamic ideology that it was “haram” to deal with secular politics, decided to join Lebanese parliament in 1992.¹⁰⁷ Secretary-General Nasrallah and some other leaders embraced the idea that a gradual reformation was useful within the party and launched a political program for the elections. As argued by Alagha (2007), it was based on three pillars; “(1) the liberation of the “Zionist” occupation; (2) the abolition of political sectarianism; [and] (3) amending the electoral law so that it will be more representative of the populace”¹⁰⁸ Shiite community supported this decision, and by joining the Lebanon parliament Hezbollah had an opportunity to empower the position of the Shiite community in the state as well as a bigger share of government resources for Shiite-dominated regions. As argued by Saideman et al, (2002) “access to the decision making process also allows the group to block any unfavorable policies that might damage its autonomy”.¹⁰⁹ It is understandable that political arena provides Hezbollah to develop its state building capability and keep an eye on its Lebanese rivals.

Although its military power cannot be compared to those of IDF and LAF which are the main adversaries, Hezbollah poses a significant threat with its anti-tank weapons and short/middle range rockets it is using efficiently. The group does not possess any sort of aircraft, tanks, or armored vehicles, but with the financial, material and political support of Iran it stands as a stronghold in southern Lebanon. While strong regular army of Israel serves as a useful opponent for the legitimacy of Hezbollah resistance, the Lebanese army with its limited fighting experience, weak professionalism and outdated military equipment constitutes the rationale for Hezbollah not to leave southern Lebanon. After the 2006 war, the dissolution and disarmament of Hezbollah militia has been argued at regional level, but LAF lacked the ability to force Hezbollah to leave arms. On the other hand, LAF refused to engage a conflict with Hezbollah forces due to the high percentage of Shiite soldiers in Lebanese national army. This would be a futile attempt placing the

¹⁰⁷ Hamzeh, N.A. (2004) *In the Path of Hezbollah*, New York: Syracuse University Press. P.109

¹⁰⁸ Alagha, J. (2007) *The Shifts in Hezbollah’s Ideology: Religious Ideology, Political Ideology, and Political Program*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. p.43

¹⁰⁹ Saideman, et al (2002) ‘Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis’, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1, February, pp. 106-107. Available at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/Saideman_Eth_Conflict.pdf access date 2 April 2017

national security of Lebanon between Shiite forces at two wings; Hezbollah and Lebanese Army cadres.¹¹⁰ Moreover, when Hezbollah received considerable pressure to disarm, it withdrew two Shiite members from the Lebanon Cabinet and caused the government to collapse.

Hezbollah, on the other hand, tries to prove its authority, in terms of judicial capability to local, regional and international environments. As argued by Raschka (1994), a 16 years old boy, was tried and sentenced to death for killing a woman and her two kids. In this case, Hezbollah run its judicial power according to Islamic law, tried and executed the boy, despite Lebanese authorities' continuous objections.¹¹¹ Such an example is visible also with the implementations of FARC military authorities. FARC has been able to decrease the criminal activities within the southeastern regions of Colombia after it controlled the region, with a sharp drop in murders, rape, robbery etc.¹¹²

2.6 International Circle of the VNSAs

The relationship of the VNSA with the US is vital due to its effects on the Parent State politics and the appearance of the VNSA in front of international community. Moreover, the VNSA aims to activate its diaspora in the US and/or abroad to raise its voice and defend its political aims in front of global public opinion. The relations/interactions of a VNSA with the US forms up the "international circle" of this literature review and this circle will be studied under three headlines; (i)VNSAs and Realist Thought, (ii) VNSA Terror in American Homeland, (iii)The US Approach to five VNSAs (FARC, FMLN, KLA, IRA, Hezbollah)

¹¹⁰ Barak, O. (2003) 'Lebanon: Failure, Collapse, and Resuscitation', in Robert I. Rotberg (ed), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 305-340.

¹¹¹ Raschka, M. (1994) 'In Lebanon Even the Opposition Checks First with Syria', *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* April/May, p. 47 available at www.wrmea.org/1994-april-may/letter-from-lebanon-in-lebanon-even-the-opposition-checks-first-with-syria.html access date 15 March 2017

¹¹² Rohter, L. (1999) 'Columbian Rebels Reign in Ceded Area', *New York Times*, May 16, p. 14 available at <https://mobile.nytimes.com/1999/05/16/world/colombia-rebels-reign-in-ceded-area.html> access date 15 March 2017

2.6.1 VNSAs and Realist Thought

Based on the truth that realism is one of the body of thoughts shaping the US foreign policy in the 2000s, there is a need to summarize how realists approach to the VNSAs. Either peaceful or violent, any other non-state actors that fall outside the context of strong International Organizations (IOs) such as UN, NATO, EU and similar were hardly taken into consideration by realists. Because the realists posit that strong International Organizations are evaluated as the extension of state power at different stages.¹¹³ Morgenthau gives little room to both universal ethic values and non-state actor activities, but Waltz (1979), as he defends the dominant position of the states in international system, he also recognizes the role and importance of the non-state actors.¹¹⁴ Accordingly, Kan (2010) argues that realist paradigm should include non-state actors and activities into their agenda, and not limit themselves with only security issues but develop their capacities on economic and societal services.¹¹⁵ In new millennia, there is a consensus that the non-state actors are accepted as an integral part of legitimacy, authority and interaction in contemporary world system. On the other hand, in 1990s, with the end of bipolar system, the global civil society emerges capable to shaping the international system and the actors in it. With this emergence, the Global Civil Society forces started to remove national borders and economic barriers within the international system, opening space for non-state actors and their transnational activities. This was a new space with transnational economic, political, societal and legal specifications where non-state actors would freely operate.¹¹⁶

So, as the realist school determines the position of the VNSAs according to the changing conditions in international relations, it is interesting to discover that also the VNSAs follow realist behaviors to defend themselves when struggling with

¹¹³ Archer, C. (1992) *International Organizations*, London, Routledge, p.85

¹¹⁴ Waltz, K.N(1979), *Theory of International Politics*, California, Addison-Wesley Company, pp.93-94

¹¹⁵ Kan, H (2010), *Actors in World Politics, Government and Politics*, Vol.II p.253

¹¹⁶ Buzan, B. (2004), *From International to World Society*, New York, Cambridge University Press, p.80

their parent-states and/or the United States. Similar to states, the VNSAs also try to defend their power, security and ideology when they operate. In this respect, Walt (1987) identifies two peculiarities of Post-Cold War security environment. First, he argues that the security environment in the Middle East has resulted in a new form of alliance dissimilar to the ‘balance of power’ theory¹¹⁷; but the ‘balance of threat’ theory¹¹⁸. Second, not only the great power approach towards the Middle East has strong realist implications but also violent non-state actors have pursued realist reactions against each other in the form of bandwagoning, balancing and promotion of military power.¹¹⁹ Thus, the great powers have felt themselves confident to project realist policies upon VNSAs. In hot spots of Middle East and Southeast Asia, realist policies have been applied in a coercive approach and security has been perceived as a “common sense”.¹²⁰ Because domestic and/or global security needs and the national interests of the US in these regions are twin aims that assures the US to maximize its influence.

On the other hand, Austin Turk (2004) contends that the history of United States is full with domestic violence associated with home-grown political, social and cultural conflicts. Massacres, bombings and similar deadly attacks have caused thousands of casualties in the United States not solely in post-Cold War term, but since its inception as a strong state. Before September 11 2001, only few of these have been labeled as terrorist acts by American administrations, but rather as political and criminal acts of individuals or gangsters. Domestic violence acts have been officially linked to foreign terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the violent acts of home-grown groups or individuals have been ignored.¹²¹ This ignorance in domestic terrorist acts is visible also in the foreign policy of American administrations until

¹¹⁷ Waltz, K. N. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, California, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, pp.102-128

¹¹⁸ Walt, S.M. (1987), *The Origins of Alliances*, New York, Cornell University Press, p. preface (x)

¹¹⁹ Walt, S.M. (1987), *The Origins of Alliances*, New York, Cornell University Press, p.149

¹²⁰ Steans, J. and Pettiford L. (2001), *International Relations, Perspectives and Themes*, London, Longman Press, pp.7-9

¹²¹ Turk A.T. (2004) “Sociology of Terrorism.” *Annual Review of Sociology*. Vol. 30, p.271

September 11 terrorist attacks. Until the end of Cold War, international terrorism has been labeled by American administrations as “state sponsored” terrorism under the effect of Cold War’s ideological rivalry. Some of the countries under direct or indirect political control of the Soviets (i.e Syria, Bulgaria, Libya, and North Korea) were accused for supporting anti-American terrorism.¹²²

In recent years the realist school make strong steps to take VNSAs seriously into consideration in parallel with their increasing influence in global international system. Another point in state-VNSA interaction is argued by Douglas Lemke (2008). Lemke argues that throughout the power political perception, the rules applied to the states are almost the same for non-state actors when questioned in the historical perspective of 19th Century South America state vs non-state wars. Though state is the major player in international relations, the VNSAs have been perceived as a serious opponent although they possess no defined territory, no government and no sovereignty. He asserts that, neither ignoring the behaviors of these actors nor rejecting the applicability of power politics on VNSA behaviors is reasonable. There are two reasons for this justification; first, existing power politics theories, although they ignore them, do not forbid the non-state actors to be studied by their laws. Second, these “new wars” are not new actually because the VNSAs have played extensive roles and made deep impact upon the human history for centuries.¹²³

Beside other conclusions Lemke reached, the most interesting point is that power politics theories are useful to understand also the behaviors of VNSAs. So that there is no need to formulate new theories for these entities. Surely, the VNSAs are very weak with their hard power capabilities when compared to states but, new wars in the future will not occur without the involvement of these violent actors. This involvement will be simply through the hands of the VNSAs to formulate the involvement of their community, either at homeland or by their Diasporas abroad.

¹²² Turk A.T. (2004) “Sociology of Terrorism.” *Annual Review of Sociology*. Vol. 30, pp. 272-273.

¹²³ Lemke, D. (2008), ‘Power Politics and Wars without states’, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 4, October, pp. 774–786.

The involvement of VNSA communities into this struggle/war is based on organized societal power and its influence upon parent state/the US communities and decision making echelons. As Holsti (1996) writes; ‘Wars within and between communities are not the same as wars between the states’¹²⁴

William Newmann (2011) brings forward another argument how VNSAs and their ideology can form a substantial threat to the US if they are ignored and are not incorporated into realist paradigm. According to him, particularly the realist theory has historically ignored the truth that these actors can form an ideology and also a potential capability to create instability on some disputed areas. Such ability may undermine hegemonic goals of the US in certain regions. In short and medium term, this may pose the greatest threat to the United States, where no serious hard balancing capability can emerge. He contends that there is no need to wait until these actors take the control of a sovereign state and form a direct threat to the international system or the hegemon state.¹²⁵ Newmann forms up an alternative scenario named “Hegemonic Disruption Model” arguing that the United States will have to devote considerable amounts of resources to control the threats created by a transnational network of the VNSAs.¹²⁶ By this model, the VNSAs will be included into the system to play their roles in international power relationship.

Newman posits that in this model although the VNSAs are far away from being a strong opponent to the United States in terms of their material and economic power, they are not in a subordinate position when it comes to ideological power and their ability to influence the regional and global public opinions. So, in this new environment, the realist paradigm is obliged to include these actors and their

¹²⁴ Holsti, K.J. (1996), *The State, War and the State of War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.18

¹²⁵ Newmann, W.W., (Fall 2011), ‘Hegemonic Disruption, the Asymmetric Challenge to US Leadership’, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, p.68

¹²⁶ Newmann, W.W. (Fall 2011), ‘Hegemonic Disruption, the Asymmetric Challenge to US Leadership’, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, p.67

ideology into the threat environment.¹²⁷ This is what the US administration has taken into theory and practice in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks. When the US is forced by its national interests and power requirements, we see that the US can approach a VNSA (such as GAM in Southeast Asia) with a positive attitude and urge it to leave arms, to come to the negotiation table and to transform into a political entity in Indonesia political spectrum.

To summarize; the realist thought has been the overarching perception for the US administrations towards the VNSAs and the first step for the international circle of the literature review was how realist approach reacted. As argued through above paragraphs, realist thought ignored the VNSAs for a long time, but with the end of Cold War, new ideas emerged across the scholars how the VNSAs should be evaluated in order to manage them. They are no more weak, isolated, state-controlled entities of 1950s and following couple decades, but serious actors in the international realm.

2.6.2 VNSA Terror in American Homeland

The violence and terror caused across American homeland in September 2001 has deeply affected the US-VNSA interactions. After September 11, the perception of the United States to domestic and international terrorism has changed fundamentally. Domestic security rose to the peak of American policy and extraordinary counter measures have been taken by all means of state capacity. American National Security Strategy Document 2002 and the USA Patriot Act 2001 (Preserving Life and Liberty) were initial reactions of American government to preserve domestic security at once and in short term. National Security Strategy Document was the overarching document for all state mechanism which did not attract any reaction. But for the USA Patriot Act it was not the same. Patriot Act 2001 has incorporated a serial of legal norms limiting individual rights and assuring extraordinary authority and power to counter terror units by extending the limits of state authority upon individuals. Many reactions have come from liberals and also conservative circles arguing that such

¹²⁷ Newmann, W.W., (Fall 2011), 'Hegemonic Disruption, the Asymmetric Challenge to US Leadership', *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, pp.70-72

initiatives would erode freedom embedded in American societal structure. The reply of President Bush and Attorney General was that USA Patriot Act does not eliminate legal procedures, rather try to adapt them into a format to encounter extraordinary terrorist threat.¹²⁸

Beyond those legal concerns, the capacities and capabilities of terrorist groups within the US homeland are widely argued as well. Heymann (2001) studies the level of the capabilities for terrorist groups in order to accomplish a large scale attack in the US. These capabilities at first step are; recruiting capability, and a capacity to retain the commitment and loyalty of those terrorist individuals. Second step is to assure technical, tactical and organizational training skills to those individuals. Third step is to provide financial and material sources such as weapons, explosives and communication assets. All these steps should be taken under an organizational success and all activities should be carried out in secrecy.¹²⁹ In his article Heymann also contends what responses to terror acts were given by the US administration. These responses are categorized under two headlines; (i) punishment of those involved in terror act and (ii) prevention of any possible terror act in the future, by using intelligence and law enforcement organizations. These two points are fundamental responses to terror acts, but there are some other additional responses such as reducing the costs of these precautions to the United States, increasing cooperation amongst not only allies but also all members of global society, and in long term to reduce the hostility of other societies particularly in third world against the United States.¹³⁰

Posen (2001), on the other hand, claims that a grand strategy should be developed by the US to defeat future mass terror attacks by VNSAs such as Al Qaeda. This strategy should inherit military and diplomatic dimensions and direct all available

¹²⁸ The aim of this Act was to unite and strengthen America by providing appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism, enacted in 2001. For more information see <http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm> and <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf> access date 20 January 2015.

¹²⁹ Heymann, P.B. (2001), "Dealing with Terrorism." *International Security*, Vol. 26, No.3, p.28

¹³⁰ Heymann, P.B. (2001), "Dealing with Terrorism." *International Security*, Vol. 26, No.3, pp.26-27

resources upon the main effort. While the military side of this strategy deals with terrorists, the diplomatic side should focus on deterring any possible state from supporting any VNSA. In addition to domestic security precautions, the US has effectively taken other steps to prevent states from supporting VNSAs such as Al Qaeda. In the wake of September 11 attacks, the US has enjoyed unconditional support from international society and has not hesitated to initiate a coercive diplomacy and anti-terror operations across the globe against any state or organization harboring terrorists. Even if a terrorist organization cannot be defeated by all its capabilities and ideology its ability to conduct violent acts can be highly eliminated and its activists can be reduced to desperate strugglers.¹³¹ Posen argues also what type of defensive precautions can be activated against a VNSA. Such defensive precautions are directly related to domestic security and requires long range attention upon; government installations and buildings, power plants, energy and communication lines.¹³²

Stern (2003) argues how a terrorist or a terrorist group adopts itself to changing conditions. Not only the individuals adopt their aims in time but also terrorist organizations behave similarly. A terrorist, for example, may join a group to make the world a better place to live at least for the population he fights for. But over time, under changing conditions, terrorism can turn into a passion for a good career, and this passion can turn into greed for status and even political power. For instance, Egyptian Islamic Jihad's (EIJ) original objective was to fight the secular Egyptian government, but after its leading cadre was killed or forced to exile in 1990s it shifted its attention to another enemy; the United States.¹³³ Not only EIJ, but also Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Al Qaeda adopted their objectives according to changing regional or global conditions. Al Qaeda's initial aim was to fight against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. After Cold War, Al Qaeda issued three manifestos in 1992, in 1996 and in 1998 to fight against Western and particularly

¹³¹ Posen, B.R. (2001) "The Struggle Against Terrorism." *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 3 pp.42-43

¹³² Posen, B.R. (2001) "The Struggle Against Terrorism." *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 3 p.45

¹³³ Stern, J. (2003) "The Protean Enemy." *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2003

American military and civilian targets. In his final manifest after September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda emphasized the sufferings of Palestinians, condemned the Israeli occupation and thus aimed to widen the scope of its terror acts and split the world into two camps; the believers and infidels.¹³⁴

In the wake of September 11 attacks, some scholars believe that the US administration derived some lessons in foreign policy that would illuminate future steps in war against terrorism. Walt (2001) discusses four lessons in this respect and also focuses on what policy should be pursued in future when dealing with terrorism and capabilities of VNSAs.

First lesson is about cost of terror acts. US administration assumed in 1990s a cost-free American foreign policy could be carried out with no risk at any corner of the world. This was a utopia produced by American victory on Cold War in technology, economy, military and cultural supremacy. However in September 11, it was proved by a VNSA (Al Qaeda) that American engagement over the globe would not be cost free. It was proved that the US, despite its military and economic superiority, was vulnerable to the VNSA threats and this would grow in the future in case such terrorist organizations would acquire more lethal weapons and improve their capabilities.¹³⁵

The second lesson is about the antipathy of global society towards the Americans. This antipathy is a deposition of previous decades assuming that other societies admire the American state and society. One reason fueling this antipathy is the close relationship of the US with Israel and endless support to some conservative Arab regimes. This lesson also proves that the international support given to American administration after September 11 attacks was not so deep and strong. Majority of

¹³⁴ Stern, J. (2003) "The Protean Enemy." *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 2003

¹³⁵ Walt, S. M. (2001) "Beyond Bin Laden – Reshaping US Foreign Policy." *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 58-59

the states that supported the US did it because terrorism was a global threat and being neutral was the worst option under those conditions.¹³⁶

The third lesson is about the necessity of the support from other countries to the US in its war against terrorism. Although American administration has demonstrated a unilateral foreign policy in first year of President Bush, it was understood that a campaign against a global threat needed international cooperation and support. No matter how strong a superpower was, it needed international support from other countries. This is what happened in the wake of Al Qaeda attacks on the US land.¹³⁷

Walt argues that fourth lesson is about ignoring the impact of consequences emerging after a failed state. Before September 11 attacks, the consequence of a failed state was regional, affecting generally the neighboring states by way of immigration, chaos or violence. Liberia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, or Sierra Leone are such incidents. But after September 11, the consequences of failed states turned out to become serious international security problems rather than being humanitarian tragedies. On the other hand, not only failed states but also unresolved conflicts pose a threat to American security, either domestic or international. Walt argues that international terrorist network that the US is trying to eliminate since September 11 is a product of chain effects of unresolved regional conflicts across the world.¹³⁸

As argued through above paragraphs, the reaction of the US administration and the scholarly circles against the VNSA acts came up through the lenses of security needs. The approach of realist thought and the reaction of the US administrations to the VNSA terror acts across the American homeland are supplementary to each other. Following the September 11 attacks, the US administration derived some lessons in dealing with terrorism and the capabilities of the VNSAs. In following

¹³⁶ Walt, S. M. (2001) "Beyond Bin Laden – Reshaping US Foreign Policy." *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 3, p.61

¹³⁷ Walt, S. M. (2001) "Beyond Bin Laden – Reshaping US Foreign Policy." *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 3, p.68

¹³⁸ Walt, S. M. (2001) "Beyond Bin Laden – Reshaping US Foreign Policy." *International Security*. Vol. 26, No. 3, pp.66-67

lines I will continue to argue the literature that studies the US interaction with VNSAs from separate geographies.

2.6.3 US Approach to FARC, FMLN, KLA, IRA, Hezbollah

In this section of the literature review, I will investigate the approach of the US to five VNSAs from different parts of the world, with different ideologies. These five VNSAs have been identified as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) by the US administrations as soon as they emerged as a VNSA in their territories and commenced terrorist acts. US Department of State annually updates the list of FTOs according to the developments in the status of related VNSAs. Moreover, the US Department of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism also holds the country reports across the world regularly, and evaluates the interactions of related states with the VNSAs.¹³⁹ As detailed in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) the substantial criteria for an organization to be classified as a terrorist organization is; "(i) the organization is a foreign organization; (ii) the organization engages in terrorist activity, or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and (iii) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States."¹⁴⁰ Except for Hezbollah, other four VNSAs (FMLN, FARC, KLA, IRA) have been removed from the FTO list by the US.

2.6.3.1 FARC and the US

The US approach to the Central American violent movements was shaped by their pro-communist ideology and their drug-trafficking capability. For the US administration FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) was a communist-led insurgency group dealing with unlawful trafficking, coca production and fighting

¹³⁹ Country reports on terrorism have been released in June 2015 by US Department of State details are available at <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf> access date 2 April 2017.

¹⁴⁰ The substantial criteria for an organization to be classified as a terrorist organization is detailed in U.S. Code 1189, for details see <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1189> access date 2 April 2017

against territorial integrity of Colombia and the US interests in the region. So that the US perception towards FARC have been shaped by a military track since 1960s. The US officials identify FARC as the oldest, largest and most violent terrorist organization of Latin America and placed it in the FTO (Foreign Terrorist Organization) list on 8 October 1997.¹⁴¹ FARC was charged by the US for several terror acts such as kidnappings for ransom, drug trafficking, attacking Colombian security forces, assassinations of government officials and civilians.¹⁴²

On the other hand, Colombia is the leading cocaine producing country in Latin America with a direct role over illegal cocaine flow into the US cities. As detailed in the statement by White House Office of National Drug Strategy, "...cocaine production constitutes a threat to U.S. security and the well-being of our citizens. According to U.S. Government estimates, ninety-five percent of the cocaine entering the United States originates in Colombia." In this report, FARC is described as the main adversary that sets a bar to control illegal coca production, as well as cocaine production and trafficking to the US. FARC, by laying mines and attacking the security forces in coca production areas, tried to restrain coca eradication program of the government which is supported by the US in order to control the production in Colombia.¹⁴³

The US, since the inception of the conflict, supported Colombia and this support is named as "Plan Colombia" composed of U.S. military and financial-technical aid.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ See US Department of State FTO list available at <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm> access date 3 April 2017

¹⁴² RAND report "Sources of Guerilla Income: Links to the Drug Trade" states that according to Colombian government figures, in 1998 the various illegal organizations (guerrillas and paramilitaries) derived 620 billion pesos (\$551 million) from the drug traffic, 350 billion pesos (\$311 million) from extortion, and 265.5 billion pesos (\$236 million) from kidnappings. According to Colombian analysts, the FARC and the ELN together account for 20 to 30 percent of all of the kidnappings that take place in the world. See details at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339/MR1339.ch3.pdf access date 4 April 2017

¹⁴³ According to 2016 estimates of the US Government, Colombia coca production is doubled in last two years, for detail see the report of White House National Drug Strategy available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ondcp/targeting-cocaine-at-the-source> access date 3 April 2017

¹⁴⁴ Plan Colombia is a military aid package activated by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 1999 in order to conduct counterinsurgency operations against FARC rebels. The US support to Colombia is composed of five elements; (i) alternative economic development and resettlement, (ii) improving

The US support to Colombia, as it was decided by the US Congress in August 2012, was not limited to sole containing illegal drug trafficking but also included security purposes. It is believed that US support helped Colombia to gain state superiority against the FARC rebels.¹⁴⁵ During the peace talks between FARC and the Government of Colombia, the US assigned a Special Envoy; Bernie Aronson, on February 2015. Aronson, as a veteran diplomat joined negotiations in the name of US Secretary of State John Kerry. Aronson argued that during the negotiations in Norway and Cuba, the US administration paid special attention to the demobilization of FARC militants and the future of illicit drug industry in Colombia.¹⁴⁶

Moreover, Trump administration also confirms the support of Obama administration for an enduring peace in Colombia paying special attention to “demobilization” issues. Rex Tillerson, the Secretary of State confirmed the US support for the peace shall continue “after the review of the details of the peace between FARC and Colombia”. As clearly stated in the motto; “No country in Latin America, outside of Mexico, will command greater U.S. policy attention as Colombia.”¹⁴⁷ The US administrations, since the very beginning, paid attention and played active role to stabilize this conflict. For the time being, under the encouraging support of the US, negotiations have been finalized and peace agreement signed between FARC and Colombia. When we check the FTO list of the US, according to current terror assessments FARC is still in the list. But since there is an agreement between FARC

government capacity, (iii) administration of justice, (iv) law enforcement, (v) support for the peace process. For more information see details at the report by Gabriel Marcella “Plan colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives”, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/ssi_marcella.pdf access date 4 April 2017

¹⁴⁵ See the article by Sergio Munoz Bata on Plan Colombia and US support, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-colombia-peace-deal_us_57ebd0dce4b082aad9b80ff5 access date 3 April 2017

¹⁴⁶ See the interview with Aronson, available at <http://chds.dodlive.mil/2016/06/01/special-envoy-bernie-aronson-and-the-colombia-peace-accords/> access date 4 April 2017

¹⁴⁷ See Inter-American Dialogue, “A Time for Decisions: U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere,” Washington, DC, 2000, p. 19.

and Colombia, based on the degree that peace conditions are met by both sides, FARC may be removed from the FTO list.¹⁴⁸

2.6.3.2 FMLN and the US

The approach of the US administrations towards FMLN (Farabundo Marti Liberation Front) has commonalities to that of Colombia's FARC. The fundamental reason behind the violence in El Salvador was similar to that of Colombia; political and economic exclusion. For the US, the front formed under the name of FMLN was a leftist terrorist organization fighting against El Salvador government, identical to other violent groups operating across the Latin America. In this sense, the US was facing two threats from FMLN; first a strong leftist ideology transferred from Fidel Castro of Cuba, challenging the US liberalism, and second a strong armed formation that would threaten the US interests in the Central America and form up a stronghold similar to Cuba via a civil war. Identical to other Central America states authoritarianism reigned in El Salvador until early 1980s under the guardianship of military. This was a gradual stability which changed with the formation of FMLN in 1980.¹⁴⁹

The approach of the US towards the violent groups in El Salvador was not different from any other group in the region. But after the military coup of junior officers on October 15, 1979 with the name of "Revolutionary Governing Junta", the situation changed for a possible civil war. Based on the ineffective control of junta in 1980, the struggle between rightist deaths squads-leftist guerillas and the security forces increased a level that political murders reached over 1000 people in one year.¹⁵⁰ Since its foundation in 1980 until 1983 the FMLN militants reached a population over 12,000 and established control zones and drove the government forces out of

¹⁴⁸ FARC protects its position in the FTO list of US Administration as of 2016, for details see <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> access date 3 April 2017

¹⁴⁹ Stanley, W.D. (1996), *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion and Civil War in El Salvador*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press

¹⁵⁰ McClintock, M. (1985), *The American Connection, Volume One: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, London, Zed Books p. 259-60.

those territories. For the US administrations, the government of “Revolutionary Governing Junta” was an instrument to realize two US foreign affairs goals; to isolate Marxist-Leninist left and extreme right politically, and to lay the foundations of a representative democracy under the guidance of Washington.¹⁵¹

During the term of President Reagan (1981-89), the US policy towards El Salvador was basically composed of military support. Actually the first step of this policy was taken by President Carter with a military aid package of 20 million dollars. Ronald Reagan approved 60 million dollars and sent 54 military advisers to direct the counterinsurgency operations of El Salvadorian military. These steps were accompanied by covert CIA operations which fueled the civil war. As contended by Walter (2008) during the term of Reagan, the US aid to El Salvador has reached 950 million dollars.¹⁵² With the end of Cold War, the danger of a Marxist-Leninist insurgency has diminished, thus the US approach to FMLN and El Salvador started to change. President Bush (1990-1994), minimized the aid to El Salvadorian military and promoted the peace talks between FMLN and El Salvador governments.

Throughout the conflict, the US administration did not negotiate with FMLN leaders directly, rather acted with the ideology of Cold War and approached FMLN as the extension of proxy wars of extremely leftist ideology in Central America. FMLN was regarded as a hostile force of the left ideology trying to harm the democratic values of El Salvadorian community.¹⁵³

2.6.3.3 KLA and the US

KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) has been removed from the Foreign Terrorist Organization list by the US administration in February 1998. As ordered by UN

¹⁵¹ Alvarez A.M. (2010) *From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution, FMLN in El Salvador*, Berlin, Berghof Transition Series, For details see http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3024/pdf/transitions9_elsalvador.pdf access date 27 March 2017

¹⁵² Cited by Alvarez A.M. (2010) *From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution, FMLN in El Salvador*. Berlin, Berghof Transition Series, p.27

¹⁵³ El Salvador; Implementation of Peace Accords, edited by Edited by Margarita S. Studemeister, p.53 See details at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pwks38.pdf> access date 4 April 2017

resolution 1244, under the guidance of NATO, the KLA demobilized and transformed itself into Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) with a population of around 20.000. Towards the end of 1999, KLA handed to NATO around 9000 small arms, 800 machine guns, 300 anti-tank mines, 1200 mines, 178 mortars, 27.000 hand grenades and over 5 million rounds of ammunition. After the transformation was complete, KPC took control of Kosovo province as well as state institutions. But Ian Davis (2002) argues that this was not a real transformation from the identity of a terrorist organization into a responsible political formation, rather the KLA was not disarmed but simply renamed as the Kosovo Protection Corps. Davis asserts, KPC was a new manifestation of the KLA protecting its military features.¹⁵⁴ Although the US recognized the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) as a terrorist organization until 1998, there are arguments that KLA was used against Serbia in order to stabilize the region. Despite UN Resolution 1244 which underlined the status of Kosovo as a sovereign territory within Serbia, the international community headed by the US followed a pro-KLA track that ended with independence. John R. Fulton (2010) criticizes this as rewarding a terrorist organization and transforming those terrorists into politicians.¹⁵⁵

Throughout the conflict, the US was the leading power of both NATO military engagement and UN mission in Kosovo. In April 1999, when NATO decided to engage Kosovo conflict, NATO objectives were identified under five headlines as; (i)stop to all military actions and violence, (ii)withdrawal of all military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, (iii)station an international military presence in Kosovo, (iv)safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, (v)establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo.¹⁵⁶ Throughout the conflict, US has, step by step, realized above mentioned objectives through the hands of NATO and UN.

¹⁵⁴ Davis, I. "Small arms and light weapons in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Saferworld.org. May, 2002. 19 May 2010. Available at <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/72-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-the-federal-republic-of-yugoslavia> access date 1 April 2017

¹⁵⁵ Fulton J.R. "NATO and the KLA: How the West Encouraged Terrorism", *Global Security Studies*, Fall 2010, Volume 1, Issue 3 p. introduction

¹⁵⁶ These objectives were decided at Extraordinary North Atlantic Council meeting held at NATO on 12 April 1999. For details see <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm> access date 5 April 2007

Serbian military and police forces have been forced to leave Kosovo. Due to non-compliance of Serbia with UN Security Council Resolutions, NATO conducted a 77-days air strike against Serbian targets between the dates of 23 March-10 June 1999. Following the withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, NATO entered Kosovo with KFOR (Kosovo Force), which was comprised of around 50,000 troops.¹⁵⁷

Following the demobilization and transformation of KLA into politics, two political parties emerged; Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). Commencing in 2005 until 2007, the independence process of Kosovo has been carried out under the guidance of United Nations. Martti Ahtisaari was assigned as the Special Envoy of UN General-Secretary to Kosovo in order to supervise the peace negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina. The peace talks continued throughout 2006 and 2007. In March 2007, Ahtisaari submitted his proposal to the UN Secretary General, recommending independence for Kosovo. This recommendation was endorsed by UN Secretary General and on 17 February 2008 Kosovo declared itself as an independent country by its elected political leaders.¹⁵⁸

2.6.3.4 IRA and the US

The US administration's approach to IRA (Irish Republican Army) is not very much different from other VNSAs mentioned in the literature review. IRA was in the list of FTO until the Agreement of Good Friday between United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, and Republic of Ireland in 1998. Since 2004, a fraction with the name of Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) continues to appear in the list. CIRA was formed in 1994 as the armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein. When IRA accepted to demobilize its active militants in September 2005, CIRA did not join the decision, and kept its effective terrorist capability. CIRA claims that it is carrying the goal of

¹⁵⁷ For details see <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm> access date 5 April 2007

¹⁵⁸ Bekaj, A.R. (2010), The KLA and Kosovo War: From intra-state Conflict to Independent Country, Veronique Dudouet and Hans J.Giesmann, Berlin, Berghoff Transition Series, p.27 available at http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/3023/pdf/transitions8_kosovo.pdf access date 1 April 2017

IRA, but with limited members to be less than 50, CIRA is away from creating a serious threat to the peace process.¹⁵⁹

Throughout the conflict years, there was a tendency amongst the IRA and Sinn Fein activists that Irish diaspora in the US would give unconditional support to the cause. Although there are over 40 million Irish-Americans living in the US, there was a lack of sympathy to IRA amongst the diaspora. During the conflict of almost three decades, there was a core IRA supporters in the US, but they were far away from producing a robust political and financial support. In conflict years, the Republicans of Northern Ireland accepted that they expected the US governments to play an active role for a permanent settlement of the conflict, by pressuring British officials. But they were aware that as long as IRA used violence the US administration would not take any further step.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, it is impossible to ignore the role of President Clinton's promise to the Irish lobby at his electoral campaign in April 1992 to take concrete steps for a peace in Northern Ireland.¹⁶¹

Along the fierce struggle years between of 1970s and 1980s, the US approach to IRA did not show any development from its original track. But in Clinton term (1992-2000) there was a shift. Maybe driven by the reality that he had Irish ancestry from both parents, President Clinton decided in 1994 to communicate with IRA and granted a visa to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Grant to travel to the US, despite strong British opposition. This initiative convinced many individuals in IRA leadership that they would encourage the US to pressure the British for peace talks. As a positive development in the conflict in August 1994, the IRA called an unconditional ceasefire. But this peace attempt of IRA did not get a positive reaction from British government, and eventually IRA broke the ceasefire two years later in February

¹⁵⁹ CIRA is in the list of FTO, for details see <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm> access date 4 April 2017

¹⁶⁰ Article by Kevin Cullen on IRA and Sinn Fein, America and the Conflict, see details at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/reports/america.html> access date 5 April 2017

¹⁶¹ MacGinty R. (1997), "American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process", *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. XVII No. 2, see details at <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/11750/12521> access date 5 April 2017.

1996. Under the guidance of the US administration and with the willingness of Tony Blair, IRA declared another ceasefire 6 months later. In this peace process the influence of the US was visible, because former US Senate George Mitchell was the chairman of Belfast negotiations as the Special Envoy of President Clinton.¹⁶²

Although the Clinton administration has given support, to the peace talks in a way encouraging all parties it has also underlined the truth that the British and Irish governments and several groups and entities in Northern Ireland should find the way to a permanent peace by own efforts. Moreover, the US administration has granted a financial contribution to Ireland Funds in order to orient the parties for a feasible cooperation.¹⁶³ As clearly depicted in “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015” the US administration acknowledged the role of United Kingdom over international terrorism as “playing a leading role in countering international terrorism”. The cooperation between the US and the UK against international terror groups was multidimensional with political, military and technical aspects.¹⁶⁴ It is possible to argue that, the efforts pledged by Clinton administration to Northern Ireland conflict owed a lot to the close anti-terror cooperation between the US and the UK in the 2000s.

2.6.3.5 Hezbollah and the US

Hezbollah is a FTO for the US since its foundation in 1982. Identical to other VNSAs, the power of Hezbollah is also underestimated by the US. But actually, as contended by H. Jaber (1997)¹⁶⁵, M. Kramer (1998)¹⁶⁶ and M. Ranstorp (1997)¹⁶⁷,

¹⁶² Alonso R. and Iribarren F.D. (2009), The IRA and ETA: The International Connections of Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism in Europe, eds. Saikia J. and Stepanova E. in *Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalism*, London, SAGE publications, p.14.

¹⁶³ Article by Sean Ohuiginn, Former Irish Ambassador to Washington DC; “The International Dimension; the Role of Irish Diaspora”, available at <http://www.osce.org/cio/90146?download=true> access date 5 April 2007.

¹⁶⁴ The US Country Report on Terrorism 2014, page 151-155 gives the US assessment upon UK, see details at <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf> access date 7 April 2017

¹⁶⁵ Jaber, H. (1997) *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, New York, Columbia University Press.

Hezbollah is a phenomenon whose power and state building capacity is determined by its domestic elements. These elements are; the Shiite community deprived of being treated as a second class by Lebanese state, the militia who claim to “have the ability to suffer and happily die more than the Israelis”, the philosophy and ideology embedded in Shiite sect, and the political/sectarian Hezbollah leaders with their heroic appearance in front of Shiite public opinion. Here, Israel is used as an asset to provide continuous domestic power from below echelons, such as men to militia, social welfare support to poor Shiites etc. The violence against Israel also grants Hezbollah to insert its authority upon its domestic affiliations with full obedience. The conflict with Israel also provides to control and regulate the internal order amongst Shiite community, and thus eliminate the interference of Lebanese authorities and reduce also the criminal activity amongst the population.¹⁶⁸

Hezbollah, after its foundation, started its military resistance during Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1990, which costed over 120.000 lives. Since early 1980s, Hezbollah formed its struggle against the US existence in the Middle East and Lebanon. In 1983 during the Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah conducted several bombings against the US targets including the US Marine barracks killing 241 American soldiers. Bombing of American embassy in Beirut and kidnapping of CIA chief William Buckley were amongst other Hezbollah terror acts.¹⁶⁹ Hezbollah has formed an identity in the region to be the vanguard against western imperialism and taken Israel as the forward post of western imperialism. Moreover, Hezbollah has succeeded to display “Arab Identity” beyond Shiite and Lebanese identities and received ideological and financial as well as military material support from Iran and Syria. Inspired by ideological teachings of

¹⁶⁶ Kramer, M. (1998) ‘The Moral Logic of Hizballah’, in Walter Reich (ed), *Origins of Terrorism: psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*, Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.

¹⁶⁷ Ranstorp, M. (1997) *Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, New York, St. Martin’s Press.

¹⁶⁸ Spears, I. S. (2004) ‘States-Within-States: An Introduction to Their Empirical Attributes’, in Paul Kingston & Ian S. Spears (eds), *States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era*, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan pp. 15-34.

¹⁶⁹ Norton A. (1999) *Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc, p.1 available at file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Norton2.pdf access date 2 April 2017

Ayatollah Khomeini, Hezbollah constantly condemned the US for its anti-Islamic policies.¹⁷⁰

In post September 11 term, the US administration tried several covert and overt strategies to contain Hezbollah's external and internal influence. Amongst those strategies three initiatives are important; (i)funding Sunni extremists, (ii)coercing the Lebanese government to pressure Hezbollah, and (iii)to force Syria to end its presence in Lebanon and to undermine logistic support to Hezbollah.¹⁷¹ But such initiatives did not make any negative effect, rather increased the legitimacy of Hezbollah as an Arab resistance force. Thus, the US has somehow encouraged Hezbollah to broaden its influence upon the Shiites and Lebanese government.

On the other hand, the political activities of Hezbollah within Lebanese political environment deserve attention. Since 1992, Hezbollah is a legitimate party, holding 12 seats in Lebanese Parliament out of 126. Hezbollah is currently represented in the government with two seats. Actually, such political activity proves the transformation for Hezbollah from violence into peace. But, its ideology and political aims are different from other four VNSAs, which are the subject matters of this literature review. The US Administration's Foreign Terrorist Organization list identifies Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and gives the list of terrorist attacks conducted by Hezbollah since 1983 until recently. Hezbollah is also accused for making money on illegal activities worldwide such as smuggling, trafficking narcotics, money laundering, immigration, and bank fraud and similar.¹⁷²

2.6.3.6 Summary

Before concluding the literature review of the thesis, I would like to summarize the findings related to the literature. As explained in the first section of this chapter, the armed conflict and civil war are the overarching topics. Without going into details, I

¹⁷⁰Jaber, H. (1997) *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, New York: Columbia University Press. Pp. 145-168

¹⁷¹Byman, D. (2005) *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*, New York: Cambridge University Press. P.62

¹⁷²See US Department of State FTO list available at <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm> access date 3 April 2017

have elaborated the roles of non-state groups within the armed conflicts and civil wars. It is clear that non-state groups are much more active in civil wars, rather than armed conflicts, which are envisaged to be a conflict mainly between two states or a group of states. In the second section of the thesis I have investigated the types of NSAs/VNSAs in order to outline the framework of the literature review, because this is a vast spectrum, and there was a need to put them into a framework. Moreover, I have investigated how the scholars evaluate the legal status of NSA/VNSAs in front of international and/or regional conflicts. This is vital because, the legal status of non-state actors is the core issue. In the third section of this Chapter, I have investigated the VNSA literature within the domestic, regional and international circles.

In domestic circle, I have questioned the inner structure and capabilities/deficiencies of a VNSA. No matter on which geography they exist, they inherit similar specifications in terms of their military, political, societal existence. They have similar ideologies, targets, manpower, social capacities, etc. In regional circle, I have studied the relations between the VNSAs and their parent/opponent states. The relationship between a VNSA and its parent state is a kind of violent dialogue, which one of the toughest exists in the relations between Hamas and Israel. In this violent dialogue, there are many ups and downs but the dialogue is not totally cut off.

And thirdly, in international circle of the literature review, I have worked on the relations of the VNSAs with the hegemon state (the US). Why did I study additional five more VNSAs from different geographies which are; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Farabundo Martí Liberation Front of El Salvador, (FMLN), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Party of God (Hezbollah). The rationale behind this supplementary study includes two reasons; first is to underline the special relationship between the US and Israel, and the second is to emphasize that GAM contains similarities with other VNSAs across the world. As studied in detail throughout the fifth Chapter, Aceh conflict reached a peaceful solution by transforming GAM into a peaceful political entity, and all above mentioned VNSAs, except for Hezbollah, left violence with relatively peaceful solutions. GAM has similarities with HAMAS as well as above VNSAs. GAM has

two identical specification with HAMAS; first, its Islamic character, second, the impact of western colonialism upon its territory. But GAMS has identical points also with FARC, FMLN, IRA, and KLA such as its nationalist character seeking for independence, its peaceful charter which is a clear declaration to the world, and its guerilla warfare tactics. In this sense, it is worth to slightly clarify the relations of above mentioned VNSAs with the US, and moreover to underline the core reason that paved the way for a peaceful solution to those conflicts.

The approach of the US to Latin American conflicts inherits similar worries and aims in terms of American foreign politics. Latin America was the backyard of the US. The US did not accept any armed conflict ideologically supported by communism and financially sponsored by drug-trafficking. Both FARC and FMLN, similar to other Latin American regional conflicts, were holding these two specifications. FARC and FMLN were two threats for the American national interests fighting against the territorial integrities of Colombia and El Salvador. Throughout these two conflicts, the US administration did not negotiate with FARC and FMLN leaders directly, rather behaved with the ideology of Cold War. Since the inception of the conflicts both Colombia and El Salvador enjoyed surplus US military and financial-technical aid. The US support to Colombia and El Salvador has homogenities with the US support to Indonesia. Removal of the tension and violence in those conflicts were in parallel with the global American interests.

The approach of the US towards European conflicts, KLA and IRA, derives its roots from two strong insights; (i) the US national interests and (ii) the managerial tasks of the US as the hegemon state of post-Cold War term. During Kosovo conflict in 1998, the US gave full support for the separation of Kosovo from Serbia and consequently for an independent state. Kosovo operation ended with the establishment of US military bases in Romania, Bulgaria and Kosovo in early 2000s, which were then satellite states under Soviet control during the Cold War years. Another factor that played a role for the solution of these two conflicts is the political free/good will that emerged under globalization in 1990s, which was also strongly supported by the global public opinion. Kosovo operation was conducted with no UN resolution. But, the invisible power behind the operation was a mutual political will shared by all

related countries, including Russian Federation (RF). RF has sent a brigade level unit to support Kosovo operation. On the other hand, IRA is a violent movement, which the US did not take active roles in Northern Ireland conflict due to its strong ties with the United Kingdom. Although, the US took a neutral stance towards the conflict, the ambiance of post Cold-War term reflected its positive impact upon the conflict. President Clinton's personal initiative to establish goodwill with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Grant to travel to the US convinced many individuals in IRA leadership to take positive steps for a peaceful solution. The strategic partnership between the US and the US has played also an overarching role pressing the sides to find a peaceful solution upon the conflict. Towards the end of the century, both KLA and IRA have left violence and transformed into a peaceful track.

And finally, the US perception to Hezbollah, which holds its position as a VNSA in Lebanon, reflects some similarities with HAMAS. The similarity of HAMAS and Hezbollah originates from their struggle against western imperialism, which they use to form a national identity. For Hezbollah, similar to the perception of HAMAS, Israel is the forward post of western imperialism. Both VNSAs take place in US Administration's Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list since they declared their establishment. They both have been subjected to strong political, economic, financial embargos and coercive military operations by the US administrations and the State of Israel. As elaborated in following chapters, the approach of the US administrations to Hezbollah and HAMAS is linked to the strong bond between the US and Israel. The security need and survival of the State of Israel, the US interests in the Middle East, and the role of Israeli Lobby in the US are strong factors that affect the US approach to Hezbollah which is actually parallel to that of HAMAS.

Consequently, throughout the literature review, I have aimed to establish a framework for the cases of HAMAS and GAM. On one hand I have underlined how the US-Israel relations shaped the US-HAMAS interaction, and once again emphasized the strong bond between the US and Israel with its political, military, economic, cultural dimensions. For sure, this is a special relationship that exists between no other states. On the other hand, I have studied the identical specifications of GAM and other five VNSAs from different geographies, and emphasized the

similiarities between those VNSAs, which left violence and transformed into a political entity. Aceh conflict and GAM would not be a strong case when compared to Palestine conflict and HAMAS, no need to compare the degree of US-Israeli relations to the US-Indonesia relations. Therefore I aimed to strengthen GAM as a case by underlining its similiarities with other VNSAs, in a way that US has a upper hand to deal with any regional conflict for a peaceful solution, but it is not the case for HAMAS/Palestine conflict and Israel.

CHAPTER 3

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS

3.1 American Foreign Policy Principles

A close look towards the background of American foreign policy principles in its historical path will provide strong stand point for my thesis. Because, without taking these principles into consideration which are core dynamics of American foreign policy in international system towards the states, it would be hard to understand the US approach towards the VNSAs which are gathering power day by day on the international stage. The principles of the US foreign policy, constitutes also a base for the strong bond between the American and Israeli states as well as the societies of both sides. This bond is visible also in the relations between the US and Indonesia to a lesser degree. This chapter will focus on three aspects; first I will study the core themes of the US foreign policy (exceptionalism, isolationism, continentalism and internationalism) in their historical patterns until the end of the Cold War, second; I will study the US foreign policy in terms of last four American presidents (Bush, Clinton, Bush Jr. and Obama,) before and after 9/11 terrorist attacks, and third I will study the opportunities provided by the international system to the US foreign policy in post 9/11 term in dealing with global terror and the violent non-state actors. When detailing these three aspects I also give links to the rationale in American foreign policy approach towards the VNSAs; such as, using them for national interests when required, or giving support to the peaceful non-state actors in terms of the liberalist view, and applying coercive policies upon violent non-state actors in terms of the realist view.

Although these principles follow a timely pattern in general in sequence of time, they also prove ups and downs according to the international political developments. For

instance, although exceptionalism finds its roots in very early days of American history, we observe that it comes into the picture as a leading dynamic of the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War term, particularly after September 11 attacks. Throughout the years of struggle to become an independent state, and after its emergence as a sovereign and independent state, the United States have followed certain patterns in its foreign policy. These patterns have been shaped by more than a dozen principles. These principles do not show sole political incentives of the US foreign relations, but they prove to be a body of thought with strong economic, military, historical, cultural, and security concerns. Before focusing upon the US foreign policy and the VNSA interactions, a brief description of American foreign policy principles will be helpful. There are around a dozen of principles that exert power upon the US foreign policy. Some of these principles have been underlined by other scholars and come to the fore according to the conditions of foreign relations. But, I will focus upon four fundamental foreign policy principles (isolationism, exceptionalism, continentalism, internationalism) that shaped the US perception since the First World War until the 2000s.

These principles form up the patterns of the US foreign affairs when interacting not only with the states but also with the VNSAs. In this sense, by rejecting any type of alliances with the European powers, isolationism emerged. As detailed in following paragraphs, the basic idea in isolationism defended the principle that the USA could walk in freedom and democracy, other than war and competence. This was a strong stand of the US foreign policy for almost one and a half century since its foundation (1776), until its decision to join the First World War (1914) against the Axis powers. The essence of American national identity was shaped by exceptionalism. This was the notion which enabled the American society and the statesmen to view the rest of the world, to say from the inside towards the outside. The American state was perceived as a unique entity, or a shining “city upon a hill”. This notion has gained power with the emergence of the US as the victor of bipolar competence and the Cold War in 1990s. Continentalism supported the US perception towards the Central and South American states that were influenced by communist/socialist ideology and weakened by social violence starting in 1960s. The US did not want any problem in its backyard to challenge the US economic, ideological, and military supremacy as

detailed in the Second Chapter of the thesis. The US took any political, military and economic step during and after the Cold War for a safe and stable American Continent. In addition, America's vast geography and its position between two oceans also played a role in developing American nationhood. Coastal access to the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans enabled the US to extend its reach from Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico. All continents with their abundant raw materials (Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia) were within the reach. Theis easy reach to natural resources supported the United States to transform into an industrial state with a global military power. On the other hand the American 'internationalism' enables us to look from the outside towards the inside to capture the position of the US in international realm. In this internationalist environment, the US takes roles in regional and/or international disputes. This principle has emerged as a strong path for the US foreign affairs in post-Cold War term. In this sense the unrests caused by the VNSAs has made a deep impact upon the US administration initiatives and the US people felt themselves less secure. These four basic principles of the US foreign policy are detailed in following paragraphs. But, let me briefly mention about other US foreign policy principles.

The oldest and basic principle of American foreign policy was the sovereignty, which meant political independence and territorial integrity of a newly born republic. This was the founding principle of the United States coined by republic's first president George Washington, rejecting any type of intervention by the British and other European powers. In this very early period of independence, Washington followed a foreign policy track abstaining from entangling alliances with the European powers. International law, or any form of foreign law, must never undermine American sovereignty and independence. American foreign policy was influenced by flexibility and balance between realism and idealism. These two perceptions have been defended and used by the US Presidents.¹⁷³

¹⁷³ Mead W.R (2002) American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World, Special Providence, New York, Routledge, pp.3-5

The American foreign policy gained coherence and appeal in 18th and 19th centuries and turned into a powerful body of thought dominating all parties which hold a role in US foreign policy initiatives.¹⁷⁴ Throughout the 20th Century, this powerful body aspired for two principles for American state and society; stability and prosperity. This century is also described as the struggle between the “realism and idealism”. In this sense, Theodore Roosevelt as a realist and Woodrow Wilson as an idealist guided the State into a mission named ‘rise to the world power’ aiming to realize the national greatness in world politics. One striking description of this new American mission by foreign affairs elites was ‘to accept the commanding position amongst the powers of the earth.’¹⁷⁵

While Roosevelt focused on an Anglo-Saxonist ideal hoisting the British-American kinship in liberty, trade and international order to the first line, Wilson put forward his famous fourteen-point blueprint as a document for a better world order in the wake of First World War. This was a new perception promoting the ‘national greatness’ and ‘liberty’ for all communities, on the basis of self-determination. This optimistic but ‘ordered freedom’ did not give fruitful results across the globe, particularly in Europe, but rather planted the seeds of split in global politics as well as casting the American-Soviet ideological rivalry.

When the globe entered the Cold War era, the American foreign policy was under the influence of historical lessons-learned and the geopolitics. The military diplomat George F. Kennan’s long telegram to Washington paved the way for the US foreign policy. A new reality, Soviet expansionism, has emerged as a threat to free nations and should be opposed by a combination of military and economic means. This perception shaped the American Cold War policy focusing its attention upon “containment” doctrine, identifying the Soviets as chief threat to freedom. The economic face of this doctrine has been reflected as the Marshall Plan to rescue the war-ravaged economies of Western Europe.

¹⁷⁴ Hunt, M.H. (1987), *Ideology and US foreign Policy*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, Preface xii

¹⁷⁵ McDougall, W.A., (1997), *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776*, New York: Houghton Mifflin, p. 114

During the Cold War, from 1948 to 1991, “multilateralism” became a standard “modus operandi” for U.S. foreign policy. Multilateralism refers to the cooperation of three or more states that can vary upon a number of dimensions such as political or economic coalitions, multilateral organizations.¹⁷⁶ This was a post-war environment based on international relationships, such as with the United Nations, and on the development of further multilateral innovations. Yet, these were not consistent with the US national sovereignty detailed in the Monroe Doctrine and in the U.S. Constitution. In this sense, there is a strong assumption that multilateralism is preferable to unilateralism, because it is global and more sophisticated.

Another principle of American foreign policy is “transnationalism.” “Transnationalism”, is described as “economic, political, and cultural processes that extend beyond the boundaries of nation-states.”¹⁷⁷ Transnationalism in parallel with multilateralism emerged during the Cold War years for a feasible cooperation when economic and security coalitions were established to resolve specific problems between the states. Although nationalism conflicts with transnationalism, new advances in transportation, communication technologies, and virtual connectivity amongst the individuals by internet has provided new opportunities in global context for the transnational perceptions.

US “unilateralism” is not a principal of post-Cold War term, but rather of post-World War II. Its ideology was based on self-righteous bipolar competition. As described in following sections of this Chapter, with the end of the Cold War and demise of strongest rival Soviet Russia, the US made huge steps in unilateralism with a natural claim and a de facto privilege in 1990s. The foreign policies of both President Clinton and Bush were unilateral initiatives of “go-it-alone.” Clinton used military force in the Balkans and Bush did the same against the “war on terror”

¹⁷⁶ Ruggie, J.G. (1993) Eds. *Multilateralism Matters, The Theory and Praxis of an International Form*, New York Columbia University Press, p.11.

¹⁷⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica describes transnationalism as an influence that conflicts with nationalism. For details see Article by Richard Huff, available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/transnationalism> access date 9 May 2017

following September 11 attacks. Most scholars criticize American unilateralism as a short-sighted move for international order and long term American interests. Actually, President Obama term has tried to repair the damages caused by unilateral acts and coercive military use. Obama has aimed to embrace a multilateral approach in cooperation with allies and under the support of UN umbrella.¹⁷⁸

Together with unilateralism, multilateralism and internationalism, as a form of unseparable foreign affairs principle, “globalization” has been used effectively. Rather than being a political tool, globalization was mostly economic. Across the globe, all nations were affected by globalization, but the US had an additional capability; to affect the globalization process by itself.¹⁷⁹ At the end of WWII, on October 27, 1945 the speech of President Truman at Navy Day Celebration in Central Park, New York City carried the signs of the US foreign policy principles throughout the Cold War years and following decades. Truman, in his public address, underlined the fundamentals of American foreign policy for the years to come. These were; no war with the aim of occupation, sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples, establish peaceful democratic governments free from Nazism, fascism and military aggression, access to the trade and the raw materials of the world, full economic collaboration between all nations, formation of united nations organization with the attendance of all nations.¹⁸⁰

As briefly mentioned above, exceptionalism finds its roots historically in very early days of Anglo-Saxon colonists in New England in 1630s. These colonists accepted themselves as the vanguard of English culture and civilization with a special destiny they believe in. One step further, they saw themselves as the pioneers of European civilization, which started in Europe centuries ago, and continuing across the vast

¹⁷⁸ Malone D.M. and Khong Y.F. (2003), Eds. *Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Press, pp.2-3

¹⁷⁹ Moon B.E (2005) *The United States and Globalization: Struggles with Hegemony*, Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, eds. *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, Oxford University Press, Introduction p.1

¹⁸⁰ For the details of President Truman, see *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XII, pp. 66-68, available at <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/post-war/1945-10-27b.html> access date 10 MAY 2017.

lands of a new continent.¹⁸¹ Throughout these decades, the United States have followed three rigid goals. These were (i) freedom from the dictates of French, British and Spanish colonial empires, (ii) improving the commercial advantages and (iii) promotion of American founding ideas and ideals. These goals are firmly tied to the values of peace and prosperity, stability and security, democracy and defense.¹⁸² This was a modest but growing role, following George Washington's farewell address, simply advising his nation good relations with all nations but "permanent alliances" with none of them. In fact, Washington did not advise his nation merely to avoid foreign alliances as a "great rule", but also he appealed a national unity rising upon the principles of American republic.¹⁸³ In post-Cold War term, exceptionalism emerges again as a leading dynamic of the US foreign policy in the post-Cold War term, particularly after September 11 attacks.

Second core theme isolationism, became a strong pattern for the US foreign policy in order to preserve the liberty of this newly born state amongst the European colonial powers and to keep away from the European alliances and wars. The main idea in isolationism stands upon the principle that America could advance in freedom and democracy, other than war and competence. Isolationism has proved its determination over Monroe doctrine in 1820s, with the motto of President James Monroe stating; "In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do."¹⁸⁴

Isolationism was the logic of American foreign policy until 1890s and was based on 7 ideas which have developed in time. First is to protect autonomy not to interfere with the wars amongst European powers. Second is to be self-sufficient in economic

¹⁸¹ Kagan, R.(2006), *Dangerous Nation*, New York, Vintage Books Press, pp. 11-13

¹⁸² Wittkopf, E., Kegley, C. and Scott, J. (2004), *American Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing, p.25

¹⁸³ Kagan, R.(2006), *Dangerous Nation*, New York, Vintage Books Press, pp. 113-115

¹⁸⁴ Monroe Doctrine, for details see; <http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1601.html> access date 22 January 2013

and military power to protect its freedom. Third is to prevent any European power to own a territorial foothold in American continent. Fourth is conducting a unilateralist foreign policy, which means going alone to protect autonomy. Fifth is to collaborate with other powers when inevitable to solve a problem, but for limited time and aims. Sixth is that foreign policy must be compatible with the founding principles of the nation and the constitutional order as stated by the founding fathers of the state, to name; justice, domestic order, welfare, liberty. And seventh is to stay away from war and standing militaries because they endanger the constitutional principles.¹⁸⁵ This general pattern in US foreign policy has been protected during the 19th century and gradually changed in the first half of 20th century. The urgent need for American involvement against Axis powers in First World War ended this American desire to keep away from international problematic areas.¹⁸⁶ But, in the second decade of new millennia, a possible return to isolationism is discussed across academic circles in order to pave the way for a successful compromise of isolation and hegemony. This new type of isolation does not find its roots in above mentioned seven principles, but rather in fiscal burden caused by interventionist American policies after 9/11. Verschoor-Kirss (2012) argues that the financial cost of Afghanistan and Iraq operations costed over 5 trillion dollars resulting in a national debt of over 15 trillion dollars in following years. This heavy fiscal cost is one fundamental reason pushing the US to withdraw its forces from hot points across the world and to act reluctantly to use its military troops in front of regional crisis.¹⁸⁷ It seems that, the US will continue its efforts to coin a new hegemonic perception, and a new format of isolationism. The forthcoming condition for such a transition is persuasion of other stake holders for burden sharing at NATO, UN and other political and security based organizations.

¹⁸⁵ Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, pp.53-54

¹⁸⁶ D. M. Snow, (2004) *United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing, p.10

¹⁸⁷ Verschoor-Kirss, A. (2012), 'Isolation and Hegemony: A new approach for American foreign Policy' *International Policy Digest World News*, available at <http://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>

Continentalism, in parallel with isolationism, was another feature of US foreign policy following the independence. This policy against the European powers continued until mid-19th century enabling the United States to expand its geographic borders “from sea to shining sea”.¹⁸⁸ At the end of continentalist politics against European powers and native Indians particularly in the first half of the 19th century, the US guaranteed its territorial integrity through a composition of means from land purchase to ethnic cleansing. The acquisition of vast territories has been realized by either war or purchase from France, Great Britain, Spain and Mexico. With the annexation of Hawaii at the end of 19th Century the US has transformed into an imperial power capable to rival the European colonial empires by military and economic power instruments.¹⁸⁹ After the Civil War (1861-65) between the Union (North) and Confederate (South), the United States ran a race of prosperity, and by the end of 1870s it became one of the most prosperous states in the world. The masses of immigrants from Europe were adding new human power in a way boosting state capacity to become a continental power. In less than a century, 13 weak states have turned into a leviathan of 38 populous and prosperous states. The abolishment of slavery in the wake of Civil War which stood as a domestic obstacle between different levels of American society has helped to lay the stones of asocial peace amongst different layers of American society. This tremendous improvement in the structure of the US has granted her also a relative security, due to her power and prosperity as well as her unique geographic position away from old world giving little chance to European powers for an easy military campaign.¹⁹⁰ During the Cold War years, the US faced several threats originating from the Central and Southern American weak states. Those threats were originating from social and political unrests, drug trafficking into the US homeland, and possible communist ideology based military interventions. Such unrests attracted the US military, economic and political interventions as detailed in literature review Chapter of this thesis. During the term of Blaine, the Secretary of State in 1870s, the US froze Monroe’s

¹⁸⁸ Wittkopf, E., Kegley, C. and Scott, J. (2004), *American Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing, p.28

¹⁸⁹ Kagan, R.(2006), *Dangerous Nation*, New York, Vintage Books Press, pp. 130-140

¹⁹⁰ Kagan, R.(2006), *Dangerous Nation*, New York, Vintage Books Press, pp. 301-302

isolationist politics and pursued an active and influential path in Central America and Pacific trade routes. This new American initiative in western hemisphere was not seeking merely to increase her power and prosperity, but also to meet the obligations of being a great power with moral and spiritual values. On the way to improve her political and commercial ties with Central and South American states, the US faced two historical opponents; the British and Spanish Empires, but in order to prove a strong arm, it was vital for the US to take risk, to contain European influence and to consolidate the American influence at her backyard.¹⁹¹

The ideology of US foreign policy during the formative period in 18th and 19th centuries was occupied by moralism and legalism based on liberty, race and revolution. This ideological understanding has safely guided the country through Anglo-French rivalry and assured the territorial integrity at a continental level.¹⁹² This American foreign policy ideology gained coherence and appeal in the 18th and 19th Centuries and at the beginning of the 20th century it turned into a powerful body of thought for the US foreign policy officials which are called ‘internationalism’.¹⁹³ In this respect, Theodore Roosevelt’s policy is worth to mention with its realist notion to build up a strong navy projecting power across the globe to pursue American national interests. The famous proverb “Speak softly and carry a big stick...” belongs to him.¹⁹⁴ In the first half of the 20th Century, three American Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt (1901-09) Woodrow Wilson (1913-21) and Harry Truman (1945-53) have accomplished the ideological transition of the US from its traditional course of moralism and legalism into a global international engagement, pursuing realist aims.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ Kagan, R.(2006), *Dangerous Nation*, New York, Vintage Books Press, pp.313-315

¹⁹² Hunt, M. (2009), *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, London, p.125

¹⁹³ Hunt, M. (2009), *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, London, preface p.vii

¹⁹⁴ Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, p.45

¹⁹⁵ Quinn, Adam. (2010), *US Foreign Policy in Context; National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine*, New York, Routledge Press, pp.24-25

As the American ‘exceptionalism’ invites us to look from inside to the outside in order to understand how the domestic processes affect the foreign policy practices, the ‘internationalism’ invites us to look from the outside towards the inside to see how the position of the US in international realm affects her external behaviors.¹⁹⁶ In this internationalist engagement, the US has been a part of regional and/or international disputes. In this sense the unrests created by non-state actors have occupied a special place in American foreign policy initiatives. It was clear that internationalism in the post-Cold War term has made the United States less secure. The United States was a party to the disputes amongst other states anymore. Because, it was impossible to stay neutral and implement isolationist policies in front of regional/international disputes. One result of internationalism for the US was that it was seen as an adversary to one party or even to all parties. Moreover, the internationalism created “terrorist” enemies who were unable to conquer the US but do their best to give serious harms to American targets.¹⁹⁷ These were violent non-state actors which were attributed economic, societal and para-military roles. They began to occupy a significant place in the US domestic, regional, international security understanding and the national interest spectrum.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Buzan, B. (2004), *The United States and the Great Powers-World Politics in the Twenty First Century*, Cambridge, Polity Press, pp.165-166

¹⁹⁷ Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, p.60

¹⁹⁸ Quinn, in his book (2010) focuses on the transition of the US foreign policy ideology particularly during 20th Century. This transition has been based on reform of the international order, balance of power and the universalization of American values and practices. Today’s American foreign policy finds its roots in this transition. President Roosevelt and Wilson built a bridge between 19th and 20th Centuries, After the American-Spanish war of 1898, President Roosevelt aimed to give a new direction to the American statesmen embracing the roles and responsibilities of becoming the new great power. He confronted the Founder’s Era consensus to shun away from European affairs and new global conditions demanded a more active US foreign policy. Theodore Roosevelt was a strong realist, counting on the expansion and development of a strong military capability, particularly a capable navy for greater international activism. Similar to Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson’s term has also been dominated by four European great powers; Britain, Germany, France and Russia. Although Wilson preferred an international order based on moralism and idealism rather than realist teachings, he also followed a path identical to Roosevelt in order to increase the level of American international engagement. The interventionist political practices such as Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic are outcomes of this internationalism. In such interventions, the requirement to pursue national interests has undermined the self-determination principle of Wilsonism. On the other hand, the term of Harry Truman has been dominated by the conditions of Cold War, and the US has been attributed vastly increased roles. The US was deeply involved in European politics as well as in any other region over the globe in terms of a new internationalism. This was a new American-led international order, and Truman doctrine was a rigid practice of increasing American influence on international order. The US foreign policy strategy during the Cold War has been identified by Truman principles until demise of Soviet Union.

3.2 American Foreign Policy in Cold War Term

In fact, two leading states during the Cold War era, the Soviet Union and the United States possessed some artificial similarities. First, both states were born in revolution. Second, both states had vast frontiers and inherited ideological aspirations not solely for their nations but at a global context. Third, both states entered the war as a result of surprise attacks by Germany and Japan. At the end of WWII in 1945, when the armies of these two super powers met at Elbe River these were the superficial similarities they had.¹⁹⁹ But, shortly after the war, these two super powers realized that the controversial ideologies and aspirations they hold would deepen the distance and fractions between them and ignite a Cold War. Victory in the Second World War had granted no security to these great powers, and eventually the members of Grand Alliance of the Second World War have been the enemies of Cold War.²⁰⁰

The Cold War has been the most significant political issue in the second half of 20th Century for the United States and the Soviets. This was an unnamed fight between two adversaries by way of covert activities used indirectly to threaten each other such as propaganda, economic warfare, espionage, technical intelligence, assistance to underground movements etc. In this fierce competition both fronts sought to expand their influence as well as their security zones. In addition to Eastern Europe as their main zone of influence, Soviets sought to expand its security zone into the Middle East, Central Asia and North Korea. Similar to the Soviets, in addition to the Middle East, the United States established a zone of security in Western Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

The new American foreign policy in Cold War era was shaped by George Kennan's ideas foreseeing the communist expansion as major threat to be contained. His famous lengthy telegram from American Embassy of Moscow to Washington in

¹⁹⁹Gaddis, J. L. (2005), *The Cold War*, New York, Penguin Press, p.7

²⁰⁰Gaddis, J. L. (2005), *The Cold War*, New York, Penguin Press, p.46

1946 has constituted the corner stones of this containment doctrine against Soviet Union.²⁰¹ Kennan's foreign policy ideology stood against moralism and legalism of Founding Era which, he thought, harmed the American foreign affairs spirit for decades. He argued that the political approach based on moralism and legalism has obstructed a clear definition and an effective pursuit of national interests. Kennan's foreign policy understanding finds its roots in realist ideology, blaming moralism and legalism as superficial political problems.²⁰²

This new philosophy in US foreign policy has continued with small changes until the end of Cold War term. American foreign politics have followed this realist philosophy, under pursue of clear and well defined national interests. Much direct and indirect American interference have occurred across the globe such as the Middle East, the Southeast Asia, the Central America, and the Central Asia as a continuity of this realist approach, sidelining domestic and international moral and legal concerns. In fact, this habit of interference with domestic affairs of other states has roots to the Woodrow Wilson's term in the first quarter of the 20th Century. Wilson, who believed in an idealist global order, did not hesitate to use hard power to increase American influence upon Central American societies.²⁰³

In time after 1950s, tensions over occupied Germany, implementation of Truman Doctrine, nuclear weapons race, outbreak of Korean War and establishment of Warsaw pact and NATO moved the political rivalry into military dimension. The reflections of the US foreign policy practices accumulated particularly on "containment" of the Soviet Union from further expansion. Together with the protection of oil fields in the Middle East, the containment of Soviets was the central vision of the US foreign policy until the collapse of iron curtain in 1991.²⁰⁴ Moreover, for the US, supporting the armed groups and violent actors in terms of

²⁰¹ Gaddis, J. L. (2005), *The Cold War*, New York, Penguin Press, pp.28-30

²⁰² Hunt, M. (2009), *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, London, Yale University Press, pp.5-7

²⁰³ Hunt, M. (2009), *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, London, Yale University Press, p.112

²⁰⁴ See the description of Cold War, and how it started, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold_war.htm access date 22 January 2013

ideology, finance and military armaments was one aspect of Cold War engagement against the Soviet Union.

The Truman Doctrine inspired by George Kennan's containment idea was followed by new politics based upon forming allies, alliances and military forces in order to deter the Soviets from communist expansion and igniting another world war. Foreign assistance, financial support and covert military operations to support friendly regimes were the foreign policy tools of US administration in Near East and Far East to contain the Soviet Union. Along the Cold War years, the US Presidents have always attributed the number one priority of their Middle East policy to the prevention of the Soviets from the region.²⁰⁵

During the Cold War, the US foreign policy followed a considerable continuity with 'twin goals' of (i) national security and (ii) economic prosperity. The attack of Japan in 1941 at Pearl Harbor demonstrated that new military and technical capabilities would easily project military power beyond vast distances.²⁰⁶ This was a direct threat to the American homeland security, first time since the colonial wars of 19th century against British, French and Spanish armies. But more serious than this threat, first time since the independence and period of continentalism, the United States perceived a global threat to its national security with the emergence of the USSR as a tremendous military power.²⁰⁷ The possibility for another isolationist politics for the US has faded with emergence of these new threats during and after the Second World War. The second leg of the US foreign policy in Europe and the Middle East was the sustainment of a liberal economy. The first step in this respect was supporting the post-war European economy by providing a seamless and robust financial aid. Bretton Woods system has been established for this aim upon the

²⁰⁵ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press, p.28

²⁰⁶ Gaddis, J. L. (2005), *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, Boston, Harvard University Press, p.69

²⁰⁷ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press, p.27

principles of free trade and fixed exchange rates and has been utilized for restructuring the war-torn economies of free European states.²⁰⁸

After the Second World War the US had no luxury of returning to isolation policy and detaching itself from international system. As detailed in next section, such a decision would result into catastrophic outcomes and give Soviets a remarkable capability to expand its influence into Europe and Asia. The US administration had a rigid understanding that in addition to a strong military armada they could contain the Soviet Union and international communism effectively by the principles of freedom of speech, freedom of belief, freedom of enterprise and freedom of political choice.²⁰⁹ In this period, unlike the politics of colonial Empires of previous centuries, the US followed a much more different way to consolidate its influence, basically using economic aid and political and military support to the friendly regimes. Thus, in the Cold War period the United States became a major power and played crucial economic, political and military roles in global politics. In the wake of Cold War, President Truman explains their intension for coming decades as “We must continue to be a military nation, if we are to maintain leadership among other nations.” And, towards the end of Cold War, President Bush says “As we seek peace, we must also remain strong. The purpose of our military might is... to deter war.”

Although the Cold War years were dominated by state rivalry and competition, the VNSAs have been benefited by parties as an asset under covert operations. During Cold War years, the VNSAs have been perceived by the US administration as agents to be used and/or benefited against the Soviet threat. The violence caused by the VNSAs for Cold War period American leaders, was not a primary matter of international politics, but an asset to be benefited when required. As discussed by Rosati and Scott (2007) the VNSAs have been supported and used as entities to help in containing communist expansion. The American support to Mujahedeen groups in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion in early 1980s is a rigid indicator of this policy and the literature on Cold War term's VNSA acts focus upon the regions such as

²⁰⁸ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press, p.29

²⁰⁹ Gaddis, J. L. (2005), *The Cold War*, New York, Penguin Press, p.161

Afghanistan and the Middle East, where American-Soviet competition intensified within the rules of bipolar system.²¹⁰

In Cold War years, for American administrations, not the VNSAs but the states supporting and/or sponsoring terrorism were the fundamental issue. Throughout half a century a conventional war between two blocks was unlikely under the devastating capacity of nuclear warfare promising no victory to the winner, but state-sponsored VNSAs have provided a substitute for traditional warfare with little risk and cost for those states. It was believed that either rouge or failed, some states were sponsoring terrorism against western world in order to avoid the risk of a general war they would not dare to take a place. One main reason for the proliferation of non-state violence was the structure of the international order after the Second World War, limiting the states from using military power. In fact, only few sovereign states within the UN Security Council could claim the monopoly of the force. The other small or weak states and quasi-states across the world, particularly in Africa, South America and Asia, have been challenged by VNSAs either within their own territory or by using the land of neighboring states.

Named either as revolutionary or terrorist groups by the states, these VNSAs have been used by both super powers for own interests during Cold War.²¹¹ The violence named as revolutionary acts have taken place generally in Western Europe, Northern America, Australia, Japan and New Zealand between 1970s and 2000s and were influenced by communist ideology.²¹² Amongst others, Murphy (1989)²¹³, Segaller (1987)²¹⁴ Gurr and Cole (2000) contend upon how state sponsored terrorism has been

²¹⁰ Rosati, J. A. and Scott J. M.(2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson West Press, p.4

²¹¹ Adams, J. (1986) "The Financing of Terror", Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986, p. 57-58.

²¹² For more information see Table 1. Revolutionary killings and the intensity of revolutionary terrorism in the developed world, 1970-2000, at <http://www.march.es/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/pdf/Revolutionaryterrorism.jpr.pdf> access date 26 January 2015

²¹³ Murphy, J. F. (1989) *State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic Dimensions*, Boulder, Westview Press.

²¹⁴ Segaller, S. (1987) *Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s*. San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich

exploited by either super powers or weak states during Cold War years for the aim of intervening in another state's domestic and/or regional politics or to reach their national goals.²¹⁵

With the demise of Soviet Union, these VNSAs in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia had fewer options when compared to Cold War era and they had to adopt their strategies effectively to use the advantages of globalization. They realized that security and stability were the overarching consideration amongst the winners and losers of Post-Cold War era and they had to avoid any condition to attract the arrows of great powers so they may blame them as the origin of instability and disorder. The VNSAs were aware that they have lost their bargaining capability of Cold War and have fallen out of the military, ideological and economic advantages of Cold War's bipolar order.²¹⁶ In this sense, the basic US concern on VNSA capabilities was the probability of these entities acquiring loose nuclear material in post-Soviet republics. Allison et al (1996) argue that the probability of a nuclear attack to the US has increased in this term and VNSAs have been evaluated as actors to dare such an attack. It was clear either rouge or failed, any state sponsoring terrorist group would not constrain such an attack.²¹⁷ After the Cold War and with the rise of religious fundamentalism, the approach of American administrations towards the VNSAs has been subject to substantial change.

3.3 American Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Term

Although the end of Cold War created a gradual relief in international relations it caused a greater complexity and ambiguity in a short period of time, with the emergence of new hot spots, over a vast geography across the Balkans, Caucasus and

²¹⁵ Gurr, N. and Cole B. (2000) *The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

²¹⁶ Art, R.J. (2005), *America's Grand Strategy and World Politics*, New York, Routledge Press, pp.102-104

²¹⁷ Allison, et al (1996) *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

the Middle East. In this new environment, the agenda of the US foreign policy has changed mainly focusing on her national interests. In this new environment of turbulence, the United States used the advantages of being sole global power in the absence of an adversary state.²¹⁸ In this respect, the end of Cold War has provided the American administration with new opportunities as well as constraints in foreign policy. This new era was an environment where non-state actors, either peaceful or violent, started to play important roles in global politics. 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks on US homeland is a corner stone transiting the US foreign policy into a coercive and interventionist structure. This era can be best understood by examining the US foreign policy initiatives across a wide spectrum between constraints and opportunities of President Bush Sr., and President Clinton before September 11 2001 attacks and President Bush Jr. and President Obama after.²¹⁹

George H. Bush (1988-1992) was in office during the period of transition from Cold War into a new era. Bush described the end of Cold War in 1991 as “new world order”. In the wake of Cold War’s harsh international struggle, this new world order was thought to be built upon the principles of international ‘justice’ and ‘fair play’ and would promote freedom and respect for human rights amongst the states.²²⁰ President Bush also predicted some roles for the US as the only super power that could mobilize its material and moral sources for democracy. According to Brilmayer (1994) Bush anticipated the American dominancy to be welcomed by the global community. In this sense, Bush’s vision stressed the appeal for “Wilsonian idealism”, which according to Kissinger (Diplomacy, 1994) was a continuing paradigm for the politics of the US presidents from Roosevelt to Clinton. It is not a surprise that during Bush administration no dominant and consistent foreign policy patterns have been implemented in the absence of Soviet Union. Rather than following big strategic steps, Bush administration preferred ‘average tactical

²¹⁸ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press, p. 50-51

²¹⁹ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press, p.32

²²⁰ Wittkopf, E., Kegley, C. and Scott, J. (2004), *American Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing, p.55

achievements' in this new complex international environment. It was clear that Bush administration could not predict the hasty collapse of iron curtain, so it was caught unprepared and rather than pursuing big goals Bush preferred to take small steps to prevent any unexpected loss by the uncertainty and possible uncontrollable conflicts in new international order.²²¹

On the other hand, Bill Clinton (1992-2000) had an ambitious foreign policy agenda but with a more modest role during his presidency. Principle items in his list were; the prevention of aggressions, the control of nuclear proliferation, the promotion of democracy and human rights, the enlargement of international market economy and conditioning the humanitarian disasters. Naturally, the impact of globalization was paramount in these principles pushing them into the front line. The security concerns left their place to international economic issues particularly among the advanced market democracies. Starting in 1993, until 11 September 2001, economic issues in parallel with environmental concerns and human rights occupied the top of the agenda. Under Clinton administration international political economy practices resulted in creation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and FTAA (Free Trade Area of Americas) embracing the North and South American countries.

But the terrorist attacks on September 11th have opened an alternative path for US foreign policy. The possibility of establishing an international economy based on foreign policy approach has been deeply swept by national security concerns with the declaration of war on terror. As detailed above, after the end of Cold War, from early 1990s until 9/11 2001, the US has pursued a pragmatic approach in foreign affairs during Bush and Clinton administrations. This was a transition period from a bipolar system into a more complex world urging to take careful steps. In this sense, the leadership in international relations could not be delegated to the UN and/or other international institutions, but rather they have been used to increase the legitimacy of US led initiatives as well as to persuade other member states to share the burden and

²²¹ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press, p.33

reduce the cost to the US.²²² In this new global order, the US has become the first global super power resting upon economic strength, military strength and cultural attractiveness.

The US military capability, which gave confidence to the US decision makers to take unilateral steps in post-Cold War term, is worth to mention briefly. Since its foundation years, the US administrations have spent great efforts to own a military power with huge strategic capacity and technological tenets. The US defense spending has always surpassed the combination of next five or six countries in last century. The US is the only country that can plan and conduct more than one large-scale combat operation far away from their home bases. The US owns more than 60 military bases in 19 countries across the world with an active men power of 1.4 million.²²³ Although the United States has formed the strongest military power ever seen across the globe, this power has domestic and foreign limitations. Domestic limitations are linked to “the Vietnam syndrome” of public opinion, focusing on American military casualties, and the economic burden upon their shoulders and prevention of international war crimes. Under the light of the lessons learned in Vietnam, the US has conducted successful military operations over different parts of the world in post-Cold War term. Amongst these operations, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are significant ones.²²⁴ On the other hand, the foreign limitations are dual. One is the adverse public reaction to an international military operation led by the United States. Such reactions have been observed in US led Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) operations. The other one is the armed VNSA reactions against the US, fueled by ethnic nationalism and particularly the radical Islam.²²⁵

²²² Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, p.16

²²³ Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, pp.17-18

²²⁴ Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, p.64

²²⁵ Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, p.65

3.4 American Foreign Policy in Post- 9/11 Term

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 put an end to this transition period forcing the US to commence unilateral steps like a rogue superpower. This was an 8 year of President Bush Jr. “unilateral” period that alienated the rest of the world. Unilateral foreign policy pattern is described simply as; ‘implying policies regardless of other states’ wishes’.²²⁶ This period of unilateralism can be described also as a “limitless sovereignty period” that frees itself from international commitments, but does whatever it perceives useful for its interests. Thomas M.Kane (2006) contends these unilateral US foreign policy practices under five headlines;(i)repudiating its anti-ballistic missile treaty commitments, (ii)imposing tariffs and economic sanctions against free trade, (iii)attacking Iraq despite the objections of UNSecurity Council members, (iv)disregarding its responsibilities of Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners in war against terrorism, and (v)ignoring several other economic, environmental and legal commitments.²²⁷

On the other hand, the foreign policy of President Bush (2000-2008) appeared to follow a realpolitik approach heavily resting upon hard power. Bush allowed the majority of the foreign policy advisors who were working for father Bush to work for him again.²²⁸ Significant personalities within Bush administration, known as neo-conservatives, tended to follow a “hegemonist” path viewing military power as the essential factor for American security. Although realpolitik is evident in George W. Bush policies, it is possible to link his neo-conservative understanding with a Hegelian sort of idealism that envisaged a preternatural power to cast a new global order. This view has been committed to the unipolar world order.

²²⁶ Kane T.M.(2006), *Theoretical Roots of US Foreign Policy, Machiavelli and American Unilateralism*, New York, Routledge p.2

²²⁷ Kane T.M.(2006), *Theoretical Roots of US Foreign Policy, Machiavelli and American Unilateralism*, New York, Routledge p.1

²²⁸ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press,p.34

Bush Doctrine identified an agenda with four principles. First, the threat was identified as an alliance of terrorist groups and rogue states against the United States and the values of American nation. Second, the core value was to be the spread of democracy to undermine terrorism and promote American goals. Third, although multilateral initiatives were appreciated and given the first priority, in case of a requirement the United States would act unilaterally. Fourth, the United States would project its supremacy anywhere any time across the world when necessary.²²⁹ President Bush's global war on terrorism has envisaged a defense buildup, a homeland security and use of a heavy military force abroad, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan.²³⁰ In this respect, the foreign policy orientation of the US was based on deterrence, containment and preemptive strikes on terrorism and probable targets throughout the world. In the wake of September 11, 2001 following the attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, the old enemy communism, has been replaced by Al Qaida-a VNSA, Iraq-a rogue state and global transnational terrorist network using more complex, technological and more effective assets.

Originating from its homeland security worries, the George W. Bush administration enacted two National Security Strategy (NSS) Documents in 2002 and 2006 in the wake of 9/11 attacks. In NSS 2002, President Bush centered on creating a 'balance of power' in favor of freedom. 'Balance of power' is used by Bush administration not as a 'cause of conflict' amongst great powers but an 'alliance' against a common threat; the global terror networks.²³¹ It will be helpful to briefly mention about these highest level security documents of American administration. These two NSS have promoted the implementation of 'unilateral' policies rather than 'co-operation' in contrary to their proclaimed aspiration. In 2002 NSS Document²³², the United States

²²⁹ See details at <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201205.tierney.obama-doctrine-iraq.pdf> access date 22 January 2013

²³⁰ Rosati, J. A. and Scott, J. M. (2007), *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth Press, p.35

²³¹ Quinn, A. (2010), *US Foreign Policy in Context; National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine*, New York, Routledge Press, p.2

²³² US National Security Strategy Document 2002, available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>, access date 22 January 2013

have declared “war on terrorism” to protect the security of the American people. George W. Bush said “it will be a long-war”, and his eight years administration justified him bringing to the world, only “war, terrorism and security” anxieties. In other words, with 2002 NSS, the world has witnessed a pre-emptive strike doctrine conducting Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. After 9/11 attacks, with a worldwide sympathy the US military intervention in Afghanistan has been supported by NATO, EU and Russia which appeared to be a US-led multilateralism. But, despite a strong reaction from the UN Security Council, and NATO member states, the unilateral US action against Iraq in 2003 caused this support and sympathy to fade away quickly.²³³

During Bush Administration, one of the most important international issues which did not receive attention was Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although George Bush was the first president who officially declared the requirement for a Palestinian state, the 9/11 attacks caused dramatic changes in American Middle East politics. During the “war on terror” campaign, the Arab states including the pro-Western monarchies have been depicted as “dangerous” states. This was a shift in American foreign policy towards the Middle East. The domestic and international security need for Americans has surpassed its traditional continuous and cheap oil politics.²³⁴ Furthermore, the American administration openly questioned the strategy of protecting oil monarchies despite its high cost while the US imported only 10 per cent of annual oil consumption.²³⁵

Therefore, throughout the war on terror campaign, the US foreign policy has followed a double standard with regard to Palestine conflict.²³⁶ Naturally, the US

²³³ Gardner, H. (2005), *American Global Strategy and the “War on Terrorism”*, Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Limited, p.2

²³⁴ Halabi, Y. (2008), *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East-From Crises to Change*, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing, pp. 97-99

²³⁵ Halabi, Y. (2008), *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East-From Crises to Change*, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing, p.101

²³⁶ Halabi, Y. (2008), *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East-From Crises to Change*, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing, p.102

overlooked the Israeli operations violating international law while Palestinians, particularly HAMAS have been treated as a part of terrorist camp and this approach has encouraged the Israelis to conduct several campaigns and to take unilateral steps such as deporting Palestinians, building illegal settlements, repressing civil movements in Gaza and West Bank. Amongst other small and medium scale military operations, Operation Defensive Shield/West Bank (2002), Operation Rainbow/Gaza Strip (2004), Operation Summer Rains/Gaza Strip (2006) and Operation Cast Lead/Gaza Strip (2008–2009) were large scale operations carried out by Israeli Military across the Palestinian territories.²³⁷ Even though President Bush has stated that war on terror was not against Islam, this was not the case for Muslim societies. Many ill actions and statements have associated Islam with violence and the gap between the sides has widened in the first decade of new millennia. Particularly the last operation which has caused tremendous amount of death upon civilian life and property was a bad heritage for Obama received from Bush administration.

One positive outcome of this unilateral foreign policy in Bush term is the peaceful settlement of Aceh conflict in 2005. Bush administration has spent efforts to find a compromise between GAM and Indonesian governments, fearing of two unwanted reasons; first the proliferation of global fundamentalist terrorism across the Southeast area and second the interference of any regional power with the conflict and harm the regional US economic and strategic interests.

²³⁷ For details of the State of Israel's military operations in Gaza between 2000 and 2008 see *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3 (Spring 2009), pp. 122–138. Although these are the large scale operations of Israel in Gaza Strip, there are more. To detail them: Operation Automatic Gear, 9/6/03, Operation Root Canal, 10/10/03–10/19/03, Operation Continuous Story, 3/15/04–c. 4/5/04, Operation Rainbow, 5/13/04–5/24/04, Operation Active Shield, 6/28/04–8/5/04, Operation to Widen the North Gaza Buffer Zone, 9/8/04–9/11/04, Operation Days of Penitence, 10/1/04–10/15/04, Operation King's Court, 10/24/04–10/26/04, Operation Orange Iron, 12/17/04–12/18/04, Operation Violet Iron, 12/22/04–1/2/05, Operation Autumn Wind, 1/2/05, Operation Eastern Step, 1/15/05–1/17/05, Operation First Rain, 9/24/05–10/2/2005, Unnamed Operation Targeting Northern Gaza, launched 12/5/05, Operation Blue Skies, launched 12/25/05, Operation Southern Arrow, launched 4/4/06, Operation Summer Rains, launched 6/27/06, Operation Samson's Pillars, 7/26/06–7/28/06, Operation Locked Kindergarten, 8/27/06–8/31/06, Operation Autumn Clouds, 11/1/06–11/8/06, Unnamed Operation against Northern Gaza, 11/21/06–11/26/06, Operation Hot Winter, 2/28/08–3/3/08, See details at <http://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/files/Israeli%20Military%20Attacks%20on%20Gaza%202009.pdf> access date 12 February 2017

On the other hand, as the forty-fourth President of the United States, the election of Obama (2008-2016) as an African American was a significant event in American history. The rise of Obama to power was a shining example for the equality of human beings, in the name of American people who voted for him. This was also a reflection of American democratic values as well as a hope for a better world after President Bush Jr's unilateral policies based on coercive power shaped by preemptive doctrines.

During 8 years, Bush administration has made the world a vulnerable place in front of complex and unpredictable threats, mainly by activities of the VNSAs across the globe. Anti-Americanism has reached its zenith during this period.²³⁸ The U.S. image has declined steeply almost everywhere including America's European Allies. Several public opinion surveys have been conducted across the globe indicating this sharp decline of particularly during the presidency of George W. Bush until 2008.²³⁹ The trust and confidence on the US leadership that was built up during the bi-polar confrontation was largely damaged during the "war on terror" phase and President Obama had to navigate through these conditions. He was obliged to accomplish a smooth transition from unilateralism into internationalism and bring other nations of the world around a table through cooperation and diplomacy for a better and peaceful world. There was a necessity for global collaboration to overcome several global crises. In such a political environment, the biggest challenge for Obama was the decline in American economy. This domestic economic meltdown did not only affect the American society causing millions to lose their jobs, homes and savings but also the international financial environment with serious consequences across the globe. In addition to these two substantial problems, the immediate problem to be dealt was the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan. The number one priority of Obama

²³⁸ Zaki M. M (2011), *American Global Challenges, The Obama Era*, New York, Palgrave Mac Millan, pp.1-4

²³⁹ After the terrorist attacks in September 11, 2001 global sympathy inclined for the United States of America. But the survey of Pew Global Attitudes proved that, in many countries, including the historical ally UK, ratings for the U.S. has dropped dramatically. Surveys conducted after invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 sympathy for America declined more in 26 of 33 countries. See details of Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008) at <http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/#americas-image-gap>, access date; 5December 2014

administration was to bring a peaceful end to “Operation Iraqi Freedom” which was ongoing since March 2003 and withdraw the bulk of American troops from the field. As a consequence of this political turn, in August 2010, all American combat troops were withdrawn from Iraqi area of operations.²⁴⁰

The number one priority for Obama administration was to prove a moral leadership to heal the wounds caused by coercive politics of previous US administration. When I analyze Obama administration’s foreign policy, I see that President Obama does not follow a rigid doctrine similar for example to Truman Doctrine stating, “You shall resist communist insurgency”, or Bush Jr. Doctrine saying, “You shall be with us, not with the terrorists.” He was aware that the world was complicated enough not to be properly perceived in a rigid and direct modality and would result in a straightjacket limiting the options for the presidential diplomacy. He followed a pragmatic foreign policy that can be regarded as similar to those of Bismarck and Churchill who preferred flexibility in their foreign policy.

This flexibility in Obama’s foreign policy steps, for the use of military force, can be determined under following headlines basically based on the lessons learned from the failures of previous administrations. First, Obama has made stable and decisive steps to limit the employment of military troops, from the Middle East, particularly from Iraq. Second, he was more careful about unintended negative consequences of military operations. Third, he preferred multilateral operations if this required a large scale commitment. And finally, Obama was averse to long and large scale initiatives such as the nation-building process in Iraq. The US non-intervention in Libya in 2012 is a sample for this policy change. In Libya the US has played a secondary role with the active involvement of UN Security Council and Arab League contrary to its unilateral move in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Zaki M. M (2011), *American Global Challenges, The Obama Era*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, pp.5-8

²⁴¹ Alex Verschoor-Kirss argues the difference between Bush and Obama foreign policy initiatives at *International Policy Digest*; *Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy*. See details at <https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/>, access date 12 February 2017

As a summarizing statement for this section of the thesis, it is possible to contend that the US grand strategy of post-Second World War order has been based on three overlapping objectives. (i)to reduce near and long term threats to US national security, (ii)to maximize domestic prosperity by a global liberal economic order, (iii)to create a global institutional order in the favor of the US interests.²⁴² Accordingly, during the terms of President Bush and President Obama three dynamics have shaped the American foreign policy. These three dynamics have provided a fertile and advantageous ground for US decision makers in their implementation at problematic zones, including their approach to the VNSAs. These dynamics are, (i)the legitimacy of post-Cold War unipolar system accepted by other great powers, (ii)the managerial tasks of United States to preserve the peace and stability as the leader of unipolar system, and (iii)the national interests of the United States as the hegemon power.²⁴³

First factor, the “legitimacy” of the international order, was also a core element of bipolar system during Cold War. Second factor the “managerial tasks” of United States in new world order aimed to keep the global peace and stability maintained by the bipolar system along Cold War years. And the third factor the “national interests” of the United States is related to the Middle East and Southeast Asia and its direct relation to Arab-Israeli and Aceh-Indonesia conflicts. When approaching to both conflicts, the Palestine and Aceh, the US has behaved under the implications of these three factors. Both conflicts have been perceived as threats to the legitimacy of

²⁴² Brooks G.S. and Wohlforth W.C. (2016), *“The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century”*, New York, Oxford University Press, Introduction.

²⁴³ The position of the US, within the international system, in Post-Cold War term has been studied and investigated broadly. It was an accepted perception that the bi-polar system of the Cold War has been replaced by a uni-polar system where the US, with its economic, technological, political and military capabilities, emerged as a hegemon state. The duties, roles, inclinations, tasks, responsibilities of the US as the hegemon state can be grouped under three headlines. First one is the “legitimacy” of the international order. Amongst others Henry Kissinger (1957-1964-1968) identifies the needs and conditions of the international order as either legitimate or revolutionary. Similarly, the second one, the “managerial tasks” of the United States in new world order is studied by Birthe Hansen (2000). Hansen’s main idea is that retreating from the global leadership is both irresponsible and impractical for the US. The third one is the “national interests” of the United States. Parallel to this dissertation I focus on the US interests to the Middle East and Southeast Asia and its direct relation to Arab-Israeli and Aceh-Indonesia conflicts. I have referred to the works of R. Kagan (2008), P. Callaghan (2004) and H.J. Wiarda (2011) for the US interest related to these two conflicts.

unipolar system, both conflicts have been evaluated to be solved within the managerial tasks of the US and both conflicts have been dealt through the national interests of sole hegemon power, the US. These three factors are explained in following paragraphs in detail.

3.4.1 Legitimacy of the Unipolar World Order

If the international order is tending towards stability and peace, it is accepted by all other role players. The bipolar system of Cold War built on balance of power was accepted by all role players and no state aspired to change that international order. In fact, today the international order reflects a unipolar character, and the great powers of today do not tend to challenge the system because current order inherits stability and peace under the control of a hegemon state, the US. This balance was assured by paramount material and political power of the United States as well as the confidence of other great powers which need a peaceful international environment to continue their peaceful rise.

Henry Kissinger argues that, the legitimacy of international order identifies the behaviors of other great powers.²⁴⁴ If the international order is accepted by all power, it is “legitimate”. If not, then it is a “revolutionary” order and one or more major powers will reject it and take initiative to change it. The revolutionary international orders of pre-First World War and pre-Second World War were the origin of such unrest amongst the great powers and this revolutionary order pushed them into devastating wars. In general terms, if an international order is tending towards stability and peace, it is legitimate and accepted by all role players. The bipolar system of Cold War era built on balance of power was accepted by all role players as legitimate, and no state aspired to change that international order. Actually, although the international order is moving towards unipolarity, the great powers of new millennia do not tend to constitute a “revolutionary” position, because current

²⁴⁴ Waltz, K.N. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, California, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, p.62

international order inherits stability and peace under the control of a hegemonic state, the US in this case.²⁴⁵

In a system of stable order assured by the tremendous power of a hegemonic state, each state will feel confident against possible unrests. Even if some states may have revolutionary insights or regimes, they are controlled and put under pressure by the system.²⁴⁶ Two different approaches of China towards Palestine problem in its historical course is a good example for this situation. China has changed its traditional pro-Palestinian “revolutionary” rhetoric of 1970s and 80s and has adopted a new approach parallel with the hegemonic state politics in last two decades. In such a global order, when the possibility of war disappears among great powers they can stand a relative loss. The reaction of France and Germany to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 indicates such a sample. Though France conducted soft balancing maneuvers in UN echelons insisting on international legitimacy for a military operation in Iraq, other powerful members of the international system did not give a strong support to France due to their confidence in the status and continuity of current system. In this sense, the role of other European powers in Iraq war decision was mixed. France and Germany insisted on finding a real evidence of a threat to the global security. France insisted particularly to insert soft power over Iraqi government and argued that a UN resolution was needed in this parallel. Germany’s concern was mainly directed to preserve its economic ties with Iraq and avoid any possible loss.²⁴⁷

In addition to the great power confidence to this “legitimate” international order, the system controls also the VNSAs no matter how much power they exert into the system to realize their revolutionary aims. The pressure exerted by VNSAs cannot go further than minor effects upon regional and international affairs in such international order.

²⁴⁵ Ikenberry G.J., Mastanduno M. and Wohlfort W.C. “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences” *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 1–27

²⁴⁶ Waltz, K.N. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, California, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, p.63

²⁴⁷ Danju I, Maasoglu Y, Maasoglu N. “The Reasons Behind U.S. Invasion of Iraq” *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences* 81 (2013) 682 – 690

3.4.2 Managerial Tasks of Unipolar State

In addition to protecting the legitimacy of the world order, the second role of the US as the leading power is to conduct “managerial tasks” for the sake of international system. By these managerial tasks, the US as the leading power, managed to control the free riding of adversary states and non-state actors, the rise of possible challengers, and prevented a possible formation of counter-alliances.²⁴⁸ Although Cold War ended in a relatively peaceful process, due to the loss of communication amongst blocks, and also miscalculations amongst the states, the transformation of the international system has caused fear. It has brought unrest and clashes particularly to the Middle East and Southeast Asia regions and their near peripheries.

Between 1991 and 2001 we have observed regional unrests, with similar consequences. That is why, the responsibility of the unipolar hegemon was to take managerial steps, to restore the legitimacy and to assure the global stability. When doing this, the unipolar hegemon defines the agenda of global politics and needs to share the burden with other global/regional partners.²⁴⁹ When dealing with regional conflicts, such as Bosnia in 1993 and Kosovo in 1999, the involvement of the military power of the hegemon state, in this case the US, was less costly and most feasible option for other great powers to assure the regional peace and also the global stability and to minimize its negative effects to the peaceful rise of great powers.²⁵⁰ This strategy has raised no threat to the interests of other great powers and has found application areas in regional conflicts, such as Persian Gulf (1990-91), Somalia (1992-93), Haiti (1994-95) and Yugoslavia (BiH-1993, Kosovo-1999).²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Hansen, B. (2000), *Unipolarity and the Middle East*, Surrey, CurzonPress Richmond, p.59

²⁴⁹ Hansen, B. (2000), *Unipolarity and the Middle East*, Surrey, CurzonPress Richmond, pp.69-72

²⁵⁰ Hansen, B. (2000), *Unipolarity and the Middle East*, Surrey, CurzonPress Richmond, p.58

²⁵¹ These operations have been conducted by either under UN, NATO or Multinational framework, but in all cases the US has led the political and military issues. For more detail see: <http://www.desert-storm.com/>, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf,

But in case of the Middle East, we observe that the US has taken unilateral steps in post 9/11 conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq interventions. With the shift of the US interest from the Middle East towards the Far East in 2000s, we observe similar unilateral steps in hot-spots of Southeast Asia. In this respect the US has made steps on cooperation with Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore under the headlines of military, economic or political initiatives. These efforts seek two aims; first is to keep other regional powers away from the region and second is to help the local and regional governments to contain Islamic terrorist organizations.

It is possible that US supremacy will continue for upcoming decades. This ‘one superpower and several great powers’ global order is expected to continue on a triple axis of American supremacy; strong economy, predominant military power and liberal political philosophy. As the US is challenging amongst several problems on a spectrum from non-state threats to economic decline, from soft balancing maneuvers of great powers to the indirect threats of rogue states, she needs to distribute the load over her shoulders. What could be done in order to distribute the load and create a more democratic and peaceful international environment? Kagan (2008) argues that the establishment of a “league of democracies” is essential in which the heavy roles of the US diminish gradually. Thus, a perfect liberal order and a concert of democracy will persuade the global democratic front to share the burden upon the US shoulders.²⁵² If such a league is established, this will also help the strong autocracies of post-Cold War era to be tamed by the virtues of democracy.

In this context, similar to other contentious regions across the globe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia come afore for the great powers and the US: either to promote democracy or to support autocracy. Promoting democracy, human rights, liberal economy, and global legacy in these two regions of the world will also contain the radical movements. So far, rather than proving a sincere intention to promote democracy with all the institutions, ‘reform and pressure’ have been used as two

²⁵² Kagan, R. (2008), *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Toronto, Alfred A.Knopf, p.97

assets to reach quick solutions in these regions in terms of human rights, women's status, free press, repeated elections etc.²⁵³

3.4.3 Strategic Interests of Unipolar State

The national interests are a composition of domestic and foreign interests. Amongst domestic ones, independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, the maintenance of constitutional order comes fore.²⁵⁴ Foreign interests, no matter how vital they are, are strongly related to the security and economic stability of that state. In addition to the 'legitimacy' of international order and the 'managerial tasks' of the unipolar hegemon at global context, the Middle East and the Southeast Asia inherit another specialty; their strong links to the 'strategic interests' of the United States. The strategic interests of the states are motivated by powerful national interests.²⁵⁵ In this context, the United States cannot behave disinterested to any conflict in these regions and leave it to the hands of other great powers. Because, if the US follows such a track, other regional powers may interfere with the situation and attempt to form symmetric alignments behind other great powers identical to Cold War era. This situation, then, will deteriorate the stability and the legitimacy of current international order and the stability in the region.²⁵⁶

The current status of the Middle East in international order has been consolidated along the Cold War years and the American foreign policy targets in the Middle East region have been accomplished. In early 1990s, in the wake of Cold War, it has been realized that, the Soviets have withdrawn from the region, the strategic natural resources of the region has been taken under the control of the West and Israel has

²⁵³ Kagan, R. (2008), *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, Toronto, Alfred A. Knopf, pp.100-102

²⁵⁴ Callahan P. (2004), *Logics of American Foreign Policy*, New York, Pearson Education, pp.54-55

²⁵⁵ The National Military Strategy of the United States of America/2015 explains the relation between the National interests and the US Army. The document uses the word Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) for VNSAs such as Al Qaida, ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) etc. For details see http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf access date 22 December 2016

²⁵⁶ Hansen, B. (2000), *Unipolarity and the Middle East*, Richmond, Curzon Press, pp.67-69

consolidated its position as a strategic ally to the US with its powerful economy and the military. Now, the point is how the United States and other great powers will approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and HAMAS as a violent non-state actor? As long as Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not perceived as a threat to current “legitimate” global order and to US national interests, neither the US nor other great powers will take a step to find a solution. No need to mention about the impact of Israeli lobby upon the American foreign policy decision makers.

On the other hand, Asia today, as the most dynamic and growth oriented area, attracts global attention. Not only China and Japan, but also other growing countries in Asia insert power in economic as well as international relations. There are several substantial realities that push Asia to the front line of global economic and political relations. Young and productive populations of Asian countries, their nuclear capabilities, their economic growth rates, and rise in regional and ethnic conflicts are worth to mention. It is possible to posit that the power balance and geographic focus of the world is shifting from west to the east.²⁵⁷ The US national interests dictate an Asia; politically stable and peaceful, an Asia open to American trade and investment, an Asia prosperous enough to buy American products, an Asia that controls its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, an Asia that may resolve its conflicts so that no threat may harm American domestic and international security.²⁵⁸

As the hegemon state, in new millennia, the US has shifted its attention to the Asia/Southeast Asia. It was very usual that such a massive global shift would create tension in the region. The hot-spots in Southeast Asia in and around three countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, have drawn the attention of the US to this region. Its strategic interests have moved the US towards a pragmatic ideology based upon power and security.²⁵⁹ In this sense, the US has activated its military, economic

²⁵⁷ Wiarda, H.J. (2011), *American Foreign Policy in Regions of Conflict*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.79-80

²⁵⁸ Wiarda, H.J. (2011), *American Foreign Policy in Regions of Conflict*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.89-90

²⁵⁹ Mauzy D.K. and Job B.L. “U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, Issue 4, (2007) pp. 635–639

and political assets in order to persuade GAM to leave arms and accept the solution offered. A stable and peaceful Southeast Asia was essential for American interests in the region in terms of three aspects; first, to contain radical Islamism and terrorist acts, second, to stop any possible regional power interference upon any regional conflict, and third to protect American economic interests, such as Exxon-Mobil oil companies in Aceh region. These three points, which have shaped the US foreign politics in the region is related to “security-first” concern. Under the light of this primary concern, the US and other regional powers let no actor to deteriorate the “legitimacy” in Southeast Asia and the established international order.

In this Chapter of the thesis I focused upon the principles of American foreign policy and how the US dealt with the VNSAs across the world. The VNSAs at every corner of the globe has interacted with the US under different names. For example in Europe; during Cold War years as Revolutionary groups, in Central and South America; drug trafficking organizations and militias, in former Soviet republics; the criminal organizations, in many African countries and Central Asia; warlords, and in the Middle East; insurgents and/or terrorists. The ideology, which forms the political power of a VNSA, is significant for the US. Because, the ideology is the main drive that feeds terror acts against the military and civilian American targets. In this sense, the VNSAs can be grouped under three headlines according to their ideologies; (i) Marxist/Leninist groups, (ii) Islamist groups, and (iii) Nationalist groups. During the cold War years, the relations of the US administrations with the VNSAs have developed generally at a defensive posture, in order to contain the communist ideology. The VNSAs that have flourished in Central and South America have adopted the Marxist/Leninist ideology, and many have been impressed by Cuban leader Castro. For example, the VNSAs in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have been actively involved in wars fought since 1950s under the names of insurgents, rebels, dissidents, guerrillas, or freedom fighters who are inspired by this ideology. The US foreign policy against such VNSAs has focused on the principles of proxy wars with three aims; (i) to give military support to parent states in order to contain the Soviet expansion and ideology, (ii) to control the illegal trafficking of drugs in to the US which is the basic item for the income of

those VNSAs, (iii) to support the pro-American regimes and political parties in these countries in parallel with American national interests.

The US has also dealt with nationalist VNSAs. Some of these are; Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Serbia, Irish Revolutionary Army (IRA) in the UK, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, and African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa Republic. Such VNSAs do not constitute a direct threat to the US either at homeland or abroad. Their ideology is based on sole nationalism and seeks independence from the parent state. Such nationalist movements, as detailed in literature review, received political, military and economic support from the US. On the other hand, as thoroughly investigated in the fourth and the fifth Chapters of this dissertation, the interaction of the US with the Islamist VNSAs is offensive and more complex. It dates back to 1980s, when Afghan jihadist groups waged a war against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US followed a coercive policy in post-Cold War years against the Islamist VNSAs assuming that converting the Islamist VNSAs into responsible political entities requires weakening, dismantling or totally destroying their military structures.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF US-HAMAS RELATIONS

4.1 HAMAS, a New Actor in the Middle East

As a socio-political movement within Palestine conflict, HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/The Islamic Resistance Movement) has emerged in 1987 as a reaction to first Intifadah (uprising) against Israeli military occupation. It was established as the wing of Palestinian Muslim. The ideological, political and socio-economic developments in Palestine since 1940s played the substantial role upon the foundation of HAMAS. The origin of HAMAS ideology is based on the philosophy of Muslim Brotherhood. First Muslim Brotherhood branches were established in Palestine territories in mid-1940s, and by 1947 as a natural outcome of this effective social network 10.000 registered members were created by both Palestinian ruling elites and the lower classes.²⁶⁰

This early establishment of Muslim Brotherhood cells in Palestine was severed by the creation of Israel State in 1948, as well as the occupation of Gaza Strip by Egypt and West Bank by Jordan the same year. On following years of 1950s, these cells have felt the hostile climate of Israel as the official state power in Palestine and moreover by Arab nationalism that was powered by Egypt's new leader Gamal Abd al Nasser. By late 1950s, its members were either in prison or exiled as a consequence of Nasser's approach to Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood's limited members in Palestine were largely inactive in weapons training and

²⁶⁰ Mishal, S. and Sela, A. (2000) *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press p.16

resistance activities but focused rather on social support for 400.000 newly arrived Palestinian refugees.²⁶¹

The 1967 Arab-Israel war changed the political structure profoundly, uniting Gaza and West Bank under one sovereign power; Israel. In this sense, the 1967 Arab defeat had a dual consequence; while discrediting Arab nationalism, it promoted both Palestinian nationalism and Islamism. On the other hand, Palestinian nationalists under the organizational structure of PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) had a leading start for resistance against Israel through guerilla attacks. By 1974 PLO was recognized as the sole representative of Palestinians by Arab League and Muslim Brotherhood had no capacity to compete either in political leadership or local elections.²⁶² But, throughout 1970s, under the leadership of Ahmad Yasin, Muslim Brotherhood established an Islamic Center (al-Mujamma al-Islami) and an Islamic Association (al-Jamiyyah al-Islamiyyah) focusing on social and welfare activities in refugee camps and surrounding poor areas.²⁶³ Time was running for Muslim Brotherhood and other two role players in Palestine, the Communist Party and Fatah had little capability when compared to Muslim Brotherhood's social welfare ideology.

When Egypt decided to make peace with Israel in 1979, PLO and secular Palestinian nationalism started to lose power and the new ideology based on Islamism was widely popular amongst young students, and mosque-centered social welfare supporters. When Egypt made peace with Israel, Palestinians realized that they could no longer rely on Egypt or other neighboring countries to liberate their homeland. They faced a bare truth; how hard it would be to realize the liberation aim, if relatively strong Arab armies of neighboring countries failed in last three decades between 1950 and 1980 in front of Israeli military power. Following 1980s onward,

²⁶¹ Cohen, A. (1982), *Political parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian regime 1949-1967*, Ithaca NY : Cornell University Press pp.206-208

²⁶² Sayigh, Y. (1997), *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: the Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.470-84.

²⁶³ Milton-Edwards, B. (1996), *Islamic Politics in Palestine*. London: Tauris Academic Studies. pp.94-102.

in the absence of Arab armies, only two actors had been left in front of Israeli state power; the secular nationalists under Fatah and Muslim Brotherhood. Throughout 1980s, the leaders of Fatah were deported and/or taken into prison but Muslim Brotherhood activists could act relatively in comfort both across Gaza and West Bank. The reason for this tolerance was the counterweight policy of Israel to use Brotherhood against Arafat and PLO.²⁶⁴

Following these developments, HAMAS has been founded officially on 14 December 1987 by the leaders of Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine; Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, Salah Sheadeh, Muhammad Shamah, Isa al-Nashar, Abdul Fattah Dukhan and Ibrahim al-Yazuri.²⁶⁵ After HAMAS's foundation, the most significant event that shaped HAMAS was the peace opportunity that emerged with Madrid conference in 1991 and following Oslo process. This peace initiative was a turning point for the transfer of power and authority from PLO to HAMAS. The basic argument of Madrid peace conference was the withdrawal of Israel from occupied areas, the recognition of Israel by PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and West Bank co-existing with Israel. HAMAS was the leading hardliner in this peace process with the external support of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Despite a huge expectation, relief and confidence in peace across the global public opinion, this initiative failed. Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and ascendance of Netanyahu to power in Israel were other factors that undermined peace process.

On the other hand, the corrupt Al Fatah administration, the lacking ability of Arafat to stop terrorist attacks of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other resistance groups helped the rise of HAMAS to power in Palestine in a way transforming the conflict between PLO and Israel into a conflict between Muslim and Judaism. In the past Israel would negotiate peace with PLO a nationalist and secular organization that would recognize the existence of Israel, but it was impossible to take such a step with HAMAS which was an Islamic extremist organization intending to destroy Israel. As

²⁶⁴ Mishal, S. and Sela, A. (2000) *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press p.26

²⁶⁵ Hroub, K. (2010), *HAMAS, A Beginner's Guide*, New York, Pluto Press, pp. 11-12

the first step, the founders of HAMAS drafted and proclaimed the HAMAS Charter (Covenant) to the public in 1988 which attracts regional and international critics for its wordings.²⁶⁶ The charter is composed of 35 articles with references to Koran and was linked to Muslim Brotherhood's theoretical principles.

As HAMAS consolidated its position amongst Palestinian society in political, economic, electoral spheres, in the wake of failed peace accord in mid 1990s tension accumulated, and in year 2000 the second intifadah erupted in occupied territories. This was a brutal encounter between Israeli Army and Palestinian suicide bombers that penetrated to the heart of Israel. The violence and terror ascended and ruled until year 2003. In following two years, efforts of the West for a new road map for a peace, the death of Arafat and uncompromising politics of Israeli PM Sharon occupied the agenda in Palestine. As the Israeli army continued to use ruthless excessive force to crush the Intifadah in front of Al-Fatah government, HAMAS grew stronger and won 2006 parliament elections.²⁶⁷

HAMAS is the first Islamic movement in the Middle East that came to power by democratic elections.²⁶⁸ In 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, HAMAS won 74 of 132 seats and broke the monopoly of Fatah.²⁶⁹ Although many see HAMAS as an obstacle for a permanent peace in the Middle East, some others assert that there can never be peace in the region until HAMAS is recognized as a legitimate political player.²⁷⁰ One orthodox perception prevailing in the western academic and political circles is that since its foundation, HAMAS has used violence and armed struggle as its sole political asset particularly against innocent civilian

²⁶⁶ HAMAS Charter 1988, For details see: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/HAMAS.asp access date: 8 February 2013

²⁶⁷ Palmer M. and Palmer P. (2008), *Islamic Exremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publsiher, pp.63-65

²⁶⁸ 2006 Legislative Council Election results: HAMAS 76 seats, Fatah 43 seats, PFLP 3 seats, Badil 2 seats, Independent Palestine 2 seats, Third way 2 seats, Independents 4 seats.

²⁶⁹ Jensen M.I. (2009), *Political Ideology of HAMAS*, London , I.B. Taurus press, p.1-2

²⁷⁰ Milton-Edwards, B. and Farrel S. (2010), *HAMAS*, Cambridge, Polity Press, p. vipreface

targets in Israel.²⁷¹ The US Department of State has designated HAMAS as a terrorist organization on October 8, 1997. In this list HAMAS is described as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of Muslim Brotherhood, which has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel since its foundation in 1987.

Moreover, HAMAS is accused for using suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks and shootings against Israeli targets including both American and Israeli civilians. The US Department of State report details some of these attacks as;

“... Hamas fought a 23-day war with Israel from late December 2008 to January 2009. From November 14-21, 2012, Hamas fought another war with Israel during which it claims to have launched more than 1,400 rockets into Israel. Despite the Egypt-mediated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in 2012, operatives from Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) coordinated and carried out a November bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. On July 8, 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in Gaza with the intent of preventing rocket fire into the country, which had increased following Israeli military operations after Hamas’ kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers. In March 2015, Amnesty International released a report in which it accused Hamas of committing war crimes for launching rockets and mortars into civilian areas in Israel during Operation Protective Edge. In May 2015, Amnesty International published another report declaring Hamas’ abduction, torture, and killing of Palestinians during the 2014 Gaza war was further evidence the group had committed war crimes.”²⁷²

Although western approach to HAMAS is cast by this perception, the changing nature of HAMAS rhetoric and ideology in recent years insert its effects on domestic, regional and international politics as *a new role player* in the Middle East politics. Since its stunning electoral victory in 2006 elections, HAMAS gained power in front of global public opinion as the Palestinian people continue to suffer from the brutality and the humiliation and Israel’s refusal to acknowledge Palestinian rights.

In following sections, HAMAS will be analyzed in three levels; (i) HAMAS- its internal structure level, (ii) HAMAS-parent/opponent state level, (iii) VNSA-international actors/community level. In this sense, first, I explain the internal

²⁷¹ Lewitt, M. (2006), *HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, Harrisonburg, R.R. Donnelly Press, pp.13-14

²⁷² US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, [Country Reports on Terrorism/2015](https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm) details Foreign Terrorist Organizations. HAMAS is in the list with a detailed terrorist activity. For details see <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm> access date, 20 December 2016.

functions of HAMAS. These functions are; HAMAS charter as a political document, its capacity as a social movement and its relations with Palestinian community, its political, societal and military capabilities. Second, I study HAMAS relations with the parent state; Israel and their interactions and the abilities of HAMAS to transform into a peaceful political entity. This is vital because, in case the non-state actor and the parent state do not share a common understanding upon peace, stability, justice, human rights and democracy, they will not find a compromise.²⁷³ Third, I focus upon the relations of HAMAS with the US under the light of capability to adopt themselves to the international conditions and the process of change in post 9/11 term.

In addition to these three levels, as the fourth circle I also investigate the relations between the US and State of Israel. This fourth circle has covers two essential factors; first by investigating the relations of the US with Israel as the parent state, I set out how this relationship shaped the interaction between HAMAS and Israel and the Palestine conflict. Second, this will be my contribution to the literature, together with the similar study on GAM, in the fourth Chapter.

4.1.1. First Level: HAMAS and its Internal Structure

4.1.1.1 HAMAS Charter; a Comprehensive Manifesto or an Obstacle for Peace

Charters are the political documents addressing the domestic and international parties about the case of independence. Not only the states but also non-state actors have declared charters about their case and rights to become an independent state. HAMAS Charter of 1988 is one of these political documents composed of terms openly referring to Koran versus under the influence of Muslim Brotherhood's theoretical principles. The Charter identifies two items as the enemies of Palestinian cause; Zionism and Secularism. While Zionism is blamed as a conspiracy for local, regional and global domination, secularism is perceived as the main reason that has weakened Muslims and Palestine. In this sense Fatah, due to its secular character, is

²⁷³ Dudouet, V. (2012), "Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation of Non-State Armed Groups, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* Vol. 6 (1), pp.100-102

understood as a misguided brother by HAMAS.²⁷⁴ The Charter was formulated during the violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontations of 1987 Intifadah and was edited and approved by Ahmad Yassin, the movement's founder and leader. It was issued on August 1988. In order to make a sound evaluation on Hamas's political, military and societal structure for further discussions, there is a requirement to go detail with the basic arguments of HAMAS Charter, which is composed of total 36 Articles.

Almost all independence charters declared across different geographies and times has referred to their historical truths, their moral and religious values, their rights to live as an independent nation and similar virtues. They use a peaceful but decisive pattern to prove the rightfulness of their case. One of the concluding remarks of Israel's Independence Charter (14 May 1948) is worth to show its peaceful intention in a way embracing all neighboring countries;

“We extend our hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.”²⁷⁵

Identical to Israeli Independence Charter, the PLO charter²⁷⁶ and GAM charter inherit a similar pattern, focusing on their rights to establish their states and exist.²⁷⁷ Both of these charters have been written during Cold War years in the same decade (PLO Charter in 1964 and 1968 and GAM Charter in 1976) and possess identical and/or common features. It is important to say that, although the Palestinian and Achehnese communities had strong links to Muslim religion, both charters inherit a secular and national character having no direct link to Muslim holy texts. Both charters complain about the implementations of British (for Palestinians) and Dutch

²⁷⁴ Davis, R. (2016) *Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East*, New York, Routledge p.41

²⁷⁵ The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Official Gazette: Number 1; Tel Aviv, 14.5.1948 Page 1, see details on https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm access date 23 December 2016

²⁷⁶ See GAM charter of 1976 at; <http://Achehnet.tripod.com/declare.htm> , access date: 8 February 2013

²⁷⁷ See PLO charters of 1964 and 1968 at; <http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/cache/offonce/pid/12008;jsessionid=462C2C15DDAAFE072D52C36586A0AB8D>, access date 19 February 2013

(for Acehnese) colonial legacies upon their homelands in the 19th and 20th centuries and how their societies have been denied from self-determination rights throughout a historical process. Both charters focus on the capacity and capabilities of their societies and how much they deserve to decide their own destiny in front of the free world. Both charters refer to the identities of their communities and their educational, economic, societal and cultural rights. Both charters use a secular wording and although they refer to some sacred and spiritual behaviors, they stay at a certain distance to Muslim religion. An interesting part of these two charters is their accepting armed struggle as the only way towards independence.

On the contrary, in HAMAS charter, the Koran verses, Hadith sources have been referred 35 times and the historical wars and clashes between the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims have been often cited to support their case. The charter can be grouped under several headlines, such as the definition of HAMAS movement, the objectives, the strategies and methods and the approach of HAMAS movement towards the internal and external role players.

The main points of HAMAS Charter can be summarized under some concrete ideas, giving little room for a hopeful start for future negotiations with Israel. First, the Palestine problem is perceived as a religious and political conflict between the Muslims and Jewish “infidels”. Second, Palestine is sacred land of Muslims, and cannot be divided with any other state. Third, holy war jihad is the main asset to lead Muslims to the victory. Fourth, Islamic consciousness must be spread by way of education under the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim solidarity must be powered by charity works and needy people must be supported seamlessly.

The language and ideology of the Charter is based on Islam religion and its association with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The concrete strategic aim of HAMAS is summarized under two headlines; first is the creation of an Islamic State in place of Israel and Palestinian territories of Gaza Strip and West Bank, and second is the annihilation of the state of Israel by way of jihad under any condition . In order to realize these aims, HAMAS connects itself to the unity and common action of global Muslim societies. The Charter identifies this common action under three

pillars interacting for this holy war against Israel and Zionism; first is the Palestinian pillar, second is the Arab pillar and third one is the global Islamic pillar.²⁷⁸

The objectives are explained as; “Fighting against the false order and establishing the State of Islam” which is very identical to the objective of Muslim Brotherhood as well. As its strategy and method, HAMAS states the motto of “Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Muslim generations, until the Judgement Day (Article 11)”. In this regard, HAMAS has a strong commitment to Arab nationalism stating that “Nationalism... is a part of religious creed (Article 12)”.

In following articles, the charter clarifies its approach to domestic and international role players in a way embracing all domestic entities and movements and condemning all foreign support and parties, behind the Zionism and Israel state. The charter openly declares its commitment to Jihad and tasks the individuals, particularly the women, and the Palestinian society to reach its targets. On the other hand it appreciates the Islamic movements across the world and other nationalist movements in Palestine including the PLO while condemning the Zionism and Israel state and the political/economic forces behind it.

This strong commitment of HAMAS Charter to unchanging and fixed Quran verses and also the idea of the destruction of Israel state has closed the doors to take action for future amendments on the text, and received strong criticisms from international circles for becoming the power behind terrorist acts against Israeli and Western targets by HAMAS militants. The language, and the terms of Charter have put HAMAS into a disadvantageous position in international political circles, and HAMAS has been understood as one of the sources of religious radical terrorism. This perception has not even changed after 2006 electoral victory of HAMAS. Khaled Meshaal, the leader of HAMAS, having felt this disturbance in front of

²⁷⁸ See HAMAS Charter Article14 at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/HAMAS.asp access date 02 February 2013

international polity, has stated that Charter is “...a piece of history and no longer relevant, but cannot be changed for internal reasons.”²⁷⁹

As a very rigid example of contrast between PLO and HAMAS charters, Article 7 of HAMAS charter can be mentioned; “Article 7 -- The prophet, prayer and peace be upon him, said: The Day of Judgment will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews (and kill them); until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: O Muslim! there is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him! “ This Article lets no room for the Israeli community to exist in Palestine/Israel whereas the PLO charter endorses a peaceful co-existence with Israel.

On the other hand, contrary to the aim of destroying the Israel state, Ismail Haniyeh, the HAMAS Prime Minister stated in 2008, that HAMAS would agree to accept a state founded on the borders of 1967 and have a long term truce with Israel. This statement is also in contrast with Article 11 of HAMAS Charter, identifying the land of Palestine as a Waqf to be protected until the Judgment Day. In this respect, it is possible to assert that HAMAS has realized the difficulties created by above mentioned dilemmas and moved away from its rigid strategic goals depicted in the Charter since it has taken over the political office from PLO.

As a good example for amendments on the Charter the compromise between Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Leader Yasser Arafat can be mentioned between 1993 and 1996. The source of this mutual understanding on the PLO Charter was the need to amend some of the articles to help both sides for peace talks. Palestinian leaders were aware that such texts, which were prepared within the context of the radical liberty movements of the 1960s, did not properly match with the modern requirements of Palestinian cause. This process has commenced with the letter of Yasser Arafat to Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin on 10 September 1993 stating that;

²⁷⁹ In an interview with Robert Pastor of the Carter Center Khalid Meshaal stated his ideas about Hamas Charter. For the details of Hamas leaders ideas about the Charter and why it can not be updated, see Davis, R. (2016) *Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East*, New York, Routledge p.41

“Those Articles of the Palestinian Charter which deny Israel’s right to exist and those provisions of the Charter which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the Palestine Liberation Organization undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council (PNC) for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Charter.”

Following the Palestinian presidential and legislative elections in 1996 the PNC approved the necessary amendments. The Palestinians did this amendment for two reasons; first simply to comply with the conditions imposed by Israel, and second most importantly that to pursue new political needs on the way to construct a new political identity. The gain for this concession was the full recognition of PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people.²⁸⁰ Actually this was the final amendment on the Charter and such positive steps have proved that, amendments on similar political documents have helped a lot to form a good-will on the way for an enduring peace between the sides and PLO has proved this.

Political circles agree that Charters are overarching political documents that address to all domestic and international parties and dictate the direction and struggle means to reach the goal. It is a directive also for the political, military, economic and social forces fighting for independence. HAMAS charter, as discussed above, leaves no room for a possible peace, not sole with Israel state but also closes the doors for cooperative efforts with domestic actors; Al-Fatah and other PLO organs. HAMAS leaders are aware that current Charter is an obstacle in this respect and they need to plan and realize required amendments.

4.1.1.2 Political Power of HAMAS

Since its foundation, HAMAS can be investigated under four terms. First term is the Formation era. It starts on December 1987 and continues until October 1994. In this era HAMAS established its Islamist identity and consolidated the support coming from the Palestinian society. Second term is Oslo process. It covers the time frame from November 1994 until August 2000. In this term HAMAS tried to destroy the Oslo Peace Process between Israel and the PLO. Third term is the pre-political era of

²⁸⁰ Qurie, Ahmad (2008), *Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine*, London, I.B. Tauris pp.14-16

HAMAS between 2000 and 2007. This is the term when HAMAS did not actively play a role over Palestinian politics. Fourth term is the governing era in Gaza strip after the civil war against Fatah. This era starts in June 2007 until present date. In following lines HAMAS-Israel relations will be investigated under these four terms that are nested in each other. In this section three factors that constitute the political power of HAMAS will be studied. These factors are; social structure in Palestine, Palestinian nationalism, and Islamisation of Palestine society,

HAMAS emerged as a political alternative in 1987 against Yasser Arafat and Fatah movement and constituted a regular and incremental political philosophy in following years. It has first refused current political mechanisms and organized a socio-political order based on grassroots mobilization inheriting an Islamic identity in full dedication against the presence of Israel and Zionism. As Arafat's political discourse was focusing on increased diplomatic dialogue at regional and international levels to find a solution to Palestine-Israeli conflict HAMAS embraced means of violence and denounced Israel and secular PLO mechanisms in parallel with the violence and terror of First Intifadah in 1987.²⁸¹

Arafat's diplomatic efforts in 1993 Oslo Peace Process and the creation of Palestinian Authority (PA) have been perceived by HAMAS as selling out of Palestine cause. But in the post-Oslo term HAMAS made a revolutionary shift in its politics against Arafat and Israel under new conditions. These were; (i) freezing the religious rhetoric and embrace a nationalist ideology based on Palestinian nationality; (ii) adopting a 'controlled calibrated violence' against Israel, (iii) cutting down the clashes with Fatah movement and follow a pragmatic path in regional and domestic politics. Until 2006 electoral victory this was the political philosophy HAMAS pursued.²⁸²

²⁸¹ Herrick, J.J. (2010), *Nonstate Actors: A Comparative Analysis of Change and Development within HAMAS and Hezbollah*, Bahgat Korany ed., *The Changing Middle East; A new Look at Regional Dynamics*, New York, the American University in Cairo Press, pp.173-174

²⁸² Mishal, S. and Sela A. (2000), *The Palestinian HAMAS: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, New York, Columbia University Press, p.109

It is a well-known reality that the political power of HAMAS has been built upon the strong support it received from the Palestinian society. The reasons under this strong support were; the ignorance of the society by the corrupt Palestinian Authority, the economic and societal failures of Palestinian people for decades and the loss of hope for a peaceful future particularly amongst the Palestinian youth. HAMAS has come to power with a strong expectation amongst the Palestinian people to end corruption, lawlessness, and chaos as well as to produce an economic renewal.²⁸³ In this sense, HAMAS is considered to be composed of a double driving force, which is a blend of nationalist and religious nature attracting the Palestinians. This dual political activism of HAMAS was the source of its rising popularity which feeds the nationalist feelings to struggle against Israel on one hand, and enjoys the strong popularity amongst the people with a traditional Muslim background on the other. This political discourse has walked hand in hand with an ‘Islamisation’ project.²⁸⁴

The ultimate political aims of HAMAS are also dual; first is the liberation of Palestine and second the Islamisation of the society. In this dual aim, the Islamisation of society, amongst rigid Palestinian Islamists was the first condition to realize, because only re-Islamized and well educated individuals could win the war against Israel. The reason for the Palestinian Islamists not starting an armed struggle against Israeli occupation between 1967 and 1987 lays in the philosophy of Muslim Brotherhood. In the thinking of Muslim Brotherhood, the backwardness, the poverty, the illiteracy of Muslims originates from their deviation of true path of Islam. Therefore, the first step in this struggle was not the violence but the education and re-Islamisation of the society until the society has been ready to start such a holy war.

Peter Mandaville argues the ideas of the founder of Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna on “...offsetting the corrosive effects of Westernization and secularism by educating the Egyptian society about the importance of religion in public life and by

²⁸³ Lewitt, M. (2006), *HAMAS; Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, Harrisonburg, R.R. Donnelly Press, p 245

²⁸⁴ Chomsky N. and Achcar G. (2007), *Perilous Power; The Middle East and US Foreign Policy*, London,Paradigm Publishers, p.222

advocating a turn to true Islam”.²⁸⁵ Olivier Roy, in a parallel perception, explains this process through the terms of “acculturation and objectification” which understands the re-Islamization practices as a part of this process.²⁸⁶ But, what HAMAS aims to achieve is to break this old-fashioned understanding coined by the founding fathers of Muslim Brotherhood and prove that both processes can go hand in hand by attracting those who want to liberate Palestine and those who want to re-Islamize the society.²⁸⁷

This new approach adopted by HAMAS was the combination of reformist and revolutionary movement in Palestine. The reformist movements are the mainstream movements in Muslim world and focus on non-violent strategies in a longer time period focusing substantially on education, welfare and thus increase the role of religion upon the society. This is a process started in 1920s and when they came to 1980s, a fertile socio-economic order emerged in Muslim geographies available for their strategies in parallel with their integration into the domestic political process. The reformist movements prefer a gradual approach for the transformation of state institutions into an Islamist structure rather than demolishing them as revolutionary movements do.

On the other hand, the revolutionary movements aim to establish the Islamic law upon the state by way of violence. The revolutionary movements in the region have gained a momentum after the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution which based its inspirational source on Ayetollah Khomani’s philosophy. His teachings have played a strong role to move the masses from political passivity to radical activism for the implementation of Islamic rule.²⁸⁸ Fundamentalist sects formulate this action under the term “jihad/will of God” and the social justice is conditioned by the notion of

²⁸⁵ Mandaville, P. (2007), *Global Political Islam*, New York, Routledge Press p.69

²⁸⁶ Roy, O. (2004) ,*Globalised Islam, The Search for a New Ummah*, London, C.Hurst&Co. Press, pp.21-26

²⁸⁷ Hroub, K. (2010), *HAMAS, A Beginner’s Guide*, New York, Pluto Press, pp. 29-30

²⁸⁸ Azani, E. (2009), *Hezbollah the Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, pp.37-40

“Shariah”. In this sense, the role of recruited individuals may rise to the point of sacrificing their life and welfare for the sake of shared aims and consequently a shared identity in contrary to modern capitalist societies, where the individual first of all operates to advance his personal welfare and aims in life.

Accordingly, HAMAS has emerged as an influential actor in national, regional and international systems along the developments since 1980s. As a reaction of human masses against the existing domestic and international socio-economic order in the Middle East, HAMAS has connected itself to violence and terror. HAMAS, with strong roots to radical Islam inherit normative and ideological characters as a revolutionary organization. It does not only aim to realize deep fundamental changes in existing socio-political order, but similar to other Islamic organizations also targets the individuals for a new religious identity. It aims to reform and rebuild the individual’s world of beliefs, as the basis of a new social order.²⁸⁹ Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Israeli foreign minister, opens a supportive window for HAMAS and argues that it is a national independence movement. He posits that despite its Islamic and violent character HAMAS is not an Al-Qaeda and Israel should allow it to rule and thus it would engage in a meaningful dialogue with Israel for a possible end to this meaningless mutual destruction. If HAMAS accepts the idea of recognizing Israel and renounce terror, negotiations between the parties should start and democracy would come through. Such a positive initiative would be for the benefit of both sides; while the Palestinians grow positive feelings for HAMAS, Israel would get rid of the load on shoulders by proving that it is a peaceful state in front of global public opinion.²⁹⁰

The nationalist movements amongst the Muslim societies are not limited merely to the conflictual geographies of the Middle East. For instance, the foreign policies of Iran during and after the cold-war have been shaped by strong nationalist sentiments. The movements in Yemen, in Sudan and in Algeria, widely use nationalist arguments

²⁸⁹ Azani, E. (2009), *Hezbollah the Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, p.2

²⁹⁰ Palmer M. and Palmer P. (2008), *Islamic Exremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publsiher, p.66

and even link the rationality of their presence to sole national aims. Thus, it would not be wrong to assert that Islamist political movements are passing through a nationalization process and they attribute almost equal value to nationalism hand in hand with their Islamist discourses.²⁹¹ Although HAMAS has flourished as a result of radical sectarian reactions in Palestine since 1980s onward, it has in recent years, followed a nationalist discourse, aiming to melt different political and sectarian groups in the pot of Palestinian nationalism. In fact, in the Middle East, nationality has been used, in a supra-national context under the name of Arab Nationalism as Gamal Abdel Nasser did in 1950s and 1960s, and sometimes in a narrower context of Palestinian nationalism as Arafat did in 1980s and 1990s.²⁹² Today, although founded upon an Islamist discourse, even HAMAS does not hesitate to use a nationalist rhetoric to maintain the solidarity amongst the Palestinians.

In this sense, we observe that HAMAS uses the capacity of both Islamic and nationalist arguments in a way to employ the organizational sources such as leadership, finance, communication network, supporters, distribution mechanisms etc. HAMAS's future role in domestic, regional and international levels is bound to its ability to transform itself from informal action patterns under the control of a charismatic leader into an organizational and institutional structure supported by formal rules and norms.²⁹³ Although HAMAS possessed a regional political power originating from the full support of Palestinian society in Gaza strip, and a partial support in the West Bank, the handicap it caused was the creation of double-head authority in Palestine case. The tension between HAMAS and Al Fatah resulted into a civil war in 2007 and eventually HAMAS drove Al Fatah from Gaza strip, gaining full control in the area. As a response to this, Al Fatah consolidated its position in the West Bank, and received the financial and economic support of Israel and the US. The uncompromising steps of HAMAS fueled by two intifadahs of 1987 and 2000,

²⁹¹ Azani, E. (2009), *Hezbollah the Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, pp.47-49

²⁹² Roy, O. (2004), *Globalized Islam*, London, C.Hurst and Co. Ltd. Press p. 62-64

²⁹³ Azani, E. (2009), *Hezbollah the Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, p.22

and its electoral victory in 2006 resulted in creation of two governments in Palestine.²⁹⁴

Since its inception into Palestine politics HAMAS proved some strengths and weaknesses in its political appearance. The core of HAMAS's political strength is its organizational structure based on Muslim Brotherhood philosophy. This is a strong dedication to the cause. When military, political or religious leaders are assassinated or arrested, new ones rise up and fill the gaps. Dissimilar to that of Al Fatah, the leaders are young, dynamic and feel the support of both Islamic zeal and Palestinian nationalism. Thus, HAMAS feels the support and confidence of Palestinians as a respond to their honest welfare programs. HAMAS strengthens its place in the Palestinian community by providing consistently food, medical support, education and other basic needs on the street.²⁹⁵ The second powerful face of HAMAS in politics is the external support it receives from a powerful network across Syria, Iran and Jordan. The branches of Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah in these countries pour money and weapons into Gaza one way or another. The third point HAMAS gets stronger in politics is the change in its perception to the existence of Israel state. HAMAS, after consolidation of its victory in Gaza strip, signaled a political will to negotiate a two-state solution with Israel. But, according to HAMAS this should be a just and viable solution based on dignity of Palestinian case, not a solution of one-sided peace under the dictation of the US and Israel.²⁹⁶

As for the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of HAMAS's political appearance it inherits a wide spectrum and cannot be abstracted from general weaknesses in Arab politics such as power fights, patronage networks and weak personal governmental capabilities. Amongst others, couple weaknesses can be mentioned mostly. First is the disaccord amongst leading cadres to transform from being a resistance movement

²⁹⁴ Palmer M. and Palmer P. (2008), *Islamic Exremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publsiher, p.67

²⁹⁵ Singh, R. (2011), *Hamas and Suicide Terrorism, Multi-causal and Multi-level Approaches*, New York, Routledge, pp.101-102

²⁹⁶ Palmer M. and Palmer P. (2008), *Islamic Exremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publsiher, p.68

into a ruling party. Palestinian community needs a strong political-military organization, capable in art of government and eager to put decisive steps towards a feasible peace, rather than a dispersed resistance organization focusing on sole charity works and terrorist acts. The second weakness is the division amongst HAMAS leading cadres. As the local leaders work for the solution of local economic-social disasters, the leaders in Damascus (until 2012) and Qatar focus on higher political strategies. As a result of this leadership division, the control over the military wing is not clear. The third weakness that puts HAMAS into a distressed position is its muzzy appearance in front of local and international parties. HAMAS needs to clarify its identity between being an Islamic movement or a nationalist resistance organization and decide who the real opponent is; Israel or secular forces in Palestine? A sound decision on this identity problem will help a lot to mobilize the Palestinian society for the case, because sole religious rhetoric will not embrace all Palestinians. HAMAS cannot continue to serve the Palestine case merely by serving hope for the future.²⁹⁷

4.1.1.3 Military Power of HAMAS

HAMAS, identical to other independence seeking VNSAs across the world, does not have a regular army capability. It has no air force, no navy, and no armored troops. It has limited manpower of guerrilla warfare, limited light arms, limited local command and control infrastructure. It is clear that HAMAS is struggling to survive in front of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) which is one of the most capable military forces in the Middle East with its man power, equipment, motivation, and training skills. According to Jane's Defense as of 2015, Israel army has a man power of 133,000 in the ground forces, 9,500 in the navy and 34,000 in the air force. In addition to active manpower Israel Defense Forces (IDF) holds one of the most capable military weapons inventory across the world.²⁹⁸ In order to survive in front of such a capable IDF military power, HAMAS organized its units as small independent militant cells

²⁹⁷ Palmer M. and Palmer P. (2008), *Islamic Extremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, pp.69-70

²⁹⁸ For detailed manpower and modern weapons details see http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=israel access date 18 November 2016

carrying light weapons and explosives using guerilla tactics. The military wing of HAMAS is represented by Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, officially established in 1991 and operating as underground and independent cells.²⁹⁹

The military strength of Hamas is harder to clarify in numbers because a great deal of Palestinian forces stays under the management of Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank. In Gaza, HAMAS controls the military power of Al-Qassam Brigades. The number of active personnel strength of the Brigades is estimated to be about 15,000. In an emergency situation, a considerable number of 3,000-4,000 additional operatives that belong to other Palestinian organizations are estimated to join Al-Qassam Brigades. This means the entire strength of HAMAS in Gaza Strip will rise to 20,000 armed men with military skills and professionalism. Additionally, there are other militant groups including Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which has several thousand members.³⁰⁰

HAMAS's military buildup process also includes training activities of operative individuals at all levels. HAMAS military wing has several hundred highly-trained individuals with basic and advanced military training. They are specialized in anti-tank weapons, small arms, sabotage, and similar military skill. Following the HAMAS takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Syria and Iran has provided training courses for HAMAS operatives in order to accelerate military build-up.³⁰¹ The military leaders of brigades act semi-independent. The large numbers of active

²⁹⁹ Bewerley M-E and Farrel, S. (2010), *HAMAS- The Islamic Resistance Movement*, Qassam Brigades, Cambridge, Polity Press, pp.110-33

³⁰⁰ HAMAS's military wing includes territorial brigades and designated units deployed throughout the Gaza Strip. Each territorial brigade is estimated to inherit more than 1,000 operative personnel. These brigades are organized under battalions and each battalion has several companies. Each company is composed of three platoons and every platoon has three teams (including fighters, anti-tank operatives, saboteurs, medics). They attack civilian targets in Israel and military targets bordering the Gaza Strip. The brigades in Gaza Strip are deployed as follows: i) One brigade in northern sector, ii) Two Brigades in Gaza City sector, iii) One Brigade in the central sector, iv) One Brigade in the southern sector. For more detail, see: [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/The HAMAS Terror Organization-2007update](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/The%20HAMAS%20Terror%20Organization-2007update): access date 22 March 2013

³⁰¹ The Web Site of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains the rocket capability of HAMAS in terms of range, number and casualties. For more detail, see: [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/The HAMAS Terror Organization-2007 update](http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/The%20HAMAS%20Terror%20Organization-2007update): access date: 16 March 2013

members operate predominantly in Gaza Strip, and in West Bank there is a limited representation. The brigades hold a high level of popularity amongst the Palestinians and encounter no recruitment problem. HAMAS enjoys a wide spectrum of grassroots recruiting capability based on its effective social network.

The transition of Al-Qassam Brigades into a recognized militant organization dates back to 1993 Oslo Accords when HAMAS reacted against the peace process, accusing Arafat for selling out Palestine cause. The group takes its name from Izz al-Din al-Qassam, who organized and established an anti-Zionist and anti-British militant organization in Palestine in 1930. Mohammed Deif is the current leader of the brigades since 2002, after the assassination of Salah Shahade.³⁰² Al-Qassam Brigades are organized in a military structure of battalions, platoons, groups and individuals but not occupying regular barracks but dispersed across the territory amongst the civilians. These cells are specialized in terrorist attacks, assassinations and kidnappings. The lines in the area of operations between HAMAS militants and Palestinian civilians are blurred. Moreover, these small units operate autonomously and carry out their individual attacks which constitute the main reason for the accusation of HAMAS as a terrorist organization by Israel and other western countries and institutions. In this respect within the realm of international security, HAMAS has been perceived as a terrorist organization at international political circles.³⁰³

No matter how weak and subservient with its irregular and light-weapon based military power when compared to Israel Defense Forces (IDF), HAMAS fought several wars with Israel before its 2006 electoral victory and after it consolidated its presence in the Gaza strip in 2007. For example, HAMAS fought a three weeks battle with Israel in January 2009. In November 2012, HAMAS engaged another war with IDF and launched more than 1,400 rockets into Israel territories. In these clashes Palestine

³⁰² BBS News details who Mohammed Deif is. For more detail see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2284055.stm, access date 16 March 2013

³⁰³ Herrick, J.J. (2010), *Nonstate Actors: A Comparative Analysis of Change and Development within HAMAS and Hezbollah*, Bahgat Korany ed., The Changing Middle East; A new Look at Regional Dynamics, New York, the American University in Cairo Press, p.169

Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also took active roles and carried out a bus bombing in Tel Aviv wounding 29 people. These rockets shelling and other attacks targeting the Israeli civilians pushed IDF to launch protective operations in Gaza strip on July 2014. As a response to these attacks, Amnesty International has issued two reports in 2014 and 2015 accusing HAMAS of committing war crimes against civilians. The military assets used by HAMAS in these attacks were for launching rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel territories.³⁰⁴

In order to determine the current fighting capacity of HAMAS and its military wing Al-Qassem Brigades, a broader investigation of 2014 Gaza war is required. Truly it was an asymmetric confrontation between IDF regular army and HAMAS forces. In this war, HAMAS used its three capabilities to confront IDF: rockets, dispersed ground forces, and the tunnel system. The rocket launchings into Israel territories can be considered as offensive operations, as the dispersed ground forces operations can be evaluated as defensive. The tunnel system, on the other hand, can be evaluated within the context of engineering activities either with offensive or defensive aims.³⁰⁵

The rocket arsenal capacity of HAMAS was estimated a total of several thousands of long, medium and short range. This capacity was primarily of short range, including several hundreds of medium and long range as well reaching to northern parts of Israel.³⁰⁶ These rocket launching systems were well prepared across Gaza, camouflaged either underground or in the hands of moving squads. Despite such considerable amount of rockets used against Israel the effects were not that high as expected. The main accomplishment was the disruption of daily life in Israel and the temporary interruption of Ben Gurion airport for a single day. The evacuation of

³⁰⁴ List of Terrorist Organizations, US Department of State, Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, see: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm> access date: 2 November 2016

³⁰⁵ Cohen Y. White J. (October 2009), Hamas in Combat, The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, *Policy Focus #97*. Pp. 5-12 For detailed tactical posture of Hamas forces see <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-in-combat-the-military-performance-of-the-palestinian-islamic-resistance> access date 11 November 2016

³⁰⁶ Hamas in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Policy Focus #97 | October 2009*, see: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/documents/pubs/policyfocus97.pdf> access date 4 November 2016

Israeli border line settlements seems to be the sole achievement, but rather than deaths and wounds amongst the civilians the rocket attacks caused stress, anxiety, horror and similar psychological problems. The total Israeli fatalities caused by HAMAS rockets and mortars into Israel are a sum of 44 people; 30 civilians and 14 soldiers.³⁰⁷ In addition to rocket attacks, HAMAS tried to employ Al-Qassem Brigades against IDF to prevent deep attacks into Gaza. HAMAS ground forces converted civilian areas of Gaza into a kind of defensive strong holds by using explosive devices, anti-tank weapons, mortars and snipers. On the other hand, tunnel system played a significant role in HAMAS military for offering cover for infrastructure, forces, weapons, ammunition and commanders. Rocket launching apparatus were concealed in tunnels enabling them to escape from IDF strikes. Tunnels were used for both offensive infiltration operations into Israel territories under the ground, and defensive maneuvers to escape from the sight of Israeli soldiers.³⁰⁸

This tunnel network system is effectively used for arms smuggling into Gaza from several sources. Three major sources provide arms and ammunition into the Gaza Strip: First is directly from Iran and Syria, and/or through Hezbollah. The arms and ammunition are smuggled first to Sinai and then carried to Gaza Strip through tunnels. These arms include artillery rockets and anti-tank weapons. The second type of source is international arms dealers. Sinai is used to smuggle these arms and then carried into Gaza Strip by way of tunnel network. The third type is domestic production in Gaza Strip. Workshops and houses are used to produce these weapons, including Qassam rockets. Chemicals, metal parts and others substances needed for domestic production are smuggled into Gaza Strip through the same tunnel network.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁷ See details at <http://mondoweiss.net/2014/07/rocket-deaths-israel/> Access date 17 Nov 2016

³⁰⁸ The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014 September 29, 2014 , Jeffrey White, see <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-combat-performance-of-hamas-in-the-gaza-war-of-2014>, access date : 2 November 2016

³⁰⁹ Cohen Y. White J. (October 2009), Hamas in Combat, The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, *Policy Focus #97*. Pp. 5-12 For detailed arms capabilities and production and procurement capabilities of Hamas forces see <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/hamas-in-combat-the-military-performance-of-the-palestinian-islamic-resistance> access date 11 November 2016

HAMAS has spent efforts to improve its military capacity in quality and quantity in last decade, but not to a degree to effectively fight against IDF war machine. HAMAS has some deficiencies in command and control, tactics and communication assets and needs to harmonize its military power in accordance with its political appearance. This harmonization requires to be done at several aspects. First is to quit terrorist acts against Israeli civilians when engaging in a war with IDF. This is the soft belly of HAMAS in front of global public opinion and international circles, receiving intense criticism. In a confrontation when IDF is using excessive power, against civilian buildings such as schools, hospitals, community centers, mosques and settlements in Gaza, Israel attracts intense criticism from regional and international political, judiciary and humanitarian institutions. If HAMAS uses excessive terror acts this advantage will be lost. The second point lacking between political and military leadership is lack of command and control over the paramilitary units. When the military units act out of the political leadership, this is hampering the Palestinian cause, by unexpected terror attacks targeting civilians. The third point is lack of compromise and cooperation between the Palestinian military units in Gaza Strip and West Bank. This handicap that hampers the Palestinian cause is mainly the result of political friction between Al Fatah and HAMAS and this political disunion is reflecting its deep negative effects upon military capacity of Palestine Authority as a whole.

4.1.1.4 Societal Power of HAMAS

HAMAS is a VNSA born in Palestine and gets its power from Palestinian society. Although it is the dominant actor in Gaza strip, some of its political, military and economic affiliations take place in the West Bank, neighboring countries and diaspora. So that, as I mention the societal power of HAMAS I will refer to the Palestinian society as a whole and investigate the social conditions in Gaza and other Palestine territories no matter under which authority they are; either HAMAS or Al Fatah. Within the entirety of this section, before focusing the societal power of HAMAS, I will first investigate the relationship between civil society, state and the

violent non-state actors in the Middle East that inserts paramount effects upon the formation and the transformation of a VNSA.

About the capability of the civil society in the Middle East, there was a traditional view that due to the existence of authoritarian states and the lack of a free and rich associational life in the society, a healthy democracy could not develop. The Arab society was different by its political, economic and societal features than the European societies. First of all, the political authority was derived from religion and conquest. Second, the public zone which was dominated by peasants and tribes was shared between the leaders of sects, merchants, sufis and similar religious figures. Third, the role of central authority in this structure was limited to defending borders, collecting taxes, maintaining justice and public order. Social services and economic functions were left to the local communities. In general the Middle Eastern civil society was defect under corruption, aggressiveness, hostility and insignificance. Despite its shortcomings in forming a robust and active civil society, the Arab societies have shared some similarities with West such as population growth, urbanization and to some degree a secular state structure.³¹⁰

Probably as a consequence of persistent conflicts such as Arab-Israeli, Iraqi-Iranian, two gulf wars in last two decades and numerous small scale unrests across the Middle East, it can be strongly argued that, Arab societies lacked civility and quality. Here civility means the tolerance towards other political views and attitudes, and willingness to others' lives. Unfortunately, although a nuclei of modern civil society has developed in 1960s and 70s in many Arab countries based on a new and modern type of middle class, this could not fill the gap to form a capable civil society. It is easy to observe that, still there is a remarkable deficit in the Middle East populations towards political toleration.³¹¹ And Palestinians as an Arabic society could not escape these deficits.

³¹⁰ Ibrahim ,S.E. (1994), *Civil Society and Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World*, 'Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.33

³¹¹ Ibrahim ,S.E. (1994), *Civil Society and Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World*, 'Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, pp.9-12

As Nancy Whittier (2002) argues, the state and the civil society shape each other.³¹² In fact this is a transformation process and interactions amongst social forces going hand in hand with modernity in last two centuries.³¹³ The crucial point concerning the Palestinian civil society is how capable it is in creating and legitimizing the Palestine State and if the social formations in West Bank and Gaza Strip are capable to shape the conditions on the way building a sound Palestinian democracy. The role of Palestinian Civil Society and HAMAS upon each other is best linked to the argument of Gramsci. Gramsci understands the civil society as a “ready social order” that can be transformed by revolutionary strategies under the guidance of “political society” that hold the political power in hand.³¹⁴ The position of Palestinian Civil Society in front of the government/state authority (State of Israel as the occupation power) is different from the position of any other civil society developing in interaction with the state mechanisms, as it was in case of European civil societies in a historical context. In this regard, the Palestinian Civil Society possesses some difficulties.

The first difficulty is lack of a normal governmental formation in West Bank and Gaza Strip and the de facto authority of Israel state since 1967 over the occupied territories. Thus, the role of state as a powerful entity is lacking and Palestinians stay deprived from the peaceful organizational contribution of the state apparatus in the development of a powerful civil society.³¹⁵

The second difficulty is the rural nature of Palestinian society. Almost two-third of Palestinians prefers living in small villages and small towns instead of urban centers. This characteristic of Palestinian Society raises worries about whether such a society can fully produce strong, effective, functional civil society organs and run them

³¹² Whittier, N. (2002), *Meaning and Structures in Social Movementst*, D.S.Meyer, N.Whitter and B.Robnett, eds., *Social Movements, Identity, Culture and State*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.289

³¹³ Buechler S.M. (2011), *Understanding Social Movements, Theories from the Classical Era to the Present*, Oxford, Paradigm Publishers, p.229

³¹⁴ Cox, R. (1999), ‘Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order’, *Review of International Studies*, No.25 p.4

³¹⁵ Muslih, M. (1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, ‘Norton R. Augustus, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Leiden, E.J. Brill, pp.243-244

efficiently for a common goal.³¹⁶ Because we know that in many Middle Eastern countries civil society associations and institutions have only names, locations, and their name signs and they fail to create a vibrant dynamism for a more active society in the process of democratization. In this sense, several reasons are argued why the Middle East lags behind with a disappointing development amongst other regions. Colonialism and foreign interference are argued to be substantial factors that drained the economic and natural sources and blocked a robust societal development. Another reason is the negative impact of colonial legacy which resulted in weak parliaments, judiciary system, weak bureaucracy and civil societies. Beyond these reasons, maybe the most crucial one which prevented a stable development in social and economic life is Islamic Laws and Sharia which provided a strong justification for top-down authoritarianism, male domination, weak pluralism, human rights and democracy.³¹⁷

Within this context, another outlining character of Palestinian Civil Society finds its roots in its modern historical past, beginning with the British colonial rule in Palestine in early 20th century. This is a historical development where local, and regional role players such as early Palestinian national movement of 1920s and 1930s, Israel State after 1948 and particularly after 1967 occupation of Palestine territories, and neighboring states like Jordan and Egypt left their deep impact upon Palestine society. Muhammad Muslih (1994) divides this historical term into three periods.³¹⁸ The first period starts in 1917 until the end of British mandate in 1948. During this period many small and large associations have been established in a wide range of social activities outside the framework of British rule. Many of these associations have been used by local politicians as assets to widen the political base of national struggle and coordinate the efforts for a common goal.

³¹⁶ Muslih, M. (1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, 'Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.245

³¹⁷ Wiarda, H.J. (2011), *American foreign policy in regions of conflict: A global perspective*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p.108

³¹⁸ Muslih, M.(1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, pp.246-248

The second period stretches from 1948 to 1967. This period is dominated by the wars between Israel and Arab states under the leadership of Egypt. Along these years, Palestinians were unable to structure their organizational life. Not only the implementations of Israel suppressed social organizations, but also the policies of Jordan and Egypt prevented the Palestinian civil society effectively to organize. Despite these restrictions the Palestinians succeeded to establish a link to the pre-1948 organs where mainly the students, the women and the workers were involved. Working for the national cause was the paramount goal of these organs. Some of these organizations worked hand in hand with Palestine Liberation Organization and its underground branch Al Fatah.

The third period starts in 1967 and extends until today. In this term, networks of Palestinian social organizations have been established primarily in Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait.³¹⁹ Since early 1970s, two political forces had a competition to influence Palestinians. One of these is Jordan, which granted Jordanian citizenship for West Bank Palestinians and provided financial support to civil society associations. The other one was PLO which became real representative of Palestinian people when it was recognized by Arab states and United Nations in 1974. Though it was not a government in a defined territory, it had capability to allocate financial resources in Palestine and functions as a parliament and an armed power. In time, the growing influence of PLO in occupied territories could not totally remove the influence of pro-Jordanian elites but undermined their authority. The struggle to influence Palestinian work power has taken place between PLO, Jordan and Egypt. In this term, as Muslih (1994) details, the associational life is managed by four types of

³¹⁹ As Mohammed Muslih explains, these were associational formations developing in Palestinian Diaspora in neighboring Arab countries. They developed hand in hand with Palestinian political movement aiming national reconstruction and liberation. The leading ones can be mentioned as in Egypt; 1959-Founding of General Union of Palestinian Students, 1962-Founding of League of Palestinian Women 1963- Founding of General Union of Palestinian Workers. In Jordan; 1953-UN Relief and Works Agency teachers union, 1959-Ongoing Ba'at, 1965-GUPW founded, 1967-1968-Fatah medical service became Palestinian Red Crescent Society. In Kuwait; 1958-Arab National Movement, 1959-Fata begins recruiting, 1963-Palestinian Workers Committee, 1966-Palestinian Teachers' Chapter.

organizations. These are political shops, voluntary cooperatives, voluntary mass organizations and Islamist groups.³²⁰

Societal Organizations in Palestine

The political shops in Palestine, which function within a patronage system, have acted as core socio-financial organizations since the early 1920s. These have been supported by Jordan in order to form a sort of local elite in West Bank loyal to Jordanian state policies. Throughout 1970s and 80s, a good number of Palestinians who were occupying senior posts in commerce, industry and other public institutions have been under the influence of Jordan. One of the struggles between Jordan and PLO has focused on these elites, while the other was on a more organized branch, the labor movement and workers union. The workers union in Palestine was historically under the hegemony of Palestine Communist Party since early 1920s and Fatah was determined to break this hegemony upon these organized worker groups. In 1981 this hegemony was broken and Fatah has accomplished to take control of workers union with its new headquarters in Ramallah.³²¹

Although the political shops and workers unions represented a general vision upon the Palestine territories, the voluntary cooperatives had limited local aims, functioning to contribute to the daily needs of Palestinians to remove the pain caused by Israeli military operations. In early 1990s, these cooperatives had reached a capacity to produce daily diary needs such as tomato paste, biscuits, milk, chicken and simple textile products such as sweaters, skirts and scarves.³²² Though limited in their economic capacity, these cooperatives has accomplished two aims. The first one

³²⁰ Muslih, M. (1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton Red Crescent Society. In Kuwait; 1958-Arab National Movement, 1959-Fata begins recruiting, 1963-Palestinian Workers Committee, 1966-Palestinian Teachers' Chapter.

³²⁰ Muslih, M. (1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.249

³²¹ Muslih, M. (1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, pp.250-251

³²² Muslih, M. (1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.252

was to create the spirit of a neighborhood idea, a kind of informal solidarity which resulted in the establishment of a network of neighborhoods linked to and supporting one another. The second one was the spirit of small town idea, which operates in a larger economic scale. This spirit targets the development of economic, social and cultural resources. Both neighborhood and small town spirits aimed to form a self-reliance and independence from the Israeli economy.³²³

The third type of civil society organizations in Palestine is named as voluntary mass organizations. The first voluntary actions belong to the students as voluntary committees of girls and boys in mid 1970s. These actions have started first as simple works conducted by volunteer teenagers in secondary schools such as cleaning the older quarters of town and later converted into a work force for farmers who could not afford workers. Such voluntary group actions, similar to voluntary cooperatives, have functioned as means to alleviate the sufferings of defenseless Palestinians in front of heavy-handed Israeli practices including economic measures. These mass organizations, unlike the cooperatives on economic development, concentrate on other kinds of work. These works can be named as charity activities focusing on health, family planning, orphans, elderly people and handicapped people. These charity organizations are free from the control of Israeli state and host experts working voluntarily such as doctors, educators, lawyers etc. These organizations also conduct some underground activities in Gaza and West Bank; helping the wounded or injured people by Israeli soldiers, providing shelter or financial aid to the people who lost their homes. During and after the first and second intifadah it was understood that such organized movements could prove a recognizable impact at domestic, regional and international circles. These three groups mentioned so far are in a position to cope with four fundamental problems; (i) hardships imposed by Israeli authorities, (ii) religious conservatism that is discouraging a wider participation, (iii) state surrogate, (iv) domestic political ambitions.³²⁴

³²³ Muslih, M. (1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.254

³²⁴ Muslih, M.(1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, pp.256-258

The fourth type of civil society organizations in Palestine are the Islamist groups with a different social and political vision from other groups. With the end of Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Russia, while secular PLO and its affiliates have lost their ideological ground and got weaker, the religio-political movements grew stronger. Amongst others, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad played the larger role. These Islamist groups in occupied territories did not only reject Israel, but also the system and the institutions in Palestine. They perceive true Islam as the only solution to Palestine problem and also to the problems of all other Muslim societies. In social sphere they used mosques, numerous circles in private homes, charities and other available instruments to disseminate their ideas and to create a new society.³²⁵ Similar to the philosophy of Muslim Brotherhood, they refused the western way of life and any other universal values in education or dress type for the Palestinian society.

Here, the position of Gaza is worth to mention as the region under HAMAS control. Although the Gazans are an integral part of Palestinian society, they have some different specifications casted by internal and external economic, societal, political conditions when compared to West Bank Palestinian society. As argued by Sara Roy (2011) these internal factors can be grouped as; (i)small geography and limited sources of Gaza Strip, (ii)heavy population density of refugees, (iii)the isolation of Gaza from other Arab states, and (iv)weak economic conditions, when compared to the West Bank.³²⁶ The external factors upon Gaza originate from the policies of two states; Israel and Egypt. Beside Israel as the sole state authority in Palestine, Egypt as the leader of Arab coalitions since the foundation of Israel state, has played a profound role upon Gazan society particularly between 1948 and 1967.

Egypt's approach to Gaza Strip has concentrated on appointing the local leaders and officers in Gaza, forbidding political activities and preventing any independent political movement. As the West Bank Palestinians enjoyed better economic and

³²⁵ Muslih, M.(1994), *Palestinian Civil Society*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.259

³²⁶ Roy, S. (2011), *Hamas and Civil Society in the Gaza Strip*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, pp. 226-228

social conditions in the wake of the annexation of West Bank by Jordan in 1950, Gazans fell behind in developing distinct political institutions, and a developed civil society. After the 1967 occupation, Israel with the hands of a military government has used a heavy control over Gazan people and territory and brute military repression against the refugees. During Israeli occupation, an associational life has flourished, but as a response to the restrictions in political and economic life. These suppressive implementations by Israel and Egypt in combination with very deficient economic and population conditions left almost no room to Gazans but to prefer violence and get more radical in coming years. Both, Gaza Strip and West Bank have suffered from the absence of a legitimate power, and presence of occupation and deprivation. But, these internal and external factors have made deep impact over the Gazan civil society and associational life.³²⁷ On the other hand, as discussed in above chapter the emergence of a civil society requires certain principles for a healthy development of that society in an interaction with other social agents. First of all, the existence of state authority is a condition, to protect the pluralism of the society and to regulate it. But in Gaza, identical to West Bank, there has never been a state to conduct its duties. Although PLO conducted some functions of a state with an impact on local formations, this was far away from a state's powerful presence. PLO's influence in Gaza was indirect, uncoordinated and fragmented.

Second lacking principle in Gazan civil society was the individual rights. The individual rights could not flourish in Gaza due to the existence of an occupation power, Israel, whose main target was to assure a political, military and economic control over the territory. Rights based on citizenship ties did not exist in Gaza. Within the nature of civil society there is an opposition movement against the state, in order to strengthen the position of individual vis-à-vis the state and to reform the state into a more democratic position. But in Gaza, the goal of the society could not develop in order to consolidate a free and strong democracy, but a societal survival against a common enemy.³²⁸

³²⁷ Roy, S. (2011), *Hamas and Civil Society in the Gaza Strip*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p.229

³²⁸ Roy, S. (2011), *Hamas and Civil Society in the Gaza Strip*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p.223

Besides, there are other factors preventing a robust and strong civil society. These can be summarized as the absence of associations and institutions and the presence of a poor and traditional refugee population. The combination of these internal and external functions fueled a political culture which used violence rather than mediating a moderate approach in politics. This traditional refugee population in Gaza left little room for diversity and pluralism due to their dominant ethnic and cultural homogeneity. But, despite all these deficiencies in front of a modern civil society, a sort of associational life has existed in Gaza despite many unfavorable conditions.

Another main difference between the Western and Middle Eastern societies, as argued by Hinnebush (1994) is the “lack of a stable social base in a dominant class”. In the Middle East, the authoritarian and populist regimes govern the society with the hands of military and bureaucracy and instead of a stable social class, they use a primordial structure to assure solidarity amongst different layers of the society.³²⁹ A civil society–political society relation in Palestine during Al-Fatah administration was similar to that of Soviet Russia, where the state governed by political society was everything and civil society was primordial. The ruling elites of Al Fatah have constructed a “top-down” hegemonic order over the society which was deprived by disadvantageous economic conditions and corruption since the beginning of Palestinian-Israeli dispute. On the other hand, HAMAS’s current political power amongst the Palestinian people originates from its approach to the civil society similar to the West where there is a proper interaction between the citizen and the ruling power or the state.

Accordingly, in Gaza strip, HAMAS social forces have constructed a “bottom-up” process, aiming to distribute the economic and social welfare equally amongst the Gazan citizens. In this process, similar to the civil societies in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in South America with their “bottom-up” reactions against ‘global

³²⁹ Hinnebush, R. (1994), *State, Civil Society and Political Change in Syria*, Norton R. Augustus, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, Leiden, E.J. Brill, p.239

production categories' in 1990s, HAMAS has proved a reaction to the political forerunners of Al Fatah.³³⁰

In this section, so far I have investigated the dynamics shaping the societal structure in Palestine including other internal and external role players; Israel and its role across occupied territories, Al Fatah and its interaction with Palestinian society since early 1970s, Egypt and Jordan as neighboring states. In following paragraphs I will focus on the interaction of HAMAS with Palestinian society.

The societal power of HAMAS is its strongest arm. In terms of identity and ideology, similar to other social movements in the Middle East, HAMAS proves the characteristics of becoming a strong social movement that proves a system of beliefs and values. This ideology HAMAS possesses, casts the identity of the individuals it addresses, "telling them who they are, where they stand in this social hierarchy and what kind of power and dignity they acquire in this system". In this ideology, similar to the ideology of GAM, the values originating from the Muslim religion occupy a significant place.³³¹ The most effective tool used by HAMAS is its effective and well organized and highly motivated social network amongst the Palestinians.

This ideology that uses religion as an asset to train individuals and society hampers the development of a healthy society similar to West. Because religion is a dogma that leaves little room to any kind of information supporting other diverse ideas. But actually, the more information is very and bountiful, the stronger the democracy penetrates the society. As discussed by Hannah Arendt in her seminal work "Origins of Totalitarianism" the democracy history of humanity is a struggle between the liberal and totalitarian types of democracy.³³² Liberal democracy sees this process as a matter of trial and error in daily life, and gives a broad room to the personal and collective actions. But, totalitarian democratic school recognizes a sole and exclusive

³³⁰ Cox, R. (1999), 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order', *Review of International Studies*, No.25, p.13

³³¹ Gecas, V. (2000), *Value Identities, Self-motives and Social Movements*, S. Stryker, T.J.Owens, R.W.White, eds. *Self, Identity and Social Movements*, University of Minnesota Press, p. 93-95.

³³² Arendt, H. (1958), *Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, Meridian Books, pp.1-3

truth in politics (Muslim religion in case of HAMAS) which may be called as political messianism. This approach seeks to drive the society towards a “perfect result” which is actually a dogmatic religious teaching. This religious perfect result accepts no resistance and widens its scope of politics to embrace whole society with a divine aim in order to control everything in life.

Here, we face the question of which path HAMAS as an Islamist entity will chose; a liberal democracy, or a messianist totalitarian democracy. Will HAMAS be loyal to the dynamics of a liberal democratic transformation, a process that may take decades to grow strong roots of a civil society throughout Palestinian society, or follow a totalitarian path in order to form a society under religious norms and codes? As Charles Tilly argues³³³ social movements emerged along with democracy, but this does not mean that all social movements will contribute democracy to flourish in a society. As seen in the first half of the 20th century, the reformist and revolutionary social movements created an anti-reaction movement by non-democratic and anti-democratic activists all over Europe in 1930s, such as fascist marches, demonstrations and mass meetings.

Here, the crucial point is how peaceful methods does HAMAS use, as it conducts public meetings, demonstrations, marches, and similar activities when proving its commitment to a cause. It is visible that if it stays away from using means of violence and promote peaceful methods in a way to strengthen the interaction between the social movement dynamics and the democratization process, HAMAS will get stronger to defend its cause of being and weaken the western coalition accusing it as a terrorist organization. In this global era where traditional nation-state loses its legitimacy in using power without limitations in all aspects of international relations, HAMAS seems to have entered a transformation process to become an effective member of civil society, rather than using radical activism. Tilly suggests,

³³³ Tilly,C. (2003), *When do (and dont) social movements promote democratization*, P. Ibarra, ed. Social Movements and Democracy, Hampshire,Palgrave Mc Millan Press, p.22

for social movements the more HAMAS becomes a part of global civil society, the stronger it will become in defending its cause.³³⁴

Religion and Palestinian Society

The societal power of HAMAS, as argued in previous paragraphs, finds its roots in its ideology fed by religious insights. Similar to other Islam communities, “ulama” the religious figures play a vital role for the interaction between the society, individual and the knowledge. Ulama who served as the gatekeepers of Islamic education throughout the history, continue to play a crucial role in shaping the individual and the society in the modern Middle East.³³⁵ Although some of these religious elites follow a more critical and activist stance opposing the modern state in the Middle East, most of them stay affiliated with the state in terms of their salaries, their posts in the state echelons and other formal institutions of state they work for.³³⁶

The ideas of Muslim Brotherhood leading figures’ ideas such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb have enlightened the path of HAMAS leaders on the struggle between the ruling elites of Fatah organization and the ulama in terms of taking the political support of the Palestinians. According to al-Banna;

“...(ulama) broke down the walls and the gates of kings and emirs, forced their opinions on them, commanded them, refused to accept their gifts, enlightened them with the truth, and presented them with the demands of the nation. Moreover they took up arms against tyranny and exploitation.”³³⁷

³³⁴ Tilly, C. (2003), *When do (and dont) social movements promote democratization*, P. Ibarra, ed. Social Movements and Democracy, Hampshire, Palgrave Mc Millan Press, p.21

³³⁵ Winter, M. (2009), *Ulama Between the State and the Society in Pre-Modern Sunni Islam*, Hatina Meir, ed., *Guardians of Faith in Modern Times; ‘Ulama’ in the Middle East*, Leiden, NV Press, p.21

³³⁶ Hatina, M. (2009), *Guardians of Faith in Modern Times; ‘Ulama’ in the Middle East*, Leiden, NV Press, p.1

³³⁷ Hatina, M. (2009), *The Clerics Betrayal Islamists, ‘Ulama’ and the Polity* Meir H. ed., *Guardians of Faith in Modern Times; ‘Ulama’ in the Middle East*, NV Press, Leiden, p.250

In addition to the teachings of al-Banna and Qutb, necessity emerged in order to redefine the concept of Muslim religious scholarship at the present times. The leader of Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, Hasan al-Turabi's definition is worth to mention in terms of the scope of knowledge (ilm). Turabi argues that;

“...all knowledge is divine and religious, a chemist, an engineer, an economist or a jurist are all ulama. So, the ulama in this broad sense, whether they are social or natural scientists, public leaders or philosophers, should enlighten society”

It is possible to assert that, al-Turabi's approach is setting the preconditions for an Islamic renaissance. With the proliferation of mass media in global era, the role of traditional mosque and madrasa in Islamic education has been replaced by printed and electronic communication assets including satellite and internet.³³⁸

On the other hand, the role of ulama in Palestine has followed a dual character since very early times of the struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis, as early as 1920s and 1930s. On one hand the Supreme Muslim Council did not hesitate to support the national cause moving towards a secular direction against the British mandate and Zionist movement, but on the other hand the same Council enacted several religious rules and directives upon the position of women in the society, such as insisting on the veil for women, forbidding the attendance of women to entertainment places etc. The Council managed a wide range of religious activities, sharia courts and controlled newspapers and educational institutions. The prestige and power of the Council continued during 1970s and 1980s creating a close identification between religion and nationality. During the rise of Islamist opposition ideas in the Middle East in post-Cold War era, the Muslim Brotherhood/HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in cooperation with the Council directed, reshaped and managed the religious consciousness in Palestinian society and prescribed the moral path for the individuals and the people to follow.³³⁹

³³⁸ Hatina, M. (2009), *Guardians of Faith in Modern Times; 'Ulama' in the Middle East*, Leiden, NV Press, pp.2-3

³³⁹ Hatina, M. (2009), *The Clerics Betrayal Islamists, 'Ulama' and the Polity* Meir H. ed., *Guardians of Faith in Modern Times; 'Ulama' in the Middle East*, NV Press, Leiden, pp.256-57

Although in Palestine there were other Islamist movements established earlier than HAMAS such as Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) and Islamic Jihad, HAMAS has edged out these movements with its very successful social network. This welfare network has won the trust and gratitude of Palestinian people which have suffered from economic and social deprivation as well as the corrupt administration of Fatah controlled Palestinian Authority. Although HAMAS has been able to build a social base among different sectors of Palestinian society in Gaza since early 1990s, generally speaking, the economic situation in Palestine is not improving.³⁴⁰

Matthew Levitt (2006) identifies three reasons for the strength of HAMAS amongst the Palestinians; first is that it is not a corrupt administration as the Fatah administration was. Second is that, it provides services such as clinics, after school programs, food distribution centers to Palestinian people, and the third is that HAMAS can hurt the Israelis if the Israelis hurt them. In this regards, HAMAS with its character combining the religion and the politics in its existence, attracts the attention of global and regional powers. Because such a political discourse plays a considerable role in shaping the fabric of Muslim societies.

In this sense, HAMAS has developed its existence on two axis in parallel to each other; first its religious identity and second its nationalist identity.³⁴¹ We see that HAMAS's political victories along this process have also effected the Islamist movements in Egypt and other neighboring countries.³⁴² HAMAS, with this double axis policy, has gained the admiration of many Islamic Organizations not only in the Middle East, but also in Northern Africa, Asia, and the Gulf. For such groups the religious nationality of HAMAS reflects their own political aspirations in front of weak secular states and their western supporters. As argued by Strindberg and Waern

³⁴⁰ Roy, S. (2011), *Hamas and Civil Society in the Gaza Strip*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p.245

³⁴¹ Lewitt, M. (2006), *HAMAS; Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, Harrisonburg, R.R. Donnelly Press, pp.33-38

³⁴² Milton-Edwards, B. and Farrel, S. (2010), *HAMAS- The Islamic Resistance Movement*, Cambridge, Polity Press, preface

(2011) Islamism represented by Muslim Brotherhood and its follower HAMAS is a combination of some facts in both ends such as the identity and the ideology, the process and the objective, the tactic and the strategy and also the reality and the ideal.³⁴³

4.1.2 Second Level: HAMAS and its Relations with Israel

In this section of the dissertation, I will investigate relations of HAMAS with the parent state Israel, the confrontations and/or interactions in-between, and the possibility of HAMAS to transform into a peaceful political entity. This is important because, in case the non-state actor and the parent state do not share a common understanding upon peace, stability, justice, human rights and democracy, they will not find a compromise. In this respect, first, I will study the capability of HAMAS transforming from a militant group into a responsible political entity. Second, I will focus upon the relations in-between HAMAS and Israel particularly under the shadow of a violent dialogue. And third, I will investigate the transformation efforts of HAMAS until 2006 electoral victory and after it assumed the governmental responsibility in post-2006 term. Oslo peace process, and the personal impact of Israeli PM Netanyahu also will be criticized.

4.1.2.1 HAMAS; Transforming from a Militant Group into a Political Entity

Since its establishment day, throughout its transformation efforts, HAMAS has faced a series of dilemmas between its imperative ideology which left little room to maneuver according to changing political conditions and the realities taking place in sub-regional, regional and international spheres. Particularly after the 2006 elections in Palestine, the members of academic and diplomatic community argue whether HAMAS is transforming from a militant opposition group into a political party shouldering the responsibility of being a government, or not. Actually in this transformation process, the substantial change would be in HAMAS ideology. The argument of Khaled Hroubis worth to mention in terms of double strategies used by HAMAS such as jihad, dawa, revolution and violence on one hand and a peaceful

³⁴³ Strindberg, A. and Waern, M. (2011), *Islamism*, Cambridge, Polity Press, p.205

reformist approach on the other.³⁴⁴ This is a kind of pendulum movement, adopting itself to the changing political and operational circumstances. This is a flexible strategy based on pragmatism within the principles of political realism, which assures the continuity of Islamic activism. This flexible strategy is also in parallel with the ultimate aims of HAMAS ideology, which are to realize the liberation of Palestine and establishment of an Islamic regime. The conduct of this flexible strategy are visible in the rhetoric used by HAMAS leaders at several stages, the formal documents endorsed by HAMAS government at internal and international levels, and the practices of HAMAS regime in Gaza strip upon Palestinian people according to Islamic lifestyle.

As argued by Guy Deutsch, after the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections victory, HAMAS used a rhetoric in favor of civil society, political pluralism, fighting corruption, administrative reforms, encouraging a culture of dialogue and similar. But, after the violent takeover of the political responsibility from PLO in Gaza strip in 2007, we observe that HAMAS return back to its original revolutionary politics based on violence and suppression against its political opponents and the Palestinian people upto a degree, particularly after the enactment of Islamic laws. In this sense, it seems that the fundamental ideological goals of HAMAS such as the Islamization of Palestinian society, was standing as a strong obstacle preventing HAMAS to take fundamental steps in order to realize its promises to the Palestinian people as well as taking steps to transform.³⁴⁵

Another shift in HAMAS politics in the wake of 2006 elections finds its roots in UN resolutions pertaining to Arab-Israeli conflict and the agreements conducted between PLO and Israel, particularly after 1993 Oslo Accords.³⁴⁶ Rather than staying loyal to

³⁴⁴ Hroub, K. (Summer 2006), 'A New HAMAS through its New Documents', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35, no. 4, pp. 6-27.

³⁴⁵ Here Guy Deutsch argues the limits of pragmatism and ideological changes within HAMAS; For details see: http://www.thepicapproject.org/?page_id=730, access date: 2 April 2013

³⁴⁶ 1993 Oslo Accords are the declaration of the principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and PLO. This was a milestone to find a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The road to Oslo Accords started in Madrid conference in 1991, between two sponsoring super powers, the USA and Soviet Union, the governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and

the goal of annihilating the State of Israel stated in its original Charter of 1988, HAMAS used a rhetoric focusing on Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Khaled Hroub (2006) asserts that this change in HAMAS politics aimed first to appease the international public opinion, and second to send a message to HAMAS supporters across Palestine territories. Here, the establishment of Palestinian State in Gaza and West Bank was an interim stage once defended also by PLO and would pave the way for the ultimate aim, which was the liberation of whole Palestine land and return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland.³⁴⁷

The crucial point here was, after taking the political support of the Palestinian people, whether HAMAS would get out of its militant opposition movement format and follow a more reformist and constructive way in order to pave the way towards a feasible and permanent peace between Palestinians and Israelis. The Palestinian politics and national consensus urge HAMAS to prove that the change in its rhetoric is not limited to short term tactical maneuvers, but represent a significant change in movement's ideology. As Khaled Hroub (2010) argues, whatever the degree of this change in its rhetoric is, the leaders of HAMAS in recent years faced a dilemma to follow a moderate or radical line of thinking and action. The decrease in terms of religious proclamation and praxis in HAMAS discourse created unrest in the interaction between the leading cadres of HAMAS and its supporters on the street. The recent line adapted by HAMAS has been questioned widely, due to its

Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the representatives of European Community. Following the Madrid Conference, bilateral and multilateral talks between the sides were conducted in Oslo in order to draft a document of principles for Israel-Palestinian peace-making efforts and pave the way to a permanent peace. In Oslo, direct negotiations between the Israeli and PLO officials were held. In September 1993, President Bill Clinton hosted a formal signing ceremony between Yitzak Rabin and Yasir Arafat. The Oslo Accords were a pivotal milestone for Arab-Israeli problem and included vital formal decisions such as; Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), letters of mutual recognition between Israel and PLO. DOP included some very important commitments such as the withdrawal of Israel from parts of Gaza Strip and West Bank, acknowledge of Palestinian Authority in these regions as self-government authority. After Oslo, Palestinians created Palestinian National Authority with democratically elected Council, and PLO's status for the first time since its inception was internationally legitimized. But the process could not reach a permanent solution due to failures of both sides to fulfill their commitments, domestic political unrest, lack of progress in final negotiations and rise of conflict. The failure of Camp David summit in 2000 and outbreak of second intifadah brought the end of Oslo process. For more details See: <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1990-2000/Oslo>; access date: 2 April 2013

³⁴⁷ Hroub, K. (Summer 2006), 'A New HAMAS through its New Documents', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35, no. 4, pp. 6-27.

perception as being an indirect recognition of Israel. Some leading figures such as Mahmoud Zahhar, the former foreign minister of HAMAS-led government in 2007, have criticized this new pattern in HAMAS politics. Some radicals and rival groups accused HAMAS leaders and the military wing for giving up the resistance for governmental posts and privileges. The claim was that this was exactly what Fatah has done in previous years.³⁴⁸

Another crucial point along this change process was that the external players such as the West, the Arab governments and Israel did not help HAMAS. Rather, these players tried to weaken the HAMAS government by way of an international embargo on Gaza strip which eventually widened the political division between West Bank and Gaza strip. This approach has hampered the Palestinian unity and reduced the possibility of consolidating a more pragmatic political process strengthening HAMAS against its internal rivals. In this respect, although HAMAS has had a rising trend since its inception in 1987, it has experienced a serial of setbacks and difficult times under unfavorable domestic and international conditions.

Beyond those difficult conditions created by domestic and international players, Palestine in general and HAMAS in particular have faced another burden. This burden appeared as the substantial factor limiting the transformation capacity of HAMAS. This burden was the continuation of the Western colonialism in Palestine. Although, the colonization era has faded away starting with the end of World War II some regions continued to face a colonial and/or a quasi-colonial rule. In addition to some other colonial implementations at different geographies such as the Chinese colonial rule over Tibet and Indonesian rule over East Timor, the occupation of Palestine land in 1967 war indicates that Israel has taken the steps of a colonial power over occupied territories. Actually the creation of Israel was a colonial project perceived, planned and implemented between 1890 and 1948. Zionism in this sense is perceived within the framework of a global colonialist policy and has used tactics upon Palestine similar to those of European colonial powers upon several regions of

³⁴⁸ Hroub, K. (2010), *HAMAS, A Beginner's Guide*, New York, Pluto Press, pp. 166-167

the world.³⁴⁹ In this case, how could there be a compromise between the parties to realize a permanent peace in Palestine? Amongst others, several scholars posit their views that Israel was pursuing a colonial project.³⁵⁰

Jurgen Osterhammel and a number of scholars argue that although European colonialism ended in mid-20th century, new colonial powers emerged. In this sense, some scholars start the Israeli colonial project before 1900s, while some others focus on post-6 Days War in 1967. As Argued by Maha Samman (2013) there are five features that assure a colonial character to the Israeli rule upon occupied territories. First; the violation of the territorial integrity of occupied Palestinian land by Israel, second; not allowing the people of occupied territories to have their government, third; integrating the economy of occupied territories to Israel economy, fourth; violating the natural resources of occupied territories, fifth; deny the the Palestinian population of occupied territories to practice, develop and express its cultural values.³⁵¹ As a rigid sign of this colonialist project; while the Jewish settlers were supported with financial benefits, grants and loans, the Palestinians faced stark restrictions. Colonial legacy, as a heritage of previous centuries, faded away with the

³⁴⁹ Samman, M. (2013), *Trans-Colonial Urban Space in Palestine Politics and Development*, New York, Routledge, p.73

³⁵⁰ Amongst others the work of some scholars are worth to mention. D. Gregory, in his book *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq*(2004) argues that some jewish settlers are motivated by religious ideology, but the majority by financial benefits, loans and credits which is a typical incentive of colonialism. Maxime Rodinson, in his book (1973) *Israel, A Colonial Settler State* pulls the attention to the reality Israel's colonial policies are similar to that of European-American expansion of nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the other hand Uri Davis (2003) in his book *Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within*, pulls our attention to Palestine conflict in the form of a conflict between a settler colonial state and a native resistance. Jeff Halper, in his book (2008) *An Israeli in Palestine Resisting Dispossession, Redeeming Israel*, emphasizes that millions of Palestinians are denied from 93 percent of the country and suppressed to live in tiny enclaves. Lorenzo Veracini in his book (2006) *Israel and Settler Society*, considers that Israel is a state of a colonial project that has failed to become a state of all citizens. Ilan Pappé, in his book *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine*, states that, "...the case of Palestine to the colonialist history of ethnic cleansing in North and South America, Africa and Australia, where white settlers routinely committed such crimes".

³⁵¹ Human Sciences Research Council, (May 2009), *Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A Re-assessment of Israel's Practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories under International Law*, Cape Town, pp. 8–9.

end of Second World War, but continued its impact on Palestine with the hands of Israel and on Aceh with the hands of Indonesia.³⁵²

The colonial process of creating a Jewish state with the acquisition of Palestinian land is composed of four stages; First stage started in 1880s when Zionist movement was initiated by Theodore Herzl by encouraging, planning and funding first Jewish immigrations to Palestine in order to buy land, to build neighborhoods and to establish small communities. This stage lasted until 1923 when Palestine came under the British Mandate. The second stage lasted until 1948 and described the collaboration of Jews with the British colonial legacy. In 1948, the Jews held only around 6% of Palestine land. The third stage commenced in the wake of first war between Israel and Arab states in 1948 and lasted until 6 days war in 1967. This period of time is occupied by intense settlement activities of Jewish immigrants. In this period over 700 settlements were constructed. The fourth stage took place with the occupation of West Bank, Gaza, Sinai Desert and Golan Heights in 1967. In this stage new settlements were built on occupied territories as a part of Israeli strategy to formulate a political solution aiming security and seize the initiative over the land and the society.³⁵³ Such severe unfavorable conditions under the colonialist politics of Israel state have negatively affected HAMAS in order to transform into a responsible political entity.

4.1.2.2 Relations of HAMAS and Israel- A Violent Dialogue

“There is a huge gap between us (Jews) and our enemies, not just in ability but in morality, culture, sanctity of life, and conscience. They are our neighbors here, but it seems as if at a distance of a few hundred meters away, there are people who do not belong to our continent, to our world, but actually belong to a different galaxy.” Former Israeli President Moshe Katsav, The Jerusalem Post, May 10, 2001.

"We have liberated Gaza, but have we recognized Israel? Have we given up our lands occupied in 1948? We demand the liberation of the West Bank, and the establishment of a state in the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its capital – but without recognizing [Israel]. This is the key – without recognizing the Israeli enemy on a single inch of land..." Hamas leader Mahmoud Al-Zahhar, Future News TV, June 15, 2010.

³⁵² J. Osterhammel, J. (1999), *Colonialism*, Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, p. 118.

³⁵³ Samman, M. (2013), *Trans-Colonial Urban Space in Palestine Politics and Development*, New York, Routledge, pp.77-78

Although Israel's interaction with HAMAS is a very good sample of asymmetric conflict³⁵⁴ of post-Cold War era, the relations between Israel and HAMAS can be best investigated over a "violent dialogue" composed of numerous statements, interviews, declarations and speeches. Since the very beginning of HAMAS-Israel relations, such violent dialogue has produced distressing samples, at almost every level, particularly with the statements of military and political leaders of both sides. Violent dialogue is a certain type of communication between the adversaries engaged in violent conflict. In this sort of dialogue, the actors do not end relations, but form a specific type of communication under the weight and control of the violence. In Palestine conflict, this violence was shaped simply by suicide missions of HAMAS and Israel's military strategy of "shock and awe".³⁵⁵ The term "shock and awe" describes a fast dominance over the adversary by using overwhelming force and firepower. The employment of this new strategic perception on the battle zone was first spelled out by the American strategic analysts Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade in a Pentagon briefing document of 1996 which is characterized by shock, surprise, flexibility and use of precise munitions on the adversary.³⁵⁶

As a reflection to this violent dialogue with Israel, after the foundation of HAMAS, to the end of 2014, Palestine armed groups have conducted 620 high-profile ground attacks against Israelis. 190 of these attacks were suicide bombings, killing a sum of 1586 and injuring 8120 Israelis. HAMAS has conducted 260 of these attacks basically composed of suicide bombings, rocket firings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and light arms shootings.³⁵⁷ These terror acts were in parallel with the ideals embedded in HAMAS Charter and the political ideology of Muslim Brotherhood. This term that extends between the outbreak of first intifadah (1987)

³⁵⁴ Kardelj, N. (2010), *Israel vs Hamas*, New York, Nova Science Publishers, Inc. p.37.

³⁵⁵ Ayyash, M.M. (2010), Hamas and the Israeli state: A 'violent dialogue', *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(1); 103-123.

³⁵⁶ See <http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/shock-and-awe> Access date 16 Nov 2016

³⁵⁷ Davis, R. (2016) *Hamas, Popular Support and War in the Middle East*, New York, Routledge pp. 192-195.

and the end of second intifadah (2005), except for 1991 Madrid Peace conference and following Oslo peace initiative, is dominated by the terror, violence and state atrocities between HAMAS and Israel.

Oslo Peace Process

After first intifadah ended in early 1990s, a promising peace process commenced as Madrid Peace Conference (1991) and continued with Oslo Accords (1993). More than 20 years passed, and Oslo is still re-emphasized by many political- academic circles as a missed opportunity that would lead to permanent peace based on two-state solution. It was assumed to be a promising environment fed by mutual recognition, mutual cooperation and a strong motivation for peace. But there are some other scholars such as Edward Said and Mahmoud Derwish accusing the agreement for preparing a tragic end for Palestinian rights. Because, they argue that those rights were traded for the public recognition of Palestine and such an agreement would diminish the scope of Palestinian aspirations for a homeland and create a triumph for Israel. Beyond these academic criticisms, the practical answer to the Oslo Accords rose up on streets of Palestine with the Second Intifadah (2000-2005).³⁵⁸ It is possible to assert that, 23 years passed since Oslo Accords signed, but it is accused for being the source of the crisis the Palestinian politics is facing today.

Oslo Peace Agreement was signed on September 9, 1993 between Israeli PM Yitzak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Thus, Arafat accepted; (i)the recognition of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security, (ii)the acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, (iii)the commitment to the Middle East Peace Process, (iv)renouncing the use of terrorism and other violent acts, (v)assuring all PLO elements to comply with these terms and prevent violations. In return, Rabin granted that Israel will recognize PLO as the representative of Palestinian people and commence negotiations.³⁵⁹ Consequently, Rabin and Arafat have exchanged letters

³⁵⁸ Sen, S. (2013) "It's Nakba, not a Party":Re-stating the (Continued) Legacy of the Oslo Records, Arab Studies Quarterly, p.163 See details at; www.plutojournals.com/asq/

³⁵⁹ Sen, S. (2013) "It's Nakba, not a Party":Re-stating the (Continued) Legacy of the Oslo Records, Arab Studies Quarterly, p.164 See details at; www.plutojournals.com/asq/

of recognition granting Israeli government and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as legitimate actors in peace talks. Negotiating parties and societies were persuaded that the interests of both sides were embedded in a mutual effort for an enduring two-state solution. Thus, both Israelis and Palestinians came to the point that an agreement could be carried out by legitimate representatives and both sides were obliged to recognize each other's identity and rights at national levels.³⁶⁰

At the signature ceremony, Rabin, told a emotional speech; "We the soldiers who have returned from the battle stained with blood ... we who have fought against you, the Palestinians, we say to you today in a loud and clear voice: Enough of blood and tears! Enough!" The response of Arafat to Rabin was an embracing sentence; "Our two peoples are awaiting today this historic hope, and they want to give peace a real chance."

After this agreement, Oslo Accords was signed declaring that; "...to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process." Oslo Peace Agreement has opened a door towards peace but how this interim agreement would turn into a "permanent settlement" and solve the right problems between the parties such as Jerusalem, refugees, Israeli settlements, security arrangements and borders.³⁶¹ In time, developments between 1993 and 2000 proved that the Palestinian side was largely unsatisfied on issues such as; ensuring the sovereignty of Palestinian Authority (PA), stopping the enlargement of Israeli settlements on occupied lands, providing access to natural resources for Palestinians, and ensuring economic development in Palestine

³⁶⁰ Kelman H.C. (1995), "Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough" *Negotiation Journal*, 11, pp.19-27.

³⁶¹ For details see; "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements," The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL), accessed April 23, 2014, <http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/71DC8C9D96D2F0FF85256117007CB6CA>.

territories.³⁶² Such negative developments proved in time that the most specific outcome of Interim Agreement was its failure for a viable Palestinian state. Hamas Deputy Foreign Minister Ghazi Hamad's, words are worth to cite to understand the depth of the disappointment for Oslo Agreement amongst the Palestinians;

“The Oslo Accords were a mistake. In the beginning it was sold as the first step for the Palestinians to create a state. But we can see that it was false hope and painted a rosy picture. They deceived us by giving us false hope. It was a big illusion ... It was not there to create a state but it is there to decrease the cost of the occupation.”³⁶³

Beside other reasons, probably one of the eminent reasons for this disappointment was the personal weakness, insufficient, unprepared and unexperienced situation of Palestinian staff that joined Oslo talks.

Originating from this deep disappointment, for Palestinians, and particularly for HAMAS Oslo Accords was accepted as a tool of persistent occupation of Palestinian territories by Israel. HAMAS since very beginning, objected firmly to Interim Agreement, declaring it as a reflection of defeatism, thus strong Israel was trying to impose its political power upon weak Palestine.³⁶⁴ HAMAS claimed that during Oslo process, Israel refused to find a solution to outstanding issues such as halting settlement construction in occupied territories, prisoners problem, access to natural water resources, future of Jerusalem as the capital city. The fate of Palestinian

³⁶² The central legal texts of the Oslo process are; Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Declaration on Interim Self-government Arrangements, Sept 13, 1993, Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization Agreements on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Israel-Palestine Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept 28, 1995, In addition, for the implementation of the phases of these agreements, there are four more additional texts; these are the Hebron Agreement (January 1997), the Wye Plantation Agreement (October 1998), the Sharm el Sheikh Agreement (September 1999), and the protocol of the safe passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (October 1999). For details, see Silverburg, S.R. (2002) *Palestine and International Law*, North Carolina, Mc Farland and Company Publishers, p 269

³⁶³ Sen, S. (2013) “It's Nakba, not a Party”:Re-stating the (Continued) Legacy of the Oslo Records, Arab Studies Quarterly, p.162 See details at; www.plutojournals.com/asq/

³⁶⁴ Meir Hatina, M. “Hamas and the Oslo Accords: Religious Dogma in a Changing Political Reality,” *Mediterranean Politics* 4:3 (1999), p.40.

refugees was never taken to the table as well.³⁶⁵ An armed struggle was the only path to follow to keep Palestinian aspirations for eventual statehood, and HAMAS was committed for this role. For this aim, HAMAS conducted popular uprisings, strikes and engaged IDF with military attacks, and exploded suicide bombings in the main cities of Israel.³⁶⁶ In this sense, HAMAS proved a significant military performance through hostile engagements with Israel and emerged as the only organization capable to hurt Israel and persuade it to withdraw from Gaza.³⁶⁷ Additionally, the post-Oslo term was dominated with economic problems, border closures, unemployment, child workers, illiteracy and high rates of corruption in PA echelons. These unfavorable socio-economic conditions were increasing the interest of secular and moderate Palestinian populace towards HAMAS which has maintained a robust-separate social welfare structure through its educational, medical and financial institutions in early 1990s across Palestine.

In addition to this welfare network, HAMAS healed moral values of Palestinian society which suffered from communitarian deterioration in recent years.³⁶⁸ With this double head strategy, -military engagement with IDF and strong social network in the Palestinian territories, HAMAS rose to the political power through electoral victories. Successful steps in local labor and student union elections in 1990s carried HAMAS to triumph in 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections.³⁶⁹ It is interesting to see that, after 2006 PLC elections, HAMAS committed itself to a twofold role; resist and govern. Particularly after assuming the governing

³⁶⁵ As contended at the article HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics, authored by Dr. Sherifa D. Zuhur, in the period of Oslo process, the Palestinian refugee numbers are; 4,913,993 Palestinians live outside of Israel and the occupied territories, 1,337,388 refugees live in camps, 3,166,781 live outside of camps, for details see: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=894> access date 12 June 2016.

³⁶⁶ Hroub, K. (2006) *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*, London, Pluto Press, p.44

³⁶⁷ Wiegand, K. (2010), *Bombs and Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups*, Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Group, p.132

³⁶⁸ Roy, S. (2011), *Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.15

³⁶⁹ Gunning, J. (2007), *Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence*, London, Hurst & Company, pp. 144-145.

responsibility in Gaza, HAMAS tried to enter a period of transformation with the political support of Palestinian people. For this aim, it reduced the attacks on Israel, and it accepted the existence of Israel state if it accepted to return to pre-six days war borders.

Netanyahu Effect

Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli PM at the time of Oslo Peace process, has played a key role until he was murdered by a young Jewish extremist on 4 November 1995. Rabin's sudden death was the start of a fatal setback to the peace process, filling both Israeli and Palestinian political echelons with a hopeless expectancy on the future of Oslo. Rabin was a peace campaigner and his loss was the beginning of a new turmoil. It is widely argued that Rabin's return from "hawk to dove" in Palestine conflict during Oslo process played a positive role on post-2006 HAMAS transformation process to minimize terror acts and embrace governing responsibility. Neither Shimon Peres as Rabin's successor nor Binyamin Netanyahu who won the elections in 1996 as the leader of Likud Party followed Rabin's path for a permanent peace.³⁷⁰ Netanyahu, after he took over the office, turned out to be a foe for the Palestinians, because after Peres who was gradually an open-minded figure, Netanyahu was a fundamentalist and demagogue politician who manipulated media skillfully. Since 1996 onwards, the peace process has fallen into the hands of PM Netanyahu.³⁷¹

Netanyahu's opposition to Oslo peace process was embedded in his ideology. He played his opposition role to the peace process under the need for security, and prioritized security above peace. Actually he was following the same antagonism he did as the leader of opposition party. Along three years, from 1996 until 1999, his approach to the peace process was a nightmare not only for the Palestinians but also for Arab states and Israeli peace promoting circles. Egypt and Jordan, for example, have frozen their relations with Israel. The United States as the leading broker of

³⁷⁰ Qurie, A. (2008), *Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine*, London, I.B. Tauris pp.7-8

³⁷¹ Qurie, A. (2008), *Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine*, London, I.B. Tauris pp.10-12

Oslo peace process, on the other hand, found itself in a dilemma as the strongest supporter of Israel state. This confrontation between the US and Israel emerged during Wye river Conference in October 1998.³⁷² After the conference, the US directed strong criticism at Israel and PM Netanyahu. Israel failed to comply with the Wye River Memorandum, and moreover it persisted on an aggressive attitude by building new settlements across the territories populated with Palestinians, such as East Jerusalem. In addition to building thousands of settlements in Jerusalem, he also confiscated thousands of acres of land to use for future settlement projects in the West Bank. Netanyahu was insisting to focus on security requirements for Israel state and society, blaming Palestinians for not obeying their commitments to stop terrorist attacks. Netanyahu kept following the policy of “facts on the ground” by realizing new settlement areas despite regional and international condemnations.³⁷³

Netanyahu took some other reckless actions which put Israel under a heavy shadow in the region. One of these actions was the attempt by Israeli agents to kill Khaled Meshaal in Amman, the leader of HAMAS. This failed attempt ruined the relations between Israel and Jordan to a degree that Netanyahu released Sheikh Ahmed Yassin the founder and spiritual leader of HAMAS from the jail, in order to compensate the reactions.³⁷⁴ During three years of Netanyahu term, new hostilities between Israel and Palestinians emerged. These hostilities resulted in suicide bombings and similar violent acts that pulled the reactions of a wider spectrum in Israeli politics. Although Netanyahu was replaced by Ehud Barak in 1999 elections, the Netanyahu policies based on political

³⁷² Wye River Conference: In October 1998 the U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted the conference at Wye River, Maryland. The Israeli delegation was headed by PM Netanyahu, and the Palestinian delegation by Chairman Arafat. King Hussein of Jordan was also present at the signing ceremony. The aim of the memorandum was to facilitate the implementation of Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The memorandum was attached a “timeline” outlining the steps to be taken by each side. The main provisions of memorandum are; further redeployments, security, preventing incitement, the Palestinian police force, the PLO charter, interim committees and economic issues, permanent status negotiations, unilateral actions. For details see; <http://www.unsco.org/Documents/Key/The%20Wye%20River%20Memorandum.pdf> accessed on 11 Dec 2016

³⁷³ Qurie, A. (2008), *Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine*, London, I.B. Tauris pp.18-20

³⁷⁴ Qurie, A. (2008), *Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine*, London, I.B. Tauris p.24

and military clashes with Palestinians led to Al Aqsa Intifadah between the years 2000-2005.³⁷⁵

Transformation Efforts of Hamas after 2006

“Prior to 2005, Hamas conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings. Hamas has not directly targeted U.S. interests, although U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks against Israeli targets. In June 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza from the PA and Fatah; the Gaza borders were closed and Hamas increased its use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza, using the Sinai and maritime routes. Hamas has since dedicated the majority of its activity in Gaza to solidifying its control, hardening its defenses, building its weapons caches, tightening security, and conducting limited operations against Israeli military forces.”US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.”

In the wake of second intifadah, concerning the HAMAS-Israel relations there were three handicaps pushing HAMAS into an unfavorable position and delaying to reach a compromise for a possible peace. First was the lack of political/military command and control over the Palestinian paramilitary units across the occupied territories. There was a lack of supreme control over Al Qassem Brigades of HAMAS, Al Aqsa Brigades of Al Fatah and Militants of Islamic Jihad. These paramilitary forces, sometimes used own initiatives to attack Israel without the permission of Palestinian political leaders. Such attacks distressed HAMAS and Al Fatah leaders in front of Israeli authorities. After Palestinian legislative elections in 2005, although did not renounce terror and recognize Israel, HAMAS displayed a good act by stopping its own terrorist attacks on Israel. But, Al Fatah could not control its own militia and Al Aqsa Brigades continued the violence and replaced the terrorist acts of HAMAS.³⁷⁶

Second was the pendulum of HAMAS leadership between a revolutionary stance holding terror and violence in hand and a reformist stance moving towards better governance after its electoral victories in 2005 and 2006. Since 2006, in parallel with the Middle East political developments, we observe that HAMAS is facing a transformation from revolutionary into a reformist structure. This process of change in HAMAS politics can be formulated under two headlines; (i) to accumulate power

³⁷⁵ Qurie, A. (2008), *Beyond Oslo, the Struggle for Palestine*, London, I.B. Tauris p.82

³⁷⁶ Palmer M. and Palmer P. (2008), *Islamic Extremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, p.233

in short and mid-term at sub-regional, regional and international platforms by way of reform and change and (ii) to avoid any large scale confrontation with the main adversary Israel Army. By leaving the acts of violence aside, HAMAS would gather a degree of sympathy from the global public opinion, get some political support at international forums and find financial support at regional and global circles. HAMAS was aware that to govern successfully was the first condition of transformation from a revolutionary position into a reformist position. Although HAMAS followed a transformation process from revolutionary into a reformist character, it kept the tension with Israel at a certain degree, in order not to lose the control over Palestinians and give the initiative to other players in Palestine.³⁷⁷ After HAMAS took control of Gaza strip from Fatah and Palestinian Authority in 2007, it dedicated majority of its activities in Gaza to harden its defense and solidify its control. In this sense, HAMAS attacks against Israeli military forces and civilian targets have been gradually limited since 2007 onwards. Although in 2009 and 2010 Israel has launched military operations against HAMAS forces, the reaction of HAMAS to these massive military engagements was to stay at a defensive posture with the aim of protecting its political and social network and its military and social support infrastructure.³⁷⁸

And the third was the hard-lining and uncompromising approach of Israel and the US towards HAMAS after its electoral victory. HAMAS has rallied amongst these conditions under the unfavorable conditions created by Al Fatah/Palestinian Authority and Israel with full support of the United States. But, HAMAS' electoral victory left Israel and the United States with a critical choice; either to work with HAMAS to encourage it to transform into a path of moderation or to try to crush it. Israel with the full support of the United States decided to crush HAMAS. What Israel did for this aim was; to accuse HAMAS again with terror and violence, and to attack HAMAS targets in Gaza. In parallel with Israeli attacks, the United States

³⁷⁷ Azani, E. (2009), *Hezbollah the Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, p.203

³⁷⁸ For more information see; <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm> ; access date: 26 June 2013

gave full political support to Israeli military operations and blocked UN decisions for the condemnation of Israel. Moreover, the United States imposed an economic blockade on the Gaza strip and froze the Palestinian assets.³⁷⁹ But both the US and Israel ignored the truth that the Palestinian unity has collapsed and HAMAS militants were new lords of Gaza, with 1.5 million “hungry, angry and radicalized” Palestinians under their rule. Now, the US was facing a most pressing foreign policy dilemma in the Middle East region. This new policy brokered by the US and Israel put too much pressure on Gazan people forcing them to radicalize and resulting with the loss of US credibility among Palestinians no matter where they live.³⁸⁰ In the long turn, the US and Israel would need to take some peaceful steps in order to engage with HAMAS.³⁸¹

Despite these unfavorable conditions HAMAS stayed at a defensive posture. It was aware that if it uses extreme violence against Israel, then IDF may respond with excessive use of military power across Gaza and cause heavy manpower and equipment loss over Al Qassem Brigades. Israel, for a long time, has employed its excessive military power under the name of “targeted killings”. Actually this is a kind of assassination policy conducted by a state’s hand against individuals (leading figures or militants) across the territory of the opponent, in this case Gaza strip. Although Israel state does not accept the term “assassination”, since 1970s dozens of Palestinian political and military leaders and militants have been assassinated by Israeli security forces/agents, and this approach is the pillar of Israel’s counter

³⁷⁹ Palmer M. and Palmer P. (2008), *Islamic Exremism; Causes, Diversity and Challenges*, Maryland, Rowman&Littlefield Publsiher, p.67

³⁸⁰ McGirk argues that Israel can punish HAMAS by limiting or completely closing the flow of daily utilities into Gaza. Sixty percent of Gaza's electricity, 100% of its gas supplies and 40% of its water come from Israel and can easily be shut off. Although this decision may put Hamas into a weak position in front of deprived Palestinians, the alternative could be worse. If Hamas fails, then, hard-liners including al-Qaeda, may fill the gap. It is for sure that Islamic Jihadists flourish amid poverty and misery.

³⁸¹ McGirk, T. (2007), How to Deal With Hamas, Vol 169, Issue 27 available at <http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/eds/detail/detail?sid=6b529886-a9a8-4a9f-a952-720e528fd856%40sessionmgr4008&vid=0&hid=4102&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWRzLWxpdmU%3d#AN=25829133&db=muh> access date 18 November 2016.

terrorism policy.³⁸² This approach has many critics. Such killings are deemed as senseless attempts because killing militants brings back retaliation from Palestinians and causes more casualties for Israel. In addition to be a senseless operation, it is regarded also as an illegal behaviour for infringing the sovereignty of a foreign political entity. And probably the most important criticism is that such killings do not reduce terror in Palestine conflict, rather escalate hostilities and terror.

Since 1970, numerous samples of such violent retaliations have occurred between Israel and Palestinians. While Israel used either helicopters and guided missiles or agents for such targeted killings, Al Fatah and/or HAMAS used suicide bombings or other types of explosives against both civilians and/or the military/police units. Such targeted killings sometimes failed and caused political/diplomatic crises between Israel and other states. As a consequence of killing wrong innocent civilian persons, or failed attempts on Palestinian leading figures, Israel has faced diplomatic problems with Canada, Jordan and Norway.³⁸³ Another aspect of targeted killings is related to its position in front of legality in terms of; the law of self-defense, international humanitarian law, and the principles of proportionality. Israel's policy of targeted killings produce a debate and face strong questions, but with blurry answers.³⁸⁴ Although targeted killings have been used by Israel since 1970s, this term has entered the international counter terrorism perception after September 11, 2001 attacks. The United States has used hi-tech military instruments such as drones and aircrafts as an important asset against terrorism and accepted targeted killing as

³⁸² Luft G. (2003), The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003 pp.3-13 for details see <http://www.meforum.org/515/the-logic-of-israels-targeted-killing> access date 18 November 2016.

³⁸³ In 1973 Mossad, while targeting a PLO leader in Norway, mistakenly killed an innocent restaurant worker, resulting in a unpleasant diplomatic crisis with Norway. In another incident, two Mossad agents tried to poison HAMAS leader Khalid Mashal in Amman in 1997, but failed. The agents were arrested by Jordan, and used to release HAMAS founder Sheikh Ahmad Yasin who was imprisoned in Israel. Mossad agents who attempted to kill Mashal have used forged Canadian passports and this also put Israel into an embarrassing diplomatic problem with the Canadian government. For details see; The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing at <http://www.meforum.org/515/the-logic-of-israels-targeted-killing>

³⁸⁴ Patel M. (2004) Israel's Targeted Killings of Hamas Leaders, American Society of International Law, Volume:8 Issue:10 at <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/9/israels-targeted-killings-hamas-leaders> access date 18 Nov 2016

a counterterrorism strategy.³⁸⁵ EU has also widely discussed and established the legal framework in order to use it as an asset to mitigate terrorist attacks, either at home or area of operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁸⁶

In addition to these unfavorable conditions created by the main adversary Israel, Al Fatah and President Abbas also did not hesitate to sabotage HAMAS at every possibility. For this aim, Abbas tried to establish a strong control over the security forces in Gaza and West Bank and in addition threatened HAMAS for dissolving the parliament and renew the elections. As a consequence of recent political and military developments HAMAS leaders learned that they were caught between Al Fatah on one side and Israel and Western pressure on the other.³⁸⁷

Eventually the tension between HAMAS and Al Fatah broke into the civil war, and ended up with the removal of Al Fatah from Gaza strip. The clashes between HAMAS and Fatah was a serious deviation from a norm of unity and national cohesion and resulted several casualties including women and children even after the signing up of Mecca agreement on power sharing and formation of a National Unity Government.³⁸⁸ This domestic dilemma between HAMAS and Fatah caused a setback for the transformation of HAMAS and served as one of the main sources fueling the violent face of Palestinian cause in regional and international arena since the emergence of HAMAS. Despite this handicap between two main actors upon the destiny of Palestinian people, there was a clear transformation going on in parallel

³⁸⁵ Anderson K. (2009) Targetted Killing in US Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=1415070 access date 21 Nov 2016

³⁸⁶ Melzer N. (2008) *Targeted Killing in International Law*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.13

³⁸⁷ Chomsky N. and Achcar G. (2007), *Perilous Power; The Middle East and US Foreign Policy*, London, Paradigm Publishers, p.223

³⁸⁸ The Mecca agreement was signed between Hamas and Fatah on February 8 under the auspices of the Saudi Arabia. The agreement was seen as end of a bloody period and welcomed by Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Territories. The aim of the agreement was cited as "...to take all measures and arrangements to prevent the shedding of Palestinian blood and to stress the importance of national unity..." , "...to form a Palestinian national unity government according to a detailed agreement ratified by both sides..." "...F to stress on the principle of political partnership on the basis of the effective laws in the PNA..." For details see http://ecf.org.il/media_items/1197(access date 12 Nov.2016)

with Islamic social movements in the global context. As Azani argues (2009), the Islamic social movements underwent a process of change which was a mixture of pan-Islamic revolutionary character and areformistnational sphere. According to Azani, these changes are the outcome of interactions between these VNSAs, the environments they operate and the international, regional and domestic systems they interact.³⁸⁹ In 2007, in the wake of civil war between Al Fatah and HAMAS, two governments were established in Palestine; one in West Bank under the control of Al Fatahwith the economic and political support of West and the United States, and another in Gaza strip under the control of HAMASwith the support from some Middle Eastern and Islamic countries.

On the other hand, the death of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat in 2004 has opened a new political space for HAMAS. As Ghazi Hamad, a HAMAS leader said: “We said negotiations alone are not enough to achieve our rights. What is needed is a new Palestinian strategy, with a genuine national consensus over aims and a proper balance between political and military struggle.”³⁹⁰ What can be this new strategy? This new strategy can be described as a combination of religious and nationalist dynamics in terms of political Islam and Palestinian nationalism. The cornerstones of this strategy were; the Islamisation of the society from bottom to top through a kind of training and education in social, religious, educational and cultural institutions and a strong armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. One aim of HAMAS was to create an image that young Islamists in Gaza did not fit the image of terrorists, but they were young men and women ready to adopt the realities of a modern world. This image was the ultimate aim for the institutions and the social network established by HAMAS in Gaza strip since early 1970s together with Muslim Brotherhood cells in Palestine.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ Azani, E. (2009), *Hezbollah the Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalization*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 41-45

³⁹⁰ The HAMAS Triumph, for details see: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060220/usher>; access date: 26 June 2013

³⁹¹ Jensen, M.I. (2009), *ThePolitical Ideology of HAMAS-A Grassroots Perspective*, New York, I.B.Tauris&Co Press, p.142

In parallel with this change, in last decade, as HAMAS became stronger in political life it managed to stay away from severe violent actions. As Jensen (2009) argues even when Israel began to target the political leaders of HAMAS; Ismael Abu Shanab in 2003, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in March 2004, Abdel Aziz Rantisi in April 2004 HAMAS did not leave this transformation posture. Rather than following a simple way of violent reaction, HAMAS preferred to protest the killings of their leaders and followed a way to preserve and strengthen their institutions within the framework of Palestinian society which resulted in increasing its legitimacy.³⁹² Another valid reason for this silence against Israel can be found in the extraordinary conditions created by September 11 terrorist attacks, and the global coalition against any kind of terrorist action. This sharp turn in the US foreign policy against any kind of terror and violence act had a considerable impact over the issue.

After HAMAS came to power in Gaza Strip, it worked hard to establish the institutions to govern Gazan people. After taking over the governmental responsibility, HAMAS rose from a community based political group to a governmental echelon and tried to fulfill its ethic responsibility for *dawa* program based on education and welfare. Under the embargo of the West and Israel, *dawa* program had limited resources. In case HAMAS failed to properly carry out its welfare responsibilities and governmental duties such as the salaries of the officials, it might face critiques from other violent resistance groups in Gaza Strip. This critique might undermine the leading position of the group and force many militants to leave Al Qassem Brigades and join other radical groups. Under such inconvenient conditions, in parallel with its acronym “Islamic Resistance Movement”, the design of HAMAS resistance was described by HAMAS leaders as ‘violent resistance’ until the Arab Spring in 2011. Following Arab Spring movements across the Middle East and North Africa, HAMAS leaders used a more flexible language suggesting that peaceful demonstrations were a part of the resistance.

Although HAMAS preferred to stay at a defensive posture after assuming the government responsibility in Gaza in 2007, Israel launched a huge military

³⁹² Jensen, M.I. (2009), *The Political Ideology of HAMAS-A Grassroots Perspective*, New York, I.B.Tauris&Co Press, pp.41-42

campaign, Operation Cast Lead, in December 2008 against HAMAS across Gaza Strip. The aim of the campaign was officially declared to counter rocket fires coming from Gaza, but actually the covert target of the operation was to crush military infrastructure of HAMAS and weaken the governing rule in Gaza. One month later, on January 2009 Israeli Defense Forces entered Gaza with land forces, killing over 1,000 Palestinians. Many foreign and even Israeli observers assumed that with such a massive military operation it was not possible to remove HAMAS regime or permanently end rocket attacks. Rather, such military campaigns would encourage rocket shelling and intensify terror acts against Israeli civilian targets in the future.³⁹³

Such big scale military operations of Israel on occupied territories get their justifications from the official Israeli position towards key Islamist non-state actors such as Hezbollah, and other Palestinian groups like HAMAS, Hizb al-Tahrir and Islamic Jihad. These actors are characterized by official Israeli approach as terrorists and/or Israel-haters and they are categorized as threat to Israel. Under the shadow of this political strategy, although the possibility of a war with regional Arab states (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Egypt) has faded away in post-gulf war term (1990s onward), Israel has not hesitated to launch an “aggressive defense”. This new strategy was utilized by Yitzhak Shamir but had a long past since 1980s. Invasions of Lebanon (1978, 1982, 2006), weapon cache operation in Syria (2007) were carried out under this strategy of attacking potential threats in the neighboring countries.³⁹⁴

4.1.3 Third Level: HAMAS and its Relations with the US

“...The Palestinian people having made their choice at the polls, the burden now shifts to those whom they have elected to take the steps necessary to advance peace, prosperity, and statehood for the Palestinian people. Hamas has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union (EU) because it has embraced terrorism and deliberately killed innocent civilians. The international community has made clear that there is a fundamental contradiction between armed group and militia activities and the building of a democratic state. The international community has also made clear that a two-state solution to the conflict requires all participants in the democratic process to renounce violence and terror, accept Israel’s right to exist, and disarm as outlined in the Roadmap. These requirements are clear,

³⁹³ Kardelj, N. (2010), *Israel vs Hamas*, New York, Nova Science Publishers, p.vii (preface)

³⁹⁴ Kardelj, N. (2010), *Israel vs Hamas*, New York, Nova Science Publishers, p.12

firm, and of long standing. The opportunity for peace and statehood – a consistent goal of this Administration – is open if Hamas will abandon its terrorist roots and change its relationship with Israel.” American National Security Strategy Document-2006 p.10

Actually, in the US, the NSAs have been attributed historically a positive role amongst domestic societal, economic and political institutions. The United States have been the home-base for many NSAs. Not only the US government funding but also the private foundations, churches and social unions have devoted sources for non-state actors across the country as well as at international level. The US have perceived NSAs as vital actors of liberal society and attributed them significant roles at domestic and international circles.³⁹⁵ On the contrary, for the American foreign affairs staff, the NSAs either violent or peaceful have been perceived as agents to be benefited in the favor of state politics. This reality has not changed in the US – Violent Non State Actor relations also. In this sense, the decision makers in American foreign policy (the President and Office of Foreign Affairs) stay loyal to a set of objectives fed by strategic concerns and national interest as paramount factors of American foreign policy.³⁹⁶

In this section, I will study the relations of HAMAS with the USas the third circle of this chapter. This study covers two terms; first, since its foundation in 1987- until electoral success in 2006, and second from its electoral victory in 2006-until 2016. For American administration, HAMAS since its foundation, is a terrorist organization using intense terrorist acts against innocent Israeli civilians and American interests across the globe. The approach of American administration

³⁹⁵ Joselin, D. and Wallace W. (2001), *Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Framework*, in Daphne Joselin and William Wallace eds, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, New York, Palgrave Publishers, p.10

³⁹⁶ One of the valuable articles produced on post-Cold War era's security structure is Barry Buzan's article he wrote in 1991; "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century". Buzan, instead of Cold War Era's narrow security understanding, identifies a broader security perception composed of five sectors interacting with one another; political security, military security, economic security, societal security and environmental security. In this new security environment, the relations between the great powers are defined by four new drives. These are; (1) the rise of multipolar power structure instead of bipolar one, (2) a lower degree of ideological rivalry between great powers, (3) rise of security community understanding amongst leading capitalist powers, and (4) the strengthening of international society. These new drives eventually create an international sphere, where the great powers of North (Center) is more dominant and the states of South (Periphery) is more subordinate. In that sense, one asset that may be used effectively by periphery is non-state actors skillfully using the advantages of globalization.

towards HAMAS is strongly linked to the US approach to the Middle East politics and shaped by two factors; the special bond between the United States and Israel, and Cold War's security based perception upon state-VNSA relations.

4.1.3.1 HAMAS vs the US in 1987-2006 Term

When HAMAS was founded in the last years of the Cold War, based on ideology and acts as coined in its Charter, the US administration labeled it as a terrorist entity without any hesitation. This approach to HAMAS, which was a newly born entity with strong support from Palestine society, was not questioned then, because the relationship between the “(violent) non-state actor” and “state” was under the rigid control of the state mechanism. Security seeking bipolar era was providing the state substantial authority to take any precaution for the aim of domestic or regional security and the approach of the US administration to HAMAS was shaped by the “security needs of Israel state”, which was one leg of the tri-pod US Middle East politics.³⁹⁷

There was a debate amongst western scholars over HAMAS whether it could be a responsible role player in Palestine conflict, or continue to be a hard and stubborn terrorist organization until its electoral victory in the 2006. Matthew Levitt (2006), among others, attributes HAMAS a huge capability to conduct terrorist acts abroad, including the US homeland. He argues that HAMAS can carry out such attacks by its semi-independent cells, by rogue cells, or by “lone wolves” who are totally independent terrorists, or by non-HAMAS jihadists across the world against western targets.³⁹⁸ Contrary to this approach, many analysts, including some Jewish origin and/or Israeli scholars, believe that HAMAS particularly after 2006 elections has no interest to conduct attacks against Western interests/targets. Additionally, there is no operational connection between HAMAS activists and the jihadists who operate globally. They argue that, as the nationalist character of HAMAS get stronger, and as

³⁹⁷ Freeman, M. (1996) ‘Democrat and Dynamite: the Peoples’ Right to Self-determination’, *Political Studies*, vol. 44, pp.746–761

³⁹⁸ Lewitt, M. (2006), *HAMAS; Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, Harrisonburg, R.R. Donnelly Press, pp.220-227

the Muslim Brothers ideology turn into a moderate movement in countries such as Egypt, the revolutionary and radical Islamic face of HAMAS would get weaker. Despite all encouraging developments in last decade concerning the transformation of HAMAS into a more democratic movement, the US administration holds its cold approach towards HAMAS and Palestine case and keeps HAMAS in the list of terrorist organizations.

The US approach towards HAMAS in 1987-2006 term was cast by the immovable understanding of American administration that HAMAS is a terrorist organization using intense terrorist acts against innocent civilians and American interests. For instance, on 25 January 1995, in Executive Order 12947, the President of the United States William J. Clinton classified Hamas (and other 11 organizations) as Specially Designated Terrorists (SDT) that threatens the Middle East peace process.³⁹⁹ Clinton states in the EO 12947;

“I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, find that grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt the Middle East peace process constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat. I hereby order...”

In following lines of the Executive Order 12947 Clinton identifies financial precautions to be taken against these SDTs and authorized the blocking of all assets and of transactions with persons associated with either organization. On August 20, 1998, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13099 to amend Executive Order 12947, with additional names.⁴⁰⁰ Other legislative and executive initiatives created several lists. For example, the enactment of “Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

³⁹⁹ Executive Order 12947 identifies 12 Middle Eastern organizations as SDT. In this respect the order covers; Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) Hizballah Islamic Gama'at (IG) Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) Jihad Kach, Kahane Chai, Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction (PIJ) Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas faction (PLF-Abu Abbas), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) as SDT. For details see; <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/12947.pdf> accessed on 11 Dec 2016.

⁴⁰⁰ Executive Order 12947 signed on 20 August 1998 by President Clinton, see details on; <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-08-25/pdf/98-22940.pdf> access date 11 Dec 2016.

Penalty Act of 1996 authorized the deportation or exclusion from entry into the US and generated the list of Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

In addition to these official governmental steps taken, US politicians were using sharp diplomatic sentences in order to re-shape Palestine conflict and warn the actors in the region not to use violence. In 1998, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a speech in Jerusalem to the Israel Academy of Science. Amongst the points she raised on the precautions how to deal with terrorism, with terrorists and their supporters, the most prominent one was her following words; “ ...getting out the message over and over again that those who commit terrorism in the name of the Palestinian cause are committing terrorism against the Palestinian cause.”⁴⁰¹ This statement by Albright pulls our attention not only upon the violent acts widely used as an asset against the Israeli targets, but also the self-destructive political trap between HAMAS and Fatah.⁴⁰²

The US security politics, cast under the name of “War on Terror” after 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks upon American homeland, has also shaped US perception upon HAMAS, and this perception has put HAMAS in the same spectrum with other VNSAs in the Middle East. In the wake of September 11 events, the President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 for Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) on 23 September 2001, just after the terrorist attacks on twin towers, aiming to “block the properties and prohibiting transactions with persons, who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.” On page 6 of this Executive Order, HAMAS leader Khalid Meshaal has been identified together with other Palestinian figures, such as Osama Hamdan (top representative of Hamas in Lebanon), and Imad Khalil Al-Alami (a member of the Hamas Political Bureau in Damascus). Additionally, the

⁴⁰¹ Albright’s address at Israel Art and Science Academy, September 12, 1997, Available at: <http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/1997/me0912a.htm> , access date:28 April 2012

⁴⁰² Schanzer, J. (2008), *HAMAS vs Fatah, the Struggle for Palestine*, New York, Palgrave Mc Millan Press, pp.10-11

Executive Order included other names added to the list on 18 March 2010 related to HAMAS such as; Islamic National Bank of Gaza, Al-Aqsa TV.⁴⁰³

4.1.3.2 HAMAS vs US in 2006-2016 Term

National Security Strategy (NSS) documents are the overarching documents for the US foreign policy. In the final sentence of NSS -2006, HAMAS is urged to “...abandon its terrorist roots and change its relationship with Israel.” The approach of the US administration to HAMAS is a typical sample of the idea that the US supports democratic regimes if they conform to US strategic objectives. The term of George W. Bush (2000-2008) dominated the US foreign policy with defining characteristics of “not negotiating with terrorists” or “governments that support terrorism.” As a natural consequence of this approach the US government refused or behaved reluctant to negotiate with HAMAS.⁴⁰⁴ After 2006 electoral victory of HAMAS, the media and academic circles as well as the US officials criticized the Palestinians for voting the wrong way in a free election and some mechanisms should be activated in order to punish the Palestinian population. As a consequence of this strange judgment, the Palestinians have been forced to stay in the isolated zones of Gaza and West Bank and accused as terrorists at any attempt to stand off against Israeli atrocities and use of excessive military assets against the civilians. In fact this was a habit of American common wisdom supporting Iraq of Saddam despite his torture to his people in 1980s or blaming Cuban people for their support to Castro regime in 1960s.⁴⁰⁵

As an indicator of the US perception upon HAMAS, the statement of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to New York Times on January 30, 2006 is worth to

⁴⁰³ Executive Order 13224 signed on 22 September 2001 by President Bush, find details on pages 6 and 16. See other details on; <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/terror.pdf> access date 11 Dec 2016.

⁴⁰⁴ Redden, T. (2008), The Bush Policy of Not Talking to Our Enemies, Northeastern Political Science Association, Abstract, p.1

⁴⁰⁵ Chomsky N. and Achcar G. (2007), *Perilous Power; The Middle East and US Foreign Policy*, London, Paradigm Publishers, p.237-241

mention. She said that "...the US had failed to understand depth of hostility among Palestinians toward their longtime leaders and this hostility led to an election victory by the militant group Hamas." As a result of this general political approach, since its rise as a power in Palestine, the US administration followed a controversial strategy against HAMAS rather than accountable and responsible steps. First it tried to bring down HAMAS government by political isolation and using economic aid as a carrot to influence Gazan people to bring down HAMAS rule. For this strategy, the US government gave support to embargos to minimize Gaza's imports and exports thus to weaken HAMAS by weakening Gaza's economy. For this aim, after January 2006 elections, which was a landslide victory for HAMAS, Bush Administration favored to reestablish Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party in power with a \$42 million campaign.⁴⁰⁶ For Bush Administration, the objective of this financial support was to create democratic alternatives to radical Islamism and protect Palestinians. As a reaction to this pro-Abbas support, HAMAS named these people as agents of Israel and the US, collaborating to undermine Palestine cause and topple HAMAS led government.

Above mentioned US campaign was led by two American non-governmental organizations (NGOs); the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI). These were US government funded "pro-democracy forces" working with trained activists to engineer massive disobedience amongst the civilians in order to manipulate elections for the aim of changing anti-democratic regimes.⁴⁰⁷ This so-called "pro-democratic" support to Abbas and Fatah was similar to three non-violent revolutions in the former Soviet territories; Rose Revolution-Georgia (2003), Orange Revolution-Ukraine (2004) and Tulip Revolution-Kyrgyzstan (2005). Although NDI and IRI, headed by two high level politicians

⁴⁰⁶ Hammond J.R. (2010) "The Rise of Hamas in Gaza", Foreign Policy Journal, 20 January, available at <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/01/20/the-rise-of-hamas-in-gaza/> access date 3 April 2014

⁴⁰⁷ NDI and IRI are funded by the US government annually with an approximate amount of total \$80 million. The training staff of these NGOs, are composed of an international list, such as from Brasil, France, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Equador and several Arab countries. Such American NGOs follows a dual path in parallel; human rights and democratization campaigns on one hand and American economic-political influence across targeted geographies on the other.

(Madeline Albright- Secretary of State and John McCain-Republican Senator) pursuing the objective of fighting against corrupt and totalitarian governments, it is a controversial situation that they supported corrupt Fatah against HAMAS which rose to power with free and fair elections.

This inconsistent US political discourse in Palestine conflict could be best described through the words of Kagan and Kristol (2007). They argued that there was a danger for the global peace that has no clear name. This danger was neither the international terrorism nor rouge states. This danger was that the US abstains from its responsibilities in international platform as the leader of unipolar world system.⁴⁰⁸ At the beginning of 1990s, the US held a unique position with a twin victory; the Cold War, and the Gulf War. The military power and ideological superiority of the US was crowned by liberal capitalism and free trade models. Moreover, the American culture was accepted as the dominant global culture. But, the US has followed a pragmatic discourse pursuing small national interests in regional conflicts and Palestine conflict was one of these, with high negative effects. In addition to the Palestine conflict, the US politics in Bosnia, Panama or the Gulf, had removed the possibility of behaving with moral values and globally accepted norms against troublemaker leaders.⁴⁰⁹

One of the strongest warnings to this policy was done by former US President Jimmy Carter, in a co-authored article with former Irish President Mary Robinson, after Israeli military operation in Gaza. Carter and Robinson condemned Israel for using excessive military power against civilians and urged the US to recognize HAMAS as a legitimate political force. In the article it is proposed that the leaders in Israel, Palestine and the world's major powers would be aware of their responsibilities and move Israelis and Palestinians come together for a permanent solution. Carter and

⁴⁰⁸ Kagan, R. and Kristol W. (2000), *Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility, Present Dangers; Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, Robert Kagan and William Kristol eds., San Fransisco, Encounter Books, p.4

⁴⁰⁹ Kagan, R. and Kristol W. (2000), *Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility, Present Dangers; Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, Robert Kagan and William Kristol eds., San Fransisco, Encounter Books, pp. 12-14

Robinson condemned both HAMAS and Israel for using force against innocent civilians and draw our attention to the point that “by recognizing the legitimacy of HAMAS as a political actor may provide right incentives to lay down its weapons.” Additionally, Israel is criticized in a decisive manner stating that;

“ ...there is no humane or legal justification for how the Israeli Defense Force is conducting this war, pulverizing with bombs, missiles and artillery large parts of Gaza, including thousands of homes, schools and hospitals, displacing families and killing Palestinian non-combatants. Much of Gaza has lost its access to water and electricity completely. This is a humanitarian catastrophe.”⁴¹⁰

After taking over the office in 2008, President Obama received strong critics not to depend solely on military means, but to use negotiation and diplomacy with the non-state actors no matter on which geography they operate. Critics were focusing on that the US cannot afford several small-scale overseas wars in far corners of the world. Rather than using military, two minimal conditions could be helpful for the success of the US administration; first the allies should share the financial and military burden on the US shoulders, second an active and sustained diplomacy and negotiation line should be established. Actually, during his election campaign, Obama has made clear that the US would talk to America’s enemies such as Iran, but expelled HAMAS, because the US State Department has listed it as a terrorist organization. Obama said; “We must not negotiate with a terrorist group intent on Israel’s destruction. We should only sit down with Hamas if they renounce terrorism, recognize Israel’s right to exist and abide by past agreements.”

But, after Obama was elected, HAMAS leader Khaled Meshaal made a statement to Sky News on November 8, 2008 at his Headquarter in Syria that HAMAS was ready to talk with President Obama. Meshaal stated that there is no option but end the boycott of HAMAS, and this was the minimal condition to make progress on peace. He said;

⁴¹⁰ Carter J. and Robinson M. (2014), Jimmy Carter urges U.S. to recognize Hamas, condemns Israel, see details at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2014/08/06/Jimmy-Carter-urges-US-to-recognize-Hamas-condemns-Israel-in-co-authored-op-ed/4231407362264/ access date 3 April 2014

“We are ready for dialogue with President Obama and with the new American administration with an open mind on the basis that the American administration respects our rights and our options. The American administration, if they want to deal with the region, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict, they have no other option than deal with Hamas, because we are a real effective force on the ground, and we are a movement that won a majority of votes in the election.”⁴¹¹

But, two years later in 2010, Obama declared a new policy to provide considerable aid to Gaza in the belief that if Gazan citizens become more prosperous they would bring down HAMAS in Gaza. Although this was not declared explicitly, the US officials expected a similar consequence like what happened in Eastern Europe against the Communist rule after the fall of Soviets. No matter how clever this new strategy was, its practical effect came true in a way to strengthen HAMAS, and undermined any possible development for Israel-Palestinian peace. More important than this, this pragmatic US strategy would result in emergence of a long-term radical, Islamist, anti-Western, and eventually a terrorist non-state actor under the control and influence of Iran.⁴¹²

Despite this controversial American strategy towards Palestinian conflict, HAMAS leadership followed a more realistic political discourse. The formal political statements of HAMAS leader Khaled Meshaal since 2006 aimed that the US and international coalition should press Israel to take realistic steps for a feasible solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. HAMAS claimed that rocket attacks to Israel were minimized since 2006 and they were the sign of resistance rather than being terrorist acts and HAMAS has minimized its violence despite excessive power use by Israel against Palestinians. In a statement in June 5, 2009 Meshaal said that HAMAS is ready to recognize Israel state if Israel moves to pre-1967 borders, which was not an acceptable idea for HAMAS in previous years.⁴¹³

⁴¹¹ Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal’s interview with Sky News, 8 Nov 2008. For details see; <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/hamas-ready-to-talk-to-obama-1.831307> access date 1 December 2016

⁴¹² For more details see Barry Rubin’s answer to the question on reversal of the US policy towards Hamas; <http://rubinreports.blogspot.com.tr/2010/10/how-has-us-policy-toward-hamas-and-gaza.html>; access date 3 April 2014

⁴¹³ Meshaal says, “I have said I accept a Palestinian state if Israel withdraws to the pre-1967 line. That doesn’t annul the historical fact of the Israeli occupation of 1948, but Hamas and the other factions have all accepted this solution of a Palestinian state at the 1967 line. But there’s still no Israeli

It is possible to argue that, HAMAS as a violent non-state actor was behaving more responsible to adopt itself to evolving regional and international conditions to find a feasible solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict when compared to that of the US and Israel. On the other hand, the US as the leading power of post-Cold War era could not fulfill its responsibilities to reach a permanent peace at Israeli-Palestinian conflict in contrary to its success at Indonesian-Acheh conflict. HAMAS, like a scapegoat, has not been given a single chance to establish peaceful relations with Israel state to totally quit violence, and to transform into a peaceful political entity and play its role identical to that of GAM in Indonesia.

4.1.4 The US-Israel Relations and its Effects upon HAMAS/Palestine Conflict

“...The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical because of the toll of human suffering, because of America’s close relationship with the state of Israel and key Arab states, and because of that region’s importance to other global priorities of the United States. There can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. The United States will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.” American National Security Strategy Document-2002 p.14

“The United States, Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States have an interest in a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict—one in which the legitimate aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians for security and dignity are realized, and Israel achieves a secure and lasting peace with all of its neighbors. The United States seeks two states living side by side in peace and security—a Jewish state of Israel, with true security, acceptance, and rights for all Israelis; and a viable, independent Palestine with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967 and realizes the potential of the Palestinian people. We will continue to work regionally and with like-minded partners in order to advance negotiations that address the permanent-status issues: security for Israelis and Palestinians; borders, refugees, and Jerusalem. We also seek international support to build the institutions upon which a Palestinian state will depend, while supporting economic development that can bring opportunity to its people.” American National Security Strategy Document-2010 p.34

This thesis focuses on the interactions amongst three role players; the Violent Non State Actor, the Parent State and the United States on the way to find a peaceful

acceptance of this, and no international recognition of this outcome’.” “Obama talked about the Palestinian state, but not its borders,’ . . .’He didn’t mention whether it should comprise all the Palestinian land that was occupied in 1967, or just part of it, as Israel demands’ as quoted in US-MIDEAST: ‘ Hamas Leader to Obama: Deeds, Not Words,’” by Helena Cobban, IPS, June 5, 2009, <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47107> access date: 3 April 2014

settlement to the conflict between the VNSA and the Parent State. The main concern in this 3rd Chapter is to argue how the United States deals with HAMAS in Palestine Conflict and without understanding the US – Israel relations in depth we cannot understand this. In this Chapter so far, I have focused on the relations between HAMAS, Israel and the United States under three circles; domestic, regional and international. In this section of the Chapter, I will focus on a fourth circle. This fourth circle will be my contribution to the literature. Because the US-Israel relations have proved its direct effects upon Palestine conflict and these relations also shape the political, economic, military and governmental echelons of HAMAS as well as the degree of the violence between Israel and HAMAS. Although there are some scholarly efforts contending that in post-Cold War era, Israel does not serve the US interests in the Middle East, it is a commonly accepted argument in global political circles that the US-Israeli relations are strategic level, power and security based relations oriented with mutual interest of both states.⁴¹⁴ It is clear that, the successful transition of HAMAS into a peaceful entity in Palestine conflict is influenced by the relations between the US and Israel. Beside the Palestine conflict, these strategic level US-Israeli relations have made sharp effects upon Israel's approach to neighboring Arab states as well. HAMAS has been also inevitably influenced by this strategic relationship.

Before investigating deep strategic level interactions between the US and Israel, let me briefly mention about the basic principles of the US-Israel relations. As the basic principles of US-Israeli relations, several justifications are put forward. The first one of these justifications is “common democratic values” shared by Jewish and American societies and cultures. It is a settled belief that both nations share many historical similarities originating from their past as two refugee and/or immigrant societies. Both nations are committed to freedom, pluralism; equality principles and both societies share Judeo-Christian religious values. It is commonly contended that the American military-economic aid and political support to Israel and Jewish people

⁴¹⁴ Rubenberg C. (1986) *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*, Urbana, the University of Illinois Press, pp.19-20.

since decades does not aim to realize American interests in the Middle East region, but rather it is a consequence of these shared values.⁴¹⁵

The second justification is “partnership” in trade and technology. This is argued that both states have developed a special economic relationship particularly in collaboration promoting scientific thinking and innovative technologies. Free trade agreement in 1985 and high-technology pact in 1994 mutually promote investments in agriculture and industrial technology. As stated by Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer in 2001 at Israel-American Chamber of Commerce, more than 200 American high-tech firms have opened research and development units in Israel in the last 2 decades including global corporations such as IBM, Motorola, Microsoft and similar. The US-Israel trade capacity has dramatically increased from 5 billion dollars in 1985 to 20 billion dollars in 2000 and to 35 billion dollars in 2014.⁴¹⁶

The third justification is on “strategic military” interests in the Middle East region. It is argued that during the Cold War years Israel has become the iron fist of the US in the Middle East containing a possible Soviet penetration. In this phase, Israel demonstrated the superiority of American war technology and military tactics against Arab states which were dependent on arms, training skills, military technology and military tactics produced by the Soviet Union. Former US Secretary of State Haig’s description on US-Israeli strategic military/security relations is a striking example; “...the largest pro-U.S. aircraft carrier, which doesn’t require U.S. personnel and can’t be sunk.”⁴¹⁷ As a consequence of this close military relationship, for decades, the US and Israel have conducted bilateral operations.

⁴¹⁵ See article “The US – Israel Special Relationship by Eli E. Hertz available at http://www.mythsandfacts.org/NOQ_OnlineEdition/Chapter17/unitedstatesisrael1.htm#2, access date 4 Feb.2015, See also The Washington Institute Policy Analysis, “Friends with Benefits: Why the U.S.-Israeli Alliance Is Good for America” by Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/friends-with-benefits-why-the-u.s.-israeli-alliance-is-good-for-america>, access date 4 Feb. 2015.

⁴¹⁶ For details in US export/import rates to Israel between 1985 and 2016 see; <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5081.html#1985> access date 4 December 2016.

⁴¹⁷ For more details on American-Israeli military cooperation see US Agency for International Development (USAID), “US Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations (1945-2013) p.8; available at <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/USOverseasLoansGrantsTheGreenBook2013.pdf> access date 16 December 2016.

The fourth justification focuses on a “common goal” in a volatile region; democratic reforms and fighting terrorism. It is contended that both countries share a core strategic intention. This intention focuses on the realization of a democratic reform throughout the Middle East region and thus cut off the ties breeding international terrorism. It is believed that many Arab states are volatile and non-democratic originating from three interconnected factors; (i)lack of tolerance to other cultures, identities and societies, (ii)non-democratic regimes, (iii)fierce ethnic rivalries.⁴¹⁸ Regional and domestic political feuds, interventions in neighbors internal affairs and civil wars prevent the Arab states to have peaceful relations with Israel. Arab non-democratic leaders intentionally fuel anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Jewish sentiments in order to stay in power. For Israelis, an enduring peace in the Middle East is possible only with the democratization of the Middle East countries.⁴¹⁹ They assert that peace is a valuable commodity only for democratic regimes and if Palestinian state wants to become independent, it must prove to be a true democracy.⁴²⁰

In following lines, for a better assessment of the depth of the US-Israeli relationship and its reflections upon HAMAS, I will focus on (i) religious and cultural incentives between American and Jewish communities, (ii) pro-Israeli approach of American Presidents to Arab-Israeli relations, and (iii) power and security oriented American-Israeli relationship in post-September 11 era in the Middle East,(iv) the military and economic aid of the US to Israel.

⁴¹⁸ Quandt, W.B. (1993) *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, Wahington D.C. Brookings Institution, pp.416-418

⁴¹⁹ Steinberg G.M (2003), *Democratic peace and the Jewish Political Tradition*, in Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel eds, *Democratization in the Middel East, Experiences, Struggles, Challenges*, New York, UN University Press pp.143-165

⁴²⁰ Although the Israelis argue that the precondition for an independent Palestine state is a true democracy, the effect of religion upon secular Israeli state is evident. Steinberg asserts the difficulties and the complexities of late nineteenth-century prevailing on modern Israel as well as the Jewish society.

4.1.4.1 A Special Relationship between American and Jewish Communities

The American Israeli relations are much more complex and stronger than the relations between any other two states located on two different continents. The relations between the US and Israel have been widely influenced by the American perspective on the Middle East in its historical course. Many believe that, the United States became active in the Middle East only after the Second World War focusing on Arab-Israeli conflict or oil politics.⁴²¹ But actually, as Oren argues, American approach to the Middle East and Israel has been built upon three themes; fantasy, power and faith extending to the earlier periods.⁴²²

Fantasy, in contrary to power and faith, was the soft face of this approach and inherited cultural motives, in a combination of religious tales such as Biblical Jewish Kingdom, romantic and exotic notions. The fantasy perception towards the Jewish society is largely fed by the immigration stories that commenced in the last quarter of 19th century, particularly from Russia towards the United States. In addition to this large scale immigrant wave (around 1.5 million), maybe the most important one was the first Jewish immigrant wave to Palestine between 1881-84. This wave brought around 25,000 religious Jews and they settled in agricultural communes, named

⁴²¹ In order to understand the US foreign policy to the Middle East, a comparison is required between the European and American approaches. Edward Said's master piece "Orientalism" provides us a strong stand point to compare the Europe and the Middle East at a very wide spectrum. Said argues that the Orient is like a mirror where the Oxidant or the West watches itself, and this image has helped the Europeans to create their own material civilization and their cultural norms. In its historical perspective, the approach of American intellectuals, statesmen and the society towards the Middle East has been influenced by the European perspective but much different from that of Europeans'. The intellectual circles in the United States throughout the 19th century have provided the American society books, magazines, periodicals and similar publications on the Middle East and Palestinians. This intellectual production inherited three significant characteristics; first is about the exotic and mystic structure of the oriental life, the second is the innocence of Israelis particularly based on the religious historical teachings and third is the negative picture built for Muslims and the Palestinian Arabs. The American orientalism has been fed by strong religious symbols such as Holy Land, Old Testament, New Testament and a degree of politics in it. For Americans, the Palestine's Arabs are similar to American Indians to be civilized. For the 19th Century Americans, the Middle East was a savage geography of infidel people to be civilized and Christianized. See; Said, E. (1977), *Orientalism*, Penguin Press, London, Sedgwick, M. (2007), in Jack Covarrubas and Tom Lansford, eds, *Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire; Harms, G. (2010), *Straight Power Concepts in the Middle East*, Pluto Press, New York.

⁴²² Oren B. Michael, (2008) *Power, Faith and Fantasy; America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*, W.W.Norton and Company, New York, pp.9-14

Kibbutz.⁴²³ After the first Zionist Congress led by a Viennese Jew Theodor Herzl held in Basel, Switzerland in 1897, this immigration continued under the guidance of a political direction. The target of this intense immigration program was to balance the huge gap between the Arab and Jewish inhabitants in Palestine. Because, according to the last Ottoman census conducted in 1914, the total Arab and Christian population was around 630.000 and constituted 91% of the local population. According to the British census of 1922, on the other hand, the Jews numbered no more than 84.000 which was around 11% to the whole population. This congress which is accepted as the birthday of political Zionism, declared the need for the establishment of a secure home for Jews in Palestine.⁴²⁴ As a consequence of this political initiative, and within the context of the First World War, Jewish community and its leaders succeeded to persuade Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration in 1917, promising a homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people.

On the other hand, the strong arm of pursuing American interests through the means of military, diplomacy and finance was power. In this respect, initial steps of American foreign policy for power in the Middle East has been shaped by Woodrow Wilson's personal, theological and ideological concept after First World War. Actually, the Middle East was the most appropriate geography for the application of Wilson principles for the post-Great War world order.⁴²⁵ Wilson and his staff have recognized the need for the independence and dignity of the Middle Eastern

⁴²³ Pappé I. (2004), *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land Two Peoples*, New York, Cambridge University Press, p.39

⁴²⁴ As depicted at web site of Knesset, the Basel Program aimed ; the promotion of settling Eretz Yisrael with Jewish agriculturists, artisans, and tradesmen; the gathering of all Jews into effective groups of action, local or general, in accordance with the laws of the various countries; the strengthening of the Jewish-national feeling and consciousness; and taking preparatory steps for the acceptance of worldwide recognition necessary for the achievement of the Zionist purpose.see details athttps://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/congres_eng.htm, access date 22 July 2015.

⁴²⁵ The Doctrine of Self-determination was supported by British, French and American political leaders for the peoples of Ottoman Empire. For Woodrow Wilson, self-determination principles were the main reason for the participation of America in Great War. Wilson principles were composed of fourteen articles, the twelfth was directly addressing to Turks and non-Turks in the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, France and Britain adopted these principles to be applied to whole Middle East.

societies, which is known as the self-determination doctrine.⁴²⁶ President Wilson, in order to reduce the embarrassment caused by the colonial design of France and Britain, sent King-Krane Commission to the region, to understand the the origin of the clashes and the wish of Arabs on Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The report of the commission was mainly referring to the wish of the inhabitants in the region for independence and Greater Syria, and to the strong opposition of Muslim and Christian communities to a Jewish homeland in the region. The commission recommended that the Zionist program in this respect needs to be modified to a greater extent.⁴²⁷ But, this initiative did not give fruitful results in the name of inhabitants in the region, and in 1922 Mesopotamia and Palestine fell under the mandate of Britain incorporating the Balfour declaration. Consequently, although the US founding philosophy is configured by liberation, minority rights and independence, and it acquired the political and material power for decisive steps in Palestine, the approach of American decision makers to the issue was to leave it to the hands of Britain. For this aim, the British Zionist Chaim Weizmann's (Israel's first President in 1948) has played a significant role in both incorporating the Zionist project into Britain's war requirements and the endorsement of Balfour declaration by President Wilson. In following decades, the American statesmen and society have shown a positive approach to Jewish cause, opening the door for an independent Jewish state in Palestine.⁴²⁸

After the Second World War, the US took over the roles of British Empire in the Middle East including the protection and survival of the state of Israel, as well as the Palestine conflict, pursuing its long term national interests. These interests and engagements in the region lay principally along economic and military lines. The

⁴²⁶ Oren B. Michael, (2008) *Power, Faith and Fantasy; America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*, W.W.Norton and Company, New York, pp.376-380

⁴²⁷ The King-Krane Commission report was prepared by Dr. Henry Churchill King and Charles R. Crane who were appointed to Peace Conference Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey. The report encompasses three divisions: Data, General Considerations and Recommendations and covers certain territories of Ottoman Empire, particularly Syria. For details see https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_King-Crane_Report access date 24 July 2015.

⁴²⁸ Oren B. Michael, (2008) *Power, Faith and Fantasy; America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*, W.W.Norton and Company, New York, pp.352-353

Middle East has been a cardinal geography where the interests of two great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, met. The United States spent efforts to contain the influence of Soviets in the Middle East on two objectives; (i) to keep the Saudi Arabian and Gulf oil fields under American umbrella, and (ii) to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the Arab world.⁴²⁹ After the establishment of the state of Israel, the security and survival of Israel emerged as another strategic objective of the US policy towards the Middle East. As a reflection of Arab-Israeli confrontation the Middle East turned out to be the most vital strategic game platform for the American policy planners, for American popular culture, for academics as well as the business world.⁴³⁰

Fred Halliday (1999) gives special emphasis on bilateral relations between the Middle East and the United States. According to him the Middle East was the primary source fueling the Cold War. He argues that the relations between the Middle East and the United States are characterized by 'structural weaknesses and dependency'.⁴³¹ This dependency and weakness is fed by the authoritarian rules complemented by military or religious elites of the Middle East. Suspicion, conflict and inter-state military rivalry were other factors suppressing individual freedom and expression of ideology in the region. When the Cold War ended and Soviets collapsed in early 1990s, the US pressed forward for global supremacy under the administrations of President George H. Bush (1988-92) and President Bill Clinton (1992-2000). In order to consolidate its gains, the United States exerted pressure in the Middle East, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia. As its new global strategy, instead of 'balance of power' the US preferred a "preponderance of power" amongst itself and other great powers, The Middle East, amongst other regions in the

⁴²⁹ Mufti, Malik, (1999) The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism, in David W. Lesch ed., *The Middle East and the United States, A Historical and Political Reassessment*, Oxford, Westview Press p.163

⁴³⁰ Said E. (1977) *Orientalism*, New York, Random House Inc. p. 294

⁴³¹ Halliday, F. 'Millennial Middle East: Changing Orders, Shifting Borders,' *Middle East Report*, No.213, Winter 1999

world, was the leading geography where the US extended its regional supremacy in the absence of a strong opponent, the Soviets.⁴³²

After the end of the Cold War, the US foreign policy towards the Middle East is formulated under three themes; (i) assure seamless flow of oil into western industries, (ii) assure the security and territorial integrity of Israel and (iii) prevent the emergence of any regional power to hamper western interests in the Middle East. In the post-Cold War era, the US simply tried to fill the vacuum left by the Soviets and broaden its influence in economic, political and social aspects to legitimize its presence in the region.⁴³³ When the United States rose as the victor of the Cold War, there were several losers in the Middle East. In parallel with Soviet-affiliated states of the Cold War such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria and Libya, also Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and HAMAS as Violent Non-State Actors have suffered a relative loss.⁴³⁴

Continuing from the analysis provided by Oren, faith was in the agenda of American administration and the society since the founding era and represented a combination of religion, democracy and patriotism. Faith has made deep impact upon the upbringings and educational characters of American Presidents and their individual perceptions towards the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. This subject is detailed in following section in its entirety.

4.1.4.2 US Presidents' Approach to Israel State

American Presidents are the leading figures of US foreign politics and they have the greatest influence over the foreign policy. Simply because, the public believes that it is the part of President's mission, because the President does not need congressional

⁴³² Kagan, Robert. (2008) "The Return of History and the End of Dreams", Alfred A. Knopf, Tronto p.50

⁴³³ Ahmadov, Ramin (2005), 'The U.S. Policy toward Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era', *Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Volume 4, Spring-Summer, p.138-140

⁴³⁴ Birthe Hansen, Peter Toft, Anders Wivel, *Security Strategies and American World Order*, Lost Power, Routledge, New York, 2009, p.1

approval to take any type of military action, and because the President can take foreign policy steps through executive agreements without the approval of the Congress.⁴³⁵ The rise of Palestine conflict in global context coincides with the rise of United States in global politics after the First World War. This is the time when the Ottoman Empire demised and the seeds of Israeli State were given to the Palestine soil. Beginning with Woodrow Wilson until today, the American Presidents and their office have played substantial role in Israeli-Palestine problem. In this process, there is a balance in favor of the Israelis where the United States have ignored the Palestinians almost for a Century. As the basis of this ignorance, Malcolm Kerr (1980) accuses the “conventional wisdom”.⁴³⁶ This wisdom, which is composed of a body of assumptions and a degree of misperceptions on Arab-Israeli conflict, has dominated the American decision making process and its diplomatic cadres.⁴³⁷ This conventional wisdom, as argued by Jeffrey Blankfort, was not the consequence of policies based on morality, justice and national interests, for almost a century.⁴³⁸ This conventional wisdom was shaped by certain factors, and these factors have dominated the personal and administrative dispositions of American presidents since the very beginning of American-Israeli relations. These factors, which are studied in detail by Kathleen Christison (1999) can be summarized under five headlines; (i)state of knowledge-educational background of the US presidents, (ii)frame of reference, (iii)capability of Israeli Lobby upon American administration, (iv)impact of the Cold War on the Middle East politics, (v)weak and disorganized situation of Palestinians.”⁴³⁹

⁴³⁵ Morris, I.L. (2010), *The American Presidency*, New York, Cambridge University Press, pp.204-212

⁴³⁶ Hunt, M.H. (1987), *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, New Heaven, Yale University Press, pp.150-151

⁴³⁷ Kerr, M. (1980), ‘America’s Middle East Policy: Kissinger, Carter and the Future’, *IPS papers 14 (E)* Washington D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies, pp.8-9

⁴³⁸ For details argued by Blankfort see;<http://ifamericaknew.org/download/lobby.pdf> access date 24 April 2013

⁴³⁹ Christison, K. (1999), Christison, K. (1999) *Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*, Berkeley, University of California Press,Chapter 2.

The first factor is the state of knowledge and the educational background of American presidents and their emotional approaches towards the Jewish and Arab societies. The reason of this pro-Israeli emotional approach finds its roots in the very early years of Jewish population in America. The Jewish minority of 19th Century in the United States, around 4.000 people then, have been subject to a program of conversion to Christianity by Protestant missionaries. These missionaries aimed to reunite with their spiritual fore bearers, the Jews and they believed that these conversions could be best conducted in the heart of Zionism, the land of Palestine. Additionally, they believed that if the conditions of Jewish sovereignty, which are seen as their cousins, is secured in Palestine as existed in Jesus' time, this would at the same time be the realization of a historical aim of Christianity.⁴⁴⁰ In this respect, it is possible to say that, since Woodrow Wilson, the perceptions of almost all American presidents have followed a pro-Jewish track. Based on his biblical beliefs, President Roosevelt (1933-45) proved a pro-Israeli and sympathetic position. Although he always considered the war time geostrategic relations between the US and Arab countries and took steps to please Arab state leaders in terms of Palestinian-Jewish conflict during his term, he did not hesitate to give full support to the foundation of the state of Israel cause. For this aim, for example, despite his assurance to Saudi King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on February 1945 that the US steps on Palestine issue would be under the full consultation of Arabs and Jews, he gave authorization to a Jewish leader in the US on March 1945 to issue a statement that the US president was giving unconditional support for Jewish immigration to Palestine for the aim of creating a Jewish State there.⁴⁴¹

After the death of President Roosevelt, his successor President Truman (1945-53), thanks to his evangelical Christian upbringing, did not hesitate to follow the the footprints of Roosevelt on a decisive pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli track. President Truman and his advisors played crucial role on the way going to the foundation of

⁴⁴⁰ Oren B.M. (2008) *Power, Faith and Fantasy; America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*, New York, W.W.Norton and Company, p.88

⁴⁴¹ Neff, D. (1995) *Fallen Pillars, US Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945*, Washington DC, Institute for Palestine Studies, p.26

Israel concerning; (i) immigration of 100.000 Jews from Europe to Palestine,⁴⁴² (ii) endorsement of the partition plan on favor of Jews at UN,⁴⁴³ (iii) the foundation and recognition of the state of Israel, (iv) reorganization of American Jewish lobby (between 1945-47) and its active role upon American public opinion and congressional support.

As a consequence of President Truman's efforts, the partition plan of Palestine granted almost 56% of best fertile land to the Jews and only 44% to the Palestinians. But, the demographic reality was not equal with the land division; because the population was 31% Jews and 69% Palestinians.⁴⁴⁴ This unequal and unrighteous demographic and geographic reality was accepted as a surprising gift by the Jews and as a deep disappointment and fury by the Palestinians. Truman's justification was far away from these injustice realities because for him, return of the Jews to Holy Land, no matter how negative effects it would create on the Middle East politics, was the realization of a biblical prophecy. Truman behaved so close to the Jewish cause, he even selected his advisors either as Zionist, or pro-Zionist figures.⁴⁴⁵ This irrational environment led President Truman to drive the Palestine conflict into a direction where the seeds of seamless enmity, violence, hatred were sown, and placed the Palestine case under a heavy wadset.

When the British mandate ended and Ben-Gurion proclaimed the foundation of Israel on May 15th 1948, Truman administration recognized this de-facto declaration only

⁴⁴²Truman, H.S. (1955) *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope*, vol. 2, New York, pp. 138-9.

⁴⁴³ The UN partition plan (29 November 1947) was aiming to establish a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international enclave for Jerusalem. The UN General Assembly Resolution 181 was seeking to secure the two-third majority. Truman administration has pressured Ethiopia, France, Haiti, Liberia, Luxembourg, Paraguay, and the Philippines to change their votes.

⁴⁴⁴ Ruedy J. (1971) "Dynamics of Land Alienation " in *The Transformation of Palestine; Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. Ibrahim A. Abu-Lughod, Evanston Northwestern University Press

⁴⁴⁵ Amongst President Truman's personnel advisors; Eddie Jacobson, Clark Clifford, and David Niles and professional advisors; Robert Lovett (Undersecretary of State), George F. Kennan (Policy Planning Director), James Forrestal (Defense Secretary), George Marshall (Secretary of State) can be cited. Amongst other advisors, Jakobson has played an instrumental role at opening a pro-Jewish window in the White House under the influence of Israeli lobby.

11 minutes later. There was a strong objection to this recognition from Pentagon, CIA and the State Department that this decision would fuel antagonism amongst Arabs, cause clashes amongst Jews and Arabs, threaten oil flow and cost a high price for the US in front of Soviets which was seeking for an advantageous opportunity to insert its influence over the Arab countries.⁴⁴⁶ This decision changed the context of the problem and pushed the Jewish-Arab struggle into an inter-state conflict in the Middle East. This conflict, does not solely feed the Arab resentment towards the US, but also fuel global terrorism and erect it as a continuous threat to the world peace. Amongst the American Presidents, only Eisenhower (1953-61) and Carter (1976-80) have followed a relatively objective approach, and rather than being emotional, they succeeded to keep an equal distance to both communities.⁴⁴⁷ The thoughts and official statements of the American Presidents in last two centuries about Jewish people and Israel are worth to argue.⁴⁴⁸

The second factor is the Israeli centered frame of reference linked to the problem. In this sense, two principles reign over the issue; first is the ignorance towards Palestinians at international circles in terms of political, historical, demographic realities and data, and second is the control of historical and political terminology over Palestine and Jewish societies by Israelis. The Palestinians have either been excluded or regarded as invisible at the international political debate. This frame of reference has been largely shaped according to the will of Western great powers, since Balfour Declaration in 1917.⁴⁴⁹ One extreme example about the role of Israelis upon American Presidential office is related to President Lyndon B. Johnson. As argued by Edward Tivnan (1988), the formal information and the individual knowledge of President Johnson have been largely generated by the Israeli experts

⁴⁴⁶ Clifford C.M and Holbrooke R.C. (1991), *Counsel to the President : A Memoir*, New York, Random House, 1st ed. pp. 18-25.

⁴⁴⁷ Christison, C. (1999), *Perceptions of Palestine*, London, University of California Press, pp.95-104

⁴⁴⁸ The thoughts and the official statements of American Presidents from John Adams to Barack Obama are detailed at <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/u-s-presidential-quotes-about-jewish-homeland-and-israel-jewish-virtual-library> access date 2 April 2014

⁴⁴⁹ Christison, C. (1999) *Perceptions of Palestine*, London, University of California Press, pp.7-13

and specialists in the US Department of State and Presidential Office.⁴⁵⁰ Johnson's strong pro-Israeli attitudes are justified by his address to an Israeli diplomat after the assassination of President Kennedy: "You have lost a very great friend. But you have found a better one."⁴⁵¹

The third factor is the effects of Israeli lobby upon American Presidents and foreign politics. This capable role has inserted multiple effects on American public opinion, American Presidential elections and American decision making process. As discussed by Jeffrey Blankfort, the citizens in any democracy need to be accurately and fully informed about any issue of domestic or foreign policy issues. It is interesting to observe that in June 1982, 800.000 American citizens have gathered in front of United Nations headquarter to protest the nuclear weapons, but 6 days earlier than this event, there was not even a single person to protest the invasion of Lebanon by the Israeli Army, a military campaign resulting with the death of thousands of civilian people.⁴⁵² The Israeli lobby is a well-organized lobby machine effectively functioning in American societal, political and economic spheres to produce pro-Jewish practices in all aspects. In addition to the success of Israeli lobby at organizing the public attention, it is possible to state that there is a lack of interest of the American society towards the problems in the Middle East and Palestine conflict in particular. Since the inception of the process of creating a Jewish State in Palestine, Israeli lobby has played vital roles. The American society has been influenced by a formidable movie-written press organization operating on a misconception that the Israelis are an oppressed and ill-treated society throughout the history. The American society has proved the utmost mercy and tender for the Israelis under the impact of the European holocaust in 1930s and 40s.

⁴⁵⁰ Tivnan, E. (1988), *The Lobby; Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy*, New York, Touchstone, pp.59-60

⁴⁵¹ Kenen, I.L. (1981) *Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington*, New York, Prometheus Books, p.173

⁴⁵² For details argued by Blankfort see; <http://ifamericaknew.org/download/lobby.pdf> access date 24 April 2013 access date: 11 October 2013

On the other hand, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) question the role of Israeli lobby in a dramatic way, arguing that the US has set aside its own security for the interests of Israeli State. They assert that the level of material and diplomatic support to Israel by the United States has exceeded any kind of strategic cooperation or moral imperatives between any two allies. The Israeli lobby argues that the US and Israeli interests are identical. Particularly after the 1973 war, direct economic and military assistance has dramatically increased. The direct or indirect US support concentrate in three aspects; weapons system, direct access to intelligence and nuclear weapons. Another type of support is diplomatic support. Since 1982, 32 UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel have been vetoed by the US.⁴⁵³

The fourth factor is the impact of Cold War upon Arab-Israeli relations since 1950s. The United States have always considered the role of Soviet Union as a senior factor in its Middle East Politics. The foundation of Israel as an independent state in the heart of Palestine during the presidency of Harry Truman, deeply affected the western initiatives to contain communism and to stop the penetration of Soviets into the Middle East. The creation of a Jewish state in the heart of Arab world was the primary threat. Because, the Arab states and the public opinion were more fearful of Zionism, than of communism. So that, when the US and Britain decided to create the Baghdad Pact in 1955 against Soviet threat, they expected Arab countries to join. But, none of Arab countries joined this defensive pact and the members were limited to Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Britain. Despite strong pressure from the Britain and the US even Jordan resisted to join.⁴⁵⁴ Iraq received harsh criticism from Arab countries, led by Egypt, and was accused to join western imperialistic alliance. The military coup in 1958 has not merely overthrown the monarchy, but brought an end to the membership of Iraq. Iraq left the pact in 1959 and this ended the western hopes for any possible Arab participation. The foundation of Israel with the hands of western powers (principally Britain and the US) has resulted in a deep distrust against these powers and eased the penetration of Soviets into the region. Heavy

⁴⁵³ Mearsheimer J. and Walt S. (2006) The Israel Lobby; For details see: <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby>

⁴⁵⁴ Brand, L.A. (1994), *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations : The Political Economy of Alliance Making*, New York, Columbia University Press, pp.87 and 285

American military assistance to Israel and Israel's "massive retaliation" policy against neighboring states pushed Egypt (President Nasser) to refuse western military aid and made the first agreement of 200 million \$ arms deal with the Soviets.⁴⁵⁵

As a different approach, the practices of Eisenhower (1953-61) connote dissimilarity to Truman in terms of electoral, historical and emotional behaviors towards Israel. Eisenhower did not show emotional reactions, did not feel himself obliged to respect the historical background of the issue and did not feel himself duty bound to Israeli lobby for the presidential electoral campaign. His overriding concern was the national welfare and the interest of the US and the balance of power in the Middle East politics amongst other role players and also to prevent any possible Soviet penetration of the area and assure easy access to the oil supplies.⁴⁵⁶

President Kennedy (1961-63) also followed a similar pro-Israeli political track in the Middle East. His policy can be characterized under two principles; emotionally pro-Israeli and seeking for a positive atmosphere with Arab leaders in order to contain any possible Soviet initiative in the region. The instrument Kennedy tried to use was the Palestinian refugee problem. In the initial phase of his administration he took some steps to solve the refugee issue, but reached to solution. Rather, he established a pattern of military cooperation with Israel resulting in sale of sophisticated arms and transfer of military technology.⁴⁵⁷ In this period a special and high level/strategic relationship has been formed between the US and Israel. Kennedy administration realized the first arms sale to Israel in 1962; anti-aircraft Hawk missiles. As argued above, also President Johnson followed apro-Israeli approach similar to Kennedy during his term, probably more pro-Israeli than his predecessors. During Johnson's presidency, high level arms sales from the US to Israel continued. In 1965 Israel bought more than 200 sophisticated tanks. This arms transfer continued with some 50 Skyhawk bombers in 1966. These were not defensive but offensive weapons which constituted a military superiority towards neighboring Arab states and also a milestone in

⁴⁵⁵ Rubenberg, C. (1986) *Israel and the American National Interest : A Critical Examination*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, p. 58

⁴⁵⁶ Christison, C. (1999), *Perceptions of Palestine*, London, University of California Press, pp.95-98

⁴⁵⁷ Christison, C. (1999), *Perceptions of Palestine*, London, University of California Press, pp.104-109

US-Israel relationship.⁴⁵⁸ During Johnson term, the most crucial event in the Middle East was the 1967 war and its consequences on Palestinian awakening and activism. On June 5, Israel launched a sudden air force attack against Egypt destroying Egyptian air force in two hours, followed by an attack on Jordan army and Syria. In 6 days, Israel has occupied Sinai Desert, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The 1967 war and Israeli occupation resulted in creating Palestinian refugee problem, a refugee population of almost 7 million at present time. This refugee problem, since then, erupted as one vital issue the American presidents and Arab leaders in the Middle East had to take into consideration. This war has also marked the date for the awakening of Palestinian activism, both in terms of ideology based on Palestinian political awakening around Yasser Arafat and transformation of resistance movements such as Fatah into paramilitary groups.⁴⁵⁹ On the other hand, this swift military victory created a sense of euphoria amongst Jews in Israel and the United States. This military accomplishment created a collective sense of Jewishness, in a way encouraging a new identity coined in American-Jewish society strongly tied to Israel. This new Jewish identity was built on dual principles; cultural and political.⁴⁶⁰ For the American society, Israel has proved to be a powerful American Ally, and for Johnson administration Israel has shattered Soviet prestige in the region by proving the superiority of American weapon systems. One significant outcome of 1967 war is that France was replaced by the US in supplying arms to Israel and a very much sophisticated arms deal from the US was F-4 Jet Fighters. Israeli Lobby has played a crucial role to persuade congress for the approval of this one and the following high level arms purchases.

The impact of Cold War upon Palestinian problem continued during the terms of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford between 1969 and 1976. The paramount events of

⁴⁵⁸ Spiegel, S. (1985) *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict : Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p.134.

⁴⁵⁹ Tessler, M. (1994), *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, p.464.

⁴⁶⁰ Christison, K. (1999) *Perceptions of Palestine : Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*, Berkeley, University of California Press, p.188.

this term are the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, the political maneuvers aiming to prevent the Soviets from penetrating into the Middle East, the oil embargo and the Peace Talks. Although Arafat's emergence as a leader and the rise of US media and public opinion upon Palestinian society have been significant developments of this term, neither Nixon nor Ford has been successful to break that pro-Israeli conventional wisdom. They have not given any concession from the security of Israel state and continued to transfer arms and military technology into Israel.⁴⁶¹ It is possible to argue that, the Middle East has been perceived as a regional conflict for the American leaders during 1960s and 70s and it never dominated the globalist strategy centered on controlling Soviet expansion or weakening its influence.⁴⁶²

The fifth factor is the weak, disorganized, poor situation of Palestinians since the very early stages of Arab-Israeli problem.⁴⁶³ The Palestinians have been viewed by the Americans through a negative lens based on preconceived historical, religious and cultural opinions. This was an oriental framework placing the Palestinians identical to uncivilized American Indians. From the religio-historical point of view, the Muslims were understood as aliens, of Holy Land, who were not biblical, Christian or Jewish. Amongst the American intellectuals, as well as the politicians and the ordinary people, the dominant idea was that real Palestine was Christian, or Jewish but not Muslim.⁴⁶⁴ Towards the Arab Americans, a form of political racism has been implemented on American political process. For example, in 1978, James Jogby, the chairman of the Palestine Human Rights Campaign, attended a meeting in the White House. He was invited by Vice-President Walter Mondale but it has been the last meeting he could attend, because on following days he was notified he would receive no further invitation due to his being an Arab. White House has received

⁴⁶¹ Christison, C. (1999), *Perceptions of Palestine*, London, University of California Press, pp.124-128

⁴⁶² Parker, R.B. (1993), *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, p.156

⁴⁶³ Roberson B.A.(2002), *The Impact of the International System in the Middle East*, in Raymond Hinnebush and Anoushiravan Ehteshami eds, *Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers pp.64-65

⁴⁶⁴ Christison, C. (1999), *Perceptions of Palestine*, London, University of California Press, pp.18-20

objections to his attendance.⁴⁶⁵ In addition to this narrow approach of Americans, the Palestinians had some weaknesses. One reason is that they did not develop a Palestinian nationality in 19th centuries like other European countries, unaware of what could happen in the wake of Great War. They felt themselves as the owner of Palestine under the Ottoman rule, and did not have any sense about what would happen to them in near future. As the Zionist front slowly prepared the political conditions of an independent Israel, the Palestinians stayed unorganized and weak.⁴⁶⁶ This unfavorable situation was not extending merely over the Palestinians but also neighboring Arab countries. On the eve of the foundation of Israel, when the Arab armies entered Palestine to fight Israel in 1948, the Arab troops proved to be lacking of military coordination, a robust command, shared military aims and operational timetables.⁴⁶⁷

As detailed above, it is possible to coin the approach of American Presidents of last century under these five factors. These factors are also the determinants of American foreign policy towards the Middle East and to Arab-Israeli conflict, like an umbrella, shaping the American perception to the Middle East. This pro-Israeli American approach at highest level, has given a strong confidence and a upper hand to Israeli statesmen in their relations with Palestinians and HAMAS. Needless to mention about how sharp disappointments occurred amongst the Palestinian community and their political and military leaders. Such a seamless sympathy from the US Presidents has played a negative role for Israel to develop a “political will” towards the Palestine conflict. Actually, in Aceh conflict, the political will of parent state Indonesia, has played the basic role on the way to reach a settled peace. In Aceh conflict, the US has proved an equal distance to GAM and Indonesian Governments and this has contributed a lot for the termination of violence.

⁴⁶⁵ Zogby, J. Our Twenty Five Years, January 6, 2003, available at <http://www.aaiusa.org/> access date 29 December 2016

⁴⁶⁶ Khalidi, R. (1997), *Palestinian identity; The Construction of Modern National Consciousness*, New York, Columbia University Press, Chapters 5-6

⁴⁶⁷ Morris, B. (2001) *Righteous Victims : A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*, New York, Vintage Books , p.219

4.1.4.3 US-Israeli Relations in Post-Sept11 Term and its Effects on HAMAS

After investigating the US-Israel relations in its socio-political and historical formation, in this part, I will argue the US-Israel relations in post-September 11 Era under the administration of last two presidents; Bush and Obama. It is clear that, although the pro-Jewish feelings of American society and pro-Israeli approach of American Presidents and foreign affairs office are important factors in American Israeli relations, the real debate is; how much do Israeli and American interests overlap since September 11 in the region, and how realistic it is to ignore and/or to contain a VNSA/HAMAS after its electoral and governing success in Gaza? The US administrations since September 11 attacks are aware that unresolved conflicts across the globe, particularly the Palestine conflict pose the largest threat to domestic and international American security.⁴⁶⁸

Bush Administration and Israel

In post-September 11 era the American-Israeli relations are shaped by “war on terror” strategy in the time of President George W. Bush (2000-2008). Under the shadow of this high scale terrorist attack, the US support to Israel was managed at the highest level, with the hands of President Bush. In the spring of 2002, under the shadow of war on terror strategy, Israel conducted military operations in West Bank and destroyed the infrastructure. At the end of this devastating military campaign, President Bush made a speech targeting the Palestinians and identifying new condition for a settled peace, saying;

“...peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born. I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror...If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel.”⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁸ McCormick M.J. (2014) American Foreign Policy and Process, Cengage Learning, Printed in the USA, pp.216-217

⁴⁶⁹ For the details of Bush’s speech see; <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jun/25/israel.usa> access date 19 December 2016.

Bush, in his speech, urged the Palestinians not only to have new leaders but new institutions and new security arrangements as well. Bush declared also the endorsement of an independent Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly and announced the formation of an international Quartet; UN, EU, Russia and the US. In following days a roadmap was issued to implement this new vision.

But, despite such a new initiative, as the spillover of the Second Intifadah, coming days witnessed an intensive exchange of violence between Palestinian militancy, suicide bombings and Israeli military forces. Israel continued to follow harsh policies under the guidance of PM Ariel Sharon. President Bush met with Israeli PM Sharon several times and showed green light for the conduct of military operations and the construction of “security fence” in the West Bank. Throughout this term which has been overwhelmed by “war on terror” mentality, Sharon did not hesitate to continue building more settlements, isolating Palestinian towns, building the separation wall, assassinating leaders and activists and keeping Arafat at house arrest. Arafat died under this house arrest time, and was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas who was willingly accepted as new “peace partner” by the US and Israel. Abbas was elected as the President of Palestinian Authority in January 2005. But one year later, the unthinkable happened at Palestine Legislative Council elections in January 2006 and HAMAS swept these universally acknowledged free elections and gained 56% of the seats, and formed the government.

This new government was an Islamist-led government under the leadership of Ismail Haniyeh, a longtime HAMAS leader. The reaction by Israel and the US to this electoral-governmental success of HAMAS was a complete rejection and an ultimatum to HAMAS for immediate recognition of Israel and renunciation of violence. Israel did not reject only the election results but also started a massive international campaign via Israeli lobbies abroad.⁴⁷⁰ No matter what legal justifications Israel used to attack the results of a democratic election, it proved to be an animosity against a democratic movement in an Arab society. This approach clashed with above mentioned pro-Israeli justification, which defends that Israel and

⁴⁷⁰ Petras, J. (2006), *The Power of Israel in the United States*, New York, Clarity Press, pp.96-98

US want a democratic Middle East. Actually the US and Israel has been trapped by a dilemma; ideal of democracy they have promoted for the Middle Eastern societies for decades and rise of an Islamist entity into Palestinian conflict. Contrary to the US and Israeli arguments, many international observers have reported that the elections were held in a free and democratic environment with no question about its reliability. This approach to HAMAS also constituted an adverse perception when compared to that of Indonesian government towards GAM, in a way encouraging GAM leaders to stick to democratic values during peace negotiations. The substantial reason for this constructive Indonesian approach was the positive effect of a decisive “political will “in Indonesian governmental echelons to solve the Aceh conflict.

On the other hand, the immediate reaction of Bush Administration to Palestine election results was to cut off all financial aids to Palestine. Additionally the US convinced the Europeans to do the same. The aim was clear; to isolate and destabilize HAMAS by creating heavy civilian sufferings, and cause the government in Gaza to collapse. This justification behind the harsh reaction of Bush administration towards a democratically elected HAMAS was to abort the emergence of an Islamist violent non-state actor to govern in Palestine and thus pose a serious threat to Israel as well as the US interests in the region. In year 2007, the US and Israel backed Fatah to form a separate government in West Bank, in a way, fueling violence between Fatah and HAMAS. In the wake of HAMAS-Fatah confrontation which caused over 150 dead and 1000 wounded, HAMAS took over the control of Gaza.⁴⁷¹

One outcome of HAMAS electoral victory was that a rapid pragmatic evolution and political moderation emerged in HAMAS leadership towards the end of the second intifadah. As Khalid Hroub argues (2006), HAMAS leadership has improved considerably on a pragmatic and state building direction. It has proved a capacity to control the resistance movements and broker a two-state solution policy with other

⁴⁷¹ The International Crisis Group Report (2007) "After Gaza," in *Middle East Report*, Brussels, 2 August, p.1.available at<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/71-inside-gaza-the-challenge-of-clans-and-families.pdf>Access date 15 November 2013

role players of Palestine conflict.⁴⁷² As Nancy Bermeo argues (1997), in her moderation hypothesis that radical groups will transform into a peaceful structure once they come to power, HAMAS has proved a moderation capability.⁴⁷³ Maybe as the most important point, HAMAS has realized a transformation to de-emphasize the religion.

This was the point the US was missing. The US has shown the same attitude towards HAMAS as it has shown to PLO when it emerged in 1964. Now, since such fundamental changes in the conditions which bind Israel and Palestinian actors in last half century, how interesting it is to see that Israel is still challenging to find a “good-will” and identify a “peace partner” to negotiate over the conflict. As narrated in above sections of this dissertation, since 1967 war, a radical transformation has occurred in the position of Arab states as well as PLO and HAMAS to accept and officially acknowledge the existence of the state of Israel. There is a consensus amongst Arab states and Palestinian actors that full implementation of UN 242 would be the basic condition to find a settled peace to Palestine conflict.⁴⁷⁴ Additionally, although the Arab states in the Middle East traditionally inherit a rejectionist character, they have made solid steps for an enduring peace in Palestine conflict. One of these steps was made by Arab League in 2002 and repeated in 2007. This was a plan with three conditions; (i) withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, (ii) resolution of refugee problem according to UNGA Resolution 194, (iii) recognition of Palestinian State with Eastern Jerusalem as capital city. Additionally, one of the expectations in the plan for Arab states was to normalize the relations with Israel.

⁴⁷² Hroub, K. (2006) "A "New Hamas" Through Its New Documents," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 35, no.4 p. 6.

⁴⁷³ Bermeo, N. (1997) "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3.

⁴⁷⁴ UN Resolution 242 was a cornerstone for a just and lasting peace. It called the parties to negotiate for a solution based on secure and recognized boundaries. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 following the Six Days War. Two main pillars of the Resolution were; (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, (ii) Negotiations for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. For details see <http://www.mythsandfacts.org/conflict/10/resolution-242.pdf> access date 18 November 2013

Obama Administration and Israel

On the other hand, Obama administration's Israel policy is not identical to his predecessor. Although Obama reflected an impression that the special relationship between the US and Israel should continue, rather than giving unconditional support to Israel, he sought some flexibility in the US foreign policy in the Middle East and tried to adopt US support to Israel accordingly. Obama aimed to foster an idealistic foreign policy especially in the Middle East. He wanted to use the lessons learned from the failures of previous administrations in foreign politics, and to repair the bilateral relations of the US with Arab states deteriorated during the war on terror strategy. In this respect first; Obama made decisive steps to disengage US military troops from Iraq in order to give a promising message to the American society which was worn out by terror threats and military campaigns of last two decades.

Second, rather than making coercive unilateral steps, and following a preventive war strategy in regional conflicts he preferred close cooperation with allies and international institutions, including the UN. The third lesson learned was to repair the appearance and the popularity of American state amongst Arab countries. Although President Obama continued to show a cold approach to HAMAS, he had a strong wish to open a new page with Arab states and Muslim World and to remove the negative influence of Afghanistan and Iraq operations upon Muslim public opinion. His visit to Egypt and his speech on June 14, 2009 at Bar-Ilan University was a sign for this restorative approach towards disappointed Arab states in the Middle East.⁴⁷⁵ This shift in US approach to Israel has created a disappointment in Israel and American political and social circles and attracted many critics. He was openly blamed for not being pro-Israeli and encouraging possible terror formations in the region. But actually the problem was related to how much the US and Israeli interests overlap in the region. This is a strong argument that the interests of Israel and US do not overlap as it was during Cold War years but go divergent in the Middle East.

⁴⁷⁵ Rubin, B. (2009), "US Middle East Policy: Too Many Challenges and Yet a Single Theme," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, XIII: 2.

Another discrepancy in the US-Israeli relations emerged after Arab Spring in 2011 which rocked the Middle East region and overthrew regimes. These pro-democracy revolts and uprisings have been welcomed by Obama administration but not that much by Israel.⁴⁷⁶ Obama administration's aim was to win the hearts of Arab streets by supporting freedom and democracy movements in the Middle East. Although for years both the US and Israel have supported pro-Western autocracies and monarchies in the Arab world, and for the first time a disaccord has emerged. These different responses to the Arab spring were most visible in the case of Egypt; Obama administration supported anti-Mubarak demonstrations and actions but Netanyahu government openly supported Mubarak regime. A similar situation emerged also in Syrian uprisings. While the US supported the separatist movements against Bashar regime, Israel did not. Israel's fear originated from the possibility if Islamic governments would be coming to power by democratic elections and threatens Israel's national security. For Israel, the most serious threat was the Muslim-brotherhood regime in Egypt. Another problem for Israel in Arab spring was its possible effects to HAMAS. Since 2007, when HAMAS took control of Gaza strip, Israel has tried to crush this new actor with several military strikes and diplomatic-economic isolations. But HAMAS, despite these unfavorable conditions, has consolidated its societal and military power. Not its military arm but social arm grew stronger in post-Arab spring term. Its ideology based on Muslim brotherhood received sympathy from Arab Street.⁴⁷⁷ In general it is possible to argue that, in practice the interests of the US and Israel in the Middle East do not completely overlap as it was during Cold War period, and the issue has turned out to be a debate if Israel is an asset or a burden for the US foreign policy in the Middle East.

The role of the US in Palestine conflict is playing a paramount effect due to the weak and divided conditions of peace supporters. Hardliners in both sides always find a chance to oppose negotiations and undermine the peace process. Here the role of US, either as a mediator or a reconciliator is vital to persuade the majority of Israelis and

⁴⁷⁶ Byman, D. (2011) "Israel's Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 3 pp.124-127

⁴⁷⁷ Byman, D. (2011) "Israel's Pessimistic View of the Arab Spring," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 3 pp.130-131

Palestinians for a peace. In order to succeed this; it is believed that the US should keep the same distance to both sides and encourage them to make strong steps for peace. Since the beginning of Cold War, the US pursued three strategic interests in the region; uninterrupted flow of oil into western industry, the security and survival of Israel and the stability and security of pro-Western Arab states. These interests have been complicated by Arab-Israeli conflict and since September 11 also strongly related to proliferation of global terror networks and weapons of mass destruction. One lesson learned in last decade is that the advancement of American interests in the region is linked to a speedy recovery in Israeli Palestine conflict.

4.1.4.4 Pro-Jewish Lobbying and US Military and Economic Aid to Israel

Several explanations have been produced about the sources of this special relationship between the US and Israel. Amongst others, the effect of Holocaust, Judeo-Christian perception, effective lobby, the weakness of Arabs, the role of media, mutual political norms, hostility towards Arabs, mutual strategic values of the US and Israel can be cited. Amongst all of these factors, two of them are coming forward; (i)lobbying activities and (ii)strategic level aids.

Pro-Jewish Lobbying

Edward Tivnan's study (1987) on how the lobby won the war in the US to consolidate its position on US-Israeli relations is worth to mention.⁴⁷⁸ Tivnan argues that, under the leadership of American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and with the financial support of several pro-Jewish Political Action Committees (PACs), the lobby won the war. In mid 1980s, the lobby was able to dominate the nature of American foreign policy over the Middle East. As a natural outcome of this development, the US military and economic assistance have consolidated the superiority of Israel against its Arab adversaries in the region. In this respect, AIPAC has assured full support of the American Congress and

⁴⁷⁸ Tivnan, E. (1987) *The Lobby : Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, preface

members of the congress have been kept on line with pro-Israeli policies.⁴⁷⁹ As a lobbying organization, AIPAC is the most effective and best known group. It has such a strong influence across the globe as described by former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; “the support of the U.S. government...and the support of the American Jewish community for Israel has an identity card. The name on that card is AIPAC.”⁴⁸⁰ Harry Reid, the Senate Majority Leader has identified AIPAC as a “well organized and respected” organization in the US.⁴⁸¹ AIPAC works within a very much organized agenda and sets its targets under three basic areas; forms an Israeli centered annual agenda, formulates pro-Israeli policies, and educates political candidates. After the approval, these targets are forwarded to the PAC network and wealthy donors. Every candidate running for Congress is met by AIPAC and introduced elaborated briefings over the issue.⁴⁸²

The pro-Israel lobby groups in the US such as American Israel Public Affairs Committee, American Jewish Congress, American Zionist Movement, American Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, American Jewish World Service, Conference of Presidents of the Major Jewish Organizations always pursue a massive propaganda in the US and European Union in order to justify and support Israeli government’s policies/violations for peace, human rights and international court rulings. As a consequence of this support and courage, Israeli administrations continue the military operations across Palestine and repeatedly ignore any HAMAS offer including unilateral ceasefires.⁴⁸³ Chomsky argues that since 1980's PLO has recognized the State of Israel, it has offered a ceasefire, and has explicitly proposed a two state solution. But the answer of Israel to those proposals has been launching military operations, invasion of neighboring territories, assassinating Palestinian

⁴⁷⁹ Findley, P. (1985) *They Dare to Speak Out : People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby*, Westport,Conn.: Lawrence Hill

⁴⁸⁰ The structure and functions of AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) based on a report by the US National Defence University in 1993 is given in detail at <https://info.publicintelligence.net/AIPAC.pdf> access date 24 November 2013

⁴⁸¹ Mearsheimer JJ and Walt SM, (2007) *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, printed by Farrar, Straus and Giroux p. 153.

⁴⁸² Mearsheimer JJ and Walt SM, (2007) *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, printed by Farrar, Straus and Giroux p. 154.

⁴⁸³ Petras, J. (2006), *The Power of Israel in the United States*, New York, Clarity Press, pp.100-101

military-civilian leaders, killing activists so that Palestinians either withdraw their offers or respond with violence to Israeli acts.⁴⁸⁴

Another negative effect of the Jewish lobby is visible on the US relations with Arab states. Backing Israel at any expense including the US decision echelons, fuels anti-American extremism and as a consequence of this pro-Israeli posture Arab-Israel conflict is traded by global VNSAs. On the other hand, any Muslim country that is ready to cooperate with the US against global terrorism is influenced by its own people's anti-American views. One rigid result of US unconditional support is the Israel settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. Since 1960s, almost every American president has opposed settlements but none of them dared to pay a political price to force state of Israel to quit this policy.⁴⁸⁵ By doing this, the US administrations also repudiated their commitments to human rights and self-determination. Cheryl Rubenberg (1986) has proved a similar stance and contends that "Israel has not served the interests of the United States in the Middle East" and that the US interests in the region have been jeopardized due to the US-Israeli partnership. She criticizes American foreign policy makers for building judgments under the influence of pro-Israel lobby and facing misperceptions in the region.⁴⁸⁶

On the other hand some authors such as Petras⁴⁸⁷, Mearsheimer and Walt⁴⁸⁸ criticize those justifications and posit that the US support to Israel exceeds any strategic or

⁴⁸⁴ Chomsky, N.(1999), *Fateful Triangle: the United States, Israel and Palestine*, London, Pluto Press, p.45

⁴⁸⁵ Hroub, K. (2000)*Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, pp.43-44

⁴⁸⁶ Rubenberg, C. (1986) *Israel and the American National Interest : A Critical Examination*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, pp. 19-20.

⁴⁸⁷ James Petras in his book (2006) criticizes the unconditional support of US administration to Israel state in post September 11 era. He focuses particularly on the outcomes of second Intifadah and approach of Israeli state to Palestinians. For details see; <http://www.social-sciences-and-humanities.com/pdf/The-Power-of-Israel-in-the-United-States-.pdf> access date 2 February 2015.

⁴⁸⁸ Mearsheimer JJ and Walt SM, (2007) *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, printed by Farrar, Straus and Giroux

moral justification.⁴⁸⁹ They argue that, during the Cold War years it was essential to give seamless support to Israel, but it is a burden now for the US on its relations with rogue states and violent entities. The main power behind this irrational support to Israel is the Israeli lobby in the US, an organization of loose individuals and institutions that works on pushing US foreign policy towards a pro-Israeli direction. They contend that the Jewish lobby does not influence only the direction of American foreign politics, but also the peace initiatives on Palestine conflict and the US relations with Arab states. The power of Israeli lobby has also pushed the US into the position of acting as Israel's lawyer in Arab-Israeli peace process. Almost all of the American Presidents, but Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush, have been influenced by Jewish lobby and could not exert enough power to enforce Israel for a feasible solution to the Palestine conflict. The continuous set backs in peace process has resulted with the electoral victory of HAMAS, an Islamist VNSA, and its emergence as an actor in the conflict.

US Military and Economic Aid

Military aid plays a tremendous role upon the US-Israel relations as well as Palestine Conflict and position of HAMAS. Until 1962, Israel purchased its military equipment from France. The first period of US military sales to Israel covers the 1962-67 period and is comprised of "defensive weapons", the Hawk missiles by Kennedy administration under Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program.⁴⁹⁰ The "offensive weapons" procurement started after 1967 Arab-Israel war, and lasted until 1978 with a total of \$ 7.8 billion. Half of this military assistance was in forms of

⁴⁸⁹ The US financial support to Israel is composed of four basic headlines; military grant, economic grant, immigration grant, ASHA (American Schools and Hospitals Abroad) grant. Annually, the US grants around 3 billion US dollars to Israel. For details see; US Foreign Aid to Israel: A Reassessment Policy Paper by Gideon Israel, available at <http://data.statesmanship.org.il/site/2014/USaidtoIsraelnew.pdf> access date 2 February 2015.

⁴⁹⁰ The first arms sale to Israel was made during the Eisenhower administration in 1958 but this sale was limited in numbers and technology and involved only 100 recoilless rifles. Dore Gold argues the conditions of initial military sales of the US administrations to Israel at his article; "The Basis of the U.S.-Israel Alliance: An Israeli Response to the Mearsheimer-Walt Assault," *Jerusalem Issue Brief* 5, no. 20 (2006).

grants.⁴⁹¹ In the term between 1978-1998 annual military aid differed between \$ 1.4 billion to \$ 1.8 billion.⁴⁹² Between 1998-2008 the figure rose to \$ 2.4 billion annually. Under the mentality of “war on terror” Bush administration concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to increase the FMF for the next decade to a total of \$30 billion.⁴⁹³ Such an increasing military aid was narrated as an “investment in peace” in parallel with the security of State of Israel. In addition to above mentioned military sales, US defense department has allowed Israel to take part in joint ventures in order to reach the technical capability for developing weapon systems. Israel has been given the concession to directly deal with the US weapon manufacturers without the oversight of American Department of Defense. Merkava tanks, Lavi aircrafts, Arrow I and Arrow II anti-missile systems are some of these joint programs developed over the years. Furthermore, the US has provided financial aid to Israel to compensate its losses after IDF operations in and/or out of Palestine territories.⁴⁹⁴ As a consequence of this pro-Israeli weapons/arms flow into Israel from the US, a very special relationship between the US and Israel has developed and thus made Israel to reach the capability of a worldwide arms supplier. On arms superiority, Israel has risen to an overarching position in front of Arab states, and no matter to mention its military supremacy to Palestinian entities; Al Fatah and HAMAS.

⁴⁹¹ The details of the US aid to Israel is given at U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" " (USAID).

⁴⁹² Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," in *CRS Report for Congress*, ed. Defense Foreign Affairs, and Trade Division Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2008.

⁴⁹³ Jeremy M. Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," in *CRS Report for Congress*, ed. Defense Foreign Affairs, and Trade Division (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, 2008). p. 2

⁴⁹⁴ Under this financial support; Israel received \$ 650 million for Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and \$ 700 million for US military equipment withdrawn from Europe, \$ 1.2 billion for the implementation of Wye agreement in 1998, \$ 1 billion after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, \$ 400 million military supplies after the war with Lebanon in 2006. For details see; CRS Report for Congress (2008), “US foreign Aid to Israel” by Jeremy M. Sharp. Vailable at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs> access date 6 December 2015

The second leg of the US aid to Israel was the economic aid which commenced with following the foundation of Israel during Truman term in 1949. Until 1974 the US economic assistance to Israel summed up to \$ 1.3 billion. Half of this assistance was food aid. During the term of 1975-1984 annual economic assistance reached \$750 million. Between 1985-1986, this economic flow peaked to around \$4 billion in order to control high inflation rate in Israel and decreased back to \$ 1.2 billion per year between 1987 and 1998.⁴⁹⁵ Israel has also received appropriate loans to finance new settlements on occupied territories, and to absorb Jewish immigrants from old Soviet Union Republics. This amount has been realized to over \$ 1.5 billion per year, despite some cuts by Clinton administration originated from the protests on unlawful settlement constructions by Israel.⁴⁹⁶ Beyond this financial support, Israel has enjoyed additional economic values and aids.⁴⁹⁷ It is estimated that the total funds Israel received between 1949 and 2008 is equivalent to \$176 billion.⁴⁹⁸ For a clear picture to comprehend the level of US military and economic support to Israel let me say that US military aid to Israel forms 20% of defense budget and total annual US support is equal to 3% of Israel's GDP. This means that each Israeli citizen received \$600 per year from the Government of the United States.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is described as an enduring problem between two peoples who claim the same land as their homeland since the end of First World War. In such a conflict, each side has approached to the other as a threat to own identity and existence and made systematic efforts to deny the opposite side's rights

⁴⁹⁵ For more information see; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook".

⁴⁹⁶ Sharp, J.M (2008) "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," in *CRS Report for Congress*, ed. Defense Foreign Affairs and Trade Division Washington D.C. Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, p.11

⁴⁹⁷ In addition to extra budgetary, one-shot grants, and waivers for the offset loans, Israel also gets assistance for each year from the funds of State Department's Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), from American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA), and from US-Israel mutual cooperation funds on several areas such as the education, science, business, agriculture etc. For details see Mark, R.C, (2005) "Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance," in *Issue Brief for Congress*, ed. Defense Foreign Affairs, and Trade Division (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service: Library of Congress, summary.

⁴⁹⁸ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, (1945 -2006), "The Greenbook" ".; Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel." 2008

to exist.⁴⁹⁹ The half century between Balfour Declaration (1917) and 6 Days War (1967) is the era that shaped both peoples, the Israelis and Palestinians, under unequal conditions. In this term, under strong lobbying activities and pro-Jewish mass media, a public opinion unity between American and Jewish peoples was established. Furthermore, the majority of the US presidents, either for electoral worries or their educational upbringings followed a pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli track since the US left isolationism policy at the beginning of First World War. This was a strong commitment to Jewish cause amongst the US Presidents. During the years between 1948 and 1967, the Palestine issue was a matter between the Arabs and Israel, but the 6 days war which put four pieces of land under Israel control (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula) changed this political atmosphere. Following the 1967 Arab-Israel war, this relationship was fed with offensive arms sales and several memorandum of understandings that consolidated the US military, economic and political support for the state of Israel. The goal of this strategic shift in the US military aid was to strengthen Israel against Arab attacks, and raised Israel to a dominant position in front of its Arab neighbors.⁵⁰⁰ Following the Israeli military victory in 1967 (and also the Arab defeat in 1973), the neighboring states to Israel left the military stage one by one.

This was the turning point in Israeli-Palestine conflict which pushed the Palestinians to the front stage under the leadership of Yasser Arafat following the peace between Israel and Egypt in 1979. Since this date onward a continuous confrontation between Israel and Palestinian society occupied the center of the conflict, resulting in two intifadahs (1987 and 2000), drawing the attention of global community to the problem of Palestinian refugees and giving birth to another actor in Palestine; HAMAS, a violent non-state actor.⁵⁰¹ In time, the Palestine conflict left the international stage from being a regional Jewish-Palestinian conflict into an inter-

⁴⁹⁹ Kelman H.C. (2007), *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes*, American Psychological Association, Vol.62, No.4, pp.288-289

⁵⁰⁰ Lewis, S. (1988) "The United States and Israel: Constancy and Change" *Ten Years after Camp David* ed. William B. Quandt, Washington, D.C, Brookings Institution, p. 235.

⁵⁰¹ Kelman H.C. (2007), *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes*, American Psychological Association, Vol.62, No.4, p.290

state rivalry between Israel and Arab States, giving room to VNSAs in the region to play their roles. Thus, HAMAS has been born upon the conditions originating from the injustice and irrational implementations of great western powers against Palestine cause. HAMAS since its inception to Palestine conflict has been observed and treated through Cold War years' state/non-state actor goggles. And despite its transforming into a political/governing entity, it has not been treated and recognized in justice by the western powers.

On the other hand, the reason for the seamless US support to Israel during the Cold War was justified by huge Soviet threat to the Middle East, but the demise of Soviet Union was not sufficient enough to support this perception.⁵⁰² Following the fall of Soviets, new threat was coined as the threat of "radical and nationalist" Arab states and Violent Non-State Actors towards the security and existence of the State of Israel as well as the US assets and properties in the Gulf region. But, actually, after the Cold War, the Arab states could not prove a solid unity against Israel, and in 1991 Gulf war they were obliged to take part in the same coalition with Israel against Saddam Hussein's Scud Missile attacks. The rise of HAMAS in Palestine conflict coincides with the rise of international terrorism and American reaction to it after September 11 attacks. Under these new security requirements, the renewed form of the US support to Israel made a shift from the Soviet threat to a new threat; terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the 2000s.

In previous sections I have argued that the US has directed sharp criticism to HAMAS in the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks, along with other non-state actors in the Middle East region. Although in the term of President Obama (2008-2016) the US perception to the Palestine conflict has evolved, the US-Israeli relations have preserved its general outline. In this part I have contended that the US-Israel relations in its historical context have proved three outcomes which create a burden for American interests particularly on war against international terrorism. These three aspects are; (i) failures in Arab-Israeli peace process between the first and second Intifadahs, (ii) failures in the US-Arab states relations in post September 11 attacks

⁵⁰² Lenczowski, G. (1990) *American Presidents and the Middle East*, Durham, Duke University Press, p. 127.

(iii) and failures in preventing Israel from pursuing an uncompromising attitude such as building settlements in occupied territories despite international condemnations. In post-Oslo term, and particularly in post-September 11 term, under the legitimacy of “war on terror” campaign, Israel as a state actor and HAMAS as a violent non-state actor behaved like two hardliners.⁵⁰³ From this tension Iran benefited the most. Iran feared that a permanent peace in the region would undermine its regional influence. A possible peace that brings down the tension would open new windows at economic and political spheres and undermine Iran’s strategies in the region.⁵⁰⁴

In Chapter 5, I will study the second leg of this dissertation; the US and Free Aceh Movement (GAM)/ Gerakan Aceh Merdeka relations.

⁵⁰³ For more information see; <http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policy-makers/2009/9/hb111-60.pdf> access date 3 February 2015.

⁵⁰⁴ Parsi, T (2007), *Treacherous Alliance; the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, pp.190-191

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF US-GAM RELATIONS

5.1 GAM, an Actor in the Southeast Asia

Indonesia's Aceh conflict has been one of the VNSA problems the US, in addition to EU and ASEAN, has been actively involved in the 2000s. The peace agreement which was signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005 between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)/Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and the Government of Indonesia ended one of the most bloody armed separatist conflicts in the Southeast Asia.⁵⁰⁵ This agreement was a historic success for paving the way to persuade an Islamist violent non-state actor, GAM to leave arms, to stop terrorist acts and to transform as a peaceful political movement in Indonesia's political spectrum.⁵⁰⁶

Aceh region, similar to Palestine, has had relations with colonial legacy throughout the historical developments. For around three hundred years, the economic system in Indonesia was a slave-plantation serving their Dutch masters. Along three centuries, the Dutch colonial power has not established any governmental, bureaucratic or educational system in the region. Aceh was an independent Muslim Sultanate when Dutch Colonial power started to invade the region at the beginning of 20th Century. In

⁵⁰⁵ Since its inception as a conflict in 1976, several peace building attempts have taken place to find a permanent solution to Aceh problem. The Helsinki peace deal in 2005 has granted "autonomy to Aceh" and assured special rights to the province. Helsinki agreement inherits such : (1) Establishment of ceasefire between parties, (2) Disarmament of 3,000 GAM fighters, (3) Amnesty and prison release to all GAM members, (4) Restricts government troop movements in Aceh, (5) Allows Aceh-based political parties to join elections, (6) Mandates 70 percent of the country's natural resources to stay in Aceh, (7) Establishes a human rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission in Aceh, (8) Allows Aceh to use its own regional flag, crest, and hymn, and (9) Gives Jakarta right to control the province's finances, defense, and foreign policy. For details see www.ffr.org/indonesia/indonesia-aceh-peace-agreement/p8789 access date 2 February 2016

⁵⁰⁶ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.1

early 1950s, when Indonesia met with independence, it was a disorganized and chaotic country.⁵⁰⁷ Along the Dutch reign over Indonesia, since the very beginning, Aceh Muslim Sultanate have fought against colonial powers and had strong commercial ties with Ottoman, Indian and Arab Muslims. Acehnese, due to the distinct character of their culture and religion and also for occupying a strategic location along the Malacca Strait trading routes, considered themselves different from other Javanese communities who form the majority of Indonesian society. They practice a more conservative form of Islam than other Muslims in Indonesia based on a form of sharia law adopted in 2003 in contrast to secular law in the rest of Indonesia.

Although Aceh region was rich with oil and other natural resources, it faced a high unemployment and inflation rate and suffered from bad economic conditions for decades after Indonesia won its independence in 1945. Aceh provides more than 25 percent of Indonesian oil and gas production. Despite its richness in natural sources, poverty has persisted for decades in the province.⁵⁰⁸ In addition to the special conditions coming from the history, the economic grievances, the discovery of rich natural resources in early 1970s and suppressive implementations of Indonesian governments in Aceh region since the independence of Indonesia from Dutch colonial administration have been the main reasons of Aceh conflict.⁵⁰⁹

GAM, since the beginning of its establishment in 1976, has tried to justify its claim that Acehnese national identity is based on distinct language, culture, history and geography coming from its distinct sovereign statehood extending to four centuries ago.⁵¹⁰ The GAM leaders have repeatedly used a rhetoric going back to centuries that the root causes of Aceh problem is to decolonize the people and the land. They claim that Dutch colonial power has illegally transferred the sovereignty of Aceh to

⁵⁰⁷ Wiarda, H.J. (2011), *American Foreign Policy in Regions of Conflict*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.97-98

⁵⁰⁸ Pan E. (2005), Indonesia: The Aceh Peace Agreement see details at: <http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/indonesia-Aceh-peace-agreement/p8789> access date 16 January 2014

⁵⁰⁹ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.4

⁵¹⁰ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.3

the state of Indonesia in the wake of Second World War.⁵¹¹ This claim has failed to be transferred into a clear negotiating table due to the fact that UN has not recognized Aceh as a region to be decolonized. The decolonization issue has been identified for 16 non-self-governing territories by the 24th Committee of UN General Assembly where Aceh is not listed, in 1961.⁵¹² Another negative result of this ignorance at the UN level is its impact upon the disappointment of local Acehese community towards the government of Indonesia. This has resulted in two shortcomings; first it has widened the gap between the negotiating parties at local, regional and international levels on Aceh conflict and second it has created unrest and non-confidence between the local Acehese and other Indonesian communities.

In following sections of this Chapter, GAM as a VNSA, will be studied under three circles; (i) VNSA-internal structure level, (ii) VNSA-parent/opponent state (Indonesia) level, (iii) VNSA-international actors/community (the US) level. In the first circle, I will explain the internal functions and structure of GAM. These functions are; GAM charter as a political document, its capacity as a social movement and its relations with local Acehese community, its political, societal and military capabilities. As the second circle, I study GAM relations with the parent state; Indonesia and their interactions and the efforts spent by GAM to transform into a peaceful political entity within Indonesia political spectrum. This is vital because, in case the non-state actor and the parent state do not share a good will and common understanding upon peace, stability, justice, human rights and democracy, they will not find a compromise. Third, I focus on the relations of GAM with the US and other international actors under the light of capability to adopt themselves to the international conditions and the process of change in post 9/11 term.

After studying GAM-US relations at three circles, similar to the 3rd Chapter of this thesis where I studied the US-Israel relations, I will investigate the US-Indonesia

⁵¹¹ Percaya, D. (2001) Resolving Aceh Issue Needs Realistic Stance, see details at; <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/08/15/resolving-Aceh-issue-needs-realistic-stance.html> access date 16 January 2014

⁵¹² UN 16 decolonization regions, see the details at <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselgovterritories.shtml> access date 16 January 2014

relations, and figure out how these relations affected GAM on the way to the peace agreement. So far, at many local, regional and international levels, GAM has been contended and studied, but the impact of the US-Indonesia relations upon an Islamist violent non-state actor (GAM), has not be broadly investigated. This will be the fourth circle in this Chapter and cover my contribution to the literature. Because the US-Indonesia relations have inserted its direct effects upon Aceh conflict and these relations also have shaped the political, economic, military and governmental echelons of GAM as well as the degree of a quarter-century-violence between Indonesia and GAM.

5.1.1 First Level: GAM and its Internal Structure

5.1.1.1 GAM Charter; a Comprehensive Manifesto or an Obstacle for Peace

GAM charter has been written by Hassan di Tiro, the leader of Aceh movement on December 4, 1976. This charter is a short manifest in terms of its wording, its aims, and the historical and political justifications it rests upon. It has no link or reference to any religious text. GAM, in parallel with the removal of President Suharto and his New Order regime in late 1990s and after taking the winds of Political Islam behind its social welfare activities in Aceh region, has refreshed its links with Islam religion. But GAM has not added any Islamic wording into its Charter during the rise of Political Islam in post-Cold War years. This is a softer manifest in the form of a three-pages-plain letter and throughout Aceh peace process GAM Charter has created no problem. Simply because, it declares no state or community as an “enemy to destroy”, rather it begins with a soft and peaceful sentence not complaining or targeting any state or community but peacefully addressing “To the Peoples of the World”. Therefore, it has not been a matter of discussion amongst the parties of peace talks and with this significant feature the GAM charter has not constituted any obstacle on the way towards the Helsinki Peace Agreement concluded in 2005. GAM charter also accepts the idea of living together with the State of Indonesia and other neighboring communities within a geographic unity.

The Charter can be examined under four headlines; (i)the impact of Dutch colonial implementations upon Aceh land in a historical explanation, (ii)the cooperation between the Dutch colonials and Indonesian state and their control upon Aceh land in post-Second World War term, (iii)the differences between the Indonesian Javanese and Sumatran Acehnese communities on religious, cultural, historical aspects and finally, (iv)the justification of their rights to become independent on their home land and their future contribution to the global peace.⁵¹³

The Charter first explains that the “impact of Dutch colonial implementations upon Aceh land” constitutes the historical justification of the independence movement. It declares that Aceh, Sumatra, had always been a free and independent sovereign State since the world begun, and complains about the unfair and wrongful invasion of Aceh region by an alien power, the Dutch Empire, in cooperation with Javanese mercenaries on the day of 26 March 1873. The Charter describes this colonial invasion through the lenses of international newspapers such as The London Times of April 1873, The New York Times of May 1873 and Harper’s Magazine of December 1873 referring to daily issues of these newspapers. For example, The London Times wrote on April 22, 1873:

"A remarkable incident in modern colonial history is reported from East Indian Archipelago. A considerable force of Europeans has been defeated and held in check by the army of native state...the State of Aceh. The Acehnese have gained a decisive victory. Their enemy is not only defeated, but compelled to withdraw."

The Charter quotes that “...this event had attracted powerful world-wide attention “and the United States has declared “impartial Neutrality” in this war between Holland and Aceh. The second invasion of Aceh by Dutch Empire towards the end of 1873 has been called as one of the “bloodiest, and longest colonial war in human history” by Harper’s Magazine during which half of Acehnese people have lost their lives. This invasion has continued until the beginning of Second World War.

Secondly, the Charter complains about the injustice cooperation between the Dutch colonials and Indonesian state in post-Second World War term, when Indonesia

⁵¹³ See GAM Charter available at ; <http://Achehnet.tripod.com/declare.htm>, access date: 14 April 2014

became an independent state and how Aceh, Sumatra was gifted to Javanese, the ex-mercenaries. This was the transfer of Aceh land to another form of colonial state, Javanese colonial empire, and the charter asserted that, colonialism was not acceptable no matter what sort it was; white European Dutch or brown Asian Javanese. This was an illegal transfer of Acehnese fatherland by old Dutch Colonialists to Indonesia, the artificial state of new Javanese colonialists. The Chapter argues that, in last 30 years (between 1945-1975) Aceh fatherland has been exploited by the Javanese neo-colonialists, who have stolen their properties, robbed their livelihood, abused the education, exiled their leaders and pushed Acehnese people into tyranny and poverty. GAM Charter states; The Dutch colonialism was not right, so the Javanese colonialism cannot be right and the fundamental international law principle dictates; “Ex injuria jus non oritur./Right cannot originate from wrong!”

Thirdly, GAM Charter identifies the differences between the Indonesian Javanese and Sumatran Acehnese communities on religious, cultural, historical aspects. In this respect, it argues that Indonesia as a term is a new label coined in a foreign nomenclature and therefore this new state identity has nothing to do with the history, language, culture and interests of Acehnese people. Because "Indonesia" is a fraud to cover up new form of colonialism and in history no people, no nation, no state existed in the Malay Archipelago under this name.

And finally, GAM Charter precisely states the will of Acehnese people to become the owner of own freedom and independence and announces the justification of their rights to rule their home land and their future contribution to the global peace saying; “Our cause is just! Our land is endowed by the Almighty with plenty and bounty. We covet no foreign territory. We intend to be a worthy contributor to human welfare the world over. We extend the hands of friendship to all peoples and to all governments from the four corners of the earth.”

It is possible to argue that GAM charter proves similarities on its spirit and terms to that of PLO charter of 1968, rather than HAMAS charter of 1988. The principle reason behind this contradiction is that GAM and PLO charters are the products of

secular Cold War paradigm. As well known, after the collapse of Soviets and the demise of bipolar world system, Political Islam has become the primary ideology fueling separatist/nationalist movements across the Muslim geographies. We see that both Palestinian and Aceh movements have been affected by Islamic rhetoric in a multi-functional way, outlining their communal identities, reorganizing their social movement capabilities, connecting the minds and hearts of the militants fighting on the streets and reliving the masses of people suffering under the suppression of the opponent state and unfavorable economic conditions. In 1960s and 1970s the political Islam and its forerunners such as Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad, Jamaat-ul Islam were not that strong to influence the leaders of separatist/independence movements across the world. Although Muslim religion is a spiritual power behind the identity of both Palestinian and Acehnese communities, the leaders of both movements have chosen a secular and national rhetoric for their ideals under the conditions of the 1970s.

5.1.1.2 Political Power of GAM

The political power of GAM is embedded in its capability to adopt itself to changing regional and international political conditions and to benefit from the opportunities. GAM has spent efforts to exploit the ups and downs in the US-Indonesia relations in early 2000s and benefited from the geostrategic position of Aceh territory and Malacca strait. During Suharto regime until late 1990s, GAM has stayed in a defensive posture and tried to protect its weak military and economic infrastructure against the Indonesian state structure, particularly against the security operations of Indonesian Army. In this timeframe until the 2000s, GAM has been subject to several military operations and lost its fighting men power and its fragile social and economic network behind its militants.⁵¹⁴ As detailed in following lines GAM has never stopped using terrorist acts to empower itself on political issues in a way urging Indonesian government that GAM cannot be beaten by military means but weaken Indonesia's fragile economy and social structure. This was a message also to

the US and international community that western interests in the region are embedded in a permanent peace for Aceh conflict.

With the end of Suharto regime in 1998, the rise of “political will” at Indonesian political circles to solve Aceh conflict and the rise of Islamist terror in Southeast Asian countries GAM has found suitable political conditions. GAM leaders were aware that international awareness on Aceh conflict was vital to pressure Indonesia for a solution. They have used any opportunity at US and UN platforms to raise their voice and effect American and UN administrations as well as the international community. The independence of East Timor in 1999 for example, has inspired GAM and Acehnese community to reach their independence aim. GAM has tried to transfer the international sympathy for East Timor into the Aceh conflict.⁵¹⁵

In terms of its political power, GAM depended on local Acehnese civilian population and the homeland terrain for guerilla warfare. This was the only way for GAM to counterbalance their lack of military capability in arms and personnel number in front of Indonesian military forces and strengthen its hand on political issues. GAM’s political strategy was dual; first to control the Acehnese population in Aceh borders and thus to paralyze the Indonesian governmental structure, and second to benefit from regional and international political developments and conditions. In this sense GAM has concentrated its attacks and supporting efforts on following five areas for political and military achievements; (i)the political structures of Indonesian government in Aceh, (ii)the state education system in Aceh, (iii)the international economic institutions in Aceh, (iv)the Javanese trans-immigrants living in Aceh and (v)Indonesian government’s security forces across the country.⁵¹⁶

The aim of GAM over the political structures of Indonesian government in Aceh was to paralyze Indonesian civil service by intimidating civil servants and

⁵¹⁵ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.41

⁵¹⁶ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington pp.34-35

replace them by local Acehnese people. By 2003, as one of the operational GAM commanders explains, around 70% of local Acehnese did not use Indonesian civil service offices for land purchase, religious affairs and marriage procedures. In year 2002, GAM minister of state Malik Mahmood declared that almost 80 per cent of Indonesian governmental administration has been taken over by GAM.⁵¹⁷

As for the state education system, it has also been systematically targeted by GAM by burning schools and killing or intimidating the teachers. GAM leaders declared that Indonesian education system were transforming the Acehnese people into Indonesians by destroying their own identity. That is why GAM attacked the educational curriculum which was teaching the children that Aceh was an integral part of Indonesian state since centuries. According to Jakarta Post news dated September 13, 2002, between 1998 and 2002 more than 60 teachers were killed and 200 were assaulted. The number of educational facilities and schools destroyed within this time period is over 600. Although there is a general acceptance that not only GAM but Indonesian security forces also burned such facilities to punish Acehnese population for their support to the separatist movement, GAM holds the largest portion of the responsibility for these terrorist acts. GAM has aimed to replace the state education system which was an important leg of their strategic targets and thus burning down the schools has resulted in the move of children to boarding Islamic schools under GAM control.⁵¹⁸

In addition to attacking the political and educational system of Indonesia, GAM targeted also the economic facilities from where State of Indonesia and its security forces benefited. Mobil and Bechtel oil workers in Lhokseumawe industrial complex have been targeted directly since 1982. Hasan di Tiro has blamed these companies for collaborating with “Javanese colonialist thieves”. GAM has systematically targeted gas and oil production facilities and pipelines which are run by international companies. Hijacking the international staff and laying landmines to blow their

⁵¹⁷ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.35

⁵¹⁸ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.36

vehicles up were the tactics GAM fighters used. GAM's attacks on international workers are based on two reasons; first they are seen as exploiting Aceh resources and second they collaborate with Indonesian military forces.⁵¹⁹

Another strategic target of GAM in Aceh conflict was the systematic attempt to cleanse other Javanese communities living in Aceh province. These people have been seen by GAM as colonial settlers and collaborators helping Indonesian security forces against Acehnese community. Some of the Javanese in Aceh have been living there for generations. They have migrated during the Dutch colonial period to work on coffee plantations. Some others have moved into Aceh region during Suharto regime in 1980s and 1990s as a part of Indonesia transmigration program. Although GAM refused the accusations on exerting terror upon civilians, international observer reports prove the opposite. Beginning in mid-1990s until 2002 GAM attacks has targeted Javanese settlers and trans-migrants. In year 1999 thousands of trans-migrants have fled from north Aceh as a consequence of GAM harassment, including terrorization and extortion and by 2002 this number has reached 50.000.⁵²⁰

The final strategic GAM target was Indonesian Security Forces. As many times stated by GAM leaders, the movement inherited no superiority in military capabilities in front of regular army and police forces. They had no chance to commit a frontal war to wipe off Indonesian security forces for a military victory, but to keep in a defensive posture by using guerilla tactics. Ambushing troops, launching hand grenades, ambushing military vehicles, kidnapping off-duty security personnel, cutting off the communication lines and similar tactics were used since the foundation of GAM in mid 1970s. GAM leaders were aware that there was no way to defeat Indonesian security forces by using their guerilla type militants and there was no way to be defeated by the security forces as long as they kept low profile, and effectively use the homeland terrain and the support of local Acehnese people. As

⁵¹⁹ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington pp.37-38

⁵²⁰ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington pp.39-40

an indicator of GAM tactics, the statements of an operational commander are worth to refer; "When they advance, we retreat; when they leave, we return. When they grow tired or weak or careless, we attack." Another guerrilla fighter says: "We don't have to win the war, we only have to stop them from winning."⁵²¹ What the GAM militants wanted was to enforce Indonesian government to spend huge efforts and spend finance on Aceh conflict so that Indonesian society would question the state politics on Aceh conflict.⁵²²

The political power of any Violent Non-State Actor is based on the degree and dimensions of the unrest and violence it causes across the territory it claims right of independence upon. The success of GAM in this respect has reached considerable levels, and provided the GAM leaders a degree of awareness at local, regional and international levels. GAM has built up a "political cause" by its systematic and seamless efforts against Indonesian state properties in Aceh region. By doing so, GAM has kept the local conscience active and pulled the attention of Indonesian society in a way expecting a peaceful solution to the problem. GAM's refusal of Indonesian state structure and violence on military and police targets as detailed above has been the power behind its political aim and provided GAM leaders with an overarching capacity.

5.1.1.3 Military Power of GAM

The military power of GAM will be examined under the headlines of strength, guns and strategy which are identical to any of VNSAs across the world. Similar to HAMAS, GAM's military power is also based on the figures not very precise in terms of guns and men power. Since its foundation date in 1976 a variety of estimates are used by different sources. This unclear situation on GAM's military power has been the part of a political game between GAM and Indonesian government. As GAM leaders insist on inflating the gun and men power of the

⁵²¹ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.34

⁵²² Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.41

organization, the Indonesian government has tended to keep the numbers at a low level, as if the movement was a fringe phenomenon.⁵²³

When GAM was founded in 1976 it had only 70 guerilla fighters. This number has grown radically in next decade and reached several hundred fighters. Although GAM leader Hasan di Tiro has claimed at several platforms that active guerilla number has reached over 30.000 and with thousands of reserves behind it including the women, the international observers estimate these figures around three to five thousands towards the end of Suharto regime in 1999. Around 700 of these fighters have received guerrilla and ideological training in Libya for a period of 7 months.⁵²⁴ The interesting point about GAM fighters' training in Libya is that they have underwent similar warfare training with PLO fighters on artillery, explosives and aviation.⁵²⁵ Libya training phase has not only provided guerilla warfare to GAM but also a motivation to recruit new fighters to reorganize the movement and to improve its strategy. This reorganization has resulted in creating responsible individuals and groups in charge of the education, the diplomacy and military operations for coming years in Aceh conflict.⁵²⁶

The arms and weapon capacity of GAM has increased gradually in years and reached a considerable number by the end of 2000. According to international observers, in year 2001 GAM possessed a number of maximum 1500 modern firearms, couple grenade launchers, and one or two light mortars.⁵²⁷ According to

⁵²³ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.30

⁵²⁴ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.31

⁵²⁵ Sayigh, Y. (1997), *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 485-486

⁵²⁶ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.32

⁵²⁷ International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001), *Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace*. Asia Report , Jakarta, p.7

Indonesian intelligence sources these numbers were spreading unevenly across Aceh territory in 2002 and 2003 as shown below.⁵²⁸

<u>District</u>	<u>August 2002</u>	<u>April 2003</u>
Acheh Besar	94	209
Pidie	266	420
North Acheh	706	889
East Acheh	410	346
West Acheh	182	113
South Acheh	76	74
Central Acheh	83	79
Southeast Acheh	5	4

These weapons are a mixture of home-made and standard fire arms. Homemade weapons are the bombs made of commercial explosives whereas the standard firearms are smuggled via arms dealers from Cambodia which provides illegal small arms in Southeast Asia. From the point of view of arms power, GAM fighters have limited capability in front of Indonesian military similar to that of HAMAS position in front of Israeli Defense Forces.

5.1.1.4 Societal Power of GAM

The root causes of Aceh conflict are embedded in political injustice, deprivation of people and economic imbalance. These causes were exploited by Acehnese community, particularly by the members of GAM seeking for independence from Indonesia. This demand has been accompanied by force and terror which was responded by Indonesian governments with a counter force as well. This dual use of terror and force has deepened the sufferings of the Acehnese community dramatically. While the security apparatus of Indonesian government intensified its efforts to restore security and order to defend its territorial integrity, the GAM members also used arms and violence to defend its position and the interest of local

⁵²⁸ Schulze, K.E. (2004), *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies, East-West Center, Washington p.32

Achehnese people. The Achehnese people were caught in between two fires and a violent generation was raised amongst daily violence and killings by both sides carrying the conflict into coming years.

The societal power of GAM was embedded in its ability to increase the awareness of local Achehnese community to independence, to organize the society to support GAM cadres and to mobilize the Achehnese Diaspora abroad. As stated in GAM charter, GAM places its case to the claim that Aceh has always been a free and independent sovereign state historically, so that, the political control of Indonesian state over Aceh has been gifted by colonial Dutch empire and cannot be recognized by Achehnese people. GAM claims also that Achehnese people are different from other Javanese communities within the borders of Indonesia in terms of religion, culture, history and other societal values. A people under the name of Indonesians never existed in Southeast Asia with scientific terms of ethnology, philology, cultural anthropology, sociology, or similar. For details see GAM Charter.⁵²⁹

Muslim religion and its weight upon the Achehnese people has been the basic factor connecting GAM, its aims and the societal support of Achehnese people. In this respect, we see that both GAM and HAMAS prove an identical feature in terms of benefiting from religious sensitivity and to mobilize the support and awareness of the masses of people from bottom to the top. The ideals of Islam such as social equality and justice, help for the needy people, raise voice against tyranny and torture has inspired Achehnese people for their unconditional support to GAM leaders and militants on the streets. Similar to Palestinian conflict, Aceh movement has also a dual character; Islamist on one hand and ethnic Nationalist on the other. Both movements are using Islamism and ethnic nationalism in order to keep their case alive. In 1950s, Islamist Darul Islam rebellion broke out in Aceh. But this movement was not as strong as nationalist GAM of 1970s.⁵³⁰ GAM, with the rise of

⁵²⁹ See GAM Charter available at <http://acehnet.tripod.com/declare.htm> access date 13 April 2015

⁵³⁰ Aspinal, E. and Crouch, H. (2003), 'The Aceh Peace Process: Why it failed', Policy Studies-1, Washington, East -West Center, p.19 for details see; scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3503/PS001.pdf access date:12 May 2012

political Islam across Muslim geographies, created a resistance front with the combination of Islamism and nationalism.

GAM accepts Islam as an inseparable reflection of Acehese culture and identity. GAM, in contrast with the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia which was the dominant political movement for two decades between 1953-1973, did not aspire for an Islamic government across Indonesia, but benefited from Islam religion as a catalyzer for a robust Acehese national identity. In addition to this close interaction with Islam, the Acehese identity appeared to be a combination of historical pride linked to Acehese Sultanate and the armed struggle linked to Dutch Colonizers.⁵³¹ After two decades of armed struggle against Indonesian military and two defeats in 1989 and 1992 the leading cadres of GAM, in contrast to those of Darul Islam in 1950s, saw Islam as integral to Acehese culture and identity but not to politics.⁵³² This approach of GAM to Islam religion is similar to that of HAMAS which struggles to build a Palestinian identity linked to historical pride and the struggle against the practices of colonial powers in Palestine, despite its close ties with Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

Since the foundation of GAM in 1976 and the rise of Aceh problem, many NGOs such as Aceh Student Action Front for Reform (ASAFR), Student Solidarity for the Peoples (SSP), Coalition for Reform Action of Acehese Students (CRAAS), Human Rights Reform (HRF), and Central Information for Aceh Reform (CIAR) have played various roles in addressing the Aceh question. Although these civil society entities were weak, fragile and partly organized in front of Indonesian security forces, they did significant work to raise the awareness of the civil society.⁵³³

⁵³¹ Shaw, R. (Fall 2008), 'Aceh's Struggle for Independence: Considering the Role of Islam in a Separatist', *The Fletcher School online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization*-Al Nakhlah-, p. 1

⁵³² Shaw, R. (Fall 2008), 'Aceh's Struggle for Independence: Considering the Role of Islam in a Separatist', *The Fletcher School online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization*-Al Nakhlah-, p. 7

⁵³³ He, B. and Reid, A. (October 2004), 'Four Approaches to the Aceh Question', *Asian Ethnicity*, Volume 15, Number 3, pp. 279-98

As GAM receives its domestic power from the local community in Aceh, its external power comes from Acehnese Diaspora. Acehnese Diaspora has played critical role by proving high mobility, flexibility and adaptability for a permanent solution. Acehnese Diaspora has been composed of the individuals who left their homeland but never failed to exert a significant influence on Aceh from distance. In 2004 the conflict was at its peak in Indonesia and the number of Acehnese people living outside was 100.000.

The Acehnese Diaspora abroad has been created by three migration waves from Aceh particularly to Malaysia. The first migration wave is the result of Dutch-Acehnese war (1873-1913), the second wave took place during and in the aftermath of Second World War (1942-1949) and the third wave took place during the Darul Islam movement (1953-62).⁵³⁴ The Acehnese communities abroad, though small in number when compared to other diasporas such as Armenian, Jewish, Palestinian etc, have been successful to favor home-land politics and establish an advocacy for host-country support. They have kept the intra-community dynamics of Acehnese Diaspora always alive during decades, until the peace agreement. In this struggle, the Acehnese community abroad has produced a notion shared by all individuals based on resistance, homeland affection and ethnic nationalism.⁵³⁵

In order to receive Acehnese diaspora's financial, moral and political support, GAM opened offices in the US, Europe, Australia and Southeast Asia.⁵³⁶ In addition, the Acehnese community in Malaysia has provided shelter for the militants fleeing Aceh as well as the recruitment and financial backing.⁵³⁷ In this regard, it is

⁵³⁴ Missbach, A. (2012), *Separatist Conflict in Indonesia, the Long-distance Politics of Acehnese Diaspora*, New York, Routledge Publishing, p.30

⁵³⁵ Missbach, A. (2012), *Separatist Conflict in Indonesia, the Long-distance Politics of Acehnese Diaspora*, New York, Routledge Publishing, p.2

⁵³⁶ Missbach, A. (2012), *Separatist Conflict in Indonesia, the Long-distance Politics of Acehnese Diaspora*, New York, Routledge Publishing, p.4

⁵³⁷ Schulze, K. (2003), 'The Struggle for an Independent Aceh; The Ideology, Capacity and Strategy of GAM', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 26,4: pp.241-71

possible to argue that Acehnese Diaspora has proved successful activities composing of long distance politics such as charity giving, lobbying, awareness building, and shelter providing to the refugees. The Acehnese Diaspora has been loyal to their case for three decades, from mid 70s until the conclusion of peace process in 2005 and succeeded to prevent any possible rivalry or fragmentation amongst different echelons of Diaspora.⁵³⁸

5.1.2 Second Level: GAM and its Relations with Indonesia

5.1.2.1 GAM; Transforming from a Militant Group into a Political Entity

By mid-1998, the state-centric Suharto regime has been replaced by a process of democratization, led by President Habib. This was the time when 1997 East Asia financial crises also hit Indonesia. Here, one point is crucial to mention; in the countries where there is a transition to democracy, separatist movements tend to rise. Efforts of freedom and democracy at every aspect of individual and social life across the county fuels the separatist movements for independence during the period of transition to democracy and this is exactly what happened in Indonesia. Although the leaders of GAM have formulated their armed struggle as “the only language Jakarta understood”, Aceh conflict has passed successfully through a transition phase over negotiation in more than two decades. This transformation has taken place particularly at the wake of Suharto’s totalitarian regime and is detailed under five headlines; the transformation of context, the transformation of structure, the transformation of actors, the transformation of issue, and the transformation of elites/personnel.⁵³⁹

The first insurgency action by GAM took place on 4 December 1976, led by Hasan Muhammad di Tiro while Suharto’s New Order regime, a central modernizing and

⁵³⁸ Missbach, A. (2012), *Separatist Conflict in Indonesia, the Long-distance Politics of Acehnese Diaspora*, New York, Routledge Publishing, p.6

⁵³⁹ Miall, H. (2004). *ConflictTransformation: A Multi-DimensionalTask*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. P.10

nation building project was in power in Indonesia. This was the commencement of a long-range struggle between a violent non-state actor (GAM) and a nationalist but non-democratic state apparatus, New Order project of Indonesia.⁵⁴⁰ While GAM targeted the aim of a “free and independent Aceh” as a violent non-state actor, Indonesia reacted to crush this movement with its state power and defend its national integrity. In this era, Indonesian government has launched several aggressive military campaigns against GAM until 1998, under the declaration of Military Operations Area.

It is a general finding that, authoritarian regimes are more successful than democratic regimes in containing separatist movements and they successfully use the state apparatus to crush such movements and protect the integrity of the country.⁵⁴¹ According to UN records, between 1974 and 1997, 57 per cent of newly born states have been established after their parent states tended towards democracy.⁵⁴² In Indonesia example, during the phase of transition to democracy, the state capacity has decreased which provided an advantage for GAM to increase its activities towards an independent state. It is another reality that authoritarian regimes construct and impose a nationalist ideology to legitimize their approach to separatist movements.⁵⁴³

5.1.2.2 Process of Change with GAM and its Relations with Indonesia

“...Indonesia took courageous steps to create a working democracy and respect for the rule of law. By tolerating ethnic minorities, respecting the rule of law, and accepting open markets, Indonesia may be able to employ the engine of opportunity that has helped lift some of its neighbors out of poverty and desperation. It is the initiative by Indonesia that allows U.S. assistance to make a difference.” American National Security Strategy Document-2002 p.10

⁵⁴⁰ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.5

⁵⁴¹ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.6

⁵⁴² Baogang, H. and Reid, A. (2004), ‘Special Issue Editors’ Introduction: Four Approaches to the Aceh Question’, *Asian Ethnicity*, vol.5 no.3. pp.293-300

The process of change with GAM is the essential factor that led to a permanent peace agreement. At the beginning of this chapter I have argued that certain conditions are required to realize the transformation of a VNSA into a peaceful political entity. It is vital that not only the VNSA but also the parent state and international role players/actors have responsibilities to broker a feasible solution. GAM, similar to other VNSA across the world has been in a process of change and adopted itself into changing conditions in military, societal, political aspects and updated its agenda and targets accordingly. In this process, the substantial political and economic changes in Indonesia, the political will in Indonesian political circles and the positive international approach has been helpful for the resolution of the conflict. One significant development in this process is the end of Indonesian President Suharto's New Order Regime in 1998 which was a cornerstone paving the way to 2005 peace agreement.

In Aceh conflict, all four presidents of Indonesia Habibie, Wahid, Sukamoputri and Yudhoyono have proved a concrete will to find a solution to the problem. This process has begun with President Habibie and his reformist implementations in Aceh and developed step by step by his successors, President Wahid, President Sukarnoputri and reached a peace agreement during the term of President Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono administration could not succeed a peace agreement without the initiatives of previous administrations, though these initiatives have been subject to many ups and downs and stayed at limited degrees. This affirmative and positive approach and also the political will of Indonesian governments are not visible in Israeli government's approach to Palestine conflict. The Indonesian Embassy political advisor in Ankara underlines the role of political good will at the interview on 12 April 2014.⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴⁴ To the question, "How was the role of Indonesian administration's democratic approach to GAM during the negotiations?" the political advisor of Indonesian Embassy replied; "The need to have peaceful solution on the conflict which has been raised by GAM was based on the willing from both side. In the beginning, the government of the Republic of Indonesia has always been in its single and only perspective; -there will be no part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia will turn to be an independent- as demanded by people who declare as leader of Aceh. Moreover, the Tsunami in 2004 has become a momentum to solve the problem in Aceh and with the role of Martti Ahtisaari, ex performed President of Finnish who became the mediator for both side, the negotiation was on the table at that time. Both side agreed that still many need to be done but the peaceful solution has

The political will was essential to resolve Aceh conflict and this was present also amongst regional and international circles. Starting in 1998 with the end of New Order regime, efforts for a solution at local, regional and international levels have intensified. GAM at local level, Indonesia at regional level and the US and UN representatives at international level have begun to build the peace process upon these three circles/pillars. For the success of the process innovative techniques were used to prevent any party to withdraw from the negotiations. The ground rule was that “anything could be discussed and negotiated, but nothing was agreed until everything was agreed”.⁵⁴⁵

We observe that, Indonesia, which was a structurally weak state in late 1990s, used democratization process in a positive and encouraging way and under the pressure of societal forces and international actors solved Aceh problem building a permanent peace process. Several factors have been effective to reach a peaceful solution in Aceh conflict. One of these factors is the acceptance of the reality that both parties recognized they could not defeat each other, either militarily or politically. Another factor was the genuine desire to reach a negotiated settlement.⁵⁴⁶ The political will of Indonesian decision makers has played paramount role in finding a solution to the conflict particularly after 1998.

There was a symbiotic interrelation between the weak state structure and political will of Indonesia. A rigid indicator of this political will can be linked with two crises. First one is the 1997 financial crisis and the second is 2004 natural disaster, the Tsunami which swept Aceh coasts. Neither after the 1997 financial crisis nor the 2004 Tsunami which devastated the state capacity of Indonesia, parties did withdraw from peace negotiations and protected their political will and used international

finally appeared. The driving force behind the peace was the democratization process in Indonesia in 1990s, and the political good will shared by the Government of Indonesia and GAM leaders.”

⁵⁴⁵ Shaw, R. (Fall 2008), ‘Aceh’s Struggle for Independence: Considering the Role of Islam in a Separatist’, *The Fletcher School online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization*-Al Nakhlah- p. 9

⁵⁴⁶ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.183

community's political, moral, material and financial assistance.⁵⁴⁷ This behavior proves that the political actors and decision makers of GAM and Indonesian Government have abstained from blaming each other and thus increase the tension.

Since its inception as a movement, the Islamic character of Aceh conflict has been emphasized by Indonesian government. This approach has also affected international media and caused a shallow analysis of Aceh movement. When the atrocities began in 1998, the articles across the world were focusing upon the Islamic character of the movement and defining GAM as Islamist separatists or Islamist separatist rebels.⁵⁴⁸ This description was not reflecting the grievances and objectives of GAM and was downgrading the position of the organization vis-à-vis the international actors in a way limited to international Islamist terror organizations.

The greatest obstacle faced by peace negotiators was to bridge the political gap between the demand for independence by GAM and the offer of special autonomy by Indonesian government. In case this political bridge could not be built and political differences reconciled, violence would occur across the region at any time. In case the talks ceased, it would encourage the hardliners of both side, similar to Oslo peace talks on Palestine conflict in 1993. In Aceh case, the weak state structure and the political will of Indonesia have encouraged and pressured to a degree for the peace. Actually, the state capacity of Indonesia has weakened dramatically by the authoritarian legacy of President Suharto's New Order regime in pre-1998 era and in addition by the 1997 economic crisis and the December 2004 tsunami disaster. The tsunami has also made a deep effect upon GAM leaders. Almost all of the casualties took place in Aceh province and the weak infrastructure of the region was swept away by this natural disaster causing huge human and material losses. As National Disaster Relief Coordination Agency announced, 150,000 people died, and an estimated 700,000 people were left homeless. The scale of the damage to Aceh

⁵⁴⁷ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.184

⁵⁴⁸ Shaw, R. (Fall 2008), 'Aceh's Struggle for Independence: Considering the Role of Islam in a Separatist', *The Fletcher School online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization*-Al Nakhlah-, p. 10

economy and infrastructure was unprecedented.⁵⁴⁹ These unfavorable economic, financial and social conditions have reduced the state capacity in Indonesia and particularly in Aceh province. But after the natural disaster nearly 500 international agencies came to Aceh region with humanitarian aid and finance. This formed an available atmosphere for the parties to use this chance for a permanent peace in Aceh.⁵⁵⁰

5.1.3 Third Level: GAM and its Relations with the US

“...The United States is a Pacific nation, with extensive interests throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region’s stability and prosperity depend on our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights. Forging new international initiatives and institutions can assist in the spread of freedom, prosperity, and regional security.” American National Security Strategy Document-2006 p.45

The US approach towards Aceh conflict cannot be separated from its concern on increasing radical Islam in Southeast Asia after September 2001. The rise of radical Islam and terrorist groups in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia and the penetration of Al Qaeda into the region by establishing local cells in these countries and by training the Southeastern Asian youth in its camps in Afghanistan have been the main drive for the US attention into the region. The response by the US to the threat was composed of a series of precautions pressing these countries to arrest terrorist individuals, to give financial and military support to these countries and establish a common regional political approach against terrorist acts.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁹ Masyrafah H. and McKeon J. (2008) Post-Tsunami aid Effectiveness in Aceh, Proliferation and Coordination in Reconstruction, Working Paper 6, Wolfensohn Center for Development, p.1 for details see https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_aceh_aid_masyrafah.pdf access date 15 January 2017

⁵⁵⁰ Miller, M.A. (2009), *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia*, New York, Routledge publishing, p.2

⁵⁵¹ In his book Chris Wilson (2008) has studied the roots of radical Islam and the rise of violence in Indonesia between the Muslims and Christians, focusing especially on North Maluku province and questioning the role of local, regional and international developments in last two decades of post-Cold War Era. In his book, he argues the subjects such as; the role of Suharto’s New Order regime upon local communities until 1998, the role of regional and international developments in South East Asia at the beginning of 2000s, the role of sudden transition from an authoritarian regime into a democratic political system in 1999, and the impact of radical Islamist movements on Southasian countries.

Indonesia and the Aceh region occupy a special place in the US initiatives since the rise of the US to global dominant power in the wake of Second World War. Noam Chomsky in the foreword to Andre Vltchek's book⁵⁵² argues that Indonesia of Suharto, together with Egypt of Nasser in 1960s onward, has occupied a vital place in the US global dominancy plans. The main function of Indonesia, with its abundant natural resources and raw material capabilities, was to provide resources and raw materials to western ex-colonial industries. The democratic posture and non-alignment policies of Indonesia, similar to Egypt and India of 1960s, were seen as a threat to American strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Thus, the military coup by General Suharto in 1965 was welcomed by American politicians. This was a fundamental change in Indonesia that would lead the country into an authoritarian regime for next 3 decades. This new regime was friendly to western and the US interests opening her vast natural resources for western investors.⁵⁵³ The dual American interests in the region were the exploitation of the natural resources of the Indonesian Archipelago and prevention of the region from communist influence. During Suharto regime between 500.000 and 3 million people are estimated to be subject to genocidal acts for their links to communist parties.⁵⁵⁴

With the end of Suharto regime in 1998 a new democratization project started in Indonesia. End of Suharto regime coincides with the rise of political Islam and ethnic conflicts across Indonesia. After September 11, 2001 the US have intensified its efforts in the region under two concerns; first the protection of American national interests and second containment of Islamist terrorism in this area. For these aims, the US has launched a Regional Maritime Security Initiative for Malacca Strait,

Wilson's book is interesting to realize the dimensions of religious violence in different regions of Indonesia, and how it effected the local communities who lived in peace for centuries. For more information see Wilson, Chris (2008), *Ethno-religious Violence in Indonesia, from Soil to God*, Routledge, New York, pp.7-14.

⁵⁵² Vltchek, A. (2012), *Indonesia Archipelago of Fear*, New York, Pluto Press, foreword p.xiii-xx

⁵⁵³ Vltchek, A. (2012), *Indonesia Archipelago of Fear*, New York, Pluto Press, foreword p.xiii-xx

⁵⁵⁴ Vltchek, A. (2012), *Indonesia Archipelago of Fear*, New York, Pluto Press, foreword p.2

established military relations and activated a financial aid program.⁵⁵⁵ In parallel with the efforts to find a permanent solution to Aceh conflict in 2004 and 2005 we see positive developments in American Indonesia relations particularly on American military support such as; International Military Education and Training (IMET), non-lethal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Indonesia and removal of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) restrictions to Indonesia.⁵⁵⁶

Although, Southeast Asian countries have showed a positive reaction to political, military and economic American initiatives in the region to combat radical terrorism, for domestic political considerations originating from their Islamic and secular nationalist groups they have reacted carefully. The pro-Israeli American stance in Israeli-Palestinian conflict has created a reaction amongst Islamic and secular circles in these countries, particularly in Indonesia. The reactions of these groups focus primarily on the politics of the US as the leader of globalization, on the repressive politics of regional secular governments, and on the Israeli politics in Gaza and West Bank in last decade.⁵⁵⁷

Malacca strait is the busiest sea rout in the world and Aceh holds the key of this gate. This gate is vital for the economic and strategic interests of China, Japan, South Korea and other countries of Southeast Asia region. Annually 50,000 vessels carry a sum of 15 billion barrels of oil and gas to these countries passing through Malacca strait.⁵⁵⁸ This route connects the Middle East and Southeast Asia and its high geostrategic value attracts the attention of regional and super powers including the US. For the US, this region is a vital base for the realization of its strategic interests and control the Chinese influence in the Southeast Asia. In this respect, the US has

⁵⁵⁵ Vaughn, B. (October 2009), 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia, CRS Report for Congress', summary, for details see; <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf> access date 10 January 2015

⁵⁵⁶ Vaughn, B. (October 2009), 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia, CRS Report for Congress', p.16, for details see; <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf> access date 10 January 2015

⁵⁵⁷ Vaughn, B. (October 2009), 'Terrorism in Southeast Asia, CRS Report for Congress', p.1, for details see; <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf> access date 10 January 2015

played an active role in resolving Aceh conflict in order to prevent the emergence of a new and weak independent state and interference of other states into the region.

Several parties have taken place in Aceh Peace Process. In addition to the Government of Indonesia and Aceh Free Movement, the EU, the ASEAN and the US have assumed active roles to end the conflict and establish a permanent peace. The US policy towards Aceh conflict has been dominated by its national interests in Pacific region (i.e. the Exxon-Mobil Corporation in Aceh region) and its approach to War on Terror.⁵⁵⁹ In this respect, the US policy has developed under the impact of September 11 attacks seeking for the cooperation of Indonesia Government against global terrorism. The US, as the home of Exxon Mobil, Japan and South Korea as the major gas importers from Aceh region have been alarmed by the clashes between GAM guerillas and the Indonesian troops.⁵⁶⁰

One of the paramount concerns shaping the post-9/11 American foreign policy is security. This well-known factor, has turned into the motto of “security first” in American-Southeast Asia relations. Under the light of this primary concern, American decision makers have aimed to maintain or help the local governments of Southeast Asia to assure regional security when dealing with local unrests. America’s “security-first” approach of Cold War was in line with President Sukarno’s (1950-67) Unitary Model and President Suharto’s (1967-98) New Order Regime where security was the operating paradigm of a secular and unitary nationalist model.⁵⁶¹ Indonesia has been treated the same in its Aceh conflict. The US Army has provided support to Indonesian military in material and training in addition to the political support given by American administrations.

⁵⁵⁹ Congressional Research Center Report, September 25, 2002.

⁵⁶⁰ The negative impact of military operations in Aceh was best seen on Exxon Mobil’s oil and gas production drop. The Indonesian Government has blamed GAM for the problem but it was aiming to get political and military support from the US and thus crush GAM resistance. But, 2001 military operations in Aceh did nothing but increase the nervousness of foreign investors. It was evident that the US and regional powers needed peace in the region as a consequence of their national interests.

⁵⁶¹ Kuok, L. (May 2008), ‘Security First, the Lodestar for U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia’, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Volume 51, Number 9, p.1406

This situation has clearly created nonconformity with post-Suharto regime in Indonesia which has adopted the “democracy-first” policy in late 1990s.⁵⁶² The Indonesian government has left Suharto’s authoritarian policy and adapted a democratic understanding in all aspects of domestic politics. As a natural consequence of this substantial shift, the strongest arm of the Indonesian state mechanism, the Army has suffered from material, financial and moral deficiency which was a brilliant opportunity for GAM to reorganize itself. Although Indonesian government has quit its long-lasting “security first” approach in Aceh conflict, the US did not. The “security-first” understanding of the US foreign policy did not give any concession from its principles. The US administration expects that long term security measures in the region will promote economic developments and thus help the spread of democracy. The US approach to Indonesia shall be examined with other two neighboring states in the region; Singapore and Malaysia. The strategic American vision in the region focuses upon the maritime security cooperation of Malacca strait in coordination with these three states.⁵⁶³

Although post-Suharto regime in Indonesia pursued a “democracy-first” approach, America’s war against terrorism, which was the number one priority in Bush administration’s security concerns, provided the Indonesian government an opportunity to name Aceh’s independence activists as terrorists. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations paid special care to support the US-Indonesia relations and promote anti-terrorism cooperation. Additionally, the US supported the initiatives by the United Nations, international humanitarian organizations, and human rights organizations to take active roles in Aceh. The aim of the US was to influence the peace talk negotiations and these actors have played significant roles in terms of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/resocialization of GAM armed groups in Aceh during and after the peace process. Doing this, the US administration was well aware that too much interference with Indonesian domestic affairs including theological issues would backfire and create a reaction amongst religious circles as

⁵⁶² Kuok, L. (May 2008), ‘Security First, the Lodestar for U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia’, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Volume 51, Number 9, p.1421

⁵⁶³ Kuok, L. (May 2008), ‘Security First, the Lodestar for U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia’, *American Behavioral Scientist*, Volume 51, Number 9, pp.1428-29

well as secular nationalists.⁵⁶⁴ American policies and security implementations in the Middle East after 9/11 has undermined American ideal and democracy understanding in Southeast Asia's Muslim countries.

The US diplomatic initiatives in the peace process have played paramount role for success. One of these diplomatic initiatives is the visit of Assistant Secretary of State, Matt Daley to Hasan di Tiro, the leader of Aceh, who was in exile in Sweden in 2002. At his visit Matt Daley used the power of efficient American diplomacy in order to urge di Tiro to quit the idea of independence and accept special autonomy.⁵⁶⁵ The US administration also tasked a retired Marine General (Anthony Zinni) as a mediator to prevent Indonesian Army from human rights abuses and impose a state of emergency in Aceh which would seriously harm the positive conditions between the parties before peace talks.⁵⁶⁶ Under these conditions, the US administration faced three challenges. First was to persuade GAM to limit itself with special autonomy. Second was to influence Indonesian government in order to implement the special autonomy law in good faith. This was crucial, because the Indonesian government has several times broken its promises of autonomy to Aceh. And the third was to influence Indonesian military and prevent any sort of human rights crisis in Aceh, such as civilian massacres.⁵⁶⁷

5.1.4 Fourth Level: Indonesia and its Relations with the US

In this Chapter, I have so far focused on the relations between GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), Indonesia and the United States under domestic, regional and international circles. In this part of my thesis I will focus on a fourth circle; Indonesia-US relations which has played a strong role in finding a peaceful solution to the Aceh Conflict. It

⁵⁶⁴ Kuok, L. (May 2008), 'Security First, the Lodestar for U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia', *American Behavioral Scientist*, Volume 51, Number 9, p.1433

⁵⁶⁵ Perlez, A. (2002), Long War Slices Deep in Indonesia, *New York Times*, June 17, A3.

⁵⁶⁶ Muklis, A and Yates, D. (2002), Indonesia Backs Away from Immediate Aceh Crackdown. Reuters News Agency, August 19,

⁵⁶⁷ Hiebert, M. and McBeth, J. (August 2002) 'Calculating Human Rights' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 15, 2002. p. 19.

is clear that the successful transition of GAM into a peaceful entity, was directly influenced by the relations between the US and Indonesia.

The relations between the US and Indonesia have been established during Cold War. The US approach to Indonesia during Cold War was shaped with the strategy of containing communist threat in Southeast Asia territory. This strategy has been the overarching principle for the US politics upon Indonesia during first two Presidents; Sukarno (1945-67) and Suharto (1967-1998). This era lasted almost half a Century from the date of independence extending from the Dutch colonial rule (1945) until the end of Suharto regime (1998). The economic, societal, institutional heritage left from the Colonial rule did not match the requirements of a modern democratic state and from the date of independence until the end of Suharto term in 1998 the primary target for Indonesia was to build a nation-state.

President Sukarno as the founding father of the country has coined some principles in non-align movement in order to build a nation-state. These principles were; structuring a free Indonesia under a secular regime, democracy, internationalism, social prosperity, and national unity. The New Order Regime of President Suharto, on the other hand, has turned the country into a kind of totalitarian regime. America's "security-first" approach in Cold War was in line with Presidents Sukarno's (1950-67) Unitary Model and President Suharto's (1967-98) New Order Regime. Stability need in the region has prevented the US to force Suharto for democratic reforms and human rights. In this section of my thesis, I will cover the US-Indonesia relations under two headlines; (i) the US-Indonesia relations in post-Suharto Term until Aceh peace negotiations, (ii) the US-Indonesia relations after Aceh peace negotiations and following the peace.

5.1.4.1 The US-Indonesia Relations in Post-Suharto Term

Indonesia's past 25 years in post-Suharto term have been shaken hard by the separatist violence and sectarian movements across the country. Aceh conflict was one of these separatist movements which has been successfully managed and solved in 2005. It should be noted that, the line that divides the radical and moderate

Muslims in Indonesia has been drawn by the founding principles of Indonesia as a secular nation-state. Although there is a radical upsurge of Islam in Indonesia, the majority of Indonesian people support secular and moderate political parties in post-Cold War era. In this process, the most effective factor was the democratic approach of post-Suharto Indonesia administration to Aceh conflict and the development of relations between the US and Indonesia and the mutual interests of both states in Southeast Asia region.

After the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, a series of leaders came to power in Indonesia through democratic elections.⁵⁶⁸ In this new era, a secular democracy with a strong civil society has developed. Although September 11 attacks on United States triggered another “security” need abroad, the Cold War’s “security first” approach of the US turned into “democracy first” motto for Indonesia. With the rise of democracy inside the country, Indonesia has managed to passivize one of its domestic headaches, the Aceh conflict with a peaceful solution, which was believed to be the most serious challenge to the territorial integrity of Indonesia.⁵⁶⁹ The Aceh conflict is not the sole problem that Indonesia faced, but it is one of several security and stability problems that Indonesia is facing since it has become a sovereign state after the Second World War.

The US-Indonesia relations in post-Suharto term has been shaped by 3 factors; (i)US economic concerns in parallel with rising share of Southeast Asia in global economy, (ii)US security concerns and influence of Islamist terror groups in Southeast Asia, (iii)rise of democratic incentives in Indonesia and the political will to solve Aceh separatist movement.

⁵⁶⁸ Following Suharto, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1988-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014), Joko Widodo (2014-) have been elected as the Presidents of Indonesia. President Yudhoyono, in his 10 years term, has played an active role in solution of Aceh conflict and improvement of US-Indonesia relations.

⁵⁶⁹ For more detail on Aceh conflict see RAND report Chapter 10 available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2002/MR1599.pdf access date 12 February 2015.

Economic and Security Concerns

Indonesia is composed of over 14.000 islands and occupies a strategic location in Southeast Asia. Since it has become an independent state in 1949, it has attracted the attention of the United States with its abundant raw material capacity as well as its strategic location controlling the sea lines. During Cold War year, energy companies such as Exxon-Mobil have represented the economic interests of the US in Indonesia. In Post-Suharto term Indonesia was facing several major economic and political problems such as; transition from an authoritarian rule to democracy, inadequate job offer, small economic growth, corruption, weak judiciary system and similar. The US administrations were aware that an underdeveloped and economically weak Indonesia could not sustain stability, and promote democratic developments in the region.

But, there were some promising developments in socio-economic domain. Successful national free elections and presidential elections since 1999 have encouraged the emergence of a civil society supported by a considerably free media. More than 5.000 NGOs were operating across the country for supporting government initiatives. This was a proper time for the US to take courageous steps to support Indonesia in its transition to democracy and to free market economy so that Indonesia would reduce its vulnerabilities to religious radicalism and control the domestic terrorist groups as well as separatist movements. The success of Indonesia would also help the US to promote democracy and human rights in Muslim World, although this was a long-term target to decay the ideology of radical Islamist movements.⁵⁷⁰

In post-Suharto term, the US has spent special efforts to develop a mutual economic agenda supporting Indonesia in the region and integrate it to global economy. For this aim the US has ensured annually around 200 million dollars as economic contribution. A unified, economically prosperous and militarily strong Indonesia was essential for US global interests, particularly to prevent any other regional power to

⁵⁷⁰ For details see Report of the National Commission on US-Indonesian Relations (2003) p.10 available at <http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/USICR.pdf> access date 15 February 2015

interfere with any regional conflict such as Aceh, and to contain any global Islamist terror organization to take roots in the region. In this respect, Indonesia has been welcomed to become the member of principal economic initiatives such as ASEAN, APEC and G-20.⁵⁷¹

For a decade, since the end of Cold War until 9/11 terrorist attacks, the relations between the US and Indonesia followed a back and forward path, between Indonesia's rising free market economic potential and American concern on human rights violations in Indonesia. But, as a heritage from Cold War legacy, the strongest bond between two countries existed on military-to-military contacts and US military aid to Indonesia.⁵⁷² In the wake of September 11 attacks, both countries have taken bilateral steps against global terrorist networks and both the US and Indonesia presidents exchanged visits. Although the Indonesian society was not happy with American war on terror due to US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Indonesian Administration gave full support to President Bush. As a sign of this support, Former President of Indonesia Megawati Sukarnoputri paid a visit to White House on September 19, 2001 and condemned the attacks. This visit can be evaluated as the opening of a new era in mutual cooperation for a more prosperous and stable Indonesia aim. Later on, Megawati's successor President Yudhoyono (2004-2014) named President Bush as a pro-Indonesian American president.

The extremists undermining the stability and territorial integrity of Indonesia are grouped under four titles; international terrorist cells, radical Islamic organizations, ethnic conflicts, separatist movements. The attacks of these extremist groups have not, until September 11, targeted any American or Western citizens abroad. The link

⁵⁷¹ Several think-tanks in Western World prepare reports in parallel with the rising economic power of Southeast Asia countries. Indonesia, with its fourth largest population and as the largest Muslim country, is occupying a central role due to its rising democracy and economic indications. A report prepared by Center for A New American Security (June 2010) argues the promising future of the US-Indonesia multi-dimensional cooperation and the contribution of Indonesia to global security and prosperity. For more detail see http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Crafting%20a%20Strategic%20Vision_Denmark.pdf Access date 12 February 2015.

⁵⁷² During Suharto term (1967-1998), the US supported Indonesian military under the principles of Cold War rivalry in order to prevent any Soviet penetration to the region. FMS (Foreign Military Sales), FMF (Foreign Military Financing) and IMET (International Military Education and Training) were three military programs used by Indonesia.

between international terrorist cells and radical Islamic organizations in Indonesia has been established by the efforts of Osama bin Laden and his network. The threat was the possibility that Al Qaeda would manage and coordinate these groups to radicalize and increase their capacities in order to follow Al Qaeda's agenda. This would surely destabilize fragile structure of Southeast Asia region.⁵⁷³ Bali bombings in October 2002 and Marriot Hotel Jakarta bombing in August 2003 were two dreadful terrorist attacks in Indonesia. These terrorist attacks that carried out by Indonesian terrorist cells and resulted over 215 deaths and 200 injuries have woken up Indonesian people and government and encouraged them to join the fight against terrorism beside the US.⁵⁷⁴

Rise of Political Good Will

As already underlined, in post-September 11 US-Indonesia relations, "security" has been the driving force based on a dual action; fighting against global terrorism and containing the international terrorist network in Indonesia and ensuring the territorial unity and stability of Indonesia. A consensus has emerged to collaborate against any religious, ethnic or separatist movement in the region. In this respect, searching a solution to Aceh conflict moved to the front line. The US administration approached this conflict as a threat to US global interests in the region and with other international role players such as EU the US gave open support to Indonesian government for an enduring peace and for the transformation of GAM into a peaceful political entity in Indonesian political structure. The mutual cooperation between both states became visible just after September 11 attacks. The joint statement of President Bush and Megawati after Megawati's visit on 19 September 2001 frames the future of the relations between two countries. This framework was based on

⁵⁷³ Amongst others, some of the leading militant Muslim groups in Indonesia are; Laskar Jihad, Islam Defenders Front, Hezbollah Task Force, and Islamic Youth Front. The formation of these militant groups accelerated in post-Suharto term and their number one aim was to recruit young Muslims for waging jihad. On January 2000, for support to Moluccas, more than 20 Islamic organization organized a meeting in Jakarta with more than 100.000 people attending. For more detail see RAND (National Security Research Division) report 2002 Chapter 8, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2002/MR1599.pdf access date 14 February 2015.

⁵⁷⁴ For details see Report of the National Commission on US-Indonesian Relations (2003) available at <http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/USICR.pdf> access date 15 February 2015

economy, rule of law, democracy and security which were related to cooperation on war against terrorism and the peaceful solution to Aceh(and Papua) conflict. This paragraph from joint statement of Bush and Megawati indicates the political will and common understanding of the US and Indonesia on Aceh conflict;

“...The two Presidents discussed the situation in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya and agreed on the urgent need for peaceful resolution of separatist pressures. President Megawati affirmed her determination to pursue a multidimensional approach to these regions, including implementation of special autonomy, resource sharing, respect for cultural identity and human rights, restoration of peace, order and the rule of law, and continued efforts at dialogue and reconciliation. President Bush reiterated the firm support of the United States for Indonesia’s territorial integrity and emphasized that the U.S. does not support secessionist aspirations in these areas or elsewhere.”⁵⁷⁵

After President Megawati’s visit to Washington in 2001, the US government followed a constructive and encouraging path on Aceh conflict particularly during December 2002 ceasefire between GAM and IDF. The Report of the National Commission on US-Indonesian Relations (2003) underlines the positive and decisive approach of the US to Aceh conflict and the future steps taken by the US;

“Top Indonesian officials have expressed deep appreciation for quiet U.S. assistance in working out the Aceh ceasefire in December 2002. ...We believe that Aceh should continue to have a high priority for the United States, and that the U.S. government should be prepared to offer additional help in ending the violence if this is requested by the Indonesians.”

The US administration was aware that a failure in Aceh peace process would encourage other fundamentalist and separatist conflicts in Southeast Asia, undermine the stability of Indonesia and fuel global terrorism. Because the existing coordination and cooperation amongst domestic extremists and international terrorist networks across Indonesian Archipelago would continue to attack US and Western targets in coming days.

As I discussed above, the driving force behind the Aceh peace process was the security requirements for both countries in order to fight regional and global terrorism. Both countries have proved a political will and a sincere approach for

⁵⁷⁵ The full text of the Joint Statement is at Annex 2 of Report of National Commission on US-Indonesian Relations (2003) available at <http://nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/USICR.pdf> access date 15 February 2015

peace, being aware that peace in Aceh would be for the benefit of both sides. During his visit to Indonesia President Bush focused on war against global terrorist networks and gave the message to Indonesian public opinion that War on Al-Qaeda did not mean the war on Islam religion.

5.1.4.2 The US-Indonesia Relations during Aceh Conflict

This security need behind the US -Indonesia cooperation has also reflected upon economic, military and political issues and created a strong bond particularly with the election of Yudhoyono as the President of Indonesia in 2004. Yudhoyono stayed in the office for 10 years until 2014 and his election to Indonesian presidency brought a healthy and continued relationship. A positive feature of President Yudhoyono was that he was willingly to talk to Indonesian public particularly on the hazards of international terrorism and what it would cause in future days for Indonesia.⁵⁷⁶ In addition to his collaborative approach to international and regional terrorism, he sent messages to international community that Indonesia will preserve its integration with global trade and commerce. The steps taken by his cabinet for economic reforms and to avoid human rights violations were warmly welcomed by Washington as well. These positive steps of Yudhoyono government have been rewarded by the US in 2004 annually \$468 million for the next 5 years. The membership of both countries in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) played a positive role to restore the relations and eased the US economic, military and humanitarian aid to Indonesia.⁵⁷⁷

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Indonesia and GAM which ended one of the long lasting conflicts in Southeast Asia has been signed under the auspices of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari on 15 August 2005. This peace

⁵⁷⁶ Smith, A.L. (2005), 'Indonesia and the United States 2004–2005: New President, New Needs, Same Old Relations', *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, February 2005, Special Assessment, p.3 available at <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/APandtheUS/SmithIndonesia2.pdf> access date 22 February 2015

⁵⁷⁷ Smith, A.L. (2005), 'Indonesia and the United States 2004–2005: New President, New Needs, Same Old Relations', *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, February 2005, Special Assessment, pp.7-8 available at <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/APandtheUS/SmithIndonesia2.pdf> access date 22 February 2015

agreement in Aceh had a huge political impact on Indonesia giving way to economic, educational, social reforms across the country and created a fertile environment for future developments. The interview with the staff of Indonesian Embassy in Ankara (Military Attachee Colonel Syachriyal Siregarand) underlines the role of the US- Indonesia relations and how vital the peace in Aceh was not for the Acehnese people but also for the territorial integrity of Indonesia.⁵⁷⁸ Aceh peace made impact also upon the position of Indonesian armed forces (TNI), by pushing it under democratic and civilian control. This was essential for Indonesia to be a modern and developed country and for TNI to be a more effective and modern army. All those positive developments helped the strengthening of Rule of Law in Indonesia. It is a widely accepted notion that, Aceh, in recent years, has become a model for unity of the Republic of Indonesia. Aceh has empowered the rule of law and national unity, opening new opportunities for societal, economic and political developments. Religious extremism and violence have left Aceh. Peace in Aceh has had some direct implications on stability. Malacca strait became a more secure sea lane with less piracy incidents. Peace has also paved the way for Acehnese diaspora abroad to return home.

Aceh case is one of few successful peace processes across the globe in 2005 which has been concluded in a short time of negotiations. The *sine qua non* condition was the inclusion of a wide-ranging autonomy and exclusion of independence for Aceh. The negotiations were held under this unchangeable status. Apart from this everything was negotiable. The agreement was reached on a short and uncomplicated MoU text, clarifying the rights and privileges of autonomous Aceh region. During the talks, both sides proved a strong commitment to political will to solve the conflict. GAM, throughout the negotiations, showed sincere wish to stop its armed struggle and by the end of 2005, it has handed its weapons and disbanded its military

⁵⁷⁸ Colonel Syachriyal Siregarand, during the interview on 12 April 2014, emphasized the role of the United States in solving Aceh problem in terms of political-economic-security requirements. He stated that, "The Government of Indonesia has come a long way with its commitment in solving the problem of Aceh peacefully. and the US had a great role in the world peace. In Aceh case the intention to solve the problem has come from both sides, the US and Indonesia administrations." Colonel Syachriyal Siregarand underlined another issue that the effects of peace to the economic-political-societal-educational conditions of Aceh region were stunning. He said; "As usual, violence has devastated the region for decades and since GAM has been a responsible political actor within Indonesia political life, significant developments have been realized for a better life."

arm. On Government side, the Indonesian officials have protected their democratic approach and put into the words that military precautions were not the solution, and declared to allocate some powers to Aceh region under autonomy. The pressure of Acehese community tired of violence, economic deprivation, and all daily problems of last 30 years, is worth to mention. They wanted peace as well.⁵⁷⁹

It was obvious that the success of peace process belonged to Acehese people and the will of the signatories of Memorandum of Understanding. After the MoU was signed, one year later first democratic local elections were held in Aceh on December 11, 2006.⁵⁸⁰ In this elections former rebels could freely forward their candidanship. Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM rebel, was elected as the governor of Aceh. Such developments helped a lot for the improvement of socio-political atmosphere in Aceh. This was a successful transition of a Violent Non-State Actor, GAM, into a political entity. The good will, the democratic approach of Indonesian government to the problem in post-1998 term, and continued persistence of the US and other international actors for a just peace were the factors that led to success.⁵⁸¹

In November 2010, during President Obama's visit to Indonesia, his main concern was to scale down the tension between the US and Muslim countries which has accumulated to a larger extent during Bush Administration's unilateral initiatives of "war on terror". In his Jakarta speech, Obama made a follow-up speech of his Cairo visit. When he visited Egypt in June 2009, President Obama had a strong wish to open a new page with the Muslim world and remove the negative influence. He clearly declared the sincere wish of the US to restore good relations with the Muslim

⁵⁷⁹ Feith, P. (2007), 'The Aceh Peace Process', *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report No:184,pp.2-3 available at <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr184.pdf> access date 22 February 2015

⁵⁸⁰ Helsinki Peace 2005 is based on the Memorandum of Understanding between GoI and GAM. The MoU is composed of six basic chapters with the ultimate aim of transforming GAM into a political entity: These are; (i)Governing of Aceh, (ii) Human Rights, (iii) Amnesty and Reintegration into Society, (iv) Security Arrangements, (v) Establishment of Aceh Monitoring Mission, (vi) Dispute Settlement. For details see; [http://www.Aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki MoU.pdf](http://www.Aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf) access date 22 February 2015

⁵⁸¹ Feith, P. (2007), 'The Aceh Peace Process', *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report No:184,pp.6-7 available at <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr184.pdf>access date 25 February 2015

world and Indonesia as the most populous Muslim country was occupying a special place. His visit to Jakarta was the second leg of this policy. In his speech Obama stressed some other points. One of his concerns was the brilliant transition of Indonesia “from the rule of an iron fist to the rule of the people”. Another point he raised was the spirit of tolerance embodied in the Constitutional Law of Indonesia that enabled the mosques, churches and other temples standing on the same line. Economic cooperation and human rights were other points he mentioned.⁵⁸²

President Obama’s visit in 2010 has paved the way for a large scale cooperation and mutual understanding for coming years. President Obama and President Yudhoyono shared an explicit desire for US-Indonesia relations and signed “US-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement”. This agreement envisaged three pillars of relationship for coming years; (i)political and security cooperation, (ii)trade and economic relations, and (iii)collaboration on sociocultural, scientific and technological fields.⁵⁸³ This agreement included 54 items and also stated the conduct of high level dialogues. In year 2010, 2011 and 2012 three sessions of these meetings were held.

During Obama term, the US-Indonesia relations gained a boost with this agreement. Having settled the regional unrests such as Aceh conflict, the cooperation focused on political, military, educational and military fields. It is clear that, the settlement of Aceh conflict and transformation of GAM into a political entity have opened new horizons for future.

⁵⁸² Visit of President Obama was noteworthy by several aspects. He has spent 4 years of his childhood in Indonesia and he sincerely mentioned of this as a special tie to Indonesian people, culture and values. For detail of President Obama’s Jakarta Speech see <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/10/remarks-president-university-indonesia-jakarta-indonesia> access date 25 February 2015.

⁵⁸³ Hiebert M., Osius T. and Poling G.P. (2013) ‘A U.S.–Indonesia Partnership for 2020’, Center for Strategic International Studies, Report, August 2013 p.ix available at http://csis.org/files/publication/130917_Hiebert_USIndonesiaPartnership_WEB.pdf access date 25 February 2015

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Introduction

This thesis is a study on the interactions between two Violent Non-State Actors from two afar geographies (HAMAS and GAM), two Parent States that struggle against violence originating from independence movements since their foundations (Israel-1948 and Indonesia-1947) and a Super Power that aims to realize its regional strategic interests over the regions where these two VNSAs operate (the U.S.). As detailed in above chapters, these interactions that affect the transformation of a VNSA into a peaceful formation and thus a peaceful solution, take place at four levels; (i) VNSA's relations with its domestic entities, (ii) VNSA's relations with the parent state (iii) VNSA's relations with the United States, and (iv) the relations between the parent state and the United States. First three levels are related to the VNSAs but the fourth item focuses on the relations between the US and two parent states (Israel and Indonesia). First three items have been studied in their patterns at different levels since the emergence of VNSAs as a threat to regional/global peace, but the influence of the US-parent/opponent state relations upon both Palestine and Aceh conflicts have not been analyzed enough in this framework. The relations between the Parent states (Israel and Indonesia) and the United States have shaped the domestic structure of HAMAS and GAM, the nature of relations between these VNSAs and the Parent States, and also the approach of the US to HAMAS and GAM.

6.2 Basic Finding

The basic finding of this dissertation is the impact of the US-Parent state relations on HAMAS and GAM and hence on Palestine and Aceh conflicts. The outcome of the US-Parent state relations is the existence or non-existence of “political good will” embedded in the complex nature of the US-Israel and the US-Indonesia relations. With the help of a more democratic and promising international environment in post-Cold War era, several regional conflicts have been dissolved and responsible VNSAs have been transformed into political entities within their regions and quit violence. GAM was one of those which signed a peace agreement with Indonesia in August 2005 for special autonomy of Aceh province and integrated into Indonesian political system. Three factors have played decisive role for the success of peace process; first, the democratic atmosphere in Indonesian state echelons after Suharto term, second the power of American strategic interests in the region and the strong need to prevent the proliferation of international terrorist acts in the region, and third the decisive approach of Indonesian politicians not to quit “political good will” in Aceh conflict. Eventually GAM, which had sought independence since the very beginning of the conflict, could not resist to this convenient political environment and welcomed the offer for a special autonomy for Aceh region and quit violence. Following September 11 attacks, throughout the negotiations, Indonesia and the US followed a positive and collaborative path in Aceh conflict. The political good will and the democratic approach of Indonesian government to the conflict have pursued dual aims; first to end a long lasting problem in its territory and restore domestic peace, and second to prevent any international terror organization to be inspired by this regional conflict and to cut off their ideological and organizational ties on the soil of Indonesia. The US administration also supported Indonesia and encouraged GAM for peace.

But the situation is not the same with HAMAS in Palestine conflict. One main reason for the setbacks in peace talks is that US-Israeli relations insert a very strong impact upon Palestine conflict and it gets more complex when compared to Aceh problem. The substantial factor in this complex relationship is the nature of the US-Israel relations in the Middle East. The special bond between the US and Israel, as

investigated in the 4th chapter, affects the US approach towards Palestine conflict. The United States preferred to stay in line with Israeli policy no matter how this overlapped with the US strategic interests in the region, or fell short. This special bond between the US and Israel is cast by a set of historical, political, strategic factors, as elaborated in the entirety of this thesis.

As a combination of these factors, Israel's colonial implementations upon Palestine territory stand out. Israel's colonial policies are similar to that of European-American expansion of nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the form of a conflict between a settler colonial state and a native resistance. Colonial legacy, as a heritage of previous centuries, faded away with the end of Second World War, but continued its impact on Palestine with the hands of Israel and on Aceh with the hands of Indonesia. This impact is obvious in both regions, but deeper in Palestine, because it gives no opportunity to Israel as the parent state to initiate a peace process based on "political good will", as it successfully happened in Aceh conflict. Political good will can be used as a common tool for the parties taking responsibility within a conflict, but it is not available to use it in colonial implementations. When I overview the creation of Israel, which was a multi-dimensional project of 19th and 20th centuries colonial rule, I identify similar justifications identical to that of global colonialism. For example; Zionism has acted in coordination and collaboration with British colonial rule in Palestine, in such a close framework that when the British mandate ended over Palestine in 15 May 1948, it was the same day Israel state declared its independence. Following the independence, Israel directed its power and attention onto a two-fold policy; first to protect the territorial borders of this newly born state against opponent Arab states, and second to enlarge the influence of Israel state on occupied territories, under the mentality of a colonial rule.

In order to enlarge its influence, building Jewish settlements was the paramount act of Israel. With the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai Desert and Golan Heights in 1967, new settlements were built on these territories as a part of Israeli strategy aiming to seize the initiative over the land and the society as a reflection of colonial policy. Between the foundation date of Israel and the 6 days war (1948-1967), in less than two decades more than 700 new settlements were

constructed despite strong regional and international condemnations, which was the root cause of the Palestinian refugee problem. The US, the first state to have recognized Israel, has provided a special economic aid to Israel under the term of “settlement construction”. Since the emergence of Palestine conflict, before the foundation of Israel between 1890-1948 and after the declaration of independence until today (1948-2017), the refugee problem and Jewish settlements have been one primary concern at peace talks or negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian parties.

In post-2001 term, Israel did not make any change on its colonial approach to Palestine conflict which is simply use of military power, isolation, embargo etc, aiming to annihilate HAMAS. If Israel had been able to follow a more constructive and collaborative path and if the US and Israel have shared a goodwill and sincere wish on Palestine approach similar to that of US-Indonesia approach to Aceh conflict just in the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks, more fruitful results could be achieved. Identical to the Aceh conflict, Palestine conflict also has been evaluated through the window of “war on terror” and HAMAS has been sidelined as a terrorist organization almost on the same spectrum with Al Qaeda. In this respect, Israel’s unilateral approach and use of excessive power in Palestine has been tolerated to the extent possible by Bush administration (2000-2008) under the legacy of “war on terror”.

But, with President Obama after 2008, we observe a more constructive and balanced foreign policy in the Middle East shaped with the lessons learned from the failures and shortcomings of Bush administration. In order to fulfill the promises of presidential electoral campaign, Obama took some decisive steps. First, the US disengaged its military troops from Iraq and Afghanistan area of operations. Second, rather than following a preventive and/or coercive war strategy in regional conflicts the US preferred close cooperation with allies and international institutions (as clearly visible in 2013 Libya internal war). Third, the US took positive steps to repair its popularity amongst Arab countries and remove the anti-American influence of “war on terror” operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obama administration seemed to be aware that unconditional support to Israel in Palestine conflict did not help its war

on global terrorism and a feasible solution to Arab-Israeli conflict would help the democratization of Arab countries, and would help to dissolve radical movements in Arab world and would help the US interests in the Middle East. Therefore he approached to the Middle East and Southeast Asia regions with the same aim; to restore good relations and confidence between the US and Muslim countries and promote democracy, human rights, liberal economy and rule of law. These aims would become the remedy also for international terror groups and strengthen international security and cooperation. But these pro-peace steps could not be effective enough to form a climate over Palestine conflict that would soften the colonial mindset of Israel and lead to a political goodwill Palestine conflict required.

6.3 Secondary Findings

There are secondary findings of this thesis. **First finding** is related to the internal structure of HAMAS and GAM. The common internal dynamic between these two VNSAs is their ability to activate the social movement capacity of their communities. They both received full support of Achehnese and Palestinians, in terms of finance, man power, arms, technology, logistics, education and similar. Both VNSAs received the support of global community particularly for their massive refugee problems as well as the support of their diasporas abroad and in the United States.

One difference between HAMAS and GAM is their political charters. GAM Charter (1976) reflects a secular and revolutionary character but HAMAS Charter (1988) refers to Muslim holy texts. GAM charter focuses on the agonies of Achehnese society coming from past and how much they deserve to decide their own destiny in front of the free world underlining their educational, economic, societal and cultural rights and legitimizes their armed struggle as sole way to independence. GAM charter is very short in terms of its aims, and the historical and political justifications without any reference to religious texts. Due to its format and context, throughout peace negotiations, GAM Charter created no friction amongst the parties. For GAM there is no community to destroy, rather it complains about the possibility of Achehnese society to be destroyed by false policy of Indonesia.

On the other hand, HAMAS charter (1988) is composed of many references to Muslim holy texts. Koran verses and Hadith sources have been referred 35 times in the text and the historical wars and clashes between the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims have been cited. This strong commitment of HAMAS Charter to fixed Quran verses has closed the doors to future amendments, and received strong critics from international circles for being the spiritual drive for terrorist acts against Israeli and Western targets particularly the civilians. This handicap caused by the Charter, emerges as a difference in the ideology of Palestine cause. Rise of HAMAS as the leading power in Gaza strip along with the second intifadah (2000-2005) has resulted in a political division in Palestine: Secular FATAH in West Bank and Islamist HAMAS in Gaza Strip. HAMAS has conducted a dual struggle. While it has waged an armed campaign against Israel mainly composed of suicide bombings and missile attacks, it has also started a political fight to undermine the nationalist and secular FATAH with its effective and well organized social network. HAMAS Charter clearly refuses a secular perception for the future of Palestine Cause saying;

“Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology. Attitudes, conduct and decisions stem from ideologies. That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian Liberation Organization - and what it can develop into - and without belittling its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic Palestine with the secular idea. The Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion and whoever takes his religion lightly is a loser.” (Article 27)

It is obvious that GAM charter has similarities to that of PLO charter drafted in 1968, rather than HAMAS charter. The principle cause is that GAM and PLO charters are the products of secular Cold War paradigm. Although Muslim religion is a spiritual power behind both Palestinian and Acehese societies, the leaders of both movements (Arafat and Di Tiro) have taken a secular-national argument for their ideals.

The Second finding is about the power of Palestine and Aceh communities as social movements and their position in front of liberal and totalitarian types of democracy. In terms of identity and ideology, HAMAS is a strong social movement defending a system of beliefs and values originating from the Muslim religion. This ideology shapes the identity of the individuals telling them who they are, where they

stand and what they are obliged to do. But this religious rhetoric hampers the development of a healthy society similar to the West. Liberal democracy sees democracy as a matter of trial and error in daily life, and gives a broad room to the personal and collective actions. But, totalitarian democracy recognizes a sole and exclusive truth in politics (Muslim religion in case of HAMAS) which may be called as political messianism. This dogmatic approach drives the society towards a “perfect result” accepting no resistance. It perceives politics as the art of a religious divine philosophy affecting all aspects of individual or social life. Here, the question is which path HAMAS as an Islamist entity will chose; a liberal democracy, or a messianist totalitarian democracy. It is very hard to say that HAMAS has followed a liberal democratic path. In addition to the religion motivated HAMAS charter, the religion motivated HAMAS ideology creates an obstacle to build up a democratic society. So far, HAMAS, under the teachings of Muslim Brotherhood, has followed a totalitarian path composed of religious norms and codes aspiring for an Islamic state.

On the other hand, the position of GAM as a social movement and democratic development proves both similarities and differences when compared to HAMAS. Identical to HAMAS, the Muslim religion and its weight upon the Acehese people has made strong effects upon GAM. In this respect, we see that both GAM and HAMAS prove similar feature in terms of benefiting from religious sensitivity and to mobilize the people. GAM accepts Islam as an inseparable part of Acehese identity but GAM did not aspire for an Islamic government across Indonesia, in contrast with the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia which was the dominant political movement for two decades between 1953-73. This negative approach of GAM to establish an Islamic government has allowed GAM to give positive reactions to democratic initiatives and good will of Indonesia government in post-Suharto term. In this respect, GAM had no problem to integrate to the Acehese society with the secular and moderate Islamic regime of Indonesia. Therefore, no matter how strong the religion was to shape the Acehese community, they have followed a more indulgent approach towards liberal democracy.

The third finding is about the similarities of the reactions of Parent States to the separatist movement. The particular position of an authoritarian state apparatus in

front of a nationalist movement indicates that both Israeli State regime and Indonesia's New Order regime of 1970s and 80s share similar specifications and show similar reactions in front of Palestine and Aceh conflicts. This reaction can be defined as the "use of coercive power" to crush such movements. Both states have justified their authoritarian behaviors under the need for domestic security and denied any separatist movement. For a long time, since their inception as violent actors, both HAMAS and GAM have been treated by their parent states as simple military targets to be coerced. This coercion was a continuity of inter-state relations of Cold War legacy and has been implemented by the states using their direct or indirect threatening capacity or using their own military power.

During Cold War years, crises in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan had been managed by such coercive means.⁵⁸⁴ The war on terror strategy in post September 11, has also been applied upon VNSAs in a form of deterrence. Economic sanctions, financial pressures and political isolations accumulate pressure upon a VNSA. But, applying coercion on VNSAs is not easy. Because, in general terms, the VNSAs create four problems to an opponent state (either the parent state or a great power engaged with the problem) that is using coercion as a political asset.

Firstly, the VNSAs are not easy to find because they have no fixed addresses, and they operate in ungoverned locations with illicit networks.⁵⁸⁵ Secondly, the VNSAs are hard to understand, because they do not possess clear lines, clear responsibilities, clear figures, clear borders identical to a state structure.⁵⁸⁶ Thirdly, the VNSAs are not easy to be communicated, because direct communication has a strategic cost for the states, and may devote the VNSA with a undesirable advantage of legitimacy.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁴ Thomas T.S (2010), *Beyond Pain: Coercing Violent Non-State Actors*, for details see www.dni.gov/press_releases/20051011_release.htm. Access date 3 March 2015

⁵⁸⁵ Naim M. (2005) *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy*, New York, Doubleday.

⁵⁸⁶ See details of the full transcript by Director of National Intelligence, available at: www.dni.gov/press_releases/20051011_release.htm. Access date 3 March 2015

⁵⁸⁷ Crenshaw, M. (2003) "The Response to Terrorism," in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin, Washington DC, US Institute for Peace Press, pp. 326-327.

And fourthly, the VNSAs are harder to pressure; because they may sacrifice their loose infrastructure and militants and they may go back to the community they fight for to recruit manpower and material.⁵⁸⁸ The VNSAs that are bound with extreme ethno-nationalist or religious convictions resist the coercive politics upon them, particularly if they assume the governmental responsibility. It is clear that coercion is a type of violence used by the state and if coercion fails war or counter violence of the VNSA may commence. GAM has encountered in 2000 heavy attacks from Indonesia military and police forces when the talks failed. Also, the first Intifadah (1987) and the second Intifadah (2000) broke out after such coercive acts of Israel Defense Forces.

The fourth finding is that the VNSAs inherit larger significance in their regions than they have been attributed so far. The United States, in 21st Century, face a new landscape where not sole peer competitors and regional powers constitute a challenge, but also the radical movements fueled by radical religious ideologies. In this new era, the non-state actors get their support not from a rival state such as Soviet Union or People's Republic of China, but rather from certain Muslim communities and rouge states. Currently, we see that violent non-state actors are using an ideology based mainly on Islamist arguments. But, the entities such as HAMAS and GAM use also nationalism as an asset to back up their ideological discourse, when they need to. HAMAS, for example, has been taken into consideration by academic circles through two principal pillars. One is its military power in terms of using violence as an asset against Israel and its Western allies. The second one is its ideology, which has carried HAMAS to a paramount position in Palestine politics.

As studied throughout the thesis, the military, economic and political power of HAMAS and GAM are very limited when compared to those of a state. In order to prevent a fatal defeat from an opponent state, they did not aim to have any regular military units. Despite their limited military, economic and political power, they have

⁵⁸⁸ US Strategic Command (USTRATCOM), *Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*(2006)Washington DC, The Joint Staff, Version 2.0, p.18.

strong social movement capacity in the community they operate. These Islamist social movements can be identified as movements standing on traditional authority, under control of relatively charismatic leaders. It is clear that the success of the violent non-state actor is embedded in its capability to activate the social movement power of the community they fight for. This is exactly what is happening in the regions where HAMAS and GAM are operating.

The fifth finding is about the degree of the capability of HAMAS and GAM transforming from a militant non-state actor into a responsible political entity and their relations with their parent/opponent states (Israel and Indonesia).

HAMAS, since its emergence as an actor in Palestine conflict, has followed a pragmatist policy with two ends; a revolutionary reaction (jihad, dawa, violence) towards the opponent state of Israel and a reformist activism towards its community in Gaza strip according to Islamic lifestyle. This reformist understanding derives its roots from the ideology of “re-islamization” which is one of the corner stones of political Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. HAMAS has used this pragmatist policy also against Fatah during and after 2006 elections. Throughout the electoral campaign HAMAS used the rhetoric of civil society, political pluralism, fighting corruption, administrative reforms with the aim of encouraging a culture of dialogue. After the elections we observe that HAMAS return back to its original revolutionary politics based on violence and suppression against its political opponent, Fatah. One outcome of this dual pragmatist policy is the negative approach of Western states, the Arab states and Israel towards HAMAS. These actors, rather than helping HAMAS to transform into a more peaceful formation, tried to weaken HAMAS administration in Gaza strip by international embargo which eventually widened the division between West Bank and Gaza strip. This short sighted approach has weakened the Palestinian unity and resulted in a serial of setbacks and difficult times under unfavorable domestic and international conditions for HAMAS.

On the other hand, since the inception of HAMAS as a power in Palestine conflict, the relations between Israel and HAMAS have developed over a “violent dialogue”. This type of dialogue is composed of numerous statements, interviews, declarations,

speeches that have produced distressing samples, at almost every level, particularly with the words of military and political leaders of both sides. In this sort of dialogue, neither Israel nor HAMAS cease communication totally, but form a specific type of interrelation under the control of violence. This violence is kept at a certain level by both sides. HAMAS uses terrorist acts, particularly suicide missions while Israel uses a military strategy named “shock and awe” which aims to realize a quick dominance over HAMAS via overwhelming military power. In this context, the relationship between HAMAS and Israel can be divided into two terms; pre-2006 electoral victory and post-2006 electoral victory. Since its foundation in 1987 until 2006, HAMAS conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks. These attacks were basically composed of suicide bombings, rocket firings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and light arms shootings. But after 2006 elections, HAMAS has adopted a defensive posture against Israeli operations. This decline can be seen in the number of attacks, the fatality and the number of casualties. After HAMAS took control of Gaza strip from Fatah, it dedicated majority of its activities in Gaza to harden its defense and solidify its control. Since 2006 Israel has launched several military operations in Gaza strip, but the reaction of HAMAS has been basically a defensive posture aiming to protect its political and social network, as well as its military infrastructure.

Since 2006 onward, it is possible to assert that HAMAS is facing a transformation from revolutionary character into a reformist character. I can formulate this process of change in HAMAS politics as; to accumulate power in short and midterm at sub-regional, regional and international platforms by way of reform and change and to avoid any large scale confrontation with the main adversary Israel. By leaving the acts of violence aside, HAMAS expects to get sympathy from the global public opinion, political support at international forums and/or institutions and financial aid at regional and global circles.

As for GAM, the relations with Indonesian government can be divided into two phases; pre-1998 era and post-1998 era. First phase is between 1976-1998. The first violent act by GAM took place in 1976, against President Suharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia. This was the start of a three decade struggle between a violent

non-state actor (GAM) and a non-democratic state, Indonesia. While GAM targeted the aim of a “free and independent Aceh”, Indonesia tried to crush this movement. In this era, Indonesian government has conducted military campaigns against GAM until 1998 in Aceh, which was identified by Indonesian Army as “Military Operations Area”. The second phase of GAM-Indonesia relations is between 1998 and 2005. By mid-1998, the Suharto regime has been replaced by a process of democratization, led by President Habib. In totalitarian countries if there is a process of transition towards democracy, separatist movements gain power and this is what happened in Indonesia after Suharto’s resignation. GAM increased its violence across Aceh territory, but particularly after September 11 attacks, Indonesian government has adopted a good will and democratic approach to the Aceh conflict which enabled a process of transformation in GAM.

The particular position of an authoritarian state apparatus in front of a nationalist movement indicates that both Israeli State regime and Indonesia’s New Order regime of 1970s and 80s share similar specifications and show similar reactions in front of Palestine and Aceh conflicts. This reaction can be defined as the “use of coercive power” to crush such movements. Both states have justified their authoritarian behaviors under the need for domestic security and denied any separatist movement. For a long time, since their inception as violent actors, both HAMAS and GAM have been treated by their parent states as simple military targets to be coerced. This coercion was a continuity of inter-state relations of Cold War legacy and has been implemented by the states using their direct or indirect threatening capacity or using their own military power. During Cold War years, crises in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan had been managed by such coercive means. The war on terror strategy, in post September 11, has also been applied upon VNSAs in a form of deterrence. Economic sanctions, financial pressures and political isolation have been diverged towards the VNSAs.

But, applying coercion on VNSAs is not easy. Because, in general terms, the VNSAs create four problems to an opponent state (either the parent state or a great power engaged with the problem) that is using coercion as a political asset. Firstly, the VNSAs are not easy to find because they have no fixed addressees, and they operate

in ungoverned locations with illicit networks. Secondly, the VNSAs are hard to understand, because they do not possess clear lines, clear responsibilities, clear figures, clear borders identical to a state structure. Thirdly, the VNSAs are not easy to be communicated, because direct communication has a strategic cost for the states, and may devote the VNSA with an undesirable advantage of regional and/or international legitimacy. And fourthly, the VNSAs are harder to pressure, because they may sacrifice their loose infrastructure and militants and they may go back to the community they fight for to recruit manpower and material. The VNSAs that are bound with extreme ethno-nationalist or religious convictions resist the coercive politics upon them, particularly if they assume the governmental responsibility. It is clear that coercion is a type of violence used by the state and if coercion fails war or counter violence of the VNSA may commence. GAM has encountered in 2000 heavy attacks from Indonesia military and police forces when the talks failed. The first Intifadah (1987) and the second Intifadah (2000) broke out after such coercive acts of Israel.

The sixth finding is the position and the role of the United States in new global order. As studied throughout the 2nd Chapter of this dissertation, these roles and tasks are; (i) the legitimacy of the unipolar world order, (ii) managerial tasks of the US in this new order and (iii) the strategic interests of the US. As we can see, these three tasks provide the US with opportunities it has never acquired since its inception as a super power to the international politics. In this new environment, the US has continued to shape its foreign policy determinants according to a statist and security based approach. In both Palestine and Aceh conflicts, the US stayed loyal to above mentioned three principles. The relations of the US with Indonesia in post-September 11 term is a good example to demonstrate how a country designs its political, economic, and security based relations with another state. The Aceh case is a good model for the US. This model has proved that if a regional conflict is solved and a VNSA is persuaded to transform into a political actor and leave violence, it is for the advantage of all parties, particularly for the parent state. Here, the vital question is how longer the US will continue to ignore the negative effects of Palestine conflict to regional and global peace as well as the US interests in the Middle East.

The seventh finding is about the one sided position of the common wisdom shaping the approach of American administration towards the Middle East in general and Palestine conflict/HAMAS in particular. This common wisdom can be seen in three fields; first; the educational background and the upbringings of American Presidents and their heavy roles and influences upon foreign politics, second; the outlook of American society towards the outer world particularly to Jewish and Palestinian societies and the forces influencing their ideas such as the Israeli lobbies and the American media, and third; the lessons learned by the office of foreign relations in its historical discourse moving amongst different principles such as isolationism, continentalism, exceptionalism, idealism, real-politic and similar.

The eighth finding is the growing influence of violent non-state actors in international politics, and the societal forces that empower the violent non-state actors in front of their opponents. In this sense I detail the position of Palestinian society and the situation of HAMAS in Palestine, particularly in Gaza strip. I stress the point that the violent non-state actors play a significant role in international politics directly. This ability they possess is because of their intimate relations with the societies they fight for. The VNSAs are not any more separate, state controlled, artificial entities of Cold Waryears used for the targets of state apparatus they are controlled by; but rather they are empowered and supported by the local and regional communities they are born in. They participate in local and parliamentary elections and they are represented in democratic echelons. They tend to leave violence and prove a peaceful character when compared to the Cold War years. In parallel with the rise of political Islam in the Middle East and the Southeast Asian regions, the Muslim religion is the basic factor connecting the society and the VNSA, as visible in HAMAS and GAM cases. In a nutshell, I aimed to explain the power of VNSAs and how they do not fit the classical statist approach of Cold War years, in terms of international law, the society-VNSA interaction, their possible role to find permanent solution to regional conflicts, as it was proved in Aceh conflict in Indonesia in 2005.

The ninth finding is about the similarities between these two violent non-state actors. HAMAS and GAM and also the Palestine and Aceh conflicts have many

similarities such as their political aims, their struggle ways, the structure and religion of the societies, the effect they insert upon the local, regional and international peace, their relations with parent-states (Israel and Indonesia). Identical to HAMAS, GAM has built its political target upon the claim that, a colonial power, the Dutch Empire has invaded the Aceh homeland and after the Second World War, handed it to Indonesian Government in an illegal way. Identical to HAMAS, GAM has also used guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics to realize its political aims, receiving strong support of Islamic Acehese society. Identical to HAMAS, GAM has also pursued the aim of independence for the Aceh region of Sumatra from Indonesia. In this conflict, the Government of Indonesia has used political, economic and military tactics when dealing with Aceh problem similar to the government of Israel in Palestine conflict.

HAMAS and GAM as two VNSAs have changed their tactics and methods in time to reach their political aims according to the changing conditions in local, regional, and international agenda. Particularly after the Cold War they used the advantages of globalization and the struggle of these VNSAs with the opponent states has never stayed outside the attention of regional and/or global powers. The Palestine and Aceh conflicts have other similarities. These similarities are visible in all dimensions, such as; the role of colonial legacy in Palestine and Indonesia throughout its historical background, the political aims of Acehese and Palestinians, the harsh approach of Indonesian and Israeli governments to HAMAS and GAM and the societies they struggle for, the characteristics and seamless support of Acehese and Palestinian societies to these movements, the role of religion in the formation of a coherent societal support to GAM and HAMAS, the role of civil society in affecting the approach of local, regional and international actors and decision makers.

The tenth finding is about the similarities between the peace initiatives for Aceh and Palestine conflicts. For both conflicts, several peace attempts have been made and these attempts have failed due to similar concerns of VNSAs and parent states.

Before the Helsinki agreement, several attempts were made since very early times of Aceh conflict. Last two are worth to mention before the MoU was signed. In year 2000, a series of meetings were organized by Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) as an initiative for peace. At the end of meetings two draft texts were promulgated on the way to the peace; (i) Humanitarian Pause and (ii) Cessation of Hostilities. Both agreement texts failed because both sides (GAM and Government of Indonesia) blamed each other for violence and insincerity. Consequently, Indonesia declared military emergency and conducted military operations across Aceh territory. Indonesia Army officials declared that they were determined to eradicate GAM existence in Aceh.⁵⁸⁹

This situation is identical to the failure in Oslo peace process (1993-2000) and the outbreak of second Intifadah in 2000. The reaction of Israel state to HAMAS was similar to that of Indonesia in March 2003. There was lack of confidence between the parties in both cases. Indonesia accused GAM for exploiting talks in order to recruit militants, raise money, and collect strength for independence which is identical to that of Israeli officials' accusation of HAMAS. There was another factor that helped a deadlock in peace talks. In both conflicts the spoilers or the hardliners to peace played considerable roles for the disruption of talks. These opposition groups acted insolently to undermine peace process and committed violent acts including raids, kidnappings, armed clashes, or demonstrations against peace talks. Some elements even raised money by standing against peace process.⁵⁹⁰

6.4 Recommendations for Future Studies

For future studies on US- VNSA relations, a final statement can be done on the behaviors of authoritarian state- democratic state approach towards these violent non-state actors. In new millennia as the authoritarian states are losing power, either

⁵⁸⁹ Aspinall, E. (2005) 'The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?' East-West Center Washington, Policy Study, pp.1-3 available at <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS020.pdf> access date 22 February 2015

⁵⁹⁰ Aspinall, E. (2005) 'The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?' East-West Center Washington, Policy Study, p.4 available at <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS020.pdf> access date 22 February 2015

violent or non-violent, Non-State Actors will gain power. In parallel with the increasing roles of civil society within the states, VNSA activities are interrelated with these social forces. So that, the democratization process in a state, inevitably increases the attention of the society to any unrest within the country and creates a favorable environment for the separatist leaders to exploit the situation for their aims. One of the weaknesses of the authoritarian states is their short sighted approach to such unrests only through the lenses of security. In post-Cold War era, the security perception has been changed from sole military needs into a sophisticated format including societal, economic, environmental, and political aspects. So that, classical state approach to a separatist movement is not considered proper either by global society or its domestic society.

The rising power of civil society upon state affairs gets stronger to urge the state apparatus to search other options rather than sole military measures. The reflection of this enforcement by the society can be best seen in “political will” of three parties; the VNSA, the parent state, the international actors. Under the peaceful guidance of the civil society the parties will feel obliged to do their best not to lose this good will and they will look for a feasible opportunity to give reasonable concessions to the opposite side for the overall success of the peace process. The political will was essential to resolve Aceh conflict and this was present also amongst regional and international circles. Starting in 1998 with the end of New Order regime, efforts for a solution at local, regional and international levels have intensified. GAM at local level, Indonesia at regional level and the US and UN representatives at international level have begun to build the peace process upon these three circles/pillars. For the success of the process innovative techniques were used to prevent any party to withdraw from the negotiations. The ground rule was that “...anything could be discussed and negotiated, but nothing was agreed until everything was agreed”.

The close peaceful concern of the Indonesian society over Aceh conflict after 1998 has forced the government to start a new initiative for a fruitful solution. Until 1998, the conflict in Aceh has been contained by Suharto’s authoritarian state into a format as if it was a security problem between the Indonesian army and Aceh separatist militants. This approach was a typical continuity of the state to non-state

actor relations of Cold War era. GAM, during its struggle with Suharto regime, has successfully mobilized the support of Aceh society and succeeded to draw the attention of international public opinion and other Indonesian communities to the economic, social, democratic rights and problems of Acehese people. The attention of Indonesian society has focused upon Aceh conflict particularly after 1998 regime change in Indonesia during the term of President Bacharuddin Yusuf Habibie (1998-1999) and other three oncoming presidents. The end of Suharto regime in 1998 has created a new dialogue opportunity between GAM and Indonesian administrations. In this new environment, the political good will of Indonesia led by the presidents and the constructive steps by GAM have encouraged international circles for a peace initiative. After 7-years-efforts for peace by GAM leadership-Indonesian administration-International actors including the US, the peace has been realized.

On the other hand, Israel, which has grown into a structurally strong state since 1973 Arab-Israel war by way of democratic governments, failed to reach a peaceful solution and the Palestinian community suffered from huge societal, economic and political problems. In this respect, the approach of Israeli state towards the Palestinians, which is actually the sole pluralist democracy in the Middle East, creates a dilemma. One reason for this dead-end is the lack of interaction between the Israeli administration and Jewish society to find an enduring solution to the conflict. The voice of the civil society and reactions groups in Israel is not so strong to persuade the state apparatus to build a “political good will” to pave the way to the peace. The role of Israeli lobby in the US and its reflection upon the Israeli administration forms also an obstacle for such a political will. For decades, the US media and American society have been blind to the Palestine conflict and also to the injustice the Palestinians have been subjected to. The fundamental cause for this dilemma is embedded in security based American foreign policy approach towards the Middle East and the reflections of this policy upon Israeli state implementations towards the Palestinians.

It can be concluded that, VNSAs have been a strong actor in post-Cold War era and they cannot be treated with sole statist and security seeking politics. It has been

proved that, Aceh conflict has been solved with a political good will supported by Indonesian civil society and shared by local, regional and international actors. Accordingly, GAM as a VNSA, has transformed into a democratic and peaceful entity. Such a success for HAMAS will pave the way for a permanent peace in the Middle East. Future of Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be shaped by the increasing concern of American and Israeli societies to the Palestinian conflict. A critical issue to be investigated by the scholars in near future may be the approach of American and Jewish societies to Palestine conflict. The rising power of civil society in coming decades will be the driving force of the governments to find a permanent peace to long lasting conflicts. Palestine conflict cannot be excluded from this reality.

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APPENDICES

A: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

1.1 Giriş Bölümü

Tezin bütünlüğü içinde anlatıldığı üzere, Devlet Dışı Aktörler tahmin edilenden daha uzun bir tarihi geçmişe sahiptirler ve uluslararası platformlarda daha etkin roller oynamaktadırlar. Her ne kadar bu tez, Şiddet Yanlısı Devlet Dışı Aktörler (Violent Non-State Actors/VNSAs) üzerinde yoğunlaşsa da, barışçıl Devlet Dışı Aktörlere (Non-State Actors/NSAs) de geniş bir çerçeve içinde değinilmektedir. Bilindiği üzere, küresel ölçekte, NSA/VNSA'ların sayıları ve etkileri ekonomik, siyasi, sosyal ve kültürel etkileşimler kapsamında hızla artmaktadır. 2000'li yıllar, soğuk savaş dönemi ile karşılaştırıldığında, NSA/VNSA'lerin etkinliklerinin beklenilenin üstünde arttığı ve küreselleşmenin etkileri ile bu aktörlerin ciddi barışçıl ve şiddet yanlısı roller oynadığı bir zamana işaret etmektedir. Bu yıllar, aynı zamanda, ABD'nin barışçıl Devlet Dışı Aktörlerle ilişkilerini artırdığı ve şiddet yanlısı Devlet Dışı Aktörler ile ciddi bir anti-terör mücadelesine girdiği yıllardır. Bilindiği üzere devlet dışı aktörler çok geniş bir yelpazede faaliyet göstermektedirler. Bundan dolayı, bu tezin kapsamı, otonomi/bağımsızlık arayan VNSA'ler ile sınırlıdır. Çünkü bu VNSA'lar benzer özelliklere, ideolojilere, mücadele taktiklerine, hedeflere ve yapısal özelliklere sahiptirler.

Uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini kapsamında, devletin asırlardır “gücü ve yetkiyi” elinde tuttuğuna, ancak “gücün ve yetkilerin” devletlerden devlet dışı aktörlere doğru kaydığına dair birçok argüman vardır. Bugün dünyada 200 kadar devlet vardır. Ancak devlet dışı aktörlerin sayısı 50.000 den fazladır ve bu aktörlere bağlı ekonomik, kültürel, sosyal bağlıları sayısının yarım milyondan fazla olduğu tahmin edilmektedir. Doğaldır ki, NSA'ların ekonomik-finansal-sosyal faaliyetleri birçok

ülke kapasitesinin üzerine çıkmıştır ve daha komplike bir uluslararası ortam yaratmışlardır. Şu bir gerçektir ki, son 30-40 yıl içinde küresel pazar ekonomisi, fon akışı, teknoloji transferleri, mal ve hizmet üretimleri artık devletlerin kontrolü dışına çıkıp NSA'lar eliyle yürütölmeye başlamıştır ve bu aslında yapısal ve köklü bir değişimdir. Buna paralel olarak, iki kutuplu dünya düzeninin çökmesi ile birlikte, güvenlik ihtiyacının yerini refah arayışları almaya başlamıştır. Diğer yandan VNSA'lar da ekonomik-finansal-sosyal açıdan değil ama, şiddet kullanmayı gerektiren uluslararası meşruiyet ve yasallık, toplumsal kimlik, özgürlük, bağımsızlık gibi alanlarda devlet otoritesi ile mücadele etmeye başlamışlardır.

Tarihsel süreç içinde, farklı devlet tiplerinin NSA/VNSA'lara yaklaşımı farklı olmuştur. Örneğin, Anglo-Amerikan devletler devlet dışı aktörleri liberal ekonomik düzenin bir unsuru olarak görüp desteklemiştir, ancak eski Sovyet cumhuriyetleri gibi uluslararası toplum düzenine karşı mücadele eden devrimci/revolutionary devletler ise devlet dışı aktörleri yasadışı sayıp yasaklama yolunu seçmişlerdir. Soğuk savaş döneminin Ortadoğu coğrafyasında yer alan totaliter devletleri ise devlet dışı aktörleri tamamen yasaklamak yerine kontrol altında tutmak ve faaliyetlerini sınırlamak yoluna gitmişlerdir. Diğer taraftan, ABD'nin NSA'lara yaklaşımı idealist bir perspektiften gerçekleşirken VNSA'lara yaklaşımı ise tam aksine, realist bir perspektif üzerinden olmuştur. Bundan dolayı da, ABD dış politika uygulamaları Filistin ve Aceh örneklerinde görüldüğü gibi farklı sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Amerikan milli çıkarları ve güvenlik arayışları Amerikan yönetimlerini Aceh sorununda etkin bir rol oynayıp barışı sağlarken, aynı başarıyı Filistin sorununda sağlayamamıştır.

Bu tez içerisinde, farklı coğrafyalardan birbirine benzer ortak noktaları olan iki VNSA çalışılmıştır; Ortadoğu'dan HAMAS (Hakarat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/İslami Direniş Hareketi) ve Uzakdoğu Asya'dan GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Özgür Aceh Hareketi). Bu iki VNSA örneğine bakarak, ABD'nin 2000'li yıllarda devlet dışı aktörlere olan yaklaşımı ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır.

1.2 Çalışmanın Amacı, Temel Motivasyonu ve Mantığı

Çalışmanın amacı, ABD'nin 2000'li yıllarda şiddet yanlısı devlet dışı aktörlere bakışını iki örnek VNSA üzerinden ortaya koymaktır. Bu anlamda, ABD'nin güvenlik ihtiyaçlarına, ulusal çıkarlarına ve VNSA'ların artan önem ve faaliyetlerine vurgu yapılmıştır. Çalışmanın temel motivasyonu, 2000'li yıllarda değişen dünya düzeni içinde, etkinliği artan VNSA'ların ABD ile nasıl bir etkileşime girdikleri ve ABD yönetimlerinin VNSA'lara gösterdiği farklı reaksiyonların ulaştığı sonuçlardır. Tezin mantığı, bir VNSA'nın barışçıl bir sonuca ulaşabilmesinin veya tam aksi olarak ulaşamamasının asıl sebebinin ABD ile o evsahibi ülke/parent state (İsrail ve Endonezya) arasındaki ilişkinin mahiyeti olduğudur. Tezin literature katkısı da bu çerçevede olmuştur.

1.3 Problem Cümlesi

ABD Endonezya'daki GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Özgür Aceh Hareketi)'ne karşı aktif bir uzlaştırıcı/kapsayıcı yaklaşım gösterirken, Filistin'deki HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya/İslami Mukavemet Hareketi)'a karşı neden aynı yaklaşımı gösterememiştir?

1.4 Literatür Taraması ve Çalışmanın Odak Noktası

Literatür taraması

NSA/VNSA'ların çok geniş bir yelpazede faaliyet göstermeleri nedeniyle bu tezin literatür taraması da detaylı olmuştur. Bu çerçevede, ilk önce Silahlı Çatışma (Armed Conflict) ve İç Savaş (Civil War) literatürü üzerinde yoğunlaşarak devlet dışı aktörlerin silahlı çatışmalar ve iç savaşlardaki rollerine baktım ve VNSA'ların Silahlı Çatışmalardan ziyade İç Savaşlarda rol aldıklarını tespit ettim. Daha sonra, NSA/VNSA'ların tiplerini ve onların bölgesel ve uluslararası çatışmalar kapsamındaki yasal durumlarını inceledim. Yukarıda da ifade ettiğim gibi, NSA/VNSA yelpazesi çok geniştir ve bu tezin kapsamını aşmaktadır. Alan G. Stolberg (2006) tarafından belirlenmiş NSA/VNSA kriterlerini ben de kullandım ve

devlet dışı aktörleri dört ana başlık altında topladım; Uluslararası Organizasyonlar (International Organizations/IOs), Uluslararası Rejimler (/International Regimes/IRs), Hükümet Dışı Organizasyonlar (Non-governmental Organizations/NGOs), ve VNSA olarak da adlandırılan Silahlı Unsurlar ve Terörist Gruplar. VNSA'ları da işlev ve amaçları açısından sınırlandırmak durumunda kaldım. Çünkü, eline bir silah alan ve özel bir amaçla bunu kullanmayı düşünen tek bir fert bile bir VNSA olarak görülebilir. VNSA'ları işlev ve kapasite olarak sınırlarken de Bremer ve Palmer (2002)'in çalışmasından faydalandım. Bir şiddet yanlısı grubun VNSA olarak kabul görmesi için dört özelliğe sahip olması gereklidir. Birinci olarak, bir VNSA'nın yalnız gezen kişilerden değil bir gruptan müteşekkil olması gereklidir. İkinci olarak, VNSA'nın asıl faaliyeti şiddet ve terör olmalıdır. Üçüncüsü, bir VNSA'nın bir ideolojisi ve siyasi hedefi olmalıdır. Dördüncüsü de, bir VNSA'nın şiddet yöntemleri olarak, bombalama, adam kaçırma, sabotaj ve benzeri infial yaratan hareketleri kullanması gerekmektedir. Tezin bu bölümünde, NSA/VNSA'ların uluslararası toplum önündeki yasal konumuna da atıfta bulundum. Geleneksel olarak, uluslararası hukukun merkezinde devlet vardır ve devlet bu ayrıcalığını herhangi bir kurum-aktör ile paylaşmak istemez. Devlet, özellikle de VNSA'lara kendi çıkarları açısından yaklaşır ve onları muhatap almak, onlarla aynı platformda bulunmak istemez. Ancak eğer önemli olan silahlı bir çatışmaya çözüm bulmak ve barışı sağlamak ise, bu çatışmanın tarafı olan devlet kendisini bu çatışmanın diğer bir tarafı olan VNSA'dan daha önemli ve ayrıcalıklı görmemelidir. Math Noortmann (2002)'in da ifade ettiği gibi, NSA/VNSA'ların etkinlik ve roller 2000'li yıllarda tahmin edilenin çok üzerinde artmıştır ve bu aktörlerin de uluslararası hukuk önünde ciddiye alınması ve kimliklerinin tanınması bir zorunluluk haline gelmiştir. Uluslararası Adalet Divanı (International Court of Justice /ICJ) gibi hukuki birimlerin de görüşleri bu yöndedir.

Literatür taraması kapsamında son olarak da VNSA'ların yerel, bölgesel ve uluslararası seviyelerini inceleyerek VNSA'ların kendi bünyelerindeki unsurlarla, mücadele ettikleri devletle ve hegemon güç olan ABD ile olan ilişkilerine baktım. Bu çalışmada HAMAS ve GAM'a ilave olarak farklı coğrafyalarda vücut bulmuş olan beş farklı VNSA daha incelenmiştir. Bunlar; Kolombiya Devrimci Silahlı Güçleri (Armed Forces of Colombia/FARC), El Salvador Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi

(Farabundo Martí Liberation Front of El Salvador/FMLN), Kosova Özgürlük Ordusu (Kosovo Liberation Army/KLA), İrlanda Cumhuriyet Ordusu (Irish Republican Army/IRA), ve Allah'ın Partisi (Party of God/Hezbollah).

Çalışmanın odak noktası

Literatür taraması her ne kadar NSA/VNSA'ların geniş bir çerçeve içindeki rollerini ve artan faaliyetlerini ve önemlerini gözler önüne sermişse de, asıl odak noktası VNSA'ların hem yerel, hem bölgesel hem de uluslararası seviyelerdeki aktörlerle olan ilişkileridir. Yerel seviyede, VNSA'nın iç yapısı ve yetenekleri/sınırlılıklarını ortaya koydum. Bir VNSA hangi coğrafyada yer alırsa alsın, askeri, siyasi, sosyal durumları açısından benzer özelliklere sahiptirler. Bölgesel seviyede, VNSA'nın mücadele ettiği devlet ile olan ilişkilerini çalıştım. Görünen odur ki, bir VNSA ile mücadele ettiği devlet arasındaki ilişki şiddete dayalı bir ikili ilişkidir. Bu ilişkide bir çok iniş ve çıkışlar olmasına rağmen, ilişki hiç bir zaman kesintiye uğramaz, değişik yönetmelerle devam eder. Uluslararası seviyede hem HAMAS ve GAM'ın hem de ilave olarak beş farklı VNSA'nın hegemon devlet ABD ile olan ilişkilerini inceledim. Bunu yaparken amacım ABD ve İsrail devleti arasındaki çok özel ilişkinin altını çizmek ve GAM ile dünyanın farklı coğrafyalarında faaliyet gösteren VNSA'ların ortak noktalarını vurgulamaktı.

1.5 Tezin Temel Argümanı

Bu çalışmanın temel argümanı, Amerikan yönetimlerinin Endonezya'nın Aceh sorununa barışçıl bir çözüm bulmaları ancak aynı başarıyı, zaman zaman gelinen bazı ümit verici gelişmelere rağmen, Filistin sorununda aynı başarıyı gösterememiş olmalarıdır. Çeyrek asırlık bir şiddet ve terör sonrasında Özgür Aceh Hareketi/GAM 2005 yılında silah bırakmaya ve Endonezya siyasi yelpazesi içinde barışçıl bir siyasi partiye dönüşmeye ikna edilmiştir. Ancak, kurulduğu 1987 yılından bugüne yine çeyrek asırlık bir şiddet ve teröre rağmen HAMAS şiddeti ve terörü terketmemiş ve Filistin sorunu bünyesinde barışçıl bir siyasi oluşum konumuna gelememiştir. Tezin bütünlüğü içerisinde incelendiğinde, bu iki farklı sonucun temel nedeni hegemon güç olan ABD'nin İsrail ve Endonezya ile olan ilişkileri ve bu ilişkiler ışığında bu iki

devletin HAMAS ve GAM'a olan yaklaşımlarıdır. Bu bağlamda, şunu söylemek mümkündür; Endonezya, 1990'ların başından itibaren Aceh sorununun çözümü için siyasi bir "iyi niyet" takip ederken, İsrail geleneksel soğuk savaş yılları siyasetine bağlı kalmış ve HAMAS'a yaklaşımının temelinde adeta bir "sömürgeci devlet" mantığını takip etmiştir.

1.6 Metodolojik Değerlendirme

Bu tez, nitel bir çalışmadır ve iki vaka analizi (HAMAS ve GAM) içermekte, bu iki vakayı birbiri ile kıyaslamaktadır.

Zaman Aralığı

Tez, soğuk savaş öncesi ve sonrası yıllarda uluslararası ilişkilerde meydana gelen olaylara atıfta bulunmasına ve devlet-devlet dışı aktör ilişkilerini incelemesine rağmen, esas itibarı ile 2000-2016 yılları arasındaki olayları, ve özellikle de Amerikan Başkanları Bush ile Obama dönemlerini incelemektedir.

Yöntem

Tez daha çok ikincil kaynaklar kullanılarak mukayeseli analiz ve tarihsel anlatımdan oluşan bir kompozisyon içerisinde toplam 6 bölümde detaylandırılmıştır. Her ne kadar zaman zaman detaylı tarihi anlatımlara baş vurulmuşsa da, elde edilen veriler daha çok analitik değerlendirmeler ile ortaya konmuştur. Bu bağlamda, tarihsel olaylara, arşiv dokümanlarına, resmi dokümanlara ve siyasi deklarasyonlara müracaat edilmiş ve yüz yüze görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Bu kaynaklar, sorgulayıcı bir yaklaşımla analiz edilmiş, elde edilen bulgular kapsamında çalışmaya derinlik ve açıklık kazandırılmıştır. Bu amaçla başvuru kaynakları arasında gazeteler, üniversiteler tarafından yayınlanan metinler, önde gelen yazarların akademik kitap ve makaleleri de vardır. Tez yazılırken, araştırma sorusuna atıfta bulunan tamamlayıcı sorular sormaya, ve bu soruların cevapları aranırken HAMAS ile GAM'ı sistematik bir şekilde mukayese etmeye gayret edilmiştir.

1.7 Tezin Yapısı

Bu tez, toplam altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde (Giriş), Araştırma Sorusu, İnceleme, Literatüre Yapılan Katkı ve Metodoloji konuları yer almaktadır. İkinci Bölümde (Literatür Taraması) yapılmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde Amerikan dış siyaset prensipleri incelenmiştir. Amerikan dış siyaset prensiplerinin geri planını, ortak akılı ve tarihsel gelişimini anlamadan 2000’li yıllarda ABD’nin devlet dışı aktörlere yaklaşımını anlamak mümkün olamazdı. Bu inceleme özellikle iki açıdan önem arz etmektedir. Birincisi ABD dış politikasını şekillendiren hususlardır. Örneğin, (i)Amerikan başkanlarının eğitimlerinin geri planı ve yetiştirme tarzları ile onların ABD dış siyaseti üzerindeki etkileri, (ii)Amerikan toplumunun dış dünyaya, özellikle de Yahudi ve Arap toplumları ile Endonezya ve Aceh toplumlarına bakışları, (iii)ABD içinde yer alan lobilerin ve diasporaların ABD başkanları ve toplumu üzerindeki etkisi, (iv)Amerikan Dışişleri Bakanlığının tarihsel süreç içinde elde ettiği dış politika deneyimleri ve dersleri ile dış politika prensiplerini uygulamada karşılaştığı iniş ve çıkışlar. İkincisi de Ortadoğu ve Güneydoğu Asya bölgesel güçlerinin ve bu coğrafyalarda faaliyet gösteren VNSA’ların ABD’ye olan yaklaşımlarını anlayabilmektir. Bu bölüm içerisinde dikkati çeken bir diğer husus da hem ABD yönetimlerinin hem de bahse konu VNSA’ların hem birbirlerine hem de bölge ülkelerine karşı sergiledikleri realist yaklaşım tarzları ve etkili olma çabalarıdır. Bu bölümde son olarak da; Amerikan dış işlerinin temelini oluşturan ortak akıl ile soğuk savaş sonrası uluslararası toplum tarafından ABD’ye atfedilen görevler ve roller de incelenmiştir. Bunlar; (i)tek kutuplu dünya düzeninin yasallığı, (ii)ABD’nin tek kutuplu düzen içindeki düzenleyici rolü ve görevleri, (iii)hegemon devlet olarak ABD’nin ulusal çıkarları.

Dördüncü ve Beşinci bölümlerde mukayeseli bir şekilde HAMAS ve GAM analizleri yapılarak, bu iki benzer VNSA’ya yapılan milli çıkar ve güvenlik arayışı odaklı iki farklı ABD yaklaşımı ortaya konmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, VNSA’ların iç ve dış etkileşimlerine ait argüman birbiri ile bağlantılı dört çember üzerinde bina edilmeye çalışılmıştır. İlk çember, HAMAS ve GAM’ın kendi toplumları ve iç organları ile olan ilişkileridir. Bu iç organları; bağımsızlık bildirgeleri, sosyal hareket kapasiteleri ile siyasi-toplumsal ve askeri imkan ve yetenekleridir. Bu çerçevede,

HAMAS bağımsızlık bildirgesi GAM ile mukayese edildiğinde bazı zorlukları içermektedir, çünkü bildirgenin tamamı değiştirilmesi mümkün olmayan ve Yahudi toplumunu hedef alan Kuran surelerinden oluşmaktadır. İkinci çember HAMAS ve GAM'ın mücadele ettikleri devletler olan İsrail ve Endonezya ile olan ilişkileri üzerinedir. Bir VNSA'nın şiddeti bırakıp siyasi bir kimlik kazanması önemlidir, ancak eğer bu devlet dışı aktör ile mücadele ettiği devlet barış, adalet, insan hakları, demokrasi, istikrar ve benzer değerler üzerinde bir ortak anlayışa sahip değillerse, çözüm yolunda ilerlemeleri mümkün değildir. Üçüncü çember, HAMAS ve GAM'ın hegemon devlet ABD ile olan ilişkileri ve kendilerini uluslararası toplumun beklediği barışa doğru değiştirme-transforme etmeleri üzerinedir. Dördüncü çember ise ABD ile mücadele edilen iki devlet (İsrail ve Endonezya) arasındaki ilişkilerin önemi ve mahiyeti üzerinedir. Tezin, literature olan katkısını da içeren bu dördüncü çember önemlidir çünkü, Filistin ve Aceh sorununa çözüm yolu bulma olasılığı ABD ile İsrail ve ABD ile Endonezya arasındaki ilişkilerin ilgili ülke çıkarları ile ne kadar çakıştığı, “siyasi iyi niyetin” ne kadar canlı tutulduğu, ve mücadele edilen devletler olara İsrail ile Endonezya'nın barışa giden yolda ne kadar demokratik davrandıkları ile doğrudan alakalıdır.

Altıncı bölümde, ulaşılan sonuçlar ve gelecekte yapılacak çalışmalar için öneriler yer almaktadır.

1.8 Tartışma ve sonuç bölümleri

Bu tezin sonuç bölümünde bir temel bulguya ve on adet ikinci dereceli bulguya ulaşılmıştır.

Temel Bulgu

Yapılan literatür taraması göstermiştir ki, tezin omurgasını oluşturan ilk üç çember NSA/VNSA'ların bölgesel/küresel ölçeklerde bir güç olarak ortaya çıkmaları ile paralel olarak daha önceden değişik platformlarda zamanlarda incelenmiş, ancak bu incelemelerde daha çok konunun şiddet-terör boyutları ele alınmıştır. Dördüncü çember olan hegemon devlet (ABD)-mücadele edilen devlet (İsrail-Endonezya)

ilişkileri ve bu ilişkilerin VNSA (HAMAS-GAM) üzerine olan etkileri ise ele alınmamıştır. Bu bağlamda, tezin temel bulgusu da bu dördüncü çember üzerine odaklanmıştır.

ABD-Mücadele edilen devlet ilişkilerinin ileri çıkan özelliği karmaşık devletler-devlet dışı aktörler arası ilişkilerdeki “siyasi iyi niyetin” mevcudiyeti veya yokluğudur. Soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde, demokrasi ve iyi niyet anlayışının yükselmesi ile birlikte birçok bölgesel sorun barış ile neticelenmiş ve ilgili VNSA’lar kendi bölgelerinde şiddeti terketmiş ve barışçıl siyasi oluşumlar olarak transforme olmuşlardır. Bu VNSA’ların içinde 2005 yılında Endonezya ile özel otonomi karşılığı barış anlaşması imzalayan ve Endonezya siyasi yelpazesi içerisinde barışçıl siyasi bir partiye dönüşen GAM da vardır. Bu barış anlaşmasının geri planında üç faktör önemli rol oynamıştır; (i)Endonezya’da 1990’ların başında Suharto döneminden sonra oluşan demokratik atmosfer, (ii)bölgedeki Amerikan stratejik çıkarlarının güçlülüğü ve küresel terörizmin Güneydoğu Asya’ya yayılmasının önlenmesine dönük müşterek gayretler, (iii)Endonezya siyasi liderlerinin Aceh sorununun çözümü için siyasal iyi niyeti sonuna kadar muhafaza etme kararlılıkları. Netice olarak, sorunun en başından beri bağımsızlık için mücadele veren GAM 1990’ların başında oluşmaya başlayan bu elverişli siyasi şartlara daha fazla karşı duramamış ve Aceh bölgesine özel otonomi verilmesi karşılığı şiddeti ve törörü bırakarak barışa razı olmuştur. 11 Eylül terör saldırıları sonrası, ABD ve Endonezya ikili ilişkileri ve küresel teröre karşı müşterek toplantıları artırarak Aceh sorunu için olumlu bir atmosfer yaratmışlardır. Bu çerçevede, Endonezya hükümetinin soruna karşı gösterdiği iyi niyet ve demokratikleşme süreci iki amaç gütmüştür; birincisi toprakları üzerinde uzun yıllardır devam eden ve adeta kanayan bir yara olan Aceh sorununu sona erdirmek ve herhangi bir küresel terör örgütünün bu sorun yüzünden bölgede kök salmasına ve ülke barışını dinamitlemesine engel olmak. Bu iki amaç ABD’nin bölge politikaları ile de uyumluydu.

Ancak durum HAMAS ve Filistin sorunu için aynı değildir. Bu sorunun çözümü için yapılan barış görüşmelerinin sekteye uğramasındaki temel faktörlerin başında, Filistin sorununun Aceh sorunu ile karşılaştırıldığında daha karmaşık bir yapı arz etmesi ve ABD-İsrail ilişkilerinin Filistin sorununa çok yoğun bir etki yapması

gelmektedir. Tezin dördüncü bölümünde detaylı olarak incelenen ABD ve İsrail devletleri arasındaki özel bağ ABD'nin Filistin sorununa olan yaklaşımını derin şekilde ve olumsuz bir istikamette etkilemektedir. ABD'nin Filistin sorunu karşısındaki tutumu ABD'nin bölge çıkarları ve küresel görünümü ile ne kadar çelişirse çelişsin, Amerikan yönetimleri İsrail politikalarını desteklemeye ve İsrail devleti ile aynı paralelde yürümeye devam etmiştir. ABD ile İsrail arasındaki bu çok özel bağ tezin bütünlüğü içinde bir çok defa vurgulandığı gibi, bir demet tarihi, siyasi, stratejik faktörler tarafından şekillenmiş, adeta alçıya alınmıştır.

Bu faktörlerin bir bileşimi olarak Filistin toprakları üzerindeki İsrail kolonyal anlayışını görmek mümkündür. Günümüzde de devam eden İsrail kolonyal politikaları 19ncu ve 20nci yüzyıl Avrupa-Amerika sömürgeci genişlemesinin adeta bir uzantısı ve benzeri durumundadır ve bir coğrafyadaki sömürge güç ile bu güce karşı mücadele eden yerli toplumun karşı koymasını çağrıştırmaktadır. Önceki yüzyıllardan insanlığa kötü bir miras olarak kalan kolonyal anlayış, İkinci Dünya Harbi ile birlikte silinmiştir ancak iki coğrafyada varlığını sürdürmeye devam etmiştir; İsrail devleti eli ile Filistin'de ve Endonezya devleti eli ile Aceh'te. Bu mirasın izleri her iki bölgede de gözle görünür derecededir ancak, Filistin'de daha yoğundur, çünkü, kolonyal anlayış İsrail'in Endonezya'nın Aceh sorununun çözümünde başat rol oynayan "siyasi iyi niyetini" ortaya koymasına engel olmaktadır. Bilinir ki, siyasi iyi niyet demokratik kazanımların ön plana çıktığı durumlarda ancak aktif rol oynarken, kolonyal anlayışın süregeldiği bir ortamda yaşama şansı bulamamaktadır. Bunun yanında, İsrail'in bir devlet olarak ortaya çıkışı da 19ncu ve 20nci yüzyıl kolonyal anlayışın bir projesidir. Siyonizmin Britanya kolonyal uygulamaları ile eşgüdüm ve işbirliği içinde çalışmasının en göz alıcı neticelerinden birisi de şudur; Britanya mandası Filistinde 15 Mayıs 1948 tarihinde sona erdiği gün, İsrail devleti bağımsızlığını ilan etmiştir. Bağımsızlığı müteakip İsrail devleti dikkatini ve gücünü iki yöne kanalize etmiştir; birincisi, yeni devletin sınırlarını Arap devletlerine karşı muhafaza etmek, ve ikincisi İsrail devletinin etkisini ve gücünü işgal edilen topraklarda, adeta bir sömürge devlet siyaseti ve mantığı ile artırmak. İsrail gücünü ve tepkisini artırmak amacıyla işgal edilen topraklarda Yahudi yerleşim bölgeleri kurmaya başlamış, 1967 savaşı sonunda işgal edilen Batı Şeria, Gazze, Golan tepeleri gibi bölgelerde yeni yerleşim bölgeleri

kurmaya başlamıştır. Bağımsızlık tarihi ile 1967 savaşı arasında geçen yaklaşık 20 yıl içerisinde 700’den fazla yerleşim merkezi kurularak adeta bir koloniyal uygulama örneği verilmiş, bunun neticesi olarak da Filistinli mülteciler sorunu ortaya çıkmıştır. ABD’nin İsrail’e yaptığı ekonomik yardım paketleri içerisinde “yerleşim merkezi inşaatı” başlığı altında bir kalemin olması ilginçtir. Taraflar arasında yapılan barış görüşmelerindeki en çetin konulardan birisi Filistinli mülteciler sorunu ve Yahudi yerleşim merkezleridir.

11 Eylül 2001 tarihi sonrasında dünya siyasetinde derin sarsıntılar ve değişiklikler olurken, İsrail Filistin sorununa olan bakışında herhangi bir değişikliğe gitmemiş ve koloniyal anlayışını HAMAS’I yok etmeyi amaçlayan askeri güce dayanan operasyonlar, izolasyon, ambargo gibi uygulamalarla daha da sıkı şekilde devam ettirmiştir. Amerikan ve İsrail yönetimleri Filistin sorununa “war on terror-teröre karşı savaş” mantığı ile yaklaşmışlar ve HAMAS aynen El Kaide terör örgütü gibi görülerek dışlanmıştır. Özellikle Bush yönetimi zamanında (2000-2008) İsrail tarafından teröre karşı savaş mantığı ile yürütülen Filistin operasyonları ABD yönetiminden azami hoşgörü görmüştür. Ancak 2008 sonrası Obama döneminde, Ortadoğu’da, Bush yönetiminin hatalarını onarmak amacına dayalı daha yapıcı ve dengeli bir ABD dış politikası izledik. Bu bağlamda, Obama yönetimi ilk olarak Irak ve Afganistan hareket alanlarındaki askeri birliklerini geri çekmeye başladı. İkinci adım olarak ABD yönetimi kriz bölgelerinde zorlayıcı ve önleyici askeri operasyonlar yapmak yerine müttefik ülkelerle (2013 Libya iç savaşında olduğu gibi) ve uluslararası kuruluşlarla işbirliğine gitmeyi tercih etmiştir. Üçüncü adım olarak Obama yönetimi özellikle Arap ülkeleri nezdinde bozulan imajını düzeltmek ve Irak ve Afganistan operasyonları ile ortaya çıkan anti-Amerikan rüzgarlarını dindirmek istemiştir. Başkan Obama ve ekibi adeta, Filistin sorununda İsrail’e verilen koşulsuz desteğin küresel terörizm ile olan mücadeleye bir katkısının olmadığını ve Arap İsrail sorununa kalıcı bir çözümün Arap ülkelerindeki radikal oluşumların çözülmesine ve Ortadoğudaki Amerikan çıkarlarına katkıda bulunacağına inanmış görünüyordular. Bu nedenle Başkan Obama hem Ortadoğu hem de Uzakdoğu Asya’da vücut bulan terör sorunlarına aynı amaçla yaklaştı; Müslüman ülkelerle ABD arasında karşılıklı güvene dayalı iyi ilişkiler tesis etmek ve demokrasiyi, insan haklarını, liberal ekonomiyi ve hukukun üstünlüğünü ön plana çıkarmak. Bu hedeflerin gerçekleşmesi

uluslararası teröre karşı bir çare olabilir ve küresel güvenliği ve işbirliğini artırabilirdi. Ancak, bu barış ve demokrasi yanlısı adımlar bile Filistin sorunu üzerinde ılıman bir iklimin oluşmasını ve İsrailin koloniyal mantığını yumuşatmasını etkileyecek bir siyasi iyi niyetin ortaya çıkmasını sağlayacak sonuçları doğuramadı.

İkinci Dereceli Bulgular

Tezin ulaştığı **ikinci derecede bulgulardan** da kısaca bahsetmek gerekirse, bunları on başlık altında toplamak mümkündür. **Birinci bulgu**, HAMAS ve GAM'ın iç yapıları ile ilgilidir. Bu iki VNSA arasındaki ortak iç dinamik, her ikisinin de mücadele ettikleri toplumların sosyal hareketlerini aktive etme ve onları harekete geçirme yetenekleridir. Her iki VNSA da hem Aceh hem de Filistin toplumlarının mali, insan gücü, silah, teknoloji, lojistik, eğitim ve benzer yeteneklerini ve güçlerini bir amaç doğrultusunda harekete geçirmişlerdir. Diğer yandan her iki VNSA da aşırı mülteci sorunları küresel kamuoyunun gündemine getirebilmiş ve hem onların hem de komşu ülkelerde ve ABD'de yaşayan diasporalarının desteğini alabilmişlerdir. HAMAS ve GAM arasındaki en önemli farklılık bağımsızlık bildirgeleridir. GAM bağımsızlık bildirgesi (1976) seküler ve devrimci bir karakter taşıırken, HAMAS bağımsızlık bildirgesi (1988) İslami bir karakter taşır ve Kurana atıf yapar. GAM bildirgesi özelliği dolayısı ile barış görüşmelerinde herhangi bir sürtüşme yaratmamıştır. Çünkü GAM'ın hedefinde yok edilecek bir başka toplum yoktur, saygı duyulacak bir bağımsızlık ideali vardır. Diğer yandan, HAMAS bağımsızlık bildirgesi tam 35 adet Kuran ayetlerinden müteşekkildir ve Yahudi toplumu açıktan hedef olarak gösterilmekte, yok edilmesi istenmektedir. Bu durum bildirgede herhangi bir olası değişikliğe imkan vermemektedir ve HAMAS yönetimini uluslararası toplum önünde zor bir konuma sokmaktadır. HAMAS bağımsızlık bildirgesi hem İsrail hem de Batılı kaynaklar tarafından HAMAS şiddet ve terör eylemlerinin kaynağı olarak gösterilmektedir. Her ne kadar HAMAS önde gelen yöneticileri bu bildirgenin bir öneminin olmadığını ve Filistin toplumunu bir arada tutmayı hedeflediğini ifade etseler de, mevcut hali ile bildirge bir handikap olmaya devam etmektedir.

İkinci bulgu, Filistin ve Aceh toplumlarının sosyal hareket olarak güçleri ve bu toplumların liberal ve totaliter demokrasi tipleri karşısındaki konumları hakkındadır. HAMAS kimlik ve ideoloji bağlamında güçlü bir sosyal harekettir ve İslam dininden gelen bir inanç ve değerler bütünü savunur. Bu ideoloji HAMAS'a gönül veren şahısların kimliğini şekillendirir ve onlara kim olduklarını ve nasıl davranmaları gerektiğini söyler. Ancak bu ideoloji batı toplumlarına benzer bir sağlıklı toplumun gelişmesine engel olur. Çünkü bu tür bir kimlik oluşumu liberal/özgürlükçü demokrasilerden ziyade totaliter demokrasilerde görülür. Liberal demokrasi demokrasiyi günlük hayatın bir deneme yanılma uygulaması olarak görür ve kişisel davranışlara çok geniş bir yer verir. Ancak totaliter demokrasilerde tek ve karşı konulmaz bir gerçek vardır, bu da dine dayanır. Bu karşı konulmaz gerçek bir dogmadır ve toplumu karşı koymaksızın bir mükemmel hedefe doğru iter ve bir karşı koymayı kabul etmez. Burada siyaset dini anlayışın bir sanatı olarak görülür ve din sosyal hayatın her alanına hakimdir. HAMAS'ın liberal bir demokrasiden yana olduğunu ifade etmek çok zordur ve Müslüman Kardeşler felsefesinin Filistin kolu olarak totaliter bir toplumsal yapıyı desteklemektedir. Diğer yandan GAM'ın sosyal yapısı HAMAS ile benzerlikler ve farklılıklar göstermektedir. HAMAS gibi GAM da toplumsal çimento olarak İslam dinini kullanmaktadır ancak Endonezya içinde herhangi bir İslami hükümet arayışında olmamıştır ve 1953-73 yılları içinde Endonezya'da faal olan ve İslami yönetim için mücadele eden Darül İslam hareketi ile bir organik bağ kurmamıştır. GAM'ın bu yaklaşımı, Endonezya hükümetinin barış tekliflerine daha ılımlı yaklaşmasına imkan sağlayan sebeplerden birisi olarak görülebilir. Bu bağlamda GAM Aceh toplumunun laik ve ılımlı Endonezya rejimi ile entegre bir şekilde yaşamasına karşı çıkmamıştır.

Üçüncü bulgu İsrail ve Endonezya devletlerinin ayrılıkçı hareketlere karşı uyguladıkları politikaların benzerliği hakkındadır. Görünen odur ki, hem İsrail devletinin hem de 1970-80'lerin Endonezya'sının ayrılıkçı hareketlere karşı reaksiyonu aynıdır. Bu reaksiyon basit olarak "zorlayıcı gücün kullanılması" olarak tanımlanabilir. Hem HAMAS hem de GAM ayrılıkçı bir güç olarak ortaya çıktıkları tarihten itibaren mücadele ettikleri devletler tarafından ezilmesi ve yok edilmesi gereken birer askeri hedef olarak görülmüşlerdir. Bu yaklaşım en basit anlatımla, Soğuk Savaş yıllarının devletler-arası siyasetinin bir uzantısıydı ancak doğal olarak

karşı taraftan misilleme ve şiddetin tırmanması sonucunu doğurdu. 1987 ve 2000 Filistin intifadaları özü itibariyle İsrail devlet şiddetine karşı, 2000 yılındaki GAM başkaldırısı da Endonezya devlet şiddetine karşı meydana gelmiş sosyal ve siyasal ayaklanmalar olarak görülebilir.

Dördüncü bulgu, VNSA'ların bölgeleri içinde tahmin edilenin üstünde bir öneme haiz oldukları yönündedir. Artık VNSA'lar Soğuk Savaş döneminde olduğu gibi desteği bir ülkeden (SSCB gibi) almıyorlar ancak ideolojik oluşumlardan alıyorlar. Bu ideolojileri sadece etnik milliyetçiliğe değil, dine-mezhebe ve evrensel değerlere de dayanmaktadır. Tezin bütünlüğü içerisinde ifade edildiği gibi, bir devlet ile mukayese edildiğinde HAMAS ve GAM'ın siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri güçleri çok sınırlıdır. Rakip devletin bir saldırısından korunmak için düzenli ordu veya kışlalar kurmazlar. Bu sınırlılıklarına rağmen VNSA'ların güçlü bir sosyal hareket kapasitesi vardır ve bunlar karizmatik liderlerin idare ettiği geleneksel bir hiyerarşi ile yönetilirler. VNSA'ların sesleri içinde yaşadıkları toplumların güçlü yönlerini harekete geçirebildikleri oranda çıkabilmektedir. HAMAS ve GAM bunu başarmışlardır.

Beşinci bulgu, HAMAS ve GAM'ın şiddet yanlısı militan bir yapıdan sorumlu bir siyasi oluşuma dönüşebilme yetenekleri ile ilgilidir. HAMAS ortaya çıktığından beri Filistin sorunu içinde iki başlı ve faydacı/pragmatist bir siyaset izlemektedir; İsrail devletine karşı cihad/dava/şiddet içeren devrimci bir yaklaşım, Gazze Şeridi içindeki Filistin toplumuna karşı İslami bir hayat tarzını benimsemiş reformist bir yaklaşım. Bu iki başlı siyasetin dışarıya yansımaları olumlu değildir. Hem Batılı devletler, hem İsrail ve hem de komşu Arap devletleri bu ikili siyaset yüzünden HAMAS'ın daha barışçı bir kimliğe bürünmesini kolaylaştıracak adımlar atmak yerine onu zayıflatacak ve şiddete itecek politikalar ve ambargolar uygulamışlardır. Bu politikalar neticesinde Batı Şeria ile Gazze arasındaki ekonomik-sosyal uçurum daha da büyümüş ve Filistin dayanışması ve birliği zayıflamıştır. Bunun da ötesinde İsrail ve HAMAS arasındaki ilişkiler adeta bir “şiddet diyaloguna” dönüşmüştür. Bu diyalog çerçevesinde hem HAMAS hem de İsrail devleti terörü ve şiddeti siyasetlerinin bir aracı olarak görmüşlerdir. HAMAS intihar bombacıları ve roketler üzerinden terörist saldırıları düzenlerken, İsrail tüm Filistin’de ve özellikle Gazze’de “şok ve dehşet” ve “bul ve öldür” operasyonları yapmıştır. HAMAS kuruluş tarihi

olan 1987 ile 2006 yılları arasında şiddeti ve terörü yoğun olarak kullanırken, 2006'dan sonra özellikle de Gazze'de hakimiyet kurduktan sonra adeta bir savunma ve mevcudiyetini koruma ve güçlendirme siyaseti gütmeye başlamıştır. 2006 yılından itibaren HAMAS adeta devrimsel bir karakterden reformist bir yapıya doğru dönüşmeye gayret etmektedir. Bunu yapmanın amacında, hem askeri, ekonomik ve sosyal altyapısını muhafaza etmek hem de küresel kamuoyu önünde haklı olmak ve sempati kazanmak, hem de uluslararası kurumların mali ve siyasi desteğini sağlamak yatmaktadır.

Altıncı bulgu, tezin ikinci bölümünde detaylı olarak izah edildiği üzere ABD'nin yeni küresel düzen içindeki rolü ve görevleri ile ilgilidir. Bunları üç başlık altında toplamak mümkündür; (i)tek kutuplu dünya düzeninin yasallığı, (ii)ABD'nin tek kutuplu düzen içindeki düzenleyici rol ve görevleri, (iii)hegemon devlet olarak ABD'nin ulusal çıkarları. Görüldüğü üzere, bu üç husus ABD'ye daha önceki hiç bir dönemde görülmemiş fırsatlar sunmaktadır. Bu yeni dönemde ABD dış politika esaslarını devletçi ve güvenlikçi bir merkeze oturtmuştur. Hem Filistin sorununa hem de Aceh sorununa yaklaşırken bu üç prensibe bağlı kalmıştır. ABD'nin 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası Endonezya ile olan ilişkileri bir ülkenin istediği zaman diğer bir ülke ile olan siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik esaslı ilişkilerini ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda yeniden nasıl tanzim edeceğine dair çok güzel bir örnek oluşturur. Aceh sorunu bu yeni ilişki yumağının güçlenmesinin temel sebebi olmuştur. Aceh sorununun çözümü için gösterilen gayretler, hem Endonezyanın hem de ABD'nin ulusal çıkarları açısından, hem küresel terörün sınırlandırılması açısından hem de GAM'ın taleplerinin kısmen de olsa karşılanması ve Aceh toplumunun refahı açısından olumlu sonuçlar vermiştir. Burada akla gelen hayati soru şudur; ABD, Filistin sorununun sürüncemede kalmasının hem Ortadoğu barışına hem de kendi ulusal çıkarlarına olan olumsuz etkilerini daha ne kadar süre görmezden gelecektir?

Yedinci bulgu, Amerikan yönetimlerinin Ortadoğu'ya ve Filistin sorununa olan bakışını şekillendiren ortak akıl/common wisdom'ın tek taraflı yaklaşımı ile ilgilidir. Bu ortak akıl üç alanda hissedilmektedir. Birincisi, Amerikan başkanlarının yetişme şartları ve dış siyasetteki belirleyici rolleridir. İkincisi, Amerikan toplumunun dış dünyaya ve Ortadoğu toplumlarına bakışı ve etkin Yahudi lobisi ve medyasının

rolüdür. Üçüncüsü Amerikan Dışışleri Bakanlığının tarihsel süreç içinde elde ettiğı dış politika deneyimleri ve dersleri ile dış politika prensiplerini uygulamada karşılaştığı iniş ve çıkışlardır.

Sekizinci bulgu, VNSA'ların uluslararası siyasette artan rolleri ve bu aktörleri hasım devletler karşısında güçlü kılan toplumsal güçleri ile ilgilidir. Bu bağlamda, tez içinde, hem Filistin hem de Aceh toplumlarına atıfta bulunulmuş, HAMAS ve GAM'ın asıl güçlerinin mücadelesini verdikleri toplumlar ile olan derin ilişkiler yumağı olduğunun altı çizilmiştir. VNSA'lar artık Soğuk Savaş yıllarının izole, devlet kontrollü, suni aktörleri değildir, bilakis mücadelesini verdikleri toplumlar içinde doğan yerel ve bölgesel toplumlar tarafından çok boyutlu olarak desteklenen varlıklardır. VNSA'lar artık hem genel hem de mahalli seçimlere giriyorlar ve demokratik platformlarda siyasi bir parti olarak kabul görüyorlar. İsteklerinin kabul görmesi ve yasallıklarının onaylanması durumunda şiddetten vazgeçip barış yanlısı siyasal bir kimliğe bürünüyorlar.

Dokuzuncu bulgu, HAMAS ve GAM ile Filistin ve Aceh sorunları arasındaki benzerliklerdir. HAMAS gibi GAM da siyasi amacını koloniyal bir gücün, yani Hollanda imparatorluğunun Aceh toprakları üzerinde tarihte yaptığı haksız uygulamalara dayandırmaktadır. HAMAS gibi GAM da silahlı mücadelesinde gerilla harbi taktikleri ve yoğun terör saldırıları kullanmıştır. HAMAS gibi GAM da hasım devlet olan Endonezya'dan Aceh bölgesinin bağımsızlığı için mücadele etmiştir. Bu temel benzerliklerin yanında iki VNSA ve iki sorun arasında başka benzerlikler de bulunmaktadır. Britanya ve Hollanda Koloniyal anlayışlarının Aceh ve Filistin topraklarındaki benzer uygulamaları, Filistin ve Aceh toplumlarının İslam dini ile olan sıkı bağları, İsrail ve Endonezya devletlerinin her iki topluma yönelttiğı zorlayıcı uygulamalar ile Filistin ve Aceh toplumlarının yerel, bölgesel ve küresel aktörleri etkilemek için gösterdikleri olağanüstü gayretler bu benzerliklerdendir.

Onuncu bulgu, Filistin ve Aceh barış görüşmeleri arasındaki benzerlikler ile ilgilidir. Her iki sorunla ilgili olarak birçok barış inisiyatifi başlatılmış, ancak bunlar benzer nedenlerden dolayı sekteye uğramıştır. Aceh sorununda, 2005 yılında ulaşılan Helsinki barış sürecinden önce 2000 yılında bir barış süreci daha başlatılmıştı ancak

GAM ve Endonezya hükümetinin uzlaşmaz ve suçlayıcı tutumları nedeniyle görüşmeler kesilmişti. Bu uzlaşmaz tutum Filistin sorununun çözümü için başlatılan Oslo barış sürecinde de görülmektedir. 2003 Mart ayında İsrail'in sürece olan itirazının temelinde karşılıklı güvensizlik vardı ve Endonezya'nın reaksiyonu ile benzerlikler gösterir. Endonezya GAM'ı barış görüşmelerini bir perde olarak kullanıp militan devşirmekle, para toplamakla suçlamıştır ve bu suçlamalar İsrail'in HAMAS'a yaklaşımı ile benzerdir. Başarısız olan barış görüşmelerinin bir sebebi de, barışa ulaşılması neticesinde kayba uğrayacaklarını düşünen katı tutumlu aktörlerdir. HAMAS'ın Oslo barış sürecindeki uzlaşmaz ve baltalayıcı tutumu buna güzel bir örnek teşkil eder.

1.1 Gelecekteki Çalışmalar için Öneriler ve Çalışma Sınırlılıkları

Bu tez, 2000'li yıllarda, ABD'nin değişik coğrafyalarda yer alan VNSA'lara yaklaşımını ortaya koymayı amaçlamıştır. Çalışmanın bütünlüğü içerisinde VNSA'ların sadece politik, ekonomik, askeri yapılarından değil, onların asıl gücünü oluşturan toplumsal destekten de detaylı olarak bahsedilmiştir. Bu toplumsal destek bir siyasi amacı olan VNSA'lar için mevcuttur, ama aynı zamanda VNSA'lar ile mücadele eden her devlet için de mevcuttur. Bu devlet ister ABD gibi bir hegemon güç olsun, ister Endonezya veya İsrail gibi orta ölçekli bir devlet olsun, VNSA ile mücadele ederken kendi halk desteğini arkasına almak zorundadır. Küreselleşmenin devletleri daha şeffaf olmaya zorladığı yeni dünya düzeninde, büyüklüğü ve demokratik seviyesi ne olursa olsun her toplum hükümetlerinin yaptığı uygulamalardan haberdar olmak istemektedir. Sivil toplumun küreselleşme ile birlikte artan gücü devlet mekanizması üzerinde de etkili olmaktadır ve bu bağlamda, sorunun çözümünde sırf askeri yöntemlerin değil başka seçeneklerin de kullanılmasını talep etmektedir. Çünkü, artık güvenliğin tanımı da değişmiş, sırf askeri tedbirler ve yöntemlerle açıklanması imkansız hale gelmiştir. Yeni dünya düzeninde güvenliğin askeri yeteneklere ilaveten ekonomik, kültürel, siyasi, sosyal ve çevresel boyutları da ön plana çıkmıştır. Varılan sonuçlar da göstermektedir ki, toplumsal destek VNSA'lar için asıl güçtür, ve toplumsal destek VNSA ile mücadele eden devlet için de güçtür, ama eğer demokratik bir yaklaşım ve bir "siyasi iyi niyet" taşıyorsa. Siyasi iyi niyetini muhafaza eden Endonezya Aceh sorununu kendi

toplumunu da mutlu edecek şekilde çözerken, siyasi iyi niyeti tam anlamıyla kucaklayamayan İsrail'in gelecekteki en büyük handikapı HAMAS ile arasındaki şiddet söylemini kendi halkına anlatamaması olacaktır. Hegemon devlet ABD'nin Filistin sorununa gösterdiği İsrail yanlısı tutumun hem kendi kamuoyunda hem de küresel ölçekte daha sert şekilde irdelenmesi kaçınılmaz olacaktır. Gelecekte konu ile ilgili yapılacak çalışmalarda, dikkate alınması gereken husus, toplumun ve kamuoyunun VNSA ile mücadelede kendi devletine sağlayacağı destek ve sorunun barışçı yollarla çözülmesi yönündeki talepleri olacaktır diye değerlendirmek mümkündür.

Bu çalışma yürütülürken bazı zorluklarla karşılaşmıştır. Birincisi, teorik altyapının oluşturulmasıdır. Konu bütünlüğü içerisinde hem barış yanlısı NSA'ler hem de şiddet yanlısı VNSA'ler incelendiğinden, teorik altyapıyı hem idealist hem de realist bakış açıları ile desteklemek zorunda kalınmıştır. Ancak, hem VNSA'ların hem de devletlerin hem soğuk savaş döneminde hem de 2000'li yıllarda realist davranışlar sergilemeleri bu anlamda yol gösterici olmuştur. Diğer bir zorluk, NSA/VNSA tiplerini sınırlandırırken yaşanmıştır. Literatür taramasında bu konu üzerinde durulmuş, esas itibarı ile bağımsızlık arayan ve değişik coğrafyalarda faaliyet gösteren, ortak özelliklere sahip VNSA'lar üzerinde çalışılmıştır. Buna ilaveten, yüzyüze görüşme talebinde bulunulan Amerikalı ve Endonezyalı elçilik mensupları devletlerinin resmi ve bilinen görüşleri ve siyasetleri dışında çarpıcı katkılarda bulunmaktan kaçınmışlardır. Son olarak da, ikincil kaynakların ve medya yayınlarının ağırlıklı kısmının İsrail ve Amerikan görüşlerini savunması, özellikle HAMAS'ın 2006'dan sonraki on yıllık süre içerisindeki savunmaya dönük politikalarını ve kendisini çözüme götürecek transformasyon ve dönüşüm çabalarını kolaylıkla ifade etmede zorluklar yaratmıştır.

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