TURKISH PRESS AND THE TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS (1946-1955)

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ABSTRACT

TURKISH PRESS AND THE TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS (1946-1955)

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This thesis examined the role of the Turkish press in the course of the Turkish-Greek relations from 1946 to 1955. These two neighbors initially achieved an exceptional and unprecedented partnership to counter a perceived threat from the Soviet Union and its satellite states in a hostile atmosphere of the emerging Cold War. Over the course of the period, however, the golden age of the Turkish-Greek relations was waned, and these two partners gradually turned against each other. Using the most circulated and influential daily newspapers of the period as well as the Turkish, British and American official documents, this thesis aimed to trace the role of the Turkish press in shaping the Turkish-Greek relations and influencing the slow but sure transition of Turkey and Greece from amity to enmity. Doing so, the press played several roles at different times with different degrees such as not only propagating and circulating the existing Greek policy of the successive Turkish governments and making the public support this policy but also challenging the official agenda and mobilizing the public perceptions. The Turkish press even led the government to reshape its policies of Greece on occasion. As this thesis argued, thanks to its intermediary position between the political elite and the public, the Turkish press took an active part in the formation of the Turkish-Greek relations throughout the period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s.

Keywords: Turkish Press, Turkish-Greek Relations, Turkish Foreign Policy

ÖZ

TÜRK BASINI VE TÜRK-YUNAN İLİŞKİLERİ (1946-1955)

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Bu tez, 1946 yılından 1955 yılının bitimine kadar olan süreçte, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin seyrinde basının oynadığı rolü araştırmıştır. Bu iki komşu ülke, düşmanca bir atmosferde gelişen Soğuk Savaş koşullarında, Sovyetler Birliği'nden ve onun bölgedeki uydu devletlerinden algılanan tehditlere karşı başlangıçta olağan dışı ve eşine az rastlanır bir ortaklığı kurmayı başarmışlardır. Ancak, zaman içerisinde, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin altın çağı sona ermiş, bu iki ortak yavaş yavaş birbiriyle karşı karşıya gelmiştir. Dönemin en çok okunan ve en önemli Türk gazetelerini ve bunlara ek olarak Türk, Amerikan ve İngiliz belgelerini inceleyen bu tez, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini şekillendirmede ve ayrıca Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki ilişkide yaşanan dostluktan düşmanlığa yavaş ama kesin bir dönüşüm sürecini etkilemede basının rolünü bulmayı amaçlamıştır. Bunu yaparken basın, sadece Türk hükümetlerinin Yunanistan politikasının propagandasını yapıp bu politikayı yaygınlaştırıp halk tarafından kabulünü sağlamanın yanı sıra resmi ajandaya karşı çıkıp ona karşı toplumsal algıyı da harekete geçirmek gibi farklı zamanlarda ve farklı derecelerde değişik roller üstlenmiştir. Hatta bazı durumlarda, Türk basını hükümetin Yunanistan politikasında değişiklik yapmasına neden olmuştur. Bu tezin de iddia ettiği gibi, siyasi elit ve halk arasındaki aracı pozisyonu sayesinde, Türk basını, 1940'ların ortasından 1950'lerin ortasına kadar Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin biçimlenmesinde aktif bir rol oynamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Basını, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, Türk Dış Politikası

To my grandfather Hasan Günay

and

other graduates of Pazaröre Köy Enstitüsü

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the role of the Turkish press in reporting, interpreting and shaping the Turkish-Greek relations from 1946 to 1955, a period that saw the post-war bipolarity in international relations, known as the early Cold War, as well as the political transition in Turkey from the single-party rule to the multi-party system. Through its focus on Turkish policy toward Greece, it investigates the extent to which the Turkish press influenced the public perception of the Turkish-Greek relations and the formation of Turkish foreign policy actions toward Greece during the decade that followed the end of the Second World War.

The choice of this period is by no means an accident. It was during these years that the Turkish-Greek diplomatic relations encountered its most productive period. A partnership was achieved between these two states, witnessing one of the heydays of their political history, and even a mention of the possibility of a Turkish-Greek federation. The same period was no less important to the Turkish press itself. On the course of the political transformation that the Turkish politics underwent both at domestic and external levels, the press became a more important actor as well as a dynamic part of Turkish foreign and internal affairs.

Faced with intra-elite political competition due to this political transformation, Turkish political elite increasingly recognized the necessity and importance of managing and directing opinion of the Turkish public. Such attempts of political elite could be achieved with the instrumental role of the press and radio. The state-owned radio increasingly became the voice of the government. On the other hand, the press was not only an instrumental tool in circulating the official stance but also it was the only channel for the public to voice overtly criticism of

government policies. This was because the press was politically divided, and the oppositional voices also found a chance of representation. This power of not only repeating the official stance but also of revealing the oppositional ideas made the press an influential agency in Turkish politics. This thesis aims to see its role in Turkey's relations with Greece from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s.

For the current literature on the Turkish foreign policy, from the end of the Second World War to the mid-1960s, the 'national foreign policy' (milli dış politika) perspective prevailed the foreign policy making process in Turkey. This perspective could be summarized as the struggle against the Soviet threat, and also the communism, and the activities to strengthen the alliance with the West. Actually, it was the Turkish drive to the West that made these desires prioritized in the Turkish politics and accepted as the basis of Turkish national interest at that particular moment. As accepted as the ways of pursuing national interests, it is argued, these desires of struggling with the Soviet Union and its ideology as well as strengthening the alliance with the West dominated the Turkish foreign policy. Thus, according to the dominant tendency in the secondary literature about the Turkish foreign policy of the period, the decisions of the governments about Turkey's foreign relations were over politics in Turkey in this period. Scholars of the period argued that there was a general agreement among political parties regarding Turkish foreign policy, and opposing parties did not react to Turkey's western-oriented foreign policy accordingly. Scholars put forward such arguments not only for the pre-1950 period in which *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) (the Republican People's Party) was the governing party but also for the 1950s when *Demokrat Parti* (DP) (the Democratic Party) governed Turkey. It is, for instance, widely accepted that the direction of Turkish foreign policy during the 1950s would have been the very same if the CHP would continue to rule Turkey instead of the DP.[1]

[1] Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Dış Politika Nedir? Türkiye'deki Dünü ve Bugünü", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 35/1 (1980), p. 323; Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1969), pp. 177-178; Melih Aktaş, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü: 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Dönemi* (İstanbul: Şema Yayınevi, 2006), p. 153; Hüner Tuncer, *Menderes'in Dış Politikası: Batı'nın Güdümündeki Türkiye* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2013), pp. 163-165; Mümtaz Soysal, *Dış Politika ve Parlemento* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1964), pp. 237-240; Cemil Koçak, *İkinci Parti: Türkiye'de İki Partili Siyâsî Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları (1945-1950) - 1* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), pp. 17-18.

Aside from those who wielded political power, Turkish public is claimed to have expressed no disapproval of the foreign policy of the government. Such a claim was explicitly stated by Duygu Sezer in her book *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika* (Public Opinion and Foreign Policy). According to Sezer, the Turkish public opinion had relatively little difficulty with the Turkish foreign policy and did not challenge the government as to foreign affairs in general until 1964.[2] The reason for why Sezer chose the year of 1964 as a turning point was the Cyprus issue, which, as scholars argued, generated a peculiar problem not only in the Turkish-Greek relations but even in the Turkish-American relations at that particular time.[3]

Nonetheless, long before the mid-1960s, which is taken as a breakthrough in the studies about the Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus issue had already started to jeopardize the Turkish-Greek relations. In parallel to the limitations of the generalizations about the Turkish foreign policy, it is similarly argued that the Cyprus issue gained popularity and sparked enthusiasm amongst Turkish citizens after Turkey's Prime Minister Adnan Menderes declared the official stance of Turkey as regards the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 on the eve of the London Conference.[4] The post-Second World War Turkish-Greek relations are likewise treated by scholars, who regarded the aggravation of the Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 and the following 6-7 September events as the origin of the deterioration in relations between two countries.[5]

Such an approach, however, tends to see the shift from amity to enmity within the framework of the Turkish-Greek relations in a way that as if the shift had come

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[2] Duygu Sezer, *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), pp. 117-120.

[3] İsmail Soysal, "Türk-Amerikan Siyasi İlişkilerinin Ana Çizgileri", *Belleten*, 41/162 (1977), p. 260; Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revisited", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 29/3 (1993), pp. 505-506.

[4] Güven Gürkan Öztan, *Türkiye'de Militarizm: Zihniyet, Pratik ve Propaganda* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 139; Behlül Özkan, "Making Cyprus a National Cause in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1948-1955", *South East and Black Sea Studies*, 15/4 (2015), p. 547; Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 2010), p. 518.

[5] A. Suat Bilge, "Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği Münasebetleri", *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* I (1919-1973) (Mehmet Gönlübol, A. Haluk Ülman, A. Suat Bilge and Duygu Sezer eds.) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982), pp. 350-360; Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", Baskın Oran (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (1919-1980)* (Ankara: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p. 593; William Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası (1774-2000)* (Petek Demir trans.) (İstanbul: Mozaik Yayınları, 2003), pp. 126-133.

out of the blue or it had happened all of a sudden. In other words, such a perspective fails to explain how Turkey and Greece suddenly turned against each other during the period when the Turkish-Greek relation was in its heyday. As scholars mainly build their studies upon certain aspects of diplomatic initiatives and state-level political relations, they incline to conclude that Turkey and Greece promoted smooth relations and strengthened a unique alliance throughout the entire period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s.[6] True, the Second Balkan Pact, which Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed in 1953, was the fruit of this cooperation that was further consolidated by military premises in 1954. Yet mentioning only these diplomatic initiatives cannot provide convincing explanations in order to grasp how such a strong partnership lost its ground in a short period of time.

This thesis aims to offer alternative explanations for why and how these two friends turned to foes. To that end, it focuses on not only relations between the Turkish and Greek governments but it also puts special emphasis on non-diplomatic interactions and the role of the Turkish press. Unlike previous studies that are heavily based on the Cyprus and minority issues,[7] this thesis also aims to provide a systematic analysis of the other territory and identity based concerns that caught the attention of the Turkish press and public such as the common past issues, the territorial water violations and the sporadic incidents that hurt the national feelings of Turkish people.

Scholars put forward similar conclusions and assumptions about the role of the Turkish press in influencing the Turkish foreign policy of the same period. It is argued that the ways in which numerous politically-divided Turkish newspapers

[6] The studies about the Turkish-Greek relations that specifically focused on this period are very rare and the ones having this focus as in the case of Murat Hatipoğlu's book, *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954*, had a tendency to see this period as the honeymoon in the Turkish-Greek relations from the perspective of diplomatic relations. For more details see: Murat Hatipoğlu, *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1954* (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), pp. 79-207.

[7] Some of these are Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Türk-Yunan Fırtınası (1940, 1950, 1960, 1970)* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2006); Özkan, "Making Cyprus a National Cause in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1948-1955", pp. 541-562; Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011); Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu* (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları, 1986); Hikmet Öksüz, *Batı Trakya Türkleri* (Çorum: Karadeniz Araştırma Merkezi, 2006); Dilek Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005).

approached to the Turkish foreign policy were more or less the same, and the Turkish press failed to challenge the decisions that the government made as regards foreign affairs.[8] This study aims to question whether this argument was valid for the case of Turkish-Greek relations from 1946 to 1955 or not.

I.I. Sources

The main sources of this study are Turkish newspapers of the period, which were collected from the newspaper collections of *Milli Kütüphane Mikrofilm Bölümü* (the Microfilm Department of the National Library of Turkey), *Türk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi* (the Library of Turkish Historical Society) and *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kütüphanesi* (the Library of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey) as well as the online collections of *Milli Kütüphane* (the National Library of Turkey), *Ankara Üniversitesi* (the Ankara University) and *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi* (the Cumhuriyet Newspaper). The newspapers that this study is based on are *Akın*, *Akşam*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Demokrat Ankara*, *Dünya*, *Hizmet*, *Milliyet*, *Ulus*, *Vatan*, *Yeni Sabah*, *Yeni Ulus* and *Zafer*.

Among these newspapers, *Akın*, *Akşam*, *Demokrat Ankara*, *Hizmet*, *Ulus*, *Yeni Ulus*, and *Zafer* were the semi-official organs of the political parties of the period. As the vital conduits for the political parties, these semi-official newspapers represented and circulated the views of their parties, both governmental and oppositional. *Cumhuriyet*, *Vatan*, and *Yeni Sabah* lent or withdrew their support to the present government, depending on context and situation. For instance, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan* were opponents of the government of the CHP between 1946 and 1950 and were closer to the DP, the main opposition party of the pre-1950 period. After the DP came to power in May 1950, they maintained their support of the DP only for a short amount of time. By then, particularly due to the increasing pressure of the DP on press, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan* became highly critical of the policies of the current government. *Yeni Sabah*, on the other hand, was a frequent critic of the government during the successive CHP governments and this

[8] Yılmaz and Doğaner, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Sansür (1923-1973)*, p. 160.

oppositional tone was also valid against the DP to some extent in the initial years of its rule. Then, particularly 1953 onwards, however, *Yeni Sabah* became an enthusiastic supporter of the DP government, which in return lifted up its countenance upon the newspaper through official announcements. Compared to other newspapers of the time, *Milliyet* was relatively a non-partisan and objective one.

All these newspapers were full of doyens of journalism as well as senior political figures of that time such as Falih Rıfkı Atay, Nihat Erim, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, Nadir Nadi, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Ahmet Emin Yalman, each of whom had been a prolific journalist and contributed much to the development of Turkish press for a long time. Being more than just journalists, these prominent individuals had close ties with the political elite, and even some of them served as deputies in the Parliament before, during and after that period. Having close affiliations with political parties, these prestigious columnists described their experiences afterwards in their memoirs, each of which presents anecdotes and eyewitness accounts. That's why this thesis also greatly benefited from the published memoirs of such individuals to shed light on the context in which the newspapers were published and to give a glimpse into the multi-faceted political framework of the period.

In order to contextualize the collected news and articles from these newspapers as well as memoirs of the journalists, this thesis also uses archival documents that were collected from *Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi* in Ankara (the State Archives of the Prime Ministry), which included a plenty of official documents, particularly those belonged to *Başbakanlık Basın, Yayın ve Turizm Müdürlüğü* (Office of the Prime Minister - the Directorate General for Press, Information and Tourism). To better understand the official stance, it also investigated the parliamentary discussions available at the online database of *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Zabıt Cerideleri* (the records of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey).

In addition to these Turkish archival materials, the documents from the National Archives, in London, including the documents from the British Embassy of Ankara, were covered. The online collection of the Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS) was also consulted. Moreover, the prominent newspapers from Britain such as the *Times*, the *Manchester Guardian* and from the US, such as the *New York*

Times and the *Washington Post*, which were accessible through the online newspaper collections of the Cambridge University Library, were also utilized.

I.II. Historical Context

Turkey's drive to the West, which was accelerated by the Soviet desires that would easily turn into a threat against the Turkish territorial integrity,[9] became a dominant factor in the Turkish politics in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Having such territorial concerns within the emerging new international atmosphere, Turkey could not maintain its pre-1945 neutral foreign policy. Turkey was motivated to strengthen its position *vis-à-vis* the Western initiatives such as military cooperation and economic aid programs.[10] This alliance triggered major transformations in the Turkish politics.

One of them was the transition to the multi-party system. In effect, it was not the first attempt to have a multi-party system in Turkey, neither was the DP the first political party that stood against the CHP in the early Cold War period. Yet, from the

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[9] T.E.M.M., "Russia, Turkey and the Straits", *The World Today*, 2/9 (September 1946), pp. 396-305; Necmettin Sadak, "Turkey Faces Soviets", *Foreign Affairs*, 27/3 (April 1949), pp. 457-461; Feridun C. Erkin, "Turkey's Foreign Policy", *The Academy of Political Science*, 24/4 (January 1952), pp. 122-133; Cevat Açıkalın, "Turkey's International Relations", *International Affairs*, 23/4 (October 1947), pp. 490-491; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "The Straits: Crux of World Politics", *Foreign Affairs*, 25/2 (January 1947), pp. 297-302; Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin and Steven Morewodd, "Turkey's Reliance on Britain: British Political and Diplomatic Support for Turkey against Soviet Demands, 1943-47", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40/2 (2010), pp. 49-50; Süleyman Seydi, "Türkiye'de Siyaset (1946-1950)", *İç ve Dış Gelişmelerle Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi* (1946-2012) (Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç and Cihan Göktepe eds.) (İstanbul: Ufuk Yayınları, 2014), p. 25; İlter Turan and Dilek Barlas, "Batı İttifakına Üye Olmanın Türk Dış Politikası Üzerindeki Etkileri", *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Faruk Sönmezoğlu ed.) (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2004), pp. 153-158; Christopher J. Dlutowski, "Turkey, the Truman Doctrine and the Cold War", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 4/1 (1990), pp. 50-52; Çağrı Erhan, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (Baskın Oran ed.) (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p. 532; Aktaş, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü: 1950-1960 Demokrat Parti Dönemi*, pp. 48-50; Sedef Bulut, "Sovyet Tehdidine Karşı Güvenlik Arayışları: I. ve II. Menderes Hükümetlerinin (1950-1954) NATO Üyeliği ve Balkan Politikası", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, 41 (May 2008), pp. 37-38; Süleyman Seydi, "Making a Cold War in the Near East: Turkey and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1947", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17/1 (2006), pp. 118-119; Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36/1 (2000), pp. 107-110.

[10] George McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West", *Foreign Affairs*, 32/4 (July 1954), pp. 620-623. This article was also reprinted and collected by the *Başbakanlık Basın, Yayın ve Turizm Genel Müdürlüğü* in Turkey. For more details see: No Date: Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Ankara [hereafter BCA], 030 01 61 377 23.

mid-1940s to 1960, the role played by the DP, first, as the main oppositional party from 1946 to 1950 and then as the ruling party from 1950 to 1960 made the DP as significant as the CHP in terms of its effect to shape the emerging new political system in Turkey.

On 21 July 1946, the first general elections of the multi-party system were held, and the CHP government under Recep Peker was established. After Peker, Hasan Saka, former Foreign Minister, became the new Prime Minister from 10 September 1947 to 16 January 1949. Then, until the victory of the DP in May 1950 elections, Şemsettin Günaltay served as the Prime Minister. On 22 May 1950, the DP years started, and Adnan Menderes remained as the Prime Minister throughout the period. The DP rule ended with a *coup d'état* on 27 May 1960.[11] The political elite and the leading journalists of the period tried to use the rhetoric of democratization as Turkey's Cold War strategy and to sell such a political transformation to the West as the promoter of having closer relations with the West.

The effects of Turkey's driving to the West were also felt in the formation of Turkey's foreign policy, including Turkey's relations with Greece. Before that period, it had been Turkey's own concerns about its territorial sovereignty and identity issues that shaped Turkey's conduct of policy toward Greece. The emerging Cold War conditions, however, brought new necessities for the Turkish authorities to seek the new ways of establishing closer relations with Greece.

Such a restricting factor was also valid for the Greek authorities. At that moment, the ongoing Greek Civil War (1946-1949) escalated the fear of a communist victory and even a possible Soviet invasion of Greece. Faced with the communist threat in Greece, the Turkish authorities became more interested in the policy of cooperation with the Greek authorities, which fought against armed communist groups and threatened by the Soviet Union and its satellite countries such as Bulgaria.

In effect, the presence of such a common threat as a unifying factor was not a totally new thing in the Turkish-Greek relations. In the end of 1920s, for instance, the

[11] Ahmet Yeşil, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Siyasi Hayata Geçiş* (Ankara: TC Kültür Bakanlığı, 2001), pp. 87-163.

existence of a common regional threat, namely Bulgaria, made these two states put aside their bilateral problems such as the minority issues, and Turkey and Greece achieved a friendship in 1930. Yet what differed the post-Second World War period from the previous cases was the role of the other countries, i.e. the West, that pointed to the necessity of the Turkish-Greek friendship. The pressure coming from the West further increased the desire of the Turkish and Greek governments to form a strategic partnership against the common enemy.

This increasing cooperation between Turkey and Greece was what the Western powers propagated and desired wholeheartedly. The President Truman, for instance, during the proclamation of his famous policy Truman Doctrine in 1947, also mentioned the possibility that the Soviet influence in Greece would first spread to Turkey and then to the Middle East. So, for the interest of the US, and the other Western powers, the Turkish support to the stability in region was crucial.[12]

Turkey, having already concerns about the possible establishment of communist regime in Greece and its recognition by Bulgaria and Romania, the communist states of the region,[13] took this job seriously and formulated a Greek policy fostering an alliance between these two states. This tendency to develop closer relations with Greece did not constitute a major challenge for the CHP rule initially. The DP also seemed convinced for the necessity of forming an alliance with Greece against a common aggressor, the Soviet Union. This friendship policy of the successive CHP governments was not attacked by the DP, despite some minor criticisms from time to time as in the case of Greek attacks against the Turkish national football team in May 1949, which will examined in detail in Chapter 5.

This harmony between the government and the opposition party in their approaches to the Turkish policy of Greece continued in the first years of the DP rule. The exclusion of both Turkey and Greece from NATO played a remarkable role in this harmony. Despite their pro-Western policies, Turkey and Greece could not

[12] Barın Kayaoğlu, "Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945-52", *Cold War History*, 9/3 (2009), pp. 327-328.

[13] Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Western Defence Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 32/2 (1996), p. 82.

become the members of NATO from 1949 to 1952. Their exclusion from NATO, like the common Soviet threat, further increased the relations between Turkey and Greece. For both countries, becoming a part of NATO was perceived as the sole solution for the security problems. To deal with such problems, both countries worked together to show the members of NATO that Greece and Turkey would act together against the Soviet expansion to the region and share the burden of the Southern flank of NATO.

Their accession to NATO in 1952, then, became a major turning point as regards this Cold War partnership. Turkey and Greece started to share even their military strategies and performed joint military exercises under the NATO commands in İzmir and Thrace, and even narrated the possibility of a federation among them. Interestingly enough, the Turkish-Greek relations started to deteriorate during the climax of their partnership. Moreover, it was the same period when the current opposition, the CHP, started to question the DP policy of Greece increasingly more.

The disagreements between the CHP and the DP on various internal and external issues continually intensified, and the relationship between these two parties went from bad to worse throughout the period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. The Turkish policy of Greece was indeed one of the backbones of the increasing contention between these two parties. At the end of the specific period that the thesis dealt with, the 6-7 September events of 1955 were the climax of such disputes between these two political parties with respect to their perspectives on the Turkey's relations with Greece. During the aftermath of the events, the CHP even accused the DP of being responsible for the events, by claiming that it was the DP policies of Greece that led to the events. Thus, in such a multi-layered and complicated political environment, the Turkish press became the primary tool for spreading both supporting and critical voices of the public with respect to the Turkish-Greek relations in particular and the Turkish foreign policy in general.

CHAPTER II

PRESS AND POLITICAL POWER IN TURKEY

It is widely accepted that the progress of democracy paralleled the promotion of freedom of the press, that is, the existence of free press has always been one of the main sources of political legitimacy in the democratic regimes.[14] In the post-1946 period, when the transition to a multi-party system took place, the political power in Turkey was in need of such a political legitimacy. In consequence of this necessity, the politicians attached great importance to the press. The press further served to promote the 'democratic' image of Turkey not only in the eyes of the Turkish people but also from the perspectives of the Western Powers.

Indeed, the press has always been essential for the political power in Turkey, thanks to its acting as an intermediary between the political elite and people. Doing so, it has always performed an incredibly significant role not only in shaping, manipulating or directing but also in representing the collective opinion of the people in Turkey. Also, it has never been unusual to find an organic link between the press and politicians in Turkey. Instead the press has always been influential to legitimize and spread external and domestic state policies, to make these policies supported and followed by the masses, to voice views of the public and also to give messages to the external world. It is not, however, difficult to guess the increasing role of the press,

[14] Erik Alaek, Arjen Van Dalen, Nael Jebril and Claes H. De Vreese (eds.), *Political Journalism in Comparative Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 1; Alpay Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi* (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Basımevi, 1994), p. viii; Tülay Bektaş, "Medya-Demokrasi İlişkisi ve Türk Medya'sında Refah Partisi İmajı", *Selçuk İletişim*, 2/1 (2001), p. 160; John Keane, *Medya ve Demokrasi* (Haluk Şahin trans.) (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1999), p. 175; Demir Şerif, "İktidar-Basın İlişkilerinin Türkiye'de Görünümü (1918-1960)", *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies*, 5/6 (2012), p. 120; Yasemin Akşit, Çok Partili Sistemin İlk Döneminde Basın ve Basın Özgürlüğü (1946-1954), Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara: Gazi University, 2012), p. 2.

with the multi-party system, particularly in foreign affairs because of the emerging context of the Cold War from the mid-1940s onward.

The increasing importance of the views of Turkish voters, which was due to the fierce competition between parties in the newly-established multi-party elections system, made the press automatically a more precious tool for Turkish politicians. Adding the Cold War to this picture had carried the Turkish press to an undeniable and influential position particularly in making foreign policy process by the mid-1940s. Such complexities of political environment during the time period of this thesis, from mid-1940s to mid-1950s, necessitates an examination of the press factor, which has been generally ignored in current literature on the Turkish-Greek relations. This chapter will give an introductory conceptual discussion that sets the stage for the nature of press-state relations in Turkey from 1946 to 1955 as well as the effect of these relations on shaping views of the Turkish people at that period.

The mid-1940s was also the period that academic interest in press and public opinion started to increase in Turkey. For instance, the book, *Efkarı Umumiye* (Public Opinion), of Aydın Yalçın, who was one of the popular Turkish academics and politicians, is accepted as one of the first academic studies on public opinion in Turkey.[15] But before Yalçın, who published his book in 1945, Niyazi Berkes had already devoted a section of his book published three years earlier, *Propaganda Nedir?* (What is Propaganda?) on the concept of public opinion. So, this work should be accepted as one of the earliest studies dealing specifically with public opinion. In this book, what Berkes did was to differentiate public opinion (in Turkish translation *amme fikirleri* and/or *amme efkarı*) from the word masses.[16] Yet, in this book, he singled out the significant role of newspapers among other instruments such as books, novels and radio, in both expressing and shaping views of public.[17] And, actually, that was the novelty. Academic studies started to recognize and cover the power of manipulating public opinion, particularly that of press, though it had been

[15] Nejdet Atabek, "Türk Basınında Kamuoyu Araştırmaları", *Gazi Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi*, 17 (2003), p. 6.

[16] Niyazi Berkes, *Propaganda Nedir? (*Ankara: Recep Ulusoğlu Matbaası, 1942), pp. 33-42.

[17] Berkes, *Propaganda Nedir?*, pp. 41-42.

already known and utilized by the political elite. With the increased interest of academics in the subject, policy makers came to understand the importance of the public opinion even more.

The increasingly important role of the press in terms of shaping and representing the public opinion in Turkish politics was evident from political campaigns before the parliamentary elections in 1946. As the most influential tool in hands of political parties, the press was widely used for propaganda purposes. The use of newspapers in wooing voters particularly by the DP invigorated passionate debates among the oppositional and governmental newspapers. These debates reached to an extent which angered President İsmet İnönü. Frustrated over the debates, İnönü even called the oppositional press as "bozguncu gazeteler" (troublemaker newspapers) and distinguished them from pro-CHP newspapers, which were "memleketin huzurunu koruyan gazeteler" (newspapers protecting the country's peace).[18]

In the years that followed the general elections of 1946 which gave 64 seats to the DP, the extensive use of newspapers by the DP alarmed the CHP officials. To counterweight the DP's propaganda against the government's domestic and foreign policies, the CHP officials prepared reports, which sought for more effective ways to use the press. Two of these reports, both of which were prepared in 1948 and found in the CHP's archives, are worthy of careful study. The first one was sent by Cemil Sait Barlas, MP for Gaziantep, to Tevfik Fikret Sılay, the Secretary-General of the CHP, on February 10, 1948. Barlas wrote this report to instruct *Ulus*, "the publishing organ of the CHP," about its three main duties: making the propaganda of views and programs of the party, supporting the actions of the CHP government, and defending the party against the attacks of the opposition.[19] In this report, Barlas set forth the necessity of performing all these duties in a systematic manner and propounded the adaptation of new methods by the CHP through the CHP-owned *Ulus* to spread the

[18] Neşe Yeşilçayır, "Çok Partili Döneme Geçiş Sürecinde Türk Basını", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi,* 27/79 (2011), p. 131.

[19] 10 February 1948: BCA, 490 01 453 1869 3, p. 2: "1-Partinin fikir ve proğramının propagandasını yapmak. 2-Hükümetin icraatlarını övmek. 3-Muhalefetin haki hücumlarına karşı savunmak vazifesini tertip etmektir."

party line more efficiently. One of these methods that Barlas underlined was the importance of gaining the sympathy of people under the current circumstances that the "opposition" tried to solidify the public opinion against CHP.[20]

Seven months later, Hakkı Tarık Us, one of the most influential Turkish journalists since the late Ottoman Empire as well as the famous book and newspaper collector, who was one of the owners of *Vakit*, submitted a report, too. On September 2, 1948, Secretary General Tevfik Fikret Sılay forwarded this report to Prime Minister Hasan Saka. The title of the report was "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Basın Faaliyetine Ait Kısa Bir Tahlil" (A short analysis of CHP's activities regarding the press). The report began with a criticism of the CHP. Us accused the CHP of "neglecting" the importance of journalism. For Us, even the attitudes of CHP officials toward their own newspapers proved such neglect. What Us complained about was the interviews of CHP members given to oppositional newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet*, *Tasvir* and *Vatan* rather than having such interviews with pro-CHP newspapers. According to Us, what these oppositional newspapers did was to use these interviews given by CHP members against the government itself.[21] This, Us further claimed, showed how government pursued a sort of press policy that worked against its own sake.[22] According to Us, however, the picture was totally different for the DP. The author argued that the Secretary General of the DP allocated almost 90

[20] 10 February 1948: BCA, 490 01 453 1869 3, pp. 2, 3: "Gazetenin bu vazifeleri layıkıyla ifa edebilmesi için bunun halk tarafından sevilerek okunur bir seviyede tutulması lazımdır. Ulus gazetesinin partinin fikir ve proğramını müdafaa etmesi bir sistem dahilinde olmalıdır. Yeni yazılacak herhangi bir yazı veya tebliğ ile değil gazetenin başyazısından havadis ve fıkraların bittiği sahifeye, ilanın başladığı yere kadar gazete o tarzda tertip edilmelidir ki okuyucu yazıların heyeti mecmasından çıkardığı manadan partiye karşı bir sempati bir anlayış duysun. Bugün muhalefeti gerçek olarak kabul etmek lazımdır. Bu bakımdan tartışmalar ölçülü bir şekilde idare edilmelidir. Parti fikirlerinin ve proğramının yayılması, muhalefeye karşı partinin savunulması daha ziyade halk tarafından sevilen muharrirlere yaptırılmalıdır."

[21] 2 September 1948: BCA, 490 01 1288 280 1, p. 8: "...kendi beyanatını kendi aleyhinde bir silah olarak kullanmışlardır…"

[22] 2 September 1948: BCA, 490 01 1288 280 1, p. 8: "...iktidarın kendi aleyhine Matbuatta nasıl bir yol tutmuş olduğunu izaheder sanırım…"

percent of his time to press activities.[23] Then, Us quoted the words of Celal Bayar, which proved how the DP acted quite differently. As Us quoted, Bayar said:[24]

> The publication of our party's activities only by the oppositional press is to support these newspapers, [as] such news are issue of sales. The publications of news regarding our party in favorable newspapers affect their circulation. For us, if possible, these [pro-CHP] newspapers could not sell even one newspaper. The General Administrative Board of our party agreed on a leading decision that news about [DP] our party will be only published in the [pro-DP] oppositional press.

These two reports from 1948, which provided a comparative analysis of the CHP and the DP in terms of their use of press reveal the increasing awareness among politicians on the effective use of press in the newly-emerging multi-party system. On the eve of the 1950 elections, again, the use of press for political purposes intensified. Newspapers were again the main propaganda tool of politicians.[25] Even the polls about the elections only were conducted via newspapers, exemplified by a nation-wide poll that *Vatan* announced on April 15, 1950.[26] Its unprecedented power to measure views of public through polls revealed how the press gained momentum in the wake of the transition to the multi-party system.

In 1950, newspapers also started to publish more articles describing and explaining the concept of public opinion to their readers. Historical studies on the issue put special emphasis on the articles of Abdülhak Adnan Adıvar, a well-known politician since the late Ottoman Empire, an independent MP for Istanbul, and a science historian, as the earliest examples of articles in Turkish newspapers about the concept of public opinion. "Efkâr-ı Umumiye" (Public Opinion) that Adıvar wrote for *Cumhuriyet* on 18 February 1950, was typical of such articles. Writing on the issue just three months before the elections, he argued that "according to double-

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[23] 2 September 1948: BCA, 490 01 1288 280 1, p. 8: "Şimdi birkaç cümle ile de Demokratların nasıl çalıştıklarını izah edeyim: Demokrat Parti Sekreterinin yaptığı işlerin yüzde doksanını, matbuat işleri teşkil eder, demek, hiçte mübalağa olmaz."

[24] 2 September 1948: BCA, 490 01 1288 280 1, p. 8: "Bizim partiye ait icraatlarımızın yalnız muhalif basında neşri onları desteklemek içindir, bu haberler aynı zamanda bir satış mevzuudur. Partimize ait haberlerin muvafık gazetelerde neşri, onların tirajına tesir edebilir. Bizim için dava, bu gazetelerin mümkünse bir tane dahi satmamalarıdır. Genel İdare kurulumuz prensip kararı vermiştir. Partimize ait haberler yalnız muhalif basında neşrolunacaktır."

[25] Yeşilçayır, "Çok Partili Döneme Geçiş Sürecinde Türk Basını", p. 131.

[26] Esin Alçora, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Parti Propagandası (1946-1950)* (İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2015), p. 311.

edged philosophy that connects free will to public will, public opinion is the object of both prestige and derision."[27] Pointing to both negative and positive effects of public opinion, Adıvar's article made the crucial link between government and public opinion very clear.

The 1950s also saw a remarkable increase in the value of measuring public opinion in Turkey among politicians as well as academics. As one of these academics, Seha L. Meray, one of the distinguished social scientists, who produced various documentary studies on the Turkish diplomatic history, wrote an article "Halk Efkârı ve Yoklaması" (Public Opinion and Measurement).[28] Based on the previous lecture notes of Meray on sociology, this article was published in 1954 by the academic journal of the Faculty of Political Science at the Ankara University, in which Meray lectured on sociology. As he noted in the introduction of this article, when the administration of the Ankara University asked Meray to teach sociology in 1951, he decided to emphasize public opinion and its measurement, which he saw a "novelty" in Turkey representing a key feature in the "democratic development" of Turkey.[29] In the following pages, Meray complained about the lack of public opinion studies in Turkey. He compared the Turkish case with the American one, in which these kinds of studies were one of the top topics. Meray wrote that there was even no Turkish word used for public opinion that everybody unanimously accepted. In the near future, however, as he guessed, Turkish people would pay increased attention to scholarly studies of public opinion.[30] Another scholar who showed a great academic interest in public opinion was Nermin Abadan Unat whose contribution to the studies of public opinion was all the more productive. Accepted as the forerunner of the field, Unat wrote one of the most encompassing book in Turkish about public

[27] Adnan Adıvar, "Efkârı Umumiye", *Cumhuriyet*, 18 February 1950, p. 2: "Ferdi iradeyi devlet iradesine bağlayan bu iki taraflı keser kılıç şeklindeki felsefeye göre efkar-ı umumiye hem itibara hem istihkara maruzdur."

[28] Seha L. Meray, "Halk Efkârı ve Yoklaması", *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 9/3 (1954), pp. 1-48.

[29] Meray, "Halk Efkârı ve Yoklaması", p. 1: "Derslerimde bilhassa memleketimiz bakımından yeni ve demokratik gelişmemiz bakımından çok önemli saydığım "Halk Efkarı" ve "Halk Efkarının Yoklanması" konuları üzerinde ısrarla durmayı yerinde gördüm."

[30] Meray, "Halk Efkârı ve Yoklaması", pp. 2-6.

opinion and its effects on the society in 1956. Unat's book contributed to the emergence of much of the conceptual studies about public opinion and public relations.[31]

From the mid-1940s onwards, the growing number of academic studies on public opinion paralleled the increase in the interest of Turkish political elite in the role of press in shaping public opinion. At the same time, public opinion-related concepts gained popularity in the language that politicians used. All were new concepts, used and refined in ways that were unprecedented in the history of Turkey. Political terminology of both the emerging multi-party system and the Cold War context made these concepts more important with respect to their political power in Turkey. Equally significant, they played a vital role in Turkey's foreign policy making process within the framework of its relations with Greece. This chapter traces the nature of relationship between press and political power from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. Doing so, this chapter builds on the insights of the political power of press and its effects on the conduct of Turkey's policy toward Greece, which is the subject of the following chapters.

Unlike the variety of present-day media instruments, the press was the dominant medium of this period in Turkey, with the exception of the state-owned radio. One of the earliest studies about such an intermediary power of journalism was written by Hasan Refik Ertuğ who produced popular books about the history of Turkish press and a well-known bureaucrat that served in the Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press, Publications and Tourism. Published in 1955, his book *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi: İlk Devirler* (History of Press and Publication: the Early Periods) defined newspaper as an "essential" and a "typical" means of media. According to Ertuğ's definition, journalism is "the art of forming public opinion" (efkârı-ı umumiye yapma sanatı), and a journalist is "the one who formed public opinion" (efkârı-ı umumiye yapan kimsedir).[32] After the discussion of the role of newspapers and journalists in the fabrication of public opinion, Ertuğ mentioned the press-state relations, with a specific emphasis on the influence of central authority

[31] Nermin Abadan, *Halk Efkârı: Mefhumu ve Tesir Sahaları* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1956).

[32] Hasan Refik Ertuğ, *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi: İlk Devirler* (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1955), p. 3.

and its institutions on the emergence of newspaper and journalist in the modern sense.[33] As Ertuğ rightfully asserted, the complicated state-press relationship is shaped by a combination of political, economic, legal and cultural factors that created conditions for the state assertion of its control over the press as it was valid from 1946 to 1955 in Turkey.

Throughout this period, the Turkish governments, which had more eagerness to control and regulate the press due to its increasing importance as a political agency, tried to set forth the press regime through the enactments of new press laws and the regulation of the legal system. It was the same state authority that used power mechanisms such as the control of the sources of news, punishment mechanisms such as the application of censorship as well as award mechanisms such as the providing of financial subsidies to the proponents. Aiming a strong authority over the press, thus, the Turkish state attempted to shape the nature of the state-press relations throughout the period, by benefiting from these mechanisms, each of which will be discussed in detail below. This chapter aims to understand whether these attempts of the political authority worked and the government managed to enjoy greater control of the press or whether alternative voices in press did not cease to appear despite the strengthening measures of the government.

II.I. Legal Structure

In respect of the legal framework that regulated the press-state relations from 1946 to 1955, the press law, which had been issued on 25 July 1931, was in force until 15 July 1950. On this day, two months after the DP took power, the new government issued a new press law. The 1931 Press Law was issued at a time when the government of newly established Turkish Republic tried to keep a strict eye on any newspaper that would surmount any challenge to the revolutionary spirit of the time. Enacted in such an environment, the 1931 Press Law empowered the hands of the state against press in a way that might lead to excessive censorship. Pro-regime

[33] Ertuğ, *Basın ve Yayın Tarihi*, p. 7: "Hakiki gazetenin ve gerçek gazetecinin doğuşu için, merkezi devletlerin meydana gelmesi, hukuk fikrinin yerleşmesi, hürriyet mefhumunun kanun bünyesine girmesi ve basın-yayın serbestisinin teessüs eylemesi gibi çeşitli içtimai, iktisadi, siyasi ve hukuki inkılapların ortaya çıkması icap etmiştir."

intellectuals and journalists of the period, too, pointed out the necessity of a strict state control over press. In the Congress of Press held in May 1935, for instance, Vedat Nedim Tör, as Matbuat Umum Müdürü (the General Director of Press), explained the roles of newspapers as "the most powerful propaganda tool in spreading principles and ideals of revolution to the great masses of people, a conscious defense mechanism, and a supportive, alerting and effective school."[34] Being aware of the propaganda power of the press, the Turkish government put the Press Law into effect to keep Turkish press under its control in accordance with the policies of the single party rule. From the mid-1940s onwards, however, this Press Law came to be a target of the opposition.

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, oppositional voices among the CHP set to oppose the government over the press freedom. As one of the four oppositional deputies in the CHP known as *Dörtlü Takrir* who later founded the DP, Celal Bayar brought the issue to the Parliament on 13 June 1945. Bayar entered a motion to the Parliament,[35] proposing the loosening of censorship through a modification of the Article 50 of the 1931 Law that gave the cabinet the power to close newspapers.[36] Debates over the anti-democratic character of the current press law surfaced even more right after the establishment of the DP on 7 January 1946. In the meantime, the lack of press freedom began to emerge as an important issue between the CHP and the DP.[37]

The proposals of the opposition led the CHP government to take active steps to reshape the press law. As one of these steps, the government decided to send

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[34] Yılmaz and Doğaner, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Sansür*, pp. 7-9: "...devrim prensip ve ideallerini geniş halk yığınları içinde yayılması için en kuvvetli bir, propaganda aracı, uyanık bir müdefaa aracı, yardımcı ve uyarıcı, müessir bir okul..."

[35] 13 June 1945: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 7, Y: 3, C: 18, B: 73, O: 1, p. 238.

[36] "Matbuat Kanunu", *Resmi Gazete*, 8 August 1931, No: 1867, Article 50: "Memeleketin umumi siyasetine dokunacak neşriyattan dolayı İcra Vekilleri kararile gazete veya mecmualar muvakkaten tatil olunabilir. Bu suretle kapatılan gazete veya mecmuanın neşrine devam edenler hakkında 18 nci madde hükmü tatbik olunur. Bu suretle kapatılan bir gazetenin mesulleri tatil müddetince başka bir isim ile gazete çıkaramaz."

[37] Ayşegül Şentürk, "1931 Matbuat Kanunu'ndaki Değişiklikler Üzerine Kronolojik Bir Değerlendirme: Basın Hürriyeti Bağlamında Meclis Tratışmaları ve Basındaki Yankılar", *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 30:1 (2015), p. 206.

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, not only an experienced journalist but also a deputy and the president of the administrative board of the Turkish Press Union (Türk Basın Birliği Merkez İdare Kurulu Başkanı), to some European states to examine their "press regimes and press organizations."[38] While the government sent Yalçın to Europe in its attempts to restructure the state-press relations, it used CHP-affiliated newspapers, particularly the media organ of the party, *Ulus*, to defend the existing press law and to prove the existence of press freedom in Turkey. Falih Rıfkı Atay's article on 2 May 1946 was the most striking example of such attempts of the CHP government. As another eminent journalist and the editor-in-chief of *Ulus*, Falif Rıfkı Atay showed his disagreement with the oppositional groups who accused the CHP of restricting press freedom. To disprove such accusations, Atay claimed that the government did not put Article 50 into practice, as known by everybody in the country.[39]

Despite such claims, most probably to stop continuing protests against it, the Saraçoğlu government decided to amend the Article 50, and the amended version was published in *Resmi Gazete* (Official Gazette) on 18 June 1946.[40] With this change, the authority to close newspapers was taken from the cabinet, and it was

[38] 7 February 1946: BCA, 030 18 1 2 110 10 19, p. 1: "Basın rejimleri ve basın teşkilatı üzetinde bazı incelemelerde bulunmak üzere bazı Avrupa memleketlerine gönderilecek olan Türk Basın Birliği Merkez İdare Kurulu Başkanı ve İstanbul Milletvekili Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın'ın gündelik ve yol giderlerine karşılık olmak üzere Maliye bütçesinin "düşünülmiyen giderler" tertibinden 5 000 liranın harcanması ve kendisine 2/8/1938 tarihli 2/9390 sayılı karar gereğince gündelik verilmesi; Maliye Bakanlığının 7/2/1946 tarihli mütealası üzerine, 1050 sayılı kanunun 59 uncu maddesine dayanılarak, Bakanlar Kurulunca 7/2/1946 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır."

[39] Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Basın Hürriyetine Dair", *Ulus*, 2 May 1946, p. 1: "-Elimizdeki basın kanunu varken serbest seçime gidebilir miyiz? Acaba bu suali soranların dilinin altında ne var? Eğer maksat hükümete gazete kapama hakkı veren madde ise, bütün memleket biliyor ki hükümet bu hakkını kullanmamaktadır."

[40] "Matbuat Kanununun 50 inci Maddesinin Değiştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun", *Resmi Gazete*, 18 June 1946, No: 6336: "Madde 50: Türk Ceza Kanununun ikinci kitabının birinci babının birinci ve ikinci bölümlerinde yazılı cürümler yayım yoliyle işlendiği takdirde mahkemece, curmin gerektirdiği ceza ile birlikte gazete veya mecmuanın bir aydan iki yıla kadar kapatılmasına karar verilir. Yetkili mahkeme hükmünden önce dahi kavuşturmanın her derecesinde gazate ve mecmuanın kapatılmasına karar verebilir. Şu kadar ki kapatma süresi birinci fırkada yazılı sürenin yukarı haddini geçemez. Bu suretle kapatılan gazete veya mecmuanın yayımına devam edenler hakkında 18 inci madde hükmü uygulanır. Böyle kapatılan gazete veya mecmuanın sorumluları kapatma süresi içinde başka bir adla gazete veya mecmua çıkaramazlar."

given to courts.[41] CHP MP for Konya Osman Şükrü Uludağ's speech during the discussions that took place in the Parliament was indicative of the CHP's efforts to stop the opposition's protests. In his speech on the amendment of the press law, Uludağ criticized the long-standing assertion of oppositional politicians and journalists, who presented the issue to the public a "matter of country" (memleket meselesi).[42] Uludağ's complaint about the opposition demonstrated the degree of the intensified oppositional pressure on the government regarding the press matters.

The amendment of the Article 50 of the 1931 Press Law, however, did not satisfy the opposition. For the opposition, there was so much to change with respect to the legal framework which regulated press activities. As the spokesman of the DP, Adnan Menderes, claimed, if the change remained limited only to the Article 50, then the public would be disappointed in politicians. The more restrictive articles of the Press Law still existed, Menderes added.[43]

The following day, pro-CHP *Ulus* covered these discussions on the amendment of the Press Law, claiming that "the opposition was heavily defeated."[44] In its attempts to interpret the amendment as the victory of the government, *Ulus* attached high value to Menderes' speech. *Ulus* went on to assert that "Menderes's allegations were totally refuted" by CHP members such as Şinasi Devrim. *Ulus* also added that Menderes left the session before proving his accusations of the government's pressure on press.[45]

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[41] Nuran Yıldız, "Demokrat Parti İktidarı (1950-1960) ve Basın", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 51/1 (1997), p. 483.

[42] 13 June 1946: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 7, Y: 4, C: 24, B: 64, O: 1, p. 264: "50 nci maddenin ortadan kaldırılması hususu uzun müddettir, hepsi demiyeyim, bir kaç gazetenin dilinde sakız oldu. Ve bunlar 50 nci maddenin Vekiller Kuruluna verdiği salâhiyeti o kadar yerdiler ki adetâ memleket meselesi yaptılar nihayet itiraz üzerine itiraz etmek suretiyle kendi isteklerini ortaya koydular."

[43] 13 June 1946: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 7, Y: 4, C: 24, B: 64, O: 1, p. 269: "Matbuat Kanununda yapılacak değişiklik yalnız 50 nci maddeye inhisar ettirilmesi, Türk umumi efkârının, haklı olarak, hayal sükutuna uğratmış olsa gerektir. Çünkü yalnız bir maddesinin değiştirilmesine mukabil altmış küsur maddelik Matbuat Kanunu bütün ağır hükümleriyle olduğu gibi duracak ve söz ve fikir hürriyetini baskısı altında bulunduracaktır."

[44] "Matbuat Kanununun 50. Maddesi Üzerinde Geçen Görüşmeler Sırasında", *Ulus*, 14 June 1946, p. 1: "Muhalefet ağır mağlubiyete uğratıldı."

[45] "Matbuat Kanununun 50. Maddesi Üzerinde Geçen Görüşmeler Sırasında", p. 1: "Menderes'in iddiaları tamamen çürütüldü. Menderes bunları cevapsız bıraktı. Salonu terkederek çekilmeyi tercih etti [...] İleri sürdüğü tenkitlere karşı Adalet Komisyonu sözcüsü Şinasi Devrim çok etraflı ve nükdeli

While the opposition continued to call for freedom of press, the reaction of the pro-CHP newspapers to such calls was the argument that freedom of press did not mean freedom to undermine personal dignity. From the perspective of pro-government newspapers, even the strict articles of the current press law did not prevent the opposition from attacking them. As a result of this perspective, pro-government columnists inserted the needs of further restriction of press freedom rather than the loosening of the existing ones. Necmettin Sadak, CHP MP for Sivas and the owner of pro-CHP *Akşam*, was one of such columnists. In his article on 12 August 1946, Sadak pointed to the increasing importance of press for people who were enthusiastic about learning what was going on in the world and finding a way to express their views in a period of the political crisis. For Sadak, although the number of readers would automatically increase in such periods, the increase also resulted in the emergence of "strange" newspapers that enjoyed the sense of excitement in public. The aim of these "strange" newspapers, Sadak maintained, was to spread fake news that would lead to "incalculable" damage to the country. Sadak further called on Recep Peker, the prime minister of the newly established CHP government, to take actions against such "strange" newspapers. The reason for such actions for Sadak was crimes against honor, pride and personal dignity that had to be punished heavily. And the punishment of people who went against these values had to be the primary responsibility of the newly established Peker government, Sadak suggested.[46]

Indeed, one of the first actions of Peker's government was to make changes in the Press Law. Just one month after the Peker government came to power, on 18 September 1946, Nihat Erim, CHP MP for Kocaeli, in his column in *Ulus*, reported

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izahlarda bulunmuş ve bütün itirazlarını ayrı ayrı cevaplandırmak suretiyle bunların hepsini çürüdmüştür."

[46] Necmettin Sadak, "Söz ve Yazı Hürriyeti Asla Tahdit Edilemez Amma", *Akşam*, 12 August 1946, p. 1: "Buhranlı devirlerde gazetelerin oynadığı rol büyüktür. Halk hadiselerin cereyanını pek tabii olarak gazetelerden öğrenmek ve merakını tatmin etmekle kalmaz, ruhundaki heyecana, okuduğu gazetede bir makes arar. Bundan dolayı bu gibi zamanlarda okuyucu sayısı artar ve gene bunun içindir ki böyle devirlerde halk heyecanile geçinen acayip gazeteler türer. Fikir, siyaset, kanaat tarafını bir tarafa bırakırsak, bir çeşit gazetecilik gayretinin sadece uydurma havadis yayma bakımından memkete ettiği kötülük hesapsızdır [...] Namus, şeref, haysiyet ticaretine engel olmak, bu gibi suçlara karşı çok sert cezalar koymak lazımdır. Recep Peker hükümetinin de ilk vazifesi budur."

that the draft press law was almost ready and some of its articles were already accepted in the Parliament.[47] And, six days later, on 24 September 1946, the government published these changes in the *Resmi Gazete*. These changes were mainly about the rules regulating the ownership of newspapers. With these changes, although the government removed some of the restrictions on the newspaper ownership, it also placed new limitations on releasing new newspapers.[48]

The pro-government newspapers unsurprisingly welcomed the enforcement of new restrictions on press. To justify these new limitations, the pro-government journalists advanced the argument that oppositional press was already too free to criticize the CHP government as it liked. Examples of this attitude can be seen in an undated document with the heading "Devlet Adamlarının Basında Çıkan Yazıları" (Articles of Statesmen Published in Press), held in Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi. Although the date of this document was unknown, in this bunch, there were articles of mostly CHP members including Falih Rıfkı Atay, Nihat Erim, Kasım Gülek and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, which were gathered in a single file. While the most of the articles in the file were written prior to 1950, there was also an article dated December of 1950, referring to the possibility that the file was prepared during the rule of the DP.

One of the articles in the file was Falih Rıfkı Atay's, which he wrote on 27 November 1946. Writing almost one month after the changes Peker made in the Press Law, Atay again addressed the danger of extreme freedom of press. To back his position, Atay claimed that if any neutral foreigner would translate what the oppositional newspapers wrote, he would see that they distorted the truth and

[47] Nihat Erim, "Hakikatin Kuvveti", *Ulus*, 18 September 1946, p. 1: "Matbuat Kanununda Değişiklik yapılmasına dair tasarının müzakeresi ilerlemektedir. Tasarının tümü hakkındaki görüşmeler bitmiş ve maddelerden bir kısmı da kabul olunmuştur."

[48] There occurred changes in the articles 9, 12, 15, 17, 18, 27, 30, 34, 35, 48 and 55. These articles were mainly related owners and editors of newspapers. With some of these changes, the responsibilities of owners were increased. For instance, they were forced to give information about every details about their newspapers. However, some of the previous restrictions were removed such as the necessity of university for owners and chief-editors. For more details see: "Matbuat Kanununda Bazı Maddelerin Değiştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun", *Resmi Gazete*, 24 September 1946, No: 6416.

reflected the current situation in Turkey worse than it was in reality.[49] As such, according to pro-CHP newspapers and journalists, the opposition was enjoying unnecessary freedom of press that might threaten the national interests of Turkey. Thus, pro-CHP journalists did not abstain to put forward the need for further restrictions rather than bringing relief to oppositional newspapers, so according to them, what Peker did was right.

The current literature treats Peker's action as a response to the increasing criticisms coming from the opposition.[50] There is no doubt that Peker's press policy which further intensified the anti-democratic restrictions of the Press Law led to a growing resentment among the DP members. From the perspective of the DP, these restrictions were to strengthen his government's hand to censor opposing newspapers.[51] The DP and its spokesman Menderes always implied that the amendment of the Press Law resulted from the authoritarian rule, and even the dictatorship. To answer these accusations, Peker gave a speech in the Parliament:[52]

> In the speech of my dear friend, Adnan Menderes, there was the mention of bad examples from world, which do not have any comparison and connection with us. He implied the big harms given to earth by the one man rule system. Does he agree with the ones thinking that the dictatorship, a sign of declining human consciousness, could only bring out disaster? Yet, on the contrary, are not there any empires which were left to decline and to fall due to its inability to secure regulation of ideas

[49] No Date: BCA: 030 01 128 833 1, p. 3: "Yabancı ve tarafsız bir misafir bir gün Muhalefet gazetelerini kendi diline çevirterek baştan aşağı okumuş olsa, gördükleri, dinledikleri ve anlattıkları ile taban tabana zıt iki his altında kalacaktır: Bu yabancıya göre memleketin iç durumu, halkın hali, yaşama ve geçim şartları, hiç şüphesiz muhalefet gazetelerinin göstermek istediğinden çok iyidir."

[50] Funda Selçuk Şirin, *İmparatorluk'tan Cumhuriyet'e Bir Aydın: Falih Rıfkı Atay* (İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2014), p. 395.

[51] Şentürk, "1931 Matbuat Kanunu'ndaki Değişiklikler Üzerine Kronolojik Bir Değerlendirme", pp. 209-220.

[52] *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları* (İrfan Neziroğlu and Tuncer Yılmaz eds.) (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2014), p. 255: "Muhterem arkadaşım Adnan Menderes'in nutkunda bizimle hiç bir nispet ve münasebeti olmayan dünya sergerdelerinden bahis vardır. Tek adamın hâkimiyeti sisteminin yeryüzünde vücuda getirdiği büyük fenalıkları ima ediliyor. Beşeri anlayışın alçalmasının bir ifadesi olan diktatörlüklerin yalnız felâket getireceği fikrinde bütün böyle düşünenlerle beraber mi. Fakat bunun karşısında iç hayatında fikir nizamını kuramıyan, fikir hürriyeti yanında Devlet olarak yaşayabilmek için onun kadar kanuni meşru bir Devlet otoritesi lüzumunu anlayamadıkları, kuramadıkları için mahvolmağa mahkûm kalan ve dağılan İmparatorluklar yok mudur?..Bizim yeni Basın tasarısı ile huzurunuza getirdiğimiz eser Türkiye'yi uzak tarihte ve yakın tarihte gördüğümüz hakikatlerin hattâ pek yakın günlerde içinden çıktığımız hâdiseleri realist bir gözle mütalâa ederek ve Türkiye'nin varlığnı teyit ve tesbit edecek şekili vermek gayretinin mahsulüdür. (Bravo sesleri alkışlar)."

> in domestic realm and its inability to understand the necessity of legitimate state authority in addition to freedom of thought in order to survive as a state?.This work, our new draft for Press Law, which we brought in front of you, by considering the realities of the previous and recent history of Turkey and also the circumstances that Turkey came through in the very recent days with a realist perspective, is the product of efforts to shape this law in a way that it can confirm and identify the existence of Turkey. (Bravo! Applauses)

The CHP government of Recep Peker was a short-lived one that lasted from 7 August 1946 to 10 September 1947 when a new CHP government was formed under the leadership of Hasan Saka. The oppositional press, yet, continued to attack the Peker government regarding his press policy even after its fall. On 1 March 1948, for instance, *Yeni Sabah* published an editorial article, written by A. Cemaleddin Saraçoğlu, the owner of the newspaper, called "Basın Hürriyeti" (Freedom of Press). The article began with the words of Celal Bayar who declared, when Peker was still the prime minister, that "there would not be democracy with Peker." Agreed with Bayar's claim, Saraçoğlu added that democracy would not be achieved with the presence of the current Press Law.[53] Saraçoğlu also criticized the period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as well as the subsequent years that witnessed the continuation of the single party rule of the CHP under the presidency of İsmet İnönü. Saraçoğlu further claimed that not even a single step was taken to achieve the freedom of press since the beginning of the multi-party system that inspired the spirit of democracy and freedom among Turkish people. Saraçoğlu further claimed that Peker's amendment of the Press Law reversed the process of democratization in press and tighten the existing chain.[54] Saraçoğlu used the "chain" as a metaphor for the 1931 Press Law, since, according to him, the oppositional voices were prisoners of the CHP government.

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[53] A. Cemaleddin Saraçoğlu, "Basın Hürriyeti", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 March 1948, p. 1: "Hakikatte Pekerle olmadığı gibi bu matbuat kanunu ile de demokrasi olmaz, olamaz!"

[54] Saraçoğlu, "Basın Hürriyeti", p. 1: "Hakiki demokrasinin en şaşmaz ölçüsü Basın ve Fikir hürriyetidir. Meclis, seçim, milli hakimiyet hepsi güzel, fakat bütün bunlara temel olacak hürriyet matbuat serbestliğidir. Halbuki Türkiye, çeyrek asırdır, tek partili ve topdancı bir manzara ve mahiyet arzettiği için matbuatı da daima tek seda aksettirmiş, memleket ve halk hep bir çan sesi duymuştur. Üç yıl evvel, demokrasi ve hürriyete heves etmeğe başladığımızdan beri de bu matbuat serbestliğini sağlayacak tek bir adım atmadık, hatta Receb Peker bunun zıddını yaparak eldeki kanun zincirine bir halka daha ekledi."

The editor of *Yeni Sabah*, Saraçoğlu, also used the United States, the new ally of Turkey, as a reference point in this article. After giving examples of news that an American newspaper reported, Saraçoğlu claimed that the American press presented Turkey as one of the countries having no freedom of press.[55] Saraçoğlu's another reference was pre-war Italy where Benito Mussolini, the leader of National Fascist Party, built a totalitarian regime. The reason for author's mention of Mussolini and his fascist regime was the adaptation of the existing press law in Turkey from Mussolini's Italy. Saraçoğlu claimed that the Press Law of 1931, which was arranged by Peker, was "the aggravated translation of the order designed by Mussolini's fascist Italy to strangle the true voice of Italian people by Peker."[56] He stated that Italy changed its press law immediately after being "set free" from fascism. And, he asked why Turkey insisted on the continuation of such a law. Saraçoğlu ended his article by urging the current cabinet of Hasan Saka to abolish the press law.[57]

Yeni Sabah's implicit accusation of the CHP government being fascist as well as its report of the US news regarding the absence of press freedom in Turkey angered *Ulus*. Three days later, on 4 March, through an editorial article entitled "Basın Hürriyeti" (Freedom of Press), *Ulus* responded to the accusations of the editor of *Yeni Sabah*. Confirming the recent news that the US press argued against Turkey, *Ulus* regarded these news as "misconceptions." American political authorities, according to *Ulus*, claimed that there was a great freedom of press in Turkey so these

[55] Saraçoğlu, "Basın Hürriyeti", p. 1: "Evvelki gün Amerikan haberleri Türkiyeyi haberleşme serbestliği olmıyan memleketler arasında sayıyordu. Bu telgraf Ankarada çok teessür uyandırmış, hatta Amerikan sefareti de Türkiyedeki Amerikalı muhabirlerin diledikleri gibi faaliyette bulunduklarını söyliyerek Amerikalılar için haberleşme bahsinde hiçbir şikayet mevcud bulunmadığını tebarüz ettirmiştir [...] Türkiyemizin yabancı muhabirleri, bilhassa Amerikalıları haberleşmede serbest bırakılması çok teşekküre layıktır amma Basın ve Fikir hürriyeti bundan ibaret değildir. Bu kadarı Amerikalıları menun ederse de bizi memnun etmez. Biz memleketimizde hakiki matbuat özgürlüğünü isteriz."

[56] Saraçoğlu, "Basın Hürriyeti", p. 1: "Mussolini'nin faşist İtalyasının İtalya halkının hakiki sesini boğmak için tertibedildiği düzenin Pekerce daha ağırlaştırılmış tercemesidir."

[57] Saraçoğlu, "Basın Hürriyeti", p. 3: "Hasan Saka kabinesinden, meclis açılmasına kadar bu matbuat kanununu ilga edecek bir tasarı hazırlamasını rica ediyoruz, ta ki sözümüz fiilimize uysun!"

speculations for stopping aids to Turkey due to its undemocratic press policies were "unfair" and "irrelevant."[58]

The response of *Ulus* to the editor of *Yeni Sabah* was not only related with his accusation of the CHP being an anti-democratic in regard to press freedom. Rather, *Ulus* grew more alarmed about the article of *Yeni Sabah* that mentioned the possibility of the termination of the American aid to Turkey. As will be examined in the next chapter under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid section, the maintenance of the American aid was of vital importance for Turkey at that period. *Ulus* also reacted too strongly to the use of the word "fascist" by A. Cemaleddin Saraçoğlu in describing the current press law in Turkey. For instance, on 22 June 1948, the author of *Ulus*, Yavuz Abadan, an academic and the CHP MP for Eskişehir, wrote that press in Turkey was "free" in reporting the views of Turkish citizens, with all of its differences, in making heavy criticisms, and in giving advices and in showing alternative ways to the government.[59] Despite this freedom provided by the current law, Abadan continued, from time to time some Turkish newspapers did not abstain to call this law "fascist."[60]

The opposition's criticisms continued during the periods of the following CHP governments after Recep Peker that led the new governments to revisit the idea of making changes on the press law. During Hasan Saka's prime ministry, who came to power on 10 September 1947, for example, *Yeni Sabah* enthusiastically reported the plans of the government to improve the current press law.[61] Nevertheless, the

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[58] Editorial, "Basın Hürriyeti", *Ulus*, 4 March 1948, p. 1: "Son günlerde bazı yabancı mahfillerin, Türk basınının durumu hakkında yanlış kanaatlere saptıklarını belirten bir iki haberle karşılaşmış bulunuyoruz: New York'tan verilen bir haberde Amerikan Harp Basın Birliğinin garip bir kararından bahsedilmektedir. Adı geçen birlik, basına müdahalede bulunan memleketlerde ve bu arada Türkiyeye Amerikan yardımının teşmil edilmemesini istemiştir. Bereket versin ki bu karar, Türkiyedeki resmi Amerikan mahfillerince ve yetkili şahsiyetlerce fena karşılanmış, Türkiyede fena bir basın serbestisi olduğuna göre haksızlık ve yersizliği belirtilmiştir."

[59] Yavuz Abadan, "Basın Hürriyeti", *Ulus*, 22 June 1948, p. 1: "Vatandaşlarının düşüncelerini her türlü renk, şekil, tezat ve tezevvülleriyle pervasızca aksettirmekte, ağır tenkidler yapmakta, nasihatler vermekte, yollar göstermekte tamamen serbesttirler."

[60] Abadan, "Basın Hürriyeti", p. 1: "Bazı gazetelerimiz kendilerine bu serbest çalışma imkanlarını sağlayan kanuna arasıra "faşist" damgası vurmaktan da çekinmemektedirler."

[61] "Basın Kanununda da Tadilat Yapılacak", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 April 1948, p.1: "Hazırlıklar bir hayli ilerledi: Umumi kanaat, kanunun yeni baştan tamzim edileceği merkezinde. Basın kanununun tatbikatten alınan neticelere yeni şartlar gözöününde tutularak tadili yolundaki hazırlıklar hayli

new law could not be enacted during Saka's tenure. Şemsettin Günaltay, who became the Prime Minister after Saka's resignation on 9 January 1949, promised to achieve this.[62] Immediately after coming to power, for example, Günaltay established a committee under the Ministry of Justice to work on the draft of a new press law as *Akşam* reported on 11 February.[63] The editor of *Yeni Sabah* was happy to hear the news about Günaltay's plans to change the 1931 Press Law completely, instead of making minor changes. On 1 April 1949, *Yeni Sabah* published an editorial article that blamed the previous CHP governments for still allowing the existence of "fascist Italy's" Press Law in Turkey. Yet, the article continued, if Günaltay could keep his promise to amend the law and if there were no obstacles standing in Günaltay's way, this law which could "survive due to the protection of extremists in CHP" was enjoying its final days.[64]

But this effort failed and a new press law was not enacted. This led to further heavy criticisms for the Günaltay government by oppositional newspapers. These criticisms reached to an extent that the Günaltay government accused them of distorting realities. Angered over such an accusation, the DP members and pro-DP journalists responded to the government. As the editor-in-chief of pro-DP *Zafer* which started to be published in 1949, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, the DP official, in his

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ilerlemiştir. Şimdi anlaşıldığına göre hükümet bu tasarıyı meclisin bu devresine yetiştirmeye karar vermiştir."

[62] "Yeni Hükümet, Bugün Grupta Güven Oyu İsteyecek", *Yeni Sabah*, 22 January 1949, p. 1: " Basın, Seçim ve Memurin kanunlarının tadili, yeni bir Borem ihdası muhtemel."

[63] "(Nihat Erim'in Beyanatı): Hükümet Verdiği Vaitleri Gerçekleştiriyor. Basın Kanunu Tadil Ediliyor. Seçim Kanununun Tadili için Başbakanlıkta Bir Komisyon Kuruldu.", *Akşam*, 11 February 1949, p. 1: "Hükümet programında vadedilen tedbirlerden biri de basın kanununun batı demokrasilerinin kabul ettiği esasları örnek tutarak yeniden gözden geçirilmesidir. Bu iş için bir müddetten beri Adalet Bakanlığında bir komisyon çalışmaktadır."

[64] Editorial, "Matbuat Kanunu", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 April 1949, p. 1: "Yürürlükte olan matbuat kanununun, Recep Peker eliyle daha da sıkılaştırılmış olan cıvataları öyle görülüyor ki -Ankara haberleri salih ise- kısmen gevşetilecektir. Esasen demokrasi ile idare edilmek istiyoruz, hatta biz en ileri demokrasi olduk diyebilmek için, ilk hamlede faşist İtalyanın matbuat kanununu kökünden devrilmek icabederdi. Şimdiye kadar gelen Halk Partili Hükumetler Saraçoğlu Şükrüsiyle bu işe yalnız lafta yanaşmış, Peker ise hafifletici tadil derken işi daha vahim hale sokmuş idi. Sayın Şemseddin Günaltay anti-demokratik kanunları kaldırmak hususunda mecliste verdiği söze sadık kalmak niyetini izhar ediyor ve bu geri ve toptancı kanun değiştiriliyor. Anavatanı olan İtalyadan bundan dört yıl evvel demokrasilerin zaferiyle, terkedilen bu kanun ancak Türkiyede bir sığınak bulmuş ve arada Halk partisi müfritlerinin himmetiyle hayatını idame edebilmiş idi. Yeni yeni engeller çıkarılmazsa bu kanunun artık günleri sayılı olduğu söylenebilir."

article dating on 12 August 1949 did not hesitate to claim that it was not Turkish newspapers but the CHP and its media organs that distorted realities by gathering and enforcing people and villagers to listen the pro-CHP propaganda and then presenting the people's attendance to the CHP programs as a "heartfelt" love.[65]

Günaltay responded to these counter-accusations of the DP in his speech in Erzurum in September of 1949. After warning oppositional newspapers, the Turkish Prime Minister underlined the significance of press freedom. Despite the mention of press freedom, Günaltay also pointed to cut the necessity of auto-censorship on behalf of the national interests of Turkey. If press would fail to achieve this auto-censorship, he implied, it would be done through the state authority.[66]

The anti-CHP newspapers perceived Günaltay's speech as a threat to their existence. Published next day, an article in *Zafer* reacted harshly on Günaltay's statement. *Zafer* reported the speech of Günaltay as "Sindirme Politikası Hâd Derecede Şiddetlendi: Başbakan Basını Tehdit Ediyor" (The Policy of Oppression Has Greatly Intensified: The Prime Minister Threatening the Press).[67] The following day, *Zafer* reported the response of Menderes, who described Günaltay's words as "direct threat" to press and opposition.[68]

In their lively polemics against the Günaltay government, oppositional journalists used the Ottoman/Turkish history as a reference point, too. On 9

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[65] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Türk Matbuatında Yapılan Tariz", *Zafer*, 12 August 1949, p. 1: "Türk matbuatı hakikatleri tahrif edemez. Hakikatleri tahrif edenler, asıl CHP Genel Başkanını karşılamak için zorla köylüleri ve halkı toplıyarak, bu organize muhabbetin sanki kalpten gelmiş bir tezahür olduğunu göstermeğe çalışanlar."

[66] "Başbakanın Basına ve Muhalefete Yeni İhtarı: Günaltay, Erzurum'daki Nutkundan Maksadın, Basını Tehdit Değil, İkaz Olduğunu Söyledi", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 September 1949, p. 1: "Arkadaşlar! Demokrasinin esaslı surette yerleşmesi için ikinci lüzumlu esas basın hürriyetidir. Yani her vatandaş düşündüklerini serbestçe milletin tetkik nazarına sunabilmelidir, muvafıksa kabul, iyi görülmezse reddedilir. Basın meselesi tahditli devirden serbest devre geçerken bir takım sarsıntılar geçirecekti. Bu sarsıntıları önlemek basının başında bulunan, memleketini seven bilgili ve görgülü vatandaşların vazifesi olmalıdır. Ben öyle istiyorum ki basının hürriyetini çerçevelemek yine basın tarafından ve basın mensupları tarafından olsun. Başka türlü çerçevelemek yoluna gitmek her halde hürriyeti tehdit eder. Basın kendi hürriyetini memleketin menfaatlerini göz önüne alarak kendisi çerçevelemelidir. Bunu yapamazsa o vakit hakikaten başka yollardan çerçevelemek zarureti hasıl olur. Buraya gitmek için mesul bir devlet adamı olarak bu arkadaşları ikaz ediyorum ve ikazıma devam edeceğim."

[67] "Sindirme Politikası Hâd Derecede Şiddetlendi: Başbakan Basını Tehdit Ediyor", *Zafer*, 7 September 1949, p. 1: "Şemsettin Günaltayın Karsta verdiği nutuk havayı çok ağırlaştırdı."

[68] "Bayar Adına Adnan Menderes Başbakana Cevap Veriyor", *Zafer*, 8 September 1949, p. 1: "Başvekilin sözü basına ve muhalefete tevcih olunmuş sarih tehditlerden ibarettir."

September 1949, for example, Mümtaz Faik Fenik wrote an article entitled "Dış Tehlikeler ve Parti İşleri!" (External Threats and the Party Matters), in which he claimed that Günaltay made this speech in the eastern part of Turkey on purpose because of the fact that throughout the Ottoman/Turkish history, these territories were attacked various times by the enemies of the Turks including Russians, the centuries-old enemies of the Turks. As a result, Fenik maintained that people living there "knew what Moscow meant very well."[69] Fenik implied that Günaltay made propaganda of his own party by utilizing the national feelings of Turkish people, who felt the Soviet threat most. At that particular place, very close to the Soviet Union, according to Fenik, Günaltay emphasized the importance of acting together as a nation, far from oppositional voices.

The following day, Fenik continued his criticisms of the speech of Günaltay, and he said such threats would no longer make sense in Turkey.[70] On the same day, *Zafer* reported news from İzmir regarding this issue. At that time, Bayar was in İzmir and it was written that Günaltay's "threat" against the newspapers from the Turkish borders with the Soviet Union created "a lot of frustration" among the members of press.[71] On 10 November, *Yeni Sabah* also published an article entitled "Matbuatın Önemi" (The Importance of Press) about this event and it was stated that in any

[69] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Dış Tehlikeler ve Parti İşleri", *Zafer*, 9 September 1949, p. 1: "İktidar partisi erkanın sık sık üzerinde durdukları mevzulardan biri de dış vaziyettir. Ne zaman bir parti propagandası yapılmak iztense, derhal dış tehlike ortaya atılır, vatandaşlar arasında ikilik olmasın, harice karşı milli birliği muhafaza etmek vatan borcudur, diğer memleketler bizi ne kadar birleşik görürlerse, o kadar çok kuvvet buluruz gibi büyük sözler sarfedilir. Son defa başbakanın doğu bölgesinde söylediği muhtelif nutuklarda yine bu temanın ele alındığını ve parti propagandasının ona göre ayarlandığını görüyoruz. Çünkü doğu, tarihte çok defa düşman istilasına uğramış bir yerdir. Bura halkı Moskofun ne olduğunu çok iyi bilir [...] O halde dış meselelerle, iç meselelerin zerre kadar karıştırılmaması lazımdır. Esasen bütün partiler dış davalarda müttefik olduklarını kaç defa ilan etmişlerdir. Ama bizim halk partililer nedense, dış tehlikeleri daima kendi partileri için sömürmeyi itiyat edinmişlerdir. Sıkı bir parti mücadelesi oldu mu: -Aman! Diyorlar, milli birliği bozmıyalım. Sonra istilaya uğrarız."

[70] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Şimdi de Basını Tehdit Ediyorlar", *Zafer*, 10 September 1949, p. 1: "Sayın başbakanımız eğer bu tehdidi bilmeyerek yapmışsa, derhal tashih etmelidir. Eğer bilerek yapmışsa biz de kendisine şunu hatırlatalım ki, bu memlekette artık bu nevi tertipli tehditlere kulak asan kimse kalmamıştır. Vatandaşlar arasında husumetin olmamasını istiyen bir başbakanın "gizli emeller" gibi, "size hudut bölgesinden hatırlatıyorum ki" gibi iymalarla Türk matbuatını halkın husumetine maruz bırakmasının manasını anlamak zordur."

[71] "İzmir", *Zafer*, 10 September 1949, p. 1: "(İzmir, Uçak Postasıyla Gecikmiştir) Başbakanın hudut bölgesinden gazetelere karşı savurduğu tehditler bütün basın mensupları arasında büyük bir teessürler karşılanmıştır."

society, where the press was silenced, would be short of expressing its problems and happiness.[72]

As the oppositional groups spoke in a unified voice against the Günaltay government, it opted to take immediate steps. Just the next day, for instance, *Yeni Sabah* informed its readers that Anadolu Ajansı (the Anatolian Agency), the Turkish state news agency, the day before, for the first time, published news about the DP. This news, however, also reported that DP was not happy with the current draft of the press law, on which the Günaltay government was working.[73] The disapproval of opposition probably made the government revisit its draft. Two weeks after the news about the objection of opposition, Fuat Sirmen, the Minister of Justice, called the members of İstanbul Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (İstanbul Journalists Association) to discuss this draft. After this meeting, the government declared that this draft was withdrawn because they decided to make further analysis on press laws of democratic states. Until now, as reported, the Swedish one was the most favored.[74]

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[72] Editorial, "Matbuatın Ehemmiyeti", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 November 1949, p. 1: "Çok eski ve fazla tekrarlandığı için yıpranmış bir teşbihtir ama hakikati tamamile ifade edildiğinden tekrarlanmasında mahzur yoktur, matbuat bir milletin ve memleketin dili mahiyetindedir. Basını susturulmuş veya sesi kısılmış bir cemiyet, ıztırap ve neş'esini ifade etmekten mahrum bırakılmış bir topluluktur. Tarihin geçmiş olayları, baskı ve yıldırmakla başladığını göstermektedir."

[73] "D.P. Yeni Basın Kanunu Tasarısına Şiddetle Muarız", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 November 1949, p. 1: "Anadolu Ajansı, dün ilk defa Demokrat Partiye ait bir haberi neşretti ve D.P. meclis grubu seçimlerine ait tebliğine bültenlerinde yer verdi."

[74] "Hükümet Yeni Basın Tasarısını Geri Bıraktı", *Zafer*, 26 November 1949, p. 1: "En ileri demokrat memleketlerde mevcut basın kanunları prensip olarak örnek ittihaz edilecek;" "Basın Kanunu Tasarısından Vazgeçildi: Yeni bir Tasarı Hazırlanacak", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 November 1949, pp. 1, 7: "Yeni basın kanunu tasarısı üzerinde Adalet Bakanlığiyle görüşmelerde bulunmak üzere şehrimize gelmiş olan İstanbul gazetecileri bu akşam İstanbul'a hareket etmiştir. Heyet burada yaptığı temaslardan memnundur. Basın kanunu tasarısı şimdilik geri bırakılmıştır. Bundan sonraki çalışmalar şu şekilde olacaktır: Muhtelif Avrupa memleketlerinin demokrasiye uygun en iyi basın kanunları tercüme edilecek, ve gazetecilerden de iki mümessilin iştirak edeceği bir komisyon tarafından bu tercüme kanunlar üzerinde incelemeler yapılacaktır. Halen tercümesi yapılmış olan basın kanunları içinde en müsait görüleni İsveç basın kanunudur;" "Basın Kanunu Tasarısı", *Akşam*, 25 November 1949, p. 1: "(Ankara, 25, Akşam) Adalet Bakanlığı tarafından hazırlanan yeni basın kanunu tasarısı etrafında müzakerelerde bulunmak üzere Bakanlıkça davet olunan İstanbul Gazeteciler Cemiyeti azalarından mürekkep heyet, dün sabah şehrimize gelmiştir. Tasarıyı hazırlayan komisyon azalarının da iştirakile yapılan bu toplantıda söz alan Adalet Bakanı Fuat Sirmen, demokratik anlayışa göre bir basın kanunu tasarısının çıkarılmasının hükümetin prensiplerinden olduğunu, amme nizamını emniyet altına alan hususlarla vatandaş şeref ve haysiyetini koruyacak kayıtlar dışında basına geniş bir tenkid hürriyeti ile dördüncü kuvvet olan mürakebe hakkı tanımak istediğini ve komisyon azalarına vaktile bu yolda çalışmaları için hükümet adına direktif verildiğini binaenaleyh hazırlanan tasarıyı kendisinin tetkik ettiğini, hükümlerde tamamen bu mahiyeti gördiğinü söylemiştir."

These efforts for a new press law, according to *Ulus*, aroused great enthusiasm among people.[75]

Despite the enthusiasm of the anti-DP newspapers for the new law, the government's decision to allocate one hour in radio to deny or correct "false" or "distorted" news (yalan veya tahrif edilmiş haber) received severe criticism from the opposition. This decision of the government, obviously, was a direct reference to the news of oppositional newspapers. Mümtaz Faik Fenik immediately criticized this attempt. He wrote that it was an attempt to suppress newspapers and put them under pressure.[76] In the same issue, on 7 January 1950 this newspaper also showed its reaction to Günaltay's statements about the press law. Günaltay told that the current draft of the press law, to which the opposition and the representatives of press had previously objected, would be enacted as it was. According to *Zafer*, although Günaltay had before told that press laws of democratic states would be translated into Turkish, he said to journalists that the government gave up this idea as the laws they examined were having more strict articles than their draft. This, for *Zafer*, was a declaration that would "astonish" journalists.[77]

Günaltay, as reported, added that throughout this process he talked with the press members of the most democratic countries, who could not believe the current freedom in the Turkish press. Anyone, according to the Prime Minister, could easily start to publish a new newspaper in Turkey, which he thought it was something to be prevented. He claimed, thus, rather than complaining about the pressure on Turkish press, which actually did not exist, he even felt the necessity of imposing more measures.[78] In this interview, moreover, Günaltay emphasized the importance of press ethics (basın ahlakı). *Ulus*, compared to *Zafer*, highlighted the Günaltay's emphasis on press ethics more. As a pro-CHP newspaper, *Ulus* put forward three

[75] "Yeni Basın Kanunu", *Ulus*, 2 January 1950, p. 1.

[76] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Göbels'in Basına Dair Bir Sözü", *Zafer*, 7 January 1950, p. 1.

[77] "Basın Kanunu Aynen Çıkacak", *Zafer*, 7 January 1950, p. 5: "...gazetecileri hayrete düşürecek bir açıklama..."

[78] "Basın Kanunu Aynen Çıkacak", p. 5: "Herkes gelip bir gazete çıkarıyor, bu meslek bu kadar başıboş bırakılamaz. Bunun için ne yapmak lazımsa düşünelim, beraber yapalım. En demokrat memleketler temsilcileri ile konuştum, bizim basının vaziyetinden hayaretle bahsettiler. O halde bir tazyik bahis mevzu olmamak üzere bir inzibat altına almak ihtiyacını hissediyorum."

main cautions of the Günaltay government in preparing the new press law: its articles would need to protect personal dignity of the Turkish citizens, to prevent pro-communist publications as well as reactionary publications.[79] Finally, he added that the government was supposed to enact a new law in accordance to the needs of the country not to those of individuals.[80]

These heated discussions for a new law between the government and the opposition from 1945 onwards, however, did not bear any fruits. A new press law could not be enacted during the rule of the CHP. It turned into a chance for the DP, which promised to withdraw so-called anti-democratic laws in Turkey including the 1931 Press Law, in case it would win the elections. As a result, one of the first actions of the DP government was to pass a new press law, only two months after it came to power.[81] As the main organ of the new government *Zafer* gave details about the draft law. *Zafer* reported that in the Parliament it was Cihad Baban, as not only a DP MP for İzmir but also a journalist, who talked about the new law. Baban, the newspaper reported, pointed out the significance of press freedom for civilized nations, and such a freedom which Turkey would also enjoy thanks to this new law.[82]

The new but also short-lived Press Law of 1950, which the DP government amended in 1954, was more democratic than the previous one, at least in theory. Nevertheless, after 1950 onwards, it was the CHP and pro-CHP press that complained about the dissatisfaction they experienced about this new law. Just only one week after the passing of the new law, on 23 July 1950, for instance, in his article in *Ulus*, Nihat Erim harshly attacked the 1950 Press Law. According to Erim, the DP could not keep its promises regarding this issue and "the new press law did

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[79] "Başbakan Gazetecilerle Görüştü", *Ulus*, 7 January 1950, p. 1: "1-Vatandaşın şeref ve haysiyeti masun bulunmalıdır. 2- Komünizmi körükleyen neşriyata müsade etmeyiz. 3- İrticaa meydan vermeyiz."

[80] "Başbakan Gazetecilerle Görüştü", p. 1: "Biz fertin değil memleketin ihtiyaçlarına uygun bir kanun çıkarmakla mükellefiz."

[81] It was published in *Resmi Gazete* on 24 July 1950. For more details see: "Basın Kanunu", *Resmi Gazete*, 24 July 1950, pp. 18808-18811.

[82] "Basın Tasarısı Dün Gece Yarısı Kanunlaştı", *Zafer*, 15 July 1950, p. 1.

not totally satisfy journalists."[83] During its opposition years the DP was very critical of this issue; however, its new law could not satisfy the DP's opposition either. From the opposition's point of view, nothing was actually changed by the new law. In the following years, the dissatisfaction of the CHP and the opposition in general was intensified. On April 4, 1951 in *Ulus*, for instance, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote:[84]

> Since 1945 we have been in the face of such a press matter. It cannot be denied that there are differences between the pre-1945 and post-1945 press regimes. Those days that led to the closing of newspapers with the Cabinet decisions are far away. Yet, that is not the end of duty…When they were in opposition, the Democrats made the heaviest attacks on the previous governing party on this issue. It would be expected that when the Democrats came to the power, this dispute would vanish and the freedom of press would settle in a form that it would not be objected. Yet, it is seen that the matter which could be solved in 10 days, has been left hanging in the air for 10 years.

The new law, which the opposition still found anti-democratic, started to disturb the DP members after a short amount of time. According to these DP members, the 1950 Press Law did not give the government enough power to control press. While the opposition complained about its anti-democratic characteristics, the DP members complained that the law allowed the oppositional newspapers too much freedom, so discussions about the press law reemerged in September 1952. According to the news in *Ulus* dating 15 September, the DP MPs, namely Zühtü Hilmi Velibeşe and his 30 colleagues, proposed to make changes in the newly

[83] No Date: BCA, 030 01 132 859 2, p. 10: "Basın Kanununa gelince, yazık ki DP iktidarı bunda da vaitlerini yerine getirmemiştir. Bir defa hükümet tarafından meclise gönderilen kanun gazetecilerin protestosu ile karşılanmıştır [...] Yeni basın kanunu gazetecileri tamamen tatmin etmemiştir. İlk fırsatta düzeltileceği vadedilmektedir. Bu nokta hal edile dursun eski kanun ne derece anti-demokratiktir, yenisi ne kadar demokratiktir. Bu da üzerinde çok söz söylenebilecek bir konudur."

[84] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Matbuat Hürriyeti Bahsinde Niçin Anlaşamıyoruz?", *Ulus*, 4 April 1951, p. 1: "1945ten beri bir matbuat meselesi karşısındayız. 1945ten evvelki matbuat rejimiyle ondan sonraki rejim arasında çok fark bulunduğu inkar kabul etmez. Bakanlar heyeti kararile gazetelerin kapatıldığı günler çok uzakta kaldı. Fakat bu kadarı ile iş bitmiyor [...] Muhalefette bulunan Demokratlar matbuat hürriyeti mevzu üzerinden eski iktidar partisine en şiddetli hücumları yaptılar. Demokratlar hükümete gelince artık bu ihtilafın tarihe intikal edeceği ve matbuat hürriyetinin hiç itiraz kabul etmeyecek bir şekilde kati hal şeklini bulacağı beklenirdi. Fakat on güne halledilecek bir meselenin on yıldır hala sürümcemede kaldığı görülüyor."

enacted law. This, of course, alarmed *Ulus* as the draft law included some articles placing severe punishment and restrictions on press.[85]

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın expressed his disapproval of the draft law with an article entitled "Basın Hürriyetine Baskı ve Tecavüz" (Pressure and Attack on the Freedom of Press). For Yalçın, it was so ironic that the DP owed its success in elections to the freedom of the press in Turkey but now "it attempted to pay its debt of gratitude for free Turkish newspapers by ruining them."[86] Two weeks later, on November 3, 1952, he repeated his criticisms in his article "Hür Basını Boğmak İçin" (To Throttle the Free Press).[87]

The above-mentioned restrictions did not alarm only the opposition. In point of fact, some DP members also worried about the planned restrictions. One of them was Cihad Baban, who had played a crucial role in the passing of the 1950 Press Law. As stated above, he was even the first DP deputy that took the floor and introduced the new law to the Parliament. Even before the discussions started in September 1952 for the changes in the 1950 Press Law, Cihad Baban was the first to protest the plans of the DP government to charge press criminals in military courts. According to the news published in *Cumhuriyet* on 7 February 1952, in the Parliament, he said: "Despite the fact that there are civil courts, which are working properly in the country, why some of the press criminals will be charged in military courts. Thinking about its meaning even offends a person."[88] Baban continued his words by reminding that even the previous CHP government, which itself passed this rule that allowed to charge some press criminals in military courts, never used it.[89]

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[85] "Basını Baskı Altına Alan Yeni Bir Teşebbüs", *Ulus*, 15 September 1952, p. 1: "Velibeşe ve 30 arkadaşı matbuat kanunda tadilat yapılması için teklif hazırladılar. Yeni tasarısa ağır cezalar ve neşriyatı takyit edici hükümler var. Başbakanın ayinesi iştir kişinin dediği Adapazarı konuşmasında iki gün sonra bu teşebbüsün meydana çıkması kaderin ne garip cilvesidir."

[86] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Basın Hürriyetine Baskı ve Tecavüz", *Ulus*, 18 September 1952, p. 1: "hür Türk gazetelerine minnet borcunu onları mahvetmek suretiğle ödemeye kalktılar."

[87] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Hür Basını Boğmak İçin", *Ulus*, 3 November 1952, p. 1: "Demokrat iktidarın bütün gayreti hürriyeti boğmak ve memlekete istediği gibi olmak hedefine çevrilmiş olduğunun son misal ve delilini hür basına karşı tevcih edilen yakışıksız hücumda görüyoruz."

[88] "Basın Suçlarının Askeri Mahkemelere Verilmesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 February 1952, pp. 1, 5: "Memlekette doğru dürüst işleyen normal mahkemeler varken bazı basın suçları neden askeri mahkemelere veriliyor, bunun manasını düşünmek bile insana ağır geliyor."

[89] "Basın Suçlarının Askeri Mahkemelere Verilmesi", pp. 1, 5.

In the following period, Baban also reacted much to the DP's plan for amending the 1950 Press Law. After many years, in 1970, in Baban's book, *Politika Galerisi* (The Gallery of Politics), there was an editor's note, which recalled the discussions of Baban with Peker regarding the freedom of press in 1946. And, after the elections, it was stated, he himself worked hard to pass the new law. Yet, he had to leave the DP as the party made actions against the democratic character of the Press Law of 1950.[90] Despite criticisms from the opposition and several supporters of the DP, it was on 9 March 1954 that the government enacted Neşir Yoliyle veya Radyo ile İşlenecek Bazı Cürumlar Hakkında Kanun (Law on Crimes Committed by Publishing or Radio).[91] With this law, much of the comparatively democratic character of the current 1950 Press Law was lost.[92]

This new law, which was enacted just before the May 1954 elections, led to severe criticisms not only within the opposition but also a noticeable reaction came even from the DP members. It was mainly the potential attacks of the new law on "the right to prove" (ispat hakkı) that disturbed these people. With this law, even having a proof would mean nothing and a journalist could not voice his/her claims, which were against the honor (namus), the dignity (şeref) and the pride (haysiyet) of anybody. Meanwhile, the reaction against this law within the DP grew and on 20 December 1955 this intra-party opposition even resulted in the establishment of a new party, namely Hürriyet Partisi (HP) (Freedom Party).[93]

All these discussions about the press law from 1945 to 1954 showed that throughout this period, the legal structure was very rigid in favor of the state authority against the freedom of press. Apparently, the legal structure that mainly shaped the press regime in Turkey always remained one of the subjects of intense

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[90] Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), pp. 7-8.

[91] "Neşir Yoliyle veya Radyo ile İşlenecek Bazı Cürumlar Hakkında Kanun" (No: 6334), *Resmi Gazete*, 17 March 1954, p. 8653.

[92] Nuri Kayış and Serhat Hürkan, *Sansürsüz Sansür Tarihi (1795-2011)* (Ankara: Sinemis, 2012), p. 116.

[93] Çağla Kubilay, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Basında İspat Hakkı Tartışmaları", *İletişim Araştırmaları*, 12/1 (2014), p. 18; Diren Çakmak, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Bir Muhalefet Partisi Örneği", *Akademik Bakış*, 2/3 (2008), pp. 156-164; Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 248; Yıldız, "Demokrat Parti İktidarı (1950-1960) ve Basın", p. 482.

debates between the government and the opposition during both the rule of the CHP and the DP. Interestingly enough, it was the DP government that decided to make changes on this 'more democratic law' just two years after in order to gain more control over press although it was the DP that had presented the acceptance of so-called more democratic press law as the top priority of the party when it was in opposition.

The amendment made by the DP was nevertheless not free from opposition. Even the members of the DP reacted to these anti-democratic legal changes aiming to increase state control. In effect, this shows attempts of the government to empower state authority over press were counter-productive. To clarify this contradiction, the implementation of these legal changes, the punishment and censorship mechanisms, will be examined.

II.II. Censorship, Punishment and Physical Violence

The discussions about the freedom of press between the opposition and the government were not limited just to the legal structure of press. Beside the legal framework, the main problem was essentially the one-sided and harsh application of these articles. Thus, although in theory there was a more democratic press law, at least from 1950 to 1954, in practice pressure mechanisms were always used against the oppositional press. During the discussions in the Parliament regarding the opposition's desire for a change in 1931 Press Law, for instance, Adnan Menderes expressed this point. He, as reported by *Ulus* on 18 September 1946, was against only the degree of punishments but not the principles and elements of the punishment.[94] In the same issue, however, there was an interesting item about an article published in a newspaper called *İzmir* against the current CHP government. CHP members brought the issue to the Parliament and the government showed its reaction to this newspaper during the discussions about passing the new press law. As the spokesman of the DP, Adnan Menderes also protested this article and pointed out that there was no affiliation between his party and this newspaper. And, this news

[94] "Matbuat Kanunu İçin Görüşmeler", *Ulus*, 18 September 1946, p. 1: "Cezaların prensibine ve unsurlarına değil sadece derecesine itiraz ettiğini belirtti."

was published in *Ulus* with a heading "Basın Hürriyeti Elbette Bu Değil" (Certainly this is not the Freedom of Press).[95]

The case of *İzmir*, however, was one of the exceptional cases until 1950 that the DP acknowledged the CHP's rightness in terms of the relation between the government and oppositional press. With the exception of such rare cases, the post-1946 years, in general, witnessed the complaints of the DP about the extensive use of punishment mechanisms by the CHP governments against the opposition.

Interestingly enough, both of these two parties during their respective rules acted in a very similar way and punished the same newspaper: *Kudret*. On the eve of May 1950 elections, it was the CHP government that put the manager of editorial department (yazı işleri müdürü) of *Kudret*, together with that of *Zafer*, into jail.[96] Then, in 1952, this time under the rule of the DP, *Kudret* was put under a financial pressure. Ali Rıza Başkan, the owner of this newspaper, gave an interview to *Ulus* and this news was published on 28 July 1952 with a heading "Kudret Gazetesinin Uğradığı Tazyikler" (Pressures Encountered by Kudret). In this interview, Başkan explained the reasons for why he had to close his newspaper temporarily. Initially, he told, the income of the newspaper was reduced due to the ban on the *resmi ilan* (official announcements) given to the newspaper. This issue of *resmi ilan* and how it was used as a financial tool in the hands of governments against the newspapers will be examined in a separate section in this chapter. But it is clear that *Kudret* was one of newspapers that was punished by the DP via a cut in its *resmi ilan* incomes. In addition to this income loss, the one-fourth of copies transported to the different parts of the country was deliberately destroyed during this transportation, and, consequently the income of the newspaper considerably decreased.[97] Then, Başkan

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[95] "Basın Hürriyeti Elbette Bu Değildir", *Ulus*, 18 September 1946, p. 1: Mecliste teessürle karşılanan bir yazı: İzmir gazetesinde çıkan bir fıkra dolayısiyle Adnan Menderes de teessürlerini bildirdi ve bu gazetenin Demokrat Parti ile ilgisinin olmadığını tasrih etti."

[96] Alçora, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Parti Propagandası (1946-1950)*, p. 135.

[97] "Kudret Gazetesinin Uğradığı Tazyikler", *Ulus*, 28 July 1952, p. 1: "Ali Rıza Başkan önce resmin ilanların kesildiğini, sonra piyasaya çıkarılan gazetelerden dörtte birinin yollarda imha ettirilerek satışının baltalandığını söylüyor. İktidarın resmi ilan baskısı yüzünden evvelki gün neşriyatını tatil zorunda kalan Kudret gazetesi sahibi Ali Rıza Başkan gazetesinin kapanış sebepleri hakkında beyanatta bulundu."

revealed how the founders of the DP had encouraged him in 1946 to start the publication of a newspaper that would oppose the current CHP government. According to Başkan, everyone knew his efforts to publish such a newspaper. Yet, as he claimed, he finally learnt that the founders of the DP did not want an oppositional newspaper for the sake of the country. Rather, what they wanted was a newspaper that would support their party "blindly."[98]

The DP's efforts from 1946 to 1950 to raise oppositional voices against the current government were clear in the case of *Kudret*. It was not until 1949 that *Zafer*, the main organ of the DP, was started its publication. Until that time *Yeni Sabah* was also one of the strong voices against the CHP government. Because of its publications, particularly the ones after 1946 elections, it was closed for a short time in July 1946.[99] This angered the DP members in the Parliament and they asked Peker the reason for this decision. Recep Peker explained the reason behind the closure of *Yeni Sabah* (together with *Gerçek*) that they both published the claims of Celal Bayar against the credibility of the elections and made the public suspicious of their results.[100]

Indeed, at that period, together with five more cities, İstanbul was ruled under the martial law, and it was the military command of the martial law that closed *Yeni Sabah*.[101] Nevertheless, the editorial of *Yeni Sabah* never forgot this closure issue together with other pressure policies against the freedom of press. And, from time to time, it harshly criticized the CHP government's press policy. After more than three years, on 10 November 1949, for instance, this newspaper published an editorial

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[98] "Kudret Gazetesinin Uğradığı Tazyikler", p. 1: "Gazetemi hükümet merkezinde ilk muhalif gazete olarak DP kurucularının ısrarları üzerine 1946 senesinde çıkarmağa başlamıştım. Mücadelem herkesçe malumdur. Sonunda öğrendim ki D.P. kurucuları memleket nam ve hesabına bir muhalif gazete değil körü körüne kendilerini destekleyen bir gazete istiyorlarmış."

[99] Şentürk, "1931 Matbuat Kanunu'ndaki Değişiklikler Üzerine Kronolojik Bir Değerlendirme", pp. 208-209.

[100] *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul Konuşmaları*, pp. 257-266.

[101] İstanbul was ruled under martial law from 1940 to 1947. It started with the Second World War conditions and the government did not abolish it until 1947. For more details see: Alaattin Uca, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye'nin Altı Vilayetinde İlan Edilen Örfi İdare ve Buna Karşı Mecliste Gösterilen demokratik Tepkiler", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi* 40 (2009), p. 375.

article entitled "Matbuatın Önemi" (The Importance of Press). Yet, what was interesting is that *Yeni Sabah* made its comments about the press regime in Turkey, while reporting the news about the visit of Walter Lippmann, a well-known and influential American journalist, who was famous with his public opinion studies and popularized the 'Cold War' concept, to Turkey. In the article, it was written that Lippmann, who throughout his life published oppositional news, had been never put into a jail, nor did he stand a trial. *Yeni Sabah* added that no journalist in Turkey could enjoy such freedom that Lippmann had.[102]

Near the end of 1949 came the more intensified criticisms of the opposition of the press regime in Turkey. Such criticisms were mainly related to their disappointment in the existing 1931 Press Law. Like *Yeni Sabah*, *Zafer* also protested the punishment policy of the current CHP government through various news. For instance, on 1 December 1949, it reported the discussions in the Parliament on the question of Sahir Kurtoğlu, the deputy of the ruling party for Kırşehir, who asked why the three months prison sentence of Mümtaz Faik Fenik had not been applied yet. It was, as claimed, because of the medical reasons and *Zafer* was furious about this question of the CHP MP.[103] It responded to this question with the words of the wife of Mümtaz Faik Fenik, Adviye Fenik, who was also a journalist. She wrote a sarcastic article on the issue: "we are looking forward the day

[102] Editorial, "Matbuatın Ehemmiyeti", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 November 1949, p. 1: "İngiltere ve Amerika ise matbuat hürriyetine o kadar alışmışlar bu hal onlar için o derece ikinci bir tabiat halini almıştır ki bugün Londra ve Vaşingtonda hiç bir parti, hiç bir şahıs yazı serbestliğine en ufak bir engel koymayı aklından bile geçirmez. Nitekim Mister (Lippman) geçen hafta, memleketimizde bulunduğu sırada, gazetelere verdiği ifadede Amerikada basın kanunu diye bir şeyin mevcut olmadığını açıklamış idi. Ömrü boyunca muhalif neşriyat yaptığı halde, bir defa olsun mahkum olmak şöyle dursun, mahkeme huzuruna bile çıkmadığını sözlerine gurur ile ilave ediyordu. Bizde hangi muharrir böyle bir iddiada bulunabilir."

[103] Adviye Fenik, "Sahir Kurtoğlu'nun Sorusu: Mümtaz Faik Fenik Neden Hapiste Değil?", *Zafer*, 1 December, p. 1, 6: "Büyük Millet Meclisinin dünkü gündeminde birçok mühim meseleden başka Mümtaz Faik Fenik'in bir neşriyat suçundan 3 ay hapse mahkûm olduğu halde neden hala cezasının infaz edilmediği hakkında Kırşehir Milletvekili Sahir Kurtoğlu tarafından sorulan suale Adalet Bakanı Fuat Sirmen'in ve Sıhhat Bakanı Kemali Beyazıd'ın verecekleri cevap da vardı."

with excitement and hope to leave him behind the cold prison bars, after we save Mümtaz from fever."[104]

Mümtaz Faik Fenik, from the perspective of the DP, was one of the most attacked victims of the CHP's rule and its press regime. But it should not be ignored that he was also the one that harshly criticized CHP's policies. From time to time, Fenik maintained his criticism of the previous CHP governments even during the DP rule. Just after the DP won the elections, on 15 July 1950, for instance, he criticized Peker's oppressive policies toward the press.[105] This picture of oppression toward press was changed, however, Fenik stated, thanks to the DP's new press law. Hence, the 1950 Press Law was beginning of a new era for the Turkish press in terms of freedom of press, according to Fenik.[106]

Nevertheless, in July 1950, just two months after the establishment of the DP government, was too early to say such things and to eulogize the freedom of press during the rule of the DP. Although the DP immediately changed the current press law with a so-called more democratic one, in short time oppositional voices were started to be silenced even more harshly. It was on 1 August 1951, only one year

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[104] Adviye Fenik, "Sahir Kurtoğlu'nun Sorusu: Mümtaz Faik Fenik Neden Hapiste Değil?", p. 6: "Biz Mümtaz'ı ateşli halinden kurtarıp, soğuk hapishane parmaklıkları arkasına bırakacağımız günü heyecan ve ümitle bekliyoruz."

[105] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Bırakınız Söylesinler, Bırakınız Yazsınlar!", *Zafer*, 15 July 1950, pp. 1, 8: "Recep Peker iktidara geldiği zaman ilk icraat olarak matbuatı sıkı bir baskı altına almayı düşündü; ve kanundaki hükümleri ne kadar ağırlaştırmak kabilse o kadar ağırlaştırdı. Adnan Menderes iktidara geldiği zaman ilk icraat olarak matbuat kanundaki bütün ağır hükümlerin kaldırılması gerektiğini söyledi ve gazetecilere tam bir hürriyet vermek için elinden gelen bütün gayreti sarfetti. İşte hürriyet anlayışında iki rejim arasındaki en büyük farklardan biri budur. Eski kanunla gazeteciler hakikaten büyük bir baskı altında bulunuyorlardı. Memlekette gazetecilik yapmak bir nevi cesaret meselesi halini almıştı. Gerçi bakanlar heyetine gazeteleri kapatmak salahiyetini veren 50 inci madde kaldırılmıştı; fakat bu sefer gazete yerine gazetecileri içeri tıkmak pekâlâ kabildi. Sonunda beraatla bitecek birçok davalar için gazetecilerin günlerce mahkeme koridorlarında süründükleri vakiidir. Öyle zamanlar olmuştur ki, bir gazeteci bazen haftanın beş günü sabah akşam mahkemelerde geçirmeğe mecbur tutulmuştur. Sebep nedir? Sebep: İllallah desin ve muhalefetten vazgeçip iktidarı methetmek yoluna girsin!..Buna rağmen meslekdaşlarımız hiçbir şeyden yılmamışlar ve büyük bir dikkat ve titizlikle mücadelelerine devam etmişleridir. Bir defa daha yazdık; Hitlerin Propaganda Nazırı Göbels demiştir ki: Bir gazeteci, bir hadisenin ne olduğunu değil, o hadise hakkında iktidarın ne düşündüğünü de bilmelidir. İşte eski iktidar bu zihniyetle hareket ediyor; ve herhangi bir hadise hakkında iktidarın ne düşündüğüne kulak asmayanlara mesleklerini icra etme hakkı bile tanımıyordu."

[106] Fenik, "Bırakınız Söylesinler, Bırakınız Yazsınlar!", p. 8: "Şimdi yeni matbuat kanuniyle önümüzde hakikaten yepyeni bir devir açılmaktadır. Yazı hürriyeti emin şartlara bağlanmaktadır. Gazetecinin kalemini bağlayan zincir kırılmaktadır. Matbuat hürriyeti bir cesaret meselesi olmaktan çıkmış bir hak olmuştur. Bırakınız söylesinler, bırakınız yazsınlar!..Bir anti-demokratik kanun daha yıkıldı! Hürriyet sahası temizlenmektedir."

after the DP's coming to power, that Falih Rıfkı Atay wrote an article in *Ulus* and described the rule of the DP as a "force regime" (zor rejimi) in terms of its pressures on the oppositional voices. He expressed his earnest opposition to the seizure of *Ulus*'s properties together with other properties of the CHP.[107]

On 16 September 1951 there occurred by-elections in Turkey as 20 deputies vacated. According to *Ulus*, this upcoming elections made the DP felt stressed as it could not fulfil its promises such as those regarding freedom of press. On 18 August 1951, *Ulus* made news about this situation: "Possibility of a fiasco (in the elections) turned into a nightmare for the DP which could not keep any of its promises."[108] Then, in this news *Ulus* also criticized the newspaper *Zafer*, which *Ulus* described this "semi-official organ of the DP government," as being "unserious" (gayri ciddi) even when reporting important events.[109] In the same issue, *Ulus* also made a separate news regarding *Zafer* and called it "İktidar Gazetesi Perişanlık İçinde" (The Government's Newspaper is in Misery). *Zafer* was accused by *Ulus* of distorting news with a "partisan" manner and of not reporting truths for the sake of the government.[110] The reason of the *Zafer*'s attitude was certain for *Ulus*. It was because of "annoying" news coming from places, where by-elections would take place and also "the attitude of people against their party."[111] This negative attitude of the opposition toward *Zafer* let it to be more aggressive against oppositional journalists. How *Zafer* handled its relations with oppositional journalists and newspaper sometimes created news for other newspapers. For instance, on 19 January 1952, *Yeni Sabah* reported that *Zafer* published an editorial, attacking the

[107] Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Zor Rejimi", *Ulus*, 1 August 1951, p. 1.

[108] "Ara Seçimler Yaklaşırken", *Ulus*, 18 August 1951, p.1: "Hiçbir taahhüdü yerine getirememiş olan D.P. için bir hezimet ihtimali bir kâbus halini almıştır."

[109] "Ara Seçimler Yaklaşırken", p.1.

[110] "İktidar Gazetesi Perişanlık İçinde", *Ulus*, 18 August 1951, p. 1: "Vatandaşların uğraştığı felaketi partizanlık uğruna tahrif etmek laubaliliktir. İktidar partisi gazetesi bir perişanlık içindedir."

[111] "İktidar Gazetesi Perişanlık İçinde", p. 1: "Bizce bunun sebepleri malumdur: Ara seçimi yapılacak yerlerden gelen haberlerin sinirlerini bozduğu, halkın partilerine karşı takındığı tavır, bu gazeteyi herkün yeniyeni saldırışlara sevketmektedir."

court when it acquitted Falih Rıfkı Atay, who was taken to the court for his articles criticizing the DP, rather than imprisoning him.[112]

In addition to these judicial punishments, the oppositional newspapers also suffered from the control mechanisms of news by the DP. Such mechanisms had also existed during the CHP; however, from the perspective of the opposition, they were intensified under the DP rule. On 10 May 1952, for instance, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote an article entitled "1952'de Türk Matbuatı" (The Turkish Press in 1952). In this article, he referred to an item that had been published four days earlier in *Vatan* which he described as a "genuine friend of democracy" and "neutral." Yalçın quoted a passage from *Vatan*: "Newspapers cannot do their main duty of news gathering properly. News agencies and radio impede them doing this. Press, if I may say so, now is like a monopoly matter in the hands of the state."[113] Then, Yalçın concluded his article with his own words "here is the situation of the Turkish journalism and journalist, 40 years after the 1908 Revolution."[114]

Indeed, the 1908 Revolution is considered as an auspicious event, which lifted censorship and created an atmosphere of free press. That is why the 24th July is celebrated every year as Gazeteciler Basın Bayramı (The Journalists and Press Festival). And, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was a journalist who witnessed the reign of Abdülhamid II, which brought greater restrictions on the Turkish press.[115] Thus, his views about the pressure on press were not ineffective. In fact, the reference he used in this article dating 10 May 1952 could also be read as an implication of accusing the DP government of imposing similar kind of censorship associated with the Abdülhamidian oppression. In the following period, he did not give up voicing his adverse criticisms of the DP's anti-democratic actions on press.

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[112] "Falih Rıfkı Atay Hakkında Verilen Beraat Kararı", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 January 1952, pp. 1, 5: "Zafer gazetesi mahkeme başkanına hücum eden bir başmakale neşretti."

[113] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "1952 de Türk Matbuatı", *Ulus*, 10 May 1952, p. 1: "Gazeteler esas vazifeleri olan haber toplama işini tam manasıyla yapamamaktadırlar. Ajanslar ve radyo bu çalışmalara mani olmaktadır. Basın tabir caizse, bugün devletin elinde bir Tekel maddesidir."

[114] Yalçın, "1952 de Türk Matbuatı", p. 1: "İşte 1908 meşrutiyet inkılabından kırk yıl sonra, Türk gazetecilerinin ve gazeteciliğinin durumu!"

[115] Ebru Boyar, "The Press and the Palace: The Two-Way Relationship between Abdülhamid II and the Press, 1876-1908", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 69/3 (2006), pp. 419-420.

As a result of his criticisms, Yalçın was frequently attacked by pro-DP newspapers such as *Zafer*. On 29 May 1952, however, *Ulus* responded to *Zafer* and claimed that Yalçın did not take *Zafer* seriously, and even he did not read this newspaper, so he could not respond to its allegations.[116] It is true that, as stated above, for *Ulus*, *Zafer* was "impudent" (laubali), so not to worth take seriously; however, this did not mean that *Ulus* did not put a strict eye on this newspaper, despite of its declarations that its journalists did not read *Zafer*. Similarly, *Zafer* also never gave up watching and protesting Yalçın's articles. For instance, on 10 December 1953, this newspaper asked "what has Mr. Hüseyin Cahit been supporting for 40 years?" This newspaper attacked the previous views of Cahit and criticized the major shifts in his political views since the late Ottoman period. It was stated that he had previously even advised people to support the Caliphate in the name of "reforms" (inkılaplar). But now, *Zafer* argued, he was clinging on İsmet İnönü in the name of supporting democracy.[117]

On 13 March 1954, Mümtaz Faik Fenik even implied that Yalçın was a 'traitor.' Fenik wrote an article entitled "Hüseyin Yalçın Ali Kemal'i Hatırlamalıdır" (Hüseyin Yalçın Should Remember Ali Kemal).[118] Here Yalçın was truly threatened by reminding famous journalist Ali Kemal who had supported the İstanbul government during the Turkish National Liberation War. Ali Kemal was lynched by a mob on 6 November 1922. So, Yalçın was not simply accused of being a 'traitor,' but being associated with Ali Kemal, Yalçın was also shown a person who might be executed.

The campaign against Yalçın was not futile. During the rule of the DP, Yalçın was even imprisoned from 7 December 1954 to 17 March 1955. The pressure encountered by Yalçın even received an international coverage. British newspaper

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[116] "Zafer Gazetesine", *Ulus*, 29 May 1952, p. 1: "Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın'a ikide bir, başyazarınızdan fıkracınıza kadar saldırmaktasınız. Size şunu haber verelim ki çok boşuna gayret sarfediyorsunuz. Çünkü Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın'ın Zafer gazetesini bir defa daha okumadığını bilmiyorsunuz. Hem şu an Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın Strazburg'da bulunmakta."

[117] "Bir Karakter Meselesi", *Zafer*, 10 December 1953, p. 1: "O zamanlar inkılaplar adına dört elle hilafet makamına sarılmayı tavsiye ediyordu. Şimdi de demokrasi adına bizzat kendisi dört elle İsmet Paşaya sarılıyor."

[118] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Hüseyin Cahit Ali Kemal'i Hatırlamalıdır", *Zafer*, 13 March 1954, p. 1, 6.

the *Times* complained about the DP's increasing pressure on the press. It was responded by Ahmet Emin Yalman, who wrote a letter to the editor of the *Times* on 1 November 1954. Oddly enough, Yalman, who was also himself a victim of the increasing pressure of the DP, claimed that there was "no restriction in Turkey on freedom to criticize things."[119] In his memoirs, Nihat Erim, who personally showed great efforts to mediate this process and tried to persuade the DP government to set Yalçın free, reveals that the increasing pressure of the DP on press also disturbed the US at that time.[120]

Yalçın was not the sole victim of the DP's aggression. The decision of his imprisonment was a part of the combined cases against all the members of the opposition's new newspaper: *Yeni Ulus*.[121] This newspaper was started to be published by Nihat Erim as a fellow of *Ulus*. It was clear that the DP systemically targeted *Ulus*, and the opposition was in need of new channels of communication for the period *Ulus* was closed. And so Nihat Erim tried to do it via *Yeni Ulus*.[122] In his article dating 16 December 1953, for instance, Erim wrote the motto of *Yeni Ulus* as "continue the work" (vazifeye devam). It would be a great pleasure for them, Erim said, to continue to circulate the views of *Ulus*.[123]

In fact, Erim was also one of those that the government and its newspapers put a strict eye on. For instance, on 11 December 1953, *Zafer* harshly criticized Erim's interview with an English journalist in which he pointed to the pressure on press in Turkey. This interview was reported in *Zafer* with the heading "Memlekete Düşmanlık" (The Enmity to the Country). The newspaper claimed that by likening

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[119] Letters to the Editor, "The Turkish Press", *The Times*, 1 November 1954, p. 5.

[120] Nihat Erim, *Günlükler (1925-1979), II. Cilt* (Ahmet Demirer ed.) (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), pp. 589-615.

[121] Kayış and Hürkan, *Sansürsüz Sansür Tarihi (1795-2011)*, pp. 118-119.

[122] The name of Erim's newspaper later became *Halkçı*.

[123] Nihat Erim, "Vazifeye Devam", *Yeni Ulus*, 16 December 1953, p. 1: "Pek yakın bir zamanda Yeni Ulus'un sahipliğine birçok partili ve partisiz vatandaşın iştirakinin gerçekleşeceğini umuyoruz. Yeni Ulus C.H.P. nin ve C.H.P. üyeleriyle, C.H.P. yi sevenlerin müşterek sahipliğinden kuvvet alacaktır. Şu intikal günlerinde, Ulus'un savuna geldiği umdelerin meşalesini sürdürmek büyük bahtiyarlık yaratacaktır. Yurdun her köşesinde bu temenni işitilmektedir. Parolamız "vazifeye devam"dır. Değil yalnız memleketimiz, bütün dünya tarihinde, demokrasi adını taşıyan bir rejimde, Türkiye'de muhalefete D.P. nin tatbik ettiği muamelelerin benzerine rastlanmaz. 1950 den beri olup bitenleri vatandaşlar ibretle seyrediyorlar. Sayın İnönü'nün dediği tarihin küsrsüsünden ibretle seyrediyorlar."

Turkey to Argentina, the Prime Minister Menderes to Colonel Perón and *Ulus* to *La Prensa*, the highly respectable Spanish language newspaper emphasized an unbiased reporting, which was then harassed and finally seized by Perón in 1951, Erim denigrated Turkey in the eyes of foreigners. So, for Zafer, what Erim did "was not an enmity to the DP but an enmity to the country."[124] Yet, this act of talking about the problems of Turkey to foreigners was not something new. The members of the DP during the CHP rule acted similarly. Fuat Köprülü, according to an article of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in *Ulus* dating 20 May 1946, talked to an American journalist and complained about the current situation in Turkey.[125] When Erim did the same seven years later, *Zafer* reacted very harshly.

The existence of this new newspaper, *Yeni Ulus*, enabled the opposition to report its own problems including the closure of *Ulus* as intended. On 16 December 1953, for instance, this newspaper allocated a great space to *Ulus*'s closure. The government decided to confiscate the properties of the CHP and the building of *Ulus* also belonged to the CHP, so it was closed the day before. Journalists and workers left the building after they prepared the last issue of the newspaper. This closure was, *Yeni Ulus* stated, done with a hope of "weakening the CHP" before the 1954 elections.[126] The DP MPs voted affirmatively to confiscate the CHP's properties, including the buildings of *Ulus*, on 14 December 1953. This decision of the DP-led

[124] "Memlekete Düşmanlık", *Zafer*, 11 December 1953, p. 1: "Yine Türkiye'yi yabancı basına jurnal ettiler. Nihat Erim'e soruyoruz: Bir İngiliz gazeteci olan Mr. Wayt'ı çağırıp kendisine yabancı gazetelerde neşredilmek üzere bir mektup vermemiş midir? Türkiye'yi Arjantin'e, Başvekil Albay Peron'a, Ulus'u La Prensa'ya benzeterek, yurdumuzu yabancılara jurnal etmemiş midir? Bu Demokrat Partiye değil, memlekete düşmanlıktır."

[125] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Bir Fena Vatandaş Örneği", *Ulus*, 20 May 1946, p. 1: "Fuat Köprülünün Amerikan muhabirlerine yaptığı beyanat evvelki günkü gazetelerde intişar etti […] Fuat Köprülün yaptığı şey nedir? O memleketi kötülemiştir. Kime? Ecnebilere...Fuat Köprülü bir mebustur. Bu sözleri Millet Meclisi kürsüsünden söyleyebilirdi. Demokrat Partinin gazeteleri vardır oradan neşredebilirdi. Sair gazetelere de şikâyetlerini gönderebilirdi. Hayır, o bunları yapmıyor, yahut yaptığı halde kafi görmiyerek Amerikaya ve bütün dünyaya hitabetmek istiyor."

[126] "Müsadere Kanun Üzerine: Ulus Gazetesi Dün Kapandı", *Yeni Ulus*, 16 December 1953, p. 1: "…birkaç ay sonra yapacağı bildirilen umumi seçimlerde rakip siyasi parti olan C.H.P yi zayıf düşürmek ve ancak bu suretle iktidarı devam ettirmek ümidiyle..."

parliament was approved by the Prime Minister on 15 December. Then, the newspaper implied that now *Yeni Ulus* would try to fill the void left by *Ulus*.[127]

In addition to these news, in the same issue, *Yeni Ulus* also published the protests of people for the closure of *Ulus*.[128] Probably, it was what the DP was afraid of. Hence, the authorities insistently told that *Ulus* was not closed and it would continue to be published. *Yeni Ulus* reacted to this and described this attitude of the government as a "contradiction" (tezat). It was the votes of the DP MPs, the newspaper stated, that allowed the current government to confiscate properties of the CHP. *Ulus's* buildings were one of these properties. Thus, it was automatically closed. Yet, *Yeni Ulus* implied, the government chose to hide this reality to protect itself from the public reaction.[129] The next day, on 17 December 1953, *Yeni Ulus* reported that the day before the buildings of the CHP, including the one of *Ulus*, were officially closed downed[130] And, then, this newspaper did not accept the government's and *Zafer*'s declarations and guarantees, claiming that *Ulus* was not closed, probably done to counter the public reaction and declared that newspaper "*Ulus* was closed down."[131] Two weeks later, on 29 December, *Yeni Ulus* reported "Basın Hürriyetine Yeni Kasıtlar" (New Attacks Against the Freedom of Press) and warned the people about the current government, which was on the way to a

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[127] "Yeni Ulus Vazife Başındadır", *Yeni Ulus*, 16 December 1953, p. 1: "Ulus gazetesi müsadere kanunu ile kapatıldığı için Atatürk ideallerine ve C.H.P. nin altı okunda ifadesini bulan prensiplere inanmış olan Türk vatandaşları davalarının yerde kalacağından endişe etmesinler. "Yeni Ulus" inandığı bu prensipleri savunmak üzere bugünden itibaren neşir hayatına ve vazifesine başlamış bulunmaktadır. Ulus'un dünkü son sayısı makinenin teknik imkânlarının azamisi kullanılmak suretiyle 125 binden fazla basılmış ve kapışılmıştır. "Yeni Ulus"u en kısa zamanda mümkün olduğu kadar çok basmak için hiçbir fedakârlıktan çekinmiyeceğiz."

[128] "Bir Anket", *Yeni Ulus*, 16 December 1953, pp. 1, 2.

[129] Tezatlar İçinde", *Yeni Ulus*, 16 December 1953, p. 1: "Başbakan meclisteki nutkunda "Ulus" çıkmağa devam edecektir" demektedir. Bunun neyi ifade ettiğini anlamak güçtür. Bir taraftan kanun çıkarıp partinin menkul ve gayrimenkul bütün mallarını müsadere ettikten sonra öbür taraftan "Ulus çıkmağa devam edecektir" demek eğer mecliste ve aklıselim ile latife değilse, çıkardıkları kanunun ne demek olduğunu bilmemek demektir."

[130] "C.H.P. Binası ile Ulus Matbaası Dün Resmen Tatil Edildi", *Yeni Ulus*, 17 December 1953, p. 1.

[131] "C.H.P. Binası ile Ulus Matbaası Dün Resmen Tatil Edildi", p. 1: "Kanunun hükmünü ne Başbakanın lakırdı teminatı ne de Zafer'in telaşlı söylemi değiştirmez... Ulus gazetesi kapatılmıştır. Bu kararın halk efkârında uyandırdığı tepkiyi gördükten sonra D.P. organı telaşa düşmüştür. "Hayır, biz Ulus'u kapatmadık" demeye başlamışlardır. İntikamcı ve karanlık ruhlu kakavuzlar yüzünden çamura saplanan D.P. kurtulmak için çırpındıkça daha çok batan bir zavallı haline düşmüştür."

"dictatorship" soon, and even these pressures against the CHP would not be enough for the DP.[132]

Indeed, what *Yeni Ulus* claimed happened later. As stated in the previous section, the DP even passed a new press law in the following few months, in 1954, to become able to punish or censor oppositional voices more easily. Relatedly, judicial punishment mechanisms were started to be utilized even more in the following period, though DP initially seemed to be a staunch supporter of freedom of press.

Among other mechanisms and incidents of the DP rule to control the press, a physical attack on one of the popular journalists of the period, Ahmet Emin Yalman, who was the owner and the editor-in-chief of *Vatan*, occupied a remarkable place. During his visit to Malatya, a Turkish city located in the eastern part of the country, as a part of Menderes's entourage, Yalman was shot by a gun seven times and he was seriously injured on 22 November 1952. This assassination attempt occurred at 11.30 p.m., as *Cumhuriyet* reported, when Yalman was returning to his hotel, Malatya Palas, and this act was committed by three unknown people.[133] In his memoirs, Yalman accounted this night and wrote that initially he could not even understand that he was shot.[134] After the attack, Yalman wrote that Menderes did not leave him alone and Mendered was very concerned about Yalman's health. When his ideas were asked about this attack in the congress of his party in Malatya, however, Menderes told: "(Yalman) from time to time criticizes us, he will and he can continue to do so, but he should not exceed the limits, this is enough."[135] Thus, although Menderes was concerned by about Yalman's health during his private

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[132] "Basın Hürriyetine Yeni Kasıtlar", *Yeni Ulus*, 29 December 1953, p. 1: "C.H.P. ni çırılçıplak bırakmak, basını yeni tehditler altına almak da çok geçmeden az gelecektir. Diktatörlük sathı mailinde yuvarlanırken uçurumun dibini bulmadan önce, daha nice çamlar devrilecektir. Bir mucize olur da uyanırlarsa ancak o zaman iş değişir ve doğru yola dönmek mümkün olur."

[133] "Ahmet Emin Yalman Silahlı Saldırıya Uğradı, Yaralandı", *Ulus*, 23 November 1952, p. 1; "Malatya'da Müessif Bir Hadise", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 November 1952, p. 1: "Ahmed Emin Yalman dün gece Malatyada vuruldu. Vatan başyazarı, saat 23.30 da otelinde dönerken 3 meçhul şahsın taarruzuna uğradı ve tabanca ile üç yerinden yaralandı, mütecavizler kaçtılar."

[134] Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim II (1922-1971)* (İstanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret, 1997), p. 1598.

[135] Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim II*, p. 1605: "Kendisi bizi zaman zaman tenkit eder, tenkit edecektir ve etsin, fakat ölçüyü elden bırakmasın, bu yeter."

meetings with Yalman, in public he did not abstain to imply that the opposition had to be careful about its criticisms, and in fact Mendered indirectly invited further violent attacks on the oppositional journalists.

This incident highly attracted the attention of the opposition. Oppositional newspapers did not only ask what the reasons were behind this attack but also they turned their attention to government's reaction afterwards. Actually, the DP's supporters started to criticize Yalman's ideas harshly just few months before this bloody event. On 21 June 1952, for instance, in his article entitled "Yalman Hangi Fikre Hizmet Ediyor?" (To Whom is Yalman Serving?) Mümtaz Faik Fenik accused Yalman of being fickle politically, as he was changing his sides continuously.[136] The author on 29 July again attacked Yalman's way of journalism.[137] Similarly, on 5 August, this time, *Zafer* published the response of Samet Ağaoğlu, the vice prime minister, to Yalman's claims about the dictatorial character of the DP's rule.[138] Thus, the fault of Yalman must have been, for the current government, to withdraw his support from the DP due to the DP's increasing pressure on the opposition.

Yalman's becoming a target for the government outraged Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, and he wrote an article to protest this attitude on 18 September 1952, almost two months before the attack in Malatya. The heading of this article, in which Yalçın criticized the attitudes of the government and *Zafer* against Yalman, was "Basın Hürriyetine Baskı ve Tecavüz" (The Oppression and Attack against the Freedom of Press). Yalçın argued that when Yalman slightly criticized the governing party, the DP members immediately attempted to attack him. Although Yalman was one of the most faithful and sincere followers of the DP as a journalist, according to Yalçın, he was accused of being a "two-faced" man.[139] After the assassination attempt, too,

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[136] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Yalman Hangi Fikre Hizmet Ediyor?", *Zafer*, 21 June 1952, p. 1: "Biliyorsunuz, artık sayın Ahmet Emin Yalman'dan rüzgara göre kuyruk istikameti değiştiren bir pervane oynaklığından başka öğreneceğimiz bir şey kaldı mı?"

[137] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Sansürü Asıl Yalman Gibiler Tatbik Ediyor", *Zafer*, 29 July 1952, p. 1.

[138] "Ahmet Emin Yalman'ın Diktatörlük Efsanesi ve Çirkin Tezvirler", *Zafer*, 5 August 1952, p. 1. "Başbakan Yardımcısı Samed Ağaoğlu dün sistemli ve sinsi hücumlara cevap verdi."

[139] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Basın Hürriyetine Baskı ve Tecavüz", *Ulus*, 18 September 1952, p. 1: "Yalman azıcık itiraz etmeğe başlayınca, kendilerine en sadakat ve samimiyetle inanmış bu kalem sahibini derhal iki yüzlü adam diye taşlamağa kalktılar. Çünkü hürriyet mefhumu ağızlarından içeri girip de ruhlarına nüfuz etmiş değildir."

Ulus blamed the government for this awful event. For instance, *Ulus* claimed on 26 November that Menderes must have been "proud of" this event. What *Ulus* implied was that Menderes was responsible for this violent attack. For *Ulus*, this event was the direct result of the DP's press policy.[140] And, this attack was seen as a continuation of physical attacks on CHP and İsmet İnönü in Manisa and Balıkesir before, in which a group of people, the supporters of the DP, did not allow İnönü to give a speech.[141]

A week after this attack, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın claimed that "a bullet fired in Malatya" (Malatya'da patlayan kurşun).[142] Other oppositional journalists such as Nadir Nadi of *Cumhuriyet* shared Yalçın's concerns. Indeed, Nadir Nadi had had a more positive stance toward the DP until recently,[143] and then changed his views mainly due to the DP's increasing pressure on press.[144] The same day, *Ulus* published the blacklist prepared by Hüseyin Üzmez, a 17 years old high school student, who later became a right-wing and an Islamist journalist after ten years of sentence, and the other assassin. According to the news of *Ulus*, this blacklist included the names of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Falih Rıfkı and Nadir Nadi.[145] The same day, *Cumhuriyet* also reported this list with a heading "Son Dakika" (Last

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[140] In this news, the newspaper described it as "beslemeciliğin kanlı meyvaları." This issue of *beslemecilik* will be examined in the next section of this chapter. *Beslemecilik* briefly referred to the DP's policy of financially supporting the pro-DP newspapers.

[141] "Menderes İftihar Edebilir", *Ulus*, 26 November 1952, p. 1: "Beslemeciliğin kanlı meyvaları: Manisa ve Balıkesir'de başlıyan kanundışı tecavüzler Malatya'da devam etmiştir."

[142] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Malatya'da Patlıyan Kurşun", *Ulus*, 28 November 1952, p. 1: "Nadir Nadi'yi heyecan ve endişe içinde görüyoruz."

[143] During the May 1950 elections, Nadir Nadi was even the independent candidate of the DP for Muğla. For more details see: Metin Toker, *DP'nin Altın Yılları (1950-1954)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), p. 18.

[144] In his article published in *Cumhuriyet* on 8 December 1953, Nadir Nadi summarized the changes on DP's attitudes toward the freedom of press. More importantly, he also expressed his astonishment for this change. For more details see: Nadir Nadi, "Hangi Basın Rejimi", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1953, p. 1: "Daha bundan üç buçuk yıl önce hürriyetçi basını göklere çıkaran, anın yardımıyla kuvvetlendiğini açıkça ilan eden, iş başına gelir gelmez eski basın kanununun zincielerini koparan bir iktidar, şimdigenel seçimlere şunun şurasında dört beş ay kala, birden bire zihniyet ve huy değiştirsin, bu kolay kolay akla sığan bir şey değildir."

[145] "İrtica Şebekesi Tevkif Edildi", *Ulus*, 28 November 1952, p. 1: "Malatya hadisesi büyüyor: Mürtecilerin karalistesi. Sanıklar Hüseyin Cahit, Falih Rıfkı ve Nadir Nadi'nin isimlerini vermekten çekinmediler."

Minute) and it was underlined that *Cumhuriyet*'s editor-in-chief, Nadir Nadi, was also included in the list of the assassins.[146] On 4 December, *Ulus* reported that the correspondents of two newspapers, Yalman's newspaper *Vatan* and Atay's newspaper *Dünya*, even had to leave Malatya because of the continuing threats.[147]

The press' main focus in this issue was how the DP government handled this issue and the way in which the DP would punish the criminals. In the first three days of the attack, it was still unknown who attacked Yalman. On 25 November, for instance, *Cumhuriyet* mentioned a gossip claiming that the assassin had already escaped to Syria. This newspaper also voiced how the Turkish public viewed the efforts of the government to find criminals with suspicion. What *Cumhuriyet* implied was that the government did not do its best to hunt down the criminals.[148] Then, three days later, on 28 November, *Cumhuriyet* reported that the attacker was Hüseyin Üzmez. And, his words were also quoted in *Cumhuriyet*: "I received an order from those men who had material and spiritual influences on me."[149]

In covering news about this issue, *Zafer*, as the main organ of the DP government, used more neutral tone from the very beginning. On 23 November, like other newspapers, *Zafer* immediately announced the news about this attack.[150] Unlike the others, however, *Zafer* allocated more space to the government's actions after the attack rather than the attack itself. For instance, the next day, *Zafer* accentuated the visit of President Celal Bayar to *Vatan*. Accordingly, Bayar clarified that the government was currently dealing with this issue "sensitively" (hassasiyetle).[151] On 25 November, probably to mitigate the fears of other

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[146] "Son Dakika", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 November 1952, p. 1: "İrtica şebekesinin tertib ettiği bir kara listenin ele geçtiği, listede Başmuharririmiz Nadir Nadi, Falih Rıfkı Atay ve Hüseyin Cahid Yalçının da isimlerinin bulunduğu söyleniyor."

[147] "Malatya Tahkikatı Gizli Yapılıyor", *Ulus*, 4 December 1952, p. 1: "Vatan ve Dünya gazeteleri muhabirleri tehdit edildikleri şehri terketmek zorunda kaldılar."

[148] "Malatya Hadisesinde Tahkikat Genişliyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 1952, p. 1.

[149] "Ahmet Emin Yalman'ı Vuran Hüseyin Üzmez İfşaatı", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 November 1952, p. 1: "...maddi ve manevi tesirleri altında bulunduğum adamlardan emir aldım."

[150] "Yalman'a Tabanca ile Tecavüz Edildi", *Zafer*, 23 November 1952, p. 1.

[151] "Cumhurbaşkanımız Vatan Yazı Ailesine Geçmiş Olsun Dedi", *Zafer*, 24 November 1952, p. 1: "Bayar, hükümetin bu nokta üzerinde hassasiyetle durduğunu tebarüz etti."

oppositional journalists after this event, Mümtaz Faik Fenik wrote an article entitled "Fikir Hürriyeti Korunacak" (The Freedom of Thought Will Be Protected). In this article, Fenik underlined that this outrageous and atrocious assassination attempt triggered national sorrow from all corners of the country.[152] On 28 November, pro-DP *Zafer* also reported that the attacker Hüseyin Üzmez chose Yalman as his target because of Yalman's views about the necessity of establishing Armenia, his so-called support for the American mandate in Turkey, his efforts for Nazım Hikmet's release, his being a free mason as well as his positive views about the American soldiers' kissing Turkish girls during a beauty contest.[153] So, according to Üzmez, Yalman was both a communist and pro-American journalist as well as an immoral and anti-nationalist free mason. By reporting these words in detail, *Zafer*, however, covertly legitimized Üzmez's attack in the eyes of its readers.

The investigation of the Malatya event was kept secret,[154] and took months to be resulted. Finally, on 3 August 1953, the court stage for the Malatya event started. The first trial took seven hours.[155] The next day, the court listened to Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who was blamed for inciting this attack. Kısakürek, having an explicit pro-Menderes line, did not hide in the court that he published his weekly journal *Büyük Doğu* "by receiving great attention of the government."[156] As he admitted, Kısakürek enjoyed the advantage of the generous support of the DP like other pro-DP publications. What was interesting was that this DP-sponsored journal and its owner Kısakürek were claimed to incite this aggression. For sure, this increased the

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[152] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Fikir Hürriyeti Korunacaktır", *Zafer*, 25 November 1952, p. 1: "Vatan gazetesi Başyazarı Ahmet Emin Yalman'ın Malatya'da uğradığı taaruz ve menfur suikast memleketin her tarafında büyük bir teessür uyandırmıştır."

[153] "Menfur Hadisenin Faili: Hüseyin Üzmez Suçlu Olduğunu İtiraf Etti", *Zafer*, 28 November 1952, pp. 1, 3: "Ahmet Emin Yalman'ın Ermenistan kurulması gerek fikri, Türkiye'nin Amerikan himayesine girmeden yaşamasının doğru olmadığını vurgulaması, Nazım Hikmet'in tahliyesi için makaleler yazması, kendisinin mason bulunması, güzellik yarışmasında Türk kızlarını ABD askerlerinin tarafından öpülmesine olumlu bakmasıymış."

[154] "Malatya Tahkikatı Gizli Yapılıyor", *Ulus*, 4 December 1952, p. 1.

[155] "Malatya Suikastı Davasının Duruşmasına Dün Başlandı", *Ulus*, 4 August 1953, p. 1.

[156] "Malatya Suikastının Dünkü Duruşması", *Ulus*, 6 August 1953, p. 1: "…hükümetten büyük alaka görerek...;" Rıfat N. Bali, *An Overview of the Turkish Press through the Reports of American Diplomats (1925-1962)* (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2011), pp. 81-82.

responsibility of the DP for this physical attack, at least from the perspectives of some part of Turkish public opinion.

The assassination attempt of Yalman was neither an isolated incident, nor was it the only violent attack on the oppositional groups. There were also other individual cases such as what happened to Tahir Şaylan, who was the member of the CHP and also the First World War veteran. On 29 October 1953, during the Republic Day celebrations, this old man was assaulted by people who *Ulus* called "Democratic volunteers" (Demokrat fedailer). And, again, as in the case of the attack on Yalman, the oppositional press saw the role of Menderes in this attack undeniable. For instance, on 31 October, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın published an article entitled "Adnan Menderes İşaret Verdi, Fedailer Harekete Geçti!" (Menderes Indicated, Volunteers Took Action), and there Yalçın directly blamed Menderes. Yalçın said: "of course the provocations were not fruitless."[157] One week later, on 7 November 1953, *Ulus* also made news about DP's provocation against two newspapers, namely *Hürriyet* and *Yeni Sabah*. In this news, it was written that "sensibilities of youths and workers were aimed to be exploited."[158]

This dispute in the oppositional newspapers led *Zafer* to publish items about the current situation in the Turkish press. On 20 November, for instance, *Zafer* declared that "Matbuat Hürriyeti Anarşi Değildir" (The Freedom of Press Does Not Mean Anarchy). In this item, this organ of government claimed that the freedom of press and publication had to be equipped with strong measures that worked against the "enemies of freedom" (hürriyet düşmanları) and also worked "on behalf of freedom" (hürriyet lehine).[159] The next day, Mümtaz Faik Fenik wrote regarding the

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[157] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Adnan Menderes İşaret Verdi, Fedailer Harekete Geçti!", *Ulus*, 31 October 1953, p. 1: "Adnan Menders iftihar edebilir. Halk Partisinin dişlerini söktüğünü artık ısıramıyacaklarını söyledikten sonra demokratların sökülmemiş dişleri ısırmıya başladı. Tahrikler tabii ki neticesiz kalmadı. Milletin cebinden beslenen demokrat fedailer dün gece hem de Cumhuriyet Bayramı gecesinde harekete geçtiler ve Eyüp'te Birinci Cihan Harbi malul Gazilerinden ve Halk Partisinden Tahir Şaylan adında altmış yaşını mütecaviz bir ihtiyarı döve döve kanlar içinde bıraktılar."

[158] "DP nin İki Gazete Aleyhinde Tahrikleri", *Ulus*, 7 October 1953, p. 1: "DP nin iki gazete aleyhinde tahrikleri gençliğin ve işçilerin hassasiyetleri istismar edilmek isteniyor.

[159] "Matbuat Hürriyeti Anarşi Değildir", *Zafer*, 20 November 1953, p. 1: "…basın ve neşir hürriyetini, hürriyet lehine ve hürriyet düşmanları aleyhine kuvvetli kıstaslara techiz lazımdır."

freedom of press and the title of this article was "Basın Hürriyeti! Fakat, Ya Şeref, Ya Haysiyet" (Freedom of Press, But What about Honor and Dignity).[160] Indeed, this language did not differ from the one that the CHP had previously used previously, when the DP was in opposition and constantly complained about anti-democratic actions of the CHP against press. This rhetoric, together with the punishment mechanisms and physical attacks against journalists, shows that although it was one of the most important points that the DP had given the CHP governments a sound slating before 1950, when it was in opposition, with having the control of the government, however, the DP used these controlling tools even more than the CHP.

Indeed, what the press regime of the DP government created, from the perspectives of the opposition, was not only the problem of the DP's efforts to bring the press under its control. The government's policy of supporting the pro-DP organs through new regulations in the government's advertisement policy also generated problems. Now, this chapter will examine the government subsidies in order to further buttress the argument that how the DP's press policies quickly changed from the so-called democratic to the more oppressive one, aiming to stifle legitimate dissent in the Turkish press.

II.III. Governmental Subsidies for Press

In July of 1951, almost a year after the elections that brought the DP to the power, the DP government enacted a regulation that authorized the Prime Ministry to distribute the half of the official announcements (resmi ilan) to newspapers as it wished.[161] It was probably done to halt the increasing criticisms in the press against the policies of the current government.[162] That is to say, this new authority empowered the government against the press as the DP could use this power easily to threaten the oppositional press. The financial sources of oppositional newspapers, for instance, were to be reduced in accordance with this new regulation. Thus, it was

[160] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Basın Hürriyeti, Ya Şeref, Ya Haysiyet", *Zafer*, 21 November 1953, p. 1.

[161] *Resmi Gazete*, 1 August 1951, p. 1717: "No: 7873: Resmi ilan ve reklamların yüzde ellisi; üçüncü madde gereğince belli edilecek gazetelere müsavaten taksım olunur. İkinci yüzde ellisinin hangi gazetelere ve ne suretle verileceği, Başbakanlığın takdirine göre tayin olunur."

[162] Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2013), p. 100.

open to abuse and to apply double standard. The opposition was naturally against this decision from the very beginning.

Even before this new regulation, the issue of official announcements started to be discussed in the Parliament. On 7 February 1951, for instance, CHP MP for Kars Sırrı Atalay asked the DP government several questions regarding the conditions the government used in distributing announcements. Atalay further asked the total amount of money Ankara newspapers received for these announcements from 22 May 1950 to 31 December 1950. As the Vice Prime Minister and the State Minister, Samet Ağaoğlu answered Atalay's questions. Ağaoğlu released the amount of money that *Ulus* and *Zafer*, main Ankara newspapers, received. Ağaoğlu told that from May to December, *Ulus* received 185.631 liras while *Zafer* was granted 264.544 liras. This showed that *Zafer* as the organ of the government received most of the announcements. In his speech, however, Ağaoğlu also gave the numbers for the whole year. According to this information in 1950, he continued, the income of *Ulus* from these official announcements was higher than *Zafer*'s. Based on this fact, Ağaoğlu claimed that the opposition was not telling the truth.[163]

CHP deputy Sırrı Atalay responded to Ağaoğlu's explanation by reminding Ağaoğlu of the objection of *Zafer*, together with other proponents of the DP in İzmir such as *Yeni Asır* and *Demokrat İzmir*, to the joint decision of 25 big newspapers from Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir that they wanted a permanent and common system for the distribution of official announcements and put an end to different applications. These 25 newspapers with the exception of the DP-affialiated organs, Atalay argued, had visited the Prime Ministry in order to have "justice." Indeed, his question was simple: Atalay asked what the reason behind having different regulations for official announcements in İstanbul and in Ankara and İzmir was.[164] The difference Atalay mentioned was that although in İstanbul, the Press Union

[163] 7 February 1951: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 2, C: 5, B: 40, O: 1, p. 60: "Görülüyor ki 1950 senesinin yedi ayı Demokrat Pati iktidarına ait olmak şartiyle Ankara'da resmi ilanlardan en fazla alanı Ulus Gazetesidir. (Bir ses: Haram olsun) (Gülüşmeler) İşte arkadaşlar, resmi ilanların iktidar gazetelerine inhisar ettirildiği hakkındaki muhalefet partilerinin en salahiyetli sözcüklerinin ağızlarda bir terane şeklinde tekrar edilip duran efsanelerin hakikati bundan ibarettir."

[164] 7 February 1951: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 2, C: 5, B: 40, O: 1, p. 60: "Resmi ilanların İstanbul'da ayrı Ankara ve İzmir'de ayrı usullere bağlanmasının sebebi nedir?"

(Basın Birliği), a civil community, had an instrumental role in the distribution, in Ankara and İzmir it was the Directorate General of Press (Basın Umum Müdürlüğü), an official state department, which was the part of Prime Ministry, that did the distribution.[165] So, in İzmir and Ankara, the distribution of official announcements was directly under the control of the DP government. Yet, Atalay's rightful question was not answered by Ağaoğlu.

It was clear that the opposition wanted the new government to set up uniform rules and criteria for all the newspapers. Nevertheless, with the new regulation in July of 1951, the rules became more unclear and less publicized, and the right of the government to determine the distribution of the official announcement was enormously strengthened. Almost half of the official announcements, for instance, were put under the direct control of the Prime Ministry, and it decided without any settled rules. In their reports to the American Consul Betty Carp,[166] the officials of the American Consulate General in İstanbul commented on this change and they claimed that this change "implied sharp discriminations." These American officials put forward that this centralization attempt in the distribution of these announcements started first under the rule of the CHP governments. However, they added, "it is true that even the most rapid opposition papers toward the end of the R.P.P. regime received a more or less equitable share of official advertising." Then, the report continued:[167]

> Conditions did not change much during the first year of the D.P. Administration, but in the course of the second half of 1951. In fact, a regime was inaugurated which implied sharp discrimination, in that the quota of advertising funds allocated to oppositional papers and more prosperous dailies of Istanbul was sharply reduced in favor of journals unconditionally supporting the D.P. Administration. This policy was at the same time accompanied by the extension of D.P.-sponsored bank credits whereby a host of new journals started appearing which were all beneficiaries of generous allocations of governmental advertisements.

Apparently, this change was working against the opposition, and the oppositional newspapers started to label pro-DP organs such as *Zafer* as "kept press" (besleme

[165] 7 February 1951: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 2, C: 5, B: 40, O: 1, p. 60.

[166] The report was sent on 12 February 1953.

[167] Bali, *An Overview of the Turkish Press through the Reports of American Diplomats*, pp. 84-85.

basın). On 20 December 1951, for instance, *Ulus* attacked Mümtaz Faik Fenik and implied that he became a millionaire with these supports although he had been "penniless" (meteliksiz) before.[168]

In May of 1952, this issue was again brought to the agenda of the Parliament by the CHP deputies. On 26 May, Ferid Melen and his two colleagues, Sırrı Atalay and Hüsnü Akyol, proposed a motion to the head of the Parliament "for the investigation of corruption [of] Samet Ağaoğlu during the distribution of official announcements." In the motion, these CHP MPs wrote that it had been a while that this issue of official announcements and their distribution became an "issue of general criticism and complaint" (umumi tenkit ve şikayet konusu) both in the Parliament and outside. The dissatisfaction was increasing each day, they argued, because each day even new application methods were invented.[169] Moreover, this motion continued, the amount of money allocated to official announcements reached to an unprecedented degrees. This was learnt from other channels such as the last general meeting of the Press Union (Basın Birliği) although according to the CHP deputies, this release displeased the government.[170]

All these points mean that mainly two things changed during the rule of the DP. One was the increase in the amount of money allocated to official announcements, and the other was the high uncertainty for the distribution of this money. These changes disturbed the opposition because according to them all these changes resulted in enormous increase in incomes of the pro-DP newspapers at the

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[168] "Zafercilere Yardım", *Ulus*, 20 December 1951, p. 1: "Dün gene Mümtaz Faik Fenik ve yedekçi başka yazarlarla meşgul oldukları için Zafer'de neşrini düşündükleri tefrikayı hazırlayamamışlardır. Şu halde biz vadimizi yerine getirelim. Tefrikadan bazı parçalar verelim: "Nasıl Milyoner Olduktan Bir Parça: O meteliksiz bir adamdı. Bir gün kendisine müstesna bir fırsat çıktı. İdaresine verilen başkalarına ait paradan bir kısmının yolunu bulup kendisine ve adamlarına kazanç getirecek şekilde kullanılmağa başlandı."

[169] 30 May 1952: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 3, C: 15, B: 78, O: 1, p. 400: "Bu tatbikatın hergün yeni tecellilerine şahit oluyor."

[170] 30 May 1952: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 3, C: 15, B: 78, O: 1, p. 400: "Bunlardan biri (Türk Basın Birliği Ortakları Resmi Lanlar Kollektif Şirketi)nin son umumi toplantısında meydana çıkmıştır. Umumi heyete verilen bilançoya nazaran 1951 yılında bu ortaklık eliyle Ankara, İstanbul ve İzmir'de intişar etmekte olan gazetelere tevzi olunan Resmi ilanların ücret tutarları 3 455 331 liraya baliğ olmuştur. Geçmiş yılların rakamlariyle mukayese edilemiyecek bir hadde varmış olan bu ücretlerin hangi esas ve ölçülere göre ve hangi gazetelere tevzi olduğu malum değildir. Her nedense bu rakamların umumi heyet toplantısında açıklanmasından içtinap olunmuştur."

expense of the pro-CHP newspapers and independent ones. Thus, Melen and his friends underlined this double standard in the motion as well.[171]

For the CHP, abuses in the distribution of official announcements turned into a political tool in the hands of the DP government to intensify its policy of oppression toward the press. For instance, Kasım Gülek in his speech in Hasköy, Ankara, repeated this argument, and his speech was published in *Ulus* on 16 August 1952.[172] One month later, on 12 September, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın repeated this allegation in his column. Yalçın claimed that by taking the control of official announcements, the DP government aimed to make owners of newspapers, in need of "favor" (lütuf) from Menderes.[173] What concerned the opposition most was, however, the fact that each day the government's policy of official announcements was becoming more discriminatory than before. On 3 October, for instance, *Ulus* declared that "Besleme Gazeteler Sevinç İçindeler" (The Kept Newspapers are in Happiness) and announced that new regulations regarding the press policy of subsidizing proponents were to be announced.[174]

Indeed, when the figures are compared, for instance between *Zafer* and *Ulus*, the discriminatory policy of the DP becomes more evident. In 1951, for example, *Zafer* earned nearly 506.972,22 liras while *Ulus* only received 216.353,17. In 1952, this difference was even higher. *Zafer* earned 711.207,20 liras while *Ulus* received just 130.422,68 liras. Similarly, in 1953, *Zafer* again received four times more than

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[171] 30 May 1952: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 3, C: 15, B: 78, O: 1, p. 400: "Bu ilanlar söylendiğine göre Başbakanlığın gizli emirleri dairesinde dağıtılmakta ve bu emirlerde işaret edilen gazetelere verilmektedir. Yine iddia olunduğuna göre tamamen bir hizmet karşılığı olması icabeden ve yıllık tutarı 3,5 milyon lirayı aşan bu ücretlerden sürüm ve satışı olan büyük gazetelere ayrılan miktar yarım milyon lirayı bulmakta ve mütekabi 3 milyon lirası tercihan iktidara taraftarlık eden veya iktidarın hoşuna gidecek neşriyat yapmayı taahhüt eyliyen sürümsüz gazete ve mecmualara, bu hizmetlerin bir mükafatı olarak verilmiş bulunmaktadır. Yine bu arada ikdar ve terfih edilmesi arzu edilen bazı kimselerin de bu kaynaktan faydalandırıldıklarına işaret olunmaktadır."

[172] No Date: BCA, 030 01 128 833 1, p. 17: "(Kasım Gülek, 16 Ağustos 1952): Hasköy toplantısında konuşurken DP iktidarının hür Türk basını üzerindeki baskıyı hususi ilanlara el atarak şiddetlendirmek istediğini belirtti."

[173] No Date: BCA, 030 01 128 833 1, p. 18: "Basın için düşünülen takrik şöyledir: Gazete sahipleri Adnan Menderes'in gözleri içine bakmağa ondan lütuf beklemeğe muhtaç bir duruma sokmak. Resmi ilanlarla bu işi başarmak yoluna girmiştir."

[174] "Besleme Gazeteler Sevinç İçindeler", *Ulus*, 3 October 1952, p. 1: "...beslemeciliğin devamı için yeni tertipler hazırlanmakta olduğu bildiriliyor."

Ulus. The figures were 797.542,89 liras and 188.940,01 liras for *Zafer* and *Ulus*, respectively.[175] For the years 1954 and 1955, making the comparison between these two newspapers is not possible as *Ulus* was closed. Yet, in these two years *Zafer* continued to earn a very significant income from official announcements, receiving 617.298,60 liras in 1954 and 700.196,50 liras in 1955.[176] Thus, it is clear that opposition was right in its protests, and the anti-opposition bias of the DP exhibited itself in the distribution of official announcements.

Oppositional newspapers were, in fact, not only annoyed by what *Zafer* received as the main organ of the DP, but also, by the emergence of small pro-DP newspapers thanks to the government's encouragement policy. Only in İstanbul, for instance, with "the DP's encouragement policy," as the official in American Consulate General called in his report dating 12 February 1953, four new publications, let's say pro-DP ones, began to be published. These were *Akın*, *İstanbul Ekspres*, *Hizmet* and *Büyük Doğu*.[177] When the income of the newspaper *Hizmet*, which was short-lived and only active in 1952 and 1953, from official announcements in 1952 is examined, it is seen that it received more fees than one of the oldest Turkish dailies *Vatan*. *Hizmet* earned 92.172,80 liras while *Vatan* only received 88.014,97 liras in 1952. Similarly, when the official announcement income of this newly emerged newspaper compared with another age-old popular newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, it was seen that there was no big difference. In 1952, *Cumhuriyet*, which a supporter of the DP during its oppositional years but then eventually withdrew this support, earned only 130.965,32 liras. Nevertheless, in addition to these official

[175] 31 October 1960: BCA, 010 09 317 985 1, p. 6: "Yukarıda yazılı resmi ilan tevzi şeklinin etkilerinden de anlaşılacağı üzere 4.7.1951 tarihli kararname yürülüğe girdikten sonra Demokrat iktidarı destekliyen büyük gazetelere bol miktarda resmi ilan verilmiş ayrıca rotatifte basılmak şartiyşe 6 aylık müddet kaydı kararnameden kaldırılmış olduğundan iktidar lehinde neşriyatta bulunmak üzere birçok küçük gazetenin teşebbüsüne imkan sağlanmış ve bunlar resmi ilanlarla beslenmiş bulunmaktadır."

[176] 31 October 1960: BCA, 010 09 317 985 1, p. 8.

[177] Only *Büyük Doğu* was weekly journal but others were dailies. For more details see: Bali, *An Overview of the Turkish Press through the Reports of American Diplomats*, p. 87.

announcements fees, an official document stated that the owner of *Hizmet* received 15.000 liras from the secret fund of the Prime Ministry.[178]

Indeed, as the secret support to *Hizmet* by the DP shows, what the opposition meant by the word *besleme* was not limited to the money received only from official announcements. The opposition was also not pleased with other kinds of financial supports, which these pro-DP publications enjoyed. Having heard of rumors that the DP was to prepare a new plan to intensify its so-called encouragement policy, on 22 September 1953, *Ulus* asked about the limits of this financial support of the government. According to *Ulus*, however, people realized which newspapers were supported by the government in a short time, and this led to the erosion of the prestige of such newspapers immediately.[179] The same newspaper, three days later, on 25 September, reported about the *besleme* press policy of the current government one more time. It criticized the direct financial aid of Adnan Menderes to one of the periodicals, *Komünizme Karşı Mücadele* (The Struggle against Communism) and claimed that this action damaged the press ethics (basın ahlakı).[180] *Ulus* further reported that an article of Bekir Berk, who was one of the authors of this journal, was found against secularism, and Berk as well as the responsible editorial manager of the journal had been sued earlier.[181]

It is clear that the opposition was not happy with the anti-Kemalist activities of some "besleme" organs of the DP. *Büyük Doğu*, whose owner was Necip Fazıl

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[178] 31 October 1960: BCA, 010 09 317 985 1, pp. 6-7: "1952 senesinde küçük besleme gazetelerinden Hizmet Gazetesine 92.172.80 lira resmi ilan bedeli ödenmiştir [...] 1952 yılında intişara başlamış sahibine Başbakanlık örtülü ödeneğinden 15.000 lira tesis masrafı da hediye edilmiştir."

[179] "Beslemeciliği Nerelere Kadar Götürecekler?", *Ulus*, 22 September 1953, p. 1: "Şimdi de gazete muhabirlerine el atmak istiyorlar. Haber aldığımıza göre Adnan Menderes beslemecilik usulünü yeniden geliştirmek teşebbüsündedir. Bilindiği üzere resmi ve diğer nimetler yolundan diğer nimetler yolundan gazetelerin mürakabesini baltalama taktiği Adnan Menderes'in elinde başlıca silahtır. Fakat üç buçuk senedir bu silahla kendi beklediğini bir türlü alamadığı da aşikardır. Halk hangi gazetelerin beslendiğini kısa zamanda farketmekte ve o gazetelerin itibarı derhal sıfıra düşmektedir."

[180] "Adnan Menderes'in Gönderdiği Para", *Ulus*, 25 September 1953, p. 1: "Basının ahlakı nasıl bozuluyor. Neşriyatı taltıf için Başbakanlık müsteşarı eliyle namına para gönderilen dergi sahibi mahkemede durumu açıkça anlattı."

[181] "Adnan Menderes'in Gönderdiği Para", p. 1: "Bundan bir buçuk yıl kadar önce neşredilen (Komünizme Karşı Mücadele) adlı dergide Bekir Berk tarafından yazılan bir yazı laikliğe aykırı görülerek yazı sahibi ile derginin yazı işleri müdürü hakkında dava açılarak sanıklar İstanbul İkinci Ağır Ceza Mahkemesine verişmiştir."

Kısakürek, was among these anti-Kemalist organs. During the court sessions about the Malatya incident, Kısakürek himself admitted to receive financial supports from the DP government. DP's sponsor of the anti-Kemalist organs received an immediate reaction from the opposition. On 16 December 1953, for example, *Yeni Ulus* published the views of its readers, who criticized this policy of government. An ordinary young man, for instance, told *Yeni Ulus* that he had wished the government, which presented itself careful in securing the wealth of nation, had not given 80.000 liras as official announcements to *Büyük Doğu*, which "swore" (küfreden) Atatürk.[182] As such, what disturbed the opposition was not only financial subsidies that pro-DP organs received but also there was a growing resentment among the oppositional newspapers of the continuing support of the DP to the anti-Kemalist partisan organs.

After the coup against the DP government, on 27 May 1960, this financial support to the pro-DP organs even turned into one of the main issues that the DP members were asked by the military court, which is known in the literature as kept press and propaganda suits.[183] It is clear that governmental financial subsidies were one of the methods, particularly during the rule of the DP, that governments used against oppositional voices and increased their say on the press via these kinds of direct financial links. Yet it was also clear that it was these attacks against the freedom of press that accelerated the opposition and the popular unrest against the DP rule.

II.IV. Conclusion

The DP and the DP-affiliated organs attacked the CHP for the existing Press Law, which gave an extensive control to the CHP government over the press, from 1946 to 1950, when the DP was in opposition. Thanks to its harsh opposition to the successive CHP governments' policies regarding the press as well as its promises that it would promote freedom of the press in case it took power, the DP gained

[182] "Bir Anket", *Yeni Ulus*, 16 December 1953, p. 1: "İsterdim ki milletin malları üzerinde hassasiyetle durduğunu iddia eden bir zihniyet, millete ait 80 bin lirayı resmi ilan diye Atatürk'e küfreden "Büyük Doğu" gazetesine vermemeliydi."

[183] *Yassıada Zabıtları, XII Propaganda Davası, Köpek Davası* (Emine Gürsoy Naskali ed.) (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2014).

support of the press during the initial years of the DP rule. Promising to end any discrimination against the oppositional newspapers, the DP initially took some active steps to advance press freedom, exemplified by the enactment of a new Press Law just two months after its victory in the May 1950 elections. Following the brief-lived experiment of the DP's liberal policies, however, it sought to have the so-called democratization efforts reversed shortly afterwards. Although the new government of the DP seemed to pledge its support for press freedom, most of its pre-1950 promises went unfulfilled.

The opposition came to challenge such a quick change in the DP's attitudes toward the press and the subsequent policies of the DP government that aimed to constraint the range of divergent opinion expressed in the Turkish press. In this regard, the first sign of the DP's authoritarian approaches toward the press was its radical regulation in the distribution of the official announcements in the second half of 1951.

The fundamental change in the DP's policy became more evident day by day. By 1952, newspapers such as *Cumhuriyet*, and from time to time also *Vatan*, which had initially supported the DP, had already stopped their support of the DP.[184] On 23 May 1952, for instance, *Cumhuriyet* published an interesting article entitled "Basın ve Hükümetler" (The Press and the Governments). In this article, it was stated: "It is understood that regardless of how democratic and freedom lover it was, the government was not fond of the press."[185] What *Cumhuriyet* implied was the fact that the DP did not allow greater freedom of expression during its rule although it had made its promise to do so before 1950.

As the DP tried to place the press under strict supervision, the tone of the opposition's criticism of the DP increased accordingly. But the main turn came with the enactment of a law about press crimes in March of 1954. By this law, the DP adopted a much more repressive legal framework as regards the press, and this law fomented agitation among even some of the DP members, who later formed a new

[184] Yıldız, "Demokrat Parti İktidarı (1950-1960) ve Basın", p. 486.

[185] Editorial, "Basın ve Hükümetler", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 May 1952, p. 1: "Anlaşılıyor ki ne kadar demokrat, ne kadar hürriyetsever olursa olsun hükümetlerin basınla başı hoş değildir."

party. Indeed, the DP's policies of the press failed of their main objectives, that is, despite its attempts to silence dissent voices in the press, the DP was not able to remain in control of all newspapers. As such, despite all the attempts of the governmental authorities to eliminate the oppositional newspapers from the public sphere through financial subsidies and legal changes, the oppositional press managed to survive from 1946 to 1955.

CHAPTER III

CREATING NEW RELATIONS: TURKISH PRESS AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE

The political history of Turkish-Greek relations is full of bitter memories, wars and hatred. Although the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 to some extent normalized the relations, from 1923 to 1930, the relations were strained under the problems of population exchanges.[186] Thus, at the post-Lausanne period until 1930, the mutual distrust did not dissappear totally.[187] Then, these two states finally settled the problems of population exchange and signed the Friendship Agreement of 1930 in Ankara. In the current literature of Turkish-Greek relations, the period started with this agreement and continued with the establishment of the Balkan Pact (1934) afterwards are accepted as an exceptionally friendly years at least at diplomatic level. The emerging partnership in the early Cold War years from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s is also accepted as another exceptionally friendly period.[188] In both cases, these two states sincerely sought the ways of closer relations. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind the contextual differences that dominated the each case and differed them from each other. In the late 1920s, for instance, there were regional problems threatening these two neighbors, i.e. the Bulgarian and Italian territorial

[186] Türkiye Araştırma ve Siyaset Plânlama Genel Müdürlüğü, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı (1923-1934)* (Ankara: T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1973), p. 153; Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), pp. 364, 496.

[187] Gözde Emen, "Turkey's Relations with Greece in the 1920s: The Pangalos Factor", *Turkish Historical Review*, 7/1 (2016), p. 57.

[188] Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", p. 576; Damla Demirözü, *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol: Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), pp. 75-107; Hatipoğlu, *Yakın Tarihte Türkiye ve Yunanistan (1923-1954)*, pp. 79-207.

ambitions.[189] Thus, Turkey and Greece were eager to put an end to the remaining problems of the Lausanne Treaty, and create friendly relations with their own initiatives.

The end of Second World War and the emerging Cold War context, however, created a new context emerged in the Turkish-Greek relations. From the Western point of view, particularly for the American policy makers, these two states, both sufferring from the Soviet claims on their territories, were no longer just friendly neighbors but they were, or would be, close allies and partners. This view also found a ground in Turkish and Greek politics. Creating such an alliance for these two states, two historical rivals, sharing bitter memories of past and having mutual deep prejudices, however, was a difficult task. The Greek case was totally different from the Turkish one, as under the civil war conditions Greece had experienced an insecure and violent political climate from 1946 to 1949. Although Turkey mostly kept out of the Second World War, it still suffered in economic and social terms while the following increasing Soviet threat to Turkey created an insecure atmosphere.

This perception of threat led these two states to turn their faces to the West even more. Under these circumstances, the development of close relations with each other was the part of their drive to the pro-West policies. Within this atmosphere, the Turkish press had a crucial role in the formation of public perceptions in Turkey for the necessity of having partnership with Greece. This chapter aims to investigate how and in what ways the Turkish press took an active part in propagating the formation of exceptionally close diplomatic relations of Turkey with Greece.

Investigating the role of Turkish press in the creation of new relations between Turkey and Greece, this chapter will base on discourse analysis of news and news articles in the Turkish newspapers of the period. In this process, it will examine the Truman Doctrine (1947) and Marshall Plan (1948), the Turkish and Greek membership to NATO (1952) and the Second Balkan Pact (1953) as case studies. These four cases will also give clues about the Western support, in particular the

[189] A. Haluk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (1923-1968)", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 23/3 (1968), p. 250.

American support, encouraging the development of these relations between these two states. In examining these four cases, this chapter will question whether there were any significant differences between oppositional and pro-governmental newspapers in covering the Turkish-Greek diplomatic relations in terms of these cases.

III.I. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

From 1946 onwards, the Turkish press had a tendency to emphasize news and official declarations which underlined how these close relations between Turkey and Greece served not only to the interests of these two states but also to the interests of the Western Bloc. The official declarations, both in Turkey, Greece and the US were that the friendly Turkish-Greek relations would not only create security for these states but also the world would be safer place. And, what the Turkish press did was generally to repeat or reproduce this argument. That is to say, for the Turkish press, the Cold War partnership between Turkey and Greece was a 'political necessity'. On 18 June 1946, for instance, *Ulus* welcomed the interview of Konstantinos Tsaldaris, the Prime Minister of Greece, which he gave to the Greek newspaper, *Atlantis*, which was published in New York. Tsaldaris underlined the necessity of Turkish-Greek friendship not only for the Western allies of Turkey and Greece but also for the Balkans and the Near East.[190] The number of such news and statements increased in 1947, with the Truman Doctrine.

The Truman Doctrine, which for some was just "the reecho" of the Monroe Doctrine,[191] announced by the American President Harry Truman on 12 March 1947, was presented as a "containmet policy."[192] It was to contain the "Soviet pressures,"

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[190] "M. Çaldaris Türk Dostluğuna Verdiği Değeri Bir Daha Belirtti", *Ulus*, 18 June 1946, p. 1: "Bu dostluk, yalnız iki memleket müttefikleri için değil fakat aynı zamanda Balkanlarda ve Yakındoğuda sulhün idamesi için de lüzümludur."

[191] "Roots of the Truman Doctrine", *The Washington Post*, 16 March 1947, p. B4.

[192] Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952", *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Origins – Volume 1* (Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds.) (Cambridge and New York: The Cambridge University Press, 2010); David J. Dallin, "Policy of Containment", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *Meaning of the 1952 Presidential Election*, vol. 283 (September 1952), p. 26; Morton Hoffman, "Aid to Greece and Turkey", *The Washington Post*, 12 April 1947, p. 6; Dennis Merrill, "Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36/1 (March 2006), p. 27.

the president underlined, which was felt mostly in Turkey and Greece. He added: "Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East."[193] Truman's words were welcomed quickly in the Turkish press, particularly by the organ of the CHP government, *Ulus*.[194] On 15 March, Falih Rıfkı Atay published an editorial article from the front page as "Barış Kurucu Amerika" (The Peace Founder America) and he wrote "pacifist" (barışçı) America found, sharing common ideals, two states in the Mediterrenean, Turkey and Greece, to whom it can trust with case of conscience.[195] There were no clash of ideas between these two states, Atay continued, that would differentiate Turkey from its friend Greece or *vice versa*.[196] Akin to Atay, Nadir Nadi also underlined the commonality between Turkey and Greece in his article published in *Cumhuriyet* regarding the speech of Truman.[197] Nadi repeated his ideas on 25 March and said: "The Turkish-Greek friendship is an absolute necessity that must be strengthened day by day."[198]

Indeed, Turkey's identification of its security partially with Greece was not a novelty. This started even before the Truman Doctrine. Turkey was actually nervous

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[193] Joseph J. Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *America and the Middle East*, 401/1 (1972), pp. 77-78.

[194] "Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a Yardım Yapılması İçin", *Ulus*, 13 March 1947, p. 1: "Ayan ve Temsilciler Meclislerinin yaptıkları müşterek toplantıda Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye 400 milyon dolarlık iktisadi yardımda bulunmasını ve bu memleketlerde askeri ve sivil personel gönderilmesini istemek üzere söz alan başkan Truman nutkuna şöyle başlamıştır: "Bugün dünyada hakim olan vaziyetin kongrenin bu toplantısında hazır bulunmasını icabettirmiştir. Bahis konusu olan memleketimizin dış siyaseti ve güvenliğidir."

[195] Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Barış Kurucu Amerika", *Ulus*, 15 March 1947, p. 4: "Barışçı Amerika Akdeniz'in bu köşesinde vicdan rahatı ve görüş ferahı ile güvenebileceği iki ülküdaş bulmuştur."

[196] Atay, "Barış Kurucu Amerika", p. 4: "Dost Yunanistan'ı bizden, bizi dost Yunanistan'dan ayırıcı hiçbir görüş farkı yoktur."

[197] Nadir Nadi, "Bir Dönüm Noktası", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 March 1947, p. 1: "Harb boyunca istila kuvvetlerine biri dövüşerek, biri de dövüşmeyi her an göze alarak türlü fedakarlıklara katlanan bu iki millete yardım elini uzatmakla, Birleşik Amerika, bir insaniyet borcunu yerine getirmekten çok daha ileri bir adım atıyor hatta Ortadoğu bölgesinin stratejik emniyetini korumak gibi haklı bir kaygının da ötesine geçiyor, dünya barışına aid nizam temelinin hangi ülküye göre ayarlanması lazım geldiğine işaret ediyor. Bu işaret azimli bir kararın ifadesidir [...] Yunanistan'a ve Türkiye'ye yardım elini uzatan Birleşik Amerika, bu haraketin, dünyada yaşatılmak istenilen Orta Çağ zihniyetine bir sed çekeceğini haykırıyor."

[198] Nadir Nadi, "Maksimos'un Sözleri", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 March 1947, p. 1: "Türk-Yunan dostluğu, gittikçe kuvvetlenmesi gereken bir zarurettir."

about the civil war in the territories of its neighbor and hoped the Greek government would win its present war with the communists. In view of that, Turkish newspapers always voiced Greek desires for American and British assistance against communists.[199] This press coverage was even appreciated by the non-communist Greek newspapers, as reported in *Ulus* dating 15 June 1946.[200] Yet, the Turkish call for assistance to Greece was further intensified on the eve of Truman's declaration.[201]

At that period, the Turkish press was also eager to report the Greek politicians' emphasis on the common foreign policy tendencies of Turkey and Greece.[202] For instance, the speeches underlining that Turkey and Greece were at the same side with America were highlightened in Turkish newspapers, as did *Cumhuriyet* on 23 March 1947 by reporting these kinds of statements of M. Maksimos, the Greek Prime Minister who succeeded Tsaldaris.[203] For Maksimos, in order to achieve the fervert desire of the world, which was peace, Turkey and Greece had to act together in any condition and had to have a close cooperation.[204]

The statement of Maksimos was greatly welcomed by Nadir Nadi on 25 March. According to Nadi, in both countries initially there were some people finding this friendship strange. Yet, Nadi further claimed, if there were still some having this idea, they could be called "traitors."[205] Indeed, the main target of this word, "traitor,"

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[199] Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Yunanistan'ın Davaları", *Ulus*, 4 February 1946, p. 1.

[200] "Yunan Gazetesi: Bir Elen Gazetesi Türk Basınına Teşekkür Ediyor", *Ulus*, 15 June 1946, p. 1: "Kathimerini: Haklarımızı destekliyen ve her Yunanlının ruhunda sevinç ve minnet hissi uyandıran makalelerinden dolayı Türk basınına teşekkürlerimizi sunarız."

[201] "Yunanistan Amerika'dan İktisadi Yardım İstedi", *Ulus*, 5 March 1947, p. 1; "Yunanistan'a Yardım Meselesi ve Amerika", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 March 1947, p. 1.

[202] "Yunan Dışişleri Bakanının Demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1947, p. 1.

[203] "Yunan Başbakanının Gazetemize Beyanatı: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan Amerika ile aynı safta yer almış bulunuyor"", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 March 1947, p. 1: "Yunan Başbakanı M. Maksimos ilk defa olarak bugün Türk basını heyetini kabul etti ve bizimle çok samimi bir hasbihalde bulundu."

[204] "Yunan Başbakanının Gazetemize Beyanatı", p. 4: "...bu dünyanın büyük bir iştiyakla beklediği sulhu kurmak ve yaşatmak için Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ın her hususta elele yürümesi ve sıkı bir işbirliği yapması lazımdır."

[205] Nadir Nadi, "Maksimos'un Sözleri", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 March 1957, p. 1: "İlk zaman Türk-Yunan dostluğunu yadırgayanlara iki memlekette de rastlanabilir. Şimdi bu kanaati besliyenler orada, yahud burada varsa, bunları birer vatan haini saymak zannımca doğru bir hüküm olur."

was probably communists in Greece. It was just four days earlier, that *Cumhuriyet* reported how Greek communists talked against Truman's speech. For them, Turkey and Greece sold the future of their countries for a few dollars.[206] It was clear that the Turkish press was very alarmed by any opposition to the closer relations between Turkey and Greece and the Truman Doctrine.

In such a sensitive period, a dispute appeared between Celal Bayar, the leader of the oppositional party, and M. Contumas, the Greek *charge d'affaires* in Ankara.[207] The reason of this was the annoyance of this Greek official from what he read on *Cumhuriyet*, dated 12 March 1947. This issue covered Celal Bayar's speech about Greece. In his speech, Bayar stated that Turkey was different from Greece and never would be like it. What Bayar implied actually was the power of communists in Greece.[208] These words of Bayar disturbed Contumas, and Contumas wrote an open letter to Celal Bayar that was again published in *Cumhuriyet* on 15 March. In this letter, Contumas underlined that despite the various invasions since the Second World War, Greeks never gave up fighting for its independence. If Turkey had also encountered similar hardships, he added, they would also act similarly, thanks to its "patriotic" and "rational" population.[209] In the end of his letter, *Cumhuriyet* added an editorial note that the Turkish nation's sympathy and admiration for the friendly

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[206] "Yunan Komünistleri ve Truman'ın Nutku: Komünist Basın", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 March 1947, p. 1: "Yunanistanla Türkiye'nin istikballeri birkaç dolara satıldı" diyor."

[207] Nihat Erim, "Dostlar Arasında", *Ulus*, 16 March 1947, p. 1: "Dün Cumhuriyet gazetesinde, dostumuz Yunan büyükelçiliği Maslahatgüzarı sayın M. Kontumas'ın bir mektubunu okuduk. Mektup, Demokrat Parti başkanı sayın Celal Bayar'a hitabetmekte ve kendisinin bir sözüne cevap vermektedir."

[208] "D.P. İktisadi Buhranı Önliyecek Plan Hazırladı", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 March 1947, p. 3: "Celal Bayar, Türkiye'nin Yunanistan'a benzemesine imkan olmadığını, Türk milletinin aklıseliminin buna müsade etmiyeceğini söyliyerek "inanılmıyacak" "olmıyacak bir şey varsa o da bizim memlekette bolşevizmin yerleşmesidir. Bolşevik prensiplerin memleketi mes'ud edeceğine asla inanmıyoruz" demiştir."

[209] "Yunan Maslahatgüzarının Celal Bayar'a Açık Mektubu", *Cumhuriyet*, 15 March 1947, p. 1, 3: "Türkiye'nin herhangi bir devlete benzeme ihtiyacı yoktur. Fakat, kendi tarih çerçevesi dışında bir model aradığı takdirde, binlerce senelik tarihi sizce meçhul olmıyan Yunanistan böyle bir model verebilecek durumdadır. Zira, sahte tevazuu bir yana bırakalım bugün bile memleketimin vereceği misal, öğretici bir misal olıcaktır. Harb içinde çektiği ıstırablara rağmen ve işgal yılları neticesinde son derece zayıf kaldığı halde, Yunan milleti, eksiriyetile memleketin kurtuluşundan beri istiklalini ve siyasi hürriyetini muhafaza için, takdire şayan bir azimle savaşmaktadır [...] Şükür Allaha Türkiye böyle bir tecavüzle karşılaşmamıştır. Fakat bir gün bizim karşılaştığımız hallerle karşılaşmak mecburiyetinde kalırsa halkın vatanseverliği ve aklıselimi sayesinde hiç olmazsa memleketimin takındığı tavır kadar azimli bir tavır takınacağından eminim."

Greek nation were obvious. And, it was not possible for Celal Bayar to think in another way. This issue, *Cumhuriyet* argued, was no more than a misunderstanding and in short amount of time Celal Bayar would explain the truths.[210]

Although *Cumhuriyet* corrected, or in fact defended, Bayar, it was not enough for this newspaper to avoid Bayar's wrath. In a period that, questioning the Turkish-Greek closeness was sufficient to be labelled as a "traitor," Bayar accused *Cumhuriyet* of not reporting his words correctly, so causing such a misunderstanding. He further accused the newspaper of delaying to report his explanation afterwards. In order to defend himself, Bayar added that he had been one of those people who had worked hard for the establishment of friendly relations with Greece and made contacts with the Greek officials in the period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[211] What he did was in fact to recall his activities for the Friendship Treaty of 1930.

Indeed, this was common for the current politicians of both Greece and Turkey at that period: recalling their willingness and efforts in the establishment of friendly relations between Turkey and Greece that was settled in the Treaty of Friendship in 1930 after problematic years in the post-Lausanne period. Like Celal Bayar, the Greek Prime Minister, Maximos, was very proud of recalling his previous efforts for the establishment of friendship between Turkey and Greece in 1930. And, he declared to the Turkish press that, as it was "yesterday," as in the 1930s, seeing a

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[210] "Yunan Maslahatgüzarının Celal Bayar'a Açık Mektubu", p. 3: "Cumhuriyet: Sayın maslahatgüzarın mektubunu yukarıya koyduk. Türk milletinin dost Yunan milleti hakkında beslediği sevgi ve takdir hisleri malumdur. Celal Bayar'ın da bu mevzuda başka türlü düşünmesine imkan yoktur. Demokrat Parti Genel Başkanının konuşmasında, sayın maslahatgüzarın da açık mektubunda bahsettiği tecavüzlere telmih ettiği aşikardır. Bu itibarla ortada mevcud olan bir yanlış anlaşılmadır ki, biz, Celal Bayar'ın ilk fırsatta yapacağı muhakkak bulunan açıklama ile onun da ortadan kalkacağına inanıyoruz."

[211] "Celal Bayar'ın Yunan Maslahatgüzarına Cevabı", *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1947, pp. 1, 3: "D.P. Genel Başkanı sözlerinin eksik neşredildiğini ve maslahatgüzar tarafından yanlış anlaşıldığını söylüyor: Toplantımızda hazır bulunan bir vatandaş, bugün Yunanistan'daki silahlı ihtilafı kasdederek bizim de bu duruma düşebilmemiz ihtimali olup olmadığını sormuştur. Cevabım münhasınan memleketimiz bakımından bu suale aiddir. Hiçbir komşumuzun kendilerine aid işleri hakkında mütalea yürütmek fikrinde olmadığım hakkındaki teminatım nasılsa muhabirinizin gözünden kaçmış ve gazetenizin bu kısa hülasında yer bulmamışıtr. Şunu da ilave olarak söyliyeyim, Atatürk devrinde Türk-Yunan dostluğuna kıymet veren ve buna çalışanlardan biri de bendim. Yunan ricalile yakından temaslarım olmuştur."

close friendship between the Turkish and Greek nations was his "most sacred wish" (en mukaddes arzum).[212]

Although from time to time, this act of referring to the Friendship Treaty of 1930 and seeing it as the first step of the current alliance, was valid for the Turkish press as well,[213] it was also always voiced that the current necessity for a friendship was even more than the one in the 1930s. The new circumstances, i.e. the Cold War conditions, left no other way for Turkey and Greece than becoming closer. This argument suited well with the American one, or it is better to say that it was even indoctrinated by the American policy makers, as reported in *the New York Times*, that described Turkey and Greece as the "outposts of a political revolution" (siyasi bir ihtilalin ileri karakollarıdır), and this was quoted in *Ulus* dating 26 May 1947.[214] Thus, what the Turkish press did, particularly on the eve of the Truman Doctrine, was to spread and make the idea of partnership with Greece acceptable and demonstrate that this was what Americans looked forward.

The Turkish press carried this attitude while reporting the news about the Marshall Plan as well. The Marshall Plan was not only designed for Turkey and Greece unlike the Truman Doctrine but it also included the other Western European states.[215] Yet, the Turkish press reported news about the economic aids of the Marshall Plan usually with a reference to the aids to Greece. Thus, like the Truman Doctrine, it also affected the Turkish and Greek politics at the same time so the

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[212] "Yunan Başbakanının Gazetemize Beyanatı: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan Amerika ile Aynı Safta Yer Almış Bulunuyor"", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 March 1947, p. 1: "M. Maksimos beyanatı arasında Türk-Yunan dostluğunu belirterek dedi ki: Türk basını mensublarile görüşmekten hassaten büyük bir memnuniyet duyuyorum. Zira ben şahsan, Türk-Yunan anlaşmasını memleketim namına imzalamış bir kimseyim. Dün olduğu gibi bugün de Türk-Yunan milletleri arasında sıkı bir dostluk görmek benim en mukaddes arzumdur."

[213] Nihat Erim, "Türk-Yunan Dostluğu", *Ulus*, 16 November 1946, p. 1.

[214] "New York Times Yazıyor: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan Siyasi Bir İhtilalin İleri Karakollarıdır", *Ulus*, 26 May 1947, p. 1: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan özel bir tazyikin noktalarını ve harp sonrası dünyasında olup bitenlerin haberdar olan herhangi bir kimsenin gözünden kaçamayacak olan siyasi bir ihtilalin ileri karakollarını teşkil etmektedir."

[215] Diane B. Kunz, "The Marshall Plan Reconsidered: a Complex of Motives", *Foreign Policies of the Major Powers Politics and Diplomacy since World War II – Volume 1* (Lloyd Pettiford ed.) (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 130; Edwin Borchard, "Intervention: The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan", *The American Journal of International Law*, 41/4 (1947), pp. 885-886.

Marshall Plan is also a good test case to examine the Turkish press' approach to the emerging new relations with Greece.

The Secretary of State, George Catlett Marshall, whom Truman called as "the greatest living American" and also whom Nüzhet Baba,[216] the Turkish Press *Attaché* of Washington called a "statesman that could not hide his love and hatred like Truman," gave a speech about his plan, now known as the Marshall Plan, on 5 June 1947.[217] The American policy makers, however, were aware of the fact that the most important thing was the reaction of people. That is to say, in order to enjoy its propaganda power, this plan had to be known and supported by international public opinion. The letter of American politician, Murray Martin, to the Turkish Prime Minister, Hasan Saka, on 5 December 1947 also revealed this American view:[218]

> Whether or not the Marshall Plan can save the world, one thing seems certain: neither the Marshall Plan nor any approach to world salvation can succeed unless it has the whole-hearted support of most people of the world. To gain that support, any plan must be understood by the people of the world. That means it must be explained to them, discussed with them, in terms they can understand and in a manner which will be above suspicion.

In the case of Turkey, this was done via the press. Turkish newspapers reported the news about the Marshall aid in detail, so informed the Turkish population. In April 1950, with the end of two years for the Plan, Russell H. Dorr, the head of executive committee for Turkey of European Economic Cooperation (İktisadi İşbirliği Türkiye İcra Komitesi Başkanı) himsely praised the Turkish press' role not only in introducing the Plan but, in general, the development of democracy.[219] Turkish newspapers already started to report the news about the

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[216] He was appointed as Press *Attaché* of Washington on 9 February 1945. For more details see: 9 February 1945: BCA: 030 18 01 02 107 98 4, p. 1.

[217] 22 May 1948: BCA: 030 01 101 617 14, p. 7: "Truman gibi hislerini, sevgi ve nefretini gizlemeye muvaffak olamayan bir devlet adamı;" James Chase, "An Extraordinary Partnership: Marshall and Acheson", *Foreign Affairs*, 76/3 (May-June 1997), pp. 192-194; Ferald J. Bryan, "George C. Marshall at Harvard: A Study of the Origins and the Construction of the "Marshall Plan" Speech", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 21/3 (Summer 1991), p. 489.

[218] 5 December 1947: BCA, 030 10 5 23 11, p. 1.

[219] "Marshall Planına Dair Russell Dorr'un İzahati", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 April 1950, p. 1: "Samimi bir havada gerçekleşen toplantıda, Mr. R. Dorr, Marshall Planının işleyiş tarzı ve Türkiyede tatbik şekli hakkında izahat vermiş, demokratik rejimlerin gelişiminde halkı aydınlatma bakımından basının rolünü belirtmiş, bu alanda Türk basınının bu yolda çalışmalarını överek ezcümle şunları söylemiştir:

Marshall Plan during discussions in the American Congress. Particularly, Truman's words stating how "these two programs [Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan] are closely related" and "alike in their aims" were reported in the Turkish press, particularly in *Ulus*.[220]

Two months later, again during the Congressional Committee's negotiations of the Marshall Plan, Truman mentioned the impacts of the previous aids of Truman Doctrine on the eyes of other nations. And, this also attracted the attention of the Turkish press. On 8 January 1948, for instance, *Ulus* reported that Truman said if they did not support Turkey and Greece, the situation would be totally different for these states.[221] He actually implied the threat of Soviet expansionism. The Turkish Press *Attaché* in Washington also informed Ankara about Truman's speech in the Congress on 7th of January.[222]

On 10 January 1948, two days after the news about Truman's speech, this time *Ulus* reported Marshall's speech arguing the necessity of the current American military aids to the Turkish and Greek Naval forces in the Mediterranean.[223] In the same issue, *Ulus* made another news entitled "Why Assisting Europe" (Avrupa'ya Niçin Yardım Ediliyor?). In this item, *Ulus* quoted Marshall's response to this

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Marshall Planı, iki gün sonra iki yaşında olacaktır. Bir çok memleketler Marshall yardımı sayesinde büyük değişiklikler arzetmektedirler."

[220] "Avrupa'ya Yardım", *Ulus*, 9 November 1947, p. 1; "M. Truman", *Ulus*, 11 December 1947, p. 1: "Bu mesaj totoliterlerin Avrupa yayılmasını önlemek maksadıyla Başkan Truman'ın Yunanistan ve Türkiye için yardım mesajı;" "M. Truman: Avrupa Kalkınma Planını Dün Kongreye Sundu", *Ulus*, 20 December 1947, p. 1; "Yardım Planı: Truman'ın Mesajı Çok Elverişli Şekilde Karşılandı", *Ulus*, 21 December 1947, p. 1; Editorial, "Marshall Planı Amerikan Kongresinde", *Ulus*, 22 December 1947, p. 1; "Truman Doctrine in Action", *The New York Times*, 12 November 1947, p. 10.

[221] "Amerika'nın Bugün İçinde Bulunduğu Durum: M. Truman Kongreye Bir Rapor Verdi. Amerika Başkanı: Türkiye'ye ve Yunanistan'a Yardımın Diğer Milletler Üzerindeki Tesirini Belirtiyor", *Ulus*, 8 January 1948, pp. 1, 4: "Türkiye ile Yunanistan'a, yabancı baskısına karşı tamamiyetlerini muhafaza edebilmeleri için esaslı surette yardım ettik. Biz onlara bu yardımı yapmamış olsaydık, bugün durumları büsbütün başka türlü olabilirdi."

[222] 29 January 1948: BCA, 030 01 101625 14, p. 7.

[223] "Yardım Kanunu Gereğince: Amerika, Türkiye'ye 4 Denizaltı, 11 Harp Gemisi Veriyor. Gl. Marshall Yunanistan'a Her Hususta Yardım İşinin Dikkatele Gözden Geçirildiğini Bildirdi", *Ulus*, 10 January 1948, p. 1.

question. Marshall stated if Europe was not assisted, the poverty in Europe would be used for political purposes,[224] implying a possible communist take over.

Ulus was also eager to report views of the Turkish authorities regarding this Plan, particularly in times, when the rumors and criticisms about the Plan increased in public mainly due to the delays in the transfer of funds.[225] In the last days of January 1948 and the first days of February 1948, for instance, such a situation occurred.[226] On 3 February 1948, the views of Necmeddin Sadak, the Turkish Foreign Minister, who was described as "Ankara's soft-spoken Foreign Minister, who has been a good friend of West since the days when he was a journalist" by one of the popular American newspapers, *The New York Times*,[227] was reported. Sadak declared: "the Americans are taking all the development needs of Turkey into consideration with a great friendship."[228]

Yet, in general, as stated above, Turkish newspapers continued to cover news about the Marshall Plan with a reference to Greece. Throughout February 1948, the amount of aid for Turkey and Greece was continued to be reported in *Ulus*.[229]

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[224] "Avrupa'ya Niçin Yardım Ediliyor", *Ulus*, 10 January 1948, p. 1: "Eğer Avrupa'ya yardım edilmezse ekonomik sefalet, siyasi gayeler uğrunda vasıta olarak kullanılacaktır."

[225] "Marshall Planı Gecikecek", *Ulus*, 2 February 1948, p. 1.

[226] Editorial, "Türk-Amerikan İşbirliği", *Ulus*, 4 February 1948, p. 1: "Bir iki haftadan beri, Marshall Yardım Planı, Türk halk efkarının duygulu hatta zaman zaman endişeli dikkatini üzerinde toplamıştır."

[227] C. L. Sulzberger, "Ankara is in Mood of U.S Alliance", *The New York Times*, 1 July 1948, p. 3.

[228] "Marshall Planı Etrafındaki Tenkid ve Dedikodulara Karşı: Dışişleri Bakanının Müthiş Nutku", *Ulus*, 3 February 1948, p. 1: "Amerikalılar Türkiye'nin bütün kalkınma ihtiyaçlarını büyük bir dostlukla dikkate alıyorlar."

[229] "Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a Yardım İçin: M. Truman Yeni Krediler İsteyecek", *Ulus*, 17 February 1948, p. 1: "Başkanın Demeci: Yunanistan'a karşı yapılan baskı gittikçe artmaktadır. 1947 yılı sonuna kadar Türkiye için Amerikan fabrikalarına 19.000.000 dolarlık askeri malzeme siparişi yapıldığı bildiriliyor. Truman'ın Mesajı: Başkan Truman bugün Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye yardım hakkında kongreye gönderdiği bir mesajında Yunanistan'daki iç harbin Yunan ekonomisini baltalamakta olduğunu bildirmekte ve zaman gelince yukarda bahsi geçen iki memlekette askeri yardım için muazzam tahsisat isteyeceğini kongreye haber vermektedir;" "M. Truman'ın Yeni Yardım Teklifi", *Ulus*, 19 February 1948, p. 1: "Gl. Marshall'e göre Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a yeni yardım 20 Şubata kadar kararlaşacak;" "Yeni Amerikan Yardımı", *Ulus*, 27 February 1948, p. 1: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan için Kongreden 275 milyon dolar isteniyor. Gl. Marshall, Türkiye yabancı bir devlete boğazlarda üs vermek ve gene aynı devlete toprak terketmek için devamlı baskıya maruzdur diyor."

Indeed, it was the period that Truman and Marshall asked the Congress for more funds both for Turkey and Greece.[230]

In March, the number of these meetings about the Plan in the Congress increased.[231] Nevertheless, the American authorities still could not decide about the amount of aids, so the Marshall aids did not reach to Turkey and Greece yet. Probably to decrease concern of public for such a delay, Necmeddin Sadak again gave a speech and it was reported in *Ulus* on 11 March. Sadak repeated to voice his high expectations of receiving a great deal of funds.[232] In the same issue, *Ulus* also published an editorial article entitled "Amerikan Yardımlarında Son Safha" (The Last Stage in the American Aids) and in this article it was written that the American aids for Turkey and Greece were the parts of the Truman Doctrine. These two territories were under "the threat of red imperialism" (Kızıl emperyalizmin tehdidi). So, the newspaper argued, aids to Turkey and Greece would continue until this threat was over.[233] And, the article was concluded with the same argument: "Today, the historic role of saving peace and security of the world falls upon Turkey and Greece, in a delicate and fragile region where the forces of goodness and badness clash."[234]

It was, however, not until the end of March 1948 that the Congress agreed on the Plan.[235] *Ulus* was quick to report the issue of Turkish and Greek aids were decided to be speeded up.[236] It was also in the same days, parallel to the news about

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[230] "Aid For Greece and Turkey: Truman Wants More", *The Manchester Guardian*, 27 Februaray 1948, p. 5.

[231] "Marshall Plan Machinery", *The Manchester Guardian*, 16 March 1948, p. 5.

[232] "Dışişleri Bakanı", *Ulus*, 11 March 1948, p. 1: "Memleketimize Marshall Planı gereğince geniş ölçüde yardım geleceğini ümit ediyorum."

[233] Editorial, "Amerikan Yardımında Son Safha", *Ulus*, 11 March 1948, p. 1.

[234] Editorial, "Amerikan Yardımında Son Safha", p. 1: "İyilik ve kötülük kuvvetlerinin karşılaştığı nazik ve hassas bir bölgede, dünya barış ve güvenliğini koruma tarihi rolü bugün Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a düşmektedir."

[235] William I. Hitchcock, "The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West", *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Origins – Volume 1* (Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds.) (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 157.

[236] "Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a Yardım Hızlandırılıyor", *Ulus*, 24 March 1948, p. 1: "275 milyonluk yardım Ayandan çıktı. Ayan üyesi M. Vandenberg diyor ki: Krediler komünizmin hain ve meşum ilerlemesini önlemeğe yardım edecektir. Vandenberg "Türkiye ile Yunanistan'a yardımda bulunulmasını reddetmek bizler ve diğer hür halk kitleleri için hür bir dünyanın muhafazasına bir

the approaching Marshall Aids, *Ulus* covered news about a new phase of cooperation between Turkey and Greece. On 23 March, for instance, it reported the statements of Tsaldaris, the Greek Prime Minister, declaring that in the following days he would give news about new steps to be taken to develop relations between Turkey and Greece.[237] Soon after this statement, mutual diplomatic visits increased between these two states.[238] And, this chapter will examine these intense visits in the following sections.

The news about the Marshall Plan gained a new character with the rule of the DP. It became a part of internal political discussions more, since the new government used the Marshall aid to criticize the previous single party rule. For instance, according to the new government, it was the CHP governments that caused to receive lesser amount of funds than other European countries, particularly Greece. Only three months after the DP came to power, President Celal Bayar met with Turkish journalists (in Bursa) and talked about the Marshall aid and his statements were published in *Cumhuriyet* on 19 August 1950. In this meeting, Bayar claimed that until now Turkey could not benefit from the Marshall aids as much as it deserved due to the clashes within the CHP governments. Bayar continued, only one year left for the Marshall aid. So, he implied, the DP could not also achieve much during this limited time.[239] *Cumhuriyet*, however, ended this news by saying that now it was the duty of new government to gain more support from the Marshall Plan.[240]

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engel teşkil edecektir demiş;" "Amerikan Yardımı Hızlandırılıyor", *Ulus*, 25 March 1948, p. 1: "275 milyonluk munzam yardım Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında ihtiyaca göre taksim edilecek."

[237] "Türk-Yunan İşbirliği", *Ulus*, 23 March 1948, p. 1: "Çaldaris, Türkiye ile olan müşterek siyasette yeni terakkiler sağlamış olduğunu pek yakında bildirecek bir durumda bulunacağını söylemiştir;" "Friendship of Greece and Turkey", *The Manchester Guardian*, 6 April 1948, p. 6.

[238] "Friendship of Greece and Turkey", *The Manchester Guardian*, 6 April 1948, p. 6.

[239] "Marshall Yardımın Arttırılması", *Cumhuriyet*, 19 August 1950, p. 1: "Marshall Yardımından şimdiye kadar layık olduğu ehemmiyette istifade edilmemiştir. İki yıldan beri Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi hükümetleri lüzumsuz yere birbirlerile çekişerek Marshall yardımından hakkile istifade imkanı bulamamışlardır. Bir sene sonra Marshall yardım tatbikatı kesilecektir. Bizler yardımın geriye kalan bir yıl içinde ne yapabiliriz?;" This piece was also collected for the document BCA, 490 1 0 204 811 3, p. 4: "Atlantik Paktı ve Marshall yardımı ile ilgili gazete küpürleri" but it was shown as published on 19 September 1950 by mistake.

[240] "Marshall Yardımın Arttırılması", *Cumhuriyet*, 19 August 1950, p. 1: "Marshall yardım planından daha fazla yardım sağlamak yeni iktidara düşer."

Indeed, this discussion was not new in Turkish politics and this issue had been already a point of friction between the CHP and the DP, before the DP's election victory of 1950. During the CHP governments, the DP and and pro-DP newspapers always criticized Turkey's smaller share in the Plan, which was even smaller than the Greek share. At that time, even *Ulus* problematized this issue. Unlike pro-DP newspapers, however, *Ulus* saw this as an American tactical mistake, which allocated less amount of money to Turkey. For instance, on 20 March 1949, Peyami Safa in his article "Marshall Planının Üvey Çocukları" (Stepchildren of the Marshall Plan) complained about Turkey's receiving lesser amount of funds than many other European states, including Greece, despite the bigger burden of the Cold War was on the shoulders of Turkey.[241] More interestingly the next day, the same newspaper published the report of Truman to the Congress which briefly argued that Turkey was different from Greece. In his report, Truman stated that "Turkey was not a state improverished as did Greece" and there was not an internal turmoil in Turkey.[242] Despite the declarations of Truman, the pro-DP press, however, continued to present this issue as the responsibility and hence failure of CHP governments.[243]

Apperantly, Turkey was not pleased with Greece's taking more advantage from the Plan in particular.[244] And, the DP opposition used this to criticize the CHP governments. This was also valid during the DP government. This time oppositional

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[241] Peyami Safa, "Marshall Planının Üvey Çocukları", *Ulus*, 20 March 1949, p. 1: "Bütün milletler arasında soğuk harbin en büyük yükü bizim üzerimizdedir. Biz daha açık söyliyelim: yaptığımız fedakarlıkla gördüğümüz yardım arasında tersine bir nispet vardır. Biri ne kadar büyükse öteki de o kadar azdır."

[242] "Türkiye'ye Yardım: M. Truman'ın Kongreye Sunduğu Raporun Tam Metnini Veriyoruz", *Ulus*, 21 March 1949, p. 1: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan dünyanın nazik bir bölgesinde komşu bulunmalarına ve her ikisi de aynı kanuna göre yardım görmelerine rağmen bu memleketlerde hakim olan durumlar arasında açık bir tezat mevcuttur. Türkiye, Yunanistan gibi fakirleşmiş bir memleket değildir. Türkiye'de, güvenliğin maruz kaldığı tehlikenin mahiyetini değiştiren veya örten dahili bir karışıklık yoktur."

[243] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Marshall Planı Tersine İşliyor", *Zafer*, 9 July 1949, p. 1; "Marshall Yardım Planı ve Türkiye", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 July 1949, p. 5.

[244] According to the figures, finally, the amount of Marshall aids received by Greece was 706.7 million dollars, while it was 225.1 dollars for Turkey. Actually, the fact about Greece's receiving more aid due to the civil war on its soils than Turkey was also valid in terms of figures about the military aids, it was 300 million dollars for Greece, but only 100 million for Turkey. For more details see: Craig Livingston, '"One Thousand Wings': The United States Air Force Group and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1947-50", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 30/4 (1994), p. 791.

newspapers started to criticize the DP's policy concerning the Marshall Plan, and regarding Turkey's position *vis-à-vis* Greece. An influential journalist, Sedat Simavi, on 14 January 1951, wrote in *Hürriyet*:[245]

> An American newspaper recently wrote that the aids received by Turkey were less than the aids received by Greece and the US did not make efforts for the development of Turkey [...] although we have a Minister of the Marshall Plan in our cabinet, we can not express our needs to the US in any way. Today, whole Europe has one hope: that is the Turkish army. Adnan Menderes government should do something at all costs and set the Marshall Plan free from this ridiculous situation.

The membership of NATO issue was also a similar case for the Turkish press. The news regarding this issue was reported in accordance with the situation of Turkey *vis-à-vis* Greece and the Turkish-Greek relations.

III.II. Turkey and Greece in NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington.[246] Yet, it was on 18 February 1952, almost four years later, when Turkey and Greece were officially admitted to NATO.[247] Throughout this period, Turkey's, and also Greece's, admissions to NATO, was almost the number one foreign policy issue for Turkish newspapers. Both oppositional and governmental newspapers were highly interested to publish news regarding this membership issue. Preceding the news about the establishment of NATO and the Turkish and Greek memberships to it, however, in Turkish newspapers, these kinds of news started with the discussion of the American guarantee for Turkey and Greece against the Soviet attack.

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[245] Sedat Simavi, "Amerikan Yardımı", *Hürriyet*, 14 January 1951, p. 1 in BCA, 490 1 0 204 811 3, p. 3: "Bir Amerikan gazetesi bize yapılan yardımın, Yunanistan'a yapılan yardımdan daha az olduğunu ve Türkiye'nin kalkınması için Amerikanın gayret göstermediğini geçenlerde yazdı [...] Kabinemizde bir Marshall Planı Bakanı bulunmasına rağmen ihtiyaçlarımızı Amerikaya bir türlü anlatamıyoruz [...] Bugün bütün Avrupanın bir tek ümidi var: O da Türk ordusu [...] Adnan Menderes hükümeti ne yapıp yapıp Marshall meselesini bu gülünç halden kurtarmalıdır." On 26 June 1951, a similar kind of news was also published in *Yeni Sabah*, though Greece was not mentioned directly. In this news, it was underlined that it was Turkey that took the least amount of aid from the Marshall Plan when compared to other states, including Greece. For more details see: "Marshall Yardımından En Az Hisse Alan Türkiye", *Yeni Sabah*, 26 June 1951, p. 1: "Dün bütçe komisyonunda bu mesele görüşüldü. Amerikalıların, Bize diğer memleketlere nazaran yüzde bir nispetinde yardım yaptığı anlaşıldı."

[246] *Aspects of NATO: Chronology (1945-1973)* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1974), p. 5.

[247] Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 30.

The speech of Truman on 17 March 1948 that put forward the necessity of supporting democratic states was, for instance, published in *Ulus* on 27 April, but here this newspaper also questioned whether this support would be completed with a security guarantee as well.[248] The news continued with a reference to an article of Walter Lippmann's "The Cold War", which was published a year earlier, on 12 March 1947 regarding the aids planned to be given to Turkey and Greece. *Ulus* used Lippmann's words claiming that providing security guarantee to these states together with the economic aids would totally counter the Soviet threat to push Turkey's wish of obtaining concrete promises.[249] Turkey, overtly, declared its desire for security guarantee on May 1948.[250] Nevertheless, the West took no concrete steps for the security of either Turkey or Greece.

On the eve of NATO's establishment, toward the end of 1948, the concerns of Turkey for being left out from the security system of this planned pact increased.[251] This was also evident for Greece. As an alternative, actually, Turkey had already proposed a pact: the Mediterranean Pact. Few months before the signature of the Atlantic Treaty, the press was even eager to make news reporting that there was a "complete consensus" (tam bir mutabakat) between Turkey and Greece regarding the Mediterranean Pact.[252] Yet, particularly when these states learnt that Italy would also be included to the Atlantic Pact Treaty, they reconsidered their policies, as it became clear that the Atlantic Treaty would be extended to cover the Mediterranean

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[248] Editorial, "Tecavüze Karşı Amerikan Garantisi", *Ulus*, 27 April 1948, p. 1: "Avrupa'nın nazik durumu hakkındaki 17 Mart 1948 tarihli nutkunda, bağımsız demokratik devletlerin komünizme ve Rus genişleme seyahatine karşı mukavemetlerinde Amerika tarafından kuvvetle destekleneceğini, hür milletlere durum gerektirdiği her türlü yardımın yapılacağı belirtilmişti. O günden beri ahlaki bakımdan çok müessir ve kıymetli olan bu vaadin, tecavüze karşı hukuki şekle uygun bir garanti taahhüdüyle tamamlayıp tamamlamayacağı siyasi çevrelerde hararetle münakaşa olunan bir soru olmuştur."

[249] Editorial, "Tecavüze Karşı Amerikan Garantisi", *Ulus*, 27 April 1948, p. 1: "Mali yardımla birlikte askeri bir garanti de teklif edecek olursak, meseleyi kökünden ele almış oluruz."

[250] George McGhee, *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu* (Belkıs Çorakçı trans.) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1992), p.109.

[251] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Atlantik Misakından Hariç Kalırsak", *Ulus*, 24 December 1948, p. 1.

[252] "Akdeniz Paktı Hususunda Türkiye ve Yunanistan Tam Mutabakat Halinde", *Ulus*, 20 February 1949, p. 1.

region.[253] Thus, initially, the Turkish expectation from the Atlantic Treaty was simply the extension of the promise of protection and security in the face of Soviet threat. Then, however, Turkey started to demand to be an official member of the Atlantic Treaty.

Yet, Turkey and Greece could not become the members of this Pact, nor did they gain any security guarantee. Particularly, the oppositional Turkish press saw this as the failure of the current CHP government.[254] But even in the government press, especially in *Ulus*, this exclusion of Turkey from the Atlantic Treaty created disappointment. But *Ulus* did not accuse CHP of being imcompetent but blamed the Western Bloc for not taking Turkey's security concerns seriously. For instance, on 26 March 1949, Peyami Safa asked why Turkey was not invited to be a member of the Atlantic Pact despite the fact that Turkey was the country most in danger.[255] *Ulus* repeated its criticisms for Western powers on 19 July 1949 as well.[256]

Indeed, it was a fact that the US and Britain had different views about the inclusion of Turkey and Greece to the Pact: the former was supportive but the latter was reluctant. And, for the Turkish press, this was the main reason behind the exclusion of Turkey and Greece from NATO for four years. Throughout that period, thus, Turkish press was keen to inform Turkish population about the efforts of US for the memberships of Turkey and Greece.[257] This problem also continued during Menderes's government. This time, however, according to the news of *Cumhuriyet* dating 2 June 1950 the US intensified its efforts.[258] This was due to the DP's success in the last elections according to *Zafer*[259] and Mümtaz Faik Fenik, its chief-editor and

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[253] Athanassopoulou, "Western Defence Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948", pp. 95-97; Lerna K.Yanık, "Atlantik Paktı'ndan NATO'ya: Türkiye Büyük Miller Meclisinde Türkiye'nin Konumu ve Uluslararası Rolü Tartışmalarından Bir Kesit", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 9/34 (2012), p. 40.

[254] "Sadak, Türkiye'ye Eli Boş Dönüyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 29 April 1949, p. 1; "Türkiye Neden Pakta Alınmadı?", *Zafer*, 19 July 1949, p. 1.

[255] Peyami Sefa, "Atlantik Paktı ve Biz", *Ulus*, 26 March 1949, p. 1: "Topun ağzında olmamıza rağmen neden çağrılmıyoruz?"

[256] "Atlantik Paktı Dışında Bırakılmamız Tenkid Edildi", *Ulus*, 19 July 1949, p. 1.

[257] Abidin Daver, "Amerikan Filosunun Ziyareti", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 March 1950, pp. 1, 3.

[258] "Atlantik Paktı", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 June 1950, p. 1: "Bazı Amerikalı Kongre üyeleri (Harry Coin) Türkiyenin bu pakta alınmasını tekrar istediler."

[259] "Türkiye Atlantik Paktı'na Girmeli", *Zafer*, 2 June 1950, p. 1.

DP MP for Ankara. This new government, Fenik argued, increased the Turkish prestige in the eyes of the US and European states. In the same article, published in *Zafer* on 2 June, Fenik protested the Atlantic Pact, to which Iceland and Portugal, and even Italy could become members, because of its exclusion of Turkey and Greece.[260]

This article of Mümtaz Faik Fenik coincided with the call of Greek General Plastiras, the Greek Prime Minister, for the inclusion of Turkey and Greece to the defence plans of NATO at least.[261] This call did not only attract the attention of the Turkish press but it was also reported in *the New York Times*.[262] Two days later, on 7 June 1950, *Zafer* reported that Fuat Köprülü, the Turkish Foreign Minister, and General Plastiras, the Greek Prime Minister, met in Paris, during the European Council of Ministers and these two parties together announced that the new Turkish government and the Greek government were dedicated to continue their friendship policy in every areas, but especially in economic issues.[263] Thus, in front of the eyes of Western powers, these two states once more repeated their adherence to the Cold War partnership and their desire to be included in the security system of the Pact immediately.

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[260] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Dünya Barışı ve Türkiye", *Zafer*, 2 June 1950, p. 1: "Son seçimler dolayısıyla Avrupada ve Amerikada Türkiye'nin kredisi çok artmıştır. Bir iki gün evvel Amerikan ayanında yapılan müzakereler esnasında, memleketimizdeki demokrasi inkılabı hakkında söylenen sözler, hakikaten her Türkin kalbini iftihar hisleriyle dolduracak kadar mühimdir. Bu takdir her halde sözde kalmıyacak ve fiiliyet sahasında da memleketimiz layık olduğu mevkii tam olarak alacaktır. Bu gayenin husulü için iki mühim esas vardır: 1) Türkiye'nin maddi kalkınması için Amerikan yardımından daha geniş ölçüde faydalanmalı; 2) Türkiye mutlaka Atlantik Paktına girmelidir. Hatırlarda olduğu üzere bu Paktın, İzlanda'dan İtibaren Portekiz'e kadar bütün Atlantik devletlerini ve hatta bir Akdeniz memleketi olmasına rağmen İtalya'yı, ve Fransa'nın Şimali Afrika'daki topraklarını içine aldığı halde bundan Türkiye ve Yunanistan istisna edilmiştir."

[261] "Türkiye-Yunanistan ve Batı Savunma Planı", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 June 1950, p. 1: "Yunan Başbakanı bu iki memleketin savunma planına dahil edilmesi lüzumu üzerinde duruyor. Atina (4): General Plastiras'ın açıklaması: Bu iki memlekete silah yardımı yapılırsa, savunma kuvvetleri artacak ve tabiidir ki müşterek batı savunması da daha kuvvetli bir hal alacaktır [...] Türkiye ile dostane münasebetlerimiz ve askeri ittifakımız vardır. Fakat bu münasebetlerin daha iyi bir hale gelmesi lazımdır ve bunun tahakkukuna çalışıyoruz."

[262] "Plastiras Asks Arms for Greece, Turkey", *The New York Times*, 4 June 1950, p. 23.

[263] "Pariste Mühim Bir Siyasi Mülakat: Köprülü Yunan Başbakanı ile Görüştü", *Zafer*, 7 June 1950, p. 1: "Yeni Türk hükümeti ile yeni Yunan hükümetinin iki memleket arsında tesis edilen dostluk siyasetini devam ettirmeğe ve hatta bütün sahalarda ve bilhassa ekonomik meselelerde fiili ve sıkı bir iş birliği ile yeni bir hamle yapmağa kesin karar vermiş bulundukları neticesine varmışlardır."

A very short amount of time after these Turkish and Greek calls, on 25 June 1950, the Korean War erupted and the next day it was widely covered in press.[264] This war, one of the dramatic moments of the Cold War, which Fenik described as "a threat to world peace" and Nadir Nadi as "the beginning of the end,"[265] totally changed the course of the membership discussions. On 28 June, Turkish newspapers reported that the US took an immediate action and attacked the Northern Korean planes.[266] And, Turkey and Greece supported and participated in this military act.[267]

When compared the efforts of Greece with the Turkish one, it can easily be seen that Turkey had contributed to this war effort more. Despite the protests of the opposition, for instance, the DP government was one of the first countries which sent soldiers to Korea. The name of the Turkish brigade was Şimal Yıldızı (The Northern Star). It was on 19 October 1950 that the first Turkish soldiers arrived to Korea. Yet, toward the end of July, the press started to voice the opposition's objection.[268] According to the news of *Ulus*, for instance, dating 27 July 1950, the CHP authorities were displeased because the current government did not ask their opinion on this very significant issue.[269] In the same issue, Nihat Erim also wrote an article in which he summarized the views of Kasım Gülek, the Secretary General of the CHP. Then,

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[264] Sevinç Tekindor von zur Mühlen, "Korean War in the Turkish Press", *Turkish Studies*, 13/3 (2012), p. 523; "Kore'de Dün Sabah Harb Başladı", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 June 1950, p. 1; "Bir Üçüncü Dünya Harbi mi?", *Zafer*, 26 June 1950, p. 1.

[265] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Dünya Barışı Yine Tehlikede", *Zafer*, 26 June 1950, p. 1: "Uzak Şarkta belki bütün dünya için bir tehlike teşkil edecek yeni bir harp başlamış bulunuyor;" Nadir Nadi, "Sonun Başlangıcı", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 June 1950, p. 1: "Yıllardan beri bir soğuk harb terimi politika edebiyatına girmiş, yerleşmiştir. Kore'deki çarpışmalar olsa olsa bu soğuk harbi kızıştırmağa yarayabilecek bir dereceden ibarettir."

[266] "Amerika Kore Harbine Karıştı", *Zafer*, 28 June 1950, p. 1; "Mac Artur Kore'ye Gitti", *Akşam*, 29 June 1950, p. 1; "Kore'de Amerika Bilfiil Harekete Geçti", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 June 1951, p. 1.

[267] John M. Vander Lippe, "Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 36/1 (2000), p. 98.

[268] "Kore İşindeki Parti Münakaşaları Alevleniyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1950, p. 1: "Bu suretle bir dış siyaset meselesinin bir iç siyaset davası halini almak istinadında olduğu görülüyor [...] Halk Partililer 'askerlik için silah altına alınan gençler doğrudan doğruya Türkiye sınırlarının korunmasile mükelleftirler' diyorlar."

[269] "Muhalefete Sorulmadan Alınan Karar", *Ulus*, 27 July 1950, p. 1: "Kore'ye asker sevki hususunda Genel Başkan İsmet İnönü'nün veya yetki sahibi herhangi bir *CHP* şahsiyetinin fikir ve mütelaası alınmış değildir." In fact, this news of *Ulus* could also be found in the Turkish document (having no information of date and place on it) BCA, 030 01 132 859 2, p. 13.

Erim asked the government whether it would not be better to act like Greece which only sent transport airplanes rather than sending soldiers as Turkey did. Indeed, Turkey sent 4.500 soldiers by that date.[270] While both Turkey and Greece had the same status, wating for an acceptance to NATO, from the perspective of the opposition, however, the Greek act seemed more conceivable than sending troops.

In this period, Turkish newspapers circulated a rumor according to which Turkey was not accepted to NATO because of Greece. Only one month after the beginning of the Korean War, on 4 August 1950, for instance, *Cumhuriyet* mentioned this allegation. The newspaper argued that although the NATO officials abstained to state it explicity, the Turkish acceptance would oblige them to accept Greece as well. Yet, according to this rumor *Cumhuriyet* voiced, the NATO members were afraid of the potential war between Greece and its communist neighbors. In case of such a war, the NATO members would be automatically included to the war. Thus, they were still against the membership of Greece. The Turkish acceptance, under these circumstances, would frustrate the Greeks. So, Turkey was not also accepted.[271] Such concerns even showed the public opinion that in this membership process, either these two states would be accepted together or both be left outside.

Meanwhile, the press in Turkey, particularly pro-governmental newspapers, continued to publish news supporting Turkey's, and also Greece's, admission to NATO. Newspapers even looked for items from foreign press to support their views. For instance, on 4 September 1950, *Zafer* reported the views of British weekly periodical, *Fleet Street Letter*, which devoted the most of its last issue on Turkey's

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[270] Nihat Erim, "Hükümetin Kararı", *Ulus*, 27 July 1950, p. 1: "Yapılacak en iyi yardım 4500 asker göndermek midir? Yoksa, diğer milletlerin yaptığı gibi (mesela Yunanistan gibi) bir miktar nakliye uçağı göndermek mi hem Birleşmiş Milletlere hem de Türkiye'nin kendi emniyetine daha faydalı olurdu. Eğer hükümet, muhalefet partisi ile istişare etseydi, onu aydınlatsaydı o zaman muhalefet vuzuha kavuşur ve ona göre mütela söylerdi." This article could also be found in the Turkish document (having no information of date and place on it) BCA, 030 01 132 859 2, pp. 15-17.

[271] "Türkiye Şimal Atlantik Paktına Alınmalıdır", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 August 1950, p. 1: "Açıkça ifade edilmemekle beraber, Türkiye Pakta girdiği takdirde, Yunanistan'ın da alınması lazım geleceği, Yunanistan'ın ise Kızıl komşularının topraklarında hazırlanan komünist çetelerin taarruzuna uğradığı ve bu yüzden Yunanistanla komşuları arasında bir harb patlarsa, bütün Şimal Atlantik Paktı devletlerinin harbe sürükleneceği, buna neden vermemek için Yunanistanın Pakta alınmamasını kararlaştırıldığı ve Türkiye'nin de Yunanistan'ı darıltmamak için Pakt dışında bırakıldığı kulağımıza fısıldanmıştı."

accession to NATO and stated that if Turkey and Greece were not invited to become members in the approaching meeting of the Atlantic Council, it would be "astounding" (hayreti mucip).[272] Yet, during this meeting, the Atlantic Council did not invite Turkey and Greece to the Pact in September of 1950.[273]

Probably due to the fear of possible disappointment in the Turkish and the Greek public opinion, just two weeks after this rejection, the member states proposed first Turkey and then Greece a special connection with NATO. *Zafer* immediately reported this. According to this, the Western powers proposed to build a contact between the Turkish General Staff and the Military Committee of NATO. In case of Turkish acceptance of this proposal, *Zafer* argued, Turkey would enjoy the most of the membership rights.[274]

In effect, this offer of the Pact to Turkey was a kind of a consultative role for the NATO's Mediterrenean policies, and Turkey accepted this offer on 25 September 1950. According to Walter H. Waggoner, from *the New York Times*, the same proposal was extended to Greece. As Waggoner learned from the newspaper's correspondent in Athens, Sofoklis Venizelos, both the Vice Prime Minister of Greece and the Foreign Minister, replied this invitation for a consultative role very positively and said that it would be also "the pleasure and pride" of his government if this offer was "extended to Greece and Turkey to take part in a regional Mediterranean security agreement." Similarly, the newspaper's correspondent in İstanbul reported that although Turkey was very glad for this consultative role, "Turkey would like to

[272] "Yabancı Gazetelerin Mütalaları: Türkiye Atlantik Paktına Mutlaka Alınmalıdır", *Zafer*, 4 September 1950, p. 1: "Londra 2 (aa): Hususi abonelere malum "Fleet Street Letter" adlı haftalık siyasi bültenin son sayısının büyük bir kısmı, Türkiyenin Atlantik Paktına alınması ve Güvenlik Konseyine üye seçilmesi bahislerine tahsis edilmiştir. Mecmuada deniliyor ki, Atlantik Konseyi toplandığı zaman Türkiye ile Yunanistan Pakta dahil olmaya davet edilmezlerse bu hayreti mucip birşey olur."

[273] "Atlantik Paktı İçtimaı Başladı", *Zafer*, 16 September 1950, pp. 1, 4.

[274] "Batılıların Bize Yeni Bir Teklifi", *Zafer*, 30 September 1950, p. 1: "Atlantik Paktının Akdeniz Askeri Komitesi ile Türk Genel Kurmayı arasında temas temini isteniyor [...] Bu teklif müsbet şekilde neticelendiği takdirde Türkiye Atlantik Paktı üyeliği haklarının çoğundan istifade edebilecek."

see this combination of the powers develop into a full-fledged Mediterranean pact, including Greece and other nations of the region."[275]

It was clear that both Turkey and Greece, as two neighbors, tried to be a part of NATO, even if not as members. At least in the Mediterranean region, they tried to act together for their regional plans in the end of 1950. This was from time to time covered in the Turkish press, however, in these news there were no clear and original details. Generally, such news based on foreign media. For instance, on 5 October 1950, *Cumhuriyet* reported, based on the Rome Radio, about the negotiations for a kind of a defense pact between Italy and some other countries, i.e. Greece and Turkey.[276] The following day, *Cumhuriyet* also reported that Turkey and Greece would cooperate with NATO. Furthermore, *Cumhuriyet* underlined the British decision of accepting any kind of Turkish arm orders and stated that among these arms and supplies, to be given Turkey and Greece, there were jet propelled aircrafts, some kinds of tanks and radar materials.[277]

On 19 October, *Cumhuriyet* again made news based on these recent developments. The newspaper reported the interview of Doğan Nadi, the newspaper's correspondent in Athens, with Venizelos, who made comments on the current position of Turkey and Greece *vis-à-vis* NATO and the idea of the Mediterrranean Pact. The Greek Prime Minister stated: "In all these issues, first Turkey and Greece should have agreed among themselves. Thus, I believe things will be solved more easily."[278] Two weeks later, on 5 November 1950, Venizelos again talked about the increasing Turkish-Greek cooperation for the defence of the

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[275] Walter H. Waggoner, "Turkey in Atlantic Pact Link; Advisory Bid Also to Greece", *The New York Times*, 5 October 1950, pp. 1, 16.

[276] "Türkiye ile Yunanistan Arasında Savunma Paktı", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 October 1950, p. 1: "Bu hususta müzakerelerin başladığı haberleri Ankara siyasi çevrelerinde tekzip edilmiyor. Görüşmelerin Akdeniz Savunma Paktı ile ilgili olabileceği ifade ediliyor. Rome Radyosu ileride İtalya ve diğer bazı memleketlerde de bu Pakt için müzakereler yapılacağını yayınladı."

[277] "Türkiye ve Yunanistanın Atlantik Paktile İşbirliği", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 October 1950, p. 1: "İngiliz Hükümeti, Türkiyenin her türlü silah siparişini kabul etmeğe karar verdi. Türkiye ve Yunanistana verilecek silah ve malzeme meyanında tepkili uçaklar, bazı cins tanklar ve radar malzemesi de var."

[278] "Yunanistan Başbakanının "Cumhuriyet"e Demeci: Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın Durumları", *Cumhuriyet*, 19 October 1950, p. 1: "Bütün bu işlerde, Türkiye ve Yunanistan daha evvel aralarında anlaşmalıdırlar. Böylece işlerin kolay halledileceğine inanıyorum."

Mediterranean and he told that he would come to Ankara soon.[279] As the statement of US Ambassador to Turkey, Wadsworth, after his meeting with Fuat Köprülü, shows that by the end of 1950, Turkey and Greece achieved to make these planned "cordial and productive" staff talks for a Mediterrenean defence plan and they would even exchange military intelligence in some cases.[280]

The year 1951 was more fruitful for the relations of these two states with NATO and their memberships were finally accepted toward the end of the same year. Yet, in the beginning of the year 1951, the rift continued between the American and British foreign policy makers about the membership of these two countries. For instance, regarding the role of Turkey, for Britain, Turkey was a part of the Middle East and should be under the British Middle East Headquarters. Thus, Britain hoped Turkey would be attracted to the idea of the Middle East Command. However, for the US, Turkey was a part of the Mediterranean and it would be more useful for the southern flank of NATO. During this rift, the US became more and more close to idea that both Turkey and Greece should be accepted as members.[281] Finally, in May of 1951, Americans formally asked Britain and France, "to approve full role for two nations,"[282] implying the full membership.

The continuing British veto to the admission of these two states was protested heavily by Turkish newspapers in the mid of June.[283] These protests in the press, at

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[279] "Akdeniz Müdaafasında Türk-Yunan İşbirliği", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 November 1950, p. 1: "Yunan Başbakanı, iki memleket arasındaki görüşmelerin geliştiğini, yakında Ankaraya gideceğini söyledi."

[280] 14 December 1950: Foreign Relations of United States [hereafter FRUS], 795.00/12-1450.

[281] D. J. K., "Greece, Turkey, and N.A.T.O.", *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 8/4 (1952), pp. 163-164; Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, "Turkey's Admission in the Middle East Command and its Admission to NATO, 1950-52", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35/4 (1999), pp. 79-80; Mustafa Bilgin, *Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 156.

[282] Walter H. Waggoner, "U.S. Presses Links to Turkey and Greece: Begins Asking Atlantic Pact Powers to Approve Full Role for Two Nations", *The New York Times*, 16 May 1951, pp. 1, 20: "This decision was reached after both political and military factors had been weighed. The result was that Greek-Turkish membership in the defence of organization was found by United States to be advisable on both grounds. Neither country has been satisfied with the half way connection, and Turkey in particular has been pressing for full partnership in the efforts of the West to secure itself against Soviet agression."

[283] "Dost İngiltere, Türkiyenin Atlantik Paktına Alınmasını İstemiyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 16 June 1951, pp. 1, 4: "İngiltere Fikrini Açık Söylemelidir", *Akşam*, 16 June 1951, p. 1.

least according to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, who was writting now in the oppositional newspaper *Ulus*, worked and the US took more concrete steps in pressing Britain, and also France, to abandon its objection for the memberships of Turkey and Greece. Yalçın claimed that the coverage of the Turkish press, reflecting the "deep grief and disappointment" of Turkish public opinion, had affected France and Britain, as they understood the danger of the negligence and disregard of Turkey.[284] A short time later, Britain declared its support for the memberships of Turkey and Greece.[285] Then, it was on 20 September that Turkish newspapers announced that these two states would become full members finally.[286]

This atmosphere made these two states get closer. They were aware of the fact that membership would bring common responsibilities for these two neighbors such as joint military strategy in the southeast command of NATO. Toward the end of January 1952, thus, they intensified their state visits. As Metin Toker, who was at that time working for *Zafer*, explained in his memoirs that even Turkey and Greece had not yet received the official invitation letter from NATO, and the NATO members were still discussing under which command the Turkish and Greek forces should be under, Turkey and Greece deliberately increased their diplomatic visits in order to appear in the eyes of NATO members, as two willing and cooperative partners, who could share responsibilities in the southeast flank of NATO.[287]

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[284] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Türk Matbuatının Bir Hizmeti", *Ulus*, 18 July 1951, p. 1: "Bizim Basın-Yayın servisinin gazetelerimize vermiş olduğu bir habere göre bu mecmua: "Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ın Pakta alınması için tartışmalara devam etmenin tehlikeli olduğunu anlamak zamanı gelmiştir" diye söze başlıyor...Demek oluyor ki Türk basınının haklı infial ve itirazları Türk efkarı umumiyesinin derin teessür ve iğbirarını meydana koymuş ve alakadarların dikkatini çekmiş ve bize karşı gösterilen ihmal ve kayıtsızlığın yersiz ve hatta tehlikeli olabileceği kanaatini uyandırmıştır [...] Hür, tarafsız ve partizan Türk gazetelerinin bu vatan meselesinde, aralarında hiçbir görüşme ve tertipleme olmadan, resmi muhitlerden hiçbir irşad, ikaz ve direktif gelmeden, sırf kendi görüşlerile, sırf efkarı umumiyeyi uyandırıp memleketin hayati menfaatlerini müdafaa azmiyle, yaptıkları bu hizmet Türk matbuatının tarihinde şerefli bir hatıra olarak kalacaktır."

[285] "Britain and Turkey", *The New York Times*, 20 July 1951, p. 20: "It is good news that Great Britain has agreed to support inclusion of Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Since the United States has long been in favor of this move and since France also supports it we may soon expect a practical working arrangement."

[286] "Atlantik Paktı Üyesi Oluyoruz", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 September 1951, p. 1.

[287] Toker, *DP'nin Altın Yılları (1950-1954)*, p. 155.

To this end, as reported in *Zafer* on 30 January 1952, Venizelos visited Ankara.[288] During this visit, Venizelos presented original excerpts from his father speech about the Turkish-Greek friendship, which he delivered in 1930 addressing Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Then, the Greek Foreign Minister stated that he came to Ankara to strenghten the Turkish-Greek friendship, established by Atatürk and his father, not mentioning İnönü.[289] Similarly, in his speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, as was reported in *Zafer* on 2 February, Venizelos said: "The Turkish-Greek friendship is relying upon genuine interests of country, the geographical necessity and the common destiny."[290]

Venizelos's words were welcomed in Turkish newspapers. For instance, two days later, Abidin Daver commented on this speech in *Cumhuriyet* and agreed with Venizelos. Daver repeated that Turkey and Greece had common enemies against whom they should fight together.[291] For Daver, even when Turkey and Greece became the members of NATO, the necessity of a closer cooperation, i.e. the military cooperation, would never cease to exist. The military forces of Turkey and Greece, for instance, would have to act together in the face of an enemy attack until other NATO members came to their aid.[292]

Regarding Venizelos's visit to Ankara, newspapers also reported the Turkish official statements. The Turkish authorities announced that two states decided to

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[288] "Türk-Yunan Görüşmeleri", *Zafer*, 30 January 1952, p. 1.

[289] "Dost Yunan Başbakanı Ankarada", *Zafer*, 31 January 1952, p. 1: "Atatürk ile pederimin kurduğu dostluğu kuvvetlendirmeye geldim;" "Cumhurbaşkanımıza Yunan Kralının Mesajı Veridi", *Yeni Sabah*, 1 February 1952, pp. 1, 4: "Ekselans Sofokles Venizelos, bu vesile ile Elen Kralı Majeste K. Pol'ün Cumhurbaşkanımıza gönderdikleri dostluk mesajını takdim etmiş ve 1930 senesinde Ankara'yı ziyaret eden babası Elefteros Venizelos'un o tarihte merhum Atatürk'e hitaben Türk-Yunan dostluğu hakkında söylemiş olduğu nutkun bazı parçalarının mutena bir hatıra olarak vermiştir;" "Yunan Kralının Bayar'a Mesajı", *Zafer*, 1 February 1952, p. 1.

[290] "Venizelos Büyük Millet Meclisinde", *Zafer*, 2 February 1952, p. 1: "Türk-Yunan dostluğu her iki memleketin hakiki menfaatine coğrafi zaruretine ve mukadderat birliğine istinat etmektedir."

[291] Abidin Daver, "M. Venizelos'un Ziyareti Münasebetile", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 February 1952, p. 1: "Çünkü bu iki devlet bugün aynı tehlikeye maruz bulunmaktadırlar. Siyasi ve stratejik vaziyetleri icabı birbirlerile gayet sıkı bir işbirliği yapmak zorundadırlar. Düşmanlarımız müşterektir. Yarın bir harb olursa bu müşterek düşmanlara karşı yanyana ve omuz omuza harbedeceğiz."

[292] Daver, "M. Venizelos'un Ziyareti Münasebetile", p. 1: "Atlantik Paktının öteki 12 devletlerinden Türk-Yunan cephesine yardım edebilecek kudrette olan devletlerin kuvvetleri yetişinceye kadarbütün yüküne başarı ile dayanmak zorundadır. Böyle olunca da Türk-Yunan askeri işbirliğinin anahtarları ve iki devlet silahlı kuvvetlerinin birbirlerine nasıl yardım edecekleri daha şimdiden kararlaştırılmalıdır."

establish a mixed Turkish-Greek committee to continue the current cooperation and to overcome any possible issues between these two states and it was written that both states agreed that their military staff would stay in a close contact.[293] According to this official statement, published by *Yeni Sabah* on 3 February 1952, Turkey and Greece agreed on strenghtening their cooperation based on mutual trust.[294] It was actually what the creation of the Cold War partnership between Turkey and Greece was about. These two governments felt that they would both get stronger militarily thanks to this cooperation.

On 21 February 1952, Turkish newspapers declared the happy news that the day before Turkey and Greece became NATO members.[295] The following day, Adnan Adıvar, in his article in *Akşam*, how such a long time the memberships of Turkey and Greece were discussed in Turkey. In order to explain the degree of frustration in public, he said, this process took years.[296] But finally these two states became members at the same time and they even started joint military maneuvers immediately in the Mediterranean.[297] This atmosphere made Nikolas Plastiras, the new Greek Prime Minister, who took the term from Venizelos on 1 November 1951 and served as a prime minister until 11 October 1952, emphasize the friendship with Turkey. In his interview to *Cumhuriyet* on 1 March 1952, Plastiras said that the

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[293] "Türk-Yunan Müzakeresi Sona Erdi", *Zafer*, 3 February 1952, p. 1: "Hükümetimiz resmi bir teblig yayınladı. İki memleket arasında işbirliğinin idamesi ve meselelerin tetkiki için komisyon kurulacak. Türk ve Yunan devlet adamları ile silahlı kuvvetler temsilcilerinin daha sık temasta bulunmaları hakkında tam bir anlaşmaya varıldı. Müzakerelerde mükemmel bir fikir birliğinin mevcudiyeti müşahade edildi."

[294] "Türk-Yunan Müzakeresi Bitti", *Yeni Sabah*, 3 February 1952, p. 1: "Neşredilen resmi tebliğde itimatlı işbirliğinin, hergün biraz daha sıkıştırılarak idame ettirilmesi zaruretinde ittifak edildiği belirtildi."

[295] "Türkiye ve Yunanistanın Pakta İştirakı Selamlandı", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 February 1952, p. 1: "Dün Lizbonda Toplanan Atlantik Paktı Konseyine Mühim teklifler Sunuldu: Yeni Üyeler Selamlandı", *Akşam*, 21 February 1952, pp. 1, 2.

[296] Adnan Adıvar, "Atlantik Paktındayız", *Akşam*, 22 February 1952, p. 1: "Aylardan, hatta senelerden beri siyasi mahfillerde, Hariciye Nezaretlerinde, Vekaletlerinde ve sonra gazetelerde bizim ve Yunanistanın Atlantik Paktına müsavi hak ve şartlarda girmemiz meselesi münakaşa edildi durdu. Nihayet evvel ki gün böylece aynı şerait ve hukuk ile Lizbon'da Atlantik Paktı Meclisinde Dışişleri Bakanının dediği gibi, Türkiye dahi "yeni müttefik sıfatiyle eskileri arasında yerini almıştır." Bu bir vakıadır. Ve bu vakıa bugüne kadar yazılan, çizilen türlü yazılara, beyan edilen bazı garip fikirlere nihayet vermiş oluyor."

[297] "Akdeniz Bölgesinde Komutanlık İhtilafı", *Cumhuriyet*, 27 February 1952, p. 1: "Dün Akdenizde büyük manevralar başladı."

strenghtening Turkish army would be beneficial for the whole Atlantic world. Thus, he argued, the Turkish army should be equipped with more weapons. He added his hope which Turkey and Greece would be united under a "federation" in near future and moreover the cooperation between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia would get closer.[298]

Plastiras's emphasis of closer relations with Yugoslavia was in fact related to the emerging idea of a new pact, the Second Balkan Pact, among these three nations. This idea also gained momentum with the NATO memberships of these two states and this chapter will also examine this issue in the following section. Yet, his emphasis of a federation is very interesting. Indeed, it was not the first time that Plastiras used this word. Similarly, almost a month earlier, on 6 February 1952, *the New York Times* also quoted Plastiras's sentences: "friendly relations between Greece and Turkey are such that it will not be long before we shall feel that we are a single country."[299] But now Plastiras directly said it to a Turkish newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*.

In April 1952, there occurred another significant state visit between Turkey and Greece. Adnan Menderes, together with Fuat Köprülü, went to Athens to meet their Greek counterparts. This visit also attracted the attention of Turkish newspapers, particularly *Zafer*'s.[300] *Zafer* reported that before he moved to Greece, Menderes told that he would mouth not only the government's friendly feelings but the sincere feelings of the Turkish nation for the Greek nation as well.[301] Then, *Zafer* also reported how the Turkish authorities were received with a great enthusiasm in

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[298] "Yunan Başbakanının Cumhuriyet'e Demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, 1 March 1952, p. 1: "Türk ordusuna bugünlerden fazla silah verilmelidir. Bu anlayış ve görüş bütün Atlantik Paktı dünyası için büyük bir kazanç olacaktır. Türkiye ile Yunanistan yakın bir istikbalde bir federasyon halinde birleşecekleri kanaatini ileri süren Plastiras, Türkiye-Yunanistan ve Yugoslavya arasında daha sıkı bir işbirliği temenni ettiğini de söyledi."

[299] "Greek Mission Going to Turkey", *The New York Times*, 6 February 1952, p. 6.

[300] "Başbakan Bugün Atina'ya Gidiyor", *Zafer*, 25 April 1952, p. 1: "Menderes ve heyetimiz saat 12 de hareket edecek."

[301] "Başbakan ve Heyetimiz Atina'ya Hareket Etti", *Zafer*, 26 April 1952, p. 1: "Yalnız hükümetimizin ve şahıslarımızın değil, Elen milletine Türk milletinin samimi hislerini de götürüyorum."

Greece.[302] Basing on the foreign comments, such as the statement of "an ambassador of one of friendly state," *Yeni Sabah* claimed that any military or political cooperation between Turkey and Greece would become a "Steel Curtain" against the "Iron Curtain," the Eastern Bloc.[303] *Zafer*, on the other hand, preferred to use the words from the joint declaration of Menderes and Venizelos: "The development of peace and civilization in the Balkans and the Near East is based on the Turkish-Greek friendship."[304]

The reporter of *Cumhuriyet*, Doğan Nadi also informed Turkish readers about the enthusiasm among the Greek public for this Turkish visit even before the arrival of Menderes and Köprülü. Nadi reported: "The road through Pireas to Athens was already decked out with Turkish and Greek flags and some of the houses were dyed with the colors of Turkish flag, white and red."[305] This also attracted the attention of Abidin Daver and he wrote an article entitled "Atina'da Dalgalanan Bayraklarımız" (Our Flags Waving in Athens). He repeated the general argument, and stated that the post-Second World War conditions, i.e. the Soviet threat, necessitated closer relations between these two states. These two states, Daver further claimed, became NATO members by working together and now as the two members of NATO, their friendship turned into an "alliance" (ittifak).[306]

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[302] "Başbakan Adnan Menderes Atina'da: Dost Elen Halkı Samimi ve İçten Gelen Büyük Tezahuratta Bulundu", *Zafer*, 27 April 1952, p. 1; "Dost Elen Halkı Büyük Sevinç İçinde", *Zafer*, 28 April 1952, p. 1.

[303] "Başbakan Atina'ya Gitti", *Yeni Sabah*, 26 April 1952, pp. 1, 5: "… (ecnebi müşahitlere göre) Türk-Yunan devletleri arasında tesis edilecek bir işbirliği demirperde gerisi devletleri için pek mühim bir engel teşkil edecektir. Bir dost devlet elçisi bunun Demir perde karşısında bir çelik perde olacağını söylemiştir. Yine aynı çevrelerin fikirlerine göre; Türk-Yunan askeri veya siyasi işbirliği, kısa zamanda Ortadoğu devletleri arasında da bir yakınlaşma doğuracaktır."

[304] "Türkiye-Yunanistan Müşterek Tedbirler", *Zafer*, 27 April 1952, p. 1: "Balkanlarda ve Yakındoğuda barış ve medeniyet eserlerinin verimli bir şekilde gelişmesi Türk-Yunan dostluğuna bağlıdır."

[305] "Yunanistanda Yapılan Büyük Hazırlıklar", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 April 1952, p. 1: "Pire-Atina arası daha şimdiden Türk-Yunan bayraklarile donatıldı, bir kısım evler Türk bayrağının rengi olan kırmızı ve beyaza boyandılar."

[306] Abidin Daver, "Atinada Dalgalanan Bayraklarımız", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 April 1952, p. 1: "İkinci Dünya harbinden sonraki hadiseler, Türkiye ile Yunanistan'ın daha sıkı bir dostlukla birbirlerine bağlanmaları lüzumunu ortaya koydu. Bu defa da iki milleti kızıl tehlike tehdid ediyordu. Bu büyük tehlike karşısında Türklerle Yunanistanın tam bir teessüd ve ittifakla elele vermeleri kesin bir zahmet idi. O kadar ki Amerika, Truman Doktrini ile Avrupa'da ilk önce bu ileri devlete askeri yardım yapmak lüzumunu duydu ve Amerikan Kongresi, bu yardım tahsilatını her defasında Türkiye ve

A week before this visit, Turkish newspapers announced that these two states would sign some bilateral treaties in favour of economic cooperation and visa waiving agreements. The visa issue was one of the most disputed issues between Turkey and Greece since the Lausanne Treaty and it was to some extent solved in 1930. The parties then agreed not to let Turks and Greeks without valid passports and visas. This friendly atmosphere in 1952, however, paved the way for one month visits without a visa.[307] Indeed, in the coming one or two years, this issue was again problematized in the Turkish-Greek relations and it will be examined in the following chapters dealing with minority problems.

These bilateral treaties were covered in the press just before Menderes's visit. Yet, during this visit, there emerged some speculations claiming that the Turkish and Greek leaders were planning to remove borders between these two countries. On 30 April 1952, *Yeni Sabah* reported this rumor based on the views of "optimistic circles."[308] Actually for the pro-DP newspapers, such as *Akın*, the Turkish-Greek friendship was the second victory of the DP's rule after that of Korea.[309] After the NATO memberships, the pro-DP newspapers started to support the Turkish-Greek partnership more strongly. They even uttered the idea of the removal of borders.

This approach, understandably, made oppositional newspapers such as *Ulus* concern more. Nihat Erim, for instance, commented on this visit of Menderes and its

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Yunanistan için müşterek olarak kabul etti. Nihayet, Türkiye ve Yunanistan, beraberlerce çalışarak Atlantik Paktına girdiler ve böylece iki memleket arasındaki dostluk hem bir ittifak halini aldı."

[307] "Yunanistanla Üç Anlaşma: Karşılıklı Vizesiz Seyahat, Üzüm ve Tütün Anlaşmaları Bugün İmzalanıyor", *Akşam*, 21 April 1952, p. 1: "Mübadil ve firariler de dahil olmak üzere her Yunan tebaası vizesiz pasaportla Türkiyede bir ay kalabilecek;" "Yunanistanla Bugün Yeni Anlaşmalar İmzalıyoruz", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 April 1952, p. 1: "Bunlar arasında vize formalitelerini kaldıran muvakale ile üç mühim anlaşma var. Türkiye-Yunanistan, bundan böyle, başlıca ihraç maddeleri arasında bulunan tütün ve üzümde müşterek hareket edecekler. Büyük Millet Meclisi azasile Yunan mensubları her iki memleketin milletvekillerine tanınan seyahat haklarından faydalanacaklar."

[308] "Menderes Yunan Kralı ve Plastirasla Görüştü", *Yeni Sabah*, 30 April 1952, pp. 1, 5: "Atina temaslarında her iki memleketi alakadar eden kararların alındığı anlaşılıyor. Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki hudu kaldırılacak mı? ..Türk heyetinin Yunanistan'da gördüğü misafirperverlik hudutsuzdur. Yunan basını Başbakan Menderes'in temaslarına ait resimlerini önplana almakta ve burada yapılan müzakerelere ait tefsirlerde bulunmaktadır [...] iyimser çevrelerden belirtildiğine göre her iki devlet arasındaki hudut vaziyeti de ortadan kaldırılacak ve bu surette Türkiye-Yunanistan kuvvetli ve büyük bir devlet halini almış bulunacaktır."

[309] "Gazetelerden", *Zafer*, 2 May 1952, p. 3: "(Akın) Büyük Kıymetlerin Zaferi: Menderes hükümeti Türk-Yunan dostluğu ile Kore'den sonra ikinci ve büyük zaferini kazanmıştır."

representation in the press and somehow showed his confusion about the recent developments. He asked, according to the news of *Ulus*, how they should evaluate the latest issues, i.e. speculations.[310] Probably, the call for a federation or removing of borders disturbed the oppositional press most.

The opposition's objections to this over friendliness revealed itself more in June 1952. *Ulus* did not pay attention to the visit of Greek King Paul and the Queen as much as did the organs of the DP in June 1952.[311] As reported by *Cumhuriyet*, this disinterest in the oppositional press attracted the attention of the Greek side and this was interpreted as a sign of the CHP's objection of establishing closer relations with Greece.[312] Actually, the summer of 1952 was also the period when the Turkish and Greek governments were negotiating a draft convention on fishery issues between these two states. This issue, which will be examined in Chapter V, led to criticisms among the opposition and in one of the parliamentary discussions, CHP members left the parliament. This could be also read as the opposition's protest to establish too close relations with Greece. Thus, immediately after this event, probably to put an end to any misunderstanding in Greek public opinion, İsmet İnönü and Kasım Gülek, gave interviews to popular Greek newspapers such as *Etnos*. In this interview, İnönü and Gülek said that the CHP would not oppose to any point in friendship between Turkey and Greece.[313] During this interview, İnönü and Gülek found an opportunity

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[310] "Yunanistan'ı Ziyaret Eden Ekip Dün İstanbul'a Döndü", *Ulus*, 4 May 1952, p. 1.

[311] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Bugün Gelecek Olan Çok Aziz Misafirlerimiz", *Zafer*, 8 June 1952, p. 1; "Yunan Kralı Bugün İstanbul'a Geliyor", *Zafer*, 8 June 1952, p. 1; Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Hoşgeldiniz Sayın Aziz Misafirlerimiz", *Zafer*, 9 June 1952, p. 1; "Dost Yunan Kral ve Kraliçesi Hoşgeldiniz", *Zafer*, 9 June 1952, p. 1; "Kral ve Kraliçeye Sevgi Gösterisi", *Zafer*, 12 June 1952, p. 1: "Misafirlerimiz halkın sevgisine candan mukabelede bulundular;" "Misafirlerimiz İstanbul'da Tezahuratla Karşılandı", *Zafer*, 14 June 1952, p. 1; "Misafirlerimiz Gösterilen Sıcak Alakadan Memnun", *Zafer*, 15 June 1952, p. 1; "Yunan Kral ve Kraliçesi İstanbul'a Gitti", *Zafer*, 14 June 1952, p. 1; "Kral ve Kraliçe İstanbul'a Geliyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 June 1952, p. 1; "Kral Paul'ün Türk-Yunan Dostluğunun gelişmesindeki Yardımları", *Zafer*, 22 June 1952, p. 1: "Yunan milleti Kral Paul'e şükran hislerini bildiriyor."

[312] "Türk-Yunan Dostluğu ve Muhalefetin Fikri", *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1952, p. 1: "Yunan gazeteci bu mülakatı şöyle anlatmaktadır: "Elen hükümdarlarının ziyareti arifesinde, Demokrat Parti hükümetine muhalif olan Türk basınının bir kısmında, Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki işbirliğinin daha da sıkılaştırılması gayretleri hakkında çıkan makale ve yorumlar bu gayrete karşı bir tenkid mahiyetinde idi. Bu olay [...] bugün muhalefette bulunan Halk Partisinin, iki milletin daha fazla yakınlaşması aleyhinde olduğu gibi bir intiba uyandırmaktadır."

[313] "Harice Karşı: CHP Türk-Yunan İşbirliğini Tasbibediyor", *Zafer*, 1 July 1952, p. 1.

to explain why they left the Grand National Assembly during the talks about Turkish-Greek relations. They stated that their objection was for the DP's policy against the opposition, never informing CHP about its foreign policy actions. Then, they also added that the CHP would be only too glad to see the DP's friendship policy toward Greece, which had been first initiated by the CHP 20 years earlier, in 1930.[314]

The close relations between Turkey and Greece continued after the election of General Papagos as the prime minister in Greece in November 1952 as well. Turkish newspapers announced that Papagos would follow the same friendship and cooperation policy toward Turkey.[315] In October, *Zafer* had already voiced the rising power of Papagos's party.[316] On 18 November Mümtaz Faik Fenik reported the victory of Papagos's party, and said that "the Greeks agreed on stability."[317] A short amount of time after the election of Papagos, Celal Bayar visited Greece, as the first Turkish President who had a state visit to this country. As the organ of the DP, *Zafer* showed a great enthusiasm and covered this visit under such a headline: "Cumhurbaşkanımız, Dost Elen Milletinin Çoşkun Tezahüratile Karşılandı" (Our President was Recieved with Exuberant Public Demonstrations of the Friendly Greek Nation). This news reported Bayar's calling the cooperation between Turkey and Greece as "the finest product of the century" (asrın en güzel eseridir).[318] Bayar's visit occurred just after Papagos's winning the elections and Bayar also met him to congratulate his recent victory. *Zafer* reported the visit of Bayar to the new prime

[314] "Türk-Yunan Dostluğu ve Muhalefetin Fikri", p. 1: "İki memleket arasında cereyan etmekte olan görüşmeler hakkındaki tartışma sırasında, bir protesto mahiyetinde olmak üzere meclisi terkettik. Zira Demokrat Parti hükümeti, vazifesi olduğu halde muhalefeti, takib ettiği siyasetten haberdar edecek meclis nizamını nazarı itibara almak istememiştir. Bundan başka bize, müsteğni bir eda ile, bu husuta istediğimiz malumatı basından elde edebileceğimiz beyan edilmiştir [...] Bugünkü hükümetin, yirmi sene önce bizzat bizim çizmiş olduğumuz bir politikayı takib etmesinden dolayı müftehiriz."

[315] "Papagos'un Dış Siyaseti", *Ulus*, 22 November 1952, p. 1: "Türkiye ile olan dostluğuna sıkı bir şekilde bağlı bulunmaktadır. Yeni Başbakan komşumuzla işbirliğigünden güne daha verimli bir hale gelmektedir, dedi."

[316] "Yunanistanda Papagosun Partisi Kuvvetleniyor", *Zafer*, 20 October 1952, p. 1.

[317] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Yunanlılar İstikrara Karar Verdiler", *Zafer*, 19 November 1952, p. 1.

[318] "Cumhurbaşkanımız, Dost Elen Milletinin Çoşkun Tezahüratile Karşılandı", *Zafer*, 28 November 1952, p. 1: "Ebedi Türk-Yunan Dostluğu yeni ve mesut tezahürlere vesile oldu. Bayar dedi ki: Türk-Yunan işbirliği asrın en güzel eseridir. Kral da "Türkler ve Yunanlılar en güzel hasletlere sahiptir" dedi."

minister of Greece on 30 November. In this visit Papagos delivered a speech, which *Zafer* quoted "there exists few individuals having such a great enthusiasm in serving the friendship between these two countries like me."[319]

About Bayar's visit, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, the author of famous commentary articles in *Ulus* regarding foreign affairs, argued that the cooperation between Turkey and Greece was not a state or a party policy. Rather it was, he stated, the result of a "common destiny" (mukeddarat birliği) that made these two neighbors cooperate since the end of Second World War. The US, Esmer further claimed, supported these two states at the same time against the common Soviet threat which they encountered.[320] In Turkey, he wrote, this cooperation had started during the rule of the CHP and then followed by the DP. Similarly, in Greece what Papagos did was to continue his predecessors' policy.[321]

It was, however, clear that with the membership of NATO this cooperation gained more momentum.[322] As being the members of NATO, these two states even found an opportunity to make joint military maneuvers in İzmir.[323] These developments were, as *Zafer* stated, concrete results that this friendship brought out. The newspaper also quoted the words of a Greek navy admiral, Constas, telling in case of an invasion these two states, such as two brothers, would protect these "sacred territories" together.[324]

This joint exercise first started at sea but it was quickly carried to land and air forces. On 8 September 1952, the NATO authorities established a Headquarters in İzmir, where the Turkish and Greek forces worked together. It was on 19 August

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[319] "Celal Bayarın Dünkü Ziyaretleri: Türk-Yunan İşbirliği Daha da Sıkılaşıyor", *Zafer*, 30 November 1952, p. 1: "İki memleket arasındaki dostluğa hizmet etmek bakımından benim kadar büyük bir arzu besleyen pek az kimse mevcuttur."

[320] Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Türkiye-Yunanistan", *Ulus*, 28 November 1952, p. 3: "Karşılaştıkları bu ortak tehlikeyi önlemek için Birleşik Amerika her ikisine de aynı zamanda yardımda bulunmuştur."

[321] Esmer, "Türkiye-Yunanistan", p. 3.

[322] Lord Ismay, *NATO: İlk Beş Sene (1949-1952)* (Suat Bilge trans.) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1956), p. 73.

[323] "Türk ve Yunan Müşterek Deniz Manevrası", *Zafer*, 16 August 1952, p. 1.

[324] "Müşterek Deniz Manevraları Bugün Başlıyor", *Zafer*, 17 August 1952, p. 1: "Kendi hürriyetlerimizi muhafaza için gerekirse iki kardeş gibi bu mukaddes toprakları muhafaza edeceğiz."

1952 that the Turkish newspapers announced this news.[325] The establishment of Headquarters in İzmir was the success of the DP government according to pro-DP newspapers. *Hizmet* even wrote that this "success" was "an exceptional lesson" (müstesna bir ders) for İnönü.[326] In this Headquarters, meanwhile, according to the news of Welles Hengen in *the New York Times*, on 9 May 1954, these two states had worked in a manner of cordiality. Thus, the author entitled his article "Greeks and Turks Cooperate in NATO: Former Foes Show New Spirit at İzmir Headquarters under U.S. Guidance."[327]

Indeed, not only in İzmir, but also in Thrace, the armies of these two states attended joint military maneuvers. For instance, on 5 October 1953, *Cumhuriyet* published an editorial article that expressed its pleasure for the joint military maneuvers of Turkey and Greece called 'Weld Fast.' For *Cumhuriyet*, one of the interesting points of these were the Turkish and Greek forces' "shoulder to shoulder" (omuz omuza) participation to the maneuvers like "fellow fighters" (silah arkadaşlığı).[328] This newspaper also quoted the words of one journalist who witnessed this NATO exercise. This Turkish journalist, whose name was not revealed in the news, said, due to these maneuvers, the Turkish and Greek forces for the first time in history would be united and fight against the common enemy. In case of a real war, he continued, this would be also done against the real enemy coming from the North. By reaching their targets together in this maneuver, according to this journalist, the forces of these two states moved the Turkish, Greek and American generals to tears.[329] In this news, *Cumhuriyet* also used a photograph that showed how Turkish and Greek soldiers hugged each other.[330]

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[325] "İzmir Şehri Atlantik Paktı Kara Kuvvetleri Karargahı Oluyor", *Hizmet*, 19 August 1952, p. 1.

[326] "Dış Politikada Büyük Başarılar", *Hizmet*, 29 August 1952, p. 1: "NATO Karargahının İzmir'de yerleşmesi yeni iktidarın bir başarısı olarak İnönüne müstesna bir ders teşkil eder."

[327] Welles Hengen, "Greeks and Turks Cooperate in NATO: Former Foes Show New Spirit at İzmir Headquarters under U.S. Guidance", *The New York Times*, 9 May 1954, p. 26.

[328] Editorial, "Manevralar Münasebetile", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 November 1953, p. 1: "Türk-Yunan kuvvetlerinin yanyana harekata iştirak-eski tabirler-omuz omuza silah arkadaşlığı etmeleridir."

[329] Editorial, "Manevralar Münasebetile", p. 1: "Bu tatbikat münasebetile Türk-Yunan kuvvetleri tarihte ilk defa olarak birleşip müşterek düşmana karşı savaşacaklardır. Bu birleşme, Türk toprakları içinde olan Koru bölgesinde olacaktır. Trakya coğrafi olarak doğu ve batı yahud da iki devletin hududları bakımında Türk ve Yunan Trakyaları diye ikiye ayrılmış olmasına rağmen, bugünkü

These joint acts of two states in the war games of NATO also attracted the attention of foreign press from the very beginning. For instance, on 3 November 1952, *the New York Times* reported how these two states participated in the maneuvers, not just with their naval units but also with their land and air units.[331] Thus, as this newspaper again argued on 26 April, the membership of NATO "opened a new phase in Greek Turkish relations." It was written that: "More than any two countries in the coalition they play a joint role. With Yugoslavia, now linked with but not in the defense circle, they "contain" Russia's restless captive nations and stand in the way of her historic push toward warm water and open sea."[332]

As even this news of the American newspaper revealed, the instensification of the idea of closer relations of these two states with Yugoslavia could also be seen as the other fruit of NATO membership. Although it had been already in the agenda of the Western Bloc, this membership triggered the emergence of the Second Balkan Pact. Now, finally, this chapter will examine the making of the Balkan Pact and following military alliance among these three Balkan states as a case study in terms of its representation in Turkish press regarding the strenghtening cooperation in the Turkish-Greek relations in the early Cold War years.

III.III. The Second Balkan Pact and the Turkish-Greek Relations

The idea of closer relations for Turkey and Greece with Yugoslavia gained momentum with the NATO memberships of these two states. Yet, in the Turkish press, the news regarding this cooperation among these three Balkan states had started earlier. On 4 September 1950, for instance, *Cumhuriyet* referred to

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stratejik şartları itibarile bir kül teşkil eder. Bir harb halinde Trakyaya şimalden taarruz edecek müşterek düşmana (hakiki düşmana) karşı, müttefik Türk ve Yunan kuvvetleri, bu bölgeyi doğu-batı diye ayırmaksızın bütün Trakyayı beraberce müdafaa etmek zorundadırlar. Müşterek bir hareketle, hedeflerine varan Türk ve Yunan taburları mensubları birbirlerile kucaklaşmışlar, bu hareket, kendilerinin, Türk, Yunan ve Amerikalı generallerin gözlerini yaşartmıştır. Bu esnada orada bulunan yabancı basın mensupları, hadisenin NATO'nun kuvvetleri bakımından müspet ve çok önemli bir hareket olduğunu söyledir."

[330] Editorial, "Manevralar Münasebetile", p. 1.

[331] "Turkey and Greece in NATO War Games", *The New York Times*, 3 November 1952, p. 3.

[332] Anne O'hare McCormick, "Abroad: The Parable of the Greeks and Turks", *The New York Times*, 26 April 1952, p. 22.

Venizelos's remarks about a planned security pact between Turkey and Greece but also it reported that according to the authorities after the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, this security pact could also be extended to this country.[333]

Obviously, Tito's Yugoslavia, due to the Tito-Stalin split, was very important for the Western Bloc.[334] From the onset of the Cold War, the Western Bloc, particularly the US, was in continous search for Yugoslavia's support for NATO in case of a Soviet agression. This idea of pact, between two NATO members and Yugoslavia, would at least make Yugoslavia engage in defence cooperation with the West.[335] This idea was also accepted by Turkey and Greece. A security pact or even a mere cooperation meant that Turkey and Greece would fulfill a part of their duties of containing the Soviet Union. For instance, a letter sent from George Wadsworth, the US Ambassador to Turkey, to the US Secretary of State dating 14 December 1950 shows that just in this period Turkey and Greece had already agreed that "Greece could not be defended against full scale Bulgarian aggression with covert Soviet backing unless Yugoslav's were brought in."[336] Hence, to "contain" the Soviet threat, Yugoslavia's cooperation was seen essential for Turkey and Greece.

The Turkish press also kept a strict eye on any developments in this issue. On 3 September 1951, *Yeni Sabah* informed its readers that Tito was a supporter of cooperation with Turkey and Greece.[337] This news could be the one of the early example of news in the Turkish press for a possible pact among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. Although official documents of these states now showed that there were

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[333] "Türkiye ve Yunanistan", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 September 1950, p. 1: "Venizelos, iki taraflı bir güvenlik paktı yapmak üzere Türkiye ile müzakerelere girişeceğini söylüyor. Yetkili çevrelerde, iki memleket arasındaki anlaşmazlıkların izole edilip Belgrad ile normal siyasi münasebetler başladıktan sonra Yugoslavya ile de böyle bir andlaşmaya matuf müzakerelere girişiliceği kanaati vardır."

[334] Svetozar Rajak, "The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945-1956", *The Cambridge History of the Cold War Origins – Volume 1* (Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad eds.) (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 208-216.

[335] Svetlana Jovanov, Yugoslav-American Relationships during the Truman Presidency: Truman's Eggs and Tito's Separate Road, Unpublished Master Thesis (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama, 2009), p. 77; Şule Kut and N. Aslı Şirin, "Bright Side of Balkan Politics: Cooperation in the Balkan", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2/1 (2008), p. 11.

[336] FRUS, 795.00/12-1450.

[337] "Tito, Türkiye ve Yunanistan ile İşbirliğine Taraftar", *Yeni Sabah*, 3 September 1951, p. 1.

already contacts between the parties for a mutual defence arrangement in 1951,[338] Turkish readers were not initially informed about this issue much. Meanwhile, as the parties made more explicit statements, news about security cooperation started to be covered more in press.

In parallel to increasing relations with NATO, for instance, the year 1952 was also very fruitful for the news for the pact plans in Turkish newpapers; let's say joint defence mechanisms, among these three states. In February 1952, during the visit of Greek Foreign Minister, Venizelos, to Turkey, Turkish newspapers reported that the Yugoslavian ambassador to Ankara, Ljubomir Radovanovic, also attended the official meetings. This led Turkish newspapers to speculate about the imminent conclusion of a pact between these three states.[339] Similarly, during Menderes's visit to Greece, in May 1952, this issue once more carried to the agenda of Turkish newspapers. In his speech, Menderes, according to the news of *Cumhuriyet* dating 3 May 1952, told that Turkey and Greece were searching ways of increasing their security through special agreements. The necessity of this, he continued, would also be realized by Yugoslavia.[340]

As there were no satisfactory official statements for a plan for a joint pact in Turkey, Turkish newspapers turned their faces to the news published in foreign newspapers in the summer of 1952. For instance, on 21 June, *Cumhuriyet* published what *the Times* had reported that the military representatives of these three states came together in Belgrade for a tripartite agreement.[341] On 5 July, *Ulus*, this time, reported the news from Yugoslavian press about the emerging new security

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[338] Paul David Lensink, Building Tito's Separate Road: Yugoslavia and the United States, 1949-1957, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1995), pp. 112-116.

[339] "Yunan Dışişleri Bakanı Şehrimizde", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 February 1952, p. 1: "Ankara'daki Türk-Yunan görüşmelerine Yugoslavya büyükelçisinin iştirak etmesi üzerine Balkanların müdafaası için, bir Türk-Yunan-Yugoslav işbirliğinden bahsedilmeye başlanmıştır."

[340] "Atina Görüşmelerine Dair Resmi Tebliğ", *Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 1952, p. 1: "Yunanistanla hususi anlaşmalar esasına dayanarak güvenliğimizi temin yolunu arıyoruz, müşterek tehlike muvacehesinde işbirliği yapılmalı ve savunma vasıtalarımızı takviye etmeliyiz, Yugoslavyanın da bu zarureti anlayacağına eminim."

[341] "Türk-Yunan-Yugoslav Askeri İşbirliği", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 June 1952, p. 1: "Üçlü bir paktın kurulması için temaslar yapıldığı bildiriliyor. Times'e göre, Belgradda üç devletin askeri temsilcileri arasında müzakereler oluyor."

mechanisms in the Balkans between these three states.[342] On 28 August 1952, again, in *Ulus*, Nihat Erim wrote an article based on the news of *the Times*. He asked whether the alleged Balkan Treaty was true.[343] Two weeks before, *Ulus* also reported news from the US claiming that the American government circles "seemed pleased" for the recent developments about the joint defence mechanisms.[344] Within the same news item, *Ulus* also referred to the Belgrade Radio's announcements about the upcoming visit of a Yugoslavian military committee to Athens in September, which was welcomed in the US.[345]

Meanwhile, the news about military cooperation among these three states became more widespread in Turkish press probably in order to prepare the Turkish public opinion. Particularly, pro-DP journalists set out to persuade the Turkish population that communism in Yugoslavia was different from the Soviet communism. Then, there emerged an opportunity for these journalists. In the end of August 1952, the Union of Yugoslavian Journalists invited a cohort of Turkish journalists to visit Yugoslavia. The representatives of many Turkish newspapers, also from the oppositional ones, went to Yugoslavia.[346] Mümtaz Faik Fenik was one of them and described his experience afterwards. In his article in *Zafer* on 3 September, Fenik called the Yugoslavian regime, "communism that hated Rusia."[347]

Hikmet Saim Balkır, the reporter of *Yeni İstanbul*, one of the pro-DP newspapers of the period, was also among these Turkish journalists who went to Yugoslavia. In 1953, he edited a book entitled *Yugoslavya'da Gördüklerimiz* (What

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[342] "Türkiye, Yugoslavya ve Yunanistan Arasında: Balkanlarda Müşterek ve Yeni Bir Siyasete Doğru", *Ulus*, 5 July 1952, p. 1.

[343] Nihat Erim, "Balkan Andlaşması Doğru Mu?", *Ulus*, 28 August 1952, p. 1.

[344] "Türkiye ve Yunanistan Yugoslavya", *Ulus*, 14 August 1952, p. 1: "Türkiye, Yugoslavya ve Yunanistan arasında askeri bir müdafaa anlaşması tesis olanabileceği ümidini uyandıran gelişmelerden memnun görünmektedir."

[345] "Türkiye ve Yunanistan Yugoslavya", *Ulus*, 14 August 1952, p. 1.

[346] The names of the journalist that went to Yugoslavia for 25 days on 20 August 1952 were Ahmet Şükrü Esmer (*Ulus*), Ercümend Ekrem Talu (*Son Posta*), Hikmet Saim Balkır (*Yeni İstanbul*), Mekki Said Esen (*Cumhuriyet*), Mümtaz Faik Fenik (*Zafer*), Nihal Kahramağralı (*Dünya*), Vala Nureddin (*Akşam*), Şükrü Emre (*Hizmet*) and Hüsnü Himmetoğlu (*Son Saat*).

[347] Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Yugoslavya Gezisi", *Zafer*, 3 September 1952, p. 1: "Rusya'dan nefret eden kommünizm."

We Saw in Yugoslavia), in which the articles of these journalists who visited Yugoslavia were published. In the beginning of the book, Tito's speech to these journalists was included. Tito stated that this visit was a sign of developing relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia.[348]

Mekki Said Esen's (from *Cumhuriyet*) articles were also published in this edited book, in which he underlined the difference between the Yugoslavian cooperatives and the collective farming in the Soviet Union (*kolhoz*). Esen quoted the views of some local people claiming that the difference between these two communist countries was the existence of "exploitation" (istismar) in the Soviet model.[349] After this visit, on 12 September, *Ulu*s quoted the words of Tito, the socialist ruler of Yugoslavia, declaring his readiness to start negotiations for a joint defense mechanism.[350] Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, during his visit to Yugoslavia with this group, had already asked Tito about the place of Greece in this picture of the developing Turkish-Yugoslavian relations. Tito answered, according to Esmer, Greece was also under threat, so he was also dedicated to establish cooperation with Greece.[351]

On 17 September of 1952, after the visit of the Turkish journalists, Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary of Britain, also went to Yugoslavia to meet Tito. *Time and Tide*, a weekly British journal, commented on this visit in an article entitled "Balkanlardaki NATO Komutanlığı" (The NATO Command in the Balkans). Halim Alyot, the head of the Directorate General of Press, Publications and Tourism, sent this article in translation to the Prime Ministry. This article claimed that the Turkish and the Greek forces finally achieved a collective perspective with NATO. Yet, this British journal underlined, without the Yugoslavian cooperation, it would not mean much strategically. This article further claimed rather than signing an official

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[348] Hikmet Saim Balkır, *Yugoslavya'da Gördüklerimiz* (İstanbul: Gün Basımevi, 1953), p. 6.

[349] Balkır, *Yugoslavya'da Gördüklerimiz*, p. 50.

[350] "Türk-Yunan-Yugoslav İşbirliği", *Ulus*, 12 September 1952, p. 1: "Müşterek savunma tedbirleri almak üzere müzakereye hazırım."

[351] Balkır, *Yugoslavya'da Gördüklerimiz*, p. 13: "-Bu Türk-Yugoslav işbirliği kadrosu içinde Yunanistan'ın yeri nedir? –Yunanistan da tehlike altındadır. Yunanlılar da istiklallerini korumak azmindedir. Bu hale göre Yunanistanla da işbirliği kurmak kararındayız."

security pact, at this stage, these three states' agreement on the general principles for security plans would be more important.[352]

This attention of western press for the approaching Balkan alliance was also reported by *Ulus* in the following month. It was on 12 November that *Ulus* reported the news of *the New York Times* that the negotiations between these three states would begin very soon.[353] *The New York Times* was, indeed, was very keen on reporting news about this issue from the very beginning and on 29 December 1952 it finally reported that "Yugoslavs, Greeks and Turks complete main outline of Mutual Defence Alliance."[354]

At that period, in December of 1952, Köprülü went to Romania and there he announced that Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia agreed in principle.[355] As the DP government continued to be silent about the recent developments about the pact, the news in pro-DP publications became more important source of information. In February 1953, for instance, a pro-DP newspaper, *Demokrat Ankara*, announced the cooperation was strenghtening.[356] Then, on 13 February, this newspaper announced that a treaty for a friendship pact would be signed in Ankara, in 15 days.[357] Similarly, *Zafer* also gave information about the process from time to time.[358] And, finally, these three states signed the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration,[359] which is

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[352] 15 September 1952: BCA, 030 01 102 636 7, p. 2: "Fakat bugünkü safhada Doğu Akdeniz, Orta Doğu ve Güney Doğu Avrupadaki Batı müdefaa planlarını çizmek, herhangi resmi bir pakt imzalamaktan çok daha önemlidir. Türk-Yunan askeri birlikleri, hali hazırda NATO'nun Güney Doğu Avrupa (veya Balkan) bölgesinde, bir bütün haline getirilmişlerdir. Ancak Yugoslavyanın işbirliği olmadıkça, bu Balkan NATO Komutanlığı, strateji bakımından tamam sayılmayacaktır."

[353] "New York Times Bir Haberi", *Ulus*, 12 November 1952, p. 1.

[354] Jack Raymond, "Balkan Arms Pact Set by 3 Powers", *The New York Times*, 29 December 1952, p. 1.

[355] "Dışişleri Bakanı Dün Romanya'ya Geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 December 1952, p. 1: "Türkiye ile Yugoslavya ve Yunanistan arasında müdafaa paktı yapılması için prensip anlaşmasına varıldığını..."

[356] "Türk, Yunan ve Yugoslav Dostluğu Gelişiyor", *Demokrat Ankara*, 7 February 1953, p. 1.

[357] "Türk, Yunan ve Yugoslavya Arasında Dostluk Paktı", *Demokrat Ankara*, 13 February 1953, p. 1.

[358] "Balkan Paktının Tanzimi Sona Erdi", *Zafer*, 23 February 1952, p. 1.

[359] The name of the treaty in Turkish is "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Yunanistan Krallığı ve Yugoslavya Federatif Cumhuriyeti arasında Dostluk ve İşbirliği Anlaşması." For more details see: 23 May 1953, *Resmi Gazete*, p. 6309.

known as the Second Balkan Pact in the literature, almost two weeks later on 28 February 1953 in Ankara as was in *Demokrat Ankara*.[360]

For Selahattin Hüdayioğlu, DP MP for Maraş and also an author of *Demokrat Ankara*, this Pact was not only important for the peace in the Balkans and the Near East but for the "world peace."[361] In fact, particularly for the governmental press, emphasizing the effect of the Pact on world politics was more important than talking about its role in relations between these three states. In covering news about this Pact, for instance, *Zafer* was eager to underline how this Pact was welcomed by the West,[362] and particularly by the Council of NATO.[363]

It was also welcomed by the western press. For instance, on 1 March 1953, *the Washington Post* reflected the views of an official from the State Department in Washington who "hailed the treaty as a new link in the chain of the free world's defence against aggression."[364] Similarly, on 2 March 1953, *the New York Times* published news showing how the NATO strategists were pleased as the new treaty seemed "to have plugged an important gap in the perimeter of defences against the Soviet bloc's aggressive tendencies."[365] Also the British newspaper, *the Manchester Guardian* praised these three states which achieved an important step forward. It was written that "only five years ago the Greek army was fighting rebels supplied from Yugoslavia among other places and the past dealings of the three countries have been marked more by emnity and rival territorial claims than by cooperation. They have now shown uncommon good sense and speed in putting these differences behind them."[366]

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[360] "Greece-Turkey-Yugoslavia Mutual Assistance Pact", *The American Journal of International Law*, 49/2 (Supplement: Official Documents) (Published by American Society of International Law) (April 1955), p. 47.

[361] Selahattin Hüdayioğlu, "İç ve Dış Politika Gelişmeleri", *Demokrat Ankara*, 14 March 1953, p. 1: "...dünya sulhu bakımından da birinci derecede ehemmiyet taşıyan bir vesika mahiyetindedir."

[362] "Dost Yunan, Yugoslav Vekilleri İstanbulda", *Zafer*, 2 March 1952, p. 1: "Üçlü Pakt hür dünyada çok iyi karşılanıyor."

[363] "NATO Konseyi Üçlü Pakt Tasvib Ediliyor", *Zafer*, 25 April 1953, p. 1.

[364] "3 Nations Sign Balkan Treaty of Friendship", *The Washington Post*, 1 March 1953, p. M4.

[365] Jack Raymond, "Balkan Lands Aim at Joint Strategy", *The New York Times*, 2 March 1953, p. 8.

[366] "Balkan Alliance", *The Manchester Guardian*, 2 March 1953, p. 4.

Yet, the death of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, on 5 March 1953 changed this picture of western support for the cooperation among these three Balkan states to some extent. Stalin's death led to short-lived changes in the diplomacy of Kremlin, which started to use new diplomacy channels to fight with the joint alliances of West established against the Soviet threat.[367] This treaty between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia for friendship and collaboration was also one of them. This new "Soviet peace," according to the journalist of *the New York Times*, Welles Hangen, made Turkey and Greece concern for possible cessation of Western support for the development of joint military mechanisms among themselves, together with Yugoslavia. In his article dating 19 June 1953, Hangen wrote that the Turkish and Greek authorities met in Ankara and they planned another meeting in Athens for the coming month as they concerned about the hesitance of the West "to take further steps that might antagonize the Soviet Union."[368]

In June and July 1953, these state visits between Turkey and Greece[369] actually occurred and the Turkish press, particularly the pro-DP newspapers, widely covered them.[370] Yet, these pro-DP newspapers did not voice the concerns of Turkey and Greece for the termination of the Western support to the security plans of these three Balkan states. Nevertheless, *Cumhuriyet*, which had already withdrawn its support from the DP and now became more independent, made news based on the report of *the Times*'s correspondent in Greece, and reported that the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia came together to discuss the repercussions of "the

[367] Mark Kramer, "Introduction: International Politics in the Early Post-Stalin Era: A Lost Opportunity, A Turning Point, or More of the same", *The Cold War after Stalin's Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace* (Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood eds.) (US: Rowman&Littelefield, 2006), p. xiv.

[368] Welles Hangen, "Turks Urge Greeks to Rush Balkan Tie: Papagos Sees Need for Speed Before Soviet Peace Curb Support of West", *The New York Times*, 19 June 1953, p. 6.

[369] During Köprülü's visit to Athens, the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister also attended the meeting.

[370] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Çok Dostane Yazıları", *Demokrat Ankara*, 23 June 1953, p. 1; "Kardeş Yunanistan'ın Değerli Başvekili ve Dışişleri Vekili", *Zafer*, 18 June 1953, p. 1; "F. Köprülü Bugün Atina'ya Gidiyor", *Akşam*, 5 July 1953, p. 1: "Fuat Köprülü Bugün Atinaya Gidiyor", *Demokrat Ankara*, 5 July 1953, p. 1.

new diplomacy of Kremlin" (Kremlinin yeni diplomasisi).[371] After this meeting at the ministerial level, the parties declared that the cooperation among them would be furthered.[372]

Actually, the only problem was not to sustain western backing. There were also problems among these three states themselves. And, these problems were covered by the oppositional press in Turkey. Two months after this ministerial meeting, for instance, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote an article asking "whether the Balkan Friendship was under threat." Yalçın wrote this article for calling attention to a telegraph, which was sent from an unidentified source from Athens to European newspaper. This telegraph was about the Greek irritation from the Yugoslavian reaction for some new decisions of Greece about Macedonia.[373] Macedonia was a big dispute between Greece and Yugoslavia since the Second World War. Until the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Tito was pursuing a policy of territorial change and sought the ways of unifying "Greek Macedonia" with Yugoslavia and also supported the Bulgarian claims on the Greek Thrace (Western Thrace).[374] Yet, Tito's distance from Stalin and the emerging friendship and collaboration made these two states put this problem aside for a while. This current tension, however, for Yalçın, showed that Greece and Yugoslavia still could not solve this problem.[375]

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[371] "Atinada Üçlü Konferans: Türk, Yunan ve Yugoslav Dışişleri Bakanları Haftaya Toplanıyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 July 1953, p. 1: "Bu konferansta 3 dışişleri bakanının Kremlinin yeni diplomasisinin husule getirdiği durumu gözden geçireceklerdir."

[372] "Atina Konferansının Mühim Kararı", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1953, p. 1.

[373] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Balkan Dostluğu Tehlikede mi?", *Ulus*, 16 September 1953, p. 1.

[374] Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Security and the European Option: Greek Foreign Policy, 1952-1962", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 30/1 (1995), pp. 188-190.

[375] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Balkan Dostluğu Tehlikede mi?", p. 1: "Üç Balkan devleti arasında, umumi bakımdan ciddi bir mukadderat ortaklığı bulunmakla beraber, aralarında mazinin bıraktığı birtakım pürüzlerin durduğu ve dostça münasebetlere az çok bir engel teşkil ettiği de şüphesizdir. Fakat bundan dolayı üç memleket başındaki devlet adamlarının ters bir yola saparak kısır münakaşalar içinde düşmanı sevindireceğine pek ihtimal vermiyoruz. Ortada iyi münasebetleri tehlikeye düşürecek ihtilaflı noktalar bulunduğu da inkar kabul etmez. Bunları hiç bilmemezliğe gelmek ve pamuk ipliği ile bağlamak siyasetine meyletmek bir hata teşkil edeceği de aşikardır. Onun için, Yugoslavyada çıkmış bir tebliği bir münakaşa mevzuu olarak ele alıp üzerinde gazetelerde polemik yapmaktan ise ya üç dost devlet birarada ya yalnız meselelere doğrudan doğruya ilgili iki devlet birarada, dostça, hatta gayrı resmi surette, görüşmek pürüzleri düzeltmeğe bakmak çok daha münasip olmaz mı?"

Nevertheless, neither the Macedonian question between Greece and Yugoslavia, nor the worsening of Turkish-Greek relations, due to the problematization of the Cyprus issue, could set back these three states and they finally decided to sign a military agreement, which the Turkish press called "Üçlü Balkan Paktı" (The Tripartite Balkan Pact), "Üçlü Askeri İttifak" (Tripartite Military Alliance), "Balkan Askeri İttifakı" (Balkan Military Alliance). It was signed in Yugoslavia, in Bled, on 9 August 1954.[376] Pro-DP *Zafer* never lost its interest for the developments about this military alliance and since June 1954, this newspaper informed its readers about the finalization of military cooperation projects among these three Balkan states.[377]

As stated above, this military alliance was finally signed on 9 August of 1954. It was based on the principle that three signatories, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, would be secured together against an outside aggression. This military alliance, called as Bled Treaty, was also a part of the Pact for these three countries and they accepted it as the strengtening of military cooperation that the parties had already agreed in the treaty of 1953.[378] With this new treaty, the parties decided to establish a standing council that would meet regularly two times in a year.[379] Yet, immediately after this treaty, the Cyprus issue was rapidly problematized between Turkey and Greece and the 6-7 September 1955 riots occurred against the Greeks living in İzmir and İstanbul. These will be examined in the following chapters, but, what made these events related with the Pact was the Greek policy concerning the Pact after the 6-7 September events. In December of 1955, during his visit to Belgrade, the new Prime Minister of Greece, Konstantin Karamanlis,[380] who came to power on 6 October 1955, declared that the Pact was "a dead letter" due to the Turkish attitude in the

[376] "Balkan İttifakı Bugün Bledde İmza Ediliyor", *Zafer*, 9 August 1954, p. 1; "Üçlü Askeri İttifak Dün İmza Edildi", *Zafer*, 10 August 1954, p. 1.

[377] "Projeler Nihai Şeklini Aloyor", *Zafer*, 19 June 1954, p. 1; "Üçlü Pakt Hariciye Vekilleri Toplanıyor", *Zafer*, 4 July 1954, p. 1.

[378] Marin Pundeff, "The Balkan Entente Treaties", *The American Journal of International Law*, 48/4 (October, 1954), p. 635. (635-640)

[379] Tuncer, *Menderes'in Dış Politikası*, pp. 77-88.

[380] He became the prime minister after Papagos died in October. For more details see: "Yunan Başvekili Papagos Dün Gece Ansızın Öldü", *Akşam*, 5 October 1955, p. 1.

Cyprus issue.[381] In the following days, Greece did not organize the council's meeting of the Pact that should be held in Athens. Then, this time the new Foreign Affairs Minister of Greece, Sypros Theotokis declared that if Turkey did not compansate the loss of Greeks that left Turkey after the 6-7 September events, Greece would not make any cooperation with Turkey in relation to the Pact.[382]

This highly angered Turkish newspapers. For instance, *Zafer* reported this Greek reaction on 25 December as the Greek "insistence" (ısrar) continued despite Turkey's rejection of their compensation demands.[383] As the voice of opposition, however, this Greek reaction angered *Ulus* more. The Greek preconditions to attend meetings of the Balkan Pact were decribed as intervetion to the internal affairs of Turkey. The newspaper gave the example of Greek setting of fishing rights on the territorial waters of Turkey as a precondition to continue the Pact meetings. Then, *Ulus* also reported that according to the views of Turkish authorities, this recent policy of Greece, setting many conditions to attend the meetings of the Pact, turned into a policy of exploiting the 6-7 September events for its longlasting desires.[384] Meanwhile, although the council of the Pact was not totally closed in Greece, as it was not transferred to Belgrade on January 1957, by the fact, the Pact lost its reason of existence.

III.IV. Conclusion

The establishment of NATO in 1949 and Turkey's possible membership to this organization were presented by the political elite as the solution to the current security and development problems of Turkey.[385] So, the NATO membership was the main motive of foreign policy makers in Turkey until the membership in 1952. This

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[381] George Klein, Yugoslavia in World Affairs, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Urbana and Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1960), p. 324.

[382] Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", pp. 591-592.

[383] "Balkan Paktı Daimi Konseyi", *Zafer*, 25 December 1955, p. 1: "Yunanistan, cevabımıza rağmen hala ısrar ediyor."

[384] "Yunanistan İçişlerimize Müdahale Sayılan Yeni Taleplerde Bulundu", *Ulus*, 22 December 1955, p. 1: "Türk resmi makamlarının kanaatince, Yunan Hükümetinin son günlerdeki hareket tarzı, 6-7 Eylül hadiselerini öteden beri bazı emeller uğrunda, istismar etme gayreti şeklini almıştır."

[385] Yanık, "Atlantik Paktı'ndan NATO'ya", p. 38.

idea was also shared and widely circulated by the mainstream Turkish press. Preceding the NATO membership process, however, Turkey had already faced with the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, which Yavuz Abadan, CHP MP for Eskişehir and also an author in *Ulus*, argued that for Turkish press, these three were "shields" which were complementing each other against the threat of "invasion" and also "assurance" of the peaceful order.[386]

In all the news about these three Western initiatives, however, Turkish newspapers also informed public that the Turkish-Greek partnership was at the core of Turkish position *vis-à-vis* these Cold War initiatives. That is to say, Turkey had to develop friendly diplomatic relations with Greece to gain more say in these Western policies. On that occasion, what the Turkish press had done was to create a language that propagated the Turkish-Greek friendship and made it acceptable for the Turkish public opinion. It repeated or reproduced the official stance that presented this friendship as a contextual and political necessity.

Accordingly, there emerged a harmony between the governmental and oppositional newspapers in Turkey. All journalists seemed to be convinced of the necessity of closer relations with Greece as as Turkey was increasingly turning toward the West. The ways of their coverage of the news about Greece, particularly in reporting diplomatic visits between these two states, were at first congruent with each other. Nevertheless, with Turkey and Greece's accession to NATO in 1952, the estrangement between pro- and anti-DP newspapers began to grow. From 1952 onwards, anti-DP organs started to express their opposition to the DP's policies toward Greece more. The reasons behind their opposition laid in the rumors surrounding the Turkish press that a federation between Turkey and Greece would be formed and that the Greek and Turkish government were currently negotiating with each other to guarentee Greece free passage within Turkey's territorial waters. More importantly, since the Greek government was embracing an increasingly anti-Turkish disposition regarding the Cyprus issue after 1952 and the opposition in Turkey was

[386] Yavuz Abadan, "Dünya Kalkınmasının İktisadi Temeli", *Ulus*, 4 April 1949, p. 1: "…tecavüz tehlikesine karşı demokratik hürriyetlerin ve barış nizamının teminatı olan birbirlerini tamamlayıcı üç kalkandır."

categorically against the incorporation of the entire island into Greece, the anti-DP newspapers naturally raised their concern about Cyprus and the DP's approach toward Greece in general.

The deviation of the oppositional press from the governmental newspapers in terms of their interpretation of the Turkish-Greek relations was first observed during the diplomatic visits between these two countries. While the anti-DP newspapers had devoted their attention to diplomatic visits before, with the emergence of a set of problems mentioned above, they chose not to report such visits. While the oppositional newspapers maintained their protest of the DP's policy of Greece and Cyprus by not reporting any important event, they adopted a similar approach regarding the Second Balkan Pact. Unlike the pro-DP newspapers, which enthusiastically propagated the importance of the Pact to Turkey, the anti-DP ones became disinterested in any development that took place within the framework of the Pact. Having considerable scruples about the consequences of the Pact as well as the DP's position on the Pact, the oppositional press began to use foreign newspapers as a source of information and reference point to further challenge the DP government.

As such, while the anti-government newspapers had served to reinforce the new relations between Turkey and Greece initially, it was the same newspapers that fielded questions to the government about the validity of the Turkish-Greek partnership. Such a challenging role of the press, to a certain extent, obliged the government to reconsider its relations with Greece, particularly on the issues, to which the public opinion in Turkey was sensitive, such as the two states's common history as well as the issues of territory and minorities. Although the CHP and the DP had very often problems with each other in terms of such national sensitivies, which were largely related to territorial and identity issues, the post-1952 period was packed with much more fierce dissension between two parties. The following four chapters will examine these issues one by one.

CHAPTER IV

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING THE TURKISH-GREEK COMMON PAST

Wars and conflicts are the dominant factors in the common history of Turkish and Greek people to the extent that these two nations gained their national identities after fighting against each other.[387] The historiography in these two countries, hence, is full of diverse and opposite views which stemmed from this common history. There are two main fault lines that lead to agitation among the populations: the Ottoman legacy and the Turkish-Greek War (1919-1922). From the Turkish side, they are the Greek recall of the fall of Constantinople, the fall of the Byzantine Empire and the rule of the Ottoman Empire. From the Greek side, these are the Turkish recall of the Greek invasion of the Ottoman territories as well as the fresh memories of the invasion of Anatolia and of course the feeling of betrayal inflicted by Ottoman Greek subjects who had nurtured Greek nationalist feelings in their hearts.

Remembering these shared bitter memories of the common past has never ceased to exist even in the Cold War years. Actually, this became more problematic compared to the previous era because on the eve of establishing a partnership, due to the early Cold War conditions, these two states felt obliged to be more careful not to hurt each other's national feelings and this further complicated the process of remembering the past. From 1946 to 1955, thus, the respective Turkish governments found themselves in a hard position of trying to balance the 'real politik' necessities and national sensitivities which were the very basis of Turkish national identity. As the memories were very fresh, the agitation was easy for the Turkish public despite

[387] Salim Gökçen, *Ortodoks Üçgeni: Yunanistan, Patrikhane ve Pontus* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2014), p. 11; Hercules Milas, "History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey", *History Workshop*, 31 (Spring 1991), p. 23.

emerging friendly relations at diplomatic level. And, press in Turkey closely watched the government's approach toward the Turkish-Greek common past, which highly attracted the attention of public.

Throughout this period, however, Turkish newspapers and journalists showed differences in representing this common past. Oppositional newspapers, for instance, usually tended to remember the bitter memories or the victories of the past, so inevitably grew agitation in public. Quite the contrary, the governmental press mainly sought the ways of making people forget for the sake of government's friendship policy toward Greece. This difference automatically turned this thorny issue between Turkey and Greece into an internal political turmoil in the Turkish politics. Remembering the Turkish-Greek common past, thus, became a friction point in the internal affairs of Turkey. This chapter will examine how the political use of history[388] by the Turkish press either to remember or to forget this common past shaped Turkey's relations with Greece. To this end, this chapter will investigate the approaching 500th anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople and the memories of Greek invasion of Anatolia as case studies.

IV.I. The 500th Anniversary of the Ottoman Conquest of Constantinople

For this specific period of emerging diplomatically close relations with Greece, from the mid-1940s to mid-1950s, talking about the Ottoman/Turkish conquest of Constantinople rather than the bitter memories of the recent Turkish-Greek War, which were still fresh in minds of both populations, would seem politically less challenging for Turkish authorities and journalists regarding the friendship with Greece. Yet, it was not the case. Remembering the conquest of Constantinople, which remained always as a holy city for Greeks,[389] was also

[388] By political use of history, the journalistic use of history is meant. That is to say, rather than scientific debate or research, how history, let's say the Turkish-Greek common history, becomes a political tool will be examined. For more details see: Giovanni Levi, "The Distant Past: On the Political Use of History", *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 16/1 (2001), pp. 61-73; Jürgen Habermas and Jeremy Leaman, "Concerning the Public Use of History", *New German Critique*, 44 (1988), pp. 40-50.

[389] Douglas Dakin, "The Formation of the Greek State: Political Developments Until 1923", *Greece in Transition Essays in the History of Modern Greece 1821-1974* (John T. A. Koumoulides ed.) (Cambridge: Zeno, 1977), p. 23.

problematized in the Turkish-Greek relations. 29 May 1953, the 500th anniversary of Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople, was, however, approaching and there was no way out for Turkish authorities. In any condition this expected important day should be celebrated, otherwise it would create a popular unrest.

This historical moment of the world history was of course very important to Turkish public, press and authorities. The preparations for the celebration of the 500th anniversary had begun years earlier with the order of İsmet İnönü in 1939. These preparations were not indeed limited to the organization of celebrations only for the day of 29 May 1953. Moreover, it was decided to restore some monumental historical buildings in İstanbul which were related to the rule of Mehmed II and also to build new monuments for his memory. Indeed, Mehmed II did not only conquer the city, however, as a ruler, aiming to bring the city to its former glory, he set to rebuild it.[390] Probably, that is why the preparations for the celebrations for Mehmed II's conquest also included restoration plans.

Nevertheless, the war atmosphere put a damper on these preparations. These preperations could gain a momentum only with the end of the Second World War. Thus, it can be argued that these initiatives really started with the mid-1940s.[391] The Turkish press was very interested in reporting news about these preparations from the very beginning. In this section, the similarities and differences between oppositional and governmental newspapers in covering news about the 500th anniversary will be examined. In doing this, the chapter will analyse the language they used in reporting news about the preparations. Initially, however, how this event affected academic studies in Turkey from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s will be examined shortly to understand the academic atmosphere of the period.

In 1953, *Belleten*, the most prestigious academic journal of the period, which was published by the Turkish Historical Association, published a special bibliography, "Fethin 500. Yıldönümü Dolayısıyla Çıkan Eserler" (Works Published

[390] Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, *A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 26-28.

[391] Çağla Derya Tağmat, "Fetih Derneği ve İstanbul'un Fethinin 500. Yılı", *Tarih Kültür ve Sanat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 3/4 (2014), p. 51.

for the 500th Anniversary of the Conquest [of Constantinople]). This bibliography was consisted of articles and books, which were printed in the first six months of 1953. It recorded 89 pieces of works.[392] Although 1953 created a trigger effect and almost 90 books and articles were published in this six month period, the academic works for the 500th anniversary had already started in the mid-1940s. Interestingly, one of the first studies was published by a Greek author living in İstanbul, Vladimir Mirmiroğlu. He published *Fatih'in Donanması ve Deniz Savaşları* (Fatih's Navy and the Naval Battles) in 1946. In fact, he had already published a book of documents from the time of Mehmed II in 1945, which was published by Sarıyer Halkevi;[393] but, this book of 1946 was published by the İstanbul Municipality, as a part of publications of "İstanbul Fethinin 500 üncü Yıldönümünü Kutlama Yayınlarından" (Publications for Celebrating the 500th Anniversary of the Conquest of İstanbul).[394]

The existence of such a publication even shows the eagerness of the Turkish authorities in the mid-1940s to encourage scholars/writters to do research about Mehmed II and his conquest of Constantinople. For this book of Mirmiroğlu, Lütfü Kırdar, both the governor and mayor of İstanbul at that period, wrote a foreword. Kırdar put forward that the 500th anniversary would be celebrated with an international organization. It was İsmet İnönü, Kırdar stated, who desired developing and embellishing İstanbul, which was described by Atatürk as "the adornment of Turkish homeland, the wealth of Turkish history, the dearest of the Turkish nation." Besides these, according to Kırdar, it was again İnönü who first ordered and encouraged preparations for the celebrations for the 500th anniversary.[395]

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[392] M. D. Mercanlıgil and S. N. Özerdim, "Fethin 500. Yıldönümü Dolayısiyle Çıkan Eserler", *Belleten*, 27/67 (1953), pp. 413-428.

[393] Vladimir Mirmiroğlu, *Fatih Sultan Mehmet Han Hazretlerinin Devrine Ait Tarihi Vesikalar* (İstanbul: Sarıyer Halkevleri, 1945).

[394] Vladimir Mirmiroğlu, *Fatihin Donanması ve Deniz Savaşları* (İstanbul: İstanbul Belediye Matbaası, 1946).

[395] Mirmiroğlu, *Fatihin Donanması ve Deniz Savaşları*, p. 3: "1953 Mayısının 29 unda alınışının 500 üncü yılı uluslararası bir törenle kutlanacak olan İstanbul Şehrinin, o zamana kadar layık olduğu derecede imara çalışılması çeşitli heykeller, abideler ve binalar yapılması, yollar ve parklar açılmasının hükümet ve belediyece tasarlanmış ve şimdiden tatbikatına geçilmiş olduğu bilinmektedir. Sayın halkımızın şunu da bilmesini candan isterim ki, Ebedi Şef Atatürk'ün "Türk vatanının ziyneti, Türk tarihinin serveti, Türk milletinin gözbebeği" dediği İstanbul'un bu güzel vasıflara her zaman hak

The books and articles, written for the 500th anniversary, dealt with different aspects of the conquest and the life of Mehmed II. But what they shared was a common language. In all these books and articles, the war was generally presented as between Byzantines and Turks. Turkish historians' emphasis of Turkish conquest instead of Ottoman can be observed in the article of Remzi Oğuz Arık, for instance. In his article "Fetihten Önce, Fetihten Sonra" (Before and After the Conquest), Arık emphasized Turkishness. He wrote "İstanbul'u Türklüğe kazandıran Fatih" (Fatih made İstanbul gained for Turkishness) and "İstanbul'un Türkler tarafından alınması" (the Turkish conquest of İstanbul).[396] Arık was not alone. O. Hamid Ongunsu also used similar descriptions in his article.[397] This approach of the Turkish intellectuals was also evident in an eminent Ottoman historian, Mustafa Akdağ's article in which he wrote "Turks by removing the Byzantine emperor."[398] So, the conquest of Constantinople was not a far away victory of Ottomans, but a striking achievement which was linked to the modern Turkish state as well.

Indeed, this Turkification of the Ottoman history was not a new thing in Turkish historiography.[399] History books written in 1930s also used a similar language for the conquest of Constantinople. Yet, in these books, the use of Ottomans and Turks interchangeably was more frequent such as in *Tarih III* (History III), which was first published in 1931 for high schools, as a part of the Republican project of rewriting Turkish history according to the needs of the new Republic. Although 'the Turkish conquest' emphasis was also evident, this book had used

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kazanması için geniş ölçüde imar edilmesini ve alınışının 500 üncü yılının da kutlanmasına hazırlanmasını isteyen hatta teşvik eden milli şefimiz İnönü olmuştur."

[396] Remzi Oğuz Arık, "Fetihten Önce, Fetihten Sonra", *Türk Dili*, 2/20 (May 1953), pp. 473-474.

[397] A. Hamid Ongunsu, "Beşyüzüncü Fetih Yılı Münasebetiyle Bazı Düşünceler", *Tarih Dergisi*, 4/7 (1953), pp. 8-9.

[398] Mustafa Akdağ, "İstanbul Fethinin Türkiye Tarihindeki Önemi", *Türk Dili Dergisi*, 20/2 (May 1953), p. 487: "…Türklerin Bizans İmparatorunu ortadan kaldırarak..."

[399] Ebru Boyar, *Ottomans, Turks and the Balkans: Empire Lost, Relations Altered* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 18-19.

"Şarki Roma Imparatorluğu" (the Eastern Roman Empire) rather than the Byzantine Empire.[400]

The Turkish history books of 1950s also avoided using the word 'Greek' in connection with the conquest of İstanbul. To some extent this might be related with the emerging close relations with Greece. The Byzantines were of course not necessarily modern Greeks, but modern Greeks perceived them as their ancestors. The absence of any Greek connotation as enemy, however, might be done on purpose. That is to say, Turkey needed Greece as an ally, so it probably felt itself obliged to be more careful not to hurt the national feelings of its Cold War partner. This was also evident for the Turkish history books of the time. Zuhuri Danışman, the author of *Yeni Tarih Dersleri-II* (New History Lessons II), which was written for the secondary schools in 1950, used the same language: the Byzantines versus the Turks.[401] This emphasis was also noticeable in Turkish newspapers.

1949 was the year when the news about the 500th anniversary started to appear more frequently in Turkish newspapers. In the beginning of the year, on 16 January 1949, Mehmet Şemseddin Günaltay established a new CHP government. Günaltay was not only a politician but also a history professor and he had served as the head of Turkish Historical Association (1941-1961), for many years. Probably, thanks to Günaltay's affinity to history in general, this new government was more excited about the preparations for the anniversary of the conquest. The oppositional press even noticed this change of attitude. On 5 April 1949, for instance, *Cumhuriyet* claimed that the reason why there was still no substantial program for the organizations was the previous CHP government's fear. Concerned for the reaction

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[400] *Tarih III Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlarda Osmanlı Türk Tarihi (1931-1941)* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), p. 25: "Türklerin İstanbul'u zaptetmeleri, 1000 sene kadar sürmüş olan Şarki Roma İmparatorluğunu ortadan kaldırmıştı. İstanbul'un o vakitler Türkler tarafından zaptı cihanşümul bir hadise oldu."

[401] Zuhuri Danışman, *Yeni Tarih Dersleri Orta Okul-II* (İstanbul: Ders Kitapları Türk Ltd. Şirketi, 1950), p. 128: "Bizans surlarına ilk defa (Ulubatlı Hasan) adlı bir kahraman çıktı. Onun arkasından bir anda surların üzerinde Türk yiğitleri ve Türk bayrakları görüldü. Son Bizans Kayzeri Konstantin kaçarken bir azep neferi tarafından öldürüldü. İstanbul Türklerin eline geçmişti (29 Mayıs 1953 Salı)."

of external powers, the newspaper implied, Turkish authorities hesitated to accelerate the preparations.[402]

Turkish authorities knew that Western powers would be disturbed by any activity that would damage the emerging partnership between Turkey and Greece. Thus, although these preparations were initiated by İnönü, according to the oppositional press, the previous CHP governments were concerned about such reactions. In the same newspaper, nine months later, on 30 January 1950, Abidin Daver argued that this concern had no reason. Although it had been at least 10 years since this idea of celebrating the 500th anniversary was first thought, because of these kinds of ill-placed fears which would create a negative atmosphere against Turkey in the "civilized world," the preparations were halted. Finally, according to Daver, with the Günaltay government, the celebration issue was reconsidered and it was put it into the agenda of the government, and, an inter-ministerial and inter-institutional standing committee for the organization celebrations was established in Ankara.[403]

Turkish newspapers were quick to show their interest in making news about the activities of this special committee. For instance, it was just one month after its establishment, on 12 February 1949, that the pro-governmental newspaper *Akşam* reported that the coming week the committee would come together for the first time.[404] The same year, the press noticed that this new government also paid more attention to the annual celebration of the conquest in May 1949, which was the 496th anniversary of the conquest. Again, the organ of government, *Ulus* announced that

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[402] "İstanbul'un 500 üncü Yılı Hazırlıkları", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1949, p. 1: "Şimdiye kadar esaslı bir program yapılmayışına sebeb eski hükümetin duydukları endişe imiş."

[403] Abidin Daver, "500 üncü Fetih Yılı ve Fatih Abidesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 30 January 1950, p. 1: "İstanbul fethinin 500 üncü yılını büyük bir törenle kutlamak fikri, ilk defa ortaya atılalı, en az 10 yıl oldu [...] Bir müddet sonra İstanbul fethinin 500 üncü yıldönümü kutlamalarının, medeniyet dünyasında aleyhimize bir hava yaratacağı gibi yanlış bir düşünce ile bu iş uyutuldu. Nihayet Şemseddin Günaltay kutlama mevzuunu tekrar ele aldı. Ankara'da "İstanbul Fethinin 500 üncü yıldönümünü kutlama Bakanlıklar ve Kurumlararası Daimi komisyonu" adile bir komisyon teşkil edildi."

[404] "İstanbul'un Fethi", *Akşam*, 12 February 1949, p. 1: "Ankara'da kurulan komisyona İstanbul'dan da bir temsilci istendi. İstanbul'un beşyüzüncü yıldönümü münasebetiyle yapılacak törene ait bir program hazırlanmak maksadiyle Milli Eğitim Bakanı Tahsin Banguoğlu'nun başkanlığında Bakanlıklararası bir komisyon kurulmuştur. Bu komisyona iştirak etmek üzere İstanbul vilayetinden de bir mümessil çağrılmıştır. Komisyon ilk toplantısını önümüzdeki hafta içinde yapacaktır."

the Ankara Radio would allocate one hour for a special program for the history of conquest and it would be broadcasted both in day and evening.[405]

Despite his efforts, however, it was difficult for Günaltay to satisfy the oppositional press regarding these preparations. As soon as the new government took power, in *Cumhuriyet*, Abidin Daver had already warned the current government that even if the restoration of historical buildings had started immediately, they would not be completed until May of 1953.[406] He actually implied that the CHP governments were too late to accelerate these preparations.

Just before the May 1950 elections, the Günaltay government again intensified its activities for the celebrations perhaps with the purpose of gaining more popular support and Turkish newspapers covered these renewed efforts. On 14 April 1950, for instance, it was written in *Cumhuriyet* that the program of the 500th anniversary was confirmed by the cabinet. The program, according to this news, assigned tasks to 20 government agencies.[407] Two weeks later, on 29 April 1950, the same newspaper also wrote that two months activities of the committee were reported.[408] The same day, this news was also covered in *Akşam*.[409]

In May, the DP won the elections. In the first few months, the press was almost silent about the preparations for the 500th anniversary. Although it was not covered in press, which was full of news about the Korean War at that time, on 28 July 1950, the cabinet of the new DP government decided to recognize an organization called "İstanbul'un Beş Yüzüncü ve Müteakip Fetih Yıllarını Kutlama Derneği" (The Society of Celebrating the 500th Year and the Following Anniversary

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[405] "Fethin 496 ıncı Yılı Dün Törenle Anıldı", *Yeni Sabah*, 30 May 1949, p. 1: "Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in türbesi önünde yapılan merasimde nutuklar söylendi;" "İstanbul'un Fethinin Yıldönümü", *Ulus*, 28 May 1949, p. 1: "Yarınki Pazar günü Ankara Radyosu gündüz ve akşam programlarında özel saat ayırdı."

[406] Daver, "500 üncü Fetih Yılı ve Fatih Abidesi", p. 1: "Kanaatimizce 1950 yılında faaliyete geçilse dahi, 1953 Mayısına kadar bütün Fatih devri eserlerinin tamiri ve restarasyonu ile imar işlerini başarmak, imkansız değilse bile çok güç olacaktır."

[407] "500 üncü Fetih Yılı Programı", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 April 1950, p. 1: "Program gereğince 12 devlet dairesile, Cemiyete 500 üncü fetih yılı hazırlıkları için vazifeler yapılmaktadır."

[408] "İstanbul'un Fetih Yılını Kutlama Hazırlıkları", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 April 1950, p. 1: "Dün toplanan komisyonda idare heyetinin iki aylık çalışma raporu okundu."

[409] "500 üncü Fetih Yılı Kutlama Derneği Kongresi", *Akşam*, 29 April 1950, p. 1: "Dernek kutlama için 4 milyon lira gelir temin edeceğini umuyor."

Years of the Conquest of İstanbul) as "a beneficial association to the common interets" (genel menfaatlere yararlı dernek).[410] The society was established in 1950, during the prime ministry of Gökaltay. Its main duty was to help the standing committee and municipial authorities for celebrations.[411] And, this organization had already asked the previous government for a status of "a beneficial association to the common interests," just before the elections in April of 1950.[412] Yet, it was the DP which accepted this request of the society. Then, the members of this society wrote a letter to Adnan Menderes on 14 August 1950 to ask for support.[413]

During that time, *Milliyet*, not from the front page, reported two small news about these preparations. The first one was on the 9th of August. This news was about the meeting of Turkish authorities such as the mayor and the governor of İstanbul, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, who succeeded Lütfi Kırdar on 24 October 1949 and stayed in office until 27 November 1957, a representative of the Ministry of Education and the Director General of Museums (Müzeler Genel Müdürü). They, according to this news, decided to first deal with the restorations of *Rumelihisarı* and Fatih's *medrese*.[414]

The second news of the *Milliyet* was on 4 October 1950. According to it, the committee decided to ask for a copy of famous painter Bellini's painting of Mehmed II, which was in the National Gallery, London.[415] Besides these, there was also

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[410] 28 July 1950: BCA, 030 18 01 02 123 61 13, p. 22.

[411] 26 July 1950: BCA, 030 18 01 02 123 61 13, p. 3: "İstanbulun Beşyüzüncü ve Müteakip Fetih Yıllarını Kutlama Derneği Ana Nizamnamesi, Madde 2: Derneğin mevzu ve gayesi: İstanbulun Beşyüzüncü ve müteakip fetih yıllarını kutlamak ve bu maksatla imar vesair hazırlıkların yapılması için Hükümetçe kurulan komitenin ve Belediyelerin çalışmalariyle ve bu mevzudaki kararlariyle alakalanarak işlerin başlamasına çalışmak."

[412] 21 April 1950: BCA, 030 18 01 02 123 61 13, p. 26.

[413] 14 August 1950: BCA, 030 01 17 98 42, p. 1.

[414] "Fethin 500 üncü Yılını Kutlama Hazırlıkları", *Milliyet*, 9 August 1950, p. 3: "İstanbul'un fethinin 500 üncü yılının kutlama hazırlıkları derneği dün vali ve belediye reisi Prof. Gökay'ın başkanlığında toplanmıştır. Toplantıda Milli Eğitim Bakanı temsilcisi, Müzeler Genel Müdürü de hazır bulunmuştur. Rumelihisarı ile Fatih Medreselerinin tamiri işi önplana alınmıştır."

[415] "500 üncü Fetih Yılı Hazırlıkları", *Milliyet*, 4 October 1950, p. 2: "İstanbul'un fethinin 500 üncü yıldönümü hazırlıklariyle meşgul olan komisyon dün Aziz Oğan'ın başkanlığında bir toplantı yapmıştır. Dünkü toplantıda Fatih'in ressam Bellini tarafından yapılan ve Londra'da National Galeride bulunan portresinin bir kopyasının alınmasına Fatihin icraat ve eserleri hakkında 8 ila 10 ciltlik bir eserin kutlama gününe kadar hazırlanmasına karar verilmiştir."

interesting news again in *Milliyet* in the first months of the DP government. It was on the 27th of August that İsmail Hami Danişmend, an important Turkish historian who later wrote books and articles about Mehmed II and the conquest, asked in his column, *Sözün Kısası*, why the "conquest of İstanbul" was not still listed as one of the Turkish national and official festivals in the calendar.[416] Actually, this was a question asked to the new DP government.

It was not, however, until 17 November 1950 that the new government's approach to the 500th anniversary was first publicized in the press. The new Foreign Minister, Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, who himself was an eminent historian and intellectual, attended one of the meetings of the committee. In addition to the official committee, which was generally headed by the governor and mayor of İstanbul, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, the society, mentioned above, was also invited to this meeting. In the meeting, Köprülü overviewed the decisions and the activities of the committee and the organization, and voiced his opinions. According to this news, Köprülü promised to make a declaration about the preparations for the anniversary, after he talked to his government about the ideas and the demands of the committee and the organization. One of these demands was the government's assignment of staff for the tasks about the preparations.[417]

Meanwhile, however, the government continued not to take concrete steps regarding the preparations. Almost a year later, this attitude of the government started to be criticized by some Turkish newspapers. For instance, on 13 November 1951, *Yeni Sabah*, which later became one of the pro-DP newspapers, asked the

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[416] İsmail Hakkı Danişmend, "Milli Bayramlar", *Milliyet*, 27 August 1950, p. 3: "İstanbul'un fethi neden dolayı resmi ve milli bayramlar takvimine girememiştir."

[417] "500 ünü Fetih Yılı Komitesi Toplandı", *Akşam*, 17 November 1950, pp. 1, 2: "Toplantıda bulunan Fuat Köprülü bu hususta düşüncelerini izah etti. Dün saat 10'da Türk İstanbulunun 500 üncü yılını kutlama derneğiyle bu husuta teşkil edilmiş olan resmi komite, şehrimizde bulunan Dışişleri Bakanı Prof. Fuat Köprülü'nün iştirakiyle Vali ve Belediye Reisi Prof. Gökay'ın başkanlığında toplanmıştır. Toplantıda kutlama mevzu üzerinde gerek hükümetçe ve gerekse dernek tarafından bugüne kadar verilen kararlar ve yapılan teşebbüsler gözden geçirilmiş ve fikir müdaveleri yapılmıştır. Prof. Fuat Köprülü bu mevzu üzerindeki, zeki bir üniversite mezunu olmak dolayısiyle şahsi ilgisi bakımından fikirlerini söylemiş ve toplantıda konuşulan fikirleri dinlendikten sonra bu mevzu üzerinde Ankara'da hükümetçe bir konuşma yapıldığı zaman bunlar hakkında tenevvür etmiş olarak mütalaa beyan edeceğini ifade etmiştir. Gerek dernek ve gerek komite hükümetten 500 üncü yıl münasebetleriyle yapılacak işlerin kadrolanarak tatbikat sahasına konulması temennisinin hükümete bildirilmesini Bakandan rica etmişlerdir."

current government "will 500th anniversary of the conquest of İstanbul not celebrated?" This newspaper argued that although it was five years earlier, during the rule of the previous government, that the authorities decided to celebrate this date, there was still no completed work. And, the newspaper reminded the government that only 20 more months left.[418] The following day, the same newspaper, this time published the views of Lütfi Kırdar, as the previous governor and mayor of İstanbul, who told that it was already too late for a large scale restoration project due to the time barrier. According to Kırdar, DP was too late to start these restoration and reconstruction plans.[419]

The underlying reason behind this negligence of the Turkish government was in fact related to the DP's concern for a possible Greek reaction. In the early 1950s, the Turkish-Greek relations were closer and closer every day and probably this new government did not want to risk this strong Cold War partnership between Turkey and Greece. Not only the architectural plans were set back, but the government also kept the celebrations small and downplayed the 500th anniversary of the conquest. The day after the 29th of May, on 30 May 1953, this policy of the DP government was reported in *the New York Times* by Welles Hangen, the newspaper and television journalist and the reporter of *the New York Times*. Hangen wrote that although the plans for great celebrations had been initiated three years earlier,[420] "the government recently decided to minimize the celebration to avoid offending the Greeks." Then, Hangen also mentioned the protests of several Greek newspapers in Athens for any possible large scale celebrations and how these newspapers claimed that the close relationship between Turkey and Greece would be overshadowed by "extolling the triumph of "Ottoman barbarism" over Byzantine civilization."[421] As correctly put

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[418] "Fetih Yıldönümüne Sadece 20 Ay Kaldı", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 November 1951, pp. 1, 5: "İstanbul'un 500 üncü fetih yılı kutlanılmayacak mı? İstanbul'un fethinin 500 üncü yılını kutlamak üzere bundan beş yıl evvel bir karara varıldığı ve bir program tanzim edildiği hatırdadır. İki yıl evvel kurulmuş olan ve bugüne hareket başına dökülmüş olan hiçbir kararına rastlanmıyan bir dernekten başka halen fethin 500 üncü yılını kutlamağa dair ortada hiçbir faaliyet eseri görülmemektedir."

[419] "İstanbul'un 500 üncü Fetih Yılı Kutlanılmayacak mı?", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 November 1951, p. 1: "Büyük çapta bir imar hareketi için zaman kalmamıştır."

[420] Indeed, these plans had started earlier than three years.

[421] Welles Hangen, "Turks Mark Fall of Constantinople: 500th Anniversary is National Fete as the Greeks Hold Requiem Services", *The New York Times*, 30 May 1953, p. 5.

forward by this American journalist, it is apparent that the DP chose not to remember the past and to celebrate the 500th anniversary for the sake of Turkish-Greek partnership.

Indeed, these abovementioned protests of Greek newspapers had been already noted by Turkish authorities and the press. Four months before the anniversary, on 12 January 1953, Halim Alyot, the head of the Directorate General of Press, Publications and Tourism sent the translations of various Greek newspapers to the Prime Ministry. Among these translations, there was an article published by *Kathimerini*, "Güzel Münasebetler" (The Good Relations), dating 6 January 1953 which criticized the preparations for the 500th anniversary. This Greek newspaper claimed that "29 May 1953 is a thorn in today's intimate Turkish-Greek relations."[422] Rather than the celebrations itself, the main problem for the Greeks according to *Kathimerini*, was the way this conquest would be celebrated. For instance, this newspaper wondered whether the janissaries would be remembered or "the method of kidnapping children (devşirme)" would be praised.[423] Greeks anticipated, according to this Greek newspaper, that Turkish diplomatic skills would solve this problem. This article also stated that the Byzantine Empire continued to guide the civilization of the Greek nation.[424] With this description, this newspaper once more put forward the continuing importance of the Byzantine legacy for Greeks.

As the date of the 500th anniversary was approaching, Greek newspapers intensified their criticisms. Therefore, Turkish authorities continued to watch Greek news very closely. In April, Halim Alyot sent another report to the Prime Ministry, consisting of translation of Greek press items regarding this issue. One of these items

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[422] 12 January 1953: BCA, 030 1 103 640 4, p. 2: "29 Mayıs 1953 bugünkü şu samimi Türk-Yunan münasebetlerinde bir dikendir."

[423] 12 January 1953: BCA, 030 1 103 640 4, p. 2: "Türkler (İstanbul'un) fethinin 500 üncü yıldönümünü kutlasınlar, Bizansın yıkılması şerefine yapılan bu muhteşem şenliklerde biz de hazır bulunalım, güzel. Madem ki davet edildik, nezaket icabı, davete icabet etmeli, törende bulunmalıyız [...] Ama şimdi mesele o değil; bugünkü dostumuz ve müttefikimiz Türkler bu büyük yıldönümünü nasıl kutlayacaklar, biz Yunanlılar için asıl mesele bu. Yeniçerileri hatırlayacaklar mı? Çocuk kaçırma (devşirme) usulünü göklere miçıkaracaklar? Törenlerini daha umumi medeniyet mefhumlarına bağlıyacaklar mı? Kılıçla tevarüs ettiklerinin değerini inkar mı edecekler? 29 Mayıs 1953 bugünkü şu samimi Türk-Yunan münasebetlerinde bir dikendir."

[424] 12 January 1953: BCA, 030 1 103 640 4, p. 2: "…Yunan milletinin medeniyet rehberliğini devam ettiren Bizans İmparatorluğu..."

was from *Ethnos* dating 22 April 1953. *Ethnos* protested the news reported in a morning newspaper in Greece. According to this news, the Greek minority students in İstanbul were not only forced to attend the upcoming celebrations for the Turkish conquest but also had to write an essay praising this conquest. The Greek newspaper described this as a "spiritual torture" (manevi işkence). Against this so-called torture, *Ethnos* reminded the words of İsmet İnönü, the ex-President of Turkey, "the friendship does not mean the destruction of history" and added "no body could be forced to praise the enslavement (esaret) of its own nation."[425] The following day, this news was also repeated in *Kathimerini* but this newspaper could not believe this was real. For this newspaper, it was unbelievable that the current DP government knew about this or tolerated any such "torture" of Greeks living in Turkey.[426]

These kinds of protests in Greek newspapers were also published in Turkish newspapers. On 18 March 1953, for example, *Demokrat Ankara*, one of the loyal supporters of Adnan Menderes and the DP government as even its name shows, reported that Greek newspapers were suspicious of the motive behind the preparations for the 500th anniversary. In this newspaper, the current mayor and governor of İstanbul, Gökay's statements against one of these Greek newspapers, *Apoyematin*, were reported. This Greek newspaper, according to *Demokrat Ankara*, accussed Gökay of uttering unfriendly words about Greeks during his speech about the 500th anniversary. Nevertheless, Gökay denied these claims and underlined his friendly views for Greece. This Greek accusation was "intentional" (maksatlı)

[425] 30 April 1953: BCA, 030 1 103 644 1, p. 2: "(22 Nisan günü "Ethnos" gazetesinden) Bir sabah gazetesi İstanbul'dan acayip, çirkin bir haber almış: Oradaki Rum öğrenciler (İstanbulun) fethinin 500 üncü yıldönümü şenliklerinde bulunmaya zorlanmakla kalmayıp, tarihi hadiseyi Türk görüşüne gore tasvir eden ve Fethi oven bir okul yazısı yazmaya da mecbur tutulmuşlar. Hiç kimse kendi milletinin esaretini övmeğe zorlanamaz. İstanbul'un Rum öğrencilerine bu manevi işkenceyi yapanlara, sabık Cumhurbaşkanı İsmet İnçnü'nün bir sözünü hatırlatırız: "Dostluk tarihin yok edilmesi demek değildir."

[426] 30 April 1953: BCA, 030 1 103 644 1, p. 2: "Bizim gazetelerden birinin İstanbul'un Rum öğrencilerinin, okul vazifesi olarak, Fetih üzerine yazı hazırlamak emrini aldıklarına dair verdiği habere inanmak güçtür [...] Rum öğrencilere böyle bir manevi işkence yapılacağına, ve Ankara Hükümetinin böyle saçmalıkları hoşgördüğüne, hatta bundan haberi olduğuna, tekrar ederiz, bir türlü inanamıyoruz."

according to *Demokrat Ankara*.[427] The celebrations could be used as a pretext, *Demokrat Ankara* implied, to damage the Turkish-Greek relations.

The following month, on 28 April 1953, *Demokrat Ankara* again pointed out the protests of the Greek press with a heading "Yunan Gazetelerinin Çirkin Hezeyanları" (Ugly Delusions of the Greek Press). This time, the protesting Greek newspapers were *Elefteria* and *Eleftaros Lagos*. In the same news, it was also mentioned that the Greek ambassador to Egypt asked General Naguib, who was currently the President, not to show the Turkish film, *Fatih Sultan Mehmet*, in Egypt.[428] This film, what the Greek authority called *Fatih Sultan Mehmet*, probably was the famous 1951 Turkish film called *İstanbul'un Fethi* (The Conquest of İstanbul).

İstanbul'un Fethi was written and directed by Aydın G. Arakon. It was the first Turkish film about the conquest of Constantinople and it told the story of the conquest through the stories of two Turkish soldiers, who went to Constantinople for espionage activities before the conquest. The film was financially and technically supported by the Turkish army and the government for the approaching 500th anniversary. Even soldiers and officers took part in the film as extras for the battle scenes. In the beginning of the film, therefore, the film crew thanked for all these supports they enjoyed.[429] The film used the same words to describe the parties to the war: Turks vs. Byzantines. In one scene, for instance, Mehmed II declared his aim of "terminating the Byzantine Empire, the centre of danger and sedition" (tehlike ve fitne yuvası olan Bizans İmparatorluğu ortadan kaldırılacak). In another scene, the sultan declared that "we are Turks," so knew how to fight with impossibilities.

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[427] "Yunan Gazeteleri İstanbul'un Fetih Yıldönümünden Kuşkulanıyorlar", *Demokrat Ankara*, 18 March 1953, p. 1: "İstanbul Valisi, bir Atina gazetesinin maksatlı tezviratına cevap veriyor."

[428] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Çirkin Hezeyanları", *Demokrat Ankara*, 28 April 1953, p. 1: "İstanbul'un 500 üncü Fetih Yılı yaklaştıkça Yunanlıların endişeleri artıyor. Yunan elçisi General Necip'e müraacat ederek "Fatih Sultan Mehmet" filmin Mısır'da gösterilmemesini istedi."

[429] *İstanbul'un Fethi* (Acar Film, 1951). In the beginning of the film, it was written that "Bu filmde mevzuun gerçeğe uygun olabilmesi için Harp sahnelerini hayatlarını tehlikeye atarak meydana getiren şanlı ordumuzun değerli komutan ve erlerimize, büyük yardımlarını esirgemeyen ilim adamlarımız ve idarecilerimize teşekkürü borç biliriz."

İstanbul'un Fethi, which was not welcomed by the Greek side, was also shown in New York in 1954.[430]

Indeed, as stated before, by keeping the 500th anniversary celebrations small, the Turkish government proved that it took Greek protests into a consideration. But this created resentment among the organization committee members. In February, just few months before the May celebrations, some members resigned without any explanation. This found an echo in public opinion. For instance, university students, who closely followed the preparations from the very beginning, were highly concerned due to the recent news.[431] *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* (MTTB), an influential student union, published a declaration regarding this issue and asked for the establishment of a new committee immediately.[432]

On 29 May 1953, all these concerns of Turkish public opinion, particularly the MTBB's, came true. Nobody could talk about a celebration, which had been dreamed since the mid-1940s. Even Adnan Menderes himself, as the head of the government, did not attend to these celebrations, and instead he visited the military Headquarters of NATO in İzmir. This low profile celebrations and government's disinterest evidenced when Menderes opted to visit the NATO Headquarters created a bitter reaction in the CHP. Mehmet Kamil Boran, CHP MP for Mardin, two days after the celebrations, on 2 June, carried this issue to the agenda of the Parliament and enquired: "Why did the celebrations for this holy, divine and global anniversary go so poor, vapid and miserable to that extent?" The government answered Boran's question more than nine months later, on 9 December 1953. Hüseyin Celal Yardımcı,

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[430] "New York Sinemalarında Türk Filmi Gösteriliyor", *Milliyet*, 8 July 1954, p. 1: "New York'ta Squire sinemasında "İstanbul'un Fethi" isimli Türkçe sesli bir film gösterilmiştir."

[431] "500 üncü Fetih Yıl Dönümü: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği Yeni Bir Komisyon Kurulmasını ve Kendilerine Vazife Verilmesini İstiyor", *Milliyet*, 1 February 1953, pp. 1, 7: "Istanbul'un fethinin 500 üncü yılını kutlama Derneğinin, fethin yıldönümüne bir iki ay gibi kısa bir zaman kala istifa etmesi, alakalı çevrelerde bilhassa bu meseleyi başlangıcından beri dikkatle takip eden üniversite gençliğiarasında büyük bir üzüntü doğurmuştur."

[432]"500 üncü Fetih Yıl Dönümü", p. 7: "(Milli Türk Talebe Birliği'nin açıklaması) İstanbul'un fethinin 500 üncü yıldönümünü kutlamak için yapılan çalışmalara Birliğimiz daima büyük bir alaka duyarak komisyonun çalışmalarına zaman zaman iştirak etmiştir. Fethin 500 üncü yılını kutlama meselelerile meşgul olan komisyondaki bazı delegelerin bilmediğimiz sebeplerler istifa etmeleri İstanbul'un fethinin yıldönümü münasebetile yapılacak bütün işlerin sürümcemede kalmasına neden olmuştur. Ayrıca şimdiye kadar da müsbel bir iş yapılmaması da üniversite gençliğini son derece müteessir etmektedir."

DP MP for Ağrı, talked on the behalf of his government and denied the claims of Boran. Then, Boran gave a long speech in the parliament. With this speech, he summarized the frustration of the opposition regarding these low profile celebrations. For Boran, many Turkish people felt so embarrassed due to these uninspired celebrations that they did not leave their houses. This approach of the government, according to this oppositional deputy, was only welcomed by Greek newspapers. The absence of Menderes in the celebrations, Boran continued, made public feel like an "orphan." Then, the DP MPs in the parliament interrupted Boran's speech by yelling: "Do not make it a political issue."[433] Boran concluded his words with the following sentences:[434]

> The advisers, who led the goverment to act passively in this sacred anniversary, thought incorrectly and led the government to make a mistake. That is why, perhaps, the Turkish government unwillingly ended up in a position favouring the admiration of some Greek newspapers at the expense of Turkish public opinion that accused and condemned the government in this issue. It is our right to expect an action, deserved by the rightful excitement of the noble nation. We are also disappointed in this. Such a difference in the understanding between the nation and the government is not a thing has been ever seen in any period of history of any nation.

Menderes's act of not attending the 500th anniversary but visiting the NATO commands, despite the internal dynamics and the expectations of Turkish public, was probably to give a message to the external actors that the current Turkish government cared NATO and the Turkish-Greek relations more than this historical event. Yet, it is obvious that it angered the opposition. Compared to this way of remembering,

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[433] 9 December 1953: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 5, C: 25, B: 2, O: 1, p. 92: "Arkadaşlar, İstanbul Fethinin 500 üncü yıldönümünde birçok vatandaşlar İstanbul'da ıstırap ve mahcubiyetten sokağa çıkamamışlardır. Matbuat bir ağızdan kutlama programının zaafından ve perişanlığından şikayet etmiştir. Lehte tek yazı yazan gazeteler Yunan gazeteleri, hatta bir tanesi Devlet ve Hükümet reislerinin kutlamaya bilfiil iştirak etmemelerini bir basiret hareketi olarak tavsif etmiş, övmüş ve bu yazı da da yüksek mehafilde maalesef hiçbir aksüamel göstermemiştir. (Soldan, politika mevzuu yapma sesleri.) Devlet reisimiz Kore değiştirme Birliğini, NATO Karagahını iki gün sonra ziyaret etmek lütfunda bulunsaydı, İstanbul valisine bir telgraf çekmekle iktifa etmeseydi, bu memleket bu kadar ulvi, mukaddes bir yıl dönümünde kendini öksüz hissetmezdi."

[434] 9 December 1953: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 5, C: 25, B: 2, O: 1, p. 92: "Hükümeti bu mübarek yıl dönümünde pasif harekete sevkeden hangi müşavirleri ise o müşavirler hatalı düşünmüşler ve hükümeti de hataya sevketmişlerdir. Bu yüzden Türk hükümeti bu mevzuuda kendisini itham ve mahkum eden Türk umumi efkarına birkaç Yunan gazetesinin tasviplerini tercih eder bir vaziyete belki de istemiyerek düşmüştür. Hükümetten, asil milletin haklı heyecanına layık fiiliyat beklemek hakkımızıdır. Bunda da sükutu hayale uğradık. Bir milletle hükümeti arasında bu derece anlayış farkı hiçbir milletin tarihinde hiçbir devresinde görülmüş şey değildir."

more correctly forgetting, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the CHP and its organs were, however, more reactive toward the DP government's remembering of Turkish near past with Greece: the Greek invasion of Anatolia. Now, the chapter will examine this issue of the Turkish-Greek common past.

IV.II. The Greek Invasion of Anatolia

The emerging close partnership between Turkey and Greece in the mid-1940s did not abstain Turkish authorities to keep a strict eye on the Greek recall of the Turkish Independence War. On 18 December 1946, for instance, the Turkish Foreign Ministry forwarded a report, received from the Turkish Consulate of Thessaloniki, to the Prime Ministry. It was about one of the weekly Greek newspapers', *Proini Ora*'s, article published on 8 October that included sentences against Turkey. The heading of the article was "1946 ncı Yılın 1922 nci Yıla Hazin Bir Benzerliği" (A Sorrowful Similarity of the Year of 1922 to the Year of 1946). This article actually targetted the British, which was accused of abandoning Greeks one more time. It recalled the Greek frustration and anger stemming from Britain's leaving them alone against Turks in 1922, however, what made the Turkish Consulate to forward this to Ankara were its negative words against Turks such as "the swords of barbarian Turks."[435] Similarly, on 22 January 1947, the government banned the entry of a Greek history book published in Athens to Turkey and used in Greek minority schools in Turkey as the book contained hostile remarks about Turks and Turkey.[436]

Yet, thanks to the friendship atmosphere, Turkish authorities and press also tried to be careful not to hurt Greek national feelings. For instance, *Ulus* generally used a neutral tone in reporting news about the Turkish national ceremonies related with the Turkish National Independence War (1919-1922).[437] Even the word

[435] 18 December 1946: BCA, 030 10 256 725 29, pp. 1, 2: "O zaman bizi Anadolu'da terk eden müttefikler barbar Türklerin kılıçlarından kurtulmak için kaçan çoluk çocuklarımızın tırmanmak için vapurlarına uzanan kollarını kesiyorlardı, şimdi de bizi yutmak için saldıran Islavlara kapularımızı açık bırakıyorlar ve bizi gülünç duruma düşürüyorlar."

[436] 22 January 1947: BCA, 030 18 01 87 576 5, p. 1: "Bu kitapların Türk ve Türkiye aleyhdarı mahiyet taşıdıkları anlaşıldığından…"

[437] "Bugün Zafer Bayramıdır", *Ulus*, 30 August 1946, p. 1: "Başbakanlık Meydan Savaşının 24 üncü yıldönümü dolayısiyle Dumlupınar'da büyük bir tören yapılacak."

"enemy" (düşman) was used from time to time; the newspaper did not name the enemy.[438] Actually, the assumption was that the reader would know who the enemy was. Similarly, another pro-CHP organ *Akşam* also used the word enemy, without giving the national identity of the enemy, in describing the Turkish victory against Greeks on 30 August 1922, *Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesi*.[439] The next year, covering the celebrations for 30 August in 1947, *Akşam* quoted the words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: "Dumlupınar will remind those who have eye on the Turkish territories the fire, the bayonet, the power and the will of Turks on 30 August."[440] Again, the newspaper did not mention any words about Greeks. Rather, what it did was to remind the words of Atatürk to imply this victory should still be deterrent for those having territorial claims on the Turkish territories.

During the rule of the CHP, the oppositional press was also careful about this issue. Similarly, *Cumhuriyet* celebrated the 25th anniversary of this war in 1947 without any anti-Greek enmity.[441] The organ of the DP, as the main oppositional newspaper of the period, started to be published in 1949; *Zafer* used the same language afterwards.[442] During the rule of Menderes government, however, there occurred a huge difference between the CHP and the DP in the way how they remembered the common past with Greece. Particularly, in 1952, as the Turkish-Greek partnership was furthered, this friction grew utmost in internal politics. Rather than remembering the past without hurting the Greek feelings, for the CHP, what the DP did was to forget the Turkish-Greek past.

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[438] "Tarihi Günümüzün 25 ini Yıldönümü Zafer Bayramımız Kutlu Olsun!", *Ulus*, 30 August 1947, p. 1: "Düşmanın yenilgisiyle sona eren Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesinin yıldönümünü bugün yurdun her tarafında büyük törenlerle kutlanacak."

[439] "Zafer Bayramı", *Akşam*, 30 August 1946, p. 1: "Yeni Türk devletinin, Türk Cumhuriyetinin temeli Dumlupınar'da atıldı. Türk tarihinde yepyeni bir devir açan, yurdumuzu düşman işgalinden kurtaran 30 Ağustos Zaferinin yıldönümünü bugün heyecan ve sevinçle kutluyoruz."

[440] "Zafer Bayramı: Yeni Türkiye'nin Kurtuluş ve Doğuş Bayramı", *Akşam*, 30 August 1947, p. 1: "Dumlupınar Türk vatanına göz dikenlere, Türk'ün 30 Ağustos günündeki ateşini, süngüsünü, kudret ve iradesindeki şiddetini hatırlatacaktır."

[441] "Zafer Bayramı Kutlu Olsun: 30 Ağustos Zaferi'nin Yirmi Beşinci Yıldönümü", *Cumhuriyet*, 30 August 1947, p. 1: "Türk Cumhuriyeti'ni üzerine kurduğumuz temel zafer, bugün bütün yurdda heyecanla anılıyor."

[442] "Büyük Kurtarıcı Eşsiz Kahraman Atatürk'ü Şükran ve Tanzimle Anıyoruz", *Zafer*, 30 August 1949, p. 1.

This friction automatically showed itself in the organs of these two parties. Mainly, in the second half of 1952, there were polemical discussions between *Ulus* and *Zafer* about the issue of remembering the Turkish past with Greece. This friction was intensified with an incident that occurred in June of 1952 when Adnan Menderes ordered the removal of İsmet İnönü's statue in Gelibolu, on the same day when the Greek King Paul visited Turkey. It was clear for *Ulus* that Menderes did this to make his Greek visitors happy. On 26 June, this newspaper made news about this issue and it was claimed that these efforts of Menderes were not in vain. He was, *Ulus* stated, appreciated and well liked by the Greek minority in Turkey, too. For instance, a Greek newspaper published in İstanbul, *Elefterie Feni*, like other pro-DP newspapers, which were supported by revenues of government's official announcements, started to attack İsmet İnönü.[443] And, *Ulus* implied that after this act of Menderes, these newspapers felt themselves freer to write against İsmet İnönü.[444]

This act was probably not only to please Greeks both in Turkey and Greece. It could also be interpreted as a DP government's attempt to disassociate İnönü from the Turkish National Independence War. Particularly in the second half of 1952, the DP and its organs intensified their attacks against İnönü.[445] This also influenced the DP's approach to the Turkish recent history. *Ulus* responded to this attitude by remembering and keeping alive the spirit of the Lausanne Treaty, which was negotiated and signed by İnönü himself. This, according to *Ulus* published on 17 July 1952, would keep Turks alert against any Greek claims, which were encouraged by recent activities of the DP such as the removal of İnönü's statue.[446] The approaching

[443] This issue will be examined in the following chapter.

[444] "Rumca Gazeteler de Neşriyata Başladı: Menderes'in Gayeleri Boşa Gitmedi", *Ulus*, 26 June 1952, pp. 1, 5: "Yunan Kralının Türkiye'ye geldiği gün, Yunan ordusuna karşı harbetmiş olan cephe kumandanının heykelini Gelibolu'da yıktırtmak suretiyle Adnan Menderes'e gösterdiği gayret semeresini vermeğe başlamıştır. İstanbul'da çıkan (Elefteria Feni) adlı Rumca gazete, diğer resmi ilanla beslenen gazeteler gibi İnönü'ye hücum etmeğe başlamıştır. Bu Rumca gazetelerden aşağıdaki satırları naklediyoruz. Türk milleti kendisine hizmet etmiş olan kahramanlara nasıl sövdürüldüğünü bir kere daha görsün: "Bu memlekette hiçbir İsmet Paşa hiçbir vatandaşın kılına bile dokunamaz. Millet müteyakkız bulunurken bir İsmet Paşa değil bin İsmet Paşa bile birşey yapamaz."

[445] "Allah Bu Milleti Şu İsmet İnönü'den Kurtarsın", *Hizmet*, 9 October 1952, p. 1.

[446] "24 Temmuz Yaklaşırken Lozan Ruhunu ve Lozan Zihniyetini Taze Tutalım: Akropolisler Karşısında Uyanık Olalım", *Ulus*, 17 July 1952, p. 1: "Fakat sağda solda Akropolis adlı Yunan gazetesinin beyanlarına benzer açık arsızlıkların baş kaldırmağa başladığı bir zamanda yaşıyoruz.

anniversary of the Lausanne Treaty, 24th of July, was a chance for this newspaper to underline the importance of this treaty in the following days as well.[447]

What *Ulus* meant by the Greek claims was the recent call of a Greek newspaper to re-convert Ayasofya Museum to a church.[448] This Greek newspaper was one of the most popular and time-honored Greek newspapers, *Acropolis*.[449] Saint Sofia Church had been converted to a mosque by Mehmed II after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 but in 1935 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk decided to turn this monument into a museum. As a museum, however, Ayasofya continued to be a thorny issue between Turkey and Greece. In both countries, even today, there are views that support either it should be a church or a mosque. *Ulus* harshly criticized this demand on 11 July 1952.[450]

Quite the contrary, *Zafer*, and also other pro-DP newspapers such as *Akın*, found this reaction unnecessarily exaggarated. They quoted the words of Greek State Minister, M. Varuutis, who was in Turkey and made a statement about this issue. The Greek Minister claimed that this article of *Acropolis* was not approved by the Greek nation, who disapproved anything that would create a problem between these

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Bunun yanında bazı sinsi teşebbüslerin, dolaşık yoldan Lozan ruhunu ve Lozan zihniyetini baltalama teşebbüslerinin yürütülmeğe çalışıldığı da gözden kaçmamaktadır. Bu hareketlere cesaret veren haller nelerdir? Gelibolu'da Lozan kahramanı Sayın İsmet İnönü'nün heykeline kemend attıran zihniyet ve zihniyetin bir takım beceriksiz işleri, bulanık suda balık avlamak heveslilerini canlandırmış olabilir."

[447] "24 Temmuz Yaklaşırken: Şanlı Türk Ordusu ve Lozan Ruhu", *Ulus*, 19 July 1952, p. 1.

[448] "Türk Basınında Haklı Bir İnfial: Ayasofya'nın Kilise Olmasını İsteyen Akropolis Hakkettiği Cevabı Aldı", *Ulus*, 11 July 1952, p. 1: "Atina'da çıkan Akropolis gazetesinin Ayasofya'nın kilise olmasını isteyen küstahça yazısı, Türkiye basınında haklı olarak büyük bir infial uyandırmış ve hakettiği cevabı almıştır. Hürriyet gazetesi bu hususta şunları yazmışlardır: "Yunan Hükümdarlarının memleketimizi ziyaretleri sırasında Türk-Yunan dostluğu hakkında klişe hale gelmiş olan basma kalıp lakırdıları bir kere daha tekrarlayan Yunan gazetesi "Megalo Idea"nın artık öldüğünü bunun yerini dostluğun aldığını yazmışlardı. Şimdi ise başlıca Yunan gazetelerinden biri olan Akropolis, Megalo Idea'nın ölmediğini bilakis hortladığını gösteren bir yazı yazmıştır. Atatürk'ün iki millet arasında bir nifak vesilesi olmasın diye, dini kisvesinden tecrit edip bir müze haline sokarak Medeniyet alemine hediye ettiği Ayasofya'nın bu gazete tekrar kilise haline sokulmasını ve ortodoks haline getirilmesini isteyerek küstahlığını göstermektedir."

[449] John Dimakis, "The Greek Press", in *Greece in Transition Essays in the History of Modern Greece 1821-1974* (John T. A. Koumoulides ed.) (Cambridge: Zeno, 1977), p. 217.

[450] "Türk Basınında Haklı Bir İnfial: Ayasofya'nın Kilise Olmasını İstiyen Akropolis Hakettiği Cevabı Aldı", *Ulus*, 11 July 1952, p. 1.

two countries.[451] Then, he underlined the Greek admiration for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's decision to turn Ayasofya, "the masterpiece of Byzantine and Eastern arts," into a museum.[452]

Indeed, such a request for the Ayasofya Museum was not new to Turkey. In 1948, before the rule of the DP, a Greek man who called himself Vasilios Karamanolis sent Hasan Saka a petition requesting that for the sake of Turkish-Greek friendship, Ayasofya needed to turn into a church.[453] But this petition was left in the state archives, while *Acropolis* made this demand public. Of course it provoked even some pro-governmental newspapers in Turkey, which were usually more tolerant of these kinds of issues. Particularly, the more conservative ones such as *Hizmet* reacted differently from *Zafer* and condemned *Acropolis* strongly. On 13 July 1952, as a response to this demand, *Hizmet* proposed to re-convert Ayasofya Museum into a mosque, particularly in such a convenient time, when the 500th anniversary of "the conquest of İstanbul" was approaching.[454]

These protests of both *Ulus* and more conservative DP supporters for the *Acropolis*'s demand disturbed Greek authorities. For instance, Venizelos, as the deputy Prime Minister, said: "I can not understand why some Turkish newspapers still continue polemics for such a nonexistent issue."[455] Then, the Greek ambassador Kontumas commented on the continuing protests in Turkish newspapers. Protesting Kontumas's remarks, *Ulus* accused him of being disrespectful to the opposition and

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[451] "Ayasofya için Kopartılan Fırtına ve Kıbrıs Meselesi", *Zafer*, 12 July 1952, pp. 1, 6: "Ayasofya hakkında Akropolis gazetesinde çıkan makaleye dair sorulan bir suale cevaben, Yunan devlet bakanı şöyle demiştir: Bu makale her iki millet arasında suitefehhüm doğurabilecek her noktayı nazarı şiddetle takbih eden Yunan millet tarafından tasvip edilmedi;" "Kıbrıs Meselesi ve Türk-Yunan Dostluğu, *Akın*, 12 July 1952, p. 1.

[452] "Ayasofya için Kopartılan Fırtına ve Kıbrıs Meselesi", p. 6: "Sizi temin ederim ki, Yunan millet, her iki milletin medeni seviyesine yakışan, Bizans ve Şark sanatlarının şahaseri olan Ayasofya'yı bir müze haline getiren Atatürk'ün bu asil jestini layıki ile takdir etmektedir."

[453] 13 September 1948: BCA, 030 01 40 241 12, pp. 1-3.

[454] "500 üncü Fetih Yılı Yaklaşırken Ayasofya Müzesini Yine Cami Yapmalıyız", *Hizmet*, 13 July 1952, p. 1.

[455] "Venizelos'un Beyanatı", *Ulus*, 19 July 1952, p. 1: "Yunan başbakan yardımcısı Akropolis gazetesinin neşriyatı hakkında "bu gayrı mevcut mesele üzerinde bazı Türk basınının neden hala polemiğe devam ettikleri anlamamaktayım"."

some Turkish newspapers. *Ulus* asked: "How could he say such words for the opposition who took 45 percent of the votes of the nation?"[456]

In fact, it was not only Kontumas but *Zafer*, together with *Anadolu Ajansı* ve *Basın Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü*, which published the interview of Kontumas, received their share from *Ulus*'s wrath. Kontumas, who gave an interview to *Zafer* and there attacked the opposition and some papers was able to do so because of *Zafer*, together with state officials, allowed an ambassador of a foreign country interfere to internal politics of Turkey.[457]

Meanwhile, *Ulus* continued its criticisms for the DP's policy of (dis)remembering the past with Greece. On 29 July 1952, for instance, an article, "Türk-Yunan Dostluğu" (The Turkish-Greek Friendship), was published. This article put forward that although the Greek claims over the Turkish territories did not really halt from 1923 to 1950, these claims remained as unofficial wishes. With the rule of Adnan Menderes, these claims, however, gained an official character. It was written that: "These desires, which remained as private views of some politicians and journalists until that time, started to be represented as the Greek government's official desires." It was because, *Ulus* claimed, until the rule of Menderes, the Turkish-Greek relations were based on the principles of the Lausanne regime. But now it changed.[458]

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[456] "Yunan Büyükelçisinin Beyanatı Memlekette Derin Teessür Uyandırdı", *Ulus*, 20 July 1952, p. 1: "Muhalefete ve basına tarziye verilmelidir. Bir yabancı elçinin nezdinde bulunduğu milletin muhalefeti ve bir kısım gazeteleri hakkında nahoş sözler söylemesi o memleket halkına karşı borçlu olduğu saygıda kusur etmesi demektir [...] Milletin yüzde 45 oyunu alan muhalefete bu sözleri nasıl söyler."

[457] "Ekselans Kontumas'ın Beyanatı Karşısında", *Ulus*, 22 July 1952, p. 1: "Bu ne perişanlık. Zafer gazetesi, Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü ve Anadolu Ajansı başı boş müesseseler midir? Yunansitan Büyükelçisi Bay Kontumas'dan bir beyanat istiyen Zafer gazetesi ve onunla birlikte Basın-Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü ve Anadolu Ajansı pek hazin bir duruma düşmüşlerdir. Ekselans Kontumas'ın Zafer'e verdiği demeçte, Türkiye muhalefeti ve muhalif gazetecileri hakkında, haysiyetini ve haklarını korumasını bilen bir cemiyetin asla kabul etmiyeceği bir müdahale vardır. Devletler hukuku ve diploması kaidelerine aykırı sözler söylenmiştir. Zafer gazetesi iktidar partisinin sözcüsüdür. Dışarıya ve yabancılara karşı muhalif ve mirvafık farkı gözetmeden bütün Türk milletinin haysiyetine ve haklarına taalluk eyliyen hususta, her gazeteden ziyade hassasiyet göstermesi icabeder."

[458] "Türk-Yunan Dostluğu", *Ulus*, 29 July 1952, pp. 1, 4: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında son zamana kadar muvazeneli bir dostluk devam etmekte idi [...] Bunlarla beraber Yunan gazetelerinden ve politikacılardan bazıları garip bir takım iddialar öne sürmekten geri kalmamışlardır. 1923-1950 denemesinde bu iddialar yalnız gayrı-resmi istekler halinde kalmıştır. Ancak Adnan Menderes hükümetinin iş başına geçmesi üzerine mesele biraz değişmiştir. O zamana kadar bazı politikacıların

Actually, the Lausanne Treaty meant a lot to Turkey. Its main importance could be its historical role against the Greek claims on the Turkish territories. Thus, the DP's forgetting the Lausanne Treaty; either to disassociate İnönü from the Turkish Independence War or to please Greeks for the sake of close relations alarmed the CHP and its organs. Concerned for the revival of the *Megali Idea*, the DP's forgetting the past was criticized. At that period, although the opposition criticized the current government strongly, there was a case that even the DP had to react. It was not, however, about the recent Turkish-Greek War or the Lausanne Treaty but it was about the Greek Independence War from the Ottoman Empire. In the international exhibition in Thessaloniki, in its NATO pavilion, there were some paintings, about the Greek independence, that disturbed Turkish authorities. The Turkish Consulate in this city asked the Greek government to remove these paintings. From the Turkish point of view, these paintings would damage the current friendship between these two states. As the Greek newspaper *Kathimerini* reported on 20 September 1952, this was accepted by Greek authorities.[459] But actually this case was one of the rare examples that the DP government protested its Greek partner regarding the remembering of the past.

On May 1954, as also examined in the previous chapter, Welles Hangen reported in *the New York Times* about cooperation of Turkey and Greece in NATO. In this report regarding the Turkish-Greek relations *vis-à-vis* NATO, however, there was also an interesting note of the author about the common history of these two states. The author, reporting from the İzmir NATO Headquarters, where these two states' officers had even made plans for a joint defence system since September 1952, recalled the importance of this city for the history of Turkish-Greek relations. It was the place, he wrote "where thirty-one years ago Turkish forces drove the invading Greeks into the sea." Thus, after drawing the picture of this "new spirit"

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ve bazı gazetelerin hususi görüşleri olarak kalan istekler, Yunan hükümetinin resmi arzuları olarak öne sürülmeğe başlanmıştır. 1950 ye kadar Türk-Yunan münasebetleri Lozan rejimi dediğimiz esaslar üzerinde inkışaf etmiştir."

[459] 25 September 1952: BCA, 030 01 102 637 2, p. 3.

between these two states, even making joint defence plannings, Hangen also did not forget to mention about a very single fact:[460]

> No one here [in Izmir Headquarters] is so naive to believe that all is now well between the two nations centuries of strife have left bitter memories and deep prejudices that still warp Greek-Turkish relations. Too many Greeks can recall the suppression they suffered under the Ottoman Empire and too many Turks can recall the fierce three-year struggle for survival they waged against a Greek invasion force that landed here May 14, 1919, intent on subjugating large parts of Asia Minor with the sanctions of the Allies.

This American journalist was actually insightful in showing the influence of the common past even during the peak of friendship between Turkey and Greece. The past was more problematized of course with the deterioration of relations toward the mid-1950s and with the Cyprus issue. This also raised concern of the opposition in Turkey reflected in their representation of the Turkish-Greek history. Particularly, in 1955, while remembering the common past, the Greek enmity appeared more overtly in oppositional newspapers. The headlines for the 30th of August's newspapers, for instance, were very interesting. To illustrate, it was "30 Ağustos'tan Hala Ders Almadınız Mı?" (Have you not Learned Your Lesson from the 30th August?), in *Akşam*. Here it was narrated how Greeks were "expelled" from the Turkish territories and how the Greeks and its supporters were pacified.[461] This anti-Greek tone was even stronger in *Ulus*. This newspaper did not hesitate to say: "we destroyed the Greeks 33 years ago today,"[462] and added:[463]

> We have been passing through a strange period for a few years. Almost we have not remembered the great victory of the Liberation War and its fruits, this independent homeland and independent state, and the battles in İnönü, Sakarya and Afyon-Dumlupınar, which are the basis of our

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[460] Welles Hangen, "Greeks and Turks Cooperate in NATO: Former Foes Show New Spirit at Izmir Headquarters under U.S Guidance", *The New York Times*, 9 May 1954, p. 26.

[461] "30 Ağustos'tan Hala Ders Almadınız Mı?", *Akşam*, 30 August 1955, p. 1: "30 Ağustos 1922 de Türklerin vatandan kovdukları sadece iki buçuk Yunanlı değildi. Büyük bir milletin baskı altına alınabileceği manasızlığına inanan iki buçuk Yunanlının arkasındaki tecavüz zihniyeti idi."

[462] "30 Ağustosu Milletçe Kutluyoruz", *Ulus*, 30 August 1955, p. 1: "Yunanlıları 33 yıl once bugün perişan ettik."

[463] "30 Ağustosu Milletçe Kutluyoruz", *Ulus*, 30 August 1955, p. 1: "Birkaç yıldır garip bir devir geçiriyoruz [...] İsmet İnönü'nün adı geçiyor diye neredeyse İstiklal mücadelesi büyük zaferinin ve onun eseri olan bugünkü müstakil vatan ve müstakil devlet ve bir millet varlıklarımızın temelleri olan İnönü, Sakarya ve Afyon-Dumlupınar Meydan Muhabereleri muvaffakiyetini ve bu zaferlerin milletler arası tasdikli senedi olan Lausanne zaferini anmaz olduk."

> national presence, and the Lausanne Treaty, as the proof of international recognition for all these victories, only for the reason that İsmet İnönü's name was mentioned in all these victories.

Just below this item, this newspaper published an item on the Cyprus issue;[464] an issue became a main source of friction between Turkey and Greece. This again shows the power of a newspaper in shaping public opinion. In a small space, it both reminded the past problems and at the same time also referred to the current ones. Hence, it has an ability to represent the problematic issues in a continuum, without any break. And, as the main organ of opposition, it repeated its complaints about the current DP government's historical amnesia.

IV.III. Conclusion

Recalling the significant moments of the common Turkish-Greek past is not necessarily a bone of contention for these two states. For instance, although the current literature usually ignores, there was a preceding diplomatic step of Turkey before Venizelos visited Ankara in October 1930 to establish friendly relations with Turkey. It was taken by the Turkish ambassador to Greece, Enis Bey [Tulça] by attending the Greek celebrations for the 100th anniversary of Greek national day. Thanks to this Turkish presence in the celebrations, ambassador Enis Bey claimed, the Greek leader could prepare the Greek public for his visit to Turkey in order to end problems. Otherwise, according to Venizelos, the opposition in Greece would put more pressure on him not to visit Ankara.[465]

In this case of 1930 friendship, remembering of this historic event conduced to the development of closer relations between Turkey and Greece. Yet, in the Turkish-Greek relations, it was very rare that any recall of common past triggered amity but not enmity between these two states. Sure, these two states share a common history and victory for one meant defeat for the other or a fete for one meant a requiem for the other. The representation of history, in other words, the way these two states remember their common past, thus, remains one of the main friction

[464] "Kıbrıs Hakkında", *Ulus*, 30 August 1955, p. 1.

[465] 24 April 1930: BCA, 030 10 254 712 11, pp. 1-3; Enis Tulça, *Atatürk, Venizelos ve Bir Diplomat Enis Bey* (Enis Tulça ed.) (İstanbul: Simurg, 2003), p. 35.

points in the Turkish-Greek relations even today. And this chapter revealed that it was also a problem in the period from 1946 to 1955.

In 1953, Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, a Turkish soldier, bureaucrat and politician, who was also the military advisor to the Turkish Commission in Lausanne, wrote an article for the 500th anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople entitled "İstanbul'un İki Fatihi: II. Mehmet ve Atatürk" (Two Conquerors of İstanbul: Mehmed II and Atatürk). He wrote: [466]

> We owe the success of the first conquest to the young, brave and heroic commander of the Ottoman army, Fatih. I think that Atatürk, the hero of the second conquest, who achieved this under the most hopeless conditions and against the world of enmity, should also be mentioned once more in the 500th conquest year, as a duty. Without any doubt, the two heroes of the two conquests were Fatih and Atatürk. If they were not the commanders of these conquests, whether these two conquests would be achieved that easily? Atatürk, before he conquered İstanbul for the second time, prevented the two Greek attempts in 1921 and 1922 which tried to capture this city with a raid [...] Greeks would go to Ankara, the centre of Turkish nationalists, Rumeli and İstanbul, the old capital of the Ottomans, at the same time to have a double victory. Because of the Greek rout in Sakarya, this attempt was interrupted.

As Bıyıklıoğlu put forward, these are the two main cases in the Turkish-Greek common past: the conquest of Constantinople and the Greek invasion of Anatolia. So, this chapter used them as case studies. These two cases show that remembering the common past with Greeks from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, was not only a foreign affair for Turkish politics, it was also an issue of internal affairs. Particularly, from 1952 onwards, it became more problematized between the opposition and the government. Thus, the difference of opinion between the oppositional and governmental newspapers regarding this issue was more deepened. Sure, this internal friction with the continuing press activities turned into a challenge

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[466] Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, "İstanbul'un İki Fatihi II Mehmet ve Atatürk", *Belleten*, 17/65-68 (1953), p. 94: "Birinci fethin muvaffakiyetini, Osmanlı ordusunun başındaki genç, cesur ve kahraman Fatih'e borçluyuz. En ümitsiz şartlar altında ve bir husumet dünyasına karşı başarılan ikinci fethin kahramanı Atatürk'ü de, beşyüzüncü fetih yılında, bir daha tanzimle anmanın yerine getirilmesi gereken bir vazife olduğunu sanıyorum. İki fethin de en büyük kahramanları hiç şüphesiz Fatih ve Atatürk'tür. Onlar bu işlerin başında olmasalardı, acaba bu iki fetih bu kadar kolaylıkla başarılabilir miydi? Bu türlü bir düşünce hiç de kötümser bir görüş olmasa gerekir. Atatürk, İstanbul'u ikinci defa fethetmeden evvel, Yunanlıların 1921 ve 1922 de, bu Türk şehrini baskınla ele geçirmek için yaptıkları iki teşebbüsü de önlemiştir [...] Yunanlılar, Anadolu'da Türk milliyetçilerinin merkezi Ankara'ya; Rumeli'de, eski Osmanlı payitahtı İstanbul'a, aynı zamanda giderek, çifte zafer kazanacaklardı. Sakarya'daki Yunan bozgunu yüzünden bu teşebbüsler yarıda bırakılmıştır."

for the emerging, in a way fragile, Turkish-Greek friendship, as these two cases proved well. Hence, it is once more clear that the process of creating a Cold War partnership was not free from crises, particularly on issues that the public opinion in Turkey was very sensitive as in the case of remembering the common Turkish-Greek past.

CHAPTER V

STORM IN A TEACUP?: TURKISH PRESS ON SPORADIC INCIDENTS

A shift from enmity to amity in diplomatic relations, actually, did not mean that the Turkish-Greek relations were free from crises. Rather, despite friendly and close diplomatic relations, even small issues could easily lead to a series of problems between the two countries at that period. The political authorities were concerned about the possibility of such minor issues turning into an open violence. The reason for such fear was the fragility of the Turkish-Greek friendship, which could be broken immediately. The delicate nature of this friendship led to quick shifts within the framework of Turkish-Greek relations, in which the public opinion might regard any small incident as a national issue. This chapter will examine two such cases that quickly evolved from an isolated event to a national one, with special emphasis on the role played by Turkish newspapers in these processed. Doing so, this chapter will narrow its focus to explore why and how the Turkish press took part in either magnifing or ignoring these daily encounters and shaped the ideas of people regarding these events.

The first case is about an attack against the Turkish national football team players by Greek football fans in Athens Stadium in May of 1949. At that particular moment, both the Turkish and Greek governments were busy with the newly established NATO and their positions in the Marshall Plan. It was actually one of the periods between the mid-1940s and the mid-1950s that these two states felt themselves forced to act together most to achieve their aims *vis-à-vis* these Western initiatives. The second case was the arrest of crew of a Greek gunboat by Turkish soldiers in Fethiye, Muğla in August of 1953. At that period, too, the Turkish and Greek governments, this time together with Yugoslavia, again tried to intensify their

relations by establishing a military alliance after the Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration of 28 February 1953, which was finally concluded on 9 August 1954.

The Turkish press in general and the oppositional press in particular, found both these cases worth to dwell on. While the former case created more agitation due to the violent nature of the incident, the latter also led to an anxiety about the future of the Turkish-Greek relations. In the former one, the CHP was the government, and the event took place at a time when both the CHP and the DP were eager to be on good terms with Greece. The latter, on the other hand, occurred during the DP rule when the CHP was becoming highly critical of the DP's Greek policy. Providing a comparative analysis of these two events, it will illuminate how these incidents affected the challenging role of the Turkish press in the formation of the Turkish-Greek relations.

V.I. The Athens Incident of May 1949

Between 13 to 20 May 1949, Greece hosted the Eastern Mediterranean Friendship Tournament Cup to which Egypt, Greece, Italy and Turkey participated. The matches took place in Athens. The Turkish national football team won its first two matches against Egypt on 13 May and Greece on 16 May. And, its last match was with the Italian national team on 20 May.[467] Throughout this so-called friendship tournament, in all three matches the Turkish football team encountered the hostile manners of the Greek players, spectators, soldiers and police in the stadium. As Turkish players and authorities reported to newspapers when they returned to Turkey, Greek hooligans shouted and swore on Turkish players not only during the match between the Turkish and Greek teams but also during the two other matches of the Turkish team. These hooligan attacks on the Turkish team were not limited to slander and oral defamation. The Turkish footballer were also exposed to physical attacks by the Greek hooligans, who did not only threw objects such as lemons on players but also hit them both during and after the matches such that some of the Turkish players were injured.

[467] "İtalya-Türkiye Maçı Bugün", *Zafer*, 20 May 1949, p. 1.

The Turkish public opinion was agitated after Turkish newspapers reported these physical and verbal attacks. Particularly in Ankara and in İstanbul, people protested this direct assault on the Turkish team by Greek fanatical groups. And, Turkish newspapers, particularly the oppositional organs, reported both the attacks in Athens and public displays in Turkey. The attacks appeared on the front page of *Zafer*, the main organ of the DP, on May 22, 1949. *Zafer* reported the attacks with a sensational headline, "Atinadaki Vahşi Tecavüz: Taşkın Palikaryalara Hadleri Bildirilecek" (The Barbarous Attack in Athens: The Greek Rowdies Will Be Put in Their Place). The use of the word "palikarya" by *Zafer* was no coincidence. Meaning "a Greek rowdy," it is used in Turkish as a slur. With using such a degrading term, *Zafer* also pointed out the reaction of Turkish public to these attacks. These attacks on the Turkish sportsmen by certain people in Athens, *Zafer* claimed, received a deep-seated hatred and repulsion in Turkey.[468]

As one of the strong voices against the current CHP government, *Yeni Sabah* was another newspaper that protested these attacks bitterly. *Yeni Sabah* allocated the most of its pages to these attacks on 22 May 1949. Describing the event as "the outrage in Athens" (Atina'daki rezalet), *Yeni Sabah* shared all the details of the attacks with its readers. Quoting statements of eye-witnesses of the event including those of the injured players, *Yeni Sabah* also raised the already present national consciousness against these Greek attackers. For instance, reporting the statements of Vildan Aşir Savaşır, the General Manager of Physical Training, can be taken as an example for this implicit target of *Yeni Sabah*: increasing the feeling of national humiliation among its readers. Savaşır stated that during these events, national feelings of Turks were hurt so much that the Turkish team cried afterwards.[469] Then, Aşır continued:[470]

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[468] "Atinadaki Vahşi Tecavüz: Taşkın Palikaryalara Hadleri Bildirilecek", *Zafer*, 22 May 1949, p. 1: "Sporcularımıza karşı Atina'da bir takım insanlar tarafından yapılan tecavüz hareketi halkta derin bir nefret ve tiksinti ile karşılanmıştır."

[469] "Hadise, Memlekette Nefretle Karşılandı", *Yeni Sabah*, 22 May 1949, p. 1: "Milli hislerimiz o kadar rencide oldu ki hıçkıra hıçkıra ağladık."

[470] "Hadise, Memlekette Nefretle Karşılandı", pp. 1, 7: "İlk maçımızdan beri devam eden seyircilerin taşkın hareketleri ve küfürleri, Yunan maçında bizzat oyuncular tarafından fiilen yapılmıştır. Saha nizami değildir. Çizgi kenarına kadar sıralanan iskemlelerde oturan subay ve sivil seyirciler topa

> Continuing delirious acts and curses of spectators since the first match were physically done by the Greek players themselves during the Greek match. The field was not proper. Spectators, either civil or military, sitting on chairs, which were located almost on the baseline, from time to time intervened the ball, so joined the match. At the last match, after our team was made lose the match in a known manner, when it was going to the dressing rooms, a Greek military officer, who did not wreak his revenge, gave a kick to Bülent's back. Then, Bülent, who was also slapped severely, had to fend himself off. This time other Greek military officers and policemen attacked him. When Gündüz, Muzaffer and Şükrü intervened, this time a bigger group swooped down on our players. During this chaos, the manager Sabri's jacket was torn with a knife from top to bottom. While the referee and people around him, who locked Bülent in a room with punches and curses, were trying to beat him, Gündüz forced the door and in difficult set Bülent free.

After reporting the attacks on the Turkish team in utter details, *Yeni Sabah* also reported how the Turkish youth, who were mainly the members of two influential university student associations *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* (MTTB) and *Türk Milli Talebe Federasyonu* (TMTF), organized demonstrations to condemn the attack without losing time. Using the headline "Üniversite Gençliği Protesto Ediyor" (University Students Are Protesting), *Yeni Sabah* also published letters and telegrams which these students sent to the Presidency of Greek Football Federation. Turkish university students, *Yeni Sabah* claimed, thought that the Turkish national pride was hurt by these attacks and the Greek government had to give an account of this scandal.[471] For *Yeni Sabah*, however, the Turkish government, too, should also do something against this national humiliation and to soothe the disappointed Turkish people. Reporting the news of its special correspondent in Ankara with the title "Ankara Galeyan İçinde" (Ankara is in an Upsurge) *Yeni Sabah* claimed that these ugly attacks created a general hatred in Ankara. Almost everybody in this capital city, *Yeni Sabah* argued, expected the Turkish government to declare that there would be no sport activities with Greece. People in Ankara, *Yeni Sabah* further

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müdahale ederek, zaman zaman oyuna iştirak etmişlerdir. Son maçta malum şekilde takımımız mağlup ettirildikten sonra, soyunma odalarına giderken hıncını alamıyan bir Yunanlı subay, Bilendin arkasına şiddetli bir tekme atmış. Arkasından da bir de şiddetli bir tokat yiyince Bilent de kendisini müdafaa etmek zorunda kalmıştır. O zaman diğer Yunan subay ve polisleri üzerine hücum etmişler. Gündüz, Muzaffer, Şükrü araya girince, bu defa daha kalabalık bir kafile oyuncularımıza çullanmıştır. Kim vurdu arasında idareci Sadrinin ceketi, bıçakla baştan aşağı kesilmiştir. Yumruk ve tokatla Bilendi bir odaya kapıyan hakem ve avanesi onu dövmek isterlerken Gündüz kapıyı omuzlamış ve Bilendi güçlükle kurtarabilmiştir."

[471] "Üniversite Gençliği Protesto Ediyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 22 May 1949, pp. 1, 7.

claimed, expected the Turkish government to take actions at the Greek governmental level prevent a repetition of the ugly scenes.[472]

Indeed, *Yeni Sabah*'s and the other anti-CHP organs' approaches to this event, presenting this issue as the dissent of the Turkish people against the Greek insult to the Turkish national pride, was also a part of their oppositional activities. That is to say, they also exploited such a crisis in the Turkish-Greek relations to voice their criticisms against the current CHP government. And, they put pressure on the government to take actions against its Greek counterpart.

For the government and its newspapers, nevertheless, this event was not as frustrating as it was for oppositional newspapers. At least initially, their reaction was not as visible as the opposition. For example, the main organ of the government, *Ulus* on 22 May reported this news in its sports page.[473] It was the following day that this newspaper carried this issue to its front page. *Ulus* reported that Mehmet Kamil Boran, CHP MP for Mardin, proposed a motion about this matter.[474] On 24 May, *Zafer* also reported about the proposals of deputies regarding the government's reaction to the event. Nonetheless, the pro-DP *Zafer* did not mention Mehmet Kamil Boran, who was a CHP member. It was Abidin Potuoğlu and Kemal Zeytinoğlu, two DP deputies for Eskişehir, *Zafer* claimed, who would propose such a motion.[475]

Despite the attempts of governmental and oppositional newspapers to take advantage of this crisis by emphasizing the role of the deputies of their own parties, in reality, the CHP deputy, Mehmet Kamil Boran, and the DP deputy, Kemal Zeytinoğlu, submitted a joint proposal to the Parliament. In effect, these attacks on the Turkish players by the Greek hooligans represented one of the few cases that brought CHP and DP deputies together. With their proposal, Boran and Zeytinoğlu

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[472] "Ankara Galeyan İçinde: Hükümetin Bir Tebliğ Neşretmesi Bekleniyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 22 May 1949, p. 1: "Yapılan çirkin hareketler şehrimizde umumi bir nefret uyandırmıştır. Hemen herkes, hükümetin bir tebliğ yayınlıyarak bundan sonra gerek içerde, gerek dışarda bir daha Yunanlılarla spor temaslarının yapılmıyacağını bildirmesini ve ayrıca Yunan hükümeti nezdinde bu hadiseler hakkında teşebbüslerde bulunmasını beklemektedirler."

[473] "Atina Hadisesi Büyük Teessür Uyandırdı", *Ulus*, 22 May 1949, p. 1.

[474] "Atinadaki Çirkin Hadise", *Ulus*, 23 May 1949, p. 1.

[475] "Tecavüz Hadisesi için Demokratların Verdiği Takrir", *Zafer*, 24 May 1949, pp. 1, 6.

asked what the reaction of the government to this "unjustifiable and inhospitable ugly incident" that offended Turkish public opinion extremely would be.[476]

It was one week later, on 30 May, that Necmettin Sadak, the Turkish Foreign Minister, gave a speech in the Parliament to reply Boran and Zeytinoğlu's parliamentary question. At the beginning of his speech, on behalf of the government, Sadak expressed heartfelt sorrow because of these attacks. He also added that what increased this sadness and worries of the Turkish government were the possible damage of such incidents to the Turkish-Greek friendship, on which the Turkish government set a high value. He, then, made a very detailed explanation about the attack.[477] During this speech, actually, the Foreign Minister abstained to magnify the physical attacks. Rather, he described them as a "very rude treatment" (hayli kaba muamele) of Greeks toward the Turkish footballers. Probably, he tried to calm down the already agitated public. Additionally, he did not forget to emphasize that the Greek authorities, too, expressed their sadness and apologies.[478] Sadak's cautious speech somehow demonstrated that the Turkish government regarded the attacks on the Turkish team in Athens as an isolated event, rather than a national issue.

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[476] 30 May 1949: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 8, Y: 4, C: 19, B: 96, O: 1, p. 1042: "…Türk efkarı umumiyesini fevkalade rencide eden bu yersiz misafirperverliğe sığmıyan çirkin hadise karşısında..."

[477] 30 May 1949: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 8, Y: 4, C: 19, B: 96, O: 1, p. 1042: "Futbolcularımız Yunanistan'a vardıkları andan itibaren teşkilat adamlarından, ev sahibi sıfatiyle, yakınlık ve alaka görmüşlerdir. Fakat futbol sahasında iş değişmiştir. Gerek Mısır'lılarla, gerek Yunan'lılarla, gerek İtalyan'larla yapılan maçlar esnasında, Türk sporcuları, seyirciler tarafından diğer takımlara karşı gösterilen çoşkun dostluğa mukabil, daima düşmanca tezahürlere maruz kalmışlardır. Bu hareket tarzı bilhassa, Türk-İtalyan maçında son haddine varmıştır. Oyunun bitmesine beş dakika kala, futbolcularımız, hakem tarafından haksız bir muameleye maruz kalmışlardır. İtalyan oyuncular, İtalyan hakem, Yunanlı yan hakemler bu haksızlığı bir an kabul etmişler iken, sahaya bir Yunan'lı idareci girmiş, vaziyetemüdahale ederek bizimkiler aleyhine karar aldırıp ilan etmişlerdir. Büyük teessüre kapılan futbolcularımız maça devam etmek istememişler, fakat idarecilerin tavsiyeleri üzerine, terbiyelerini hiç bozmadan oyunu sonuna kadar devam etmişlerdir. Oyun biter bitmez, sahaya hücum eden halk diğer tarafı alkışlarla omuzlarında taşırken, bizim futbolculara türlü hakaretler ediyor, küfürler savuruyorlar, limon kabukları atıyorlardı. (kahrolsunlar sesleri). Futbolcularımız muztarip bir halde, hatta bazıları teessürlerinden ağlıyarak giyinme odalarına gittikleri zaman, "Türk'ler İtalyan'ları dövüyorlar" şeklinde yaygara koparılmış ve polis çağrılmış, o daracık yere gelen polisler de futbolcularımıza hayli kaba muamelede bulunmuşlar, fakat Türk ve İtalyan futbolcularını gayet dostane hasbihalde görerek gtimişlerdir."

[478] 30 May 1949: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 8, Y: 4, C: 19, B: 96, O: 1, p. 1042: "İyi niyet ve iyi muamele gösteren Yunan Futbol Tertip heyetine mensup bazı insaflı kimselerin, bu tezahürlerden sonra, Türklere karşı utanç duyduklarını, hemen oyun sonunda itiraf ederek özür diler bir vaziyet aldıklarını Büyük Elçimiz bildirmektedir."

That was, however, not the case for public opinion. For more than one week, from 21 May to 30 May, Turkish people across the country held various demonstrations. These demonstrators, the majority of whom were university students, were also able to make their voices heard through the press. Turkish newspapers continued to make news about these continuing protests of the students of İstanbul University, Ankara University and İstanbul Technical University.[479] As one of these newspapers, *Akşam* reported the demonstrations in Beyazıt, İstanbul on 24 May. The protesting students, *Akşam* wrote, were holding banners such as "Yunanlılarla Spor Temaşası İstemiyoruz" (We Do Not Want Any Sport Activity with Greeks). *Akşam* also reported the statement of Talha Eriş, the chair of TMTF (Türk Milli Talebe Federasyonu). Eriş argued that Turkish public had a right to feel "indignant" toward the Greek nation after these events. These attackers, according to him, wanted to take the revenge of their defeat in the past.[480] The defeat in the past was actually a direct reference to the Turkish-Greek War (1919-1922). This even proves how the common past could easily be remembered even after any daily issues such as football hooliganism, as already stated in the previous chapter.

Then, *Akşam* reported the speech of Gündüz Kılıç, a famous Turkish football player and coach as well as the son of Ali Kılıç, who was a leading political figure of the early Republican period, and also the brother of Altemur Kılıç, an influential state official who even served as a press attaché in Washington from 1955 to 1959. Gündüz Kılıç talked on behalf of the Turkish national players. He argued that this enmity must have been carried out by "red communists."[481] Kılıç hence meant the Greek communists, who were known in Turkey as the main opponents of the emerging good relations between Turkey and Greece.

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[479] "Atina'daki Hadisenin Akisleri Devam Ediyor", *Ulus*, 24 May 1949, p. 1: "İstanbul Talebe Birliği dün bir toplantı yaptı. Ankara gençliği teessür ve teessüflerini bildiriyor;" "Atina'da Yapılan Tecavüzün Akisleri", *Cumhuriyet*, 25 May 1949, p. 1: "Atinadaki Çirkin Hadiseyi Protesto Mitingi", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 May 1949, p. 1.

[480] "Gençliğin Protestosu: Sporcularımızın Atinada Maruz Kaldıkları Muamele Protesto Edildi", *Akşam*, 24 May 1949, pp. 1, 2: "Yunan milletine karşı infial duymakta haklıyız. Onlar mazideki mağlubiyetlerinin acısını bir dostluk maçı için Atinaya giden bir avuç Türkten almak istemişlerdir."

[481] "Gençliğin Protestosu", p. 2: "Ben şahsen bu düşmanlığı kızıl komünistlerin yaptığını düşünüyorum."

This event in Greece and the protests in Turkey occurred on the eve of diplomatic visits between these two states to sign economic treaties in relation to the Marshall Plan. The second year for the Plan was approaching and these two states came together to increase the economic cooperation among themselves in accordance with the Marshall Plan. During these meetings, as *Akşam* reported, Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, the Turkish ambassador to Athens, and Konstantin Tsaldaris, the Foreign Minister of Greece also touched upon this attack against the Turkish players.[482] The same day, on 25 May, *the New York Times* also reported this news but in a different way. Unlike *Akşam*, this American newspaper claimed that rather than the economic treaties, the main topic of the meetings was the recent events in Athens. According to *the New York Times*, Tsaldaris called Ünaydın to talk about this crisis.[483]

Although what happened behind the closed doors and whether the news of *Akşam* or *the New York Times* were true remained unknown, at the end of this meeting Tsaldaris gave a statement to the Turkish press as follows: "These kinds of incidents resulted from the competition of football, in general sports, cannot any way affect already existing friendly relations between Turkey and Greece."[484] Yet, for the Turkish public opinion, this event was not just the result of sports competition. It, hence, aroused a big anger all over the country. And, the demonstrations continued intensely in the following days.[485] What most agitated Turkey was in fact the Greek authorities' accusation of Turkish newspapers of spreading misinformation and hiding the truths about the alleged misbehaviors of the Turkish players.

One example for such an accusation was the declaration of the Greek Football Federation which was even published in *the New York Times*. In this declaration, the

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[482] "Atinadaki Çirkin Tecavüze Dair Çaldarisin Demeci", *Akşam*, 25 May 1949, p. 1: "Atinadaki Türkiye büyük elçisi Ruşen Eşref, dün Yunan Dışişleri Bakanı Çaldarisi ziyaret ederek Marshall yardım planı mucibince Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında imzalanacak olan iktisadi anlaşmaları görüşmüştür. Bu görüşme esnasında geçen Cuma günü Atinada oynanan Türkiye-İtalya futbol maçı esnansında vuku bulan şayanı teessüf hadiseler de bahis mevzu olmuştur."

[483] "Turks Protest Attitude of Athens Soccer Crowd", *The New York Times*, 25 May 1949, p. 9.

[484] "Atinadaki Çirkin Tecavüze Dair Çaldarisin Demeci", p. 1: "Futbolun ve umumiyetle spor rekabetinin sebep olduğu bu gibi hadiseler, Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında mevcut dostane münasebetlere hiçbir suretle tesir edemez."

[485] "Turks Again Hit Greeks, Third Demonstration in Two Days is Held in Ankara", *The New York Times*, 28 May 1949, p. 5.

Greek Football Federation used words such as "inaccurate Turkish press reports" while telling the story of incident. Moreover, it blamed the Turkish team for its "maltreatment" of the Greek referee and kicking the Italian players.[486] These kinds of accusations were not accepted by the Turkish side, particularly, by the oppositional press. As one of them, *Yeni Sabah*, for instance, protested this Greek attitude by using a heading as "Yunanlılar, Şimdi de İftiraya Başladılar: Atinada Olup Biten Hadiseleri Türk Gazeteleri Tahrif Ediyorlarmış! Ayıp, Ayıp!" (Greeks Now Started to Slander: The Turkish Press Claimed to Be Distorting the Events in Athens! Shame on You [Greeks]!). Then, the newspaper even used the term "enemy" (düşman) and wrote that MTTB would organize a big protest the next day in İnönü Stadium to protest the "enemy."[487]

The next day, on 26 May 1949 *Ulus* also protested the Greek approach which did not take any responsibility for these attacks against the Turkish football team and similarly underlined the Turkish youth's emotionality against this "assault" (tecavüz). In this news, *Ulus* tried to demonstrate that not all the Greek political elite supported this negligence of the Greek government. For instance, *Ulus* reported that one of the leaders of the Greek opposition even accused the current Greek government of risking the friendship with Turkey.[488] Yet, the Greek government remained silent. The absence of a sincere Greek apology indeed did nothing but agitated the Turkish population and fostered the protests more. So, the demonstrations continued.

On 27 May, for instance, *Yeni Sabah* and *Zafer*, as the main opponents of the CHP rule, allocated all their front pages to one of these protests occurred a day before. It was stated that in addition to students, tens of thousands of Turkish citizens

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[486] "Turks Again Hit Greeks, Third Demonstration in Two Days is Held in Ankara", p. 5.

[487] "Yunanlılar, Şimdi de İftiraya Başladılar: Atinada Olup Biten Hadiseleri Türk Gazeteleri Tahrif Ediyorlarmış! Ayıp, Ayıp!", *Yeni Sabah*, 25 May 1949, p. 1.

[488] "Atina Ajansının Siyasi Mahfillerine Atfen Bildirdiğine Göre", *Ulus*, 26 May 1949, p. 1: "Yunanlılar kendilerini mesul görmüyor. Tecavüz hadisesi karşısında gençliğin hassasiyeti. İstanbul ve Ankara'da bugün birer miting yapılıyor. Yunan muhalefet şeflerinden biri "beyinle kazandığımızı ayakla kaybetmek tehlikesi karşısında bulunuyoruz" dedi. Ankara Yüksek Tahsil Gençliği yarın saat 17'de Cebeci meydanında Atina'da sporcularımızın gördüğü fena muameleyi protesto etmek için bir miting etmişlerdi."

in Ankara and in İstanbul participated to these demonstrations. The Turkish sportsmen also came to this meeting and talked to masses. *Zafer* even published the words of an Olympic medalist (1948, London) who later became also the world champion (1951, Helsinki), Celal Atik, who said: "We will take our revenge."[489] This famous wrestler implied the approaching wrestling competition in İstanbul with Greeks in the European Championship, in which he again won the gold medal.

Similarly, the organ of the CHP, *Ulus*, did not hesitate to inform its readers about continuing protests in various parts of Turkey, despite the ongoing friendly relations at diplomatic level. The same day, thus, *Ulus* also published the same news.[490] Indeed, 27 May was itself the date when one of the biggest Turkish protests against this incident took place not only in İstanbul but also in Cebeci, Ankara. *Zafer* informed its readers the day before the upcoming protest with news entitled "Palikarya Tecavüzünü Protesto" (A Protest for the Greek Rowdy's Outrage).[491] In this news again *Zafer* used the word "palikarya." And, on the very date of the protest it published the detailed program of the protest for those who would decide to participate to it.[492] Thus, *Yeni Sabah* somehow encouraged its readers to attend the planned protest.

The news about this huge demonstration was also reported in *Ulus* such an extent that the newspaper allocated even more space than these two oppositional newspapers. In the news, *Ulus* directly quoted the words of a Turkish university student, Ethem Löker, who talked on behalf of his friends during the protest, held in Cebeci. In his speech, Löker first mentioned the clash of two ideologies under the

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[489] "Gençlik Heyecanlı Bir Miting Yaptı", *Yeni Sabah*, 27 May 1949, p. 1: "Sporcularımıza saldıran Yunanlı mütecavizler nefretle telin edildi. Mitinge onbinlerce vatandaş katıldı;" "Dün İstanbul'da Muazzam Bir Miting Yapıldı", *Zafer*, 27 May 1949, p. 1: "Atina'daki tecavüzler nefretle karşılandı. Milli Takım futbolcuları dün omuzlarda taşındılar, Celal Atik de "İntikamımızı alacağız!" dedi."

[490] "Yurt Gençliği Tecavüz Hareketini Takbih Ediyor. Talebe Birliğinin Tertibi ile", *Ulus*, 27 May 1949, p. 1: "İstanbul'da dün büyük bir protesto mitingi yapıldı. Söz alan muhtelif hatipler hadise yüzünden duyulan teessürü belirttiler. Dün gelen sporcularımız müessif hadiseyi anlattılar. İzmir ve Polatlı'da da mitingler yapıldı."

[491] "Palikarya Tecavüzünü Protesto", *Zafer*, 26 May 1949, p. 1: "Yarın da saat 17 de Cebeci'de büyük bir miting tertip edildi."

[492] "Ankara Gençliği de Bugün Toplanıyor", *Zafer*, 27 May 1949, p. 1: "Bu husutaki program beşinci sayfamızdadır."

Cold War circumstances. These were, he said, "freedom lover democratic states" (hürriyete aşık demokratik devletler) versus "communists trying to drag humanity to an unknown future" (insanlığı akibeti meçhul bir aleme sürüklemeye çalışan komünistler).[493] Then, he implied that in such a clash, Turkey and Greece, as two "democratic states," should form their policies according to this and they should cooperate. Turkey, Löker claimed, acted in accordance with these Cold War realities. Yet, in Greece, however, from time to time, either press or some politicians displayed antagonism toward Turks.[494] So, again, by covering the speech of Löker, who once more repeated the discourse of the period, *Ulus* emphasized the necessity of the Cold War partnership with Greece rather than these kinds of antagonistic attacks as the Greeks did.

The same day, on 28 May, there was also a huge protest in Zonguldak. Actually, newspapers announced the demonstrations that took place in Ankara and İstanbul throughout the week. Yet, this document sent by the party members of the CHP to the Secretary General of the CHP showed there was also a huge protest in Zonguldak. There was an interesting point in this report about the speech of one high school student, İzzettin Yılmaz. This boy was born in Xanthi (İskece), in Western Thrace but had to escape to Turkey, probably due to the Greek Civil War. He made "the most fiery" speech during the demonstrations. According to this report, Yılmaz talked about the tyranny he witnessed in Greece and left the protestors in tears.[495] Actually, it was the period that the Turkish minority in Western Thrace encountered oppressions due to the civil war conditions and many of them escaped to Turkey by leaving all their properties in Greece. This issue will be examined in the following

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[493] "Ankara Gençliği Müessif Hadiseyi Protesto Etti", *Ulus*, 28 May 1949, pp. 1, 3: "Dünya yaşadığımız şu günlerde muazzam ideoloji mücadelelerine sahne oluyor. Bir tarafta hürriyete aşık demokrat milletler, diğer tarafta insanlığı akıbeti meçhul bir aleme sürüklemiye çalışan komünistler var."

[494] "Ankara Gençliği Müessif Hadiseyi Protesto Etti", p. 3.

[495] 30 May 1949: BCA, 490 01 608 109 14, p. 3: "Bu arada kısa klot ve kareli gömlekle kürsüye çıkan Çelikel Lisesinden İzzettin Yılmaz en ateşli konuşmayı yapmıştır. Yunanistan'ın İskeçe şehrinde doğan ve Yunan baskısından zorla kaçarak şehrimize yerleşen Yılmaz, ailesinin en küçük uzvu olan bu küçük yavru gençliği ateşlendirenve göz yaşartan tesirli sözler söyledi ve uzun alkışlar topladı. Kendi gözleri önünde cereyan eden Yunanlı'ların vahşice hareketlerini anlatarak hazır bulunanları göz yaşları içinde bıraktı."

chapter regarding the minority problems. Yet, what is important here is that this football incident also resulted in growing more agitation for other already existing problems.

Ulus similarly added that the youth in Ankara shouted in the streets as "a friend to a friend, an enemy to an enemy."[496] These protests revealed that Turkish people started to question even the emerging friendship with Greece. This probably concerned the Americans, who encouraged the Turkish-Greek partnership in line with their Cold War strategies. Being the American newspaper *the New York Times* shared this concern. On 28 May, *the New York Times* also pointed out that one of the protesters in Ankara shouted as "an old enemy cannot be your friend."[497] According to *the New York Times*, this issue "deteriorated" the Turkish-Greek relations and "a large section of Turkish press," it argued, made this game "the occasion of a bitter attack upon Greece."[498] Like the Greek authorities, this American newspaper also accused the Turkish press of increasing the public agitation.

After these week-long demonstrations, as stated above, it was finally on 30 May that Necmettin Sadak answered the questions of the deputies, Mehmet Kamil Boran and Kemal Zeytinoğlu, about the government's reaction to this recent incident. His words were also published in his newspaper *Akşam*, in which he told: "It is a must for the Turkish and Greek nations to become friends and walk hand in hand."[499] Indeed, this official declaration somehow put an end to these ongoing public protests. It was quickly reacted, yet the reaction also ended quickly. But it does not mean it was forgotten in Turkey. In the following period, from time to time both politicians and journalists in Turkey recalled this incident, while they were talking about the Turkish-Greek relations.

One of them even attracted the attention of the British authorities. In his report to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dating May 1953, the

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[496] "Ankara Gençliği Müessif Hadiseyi Protesto Etti", p. 3: "…dosta dost, düşmana düşman..."

[497] "Turks Again Hit Greeks, Third Demonstration in Two Days is Held in Ankara", p. 5.

[498] "Turks Protest Attitude of Athens Soccer Crowd", p. 9.

[499] "Atinadaki Hadise: Dışişleri Bakanı Sözlü Soruya Cevap Verdi", *Akşam*, 31 May 1949, p. 1: "Türk-Yunan milletinin dost olmaları, el ele yürümeleri şarttır."

British ambassador to Ankara sent the translation of an article from *Aydın*, a Turkish newspaper published in İzmir. The author of this article, Cavit Aker four years after the incident overtly asked "can we forget the incident in Athens when our soccer players were beaten up?"[500] Thus, although it seemed a small issue, it was remembered even four years later. Hence, for some, particularly for the oppositional voices, this individual event turned into a national issue. The reason behind the quick shifts in the Turkish-Greek relations and the great internal reactions was actually the fragility of this Cold War partnership. At that time, such isolated issues that quickly turned into a national issue also occurred in the Aegean Sea. The continuous Greek violations in the Turkish territorial waters highly attracted the attention of the press. Its wide coverage in the press grew agitation in the public as it was already perceived by the Turkish people as threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey. Now, the chapter will investigate these early disputes in the Aegean Sea.

V.II. The Early Disputes in the Aegean Sea

The current literature regards the Aegean dispute, consisting of the continental shelf and the territorial waters problems, as one of the major disputed matters between these two states in addition to the minority issues and the Cyprus problem. Nonetheless, the period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s was too early to talk about such an issue. It is true that concepts such as territorial waters, fishery conservations and continental shelf had been already started to be discussed in the international arena, nevertheless, it was not until 29 April 1958, the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, that the law of sea was codified internationally. Without a doubt, however, these concepts had already become a source of problems between the states, particularly for the ones like Turkey and Greece sharing the Aegean kind of geographically problematic seas. The Aegean Sea is "irregularly shaped" and narrow with little basin.[501] Hence, it was difficult not to have problems even for the states having friendly relations throughout history.

[500] 13-17 August 1953: The National Archives, London, UK [hereafter TNA] FO 371/107494.

[501] Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes: A Unique Case in International Law* (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004), p. 421; Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 78.

This section will examine how small fishing incidents or even rescue operations in the Aegean Sea from 1946 to 1955 were covered in the press and how the press played an active role in turning them into serious problems for Turkey and Greece.

The issue of fishing in general was always on the agenda of the Turkish governments, having wealth of fish sources in its territorial waters, particularly on the Aegean Sea. During the rule of the CHP, for example, the party document dating 13 June 1948 shows that the deputy chairman of Secretary General of the CHP prepared a detailed report about what had been done for 20 years regarding the fishing issue and what the new plans of the government were. Actually, this critical report was prepared after his visit to the Black Sea region. During this visit, people complained him about problems of fishers such as finding a rope for their fishnets. When he returned to Ankara he studied on this report with his colleagues and sent it to Tevfik Fikret Sılay, the Secretary General of the CHP, asking for him to inform the current CHP government about these problems.[502] The report claimed that although there had been various studies, reports and opinions of experts, the majority of whom were invited from abroad, the government did not take them seriously and somehow failed to understand the importance of this sector. In this report, it was also noted that Ayvalık, together with Edremit, had rich fish sources.[503] This was actually interesting information to note. Ironically, it was these rich resources that attracted the Greek fishermen to violate the Turkish territorial waters on the coasts of the Aegean Sea, particularly in Ayvalık, Fethiye and other close places to Greece.

These Greek fishermen's illegal fishing in the Turkish territorial waters created a continuous problem between these two neighbors. Yet, the fishing issue between Turkey and Greece started to be more problematized in internal politics of Turkey from 1952 onwards with the ongoing meetings for a convention regarding fishery disputes between these two states. The DP was very dedicated not to explain the content of this draft convention, for which the parties were still negotiating. The rumors about the ongoing negotiations between the foreign ministries of both states, however, quickly alarmed some Turkish politicians. These were not only the

[502] 13 June 1948: BCA, 490 01 1452 17 2, p. 1.

[503] 13 June 1948: BCA, 490 01 1452 17 2, pp. 10-11.

members of the oppositional party, but even the deputies of the DP were alarmed about this issue. One of them was Zeyyat Mandalinci. He was the deputy of Muğla, one of the Turkish cities on the coast of Aegean Sea, very close to the Greek islands. Sure, as a man from the region, he had a full knowledge of existing problems of Turkish fishermen due to Greek violations, so he concerned more about the rumors about the recent negotiations at the ministerial level. On 16 May 1952, he proposed a motion to the Parliament regarding this issue. He asked whether these rumors were correct or not. For instance, he asked whether Turkish government would really let some parts of the Turkish territorial waters to Greeks to allow them fish freely.[504]

Both the Turkish and Greek governments were keeping the negotiations secret, probably to minimize a possible public reaction. And, this parliamentary question created an opportunity for publicizing the issue in a way that Turkish people could learn the details. Nevertheless, Fuad Köprülü's response was not very explanatory. Köprülü only admitted that the *Muhtelit Türk-Yunan Komisyonu* (which was previously the Mixed Exchange Commission) was discussing the "the fishing issue" (balık avlama meselesi). And, he continued, before the final decision, it was not possible for him to give more information.[505] Then, Mandalinci again took the word and summarized the current fishing problems between Turkey and Greece. These Greek islanders, who were so poor, he claimed, smuggled fish from Turkish coasts. This illegal Greek fishing in Turkish territorial waters, he continued, arose another set of problems between these two nations that would even damage the friendly Turkish-Greek relations. Mandalinci reminded the 1937 Contract,[506] which,

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[504] 16 May 1952: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 3, C: 15, B: 73, O: 1, p. 261: "Kara sularımızda bâzı bölgelerin Yunan balıkçıları tarafından serbestçe balıkçılık yapılmak üzere Yunanistan'a kiraya verilmesi hakkında Dışişleri Bakanlığında cereyan ettiği şayi olan müzakereler hakikaten varit midir?"

[505] 16 May 1952: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 3, C: 15, B: 73, O: 1, p. 262: "İki memleket kara sularının muayyen sahalarında karşılıklı olarak balık avlama meselesi Ankara'daki Muhtelit Türk-Yunan Komisyonu tarafından incelenmektedir. Komisyon her iki memleketin yüksek menfaatlerini telif ve alakadarları tatmin edecek bir hal şekli bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Müzakeremiz sona ermemiş bulunduğundan bu hususta daha fazla izahat vermeme imkan olmıyacağını takdir buyuracağınıza eminim. Görüşmeler kati bir safhaya girince varılacak neticeden yüksek Meclisi etraflı şekilde tenvir edeceğimiz tabiidir. Şurasını da izah edeyim ki; sünger mevzuunda aramızda herhangi bir müzakere cereyan etmiş değildir."

[506] Actually this Contract of 1937, which is known as the Arrangement de Nyon, signed against the piracy in Eastern Mediterranean, was not only signed by Turkey and Greece. But also by Britain,

he told, had been designed to prevent such illegal activities and violations. Yet, it did not work. As this illegal fishing, which he described as "invasion" (tecavüz), increased since May of 1951, the Turkish authorities warned Greece.[507] Actually, he implied, if rumors were true and the Greek fishermen were allowed to make free fishing in the Turkish territorial waters, the existing crisis in the Turkish-Greek relations due to Greek violations would increase.

Of course, this issue was protested more by the oppositional newspapers. Although there was no official declaration made by the current government regarding this issue, the rumors for a plan for giving free fishing rights to Greeks in the Turkish territorial waters were enough to alarm the opposition. *Ulus*, on 13 July 1952 complained that Greeks started their fishing activities in the Turkish territorial waters, although the convention was still not signed yet.[508] Then, on 5 August 1952 *Ulus* published an item under the title of "Balık Meselesi" (The Fish Question). At that time, the Parliament was in summer holiday, but this newspaper argued that there would be big discussions in the Parliament about this issue, as soon as it was opened.[509] Two days later, this time, *Ulus* published the disapproval of some experts on this issue. For instance, the warnings of a lawyer, Reşit Ülker were reported. These kinds of juridical comments were important because for the opposition, if these rumors were correct, this convention would clash with the Lausanne spirit and the Turkish sovereignty. Ülker protested the rumors that the Turkish government would also accept a Greek right to set up fisheries in its territorial waters. Any one in Turkey, Ülker claimed, until now could write about the possible positive results of this planned convention, which was protested by public across the country.[510]

Bulgaria, Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia. For more details see: *Resmi Gazete*, 20 September 1937, p. 8729.

[507] 16 May 1952: *Zabıt Cerideleri TBMM*, D: 9, Y: 3, C: 15, B: 73, O: 1, pp. 262-263.

[508] "Henüz Anlaşma İmza Edilmeden", *Ulus*, 13 July 1952, p. 1: "Yunanlılar kara sularımızda balık avlamağa başladılar."

[509] "Balık Meselesi", *Ulus*, 5 August 1952, p. 1: "Meclis'te tartışmalara neden olacağı bildiriliyor."

[510] "Balık Anlaşması Tenkidediliyor", *Ulus*, 7 August 1952, p. 1: "Yunanlılara Türk karasularında balık evi hakkını veren anlaşmanın bütün memleketteki menfi akisleri devam etmektedir. Şimdiye kadar bir kişi çıkıp bu işlerin iyi olduğunu izaha yarar yazı yazmamıştır."

Zafer was, however, one of those who defended the draft. As the organ of the current government, not surprisingly, it evaluated the issue in a totally different way. It even called the name of this draft agreement as "Türk-Yunan Müşterek Balık Avlama Tasarısı" (The Draft for Turkish-Greek Mutual Fishing) rather than just calling the fishery agreement or convention, as done by oppositional newspapers. This title was probably to put an emphasis on the word "mutual" to oppose *Ulus*'s allegations of Menderes's concessions to Greece. Nonetheless, more important than this, *Zafer* presented this draft as it would allow free fishing in the Greek territorial waters around the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, for Turkish fishermen.[511]

Thus, while *Ulus* tried to increase the concerns of Turkish people for the possibility of Greek fishing in the Turkish territorial waters, *Zafer* tried to present this draft as an opportunity for Turkish fishers to fish in the Greek territorial waters around the islands. What *Zafer* implied was that it was not the Turkish but the Greek concession. Indeed, the Turkish archival material also reveals that there was an opposition in Greece to the recent developments. For instance, on 27 August 1952, a Greek newspaper *Vradyni* published the protests of the fishers living in the Greek islands Lesbos and Crete. These islanders protested the Greek government's acceptance of exporting 3.000 tones fresh fish from Turkey in accordance with this draft treaty. This would, according to Greek newspapers, leave Greek fishermen jobless, so be a "death blow" (öldürücü darbe) for the Greek fishing.[512]

The opposition in Turkey, however, did not object to this draft due to economic concerns as did Greek fishermen. Indeed, the draft was mainly objected because of the concerns about the Turkish sovereignty in its territorial waters. Meanwhile, *Zafer* intensified its criticisms for *Ulus* regarding this pro-CHP newspaper's protests against these negotiations. Rather than making its own news about the draft itself, *Zafer* only refuted what *Ulus* said about the fishing issue. On 21 July 1952, for example, this newspaper accused *Ulus* of making "wrong and

[511] "Türk-Yunan Müşterek Balık Avlama Tasarısı", *Zafer*, 27 June 1952, p. 1: "Ege'deki Yunan adalarını saran bütün karasuları avcılığa açık bırakılacak."

[512] 5 September 1952: BCA, 030 01 102 636 4, p. 3: "Yunan balıkçılığını çok sarsacak ve balıkçı gemilerini işsiz bırakacak olan 3000 ton taze balık ithalini aynı şekilde telgrafla protesto etmişlerdir."

slanderous" publications. For this newspaper, the concern of *Ulus* for the Turkish territorial waters was not just a "delusion" (kuruntu) but also a "sign of ignorance" (cehalet tezahürü).[513] Three days later, on 24 July, *Zafer* again responded to *Ulus*'s reaction and claimed that it would be *Zafer*'s last engagement with the concerns of *Ulus*, which they found unnecessary. According to *Zafer*, this agreement would provide advantages for Turkish fishers.[514]

These harsh replies of *Zafer* did not actually work, and *Ulus* continued its criticisms. On the eve of Papagos's becoming the new Prime Minister in Greece, on 30 November 1952, Nihat Erim wrote in *Ulus*, trying to explain the possible damages of this draft treaty between Turkey and Greece that would regulate the fishery. He wrote:[515]

> For the reconciliation of interests of these two countries, the main condition is to remain loyal to the Lausanne mentality. This should not be tainted. Tainting this, perhaps, might provide temporary benefits for Greece. For instance, a draft giving a right to fishing to Greeks in the Turkish territorial waters is a defective work. Thus, even before it is enacted it led to negative repercussions in Turkish public opinion. On the other hand, this convention also did not please Greeks in terms of its conditions and of its method. So, it is seen that this fishery convention left on the public of these two states a poisoning impact on the relations of these two states. Such kinds of defective acts should be avoided. Steps should be taken after the Turkish and Greek public opinions were assessed. It is the proof of the damages done by initiatives against the Lausanne mentality such as the fishery convention.

Thus, Erim one more time repeated the significance of the Lausanne peace for the continuity of friendship between these two states without agitating the public

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513 "Türk-Yunan Balıkçılık Anlaşması", *Zafer*, 21 July 1952, p. 1.

514 "Gene Balıkçılık Anlaşması: Ulus'un Kaygısına Son Cevabımız", *Zafer*, 24 July 1952, p. 1: "Anlaşma balıkçılarımıza 4,5-9 milyon mahreç sağlıyor."

515 Nihat Erim, "Türk-Yunan Münasebetleri", *Ulus*, 30 November 1952, p. 1: "İki memleket menfaatlerinin uzlaştırılması için en büyük şart Lozan zihniyetine sadık kalmaktır. Bu bozulmamalıdır. Bunu bozmak belki Yunanistan'a geçici faydalar sağlar. Mesela Türkiye karasularında balık avı hakkını Yunanlılara veren sözleşme tasarısı sakat bir eserdir. Nitekim daha yürülüğe girmeden Türk halk efkarında çok menfi yankılar uyandırmıştır. Diğer taraftan sözleşme esasları ve tekniği bakımından Yunanlıları da memnun etmemiştir. Görülüyor ki balık sözleşmesi iki memleket halk efkarında, iki devlet münasebetlerini zehirliyen bir tesir bırakmıştır. Bu türlü sakat işlerden kaçınılmalıdır. Atılacak adımlar Türk ve Yunan halk efkarı önceden yoklandıktan sonra atılmalıdır. Balıkçılık sözleşmesi misali, Lozan zihniyetine aykırı teşebbüslerin fayda değil zarar getirdiğinin göstergesi."

opinion. Indeed, this is what the CHP and its organs always warned the Menderes government to reconsider its foreign policy toward Greece.

This draft that invigorated passionate debates in the oppositional press was not submitted the Turkish Parliament, and so was not enacted. It was known that although the Turkish and Greek parties agreed on many points, despite the fact that these points were not explicitly revealed to the public, this agreement was not finalized. Meanwhile, the violations in Turkish territorial waters continued. The rumors about the DP's promises to Greek authorities for free fishing in the Turkish territorial waters behind the closed doors might have encouraged the Greek fishers. Yet, at that period, what the DP did was not to bring this disputed fishing convention to the Parliament.[516]

These increasing violations in the Aegean Sea attracted the attention of the British representatives in the region. In his report to the British Embassy in Ankara, dating 31 December 1953, for instance, the British Consul of Rhodes underlined this and he said it was because of the fact that the Turkish territorial waters were rich of fish so the Greek fishing vessels did this. Nonetheless, he said that it "embroiled" the Turkish-Greek relations.[517] Then, he added:[518]

> Such incidents are likely to continue in this geographically entangled area of gulfs, jutting headlands and scattered islands. The temptation is too great especially as the adjacent Turkish coast is very sparsely populated. It is, for instance, no unknown thing for the meatless inhabitants of Castellorizo [a Greek island] to raid the Turkish grazing-grounds opposite and return with a sheep or two.

Again, the same report mentioned that on 8 August 1953 there occurred one of such incidents. Three small fishing vessels from the Greek islands, two from Kalymnos and one from Rhodes, were caught by the Turkish patrol boat, while they were fishing in the Turkish waters. According to the report, five of these fishers were

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[516] "Yunanlılar Karasularımızda Balık Avlıyamıyacaklar", *Milliyet*, 11 October 1954, p. 7: "İki sene evvel yapılan balıkçılık anlaşması henüz B.M.M since tasdik edilmediği için meri'yette bulunmıyor."

[517] 21-23 January 1954: TNA, FO 371/112835: "Relations with the Turks are embroiled by repeated incidents involving the confiscation of local Greek fishing vessels and the arrest and imprisonment of crews. The territorial waters at the Turkish coast opposite are far richer in fish than the seas around the local fishing in them."

[518] 21-23 January 1954: TNA, FO 371/112835.

arrested and sent to Bodrum, the nearest town center, but two of them achieved to escape by swimming.[519]

It was indeed one of the usual events that both states got accustomed to. In August of 1953, five days before this event, however, there also occurred a quite different event almost at the same place, in Fethiye. When compared to the other usual events, it attracted the close attention of both countries. This incident did not occur between Greek fishermen and Turkish authorities, rather it took place between the crew of a Greek war ship and a Turkish patrol boat. It was first widely reported and protested in Greek press. Then, this reaction of the Greek press annoyed the Turkish press and so it was also carried to Turkish newspapers.

This, in fact, was just a rescue operation that strained the relations between Turkey and Greece. On 3 August 1953, Air France aircraft, Lockheed 749 A-F.BAZS, flying from Paris to Tehran, via Rome-Beirut, made an emergency water landing in Fethiye.[520] The crash was first seen by the Turkish lighthouse keepers, and the passengers and crew were immediately rescued.[521] Yet, four passengers out of 42 died. How this accident had created a crisis between Turkey and Greece is an interesting story. The problem was about a Greek gunboat which did not hoist a Turkish flag but decided to help the crashed French plane, the following day after the crash, when the plane was still in the Turkish territorial waters. There occurred a dispute between the Turkish authorities and the crew of the Greek gunboat and the Turkish authorities perceiving the Greek gunboat's rejection of hoisting a Turkish flag as an unjustified attack on the Turkish flag and hence sovereignty arrested the Greek crew. This arrest highly angered Greek press. According to Turkish newspapers, their Greek peers used this issue as an opportunity to make news against Turkey.

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[519] 21-23 January 1954: TNA, FO 371/112835: "Three small fishing vessels-two from Calymnos and one from Rhodes-were fishing in Turkish waters on the 8th when accosted by a Turkish patrol-boat. The five members of two of the boats were arrested and taken to Budrum; and two Greeks in the third sank their boat and escaped by swimming off to a nearby islet."

[520] "Rapport d'enquete sur l'accident survenu: Fethiye (Turquie), la 3 aout 1953, a l'avion Lockheed 749 A-F.BAZS, dela Campagnie Nationale Air France", *Journal official de la Republique Française annaxe administrative*, 16 March 1954, pp. 149-154.

[521] "Kuru Gürültü", *Cumhuriyet*, 13 August 1953, pp. 1, 3.

Initially, this event did not attract the attention of the Turkish press. However, this Greek approach also turned the attention of the Turkish newspapers to this event, and they protested the Greek newspapers. For instance, *Cumhuriyet* on 12 August 1953 made a news entitled "Yunan Gazetelerinin Yakışıksız Neşriyatı" (The Inappropriate Publications of Greek Newspapers) and reported that all Greek newspapers covered and magnified this issue, writing "very ugly" (çok çirkin) articles against Tukey.[522] Moreover, according to *Cumhuriyet*, these Greek newspapers also tried to hide the underlying reason behind the arrest.[523] Even this ship entered the Turkish territorial waters with a purpose of rescue operation, without a Turkish flag and permission, which was a violation, and the crew displayed disrespect for the Turkey flag, Yet, Greek newspapers disregarded all these points.

Indeed, this incident occurred at a period when both Turkish and Greek authorities tried to establish closer relations with each and with Yugoslavia as well, with the purpose of establishing a military alliance between these three states, all of which were the members of the Second Balkan Pact. Thus, understandably, the attitude of the Greek authorities in this respect different from that of the Greek press. On 12 August, *Cumhuriyet* reported the views of Stefanos Stefanopoulos, the Greek Foreign Minister, about this incident happened in Fethiye. It was reported that the Greek Foreign Minister, after talking with the Greek ambassador to Ankara, had contacted the Turkish authorities. And, after these diplomatic initiatives, the arrested crew was released. So, for the Minister, *Cumhuriyet* stated, the problem was solved.[524]

It was clear that the Greek authorities did not want the issue to remain a challenge between Turkey and Greece. This led *Cumhuriyet* to further question the

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[522] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Yakışıksız Neşriyatı", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 August 1953, p. 1: "Bütün gazeteler Fethiye hadisesini ele alıp büyüterek aleyhimizde çok çirkin yazılar yazıyorlar."

[523] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Yakışıksız Neşriyatı", p. 1.

[524] "Yunan Dışişleri Bakanının Beyanatı", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 August 1953, p. 1: "(Atina-11 (THA)) Birkaç gün evvel, Fethiyede Fransız tayyaresi kazazedelerini almak üzere gelen Yunan gemisi kaptanının Türk bayrağına hakarette bulunmak suretile çıkardığı hadise hakkında fikri sorulan Yunan Dış İşleri Bakanı Stefanopulos, hadiseye kapanmış nazarile bakılabileceğini söylemiştir. Yunan Dış İşleri Bakanı hadiseyi müteakib Ankaradaki Yunan Büyük Elçisi ile telefonda görüştüğünü ve bu görüşme neticesinde de Türk makamlarile temasa geçilerek Yunan gemisi kaptanı mürettebatının serbest bırakılması hususunun temin edildiğini söylemiş ve meselenin kapandığını ilave etmiştir."

approach of the Greek newspapers. It asked what the reason of their manipulation was. For *Cumhuriyet*, this agitation was related to the emerging Cyprus campaign in Greece which aimed to damage good relations between two states.[525] In order to prove its argument, this newspaper published quotations from popular Greek newspapers. For instance, *Elefteria* claimed that the release of arrested Greeks, who had been kept under "harsh condition" for 130 hours, did not end this issue.[526] Another Greek newspaper, *Etnikos Kriks* asked what happened to the Turkish-Greek friendship.[527] Similarly, *Kathimerini* used a title such as "Acayip Bir Dostluk" (A Strange Friendship).[528]

In fact, *Cumhuriyet* was right to connect the intensifying *enosis* campaigns in Greece with this issue. Supporters of the *enosis* did not care about the current friendship of Greece with Turkey. Thus, this incident in Fethiye turned into a political tool for them. Probably, this atmosphere also led British authorities, as the part of the Cyprus disputes,[529] to keep a strict eye on the Turkish-Greek relations, and even such small incidents became important to Britain, too. Like *Cumhuriyet*, a British document, dating August 1953, also referred some articles published in Greek newspapers. This document also reported the views of *Kathimerini*, which was labelled as a governmental newspaper. A passage taken from this Greek newspaper was such: "It is a fact that at the time Greeks and Turks were enemies, their neighboring relations were better than today when they are supposed to be friends." *Kathimerini* implied that Turkey acted against this friendship. Similarly, *Elefteria*, which was one of the oppositional newspapers according to this British document,

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[525] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Yakışıksız Neşriyatı", p. 5: "Tam bu sırada Kıbrıs hakkında da daha çok Türkiye'yi ittihaz eden bir kampanyanın başlamış olması iki memleket arasındaki normal münasebetleri zedelemeğe matuf sistemli bir plan takib edildiği hissini uyandırmıştır."

[526] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Yakışıksız Neşriyatı", p. 5: "130 saat müddetle en ağır şartlar altında tutulan Yunan mevkuflarının serbest bırakılması, bu meselenin kapanmasına sebeb teşkil etmez."

[527] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Yakışıksız Neşriyatı", p. 5: "Türk-Yunan dostluğu nerede kaldı?"

[528] "Yunan Gazetelerinin Yakışıksız Neşriyatı", p. 5.

[529] The emerging Cyprus problem in the Turkish-Greek relations and the stance of Britain in this issue will be discussed in the next chapter.

claimed that Turkey's "improper action" in this event, in Fethiye led the French and NATO authorities in İzmir to take severe steps against Turkey.[530]

Actually, through these claims, the Greek newspapers aimed to implicitly threaten Turkey, using the alliance of Turkey with the West. The Headquarters of NATO in İzmir symbolized the Turkish-Greek relations for the reason that the military forces of these two states worked together since September of 1952. This partnership in İzmir was also praised in various news of Western press as mentioned in Chapter III. So, this emphasis of *Elefteria* was on purpose. Most probably, it tried to reveal how Turkey acted against the Cold War partnership. In addition to these newspapers, the British report also included the news of *Vima*, which described this flag issue as the sign of "ridiculous chauvinism" of Turkey.[531] For Turkey, on the contrary, it was the Greek press but not Turkey that posed the problem.

The Greek authorities, too, were uneasy about this agitation of the Greek press. Probably worried of a possible damage on the Turkish-Greek friendship, the Greek side decided to take steps against the ones who were responsible for the problem. On 12 August, *Cumhuriyet* reported that the Greek Foreign Ministry appointed Greek civil servants to investigate this incident. Two states even agreed to carry out a mutual investigation of the incident.[532]

The following day, *Cumhuriyet* continued to protest agitations in Greek press about this issue. It declared that "Yunan Basını Hesabına Yüzlerimiz Kızarıyor" (We are Ashamed of in the Name of the Greek Press) and continued to deny the accusations of the Greek press. According to abovementioned British report, *Elefteria* claimed that France protested the Turkish action. Nevertheless, this *Cumhuriyet* item responded to these claims, by reporting the thanks of the French

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[530] Despite these claims of *Elefteria*, there were no Turkish document showing any protest of Turkey either by the French or the NATO authorities.

[531] 13-17 August 1953: TNA, FO 371/107494.

[532] "Hadiseye Sebebiyet Veren Yunanlı Memurlar İşlerinden Alındılar", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 August 1953, p. 5: "(Atina-11) Yunan Dışişleri Bakanlığından bildirildiğine göre, geçen hafta Fethiye civarında denize düşen Fransız yolcu uçağının kazazedelerini almak üzere Fethiye limanına getirilmiş olan Yunan harb gemisi mürettebatı ile Türk makamları arasında çıkan müessif hadisenin mesulünü bulmak maksadile iki memleket temsilcilerinin iştirakile kurulacak bir komisyon yakında incelemelere başlıyacaktır. Bakanlığın ilave ettiğine göre, hadiseye sebebiyet veren Yunanlı memurlar muhakkaten işlerinden alınmışlardır."

government and Air France to Turkey for its help for victims of the plane crash. Similarly, *Cumhuriyet* reported the telegraphs of its readers from Fethiye, who witnessed this event, in order to show the facts. In other words, it was to deny the claims of Greek newspapers.[533] In doing this, once more *Cumhuriyet* aimed to explain "what this "Fethiye Incident" was.[534] The aim of the newspaper was to clarify the flag issue, actually, the missing part in the Greek narration of the story. *Cumhuriyet* stated that the day after the Turkish rescue operation, the Greek gunboat came to Fethiye to transport these passengers and crew of Air France. Yet, it was not stated in this item either this gunboat was asked to attend to the rescue operation or not. Rather, the newspaper focused on how the prestige of the Turkish flag was tarnished. When the Turkish authorities realized that, despite the international rules, there was no Turkish flag in this Greek gunboat sailing in the Turkish territorial waters, asked the reason of it, and the crew said it was because they did not have any Turkish flag. Then, a flag was sent to the gunboat. This time, while the captain was "throwing" the flag to a crew member to fly it, the flag dropped on the deck.[535] After this, the crew of the gunboat was detained. Yet, according to *Cumhuriyet*, probably the Turkish authorities did not want to exaggerate issue and released them without losing time.[536] *Cumhuriyet* continued: "Here it is the "Fethiye Incident" and due to this incident (!) Greek newspapers grabbed their pens and started publications, without neglecting to represent Turks as primitive, brutal, cruel and tyrant."[537]

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[533] "Yunan Basını Hesabına Yüzlerimiz Kızarıyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 13 August 1953, p. 1: "Fransa hükümeti ve Air France uçak kazazedelerine yaptığımız yardımlardan dolayı teşekkür ettiler. Yunan basınının Fethiyede uçak kazası münasebetile yaptıkları yakışıksız neşriyat okuyucularımızın malumudur. Dün gelen aşağıdaki telgraflar bu neşriyatı fiilen tekzib etmekte ve dost Yunanistanın basınına hak ve hakikat namına yerinde bir ikaz teşkil eylemektedir. Mütenebbih olmalarını temenni edelim."

[534] "Kuru Gürültü", p. 1: "Vak'a yaratmış olmak adına hemen "Fethiye hadisesi" ismi takılan hadise nedir?"

[535] "Kuru Gürültü", p. 3.

[536] "Kuru Gürültü", p. 3: "Mesele yapılmağa değer bir ehemmiyette bulunmadığı görülmüş olacak ki Yunanlı denizciler derhal serbest bırakılmışlar ve memleketlerine dönmüşlerdir."

[537] "Kuru Gürültü", p. 3: "İşte "Fethiye Hadisesi" bu ve bu hadiseden (!) dolayıdır ki Yunan gazeteleri kaleme sarılmışlar ve Türklerin ne iptidailiklerini, ne vahsiliklerini, ne zulüm ve istibdad temayüllerini ihmal etmemecesine neşriyata başlamışlardır."

This missing part about the Turkish flag in the Greek version of the story also initially misled the British diplomatic representatives both in Ankara and Athens. For instance, the British Consul of Rhodes, as mentioned above, immediately after the event, in August 1953, in his report to the British Embassy in Ankara, found Turkey guilty and asked "how can the Turks permit themselves, with no apparent provocation, to act in ways which can all too easily undo all that the Treaty of Ankara [1930] is intended to achieve."[538] Meanwhile, however, as the issue became clearer, the British Consul finished his report, dating January 1954, as such: "we fear that in our letter 1031/6/53 of August 13 we were over kind to the Greeks." This Turkish act, i.e. the arrest of these Greeks, was not without apparent "provocation."[539] Actually by provocation, the British authority referred to this Greek disrespect to the Turkish flag in Fethiye.

In the intervening time, these kinds of Greek provocations that aroused the agitation of the Turkish authorities continued, as did the Greek violations in the Turkish territorial waters. The worsening Turkish-Greek relations also affected the planned fishing agreements and, toward the end of 1954, the DP government started to change its policy for this issue in general. On 11 October 1954, *Milliyet* published very interesting news regarding this shift. This newspaper reminded that in 1952, Turkey and Greece agreed on a draft treaty for fishing matters, which had been "objected by the opposition strongly." As stated above, however, this draft agreement was not brought to the Parliament and it was not ratified. Thus, it was not legally binding and its status remained as *ad referendum*. Nonetheless, according to the news, the government decided to postpone this agreement totally.[540] On 30 January 1955, *the New York Times* also noted about this shift in the Turkish policy. It

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[538] 13-17 August 1953: TNA, FO 371/107494.

[539] 21-23 January 1954: TNA, FO 371/112835.

[540] "Yunanlılar Karasularımızda Balık Avlıyamıyacaklar", *Milliyet*, 11 October 1954, p. 7: "Yunan balıkçılarının, hükümetimiz tarafından gösterilen müsaamayı suistimal ettikleri ve sahillerimize sokularak balık yuvalarını imha ettikleri ileri sürülmektedir. Bilindiği gibi, iki sene evvel Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında imzalanan Balıkçılık Anlaşması, muhalefet tarafından şiddetle tenkid edilmişti. Bugün alakalıların verdikleri izahate göre, hakikatte bir ad referendum mahiyetinde olan bu anlaşma, henüz Büyük Millet Meclisine sevkedilip tasdik edilmediği için, esasen meriyette bulunmamaktadır. Yalnız, öğrendiğimize göre anlaşma, Büyük Millet Meclisine getirilmeyerek tasdik edilmemesi düşünülmektedir."

was argued that the Turkish government's concern for the Greek "arms-running" activities in Cyprus made the Turkish side "postponing a debate on the Turkish-Greek fisheries agreement."[541]

It was clear that due to the changing atmosphere in the Turkish-Greek relations, which lost its momentum mainly with the Cyprus problem, Turkey found the toleration of the Greek violations in the Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, which continued to raise tension between these two states in the following period, increasingly difficult to sustain. As a result, Turkey changed its approach toward Greece. According to the broadcast of the state radio of Athens, for instance, on 9 December 1955, one Greek fishing vessel, while sailing through the Turkish territorial waters, was fired on by Turkish coastguards, and one member of the crew was killed.[542]

This event occurred just after the deterioration of the Turkish-Greek relations following the 6-7 September events. Thus, the relations were already in crisis. Nonetheless, what was obvious is that from 1946 to 1955, Turkey and Greece could not settle this problem. While Turkey was disturbed by the continuing violations in its territorial waters, Greece asked Turkey to be more tolerant. Yet, with the insistent objections of the oppositional press in Turkey, perceiving violations in the Turkish territorial waters as threat to Turkish sovereignty and the shifts in the Turkish-Greek relations, in time, the DP government also felt itself forced to be more intolerant of these Greek violations, which further mounted tension in the Turkish-Greek relations.

V.III. Conclusion

From the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, not only the political crises such as the minority problems and the Cyprus issue, but also the small isolated cases agitated the Turkish press and public. Such incidents, then, turned into grave national issues easily due to the precarious nature of the Turkish relations with Greece. The worst

[541] "Turks Warn on Cyprus: Pro-Governmental Paper Accuses in Arms-Running", *The New York Times*, 30 January 1955, p. 3.

[542] 9-12 December 1955: TNA, FO 371/117698.

scenario for political authorities and Western powers was that such issues carried a potential of leading people to lose their belief in the Turkish-Greek friendship, which was propagated as the political necessity of the Cold War.

This chapter examined two different cases occurred in different times. Although one occurred during the rule of the CHP and the other was in that of DP, they shared a significant commonality. At both times, the Turkish and Greek governments felt themselves obliged to act together. In the first case, for example, they were not the members of the Atlantic Pact, and the accession to NATO was their common goal. In addition, their desire to increase the amount of the resulting from the Marshall Plan brought these two government together. The pragmatic attitude of the government, however, was not enough to stop criticisms of the Turkish press. Instead, even small incidents caused deep resentment among both the governmental and oppositional journalists. According to both groups, it was needed to differentiate the developing partnership between Turkey and Greece from such small incidents, which they considered an abusive attack on Turkey's national pride.

The second case occurred during the final rounds of negotiations to form a military alliance among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia after the conclusion of the Second Balkan Pact in order to have a military alliance, which promised mutual defense to all against the threats coming from the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. While the oppositional newspapers underlined the urgency of the Cold War strategic partnership between Turkey and Greece after the first incident, this time, they claimed that this partnership had already lost its momentum. They even casted suspicion upon the ongoing negotiations to form the military alliance. The most common fear of the oppositional newsapers was the possibility that the DP could grant concessions to Greece behind the closed doors for the sake of the Turkish-Greek friendship. It was the same suspicion that led the oppositional newspapers to follow the DP's fisheries policy keenly. By 1952, the oppositional press had become so suspicious of the DP's activities that an isolated event such as the one that took place in Fethiye in August 1953 could easily be regarded as a worrisome development, which was of high national priority.

CHAPTER VI

THE TURKISH MINORITIES IN WESTERN THRACE AND CYPRUS

Turkish/Muslim minorities in the Balkans have always attracted the attention of the Turkish press. Their daily life struggles, together with their never-ending problems such as property rights, have been reported to Turkish readers regularly. The early Cold War years were not an exception. Quite the contrary, the emerging communist regimes in some of the Balkan states made Turkish newspapers keep a stricter eye on pains of these people. The Greek case is especially interesting in this regard.

Since 1920, when Western Thrace was granted to Greece under the Treaty of Sevres, the rights of Turkish population have been secured with the treaties. As the Treaty of Sevres is invalid, it is the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923) together with the bilateral Convention on the Exchange of Populations (30 January 1923) that became the main legal documents for Muslim minority in Greece. Thanks to this Convention of 1923, which was revised with a new Convention on 10 June 1930, Turks living in Western Thrace exempted from the compulsory exchange of populations.[543]

Thus, with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Muslim community of Western Thrace, including Turks (constituting almost the %70 of the community), has

[543] "Türk ve Rum Ahalisinin Mübadelesine Dair Mukavelename ve Protokol", *Düstur*, Üçüncü Tertip, Vol: 5, pp. 205-206: "Madde 2- Birinci Maddede musarrah olan mübadele atideki ahaliye şamil değildir: a) Dersaadet Rum ahalisi; b) Garbî Trakyanın Müslüman ahalisi;" *Mübadelei ahaliye mütadair Lozan Muahedenamesile Atina İtilâlafnamesinin Tatbikatından Mütevellit Mesailin Sureti Katiyede Halli Hakkında Mukavelename* (Ankara: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hariciye Vekâleti, 1930), pp. 1-15; Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 364.

become the minority under legal protection.[544] In 1930, as Turkey and Greece solved their remaining minority problems regarding the exchange of populations, to some extent, living conditions of the Turkish population seemed to improve until the mid-1950s. Particularly, the early 1950s are accepted as exceptionally good days by some scholars.[545] This chapter focuses on the period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s and considers whether it was the case and what was the position of the Turkish press in relation to this.

For the early Cold War years, what made the Greek case different from the Balkan states for the Turkish press and the authorities was the Civil War in Greece. From 1946 to 1949, there was a civil war in this country between the current government and communists, in other words, between the Greek Government army and the Democratic Army of Greece. Thus, at least initially, the maltreatment of Turks in Western Thrace did not lead to a direct confrontation with the Greek government, as communists were seen responsible for the current maltreatment. With the end of the Civil War and hence the decline of the "communist threat," in 1949, the maltreatment of the Turkish minority in Greece became a source of friction between Greece and Turkey.

But this friction caused by the minority issue did not dominate the official agenda of these two states until 1955. Yet the Turkish press in this respect differed from the official agenda and reported the sufferings of Turks in Greece frequently throughout the period. The year of 1955 saw a substantial increase in the frequency of the news of how the Turkish minority faced waves of persecution in Greece. An article in *Milliyet* on 12 August 1956 represented this trend perfectly. *Milliyet* reported that attacks on the Turks in Greece had escalated recently.[546] This was not

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[544] Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "The Legal Status of Islam in Greece", *Die Welt des Islams*, 44/3 (2004), p. 405; Türkkaya Ataöv, "The Ethnic Turkish Minority in Western Thrace, Greece", *The Turkish Year Book* of International Relation, 22 (1992), p. 89-90.

[545] Christina Borou, "The Muslim Minority of Western Thrace in Greece: An Internal Positive or External Negative "Other"?", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 29/1 (2009), p. 8; Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", p. 593; Ali Dayıoğlu and İlksoy Asım, "Reciprocity Problem between Greece and Turkey: The Case of Muslim-Turkish and Greek Minorities", *Athens Journal of History* (January 2015), pp. 40-41.

[546] "Batı Trakya'daki Türklere Yapılan Tazyik Arttırıldı", *Milliyet*, 12 August 1956, p. 1.

much different in the case of Turkish Cypriots, who were almost the one-fifth of the population of the island. Yet, while in Greece Turks lived under the Greek government, in Cyprus they were British subjects. So, how the Turkish press represented the conditions of Turkish minorities living in both countries is also instrumental to understand the Turkish perceptions of Greece and Britain, as well as the emerging Cyprus disputes. So, this chapter, by focusing on Turkish view of Turks living in Greece and Cyprus from 1946 to 1955, examines how effective the press was in the creation of this view and how this public view influenced Turkey's policy toward Turkish minorities in Greece and Cyprus in general and the Cyprus problem in particular.

VI.I. The Turkish Minority in Greece and the Refugee Crises

The Greek Civil War, which continued almost three years from the autumn of 1946, though it was intensified in December of 1946, to the autumn of 1949, made itself heavily felt in Western Thrace, in Turkish villages.[547] Above all, there was a political instability in rural areas, and this instability inevitably hardened living conditions of Turks, as the clash between the government army and communists' armed forces took place mainly in the mountains of villages such as the ones populated by Turks. On the one hand, communists forced these people to fight with them, and on the other hand, the government army and the state-led illegal armed forces suppressed these people, in case of their backing communists or even without any reason. These people found themselves "stuck between a rock and a hard place."[548] Hence, Turkish newspapers, particularly the oppositional ones, closely watched the situation.

Cumhuriyet was one of them. In December of 1946, probably due to the intensification of the Civil War, this newspaper published various news about the violence encountered by Turks. On 5 December, for instance, news entitled "Batı Trakya'da Çeteler Faaliyetlerini Arttırdılar" (Gangs Increased Their Activities in

[547] Öksüz, *Batı Trakya Türkleri*, pp. 207-208.

[548] Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis and Georgios Niarchos, *The Last Ottomans: The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1940-1949* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 215-223.

Western Thrace) and on 8 December "Yunan Çeteleri Batı Trakya'da Toplanıyor" (Greek Gangs Gathered at Western Thrace) was to reveal the intensification of the activities of the illegal armed forces.[549] Interestingly, on 16 December, *Cumhuriyet* also put a stress on the fact that these Greek armed forces, assaulting to Turks, were not only leftist but there were also "extremist rightist gangs."[550] Although *Cumhuriyet* here referred to rightist groups, so at least admitted the fact that Turks in Western Thrace were a target of hostility from every front, and this was against the general trend in Turkey at that period. The Turkish press mainly blamed communists for the sufferings of the Turkish minority. *The New York Times*, which was hardly a pro-communist newspaper, mentioned this approach but also put forward the real situation:[551]

> For, contrary to reports in the Turkish press which, typical of its attitude toward the Left, is putting the entire blame on the communists, the refugees from Greece stated openly and banditry not only from the extreme Left wing but also from the extreme Rightists-especially from the Greek gendarmerie.

Turkish refugees, fled from the violence of armed forces, were a source of news for Turkish newspapers. The increase in the number of refugees toward the end of 1946 who escaped to Turkish Thrace resulted in changes in the news content, and the tone of the articles became inevitably more aggressive probably due to the interviews conducted with victims. As a result, this refugee problem, which was, in fact, a result of forced emigration, deliberate attacks, abuses and violations, received a substantial space in Turkish newspapers in 1947. On 28 July, for instance, Metin Toker, writting in *Cumhuriyet* at that period before his career in *Zafer*, wrote that Greek "gangs" started "massacres" in Western Thrace.[552] In the same issue,

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[549] "Batı Trakya'da Çeteler Faaliyetlerini Arttırdılar", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 December 1946, p. 1: "Yunan-Bulgar hududundaki Ortaköy'de toplanan çeteler Yunan arazilerine giriyorlar;" "Yunan Çeteleri Batı Trakya'da Toplanıyorlar", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1946, p. 1.

[550] "Batı Trakya Türklerine Yapılan İşkenceler", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 December 1946, p. 1: "Türk halkına yalnız solcu çeteler değil müfrit sağcı çeteler de tecavüz ediyorlar."

[551] "Anti-Communists Fleeing Balkans Find a Heaven in Turkish Thrace", *The New York Times*, 29 August 1947, p. 12.

[552] Metin Toker, "Çeteler Batı Trakya'da Katliama Başladılar", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1947, p. 1.

Cumhuriyet also allocated a space for the interviews with these refugees and hence make their voices heard by the Turkish public opinion.[553]

At the very same period, the organ of the current government, *Ulus*, however, had a slightly different approach. On August 24, 1947 this newspaper reported news that was not related with problems of Turks living in Western Thrace but it was about the ill-treatment of Turks living in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia under "communist oppressions." This news, "Balkanlarda Komünist Zulümler: Anavatana İltica Edenler Müthiş Şeyler Anlatıyorlar" (Communist Oppressions in the Balkans: [Refugees] Fled to Homeland Telling Terrible Stories), was reported by the newspaper's İzmir correspondent. He reported that 112 Turks arrived to İzmir from the Piraeus port of Greece on a Turkish steamship called *Aksu*, and the same steamship would carry them to İstanbul. These refugees were in Piraeus, in a refugee camp, because they had to first flee to Greece, as it was closer to the borders of Greece-Bulgaria and Greece-Yugoslavia. These Turkish people, according to *Ulus*, encountered various atrocities of communists since the Second World War both in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.[554]

Refugees did not only come from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia but there were also considerable number of Turks fleeing from Western Thrace. Due to these refugees, the American newspaper, *the New York Times*, concerned with the re-emergence of the old minority problem between Turkey and Greece, which had really strained the bilateral relations from 1923 to 1930. Just five days after this article of *Ulus*, on 29 August 1947, *the New York Times* made news entitled "Anti-Communists Fleeing Balkans Find a Heaven in Turkish Thrace" regarding this issue. It wrote that "the emigration of Turks from Greece threatens to reopen the old minority problem between the two countries that had been peacefully settled by permitting both the Turks in Greece and the Greeks in Turkey to enjoy life where

[553] "Yunanistan'dan Kaçan Türkler Neler Anlatıyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1947, p. 1.

[554] "Balkanlarda Komünist Zulümler: Anavatana İltica Edenler Müthiş Şeyler Anlatıyorlar", *Ulus*, 24 August 1947, pp. 1, 2: "(İzmir) Bugün Aksu vapuriyle Yunanistan'da Pire'deki kamplarda bulunan ırkdaşlarımızdan 112 kişilik bir grup şehrimize gelmiştir. Bunlar aynı vapurla İstanbul'a geçmektedirler. Bu ırkdaşlarımız İkinci Dünya Harbi içinde Bulgaristan ve Yugoslavya'da komünistlerin zulümlerinden arta kalmış bin bir maceraya şahit olmuş insanlardır."

they were."[555] This non-immigration rule for the Turkish and Greek minorities of Western Thrace and İstanbul was agreed in the Lausanne settlement. Nonetheless, as this newspaper clearly put forward, the current situation that almost 1.000 Turks fled from Western Thrace to Turkey by crossing the Maritza River, was against to this rule. These huge numbers of people, according to this newspaper, escaped to Turkey as there was no security for them in Greece.[556]

In order to prevent possible public protests against the Turkish government, the Turkish authorities quickly informed both Turkish citizens and Turks in Western Thrace about the precautions taken by the government against this refugee crisis. In September of 1947, Hasan Saka, for instance, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, explained the activities of the Turkish government to remedy the sufferrings of the Turkish minority. This was published in *Ulus* with a heading "Dışişleri Bakanı: Balkanlardaki Türklere İzahat Verdi" (The Foreign Minister: Made Explanations for Turks in the Balkans). *Ulus*, once more, chose to call this problem as a problem of the Balkan Turks but Saka's speech was mainly related to Turks living in Greece. The Foreign Minister first thanked to the Greek government which took necessary steps to provide security for the "Turkish minorities."[557] Referring to the "Turkish minorities," Saka in fact implied not only the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, but also the Turks fled from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to Greece, as explained above. Then, he added that it was right that Turks encountered bad conditions in Greece in the recent years. It was, Saka argued, however, mainly resulted from the domestic problems of this country, first due to the invasions during the war years and now

[555] "Anti-Communists Fleeing Balkans Find a Heaven in Turkish Thrace", p. 12.

[556] "Anti-Communists Fleeing Balkans Find a Heaven in Turkish Thrace", p. 12: "((Special to New York Times) Andrionople/Turkey, August 24 (Delayed)): ...Turkish Thrace has become today the refugee of those fearing communist dictatorship. The largest group of refugees nearly 1,000, may have come from Greece. They are part of the Turkish minority of 500,000 living in Greek Thrace. They are crossing the Maritza River-the Turco-Greek border-daily to find here the security that does not exist in Greece."

[557] "Dışişleri Bakanı: Balkanlardaki Türklere İzahat Verdi", *Ulus*, 5 September 1947, p. 1: "Bakan; Yunan hükümetinin Türk azınlıklarının emniyet ve asayişi için gereken tedbirleri aldığını bildirerek bunu teşekkürle ifade etti."

from the Civil War in Greece, "[Turkey's] friend."[558] This speech was probably to please the Turkish public opinion. So, Saka assured Turkish public opinion, both within the country and outside, that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was not "unaware" of the situation and it took necessary steps against each and every incident on time at the diplomatic level through the contacts with the Greek authorities in Athens.[559]

Saka's speech partially aimed to reassure the Greek public opinion, agitated by the communist publishing organs both in Greece and Bulgaria about the so-called hidden agenda of Turkey to invade Western Thrace under the pretext of maltreatment of the Turkish minority there. These organs started to spread such rumors in the end of August 1947, and these were also covered and protested by the Turkish press. On 30 August 1947, for instance, *Akşam* immediately published news to deny such claims in Bulgarian newspapers and stated that what Turkish authorities did was to use diplomatic channels in order to warn Greece to take necessary steps against the current sufferings of Turks. Akşam concluded: "Our government believes in the Greek government's taking necessary steps to secure lives and properties of Turks of Western Thrace."[560]

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[558] "Dışişleri Bakanı: Balkanlardaki Türklere İzahat Verdi", pp. 1, 3: "Hepimizin malumudur ki Garbi Trakya'da mühim miktarda Türk azınlığı namı altında bir ekaliyetimiz mevcuttur ve bu bir ahdi vaziyettir. Dışişleri bakanlığımız bunların mukedderatı ile her zaman ve daima layık olduğu veçhile icabettiği şekilde alakasını devam ettirmiştir. Harbin bilhassa son senelerinde muhtelif işgaller geçirmiş olan bu mıntıkada bu yurtdaşlarımızın, Türk azınlığının Garbi Trakya'da bir çok huzursuzluklar, ızdıraplı zamanlar geçirdiği muhakkaktır. Bunun en ziyade dikkati çeken safhası, bilhassa komşumuz ve dostumuz Yunanistan'ın bugün içinde çırpındığı dahili vaziyet zamanına tesadüf eder, Şimdiye kadar bu dahil ayaklanmanın dahili olmaktan daha başka sebeplere bağlı olduğu, beynelmilel komisyon marifetiyle yapılmış olan tahkikatten anlaşılmıştır. Malum olduğu üzere Yunanistan'ın bugünkü iç durumu bilhassa son zamanlarda Garbi Trakya mıntıkasında dahi tezahürlerini ve tahribatını göstermiştir. Bilhassa bizim azınlığımızın emniyet ve huzurunu kaçıran bir çok hadiseler maalesef olmuştur."

[559] "Dışişleri Bakanı: Balkanlardaki Türklere İzahat Verdi", p. 3: "Dışişleri Bakanlığımız bu hadiselerin hiçbirinden gafil değildir ve her biri hakkında layık olduğu veçhile icabeden teşebbüsleri vakit ve zamanında gerek burada gerek Atina'da ilgili makamlar nezlinde her zaman yapmıştır."

[560] "Garbi Trakya Türkleri", *Akşam*, 30 August 1947, p. 1: "Türkleri korumak için Garbi Trakya'ya asker göndermemiz mevzubahis değil. Son günlerde Bulgar basını ve onlardan naklen bazı ecnebi gazeteleri Garbi Trakya Türklerini çetelerin tecavüzlerinden korumak için Garbi Trakya'ya asker göndermek için müracaat ettiğine dair bazı haberler neşretmişlerdir. Türkiye hükümeti Grabi Trakya Türklerinin tecavüzlerden korunması hususunda sıkı tedbirleralınması için Yunan hükümeti nezdinde teşebbüslerde bulunmuştur. Fakat Garbi Trakyaya Türk askeri gönderilmesi asla bahis mevzuu olmamıştır. Hükümetimiz Garbi Trakya Türklerinin mal ve canlarını korumak için Yunanistan hükümetinin gereken tedbirleri alacağına inanmaktadır."

In fact, Turkey and Bulgaria had already agreed not to publish news that would result in agitation in both Turkish and Bulgarian populations. According to an official document sent from the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Turkish Prime Ministry, these two states agreed about this on 22 January 1947. On 19 March 1947, however, the Bulgarian Embassy in Ankara conveyed its protests to the Turkish Foreign Ministry about a Turkish newspaper, *Son Posta*, for its news item which attacked the Bulgarian Prime Minister and created a negative impact on the Bulgarian public opinion.[561] Taken this complaint seriously, Hasan Saka reported this Bulgarian protest to the Prime Ministry and expressed his view that unless the Bulgarian press "created a necessity" the Turkish press had to be very careful about writing anything against Bulgarians.[562] Yet, this news of *Akşam* dating 30 August 1947, mentioned above, however, showed that although Bulgarians immediately protested Turkish newspapers just for any negative presentation of their rule, they published items accussing Turkey of even getting ready to invade Western Thrace.[563]

Turkey, unable to prevent the hostile press coverage in Bulgaria, was not also able to prevent similar news items appeared in communist Greek newspapers. In his speech published in *Ulus* on September 5, thus, Saka also complained news of *Vizoz Patrisa*, "the organ of Communist Party of Greece,"[564] which repeated such claims similar to those of Bulgarian. This Greek newspaper, according to Saka, even argued that this so-called Turkish plan of invading Western Thrace was backed by the US.[565]

Saka concluded his words with thanks to the Greek authorities. Relying on the August report of Turkish Consulate in Komotini (Gümülcine), he argued that the

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[561] 19 March 1947: BCA, 030 01 243 646 14, pp. 1-3.

[562] 19 March 1947: BCA, 030 01 243 646 14, p. 2: "Bulgar basını sebebiyet vermedikçe basınımızın da Bulgaristan aleyhinde yayında bulunmaması düşüncemi teyiden keyfiyeti yüksek bilgi ve takdirlerine derin saygılarımla arzederim."

[563] "Garbi Trakya Türkleri", p. 1.

[564] "Dışişleri Bakanı: Balkanlardaki Türklere İzahat Verdi", p. 3: "…bazı Yunan gazeteleri, hassaten Vizoz Patrisa adındaki Komünist partisinin organı..."

[565] "Dışişleri Bakanı: Balkanlardaki Türklere İzahat Verdi", p. 3: "Güya biz Garbi Trakya'yı işgal etmek için Garbi Trakya Türklerinin huzursuzluk ve asayişsizliğini vesile ittihaz ediyomuşuz. Hatta Amerika Hükümeti bunu arzu ederek bizim müsellah kuvvetlerimizle Yunanistan işlerine müdahale etmemizi istemiş."

Greek government did its best to provide security for the Turkish minority.[566] So, he implied that there was no need for Turkey to take further actions. According to *the New York Times*, although knowing the problems of the Turkish minority, what set back Turkey to ask Greece for "better treatment of its minority" was the fear of justifying the "Russian game."[567] This "Russian game" was the Soviet propaganda that aimed to agitate the Greek public opinion against Turkey, which was accussed of planning to invade Western Thrace. Thus, Saka in a way tried to give assurances that Turkey did not have such an intention.

Saka's speech was welcomed by the Greek press. On 13 September, *Ulus* covered the positive reception of this speech by three Greek newspapers, *Estia*, *Akropolis* and *Efteria*: "B. Saka'nın Batı Trakya'ya Dair Demeci: Yunan Basınında Memnunlukla Karşılandı" (Saka's Speech for Western Thrace: Welcomed by the Greek Press). *Estia*, as *Ulus* reported, argued that this speech put a definite end to the systematic attacks of communists with their "made up lies."[568] Similarly, *Akropolis* claimed that this speech did not only prove the news of "international Bolshevists" were "fabricated" but also showed that the only friend of Greece among its neighbors was Turkey.[569] *Esteria* also pointed out that this speech was based on the principles of good neigborhood and ought to be an example for the northern neighbors of

[566] "Dışişleri Bakanı: Balkanlardaki Türklere İzahat Verdi", p. 3: "Garbi Trakya'daki Gümülcine Konsolosluğumuzdan Ağustos ayı içinde aldığımız son raporda da görüldüğü veçhile Yunanistan hükümeti elinden gelen bütün tedbirleri almak suretiyle Yunanistan halkının oduğu gibi bizim Garbi Trakya'daki Türk azınlığın da emniyet ve asayişine müteallik olan tedbirleri sarfetmekten kaçınmadığına huzurunda teşekkürle şehadet etmek bana düşen bir vazifedir."

[567] "Anti-Communists Fleeing Balkans Find a Heaven in Turkish Thrace", p. 12: "Until now the Turkish Government, although aware of the fact, has refrained from intervening in Athens to obtain better treatment of its minority because it feels such a step would help Russian game."

[568] "B. Saka'nın Batı Trakya'ya Dair Demeci: Yunan Basınında Memnunlukla Karşılandı", *Ulus*, 13 September 1947, p. 1: "Estia gazetesi, şunları yazıyor: Yapılan beyanat bu manada çok iyi karşılanmıştır. Zira bu, komünistlerin sistemli ve yalandan ibaret olan hücumlarına kati olarak son vermiştir."

[569] "B. Saka'nın Batı Trakya'ya Dair Demeci: Yunan Basınında Memnunlukla Karşılandı", p. 1: "Bu beyanat, milletlerarası Bolşevizmin yaptığı aslı esası olmıyan uydurma haberlerin ne kadar kabaca uydurulmuş olduğu, Hasan Saka'nın, komşularımız arasında tek dostumuz olan memleket Bakanının sözlerinden anlaşılmaktadır."

Greece.[570] Yet, despite these assurances of the Turkish authorities, the anti-Turkish propaganda of the communist Balkan states, mainly Bulgaria, continued.[571]

This conciliatory approach of the Turkish government to make Greek public believe in the fact that Turkey did not have any claims on the Greek territories did not satisfy the oppositional Turkish newspapers as it did the Greek ones. Six months after this speech of Saka, for instance, *Yeni Sabah* published news about the current Turkish-Greek relations and the continuing problems of Turks in Western Thrace. Indeed, the main aim of this news was to attack an article of Ahmet Emin Yalman, the owner of *Vatan* newspaper, who wrote his ideas about Turkey's policies toward Greece after his visit to this country. According to *Yeni Sabah*'s summary, Yalman did not hesitate to ask Turkey for more concessions in favour of its neighbor. To illustare, according to Yalman, Greeks were not satisfied with Turkey's "insufficient" support for Greece during its civil war. What most disturbed *Yeni Sabah* about this article were that Yalman's complaints about the Turkish restriction for Greeks to return Anatolia.[572] *Yeni Sabah* saw this call as a result of "over zealousness" especially in a time when the Turkish minority had to endure many difficulties in Greece. *Yeni Sabah* implied rather than thinking about Greeks, Turkey had to protest the attacks against Turks, either by the communist armed forces or by the government army, more severely.[573] This article of *Yeni Sabah* seemed to attack

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[570] "B. Saka'nın Batı Trakya'ya Dair Demeci: Yunan Basınında Memnunlukla Karşılandı", *Ulus*, 13 September 1947, p. 1: "Efteria gazetesi de, bu beyanatın, iyi komşuluk esaslarına dayandığını ve Yunanistan'ın kuzey komşuları için eğer Yunanistan'a hakikaten iyi komşuluk istiyorlarsa, bir misal teşkil edebileceğini yazmaktadır."

[571] Athanassopoulou, "Western Defence Developments and Turkey's Search for Security in 1948", p. 82.

[572] "Vatan Başyazarı Ne Demek İstiyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 4 March 1948, pp. 1, 3: "Fakat bir Avrupa seyahatinden dönen Ahmed Emin Yalman, Yunanistan'a uğramış, oradan yeni ve dumanı üstünde intibalar edinerek bizlere yeni direktifler getirmiş bulunuyor. Bizzat kendisinin de şahsen iştirak ettiğini açıkladığı bir Yunanlının dilek ve isteklerine tercüman olan bu yazısında "Vatan" başyazarı, Türkiye'nin Yunanistan'a karşı hareket hattının daha canlı, daha faal, işbirliğinin daha sıkı olmasını istiyor. Yunanlı dostlarımız Türklerin atıl ve batıl durumlarından Yunanistan'ın başına gelen felaketler karşısında sadece teessür izhar ederek kuru teselli hatları sarfetmelerinden çok üzülüyorlarmış ve Yalman'a göre hakları da varmış [...] Diğer tarafdan Ahmet Emin Yalman karışık cümlelerle Yunanlılara Anadolu'ya dönmek imkanını hala vermediğimizden şikayet ediyor. Anlaşılan Atina'da kendisi iyice doldurulmuş. Yalman ne istiyor kapanmış bir tarih faslını yeniden tek taraflı olarak mı açalım?"

[573] "Vatan Başyazarı Ne Demek İstiyor?", p. 1: "Bugün için yapılacak bir şey varsa o da Yunan topraklarında ırk ve dindaşlarımıza karşı reva görülen zulümleri Atina nezdinde daha şiddetle protesto

another oppositional journalist, Ahmet Emin Yalman. Nevertheless, it was full of implicit criticisms for the current CHP government under Hasan Saka. It implied that Turkey should have protested Athens more regarding the maltreatment of Turkish/Muslim minority.

Despite this criticism, on the contrary, the pro-government newspapers' wide coverage of Turkish-Greek cooperation against the problem of anti-communist refugees of Bulgaria was also valid in the early years of the DP rule. Five months after the DP's coming to power, the Greek governor general of Western Thrace visited Edirne. On 12 October 1950, *Cumhuriyet* published news about this visit, and explained its reason as the migration issue.[574] In the news, it was also reported that the Greek Prime Minister would also come to Turkey about this migration problem.[575]

In fact, this migration problem was about the refugees from Bulgaria to Turkey or Greece.[576] So, what brought these two countries together was the refugees from Bulgaria, escaped "from the communist rule," to these two countries. And, by 1951, this problem was intensified and its coverage in Turkish press even attracted the attention of the British Embassy in Ankara. In a report of the British Embassy to the Foreign Office in London on 12 January 1951, this negative press coverage in Turkey was noted.[577] On 14 December 1951, similarly, the popular British newspaper, *the Manchester Guardian*, reported the Bulgarian refugee problem of

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ederek onları korumak ve bu zulümlere mani olmaktır. Durum bu merkezde iken Yunanlıların bizden şikayetçi olduklarından dem vurmak fazla gayretkeşlik olur [...] Türkiye dostlarının en karanlık günlerinde de yanlarında bulunmaktan zevk duyar. Düşkünlere hiç bir zaman sırt çevirmek Türkün cihanmerd tabiatında yoktur. Biz o kadar vekarlı bir milletiz ki, Yunan topraklarında ırk ve din kardeşlerimizin gerek komünist çeteler gerek onlara karşı hareket eden Yunan hükümet kuvvetleri tarafından uğradıkları en ağır cürumlar bile hergün işittiğimiz halde fazla bir velvele ve şamata yapmıyoruz. Mamaafih Rumelideki Türklerin çektikleri acıların sızısını kalbimizde duymuyor değiliz. Sukünumuzun ve vekarlı duruşumuzun manası bu değildir. Millet, hükümetin bu yolda ve icab edenler nezdinde teşebbüslerde bulunmakta olduğunu tahmin etmekle teselli oluyor."

[574] "Yunanlıların Umum Valisi Edirne'ye Geldi", *Cumhuriyet*, 12 October 1950, p. 1: "Hudud şehrimizde göçmenler meselesi etrafında görüşmeler olacağı sanılıyor."

[575] "Yunanlıların Umum Valisi Edirne'ye Geldi", p. 1.

[576] "Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a İltica Eden Bulgarlar", *Cumhuriyet*, 13 October 1950, p. 1.

[577] 12 January 1951: TNA, FO, 371/95313.

Turkey and Greece.[578] However, this cordial relationship and mutual understanding about the minority problem did not exist when it was about the Turkish minority in Greece and the Greek minority in Turkey. This problem, thus, continued to exist so on and so forth, despite the end of Civil War in Greece and the change of rule in Turkey.

The early 1950s witnessed the end of direct pyhsical attack. Yet, according to the Turkish press, this time the Greek authorities' seizure of properties of Turks led to sufferings. On 2 October 1952, for instance, *Yeni Sabah* mentioned these property problems and how Greek authorities acted against the minority rights settled in the Treaty of Lausanne:[579]

> Greeks are seizing the lands of the [Turkish] landowners. According to accounts of Turks coming from Western Thrace, the Greek administrative authorities are taking action against the Turkish minority, contrary to the articles of the Lausanne Treaty. According to the articles of the Lausanne Treaty, the property rights of Turkish minority in Western Thrace on their real estates and lands were recognized. Yet, recently, the Greek authorities attempted to seize the lands of big landowners and set to put these attempts in practice [...] These unpleasant incidents, occurred on the eve of our President [Celal Bayar]'s visit to Greece, is received with grief.

Similarly, on 11 November 1952, *Cumhuriyet* reported the story of 49 Turks who escaped from Western Thrace and came to Ayvalık because of "difficult living conditions" including the loss of property.[580]

In fact, November 1952 was the eve of the elections in Greece. According to *Yeni Sabah*, Turks in Greece were supporters of Alexandros Papagos.[581] He won the elections on 19 November 1952. Actually, during his office, in 1954, Papagos took some concrete steps for the sake of the Turkish minority such as his order of calling

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[578] "The Refugees in Greece", *The Manchester Guardian*, 14 December 1951, p. 6.

[579] "Garbi Trakya'da Yaşıyan Türkler", *Yeni Sabah*, 2 October 1952, pp. 1, 5: "Yunanlılar arazi sahiplerinin topraklarını ellerinden alıyorlar. Garbi Trakyadan gelen Türklerin anlattıklarına göre, Yunan idare makamları, Lozan muahedesi hükümlerine aykırı olarak Türk azınlığa karşı harekete geçmiş bulunmakta. Lozan muahedesi hükümleri gereğince Trakya'da bulunan Türk azınlığın sahip bulunduğu arazi ve emlak üzerindeki hakları tanınmıştır. Halbuki son zamanlarda Yunan makamları büyük arazi sahiplerinin ellerinden topraklarını alma hususunda teşebbüse geçmişler ve bu teşebbüslerini tahakkuk sayfasına koymuşlardır [...] Cumhurbaşkanımızın Yunanistan'ı ziyaret edeceği günler arifesinde vukua gelen bir takım nahoş hadiseler, teessürle karşılanmaktadır."

[580] "Batı Trakyadan Ayvalığa Gelen 49 Mülteci", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 November 1952, p. 1.

[581] "İskece Tarafındaki Türkler Meskun Olan Mıntıkalar Papagos'u Tutuyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 November 1952, p. 1.

their schools as "Turkish schools" rather than "Muslim minority schools." This was really a radical step as since the Lausanne settlement Turks in the region demanded to be recognized as the Turkish minority rather than the Muslim one. Yet, it was a temporal gain as the Greek authorities withdrew this symbol of recognition of the Turkish identity in 1957.[582] Yet, beside this positive step, the problems of Turks continued throughout the Papagos government that ended on 4 October 1955, when he died.

The problems continued, so did the Turkish press' interest. On 24 June 1953, a pro-DP newspaper, *Demokrat Ankara* carried the problems of Turkish minority to its first column. Fuad Suat Bayramoğlu, a Turkish authority worked both for the Prime Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, wrote an article entitled "Böyle Dostluk Olmaz!" (There Can't Be Such A Friendship!). Bayramoğlu highlighted the continuing migration of Turks from Western Thrace to Turkey and implied that under these circumstances, the friendship would be finally damaged.[583] Again, on 1 October, this newspaper asked "Yunan Dostluğu Bu Mu?" (Is This the Greek Friendship?). And it reminded the continuing property problems of Turks. This news was to denounce the enactment of a new law in Greece called "abondoned properties" (terkedilmiş mülkler), according to which the Greek authorities would be able to seize a great amount of Turkish property in Western Thrace. The newspaper concluded the news, originated from Xanthi (İskeçe), that Turks waited to be rescued.[584]

There was, however, a serious legal obstacle for Turks, at least to leave Greece. In accordance with Turkish laws and the agreements between Turkey and Greece, Turkey could not accept people fleeing from Greece without a passport or an immigration visa. This always made things increasingly more difficult for the

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[582] Ataöv, "The Ethnic Turkish Minority in Western Thrace, Greece", p. 83; Borou, "The Muslim Minority of Western Thrace in Greece: An Internal Positive or External Negative "Other"?", p. 8

[583] Fuad Suat Bayramoğlu, "Böyle Dostluk Olmaz!", *Demokrat Ankara*, 24 June 1953, p. 1: "Batı Trakya'daki iltica hareketlerine rağmen nasıl dost kalınabilir?"

[584] "Yunan Dostluğu Bu Mu?", *Demokrat Ankara*, 1 October 1953, pp. 1, 4: "Türk emlakine bir kanunla Batı Trakya'da el kondu. Şimdi bu vatandaşlar hükümetten yardım beklemektedirler. İskeçe: Yunan Hükümeti yeni çıkardığı "terkedilmiş mülkler" adlı bir kanuna dayanarak Batı Trakya'daki Türk mallarının büyük bir kısmına el koymuştur [...] Irkdaşlarımız imdat bekliyor."

Turkish governments since the 1920s. The public opinion generally asked for more active government policies against the maltreatment of the Turkish minority and acceptance of these people even without passports.

Yet, it was normally not possible. During the Greek Civil War, however, the conditions were different, and both Turkey and Greece were more tolerant of this issue, accordingly refugees from the Balkans and Western Thrace were usually accepted. Toward the mid-1950s, on the contrary, probably due to the increasing number of people who fled away from Greece, the DP government started to follow a stricter policy. The change in the policy was immediately covered and protested by the press. According to the news of *Cumhuriyet* dating 4 December 1953, for instance, Turkey did not accept the Turkish refugees who fled from Western Thrace. These refugees included 22 children and nine women, and the border authorities sent them back to Greece via the Greek military trucks.[585]

This *Cumhuriyet*'s report that informed the public about the DP's approach toward the refugees probably made the government change its mind quickly. This might be resulted from the fear of a public reaction. On 6 December, just two days after, the same newspaper made news "Batı Trakyalı Mülteciler Yurdda Kalabilecekler" (The Refugees From Western Thrace Can Stay in the Country) as the Turkish government decided to reassess the situation in terms of its own Passport Law, the Article 4,[586] which allowed the Ministry of Internal Affairs to decide about letting refugees without passports in.[587] This change of policy by the Turkish government was not welcomed by the Greek side, and according to an article of

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[585] "Yunanistandan Bize Sığınan Irkdaşlarımız İade Edildier", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 December 1953, p. 1: "Aralarında 22 çocuk ve 9 kadın bulunan mülteciler dün Yunan askeri kamyonlarile gittiler."

[586] "Batı Trakyalı Mülteciler Yurdda Kalabilecekler", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 December 1953, p. 1: "Hükümet kararını değiştirdi. Pasaport kanununun 4 üncü maddesinin kendisine verdiği salahiyeti kullanacak, mülteciler vaziyetleri yeniden tetkik olunacak."

[587] The Passport Law (5682) was issued by the DP on 15 July 1950 and published in *Resmi Gazete* on 24 July. The Article 4 reads as "Generally the acceptance of refugees and foreigners who have an intention to settle but do not fit the current regulation for settlement, with or without passports, is based on the decision of Ministry of Internal Affairs" (Umumiyetle mültecilerin ve iskan hakkındaki mevzuat dışında olarak yurt tutmak maksadile gelen yabancıların, pasaportları olsun olmasın Türkiye'ye kabulleri İçişleri Bakanlığının kararına bağlıdır). For more details see: *Resmi Gazete*, 24 July 1950, p. 18811.

Cumhuriyet, dated 9 December, the Greek authorities decided to take stricter precautions on its borders.[588]

Meanwhile, the Turkish government, despite its promise to use its authority gathered based on the Article 4 of the Passport Law, could not solve the problem, most probably in order not to disturb the Greek government. Therefore, Turkish newspapers continued to make news about the heavy living conditions for the Turks, who were sent by the Turkish authorities back to Greece. It was claimed that these people even suffered from hunger.[589] Although *Zafer* was took a relatively more passive position on this issue, *Demokrat Ankara*, again one of the important organs of the government, reassurred its readers that the Turkish government was working on a new regulation to prevent such problems, and so it would be able to accept these people without passports.[590]

Still, compared to the portrayal of the living conditions of the Muslim/Turkish minority in other Balkan countries, the Muslim/Turkish living in Greece, particularly in the mid-1940s and the early 1950s, was depicted in the press as if it had a better life. Toward the end of 1953, however, this attitude started to

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588 "Yunanistandan Türkiyeye Kaçan Türkler: Yunan Hükümeti Bu İlticaları Önlemek Üzere şiddetli Tedbirler Alıyormuş", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 December 1953, pp. 1, 6: "(İzmir 8-THA) Yunanistandan memleketimize iltica eden ırkdaşlarımızın durumu hakkında bir kaç gün önce İçişleri Bakanı Ethem Menderes'in bu dava ile bizzat meşgul olarak pasaport kanunun 4 üncü maddesindeki yetkileri kullanmağa karar vermesi siyasi mahfillerde olduğu kadar gerek iltica eden ırkdaşlarımız gerek halkımız arasında derin bir memnunluk uyandırmıştır. Fakat ilgili makamlardan öğrenildiğine göre İçişleri Bakanlığının almış olduğu bu karar, Yunan resmi makamlarınca hoş karşılanmamış ve menfi bir tesir uyandırmıştır [...] Yunan makamları Trakya Türklerinin memleketimize iltica etmesini önlemek için firar hadisesine elverişli yerleri sıkı bir kontrol altına almışlar ve otomatik silahla mücehhez devriyeler bulundurmağa başlamışlar. Ayrıca, Yunan makamları bundan böyle memleketimize ilticaya yeltenen ırkdaşlarımız hakkında daha şiddetli cezalar tatbik etmeğe karar vermişlerdir. Zira, İçişleri Bakanının bu son kararı üzerine Yunanistandaki Türk azınlığın anayurda kaçmak için toplu bir şekilde faaliyete geçmeleri kuvvetlendirilmiştir. Hükümetimizin bu son kararı Trakya Türkleri arasında büyük bir sevinç yaratmıştır."

589 "Yunanistana İade Edilen Türkler", *Cumhuriyet*, 17 December 1953, p. 1: "Bu ırkdaşlarımızın feci bir durumda oldukları, açlık içinde kıvrandıkları bildiriliyor;" "İade Edilen Göçmenlerin Durumu", *Milliyet*, 17 December 1953, p. 7: "(Gümülcine 16 (THA)): Bundan bir müddet evvel Batı Trakya ve Adalardan Türkiye hükümeti tarafından eski ırkdaşlarımızın feci bir durumda oldukları bildirilmektedir. İade edilen mültecilere yapılmakta olan zulüm ve işkencenin tahammül fesna olduğu iddia edilmekte ve anayurdun yakın alakası beklenmektedir. Yatacak yerleri ve barınacakları bulunmıyan bu Türklerin açlık içinde kıvrandıkları buna ragmen Yunan hükümetinin bu acıklı durum karşısında kayıtsız şartsız bir tavır takındığı müşahede edilmiştir."

590 "Yunanlılar Türklere İnsafsızca Zulmediyorlar", *Demokrat Ankara*, 17 December 1953, p. 1: "İade edilen mülteci ırkdaşlarımızın durumu ve Trakya Türkleri hakkında hükümetimiz yeni kararlar almak üzeredir. Mevcut kararname değiştirilecektir."

change. On 11 November 1953, for instance, the article in *Milliyet*, written by H. Emir Erkilet, stated that the kind of oppression encountered by Turks in Bulgaria nowadays was also valid for Turks in Western Thrace as well. According to Erkilet, Greece pursued such pressure and oppression policies to force these people to leave their houses, farms and properties and finally to systematically "Hellenize" Western Thrace totally.[591] Erkilet concluded his words by warning the current Turkish government not to show any tolerance that would let the Greek authorities to abuse it.[592]

Cumhuriyet, as one of the other most interested Turkish newspaper in this issue, continued to publish news about the problems of the Turkish minority in 1954. In January, this newspaper even published article series about the migration problem of Turks. The main concern of this article series was the reason behind the increasing number of Turks that escaped from Greece to Turkey.[593] To answer this question and to understand the current situation in Western Thrace, the journalist of *Cumhuriyet*, Şahab Balcıoğlu, went to Greece for ten days and prepared this article series.[594] On 9 January, the author wrote: "The same answer from all: what else can we do if not escape?"[595] He wrote that the concern of Turks intensified due to the Greek government's new plans to seize the remaining small amount of properties left in the

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[591] H. Emir Erkilet, "Rumeli Türkleri ve Akaliyetler", *Milliyet*, 11 November 1953, p. 6: "Bulgarlar birkaç yıl öncekiş ortalarında onbinlerce ırkdaşımızı hududumuza sürerek zorla tehcir etmiştir. Bunların ev, tarla ve eşyalarının Bulgaristan'da kaldığını hatta bunların satmalarına ve ellerindeki paraları bile çıkarmalarına müsaade edilmediğini söylemek fazladır. Bulgaristan'da daha yüzbünlerce Türk vardır. Günün birinde Bulgarların, bunların da bir kısmını veya hepsini ve yine kış ortasında hudutlarımıza sürmeleri mümkündür. Şimdi de buna benzer bir trajedi Batı Trakya'da başlamış gibidir. Gazetelerde okuduğumuza göre, Yunanlılar, Doğu Trakyadaki Türkleri hicrete mecbur etmek için sistemli bir surette tazyik ediyorlarmış. Maksat tabiatiyle bunların emlak, tarla ve varlıklarına el koyup Garbi Trakya'yı tamamen Yunanlaştırmaktır."

[592] Erkilet, "Rumeli Türkleri ve Akaliyetler", *Milliyet*, 11 November 1953, p. 6: "Onlara akıllarını başlarına almalarını tavsiye ederken, hükümetimizden de herhangi bir zaaf alameti göstermek yüzünden bu hususta Yunanlılara şımarmak için açık bir ümit kapısı bırakmamalarını temenni ederiz."

[593] "Her Türkün Kafasını Kurcalıyan Sualler", *Cumhuriyet*, 6 January 1954, p. 1: "Batı Trakya'da neler oluyor? Niçin orada yaşayan Türkler anayurda gittikçe daha fazla miktarda iltica ediyorlar?"

[594] "Batı Trakyada 10 Gün", *Cumhuriyet*, 7 January 1954, p. 1: "Batı Trakyadaki Türkler büyük veya küçük gruplar halinde birbiri peşisıra neden Türkiyeye kaçmağa başladılar? İşte bu soruların cevaplarını aramak ve meseleyi yerinde incelemek maksadile Batı Trakyaya gittim."

[595] "Batı Trakya Türklerinin Endişesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 9 January 1954, p. 1: "Her ağızdan aynı cevab: Kaçmayıp da ne yapalım?"

hands of these people.[596] The next day, the author quoted the warnings of these people about the forthcoming migration wave in spring as they told that it was more difficult to flee in winter thus they waited the end of it in order to flee to Turkey.[597]

Indeed, toward the end of the winter of 1954, the number of refugees increased. For instance, on 22 March 1954, *Milliyet* reported that seven Turkish young men escaped from Greece via swimming through the Maritza River. Moreover, Turkish authorities also told that 15 more reached to the Turkish borders.[598] The same newspaper, on 6 April, stated that Greece increased its pressure on Turks recently. In accordance with the statements of the Turks fled from Greece, the newspaper reported that the recent words of Papagos against the Turkish-Greek friendship due to the Cyprus problem, made the Greek population and the civil servants increase their "oppression" (zulüm) on the Turkish minority.[599] Hence, after the Greek Civil War, now the Cyprus problem made the living conditions of Turks in Western Thrace harsher.

At that period, the Turkish government issued some new regulations at least to make the lives of refugees better in Turkey. For instance, with a decree dating 10 March 1954, it became easier for refugees to take a Turkish citizenship.[600] Yet, the

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[596] "Batı Trakya Türklerinin Endişesi", p. 7: "Yunan Ziraat Bakanının istifasından beri bu Bakanlığın idaresini de üzerine almış olan Ticaret Bakanı Papaligunas'ın Selaniğe ve Batı Trakyaya yaptığı seyahat, Batı Trakyaya yaptığı seyahat, Batı Trakya Türkleri arasında yeni endişelere yol açmıştır. Papagos hükümetinin "toprak tezviratı" programını bahane ederek Türklerin elinde kalmış olan son toprak parçalarını da almak üzere tedbirler hazırladığı ve Papaligunasın seyahatinin de doğrudan doğruya bununla ilgili olduğu söylenmektedir."

[597] "İlkbaharı Bekleyin O Zaman Göreceksiniz Türkiyeye Akını", *Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1954, pp. 1, 6: "...onlara bu lafın manasını sordum.-Çünkü dediler, şimdi kış mevsimindeyiz. Ege denizinin korkunç fırtınalarını küçük bir yelkenli tekne içinde herkes geçmeğe cesaret edebilir mi?"

[598] "Batı Trakya'dan İlticalar", *Milliyet*, 22 March 1954, pp. 1, 7: "Yedi genç dün Meriç'i yüzerek geçip memleketimizeiltica etti. Diğer taraftan ilgili makamlar bugün 15 Batı Trakyalı Türkün daha hudutlarımızı geçerek Türkiyeye iltica ettiklerini haber vermektedir. Batı Trakya'dan yurdumuza ilticaların muntazaman devam etmesi üzerinemülteci Türklerin Edrine şehri içinde iskan edilmeleri hususunda alakalılara gerekli talimat gönderilmiş bulunmaktadır."

[599] "Batı Trakya'dan Yeni İlticalar", *Milliyet*, 6 April 1954, p. 1: "Mülteciler Yunanistan'da Türklere karşı yapılan zulümün son günlerde arttığını söylüyorlar. Belirtildiğine göre Türk topraklarına sığınan mülteciler Yunan Başvekili Papagos'un Türk-Yunan dostluğu ile ilgili beyanatından sonra, Batı Trakya Türklerine yerli halk ve bilhassa küçük memurlar tarafından zulmün arttığını beyan etmişlerdir."

[600] "Dahiliye Vekili", *Tan*, 24 February 1955, p. 7: "Garbi Trakya Türkleri hakkında eskiden mevcut olan tahditler 30.3.54 tarih ve 2781 numaralı kararname ile kaldırılmıştır. Böylece serbestçe göçmen vizesiyle Türkiyeye gelenler tabiiyet beyannamesi vermek şartiyle vatandaşlığa alınmıştır."

ambiguity for the ones escaped to Turkey without passports and a migration visa continued in 1955 as well. That is why time to time, the rumors about the Turkish government's decision to send these Turks back to the Western Thrace intensified. According to the news of *Tan* on 7 January 1955, the government once more reassurred the public that the Turks arrived after 25 April 1953 would not be sent back to Greece.[601]

In February of 1955, relying on a rumor circulated in Xanthi (İskece), *Akşam* again asked whether the government would send Turks arrived from Greece back.[602] Then, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Namık Gedik, who succeeded İbrahim Ethem Menderes, replied this question and admitted the truth in such rumors and said that Turkey had to send some of these refugees back to Greece.[603] The number of refugees increased dramatically, the Minister continued, however, in order to solve this problem the Turkish government was in negotiations with the Greek authorities.[604]

Throughout this period, however, the parties could not reach an agreement. And, the situation got worse and worse each day. Thus, the Turkish press continued its criticisms. *Vatan*, for instance, on 6 September 1955, interestingly just few hours before the beginning of the tragic 6-7 September events, which will be examined in the following chapter, reported that in the last one and a half years, the number of Turks fled from Greece reached to 30.000.[605] This was a large number and created a very negative atmosphere in relation to Greece and Greeks. Yet, at that period, the maltreatment of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace meant more than this for the Turkish public opinion. It was also related to the Cyprus issue.

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[601] "Yunanistan'a İade Edilecek Türk Yok", *Tan*, 7 January 1955, p. 1: "Resmi makamlar bu hususta çıkan haberleri kati olarak tekzip ediyorlar. Hükümet, 25 Nisan 1953 den sonra yurda gelen Türk soylu hiçbir Yunanistan mültecisini geri iade etmeyi düşünmemektedir."

[602] "Batı Trakya'daki Türkler Perişanlık İçinde", *Akşam*, 22 February 1955, p. 1: "Yunanistan'dan gelen ırkdaşlarımızı geri mi göndereceğiz?"

[603] "Garbi Trakya ve 12 Ada Türkleri Zulüm Görüyor", *Tan*, 24 February 1955, p. 1: "Dahiliye Vekili bir kısım mültecileri iade zaruriyetinde olduğumuzu açıkladı."

[604] "Dahiliye Vekili", p. 7.

[605] "Batı Trakya'dan Göç Devam Ediyor", *Vatan*, 6 September 1955, p. 1: "Bir buçuk yılda Yunanistan'dan gelen Türklerin sayısı otuz bini buldu."

The sufferings of these Turks living in Western Thrace actually made the Turkish population concerned more about the *enosis*, which would also leave Turkish Cypriots under the Greek rule. Meanwhile, particularly, for the opponent journalists, this Greek failure to treat Turks in Western Thrace properly had to be used against the Greek claims in Cyprus. On 10 July 1955, for example, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote an interesting article in *Ulus* regarding this issue. He said: "We have a right to feel sorry and to complain about the Greek administration's policy toward Thracian Turks. It is impossible to ignore the fate of Turkish Cypriots who will be ruled by Greece."[606] Hence, for the Turkish press, there was a close connection between these two cases, and the situation of Turks living in Cyprus was also a part of minority issue in the Turkish-Greek relations. Now, the Turkish press' view of Turkish Cypriots case will be examined.

VI.II. The Turkish Cypriots and the Cyprus Issue

Throughout the period from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, Turkey was totally against one thing in terms of the Cyprus debate: the idea of the *enosis*. In any condition, the union of Cyprus with Greece was unacceptable for the Turkish side. Particularly, regarding the Turks of the island, Turkey rejected the idea of incorporating the island into Greece. Although there was a long history of the *enosis* going back at least to 1878, the year the British rule on the island started,[607] it was in July of 1948 when Greece started to voice this *enosis* demand more explicitly and through official channels. It was King Paul who asked Britain for the union of the island with Greece and with a promise of not touching the British military bases on the island, but the British government refused this Greek wish immediately. The King based his claim on the desire of the majority of the island, which was the Greek Cypriot, who "wish[ed] to come under Greek rule." Despite the British rejection of

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[606] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Kıbrıs Meselesi", *Ulus*, 10 July 1955, p. 1: "Yunan idaresinin Trakya Türkleri hakkında tatbik ettikleri politikadan üzülmeğe ve şikayet etmeğe hakkımız vardır. Yunanistan'a geçecek Kıbrıs Türklerinin mukadderatına ilgisiz kalmamıza imkan yoktur."

[607] Zafer Çakmak, *Kıbrıs'ta İsyan: Kıbrıs Rumlarının 1931 Enosis İsyanı ve Kıbrıs Türklerine Etkisi* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2009), pp. 23-25; Rasim Koç, *Kıbrıs Basınında Kıbrıs Olayları (1950-1954)* (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006), p. 23.

this demand, the Greek demand immediately led to protests by the Turkish Cypriots. In Turkey, too, a press campaign started.[608]

By the end of 1948, the number of protests increased on the island, and the Turkish press watched them closely. On 28 November 1948, for instance, *Ulus* informed its readers that Turkish Cypriots organized an "enormous" (muazzam) demonstration in Nicosia. These Turks overtly declared that they demanded the continuity of the British rule, but in case of British leaving the island, Cyprus had to be returned to the "previous sovereign of Cyprus" (Kıbrıs'ın eski hakimi), Turkey. The protesters also accused Greek communists on the island of receiving money and orders from Moscow.[609] After this demonstration, Fazıl Küçük,[610] one of the leading Turkish Cypriots, who became the voice of these people for many years and one of the most anti-*enosis* activists, sent a telegraph to İsmet İnönü to report the demonstration, held by '15.000' Turkish Cypriots.[611]

These demonstrations were also spread to Turkey. One month later, a similar kind of demonstration took place in Ankara. The oppositional press particularly was

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[608] Thomas W. Davis, "The Role of the United States in the Cyprus Dispute Past and Present", *Greece in Transition Essays in the History of Modern Greece* (John T. A. Koumoulides ed.) (London: Zeno, 1977), pp. 256-260; C. L. Sulzberger, "Another Chapter in the Cyprus Story: The Ancient Island, with Its Memories of Many Conquerors, Becomes a Key to the Mediterranean", *The New York Times*, 15 August 1948, p. SM22.

[609] "Kıbrıs'ta: Altı Bin Türk'ün İştirakile Bir Miting Yapıldı", *Ulus*, 29 November 1948, p. 1: "(Nikosya, Kıbrıs): Kıbrıs adasındaki 80 bin Türk nüfusu temsil eden 6 binden fazla Türk, bugün bir miting tertibederek Adada İngiliz egemenliğinin devamını istemişlerdir. Kıbrıslı Rumların bağımsızlık taleplerini şiddetle reddeden Türkler, İngilizlerin Adayı herhangi bir surette terketmeleri halinde Kıbrıs'ın eski hakimi Türkiye'ye iadesinin icabedeceğini ileri sürmüşlerdir. Bu muazzam mitingde Türk siyasi partilerinin temsilcileri de bulunmuşlardır. Hatipler aynı zamanda Kıbrıs komünistlerini de tahkik ve onları Moskova'dan para ve talimat almakla itham etmişlerdir."

[610] Fazıl Küçük was an active politician for Turkish Cypriots, who had also close relations with the Turkish authorities. Until Fazıl Küçük started to publish Turkish daily, *Halkın Sesi*, in 1942 because Turkish Cypriots could not make their voices heard. Two years later, on 23 April 1944, Küçük also established *Kıbrıs Milli Türk Partisi* [Cyprus National Turkish Party]. In the following period, he became the leader of Turkish Cypriots. For more details see: Koç, *Kıbrıs Basınında (1950-1954)*, pp. 15-16; Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs*, p. 225; Rukiye Maden, *Dr. Fazıl Küçük ve Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi Yayınları, 2014), pp. 38-48; Hüseyin Mehmet Ateşin, *Kıbrıs'ta Türklük ve Müslümanlık Kimliğinin Şahsiyet Bulma Mücadelesinde Menfi ve Müsbet En Etkin İki Odak: Dr. Fazıl Küçük ve Şeyh Nazım Kıbrısı* (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1997), pp. 102-111; Hüseyin Mehmet Ateşin, *Kıbrıslı "Müslümanların" "Türkleşme" ve "Laikleşme" Serüveni (1925-1975)* (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1999), pp. 57-62.

[611] 28 November 1948: BCA, 030 01 40 241 14, p. 2: "28 Kasım 1948 tarihinde Lefkosada onbeş bin Türkün yapmış olduğu mitingde bir kere daha Kıbrıs Rumlarının Yunanistana ilhak ve muhdariyet taleplerinin şiddetle reddedilmesi oybirliği ile kararlaştırılmıştır."

very interested in this issue. As one of them, *Cumhuriyet* reported that '10.000' Turkish young people came together in Ankara to protest "the claims for leaving the island to Greeks and the oppression inflicted to Turks outside."[612] Sam Pope Brewer from *the New York Times* also described these protests and the calls for the union of the island with Turkey, and called this protest as a result of "Turkish student and press agitation." The author claimed that the oppositional newspapers in Turkey, one of which was *Cumhuriyet*, were "pressing the idea lately that if Cyprus were to be removed from British rule it had to revert to Turkey from whom the British first leased and then annexed." Brewer mentioned about the "varied and lively reactions" which the demonstrations in Ankara aroused in Cyprus. And, he stated that the Turks of island, exposed to the Greek agitation for the *enosis*, were "delighted" with the demonstration news from Turkey. While concluding his article, Brewer did not forget to mention that the "modest" agitation of Turkey was indeed not conducted against the current British rule but against a possibility of the establishment of the Greek rule on the island.[613]

Cumhuriyet's interest in this issue was also high in the first two months of 1949. On 16 January 1949, for example, the newspaper reported the protests in Balıkesir, a small city in Turkey, for Cyprus.[614] On 21 January, the newspaper also informed its readers about the plans of the almost 100 students from Athens

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[612] "Ankarada Dün On Bin Gencin İştirakile Yapılan Mitingden Bir İntiba: Kıbrıs Adası İçin Dün Ankarada Yapılan Miting", *Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1948, p. 1: "Adanın Yunanistan'a terki söylemlerini ve hariçteki Türklere yapılan zulümleri."

[613] Sam Pope Brewer, "Turks News Claims to Cyprus: Student and Newspaper Talk Gives New Twist to Question of Annexation to Greece", *The New York Times*, 31 December 1948, p. 4: "(Nicosia, Cyprus, 30 December) The perennial question of union of Cyprus with Greece has taken a new twist, with Turkish student and press agitation for the island's return to the Turks if British should ever give it up. The Turkish counter-claims have aroused varied and lively reactions here. Since the Greeks have agitated so long for "enosis"-the Greek equivalant of "anschluss"-the news from Ankara of a public demonstrations by university students calling for "ilhak"-the Turkish equivalant of enosis [...] The Turkish opposition press also has been pressing the idea lately that if Cyprus were to be removed from British rule it should revert to Turkey from whom the British first leased and then annexed it. The Turkish agitation has been conducted on modest lines, opposing eventual Greek rule of the island, not present British rule. Demands for freedom from the British continue to occupy a major place in the Cypriot press."

[614] "Kıbrıs İçin Miting", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 January 1949, p. 1: "Dün Balıkesir gençleri de heyecanlı bir miting yaptılar."

University to visit Cyprus,[615] probably to spread the *enosis* propaganda. Actually, a similar kind of student visit to Cyprus had been already planned by Turkish university students, who were the members of *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* (MTTB). Yet, the Turkish government did not allow them to go to Cyprus. *Cumhuriyet*'s coverage of Greek students' visit might be to show that the Turkish government failed to support Turks on the island by allowing this visit while Athens continued to provide every support possible to the idea of the *enosis*. Then, on 10 February, the newspaper reported the speech of Necmettin Sadak, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, which he delivered before his visit to Paris to attend the Conference for European Economic Cooperation. Sadak told that "Britain can never grant Cyprus to Greece."[616] It was the first official declaration of the Turkish government for the emerging Cyprus issue.[617] Indeed, these words reflected that the Turkish government was trying not to create further problems in relation to the Cyprus issue. It could be because of the fact that Turkey in this critical point of the Cold War, on the eve of establishment of the Atlantic Pact (4 April 1949), avoided to be seen as a country creating unnecessary agitation.

This, however, was not welcomed by *Hür Söz*, a popular Turkish newspaper in Cyprus. It asked the reasons behind the Turkish government's ban of this visit to the well-known journalists of the period in Turkey, namely Ahmet Emin Yalman from *Vatan*, Peyami Safa from *Ulus*, Abidin Daver from *Cumhuriyet* and Burhan Felek from *Cumhuriyet*.[618] *Hür Söz* initially asked these journalists what their views about this decision of government not to allow students were. Then, it asked how the Greek government, doing the exactly opposite and hence sending Greek university

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[615] "100 Üniversiteli Genç Kıbrısa Gidiyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 January 1949, p. 1: "Atina Üniversitesinden bir grup da aynı günlerde Kıbrısta bulunacak."

[616] İstanbula Gelen Dışişleri Bakanının Demeci", *Cumhuriyet*, 10 February 1949, p. 1: "Necmeddin Sadak, Kıbrıs meselesi için de: İngiltere Kıbrıs'ı hiç bir zaman Yunanistana veremez" dedi."

[617] Şükrü Torun, *Türkiye, İngiltere ve Yunanistan Arasında: Kıbrıs'ın Politik Durumu* (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Matbaası, 1956), p. 112.

[618] "Men'edilen Kıbrıs Seyahati İçin Ne Diyorlar?", *Hür Söz*, 12 February 1949, p. 1: "Malum olduğu veçhile Üniversite Talebe Birliği Kıbrıs Türklerinin daveti üzerine Kıbrısa bir seyahat tertip etmişti. Bakanlar Kurulu kararıyle bu seyahat menedilmişti. Bu husuta A. E. Yalman, Abidin Daver, Peyami Sefa ve Burhan Felekle görüştük."

students, would mean to the Turkish-Greek relations.[619] In his answer, Peyami Safa said that there was a difference between the nationality issue (milliyet davası) and the nationality policy (milliyet politikası). Under the current circumstances, Peyami Safa continued, the Turkish policy of Cyprus needed to be based on "caution" (ihtiyat) rather than "heroism" (kahramanlık). According to him, the underlying reason was not to threaten the political balance (siyasi muvazene) in the Middle East. In securing this balance, according to the author of *Ulus*, Turkey had to be more cautious in pursuing its national policy behind its borders. This caution, however, Peyami Safa added, did not mean that Turkey needed to abandon its views and demands for Turks living outside but it only meant that today was not the correct time.[620] He implied that Turkey needed to act according to the Cold War reality rather than following a national policy. That is why he described the Greek act of following a national policy and sending students as a "mistake" (hatalı).[621]

The answers of the remaining authors, from the oppositional newspapers, also did not show big differences. Abidin Daver, from *Cumhuriyet*, also gave a similar kind of answer and described the reason of this ban as "political." Daver noted that the Turkish government banned university students' visit to Cyprus probably in order to prevent undesired incidents between Turkish and Greek students, which would harm the Turkish-Greek friendship, in such a time that these two nations and two states had to become very close friends.[622] Yet, he also underlined that this cautious

[619] Men'edilen Kıbrıs Seyahati İçin Ne Diyorlar?", p. 1.

[620] Men'edilen Kıbrıs Seyahati İçin Ne Diyorlar?", p. 1: "Gençliğin bu mevzudaki bu hassasiyeti Türk milletinin kendi cevherinden çıkan en büyük duygusunun ifadesidir. Fakat, milliyet davası başka, milliyet politikası başka şeydir. Bu davada kahramanlığı veya ihtiyatı emreden ayrı ayrı tarih devirleri vardır. Biz şimdi birincisi içinde değiliz. Orta doğu bir siyasi müvazene geçiriyor. Bu müvazenenin korunması bizim, bozulması düşmanlarımızın lehindedir. Onu koruma bahasına milli davamızın sınır dışı meselelerinde bugün her zamankinden fazla temkinli olmak zorundayız. Bu ihtiyat, bizim dışarıdaki Türklerin mukadderatı hakkındaki düşünce ve isteklerimizden vazgeçişimizi tazammun etmez. Sadece en büyük davama ele alınacağı eşref saatin henüz gelmediğini gösterir."

[621] Men'edilen Kıbrıs Seyahati İçin Ne Diyorlar?", p. 1.

[622] Men'edilen Kıbrıs Seyahati İçin Ne Diyorlar?", p. 1: "Siyasi bir düşünce ile menedildiği kanaatindeyim. Bizim üniversitelilerin oraya gideceği sırada Yunan Üniversite talebelerinin de adayı ziyareti söylendi. Tabii bir taraftan ada Rumları diğer taraftan oradaki soydaş ırkdaşlarımız bu ziyaretler münasebetiyle tezahürler yapacaklardı. Kıbrıstaki mevcudiyetlerinden propagandalarından bahsedilen komünistler de bu tezahürlerden faydalanarak hadiseler çıkarmaya çalışacaklarına şüphe yoktu. Bu hadiselerin müessif bir şekil alması ve Türk-Yunan umumi efkarını heyecanalandırıp, iki millet ve devletin birbirile en sıkı bir şekilde dost olmaları lazım gelen şu sıralarda bu dostluğa zarar

policy pursued by Turkey was not pursued by Greece, and sometimes there occurred incidents contrary to the friendship ideal.[623] Thus, according to these journalists, Turkey was right to pursue a cautious policy but Greece was mistaken in pursuing such a national policy as the *enosis* in the conditions of the Cold War.

Despite this cautious policy of Turkey, the Greek press based on Turkish newspaper coverage and some periodical articles such as the ones in *Yeşil Yol*, argued that Turkish approach to the Cyprus issue would harm the friendship. On 16 February 1949, *Cumhuriyet* responded to these claims in an item called "Yunanlıların Bize Karşı Çok Garip İthamları" (Very Strange Allegations of Greeks against Us). And, the item noted that:[624]

> For such an issue as the Cyprus issue, which does not only attract the high attention of the Greek people but also the Turkish people, despite Turkey's calm policy and its activities, respecting the Turkish-Greek friendship, which are seen by any one, this provocative atmosphere in our neighbor Greece will only lead to wonder and sorrow.

The Turkish government's ban for university students' visit to Cyprus did not stop the youth, and they continued to show their resentment in Turkey. On 21 February 1949, *Akşam* reported that there occurred demonstrations protesting the problems that Turks encountered on the island. The protestors carried banners which "Kıbrıs Türkleri Kalbimiz Sizinle Beraberdir" (Turkish Cypriots Our Hearts Are with You) and "Sizin Acınız Bizim Acımız Olacaktır" (Your Pain Will Be Our Pain) were written.[625]

Oppositional newspapers in fact continued to be more eager to report these kinds of public protests news, and used them to criticize overtly the Turkish

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vermesi mümkündü. Tezahürler sırasında Kıbrısta istenilmiyen hadiseleri önlemek çok güç belki de imkansız olacağına göre Dışişleri Bakanımız Üniversitelilerimizin Kıbrısa gitmekten vazgeçmelerini rica etmekle vukuu muhtemel hadiseleri önlemek istemiştir."

[623] Men'edilen Kıbrıs Seyahati İçin Ne Diyorlar?", p. 1.

[624] Yunanlıların Bize Karşı Çok Garip İthamları: Türkiye Kıbrıs Hakkında Oradaki Dostluğu Bozabilecek Faaliyette Bulunuyormuş", *Cumhuriyet*, 16 February 1949, p. 1: "Yalnız Yunan halkının değil, Türk halkının da üzerinde hassasiyetle durduğu Kıbrıs meselesi hakkında hükümetimizin son derece ağırbaşlı ve Türk-Yunan dostluğuna hürmetkar hattı hareketi herkesçe malumken komşu Yunanistanda bu şekilde tahrikçi bir davanın esmesi ancak hayret ve teessür uyandıracaktır."

[625] "Kıbrıs Türkleri: Dün İzmir Gençliği Büyük Bir Miting Yaptı", *Akşam*, 21 February 1949, p. 1: "Bugün İzmir gençliği yurt dışındaki ırkdaşlarımız ve bilhassa Kıbrıs Türkleri lehine büyük bir miting yapmıştır."

government's policy for Turks in Cyprus. In reporting news about public protests in Turkey, the oppositional newspapers also emphasized messages about anti-communism in these demonstrations and did not miss the opportunity to use this in attacking the current government. These newspapers implied that the Turkish government had to pursue a more active policy toward this communist attempt of propagating the *enosis* on the island. *Yeni Sabah* reported the same news of public protests in Turkey against *enosis*: "Thanks to this opportunity, the youth held an anti-communist demonstration."[626] Similarly, on 9 September, eight months later, the oppositional newspaper *Zafer* wrote about the communist propaganda on the island and how it created problems for Turks living there.[627]

For these problems, as usual, *Zafer* blamed the current CHP government. Against the Greek government's supports for the *enosis* activities, which had communist elements, according to this organ of the DP, the Turkish government remained passive. On 29 July 1949, for instance, this newspaper wrote that Turkey had to follow a clear-cut policy and pay attention to the demands of Turkish Cypriots.[628] In the same news, Nazif Süleyman, Nicosia correspondent of *Zafer*, criticized the foreign policy of the current government and argued that in the Cyprus issue, like all other foreign affairs, the government did not follow an active policy and tried to remain outside the problem. But on the contrary, according to Nazif Süleyman, the Greek government did not lose any time to back the *enosis* activities in Cyprus.[629]

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[626] "İzmir Gençleri Kıbrıs için Miting Yaptılar", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 February 1949, p. 1: "Gençler bu vesile ile komünizm aleyhtarı gösteride bulundular."

[627] "Kıbrıs Meselesi ve Kıbrıs Sorunu", *Zafer*, 9 September 1949, p. 1.

[628] "Yunanlılar Kıbrıs'a Sahip Çıkıyorlar", *Zafer*, 29 July 1949, p. 1: "Kıbrıstaki Türklerle alakadar olmalıyız. Kıbrıs'ın akibeti hakkında kesin bir politika takip etmek lazımdır."

[629] "Yunanlılar Kıbrıs'a Sahip Çıkıyorlar", *Zafer*, 29 July 1949, p. 1: "(Lefkoşa (Hususi Muhabirimiz Nazif Süleyman bildiriyor): Dış politikanın her alanında olduğu gibi Kıbrıs meselesinde de iktidar hükümeti bir çeşit "suya sabuna dokunmamak" politikası takip etmektedir. Yunan hükümetiyle daimi teşriki mesai halinde bulunan Kıbrıs Başdespotunun riyasetindeki Kıbrıs Rum siyaseti makinesi, "ilhak", "ilhak" diye, Kıbrıs ve İngiliz hükümetini taciz ederken diğer taraftan da İngiliz ve Amerikan halk efkarını kazanmak için sistemli ve metodlu bir şekilde çalışmaktadır ve asıl mühimi Yunan hükümeti bu çalışmaları desteklemektedir."

Toward the end of 1949, the attempts of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus to hold a plebiscite to achieve the *enosis*, and its appeal for the United Nations enraged public in Turkey, leading to further protests. Oppositional press was eager to report these protests. For instance, on 13 December 1949, *Yeni Sabah* published a letter sent by *Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı*, which was the head of student organization *Türk Milli Talebe Birliği* (TMTF), which was established in 1948 and as popular as MTTB,[630] to Turks living in Cyprus, protesting this proposal for a plebiscite. These students wrote that their hearts were with Turkish Cypriots and they would be supporting the struggle of Turkish Cypriots in any case.[631]

The following day, this newspaper again informed its readers about this issue with news entitled "Kıbrıs Türkleri Galeyan İçinde: Adanın Yunanistana İlhakını İstiyen Kıbrıslı Yunanlılara Vakur Bir Cevap" (Turkish Cypriots Are in Rage: A Dignified Answer to Greek Cypriots Wanting Union with Greece). Nicosia correspondent of *Yeni Sabah* stated that this plebiscite, organized by Greek Cypriots themselves to achive union with Greece, aggravated the Cyprus issue.[632]As rightly argued by *Yeni Sabah*, actually it was the plebiscite attempt of the church that again stirred up worries of Turks of the island. Hence, the Turkish press reported how the protests against the *enosis* demands intensified both in Cyprus and Turkey.[633]

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[630] With the multi-party system, the CHP government in order to make the students voice their ideas re-opened *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* after 10 years in 1946 and in 1948 the second student organization *Türk Milli Talebe Federasyonu* was established. These two organizations showed similar inclinations in general issues and Cyprus issue in particular. For more details see: Joseph S. Szliowicz, "Students and Politics in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 6/2 (1970), pp. 150-162; Nermin Abadan, "Values and Political Behavior of Turkish Youth", *Sixth World Congress of International Association of Political Science* (Genova) (21-25 September 1964), pp. 95-96.

[631] "Kıbrıs Adası ve Türk Gençliği: Türk Gençlik Teşkilatı Kıbrıs Türklerine Bir Mektup Yolladı", *Yeni Sabah*, 13 December 1949, p. 1: "Kıbrısın Yunanlılara ilhakı hakkında Yunan Ortodoks Kilisesinin yaptığı plebisit tekliflerine karşı asli infialinizi büyük bir heyecan ve memnuniyetle karşıladık. Kalblerimiz sizinle beraberdir. Her türlü mücadelenizde bizleri saflarınızda bulacaksınız."

[632] "Kıbrıs Türkleri Galeyan İçinde: Adanın Yunanistana İlhakını İstiyen Kıbrıslı Yunanlılara Vakur Bir Cevap", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 December 1949, p. 1: "Kıbrıs Rumlarının ilhakı sağlamak maksadile kendi kendilerine bir plebisit yapmıya kalkışması Kıbrıs meselesini yeniden alevlendirmiştir."

[633] "Kıbrıs Türklerinin Protesto Mitingi", *Akşam*, 12 December 1949, p. 1; "Kıbrıs İçin Yapılan Protesto Toplantısı", *Yeni Sabah*, 15 December 1949, p. 1: "Kıbrıslı Rumların Yunanistanla birleşme isteği protesto edildi;" "Gençliğin Kıbrıs için Toplantısı", *Akşam*, 15 December 1949, p. 1: "Kıbrıs Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, İstanbul Üniversitesi Talebe Birliğine bir telgraf çekerek Adanın Yunanistana ilhakı hakkında Yunanlılar tarafından gösterilen arzuyu protesto ettiklerini bildirmişti. Türk gençlik teşkilatı da dün saat on beşte Eminönü Halkevinde toplanarak bu mesele etrafında bir

Concerned with the increasing tension in the Turkish public opinion, the Greek Prime Minister, Alexander Diomides, warned the Greek nation not to organize demonstrations calling for the *enosis*, particularly in such a "fragile situation" (nazik durumda), which he implied Greece's continuing search for membership of NATO. The Prime Minister also added that the government would approach to all national issues of Greece in accordance with its good relations with its "big allies" (büyük müttefikler).[634] Surely, he meant Britain and the US. Thus, he implied that the Greek government did not want to clash with these two powers or risk its relations with Turkey for the sake of Cyprus. And, his statements were published on 16 December in *Akşam*. In this news item, *Akşam* also reported that the Foreign Minister of Greece, Konstantin Tsaldaris,[635] said that the agitation for the *enosis* made by unofficial channels.[636] So, Tsaldaris underlined that the Greek government did not back these activities.

Despite these protests, this plebiscite, however, was held on 15 January 1950,[637] by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus not long after these statements of the

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görüşmek yapmıştır. Toplantı gençlik arasında şehrimizde tahsil etmekte olan Kıbrıs Türkleri de bulunmakta idi [...] Söz alan gençler Kıbrıs Türklerinin gadre uğradıklarını, memleket hasreti çekmekte olduklarını Yunanlıların bu adayı ilhak etmek hususunda gösterdikleri arzunun yersiz ve haksız olduğunu belirtmişlerdir."

634 "Kıbrısın Mukadderatı: Yunan Başbakanı İlhak Lehinde Gösteriler Yapılmamasını İhtar Etti", *Akşam*, 16 December 1949, p. 1: "(Atina 16 (AP)): Yunan Başbakanı Alexander Diomides, dün Yunan milletine, şimdiki "nazik durumda" Kıbrıs adasının Yunanistana ilhak edilmesi hususunda gösteriler yapmamalarını ihtar etti. Resmi bir beyanatında Diomides, Yunanistanın "büyük müttefikleri" ile olan iyi münasebetlerini devam ettirmek mevkiinde olduğunu söylemiştir. Bütün Yunan milli meselelerinin bu işbirliğine bağlı olduğu hususunu Başbakan ilave etmiştir."

635 As stated in the second chapter of this thesis, Konstantin Tsaldaris was a well-known Greek politician by the Turkish public opinion with his personel efforts to strenghten friendship between Turkey and Greece. For more details see: "Türk-Yunan Dostluğu", *Yeni İstanbul*, 2 January 1950, p. 1: "Yunan Başbakan Muavini Konstantin Çaldaris, daha sıkı ve daha başarılı bir Türk-Yunan dostluğu cereyanına şahsi gayretlerini eklemektedir. Bundan birkaç gün evvel, iki memleket arasındaki temasların ve münasebetlerin takviyesi için gerek Ankara ve gerekse Atina parlamento mensuplarından teşekkül eden komisyon, bir plan neşretti. Çaldaris Makedonya ve Yunan Trakyasında yaptığı teftiş seyahati esnasında verdiği nutukta bu işbirliğinin vüsatını belirtiyor: "Yunan ve Türk milletleri, dünyanın bu köşesinde işbirliği yaparak dinamik bir mevcudiyet göstermek zaruriyetindedirler."

636 "Kıbrısın Mukadderatı: Yunan Başbakanı İlhak Lehinde Gösteriler Yapılmamasını İhtar Etti", p. 1: "Dışişleri Bakanı Konstantin Çaldaris de, Çarşamba günü, en ciddi tahriklerin "mesul olmayan kaynaklar" tarafından yapılmakta olduğunu bildirmiştir."

637 Torun, *Türkiye, İngiltere ve Yunanistan Arasında: Kıbrıs'ın Politik Durumu*, p. 68; Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrısta Türk-Yunan Fırtınası* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2006), p. 153.

Greek authorities. *Ulus* reported this plebiscite news by underlying the fact that Turkish Cypriots stayed at their homes and did not go to vote. Moreover, *Ulus* noted that the Church was able to organize this plebiscite with the help of "communist party" in Cyprus,[638] which was AKEL.[639] In the same issue, *Ulus* also quoted the comments of a British newspaper: *the Glasgow Herald*. This newspaper, according to *Ulus*, warned Greece for the side effects of any possible instability in Cyprus and recalled the Soviet threat.[640]

Of course, this plebiscite, in addition to the continuing demonstrations in Greece for the *enosis*, very much agitated the Turkish public opinion. Immediately after the plebiscite, the student organizations together decided to organize a huge demonstration in Ankara. These recent developments actually enraged *Ulus* as much as the oppositional newspapers. By reporting this protest in Ankara, thus, *Ulus* said: "Cyprus issue has found an interest which it deserved in the Turkish nation."[641] Then, in the same news, *Ulus* also published the announcement of these university

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[638] "Kıbrıs'ta Plebisit", *Ulus*, 16 January 1950, p. 1: "Kıbrıs Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi tarafından tanzim edilen ve Yunanistan ile Kıbrısın birleşmesini temine matuf plebisit bugün yapılmıştır. Binlerce Kıbrıslı Rum bugün kiliseye giderek Kıbrısın Yunanistanla birleşmesini talep eden formülleri imzalamışlardır. Birleşmenin istenmediğini ifade eden formülleri imzalayanlar görülmemiştir. Bununla beraberbinlerce kişi evde kalmışlar ve oylarını kullanmamışlardır. İngiliz askerleri oy verme esnasında şehir haricinde kalmışlardır. Kilisenin Komünist partisi ile işbirliği içinde tanzim ettiği bu plebisitin neticesi 28 Ocak tarihinde belli olacaktır."

[639] AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) was established in 1941 and supported the *enosis* policy from the very beginning. For more details see: Stavros Tombazos, "AKEL: Between Nationalism and 'Anti-Imperialism'", *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey* (Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılyürek and Umut Özkırımlı eds.) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 220.

[640] "Kıbrıs'ta Plebisit", *Ulus*, 16 January 1950, pp. 1, 3: "Londra, Glasgow Herald gazetesi Kıbrıstaki durumu inceliyerek şunları yazıyor: "Bizzat Atina hükümeti bu kargaşalığın Yunanistanın milletlerarası durumuna zarar vermesinden korktuğu için endişelenmiştir. Gelecek seneler zarfında Yunanistanın, yıkıcı bir iç harpten sonra memleketin kalkınmasiyle meşgul olması lazımdır. Ruslar dikkatlerini başka bir tarafa çevirdikleri için Atian bizzat nefes alabiliyor. Fakat Yakın Doğunun diğer bir noktasında yeni tazyikleri olabileceği ihtimalini unutmamak lazımdır. İngilterenin askeri durumunu zayıf düşürmek herhalde Yunanistan için kıyasetli bir siyaset olmaz. Ortodoks kilisesinin de bunu anlaması lazım."

[641] "Yüksek Tahsil Gençliği Bugün Kıbrıs için Bir Miting Yapıyor", *Ulus*, 18 January 1950, pp. 1, 3: "Gençler dün, halkı toplantıya çağırmak için bir de beyanname yayınladılar. Ankara yüksek tahsil gençliği Kıbrısta Ortodoks kilisesinin yaptığı plebisiti ve Yunan üniversitelilerinin mitingini protesto maksadiyle bugün saat 11.30 da Zafer meydanında büyük bir miting tertip etmiştir [...] Yüksek Tahsil gençliğinin Kıbrıs davası üzerindeki hassasiyeti ilgiyle karşılamıştır. Bilhassa Kıbrıs'ta son olan hadiseler ilgiyi daha da arttırmıştır. Kıbrıs davası layık olduğu alakayı Türk milletinde bulmuştur. Bugünkü mitingin Türk milletinin asaletine yakışır vakarlı bir şekilde cereyan edeceği muhakkaktır."

students' call people for the demonstration, which would be held on 18 January. This announcement that *Ulus* published had a deliberate anti-communist language. It claimed that it was the communists who convinced the church first and then led to this plebiscite. Yet, students continued, the Turkish youth would not allow the communists to settle in Cyprus.[642] The following day, on 19 January 1950, the main topic of Turkish newspapers was this protest. And this anti-communist emphasis of students also reported in newspapers via their banners as "Yeşil Ama Kızıl Olamaz" (Green but Can't Be Red).[643]

These protests of university students, however, displeased the Turkish government. Following the immediate Turkish reactions, the Turkish authorities carried these protests to the Parliament. The next day, the speech of the Foreign Minister in the Parliament was published on 24 January 1950 by *Cumhuriyet*. The newspaper reported how Necmettin Sadak warned the Turkish youth about the negative effects of such protests and demonstrations on the foreign affairs of the state. He insisted that there was no such a Cyprus problem, so Turkish youth's sensation was "in vain" (beyhude). What Sadak wanted from the Turkish youth was clear: to stop protests and demonstrations. He overtly declared his wish in his speech in the Parliament: "Our youth had to stay away from these kinds of demonstrations."[644] Obviously, the CHP government did not want to damage the

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[642] "Yüksek Tahsil Gençliği Bugün Kıbrıs için Bir Miting Yapıyor", pp. 1, 3: "Aziz Yurddaş! […] Kızıl zehrini Kıbrısa akıtmağa çalışan komünistler, nihayet ortodoks kilisesini de saflarına geçirmeğe muvaffak olmuşlardır. Böylece bir komediden ibaret neticesiz plebisit yapılmıştır. Bu vaziyet hem kilise hem bütün Yunan gençliği tarafından desteklenmektedir. Yunan üniversiteleri neticeyi ve hakikati düşünmeden miting tertibetmektedirler. Biz Türk gençliği olarak Kıbrısa komünistlerin yerleşmesine asla izin müsaade etmiyeceğiz [...] Arkadaş senin de kalbin bu imanla çarpıyor. Senin de damarlarında Kıbrısta şehit olan dedelerinin kanı dolaşıyor. Kıbrısa bağlılığını belirtmek için 18.01.1950 Çarşamba günğü 11.30 da Zafer meydanına gel. Sesini, Hakka dayanan sesini dünyaya duyur. Felek her türlü esbabı cefasını toplasın gelsin. Dönersek kahpeyiz Kıbrıs yolunda bir azametten."

[643] "Ankara'da Kıbrıs için Yapılan Miting", *Yeni Sabah*, 19 January 1950, p. 1: "Gençler komünistlerin tahrikile kilise tarafından ortaya atılan Kıbrıs hakkındaki Yunan emellerini reddetti;" "Gençliğin Tertiplediği Mitingde Kıbrıs'ta Yapılan Plebisit", *Ulus*, 19 January 1950, p. 1; "Ankara'da Kıbrıs Mitingi", *Akşam*, 19 January 1950, p. 1; "Kıbrıs için Yapılan Miting", *Zafer*, 19 January 1950, p. 1: "Binlerce genç büyük bir heyecanla mitinge iştirak etti."

[644] "Kıbrıs Meselesi Dün Mecliste Görüşüldü", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 January 1950, p. 1: "Dış İşleri Bakanı: "Böyle bir mesele yoktur. Gençlik beyhude heyecana kapılıyor" dedi. Sadak, dış işlerimize aid nümayişlerin bazen devlete çok zararı olduğunu bildirerek ilave etti: "Gençliğimiz bu gibi nümayişlerden sakınmalıdır"."

friendship atmosphere between Turkey and Greece and of course to create a negative image of Turkey in the Western Bloc by problematizing the Cyprus issue.

This approach was also valid for the first years of the DP rule. On 19 June 1950, a short amount of time after the victory of the DP in the elections, *Ulus* published news about the Cyprus issue, basing on a broadcast of the Athens Radio, entitled "Kıbrıs İşi Yeniden Alevleniyor" (The Cyprus Issue Blazing Up Again).[645] Nevertheless, this time it was *Zafer* and *Yeni Sabah* which were silent, and instead, two days later, they published the views of Fuad Köprülü, the new Foreign Minister of Turkey, who declared that the Cyprus issue did not officially exist for Turkey.[646] Thus, as the previous CHP governments, the newly elected DP government also conducted its policy of Cyprus from the perspective of Cold War dichotomy and remained silent and failed to understand the national character of the issue from the Greek perspective.

The Cyprus issue always remained as one of the top topics in the Greek agenda. Yet, Turkey only officially started to acknowledge this from 1951 onwards when the Greek policy on Cyprus became more aggressive. For instance, the Greek authorities felt freer to declare the *enosis* demands publicly, as did Venizelos.[647] What else agitated the Turkish public opinion in April 1951 was the Greek government's promise of solving this issue either with Britain or the UN. *Yeni Sabah* reported this on 6 April and claimed that this Greek declaration disturbed Turkish public opinion. In the same issue, the open letter of the popular Turkish newspaper in Cyprus, *Halkın Sesi*, to the President of Turkey, Celal Bayar, was also published. This letter was not only to protest these recent Greek declarations but it was also to make the Turkish government declare its views. Until that time, the current Turkish government did not officially declare its views and policies about the Cyprus issue. Nonetheless, *Yeni Sabah*, which was not still one of the main advocators of the DP,

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[645] "Kıbrıs İşi Yeniden Alevleniyor", *Ulus*, 19 June 1950, p. 1: "Atina'daki Kıbrıs metropoliti başkanlığındaki heyet plebisit yapılmasını tavsiye den bir beyanname yayınladı."

[646] "Dışbakan, Grupta Seyahatini Anlattı", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 June 1950, pp. 1, 5: "Dışişleri Bakanı böyle bir meselenin resmen mevcut olmadığını söylemiştir;" "Dışişleri Bakanı Dün Dış Mes'eleleri İzah Etti", *Zafer*, 21 June 1950, p. 1.

[647] Davis, "The Role of the United States in the Cyprus Dispute Past and Present", p. 260.

asked the government to declare its Cyprus policy.[648] The newspaper concluded its news as if Greece carried this issue to the UN; it would lead to the Turkish-Greek conflict, which would please the "communists."[649]

The following day, *Yeni Sabah* continued to warn Greece with an article entitled "İyi Komşuluğun Şartları" (The Preconditions of Good Neighborliness) and noted that the Greek government's Cyprus policy, in such a period when these two states were "stuck together" due to the most terrible danger, made public in Turkey surprised.[650] The implication behind this statement was that Turkey and Greece had the common Soviet threat which they needed to act together against. At that particular point, the US Senate had been debating the acceptance of these two states to NATO.[651] Hence, the Greek insistence on the problematization of the Cyprus issue was also not welcomed by Turkey because of this very reason. Toward the end of 1951, Turkish newspapers including the pro-DP ones, started to publish about their distrust for Greek intentions more explicitly. On 19 December 1951, for instance, *Akın*, one of the organs of the DP, claimed what Greece wanted was Cyprus.[652]

Yet, meanwhile, despite this increasing disturbance in Turkish newspapers, the demonstrations for the *enosis* continued in Greece.[653] This atmosphere, on the eve of NATO memberships of these two states, probably forced the Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos to give assurances to Turkey. In January 1952, for instance, during his diplomatic visit to Ankara, Venizelos stated: "the Cyprus issue is an issue

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[648] "Kıbrıs Adasına Dair Türk Görüşü: Yunan Hükümeti Adayı İstemeğe Karar Verdi", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 April 1951, pp. 1, 6.

[649] "Kıbrıs Adasına Dair Türk Görüşü", p. 6: "İki devletin, komünistlerin tahriki ile dostluklarının bozulması tehlikesinin belirmesi esefle karşılanmaktadır. Kıbrıs meselesi, şayet, Yunan hükümeti tarafından Birleşmiş Milletlere aksettirilecek olursa, o zaman bir Türk-Yunan ihtilafı Yunanlılar tarafından çıkarılmış olacak."

[650] "İyi Komşuluğun Şartları", *Yeni Sabah*, 7 April 1951, p. 6: "Türkiye ve Yunanistan gibi hür memleketlerin, tarihte eşine rastlanmamış olan en müthiş bir tehlike ile yapışık bulundukları bir sırada, her zaman ziyade birlik ve beraberlik olmak icap ederken, bu Kıbrıs işinin bu derecede velveleli bir şekilde ortaya atılması ve Venizelos hükümetinin de aşikare bir şekilde bu işe müzahereti, Türk efkarında, elim bir hayret uyandırıyor."

[651] "İyi Komşuluğun Şartları", p. 1.

[652] "Yunanistan Kıbrıs'ı İstiyor", *Akın*, 19 December 1951, p.1.

[653] "Yunan Talebesinin Kıbrıs için Gösterisi", *Yeni Sabah*, 20 January 1952, p. 1.

that will be solved between Britain and the population of Cyprus."[654] On 2 February, before he left Ankara, Venizelos gave an interview to the Turkish press and claimed that the Cyprus issue could not harm the Turkish-Greek friendship.[655]

Venizelos made this speech at the period when these two states were just becoming members of NATO. In fact two weeks later, on 18 February, officially both countries admitted to NATO. Yet, in spite of what Venizelos officially stated, in actual fact the pro-e*nosis* demonstrations did continue in Greece. To respond to these *enosis* demonstrations mainly held by Greek university students, the MTTB asked the Turkish government for a permission to organize similar kind of public displays in Turkey.[656] Nevertheless, the DP government did not give permission to such protests, and the MTTB sent a protest letter to students of Athens University.[657]

Sure, the Cyprus issue was not only a foreign affair issue for both states. Quite the contrary, it was always very significant for the internal politics both in Turkey and Greece. In the mid of 1952, probably due to the approaching elections, Greece became more aggressive about this issue. On 21 June, *Ulus* announced this with a heading "Kıbrıs Meselesi Tazeleniyor" (The Cyprus Issue is Being Renewed). The current Greek government, *Ulus* reported, had been receiving various telegraphs from Greek people pressing the government to carry this issue to the next meeting of the UN. Papagos, the current leader of the opposition, and would be the victor of forthcoming elections of November, according to *Ulus*, abstained to declare his ideas about this issue explicitly.[658] Behind the closed doors, however, Papagos had already

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[654] "Yunan Dışişleri Bakanı Dün Geldi", *Yeni Sabah*, 30 January 1952, p. 1: "Kıbrıs meselesi İngiltere ile ada halkı arasında halledilecek bir meseledir."

[655] "Venizelos Ankara'da Basın Toplantısı Yaptı", *Yeni Sabah*, 3 February 1952, p. 1: "Kıbrıs meselesi Türk-Yunan dostluğunu haleldar edemez."

[656] "Gençliğin Kıbrıs için Beyannamesi", *Yeni Sabah*, 11 May 1952, pp. 1, 7: "Hükümetle temastan sonra bir miting yapılacak. Atinada Kıbrıs için yapılan miting Tüğrk umumi efkarında infial yaratmıştır."

[657] "Kıbrıs için Mitinge İzin Verilmedi: Gençler Atina Üniversitesi Talebe Birliğine Bir Beyanname Gönderdiler", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 May 1952, pp. 1, 5.

[658] "Kıbrıs Meselesi Tazeleniyor", *Ulus*, 21 June 1952, p. 1: "Yunan Hükümeti, bütün memleketten ve Kıbrıs adasından Kıbrıs meselesinin Birleşmiş Milletlerin gelecek toplantısına aksettirilmesini talebeden telgraflar almaktadırlar [...] Muhalefet lideri Papagos, Kıbrıs meselesinin bütün milleti heyecanlandırmakta olduğunu söyliyerek demiştir ki: Hükümet hattı hareketi hakkında bana malumat verdikten sonra bu husutaki görüşlerimi bildireceğim"."

promised Makarios to carry this issue to the UN, in case of his winning the elections.[659]

Unlike Papagos, who was only the leader of oppositional party at that time, the current Greek government had to make explicit declarations to satisfy the Greek public opinion about carrying this issue to the UN agenda. The Turkish press also closely watched the position of the Greek government at this particular point. And, on 23 June, the official declaration of the Greek Foreign Ministry about Cyprus, which only assured that the Greek common interests would be taken into consideration, was covered in Turkish press from the front page.[660] This declaration was, in fact, not clear in showing plans of the Greek government. But, on 5 July 1952, *Akın* reported that Venizelos, who was currently serving as the deputy Prime Minister in the Greek government, had promised the Archbishop of Athens for an appeal to the UN for the Cyprus issue.[661] After this news, *Yeni Sabah* reported about the Turkish protests in Cyprus against this promise.[662] And, in the same issue dating 6 July 1952, this newspaper published an editorial article that warned the Turkish Foreign Minister, Köprülü for the recent news about Venizelos's promise and protested the quick shift in Venizelos's statements.[663] At that period, *Yeni Sabah*, still was not one of the pro-DP newspapers, although it became one in the following period, hence it was more able to warn the government about Greece.

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[659] Davis, "The Role of the United States in the Cyprus Dispute Past and Present", p. 261.

[660] "Kıbrıs'a Dair Yunan Resmi Tebliği", *Ulus*, 23 June 1952, p. 1: "…memleketin umumi menfaatleri çerçevesinde...;" "Yunan Hükümetinin Kıbrısa Dair Tebliği", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 June 1952, p. 1.

[661] "Başbakan Vekili Venizelos Atina Başpsikoposu Spiridon'a Vaadı", *Akın*, 5 July 1952, p. 1: "Kıbrıs'ın ilhakı için Yunanistan Birleşmiş Milletlere müracaat edecek."

[662] "Kıbrıs Türklerinin Yunan İsteklerini Protestosu", *Yeni Sabah*, p. 1: "Türkler, Kıbrıs ile Yunanistan'ın birleşmesine her zamankinden daha fazla muhalif olduklarını bildirdiler."

[663] Editorial, "Dışişleri Bakanına İthaf", *Yeni Sabah*, 6 July 1952, p. 1: "Dışişleri bakanlığımızın, dün, Atinadan gelen haberleri, itina ve dikkat ile okunması, çok tavsiyeye şayandır. Atinada behmahal Kıbrıs adasının Yunanistan'a ilhak etmek istiyenler, yine şahlanmış ve başlarına payitaht Başpsikoposu getirerek, hükümet nezlinde şiddetli teşebbüslerde bulunmuştur. Mösyö Venizelos dün İstanbul'da ve Ankara'da bulunduğu sırada verdiği demeçlerin zıddına ve onlara tamamen aykırı olarak, meselenin Birleşmiş Milletlere aksettirilmesine ve İngiltere'den bu mesele üzerine şikayet edilmesine taraftarlığını ilan etmiş ve Başpsikopos bu husuta teminat vermiştir. Türk-Yunan dostluğunun daha ilk temelleri kurulur ve İstanbul ve Ankara'da Yunan hükümdarlarına gösterilen sevgi ve saygı tezahürlerinin akisleri sönmemiş iken, müşahade ve tesbit edilen bu hırçınlık nasıl ifade ve izah edilebilir."

June of 1952 was a particularly busy period concerning the diplomatic visits and friendly gestures as was reported regularly in *Zafer*, and as discussed in the third chapter of this dissertation.[664] Nevertheless, it was clear that despite these visits and the ongoing friendship rhetoric, the Greek side was insistent to pursue its *enosis* policy for Cyprus. In the following months, yet, as the Greek elections of November 1952 were approaching, the discussions over Cyprus were heated more.

The Turkish press was closely watching these discussions in Greece and it was also becoming a party to them. On the one hand, Turkish newspapers responded to Greek newspapers' coverage supporting the *enosis*, as was done by *Hizmet*, a pro-DP newspaper, which reacted to *Elefteria*'s coverage favouring the *enosis* in a news item entitled "İşgüzarların Yeni Bir Marifeti" (A New Piece of the Officious) on 19 November 1952.[665] *Hizmet* continued to follow developments not only in Greece but also in Cyprus, for instance, two weeks later, the newspaper informed the Turkish public opinion about the Archbishop of Cyprus Orthodox Church, also the leading figure of the *enosis* propaganda, Makarios's detrimental activities and prostests organized by Turkish Cypriots against the "Red [Kızıl] Propaganda of Makarios."[666] On the other hand, Turkish newspapers were busy with providing how the Greek policy about Cyprus undermined its own position within the Western Bloc in favour of Turkey which of course did not pursue an aggressive policy about Cyprus. The editorial of *Yeni Sabah*, on 14 September 1952, claimed that Greece, which was not happy with the British rejection of the *enosis* and was under the influence Makarios's "intrigues," "became furious" when İzmir was elected as the headquarters of the Middle East Command.[667]

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[664] "Dost Yunan Kral ve Kraliçesi Hoşgeldiniz", *Zafer*, 9 June 1952, p. 1; "Bayar'a Dün En Büyük Yunan Nişanı Verildi", *Zafer*, 11 June 1952, p. 1; "Misafirlerimiz Gösterilen Sıcak Alakadan Memnun", *Zafer*, 15 June 1952, p. 1; "Venizelos: Türk-Yunan Dostluğunun Siyasi Neticleri Mühimdir", *Zafer*, 20 June 1952, p. 1; "Türk-Yunan İşbirliği Daha da Gelişiyor", *Zafer*, 26 June 1952, p. 1.

[665] "İşgüzarların Yeni Bir Marifeti", *Hizmet*, 19 November 1952, p. 1. "Elefteria gazetesi gene Kıbrısın Yunanistan'a ilhakını istiyor."

[666] "Kıbrıs Türkleri", *Hizmet*, 2 December 1952, p. 1.

[667] Editorial, "Şu Yunanistan'da Neler Oluyor?", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 September 1952, p. 1: "Yunan komşumuzun iç işleri ve dış politikası, bu son günlerde, çok acayip bir manzara almıştır. Türk basını Atina'da olup bitenlerden habersiz değildir. Fakat bunu bir saman alevi sayarak, işe fazla ehemmiyet

Meanwhile, this problem started to influence even the routine relations of these two states. For instance, the Turkish delegation was invited to the Labour Congress in Athens in April of 1953. During this meeting, however, some of the Greek authorities applauded the representative of the Cyprus Labour Federation and shouted "*enosis*." This did not only disturb the Turkish delegation but also the British one. As a protest to this, the Turkish delegation and the British *Attaché* left the room. Nonetheless, according to the news of *Demokrat Ankara*, the American delegation attempted to persuade the Turkish delegation to return to the meeting and continue to attend the Congress. Yet, the Turkish delegation did not accept this and decided to leave Greece.[668]

The next day, the DP MP for Maraş and the editor of *Demokrat Ankara*, Selahattin Hüdayioğlu, published a leading article about the Cyprus issue and uttered threats of violence:[669]

> The Turkish-Greek friendship is a matter which we have been working to establish for long years. We have been trying to make this friendship widely accepted and adopted by two nations rather than just a project of friendship, which is resulted from the necessity of good relations and limited to the diplomatic arena. Although we keep calm as the Turkish authorities, the Turkish nation is a nation which knows very well how to teach a lesson when necessary. Do today's spoiled children of Greece not take any lesson from what their fathers had learnt? They should not forget: Cyprus is completely Turkish. It was kneaded in our blood, so it is a part of us.

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vermek istememiş idi ancak zaman geçtikçe Yunan matbuatı kameli arttırmaktadır [...] Atina'daki bu hırçınlık ve hiddet havasının salikleri o kadar gizli ve akılalmaz şeyler değildir. Kıbrıs Psikoposunun entrikaları tesir yaratınca, Atinadakiler, İngiltere'ye hiddetlendiler ve şimdi Orta Doğu Komutanlığını ateşlemek isteyenler ve İzmir'in karargah olarak seçilmesi Yunanistan'ı çileden çıkarmıştır."

668 "Yunanlıların Yeni Küstahlığı", *Demokrat Ankara*, 25 April 1953, pp. 1, 4: "Atina'daki Çalışma Kongresinde Kıbrıs lehine tezahurat yapıldı. Türk delegesi ve İngiliz ateşesi toplantıyı terk ettiler. Türk delegesi yurda dönüyor [...] Kıbrıs İşçi Federasyonu mümessili Pisosi'yi alkışlamışlar ve "Enosis" diye bağırmışlardır [...] Amerikan delegesi, Türk delegesine toplantıya dönmesi adına konuşma yaptı."

669 Selahattin Hüdayioğlu, "Türk Kıbrıs", *Demokrat Ankara*, 26 April 1953, p. 1: "Türk-Yunan dostluğu uzun yıllardan beri tesisine çalıştığımız bir olaydır. Biz dostluğu yalnız diplomatik sahada iki devlet arasında karşılıklı iyi münasebetlerin icap ettirdiği bir proje dostluğu değil iki milletin kendisine mal olmuş, milletce benimsenmiş bir dostluk olmasına çalışıyoruz. Resmi makamlarca sukütü muhafaza etsek de Türk milleti icap ettiği zaman ders vermesini bilen bir millettir. Bugünkü Yunanistanın şımarık çocukları babalarının aldıkları derslerden kendilerine hiç mi bir ibret hissesi çıkarmıyorlar? Unutmasınlar ki: Kıbrıs köküne kadar Türktür. Bizim kanımızla yuğrulmuş, bizden bir parçadır."

What made Selahattin Hüdayioğlu wrote this article was the recent incident in Greece against the Turkish delegation. Similarly, regarding this incident, the next day, Faik Suat, another author in this newspaper wrote that Turkey had to call the Greek authorities to account.[670] On 28 April, this newspaper also claimed that there was a "devious" policy for Cyprus in Athens,[671] however, *Demokrat Ankara* added; Cyprus would never become a part of Greece.[672]

In the second half of 1953, anti-British protests increased in Cyprus. On 23 May, *Ulus* reacted to the continuing *enosis* activities of Makarios, who was trying to provoke people in Cyprus according to this newspaper.[673] In July, one of the popular Greek newspapers, *Ethnos*, went further and said if Britain did not take the Greek demands on Cyprus seriously; the Soviet Union would be called to intervene. This article was published at a particular time when the Turkish, Greek and Yugoslavian foreign ministers came together to increase the military cooperation among themselves. According to *Demokrat Ankara*, this article of *Ethnos* created a negative impact.[674] Of course, these kinds of declarations increased the Turkish territorial concerns. Any possible Soviet intervention in Cyprus, a very close island to the Turkish territorial waters, would be a trouble.

After a couple of months, on 21 October 1953, this time rather than an article in Greek newspapers, the statements of Greek authorities annoyed the Turkish press. The Vice Foreign Minister of Greece, Stefanos Stefanopoulos, talked to American newspapers in Athens about the foreign affairs of Greece in general. Regarding the

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[670] Faik Suad, "Bu Hareketin Hesabı Sorulmalı", *Demokrat Ankara*, 27 April 1953, p. 1.

[671] "Kıbrıs Hiçbir Zaman Yunanlıların Olamaz", *Demokrat Ankara*, 28 April 1953, p. 1: "Atina'da Kıbrıs için sinsi bir faaliyet göze çarpıyor."

[672] "Kıbrıs Hiçbir Zaman Yunanlıların Olamaz", p. 1: "Kıbrıs hiçbir zaman Yunanlıların olamaz."

[673] "Kıbrıs Psikoposunun Tahrikleri. Şimdi de Halkı Galeyana Getirmeye Çalışıyor", *Ulus*, 23 May 1953, p. 1.

[674] "Yunanlılar Kıbrıs Meselesini Yine Dillerine Aldılar", *Demokrat Ankara*, 5 July 1953, p. 1: "Etnos gazetesinin yazdığına göre eğer İngiltere anlayış göztermezse Kıbrıs'ın müdafaasına Rusya çağırılacakmış. Yazı üç dışişleri vekilleri toplantı sırasında hiçte iyi bir netice doğurmamıştır."

Cyprus issue, in particular, he claimed that the Cyprus issue was only between Greece and Britain.[675]

In the meantime, the increasing mistreatment of Turks in Cyprus angered the Turkish public opinion more and more agitated about this issue. The current DP government, however, continued to remain silent rather than declaring its official Cyprus policy against the *enosis* policy of Greece. This attitude of the government made the CHP and its organs more alerted. Losing their faith in the DP government, Turkish Cypriots started to convey their problems to the opposition, and their problems were widely covered by the oppositional press. On 19 August 1953, for example, *Ulus* reported that a committee from Cyprus visited İsmet İnönü.[676] Two months later, on 11 October 1953 Kasım Gülek, the Secretary General of the CHP, explained the CHP's view regarding the Cyprus issue. Stating the importance of Turkey's friendly relations with Britain and Greece, Gülek, in the name of the CHP, wanted the continuation of the existing *status-quo* in Cyprus. In case of a change, however, this could only be "in favour of Turkey" (Türkiye'nin lehine).[677]

While the opposition was clear about its stance *vis-à-vis* Cyprus, the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes did not declare the stance of the Turkish government until August 1955 overtly.[678] On 24 August, on the eve of the approaching London Conference, which would take place between 29 August and 7 September between Turkey, Greece and Britain, he gave a speech regarding this issue. He stated that in case of a change in the *status-quo*, Turkey would want this island back. Menderes also declared that Turks of Cyprus would not be left "defenseless" (savunmasız). In his speech, Menderes accused Greece of problematizing this issue. He protested the Greek government's approach toward Makarios, which respected Makarios as if

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[675] "Yunan Hariciye Vekiline Göre: Kıbrıs Yunanistanla İngiltere Arasında Bir Mesele imiş", *Demokrat Ankara*, 21 October 1953, p. 1: "Kıbrıs meselesini sırf Yunanistanla İngiltere arasında bir mesele olarak telakki etmektedir."

[676] "İnönü, Kıbrıs'tan Gelen Heyet Üyeleri ile Görüştü", *Ulus*, 19 August 1953, p. 1.

[677] "Kasım Gülek'in Kıbrıs'a Dair Konuşması", *Cumhuriyet*, 11 October 1953, p. 1: "…eğer statükoda bir değişiklik olması mevzuu ise bu ancak Türkiyenin lehine olabilir."

[678] "Kıbrıs Meselesine Dair Türk Tezi Son Şeklini Aldı", *Yeni Sabah*, 9 August 1955, p. 1.

Makarios was a head of state rather than a "town priest."[679] This speech of Menderes, according to *Zafer*, created "relief" among Turkish Cypriots, and one of these Turkish Cypriots even told to *Zafer*: "We again breathe a sigh of relief."[680]

Menderes, however, was too late to declare his government's official view. Nonetheless, this speech was welcomed by the CHP and its organs.[681] And, the CHP declared that until the end of the London Conference, they would support the government's stance.[682] Despite the opposition's open declaration of support to the government's stance in Cyprus, this was not reported in *Zafer*. And this omission was protested on 27 August 1955 in *Ulus*, the organ of the CHP.[683] After this open protest by *Ulus*, *Zafer* covered the opposition's support for the government's Cyprus policy in the following day. Obviously this kind of unanimity was such a rare occassion that *Akşam* reported *Zafer*'s reporting about the CHP's support.[684]

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[679] "Kıbrıs Statükosunun Değişmemesi Asgari Şartımızdır", *Zafer*, 25 August 1955, p. 1: "Bu ne biçim bir hükümettir ki bir kasaba papazına devlet muamelesi yapacak kadar eğilip bükülmektedir;" "Kıbrıs Türkleri Müdafaasız Bırakılmayacak", *Yeni Sabah*, 25 August 1955, p. 1.

[680] "Başvekilin Nutku Kıbrısta da Ferahlık Havası Yarattı", *Zafer*, 27 August 1955, p. 1: "Tekrar rahat nefes almaya başladık."

[681] Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Başbakanin Kıbrıs Demeci", *Ulus*, 28 August 1955, p. 1: "Başbakan Sayın Adnan Menderes, Londra Konferansı arifesinde Kıbrıs hakkındaki Türk görüşünü vuzuhla açıklamıştır. Bu beyanat muhalefet partileri tarafından desteklendiği gibi, Türk milletinin duygularını da ifade etmektedir. Bu sebeple Başbakanın bu konudaki sözlerisamimi yankı uyandırmış ve denilebilir ki resmi makamların Kıbrıs meselesinde şimdiye kadar ihtiyar ettikleri sükuttan doğan ıstırabı dindirmiş ve büyük rahatlık duygusu yaratmıştır. Eğer resmi Türk görüşü daha once bildirilmiş olsaydı, Yunanistan bu konu da bu derece ileri gitmez miydi? Bu suali cevaplandıracak durumda değiliz. Her halde hükümeti bu noktada temkin ve ihtiraza sevkeden düşünce samimiyetle izah ettiği gibi Yunan dostluğuna kıymet verilmesidir. Eğer Yunanistan da Türk dostluğuna ufak bir kıymet vermiş olsaydı, durup duruken Kıbrıs meselesini ortaya atmazdı."

[682] "Londra Konferansı Bitinceye Kadar", *Akşam*, 27 August 1955, p. 1: "Halk Partisi mutedil bir politika izleyecek;" "İnönü'nün Kıbrıs Demeci", *Ulus*, 26 August 1955, p. 1: "Kıbrıstaki kardeşlerimizin can ve mallarını tehlikeden korumak için hükümetle beraberiz. Kıbrıs Konferansının şekli ve neticesi belli oluncaya kadar muhalif parti olarak dikkatimizi bu mevzuuda toplıyacağız."

[683] "Mensup Olduğunuz İktidarca Çıkarılan Bir Kanunla Matbaası Elinden Alındıktan Sonra Yeni Tesisler Kurmasına İzin Verilmiyen Her Türlü Malzeme Tedarikinde Zorluklara Uğratılan Kağıt Kontenjanı Kısıtlanan Ulus'un Durumu Karşısında", *Ulus*, 27 August 1955, p. 1: "Efendiler size ancak susmak düşer. Bütün imkanlara sahip bulunduğu halde bize ağır ithamlar savurmaktan sıkılmıyan Zafer gazetesi çok erken saatte basına verilen İnönü'nün Kıbrıs meselesinde hükümeti desteklediğini bildiren beyanatını neşretmemesinin ayıbını örtmek için acaba hangi mazareti ileri sürecektir."

[684] "Zafer: Bu Ne Güzel Birlik", *Akşam*, 29 August 1955, p. 1: "Londra Konferansı münasebetiyle iktidarla muhalefet arasında hasıl olan görüş birliği Ankarada memnuniyet uyandırdı."

Until Menderes's open declaration, in fact, there were internal disputes between the government and the CHP over the Cyprus issue. According to the CHP, the current government was pursuing a passive policy about Cyprus. For instance, on 24 June 1955, *Akşam* quoted the words of Kasım Gülek, who said if the government continued its "passive policy" Cyprus would be lost.[685] In the following month, in July of 1955, *Ulus* reported the increasing oppression toward Turkish Cypriots and accused the Turkish government of being responsible of this continuing maltreatment.[686] These two parties, finally, on the eve of London Conference, united around a common policy, which favored was no change in the *status-quo*.

In this period, the Turkish public opinion became more and more agitated due to the continuing pressure on Turks on the island. Particularly from the summer of 1955 onwards, this disturbance reached its peak due to increasing problems of the Turkish population under attacks of Greek Cypriots.[687] Actually, these were not just isolated armed attacks but they were a part of terrorist activities of newly established EOKA, a terrorist organization, which aimed to achieve the *enosis* and started its campaign on 1 April 1955.[688] Day by day, from the Turkish point of view, Cyprus became more and more unsafe for Turkish Cypriots. The situation was so bad that

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[685] "Kıbrıs Hadisesine Seyirci Kalamayız", *Akşam*, 24 June 1955, p. 1: "...hükümetin pasif politikası devam ederse Kıbrıs elden gider."

[686] "Kıbrıs Türkleri", *Ulus*, 11 July 1955, p. 1; "Nota Verdik", *Ulus*, 12 July 1955, p. 1; Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Kıbrıs için Müzakere", *Ulus*, 18 July 1955, p.1.

[687] "Kıbrıs Türklerine Tecavüz Başladı", *Akşam*, 22 June 1955, p. 1; "Kıbrıs Rumları Hala Yatışmadı", *Ulus*, 13 July 1955, p. 1; "Kıbrıs Türklerinin Feryadı", *Ulus*, 16 August 1955, p. 1; "Kıbrıs'ta Türklerin Mal ve Can Emniyeti Kalmamıştır", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 August 1955, p. 1: "Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu başkanı, olup bitenleri bildirmek için Ankara'ya gitti;" "Kıbrıs'ta Türkler Geceleri Dışarı Çıkamıyor", *Yeni Sabah*, 22 August 1955, pp. 1, 7: "Rum tedhişçiler tarafından öldürülen Rum posta memuru, aynı zamanda sivil memurmuş. Atina radyosu, bu cinayeti bir kahramanlık olarak gösteriyor. (Lefkoşa: Hususi muhabirimiz Hüsrev Dağseven bildiriyor): Kıbrısa gelişimden bu yana henüz beş gün gibi kısa bir zamanın geçmesine rağmen, hüküm sürmekte olan terör havasının daha artmış olduğunu hayretle gördüm. 4 gün içinde EOKA teşkilatına mensup şahısların alçakça ve pek vahşi bir şekilde yaptıkları 4 katliam hadisesi ile geceleri yine 4 Türk polise ateş açılması hadiselerinin halk arasında uyandırdığı heyecan şiddetinden henüz bir şey kaybetmiş değildir [...] adadaki huzursuzluk son haddini bulmuş ve bütün gözler Londra Konferansına çevrilmiştir."

[688] Niyazi Kızılyürek, "Fear and Nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot Community", *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey* (Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kızılyürek and Umut Özkırımlı eds.) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 179; Davis, "The Role of the United States in the Cyprus Dispute Past and Present", p. 263.

even the representatives of the Turkish republic on the island were under attack. For instance, on 28 July 1955, *Ulus* reported that the Turkish Consul had to leave the island due to the increasing attacks.[689] The threats received by the prominent names of Turkish Cypriots such as Fazıl Küçük, were graphically described in Turkish newspapers. According to *Ulus*, Fazıl Küçük was threatened with such words: "You will be beheaded and we will throw your head to football pitch and we will cut your body into pieces and throw each of them to dogs. Whatever you do, the *enosis* will become true and you will understand what the Greek means."[690]

All these sensational press coverage created a patriotic atmosphere and mobilized the public in Turkey more. Turkish newspapers, this time, started to report news about increasing numbers of volunteers who wanted to go to Cyprus to rescue their fellow Turks from the tyranny of Greek Cypriots. For instance, on 28 August, *Akşam* wrote about an old man, Musa Ecel, who fought against the Greeks during the National Independence War. Ecel said: "Send me to Cyprus and I will again teach a lesson to these *Rum*s [Greeks]. It seems as if they ride for a fall."[691] The following day, Muammer Kaylan, the correspondent of *Yeni Sabah* reported from Cyprus that lives and properties of Turks still could not be secured.[692] Then, he added: "All across the country thousands of Turks appeal to go Cyprus voluntarily."[693]

While Turkish newspapers were busy with what was going on in Cyprus and highly concerned about their fellow nationals, the London Conference started on 29 August 1955.[694] They also followed this conference very closely. The news about the Cyprus issue increased automatically and the most of the newspapers allocated all

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[689] "Türk Konsolosu Kıbrıstan Döndü", *Ulus*, 28 July 1955, p. 1.

[690] "Türk Konsolosu Kıbrıstan Döndü", p. 1: "Senin kafanı keserek futbol sahasına ve vücudunu da parçılıyarak köpeklere atacağız. Ne yaparsan yok ilhak tahakkuk edecek ve Yunan'ın ne demek olduğunu anlıyacaksın."

[691] "Rumların Katliam Teşebbüsü Fiyasko Verdi", *Akşam*, 28 August 1955, p. 1: "Beni Kıbrısa göndersinler de yine o Rumlara bir ders vereyim. Bunlar galiba canlarına susamışlar."

[692] "Türklerin Mal ve Can Güvenliği Sağlanmış Değildir", *Yeni Sabah*, 29 August 1955, p. 1: "Türklerin mal ve can emniyeti sağlanmış değildir."

[693] "Türklerin Mal ve Can Güvenliği Sağlanmış Değildir", p. 1: "Yurdun her tarafında Kıbrıs'a gönüllü gitmek için binlerce müracaat yapılıyor."

[694] "Londra Konferansı Bugün Açıldı", *Akşam*, 29 August 1955, p. 1.

their front pages to this event. These news were not necessarily about the meetings in the London Conference. There were also some other interesting news regarding this issue. One of them was, for example, the CHP's gift to the MTTB. From the very beginning of the Cyprus issue, although the Turkish population supported and attended their demonstrations, it was mainly the members of the MTTB that organized protests voicing the position of Turkish Cypriots as well as pressing for a strong Turkish stance. Their actions from time time even irritated the Turkish authorities both in the CHP and the DP rules. Even, during the rule of Menderes government, the members of the MTTB were interrogated in April 1955 due to their insistent protests.[695] This happened when the DP still did not declare its Cyprus policy and did not want to create too much animosity against Greece and wanted to control the Turkish public opinion and did not welcome the MTTB's heated defense of Turkish Cypriots.

The CHP, now as an oppositional party, supported the MTTB's efforts. On 1 September 1955, *Akşam* reported that the CHP's youth branch of Galata presented a gift to the MTTB. It was a Turkish flag on which there was a map of Cyprus.[696] On this map it was written: "Cyprus is Turkish."[697] Thus, although the CHP and the DP decided to have a kind of temporal consensus during the London Conference, it was clear that a difference between their approaches toward the Cyprus issue always remained valid.

The following day, the Turkish newspapers all reported the speech of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who was currently the Turkish Foreign Minister and also the head of the Turkish delegation in the Conference. Zorlu repeated the Turkish stance: either the continuation of the *status-quo* or giving island back to Turkey.[698] Then, as the parties

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[695] "Nümayiş Yapanlardan 21 Kişinin İfadesi Alındı", *Akşam*, 22 April 1955, p. 1: "Bunlardan yedisi hakkında dünkü sokak tezahüratının devamından sanık olarak tatbikat yapılıyor."

[696] "Türk Kıbrıs Bayrağı", *Akşam*, 1 September 1955, p. 1: "CHP Galata gençlik kolutarafından Milli Türk Talebe Birliği Başkanlığına üzerinde Kıbrıs adasının haritası bulunan bir Türk bayrağı hediye edilmiştir."

[697] "Türk Kıbrıs Bayrağı", p. 1: "Kıbrıs Türktür."

[698] "Londra Konferansında Dün Okunan Türk Tezi", *Akşam*, 2 September 1955, p. 1; "Kıbrıs Hakkında Son Sözümüz: Fatin Rüştü'nün Konferanstaki Konuşması", *Ulus*, 2 September 1955, p. 1: "Türkiye statükonun devamı fikrindedir. Bu bozulacaksa o da Türkiye'ye avdet etmelidir. Şunu da iyice bilmek lazımdır ki statükoyu başka türlü değiştirmeye çalışmak Türkiye'nin dostluğunu

could not agree, the Conference was closed from 3 September to 6 September.[699] Within this period, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu stated: "Now, Greece is in the face of a choice: either it will choose the friendship with Turkey or it will insist on its Cyprus policy, so perhaps lose this friendship forever."[700] Actually, just before the beginning of the London Conference, on 28 August, the Turkish authorities of the Turkish Embassy in London had already voiced this sentence to the British Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan.[701] Indeed, the Turkish authorities were right as this problem started the beginning of the stalemate in the Turkish-Greek relations and brought an end to the emphasis on the friendship. During the Conference, finally, there occurred the 6-7 September events in Thessaloniki, İstanbul and İzmir, and the Turkish-Greek relations entered a new era.

VI.III. Conclusion

Compared to the issues examined in the previous chapters such as the remembering and forgetting the common past as well as the sporadic incidents, the Turkish press was more interested in the issue of Turkish minorities because of people in Turkey whose primary concern was to ensure the well-being of their fellow nationals. Sure, this issue had a crucial impact on Turkish people as it mainly formed the basis of their views of Greece. At that particular moment, Turkish Cypriots, although they were not ruled by Greece, also shaped the Turkish perceptions of the Turkish-Greek relations. The Turkish press was aware of this fact. In order to challenge the government's Greek policy, it widely covered the ill-treatment of these Turks either by the Greek government itself or by illegal forces backed by the Greek government. The coverage of the mistreatment of the Greek government by the

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muhafaza ile kabil değildir;" "Londra Konferansının Dünkü Toplantısında Kıbrıs'a Dair Türk Tezi Açıklandı", *Zafer*, 2 September 1955, p. 1.

[699] "Kıbrıs Konferansına Ara Verildi", *Ulus*, 3 September 1955, p. 1; "Londra Konferansı Bugün Tekrar Toplanıyor", *Ulus*, 6 September 1955, p. 1.

[700] "Editorial, "Ya Kıbrıs, Ya Türk Dostluğu", *Yeni Sabah*, 5 September 1955, p. 1: "Yunanistan şimdi bir tercih karşısında: Ya Türkiye ile dostluğu seçecek yahud da Kıbrıs davasında ısrar ederek bu dostluğu belki ebediyyen kaybedecektir."

[701] 28 August 1955: BCA, 010 09 109 340 4, p. 4: "Yunanistan bu davasında ısrar ederse Türk-Yunan dostluğunun aynı şekilde devam etmesi imkansız bir hale gelecektir."

Turkish press aroused an intense national hatred of the Greek government among the Turkish people. More importantly, the comprehensive coverage of the events that took place both in Greece and Cyprus led the Turkish people to question the necessity of the Cold War friendship with Greece even more, and the Turkish public urged the DP government to end its friendly Greek policy.

There was an emerging official Greek demand for ruling Cyprus, thus, these two minority issues were interrelated issues for the Turkish public from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s onwards. As a result of the wide press coverage, the problems of Turks living in Western Thrace continued to occupy the agenda of Turkish public throughout this period. Particularly, toward the mid-1950s, the problems of Turks in Cyprus also added to this picture. In time, the attacks toward these Turkish Cypriots even turned into terrorist attacks. These all made people asked what would happen to Turkish Cypriots in case of an *enosis* then. Hence, for the Turkish public opinion, knowing the never-ending problems of Turkish minority in Western Thrace, in which press played a crucial role to inform public regularly with its continuing attention for this issue Turkish Cypriots had to be protected from the Greek rule.

Public reactions intensified in Turkey as Greece started to publicize its official demands about Cyprus during the rule of the DP. There were frequent public movements asking the DP government to put a diplomatic pressure on Greece to change its minority and Cyprus policy.[702] These public protests were mainly organized by the student organizations, enjoying the full support of the oppositional press. These increasing oppositional voices, thanks to the mobilization power of the press, even resulted in some changes in the course of foreign policy actions of the government occasionally, as was seen in the case of accepting Turks who had escaped from the Western Thrace. The DP, despite the lasting public protests, continued to pursue a relatively less responsive approach toward the problems of Turks and did not change its Cyprus policy until the beginning of 1955. Therefore, the DP government had no intention to cease to place great importance on the Cold

[702] 22 September 1954: BCA, 010 09 457 1323 6, p. 17.

War partnership with Greece, nor did the oppositional press stop its protests throughout the period.

CHAPTER VII

THE GREEK MINORITY IN TURKEY

The principle of reciprocity for the ones exempted from the exchange of population, i.e. Turks/Muslims living in Western Thrace and Greeks living in İstanbul, was recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne. It meant these two minorities would enjoy the same rights granted by Turkey and Greece.[703] This reciprocity in principle also rules the Turkish perceptions of minority issue in practice, meaning that the situation of the Turkish minority in Greece influences the Turkish public opinion about Turkey's policy toward the Greek minority in Turkey. It was also valid from 1946 to 1955, and, as the previous chapter examined, the maltreatment of Turks at that particular period made Turkish people question the Turkish authorities' more tolerant approach toward the Greek minority in Turkey.

From the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, the underlying reason behind Turkey's tolerant policy toward the Greeks, despite the maltreatment of Turks, might be linked to the successive CHP and DP governments' readiness to associate even its minority problems with their Cold War strategies. In a way, it meant that the Turkish government sacrificed its independent control over its internal affairs regarding the Greek minority for the sake of Western support in general and the Turkish-Greek Cold War partnership in particular.

Throughout this period, the Turkish press covered three main headings regarding Greeks living in Turkey. One of them was Aristoklis Mathias Spriyu's (Athenagoras's) becoming a Patriarch to the Greek Orthodox Church in 1948. The second major issue was the remembering of the *Varlık Vergisi* (the wealth tax) and,

[703] *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, I (Seha L. Meray ed. and trans.) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1969), p. 202.

finally the 6-7 September events. Examining the Turkish press coverage of these three topics, this chapter will investigate the role of the press in the creation of public perceptions of Greeks in Turkey and to what extent such a role shaped the Turkish policy toward the Greek minority.

VII.I. Patriarch Athenagoras

The emerging Cold War atmosphere made the Western powers and the Soviet Union turned their eyes to the position of Patriarch in the Greek Orthodox Church in Fener, in İstanbul. According to Moscow, there was a Turkish pressure on the Patriarchate, so Patriarch had to be elected by all Orthodox churches including the Russian one. This Soviet demand alarmed the Western powers, especially Britain and the US. Such a step would mean a Soviet influence on the Patriarchate. To eliminate such a potential risk, they attempted to persuade Turkey to establish better relations with the Patriarchate. In February of 1946, most probably to satisfy the Western concern, the Turkish authorities, including the governor of İstanbul, attended the funeral of Patriarch Veniamin, to show their good will. It was the first time that a Turkish official attended a Patriarch's funeral.[704]

After Patriarch Veniamin's death on 17 February 1946, Maximos V was elected a new Patriarch. His election, however, had great concern for the Western allies, mostly due to his 'pro-communist' views regarding the ongoing Greek Civil War.[705] To eliminate such concern, Maximos had to be removed from this influential position. From July 1947 onwards, there emerged rumors about the retirement of Maximos V for the reason that he was in poor health although for some of his associates, he "appeared greatly improved."[706] The major impetus behind rumors on Maximos V's health was to oblige him to retire. The rumors worked, and he was retired on pretext of psychological reasons on 18 October 1948. Pressures on him to leave his position were largely put by the US channels, and the US influence was not

[704] Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of İstanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations (1918-1974)* (Athens: Center for Asian Minor Studies, 1983), p. 241.

[705] Gökçen, *Ortodoks Üçgeni: Yunanistan, Patrikhane ve Pontus*, pp. 109-110; Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", p. 585.

[706] "Turkish Patriarch Home: Maximos V of Orthodox Church Ends Visit to Greece", *The New York Times*, 4 August 1947, p. 9.

limited to the retirement of Maximos. In Athenagoras's election as the new Patriarch, too, the US played a crucial role.[707]

Athenagoras I, whose real name was Aristoklis Mathias Spriyu, was an American citizen. He served as the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America from 1930 to 1948. During Athenagoras's presence in the US, President Truman was his most important interlocutor. He was regularly invited to the White House for official receptions. He always admired the policies of Truman, and after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, Athenagoras even organized a special thanksgiving for Truman, in which he said "Truman was a man sent from God." His close relations with Truman worked: he first became a Turkish citizen and then became the new Patriarch on 1 November 1948, and preserved his position until 7 July 1972. Pro-American Athenagoras was of cardinal importance from the US perspective, for he would act in partnership with the Western Bloc as one of its main foreign policy agents. Athenagoras did what had been expected of him. After taking his position, he made a concentrated effort to promote Western objectives in Turkey as well as in Greece and bolstered the Turkish-Greek friendship.[708]

His election as a Patriarch caught the attention of the Turkish press. According to *Cumhuriyet*, the Orthodox community expressed gratification that Athenagoras was elected.[709] After more than two months of his election, he came to İstanbul in the personal airplane of President Truman. Like his election, the arrival of Athenagoras was a front-burner issue for the Turkish newspapers, and they reported how Athenagoras was warmly welcomed by people in Turkey. On 28 January 1949, *Akşam*, the newspaper of the current Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, for instance, reported that his inaugration ceremony that took place the day before at 11

[707] Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", p. 585.

[708] Peter A. Zervakis, "The Greek Lobby and the Reemergence of Anti-Communism in the United States After World War II", *Enemy Images in American History* (Rognhild Fiebig-von Hase and Ursula Lehmkuhl ed.) (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1997), p. 315; Peter C. Moskos and Charles Moskos, *Greek Americans: Struggle and Success* (New Jersey: New Brunswick, 2014), p. 68; Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", p. 585.

[709] "Ortodoks Patrikliğine Düm Athenagoras Seçildi", *Cumhuriyet*, 2 November 1948, p. 1: "Dünkü seçim neticesi, Ortodoks cemaati arasında büyük memnunluk uyandırdı."

a.m.[710] In the same issue, this newspaper published an article entitled "Yeni Patriğin Alakayla Karşılanışı" (The New Patriarch's Reception with Interest). This article was very sympathetic to and positive about the new Patriarch. Even his pyhsical appearance was praised. It was written that: "New Patriarch Athenagoras brought a new spirit to our country. No one thinks of suspecting the sincerity of the words and acts of this tall man with wide shoulders, huge head and heavy bear thanks to generosity of nature."[711]

Then, in the following paragraphs, more important than his appearance, *Akşam* underlined his two characteristics: his willingness to end "factions" (nifakları) between the Greek minority and the Turkish population and his ability to understand the "American spirit" (Amerikan ruhunu), which, the newspaper argued, were "certain with his being a friend of President Truman and his attracting Truman's great interest."[712] According to the news of *Ulus* dating 7 February 1949, Athenagoras, himself, was also very happy due to the Turkish press' friendly approach toward him.[713]

Indeed, until the summer of 1955, when Cyprus issue intensified, there was no negative attitude about the Greek minority in Turkish newspapers, with the

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[710] "Patrik Dün Merasimle Makamına Oturdu", *Akşam*, 28 January 1949, p. 1: "Patrik nutkunda Türkiye'nin sulh yolundaki hizmetlerini belirtti [...] Yeni Patrik Athenagoras'ın makamına oturma merasimi dün saat 11'de Fener Patrikhanesinde yapıldı."

[711] Arada Bir, "Yeni Patriğin Alakayla Karşılanışı", *Akşam*, 28 January 1949, p. 1: "Yeni Rum Patriği Athenagoras memleketimize taze bir ruh getirdi. Tabiatın cömertlikle yarattığı bu uzun boylu, geniş omuzlu, kocaman başlı, gür sakallı zatın yüzündeki ifade kadar sözlerinin ve hareketlerinin de samimiyetinden şüphe etmek kimsenin aklına gelmiyor."

[712] Arada Bir, "Yeni Patriğin Alakayla Karşılanışı", p. 1: "Athenagoras, memleket dışında ve memlekete döndükten sonra Türk toprakları üzerinde yaşıyan bütün vatandaşların lehine çalıştığını, nifakları ortadan kaldırmak istediğini ve bizi hür milletler dünyasında sevimli göstermek üzere elinden geleni esirgemediğini ispat etmiştir. Memlekette çoğunluğu teşkil eden Müslüman Türkler, uzun tarihi tecrübeler neticesi, samimi ile gayrisamimiyi daha uzaktan anlamak kudretindedir. Bu sebeple çoğunluğun elinde bulunan gazeteler, bir Rum Patriğine, belki de İkinci Sultan Mehmet zamanından beri gösterilen alakanın en büyüğünü ve bilhassa en samimisini göstermiştir. Dünkü gazetelerdeki fotograflar, kalın serlevhalar ve makaleler bunun delili idi. Sayın Patrik Athenagoras, muhtelif ırkların bir araya toplanıp din ve mezhep farkını gözetmeksizin yekpare bir millet teşkil ettikleri Amerikadan geliyor. Amerikanın ruhunu ne derece anladığı, Başkan Truman'la arkadaş oluşundan ve onun yüksek alakasını celbedişinden bellidir."

[713] "Athenagors: Ankara'dan Çok İyi İntibalarla Ayrıldı", *Ulus*, 7 February 1949, p. 1: "Muhabirler, gazeteciler en iyi arkadaşlarımdır. Kendilerini çok severim. Vazifemin ifasında bana çok yardımları dokunmuştur. Esasen Amerika'da birçok gazeteci dostum vardır. Türk gazetecilerinin bana göstermiş oldukları yakınlık yeniden birçok gazeteci dost kazanmama vesile olmuştur."

exception of one incident. The exception was an attack on Athenagoras in February of 1950 in İstanbul. The assaulter was Vasil Haci Yorgi, a Greek man living in İstanbul. Turkish newspapers reported the offense in tremendous detail. On 28 February, *Cumhuriyet* reported that "a repairman attacked Athenagoras with a razor" after the Sunday religious service. And, this Greek assailant yelled at Athenagoras that "you are not deserving to be here, get out of here!"[714] Indeed, when Athenagoras' name was first voiced by the US as a candidate, Greece and the Patriarchate objected to his candidacy as they had other names in their minds for this position.[715] When Turkey made an objection to other candidates and the US insisted on Athenagoras, Athenagoras was elected the Patriarch. Furthermore, apart from this assasination attempt in February of 1950, there was no mention of an objection of the Greek community to Athenagoras in the Turkish press.

Until the summer of 1955 and especially during the rule of the DP, thus, the press coverage of him was mainly about his good relations with Turkish authorities.[716] Athenagoras was able to have so close relations with the DP cadre that even Menderes visited the Patriarchate on 6 June 1952.[717] While Menderes became the first and the only Turkish Prime Minister who have visited the Patriarchate, Athenagoras called Menderes the "unprecedented" (emsalsiz) prime minister in return.[718]

The worsening Cyprus problem, however, changed the unique close identification of the Patriarchate with the Turkish government dramatically. Particularly in 1955, the Turkish press paid increased attention to Athenagoras as well as his relations with Greek Cypriots. One of these Greek Cypriots with whom

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[714] "Patriğe Suikasd", *Cumhuriyet*, 28 February 1950, pp. 1, 3: "Bir tamirici ayinden sonra Athenagoras'a jiletle hücum etti: Pazar günü Fener Kilisesinde yapılan bir ayinden sonra Patrik Athenagoras Vasil Haci Yorgi isminde bir şahsın hücumuna maruz kalmış fakat etraftan yapılan müdahaleler üzerine müessif bir hadisenin önüne geçilmiştir. Mütecaviz bu sırada sen buraya layık değilsin, buradan git demiştir."

[715] Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 188.

[716] Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of İstanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations*, p. 247; Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, pp. 192-195.

[717] "Başbakan Adnan Menderes Dün Patrikhaneyi Ziyaret Etmiştir", *Akşam*, 7 June 1952, p. 1.

[718] 21 June 1954: BCA, 030 01 133 867 5, p. 1.

Athenagoras had personal relationship was Makarios, not only the Archbishop of Cyprus Orthodox Church but also the leading figure of the *enosis*. As a result, Turkish newspapers started to report that Turkish people came to increasingly dislike Athenagoras. As he began to gain downright negative receptions from Turkish public, Athenagoras also lost his initial status as a symbol of the developing close relations between Turkey and Greece. Such a radical change in the perception of Athenagoras will be examined at full length in the third section of this chapter.

VII.II. Revisiting the *Varlık Vergisi* (The Wealth Tax)

From the mid-1940s, the Turkish government aimed to have tolerance for the Greek minority.[719] This was more a result of heavy criticisms Turkey received in the past. There was always a deliberate attempt in the West to create a hostile image regarding the Ottoman/Turkish treatment of non-Muslims since the late Ottoman period. This was most probably the underlying reason behind the CHP government's desire to change this image, by coming to see the Cold War, which brought Turkey's pro-American orientation, as an opportunity. To this end, even before the end of the Second World War, in March of 1944, Turkey abandoned the *Varlık Vergisi* (the wealth tax), which was harshly criticized by Britain and the US.[720]

The *Varlık Vergisi* was enacted during the single party rule on 12 November 1942, under the Second World War conditions. This tax was also applied to the Muslims; however, the majority of people (almost % 86.9) exposed to this tax were the non-Muslims, including the non-immigrant Greek minority living in İstanbul. For the ones who could not pay the reported amount of money, the government enacted a regulation that forced these people to work for state on 7 January 1943. Yet, this new regulation was applied only to the non-Muslims. And, it was on 15 March 1944 that the government abandoned this tax.[721]

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[719] Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları*, p. 119.

[720] Aktaş, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Amerikan Faktörü*, p. 30.

[721] İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *İktisadi Politikaları ve Uygulamalarıyla İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2014), pp. 39-52; İbrahim İnci, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye'de Varlık Vergisi Uygulaması", *CBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 10/2 (2012), pp. 272-290.

This tax issue, which created bitter memories for the Greek minority during the war years, was revisited by the DP after 1945. The DP most likely did it so to undermine the CHP's new image of 'good guy' regarding its minority policies. At the same time, denigrating the CHP's policies of minority groups, the DP would gain a better support from the West. Nonetheless, the top-notch DP leaders such as Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü, too, casted their votes to enforce stricter taxation measures on minorities. Despite the fact that, they were a part of the CHP and the political establishment in 1942, the DP leaders aimed to distance themselves from the past mistakes of CHP governments, by discrediting their political foes.

It was during the election campaigns of 1946 when the DP reawake this former policy of the CHP for the first time.[722] On 16 July 1946, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, as one of the most popular members of the party, delivered his speech over radio. Contrary to what the CHP argued to defend its decision, Fenik claimed that the conditions of 1942-1943 had not necessitated heavily taxing people, which resulted in such bitter memories, and there had been other alternatives of taxation for the government to find money it needed.[723] Indeed, the DP members did not only revisit this issue, but also during this elections campaign, the DP even promised compensation and restitution for the victims of this special tax. Nonetheless, this promise was mainly to criticize the single party rule and to gain the support of the Greek population, which actually supported the DP.[724]

After the elections, there even emerged rumors about the restoration of the money taken as the *Varlık Vergisi* to the taxpayers. According to the news of *Cumhuriyet* dating 15 December 1946, these rumors were published by one of the oppositional Turkish newspapers, *Yarın*, asking "Varlık Vergisi Geriye mi

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[722] Murat Burgaç, "1946 Genel Seçimlerinde Propaganda", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştımaları Dergisi*, 13/26 (2013), p. 167.

[723] 16 July 1946: BCA, 030 10 129 929, p. 17: "Varlık vergisine gelince mali ekseriyeti içte ve dışta sarsan devlet ciddiyetine dokunacak işlere yol açan ve türlü türlü tatbikatı ile hepimizin hatıralarında acı izler bırakmış olan böyle bir vergiye başvurmaktansa vaktinde normal ve adil vergiler bulmak yolu ile varlık vergisinden elde edilen paraların temini pek mümkündü [...] Kanaatimiz odur ki, varlık vergisi gibi eşi tarihte görülemeyen bir vergiye başvurmak asla zaruri değildi."

[724] Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları*, p. 121.

Verilecek?" (Will the Wealth Tax be Returned?). The speculations reached to an unprecedented degree, and the Minister of Finance felt obliged to make a statement about these rumors and denied such claims.[725]

After its victory in the May 1950 elections, the DP continued to use the *Varlık Vergisi* as a trump card against the CHP. While the DP accused the CHP of mistreating minorities before and after 1950, the DP members and organs even charged the CHP with the misuse of the income received from this tax as well as corruption during the DP rule. Accusations and charges were not the sole elements of the anti-CHP campaign of the DP. As soon as the DP took the power, DP deputies brought the issue to the Parliament. The first of these deputies was Sinan Tekelioğlu, MP for Seyhan who was elected from the list of the DP but then became an independent MP. Later, a committee under the Parliament was formed to investigate alleged corruption in using tax revenue gained through the *Varlık Vergisi* by the CHP officials.[726] With all these attempts, the DP intended to revive the issue constantly.

A year later, on 28 June 1951, *Yeni Sabah* covered one of these debates in the Parliament.[727] This time, the reason for why the issue regained its popularity was the publication of memories of Faik Ökte, the former director of the financial administration of İstanbul (İstanbul eski defterdarı). Ökte published his book, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası* (The Disaster of the *Varlık Vergisi* [Wealth Tax]) in 1951, when the CHP faced the DP's intensified attacks. In such an atmosphere of lively debates about the *Varlık Vergisi*, Ökte did not lose time to write this book. According to some Turkish officials of the time who worked with Ökte closely such as Cahit

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[725] "Varlık Vergisi", *Cumhuriyet,* 15 December 1946, p. 1: "...mezkun yazıda verilen habelerin hiç bir esasa istinad etmediği kesin olarak belirtilmiştir."

[726] "Varlık Vergisinde Yapılan Yolsuzluklar", *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 1950, pp. 1, 2: "(Ankara 3 (Telefonla)-Meclisin bugünkü toplantısında Seyhan milletvekili Sinan Tekelioğlu'nun varlık vergisi tarhında yapılan yolsuzluklar hakkındaki sözlü sorusu görüşüldü. Maliye Bakanı Halil Ayan: "Arkadaşımız acı bir mevzua dokundu" diye söze başladı. 1942 senesinde çıkarılan hususi bir kanunla alınan varlık vergisinin hususi bir komisyonun takdirile tarhedildiğini, mükellefe itiraz etmek, dava açmak hakları tanınması gibi hususiyetleri ihtiva ettiğini izah etti. Vergi alakası olmıyan, dünyada eşi bulunmıyan bir vergi olduğunu ifade ile: Böyle bir vergiden husule gelmiş haksızlık neticesinde duyulan ıstıraplar hakkında izahat veremiyeceğim için beni mazur görün" dedi. (Sinan Tekelioğlu) Kendisine bir tehdit mektubu geldiğini ifade ederek Büyük Millet Meclisi kağıdına yazılmış bu mektubu okudu;" Nevin Coşar, "Varlık Vergisi Konusundaki Yolsuzluk Söylentileri", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 58/3 (2003), pp. 19-25.

[727] "Mecliste Varlık Vergisine Dair Dünkü Münakaşalar", *Yeni Sabah*, 28 June 1951, p. 1.

Kayra, the controller (müfettiş) when the *Varlık Vergisi* was issued, Ökte brought sometimes subjective accusations against people who took some part in the introduction and implementation of the Varlık Vergisi.[728] Ökte blamed, *Yeni Sabah* wrote, the Prime Minister of the period, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, for being the "main authority responsible" (baş mesul) of this tax.[729]

In 1952, this time, another pro-DP organ, *Hizmet* reopened the case. On 13 June 1952, for instance, it asked "whether the *Varlık Vergisi* was in accordance with the constitution."[730] On 23 June, this newspaper described this tax as a "disaster" (facia).[731] Three days later, this time, it described this tax practice as a "state-led gangsterdom" (devlet gangsterliği).[732] Then, on 27 June *Hizmet* overtly accused the CHP members of becoming rich with the misuse of funds collected via this tax.[733] The following month, in July of 1952, *Hizmet* continued its publications about this issue and on 4 July it reported the bitter memories of the "victims," who told that they had been transferred to the working camps by garbage trucks (as a forced labor).[734]

These debates were carried when the DP rule was more tolerant of the Greek population and before the intensification of the Cyprus disputes. As stated in the previous chapters, particularly in 1952, the diplomatic relations between these two states were very close while they had recently become the members of NATO and were currently organizing joint military exercises. In such a friendly atmosphere, remembering the *Varlık Vergisi* would be the DP government's strategy to display that their view of Greek population was significantly different from that of the single party rule of the CHP.

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[728] Cahit Kayra, *Savaş Türkiye Varlık Vergisi* (İstanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2013), pp. 59-85; Tekeli and İlkin, *İktisadi Politikaları ve Uygulamalarıyla İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi*, p. 45; Cahit Kayra, *38 Kuşağı* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002), pp. 102-119.

[729] "Varlık Vergisi Faciasının Mesulü", *Yeni Sabah*, 18 May 1951, p. 1.

[730] "Varlık Vergisi Anayasaya Uygun Mu idi?", *Hizmet*, 13 June 1952, p. 1.

[731] "Varlık Vergisi Faciası", *Hizmet*, 23 June 1952, p. 1.

[732] "Varlık Vergisi Bir Devlet Gangsterliğidir", *Hizmet*, 26 June 1952, p. 1.

[733] "H.P.'nin Vergi Gangsterliği", *Hizmet*, 27 June 1952, p. 1: "Tatbikattaki suistimallerle nasıl servet sahibi oldular?".

[734] "Varlık Vergisi", *Hizmet*, 4 July 1952, p. 1: "Çöp kamyonuyla nasıl nakledildik."

Indeed, during the first years of the DP government, it was in some aspects a fruitful strategy. The Greek press, for instance, made a distinction betwen the DP's minority policy and those of the previous CHP governments. According to a Turkish document sent by Halil Alyot, the head of the Directorate General of Press, Publications and Tourism, to the Prime Ministry, one of the Greek newspapers, *Allaghi*, published an article about the Greek population in Turkey on 23 April 1953, which showed how the *Varlık Vergisi* still agitated Greece. This Greek newspaper saw the special tax as a policy of pressure İsmet İnönü's regime on the Greek minority. Yet, *Allaghi* further argued that now there was the rule of Bayar and Menderes, who were "considerate" and "candid" (anlayış sahibi ve riyasız) statesmen, and these two statesmen would not allow any enmity grow against the Turkish-Greek friendship in Turkey.[735]

The reexamination of the *Varlık Vergisi*, however, surprised some Turkish people, who witnessed the *Varlık Vergisi* years very closely. A well-known Turkish journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman was one of them. Although he initially remained silent when this issue was first revisited by the DP, Yalman wrote an article in *Vatan* entitled "Kendi Kendimizi Aldatıyoruz..." (We are Fooling Ourselves) on 29 November 1955. Yalman criticized the insistence of the DP on the *Varlık Vergisi*. He further demonstrated how the *Varlık Vergisi* gained the popular political support in 1942. He wrote that: "Today you can not find anyone who is not condemning the *Varlık Vergisi*." Yet, in 1942, Yalman argued, when this excessive tax, which was beyond the principle of equality, was imposed, it was applauded by all hands.[736] Yalman implied that it would be "self-fooling" to believe the sincerity of DP's protests of this tax of 1942 because in 1942 not only the today's CHP members but also the DP leaders were present in the Parliament, while this tax was issued, and the DP leaders had no objection to its imposition. Why Ahmet Emin Yalman broke his silence about the *Varlık Vergisi* at this point was not related to the past but related to

[735] 30 April 1953: BCA, 030 01 103 644 1, pp. 3-4.

[736] Ahmet Emin Yalman, "Kendi Kendimizi Aldatıyoruz", *Vatan*, 29 November 1955, p. 1: "Bugün varlık vergisini ayıplamıyan bir tek kişiye rastgelmezsiniz. Fakat ölçüsü olmıyan ve müsavet esasını çiğniyen bu verginin tatbik edildiği sırada her taraftan alkış sesleri duyuluyordu."

the present. He wrote this article after the 6-7 September events, which destroyed the DP's positive image regarding the Greek minority over a night.

VII.III. The Cyprus Issue and the 6-7 September Events

Toward the mid-1950s, Turkey started to get more agitated by the continuing mistreatment of Turks in Western Thrace, attacks on Turkish Cypriots and the Greek support behind the *enosis* policy, as well as the insistence of the Greek party on the internationalization of the Cyprus issue. Inevitably, the Greek changing attitudes toward minorities and the Cyprus issue influenced the Turkish view of the Greek population living in Turkey. This led to a comparative evaluation of the situation of Greeks living in Turkey and Turks living in Greece and Cyprus by the Turkish public opinion.

Turkish newspapers, of course, shaped and directed such evaluations. In general, the Turkish press had a tendency to emphasize that the Greek minority in Turkey enjoyed better material conditions than the Turkish minorities in Greece. For instance, on 11 November 1953, *Milliyet* reported that the Greek population was enjoying more tolerance, when compared to the conditions of Turks, whose properties were always under systematic attack.[737]

In 1955, this negative Turkish attitude toward Greeks both in Greece and Turkey intensified as parallel to the deteriorating conditions in Cyprus. These developments as well as the reaction and agitation in Turkey were reported regularly by Turkish newspapers. Among the many other dimensions of the Cyprus issue, the Greek minority's relations with Greek Cypriots and their view of the Cyprus issue started to be monitored closely by press. This was of course most felt by Patriarch Athenagoras. Particularly, by the summer of 1955, when the Turkish government overtly declared its Cyprus policy, saying the *status quo* needed to be kept; Turkish newspapers, both the oppositional and the governmental, started to criticize Athenagoras for his approach to the Cyprus issue. He was either accused of not protesting the Greek activities or of supporting the religious leader of the Greek

[737] "Rumeli Türkleri ve Akaliyetler", *Milliyet*, 11 November 1953, pp. 1, 6: "Yunanlılar, Doğu Trakyadaki Türkleri hicrete mecbur etmek için sistemli bir surette tazyik ediyorlarmış. Maksat tabiatiyle bunların emlak, tarla ve varlıklarına el koyup Garbi Trakya'yı tamamen Yunanlaştırmaktır."

Cypriots, Makarios. For instance, on 6 July 1955, the pro-DP *Yeni Sabah* asked with a heading on page one: "Kıbrıs Hadiseleri Dolayısiyle Patriğin Sukutu Tasvip Demek midir?" (Does the Silence of Patriarch for the Cyprus Issue Mean His Approval?).[738] *Yeni Sabah* was not appearently satisfied with Athenagoras's statement of not being "engaged in politics."

Three days later, the same newspaper reported that the Turkish public opinion was not happy with Athenagoras's refusal of condemning the *enosis* propaganda of Makarios and his colloborators. According to this news, people in Turkey were disturbed by the Patriarch's avoidance of speaking on this issue by saying: "it is a political issue, so we will not talk about it."[739] Besides this, in the same news, it was also stated that there were rumors about the Patriarchate's financial support to the *enosis* activities. According to *Yeni Sabah*, there was an expectation in the public for the Patriarch's denial of these rumors.[740] Thus, not only his silence but also increasing rumors about his support to the *enosis* propaganda created a negative press coverage for one time popular and favored Athenagoras. The Turkish press wanted an immediate statement from the Patriarch, declaring his support of the Turkish point of view on the Cyprus disputes. Although Turkish newspapers anticipated a favorable reply, Athenagoras never delivered such a statement.

The statement that Turkey expected was provided by another religious leader, Papa Eftim (Zeki Erenerol), the founder of the Turkish Orthodox Church. His previous activities during the National Independence War were indeed unforgettable to Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had recognized the worth of his activities and stated: "(Papa Eftim) helped us during the National Independence War as much as an army could" (Milli Mücadelede bize bir ordu kadar yardım etti).[741] Nevertheless, in

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[738] "Kıbrıs Hadisesi Dolayısiyle Patriğin Sukutu Tasvip Demek midir?", *Yeni Sabah*, 5 July 1955, p. 1: "Athenagoras "siyasete bulaşmıyoruz" demekle iktifa ediyor."

[739] "Patrikanenin Mali Durumu", *Yeni Sabah*, 8 July 1955, p. 1: "Fener Kilisesi'nin, Kıbrıs mevzuunda Makarios ve Spirido'nun tahriklerini cevaplamayışı, "Bu politik bir iştir. Biz konuşmayız." diye meseleyi kapatmak isteyişi, umumi efkarda büyük bir ilgi uyandırmıştır."

[740] "Patrikanenin Mali Durumu", p. 1: "Patrikanenin Kıbrıs ve Atina kiliselerine mali yardım yaptığı söylentileri karşısında Fener'in açıklamada bulunması bekleniyor."

[741] Hikmet Yavuz Ercan, "Fener ve Türk Ortodoks Patrikhanesi", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 5/8 (1967), p. 416.

the following period, there were not many news about him. With his support for the Turkish stance in the Cyprus issue, however, Papa Eftim again attracted the attention of the press. *Yeni Sabah*, for example, published his statements on 9 July 1955 from its front page. This newspaper quoted Papa Eftim's words saying: "In the case of necessity, we, like every Turk, get to Cyprus." He also argued that as the Greek Orthodox Church in Fener, headed by Athenagoras, was financed by Greece, so it voiced the views of Greece.[742]

Similary, on 30 July 1955, this time, *Ulus* published Papa Eftim's criticisms of the Greek Patriarchate. Obviously, as the organ of the opposition, *Ulus* was more concerned about Athenagoras's current attitude and used the warnings of Papa Eftim to inform its readers. In this news, additionally, it was reported that Papa Eftim had already warned Menderes about the Patriarchate. Having recalled the previous activities of the Patriarchate during the National Independence War, the newspaper continued, Papa Eftim had told Menderes that he had better not expecting anything from the members of this Church.[743]

Papa Eftim's views published in Turkish newspapers made him a target of Makarios. Papa Eftim in return responded to Makarios's accusations about him through telegram. On 27 August 1955, *Akşam* published this telegram in which Papa Eftim wrote that he was leaning on first the God, then the "undefeatable" Turkish youth, and that he believed in the Turkish victory. And, Eftim added: "Long live Turkish youth, long live the Turkish nation, down with the traitors."[744] Papa Eftim also explained that he prayed for the wellbeing of the Turkish nation day and night and underlined the necessity of condemning Makarios type of people, who used religion for their political purposes.[745]

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[742] "Türk Orthodoks Kiliseleri Başkanı Papa Eftim, "Gerekirse Her Türk Gibi Kıbrıs'a Gireceğiz" Dedi", *Yeni Sabah*, 9 July 1955, p. 1.

[743] "Kıbrıs Meselesinde", *Ulus*, 30 July 1955, p. 1: "...bu adamlardan bir şey beklemeyiniz..."

[744] "Papa Eftim Makarios'u Lanetliyor", *Akşam*, 27 August 1955, p. 1: "Dayandığım kudret evvela hak ve pazusu bükülmez Türk gençliğidir. Bunun için Türk zaferine daima inanmaktayım. Yaşasın Türk gençliği, varolsun Türk milleti, kahrolsun hainler."

[745] "Papa Eftim Makarios'u Lanetliyor", p. 1: "...dini siyasete alet edenleri..."

Athenagoras, however, continued to keep his silence. Meanwhile, the Turkish press became more and more agitated about the continuing silence of Athenagoras. Even when he spoke, according to the Turkish press, he was not able to satisfy the Turkish public opinion. On 14 July 1955, for instance, *Yeni Sabah* wrote that the Patriarchate talked but it "parried the questions," which haunted the Turkish public opinion.[746] Two days later, again this newspaper, displeased about his silence, and asked: "why is Athenagoras silent?"[747] *Yeni Sabah* implied that this silence of Athenagoras was making the Turkish public opinion lose their patience about him. On 21 July, for instance, Turkish newspapers reported the MTTB's demands from Athenagoras to reveal his views on the Cyprus.[748] *Dünya* reported on 24 July that Athenagoras rejected the request of MTTB members to meet him in person and avoided making any comments on the issue.[749]

At that particular point, the press put a systematic pressure on Athenagoras to declare his views on Cyprus, and his silence over Cyprus-related issues was interpreted as his support to the Greek cause. Despite this, the reason behind why Athenagoras commenting might also be related to the US policies within the context of the Cyprus disputes. Throughout the 1950s, the US maintained a low-profile position toward the Cyprus issue,[750] which also created dismay in Turkey.[751] The Turkish press, on the other hand, never voiced the possibility of an influence of the US on Athenagoras. While the press seemed to ignore a possible US factor, the coverage of Athenagoras in a negative way maintained, which led to grew agitation in public. On 9 August 1955 while he was walking, Athenagoras encountered a

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[746] "Patrikhane Konuştu Fakat Cevap Vermedi", *Yeni Sabah*, 14 July 1955, p. 1: "Patrikhane konuştu fakat cevap vermedi."

[747] "Athenagoras Neden Susmaktadır?", *Yeni Sabah*, 16 July 1955, p. 1: "Athenagoras neden susmaktadır?"

[748] "Kıbrıs Davası. M.T.T.B. Patrik'ten Bir Mülakat İstedi", *Dünya*, 21 July 1955, p. 1; "Gençlik Athenagoras'ı Kıbrıs Konusunda Konuşmağa Davet Etti", *Yeni Sabah*, 21 July 1955, p. 1.

[749] "Athenagoras M.T.T.B. nin Davetini Kabul Etmedi", *Dünya*, 24 July 1955, pp. 1, 5.

[750] Davis, "The Role of the United States in the Cyprus Dispute Past and Present", pp. 262-263.

[751] Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç, "The Roots of Anti-Americanism in Turkey 1945-1960", *Bilig* 72 (2015), p. 272.

public protest in Eminönü, İstanbul, and the people yelled at him: "Cyprus is Turkish."[752]

A short while after this protest, the London Conference was held between 29 August and 7 September with the participation of Turkey, Greece and Britain to discuss the Cyprus disputes. A Turkish document dating 28 August reveals that the parties to the conference previously agreed to make joint statements publicly in the course of the conference in order to prevent any agitation and misunderstandings.[753] During the conference, however, it became difficult to do so. In addition, throughout this period, newspapers continued to widely speculate on the possible outcomes of this conference, and the Turkish press, following the conference closely, was eager to present every detail to public.

The Turkish press, at the same time, took a close interest in what was going on in Greece and Cyprus. There were rumors spreading, which mounted the tension between two sides. On 30 August 1955, for instance, *Milliyet* reported that rumors were flying in Cyprus and Greece that more than 200 Turkish policemen intervened in the Patriarchate. For *Milliyet*, these Greek speculations both in Greece and Cyprus were to provoke the Greek side to leave the negotiation table.[754] Actually, this concern about Greek provocations was shared by both the Turkish and British authorities even before the conference. That is why the British authorities watched Greek newspapers with deep concern.[755]

The press in Turkey also paid utmost attention to any possible Greek provocation and tried to publicize and deny them if it was possible. One of the Greek speculations was published by *Ulus* on 5 September with a heading "Rumlar İşi Azıtıyor" (The Greeks Are Going Too Far). This news reported that in İstanbul, three spies, holding the pictures of Turkish military and industrial buildings, were captured. These agents, *Ulus* claimed, grew agitation among the Greek population

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[752] "Eminönü'nde Halk, Athenagoras'a "Kıbrıs Türk'tür" Diye Bağırdı", *Yeni Sabah*, 10 August 1955, p. 1.

[753] 28 August 1955: BCA, 010 09 109 340 4, p. 2.

[754] "Adada Durum Vahim", *Milliyet*, 30 August 1955, p. 1.

[755] 30 August 1955: TNA, FO 371/117653, pp. 1-3.

living in İstanbul for the Cyprus issue.[756] Turkish newspapers reported the true news probably to prevent agitation among the Greek minority but such news did not help the Turkish public opinion calm down.

On 6 September, the British side in the London Conference offered a kind of self-government in Cyprus, if not union of Cyprus with Greece. According to a very secret Turkish document sent from the Turkish ambassador to London to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on 28 August, the Turkish authorities had already heard of the British plan for a self-governed Cyprus. Although the British proposal was to fall short of the expectations of the Greek side, which had a strong passion for the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece, it was still a concession given to Greece from the Turkish perspective. The Turkish delegates argued against the British intention accordingly. Despite the disapproval of the Turkish committee, the British floated the idea of self-governance during the conference on 6 September.[757] In fact, the day before, on 5 September, newspapers in Turkey, particularly pro-DP *Yeni İstanbul*, already started to harshly criticize Britain by reason of the possibility that it might bring the proposal of self-governance to the agenda of the conference.[758] Paying no mind to the Turkish criticisms, however, the British declared its pro-Greek proposal the next day. In the face of escalating tension between Turkey and Britain as well as Greece, the 6-7 September events in Thessaloniki, İstanbul and İzmir started.[759]

On 6 September, one of the pro-DP newspapers, *İstanbul Ekspress*, reported that Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki, close to the Turkish Consulate, was bombed by Greek attackers the day before. This provoked the devastating incidents afterwards. Protesting the attack on the house of Atatürk, *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti* (Cyprus is Turkish Community) immediately organized a demonstration in Taksim. In a short amount of time, public protests got out of control, and militants started attacking on

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[756] "Rumlar İşi Azıtıyor", *Ulus*, 5 September 1955, p. 1: "İstanbul'da üç casus yakalandı. Kıbrıs meselesinde Rumları kışkırtan casusların üzerinde askeri ve sınai tesislerimizin resimleri ele geçirildi."

[757] 28 August 1955: BCA, 010 09 109 340 4, pp. 2-4.

[758] Mehmet Akif Demirer, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu Gerçeği* (İstanbul: Profil Yayıncılık, 2009), pp. 193-194.

[759] "Anti-Greek Riots Flare in Turkey: Istanbul Mobs Wreck Shops, Threaten Church-British Offer a Freer Cyprus", *The New York Times*, 7 September 1955, p. 1.

the Greek population in Turkey and their properties. During these attacks almost more than a half of the churches were set on fire, and the rest was ruined. Also, two Greek cemeteries as well as many schools were destroyed, and private properties such as houses and shops were damaged. What is more, one priest was injured during these attacks, and he died shortly thereafter.[760]

These events were all over the Turkish newspapers, which gave an emphasis to the preceding attack on the house of Atatürk. *Ulus*, for instance, reported on 7 September 1955 that "Greeks bombed Atatürk's house." One of the two bombs, *Ulus* reported, which were dropped to the garden of the house was exploded, and windows of the house as well as Turkish Consulate were broken due to the explosion.[761] In the same issue, *Ulus* also reported the incidents that took place in İzmir and İstanbul onwards with a heading "Selanik Hadisesinin Tepkileri" (The Reactions of the Thessaloniki Events). It was written that after the news about the attack on Atatürk's house were heard, "some incidents" (bazı hadiseler) happened in İstanbul, and a few groups of militants started throwing stones at some houses of the Greek minority.[762] The other oppositional newspaper *Dünya* also described this attack in Thessaloniki as "an outrage that led to the events."[763] The DP government, however, was quick to take precautions and declare a martial law.[764] Henceforth, it became difficult for newspapers and the opposition to further comment on this issue.

The most popular organ of the government, *Zafer*, pursued a different attitude. It was busy to prove how the DP government was working hard to find

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[760] 15 November 1955: BCA, 010 09 109 339 1, pp. 1-5; 17 September 1955: FO 371/117713; Güven, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları*, pp. 71-72.

[761] "Fevkalade Hale Son Verildi: Kıbrıs Konferansı Devam Ederken", *Ulus*, 7 September 1955, p. 1: "Yunanlılar Atatürk'ün evine bomba attılar. Evvelki gece geç vakitlerde bahçeye atılan iki bombadan biri patladı. Evin 17, konsoloshanemizin 40 camı inflaktan parçalandı."

[762] "Selanik Hadisesinin Tepkileri: Dün Yapılan Nümayişler. İstanbul ve İzmir'de Birçok Dükkan Yıkıldı, Kiliseler Yandı", *Ulus*, 7 September 1955, p. 1: "Atatürk'ün Selanik'teki evine Rumların bomba atma teşebbüsünde bulundukları öğleden sonra İstanbul'da şayi olur olmaz şehrimizin birçok semtlerinde bazı hadiseler olmuş ve bu arada Şişlideki birçok Rum vatandaşların evlerinin pencerelerinin camları taşlanmıştır. Bu arada gençliğin galeyanına karşı koyan bir Rum da yakapaça edilerek hırpalanmış ve tahkik edemediğimiz bir habere göre ölmüştür."

[763] "İstanbul ve İzmir'de Örfi İdare İlan Edildi", *Dünya*, 7 September 1955, p. 1: "...hadiseyi doğuran tecavüz..."

[764] "Meclis İctimaa Davet Olundu: Ankara, İstanbul ve İzmir'de Örfi İdare İlan Edildi", *Zafer*, 8 September 1955, p. 1.

those who attacked the Greek population. *Zafer* immediately marginalized the events by pointing out two groups, namely communists and the *Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti*, as did the government. It reported how the government took strict measures to stop such marginal groups.[765] Besides, *Zafer* was also eager to publish news about the government's relief efforts for victims. Using headings such as "Bize Düşen Vazifeler" (Duties for Our Share), this newspaper also tried to encourage its readers to help these Greek people.[766] *Zafer* also did not hesitate to praise Menderes's attitude about the 6-7 September events. On 13 September, it even published a news entitled "Adnan Menderes'in Yaptığı Vazıh Samimi ve Çok Tatminkar Konuşma: Bütün Mesuller Ortaya Çıkacak" (Clear, Sincere and Very Satisfactory Speech Made by Adnan Menderes: "All Responsibles will be Caught Up").[767]

Menderes said these words in the Parliament on 12 September after the speech of Fuat Köprülü, who implied that the government had already known the approaching events. Köprülü's claims left the government under suspicion, and Menderes found himself on the hot seat. Accordingly, Menderes took the floor and stated that the responsibles of the events would be found. Yet, he also added that the police still could not catch criminals but the government would provide compensation for the loss of the victims.[768]

In spite of Menderes's response to allegations, the speech of Köprülü casted the oppositions's doubts on the role of the DP in the emergence of the riots. With

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[765] "Müessif Hadisenin Tahrikçileri: Suçlu Görülenlerin Adedi 2124'e Çıktı, Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti Kapatıldı", *Zafer*, 9 September 1955, p. 1; "Zararın Bilançosu", *Zafer*, 9 September 1955, p. 1; "Müessif Hadisenin Tahrikçilerinden İstanbul'da 43 Kızıl Yakalandı: Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyetinde Arama Yapıldı", *Zafer*, 12 September 1955, p. 1; "İstanbul'da Suçluların Adedi, 4000 e Yükseldi", *Zafer*, 13 September 1955, p. 9.

[766] "Zararlı Vatandaşlara Her Türlü Yardım Yapılacak", *Zafer*, 10 September 1955, p. 1; "Zarar ve Ziyan Tespiti Başladı", *Zafer*, 10 September 1955, p. 1; "Kızılay Yardım İçin Faaliyete Geçti", *Zafer*, 10 September 1955, p. 7; "Hamiyetli Türk Vatandaşları Yardım İçin Elini Uzatıyor", *Zafer*, 11 September 1955, p. 1; "Bize Düşen Vazifeler", *Zafer*, 11 September 1955, pp. 1, 7; "Zarar Görenlere Yapılan Yardımlar", *Zafer*, 18 September 1955, pp. 1, 7; "Zarar Görenlere Yapılan Yardımlar", *Zafer*, 19 September 1955, pp. 1, 7; "6-7 Eylül Hadiselerinde: Yunan Bayrağına Yapılan Tecavüzün Tamiri ve Takbiki", *Zafer*, 22 October 1955, pp. 1, 7; "6-7 Eylül Hadiselerinde: Yunan Subaylarına Bazı Hareketlerin Tamiri ve Takbihi", *Zafer*, 23 October 1955, pp. 1, 4.

[767] "Adnan Menderes'in Yaptığı Vazıh, Samimi ve Çok Tatminkar Konuşma", *Zafer*, 13 September 1955, p. 1.

[768] Serdar Sakin, "6-7 Eylül Olayları ve Köprülü", *Mehmet Fuat Köprülü* (Yahya Kemal Taştan ed.) (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 2012), p. 423.

each passing day, such suspicions raised more and more. Yet, there was the rule of martial law, which disabled any independent investigation of the events to reveal what actually led to the violent attacks. Uncomfortable with the way that the DP handled the crisis, the opposition was even more frustrated by the extension of the rule of martial law for six months.[769]

Indeed, the opposition had demanded the government to find and punish criminals from the very beginning. In the immediate aftermath of the events, İnönü, as the leader of the opposition, called these events as "a national disaster" (bir milli felaket) and wanted Turkish citizens to remain calm and to share the grief and pain of "our citizens," who were attacked.[770] Obviously, the extension of the martial law by the DP government was not what the opposition wanted. That is why İnönü asked the government to lift the martial law at least in Ankara and to allow the Parliament to continue its sessions as usual.[771] Furthermore, İnönü, who was not satisfied with Köprülü's and Menderes's explanations about these incidents, wanted the Parliament to investigate the events and to follow the developments very closely. Neither of İnönü's demands, however, was met.[772]

The opposition was right to worry about the martial law. It immediately turned into a tool in the hands of government against the oppositional groups. First of all, the martial law was not used to restore order in the places where such attacks had happened. Instead this law was used to further increase the government's pressure on oppositional newspapers, and the closure of these newspapers became much easier.

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[769] "Örfi İdare 6 Ay Devam Edecek", *Ulus*, 13 September 1955, p. 1; "Örfi İdare 6 Ay Devam Edecek", *Dünya*, 13 September 1955, p. 1.

[770] "İnönü Sukunet Tavsiye Ediyor", *Ulus*, 8 September 1955, p. 1: "CHP genel başkanı diyor ki: Vukua gelen hadiseler ve tecavüzler çok esef verici olmuştur. Tecavüze uğrayan vatandaşlarımızın ıstıraplarını yürekten teessürler paylaşırız. Asayişe hakim olunabilmesi için yapılacak iş, vatandaş olarak vazifelerimizi iyi niyetle ve temiz yürekle ifa etmektir. Bir milli felaket halinde olan hadisenin zararlarını bu suretle telafi edebiliriz."

[771] "Büyük Millet Meclisinin Dün Aldığı Tarihi Karar", *Akşam*, 13 September 1955, p. 1: "Örfi idare 3 vilayette de 6 ay devam edecek. İnönü Meclisin içtimalara devam etmesini ve Örfi idarenin Ankara'da kaldırılmasını istedi."

[772] "İnönü, Meclisin Toplanmasına Devam Etmesini İstedi", *Ulus*, 14 September 1955, p. 1: "CHP Genel Başkanı, gerek Köprülü'nün gerek Başbakan'ın 6-7 Eylül hadiselelerinin oluşuna dair verdikleri izahatin B.M. Meclisi'nin hadiseleri takibetmek için içtimada bulunmasını zaruri kıldığına işaret etti."

On 14 September, *Dünya* made news regarding this issue. It quoted the words of the maritial law commander (örfi idare komutanı) who told that some newspapers were publishing items regarding the maltreatment of Turks in Greece "on purpose" (kasten). The commandor implied that these newspapers tried to grow agitation once more in such a particular time. Warning people about provocations of these newspapers, he wanted people not to give credit to such news and to inform the nearest police station in case these newspapers would spread such provocative items.[773] In fact, a newspaper called *Medeniyet* was closed because of publishing an article entitled "Batı Trakya Türkleri ve Onların Acıklı Durumları" (The Turks of Western Thrace and Their Sad Situations).[774]

True, such news had a potential to incite further hatred against the Greek minority and provoke mass movements. Nevertheless, the military authorities empowered by the martial law used their power to close down newspapers frequently without any need for a court order. On 16 September, for instance, *Dünya* again reported that one of the local newspapers of İzmir, *İzmir Sabah Postası*, was closed.[775] Starting with local newspapers, the authorities moved to close national oppositional newspapers. On 20 September, *Vatan* announced that *Ulus* was closed together with *Tercüman*, *Hürriyet* and *Her Gün*.[776] Two days later, *Vatan* also reported that the authorities declared that the owners of newspapers which were closed could not publish new newspapers,[777] i.e. newspapers under different names, as was done in the late Ottoman period.

The following month, *Ulus* was again closed by the martial law commanders. It was because of the quarrel between *Ulus* and *Zafer* about the Turkish army. In

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[773] "Bazı Muzır Şahısların Kışkırtıcı Haberler Yapmaları Karşısında Örfi İdare Komutanının Dünkü Tebliği", *Dünya*, 14 September 1955, p. 1: "Yunanistan'ın bazı bölgelerinde Türklere zulüm yapıldığı haberleri kasden çıkarılmaktadır. Halkımızın bu ve emsali haberlere itibar etmemeleri ve bu şahısları en yakın karakola bildirmeleri rica olunur."

[774] "Örfi İdare Tebliği: Medeniyet Gazetesi Müddetsiz Olarak Kapatıldı", *Vatan*, 23 September 1955, p. 1.

[775] "İzmir Sabah Postası Gazetesi Kapatılacak", *Dünya*, 16 September 1955, p. 1.

[776] "Örfi İdare Komutanlığından", *Vatan*, 20 September 1955, p. 1.

[777] "Örfi İdare Tebliği", *Vatan*, 22 September 1955, p. 1: "...kapatılan gazete sahipleri başka gazete çıkaramıyacaklar."

Ulus, on 25 October, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın published an article with a heading "Türk Ordusu Ancak Vatanın Hizmetindedir" (The Turkish Army Can Only Serve the Fatherland). In his examination of the DP congress, Yalçın directed his fire at the banners used during the Congress such as "Türk Ordusu Demokrat Parti Hizmetindedir" (The Turkish Army is in the Service of the Democrat Party).[778] This was responded by *Zafer* the following day with a heading "Şimdi de Orduyu Tahrik Ediyorlar" (And Now Inciting the Army).[779] Later, according to the news of *Akşam* and *Dünya* dating 28 October, both *Ulus* and *Zafer* were closed by the Full General Nurettin Aknöz, who declared that these two newspapers were closed because they used the army as a material for internal politics.[780] What is interesting was that just two weeks later, the rule of martial law permitted *Zafer* to be printed but *Ulus* was still closed.[781]

Actually, the main objection of the CHP and oppositional newspapers to the rule of martial law was its exploitation by the current government to put further pressure on the opposition. In fact, the DP government while explaining its *raison d'etre* as to "reestablish calm and prevent further outbreaks in İstanbul and İzmir,"[782] eventually used it to silence the opposition. Kasım Gülek, the Secretary General of the CHP, for example, on 21 October, held a meeting, which was closely watched by the government, and a report about Gülek's meeting was sent to the Prime Ministry by the Directorate General for Press, Information and Tourism. In this meeting, Gülek complained about the pressure on the opposition. Then, he read a passage from an American periodical which also supported his complaints, which made an irony that the DP government was better in silencing the opposition rather than

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[778] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Türk Ordusu Ancak Vatanın Hizmetindedir", *Ulus*, 25 October 1955, p. 1: "Demokrat Parti Kongresinde Türk ordusu Demokrat Parti hizmetindedir diyor."

[779] "Şimdi de Orduyu Tahrik Ediyorlar", *Zafer*, 26 October 1955, p. 1.

[780] "Orduyu İç Politika Mevzuu Yapan Zafer ve Ulus Müddetsiz Kapatıldı", *Akşam*, 28 October 1955, p. 1: "Orduyu bir iç politika malzemesi olarak ele almıştır;" "Ulus, Zafer Gazeteleri Kapatıldı", *Dünya*, 28 October 1955, p. 1.

[781] "Zafer'in Çıkmasına İzin Verildi", *Akşam*, 17 October 1955, p. 1: "Örfi İdare Tebliği: Ankara'da münteşir Zafer ve İstanbul'da münteşir 24 Saat gazetelerinin 17 Kasım 1955 günü saat 00.01 den itibaren neşrine müsaade ettim."

[782] Henry Giniger, "Anti-Greek Riots in Turkey Studied by NATO Council", *The New York Times*, 9 September 1955, pp. 1, 2.

solving the problems of Turkey.[783] Thus, to criticize the DP's oppression, he also used the US as a reference point. This speech was also reported in *Ulus* in the following day. He summarized the current DP policy, ruling the country with the martial law, as "trying to hide its failure from people."[784]

In fact, such open criticisms did not discourage the government. On 9 December, *Akşam* reported that two oppositional newspapers, *Dünya* and *Vatan*, were closed for 15 days by the rule of martial law. The pretext for these punishments was that both of them wrote about the cabinet crisis.[785] As a response to this increasing pressure, the opposition decided to end its propaganda activities and remained silent until the end of the martial law.[786] Yet, despite the objections of the opposition, Menderes did not step back.[787] The 6-7 September discussions continued within this "anti-democratic" atmosphere of the martial law.

There are many points in the 6-7 September events that even today need to be clarified. Sure, the events seemed more confusing immediately after the events since the government did not explicitly explain the events. Under the martial law circumstances, the opposition also could not investigate the events properly. Then, on 17 December 1955, İnönü gave an interview to the press and directly blamed Menderes for the current problems between Turkey and Greece due to his "provocative and adventurist" policies. For İnönü, what Menderes did was to pursue inconsistent policies toward Greece. Before the London Conference, for instance, İnönü argued, Menderes acted as if he would wage a war against Greece. Now,

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[783] 22 October 1955: BCA, 030 01 43 253 14, pp. 2, 3: "...keşki iktidar partisi başkanı muhaliflerini susturmakta gösterdiği mahareti Türkiye'nin içinde bulunduğu zorlukların halletmekte kullanabilse..."

[784] "Kasım Gülek'in Basın Toplantısı", *Ulus*, 23 October 1955, p. 4: "...muvaffakiyetsizliği milletten gizlemeye çalışıyorlar..."

[785] "Dünya ve Vatan Gazeteleri Kapatıldı", *Akşam*, 9 December 1955, p. 1: "(Örfi İdare Komutanlığından tebliğ edilmiştir) 08.12.1955 tarihli "Dünya" gazetesinin (Demokrat parti grubundaki huzursuzluk arttı) aynı tarihli "Vatan" gazetesinin (Bu Böyle Gidemez) başlıklı tehyiç ve tahrih edici mahiyette görüldüğünden tab ve neşrini 15er gün müddetle menettim."

[786] "Muhalefet Propaganda Faaliyetinden Vazgeçti", *Akşam*, 15 September 1955, p. 1: "CHP de CMP de örfi idare sona erinceye kadar pasif kalmaya karar verdiler. Örfi idarenin tatbik edilmediği vilayetlerde de propaganda faaliyetinde devam edilmesi kararlaştırılmıştır."

[787] The rule of martial law continued to exist. On 7 March 1956, the rule of martial law in İstanbul even prolonged for three more months. For more details see: Nedret Selçuker, "Örfi İdare 3 Ay Uzatıldı", *Milliyet*, 1 March 1956, p. 1: "İnönü "Örfi İdareye gerek yoktur" dedi. Hükumet tezkeresi muhalefet ve 6 D.P. liye rağmen kabul edidi."

however, İnönü said, Menderes told that he would harshly punish anyone, who said a word against Greece.[788] According to İnönü, thus, it was Menderes who was "directly" responsible not only for the 6-7 September eventsbut also for the problems of the democratic regime and the current foreign policy actions of the Turkish government.[789] In this interview, İnönü further asked the government how the DP could allow the governors of İstanbul and İzmir to remain in their positions after the 6-7 September events.[790] Just a day after İnönü's warning, *Ulus* reported that an inquiry was finally started about the governor of İzmir, Kamil Hadımlı, who said "approving" words for the demonstrators in İzmir, on 6 September.[791]

Additionally, the opposition was also disturbed from the government's quiteness toward the Greek speculations about the event in Thessaloniki. There were rumors that it was the Turks themselves that attacked the house of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Thessaloniki. In order to criticize the government's attitude, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın wrote an article entitled "Türk Namusuna Leke Sürülemez" (Turkish Honor Can't Be Sullied). This issue, which was also closely watched by external powers, Yalçın claimed, needed to be considered in terms of world public opinion. According to the author, if these Greek claims were not refuted properly, the Turkish reputation, which had already been seriously damged in the eyes of the external world due to various reasons including the 6-7 September events, would be totally discredited.[792]

The DP government's approach toward the 6-7 September events was also one of the main topics of the *Yassıada* Courts after the coup against the DP on 27 May 1960. After five years, the court investigated these kinds of speculations about

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[788] "İnönü'nün Menderes'e Cevabı: Tahrikçi, Sergüzeştçi Politikadan Şikayetçiyiz", *Ulus*, 18 December 1955, p. 1: "...24 Ağustos'ta Yunanistan ile harbeder gibi konuşursun, çalımından geçilmez. 15 Eylül'de Yunanistan'ın aleyhinde kim söz söylese dilini keserim dersin..."

[789] "İnönü'nün Menderes'e Cevabı", p. 3: "…demokratik rejimin uğradığı bütün zararlardan, 6/7 Eylül hadisesinden, dış politikadaki icraatından doğrudan doğruya başbakan sorumludur."

[790] "İnönü'nün Menderes'e Cevabı", p. 3.

[791] "İzmir Valisi Hakkında Tahkikat Yapılıyor", *Ulus*, 19 December 1955, p. 1: "…6 Eylül'de nümayişçiler için tasvipkar sözler söylemiş olan…"

[792] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Türk Namusuna Leke Sürülemez", *Ulus*, 21 December 1955, p. 1: "Yunan iddiasının yalan olduğuna batı dünyasında kati bir kanaat husule getirmemek dış memleketlerde muhtelif sebeplerle zaten sarsılmış olan itibarımız sıfır olur."

the role of the DP in the 6-7 September events. For instance, the court registers showed that the martial law commander forced newspapers initially to claim that the events were organized by Turkish communists.[793] Thus, as the opposition always put forward, there was a pressure on the newspapers due to the martial law. So, it was not possible for them to inform their readers properly.

During the court process, the influential names of the DP also had to defend themselves about the riots in İstanbul and İzmir. Celal Bayar, as the ex-President, was one of them. His lawyers, Orhan Ergüder and Gültekin Başak, decided to start with the Cyprus problem in their defense to show that Bayar had no responsibility for the 6-7 September events. In this defense dating 12 December 1960, it was argued that the continuing *Megali Idea* spirit was the main reason behind this Cyprus problem.[794] Although the Turkish governments were aware of this, it was argued, until recently, they abstained to talk explicitly regarding this Cyprus issue and the continuing Greek demands.[795] These Greek policies, however, the lawyers argued, grew agitation in the Turkish public. So, the 6-7 September events were "final and ultimate movement."[796] According to Bayar, for example, it was the result of Greek policies that led to riots against the Greek population in Turkey. Nevertheless, the Court found the DP government responsible for the attacks. On 5 January 1961, the *Yassıada* Courts declared its final decision for these influential names of the DP rule during the 6-7 September events such as Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad

[793] 12 December 1960: BCA, 010 09 110 343 2, p. 2.

[794] 12 December 1960: BCA, 010 09 110 144 1, p. 2: "1930'dan beri Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki dostane münasebetlerin mevcudiyeti yalnız ve yalnız Türklerin hüsnüniyetine isnat etmektedir. Yoksa Yunanlıların Megali İdeası ölmemiştir. İstanbul'un 500 üncü fetih yıldönümü münasebetleriyle kiliselerde Yunan papazları halka şunları söylemiştir. –Konstantin Peleologos Konstantinopolis (İstanbul) surları önünde Yunan milletinin Megali İdeası uğruna can verdi. Böylece Megali İdea ebedileşti."

[795] 12 December 1960: BCA, 010 09 110 144 1, p. 4: "İkinci Cihan Harbinin sonundan itibaren hemen hemen bütün Türk hükümetleri Kıbrıs meselesinde statükonun muhafazası yolunda fikir beyan etmişlerdir. Türk hükümetlerince iki sene evveline kadar yapılan beyanatlar pek azdır. Bunun sebebi Rus tehlikesine karşı batılılarla birleşerek ve günün politika zaruretini tekdir ederek ihtiyatlı bir siyaset gütmek endişesi ve hem de dostumuz Atiananın Kıbrısın ilhakı yolundaki muvazenesiz ve tahrikçi hareketlerini ağırbaşlı bir siyasetle frenliyebileceğimiz kanaati iledir."

[796] 12 December 1960: BCA, 010 09 110 144 1, pp. 9-10: "...6/7 Eylül son ve nihai bir hareketti."

Köprülü and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. All of them were found guilty of not taking necessary measures on time.[797]

VII.IV. Conclusion

On 15 November 1955, Patriarch Athenagoras wrote a letter to Adnan Menderes regarding the 6-7 September events. According to him, this incident did not break out due to "rage" (galeyan) of the moment. Thus, it was not an isolated incident. Rather, Athenagoras argued, it was "the product of deeper psychology" of Turkish people, whom the Turkish press had played a major role to agitate for a long time.[798] Yet, it was also the same Athenagoras that previously enjoyed positive coverage of the press in Turkey, when he first became a Patriarch. At that time it was the press that created a positive image for him. What changed the attitude of press toward him, particularly among oppositional newspapers, was his Cyprus policy. He did not say any words denying the *enosis* demands of Greece. Thus, he became the target of oppositional press.

In 1950s, this pressure of opposition and its organs of course felt mostly by the DP government. It was the period that DP authorities had close relations with the leader of the Greek community, Athenagoras, and even for the first time a Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, visited the Patriarch. The DP even did not abstain to use a historical event, the *Varlık Vergisi*, with a political purpose to show that the DP would follow more tolerant policies toward the Greek minority. This policy of the DP did not always please Turkish public opinion, which was regularly informed by the Turkish press of the the violent treatment of Turks in Greece and Cyprus. Yet, despite these press activities and the increasing disturbance of the public, the DP did not change its policy and did not put the same pressure on the Greek community in

[797] 5 January 1961: BCA, 010 09 112 350 1, p. 2: "...adları yazılı sanıkların tahrip maksadına müstenit fiil ve hareketleri sonucunda husule gelen nümayişleri önleyecek tedbirleri almamak, tevessül ettikleri bazı tedbirleri de zamanında yerine getirmemek, nümayilerin tevessüüne ve tahribe müsaade ve müsamaha eylemek suretile suça fer'an iştirak ettikleri..."

[798] 15 November 1955: BCA, 010 09 109 339 1, p. 3: "İşbu hadisenin bir anın galeyanı ve tezahüru neticesi olmayıp daha derin bir haleti ruhiyenin mahsulü bulunması ve bu hususta memleket matbuatının bir kısmının dahi senelerden beri vaki neşriyatı ile büyük, bir mesuliyet hissesi olduğunu düşündükçe acımız bir misli daha artmaktadır."

name of reciprocity. In order to prevent agitation among the Greek minority even decided to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the Conquest of Constantinople with a modest celebration. Finally, however, this tragic 6-7 September events occurred during the rule of the DP, and there were at least its indulgence behind the events.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Using the Turkish-Greek relations from 1946 to 1955 as a case study, this thesis challenged two conventional perspectives on Turkish foreign policy, the one that disputes between the CHP and the DP over domestic affairs played almost no role in shaping foreign policy during this period, and the one that these years saw the golden age between Turkey and Greece, having relatively little difficulty with each other. True, an examination of official records, agreements between these two countries, declarations of the Turkish and Greek authorities as well as diplomatic visits might lead to the conclusion that the Turkish and Greek governments worked together smoothly during the years that followed the Second World War. Yet such a perspective that is solely based on the Turkish-Greek relations at the diplomatic levels is likely to fail to explain why the golden age of the Turkish-Greek relations was suddenly waned in the summer of 1955. For this reason, this thesis mainly used the Turkish press as a source to analyze the underlying reasons behind the shift from amity to enmity in the Turkish-Greek relations at that particular moment.

A more careful look at the non-diplomatic interactions between Turkey and Greece and, more importantly, how the Turkish press perceived and interpreted the Turkish-Greek relations would be hostage to the fact that the Greek policy of the Turkish government was hardly unchallenged and unquestioned. Rather, raising questions about the maintenance of the Turkish-Greek partnership, the Turkish press played multiple roles in the making of Turkish policy toward Greece.

Throughout the entire period, news about Greece and Greeks prevailed in the Turkish press. What exactly motivated the interests of the Turkish press in Greece was the fact that Greece was not only an ordinary foreign state for Turkey. It was

also a neighbor of Turkey, with which Turkish people shared a common history full of wars and violence. For the Turkish political elite, on the other hand, Greece was more than a neighbor. It was a strategic partner against the common threat coming from the Soviet Union, and such a strategic partnership was encouraged and even forced by the United States and Britain, both of which Turkey tried to form a Cold War alliance with.

The diversity of perspectives of the political elite and common people allowed the Turkish press to produce a different agenda of the Turkish-Greek relations than the official one. As shown in Chapter II, despite various attempts of political authorities to maintain the post-Second World War partnership between these two countries and to control the press through censorship and oppression, the press managed to remain politically divided and did much more than repeating the official stance unlike the state-owned radio. Thanks to the survival of oppositional newspapers, the press was able to perform its intermediary role between the political elite and people. Acting as intermediaries between the government and the populace in Turkey, the Turkish press gradually changed its views on these relations throughout the period. While the press took a more conciliatory stance initially, it became more critical of the Turkish-Greek relations in the course of time.

Such a change, which took some time, was the result of the changing political environment. As was shown in Chapter III, there was initially an agreement between the Turkish political parties that Turkey needed to improve ties with Greece in harmony with the Western strategy to stop the Soviet expansion in the region. As a result of this agreement, both pro- and anti-government newspapers circulated the idea that fostering closer ties with Greece would be the best way to preserve the national interests of Turkey. Doing so, the Turkish press aimed at the preparation of Turkish people for having ‘too close’ relations with Greece. The preparation of the ground for the closer Turkish-Greek relations by the Turkish press was further accelerated during the early 1950s as the West stipulated that Turkey and Greece needed to have good relations with each other if they wanted to become NATO members. The press worked hard to spread conciliatory messages accordingly.

The Turkish press unanimously propagated the existing premises of the Turkish-Greek relations and made them accepted by the public until the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO in February of 1952. After that, disagreements among the DP and the CHP regarding their views of the Turkish-Greek relations began to surface. The increasing rift between the opposition and the government on the issues regarding the Turkish-Greek relations was directly reflected in the attitudes of the newspapers having organic links with these parties. The core of this rift was the CHP's criticism of the DP's continuing policy that looked at the Turkish-Greek relations from the prism of the Cold War. The CHP criticized the DP for being insensitive in its handling of national priorities of Turkish people and for favoring the continuation of close relations with Greece even at the expense of Turkish national sensitivities. For the CHP, such a policy could not be maintained since the Greek government had put the policy of strategic partnership behind it, and national priorities topped the agenda of the Greek government as it was to become obvious in the Cyprus case. Within this context, the oppositional press did not lose time to take the role of challenging the existing Greek policy of the DP government whereas the pro-DP newspapers continued to spread conciliatory messages.

Remembering the common Turkish-Greek past, as was shown in Chapter IV, was one of national sensitivities in Turkey. The oppositional press was always critical of the way in which the successive Turkish governments remembered the Turkish-Greek common past. So, the protests of the press regarding this issue were also valid during the rule of the CHP governments. Yet, these attacks of the oppositional press intensified during the DP government, for the DP was claimed to try to make Turkish people forget the historical background of Turkish-Greek relations soon after it came to power. In this respect, the year of 1952 was a turning point. At that year, for example, such DP policies drove the pro-CHP newspapers a campaign to recall the Lausanne spirit and to keep memories of the past alive. The same newspapers, similarly, castigated the DP government bitterly when the DP tried to keep a low profile during the celebrations for the 500th anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. Prime Minister Menderes chose to visit the NATO Headquarter in İzmir, in which Turkish and Greek soldiers served side by side, rather

than to attend the 500th anniversary celebrations. The message of Menderes's choice was clear: the continuation of the Cold War partnership between Turkey and Greece was still a top priority for Menderes and his government. For the CHP as well as the anti-DP newspapers, doing so, Menderes showed total disrespect to Turkish people, and what he did was to ruin the national prestige of the Turks.

The sporadic incidents between Turkey and Greece, which turned into a national problem out of isolated events, also showed the increasing gap between the Greek policies of the government and the opposition, as was examined in Chapter V. Although such sporadic incidents had led to a national crisis between Greece and Turkey before as it did after a football tournament in 1949 when CHP was still in power, the approaches of the CHP and the DP to these problems were more or less the same up until 1952. Starting in 1952, however, the oppositional newspapers elicited widespread criticism of the DP's fisheries policy while accused the DP of overlooking the Greek violations in the Turkish territorial waters, and such accusations were not without foundation. Being one of the earliest instances of the territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea, which still remain as a major problem between Turkey and Greece, the DP's fisheries policy not only emerged as a new challenge that the press posed for the DP government but it also represented a remarkable case, in which the press was able to change the course of foreign policy of the DP government. Having met immediate criticism from anti-DP journalists during the negotiations of a draft of a new convention as regards the fishing issues between Turkey and Greece, the DP gave up the idea of bringing this draft to the parliament.

The fishing issue was not the only case that the press could have an effect upon the decisions of the DP leadership. In other cases, too, the press was able to guide the DP's foreign policy, exemplified by the case of the Turkish minority in Greece, which was explained in Chapter VI. Faced with mistreatment, a significant percentage of the Turkish population in Greece wanted to leave Greece for Turkey. These minority groups, however, did not hold entry permits, which were issued by the Turkish government, so they were not able to seek refuge in Turkey. Since the DP government did not want Turkey's relations with Greece to be deteriorated, it initially stayed indifferent to the problems of these people and sent them back to

Greece. Faced with an intense campaign of the oppositional press, however, the DP government stepped back from its controversial policy of the Turkish immigrants and took active steps to allow the entrance of immigrants to Turkey, most of whom had escaped from Greece without having a valid passport and visa.

The case of the Turkish Cypriots was no different. From the very beginning of the period, the Turkish press constantly presented the current events on the island in the context of Turkish-Greek relations. The reason for why the Cyprus issue caught the attention of the Turkish press was the propaganda of Greek nationalists to incorporate the entire island of Cyprus into Greece, known as *enosis*, which was escalated after 1948. From this year onwards, the Turkish press widely covered demonstrations of the public in Turkey, who took to the streets to protest pro-*enosis* activities of the Greek radicals. With the change in the polices of the Greek government, which became more Greek-centered and less conciliatory, toward the mid-1950s, the anti-DP newspapers grew steadily more alarmed about the spreading of the *enosis* propaganda in Greece. In effect, keeping the current events in Cyprus and Greece as well as protests of the Turkish people in the forefront of their pages, the oppositional newspapers played an undisputed and a unique role in mobilizing thousands of people on the streets and creating broad support for the Turkish cause. Doing so, the anti-DP newspapers were able to remobilize politicized masses and to galvanize common people into action against the DP's policies of Cyprus and Greece in general.

The case of Patriarch Athenagoras was another example of the mobilizing power of the press. As was shown in Chapter VII, when Athenagoras came to Turkey as the new Patriarch in 1949, he was greatly welcomed by Turkish public because both pro- and anti-government newspapers welcomed his coming, too. When he did not publicly show his objection to the *enosis* propaganda later, however, the Turkish press turned against Athenagoras, which grew agitation among people against him. As Athenagoras later claimed, it was the mobilizing activities of the Turkish press that led to the tragic 6-7 September events.

To conclude, by examining the roles played by the Turkish press in the formation of the Turkish-Greek relations from 1946 to 1955, this thesis provided a

more nuanced picture of relations between these two states. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Cold War partnership between Turkey and Greece during these years was a fragile one, which came under attack by the opposition in many ways. It was the press that mirrored the complicated political differences, which sprang from several issues, between the CHP and the DP. Yet what the press did was more than reflecting similarities and differences between these two political parties. More importantly, the press itself took a position in the Turkish-Greek relations and was able to affect the direction of these relations. Doing so, the press played several crucial roles, which took different forms at different times and in different contexts. Instead of being passive participants, Turkish newspapers of that period were even able to lead to changes in Turkey's policy of Greece in certain cases as mentioned above. Finally, contrary to the shared understanding that the year of 1955 marked the birth of public criticism of Greece and the government policies in Turkey, this thesis found that particularly the oppositional newspapers had already started to challenge Turkey's relations with Greece prior to the Cyprus crisis of 1955.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Emen Gökatalay, Gözde
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 11 March 1985, Ankara
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU International Relations	2011
BS	METU International Relations	2008
Minor	METU Psychology	2008
High School	Çağrıbey Anadolu Lisesi	2003

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2011- Present	METU Research Coordination Office	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English (Fluent), Greek (Elementary), Ottoman Turkish (Reading Skills)

PUBLICATIONS

1. Emen, Gözde. "Turkey's Relations with Greece in the 1920s: The Pangalos Factor", *Turkish Historical Review*, 7/1, 33-57 (2016).
2. Emen, Gözde. "Turkey's Reaction to the Bulgarian Memory of the Balkan Wars in the Inter-war Period", *The Centenary of The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) Contested Stances / 100. Yılında Balkan Savaşları (1912-1913) İhtilaflı Duruşlar Vols. I-II* (Mustafa Türkeş ed.) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2014), pp. 415-425.

HOBBIES

Cooking, Movies

B. TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, uluslararası arenada, Erken Dönem Soğuk Savaş koşullarının başladığı, Türk iç siyasetinde ise tek partili hayattan çok partili hayata geçildiği yılları kapsayan 1946-1955 döneminde, Türk basınının, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin seyrinde nasıl bir rol oynadığını araştırmaktadır. Bu tez çalışmasında, bu dönem aralığının seçilmesi bir tesadüf değildir. Konu edilen dönem, Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki diplomatik ilişkilerin en canlı olduğu dönemlerden biridir. Öyle ki, bu dönemde resmi ilişkiler altın çağlarından birini yaşamıştır. Aynı zamanda, dönemin yetkili isimlerince yerli ve yabancı basına verilen demeçlerde, bu iki komşu ülke arasındaki sınırların kalkması ve federasyon tipi bir yapının iki ülke için uygulanması ümidi bile dile getirilmiştir. Ayrıca, aynı dönem, büyük ölçekli politik değişikliklere tanık olan Türk siyaseti açısından, basının, daha aktif bir aktör olarak politika yapım süreçlerini etkilediği bir dönem olmuştur. Tüm bu değişim ve dönüşümler göz önüne alındığında, seçilen dönemin, hem Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, hem de Türk basını için ne kadar önemli olduğu daha net bir biçimde anlaşılmaktadır.

Mevcut yazında, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin bu zaman dilimindeki seyrine ve genel anlamda bu ilişkilerin Türk dış politikasına olan etkisine odaklanan çalışmalar oldukça sınırlıdır. Özellikle de, bu konuları, dönemin gazeteleri aracılığıyla ele alan ve basın üzerinden söz konusu gelişmeleri irdeleyen, çalışmalar ne yazık ki mevcut değildir. Bu dönemi de kapsayan daha geniş ölçekli çalışmalara bakıldığında da, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin gidişatı açısından ele alınan konuların daha çok iki ülke arasında kanayan bir yara olarak azınlık sorunlarının ve Kıbrıs meselesinin ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. Kapsamını yalnızca bu iki başlıkla sınırlandırmayan bu tez, erken Soğuk Savaş döneminde, mevcut literatür tarafından görece ihmal edilmiş noktaları da içerecek şekilde, söz konusu dönemdeki Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine çok yönlü bir bakış açısı getirmektedir. Özet boyunca detaylandırılacak olan ihmal edilmiş konular, Türk-Yunan ortak geçmişinin hatırlanması ve gündelik sorunların ansızın iki ülke arasında ulusal ölçekli sorunları doğurmasıdır.

Literatürde bahsi geçmeyen bu konuların ne kadar önemli olduğu, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine olan ilgisi bir an bile kaybetmeyen ve bu ilişkiler bağlamında sürekli olarak haber yapan, dönemin Türk gazetelerinin ayrıntılı bir taraması yapıldıktan sonra fark edilmiştir. Bu konuların taşıdığı önem ise mevcut literatürün Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin birdenbire ve keskin biçimde bozulmasını yeteri ölçüde açıklayamamasında yatmaktadır. Mevcut literatürün göz ardı ettiği bu konular, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin altın çağının yalnızca 1955 yazındaki Kıbrıs krizi ve 6-7 Eylül olayları yüzünden sona ermediğini, 1955 yılından öncesinde de ilişkilerin seyrinin ileri bir tarihte bozulacağının sinyallerinin verildiğini göstermektedir.

Bu noktada, basın, dönemin Türk hükümetlerinin resmi Yunanistan politikasını tekrarlamak ve bu politikaların gerekliliğini geniş halk kitlelerine ulaştırmanın çok daha ötesinde bir rol oynamıştır. Öyle ki, (özellikle de muhalif) basın, resmi söylemin eleştirisinin yapılabildiği ve yapıldığı bir platform olmuş, hatta hükümetin Yunanistan politikasını değiştirebilecek bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak, Türk-Yunan ilişkileri kapsamında kamuoyu oluşturan basın, kitleleri harekete geçirebilme özelliği de seçilen dönemde Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin seyrini açıklama açısından araçsal bir görevi haizdir.

Çalışmanın ana malzemesi olarak yoğunlukla başvurulan gazeteler, Akın, Akşam, Cumhuriyet, Demokrat Ankara, Dünya, Hizmet, Milliyet, Ulus, Vatan, Yeni Sabah, Yeni Ulus ve Zafer'dir. Bu gazetelere ulaşmak için Ankara'da bulunan çeşitli kütüphanelerden yararlanılmıştır. Bunlar Milli Kütüphane Mikrofilm Departmanı, Türk Tarih Kurumu Kütüphanesi ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kütüphanesi'dir. Ayrıca, Milli Kütüphane'nin, Ankara Üniversitesi'nin ve Cumhuriyet Gazetesi'nin internet erişimine açık gazete kataloglarından da yararlanılmıştır. Bu adı geçen gazeteler, bahsedilen dönemde, Türk basın tarihinin, Falih Rıfkı Atay, Nihat Erim, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, Nadir Nadi, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın ve Ahmet Emin Yalman gibi kıdemli isimlerini kadrolarında bulundurmaktadır. Bu isimler, gazeteci kimliklerine ek olarak siyasi yapıyla çok yakın ilişkiler içerisinde olan kişilerdir. Bu nedenle, dönemin kanaat önderleri olarak adlandırılabilecek bu duayen isimlerin, köşe yazılarına ek olarak, sonraki dönemlerde yayınladıkları anı kitapları da bu çalışmaya ışık tutmuştur.

İncelenen bu gazetelerde Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine dair çıkan haberlere ve köşe yazılarına ek olarak, bu haberlerin, dönem koşullarının göz önüne alınarak daha iyi yorumlanabilmeleri amacıyla, Türk, İngiliz ve Amerikan resmi belgeleri de kullanılan diğer birincil kaynaklar arasındadır. Ayrıca, *The Times*, *The Manchester Guardian*, *The New York Times* ve *The Washington Post* gibi önemli yabancı gazeteler de Cambridge Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi'nin gazete arşivinden yararlanılarak incelenmiştir.

Türk basının Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin seyrindeki etkisini anlayabilmek adına, giriş bölümünü takip eden İkinci Kısım'da 1940'ların ortasından 1950'lerin ortasına kadar olan dönemde, basın ve siyasi otorite arasındaki ilişkinin doğasına bakılmıştır. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nı takip eden dönemde, Türk siyasetinde, çok partili hayata geçilmiştir. Bu geçiş döneminde, basın, siyasi otorite için gerekli olan meşruiyet araçlarından neredeyse en önemlisi olmuştur. Bu süreçte basının özgürleştirilmesi, siyasetçiler için hem içte, hem dışta demokratik bir ülke olarak kabul edilmenin koşullarından biri haline gelmiştir. Fakat buna paralel olarak çok partili siyasi hayatla birlikte Türk siyasetinde kamuoyunun artan önemi, özellikle de Soğuk Savaş koşullarıyla basının ve diğer tüm propaganda araçlarının kazandığı değer, siyasetçilerin gözünde basının önemini daha da arttırmış ve bu durum, siyasetçilerin basını düzenleme ve kontrol etme isteğini daha baskın bir hale getirmiştir.

Bu isteğin tezahürü olarak dönem boyunca çok çeşitli mekanizmalar denenmiştir. Bunlardan bir tanesi basın rejimini belirleyen hukuksal zeminin, devlet otoritesinin basın üzerindeki etkisini arttırma yolunda hazırlanmasıdır. Demokrat Parti'nin (DP) muhalefette bulunduğu 1946-1950 döneminde, DP'nin, bu yıllar arasında görev yapan Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) hükümetlerine getirdiği temel eleştirilerden birisi 1931 yılından beri yürüklükte olan Basın Kanunu'dur. Bu kanun, DP tarafından anti-demokratik olmakla suçlanmış ve basının özgürleşmesinin önündeki en büyük engellerden birisi olarak işaret edilmiştir. CHP hükümetleri bu eleştirilere kulağını tıkamamış ve zaman zaman mevcut kanun üzerinde değişiklikler yapmıştır. Bu değişikliklerin en önemlisi üzerinde yoğun tartışmalara neden olan ve hükümete gazeteleri kapatma yetkisi veren 50. Madde'dir. Şükrü Saraçoğlu Hükümeti, 18 Haziran 1946 tarihinde bu maddeyi değiştirmiş ve gazete kapatma

yetkisi bakanlar kurulundan alınıp, yetkili mahkemelere devredilmiştir. Ancak, bu değişiklik DP'nin eleştirilerini azaltmamıştır.

DP'nin basın mevzundaki bu özgürlükçü söylemleri ve tabiri caizse baskıcı mevcut basın kanunun değişmesi için verdiği çabalar meyvelerini vermiş ve DP geniş bir basın desteğinin rüzgârını arkasına alarak 1950 seçimlerinde galip gelmiştir. Basına verdiği sözleri yerine getirmekte acele eden DP hükümeti 1950 yılının Temmuz ayında görece daha demokratik olan 1950 Basın Kanunu'nu meclisten geçirmiştir.

Ancak, bu yeni kanunun yarattığı görece demokratik ortam DP hükümetinin getirdiği yeni ceza mekanizmalarıyla kısa zamanda kaybolmuştur. Aslında, 1952 yılından beri, kulislerde dolaşan dedikodulara göre, hükümet, yeni kanunda özgürlükleri sınırlandıracak değişiklikler yapmayı amaçlamıştır. Bu söylentiler, bilhassa CHP yanlısı gazetelerde endişeyle karşılanmış ve sıklıkla manşetlere taşınmıştır. Korkulan durum, 1954 yılının Mart ayında, genel seçimlere aylar kala, gerçekleşmiş ve DP hükümeti basın suçlarına ağır cezaları beraberinde getiren yeni bir kanunu yürürlüğe sokmuştur. Bu kanun, basında 'ispat hakkı' tartışmalarını da beraberinde getirmiştir. Gazeteciye ispat hakkı tanımadan namus, şeref ve haysiyeti zedeleyen haberlere ve bu haberleri yapanlara ağır cezaları öngören bu kanun, yalnızca muhalefetin değil kimi DP milletvekillerinin bile yoğun protestosuna neden olmuştur. Böylece, 1950 öncesinde basını özgürleştirme söylemleriyle popülerlik kazanan DP, iktidara geldiği 1950 Mayıs'ından sonra, verdiği sözlerin tam aksi bir tutum alarak, muhalefetin tepki odağı olmuştur.

Aslında, 1954 yılındaki bu kanundan çok daha önce, 1951 yılı ortalarında, resmi ilanların dağıtımına getirdiği yeni düzenlemeyle, DP, basın desteğini çoktan kaybetmeye başlamıştı. Yasal zeminin düzenlenmesinin ve ceza mekanizmalarının uygulanması dışında, gazetelere yapılan devlet yardımları, üçüncü bir yol olarak görülebilir. Basın-iktidar ilişkisini şekillendirme de etkili bir araç haline gelen devlet yardımları, DP iktidarında etkin bir şekilde kullanılarak, DP yanlısı gazetelere hatırı sayılır ölçüde avantaj sağlıyordu. DP yanlısı gazetelere verilen bu cömert destekler ise, DP'nin basın politikasına verilen desteğin yavaş yavaş kaybolmasına neden olmuştur.

Bununla birlikte, CHP döneminde olduğu gibi bu dönemde de, basına yapılan baskılar ters tepmiş, baskılar muhalif sesleri yok edememiştir. Bu muhalif seslerin kendini hissettirdiği alanların önde gelenlerinden birisi de Türk-Yunan ilişkileridir. Ağırlıklı olarak CHP ya da DP ile organik bağa sahip bu gazeteler, bu siyasi ilişkiye rağmen hükümetin sözcüsü haline gelen Devlet Radyosu'nun aksine, en azından siyasi farklılığını koruyabilmiştir. Bu farklılığın hissedildiği mecralardan bir tanesi de Türkiye'nin Yunanistan politikasıdır. Zaman zaman bir arada hareket edip ortak amaca hizmet eden muhalefet ve iktidar gazeteleri, bazen de mevcut hükümetleri eleştirmek amacıyla, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini kullanmış ve bu eleştiriler sayesinde kamuoyunda ses getirmiştir. Tüm bunlar, siyasi elit ve halk kitleleri arasında aracı pozisyonunu koruyan basının, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde aktif bir rol alabilmesini sağlamıştır.

Basın ve siyasi otorite arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koyan bu kısmın ardından, ağırlıklı olarak bu iki devlet arasındaki diplomatik ilişkileri araştıran Üçüncü Kısım gelmektedir. Bu bölümde, iki devlet arasında Batı'nın desteğiyle kurulan işbirliğinin, basın tarafından nasıl halka duyurulduğu, daha doğrusu gelişen bu yakın stratejik ortaklık açısından kamuoyunun nasıl hazırlandığı incelenmektedir. Basının, hükümetin resmi Yunan politikasına verdiği bu desteği anlamak için öncelikle Türk-Yunan resmi ilişkileri bağlamında dönem boyunca öne çıkan başlıklar belirlenmiştir. Bu başlıklardan ilki Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Yardımları'dır. Hem muhalif, hem de hükümet yanlısı gazetelerde, bu iki konu hakkında yapılan haberler incelendiğinde, Truman Doktrini'nin açık bir şekilde ortaya koyduğu gibi, Türk-Yunan işbirliğindeki artışın bu iki devleti, Batı'nın Soğuk Savaş stratejilerinde daha önemli bir konuma taşıdığı yansıtılmaktadır. Yine, yapılan haberlerde Marshall Planı bu yakınlığın olumlu sonuçlarını gösteren Batı politikalarından biridir. Marshall Planı'na uyumlu olarak, bu dönemde iki devlet ekonomik işbirliklerini arttırmış ve basın tüm bu ekonomik gelişmelerin güzellemesini yardımlardan daha çok pay alabilmek adına yapmıştır.

Bununla birlikte, bu savın en çok test edildiği alan iki ülkenin NATO üyelik süreçleri olmuştur. 1949 yılında kurulan NATO'ya bu iki devletin üye olarak kabul edilmesi 1952 yılını bulmuştur. Geçen bu süre içinde, zaman zaman oluşan münferit

seslerin dışında büyük çoğunlukla Türk basını, Türk-Yunan ortaklığının, iki ülkenin de üyelik yolunda işlerini kolaylaştıracağı resmi söyleminin en etkili savunucusu olmuştur. 1952 yılı Şubat ayında, iki ülke aynı anda NATO üyeliğine kabul edilmiştir. Bu ise gün geçtikçe gelişen stratejik ortaklığı başka bir noktaya taşımış, bu iki ülke askerleri NATO kapsamında omuz omuza faaliyet göstermeye başlamış, NATO'ya üye olmalarından çok kısa bir zaman sonra da NATO'nun İzmir Karargâhı'nda ortak askeri faaliyetlere başlamışlardır. İlişkilerdeki yakınlık birden bire o derece hızlanmıştır ki iki devlet arasında sınırların kalkması ve Türk-Yunan federasyonun kurulması gibi görece ütopik söylemlerin resmi çevrelerce basına yansıtıldığı bile olmuştur.

İlişkilerin neredeyse tarihte hiçbir zaman olmadığı kadar yakın olduğu bu günler, aynı zamanda da şaşırtıcı bir şekilde ilişkilerin seyrini değiştiren, iç ve dış etkilerin baş göstermeye başladığı bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Kurulan bu 'çok yakın' ilişkilerden tedirgin olmaya başlayan CHP muhalefeti ve ona yakın yayın organları, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde yavaş yavaş daha eleştirel bir tutum takınmaya başlamıştır. Muhalif kanattaki bu değişimin aksine hükümet organları, DP'nin Yunanistan politikasını desteklemeye devam etmişlerdir. Oluşan bu fark, İkinci Balkan Paktı kapsamında çıkan haberlerde kendisini iyice hissettirmiştir. Bu olay karşısında, muhalif basının daha kuşkucu bir tutum sergilemeye başladığı göze çarpmıştır. Tezin diğer dört bölümünde, CHP ve DP arasında, az da olsa her zaman var olan, Yunanistan politikası farklarının 1952 yılını takip eden süreçte nasıl derinleştiği ayrı başlıklar altında incelenmiştir.

Bu bölümlerden ilki, Türk-Yunan ortak geçmişinin hatırlanmasını konu olan Dördüncü Kısım'dır. Bu bölümde, Türk-Yunan ortak geçmişinin iki önemli olayı ele alınmıştır. Bunlardan ilki, İstanbul'un fethi olayıdır. Tezin baktığı dönem, İstanbul'un Osmanlılar tarafından alınmasının 500. Yıldönümü olan 29 Mayıs 1953 tarihini de kapsamaktadır. Bu tarihi olay için yapılan hazırlıklar, 1939 yılında İsmet İnönü'nün çağrısıyla başlamıştır. Devam eden süreçte hem basın, hem kamuoyu bu konuya ilgilerini kaybetmemişlerdir. DP'nin muhalefette olduğu dönemde, zaman zaman bu konu muhalif basın tarafından CHP'yi eleştirme aracı olarak gündeme getirilmiştir. Ancak, bu konunun iki parti arasında büyük tartışmaya neden olması,

500. Yıl kutlamalarının yapıldığı gün, Adnan Menderes'in İstanbul'daki bu kutlamalara katılmak yerine, İzmir'de Kore Tugayı'nın değişim törenine katılması ve akabinde Türk ve Yunan askerlerinin bir arada görev yaptığı yine İzmir'deki NATO Karargâhı'na gitmesidir. CHP açısından mesaj çok nettir. Menderes, Yunan basınının sıklıkla dile getirdiği rahatsızlıkları ön planda tutarak, Türk kamuoyundaki rahatsızlığı bir kenara bırakıp bu tarihi kutlamaya katılmak yerine Türk-Yunan işbirliğinin sembolü haline gelen İzmir'deki Karargâhı ziyaret etmeyi seçmiştir. Menderes, Türk kamuoyundaki hassasiyetten daha ziyade, Türk-Yunan stratejik işbirliğini önemsediğini göstermiştir.

Benzer dönemde, yani 1952 yılı itibariyle, CHP yanlısı basını asıl endişelendiren, DP'nin aynı tutumu Yunanistan'ın Anadolu işgalinin hatırlanması konusunda da sergilemesidir. Bir açıdan, siyasi rakip olan İsmet İnönü'nün o dönemdeki etkinliğini unutturma amacını taşıdığını da akıllara getirmekle birlikte, 1952 yılı Haziran ayında DP'nin Yunanistan'dan gelen devlet yetkilileri rahatsız olmasın diye, Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı anımsatan anıtları kaldırtması, CHP basınının asla kabul edemeyeceği bir durum olmuştur. Karşı hamle olarak, bu dönemi takip eden süreçte, Lozan ruhunun Türk-Yunan ilişkileri açısından ne kadar önemli olduğunu vurgulayan bir basın kampanyası başlatılmış, kamuoyunun ilgisi bu konuya çekilmiştir.

Tezde bu bölümü takip eden Beşinci Kısım'da, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde birden bire gelişen, bağımsız gündelik olayların kamuoyunda nasıl bir milli sorun haline dönüştüğü incelenmiştir. İncelenen iki olaydan birincisi, CHP hükümeti zamanında Mayıs 1949 tarihinde, Türk futbol milli takım oyuncularına, Akdeniz Dostluk Kupası maçları boyunca yapılan saldırılardır. Yunan rakibini yenen Türk takımı, turnuva boyunca, yalnızca Yunan seyircilerinin değil ayrıca, Yunan asker ve polisi olmak üzere, resmi yetkililerinin de saldırılarına maruz kalmıştır. Bu saldırılar, turnuvanın son maçı olan Türk-İtalyan maçında şiddetlenmiş, çıkan arbedede Türk milli sporcularından bazıları yaralanmışlardır. Bu olay, Türk basınında geniş yer bulmuş, yaşanan bu olaylar kısa zamanda kamuoyunda büyük tepkilere yol açmıştır. Türkiye'de birçok farklı noktada büyük ölçekli gösterilerle bu holiganlık kınanmıştır.

Gazetelerin tutumları incelendiğinde, bazı küçük farklılıkların dışında hem CHP, hem de DP basınının benzer tepkiler verdiği anlaşılmaktadır.

Ancak, bu bölümde incelenen diğer olaya bakıldığında aradaki uçurumun zaman içinde fazlasıyla arttığı fark edilmektedir. Bu diğer olay, 1953 yılının Ağustos ayında Muğla'nın Fethiye ilçesinde meydana gelmiştir. Olay, Türk karasularına teknik bir arıza nedeniyle acil iniş yapmak zorunda kalan bir Fransız yolcu uçağı ve mürettebatının kurtarma çalışmaları esnasında, izinsiz bir şekilde Türk bayrağı taşımayan bir hücumbotla Türk karasularına giren Yunan askerlerinin gözaltına alınmasıyla patlak vermiştir. Türk yetkililerce, Türk bayrağı taşıma konusunda uyarılan Yunan mürettebatın, hücumbota takmaları için verilen Türk bayrağını birbirlerine uzatırken yere düşürmeleri neticesinde olaylar büyümüş ve olay Yunan askerlerinin karakola götürülmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu olay, Yunan basınında geniş bir yankı uyandırmış, Yunan gazeteleri tarafından, olaydaki bayrak meselesi anlatılmadan, Türk yetkililer eleştirilmiştir. Bu tepki, hâlihazırda karasuları konusunda hassas olan muhalif Türk basınını daha da kızdırmıştır. Bu münferit olaya daha geniş bir çerçeveden bakıldığında, Türkiye'deki muhalif basın için olayın Türk karasularında Yunan ihlali gibi görüldüğü açıktır.

Ege Denizi'ndeki Türk karasularında meydana gelen Yunan ihlalleri, bahsedilen dönemde muhalif basını en çok rahatsız eden konulardan biri haline gelmişti. Bunun nedeni, balıkçılık konusunda kapalı kapılar arkasında devam eden Türk-Yunan görüşmeleriydi. Basına sızan bilgilerden birisi de Yunanistan'a Türk karasularına serbest giriş hakkının verileceği yönünde olmuştur. Muhalif basın, bu dedikodunun gerçekleşme olasılığını kabul edilemez bir durum olarak değerlendirmiştir. DP basınının bu anlaşma taslağını Türkiye'nin yararına gösterme çabalarına rağmen, muhalif basın, etkin bir kampanya yürütmeye devam etmiş ve büyük olasılıkla bunun neticesi olarak, tasarı DP tarafından Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne getirilmemiştir. Sonraki dönemlerde Türk-Yunan ilişkileri çerçevesinde, en büyük sorunlardan birini teşkil eden karasuları konusunun ilk örnekleri sayılabilecek bu tepkiler, 1950'lerin ortasına doğru, Türk muhalefetinde ve muhalefet yanlısı basında, Türk-Yunan stratejik ortaklığına duyulan güvenin zaman içinde nasıl eridiğini de göstermektedir.

Bu bölümü takip eden Altıncı Kısım'da, Batı Trakya ve Kıbrıs'ta bulunan Türk azınlıkları konusu incelenmiştir. Türk basını için Balkan topraklarında yaşayan Türk/Müslüman azınlıklar her zaman ilgi çekici bir konu olmuştur. Basın, bu azınlıkların mülkiyet haklarına yapılan ihlaller gibi hiç bitmeyen sorunlarını, Türk halkına sürekli bir aktarmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Erken Dönem Soğuk Savaş yılları da bir istisna teşkil etmemiştir. Tam aksine, çoğu Balkan devletlerinde siyasi iktidarı ele alan komünist gruplar, Türk basınının, Balkanlardaki Türk azınlığın deneyim ve yaşam koşullarına daha dikkatli bir gözle bakmasına neden olmuştur.

Batı Trakya'daki Türk/Müslüman azınlığın haklarını garanti altına alan hukuki belge Lozan Antlaşması ve bu antlaşmaya ek olarak iki halk arasındaki nüfus mübadelesini düzenleyen sözleşmelerdir. İlk olarak 1923'te imzalanan, daha sonra 1930 yılında, revize edilen bu mübadele sözleşmesi maddeleri uyarınca, Batı Trakya'daki Türkler zorunlu nüfus mübadelesinden muaf tutulmuşlardır. 1930 yılıyla birlikte gelişen dostluk ilişkisinin bir sonucu olarak, Türk azınlığın görece daha iyi bir yaşam standardına kavuştuğu, özellikle de diplomatik ilişkilerin iyice hız kazandığı 1940'ların ortasından itibaren, bilhassa da 1950'lerin ilk yarısında, azınlıkların iyi koşullar altında yaşadığı mevcut yazında kabul görmüş bir savdır. Ancak, bu genel kanının bazı eksikleri olduğu basın araştırması neticesinde daha net fark edilebilmektedir.

Öncelikle, tezin odaklandığı bu dönemin ilk yıllarında, Yunanistan'da süregelen İç Savaş koşulları ve özellikle Türk azınlığın yoğun olarak yaşadığı kırsal alanlarda, bu savaşın beraberinde getirdiği siyasi karışıklığın, Batı Trakya Türkleri üzerinde nasıl olumsuz bir etkiye sahip olduğu açıktır. Bu zorluklardan kaçmayı başarabilip Türkiye'ye ulaşan mağdurların, Türk gazetelerine verdikleri demeçler, yaşanan sıkıntının boyutlarını daha açık biçimde ortaya sermektedir. Yaşanan göç dalgasının öyle bir noktaya gelmiştir ki Amerikan basınının bile endişeyle takip ettiği Türk-Yunan ilişkileri çerçevesinde, 1923-1930 yıllarında yaşanan azınlık sorunlarının yeniden gerçekleşebileceği olasılığı dile getirilmeye başlanmıştır. Böyle bir ortamda, Batı Trakya Türkleri, tüm mal varlıklarını artlarında bırakıp, bu kaotik ortamdan kaçmanın yollarını aramaya başlamışlardır. Onları, bu göç dalgasına

zorlayan şey silahlı komünist örgütlerle devlet güçlerinin baskıları arasında sıkışmaları olmuştur.

Bu insanların sorunları, literatürdeki yaygın görüşün tersine, Yunan İç Savaşı'nın 1949'da bitmesiyle son bulmamıştır. Sonraki süreçte de, Yunanistan'daki Türk azınlığın tanık olduğu acılar devam etmiştir. Her ne kadar savaşın bitmesiyle fiziksel saldırılar sona ermişse de, bu azınlıkların mülkiyet haklarına yapılan saldırılar süregelmiştir. Öyle ki, 1952 yılının sonbaharında uygulamaya konulan "terkedilmiş mülkiyetler düzenlemesi" uyarınca, Batı Trakya Türkleri büyük hak kayıplarına uğramıştır. Bu ve benzeri düzenlemeler yüzünden, ellerinden mal ve mülkleri alınmaya başlanmıştır. Bu da İç Savaş zamanı başlayan göç dalgasının, savaş sonrasında da devam etmesine neden olmuştur.

Türk basınında Yunanistan'a karşı tepkisel bir ortamın başlamasının nedenlerinin başında bu devam eden göç sorunu gelmekteydi. İç Savaş yıllarında, Batı Trakya'dan kaçan Türkler, basında Yunanistan'a karşı bir tepki doğurmamıştı. Çünkü Türk basınının sahip olduğu anti-komünist söyleme paralel olarak, söz konusu saldırıların sorumluları komünist gruplar olarak algılanmakta ve kamuoyuna da bu şekilde yansıtılmaktaydı. Söz konusu anti-komünizm, iki ülke hükümetlerini bir araya getirmiş ve iki hükümet Bulgaristan ve Romanya gibi diğer Sovyet yanlısı Balkan ülkelerinden kaçan azınlıklara destek olabilmek adına işbirliği yapmışlardı.

1952 yılından sonra devam eden göç sorunu ise bu işbirliği ortamını zedelemeye başlamıştır. Türk basını, eleştiri oklarını komünistlerden çekerek, Yunan hükümetini hedef göstermeye başlamıştır. Hatta kimi zaman, Türk gazeteleri, Yunan hükümetinin azınlık politikalarını, dönem boyunca kötü bir imaja sahip Bulgar yönetiminin tutumuyla, özdeşleştirmeye başlamıştır. Basının bu tutumu, halk düzeyinde geniş ölçekli protestoları beraberinde getirmiştir.

Aslında muhalif basını ve genel anlamda kamuoyunu rahatsız eden durum, Yunan hükümetinin azınlık politikasıyla sınırlı değildi. Aynı zamanda, Menderes Hükümeti'nin değişen tavrı da tepkilere neden oluyordu. Savaş koşulları içinde sınırı geçme kuralları katı bir şekilde işletilmemiş, kaçan Türklerin Türkiye'ye kabulü rahat bir şekilde sağlanmıştır. Ancak, bunun savaş sonrasında da devam etmesi,

Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini zedeleme endişesiyle Türk hükümetini daha katı tedbirler almaya itmiş bu da Türkiye'de tepkilere neden olmuştu.

Özellikle de canlarını tehlikeye atıp Türkiye'ye kaçan bu kişilerin kurallar gereği tekrar Batı Trakya'ya gönderilmesi üzerine basın bu konunun üzerine gitmeye başlamış bu konuyu manşetlerine taşımıştır. Muhtemelen kamuoyunda doğacak tepkiden çekinen DP yönetimi, yeni düzenlemeler yapma yoluna gitmiştir. O dönemde oluşan bu tepkiyi anlamak için bu olayı dönem koşulları içinde yeniden değerlendirmek gerekmektedir. 1952 sonrası yıllar, Yunanistan'ın resmi olarak Kıbrıs'ın Yunanistan'a ilhakı isteğini dile getirmeye başladığı yıllardır. İki ülke arasında hızla büyüyen bu Kıbrıs sorunu ışığı altında, Batı Trakya'da Türk azınlığın yaşadığı sıkıntılar, muhalefet ve organlarında şu kaygıyı iyice arttırmaktadır: Acaba, aynısı Kıbrıs'ın Yunanistan'a verilmesi durumunda Kıbrıs Türklerinin de başına gelecek miydi? Basın, bu noktada kendi politik hamlesini yapıp Yunanistan'ın Kıbrıs politikasına karşı, Batı Trakya Türklerinin yaşadıkları sorunları etkin bir şekilde gündeme getirmeye devam etmiştir. Aslında, Kıbrıs olayını uluslararası mecraya taşıyan Yunanistan, bu kötü imajdan son derece korkmuştur ve buna sebebiyet vermemek için Türklerin okullarına Müslüman okulları yerine Türk okulları denilmesine izin vermiştir. Ancak, bu yine de yaşanan sıkıntıları ve basının bunları dile getirmesine engel olamamıştır.

Bu durumdan da anlaşılacağı gibi tezin odaklandığı dönemde Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde Türk azınlıklar konusuna bakıldığında tek sorun Batı Trakya Türkleri değildir. İngiliz yönetiminde olsalar bile Kıbrıs Türkleri de bu denklemin bir parçasıdır. 1948 yılından beri aktif bir şekilde hem adada hem de Yunanistan'da devam eden enosis propagandası, basının bu olaya olan ilgisini son derece arttırmıştır. Öncelikle, Kıbrıs'ta bu propagandaya karşı düzenlenen gösteriler, basında geniş yer bulmaya başlamıştır. Sonrasında da bu protestoların Türkiye'ye sıçraması basının mevcut ilgisini gözle görülür bir şekilde arttırmıştır.

Çıkan haberler, Türk öğrencilerinin Kıbrıs'ı ziyaret etme taleplerine varıncaya kadar detaylı bir şekilde Türk okuyucuya sunulmuştur. Yine aynı haberler, Türk hükümetinin daha itidalli davranmak istediğini ve öğrencilerden gelen bu talepleri Kıbrıs'ta bir kışkırtma ve kaos ortamı yaratmamak adına engellediği

belirtilmiştir. Ancak aynı özenin Yunan hükümeti tarafından gösterilmemesi ve Yunan üniversite öğrencilerinin Kıbrıs'a gönderilmesi hem basında hem de kamuoyunda Yunanistan'a karşı olan tepkileri arttırmıştır.

İlerleyen zamanlarda, daha açık bir şekilde enosis propagandasına izin veren Yunan hükümeti, basın tarafından daha da ağır bir şekilde eleştirilmiştir. Aynı eleştirilerden nasibini, Yunanistan'ın daha milli bir politika takip etmesine karşın, Kıbrıs politikasını oluştururken bile Soğuk Savaş işbirliği stratejisine öncelik vermeye devam Menderes yönetimi de almıştır. Muhalif basının tepkisine daha da önemlisi halk protestolarının yoğunlaşmasına rağmen, Menderes 1955 yılının Ağustos ayına kadar hükümetin resmi Kıbrıs politikasını kamuoyuna açık bir biçimde dile getirmemiştir. O zamana kadar Kıbrıs'ta artan terör ve Türk azınlığın yaşadıkları kamuoyunda çok büyük tepkilere neden olmuştur. Bunların üzerine DP hükümetinin tabiri caizse sessiz kalma politikası, durmadan devam eden basın haberleriyle gün geçtikçe bu konulardaki duyarlılığı gittikçe artan Türk halkı için asla kabul edilemez hale gelmişti.

Hükümetin bu sessizliği iç muhalefeti bastırırken maalesef kendisini göstermemiştir. 1953 yılında Kıbrıs konusunu milli davası haline getiren öğrenci birliklerine ağır baskılar baş göstermeye başlamıştır. Hükümet öğrencilerin bu 'politik' meselelerle meşgul olmasını istememiştir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, hükümet Kıbrıs politikasının o ya da bu şekilde eleştirilmesine kesinlikle karşıydı ve muhalif sesleri susturma politikası takip etmiştir. Ancak, bu susturma politikasında istediği derecede etkin olamadı ve süreç boyunca Kıbrıs protestoları devam etmiştir. Aynı şekilde, muhalif basın da bu protestoların sesi olmaya ve öğrenci birliklerini desteklemekten geri durmamıştır.

Ekim 1953 tarihi itibariyle CHP'nin politikasını daha net bir şekilde ortaya koyduğu görülmektedir. Yine muhalif basının genişçe yer verdiği bu açıklamalardan anlaşılan CHP'nin önceliğinin hala adadaki mevcut düzenin devam etmesi yönünde olduğudur. Ancak, bu mevcut düzenin bozulacağı herhangi bir politika değişikliğinde bunun Türkiye'nin lehine olması yönünde de bir beyanda bulunulmuştur. CHP, çok net bir şekilde enosis fikrini her koşulda reddedeceğini ifade etmiştir.

Aynı süreçte, DP hükümeti ise sessizliğini bozmamıştır. DP'nin bu sessizliği, 29 Ağustos ve 7 Eylül 1955 tarihleri arasında Türkiye, Yunanistan ve İngiltere arasında gerçekleşen Londra Konferansı'nın öncesinde son bulmuştur. Menderes, bu konferanstan çok kısa bir süre önce, 24 Ağustos günü, hem muhalif hem de hükümet yanlısı gazetelerde büyük yankı uyandıran bir konuşma yapmıştır. Bu konuşmasında Kıbrıs Türklerinin hiçbir koşulda savunmasız bırakılmayacağını ve adada mevcut koşulların bozulduğu noktada Türkiye'nin adayı geri isteyeceğini basın aracılığıyla herkese duyurmuştur. Bu sert konuşma, hükümet yanlısı gazetelerde de tutum değişikliğine neden olmuştur. DP'nin en önemli yayın organlarından olan Zafer gazetesi bu konuşmaya övgüler yağdırmıştır. Sadece hükümet gazeteleri değil ayrıca muhalif gazeteler de kendilerince geç gelen bu konuşmayı desteklemişlerdir. Hatta öyle ki, CHP resmi bir açıklama yapıp Londra Konferansı boyunca DP'nin Kıbrıs politikasını destekleyeceğini bildirmiştir. Ancak, Konferans 6-7 Eylül Olayları ile birlikte anlamını yitirmiş ve taraflar konferanstan herhangi bir uzlaşma olmadan ayrılmışlardır.

Tezde bu bölümü takip eden son kısımda, yani Altıncı Kısım'da 6-7 Eylül Olaylarına da değinen Türkiye'deki Yunan azınlıklar konusu incelenmiştir. Bu kısım, öncelikle 1940'ların ortalarında Türk-Yunan dostluğunun sembollerinden biri olan fakat sonradan özellikle Kıbrıs problemi derinleştikçe bu olumlu imajını kaybeden Fener Rum Patriği Athenagoras konusunu işlemektedir. Asıl adı Aristoklis Mathias Spriyu olan yeni Patrik, aslen Amerika Birleşik Devletleri vatandaşıdır. Patrik olarak seçildiği Kasım 1948 tarihinden sonra Türk vatandaşlığına kabul edilmiştir. Kendisi, Ocak 1949 yılında Türkiye'ye gelerek görevinin başına geçmiştir. Seçildiği ilk andan itibaren basının büyük bir ilgisiyle karşılaşan Patrik, Türkiye'ye gelir gelmez basına ayrıca teşekkür etmiştir. Basında en çok altı çizilen konu yeni Patrik Athenagoras'ın Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Başkanı Truman tarafından desteklendiği bilgisidir. Sürekli bu bilgi üzerinden haberler yapan basın, kamuoyunda batı yanlısı politikaları nedeniyle Athenagoras'ın destek görmesine vesile olmuştur. Hatta kendisi yine basından öğrenilen haberlere göre Truman'ın uçağıyla Türkiye'ye gelmiştir.

Kıbrıs olaylarının hız kazandığı zamana kadar Türk halkı tarafından kendisine yapılan herhangi bir protesto haberi gazetelerde mevcut değildir. Sadece, 1950

yılının Şubat ayında, kendi cemaatine mensup Vasil Haci Yorgi isimli bir kişi tarafından kendisine saldırı girişimi olmuş, bu münferit olay Türk basını tarafından hemen kınanmıştır. Yine Athenagoras zamanında, 1952 yılının Haziran ayında, Menderes, Patrikhane'yi ziyaret eden ilk ve tek Türk Başbakanı olma sıfatıyla kendisini ziyaret etmiştir. Başbakanlık arşivinden alınan belgeler ışığında bu ikilinin zaman zaman yakın temaslarda bulunduğu ve aralarının iyi olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Athenagoras'ın yaşadığı sıkıntıları ve taleplerini hiç çekinmeden Menderes'e ilettiği yine belgeler ışığında anlaşılmaktadır.

Tüm bu olumlu tabloyu bozan Athenagoras'ın Kıbrıs olaylarında tarafını belli etmemesi ve enosisi açık ve net bir şekilde reddetmemesi olmuştur. Bu baskı daha çok 1955 yılının yaz aylarına denk gelmektedir. Basın Athenagoras'ın suskunluğunu eleştirirken, kamuoyunun Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan beri yakından tanıdığı Türk Ortodoks Kilisesi'nin başı olan Papa Eftim'in Kıbrıs meselesinde Türk tezini savunan demeçlerine sıklıkla yer vermeye başlamıştır. Papa Eftim'in de hedefinde Athenagoras vardı. Papa Eftim verdiği demeçlerde, Patrik Athenagoras'ın enosis propagandasına maddi manevi yardım ettiğine dair şüpheleri olduğundan bahsetmekteydi.

Basının ısrarlı yayınlarına rağmen Athenagoras sessizliğini korumuştur. Yine aynı dönemde gazete haberlerinde, bu durumun öğrenci birliklerini rahatsız etmeye başladığı sıklıkla dile getirilmektedir. Hatta gazeteler öğrencilerin kendisine sitemlerini bildirmek üzere Athenagoras ile görüşme taleplerinin olduğunu ancak bu taleplerin Patrik tarafından reddedildiğini de sayfalarına taşımışlardır. Bununla da kalmayıp öğrencilerin Athenagoras'a iletmek istediği mesajlarını sayfalarından duyurmuşlardır. Tüm bu kampanyalar sonucunda, halkta büyüyen öfke Athenagoras'ın protesto edilmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. 9 Ağustos 1955 günü İstanbul'un Eminönü semtinde Athenagoras'ı karşılarında gören bir grup insan Athenagoras'a "Kıbrıs Türk'tür" diye bağırmıştır. Yine bu haber, gazetelerde birinci sayfa haberi olarak verilmiştir.

Tezin bu altıncı bölümünde, Patrik Athenagoras konusundan sonra yine bu konu gibi Türkiye'deki Yunan azınlığı fazlasıyla etkileyen Varlık Vergisi'nin yeniden hatırlanması konusu incelenmiştir. DP'nin henüz muhalefet partisiyken

CHP'nin geçmiş politikalarını eleştirmek amacıyla yeniden ortaya attığı bu konu, DP'nin iktidar yıllarında da bir politika malzemesi olarak DP tarafından CHP'ye karşı kullanılmaya devam edilmiştir. Özellikle 1950 yılında seçimlerden sonra TBMM'de bu verginin yeniden incelenmesine dair kurulan komisyon verginin uygulandığı dönemde yolsuzluk yapılıp yapılmadığına dair bir araştırma başlatmıştır. Bu komisyonun varlığı verginin uygulandığı dönemde İstanbul eski defterdarı Faik Ökte gibi o dönem üst düzey görev yapmış eski bürokratları haklı olarak endişelendirmişti. Muhtemelen bu psikoloji nedeniyle, Ökte bir yıl içerisinde bu verginin aralarında İstanbul'da yaşayan Rumları da barındıran gayrimüslim halka yaşattığı trajedilerin altını çizen ve olaylardan CHP yönetimini sorumlu tutan bir kitap hazırlamıştır. Ancak, sonraki dönemlerde, o zamanlar Ökte ile birebir çalışma fırsatı yakalayan Cahit Kayra gibi yine dönemin bürokratları, bu kitabın sübjektif ve gerçekten uzak bazı yargılara sahip olduğunu yazmıştır. Tüm bunlardan bağımsız olan gerçek şudur ki DP'nin bu Varlık Vergisi'nin yeniden hatırlatma politikası Yunan basınından destek görmüş ve hatta önemli bir Yunan gazetesi, Menderes'i bu çabalarından dolayı "anlayış sahibi ve riyasız" bir devlet adamı olarak sayfalarına taşımıştır.

Kısacası bu dönemde, DP'nin hem Athenagoras'a karşı gösterdiği yakınlık hem de Yunan azınlık için böylesi önemli bir konuda takındığı tavır, DP'nin azınlıklar tarafından destek görmesine vesile olmuştur. Fakat bu durum, Türk azınlığın yaşadığı problemlere karşın, iki azınlık için Lozan Antlaşması'ndan beri azınlıklar rejimini belirleyen 'karşılıklılık' prensibinin çalıştırılması gerektiği fikrini akıllara daha çok getirmeye başlamıştır. Batı Trakya'da Türklerin yaşadığı sıkıntılar basında yer buldukça bu beklenti, kamuoyunun Yunan azınlığına bakışını ister istemez gün geçtikçe daha çok etkilemeye başlamıştır. 6-7 Eylül Olaylarının olduğu gün bile gazeteler, Batı Trakya'da devam eden sıkıntı haberleriyle doludur. Basında bu haberlerin yer alması, 6-7 Eylül Olayları'nı takip eden günlerde, Athenagoras'ın Menderes'e yazdığı mektupta bu trajik olaylar için basını suçlamasına bile neden olmuştur.

6-7 Eylül Olayları, tezin bu bölümünde Patrik Athenagoras ve Varlık Vergisi'nin yeniden ziyaret edilmesi konularına ek olarak işlenen üçüncü konudur.

Tezde bu olaylar, Kıbrıs sorununa bağlantılı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Daha önce de bahsedildiği gibi bu olaylar Londra Konferansı esnasında meydana gelmiştir. Döneme ait resmi dokümanlar, konferans öncesi tarafların kamuoylarını tahrik etmemek adına konferans hakkında basın açıklaması yaparken dikkat etmek hususunda anlaştığını göstermektedir. Ancak, konferansa taraf üç ülkede de basının duyduğu ilgi yine taraflarca bilinmektedir ve konferans esnasında özellikle Türk ve Yunan basınlarında hiç durmaksızın Kıbrıs konusuyla ilgili haberler verilmiştir. Yunanistan basınına oranla daha dikkatli bir dil kullanmaya çalışan Türk basınında, gazete haberlerine konu olan bir diğer başlık Yunan gazetelerinde çıkan spekülatif haberlerdir. Bunlardan birisi, Patrikhane'nin polisler tarafından basıldığı haberidir. Tam bu noktada basın bu spekülatif haberleri yalanlayıp olayların büyümesini engelleme rolünü kendisine vazife edinmişti. Ancak bu itidalli tutum 6-7 Eylül Olayları öncesinde farklı bir yapıya büründü. İstanbul Ekspres adlı hükümet yanlısı bir gazetenin Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Selanik'teki evinin bombalanmasıyla ilgili yaptığı haberin ardından olaylar kontrolden çıkmış İstanbul ve İzmir'de Yunan azınlığın can ve mallarını kasteden saldırılar gerçekleşmiştir. Bu yaşanan olaylar günümüzde bile Türk-Yunan ilişkileri açısından unutulmak istenen acı anılar olarak kalmıştır.

Sonuç olarak, 1946-1955 döneminde Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini konu alan bu tez, Türk dış politikasına dair iki yaygın kanıya karşı çıkmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki, bu dönem boyunca hatta 1960'ların ortalarına kadar, Türk dış politikasının siyaset üstü bir yapıya sahip olduğu ve partiler arası çekişmenin dış politika alanının dışında olduğu savıdır. İkincisi ise, tezin odaklandığı bu yılların Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde bir altın çağ olduğu ve ilişkilerin sorunsuz biçimde sürdüğü savıdır. Gerçekten de resmi ilişkiler çerçevesinden bakıldığında yani ikili anlaşmalar ve demeçler ekseninde bir araştırma yapıldığında, ilişkilerin en azından görünürde sorunsuz bir şekilde yürüdüğü düşünülebilir. Ancak, sadece diplomatik ilişkileri referans alan bu anlayış, böylesine güzel giden ilişkilerin nasıl olup da 1955 yazında birdenbire bozulduğunu açıklamak konusunda son derece sınırlıdır. Oysaki diplomatik ilişkilerin dışına çıkıldığında Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin çok daha karmaşık bir yüzüyle

karşılaşılmaktadır. Türk-Yunan ilişkilerindeki bu çok boyutlu yapıyı anlayabilmek için bu tezde dönemin Türk basını ana kaynak olarak kullanılmıştır.

Gazete taraması sonucu varılan noktalardan biri, bu süreç boyunca, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine ve Yunanistan'a dair haberlerin basında kendisine ayrıcalıklı bir yer bulduğu gerçeğidir. Türk basınında bu ilgiyi uyandıran başlıca nedenlerden biri Yunanistan'ın Türk halkı için yabancı bir ülkeden çok daha fazla bir anlam ifade ettiği gerçeğidir. İki komşu ülke toplumu arasında savaş hatıralarının baskın olduğu ortak bir hafıza vardır. Aynı şekilde, dönem koşulları göz önüne alındığında, Türk siyasi eliti için de Yunanistan yabancı herhangi bir devletten çok daha fazlası demekti. Türkiye'ye komşu olmanın çok daha ötesinde, Yunanistan, siyasi elit için ortak Sovyet tehdidine ve yine Sovyet desteğini alan bir Bulgaristan saldırısına karşı bir numaralı stratejik ortak olarak kabul edilmiştir. Hatta bu ortaklık, Türkiye'nin ilişkilerini daha da geliştirmek istediği Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve İngiltere tarafından da ısrarla desteklenmekteydi. Yani, Türk-Yunan yakınlaşması aynı zamanda bu iki devleti Batı politikalarına da daha çok yaklaştırmaktaydı. Tüm bunlar, basının gözünde Türk-Yunan ilişkileri meselesini diğer dış politika meselelerine kıyasla çok daha önemli bir noktaya taşımıştı. Radyo gibi tek sesli olmayan haliyle, siyasetçiler ve halk arasında aracı bir pozisyonda konumlanan basın, böylece de Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde resmi politikaya bağımlı olmayan bir anlayışa sahip olmuştu.

Anlaşılan odur ki incelenen dönem içinde basın, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin seyrinde farklı zamanlarda farklı derecelerde çeşitli roller üstlenmiş ve dostluktan yeniden düşmanlığa giden yolda önemli etkilere sahip olmuştur. Gazete taramasına dayanan bu tez, kullandığı bu birincil kaynak sayesinde genel literatür kabullerinin ötesinde çok daha karmaşık bir Türk-Yunan ilişkileri görüntüsüne kavuşmuştur. Büyük çoğunlukla CHP ve DP arasında dağılan ve bu iki partinin görüşlerini yansıtan dönemin ana akım basını, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde de partiler arası görüş benzerliklerini ve farklılıkları yansıtan bir araç olmuştur. Ancak, yapılan araştırma göstermiştir ki bunun çok daha ötesinde basının kendisi bu ilişkilerde aktif bir rol almış ve Türkiye'nin Yunanistan politikasını yönlendiren bir rol üstlenmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın bittiği, Soğuk Savaş koşullarının uluslararası politikayı

şekillendirmeye başladığı ilk dönemde, basında öncelikle ağız birliği yapılmışçasına Türk-Yunan yakınlaşmasının Türkiye'nin çıkarlarıyla doğrudan bağlantılı olduğu ve ulusal çıkarlar nedeniyle aynı tehdit karşısında kader ortaklığı yapan bu iki ülkenin yakınlaşmasının ne kadar gerekli olduğu vurgusu yapılmıştır. Sonraki dönemlerde zaman zaman CHP ve DP arasında görüş farklılıkları olsa da basın 1952 yılına kadar daha uyumlu bir tablo çizilmiştir.

1952 yılı ve devamındaki süreçte, görüş farkları gün geçtikçe keskinleşmiş, DP basını Yunan dostluğunu savunmaya devam ederken, CHP basını bu dostlukla ilgili şüphelerini dile getirmekten çekinmemiştir. Aradaki ince ayrımlar, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerindeki sorunların, resmi söylemlerin ve literatürde hâkim olan görüşlerin aksine, 1955 yazındaki Kıbrıs krizinden daha önce başladığı ve sorunların sadece Kıbrıs konusu gibi sonraki dönemde kurulan ilişkilerde de pürüz yaratan bir problemden ibaret olmadığı anlaşılmaktadır. Kıbrıs sorununun hatta azınlık sorununun yanı sıra iki ülke arasında ortak tarihin hatırlanması, karasuları ve balıkçılık sorunları ve hatta gündelik krizler gibi konuların kolaylıkla sorunsallaştırıldığı ve Soğuk Savaş işbirliğinin süreç içinde Türk basını tarafından sorgulanmaya başlandığı görülmektedir.

C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : EMEN GÖKATALAY
Adı : Gözde
Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): TURKISH PRESS AND THE TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS (1946-1955)

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans [ ] Doktora [X]

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. [ ]
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. [ ]
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. [X]

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: