

THE REFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN IRAN  
(1926–1946)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

MURAT YÜMLÜ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

DECEMBER 2016

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Tlin Genz  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Philosophy of Doctorate.

---

Prof. Dr. mer Turan  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Philosophy of Doctorate.

---

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur	(METU, HIST)	_____
Prof. Dr. zlem Tr	(METU, IR)	_____
Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyitdanlıđlu	(Hacettepe Uni.,HIST)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Birten elik	(METU, HIST)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Agâh Hazır	(Yznc Yıl Uni., IR)	_____

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last Name : Murat Yümlü  
Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE REFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN IRAN (1926–1946)**

Yümlü, Murat

Ph. D. Department of History

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur

December 2016, 390 pages

This dissertation aspires to analyze the reemergence of the political opposition in Iran during the period between 1926 and 1946 by adopting a historical perspective.

The consistency of the political opposition depends on the internal and external factors which define the capacity of the political movements that prescribe the representation of the political interests. Additionally, the dissertation deals with the political transformation's limits and the political party formation during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi and its immediate aftermath. By doing so, the study aspires to answer the question to what extent did the political party formations bring a successful result to transform the political life in Iran. This question continues through the early period of the nationalist interregnum. Briefly, from the 1920s to the early 1940s, the political life in Iran transformed from a strict structure of administration into a relatively liberal atmosphere with the help of the international domain's crisis and the manipulation of Allies. The dissertation asserts that aside from the limits of external factors, the domestic factors also affected the proliferation of political parties and associations. Hence, the dissertation targets to elucidate the course of political events, patterns, and the political rivalries during the period from 1926 to 1946, and to examine that the political opposition reemerged during the early transition period of the nationalist interregnum.

**Keywords:** Pahlavi Dynasty, Politics in Iran, Political Opposition, Nationalist Interregnum.

## ÖZ

### İRAN’DA SİYASAL MUHALEFETİN YENİDEN OLUŞUMU 1926–1946

Yümlü, Murat

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur

Aralık 2016, 390 sayfa

Bu çalışma, tarihsel bir çerçeve içerisinde İran’da siyasal muhalefetin 1926-1946 yılları arasında yeniden ortaya çıkışını hazırlayan nedenleri incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Siyasal muhalefetin istikrarı, siyasal çıkarların temsiliyetini öngören hareketlerin kapasitesini belirleyen iç ve dış faktörlere dayanmaktadır. Ek olarak, çalışma siyasal dönüşümün limitleri ve Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminde siyasal parti oluşumunu ele almaktadır. Böylelikle, çalışmada parti oluşumlarının siyasal hayatı ne dereceye kadar dönüştürmekte başarılı olduğunun incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Bu soru milliyetçi ara dönemin erken evresini de kapsamaktadır. Kısaca, 1920’lerden 1940’lara, İran’da siyasal hayat uluslararası ilişkilerdeki kriz dinamiği ve işgalci Müttefik devletlerin manipülasyonları yoluyla katı bir yönetim çizgisinden görece liberal bir atmosfere dönüşmüştür. Çalışmada dışsal faktörlerin limitlerinin yanında, içsel faktörlerin siyasal partilerin ve derneklerin yaygınlaşmasında etkili olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Böylece çalışma 1926-1946 arasındaki dönemde siyasal olaylara, modellere ve mücadelelere ışık tutmayı ve milliyetçi ara dönemin erken evresinde İran’da siyasal muhalefetin yeniden ortaya çıkışını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Pehlevi Hanedanı, İran Siyaseti, Siyasi Muhalefet, Milliyetçi Ara Dönem.

Bu alıřma;

*aędař, laik, oęulcu, demokratik ve eřitliki bir Dnya ve Trkiye idealine adanmıřtır.*

*This dissertation is dedicated to the ideal of a modern, secular, pluralist, democratic and egalitarian World and Turkey.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Professor Recep Boztemur for his encouragement and guidance throughout my dissertation. His trust and support, whenever I requested, has been an inevitable part of my study. Undoubtedly, it's to be stated that I could not have dared to begin this work without orientation of esteemed Professor Recep Boztemur. Without his unwavering support, this study, I could not have completed this work. Although he was missioned as the Assistant to the Chancellor of the Middle East Technical University (Northern Cyprus), his support in critical times was invaluable, and beyond any kind of worth. I would also like to thank esteemed members of the dissertation board, Professor Özlem Tür, Professor Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, Associate Professor Birten Çelik, and Assistant Professor Agâh Hazır, who kindly accepted to be members of the dissertation committee; read the draft and made valuable comments, critiques, and suggestions which vastly improved the work. My thanks, and gratitudes also go to my friends Perihan, Volkan, Evren who scrupulously read the text and provided constructive criticism. I would like to thank my friends from the department years Perihan Ünlü Soylu, Derya Büyükduru and Evren Eren for their encouragement and motivation during the writing process. I would also like to thank the Perry-Castaneda Library's personnel and Associate Professor Kamran Scott Aghaie at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the University of Texas at Austin for their valuable guidance during my visiting research term in the U.S.A.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their deep and infinite love. My father Abdullah, mother Hamdiye, brother Mustafa Serdar, and his family members have always been there. Last, of all, I couldn't have undertaken this task had it not been for Işıl's (Bayraktar) assistance. With being provided both rhyme and reason, I am indebted to her with all my heart.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
DEDICATION .....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xi
CHAPTER	
1.INTRODUCTION	
1.1.Statement of The Problem.....	1
1.2.Significance of the Study .....	8
1.3.Literature Review.....	20
1.3.1.Evolving Political Party-Based Narratives: Dowreh-System.....	22
1.3.2. Modernization Under Reza Shah: Instrumentalist or Enlightened?.....	25
1.3.3. Confrontation of the Society with the State.....	29
1.3.4. Approach of Compromise .....	35
1.3.5.Ruling-Party Approach.....	42
1.3.6. Conceptual Framework .....	51
1.3.7.Arbitrary Rule and the Aridisolatic Society .....	52
1.3.8. The Conceptualization of the Early Phase of The Nationalist Interregnum .....	57



2.POLITICAL HISTORY OF IRAN UNDER REZA SHAH PAHLAVI	
2.1.Introduction .....	63
2.2. Clash of Foreign Powers In Iran and The Rise of Reza Shah.....	63
2.3. The New Dynasty: Reza Shah's (Pahlavi) Rule (1926–1941).....	83
2.3.1. Pahlavi Dynasty's Relations With The Clergy and The Tribes .....	83
2.3.2. Revisiting The Shah's Modernization Program .....	105
2.3.3. Revisiting The Political Opposition In Iran (1926–1941) .....	133
2.4.The Occupation of Iran (1941) and The Political Landscape (1941–1944).....	146
2.4.1.Wartime Problems In Iran: The Aftermath of The Occupation .....	148
2.4.2.The Nascence of The Political Party Activities Before WWII .....	160
2.4.3.The Reformation of The Political Party Activities During WWII .....	165
2.4.4. Cabinets and Prime Ministers In Iran (1941–1946) .....	184
2.4.5. Encountering With The Ethnic Mobilization.....	233
2.4.6. Emission Problem and Food Shortages In Iran During WWII .....	249
2.4.7. Summary.....	251
3.THE 14TH MAJLIS (1944–1946) AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN	
3.1.Introduction .....	254
3.2. The Formation of The 14th Majlis .....	264
3.3. Tehran Bread Riot ( December 8–9, 1942).....	275
3.4. Ali Soheili's Term in Office and Its Aftermath .....	290
3.5. Rivalry of Three Political Currents In Iran (1941–1946) .....	320
3.6. Summary .....	332
4.CONCLUSION .....	334
REFERENCES.....	347
APPENDICES	
A.GRAIN PRODUCTION IN IRAN AND TRANSPORTATION (1943).....	371

B.CURRICULUM VITAE.....	372
C.TURKISH SUMMARY (TÜRKÇE ÖZET) .....	374
D.TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	391

## LIST OF TABLES

### TABLES

Table 2.1: Egypt, Iran and Turkey, 1925: Selected Indicators of Development.....	114
Table 2.2: Egypt, Iran and Turkey, 1938: Selected Indicators of Development.....	117
Table 2.3: Germany-Iran Trade Figures.....	147
Table 2.4: Iranian Prime Ministers Between 1941–1953.....	196



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1. Statement of The Problem

This study deals with a set of questions to understand the political formation of Iran during the two-decade period from 1926 to 1946, and the evolution of the political opposition from the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi to the end of the Second World War (WWII). Thus, the study mainly holds the period covering the two decades to assess the rise and eclipse of Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule, and the dynamics of reemergence, and the reformation of the political opposition in Iran after the occupation of the country. Since the times of the Safavid rule (1501–1722)<sup>1</sup>, Iran had experienced its politics with a combination of Shi'ite belief. In the modern times, the secular nationalism has also become a component of the political agenda.

Iran, as a country in the Middle East, has an area of approximately 630,000 square miles. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was bordered by Iraq on the west, by Turkey on the north-west, by the Soviet Union on the north and north-east, Afghanistan to the east, Pakistan to the south-east.<sup>2</sup> Iran experienced the economic involvement of Western powers, Britain and Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Iran was nominally a constitutional monarchy since the Constitutional Revolution (*Enq̄lab-e Mashruti or Enq̄lab-e Azadi*). It was the harbinger of political modernity as Katouzian asserted by stating that “the negative and positive concepts of liberty”'s scrutiny has taken its roots during, and for a short while, after the constitutional period. The absence of an established and inviolable legal framework

---

<sup>1</sup>Thomas R. Mattair, *Iran: a Reference Handbook*, Westport, Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Philip Ward, *Touring Iran*, London, Faber and Faber, 1971, p. 15.

stood in the heart of Iranian politics as the political mindset started to reform. As the negative liberty mentioned the freedom from the arbitrary rule, the positive type of liberty made it as a solid base for the established legal framework that would guarantee more predictable and secure conditions for a living.<sup>3</sup> However, the balance of encroachments of which the Tsardom of Russia and Britain intervened in Iranian political affairs as well as the arbitrary society tradition, the fragmentation of the political ideas, and the fate of the constitutional revolution yielded to the fragility of law, and the stagnation of the Majlis. As Stephen C. Poulson mentioned, the long-lasting protest cycles in Iranian history found their roots in the *Tobacco Movement (1891–1892)*, and the *Constitutional period (1906–1911)*.<sup>4</sup>

Subsequently, after WWI, the rule of Reza Khan provided the absence of political alternative, and the political opponents of his rule were compelled to rush out of the political sphere either by extortion, relegation or by the implementation of anti-collectivist law in 1931, which sought to prevent the activities of political agents to whom the “disloyalty” attributed. As Afshin Matin-Asgari asserted, “the Marxists, comprising the intelligentsia and students were the most persecuted”.<sup>5</sup> Amongst these political figures of opposition, Dr. Mosaddiq<sup>6</sup>, Tabatabai were the exceptions forced to domestic or foreign exile respectively. One may shortly count the names of *Sayyed Hassan Modarres*, *Teymurtash*, *Sardar Asad Bakhtiari*, *Taqi Arani*, and *Mirzazadeh Eshqi*.

---

<sup>3</sup> Homa Katouzian, *Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society*, New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 121.

<sup>4</sup> For the protest cycles in modern Iranian history, Poulson counted the post-War II movements. The Tudeh Party and the National Front as the second; the 1963 Qom protests and the Iranian Revolution (1977–1979) as the third, and the 2nd of Hordad Movement (1997-to the early 2000’s) as the fourth. Please see Stephen C. Poulson, *Social Movements in Twentieth Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2006, p. 2–7. Please also see the foreword by Fred Halliday. *Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects*, ed. Ali Mohammadi, London, Routledge, 2003, p. xviii.

<sup>5</sup> Afshin Matin-Asgari, “The Pahlavi Era Iranian Modernity In Global Context”, in ed. Touraj Daryaei, *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 346–365.

<sup>6</sup> Transliteration of the Persian terms in English may feature by several examples. In that respect, it is necessary to state that the name of the popularly elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddiq checked in several forms. On this point, Ervand Abrahamian’s preference is used in entire of the study. Ervand Abrahamian, *the Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern US-Iranian Relations*, New York: The New Press, 2013, p. ix.

On one side, the modernization attempts followed to cause a considerable degree of satisfaction in the intellectual circles, and the widening of the education network around the country that had appealed to the people. On the other hand, there were several layers in a society, whose discontent had born out of the religious, political, economic, and cultural factors.

The downfall of the Shah, after the change of equilibrium during the relatively early phase of WWII, brought a sudden change in the country where the political spectrum flourished once again. During the early phase of the Constitutional period, the formation of a myriad of political parties in a premature way of *fraksiyuns* had represented a diverse political ground. It was the second time of Iran to experience the political opposition gathering under the auspices of the political parties. This new formulation of the political movements brought a challenge amongst the Shah, the Majlis bodies, and the occupying powers.

The tripartite struggle of power politics had been a major agenda for the country for almost the whole of WWII. The Tripartite Treaty signed between the Iranian Government, and the Allied powers, Britain, the Soviet Union on 29 January 1942 was theoretically a guarantee for the sovereignty, the political independence, and evacuation of occupation forces from the country after six months of the War's end. As Roham Alvandi stated, even though the subsequent course of events proved the fact that the American involvement in Iranian affairs rose gradually during WWII, the United States of America, as a reinclining force in Iranian affairs, was not amongst the signatories of the treaty.<sup>7</sup> However, taking into consideration that the Tripartite Treaty was an effort to make the invasion of Iran compatible with the Atlantic Charter, which released almost two weeks before the landing of foreign troops in Iran, the American involvement, aside from its century-old development, has gained impetus since 1941. As the transition period of Iran continued from 1941 to the early 1950s, the literature mentioned the instability of the cabinets, caused respective cabinet changes. During these years, the tremor brought a deep political instability in the country where the setting of many cabinets had reached up to thirty-one, in comparison with the former period's record of ten.

---

<sup>7</sup> Roham Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 6.

Malcolm Yapp mentioned, that the main basis of the political opponents in the country constituted by the landowners, tribal chiefs, and religious authorities. A fragile coalition of competing power groups was the new consequence after the occupation of Iran. It was not an ironic result that the land ownership has lost ground in the political sphere during the war years after the formidable rulership of Reza Shah Pahlavi. As Ann K. Lambton stated in her *Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966*, the landowners' power tended to decrease so long as the central government extended its control over the outlying areas of the country. "Although the deputies of the *National Consultative Assembly* were mainly drawn from the landowners, and the official classes, during this period, there was a marked decline in the political and social status of the landowners".<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, despite any kind of taxation policies on the land ownership, the agrarian reform could not come about. The lack of agrarian reform, as Nikki Keddie stated, referred to the powerful base of the landowners in Iranian political life.<sup>9</sup> In addition to that, John Murphy stated that Reza Khan's single-mindedly bent on the modernization caused a deep negligence of the agriculture. The deteriorating status of the peasantry referred to another source of wider discontent.<sup>10</sup> Even though, it was not directly the goal of the Allied powers, it realized under the auspices of the European powers against which they had been in a fierce rivalry.<sup>11</sup>

After the abdication of the Shah, the lack of the loyalties due to the alienation of several opposition groups, and circles' background nurtured the instability of the politics. Related to this shaky background, Bayandor assessed the debut of the new Shah as such "tottery and insecure".<sup>12</sup>

Amongst the political parties, *Hezb-e Tudeh (The Party of the Masses)* was the most claiming organization to take part in the political sphere, and its leadership in the

---

<sup>8</sup> Ann K. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, p. 34-35.

<sup>9</sup> Nikki Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society*, Collected Essays, London, Frank Class, 1980, p. 171.

<sup>10</sup> John Murphy, *Modern World Leaders, Ali Khameini*, New York, Chelsea House, 2008, p. 58.

<sup>11</sup> Malcolm Yapp, *the Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995*, London, Pearson Publishers, 1996, p. 180.

<sup>12</sup> Dariush Bayandor, *Iran and The CIA: The Fall of Mosaddegh Revisited*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 17.



formation of the political opposition in mostly urban spaces was a promising development for the country. It convened by a group of Marxists surviving from the arrests, and custody of the 1930s. During this period, as Bayandor stated, the alienation of the communist ideology (*maram-e eshteraki*) by the Pahlavi regime ended with the arrests of several members of the party.<sup>13</sup> The political cadres of the Tudeh Party were mostly the followers of Dr. Taqi Arani, a professor at Tehran University who gained his political formation during his studies in Berlin immediately after WWI, and mysteriously died in prison in 1940.<sup>14</sup> The party became the main center of political activity to appeal to the industrial labor after 1941.

The formation of the *Council of Federated Trade Unions in 1942*<sup>15</sup> later sparked the riots, and the social and economic discontent evolved into a massive political resistance under the guidance of the Tudeh Party. This party's center was in the northern part of the country where the Soviet dominance prevailed after the occupation, and its spread amongst the oil industry's labor and the textile workers in areas like Isfahan was a source of outstanding mobilization.<sup>16</sup> It is worth mentioning that the Tudeh-affiliated political opposition was not only limited to the civilian politics, but also the military politics where the opposition of the Tudeh Military Organization by Captain Ruzbih and Colonel Siamak in the 1940s, and even 1950s shaped the political rivalry partially.<sup>17</sup>

During WWII, there were several socio-economic problems, which overwhelmingly boosted the social discontent. Along these years, the Tudeh party's membership was not limited to the economically advanced regions in the north, but also in the

---

<sup>13</sup> Bayandor, *ibid*, p.13.

<sup>14</sup> L.P. Elwell Sutton, "Political Parties In Iran, 1941–1948", *Middle East Journal*, v. 3, n. 1, January 1949, p. 46. Savory, R.M. "Modern Persia", *the Cambridge History of Islam*, v. I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 613. On the role of the former Persian Communist Party (PCP), which had been founded in 1920 please see Reza Ghods, "the Iranian Communist Movement under Reza Shah", *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 26, n. 4 (October, 1990), p. 506–513.

<sup>15</sup> Yapp, *ibid*, p. 180.

<sup>16</sup> Nikki Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006, p. 106–107.

<sup>17</sup> Stephanie Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 238–260.

southern parts of the country where the British interests inevitably caused a confrontation of political interests.

As Keddie put forth; the main dynamics for the growth of the political opposition to the occupation were simply a result of “the scarcities, inflation, and dissatisfaction” amongst the Iranian people, in both the urban and rural spaces.<sup>18</sup> Axworthy counted these reasons as “the humiliation of the invasion, the presence of the Allies, the food shortages, the economic disruption caused by the war, the weakness of the government –all of it helped to stimulate another upsurge in political activity, especially through the nationalistic feeling”.<sup>19</sup>

The development of political freedom provided the flourishing of several newspapers, which disseminated versions of nationalism along with the other currents of thought. For some cases, the political organizations permitted to set up newspapers for more than one in case of bans. Another prominent political organization was the National Will Party. First, it appeared as the Fatherland Party. Then, the name converted into the National Will Party (*Hezb-e Eradeh-ye Melli*). As an expatriate, and a former comrade of Reza Khan at the juncture of 1921 coup d'état, he was encouraged by the British authorities, and came back to Iran at the end of 1942. In the front lines of a political rivalry against the Tudeh Party, Tabatabai and his political organization under the patriarchal orientation of the Anglophile approaches continued to work up until the end of the War.<sup>20</sup>

As Houchang Chehabi stated in his work dealing with *the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) under the Shah and Khomeini*, other from the repression activities, one such policy of this party such as the burning of the Tudeh Party offices in the south showed the harsh confrontation between its followers and the Tudeh's supporters. Besides, the national, governmental action led by Dr. Mosaddiq assumed the way of governmental actions against the Tudeh Party, the third way offered to confront the

---

<sup>18</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 107.

<sup>19</sup> Michael Axworthy, *a History of Iran: Empire of the Mind*, Iran: Empire of The Mind, New York: Basic Books, 2008, p. 231.

<sup>20</sup> E. Burke Inlow, *Shahanshah: A Study of The Monarchy of Iran*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979, p. 214.

Tudeh program and policies with the new, conservative, and more challenging nationalistic ideology amongst the youth of the country.<sup>21</sup>

This rivalry continued as long as the warfare conditions were alive during the first half of the 1940s, and until the end of it, the other political groups were active in the Majlis, capable of little resonance in the society. During WWII, *Hezb-e Adalat* (*Justice Party*) was one of the most prominent political organizations in Iran. Led by a former journalist, and a former comrade of Reza Khan, Ali Dashti, this organization was remarkably different from the former Adalat (Justice) Party.<sup>2223</sup>

The struggle amongst the political parties was both influential on the strikes, riots, and the youth activities. The activities of Tudeh at the University of Tehran, were seen as a source of “outrage and insult” by the conservatives. Mahdi Bazargan, a member of the National Front (*Cebhe-ye Melli*) and the premier of the country during the time of the Islamic Revolution’s transition period, stated in his memoirs that the *Modafe’at* represented rising politics amongst the university students. His record from the six-year period when he had held the post of Dean at the Faculty of Engineering of this university in 1945 presents us the struggle in the eyes of a member of the National Front movement.

In those days, it was not easy to administer a faculty. More difficult than all educational, technical, administrative, financial, and human problems was the struggle against the Tudeh members. The Tudeh party had made the university its main bastion. Tudeh activities reached their peak in the years 1324–1330 [1945–1951] .... We were besieged from all sides –by the students, professors, clerical workers, janitors. The communist students had taken over the university clubs, held their meetings in classrooms, ordered employees and workers to strike, and claimed they had a right to interfere with the curriculum. They had no discipline and committed all sorts of outrages and insults. Administrative and educational activities had totally broken down. These were truly dark days. One day they besieged the University Council and imprisoned the professors.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> H.E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1990, p. 117–118.

<sup>22</sup> For more information about Ali Dashti, please see Michael C. Hillman, “Ali Dashti”, *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, *ibid*, p. 678.

<sup>23</sup> Bayandor, *ibid*, p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Mahdi Bazargan, *Modafe’at Dar Dadgah-e Gheir-e Saleh-e Tajdid-e Nazar-e Nezami*, N.P., *Entesherat-e Modarres*, 1971, p. 116 in Chehabi, 1990, p. 118.

The War years were also the transition period for the challenges against Iran's point of view to compete for any kind of foreign penetration. As the foreign intervention and the exploitation were at the top of the agenda of Reza Khan's rule in the beginning of the 1920s, the new period strengthened the nationalistic views. The years along WWII directly depended on the expression of nationalism, in an amalgam of both the Persian identity, and Shi'ite identity, and as a secondary theme, the expansion of Iranian economy by the expectation to change its foreign policy, and the national control of natural resources.<sup>25</sup> Through the midst of the war, one of the main conferences to gather the political leaders of the Allied powers, Britain, Soviet Union and the U.S.A. was the Tehran Conference, which took place in the late days of 1943. The Tehran Conference was a milestone for the country. Although the main agenda of the conference was not only restricted to the affairs in Iran, upon a declaration, the three Allied powers had expressed the sincere desires to maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the country. Through the end of WWII, the nationalist tendencies in Iran inclined. As the most encompassing ideology during the interregnum, nationalist tendencies constituted the main motive for the political activism. However, the Tudeh Party's specific position in the Iranian political life affected domestic politics, as well as the calculus of the international domain's influence over the country. Throughout WWII, both the labor strikes and the foundation of autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions of the country represented the fragmented features of the political life.

## **1.2. Significance of The Study**

This dissertation aimed to analyze the reformation of the political opposition in Iran, covering the period from 1926 to 1946. By looking at the period during the early Pahlavi rule, and the early phase of the nationalist interregnum, the dissertation aimed to put forth the different approaches to reflect the significance of the study. With that regard, I will try to specify my position against the approaches which were presented to understand the Iranian political transformation from 1926 to 1946, explicate my arguments, and attempt to put forward how my approach distinguished from the existing literature. In order to depict a general picture of the dissertation,

---

<sup>25</sup> Joseph M. Upton, *the History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 82.

two points and questions were emphasized. Why was it important to study the early Pahlavi period? To what extent did the early Pahlavi rule affected the reformation of the political opposition after 1941?

First, it is certain that single causation can hardly account for conducting a study that focused on the political modernization, and the study on the reformation of the political opposition. Therefore, drawing strict lines by neglecting the plethora of events and conditions between the particularities and the universalities would cause a deep confusion. By that purpose, the study did not attempt to take any of the political strategies and approaches uniquely. Instead of that, the change of the political strategies under the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi was assessed as a legacy for the early phase of the nationalist interregnum. Thus, the study emphasized the importance of the scholarly interest that helped the scrutiny of the period under Reza Shah Pahlavi, and the early phase of the nationalist interregnum. The significance of the dissertation relied on the close examination of Iran's political transformation, and the impacts of the political modernization without falling into the trap of oblivion that asserted itself in a monolithic type of literature that criticized the authoritarian modernization unilaterally. On the other hand, while looking into the authoritarian style of governance, the dissertation claimed to put forth its significance by paying attention to the democratization levels.

In addition to that, the particularities of the period when Iran was occupied reflected the continuity, and the formation of the political field once again. It assessed the early years of the Pahlavi period did not totally diverge from the previous periods of Qajar dynasty in terms of the arbitrary rule tradition; however it succeeded in the transformation of the political and social sphere to a considerable extent towards the role of the intellectuals and the social layers to mobilize the political opposition. The emergence of a middle-class and broadening working class relied on the two-dimensional character of the modernization program under Reza Shah. This was verified after the Constitutional period, during the early years of Reza Shah's rule and its immediate aftermath. By looking into the new dimensions of political opposition, and the early phase of the nationalist interregnum, the democratization patterns were emphasized. This discussion directly meant that the political modernization consisted both the circles of authoritarianism and democratization

which not necessarily excluded each other although the evolution of the Pahlavi dynasty referred to the development trajectory towards the autocracy.

With that regard, in the subsequent chapters after the introduction, the dissertation followed a strategy to put forth that Iran's trajectory of political modernization was not only confined to the authoritarian modernization program during the early Pahlavi period, but also it was related to the international domain's influences on the country's domestic politics. Second, a large body of literature paid attention to the early Pahlavi rule in both comparative historical framework, and as a singular country study that scrutinized Iran's political history. Other than the content of the dissertation, the questions which gathered around the modernization converged with the modernization theory's linear aspect which paid attention to the Western world's development trajectory that diverged from the rest. According to that theoretical approach, the trajectory of the Western world was an inevitable way for the rest. Iran, as a part of the non-Western world, experienced a trajectory of the arbitrary rule as being mentioned in Katouzian's studies. According to that approach, Iran's arbitrary rule tradition continued during the early Pahlavi period, and so on. Without a doubt, there were exceptions which constituted the protest cycles that allowed the legal framework function to a certain extent. One of the exceptions to this tradition was the nationalist interregnum (1941-1953) when Iran experienced the rise of the constitutional rule once again.

However, the authoritarian modernization program did not only have the weaknesses but also the dissertation paid attention to the strength of the program. That mainly stemmed from the fact that Iran experienced a considerable development during the early Pahlavi rule although the democratization stayed in an unsuccessful level that sourced from the suppression of the political opposition. Thus, the significance of the study stemmed from the fact that the political achievements during the early Pahlavi period were not limited to an authoritarian modernization program since the constitutional period's legacy did not evaporate although it was pushed out of the political scene in the 1930s. The crisis in the international domain affected the course of history although the structural changes continued to remain influential.

A large body of the literature dealt with the successful records of the early Pahlavi rule in regard with opposition to the Islamic regime in Iran after 1979. The scholars from the Western countries and those, who had escaped from Iran focused on the

authoritarian character of the modernization program, and the scrutiny of the trajectory to understand the Iranian Revolution. Modernization, as a theory had been utilized by these scholars that emphasized the industrialization, urbanization, development of the infrastructure, law system, healthcare, literacy rate, and the educational institutions along with the awakening of women. What constituted a theoretical fallacy was the single-way of assessment that overemphasized the strength or the weakness of early Pahlavi rule. Under the influence of the modernization theory, the field studies have primarily examined the strength of the authoritarian modernization. On the other hand, the main discussion about the weakness of the modernization program revealed the fact that democratization could not reach a satisfying level in terms of the intellectuals and other social layers although the early phase of Reza Khan's rise to power presented such a political atmosphere. To support this proposition, many scholars such as Cronin, Katouzian, and Azimi paid attention to the subordination of the Majlis to a rubber stamp as well as the suppression of the opposition and the oppression of the tribal revolts. Although the monopolization of power continued through the 1930s, the political atmosphere changed abruptly after the occupation in 1941. The proliferation of the political field proved the fact that Iran's political transformation was not only confined to the authoritarian modernization program. Certainly, the international domain's equilibrium defined the feasibility of authoritarian modernization although there were restrictions due to the alignment of the country. Thus, the profound changes that took place in the early Pahlavi period, and subsequently in the early phase of the nationalist interregnum were assessed by avoiding the approach of ethnocentric trajectory that sourced from the modernization theory.

Third, the overwhelming part of the literature on the Pahlavi rule emphasized the pre-Iranian revolutionary dynamics by neglecting the political transformation from 1941 to 1946 with shortly-cut assessments. According to a large body of literature that dealt with the post-occupation dynamics of Iran, the modernization theory's aspect paid attention to the abrupt changes that a backward country strived to catch up with. However, the course of events and the political climate started to emphasize the constitutional rule more than the previous period under Reza Shah with changes that inherited from the Constitutional period. Therefore, the dissertation avoided the particularist approach whilst it did not define the role of the intellectuals as the only

source of the social sphere. Social sphere's institutional dynamics were shared by the landowners, the merchants, the bazaar, workers in a bunch of industrial sectors, the clergy and the conservatives. In an overall assessment, the dissertation focused on the contribution of the early phase of the nationalist interregnum to the democratization patterns. By doing this, the main aim was to avoid the over-politicized features to study this period, and understand its contribution to the democratization processes. A monolithic reading of the clergy's role in the Iranian Revolution in 1979 referred to the negligence of the political developments in Iran during WWII, and the immediate post-WWII period. Consequently, the significance of the study depended on the prerequisites to study the period under Reza Shah Pahlavi, and the early phase of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule. Briefly, these were the avoidance of the over politicization to comprehend the political transformation from an autocracy to the relatively mildened Constitutional rule that nurtured the political proliferation, and the emphasis on the democratization patterns decades before the 1979 Revolution. The repercussions of the over politicization were definitely a barrier to understanding the strength and the weakness of the period's political vision. As a Turkish scholar, my primary goal was to scrutinize the Iranian political transformation in order to get beyond the demarcations of the Pahlavi dynasty's two-dimensional modernization program, over-politicization and explicate that the historical trajectory of the country had defined the political transformation, although it was not the only element towards the reformation of the political opposition.

Taking these factors outlined above, this thesis will seek to answer the questions of the thesis in the following chapters: Following the first chapter that explain the objectives, draws its conceptual framework, and makes the literature review, the second chapter of the study scrutinizes the early phase of Iran's modern history up until the foundation of Pahlavi dynasty. Thus, it deals with the clash of foreign powers in Iran, and the rise of Reza Khan, and his coronation as the new Shah of Iran as the arbitrary ruler of the country, and his modernization program.

The third chapter of the study takes the international and domestic implications of the occupation of Iran in the late summer of 1941, and examines the political life's turmoil up until the formation of the 14<sup>th</sup> Majlis in 1944. For that purpose, the



dissertation examines the arrival of American financial expert *Arthur C. Millspaugh* and other American official in terms of the political turmoil and foreign meddling. This chapter looks into the German espionage system's trials to set up some new cooperation with the tribes such as the Qashqai. It scrutinizes the alienation from the Pahlavi administration since the former Shah's reign, the political strategies of these tribes by cooperating with the surviving German agents such as Franz Mayer, and Schultze-Holthus. As Abbas Milani stated, "Nazis had also found willing allies in Leaders of the Qashqai tribes who not only helped hide two of Nazi Germany's spymasters –Berthold Schultze–Holthus and Franz Mayer– in the near midst, but declared themselves ready to help a massive uprising in favor of Germany".<sup>26</sup> Thus, by the help of the Foreign Office (FO) documents, the chapter tries to explicate this bilateral dependency of the tribes and the Nazi spymasters. The following subchapter of the third chapter takes new dynamics of the political opposition in the country by assessing the formation of a new Majlis after the elections, and by doing this, the participation of Tudeh Party in the 14th Majlis benches by eight deputies from the Soviet Union's influential zone<sup>27</sup>, and the rise of the National Front movement led by a veteran deputy, Dr. Mosaddiq.

In the fourth chapter, the study will continue for the readers up to the political crises, which had an outburst at the end of the War in the northern parts of the country. As it was stated by William L. Cleveland, one of the first crises of the Cold War period had emerged in the immediate neighbors of the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Iran: "Although the entire Middle East was affected by the Cold War struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union, the first states of the region to be drawn into the superpower rivalry were Turkey and Iran, the Soviet Union's immediate neighbors".

28

The ethnically emboldened separatism of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions in the country represents an accumulation of political struggle amongst the local rioters and the Iranian Government. Other than that, these crises were also a part of the tug-of–

---

<sup>26</sup> Abbas Milani, *The Shah*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 69.

<sup>27</sup> Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest For Democracy In Iran: A Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 128.

<sup>28</sup> William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Oxford, Westview Press, 2006, p.267.

war amongst the Allied powers, and the resistance of the Soviet Union on behalf of an oil concession in Iran, and its postponement of the evacuation. No need to say, the foreign policy of Iran during WWII, and right at the beginning of the post-War years requires a profound analysis. By depending on the prerequisites, the foreign policy of the country deals shortly along the role of Ahmad Qavam whose negotiate role between the Soviet Union and Britain in order to understand the reformation of the political opposition. Before the formation of the 15th Majlis in 1947, the role of Ahmad Qavam was remarkably witnessed from the angles of both internal and external affairs of the country.<sup>29</sup>

The study ends with a conclusion chapter to evaluate the Iranian political transformation under both the internal and external dynamics. The question of whether the internal dynamics or the external factors were determinant on the Iranian political transformation from the 1920s to the end of WWII requires a balanced analysis of international developments all along these years. As stated by Chehabi, “the social scientists, by paying attention exclusively to movements, currents of thought, institutions and ideas that seem important at the time also risk creating a reductionist and incomplete picture of the world”.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the study was prepared with the attention to consider the multi-faceted dimensions of the political life in Iran. This point is a key as a way to overcome the barriers that emerged in the historiography on the political opposition during the early Pahlavi era and its aftermath. Undoubtedly, the outburst of WWII had remained in the base of several dynamics, which had risen to affect the country from a static position to a shaky one. Theoretically, WWII had ended in September 1945 all over the world. However, by a new crisis, which was one of the early sparkles of the Cold War, Iran had continued to stay in the heart of the world affairs. In this regard, the study tries to put forth the main dynamics that affected the post-WWII period, too.

Throughout WWII, *Iran-e Demokrat*, a new political party, was introduced to the Iranian nation in response to the Democrat Party of Azerbaijan. Even though his political party won the majority of the Majlis at the elections in the summer of 1947, the political victory of the elections did not result in the consolidation of his power

---

<sup>29</sup> Yahya Armajani, *Middle East: Past and Present*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 349.

<sup>30</sup> Chehabi, 1990, p. 1.

due to the presentation of a concession treaty with the Soviet Union. As the treaty that passed to the Majlis on October 22, 1947, the Majlis defeated it almost unanimously with only two dissenting votes. The resignation of Ahmad Qavam came afterwards, and the discredited Tudeh Party's dominance had decreased gradually at the same time.

This thesis seeks to fill one of the gaps in our understanding of Iranian politics. The period of the thesis was selected as the period between 1926–1946. The coronation of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926 was selected as the starting point by a brief analysis of the preceding phases of Iranian modernization. It focuses on a period when the country had experienced the nationalist tendencies to a growing extent. Even though this has appeared to come to an end by the occupation of the country, the British archival documents had provenly exerted that the transition which was generally taken as the “Nationalist Interregnum” had reached an inevitable level towards a political transformation by the formation of the 14th Majlis. The term of 14th Majlis had started by the resulting of the elections at the end of 1943.

A key component of the affairs in 1943 was the gathering of Tehran Conference. Since the beginning of 1943, it was for the first time that the Axis powers were encountering a vital challenge from the side of the Allies. The landing of the Allies had ended by the pacification of Italy, where the Gordian's Knot was resolved by the joint actions of these countries. Soviet Union's remarkable logistics had been supported by a conduit which was named as Persian corridor. In September 1943 Iran had directed towards a more secure way to locate itself at an orbit against the Axis powers. Up until the war declaration of Iran against Nazi Germany officially, the main ambivalence of the country was causing a dilemma. In that regard, the questions which had risen since the occupation of the country were put to a new phase by the War declaration against the expansionist Nazi Germany. The war declaration was combined with the following conferences which were ordered in a chain of Allied leaders' enterprises to bring rapid and clear-cut solutions to the fate of WWII.

Amidst the world affairs, Iran's political establishment had changed unalterably through the composition of the 14th Majlis. Regarding with the problematic of the study, the question of which the time period of the dissertation was investigated referred to a quasi-ambivalent, and twenty-year period approximately. Even though

the beginning of the dissertation could be justified by the coronation of Reza Shah Pahlavi, it was meant to bring a justifiable scheme of the study by standing longer on the occupation of the country. On the contrary, the Pahlavi reign's first and uninterrupted period was alive by at least the functioning of the landowners. As a privileged class in Iranian politics, landowners were still quite effective in the Iranian politics after the abdication.

One may add that neither they were the only component to affect the Iranian politics after the occupation had taken place nor they were the least effective elements of the Iranian Majlis. The political system was described as a *dowreh-system*. This system was described according to the narrowly-identified interests of the small political groups. The dowreh-system which was an encapsulating model that was an outcome of the acute distribution of the political interests by the political parties, mostly under the charismatic leadership, had re-emerged after the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi. In that regard, the years along the 13th Majlis did not refer to a turning point. The turning point was the gathering of the 14th Majlis when the Tudeh Party had gained the seats in the Iranian Majlis by eight deputies.

Pandey assessed the dowreh-system as given below: “*The Dowreh system was detrimental to the Nation. It is composed of informal groupings of individuals from all walks of life, from political to recreational. It gave importance to personalities rather than institutions too. It created political elites, thereby greatly influencing the political life in Iran*”.<sup>31</sup> As Pandey emphasised, “*anachronisms in Iranian political context were the rule of the Shah (patrimonial rule), Dowreh-system, and Irano-Islamic system. All of them were spearheaded by political personalities although the Dowreh-system was partially torn down by two political organisations. Tudeh Party (Hezb-e Tudeh; Party of The Masses) and National Front Party (Cebhe-ye Melli)*”.<sup>32</sup> Hence, when it is considered that the influence of the landowners had started to fall down gradually, and the influence of the Tudeh Party had started to rise, the short-

---

<sup>31</sup> Sushil Raj Pandey, *Representative Institutions: Opposition and Royal Rule In Iran*, Kwako, Joshi Mudranalaya, 1981, p. 16.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3–5. For the dowreh system please also see Miller’s article which mentioned the most prominent figure in the dowreh-system as Mosaddiq. According to Miller, these were not meaningful if taken singly, yet taken together the political parties in the dowreh-system did not constitute key elements in the structure. Please see William Green Miller, “Political Organization In Iran: From Dowreh To Political Party”, *Middle East Journal*, v. 23, n. 3 (Summer, 1969), p. 346.

period ending up with the results of 1943–1944 elections can be considered as a turning point. In 1944, the oil concession enterprise by the Soviet Union was a remarkable milestone in Iranian affairs during WWII. In addition to that, the study focused on to emphasize the contention that WWII's fate was drawn by the Allies at Tehran Conference, as it was a denominator for the approval of the plans to confirm the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance in the late January 1942. Finally, the Tehran Conference, where the ultimate decisions of WWII's final phase were taken, and the landing plan on Normandy<sup>33</sup>, France by the Allies was confirmed, had also verified the territorial integrity of Iran, and drawn a scheme to locate Iran into the post-WWII order without an interruption. Even though, the struggle between the USA, Britain and the Soviet Union would bring an end to this plan at the final phase of WWII for a temporary period, in the late weeks of 1946, the transition of Iran into the post-WWII order had been completed eventually.

Here, the political parties functioned as the main elements of discussions which were exerted by the foreign powers. As Chehabi stated in his *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under The Shah and Khomeini*, the justification could be considered in terms of the oldness of the political parties.<sup>34</sup> His focus on the Liberation Movement of Iran under the pioneering of Mahdi Bazargan brought a new insightful approach to that movement which he recalled as the second oldest movement in Iranian politics in the post-1979 period. Chehabi put forth that after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the oldest political organisation surviving in the country's political landscape was the Tudeh Party. It was founded in 1941 out of its ashes. In that regard, the foundation of the Tudeh Party as a legal party to compete with its opponents had become more remarkable by the end of 1944 elections. The elections for the 14th Majlis were held from June 1943 to April 1944.<sup>35</sup> The elections were just completed due to the difficulties arising from WWII. By the new results, the political formation in Iran had started to change unalterably. According to the composition of the new Majlis, the

---

<sup>33</sup> Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *1939–1945 Kronoloji ve Belgelerle İkinci Dünya Savaşı*, çev. Alb. İbrahim Ulus, Ankara, Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1989, p. 919.

<sup>34</sup> H.E.Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under The Shah and Khomeini*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1990, p. 2–3.

<sup>35</sup> Bahman Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics In Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics*, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 1996, p. 31.

Tudeh Party's rise had brought a concrete result by the winning of eight seats. Chehabi's second justification point was the negligence against the oppositional groups. In that regard, this study paid attention not to omit the oppositional group's activities under the light of the British archival documents. Several political parties had proliferated after the opening of the political spectrum since the occupation, and the abdication of the former Shah.

The third point of Chehabi was the requirement of an emphasis on the role of religion in Iranian society, and its politics. The year 1943 was also a turning point in that sake for the rise of the political opportunities to permit the clergy members to act on behalf of their own interests in the political field. Ayatollah Hossein Qomi's returned from Najaf to Iran was a remarkable step to reconcile with the clergy of which the Shah had sought to implement an alternative root in the political life.<sup>36</sup> The demands of the clergy to fix the economic losses of the Madrasas and the end of the policy on the unveiling of women were introduced once again. Whereas it should not be omitted that the factuality of rising religious influence was not confined to these indicators. It was a reciprocal understanding between the Palace, and the clergy to boost the cultural-religious assets. Both sides were feeding different concerns indeed. Regarding that, the scope of the study was justified in accordance with the change of the political agents' capabilities in an unalterable way, and the consolidation of the political path on behalf of the broadly-based political organisation of the Tudeh Party, landowners, merchants, and the clergy. This was the third point of justification.

All along these years, especially after 1943, The Majlis had started increasingly to get an influential characteristic on the Palace, and the Cabinets as well. Considering all the changes in Iranian political life, the thesis tries to put forth the rise of political factions even though these political organisations were shaped in a dowreh-system where the political interests were not distributed broadly, and the representation was just made possible under a charismatic leadership.

As a conclusion, this thesis seeks to evaluate the rather short period from 1926 to 1946 in Iran's long history to understand the political dynamics and the formation of

---

<sup>36</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 125. Please also check the chapter in the biography of Ayatollah Borujerdi, the marja'e taqlid in the 1940s. Abbas Al-Abeeri, *Ayatullah al-Borujerdi: the Great Leader*, Tehran, Ansariyan Publishers, 1995, p. 74–75.

the political opposition during these years. Before all, the study depends on four underpinnings. These were defined as the formation of a new Majlis body under the name of the 14th Majlis in 1944, the clergy's rather satisfying liberation in social and political spheres, which was mostly exemplified by the return of Ayatollah Qomi from Iraq to Iran, the return of ex-compatriot of Reza Khan Sardar Sapah, Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai to Iran to enter the politics in a fashionable way of anti-communism, and the gradual rise of Mohammad Mosaddiq-led National Front to oppose the concession plans for the Soviet Union in the Majlis, and the footsteps of a National Front. Apart from these, Arthur C. Millspaugh, who arrived in Tehran on January 29, 1943, and assumed the position of *Treasurer General of Iran* once again, was discharged a year later. Even though he had continued his position by the re-assignment of the Government, the reaction of the Majlis was a prominent step to evoke its nationalist tendencies. In that regard, the failure of the Majlis did not mean a genuine failure in the long run. Even though American presence in Iran had converted into different styles, in the long run, the nationalist tendencies had evolved into a political organisation at the juncture of WWII's last years.

When it is considered the American perspective had been launched after the course of events that followed the Tehran Conference, it is possible to exert that the reactions against the American interference had risen since the end of 1943, and throughout the year, 1944. Millspaugh mission, Sheridan mission, and the sending of Hurley months before the Tehran Conference were significant turning points to understand the rising presence of the U.S. in Iran. Even though the Shah had sometimes sought to benefit from U.S. leadership, it is possible to assert that U.S. interest in Iran had stayed within the margins of Allied strategies as the most favorable. There was no breakup of the Allied powers' strategies. The urgency of WWII against the Axis camp had been preserving these ties.

Finally, it is quite clear that one may pay attention to the further developments in the last year of WWII, and the counter-interference of the Soviet Union in Iranian politics in order to safeguard the autonomous political entities in the northwestern sides of Iran. In that regard, the thesis targets to build an explanation of these political phases by looking at the international's domain's crisis on the formation of Iranian politics although it does not emphasize negligence of the domestic politics. Below, the dissertation will continue with a literature review.

### 1.3. Literature Review

This section presents an extended review of the literature on Iranian politics from 1926 to 1946 and the ways how the scholarly works implemented with the growth of political opposition in Iran. The main question of the dissertation was defined as what caused the reformation of the political opposition during the Reza Shah's early period, subsequently the waning of the political opposition and the fragmentation of the political field after the occupation of the country? From the onset of the 20th century, Iran constituted one of the major Middle Eastern states where the political developments made an effect to make the researchers, travellers, scholars and journalists look at the pulse of politics. The bibliography on Iranian politics between 1926 to 1946 was evaluated in three categories: Scholarly works such as the articles and monographs, archival documents in Public Record Office in Britain and the Turkish archival documents.

On the general perspective; to give the political synapses of political party activity, the evolution of the political opposition under Reza Shah and the turmoiling years during WWII after his abdication, there are five basic lines of political trends which would help the readers to understand the growth of the political opposition from 1926 to 1946. The first line depends on the view that the political party activities evolved through the political factions, and these were influential on the designation of political interests under the loose coalitions and prominent political personalities. Garthwaite described these as "volatile groupings around the leading personalities".<sup>37</sup> The dowreh-system appeared as the most valid type of political party description where the loose gatherings of the political personalities functioned through the distribution of political interests. This was a legacy of the constitutional period. The early period of the dowreh-system constituted the fact that the growth of the political opposition required a broader base in Iranian society.

The second line of the literature on the evolution of the political opposition in Iran from 1926 to 1946 referred to the modernization theory where the steps towards modernization of a backward country have helped to stimulate the rising middle-classes and the intellectuals. Yet the feature of the modernization program's

---

<sup>37</sup> Gene R. Garthwaite, *The Persians*, Madlen, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 236.



implementation constituted the main problematic and stagnated the evolution of the political opposition due to the formidable rulership of Reza Shah Pahlavi. In order to strengthen the modernization bases, the institutional efforts to concentrate state authority carried a vital role. Regarding the role of the state building efforts on the suppression of the political opposition, one may emphasise the certainty of intelligence agency's empowerment which carried a significant role. In that regard, the gradual growth of the political opposition and the suppression of the political opponents mainly depended on the police service which was called as *Shahrbani*. As the director of SAVAK in the late period of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, General Hussein Fardust mentioned the key details of the former activities of the Iranian police service during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi from 1926–1941. Fardust mentioned, Reza Shah's early political attitudes also depended on the secret service of Shahrbani.<sup>38</sup>

The third line emphasised the confrontation of the society with the state as a thesis to denote the reactionary perception of the Pahlavi modernization by the wider masses. The tradition of the arbitrary rule was turning back and the repercussions of this return emphasised the need to suppress the political opposition.

The fourth line referred to the approach of compromise to understand the ways how the Pahlavi administration and Reza Khan/Shah himself followed the way of compromise with the political opposition groups. Among these, the clergy's prominent place was undoubtedly a determinant for the political vision of Reza Shah himself. Being supported by the political establishment's reformist circles, Reza Khan's policy of compromise has helped him to earn enough time to overcome the difficulties towards his political vision.

The fifth line to understand the evolution of the political opposition depends on the ruling-party system which was assessed by the ruling party chain in Iran via *New Iran Party*, *Taraqqi Party* respectively. These parties eradicated the basis of the

---

<sup>38</sup> General Hussain Fardust, *The Rise of and The Fall of The Pahlavi Dynasty*, tr. Ali Akbar Dareini, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1999, p. 25. It is essential to note that the memoirs of Fardust were criticized by Ervand Abrahamian as his confessions on television through the 1980s should be taken with "a grain of salt". Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic*, California, Berkeley University Press, 1993, p 129.

political opposition to a considerable level and the capability of the political party's growth was prevented for a quite important period of time.

Below, these main lines of trends on the political opposition's historical growth in Iran from 1926 to 1946 will be evaluated. To sum up these, a list will be given below:

- 1.Evolving Political Party-Based Narratives: Dowreh-System*
- 2.Modernization Under Reza Shah: Instrumentalist or Enlightened?*
- 3.Confrontation of the Society with the State*
- 4.Approach of Compromise*
- 5.Ruling-Party-Based Approach Towards The Controlling of The Political Opposition*

### **1.3.1.Evolving Political Party-Based Narratives: Dowreh-System**

To begin with, the first line refers to the dowreh–system where the loose coalition of political factions has attempted to survive through the period of Reza Khan's ascendancy to power. The dowreh-system was a legacy of the Constitutional period. According to Richard W. Cottam, the dowreh–system could be described by “a group of friends, relatives or men of similar interests who met regularly for discussions of socialising”.<sup>39</sup> The outcome of the formation of dowrehs were the anjomans which Cottam mentioned as resembling “the salon constitutionalism of the 19th century”.<sup>40</sup> Iran has witnessed a period of turmoil from 1921 to 1926. As a period of transition, this made a record of years of turmoil which could be evaluated in two categories. The period from 1921 to 1923 has witnessed the rise of Reza Khan to the premiership. Then, the process of the attempts of eradication against the dowrehs started to function. Later, in 1926, Reza Khan's coronation started the new dynasty of Iran under the name of middle-age tongue Pahlavi. The subsequent period can be analysed under two categories. The period from 1926 to the early 1930s witnessed the change of Pahlavi monarchy's policies and from the early 1930s to the

---

<sup>39</sup> Richard W. Cottam, “Political Party Development in Iran”, *Iranian Studies*, v. 1, no. 3, Summer, 1968, p. 84.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84.

end of his rule, Reza Shah's rule has risen as an autocracy. In the 1930s, this episode was concluded with the clearcut solution of the absence of a ruling party and the total prohibition of political party activities against the Pahlavi rule. In all these years, along with state policies, the vision to control the historiography, and intellectual life constituted a key line to degrade the political opposition as well. Among these historians, Matin-Asgari counted the names of Taqi Raf'at, Aref Qazvini, Mohammad Ali Foroughi and Abbas Iqbal.<sup>41</sup>

Despite the fact that the political activities and opposition trials were suppressed without any mercy, the dowreh-system could re-emerge just after Reza Shah's period would come to an end. The abdication of a mighty monarch brought the proliferation of the political parties and political associations through the fragmentation of power between the Majlis, the Shah, the occupational forces of the Allies, the land ownership, the clergy, the tribal chiefs and the bureaucracy. This line pays attention to the liberation of the political field in order to understand the re-formation of the political opposition to Reza Shah. Indeed, the social discontent has turned into a political opposition with the help of many factors such as the occupation of the country which vitally resulted in the abdication of the Shah, the economic fluctuations, the factor of the intimidation of the Allies which resembled the conventional aggressive incursions of the last and early twentieth century, and wheat shortages. At the same time, it is possible to assert that as a structural factor, the dowreh-system tradition constituted one of these factors. In this context, Mustafa Suphi Erden's interpretation on the dichotomy of "strong state and weak society" vis à vis "the strong society and weak state" is useful.<sup>42</sup> In his dissertation, his focus to argue that the state tradition's strength which appeared in the comparative example of Turkey made a differentiation than the Iranian historical experience.<sup>43</sup> The relative autonomy of the clergy and the dowrehs in general reflected the political sphere's balance by the non-governmental organisations in Iran. Thus, the dowreh-system's legitimacy has helped to boost the capacity of the non-governmental organisations to

---

<sup>41</sup> Afshin Matin-Asgari, "The Pahlavi Era Iranian Modernity in Global Context", in ed. Touraj Daryaei, *the Oxford Handbook of Iranian History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 352.

<sup>42</sup> Mustafa Suphi Erden, *Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey and Iran*, Middle East Technical University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 2010, p. 130-184.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p. 130-184.

impose their demands against the coercive state tradition. Definitely, the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi which could roughly be extended to the earlier phase of coronation referred either to the subordination of the dowrehs or the banning of any kind of dissident political organisations totally. The former has taken place in the 1920s, and the latter has taken place in the 1930s. In that regard, it has been concluded that the dowreh-system has gained importance according to the monarchy's empowerment and the environment of the international affairs. That is why the term "detrimental" was used by Sushil Raj Pandey. The description by Pandey mentioned that the dowreh system was detrimental to the nation which loosened the institutions rather than the personal-based forms of politics. Sushil Raj Pandey assessed the dowreh-system as follows: "*The dowreh system was detrimental to the Nation. It is composed of informal groupings of individuals from all walks of life, from political to recreational. It gave importance to personalities rather than institutions too. It created political elites, thereby greatly influencing the political life in Iran*".<sup>44</sup>

The role of the prominent politicians in Iranian politics has been diminished during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi. The problematic continued after the abdication of Reza Shah, and the Pahlavi dynasty's continuation from the edge of a cliff when the international context has led the country to a turmoil triggered the rise of political opposition. In that regard, Ağâh Hazır's dissertation which mentioned the role of the international milieu to understand the historical experiences of nations and countries along with the institutional and ideological sides of the toolkit help the readers to analyse the political turmoil in Iran during WWII.<sup>45</sup> Did dowreh-system arise from the weak state and strong society formation Iran or were there other factors? This question also gets related to the factor of international milieu and the ideological factors which defined the nature of Iranian politics. In that regard, as a line to explain how and why did the political opposition re-form after the occupation of Iran in 1941 can partially be connected to the dowreh-system's evolution. Lastly, since the dowreh-system's re-formation had taken place after the occupation of the country, it

---

<sup>44</sup> Sushil Raj Pandey, *Representative Institutions: Opposition and Royal Rule in Iran*, Kwako, Joshi Mudranalaya, 1981, p. 16.

<sup>45</sup> Ağâh Hazır, *A Comparative Analysis of Religion-State Relations: A Case Study On Turkey and Iran*, Middle East Technical University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 2014, p. 162–165.

directly meant the ending of Reza Shah's arbitrary rule, albeit the institutional changes took a few years towards the dowreh-system's reformation and the ending of the legitimacy of Reza Shah's rule. On the arbitrary rule, as Homa Katouzian pointed out in his article, "the presence of an arbitrary ruler was a facilitator for political unity"<sup>46</sup> which would disrupt the structure of dowrehs. Reza Shah's vision would disrupt when the depersonalization efforts could not extend to the participative veins of the society.

### **1.3.2. Modernization Under Reza Shah: Instrumentalist or Enlightened?**

The second line which basically assumed the modernization program as another determining factor in political life appears as a key component to understanding the political opposition during the Pahlavi rule and the early post-Reza Shah period. The Pahlavi modernization program was a profound transformation program, however, kept the political opposition only under the rigid state control as the rise of Reza Shah brought a dictatorial rule. Thus, it is compulsory to question the aspects of modernization on the nearby history of Iran which requires an encompassing analysis in order to understand the theoretical approaches in the relevant literature.

The literature on modern Iranian history pertaining to the Pahlavi dynasty's rule pays attention to the transformative role of the autocratic modernization, the dislocations, and the discontent which have arisen out of the modernization attempts. Reza Shah's role as an agent of profound transformation spanned a wide range of cultural, economic, political, legal changes. The centralization of the state, the suppression of the centrifugal forces, in particular, the tribal chieftains, the subordination of the religious authorities on education and the economy, the foundation of the industrial infrastructure, the state monopolisation through the 1930's constituted the main tenets of the Pahlavi authoritarian modernization. As the literature in the field of modern Iranian studies already displayed, the modernization processes in Iran had already been started to build through the early phase of the twentieth century. The political transformation's capabilities had been triggered by the end of the first quarter of the century by the rise of Reza Khan to power in Iran. Thus, the role of

---

<sup>46</sup> Homa Katouzian, "Arbitrary Rule: A Comparative Theory of State, Politics and Society in Iran", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 24 (97), p. 53.

Reza Khan, and then, as a Shah, the role of Reza Shah Pahlavi proved the fact that the revival of the Iranian state and society had started through the midst of the 1920s. There were elite factions which supported the early rule of Reza Shah such as the socialists, the clerics, and the big landowners and some convergences through the claims to modernise the country caused a temporary alliance with the Pahlavi autocracy. In that regard, it is possible to assert that the literature focused on the strength and the weaknesses of this period by mostly paying attention to the oppression of the political opposition. The reduction of the Iranian Majlis to “a rubber stamp”<sup>47</sup> and the stagnation of political party and trade union activities along with the anti-collectivist law in 1931 prove the fact that the Iranian modernization couldn’t be strengthened by the parliamentary democracy. As Blake stated the Tudeh Party’s refraining from making any reference to communism in its program also depended on the anti-collectivist law in 1931.<sup>48</sup> By that law, the communist activities in Iran were banned. Subsequently, Dr. Arani was arrested who was revered as the leader of the Iranian communist movement in the 1930s and the communist movement was struck temporarily.

Despite the fact that the political modernization could not find a way to proceed with the social and economic modernization, the accomplishments of Reza Shah’s rule were definitely outstanding. This period lasted almost sixteen years and resulted in the abdication of the Shah on a bunch of amalgamated pretexts and reasons. Although the political historiography on the period under Reza Shah Pahlavi has developed in the last decades, it is still possible to assert that the political opposition’s evolution is frequently omitted or assessed shortly. For that purpose, the monographs which deal with the political opposition’s evolution occupy only a small part of the literature. An analysis on the role of the modernization attempts with the suppression of the political opposition takes the researchers to find out the changing parameters of the state policies towards the social layers. Modernization was exalted as an ideal however the description of the rejuvenating efforts depended upon the

---

<sup>47</sup> Hamideh Sedghi, *Women and Politics in Iran, Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 65. M. Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, p. 100.

<sup>48</sup> Kristen Blake, *The U.S.–Soviet Confrontation In Iran, 1945–1962, A Case In The Annals of The Cold War*, Lanham, University Press of America, 2009, p. 14.

state-sponsorship any time. A critical example about the state-sponsorship towards the modernization program was the banning of any women's associations in the 1930's, and instead of them, the foundation of a state-sponsored centre under the label of *Kanun-e Banovan (Ladies Center)*.<sup>49</sup>

As Hamideh Sedghi argued, although the modernization efforts emerged on behalf of the Iranian women during those years which helped to find space in many sectors of the economy and social life, the political dissidence related to the independence organisations and associations was not allowed. The banning of the independent women's organisations came under this atmosphere. The outcome of the state-sponsorship policy was definitely the breakdown of the loose gatherings of political factions under the prominent politicians yet the memory of these dowrehs could not be smothered. In one sense, the authoritarian modernization has helped to emancipate the women by making them stronger in social and economic life, however, as any kind of political opposition was banned, the perception of dissidence was overthrown by the state-sponsorship polity. Thus, the modernization literature's problematic emerged by the question as follows: To what extent did this program serve to the political modernization? In the first line of the literature, the dowreh-system's revival was mentioned. Regarding this revival, it is possible to put forth that the modernization program was instrumentalist although it functioned in an ostentatious way of enlightenment. However, the goal of settling a ruling-party that would support the growth of constitutionalism failed, and the international factor affected the Iranian political affairs against the proliferation of any political parties.

The legacy of the dowreh-system could survive underground because the modernization attempts towards the political opposition were not totally the reflections from an enlightened perspective. Afshin Matin-Asgari stated that these were instrumentalist in terms of policies towards religion and Reza Shah's modernization attempts towards the clerical establishment have helped them to survive up until the occupation of the country. After his abdication, the clerical establishment could find its way of political opposition. Thus, the modernization theory's implementation on the early Pahlavi period in Iran brought an answer to the

---

<sup>49</sup> Sedghi, *ibid*, p. 62.

re-formation of the political opposition as the prematureness of the opposition.<sup>50</sup> As Stephanie Cronin stated, “the conventional aspect on the early Pahlavi period in Iran depended upon the prism of state-building efforts”.<sup>51</sup> Mostly, the political history of Reza Shah’s period and the subsequent period of Mohammad Reza Shah during WWII focused on the high politics in and around Tehran. The problematic of the modernization aspect of Iran’s transformation during the early decades of the Pahlavi rule emerged due to the omittance of the scholars on the political opposition groups although the opposition was “neither passive nor blind” as stated by Cronin.<sup>52</sup>

The discourse of political opposition has nourished from the contemporary concerns during the Pahlavi rule. As Kingshuk Chatterjee stated, the modernization and progress were the concepts of which the political opposition has sought to move into the discursive space where the regime vacated.<sup>53</sup> It was mostly assessed as a premature form of modernization in both substructural and superstructural terms. The harsh critics and the embittered memory of the society against the encounters with western type of modernization caused the fluctuations of Reza Shah’s Pahlavi modernization program. After the abdication of the Shah, the reactions have re-started to take the stage in a very short period of time. Thus, the modernization program’s approach to the opposition groups could be assessed as the source of social dislocation which turned into a political discontent and opposition. Matin-Asgari stated the nature of the Pahlavi modernization towards the religious institutions as non-systematic which could not penetrate into the minds of the conservative Islamic thought. “*Consequently, the social bases and doctrinal foundations of clerical authority remained intact and unchallenged. Thus, while dormant and conciliatory under Reza Shah, clerical power quickly reemerged to*

---

<sup>50</sup> Afshin Matin-Asgari, “The Pahlavi Era Iranian Modernity In Global Context”, in ed. Touraj Daryaei, *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 346–365.

<sup>51</sup> Stephanie Cronin, “Reform From Above, Resistance From Below: The New Order and Its Opponents In Iran: 1927–1929”, ed. Touraj Atabaki, *The State and The Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2007, p. 71.

<sup>52</sup> Cronin, *ibid*, p. 71.

<sup>53</sup> Kingshuk Chatterjee, *‘Ali Shari’ati and the Shaping of Political Islam In Iran*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Chapter 2.



*intervene in politics during the second half of the century*".<sup>54</sup> Although this did not mean a total inadequacy of the Pahlavi modernization program, the efforts towards the modernization of the country were mostly found as incomplete. The changes in social, economic levels could not match with the political and cultural levels. In that regard, the modernization experience in Iran through the 1920s and 1930s accelerated the idea of political discontent to turn into the political opposition. It is ironic that the abdication of the Shah brought the chances for the clergy and the other groups of political opposition such as the tribal groups, land owners in Iran to take new roles in the political sphere. The understanding of national unity was not totally broken however the Pahlavi modernization could not bring the uniformity in the national mentality due mainly to the institutional, ideological and international domain's influences.

### **1.3.3. Confrontation of the Society with the State**

State and society's confrontation is a useful tool as a line to interpret the state tradition and state-building processes as well as the role of the former processes on the growth of the political opposition. Homa Katouzian's views are helpful to understand the growth of the political opposition through the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. In order to take up with the literature on modern Iranian political history between the period from 1926 to 1946, it is possible to assert that the articles in the volume edited by Touraj Atabaki and Eric J. Zürcher, refer to the interaction between the state and the society in Iran during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi. These articles by Homa Katouzian, Touraj Atabaki, and Matthew Eliot deal with the political transformation of the country under the rule of Reza Shah and the repercussions of the Pahlavi modernization program. In all these articles, the modernity as a concept to refer to the European style emerge as confined to the Iranian peculiarities. In that regard, the restrictions towards the development of a parliamentary system were put under scrutiny with some margins to assess the weaknesses of political modernization in Iran. The third article of the edited volume belongs to Homa

---

<sup>54</sup> Matin-Asgari, *ibid*, p. 351.

Katouzian who dealt with the confrontation of the state and society during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi.<sup>55</sup>

Regarding the evaluation of Katouzian on the arbitrary rule, it is noteworthy to state that it appeared as the form of government in the beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, the new way of divergence from the absolutism requires a deep attention. Absolutism, in European and Russian contexts, appeared as the limited monarchical tradition which could not exceed the tradition and the class-based administration levels. The monarchical assumption of the class identity has caused the political rivalry between the classes and the revolutions. However, in Iran, as a patrimonial state, the tradition brought the challenge of the lower classes against the state (Dowlat). Thus, the society (Mellat) challenged the arbitrary rule of the Qajar dynasty. The revolutionary flames in the beginning of the twentieth century were sparkled in accordance with the factuality of the opposition to the arbitrary rule. The demands towards the transition from an unjust rule to a “just” one constituted the basic tenet of the revolutionary steps and revolts. After the constitutional revolution, the new political equilibrium was sought under the interference of the foreign powers. Iran’s rising nationalist tendencies have gained impetus since the insistence of Britain towards the interventionist and concessionist policies. Thus, the Anglo-Iranian Agreement in August 1919 was not only denounced by the Bolsheviks but also the moderate classes in Iran and the Majlis. Sooner, the Jangali movement of Kuchik Khan was a reaction to the British perspectives, and this movement was surpassed by the Cossack Brigade and the British Norperforce (North Persian Force) which was located in Qazvin.<sup>56</sup> The coup which took place in February 1921 triggered the new course of events, and as Katouzian stated, the rivalry between the forces of chaos, the forces and the trend towards the dictatorship, and later the arbitrary government and the constitutionalists both conservative and democratic

---

<sup>55</sup> Homa Katouzian, “State and Society under Reza Shah”, in eds. Touraj Atabaki, Eric J. Zürcher, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p.13–43.

<sup>56</sup> Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 13–15. Please also see Homa Katouzian, “The Campaign against the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919”, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 25, no. 1 (May, 1998), p. 5–46.

continued for a period of time to end in a consolidation of the rule of Reza Shah.<sup>57</sup> These trends which were assessed by Katouzian present the clash of powers in Iranian political life. Since Mosaddiq, Taqizadeh and a few others were against the establishment of a new dynasty, it appears by such an argument that Reza Khan's powerful administration in the absence of an exiled Qajar monarch resulted in the dominance of trustability to Reza Khan's political vision. The tradition which defined the Iranian state structure from the late 19th century to the early 20th century focused on the weakness of the state. The cycle of the centralization and decentralization made the genuine character of the state structure in Iran which basically formed by the external and internal factors. Although the state and society's confrontation thesis omits the definitive role of the international factors, it is probable to state that it constituted a prominent space within the bilateral, and multilateral concepts of relationship.

Atabaki's emphasised "the antagonistic style of relationship between the state and the society". As a scholar focusing on the ethnic dimensions of the political opposition in Iran in the twentieth century, and the territorial integrity's limits, he gave the related examples by "the changing capitals in Iran" for several centuries.<sup>58</sup> The weak tradition of state in Iran, as mentioned by Mustafa Suphi Erden, was inherited by Qajars, and this tradition continued to affect the Pahlavi dynasty's efforts to challenge by centralization.<sup>59</sup> As an agent of profound modernization, Reza Shah's and his imperial bureaucracy restrictions depended upon the Qajar legacy. On this legacy's analysis, by looking at the women's movements as a crucial segment of the Persian society, Vanessa Martin dealt with the late Qajar period's women's movements which represented the Iranian culture peculiarly. She argued that "the growing consciousness of the women's movements" in the late Qajar period emerged as "a better-organized, better-off, better-educated women's movement" yet the roots

---

<sup>57</sup> Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 17.

<sup>58</sup> Touraj Atabaki, "From Multilingual Empire to Contested Modern State", in ed. Homa Katouzian, Hossan Shahidi, *Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics and Conflicts*, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 42.

<sup>59</sup> Erden, *ibid*, p. 140.

of the women's movements were to be assessed by looking back to the early decades of the 19th century as well.<sup>60</sup>

As it was assessed by Martin, despite the fact that these were “choreographed” movements, and were “scanty” in comparison with the experience of movements during the Constitutional Revolution, these were one of the earliest examples in the Middle East. On the contrary, Martin did not omit the fact that the role of social groups was not represented by the archival documents and historical resources. To assess the development of Iranian women's movement, she emphasised that the attention of the social segments' roles can easily be “overlooked”.<sup>61</sup> However, in total, the crowd's role emerged as a challenge to the designation of the framework of rights defined by the state. Since the study is not concerned with the comparison of state structures and institutions in a comparative scale, the uniqueness of the social protest movements can just be put under the scrutiny of a general perspective to assess the extent of the social groups through their differentiation from the state structure. In that regard, the interpretation on the combinations either ephemeral or long-lasting is crucial to understand the resistance ways of the society against the state-building processes under Reza Shah, and the relation of these with the growth of the political opposition from 1926 to 1946.

The state's confrontation with society was a pivotal phenomenon which the historians of social protest mentioned to assess the roots of premature facades of the political opposition. As Ervand Abrahamian mentioned the role of the crowds in Iranian history in the first half of the twentieth century, he argued that the crowds have found spaces of autonomy from the state which basically depended upon the state structure's capacity.<sup>62</sup> Institutional capacity of the state structure encountered with the resistance of society's different classes in Iran. In that regard, the modernization literature's problematic can be correlated to the state and society's confrontation. As a contributor to the modernization program, state's encounter with

---

<sup>60</sup> Vanessa Martin, “Women and Popular Protest: Women's Demonstrations in Nineteenth Century Iran”, eds. Stephanie Cronin, *Subalterns and Social Protest: History From Below In The Middle East and North Africa*, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 50–66.

<sup>61</sup> Martin, *ibid*, p. 61.

<sup>62</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, “The Crowd in Iranian Politics: 1905–1953”, *Past and Present*, no. 41 (Dec. 1968), p. 184–210.

society as a factor to develop the trajectory of the political opposition requires a broader analysis.

Stephanie Cronin's article in the edition under the title of *Subalterns and Social Protest: History from below in the Middle East and North Africa* presents the confrontation of the rural poor, tribal groups and the land tenure system's resistance ways to understand the modes of political opposition under Reza Shah.<sup>63</sup> Cronin mentions that, from 1921 to 1941, the profound modernization process in Iran which was unprecedented in its scope and its pace, did not give an end to the resistance ways of the pastoral nomads, rural poor and villages. The way of complaints against the state-building processes and the reflections of these processes to the rural have appeared by the petitions where the nomads, sharecroppers and the villagers have explained their resentment against the Pahlavi bureaucracy. Other than that, "the committees have been set up in order to make collective bids to deal with the land owners on their interests. As Cronin argued, the change of the strategy towards the resistance movements have taken place from the 1920s to the 1930s. The atmosphere of the 1920s which was depicted by the rapid centralization and the westernisation, the 1930s have passed under the weight of the new state. Sooner, the ways to benefit from the bribery, banditry, smuggling and the incorporation to the elites of the Pahlavi bureaucracy have risen".<sup>64</sup> Cronin's assessment demonstrates the limits of trustability for the society in rural areas to the newly-rising state structure, and this approach mentions the migrant workers who had sought to find a way to make their livings in a more facilitated way than their previous conditions. In that regard, Cronin, as a scholar who expertise on the resistance ways of the social groups against the Pahlavi state, and the impacts of the state-building in Iran under Reza Shah mentioned the role of the Bakhtiari tribal confederations' political activism through the 1920s and 1930s. As an argument, she claimed that the possibility of the resistance depended upon the extensive involvement of the Bakhtiaris to the oil

---

<sup>63</sup> Stephanie Cronin, "Resisting The New State: The Rural Poor, Land and Modernity in Iran, 1921–1941", in eds. Stephanie Cronin, *Subalterns and Social Protest: History From Below In The Middle East and North Africa*, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 141–170.

<sup>64</sup> Cronin, *ibid*, p. 141–142.

industry.<sup>65</sup> Hence, Cronin mentioned the economic policies which evolved through a statist policy to introduce some new indirect taxes on the basic goods of consumption such as sugar, tea, caused a deep discontent and “widespread pauperization”.<sup>66</sup> Cronin’s emphasis on the economic policies’ impact on the discontent of the nomadic settlement and the rural poor reflect the vastness of the resentment channels against the rule of Reza Shah. The main tenets of the regime were the security and the political compliance as Cronin stated. Thus, from the 1920s and 1930s, the problematic of Iranian modernization was to bring solutions to the confrontation between the state and the society.

Another aspect of the land tenure system was the taxation policy which Cronin mentioned the alienation of the peasantry. Since Iran’s social formation was mostly composed of the peasants in the first half of the twentieth century, it was natural that the resentment of the peasantry relied upon the land tax system’s substitution with the agricultural product’s taxation. Cronin’s assessment on Reza Shah as “pro-landlord” was probably a breakdown in the perception of the peasantry when the land taxation system was changed from 1924 to 1934. To sum up the example of state and society’s confrontation, Cronin stated the conscription policy, land taxation policy, disarmament which resulted in the tribal revolts in general, monopolization policies on tobacco and opium provoked intense hostility of the peasants which was a key factor to analyse the rising grievances.<sup>67</sup> In all these, the equilibrium changed after the obliged fall of Reza Shah that brought the encounter of a new state out of the formation of Pahlavi modernization. The Pahlavi state continued during the turmoil of WWII however the factor of foreign occupation and the wartime problems triggered the reformation of the political opposition along with the structural elements of Iranian political culture, international milieu and the ideological domains. After depicting the state structure’s definitive role, another line will deal with the approach of compromise to explain the political opposition’s features in Iran pertaining to the time period of the study below.

---

<sup>65</sup> Cronin, *ibid*, p. 142.

<sup>66</sup> Cronin, *ibid*, p. 144.

<sup>67</sup> Cronin, *ibid*, p. 146.

### 1.3.4. Approach of Compromise

On this approach, the application of the compromise as a strategy to control or pacify the political opposition during the rule of Reza Shah, and subsequently during the early rule of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, will be scrutinized. Atabaki and Katouzian mentioned the compromising efforts of Reza Khan towards the Republicanist campaign during the early half of the 1920s. By depending on the revelations of Mosaddeq and Modarres, two prominent political personalities during the turmoil of Qajar dynasty's fall down, Katouzian's evaluation on the concept of compromise (*sazesh*) help us to understand the nature of the political opposition against the rising rule of Reza Khan. Since the Republican campaign had ended in the midst of 1920s, Reza Khan's political vision was supported by Sayyed Hassan Modarres whose popularity helped him to oust the political opposition. Katouzian referred to the two meanings of the term of compromise which directly meant that "collaborationism at best or sell-out at worst".<sup>68</sup> The two ways of compromise found their representatives as both in Modarres whereas Mosaddiq, whilst being offered the post of foreign ministry at the cabinet of Mostawfi-ol-Mamalek, acted towards the superiority of the constitution. Mosaddiq's statement to refer to the ultimate rulership of the constitution relied on the suspicions of Reza Khan's political leadership. In that regard, the concept of compromise could help us little to understand the pacifying of the political opposition during the transition period from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi dynasty. Although Modarres acted towards a passive line to follow the rapprochement to the Shah, sooner his emphasis on the constitution provided him a more popular base in Iranian politics. The compromise acted as a litmus test during the political life in the 1920s which could keep the margins of a constitutionally organized political opposition. However, the assassination attempt on Modarres soon after his speech at the Iranian Majlis in 1928 proved the fact that the political opposition would also mean assuming the risks of life even when it was based on a constitutional aspect. Katouzian stated that the *modus operandi* between the Shah and Mostawfi as prime minister brought the new equilibrium of politics where the loyalty started to rise against of the political opposition through the end of 1927.<sup>69</sup>

---

<sup>68</sup> Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 28.

<sup>69</sup> Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 29.

As also stated by Fakhreddin Azimi, by the unmistakable identification of Pahlavi state with the person of the Shah, “he initially needed and endeavored to enlist the cooperation of as many reputable politicians as possible”.<sup>70</sup> The article of Touraj Atabaki<sup>71</sup> which dealt with the nucleus of the political opposition against the rising rule of Reza Khan helps us to understand the role of clerics to send the political vision of Republicanism away and the reactions by the clerics towards the abolition of Caliphate in Turkey on March 3, 1924. Atabaki argued that the main line of reaction against the Republican campaign was the abolition of the caliphate in Iran’s neighbor. Contrary to Atabaki’s assertion, by looking at the Tehran’s elite factionalism, Vanessa Martin stated that the clergy had played little role in the quashing of the Republicanist campaign in Iran.<sup>72</sup> The abolition of the caliphate, as mostly attributed to diverge new Turkey from it’s connections to Islam in the designation of a new political system was portrayed as a source of reaction and concern in Iran. The political calculations of the clerics have proven the way that the possibility of Republicanism would disrupt the clerical establishment. In that regard, the calculations can be exemplified by the campaign under the leadership of Modarres alleging that Reza Khan was a Babi, a heresy-attributed religious identity in Iran. Banani stated that the campaign emphasized that “he conspired to destroy Islam”. Soon after, Reza Khan’s participation to march in front of the band to commemorate the *Tasu’a*, the traditional commemoration of Imam Hussain’s martyrdom in Karbala, and then the holy shrines in Karbala and Najaf proved the piety of him which eventually gave an end to the Republican campaign. These were the cities where the heart of Shi’ite world beat, and the political configurations of Reza Khan proved the fact that he was a master of politics in terms of making new

---

<sup>70</sup> Fakhreddin Azimi, *The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 69.

<sup>71</sup> Touraj Atabaki, “The Caliphate, The Clerics, and Republicanism in Turkey and Iran: Some Comparative Remarks”, in eds. Touraj Atabaki, Eric J. Zürcher, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p.44–64.

<sup>72</sup> Vanessa Martin, “Modarres, Republicanism and The Rise to Power of Reza Khan”, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 21, no. 2, 1994, pp. 202. Please also see Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 45. “Contrary to these arguments, there are scholars who, by highlighting the fractions amongst the clerics, deny any role played by them in restoring the monarchy in Iran”.



deals with the opposition. Banani stated that Reza Khan was “obliged to abandon the republican project in order to gain this victory but the last serious opposition was overcome”.<sup>73</sup>

Therefore, a *modus vivendi* between the rising rule of Reza Khan and the clergy was established which could survive fluctuating until the foundation of Pahlavi dynasty. It’s implementations of the secularization reforms through the second half of the 1920s has been facilitated by this *modus vivendi*. Regarding these, Atabaki stated that the divergence of the secularization and the modernization attempts stemmed more vividly from the active role of the clergy in Iranian political establishment. The reduction of Islam to “a sort of rationalistic monotheism” was not the type of goal in Iran which could not be achieved without the support of the clergy. The feasibility of the reforms was set out in accordance with the role of the clergy in the political system. Atabaki’s article is a good example to highlight the absence of principles of the rising political system in comparison with Turkey’s regime. Indeed, there were not any concrete principles in Iran during the years of Reza Khan’s ascendancy to power. The compromise efforts depended upon the goals for the consolidation of the state authority along with the authority of Reza Khan. For that sake, the compromise with the clergy has appeared as a feasible goal in as much as it would function towards the political projections of Reza Khan himself.<sup>74</sup>

However, Atabaki counted a few principles to illustrate the features of power’s designation such as “the secularism, nationalism and étatisme”.<sup>75</sup> All of these trends in the political life of Iran could find their roots in the Constitutional period, and the designation of the party politics and the political opposition would be interpreted in accordance with these principles.<sup>76</sup> However, Republicanism as an idea for both the notion of democracy and the shape of government would be analysed as these date back to the nineteenth century. This century brought the new challenges of the French Revolution and the European enlightenment to Iran. Atabaki’s brief survey

---

<sup>73</sup> Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran: 1921–1941*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 42.

<sup>74</sup> Atabaki, 2004, p. 45.

<sup>75</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 45.

<sup>76</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 44–46.

deals with the historical trajectory of Republicanism in Iran. What this historical trajectory meant for the evolution of the political opposition was that both the idea of republicanism and the power of Reza Khan were understood as premature however the rising effectiveness of Reza Khan against the Qajar dynasty's authority caused a new dilemma in Iranian political life to plunge into the prospects of a new monarchical rule. Reza Shah's campaign did stop in an interaction with the clergy's opposition. The ambivalence of the political type of system caused some premature reactions such as the manifestation of the Independent Democrat Party of Iran which defended the idea to circulate the illegitimacy of the Qajar rule from then on. As Atabaki stated, even a political party was formed in an earlier context: *Hezb-e Comhuriye Iran* (The Republican Party of Iran).<sup>77</sup>

The foundation of this political party dates back to four years earlier, and the Qajar administration's reaction was towards the political suppression of a republican movement. All these discussions continued during the term of the fifth Majlis. This Majlis was the political body to accelerate the establishment of a chain of ruling state parties. It was active between 1924 and 1926. The prominent groups in this Majlis body were counted as the *Tajaddod* under the ex-cleric Sayyed Mohammad Tadayyon, the *Unifiyeh* (Socialists) faction under Qajar prince Suleiman Mirza Iskandari and the independents whose tasks were to constitute the Republican political system instead of the monarchy. However, against these supporting groups, the fifth Majlis witnessed the political opposition of the clerics numbering to a dozen under the leadership of Sayyed Hassan Modarres. The anti-republican opposition under the leadership of Sayyed Hassan Modarres constituted the base of the political discontent towards Reza Khan's powerful leadership. The campaign was pushed to an end by the energetic challenges of the political opposition camp. In that regard, as Atabaki stated, the targets to postpone the political discussions on the form of government and to pacify the independent groups in the Majlis body against the political vision of Reza Khan reached to a considerable satisfaction.<sup>78</sup> The fifth Majlis body has proven to assert that the anti-clerical adjustments in newly rising

---

<sup>77</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p.55.

<sup>78</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 56.

Turkey caused some “ample repercussions” in Iran since the abolition of the caliphate and the adjustments on the religious institutions coincided with the vivid debates in the Iranian Majlis.<sup>79</sup> The nature of these repercussions, as revealed by Atabaki’s article, prove the fact that the clerics were capable of enlarging the political opposition in condition with the protests of the bazaars. As the author stated, it was the consequence of the coalition between the ulema and the bazaar as the ending of the republican campaign by the statement of Reza Khan after meeting with the high-ranking members of the ulema.<sup>80</sup>

Atabaki’s article mentioned the fact that the conjunction of secularism and republicanism pushed the clerics towards the arena of political opposition since the realm of Islam was allegedly put under the rising threat of emboldened secularism with the empowerment of republicanism. The course of events in Republican Turkey triggered the reactions in Iran under Reza Khan. Thus, on the evolution of the political opposition in Iran during the 1920s, the article’s insightful comments have displayed the fact that the nucleus of the political opposition against the rising power of Reza Khan was still the clerics. Although the clerical fragmentation caused a dispersal in terms of the designation of the political opposition, the clerical authorities carried a vital line to oppose the political vision of Reza Khan and his bureaucrats. After the abdication of a mighty monarch, the political opposition has just carried a vital aspect of the clergy and the experience of the Pahlavi state to cause dispersal in clerical power by the fragmentation. This caused the new course of political events. However, the continuity of the “clerical quietism”<sup>81</sup> during the 1940s under the specific conditions of WWII represented the extraordinary status quo which could be shaken within a few decades. Indeed, “the clerical quietism” was a phenomenon of the 1940s and 1950s however, on the conservative leadership of Grand Ayatollah Hajj Sheikh Abd-al-Karim Ha’eri during the 1930s when Iran

---

<sup>79</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 57–58.

<sup>80</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 59.

<sup>81</sup> Majid Sharifi, *Imagining Iran: The Tragedy of Subaltern Nationalism*, Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2013, p. 153–154.

experienced anticlericalism and secularism, Dabashi noted the attitude of Ha'eri "as staying away from politics as much as possible".<sup>82</sup>

In addition to Dabashi, Zibakalam also stated that Hae'ri was "essentially a quietist cleric who tried to stay out of political life". His devotion to the theological studies would probably and bitterly cause a resentment on behalf of his prominent disciple, Ruhollah Khomeini. As a scholar who studied the political life of Khomeini, Zibakalam mentioned the challenging role of this cleric yet he also stated the inspiration of Khomeini with his *marja'e taqlid* through the Islamic mysticism and poetry of Hafez. As Khomeini was the distinguished disciple and one of the most energetic followers of Ha'eri in Arak and Faiziyah madrasah in Qom<sup>83</sup>, their different approaches to policies of the "assertive secularism"<sup>84</sup> point out that clerical quietism was definitely a key term to understand the policies of compromise.<sup>85</sup> Undoubtedly, the quietism as a way of acting in the political sphere referred to the model of staying out of politics. By selecting such a way, the clergy's hierarchical position continued to confirm the ineffective status to define the Islamicness of the laws in the 1930s. This discussion appeared an inchoate discussion in the 1930s. However, as Majid Sharifi stated, in 1940, when Khomeini wrote the *Kashf-al Asrar*, the discussion's origins were soon reminded of the constitutional period and Khomeini started to take a role on the stage to reflect the variants of "different spaces of contestation".<sup>86</sup> In regard to the attitude of Ha'eri, the compromise was not admitted by Khomeini however it was interpreted as a fractional point of view. The literature on Iranian religious establishment and the clerical structure during the era of Pahlavi dynasty mentioned the comparison between Shirazi and Ha'eri. It is also imperative to note that the comparison between Ha'eri and his disciple Khomeini is

---

<sup>82</sup> Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent*, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2006, p. xv.

<sup>83</sup> Daniel Harman, *Spiritual Leaders and Thinkers: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini*, Philadelphia, Chelsea Publishers, 2005, p. 21.

<sup>84</sup> Martin, 1994, p. 202.

<sup>85</sup> Sadegh Zibakalam, "To Rule or not to rule? An Alternative Look At The Political Life of Khomeini, Between 1960 and 1980", in ed. Arshin Adib Moghaddam, *A Critical Introduction to Khomeini*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 261.

<sup>86</sup> Sharifi, *ibid*, p. 156.

another vital example in terms of political quietism. Ha'eri was a disciple of Grand Ayatollah Shirazi. Nonetheless, Ha'eri's position as the *marja'e taqlid* which started in the beginning of 1920's referred to the differentiation from Ayatollah Shirazi as the latter played a prominent historical role in the outburst of the Tobacco Revolt. The category's change came after a few decades when the political quietism linkage was broken down by Khomeini.

Since Khomeini was perceived as the spiritual leader and one of the thinkers behind the revolutionary movements in the late 1970s, it is quite important to note that his bonds with Ayatollah Borujerdi who replaced Ayatollah Abdolhassan Isfahani, the successor of Hae'ri were crucial. Zibakalam stated that just as "Hae'ri and Isfahani shunned politics, Khomeini would also".<sup>87</sup> These were crucial in terms of the nature of political quietism and the capabilities of political compromise with the Pahlavi monarchy and the clergy. In that regard, the political compromise has taken place in accordance with the changing conditions of the Pahlavi dynasty around the determining roles of the internal and external factors.<sup>88</sup> This was mostly visible which Zibakalam mentioned as "presumably in dismay"<sup>89</sup> Khomeini, as a loyal disciple under the hierarchy of Borujerdi, followed the same root without assuming the entire political point of view.

Although the political conditions were still inchoate, the form of clergy's status would assume more roles than being religious guides such as being the orator, judge, and teacher. However the changing political conditions would make sense in the minds of the clergy as Khomeini interpreted the different periods under the perceived tyranny of Reza Shah, and the period of Mohammad Reza Shah until the 1950s without quarrel. Thus, the compromise as a concept to understand the changing modes of political opposition would help us unless the socio-political context is analysed encompassingly.

Finally, from the early 1920s to the midst of the 1940s, the compromise efforts could be understood in order to look at the two sides of the coin. After the abdication of Reza Shah, as the new owner of the Iranian throne, the young and inexperienced

---

<sup>87</sup> Zibakalam, *ibid*, p. 263.

<sup>88</sup> Zibakalam, *ibid*, p. 263.

<sup>89</sup> Zibakalam, *ibid*, p. 263.

Muhammad Reza Shah could just look for a way of compromise with the clergy to balance the social unrest and the Tudeh Party's enlarging influence in the political life of Iran. In that regard, Majid Sharifi stated "the promotion of political quietism in the 1940s as a precaution against the political mobilisation in the Iranian right and left, and the *hozeh* in Qom, in general, took a conservative and non-political position".<sup>90</sup> The last line of the models to explain the growth of political opposition will deal with the ruling party approach below.

### **1.3.5.Ruling-Party Approach**

Lastly, the ruling-party approach is an explanation to understand how the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi has become an authoritarian modernist rule through the end of the 1920s, and what kind of factors did cause an alienation in the minds of Pahlavi administration against the ruling party. In that regard, in particular, Matthew Eliot's article "New Iran and The Dissolution of Party Politics Under Reza Shah"<sup>91</sup> brings an insightful comment on the relatively new affairs of political parties in comparison with the European countries. As Amin Banani stated in his *Modernization of Iran: 1921–1941*, the political parties emerged as the solution to the problems of Iran in the beginning of 1920s. The legacy of the moderates and democrats of the constitutional period was on the verge of transformation. Eliot assessed the political party affairs during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi by the short-lived political party of *Iran-e Now (New Iran)*.<sup>92</sup> Then the author focused on the offshoot of this political party, *Taraqqi (Progress)* which subsequently occupied the space of *Iran-e Now* from 1927 to 1932, the former of which only lasted for three months.

As a political party which was admitted on the fascist lines by European observers then, the author paid attention to the monarchical power of Reza Shah beyond the predecessor Qajars in substance and style. Centralization of the state along with the strengthening of the army from the ashes of the Cossack Brigade represents an overall picture. The representation capabilities emerge as quite restricted within a

---

<sup>90</sup> Sharifi, *ibid*, p. 154.

<sup>91</sup> Matthew Eliot, "New Iran and The Dissolution of Party Politics Under Reza Shah", in eds. Touraj Atabaki, Eric J. Zürcher, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2004, p.65-97.

<sup>92</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 75.

two-stage system in the provinces. The personal following as a feature of the political factions indicated the main problematic of the Iranian political establishment. Thus, the author stated that the *Iran-e Now*, and subsequently the Taraqqi “struck a fatal blow at the remaining elements of independent-mindedness amongst Persian politicians and within parliament”.<sup>93</sup> The motto of the former, Wilber wrote, was such a claim to gather the goals of loyalty, devotion, and progress. The term of “loyalty” which was stated by Donald N. Wilber referred to the motto of *Iran-e Now*: “Loyalty to the Shah and devotion to the progress”.<sup>94</sup> The founding members of *Iran-e Now* were *Teymourtash*, *Firuz*, *Davar*, *General Murtaza Yazdanpanah* and the private secretary of Reza Shah, *Faraj Allah Bahrami*.<sup>95</sup> Eliot’s emphasis on the inspiration of Reza Shah’s rule with the help of mediocrities represented the subversion from the liberal spirit of the constitution. The closest examples for the spoiling of the liberal spirit were given as fascist Italy, the Soviet Union, and Republican Turkey. Out of the constitutional legacy, the absolutist and arbitrary rule’s rise brought the *Iran-e Now* Party as a formulation for “bringing discipline to the chaotic parliament in Iran”.<sup>96</sup> The abolition of the capitulations which the British legation members paid attention as their “essential interests” remained intact started a change in the perception of Britain and this happened during the one-party designations of the political system in Iran.<sup>97</sup> In all these, the efforts were mostly organised by the Imperial Court Minister *Teymourtash*. His influences on the Shah were merely decisive towards the policy making through the second half of the 1920s. *Iran-e Now*, as Eliot stated, was the political party to dominate the political sphere in Iran and to catch the support of Majlis deputies along with the political strategy of Pahlavi administration. Its predecessor was Tajaddod which was organised by prominent members of the political establishment,

---

<sup>93</sup> Eliot, *ibid*, p. 67.

<sup>94</sup> Donald N. Wilber, *Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and The Reconstruction of Iran*, Hicksville, Exposition Press, 1975, p. 122.

<sup>95</sup> Wilber, *ibid*, p. 122.

<sup>96</sup> Eliot, *ibid*, p. 68.

<sup>97</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 71.

Teymourtash, Tadayyon, and Davar.<sup>98</sup> In one sense, the constitutional legacy's inoperative orientation has emerged by the breakdown of the mediocrities of which the foundation process of *Iran-e Now* proved the absolutist line of administration. As the author displayed from the late years of the Qajar rule to the early phase of Pahlavi dynasty, the Majlis bodies were dominated by *Tajaddod*, *Iran-e Now* and subsequently *Taraqqi*. In comparison with its predecessor and the successor parties, *Iran-e Now* was the shortest in life yet substantially the longest one with its repercussions. Therefore, we may assert that the early perception during the rule of Reza Shah was the concentration of the Majlis support under the banner of a political party. This has been realised during the fifth Majlis body to the eighth Majlis from 1924–1926 to 1930–1932. Undoubtedly, the support of the big landowners constituted the basic section of political stabilisation and the expression of the political opposition did just depend on the religious lines instead of the political formation of the parties. At the time, as Eliot stated, “it was safer to express political dissent in a religious form” rather than a directly-conducted expression under a political party banner.<sup>99</sup>

Eliot's article is a remarkable example in the literature to deal with the strategic thinking of the political opponents of the Shah's regime and for questioning to what extent did these political opponents fell in the controversy and confusion? His main sources to investigate the restrictions on the ubiquitous political opposition were the British archival documents. By depending on the negative attitudes of the Shah against the clergy, and any kind of political opponents, the political opposition was almost choked during the second half of the 1920s and the 1930s. The prospect to provide a safer basis for the secularisation reforms constituted the main problematic in all these Majlis bodies.

Thus the implicit opposition of Tadayyon's *Tajaddod* party fell in the marginality when the secularisation attempts by the enactment of civil and penal codes have risen. “Rigged elections and the packed parliament” were found as the only solution to silence the political opposition and political chaos.<sup>100</sup> The author's concluding

---

<sup>98</sup> Eliot, *ibid*, p. 82.

<sup>99</sup> Eliot, *ibid*, p. 83.

<sup>100</sup> Eliot, *ibid*, p. 84.



remark brings us an answer to the question of why the dominant political party formation did not institutionalise during the interwar period in Iran. In Turkey, RPP's basis reflected the cohesion between the people and the state administration, the pride and the skills which inherited from the Ottoman imperial legacy made it more powerful, and the century-old processes of political modernization. As Eliot argued, these were all influential on the emergence of difficulties of a ruling-party system construction in Iran.<sup>101</sup> If so, what were the benefits of these single-party attempts to the Pahlavi state administration? This key question can be answered by looking at the professional politicians whose expertise in politics have helped Reza Shah to strengthen the state administration, centralize the army and the police service, and pay attention to the oil rentiers of the state to start some new development projects which was mostly hailed by the Trans-Iranian Railway.<sup>102</sup> In all these, the scope of the development projects was not adequately influential on the Iranian society's perception of democracy however it was probably to assert that the initial co-operation between Reza Shah and the imperial bureaucracy and the professional politicians provided a considerable length of time for Reza Shah to power his rule in the country. The opposition's neutralisation came under these conditions.

Before the concluding remarks on the literature review, it is certain that the Pahlavi modernization constituted one of the claimant examples of authoritarian modernization in the near east during the interwar period. The Shah was the personality who stood in the midst of the Pahlavi state system and his role as an agent of authoritarian modernization has risen after his military commandship gradually. The identification of the state with the personality of the Shah strengthened the aspect of patrimonialism. As Reza Ghods stated in his *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, the political fact that "the entire country depended directly on Reza"<sup>103</sup> meant the distrust of the Shah to delegate authority in an easy way. This was a part of the ruling-party experiences which eventually brought the elimination

---

<sup>101</sup> Eliot, *ibid*, p. 84.

<sup>102</sup> For the discussion of rentier state, please also see Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Islamic Revolution", *Theory and Society*, v. 11, No. 3 (May, 1982), p. 265–283.

<sup>103</sup> Ghods, 1989, p. 100.

of many figures in political life. Ghods put forth the suspicion of “republican sentiments” related with the ruling party circles that caused the triggering effect of political elimination in 1932.<sup>104</sup>

Why did the political opposition re-shape and wane after his ascendance to Iranian throne stood as a speculative question beyond the main trends of lines which can help the readers to analyse the growth of public discontent? Amongst these, the ruling-party model relied upon the main problem of a satisfying support from the ordinary townspeople. As Azimi stated, among the Majlis terms from the sixth period up to the twelfth period, only the sixth Majlis term constituted a credibility by being away from “the whole manipulation” unlike the proceeding terms.<sup>105</sup> In that regard, the capability of the sixth Majlis term to constitute a broader legitimate base referred to the subsequent manipulations which also slowed down the chances to suppress the political opposition. Azimi stated “the little appeal” of the elections for the electorates during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi and as a certain point, the alienation of the inhabitants from imposed politics in Tehran.<sup>106</sup> The manipulations of the elections continued through the 1930s and referred to the change of political system along with the credibility of the democratic patterns. In that regard, the ruling-party system did not function on behalf of the political opposition, and after the finalisation of these political parties, the rest of the Pahlavi autocracy witnessed the oppression of any kind of opponents. The international atmosphere of the interwar period and the rapprochement of Iran with rising Germany along the political vision of national socialism facilitated the political opposition’s suppression. Another point was the army’s role which was scrutinised by Stephanie Cronin. In her monograph on the Iranian Army and the creation of the Pahlavi state, Cronin paid attention to the “curbing” of the ulama, the suppression of the press, the centralization of the army, the weakening of the Majlis before the 6th term and the political parties as well.<sup>107</sup> As Cronin also mentioned the concurrent trajectory’s

---

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, p. 100.

<sup>105</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 76.

<sup>106</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 76.

<sup>107</sup> Stephanie Cronin, *The Army and The Creation of The Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910–1926*, London, I.B. Tauris, 1997, p.144.

resemblance in Turkey and Iran, it is helpful to glance at a comparative study in this field. In the field of comparative studies, the interwar period of Turkey, as “the closest neighbour” of Iran towards the authoritarian modernization path, constituted a primary example. In his comparative study, Hazır grouped the comparison lines of trends for these countries as the modernization theory’s interpretations, sectarian-structuralist and essentialist-religious-cultural approaches, non-essentialist religious-cultural approaches, institutional-economic approaches, and the current literature’s developing approaches.<sup>108</sup> Under the light of Hazır’s findings, the role of religion and the role of the army were both determinant factors on the development of Iran’s political administration. Upon these, the emergence Reza Khan as a dominant factor, his policies towards the centralization of the state institutions affected the country’s modernization process. His “modus operandi was to respond with an iron fist to any move that he perceived as a challenge to the authority of the state”.<sup>109</sup> The foundation of government parties to monopolise the Majlis constituted the narrowing basis of politics from the midst 1920s to the end of 1930s. In addition to these, the centralization of the army was concluded with the conscription policy<sup>110</sup> which made the Pahlavi state to act on against the vision of the clergy. The reactions continued through the end of the 1920s.

After those, one may find some aspects in the literature on Iranian political development that the way of fostering secularism, the discouraging approach towards the political participation and the military’s control via the centralization to strengthen the state authority and the intelligence services against the political opposition referred to the monopolization of the political sphere through the end of the 1920s and 1930s. The foundation years of the Pahlavi monarchy brought some rapid results towards the elimination of political opponents either implicitly or explicitly. Azimi mentioned one of the most frequent threatening remark of Reza Shah to spread fear around was “elimination”. In that regard, the lack of broadly based political parties in Iran supported the chance of a powerful monarch to lead an

---

<sup>108</sup> Agâh Hazır, *ibid*, 2014.

<sup>109</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 73.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid*, p. 71.

authoritarian way of modernization through a regime resembling an arbitrary rule. In addition to that, the modernization theory's European senses have become so much eroded along the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi which resulted in the vanishing of a ruling-party project that failingly prescribed the cohesion between the state and the society at least in an emulation respect to the revolutionary approach of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Turkey. Other than the ruling-parties *Iran-e Now* and *Taraqqi*, which were assessed by Fardust as "the bastions of Reza Shah's government"<sup>111</sup> that shortly befell due to the erosion of trust on Teymourtash, there was even a party modelled after Turkey's Republican People's Party (RPP) by *Ahmad Matindaftari*.<sup>112</sup> Aside from these, the limited scope of the religious establishment functioned towards the spoiling elements against the enlightened version of modernization which has been unconsciously substituted with its instrumentalist counterpart. Reza Shah's fierce attitudes such as the crushing of the clergy at the shrine of Qom in 1927 or 1935 referred to the merciless character of Pahlavi state administration against the religious establishment. The tradition of taking bast in sanctuaries has gone underground through the authoritarian modernization campaign of Reza Shah Pahlavi.<sup>113</sup> However, all of the political tendencies to oppose or criticise the Shah's regime have found bases to blossom after the occupation of the country which shortly ended in the finalisation of a sixteen-year reign. In addition to the manipulation of Majlis elections, the role of the army, the conscription policy and the disruptive efforts to tame the religious establishment, the triumvirate's role is of decisive importance in order to understand the rise of fear through the 1930s. As being supported by the constitutionalist circles, the political field's domination by *Teymourtash*, *Davar* and *Firuz* who respectively shared the posts of Imperial Minister, Minister of Justice and Minister of Finance for a period of transition through the second half of the 1920s, the loss of political grounds of these prominent personalities through their exile which started by the "elimination" of *Firuz* in 1929 followed a pattern of political suppression of the opponents who were suspected of

---

<sup>111</sup> Fardust, *ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>112</sup> Fakhreddin Azimi, "On Shaky Ground: Concerning The Absence or Weakness of Political Parties in Iran", *Iranian Studies*, v. 30, n. 1-2, Winter/Spring 1997, p. 58.

<sup>113</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 78.

either restoring the constitutional monarchy or abolishing the Pahlavi dynasty. Thus, the fear's dissemination has become a widespread element which affected the public perception through the 1930s. At first, *Teymourtash* has been tried due to the charges of embezzlement and bribery and died in prison nine months later in 1932.<sup>114</sup> Then *Davar* committed suicide in 1937, and *Firuz* was killed through the second half of the 1930s. Deterrence of “would-be plotters”<sup>115</sup> against the Pahlavi regime has become a landmark of the 1930s in Iranian political life. The shaky background of the Shah's authority as a monarch has been scrutinised of which Azimi stated through the key question of why even “state-sponsored political parties fail in Iran”?<sup>116</sup> Although this question had direct connections to the political party formation from the 1950s to the 1970s, the key line to understand the state-sponsored political parties emerged in the 1920s and the early 1930s. In that regard, Azimi mentioned the role of Reza Khan/Shah to overcome “the political fatigue”<sup>117</sup> and “exhaustion” yet the trustability of the strong leadership has yielded some results which were not within the limits of ambivalence that the political establishment sought for the salvation of the country. What was remarking yet a restricted interpretation on the personalistic effort of Reza Shah was the statement by Azimi that he mentioned the Shah had no interest in developing political institutions in the Western style which could help to sustain a “depersonalised state”.<sup>118</sup> The fears or the concerns of Reza Shah towards the development of a controlled ruling-party system did not function although a few years' experience brought a legitimacy for the subsequent efforts. The observations and the emulations have helped to bring some progress so long as the power base was kept under the control of Reza Shah himself. Thus, the political culture and the prevailing tradition of understanding the political parties as “the vehicles for opposition” triggered the course of events which

---

<sup>114</sup> Fardust, *ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>115</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 81.

<sup>116</sup> Azimi, 1997, p. 53.

<sup>117</sup> Azimi, 1997, p. 57.

<sup>118</sup> Azimi, 1997, p. 58.

resulted in the monopolisation of the political sphere under Reza Shah's full authority and military autocracy.<sup>119</sup>

To sum up, the policies such as the conscription, monopolisation, suppression and resettlement or sedentarization of the tribal groups along with the taxation policy accompanied the ideological, institutional and international domain's influences. Although the singular type of description on all these domains remained within a limitation, it is possible to assert three determinants affected the process of opposition's reformation. First, the idea of Iranian nationalism in the ideological domain was divided into categories after the Shah's abdication. As Wilber noted, an example of this idea was the nationalist discourse of the Shah to emphasise "the Persian character and national values"<sup>120</sup> Second, as a part of the international domain to affect the political opposition's reformation, WWII caused some drastic changes in Iran. The occupation of the country, the dethronement of the Shah, and the Allied countries' configurations influenced the political sphere. Lastly, the institutional capacity of the state along with the domestic organisations of the institutions led by clergy and land ownership affected the fate of the political turmoil. The relevant literature on the political opposition groups from 1926 to 1946 dealt paid attention to the weakness of the political activities which emerged as a result of the oppressive policies under Reza Shah Pahlavi. The early Pahlavi regime precipitated the political modernization's infrastructure to a satisfying level although the modernization program was cut short owing to the extraordinary crisis that struck Iran's independence. After 1941, the country's political life developed by the contribution and resonance of domestic and foreign factors. Therefore, the literature review paid attention to the continuities from 1926 to 1946 with the new trends in the political life of Iran. After this review, below the conceptual framework will deal with the arbitrary rule tradition, and the influences of the aridisolatic society on Iran's political development.

---

<sup>119</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 58.

<sup>120</sup> Wilber, *ibid*, p. 136.

### 1.3.6. Conceptual Framework

In this section, I address some explanative approaches on the reformation of the political opposition in Iran between 1926 and 1946. I aim to crystallise the patterns which defined the reformation of the political opposition in the country. The dissertation used the conceptual tools of *arbitrary rule* and *the aridisolatic society* in order to explicate the reemergence of the political opposition in Iran from the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi to the period between 1941–1946. These approaches serve to the idea that the transformation of the country proved the fact that Iran has gained an arbitrary rule tradition throughout her history. This tradition was defined by Katouzian as “the lack of rule of law for the power and the authority”.<sup>121</sup>

It evolved in the historical ages of Iran as a distinct form of government and rule in which an established “legal and inviolable framework” was not present. It was explicated by Katouzian along the chain of “chaos, arbitrary rule, and chaos again”.<sup>122</sup> In that respect, the author stated the lack of continuity in Iranian society that stemmed from the absence of institutions and the European–sense social classes, including the non-existent aristocratic peer class. By the same token, Katouzian asserted to support his theses with the concept of pickaxe society (*jame’eh-ye kolangi*) for Iran. This underlined the weak roots of the political modernization as well. According to this concept, the buildings, either new or old, collapsed due to the lack of institutional continuity. The lack of an established legal framework which guaranteed the civil rights, the political organisation, and the autonomy of the “social classes” remained as a missing episode in the modern times of Iran.<sup>123</sup>

Briefly, the arbitrary rule tradition influenced the evolution of the political opposition by both the equilibrium in the domestic politics and the international domain. The

---

<sup>121</sup> Homa Katouzian, *Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society*, New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 10.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>123</sup> Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 22. Katouzian’s views on the economic history of Iran present some insightful comments. Please also see Homa Katouzian, “The Significance of Economic History, and the Fundamental Features of the Economic History of Iran”, ed. Homa Katouzian, Hossan Shahidi, *Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics and Conflicts*, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 279–280.

arbitrary rule tradition emphasised the idea that the political opposition would cause fragmentation in the society and the state administration. By the same token, the arbitrary rule did not content for any kind of concessions to the political groups of opposition and did not accommodate the policies that would put obstacles in front of the repression. The concept of the repression, the political concessions, and their repercussions were asserted as the contributors of the spatial diffusion of the political opposition. With the presence of an arbitrary ruler, the ultimate way of preventing the political opposition was the repression. Nonetheless, the repression would cause numerous effects on dissent. The political dissent would grow by the transformation of the society, and the economy, the consciousness and the experiences of the social groups, and the new conditions than can affect the political landscape of the country. In that regard, the arbitrary rule tradition served to cover the reasons that pacified the political opposition groups. The absence of arbitrary rule would cause chaos and lessened autocracy, and the reflections of the international domain's crisis over the country would cause political proliferation. Below, these theses will be explicated.

### **1.3.7.Arbitrary Rule and the Aridisolatic Society**

Relevant to the arbitrary rule tradition, Katouzian put forth a bunch of theses. These can be summed up by his findings below. First he put forth that historically, Iran has been an arbitrary state and society. Second, the arbitrary rule was based on state monopoly and the property of rights and ownership were not guaranteed. There was no inviolable, an established, legal framework. There was no predictability for the future of the privileged classes, and the ordinary people. Third, mainly, the economy was based on the agriculture, and the dynasty owned huge amounts of agricultural land. Fourth, the arbitrary rule put no guarantee for the merchant capital that prevented the accumulation. Fifth, social classes, as an historical factuality, had not existed in Iran in European terms. The official position, the occupation, wealth and incomes of such layers as the landowners, state functionaries, religious dignitaries, royal persons, merchants, traders, artisans, town labourers, peasants and so on constituted the social groups rather than the social classes. All of these were not functional vis à vis the State. The relationship was empirical. As a sixth point, Katouzian stated that Persian type despotism was to be called as *the aridisolatic society*. There was no aristocracy, and the feudality in Iran in European terms.



Instead of that, the land ownership and some agents of exploitation existed. There was no feudal system in Iran. No aristocracy and no rural gentry. This referred to the aridisolatic society “where the aridity served to the autonomous village units production, and the dispersal of collective surplus” *in absentia* of the arbitrary rule.<sup>124</sup> Briefly, the aridisolatic society meant the concentration of the state power by the arbitrary rule tradition however the relentless circuit turned round without any interruption up to the end of the Pahlavi regime. Independent ownership was not allowed. In that regard, they did not have any political rights independent of the state. Although Iran had always been a trading nation, the words *bazaar*, and *bazargan* were as ancient as the financial institutions such as banking and credit-serving in the history of the country. The accumulation of capital was weak, and it mainly depended upon the lack of security which affected the postponement of present consumption and saving. Seven point dealt with the autonomy of the social groups. These could not develop in the flow of history, and this brought the extensive dependence of the social groups. The lack of secure representation of the social groups affected the social mobility which jeopardized the political activities. As a contributing point, Rouhollah Ramazani’s assessment on the political development was emphasized in order to strengthen the view that the phases of revolution under which the country had passed were determining the role of the political opposition. In that regard, four models of political development were counted. These were “the nationalist revolution, authoritarian revolution, participation revolution and lastly, the welfare revolution”.<sup>125</sup>

As an eight point, there was no law in Iran bound to the framework which could function to organize the state to get out of arbitrary rule (*estebdad*). In Iran, the rivalry between the *qanun* and *estebdad* appeared in the minds of the intellectuals who were inspired by the European history’s evolution. “They did not have a theory but clearly saw the stark fact, *differentia specifica* between the two societies. Thus, through the constitutional period, the elements of consciousness towards the rule of law instead of the arbitrary rule started to incline. In that respect, the 19th century

---

<sup>124</sup> Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 73–74.

<sup>125</sup> Rouhollah Ramazani, “Iran’s White Revolution: A Study In Political Development”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 5, no. 2, April, 1974, pp. 124–139.

was an episode to trigger the course of discussions between the arbitrary rule and the rule of law. As Abbas Milani stated, “the hapless *reayat*, and the all-powerful *Geble-ye Alam* (the Pivot of the Universe) of traditional Iran were suddenly to become the citizen and constitutional monarch of a modern polity”.<sup>126</sup> The legacy of the Constitutional period did not evaporate totally during the autocracy of Reza Shah. The political entities flourished by the compatible conditions of the War years which dragged Iran under the occupation of the Allied powers. As a ninth point, since the law was absent, so was the politics. Up to the early twentieth century, the word had two meanings which were interrelated to each other. The first meaning of the word was the successful governance of the realm, and the second was the punishment of the state functionaries, and notables. This happened as executions in most of the cases. The tradition continued under Reza Shah in the prominent examples such as the execution of abducted Court Minister Teymurtash, Firuz, the suspicious suicide of Ali Akbar Davar or the leader of the group of 53-communist activists, Dr. Taqi Arani and so forth. Last of all, despite the arbitrary state was followed by the chaos and the relatively liberated atmosphere of the social groups, sooner, when the conditions of chaos, and disorder inclined, the people sought to find a new way of order. The nostalgia for the former arbitrary rule unless the conditions of a new arbitrary rule emerged, started to affect the affirmative perception of the arbitrary rule.<sup>127</sup>

After Katouzian’s views, I explicate the other conceptual approaches to put forth that the arbitrary rule tradition remained in the epicenter of the political affairs. To continue with the political proliferation in Iran during the turmoil of WWII, the justifiability of the theses can be examined. The arbitrary rule tradition continued through the modern times of Iran after the Constitutional period. The turmoil of WWI did result in political prospect of order and sustainability along with the dominance of Persian nationalism. Meanwhile, when Reza Khan’s rule turned out to an arbitrary style, the people started to criticize his rule as a dictatorship, and his

---

<sup>126</sup> Abbas Milani, *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women who Made Modern Iran, 1941–1979*, v. 1, New York, Syracuse University, Press, 2008, p.7.

<sup>127</sup> More than ten theses were counted in the study of the author. These theses were summarized by ten points respectively. Please see Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 38–55.

governance was put under scrutiny once again. Regarding the arbitrary rule, the attention of Mosaddiq on the constitution's superiority, and the statement in his address to the Majlis in 1925 that such an arbitrary rule would exist nowhere, even in Zanzibar was a quite remarkable warning on the history of Iran.<sup>128</sup> The separation of powers sooner vanished. The credibility of the elections took a pace down through deterioration. The legal framework did not consistently evolve under the rule of the new Shah who founded a new dynasty named after the middle-age tongue of Persian, the Pahlavi. The state monopolization of the huge amounts of agricultural lands did not change the agricultural life in a substantial way. Even though there had been land registration, the lack of agrarian reform was a part of the campaign against the Shah. That was certainly a part of the arbitrary rule tradition. The lack of agrarian reform prevailed until the occupation of the country. Keddie mentioned "the lack of agrarian reform under Reza Shah made thorough modernization and economic improvement impossible. The heavy tax burden on the peasants, the import duties on the basic goods of consumption, the little incentive of the landlords to make investments in private enterprise since the agricultural assets were more profitable, the settlement of the nomads, the hard-hitting conditions of the economic depression since 1929 have all affected the peasantry's conditions in the country".<sup>129</sup> Thus, it was ironic that the country suffered from the economic deprivations, and the peasantry was more affected by the hard economic conditions than the landlords. The prices of the agricultural goods sold by the peasants fell more than the prices of the goods they manufactured. As Keddie mentioned, "the five-year agricultural plan was ambitious enough when it was launched in 1940 however the war conditions and the occupation of the country caused an interruption which was interpreted by the author as doubtful that it could otherwise have reached its aims".<sup>130</sup> As Keddie analyzed the agrarian situation in the country, she mentioned that according to the examination of Reza Shah's program, its costs meant that by the time of the outbreak of World War II,

---

<sup>128</sup> Touraj Atabaki, *Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 53.

<sup>129</sup> Nikki Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society*, Collected Essays, London, Frank Class, 1980, p. 171.

<sup>130</sup> Keddie, *ibid*, p. 171.

the economic position of the average Iranian was considerably and chronically worse than it had been in 1925".<sup>131</sup> The lack of guarantee for the merchant capital derived from the state's non-sufficient toward the accumulation of the capital. Huge loans, high debts, and the concessions had constituted the economic agenda of the country from the previous decade up to the early twentieth-century.

Thus, the state monopolisation guaranteed the infrastructural facilities such as the Trans-Iranian Railway by applying to a numerous foreign campaigns of Western countries, financing the project by the taxes on sugar and tea.<sup>132</sup> The lack of the agrarian reform was a determinant on the social discontent in the rural side that affected the reformation of the political opposition. The merchant capital was not adequate although the political parties in the aftermath of 1941 were supported by the some of the merchant capital. The mobilisation that these parties sought stayed within the weak margins. Katouzian's assessment on the European-style social class consciousness defended that it remained absent in Iran during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Although quite a satisfying mobilisation took place after the arbitrary rule, it can be concluded that the retreat of the leftist mobilisation in the post-War era testifies the observation of Katouzian. Iran's social classes were the social groups which could not benefit from the political strategies to a large extent and the autonomy from the state. The empirical character of these social groups in their relations with the State remained the same in their relations with each other. However, the attempts of the *Tudeh Party*, *Firqa-ye Dimokrat-e Azerbaijan* and the center-right parties such as the *Justice Party*, the *National Will Party*, the *Iran-e Democrat Party* proved the fact that there were some collaborations against the foreign concessions, foreign advisory on the domestic affairs of the country, and so forth. Briefly, the social class consciousness did evolve during the transition period of WWII with a legacy of inconsistency. On the Persian despotism which Katouzian conceptualised as the ardisolatic society, the dependence of the village units continued during the early Pahlavi period. WWII did not provide a concrete transformation which testified the vaporization of the ardisolatic society. Thus, the

---

<sup>131</sup> Keddie, *ibid*, p. 172.

<sup>132</sup> Abrahamian, *a History of Modern Iran*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 77.

traditional patterns prevailed during these years with the exception of Constitutionally-inspired political parties.

One of the important factors that defined the reformation of the political opposition was the short-term change of punishment as a constituent on the concept of politics. The rise of the politics mentioned the political parties, political associations both formal and informal, the negotiation ways with the Court, and the Government, the political concessions that encouraged the political gatherings such as the strikes, protests, and mass rallies. In that regard, the reformation of the political opposition considered the political experience even though the political parties were reminiscent of the Constitutional period's vocabulary and structure. As Sushil Pandey mentioned, this structure was the *dowreh* system. This system meant the development of the loose gatherings of political personalities to make discussions on the Iranian affairs. The legacy of the Constitutional period remained strong on the political affairs during the interlude of WWII.<sup>133</sup> Pandey emphasised that this was an anachronism of the Iranian political life. The patrimonial system that meant the fundamental assumption of the Shah as the sole patriarch on the society was broken during the War years. The components of the political decision-making were not only confined to the Court, but also the Majlis, the foreign legations, and the social groups which sought their interests were actively involved in this process. Another point that caused the anachronism was the Irano-Islamic system which Pandey assessed as the failure of distinction-drawing between the religion and the secular values.<sup>134</sup>

### **1.3.8. The Conceptualization of the Early Phase of The Nationalist Interregnum**

When compared with the political atmosphere after the abdication of Reza Shah, it is possible to assert the rejoiced rejection of the masses continued. However, this was not a revolt against the state, and more than that, this was not a revolution. Taking the ties of the arbitrary ruler with the imperialist Britain into consideration, Fred

---

<sup>133</sup> Sushil-Pandey, *ibid*, p. 16.

<sup>134</sup> Sushil-Pandey, *ibid*, p. 16.

Halliday mentioned that both Shahs were perceived as “illegitimate rulers”.<sup>135</sup> Needless to say, this perception was not static; however, it prevailed in a motion of persistence as long as “the fear, frustration, insecurity, mistrust, disbelief, resentment and the alienation” continued.<sup>136</sup> As Reza Ghods stated, “the Iranian public discontent at the time of the Shah’s abdication has been widely recognised”.<sup>137</sup>

Before the Shah was dethroned, the cabinet was changed in a few days. The general amnesty released several political prisoners in 1941. After Reza Shah’s formidable rulership, the conditions changed towards pluralism, and the political life changed in a remarkable way that the proliferation of the political parties and the associations proved an affirmative way of “democratisation”.

There was press censorship with some interruptions, and the vigorous press, however, nurtured the freedom of speech. During the War’s turmoil in Iran, the core political identity was the nationalistic identity of which the people defined themselves as a part of the Iranian nation with some distinctions that the main motive was *anti-concessionist and the opposition to the foreign occupation*. As Jerrold D. Green stated during the turmoil of WWII, and in the immediate years of the post-WWII period, “along with the absence of a genuine central government, the foreign military occupation enhanced feelings of both Persian and Islamic nationalism among the country’s dissatisfied politicised sectors”.<sup>138</sup> The superiority of the Majlis was almost new to the Iranian people although the constitutional period’s experience was not fallen into oblivion. However, this new experience was branded with the contribution of the international domain, and WWII’s extraordinary conditions.

Aside from the Tudeh Party which was affiliated with the Soviet Union, Tamadonfar wrote that “most of the political parties were tied to the foreign powers”.<sup>139</sup> These

---

<sup>135</sup> Fred Halliday, “İran Devrimi: Eşitsiz Gelişme ve Dinci Popülizm”, com. Serpil Üşür, *İran Devrimi: Din, Anti-Emperyalizm ve Sol*, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1992, p. 27–28.

<sup>136</sup> Katouzian, *ibid*, p. 121.

<sup>137</sup> Reza Ghods, “Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 27, n. 1, January, 1991, p. 35.

<sup>138</sup> Jerrold D. Green, “Terrorism and Politics in Iran”, in ed. Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism in Context*, Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007, p. 559-560.

<sup>139</sup> Mehran Tamadonfar, *Islamic Law and Governance in Contemporary Iran: Transcending Islam for Social, Economic and Political Order*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2015, p. 128.

parties were the Fatherland Party (Homeland), and the National Will (Determination) Party defending the British interests, the Struggle (Peykar) Party defending the French interests, the Justice (Adalat) Party and the Freedom (Azadi) Party working for the American interests, and Iranian Nationalists' Party (Hezb-e Melliyyun-e Iran) working for the interests of Germany.<sup>140</sup> Except for the Tudeh Party, all of these political parties vanished in the post-WWII period. Thus, the role of the foreign intervention on the political parties stayed limited to the ideological nucleus. Excluding the Tudeh Party and some other affiliate parties, the bulk of the political parties depended on the interests of the notables, and the bazaar merchants. The clergy played a backstage role in the first years of the transition period. Their politicisation remained at a low extent owing to the approach of political quietism. Yet, throughout WWII, some political groups were formed such as *the Fedaayen-e Islam* (the Devotees of Islam). Testifying the reformation of the political opposition, violence was imbued as a contributory tool to the political struggle. The assassination of *Ahmad Kasravi*, *Abbas Masudi* in 1946, and 1948, and the Prime Ministers *Hazhir* and *Razmara* between 1948–1951 were the hallmarks of the partial deviation from the non-violent struggle lines of politics to the violence. The women's movement began to defend the suffrage as the women's branch of the Tudeh Party as it turned out to be a Women's Party (*Hezb-e Zanan*), and defended the view that the patriarchal establishment promoted the misogyny and the introduction of the women's suffrage by the help of the foreign powers. This was a remarkable change after the independent women's organisations were banned in the midst of the 1930s by the Women's Awakening Project. The tribal revolts continued up until 1944. On the nature of the social movements, as Charles Tilly stated, the historical examination of the social development patterns help us to understand the social movements, and make the possibility of the general laws to assess the evolution of the social change.<sup>141</sup> By the same token, Stephen Poulson mentioned the protest of cycles in the Iranian case. These cycle of protests contained the period from 1941 to 1953, and the first phase of the nationalist interregnum involved the lessening of

---

<sup>140</sup> Tamadonfar, *ibid*, p. 128.

<sup>141</sup> Charles Tilly, *Social Movements: 1978–2004*, London, Paradigm Publishers, 2004.

government repression on the political opposition.<sup>142</sup> Kevin Rasler, in his study on the role of the government concessions to the political opposition, put forth that the repercussions of these political concessions were positive in the short-term, but negative in the long-run. U-shaped and inverted U-shaped effects were possible.<sup>143</sup> Rasler emphasised the positive effect because it had a cost. On the other hand, the negative effect would cause micro-mobilization. Although the author underlined the causes of the Iranian Revolution, these were mostly tied to the following cycle of protests in Iran. However, beyond the limits of repression, the press censorship, bans, and concessionary politics in the formulation of the Soviet pressure, the negotiations with the political opposition such as the involvement of the Tudeh Party deputies in the cabinet of Ahmad Qavam, and the paid-day holiday decision for the workers testified the potential gains of the political opposition.<sup>144</sup> This was a testifier to the theory mentioned by Rasler as “the bandwagon effect meant the past levels of protest would help the protest activities, and the spatial diffusion to increase”.<sup>145</sup> Not only depending on the role of Allied powers, but also the social and economic problems during the War years, there were several social protests, demonstrations, and the strikes organised by the leadership of the Tudeh Party. Poulson stated that the Tudeh Party consolidated the mindfulness of a political projection that affected many social movements, and the political parties towards the class-based egalitarianism.<sup>146</sup> During WWII, the social movement frames were opposed by the landowners to prevent the peasantry to refrain from demanding their rights in the absence of a land reform, and the clergy against the concentration of demands towards the suffrage for women as a consolidation on their emancipation.

The evolution of the social movements under the guarantee of a constitutional rule strengthened the pavement of the country towards the discussions on the social and economic issues. The political parties were the pioneering platforms for these

---

<sup>142</sup> Stephen C. Poulson, *Social Movements in Twentieth Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks*, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2006, p. 4-5.

<sup>143</sup> Karen Rasler, “Concessions, Repression and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution”, *American Sociological Review*, 1996, v. 61 (February), p. 133.

<sup>144</sup> Rasler, *ibid*, p. 134.

<sup>145</sup> Rasler, *ibid*, p. 135.

<sup>146</sup> Poulson, *ibid*, p. 2-4.



movements. The workers in the oil industry were active to demand their rights for the better living conditions, and the health care as well as the legal framework that can help to boost the class-consciousness. On the elements to represent the sustainability which would help to take the isolated social protest frame out of the fluctuation, Tilly offered a three-legged model of the campaigns, repertoires, and the combination of “worthiness, unity, numbers, and the commitment”.<sup>147</sup> All these were developed under the guidance of the Tudeh Party although the conditions favoured the nationalist elements which mostly stood in the right wing of the political sphere. On the side of the Tudeh Party, there were the political parties which shared the leftist discourse partially such as the Comrades Party; on the other side, the political parties such as the National Will Party, Iran-e Demokrat Party, and the Patriots Party represented the *status quo*. There were also other parties classified under the nationalist, religious and fascist lines. The nationalist line was represented by the parties such as the Iran Party, the Iran People’s Party, and the Iranian National Front which was founded in the late 1940s as an extension of these political party groupings. The fascist line was represented by the parties such as *the Susyalist-e Milli-yi Kargaren-i Iran* (The Iranian Nationalist Socialist Party) (abbreviated as SUMKA), *the Kabud Party*, *the Arya Party*.<sup>148</sup> The Tudeh Party’s campaigns, demonstrations, and the statements, labels, occupations, rallies, marches all helped to build a social movement frame which was inconceivable during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi.

After all, the findings on the reformation of the political opposition from 1926 to 1946 can be put forward as given below:

First, The arbitrary rule thesis and the aridisolatic society thesis mentioned the social groups lacked autonomy from the state, and the arbitrary rule as the historical pattern in Iran prevailed in the modern times. The breaking up of the social groups from their ties to the state did shape through the reformation of the political opposition in Iran. Second, the social movement frames were supported by the opportunities of the international domain’s crisis in Iran through WWII and its aftermath. Third, the

---

<sup>147</sup> Charles Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires*, London, the University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 54.

<sup>148</sup> Tayarani et al., *ibid*, p. 11–12.

political opposition's reformation took place under the auspices of the Constitutional period's legacy. Fascist, nationalist, Marxist-Leninist, religious and conservative political parties were formed by not only benefiting from the Constitutional period's legacy, but also from the legacy of the period under the former Shah. Fourth, the arbitrary rule tradition's critique which concentrated on the autocracy, the absence of a genuine government authority and the socio-economic problems nurtured the reformation of the political opposition and its agenda in Iran. Last, the social networks gained a more satisfying experience through the early phase of the nationalist interregnum. Class-consciousness towards the amelioration of the workers' conditions and the collective action experience broadened through the gains of the government's conciliatory policies.

## CHAPTER 2

### POLITICAL HISTORY OF IRAN UNDER REZA SHAH PAHLAVI

#### 2.1.Introduction

This chapter is an effort to deal with the political history of Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi, and the basis of the reformation of the political opposition in Iran. Below, the clash of foreign powers in Iran during the 19th century, the rising nationalist tendencies against the imperialist rivalry's disruptive effects on the country, and the political life during the early Pahlavi period will be analysed.

#### 2.2. Clash of Foreign Powers In Iran and The Rise of Reza Shah

A long history of state organisation dating back to 2800 BC approximately, Persia of ancient, pre-modern and modern times (as it is going to be named as Iran in 1935)<sup>149</sup> can also be assessed as a country which experienced the colonialist pressures deeply from all directions for centuries. In that regard, the history of Iran during the modern times can be summed up by the clashes between the external powers and the domestic powers of resistance along with the state and society relations. Under the Qajar dynasty, from the early 19th century to the first quarter of the 20th century, Persia's main domination point had been dormant at the heart of the Anglo-Russian rivalry.<sup>150</sup> Alerted by the security issues of the Indian subcontinent in the 19th century, Britain's prospect was the containment of incursive imperial force of Russian Tsardom. Beginning by the treaties such as the Treaty of Golestan (1813), the Treaty of Finkenstein (1815) and the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), Persia under

---

<sup>149</sup> Grant Farr, *Modern Iran: a Volume in the Comparative Series*, Boston: McGraw Hill, 1999, p. 25. Gene R. Garthwaite, *The Persians*, Madlen, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 229.

<sup>150</sup> Warfield, Robin E. *Christians In Persia: Assyrians, Armenians, Roman Catholics and Protestants*, New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 87. It can be stated that the "Great Game"s story is briefly accounted in this work. Great Game is the name given to the rivalry between the two strong empires in the 19th century, Britain and Tsardom of Russia.

the Qajar rule experienced the political and economic concessionist policies in the 19th century.<sup>151</sup> In this respect, Iran as a country to hold a strategic region, for the high, challenging claims of transition to the Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent stayed to become under the heavy influences of the Russian Tsardom and Britain.<sup>152</sup> At the beginning of the 20th century, Iran's fate changed once again by the discovery of oil in the district of Masjid-e Suleiman, the southwestern historical site of the country. Then, the position of the Empire which had been already attentively followed and standing within the prospect of the world agenda gained prominence. In a few years, since the early decades of the 19th century recorded amongst the concessions as the biggest, D'Arcy concession to promote the British interests in the region had been representing the other facet of the Qajar dynasty's administration. Through the first decade of the new century, a new company appeared to represent the interests of Britain by the name of *Anglo-Persian Oil Company* (APOC).<sup>153</sup> Along the two decades from the 1890s, the arbitrary rule in politics, the problems in the economy, and reactions that accompanied these problems in the societal sphere such as the ones against the concessions, the corruption and the extravagance of the Imperial Palace and the Qajar Kings such as *Nasser al-Din Shah* (r. 1848–1896) and his son *Mozaffar ed-Din Shah* (r. 1896–1907)<sup>154</sup> had been due to cause a few yet massive social protests. Among these massive protests, the Tobacco Revolt<sup>155</sup> during

---

<sup>151</sup>Although there are several sources implementing the Qajar period of Iran, it is probable to say that any of the sources refer to the main historical fact to denote the heavy foreign involvement of the imperialist forces in the 19th century Iran. Please see some brief notes in the following sources accordingly. A. Bausani, *The Persians: from the Earliest Days to the Twentieth Century*, tr. J.B. Donne, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971, p. 164–170. Nikki R. Keddie, Mehrdad Amanat, "Iran under the Late Qajars: 1848-1922", in *Cambridge History of Iran*, v. 7, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 174–212. Sadri, Houman A. "Iran-History", *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia*, v. 5, Michigan: Gale Publishers, 2002, p. 105–106.

<sup>152</sup>Lorentz, John H. "Qajar Dynasty", *Historical Dictionary of Iran*, Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007, p. 255.

<sup>153</sup> For the story of Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC), please visit the fresh and illustrated work of David Fraser. David Fraser, *Persia and Turkey in Revolt*, London, William Blackwood and His Sons, 1910, p. 226–238.

<sup>154</sup>Sadri, *ibid*, p. 106.

<sup>155</sup>The Tobacco Revolt represents the most significant event in Iran's history in the 19th century referring to the discontent of the wider masses against the rising influence of Britain. The focus of the Tobacco Revolt laid on the tobacco concessions given to British entrepreneurs. Nikki Keddie's study on the Iranian revolutions in comparative perspective deal with the anti-imperialist features of the Tobacco Revolt. Please also see Nikki R. Keddie, "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective",

the reign of *Nasser al-Din Shah* had been a surrounding case to verify the role of the social layers such as the clergy and the bazaar, merchants, even the royal households. Along the 19th century, the failures in several fields yet especially in the military field had been triggered the Western-style reforms<sup>156</sup> and thought as the Imperial Court's main projection had been dependent on the economic and political ties to Russia and Britain.

Henceforth, it was the strong influence of bilateral imperialist policies by the Tsardom of Russia and Britain which caused Iran to be squeezed as the former conquering around the inner lands of Asia and the latter controlling the trade and energy routes around the subcontinent of India. Contrary to the imposed equilibrium, Iran's potential to lean towards the rising and newly unified Germany was a crucial factor in enforcing the Allies for foreign intervention. In 1906, the Shah promulgated the Constitutional Revolution (*Enqilab-e Meshruti*) which was a step towards the restriction of the Shah's administration. Here, Sohrabi referred to the factor of contingency in his monography on the comparative analysis of *Young Turk Revolution* and *Iranian Revolution* which led to the promotion of the constitutionalist demands. Here, the inspiration from Russia, the invented tradition of the previous century and the agency of the intelligentsia as the crucial elements that prepared the Constitutional Revolution. In addition to these, both as an inspiration and a triggering effect, the Young Turk Revolution would be a part of the analysis on Iran's political transformation in the beginning of the 20th century.<sup>157</sup> As Abrahamian put forth, the

---

*American Historical Review*, 88 (no. 3), June, 1983, p. 584–585. Nikki Keddie, *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892*, London, Frank Cass, 1966.

<sup>156</sup>Opposing this view, the thought of west struckness or westoxication (*gharbzedegi*) became a part of the new reactionism in the 20th century Iran. Michael Axworthy, counting the work of Jalal Ali-Ahmad, reminds the creation of a culture and a society by the words as “neither genuinely Iranian nor properly Western”. To read more of it, please see Axworthy's work. Michael Axworthy, *A History of Iran: Empire of The Mind*, Iran: Empire of The Mind, New York: Basic Books, 2008, p. 238. However, I may add that the Western impacts on Iranian study and the culture was mostly limited to the imperial and intellectual spheres until the early part of the Pahlavi dynasty. As Banani added, the developments inspired from the Western world or mainly, from the continent of Europe had stayed restricted to the intelligentsia. An earlier interpretation on this topic was exemplified by Banani. “Although the minds of the intelligentsia had been influenced by the West, the face of Iran remained virtually unchanged”. Please see Amin Banani, , *The Modernization of Iran: 1921–1941*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 28.

<sup>157</sup> Nader Sohrabi, *Revolution and Constitutionalism In The Ottoman Empire and Iran*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 338. Sohrabi refers to the factor of contingency in his monography on the comparative analysis of Young Turk Revolution and Iranian Revolution which led to the promulgation of the constitutionalist demands. Here, the inspiration from Russia, the invented

long-term causes of the revolution laid in the 19th century's intense trials for the modernization. In the last decades of the 19th century, several newspapers such as Tarbiyat (Education) in Tehran, Hemmat (Endeavor) in Tabriz, Habl al-Matin (Firm Cord) in Calcutta, Akhtar (Star) in İstanbul, Parvaresh (Education) in Cairo, and Qanon (Law) in London were published. The secret societies to discuss the constitutional demands, both for the rule of law, and the national independence catalyzed the process of constitutionalism. On the other hand, as Abrahamian stated, the short-term causes of the collective mind that resulted in the Constitutional Revolution depended upon the heavy burden of the foreign loans, the irrational state expenditure system, in particular Mozaffar ed-Din Shah's high expenditures during his foreign visits, the lavishing of the loans to the courtiers, the bad harvest conditions right before 1904–1905, and the disruption of the foreign trade that affected the northern provinces due to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905. In that regard, the collective mindset through a constitutional action hastened the process social movements that already been started in the last decade of the 19th century.<sup>158</sup>

The main elements reflecting the German influence after the ratification of the Constitution (*qanun-i esasi*) had been the fastener pretexts to enforce the alliance of Tsardom of Russia and Britain. The Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907 was also a result of this. Depending on the condition to separate Persia into the spheres of influence and a neutral zone to represent the heartlands of Iran as the buffer zone, the treaty was a milestone. With that regard, Savory evaluated the convention as a pre-emptive move against the rising influence of Germany in the region. “The convention was inspired by a mutual fear of resurgent German militarism: it was designed to demarcate the each party's sphere of influence in Persia in order to avoid the possibility of armed conflict in that area, and to leave the signatories free to give their full attention to events in Europe.”<sup>159</sup>

---

tradition of the previous century and the agency of the intelengentsia were counted as the crucial elements that prepared the Constitutional Revolution. In addition to these, both as an inspiration and a triggering effect, the Young Turk Revolution would be a part of the analysis on Iran's political transformation in the wake of the nineteenth century.

<sup>158</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, *a History of Modern Iran*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 41–45.

<sup>159</sup> Savory, R.M. “Modern Persia”, *The Cambridge History of Islam*, v. I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 596. Savory counts this as *German militarism*.

The author counted the potential role of Germany as a bulwark for the Iranian administrations and the margins to be separated for the *Ostpolitik* of Germany.<sup>160</sup> Modern Persia's history in the twentieth century started by the Constitutional Revolution and a treaty to designate the economic interests of the big powers in the *Great Game*. The Treaty of Influence or Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 constituted the vital part of the power struggle. Though trying to keep its neutrality, Iran suffered foreign occupation of Great Britain and Russia during the turmoil of WWI.

Though being preserved in different forms, the main body of the concessions had stayed untouched or quite unwrapped. If we take the decade after the Constitutional Revolution, we would see the discovery of oil, the foundation of the APOC and British Navy's transition to oil from coal<sup>161</sup> were the main developments to constitute the route to affect the future of the country. It was also the ending of the clashes owing to the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention dealing with the concessions had been amongst the remarkable events.

Along the years of WWI, Iran was a land of foreign domination and the manoeuvres and the projections of the foreign powers relied on the capacity and logistics of the strategic allies. Probably, another scene which was going to be witnessed in WWII, Iran's territorial integrity had been under the control of the *Entente* powers, Russia and Britain, as Germany was standing on the opposite, the Ottoman Empire's main ally. It was remarkable during these years the pressure of Germany resulted in the establishment of foreign-led cabinets. First in Qom, then in Kermanshah, the tentative cabinets represented the clash of foreign powers as another episode of the fierce rivalry amongst the imperialist designs. As Nirumand put forth, during the turmoil of WWI, "the British Navy's and British oil industry's main field of support stayed within the borders of Iran. Making the oil production at the rate of 25000 tons monthly, Iran was definitely an important country for Britain at the expense of taking any kind of strict measurements".<sup>162</sup>

---

<sup>160</sup>Savory, *ibid*, 596.

<sup>161</sup> George Lenczowski, *Oil and State In The Middle East*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960, p. 11.

<sup>162</sup> Bahman Nirumand. *Hür Dünyanın Diktatörlüğü (İran)*, çev. Arif Gelen. Ankara: Anadolu Yayınları, 1968, p. 30.

To foment the anti-British tribal disputes and conflicts had been amongst the main missions of German agents such as the missions led by *Cont Kanitz*, *Wassmuss*<sup>163</sup>, *Schunemann* and *Zugmayer*. Wassmuss, also known literally as the German Lawrence, “was missioned to foment Bakhtiari and Qashqa’i revolts against the British in southwestern Iran”. After his fomenting a tribal revolt in southern Iran in 1915, the Iranian Majlis deputies who kept the pro-German sentiments entered “some secret negotiations with the German envoy” in Tehran, and planned to join the Central powers, and in return expected to gain military assistance and the territorial integrity of the country. The Russians, on the other hand, defeated the Turks and came sixty miles close to Qazvin. The fear of a Russian take-over made the pro-German nationalist deputies decide for a move of the capital to Isfahan. However, the Russians objected this plan by threatening to replace the young Ahmad Shah Qajar with his abdicated father, Mohammad Ali Shah. Although the Russian pressure inclined, some of these deputies set up the National Committee of Defence in Qom, and following the Russian advance, they retreated to Kermanshah and gave support to tribal revolts against the British forces.<sup>164</sup> Against his activities, to counter the German presence in the British sphere of influence, Britain organized the South Persian Rifles in 1916.<sup>165</sup> Amidst the rising clash of intelligence, political and cultural interests, the political and economic scheme of patronage was virtually fostering. Yapp’s assessment in this part would be beneficial to assess the German influences in the turmoil of WWI. The German influences which had been well

---

<sup>163</sup>Herr Wassmuss was amongst the most talented agents of German missions in the Near East. It is a key note to state that he was accepted as the German counterpart of the British agent T.E. Lawrence. There’s a monography of Sykes on the mission of Wassmuss during WWI. Please see. Christopher Sykes, *Wassmuss “The German Lawrence”*, New York: Longmans, 1936. Please also see the “opus magnum” of Rouhallah Ramazani on the foreign policy of Iran. Rouhallah Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran: 1500–1941*, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1966. p. 119. Keddîe, Amanat, 2007, p. 208. Ramesh Sanghvi, *Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran: A Political Biography*, New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1968, p. 12. Mohammad Reza Djalili, Thierry Kellner, *Iran’ın Son İki Yüzyıllık Tarihi*, tr. Reşat Uzmen, İstanbul, Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2011, p. 52. Again as an article to cover the two decades beginning from the pre-Constitutional Revolution era and ending with the Reza Khan’s coup, please see Yapp, Malcolm E. “1900–1921: The Last Years of The Qajar Dynasty”, *Twentieth-Century Iran*, eds. Hossein Amirsadeghi, London: Heinemann, 1977, p. 17.

<sup>164</sup> Keddîe, Amanat, 2007, p. 208.

<sup>165</sup> Garthwaite, *ibid*, p. 215.



bonded to each other with the periphery were to be considered for both the economic and political frameworks:

The summer of 1915 saw a considerable increase in German influence in Iran through the activities of German diplomats and agents such as Schünemann in Kermanshah, Pugin in Isfahan and the famous Wassmuss in Fars. In Tehran, the German Legation became a shelter for German and Austrian prisoners of war. The Swedish officers of the Gendarmerie, a force established in 1911 to safeguard the roads of Iran, were also pro-German, partly by inclination and partly because they relied on German money.<sup>166</sup>

Even though the concessions primarily meant the indirect economic capitulations and referred to the consolidation of economic dependency of the Persian economy and its subsectors, it had also referred to the political and cultural dependencies. While the Germans had been following the back steps, the British troops and the agents had all been tending to supersede the 19th century's formula for the clash of powers. Britain's impact on the Persian politics and economy had been more significant all along these years. Being advantageous along this period, Britain's attempts for the re-consolidation of the concessions had been rising. Needless to say that the oil-rich lands of Iran had been charming and the war conditions had been enforcing the interventions of the troops of the neighboring Ottoman Empire on also behalf of the Germans.<sup>167</sup>

As Savory underlined, "the decision to shift the ships from coal to oil" had been a step worth to mention of which the dependency on the strategic and naturally oil-rich lands had arisen:

To protect the oil installations and prevent sabotage of the pipeline, the British raised a body of levies known as the South Persia Rifles and established the East Persia Cordon in an attempt to prevent German agents from reaching Afghanistan.<sup>168</sup>

In the wake of WWI, not only Iran's territorial integrity but also the entire landscape of the Middle East was under the threat of imperialism. In that regard, the immediate repercussion of the Ottoman Empire's partition, the foundation of the mandate of Iraq along with the Indian subcontinent's vitality for the military manpower for Britain caused a restraint on behalf of Iran as the country was surrounded from the south, east, and the west. It is a crucial point that Britain's policy towards Persia

---

<sup>166</sup> Yapp, *ibid*, p.17.

<sup>167</sup> Yapp, *ibid*, 19.

<sup>168</sup> Savory, *ibid*, 599. Please also see Nirumand, *ibid*, p. 30. Patrick Clawson, Michael Rubin, *Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 3.

appeared as more advantageous due to the arisen internal issues of the Soviet Union. Along this period, the civil war after the Bolshevik Revolution had constituted the main headline of its agenda. As reminded by Aryeh Y. Yodfat pertaining to the relations between the Soviet Union and Iran after the Revolution of 1979, the internal issues of this period could be considered on the vast lands of the country straddling from Transcaucasia and the Central Asia.<sup>169</sup>

The post-WWI conditions were interpreted by Mohammad Gholi Majd as more favorable for Britain rather than being favorable for the traditional quest of Russia. The shifts in the international alignment confirmed that the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 changed the political landscape in Eurasia. Under these conditions, by asserting that Iran has undergone a decades-long patronage of Britain, Majd stated that “a de facto encirclement”<sup>170</sup> of Iran, and in general, the patronage of Britain on Iranian state continued from the 1920s to the 1940s. By looking to the long-lasting influences of Britain in Iran, the author emphasized the invasion, and the occupation of Iran in April 1918 as “a cardinal event in the history of the country”.<sup>171</sup> Being dependent on the rising influence of Britain, the state functionaries proved the fact that the government ministers, even the prime ministers would be fallen to the degree of puppets in the hands of the British imperialism.<sup>172</sup> On April 1918, “by benefiting its predominance in the region”, Britain invaded Iran from the west and the east to which only the province of Azerbaijan was an exception. As a prominent politician, Vosouq al-Dowleh (Hassan Vosouq) was appointed a Prime Minister in August 1918 in the place of Samsam as-Saltaneh.<sup>173</sup> On that point, James Gelvin assessed during the term of Vossouq al-Dowleh “the British attempted to impose a treaty on

---

<sup>169</sup>Yodfat, Aryeh Y. *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran*, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 11.

<sup>170</sup> M. Majd, *Great Britain&Reza Shah: The Plunder of Iran, 1921–1941*, Florida: University Press of Florida, 2001, p. 1.

<sup>171</sup> Majd, *ibid*, p. 1.

<sup>172</sup> Ali Reza Ashgarzadeh, *Iran and The Challenge of Diversity, Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism and Democratic Struggles*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 90. One subsequent example of this cling by British imperialism will be exempfilied below. The MI6 agents Sir Ardeshir J Reporter, and his son Shapoor J. Reporter attempted to take the attention of British agents in Iran, the Cossack Brigade commander General Ironside as well to the Cossack Brigade’s rising military alternative of Reza Khan.

<sup>173</sup> Majd, *ibid*, p.1–2.

their hosts that would have made Persia into a virtual British protectorate”.<sup>174</sup> Under these conditions, the Bolshevik (Russian) government backed the dissemination of ideological tools, and a provincial policy to strengthen the reform, and the confrontation of British imperialist desires were conducted. In that regard, rooted in the turmoil of WWI, some autonomous movements emerged in the north. As Ashgarzadeh stated, including the Mirza Kuchik Khan’s Jangali movement in the northern province of Gilan, Khiabani’s Azadi movement in southern part of Iranian province of Azerbaijan, the movement of Sheikh Khaz’al Mohammarah in the Khuzestan province, several revolts, rebellions against the central authority of the state caused a widespread discontent in many parts of the country. Another movement was the Social Democratic Party (Hezb-e Social Dimokrat) movement, gathered around the city of Sanandaj mostly populated by the Kurds.<sup>175</sup> Thus, the territorial integrity of the country was crosscut by the provincial lines of which the internal and external pressures were set to arise. However, given the general features of the Soviet ideology, the Soviets did not pay attention to the ethnic boundaries, but a revolutionary ideal’s implementation emerged within the peculiarities of Iran. Thus, Iran’s main problem was provincial rather than being ethnic. The emphasis on the provincialism sourced from the conditions that have arisen in the wake of the War.

On the depth of this discussion, Reza Ghods wrote that there were basically two sides, one to represent the demands for the central authority, and the other to represent the decentralized way of governance, the provincial administrations. Although the distinction between these two sides could be an oversimplification, pro-British, and the pro-Soviet approaches dominated the political scene. These were simply entitled as the *Tashkilati*, and *the Zedde-Tashkilati*.<sup>176</sup> During the term of Vossouq al-Dowleh, the Iranian government signed an Anglo–Persian Convention in August, 1919 which sought to grant major concessions to Britain that would terminate the economic independence of the country. Amongst these concessions, the

---

<sup>174</sup> Gelvin, James L., *The Modern Middle East: A History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 193.

<sup>175</sup> Ashgarzadeh, *ibid*, p.85–86.

<sup>176</sup> For the clash of political thoughts pertaining to *the centralism (organizationalism)*, and *provincialism (anti-organizationalism)* please see Ghods, 1991, p. 35–36.

booming oil industry was particularly important. Indeed, both the Soviet note on June, 1919 and the Anglo-Persian Treaty had been calling for the revoking of the dependency of Persia to these states. However the Anglo-Persian Convention was a novel medium of intervention by Britain to design the military organization and state finances.<sup>177</sup>

Iran had already been familiar with the British imperialism, and its penetration efforts for the long-lasting decades. The concessions were the source of grievances in Iranian society which were collectively objected since the Tobacco Revolt in the last decade of the 19th century. The Constitutional period's legacy had nurtured the nationalistic sentiments. Now, under the light of the new circumstances, this was viewed by the general public in Iran that the Anglo-Persian Convention was "another extortion most levied against their government by an outside force".<sup>178</sup> As the Iranian public opinion's mentors, the reformist circles mentioned the violation of the country's independence would cause further resentments. In that regard, the Majlis, as not willing to spearhead a pro-British campaign, did not ratify the convention. It was the first treaty which failed since the beginning of the 19th century. The rise of the nationalistic sentiments nurtured the Iranian self-confidence with the margins of ongoing instabilities. The Majlis, as a source of political power in modern Iranian history, functioned as a tool to catalyze the nationalistic sentiments. Despite the fact that the nationalistic upheaval in Iran caused some further developments, the concentration of the centralization efforts, the British influence in Iran coexisted with these nationalistic sentiments. Regarding with that view, Majd asserted that the country efficiently lost its independence for "the next sixty years". The author's assertion, as an alternative way of interpretation involved period when the centralization efforts of the country have come about during the 1920s, and 1930s.<sup>179</sup> Ashgarzadeh, too, mentioned the role of British MI6 agents such as Sir Ardeshir J.

---

<sup>177</sup>Yodfat, *ibid*, p. 11.

<sup>178</sup> Ashgarzadeh, *ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>179</sup> Majd, *ibid*, p. 1. In that regard, an assessment on the, "the invisible hand of Britain (Kar-Engilisi)" can be visited. In that regard, as the former diplomat of Iran, Bijan Bahadorvand Shenhi mentioned the perception of several Iranians on the British role behind many political and governmental affairs. Please see Bijan Bahadorvand Shenhi's speech which was read on his behalf at a Schiller Institute Conference in Berlin. Bijan Bahadorvand Shenhi, "Kar Inglise: The Bloody, Invisible Hand of the British Empire", *EIR*, December, 2011, p. 23–24.

Reporter, and his son Shapoor J. Reporter to take the attention of the British authorities on a probable ruler to help build the centralization process of the country. Their discovery and role, as Parsis of India, a small Farsi speaking community in Indian subcontinent who had accepted themselves as the seventh-century immigrants from Persia to India, to present a charismatic commander of the Cossack Brigade to the British commanders was interpreted as the consolidation of British interests in Iran.<sup>180</sup>

As a former general of SAVAK, and a schoolmate of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, Hussein Fardust asserted that Reza Shah was “a definite British agent”. Fardust mentioned the relations of Ardeshir J. Reporter with British General Edmund Ironside, and the ruler of British India, his role to take the attention of the commanders at the head of the British military presence in the military leadership of Reza Khan. The contacts who helped to build a plot for a coup were hired. Among these, “two of them were Khan Akbar and father of Shahpour J. Reporter. Another name was As’ad Bakhtiari”.<sup>181</sup> Hence, as the points of view by Fardust, Majd, Ashgarzadeh mentioned the role of the British agents in Iran on the discovery, and the promotion of Reza Khan reflected the degree of British influence in and around the country. On the contrary, without the omission of the fact that Reza Khan’s commandship was supported by the British, the assessments which did not denounce the efforts of Reza Khan towards modernization, and the quest for the political independence of the country require a lengthy examination. In that regard, it is imperative to note that there are some different points of view. Axworthy assessed the underlying purpose of Reza Khan “as the control of the country, to make the country strong, to develop it so that it could be truly independent, to modernize it so that it could deal with the great powers on an equal basis, to have a strong army to resist foreign interventions, and to impose order internally so that, as in other modern countries, the state enjoyed the sole control”.<sup>182</sup> Thus, for both the rise of Reza Khan to power, and the aftermath, it is possible to assert that Reza Khan’s contradictory policies depended upon the strategic manoeuvres to persuade the British Legation

---

<sup>180</sup> Ashgarzadeh, *ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>181</sup> Fardust, *ibid*, p. 26–28.

<sup>182</sup> Axworthy, *ibid*, p. 222.

members to alter their policies, and support his power. Although that took a few years, Reza Khan's contribution of stability in the country was appreciated by the British, then.<sup>183</sup>

In that regard, Katouzian stated that the long cyclical flow of the history dragged the society to yearn for chaos and disorder, and not long after, it led up to the subsequent calls for an arbitrary ruler.<sup>184</sup> Iranian public opinion's expectations were averse to the re-shelving of the constitution. The primary expectation of the public opinion represented the grievances, and the complaints of the people in Iran. The assessment of Albert Hourani would be helpful in order to explicate the widespread expectations in Iran in the wake of WWI. Hourani, by looking into the state-building processes, and by regarding the processes based on the strength of states and the individual virtue, the nationalist sentiments in the constitutional period, as it was valid in the broader Middle East, "had a content derived for the most part from the thought of liberal Europe: to be a nationalist meant to believe in constitutional government, universal education, the rights of women and intellectual freedom".<sup>185</sup> These political ideas, in a fluctuation between the arbitrary rule (*estebdad*) and the arbitrary society sooner turned out to be a call for the finalization of the concerns over the instability, the insecurity, and the unpredictability. Since the failure of the Constitutional Revolution, Ahmad Shah had been seating at the Iranian throne. Being ascended to the throne at the age of twelve, the young, and the inexperienced Shah was possibly the most unlucky of the Qajar rulers.<sup>186</sup> The fear of being dethroned by his father, his brother had gone along with the intrigues in the following years. The decay of the Empire went with the reactions of the antagonists of imperial rivalry hand in hand, as Russia, and Britain represented the opposition to the national interests of Iran, and the intimidation of the great powers. However, the interpretation of these imperialist

---

<sup>183</sup> Houshang Sabahi, *British Policy in Persia: 1918–1925*, London, Frans Class, 1990, p. 154.

<sup>184</sup> Katouzian, 2003, p. 121–122.

<sup>185</sup> Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, Oxford, The Macmillan Press, 1981, p.187–188.

<sup>186</sup> Ahmad Shah was the last Qajar ruler of Persia who ruled the vast Empire holding the geopolitically inevitable lands of Persia from 1909–1925 until after the transition period starting by the Reza Khan's final blow of the 1921 coup d'état. Please see. Banani, *ibid*, p. 31–32. For a brief biography, please see Mansorueh Ettehadeh, "Ahmad Qajar", *Encyclopedia of The Modern Middle East&North Africa*, v. I, New York: Thomson Gale, 2004, p. 88–89.

powers on the Persian question started to change as the Soviet Union directed towards a new construction after the Bolshevik Revolution, the civil war and Britain sought to consolidate its interests in Iran, and in a broader sense, in the Middle East opposing the new conditions detrimental to her sake. Under these circumstances, the quest for the centralization, and the modernization started to rise. Up until the end of WWI, the military presence in Iran had consisted of the Gendarmerie, the Cossack Brigade, the Dunsterforce of Britain, and the South Persian Rifles as most of which represented the Anglo-Russian balance of power to define the fate of the country. Despite the fact this did not denounce the internal factor's capacity, as Fred Halliday stated, the shift of international agenda, and the roots of the external factors on the internal affairs continued to define the fate of the country. After the fall of Vosouq ad-Dowleh's cabinet in 1920, the British circles in Iran sought to benefit from the intersection of the internal upheaval with the external influences.<sup>187</sup>

At the same time, Mushir al-Dowle seated at the office for a while. A provisional socialist government eventually fell due to the quarrels between the Jangalis who had been separated into the left and right wings. Until he was replaced by Sepahdar, he tried to stop the discussions in the Majlis pertinent to the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. Although Sepahdar was attributed pro-British sentiments, he also did not take an action to bring the Agreement to the Majlis sessions. Through the end of WWI, Reza Khan was a commander of the Cossack Brigade stationed in Qazvin. He had a long-lasting service in the Cossack Brigade where he enlisted in the lower ranks, and gradually promoted by his successful services from the midst of 1890s. Polk stated that his "determination, skill and bravery" helped him to rise to the upper ranks of the military although he had no formal military education. After his service at the German Legation, he also served under the Qajar prince, and a Governor Abdolhossein Farmanfarma, and he learned how to use the *Maxim* machine gun, as a compared example with the Nader Shah Afshar in the 18th century's post-Safavid times of turmoil.<sup>188</sup> Regarding that Gholam Reza Afkhami stated in his biography of

---

<sup>187</sup> Fred Halliday, "Introduction: Iran and the World: The Reassertion and Its Costs", Iran and the International Community, eds. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Manshour Varasteh, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 1.

<sup>188</sup> William R. Polk, *Understanding Iran*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 100. Ervand Abrahmanian stated that Reza Khan served at the Dutch Legation, and the American Presbyterian Mission. Please also see Abrahamian, 2008, p. 63.

Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Cossack Brigade was formed during the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah. It was founded in 1878 by the auspices of Russian Kingdom's military experts after Nasser al-Din's visit to St. Petersburg. With the help of the Russian military under the command of Colonel Alexei Ivanovich Dumantovich, the Cossack Brigade had started to recruit thousands of soldiers. As one of the ordinary soldiers in this brigade, within a few decades, Reza Khan, under the mature conditions of chaos and despair, marched his way to rise through the upper ranks from Alasht, Savad Kuh region to the commandership in Qazvin.<sup>189</sup> He was a charismatic commander at that time to affect the forthcoming days in his country. It was a remarkable turning point to lead the destiny of the country through an alternative path which tended to separate Iran from the past century's miseries *en masse*. The country's conditions, which were assessed as the arbitrary society's disorder, economic problems, the reflections of the international domain's crisis in Iran, the fragile integrity of the country's territory were all sources of grievances. The coup which was hatched by the support of British General Edmund Ironside (the commander of the British Norperforce) took place as almost bloodless on February 21, 1921 (Esfand, 1299) and ousted the Sepahdar Government. In this regard, the arguments on the British Foreign Office that it was not a direct part of the coup plot was discussed by Keddle, and Katouzian. As stated by Keddle, there was "no written evidence" relevant to this case in British Foreign Office documents and Katouzian stated that it was conducted "without the knowledge of the British Government". In accordance with these views, the domestic British circles in Iran assumed the main roles for the allocation of the coup.<sup>190</sup> Thus, the coup's contextualization represented another breaking point for the modern history of Iran. As Keddle stated, the discontent of the nationalists, along with the absence of any strong national party, made it possible for a small group of men to overthrow the Sepahdar government. Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai, as a pro-British moderate, was the civilian side of this movement.<sup>191</sup> On the coup of 1921, Shareen Blair Brysac put forward Reza Khan

---

<sup>189</sup> Gholam-Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of The Shah*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>190</sup> Keddle, 2006, p. 80. Katouzian, 2003, p. 54.

<sup>191</sup> Keddle, 2006, p. 80.



was the main agent of this movement to restore the government. He was believed to be backed by the British, then.<sup>192</sup> Drawing to a close, these found themselves in cooperation to fill the inadequacies in the central authority of the country after the withdrawal of the British forces.<sup>193</sup>

In his government, Tabatabai annulled the Anglo–Persian Treaty of 1919, hastened the Russo-Iranian Treaty of 1921, the fifth and the sixth articles of which introduced the right of the Soviet Union to take measures on the intervention to Iran’s territorial integrity when a third-party’s threat would arise as an endangerment against itself.<sup>194</sup> Although this treaty renounced the concessions, loans of Persia to the Soviet Union, the concession for the Caspian fishery was preserved. Along with the retreat of British forces as promised before the coup of 1921, the Soviet-Persian Treaty contributed to the impetus of economic and political self-determination which was provided by the nationalist sentiments inclining in Iran.<sup>195</sup> The government of Tabatabai announced some reformist steps such as “the land reform, national independence, a plan for a modern, industrialized economy, and other social reforms”.<sup>196</sup> In a short period of time, Reza Khan, after the title of commander of the Cossack Brigade that was won in 1920, with his new titles of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and Minister of War submerged from Tabatabai. Polk stated that Tabatabai, his reformist program caused the alienation of the landowners and the privileged class. On his efforts to eradicate some of these privileges, Polk stated that

---

<sup>192</sup>Shareen Blair Brysac, “A Very British Coup: How Reza Shah Won and Lost His Throne”, *World Policy Journal*, v. 24, n. 2 (Summer, 2007), p. 99–100.

<sup>193</sup>Knapp, Wilfrid. “1921–1941: The Period of Reza Shah”, *Twentieth-Century Iran*, eds. Hossein Amirsadeghi, London, Heinemann, 1977, p. 23–24. Needless to say that there are several sources pertaining to the bloodless coup d’etat which had taken in February, 1921. Here, a few recommendations would be insightful through the thematic reading. Please see. Axworthy, 2008, p. 221–223. Yahya Armajani. “Reza Shah Pahlavi”, *Encyclopedia of World Biography*, v. 9, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1973, p. 160–162. Keddie, 2006, p. 80–88. L.P. Elwell Sutton, *Modern Iran*, v. 4, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 68–81.

<sup>194</sup> Mostafa Elm, *Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and its Aftermath*, New York, Syracuse University, 1994, p. 26. Please also see “the Soviet Note to Iran”, *Bulletin of International News*, v. 18, n. 18, (September 6, 1941), p. 1135–1136.

<sup>195</sup> Keddie, Amanat, 2007, p.210.

<sup>196</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 81. Keddie, Amanat, 2007, p. 210.

he was a type of politician who “might have changed the Iranian history”.<sup>197</sup> After three months into his tenure as Prime Minister, some dismays arose with this erstwhile comrade, Reza Khan. The dismays which had arisen between him, and the Tabatabai caused the resignation of the latter, and the latter's fled from Iran to Switzerland, and then to British mandate of Palestine.<sup>198</sup> A new cabinet was set up under Qavam al-Saltaneh. As a famous figure in Iranian politics, formerly the governor general of Khorassan, descending from the Qajar lineage, Qavam's position was contributory to the reformist program. The main part of the new government's agenda was the suppression of rebellions such as Mirza Kuchik Khan's movement in Gilan. The discord between the communist and non-communist movements has helped the Tehran Government to take immediate measures to put down the rebellion.<sup>199</sup> In 1921, another revolt took place amongst the tribes in the province of Khorassan and formed a provisional government under the Gendarmerie Colonel Muhammad Taqi Khan Paysan. His provisional government in the province of Khorassan ended with his killing during the fights with the tribal insurgents. Another revolt in Tabriz under the leftist gendarmerie officer Major Lahuti came about in 1922. It was sooner put down, and the Major Lahuti was chased out to the Soviet territory.<sup>200</sup> Mostly, the geographical and ideological divisions were exploited by the Governments to restore order, overcome the deepening disdain and fear of the Iranian society. The claims for the reformist programs could function under the light of these advantageous positions. The retreat of the British forces had contributed to the quest for a powerful leader to take the urgent measures. Between the period 1921–1925, as Savory noted, the Iranian political landscape was shaped “under the principal means of unification, control and the strengthening of the army, the

---

<sup>197</sup> Polk, *ibid*, p. 101.

<sup>198</sup> Gavin R.G. Hambly, “The Pahlavi Autocracy: Reza Shah, 1921–1941”, *Cambridge History of Iran: from Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic* v. 7, eds. Peter Avery, Gavin R.G. Hambly, Charles Melville, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 219.

<sup>199</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 82.

<sup>200</sup> “Iran's Forgotten Revolutionary: Abolqasim Lahuti and The Tabriz Resurrection in 1922”, in ed. Stephanie Cronin, *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perceptions of the Iranian Left*, New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 118–146.

suppression of the tribal revolts, the temporary appeasement of the clergy, the domination of successive cabinets, and the manipulation of the Majlis”.<sup>201</sup>

In 1922, the news at *Washington Herald* daily stated that “the husky dictator of Persia was ruling with an iron fist”. What the correspondent stated was the ever valid fact to understand the Iranian monarchy. After the weakness of the Qajar line’s last three monarchs, Reza Khan, as Sardar Sepah, the title he has gained after the coup of 1921, claimed that he was the Government. A variant of the famous quotation of Louis XIV, “l’etat c’est moi”, the new powerful head of the Government claimed more than the Iranian system described. Almost a year and a half after the coup in February, 1921, he shared his commitment to the service of his country, and declared his projections to sovereign as in an ambivalent way between the constitutional and the arbitrary system’s political leader in his country.

The news stated that Reza Khan Sardar Sepah was not a “modest” man. It continued by the following words: “Sardar Sepah, or Marshall of the marshalls, as he is known since he became dictator of Persia makes no bones about his power”.<sup>202</sup> Reza Khan’s decisiveness and the strictly-pronounced words proved the fact that he admitted himself as the only source of the government. The correspondent wrote that “ ‘I am the government’ he said to me once during the course of an interview, and ‘I am the source of reforms in Persia’ he repeated many times”.<sup>203</sup> The role to which Reza Khan paid attention to the constitutional rule sourced from the transition period of the country. His appeasement policy, efforts for the compromise changed gradually into an uncompromising way of politics.

Thus, what was striking about the thoughts of the new Shah would be derived from the earlier portrait of Reza Khan in the first half of the 1920s. According to the news, Reza Khan was perceived as “a man of people”. “He knew the hardships his people were called on to endure. Conscious of his power, accustomed to obedience, he nevertheless seemed to be working for the good of the state, and not for his own pocketbook”.<sup>204</sup> This image of Reza Khan changed from time to time, the portrait of

---

<sup>201</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 601.

<sup>202</sup> “Husky Dictator of Persia Rules With An Iron Fist”, *Washington Herald*, August 16, 1922, p. 5.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid*, p. 5.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid*, p. 5.

him which was drawn with remarkable features proved the fact that within just two decades he and his regime lost the political prestige drastically.<sup>205</sup> As the literature focused on this topic, the coup in 1921 represented almost the beginning of Qajar dynasty's fall. Ahmad Shah, as a young monarch, was going to make some visits to European countries which are mostly thought to be legitimized by the declared pretext of "medical treatment". After Ahmad Shah's *de facto* leave from the throne, there were the open indications of the consolidation of power on behalf of Reza Khan from 1923 onwards when he became the new prime minister of the country. This was the beginning of a new stage which Mohsen Milani stated as the second for the fascinating accession of Reza Khan to the Iranian throne. Henceforth, he also acted as the Prime Minister in Iran up until 1925. This was the second stage of Reza Khan's march towards the ousting of the Qajar dynasty.<sup>206</sup> It was also the period when Ahmad Shah's efforts rose to stop the rising influence of Reza Shah which coincided with the abolition of the caliphate in neighboring Republican Turkey. Through the last days of 1925, the prominent American journal, *the Washington Post* quoted the hope of Ahmad Shah to return to his country back: "I am, and I remain the legitimate and constitutional sovereign of Persia and I await the hour to return my country to continue to serve my people".<sup>207</sup> In 1925, owing to this legacy and the recent developments around the country, the parliament gave full powers to solve the political crisis. A few years ago, in the absence of Ahmad Shah<sup>208</sup>, there were strong sentiments of Republican regime inspired by the neighboring Turkey's regime change. As Bausani put forth, the discussions on Republicanism "were quickly suppressed by the reactionary mujtahid".<sup>209</sup> Behind this campaign against

---

<sup>205</sup> Through the end of his reign\ in the beginning of 1940s, the portrait was not only to show a monarch of which the arbitrary rule was criticized but also to show the exultant masses welcoming the deposition of the Shah in a way of humiliation.

<sup>206</sup> Mohsen M Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to Islamic Republic*, Colorado, Westview Press, 1994, p. 32.

<sup>207</sup> "Reza Khan Becomes Persian Shah", *The Washington Post*, December 11, 1925, p. 1.

<sup>208</sup> Ahmad Shah could never achieve the throne again. He died in Neuilly (France) at American Hospital on February 27, 1930 at the age of 32. Please see Ahmed Ekrem, *Bugünkü İran*, İstanbul, Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1934, p. 10.

<sup>209</sup> Bausani, *ibid*, 176. Oberling added that amongst the genuine architects of Reza Shah's reforms, Abdoul Hossein Teymourash was a political figure who had been suggesting the establishment of a

Republicanism, the leading mujtahid was Sayyed Hassan Modarres, and the prominent opposition of the clergy rose to a considerable level which mentioned the regime's prospects of "incompatibility with Islam". As David Menashri stated in his article of the *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, Modarres's testimony, in fact, did not deny "a form of republic" (jomhuri-ye vaqei) since it was introduced in the early times of Islam, however the clergy's opposition was attributed to the republican schemes of Britain.<sup>210</sup> Soon after, when the bill was passed to the Majlis, the anti-republican faction was strengthened by the clergy led by Modarres. The demonstrators in the Majlis square shouted as "Down with the republic! (*Mordebad Jomhuri*)", and soon after Reza Khan backed off depending on the pretext that "the will of the nation" did not seek a transition to the republican regime, as the prominent leaders of the clergy, Ayatollah Isfahani (d. 1946), Ha'iri (d. 1937)<sup>211</sup>, and Na'ini (d. 1936) claimed their authorities as the discussion on the regime type was not appreciated by many people in Iran.<sup>212</sup> In a sense, these discussions, along with the coup in February 1921 that helped Reza Khan to seize power, were connected to the conspiracy theories. The conspiracy theories, as Charles Kurzman underlined, had a long history in Iran which emerged by the attribution of many Iranians that

---

republican regime similar to the example in Turkey. See. Pierre Oberling, "Atatürk and Reza Shah", I. Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu Bildirileri, 21-23 September 1987, çev. Hasan Mert, Ankara, 1994, p. 651-659.

<sup>210</sup> David Menashri, "The Persian Monarchy and the Islamic Republic", in ed. Joseph Kostiner, *Middle East Monarchies: the Challenge of Modernity*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, p. 217.

<sup>211</sup> For the role of Ha'iri in another source -as the Islamic Republic's propaganda book- that boosted the services of the prominent mujtahid, and condemned the modernization efforts of Reza Shah please visit the following source. Aqiqi Bakhshayeshi, *Ten Decades of Ulama's Struggle*, tr. Algedin Pazargadi, Tehran, Islamic Propaganda Organization, 1340, p. 157-168.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid*, p. 217. For the interpretations of these religious authorities, the traditionalism (akhbarism), and the usulism (rationalism) constituted the basic lines of political differentiation. As Isfahani was the student of Na'ini (1860-1935), whose firm support to Usulism was stated, he was assessed as a leading mujtahid through the anti-rationalistic school. The republican campaign's discussion could be assessed under the light of these schools. In that regard, please see the monography on Atayollah Mutahhari, as one of the theoreticians of the Islamic State in Iran. Mahmoud Davari, *The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian Theoretician of the Islamic State*, New York, Routledge, 2003, p. 8-10.

“the fate of the country depended upon the foreign machinations”.<sup>213</sup> However, as Kurzman stated all of the conspiracy theories on Iran’s political life were not misleading since the Tsardom of Russia and Britain did support the coup in 1911, also the British did support the coup in 1921.<sup>214</sup> What made these relevant to the political opposition is that they functioned as a part of the conditional political opposition during the concentration periods of power. The Qajar Shah’s authority has been put under the construction efforts when he ascended the throne in 1909. Since then, the political turmoil persisted in Iran, and as John Murphy stated, the Qajar Shah has almost been a figurehead in Iran after the gradual rise of Reza Khan, whom the author stated he lacked “caliber in comparison with the great Achaemenid kings Cyrus or Darius”. Meanwhile Reza Khan’s great impression as a “righteous ruler” paved his way after many obstacles towards the Iranian throne.<sup>215</sup>

In 1925, owing to a crisis at the parliament, he became successful to put his sovereignty to oust the ruling dynasty in the country. A bill was passed in the Majlis with the goal to terminate the Qajar dynasty, and as entrusted to Reza Khan, a provisional government was founded with the new role of the Constituent Assembly (Majlis-i Muessisan). Among the handful of deputies who voted against the overthrow of the dynasty was Dr. Mosaddiq. Later, the Constituent Assembly voted 257–3 to vest the monarchy in Reza Khan.<sup>216</sup>

Below, the next section of the chapter will deal with the construction of a new dynasty under Reza Shah Pahlavi. In the following minor sections, the study will examine the Pahlavi dynasty’s relations with the clergy, and the tribal confederations, the nascence and the suppression of the political opposition during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the occupation of the country in the run-up to the Second World War by the Allied powers, and the reformation of the political parties, and the assessment of the Majlis bodies wartime problems during WWII.

---

<sup>213</sup> For the application of conspiracy theories in Iranian history, please see following source by Kurzman. Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 13.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.

<sup>215</sup> Murphy, *ibid*, p. 55.

<sup>216</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 601.

## **2.3. The New Dynasty: Reza Shah's (Pahlavi) Rule (1926–1941)**

### **2.3.1. Pahlavi Dynasty's Relations With The Clergy and The Tribes**

The antecedents which served to the rise of Reza Khan have examined above in the previous section. Mostly, these were the conditions of turmoil which basically sourced from the internal and external pressures, and the society's transformation with the international domain's crisis led Iran to the grim circumstances of the economy and social life. The manipulation of the foreign powers, disorder, fluctuations all has helped to stimulate the quest for the overcoming of antagonism-led chaos. Mohsen Milani asserted "the fascinating accession of Reza Khan to the Iranian throne" came about in two stages", as the former from 1921–1923 witnessed a priority for the law and order, the suppression of the tribal revolts such as the revolt of Sheikh Khazal in a part of Iran (Khuzestan), the termination of the semi-autonomous status of major regions such as Azerbaijan, Lorestan, Arabistan (Khuzistan), and Kurdistan.<sup>217</sup> This term, in a sense, was a quest for Iran to regain its territorial integrity which was shaken during the turmoil of WWI and its aftermath. In this stage, the state's main projection depended upon the policies of centralization, and the suppression of tribal revolts. From 1923–1925, the second stage addressed to the compromising efforts to soothe the clergy and the continuation of the centralization policies.<sup>218</sup> As Daniel and Mahdi asserted, Reza Khan was a "proven dynamic leader" and the "de facto" leader of the country during this process.<sup>219</sup> From time to time, the consensus over Reza Khan inclined towards the strengthening of the constitutional rule. In the early years of the 1920s, the most legitimate leadership was attributed to Reza Khan, and upon these two stages displayed by Milani, sooner replaced the existent dynasty dependent upon the massive consensus of the political sides. For all these purposes, Reza Khan benefited from the political parties which served as an element that contributed to his ultimate attainment of power. Although the vigor of the politics during the constitutional period could not be stimulated, the political opposition, by the channels of the tribal oppositions, Republican views,

---

<sup>217</sup> Ashgarzadeh, 2007, p. 86–87.

<sup>218</sup> Milani, 1994, p. 32.

<sup>219</sup> Elton Daniel, Ali Akbar Mahdi, *Culture and Customs of Iran*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 2006, p.28.

leftist circles, and socio-economic discontents, prevailed. Chronologically, the first significant party during the rule of Reza Khan was the *Hizb-i Eslahtalaban* (the Reformist Party) amongst the members of which Sayyed Hassan Modarres, Nusrat Allah Firuz, Abdol Hossein Teymurtash were the most prominent names.<sup>220</sup> The support of the Tajaddod Party along with the support of the Socialist Party constituted the other sources of political legitimacy. Of these political parties *the Hizb-i Tajaddod* (the Modernist or Revival Party), as it was named *the Hizb-i Dimukrat-i Mustaqqil* (Independent Democratic Party) formerly was the most important element of the political life that helped Reza Khan to ascend the Iranian throne. Among its leaders Teymurtash, Ali Akbar Davar, and Sayyid Hassan Tadayyon, Mohammad Ali Foroughi were the most prominent names. The general features of these leaders were that all of them supported the constitutional period's democratic movements.<sup>221</sup>

His new period terminated the Qajar dynasty's rule in the country and followed the construction of a new dynasty. The name of the new dynasty depended on the middle age's Persian language. Unequivocally, this decision was an earlier chain of the nationalist indoctrination in the country.<sup>222</sup> Nationalism, as a source of inspiration, drawn from the regional and European modernization was amongst the tenets of the country's political landscape. "The glorification of pre-Islamic past of Persia" emerged as a tenet of the Pahlavi regime. Mohsen Milani mentioned that the Iranian nationalism's interpretation under Reza Shah Pahlavi resembled a "jingoism" which were assessed as a transition tool to Iran's quest for modernity.<sup>223</sup> The implementation of nationalism under Reza Shah was a part of the cultural modernization program of which the pre-Islamic past of the country was bolstered. The historical narrative's transformation along with the Persianization left an acute angle for the ethnical diversity of sub-national groups. Even though the ethnical

---

<sup>220</sup> Bihruz Tayarani, 'Abdul Kadir Suvari, Rahim Rais; 'niya, Ahmad Taqizadih, Muhammad Rida Skakiba, "Party", *Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopedia of the World of Islam*, eds. Gholamali Haddad Adel, Mohammad Jafar Elmi, Hassan Taromi-Rad, London, EWI Press, 2012, p. 7.

<sup>221</sup> Tayarani et al, *ibid*, p. 6.

<sup>222</sup> Saul Friedman, *a History of the Middle East*, North Carolina: MacFarland Publishers, 2006, p. 286.

<sup>223</sup> Milani, 1994, p. 32–33.



diversity constituted one of the factors for the tribal opposition, mainly the tribal opposition grew larger due to the modernization and centralization efforts. The conscription policy which was enacted in the midst of 1920s affected both the tribal confederations and the clergy. A comprehensive modernization program under the auspices of “a group of capable men that gathered around the Shah started to affect several facets of the society”.<sup>224</sup> Thus, the Pahlavi regime’s relations with the tribal centrifugalism and the clerical opposition did not only rise between the two-staged period of Reza Khan’s rise to Iranian throne, but also it continued after the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty. The centralization efforts and the incorporation of the armed forces lowered the capability of tribal opposition, however, the clerical opposition’s capacity continued partially in the 1930s.

Below, the Pahlavi regime’s relations with the clergy will be examined first. Then, as a second part to understand bases of the opposition, both political and the socio-economic, the relations with the tribal confederations will be assessed.

The clergy, as a major social force in Iranian society, had risen since the times of the Safavid Empire. From the 18th to the 20th centuries, the clergy had provenly asserted a new political caliber that helped it to reach its vertex in the Iranian court. Since the penultimate decades of the 19th century, the clerical power’s diverse features were observed. Mainly, *the usuli and the akhbari* schools<sup>225</sup> had been in the rivalry of which the former had gained superiority from time to time. The clerical figures as prominent subjects of the constitutional period depended upon the traditions such as taking *bast* in a sanctuary (an inviolable locale or seminary) and the less frequently applied way as “the exodus to other Shi’ite poles was resorted”. The alliance with the bazaars, and the merchants to preserve the economic interests of each side mutually, or non-mutually consolidated the clergy’s role in the Iranian political life. In that regard, as Bayandor stated, the members of the clergy had thrown their weight for “the history of past 150 years of Iran”. Mainly, “the arbitrary economic decisions of the court” constituted the main motive of the clerical opposition. As an episode on the clerical opposition’s rise, “the Tobacco boycott movement” was examined in the

---

<sup>224</sup> Milani, *ibid*, p. 32.

<sup>225</sup> Davari, *ibid*, p. 8–10.

first section above.<sup>226</sup> Another episode was the Constitutional Revolution, of which the bazaars and the clergy made an alliance, and the strategic card of taking bast in a sanctuary displayed the modern approach of the clergy. In a sense, the clergy had been the most capable segment of the Iranian society in the modern times to challenge the arbitrary rule. The challenge, in a changing formula, evolved from time to time. As Ramazani asserted the military defeats with Tsarist Russia in the 19th century, the imposition of the peace treaties of Golestan, and Turcomanchai, the opening of telegraphic communication with Britain, the Anglo–Russian rivalry over commercial and economic concessions, the dissemination of foreign ideas through education were all influential on the layers of the Iranian society.<sup>227</sup>

It was apparent that the clergy constituted one of the main tenets of the rising Iranian nationalism, and the ideological core was affected by the clergy. Aside from nationalism, the clergy's massive capacity to influence and mobilize the wider portions of the society could be analyzed by the commemorations of Moharram, the construction of *takyas*, and the staging of passion plays. In that regard, Kamran S. Aghaie examined the political allegiances of Iranians through these commemorations, *takyas*, and the staged passion plays. The temporary tents around the nucleus of the capital city, Tehran gathered thousands of people through the penultimate decades of the 19th century. The construction of the social identity and the mediator role of the clergy evolved from time to time although the essence of the political capability to mobilize the masses continued.<sup>228</sup> As Aghaie stated, the mixture of clergy's quest to mobilize the people both served to the consolidation of the clergy, and the inadequate level of identification in the rise of nationalistic feelings. The goal of exceeding the legitimization depended upon the enlargement of the political base supported by the masses. In that regard, Aghaie's mention lead us to understand that the mediative role of the clergy with the social and economic relationships, in both the elite circles and the level of wider masses continued to

---

<sup>226</sup> Bayandor, *ibid*, p. 18–19.

<sup>227</sup> Ramazani, 1974, p. 124–139.

<sup>228</sup> Kamran S. Aghaie, "Religious Rituals, Social Identities, and Political Relationships in Tehran under Qajar Rule: 1850s-1920s", ed. Robert Gleave, *Religion and Society in Qajar Iran*, Oxon, Routledge, 2005, p. 373–392.

serve the political capability of the clergy's role in Iran. As the basis of these economic and social relationships changed, the forms of the rituals started to change. Thus, from the second half of the 19th century to the early 1920s, the clergy's role had been identified in accordance with the mediation structure of the state.<sup>229</sup> After WWI, the failure of the post-war governments caused the dissatisfaction of the clergy, too. It was such an expectation that the clergy supported the constitutional rule of Reza Khan even though the support stayed within the conditional levels. These suspicions became stronger when the two campaigns were set forth. The abolition of the sultanate (1922) and the caliphate (1924) in Turkey caused not only the differentiation of the monarchical tradition of Iran by its neighbor but also a perception of a cultural and political threat to the clergy in Iran. The role of the ulama as a powerful and privileged layer in the Iranian society was obviously a barrier for the proclamation of Republic in Iran. These discussions, as stated by the demonstrators chanting against the bill passed to the Iranian Majlis by the words "Morde-bad Jomhuri" as stated above, dealt successfully with the "notorious" correlation of the caliphate and the republic. In 1924, American Vice-Consul Robert Imbrie was assassinated due to the rumors about his affiliation with Baha'i belief. On that matter, Keddie asserted that, through the capitulation on the republican campaign in 1924, Reza Khan attempted to placate the clergy, and encouraged an anti-Baha'i campaign which resulted in "a clerically-led torture of the Vice Consul to death to which the regime was rumored to be tied".<sup>230</sup> In the midst of the 1920s, when Reza Khan was on the path of gaining a more grounded support, Iran could not follow the path of Turkey. The main reason behind the failure of the republican campaign was the social and economic bases of the country. The sultanate's continuation by the foundation of a new dynasty named after the early medieval ages' Persian language under the name of Pahlavis was a reference to the margin of path differentiation.<sup>231</sup>

---

<sup>229</sup> Aghaie, *ibid*, p. 387–390.

<sup>230</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 85–86. On the persecution of Baha'is during the early Pahlavi rule Ronen Cohen's *Hojjatiyeh Society* is a helpful source. Please see Ronen A. Cohen, *The Hojjatiyeh Society in Iran: Ideology and Practice from the 1950s to the Present*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 65.

<sup>231</sup> Daniel, Mahdi, *ibid*, p. 29.

As Keddie put forth, the reign of Reza Shah was obviously a period limiting the political life and the “monopolization was highly enforced”.<sup>232</sup> Some prominent figures in Iranian political and social life were assassinated during this time. These executions were mainly attributed to Reza Shah’s despotic regime. Keddie’s example for the clerical opposition, *Modarres* was a key figure to understand the capability of the suppressed opposition. Another prominent figure of opposition, *Dr. Mosaddiq* was amongst the very few opponents who dared to show open opposition to the bill enacting the deposition of the Qajars.<sup>233</sup> The others were prominent liberal intellectuals of the constitutional period, Taqizadeh, left nationalist Yahya Doulatabadi<sup>234</sup> and Modarres. In that regard, as the major organized force behind Reza Khan’s political projections, the support of the Revival Party did not stay in an inadequate level although the political opposition with a few prominent personalities both from the liberal intellectuals, reformists, and the clergy mentioned the risks of arbitrary rule. By December 12, 1925, “a Constituent Assembly modified the articles in the Fundamental Laws concerning the sovereignty of the country, and a vote of 257 to 3, gave Reza Shah and his male heirs the crown” that none of the members of the Qajar dynasty could ever again have the right to seat at the Iranian throne.<sup>235</sup> Up until the midst of 1920s, the main lines of tension between the clergy and the administration of Reza Khan relied upon the conscription policy to unify the national army which was constructed by the Cossack Brigade (1879), and the Swedish-supported gendarmerie (1911). The clergy’s opposition to the conscription policy

---

<sup>232</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 88.

<sup>233</sup> Memduh Şevket Esendal, *Tahran Anıları ve Düşsel Yazılar*, İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999, p. 13.

<sup>234</sup> Yahya Doulatabadi, and his sister Sadeqeh Doulatabadi were prominent intellectual portraits of that time. Since the constitutional period, Sadeqeh Doulatabadi were amongst the pioneers of women’s rights campaign in Iran. She published one of the most powerful journals that defended the political rights of women in the first half of the twentieth century. The publication was named *Zaban-e Zanan* (Women’s Tongue). After her journal was shut down, she went to Isfahan, and then, to Paris, to obtain a university degree to pioneer the Iranian women as an educationalist. She was the first woman to appear publicly unveiled. Since the women’s movement requires a broader analysis, the study did not involve the development of the women’s movement in a general perspective. In that regard, for a brief presentation of the women’s movement in Iran, please see Sedghi, 2007, p. 52–57; Keddie, 2006, p. 87. Nikki R. Keddie, *Women in the Middle East: Past and Present*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 84–88.

<sup>235</sup> Peter Avery, *The Spirit of Iran*, Costa Meza, Mazda Publishers, 2007, p. 647.

represented the commonality with the tribal confederations. On the other hand, not necessarily to constitute a common path with the tribes, the republican campaign of Reza Khan encountered the fierce rivalry and opposition of the clergy. Against the clerical reactions, Reza Khan, as the new Prime Minister after 1923, and the Commander-in-chief of the Iranian Army capitulated within a short period of time. Reza Khan's efforts to distinct himself from Baha'ism developed with the failure of the Republican campaign coincidingly. At the same time, Reza Khan's efforts to overcome the perception of the alienation from the religious dignitaries, and the religiosity were exemplified by Davari as Reza Khan accompanied the Qajar Shah's visit to the newly-established seminary in Qom.

Additionally, paying of Reza Khan pilgrimage to the Holy shrines in Iraq, showing interest in religion and the religious affairs by organizing religious ceremonies such as a mourning of Imam Hossein in a mosque in Tehran were the parts of the efforts to appease the clergy's potent vein of the political opposition.<sup>236</sup> As Davari stated, the second stage of the Pahlavi regime's relationship with the religiosity, in particular, with the capacity of the political opposition by the clergy started after his coronation. The second stage lasted for almost three years as the turning point of the Pahlavi regime to turn into an arbitrary rule. Despite the elimination of the imperial bureaucracy's reformist elements such as Teymurtash, Davar, Firuz came subsequently in the following decade, the early of times of which gave an end to the Shah's perceived threat of being meddled into the political affairs, and the republican conspiracies, the arbitrary rule's roots emerged during the second stage. Briefly, this episode of the relationship between the Pahlavi regime and the clergy evolved as "a mutually-respectful" period.<sup>237</sup> Then, the third stage, which Davari categorized as a period from 1927 to 1941, started. During this period, the Pahlavi regime's implementation of the new modernization steps that transformed the country exceeded the limits of the appeasement policies vis à vis the clergy, and the religiosity. The absence of the democratic principles through the consolidation of the arbitrary rule emphasized the need to look into the changing roles of the clergy within the social and economic bases of the mediated system of the Qajars. Briefly,

---

<sup>236</sup> Davari, *ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>237</sup> Davari, *ibid*, p. 10.

the Pahlavi regime's focus was the change in these relationships which prescribed adversely that the ethnic or social kind of loyalties to the guilds, the prominent social mobilization capacity of the clergy through the rituals could just stay behind the nationalistic, and modernizing efforts of the state.

Likewise, of the reforms undertaken by the leadership of (Gazi Mustafa Kemal) Atatürk in Turkey, Reza Shah's reforms can also be categorized under a few groups encompassing the cultural, educational, legal, political and economic levels. Among these reforms, Keddie first counted the dress reforms. As a prominent scholar in his field, Keddie mentioned, the rule of Reza Shah brought a massive transformation depending on a larger modernization program. The steps were taken by the related modernization program also depended on the infrastructure. Cultural fields' elements were re-organized according to the nationalist sentiments and the westernization attempts. As Daniel and Mahdi emphasized, there were "several measures implemented for the aim of restoring a sense of pride and unity and national identity, ranging from encouraging the study of Iranian antiquities to regulating the kind of clothes people could wear to demanding that foreigners call the country Iran instead of Persia".<sup>238</sup> The introduction of civil law and courts in the 1920s, the state control of education and the emancipation of women represented the main characteristics of the reforms implemented during the early Pahlavi period. Apart from these, one can emphasize the suppressive subordination of religion and religious elements in the society and state administration. Ulamas' role and the influence in the legal field was a clear barrier for the Pahlavi modernization program. The courts' re-designation caused a significant upheaval intermingled by the dress reforms trying to persuade the people of Iran that the women would be a part of the Western landscape in the society.

To give an example to the suppression policies of Pahlavi modernization on the role of the clergy in Iranian society, the simple argument can be given by the cancellation of the clergy's authority on the functioning of courts. Until that time, the historical path of their role on the judiciary system proved the confirmation of court decisions and related to it, the economic base of this layer in the society. Regarding with the degrading of the clergy's role in the society and the legal system, Knapp assessed the

---

<sup>238</sup> Daniel, Mahdi, *ibid*, p. 29.

enactment of a new *Civil Code* in 1928 and the establishment of new civil courts were given as quite significant examples. Knapp asserted that there had been some difficulties in applying these reforms: “Naturally in assessing the significance of these reforms, it has to be realized that they were not all applied with equal vigor everywhere at the same time, for this was clearly not the case. Their real importance is in their cumulative influence on social and cultural practices and habits”.<sup>239</sup>

The ulama’s reactionist voices were clearly heard during those years. The tightening of ulama’s role on the education system started the worsening of this problematic relationship. The new regime’s patterns were re-organized by numerous measures such as the separation of madrasah and the new modern schools. This policy which deepened the tension between the clergy and the policies of Reza Shah brought some upheavals such as the upheavals in Esfahan in 1927, in the holy cities of Qom, in 1928 and of Mashhad in 1935.<sup>240</sup> In the latter example of vicious effort by Reza Shah, the regime substantially stated its anger against the authority of the clergy which basically confronted the modernization efforts of the regime. The latter of these were assessed as “a massacre” by the religious dignitaries and traditional values were thought to be violated. By the orders of the Shah, after a critical sermon at the Imam Reza Shrine, “Ayatollah Madresi raised his voice in complaint and grievance” of the monarch’s trampling down the clerics. As any other opponents or critical personalities, he was imprisoned for many years.<sup>241</sup> Hadji Agha Norullah’s call for the closing of local shops in Esfahan which ended in a hard blow to the Pahlavi administration and Reza Shah Pahlavi’s harsh critique and physical attack<sup>242</sup> on the religious leader *Mohammad Taqi Bafih* in Qom in these years respectively represented the critical breakdown of ties between the ulama and the Pahlavi center of modernization.

---

<sup>239</sup> Knapp, *ibid*, p. 50.

<sup>240</sup> This upheaval was also called as *Goharshad Massacre*. For another narrative, please also see the memoirs of Savak’s former General Hussain Fardust. Fardust, *ibid*, 1999, p. 20–21; Davari, *ibid*, p. 12–13; Please also check Farr, *ibid*, 25.

<sup>241</sup> Ryszard Kapuściński, *Shah of Shahs*, tr. William R. Brand, Katarzyna Mroczkowska–Brand, New York, Vintage Books, 1986, p. 22.

<sup>242</sup> Roger Savory, “Social Development In Iran During The Pahlavi Era”, *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, ed. George Lenczowski, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 97.

Mashhad, as the city where the holy shrine of Imam Reza was located, represented the deepest breakdown of ties between the Pahlavi administration and the ulama. In this regard, the measures of the Pahlavi regime to subordinate the role of the clergy in Iranian society are worth to mention. Armajani counted several measures to subordinate the role of the clergy in the Iranian society. Among these he stated that the “partially discarding of Islamic law, abandonment of the Islamic education, forbidding of the religious processions, the introduction of Persian-Zoroastrian calendar instead of the Islamic calendar, the modernization of mosques, the discouraging of pilgrimage to Mecca” as easily countable examples.<sup>243</sup> Along the construction of new education system, Pahlavi modernization directed towards the foundation of new middle and high schools and the reorganization of university parallel to the Western system of higher education. *Tehran University* was founded in 1934 upon the remains of *Dar’ul Funun*.<sup>244</sup> Although the state control kept its rigid margins during the early Pahlavi regime, the universities functioned as the bastion of freedom during the rest of the Pahlavi era. In that regard, the higher education institutions, as the University of Tehran was the pioneer, were the strong centers of free discussions the currents of thought.<sup>245</sup> It was also a significant step towards the understanding of educational modernization that took place by the foundation of *Persian Language Academy*<sup>246</sup>, or in its original name, *Farhangistan*.<sup>247</sup> Its task depended on the purification of Persian by the distillation of the borrowed words from foreign languages led by Arabic. The purification of

---

<sup>243</sup> Yahya Armajani. “Reza Shah Pahlavi”, *Encyclopedia of World Biography*, v. 9, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1973, p. 161.

<sup>244</sup> There are some contradictory dates on the establishment of Tehran University. As a different example, Goldberg wrote that the university was founded in 1936. Ori Goldberg, *Shi’i Theology in Iran*, Oxon, Routledge, 2012, p. 94. However, the bulk of the relevant sources on the history of modern higher education refer to the date of establishment as 1934. Please also see the article of Hamdhaidari below.

<sup>245</sup> Please also see the following article that assessed the role of the universities on especially the Iranian Revolution, as referring to the populace calling these institutions sangar-e azadi (the bastion of freedom). Shokrollah Hamdhaidari, “Education during the Reign of the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran (1941–1979), Teaching in Higher Education, v. 13, February 2008, p. 17–28.

<sup>246</sup> Armajani, *ibid*, 161.

<sup>247</sup> Melike Anbarcıoğlu, “Gazi Mustafa Kemal ve İran’da Yapılan Reformlar”, *Doğu İlleri Dergisi*, III/4, Ankara, 1983, p. 14. Bausani, *ibid*, p. 177.



Persian had been rooted in the 19th century's modernization attempts. In that regard, the first modernization steps had been taken by *Mirza Taqi Khan-e Farahani* or mostly known as *Amir Kabir* (1848–1851).<sup>248</sup> Also known as *Amir Kabir* (1809–1852) he was the most significant grand vizier or “first hand of the realm” during the 19th century's Qajar administration. He was widely assessed as the enlightening grand vizier of *Naser ad-Din Shah* (1848–1896) during his term in the office; he started the reformist programs to modernize, and to an extent, to centralize the education, mining, agriculture, trade, government and military system of Persia under the Qajar Dynasty. Other than the son of Fath Ali Shah, Abbas Mirza, the historical records count his name as the most pioneering personality to set up some reformist steps which had been feeding the projection of Qajar dynasty's authority within the borders of the country. In that regard, as one of the pioneers of the Iranian modern state, his reformation period, although lasted shortly, requires an analysis of a phase to understand the subsequent development patterns of the social movements in Iran.<sup>249</sup>

Wilhelm Eilers counted some historical steps for the understanding of educational and cultural development in the country from the mid-19th century towards the 1930s. In that regard, to understand the changing roles of the clergy, we can rely on the main phases of this historical development in the 1930s. Eilers assessed the changing roles' of the clergy by looking into the years when he had been to Persia. He added that he made some visits to high schools in Shiraz in 1933. His vivid narration on his visits to Persian high schools in the Fars province represented the newly fixed-up status of men and women, boys, and girls. Other than the high schools (*madrase-ye motavassseteh*), he also counted the dynamic elements in the total education system which gave the signal of common and equal education widespread in the country.

The other schools were the elementary schools (*dabestans*), secondary schools (*daberestans*), boys' schools (*pesaranehs*) and girls' schools (*dokhtaranehs*). Surely, the higher education institutions under the title of universities (*daneshghahs*) were

---

<sup>248</sup> Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 208–209. Please also see Cyrus Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of the Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power*, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 4.

<sup>249</sup> Simin Fadaee, *Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society*, Oxon, Routledge, 2012, p. 38.

also included in this list. Eilers, from his witnessing and studies in Persia in the early 1930s, gave us an account on the meeting at a house of an “amiable headmaster of a high school” which was wrecked by a traditional-minded military officer’s arrival. We learn from this record that his arrival to that home was just before an informal and free conversation on the high school education in Persia. The women who were available at this meeting started to wear veils when the conservative-minded military officer arrived at home. This was prior to the enactment of law by Reza Shah Pahlavi in the mid-1930s. He added the critical change in the society keeping the lines of dualism: “Some years afterward I went again to Iran. By then, no woman or girl wore the veil, at least not in the larger towns. Reza Shah had flatly forbidden the chador. There were stories, not devoid of a comic flavor, of how policemen, equipped with big scissors, were instructed in case of noncompliance to cut asunder the veils of reluctant women”.<sup>250</sup> Within a few years, the westernization of the dress code aimed to strengthen the status of women, and the prospect of a society’s western-type dress code was implemented by force. After the clergy’s fierce opposition was suppressed brutally in Mashhad in 1935, a legal framework was enforced to counter the opposition of the clergy against the Western-type of dress codes. Among the dress codes, the headgears of men, formerly as the *Pahlavi hat*, then as the *fedora*, the unveiling campaign of women played prominent roles which coincidingly sparked the clerical opposition to face a rigid oppression. In that regard, the encompassing repercussions of the Pahlavi modernization program, without yielding to the local officials’ pressures on both the social life and the education system, developed through the emancipation of women, which was formerly exemplified by Sadeqeh Doulatabadi’s unveiled publicly appearance in the midst of 1920s. Abbas Milani wrote on the biography of Hossein Ala and emphasized the role of Rukiye Qaragozlu, as the wife and one of the pioneers of women’s unveiling movement.<sup>251</sup> Needless to say, the Western legacy of the liberal thoughts inclined in the elite circles

---

<sup>250</sup> Wilhelm Eilers, “Educational and Cultural Development In Iran During The Pahlavi Era”, *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, ed. George Lenczowski, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 303–304. Wagner, *ibid*, p. 27.

<sup>251</sup> Please also check the example of Rukiye Qaragozlu. She was one of the first women in her generation to leave off the veil also the wife of Pahlavi era’s prominent Court Minister, diplomat to several Western countries such the United States, Britain and France, and twice Prime Minister in Iran in the 1950s, Hossein Ala. Please see “Hossein Ala”, Abbas Milani, *Eminent Persians*, v. 1, New York, Syracuse University Press, 2008, p. 39.

of Iran, as it took the same path in many countries in the eastern world. As Nikki Keddie stated, Reza Shah had been impressed by the status of women, their participation in the public sphere, and the participation of the girls in the education system when he visited Turkey under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. By looking into the impressions of Reza Shah, it would be much of an exaggeration to state that Iran had not been familiar with the ideas of women's emancipation. Although the modernization cycle of late-Ottoman period brought some advantages to the newly rising Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's role in catalyzing the emancipation process was definitely a high asset for Turkey. At the same time, the opposition of the clergy against the unveiling campaigns did also find its roots back in the modern history of Iran.<sup>252</sup>

The encouragement of women to discard their veils was supported in the legal sphere as the Pahlavi regime went further to punish the clergy's opposition to the westernized dress reforms. These reforms, despite all the type of inadequacies shown by the Pahlavi regime, alienated the clergy and nurtured the political quietism<sup>253</sup> in the 1930s. Thus, in consideration of the education system, the duality of the clergy-led education, and the resistance of the clergy against the dress reforms constituted the new lines of tension between the Pahlavi regime, and the clergy. Although these were not a part of the dualistic approach in a legal framework, the influences of the Pahlavi modernization on the clergy, and the relationship networks of the clergy with the wider masses, in particular in the rural areas, survived in portions from the "shock treatment" of Reza Shah. The approach of a one-man rule, as assessed by Richard Frye in his *Persia*, as believed by many, represented the deterministic school of history when the conditions of chaos, arbitrary society, and the disorder concentrated the people's will to restore the order under a powerful leadership. By looking into the modernization efforts of Reza Shah, Frye described the nature of this

---

<sup>252</sup> Keddie, 2007, p. 87.

<sup>253</sup> Political quietism, as the political stance of the clerical authorities to stay out of the political issues, and the refraining from any political claims against the monarchical rule was mostly attributed to Ayatollah Hossein Borujerdi, as the sole marja'e taqlid in the from the 1940s up to the 1960s.

leadership as “a comic-opera nature” owing to the Opera House constructed in Tehran during the rule of the Shah.<sup>254</sup>

Indeed, as Knapp stated, the emancipation of women was standing as a hard-point for the construction years of Pahlavi modernization: “From the earliest years women began to enjoy a greater degree of freedom; in 1935 his Majesty’s Queen, who took an active part in the social affairs, appeared unveiled in public, and this was followed by an intelligent and forceful movement for the abolition of the veil. This was a movement of much greater general significance than the earlier insistence on male European dress and headwear”.<sup>255</sup> Surely, this was a margin for the understanding of women’s participation in the public sphere, and the education system. The religious reactionism oriented towards the unveiling campaigns of royal women in the midst of 1930s. Bianca Devos and Christopher Werner assessed this cultural reform as the most prominent one in women’s movement (*nahzad-e banovan*). This was mainly called as *Kashf-i Hijab*.<sup>256</sup> On the first days of 1936, the participation ceremony of Royal Family along with Reza Shah Pahlavi to the *Womens’ Teacher’s Training College* was a deep step for the understanding of Pahlavi modernization’s struggle against the religious reactionism. The education was deemed as a key pinnacle for this struggle. Previously, it was strongly opposed by the ulama as to be seen in *Mashad reactionism*.<sup>257</sup> The reaction of Reza Shah Pahlavi against one of the ‘ulama

---

<sup>254</sup> Richard Nelson Frye, *Persia*, Oxon, Routledge, 2011, p. 103.

<sup>255</sup> Knapp, *ibid*, 50. Please also see Avery, *ibid*, p.650. For a brief analysis on non-feminist emancipation of women (which appeared as in a reactionist, anti-Western style) decades after the early Pahlavi modernization, please also see Bahman Nirumand, *İran’da Soluyor Çiçekler*, çev. Kemal Kurt, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1988, p. 272. Nirumand’s critical interview focuses on the post-Islamic revolutionary discussions however brings some comparative assessments on the Pahlavi era’s emancipation.

<sup>256</sup> Bianca Devos, Christoph Werner, “Introduction”, *Culture and Cultural Politics Under Reza Shah: The Pahlavi State, New Bourgeoisie, and The Creation of a New Society in Iran*, eds. Bianca Devos, Christoph Werner, New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>257</sup> Jasmin Rostam-Kolayi, Afshin Matin-Asgari, “Unveiling Ambiguities: Revisiting 1930s Iran’s Kashf-i Hijab Campaign”, *Anti-Veiling Campaigns In The Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and The Politics of Dress*, ed. Stephanie Cronin, Hoboken: Taylor&Francis, 2014, p.121. The author of this article also gave a striking comparison of anti-veiling campaign examples from Turkey and Iran. It is mainly stated that the articulation of kashf-i hijab was banning the *chador* (charshaf in Turkish) and *pichec* (peçe in Turkish) totally. In Turkish example, it was stated as a discouraging element rather than a banning. In this regard, please check another source Sofia A. Koutlaki, *Among The Iranians: A Guide To Iran’s Culture and Customs*, Boston, Intercultural Press, 2010, p. 94.

in Qom was a critical example to understand the inclining tension between the ulama and the Pahlavi administration. It was the breaking up of the path since his visits to holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala in 1924.<sup>258</sup> As Mohsen Milani stated, “the passion plays and the self-flagellations” which played a prominent role in the construction of the clerical network, both vis à vis the ruling elites, and the wider masses, started to vanish after the banning of these plays. Iran’s westernized cultural topography, in the last resort, constituted the Pahlavi modernization program’s top-level achievement, and the networks of which the clergy would benefit such as the education institutions, the Islamic-law implemented courts, charitable lands, university of Tehran, women’s status in the public sphere, state agencies were targeted to put under the monopoly of the Pahlavi regime. The state’s functions raised on behalf of the clergy.<sup>259</sup>

The ceremony which happened in the early days of 1936 witnessed the speech of Reza Shah on the rights and status of women. There, he was an attendant at a ceremony where the male and female graduate nominees to be teachers at modern education institutions of Iran had been invited. He stated the value for the emancipation of women towards the construction of a modern society. This was thought as a society where the women and men would be equal in total terms.

I am exceedingly pleased to observe that, as a result of knowledge and learning, women have come alive to their condition, rights, and privileges... We should not forget that up to this time one-half of the population of the country was not taken into account. No statistics of the female population were taken... I am not trying to point out contrasts between today and the old days but your ladies should consider this as a great day. You should avail yourselves of the opportunities which you now have to improve your country.<sup>260</sup>

The speech of Reza Shah Pahlavi displayed the correlation between the emancipation of women and the construction of modern education in Iran. Pahlavi modernization’s projection was towards the establishment of several schools in the elementary and high levels of education system. As Milani stated, “hundreds of schools were built to the detriment of the traditional *maktabs* administered by the ulama”.<sup>261</sup> Higher education was promoted, too. Knapp referred to the successive yet unfulfilled

---

<sup>258</sup> Banani, *ibid*, 42.

<sup>259</sup> Milani, 1994, p. 33.

<sup>260</sup> Savory, *ibid*, 98.

<sup>261</sup> Milani, 1994, p. 33.

*Ramsar Conferences* on education towards the construction of modern institutions in this field.

Yet he also added:

Nevertheless, the interest taken by Reza Shah was decisive. He helped to bring about a program of elementary, secondary, adult, vocational, and university education at a time when there were no more than 10,000 students in all the state schools. Teachers were trained, schools built, curricula created, textbooks written, chosen students sent abroad for higher studies. It was a formidable undertaking, almost everything being done at once, and it has to be admitted that quality suffered from quantity and that bad educational habits appeared. There is, however, no doubt that whatever the shortcomings, Iranian education owed much to the interest of Riza Shah. Its effect was gradual as it revealed a wider knowledge of the world than had been included in the more traditional religious instruction and indirect as it contributed to the emancipation of women.<sup>262</sup>

Under the light of these, Reza Shah's determination to monopolize the state's functions over the sphere where the clergy's influences were definitely turned out to the construction of a state-sponsored education system. The encouragement of women's movement, the western-type of legal framework by mainly enacting the civil and penal laws, the obligation for the judges to have a formal law degree in order to continue the legal administration, the introduction of the state school system under the ministry of National Education, and the subordination of the traditional maktabas under the same institution, diminishing of the clergy's power in the courts, the foundation of a department of Theology at the University of Tehran (1935) were the main pinnacles of the Pahlavi modernization program that influenced the relationship between the clergy and the Shi'ite based religiosity. After his visit to Turkey, as a rapidly-modernizing neighbor of Iran, the Shah hastened the process of unveiling campaigns with detrimentally marginalizing the clergy's opposition efforts. Hence, after the education system's modernization, the modernization efforts on the cultural field pertinent to the dress code and the women's movement, the legal field, the economic field emerged as the lines of tension between the relationship of two parties. On the women's movement, it is possible to assert that the changing household roles of Iranian women were a tensioned part of the relationship between the clergy and the early Pahlavi regime. In that regard, the women's quest for the higher education depended upon the quest to assume an enlarged role beyond the

---

<sup>262</sup> Knapp, *ibid*, 49.

household that had traditionally been prescribed for them. The women were active against the limits set by the former discourse and their quest towards the higher education status triggered the tension between the clergy and the early Pahlavi regime. As Afsaneh Najmabadi stated, the women opted to enlarge their domestic duties to the national service. The new home was the entire country itself. Although the women's movement was subjected to the citizenship program of the early Pahlavi regime, which Najmabadi stated that it was not a "sell-out", the movement evolved through "the disciplinary as well as the emancipatory dynamics" both of which functioned on behalf, and the dislike of the clergy.<sup>263</sup> One of the substantial evidence for the state patronage to reflect the discipline was the family law (1931–1935) that prescribed the marriages be registered at civil bureaus instead of the religious courts. Setting an age limit for the marriages, the law adjustment, with a requirement for a broader analysis of the legal processes, prescribed the limited alienation of the clergy although the Pahlavi regime's vision was on behalf of the women's emancipation. However, the peculiarities of the country could not enforce the extension of the family law towards the elimination of a unilateral right recognized for the men to divorce. The only exceptions without the will of the men depended upon the decree that assumed "the insanity and impotency".<sup>264</sup>

As a consequence, the Pahlavi regime's prospect, after the turbulence of WWII, the crisis of the oil nationalization campaign, ousting of the popularly-elected Prime Minister Mosaddiq in 1953, the rise of the arbitrary rule through the 1960s, and the deep repercussions of the White Revolution in Iranian society along with the clergy's politicization, survived. However, as Davari stated by his monography on the prominent theoretician of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Motahhari, the physical attacks of the police forces against the clergy's traditional clothes, gazing around with their scissors to cause the perception of *mukalla* (a man without traditional dress) caused the deep resentment of the clergy. Although it would be an exaggeration, it is probable to state that the early Pahlavi period's tension-climbing

---

<sup>263</sup> Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches, and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, p. 206.

<sup>264</sup> *Navigating Contemporary Iran: Challenging Economic, Social and Political Perceptions*, eds. Eric Hooglund, Leif Stenberg, Oxon, Routledge, 2012, p. 89.

efforts to modernize the clergy caused the consolidation of the monolithic structure of the religious dignitaries. However, as Davari stated, Ayatollah Hae'ri played a soothing role by encouraging the political quietism which was assessed by Davari as “a moderate, and wise” policy that helped to protect the religious establishment in Qom.<sup>265</sup> After the tension-climbing aspect of the early Pahlavi regime against the clergy, it was not surprising that the seminary in Qom kept its silence completely, and stood aloof when the country was occupied by Britain and the Soviet Union.<sup>266</sup> To bring a concluding remark of the third stage pertinent to the relationship between the clergy and the Pahlavi regime, Keddie's assertion can help us to understand that the essence of the unveiling campaign did not remain untouched, yet within a limitation of the middle urban classes after the Shah's fall. The “class-based division” was a cross-cutting, clear proof of the fractured legitimization of the Pahlavi modernization's efforts in the cultural field. In the rural areas, the ending of the unveiling campaign after the Shah's reign affected the social milieu of which Keddie put forth the return of the popular and bazaar classes to the all-covering chador though without the face veils.<sup>267</sup>

The tribal confederations, and in particular, the tribal khans were the constituent elements of the structure that legitimized the power structure in Iran for the long-lasting centuries. Since the chain of Safavids, the Afshars, the Zands, the Qajars had proven the fact that the superiority quest of the tribal leadership on the others catalysed the power struggle to behold the centralized state administration. Although the target of the tribal chieftains emerged as the centralization, the problematic of the international domain's crisis, and the provincialism affected the continuity of the chaotic conditions. The curtailing of the centrifugal forces, as a quest to overcome the question of centralization, constituted the main agenda of Iranian rulers and the fate of their arbitrariness by ruling. In that regard, whether it was the same thought of inspiration or not, the tribal revolts had been perceived as a threat to the inclining decentralization of the state. In the wake of WWI, Reza Khan was not the only nationalist figure who opposed the tribal revolts and the threat these have caused

---

<sup>265</sup> Davari, *ibid*, p. 13–14.

<sup>266</sup> Davari, *ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>267</sup> Keddie, 2007, p. 88.



against the territorial integrity of the country. In the previous section, the provincialism was examined. Amongst the policies of Reza Khan against the opponents, the most significant element which represented the consistency of centralization was the suppression of the tribes. Making the tribal confederations distinct from each other, the Shah envisaged the centralization process by way of unification of the Armed Forces, and maintained the titles he gained after the coup in 1921. First, the Shah owned the title of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Within just three years, the tribal revolts, and the provincialism were discarded to a large extent and in the place of it, the centralization process inclined. Although the period of suppression on the tribal resistance did not stop after the first phase of Reza Khan's rise to power, the period followed by the centralization policies to enforce the nomadic peoples to settle in designated areas at very high human costs. As Gronke stated, evolving into the disarmament and the sedentarization of tribes, the policy spanned "one fourth of the population" in the mid-1920s.<sup>268</sup>

In that regard, Katouzian stated that there was an onslaught against the nomadic peoples. After the assessment of the relationship between the clergy and the early Pahlavi regime, it is possible to assert that the early Pahlavi regime, although not in a short period of time, alienated the tribal confederations due to the settlement policies. As the country went under an occupation in September 1941, these tribes all went back to their lands by the help of the Allies. In that regard, Katouzian's assessment helps us to understand the dividing policies of the Allied powers to make a temporary agreement by the designation of these tribes' former lands.<sup>269</sup> William Polk assessed the policy of the early Pahlavi regime on the tribal resistances as a policy of unification. However, whether the policy pertinent to the tribal unrests succeeded or not, he made the negative remarks on Reza Shah's behalf by stating that the Shah could not anticipate the repercussions of the settlement policies. Being deprived of their lands, the pastoral nomads could not contribute to the economy any longer. Polk's which was basically dependent upon the great proportion of the tribal

---

<sup>268</sup> Monica Gronke, *Iran: A Short History*, tr. Steven Rendall, Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2008, p. 119.

<sup>269</sup> Katouzian, 2003, p. 107.

population as the pastoral nomads constituted one sixth or seventh of the total population, then. The suppression of the tribal resistance sourced from the transition period of Reza Khan's to power and the monarchy. As the dark pages of the provincialist demands, the resurrections proved the vulnerability of the domestic politics. Being used by the foreign powers as the bastion in their regions, in particular by British towards their desires to secure India, and southern regions of Iran, Polk stated that the tribal confederations, unless they acquiesced with the Pahlavi regime, and the Shah himself, were seen as "the domestic enemies". There was no way to accept the independence of the tribal confederations, their traditional and historical roles to disrupt the Iranian society, and the dynasties as well. In that regard, the Shah consorted his military strategy to a further extent as the National Army's growth continued. To pick them separately, he divided the tribal confederations, some he flattered, some he attacked. As a matter of fact, the policy to deprive the tribes of their power required a strong military hold on the issues. Yet, the contributive side of the program was the taxation policy which loaded a heavy burden of tax on the tribes. Another policy enforced the tribal confederations to settle in unaccustomed lands where the tribal population suffered from malaria and other diseases. At the same time, the herding seasons of the tribes were met benignly. Finally, the conscription policy, as stated above, deepened the weakening of the tribes as the younger men of the tribal confederations were taken away by the imposition of the conscription. As Galvin Hardy stated the tribal policy of the early Pahlavi regime, as an autocrat, Reza Shah was both "vindictive and unnecessary, but their violent pacification, besides further testing the mettle of their troops, affirmed both his absolute mastery of all his subjects, and his commitment to modernity".<sup>270</sup> What was the reason for Hambly to assess the regime's tribal policy as "unnecessary"? The answer of the author was that the negligence of the regime against "the livestock and the animal husbandry potential in a country that was so much suited to pastoralism caused scarcely less costly suffering in economic terms than the loss of human lives". As a similar view, Polk stated that the Shah did not understand the economic contribution of the nomads to a country "mainly steppe and desert". In his opinion, as a vast territory lacking the sufficient water resources, the

---

<sup>270</sup> Hambly, 2007, p. 225–229.

sustainable way of pastoralism could make economic contributions to Iranian economy. The early Pahlavi regime disrupted this structure of which the pastoral nomads could live in the dry areas. The conditions of the seasons changed the life conditions in the country where the nomads could make harvest of the vast, and dry areas by immigrating to highlands in the summer when the heat increased and the in the winter when the livable conditions in the upper lands started to lessen. Polk assessed that the worsening life conditions of the tribes did not take the attention of the Shah since the early Pahlavi modernization program ascribed the modernization on behalf of any kind of traditional elements in the society. The landscape of the country was more important than these traditional elements. Thus the tribes people were aspected to constitute the bulk of manpower for the newly rising state-run industries. Polk called these people who should no longer stay in their pastoral conditions as the “New Men”, as the national economy was like a boat where the people were trying to row the oars. Although the Shah’s will was that the people in Iran should row, the evolution of the premature modernization attempted to encounter the difficulties.<sup>271</sup> As Peter Tomsen assessed the tribal conflicts in Afghanistan, he dealt with the comparative examples of Iran and Turkey, he stated the confiscation policy of the regime in Iran as well as the imprisonment and tortures of the tribal leaders was realized by the military and political mass of power in both countries.<sup>272</sup> That was why the Pahlavi modernization, although Hambly wrote that “there was hardly any blacker page in Pahlavi Iran than the persecution to which the tribal population was subjected by the Shah’s myrmidons”<sup>273</sup> gained a success on behalf of the future of Iran to lay under the great rupture of the social revolutionary movements. The tribal opposition of the 1920s continued in the 1930s. Hambly assessed these as the Qashqai, Bakhtiari tribes as these were the most prominent tribal confederations which developed some autonomy from the state in the decay of the Qajar Empire. The APOC’s independent relations as a network that threatened the vision of the early Pahlavi regime caused some harsh interventions on the tribal

---

<sup>271</sup> Polk, *ibid*, p. 105–106.

<sup>272</sup> Peter Tomsen, *The Wars on Afghanistan, Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers*, New York, Public Affairs, 2011, p. 64–65.

<sup>273</sup> Hambly, *ibid*, p. 229.

population. The clear formula was the modernization effort. Although the modernization of the early Pahlavi era was described as “oppressive and brutal”, that was not unusual during the interwar period. As an interim period, the European politics as well the political systems in “the Third World” as the Western scholars called later on, witnessed the fascist regimes, of which the brutality was no less than the early Pahlavi regime. It was a part of the legitimization that supported the coercive police state in Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi. As a result of these, when the Shah was deposed in 1941 under the turmoil of WWII, with the pretext of British and the Soviet decision-makers to secure the all-seasons route of Iran and the oil reserves of the country against the threat of the already-rising German fifth column agents, the tribal confederations did not consort to a way to resist the occupation. Briefly, the conscription policy, the taxation policy which imposed the heavy burden on the peasants and the tribal confederations, the imprisonment, the torture and the execution of the tribal leaders such as Sardar As’ad Bakhtiari<sup>274</sup>, the settlement policies which deprived the tribes off their pastoral lands were the main reasons that froze the tribal resistance to a greater extent under the formidable autocracy of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Although the tribes ceased to resist during the second half of the 1930s, the tribal resistance, with the chief tribal confederations having the chance to return their pastoral lands, did resuscitate. As Jerrold D. Green stated, the suppression of the tribal resistances constituted one of the main lines of the agenda during the early period of second Pahlavi monarch.<sup>275</sup> After all, it is imperative to note the suppression of the tribal resistance and the revolts did not exclude the early Pahlavi regime’s vision to educate the youth of these tribes. One of the remarkable examples was Karim Sanjabi who, as a descent of the Kurdish tribe of Sanjabi from Kermanshah, owned the family roots traditionally in opposition to the early Pahlavi regime. Sanjabi had been amongst the students who were sent abroad for education. He obtained a law degree in Paris, France by the support of the Iranian Government

---

<sup>274</sup> "Sardar Assad" *Times* [London, England] April 20, 1934, p. 9.

<sup>275</sup> Jerrold D. Green, *Revolution in Iran: the Politics of Counter-Mobilization*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982, p. 15.

under the early Pahlavi regime.<sup>276</sup> Thus, the main criteria for the tribal resistance did not exclude the persuasion policy, and the overtly opposition relied upon the decision of the Pahlavi governments. Undoubtedly, the singularity of the Pahlavi regime's implementation of such policies to eradicate the tribal traditions did not alter the general picture. In total, the nationalization program via the secular modernization served to the country's future goals. However, the studies of the tribal anthropology continued in the following years, especially in the 1960s. As Nematollah Fazeli stated, the anthropological interest on the tribal confederations continued after the nationalization program of the early Pahlavi regime that aspired for a secular, modern, developed Persian-speaking nation that challenged with the autonomy of the tribes, and the indigenous features crosscutting the national agenda. In that regard, the tribes which opposed the rule of law by their resistances and the modern state were put under the scrutiny in the following years. Hence, the studies of the nomadic tribes continued to constitute the most salient and sensitive branches of the anthropology discipline for more than four decades.<sup>277</sup> In a comparative scale, it is possible to assert that the Pahlavi regime's scrutiny on the tribal anthropology constituted much exceeding interest than the anthropology of religion. After the relationship of the Pahlavi regime vis à vis the clergy, and the Shi'ite religiosity and the tribal confederations, below the next section will examine the main facets of the Pahlavi modernization program.

### **2.3.2. Revisiting The Shah's Modernization Program**

From 1921 to 1926, the unification, the centralization, the appeasement combined with the compromise policies and the suppression of the tribal revolts marked the genuine facet of the rising administration of Reza Khan. After he became the Shah of Iran and started to construct a new dynasty, of which the Iranian society could not

---

<sup>276</sup> Sanjabi played prominent roles in Iranian politics since the late 1940s. He served as the Minister of Education in the popularly-elected Government of Mosaddiq's National Front (Cebhe-ye Melli), and was offered the position of Prime Minister in the late 1970s by the late Shah. However, he rejected the offer, and went to France to reside Ayatollah Khomeini. After the Revolution of 1979, he took part in the Mahdi Bazargan's government as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for a short period of time. Then, he was forced to flee Iran, and exiled in the United States. He died in that country in Illinois in 1995. Please see Lorentz, "Karim Sanjabi", 2007, p. 279–280.

<sup>277</sup> Nematollah Fazeli, *Politics of Culture in Iran, Anthropology, Politics and Society in the 20th Century*, Oxon, Routledge, 2005, p. 78.

find an historical legacy in terms of the “dye of religion”, as a reference to the Ibn-Khaldunian vocabulary, he directed towards the modernization and secularization policies by the “dye of leadership and kingship”.<sup>278</sup> By focusing on an authoritarian modernization program including the profoundly changes via secularization, Reza Shah’s “dye of leadership and kingship” was comparable with the former example of Nader Shah in the closest sense. Polk assessed that the legitimacy of the Iranian throne depended not only the dye of religion but also the dye of leadership. Reza Shah’s success depended upon the scope of the authoritarian rule and the modernization program’s implementation relied upon the construction of an arbitrary rule. The Shah’s state administration and the political philosophy stood along the lines of strong military, limitation of the capitulations, unification and consolidation of the state authority, development of transportation in a country-wide scale, industrialization, promotion of Western-based legal codes and the modern educational and cultural institutions. Below, these steps taken by Reza Shah will be scrutinized. However, before taking up with the early period modernization program of the Pahlavi regime, one may look into the assessments of R. Savory and R.N. Frye on Reza Shah Pahlavi. Savory assessed the prominent role of Reza Shah to claim that he was the starting point to launch the country into the 20th century although the Western type of political thoughts had already been circulating in Iran during the constitutional period.<sup>279</sup> Despite the mass demonstrations which proved the mobilization of the many layers in Iranian society, and the transformation at the institutional level, the landscape of the country could just change under the reign of Reza Shah in a profoundly scale. The state bureaucracy’s alteration of the whole military, legal, judicial, educational, economic and administrative sectors affected many layers in the society. In that regard, Frye made a comparison of Reza Shah with Peter the Great of Russia, as the both leaders envisaged to change the landscape of their countries. In addition to these assessments, Abrahamian stated that Reza Shah ascended the throne “much in the fashion of his heroes, Napoleon, and Nader Shah”.<sup>280</sup> As Ori Goldberg put forth, the Shah had never been an “overt ideologue”,

---

<sup>278</sup> Polk, *ibid*, p. 103–104.

<sup>279</sup> Savory, 1970, p. 595. Frye, *ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>280</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 65.

although “he enamored the Western state”. By looking into the Western state type, he found the uncontested “homogenous state” type which did not assume any alternative spaces than its single, monolithic space. The citizenship’s designation, under the Western type of state, and “the rightful monarch”, was organized according to the sole authority which covered all of “the citizen-subjects’ lives”.<sup>281</sup>

In order to understand the legitimization of the modernization program, Knapp’s assessment is an insightful example. As a Shah, depriving the royal heritage, conscious of the nationalist tendencies in the society as well as in the elite circles, the Shah sought to mention the breaking up of the country’s traditional ties on behalf of the modernized state infrastructure that targeted to boost the national independence. As Knapp asserted, “the ambitions of Reza Shah Pahlavi for Iran were an extension of his own achievement -that Persia should control its own destiny, a renewed country, called Iran, free from the constraints imposed by outside powers”.<sup>282</sup> For the purpose of eliminating the constraints, the country’s massive modernization program would function without any hesitation, without any obstacles to prevent disruption of the monolithic state structure and the sole authority of the rightful monarch would enlighten the country’s disdained future. Along these years, Reza Shah’s main aspect was towards the centralization of both standings upon the indirect benefits of foreign counsellorship and the administration capabilities by the centralization of power through the state mechanisms. In that regard, we may not omit the fact that foreign counsellorship was a medallion to see both sides of the clashes among the foreign powers such as Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in Iran. Reza Shah’s choices were not myriad whereas the real sides of the foreign influence in Iran presented the main difficulties along with the companies led by the *Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)* that culminated the tension in the early 1930s.

In the field of economic and political development, some of the modernization steps were the centralization of power, the establishment of a civilian bureaucracy, the unification of the army and the nationalization steps to build up the development projects. As Abrahamian stated the hallmark of the Reza Shah era was to be “state-building”. His state-building program sourced from the lack of a centralized state, of

---

<sup>281</sup> Ori Goldberg, *Shi’i Theology in Iran*, Oxon, Routledge, 2012, p. 94.

<sup>282</sup> Knapp, *ibid*, p. 48.

which he aspected to change “the ramshackle administration into a centralized state”. Here, Abrahamian’s example is an explanatory one although Stalin’s Soviet Union was a vast country in comparison with Iran. Stalin’s achievement to transform a country of the wooden plow to the level of an atomic bomb would not shadow the early Pahlavi regime’s achievement where the shaky background of the state administration was sought to be transformed. Without consorting to the deep rhetoric and philosophy, Reza Shah targeted to combine the tripartite elements as given by Abrahamian *the Shah, Khoda (God), and Mehan (Nation)*. Thus, symbolically, as a cohesion element, these three were mixed in the persona of the Shah, and the combination of these was used for the pacification of the tantamount opposition. Otherwise, the opposition’s treason was perceived as inevitable.<sup>283</sup> Reza Khan set out to achieve the goal of unifying various Iranian peoples into one coherent nation by carrying out infrastructure projects such as all-weather roads and Iran’s first railway line (*Trans-Caspian Railway*) which established easier links between the capital city, Tehran and the other provinces.<sup>284</sup> Along with these steps, the adjustment of the financial system under the guidance of foreign counselors carried great importance. The collective action’s development patterns in the recent history of Iran put forth the rising objection of the wider masses, the clergy members, the bazaar merchants, the modernists and more important than these, the ordinary people whose economic status deteriorated from time to time could take action against the foreign intervention. The Belgian customer expert, *Mr. Naus*, at the onset of the Constitutional period, was an example of the collective mind that opposed the foreign counselors.<sup>285</sup>

Regarding the increasing of the state revenues, one of the main goals was the registration of all expenditures and revenues to find out the main basis of economy in Iran. As the product of the Perso-American negotiations that did not make a concrete result by an oil concession to the American companies<sup>286</sup>, a new American expert

---

<sup>283</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 65–66.

<sup>284</sup> Koutlaki, *ibid*, 206.

<sup>285</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 41–49.

<sup>286</sup> For a full story of American-Iranian relations between 1921–1925, numerous sources can be checked. Pertinent to the oil concession negotiations, the monography of Houshang Sabahi is a



arrived Iran to adjust the economy. The name of the new expert was Arthur C. Millspaugh (1883–1955). He served as the General Directorate of Finances in Iran from 1922 to 1927.<sup>287</sup> Prior to his term at the office of Financial Affairs, during the Constitutional period, Morgan Shuster (1877–1960) was a key figure who represented the rise of foreign expertise in accordance with Iran’s quest to balance the foreign power’s rivalry in the field of financial affairs. His term lasted shortly during the late phase of Constitutional Revolution (1906–1911). For a short while, as a period less than a year, and although his mission failed which he narrated in his memoirs in a detailed way soon after<sup>288</sup>, he was a remarkable figure to represent the American assignment and task in Persia to build the financial system’s skeleton. Millspaugh’s financial position as an advisor was definitely critical. The state’s financial skeleton could help to boost the authority, and the military’s expansion was a contradictory adjustment from the risk of implementation of the security policies which could undergo a failure. Indeed, the Millspaugh mission did face a kind of anti-American reactionism of clerics based upon the stereotypes directed to American Vice Consul in Tehran in 1924. The American Vice Consul *Robert Imbrie* was killed by “a frenzied mob of the clergy and soldiers” after a misidentification of him as misperceiving “notoriety-attributed” believer of Baha’ism. The nationalist sentiments from many layers caused the discussions, and probably by the tendency of arbitrariness, and owing to the nationalist opposition to the foreign intervention in the state system of finances, Reza Shah could benefit from the situation to discharge the

---

valuable source that deals with the British policy’s transformation in Iran. In his work, looking into these years, this policy’s contributive part can be examined under the title of Anglo-American partnership. Please see Houshang Sabahi, *British Policy in Persia: 1918–1925*, London, Frans Class, 1990, p. 133–148. Please also see Hambly, 2007, p. 221.

<sup>287</sup> Please recheck the footnote about Arthur C. Millspaugh’s mission in Iran during the 1920s. Inlow, *Shahanshah: A Study of The Monarchy of Iran*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979, p. 142. Amongst the financial advisors who were missioned to adjust the financial affairs in Iran, one can count some of the high ranked advisors. Before Millspaugh, Morgan Shuster was the first person reflecting the American interests and foreign aid in both technical and financial ways. For Shuster, please see Lorentz, *ibid*, 313. Ghani, *ibid*, p. 12. Polk, *ibid*, p. 96–97. Besides, Lorentz gave the accounts of Groseclose (1899–1983) who served as the assistant to Arthur Millspaugh (1883–1955) during his second term in financial administration office. Please see Lorentz, *ibid*, 113–114. For the biography of Arthur Millspaugh, Lorentz presented two terms in office. The second term in office when Millspaugh went on a relatively shorter term was in 1943. It will also be dealt later in the following chapter. Please see Lorentz, *ibid*, 205. Please check also Farr, *ibid*, p. 23.

<sup>288</sup> Morgan C. Shuster, *The Strangling of Persia: a Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans, a Personal Narrative*, New York, Appleton Century Croft, 1912.

American expert Millspaugh.<sup>289</sup> Polk's assessment on "the infuriation of the Shah" was a significant example to understand the arbitrary nature of the rule, which as a tradition that inherited from the patrimonial state system contradicted with the modern state's prerequisites. As Polk stated, the Shah was infuriated by the confinements of the strictly-implemented budget. He aspected to separate a grand portion of the budget for a national Army, which would guarantee the security of the new rule, and the monarchy, and the territorial integrity of the country, as well as the strength of the state. However, by not accepting the confinements on his rule, and the financial administration, Polk assessed the Shah's vision as he perceived the state budget as his "wallet".<sup>290</sup> After the dismissal of Millspaugh, the economic administration carried vital importance in order to strengthen the goals for the independence. The capitulations were the obstacles in front of the vision that assumed the consolidation of the political independence. After all, the abolition of the capitulations in 1928 represented the new phase for the country to demand an egalitarian base of relationship in the international context. The Shah's prominent nemesis was a not a personality, or a social layer, but by and large, through the perspective of egalitarian base of relationship, his and the early Pahlavi regime foresaw the nemesis as the British and Soviet desires. Among the traditional patronage networks of both imperialist powers, without a distinction between the two sides, the Shah's core nemesis was overtly the APOC. As Kinzer put forth, from 1928, the quest of setting up a more equitable accord with the British sought to change the % 16 percent share of Iran by the APOC's oil revenue profits, and the steadily widening living conditions with the British employees in Iran catalysed the process. Within a four-year period, the Shah's demands were not taken seriously by the British, and mostly these were deterred. However, as early as 1932, the tension between Iran and Britain started to incline. Being refused, and put to delays in many

---

<sup>289</sup> Please see. Michael Zirinsky, "Blood, Power and Hypocrisy: The Murder of Robert Imbrie and American Relations With Pahlavi Iran, 1924", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 18 (1986), p. 275–276. Clawson, Rubin, *ibid*, p. 52. On that case, Henry S. Villard, in the country reader that assessed witnessings of the U.S. members of the corps diplomatique, by recalling the assassination of Robert Imbrie as one of his predecessors, stated that "it was not a very encouraging start to live in Persia" at that time. Please also see the interview record of the American Vice Consul Henry S. Villard in Tehran between 1929–1931. <http://adst.org/oral-history/country-reader-series/> p. 10.

<sup>290</sup> Polk, *ibid*, p. 103.

attempts, the Shah, after a brief investigation on the record of talks that the Pahlavi bureaucrats conducted with the APOC officials, suddenly cancelled the APOC concession. In despair and frustration, the situation of non-accord was transmitted to the League of Nations. As the chairman of APOC, Sir John Cadman<sup>291</sup> preferred the way to make personal enterprise to make negotiations with the Shah. After a few days of negotiations in 1933, the Shah accepted to prolong the APOC concession for a sixty-year period. A minimum amount of 975,000 pounds annually were guaranteed under the new accord with the promises for the improvement of the Abadan oil workers, and the reduction of the D'Arcy concession-covered areas by three quarters. A contributive agreement was made between the two parties as the Shah did not like the name of Persia, it was concluded that the new name of the company would be Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Kinzer asserted by standing on the testimony that the APOC Chairman Cadman was "personally satisfied" with the new accord, which fixed the bilateral relations up for the rest of Reza Shah's reign.<sup>292</sup> Regarding the satisfaction of the British side, one important point to support this view can be emphasized. Elm wrote that the Shah's fearful act to retreat, and mediate when the British side pressured caused a lately-regretted cancellation of the D'Arcy concession. The new agreement was extended for a sixty-year period in the place of the thirty-year agreement formerly, and this situation was criticized by the prominent members of the Iranian Legation at the League of Nations who attended the negotiations on the dispute between Iranian Government, and the APOC, Sayyed Hassan Taqizadeh, and Hossein Ala. According to two diplomats, the negotiations had been a mistake. As a prominent personality in the political life of Iran, Taqizadeh shared his views on why "the onerous terms" were admitted that the sole authority in

---

<sup>291</sup> Donald N. Wilber, *Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and The Reconstruction of Iran*, Hicksville, Exposition Press, 1975, p. 150. On the role of John Cadman, formerly the Professor of Oil Engineering at Birmingham University, at the Royal Commission to conduct the investigation on the oil sources in 1912, and his taking part in government bodies such as Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee (1919) and Government's Oil Secretariat, and the roles on San Remo Oil Negotiation which permitted Britain to build pipelines from Persia and Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean through the territories under the French mandate. Please see the following article. Roxane Farmanfarmanian, "The Politics of Concession: Reassessing the Interlinkage of Persia's Finances, British Intrigue and Qajar Negotiation", In *War&Peace in Qajar Persia*, ed. Roxane Farmanfarmanian, Oxon, Routledge, 2008, p. 221–222.

<sup>292</sup> Stephen Kinzer, *All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, New Jersey, John Wiley&Sons, 2003, p. 51–52. Please also see Elm, 1994, p. 27–40.

the country was the Shah, and “it would be appropriate to lay the fault at the feet of the principal instead of the agents”.<sup>293</sup>

For a considerable step to elevate the level of Persia then, Reza Shah’s administration searched for a detailed program to abolish the capitulations, to adjust the commercial treaties, foreign trade, fiscal and financial institutions i.e.<sup>294</sup> As Charles Issawi presented some important details on this period’s economic quest for independence and power, it was a clear fact that Iran was standing in the third position of the list including the prominent countries in the Middle East. These countries were Egypt, Turkey and Iran. Accordingly, he added: “Iran’s lack of development at the beginning of Reza Shah’s reign may be judged by comparing her with two other Middle Eastern countries with roughly equal populations and a similar historical and cultural background”.<sup>295</sup> In his list, Issawi presented the main indicators to measure the simple way of development. According to this table, the population of these countries, imports, railways, automobiles, cement output, refined sugar output and lastly, students enlisted in schools were compared. Iran, right before the coronation of Reza Khan in 1926, was nearly a weak country in comparison with Egypt and Turkey. In this order, Iran’s population was around 12,5 million. The others owned around 14 and 13,1 million population. Imports were given by the scale of millions of dollars. In 1925, Iran was at the level of 88 million dollars import. The two others were at the level of 250 and 246 million dollars. Iran’s worst record amongst the basic level of indicators is given as the railroads. When compared with these countries and in regard to the grand project of Trans-Caspian or Trans-Iranian Railway<sup>296</sup> which was completed through 1938 after almost eleven years of construction, Iran was definitely staying at an underdeveloped level. The counterpart examples such as Egypt and Turkey were at the level of 4555 and 4700 kilometres. In 1925, Iran’s substructure at the railroad construction was just 250 kilometres long. On this topic, Issawi wrote:

---

<sup>293</sup> Elm, 1994, p. 39.

<sup>294</sup> Charles Issawi, “Iranian Economy 1925–1975: Fifty Years of Economic Development”, *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, ed. George Lenczowski, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 131.

<sup>295</sup> Issawi, *ibid*, p. 131.

<sup>296</sup> Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 334.

But the most ambitious transport project was the Trans-Iranian Railway, linking the Caspian port of Bandar Shah with the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Shahpur, a distance of 1394 kilometres. Begun in 1927 it was opened to traffic in 1938, at a total cost of about \$150 million. The extension of the line northward to Tabriz and eastward to Mashad was interrupted by the invasion of Iran in 1941, after 853 of the 1553 kilometres of line had been completed.<sup>297</sup>

About a number of automobiles, Iran was just relatively closer to Egypt and Turkey. A number of automobiles were 4450 in Iran. In the other two countries, the number of automobiles was registered as 17740 and 7500. Mainly, Turkey was a relatively further example than Egypt when it was compared to the use of automobiles. In Iran, 1925 met with no amount of cement output. According to the statistics, no possibility of the cement fabrication in Iran put its potential revealing its disadvantage against its counterparts in the Middle East region. Egypt's cement output was around 90000 during this period through the end of the 1920s.

On the other hand, Turkey's output amount was relatively considerable, 59000. At the amount of refined sugar output, the measure of metric tons was used like it was used for the cement output. Iran's refined sugar output also reveals as a null. This scale meets with the amount of 109000 metric tons in Egypt and 5000 metric tons in Turkey. Finally, Issawi examined the number of students enrolled at the schools in those three countries. Iran's record appeared as 74000 in 1925. The same scale presented the number of students who were enrolled at schools in Egypt and Turkey as 635000 and 413000. Iran's fiscal and financial system, as well as the status during the 1920s and 1930s, are also evaluated by Issawi. The details of the adjustments in the fiscal and financial system of Persia reflected the backside of the medallion, where the historians may find out the autonomy and the self-administration capacity of Persia's Pahlavi rule. Reza Shah's personal attitude depended upon the financial independence. According to this approach, it was clearly a structural element for the consolidation of economic policy in Iran.

---

<sup>297</sup> Issawi, *ibid*, p. 131.

TABLE 2,1<sup>298</sup>

IRAN, EGYPT, AND TURKEY 1925: SELECTED INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT			
	IRAN	EGYPT	TURKEY
Population (millions)	12.5	14	13.1
Import (millions of dollars) *a	88	250	246
Railways (kilometres)	250	4555	4700
Automobiles *b	4450	17740	7500
Cement Output (metric tons)	-	90000 *c	90000 *c
Refined Sugar Output (metric tons)	-	109000 *c	5000 *c
Students in schools	74000	635000	413000

Source: League of Nations, *International Statistical Yearbook*, 1926 and 1927; United Nations, *The Development of Manufacturing Industry in Egypt, Israel, and Turkey*.

- a. Exports are omitted since both the inclusion and the exclusion of petroleum would be misleading.
- b. 1926.
- c. 1928.

The main elements of the development projects were transport and industry rather than the agriculture, irrigation, or even the nationalization of petroleum resources. Meanwhile, the tariff autonomy of Persian economy since 1928 and the professional reorganization and regulation of the fiscal system depending on the revenues of twenty-seven monopolies in tobacco, sugar, tea, and other goods. Here, a historical perspective can make the readers understand the substantial portion of eradication on the financial system's deficits. An excerpt from Issawi can avoid misleading information on the evolution of fiscal system led by the measures of Reza Shah's administration. During this period, a number of revenues rose steadily as it was simply stated by the words of Issawi.

---

<sup>298</sup> Issawi, *ibid*, p. 130.

From 229 million rials in 1922 revenues rose to 400 million in 1931 –converting a substantial deficit into a small surplus– and to 1,376 million in 1938 and 3,200 million in 1941. Defense absorbed much of expenditure, but its share fell from over 50 percent in the 1920s to 26 percent in 1939, while that of public works and social services rose steadily to 30 percent.<sup>299</sup>

Yet, to understand the changes in those three countries during the second half of the 1920s and almost the entire length of 1930s, the table which would present the basic indicators of development might be profitable. By glancing at those basic indicators of development, Issawi assessed the main features of development during the rule of Reza Shah. The essential pillars of this program to carry out the development were designed strictly on economic independence. Independence as a thought and goal was fed by the projection of the eradication policies on capitulations. Surely, his approach was a fresh one. It was not comparable to the mutual approaches led by the rulers and the high political figures in Iranian political arena. Qajar dynasty's dependency was something where the arrows of the Pahlavi administration stood far away. Depending on the revenues which can be summarized by the taxes, oil revenues, the new rule in Iran evolved by the registration of financial sources. Issawi's point helps us understand the main deficiencies of Iran to become an independent country although the foremost consistency level was combined with the limited sources of revenues.

This development was carried out without any foreign financial assistance. Offers of foreign loans were turned down, for fear they might jeopardize the country's independence and, as noted before, oil revenues were allocated to military uses. The cost of the whole development program was met by taxes, mainly on consumption. Needless to say, in this as in all similar strenuous attempts to accelerate development, there was a considerable waste and the cost to the consumer and taxpayer was high.<sup>300</sup>

Militarily needs of the new regime were somewhat restrictive whereas the professionalization's motive and dynamism were freshly invigorating. For all these restrictions, Iran stood amidst the fire zone which can be remembered as a metaphor. This fire zone enlarged from time to time, yet it did not reach up to a level for Persia to get closer to its further counterparts. In this regard, we can check the main indicators once again. In 1938, Iran's population grew to 15 million. Latter countries,

---

<sup>299</sup> Issawi, *ibid*, p. 132.

<sup>300</sup> Issawi, *ibid*, p. 133.

Egypt and Turkey's populations grew to 16,4 and 17,1 million. Imports given by millions of dollars were around 55, 184 and 119 respectively. Railways were strategically crucial for Persia during the 1920s and 1930s. The grand project of Trans-Iranian Railway reached up to the level of 1, 700 kilometers. Egypt's railways grew up to 5,606 kilometers and Turkey's railways grew -the most- up to 7, 324.

Automobiles as a scale to see the vehicles on the transportation substructure could make Iran's record relatively stronger. 15, 000 automobiles were met by 33,700 and 11, 300 in the latter countries. Cement output was given as 65,000 in Iran. Egypt's record was 375,000 metric tons and Turkey's was 287,000 metric tons. Next, to the cement output, the virtual refined sugar output rose to 22,000 from null in Iran. In Egypt, this number rose to 238,000 and in Turkey, it rose to the level of 247,000. Cereal output which was given by million metric tons were given by average, 3,09. In Egypt, it was around 3.63. In Turkey, this number was around 6.46. While coming to the cotton output, we can see the level was given by metric tons of 34, 000. Egyptian example was given by 400,000 and Turkish example was given by 52,000. Energy consumption is another scale to understand the substructural facilities. Iran's record was around 1.55 while the latter were around 2.05 and 2.18 respectively. Lastly, the number of students enrolled at the schools are given as 234,000. Iran's record was met by a record a few times more in both countries. Egypt's record was six-fold bigger than Iran as Turkey's record was around 810,000.<sup>301</sup> According to these economic indicators, one can state that the economic performance of the country during the interwar period was somewhat satisfying in terms of making it closer to the counterparts whereas the deficiencies and the partial dependencies were staying alive. Reza Shah's great concerns are explained by the perception of dependency to jeopardize the independence level of the country. For almost a century, Iran's record was kept under the tutelage of the foreign powers. 19th century's "great game" was opposed and the challenge of the Pahlavi modernization was vividly growing. Regarding with the basic consumption goods and the main monopolies such as the tea, tobacco, i.e. the new administration took some measures to get beyond the levels of dependency. Monopolies were under the service of state's huge investments. High taxes were making a heavy burden for the citizens. As Parviz

---

<sup>301</sup> Issawi, *ibid*, p. 133.



Ilmi stated her dissertation almost of the entire of Iran's history converged with the taxation policies of the empires and kingdoms, and the repercussions these policies.<sup>302</sup>

TABLE 2,2<sup>303</sup>

IRAN, EGYPT, AND TURKEY, 1938: SELECTED INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT			
	IRAN	EGYPT	TURKEY
Population (millions)	15	16.4	17.1
Import (millions of dollars) *a	55	184	119
Railways (kilometres)	1,700	5,606	7,324
Automobiles *b	15,000	33,700	11,300
Cement Output (metric tons)	65,000	375,000	287,000
Refined Sugar Output (metric tons)	22,000	238,000	247,000
Cereal Output (million metric tons)*a	3.09	3.63	6.46
Cotton Output (metric tons)*b	34,000	400,000	52,000
Energy Consumption	1.55	2.05	2.18
Students in schools	234,000	1,309,000	810,000

Source: League of Nations, International Statistical Yearbook, 1939/40; United Nations, Review of Economic Conditions In The Middle East, 1949-50; *ibid.*, 1951-52; al-ihsa al-sanawi; İstatistik Yıllığı.

a. Wheat, barley, maize, rice –annual average, 1934–38.

<sup>302</sup> Tax policies of Iranian administrations and the reactions against the heavy burden of the taxes constitute a vital part of Iran's history. In that regard, please also see an unpublished thesis by Parviz Ilmi. Perviz Ilmi, *İran'da Maliye ve Verginin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Hayata Etkisi*, İstanbul University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Ph.D., 1973, p. 134.

<sup>303</sup> Issawi, *ibid*, p. 133.

- b. Lint-annual average, 1934–38.
- c. Million metric tons of coal equivalent.
- d. 1936/37.

Rising investments caught the averages consent of the population whereas there was already a potential of local upheaval against the rising central authority in Iran. The suppression of local upheavals such as Sheikh of Muhammarah was already in the minds of people and the administration. As Cronin put forth, the unification of the army was characterized by both the “positive” and “negative”, that’s accompanied by another term such as “counter-productive” ways. “Throughout this period the army, although of doubtful conventional military capability, was extremely successful in advancing, not merely the power of an impersonal state, but the political ambitions of its own chief”.<sup>304</sup>

Cronin’s main argument is based on putting the paradoxical sides of the military modernization under Reza Shah. In that regard, she specially dealt with the capabilities, threats, and position of the local authorities vis á vis the Pahlavi rule. In accordance with the disintegration threat of the army and the overcoming of Reza Shah on this threat, she carefully pointed out that there were “structural strains and weaknesses”<sup>305</sup> during this period. On the striking examples for the lackness of the military’s full authority over Iran, Cronin reminded the tribal uprisings which had taken place in the province of Fars, in 1929. Being scattered across the lands of the Bakhtiari tribes, the uprisings were almost the last confrontation of Reza Shah’s army with the local tribes. From time to time, the pacification of the tribes provided a widespread authority and fame for Pahlavi rule.

Another study on the tribal activism, Richard Tapper’s *Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of The Shahsevan* presented the researchers who study history a great deal of work on the tribal confederations during the interwar period. The vanishing of the decentralized authority during the time of Reza Shah depended on two main goals which sought to see the settlement of the tribal structures and the appeasement and disarmament policies followed the former policy. Needless to say,

---

<sup>304</sup> Stephanie Cronin, “Reza Shah and The Paradoxes of Military Modernization In Iran: 1921–1941”, *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Riza Shah, 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 59.

<sup>305</sup> Cronin, 2003, p. 60.

the taxation policy's consolidation was already a temporary solution for the declaration of pacific politics and financial status. Thenceforth, the taxation policy's failure or success was going to prove the legitimacy of the policies led by Reza Shah. During the first decade of his rule, Tapper asserted, he was already successful in the pacification and disarmament policy. Nonetheless, he was also far from the victorious cries when it was the term on the settlement policy. Tapper's questions can bring us the medallion's other side about the success of the settlement policy. His point on the tribal activism takes us to the uneasy relationship between the central authority's side, Pahlavi administration and the decentral forces such as the clergy and the tribes. Amongst these tribal uprisings against the central authority, Reza Shah's both attempts during which his term in office as prime minister and term at the throne as the Shahanshah were critical. In 1924, the uprising of Shaykh Khaz'al to gain autonomy in Khuzestan<sup>306</sup> was a clear example to understand the suppression policies of Reza Khan. His rising authority in the political sphere and the military was proving the search for the national securitization of the oil-rich lands such as Khuzestan. Consisting of two strategically important cities such as Khorramshahr and Abadan, this province including the Arabic-speaking portion of Iran as a not negligible quantity, was also strategically important for the main route of the Trans-Iranian Railway.<sup>307</sup> Thus, the revolt of Shaikh Khaz'al or other examples were the challenges about which Reza Shah took some measures adroitly. Tapper asserted:

Reza Shah's tribal policy had two main aspects, and was implemented in two distinct phases: a campaign of pacification and disarmament, carried out mostly before he became Shah, and a program of nomad settlement enforced during his last decade. The pacification campaign, often quoted as a successful example of his strong-arm approach, is well documented, but there is little detailed record of the enforced settlement, which by contrast has received considerable –largely justifiable– notoriety as a brutal and catastrophic failure.<sup>308</sup>

After all, it is not difficult to assert that Reza Shah's rule was clearly a well-dominated yet partially shaky base for the modernization in Iran. The perspectives of the Pahlavi family and the imperial bureaucracy stayed shaky as it could be

---

<sup>306</sup> Daniel, Mahdi, *Culture and Customs of Iran*, p. 29. Please check Lenczowski, 1960, p. 123.

<sup>307</sup> "Khuzistan", Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 178.

<sup>308</sup> Richard Tapper, *Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of The Shahsevan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 283.

summarized by the deterrence of foreign aggression. Mainly, the oil resources restricted the capacity of Iran against the rivalry of foreign dominance. The neutrality policy of the Shah through the implementation of foreign policy fractured well easily when the Nazi Germany's oppugnant path was prolonged through Soviet Russia.

In 1941, Iran experienced the threats, blackmails, the inadequacy of its policies and militarily and the political turmoil by experiencing the foreign intervention and occupation of the imperial powers. As Bakhtiari asserted, the years staging the occupation during WWII from 1941–1946 and the post-WWII constructionist phase of Iranian parliamentary politics can be understood by both the economic inconsistencies and hardships as well as the rapid rise and fall of several cabinets:

Iranian independence was considerably abridged and the power of the government was reduced. The demands of the Allied forces also imposed on Iran much economic hardship leading to over three hundred percent inflation in the years from 1941 to 1943. At the same time, the removal of Reza Shah led to much greater political freedom, which in turn led to a struggle for influence between a new shah, Mohammad Reza Shah (who was only twenty-two years old), the Majlis and the occupying powers. The consequences of this struggle that lasted until 1953 can be seen in the rapid rise and fall of 31 cabinets and 140 ministers in the 12 years after 1941, as compared with 10 cabinets and 50 ministers in the previous 16 years of Reza Shah's rule.<sup>309</sup>

Consequently, as Lorentz put forth it is not an easy formulation to derive the impact of the administrations of Reza Shah such as the acquirement of an “immense personal fortune through misappropriation of personal funds”<sup>310</sup> Indeed, Reza Shah as the formidable monarch of the country was both keen on the constitutional tradition's evolution and the monopolization of power in the hands of the Royal family. Regarding with this actuality, the historians may assess his term “to credit the initiation and implementation of changes that enabled the country to cope with the realities of the 20th century and remain an independent entity”<sup>311</sup>. As Ira Lapidus asserted, the main achievement in Iran during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi was the

---

<sup>309</sup> Bahman Bakhtiari, *Parliamentary Politics In Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996, p. 28.

<sup>310</sup> “Reza Shah”, Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 275.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275.

construction of a modern and considerably mighty army when it is compared to the Qajar predecessors:

Reza Shah's first accomplishment was to build a modern army. While the Qajars had attempted military reforms along Western lines, they had maintained the traditional pattern of competitive regiments rather than a unified corps. Reza Shah set about training a new officer corps in France and introduced compulsory conscription. Some 33 percent of the annual government budget was spent for military purposes. Thus, he built up a Westernized army which could dominate the country politically but proved unable to prevent Russia and Britain from occupying Iran in 1941.<sup>312</sup>

Of course, the construction of a new modern army brought the main challenges against the potentially political layers of the society in Iran. During the 1920s and the 1930s, the opposition which was composed by the religious, tribal and the merchant elites were definitely a notorious goal for the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Although the policies which were implemented by Reza Shah had changed from time to time, the main aspect was directly towards the suppression of any kind of political opposition. Nonetheless, this was not something formulated unconditionally. The prerequisites which were valid for the subordination or the total termination of the political opposition movements have changed. In accordance with the opening of the gulf by a relative deterioration trend by its relations with the Soviet Union, Iran started to experience a considerably closer relationship with Nazi Germany in the 1930s.

Standing on the side of the main facets of this transformation via its economic basis, we can see the rising influence of Germany on Iranian political formation. Other than this factuality, we may assert by reference to Lapidus that the "outlawing of the Communist Party and the trade unions, the reduction of the parliament to a rubber stamp and the censorship on press"<sup>313</sup> were clear examples of the political oppression. The political field was restricted in as much as the political opposition was depending on tutelage. Undoubtedly, Reza Shah's setback from the political scene in 1941 by the occupation of Allied Forces and the abdication from the throne, the political opposition was going to find a yielding base for the political activism. As Mattair asserted, the political groups and the politically potential classes were going to re-mobilize after the abdication of Reza Shah. Of course, the interpretation

---

<sup>312</sup> Lapidus, *ibid*, p. 477.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid*, p. 477.

of the separatist and activist tendencies and expectation were due to differing approaches:

In 1941, when he succeeded his father, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a reigning constitutional monarch, but not a fully ruling monarch. Iran was occupied, the conservative Shia clergy reemerged to challenge his father's secular judicial reforms, diverse tribal and ethnic groups had separatist ambitions and the Tudeh party worked with the occupying Soviet Red Army to promote the communist goals.<sup>314</sup>

Apart from the accumulation of power in the hands of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the imperial bureaucracy's misappropriation through the immense sources and the lands of the country, another weak side of the Pahlavi administration during the 1920s and 1930s can be asserted as the agricultural policy. Lapidus asserted that agriculture during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi remained as "unproductive".<sup>315</sup>

However, possibly, his reign or rule can best be understood from the transformation of German influence into a type of fracture on the fate of this country. It emerges as a difficult factuality to understand through the lens of traditional imperial powers in Iran, the Soviet Union, and Britain. As Lapidus counted as a statistical change on the import level of Persia/Iran, Germany started to take the lead of foreign trade in Iran through the 1930s:

In the 1920s and 1930s, Russian and British influence remained relatively balanced. Russia was an important trading partner; Britain controlled the production of oil. To offset the influence of these two powers, Iran made use of German capital and technical assistance, and Germany maintained a strong presence by the establishment of research and cultural institutes as well as espionage and political networks. In the 1930s the Russian share of Iranian exports fell from 34 percent to 1 percent, and the German share rose from 20 percent to 42 percent. The state-controlled approximately 33–40 percent of Iranian exports and imports.<sup>316</sup>

Beyond this excessive success of Germany in Iran, it was clear that the technical assistance and capital support of Germany were directly connected to the leading figures in the Iranian economic administration. Among these, possibly the most

---

<sup>314</sup> Mattair, *ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>315</sup> Lapidus, *ibid*, p. 479.

<sup>316</sup> Lapidus, *ibid*, p. 478.

influential figure was *Kurt Lindenblatt*<sup>317</sup> who served as the governor of National Bank (*Bank Melli*)<sup>318</sup> from 1927. This substituted the Imperial Bank of Persia which had been founded at the end of the 19th century.<sup>319</sup>

As counted above, the interests of the foreign counselors in Iran was not something new to the Iranian officials. To check the evolution of German influence in Iran, we may delve into some other sources to understand the need of a third force to balance the Iranian foreign policy under Reza Shah's rule and the close implications related to this. It may even be important to bring an outline for the upcoming pressures by the Soviet Union and Britain against Iran. Regarding with Germany's influence on Iran, Sydney Nettleton Fisher asserted that Reza Shah's attitude was "pro-German" right on the eve of WWII. The author also emphasized the anti-British and anti-Soviet attitudes of Pahlavi administration regarding with the construction of Iranian policy:

At the outbreak of World War II Iran under Shah Reza was deeply involved economically with Germany. Large percentages of imports and exports were German, and German technicians were assisting in the development of the industry and the natural resources of Iran other than oil. Although Iran declared her neutrality, official Iranian attitudes were pro-German until the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941. Shah Reza was decidedly anti-Russian and anti-British, largely because of the time-worn imperialism of those powers in Iran. The British closed the sea routes to Germany and did not permit Iranian goods to pass to Germany through neutral states. The Soviet Union opened her ports, and a treaty of March 1940 allowed Iranian goods transit through the U.S.S.R. to states having treaty relations with Russia.<sup>320</sup>

This attitude of Reza Shah was a significant remark to check for the quest towards finding and consolidating a balancing force against the imperial powers. As Savory noted, Reza Shah's dedication to making his country less dependent on the U.S.S.R was not something to be changed overnight.<sup>321</sup> There were some *ad hoc* trade

---

<sup>317</sup> Wilber, 1975, p. 147. Ramazani counted the name of German financial expert as "Hurt". See also Ramazani, *ibid*, p. 287. William E. Griffith, "Iran's Foreign Policy In The Pahlavi Era", *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, ed. George Lenczowski, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 370.

<sup>318</sup> Savory, 1970, p. 607. This bank replaced the concessionary Imperial Bank of Persia which was founded by Britain.

<sup>319</sup> Ekrem, *ibid*, p.32.

<sup>320</sup> Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East: A History*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, p. 487–488.

<sup>321</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 606.

agreements which were signed with this big power in the 1920s. These were 1927, 1931 and 1935 agreements and all of those trade agreements were carrying some unfavorable conditions for Iranian foreign trade. In addition to these points in the foreign trade, Savory also emphasized the dedication of Reza Shah Pahlavi to decrease the foreign trade share of Soviet Union. The period following the strict decline of Soviet foreign trade share in Iran brought the rapid increase of Nazi Germany's share at the same time. The portion of U.S.S.R's trade with Iran went as one-third of Iran's total foreign trade until 1938–1939. In 1938, the trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. expired. Iran's expectations to develop better terms for a trade agreement failed sooner. According to Savory's notes, rising Iranian trade with Nazi Germany made Reza Shah feel more comfortable with not-favorable conditions of trade with the U.S.S.R. The alternative path of developing foreign trade with a third country, and making the U.S.S.R unfavorable accompanied the development of Iran's foreign trade with Germany. "Between 1938 and 1941, Russia's share of Iran's exports fell from thirty-four percent to just over one per cent".<sup>322</sup> Along these years, Germany's share rose from twenty percent to forty-two percent. In the portion of imports from the U.S.S.R. and Germany to Iran, "Iran's imports fell to 0.04 percent, while those from Germany increased to forty-seven per cent".<sup>323</sup> On 25 March 1940, Iran signed a commerce and navigation treaty with the U.S.S.R which was the most comprehensive commercial treaty.

Other than the foreign trade share criteria, the high activism of German technicians in Iran's entrepreneurship was also a breakpoint for all the powers interested in the country. Indeed, one can easily categorize the German influence in Iran into the types of economic and political implications. To bring some details on this topic, it is a clear fact that Germany's both political and economic pressure went hand in hand during the interwar period and Nazi Germany's expansionist policies grew by leaps and bounds in the 1930s. Regarding with the economic steps taken by the guidance of German experts, one may feel astonished by the gradual substitution of the American experts by the performance of Nazi Germany's experts. The Trans-Iranian

---

<sup>322</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 606.

<sup>323</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 606.



Railway which was completed in almost a decade from 1927 to 1938 was supported by the German experts. Even though the mission of American financial expert Millspaugh was a starting point to adjust the budgetary elements, and it dominantly designed the financial development of Iranian economy, the railway was completed by the share of German companies in the following decade of Millspaugh's dismissal from the mission in 1927. As Banani stated, there were other companies from "the USA and the Scandinavian concern" through the construction phases of Trans-Iranian Railway.

The early surveying and drafting operations were carried out by an American firm and a German firm. In all, approximately two hundred foreign engineers and experts were brought to Iran for the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway. This enterprise also provided an occasion for sending a large number of Iranian students to Europe to study various phases of railroad construction and operation.<sup>324</sup>

In this regard, Inlow states the German penetration in Iranian economic development parallel to the strategic goals. "German aid and influence in Iran reached dangerous propaganda proportions on the eve of World War II. For example, the swastika-adorned the new railway station in Teheran. There were youth groups organized under German guidance as well".<sup>325</sup> Apart from the railway transportation, the German influence was openly seen by the water transportation. Banani counts the existence of a few boats which were operating on the Caspian sea, on Lake Reza's (Urumia) and on the lower river of Karun. Naval facilities represented Iran's challenge in free sea transportation and the rise of the naval forces. As Banani stated, the greatest achievement of the period in water was "the construction and launching of a dredge in the Caspian port of Pahlavi (later renamed as Enzeli) in 1940".<sup>326</sup> This example was a direct reference to German expertise, and the manufactured parts which were brought from Germany were assembled in Pahlavi. This dredge was "christened" as Mazandaran, the birthplace of Reza Shah Pahlavi.<sup>327</sup>

In the field of air transportation, once again the German influence and penetration in Iran were prevalent. As Banani asserted, the air transportation was amongst the

---

<sup>324</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 134.

<sup>325</sup> Inlow, *ibid*, p. 143.

<sup>326</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 136.

<sup>327</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 136.

modernization steps went along with the authorization of German air firm Junkers to establish an air passenger and mail service between Europe, Iran, and points farther east in Asia. Also, this service operated between the cities of Iran. In addition to these, a pilot training school was established, and major repair plants were founded. Junkers, along these years, helped Iran to build a well-structured plan for aerial mapping of the country.<sup>328</sup> “By 1929, Junkers already provided air service between Tehran and the cities in Pahlavi, Qasr Shirin, Bushehr, and Mashad. In the 1930’s, the German airline, now operated by Lufthansa, was until only foreign airline service in Iran”.<sup>329</sup>

Savory’s examples such as the first airline inaugurated in 1937 on the route from Berlin–Baghdad–Tehran via Lufthansa, share support of German companies to the construction of Trans-Iranian Railway. This project, being completed within eleven years approximately from 1927 to 1938 was amongst the most significant elements which can be implemented in the case of Nazi Germany’s relations with Iran. The examples of the roles of publication companies and the curriculum of German national education on Iran’s cultural life and national education curriculum completed the newly rising set of relations between Iran and Germany.

The visit of the financial minister of Nazi Germany, *Dr. Schacht*<sup>330</sup> in 1936 was a remarkable event in this case. Aryans as the superior race category represented that the Iranians, in this case, were verified by the statement of German minister. “Iranians were specially exempted from the provisions of the Nuremberg race laws”.<sup>331</sup> On that matter, L.P. Elwell-Sutton stated that the racial laws application caused a cold reception. During his tour in the Near East, “Schacht was rather coldly received, owing probably in part to the fact that during his visit, the Iranian identity has not still officially been exempted from the Nuremberg anti–Semitic race laws”.

<sup>332</sup> Despite the fact that the cultural race laws caused a little frustration in the minds

---

<sup>328</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 611.

<sup>329</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 611

<sup>330</sup> Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, çev. Arif Gelen, İstanbul: Onur Yayınları, 1976, p. 63.

<sup>331</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 611. Milani, 2011, p. 67.

<sup>332</sup> Sutton, 2011, p. 164–165.

of the Iranian officials, some further trade agreements were conducted. Here, Savory pointed out to the extension of German influence in Iran other than the economic affairs. After 1933, the rise of the thought of National Socialism to power, German influence had risen to an extensive level in Iran which had not only emerged in the economic field but “energetically fostered cultural relations of all kinds”.<sup>333</sup> The foundation of Deutsche Orient Verein and the Deutsch Persische Gesellschaft’s lecture-tours, and the publications were such examples in the fostering of cultural relations. “From 1933 onwards, the curricula of German universities began to indicate a marked interest in the Orient”.<sup>334</sup>

Dr. Schacht was seen as the architect of German economic miracle. He was the President of the German *Reichsbank*.<sup>335</sup> As a financial expert and a minister, his visits to the Near Eastern countries including the Balkans, Turkey and Iran were definitely helpful for the understanding of Germany’s penetration into these countries and functional for the construction of a trade program. In this regard, Wilber wrote on the promotion of Germany in the local news. The Majlis sooner had ratified a clearing agreement with Germany which was presuming the developing of strong commercial relations. In that period, the Majlis had also passed a bill to provide employment of German teachers at the Industrial School in Tehran, to extend the contract of the Germans in charge of the printing plant of the Majlis. Additionally, a German professor’s hiring was planned by that Bill. In November, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht came to Iran as the Minister of Economy for Germany.<sup>336</sup>

Not surprisingly, other than the laying of communication and transportation substructures by the support of German companies and experts, the industrialization steps were also taken by the help of Germans. Again Banani states the few factories were existent before the rule of Reza Shah. “The few factories that had been set up in Iran before 1921, among them a sugar refinery and a match factory, were shut down

---

<sup>333</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 611.

<sup>334</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 611.

<sup>335</sup> Faramorz Fatemi, *the U.S.S.R. in Iran: the Background History of Russian and Anglo-American Conflict in Iran, Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism, and the Fall of the Shah*, London, South Brunswick, 1980, p. 16.

<sup>336</sup> Wilber, 1975, p. 177.

owing either to wartime disrepair or to inability to compete with imported commodities". In addition to the remnant industrialization basis, the steps taken by German technicians and engineers can be followed respectively. As early as 1924, certain steps for the development of technical schools and workshops were taken by the Germans. Technical support of the Germans went forward by the foundation of a technical school.<sup>337</sup> Next, to the industrialization steps, there were the plans of Pahlavi regime to establish an "iron foundry and a steel mill" in the country. Being rationalized "in terms of the needs of the railroad and construction operations", these plans which were provided by "much of the imported German machinery" stayed incomplete, when Reza Shah was forced to descend from the throne in 1941.<sup>338</sup>

In that regard, Savory indicated another critical point about the German invasion of Czechoslovakia to understand the Czech firms' economic activism in Iran. The German expansionism appears by a foreign trade program and another program to accompany the industrial basis of machinery production, the exportation of these machinery through the countries in the Near East (*Nach Ost*). The plans for an iron and steel plant had gone abortive unfortunately for Iran's nearest projections. Thus, the dependence on "the imports for machinery, automobiles, and vehicles of all kinds", locomotives and rolling stock, and both industrial and domestic appliances". As an example of Germany's monopoly on the equipment and installations, Siemens firm held the monopoly in its hands in the field of telephone equipment, and the electrical installations.<sup>339</sup>

The field of education was a core field for the Pahlavi modernization program. Especially for the building of a technical education system, German assistance was definitely carrying the vital features. Following a "utilitarian pattern" by establishing diverse schools, benefiting from the foreign assistance, Reza Shah's Iran witnessed the opening of a polytechnical school by the Germans. Hereby, Banani asserts that

---

<sup>337</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 137.

<sup>338</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 141.

<sup>339</sup> Savory, *ibid*, p. 608.

the technicians of this polytechnical school were excluded from the expulsion list of Germans in 1941.<sup>340</sup>

In the field of public health services, the most dominant group of expertise was employed from France as it can be clearly seen in the example of *Pasteur Institute* in Teheran<sup>341</sup>. Banani states the role of foreign experts and scholars towards the accomplishment of Pahlavi regime on the construction of a contemporary public health system. Hereby, the role of European experts provided an in continuous and direct expertise, and the advantages of European education was utilized. Banani stated that from 1922 to 1941, the year when Reza Shah was forced to descend from his throne, “seven Frenchmen, an American, a Pole, and a German were employed as Professors by the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Tehran, for a total of thirty academic years”. Amongst these, two of these men, “a Frenchman Oberlin, and a Pole Melczarski served as heads of the Faculty of Medicine and the School of Dentistry respectively”.<sup>342</sup> Along the same period, “six Frenchmen, three Hungarians, two Germans, an Austrian, and a Belgian were employed in several fields under the Department of Health for a total of twenty-eight years”.<sup>343</sup>

For all these efforts, one may mention the penetration attempts of European powers into Iran’s cultural and economic field. According to that, the orientalist approach’s apex was caught in the 19th century whereas the striking points of foreign penetration into this strategically important land were seen at the beginning of the following century. American counselors and the missionaries<sup>344</sup> were the leading figures until the time came to prove the German interests and revival attempts in the Middle East. As it can be concluded in the example of hospitals which had been built through the 1830s<sup>345</sup>, there were several fields which stayed almost intact at the

---

<sup>340</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 97–98.

<sup>341</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 64.

<sup>342</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 66–67.

<sup>343</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 66–67.

<sup>344</sup> To exemplify the American missionaries in Iran, Lorentz counted the name of Justin Perkins (1805–1869) who was the first person representing American interests in the region. Please see the entry “Perkins, Justin”, Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 243.

<sup>345</sup> Banani, *ibid*, p. 62.

beginning of Reza Shah's rule. The German influence on Iran was seemingly a record which caused the malfunctioning of the foreign policy of the country at the very beginning of WWII. Hence, German influence proved that the European powers' influences on Iran would be analyzed according to the international conjuncture. According to that, Iran's position to keep its neutrality, and favor a third-power vis á vis the traditional rivalry between Britain and Russia (now then, the U.S.S.R.) was tolling the bells. As a different approach, Garthwaite wrote, this record was not something to vilify the Reza Shah's rule which helped Iran jump to the new century overall kind of difficulties. As Garthwaite mentioned, the approach to Reza Shah's Iran to Germany was partly because the Shah saw Germany as "a balancing power" against the U.S.S.R. and Britain. Yet, according to his assertion, the German influence on Reza Shah, and Iran was quite exaggerated and used as a tool of pretext to legitimize the occupation of Iran.<sup>346</sup> Garthwaite mentioned that Reza Shah's "nationalism and emphasis on the centrality of the state was bearing a resemblance to National Socialism, but both policies were independent of Nazism".<sup>347</sup>

Starting mainly the economic pressure levels of Nazi Germany on Iran during the 1930s, one can also find some elements to understand the Nazis' political penetration in the country. Wilber asserts the point which we can also derive from Savory's notes. As Savory stated there were the tours arranged by *Deutsch-Persische Gesellschaft* through the end of the 1930s. Wilber adds a relevant point to understand the conception of political formation embedded to the Pahlavi regime. A public institution which would work for the construction of a regime-supporting the public opinion, would supply a great base for the Pahlavi regime. Azimi notes the relationship of political opposition and the Pahlavi rule as a body of absolute obedience. Azimi put forth that Reza Shah was convinced to omit to seek a mediation between "the subjugation of people", and establishing an authority to represent his iron fist.<sup>348</sup> According to Azimi, Reza Shah gave "little thought to the probability that the demise of a feared dictator would readily result in disorder".<sup>349</sup>

---

<sup>346</sup> Gene R. Garthwaite, *The Persians*, Madlen, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 232.

<sup>347</sup> Garthwaite, *Ibid*, p. 232.

<sup>348</sup> Azimi, 2008, p. 90.

In 1935, he revealed the thought that “the only viable form of government was an authoritarian government, otherwise the nations would succumb to communism”.<sup>350</sup> In this regard, Wilber pointed out that the subordination of the citizens against the state’s main interests would function as a way to locate themselves under the Pahlavi rule. One may find some correlation between the approach of Reza Shah’s Iran to German in terms of cultural and economic perspectives, and the formation of the ideological apparatus. The state’s main projection was a concentration policy to enforce the citizens open to the subordination of their personal interests. In that regard, Wilber mentioned the role of the Society to Guide Public Opinion which was established in 1939. “This society was influenced by the Nazi and Fascist machines”, and functioned through “the direction of public opinion along specific lines”, and “the promotion of national pride”. Touring the cities by the guidance of lecturers, and the flood of numerous publications were the nearest results of these efforts.<sup>351</sup>

After the modernization program’s examination, the key questions which were loaded in the 20th-century Iranian historiography can be scrutinized. Was the early Pahlavi rule a failure or not, and if so, what were the precursors for the failure of the reign of Reza Shah? Was he a patriot or a British-agent?

The modernization program under the early Pahlavi regime depended upon the coercion of the state, and two of its main pillars. As mentioned before, these pillars, the bureaucracy, and the military proved the extension of the state as the former grew seventeen-fold, and the latter ten fold. The state’s coercive measurements to suppress the opposition included the budgetary elements to levy up to the taxes, higher customs duties, oil revenues, and the introduction of new taxes on consumer goods. As stated before, the tribal resistance was severely affected by the rise of the centralized state. The conscription policy was a part of the coercion which, in particular, the clergy and the tribal confederations could not easily get accustomed to. Another coercion was the confiscation. It was the confiscation of several lands via the centralization’s monopoly which led to the accumulation of wealth in the hands

---

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid*, p. 90.

<sup>351</sup> Donald N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 131.

of the Royal Family caused a resentment in many layers of the society. The sources reflect the details in correlation with the centralization of power and accumulation of wealth in the hands of the Pahlavi dynasty. Meanwhile, the centralization steps also carry great importance for a country where the main forces of the decentralization kept a great potential to oppose the regime. As the Shah's iron fist caused resentment in some layers of the society, the economic and the social deprivations of the modernization process contributed to the folding of the resentment. Since the Iranians could not prefer between the arbitrary rule, and the notoriously-recalled conditions of the disorder, continuity, and instability, the formidable rulership extended its bases with the help of the rising state revenues. As Abrahamian stated by compiling the relevant information from the state budgets, the state revenues have risen from 245 million rials to 3,163 million rials within a sixteen-year period of reign. Hence, the oil revenues, direct or indirect taxation, and the customs duties all supported the early Pahlavi regime at the expense of any kind of suspected opposition groups.<sup>352</sup> If not to fall in oversimplification, the early Pahlavi regime fell in incompatibility with the peasantry, the tribal confederations, and the clergy as well as the leftist groups. Each of these groups assumed different pretexts although the resentment of the political opposition gets under the umbrella of the critiques against the autocracy. The arbitrary rule meant the pacification of the constitutional rule where the constitution remained as almost inefficient. In some cases, he directly contacted with the Army commanders and prolonged his ties with the former Cossack officers by promoting them into higher positions in the military. Two secret security organizations filled the resentment as well. "These were the Shahr-bani, the secret police organization, and the Rokn-e Dovvom (Second Bureau) modeled after the French Deuxieme Bureau".<sup>353</sup> Briefly, there were a few reasons for the people who resented the early Pahlavi rule to stay motionless when the Shah was abdicated. Mohsen Milani assessed the early Pahlavi regime personified by Reza Shah as both a victory and the defeat for the architects of the Constitutional period. It was a victory owing to the achievements of the early Pahlavi regime, albeit it was a defeat at the

---

<sup>352</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 69.

<sup>353</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 70.



same time to represent the “blatantly violation” of the constitutional rule. The Majlis was turned into a submissive body, and the “ecclesiastical committee” was never convened, “the political participation was mocked”.<sup>354</sup> Considering all of these, one may conclude that there was not a failure however the participative lines of the regime could not reach up to a satisfaction as well as the economic deprivations of many layers in the society.

Secondly, discussion on the patriotism of Reza Shah can be understood with getting beyond the allegations of the British conspiracy. Despite the fact that Reza Khan’s ascendancy to power was labeled as being backed by the British, under the normal circumstances, he, and the Pahlavi autocracy would have fallen under the manipulations of Britain. However, as Savory put forth, the nationalist intelligentsia disfavored the achievement of Reza Shah owing to the causes that triggered the resentment. Contrarily, Reza Shah’s arbitrarily stance towards the monopolization of nationalism dragged him and his regime towards a “third power” policy of which he aspired to challenge British and Soviet interventions. In the last sense, Reza Shah was patriotic in terms of his profound modernization program but his regime did not nurture democratic aspirations.<sup>355</sup> His ascendancy to power coalesced with the alteration of British plans in the region, although he was not a British puppet.

### **2.3.3. Revisiting The Political Opposition In Iran (1926–1941)**

In this section, the political opposition will be examined under the terms of the tribal opposition, the clerical opposition, the leftist opposition, and the opposition in the military to the early Pahlavi regime. Since the tribal resistances and the clerical opposition were examined in the previous chapter, these titles will be investigated briefly for the purpose of making the correlation between the political opposition networks. Thus, the section will mainly deal with the leftist opposition, and the bureaucracy’s transformation towards a pro-German position which functioned as a pretext for the occupation of the country in the run-up of WWII, and the opposition in the military. By standing on these, the consequences of Reza Shah’s elimination efforts through the fragmentation of the political power will be explicated below.

---

<sup>354</sup> Milani, 1994, p. 34.

<sup>355</sup> Savory, 1970, p. 624.

To begin with, it is possible to assert that the Shah's actions as the fundamental and sole patriarch, by omnipotence on the society were not totally admitted in any phase of his rule, and as a result of this, the political opposition was made unsuccessful coercively to stay out the legal grounds. During these years, the political life was under the full control of the imperial dynasty and the civilian, and military bureaucracy, which was surrounded by the definite authority of the Shah. Even though a few attempts for the functioning of political parties were made for the enlargement of the political sphere, the politics stayed just embedded. The prominent figures of the political sphere were mostly the members of the Cabinets. Amongst these, Abdol Hossein Teymurtash, also known as *Sardar Mu'zzam Khorasani*, the (first) *Imperial Court Minister* was discharged from his post due to a pretext of corruption in the early 1930s, and he has executed soon after.

He was from Khorasan's landowning family and a well-educated man at the military academy in St. Petersburg, Tsardom of Russia. He had been elected deputy to the 4th Majlis during the Constitutional period. As Wilber stated, he was thought to be an Anglophobe with strong leanings to Russia.<sup>356</sup> After the dismissal of Tabatabai, he was thought to fill the post that was vacated by the former, yet the course of events proved that Reza Khan took charge of the post himself, and he continued to serve the Governments in some other posts through his career lines. Before the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty, he served as an experienced administrator by his posts at the Ministry of Public Works and Military Governorship in several provinces. What made him important to the Shah was his service as the Governor of Gilan during *the Jangali Revolt* in 1921.<sup>357</sup> As Rezun stated, his contribution to the Government in the fight against the ever-recalcitrant semi-autonomous tribal confederations helped the submission of the central authority in these regions.<sup>358</sup> Stating the position of Teymurtash as being into semi-oblivion, Miron Rezun assessed the prominent and positive role of the Imperial Court Minister that helped the construction of the early

---

<sup>356</sup> Wilber, 1975, p. 113.

<sup>357</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran: Between Two Revolutions*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 122. "Teymurtash Khan", *The Times* (London, England), Oct 09, 1933, p. 19.

<sup>358</sup> Miron Rezun, "Reza Shah's Court Minister: Teymourash", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 12 (1980), p. 120.

Pahlavi regime via providing the support in the Majlis that legalized the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty (Indira) in 1925.<sup>359</sup> He was attributed a ubiquitous diplomat, and political figure, and owned the anti-clerical views. He was also known as the founder of *the National Heritage Foundation*. Thus, as a member of a cadre who shared the loyalties and dependency to the Shah, Teymurtash's deposition from his post as the Minister of Court was extremely a breakpoint for the Shah's administration. The report of Mr. Husrev Bey (Gerede), the Turkish ambassador to Tehran, to inform the Headquarters in Ankara dealt with the rising rumors about Teymurtash's "bribery, embezzlement and extortion"<sup>360</sup> to make a bargain of British currency in an unfair way.<sup>361</sup> After he learned from the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Foroughi Khan (*Zoka al-Mulk*), this new situation was considered to be legitimized by Reza Shah Pahlavi as "the ending of the policy of feudalism".<sup>362</sup>

After all, Teymurtash's prominent position in the early Pahlavi regime represented the deep bonds of interests amongst the bureaucratic circles. More important than his trials by bribery, embezzlement, and extortion, his period as the Imperial Court Minister from 1926 to 1932 consisted of the ruling party attempts (*Iran-e Nau*, and subsequently *Taraqqi*) which failed eventually with the remnant of suspicions on the Shah that a Republicanist propaganda could survive.<sup>363</sup> Thus, the trial of Teymurtash was assessed as a political condemnation rather than relying upon the lawful deeds. The Shah's personal rejection of any kind of opposition was explicated above by the combination of three concepts, "Shah, Mehan, and Khoda". Any political figure who would oppose the early Pahlavi regime, by the charism and organization skills would be eliminated.

Here, the discussion leads us to the question when the arbitrary rule of the early Pahlavi ruler did start that resulted in the cleansing of the political sphere and the political opponents? The Shah's reign encompassed the Majlis terms from the 6th to

---

<sup>359</sup> Rezun, *ibid*, p. 121.

<sup>360</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 150.

<sup>361</sup> General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 30.10.0.0, 261.758..10, p.4.

<sup>362</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 122.

<sup>363</sup> Azimi, 2008, p. 76.

the 12th. From 1925 to 1941, the Shah's understanding on the monopolization of force confronted the interests and political configurations of the bureaucratic figures. Aside from Teymurtash, there were several figures such as Firuz, Davar, Sardar Asad Bakhtiari, and Modarres who were attributed matched with the disloyalty to the regime. Amongst these, Modarres, as an exception, represented the degradation of the clergy which as a confrontation started almost in the midst of 1920s. The first three names were state officials and kept prominent positions on the court, and the cabinets. As Sardar As'ad was the War Minister through the end of the 1920s and kept a prominent chiefdom in the Bakhtiari tribe, his position was different than the first three. Likewise, an ex-member of the Iranian Majlis, the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War Affairs, chief of Bakhtiari tribe Sardar Asad was executed after being arrested in the early months of 1934.<sup>364</sup> It was stated by the news of *Times* that Sardar Assad died of "apoplexy" in prison. The news at *Times* magazine implemented with the risks of political opposition by assessing the examples of Teymurtash Khan and Sardar Assad:

Politicians in underdeveloped countries under autocratic government must take their risks, and the death of Sardar Assad calls inevitably for the fate of Teymurtash Khan, once, and not so many months ago, Minister of the Court, who also, after a brilliant career, died in jail, last October. With Sardar Assad, there were arrested several Bakhtiari and other notables; of them, one has been liberated from prison but remains more or less under open arrest; of the fate of the others, nothing is known.<sup>365</sup>

Bakhtiari tribe's importance for the construction of Pahlavi politics requires a detailed analysis as well. Since it is the end of the chapter, it would be suitable not to omit that the tribe was one of the biggest tribes in Iran during the 1920s and 1930s. It was also a key fact that the tribe's inhabitation around the oil-discovered villages in Memateyn and Masjid-e Suleiman was making the necessity of tribe's co-opting with Pahlavi administration. In this regard, the memoirs of Princess Soraya Esfandiari, as a descent of the Bakhtiari tribe, and the second wife of Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi brings us some clues worthy of attention. Princess Soraya narrated the role of Germans in the anti- governmental activities of the

---

<sup>364</sup> General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 30.10.0.0.,261.759..5, p. 1-5.

<sup>365</sup> "Arrests In Persia", *Times*, [London, England] December 01, 1934, p. 14. "Arrests In Persia", *Times*, [London, England] December 12, 1934, p. 13. "Sardar Assad" *Times* [London, England] April 20, 1934, p. 9.

Bakhtiari tribe and the revolts which were scattered around Fars, Balochistan, and Gilan were all suppressed.<sup>366</sup> As long as the tribal chieftains assumed the malleable posts with the state, and took roles in the state administration, the security of their lives would be under the guarantee of the Shah. In that regard, Sardar As'ad, as an example from the higher echelons of the tribal administration represented an example for the Pahlavi state's alienation that extended through several layers of the society.

Another prominent figure was the Minister of Justice, lately the Minister of Finance Ali Akbar Davar.<sup>367</sup> Known by his promulgation of the new civil law to Iran which was enacted from 1927 to 1932, Davar committed suicide later on in 1937.<sup>368</sup> The story of Davar's suicide was explicated in details by Majd. The author stated that there were rumours such as the voice-recording of Davar when he visited the Shah, the explicit attitudes of the Shah to reflect that his life was not under guarantee any longer, receiving a fifty-thousand amount of American dollars for the granting of oil and pipeline concessions to the U.S.A. however, after all, he was appreciated by being the long-lasting part of Pahlavi bureaucracy.<sup>369</sup>

Amongst the first three names, Ali Akbar Davar, as the architect of the judicial reforms in the early Pahlavi regime represented the European liberal thoughts which he implemented, and affected the elite circles through the Tajaddod Party experience, and by the newspaper, he started to publish in the first half of the 1920s. The newspaper, entitled as *Mard-e Azad (the Free Man)* was inspired by a French example.<sup>370</sup> Firuz and Teymurtash were amongst the Tajaddod members who were influenced by the European enlightenment. In that case, the comparison of all these prominent bureaucrats presents the fact that the Shah's regime directed towards the suspecting way of perception against the Western-minded, and European-educated personalities. Teymurtash was the most significant example owing to his prominent

---

<sup>366</sup> Prenses Süreyya, *Sürgündeki Prenses Süreyya*, çev. Şirin Röşşev, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2003, p. 32–33.

<sup>367</sup> Said Amir Arjomand, "Islam and Constitutionalism In The Nineteenth Century: The Significance and The Peculiarities of Iran", in ed. Said Amir Arjomand, *Constitutional Politics In The Middle East*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 48.

<sup>368</sup> Hooglund, Curtis, *ibid*, p. 28–29.

<sup>369</sup> Majd, *ibid*, p. 221–226.

<sup>370</sup> Ghani, *ibid*, p. 295.

position in the early Pahlavi regime as the most influential personality next to the Shah. Davar, although there were several figures, was probably the second most remarkable personality who eventually encountered the degree of disloyalty as he lost the venue when the Shah leaned towards the arbitrary rule in the 1930s.

Teymurtash's dismissal and the subsequent execution started a chain of elimination steps against the political opponents. Although these were substantial in the level of elite politics, more importantly, the social resistance, and the political opposition of the groups such as the clergy, and the leftists lost their bases to go underground. As a breaking point in the beginning of 1930s, "the anti-collectivist law of 1931" triggered the period of arbitrary rule. This law concentrated the political power in the hands of an autocrat, caused the resentment which gradually dampened the nature of the Majlis. The critiques against the Shah and his regime lessened to a severe state in the 1930s when the country's quest for the constitutional rule vanished, and the military dictatorship or autocracy being converted into an arbitrary rule replaced any other alternatives.

As Abrahamian wrote in his prominent monograph, *Iran: Between Two Revolutions*, there were numerous examples concerning with the suppression of potential political opposition in the upper layers. Reza Shah's policy to pacify the political opposition depended on "the co-opting with some of the aristocratic families". The Shah also supplanted them from their positions as local magnates that they had occupied throughout the nineteenth century. Since the end of the Constitutional Revolution, he had found the chance to observe on the widely-issued economic interests, and his policy did not only depend on the dismissal of some prominent members of land aristocracy from state administration but also depended upon the deprivation of these people on their properties, and in some cases, of their liberty, dignity, and even lives. Sepahdar, as the former Prime Minister, with a tax audit, committed suicide in 1926.<sup>371</sup> He was a spectacular example. Ahmad Qavam, as a prominent figure during the Constitutional period, was "accused of plotting a coup" against the Shah.<sup>372</sup> Mossadiq (1882–1967) was another fierce, and enthusiastic orator in the Majlis

---

<sup>371</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 150.

<sup>372</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 150.

before the proclamation of the Pahlavi dynasty. Sooner, he had to reside his own village to Ahmadabad, which was not much distanced from the capital. Until the abdication of the Shah, the proliferating atmosphere of the political amnesty, he had to stay away from politics under the house arrest.

How the evolution of the political path could be described during the reign of the Shah? Memduh Şevket Bey, as the ambassador of new Turkey in Tehran, narrated in his memoirs the speech of Mosaddiq in Iranian Majlis to remind the Shah that he was not against the leadership of him, but against the contravention of the Constitution.<sup>373</sup> His constitutionalist portrait made him suffer from the Shah's exile policy, which in a lowly-based oppression caused him to spend some time in prison<sup>374</sup>, after the intimidation, withdraw to his estates<sup>375</sup> in Ahmadabad, a town from Tehran of approximately one hundred kilometers. Abrahamian also added the names of "Sheikh Khaz'el Simko", a tribal khan, and the Qashqai ilkhani who died under house arrest suspiciously. Briefly, as Abrahamian asserted, the life conditions of these people were not necessarily poor, yet their lives would easily fall into the encounter with the brutal, oppressive, iron fist of the regime.<sup>376</sup> Abrahamian gave another key example as "Firuz Farmanfarma, the Qajar Prince who had served as Reza Shah's right-hand man since 1923 was dismissed from the government in 1930 and eight years later, he was strangled to death".<sup>377</sup>

After all, the period under Reza Shah Pahlavi brought the gradual integration of the country in parallel to the suppression or restriction of decentralist tendencies along with the rising discontent through the 1930s. Above the nationalization and westernization, an accumulation of discontent which was disallowed to perform on the political scene was going to erupt after the deposition of the Shah. Since the main focus of this dissertation is gathered on "the political opposition" in Iran, the key findings would be summarized as the Pahlavi regime's restrictions to feed the

---

<sup>373</sup> Esendal, *ibid*, p. 14.

<sup>374</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 150.

<sup>375</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 150.

<sup>376</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 150.

<sup>377</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 150. Azimi, *ibid*, p. 79.

political opposition. The interwar period's pretexts were already available. The democratic institutions were not necessarily growing owing to the alleged thoughts of Reza Shah in favor of Republic. As one of the nearest neighbors of Iran, Turkey's proclamation of Republic in 1923 was assessed a threat by the ulama in Iran. His political strategy was primarily dependent on the tranquil steps to persuade the members of the ulama that he wouldn't act averse to their demands. As stated by Ahkavi, Reza Shah's attempts were cross-cut by Qajar King Ahmad Shah.<sup>378</sup> As Turkey's Ambassador to Tehran on the eve of the abolition of Qajar dynasty, Memduh Şevket Bey wrote in his memoirs that either Reza Shah had become successful in proclaiming a Republic or not, he believed that the new regime, the new administration in Turkey would recognize Iran without losing time. His meetings with the Soviet Ambassador and the Deputy of Urumiyyah in Iranian Majlis Afshar were proving the fact that several countries and personalities in domestic politics were convinced that Reza Shah required "a political party" to declare his goals in a louder context.<sup>379</sup> In that regard, by the lack of a political party which would lead the political program of Reza Khan, Turkey's Ambassador Memduh Şevket Bey wrote the parts of their meeting with Afshar, and on his assessments which were worth of attention. A socialist faction in the Majlis was just comprised of five deputies. They were led by Suleiman Mirza and Nasirulislâm. The organization of the socialist faction was also spread out of Iran's boundaries. Secondly, a "radical" faction was led by Mirza Ali Akbar Khan Davar, and Deputy Afshar. The "radical" faction had also a foreign representation. A "neutral" faction was comprised of twenty deputies, and they were led by Sardar Afakî. Another faction was led Taqizade, Devlet-i Abadi, Alayül Müshirüddowle. The "Coalition" faction was led by Doctor Emir-i Alam and Asgar. Progressive Faction was led by Nadim. Azer faction was led by Seyyid-ül Muhakkike, and it was comprised of Azerbaijani deputies. Azad-ı Havai, as another faction, was led by Alameti. Last, of all, there was a minority group called "*the Ekalliyet*" in the Majlis.<sup>380</sup> After all, there

---

<sup>378</sup> Şahruh Ahavi, *İran'da Din ve Siyaset: Pehlevi Devrinde Ulema-Devlet İlişkileri*, çev. Selahattin Ayaz, İstanbul, Yöneliş Yayınları, 1990, p. 70-71.

<sup>379</sup> Esendal, *ibid*, p. 24-26.

<sup>380</sup> Esendal, *ibid*, p. 26-27.



were clear differences between the terms of Reza Khan, and the period after he ascended the Iranian throne by the title of Reza Shah Pahlavi. His policies which relied on the persuasion attempts were transformed into a monarch's own projections. Even though Reza Shah Pahlavi's rule was reflected as the rule of Iranian monarch bypassing the Majlis, the Majlis was open all along his period. The retrospective's failure caused some discussions after his deposition from the Iranian throne. What was the legacy of Reza Shah Pahlavi in terms of political opposition would be assessed as the eradication of political opposition from the Majlis and the controlling of "loose coalitions of like-minded individuals".<sup>381</sup> As a consequence, the Majlis was mostly labeled as a mere "rubber stamp" during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. One of the most critical points on the political historiography of Iran appears as the differentiation of the terms "rule" and "reign". In that regard, Reza Shah Pahlavi's period was mostly affiliated with the secondary position of the Majlis. The will of the almighty monarch, even though this was quite manipulated by the Allied powers after the occupation, had also let the way of keeping the Majlis open all along these years.

On the military opposition, an extensive literature evolved from time to time. As one of the contributors to this field, assessing the Pahlavi modernization's misinterpretation in the early Pahlavi regime's army, Cronin mentioned in many of her studies that the military was not a bedrock of the authoritarian modernization. Owing to the leftist sentiments, the provincial support to the Army commanders who opposed the rising central authority, and the delay of the payments in long arrears constituted the reasons for the military group's revolts. These revolts ranged from the Colonel Pasyan Revolt in 1921, in the early months of 1922, the revolt of Major Lahuti, in 1926, the revolts of Lieutenant Salar-i Jang, Colonel Puladin, and in a very late date through the arbitrary rule, the revolt of Muhsen Jahansuz group in 1939.<sup>382</sup> Amongst these, the relationship of these revolts with the tribal uprisings require a broader attention. As the tribal resistance vanished through the 1930s, this relationship started to vanish at the same time. Nonetheless, the 1920s were a

---

<sup>381</sup> Ed. Frank Tachau, *Political Parties Of The Middle East and North Africa*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994, p 135.

<sup>382</sup> Cronin, 2010, p. 238–260.

different episode for the history of the country. As Wilber wrote on the revolt of Colonel Puladin, in fact, it was a plot to assassinate the Shah during the newly-crumbling turmoil of the revolt in Kurdistan region of Iran. Close to the Turkish frontier of the country, another revolt by Simko had already been suppressed. In the wake of these events, Colonel Puladin with two officers under his command, Major Ahmad Khan, and Major Rouhollah Khan, and a Shaykh al-Aragayn were arrested in September 1926. Wilber wrote that this was the first link of a chain through the alleged military plots against the ruler. In one sense, these were sourcing from the discontent; however, in another, the synchronization of these with the emboldened political opposition was shared by many Iranians as the military plots, and subsequently the trials were brought back to light when the Shah and the people around him thought of handling some scapegoats to discourage the others who might have similar ideas.<sup>383</sup> The case of Mohsen Jahansuz was a different case than the previous revolts that sourced from the military groups. Matin-Asgari stated that the revolt was in the fascist lines, and Jahansuz was known as the translator of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Jahansuz and his group's activities were treated harshly, as the leader of the group Jahansuz, and the eight officers along with him tortured. On the execution of Jahansuz, Matin-Asgari wrote that this showed that "the Shah took the threat of a military coup very seriously".<sup>384</sup>

On the leftist opposition, it is not much of an exaggeration that the leftist opposition was put on a systematical-scale of eradication, the tortures, and the executions. On the political imprisonment, and its repercussions, the article of Afshin Matin-Asgari helps us to discover many facets of the leftist opposition and the regime's treatments on these groups. As the author stated, in line with the traditional reforms, some prominent political personalities such as Teymurtash, Davar was charged due to the embezzlement, double-dealing, and the corruption instead of the political crimes.<sup>385</sup> That situation was certain in the eyes of the foreign powers which sought to preserve their interests in Iran. Reza Shah's nationalism found its bases in the pre-Islamic

---

<sup>383</sup> Wilber, 1975, p. 120.

<sup>384</sup> Afshin Matin-Asgari, "Twentieth-Century Iran's Political Prisoners", *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 42, no. 5, September, 2010, p. 695.

<sup>385</sup> Matin-Asgari, *ibid*, p. 695.

gloriousness, and to a lesser extent, it was appreciated by the middle classes and the intelligentsia. Although this nationalism contained the appreciation of the modernist people, and to a considerable extent, the leftist circles, it was also put under critiques due to the patrimonial nationalism which excluded the leftist politics in regard to the anti-communist sentiments. It would be an exaggeration to assert that the 1930s in Iran witnessed an anti-intellectualism, however, it was certain to a bothering extent that the hallmark of the 1930s was the anti-communism with which Reza Shah combined the anti-British aspects. As Matin Asgari assessed the evolution of the secret police service (*Shahrbani or Nazmieh*), and the anti-collectivist law, he mentioned that the biggest punch of the regime was blown against the communists whose activities were suspended, and the activists were tortured and executed. Although the suppression of the left was not systematic during the ascendancy period of Reza Khan to power, the revolutionary poet *Mirzazadeh Eshqi* (1893–1924) had been murdered on an early stage.<sup>386</sup> This was a typical traditional way in a sense. Another socialist poet *Farrokhi-e Yazdi* (1889–1939) was murdered in the late 1930s in jail. Along with Sulaiman Iskandari, who took the stage in the formation period of the Tudeh Party in the turmoil of WWII, and journalist, and author Ali Dashti, Farrokhi-ye Yazdi was involved in the official delegation to attend the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution. He was elected deputy to the Majlis in 1928 and stayed defiant to the monolithic decision-making processes in the Majlis.<sup>387</sup> There had already been the communist activists who numbered more than 200 were arrested through the end of the 1920s. After a labor strike, the banning of these sort of activists proved that the security of peaceful mass demonstration was not guaranteed by the regime. The perception of extraordinary conditions reached its zenith in the beginning of 1930s when the anti-collectivist law was enacted in 1931. This law was dubbed as the “Black Law” by the communists. Several of them were released after being arrested, and some of them were sent into internal exile. In the 1930s, the most popular prison was the Qasr Prison where the communists developed

---

<sup>386</sup> Matin-Asgari, *ibid*, p. 693.

<sup>387</sup> Afshin Matin-Asgari, “Marxism, Historiography, and Historical Consciousness”, Ed. Touraj Atabaki, *Iran in the 20th Century, Historiography and Political Culture*, London, I.B.Tauris, 2009, p. 213.

a strategy of solidarity under the conditions of the prison. Matin-Asgari summed the efforts as “the creation of their own social organization”, and “the sub-culture of resistance and captivity”. These were mostly the men in their twenties, and the level of leftist women prisoners constituted a low portion in total. Being leftist in Iran during the reign of Reza Shah meant the assumption of being treated with the charges such as “treason and espionage”. These were disruptive labels that foresaw the alienation of the wider masses from the leftist ideology, and the groups. In that regard, the descriptions on the other political charges differed from the charges on the leftist activists. Thus, although it was not the main problematic, the legitimization problem for the left against the accusations and the charges of being in “treason” (*kha'en, be-vatan or vatanforoush*) prevailed. As Matin-Asgari pointed out to the similarity of both U.S.S.R, and Iran on the purges of leftist opposition, he mentioned that ironically, the distanced relationship of the early Pahlavi regime with the U.S.S.R did not prevent the regime in Iran from implementing the notion of treason (*khi'anat*) and infidelity although the perspectives differed in the scale of repressive class character.

The last group of leftist opposition in the early Pahlavi regime had been legendarily examined in the 20th-century historiography of Iran. Indeed, the fifty-three members of the group constituted the core of the leftist circles who rejuvenated the leftist movement after the abdication of the Shah in September 1941. The group, as being accused of setting up clandestine communist cells, were charged by the *Anti-Collectivist Law of 1931*, and the amongst its members, 14 were the labor activists, and the rest was comprised of modern educated civil servants, and the twelve of them were the university students. Sepehr Zabih stated that the members of the group were publicly tried, and given sentences ranging from three to ten years.<sup>388</sup>

The legendary leader of the group was Taqi Arani<sup>389</sup>, a university professor, and the publisher of a leftist journal called as *Donya* (the World).<sup>390</sup> Sutton put forth that there is little evidence to show that they enjoyed active support from the Soviet

---

<sup>388</sup> Sepehr Zabih, *The Left in Contemporary Iran: Ideology, Organization and the Soviet Connection*, Oxon, Routledge, 2011, p. 2.

<sup>389</sup> Erani Circle. Please see CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010030-8 Dated to 8 December 1978.

<sup>390</sup> Matin-Asgari, *ibid*, p. 694–696.

Union in this period.<sup>391</sup> Amongst the fifty-three members, the leader died in prison of typhus in solitary confinement. The experience of the fifty-three membered group (*pencah se nefar*) injected a new stimulating force to the leftist movement when the conditions started to change after the occupation of the country, and the promulgation of a general amnesty.

Finally, as Kinzer put forth, “if the Shah had not alienated himself from almost every segment of the society, and if he had kept a cadre of wise advisers around him instead of systematically exiling or murdering them, he might have been able to resist”.<sup>392</sup> He added that the Shah’s alienating policies towards the bureaucracy, and the several segments of the society caused a deep political loneliness that “instead of all, his dreams started to shatter, by his narrow-mindedness, the corruption, and the boundless egotism”.<sup>393</sup> On that point, Donald Wilber’s assessment helps us to understand the changing nature of Reza Shah from the early years of the monarchy to the arbitrary rule. As a matter of fact, as Wilber asserted, the Shah was sensitive to the people who had the courage of their convictions unless these prominent personalities were the old regime’s elements, flatterers, and the opportunists”. At the same time, as seen in the case of Tadayyoun, who had been away from a post after the foundation of the dynasty, he could also act in an impolite genre as he replied the mediation of Muhammad Ali Foroughi for Tadayyoun that “he completed his mission”. The pragmatic way of political understanding was approved by Wilber although he stated that the Shah was open to the independent personalities. Yet, as stated above, the Shah demanded the neutrality of these people towards himself, and the regime if they would not support him. “If he failed, he directly put these political figures aside from the political scene. If he succeeded, he managed to shackle their initiative”.<sup>394</sup>

Regime’s distancing itself from the British influences caused the revenge of Britain to implement the vilification campaigns against the Shah. The British press, and the

---

<sup>391</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 47.

<sup>392</sup> Kinzer, *ibid*, p. 45.

<sup>393</sup> Kinzer, *ibid*, p. 45.

<sup>394</sup> Wilber, 1975, p. 119.

Commonwealth press organs as no exceptions circulated a widely ranging campaign to denounce the anti-democratic, brutal, and oppressive style of the early Pahlavi regime. It can be appropriate to conclude this section with the critique of the *Argus* daily's news on July 29, 1939, which asserted that the Shah had been the largest landowner in Asia with possibly the only exception of the Japanese Emperor".<sup>395</sup> As Frye wrote the confiscation policy's results, the Shah himself had become the largest landowner in the country by acquiring most of the land in Mazandaran, the province as his hometown, and the foundations of land ownership had changed little in the country.<sup>396</sup>

Since the study's context is designed to prolong through the post-occupational agendas of Iran between 1941–1946, the study will continue to assess the formation of political opposition in the following phase of Iranian history. In the following section, the study will deal with the occupation of Iran and the political, social and economic atmosphere of the country for the duration of WWII.

#### **2.4.The Occupation of Iran (1941) and The Political Landscape (1941–1946)**

In the previous section, the study focused on the period to “cover some of the most turbulent times of Iran has ever known: the final years of Reza Shah's reign through the outbreak of the Second World War”; as the rest will attempt to deal with the invasion of the country by Allies, and the abdication of Reza Shah; the wartime problems of scarcity and rising prices; and the problems in the Iranian political scene. These titles will be analyzed under the sections respectively.

Right on the eve of WWII, Iran was at a very sharp edge which was the thorniest time of the Pahlavi regime since its foundation in 1926. Throughout the 1930s, the country's main mechanical systems were supported by Germany, as the share of Germany on Iranian trade grew almost to a half level and the considerable rise of the German influence in the country were making Iran a risky link in consideration of Britain and the Soviet Union.<sup>397</sup> In that regard, the Iranian trade statistics may help

---

<sup>395</sup> “Iran's Troublesome Elderly Shah”, *Argus* (Melbourne, Australia), July 29, 1939, p. 8.

<sup>396</sup> Frye, *ibid*, p. 92.

<sup>397</sup> Fatemi, *ibid*, p. 16. Fatemi stated the dramatic decline of the Soviet Union's share in Iranian foreign trade from 35 per cent share to the 0,5 per cent share within just four years. One important factor for that was the arrest of the 53 communist activists.

the readers to find out the rising influence of Germany. As it may clearly be witnessed from the table on the bilateral trade figures, for the first time, Germany's exports exceeded Iran's exports, and in 1939, the share of Germany became the first in Iran's imports.

TABLE 2,3

Germany–Iran Trade Figures (1928–1936)<sup>398</sup>

YEAR	GERMAN IMPORTS FROM IRAN	GERMAN EXPORTS TO IRAN
1928	29.3 RM	9.9 RM
1929	30.6 RM	17.0RM
1930	36.2 RM	9.5 RM
1931	35.3 RM	6.0 RM
1932	28.8 RM	5.4 RM
1933	20.6 RM	6.6 RM
1934	24.1 RM	7.5 RM
1935	15.3 RM	13.5 RM
1936	23.0 RM	30.4 RM

RM: Reichsmark

On September 4, 1939, Iran declared its neutrality.<sup>399</sup> After the outbreak of the war, Iran's position grew harder and harder by the scattering of war flames through the Near East. On this game pertaining to Iran, the Soviet Union's initial projection was not the restriction and pacification of German influence to a large extent, and during the harsh times of the war, when Germany decided to attack the Soviet Union, the pretexts were not of the unanticipated kind. The attack of Germany on the Soviet lands in June 1941 triggered the urgency sought by the Allies, and Iran was thwarted to come into the heart of world affairs. The occupation of the country came to the end of August 1941 by the entry of invading forces, the Soviet Union and Britain into the frontiers of Iran. Iranian troops which made the main and "resistant" body of Reza Shah's conscription policy and the central authority's ostentatious army fell down easily in a very short time and the resistance did not take place to survive. As Abrahamian stated, the military modernization constituted the bastion of the early Pahlavi regime, as the bulk of the military developed by the unification of the

---

<sup>398</sup> Rashid Khatib Shahidi, *German Foreign Policy Towards Iran Before World War II*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2012, p. 166.

<sup>399</sup> Fatemi, *ibid*, p. 17. The policy of neutralism was reaccentuated after August, 1941.

Cossack Brigades, Gendarmes. “In 1921, the bulk of the Army totaled 22,000 soldiers. In 1925, the total of the military had been raised up to 40,000. In 1941, when the Shah was abdicated, the number had reached to 127,000”.<sup>400</sup> The country’s army and the other institutions of the modern state were reminiscent of an amalgam of both modern and traditional institutions; as Ansari noted as a feature to define the political character of Reza Shah and the authoritarian modernization program attributed to him.<sup>401</sup>

Although, the bases in the Iranian military, in exclusion with the coup plot of the Mohsen Jahansuz group in 1939, represented a strong bastion for the fate of the early Pahlavi regime, the military resistance could not succeed when the social resistance against the invasion and the occupation of the country did not bring a support. Regarding the occupation, Ashgarzadeh put forth that “the brutal army which was so “fierce and brave in killing dissenting Iranians and plundering non-Persian communities, humiliatingly capitulated in the face of the occupying forces”. It was more surprising that “there was no public protest against the dethroning of Reza Khan, a fact that testified to the extreme shallowness and popularity of the Pahlavi regime”.<sup>402</sup> Proceeding the assessment of Ashgarzadeh, it can be concluded that the social support to the early Pahlavi regime, though the modernization and centralization attempts served to the deeds of the strong modern state, could not get beyond the prejudices against the repressive character of the regime. The following section will examine the wartime problems, the occupation process of Iran, and the abdication of the Shah with its repercussions.

#### **2.4.1. Wartime Problems In Iran: The Aftermath of The Occupation**

The aftermath of the occupation was intermingled with both hopefulness, and despair, pluralism, and the authoritarian calls, concerns for the territorial integrity of the country, and the pledges. The economic and social inconsistencies which had

---

<sup>400</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 127. Clawson and Rubin. *ibid*, p. 52. In this regard, Sanghvi shared the growth of the army reaching up to 200,000 from the memoirs of Hassan Arfa who is counting the eyewitness of Turkey’s Ambassador to London in 1941 as the British side was representing the main side to follow the occupation plans more than the Soviet Russian officials. Please check Sanghvi, *ibid*, p. 66. For the Turkish translation of Sanghvi’s biographical work, please check Rameş Sanghvi, *Aryamehr: İran Şahı Siyasî Bir Biyografi*, İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1971, p. 62.

<sup>401</sup> Ansari, *ibid*, p. 75.

<sup>402</sup> Ashgarzadeh, *ibid*, p. 94.



outburst constituted the main agenda of the country for a long while, up until the end of the War years. The oppression of the Islamic networks and the leftist movements carried the pioneering flag of activism during the years when Iran confronted the occupation and WWII. Foreign influence erupted after the ascendance of Mohammad Reza to the throne by the two Allied powers leading the rivalry of imperialism under the disguise of war protectionism. As it can be remembered from the neutral policy's construction and the attempts of the early Pahlavi administration to balance the foreign powers towards its foreign and domestic policies, Iran had been standing close to the USA as an alternative third force in the 1920s since Germany constituted an option no longer.

In the beginning of the 1930s, Reza Shah's attempt to overcome the British patronage over the national oil resources was stayed futile after the deal was completed in 1933.<sup>403</sup> As noted by Sanghvi, the lease led by Shaikh Khazal was a matter of discussion during the hard-moving negotiations between Iran and the administration of the APOC during the early 1930s.<sup>404</sup> Henceforth, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's shares were going to remain in favor of Britain with a little bit adjustment in favor of the Shah's Iran. As Sanghvi noted, the negotiations ended in April 1933 and a new agreement was signed: "In April 1933, a new agreement was signed. The Company undertook to increase the size of the royalty. The British monopoly of exploration rights throughout Iran was broken and the concessionary area reduced"<sup>405</sup> The company's name was changed into the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) along with the decree circulated to any of the country's embassies in 1935.

In accordance with this approach, Reza Shah's attributed "pro-German sentiments" upon which the main motive was the technical progress of the country were going to trigger the British interventionist sentiments to restore the old tribal diplomacy through the occupation of Iran. This diplomacy which was based upon the fulfilling of the gap where the authority of the central government was staying weak had survived mostly during WWI in Iran. British intentions and demands to restore the

---

<sup>403</sup> "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company-AIOC", Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 28.

<sup>404</sup> Sanghvi, *ibid*, p. 55.

<sup>405</sup> Sanghvi, *ibid*, p. 55. Savory, *ibid*, p. 609.

oil-rich resources' control by the help of tribal confederations' support were revised. This was both related to tribal activism in favor of Britain and own interests of the tribal structures.

As stated in the previous sections, the restriction on the tribal population ended after the invasion of the country. Qashqa'is, a nomadic Turkic tribe, were amongst these tribal confederations.<sup>406</sup> The political affiliation of the Qashqai's was close to German agents. On the other hand, as Lenczowski stated, after the relapse occurring during WWII, the British sides' reciprocal manoeuvres were closely tied to the tribal support. "The weakening of the central government enabled the tribes to reassert their autonomy, and the British in their eagerness to maintain security and stability in the southern part of Iran again reverted to tribal diplomacy".<sup>407</sup> On the "tribal diplomacy", British efforts prospected the maximum exploitation which basically relied upon "the forestalling of the possible rebellions" that could be fomented by the prominent Iranian nationalists. *General Zahidi*, the commander of the garrison in Isfahan was one of these names. Elm mentioned that with the suspect of organizing an armed uprising with German agents, Zahidi was abducted by the British, and sent to British mandate of Palestine where he stayed until the end of WWII.<sup>408</sup> As Gronke wrote on the tribal policy of Reza Shah, it was clear that the goal for the "sedentarization of tribes" was a part of the centralization and the consolidation of state's authority, and it was considerably over, then.

The months after the invasion in 1941, Iran –as a country of 15 million population– were witness to transfer of power to a new administration led by a young heir when the country also confronted the tribal activism. On the 18th of August, 1941, *Times* correspondent wrote for the assessment on the hard task of the new regime and the rapidly ongoing activities of the Allied powers to intern the German agents. The Chief of the Police forces has been dismissed by the new Shah. "Another 240

---

<sup>406</sup> "Qashqais", Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 258. "During the 1800s, the Qashqai dominated as the most powerful tribal organization in Iran, even defeating British-led troops. However, in the early 1900s during Reza Shah's attempt to settle the nomadic people of Iran, the Qashqai were defeated when their only passage from the summer pastures to the winter pastures were blocked, forcing the Qashqai into surrender. Like many tribes however, the Qashqai returned to their nomadic practices upon the abdication of the Shah in 1941".

<sup>407</sup> Lenczowski, 1960, p. 123.

<sup>408</sup> Elm, 1994, p. 42–43.

Germans have been sent away to internment. The number of Germans in Iran is one thing; the security of Iranian communications from the German danger is another”, and added some remarks on the new Shah’s rule: “British and Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Teheran, the Iranian capital. The new Shah has begun his reign with a promise to amend past wrongs and to govern according to constitutional principles”.<sup>409</sup>

With the German agents’ threat ongoing in mind, the sabotage risk over the “innumerable tunnels and bridges of the Trans–Caspian Railway”,<sup>410</sup> the uncertainty of the current status in Iran nurtured the concerns in the country. In the German legation, there were approximately a hundred and fifty Germans, and *Times* correspondent wrote that the German males over forty–five would be exempt from the precaution of internment, and expulsion due to the international law. Additionally, it was claimed that the mendacious propaganda of Germany that the Shah was sitting on the throne with the help of Britain was falsified. Finally, the new Prime Minister’s address to the Majlis on the marching of British and Russian troops to Teheran was commenting on the assurance of the Allied powers for not to harm the people and the capital city. Another assurance from the new Shah stated that he would rule fairly to the utmost level, and would seek the way to repair the wrongs of the past. Lastly, the correspondence also included that Mr. Foroughi Khan has assured to reveal the national property of Crown Jewels at the National Bank in Teheran.<sup>411</sup>

On September 20, the Tasmanian newspaper, *the Mercury* wrote on the irrevocable path of the Allied invasion to eradicate the German agents’ activism in Iran, assessing the efforts of German General Von Rundstedt could not provide a support line for the abdicated Shah through the campaign against the Soviet territory of Caucasus, and the new Shah’s some unpleasant characteristics reminiscent of his father’s German sympathy was assessed as it would not help him to make a longer reign. In addition to that, on Reza Khan and the Mufti of Jerusalem’s fate, it was

---

<sup>409</sup> “New Regime In Iran”, *Times* [London, England], September 18, 1941, p. 4.

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4.

<sup>411</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4. Please also see “Events In Iran”, *Barrier Miner* (Broken Hill), September 18, 1941, p. 2. “Germans Try To Leave Iran”, *Daily News* (Perth), September 19, 1941, p. 21.

assessed that the probability for them to stay in Iran was until prevalent. The Mufti, as it was recently obtained, was sheltering in the Japanese Legation, and the Axis Legations were reported to be closed including the Italian diplomatic centers, then.<sup>412</sup> On the 22nd of September, *Times* correspondent wrote on the new libertarian regime's hopeful atmosphere although the reforms in several fields were expected by the peoples of Iran.

In this regard, the decrease of taxes which constituted a heavy burden for the average people in Iran and the change of the monopoly system were demanded primarily. On the fortune of former Shah Reza Pahlavi, it was stated that "the Shah signed a document to cede all his properties to the Iranian State which included his deposits exceeding ten million pounds, and all of his estates, industrial properties, hotel, and houses". It was also stated that a "Civil List pension" would be granted to the abdicated Shah to "permit him to live in reasonable comfort abroad". He was "staying in Isfahan with a number of members of his family" then, and he was expected to depart through the destination of India.<sup>413</sup>

About his possession of massive lands around the country, the news gave some examples which allegedly affected the lives of the peasants around the Caspian littoral negatively. Coastal towns were mostly the holiday resorts during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. The construction of some comfortable hotels and a casino in a town were welcomed by mostly the wealthy people in Iran, and the foreign visitors of the country during those years. "More recently, his acquirement of villages round Shahabad in the west, and in Karind, which it was his intention to develop as a holiday resort for the people of Baghdad".<sup>414</sup> The Shah was also interested in silk and textile mills. In order to provide a more comfortable transportation, good roads were built in the Caspian provinces. In all these, the news stated that his mass fortune around the Caspian littoral meant the flight of the peasants due to the low wages of labor, and now then, the estates of the deposed Shah would be distributed to the

---

<sup>412</sup> "Iran", *The Mercury* (Hobart, Tasmania), September 20, 1941, p. 3. "The Fifth Column In Iran", *Times* [London, England], September 22, 1941, p. 4.

<sup>413</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4.

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4.

nation.<sup>415</sup> On the other hand, Wilber wrote on the dazzling fortune of the ex-Shah as it was misinterpreted just towards the ownership of a huge amount of money and massive lands instead of the concern for the development of the country. In that regard, Wilber's assessment was alternative effort to show the Shah's dedication to spend all his fortune for the sake of his nation. He defended the mass fortune of Reza Shah Pahlavi by giving a comparison of 1930 with the time the Shah was forced to abdicate. In 1930, his personal account in the National Bank of Iran (Bank-e Melli-ye Iran) totaled "a hundred thousand tomans" albeit when he abdicated the total amount of his mass fortune was around "sixty-eight million tomans".<sup>416</sup> Additionally, he also owned of "three million acres of land (1,2 million hectares)".<sup>417</sup> Regarding with the mass fortune of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Wilber's alternative interpretation meant that Reza Shah's concerns were misunderstood by the emphasis on his mass fortune. Since Wilber's monograph on Reza Shah Pahlavi was published in the midst of 1970s, one may realize the fact that the harsh, critical approach to British media was already flown away.

On the 26th of September, by the title of "Warning to Germans", *Times* correspondent wrote again on the fortune of the ex-Shah, and his current position along with the family members. This was an open propaganda to refer to the Shah's huge amount of wealth, and its transfer to the National Treasury was sought. There were some discussions in the Parliament respectively. The *Times* news stated that the investigation on this matter did not bring any results, and the allegations on the Shah's deposition in bank accounts under a false name in foreign countries were until suspicious. According to the news, Shah was presumed to take reside in his exile in the USA.<sup>418</sup>

With these in mind, Wilber's points depended heavily on the righteous reasons for Reza Shah to possess large lands and a large amount of money. Regarding with that, the author stated that Reza Shah tried to interest landlords for the development of the

---

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid*, p. 4.

<sup>416</sup> Wilber, 1975, p. 243–244.

<sup>417</sup> Cleveland, *ibid*, p. 189.

<sup>418</sup> "Warning to Germans", *Times*, September 26, 1941, p. 3.

agriculture in the country; yet these efforts did not bring the desired results. The construction of bridges and roads along with the railroads were the key parts of Iranian development albeit it stayed in a beneficial state to boost the substructure of Reza Shah's lands other than the strategic framework. Yet, Wilber pointed out to the national pretext of Reza Shah Pahlavi that he selected the Caspian provinces for his mass fortune primarily for the purpose of keeping the "communist threat" away from his country. In regard with this pretext, the author's point was consolidated that by the inquiry of the Iranian Government after the abdication, no bank accounts in European countries had been detected: "Reza Shah spent no money for himself and for his personal pleasures. Large sums were allotted to the construction of palaces at Teheran and Sad'abad in Shemiran, but he continued to live in the simplest manner within those symbols of the prestige and anticipated community of his dynasty".<sup>419</sup> Finally, Wilber recounted the tough and thorny path of the authoritarian modernization program which functioned to a considerable level under Reza Shah Pahlavi and he added, his son as a crown prince, that's to say the new Shah, saw the lack of his father's confidence on him through the end of his reign. This was built upon the conversation between the Shah and his son, which referred to the incompleteness of the modernization steps and institutions through the early 1940s:

Although he was subject to moods of deep discouragement, Riza Shah was always looking forward to the future. He knew that a time would never come when he could feel that his work was finished. Near the end of his reign, he began to show a growing concern over finding means to integrate Iranian society and to win public enthusiasm for the aims and accomplishments of the regime. Walking in the garden of the palace with the Crown Prince, he remarked, "I wonder what will happen to me, as I have not the time to establish the necessary institutions." His son was upset at the time because the remark seemed to reflect a lack of confidence in his ability to take over the throne, and it was not until he himself was on the throne and faced with the problems of the country that he understood what his father had in mind.<sup>420</sup>

Under the light of Reza Shah's lack of full confidence on his successor, thus, Iran was an Asian country which has become relatively modern to stand on the merge of decentralization and loss of central authority. The ongoing war affairs brought a considerable agenda for the new, young Shah. Then, he constituted both the despair and the luck of the country. For the former, he was standing on the risk margin to be

---

<sup>419</sup> Wilber, 1975, p. 245.

<sup>420</sup> *Ibid*, p. 246.

accepted as a “puppet” or a “British agent” likewise of his father had been perceived; for the latter, he has become the leader of the country to promise a reformist transformation to enlarge the civil rights and liberty in the country. As it can be concluded from the numerous biographies on Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the young Shah was an inexperienced inheritor of the Iranian throne when he ascended to it. He was born in 1919, and his education abroad in Switzerland at Le Rosey College provided him an alternative understanding of the Western countries which was seemingly absent in the mind of the abdicated Shah.

Nonetheless, as Axworthy noted, he has been shadowed by his formidable and mighty father as a sovereign of the country, and he has been constituting an inheritor character to carry a distanced personality from the ruthlessness and powerfulness:

It seems that Reza Shah’s relationship had been something like that between a senior officer and a subordinate. Mohammad Reza was educated in the 1930s, which did not bring him any closer to his parents or to the people he was going to rule. Mohammad Reza had a sharp mind but was socially shy and diffident –a legacy from his education and his relationship with his father.<sup>421</sup>

His will to transform society and the state in a differentiating path from his predecessor, Shah Reza Pahlavi, sourced from the Western-oriented education. That’s why, Mohammad Reza Shah’s mind, as the new possessor of the Iranian throne was beset upon the cultivation of strong ties with the Western countries and as Lorentz asserted, “unlike his father, he was not averse to using foreigners to organize and run Iran’s young oil industry, and was influenced by the West in the formulation of foreign and domestic policy”.<sup>422</sup> Indeed, there were several foreigners who had been hired by the Iranian Government to adjust the state institutions, and this projection of the new Iranian administration was converging with the approach of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. On the contrary, as it was stated in a guidebook for the American soldiers who had been responsible for some security affairs in Iran, the penetrative powers such as Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the USA were all aware of the Iranian phase of the competition. It was stated that Iran was not a negligible country in the region, and the vital resources of the country were evaluated:

---

<sup>421</sup> Axworthy, *ibid*, p. 230.

<sup>422</sup> Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 205.

Iran is much more than a lifeline. It is a major source of the power that keeps the United Nation's military machine turning over-oil. Because of its prime strategic value, Iran is the only country in the world where the armies of three of the United Nations –Great Britain, Russia, and the United States– are operating in daily touch with each other. This combination of great powers, cooperating in the defense of Iran, is a clear-cut indication of the decisive importance of the task you and your outfit have been called upon to do.<sup>423</sup>

What was remarking the period of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was first the reformation of the political system. Establishment of the new political parties and the enlargement of the liberties were the main steps for the animation of both the political and the social life in Iran. Regarding with that, the new Shah first endorsed the constitutional monarchy which was experienced before WWI for almost five years. The new period, even though it was not totally a decentralized era in an occupied country resembled the period of Constitutional Monarchy (*Dovre-y-e Enqilab-e Mashruti*) in Iran.

Although the period of Constitutional Monarchy was the first experience of constitutional developments in the country, this period had both affected WWI and the reactive capacity of Iranian nation by the consolidation of Iranian nationalism. Undoubtedly, the international developments such as the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 brought the dense debate and a vivid political atmosphere which culminated in the proclamation of Constitution in Iran. Later, the absolutist tendencies of the new Pahlavi regime under Reza Shah Pahlavi brought a squeezed political and social sphere towards an authoritarian modernization program. As Gronke noted even though the Constitution was restored after Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was sworn in, the development of the political system failed to a considerable extent:

At first, Mohammad Reza endorsed the constitutional monarchy, but during these years the parliament essentially paralyzed itself by engaging in partisan factional struggles. Taking advantage of the weakness of the young shah, various social-revolutionary movements that had been repressed by Reza Shah fused in the communist Tudeh Party (Persian Tudeh, masses), many nomadic tribes reorganized themselves and went back to their traditional way of life, and the clergy also sought to regain influence.<sup>424</sup>

---

<sup>423</sup> A *Pocket Guide to Iran*, Washington D.C., War and Navy Departments, 1946, p. 1–2.

<sup>424</sup> Gronke, *ibid*, p.120–121.



The reorganization of a leftist party in the orbit of Soviets was one of the most remarkable events during these years. A reactionary nucleus for the development of Iranian politics was constituted by the clerical circles. Another term which carried a pejorative meaning for the clergy was *akhund*. The social base of the clergy had gained grounds by the liberation of the political sphere during these years, in particular after the end of WWII. As Gronke noted, during the first phase of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, "the Muharram celebrations were gradually resumed, and in 1948 a religious edict (fatwa) issued by one of the leading mujtahids declared that women once again had a duty to wear the veil".<sup>425</sup>

After all, one may assert that the new period which constituted the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi symbolized the liberation of the political sphere and the re-orientation of Iranian foreign policy towards another balancing power, which was already keeping interest on this land of strategic importance and deep cultural and historical assets: the U.S.A. Before standing on the transformation of foreign policy, we may excerpt a brief note from Darioush Bayandor's essential work, *Iran, and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited*:

The eruption of liberties following his downfall spawned a full spectrum of political parties as well as a plethora of newspapers and tabloids. Politicians re-emerged from banishment and isolation; the gilt-edged hezar famil (1000 families) resurfaced from relative eclipse. Turncoats, muckrakers, and other political fortune hunters found a free reign. The country had begun experimenting with democracy.<sup>426</sup>

For the transformation of Iranian foreign policy, we may look at the Tripartite Treaty which was signed in the early phase of 1942. Beginning from the early months of the occupation, Iran was staying under the influence of two traditional powers, namely Britain and the Soviet Union along with the U.S.A. staying on a presumed role of balancing power. Regarding with that, as Djalili and Kellner asserted, a treaty which defined the occupation terms under the enforcement of the U.S.A. was signed with Britain, Soviet Union, and Iran.

According to this treaty, the occupying forces were accepting to finance the occupation expenditures, and they were sharing the guarantee to protect the territorial

---

<sup>425</sup> Gronke, *ibid*, p.121.

<sup>426</sup> Bayandor, *ibid*, p. 11.

integrity of the country.<sup>427</sup> This was a pretension depending on a *modus vivendi* amongst the huge powers, and as Armaoğlu asserted a treaty amongst Iran, Britain and the Soviet Union verified the existence of Allied powers to protect the Iranian territories just for the duration of the war. What was going to be done after the end of the war was determined by this Treaty of Tripartite powers?

The article 5 of the treaty, which was signed in January 1942 finalized the evacuation date of the Allied powers from Iran within the prospective six months of the end of WWII.<sup>428</sup> Meanwhile, through the following months of the end of the War, this was going to evolve into a strict tug-of-war between the sides to uplift Iran once again into the heartland of the world affairs. This Treaty which has been concluded for the duration of the Great War was confirmed by the Allied Powers at the *Tehran Conference*<sup>429</sup> at the end of 1943. Axworthy stated the importance of the Conference where the leaders of the three Allied powers had attended for the first time, and added: “Amongst the arrangements that Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt agreed upon for the conduct of the war –including opening a second front in western Europe in 1944– was the commitment to withdraw from Iran within six months of the war’s end”.<sup>430</sup>

Through the rest of WWII, Iran was going to be supported by the U.S.A. by military aids and credit programs.<sup>431</sup> What was making the new period in Iran under the new Shah different could be understood from the relative emancipation on the political layers. As it was stated by Clawson and Rubin, “... He initially adopted a far less dictatorial style, paying more heed to his cabinet, and to the Majlis. Some of his flexibility might have been sincere but part of it may have been pragmatic. With his country occupied by the Soviet Union in the north and Britain in the south, the

---

<sup>427</sup> Djalili, Kellner, *ibid*, p. 82.

<sup>428</sup> Please see “Pehlevi, Muhammed Rıza”, *Türk ve Dünya Ünlüleri Ansiklopedisi*, v. 8, İstanbul, Anadolu Yayıncılık, 1983–1984, p. 4441–4442.

<sup>429</sup> For the vivid narration of Tehran Conference, please check Valentin Berojkov, *Tahran 1943, Yeni Bir Dünyaya Doğru*, tr. Hasan Ali Ediz, İstanbul, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012.

<sup>430</sup> Axworthy, *ibid*, p. 230.

<sup>431</sup> “Pehlevi, Muhammed Rıza”, *ibid*, p. 4441–4442.

Shah was in no position to dictate strong policy”.<sup>432</sup> After the occupation, in a very short time, the political figures who had been under house arrest or who had been exiled during the last decade of Reza Shah’s rule such as *Mohammad Mosaddiq*, *Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai* had found a chance to act on the political scene.<sup>433</sup> There is no hesitation to say that there had been a political stimulation in the country which appeared by the foundation of several political parties.

Ranging from the left wing to the right, the political spectrum’s widening was a hopeful yet ephemeral development during the first phase of Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign. The elements which had been functioning for the evolution of party politics in Iran could be evaluated from the angles of both nationalism and anti-imperialism. As Axworthy noted, “the humiliation of the invasion, the presence of the Allies, the food shortages, the economic disruption caused by the war, the weakness of the government –all of it helped to stimulate another upsurge in political activity, especially through the nationalistic feeling”.<sup>434</sup>

Since the occupying forces constituted the main focus of the anti-imperialist and nationalist opposition, the political establishment which depended heavily on the opposition to Western powers’ exploitation in Iran have made a considerable progress during the War years. As it would be seen from the case of Mosaddiq, and the political movement related to his leadership, the National Front (*Cebhe-ye Melli*) which was officially founded in 1949, the suppression of the leftist movements constituted the base of the political landscape’s definition during and after WWII. Indeed, this was projected to be a part of the historiography by the latter official publications. A remarkable example of the attempts of the Pahlavi regime which found an enlarged basement to consolidate the political system is shown by the Iranian Embassy’s special bulletin which was attributed to the 28 Mordad “awakening” published in Turkey. This bulletin read the righteousness of the Shah’s new administration in the early 1960’s which was believed to be “applauded” by millions of Iranians:

---

<sup>432</sup> Clawson and Rubin, *ibid*, p. 58.

<sup>433</sup> Axworthy, *ibid*, p. 231.

<sup>434</sup> Axworthy, *ibid*, p. 231.

Ten years ago, Iranian nation, from the very edge of a deep cliff saved the fate of the country by a courageous awakening on a likely day. Ten years ago, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of August, Iran had been a vast threat, and the threat of communism had been menacing the whole of the country. However, the Iranian nation could just tolerate such a threat for only three days, and on the 19th of August, the nation had stood up to support her Shahanshah, and after a bloody encounter, it had prevailed to preserve the 2500–years lasting reign of the country. On the morning of August 19, both women and men who had been hand in hand with the valiant soldiers of the Iranian army had saved the independence and the freedom of the country at the expense of their lives. 28 Mordad is a cheerful day. Because, on that day, Iranian nation, not only saved the country from that destiny sinister, but also by pouring down their blood, also helped the enthronement of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi for the second time, and by this, they had displayed that they were faithful and loyal to the tradition of 25-centuries long dynasty. By the end of this bravely awakening, the security and the tranquillity in the country was provided, and the revolutionist steps which were vital for the future of Iran were started by the leadership of Shahanshah. Hence, the nation had succeeded to put into effect the steps in the field of planning and development. Thus, so many progressive steps in several fields were taken. For this reason, the Iranian nation congratulates the 28 Mordad awakening annually.<sup>435</sup>

#### **2.4.2.The Nascence of The Political Party Activities Before WWII**

In the edition published by Frank Tachau, *The Political Parties In the Middle East and North Africa*, it is stated that the edition is separated into chapters dealing with the regional states' relatively differing bodies of politics. In this regard, the chapter which deals below will assess the political party formation, evolution, and fractions in Iran and present some important details about the body of the politics of this country in the early Pahlavi period under Reza Shah Pahlavi. Since it is quite substantial to understand the political party formation in Iran, the assessment of this period will provide a background for the period of the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. The latter is generally held in three phases, first of which in the War years, and second up until the early 1950s, and the period from the early 1950s to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 which ousted the Pahlavi monarchy and turned into the Islamic Republic. As Tachau stated relatively later than some articles dealing with the Iranian political sphere and parties, it is not an exaggeration to evaluate the foundation of political organizations at the beginning of the 20th century. Even though these organizations were not the same as the sort of political parties, that's to say in the form of groups (*maslak/fractions*), the organizations mostly helped to uplift the level of political activities, and the ultimate form of political party

---

<sup>435</sup> İran Büyükelçiliği Basın Ateşeliği, 28 Mordad, August 19, 1963, p. 1.

formation soon arrived in Iran. In this regard, Tachau counts the name of some important anjomans. These were the societies, which had mostly organized along the lines of culture, occupation and religious convergences. Amongst these, one may refer to the Society of Culture (*Anjoman-e Maarif*), the Humanity Society (*Anjoman-e Adamiyyat*), two regional societies were mostly known as Azerbaijani-oriented political organizations, the Secret Society (*Markhaz-e Ghaybi*), the Social Democratic Party (*Hezb-e Ejtemaiyyun-e Ammiyun*); in addition to these there were two Teheran-based organizations which were the Revolutionary Committee (*Komiteh-ye Engelabi*) and the Secret Society (*Markhaz-e Makhfi*). Other than these societies, Tachau counted the groups as the political circles, which had been representing the political interests of the society. The proclamation of the Constitution in Iran under the Qajar dynasty met with the challenge of some circles in the Iranian parliament (Majlis).<sup>436</sup> These are given as below: “In the first Majlis, which convened in October 1906, three major tendencies were visible: the pro-aristocratic Royalists (*Mostabeddan*), the traditional merchant-oriented moderates (*Mota’delan*), and the faction representing the reform-minded intelligentsia, and the liberals (*Azadikhavan*)”.<sup>437</sup>

After the first Majlis, the new establishment met with the sharp division of political layers in a new parliament in 1909. Persia’s political establishment was clearly seen on this scheme which emboldened the political leanings through the stimulation of *Azadi* thought. *Ferqeh-ye E’tedal* and the *Ferqeh-ye Demokrat* were the two factions (*Moderates and Democrats*) which set the hegemony in the Majlis composition. Tachau added the prolonging influence of these two factions in the new Majlis which was happened shortly after the outbreak of WWI. This Majlis, the third one, included some new factions which were called as the Jangali Movement and the quasi-communist movement like *Ferqeh-ye Adalat* (*Justice Party*).<sup>438</sup>

After the resolution of War’s gridlock, the new era met with the Majlis’s opposition to the Treaty of Influence enforced by Britain in 1919. The weeks which followed

---

<sup>436</sup> Akhavi, in Tachau, *ibid*, p 134.

<sup>437</sup> *Ibid*, p. 134.

<sup>438</sup> *Ibid*, p. 134.

the 1919 Treaty were a part of the phase of transition in the Near East. The Ottoman Empire, unlike of its immediate neighbor, which was clinched by the Treaty of Moudros as an Armistice under the direct control of the Entente countries of WWI on the 30th of October, 1918 suffered the disruptive months of the invasion. Persia was not forced to make an armistice at the end of WWI, albeit it had been pulled through the Treaty owing the capitulations. Since the recent history of Persia has been under the heavy influence and pressure of the traditional imperialist powers, i.e. Britain and Russia, and the newly rising imperialist projection of Germany in pursuit of *Weltpolitik*, the country's politics which included a rarely-used term *hezb* instead of party, had stood under the pretexts of the Shah to overcome the foreign penetration. In this sense, political parties were considered as the agents of the foreign penetration, and influence. As Tachau asserted, the Shahs, due to all sort of restrictions on the political layers, did just their best to ignore them.<sup>439</sup>

After the turmoil which had arisen after the rebuffing of 1919 Treaty of Alliance, a new political path getting beyond the Qajar dynasty's control was consolidated by the coup d'état in February 1921. As the ex-commander of the Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan ascended to the Imperial throne in 1926 "under the title of Reza Shah Pahlavi".<sup>440</sup> Reformation of the political system meant a direct resolution of the political puzzle, and in this new era, the political groups were re-aligned for some of which a political positioning on the side of Reza Shah Pahlavi was favorable; as for some of the others, the contrary lines seemed to promise more security. This new era brought some important questions such as the "adherence of the new monarch to the Constitution (which was modeled after the Constitution of Belgium which was dated to 1831)" and "leave matters of rule to the cabinet and the parliament". The word "party" was in use mostly during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi although the use mostly referred to the caucuses instead of a direct political party organization.

The four political parties that controlled the fourth and fifth Majlises from 1921 to 1925 were the Reformers' Party (*Hezb-e Eslah Talaban*), The Revival Party (*Hezb-e Tajaddod*)<sup>441</sup>, the Socialist Party (*Hezb-e Sosialist*), and the Communist Party

---

<sup>439</sup> *Ibid*, p. 134.

<sup>440</sup> *Ibid*, p. 135.

<sup>441</sup> *Ibid*, p. 169–170.

(*Hezb-e Komunist*).<sup>442</sup> As in the term of word “hezb” in reference to the political party, Tachau referred to the loose coalition of individual interests instead of the institutional politics and finds the evolving political sphere in a relative freedom.<sup>443</sup> As it was stated by Tayarani et al, the general feature of the political parties in the Islamic world in a broader sense did not represent more of the nationalist and Islamic elements although there were some exceptions observed in the cases of the secular political parties.<sup>444</sup> The years under the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi are mostly characterized by the *subordination* of the Majlis which has found a base for itself through the functionary politics. Instead of depending on the party politics, Reza Shah’s oppressive style resulted in the vanishing of all kind of political organizations gradually. As Savory stated, “the political life in the reign of Riza Shah had fallen into the level of stagnation due to the increasing concentration of power and strategic expectations of the Pahlavi regime”.<sup>445</sup> During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the newspapers which opposed the regime were suppressed; the Majlis was just legitimized by its existence for the approval of the new legislation. Regarding with the Reza Shah’s regime, it was possible to assert its feature to outlaw the communist movements, however, the main reason for the banning of such activities mostly resourced from the view that these were perceived as the most powerful epicenter of opposition against the regime. In that regard, the Communist Party was banned, and trade unions were abolished.<sup>446</sup>

Other than the banning of Communist movements, his quest for Iranian national unity made Reza Shah to get use of religion unless the politicization did not take place. As Clawson and Rubin stated, “he restricted or banned the rights of Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Baha’i to educate their children in religious schools”.<sup>447</sup>

---

<sup>442</sup> Tayarani et al, *ibid*, p. 1–6.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid*, p. 135.

<sup>444</sup> Tayarani et al., *ibid*, p. 1–6.

<sup>445</sup> Savory, 1970, p. 610.

<sup>446</sup> Savory, 1970, p. 610.

<sup>447</sup> Clawson, Rubin, *ibid*, p. 57.

In this regard, it is beneficiary to repeat that the role of the education to construct a national identity stood as the foremost achievement of Pahlavi modernization program. In the case of politicization or the divergence of the political interests, Reza Shah's almighty character and rule stepped forward to take the "threatening" officials down. Regarding with the religious autonomy, one may easily find some examples related to the oppression, exile or execution. Clawson and Rubin stated the mystery of the deaths of some officials, and some other's deposition from their posts. A prominent Jewish deputy of the Majlis was arrested and executed in 1931. Shah's political strategy depended upon some prominent members of the Majlis. In order to design the judicial system or recognize state finances, several political figures were imprisoned or "met with mysterious deaths".<sup>448</sup>

Although the Pahlavi modernization was presenting itself as a program on a base to enlarge the civil rights, mostly the overall assessment on this regime was towards the oppression of it. As an example, the growing of the civil rights movement amongst the women in Iran does not necessarily refer to the massive transformation, albeit it was a part of the modernization program to shape the country's rural landscape as well. As Pappé stated the Pahlavi Shah's terms from 1925 to 1979 witnessed the fostering of women's rights than any other regime in the Middle East. One certain point was that the emancipation of the women started during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Although the enfranchising of women waited up until the 1960s, Reza Shah's forceful policy of unveiling the women by a special decree on January 8, 1936 was a deeply brave attempt during the interwar period in the Middle East. This date was celebrated as the national women's day in the following years.<sup>449</sup> Even though the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi proved a certain degree of emancipation for Iranian women, this was another fact that the regime was not suitably designed to boost the political opposition. Any kind of political opposition would face the same iron fist of the regime. Clawson and Rubin's statement on the Reza Shah's rule would help us to understand the limitations it had to encounter: "By the beginning of

---

<sup>448</sup> Clawson, Rubin, *ibid*, p. 52.

<sup>449</sup> Ilan Pappé, *The Modern Middle East*, New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 23. "By the 1930s, however, 14 women's magazines would be in distribution, discussing women's rights, veiling and education". Lorentz, *ibid*, p. 354.



World War II, Reza Shah's rule was marked by growing press censorship and intolerance to political dissent".<sup>450</sup> The following section will evaluate the reformation period of the political party activities in the early phase of the post-occupational period.

### **2.4.3. The Reformation of The Political Party Activities During WWII**

Although the nascence of the political party activities went back to the Constitutional Revolution, and its aftermath, the real political party establishment in Iran under the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty from 1925 to 1979, had come to a level of flourishing genuinely during WWII. In this regard, the War years made a rupture on the strict control of the political sphere. "The amnesty law" which let the political prisoners<sup>451</sup> to enjoy their freedom was another facet of the atmosphere feeding the liberation in the country.<sup>452</sup> Gholam Reza Afkhami assessed the political party formations in the turmoil of WWII in Iran as a contestation amongst *the traditionally sanctioned (crown and the clergy), organizationally efficient (the Tudeh, and the Army), and the socio-economically commanding sides (the tribal chieftains, the bazaar merchants, and the landlords)*. As Afkhami noted the religious groups led by Ayatollah Kashani, and the political movements reflected the full range of the ideological spectrum, from the extreme left to the extreme right contested in the urban areas in the expectation and hope of achieving the political power.<sup>453</sup> The vigorous atmosphere for the proliferation of the political parties continued through the end of 1940s. From 1941 to 1948, nearly "seventy" political parties were established in Tehran and the other cities.<sup>454</sup> As Tayarani et al. stated the categorization of the various forces and movements could be assessed by first with the independent and the nationalist-

---

<sup>450</sup> Clawson, Rubin, *ibid*, p. 57.

<sup>451</sup> Ashgar Alam Tabriz, *Aydınların, Dini Liderler ve Esnafın İran'ın Yakın Dönem Toplumsal Hareketlerindeki ve Devrimlerindeki Rolünün İncelenmesi*, Ankara University, Graduate of Social Sciences, Ph.D., 2004, p. 127.

<sup>452</sup> Rıza Kurtuluş, "Muhammed Rıza Şah Pehlevî", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 30, p. 565.

<sup>453</sup> Gholam Reza Afkhami, "the Nature of the Pahlavi Dynasty", *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, eds. Peter J. Chelhowski, Robert J. Pranger, Durham, Duke University Press, 1988, p. 33.

<sup>454</sup> Tayarani et al, *ibid*, p. 9.

reformist forces; by second with the feudal and the influential individual families; by a third with the Royal court; and lastly with the foreign powers.<sup>455</sup> Along the restricted hand of the Allied powers on the politics of Iran and the Iranian parliament, Iran's political party organization depended mostly on the elderly politicians at the first phase. This, depending either on the will of the Allied powers or the new, young Shah, had become the main factuality of the Iranian politics during WWII years. As Sutton expressed, "this traditionalism once established, set the tones of Iranian politics even after the Allied powers had gone".<sup>456</sup> He added the dominance of the elderly politicians whose experience of whom functioned as a facilitator for Iranian international relations: "The 300-odd vacancies in some 24 cabinets between August 1941 and November 1948 were filled with few exceptions from a clique of 70 or 80 politicians, all over fifty years of age, many over sixty".<sup>457</sup>

As Clawson and Rubin stated, the right wing of the political sphere was dominated by a new political party during the War years: "The British also sponsored new political parties. The National Will Party worked to reinforce traditional Iranian conservatism at the expense of Reza Shah's efforts to undermine the clergy and the tribes".<sup>458</sup> Although his views are not contrary to the Allied intrusion in Iranian political affairs started after the occupation, L.E. Sutton put forth that the Allied powers paid little attention to the political party activities until the War against Germany receded in the Soviet lands. The mere presence of the Allied powers and the strict censorship organization helped the consolidation of the obstacles in front of the constitutional spirit.<sup>459</sup> Finally, the clashing of the views represented the confrontation of the social invigoration and the fragmentation. As Azimi stated, "the upsurge of the political, professional, religious associations were assessed by some as the social vibrancy, as the others viewed it signaling the fragmentation and the

---

<sup>455</sup> Tayarani et al, *ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>456</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46.

<sup>457</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46.

<sup>458</sup> Clawson, *ibid*, p. 59.

<sup>459</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 45.

malaise”.<sup>460</sup> Below, the political parties which were formed in the turmoil of WWII will be examined.

The National Will Party (the National Determination Party)<sup>461</sup> was founded by an ex-comrade of Reza Shah Pahlavi, by Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai who had been exiled to Switzerland (1921– 1930), and then to Palestine (1930–1943) after the breakup of two comrades in the early 1920s. On the record of this political party, one may mention the “Anglophile character of Tabatabai”<sup>462</sup> who had been assumed to be a pro-British politician and journalist in Iranian political history, and it would not be a false comment that his efficacy in the political field was directly supported by the British interventionist powers during the years when Iran had been under the Anglo-Soviet occupation.

On his biography, one may find the struggle for the constitution as he was amongst the agents of Constitutional movement in Iran during the first decade of the 20th century. Born in *Yazd*, a city in the southeastern part of Iran, Tabatabai as a man who experienced his early youth during the Constitutional period, had published some newspapers to defend this course such as *Barq* (Rain) and *Islam Shark* (Eastern Islam) in Shiraz. After an experience of journalism in a relatively vivid city such as Shiraz, he then moved to Teheran, and there he published *Ra’d* (Thunder) to continue to defend the “constitutional course” and “social reform” as well as the British policy on Iran. *Ra’d* revived as the *Ra’d Emruz* (Today’s Thunder) by the edition of Muzaffar Firuz in October 1943.

This new political position “earned him favorable standing with the British, enabling him to act as a go-between for Iranian notables who wanted their checks cashed by the British-owned *Imperial Bank of Persia*, which in turn gained for him considerable influence in Tehran society”.<sup>462</sup> Being one of the pioneers of a committee called *the Steel Committee (Anjoman-e Pulad)*, he also actively participated in some trade negotiations with the officials of the Azerbaijani Republic, and then for a quest of change, the destinies of two public figures who had achieved

---

<sup>460</sup> Azimi, 2008, p.127.

<sup>461</sup> Tayarani et al, *ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>462</sup> Hamid Algar, “Tabataba’i, Ziya (1889–1969), *Encyclopedia of The Modern Middle East&North Africa*, v. IV, New York: Thomson Gale, 2004, p. 2142.

a chance to discuss a plan for a coup d'état intersected.<sup>463</sup> Although he succeeded to the office of Premiership, instead of Tabatabai, the real popularity and public support were on the side of Reza Khan Mirpanc, and the surviving differences on the two personalities and the political agenda resulted in the exile of Tabatabai, first to Switzerland, then to Palestine.

His tenure in Switzerland had lasted for nine years, as the second almost thirteen years until he had found a chance to come back to Iran. Tabatabai, after years of political exile, had found a chance to activate the pro-British sentiments during the occupation years. Since the political opposition's framework was beset upon the layers of Allied occupation, the British and the Soviet sides were actively directing the new political system. Upon the remnants of the political establishment which has found a base during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, some new elements had become apparent. Tabatabai's political leadership emerged under these circumstances. As Algar stated, his arrival has caught dense opposition from the Soviet side primarily, as well as an opposition accompanying the former one, from the United States of America. "The energetic representations of the British side" opened a political sphere for his quest for political activism during those years. As credited with the pro-British activism, he first has found a place in the *Patriotic Caucus (Fransiyun-e Mihan)*, then he has supported a political party, the *Fatherland Party (Hezb-e Vatan)* in 1943. As Sutton put forth, this political party was also called as the *Hezb-e Halqa* owing to its composition of the cells to include nine members under a leader, grew from time to time. The *sar-halqa* (leader of the cell) provided the enlargement process by the registration of eight other members in each cell.<sup>464</sup> The Fatherland turned out into the National Will Party in 1944. The 1944 meeting of the National Will Party resulted in the election of Tabatabai as the *Rahbar-e Koll* (the supreme leader), a title which rejected by him, and in the place of it, Tabatabai assumed the title of *Monse-yi Koll* (Secretary General). Being elected to the 14 Majlis, then, he reshaped his political party under autocratic lines with the name of *National Will Party (Hezb-e Erade-ye Melli)* in 1944.<sup>465</sup> Azimi mentioned the role of the party to

---

<sup>463</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2142.

<sup>464</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 52.

<sup>465</sup> Algar, *ibid*, p. 2143. Savory, 1970, p. 625.

balance the interests of the privileged classes, and the bazaar merchants against the rising Tudeh Party. As he asserted, Tabatabai was “an eccentric traditionalist who defended the pre-modern agrarian and pastoral-nomadic mores”. Fighting against the Tudeh forces sooner became the hallmark of the National Will Party which was supported by an organized special guard called as “*Goruh-e Paykar* (the Battle Band) led by the hoodlums such as *Mostafa Zaqi, Sani Katam, Hasan Arab*”.<sup>466</sup> The political path of the party was directly towards the consolidation of the Iranian political system on the side of British interests during WWII years. Azimi noted that “capitalizing on the British interests nurtured both of his notoriety in the eyes of the Iranian public opinion, and the considerable clout as well”.<sup>467</sup>

In the aftermath of the occupation, the political life’s steadfast growth brought some important results. After the abdication, the political formation’s algorithm developed on behalf of the occupying countries, first. The political party under the administration of Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai, *the National Will Party* was amongst the first outcomes of the configurations of British interests in Iran.<sup>468</sup> Regarding with the British presence in the political configurations, the National Will Party proved the fact that it benefited from the British agents such as *Robert Zaehner* and *Norman Darbyshire*. *Along with many diplomats of Britain*, both of these agents played vital roles to organize mass rallies against the popularly-elected government that achieved the goal of oil’s nationalization in Iran, and the ousting of it eventually. As Azimi stated, the relentless confrontation of *the National Will Party with the Tudeh Party* constituted the shadowy face of the inchoately developing political life of the country.<sup>469</sup> Mainly, the establishment of autonomous governments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan triggered the course of fears which the nationalists had long born in their minds. The National Will Party was banned by the Government of Ahmad Qavam in 1946 by the pretext that the Government sought a diplomatic balance to persuade the Soviet Union which was procrastinating with the diplomatic calculus on the evacuation of its troops from the Iranian provinces. The rapprochement process with

---

<sup>466</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/eradeh-ye-melli>.

<sup>467</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 128.

<sup>468</sup> Clawson, *ibid*, p. 59.

<sup>469</sup> Azimi, 2008, p. 131.

the Soviet Union owing to the new agenda in the international context resulted in the arrestment of Tabatabai and his lieutenants in 1946. As soon as the leadership of the National Will Party was arrested, the support given to the political party by the newspapers such as *Wazifa* (editor Sayyed Baqer Hejazi), *Mahur* (editor Ali Jawahar Kalam), *Saday-e Iran* (editor Sadeq Jarmad), Ali Besavat, *Saday-e Watan* (editor Ali Besavat), *Nasim-e Semal* (editor Mohsen Sa'i), *Kanun* (editor Hosayn Moti'i), *Nedaye Asmani* (editor Mohammad Jenabzada), *Eradeh-ye Fars* (editor Allah Kavari) vanished abruptly.<sup>470</sup> One early example of the newspapers that supported the movement of Sayyed Zia was the *Eqdam* newspaper published by Abbas Kalili. After he had withdrawn his support to the National Will Party, it came to support an obscure party, *Hezb-e Yaran*. From 1945 onward, it supported the nationalist movement, and later Mohammad Mosaddiq.

After all, the main reasons for the shut-down of the National Will Party were many. As Abrahamian stated in *Khomeinism* to refer to the wide perception conspiracy by the familiar terms such as *posht-e pardeh* (behind the curtain), and *posht-e sahneh* (behind the stage)<sup>471</sup>, the distrust against the British involvement in Iranian affairs was one reason. The other reason was the indecisive policy of British diplomatic and military officials in Iran. The victory of the Labour Government in Britain's elections. Finally, the newly-arising conditions of the U.S.A. involvement in the Iranian affairs constituted the last line to explicate the shut-down of the National Will Party. Tabatabai made another effort to make his political party bid in a prompted way bolstered by the British in 1951. His efforts to challenge Mosaddiq sooner failed, and the Party was closed in two months.<sup>472</sup>

*Hezb-e Tudeh* (the Party of Masses) was founded in October 1941. On the configuration of the clash of foreign powers in the country, the Soviet Union's relief in the following months of the occupation helped the Tudeh movement's escalation in the northwestern parts of Iran. Here, a base of the socialist movement was already available, and it was clear that the political freedom's promotion during the

---

<sup>470</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/eradeh-ye-melli>.

<sup>471</sup> Abrahamian, 1993, p 111.

<sup>472</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/eradeh-ye-melli>.

occupation years helped the masses to build a new socialist movement and political organization. Regarding the Soviet Union's projections in the Middle East during this period, Samuel L. Sharp put forth that "the northern zone was virtually isolated from the rest of the country". The Soviet propaganda consisted of lavish Soviet movies and the conspicuous participation of troops in locust control and well-repairing.<sup>473</sup>

*Dr. Taqi Arani* was regarded as the founder of the movement although he could not find the chance to stand at the steering wheel of the foundation process as he died "mysteriously" in 1940 of which he was believed to be murdered in prison.<sup>474</sup> For the period of legislation, the Tudeh was going to wait the 14th Majlis when it succeeded to win the eight seats –without the discredited candidacy of Jaf'ar Pishavari– in the Iranian National Majlis out of the 136 seats in 1944.<sup>475</sup>

This political movement and the party had implicitly defined itself in the orbit of Soviet socialism in the 1930's. After spending some years in Berlin for his medical studies, Dr. Arani's return to Iran sparked the Tudeh's organizational activities. During the 1930's, "he gathered around him a group of young students and professional men whose common ground was a hatred of dictatorship and a sympathy with Marxism".<sup>476</sup>

The understanding of the political administration during the 1930s was towards the limitation of the leftist movements. Reza Shah's powerful identity and his regime's strict policies were determinant on the left's development. The magazine of the movement was *Donya (The World)*, and according to Sutton, this monthly magazine caused somewhat fear in the eyes of the authorities.<sup>477</sup> On the other hand, when the *Donya* magazine was started to be published, the nucleus of the leftist movement was already arrested and tried according to the 1931 Act which targeted to ban the leftist movements as much as possible. Dr. Arani, as the leader of the movement, was also

---

<sup>473</sup> Samuel L. Sharp, "the Soviet Position in the Middle East", *Social Science*, v. 32, no. 4, October, 1957, p. 225–231.

<sup>474</sup> David Seddon, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of The Middle East*, London, Europa Publications, 2004, p. 652. Tachau, *ibid*, p. 146.

<sup>475</sup> Seddon, *ibid*, p. 653.

<sup>476</sup> Elwell-Sutton, *ibid*, p. 46.

<sup>477</sup> *Ibid*, p. 47.

arrested, and he died in prison. Sutton added that “*he was generally held to be murdered there*” and this movement’s remnant members who had been organized after 1941 founded the Tudeh Party.<sup>478</sup> Although the reticence of the Tudeh Party members was the first and key rule of the political movement, after the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi, they gathered to make a commemoration of Dr. Arani, as the founder of the Tudeh movement, at his grave on February 3, 1942.

The ambiguity and the controlled character of the party emerging from its program enhanced its chance to act in the political sphere other than the new leadership of *Soleyman Mohsen Iskandari*, whose ancestral ties with the Qajar dynasty made the party’s respectability more favorable.<sup>479</sup> The organization capacity of the Tudeh Party evolved to get beyond the other political entities during these years.

Indeed, the party succeeded in organizing almost 335,000 workers through the end of WWII, and the organization of a labour force at this magnitude was proving the substitution of pre-capitalist relations with the class-based understanding and action.

<sup>480</sup> The party’s controlling capacity was well-achievable by the example of Sutton as the *Anti-Fascist Society’s (Jamiyat-e Zedd-e Fascist-e Iran)* activities were monopolized by the Tudeh party administration. This society which was founded by Mostafa Fateh, was founded in 1942. The newspaper of this society, *Mardom* (People) was also put under hegemony of the Tudeh Party in the following months.

<sup>481</sup> The party’s deepest influence flourished in the northwestern part of Iran where the Soviet dominance was a suitable base for their political activism. Iran’s social landscape during WWII referred to a low-level of literacy, and the Tudeh Party preferred to benefit from radio broadcasts at the same time which was supported on behalf of an implicit Soviet propaganda. Up until 1944, when the Tudeh succeeded in achieving a greater goal in the collaboration with the United Front’s layers, it efficiently worked for the goal of unifying the various forces such as the peasants, workers, women, the intellectuals, and the students. In August, 1942, the Tudeh

---

<sup>478</sup> *Ibid*, p. 47.

<sup>479</sup> *Ibid*, p. 47.

<sup>480</sup> *Devrimler Ansiklopedisi*, “İran İslam Devrimi”, İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1991, p. 244. See also Joel S. Beinin, “Communism In The Middle East”, *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, *ibid*, p. 627.

<sup>481</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/fateh>.



organ *Siasat* (Politics) joined the newly formed *Press Association*. Finally, the Tudeh's press organs gathered under the leftist press association of *Freedom Front* in July, 1943.<sup>482</sup>

The party's achievements in the labour class was partly due to the rising influence of the Soviet Union in the northern zones of the country. As Elwell-Sutton asserted, another reason for the broadly-based organization of the Tudeh Party was the industrialization capacity of the country. The northern zones along with the oil fields in Khuzestan, and the founded factories in Isfahan as well as provincial towns in Mashhad, Hamadan, and Kermanshah.<sup>483</sup> As Tayarani et al. stated, "the United Council of Iranian Labourers (*Shoray-i Muttahidih-yi Kargaran-i Iran*) was also active in most of the factories, and industrial workshops throughout Iran".<sup>484</sup> Under the "dark clouds" of the 1944 oil concession discussions, the Soviet Union benefited from the radio broadcasts to criticize the Iranian government directly. As soon as the Soviet spokesman finished his program, Iranian Minister of Propaganda Safavi took stage and started a counter attack on the Soviet Union stating that the Tehran radio programs could not be used towards an anti-Iranian propaganda. It was a courageous act which could be assessed as a subjective effort to condemn the Soviet attempts. Soon after, Safavi was replaced without any explanation.<sup>485</sup> The 1944 oil concession constituted the major revision point of the Tudeh Party's implicit-affiliation with the Soviet Union. A partial reason for the revision was the death of Sulaiman Iskandari who died in the same year. As Abrahamian stated, by being experienced during the Constitutional period that he assessed it unnecessary to antagonize the devout.<sup>486</sup> After refusal of the Majlis to grant an oil concession, the Soviet Union continued to apply pressure on the Iranian Governments with a margin of satisfaction preserved towards the negative equilibrium. However this was a temporary satisfaction, and the pressure continued through the premiership term of Ahmad Qavam that made the last

---

<sup>482</sup> Elwell-Sutton, *ibid*, p. 48.

<sup>483</sup> *Ibid*, p. 49.

<sup>484</sup> Tayarani et al. *ibid*, p. 9.

<sup>485</sup> George Lenczowski, *Russia and The West In Iran: A Study In Big Power Rivalry, 1918–1948*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949, p. 202.

<sup>486</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 108.

cabinet from 1946 to 1947. The provincial governments that represented the autonomy constituted the concentrated diplomatic rivalry between the Soviet Union and the Iranian Government.<sup>487</sup> During the turmoil of WWII, many other parties were formed. However, as Abrahamian stated by depending on the dispatches of the British diplomats, and their American counterparts, the Tudeh was widely perceived as the only broadly-based political party during these years. From the onset of its activities, the party grew gradually within a few years. Its appeal was explained in the very first program as the mobilization of the peasantry, the progressive intellectuals, traders, and craftsmen of Iran. Paying attention to the distinctive barriers between the the layers who own “the main means of production, and those who have significant amounts of property”, the Tudeh Party alleged to bolster the class-consciousness by the appeal to “the socialistic, patriotic, democratic and constitutionalist sentiments”. By 1945–46, it had six parliamentary seats in addition to a seat in Isfahan, and the three cabinet ministries: “education, health, and trade”. Its main newspaper, after *Mardom*, and *Siasat, Rahbar (Leader)* reached to a huge circulation more than 100,000 –triple of the number that the semi-official *Ettela'at* daily's circulation. Core members of the party reached up to 50,000, and the affiliated members were around 100,000. In almost all of the cities with a population over 10,000, it opened seventy-eight towns. As the calls of the Tudeh Party resonated more than any other political organizations, the remarkable successes as the record of demonstrations were achieved through the end of WWII. The stimulation of “the masses to think and act politically”, as Abrahamian referred to the *New York Times*, was mostly represented by the May Day and Constitution Day celebrations. Abrahamian emphasized the role of the Central Council of Federated Trade Unions (CCFTU) on the organization of thousands of labourers in several industrial fields. With its affiliates, numbering more than 275000 workers that constituted the seventy-five percent of the industrial labour force in the country, the membership to the CCFTU included 45,000 oil workers, 45,000 construction labourers, 40,000 textile workers, 20,000 railwaymen, 20,000 carpet weavers, 11,000 dockers, 8,000 miners, and 6,000 truck drivers.<sup>488</sup> In *Khomeinism*, with reference to the British

---

<sup>487</sup> Sharp, 1957, p. 229.

<sup>488</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 108–109.

dispatch, Abrahamian added to these labour forces the 9,000 shoemakers, 9,000 food processors, 8,000 tobacco cleaners, 5,000 fishery workers, 3,500 employees in the Education Ministry, 3,000 slaughterhouse workers, 3,000 brewers, 3,000 munition workers, 3,000 cart drivers, 3,000 sugar refiners, 2,700 hospital attendants, 2,300 chemical workers, 2,000 printers, 2,000 glass makers, 2,000 cotton cleaners, 2,000 silk workers, 1,500 bath attenders, 1,200 cement workers, 1,000 engineers and technicians, 600 electricians, and 150 newspaper sellers.<sup>489</sup> Abrahamian, with a brief historical analysis on the former May Day celebrations, mentioned the role of the CCFTU which had been re-established in May Day, 1944 at the former Socialist Party's headquarters under the name of *May Day Club*. The council strengthened its ties with the Tudeh Party, and the full-strength showdown of the CCFTU took place as an oil strike in May, 1946. On the eve of the demonstrations, "the Government announced one day paid holiday although the May Day fell on a Wednesday". The chantings of the workers declared the zenith of the class-consciousness by the slogans such as "The factory owners, the workers have awakened", "Bread, Work, and Health for All". Several demands of the workers involved the Friday pay, eight-hour work, equal pay for men and women, work for the unemployed, housing for the homeless, support for the Republican cause in Spain, recognize trade unions, accept May Day as a public holiday, higher wages.<sup>490</sup> Hence, throughout WWII, the Tudeh Party's success was a blueprint for the future generations of the Iranian left. As Abrahamian mentioned, the main evidence which was presented to the court on the arrest of Dr. Arani relied upon his May Day manifesto. Even considering the black memories of the 1929 May Day arrests, the advent of the communist movement within just sixteen years proved a huge experience in both Iran, and the Middle East. Within just two weeks of the May Day, 1946 street rallies that took place in many parts of the country, the Government decreed the first comprehensive Labour Law which was shelved sooner as the Royal autocracy came back that marked the end of the nationalist interregnum in 1953.<sup>491</sup> The course of events proved the factionalism

---

<sup>489</sup> Abrahamian, 1993, p 66.

<sup>490</sup> Abrahamian, 1993, p. 66–67.

<sup>491</sup> Abrahamian, 1993, p. 68.

in the Tudeh Party following the suppression of the autonomous governments. The support of the Tudeh Party to the provincialism caused deep discussions that affected the reformation of the political opposition. The discussions with the Central Council of Federated Trade Unions (CCFTU) hastened with the the Tudeh Party's call to end the strike in the oil fields of Abadan on July, 1946, and the rejection by the Majlis of the Soviet oil concession on October, 1947.<sup>492</sup>

Converging with the Tudeh Party, another political party was *Hezb-e Hamrahan (the Comrades Party)*. According to Sutton, the political formation which was led by Mostafa Fateh acted beyond the socialist lines of the Tudeh Party. It was formed in October, 1942 by Mostafa Fateh and his comrades after they had broken with *the Anti-Fascist Society*. He had served as the deputy *Director General of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company* in the 1920s, and his ties with this company affected the conspiracy of *Tudah-nefti* (a term to vilify some of the Tudeh members) referring to the secret ties of the Tudeh members with this oil company. The conspiracy was both defended by the new Shah, and Dr. Mosaddiq who defended the non-alignment of Iran against the concessionist policies.<sup>493</sup>

Sutton assessed this political party as a “more orthodox party than the Tudeh Party in terms of the nationalization of the means of productions, as well as social insurance, free medical facilities and education, and family allowances”. Regarding with the *Hezb-e Hamrahan*, Tachau counted the career perspectives of some of the Tudeh members whose positions in Tudeh were not satisfying them. Fateh, as aThe party was split and spawned the Socialist Party in mid 1944.<sup>494</sup> The split in the Hamrahan Party caused another party, *Hezb-e Iran (Iran Party)* following the left-wing ideals led by engineer *Farivar* in 1944. It started to publish *Shafaq* (the Twilight) newspaper in November, 1944.<sup>495</sup> Subsequent courses of events that superseded the censorship, and factionalism caused the *Vahdet-i Iran Party*, and the newspaper such

---

<sup>492</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/communism-ii>.

<sup>493</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/fateh>.

<sup>494</sup> Please also see Akhavi, in Tachau, *ibid*, p. 148.

<sup>495</sup> Sutton, 1949, p. 53.

as *Nabard-i Imruz and Jibha* (Front) in 1945–1946.<sup>496</sup> Its journal was *Imruz va Farda* (Today and Tomorrow), and subsequently, the journal of *Sham* (the Candle) propagated its ideas, too.<sup>497</sup> Since there was only one radio station<sup>498</sup> in the country during WWII, the radio continued to hold the monopoly of sewing the political opposition amongst the wider masses. As Axworthy stated in his *Empire of the Mind*, “radio ownership was also expanding rapidly, exercising a further integrating influence and focusing the attention even of isolated villages on national events and discussions”.<sup>499</sup> During these years, aside from the radio broadcasting, as a crucial part of the public network, newspapers, printed pictures, pamphlets, mass street rallies functioned as the the primary agents on the information of the public. Axworthy added that “by 1943, there were forty–seven newspapers in Tehran”. “This number was going to rise up to seven hundred by 1951”.<sup>500</sup> To save in mind that during those years, there was only one radio station in the country.

Whilst counting the Tudeh’s dominance and the such an example of a factional political party, *Hezb-e Hamrahan*, Sutton also counted the *Hezb-e Adalat* (Justice Party) which was founded in December 1941. Appealing mainly to the bazaar merchants, this political party was founded by Ali Dashti, a prominent journalist since times of WWI.<sup>501</sup> He was considered to be the first deputies of the Majlis who publicly denied the abdicated Shah and advocated the investigation of the early Pahlavi period on September 28, 1941. The other leaders of the Justice Party were Jalal Emami, Ebrahim Kaja’nuri, a Belgian-educated journalist, lawyer, essayist, and

---

<sup>496</sup> Sutton, 1968, p. 83, 91.

<sup>497</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 49. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/fateh>. Sutton, 1968, p. 91.

<sup>498</sup> *Iran*, Ankara, İran Büyükelçiliği Basın ve Enformasyon Bürosu, 1967. In this booklet published by the Bureau of Information and Press at the Embassy of Iran in Turkey, it was targeted to make the propaganda of the Pahlavi regime, the development of the national industry was stated by the example of 14 radio stations that was stated to be numbered only one through the years of WWII. Most of these booklets were published on behalf of Iranian Government to boost the development in the country, and this was of no coincidence that these were published during the 1960s, and 1970s when the regime was assessing itself quite successful in terms of the past decades.

<sup>499</sup> Axworthy, *ibid*, p. 232.

<sup>500</sup> Axworthy, *ibid*, p. 232.

<sup>501</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p 50.

served as the head of Government Press and Propaganda Bureau (*Edare-ye Tabligat va Entesarat*) but resigned his position on November 16, 1947, because of his disagreement with Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam. Faraj Allah Behrami, former Chief Secretary of Reza Shah, Jamsid Alam, influential politician and physician, Abul Qasem Amini, Majlis deputy, governor-general of Isfahan (who later joined Democrat Party).<sup>502</sup>

Ali Dashti has been a sincere supporter of Reza Khan in the beginning of 1920s. Nonetheless, from time to time, his critical approach made him distanced to the Pahlavi administration, and he was sent to prison during the 1920s. He had been publishing the newspaper *Shafaq-e Sorkh* (*Red Twilight*) in 1922 before he got “disillusioned” with the Pahlavi administration.

From 1928 to 1978, he was an elected deputy in the parliament, and during the years of WWII, his career along the political lines followed the leadership of *Hezb-e Adalat*. Later on, in 1948, he was appointed the Ambassador to Lebanon and Egypt. Apart from his political career lines, one may find his literary career by his works on *Omar Khayyam*, *Hafez*, and *Prophet Mohammad*.<sup>503</sup> As Peter Avery mentioned, Ali Dashti was one of the promising authors during the Pahlavi era who stayed out of the early Pahlavi regime’s line although he had ardently supported the rise of Reza Khan in his early years.<sup>504</sup> Surely, his novels on the contemporary Iranian women’s rights were of interest of several readers during those years. Justice Party’s propaganda was broadcasted by first the newspaper *Adalat* (Justice) and *Mehr-i Iran* (The Sun of Iran), and later it established its own press organ *Bahram* (January 1944) and subsequently launched the *Neda-yi Adalat* (the Call of Justice).<sup>505</sup> Amongst these *Mehr-i Iran* supported the employment of foreign advisers, and appealed to the mercantile classes, especially in Khuzestan. Later it became the press organ of the

---

<sup>502</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/edalat>.

<sup>503</sup> For more information about Ali Dashti, please see Michael C. Hillman, “Ali Dashti”, *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, *ibid*, p. 678.

<sup>504</sup> Avery, *ibid*, p. 652.

<sup>505</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 49.

*Paykar (Battle) Party*.<sup>506</sup> *Neda-yi Adalat* opposed the Millspaugh mission in 1944, to prove the change of the Justice Party's policy into a nationalist line, and changed its name as *Neda-yi Azadi* in 1945.<sup>507</sup> Tachau added the prominent role of Ali Dashti and the continuous character of the Justice Party with the former counterpart in reference to the years of *Constitutional Revolution*. Additionally, he also adds the party's political principles such as the lowering of the military expenditures, greater government commitment to education, and preference for American advisers. The party's activities were ended unceremoniously in 1947 due to Prime Minister *Ahmad Qavam*'s prospect to approach the Soviet Union.<sup>508</sup> Amongst the political parties of this period, one may find the officialdom in a rather weaker sense, yet as not vanished. The autonomy of the intellectuals, journalists, and the politicians was not extended far away even though a comparison with the former period of reign was not logical in terms of the influx of political parties.<sup>509</sup>

*Mihan Parastan (Patriots)*, as a political party leaning to the left, had a very similar program with the former leftist parties, though leaning more to the left; its members seemed mostly to gather officials and the technicians. Its newspaper was *Mihan Parastan*. What was important and worth to remember about *Mihan Parastan* was surely the party's confused role of constituency under the title of *National Front (Cebhe-ye Melli)*. This was a *blanket term* to surround several political groups and parties. As Tachau noted, *Mihan Parastan* was a political party which ceased its activities and participated into the *Hezb-e Melli* (the National Party) in 1944.<sup>510</sup>

In that regard, Sutton stated the difference of Tudeh Party as a political organization which emerged as the most broadly-organized political entity getting beyond the level of a personality-based political formation. The other political parties were

---

<sup>506</sup> L.P. Elwell-Sutton, "the Iranian Press: 1941-1947", *British Institute of Persian Studies*, Iran, v. 6, (1968), p. 98-99.

<sup>507</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1968, p. 100.

<sup>508</sup> Akhavi in Tachau, *ibid*, p. 159.

<sup>509</sup> Hossein Shahidi, *Journalism in Iran: From Mission to Profession*, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 1. Shahidi, as a prominent scholar in his field focused on the evolution of journalism in Iran since 1979. One of his introducing remarks was on the nature of journalism which was under the state monopoly in many aspects before the Iranian revolution in 1979.

<sup>510</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 166.

clearly the gatherings of a group of people depending upon some “pious platitudes” concurred with the variants of Iranian nationalism. As Sutton stated “parties of this type seldom spread their influence beyond their own circle of intellectuals and professional men; and their fortunes, being dependent on the whims of individuals, fluctuated widely”.<sup>511</sup>

The National Front was a far more significant phenomenon in the political life of Iran from the years it started to influence the political sphere up until the mid-1950s. It was an ardent defender of nationalization policies under the leadership of *Mohammad Mosaddiq*, a prominent politician since the times of the Constitutional Revolution. Pertaining to *Mihan Parastan*, Tachau counted other political parties which gathered under the roof of *National Front* such as the *Paykar (Battle)*, *Istiqlal (Liberty)* and *Azadi Khvakhhan (Freedom Seekers)*, and *Hezb-e Mihan (National Party)*. For the political orientation of *Hezb-e Mihan*, Tachau added the *irredentist* slogans and rhetoric of this political party, which included the close geographies such as Bahrain, Afghanistan and the Caucasus for a “Greater Iran”.<sup>512</sup> In this regard, it would be quite helpful to state that a confusion would be probable with the *Hezb-e Mihan Parastan* and *Hezb-e Mihan* as both of these political entities were not the constituents of the *National Front*. The former had ceased its activities by merging into the *National Party (Hezb-e Melli)* in 1944.

During these years, the features of the political parties would have been categorized under several terms. One of those features was the *ephemeral* character of the political parties of which the short-term political parties which had been orienteering towards some extremist points such as Neo-Nazism were apparent. An example to these was *Hezb-e Sosialist-e Melli-ye Kargar-e Iran (National Socialist Worker’s Party of Iran)*.

Tachau counted on this political party as it had affiliated with *the National Front* in the early 1950s, as yet it just left a little imprint on Iranian politics.<sup>513</sup> Another political party was *Paykar (Battle) Party*. Its cadre was including some officials and technicians, and intellectuals at the same time. *Hosseini Ala*, who had become the

---

<sup>511</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 49.

<sup>512</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p.164.

<sup>513</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 164.



Prime Minister twice in the 1950s was a prominent political figure to represent the officialdom. After the Paykar experience, Ala was assigned to the Embassy in Washington, and along with him, during the Paykar experience, there were lawyer *Dr. Isa Sadiq*, *Khosro Iqbal*, and some other people. First, it published the newspaper *Bahar (Spring)*, and then, it was represented by *Nabard (The Struggle)*. On the rest of the Paykar experience, Sutton added a few notes which depended on *Iran-i Ma (Our Iran)* newspaper. Even though the political party ceased to exist during this period, the popular independent left-wing daily of *Iran-i Ma* continued to be published.<sup>514</sup> *Iran-e Demokrat Party* was founded by Ahmad Qavam in 1946 and did not last long. Its main role in the Iranian political affairs emerged as the diplomatic manoeuvres against the Soviet Union and replaced the National Will Party's zone of influence.

As the historiography pays attention to rather the massive political parties, it would be helpful to look into the list of other smaller political parties. Other than these, there were a few political parties such as the *Hezb-e Mardan-i Kar (Men of Work Party)* led by Amir Ibrahim, *Hezb-e Mellat (Nation Party)* founded by Mohammad Sadaq Tabataba'i in January, 1942, *Hezb-e Melli (National Party)* founded by Mohammad Tadayoun in October, 1941, and *Hezb-e Jangali (Forest Party)* in Rasht as the last of which was regarded as a remnant reference to the leftist movement in the early 1920s.<sup>515</sup> Surely, amidst the influx of political parties, in a political climate where the political parties and political freedom was promoted, several of those were founded, and some of them were the re-trials of the elderly politicians within the limits of the political order. Amongst the other political parties of this period, Tachau counted the names of some others as the National Union Party (*Hezb-e Ettihad-e Melli*), Nationalists of Iran (*Hezb-e Melliyun-e Iran*), Pan-Iranist Party (*Hezb-e Pan-Iranist-e Iran*), *Hezb-e Mardom (The People's Party)*, *Fedaiyan-e Islam (The Devotees of Islam)*, and the *Mojahedin-e Islam (The Warriors of Islam)*.<sup>516</sup> One important contributor to the women's movement in Iran

---

<sup>514</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 50.

<sup>515</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p. 50. Please also see Tachau, *ibid*, p. 158.

<sup>516</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 135.

was the *Hezb-e Zanan* (Women's Party) that was formed by the elderly women in October 1943 who split from the *Teshkilat-e Zanan-e Iran* (Iranian Women's Association, the women's branch of the Tudeh Party in July 1943.<sup>517</sup> Camron Michael Amin put forth that the Hezb-e Zanan broke a new rhetorical ground by making campaigns on the women's suffrage between 1943–1946. The elderly women tried to change the path of the National Awakening Project towards a more strengthened emancipation by defending that the women's suffrage.<sup>518</sup> Even the party members defended the ending of male dominance by invoking the international intervention on behalf of the women's suffrage. In that regard, Amin stated that “by raising the international intervention to fight misogyny in Iranian society, the leadership of the Women's Party was confronting that critique and considering the foreign intervention a lesser evil than the oppression of women by Iranian patriots”.<sup>519</sup>

During WWII, the foreign interests' penetration to the political party activities were undoubtedly concealing the German interests, and the disappearance of the German interests in a very short time had not been proving the absolute eradication of Nazi Germany's network. As stated above, the German agent *Franz Mayer* was already active in Iran along with some other agents such as Berthold Schultze–Holthus, as both agents were occupying the spymaster field of the blacklist of the Allies, and including Ayatollah Kashani and Habibollah Nobakht, in a political organization under the title of *Melliyun-e Iran* (Iranian Nationalists) that was founded during WWII. Their publication organ which went on its calls to the Iranian nation to vilify the Allied powers' interests was *Dideban (Lookout)*.<sup>520</sup>

Related to the German agents' activities under this political party, *Melliyun-e Iran* (Iranian Nationalists), Tachau noted the projection of German agents for the tribal rebellions amongst the Qashqais, Kurds and some other parts of the country. By the

---

<sup>517</sup> Elwell–Sutton, 1949, p. 53–54.

<sup>518</sup> Camron Michael Amin, “Globalizing Iranian Feminism”, 1910–1950, *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, v. 4, n. 1, Special Issue: Early Twentieth-Century Middle Eastern Feminisms, Nationalisms and Transnationalisms, Winter, 2008, p. 7.

<sup>519</sup> Amin, *ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>520</sup> Elwell-Sutton, 1949, p.50.

probable revolts amongst the Kurds, and the Qashqai, a nomadic Turkic tribe in the western parts of Iran, German secret service members were expecting to break up the role of Iran as a corridor to Soviet Union's aids. Indeed, Iran's status as a conduit first for British and then U.S. aids to the Soviet Union was stated as *Persian corridor*<sup>521</sup> and the halting of this corridor in order to break up Iran's ties with the Allied powers was a rather unachievable destination under those circumstances.

As Tachau noted on this political party, "one of its adherents was a prominent soldier and politician in Iran's political sphere, *General Fazlollah Zahidi* whose arrest in 1944 by the British forces", and his arrest ended up with ceasing of the activities of Germans and this political party gradually.<sup>522</sup> In this regard, Berojkov's narration of the *Tehran Conference* eyewitness, and as one of the focal points, the probable threats of German network of agents and local tribes shed light upon the course of events:

Currently, the events which are known by all of its details tell us clearly the fact that Tehran was one of the centers for German espionage in the Middle East. When it was the term for taking immediate measures, also the member of the U.S.A's Intelligence Service Michael Raly had partaken the view of Soviet Intelligence Service. Besides, he, due to any measures were taken, had approved the view that amongst the thousands of foreigners who'd run from Europe to Tehran, stayed in Iran.<sup>523</sup>

After all, one may mention that in exception of the Tudeh Party, the political party organization in the turmoil of WWII did not create broadly-based organizations. Personality-based organizations were superior to the latter type to mobilize the masses. The orientation of the Tudeh Party towards pro-Soviet policies inclined from 1944 to 1946. However, the post-WWII dynamics of Iranian political life boosted the nationalist organizations which referred to the most dominant political current of thought during the last years of the period between 1941 to 1946. All along these years, the alignment of the left and right wings emerged for the first time. The factionalism caused some deep discussions within the parties, and the alignments

---

<sup>521</sup> Please see Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'État in Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, n. 19, v.3, 1987, p. 267. Please also see Adel Altorai, *Understanding The Roles of State Identity In Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Rise and Demise of Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement (1997– 2009)*, London, London School of Economics (LSE), Ph.D., 2012, p. 99.

<sup>522</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 164. Please also see Berojkov, *ibid*, p. 21.

<sup>523</sup> Berojkov, *ibid*, p. 21.

affected the national and provincial press organs. The level of political violence inclined gradually. The provincialism was encouraged by the autonomous movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan regions of the country.

Constitutionalism was emboldened by the proliferation of the political parties, associations, and the newspapers. The relatively enlivened liberties supported the cause for the traditionalists to oppose the modernization attempts in the early Pahlavi regime, as the honorifics of the noble families during the Qajar dynasty were restored, and as seen in the example of Sayyed Zia, “wearing of the old-fashioned fur cap instead of a European-style hat” became less risky.<sup>524</sup> The censorship mechanism functioned, and as the Prime Minister Mohammad Sa’ed noted in his address to the 14th Majlis, the fundamental problems of the country prevailed owing to the factional disputes. The chief topics of the political agenda during the 13th Majlis (1941–1944) continued with slight amelioration in the following years. Despite the fact that factional disputes did not come short, the first free elections that took place in some seventeen years helped the composition of a more democratic Majlis body. The 14th Majlis (1944–1946) dealt with the oil concession manoeuvre of the Soviet Union, and the rise of the “negative equilibrium” policy led by Mohammad Mosaddiq. In that regard, the reformation process of the political opposition gained a long-lasting experience to build up new strategies towards the oil nationalization policies.<sup>525</sup> Below, the cabinets and the term of the Prime Ministers who seated in the office from 1941 to 1946 will be examined.

#### **2.4.4. Cabinets and Prime Ministers In Iran (1941–1946)**

In order to understand the flow of events and the changing parameters of the political life in Iran during the turmoil of WWII, it would also be useful to add a few notes on the cabinets and the elections of these years. When the old Shah was abdicated, the time for elections of the 13th Majlis was nearing. After the assignment of Mr. Foroughi Khan as the new Prime Minister, this process which facilitated the influence of elderly politicians gradually. On March 12, 1942, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Soheyli (1896–1958) was assigned as the new Prime Minister

---

<sup>524</sup> Sutton, *1949*, p. 51.

<sup>525</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 137–138.

instead of Mohammad Ali Foroughi (1877–1942) who was known as *Zoka al-Molk*, a title which he inherited from his father. Mohammad Ali Foroughi was one of the prominent politicians during the rule of the abdicated Shah,” a top member of the freemasonry” as well as “an educated person, highly respected in the Iranian cultural and scientific circles”.<sup>526</sup> Shah’s attention to his career was undoubtedly a result of Foroughi’s career which was sometimes regarded to be an amalgam of intellect, literature, history, philosophy and the politics. His service were appreciated by many sources in the field literature. Kamran M. Dadkash stated that Foroughi rendered great service to his country at a very critical moment in Iranian history.<sup>527</sup>

The literature on Iranian politics of this period focuses on the political leaders’ style where Ahmad Qavam (1876–1955) occupies a significant place. As an elderly politician, Qavam was the representative of the Constitutional period of Iran of which the pluralism was mostly regarded as a similarity with WWII and the post–WWI period. After several years of interruption of his active life, he was appointed to the Office once again in 1942. As he was the leader of a political party to converge the interests of the land aristocracy and merchants i.e. the political scenery met with his political leadership in the country during the turmoil of WWII.

The political party which was established after the end of WWI, *Hezb-e Eslah Teleban*<sup>528</sup> was the political party of Qavam, and by a political entity like that, he was a forceful character of the political layers at the end of WWI as his older brother Vosuq al–Dowleh (Mirza Hasan Khan) (1873–1950)<sup>529</sup> had also served as premier of Iran in the wake of WWI. As noted in the biography of Vosuq al–Dowleh Ahmad Qavam had also been constituting the members of the transition period of Iran, by both the lineage to the Qajar dynasty and the new political dynamics in Iran after the times of the Constitutional Revolution. As stated above, Mohammad Ali

---

<sup>526</sup> Fardust, *ibid*, p. 36.

<sup>527</sup> Kamran M. Dadkash, “From Global Capital to State Capitalism: The Evolution of Economic Thought in Iran, 1875–1925”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 39, n. 4 (October, 2003), p.151.

<sup>528</sup> This political party was re–organized under the title of the Reformer’s Party during the mid 1940s. Please see Tachau, *ibid*, p. 169.

<sup>529</sup> Neguin Yavari, “Vosuz al–Dowleh”, *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, p. 2318. Yapp, 1996, p. 173.

Foroughi (1877–1942)<sup>530</sup> was the first Prime Minister of Iran who had seated in the office until the spring of 1942. For a six-month period approximately, he was the Premier of Iran under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah.

Mohammad Ali Foroughi, who had been assigned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Prime Minister during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, had also been *the Minister of Finance* before the coup of 1921. Originally, his family was from Iraq, and then they had been settled in Isfahan. His title in the political field which referred to the aristocratic lineage was *Zoka Al-Molk*, a title which he'd inherited from his father, a prominent aristocratic figure of the late Qajar times. As Milani stated in his *Eminent Persians*, “he was a prolific scholar”.<sup>531</sup> After him, probably, Ahmad Qavam was the second most experienced personality to represent the former period's dynamics and understanding, probably to take the lead with first expelled and then, executed politician due to the allegations of his corruption, old Imperial Minister of Iran, *Abdol Hossein Teymurtash*. It is possible to assert that likewise of Abdol Hossein Teymurtash's political status as a metaphor by data recorder of the flights, who had been regarded to be executed in prison in 1933, *Zoka al-Molk* could also have been regarded as a “data recorder”.<sup>532</sup> To add a third one to these cunning politicians, and statesmen, Ahmad Qavam would be the right decision who had found the chance to preserve the political prominence to a further level during the early rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Therefore, whilst counting on the cabinets of this pluralist period between 1941 and 1953, one may not feel the obligation to separate a special place for Ahmad Qavam is not taking to a false direction. Probably, Ahmad Qavam could be regarded as not within the political actors who had fallen into quasi-oblivion such as Abdol Hossein Teymurtash, and to a considerable extent, Mohammad Ali Foroughi. Regarding with that, Dr. Manoutchehr (Iskandari-Qajar) stated for Abdol Hossein Teymurtash that it was a

---

<sup>530</sup> Neguin Yavari, “Foroughi, Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan, Zaka al-Molk”, *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, *ibid*, p. 842.

<sup>531</sup> Milani, 2008, p. 152.

<sup>532</sup> The term of “data recorder of the flights” to denote to the influence of the political authority for these two Minister of Courts was an inspiration from a website. Please check the website on Teymurtash which was prepared by Dr. Manoutchehr (*Eskandari-Qajar*). <http://www2.unb.ca/~mrezun/teymourtashpersiand.html> [January 30, 2015]

“pity indeed... and so strange, to say the least, that a man who was “larger-than-life” in his own day, has fallen into disgrace and quasi-oblivion, without the slightest ceremony”.<sup>533</sup>

Dr. Manoutchehr’s point is right whilst he stated that anyone who cares about being Iranian buff should take the accounts into consideration. He stated that there was barely a book on Teymourtash “who helped bring the Pahlavi dynasty into existence”.<sup>534</sup>

Indeed, apart from the book published in the series of *Nohostvaziran-e Iran Dar Dowran-e Pahlavi* (The Premiers of Iran During The Pahlavi Era), there’s almost nothing on Teymurtash’s political career specifically. Hence, Dr. Manoutchehr’s point would be admitted as underlying a substantial factuality of quasi-oblivion. Unlike his counterparts whose fate of quasi-oblivion stated, Qavam had restored the *Hezb-e Eslah Taleban*, a political party which sought to promote the reformist steps throughout the 1920s. His political career followed the path of the consolidation of power. As a politician who had been active since the times of the Constitutional Revolution, Qavam who has been known to the public opinion and political circles as *Qavam us-Saltaneh*, as a popular title, had been assigned as the Prime Minister a few times before. Yet, his political career did seem likely to end when he lost the confidence of Reza Khan, even before the coronation of Reza Shah Pahlavi.

His assignment to the Office once again was a remarkable happening as he was going to be assigned to this post twice in the following years. As stated by Bakhtiari, the end of the *12th Majlis* coincided with the abdication process of Reza Shah Pahlavi. As the Prime Minister who was assigned by the pressure of Allied Powers, Mr. Foroughi Khan was under the pressures from many circles to nullify the elections of the *13th Majlis*: “With so much turmoil in the country, Foroughi’s cabinet did not initiate new elections. It was simply impossible to monitor and implement elections when practically the whole country’s political situation was uncertain. Most provincial governors had abandoned their posts and fled the countryside. The armed forces were in disarray, and lootings were taking place in major cities”. Bakhtiari added the crucial point that “Foroughi’s government had not

---

<sup>533</sup> <http://www2.unb.ca/~mrezun/teymourtashpersiand.html> [January 30, 2015]

<sup>534</sup> <http://www2.unb.ca/~mrezun/teymourtashpersiand.html> [January 30, 2015]

control over major parts of the country”.<sup>535</sup> Like Mr. Mohammad Ali Foroughi Khan, the successor was expected to be a cunning and shrewd politician to balance the political opposition to a considerable level. Ahmad Qavam was a suitable profile in a country where the Majlis had become “a microcosm of the country with factions emerging from a long period of repression”.<sup>536</sup>

Probably, his advantageous position also resulted from the favoring of the Soviets, and by the Tudeh Party circles. Indeed, he was not the favorable personality to be boosted during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, as his last term in office was in 1923, before the coronation of Reza Khan as the Shah. In comparison with Mr. Foroughi Khan Ahmad Qavam’s successful career lines has been proving the sole fact that he was one of the few personalities to survive up until the early 1950s, for the end of the time of pluralism and interregnum in Iran.

In this regard, the drawing of Mr. Foroughi from the political scene since he had died right after the composition of a new cabinet in Iran was also a result of the breakup of political equilibrium during the War years. Mr. Foroughi Khan, who was “the trusted advisor” to Reza Khan, and to him as the new Shah and monarch of Iran until the midst of the 1930s, had been the envoy to present and offer the abducted Ahmad Shah Qajar a rejected letter of resignation in order to meet the constitutional monarchy’s prerequisites.

In the history of 20th-century Iran, this enterprise is mostly omitted although it was a brave encounter of Ahmad Shah in accordance with the restricted political conditions for himself. In response, he has rejected the offer for the signing of a resignation letter in order to fulfill the requisites of the Constitution of Iran. In a response to being aware of the fact that his words would not get beyond uttering, he vociferously attacked the present authority in Iran by referring to the illegality of the authority.<sup>537</sup>

Indeed, this enterprise of Reza Khan Sardar Sepah by sending Mr. Foroughi Khan as the envoy of Iran to the Shah in exile was the subsequent part of a story in the midst of which Ahmad Shah Qajar was playing a prominent role. A few years before that, Ahmad Shah was informed by the Ambassador of Turkey, of a country which was

---

<sup>535</sup> Baktiari, *ibid*, p. 28.

<sup>536</sup> Baktiari, *ibid*, p. 28.

<sup>537</sup> <http://www.qajarpages.org/qajcoup1925.html> [February 01, 2016]



recently turned into a Republic under the leadership of Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, *Anoushirvan Sepahbudy-Qajar* about the “alleged” offer of Turkey’s President Mustafa Kemal, to restore the broken regime of Qajar dynasty, yet this was directly rejected by Ahmad Shah who had arranged the meeting with Sepahbudy-Qajar in Lausanne, Switzerland. Regarding with this, the memoirs of Sepahbudy-Qajar cause a little confusion due to the Republican vision of Turkey during those years.

Although a close lineage of the Qajars as a Turkic tribe which had become sovereign all around Iran throughout the late 18th, and the 19th centuries until the end of the first quarter of the 20th century could have been a part of the aspects for the projection of a new regime in Turkey, it would not directly stand as a point of divergence between the two administrations. During those years, Mr. Foroughi Khan, Abdolhossein Teymurtash had been the representative of the establishment process of a new dynasty albeit the Qajar-times establishment was not totally eradicated during this process of transition.

Mr. Foroughi Khan’s last debut in the political ended in almost six months at the very beginning of which he was even offered the regime change, and the political status of Presidency by the Allied Powers, especially by the British. His response to this offer was a direct one, by that he urged the British authorities to accept the suitable choice for the Iranian people as the Constitutional Monarchy. Mr. Foroughi appeared as the dictated political personality to the new, young, and inexperienced Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. To remember the alternative plans of the occupying British forces and the plans appearing after the prospected abdication of Reza Shah, Qajar inheritors of the throne were even considered as within the alternatives. In this regard, Abbas Milani wrote in his longitudinal prosopography that after the plan of Qajar inheritor’s ascendance to the Peacock throne, there appeared a plan to which the logic was attributed by the British diplomatic authorities. Although they were reluctant to see Reza Shah’s son crowned, they were obliged to accept him as the new Shah of Iran due to the last Qajar inheritor’s lack of Persian. They even thought about the idea to transform Iran into a Republic, yet the offer to Mr. Foroughi Khan was reversed by the reply that “Iran was not ready for such a change”. According to Mr. Foroughi Khan, “monarchy was the best form of

government for Iran”.<sup>538</sup> Since the projection of the British side could not take place as it was contemplated, it was a clear sign of discontent by the Allied powers when the new, young and inexperienced Shah ascended to the Iranian throne. They had selected the way to show their discontent by not attending the ascendance ceremony officially.<sup>539</sup> Regarding with that, it may be suitable to assert that a reciprocal distrust’s vanishing took a short of time even though the remnants of the days when the new King of the country had seated on the throne had not vaporized in such a short time.

This new period, as it was detailed in the previous paragraphs, brought the greedy chances for almost anyone who had been separated or swept away from the active political zone. Amongst these personalities, Mr. Foroughi was a person of destiny to use his chance to an utmost level of pragmatic relationship with the Court, and the Allied Powers. As Milani wrote on the issue that “many public figures who had been relegated to the sidelines of exiled during the reign of Reza Shah returned to the political arena. Among them were Seyyed Zia Tabatabai, Ahmad Qavam, and Mohammad Mosaddeq. All three would go on to play pivotal roles in the post-war politics of Iran”.<sup>540</sup> Hence, Mr. Foroughi Khan’s debut diverged from his counterparts where the Palace had labeled the activation of him to a further extent than the politicians such as Tabatabai, Ahmad Qavam, and Mosaddiq. In the following years, the political equilibrium’s change, and the introduction of new dynamics would result in the activation of these personalities.

After Mr. Foroughi Khan, Ali Soheili, an old Minister of Foreign Affairs between October 1, 1938–March 7, 1939, was assigned as Prime Minister in Iran. His assignme to the Office was a part of the equilibrium in the Majlis of the country. In other words, this was the result of a balance found after the tug-of-war amongst the political factions in the 13th Majlis. These were stated by Bakhtiari as the Patriotic faction (*Mihan Parastan*), the National Unionists faction (*Itte’had-e Melli*), the

---

<sup>538</sup> Milani, 2008, p. 12.

<sup>539</sup> *Ibid*, p 12–13.

<sup>540</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.

Azerbaijanis faction (a group to constitute a base for Tudeh Party to a considerable extent) and the Justice faction (*Adalat*).<sup>541</sup>

For these political factions, apart from the explanations given above, one might have found out the clash of foreign interests once again. For the latter, *Hezb-e Adalat* which was led by an old popular journalist of the times of Constitutional Revolution, Ali Dashti was supporting the U.S.A as the counter-balancing foreign power amidst the rivalry on Iran. Thus, this period was going to constitute almost the second phase of American influence on the Iranian political establishment. Along with them, there were the National Unionists whose political agenda was set by the agents of the establishment; by the prestigious members of the land aristocracy such as *Morteza Qoli Khan Bayat* who was going to seat in the Office a few years later. By the support of these rather larger blocs, the support of the Iranian Majlis to Ali Soheili in order to elect another member of the Majlis in the place of Mohammad Ali Foroughi Khan was completed by after a few months of the election. Hence, Ali Soheili was elected as the new Prime Minister in the country.<sup>542</sup>

The election of Ali Soheili in the place of Mr. Foroughi Khan was depending on the key role of Ahmad Qavam whose support, thought Mr. Foroughi Khan, would save the dominance of Foroughi's group members in the Parliament.

After the support of the Majlis deputies to Mr. Ali Soheili who has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of Mr. Foroughi Khan, the new holder of the Cabinet's front desk was found. As Bakhtiari stated, "as a-five-year old prospect, Soheili had received only five votes before the Shah summoned him to offer the post". Therefore, his election as the New Prime Minister might have seemed as illogical in a mathematical sense when the seats in the Majlis counted up to a hundred. Yet, "the convergence of the National Unionists, and the Justice Party factions" brought enough support for him.

When he introduced his cabinet, he was enjoying an overwhelming majority of the Iranian Majlis which has not been seen ever since the foundation of this institution, then. "Out of 104 votes, he had won the 101 votes", a number which reflected the

---

<sup>541</sup> Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 29.

<sup>542</sup> "İran Kabinesi Eski Hariciye Nazırı Tarafından Kurulacak", *Karagöz*, March 12, 1942, p. 2. See also Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 30. "İran'da Siyasi Buhran", *Cumhuriyet*, March 01, 1942, p. 1. "Yeni İran Kabinesini Süheyli Kuruyor", *Cumhuriyet*, March 09, 1942, p. 1.

gigantic consensus of the Majlis as a proof of the palliative equilibrium. Bakhtiari, after this point by stating that “it was an unprecedented show of support for any previous premier”, mentioned the main topics of agenda which stayed in front of the new Prime Minister. Amongst the social and economic problems such as the high inflation, famine, brigandage, and the outlaws, the new Prime Minister encountered the rising agendas of Iranian society.<sup>543</sup>

In this respect, a political chaos was seemingly overrun, as yet, the basis of the chronic socio-economic problems were lasting. The Prime Minister soon convinced the Cabinet to pass a bill to authorize the Minister of Finance *Mahmoud Badir* (*Mahmud Bedir*)<sup>544</sup> to the printing of additional Iranian currency.<sup>545</sup> Nonetheless, the emission process in the country brought some results in the negative direction to the hopefulness. Bakhtiari stated that as soon as the economic measure was taken, “the prices of basic goods skyrocketed” amongst which bread was occupying a substantial place.<sup>546</sup>

During his term in office, an unomittable happening was the gathering of a conference between the Allied Powers in Teheran. As well as his “pivotal role in the signing of the Tripartite Treaty<sup>547</sup>”, and well acquaintance with the Allied powers, Soheili’s term was crowned with the gathering of a conference in the midst of the War. Surely, the main projections of the Allied powers were towards putting an end to the bloody War which has already enforced the belligerent sides to make more widened military campaigns and defining the post-War status of Iran, as a country under the *de facto* occupation of the Allied Powers. Indeed, the Treaty was a litmus paper to observe the rising opposition in and out of the Majlis.

As to be presumed, the Government under Mr. Ali Soheili was striving to benefit from this Treaty, and the Conference as well with both of which the wartime presence of the Allied powers was concluded. The news about the *Tripartite Treaty*

---

<sup>543</sup> Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>544</sup> For the cabinet members please see “Yeni İran Hükümeti Kuruldu”, *Cumhuriyet*, March 13, 1942, p. 1. The news state the votes of the new Cabinet’s level of support in the Majlis as 100 out 104.

<sup>545</sup> Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>546</sup> Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>547</sup> George Lenczowski, *Russia and The West In Iran: A Study In Big Power Rivalry, 1918–1948*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949, p. 319–322.

(January 29, 1942) have risen before Soheili's assignment to the Office whilst he has been seating at the Minister of Foreign Affairs (*Vazarat-e Hariji*). The discontent was clearly seen from some of the demands written by the news. The daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet* (*Republic*) in Turkey stated the demands of the Government in Teheran for the facilitation on the articles of the incomplete Treaty.<sup>548</sup>

As a country standing on the edge of a cliff, which can be metaphorize by the soul of concessions, the previous experiences due to the intervention of foreign powers were causing a widespread discontent all around the country. Now, after the abdication of a formidable ruler, Reza Shah Pahlavi, the country's main discussion which surrounded the daily life was the *Tripartite Treaty* and the daily life's turmoil which has risen to an intolerable level.

On 11th of January, 1942, the daily *Cumhuriyet* was standing on the concessions which were expected to be given to the Allied powers by Iran. Finally, through the end of January, 1942 on the signing of the Tripartite Treaty, *Cumhuriyet* stated the signing of the Treaty in presence of the participant countries' ambassadors to Teheran, Britain's minister Sir Reader Bullard, the Soviet Minister Smirnov, and on the other side Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ali Soheili.<sup>549</sup> Amongst these personalities, Sir Reader Bullard was an experienced diplomat of Britain whose dispatches during these years which had supplied a vast amount of information from Iran were analyzed by the Foreign Office documents in close attention. These volumes which had been edited by *Malcolm Yapp* stated the genuine character of Sir Reader Bullard as a dedicated diplomat in this country. Taking up with his work on Persia, *Camels Must Go* (1960) the editor analyzed it as one of the most amusing diplomatic memoirs although being discreet of some important issues.<sup>550</sup> Sir Reader Bullard's record might possibly be stated by the distance in a country like Iran while he was not able to construct well relations with the Iranian administration. In this sense, although he continued to stay on the seat of Britain's Ambassador to Teheran,

---

<sup>548</sup> "İran Hükümeti İngiltere'den ve Rusya'dan Taahhüdlerinin Hafifletilmesini İstemiş", *Cumhuriyet*, January 6, 1942, p. 1.

<sup>549</sup> "İran Meclisi, İngiltere ve Rusya İle İttifakı Tasdik Etti", *Cumhuriyet*, January 28, 1942, p. 1, 3.

<sup>550</sup> Malcolm Yapp, "Introduction", *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. III, Persia and Afghanistan January, 1940-December, 1941*, ed. Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997, p. xv.

he was regarded to be a failure to keep up with the overcoming of the poor communications with the ex-Shah. As stated by Yapp in the introduction episode of Foreign Office Volume that the interpretation in such a way “this may have contributed to the disaster that befell Iran in 1941”.<sup>551</sup>

Yapp’s short analysis on the diplomatic career of Sir Reader Bullard in Iran, and the political dynamics which has been seemingly set out of the equilibrium present the researchers a prelude to the massive amount of archival documents.<sup>552</sup> Thus, Soheili’s term in office could be understood from two points of views as these were depending on the socio-economic agenda of the country first, and then the repairing of the foreign relations, and defining a more crystal future for the country. Indeed, until the signing of *the Tripartite Treaty*, the future of Iran was almost uncertain, and the crystallization was an urgent case for the professionals in the political field. On the socio-economic agenda’s adjustment, the good intentions of the cabinet under Ali Soheili turned out to be a frustration in a very short time. During the War years, the rising of inflation became inescapable as the calculations of the Cabinet members did not take place when the printing of new currency did not create a demand for the Iranian goods abroad. As Bakhtiari stated, the devaluation came afterward, and the skyrocketing of the prices had fed the social discontent.

What caused that was directly the fall down of the expectations which had been grown by the Iranian administrators. The repercussions would go forward to deepen the social and economic crisis in the country, which could also be understood as the rise of a demand for change in the following elections in 1944. During the term of Ali Soheili in office, after the measures taken without the successful results, the prices of bread had jumped fourfold.<sup>553</sup> In the following episode, the cabinet under Ali Soheili had become obliged to encounter the new social and economic issues such as the “arrival of Polish refugees, the outbreak of typhus, the shortages of

---

<sup>551</sup> *Ibid*, p. xv.

<sup>552</sup> *Ibid*, p. xv-xvi.

<sup>553</sup> Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 30–31.

medicine and doctors etc”.<sup>554</sup> Soon after these, a new period under an elderly politician in the Iranian Majlis was going to take up.

As it is mostly similar to any cases of Cabinets suffering some insurmountable problems, it was an inevitable scenario that the authoritarianism’s rise would cause new challenges in the legal platform for the politics. Ali Soheili’s confrontation with the Majlis, and his implicit threats to dissolve it ended up with the transition decision of the dominant factions in the legislation organ of the country. In this respect, Ahmad Qavam had become a favorable option in the eyes of the members of the Majlis. The leader of the Justice Party, Ali Dashti, and an elderly politician and land–aristocrat Mohammad Mosaddiq was undoubtedly the new political personalities to set the agenda of the country during those days. In this sense, the transition period from Ali Soheili’s cabinet to his successor Ahmad Qavam would be analyzed as the first step of Mohammad Mosaddiq’s penetration into the layered political strata after the recent occupation of the country. As it is going to be detailed below, Mosaddiq’s career lines benefited from the search for an equilibrium in the political life of Iran.

As Bakhtiari stated, Mosaddiq’s exposition which went steadily to criticize the “indecisiveness” of Ali Soheili was one of the prominent topics in the country’s political agenda.<sup>555</sup> A critical point on the rise of Mosaddiq’s star in the political scene could be assessed from the point of view of which Mosaddiq’s debut on the political scene long before. Nonetheless, mostly the resources pay attention to Mosaddiq’s career lines which only focus on his late years after WWII. Indeed, his political realism and idealism had found the genuine chances for the promotion of a new, political organization called as the National Front (Cebhe–ye Melli).

---

<sup>554</sup> Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 31. Aside from the substructural activities and services such as the founding of schools at the primary and secondary levels, opening of the hospitals, there were even some journals which targeted to bring a network of publications such as the *Pole In Iran* which was around the circulation of 1800 copies and *The Scout* as the journal of A Polish Scout’s Association in the Middle East. Please see Ed. Tadeusz Piotrowski, *The Polish Deportees of World War II, Recollection of Removal To The Soviet Union and Dispersal Throughout The World*, Jefferson: Mcfarland Company, 2004, p. 97–99.

<sup>555</sup> Bakhtiari, *ibid*, p. 31.

TABLE 2.4.<sup>556</sup>

## IRANIAN PRIME MINISTERS BETWEEN 1941–1953

Name	Term In Office
(1) Mohammad Ali Foroughi	27 August 1941–9 March 1942
(2) Ali Soheili	9 March 1942–9 August 1942
(3) Ahmad Qavam	9 August 1942–15 February 1943
(2) Ali Soheili	15 February 1943–6 April 1944
(4) Mohammad Sa'ed	6 April 1944–25 November 1944
(5) Morteza Qoli Bayat	25 November 1944–13 May 1945
(6) Ebrahim Hâkimi	13 May 1945–6 June 1945
(7) Mohsen Sadr	6 June 1945–30 October 1945
(6) Ebrahim Hâkimi	30 October 1945–28 January 1946
(3) Ahmad Qavam	28 January 1946–18 December 1947
(8) Mohammad Reza Hikmat	18 December 1947–29 December 1947
(6) Ebrahim Hâkimi	29 December 1947–13 June 1948
(9) Abdolhossein Hazhir (assassinated)	13 June 1948–9 November 1948
(4) Mohammad Sa'ed	9 November 1948–23 March 1950
(10) Ali Mansur	23 March 1950–26 June 1950
(11) Ali Razmara (assassinated)	26 June 1950–7 March 1951
(12) Hossein Ala	12 March 1951–30 April 1951
(13) Mohammad Mosaddiq	30 April 1951–17 July 1952
(3) Ahmad Qavam	17 July 1952–22 July 1952
(13) Mohammad Mosaddiq	22 July 1952–19 August 1953

Being presented at the table of the Prime Ministers, who had led the Iranian Governments after the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the second term of Ali Soheili came after the term of Ahmad Qavam. In the first period, when he was the Premier of Iran, Soheili's Government encountered several issues some of which were counted above. Qavam's term in office followed Soheili's term of which the former met between the dates of March 9, 1942–August 9, 1942 formally. *Cumhuriyet daily* stated the ambiguity of the successor of Ali Soheili's government, and as the main reason for the change of the Government was asserted as “the lack of basic goods of consumption”.<sup>557</sup> When it is compared with the fall of Mr. Foroughi Khan's cabinet with the same fate of his successor, Mr. Ali Soheili, it is possible to

<sup>556</sup> For the list of cabinets in Iran. Please see Abrahamian, 2008, p. 102.

<sup>557</sup> On the assignment of the new Cabinet members, and the new Primer Minister in Iran, the news at *Cumhuriyet daily* pursued the details in an almost regular type. In respect to that, the cabinet was found on the 5th of August, 1942 by *Ahmad Qavam* (*Qavam al-Saltaneh*), and the absence of basic goods of consumption was a reason for the fall of Ali Soheili's cabinet. Please see Yunus Nadi's column “İranda Buhran”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 2, 1942, p.1, 3. “İranda Yeni Kabineyi Kimin Kuracağı Belli Değil”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 2, 1942, p 1, 3. “İran Hükümeti Kat'i Olarak Kuruldu”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 6, 1942, p. 1.



assert that until that time, as one of the main social and economic problems in the country, the lack of basic goods for consumption has not been solved yet. Another reason for the fall of Soheili's predecessor's Cabinet in March was presented as the rising riot in the Bakhtiari and Kordestan area of the country.<sup>558</sup> The tribal rebellions in the country were a part of the regular outbursts which mostly sourced from the discontent of the peripheral segments of the society in Iran. These were also the irregularly-heard news during the early years of Reza Shah Pahlavi's reign.<sup>559</sup>

Bakhtiari tribe's function in the politics and rural life of Iran was dominant as it was a case for the chase of Reza Shah Pahlavi's administration to track some leading members of the tribe off the political sphere. In this regard, *Sardar Asad Bakhtiari* was a prominent example whose story was narrated before.

Even after a few months of Soheili's inauguration for his Cabinet, the news on the resignation of Ali Soheili was gathering around the political circles due to the rising riot around the country. By a marge of suspicion, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper's verses were reading the rebellions in different parts of the country. Throughout April 1942, Iran's Prime Minister, directly himself, was accusing the people who had not been in collaboration with the Government, and he was insistent on labeling them as the "traitors" which was a conventional way of political challenges.<sup>560</sup>

About the crisis period in Iran which was squeezing Ali Soheili's government, the gridlock was solved by a few members withdrawal of the Government. At his column, *Yunus Nadi*, as the head columnist of *Cumhuriyet* newspaper was evaluating the crisis from both internal and external factors. It was alleged to be sourcing from the internal reasons, and it was depending on *the Pars News Agency*. Yunus Nadi stated the rising discontent would be correlated to the discontent of the foreign powers, the Allied powers which were controlling Iran during the War years. As a

---

<sup>558</sup> "İran Kabinesi Niçin Düştü", *Cumhuriyet*, March 15, 1942, p. 1, 3. "İranda İsyanlar: Horasanlılarla Birçok Kabileler İhtilâl Halinde", *Cumhuriyet*, March 16, 1942, p. 1, 3. "İranda İsyan Bastırılmış", *Cumhuriyet*, April 09, 1942, .3.

<sup>559</sup> Please see "İrandaki Kürtler Ayaklandı" *Cumhuriyet*, April 4, 1942, p. 1. "İranda İsyan Bastırılmış?", *Cumhuriyet*, April 9, 1942, p. 3.

<sup>560</sup> "İran Feci Vaziyette", *Cumhuriyet*, April 22, 1942, p. 1, 3.

paradoxical point, Yunus Nadi focused on the external factor's determination on the internal factors which fed the discontent in a widespread margin in the country.<sup>561</sup>

It was astonishing that the news at *Cumhuriyet* at the same day, by the title of "It is Vague At The Moment Who Will Found The New Government" stated that Ali Soheili's perspective was the "current status of the country was extremely well".<sup>562</sup>

In this respect, the news was continuing to state that even though Soheili resigned from his post, it would be a re-assignment probable for him, as the other nominees were counted as Ahmad Qavam, and Hossein Pirniya latter of whose health problems were understood as Pirniya's chance was lower at that moment. By that point, even his change of decision was understood as probable.

On the case of Soheili's "grave anxiety", we may find a satisfying level of information at the British National Archives. The Foreign Office documents were presenting some important details about the possible politicians whose leadership would end the crisis. The telegram from Mr. Holman to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Anthony Eden stated the possible successors of Ali Soheili's Government amongst whom Ahmad Qavam was reported as the most favorable one by the Soviet circles: "Possible successors appear to be Taddayoun, Said Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai, and Qavam-us-Sultaneh. The latter is at present strongly favored by the Soviet Ambassador, with whom I am maintaining close touch. My United States and Turkish colleagues appear to hold no strong views".<sup>563</sup> Soheili's speech at the resignation session in the Parliament was directly a denial of the rising claims for which the food shortages, the economic problems, the democratic atmosphere's declination i.e. were invoiced. He stated a few elements in order to defend his Government which approximately lasted for only five months.

These were the "construction of friendly relations with the Allied Powers", "the improvement of the financial status of the country" which was alleged to be extremely well, "the restoration of the order and the security all around the country",

---

<sup>561</sup> Yunus Nadi, "İran'da Buhran", *Cumhuriyet*, August 2, 1942, p. 1, 3.

<sup>562</sup> "İranda Yeni Kabineyi Kimin Kuracağı Belli Değil", *Cumhuriyet*, August 2, 1942, p. 1, 3.

<sup>563</sup> Malcolm Yapp, "Introduction", *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. VI, Near and Middle East, July, 1942-March, 1943*, ed. Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997, p.10. FO [E4095/14/34] dated July 8, 1942.

“the preservation of the democratic principles in the country” although the current international dynamics were averse to that, and Soheili was stating that by being a target of the critics at which he was accused of trying to maintain his career goals by staying at the post of Premier, that he has decided to resign from his post.<sup>564</sup>

After Soheili’s Government, the British report was focusing on the possible political turmoil in the country as for whether there would be an election or not. The result was assessed as the current influential probability of Soviet Union would not grow to an insurmountable level, as the British representative in Iran, Mr. Holman was stating that he was not sharing the concerns of his Turkish colleague: “Situation, of course, needs watching closely, but I am not impressed by the fears of my Turkish colleague, nor do I think that dissolution and renewal of Majlis at the moment by a Government as unpopular or as weak as that of Soheili is impracticable, however, desirable it may be from our point of view and in the interests of efficient Government”.<sup>565</sup>

Eventually, Soheili resigned from his post, and the news at *Cumhuriyet* newspaper was stating that “there was a new crisis in the country”.<sup>566</sup> In the following days, the news which dealt with this resignation story brought some details about the views on Soheili’s cabinet, and its reasons for the resignation. First and foremost, the news at *Cumhuriyet* newspaper represented Iran’s neighbor Turkey’s close and watchful analyzes in a rather sympathetic way closer to *Nazi* Germany. The propaganda news of the threatening world power, *Nazi* Germany were also analyzed by this news.

Although the ties with the Sad’abad Pact were broken after the occupation, the close and watchful analysis was stating that Iran’s hardened position in the international arena was causing a deep concern. As stated by Soheili during his farewell speech at the resignation session of Iranian Majlis, the developing of bilateral relations with the other countries, and the pursuit of a peaceful diplomacy was witnessed by the cutting off relations with Japan. As an aggressive member of the Axis powers during WWII years, Japan’s rising threat from the far eastern

---

<sup>564</sup> “İranda Yeni Kabineyi Kimin Kuracağı Belli Değil”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 2, 1942, p. 1, 3.

<sup>565</sup> *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. VI, Near and Middle East, July, 1942-March, 1943*, ed. Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997, p.11. FO [E4095/14/34] dated July 8, 1942.

<sup>566</sup> “İranda Yeni Bir Buhran”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 1, 1942, p. 1, 3 “İranda Yeni Kabineyi Kimin Kuracağı Belli Değil”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 2, 1942, p. 1, 3.

regions of Asia to the subcontinental parts of the old continent was causing a deep concern by the British and Soviet Russian legations.

As the pressure from the British side has risen, there appeared a problem for Iran as for whether the interests of Japan would be preserved or not. The British representative Mr. Holman wrote to the Headquarters in London, to Mr. Eden about the continued presence of Japanese Legation in *Teheran* to assess the probability of the rupture of bilateral relations with Japan:

I need not recount at length the history of the long and repeated representations to the Persian Government begun early in February. Suffice it to say that no progress could be achieved with this question for about two months. It was necessary to use every possible form of inducement and pressure. The United States Government were persuaded to make the grant of lease-lend facilities for the Persian government and the provision of expert advisers dependent on the rupture of relations between Persia and Japan. The Soviet Government agreed to inform the Persian Government that they had no objection to their breaking off relations with Japan. His Majesty's Legation collected all evidence secret and other sources to prove that Japanese Legation was indulging in undiplomatic and subversive activities and this information was communicated to the Persian authorities. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, and his Majesty the Shah himself were warned in no uncertain terms that the situation would seriously deteriorate unless early satisfaction were received.<sup>567</sup>

In this regard, Turkey's role in balancing the aggression of Axis powers can be analyzed from some of the primary sources of that time. At *Karagöz* newspaper, in a few and piling days, the rupture of the bilateral relations between Iran and Japan were stated.<sup>568</sup> At another primary source, at a document, which is dated to April 20, 1942, from the National Archives of Turkey, one may find the intermediary role of Turkey to accept the offer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iran to balance the interests of Iranian people and companies in Japan. In that regard, the consular affairs and the other interests were going to be conducted by Turkey.<sup>569</sup>

Very soon after that, which dates back to Soheili's term at the Office, another news at *Karagöz* newspaper was stating that Turkey would also seek to protect the interests of Romania in Iran which could also be interpreted as an example of the

---

<sup>567</sup> *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. VI, Near and Middle East, July, 1942-March, 1943*, ed. Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997, p.11. FO [E4095/14/34] dated July 8, 1942. p. 14. FO [E4078/3655/34] dated July 21, 1942.

<sup>568</sup> "İran Japonya İle Münesebatı Kesti", *Karagöz*, April 19, 1942, p. 2.

<sup>569</sup> General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 30.10.0.0.,262.763..32, p. 2.

Iranian Government's application to Turkey's officials. This application from Romania to Turkey was transferred to Iranian officials, and after its admission, the patronage of Turkey has started.<sup>570</sup> Aside from the improvement of foreign relations and the adjustment towards the will of the Allied Powers, Iran's main projection during Soheili's cabinets were also focused on the tribal revolts. As it was mentioned before, the conscription policy's urgency was understood due to the tribal revolts which had taken place around several places of the country, and the strict application of the policy was started through the last weeks of Soheili's first cabinet.<sup>571</sup>

Before the end of Soheili's term, British dispatches were including the recent political developments in Iran. Amongst these, the views of the political personalities were also counted. In reference to the longer dispatch of which Mr. Holman expressed his refrains to the Headquarters, he was briefly analyzing the recent political status of the country. These statements were including the main features of the political parties which have been narrated as "recently come into prominence in Teheran":

Most of them are of an ephemeral nature, and none of them are real parties in the same sense as the word is used in European countries. The Prime Minister regards them as quite unimportant and considers most of their members are merely hoping to secure lucrative posts by means of the political pressure which their party hopes to exercise. A past Minister of Education Tadayyoun, regards them as an instance of history repeating itself: meaning that in the early days of the Constitutional Movement in 1904 and 1905, a large number amounting to as much as 100 of such ephemeral parties, sprang up. They were known as "anjumans", and they all disappeared when the Majlis was bombarded and forcibly closed by the reactionary party.<sup>572</sup>

On the Qavam's term, it is possible to state it was rather longer than Soheili's term in office as his term also met with the socio-economic problems' wreckage in the country. As Bakhtiari stated the turmoil in the country was witnessed from the rapidly changing cabinets during a twelve-year term of which the change of cabinets have risen to a level of inconsistency: "The consequences of this struggle that lasted

---

<sup>570</sup> "İran'daki Romen Menfaatlerini Biz Himaye Edeceğiz", *Karagöz*, April 23, 1942, p. 2.

<sup>571</sup> "İranda Mecburi Askerlik İhdas Ediliyor", *Cumhuriyet*, July 2, 1942, p. 3; "İranda Mecburi Askerlik İhdas Ediliyor", *Karagöz*, No. 526, July 05, 1942, p. 2.

<sup>572</sup> *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. VI, Near and Middle East, July, 1942-March, 1943*, ed. Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997, p.22. FO [E4357/14/34] dated July 9, 1942.

until 1953 can be seen in the rapid rise and fall of 31 cabinets and 140 ministers in the 12 years after 1941, as compared with 10 cabinets and 50 ministers in the previous 16 years of Reza Shah's rule".<sup>573</sup>

In spite of the fact that the number of cabinets was counted by 31, and additionally the Ministers who had acted in the numerous cabinets were counted as 140 ministers during a twelve-year interregnum, it emerges as a number less than 31. Indeed, the number of the cabinets appears as 20 with regarding the repetitious leadership of the cabinets. What sort of factors fed the inconsistencies in Iran, and what kind of factors were determinant on the shaky-terms of the Cabinets can be understood from some of the British secret dispatches. In a dispatch of the British Legation in Teheran, "the shaky grounds of the Cabinet" was stated, and *Ahmad Qavam* was assessed as the most favourable personality whose possible Premiership, was not also objected by the British which was regarded as a supportive view for the Soviet Russian circles. The dispatch from Teheran was also consisting of the information gathered from the meetings with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Smirnov:

The Cabinet is very shaky. Owing to the incompetence and corruption of the local officials, the bread situation is bad in many districts, and there have been bread riot at Burujird and Malayir, and I know no one who now expects that Soheili, who is himself considered both corrupt and afraid to act, can reform his Cabinet in such a way as to be able to deal with the crisis. The Shah sounded Pirnia (Personalities 156), but he refused. The general opinion seems to be that Qavam-es-Sultaneh is the only man on the spot who could hope to make some headway against the difficulties which beset the Persian Government. The Russian Ambassador would like me to join him to put Qavam into power, but I have told him that, apart from the fact that my latest instructions are to put with Soheili for the present, our policy is to accept any Government which the Persians set up, provided that it will work energetically with the Allies. I added that if Qavam was put forward as the Prime Minister at this juncture, I should certainly not feel justified in objecting.<sup>574</sup>

The second paragraph of the dispatch was including the views of the Soviet Ambassador and the Prime Minister's own critics of the current situation in the country himself. Mr. Soheili was stating the current situation of the country as a verification to the complaints of the British Ambassador, and the Prime Minister was approving that "he must either resign or remodel his Cabinet before August 2,

---

<sup>573</sup> Baktiari, *ibid*, p. 28.

<sup>574</sup> *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. VI, Near and Middle East, July, 1942-March, 1943*, ed. Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997, p.31. FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 28, 1942.

1942”.<sup>575</sup> During those days, German advance into the Caucasus was creating a considerable discontent at the Iranian circles, and this threat was also added to the dispatch by clear attention: “He mentioned several political candidates for places in his Cabinet, but only one likely to be at all popular, and to reinforce the Cabinet is Tadayyun about whom the ambassador still seems doubtful. The food situation and the German advance in Russia have created problems which I fear are beyond Soheili’s powers, and the Russian Ambassador and I have both come to the conclusion that his weakness and inactivity constitute a serious danger for the Allies”.<sup>576</sup>

The phrases which went on to follow the sentences to bring a completion to the views of British Ambassador in Teheran were including the pessimism: “I am to see the Prime Minister to-morrow, and I shall tell him that I have reported to you about his Government in most pessimistic terms”.<sup>577</sup>

On the 29th of July, 1942, a more clear reversal dispatch from Mr. Eden in London, the British Secretary of State to Mr. Reader Bullard, British Ambassador in Iran was consisting of the identified personality to assume the new term in Iranian Office: “I agree that we should accept any Government which the Persians set up, provided that it will co-operate energetically with the Allies. We can accept Qavam [es-Sultaneh] as Prime Minister, though we need to make no effort to put him into power”.<sup>578</sup> The last days of July, and the early days of August 1942 were the remarkable days for Iranian politics to witness the resolution of the gridlock. Mr. Bullard was writing the recent decision of Shah to summon Ahmad Qavam for offering the new term at the Office:

1.The Shah sent a message this morning that he was thinking of sending for Qavam-es-Sultaneh. I replied that we had no objection to him as Prime Minister. 2.The news was going round was that neither Qavam-es-Sultaneh nor any other man of consequence would accept office at this difficult moment. But Qavam the Oriental Secretary to-day, however, unattractive the prospect, he would accept the premiership if it was offered to him. He said that Persia’s interests were bound up with those of Great Britain and that he hoped he could count on our support. Oriental

---

<sup>575</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31. FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 28, 1942.

<sup>576</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31. FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 28, 1942.

<sup>577</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31. FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 28, 1942.

<sup>578</sup> *Ibid*, p. 32. FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 29, 1942.

Secretary replied that he could. Qavam already knows that the Soviet Embassy is in his favor, though he declares that he has no particular relations with them. The United States Minister thinks Soheili is finished, and Qavam as a good alternative as any.<sup>579</sup>

About the will of Iran's monarch, Shahanshah-e Iran for the change of the ongoing Cabinet in Iran, the British reports were including some more keynotes. These were reckful written by the representatives of the Legation of Britain, and the notes were also consisting of the details about the political organizations in the center of the country. The following report, rather shorter than the previous one, stated that "Soheili informed the Parliament about the resignation preparations of his Cabinet members", and his disappointment were presented by the factors such as the lack of Parliament's sympathy to his Cabinet, and the press to the Governmental measures which were taken seriously at length".<sup>580</sup>

Soon after, as reported by an urgent telegram, Soheili's resignation came with the clear statements representing his acceptance of failure, and some implicit critics against the Majlis. Soheili's during his farewell speech at the parliament was including a complaint about the brave and "constitutionally-constructed" way of his Cabinet's policies: "My Government has tried to keep Majlis and press informed what doing and has tried consult deputies and press representatives; unfortunately, it has received no corresponding confidence from Majlis, and press, and its attempt to behave constitutionally has been misinterpreted as weakness".<sup>581</sup>

After that, the proceeding telegraphs have started to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Britain about the change of Government, and the relief to which the Shah of Iran was brought after the consumption of other possibilities. First and foremost, the telegram stated "the refusal of Pirnia". Secondly, it was understating the optional decision of Soheili just act to establish a Cabinet conditionally which was directly depending on the full exploitation of Qavam's chance. Cabinet depending on the

---

<sup>579</sup> *Ibid*, p. 32. FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 29, 1942.

<sup>580</sup> *Ibid*, p. 32. FO [E4519/14/34] dated July 30, 1942.

<sup>581</sup> *Ibid*, p. 32. FO [E4550/14/34] dated July 31, 1942.



remodeling was conditional to the direct refusal or failure of Qavam's possible chance for establishing his Cabinet.<sup>582</sup>

Although the political parties of this period up until 1946 were selected to represent a wider spectrum, and the quantitative and qualitative features of the political parties were sought to be presented, the enclosure which was numbered eight was representing the main features of the political parties of that period, and aside from that, the publication organs of these political parties. Amongst those the Tudeh Party, the Justice Party, the National Party, Mihan Parastan (the Patriots Party), Paikar (War) Party, Vahdat-i Milli (National Unity), Iran-i Javan (Young Persia), Iran or Sa'Aadat, Hezb-i Shah were counted in the enclosure. The diplomatic report's section on the Tudeh –which was given as the “ ‘Tuda’ Party”– ran as the Tudeh Party was described as “socialist” and “anti-Fascist”. The party's overt policy was towards the denial of their party's existence as a communist, but it was stated in the report that “the Party and the newspaper Siyasat were supported and subsidised by the Soviet Embassy”.<sup>583</sup> The President of the Party was Suleiman Mirza, and its most active member was stated to the editor of the newspaper, Abbas Iskandari.<sup>584</sup> The report from Teheran was righteously stating the political dominance of the Tudeh Party, and it was stating that “most of the rest of the parties seem to arise in order to combat the *Tuda* Party”. Amongst those which were in rivalry with the Tudeh Party, Justice Party faction was the most important one. The following paragraph of the dispatch was separated to the organization of the Justice Party whose formation by an ex-newspaper owner Ali Dahsti was stated above. The dispatch wrote that “the firebrand editor Sheikh Ali Dashti”, and “the official organ of the Adalat Party, Mehr-i Iran edited by Majid Muwaqqar” represented “a liberal and progressive” property.<sup>585</sup>

On the 2nd of August, the telegram from Teheran to London was stating the recent development in Iranian politics by the change of the Cabinet from Ali Soheili to

---

<sup>582</sup> *Ibid*, p. 32. FO [E4550/14/34] dated July 31, 1942.

<sup>583</sup> *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. VI, Near and Middle East, July, 1942-March, 1943*, ed. Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997, p.22. FO [E4357/14/34] Reference Enclosure 8 dated July 9, 1942.

<sup>584</sup> *Ibid*, p. 32. FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 29, 1942.

<sup>585</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22. FO [E4357/14/34] Reference Enclosure 8 dated July 9, 1942.

Ahmad Qavam as the British legation members were “doing their best to ensure that Qavam chooses the suitable members for his Cabinet”.<sup>586</sup> After the thorny ways of political transition in Iranian politics, it was the expected result through the return of Ahmad Qavam to the Premiership once again after several years. In this regard, this return of Qavam was closely analyzed by the British reports from Teheran.

On the 5th of August, a report from Mr. Bullard, Britain’s Ambassador in Teheran was stating the new Cabinet’s restrictions and the discussions which were gathering around the Cabinet members. For the formation of the Cabinet, Mr. Bullard was stating that it would take a few days more by the reason that the new Prime Minister after whose assignment to the post was having a difficulty through it: “Several members of the late Cabinet are likely to retained, viz. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Communications, and Minister of Agriculture, all of whom are satisfactory. It is rumored that Persian Minister is being offered a portfolio”.<sup>587</sup>

On the same date, another report was including the details about the espionage activities of the Germans, and the Persians whose affiliations to the German circles in Iran were found extensively threatening. By that reason, the demand for their arrest without any delay was transferred to the new Prime Minister by the British Ambassador.<sup>588</sup>

The following paragraphs of this telegram which was significantly standing on the ongoing espionage activities of the Germans, and the local people in Iran whose affiliations to the German networks were found outstayed to keep a balanced approach of Mr. Bullard, for which the internment and the interrogation of those people whose activities and the names were shortlisted, and as it was told to the new Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam, that it was going to be shared with him and the Persian administration, was directly demanded. Even though an optimistic approach of Ahmad Qavam was available at that moment, his concerns were also evident enough whilst he was sharing the possibility of the people’s opposition to this kind of abrupt and sudden arrests. In that regard, Mr. Bullard’s final conclusion about the preparations of the British legation in Teheran was towards the attentive precautions

---

<sup>586</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33. FO [E4564/14/34] dated August 2, 1942.

<sup>587</sup> *Ibid*, p. 34. FO [E4610/14/34] dated August 5, 1942.

<sup>588</sup> *Ibid*, p. 34. FO [E4611/122/34] dated August 5, 1942.

of the British authorities which were depended on a case in Ahwaz, and the seeking of an alternative way of utilizing the British Legation's network to make pursuit and arrest of the suspected German agents. The Iranian people whose records were found out to help the German agents by hosting, or concealing them in some strategic areas were stated to be a reason which could enforce the British representatives in the country to take further measures.

In the case of Ahwaz, in a city in the southern part of the country, an arrest of a person whose age was over 70, named Nabbizada had caused a loss of confidence between the British and Persian authorities. The man had died after his arrest, and this was protested by the Persian Government. In this regard, the situation of the concerns of two sides was not bilateral, and Mr. Bullard was emphasizing the urgent need of making some concessions, and co-operation with the Persian authorities. By the help of this, they would be able to construct a more secure way of politics, and the facilitation of the implementation of their demands.<sup>589</sup>

To conclude the formation of the Cabinet in Iran, Mr. Bullard's final dispatch was including the probability of a nationalistic manoeuvre of the Majlis in the case of the widening of the German invasion through the Caucasus:

In the case of immediate threat from the North, Deputies might e.g. make a nationalistic declaration and perhaps cancel their ratification of the treaty. Soviet Ambassador (Mr. Smirnov) agrees generally and promised to ask his Government not to oppose dissolution if the Shah and new Prime Minister should desire it. Shah has recently spoken against the Majlis and Prime Minister is not a man to accept its dictation. If either of them proposes dissolution, I shall tell them on the strength of your above-mentioned telegram that his Majesty's Government has no objection.<sup>590</sup>

Even though the political agenda of the Majlis was staying in a corner of the minds of the deputies, the threat from Germany's expansionist aspects was also constituting one of the core issues of the Majlis. The transition phase of the Government was soon completed, and the formation of a new Cabinet was wired to the Headquarters in London by a telegram dating to July 28, 1942. A few subjects with which the telegram was dealing were the internment of "enemy agents", and the possible ways of the hindrance to avoid these agents' passing into Persia from Turkey's "Kurdistan borders". The risk of the agents' probable sabotage on the Trans-Caspian Railway

---

<sup>589</sup> *Ibid*, p. 34–35. FO [E4611/122/34] dated August 5, 1942.

<sup>590</sup> *Ibid*, p. 35. FO [E4636/14/34] dated August 5, 1942.

was alerting the British circles in Iran. Other than that, the wide sense of the public opinion was assessed as a possible reason to overcome the Nazi sympathies, and the probability of a wheat shortage was stated to crumble the proceeding government of Ahmad Qavam.<sup>591</sup> The problems were evaluated in a wider scope this time, in a more pessimistic yet precautionary way of resolution. Until 8th of August, there was no other dispatch from Teheran to London, as on that date, an almost completed Cabinet was announced although there were still some missing positions such as the Ministry of Finance. The dispatch was informing the Headquarters about the possible seater of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Taqizada, a prominent political personality in Iran, and Mr. Kazemy's "probable appointment" to the post of the Ministry of War was announced as an innovation since he was a civilian.<sup>592</sup>

On the 8th of August, 1942, the news from the British Ambassador to Teheran, Mr. Reader Bullard to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in London, Mr. Eden was stating that the new PM acted with "promptitude" to provide the arrest of 45 suspects. The key elements to fix the relations with the British administration and British representatives were promising a new era at the very beginning. Qavam's cabinet's first and foremost agenda was constituted by the British Embassy's task on his table which was expecting an urgent response pertaining to the arrest of the suspects mostly foreigners, as yet sometimes in a group of suspects including the local Persians. In this regard, the palliative manoeuvre of the Prime Minister, Mr. Qavam was a conditional clause to take the initiative for such a short term, however if the demands from the British circles and the Shah would continue, he would resign, and depend on a pretext which would not touch the sensitive lines of the relations between the two countries. The telegram was ending with a short scheme to provide the implementation of British demands, and a feasibility of the actions to be taken. The essence of the demands stood by the handing over of non-Persian suspects to the officials. On the contrary, Persian suspects were going to remain under detention.<sup>593</sup>

---

<sup>591</sup> *Ibid*, p. 35–36. FO [E4619/3655/34] dated July 28, 1942.

<sup>592</sup> *Ibid*, p. 40. FO [E4681/14/34] dated August 8, 1942.

<sup>593</sup> *Ibid*, p. 40–41. FO [E4682/14/34] dated August 8, 1942.

In another telegram, the report was stating that the British officials had some other agendas amongst which the Prime Minister was maintaining a prior place, and that it would be dealt with the Prime Minister who was stated to take the seat in the Office “at a time when the office was much less attractive than usual”.<sup>594</sup>

On the 6th of August, 1942, the news at *Cumhuriyet* newspaper was stating that Qavam al-Saltaneh’s cabinet, as to be approved by the Majlis<sup>595</sup> declared its program. The cabinet program in Iran was mainly focusing on the overcoming of the shortages of basic goods of consumption, and the Cabinet’s main plan was to establish a Ministry for Supplies of The Basic Foods and the Goods of Consumption was in order. Therefore, the main essence of the program was depending on placating the wider masses in Iranian society whose complaints were mostly gathering around the economic issues.

In the Government’s new program, there was also the statement to emphasize the importance of the bilateral and friendly relations with Iran’s close neighbor, Turkey.<sup>596</sup> The new cabinet members were reported from Teheran to London with a telegram dated as the August 9th, 1942. The Cabinet members were as given below:

Ministers without portfolio: Hâkim-ul-Mulk, and Sadiq Sadiqi (Mustashar ad-Dowley); Foreign Affairs: Said; Interior: Kazemi; Industry and Commerce: Hajhir; Communications Azadi; Posts: Hamid Sayyah; Agriculture: Hossein Adl; Education: Ali Akbar Siasi; Justice: Baha-ul-Mulk Gharagozlou; Health: Ismail Marzuban; Finance: Taqizadah; War To be appointed later.<sup>597</sup>

The report’s core elements on which the British representative of the Legation stated was the foundation of a new Ministry, the Ministry of Food. Aside from that, the struggle against the hoarders and the inevitable goal to consolidate the co-operation with the Allies were stated.<sup>598</sup> As a new Government, what sort of elements were making the Cabinet of Ahmad Qavam different, and almost on a wreckage, what

---

<sup>594</sup> *Ibid*, p. 41. FO [E4682/14/34] dated August 8, 1942.

<sup>595</sup> “İran Hükümeti Kat’i Olarak Kuruldu”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 6, 1942, p. 1.

<sup>596</sup> “Yeni İran Hükümetinin Beyannamesi”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 11, 1942, p. 1, 3. *Ibid*, p. 41. FO [E4690/17/34] dated August 9, 1942.

<sup>597</sup> *Ibid*, p. 41. FO [E4690/17/34] dated August 9, 1942.

<sup>598</sup> *Ibid*, p. 42. FO [E4690/17/34] dated August 9, 1942.

were the legacies of the Ahmad Qavam cabinet? A telegram which was dated to the 14th of August, 1942 was stating the main features of Ali Soheili's farewell speech, and the related features were given as the "lack of sympathy shown by the Majlis", and "press to his Government's efforts" which in the final sense brought the resignation of the Cabinet.<sup>599</sup>

One may easily assert that the Majlis was "obstructive" as it was stated in the same telegram, and the names of a few members of the Majlis were given for whose opposition was attempted to be clarified. Aside from Ali Dashti, for some other prominent members of the Majlis was asserted that these members were promised for some posts in the Cabinet of Ali Soheili, and by the reason that the fulfillment of these promises was not realized, there was a growing opposition throughout the end of July 1942. Now, after all, it was an overall assessment to note that the Press opposition was due to the restriction trials of the Soheili Cabinet. Regarding with that, a new law was enacted, yet soon it was understood that it was not possible to limit the press opposition, and the backstop of the Soheili Cabinet has helped to risen the discontent. Meanwhile, the telegram was stating at the same time that if the Soheili Cabinet has kept the strict measures to restrict the Press organs, the result would have been different than the actuality: "Certain Majlis deputies were of the opinion that, if he had been courageous enough to use the powers which were already at the disposal of the Government in virtue of the state of military law which until exists at Tehran, he could have checked this irresponsible criticism without recourse to this new legislation".<sup>600</sup>

The report's following part was dealing with the failure of the adequate food distribution to the inner lands of the country, which, after all, kind of factors, was feeding the discontent, and carrying a primary importance. There was some riot due to the bread shortage in the towns such as Malayir, and Burujird and the rumors which were encompassingly were growing up to the role of the members of the Cabinet in all these. The terms of "widespread corruption", and the "hoarding" were

---

<sup>599</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44. FO [E5057/14/34] dated August 9, 1942.

<sup>600</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44. FO [E5057/14/34] dated August 9, 1942.

signifying the basis of these irregularities, and the final sentence was stating that even the PM himself was included in all these “scandalous rumors”.<sup>601</sup>

For another factor to understand the resignation of Soheili’s cabinet totally, it was stated that Mr Ahy’s appointment to the Embassy in Kuibyshev during the last days of the Cabinet was definitely a break-up of the ties. Upon his unwillingness to be appointed to the foreign post, as a Minister whose decision was not asked by the Shah, and the PM was interpreted as a flame to trigger the events. After the appointment of Mr. Ahy to the Ambassadorship in Soviet Russia, he decided to resign from the Cabinet, and the telegram stated that even though he was not a Cabinet member prestigious enough to shake the Cabinet, soon after the events had fallen down to jerk the Cabinet.<sup>602</sup>

Eventually, the final factor analysis was stating the current situation in Iran that the Cabinet had lost the confidence to both of the occupying Allied powers. As a proof of that, the evidence was utilized as the Soviet Ambassador in Iran has shared the rising discontent with the PM on several issues amongst which the bread shortage was a leading title. During those days, Soheili was preparing to make a further move remodel his Cabinet, however, these attempts could not come to supply a prospect for Soheili and his administration.<sup>603</sup>

As it was mentioned before, the role of the foreign powers on Iranian politics may be evidently witnessed from some important sources such as the British archival documents. Pertaining to the years of WWII, the same report was underscoring the role of Ahmad Qavam on the formation of his Cabinet since the application of British legation to erase some of the names for the Cabinet list was proving the details of which one may derive the foreign influence of the British circles on Iranian politics. The ceaseless efforts of the British side to add some new names to the list of possible fifth columnists was an extraordinary effort which was also constituting the main tension lines between the British Legation, and the Iranian Government. The detention problem of the German agents was stated to be as a non-satisfying way of

---

<sup>601</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44. FO [E5057/14/34] dated August 9, 1942.

<sup>602</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44. FO [E5057/14/34] dated August 9, 1942.

<sup>603</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E5057/14/34] dated August 9, 1942.

solution, and the assignment of some political personalities to some of the posts in the Cabinet was stated to last for more upon the ambiguities.

First and foremost, as Kazemi was considered for the Ministry of War, it was understood that his refusal due to the difficult situation in the country was causing a problem. Aside from Mr. Kazemy, Hossein Ala who was the General Manager of the *Bank-e Melli (National Bank of Iran)* was written as another personality to reject this post. For the post of Ministry of Food, Mr. Bullard's telegram was consisting of a name for this post: Amanullah Ardalan (Haji Izz-ul Mamalik). For his political biography, the note was added that formerly, he had the chance to seat at a Ministerial post, and his service to the Government was also including as the Governor-General at Rezaieh, Ispahan, and Kermanshah.<sup>604</sup>

One of the first cases during Ahmad Qavam's third term in the Iranian Office was the judgment of ex-Chief of Police Department, Mr. Ruhk-ud Din Muhktari.<sup>605</sup> This former Chief of the Police Department was in charge of the internal security forces during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, and since 1936, after he has replaced Muhammad Hussein Ayrum, he was blamed for making of various acts such as the oppression, imprisonment and the tyranny against the people. Amongst the people who were put under oppression politically were some prominent political, and religious figures such as Seyyed Hassan Modarres, Prince Firouz (Nusrat ad Dowleh), Abdul Hussein Diba, Sheikh Khazal<sup>606</sup>, the Sheikh of Muhammarah.<sup>607</sup> Charges varied in terms of these names, and several others. The most common ones depended on the espionage allegations and the risk of the growth of political opposition.<sup>608</sup>

---

<sup>604</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E5057/14/34] dated August 9, 1942.

<sup>605</sup> Fardust, 1999, p. 25.

<sup>606</sup> The uprising of Sheikh Khazal which was assumed as a pawn in Ahwaz region was soon suppressed by the forces under General Fadlallah. In 1925, the name of the region was converted into Khozestan. Muhammed Surur Zeynelabidin, *Mecusîlerin Geri Dönüşü: İran Devriminin Tarihi, Akidevî ve Politik Boyutları*, tr. Hüsrev Subaşı, İstanbul, Guraba Yayınları, 2014, p. 235.

<sup>607</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46. FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942.

<sup>608</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46. FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942.



This telegram was an overt proof of the change in the political equilibrium of which the agents of the former political field were encountering some new challenges. Although there was not a certain remark for the Shah's responsibility for this kind of misuses, and mistreatments, the mainstream trend since the occupation was gradually changing on behalf of the political agents whose career lines were obstacles by the former times' establishment. Modarres as a political opponent of the ex-Shah's regime has been executed, however, the longing revenge expectations of the people amongst whom the relatives of Seyyed Hassan Modarres were available was now becoming real. As it was stated by the dispatch, "it was not unnatural that their hatred and thirst for revenge should be concentrated on the executive head of police under Reza Shah".<sup>609</sup> The indictment's sentences were also including the words to reflect an exempted status of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the father of the present Shah, and the former ruler of Iran.

It was not surprising that the headlines of the newspapers in Tehran during the trials, and throughout the end of it, were consisting of the words to accuse Mukhtari of several tortures, and surely the hatred against him was concretely written on some pamphlets, and newspapers. Even though the British Legation was trying to clarify the social perception, it was to a considerable degree that the British legation members were even warned for not protecting the former Chief of Police department. Indeed, the sentences of the dispatch which stated that it can be interpreted as a liberation of the political field, the symbolic meaning of the trial was significantly clear by this example: "It is easy to forget in these days of free speech, the iron discipline of Reza Shah's reign".<sup>610</sup>

As counting the final remarks, the dispatch of which it constituted a primary role in the cabinet of Ahmad Qavam's agenda claimed that it was inevitable that Mukhtari would be penalized for some tortures, even though he would feel lucky for not being charged for accumulating a large fortune. In that regard, his predecessor, Ayrum was thought to be a suitable example for obtaining a large fortune by his discharge of service. On the trial day, the newspapers were carrying the sensational headlines. An

---

<sup>609</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46. FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942. For the role of General Mukhtari at the head of Police Service Shahrani, please see Fardust, *ibid*, p.24.

<sup>610</sup> *Ibid*, p. 47. FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942.

example for these headlines can be given as below: “Mukhtari, the agent of Reza Shah, foremost in working the machinery of tyranny, and a shedder of blood comparable to Jenghiz Khan or Tamurlane, appeared trembling at the seat of justice.”<sup>611</sup>

As the dispatch stated that the defense of the ex-Police chief depended on a denial of all the charges, by putting the example of Sheikh Muhammara forth, the counter-interpretation was not utilized even though Mukhtari was trying to put himself abstracted from the Reza Shah’s iron-fist regime. A propaganda against the ancien regime was just accessible, and logical if the critics were not against the Shah. As an example, a pamphlet was underscoring the cruelty of the Mukhtari administration at the Police Department: “Mukhtari has made children fatherless, wives husbandless etc. Hundreds of innocent women have expired under the kicks of Mukhtari’s jack-boots; today the judges of the criminal court must avenge them”.<sup>612</sup> Finally, even though there was an embarrassment of the present Shah, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi due to the misdeeds directed to his father, the encouragement was found as a genuine effort by the British Legation.<sup>613</sup>

During the last weeks of 1942’s summer, and in the fall in Iran under Ahmad Qavam’s cabinet, Iran was facing a rising threat of German forces which were claimed to penetrate into the Caucasus. The threat was stated to be at a one-hour distance by flight, and the news at *Cumhuriyet* newspaper was stating the commandership for the Iranian occupation of the British Forces was transferred from General Wavell to Sir Henry Maitland Wilson former of whose commandership at the Indian Headquarters was a part of the *British Near Eastern Headquarters*. Amongst these commanderships, the British forces against Japan in the eastern part of India; in Egypt, the British forces against Nazi Germany in the western part of the Middle East, and lastly the British forces against the Iran and Iraq’s campaigns against Caucasus were the main pinnacles.<sup>614</sup> As of the early days of Autumn, 1942,

---

<sup>611</sup> *Ibid*, p. 47. FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942.

<sup>612</sup> *Ibid*, p. 47. FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942.

<sup>613</sup> *Ibid*, p. 48. FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942.

<sup>614</sup> “İranla Irakın Müdafaası”, *Cumhuriyet*, August 25, 1942, p. 1, 3.

the new Prime Minister of Iran, Ahmad Qavam's statement was declaring an astonishing result of the affairs since the occupation of Iran. Even though Iran was successful to stay out of the War affairs, the Premier was pointing out to the astonishing economic deterioration in the country. This statement was directly a counter-reference to the statements of his predecessor, Mr. Ali Soheili.<sup>615</sup>

Since the inauguration day of Ahmad Qavam's Cabinet, there were some rumours that British legation's pressures on the German suspects were causing a deep disturbance on behalf of Ahmad Qavam, and the telegram on the date of September 12, 1942, was focusing on these rumours, and it was interpreted that the assignment proposal of Qavam's brother to Turkey as the new ambassador of Iran was proving the low risk of resignation. Even the meeting with the new PM was understood that he would come closer to the offers of the British Legation, and the new administration in Iran would seek to fulfill the demands of Britain.<sup>616</sup>

Since the close neighborhood's promotion was another topic on the Government's agenda, the main topic of Ahmad Qavam's government was overcoming the food shortages since it was the direct element of the widespread discontent of the Iranian public opinion. The rising threat of Nazi Germany which was alleged to be standing at an hour distance from Iran was another topic.

Throughout the days of August 1942 and early days of September, as the resignation probability of Ahmad Qavam Cabinet -due to several topics on the agenda- was analyzed, the political stability of the Government was found stronger than the two former Cabinets in the country. As it was reported in another telegram, it was believed that the PM Qavam had a "far greater authority than that of his two immediate predecessors". The following verses of the report were presenting some other notes in a comparative scale: "Firughi (Foroughi), besides being in poor health, despised political intrigue, while Soheili was little known, was considered weak and corrupt. Qavam even seems to have settled to his satisfaction the dispute between the army, and civilians, and will probably keep the Ministry of War in his own hands".<sup>617</sup>

---

<sup>615</sup> "İran Başvekili Hayret İçinde", *Cumhuriyet*, September, 04, 1942, p. 1, 3.

<sup>616</sup> *Ibid*, p. 48. FO [E5200/122/34] dated September 1, 1942.

<sup>617</sup> *Ibid*, p. 49. FO [E5200/122/34] dated September 1, 1942.

On the 5th of September, 1942, this time, the dispatch was noting that the co-ordination amongst the British, Soviet Russian, and the American legations in terms of the pursuit, and internment of the fifth columnist agents in the country.

Since it was put to a warranty from the PM himself, and the recent developments were supporting the vanishing of resignation possibility of the PM, the British Secretary of State, Mr. Eden was approving the situation with the concomitant information to the British Ambassador in Tehran. As the deal was making the case easier, the belief of the British circles to guarantee the British interests by overcoming the activity of German agents was becoming more stronger.<sup>618</sup>

After all, the archival documents at the British Foreign Office represent a wider spectrum of which it is possible to find out the six-monthly reports. In the early days of September, a report which surveys the past six months' political happenings present a detailed scheme for the Russo-Persian, Anglo-Persian relations, and the internal affairs in the country.<sup>619</sup> Mostly, the report was focusing on the rebellions around the country where the authority and the prestige of the Government was consolidated. The pretext for the rebellions was not similar as yet the oppression, and the corrupt rule of the country was constituting a central part in all these upheavals. Other than this, undoubtedly, the will to restore the old appropriation regime against the initiatives of the former Shah's administration was the primary motive of the rebellions. As the rebellions which outburst around the country from time to time, the Government's oppressive style in conditional to the pacification of the rebels, and in some examples, the restoration policies were beneficial to fix the damaged prestige of the Government.<sup>620</sup>

It was almost the first year of the joint operation of the Allied powers, and WWII's harsh confrontations were ongoing. On the anniversary of the present Shah's ascendance to the throne, the PM's speech was consisting of the compliments to the Shah's regime, and the statements of Qavam were towards boosting of Shah's administration. Thus, it was made possible to establish security all around the

---

<sup>618</sup> *Ibid*, p. 49–50. FO [E5214/122/34] dated September 5, 1942.

<sup>619</sup> *Ibid*, p. 52–53. FO [E5274/173/34] dated August 18, 1942.

<sup>620</sup> *Ibid*, p. 50–51. FO [E5274/173/34] dated August 18, 1942.

country “owing to the discipline” supplied by the help of the Shah. Asking for confidence to his Government from the Nation as well, PM was stating the real interests of the country were sought after by his Government, and his denial of the claims that his Government was “tainted” with the “foreigner worship”.<sup>621</sup> It was a striking sentence at PM’s broadcast that as a guarantee to the voters in the country and his Government would be punished unless the Government would not keep the promises to eradicate the corruption and the bribery. It was a hopeful incident that it was stated: “a special inspection was set up in order to punish such crimes under Qavam’s personal supervision”.<sup>622</sup> The main steps of the Government’s reform program were shared with the public opinion, and related to this reform program, the reform of the Government’s departments along with the employment plan of the American advisers. Other than these, the statement for a reform step was presented as “methods of business would be made quicker and simpler, and young men would be given trial”. Finally, some other measures such as the anti-hoarding, guarantee of the food supplies all around the country, development of the irrigation, road, and railway systems were counted in the Cabinet program’s introduction to the public opinion.<sup>623</sup> A few of the telegrams which followed the last broadcast of Ahmad Qavam were encompassingly a resume of the political, economic, and social affairs in the country. Indeed, prolonging from the census in the country to the status of the Persian Armed forces, extending from the inter-Cabinet problems to the reactions of the diplomatic missions in the country i.e. were summed up by these reports. The last of those reports which were transmitted with their copies dating to September 2–8, 1942 was concentrating on the Prime Minister’s denial on the claimed demands of the Allied powers to request Persia’s war declaration against Germany, and the probable mobilization scenarios of the Persian Armed Forces. Other than these, his power’s inclination was summed by the paragraph in the dispatch of which he was found successful to suppress some six or seven newspapers, limit the authority of the Chief of General Staff relatively, and make responsible the Chief of Police to present the

---

<sup>621</sup> *Ibid*, p. 53. FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 20, 1942.

<sup>622</sup> *Ibid*, p. 53. FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 20, 1942.

<sup>623</sup> *Ibid*, p. 53. FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 20, 1942.

regular reports to the Shah instead of himself as it was mentioned as a custom, and raise some fears amongst the officials.<sup>624</sup>

All of these which were referring to an inclination of his powers, and authority in the final sense was interpreted as a matter of suspicion in the mind of the Shah. By that reason, it was added to the dispatch that “it is the knowledge of that lack of confidence that prevents the Prime Minister from proposing himself as Minister of War”.<sup>625</sup> During the early days of September, as a topic on the agenda of the Cabinet, the anti-hoarding campaign was accelerated. Regarding with this, a circular was distributed to all Governors-General, Governors, and Directors of Finances in all provinces to collect grain as much as possible, and it was stated that this is the primary task of all the officials. Needless to say, the crop assessment of the provincial officials were ongoing, and as in the case of Kerman, the crop assessment reports were presented to the political center of the country. Kerman’s assessment was announced to be around 3500 tons of grain before the next harvest. The initiatives of the new Government were also reported by this telegram where the appointment of Iran’s new ambassadors to some critical countries for the international relations of the country were presented with just a few words. As it was stated before, the appointment of Ahmad Qavam’s brother, Rosouh-ud Dowleh to “Angora” was realized. It is interesting that there was the same use of the word Angora for the new capital of Turkey in a similarity to the use of Persia instead of Iran. Since the use of the words Angora, and the old capital of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul was changed to Ankara, and Istanbul by a Governmental circular in 1930, it may be interpreted as one-sided British perspective to insist on the former use of the private city names. Rosouh-ud-Dowleh was transferred from Switzerland to Ankara. Apart from him, all of the diplomats whose appointments to some central, and peripheral countries were surprising. As the two immediately former Prime Ministers before Ahmad Qavam, Mr. Zoka al-Mulk, and Mr. Ali Soheili were appointed to Washington, and Kabul respectively. Mr. Hossein Ala, whose position was the *Directorship of the Bank-e Melli (National Bank of Iran)*<sup>626</sup> was appointed as the new

---

<sup>624</sup> *Ibid*, p. 83. FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 08, 1942.

<sup>625</sup> *Ibid*, p. 83. FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 08, 1942.

Minister of Imperial Court, and Mr. Ahy who was a member of the Ali Soheili Cabinet was appointed to Kuibishev, Soviet Russia.<sup>627</sup>

As the new reports from the Military Attachés were arriving, the balances for the political situation of the country were explained in details. As a reiterated note, the political status of Ahmad Qavam's cabinet, and the authority of it was interpreted at a satisfying level once again. In terms of the satisfaction, a relatively "calmer" atmosphere was a clear indication, and the providence of the food supplies all around the country was relatively close to adequacy.

However, the monthly balances would not ensure the near future. Since the role of religion was certainly massive in this country, the orders of the PM for the people to obey the ban of the breaking of the fast in the public areas was reflected as a source of pleasure on behalf of the people who pay attention to the religious values. Additionally, the suppression of some of the newspapers was reflecting a sobering effect, and the rise of the Government's authority, and as a further step, and at least a more democratic perspective either in a pretension or not, the formation of a body of inspectors to check on the maladministration, and corrupt body of the Government. For this body of inspectors, "the men of good reputation" were sought to be selected, and it was feeding the hopes of the broader society on the Government.<sup>628</sup>

Aside from these details which were wired from Tehran to London for several times via the intelligence reports, the report's last section was separated to the German agents' activities in the country. Such an incident was reported as a German airplane dropped some leaflets in Pahlevi on the 9th of September, at about 14:30 local time. As it was reported, "the leaflets were in Azerbaijani Turkish, and were mainly intending to affect the Azerbaijani population around for avoiding them from helping the nearly-defeated Russian troops". Even though there was some commotion in the area, it was not more than the least influential strike by propaganda, and the Russian

---

<sup>626</sup> "Hossein Ala", Milani, 2008, p. 38. Milani stated that Ala took over the reins of the Bank-e Mellī-ye Iran though he had no knowledge in this field.

<sup>627</sup> *Ibid*, p. 85. FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 08, 1942.

<sup>628</sup> *Ibid*, p. 88. FO [E5615/19/34] dated September 15, 1942.

sources were saying that the aircraft was forced to down near Tiflis (Tbilisi) on its homeward flight.<sup>629</sup>

Even though the recent reports were confirming the energetic performance of the Prime Minister, there was a little hesitation on the Prime Minister's new administration of which a comparison was made to scatter the corrupt features of the former Prime Minister, and his Government on the 1st of October, 1942. As Mr. Soheili was appointed to Kabul, Afghanistan, the processors' influence on the politics were rather weaker, and the dissolution of the Majlis which was taken as the epitome of the political opposition, also the optimistic view of the Allied powers on the holding of fresh elections to relief the political system were counted by a telegram from the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden to the Soviet Russian Ambassador of the country, Mr. Clark Kerr in Kuibyshev. This telegram was stating the energetic style of the new Prime Minister to take some strict measures to rehabilitate the political system, and the society, as yet it was understood that even the Prime Minister Qavam us Saltaneh himself was seeking to dissolve the Majlis himself, and the main problem emerges as the members of the Cabinet did not seem sympathetic to this opinion at that moment. Since the views of the Soviet Russian Government was important, it was stated that it would be helpful to inform the Soviets about the certain decision of the British Government that there is no objection to the holding of fresh elections in Iran. Nonetheless, there were the doubts of the Government as those were stated in the telegram that it was questioned whether it would be possible to change the body of the Majlis which was mostly elected as the nominees of the ex-Shah or not. The dominant view appeared as it would be difficult to change the body to a satisfying extent even though the way of holding the fresh elections was sought to be a better way. Lastly, it was understood from the Soviet Russian Ambassador to London that there was a plan to establish a Senate, and was added that since it was not verified by the diplomatic sources, it would not be possible to make an assessment for a bicameral system as disadvantageous or not.<sup>630</sup>

---

<sup>629</sup> *Ibid*, p. 90. FO [E5615/19/34] dated September 15, 1942.

<sup>630</sup> *Ibid*, p. 218. FO [E5805/14/34] dated October 1, 1942.



Qavam us Saltaneh's "display of energy" was definitely an asset of the new Government which made the PM, and the other Cabinet members luckier than their predecessors. In terms of the public opinion, their chance to use the propaganda devices in order to mobilize the social groups, and the ability to propagate against the bad features of the former administration, Qavam, and his Cabinet members were assessed as more competitive than before. Almost three weeks prior to the telegram from the details were presented above, another telegram stated that the transition from Ali Soheili's Government to the Government of Ahmad Qavam was "a real relief" for the country. The dispatch mentioned "the loss of all confidence of Soheili in himself" and stated that "Soheili was quite unable to take any decision".<sup>631</sup>

This telegram which was a dispatch from Mr. Bullard to Mr. Eden was stating "the obstinate, and the vigorous" character of the new Prime Minister. In parallel with this, his vigorous feature was affirmed, as yet the obstinate feature which was sometimes making some difficulties for "His Majesty's Government" was making the British Legation confused about the presence of the new Prime Minister or either holding of a new regime. As it was stated in the previous telegram from London to Kuibyshev, in such countries, that's to say in the countries like Persia, "in countries like Persia, the Government in power were often able to influence the elections".<sup>632</sup>

Regarding with the vigor of the PM, and his Cabinet, there were some concerns on the British side. Meanwhile, Qavam's obstinate style which were inherited from the land ownership, and kinship ties with some other aristocratic families whose members were prominently active in the political life of the country. Amongst those, Abrahamian counted the Qajars, Farfanfarmas, Alas, and the Qarahgozlus.<sup>633</sup> As mentioned before, the role of "the gild-edged hezar famil (1000 families)" was an outcome of the end of "their relative eclipse".<sup>634</sup>

For the British side, the most crucial, and a key feature of any Prime Minister who would seat in the Office was the coordination capacity and the tendency. Regarding

---

<sup>631</sup> *Ibid*, p. 218. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>632</sup> *Ibid*, p. 218. FO [E5805/14/34] dated October 1, 1942.

<sup>633</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 103.

<sup>634</sup> Bayandor, *ibid*, p. 11.

with that, by stating the “firmness of Qavam” has provided a support for him at both the popular level, and in the Parliament of the country, a typology of the prospective Prime Minister was drawn by the same dispatch. A moderate, yet influential personality who is capable of balancing any kind of fractions (fraksiyun) in the Majlis was offered. The British view on the new Prime Minister made an emphasis on the respectability and influence of the new name: “In view of the present unwillingness of various suitable personalities to take the office (e.g. M. Pirmia), Qavam es Saltaneh seems to be almost the only candidate of the first category. I am, however, anxious to have some alternative ready, and the oriental secretary is accordingly going to Palestine very shortly in order to see Said Zia ed din Tabatabai”.<sup>635</sup>

According to this telegram, one may find the political intrigues against Ahmad Qavam, and the probable calculations of the Allied powers in order to promote some new political figures. Tabatabai was one of those whose exile period was going to end after the enterprises of British side, and the contacts, as it was hoped, would colorize the political spectrum to a relatively affirmable level.

The report’s following section was separated to the transition assessment of the Prime Ministers, from Soheili to Ahmad Qavam, in terms of the detention of the German spies. Either they were German agents or Persians, the people whose names were written on the list to demand from the Iranian Governments were partly under detention, yet the eighteen persons whose names were demanded by a list of the Persian authorities were not handed over to the British authorities. It was stated, however, Soheili’s extensive measures did not take place for further deals between the British circles, and the Iranian Government. Hence, one of the key questions was still what Qavam’s Government would do in the near future. For the measures taken by the Qavam’s Government, the statement told that the British Legation made a rapid attempt in the very early days of Qavam’s Government by submitting a forty-person list.<sup>636</sup>

---

<sup>635</sup> *Ibid*, p. 219. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>636</sup> *Ibid*, p. 219. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

The keynote was seen in the dispatch's following sentences, where the perspicacious manoeuvre of Ahmad Qavam was not appreciated by the British authorities. Since it was a consistent, and direct demand from British circles, it was the postponement, or suspension of the fulfillment of these demands was making the British circles more concerned with the following developments in Iran. By that reason, the following sentences were revealing the furious perspective of the British legation. Qavam was procrastinating on the arrest of "Persian suspects", and the political power's limits were analysed by that dispatch that the efforts would not bring any concrete results in the near future. As "one of the principal suspects, Frau Bernstein, a German, known to be the link between the Axis agents in Fars, and those in Tehran, was reported dead after she committed suicide in her house."<sup>637</sup>

At last, against any sort of dissatisfying incidents, and attitudes shown by the new Government, the reiteration of the demands won a considerable satisfaction as the rest of the telegram was following. The fruitless efforts gained prominence by Qavam's putting an end to the resistance against the British demands, and now after the previous episodes, "the agreement was providing an opportunity to make detention of all suspects in Sultanabad", not in Tehran as it was supposed and offered by the Persian Government. It was also stated that "there were the British troops in Sultanabad, and the British authorities would take the responsibility of interrogation and supervision processes of the suspects".<sup>638</sup> It was added that the smooth working of the process was expected, yet "the arrest and handing over of Persians would bound to be unpopular, and for further demands, it would be presumed that they expect to encounter difficulties if they insist on further demands, and ask for an extended list of the suspects."<sup>639</sup> For the financial deals with the Persian Government, the Dispatch was considering the Iranian currency's urgency for the waging of the labor where the British circles were benefiting from. In this regard, the exchange of British pounds to Iranian rials was thus a substantial part of the British Legation's financial expectations. In order to do this, a financial agreement on 26th of May,

---

<sup>637</sup> *Ibid*, p. 219. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>638</sup> *Ibid*, p. 220. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>639</sup> *Ibid*, p. 220. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

1942 was reached, and there were some other agreements for providing remedies to the British Legation's financial affairs inside the country. Depending on the remedies, it was expected from the Persian Government not to act on the path of criticism against the Allied powers, and as it was emphasized, there was not any benefit to having been caught from the anti-Allied campaign.

The establishment of a Ministry to take care after the food shortages were reported in the dispatch's section under the title of "Food Supply". In parallel with this, the wheat collection's urgency was stated, and the precautions by the establishment of a Directorate of Food whereas the Minister M. Ardalan was selected in the Government were ongoing. It was stated that the Minister was co-operating with the Legation's member, Mr. Squire, and the Prime Minister's telegraphic instructions were sent to any corner of the country to warn the officials for the battle against the hoarders. For the implementation of these, even the severest measures including "the death penalty" was counted.<sup>640</sup> On the case of the resolutions of the food problem, the main difficulty was stated as the resistance of the local authorities to take action against the landowners. Surely, this was sourcing from their fears, where the strength of the central authority, and its transmission capacity to the local levels were understood by the British Legation. The members of the Legation were underlying the urgency of the Persian Government's to supply wheat, and as the demand from the British authorities at the level of approximately 120,000 tons of wheat was not fulfilled, the new policy was defined as the collection of wheat from the peasants at any free price. Even though, wheat was the first, and substantial part of the goods, there were some others including the sugar, grain, rice, and barley. Apart from these, the main expectation was the resolution of the food supplies, and by offering a free price system to the peasants, it was targeted to appeal any of the producers, and overcome the main problem of smuggling.<sup>641</sup>

In the beginning of WWII, despite any kind of efforts to modernize it, Persia was a country of poverties. There were several vital questions. From the viewpoint of the Western countries, this was directly depending on the providence of diversity in

---

<sup>640</sup> *Ibid*, p. 221. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942. Please also see "İranda Muhtekirler İdam Edilecek", *Son Telgraf*, September 7, 1942, p. 1.

<sup>641</sup> *Ibid*, p. 221. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

many fields. According to the dispatch, the transportation system's main requisite was the change of the system from the heavily-basement of the railway to the road system. For that purpose, a committee of transport was established under the guidance of the Persian, American, and British representatives. In this committee, Sir Arthur Parsons was the official representative of British side. As a first measure, it was offered to make a census of all tyres, and lorries. Even though, the census was stated not to proceed November 4, 1942, Major Quinall's arrival from Jerusalem M.E.S.C. to Tehran was stated to accelerate the census process, and by this, it was targeted to achieve a result to make differ the essential and useless vehicles on the transportation system. The section on the transportation system in Iran ended with the "cautious optimism" of Sir Reader Bullard for the near future. Here, a few notes on the M.E.S.C. would help us to understand "the innovative and organizational device" under the command of the Allies. Sydney Nettleton Fisher stated that the center was the most encompassing device in the region. The goods, many of them luxuries, which caused the space of loading were assessed by Fisher the center of any kind of commodities, cereals and rationed articles. From April 1941, the M.E.S.C. lost its full control over the distribution of the commodities, cereals and other items. It was a certain fact that the administration of this center stayed in the hands of the British military's commanders yet through the application of lend-lease policy which promoted the American existence in the region in the beginning of 1942, one American headquarters in Cairo and an official office in Washington were established. The governments of the middle eastern countries could not enjoy any seats on the boards of these headquarters. Through the end of WWII, as the Ally efforts to develop area co-ordination, resources and applied benevolent tutelage on economic planning were saved, the original justification of the M.E.S.C. started to disappear. As early as 1944, Britain's vision was the maintenance of its role and influence in the region by the administration of the center. Using the sterling area pool to circulate it's currency, British aspects sooner fell down after the withdrawal of the United States from the operations in 1945.<sup>642</sup>

It was one of the remarkable episodes of WWII years in Iran when the Polish refugees from Soviet Union were compulsorily evacuated, and they were transferred

---

<sup>642</sup> Fisher, *ibid*, p. 490–491.

to Tehran by the number of thousands.<sup>643</sup> It was understood from the dispatch that both the British Legation, and the Persian Government were anxious, and even, this sudden transfer was causing some misgivings amongst the Persians. For an abrupt solution, the remedy was found as to transfer these Polish refugees for an overseas destination which would be East Africa in the first step. This solution was primarily forecasting the sending of 10,000 Polish refugees immediately, and the sending of the rest later since the shortages in the country, and the presence of several Europeans were making the problem of boarding hardened than ever.<sup>644</sup>

Since the war conditions were making the social life harder than ever, the discontent among the Iranians was rising. The publishing of some commentaries against the dissatisfying struggle of the Allied powers against Germany in Soviet Union made the Government to take some strict measures in accordance with the Military Governorship Law of 1911. In this regard, the attitudes of the Persians were stated to be a kind of alienation from the British circles, and the misgivings in parallel with that was causing a considerable anxiety at the British Legation. Even though the flow of events were not in an affirmative way, it was stated that PM's standing up against the deputies to fulfil their duties, and contribution of the Shah to that was counted as a satisfaction.<sup>645</sup> Although it was not stated to be a full contending one, the visit of Mr. Winston Churchill to Iran was written in the dispatch under a separate section. Even Mr. Wendell Willkie's visit to Tehran other than the British PM was stated as "an unqualified success".<sup>646</sup>

Under the section of "Anglo-American Co-operation in Persia", a favourable result was the decision of Iranian PM, Qavam es Saltaneh to hire some first-class advisors in Governmental affairs. Mr. Bullard's statement to favour this decision was directly

---

<sup>643</sup> During the heyday of the occupation, from 1942–1945, as one of the most prominent scholars on the history of 20th-century Iran, George Lenczowski took a central role as Press Attaché at the Polish Legation in Tehran. After WWII, he, and his wife decided to immigrate to the United States where he selected to build a career as a scholar instead of his services in the diplomatic missions. Please see Peter J. Chelhowski, "the Life and Work of George Lenczowski", *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, eds. Peter J. Chelhowski, Robert J. Pranger, Durham, Duke University Press, 1988, p. 1–4.

<sup>644</sup> *Ibid*, p. 222. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>645</sup> *Ibid*, p. 222. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>646</sup> *Ibid*, p. 222–223. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

a result of the current situation where the British were not able to produce first-class advisors, and this would have been a source of suspicion in the eyes of the Soviet officials as well. As the dispatch stated the will of the British side to co-operate with the American expertise, they were also keeping the measure to control the Iranian governmental affairs. In that regard, the maintenance of the close relations with the American advisers would help British Legation to follow a more secure line: "It is all-important to keep closely in step with the Americans, since an increase of American influence is taking place here as the American advisers arrive and take up their duties in the various ministries, and as more, and more American technicians come to superintend and assist the transport of goods to Russia".<sup>647</sup>

The same dispatch brought some important details about the political attitude of Qavam, and the political affairs of the country too. Most importantly, the reform program's future was analyzed by this part of the dispatch. On the case of the American advisors, it was stated that Qavam's favoring the American experts was presented -as it was understood- to be a facilitator for the "far-reaching reform program" of the Government. Whereas the arrival of only one or two American experts did not represent the current energetic attitude of the Government, it was assessed as a new, fresh attitude of the new Government to provide a dynamism to the internal affairs of the country. The relatively successful attitude of the Government was a promising one, and the foundation of a new inspectorate to inquire the bribery and extortion complaints against the Government servants was appreciated. Even though the ambiguity would make the British Legation members to wait for a while to understand whether this inspectorate would be successful to eradicate the bribery and extortion or not, it was a promising incident reported recently.<sup>648</sup>

Another news was coming from the Ministry of Health. This, for the first of all, depended on the drastic decision of the new Minister of Health, Dr. Mareban to cut the budgets of hospitals in Teheran, and to bring a rotation system to enforce the doctors in the capital to move forward through the other parts of the country. Due to

---

<sup>647</sup> *Ibid*, p. 223. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>648</sup> *Ibid*, p. 223. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

the lack of health personnel, this was mostly supported, and the bad condition of the country was outspoken in many parts of the country. Even though the doctors were obliged to leave the capital for the provincial posts, the cases such as the appointment of a couple to Kerman, and Hamadan were remarkable examples of the severity of the conditions. The dispatch was reporting that it would not work out properly, albeit it was not omitting the urgency of the gaps in the health system.<sup>649</sup>

Aside from these, the diligence of the Government on religious life in the country, and a measure in parallel with this, the warning on the Government servants not to break their fasts in Ramadan in public was written in the following paragraph of the dispatch. Undoubtedly, this was interpreted as a significant break from the Pahlavi tradition. This was understood as a chance for the Government since there was not a popular reaction against its measures. Even the measures such as the foundation of an inspectorate, and the implementation of the doctor's rotation system were not causing a deep discontent. On the other hand, the measure to warn and prohibit the Government servants for not to break their fasts in the holy month of Ramadan was understood as a limit that "lest the religious forces gather strength, and lead to the reintroduction of the veil for women".<sup>650</sup>

This period, for the first time since the rise of Pahlavi rule in the country, witnessed the political agency of the Shah of Iran for more than ever. In this regard, the dispatch was stating the address of the Shah on the anniversary of his ascendance to Iranian throne had satisfied the people. His appealing to the people by ensuring that he would keep the strict measures to overcome the food shortages and security was represented as a source of satisfaction.<sup>651</sup>

As it was reported by the earlier dispatches, some details on the report of the trial on the ex-Police chief Mukhtari were wired once again. The most important of all was the division of the public opinion into two on this trial that one of these were approaching the issue as the ex-Police chief should have been executed, and on the other hand, the other group members were following the opinion that it would not be

---

<sup>649</sup> *Ibid*, p. 223. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>650</sup> *Ibid*, p. 223. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>651</sup> *Ibid*, p. 224. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.



fair to condemn a slavish subordinate of the ex-Shah since the now-then assumed crimes were under the responsibility of the ex-Shah.<sup>652</sup> The following report on the political developments in Iran was including the details about the arrest of the Persian suspects, a subject which had been carrying more importance by sophistication than the arrest of the German suspects. The names of the seven Persian suspects were given in this dispatch, and the overall assessment of the process for the detention of the suspects was wired from Mr. Bullard to Mr. Eden.

As it was understood from a list of telegrams most of which were summarized above, the transition of the administration in Iran from Mr. Soheili's cabinet to Mr. Qavam's was reported to end up with the semi-satisfying, and rather successful to eradicate the illusion of the British side on the rounding-up of the Persian fifth columnists. This information was an updated information up to the end of September 1942. Their endeavor was summarized as the way to achieve a collaboration level rather than expecting a level of direct response to satisfy the British Legation, and the names of the most prominent, and whose detention were paid an utmost attention then were added to the dispatch. Amongst these, Vaziri, Darugar, Darudi, Atabai, Zulfagmeri, Ghaffari, and Daryush's names were significantly remarked after the signing of the Tripartite Treaty between the parties. Soviet Union's expectations were supported by the British Legation, and the arrest of these people was reported to be an incomplete operation. The status of some of the suspects was reported to be large, and this was interpreted as a weakening effect on the trust of the British Legation for the Persian officials. Even though the trial of these suspects was ongoing, the resentment of the Persian Government to round up the rest of the suspects and the inadequacies such as the incapability of the local authorities to take risk of detaining these people were reported.<sup>653</sup>

Sooner, a dispatch noting the recent economic developments pertaining to the internal situation in Iran arrived from London to Teheran. In that dispatch, Mr. Eden was noting the details of his meeting with the Persian Minister. During the visit of Persian Minister to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Britain, Mr. Eden noted the

---

<sup>652</sup> *Ibid*, p. 224. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>653</sup> *Ibid*, p. 224–226. FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 28, 1942.

request of wheat from Iran, and the insufficiency of the stocks was added. “Mr. Taqizadeh maintained that the Persian Government had done everything within their power to check hoarding. They had agreed to offer a greatly increased price for wheat and had set up a Ministry of Food. Nevertheless, they had been unable to secure any appreciable quantity of wheat, and the public now feared that there would be a serious shortage during the coming year”.<sup>654</sup>

The following part of the dispatch was including the surprises of Mr. Eden on which the Persian Minister Mr. Taqizadeh<sup>655</sup> was insistingly requesting from them. The risk for the securing of an appreciable quantity of wheat for the upcoming year was the main topic of the meeting. The question of the food shortages was a mark for the risk of the protests, and even though British authorities were maintaining the anticipation of the wheat supplies was at the level of satisfaction, the result was aversive to their anticipation. Finally, the semi-complaint of Iranian Minister due to the food shortages at a meeting in London was also reported to Mr. Eden by an *aidé* *memoire*.<sup>656</sup>

Following that, on November 3, 1942, Mr. Eden wrote to the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir A. Clark Kerr about the recent demands from Persian authorities, and the *vis á vis* demands from the British authorities. The reciprocity of these demands was crucial at large, and the British Minister of Foreign Affairs were affirming the key questions on the need of British circles in Iran for Iranian currency, the rial, the wheat situation, the possible dissolution of the Majlis. As the Soviet Ambassador in London had a meeting with the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden, it was urgently turned out to be a call for the British Ambassador in Tehran to take stronger support from the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran. Thus, the good will of the both sides were confirmed once again. What was the conclusion of both sides on the food shortages, and the urgent demands of the Persian authorities for wheat at this meeting? This point was answered by British Foreign Minister. Mr. Eden wrote

---

<sup>654</sup> *Ibid*, p. 227. FO [E6200/144/34] dated October 23, 1942.

<sup>655</sup> For a biography of Taqizadeh, please also see Milani, 2008, p. 321–326. Milani stated some of the political views of Taqizadeh of which he stated the backwardness of the political life in Iran due to “the curse and cholera” of the politics. Milani, 2008, p. 325.

<sup>656</sup> *Ibid*, p. 228. FO [E6200/144/34] dated October 23, 1942.

about the Persian Ambassador's views for overcoming the wheat shortages, and urgently, it was shared urgently as an advice that "Persia should normally produce wheat", and the main reason for this situation was reported as "the failure of the Persian authorities for supplying the demands of the nation, and the shortages of the lorries was another reason for the failure of the Government to take adequate measures."<sup>657</sup>

It was a surprising note which was wired from London to Moscow on the Soviet Ambassador's information that the urgency of the wheat deficiency in Iran was understood as just to be solvable by the help of Soviet authorities. For that purpose, from Azerbaijan, and Khorassan, from the Soviet zones, the transfer of the wheat and foodstuffs was going to be completed. "Mr. Maisky", Soviet Ambassador to London "had added that in his Government's view, there were also other contributory factors. Smuggling, for instance, had greatly increased, and considerable quantities of wheat were being sent over the border of Iraq, and Turkey. The large numbers of British and Soviet troops in Iran inevitably increased the food shortage, while the presence of many thousands of Poles also had its effect, even though their needs were met to a great extent by imports".<sup>658</sup> Hence, the key question of the food supply's urgency was put on the table by the meeting of two sides' representatives. The British side's offer was gathering on the urgent shipment program of food supply to Iran the former of which was stated to be planned for completion in November 1942 by 5,000 tons of wheat, and the latter, one month after that, by the same amount. Even "the further shipments would be emergently considered".

As one of the main problems which had risen on Iran's stability was asserted as the lack of food supplies, the strict measures were guaranteed by the reciprocal confirmation of both parties. Another confirmation of both parties was on the support of Soviet Ambassador to British Ambassador in Tehran whose support would be of great importance than it may imagine.

Even though the transition of the Government by the election of Ahmad Qavam as the new Prime Minister was completed, the dissolution of the Majlis was under

---

<sup>657</sup> *Ibid*, p. 228. FO [E6470/122/34] dated November 03, 1942.

<sup>658</sup> *Ibid*, p. 229. FO [E6470/122/34] dated November 03, 1942.

investigation, and the ongoing social and economic problems were causing a great discontent up to the Legation of the Allied Powers. In this respect, the dispatch was revealing the sincere wishes of the British side being presented by the will of the Foreign Minister of Britain, Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden's conclusion on this issue was clarified by the same dispatch. According to the new political conditions, Mr. Eden stated the key importance of co-operation with the Soviet side. This situation was briefly suggested by Mr. Eden to the Soviet representative to London, Mr. Maisky.<sup>659</sup> A following dispatch which was wired from Mr. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London to Mr. Cadogan was including the details about the expectations of the Soviet Government for both the supply to guarantee the lack of food in Iran, and the implementation of local ways to send logistic aids from the zone of influence under Soviet Russia in Iranian Azerbaijan on the 16th of November, 1942. In this regard, Mr. Maisky wrote about the alternative plans in case that the wheat, barley, and rice stocks would not be sufficient for Iran:

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the unity of the two Governments on the fact that at present, after the harvesting of crops, Iran has at her disposal a sufficient amount of wheat to satisfy the needs of the population. The difficulties which arose in the supply of cereals in some regions of Iran originated from defects in organizing the collection of cereals and in the lack of sufficient transport facilities. With a view to overcoming the difficulties which now exist in the supply of foodstuffs to Teheran, the Soviet Government informed the Government of Iran of its willingness to export from Iran-Azerbaijan up to 35,000 tons of wheat for supply to Teheran from the surplus wheat now existing in that region, and which is assessed by the British mission in Iran at 40,000 tons.<sup>660</sup>

Considering recent developments, the discussions on the lack of foodstuffs, the lack of barley, rice, and wheat, in particular, the problem of conformity for the Polish refugees in Iran, Soviet Ambassador's note was a clear proof for the explicit *modus vivendi* between the two Allied parties. In this regard, Soviet Ambassador in London wrote about the expectations of the Soviet Government to supply the sufficient level of rice, barley, and wheat: "With regard to the purchase of 30,000 tons of rice for export to the Soviet Union, an amount".<sup>661</sup>

---

<sup>659</sup> *Ibid*, p. 229–230. FO [E6470/122/34] dated November 03, 1942.

<sup>660</sup> *Ibid*, p. 234. FO [E6811/122/34] dated November 16, 1942.

<sup>661</sup> *Ibid*, p. 235. FO [E6811/122/34] dated November 16, 1942.

Soviet Government's expectations to guarantee the adequacy of the foodstuffs in northern Iran was a part of the policy which was implemented during the war years. In accordance with the balance of the main Allied powers, Soviet Union and Britain, the main task of the Soviet Government was not missing the momentum on the sharp edge of the implicit rivalry. The telegram went on to the notes that the "British Government propose to import into Iran in the near future 20.000 tons of wheat". As a part of the soothing policy, it was noted that the supply of foodstuff at a level of 20.000 tons of wheat was going to fulfill the requirements of the rising number of Allied troops and the Polish refugees as well.<sup>662</sup>

#### **2.4.5. Encountering With The Ethnic Mobilization**

Through the midst of November 1942, the telegram which was stating the vitality of the Kurdish problem was delving into the deep ethnic sectarian lines in the society.

<sup>663</sup> Mr. Urquhart's previous report was summarized by Mr. Eden, British Ambassador in Tehran to the headquarters in London. In this telegram, Mr. Eden wrote about the Kurdish problem in Azerbaijan region where the provincial definition was apparently open to the name of Kordestan. Mr. Eden wrote to Eden to inform him about the support of the Soviet Russian authorities on behalf of the Kurdish ethnic identity, and the recent developments in the region where the Kurdish identity was remarkably overstated had caused the disturbance at the Russian circles. In this regard, the telegram summarized the Kurdish sentiments, and how the "once-normal" sentiments were taken back to the question of "abnormality". The dispatch stated the ways that British authorities sought to give an end to the possible political reactions: "With an eye on the more distant future we must 'do what may be possible to help the moderate men to evolve a modus vivendi which will not require drastic revision when the occupation comes to an end' ".<sup>664</sup>

In this dispatch, what was constituting a striking point more than the others was the political approach of Ghazi Mohammad to the political affairs ongoing in Iranian Kurdish region. The ethnic sectarianism's political background was not new to the

---

<sup>662</sup> *Ibid*, p. 235. FO [E6811/122/34] dated November 16, 1942.

<sup>663</sup> *Ibid*, p. 235–236. FO [E6920/21/34] dated November 10, 1942.

<sup>664</sup> *Ibid*, p. 235–236. FO [E6920/21/34] dated November 10, 1942.

country, and for the region since the first enterprise of a Kurdish separate state at the region of Ararat was left behind in 1930, the rise of the ethnic consciousness amongst the Kurds in the region of Mahabad, eastern Azerbaijan, the fresh political activism was causing a great a dissent on the side of the Soviet Russian and British circles. Although the formidable rulership of Reza Shah Pahlavi was something new for the country, and it was left behind after a tumultuous collapse of the system except the implicit image of the Pahlavi absolutism, the new dynamics of the Kurdish activism were freshly rejuvenating the Kurds in the region, and the leadership of Ghazi Muhammad was becoming more apparent than ever. In this regard, one may emphasize the British attention on the Kurdish movements in Iran during the War years, and the early traits for the formation of the Kurdish movement within Iranian borders were becoming more mature in the recent years.

The main proof for this would be the Foreign Office document which refers to the dispatch between the British Ambassador in Tehran, Mr. Bullard to the British Minister of FO, Mr. Eden. Although Ghazi Muhammad's political activism would be presented in the following parts of the study, the following paragraphs of the dispatch should also be put under scrutiny. Regarding with that, Mr. Bullard's note to Eden was stating the recent position of Mr. Urquhart to stand close by the satisfaction of the Soviet Russian counterparts. In Tabriz, a city in the northwestern part of the country, Mr. Urquhart's observations on the Soviet Russian attitudes, the attitudes of the Kurdish activists, their political demands, and the feasibility of these were put under investigation. Most important of all, Mr. Urquhart was stating the new status of the Kurdish authorities vis á vis the Soviet Russians', the urgency of the strict measures which were expected to be taken i.e. were all causing dissent and divergence between the Soviet Russians. As Abbas Vali stated in his work dealing with the formation and the development of the Kurdish political sentiments and the political identity, it was the ethnicity being hardware by the rights by the help of nationalism.<sup>665</sup>

Regarding with the ethnicity, Vali wrote: "The idea that ethnicity is not self-signatory, in turn, means that it always needed a political force outside it to animate it, to set in motion in the historical process of nation process. This force is

---

<sup>665</sup> Abbas Vali, *Kurds and The State In Iran, The Making of Kurdish Identity*, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2011, p. xiv.

nationalism”.<sup>666</sup> Making it a stronger part of the political identity was going to be possible by the steps which could affirmatively affect the Kurds’ lives in Iran. Since the political quest was outspoken in a political legitimacy, the demands of the Governor-General in the Kurdish region in eastern Azerbaijan were found as unsuitable for a time to control the autonomous non-centrifugal forces. These dynamics which represented the “appeasement policy” of Britain were set in the same dispatch with the proposals to soothe the Kurdish political activism. According to the *raison d’être* in Iran, this was not a way of a solution to soothe the Kurdish population, albeit the British aspect sought to bring an appeasement on behalf of Kurds in a condition that they do not follow the same path of political activism threatening the Government’s authority.<sup>667</sup>

What was making the differentiation of the Soviet authorities from the British, save the tendencies to coalesce at a maximum level, was the British Legation’s role on the Kurdish political activism, and the lack of wheat supplies. In this regard, Mr. Bullard, by being dependent on the reports of Mr. Urquhart, wrote to Mr. Eden that the British authorities in Iran were assuring the treatment of them to the Soviet authorities in the country with an utmost frankness to overcome the existent and probable suspicions against them. The following part of the dispatch was including the alleged approval of the “frankness” which was shown to the Soviet Ambassador. As Mr. Urquhart had been in Tehran, he was directed to meet the Soviet Ambassador, yet the meeting of two diplomats was not sufficient to guarantee the belief that the British were not backing or encouraging the Kurdish activists up.<sup>668</sup> It was interesting to note that the dispatch went on with the identification of Mr. Bullard of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iran, Mr. Sa’eed as “foolish”, and the non-acceptance of the British Ambassador in Iran was stated that a meeting was arranged with Mr. Sa’eed for Mr. Urquhart in order to provide the dissipation of the similar views.

---

<sup>666</sup> Vali, *ibid*, p. xiv.

<sup>667</sup> *Ibid*, p. 236. FO [E6920/21/34] dated November 10, 1942.

<sup>668</sup> *Ibid*, p. 236. FO [E6920/21/34] dated November 10, 1942.

On the 22nd of October, 1942, a subsequent dispatch was sent from Consul-General of Britain, Mr. Urquhart to Mr. Bullard. Since the previous dispatch was stating the visit of Mr. Urquhart to Mahabad, the central town of the Kurdish activism in Azerbaijani part of Iran was viewed as a step which could not help to unloose the ties of confidence between two Allied powers, the dispatch was referring to the Mahabad visit of Mr. Urquhart directly. Mr. Urquhart stated that his visit on the dates of 13th to 15th of October, 1942 helped to prove the sincere wishes and approach of Britain to the question of Kurdish activism, and an adverse interpretation was made in this sake. Since the question of untrustability was at the edge of the diplomatic revelation, Mr. Urquhart was putting forward another reason to assess the case of Soviet disturbance about the British “interventionism”.

What Mr. Urquhart wrote about this visit was including the flatter of the Soviet circles was relatively successful, and the reciprocal understanding and the fixing of good intentions were provided. The main reasons for which have helped to boost the Soviet zeal towards a change of attitude on the Kurdish population of Iran were summarized as the British jealousy, Communist zeal as a poor one, and probably the fear of American offensive opinions on the region. In this regard, the evaluations of Mr. Urquhart on the shaping of Persian and Russian policies were reported below by the following paragraphs of the dispatch. On the side of the Persian policy, what was making a mere urgency for the local officials was the re-establishment of the authority in Kurdistan region of the country. Mr. Urquhart wrote that it was aimed to be achieved “as quickly and as completely as possible” by the Tehran Government. “Moderate men like the Governors-General of the Eastern and Western Azerbaijan are prepared to move slowly and to profess a desire to give Kurds better treatment than did Reza Shah; at the other extreme are the army officers like Sarhang Hashimi, who would like to force the pace, who would ferociously mishandle the Kurds if they could do with impunity”.<sup>669</sup> It was probably the litmus paper of the Kurdish population of the country of which they found the early parameters of the trustability to the Persian Government.

Given that the same path of treatment was going to be followed, the result was closer than the prediction indeed. By that reason, Mr. Urquhart’s note was somewhat a

---

<sup>669</sup> *Ibid*, p. 238. FO [E6920/21/34] dated October 10, 1942.



warning to the British administration to select a way adverse to where the Soviet authorities were expecting a decentralized way of authority mixing. The other point of which one may derive from the dispatch of Mr. Urquhart was the need to solve the reasons for the Soviet Russian perception's change of attitude on the Kurds in Iran.

This was directly interpreted as a part of the growing distrust between Soviet Russia and Turkey due to the neighboring northwestern part of Iran with Turkey. This region, which is called Azerbaijan-e Iran was under the propaganda of the Turkish state at the same time which was currently a strategic country for the Allied principles and vision during those years.

Actually, the decision of Turkey to stay out of WWII was not appreciated by the Allies, and it was a clear fact that since the very beginning of the Great War, the Allies were insistent on the inclusion of Turkey into the Warfield. Its strategic importance was not underestimated anyway, and the views to underestimate that were not approved by the British side primarily. The role of Mr. Urquhart during these incidents could be labeled as a go-between between the Persian local authorities, Governors-General, and the Kurdish leaders. Apart from Ghazi Muhammad whose leadership requires a more detailed analysis the names of *Kara Aini Agha* and *Ali Khan* were counted. These political figures whose political efficacy was a catalyst of the Kurdish autonomous and separatist struggles were under scrutiny which had not been existing ever before.<sup>670</sup> Mr. Urquhart added in the following sentences of the dispatch that he had told these political pioneers to lay their complaints before the Persian Governmental authorities.<sup>671</sup>

As it is understood from the dispatch of Mr. Urquhart, the Consul-General of Britain in Tabriz was depending on the re-formulation calculations of the Kurdish movement in this country. As an attachment to the dispatch of Mr. Bullard to Mr. Eden, the enclosure's final statements were including the probable risks to overcome in order to guarantee the secure and trustable ties with the Soviet counterparts. In this regard, the views of the Governor-General of Iran were taken under scrutiny.<sup>672</sup>

---

<sup>670</sup> *Ibid*, p. 238. FO [E6920/21/34] dated October 10, 1942.

<sup>671</sup> *Ibid*, p. 238–239. FO [E6920/21/34] dated October 22, 1942.

<sup>672</sup> *Ibid*, p. 239. FO [E6920/21/34] dated October 22, 1942.

In the following days, Mr. Eden as the British Secretary of State was emphasizing the vitality of two basic points in order to provide a secure transition root for Britain. By his dispatch to Mr. Baggallay in Kuibyshev, the core points of the encrypted correspondence were the key importance of the Persian Gulf ports on the southern part of Iran, and the Persian transition root's main transportation line, Trans-Iranian Railway and its adherents. Even though it is not a total differentiation, the use of the name Persian and the national characterization of the country as Persian instead of Iran, the name that refers to the Land of Aryans, and the Iranians was a symbol for the resistance of Britain to assess this country. In his dispatch, Mr. Eden's call to Mr. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London was transferred to Mr. Baggallay, and he was stating his recent meeting with the responsible Generals of Britain to inform his Ministry about the recent militarily situation in Iran. It was a simultaneous effort of Britain to inform the Soviet Ambassador in order to clarify the steps "which have been taken since the occupation of the country, September 1941 up to (that) present time". The meeting of the British Secretary of State with the Soviet Ambassador Mr. Maisky was thus including an information package of the British authorities about the "very limited capacity of the transportation system" in the country.

By this dispatch, the response to the inquiry of the Soviet Ambassador about the number of locomotives and the wagons was put clear by the number of 200 locomotives and 300 wagons. Since this number was stated to be eight trains' transportation for each day, the rising number of the train transportation within a year was put as a merely hopes giving step led by Britain. The British claims were including some other details. The details were about the port capacities of the country, and the capacity for the road transportation system. Amongst the ports such as Bandar Shahpur, Khorramshahr, and an inland water port such as Ahwaz, the inclination of the port capacity's rise was assessed as a countable leap in the country. Aside from the railway system which mainly was developed during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the construction of a new railway between Khorramshahr and Ahwaz, and the length of the railway was going to be around 75 miles, and it was in operation for three months already. Another line which was told to be completed shortly was between Tanuma and Ahwaz, and it was going to be around 30 miles long. Even the Kowloon Railway system's operating engines which were remarked

as inherited from the Germany's influence in Iran were aspected to be brought back to Iran.<sup>673</sup>

According to the rising demands and the lack of transportation facilities and the engines, the British authorities were flexible manoeuvring towards the rehabilitation of the transportation system in the country. Kowloon Railway was one of the examples. Yet before the dispatch to Persia, like of the trains' conversion into oil-burning machines from coal-burning, the engines were planned to be converted in the same way.

For the people who conduct the researches on WWII, the conversion of military machines from coal-burning into the oil-burning systems might seem surprising to a considerable extent. Indeed, it is possible to evaluate the pragmatic vision of Germany to sustain the overall capacity of available military machines both burning coal and the oil. On the other hand, the existent machines which were retained from the formerly influential zones of Germany in Iran have put to the path of utilization by British authorities once again. The keyword which was reflected from the dispatch of Mr. Eden to Mr. Baggallay was the enabling of "a more efficient control" in the country, and for that sake, the establishment of a wider telegraph line network was also going to help build the railway system in a more effective way.<sup>674</sup> For the transformation of port system via increasing the capacity of a few ports around the country, the curiosity of Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Maisky was met with the answers referring to the increase of Bandar Shahpur Port's capacity from 750 to 1500 tons a day, Khorramshahr as stated to be a negligible port before the British authorities had taken action had a daily capacity of 1300 tons, and lastly, an inland port destination of Ahwaz was asserted to rise from 200 tons a day to 900 tons a day comparatively. As the road system's capacity was growing up, the statistical briefing on the road system's capacity was clarified as 23.000 tons monthly. According to the estimates, and the rising capacity of the workers and the equipment for the improvement of road transportation, it was anticipated that it would grow in the following years. The details of the total tonnage carried by road were put clear in a division of provinces in the country such as Bushire, north of Andimeshk, Khanikin to Hamadan. In order

---

<sup>673</sup> *Ibid*, p. 240. FO [E7042/2067/6] dated November 24, 1942.

<sup>674</sup> *Ibid*, p. 240. FO [E7042/2067/6] dated November 24, 1942.

to secure the transportation capacity, two truck factories were established in Andimeshk, and the American experts were getting more active in the area in the last months. For the understanding of developing a more efficient road system, the estimate of General Naylor whose name was counted amongst the top officials to inform the British Secretary of State, Mr. Eden and Mr. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador to London, was around 100.000 tons a month, which was asserted to be verified in the following days to a truer account. Bushire's road capacity was counted as 2500 tons a month, whereas the northern part road through Andimeshk was providing a capacity to carry the tonnage of 13.000 tons monthly, and the last one, the road from Hanikin to Hamadan was providing 7500 tons monthly, just one thousand tons more than a half amount capacity of the former road of Andimeshk.<sup>675</sup>

During this meeting of Soviet Ambassador with British authorities in London, another information on the lorry route from Zahedan to Meshed, a lorry route which would cross the country from the southeastern to the northeastern was reported to be completed by their estimates. During the last months of 1942, the threat from the Caucasus campaigns of Germany was rising. As it was mentioned before, the threat was evaluated by the British authorities closely. Pertaining to the threat of Germany through the Trans-Caucasian lines, a military meeting of the Generals whose names were counted above was organized through the end of September 1942.<sup>676</sup>

After a few weeks than this, the news was stating that the Allied Powers have sent a Note to Iranian Government to take measures for the domestic security of the country which would result in the aversive way if the measures were not taken. This was a clear proof of the continuation where the demands from Britain were unsatisfyingly repeated.

Through the end of the year, *Karagöz* newspaper was stating the lack of basic goods of consumption, and the riot related to that. As this has caused a deep discontent in the Iranian society, the Minister of the Government whose work met with the extraordinary conditions was calling to the Iranian citizens to inform the

---

<sup>675</sup> *Ibid*, p. 240–241. FO [E7042/2067/6] dated November 24, 1942.

<sup>676</sup> For the precaution of British Commandership in both Iran and Iraq please see “İran ve Irak Orduları Bir Kumanda Altında Birleştirildi”, *Son Telgraf*, August 24, 1942, p. 1. “İranla Irakın Müdafaası”, *Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 1942, p. 1. “Muharebe İrana Yaklaşıyor”, *Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 1942, p. 1. “İran Kuvvetleri İngiliz Komutanlığı Emrine Verilecekmiş”, *Karagöz*, No: 560, November 1, 1942, p. 2.

Governmental officials about the profiteering acts of the artisans. In this respect, the news was stating the foreign aid from Soviet Russia and the United States of America to balance the wheat and rice stocks, and the call of the Minister to award the people by the twenty percent of the concealed products for their information about the cheatings of the profiteers.<sup>677</sup> In the enclosure which was sent after the dispatch of Mr. Eden to Mr. Baggallay, the details of the sensitivities of the members of Tripartite Alliance were revealed by the enlarging of truck factories assembled with the help of American experts, the widening of logistic supplies, and the fixing of a reciprocal understanding between the Allied parties. Because of this, another dispatch from Mr. Cadogan to the Soviet Ambassador in London was sent to take the Soviet authorities' attention once again on the wheat question.

In that regard, this question of food shortage was not only confined to the wheat problem, which was additionally including the urgency of food supplies such as rice, barley, and potatoes. The providence of the basic goods of consumption was already set to a deal between British and Soviet Russian authorities, albeit the suspension of the transition of abovementioned food stuff was causing the deepening of concern in the country. As the Persian Minister's demands were written once again, the demand of 35.000 tons of wheat supply from Persian Azerbaijan which has been under the Soviet Russian control to Tehran was repeated. Following that demand, the statement to reveal the probable adequacy of the 35.000 tons of wheat supply for almost three-four months was coming afterward.<sup>678</sup> Regarding with the suspensive attitude of Soviet Russian authorities in the country against the re-adjusting of cereal problem, it was stated that the separately supply of the Allied powers in the country, and the additional portion to be provided for the Poles, the refugees of those months, the decision of Britain to the transition of 15.000 tons wheat to Iran was not going to meet all the awaiting demands.<sup>679</sup>

Amongst the Allied powers which had taken action in Persia/Iran during WWII years, the position of the United States requires a detailed inquiry. It was no

---

<sup>677</sup> "İranda İaşe Darlığından Çıkan Kargaşalıklar", *Karağöz*, No. 573, December 17, 1942, p. 2.

<sup>678</sup> *Ibid*, p. 243. FO [E6811/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>679</sup> *Ibid*, p. 244. FO [E6811/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

coincidence that during these days of turmoil in the country, the United States Embassy in London issued a memorandum that had reached the Tehran Legation of Britain during those days. Apparently, the United States was in a search of taking more and efficient role in the Iranian affairs, and the request from the local authorities in Tehran was a verification for this. The demand from the Iranian Government to hire some American experts and advisers in order to accelerate the governmental affairs was not a unique step by reason of the former experiences in the country during the 1920s. During those years, the mission of Arthur C. Millspaugh was well remembered by the people who had been interested in the state affairs.

The dispatch was stating “the wholehearted support” of British side on behalf of the American expertise, and the reciprocity of the approach to help build Persia’s state affairs to a more satisfying level than before was making the American experts feel obliged to take required steps. In this respect, the statement of the dispatch which denoted the decisive approach of American authorities followed by the words below:

With a view to strengthening the internal administration of Persia, the Government of Persia has asked for a considerable number of American advisers. The Government of the United States naturally feels obliged to see to it that these advisers can begin and carry on their work under conditions favorable to the success of their efforts. The British Government, it is understood, has been wholeheartedly in favor of the sending of these advisory missions to Persia.<sup>680</sup>

In the first part of the dispatch, the key sentence was undoubtedly the first one. As it referred to the quest of Government of Iran for a considerable number of American advisers to strengthen the internal administration of the country, it was then accepted that the weakness of the Government on the maintenance of the authority within its borders. For that sake, the employment of American experts, although it was not a new step in consideration with the former reign of the Pahlavi regime, it was a new development in the perspective of flow through the Great War’s influences on the country.<sup>681</sup>

The following sentences of the dispatch were focusing on the British support. “As a matter of fact, the British Government has on several occasions been the first to urge

---

<sup>680</sup> *Ibid*, p. 244. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>681</sup> *Ibid*, p. 244. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

that such missions be organized. Obviously, such advisers are in a position to exert on behalf of the common cause a most effective influence”.<sup>682</sup>

The following paragraph of the dispatch which stressed the urgency of the problems to be solved, and thus, “the acute economic and political situation” in the country since the jointly-directed occupation in the late days of 1941’s summer, has been sharing the detail that for more than a month, since the middle of October, the American authorities has attended the meetings with British and Soviet Russian Legation members. Negotiating and exchanging views of the squeezed situation of Persia then, the Americans “has consistently maintained that the problem could be satisfactorily solved only if, in one way or another, adequate provision were made for the minimum economic requirements for the people of Persia and Persian authority and responsibility in the internal affairs of Persia were maintained to the possible extent”.<sup>683</sup>

The most urgent problem of the country during the fall of 1942 was the development of transportation facilities along with the providence of adequate level of wheat to the capital of the country. For that purpose, the role which the Americans were asked, and wishful to play was expressed in this dispatch. Even though the steps which had stayed at an unsatisfying level at that time were questioned, the American view was putting an explicit warning on the pressure’s faultiness towards an effect to cause some undesirable results. On the other hand, the possibility of achieving the desired result was not going to stay at short sight unless the urgency of the situation was not fully analyzed, and the precautions were not taken: “Moreover, it was felt that resort to coercion on the authorities would not only lead to many undesirable repercussions but probably also to failure to achieve the desired objective”.<sup>684</sup>

Hence, The attitudes of Foreign Office (Britain) and the State Department (USA) were moving hand-in-hand, and the concerns which were expressed by the American authorities had been emphasizing the current wheat problem’s probability to grow up

---

<sup>682</sup> *Ibid*, p. 244. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>683</sup> *Ibid*, p. 245. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>684</sup> *Ibid*, p. 245. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

into a bigger crisis, and the large assumptions of the Allied powers, primarily the British Legation members to assess the severity of the growing crisis were repeated by a few remarks. These brief points which were brought to the attention of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs were essentially indicating the seriousness of both the trustability and the security for of both which the American view was keeping the growing concerns.

In this regard, the delicate, as well as the realist approach of State Department, was displaying the way for a route map to overcome the temporary problems among the members of the Tripartite Alliance and the Government of Iran. In one sense, the dispatch was a warning to the legation of Britain from their American Allies. This dispatch as an enclosure dated to December 14, 1942, was first and foremost paying attention the wheat problem. However, aside from the wheat problem, the dispatch was also paying attention to the arrest of Persian suspects, and the transfer of flour, and barley i.e. Besides, the main prospect of State Department was a remark which targeted to exhibit the surprise of the American Minister in Tehran and the Headquarters in Washington. That was due to the conditional clause of the British side which adversely has helped to alienate the Iranian Government just because of acting to serve the enforce the weakening of it by the heavy shortage of wheat. The weeks which followed the deepening of the wheat and cereal crisis in the country had brought the Iranian Government to a sharp edge. An enclosure which can be understood as a reply from the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed the correspondence of British Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The dissatisfaction of the American authorities in terms of the failure of food supplies to the capital, the most populated city in the country was apprehended by the British authorities. For the purpose of taking some strict measures to overcome the rising riot in the capital, the implicit declaration was shared with the American officials.<sup>685</sup>

What the British communication was directed to mean covered the sympathy and the apprehension of them in response to the American dispatch. It was ironic that on the terms of Iran's economic struggle, and the food shortages were rising although the

---

<sup>685</sup> "İran", *Askeri Mecmua*, March 1, 1943, No: 128, p. 103–106. As it was stated by the *Military Journal of Turkey (Askeri Mecmua)* during the spring of 1943, the total population of the country was around 16 million, then. Tehran's population was around 400.000. Afterwards, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz were amongst the cities inhabited by big-portion of the country's population. Their population's were 200.000, 100.000, and 100.000 respectively.



British response was reflecting a picture adverse to that: "It is believed that the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Persia corresponds very closely with that of the United States Government."<sup>686</sup> The following parts of the British reply to American correspondence have been stating almost the same things counted above. As usual, the diplomatic tongue of the dispatches was carrying the simple formulae to keep the peaceful path between the Allied powers. In this regard, it was taken the lead to take the attention of State Department once again that British suggest the same way that American advisers should be sent to Iran.<sup>687</sup>

Meanwhile, if we save the emphasis for the collaboration between the two parties, the main struggle for fixing the social and economic problems was not a bold line to separate both sides. However, there were other suggestions which British side sought to transmit the other side. A sort of complaint could be followed from this dispatch: "Until recently the task of maintaining the interests of the United Nations at Tehran has fallen almost exclusively on the British Legation. It is hoped that it may henceforward be the United States representative at Tehran to take an equally active part in helping to solve important problems of common concern to the Allied Governments; and it is that the task of two legations may be greatly eased by the steadying influence which will be exercised by the Persian authorities through the United States advisers".<sup>688</sup>

The dispatch which included the details of the complaints were bringing an insightful approach to all those American officials to take care of the Persian affairs altogether from then on. In the case of the growing events, and the width of the recent developments, it was a turning point since the United States was not a signatory of the Treaty of Alliance which was signed on January 29, 1942 during the premiership of Mr. Foroughi Khan. Ali Soheili, as the successor of this cunning and wise politician, was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iranian Government.

During that case, what the British Legation members were saying was that Britain was first and foremost paying attention to lead the process solving some urgent

---

<sup>686</sup> *Ibid*, p. 246. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>687</sup> *Ibid*, p. 247. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>688</sup> *Ibid*, p. 247. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

problems in Iran, and amongst these, as abovementioned, the wheat problem was constituting the main obstacle to keep the social and economic tranquility. Other than the wheat problem, the second of the urgencies which was stated by the dispatch was the local currency problem of the Allied powers. As there was not a strict separation line to make British Legation members and military and civilian personnel from their Soviet counterparts in Iran, the urgency was directly stated as a problem of local currency for the United Nation's forces of the Allied side. Surely, the use of a term to denote the Allied countries' representation was a charming one. It was thus a reference to the unity of the Allied powers with which they even sought to adopt to the Iranian local currency in order to conduct their domestic affairs. The last of the points which was already a main title of the Allied agenda was the taking of security measures against the Axis agents in this country.<sup>689</sup>

For the approval of Britain was not acting towards a path of self-interest, the dispatch was stating the fact to the attention of United States administration to assume their own responsibilities, and move on a path of co-operative understanding. A hopeful effort was shown by Iranian Government to act in accordance with the Anglo-Iranian Financial Agreement of May, 29, 1942. In that respect, the Iranian Government was sought to withhold necessary currency for the Allied powers. As the American advisers were expected to come to Iran in short period of time, it was expected that the assumption of American mission over Financial administration in the country would prevent such threats of currency delay.<sup>690</sup> For the urgency of taking security measures against the Axis agents in Iran, the dispatch was following with the words accompanying the briefing of existent German influence in the country. Since it was not possible at once to eradicate the German influence all around the country, and pacify the German agents whom were sometimes disguised under a technical typology, the situation was described as a floating threat around many cities of the country.<sup>691</sup>

---

<sup>689</sup> *Ibid*, p. 247. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>690</sup> *Ibid*, p. 247–248. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>691</sup> *Ibid*, p. 248. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

Eventually, this long dispatch that was involving the memorandums ended with the words to display the “very closely agreement” of both sides, and “His Majesty’s Government” was interested in the signature of the Wheat Agreement with a no further delay. The attention which was paid on the signature of such a treaty was an hopes giving development. Besides, the reciprocity of the good intentions were repeatedly fed between the two parties. Pertaining to the wheat problem which was already a risky point to create a fault line between Soviet Legation members and their British counterparts, the dispatch was stating the arrest of General Zahidi. As the Governor-General of Isfahan, Zahidi was regarded to be implicated to “foil up some interior resurrections of tribes” in the central parts of the country.<sup>692</sup>

It was the first time, the name of Zahidi emerged on a dispatch with an implication of a suspected character, and as in the case of Molla Kashani<sup>693</sup>, another typology of Iranian suspects emerged on the agenda of British Legation. Since the recent riot due to the bread shortages in Tehran<sup>694</sup>, a battalion of British forces was located in the capital, and “the sole reason for such a precaution was counted as the protection of Allied property and military stores”.<sup>695</sup> The concluding remarks of the dispatch was a final blow of British Headquarters to take the attention of State Department officials to “the allegations on the intentional delay of wheat stocks” in order to threaten the Iranian Government: “Nor did Sir Reader Bullard speak to the Shah or the Persian Prime Minister on the lines mentioned, or threatened them in any way with the possibility that supplies already arranged might be withheld. It is hoped that it may be made clear to the United States Minister at Tehran that has been misinformed on these points”.<sup>696</sup>

Some examples of the dispatches were not ordered well in the volumes as the anachronic flow was sometimes evident. Indeed, the main reason for this mixture of dispatches was depending on the arrival date of the telegrams. It may be well

---

<sup>692</sup> Milani, 2008, p. 499. *Ibid*, p. 249. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>693</sup> Milani, 2008, p. 343–350.

<sup>694</sup> Aaron Bobrow-Strain, “Making White Bread By The Bomb’s Early Light: Anxiety, Abundance, and Industrial Food Power In The Early Cold War”, Eds. Benjamin N. Lawrance, Carolyn de la Pena, *Local Foods Meet Global Foodways: Tasting History*, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 87.

<sup>695</sup> *Ibid*, p. 249. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

<sup>696</sup> *Ibid*, p. 249. FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

understood if the situation of the country in Iran arrived in a late date of November, 1942. In that respect, a leap of a two-month period was not surprising albeit it was not constituting a usual example. A detailed dispatch of September 16–18, 1942 was sent from Tehran to London on a bunch of topics ranging from political landscape to economic affairs within the borders of the country, from the military affairs to the social issues. In this regard, Mr. Bullard wrote from Tehran on the speech of Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam on the date of Shah's ascendance to the throne. He went on by the words that Prime Minister, "after some conventionally flattering references to the Shah, took the opportunity to warn Government servants against corrupt practices, promised to give opportunities of service to educated youth, held out the prospect of an extensive program of public works, and stated that the measures he was taking to ensure food supplies removed all causes for anxiety".<sup>697</sup>

During those days, the arrival of USA's President Roosevelt's Counselor Wendel Willkie to Tehran was also held in the dispatch. His statements after his arrival to Tehran was understood as an "uncompromising statement", and the contents were given as he had been greeted by many articles in Iranian press. Additionally, his suggestions were repeated as the Iranian Government would not avoid from acting on a non-Axis line in order to benefit from the lend-lease agreement. This bill which was approved in the Senate of USA was targeting to provide a framework for USA's overseas programs to get involved in the economic aids to the countries on the Allied orientation. In that respect, Iran was one of the main countries where the economic aid of USA was expected to give an end to the distress of the society. Amidst the main social, economic and political problems, Mr. Willkie's suggestion was put clearly by the British dispatch as Persia should "identify herself more openly with the Allied cause".<sup>698</sup> On the visit of Wendel Willkie to Tehran, and his later visit to Moscow, Turkish daily, *Son Telgraf* was sharing the details of an allegedly reciprocal understanding between the two parties.<sup>699</sup> During those days, the riot in

---

<sup>697</sup> *Ibid*, p. 249. FO [E6153/19/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>698</sup> *Ibid*, p. 250. FO [E6153/19/34] dated September 22, 1942.

<sup>699</sup> "Vilki İran Başvekili İle Görüştü", *Son Telgraf*, September 16, 1942, p. 1. "V.Vilki...", *Son Telgraf*, September 17, 1942, p. 1. Willkie's visit to Tehran had been arranged with his visit to Ankara, for that the latter of which was his first destination. Please see "Vendel Vilki Ankara'da", *Turan (Elazığ)*, September 10, 1942, p. 1.

Mosul, Iranian Azerbaijan and Tabriz were constituting one of the major topics on the agenda of the Government. As the Nazi threat in Iraq had been eradicated already, the risk of autonomous administrations that were growing in Iran had fed the official concern in the country.<sup>700</sup>

Other than the political developments, and the social and economic problems, the margins of the new Shah's action towards the limits of Constitutional Monarch were the result of the equilibrium. On both the expropriation of Royal family's mass fortune which was inherited from the old-Monarch, Reza Shah Pahlavi, the way to enlarge the popular base of Royal family was followed. That's why one may mention the words of Homayoun Katouzian on the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi as it was before mentioned: "That's why when Reza Khan took over the realm, he was at first supported by a substantial section of the body politic. Yet, when he fell 20 years later, in 1941, his departure was greeted with unmitigated joy and approval by the vast majority of the people of all social groups, for by then his regime had changed from mere dictatorship under arbitrary government".<sup>701</sup>

#### **2.4.6. Emission Problem and Food Shortages In Iran During WWII**

During the last days of 1942, the food shortage was a serious crisis for the country. Another problem was the emission of Iranian rials into the financial market. The Government's precaution to complete the emission of new Rials to be circulated in Iranian financial market was another step to soothe the Iranian economy. In that respect, during the term of Ahmad Qavam, five hundred million rials were monetised in October, 1942.<sup>702</sup> For the sake of overcoming food shortages, to appease the discontent of the grassroots, any kind of precautions were not bringing a rapid remedy.

Needless to say, the tools of propaganda which, by and large, were depending on the utilization of press, were enforced through these days. On the following day, the real

---

<sup>700</sup> "Musulda, İran Azerbaycanında ve Tebriz Şehrinde İsyan Çıktı", *Son Telgraf*, September 16, 1942, p. 1.

<sup>701</sup> Homayoun Katouzian, "Iran and The Problem of Political Development", in ed. Ali Mohammadi, *Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects*, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 12.

<sup>702</sup> "İran Yeni Para Basıyor", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, October 26, 1942, p. 1.

catalyzers of the events in Tehran were the people who sought employment from the Government, and the hoarders were assumed to stand behind this riot, too. On the other side, a few British troops were directed to Tehran in order to put their British citizens under security. Another factor which accelerated the British troops was the German agent's plot which was alleged to take place by benefiting from the possibility of authority's vanishing in Tehran. In that respect, British troops were in action for the purpose preventing any kind of plots against the Government, and the British existence in Iran. For the food shortages, in particular for the providence of wheat stocks, an agreement was signed by Iranian Government with the Allied commanders in Iran, and it was prospected to supply 20.000 tons of wheat to the country in a short period of time.<sup>703</sup> Since the occupation of the country by a jointly-operation in August 1941, it was almost one and a half year, and even after this period, the question of German agents and their affiliated Iranian suspects were occupying a place on the Allied countries' agenda.

On the 16th of December, 1942, Tehran Radio broadcasted a speech of Prime Minister which included messages to declare that the Government was keeping the internal affairs under control, and the necessity of Government's intervention to solve the wheat problem was appreciated for a long time. This social and economic problem which was not sourced during the term of Qavam was affecting his term more than the term of his predecessor, Ali Soheili.

Regarding the speech of Qavam at Tehran Radio, it was prevalent that the protests which had been led by the youth were undeniably a source of concern for the Government. The speech was resembling a call for solidarity under the conditions of political, economic and social turmoil. The extraordinary characterization of the political sphere was a cunning step by Qavam to make the masses sense the difficulties awaiting in front of the country. There were other details in his speech where he had stated the Government's strict rules were going to be applied on the looters of some local shops in Tehran, and in other parts of the country. The economic loss of the shop owners was going to be compensated by the Government on behalf of the will of Shahanshah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Other than that, in order to avoid the wheat shortage, Qavam was stating the Government had

---

<sup>703</sup> "Tahran İşgal Edildi Mi?", *Tasvir-i Efkâr*, December 12, 1942, p. 1.

already provided 3600 tons of wheat to his country, as yet the level stated by him was not paying sufficiency to the requirements of the country as it was suitably paying before WWII. After dealing with these problems, and declaring the Government was not assuming the attributed failure record, Qavam's words were carrying the threat of the Government due to the recent assaults to his residence and the Majlis building. He, for that sake, accused of the people who had been acting unconsciously and was guaranteeing the responsible people who had caused such a mess would be punished properly.

On his speech, it is possible to assert that it would be understood from two angles as a cross-cutting approach to Iranian political affairs, and regarding with that, to the economic and social affairs may be obtained in a balanced interpretation. First and foremost, Iran was a country under the Allied occupation, and the demands and the policies of these countries made pressure on the Governmental policies. The formation of the policy was not exempt from the Allied powers, and their far-sighted projections did not cross at that conjuncture. For this sake, Qavam's political attitude to soothe the discontented masses was the first step. Even though this was not an achievable goal in short-term, it would have been understood as an effort of the Government. Meanwhile, Qavam's restrictions enlarged by the time the country was on the verge of a new year. After a detailed survey on the early Pahlavi period and the course of trends and social and economic problems of the early post-1941 period, a summary of the chapter is presented below.

#### **2.4.7. Summary**

As a summary of chapter two, one may conclude that during the early Pahlavi period the efforts towards an authoritarian modernization in Iran did create a massive impact although the occupation of the country and the abdication of the Shah resulted in the steps back from the modernization program. This chapter sought to avoid the over politicization of the early Pahlavi period since the trajectory of Iranian political life proved that the fluctuations depended on not only the particularities but also the universal aspect of the modernization program. During the interwar period, what modernization meant in the minds of the Iranian political elite was a type of political program squeezed between the Iranian peculiarities and the Western political and

social formation. The range of the modernization efforts encompassed the attempts in the education, health, law system, industry and economy. The cultural codes could gradually change through the Pahlavi autocracy. The social layers presented the scope of these reflections in several fields as the intellectual circles focused on the favorable sides of the modernization program that aspired to change the landscape of the country. The peasants paid attention to the amelioration of their life standards in the rural side.

The occupation of the country due to the international domain's crisis affected the flow of Iranian history that culminated in the transition to the nationalist interregnum. In that regard, after the abdication of the Shah, the wartime problems flourished in an atmosphere of crisis in the international domain and the political vacuum has shaken the country. Regarding numerous problems, it was contended that the reformation of the political opposition took place at the juncture of the occupation. Coincidentally, the political fragmentation accompanied the political proliferation which could just be compared with the early stages of Reza Khan's rise to power in the first half of the 1920s. Hence, as the second chapter strived to scrutinize on the social and economic problems as well as the landscape of the political life in Iran, the transition from a political system where the political opposition could just activate towards the illegal ways was implemented as a part of the nation-building processes. The transformation that took place after 1941 emerged as a source of fragmentation and flourishing in the political life of Iran. This two-faceted transformation constituted the basis of examination of the nascence of political parties and opposition during the early Pahlavi period and the early period of nationalist interregnum. Considering the early Pahlavi rule, the literature paid attention to the nationalism and Westernization in terms of the authoritarian modernization program. A profound system of changes that took place in Iran from the early 1920s to the early 1940s represented the idealism of the Iranian political elite although there had been some different interpretations. These different interpretations could rise when the country experienced a political transition period. Thus, in order to understand the flow of 20th century Iran, the early Pahlavi rule was a period indicating the quest of the state which basically referred to the dichotomy of state and society in Iranian history. In view of the facts that were examined through the early Pahlavi rule, the main problematic was assessed as the satisfaction level of



the quest flown by the state vis á vis the society. Although it was not necessarily a direct confrontation, such kind of indicators were displayed in the chapter to understand the alienation of the state administration and the Iranian political elite from the society. After all, the early Pahlavi period under Reza Shah Pahlavi did not totally mean the alienation of the masses, but also the social and economic grievances which stemmed from the imposed levies by the centralization of the Iranian state. During that period, as a remarkable achievement, the Trans-Caspian Railroad was already accentuated in many sources that the state assumed its responsibility to consolidate the network all around the country in a much broader scale. In total, against the modernization efforts, several segments of the society claimed their opposition although the state administration could weaken these attempts. What was remarkable about the Reza Shah's rule was that the period could not be restricted to a mere reading of the alienation, and the opposition to the modernization program but also to the historical trajectories in the modern history of Iran. The following third chapter will examine the formation of the 14th Majlis where the political tension escalated, and the new coalitions and the political struggles in Iranian political life through the end of WWII.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE 14TH MAJLIS (1944–1946) AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN

#### 3.1.Introduction

In the beginning of 1943, Iran's political turmoil was set to a stagnation, even though political debates were ongoing. Rumors wandered about anywhere on the necessity of a change in the Government. Shuffles in the Cabinet could not bring successful remedies all the time, and it was expected from the British angle that Qavam's substitution with his predecessor would be appropriate for a transition period. From the late weeks of 1942 up to the early days of 1943, ten out of fifteen members of Qavam's cabinet had already resigned.

On 23rd of January 1943, the news from Reuters Agency had stated the probability of the change in Iranian Cabinet.<sup>704</sup> After the wobbling of the Cabinet, the Parliament's test to measure the confidence level of the Cabinet had resulted in a negative way sooner. Thus, after a voting in Iranian Majlis which resulted in the absence of confidence for Ahmad Qavam's Cabinet, Ali Soheili substituted Ahmad Qavam, and his second term in Office started on February 15, 1943.<sup>705</sup>

On what was continuous in Iran, both of the developments, external and internal led up to the necessity of providing security and in this regard, the development of the freedom and rights remained under the shade of urgent titles on the agenda of the Allied powers. During the second term of Ali Soheili, the political agenda was full of the remnant problems that were not directly inherited from Ahmad Qavam's term. Indeed, the continuity of the social and economic problems

---

<sup>704</sup> "Iran Kabinesi, *Son Posta*, January 23, 1943, p. 3.

<sup>705</sup> Abrahamian, 2008, p. 102.

along with the political counterparts made pressure in the country. Thus, the struggle of the Allied powers with a differentiation capacity which had been emerged in some cases against the German enterprises to penetrate into the political and social mind occupied the main title of the Iranian agenda. On that point, Sadri Ertem, a columnist of Turkish daily *Vakit*, stated the rivalry of these parties could not be understood without looking into the background of the political rivalry between Iran in the last two decades. The transformation of the *Great Game* was on the verge of a new phase, even though Germany's activities seemed to stand on a silent path.<sup>706</sup> It was remarkably witnessed that every year, with an interruption of Nowruz celebrations, the War conditions were sovereign all around the country. In 1943, the Shah of Iran made a statement to the Iranian people by his address during Nowruz celebrations.<sup>707</sup> As a traditional and national celebration, Nowruz was perceived as a tenet of the peacebuilding and the rejuvenating of nature by the blossoms of spring. What Shah of Iran said was dependent on two main titles. First, the Shah stated the responsibility of the Nation was growing from time to time, and in the midst of the War, it was not unprecedented that the War would still come to an abrupt end. The main prospect of the Allied powers was towards to make an intervention to change the destiny of the War. The will for the joint action would eventually help to transform the flow of WWII and it was going to make it possible to confront Germany in Europe. Undoubtedly, the War's fate was not only confined to the conflict and War efforts in Europe. Other than this old continent, the far-eastern developments in WWII made the War efforts to rise to a tougher line. Secondly, the statements of the Shah varied on a differing list of matters including the wheat question, the relationship of Iran with the Allied powers, the decisiveness of Iran to act on behalf of the democratic world, and its progress (*tamaddon*).<sup>708</sup>

---

<sup>706</sup> Sadri Ertem, "İranda Su Altı Cereyanları", *Vakit*, January 20, 1943, p. 3.

<sup>707</sup> "Millî Şef İle İran Şahı Arasında Telgraflar Teati Edildi", *Son Posta*, March 26, 1943, p. 1. "İran Şahı Vatandaşlarına Hitap Etti", *Vakit*, March 23, 1943, p. 1. "Millî Şef İran Şehinşahını Tebrik Ettiler", *Vakit*, March 26, 1943, p. 1.

<sup>708</sup> The term of *tamaddon* was going to evolve into a master target of the Shah during the late 1970s. Prior to the Iranian Revolution which had turned out to be an Islamic Revolution after the referendum that had transformed the country into an Islamic Republic in 1979. Shah's rhetoric mainly depended on the construction of a "*Tamaddon-e Bozorg*" (*Great Civilization*)" in a reference to recall the pre-Islamic past of the country.

During his address to the Nation, the Shah stated the self-sacrifice of the nation was compulsory under the harsh conditions of WWII, and he kept his hopes that the War would soon come to an end.<sup>709</sup>

In the meantime, it is possible to assert that the policy of the Shah depended on the preservation of controlling capacity over the regime and the politics in his country. In the respect of consolidating his monarchy which he inherited from his father in a disadvantageous way, he sought to apply a three-pronged strategy. Abbas Milani assessed that the first part of this three-pronged strategy depended on the donations to some institutions, newspapers and so on. As a part of policies to construct consent towards the Monarchy, the Shah paid attention to the policy of donation. In that respect, another step was correlated to the first one, of which the Shah aimed to utilize from fire against fire. Any kind of critics turned against Shah Reza Pahlavi would be reversed by the help of press organs.

A key example of that vision of the Shah was Amir Ashgar Amirani, who had published the homegrown version of Reader's Digest in Iran, *Khandaniha*<sup>710</sup>, for almost four decades from 1940 to 1979. Abbas Milani asserted that "Ashgar Amirani played a critical role in Iranian journalism –often critical of politicians, always faithful to the Shah".<sup>711</sup> Another example was the publication of daily *Keyhan (Donya)* by the selection of French-trained law professor *Mostafa Mesbahzadeh*.<sup>712</sup> For the position of editor-in-chief, one of the most esteemed journalists of that time, *Abdulrahman Faramarzi* was appointed. In his prosopographic study, Milani presented an insightful narration on the biography of Ali Asqar Amirani, the publisher of *Khandaniha* Magazine. As a boy who had lost his mother in his childhood, Amirani had kept his anger against his step-mother, the sister of his ill-fated mother and he had kept the will in his heart to jump over the torturous life. At a time he had not been able to persuade his father, he had decided to burn all the ships

---

<sup>709</sup> "İran Şahı Vatandaşlarına Hitap Etti", *Vakit*, March 23, 1943, p. 1. For an example celebrating both the 36th anniversary of the Constitution in Iran and national responsibilities of the citizens, please see "İran Şehinşahi Radyoda Bir Hitabede Bulundu", August 6, 1942, *Son Telgraf*, p. 1.

<sup>710</sup> For the full collection of this magazine, please check the website prepared for International Institute of Social History in Netherlands. Call number is given as ZO 56339. <https://socialhistory.org/en/collections/khandaniha-magazine>.

<sup>711</sup> Milani, 2011, p. 98. Please also see Milani, 2008, p. 379–385.

<sup>712</sup> Milani, 2008, p. 399–406.

in his life and had taken his way to Tehran. By the help of an officer's family, he found the chance to complete his secondary education at Dar'ulfunun High School.

By donating some huge amounts of money in order that the publishers who were sought to act on behalf of the Shah, the strategy to keep the balance of the press which was displaying a bewildering range of political spectrum was consolidated. The third pillar of the Shah's strategy was the reconciliation with the clergy.

As a part of the establishment in Iranian political sphere as well as the social and economic spheres, the clergy's role in Iranian politics had grown considerably again. Although this had not been realized by leaps and bounds, the way to reconcile with the clergy was a sharp turn over the strict and merciless strategy of Shah's father. When it is considered that Reza Shah Pahlavi had mercilessly commanded for the penalization of the clergy in Mashad in 1935, his son's political vision represented a sharp turn from the tough policy of the Iranian throne. The position of the Shah, as a Constitutional Monarch in Iranian political system, provided him act according to the limitations which had seemed to bring a differentiation from the reign of his father. In that regard, the concurrent situation in Iranian political life allowed him just to rule within the boundaries of a political sphere which was framed by the Majlis, and the Allied powers. Nonetheless, as Milani wrote, the attempt of the Shah to reconcile with the clergy had not meant a direct and total differentiation than his father. He insistently and sincerely kept the goals of modernization which would not deviate from the authoritarian lines totally.

Helping to develop a state monopoly on the key sectors of the economy, elevating the emancipation level of the women even though the suffrage was not legalized, the rise of education level in all levels of society, the growth of industrialization and the promotion of agriculture in order to facilitate the industrial growth, anti-communism would be a few titles where the hereditary lines converged instead of divergence. As Milani continued they both shared the desire for a large military and maintained the sensitivity on the boosting of Iran's imperial grandeur back in the pre-Islamic ages.<sup>713</sup>

On his reconciliation attempts with the clergy, one may realize the fact that the total number of mosques, the restoration of the clergy over the waqfs and the religious

---

<sup>713</sup> Milani, 2011, p. 99.

schools had increased considerably to a level which could not be neglected by any of the observers. On this matter Milani, by not only standing on the period of WWII, stated that the number of religious schools and the mosques had escalated sharply. Mosques had increased to more than 55.000, and the number of religious schools had also risen from 154 to 214 in 1960.<sup>714</sup> The Shah's strategy to reconcile with the clergy depended on the utilization of a cultural-religious tool in order to boost his power in Monarchy. It also prevailed the struggle against the communists to whom he attributed an enmity.

For degrading the member of the communist movement, in particular, the Tudeh Party (*Hezb-e Tudeh*), Shah's manoeuvres were surprising to a certain extent. As a step to display a concrete level of his sincerity for the clergy, he invited Ayatollah Hussein Qomi and by declaring the invitation of the Shah to his religious circles, Ayatollah Qomi had returned his home country in June 1943. Even though there were concerns shown by the British Legation members, the insistence of the Shah provided him the opportunities.<sup>715</sup> What brought importance on that matter was the belief of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi over the monarchy's vitality for clerics. In the struggle against the communists, the clergy also acted in a conditional dedication<sup>716</sup> to helping the Shah build a new formula during WWII and so forth. Nonetheless, this conditional dedication did not provide a long-term guarantee. Upon the arrival of Ayatollah Qomi, the only critic had come from *Ahmad Kasravi*<sup>717</sup>, an eminent historian in Iran during those years. Ayatollah Qomi had been welcomed by a joyful crowd in his country and during the days of his arrival, amongst this joy, as Milani wrote, a fierce cleric had emerged by the decisiveness of filling a gap in an Islamic movement. It was important, in a sense, that the divided

---

<sup>714</sup> Milani, 2011, p. 100.

<sup>715</sup> Azimi, *ibid*, p. 125.

<sup>716</sup> "Conditional Dedication" would be a suitable term to represent the political equilibrium in Iranian political life. In this regard, by the usage of this term, I attempted to show the two facet of mollahs' political activism. Although Borujerdi, and as the mainstream current of the clergy approved the political quietism, the rejection of clerical involvement in politics, and even he said that "I pray day and night for the Shah for whom I entertain sincere regard", the dedication was conditional in the last sense. However, it was unnecessarily a source of confusion for the involvement in politics. Please also see Menashri, *ibid*, p. 218.

<sup>717</sup> Abbas Milani, 2008, p. 947-953.

clergy establishment between Iran and Iraq represented a crucial part of the twentieth century. At that point, it is helpful to note that the division of the clergy was based on *the usuli and the akhbari* schools. The traditional, and the rationalistic approaches to the marja'e taqlid, as the source, and highest status of religious authority conveyed to the division of the clergy between the seminaries in Iran, and Iraq. Although the religious involvement in politics declined gradually, the level of that political interest was even low. Contrary to the period in the early half of the 1920's, Qomi's return to Iran did not directly mean the religious involvement in politics, but rather an encouragement for the representation in Iran upon the conditional terms. In the 1920's Mirza Na'ini and Isfahani in Iraq, and Sheikh Ha'iri at the highest dignitary position of the re-established Qom seminary were the prominent religious dignitaries aside from Modarres; however the level of the political affiliation was set to a rapid decline.<sup>718</sup> For that purpose, the changing parameters affected the relations between the Pahlavi regime and the clergy. Other than Qomi, Ayatollah Borujerdi's position was a confirmation for the conditional dedication of the clergy of which the *political quietism* was assumed as the primary policy. Borujerdi's personal secretary during the turmoil of WWII was Sayyed Ruhollah Khomeini, who could enjoy the relatively pliant atmosphere that supported the political freedom. In 1944, he wrote a book entitled as *Kashf-al Asrar (the Unlocking of Secrets)* as a rejoinder to *Asrar-e Hezar Saleh (the Secrets of Thousand Years)*, written by Ali Akbar Hakamizada<sup>719</sup>, a fervently anti-clerical supporter of eminent historian Ahmad Kasravi.<sup>720</sup> In the short biography of Khomeini, Hamid Algar stated that an inauguration for the political debut of Khomeini took place during that period. Goldberg stated that Khomeini's book was not only a rejoinder but also a harsh critique of the secularization policies that were conducted during the reign of Reza Shah. As a different portrait both during WWII and in the wake of it, Ayatollah Kashani played a prominent role in both *the Mojahadeen-e Islam* and to a less degree than that, on *the Devotees of Islam*.

---

<sup>718</sup> Davari, *ibid*, p. 9–10. Please also see Ori Goldberg's monography on the Shi'i theology in Iran. Goldberg, *ibid*, p. 93.

<sup>719</sup> Hamid Algar, "Imam Khomeini: A Short Biography", In *the Imam Khomeini: Life, Thought and Legacy*, ed. Abdorrahman Koya, Kuala Lumpur, Crescent International, 2009, p.19-60.

<sup>720</sup> Goldberg, *ibid*, p. 95.

Since the Constitutional period, Kashani's political role was a type of sacred duty against the British imperialism. His father had been killed by the British soldiers in the wake of WWI. He was put into the prison after the invasion and the occupation of the country in the run-up of WWII. He was attributed pro-German sentiments however after his release from the prison, his popularity amongst the religious circles started to rise.<sup>721</sup> Stephen Kinzer described him as “flamboyant and ambitious” and that he had never been perceived as a great religious authority; however, made his popularity by anti-imperialist attitudes.<sup>722</sup> Nonetheless, it is imperative to note, Kashani's role, as a denominator for the clergy's changing patterns of politics, continued after WWII. As Manochehr Dorraj asserted, with the exception of the political activism of Sayyed Hassan Modarres in the 1920s, there was no political activism of the clergy until Kashani's re-emergence in the wake of WWII. In 1948, he began to collaborate with the clandestine organization of *the Devotees of Islam*.<sup>723</sup> In the biography of Ali Khamenei (later as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran), John Murphy stated that in the beginning of 1950's, Navvab Safavi (Sayyed Mujtaba Mir-Lauhi)<sup>724</sup> visited the Sulaiman Khan Seminary in Mashhad, and gave a fierce sermon against the secular policies of Mohammad Reza Shah and the ongoing British influence in Iran. Murphy wrote that “as a revolutionary critic”, his sermons on the Shah, and his cohorts as assessing them the “pack of liars”, and “not true Muslims” were described by Khamenei as “music to his ears”. Khamenei's assessment on the genesis of revolutionary Islamic revivalism depended upon the role of Navvab Safavi that the consciousness of Islamic revivalist thought in his mind has sparked by Navvab Safavi's revolutionary sermon.<sup>725</sup> Although Kashani was not directly influential on the Safavi's leadership, he was one of the pioneers squeezed within the Pahlavi-orientation of the political quietism and the Islamic revivalism. Safavi was another figure in these efforts. After the end of

---

<sup>721</sup> Bayandor, *ibid*, p. 20–22.

<sup>722</sup> Kinzer, 2003, p. 75.

<sup>723</sup> Manochehr Dorraj, *from Zarahustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran*, London, Lynce Rienner Publishers, 1990, p. 109–110.

<sup>724</sup> Azimi, 2008, p. 128.

<sup>725</sup> Murphy, *ibid*, p. 65 –66. Please also see Karim Sadjadpour, *Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, p. 5.



WWII, the cleric who named himself as *Navvab Safavi*<sup>726</sup> had sooner founded a radical Islamist movement which had assassinated some prominent personalities in Iranian life led by Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946). This assassination was a key event in terms of understanding the political network which could be extended to Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani who had been admitted as one of the spiritual guides of Fedaiyan–e-Islam (*Devotees of Islam*).<sup>727</sup> In that regard, the assassination had just stood along the ambivalence of political intrigues behind of which the ulama represented an accumulation of power in the political sphere. As an Iranian who was born in Tabriz, Kasravi had become a popular figure by his writings. Apart from his career as a historian, he was known to be a reformist interpreter of Islam.

In 1946, when he was put to a trial in an open court in Tehran due to the accusations of his “slander of Islam”, he and his assistant had been mutilated, and brutally killed by Safavi and two of his followers, members of a terrorist organization called *Fedaiyan-e Islam (literally the Devotees of Islam)*. As a notable historian, linguist and reformist of Shiism, and a judge between 1921–1933 at the Ministry of Justice in Iran<sup>728</sup> Kasravi’s critics against the rise of Islamic elements and the Fedaiyan–e-Islam sooner ended with his assassination.

This assassination was a critical turning point on the nature of political murders. Surprisingly, the Shah would hear the name of this terrorist organization for the first time after Kasravi and his assistant was killed. As Milani wrote, “there was no intelligence organization at that time”. Even though some units in the Armed Forces and the Police Organization assumed the role of intelligence during WWII, their main target for intelligence was against the communist threat.<sup>729</sup>

---

<sup>726</sup> Milani, 2011, p. 101.

<sup>727</sup> Ghoncheh Tazmini, *Revolution and Reform In Russia and Iran, Modernisation and Politics in Revolutionary States*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012, p. 87. Akhavi, in Tachau, *ibid*, p.135.

<sup>728</sup> <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kasravi-ahmad>.  
[http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/akasravi/ahmad\\_kasravi.php](http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/akasravi/ahmad_kasravi.php).

<sup>729</sup> Milani, 2011, p. 101. For the Tudeh Party, please also read Bayandor, *ibid*, p. 13–14. The Shahr bani was an exception to that assessment which functioned as the main service of police intelligence during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. On a brief explanation of Reza Shah’s cultural policy vis à vis the restrictions of the widespread police network please also see Devos, Werner, *ibid*, p. 6.

The story of SAVAK was written all along the Iranian literature of political history after Iranian Revolution of 1979. The notorious intelligence organization of Iran was mostly known likewise of its mutuality, by an abbreviation of SAVAK. One may question the absence of an intelligence organization during the period of WWII in Iran. A key response to such a question would be the period of maturation of which Shah strived to consolidate his rule. Indeed, it is possible to assert that it was probably an outcome of the years in interregnum and the political turmoil and crisis between 1951–1953 along with the rising authoritarian desires of the Shah.<sup>730</sup> Hence, the strategy of Shah against any sort of political opponents which would act against his establishment was depending on three-pillars. By these, he had sought the support of the clergy unlike of his father, a donation system's circulation in order to boost his power, propaganda and the utilization of military power against any kind of opponents. Besides, the Police forces were also directed to act on behalf of the Shah in terms of the riot in major cities of the country. As it is stated by the proliferation of newspapers along with the period of political freedom “that subsequently produced organized political parties”<sup>731</sup> the political historiography mostly dealt with the fact that the objective conditions in the country were the precursors of Shah's strategy. However, it was of no surprise that Shah made efforts to turn the medallion's facet of luck to his own Monarchy albeit the disadvantageous conditions were persistent against his position in the Iranian political system.

To assess the first half of 1943, one may depend on an overall assessment of which the change of Cabinet, the Shah, and the Allied approached to an obliged *modus vivendi*. Indeed, as Milani had stated, Ahmad Qavam had been favoured by the Shah and the struggle between these sides of the Iranian politics had not ended in a harsh breakup as yet the victory of the Shah had brought a new term. Probably, when it is considered the favorable ties of Ali Soheili with the Allied powers, a new, yet old figure for the place of Ahmad Qavam was supported by both sides. At the end of these critical months from the last days of 1942 to the early days of 1943, the gradual inclination of the discontent accompanied the Shah's desires for the new future of his

---

<sup>730</sup> Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Kashvar (SAVAK).

<sup>731</sup> Farid Mahdavi, “Revolution-Iran”, eds. William H. McNeill et al. , *Berkshire Encyclopedia of World History*, v. 4, Great Barrington: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2005, p. 1608.

country. In that respect, the name of Ali Soheili had been put forward for the urgent consensus. In the beginning of 1943, Iran's political agenda was vitally full of employment of American advisers and experts.<sup>732</sup> As mentioned before, Arthur C. Millspaugh's mission was starting for the second time.

A new era started with the employment of American expertise. The employment issue was set on a prolonged agenda for a few months. The call for American expertise was not only confined to the adjustment of financial affairs in the country. Also, the call for the ex-Chief of Police Department of New Jersey, Schwarzkopf for the internal security of the country was another step. From that time, American intelligence along with the security affairs started to deal with the Iranian affairs in a more professional way. A few months prior to the early days of 1943, it was also declared that the security affairs of gendarmerie were assigned to the leadership of American experts.<sup>733</sup> Other than that, the assessment of American expertise would be analyzed by the rising influence of American penetration into Iran. As George Lenczowski stated in his *American Presidents and The Middle East*, the launching effect of the American presence in Iran jumped beyond the experienced missions of American protestant missions. Thus, the abrupt change of relations between the two countries accelerated the American interests in this country. "Beginning with 1942, thirty thousand American troops arrived in Iran to help transfer lend-lease war equipment and supplies to the Soviet Union".<sup>734</sup>

The insistence of the Shah on removing Ahmad Qavam was not totally a success even though he had assumed himself to win over a struggle to gain more cards. All along the term of Soheili, it was possible to assert that the Shah was trying to consolidate his authority over the Iranian army. As a reunited and readjusted defense unit, the Army was transforming by the modernization via the support of the Allied powers, in especially by the support of the USA. Needless to say, the Shah was insistent on preserving the assignment authority of the army's high-commandership and he was strictly interfering with any kind of military affairs.

---

<sup>732</sup> "İran Maliyesini Amerikalılar Düzeltecek", *Karagöz*, January 10, 1943, p. 1.

<sup>733</sup> "İran'da Emniyet İşlerini Bir Amerikalı Islah Edecek", *Son Telgraf*, October 5, 1942, p. 1.

<sup>734</sup> George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and The Middle East*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1990, p. 7-8.

Through the end of August 1942, the commandership of Iraqi and Iranian armies was combined under the commandership of British General Wavell, the ex-commander of Indian Colonial armies. Under the circumstances when the Shah was trying to consolidate his power, the assignment of Ali Soheili as the new Prime Minister of the country was a step to satisfy the Allied Powers. In particular, British understanding was towards the relocation of a political leadership to balance the relationship between Britain and Iran to a more satisfying level. The persistent problems had the level of tension stay at a consistent edge, as yet the British control over the country was transformed by the admission of American forces and secret intelligence into the field.

### **3.2. The Formation of The 14th Majlis**

The fourteenth Majlis was officially convened on February 26, 1944.<sup>735</sup> From June 1943 to April 1944, the elections were held for the 14th Majlis in Iran. It was quite interesting that the elections had undergone a slow flowing phase due to the difficulties of War conditions and the Soviet Union's interferences to avoid the tackling of Tudeh Party's nominees. What made the Shah feel the elation of the relatively growing democratic patterns of the Iranian political system was the change of the political equilibrium. Meanwhile, the change of the political equilibrium did not bring a satisfaction to the Shah's administration at the end. The multi-faceted composition of the political system was undoubtedly a fault-line which caused a point of disturbance on behalf of the Shah and his administration. The rising influence of the agents in a political spectrum had become a part of the political establishment, then. On the elections, a correspondent of *Son Telgraf* newspaper wrote the details of the political system and the voting base of the country. According to the Constitution, the voting base permitted only the male and adult members in society for the right of being elected. The elections, since the days of *Operation Countenance*, was a milestone in the politics of Iran. While dealing with these elections, Tehran correspondent of Turkish daily *Son Telgraf* stated that only male members who had been between the ages 35–65 were eligible to be elected in

---

<sup>735</sup> Touraj Atabaki, *Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000, p. 76.

the elections and the age gap was defined as given above for being a deputy in the Iranian Majlis. The elections were to be held in every two years. The criteria for the elections was only defined for the males of Shi'ite belief.

According to that, the women were not permitted to be elected in the Iranian Parliament.<sup>736</sup> When it is considered that the women were not found eligible to be elected by the elections until the early 1960s and they had not been let to vote in the elections, the semi-developed patterns of the democratic system in the country would easily be seen. Depending upon a reform program of the Shah to change the Iranian political and economic establishment by the White Revolution<sup>737</sup> in the early 1960s, Iran went under a critical transformation. Indeed, when it is considered with Turkey's step towards an authoritarian modernization program to emancipate the women in the political system, Iran's development in this field would seem rather postponed.

According to the Constitution, civil servants were not also permitted to be elected in the elections. Amongst the political parties, Yahsi counted on the widespread support of *Tudeh Party (Hezb-e Tudeh)* and the *Justice Party (Hezb-e Adalat)*. As mentioned above, as a political party led by a journalist Ali Dashti, the Justice Party<sup>738</sup> was one of the main components of the political spectrum, apart from the National Will Party, which was founded to hold a special space in the political field on a basis to act towards the British will. Yahsi described the Justice Party as the party of intellectual workers and the democrats. Indeed, the distinction which was a part of the Iranian political establishment since the years of Constitutional Revolution was recalled again. The transformation of the dowreh-system which referred to the loose coalitions of personality-based political factions, was moving in a weaker context. Yahsi's notes ended with the nominees who had been running for the elections. Almost 4000 candidates were nominated, and only 320 of them were elected by the

---

<sup>736</sup> "İranda Seçim", February 1944, *Son Telgraf*, p. 3.

<sup>737</sup> Ghoncheh Tazmini, *Revolution and Reform In Russia and Iran, Modernisation and Politics in Revolutionary States*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012, p. 111–112.

<sup>738</sup> Ali Dashti, please see Michael C. Hillman, "Ali Dashti", *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, *ibid*, p. 678.

elections to form the 14th Majlis.<sup>739</sup> Probably, the most prominent member of the new parliament was Mosaddiq, who had been known as a pro-Constitution politician. Sheikh Molla Hossein Langari was another political personality to be elected and to hold political prominence. Indeed, this was another indicator of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's transformative policy to leverage the status of the clerics. As a remarkable point which was stated in *Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited*, the "lumpen status" of the clergy during the father of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was transformed by a lucrative intervention of the new Shah.<sup>740</sup> In addition to these names, one of the ex-conservative political figures, Firuzabadi, the owner of *Etteleat* journal, Abbas Masudi<sup>741</sup>, the publisher of *Ikdam* journal, Mirza Abbas were amongst the people who had been elected. As Hossein Beshiriyeh stated, the 14th Majlis was a distinctive Majlis in terms of its composition. The majority of the land magnates was a remarkable indicator to prove the continuity of the influential power bloc of the landowners: "The 14th Majlis was the parliament which had convened after the fall of Reza Shah in 1944. Referring to the base of block of the deputies, 59 percent were land magnates, 11 percent from the bazaar, 27 percent from the upper bureaucracy, 2 percent from the ulama and 1 per cent from the lower classes".<sup>742</sup>

As mentioned before, Ali Soheili was elected as the new Primer Minister. On February 20, 1943, he stated the basic principles of his new Government as a declaration for a hopeful consensus with the Allies. Indeed, the main prerequisite of his Premiership was undoubtedly his dealing capacity with the discontented Allies. His statement which had focused on the implicit consensus of the Iranian administration with all members of the Allied powers, the USSR, the USA and Britain was a guarantee.

Ali Soheili's term had lasted for more than a year. Undoubtedly, it was a consolidation of the policy to cling the Iranian anchor into the strategic circles of the

---

<sup>739</sup> "İranda Seçim", February 1944, *Son Telgraf*, p. 3.

<sup>740</sup> Bayandor, *ibid*, p. 11.

<sup>741</sup> For a brief biography of Abbas Masudi, the editor of Etteleat journal who published this daily newspaper for more than four decades, please see Milani, 2008, p 394–398.

<sup>742</sup> Hossein Beshiriyeh, *State and Revolution In Iran*, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 16.

Allied powers. Among the main developments of this period, Tehran Conference which was held through the end of 1943 was a remarkable turning point.

Turkey's position as a neutral country was reflecting an insistence. After years of insistence when Turkey had balked for not attending this War which would endanger its territorial integrity, Turkey's insistence was going to be questioned once again at the Tehran Conference. As a matter of fact, these two countries which had been sharing a long border for centuries were at the edge of being enforced through the War by the Allied powers. Tehran Conference meetings were going to call this matter back to the main agenda of WWII.

The flow of WWII brought a disastrous milestone for both parties. A bloody War struggle continued in the far eastern parts of the World. Aside from that, the Allied powers sought the chance to weaken Italy and the trials to influence the destiny of Italy which had been under the fascist rule of Benito Mussolini were enforced. Just a few weeks prior to the setting up a new cabinet by Soheili, Sir Reader Bullard sent a telegram to Mr. Eden in London, stated that British opinion was in the midst. Instead of making the new elections, the alternative solution was sought by the strengthening of Qavam us-Saltana first. Yet, this solution was mostly opposed by the Shah himself, who had sought to restrict the powers of Qavam. As a charismatic personality, Qavam's features were mostly confined due to the distrust which the Shah had fed to him. After the weeks of Shah's distrust had aroused, the final statement wired on the political affairs of Iran was a remark to display Shah's way of political opposition against him. In that telegram which was dated to December 18 1942, Sir Reader Bullard noted the statement for the attention of British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden:

Some attempt was made in political circles in the capital to arouse fears that the British intend to establish Qavam es-Saltaneh as a dictator, and this has to some extent been successful in arousing strong feelings against him. Even the Shah appears to have been alarmed, and he is showing an increasing tendency to look for support and protection in the army rather than in the Government and the Majlis.<sup>743</sup>

For the economic affairs of the country, one of the last remarks on Iran was assessed in the following parts of the same dispatch. On the financial and economic affairs, one may not omit the factuality that the bread crisis in the country has made a deep

---

<sup>743</sup> *Ibid*, p. 272. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

wave of discontent. Since the years of WWI, it was one of the disastrous titles of the agenda. A widespread famine from the times of WWI was well remembered and it was a source of bad memories pertaining to the foreign interventions in the country. Not only related to this, but also related to some internal factors, the discontent of the grassroots against the foreign intervention in Iran was a consequence of the economic sufferings. As the main triggering factor, the country's fate was going to be described by the rising bread crisis. Although it was not an intervention to be labeled on-time, British aid had brought a relief of the tightened economic situation. Through the end of the year, an import of 25,000 tons of wheat was declared to the public by the Government, and the attempt to reflect a hopeful atmosphere was repeatedly put forward.<sup>744</sup>

In the following part of the dispatch, an index of wholesale prices was shared by the British report from Tehran to London. On the economic affairs of the country, critical point that had come to a sharp edge was the unprecedented rise in the prices. The inflationary pressure was making the economic administration harder than ever. Regarding with that, the prices of 1936 was fixed as 100. As a starting point, the price index has risen to 283 in March 1942, and within a few months up until July 1942, the prices had already risen to the level of 319. As it was excerpted by Nikki Keddie from Richard Nelson Frye's *Iran* this price level was considered according to prices of 1939. Hence, as it was considered 100 in 1939, the price level had risen to up to 269 in 1942, 659 in 1943 and 757 in 1944.<sup>745</sup> When it was examined closely, the four-month period was referring to the period when Ali Soheili had seated in the Premier's office for the first time. Now then, at his second time, the equilibrium of the economy was going to constitute one of the main topics of the national agenda again.

As Nikki Keddie stated, the price level was not the same all around the country. Additionally, the economic problems were persistent. On the other hand, as stated by Keddie, "the large sums were spent by the Allied powers" which eventually had helped to raise the inflation in the country.<sup>746</sup> Along the war years, the problem of

---

<sup>744</sup> *Ibid*, p. 272. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>745</sup> Richard Nelson Frye, *Iran*, 1953, revised ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1968, p. 113–114. cited in Keddie, 2006, p. 108.

<sup>746</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 108.



inflation had gradually become a feature of the economy. In this regard, the layers in the society who had suffered from the rising prices were those with fixed incomes and people on the streets. Undoubtedly, the economic disadvantages were confirmed on behalf of some layers of the society in Iran. Amongst these, middle and upper classes were dealing with the goods or credits.

On the other side, the working class was enjoying a stimulation more than it had been anticipated. Both the employment opportunities for the sake of working class in oil fields, refineries, railroads and constructions and rising political activism had beset the agenda of the working class. As Keddie had stated, the government expenses had fallen from the level of % 30–40 to % 7 percent within a four year period from 1942 to 1945–1946. Indeed, the revenue from income taxes had risen a little after Millspaugh mission which had lasted for only three years between 1942–1945. The economic panorama could not present a hopeful picture in general terms. However, Keddie added that the efforts to improve the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) factories had existed.<sup>747</sup>

To continue the account of economic affairs, British reports from Tehran to London consisted several details of the economic disruption. Needless to say, the economic disruption along with the social problems was a triggering factor to mobilize the wider masses and the political establishment had found a chance to establish several political parties. In the following part of the dispatch, the cost of living index was a permanent indicator to reflect the expansiveness in Iran. Being adjusted according to 1936 as 100, the results according to September 1941 was around 242,6. In March 1942, the cost of living index had risen to 314. After a few months, it was measured as 368 in July 1942. Later on, in October 1942, the cost of living index was around 418.<sup>748</sup> On a number of Iranian bank notes which in circulation, the number was given as 1.746.000.000 in March 1942. This amount had increased from the former level up to the level of 3.000.000.000 in November 1942.<sup>749</sup> As it had become distinct by the dates, the change in economic affairs was witnessed from the term of

---

<sup>747</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 109.

<sup>748</sup> *Ibid*, p. 273. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>749</sup> *Ibid*, p. 273. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

Ali Soheili to Ahmad Qavam. In a context of distrust led by Iranian public opinion, the report stated the adjustment on the currency of Iran and the related law had prepared the gradual drop of gold against the Iranian currency. Rial, as the currency of Iran, was put to a restore in a relative way.<sup>750</sup>

As it was assessed in the latter part of the dispatch, the report dealt with the Iranian Military Affairs. What was the current status of Iranian forces, then? The response was given according to the questioning that how the Iranian Armed Forces would be designed in the following period. It was already concluded that the assignment of American advisers to help build the Armed Forces on a more functional path was repeated. In that regard, the head of American mission was going to assume a post for the assistance to the Minister for War.

Aside from that, it was a key point that the orders regarding administration and organization would be issued by the order which would be delivered from the Head of the American mission. Therefore, the administration and organization's functionality was connected to the mission which was going to come from the United States. The dispatch's focal point was the corruption in the Armed Forces of the country. Hence, the attitude of the Shah towards the final decision to guarantee the authority of American mission supported the main concerns of the general staff in Iran. The final remarks on Persian forces proved that Shah was fell in a confusion to either let the American mission go over the corruption in the army or set an obstacle for those allegations.<sup>751</sup>

In the final remarks on the Iranian army's status, the appointments to the Military were reported by the dispatch: "Army's appointment was including the appointment of Sarhang Muhammad Taqi Alp, formerly Chief of Staff Sipahbod Shahbakhte, to be Commander of the 9th (Ardebil) Brigade, vice commander Sarhang Jahanpulad. For the forces of Gendarmerie, Sarhang Muhammad Ghaffari to command No. 1 (Tehran, Gendarmerie) District. Sarhang Javad Mir Fendereski to command No. 7 (Western) Gendarmerie District. Sarhang Bakir Nikandesh to command no. 3 (Khorassan) Gendarmerie District".<sup>752</sup>

---

<sup>750</sup> *Ibid*, p. 273. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>751</sup> *Ibid*, p. 273. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>752</sup> *Ibid*, p. 273. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

As it was mentioned before, there were numerous political organizations during the turmoil of WWII. Suspects on Germany still continued in 1943 although the struggle against the German espionage has come to a considerable level. As Keddie stated, General Fazlollah Zahidi's position was suspicious in terms of the Allies and should the German troops reach Iranian frontiers, a German-led upsurge would endanger the territorial integrity of Iran.<sup>753</sup> Aside from Zahidi's suspicious position, it is possible to assert that German agent whose name was recalled from the memoirs of a Soviet representative at Tehran Conference, Franz Mayer acted in resemblance to former German agent Wassmuss. Zahidi was amongst the leading personalities of a political party, then. This political party was mentioned before by the name of Melliyun-e Iran (Iranian Nationalists)<sup>754</sup> and a prominent member, Zahidi was arrested in 1944 by the pressure of British forces.

Moreover, Mayer's role differed from Wassmuss in terms of the objective conditions of WWII. Although it was not totally different, the prospect of Germany against the Soviet Union and Britain was at a sharper edge than the conditions during WWI. Mayer was influential amongst the *Qashqai* tribes and the Turkic origins of these tribes made the dilemma more complicated than ever. As Yapp stated "nomadism and semi-nomadism" was said to have doubled during those years.<sup>755</sup> Indeed, what German agents expected during the turmoil of WWII was the breaking up of ties between the Soviet and British influential zone. This could be interpreted as the tearing down of the conduit which was enforced by the Allied powers once again.

Aside from Franz Mayer, another figure of German intelligence was *Roman Gamotta*<sup>756</sup> whose work mostly gathered around the sabotage activities in the Bakû oil fields. It is a detailed survey of Herbert Wilhelm Kurt Eilitz that his comradeship with Roman Gamotta was an example of ties which German agents that had been set up during the turmoil of WWII.<sup>757</sup> To turn back to dispatches from Tehran to London, we may find some other clues about the recent situation of the country. How

---

<sup>753</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 109.

<sup>754</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 164. Please also see Berojkov, *ibid*, p. 21.

<sup>755</sup> Yapp, 1996, p. 180.

<sup>756</sup> Fisher, *ibid*, p. 488.

<sup>757</sup> CIA, EGMW-12363, dated to October 9, 1962, p. 1-3.

were the state affairs ongoing? The Shah's rule was pressurized from the Allied representative institutions. Iranian Majlis was the center of the quest for the growth of political opposition. Amongst these critical questions, Shah's strategy to soothe the clergy to hold a line which would appease and strengthen the role of the army over the politics were quite easily observed. The dispatch dated to December 18, 1942, focused on the internal affairs of Iran. Aside from that, as discussed before, Soviet affairs were put under scrutiny once again. Indeed, the policies of the Soviet Union constituted the crucial part of British agenda on the fate of Iran. Other titles were given as Fighting French Affairs and Turkish Affairs.

On the topic of internal security, the dispatch has informed the officials in London about the return of General Agevli, the head of Iranian Gendarmerie. Since the employment of American officials, a change in the chain of command realized. General Agevli, was reported to come back to Iranian capital from Western Azerbaijan. His mission was reported as the preventing of smuggling of wheat into Turkey and Iraq.

The dispatch also showed that the Soviet authorities were also anxious about this traffic of foodstuff. Indeed, this was a leakage from Iranian borders where the Iranian authorities were disturbed about the loss of wheat. General Agevli's view on the issue was reflected as the urgency of locating a strong army unit there to fight against the smuggling and the reason for Kurdish autonomous activities was repeated. Kurdish tribal activism with armed units made the Iranian authorities to fall in a gap. Therefore, General Agevli's view to strengthen the Iranian Army in western Azerbaijan emerged as a measure to help Iran build a strong defense line against any kind of threats. Amongst these threats, undoubtedly, the ethnic threat was leading. All along this process, the success of Gendarmerie was not found sufficient due to the small units. On that occasion, the view of General-Consul of Britain in Tabriz was reported as "the Iranian Army would unlikely venture on the serious operations that would be necessary for the disarmament of the Kurds".<sup>758</sup>

---

<sup>758</sup> *Ibid*, p. 273. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

By that dispatch, on the internal security in Kermanshah, a military operation for the disarmament of Khalkani tribe in Kasr-i Shirin-Karind<sup>759</sup> was planned. In Lurestan region, against the rising signs of discontent among the Luri tribes, there were Indian troops which were mobilized in order to supply tranquility in the region.<sup>760</sup> In Khuzestan, where the Arab tribes were active and the lawlessness of Arab communities caused a discontent, meetings have recently taken place between Iranian officials and Arab tribal chiefs. On the possibility of deepening discontent in this region, the dispatch stated that General Shahbakhte was reported to make a visit to the region in the near future. He was assessed to display a confident attitude to change the peace conditions in the region.<sup>761</sup> In Fars region, several tribes which had been led by Qashqais were in an endeavour to change the perception that they were pro-British instead of being pro-Axis. However, the change of the perception would not come true in a very short period of time. The dispatch stated that “Nasir Qashqai’s brother, Khosrow has been into Shiraz and he has professed friendly sentiments to the Governor-General and towards the British to his Majesty’s Consul. He was reported to go back to his brother, Nasir Qashqai<sup>762</sup> to advise him and come back to make peace”.<sup>763</sup> The atmosphere to come into the open way to deal with the Government was an overt proof of the changing conditions.

These statements which were reported from Tehran to London had envisaged the change of perception from two sides. For the former, the British circles were planning to change the pro-Axis stance of some tribes. Qashqa’is were amongst the leading tribes to support the pro-German cause. On the other side, the latter, Qashqa’is, and the other tribes were projecting to change their political situation on behalf of British circles. This was comprehensible when the flow of WWII was

---

<sup>759</sup> As an officer in the Ottoman army, Abidin Ege’s war diaries present the readers a well-detailed picture Ottoman war efforts in Iran during the course of WWI. In his memoirs, where he assessed the insecurity of the region which was mostly inhabited by the Kurdish population, please see Abidin Ege, *Çanakkale, Irak ve İran Cephelelerinden Harp Günlükleri*, prepared by Celali Yılmaz, İstanbul, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011, p. 454.

<sup>760</sup> *Ibid*, p. 274. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>761</sup> *Ibid*, p. 274. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>762</sup> For an insightful biography of two Qashqai brothers, please also see Milani, 2008, p. 261–266.

<sup>763</sup> *Ibid*, p. 274. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

understood. The deadlock was about to loosen in a few months contrary to the projections of German War propaganda.<sup>764</sup>

Amidst the gap of political authority, where the British troops were attempting to consolidate the internal security in the vast lands of Iran, some robberies were also witnessed. The securitization of the roads and the railroads constituted one of the major issues. Hence, throughout the end of 1942, the security along with the socio-economic problems which had risen during the terms of Ali Soheili and Ahmad Qavam was a major title in Iranian administrative agenda. “On the Russian affairs, the new appointment to Russian Legation in Tehran was reported by the dispatch. Mr. Maximoff, until recently Soviet Consul-General in Khorassan, has been appointed counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran in place of M. Ivanov, who has returned to Persia”.<sup>765</sup>

On another problem, the smuggling of Iran’s oil sources via Soviet-controlled lands in northwestern parts of Iran and by way of Afghanistan, the dispatch had stated that Soviet commander in Mashad had taken strict commands to mobilize its troops to prevent such actions of smuggling.<sup>766</sup> Controlling everything was an utopic goal which was fed by British circles. In coordination with French authorities, which was divided into two by first, under Field Marshall Petain’s France and French National Resistance Movement of General De Gaulle in Britain, a mission of French Air Force personnel had been stated to move forward to Soviet lands. They were reportedly going to fight against German forces. This crew consisted of eighteen officers and forty other soldiers.<sup>767</sup>

The last of the assessments to clarify the internal situation in Iran in 1942 was the dispatch which was received on December 29, 1942. Sir Reader Bullard has telegraphed the report of Tehran Legation’s Military Attaché, the details about the bread riot which had taken place in Tehran, in front of the Majlis building. During this riot, the residence of Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, some shops, and restaurants in Tehran were destroyed. It was reported that “order was not restored until the

---

<sup>764</sup> *Ibid*, p. 274. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>765</sup> *Ibid*, p. 274. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>766</sup> *Ibid*, p. 274. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

<sup>767</sup> *Ibid*, p. 274. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

police and military had opened fire on the mobs. “The number of casualties” was not stated yet.<sup>768</sup> Tehran bread riot could be assessed as one of the most blazing social explosions during WWII in Iran. For this purpose, the following sub–title would try to assess the causes and impacts of the tumultuous days of Tehran where the angry mobs ripped out against the government's policies.

### **3.3. Tehran Bread Riot ( December 8–9, 1942)**

Throughout WWI, Iran has been dragged down to a deep shortage of wheat. Then, the country was struck by the weight of a widespread famine and the epidemic diseases. As an example, Majd’s monograph dealt with the deep grievances, and the starvation of the Iranian people during the period between 1917–1919. Majd put forth that the record of eight to ten million out of an approximately twenty million population suffered from the famine and epidemic diseases and was put to the destiny of death.<sup>769</sup> As a little–known calamity of WWI, the disastrous effects of the grain shortages owing to the hoarding, speculation and allegedly–disruptive British policies, this episode of Iranian history proved the fact that the turmoil in the flow of international relations and conflicts made Iran suffer to a larger degree. In addition to these, Majd also stated that Iran, after having experienced occupation and famine in WWI, encountered the same fate of disastrous events. During WWII, due to the famine and diseases, almost four million lost their lives. “Iran’s population in 1944 (12 million) was the same as 1900, and an indication that nearly half a century of population growth, had been wiped out due to war and famine, a catastrophe of Malthusian proportions”.<sup>770</sup>

Persia, as the second largest country in the Middle East<sup>771</sup>, stood for the perpetuated food shortages during WWII. Although the exultance of the masses which unleashed after the abdication of the Shah referred to a great extent of

---

<sup>768</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>769</sup> “Introduction”, Mohammad Gholi Majd, *The Great Famine and Genocide In Persia, 1917–1919*, Lanham: University Press of America, 2003.

<sup>770</sup> Mohammad Gholi Majd, *Iran Under Allied Occupation in World War II; The Bridge of Victory& A Land of Famine*, Lanham, University Press of America, 2016, p. 1.

<sup>771</sup> E.M.Lloyd, *Food and Inflation In The Middle East: 1940–1945*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, yy, p.45.

disregard and discontent<sup>772</sup>, the relative deterioration of the foodstuff index proved that the country lost its economic stability. Despite the fact that the nationalist variances of an ideological toolkit found an extensive ground in the course of events, the discontent was combined with the country's dislike of foreign interference. Iran's massive oil resources which were estimated to constitute the 13 percent of world oil reserves<sup>773</sup> provided the way that the nationalist aspects of domestic politics should gain more grounds to deal with the campaigns against any kind of concessions. In that regard, as a feature of the nationalist excitement, the perception on the exploitation of the country's wealth stood as a leitmotiv behind the riots. There was already a martial law regulation in Iran which gave the military governor in Tehran the right to close any newspapers. In the wake of the riots, the martial law made Qavam's government to increase the level of censorship.<sup>774</sup> Although the severity of the famine of WWI's turmoil did not occur during the Tehran bread riots through the end of 1942, the riots proved the fact that the strategy of allies on Iranian domestic affairs failed along with the government's precautions attempts. As Kamran Matin stated through the devastating efforts of Britain, the Soviets and the USA in Iran, the economy stumbled due to the monetary policy to evaluate the Iranian rial, an extensive emission and the credit pressure on Iranian governments. The price of goods increased tenfold and in 1944, the food shortages and even famine.<sup>775</sup>

About the bread riot in Tehran in December 1942, it is quite clear that the various causes which Stephen L. Macfarland asserted were structural.<sup>776</sup> The causes which were counted by Macfarland clarified the position of Iran suffering from social, cultural, economic and political difficulties. These were counted as “the food

---

<sup>772</sup> Ali Gheissari referred to two anecdotes of which the extent of disregard and dislike against the arbitrary rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi could be understood by applying the memoirs of General Hassan Arfa. For these anecdotes, which stated the exultance of a driver while the General's wife was being driven downtown Tehran, and the fear of a bandit when it was told by an extorted-traveller that Reza Shah had returned, one may realize the iron-fist of a formidable monarch whose absence by the political and social chaos was at the onset. Please see Ali Gheissari, *Iranian Intellectuals In The Twentieth Century*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1998, p. 61.

<sup>774</sup> A. Reza Arasteh, *Man and Society In Iran*, Leiden, Brill, 1964, p. 115.

<sup>775</sup> “The Tragedy of Nationless Nationalism: Mosaddeq's Oil-Nationalization Movement 1951–1953”, Kamran Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity: International Relations and Social Change*, London, Routledge, 2013,

<sup>776</sup> Stephen L. Macfarland, “Anatomy of An Iranian Political Crowd: The Tehran Bread Riot of December, 1942”, *IJMES*, v. 17, n. 1, February, 1985, p. 51.



shortages, xenophobia, food hoarding, crop failures, Allied occupation policies, political infighting, strident dissatisfaction, inflation, insecurity, the post-Reza Shah reemergence of the luti (*chaqukeskans*), national humiliation resulting from the Allied invasion, an absence of Iranian social responsibility”.<sup>777</sup> Amongst these, the food shortages and food hoarding were the Wartime problems. Since these problems were experienced during WWI, these were possible to be labeled as the structural problems. Xenophobia was a different cause due to its property where the foreign effects on Iran have helped to escalate the level of anger against the foreigners. It is possible to assert that the anger and violence of the clergy against the Griboyedov mission of Tsarist Russia<sup>778</sup> or the tobacco concession in 1891 and the repercussions only partially resulted in little from the xenophobia’s cultural base.<sup>779</sup> In that regard, as Limbert stated, “the handpicking of a circumstance and applying it into the entire of the Iranians would mislead the researchers”.<sup>780</sup> As a remedy to help the researchers to build an analysis of traits in a healthy way, the author stated the attention on the selection of circumstances would help the researchers to understand the historical truth. When Mirza Hasan Shirazi, as the most authorized cleric in Iranian society issued “a *fatwa* against the concession and forbade the nation to consume tobacco so long as it was handled by a foreign monopoly”<sup>781</sup>, the cultural basis of xenophobia were triggered. Meanwhile, the most critical effects of the xenophobic culture would not be related to the Iranian aspects of justice and independence. More importantly, xenophobia nourished from the religious circles and when the disruptive elements of foreign penetration in Iran made the people cry out their quest for independence, the social explosions were to become due. Starting

---

<sup>777</sup> *Ibid*, p. 51.

<sup>778</sup> Mohammad Reza Takhsid, *The Ulama of Iran: Fluctuations In Power: 1796–1941*, Knoxville, The University of Tennessee, Ph.D., 1988, p.43. Please also see the encompassive monography of Elena Andreeva on the Russian travelogues from the 19th century to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Elena Andreeva, *Russia and Iran In The Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism*, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 69–72.

<sup>779</sup> John W. Limbert, *Negotiating With Iran: Wrestling The Ghosts Of History*, Washington, United States Institute of Peace Pres, 2009, p. 17.

<sup>780</sup> Limbert, *ibid*, p. 17.

<sup>781</sup> Ali Gheissari, Vali Nasr, *Democracy In Iran: History and The Quest For Liberty*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 25.

from 1921, when the military coup made Reza Khan and the radical reformers led by Tabatabai to assume the administration of the country, the demand for the foreign expertise had emerged once again. As Yapp stated in 1921, “outside Arabia, Iran had the least experience of modernization in the Middle East”.<sup>782</sup> Iran’s backwardness, as a centuries–old backwardness and the country’s urgent requirements made the administration's search for the foreign expertise. The American expertise, as they kept a moderate record in comparison with the Anglo–Russian record of the Constitutional period, was rather favored. Under the light of these circumstances, xenophobia was an element in Iranian society which could pour down the vase of nationalism in accordance with the rise of disturbance amongst the people due to the economic and political reasons.

The crop failures formed another cause of the disturbances during the Tehran bread riot. Since almost after the occupation, the failures affected the country’s total harvest and the level of dependency in Iran. From time to time, the people started to think about the conspiracies of the Allies and the deterrence of food supplies made them find another way to express their frustrations. The policies of the Allies in Iran were assessed as against the national interests of Iran. Although Iranian administrations kept their attentions on the level to keep the society’s anger against the Allies, probably the policies which were followed by them to allege the security of Iran’s national interests were refuted by the course of events. As long as the economic and social deprivation continued, the people in the streets learned that the governments did not pay enough attention to economic justice.

The political infighting and the strident dissatisfaction were the outcomes of the unleashing of the political sphere. The fragmentation in the political field in Iran helped build the new demands and the rise of the number of political associations and the parties triggered the course of discussions. A dissatisfaction was already available in Iranian society. Reza Shah’s reign could just provide a national awakening albeit the class–based, ethnic, tribal and religious nucleus could stand against the régime while any kind of dissatisfaction to the suppression of the opposition. Inflation was another outcome of the war years which mostly depended upon the expenditures of the military. Insecurity was another problem due to the

---

<sup>782</sup> Yapp, 1996, p. 167.

shambling of country's central authority. As Iran preferred the way to employ foreign expertise in the design of technical fields such as aviation, postal services, telecommunication along with the health services, education during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi the modernization attempts continued with the reorganization of police service and the gendarmerie. Therefore the American expertise which was employed during WWII displayed that Iran preferred to benefit from foreign experts in order to intimidate the sources which threatened the public security. The last weeks of 1942 just referred to the ongoing problems in Iranian society when the American experts were due to arrive in Iran. For this reason, the motives from which the angry mobs nourished were not only economic but also social, cultural and more important than these, mixed with security issues. Lastly, the national humiliation was an inspiration which the Iranian citizens would not tolerate easily.

As Macfarland stated, all these events were shortlived whereas the influences on the course of Iranian history were longer. The points which Macfarland emphasized by the results of the riot, were "the exacerbation of Allied relations, and dragging of the USA deeper into the maelstrom of Iranian affairs".<sup>783</sup> In that regard, the riot in Tehran was a critical turning point.

Allied occupation, in a general sense, was an origin for any kind of transformation in the society. It meant the pluralization of the society and the politics. On the other hand, the occupation directly meant the interference into the Iranian affairs, skyrocketing of the prices, that's to say, the price inflation and the diminishing of the food supplies.<sup>784</sup> The problems due to the refugees, the breakdown of the transportation were not anticipated by the Iranian administrators as well. Along with these, the reluctance of the Allied powers across the demands for food supplies in Tehran was at an insurmountable level. There were already 75,000 troopers<sup>785</sup> in Iran and the food supply of the Allied soldiers was not a secondary problem. "Two Allied organizations, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, and the Middle East

---

<sup>783</sup> Alvandi, *ibid*, p. 6. Macfarland, *ibid*, p. 51.

<sup>784</sup> *Ibid*, p. 52.

<sup>785</sup> *Ibid*, p. 52.

Supply Center (M. E. S. C.) took control of Iran's foreign trade, operating it according to Allied, not Iranian, priorities.”<sup>786</sup>

What was remarkable about the food shortages that the main reason for this problem was not totally the lack of wheat, but the transportation and distribution problems. “The wheat harvest declined by an estimated % 30 level in 1941, and % 18 in 1942, under prewar levels, but before the War Iran had been a net exporter of grain, providing itself with a buffer in times of domestic shortages. Meat, fruit, vegetables and rice productions also declined, but by fewer amounts”.<sup>787</sup>

Surely, the price index of wheat inclined more than any other cereals and consumption goods. The level of the food prices made a dazzling rise from 1939 to 1943. “Between 1939 and 1943, food prices increased an average of %555. The price of bread on Tehran's open market increased from six cents in January to one dollar in May 1942. These rising prices encouraged landlords to withhold their supplies of wheat, further increasing collection problems. Two weeks after Reza Shah's abdication, the market price of wheat had risen to \$37 per ton, compared with the government purchase price of \$20.15”.<sup>788</sup> The rise went through the last quarter of 1941. “In October 1941, the government raised its price up to \$37.20 in an attempt to win the compliance of landlords with government regulations that they sell all of their supplies to the government. The open market price continued to rise, however, climbing to \$ 124 per ton by May 1942”.<sup>789</sup> After the bakers and the bazaar merchants could keep the pulse of the capital city which was inhabited by almost 750,000 people, the result was not a satisfaction. Mr. Sheridan, as Marfarland stated, could not oppose well enough to persuade the bazaar merchants and the landlords to prevent the free market of these basic goods of consumption.

Ultimately, the problem was solved by the emission of billion-level rials by Iranian Government. Qavam's performance as a Prime Minister was dependent on the British aspect to manipulate the Iranian policies and the capability of balancing the Anglo-Soviet establishment in Iran. Regarding with the German suspects, British

---

<sup>786</sup> *Ibid*, p. 52.

<sup>787</sup> *Ibid*, p. 52.

<sup>788</sup> *Ibid*, p. 53.

<sup>789</sup> *Ibid*, p. 53–54.

played a vital role to make Iranian Governments take efficacious actions. In that regard, what Macfarland claimed was the British side's interference in Iranian affairs to comply their demands. One of their demands was the arresting of the Persian suspects who were believed to act on Germany's behalf.

As long as Qavam made an effort to put up these efforts, he was more favoured. As a matter of fact, Qavam was well aware of the fact that playing a game with the British side was just possible to keep his cards up until the last time secretly. He acted very carefully to balance the rising interference of the British side. In that regard, his efforts would not be judged according to the ultimate failures. On the other hand, this point of view would cause some miscalculations. About the German espionage and the Iranian suspects, the view of the Government was that they were Iranian citizens, and any action to take measure of their destiny would be taken by themselves. "Because they were Iranian citizens, the detention of these potential threats to the security of the Persian corridor came within the authority of the Iranian Government. The British viewed these Iranians as an immediate threat, while Iranian authorities believed that they were participating in Iran's experiment in democracy during the war".<sup>790</sup>

However, Qavam lastly resorted to the deals with the British side to guarantee a supply of grain, and the problem would be solved by making a definite agreement on the arrest of forty suspects. All these were happening through the late days of August 1942. That is clear what Qavam had aspected from the very beginning was overcoming the problems by a deal with the British Legation members. This effort of Qavam was a well-reading of the problems.<sup>791</sup> After months of tides, it was clear that the promises from both the British side and the Soviet Union resembled the political strategies of both countries. Beyond the reason of a political strategy, one might find a few other reasons to understand the delays from the Allied powers. First and foremost, the pretext of the Soviet authorities was already available for the supply of grain which was not adequate for the area under Soviet influence. The demand for the troops grew from time to time.

---

<sup>790</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.

<sup>791</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.

In that regard, the agreements or any kind of promises were transforming into a new scheme. In the beginning of November 1942, this was the main picture of government's dilemma. On the one hand, there was the agreement which was concluded with the Allies. The Allied powers were assessed as the source of hopes even though these emerged sometimes as vanishing. On the other hand, the losses of submarines which were destroyed by the Axis powers caused another part of the dilemma. Under these circumstances, a fifty percent decrease in a number of grain stocks caused the folding of the food crisis.<sup>792</sup> As Macfarland stated, the agreement between the USA and Britain with the Government in Tehran had become "a dead letter"<sup>793</sup> by the course of events. Thus, the fear of famine made the peasants direct towards hoarding activities. This was not abnormal when the conditions were considered. The people were in fear of a scarce condition for food supplies, and the trustability of the Government was questioned. Even though the efforts of Qavam were not trust breaking, these were not able to bring the satisfaction of the grassroots. Pertaining to the internal problems, the external reasons were making a heavy burden for the Government in Tehran. When one think that the Government price of wheat was around \$93, and the market price level was at \$186, it became quite clear that there was an urgency for Government's application of rules and laws strictly.<sup>794</sup> The officials were described as "totally corrupt"<sup>795</sup> in some examples. In Ahwaz, which was one of the middle-range towns in Iran, the price level was %367 higher than the Government price.<sup>796</sup> On November 14, 1942, food adviser Mr. Sheridan reported that the silo in Tehran had reserves ingoing and outgoing that were almost equal to each other whereas the only half-day supply in the silo was a significant proof of the bell tolling. On December 8, 1942, the bread rations were reduced on the eve of the riot.

Depending on the proximate and structural causes, the people in Tehran who gathered in *Baharestan Square* were chanting their rights to demand bread from the

---

<sup>792</sup> *Ibid*, p. 57.

<sup>793</sup> *Ibid*, p. 57.

<sup>794</sup> *Ibid*, p. 57–58.

<sup>795</sup> *Ibid*, p. 58.

<sup>796</sup> *Ibid*, p. 58.

Government that day: “You may kill us, but we must have bread”. All these courses of events and decisions had resulted in a riot. The angry mobs were ready to take their concerns and violence. In fact, the riot had started as a demonstration of university students. Within hours, on December 8, 1942, the demonstrations turned into a riot which directed towards the Majlis. During this kind of examples where the lack of authority was sensed, the Iranian theater was already available to set up some new demonstrations. The riot through the first week of December 1942 was such an example. Macfarland stated that “by perceiving the impotence of Qavam’s Government, and the dormancy of the Parliament, various political centers in Iran undertook different tactics for either breaking the deadlock, or using it to their advantage”.<sup>797</sup>

Even though the riot sourced from a normally-growing motive of protest, the agitative attitudes from the Palace were also observed. Macfarland mentioned the passive attitude of the police forces during these demonstrations, and that day and the silence of the police forces mixed with a kind of ineptitude caused the growth of the events. Even beyond these, the riot could be related to the arrest of “General Zahidi of Isfahan” in the early hours of that day. This was probably interpreted as the compromise of Ahmad Qavam’s cabinet to the British authorities. General Zahidi, who had a widespread celebrity in Iranian state administration was known as one of the pro-German elements of the Iranian Armed Forces.

He was suspected of his involvement in the Melliyun-e Iran Party (Party of Iranian Nationalists)<sup>798</sup>, and his ties with the German agent Franz Mayer. Another military figure who stood in the midst of the events was General Hassan Arfa. He was reported to address to the rioters that the Army had orders not to interfere in the demonstrations by Lieutenant Colonel Stephan Timmermann, the American adviser to the Iranian municipal police forces.<sup>799</sup>

Then, the manipulations had risen. Afrasiyab Azad, the editor of the newspaper *Name-ye Azad*, and one of the leading deputies of the Majlis, Javad Masudi made

---

<sup>797</sup> *Ibid*, p. 58.

<sup>798</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 164. Macfarland, *ibid*, p. 59.

<sup>799</sup> Macfarland, *ibid*, p. 59. Timmermann’s mission became the shortest example of American expertise due to his sudden death in 1944. Lenczowski stated, his sudden death caused the interruption of this task. Please also see Lenczowski, 1949, p. 272.

some speeches to the demonstrators towards the call for the resignation of the Prime Minister. As Qavam was a prominent political figure, it was his own test of confidence, too. As the demonstration turned into a riot, the angry mobs took a path to the shops in Tehran's famous bazaar, towards the Cyrus Street. The looting of the food stores, and the other stores followed by the others toward evening. In the latter attempts, the shops which belonged to Armenians, and Jews in the city were looted particularly. Even, the anger of the mobs was directed towards the house of the Prime Minister, and some contents of his house were burnt. The approaching of the evening hours brought the intervention of the Army and the police forces. By 6 p.m. already, the intervention started to diminish the riot along with the darkness getting over the city.<sup>800</sup>

The term which was used by Macfarland could also be used as a metaphor to display the "darkness". The riot's anatomy was proving the fact that the anger of the people was mixed with the challenge against the Government in several ways. In that regard, the political intrigues were a facet of the darkness which was penetrating into the Iranian affairs. As it was put forth, there were several reasons behind the scenes of the riot. It is probable to assert that the Palace was acting as a political agency to make benefits by fomenting the riot.

General Hassan Arfa's involvement in the demonstrations by stating that the Army wouldn't make any interference was a key example. Since he was a close compatriot of the young Shah, General Hassan Arfa's role was a significant mediation in the agency to catalyze the events. In that regard, the struggle between the Prime Minister and the Shah, and the Iranian security bureaucracy was the most immediate result of any these riot. The struggle between Qavam and his opponents were already clarified with the riot. On the turn of the first day, the political elitist activity which Macfarland stated put some strong attempts to force the Prime Minister for resignation. He was made a persona non grata, or the widening of this perception was sought to bring some new political intrigues against him. In that regard, the Peykar (Youth) Party, a former head of the food administration, a former Prime Minister, the

---

<sup>800</sup> *Ibid*, p. 59.



Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Yazdan Penah, and the chief of the Police forces Radsar were acting in an implicit coordination.<sup>801</sup>

“Qavam bolstered by the announcements of Soviets, British and American authorities, and refused to resign. Instead he ordered immediate taken to restore order at 8:00 P.M. curfew, the complete suppression of newspapers, the censorship of Radio Tehran, the establishment of an official newspaper of Government, *Akhbar-e Ruz* (*The News of The Day*), and the appointment of *Field Marshall Ahmadi* to establish order in the streets of Tehran”.<sup>802</sup> The riot continued on the 9th of December, 1942.<sup>803</sup>

Youth mobilization was an obvious fact pertaining to the social analysis of the demonstrators. The demand of the people was like the outburst of the discontent which seemed to rise up to an insurmountable level. The decisiveness of the Government to apply the curfew and the intervention of the martial law forces were not adequate to affect the discontented people. The classes were called off again, and the university students of Tehran University were on the streets again. In Baharestan Square, the firing of the troops caused some casualties. The number of people who were killed and wounded by that intervention of the Government forces was counted as approximately 600.<sup>804</sup> After all, the iron fist of the Government was shown as a litmus paper to measure the stamina of Qavam’s political leadership. As Macfarland stated, all shops were closed following the military troops’ harsh intervention, and there was only military control in the streets ubiquitously. Sweeping out the discontented from the streets emerges as a clear-cut solution to answer any kind of social unrests. Mostly, the way that the political authorities follow doesn’t change from geography to another, and the result was almost the same in Iran during the bread riot.<sup>805</sup>

On the evening of December 9, 1942, the Government newspaper *Akhbar-e Ruz* was published to declare the firm control of the Government. Censorship was not a policy

---

<sup>801</sup> *Ibid*, p. 59.

<sup>802</sup> *Ibid*, p. 59.

<sup>803</sup> *Ibid*, p. 59.

<sup>804</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

<sup>805</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

in Iran which could be labeled as occasional. In this example, the censorship policy of the Government was also a remark for the crackled unity in the state administration. Hence, the decision of the Prime Minister to censor the state radio in Tehran and the newspapers referred to a power struggle within the limits of the constitution. Constitution was the real political heritage of the country since the times of Constitutional Revolution. However, the application of the Constitution was sometimes halted.

This was relevant to the powers accumulation in a monarch's hand, and the Majlis authority. The bread riot was not only a scene from the social and economic landscape of the country during the War years, but also these events brought some short-run and long-run implications. Macfarland counted these as the distribution of "ration cards to all of the inhabitants of Tehran after a census on December 18, 1942, and according to that, 800 grams of barley bread per day from the silo bakeries was promised for the laborers, 400 grams for the others at a cost of three cents, over %60 lower than average consumption during more normal times".<sup>806</sup> "The free market continued to operate, however, where good quality white bread in any quantities could be purchased for about one dollar per 400 grams".

"Until it was closed by Arthur Millspaugh on August 3, 1943, the free market consistently outbid the silo for scarce wheat". Rationing, as mentioned by Macfarland was not a clear-cut solution which due to the lack of grain and the shipment problems after the promises of Allied powers couldn't solve the problem. After the Americans promised for a shipment of "25,000 tons of wheat", and British promised for a more "15,000 tons of wheat", the problem continued since the USA could only send 1800 tons of wheat.<sup>807</sup> The small amounts of wheat wouldn't solve the urgency of the food crisis in Iran. This amount of 800 tons would only last for three days in Iran's daily consumption levels. Up until June 1943, the problem continued, and by just June 1943, the problem was alleviated.<sup>808</sup> Macfarland stated that the USA and Britain sent some 50,000 tons of wheat up until June 1943, and the one month before that, the Soviet shipment at the amount of 4500 tons had already

---

<sup>806</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

<sup>807</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

<sup>808</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

arrived in Tehran. Even though the transportation facilities were available in Tehran, the hard weather conditions and the War conditions had affected the shipment programs. It was not a surprising fact that the shipment from the southern areas of Iran to the capital city would last for seventeen days. The trucks' contribution to the finalization of the grain crisis would not be omitted. As Macfarland stated the three reasons were determinant on the solution of the food crisis: "The continuation of the Allied imports, an improved harvest in 1943, and the use of Allied trucks for collection and distribution".<sup>809</sup> One of the short-run implications of the riot in Tehran was the bringing down of Qavam's cabinet. Qavam's dictatorial style was criticized several times, and it was assessed as evidenced with the suppression of the press.

The press and the radio were the two main elements of the mass communication. The atmosphere by the proliferation of several newspapers was not something to be interrupted. The pressure on Qavam was a disappointment on behalf of him probably, a reference for the failure of his political strategies. He was mostly accused of acting on Britain's behalf, and a pro-British political character would not keep the political leadership under control due to the public opinion. Except the American expertise, British and Soviets were the least favorable elements of the occupation. The rising nationalist tendencies were drawing the lines of trustability from many angles. In that regard, Qavam's support to British demands by acting towards the will of British Legation in Tehran was measured according to the arrest of Persian suspects who were believed to act on Germany's behalf, the currency problem, and finally by the using of British troops to suppress the December riot. One final example to Qavam's action towards the British political demands was the restructuring of his Cabinet on January 21, 1943, to satisfy the British demands.<sup>810</sup>

Sooner, the crisis knocked the door. As a matter of fact, the crisis was a picture to denote the ever-fresh problematic of the heads of governments. The cabinet's confidence was not an adequate level to make feel the Prime Minister safe in his seat. The Majlis was not showing consent after a period of time's distrust on the Prime Minister. Thus, by February 6, 1943, ten of the Cabinet ministers resigned from their posts. This was due to the proposal of Qavam to ensure the Cabinet Ministers' seats

---

<sup>809</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

<sup>810</sup> *Ibid*, p. 60.

in the Majlis. As long as the rising distrust was questioned, the resignation of the Cabinet Ministers meant the test of the constitutionality of Qavam's premiership. On February 14, 1942, the Parliament voted against Qavam's cabinet and voted in favor of Ali Soheili. As the former Prime Minister, he was lucky enough to withhold the confidence of the Majlis. Now then, under Mr. Soheili, an Allied compromise was going to function up until the War years.

Macfarland stated that another implication of the riot was the return of Allied troops to Tehran. As the capital city of the country, Tehran's domination changed by the Allied military powers' existence in the capital. The other implications were "the return of the luti to Tehran", and "the proper conditions" which helped the Tudeh Party to organize widely and rise in Iranian politics in 1943, and 1944.<sup>811</sup> Indeed, the bread riot in Tehran stood as a unique example in the wartime history of Iran. As the historians try to find out the main reasons behind the curtains of the darkened events, the difficulty of separating the motives behind the social disturbances make them compelled to keep the recklessness up until the end of their analysis. Tehran riot was coincidental with the young and new Shah's efforts to consolidate a constitutional portrait instead of the former Shah's, his father's "husky" portrait which was once stated by Washington Herald daily's analysis on the eve of his rise to power.<sup>812</sup>

Under the light of these, as a quite cunning encounter accompanying the objective conditions against the elderly statesman, the Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam, The Shah did not lose to keep the pulse of the nation. After the bread riot, the main struggle was against Ahmad Qavam. As the young and inexperienced Shah faced some difficulties, he foresaw the fact that the country's first and foremost responsibility was gathering on his shoulders. Thus, his political rivalry against the Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam was not a feud, but a genuine tug of war in his mind. What made the Shah feel the hatred against Qavam was basically the quest of the Iranian monarch to consolidate the full powers under the terms of the ongoing occupation. However, the emergent motive behind his will to change the Prime Minister depended on the compromise with the Allied powers.

---

<sup>811</sup> *Ibid*, p. 61.

<sup>812</sup> "Husky Dictator of Persia Rules With An Iron Fist", *Washington Herald*, August 16, 1922, p. 5.

Therefore, the Majlis acted towards deposing him, and selecting Ali Soheili instead of him. As it was stated before, other than the existence of the Allied troops, the USA's penetration into the Iranian affairs directed towards a new way. Months after the bread riot in Tehran, the USA President's personal representative General Hurley's arrival, and mission in Iran proved the essence of the struggle towards consolidating the American influence in Iran. In that regard, one may not omit the fact that both the external and internal factors were able to make new strategies to benefit from the rising disturbances in the society. Macfarland assessed that no new deaths had taken place after the bread shortages, and no new bread riot happened within five months after the December disturbances.<sup>813</sup>

After all, the bread riot in Tehran had proven the fact that Iran had been suffering from the political and economic deprivations, and the feeling against the political establishment, in particular, the landowners turned out to be a social protest. However, the rise of the nationalist feelings made the landowners make build a controlled opposition against their establishment in Iranian political scene. The emergence of the luti was assessed on that direction. The main dynamics behind the rise of the disturbances which turned into riots were the changes in the political economy of the country. These changes did not happen in a rapid way, but in a tendency to rise to an insurmountable level. On the other hand, the combination of the changes along the rising discontent with the Qavam's premiership had led to a political tug-of-war between the Shah's bureaucracy, and Qavam's side. Chief of Yazdan Panah was a powerful member of the bureaucracy who acted towards the interests of the Palace. As mentioning the comradeship of Colonel Zahidi to accompany the departing and humiliating Reza Shah Pahlavi, Milani stated that Yazdan Panah was a part of the nucleus cadre members of which were the ardent supporters of the newly abdicated king. Milani quoted that Reza Shah, after meeting them in Isfahan, where the General Zahidi, General Yazdanpanah and the son of the former, Ardeshir Zahidi stressed their desire not to turn back wisely, they were replied by the Shah that General Zahidi should return back to Tehran. The Shah was reported to have told the General that he left his son to the care of General Zahidi. As General Yazdan Panah was the Chief of General Staff, thus the highest ranking

---

<sup>813</sup> Macfarland, *ibid*, p. 61.

commander of the army, the role of the loyal commanders and bureaucracy to the formerly abdicated Shah was made more prevalent in this new period.<sup>814</sup>

An analysis of the anatomy of this kind of social unrests requires a wide-range perspective to keep the pulse of the grassroots. In that example, the people were crying out their demands to give an end to the sufferings of the people, and the grain shortages, in particular, the shortages of wheat were making their anger louder than ever. Even though there was the combination of several factors to attach to the discontent of the demonstrators and the rioters, it was obvious that the riot was “pseudo-popular” of which Macfarland displayed the strategic tactics of the landowners to push the lutas on the streets of Tehran.<sup>815</sup> Hence, the political elite’s successful tactics caused a limited action.

After all, these events proved that the transformation of Iranian political system functioned towards the co-operation of the Palace with the landowners, and in the right time, the Palace made an attempt to lower the tension of the society by acting through the resignation of Ahmad Qavam. Undoubtedly, the co-operation of the Palace with the landowners was just a *modus vivendi*. The Palace was restricted to keep the strong line without touching the tension limits of the nationalist circles. In that regard, the breakup of the landowners against the Palace had sooner risen. Tehran Bread Riot of December 8–9, 1942 was a limited action as alleged by Macfarland, however, the riot brought some new results to the political life in terms of the rise of nationalist circles’ voice. “Bread” as a crucial issue addressed by the officials, was cried out by the slogans at May Day demonstrations of 1946 led by the Tudeh Party and the CCFTU. Below, the following sub-section will deal with the premiership of Ali Soheili and its aftermath.

### **3.4. Ali Soheili’s Term in Office and Its Aftermath**

As it was stated before, the signing of the *Treaty for the Tripartite Alliance* with the occupying countries verified the tightened position of Iran in the international sphere. *The Tripartite Alliance* was formed in January 1942 and Iran gained the promise of the Allied powers for the post-war aid programs. The privileges which the Allied countries could not utilize during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi came true in the

---

<sup>814</sup> Milani, 2011, p. 498.

<sup>815</sup> *Ibid*, p. 62.

following process. These were “the capabilities provided to the Allied countries to use the military bases, limitless use of the lines of communication, means of transport, direct supervision, and censorship all over the roads”.<sup>816</sup> As Janjua stated by the *Modern Iran in the 20th Century*, all of these opportunities were provided to the Allied countries when the Axis powers were at the height of their strength and the world had been presuming the inevitable victory of the Axis powers.<sup>817</sup>

Under the light of these facts which restricted Iranian political sphere, and which made the occupational forces’ interests enlarge as much as possible, Iranian politics had regained a conditional impetus.

The challenge of Qavam against the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was a political rivalry which could be assessed to live within its limits. Shah’s authority was not comparable with his father. The young and inexperienced Shah made the cunning and “forceful” politicians seek a more complicated way of rivalry. In this regard, the question of what was making the Shah disturbed about Qavam’s authority and political charisma may not be tied to a single factor; yet, instead, it would be related to many factors. Therefore, when the British dispatch stated that the bread riot would be linked up with Shah’s intrigue, it was not surprising indeed. The dispatch on December 29, 1942, stated that the attempts to link this riot up with the discontent sourcing from bread shortages would not be adequate. Although the Dispatch did not ignore this factor, the role of the Shah on the bread riot was questioned. The Shah was reported to act towards the resignation of Qavam, yet it was stated that Qavam “declined to do so”.<sup>818</sup>

On this field of political rivalry, the Shah maintained the support of the Army. The position which was identified by the Chief of General Staff General Yazdan Panah was reported in another dispatch.<sup>819</sup> As it was understood from the new dispatch, the ties between the high commandship of the Army and the Shah caused this rivalry deepen to a more certain extent: “The Prime Minister is credited with a desire to

---

<sup>816</sup> Abdul Razaq Janjua, *Modern Iran In The 20th Century*, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publications, 1966, p. 471.

<sup>817</sup> *Ibid*, p. 471.

<sup>818</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>819</sup> *Ibid*, p. 273. FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

establish the full control of the Army by the Ministry of War. There is little doubt that both the Shah and the Chief of the General Staff would welcome the retirement of Qavam us-Sultaneh and his replacement by a less forceful personality”.<sup>820</sup>

By the flow of events in reaction to the riot, Sipahbod Ahmadi was appointed as the new commander to give an end to the upsurge in the capital of Iran. The Shah, as it was reported, had regretted his decision which was, by the advice of British Legation members, accepted by the Prime Minister, too. Sipahbod Ahmadi was assessed as not a close ally of the Chief of General Staff, Yazdan Panah. His attitudes which were not interpreted as “friendly” had caused a problem on behalf of the Shah, and the eventual scenery presented that the Shah was not fully satisfied by the developments.<sup>821</sup>

After holding the post as ex-Chief of Police staff during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mukhtari was assessed in a pejorative term to display the ruthlessness of a bureaucrat. “Scoundrel”<sup>822</sup>, as a term was an implementation in terms of being pejorative and merciless of shrewdness which was attributed to Sipahbod Ahmadi. Although this meant that along with Sipahbod’s prestige, the Shah’s prestige would also be damaged. Nonetheless, the general perception of the people in Iran, in especially the capital city, Tehran was reported to be different. The bulk of the perceptive condemnation was separated for the Prime Minister. Instigation was overloaded to the administration of Prime Minister, then. Under these circumstances, the statement in British dispatch displayed the conspiracy’s high role along the flow of events: “It is said that he instigated the disturbances rather than face the Majlis, as he was due to do on that day, and that he staged the pillaging of his house to avert suspicion from himself”.<sup>823</sup>

Under the dust of the riots, it was evaluated by the British Legation members that the problem would be solved according to the promises of the Prime Minister, Ahmad Qavam. Qavam was said to prepare for reconstituting his Cabinet. On the other side, the projection of the Shah was towards permitting the young officers to play a

---

<sup>820</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>821</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>822</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>823</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.



considerable role in this change. Hence, the differentiation of two powerful actors in Iranian politics made the political turmoil more complicated than ever.

During the turmoil of the riots, it was possible to observe the accelerated search of Ahmad Qavam to change the impetus of his cabinet. In that regard, he was claimant to give the position of Minister of Finance to Allahyar Saleh who had been working as the delegate of the Government in the United States for economic affairs.<sup>824</sup>

Giving a fresh blood to the Cabinet was the turning point for Qavam's Cabinet. In order to prolong the life of the Cabinet, he acted in a decisive way. In that regard, Qavam was told to send directives to the authorities to take urgent measures to help build the deficiency of grain in any part of the country. Thus, although it was not the only reason for the discontent of the masses, it was understood that the lack of wheat supplies constituted a vital problem for the future of the country. Tehran, during the last days of 1942, was reported to run out of wheat stocks and it was the British support at the last time to save Qavam's cabinet. "Situation was saved by the supply of British Army stocks at the amount of 250 tons".<sup>825</sup>

Another party at the amount of 1200 tons from the same source was reported to be on its way.<sup>826</sup> Aside from the British stocks, Soviet stocks were also used. The Soviet stocks were let down from the northern Iran for the relief attempts of Iran Government. It was also stated that the government had agreed with the Soviet circles on the amounts for 18.000 tons of barley, 5000 tons of wheat, and 30.000 tons of rice. Additionally, "in order to raise a number of bread supplies", it was reported that "20 tons of cooked potatoes were distributed to the poor families at two rials per kg".<sup>827</sup>

As these happened, the Soviet circles had applied to the Iranian Government by the demand of an immediate credit of 500 million rials. The currency problem, after the demands coming from British circles, was consistently awaiting. It was reported by the British dispatch that the financial agreement which being proposed by the

---

<sup>824</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>825</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>826</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>827</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

“Russians” was not concluded yet.<sup>828</sup> The dispatch dated to December 29, 1942, also included the news on the appointment of Governor–Generals. “Sarlashkar”, as one of the highest ranks in Iranian Army was called for Muqaddam whose appointment to Western Azerbaijan was a prominent change in Iranian administrative affairs. By the appointment of Muqaddam, it was also reported that the separated Western and Eastern Azerbaijan were going to be united. Sarlashkar Muqaddam was appointed as the new Governor–General of this new, united “Ustan”. Ustan was the word to refer to the largest administrative unit in Iranian geographical system of administration. In addition to Muqaddam, Sardar Akram Qaragozlu was going to be appointed to Ustan–e Hamadan as the new Governor–General.<sup>829</sup>

The final remarks of the dispatch were separated to the Iranian forces, Soviet affairs in Iran and the internal security. The growing on the Iranian suspects had been a problem where the British depicted from the ties of some Iranian officials with the German agents. Although it stayed suspicious in some cases, it was evaluated by the British circles that Sartip Zahidi was an Iranian official whose ties with Germans proved that he worked on behalf of Germany. His arrest on December 7, 1942, was understood as he played a key role to instigate the Qashqai's against the Allied forces. The British plan to arrest him caused some concern in the way that he would be supported by the masses and it would result in some demonstrations against the Allied circles.

Eventually, this has caused a mild atmosphere of demonstrations and finally, it was interpreted that “the effect of Sartip Fazlollah Zahidi’s arrest on the situation” was not clear, yet. Sincerely, the British circles were receptive to Qavam’s balancing strategies yet Zahidi’s arrest was probably one of the turning points for them to provenly accept that Qavam’s role was sometimes a role of a forger. It is not certain that what kind of dynamics have played a vital role to alienate the British from Qavam’s premiership. Albeit, it was quite important to question that had it not been probable to depose Ahmad Qavam and assign Ali Soheili in the place of him. In this regard, Qavam’s role in balancing the young and inexperienced Shah's perception of the rising pressure which had sourced from many sources such as the Allied powers,

---

<sup>828</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>829</sup> *Ibid*, p. 276. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

social and economic problems would be studied to a more certain extent. The Shah had found the chance to degrade Qavam and in a such a *modus vivendi*, deposition of him and the assignment of a new Prime Minister by selecting his predecessor was a remedy to retry the experienced politicians.

Qavam's energetic and forceful character was perceived as an obstacle to the administration of the Shah. The Shah's selective approach and his preferences did not converge with the preference of the Allied powers all the time. In that regard, it is possible to say that after the arrest of Zahidi, the British circles gradually distanced from Qavam's position and he was, as it was stated above by the dispatch clearly, put forward to the arrows of instigation which had resulted in the outburst of riot affecting the capital city. The new appointments proved the posts that Sipahbod Ahmadi was appointed as the new Governor-General of Tehran due to his strict measures to soothe the crowds in Tehran during a panic-ridden atmosphere. Sartip Abdul Ali Etemad Muqaddam was appointed from the post of Deputy Chief of Gendarmerie to Chief of Police. Reza Quli Kerim Quvanlu was reinstated in the Army and was appointed as new the Sartip-ranked officer in Gendarmerie. Sarlashkar Muhammad Nahkcevan was the former Minister for War. He was appointed as the new *Order of Homayun*.<sup>830</sup>

Hence, the current situation in Iran at the end of 1942 and at the very beginning of 1943 revealed the strictly-measured program of the Government to overcome the social and economic problems. Smuggling, corruption, tribal activism, the demands of Allied powers amongst themselves and the Iranian Government, shortage of cereals, security issues were mostly counted in this program.

From the outbreak of WWII, the general view on Turkic tribes and the Turkic population in total was averted. Even though, there was a mild approach between Iran and Turkey which had developed under the light of interwar period's international conditions and perception of threats, it was now understood that Turkic tribes' general attitude to stand on the side of Germany, and the pressure on them due to the suspects for Germany's espionage was making it a gridlock. The Qashqai's, as a Turkic tribe,<sup>831</sup> were in connection with the Turkish administration as well. As the

---

<sup>830</sup> *Ibid*, p. 277. FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

<sup>831</sup> Muhammed Taki Zehtabi (Kirişçi), *İran Türklerinin Eski Tarihi*, çev. Ferhad Rahimi, İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2010, p. 7.

descendants of Turkic tribes who left central Asia in the eleventh century, they were believed to settle down into the area around the Zagros mountains in the fifteenth century. As a nomadic tribe, their main occupation was the herding of large flocks of sheep and their life span depended on the times they spent between their summer and winter pastures. Woven items such as kilims (woven rugs), knotted rugs, and bags in the traditional style of Qashqa'i were their trademarks.<sup>832</sup> One of the best examples to understand the gradual alienation of Turkish administration from Iran could be assessed by the column of a prominent journalist of those years.<sup>833</sup>

At his article carrying the title of “Reza Shah Pahlavi Period in Iran”, his statements mostly focused on the Reza Shah period’s restrictive and oppressive way against the Turkish and Turkic communities and tribes. It was already a repeated fact that mostly the Qashqai’s were anxious about the oppressive way of governance in Iran. Since the Sad’abad Pact was over, the article dealt with the new conditions to remind Iranian administration about the patronage of Turkey on the Turkic tribes. During those months, the Qashqai’s were keeping their ties with the Turkish administration as well. According to an archival document at Directorate of State Archives in Turkey, the correspondence from Tehran under the ambassadorship of Mr. Cemal Hüsnü Taray to the General Secretary of the ruling single-party, Republican People’s Party (RPP) stated that Qashqa’i leader *Khosro Qashqai* had sent a sovereign well-woven Qashqa’i carpet. The document stated that the carpet was

---

<sup>832</sup> Colbert C. Held, *Middle East: Patterns, Places and Politics*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994, p. 94. Please also see the anthropological study of Lois Beck as an attempt to explain the continuities and changes in a society, the Qermezi sub-tribe of Qashqai confederacy. Lois Beck stated that the Qashqais emerged in the south western part of the country during the time of Karim Khan Zand in the midst of the 18th century. Lois Beck, “Local Histories: A Longitudinal Study of Qashqa’i Subtribe In Iran”, in ed. Rudi Matthee, Beth Baron, *Iran and Beyond*, California: Mazda Publishers, 2000, p. 267.

<sup>833</sup> Since the times of Constitution (Kanun-ı Esasi) which was restored in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, the name of Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) was known to thousands of people. As a prominent journalist who had been mostly affiliated with the daily newspaper *Tanin*, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was a significant portrait in the history of Turkish journalism. His fierce critics were making him a combatant pen in the Ottoman press. After the proclamation of Republic in Turkey by the leadership of Gazi Mustafa Kemal, as later given the surname of Atatürk (Father of the Turks) by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was still one of the prominent journalists. However, his weight could be decreased by the promotion of some new names from time to time. During WWII, he was still the head columnist of *Tanin*.

donated to the People's House branch in Ankara by Turkey's President Ismet Inonu.<sup>834</sup>

To turn back to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın's statements, it was clearly shown that he stated in his column the oppression and black days of Turks in Iran were so much repeated during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Indeed, when it is considered that Reza Shah's official visit to Turkey, the other was made to Iraq's holy cities, Najaf and Karbala, was an appreciated step to strengthen the ties between two countries. However, the mild atmosphere had ended in a precedented flow of history which threatened the peaceful plans in the world. Atatürk's motto as "Peace at home; Peace in the World" was concretely waved as a flag in the Middle East by the foundation of Sa'dabad Pact which Iran found a prestigious place there. Now then, the concerns of Turkish officials were repeated in many centers. As a prominent political figure in Turkey during WWII, Faik Ahmet Barutçu reminded that right through the pressure of the Allied powers that was rising on the Iranian Government, the Ambassador of Iran to Ankara had applied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey about the concerns of his country. Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time was Şükrü Saraçoğlu. As an experienced politician, he had invited the Ambassador of Britain, Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen to the Turkish Headquarters.

At that meeting, as Barutçu quoted, Turkey's Minister had stated that the pressure against Iran was surprising for Turkey that they would expect the sincere and dedicated attitude of Britain to inform her about any kind of developments around its borders. The sincere alliance required that. By the adverse response of British Ambassador to Ankara to the Minister, the Minister had quoted to add that Turkey's fifth column is himself instead of the existence of German suspects in Turkey, too. Under the light of Iran's occupation process, it would be derived that Turkey's opposition was due to the breaking up of the trustability. Turkey was bothered by the questioning of its trustability. Nonetheless, Turkey's foreign policy to keep the path of balancing strategy made it a favorable option in case of the vitality of alternatives. That's why the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with British Ambassador to Ankara was one of the most critical meetings during WWII. As Barutçu noted in his memoirs titled as *Political Memoirs (Siyasi Anılar)*, he stated the fact that Turkey

---

<sup>834</sup> General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 490.1.0.0. , 1061.2..1074, p. 2.

was not able to deal with the problems of the Turkic population in Iran during those days. The occupation process had brought some atrocities against the Azeris. Barutçu made the resemblance of the country and Soviets as a man who tries to purchase some goods at the juncture of a fatal sickness.<sup>835</sup> The Soviets, according to the claims of Barutçu, were trying to exploit that situation. They were trying to make the region “Bolshevik–minded”. Additionally, Barutçu alleged that the Soviet side tried to establish a joint Armenia including the eastern lands of Turkey and the Iranian lands inhabited by the Armenians. Barutçu was adding that the real opposition to such a task had arrived from the USA, and finally the Soviet participation was prevented.<sup>836</sup> Finally, Barutçu mentioned the deterioration of Turkic population in several parts of Iran and he kept his hopes for the way to improve their situation by the enterprises of İnönü administration. As a member of the single–party rule in Turkey, Barutçu concluded his remarks on the Turkic population in Iran that their number was numbered from five million population up to nine million. This, at the end, was a requisite of a giant foreign policy perspective for not to omit the foreign Turks. Taking the average of the estimates, Barutçu stated that Turkey should assume a more interceptive role on behalf of the Turkic population in Iran.<sup>837</sup> To turn back to the column of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, one may find the ongoing concerns of the Turkish administration about the Turkic population in Iran. Mr. Yalçın stated that the “black days of the Turkic population in Iran” was well remembered since it had almost started a decade and a half ago.

By mentioning a series of articles dealing with the literature in Iran and the influence of Turks on Iranian literature, Mr. Yalçın dealt with the restrictive policies of Reza Shah’s rule against the Turks in Iran. During the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, it was stated that the schools had started to make education in only Persian (Farsi), the newspapers which had been published in Turkish were banned, and briefly a

---

<sup>835</sup> Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977, p. 237. The original phrase which Barutçu used in his memoirs was “maraz-ı mevtte mal almağa heves eden bir adamın durumu gibi”.

<sup>836</sup> *Ibid*, p. 237.

<sup>837</sup> *Ibid*, p. 237.

Persianization policy had been launched.<sup>838</sup> Mr. Yalçın claimed that even though Reza Shah Pahlavi had visited Turkey in the early summer of 1934, he was in disguise to crush the Turks in Iran, and he was “the only enemy” of Turks in the Near East in the columnist’s mind. Hence, Mr. Yalçın questioned that if the general perception of the Imperial administration in Iran had changed or not by the ascendance of a new Shah on the Iranian throne.<sup>839</sup>

As a well-educated, young and inexperienced Shah, he was mostly attributed to the liberal thought to lift up the curtains on the freedom of thought and press. By depending on the general assessments, Mr. Yalçın stated that the concerns were consistent and in continuation. At the final analysis, he, and the Turkish people still kept the desire for the continuation of Sa’dabad Pact since it was crumbled due to the occupation of Iran. Even though the relatively liberation of the political and social sphere was observed, the continuity of the alleged “factionalism” would damage the bilateral good intentions and relations. Finally, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın’s remarks ended with the good intentions that they would persistently live as soon as the atrocities and pejoration of Turkish identity in Iran would end.<sup>840</sup> Despite the fact that Turkey’s political stance did not refer to an irredentist policy, this policy converged with the goals of Germany. In that regard, it was possible to say that Iranian administration did not perceive the approach of Turkey as a tool of good intention. However, the tribal activism was not the sort of policy which Turkey would seek during the turmoil of WWII. It was only that example was already a proof for the understanding of mixed-nature of tribal politics, and their potential to affect the political opposition in the country.

To turn back to the developments of 1943, a British report on the date of March 1, 1943, was dealing with the “exaggerated rumors” in Tehran. The transition of the government was completed in a previous month. It was almost one month after the Soheili’s assignment as the new Prime Minister of Iran, Mr. Urquhart, Tabriz Consulate-General of Britain was wiring to Sir Reader Bullard about the recent

---

<sup>838</sup> Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, “İranda Rıza Şah Pehlevi Devri”, *Tanin*, October 11, 1943, p. 1.

<sup>839</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1.

<sup>840</sup> *Ibid*, p. 1.

developments in Tabriz. The rumors were everywhere which were mostly dealing with the hardships of Governor-General in Tabriz to manage the city's administration along with the alienation of the bureaucracy in the heart of the country. What kind of problems was causing this alienation? This is a vital question which appears in the perspective of British circles.

The dispatch took up with the severe weather conditions in Iran although it had gone "abnormally mild for the greater part" of the winter. It was reported that "it has prevented the free movement of grain and created a genuine food crisis in Tabriz and other towns". The interruption of the communication with Tehran was another outcome of the severe conditions in the country.<sup>841</sup> There were several telegram poles damaged since the outburst of the storm, and the severe conditions of the season. Tabriz city's Governor-General was complaining about the fact that the Iranian Government did not come to his help as much as he expected. His main complaints concentrated on the suspicion clouds gathering around him. On the one hand, he was suspected of "showing some revolutionary plots" and on the other he was suspected by the Soviet authorities when he selected the way of "repression on the communists".<sup>842</sup> Thus, he selected a "middle course" to guarantee his position in Iranian state administration.<sup>843</sup> When one consider that any bureaucrats would face the same risks, their way of overcoming the suspicions referred to the middle course rhetoric and policy-making. In 1943, it was still prevalent that the authorities in the state administration were refraining from holding an open position.

Until that point, the Governor-General referred to the alienation of the bureaucracy to a considerable extent. He encountered the difficulties to have had the genuine kind of support from the Central Government. On the other hand, he also had the hardship to keep the balance of ideological clashes which were surviving in Iran. The Soviet Union pushed for a rapidly growing propaganda, and the local authorities were basically kept under the strict intelligence. That's why the Governor-General in Tabriz, as occupying the central position in the country was questioned by his attitudes towards the Soviet circles' activities in Tabriz. As a part of the Soviet zone

---

<sup>841</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

<sup>842</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

<sup>843</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.



of influence, the region of Azerbaijan was assessed to be at high risk of Soviet propaganda. Even though Governor-General was ensuring the head of the British Legation in Tehran about the recent developments and risks, the suspicions were ongoing about his management.

Meanwhile, his quarrel with the Chief of Municipality in Tabriz, and alleged physical violence against him was put under scrutiny. This was assessed as a part of his losing prestige in the following days amongst the bureaucracy. It was added that “his quarrel with Mr. Vivian, American Minister to Tehran<sup>844</sup>, has lessened the respect for his authority”. Even though the state affairs were not conducted in an emotional way, Governor-General’s position was proving that the emotional understandings were also definitive on the state affairs during those years. American and British perceptions were definitive on the state cadres. British aspect was a confirmation of the American aspect on one side, and on the other, it was dealing with the rumors in the bazaars.

As the pulse of the society in Tabriz, and elsewhere in the country, the bazaars were the places where the general understanding and the public opinion would be observed. By depending on the information which was collected by the British agents, the report confirmed the point that both sides were against each other. “It was common knowledge in the bazaars that each was recommending the removal of the other, while all the time no apparent progress was being made toward bringing in wheat”.<sup>845</sup> Aside from the tug-of-war amongst the bureaucracy, the Palace, the landlords, the Allied powers, the report was analyzing the recent severe conditions in the country. The severity of the conditions were mostly connected to the Soviet influence with which British Consulate General Mr. Urquhart achieved the result that the Governor-General, under conditions to feel “nervous and precipitate”, was “entirely a tool in Russian hands, or that he has thought to separate Azerbaijan from the rest of Persia”.<sup>846</sup>

---

<sup>844</sup> Prior to 1944, the American diplomatic missions were not served by an Ambassador. Instead of an Embassy, there was a Minister who had served for the U.S.A.

<sup>845</sup> *Ibid*, p. 25.FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

<sup>846</sup> *Ibid*, p. 26. FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

One of the most interesting outcomes which were derived from the telegram of Mr. Urquhart to Sir Reader Bullard was about the position of Mr. Vivian. As the American Minister to Tehran, Mr. Vivian was serving as the highest official on behalf of the U.S.A. in Tabriz. His position was reported to fail due to his contribution in a negative way to the ongoing shortage of bread in Tabriz. As the situation was assessed as “near-famine” by Armajani<sup>847</sup>, the results cause some deep concerns which could not change within the flow of the months. Mr. Urquhart was making some anticipations about the tough situation in Tabriz. That’s why he stated that the American representative could hardly find the chance to return back to his office in Tabriz. Tabriz, as the powerful heart of the Constitutionalist movement, was one of the most populated cities in the country. The vastness of the food problems did not only struck this city’s inhabitants but also the trustability of the foreign experts relied upon the social reactions.

It was not surprising that the War conditions in Iran, in general, had caused the evasion of monopoly for basic goods of consumption. In the last analysis, it had been exploited by the landlords. The dispatch also dealt with the landlords black marketing during those years. Since the transition of Government from Ahmad Qavam to Ali Soheili, the result remained the same. The landlords, by depending on the weakness of the Central Government in Tehran, were able to bury their crops or sell these to the speculators with high prices. The black market economy’s evolution was interpreted by British report as a way to cause some suspicions of the officials. Mr. Vivian made pressure on these landlords, however this was not interpreted as a direct solution to the problems. Their chantings were even expected due on the way to “Bolshevism, Revolution and the Soviet Union” in general.<sup>848</sup> Thus, the political opposition’s volatile character emerged as a point of distrust in accordance with the evaporating of the economic interests. The landlords, within the limits of retaining the nationalist and conservative discourses, selected the way to blackmail the American and British interests by stating that the adjustments on the free market system, that’s to say the interventions on the price levels, would lead to serve the Soviet Union’s economic programs.

---

<sup>847</sup> Armajani, 1970, p. 346.

<sup>848</sup> *Ibid*, p. 26. FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

The general situation of the public opinion was shaky and bored with the economic sufferings. Mostly, after the demonstrations that had taken place in the last days of 1942, the silence was apparently ongoing. The discontent persistently evolved even though the situation was assumed as a provision.<sup>849</sup> The acceptance of the wider masses proved on the current situation that the discontent was a status of feeling to observe the realities. The reluctant masses accepted the current situation. Although their denial against the current situation was confirmed, they consciously ignored the corruption in the country. As it was stated, “the public knew that the officials were corrupt, that much wheat was hoarded, but that the Russians have received thousands of tons of wheat which would have saved the situation, then, had it remained in Persian hands”.<sup>850</sup> One of the most insightful remarks on the future of Iran in March 1943 was wired by that report of Mr. Urquhart. Some key questions were waiting to be replied. What kind of outcomes were expected from Soviet policies? By calling them “the Russians” in emphasis, the British aspect saw the issue that the Russians continued to act on behalf of their economic interests. What kind of a future was awaiting in Iran in terms of wheat supplies? Mr. Urquhart was asking this kind of questions for the purpose of clarifying the Soviet policy first. “What of the next harvest? Is it to be landlords to hide, to speculators and hoarders? Will the Russians maintain their present prohibition on the movement of grain to the south? Will the finance department be allowed to accept bribes and under-estimate the crops again?”<sup>851</sup>

Dr. Millspaugh was at the steering wheel of the Iranian finances, then. Mr. Urquhart was stating in the following part of the dispatch that the best way for Britain would be relying on the information of American adviser Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh. As they were deceived, and their good intention exploited by Iranian officials, Mr. Urquhart emphasized the dishonesty of the Iranian officials. What would be the outcome if they couldn’t solve the dishonesty and the negligence against their good wills? Mr. Urquhart stated that if it was not so, they would face the

---

<sup>849</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27. FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

<sup>850</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27. FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

<sup>851</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27. FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

same kind of difficulties “as have baffled us hitherto –dishonest officials, hoarders, speculators, keen buyers from Iraq and Turkey, and the paucity of transport”.<sup>852</sup>

The critical conclusion of Mr. Urquhart was that the Germans would not come near to Azerbaijan this year which was implemented by him as a threat to inspire Iranians not to co-operate. On the other hand, Soviet needs were stated that they were sharper than they were a year ago. Finally, at the end of this dispatch, the overall assessment of the British Consul in Tabriz was around that the greater supply of goods such as sugar, tea, and cotton goods were ventured. On 19th of April, 1943, the following dispatch reached the Headquarters in London from Tehran. Mr. Bullard’s dispatch dealt with the food situation in the country. In that respect, as Armajani stated, “the gap between the rich and poor widened”.<sup>853</sup>

On the dispatch sent by Mr. Urquhart to Mr. Bullard wired the information collected on the visit of Consul Ogden’s visit to Rezaieh. Rezaieh, as the vicinity around Urumiyyah, was used as a name for the Lake Urumiyyah as well during the Pahlavi monarchy’s reign. Mr. Urquhart was standing on the discomfort of the transportation in that season, and the visit by railway and lake line by a steamer was not something to prohibit him to call the visit well worthwhile. He proposed that the visit would be repeated once again in the spring of 1943 “so that they may have the chance to collect the information about the prospective Kurdish raids”.<sup>854</sup>

Mr. Ogden’s report, similar to several reports of that time, ensured that the familiar picture would be obtained in the short-term analysis. It went on by the words given below: “The Persians want to re-establish their gendarme posts and to make them strong, but the Russians would neither agree to the number of posts which the Persians want nor will they allow sufficient strength of men at the points of which they approve. So these weak groups are either chased away or wiped out with the Kurds, who are clearly as determined this year as they were last that the gendarmes shall not again be re-established in their midst”.<sup>855</sup>

---

<sup>852</sup> *Ibid*, p. 27. FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

<sup>853</sup> Armajani, 1970, p. 345–346.

<sup>854</sup> *Ibid*, p. 28. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>855</sup> *Ibid*, p. 28. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

Mr. Urquhart focused on the Turkish Vice Consul's exaggerations and "embellished" attitudes. During those days, the appointment of a new Turkish Consul General to Rezaieh was completed, yet the new Consul was reported as still to arrive at the region. Hence, it was a kind of warning from Mr. Urquhart about the question of trustability of Turkish Vice Consul General. Under the terms of Turkey's close relations with the Allied powers, the lack and/or questioning of trustability was a proof to understand the persistent problems. The British side was approaching to any kind of matters in the perspective of trustability during this critical period. The basic proof of British questioning of trustability was gathering on the Soviet side where they were judged by still following the military precautions. On one side, the military precautions were ongoing, and on the other hand, there was still no evolution in their policy. In that respect, Mr. Urquhart's assessments provided the British policy-making process in warning to the Soviet desires in the last months. A subclosure as a memorandum attached to the dispatch reported the visit of Mr. Ogden, British Consulate-General in Tabriz.

Through the end of February 1943, on the 26th day of this month, he had reported his arrival to Rezaieh. Then, he made a short-trip by train to Sharif Khaneh, and arrived there at 3 p.m within four hours. This area, at the northeastern side of Lake Urmia, was also a notoriously bad area for malaria. After than that, he had returned from Sharif Khaneh to Rezaieh at 10 p.m. Through the early hours of the day, at 5 a.m. he had arrived to the center town. On Monday, as the first day of March 1943, he had made some visits to the local authorities. In the political context of Iranian life, the local authorities were both the foreign representatives and the Governmental officials. Other than these, the religious authorities were also included in this category. He had reported that he made visits to Farmandar, the local commander of Persian troops, the Soviet Consul and the Turkish Vice-Consul. After the visit of these people on the same day and the day after that, he had also reported that he visited the commandant of the gendarmerie, the chief of police forces there, and as emphasized, by the invitation of the Assyrian bishop, some other visits were made. As a proof for British sensitivity during those days which was stated by the words

“as a counter–balance to that last visit”, Mr. Ogden has also called on the Mujtahid, the head of the Moslem religious community.<sup>856</sup>

The following part of this memorandum puts clear that how severe conditions of food supplies had grown in those months. As it was stated, the shortage of wheat was persistent. As a factor to judge the reasons for the problem, it was stated that “shortage was going on owing to the activities of the Kurds last year, and to hoarding by landowners and speculators”. As the political power was mostly existent in the hands of the “old–timers”<sup>857</sup>, it was due to recall that the land ownership was still one of the most determinant elements in political, social and economic life. The memorandum stated that “in the middle of February, the position became so acute that there were fears of rioting”.<sup>858</sup> In order to observe the recent picture in the northwestern part of the country, “Colonel Mahin, then the officer commanding the Persian troops, and the Soviet Consul, together visited the bazaars, and promised an improvement in the bread situation”. This co–ordinated visit of the officials had brought a temporary solution to the problem. The following day, it was reported, “wheat was produced and the immediate danger was averted”, but, as a warning, the low level of stocks was reminded.<sup>859</sup>

The British dispatches were mostly interested in the political affairs. However, whilst reflecting these, they were also interested in the social and economic panorama of the country. Even further than that, the dispatches were capable of reflecting a wide range of social and economic dynamics. As Mr. Ogden stated by depending on the information of the Farmandar, the wheat prices were reported to rise up from 200 tomans a ton to the level over 1000 tomans a ton within the last twelve months. Since the inauguration of Ali Soheili as the new Prime Minister of the country, it was apparent that after the change of Cabinet, the sharp inclination of the wheat prices had relatively decreased with the suffering level of the wider masses. Although the level of wheat prices had fallen to a little degree below

---

<sup>856</sup> *Ibid*, p. 28–29. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>857</sup> Armajani, 1970, p. 345.

<sup>858</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>859</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

the level of 1000 tomans a ton, through the level of 950 tons a ton, the hoarding was not found sufficient enough by the Farmandar. As it was labelled by the term “undoubtedly”, there was no suspicion on behalf of British circles in the region that Kurds around the region Rezaieh had accumulated high level of wheat, and their level of accumulation was considered not only in terms of hoarding but at the same time, by the level of smuggled accounts of wheat into Iraq. The Kurds in the region sent occasional small quantities of wheat into Rezaieh to be sold at the concurrent high market prices. The prices for eggs and chickens were the exceptions, and apart from those, mostly the prices were generally at the same level as in Tabriz. In Rezaieh, the eggs were sold for 16 shahis as each against 20 shahis in Tabriz. On the other hand, the chickens were sold for 15 to 20 rials as each against the 30–40 rials in Tabriz.<sup>860</sup>

One of the most crucial policies of government during this period was the issuing of ration cards. Unless the problem of adequate stocks were solved, the issuing policy was going to continue. The dispatch was standing on the “lamentable failure” about the policy pertaining to the ration cards. Since December 1942, sugar was to be rationed. “It was then discovered that the number of people to draw rations greatly exceeded the population of Rezaieh. Corrupt minor officials had added, for a consideration, imaginary names to family ration cards”.<sup>861</sup>

The dispatch wrote as given below: “As a result, the cards were withdrawn, and up to the present, no sugar has been issued. If, and, when a new scheme is evolved, it seems most unlikely that back rations for the past months will be issued”.<sup>862</sup>

The discriminative policies along the years of WWII were not only confined to the implementation of the laws but also, it was related to the economic “preferential decisions”. In that regard, Mr. Ogden stated that the Assyrian community in the region complained about the cheaply priced bread’s service to the Moslem community. Mr. Ogden assessed the problem as there was nothing new in this, and it was not serious although it was certainly true.<sup>863</sup> Regarding with that, it is

---

<sup>860</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>861</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>862</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>863</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

possible to assert that the regional choices made the governmental policies shaky in the eyes of some segments of the society. A map which was dated to 1943 shows this detail and reveals the regional differences in terms of food distribution. First of all, the map represented the administrative units in Iran during those years. According to that, the northern part of the country including the “ostans” was comprised of the Eastern and Western Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, and the northern part of the Khorassan regions. Khorasan's Kushan and Meshed cities were included in the surplus grain production area.

The northern part of the country was represented by bold tones of green which denoted the surplus grain production. Through the northwestern side of the country from the center parts of it, the region which included two-thirds of Tehran, northern part of Semnan, almost the whole of Isfahan, and Kashan, Loristan, Kermanshah, Arak, Sayeh, Hamadan, Kurdistan, Garrus, Khamseh, Zenjan were represented in the second category of grain production. Although the map was not only confined to display the grain production, it was displaying the level of grain sufficiency around the country primarily.

It was also a map to show the transportation substructure all around the country. The second category was drawn to show the self-sufficient grain production in the country. Hence, even the second category stayed within the levels of content which would be provided by strictly implemented rules of grain distribution. Nonetheless, the third category was displayed as the insufficient area of grain production in the country. Considering about one-third of Tehran, two-thirds of a larger “ostan” than Tehran, Semnan, Yazd, Kerman, Baluchistan, Fars, Behbahan, Khuzistan, one may find that a definitely half level of the country was put under insufficiency of grain distribution. Thus, cities such as Shiraz, Bandar Shahpur, Bandar Abbas, Zahedan, Bampur, Yazd, Ahwaz were all suffering from the lack of grain production or the lack of food supplies.<sup>864</sup>

The British archival documents made it clear that the wheat shortages were not the only constituent of the discontent widespread in Iran. The shortage of sugar, and averse to the promises of the municipality, the problems which had appeared by the delivery of ration cards proved this point clearly. Mr. Ogden stated that in the

---

<sup>864</sup> Please see the map that displays the grain production and transportation capacity in Iran in 1943. Appendice I.



enclosure he had contacted Mr. Vivian about the recent situation of shortages in the country. On the Kurds and the security affairs, Mr. Ogden wrote about the arming process of the Kurds in the region. As the Eastern Azerbaijan was a province where the Kurds were mostly inhabited, the armament process continued to catch the attention of the British circles.

What Mr. Ogden wrote about this process included the Kurds had been purchasing rifles by exorbitant prices by selling the high amounts of hoarded wheat. Mr. Ogden's analysis was rightful with the co-operation capacity of Soviet circles pushing for ignorance against the armament of the Kurds, and not caring about the nonattentive policy of the Iranian officials. As the government's officials assessed the issue by the statement "non mea culpa" which displayed that the Iranians sit back, and declare that they had not been responsible, the Soviet officials were evaluating the gap of political authority in the region.

Therefore, Mr. Ogden stated that the Soviet circles had not refrained from co-operating with the Kurds instead of co-operating with the local Iranian officials. Mr. Ogden's statements consisted of a bilateral reading of the concurrent affairs in the region. Since the campaigns of *Wehrmacht* through Caucasus had not gone in the anticipated direction, the Soviet Union's influence had risen. Mr. Ogden stated that the present situation was in advantage of the Soviet side. "...Because things went well in the Caucasus for the Russians, the Kurds have been naturally strongly pro-Russian. But if the Germans had succeeded in breaking through the Caucasus to Persia, I am sure the Russians would have found their own arms turned against them by the same Kurds, who would have seen vistas of great plunder opened to them".<sup>865</sup>

These statements referred to the clear proof that the nature of alliance in the domestic politics was changeable when the things could change. It was ambivalent whether the change would come by a fundamental change of the power equilibrium or not. The dispatch also reflected the complaints of the Turkish Vice Consul in Iranian Azerbaijan, due to the rising raids of the Kurdish tribes. It was stated that the inhabitants of Turkey who continued to suffer the raids of Kurdish raids beyond the Turco-Iranian border were rapidly losing their patience. This point which was wired to the Vice Consul in Rezaieh on the case that the situation would cause an urgency

---

<sup>865</sup> *Ibid*, p. 29-30. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

if the precautions were not taken on time. The Vice Consul of Turkey was not interested in the fate of the Kurds, and in the place of that, he was mostly interested in the Turkish citizens whose patience were rapidly evaporating. Indeed, a risk of armed conflict between these people who had been assumed to cross the border, and the Soviet troops were causing a deep concern on the Turkish side. Apart from the risk analysis of one the Turkish Governors, some information was included by the dispatch. According to that, in one of the last raids Kurds had made to cross the border, “they had got away more than 1000 sheep”.<sup>866</sup> The Russians have recovered some 200 of them and handed them over to the Turkish Vice–Consul. It was a blazing point that the Soviet authorities were stating that they could not arrest the raiders although they had the list of their names. The British reporter added that “the Turk took the view that it was a case of “will not” rather than “can not”.<sup>867</sup>

The problem which was defended by the Turkish Vice–Consul Nashaat Bey was interpreted in the following paragraph of the dispatch. What Mr. Ogden stated was the disturbance of Azeri local families who had been living in the area. In that regard, some eighty people within some fifteen Turkish families have kept their fears due to the Kurdish tribal raids. Even though Mr. Ogden assessed the situation as a rather exaggerated example, he tried to understand the perception of these people. The former Turkish Vice–Consul was compared to the new Vice–Consul, Nashaat Bey. In that regard, the former was identified as the “wagon”, while the latter one was described as “locomotive”.<sup>868</sup> Nashaat Bey’s bullying of the Farmandar was such an example. Mr. Ogden stated that he could get nowhere by these, yet the problem continued. Beware of that fact, the observations of Mr. Ogden, as exemplified in some British reports, were narrated how the Turkish authorities in the region analyzed the Iranian administration and the Iranians. Even though the generalizing of an identity would cause some miscalculations, it was stated by Mr. Ogden that the Turkish Vice–Consul Mr. Nashaat Bey was “despising the Persians because of their corruptness and dilatoriness”.<sup>869</sup>

---

<sup>866</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>867</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>868</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

<sup>869</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30. FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

Despite the fact that the recent developments caused a deep attentive interest of the British circles in the early Spring of 1943, the report on 26th March 1943 was a final evaluation of Sir Reader Bullard which was summed up in a dispatch supported by Mr. Hankey's assessments. The report's section including the assessments on the internal situation in the country had brought an insightful analysis on the development of domestic political affairs. Of these developments, the first position was separated to the Anglo-Persian Treaty of Alliance. The British authorities in Iran continued to insist on the use of terms, "Persia and Persian". Even though it was symbolic, this was a clear point in almost all dispatches. The Treaty of Alliance was counted as "the most important business" of Muhammad Foroughi.<sup>870</sup> He was the first premier after the abdication of Reza Shah. Then, by a list including the probable names for the cabinets, the names of Ali Soheili and Ahmad Qavam were counted. The former's cabinet has started from March 1943 up to July 1943. Finally, up until the recent developments that resulted in the change of cabinet again, Ahmad Qavam's cabinet had led the country. The section of this long dispatch evaluated the affairs of 1942 in general. Even though it sometimes moved along in a brief way, the findings were adequate to understand what kind of topics stood on the top side of the political agenda. Regarding with the relatives of the soldiers who had been killed during the clashes of August 1941, a bill to provide pension to them was discussed. Other than that, "a bill to regulate the disposal of the lands of ex-Shah, and "a bill to prevent hoarding and profiteering" were discussed in the Majlis.<sup>871</sup>

On the appointment of Soheili as the new and second Prime Minister of Iran after months of the occupation, the dispatch dealt with the possible names. In that regard, the dispatch was a repetition of the dispatches in those months. The Soheili cabinet's program was described as a "well-organized combination of good intentions". The catalog insisted of some new reforms: "the revising of laws, strengthening the Army, balancing the budget and the securing the food supplies". When it is compared with a year's record, the country's new administration under Ali Soheili encountered some of these problems again. Other than these, through the end of Soheili's term, the

---

<sup>870</sup> *Ibid*, p. 34. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>871</sup> *Ibid*, p. 34. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

background of the political rumors was explained. Tadayyoun and Ahmad Qavam's fierce opposition was growing during those weeks. The rumours were about his "nepotism" and some told "ugly stories" about the Prime Minister's "venality".<sup>872</sup> In the first months that Ali Soheili was in the office for the first time, Ali Dashti's Adalat Party was very active and it was stated that throughout the end of Soheili's term, they did their best with Farajhollah Bahramy. Finally, after some negotiations to find out that whether it was suitable to change Ali Soheili or not, the Soviet Legation's response was not affirmative for a while, asking for a more suitable time. At the end, it was not possible to find another solution. Soheili's resignation came afterwards in July 30, 1942. Even though Mr. Soheili was amongst the favourable personalities when he was nominated to the Office, the conditions proved that the change in the Iranian Cabinet would solve some persistent problems. Three days later, Qavam was selected as the new Prime Minister by the Majlis.<sup>873</sup>

After Qavam was assigned as the new Prime Minister, "his firm line with the press" was implicitly approved by the British report that he acted more courageously and actively in the beginning. After all, he was trying to relocate the political authority which had arisen during the terms of his predecessors. Muhammad Ali Foroughi's term and Ali Soheili's term were not found by the British reporter as satisfying. His program was quite brief to address the social and economic problems along with the diplomatic ties with Iran. In that regard, "he stood for the observance of treaties, for internal security, and for the supply of food and medicines for the whole of the nation".<sup>874</sup> In his cabinet, two elderly statesmen were appointed. These were "Hâkim-ul-Molk and Mostashar-ad-Douleh". Aside from these names, Muhammad Sa'ed stayed in the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. For the position of Ministry of Finance, Taqizadeh's answer caused a short-term delay. The problem was solved on August 22, 1942, when Kasemi was named as the new Minister of Finance. Then, Javad Ameri was named as the Minister of Interior. Dr. Siassi was named as the new Minister of Education. Hamid Sayyah was named as the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Baha-ul-Mulk was named as Minister of Justice. Âmin ul- Mulk was

---

<sup>872</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>873</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>874</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

named as Minister of Health. Adl remained in the post of Ministry of Agriculture.<sup>875</sup> Qavam had assumed the Minister of War himself, and this decision was interpreted as a way to distinct himself from the controlling strategy of the Shah. In that regard, this had caused an open dispute between Ahmad Qavam as the new Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff, and certain to state, the Shah.

The British general view assessed the downfall of Ahmad Qavam mainly in regard to his challenge against the Shah's authority on the Armed Forces of Iran. As an overview of Qavam's term in office, these paragraphs proved the critical decisions of this cabinet to bring a resolution to the persistent problems of the country. One of the critical issues was the arrest of certain German suspects whose ties were referring to a direct linkage to the Axis powers in the mind of the Prime Minister. His policy was assessed as a soothing policy. In that regard, his offer to gather the German suspects in a camp in Sultanabad was assessed a way of Qavam's solution to persuade the British Legation in Tehran. On the other hand, the Bill to overcome "a major financial crisis" was passed on September 12, 1942. It was wired that these just provided a "moderate satisfaction" for the country.<sup>876</sup> Qavam's Cabinet made a subsequent war declaration to confirm Iran's dedication to acting on behalf of the Allied powers. The concluding remarks were completed during Ali Soheili's term. "Inspector were appointed in order to remedy and prevent abuses and irregularities by Government officials, and broadcasts by Qavam about the Government's resolve to co-operate with the Allies were well received".<sup>877</sup> The food problems were persistent and these caused a deep discontent in the society. In order to make new adjustments, through the end of September 1942, Qavam had assigned Farrukh as the new Minister of Food. This was not appreciated by the British Legation members' as the new Minister was labeled as "scatter-brained, and temperamental".<sup>878</sup>

Majlis bill on the conscription was put to a further study. The resignation of the Chief of Staff Morteza Yazdan-Panah, although it was not accepted by the Shah, was a strong remark to display the dissatisfaction with Qavam's policies. It was stated

---

<sup>875</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>876</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>877</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>878</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

that Qavam's policies were unwise and he was exposed to accusations such as "favoritism and nepotism". "Kazemi soon resigned, after behaving most disloyal to his chief, soaring prices exacerbated popular discontent, and the fear of the deputies on Qavam's possible dissolution of the Majlis had inclined the opposition in the Majlis."<sup>879</sup>

In November, the Prime Minister decided to ask the Majlis to give him full powers to overcome the difficulties of the country which was fallen in a thorny path. It was explained by the words "to cope with the difficult situation".<sup>880</sup> However, Qavam's political desires were not appreciated by the Majlis. It was thus explained by the words of "without justification" to refer to the misapprehension of Qavam to offer a remedy to bring a solution to the ongoing social and economic problems. Immediately, the Majlis had proven its capacity to oppose the political plans of Qavam which was understood as a plan for an alleged "dictatorship".<sup>881</sup> In that regard, one may easily find some clues to connect the riot which had risen in the capital of Iran and the political desire of Ahmad Qavam. These were causing some violent discussions in the Majlis. On 19th of November, 1942, a secret session had evoked the most violent discussions. As this overall evaluation of the political problems put forth, the political struggle's agency was not only confined to the Majlis deputies, and the Prime Minister Qavam, but also the Shah himself sought the political interests from this dispute. On this point, it was written on the telegram: "The dispute between Qavam and the Shah was brought to a climax by an outbreak of looting and rioting in the streets of Tehran on the 8th and 9th December 1942; the Shah behaved unwisely, and did his best to order the Prime Minister to resign, in spite of having agreed with His Majesty's Minister that he was to stay in office".<sup>882</sup> Qavam's stand was quite firm to display his decisiveness not to leave his post and fight as long as it would take. As a cunning politician, Qavam acted towards the political limits of Iranian intrigues. Hence, it is possible to assert that the discontent of the Shah was due to the rising efficacy of Qavam. The Dispatch analyzed this

---

<sup>879</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>880</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>881</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>882</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

encounter up to the end of 1942. The new developments in the political life of Iran caused some new problems through the resignation of Qavam: “The firm stand taken by Qavam during this crisis created a very good impression on this legation, but it was not long before Qavam’s efforts to please the Deputies caused him the new difficulties, and at the end of the year, the harassed head of the Government was endeavouring to find new members for his Cabinet who might be acceptable both to the Shah and the Deputies”.<sup>883</sup>

The final remarks on the previous year concluded that the political weakness of the Governments to overcome the persistent problems had caused their failures. This was a genuine point to a large extent that the failure of the administrations in Iran had long caused the social and economic problems rise up to an insurmountable level. That’s why the overall assessment implicitly referred to the foreign aids which had functioned to ease the resolution of the conflicts and continuous problems. As the dispatch had narrated some observations on Iranian society’s lack of information, the dispatch put forward that the society’s consciousness was not adequate enough to see the origins of the problems. After stating that a “more radical type of government was needed in order to avoid the revolutionary tendencies”<sup>884</sup> the overall assessment of the British Legation was revealed by the words that “the people of Persia were ill-informed, politically unconscious, and appeared to be almost infinitely long-suffering”.<sup>885</sup>

After the analysis on the course of events which had taken in 1942, the dispatch on March 6, 1943, evaluated the recent situation in Iran. As these reports assessed the technical expertise level of the Allies which had paid attention to the urgency of the social and economic problems, the language was almost interchangeably used for any year of the World War II. Indeed, the chronic problems were perilous to affect the fate of the country. In that regard, Ali Soheili’s balance sheet was going to function as a step to lever up the country’s political, economic and social performances. The dispatch, after assessing the soaring prices, mentioned

---

<sup>883</sup> *Ibid*, p. 45. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>884</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

<sup>885</sup> *Ibid*, p. 46. FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

the newly-arrived American expert Dr. Millspaugh on Iranian finances. At that time, his mission had just arrived in Tehran. For the sake of strengthening Millspaugh mission, a bill was submitted to Iranian Majlis by the Government.<sup>886</sup> The dispatch, on Soheili's Cabinet's first weeks, wrote the assessment that the difficulty of "dealing with the press firmly" was ongoing and there were the indications that "he intended to introduce a social reform program".<sup>887</sup> In order to take some strict precautions, the special powers given to Dr. Millspaugh which would be remembered from the former period of advisory of him would cause some problems. As the powers which were granted to American expertise grew to a larger extent, the following course of events was going to prove that. Indeed, there were several American experts whose advisory was sought to help build Iranian economy, agriculture, police forces, gendarmerie i.e.

Dr. Millspaugh was not the only personality to take a role in adjusting the Iranian domestic affairs. The expertise ranged from a number fields including the urban and rural security, financial administration, agriculture. Moreover, it was his second time, and his position and the other American experts' positions were welcomed to a considerable degree to lever up the Iranian state administration. Other than Dr. Millspaugh, Blake counted the names of *Joseph P. Sheridan*<sup>888</sup> to adjust the Iranian agricultural system which was chaotically suffering in the shortages of cereals, *Stephen Timmermann*<sup>889</sup> to adjust the Police Forces, and *Colonel Norman Schwarzkopf* to adjust the Iranian Gendarmerie.<sup>890</sup> Hence, once again, as it would be derived from the early American expertise during WWII, the main topics of the agenda concentrated on the security issues and fiscal problems. That's why an

---

<sup>886</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

<sup>887</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

<sup>888</sup> Blake, *ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>889</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>890</sup> Rose L. Greaves. "1942-1976: The Reign of Muhammad Riza Shah." In *Twentieth-Century Iran*. Edited by. Hossein Amirsadeghi. London: Heinemann, 1977, p. 56. Greaves also counted the names of General Greely, as successor of him, General Ridley, advisers to the Intendant General's Department of the Ministry of War.



income tax, as the riskiest and adorable underpinning of the Millspaugh's mission, was introduced.

Thus, the American aids were playing a vital role in order to diminish the sufferings of Iranian society during those months. Through the spring of 1943, the unprecedented weather conditions and the railway problems, "the blocking of the roads by snow"<sup>891</sup>, and the transportation process of barley from Iraq along with the harsh weather conditions were the main reasons to make Iranian Government encounter the anxious days. Therefore, the Iranian Government in Tehran was trying to find an urgent solution directly for the wheat problem. Aside from American aids, Soviet aids also supported Iran: "Some 1,200 tons of wheat and barley were released by the Russians from Gorgan area, south-east of the Caspian, but the truth of a statement provided with foodstuffs entirely from the Northern provinces of Persia, was anything but apparent in Tehran".<sup>892</sup>

Meanwhile, the Iranian public opinion was aware of the fact that the delays continued to cause the rise of the level to make Iranians suffer more due to the food shortages. As the time went by, the anger and the accusations of the Iranian public rose. The disturbance of Iranian people towards dependence on the imports of Allies would not present any solution in the short term.<sup>893</sup> Hence, as a discussion to solve the food problem, a new plan to provide new stocks of cereals was prepared. The question was put on the table in January and February 1943 between the American expert Mr. Sheridan, British and the American Legations. "The final conclusion was that, in addition to the 25,000 tons of wheat already promised, 5,000 tons of wheat, and some 16,000 tons of barley or millet flour would need to be imported, and these additional amounts and more have now been incorporated into the Middle East Supply Center (M.E.S.C.) programme for the provision of cereals for the Persian Gulf area".<sup>894</sup>

The most critical part of the telegram dealt with the new Iranian cabinet under Mr. Soheili. As Mr. Soheili assumed the post of Premier for the second time, the main

---

<sup>891</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

<sup>892</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

<sup>893</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

<sup>894</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55-56. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

question was what kind of changes were to be introduced to Iranian society. In that regard, Mr. Tadayyoun's assignment to the Ministry of Food who was the Minister of Finance without portfolio was stated to add to his strength. The Prime Minister's new effort was understood as a fresh style to keep the strong ties between his Office and the Chamber. For that purpose, a group of fourteen deputies was selected to meet the Soheili Cabinet periodically. Thus, the contact was going to be maintained. It is not surprising that the Government would face the opposition when it made an effort to grant widely-arranged authority to Dr. Millspaugh to control the prices. This was stated to cause an opposition inevitably.<sup>895</sup>

As this point clearly indicated, the widely-arranged authority of Dr. Millspaugh would eventually cause a political opposition in Iranian Majlis. Even though there was such a risk, these wide powers were definitely helpful to understand the sophisticated nature of the Iranian economy and social life. In a sense, the huge amount of problems were loaded onto the shoulders of an American expert. After all, Dr. Millspaugh could be evaluated as one of the most powerful authorities in Iranian political scene during WWII. Dr. Millspaugh's mission should be affirmed by the Majlis deputies and Prime Minister Qavam had submitted the authorization bill to Iranian Chamber on November 12, 1942. For that sake, "he had to convince the deputies on the importance of attracting American grain and American intervention against the British".<sup>896</sup>

The powers which were granted to Dr. Millspaugh were counted as the "control of everything concerning the purchase of merchandise, other than the food-stuff, including the importation, transport, ware-housing and distribution". Other than these he was stated that "he would be empowered to require the return of existing stocks, to issue licenses for the manufacture and sale of goods, to confiscate stocks with compensation to owners, in general, to do all that he considered necessary to stabilize prices and ensure fair distribution. Finally, he would have the power to make regulations having the force of law".<sup>897</sup> Briefly, the field of authority which Millspaugh wielded included almost every field in an exclusion of the foodstuffs.

---

<sup>895</sup> *Ibid*, p. 55-56. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

<sup>896</sup> Macfarland, 1985, p. 57-58.

<sup>897</sup> *Ibid*, p. 58. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

Since the field of foodstuffs was separated for the authority of Mr. Sheridan, yet a legislation to prohibit the speculation on crops was submitted to the Majlis. After all, Millspaugh mission gathered the arrows of the critiques of the deputies when he dismissed the head of National Bank of Iran (Bank-e Melli-ye Iran). The head of the National Bank was Abol Hassan Ebtehaj.<sup>898</sup>

On the following part of the dispatch, Ali Soheili's ten-point program was analyzed which he addressed at the New Year broadcast. Nowruz, the celebration of the new year was a remarkable time where the political leadership could benefit along with the national values. The new Prime Minister's agenda commenced with "the call to his compatriots to make sacrifices in the interest of final victory".<sup>899</sup> Although the term of final victory did not refer to an early predicted final of WWII, it was already an indicator of the wish to mention the national unity. Even though there were social and economic unrests in the country, the political stability was relatively caught during the term of Ali Soheili. After his withdrawal in February 1944, the new phase of the nationalist interregnum as a democratic prelude started. Since the study's definition of time period relied on the course of events to involve the affairs of the thirteenth Majlis, the pulse of the political life was scrutinized. The presence of allies in Iran through the tumultuous phases of WWII displayed it certainly that the domestic milieu of Iran could be transformed through the handling of social and economic problems. Although it did not present a full solution of the persistent problems in Iran, the main part of the war agenda was answered. In the second phase of the interregnum, the struggle between the Allies converted into a three-pronged strategy by the involvement of the United States. In that regard, one may not neglect the fact that the Allied contributive efforts in Iranian political life came afterward of the 1943 elections. As an episode worthy of attention on Iran's political agenda during WWII, Tehran Conference and its repercussions in terms of the fate of Iran need a further analysis.

---

<sup>898</sup> After years of his dismissal from the directorship of Bank-e Melli by the directorship of Dr. Millspaugh, Abol Hassan Ebtehaj was recalled to duty by the Shah as the director of the new development plan. Please see Harald Mehner, "Development and Planning In Iran After The World War II", *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, ed. George Lenczowski, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978, p. 177. Milani, 2011, v. 2, p. 735-744. For the first development plan which was conducted between 1949-1956 please also see Janjua, 1966, p. 140.

<sup>899</sup> *Ibid*, p. 58. FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

During the term of Ali Soheili, the Tehran Conference has gathered under cautious terms of WWII. Before the Tehran Conference, the Allied leaders had gathered in Cairo and Moscow, the latter of which was a contributive effort for the Allied talks. As it was mentioned before, Iran's war declaration against Germany was a symbolic effort to consolidate her position among the United Nations. This fact was repeated by the British archival documents for several times. In that respect, the war declaration in the first part of September 1943 brought a new term for Iran.<sup>900</sup>

During the Conference in Tehran, Iran's territorial integrity and the opening a new front in Normandy, Europe were the two significant achievements. According to the declaration of the Conference, the Allies were going to evacuate Iran in no more than six months after the ending of hostilities. Moreover, it was certain that they guaranteed the respect for the independence of Iran and its territorial integrity.

There is no hesitation to say that the conference in Tehran had brought declarations which were carrying vital importance in two ways. First and foremost, the fate of WWII was designed, and the future lines of cooperation were defined. It was partially related to the office term of PM Ali Soheili; however, the main reason for the gathering of Tehran Conference was beyond that factor. Although it was the second declaration, the declaration about Iran's fate in and after WWII sought to prove the trustability of Allied powers in the eyes of Iranian Government. It was a remarkable point that the conference had gathered without the permission of Iranian Government.<sup>901</sup> In the following sub-title the nature of three currents of thought which rivalled during the first phase of the national interregnum will be examined.

### **3.5. Rivalry of Three Political Currents In Iran (1941–1946)**

Despite the fact that the social and economic aspects require a broader review along with the political dynamics in Iran during WWII, it is possible to analyze the Iranian political affairs under three categories in a given time period. The currents of thought which encircled the political field that suffered in tumultuous months of

---

<sup>900</sup> *A Political Chronology of The Middle East*, London, Europa Publications, 2001, p. 50.

<sup>901</sup> Lorentz, "Tehran Conference", *ibid*, p 330.

worldwide warfare were nationalism, communism, and Islamic reactionism respectively. Amongst these currents of thought, nationalism was probably the most substantial ideology that also affected communism and Islamic reactionism. As the commander of the Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan staged a coup with Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai on the pretext to solidify the administration of the country by the support of a number of radical reformers. As Yapp stated, after a few years of the coup, the Shah underlined “the object of his movement” and political program relied upon the army, and thus the state. The prioritization of the army which was stated by the Shah generated the main goal of his reformation program. In a sense, as Kapuściński stated, “the army was the apple of the Shah’s eye”.<sup>902</sup> A military and uniformed understanding of the nationalization was significant in the example of Iran’s transformation into a nation–state. In his regard, the spirit of the country was equal to the army. Eradication of the foreign influence on the army and the domestic affairs and making the country independent<sup>903</sup> as much as possible was a goal which amalgamated with the thought of nationalism. Even though there were numerous variants of nationalism, it endured being the most encompassing ideology during the Pahlavi era. During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the country experienced the change of dynasty which had ruled on the territory of Iran for more than a century. After the foundation of Pahlavi dynasty, the rise of the political system depended on the perspectives of nationalism and centralization. The post–occupation era in Iran brought an unprecedented change in the political life of the country. Even though Iran’s political life was not totally monolithic which represented the stagnation of the authority of the Majlis, Reza Shah’s vision helped Iran to build up a monolithic system where any kind of opposition to the national views of culture and history were rejected. Iran’s pre–Islamic legacy was a kind of buffer to encounter Islam and it is ideology. What nationalism referred in Iranian context under the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the subsequent rule under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was that entire class structures were under the influence of this ideology. As Ahmad Fekri put forth, the new middle class which appeared as a political body to make a quest of

---

<sup>902</sup> Kapuściński, *ibid*, p. 22.

<sup>903</sup> Yapp, 1996, p. 169. Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History In A World Civilization*, v.3, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 330.

new social, cultural and economic demands depended upon the principles of national sovereignty and independence. Rule of law, the construction of Iranian national values along with the national identity, liberalism, secularism and modernism were the main demands of this new middle class.<sup>904</sup> Amidst these political demands, nationalism stood as an ideology to represent the main character of both the power and in a partial context, the political opposition. Even the clergy was affected by the thought of nationalism and they could not stay benign to the nationalistic demands. All of the impacts of nationalism endured affecting the Iranian political life right after the invasion of the country. Anglo–Soviet invasion of the country by August 1941 unleashed the pent–up grievances and political opposition. As nationalism was the most puissant ideology, it found a way of expression in any kind of political agencies. The term “national (melli), “Iran” and “the nationalist” (melliyun) were the trademarks of the nationalism which referred to the entire of the nationalist interregnum. Although the Tudeh Party was the most significant formation in the political field during this period, it was also the National Front (Cebhe–ye Melli) a trademark of the idea of nationalism depending on the political struggle against the foreign influence in Iran and the concessions.<sup>905</sup> As Majid Yazdi stated in his dissertation, “the main characteristic of the nationalist era was the relative restoration of freedoms both social and political”.<sup>906</sup> In that regard, nationalism as a way to open the political paths for both communism and Islamic revivalism represented a blanket ideology to converge with the political visions of these ideologies. It may sound astounding why nationalism could stand as the most puissant ideology against the thought of communism and Islamic revivalism. The second was a reference to the communized property and the eradication of the mobilization of labor against the capitalist interests. The third was a political idea to encompass the Islamic values and a political vision to conduct an alleged “purification” and the description of a transnational identity even when it was considered in terms of the term of the

---

<sup>904</sup> Amir Ahmad Fekri, *Tarihsel Gelişim Sürecinde İran Devrimi*, İstanbul, Mızrak Yayınları, 2011, p. 207.

<sup>905</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 153, 156, 163–164.

<sup>906</sup> Majid Yazdi, *Religion, Modernization and Politics In Iran: An Analysis of Clerical Political Behavior During The Pahlavi Monarchy (1925–1979)*, Houston, Texas, Rice University, Ph.D. 1989, p. 3.

denomination. In that regard, the role of nationalism emerged as the most sophisticated element in Iranian politics during the early Pahlavi period and the nationalist interregnum.

Secondly, the idea of communism was mostly represented by the Tudeh Party. Although it was not the first political organization to defend the communist goals in Iran's recent political history, a well-woven and compact past that lied behind it since the early 1920s, the Tudeh Party made a successful record to prove the genuinely-based organization of a political party. As Tachau stated, it differed from the older Communist Party both in its name and composition. The former communist party was composed of a balanced cadre who assumed the role to defend Marxist ideals. The latter communist party which Tachau stated as the "Communist Party II" was mostly composed of Azerbaijanis who had converted to Marxism as a consequence of interactions with Soviet intellectuals.<sup>907</sup> The Tudeh Party was mostly urban-based, in particular it flourished its ideas in Tehran and the vicinity of the capital. More important than these, it did not assume the name of "communist" due to the "shunned and condemned" myth of the idea. Instead, the Tudeh Party referred to a wider scope to catch the political interests by reference to the word "masses".<sup>908</sup> Gholam-Reza Afkhami asserted that, as WWII broke out, the main concern of Iran was the Soviet Union. As the epicenter of communism at that time, the Soviet Union was not perceived as a comrade and ally by the Iranians. The false perception of the thought of communism was disliked by millions of Iranians due to the clerical propaganda against the "godless" values of communism.<sup>909</sup> Although the thought was a reference to the egalitarian worldview of the intellectuals and any kind of suppressed people (literally it would be denoted as *mostazafan*) this perception was objected by the clerics who mentioned in a nasty way to vilify that the idea of communism depended upon of sharing the wives and daughters and the collective ownership. The distrust of Iranians towards Tsarist Russia had once been reproduced by the black propaganda of the clergy. As Abrahamian stated, to use the language of the 19th century, Iran had been a pawn in the "Great Game" of which the economic

---

<sup>907</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 146–147.

<sup>908</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 146–147.

<sup>909</sup> Afkhami, *ibid*, p. 61.

and political rivalry between two big powers converged in Iran.<sup>910</sup> Although the objective conditions which affected the distrust were available, the distrust's relationship with the idea of communism was ambivalent. Hence, after all kind of objective conditions, the alleged distrust of Iranians produced the idea that communism was "a tool of Soviet Union to maintain it's dominion and control".<sup>911</sup> Even though the level of distrust was high enough, the Soviet Union's revolutionary ideals and revolutionary position on Iran's fate changed the equilibrium on behalf of the Tudeh Party. By the mid-century, the public opinion detected the "hidden hand" of Britain behind some crucial events in the country's past such as the Russian emissary Griboyedov's murder, the assassinations of Amir Kabir (d. 1852), Nasser al-Din Shah (d. 1896)<sup>912</sup>, and Robert Imbrie, the American Vice-Consul (d. 1924) supposedly of his seeking an oil concession on behalf of the United States. Nikki Keddie stated that from 1921 to 1924, the American enterprise for oil concessions was conducted by the Standart Oil Company and the Sinclair Oil Company. The mission of American financial expert as the new treasurer general of Iran started during this process. However, the oil concession enterprises, although ratified in the Iranian Majlis, did not bring a concrete result. Although the Arthur Millspaugh mission failed eventually, the credibility of the United States remained as a favorable option for a short period of time. In the last analysis, the British options confirmed that American enterprises would be "the next best" option during these years.<sup>913</sup> Thus, during the times of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, it was prevalent that the public distrust did not only target these powers but also Britain as well.<sup>914</sup> It is worth to note that unlike of Tsarist Russia during WWI, the Soviet Union followed a

---

<sup>910</sup> Abrahamian, 2013, p. 24.

<sup>911</sup> *Ibid*, p. 61.

<sup>912</sup> Nasser al-Din Shah's assassination by one of the disciples (Mirza Reza Kermani) of prominent 19th century thinker of Persia, Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani requires a broader analysis, which in the last resort, reveals the detected suspicions, and the distrust of the Iranian people against the foreign manipulations. In that regard, two articles would be helpful for an inauguration of the reading. Margaet Khohn, "Afghani on Empire, Islam, and Civilization", *Political Theory*, v. 37, n.3, June, 2009, p. 398–422. Nikki R. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II", *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 3, n. 1, (Ocober, 1966), p. 46–67.

<sup>913</sup> Keddie, 2006, p. 83–86.

<sup>914</sup> Abrahamian, 2013, p. 30.



path of revolutionary ideals in Iran during WWII. For that purpose, it was possible to analyze that the roles of two traditional powers had changed from WWI to WWII in terms of supporting the status quo.<sup>915</sup> During WWI, Britain was the supporter of revolutionary ideals which believed the need to change the Constitutional period's stagnancy. That situation which continued up until the end of WWI changed on behalf of the Soviet Union during WWII. That fact could not change the wicked image of the Soviet Union in reference to its past of empire yet it helped build the Tudeh Party to fix the image of the Soviet Union relatively. The Tudeh Party pursued "a united front against fascism"<sup>916</sup> which was probably the most convergent element with the Soviet Union. Although it was a communist party which developed a more skillful effort than its predecessor, it did not assume any affiliation with the Soviet Union directly. In terms of the Tudeh Party's program, it was possible to state that the revolutionary ideals were assessed in the uniqueness of Iran's societal and economic dynamics. It was probably due the assumption that the Tudeh Party should put its identity to oppose the inequalities and the economic deprivations of the Iranians, the party members took an active role during the bread riots in Tehran.<sup>917</sup> It was asserted by Tachau that Iranian intellectuals who led the Tudeh Party did not find Iran at a level of satisfaction to implement the class-based conditions.<sup>918</sup> Even though the time period of the study selected to assess the formation of the political opposition and the interrelationship of foreign policy with the domestic politics until the gridlock of WWII, it was the Tudeh Party which won eight seats in the fourteenth majlis found an opportunity to co-operate with Ahmad Qavam in 1946. As the war was over and the conditions of the Tripartite Alliance aspired to finalize the military presence of the Allies, Ahmad Qavam's political strategy soon diverged from the strategy of the Tudeh Party. The party's affiliation with the Soviet Union became more clear during these years. Thus, it was clear that any kind of movement supporting the communist ideals faced the threat of nationalism which as an idea was inclining gradually. As a competing current of thought, the thought of communism

---

<sup>915</sup> Armajani, 1970, p. 347.

<sup>916</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 147.

<sup>917</sup> Gheissari, 1998, p. 66.

<sup>918</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 147.

enjoyed the most vivacious period up until those years. In particular, the period between 1941 and 1946 when the “the events of Shahrivar 1320” as the Iranians called the occupation to the settling down of the European war campaigns, shaped the vision of the Tudeh Party. Recruiting the leadership of Iraj Iskandari and his comrades, the efforts of them resulted in the acquisition of eight seats in the parliament of Iran in the following years. This period represented the most confident era of the communist movement up until the 1970s. The frustrated intellectuals whose background of education referred to a bunch of prominent European countries were aware of the fact that “the outmoded system”<sup>919</sup> caused the deep problems in Iran. The party as the epicenter of the chronically growing discontent did not omit the social and economic facts and cared for the basis of nationalism. After the party gained a minority status in Iranian Majlis, it was obliged to encounter the rising pressure of the nationalist approach of the deputies led by Mohammad Mosaddiq who defended the anti-concessionist position of Iran against the Soviet Union as well. One of the milestones of the political affairs in 1944 was the strong objection of the deputies against the Soviets’ head of oil delegation, Sergei Kavtaradze.<sup>920</sup> Kavtaradze’s arrival to Tehran coincided with the difficult task of the fifth prime minister of the Iranian administrations. After Mohammad Ali Foroughi, Ali Soheili and Ahmad Qavam and the second term of Mr. Soheili in office, Mohammad Sa’ed, a prominent Majlis deputy of Azerbaijani origins, as the former ambassador to Moscow was “to all appearances particularly suited to deal with the Soviets’ foreign policy”. As Atabaki stated, his “wait and see”<sup>921</sup> policy against the concessionist trials of the Soviet Union was already perceived by the Tudeh Party. The party’s traditional remedy to activate the nationalist discourse came in this process. Radmanesh, as a member of the Tudeh Party’s caucus in the Majlis, “rose to his feet and made clear his party’s policy concerning the oil concessions”<sup>922</sup> and declared that the Tudeh Party opposed any kind concessions to foreign countries. The

---

<sup>919</sup> Savory, 1978, p. 100.

<sup>920</sup> Atabaki, 2000, p. 78.

<sup>921</sup> Atabaki, 2000, p. 78.

<sup>922</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 77.

country's capability of extracting its own resources along with the construction of railroads were the main elements on defending his own party. Radmanesh's speech at the secret session in Iranian Majlis coincided with the American concessionist trials before the Soviets' approach to demand new concessions. As one would analyze the context of international relations, the indicators on the cause and effect would help the readers to understand the course of events. Thus, first the American efforts and subsequently the Soviet efforts made the country, the government under Mohammad Sa'ed and the Tudeh Party come to a critical turning point. The Tudeh Party, although it stated a position against the concessions in the first congress which convened just two months previously, directed towards a concessionist policy to favour the Soviet interests. In that congress, out of 25800 members, 168 delegates were elected to the council of the Tudeh Party in August, 1944.<sup>923</sup> Atabaki mentioned that this turning point affected the fate of the Tudeh Party in the course of its own history. More importantly, it was the Soviet pressure on the Tudeh Party that caused the idea of communism lose some grounds. The factors which affected the party's base lower could be summed up with the causes of the Soviet pressure, and related to that, the Tudeh Party's activation of oil workers to come into the streets in Tehran on October 27, 1944.<sup>924</sup> Hence, the outcomes of the change of communist strategy was mentioned by the definition of the veteran leaders of the Tudeh Party as a "catastrophic result".<sup>925</sup> Here, at that point, the Tudeh Party's encounter with nationalism proved the fact that Iranian political affairs require an analysis of the equilibrium. As a matter of fact, Mosaddiq's opposition to the concessions as the rising leader of the vaguely floating national front was not some atypical. However, he mentioned that the positive equilibrium (*movazana-e mosbat*) policy which resulted in the unequal distribution of interests on Iran's natural resources would not help the country's ill-fated future.<sup>926</sup> His firm stance against the rising American demands for concessions on behalf of the companies such as Standart Oil of New

---

<sup>923</sup> Gheissari, 1998, p. 66.

<sup>924</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 78.

<sup>925</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 79.

<sup>926</sup> Abrahamian, 2013, p. 24.

Jersey and Socony–Vacuum would cause a new dilemma for Iranian politics against the concessions soon after the rise of Soviet demands.<sup>927</sup> As it was cited from the memoirs of British consul then, all the course of events would make the Soviet Union to transform into “a cold-war rival from a hot-war ally”.<sup>928</sup> He proposed a new policy which was a contribution to the literature on Iranian foreign policy, and defended that being averse to demanding the new concessions for the Soviet Union, Iranian governments should follow the path of cancelling any kind of concessions. This meant the eradication of concessions entirely, and the assumption of “a non-aligned status”.<sup>929</sup> Although the policy rose in the beginning of 1950’s, the roots of this policy emerged during WWII’s momentous times. His policy which he named as “negative equilibrium (movazanah–ye manfi)”<sup>930</sup> proved the victory of nationalist approach as a current of thought that shaped the Iranian political thinking. In that regard, although it may appear as a fluctuation of the Tudeh Party’s political aspects, the turning point eventually helped the radicalization of Soviet interests in Iran. An ethnic problem’s fundamental roots were already available. Yet, the turning point of the Tudeh Party and the communist movement brought some subsequent turbulence for the idea of communism in Iran. Surely, Iran’s territorial integrity which underwent the threat of Azeri and Kurdish autonomous states constituted one of the earlier international problems of conflict resolution. During the War years, there were numerous journals and newspapers sponsored by the political parties. Amongst these, the Tudeh-sponsored organs were *Rahbar* (the Guide), *Mardom* (the people), *Zafar* (the Victory), *Khavar Now* (the New East) in Tabriz, and *Rasti* (the Truth) led by the Tudeh committee in Khorassan.<sup>931</sup>

As the third and the last current, Islamic reactionism was a part of the intellectual life and both the economic and social spheres in Iran’s nearby history. To

---

<sup>927</sup> *Ibid*, p. 38–39.

<sup>928</sup> *Ibid*, p. 39.

<sup>929</sup> Poulson, *ibid*, p. 168.

<sup>930</sup> Atabaki, *ibid*, p. 79. Savory stated in October 1944, in his famous “negative equilibrium speech”, he defended the view that no oil concessions should be granted while foreign troops were landed on the Iranian soil. Savory, 1970, p. 625.

<sup>931</sup> Arasteh, *ibid*, p. 116.

begin with, it was certain that religion had kept its centrality in Iranian society for many centuries. As Limbert stated, it was a fact of historical ages since the times of the Achaemenian and Sasanid empires. Ahura Mazda, as the God of Zoroastrianism was respected at the utmost level and the kings' association themselves with the God of this religion continued during the Sasanid era as the Zoroastrianism was made the official religion of the state. A significant example to understand the role of religion in Iranian society and political affairs was the Safavid Empire which assumed the Twelver Shi'a Islam as the official belief.<sup>932</sup>

The clergy's role for several centuries affected the way of thinking and the pulse of any kind of layers in the society such as the bazaar, the merchants, the land aristocrats, the civilian and military bureaucracy, and the Palace. Religion's centrality would also be specialized in terms of Shi'a Islam of which the clergy asserted an autonomy from the state power. Even though the clergy's authority did not make a total splinter off the state authority during the Qajar era, the members of the clergy had assumed themselves as strong enough to warn about the foreign representatives' interferences. As the clergy did not assert any control on the solid power of the Qajar monarchs, they consistently preserved the confidence to claim the right on the violation of Iran's independence. Two significant examples to display the role of the clergy in the rise of popular protests against the foreign concessions and domination were the Alexander Griboyedov incident and the Tobacco Revolt. In the former case, Russian representative and his entourage had arrived in Iran to make negotiations of a treaty after the Russo-Persian War. At the same time, his investigations on detecting the forcefully realized marriages of some Georgian women with Iranians revealed the fact that conversion into Shi'ite belief and the decisions of these women to make marriages did not rely on their consent. Acting on behalf of the Tsarist Russia's directives, Alexander Griboyedov made some of these women who did not resent the idea of taking shelter in the Russian Legation. Soon after, the clergy's reaction to oppose the interference of Russian officials resulted in their murder of Griboyedov and a few members of his short-term mission. The second example was the Tobacco Revolt of which the clergy's role in the previous episodes of Iranian history were solidified. The clergy's strict attitude to deny the

---

<sup>932</sup> Limbert, *ibid*, p. 26.

consumption of a concession–led production referred to both the attention paid on the independence of the country and the circulation of the values pioneered by the religious authorities. The Tobacco Revolt was often taken as a prelude to the Constitutional Revolution. Hence, up until the wake of the 20th century, the ulama emerged as a source of opposition to the foreign interference, humiliation of religious and moral values by the foreigners, although an exceptional case such as the first concession of Britain in 1863 was available, concessions and the subordination of the clergy’s influence on the society and their interests. The period of Reza Shah stood as a unique phase of Iranian history in terms of the attempts to subordinate the clerical establishment in Iranian society and economy. Even though the eradication of the economic power of the clergy was rather concluded during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the political power of the clergy survived to a considerable extent through the end of this era. Although the clergy’s role during the Constitutional Revolution was not primary, it was certain that in mostly the rural areas and to a certainly lesser degree than that, in the urban areas, the clergy maintained its role as a source of authority on the Iranian public opinion. As Yazdi stated in his dissertation on the role of the clergy under the Pahlavis, the nationalist period signified the liberation and the manifestation of the clergy’s interests. Yazdi counted three categories to represent the formation of clergy’s interests as “the radical, pragmatic and conservative”. These patterns which were counted by Yazdi referred to the fact that the clergy’s interests were not totally converging and homogenous. In all these patterns, the order of clerical interests, national aspects and the religious values were shuffled. The conservative approach the clergy stated that the order should follow the priorities in such order as religious, clerical corporate and the nationalist. The pragmatic pattern presumed that the order should follow the priorities in such order as the nationalist, religious, and clerical corporate. Lastly, the radical view which was exemplified by the Devotees of Islam presumed that the religious, the nationalist and the clerical corporate were the priorities. Amongst the political parties which proliferated in the wake of the occupation the notion of religion could find places for itself however the secular establishment of the political life in Iran did not let the rise of religious political activism. Although a *modus vivendi* between the Shah and the clerical establishment came true through the midst of 1943 and it flourished in the subsequent course of events in such cases as the Shah’s invitation of Ayatollah

Qomi, and Shah's visit of Ayatollah Boroujerdi at the hospital where he was treated or the election of Sheikh Molla Hossein Langari to the fourteenth Majlis, a prominent, secret and a radical political party's formation did just take place through the end of WWII. This political entity was formed by a young seminary of Shi'ite thought, Navvab Safavi. Even though the parties were not the sole constituents of the political field and there were some political associations, the political party formation along the interests of Islamic reactionism did not take place during WWII. Although a political party's formation waited up until the end of the 1940s, certain amount of importance was paid to the press than the political party activities. As Arasteh stated the press organs of the ardent supporters of Islamic revivalism were *A'in-e Islam* (The Doctrine of Islam), *Neday-e Hagh* (The Herald of The Truth) and *Ruh-e Azadi* (The Spirit of the Freedom).<sup>933</sup> In that regard, one may come to a conclusion that the Islamic reactionism stood behind the margins of the dominant currents of thought as nationalism and communism could find the tunnels of political party activism. Additionally, as Aaron Vahid Sealy stated in his dissertation, the clergy's political vision to act "as a bulwark against communism" proved the fact that it was beneficial along with the nationalists' struggle with the communists.<sup>934</sup> However, the genuine course of events proved that the rhetoric and the political agency continued on behalf of the members of the clergy. The Shah's policy to keep the equilibrium in domestic politics made him to follow an appeasement policy to stimulate the clerical interests on behalf of his power. The Shah's conscious involved a two-faceted view for either of which he was not able wear a fully suitable shirt. Two natures developed and coexisted in the mind of the Shah of which he assumed his power would grow ambitiously.<sup>935</sup> In that regard, his cruelty in his first period of rule was not comparable with the cruelty of his father. His personal features made him to select a way of appeasement under the light of subjective and objective conditions. Conservative realists would be analysed in a floating terminology amongst the political parties such as the National Will Party, Justice Party and the Democrat Party

---

<sup>933</sup> Arasteh, *ibid*, p. 116.

<sup>934</sup> Aaron Vahid Sealy, " 'In Their Place': Marking and Unmarking Shi'ism In Pahlavi Iran", University of Michigan, Unpublished Ph.D., 2011, p.3.

<sup>935</sup> Kapuściński, *ibid*, p. 22.

of Iran. Although these political formations recruited some items and discourse from the leftist and Islamic revivalist cadres, the target to keep the centrality of the politics lasted up until the end of the war years. Their press organs were counted by Arasteh as *I'tehad-e Milli* (the National Union), *Shahid* (Martyr) and *Bakhtar-e Emruz*.<sup>936</sup>

### 3.6. Summary

As a summary, this chapter was an effort to encompass the political atmosphere in Iran during the tumultuous months of WWII. In order to scrutinize the reasons that affected the course of political affairs, the political historical scale was not sufficient enough. As Cronin put forth that the history from below appeared as a disadvantageous type of historical study due to the domination of well-prepared, voluminous sources by the political elites in such fields as the politics, religion, military, education, health and law.<sup>937</sup> The British documents were helpful to overcome the difficulties to highlight the problems that were persistent in social and economic spheres. Finally, this chapter also sought to put forth that the political turmoil of the country did not only depend on the political intrigues but also stayed under the heavy influences of a bunch of structural reasons. The formation of the 14th Majlis depended upon the regularly growing mindset of constitutional rule. To a certain extent, the constitutional rule developed through the new course of affairs after 1941. The social and economic grievances of the wider masses that included the intellectuals, and the working class emerged in several type of forms that represented the political opposition. The result of these grievances represented themselves in the political sphere by numerous type of political coalitions which did not exempt the Palace and the Imperial bureaucracy. The main aim was to consolidate the state building process, and the preservation of the essence of the modernization program. However, the new dynamics set the tone and the strategies of the political life where the nationalist claims were determinant which found its basis within the societal approach that covered almost the whole of the intellectual life. Tribal oppositions continued up until 1944 along with the rise of the autonomous movements. That was

---

<sup>936</sup> Arasteh, *ibid*, p. 116.

<sup>937</sup> "Introduction", ed. Stephanie Cronin, *Subalterns and Social Protest: History From Below In The Middle East and North Africa*, New York, Routledge, 2008.



represented on the struggle between the Allied powers and the Nazi forces. However, the main struggle was among the Allies, in particular the Soviet forces and authorities and the British forces, and the Legation members. Other than that, the rivalry of three currents of thought represented the fragmentation of the political sphere which was assessed as it relatively continued through the post-WWII period. The question to be raised here was whether during the transition period a titular democratization took place or not. Considering the formation of the 14th Majlis, the rise of the nationalist tendencies along with the Islamic reactionism, and the leftist movements, the Majlis gained its authority once again. The transformation of the titular Majlis into a legislative organ necessarily meant the separation of powers. The legacy of the Constitutional period which relied on the rule of law and predictability of governance reformed during the turmoil of WWII referred to the credibility of the elections. Thus, although a large body of literature mentioned the youth and the inexperience of the new Shah, the main dynamics that affected the political party formation once again were the social and economic grievances, the support of the occupant Allies to the political proliferation, and the Constitutional period's legacy. Although the authoritarian modernization under the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi rose on the tenets of a profound program, the emanation of the political opposition was prohibited eventually. The support of the imperial bureaucracy to the political proliferation continued through the early phase of the nationalist interregnum which could be understood as an advantage for the Iranian political transformation. Despite the fact that the entire of the wartime problems could not be solved, the Majlis and the political parties contributed to the resolution of the social and economic problems. As a conclusion, the third chapter dealt with the rise of the 13th, and more important than that, the 14th Majlis bodies to claim a widespread participation and representation. The Tudeh Party's rise to the benches of the Majlis did not only refer to the turmoil of WWII, but also it referred to the political opportunities to make extensive collaborations. Below, the fourth, and the last chapter will assess the main dynamics that affected the reformation of the political opposition in Iran from the mid 1920s to the mid of the 1940s.

## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed at exploring the bases, and the dynamics of the reformation of the political opposition in Iran from 1926 to 1946. The period which was mostly assessed as the early Pahlavi period followed the inclination and consolidation of Reza Shah's arbitrary rule from 1926 to 1941. Subsequently, Iran was occupied under the command of the Allied forces. The substitution of a powerful monarch with his son, the turmoil, fragmentation and the proliferation of political parties in the country through WWII, and socio-economic fluctuations constituted the main agenda of the period from 1941 to 1946.

The general tendencies in the related literature were evaluated in the first chapter of the dissertation. Depending on the literature review, a five-stepped model to explicate the reformation of the political opposition in Iran was offered. These models were given as below: *1.Evolving Political Party-Based Narratives: Dowreh-System 2.Modernization Under Reza Shah: Instrumentalist or Enlightened? 3.Confrontation of the Society with the State 4.Approach of Compromise 5.Ruling-Party-Based Approach Towards Controlling of The Political Opposition*

In the second chapter of the dissertation, Iran's recent political history under Reza Shah Pahlavi was analyzed. During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the transformation of the country into the quest of an authoritarian modernization program helped build the centuries-driven oldness of the country. All along these years, several fields witnessed the progressive transformation of the country. Although the modernization was coded with the hyper-masculine nucleus, the essence of the Pahlavi modernization introduced some progressive steps to enlarge the rights of women in the Western style without the suffrage. The substructure's development happened in all of the restrictions of the country's economic dependence by the Western world. The attention which was paid to the education, commerce, transportation, health system, technical capacities, the restoring of the

central authority, the building of a stronger army prevailed the fact that the progress was aimed at the expense of the political opposition.

Iranian nationalism was a part of the Pahlavi autocracy which sought to unify the fragmented composition of the society in Iran. By depending on this current of thought's profound influences, the second chapter aimed to explicate the rising tendencies of nationalism in Iran prior to the 1920's first, and the subsequent conditions which prepared the ascendance of Reza Khan as the sole authority in Iranian political life. The quest of the country towards a more confident path which subsequently evolved from the chaotic conditions to the arbitrary rule of Reza Khan in the 1920's was examined in the second section of this chapter. As mentioned before, the modernization efforts' scope under Reza Shah Pahlavi has carried the country to a more competent level but by and large, the political modernization failed at the level of inadequacy. Thus, within the margins of fluctuations, it accompanied the modernization steps in the societal, cultural, and economic levels. Regarding the political modernization's inadequate façades, there were some other factors such as the structural elements in the political culture of Iran since the constitutional revolution, the international domain's influences in the Middle East, and particularly in Iran, the political balances during the rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the newly-rising economic situation due to the wartime conditions. These were all determinant on the reformation of the political opposition in Iran. Since the main question of the dissertation was defined as what caused the reformation of the political opposition in Iran from 1926 to 1946, the following section of the second chapter dealt with the resistance ways, resurrections, revolts, and the expression ways of the political opposition during that period. Despite the fact that the central authority was consolidated through the rule of the Shah, the tribal unrests continued in an irregular way, and the clergy's role in Iranian political life prevailed with a rapid change towards the curtailing of this traditional societal, political and economic layer's power in Iran. Regarding these, the minor sections of the second chapter dealt with the Pahlavi regime's relations with the clergy and the tribal confederations. Since the ruling party efforts were correlated with the newly-rising republican regime of Turkey, another minor section aimed to explicate the repercussions of the Shah to the neighbouring countries. The Shah's foreign visit to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's republican regime consisted both the modernization aspects and the co-operation

vision by foreign policy between his country and Turkey. After the foreign visits of Reza Shah were analyzed in terms of the reflections of modernization on Iran, and the relations of these repercussions in Iran with the political opposition's evolution, the last minor section served to the revisiting of the Iranian political opposition under the Shah. The third section of the second chapter was separated to the occupation of Iran, and the political landscape of the country. Following the introduction to this section, the first minor section dealt with the occupation of the country, and the abdication of the Shah which came about in September 1941. The second minor section focused on the aftermath of the occupation, and the wartime problems in Iran which presented the new shaky background of politics, society, and the economy. The third minor section targeted to present the nascence of political parties as the political organizations to represent the societal demands and interests. Then, the following minor section held the reformation of the political parties in Iran during WWII. The fifth minor section focused on the cabinets and prime ministers during WWII when Iran was under the occupation of the Allies. The second chapter ended with the last minor section which paid attention to the emission problems in the country and the widespread food shortages.

The third chapter which dealt with the developments in Iranian political life after the composition of the 14th Majlis focused started with an introduction section. Then, the formation of the 14th Majlis was analyzed which referred to the change of the political equilibrium after the 13th Majlis. The second section of the third chapter aimed to put forth the rivalry amongst the three currents of thought between 1941 and 1946. These were assessed as leftist movements, religious revivalism, and nationalism. Encountering with the ethnic mobilization was another reality in Iranian political life through the end of WWII. The new course of events was analyzed in the last section of this chapter.

Finally, the concluding remarks aimed to summarize the general narrative and theoretical perspective of the dissertation which relied upon the reformation of the political opposition from the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi to the rule of new Pahlavi monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Iran, as a country of dilemmas, witnessed the clash of foreign powers and the rise of nationalist tendencies along with the opposition of political factions since the penultimate decades of the 19th century. It was assessed by theorists of development

as an “old new state”.<sup>938</sup> Iran retained its “cultural ethos and sense of identity” for several millennia.<sup>939</sup> In the beginning of the twentieth century, the country experienced a Constitutional Revolution which would be contextualized with the preceding Russian Revolution in 1905, and the proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution for the second time in July 1908. Since the constitutional revolution, the liberal, conservative contexts of politics in Iran found opportunities to evolve to an insufficient extent. The political formations were mostly analyzed under the loose circuits which were called as *dowrehs*. On the other hand, the fluctuations in the international domain which mostly struck Iran during WWI caused the formation of stagnant Majlis bodies. As a country, Iran experienced the vulnerability to the international domain once again although it was neutral during WWI. The country had become a battlefield of foreign powers including Britain, Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire. After WWI ended, Iran’s political dynamics have aligned towards the consolidation of nationalist groups and the variants of nationalism started to affect the political domain in the country. It was certain that the reactions which rose against the Anglo–Persian Convention in 1919 helped the political plans which culminated in a coup, led by the Cossack Brigade commander Reza Khan and journalist Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai. Reza Khan’s rise to Iranian throne has taken place within a five–year period of transition. The most substantial step towards the empowerment of the military functioned through these years when the country’s new administration encountered some further tribal revolts. Cronin mentioned the phases of contestation against the power in the new Iran. Reza Khan’s rule has started to rise since 1921. After the coup, Iran consented to stabilise the relations with the newly–rising Soviet Union in a mutual understanding allowing this neighbouring country to act on behalf of herself when the territorial integrity of Iran was threatened. Following the coup, there were several revolts around the country. Cronin focused on the 1921 Mashad rebellion under the leadership of Colonel Paysan, 1922 resurrection in Tabriz under Major Abolqasim Lahuti.<sup>940</sup>

---

<sup>938</sup> Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 3.

<sup>939</sup> Tachau, *ibid*, p. 133.

<sup>940</sup> Stephanie Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921–1941*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 44–100. Please also see p. 101–127.

Regarding the chaos of the political authority, Martin Van Bruinessen mentioned the efforts of Reza Khan to make the military “a modern, disciplined, coherent national army”.<sup>941</sup> His rise to power triggered the course of events which culminated in a transition period when the efforts towards centralization, strengthening of the army, and the financial adjustment of the state budget. These efforts towards modernization to strengthen the state resulted in a satisfying level of amelioration. The literature on Reza Shah period was mostly analysed in terms of the vigorous modernization efforts under a powerful monarch whose vision along with the imperial bureaucracy’s contributions helped the country to move towards a new establishment to alter the chain of chaos and fragmented politics. Despite the fact that these efforts mostly ignored the political rivalry against the tending arbitrary rule of Reza Shah, such an analysis on the suppression of the political opposition through the prism of state-building developed since the 1990’s by the growth of the literature on Iranian politics under Reza Shah.

In 1941, the country was occupied by a concerted action of the Allied powers, the Soviet Union and Britain. The expulsion of German agents in Iran who were attributed to causing a potential threat to the defense of the Soviet Union was the main pretext of the Anglo–Soviet occupation. Needless to say, the security of the oil fields under the conditions of German-expansionist threat constituted another reason for the occupation. After 1941, under the ambivalence of the successor candidates, Reza Shah’s manoeuvres provided the result on behalf of his Pahlavi dynasty, and soon after three weeks of the occupation, crown prince Mohammad Reza ascended to the Iranian throne. Following the abdication of the Shah, the new dynamics have arisen through the proliferation of the political parties, associations and the relief of the suppressed political sphere. Thus, the period under Mohammad Reza Shah inaugurated with the breakup of the political equilibrium in Iran. Until the end of WWII, Iran maintained its territorial integrity thanks to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of which the Allied countries along with the USA supported the country’s economic balance in condition to the functioning of a vital conduit through the invaded lands of Soviet Union.

---

<sup>941</sup>Martin Van Bruinessen, “A Kurdish Warlord on the Turkish–Persian Frontier in the Early Twentieth Century: Isma’il Agha Simko”, in ed. Touraj Atabaki, *Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2006, p. 69–93.

During WWII, the country's political landscape was accentuated with the clash of some political thoughts intermingled with the religion's role in the political field, the limits of the foreign penetration in the country's politics, and the limited capacity of the opposition being represented by the political factions. In a short while, the political sphere has been colorized by the permission of party activities once again. It is certain that the drawing of a tile from the tightened mosaic of Iran meant the breakdown of the encapsulation of the political opposition.

As the historiography on the War years of Iran strongly dealt with the proliferation of several newspapers, the establishment of some associations to represent the civil-society's inclination, and the foundation of several political parties, the main emphasis stood on the political party organizations. The political field's fragmentation was a new phenomenon, and the harsh critics along with the critical interventions of the Allies to decrease the legacy of the abdicated monarch constituted one of the main topics of the political agenda. This was considerably dependent on the inexperience, and the lack of the political efficacy of the young Shah whose ascendance met with the turmoil of the War years. Although the political party types were assessed as in the type of *dowreh*-system where the loose coalitions were dealing on behalf of the interests of a limited number of political personalities, the intrusion of the Allied powers to consolidate their political interests, much of the political activity led to the fragmentation, and the rise of nationalist, and class-based demands. In addition to the relief of the political sphere, and the uplifting of the bans against the political parties, and the return of political personalities whose political careers were halted during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi such as Mohammad Mosaddiq, Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai back to the active politics, there had also been the societal and economic problems of the War years.

One of the most striking problems was the bread riot which sparkled in Tehran through the end of 1942. On December 8–9, 1942, the bread riot led to some short-ranged, and long-ranged implications. After all, the country's shaky position of wheat stocks did not only cause some deep repercussions in Iranian societal, economic and political life but also led to the abeyance of the Iranian Government's rapid way of solutions. Since the occupation of Iran, the problem grew to an insurmountable level which lastly ended up with a bread riot in Tehran. The changing parameters of the War years were revealed and put forth by the Allied

powers during the riot which had taken place in Tehran in December 1942 concretely.<sup>942</sup> Other than the lack of wheat supplies, and the dependence of Iran as a country under the occupation, to the Allied aids, there were several problems pertaining to the War years' influx of societal and economic disorder. As the political pluralism was the main dynamic of the War years, there were some other titles of Iranian governments' agendas. These were counted as given below: Corruption, bribery, inflation due to the huge expenditures of war, the trials of bureaucrats from the time of former Shah's administration, traditional intrigues on politics, the political activism's edgy limits which sometimes converted into street violence, rising demand for the nationalization campaigns which eventually led to the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddiq as the pioneer of Cebhe-ye Melli (National Front) i in the context of post-war equilibrium, the problem of the Polish refugees<sup>943</sup>, emission of Iranian rials to bring relief to the economic system, the problems which arose due to the employment of American experts, and the Allied presence in the country.

In addition to these, the breaking up of ethnic lines in the northwestern parts of the country along with Soviet activism constituted another title of Iranian administrative agenda which turned out to be the main problem on the eve of the Cold War. Thus, Iran has fallen into a superpower rivalry in 1946 which was assessed as the first crisis of the Cold War period. Since it was a part of the post-WWII dynamics, it is not an exaggeration to assert that the interregnum's orientation was pulling the country to the edge of new waters. Eventually, Iran has leaped out the atmosphere of crisis in a short period of time, and the new aspects for the nationalization of oil were inclining. During the War years, Iran experienced both from the old-establishment, and the newly-rising political establishment. In that regard, the premiership of Ali Soheili twice, and Ahmad Qavam constituted the most critical terms during Iran's hardly-borne conditions of governance. Although the wheat shortages sparked during the

---

<sup>942</sup> Mohammad Gholi Majd, *Iran Under Allied Occupation in World War II; The Bridge of Victory & A Land of Famine*, Lanham, University Press of America, 2016, p. 334–352.

<sup>943</sup> Aside from the substructural activities and services such as the founding of schools at the primary and secondary levels, opening of the hospitals, there were even some journals which targeted to bring a network of publications. One example was the *Pole in Iran* which was around the circulation of 1800 copies and another example was *the Scout* as the journal of a *Polish Scout's Association* in the Middle East. Regarding the influx of Polish refugees in Iran, please also see Majd, 2016, p. 206–221.



premiership of Ali Soheili, the wreckage of the wheat shortages along with the economic reformation plans continued to exist when Ahmad Qavam was assigned to that post in August 1942. From August 1942, to February 1943, Qavam, as one of the senior politicians in the country held the steering wheel of the country. His efforts to soothe the Allied demands resulted in a semi-satisfaction, and catalyzed the Tehran bread riot in early December 1942. Qavam had fallen in an embittered situation which ended by the collapse of his Government through February 1943. The country's thirteenth term of Majlis witnessed the second term of Ali Soheili, as he was supported by the Allied powers, and the Shah to substitute the once-appreciated leadership of Ahmad Qavam. The second term of Soheili in the Office was a period of the resolution of the gridlock when the exhausting dynamics of the War years - both domestically and externally- made pressure on the Iranian society.

On the other hand, the new problems were rising on the horizons of Iranian politics throughout the term of Soheili. Ali Soheili's term was mostly affiliated with the war declaration of Iran on Germany, thus a brave decision to relocate Iran unalterably on the path of Atlantic Declaration, and the gathering of the tripartite summit of the War's fate in Tehran. This conference which was commentated in the historiography as *Tehran Conference* took place in the last days of November 1943 up to the beginning of December 1943.

As one of the main agendas of the Conference was the territorial integrity of Iran, and the depletion of Allied occupation in as much as a six-month period of the War's end, the Conference was also a milestone for the fate of WWII on the consensus of Soviet Russia, Britain, and USA to open a new front in Normandy, France in the next summer of 1944. According to their projections, the Allied powers sought distinct ways from each other as the Soviet Union insisted on the opening of a new front in Western Europe, albeit Britain insisted on the opening of a new front in the Balkans in order not to leave the Soviets to find a suitable zone of influence. Although the War projections of the Allied co-belligerents met with each other on the sake of coalescing against the Axis powers, there were some key divergences. Besides, the conference reached a satisfying step on Soviet Russia's declaration of war against Japan conditionally. As a concluding phase of the Tehran Conference which was codenamed as *the Operation Eureka*, Iran's key position was confirmed once again as it was applauded as "the bridge of the victory".

Tehran Conference also remarked the decisiveness of Iran to define itself on the root of the Allied powers. Up until that time Iran reached to a turnout, the country's political establishment changed in an unalterable way to eradicate the roots of Reza Shah Pahlavi's political establishment. In that regard, the elections which were held from the second half of 1943 up until the beginning of 1944, provided a new platform to involve the newly-rising leftist movement of Tudeh Party, which was the most broadly-organized political party of those years. Vis-à-vis, the National Will Party was introduced to the Iranian people to balance the rising influence of the Tudeh Party. As the latter was affiliated with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's concessionist trials coincided with the formation months of the fourteenth Majlis, a fierce campaign was pushed forward by the Palace, and the Iranian political establishment. The Tudeh Party's distinction from the other political parties was an outcome of the foreign occupation, and the party's well-organized, broadly-based perspectives. In that regard, the Tudeh Party deserved a deeper attention owing to the long-term existence of the party, and the crucial role of this organization in Iranian politics during WWII. Even though the Tudeh Party was enforced to stay in a limited activism, it was the most organized political formation during the war years. It was founded soon after the occupation. Aside from the Tudeh Party, if one may count some prominent parties, the names of the National Will Party, and the lately-founded Iran-e Democrat Party would come as the other prominent parties. Generally speaking, the appeal to the new intellectuals, the labor in the oil sector, the peasantry, the merchants and the old oligarchy provided the chances for the Tudeh Party and Iran-e Democrat Party to be more successful than the others during this period. Despite the fact these two political parties reflected the main bodies in the political field, there were several political parties. As Inlow stated, being divided into the left and right sides roughly, the first political parties were formed in 1942. These mostly lacked the financial and political organization although there was some financial support from the landowners and the merchants. Inlow stated that on the left there were the Comrades Party, the Freedom Party, the Justice Party, and the Tudeh Party. He also paid attention to the names of these political parties in a partial reminiscence of the constitutional period.<sup>944</sup> On the right wing, the Patriot Party was the first

---

<sup>944</sup> Inlow, *ibid*, p. 214.

political party which later was replaced by the National Will Party. It was not a broadly-based party, and the members of the party seated in the Majlis in a private capacity. The party ceased to exist after the arrest of its leader, Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai in 1946.<sup>945</sup>

For all the parties, “nationalism”, as an encompassing ideology, was an political asset, and “the opposition to the foreign intervention” was quite influential on domestic politics. As one may find a detailed survey on the biographies of political leadership, it is possible to derive that it was not quite surprising of British authorities to call Sayyed Ziaeddin Tabatabai return back to his homeland. He was encouraged to build up a pro-British political party to balance the old oligarchy and the new intellectuals through the consolidation of their interests. Meanwhile, contrary to the nationalist perspectives, as the Allied interests were conflicted in some cases, the American expertise was employed by Qavam’s Government through the last quarter of 1942. In a few months, several experts have arrived to Iran. The leading figure of those experts was Arthur C. Millspaugh who came to Iran to adjust the financial administration. The Millspaugh mission was not simply a repetition phase of the history as the different conditions started to affect the country. This time, Millspaugh’s mission which lasted approximately three years came to an end due to the rising nationalist tendencies in the Majlis. In the 1920s, when Millspaugh was employed as the Treasurer General of the country, the knot was resolved by the fierce scolding of Reza Shah Pahlavi stating that “there would not be two kings in a country”. In his second term of the mission, the political equilibrium changed unalterably up until WWII. Nationalist tendencies constituted the third dynamic of the War years’ political life in Iran other than the broadly-based Tudeh Party’s voting base, and the centralised axis of political party party formation in such examples as *the National Will Party*, and after that, through the end of WWII, *the Iran-e Democrat Party*. The religious revivalism could just find a place for itself in Iranian politics towards a pre-mature way of compromises with the Shah. That was

---

<sup>945</sup> Inlow, *ibid*, p. 214. In reference to the Foreign Office documents, Ali Rahnema put forth that as early as July 12, 1951, Tabatabai was encouraged to revive his closed political party (Eradeh-ye Melli) to challenge the rising influence of Mosaddiq’s National Front. Please see FO 248/1514, 21 July 1951 in Ali Rahnema, *Behind The 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers and Spooks*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 13.

partially dependent upon the political approach displayed by the clerical authorities. The Majlis was another power bloc in total which has proven its challenge against the concessionist trials, and the foreign interventions on the country's fate. Additionally, the Majlis made a landmark disapproval of the oil concession attempts of the U.S.S.R. in 1944, and the mission of Sergei Kavtaradze vanished out eventually. In 1944, the American enterprise for the oil concessions was replied by the Soviet enterprises. The Majlis sooner reacted towards the cancellation of the government's right to sign any foreign concessions in the same year. The differentiation of Iran's political establishment by the nationalist tendencies proved the fact that if not only the Shah's authority but also the authority of the Majlis became successful to forge an opposition against any kind of means of foreign intervention. It was clear that the Majlis authority has shown its opposition towards not to extend the powers of American financial expert Millspaugh over the Iranian fiscal system. These three examples referred to the implicit way of policies of which the balance of Iranian policy was asserted. It was quite important, as Inlow stated on the case of the constitutional period, Iranian political establishment was also divided in an implicit way of right and left wings during WWII. Besides, as Inlow stated, the opposition capacity of the Majlis against the political decisions of the Shah has risen as it was experienced during the constitutional period. However, the political opposition to the concept of the monarchy<sup>946</sup> was not emboldened although the British authorities allegedly offered Muhammad Ali Foroughi the presidency when the country was occupied. In that sense, the constitutional period's political patterns were partially similar to the reformation period of the political opposition during WWII. In addition to that, the political opposition's main characteristics were partially connected to the dowreh-system, relatively liberation of the political field, the empowerment of the Majlis in comparison with the former Shah's period and the collapse of the arbitrary rule which was attributed to the former Shah's period in the relevant literature.

Amidst these political challenges, the young and inexperienced Shah tried to enlarge the authority of the Court, and by depending on the ulama, the Allied Legations, and demands, he sought to consolidate his power. One of his deepest contentions was

---

<sup>946</sup> Inlow, *ibid*, p. 213.

against Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam. Probably, Qavam's senior position, and cleverly-managed way of administration style caused the Shah to stand against the bread riot in Tehran. Inspecting the Army for several times, and assigning the high-commandership of the reunited and readjusted Iranian army, Shah sought to keep the aspect of continuing his influence on the fate of the Constitutional Monarchy. In that regard, the dissertation put forth the fundamental change of the political equilibrium in Iranian political life came by the transition period of the War years. From 1941 to 1944, the influence of the old establishment stayed at a permanent level whereas the influence of the intellectuals, the oil workers, the peasantry, and the tribes rose to a considerable level. The term of the fourteenth Majlis provided the chance for the Tudeh Party to have eight seats in the Majlis. The Majlis as a relatively powerful political body to represent the opposition was not alone. Although the political quietism of the ulama was not resolved totally, the influence of the clergy was significant, and their demands along with the compromise with the young Shah followed the new course of events. Thus, the political opposition's formation could be assessed in two terms. First, and foremost, the political opposition's restrictions were clear enough during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Owing to his formidable rulership, the opposition couldn't find a broad base to flourish in the societal and political layers. However, the members of the communist movement, the land aristocracy, and as the centrifugal forces in the country, the tribal confederations along with the ulama could find a way to express their political opposition. In the first chapter of the dissertation, the literature review targeted to put forth the determinant roles of the dowreh-system, the modernization program of the Pahlavi regime, and the state vs. society confrontation thesis as structural. In addition to these, the compromise efforts of the former Shah with the ulama, and the suppression policies on the tribal revolts, and the communists were assessed as non-structural factors. It was only after the occupation, the country's political landscape started to change. Within a few years along the course of WWII, the pluralism brought the country to an edge of the transformation. Therefore, the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi could be assessed as to end the occupation of Iran by a jointly-manoeuvred Allied operation (*Operation Countenance*) with a slight margin to the re-forming political opposition in Iran. The constitutional period's legacy affected the reformation of the political opposition however the new dynamics were already available after the

country was occupied. The relatively-satisfying liberation of the clergy, the political network's enlargement under the leadership of the Tudeh Party, the repercussions of the Tudeh Party's activism in northwestern Iran, in particular in the regions of high Azeri and Kurdish population groups, and the submission of Iran's will to participate in "the united front" of the Allies affected the political formation of the country.

Consequently, the dissertation's main arguments on the re-formation of the political opposition can be summed as given below: The influences of the structural elements in Iranian state system, society, economy, agriculture, the newly-born hardships owing to the international domain's crisis during WWII, and the reflections of these hardships into Iran as well as the political rivalry's influences on the Iranian political life. As a result of these, several political parties ushered in the new era from 1941–1946.

## REFERENCES

### Secondary Sources (Books)

*A Pocket Guide to Iran*, Washington D.C., War and Navy Departments, 1946

*A Political Chronology of The Middle East*. London: Europa Publications, 2001.

Aaron Bobrow-Strain, “Making White Bread By The Bomb’s Early Light: Anxiety, Abundance, and Industrial Food Power In The Early Cold War”, Eds. Benjamin N. Lawrance, Carolyn de la Pena, *Local Foods Meet Global Foodways: Tasting History*, London, Routledge, 2012.

Abbas Al-Abeeri. *Ayatullah al-Borujerdi: the Great Leader*. Tehran: Ansariyan Publishers, 1995.

Abbas Milani. *Eminent Persians*, v. 1. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2008.

Abbas Milani. *Eminent Persians*, v. 2. New York, Syracuse University Press, 2008.

Abbas Milani. *The Shah*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Abbas Vali. *Kurds and The State In Iran, The Making of Kurdish Identity*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011.

Abdul Razaq Janjua, *Modern Iran In The 20th Century*, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publications, 1966.

Abidin Ege. *Çanakkale, Irak ve İran Cephelelerinden Harp Günlükleri*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011.

Afsaneh Najmabadi. *Women with Mustaches, and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.

Ahmed Akbar. *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Ahmed Ekrem. *Bugünkü İran*, İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1934.

Alessandro Bausani. *The Persians: from the Earliest Days to the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.

Ali M. Ansari. *Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*, London: Longman, 2003.

Ali Gheissari. *Iranian Intellectuals In The Twentieth Century*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998.

Ali Rahnema. *Behind The 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers and Spooks*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Ali Reza Ashgarzadeh. *Iran and The Challenge of Diversity, Islamic Fundamentalism, Aryanist Racism and Democratic Struggles*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Amin Banani. *The Modernization of Iran: 1921–1941*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Amin Saikal. *The Rise and Fall of The Shah, Iran From Autocracy To Religious Rule*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Amir Ahmad Fekri, *Tarihsel Gelişim Sürecinde İran Devrimi*. İstanbul: Mızrak Yayınları, 2011.

Ann K. Lambton. *The Persian Land Reform. 1962–1966*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.

Aryeh Y. Yodfat. *The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran*. New York: Routledge, 2011.

Bahman Baktiari. *Parliamentary Politics In Revolutionary Iran: The Institutionalization of Factional Politics*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996.

Bahman Nirumand. *Hür Dünyanın Diktatörlüğü (İran)*, çev. Arif Gelen. Ankara: Anadolu Yayınları, 1968.



Bahman Nirumand. *İran'da Soluyor Çiçekler*, çev. Kemal Kurt. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1988.

Bakhshayeshi Aqiqi, Alaedin Pazargadi, and G. S. Radhakrishna. *Ten Decades of Ulama's Struggle*. Islamic Propagation Organization, 1985.

Charles Kurzman. *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Charles Tilly. *Regimes and Repertoires*. London: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Charles Tilly, and Tarrow Sidney G. *Contentious Politics*. Paradigm, 2007.

Chris Cook. Stevenson, John. *The Routledge Companion To World History Since 1914*, London: Routledge, 2005.

Christopher Sykes. Wassmuss "The German Lawrence." New York: Longmans, 1936.

Cyrus Ghani. *Iran and the Rise of the Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000.

Darius Bayandor. *Iran and The CIA: The Fall of Mosaddegh Revisited*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

David Fraser. *Persia and Turkey in Revolt*. London: William Blackwood and His Sons, 1910.

David Seddon. *A Political and Economic Dictionary of The Middle East*. London: Europa Publications, 2004.

Donald N. Wilber. *Reza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and The Reconstruction of Iran*. Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1975.

Donald N. Wilber. *Iran: Past and Present*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

E. Burke Inlow. *Shahanshah: A Study of The Monarchy of Iran*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979.

Elena Andreeva. *Russia and Iran In The Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism*. London: Routledge, 2007.

Elton L. Daniel. *The History of Iran*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001.

Elton L. Daniel, Mahdi Ali Akbar. *Culture and Customs of Iran*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006.

Ervand Abrahamian. *Iran: Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Ervand Abrahamian. *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic*, California: Berkeley University Press, 1993.

Ervand Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Ervand Abrahamian. *The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern US-Iranian Relations*. New York: The New Press, 2013.

Fakhreddin Azimi. *The Quest For Democracy In Iran: A Century of Struggle Against Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Faik Ahmet Barutçu. *Siyasi Anılar*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977.

Faramorz Fatemi, *the U.S.S.R. in Iran: the Background History of Russian and Anglo–American Conflict in Iran, Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism, and the Fall of the Shah*, London, South Brunswick, 1980.

Farih Mahdavi, “Revolution-Iran”, Edited by William H. McNeill et al. *Berkshire Encyclopedia of World History*, v. 4. Great Barrington: Berkshire Publishing Group, 2005.

Gene R. Garthwaite. *The Persians*. Madlen: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.

General Hassan Arfa. *Under Five Shahs*. London: Murray, 1964.

General Hussain Fardust. *The Rise of and The Fall of The Pahlavi Dynasty*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1999.

Ghoncheh Tazmini, *Revolution, and Reform In Russia and Iran, Modernisation and Politics in Revolutionary States*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012.

George Lenczowski. *Russia and The West In Iran: A Study In Big Power Rivalry, 1918–1948*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1949.

George Lenczowski. *Oil and State In The Middle East*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1960.

George Lenczowski. *American Presidents and The Middle East*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.

Gholam-Reza Afkhami, *The Life and Times of The Shah*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Grant Farr. *Modern Iran: A Volume in the Comparative Series*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1999.

H.E. Chehabi. *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1990.

Hamid Dabashi. *Theology of Discontent*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2006.

Hamideh Sedghi. *Women and Politics in Iran, Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. *1939–1945 Kronoloji ve Belgelerle İkinci Dünya Savaşı*, çev. Alb. İbrahim Ulus. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1989.

Heather Legh Wagner. *Creation of The Modern Middle East: Iran*. New York: Chelsea Publishers, 2009.

Hillel Frisch. *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, v. 1. New York: Academic Press, 2001.

Homa Katouzian. *Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Hooglund, Eric, and Leif Stenberg, eds. *Navigating Contemporary Iran: Challenging Economic, Social and Political Perceptions*. Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Hossein Bashiriyeh, *State and Revolution In Iran: 1962–1982*, London, Routledge, 2011.

Hossein Shahidi. *Journalism In Iran: From Mission To Profession*. London: Routledge, 2007.

Houshang Sabahi. *British Policy in Persia: 1918–1925*. London: Frans Class, 1990.

*Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, eds. Peter J. Chelhowski, Robert J. Pranger, Durham, Duke University Press, 1988.

Ilan Pappé. *The Modern Middle East*. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Ira M. Lapidus. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

*Iran: A Country Study*. Edited by. Eric Hooglund, Glenn E. Curtis, Library of Congress, 2008.

James L. Gelvin. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Jerrold D. Green. *Revolution in Iran: the Politics of Counter-Mobilization*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

Johannes Glasneck. *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*. çev. Arif Gelen. İstanbul: Onur Yayınları, 1976.

John W. Limbert. *Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the ghosts of history*. Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 2009.

John H. Lorentz. *Historical Dictionary of Iran*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2007.

John Marlowe. *Iran: A Short Political Guide*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1963.

John Murphy. *Modern World Leaders, Ali Khamenei*. New York: Chelsea House, 2008.

Joseph M. Upton. *The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Kamran S. Aghaie. “Religious Rituals, Social Identities, and Political Relationships in Tehran under Qajar Rule: 1850s-1920s.” in *Religion and Society in Qajar Iran*, edited by Robert Gleave, 373–392. Oxon: Routledge, 2005.

Kamran Matin. *Recasting Iranian Modernity: International Relations and Social Change*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Karim Sadjadpour. *Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009.

Kaveh Farrokh. *Iran At War: 1500–1988*, Bloomsbury: Osprey Publishing, 2011.

Kristen Blake. *The U.S.–Soviet Confrontation In Iran, 1945–1962, A Case In The Annals of The Cold War*. Lanham: University Press of America, 2009.

L.P. Elwell-Sutton. *Modern Iran*, v. 4, London: Routledge, 2011.

M.Lloyd. *Food and Inflation In The Middle East: 1940–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956.

Mahmoud Davari. *The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari: An Iranian Theoretician of the Islamic State*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Majid Sharifi. *Imagining Iran: The Tragedy of Subaltern Nationalism*. Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013.

Malcolm Yapp. *The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995*. London: Pearson Publishers, 1996.

Malcolm Yapp. "Introduction", *British Documents On Foreign Affairs (Public Record Office), Part III, Series B, v. III, Persia and Afghanistan January 1940–December, 1941*. Edited by Malcolm Yapp, University Publications of America, 1997.

Manochehr Dorraj. *From Zarathustra to Khomeini: Populism and Dissent in Iran*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.

Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History In A World Civilization*, v. 3, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Memduh Şevket Esendal. *Tahran Anıları ve Düşsel Yazılar*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999.

Michael Axworthy. *A History of Iran: Empire of The Mind*. Iran: Empire of The Mind, New York: Basic Books, 2008.

Mohammad Gholi Majd. *Great Britain&Reza Shah: The Plunder of Iran, 1921–1941*. Florida: University Press of Florida, 2001.

Mohammad Gholi Majd. *The Great Famine and Genocide In Persia, 1917–1919*, Lanham: University Press of America, 2003.

Mohammad Gholi Majd. *Iran Under Allied Occupation in World War II; The Bridge of Victory& A Land of Famine*. Lanham: University Press of America, 2016.

Mohammad Reza Djalili. Thierry Kellner, *İran'ın Son İki Yüzyıllık Tarihi*, çev. Reşat Uzmen. İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2011.

Mohsen M Milani. *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: from Monarchy to the Islamic Republic*. Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.

Monica Gronke. *Iran: A Short History*. tr. Steven Rendall. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2008.

Morgan C. Shuster. *The Strangling of Persia: a Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans, a Personal Narrative*. New York: Appleton-Century Croft, 1912.

Muhammad Rıza Şah Pehlevi. *Babam Büyük Rıza Şah*, çev. Ali Genceli, Ankara: 1977.

Muhammed Surur Zeynelabidin. *Mecusîlerin Geri Dönüşü: İran Devriminin Tarihi, Akidevî ve Politik Boyutları*, tr. Hüsrev Subaşı, İstanbul: Guraba Yayınları, 2014.

Muhammed Taki Zehtabi (Kirişçi), *İran Türklerinin Eski Tarihi*, çev. Ferhad Rahimi, İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2010.

Nader Sohrabi. *Revolution and Constitutionalism In The Ottoman Empire and Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Nematollah Fazeli. *Politics of Culture in Iran, Anthropology, Politics and Society in the 20th Century*. Oxon: Routledge, 2005.

Nikki R. Keddie. *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892*. London: Frank Class, 1966.

Nikki R. Keddie. *Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society, Collected Essays*. London: Frank Class, 1980.

Nikki Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Nikki R. Keddie. *Women in the Middle East: Past and Present*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Ori Goldberg. *Shi'i Theology in Iran*. Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Patrick Clawson, Rubin Michael. *Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Peter Avery. *The Spirit of Iran*. Costa Meza: Mazda Publishers, 2007.

Peter Tomsen. *The Wars on Afghanistan, Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.

Philip Ward. *Touring Iran*. London: Faber and Faber, 1971.

*Political Parties of The Middle East and North Africa*. Edited by. Frank Tachau. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994.

Rashid Khatib-Shahidi. *German Foreign Policy Towards Iran Before World War II*. London: I.B. Tauris. 2012.

Ramesh Sanghvi. *Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran: A Political Biography*, New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1968.

Reza A. Arasteh, *Man, and Society In Iran*. Leiden: Brill, 1964.

Reza M. Ghods. *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.

Rıza Kurtuluş, “Muhammed Rıza Şah Pehlevî”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) İslam Ansiklopedisi*, v. 30, p. 565.

Richard Nelson Frye. *Persia*, Oxon: Routledge, 2011.

Richard Tapper. *Frontier Nomads of Iran: A Political and Social History of The Shahsevan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Robin E. Warfield. *Christians In Persia: Assyrians, Armenians, Roman Catholics and Protestants*. New York: Routledge, 2011.

Roham Alvandi. *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Ronen A. Cohen, *The Hojjatiyeh Society in Iran: Ideology and Practice from the 1950s to the Present*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Rouhallah Ramazani. *The Foreign Policy of Iran: 1500–1941*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966.

Ryszard Kapuściński. *Shah of Shahs*. Katarzyna Mroczkowski–Brand, New York: Vintage Books, 1986.

Said Amir Arjomand. “Islam and Constitutionalism In The Nineteenth Century: The Significance and The Peculiarities of Iran”, In *Constitutional Politics In The Middle East*. edited by. Amir Arjomand. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008.

Saul Friedman. *A History of the Middle East*. North Carolina: MacFarland Publishers, 2006.

Sepehr Zabih, *The Left in Contemporary Iran: Ideology, Organization and the Soviet Connection*. Oxon: Roudlegde, 2011.

Simin Fadaee. *Social Movements in Iran: Environmentalism and Civil Society*. Oxon: Routledge, 2012.



Sofia A. Koutlaki. *Among The Iranians: A Guide To Iran's Culture and Customs*. Boston: Intercultural Press, 2010.

Stephanie Cronin. *The Army and The Creation of The Pahlavi State in Iran. 1910–1926*, London: I.B. Tauris, 1997.

Stephanie Cronin. *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest, and Revolt, 1921–1941*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Stephen Kinzer. *All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*, New Jersey: John Wiley&Sons, 2003.

Stephen C. Poulson. *Social Movements in Twentieth Century Iran: Culture, Ideology, and Mobilizing Frameworks*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006.

Sushil Raj Pandey. *Representative Institutions: Opposition and Royal Rule In Iran*. Kwako: Joshi Mudranalaya, 1981.

Süreyya Esfendiari, *Sürgündeki Prenses Süreyya*, çev. Şirin Rövşev, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2003.

Şahrüh Ahavi. *İran'da Din ve Siyaset: Pehlevi Devrinde Ulema–Devlet İlişkileri*, çev. Selahattin Ayaz, İstanbul: Yöneliş Yayınları, 1990.

Sydney Nettleton Fisher. *The Middle East: A History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.

*The Polish Deportees of World War II, Recollection of Removal To The Soviet Union and Dispersal Throughout The World*. Edited by Tadeusz Piotrowski, Jefferson, Mcfarland Company, 2004.

Thomas R. Mattair. *Iran: A Reference Handbook*. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008.

Touraj Atabaki, *Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and The Struggle For Power In Iran*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000.

Valentin Berojkov. *Tahran 1943, Yeni Bir Dünyaya Doğru*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012.

Vali Nasr, Gheissari, Ali. *Democracy In Iran: History and The Quest For Liberty*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

William L. Cleveland. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. Oxford: Westview Press, 2006.

William R. Polk. *Understanding Iran*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009.

Yahya Armajani. *Middle East: Past and Present*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

### **Articles / Book Chapters**

Afshin Matin-Asgari. “Marxism, Historiography, and Historical Consciousness”, In the *Iran in the 20th Century, Historiography and Political Culture*. Edited by. Touraj Atabaki, 199–232., London: I.B.Tauris, 2009.

Afshin Matin-Asgari, “Twentieth–Century Iran’s Political Prisoners”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 42, no. 5, September 2010, p. 689–707.

Afshin Matin-Asgari. “The Pahlavi Era Iranian Modernity In Global Context”, In the *Oxford Handbook of Iranian History*. Edited by. Touraj Daryaei, 346–365. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Bihruz Tayarani. ‘Abdul Kadir Suvari, Rahim Rais’niya, Ahmad Taqizadih, Muhammad Rida Skakiba, “Party”, *Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopedia of the World of Islam*. Edited by Gholamali Haddad Adel, Mohammad Jafar Elmi, Hassan Taromi-Rad, 1–73. London: EWI Press, 2012.

Bijan Bahadorvand Shenhi, “Kar Inglise: The Bloody, Invisible Hand of the British Empire”, *EIR*, December 2011, p. 23–24.

Camron Michael Amin, “Globalizing Iranian Feminism, 1910–1950”, *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies*, v. 4, n. 1, Special Issue: Early Twentieth-Century Middle Eastern Feminisms, Nationalisms and Transnationalisms, Winter, 2008, p. 6–30.

Charles Issawi. "Iranian Economy 1925–1975: Fifty Years of Economic Development." In the *Iran Under The Pahlavis*. Edited by. George Lenczowski, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

David Menashri. "The Persian Monarchy and the Islamic Republic", In the *Middle East Monarchies: the Challenge of Modernity*. Edited by. Joseph Kostiner, 213–236. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

*Devrimler Ansiklopedisi*, "İran İslam Devrimi", İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1991.

Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics: 1905–1953", *Past and Present*, no. 41 (Dec. 1968), p. 184–210.

Fakhreddin Azimi, "On Shaky Ground: Concerning The Absence or Weakness of Political Parties in Iran", *Iranian Studies*, v. 30, n. 1–2, Winter/Spring 1997, p. 53–75.

Fred Halliday. "İran Devrimi: Eşitsiz Gelişme ve Dinci Popülizm", In the *İran Devrimi: Din, Anti-Emperyalizm ve Sol*, Edited by. Serpil Üşür, 9–53. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992.

Fred Halliday, "Introduction: Iran and the World: The Reassertion and Its Costs", In *Iran and the International Community*. edited by. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Manshour Varasteh, London: Routledge, 1991.

Fred Halliday, "Foreword", In the *Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects*, Edited by. Ali Mohammadi. xii– xvi. London: Routledge, 2003.

Gavin R.G. Hambly. "The Pahlavi Autocracy: Reza Shah, 1921–1941", *Cambridge History of Iran: from Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, v. 7. Edited by. Peter Avery, Gavin R.G. Hambly, Charles Melville. 213-243. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Hamid Algar, "Tabataba'i, Ziya (1889–1969)", *Encyclopedia of The Modern Middle East&North Africa*, v. IV, New York: Thomson Gale, 2004.

Hamid Algar, "Imam Khomeini: A Short Biography", In *the Imam Khomeini: Life, Thought and Legacy*, Edited by. Abdorrahman Koya. 19-60. Kuala Lumpur, Crescent International, 2009.

Harald Mehner. "Development and Planning In Iran After The World War II", In the *Iran Under The Pahlavis*. Edited by. George Lenczowski. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Homa Katouzian, "Aridisolate Society: a Model of Long-Term Social and Economic Development in Iran, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 15, no. 2, May 1983, p. 259–281.

Homa Katouzian, "Arbitrary Rule: A Comparative Theory of State, Politics, and Society in Iran", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 24 (1997).

Homa Katouzian, "The Campaign against the Anglo–Persian Agreement of 1919", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 25, no. 1 (May 1998), p. 5–46.

Homa Katouzian, "Iran and The Problem of Political Development", In the *Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects*, Edited by. Ali Mohammadi. 7-23. London, Routledge, 2003.

Homa Katouzian. "State and Society Under Reza Shah." In *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*. Edited by. Touraj Atabaki, Eric J. Zürcher, 13–43, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

Homa Katouzian. "The Significance of Economic History, and the Fundamental Features of the Economic History of Iran." In the *Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics, and Conflicts*, Edited by. Homa Katouzian, Hossain Shahidi, 273–290. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Houman A. Sadri. "Iran-History", *Encyclopedia of Modern Asia*, v.5, Michigan: Gale Publishers, 2002.

İran, Ankara, İran Büyükelçiliği Basın ve Enformasyon Bürosu, 1967.

İran Büyükelçiliği Basın Ateşeliği, *28 Mordad Sayısı*, August 19, 1963.

Jasmin Rostam-Kolayi, Afshin Matin-Asgari. "Unveiling Ambiguities: Revisiting 1930s Iran's Kashf-i Hijab Campaign." In the *Anti-Veiling Campaigns In The Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and The Politics of Dress*. Edited by. Stephanie Cronin. Hoboken: Taylor&Francis, 2014.

Joel S. Beinin, "Communism In The Middle East", *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, v. IV, New York: Thomson Gale, 2004.

Kamran M. Dadkash, "From Global Capital to State Capitalism: The Evolution of Economic Thought in Iran, 1875-1925", *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 39, n. 4 (October, 2003), p.140-158.

L.P. Elwell Sutton, "Political Parties In Iran, 1941-1948", *Middle East Journal*, v. 3, n. 1, January 1949.

L.P. Elwell-Sutton, "the Iranian Press: 1941-1947", *British Institute of Persian Studies*, Iran, v. 6, (1968), p. 65-104.

Malcolm E. Yapp. "1900-1921: The Last Years of The Qajar Dynasty." In *Twentieth-Century Iran*. Edited by. Hossein Amirsadeghi. 1-22. London: Heinemann, 1977.

Mansourueh Ettehadieh, "Ahmad Qajar." *Encyclopedia of The Modern Middle East&North Africa*, v. I. New York: Thomson Gale, 2004.

Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup d'État in Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, n. 19, v.3, 1987.

Martin Van Bruinessen, "A Kurdish Warlord on the Turkish-Persian Frontier in the Early Twentieth Century: Isma'il Agha Simko", in ed. Touraj Atabaki, *Iran, and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2006, p. 69-93.

Matthew Eliot. "New Iran and The Dissolution of Party Politics Under Reza Shah", In the *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*. Edited by. Touraj Atabaki, Eric J. Zürcher, 65-97, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.  
Melike Anbarcıoğlu, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal ve İran'da Yapılan Reformlar", *Doğu İlleri Dergisi*, III/4, Ankara, 1983.

Michael Zirinsky, "Blood, Power, and Hypocrisy: The Murder of Robert Imbrie and American Relations With Pahlavi Iran, 1924", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 18 (1986).

Michael Zirinsky. "The Rise of Reza Khan." In the *A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran*. Edited by. John Foran. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

Miron Rezun, "Reza Shah's Court Minister: Teymourdash", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 12 (1980), p. 119–137.

"Muhammed Rıza Pehlevi", *Türk ve Dünya Ünlüleri Ansiklopedisi*, v. 8, İstanbul: Anadolu Yayıncılık, 1983–1984.

Negin Yavari, "Vozuq al-Dowleh", *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, v. IV, New York: Thomson Gale, 2004.

Negin Yavari, "Forughi, Mirza Mohammad Ali Khan, Zaka al-Molk", *Encyclopedia of The Middle East&North Africa*, v. IV, New York: Thomson Gale, 2004.

Nikki R. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdulhamid II", *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 3, n. 1, (October, 1966), p. 46–67.

Nikki R. Keddie. "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective" *American Historical Review*, 88 (no. 3), June 1983, p. 579–598.

Nikki R. Keddie. Mehrdad Amanat "Iran under the Late Qajars: 1848–1922", in *Cambridge History of Iran*, v. 7. Edited by. Peter Avery, Gavin R.G. Hambly, Charles Melville. 174–212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Pierre Oberling. "Atatürk and Reza Shah" Proceedings of the First International Atatürk Symposium. 21–23 September 1987, Ankara, 1994.

Reza Ghods, "the Iranian Communist Movement under Reza Shah", *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 26, n. 4 (October 1990), p. 506–513.

Reza Ghods. "Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah", *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 27, n. 1, January 1991, p. 35–45.

Richard W. Cottam, "Political Party Development In Iran", *Iranian Studies*, v. 1, no. 3, Summer, 1968, p. 82–95.

Roger M Savory. "Modern Persia", In the *Cambridge History of Islam*, v. I, p. 595–620, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Roger Savory. "Social Development In Iran During The Pahlavi Era." In the *Iran Under The Pahlavis*. Edited by. George Lenczowski, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Rose L. Greaves. "1942-1976: The Reign of Muhammad Riza Shah." In *Twentieth-Century Iran*. Edited by. Hossein Amirsadeghi. 53–92. London: Heinemann, 1977.

Roxane Farmanfarmanian. "The Politics of Concession: Reassessing the Interlinkage of Persia's Finances, British Intrigue and Qajar Negotiation", In the *War&Peace in Qajar Persia*. Edited by. Roxane Farfanfarmanian, 221-228. Oxon: Routledge, 2008.

Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Iran's White Revolution: A Study In Political Development", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 5, no. 2, April, 1974, pp. 124–139.

Sadegh Zibakalam. "To Rule or Not to Rule? An Alternative Look At The Political Life of Khomeini, Between 1960 and 1980." In *A Critical Introduction to Khomeini*. Edited by Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, 256–274. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Samuel L. Sharp, "the Soviet Position in the Middle East", *Social Science*, v. 32, no. 4, October 1957, p. 225–231.

Shareen Blair Brysac, "A Very British Coup: How Reza Shah Won and Lost His Throne", *World Policy Journal*, v. 24, n. 2 (Summer, 2007).

Shokrollah Hamdhaidari, "Education during the Reign of the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran (1941–1979)", *Teaching in Higher Education*, v. 13, February 2008, p. 17–28.

Stephen L. McFarland. "Anatomy of an Iranian political crowd: the Tehran bread riot of December 1942." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 01 (1985): 51-65.

Stephanie Cronin. "Reza Shah and The Paradoxes of Military Modernization In Iran: 1921–1941." In the *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Reza Shah. 1921–1941*, Edited by. Stephanie Cronin. London: Routledge, 2003.

Stephanie Cronin, "Iran's Forgotten Revolutionary: Abolqasim Lahuti and The Tabriz Resurrection in 1922", in Edited by Stephanie Cronin, 118–146. *Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perceptions of the Iranian Left*, New York, Routledge, 2004.

Stephanie Cronin. "Reform From Above, Resistance From Below: The New Order and Its Opponents In Iran: 1927–1929", in *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran*. Edited by. Touraj Atabaki London, 71–95: I.B. Tauris, 2007.

Stephanie Cronin. "Resisting The New State: The Rural Poor, Land and Modernity in Iran, 1921–1941", In the *Subalterns and Social Protest: History From Below In The Middle East and North Africa*. Edited by. Stephanie Cronin, 141–170, New York: Routledge, 2008.

"The Soviet Note to Iran", *Bulletin of International News*, v. 18, n. 18, (September 6, 1941), p. 1135–1136.

Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Islamic Revolution", *Theory and Society*, v. 11, No. 3 (May 1982), p. 265–283.

Touraj Atabaki. "From Multilingual Empire to Contested Modern State." In *the Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics, and Conflicts*. Edited by. Homa Katouzian, Hossan Shahidi, 41–62, New York: Routledge, 2008.

Touraj Atabaki. "The Caliphate, The Clerics, and Republicanism in Turkey and Iran: Some Comparative Remarks." In the *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*. Edited by. Touraj Atabaki, Eric J. Zürcher, 44–64, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

Vanessa Martin, "Modarres, Republicanism and The Rise to Power of Reza Khan", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 21, no. 2, 1994, pp. 202–210.



Vanessa Martin, "Women and Popular Protest: Women's Demonstrations in Nineteenth-Century Iran", eds. Stephanie Cronin, *Subalterns and Social Protest: History From Below In The Middle East and North Africa*, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 50–66.

Wilfrid Knapp. "1921–1941: The Period of Reza Shah." *Twentieth-Century Iran*. Edited by. Hossein Amirsadeghi, London: Heinemann, 1977.

Wilhelm Eilers. "Educational and Cultural Development In Iran During The Pahlavi Era." In the *Iran Under The Pahlavis*. Edited by. George Lenczowski. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

William E. Griffith. "Iran's Foreign Policy In The Pahlavi Era." In the *Iran Under The Pahlavis*. Edited by. George Lenczowski. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

William Green Miller, "Political Organization In Iran: From Dowreh To Political Party", *Middle East Journal*, v. 23, n. 3 (Summer, 1969), p. 343–350.

Yahya Armajani. "Reza Shah Pahlavi." In *Encyclopedia of World Biography*, v. 9, 160–162. New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1973.

### **Secondary Sources (Dissertations)**

Adel Altorai, *Understanding The Roles of State Identity In Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Rise and Demise of Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement (1997–2009)*, London, London School of Economics (LSE), Ph.D., 2012.

Agâh Hazır, *A Comparative Analysis of Religion-State Relations: A Case Study On Turkey and Iran*, Middle East Technical University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 2014.

Ashgar Alam Tabriz, *Aydınların, Dini Liderler ve Esnafın İran'ın Yakın Dönem Toplumsal Hareketlerindeki ve Devrimlerindeki Rolünün İncelenmesi*, Ankara University, Graduate of Social Sciences, Ph.D., 2004.

Majid Yazdi, *Religion, Modernization and Politics In Iran: An Analysis of Clerical Political Behavior During The Pahlavi Monarchy (1925–1979)*, Houston, Rice University, Ph.D. 1989.

Mustafa Suphi Erden, *Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey and Iran*, Middle East Technical University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 2010.

Parviz Ilmi. Perviz Ilmi, *İran'da Maliye ve Verginin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Hayata Etkisi*, İstanbul University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Ph.D., 1973.

Takhshid, Mohammad Reza, "*The Ulama of Iran: Fluctuations in power 1796-1941*", University of Tennessee, Ph.D., 1988.

### **Primary Sources**

FO [E4095/14/34] dated July 8, 1942.

FO [E4357/14/34] dated July 9, 1942.

FO [E4078/3655/34] dated July 21, 1942.

FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 28, 1942.

FO [E4619/3655/34] dated July 28, 1942.

FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 29, 1942.

FO [E4519/14/34] dated July 30, 1942.

FO [E4550/14/34] dated July 31, 1942.

FO [E4485/14/34] dated July 29, 1942.

FO [E4564/14/34] dated August 2, 1942.

FO [E4610/14/34] dated August 5, 1942.

FO [E4611/122/34] dated August 5, 1942.

FO [E4636/14/34] dated August 5, 1942.

FO [E4681/14/34] dated August 8, 1942.

FO [E4682/14/34] dated August 8, 1942.

FO [E4690/17/34] dated August 9, 1942.

FO [E5057/14/34] dated August 9, 1942.

FO [E5055/-/34] dated August 12, 1942.

FO [E5274/173/34] dated August 18, 1942.

FO [E5200/122/34] dated September 1, 1942.

FO [E5214/122/34] dated September 5, 1942.

FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 08, 1942.

FO [E5615/19/34] dated September 15, 1942.

FO [E5579/14/34] dated September 20, 1942.

FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 22, 1942.

FO [E6153/19/34] dated September 22, 1942.

FO [E6154/3655/34] dated September 28, 1942.

FO [E5805/14/34] dated October 1, 1942.

FO [E6920/21/34] dated October 10, 1942.

FO [E6920/21/34] dated October 22, 1942.

FO [E6200/144/34] dated October 23, 1942.

FO [E6470/122/34] dated November 03, 1942.

FO [E6920/21/34] dated November 10, 1942.

FO [E6811/122/34] dated November 16, 1942.

FO [E7042/2067/6] dated November 24, 1942.

FO [E6811/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

FO [E7330/122/34] dated November 27, 1942.

FO [E7393/19/34] dated December 18, 1942.

FO [E7555/19/34] dated December 29, 1942.

FO [E2453/239/34] dated March 6, 1943.

FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

FO [E2168/80/84] dated March 19, 1943.

FO [E2450/239/34] dated March 26, 1943.

FO [E2248/80/34] dated March 30, 1943.

CIA, EGMW-12363, dated October 9, 1962, p. 1-3.

CIA-RDP80T00634A000500010030-8 dated 8 December 1978

General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 30.10.0.0, 261.758.10, p.4.

General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 30.10.0.0, 261.759.5, p. 1-5.

General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 30.10.0.0, 262.763.32, p. 2.

General Directorate of State Archives/Turkey (BCA) 490.1.0.0, 1061.2.1074, p. 2.

### **Newspapers and Periodicals**

Argus  
Askeri Mecmua  
Barrier Miner  
Cumhuriyet  
Daily News  
Haber Akşam Postası  
Karagöz  
Son Posta  
Son Telgraf  
Tanin  
Tasvir-i Efkâr  
The Mercury  
The Times  
Turan (Elazığ)  
Vakit  
Washington Herald  
Washington Post  
Western Mail

### **Websites**

<https://socialhistory.org/en/collections/khandaniha-magazine>

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kasravi-ahmad>.

[http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/akasravi/ahmad\\_kasravi.php](http://www.iranchamber.com/personalities/akasravi/ahmad_kasravi.php).

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United\\_States\\_Ambassador\\_to\\_Iran.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Ambassador_to_Iran)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reza\\_Shah's\\_mausoleum](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reza_Shah's_mausoleum) [visiting date June 03, 2014]

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran\\_Conference.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran_Conference) [visiting date June 03, 2014]

<http://www2.unb.ca/~mrezun/teymourtashpersiand.html> [January 30, 2015]


<http://www.qajarpages.org/qajcoup1925.html> [February 01, 2016]

<http://adst.org/oral-history/country-reader-series/> [August, 2016]

## APPENDICES

### A. IRAN: GRAIN PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION

Library of Congress, Division of Maps



## **B.CURRICULUM VITAE**

### **PERSONAL INFORMATION**

Surname, Name: Yümlü, Murat  
Nationality: Turkish (TC)  
Date of Birth: 14 February 1982, İstanbul  
Marital Status: Single  
Phone: +90 554 950 30 28  
E-mail: [muratyumluhistory@gmail.com](mailto:muratyumluhistory@gmail.com)

### **EDUCATION**

<b>Degree</b>	<b>Field</b>	<b>University</b>	<b>Year</b>
B.A.	International Relations	Istanbul University	2004
M.A.	History of Turkish Revolution and Atatürk's Principles	Yıldız Technical University	2009
Ph.D.	History	Middle East Technical University	2017

### **FOREIGN LANGUAGES**

Advanced English, Elementary Persian, Elementary French

### **WORK EXPERIENCE**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Enrollment</b>
2010-2010	Muğla University	Lecturer (History of Turkish Revolution and Atatürk's Principles)
2014-2017	Bartın University	Lecturer (History of Turkish Revolution and Atatürk's Principles)
2013 (Sept.-Dec.)	University of Texas at Austin CMES	Visiting Scholar



## PUBLICATIONS

Murat Yümlü. “Contextualizing The Political Trends in Iranian Politics: 1941–1946”, *Symposium on the Global Perspectives for Social Sciences and Humanities*, (Ankara: Detay Yayıncılık, 2016). pp.140–155.

Murat Yümlü. “Post Second World War Case of Conflict Resolution: the Question of Trieste”, *ICRP Balkans Dialogue, Conflict Resolution and EU Accession Politics in The Balkans and Turkey* (Budapest: Institute For Cultural Relations Policy, 2013). pp. 19–26.

Murat Yümlü. “The Relationship of Ulusoy Family with the Turkish Unity Party as One of the Dergâh Representation Ways Across the 1960’s”, *Proceedings of the International Hadji Bektash Veli Symposium (Uluslararası Hacibektaş Veli Sempozyumu Bildirileri)/Hacibektaş Veli: Güneşte Zerresinden, Deryada Katresinden* (Ankara: Dipnot Press, 2010), pp. 265–279.

## C.TURKISH SUMMARY

### İRAN'DA SİYASAL MUHALEFETİN YENİDEN OLUŞUMU

(1926–1946)

1926–1946 yılları arasına odaklanarak, İran'da siyasal muhalefetin yeniden ortaya çıkışına odaklanan bu çalışmada, Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminin ardından milliyetçi ara dönemin ilk evresinde (1941–1946) siyasal muhalefetin nasıl geliştiği ve bu gelişimin temel unsurları incelenmiştir.

İran, siyasi parti organizasyonu ve siyasal muhalefetin gelişimi açısından yirminci yüzyılın başlarından itibaren önemli gelişmelere tanıklık etmiştir. İran vatandaşlığı 19. yüzyıldan itibaren aktif ve kamusal alan karşısında özel alanın vurgulandığı bir vatandaşlık olarak nitelenmiştir. İran'da tarihsel deneyim ışığında düşünüldüğünde devlet, örgütlü sosyal yapısıyla ulema ve esnaf grupları (bazaari/pazar esnafı) karşısında gücünü sürekli arttırmaya çalışmıştır. Ne var ki, ulema, pazar esnafı ve bileşenleri, politik sol gruplar ve aşiretler başta olmak üzere aşağıdan gelen tepkilerle karşılaşmıştır.

1891'de tütün imtiyazının Britanya'ya verilmesine karşı mollaların başını çektiği Tütün Ayaklanması, 1906-1911 arasında Batı siyasi düşüncesinin sağladığı hukukun üstünlüğü ilkesini savunan aydınların ve mollaların, aşiretlerin, esnaf kesiminin, Azerilerin ve Ermenilerin başını çektiği Meşrutiyet Devrimi, 1945–1946'da Sovyetler Birliği'nin savaş sonrası düzenin şekillenmesinde söz sahibi olmak amacıyla desteklediği Azeri ve Kürt otonom hareketleri ve bu hareketler sonucunda ortaya çıkan Demokratik Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti, Mahabad Özerk Cumhuriyeti, 1950'lerin başlarında Musaddık'ın önderliğinde gelişen Milli Cephe hareketi, 1960'ların ortalarında gelişen sosyal hareketler ve 1978–1979'da gelişen ve İran Devrimi ile sonuçlanan hareketler ülkedeki sosyal yapı ve devlet inşası süreçleri arasındaki gerilimi temsil eden protesto döngülerini oluşturmuşlardır.

1926-1946 yılları arasında İran'da siyasal muhalefetin nasıl yeniden ortaya çıktığı anlatılmaya çalışılırken keyfi yönetim geleneğinin İran'da devlet anlayışına etkileri ele alınmış, Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminde ulusal düzeyde modernleşme hareketiyle

elde edilen başarılarla karşılık siyasal muhalefetin hangi nedenlerle etkisizleştiği sorusu yanıtlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu soru 1941 yılında Sovyetler Birliği ve Britanya'nın orduları tarafından ülkenin işgal edilmesi ve Rıza Şah Pehlevi'nin tahttan indirilmesi sonrasında siyasal alanda yaşanan gelişmelerle birlikte ele alınmıştır.

Tez, ilk bölümü giriş bölümü olmak üzere, dört bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde amaç, önem, akademik yazın taraması ve kavramsal çerçeve ele alınmıştır. Bu amaçla, tez kapsamında yer alan ilgili yazın taranmıştır. İngiliz arşiv belgeleri (Foreign Office/FO) ve Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Cumhuriyet Arşivi belgeleri (BCA) çalışmanın birincil kaynaklarını oluşturmuşlardır. Ayrıca, ağırlığını İkinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarında yayınlanan gazetelerin oluşturduğu Türkçe ve İngilizce basın materyali de İran'da yaşanan sosyal, ekonomik çalkantıları, Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminde şekillenen muhalefeti, 1941 yılında ülkenin yaşadığı işgali, işgalin İngiliz basınında ele almış biçimlerini, kabine değişikliklerini ortaya koymak üzere değerlendirilmiştir.

Tezin amacı yukarıda da ifade edildiği şekliyle, siyasal muhalefet olgusunun yeniden ortaya çıkışının nedenlerinin araştırılmasına dayandırılmıştır. Siyasal muhalefetin nasıl ortaya çıktığı değerlendirilirken tarihsel patikalar ışığında siyasal yönelimlerin çerçevesi sadece Batı siyasi tarihinin etkilerine bakılarak değil, aynı zamanda İran tarihinin özgüllükleri ışığında değerlendirilmiştir. İran'da 19. Yüzyıl sonlarından itibaren ortaya çıkan gelişmeler, 20. yüzyıl başlarında Meşrutiyet devriminin tetiklediği bir anayasal gelişme çizgisini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu kapsamda İran siyasi tarihinin tartışmaları anayasal gelişme çizgisi ve uluslararası alanda yaşanan gelişmelerin İran'ın toprak bütünlüğüne, mali bağımsızlığına etkileri ışığında ele alınmıştır. Birinci Dünya Savaşı döneminde İran'ın toprak bütünlüğünün bozulması dolayısıyla ortaya çıkan riskler farklı siyasal koalisyonları gündeme getirmiştir. Devletin merkezi otoritesinin tesis edilmesi konusunda yaşanan tartışmalar, siyasal otoritenin yeniden güçlendirilmesi amaçlayan milliyetçi aydınların savlarına göre şekillenen bir dizi koalisyonlar ışığında sürdürülmüştür.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Rıza Şah Pehlevi dönemi İran'da devlet ve toplum ilişkilerinin otoriter bir modernleşme programının merkezinde yer aldığı bir siyasal projeksiyona göre şekillenmesini amaçlamıştır. Bu bakımdan tezin önemi değerlendirilirken, Rıza Şah Pehlevi dönemini çalışmanın gerekçeleri üzerinde

durulmuştur. 1. ve 2. Dünya Savaşları arasında İran'da modernleşme programının hem Batı modernleşmesi hem de İran'ın özgüllükleri ışığında değerlendirilmesinin gerekliliği üzerinde durulurken, Batı akademilerinde öne çıkan akademik yazının sağladığı tartışma imkânlarından yararlanılmıştır. Tez, Rıza Şah Pehlevi ve milliyetçi ara dönemin erken evresinin çalışılmasının neden önem taşıdığı ve çalışmanın ilgili yazındaki çalışmalardan nasıl farklılaştığı sorularına dayandırılarak ele alınmıştır. Beş model üzerinde durularak İran'da verili dönem aralığında muhalefetin nasıl yeniden ortaya çıktığı anlatılmıştır. Bu modeller aşağıda okuyucuların dikkatine sunulmuştur:

A)Devre Sistemi

B)Siyasi Modernleşmenin Yetersizliği Yaklaşımı

C)Devlet ve Toplum Karşılaşması Yaklaşımı

D)Siyasal Muhalefeti Uzlaşmayla Bastırma Yaklaşımı

E)Devlet destekli tek parti modeli yaklaşımı

Her bir modelin tezin yanıtlamaya çalıştığı soruya dolayısıyla siyasi muhalefetin nasıl yeniden ortaya çıktığına dair yanıtlar sunarken genel olarak kurumsal, ideolojik ve uluslararası etkileri dikkate aldığını belirtmek gerekmektedir.

İlk model esnek koalisyonlar biçiminde ve encümenler etkisinde gelişen zayıf siyasi parti modelidir. Devre sistemi olarak adlandırılan bu model Rıza Şah döneminde neredeyse son bulmuştur. Pehlevi rejiminin otoritesinin güçlenmesiyle birlikte genellikle aristokratik çevreler tarafından kurulan devre adlı zayıf siyasi oluşumlar yok olmuştur. Bu model ışığında ilgili akademik yazındaki tartışmalara yer verilmiştir. 1940'lerden, 1960'lara uzanan bir evrede İran siyasi hayatının geçirdiği dönüşümü ele alan çalışmalarda temel tartışma İran'da siyasi parti organizasyonunun devre sisteminin etkisinde kaldığı yönündedir. İstisnai olarak toplumsal sınıf çıkarlarına dayanarak gelişen Tudeh Partisi dışında diğer siyasi partiler liderliğe bağlı, kişi ya da grupların kontrolünde gelişen ve siyasal hareketlere dayanmaktan çok, erken Pehlevi döneminde siyasal muhalefete yönelemeyen siyasal elitlerin yönlendiriciliğinde gelişmiştir. Çalışmada, 1941-1946 yılları arasında İran siyasetinin temel dinamikleri ele alınırken, Richard Cottam'ın dönemlendirmesi dikkate alınmıştır. Cottam, 1968'de İran Çalışmaları (Iranian Studies) dergisinde yayınladığı makalede, İran'daki siyasi parti gelişiminin dönemlendirmesini 1906-1921, 1941-1950 ve 1950-1953 yılları arasına dayandırmıştır. Bu bağlamda, çalışma

Cottam'ın ele aldığı ilk iki döneme odaklanarak devre sisteminin yavaş yavaş çözülmeye başladığından bahsetmektedir. Aslında devre sistemi denilen ve daha çok İran toplumsal yapısı içinde saray bürokrasisi, toprak aristokrasisi ve kısmen de yurtdışında eğitim görmüş entelektüel zümrenin temsil ettiği kanatlardan karizmatik liderlikle şekillenen, siyasi çıkar çevreleriyle sınırlı bu sistem İran siyasetinin 1940'lı yıllardaki demokratikleşme sürecini anlamak açısından önem taşımaktadır. Bu dönemde kurulan siyasi partilerden bahsederken Frank Tachau da aynı çizgide pek çok siyasi oluşuma değinmektedir. Devre sisteminin gelişimine bakıldığında siyasi dernek faaliyetleri ışığında gelişen liberal milliyetçiliğin etkileri dikkat çekmektedir. 1906-1921 dönemine odaklanıldığında Meşrutiyet Devrimi'nin birikiminin 1941 sonrasında da değerlendirilmesine işaret eden gelişmelerle birlikte, İkinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarının işgal tecrübesi de dikkate alınmıştır. İşgal süreci İran'da devre sistemi pratiğinin yeniden ortaya çıkması bakımından dikkat çekicidir. İçsel dinamiklere bağlı olarak değerlendirildiğinde devre sistemi Müttefik ülkelerin işgalinden etkilenen fakat İran siyasi tarihinin Meşrutiyet döneminde tecrübe ettiği tartışmalardan da yararlanan önemli bir model olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Siyasal muhalefetin İran'ın işgali sonrasında yeniden ortaya çıkmasında bu birikimin etkisi göz ardı edilmeksizin, diğer modellerin etkileri de dikkate alınmıştır.

İkinci model siyasi modernleşmenin sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik boyutlara nazaran zayıf kalmasıdır. Anayasaya bağlılık ve Meclis otoritesinin korunması, seçimlerin güvenilirliği bakımından Rıza Şah dönemi eleştirilere konu olmuştur. Rıza Şah gibi güçlü bir monarkın İran tahtından çekilmesiyle doğan boşluğu genç ve tecrübesiz oğlunun doldurma çabaları 1941-1953 arasında siyasal muhalefetin güçlenmesine zemin hazırlamıştır. Bu dönemde çok sayıda siyasi parti kurulmuş (Tudeh Partisi, Milli İrade Partisi, İran Partisi, Anavatan Partisi, Demokrat İran Partisi, Azerbaycan Demokrat Fırkası, Kürdistan Demokrat Fırkası, Sumka vb.) Rıza Şah döneminin modernleşme uygulamaları pek çok yönden tartışılmıştır. Modernleşme yaklaşımına bakıldığında İran'ın siyasal pratiği aydınların ve ulemanın önemli bir bölümünün topluma tanıttığı hukukun üstünlüğü, Meclis, seçim, yabancı etkisi, ekonomik imtiyazlar vb. bir dizi kavramla ilgili tartışmaların sürekliliğine dayanmaktadır. Rıza Şah Pehlevi dönemi bu açıdan iki savaş arasındaki dönemin dinamikleri anlaşılaksızın yanlış bir perspektifle yorumlanabilmektedir. Bu yoruma göre Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminin siyasi alandaki modernleşme çabaları Matin-Asgari'nin

incelediği şekliyle araçsallaştırmacı yaklaşıma indirgenebilmektedir. Aydınların desteklediği sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel modernleşme çabalarıyla birlikte değerlendirildiğinde İran'da seçimlerin güvenilirliğinin gittikçe azaldığı erken Pehlevi döneminin temel vizyonu otoriter modernleşmenin hayata geçirebilmesi için uluslararası ilişkiler ekseninde kurulan ittifaklar ışığında Britanya ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin etkisinin gözlenebildiği siyasi muhalefet potansiyelinin ötelenmesi yönünde olmuştur. Bu çabalar, aynı zamanda ordu içindeki kliklerin bastırılması, ulema muhalefetine bastırılması ve dini reaksiyonerizmin sonlandırılması, seküler bir anlayışın yerleştirilmesi, merkezileşme politikalarının güçlendirilmesi için aşiret konfederasyonlarının isyanlarının sert tedbirlerle bastırılmasıyla birlikte sürdürülmüştür. Sol muhalefetin filizlenmesi engellenirken temel yaklaşım sol muhalefetin modernleşmenin toplumsal alandaki etkilerine muhalefetinin engellenmesi değil, daha çok sınıf temelli bir siyasetin engellenmesine dayandırılmıştır. Devlet eliyle kapitalistleşme sürecinin temel vizyonunu siyasi modernleşmenin zayıf kılınmasıyla birlikte değerlendirmek gerektiği üzerinde durulmuştur. Modernleşme konusunda Batı'nın siyasal modernleşme çizgisinin uygulanmasında yaşanan zorluklar göz ardı edilmemeye çalışılmıştır. Bu aşamada, siyasal pratik İran'da Meclis'in etkisinin güçlendiği evrede Meşrutiyet'in bölgeselcilik eğilimlerini güçlendirdiği şeklinde değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bakımdan modernleşme vizyonunun otoriter bir damara dayandırılması çoğunlukla Meşrutiyet döneminin ardından Birinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarında yaşanan otorite boşluğuyla ilişkilendirilmiştir. Bu temel gerekçe siyasal muhalefetin bastırılması için kapsamlı bir biçimde kullanılmıştır. Bu model ışığında, Rıza Şah'ın tahttan ayrılmasıyla birlikte İran'da siyasal modernleşme alanındaki atılımlar daha çok bu gerekçenin ortadan kalkmasına dayandırılmaktadır. Buna karşılık, ilgili yazında yer alan modernleşme vizyonunun erken Pehlevi dönemindeki karşılığının demokratikleşmenin güçlenebileceği bir toplumsal oluşumlar dizgesinden bağımsız kılınması yetersiz görünmektedir. Sonuçta, İran'da İkinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarında siyasal muhalefetin yeniden ortaya çıkışının temel dinamiği işgal ve Şah'ın tahttan ayrılması olduğu kadar, erken Pehlevi döneminin modernleşme programının sağladığı kazanımlardır. Basın-yayın hayatının gelişmeye devam etmesi, 1906-1932 aralığında ortaya çıkan siyasal parti oluşumlarının dikkate alınması, Müttefik ülkelerin Şah dönemine yönelik kampanyalarının demokratikleşme vizyonunu

güdümlü olarak desteklemesi dışında petrol ve tekstil işçilerinin başını çektiği bir sanayileşme altyapısının etkileri de dikkate alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda, devre modeli sonrasında modernleşme pratiğinin İran'ın özgül patikasıyla örtüşen yönleri siyasal muhalefetin yeniden oluşumuna etki eden farklı bir model olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Üçüncü model devlet ve toplumun karşılaşması yaklaşımına dayanmaktadır. Bu noktada Homa Katouzian'ın vurguladığı temel husus 19. yüzyıldan itibaren devlet ve toplum karşılaşmasında modernleşme sürecinin yanında milliyetçiliğin yükselmesi ve Britanya ve Çarlık Rusyası'nın emperyalist hedeflerinin İran'da bir reaksiyon doğurmuş olmasıdır. Devletin toplumun muhalefet dinamiğini kontrol altına alamaması İran'ın yirminci yüzyıldaki dalgalanmalarını açıklamada temel anahtar olarak kullanılmıştır. Rıza Şah döneminin tepeden inmece devrim programıyla Türkiye modelinden de esintilerle sürdürdüğü modernleşme çabaları karşısında toplum nezdinde ulema, esnaf kesimi ve bileşenleri, politik sol gruplar ve aşiret yapıları şeklindeki muhalefet odaklarının etkileri sürmüştür. Bu modeli destekleyen bir görüş Katouzian'ın kısa vadeli devlet ve toplum ilişkileri tezidir. Güçlü toplum yapısı karşısında İran'da devletin keyfi kurumsal yapısı Rıza Şah döneminde aşılammıştır. Kacar hanedanı döneminde görülen bürokratların keyfi şekilde azledilmesi, sürgün, işkence ve infaz uygulamalarının yanında siyasi muhalefet büyük ölçüde bastırılmıştır. Poulson'un değerlendirmesi ışığında protesto döngülerine bakıldığında İran'da toplumun zayıf devlet karşısında güçlü bir muhalefet geleneğini belirleyen etmenler arasında yabancı müdahalesi ve imtiyazlarına karşı reaksiyonlar, Şii ulemanın toplumsal protesto hareketlerini yönlendirebilme kapasitesi dikkate alınmıştır. Mustafa Suphi Erden'in çalışmasında vurguladığı şekliyle İran'da devlet ve toplum karşılaşması bağlamında özel alanın genişlediği yeni bir siyasal pratik demokratikleşmeye ortam hazırlamıştır. Bu nedenle, modelin ortaya koyduğu yaklaşıma dayandırılarak İran'da siyasal muhalefetin yeniden oluşumunda tarihsel pratiğine yön veren bu yapısal etmenlerin dikkate alınmasının gerekliliği vurgulanmıştır.

Önceki model 1930'larda Pehlevi rejiminin evrimini anlamak açısından önemlidir. 1921 darbesinden 1926'ya kadar geçen sürede uzlaşma anlayışıyla muhalefetin tasfiyesi amaçlanmıştır. Bu tezi işleyen Katouzian ve Atabaki, Rıza Han'ın siyasi manevra yeteneğine vurgu yapmalarının dışında ulemanın parçalı yapısına değinmişlerdir. Rıza Han, Türkiye'den esinlenerek Cumhuriyet'in ilan edilmesine

yönelik kampanya yürüttüğü dönemde de benzer bir anlayışla hareket etmiş, mollaların kendisini Baha'i olarak niteleyip siyasal olarak “güçsüzleştirmeleri” riskini manevralarla atlatmıştır. Aynı şekilde reformları arasında önemli bir yer tutan zorunlu askerlik uygulamasıyla ordunun gücünün arttırılması politikası ulemanın tepkisini çekmiştir. Bu model kapsamında Rıza Han ve Rıza Şah dönemlerine eğilerek zorunlu askerlik uygulamasının otoriter modernleşmenin askeri karakterini de ortaya çıkardığı vurgulanmıştır. Bir yönüyle, modernleşme programının temel ayaklarını destekleyen eğitim, sağlık, sanayi, ekonomi ve hukuk alanlarındaki seküler reformlar merkezileştirmeyi destekleyen bürokrasinin güçlendirilmesi ve yaygınlaştırılması ile birlikte zorunlu askerlik uygulamasına dayanmıştır. Uzlaşma siyaseti daha çok 1920’li yılların başlarından itibaren 1930’ların başlarına kadar uzanan bir siyaset çizgisinde değerlendirilmektedir. 1920’lerin sonlarına gelindiğinde İran’da Pehlevi hanedanı yükselmeye başlarken, taç giymesinin ardından, Rıza Şah’ın sürdürülmesini desteklediği siyasi parti oluşumları sekteye uğramaya başlamıştır. Rejim, seküler modernleşme anlayışını saray bürokrasisinin öne çıkan yöneticileri aracılığıyla sürdürürken Terakki Partisi denemesinin ardından, 1930’larda hayata geçirilemeyen bir devlet partisi modeli üzerinde durmuştur. Bu dönemi Rıza Şah Pehlevi’nin kendi otoritesini pekiştirerek, saray bürokrasisinde giriştiği tasfiyeler dönemi şeklinde değerlendirmek mümkündür. Aynı zamanda, 1931’de çıkarılan anti-kollektivizm yasası ışığında siyasal alanın herhangi bir muhalefete tamamen kapatılmaya başlandığı sürgün ve korku atmosferi üzerinde durulmuştur. Siyasal uzlaşma yöntemi modelinin ortaya koyduğu formül tarihsel konjonktür ışığında siyasal elitler arasındaki uzlaşmazlıklara dayanarak otoriter bir modernleşme programının hayata geçirilebileceği görüşüne dayanmaktadır. Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminin bu yaklaşımı ilerlemeci bir tarih çizgisinin ortaya çıkışı bakımından modernleşmeyi destekleyen aydınlar tarafından desteklenmiştir. Bu desteğin geçerlilik süresi seküler modernleşme atılımlarının hızını kaybetmemesine dayanmıştır. Bu nedenle, siyasal muhalefetin bastırılması bakımından önem taşıyan bu yaklaşımın diğer modelleri destekleyen; Rıza Şah döneminin ardından siyasal muhalefetin yeniden ortaya çıkışını anlamak açısından önem taşıması yanı sıra, 1941 sonrasında ortaya çıkan yeni dinamiklerin Muhammed Rıza Şah Pehlevi’nin yeni adapte olduğu şartları değerlendirmek için önem taşıdığı belirtilmiştir. 1920’lerin sonlarında artık uzlaşma siyasetinin yerini siyasal muhalefeti bastırma siyaseti



almaya başlamıştır. Bu baskı politikası 1930'larda daha da güçlenmiştir. Ülkenin işgale uğraması sonrasında uzlaşma siyasetinin özellikle mollalarla birlikte değerlendirilmesi gerektiği üzerinde durulmuştur. Mollaların reaksiyoner damarı Rıza Şah dönemindeki siyasal dingincilik yaklaşımından küçük çaplı kopuşlarla birlikte milliyetçi ara dönem sonrasında da devam etmiştir. Bu açıdan çalışmanın incelediği dönem aralığında siyasal muhalefetin bastırılması ve yeniden ortaya çıkışı ikilemini belirleyen unsurlar arasında siyasal uzlaşma stratejisinin etkili olduğu değerlendirilmiştir.

Son model ise 1920'lerin ortalarından 1930'ların başlarına kadar kurulan üç siyasi parti denemesiyle ilgilidir. Rıza Şah'ın hanedanlığını kurması ve taç giymesinden önce aristokratik çevrelerin yönetimindeki Teceddüd (Yenilik) Partisi, 1927 yılında yerini Yeni İran (Iran-e No) Partisi'ne bırakmıştır. 1927'de üç ay süreyle var olan bu partinin yerini 1927-1932 arasında Saray Nazırı -Pehlevi bürokrasisinde Şah'ın ardından gelen en önemli kişi olan- Timurtaş'ın kurduğu ve yönettiği Terakki (İlerleme) Partisi almıştır. Timurtaş, Pehlevi bürokrasisinde Şah'a yakın kişilerin hayat güvencelerinin kolaylıkla kaybedileceğine dair dikkat çekici bir örnek olarak nitelenmiştir. Timurtaş'ın tasfiyesi dışında 1920'lerin sonları, özellikle de 1930'lar siyasal muhalefetin elitler arasındaki tasfiyesi açısından dikkat çekici başka örnekleri de içermektedir. Çalışmada ele alınan erken Pehlevi döneminin hukuk reformlarının mimarı Ali Ekber Daver'in ya da Bahtiyari aşiretine mensup olan, Pehlevi bürokrasisinde bakanlık görevinde de bulunan Serdar Esad örneklerinde görüldüğü üzere tasfiyelerin gerekçesi farklılık arz edebilmektedir. Çoğunlukla demokratikleşme vizyonuna yönelik eleştirilerle birlikte siyasal ve mali yönetim sorunlarının çözümüne ilişkin yaklaşım farklılıkları ayrışmayı beraberinde getirmiştir. Tarihsel olarak uzlaşma kültürünün saray yönetiminin belirleyiciliğinde sürdüğü düşünüldüğünde seküler modernleşmeci reformlara destek veren bürokrasinin hanedana daha çok bağlılık göstermesi beklenen bir dönem yaşanmıştır. Bu dönemin mirası reform düşüncesinin hayata geçirilebilmesinin siyasal parti organizasyonlarının geliştirilmesine dayandığı fikrini de ortaya çıkarmıştır. 1930'ların başlarına kadar reform düşüncesinin arkasında yer alan önemli bürokratların başında Timurtaş gelmektedir. Fakat İngiltere'ye yakınlığı, iyi derecede Rusça bilmesi, eşinin Rus olması gibi faktörlerle birlikte aleyhinde yürütülen siyasi kampanyalar sonunda Rıza Şah tarafından rüşvet ve zimmet suçlamalarıyla mahkûm

ettirilmiş, hapiste geçirdiği bir kaç ayın sonunda zehirlenerek öldürülmüştür. Batı dünyasıyla İran arasında güçlü bağlar kuran Pehlevi bürokratları arasında pek çok ismin tasfiyesi İran'da devlet destekli ve muhalefete çeşitli şekillerde yer verebilecek siyasi parti projesinin çökmesine neden olmuştur. 1932'den 1941 yılına kadar İran'da ne dernekler yönünden, ne de sosyal ve siyasi örgütlülük yönünden hiçbir partiye izin verilmemesinin sonunda muhalefet birikimi sönümlenmeye yüz tutmuştur. 1941 sonrasında muhalefetin yeniden ortaya çıkmasında bu tek parti projesinin -Türkiye'deki CHP örneğinden de esintiler taşıdığı Fahreddin Azimi'nin çalışmalarında belirtilmiştir- başarısızlığının etkili olduğu çalışmada vurgulanmıştır. Buna karşılık, işgal sonrasında İran siyasal hayatına damgasını vuran Tudeh Partisi dışında diğer partilerin saray çevresiyle bağlantıları siyasal muhalefetin yeniden oluşumunu inceleyebilmek için büyük önem taşımıştır. Böylece son modelde hanedanın onayladığı tek bir parti modelinin başarısızlığının İran'da toplum ve devlet ilişkileri nezdinde dengenin sağlanmasına engel teşkil ettiği görüşü değerlendirilmiştir. Eliot'un çalışmasında incelediği bu parti modeli Türkiye'de yükselen tek parti modelinin Osmanlı'dan devraldığı tutunum ideolojisinin yaratılamamış olması fikrine dayanmaktadır. Buna göre, işgal sonrasında İran'da devlet ve toplum ilişkilerine yön verebilecek ve siyasal muhalefeti kontrol altına alabilecek bir tutunum ideolojisi partisi fikri hayata geçirilememiştir.

İran, İkinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarının kritik bir dönemecinde tarafsızlığına karşılık, işgalle birlikte fiili olarak Müttefikler bloğunun etkisine girmiştir. 1941'de yaşanan işgal sonrasında İran'ın uzun tarihinde önemli bir dönüm noktasına geldiği, kapsamlı modernleşme programıyla önemli başarıların elde edildiği Rıza Şah Pehlevi sonrasında siyasal hayatın nasıl şekilleneceği sorusu önem kazanmıştır. Bu dönemde, İran'da ekonomik, siyasi ve kültürel alanda İngiliz etkisinin arttırılmaya çalışıldığı ve bu çabaların dayanak noktası olarak Rıza Şah Pehlevi dönemine bir misilleme taşıdığı da görülmüştür. Rıza Şah dönemi Polis Şefi'nin bir yıla yaklaşan yargılanma sürecinde devr-i sabık yaratma sürecinin küçük bir sahnesiyle karşılaşılmıştır. Bu davada kamuoyuna sunulan bilgilere İngiliz Arşiv belgelerinden kısmen de olsa ulaşılabilmektedir. Bir bakıma Rıza Şah döneminin kötülenmesi ve hukuksuz yargılama dışında, fail-i meçhul cinayetlerine yönelik eleştiriler sıklıkla vurgulanmıştır. Müttefiklerin İkinci Büyük Savaş dinamikleri ekseninde savunduğu “demokrasi” cephesi bakımından düşünüldüğünde, Mihver bloğunun totaliter ve

faşist rejimlerinden çok daha özgürlükçü vaatlerde bulunduğu ancak liberalleşme sürecinin görece ilerlemelerle sınırlı kaldığı belirtilebilir. Her şekilde, İkinci Dünya Savaşı yılları İran siyaseti başta olmak üzere toplum, kültür, din ve ekonomi türünde alanlarda yeni düzenlemelere sahne olmuştur. İran, bu dönemde, daha önce anıldığı üzere, öncelikle işgal sonrası dönemin ikinci Başbakanı ve ardından dördüncü Başbakanı olarak görev yapan Ali Süheyli döneminde Müttefikler nezdinde stratejik önemine vurgu yapmasının dışında, ittifak yapısı içinde yer almaya sıcak bakmıştır. Şah'ın, siyasal bir özne olarak desteklediği, aynı zamanda Britanya'nın İran'ın dış ilişkilerindeki tecrübesi ve Ali Süheyli'nin de desteklediği, Müttefiklerin kararlaştırdığı Tahran Konferansı'nda ev sahipliği öncesinde Nazi Almanyası'na savaş ilan etmiştir. İran'ın savaş yıllarının kritik bir aşamasında, belki de savaşın en kritik ikinci yılında Almanyaya savaş ilan etmesini izleyen süreçte yaşananlar birbirini tetikleyen olaylar niteliğindedir. 1943 yılının Kasım ayı sonlarında Tahran'da toplanan Üçler Konferansı'nda Sovyetler Birliği, İngiltere ve ABD liderlerine ev sahipliği yapan İran'ın, savaş yıllarının geri kalanında ABD ve İngiltere arasında Tahran Konferansı'nda netleşen bazı ufak tefek ayrışmalar dışında toprak bütünlüğü, savaş sonrasında da bağımsızlığına saygı duyulacağı üç büyük Müttefik güç tarafından garanti edilmiştir.

Tahran Konferansı, İran'ın olduğu kadar, İkinci Paylaşım Savaşı'nın kaderini belirleyecek kararların alındığı bir konferans olması yönüyle de önemli bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Bu konferans, İkinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarının Müttefik ülkeler diplomasisi açısından önem taşımıştır. Bu konferansta, İngiltere ve ABD arasında Türkiye'nin savaşa girmesi konusunda önemli bir görüş ayrılığının somutlaştığı, İran açısından da Türkiye'nin acilen Müttefikler nezdinde savaşa girmesi konusunun üzerinde durulmuştur. Dahası, İkinci Paylaşım Savaşı'nın akışını etkileyecek yeni bir Avrupa cephesinin Fransa'nın batı sahillerinde Normandiya'da açılması kararı aradaki görüş farklılığının mesafesini somutlaştıran en ivedi konu olarak görüşülmüştür. Konferansın önemli sonucunu oluşturan Normandiya Planı, yoğun savaş malzemesi tedarikiyle desteklenmesi gereken Türkiye'nin acilen Müttefikler bloğuna katılması beklentisinin ötesine geçmiştir. Bu durumu Türkiye'nin savaşın başlangıcından itibaren tarafsız (*neutral*) pozisyonunu korumasında dışsal bir belirleyici olarak anlamak daha yararlı olacaktır. Tahran Konferansı'nda yaklaşık

altı ay içinde (1944 baharı) Avrupa’da yeni bir cephe açılması yoluyla kilitlenmiş mücadelenin ve topyekûn savaşların sonlandırılması amaçlanmıştır.

İşgalin yeni dinamikleri ortaya çıkardığı İran’da modernleşme uygulamalarına karşı küçük çaplı tepkiler yaşanmıştır. Sosyal ve ekonomik meseleler ülkenin siyasal ajandasında üst sıralarda yer almaya başlamıştır. Bu meseleler işgal sonrasında İran yönetimini üstlenen hükümetler açısından ivedilikle çözülmesi beklenen meseleler arasında yer almışlardır.

İran, işgal sonrası dönemin ilk yılı tamamlandığında, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda ağır bir şekilde yaşanan buğday kıtlığını andıran önemli bir sosyal ve ekonomik krizle karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu kriz Macfarland’ın çalışmasında anlattığı şekliyle Tahran Ekmek Ayaklanması olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Ülkedeki kaos ortamını etkileyen dışsal faktörler arasında Polonyalı mültecilerin ülkeye ilticası ön sıralarda yer alırken, sayıları 25–30 bine çıkan mültecilerin iâşe ve konaklama sorunu çözülmeye çalışılmıştır. Enflasyon, yolsuzluk ülkedeki siyasetin gündem maddeleri arasındaki yerini 1942 yılı boyunca korumuştur. Ülkede oluşan otonom iktidar odakları bazı ayaklanmalar ve karışıklıklar çıkarmışlardır. İşgal sonrası ülke yönetiminde genç ve tecrübesi yetersiz Şah’ın ve onun belirlediği Başbakanlar yönetimindeki kabinelerin uğraşmak durumunda kaldığı bu meseleler İran’ın İkinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarında karşılaştığı meseleler olmalarının yanı sıra, Birinci Dünya Savaşı dönemi ve hemen sonrasında siyasal tartışmalarını da gündeme getirmiştir.

Aynı şekilde, ülkede 1945 sonlarında şiddetlenen etnik kimlik krizi Demokratik Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti’nin Sovyetler Birliği’ne ve ona yakın çizgisiyle Tudeh’e angaje Demokratik Azerbaycan Partisi (Fırka-yi Dimokrat) kadroları ve onun önderi **Cafer Pişevari (Jafar Pishavari)** liderliğiyle derinleşmeye devam etmiştir. Bu durum birkaç ay içinde İran’ın Pehlevi dönemi öncesinden başlayarak, özellikle Meşrutiyet İnkılabı olarak anılan (**Enqılab-e Azadi**) devrim hareketi döneminde coşkun kitle hareketlerine ev sahipliği yapan Azerbaycan’a bağlı olan Kürdistan coğrafyasında yine Sovyetler Birliği’ne angaje bir otonom idarenin ortaya çıkmasıyla daha da somutlaşmıştır. Bu bakımdan, tematik bir skala sunmaya çalışılırken Azeri ve Kürt kimlik hareketlerinin İran’ın İkinci Dünya Savaşı yılları siyasetinin temel dinamikleri açısından önemli bir değer taşıdığı dikkate alınmıştır. Kürt Otonom Cumhuriyeti, Gazi Muhammed’in önderliğinde örgütlenerek gelişmiştir. 19. yüzyıldan itibaren uluslararası güçler çekişmesinin arasında sıkışıp kalan İran

platosu, bu yüzyılın başında Rus İmparatorluğu'nun baskıları karşısında bir kısım imtiyaz antlaşmalarıyla neticelenen gerilemeler yaşamış, aynı zamanda Osmanlı ve Rus modelleriyle çağdaş bir gelişme sergileyen bir modernleşme serüveniyle devletin ömrünün uzatılmasına çalışılmıştır. Şüphesiz ki, İran modernleşmesi, Osmanlı modernleşmesinden pek çok alanda beslenirken, kendi dinamizmiyle ve sosyal hareket geleneğiyle ayrı bir tarihsel patikada değerlendirilmiştir.

Bu tarihsel patika farklılığında önemli bir katmanı da mollalar oluşturmuşlardır. 1890'da Tütün Devrimi'nden başlayarak, 1906'da başlayıp İran Milli Meclisi'nin Muhammed Ali Şah tarafından kapatılmasına kadar süren, daha sonraki süreçte sürekli tadiline çalışılsa ya da bu doğrultuda iddialar dile getirilse de, tadil edilemeyen Meşrutiyet Devrimi'ne kadar toplumsal ve siyasal akvitezme büyük oranda etki eden mollaların İkinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarında ülkede Rıza Şah'ın otoriter modernleşme programının çıkarları aleyhine doğurduğu uygulamaların hafiflemesiyle birlikte etkilerini arttırmaları bir başka tarihsel örnek olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Abbas Milani'nin ortaya koyduğu şekliyle, Şah'ın siyasal bir özne olarak kendini siyasal alandaki daha düşük dereceli rakipleriyle birlikte aynı arenada bulduğu süreçte müttefik arayışlarına karşılık yaslandığı temel blok mollalar olmuştur. Şüphesiz, tek dayanağı mollalık sayılamazsa da, 1941 sonrasında gittikçe artan ve milliyetçi ara dönem olarak nitelendirilen dönemin genel dinamiklerinden birisini de, Şah'ın mollalarla "şartlı bir dayanışma" içinde yer alması oluşturmuştur. Çalışma kapsamında 1946 sonrası ele alınmamış olmakla birlikte, mollalarla uzlaşma siyasetinin temel parametrelerinin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasındaki yıllarda meydana gelen gelişmelerle birlikte ele alınması gerekliliği üzerinde durulmuştur. Hac ziyaretlerinin kolaylaştırılması, devlet tarafından mollalara ait vakıflara el konulması uygulamasına son verilmesi, taşrada kadınların peçe takmalarına karşılık politika farklılığının benimsenmesi türünde pek çok uygulamanın milliyetçi ara dönemin siyasal doğasının anlaşılması açısından önem taşıdığı vurgulanmıştır. Yukarıda da vurgulandığı üzere, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası gelişmeler dikkate alındığında, 1946-1949 aralığında olağanüstü hal uygulamasıyla sonuçlanan bir yeni bir kırılma evresi yaşanmıştır. 1949'da Meclis'in olağanüstü hal uygulamasıyla çıkardığı yasayla, işgal sonrasında tahttan veliaht prens lehine feragat eden Rıza Şah Pehlevi'ye "Kebir" unvanını verilmiştir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı döneminin temaları arasında belki de en önemlisi petrolün millileştirilmesi kampanyasıdır. Kacar soyundan gelen ve Meşrutiyet Devrimi'nin ateşli savunucularından Doktor Musaddık'la özdeşleşen bu millileştirme hareketi konusunda Abrahamian değişen İran siyaseti dinamiklerinin üzerinde durarak Tudeh'in savaş sonundaki öncülüğünden bahsetmektedir. Bu süreç, 1943 yılının sonlarında başlayıp 1944 başlarında kesinleşen seçimler sonucunda şekillenen 14. Meclis döneminde İran siyasetinin devre tipi siyasal oluşumlar, toprak aristokrasisi, mollalar ve yeni aydın zümre arasındaki milliyetçi rezonansın sonucunda ortaya çıkmıştır.

Savaşın sonunda İran, artık yeni bir dünya düzeninin parçası olarak Soğuk Savaş'ın ilk büyük krizinin odağında yer almaya başlamıştır. Sosyal ve ekonomik meselelerin siyasi meseleleri tetikleyici özelliği bu dönemin ajandasını izleyebilmek açısından önem taşımaktadır. Bu meseleler genel hatlarıyla şöyle sıralanmıştır:

- 1) Buğday ve diğer tahılların fiyatlarındaki yüksek artışa duyulan tepkiler
- 2) Güvenlik nedeniyle Tahran'a yerleştirilen Polonyalı mülteciler sorunu
- 3) Tifüs sorunu
- 4) İlaç ve doktor kıtlığından doğan sorunlar
- 5) 13. ve 14. Meclis kompozisyonu ile ortaya çıkan sorunlar
- 6) Rüşvet, yolsuzluk ve eski rejimin işkence uygulayan bürokratları dolayısıyla yapılan tartışmalar
- 7) Şah'ın 3 milyon sterline varan serveti ve Saray mücevherleri konusunda ileri sürülen iddialara bağlı olarak yapılan tartışmalar
- 8) İran Riyali (para birimi) konusunda işgalci Müttefik ülkelerin (Britanya, Sovyetler Birliği ve ABD) talepleri dolayısıyla ortaya çıkan emisyon sorunu
- 9) Etnik Meselelerin Yükselişe Geçmesi
- 10) İran'da faaliyet gösteren Alman ajanlarının Müttefiklere teslim edilmesi ve ülke dışına ihraç edilmeleri meselesi (Savaşın gidişatının belirlendiği 1944 yılına kadar sürmüştür)

Britanya ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin kontrol etmeye çalıştığı yerel dinamikler bu dönemin siyasi ajandasında öne çıkmaya başlamıştır. Sol siyasetin filizlendiği bir döneme karşılık gelmesiyle milliyetçi ara dönemin erken evresi İran siyasetinin dönüşümünde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Tudeh (Kitleler) Partisi bu dönemin en önemli siyasi oluşumdur. Dönemin en etkili siyasi organizasyonu olarak Tudeh

Partisi petrol ve tekstil işçilerinin, köylülerin ve toprak sahiplerinin siyasi manevralarının ortasında siyasi yelpazenin beklenmeyen bir canlanış döneminde ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu yıllar boyunca, Pehlevi yönetiminin kurulmasından itibaren ilk defa, Şah, eşit olmayan muadilleri arasında bir siyasi özne olarak çekişmelerin ortasında kalmıştır. Kapsamlı siyasi toplantılar, yürüyüşler, boykotlar düzenleyen partinin İran siyasetinin dönüşümünde belirleyici rol oynadığı bu dönemin temel özelliği sert, otoriter bir modernleşme çizgisinin birikiminin dönüşmeye başlaması ve görece liberal bir siyasi atmosferin ortaya çıkışıdır. Bu siyasi atmosferin muhalefet potansiyelini Tudeh Partisi başta olmak üzere çeşitli partiler harekete geçirmişlerdir. Sol siyasetin taleplerini toprak reformu, rüşvet ve yolsuzluğun önlenmesi, eski rejimle hesaplaşılması, bir sınıf bilincine kavuşturulmaya çalışılan işçilerin haklarının genişletilmesi, Tudeh Partisi çatısı altında mobilizasyonu sağlanan kadın hareketinin yükselişi, iâşe sorunları, düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğünün genişletilmesi şeklinde önemli meseleler oluşturmuştur. Demokratik Azerbaycan Fırkası ve Kürdistan Demokrat Fırkası örneklerinde İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında filizlenen siyasi muhalefetin yeni dinamiklerini bulmak mümkündür. Bu yönüyle İran siyasetinde siyasi muhalefetin etnik kimliğe bağlı olarak yükselişinin parametreleri çalışmanın temel soruları arasında yer almıştır. Tudeh Partisi'nin siyasi alandaki etkisinin kısılmaya başlamasının doğrudan sonuçları arasında yerel siyasi partilerin kurulması önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Buna göre 1944–1946 yılları arasında İran'da Tudeh Partisi'nin merkezinde yer aldığı siyasi alanın dönüşümü Britanya'nın müdahaleleriyle birlikte devam etmiştir. Bu süreçte İran'da milliyetçi siyasi çizginin yabancı işgaline karşı tepkisel damarının güçlenmeye başladığı görülmektedir. Reaksiyoner damarı oluşturan siyasi parti oluşumları 1946 öncesindeki siyasi dinamiklerden yararlanarak İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında filizlenmeye başlamıştır. Böylelikle otoriter modernleşme programının ikincil planda yer aldığı, kitle siyasetinin Tudeh Partisi önderliğinde sürdürülen çalışmalarla yükseldiği, Britanya'nın siyasi alanı dengelemek amacıyla manipölasyonlarını sürdürdüğü, petrol imtiyazı girişimlerinin Meclis tarafından onaylanmadığı bir sürecin sonunda İran'da sosyal kesimlerin dengesinin ne kadar belirleyici olduğu ve siyasi muhalefetin bu kesimler aracılığıyla yönlendirildiği tespit edilmiştir.

Meclis'in bir parçası olarak, Müttefik işgalci ülkelerle kurdukları ilişkiler ve eski Kacar Hanedanı'yla ve toprak sahipliğiyle bağları sayesinde siyasal etkilerini arttırabilen Ahmed Kavam, Muhammed Musaddık, Seyyid Ziyaeddin Tabatabai ve Muhammed Ali Furugi (Zoka ül-Mülk) gibi siyasi şahsiyetler bu dönemde tahminlerin ötesinde bir siyasal uyanışın sorgulanması açısından İran siyasetinde başlıca özneler arasında yer almışlardır. Siyasal öznenin sadece aristokrat kökenli isimlerle sınırlanması mümkün değilse de, İran siyasal hayatının bu kritik evresinde çalışmanın üçüncü bölümünün son kısmında ele alınan rekabet halindeki düşünce akımları arasında milliyetçiliğin ağırlığının anlaşılması açısından büyük önem taşıdığı belirtilmiştir. İran'da siyasal hayatın doğasının nasıl şekillendiği siyasal muhalefetin anlaşılması açısından da önem taşımaktadır. Bu bakımdan milliyetçilik anlayışının farklı türevlerinin temsiliyetinde hem kurulan kabinelerin hem de siyasi partilerin yaklaşımları İngiliz arşiv belgelerine ve ilgili yazında yer alan ikincil kaynaklara dayandırılarak anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Sonuç olarak, çalışmada İran'da 1926 ve 1946 yılları arasında siyasal muhalefetin nasıl şekillendiği, Rıza Şah sonrasında iktidarın parçalı yapısının siyasi parti oluşumlarına nasıl etki ettiği, 1941 yılında ülkeyi işgal eden Müttefik devletlerin politikalarının İran siyasetinin gelişimine etkileri, yerel siyaset dinamiklerinin yükselişe geçmesinin nedenleri, İran'ın petrol imtiyazı konusundaki politikalarının nasıl sonuçlar doğurduğu soruları yanıtlanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bütün bu soruların temel motifini siyasal muhalefetin kompozisyonunun anlaşılması oluşturmuştur. Tarihsel bir olgu olarak siyasal muhalefetin temel bileşenleri arasında toplumsal hoşnutsuzluk, sosyal ve ekonomik meseleler ve Meclis çatısı altında bir grup oluşturma başarısını gösteren Tudeh Partisi'nin temsil ettiği sınıfsal temsiliyet mücadelesi üzerinde durulmuştur. İlgili literatürde çoğunlukla Meşrutiyet döneminin kavramsal skalası içinde yer bulan fraksiyon ile parti arasında gidip gelen siyasal oluşumlar üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu bağlamda siyasal muhalefetin yeniden ortaya çıkışının ve oluşumunun dinamiklerini inceleyen bir çalışmanın sadece siyasal hayata indirgenen bir perspektife dayanmasının yetersiz kalacağı dikkate alınmıştır. Buna göre İran'da siyasal muhalefeti tarihsel bir evrede inceleyen bir çalışmanın temel meselesini sosyal, siyasi ve ekonomik bağlamların birbirinden ayrıştırılamadığı bir toplumsal çerçevenin kurulması oluşturmuştur. Tarihsel olarak modern dönemde İran siyasal hayatının kompozisyonunun içsel ve dışsal faktörlerin dengelenmesine



dayanan krizlere, iç karışıklıklara, merkezi yönetimin yetkesinin azalmasına veya artmasına borçlu olduğu ilgili yazındaki tartışmalarla ele alınmıştır. Bu sorular ışığında İran siyasetinin dengelerini belirleyen dışsal ve içsel faktörlerin önemi üzerinde durulmuştur. Dışsal faktörlerin odağında İran'ın dışa açılma sürecinin sancıları, Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı dikkat çekmektedir. İçsel faktörlerin odağında ise Pehlevi hanedanlığının kuruluşu, hayata geçirilen otoriter seküler modernleşme anlayışının toplumsal destek marjlarının belirleyiciliği, ülkenin işgale uğraması, Şah'ın tahttan indirilmesi yer almıştır. Ayrıca, 1941'deki işgal sonrasında İran'da yeni, genç ve tecrübesiz bir Şah'ın yönetimindeki vesayetçi rejimin korunması konusunda sert tedbirler sürdürülmeye çalışılmışsa da, İran toplumunun çeşitli kesimleri tarafından desteklenen bazı yeni çıkışlar ve protestolarla karşılaşıldığının da göz ardı edilmemesi gerekliliği üzerinde durulmuştur.

Bu alanda modernleşme birikiminin göz ardı edilmeyeceği, İran'da demokratikleşme çizgisini destekleyen ve yirminci yüzyıla damgasını vuran Meşrutiyet Devrimi'nin sağladığı kazanımların yok sayılamayacağı bir bakış açısından hareket edilerek Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminin salt otoriter modernleşme perspektifine dayandırılan fakat demokratikleşme vizyonunu taşımayan bir dönem olarak görülmesinin yetersiz geleceği görüşü değerlendirilmiştir. İran'da demokratikleşme geleneği Meşrutiyet Devrimi'yle birlikte siyasal hayata önemli katkılar sunmaya başlamıştır. Bu nedenle Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminin odak noktasını oluşturduğu bir çalışmada Meclis'in sürekliliğinin sağlanması –her ne kadar, Meclis seçimlerinin kredibilitesi sorgulanmış olsa da– işgal sonrasındaki dönüşüme katkı sağlayan bir faktör olmuştur. Bu değerlendirmeye karşılık, Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminin Meşrutiyet Devrimi'nin siyasal mirasının durağanlaşmaya başladığı bir dönem olarak değerlendirildiği literatürde modernleşme çabalarını dışarıda bırakmayan bir yaklaşım sergilendiği üzerinde durulmuştur. Son olarak 1941– 1946 arasında İran siyasetinde politik eğilimler ile ilgili tematik bir çerçevenin çizilmesinin oldukça güç bir uğraş olduğu vurgulanabilir. Bu temalar arasında ülkede meydana gelen *buğday kıtlığı*, *petrolün millileştirilmesi meselesi*, *etnik fay hatları ve otonomiye dayanan hareketler*, *toprak aristokrasisinin siyasal hayatta yeniden yükselişi*, *Dovre (Devre) sistemi*, *yolsuzluk*, *Polonyalı mülteciler meselesi*, *Şah'ın mollalarla uzlaşma çabaları*, *yeni siyasi partilerin kurulması*, *basın-yayın hayatının zenginleşmesi*, *yürüyüş ve gösterilerle birlikte petrol işçilerinin siyasal aktivizmi*

şeklinde pek çok tema üzerinde durulabilir. Bütün bu temaları kapsamak üzere çalışmada hem düşünce akımları bağlamında komünist hareketin, İslamcı reaksiyoner hareketin bileşenlerinin ve milliyetçilik anlayışının Meclis çatısı altında güçlenmesinin üzerinde durulmuş, hem de Rıza Şah Pehlevi döneminin siyasal mirasının dönüşümü sürecinde siyasal muhalefet olgusunun yeniden ortaya çıkışı değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda temel tartışmaların döngüsel sürekliliği de dikkate alınmıştır. Rıza Han ve Seyid Ziyaeddin Tabatabai'nin önderliğinde gerçekleşen 1921 darbesine kadar öne çıkan bölgeselcilik dinamiği işgal sonrasında İran'da idarenin örgütlenmesi açısından ciddi bir mesele olarak varlığını hissettirmeye devam etmiştir. Ayrıca, İran siyasal hayatının muhalefet potansiyelinin anlaşılması açısından II. Dünya Savaşı sonlarında gelişen otonomi hareketlerinin dağarcığının I. Dünya Savaşı sonrasındaki gelişmelerle birlikte ele alınmasının gerekliliği vurgulanmıştır.

## D.TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

☐

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü

☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

☐

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : YÜMLÜ

Adı : MURAT

Bölümü : TARİH

### TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

THE REFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN IRAN (1926–1946)

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

☐ Doktora

☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

☐

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

☐

3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

☐

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: 27.02.2017