

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CRIMEAN CRISIS
BEFORE AND AFTER 2014

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ABSTRACT

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CRIMEAN CRISIS BEFORE AND AFTER 2014

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This work covers the Crimean crisis of 2014, i.e. the EuroMaidan that started in Kyiv, in November 2013, and that was followed by the Anti-Maidan in the Crimea, and, as a result, the proclamation of independence, as well as the unification of the Crimea with Russia via referendum. Contrary to the views of some experts who argue that the Crimean crisis and the annexation of the Crimea as well as the developments in the aftermath of this annexation could be explained with the reference to foreign policies of Kyiv and Moscow, this thesis argues that local regional dynamics in the form of historical, social, cultural, political and economic structures have played a decisive role in the outbreak and development of the Ukrainian crisis.

Keywords: Crimea, Russia, annexation, EuroMaidan, region.

ÖZ

2014 ÖNCESİ VE SONRASINDA KIRIM KRİZİNİN İÇ VE DIŞ BOYUTLARI

Demydova, Viktoriia

Doktora, Bölge Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Bu çalışma, 2014 Kırım krizini, başka bir deyişle Kasım 2013'te Kiev'de başlayan EuroMaidan, takiben Kırım'da Anti-Maidan ve sonuç olarak bağımsızlık ilanı ve referandum yoluyla Rusya ile Kırım'ın birleşmesi konularını kapsamaktadır. Bu tez, Kırım krizinin ve Kırım'ın ilhakının ve bu ilhak sonrasında yaşanan gelişmelerin Kiev ve Moskova'nın dış politikalarına istinaden açıklanabileceğini iddia eden bazı uzmanların görüşlerinin aksine, tarihi, sosyal, kültürel, politik ve ekonomik formdaki yerel bölgesel dinamiklerin Ukrayna krizinin patlak vermesi ve gelişmesinde belirleyici bir rol oynadığını iddia eder.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kırım, Rusya, ilhak, EuroMaidan, bölge.

To the Crimeans

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Association Agreement with the European Union
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARC	Autonomous Republic of Crimea
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
BYuT	Block of Yulia Tymoshenko
CAC	Central Asian Cooperation
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CES	Common Economic Space
CIS	Commonwealth of the Independent States
CPC	Council of People's Commissars
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CTNM	Crimean Tatar National Movement
CTPF	Crimean Tatar People's Front
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CU	Customs Union
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DTsMK	Spiritual Center of Muslims of the Crimea
DUMK	Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea
EaP	Eastern Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EU	European Union
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community
FEZ	Free Economic Zone
FPE	Foreign policy executives
FSB	Federal Security Service
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross domestic product

GUAM	GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
LDPR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
MRG	Minority Rights Group
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
NATO	North Atlantic Alliance
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NKVD	People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
NRC	NATO - Russia Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU
RCC	Russian Community of Crimea
RCP(B)	Russian Communist Party (<i>Bolsheviks</i>)
RF	Russian Federation
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SBU	Security Service of Ukraine
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
VCIOM	Russian Public Opinion Research Center
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations Organization
UOC	Ukrainian Orthodox Church
UOC KP	Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchy
UOC MP	Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

WWI

World War I

WWII

World War II

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Scope and Objective

This thesis covers the Crimean crisis of 2014, i.e. the EuroMaidan that started in Kyiv, in November 2013, and that was followed by the Anti-Maidan in the Crimea, and, as a result, the proclamation of independence, as well as the unification of the Crimea with Russia via referendum. At the same time, an important prerequisite of this analysis, the historical developments in the Crimea are discussed. While the thesis starts with the discussion of the first settlements in the Crimea, particular attention is paid to the Crimean Khanate and the Russian Empire periods of the Crimean history. Furthermore, analysis of the Soviet period is followed by the more detailed examination of the political and ethnic dynamics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Additionally, as a context and impetus for the long-lasting political conflict in Ukraine the international context is studied. Important place is given to the role of the EU, NATO and Russia with its Customs Union as factors that jeopardized the Ukrainian domestic turbulences. Moreover, it is necessary to touch upon the developments in the Crimea after the change of the status in 2014. Therefore, the time period that is in the focus of my research is 2014 - 2016, although two historic chapters are included into the thesis. The thesis aims at presenting the domestic developments in the Crimea (political, economic, inter-ethnic) that are seen as responsible for the outcome of the Anti-Maidan and the Russian invasion. Using the area studies approach and the neoclassical realism, this thesis concentrates on the role of the Crimean elites in the secession of the region.

1.2. Research Question

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea had always been the 'pro-Russian' region of Ukraine. This can be understood from the proportion of the Russians in the ethnic composition of its population, the status of the Russian language, the electoral behavior, and the particular importance of Sevastopol as the base of the Russian fleet. Therefore, the explanation of the Crimean referendum and the consequent changes as the result of the Russian invasion is found insufficient. This thesis seeks to answer the question about the role of the Crimea's political institutions, elites, state - society relations, ideology and nationalism discourse and how resources extraction mechanisms affect the choice of the autonomous republic during the political crisis. This thesis will shed light on the internal dynamics in Crimea since 1991 and its impact on the lust of the Crimeans to separate and become a part of the Russian Federation in February - April 2014.

1.3. Literature Review

The bulk of the literature related to the topic of my thesis can be categorized according to the main issues raised in this work. Thus, since the theoretical approach to the Crimean crisis is discussed in details in the second chapter, I find it reasonable to touch upon the works on the history of the region, first. The monographies on the topic that can be used by the students of the region include, first of all, Andreyev's *The History of Crimea (Istoriya Kryma)* in Russian.¹ It is a comprehensive study of the history of the region dating back to the first human settlements. It goes through the Scythians, Greek settlements, Crimean Khanate and the Russian Empire up to the end of the XIXth century. Although the scholar works in Moscow, he appears to be the author of the several books on the history of Crimea.

Valerii Dulichev is the author of the most wide-used textbook for the students of the Crimean schools and universities *Rasskazy Po Istorii Kryma (Narratives on the*

¹ Андреев, А. (1997). *История Крыма: краткое описание прошлого Крымского полуострова*. Изд-во Межрегиональный центр отраслевой информатики Госатомнадзора России.

History of Crimea).² The author starts the two-volume work with the discussion of the general geographic review of the region, early settlements in the Crimea. He adds some legends to the book. The second volume ends with the discussion of the XXth century Crimea. Another important monography in Russian is *The Crimean Knot (Krymskiy Uzel)* and belongs to the Crimean historian Andrei Mal'gin.³ Mal'gin concentrated on the political developments since 1991, mainly the Black Sea Fleet, and issues of the political and ethnic conflicts in the region.

It is important to note that the Soviet period of the Crimean development is badly discussed in the literature. Particularly, after the end of the World War II, one can notice the lack of the literature. In contrast, the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the war years are illuminated in the academic literature. Thus, particular attention should be paid to the works of Kondratiuk, Pashchenya and Zmerzliy in Russian. The first is the assistant professor at the Crimean Engineer - Pedagogic University in Simferopol, and is the expert on the issue of *indigenization (Korenizatsiya)*. The first mentioned article is the analysis of the policies towards the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea in the 1920s - 1930s. The author based his research on the archive data on the number of schools, educational institutions and published materials related to the Tatar population.⁴ The second article is devoted to the involving the Crimean Tatars into the production sphere by means of the professional education.⁵ Another issue that Kondratiuk touches upon is the religious policies regarding the Muslims. He analyzes the state of arts in the religious sphere, the number of mosques, educational centers, the activities of the believers.⁶

² Дюличев, В. П. (1998). *Рассказы по истории Крыма*. "Бизнес-информ".

³ Мальгин, А. (2000). *Крымский узел. Очерки политической истории Крымского полуострова 1989–1999*. Симферополь: Новый Крым.

⁴ Кондратюк, Г. Н. (2011). Крымские татары в условиях политики коренизации межвоенного периода (20–30-е годы XX века). *Культура народов Причерноморья*, 199(1), 30–34.

⁵ Кондратюк Г. Н. (2010). Коренизация в промышленности Крымской АССР как одно из направлений национальной политики (20–30-е годы XX века). *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*, 29, 165 - 171.

⁶ Кондратюк, Г. М. (2012). Етноконфесійна політика щодо мусульман Криму в міжвоєнну добу (20–30-ті роки XX століття). *Науковий вісник Миколаївського національного університету імені ВО Сухомлинського. Сер.: Історичні науки*, 33, 140–147.

Pashchenya is the professor of history at the Crimean Federal University who is an expert on the early years of the Soviet rule in the Crimea. He focuses on the issues of the minorities in the administrative apparatus of the Party and the production sphere.⁷ Moreover, in his other article, the scholar discusses the dual nature of the nation-building policies in Crimea.⁸

The political developments in Crimea after the dissolution of the Soviet Union are widely discussed by the Crimean scholars. It is important to note the lack of the literature in English regarding the period before 1991, while the later events are more illuminated by the scholars. One of the most complete discussions of the political documents that shaped the Crimean Autonomous Republic and designed its relations with Kyiv was proposed by Mandryka.⁹ The discussion of the political and ethnic processes in the Crimea in the mentioned period can be found in the book by Oleg Gabrielian.¹⁰ Being the representative of the Armenian Community of Crimea, the author concentrates on the ethnic issues and conflicts. The colleague of Gabrielian, Andrei Nikiforov also studies the ethnic issues - particularly the Crimean Tatar National Movement development in 2010 - 2013.¹¹ Also, Nikiforov is the author of the articles on the regional approach in the analysis of the Crimea, and electoral behavior.¹²

⁷ Пашеня, В. Н. (2005). Татарский вопрос в национально-государственном строительстве Крымской АССР и его решение в деятельности исполнительно-распорядительных органов власти в 1930-х-начале 1940-х гг. *Культура народов Причерноморья*, 66, 33 - 38.

⁸ Пашеня, В. Н. (2004). О дуализме в национально-государственном строительстве в Крыму в 1930-х годах в цифрах и фактах. *Культура народов Причерноморья*, 50, 88-92.

⁹ Мандрыка, Е. В. (2003). Эволюция процесса конституционно-правовых норм, регламентирующих статус Автономной Республики Крым (Украина). *Вісник СевНТУ. Сер.: Політологія*, 50, 176 - 181

¹⁰ Габриелян, О. А. (2000). *Политические процессы в Крыму. Последнее десятилетие XX века. Спецкурс*. Симферополь: Таврия.

¹¹ Никифоров, А. Р. (2013). Политические процессы в крымскотатарском национальном движении (2010-2013 гг.). *Вісник СевНТУ. Сер.: Політологія*, (145), 214-218.

¹² Никифоров, А. (2009). Крымское региональное сообщество: Опыт разноформатных и разноуровневых измерений. – *Межэтнические и межконфессиональные отношения в Крыму: проблемы и их решение. Сборник научных работ*. – Симферополь: ИД "Тезис", 13 - 24

Religious issues are well discussed in the article by Kiselyova, the Crimean expert from the Crimean Federal University.¹³ She approaches the relations between state and religion from the sociological standpoint. Furthermore, it is worth to note the work by Baranov on the confessional issues.¹⁴ Another Crimean expert Elmira Muratova pays much attention to Islam in her works.¹⁵ She deals with the issue of the revival of Islam in the region;¹⁶ particularly compares official and unofficial Islamic organizations in the Crimea, their goals and activities. Particular attention is paid to the political Islam. Significant analysis of the social, economic, and ethnic conflicts related to the Crimean Tatars' return was completed by the Crimean scholars Shvets and Yakovlev in 2000s.¹⁷ Their wide-scaled analysis is based on the study of the conflict in the Crimea between Tatars and other ethnic groups between 1990 and 2010. Thus they determined the regions of the most acute conflicts and its factors;¹⁸ defined the types and nature of the conflicts;¹⁹ also, focused on the specific types of the violation such as religious vandalism.²⁰

As to the political issues, it is important to mention the analysis of the electoral behavior proposed by Yevgeniy Khan. The author discussed the voting behavior of

¹³ Киселева, Н. В. (2012). Социологическое измерение угрозы межэтнического конфликта в Крыму. *Научно-практический дискуссионно-аналитический сборник «Вопросы развития Крыма»*, 6, 139 - 145.

¹⁴ Баранов, А. В. (2013). Политизация ислама в современном Крыму: конфликтологический аспект. *Власть*, 4, 196 - 200

¹⁵ Муратова, Э. (2011). Политический ислам в Крыму: локальные вариации глобальных проектов. *Кримськотатарське питання*, 39(2), 24–30.

¹⁶ Muratova E. S. (2009). The Crimean Muslims: an Inside View (the Results of the Sociological Survey). Simferopol: Elinio.

¹⁷ Шве́ц, А. Б., Беднарский, И. Г., & Яковлев, А. Н. (2005). Проявления социокультурной конфликтности в Крыму. *Проблемы материальной культуры. Географические Науки*, 73, 165 - 176

¹⁸ Шве́ц А.Б. Яковлев А.Н. (2012). География социокультурных противоречий в Крыму (2006-2010 г.г.). *Геополитика и экогеодинамика регионов*, 8(1-2), 110 - 124

¹⁹ Яковлев, А. Н. (2010). Типы взаимодействия конфликтующих сторон в социокультурной конфликтности современного Крыма. *Ученые записки ТНУ. Серия: география*, 23(62), 185-196. Шве́ц, А. Б. (2008). Паспортизация социокультурных противоречий в Крыму. *Геополитика и экогеодинамика регионов*, 4(1-2), 72-80.

²⁰ Шве́ц, А. Б., & Яковлев, А. Н. (2011). Некоторые особенности географического изучения резонансных случаев вандализма в современном Крыму. *Ученые записки ТНУ, серия: география*, 24(63), 267-277.

the different regions of the Crimea.²¹ Mentioned earlier Mal'gin also elaborated on this issue.²² In his turn, Grigorian devoted his research to the analysis of the evolution of the Crimean elites, particularly the pro-Russian political blocs and parties.²³

The analysis of the Crimean politics would be incomplete without discussing the political system of Ukraine and its regime. One of the classis of the literature on this issue is the Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio.²⁴ The book examines the formation of the political system in Ukraine since 1991, main political parties, and social dynamics. Another important work belongs to Kataryna Wolczuk and is titled *Moulding of Ukraine*.²⁵

The national-building policies are discussed in details by Taras Kuzio. Taras Kuzio is the author and editor of 14 books, including *Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Nationalism* and *Ukraine-Crimea-Russia: Triangle of Conflict*. The article argues against the view that language is the only identity marker for Ukrainians. The 1996 article starts with the theoretical discussion of identity. Thus, Kuzio stresses that the identity formation process is always under transformation. National identity can also be multi-layer, as it is in the case of Ukrainians. It cannot be reduced to a single factor, such as language.²⁶ The main markers of identity in Ukraine's regions are ethnicity, culture, language, common history, religion, food, customs and intermarriage.²⁷ However, Kuzio points out the regional difference: language, as well as religious adherence, is more important for Western Ukrainians

²¹ Хан, Е. А. (1997). Электоральная география Крыма (по результатам выборов в 1994 г.). *Ученые записки Симферопольского государственного университета*, 3(42), 83 - 95

²² Мальгин, А. В. (2012). «Русский Крым» в посторанжевой Украине: новые реалии—старые проблемы. *Научно-практический дискуссионно-аналитический сборник «Вопросы развития Крыма»*, 16, 333 - 346

²³ Григорян, А. (2014). Особенности эволюции крымской политической элиты в новом тысячелетии. *Культура народов Причерноморья*, 274, 16 - 19

²⁴ D'Anieri, P., Kravchuk, R. & Kuzio, T. (Eds.). (1999). *Politics and society in Ukraine*. Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Studies. Boulder: Westview Press

²⁵ Wolczuk, K. (2001). *The moulding of Ukraine: the constitutional politics of state formation*. Central European University Press.

²⁶ Kuzio 1996: 583

²⁷ Kuzio 1996: 584

than for the Eastern. As Kuzio quotes one of the Ukrainian experts Larisa Aza, the national consciousness is becoming closely interlinked to political orientations. "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine: Defining the 'Other'"²⁸ is the article of Taras Kuzio that argues that "the construction of a national identity requires the existence of contrasting 'Others' because the creation of bounded in-groups requires there to be a perceived sense of difference to other out-groups".²⁹ In this article Kuzio argues that national identity is created in relation to 'Others', by means of demarcation from other national groups. The sense of 'Otherness' becomes more urgent when two nationalities are both ethnically close. As Kuzio correctly underlines, Russia sees Ukrainians and Belarusians as the branches of all-Russian ethnocultural group. Ukraine is likely to forge its national identity in the short term through the reintegration with Europe, at the same time contrasting itself to the Russian, former Soviet and Eurasian 'Other'. However, competing political elites in Ukraine refer to Europe and Russia in different ways because of the lack of consensus. In this regard the paper concentrates on elites and their key role in the construction of the national identity.³⁰

The article that continues the discussion of the nation-building project in Ukraine is "History, Memory and Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Colonial Space".³¹ Article argues two points. Firstly, many of the imperial policies imposed by the imperial core in the Soviet empire were similar in nature to those imposed by imperial powers in Ireland, Africa, and Asia. Secondly, Kuzio compares the post-Soviet countries to the post-colonial states insofar as they seek to get rid of post-colonial legacies. One of the main issues in this process imply the removal of the imposed imperial legacies. Therefore, the newly independent countries seek to revive national historiography as a part of nation-building. The article that has an important contribution to the analysis of national identity formation in Ukraine after 1991 is "National Identity and

²⁸ Kuzio, T. (2001). Identity and nation-building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other'. *Ethnicities*, 1(3), 343-365.

²⁹ Kuzio 2001: 343

³⁰ Kuzio 2001: 344

³¹ Kuzio, T. (2002). History, memory and nation building in the post-Soviet colonial space. *Nationalities Papers*, 30(2), 241-264.

History Writing in Ukraine".³² The article focuses on contestation of history writing between Russia and Ukraine, particularly, as to the issue of Kyiv Rus. Article surveys four different schools of history in Ukraine - Russophile (Russian imperial), Sovietophile, Eastern Slavic and Ukrainophile. The first part of the article argues that although Ukrainian presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma promote the Ukrainian national school, their centrist views and policies are closer to eastern Slavic school. The second part examines the discussion between Ukrainophile and Eastern Slavic school as to the Kyiv Rus legacy. The last article I would like to discuss is Taras Kuzio's "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution".³³ This article seeks to demonstrate that the relationship between nationalism and post-Communist transitions is more nuanced. Different types of nationalisms played different roles in post-Soviet republics. The article is based upon the scholars who argue that civic nationalism has a positive impact on democratization. It also argues that other types of nationalism in a post-Soviet space – ethnic, Soviet and power-imperial - have led to ethnic conflict, chauvinistic xenophobia and establishment of authoritarian regimes.³⁴

In the relevant literature, the issue of the annexation of the Crimea has been analyzed from the different standpoints. The biggest share of the scholars tend to see the Russian invasion as a result of Putin's policies in the post-Soviet space, embodiment of the existing ideology that includes the compatriots protection issue. For instance, Jeffrey Mankoff (CSIS, Russia and Eurasia Program) argues that "Russia felt free to intervene the frozen conflict in the former Soviet republics, if its influence in the region was challenged, using the aim to protect compatriots".³⁵ Aurel Braun (University of Toronto), in his turn, thinks that Putin seeks to re-construct the Russia

³² Kuzio, T. (2006). National identity and history writing in Ukraine. *Nationalities Papers*, 34(4), 407-427.

³³ Kuzio, T. (2010). Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 43(3), 285-296.

³⁴ Kuzio 2010: 285

³⁵ Mankoff, J. (2014). Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine. *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 60-68.

of the XIX century while neglecting the failing economy, corruption. The Ukrainian crisis may pose a threat to his power.³⁶

Lilia Shevtsova (Moscow Carnegie Center) stresses that ideology and doctrine of Kremlin contains the vision of Russia as a 'civilization-state', based on the traditional values; the leading role in the post-Soviet economic integration; and the desire to defend the 'Russian World'.³⁷ Michael Rywkin also underlines the role of ideology. According to him, Putin utilizes the myths of the Moscow as a Third Rome and 'elder brother' in order to fill the ideological vacuum of 1990s and contrast the Messianism of Russia to the US' multiculturalism.³⁸ Stephen Blank (AFPC) adds that Russian legislation allows the president to send the military aid in order to protect the compatriots in the near abroad without the consent of the State Duma. Therefore, in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, the similar situation may happen due to the variety of threat and they require sustained U.S. attention and even sometimes intervention.³⁹ According to Michael McFaul, the Ukrainian crisis is not about the contradiction between NATO and Russia, but "about Putin and his unconstrained, erratic adventurism", which gains, however, are very limited.⁴⁰

Some authors see the important role of the Western institutions in the Crimean crisis. Thus, John J. Mearsheimer the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. NATO's enlargement and its strategy to decrease Russian influence on Ukraine became the decisive factor of the Russian politics, whereas the EU's DCFTA negotiations and the role of these institutions during the Orange Revolution also facilitated Russia's policies as to the Crimea.⁴¹ Edward W. Walker (US Berkeley) argues that new Ukrainian government was perceived by

³⁶ Braun, A. (2014). Tougher sanctions now: Putin's delusional quest for empire. *World Affairs*, 177(2): 36.

³⁷ Shevtsova, L. (2014). The Russia Factor. *Journal of Democracy*, 25(3), 74-82.

³⁸ Rywkin, M. (2014). Russia: Mythology in the Service of Realpolitik. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 36(3), 195-200.

³⁹ Blank, S. (2014). From Eurasia with love. *American foreign policy interests*, 36(3), 162-174.

⁴⁰ McFaul, M., Sestanovich, S., & Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Faulty powers: who started the Ukraine Crisis. *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 67.

⁴¹ Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 77.

Kremlin as the one that would seek partnership with the EU, instead of the Customs Union. Therefore, Moscow policy makers decided to respond with the intrusion into the Crimea and destabilization of the Eastern regions of the country.⁴² Stephen F. Cohen beginning in the 1990s, every American president and congress has treated post-Soviet Russia as a defeated nation. The EU proposal was a reckless provocation compelling the democratically elected president of a deeply divided country to choose between Russia and the West. The underlying causes of the crisis are Ukraine's own internal divisions, not primarily Putin's actions.⁴³ Alexander Lukin (Higher School of Economy, Moscow) maintains that the seeds of the Ukrainian crisis should be searched in the Cold War period when the United States acted according to the zero-sum mindset. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush fostered the NATO's enlargement and provoked the severe response from Russia, which was the Georgian war. The annexation of the Crimea was the response to the aspiration of the majority of its residents as well as the desire of the NATO to deploy its navy in the Black Sea. Important drivers were also the need to protect the Russian speakers as well as the rejection of the unipolar world by the Russian leadership.⁴⁴

Besides, some authors approach the issue from the perspectives of the Ukrainian policies. Thus, Andrew Wilson (University College of London) insists that the new Crimean authorities were established at gunpoint. Despite Russian rhetoric about a 'coup' in Kyiv, the real coup was in Crimea.⁴⁵ Taras Kuzio, in his turn, traditionally approaches the issues from the nationalism discourse. The dichotomy in Ukraine during EuroMaidan was used to mobilize the public support of the Russia's actions in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine: "Putin's strategy was to mobilize a Russian-

⁴² Walker, E. W. (2015). Between East and West: NATO Enlargement and the Geopolitics of the Ukraine Crisis. E-International Relations. In A. Pikulicka-Wilczewska & R. Sakwa (Eds.) *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives* (pp. 141-54). Retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf>: 141.

⁴³ Cohen, Stephen. (2014, 12 August). The New Cold War and the Necessity of Patriotic Heresy. *Foreign Policy*.

⁴⁴ Lukin, A. (2014). What the Kremlin Is Thinking: Putin's Vision for Eurasia. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(4): 85.

⁴⁵ Wilson, Andrew. (2014, 3 March). Ten things you should know about Crimea. *European Council on Foreign Relations. Blog*. Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.eu/blog/entry/ten_things_you_should_know_about_crimea

speaking counter-revolution against the EuroMaidan throughout eastern and southern Ukraine and detach 'New Russia'".⁴⁶

At the same time, among the Russian scholars, one can find the approach that justifies the Russian invasion. Vladimir Tomsinov from Moscow State University, argues that the people of Crimea had enough legal basis from the standpoint of contemporary international law on the right to self-determination through secession from Ukraine (based on the cases of Aland Island Finland the Eastern Branch Pakistan (Bangladesh) from the Pakistani state, the referendum on secession of Quebec from Canada, the secession of Kosovo from Serbia).⁴⁷ Mikhail Deliagin (Institute for Problems of Globalization) approaches annexation as both a reflection of the historical connection between Crimea and Russia and the result of the illegitimacy of the post-coup government in Ukraine. He then turns to the potential role of the integration of Crimea as a national project that could revive Russia while allowing its leaders to root out traitors and other undesirables from among the Russian elites.⁴⁸

1.4. Argument

Contrary to the views of some experts who argue that the Crimean crisis and the annexation of the Crimea as well as the developments in the aftermath of this annexation could be explained with the reference to foreign policies of Kyiv and Moscow, this thesis argues that local regional dynamics in the form of historical, social, cultural, political and economic structures have played a decisive role in the outbreak and development of the Ukrainian crisis. It is also argued that while the area studies approach is utilized in this work, among the wide range of the traditional IR

⁴⁶ Kuzio, T. (2015). Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian- Ukrainian Conflict. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 15(1), 157-169.

⁴⁷ Томсинов, В. А. (2015). Крымское право» или юридические основания для воссоединения Крыма с Россией. *Вестник Московского университета. Серия, 11*, 19-20.

⁴⁸ Deliagin, M. (2015). Crimea: The First Step in Russia's Return to the World. *Russian Politics & Law*, 53(2), 6-31.

approaches to the analysis of the Crimean crisis, the neoclassical realism despite its deficiency provides the analytical tools for the examination of the case.

Based on the literature discussed above this thesis provides the proof of the argument. In the historical chapter attention is paid to the formation of the ethnic composition and power structures, as well as role of the RF in the region. Furthermore, this thesis discusses the formation of the elites in the Crimea and the main interest groups as well as their connections to the Ukrainian authorities. The focus of the thesis is on the role of the elites and their discourses in the separation period. Besides, the chapters that analyze the post-separation developments in the Crimea also support the main argument and state that the Russian policies in the Crimea after 2014, first of all, aimed at reconfiguration of the elites, officials and minimize the role of those groups that opposed the unification of the Crimea with Russia.

1.5. Research Design and Methodology

First of all, documentary research and fieldwork are used in the thesis. The documentary research includes the study of the official statistics, official documents and legislation. The former included the analysis of the Constitutions of the Russian Federation (1993), Ukraine (1996) and Crimea (1998). Furthermore, the demographic, economic and social statistics data is used in the thesis, as well as the elections and referendum results. Besides, the special decrees and resolutions of the presidents, laws of the parliaments were examined in this research. The languages of the documents are Russian and Ukrainian. Another part of the documentary research constitutes the official documents of the European Commission, NATO, UN Security Council and other international organizations and actors. Correspondingly, this bulk of the sources were accessed in English. These as well as the field research constitute the primary sources of the analysis.

The field research was conducted in January - February 2016, in the Crimea and, in October - November 2016, in Ankara. It included semi-structured in-depth

interviews with Russians, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, ordinary people and activists. Respondents for interviews were chosen through the help of convenient and purposive sampling with the mediating role of gatekeepers.

For the two groups of interviewees, there are two separate variations of questions. A set of semi-structured in-depth interviews with the ordinary people from the Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar ethnic groups, residing in the Crimea (Simferopol and Kerch) constitutes the second part of the fieldwork. The questions of the interviews cover the following topics: personal background; language proficiency; occupation; the evaluation of the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954; the development of the Crimea under the Ukraine since 1991 and the role of the Russian Federation in the political life of Crimea; the factors that determined the separation of the region; the actors responsible for the decision-making in the Crimea; the internal and external dynamics in the Crimea after its unification with the Russian Federation; the evaluation of the political processes and living standards as well as the international context; the living standards and changes in the life patterns. The language of interviews was Russian.

Moreover, the interviews with the activists included the questions regarding the state of arts in the activist movements in the Crimea, as well as outside (Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Turkey); the existing organizations; the activities and main publishing organs; the measures of the Russian government aiming to curb the discordant activities. Finally, the data collected through the help of interviews was supplemented with the data from the field observations at regions. The research field for the case was the Crimea where all three ethnic groups reside. It included the issues of obtaining the citizenship and passports, re-registration of the vehicles, medical insurance procedures; the electricity and water supply issues; border issues and transportation; the functioning of the educational institutions; moving of the Crimean population out of Crimea; every-day life and issues of the supply of goods and services.

The interviewees kindly agreed to participate in this research anonymously. The interview content is stored as audio recordings and written answers to the questions and can be accessed through the contact with the author.

The theoretical framework of the research is the neoclassical realism. While the following chapter of the thesis is devoted to this approach, it is important to note the analysis of the role of the Crimean elites and policy-makers, the political institutions, relations of those with the society, the ideology and state supported nationalism, the resource extraction mechanisms existing in the Crimean society that are considered as key in the understanding the process of the separation of the region, it would have been incomplete without the interdisciplinary area approach.

1.6. Thesis Structure

The structure of the thesis is as it follows. The introduction chapter covers the scope and objective of the research, research question, argument, literature review, research design and methodology, as well as the thesis structure. The second chapter is devoted to the discussion of the theoretical framework of the thesis. The neoclassical realist approach that is utilized in this work is introduced. Finally, the research's link to the area studies approach is presented. The third chapter of the thesis is the historical chapter that concentrates on the developments in the region since the first settlements on the peninsula. Separate subsections discuss the Crimean Tatar Khanate and the Russian Empire eras in the Crimean history. Moreover, this chapter touches upon the issues of the establishment of the autonomous republics in the Crimea in the early years of the Soviet rule, the causes of the deportation of the numerous ethnic groups, and the transfer of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. The logical continuation of the history discussion is the analysis of the internal dynamics in the Crimea which is completed in the fourth chapter. This part of the thesis starts with the note on the referendum in the Crimea and key documents that shaped the republic and its relations with Kyiv. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Crimean parliament. Furthermore, the chapter focuses on the Constitution of 1996,

and changes it brought to the Crimea; electoral dynamics and elites formation. Important place is given to the economy analysis and inter-ethnic relations in the region. The next chapter of the thesis sheds the light on the internal factors that determined the separation of the Crimea. It starts with the discussion of the Euro-Maidan in Kyiv, the response to it in the Crimea, position of the different ethnic groups during the crisis. It also elaborates on the role of the 'green men' in the Crimean parliament seizure, control of the checkpoints and military bases. The sixth chapter, correspondingly, is devoted to the examination of the international environment of the Ukrainian and Crimean crises. Thus, the Ukraine's relations with the EU, NATO, and Russia and the Customs Union are seen as the precondition of the conflict between different loyalties of the Ukrainians. Consequently, the seventh chapter explains the domestic developments in the Crimea after the unification with the Russian Federation: institution formation, new appointments, legal provisions. The chapter is also concerned about the main political and economic processes in the republic. Finally, the last chapter deals with the external relations of the Crimea, i.e. relations with Moscow, Ukraine, other regions of the Russian Federation, as well as Turkey. Concluding chapter of this thesis summarizes the research and findings of the author.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This chapter aims at establishing the theoretical basis of this work for the analysis of the factors of the Crimea's separation. The neoclassical realism, with its focus on the systemic incentives which define the foreign policy of the state where the policy makers, elites are the intervening variables, appears to be the most useful tool in the analysis of the events in the Crimea. While the author uses the area studies interdisciplinary approach in this work combining the examination of the region's historical, political, economic, social and cultural structures, the neoclassical realism focuses on these issues as well. The chapter discusses the neoclassical realism, its varieties and key points relevant to the topic of my research. The issues of the role of the elites and decision makers, ideology, identity and military intervention will contribute to the thesis. Finally, I will focus on the applicability of this approach to the region, i.e. I will justify the use of the neoclassical realism in my thesis.

2.2. Neoclassical Realism as a Basis of Research

The neoclassical realism fits best to the research on the Crimea insofar as focuses on the independent variable (international system and constraints), intervening variable (state institutions, relation between state and society, ideology, perceptions) and dependent variable (foreign policy of the state). This section concentrates on the key provisions of neorealism. It will evaluate and sum up which provisions of this approach have the bigger explanatory power in the analysis of the Crimea's occupation.

The distinguishing feature of the neoclassical realism in comparison with the realist and neorealist approaches is that the neoclassical realist scholars pay particular attention to the intervening role of the state. Particularly, they aim at explaining

why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states – the extractive and mobilization capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite or societal cohesion – intervene between the leaders' assessment of international threats and opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders pursue.⁴⁹

The state that is the black box in the realist understanding of the international system is unclosed and analyzed and a 'transmission belt' between systemic incentives and constraints, on the one hand, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies states select, on the other.⁵⁰ Tudor Onea, in his article devoted to the analysis of the US foreign policy, distinguishes three trends of neoclassical realism labeling them as orthodox, semi-orthodox and revivalist trends accordingly. These varieties, however, share certain common visions. The main provisions of the neoclassical realism are discussed below.

2.2.1. The Key Provisions of the Neoclassical Realism

The main provisions of the neoclassical realism regarding the foreign policy making in the context of the systemic and structural variables, as well as with the consideration of the domestic actors, will be discussed in details in this section. Particularly, one should pay attention to the issue of the threat assessment, factors allowing and impeding military intervention, and, finally the systemic pressure on the state.

According to Fareed Zakaria, the analysis of the foreign policy should start with the discussion of the international system and its impact on the state:

⁴⁹ Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2009). Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, in N. M Ripsman, J.Taliaferro, & S. E. Lobell (Eds.). *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 4.

⁵⁰ Ripsman [et al.] 2009: 4.

A good theory of foreign policy should first ask what effect the international system has on national behavior, because the most powerful generalizable characteristic of a state in international relations is its relative position in the international system.⁵¹

According to Gideon Rose, since the system variable's impact (Rose means relative power) is not necessarily obvious, the scholars of the issue must be careful and start the analysis by searching for this influence.⁵² The main provision of the neoclassical realism is that states seek to control and shape their external environment as a response to the instabilities and uncertainties of the international system. This school argues that states want more external influence. Furthermore, the advocates of this approach suggest that the relative amount of material power resources countries possess will shape the magnitude and ambition of their foreign policies: with the raise of their power, the states will be looking for broader influence abroad. However, this is an omission to limit the analysis of the factors to the systemic pressure. Rather, the IR students should examine how the system pressure is being transmitted through the unit level variables (decision-makers, ideology, relations between the state and society).

According to neorealist perception of anarchy, states cannot clearly see whether the security is guaranteed or not, they have hard times taking decisions. Therefore, it can be said that neoclassical realists occupy a medium position between pure structural theorists and constructivists. The social constructivism, as it was discussed earlier, implies the link between systemic constraints and unit-level behavior; the latter denies that any objective systemic constraints exist at all, arguing instead that international reality is socially constructed and that "anarchy is what states make of it."⁵³

It is noteworthy that the decision-makers' perceptions, through which systemic pressures must be filtered, is the first intervening variable neoclassical realists deal with. The state officials must ensure the translation of the systemic impetus into the

⁵¹ Zakaria, F. (1992). Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay. *International Security*, 17(1): 197.

⁵² Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. *World politics*, 51(01): 151.

⁵³ Rose 1998: 152.

national policy. Thus, according to Friedberg, "in most structural realist formulations assessment [of relative power] through rational calculation plays the part of a reliable but invisible transmission belt connecting objective [material] change to adaptive behavior".⁵⁴ Keohane shared this approach stressing that

the link between system structure and actor behavior is forged by the rationality assumption, which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond to the incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. Taking rationality as a constant permits one to attribute variations in state behavior to various characteristics of the international system.⁵⁵

In contrast, the advocates of the neoclassical realism maintain that the concept of the 'smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt' may be incorrect. They suggest that the system factors' transmission mostly depends on the state officials therefore may be rough and capricious over the short and medium term.⁵⁶

In his turn, Wohlforth, *In The Elusive Balance*, analyzes the Cold War dynamics from the USSR's standpoint. As he argues, World War II may have eliminated the Axis; however, it did not establish the hierarchy among the winners and opened the way for the discussions over the leadership. He sees the roots of the tensions between the US and the USSR in the ambiguities of relative power and the officials' perceptions of it:

Each [cycle of tension] was shaped by a change in the power relationship differently interpreted by the two sides.... In the wake of each shift, each side tried to maximize its own position. Unwilling to go to war to test the power distribution, they reached stalemates after crises, posturing and signaling until a new perceived shift led to another round.⁵⁷

As it can be seen, Wohlforth considers the Cold War as a constant argument between the parties over the power potential and their influence over the international system. Thus, the USSR was constantly trying to obtain international influence abroad, control over international institutions, general prestige and deference commensurate

⁵⁴ Friedberg, A. L. (1988). *The weary titan: Britain and the experience of relative decline, 1895-1905* (p. 12). Princeton: Princeton University Press: 13, quoted in Rose 1998: 158.

⁵⁵ Keohane, R. O. (1986). *Theory of World Politics. Neorealism and its Critics*: 167, quoted in Rose 1998: 158.

⁵⁶ Rose 1998: 158.

⁵⁷ Wohlforth, W. C. (1993). *The elusive balance: power and perceptions during the Cold War*. Cornell University Press: 301 - 302, quoted in Rose 1998: 159.

with its perceived power capabilities. The US, in its turn, was denying the Soviet Union's power capabilities.

2.2.2. State Apparatus in the Foreign Policy Making.

The second intervening variable emphasized by neoclassical realists especially Zakaria and Christensen is the strength of a country's state apparatus and its relation to the surrounding society. The system pressures and the international distribution of power is not enough. Society and countries' access to the material power sources may limit the policy makers. The ability of governments to extract and direct the resources of their societies should be incorporated into the analysis of the foreign policy. Fareed Zakaria analyzes the expansion of American foreign policy in the years before World War I and asks why it occurred. He notes that despite the fact of the welfare the country reached and the influence abroad it achieved, the opportunities to expand the latter were rejected. Zakaria finally concludes that American external behavior depended on the means at the disposal of national decision makers.⁵⁸

Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its government. Consequently, what matters is state power, not national power. State power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends.⁵⁹

2.2.3. Threats identification and assessment.

The FPE focuses outward on the systemic and subsystemic balance of power (where states compete), and inward on the domestic balance of power (where societal blocs compete). The shifts in the international system or internal domestic arena pose threats to the great powers. Besides, for the regional powers, the threat may lay also

⁵⁸ Zakaria, F. (1999). *From wealth to power: The unusual origins of America's world role*. Princeton University Press: 5, quoted in Rose 1998: 161 - 162.

⁵⁹ Zakaria 1999: 9, quoted in Rose 1998: 162.

in the shifts in the subsystem.⁶⁰ Lobell distinguishes four types of threats: systemic threats, subsystemic threats, domestic threats (that have their roots in the intra-state competition), and multitiered threats.⁶¹ *The systemic threats* are originated from the interstate competition. Defensive realists argue that the international system makes states to choose moderate behavior to secure their survival and safety. They share the idea that any step in order to gain more power to achieve hegemony or preponderance is unproductive insofar as provokes the response. For defensive realists, states expand when they are forced to by their environment – when they are threatened owing to insecurity or shifts in relative capability, or by states with aggressive designs.⁶² As to the offensive realists, they suggest that the international system makes states to maximize their relative share of world power in order to make themselves more secure.⁶³ The rationale is the stronger states have lesser chances to become a target for other states. Such logic justifies expansionist and aggressive foreign policies. For offensive realists, threatening states are those that can expand – states that possess a combination of latent and land power. For regional powers, the great powers and their impact on regional dynamics appear to be the systemic threats. Thus, during the Cold War, regional politics to different degrees was imbued with the American–Soviet confrontation. According to one standpoint, in the regions with the high contradictions, the great powers tend to prohibit regional rivalries and prevent their allies by exerting influence and thereby ensuring that regional conflicts did not escalate into global conflicts between the superpowers. On the other hand, a contrary standpoint suggests that the competition for global influence, bases, and facilities between superpowers internationalized and jeopardize regional and local threats.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Lobell, S. E. (2009). Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model. In N.M. Ripsman *Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Ripsman [et al.] 2009: 43.

⁶¹ Lobell 2009: 42-74.

⁶² Lobell 2009: 47.

⁶³ Lobell 2009: 47.

⁶⁴ Lobell 2009: 48.

As to the *subsystemic threats*, Lobell argues that these are coming from the interstate competition. Competition occurs between the major regional players for leadership or hegemony over the locale. Great power induced shifts in the regional distribution of power can create new threats and opportunities for local states.⁶⁵

Domestic politics is characterized by intra-state competition. Nonwestern states that are not the nation-states in the classic sense usually represent different ethnic and religious groups therefore the identity is not common.⁶⁶ Thus, Steven David defines the state as merely the "representative of a group that holds power in the capital ...[and] do not want to relinquish their only opportunity to acquire and keep wealth and influence".⁶⁷ Therefore the internal rivalries threaten the states' survival. Under such conditions, Lobell argues, leaders are primarily concerned about the ruling regime's survival rather than the nation-state's survival. The state leaders are mainly concerned about the impact of the uneven distributional effects of foreign policy on the internal effect of political and economic power. The long-term consequence can be a change in the state's economic and political institutions.⁶⁸

Lobell points out the following issues of the multitiered threats identification. First, he argues that this approach suggests that the policy makers may manipulate the foreign policy issues in domestic politics, in order to achieve political or economic gains. Because of the 'rally around-the-flag' the hardliners among the foreign policy makers can divert attention from the certain issues and create internal solidarity. This allows weakening opposition as well as mobilizing internal backing for costly grand strategies the population would otherwise not support.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Lobell maintains that policy makers can have an aim of manipulating domestic actors and interest groups in other states.⁷⁰ Particularly, state's decision as to arms, allies, or

⁶⁵ Lobell 2009: 49.

⁶⁶ Lobell 2009: 50.

⁶⁷ David, S. R. (1991). Explaining third world alignment. *World Politics*, 43(02): 239–40, quoted in Lobell 2009: 51.

⁶⁸ Lobell 2009: 51.

⁶⁹ Lobell 2009: 52.

⁷⁰ Lobell 2009: 53.

appeasement can strengthen the political power of some societal and economic actors in foreign states while others will be weakened politically and economically. The stronger groups then will lobby their political interests. The long-term consequence can be the alteration in the foreign state's political and economic arrangements. Besides, the complex threat identification model suggests that some leaders can act locally with the intention of pulling reluctant extra-regional great powers into the conflict until all are involved. Finally, at the global level, with the leaders of second-tier states defying the great powers in order to flex their muscles and thereby gain status amongst regional competitors.⁷¹

2.2.4. Domestic interest groups.

Norin M. Ripsman, in his work, elaborates on the issue of the domestic interest groups answering the question which domestic actors matter the most and under which circumstances.⁷² Under the domestic political actor, the scholar understands the legislature, the media and organized interest groups. He argues that even-nondemocratic governments must consider the military, economic elites, and even public as a whole. Finally, he assumes that all political actors may try to influence the foreign policy executive.⁷³ The economic and political interests of the governing coalition have an impact on the threats the state respond to and the measures it uses to curb them. Therefore he prefers the additive model of analysis that domestic and international pressures are easily separable and identifiable.⁷⁴

According to Ripsman, the executive is more attuned to international imperatives than other actors. Under the anarchic conditions, all the states are socialized to behave in a similar manner - they behave rationally internationally.⁷⁵ Domestic

⁷¹ Lobell 2009: 53.

⁷² Ripsman N. M.(2009). Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups. In Lobell [et al.]: 170-193.

⁷³ Ripsman 2009: 171.

⁷⁴ Fordham, B. O. (2009). The limits of neoclassical realism: additive and interactive approaches to explaining foreign policy preferences. In Lobell [et al.] 2009: 251.

⁷⁵ Ripsman 2009: 174.

actors should have less access to the national security policy due to the high costs of its mishandling and the wide distribution of the costs and benefits of the national security aspects over the society.⁷⁶ Therefore, Ripsman says, in democratic states interest groups with the large membership rolls have greater chances to influence the foreign security policy. Here, the degree of control over the membership's voting behavior correlates with the success of the group. Besides, single-issue groups appeared to be more passionately committed to the issue than the groups whose members face the need to consider a wide range of issues. Moreover, ethnic diaspora communities display more consistent voting behavior, in opinion of the scholar, as well as the groups with the significant voter base in strategic regions.⁷⁷

With regard to the non-democratic regimes, Ripsman names two factors that have impact on leaders' attempts to retain power. They are the kingmakers or those with the power to select, eject and back leaders; and the effort of the groups who can lead the coup or revolt, such as military. In case of the corrupt regime, the political leaders have particular interest in those who provide the resources.⁷⁸

It is noteworthy to mention the constructivism component of the Ripsman's approach - he underlines the ability of the domestic factors to shape and manipulate the interpretation of the international circumstances and therefore to define the national interest.⁷⁹ As to the correlation between the international conditions and the influence of the domestic groups, the author argues that during the stable periods, the impact of the domestic actors and influence groups is higher due to the low risks. In the domestic sphere, Ripsman shows that

a democratic national security policy executive might be most willing to bargain with domestic interests over national security policy as an election approaches and public opinion polls show that reelection will be difficult.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Ripsman 2009: 180.

⁷⁷ Ripsman 2009: 182 - 183.

⁷⁸ Ripsman 2009: 183.

⁷⁹ Ripsman 2009: 185.

⁸⁰ Ripsman 2009: 188.

Also, when the leader's hold on power is weak, and when the national security executive lacks autonomy, the actors are likely to have a greater influence.

2.2.5. Democratic transition and the institutional strength.

The analysis of the domestic actors and the interest groups lead us to the discussion of the democratic transition and the institutional strength. These issues deserve particular examination in the post-Soviet context where the states do not display the consolidated democratic governments and mature institutions.

According to Mansfield and Snyder, the weaker the domestic political institutions are, the higher the probability of the emergence of the nationalism that would lead the democratizing country to the war is. Nationalism, according to the scholars, is likely to emerge in two cases. On the one hand, in the absence of the political institutions, societal leader tend to use nationalist sentiments as the unifying force for the certain action. The more immature the institutions are the higher mobilizing effect the leadership's appeals will have. The second issue is that the break-up of the authoritarian regimes poses threat to the domestic interest groups' attempt to obtain the payoffs from the possible war. Under such circumstances, these groups tend to utilize nationalistic appeal in order to gain larger support within the society.⁸¹

In mature democracies, the citizens have bigger chances to obtain information about the societal leaders and punish those who do not satisfy the electorate.⁸² And vice versa, in newly democratizing states, limited suffrage, unfair constraints on electoral competition, disorganized political parties, corrupt bureaucracies, or partial media monopolies may skew political outcomes away from the patterns that coherent democracies generally produce. Moreover, the authors say that while federalism may generate certain benefits for mature democracies, the decentralization and

⁸¹ Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. (2002). Democratic transitions, institutional strength, and war. *International Organization*, 56(02): 299.

⁸² Mansfield & Snyder 2002: 300.

fragmentation in newly democratizing regimes bear a threat of exacerbating the issues related to the transition periods.⁸³

As to the issue of nationalism, Mansfield and Snyder argue that the power of central authorities is impoverished in newly democratizing states. The old authoritarian regime has disassembled, while its old elites is still represented in the powerful interest groups. Some of these groups, including the military bureaucracy and dominant economic interests, may have self-serving reasons to lobby for military expansion or the exclusion of foreign economic competition, policies that could cause tensions with other states. At the same time, unsatisfied ethnic elites or rising proponents of commercial expansion may press their demands on the weakened state. Such interest groups due to their rhetorical appeals for popular support may be utilizing the nationalistic and expansionist discourse as well as economic protectionism issue. Particular attention is paid to the veto groups that may have a stake in in foreign policies and nationalist rhetoric. Particular case of the veto group discussed by Mansfield and Snyder is the 'logrolling' that is defined as mutual assistance in achieving narrow interests.⁸⁴ Consequently, the power of the mass groups is not institutionalized (unlike the mature democracies in which the taxpayers granted larger powers), in the newly democratizing states, while the strength of the elites is dependent on the weakness of the central authorities. Therefore, the newly democratizing states are more prone to the nationalistic conflicts due to the elites' logrolling.

Mansfield and Snyder discussed two phases of the democratization. The first one deals with the transition from the authoritarian regime to the unstable democratic regime, while the second is the passage to the consolidated democracy.⁸⁵ They argue that the first phase has a higher risk of the war due to the fear of the elites and still powerful position of them. At the same time, mass participation is very weak during this phase. The second stage is characterized by the mass participation, political

⁸³ Mansfield & Snyder 2002: 301.

⁸⁴ Mansfield & Snyder 2002: 302.

⁸⁵ Mansfield & Snyder 2002: 304.

competition, institutionalization of the procedures and norms as well as by the accountability of the government. There is also a risk that the elites would play the nationalistic card during the second phase in order to obtain the power. Only institutions may cure the elites and their rhetoric during this stage.⁸⁶

2.2.6. Military Intervention and the Role of Domestic Actors.

Colin Dueck, in his turn, argues that when facing the possibility of major military intervention, state leaders usually begin by consulting what they perceive to be the national security interests of the state. In this sense, domestic politics 'matters', not as a primary cause of intervention, but rather as a powerful influence on its exact form.⁸⁷ In comparison with the structural realism admirers, representatives of the neoclassical realism bridge the gap between the second and the third images, maintaining that under the conditions of the systemic pressure, the foreign policy can be explained only by looking at the unit-specific variables. Therefore, according to the advocates of this approach the systemic pressure becomes the most important factor in the explanation of the foreign policy only if it is understood through the prism of the elite's perceptions and domestic politics.⁸⁸

As Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman suggest, even if leading state officials seek to advance the national interest, the internal characteristics of states may constrain their ability to do so. The contribution of the given approach is the disclosure of the mechanisms of the domestic political dynamics' and structures' impact on the foreign policy.⁸⁹

They list several factors preventing the state leaders from engaging into the military conflicts. On the one hand, the domestic political incentives for military campaign are not supportive and may be risky for the political power of the leaders. Thus,

⁸⁶ Mansfield & Snyder 2002: 306.

⁸⁷ Dueck C.(2009). Neoclassical realism and the national interest: presidents, domestic politics, and major military interventions. In Lobell [et al.]: 139.

⁸⁸ Dueck 2009: 139.

⁸⁹ Dueck 2009: 143.

during the election campaign, the political leaders prefer to avoid the military action platform.⁹⁰ On the other hand, the anarchy pushes states to consider their security constantly and the military intervention is seen as a tool for this. The process of identifying national interests and then mobilizing resources to pursue those interests is not a given, and cannot even be usefully taken as such. As Schweller and Taliaferro show, a wide variety of domestic political factors may influence this process. Military intervention can be very costly in societal terms; state officials face varying domestic political hurdles in building support for such interventions. In other words, the fact and the form of the military interventions will correspond to the state officials' vision of the national interest. This is the case of the loose and permissive domestic conditions. At the same time, in the opposite case, the elites would need institutional conditions and mass support for the action. Under such conditions, the intervention will be shaped in a way that will be able to gain the mass support.⁹¹

2.2.7. Resource Extraction.

Neoclassical realists pay particular attention to the issue of the resource extraction. In this regard the 2006 work by Taliaferro deserves more detailed examination.⁹² According to his model, the independent variable (external threat or vulnerability) is represented by the relative distribution of power (both in the international system and in the particular region), the offense-defense balance in military technology, and geographic proximity. The intervening variable, according to the author, covers the state's ability to extract or mobilize resources as well as nationalism and ideology. The dependent variable, in its turn, presents itself in one of the three possible strategies: emulation, innovation, or persistence in existing strategies.⁹³

⁹⁰ Dueck 2009: 144.

⁹¹ Dueck 2009: 146.

⁹² Taliaferro, J. W. (2006). State building for future wars: Neoclassical realism and the resource-extractive state. *Security Studies*, 15(3), 464-495.

⁹³ Taliaferro 2006: 486.

In his article, Taliaferro assumes that states are reasonably coherent that is a difficult to apply in the particular cases, in our opinion insofar as the competition between different elites and interest groups inevitably occur. According to the scholar, under the pressure of the systemic factors, the country's government may employ two different strategies - mobilization and extraction. Mobilization can be represented by two forms of behavior. On the one hand, a state can directly control economic activity and reallocate resources through centralized planning, the nationalization of key industries or particular firms, and other means. Also, the authority seeking to increase the wealth of the country can interfere economy and particularly tax collection. The government has to invest certain political and economic resources in these mobilizations, whether in the form of expenditures on a large administrative apparatus (direct mobilization) or in the form of subsidies and concessions to no state actors as an inducement to expand production (indirect mobilization). As to the resource extraction, the state directly converts societal wealth into military power through taxation, requisition, and expropriation.⁹⁴ Centralized and insulated states have higher abilities of the wealth extraction on comparison with the decentralized and constrained states. But, according to the Dueck's work, even democracies have different abilities in resource extraction.

2.2.8. Ideology and state-sponsored nationalism

Ideology and state-sponsored nationalism are two other components of state power. In general, state nationalism secures social cohesion and the propensity of individuals to identify with the state, which in turn facilitates leaders' efforts to extract and mobilize resources from society for national-security goals. The success of the ideology in the resource extraction and mobilization depends on its content and the elites' consensus about the role of the state vis-a-vis society and economy. Taliaferro defines 'nationalism' as

⁹⁴ Taliaferro 2006: 487 - 488.

a propensity of individuals to identify their personal interests with that of a group that is too large to meet together; to identify those interests based on a common 'culture', 'ethnicity', 'civic' or 'national identity' that the members of the group share to the exclusion of other groups; to believe that the members of the group share a common history; and to believe that the group requires its own state if it is to survive.⁹⁵

He continues with stressing three key issues as to nationalism. Firstly, it assumes that leaders deliberately inculcate nationalism primarily as a means to achieve societal cohesion against external adversaries. This approach does not consider excludes ethnic, secessionist, and vernacular nationalisms that might hinder and threaten the state from within. Secondly, author suggests that individuals' loyalty to the state supersedes their loyalty to more exclusive groups, such as those based on common kinship and location, and that such identification increases the cohesion of the group.⁹⁶ Finally, social cohesion does not presume the absence of the disagreements within society. All societies, demonstrate certain level of conflicts stemming from conflicting class interests, resource allocations, competing political goals, regional differences, and ethnic rivalries. Nevertheless, nationalism has potential enhance social cohesion and the willingness of individuals to make sacrifices to the extent that most individuals and societal groups view the state's institutions as legitimate. Particularly during periods of high external vulnerability, leaders have an incentive to inculcate nationalism as a means to extract greater societal resources for the production of military power.⁹⁷

2.2.9. Neoclassical Realism and the Issue of Identity.

Jennifer Sterling-Folker develops this topic in her article.⁹⁸ According to the author, the identity, the immutability of tribalism and centrality of conflicts allows the conflict and trade coexist on the international arena. For her, the national collective

⁹⁵ Taliafero 2006: 491.

⁹⁶ Taliafero 2006: 491.

⁹⁷ Taliafero 2006: 492.

⁹⁸ Sterling-Folker, J.(2009) Neoclassical realism and identity: Peril despite profit across the Taiwan Straits. In Lobell [et al.], 99 - 138.

identity may coexist with the rational self-interest in cooperation and profit.⁹⁹ The scholar starts with the point that in realism the core analytical point is not the state, but the human collectives. They treat humans as social animals that form groups. The former bind their members together through the social practices and institutions, according to social constructivism. By making self - other distinctions, individuals are able to construct their own identity. The same mechanism is used in formation of the collective identity.¹⁰⁰ Multiple group membership is the norm; however, at any given historical moment, particular collective identities are more pertinent than others. From this point of view, the control over the resource allocation and other decision-making procedure is the indicator of the dominance of the certain identity.

Contemporary states are unique due to the marriage of the nation to the state. The subunits of the state fight with each other in order to obtain control over the resource allocation. As Jennifer Sterling-Folker argues that

in the Westphalian system, where collective identity construction is linked to national collective autonomy and territorial self-determination, subgroup competition for state control can manifest itself as electoral, bureaucratic, and/or leadership struggles, depending on whether or not a polity is a democracy.

She stresses that while not all the rivalries involve national identity formation and reproduction, nevertheless the national identity symbols are implicated, evoked or encouraged as means of winning such competitions.¹⁰¹ According to Roxanne Dory, the state is a key actor in the process producing and reproducing the national identities. By means of the so called 'sovereignty effect' the state reaffirm the belonging to the groups and the differentiation from the others.¹⁰² During the group formation process, the individual identity is being connected to the political and economic decision-making, and this identity is being opposed to the external, different and something less desired.¹⁰³ Since the identity formation is never ending

⁹⁹ Sterling-Folker, J. 2009: 104.

¹⁰⁰ Sterling-Folker, J. 2009: 110.

¹⁰¹ Sterling-Folker, J. 2009: 114.

¹⁰² Doty, R. L. (1996). Sovereignty and the nation: constructing the boundaries of national identity. *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, 46(1): 128, quoted in Sterling-Folker, J. 2009: 115.

¹⁰³ Sterling-Folker, J. 2009: 115.

process it shows the need for the constant analysis of the internal and external competitions. Sterling-Folker pays particular attention to the issue of manipulations of the issue stressing the unpredictable consequences of it.

2.3. Neoclassical Realism and Area Studies

As it was shown in the previous sections of this chapter, the neoclassical realism in its analysis focuses on the three variables - independent or system variable, intervening variable (state institutions, domestic actors and interest groups, ideology) and dependent variable that is the foreign policy of the state. The advocates of this approach pay particular attention to the intervening variable that in my opinion allows students to link given approach to the area studies as a discipline.

The neoclassical realist perspective has bigger potential for the area study than any other approach due to the several reasons. Firstly, the state or the region is being perceived as a whole, with its historical, political, economic, national dynamics that secure the interdisciplinary approach to the problem. Thus, Benjamin Schwartz's definition of area as a cross-disciplinary unit says that area refers to

...some portion of the earth's surface inhabited by human collectivities, more or less marked off from other collectivities by virtue of the fact that they constitute relatively autonomous fields of human interaction among various life-realms. Within it one can discern complex interactions among economic, social, political, religious and other spheres of life.¹⁰⁴

Here we see the important features of area under study: geographical wholeness, separateness from other regions and complex of factors that can be studied. However, Schwartz points out the ambiguity of this term. On the one hand, he says, scholars can talk about "a separate collectivity constituting a field of intensive cross-disciplinary interaction". On the other hand, the term can be referred to the common cultural features shared by several societies. Finally, the term can be applied to China, Japan, Korea considered separately.¹⁰⁵ Here we see the ambiguity – what can

¹⁰⁴ Schwartz, B. I. (1980). Presidential address: Area studies as a critical discipline. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 40(01): 15.

¹⁰⁵ Schwartz 1980: 16.

be considered as area. I would say under term 'area' one should understand the state, group of states or territories, close to each other geographically, sharing commonality or similarity of culture and language, history, that makes the region the whole, as well as similar political and economic challenges that makes the study of them together reasonable. The proposed definition is quite useful for Area Studies insofar it deals with the geographic region.

Werner Cahnman, in his turn, stresses that Area Studies focus on the study of 'specific regions', as opposed to 'generic regions', dividing the world into major part, and subparts that constitute a whole.¹⁰⁶ These regions are characterized by multiple complex factors, and at the same time these regions represent the wholeness and uniqueness.¹⁰⁷ Uniqueness of the regions that are the object of Area Studies is also stressed by Robert Bates. Bates emphasizes the importance of cultural distinctions for the Area Studies that is the starting point for its scholars.¹⁰⁸ However, while Bates is talking about cultural distinctions mainly, which he calls contextual knowledge and that are determined by institutions, histories and beliefs, Cahnman means wider range of distinctions, including geographical, economic, and others.

Besides, what makes neoclassical realism approach more relevant for the area studies research is that the latter locates the state into the international environment and looks for the systemic factors that are seen as defining the national security decision-making process. Kolodziej would push the analysis beyond the state level so that "security policy may be defined as the pursuit by groups and states to influence and determine the overall structure of the component parts in preferred ways".¹⁰⁹ As he shows, security policy of one state (dominant in the region, for instance) can shape the structure of the whole region.

¹⁰⁶ Cahnman, W. J. (1948). Outline of a theory of area studies. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 38(4), 233-243.

¹⁰⁷ Cahnman 1948: 235.

¹⁰⁸ Bates, R. H. (1997). Area studies and the discipline: a useful controversy?. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 30(02): 168.

¹⁰⁹ Kolodziej, E. A. (1992). What is security and security studies?: Lessons from the cold war. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 13(1): 12.

Furthermore, neoclassical realists define the state apparatus, political regime, key actors, and interests groups as particularly important for their analysis. As Ripsman and Fordham show, the electoral behavior, mass media, the role of the military have an impact on the national security executives that also may vary depending on the international and domestic circumstances. The importance of the regional perspective in this regard was demonstrated in 1956 by Gabriel Almond, who employed political culture as a way of defining political system that was more meaningful than reliance on institutional comparisons.¹¹⁰ Political culture concept can correct the weakness of the rational choice theory. Ruth Lane introduces the term of 'cultural rationality'. It emphasizes specific content of various political cultures, and shows how these specific norms and beliefs can be described and used to predict specific behavioral patterns.¹¹¹ Different areas bear different types of cultures. Although classics of this trend, such as Almond, Verba, Pye, analyzed the particular countries, the types of the political culture are more broad, and can be applied to certain region, where one country represent this type to the most extent. Here, I will make examples of some cultures. In 1965, Rustow published analysis of Turkish political culture. His conclusion can be summarized in following. For Turkish political culture, the group's welfare is more important than the individual's. The group is hierarchy based on age. The group's welfare is defined by elders; and therefore their directions are to be obeyed. These directions include Islamic austerity and courage in protecting the group.¹¹² These characteristics can be applied if not to the whole but to Middle Eastern Islamic world.

It shows how political culture differentiate from country to country (and between different regions as well). These differences explain the different political institutions established. For example, the Japanese political culture explains power of emperor, and British political culture explains the type of monarchy in England, the power of

¹¹⁰ Almond, G. A. (1956). Comparative political systems. *The Journal of politics*, 18(03), 391-409.

¹¹¹ Lane, R. (1992). Political Culture Residual Category or General Theory?. *Comparative political studies*, 25(3): 365.

¹¹² Rustow, D. A.(1965). Turkey: the modernity of tradition. In L.W. Pye & S.Verba (Eds.), *Political culture and political development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 171 - 198.

the parliament and hereditary elites there. At the same time, Turkish political culture catches the most important features of that country – the influence of Islam and militarism, although society there is not that sharply stratified. In sum, analysis of political culture can explain the institutional preferences not only within certain country, but also in certain region, and therefore overcomes the weakness of the rational choice theory. As area studies, theories of political culture start by recognizing the uniqueness of the object of research.

Utilizing the works of the social constructivist school, the neoclassical realism employs the identity concept and communication approach related literature in the discussion of the threat identification, formulation of the national interest process and the ethnic groups' impact on the foreign policy making process. As Sterling-Folker shows, the identity of the certain group is being constructed through the interaction with other human collectives and through the opposition 'self' - 'other'.

As Rafael with the reference to Stuart Mill notes the importance of the language proficiency in the research:

Without knowing the language of a people, we never really know their thoughts, their feelings, their type of character; and unless we do possess this knowledge of some other people than ourselves, we remain, to the hour of our death, with our intellects only half expanded. ... Since we cannot divest ourselves of preconceived notions, there is no means of eliminating their influence but by frequently using the differently colored glasses of other people; and those of other nations, as the most different, are the best.¹¹³

Thus, Thomas Stephan Eder, in his 2013 work, elaborates on the issue of the China - Russia relations and argues that the application of the concept of the intervening variable to the concrete analysis will inevitably require the area expertise including the foreign language capabilities.¹¹⁴ He also points at the necessity of the study of the official documents that are accessible for the area specialist.

¹¹³ Hall, R. (1948). Area Studies: With Special Reference to Their Implications for Research in the Social Sciences (New York: Committee on World Area Research Program. Social Science Research Council, quoted in V.L. Rafael (1994). The cultures of area studies in the United States. *Social Text*, (41), 91-111.

¹¹⁴ Eder, T. S. (2014). China-Russia Relations in Central Asia: Energy Policy, Beijing's New Assertiveness and 21st Century Geopolitics. Springer VS: 87

2.4. Conclusion

The analysis of the traditional IR approaches allows to conclude that they display certain limitations applicable to the cases, particularly in the case of the Crimea. At the same time, the neoclassical realist approach is seen as the most powerful tool in the examination of the Crimean crisis of March 2014. The value of the approach for this thesis is first of all the emphasis on the intervening variable, or the state institutions, state-society relations, domestic actors and interest groups, nationalism and ideology. I argue that despite the rhetoric about the Russian invasion in Crimea and the analysis of the Russian foreign policy in realist and neoclassical realist terms, the neoclassical realist perspective from the Crimea's standpoint becomes a significant contribution to the bulk of literature on the case. Although we have to accept the international conditions that threatened Russian interests in the near abroad, they were the Crimean elites who perceived the system incentives in the way they did and undertook the decision of separation and unification with the Russian Federation.

The analysis of the domestic actors and interest groups are significant due to the several reasons. Firstly, Ukraine finds itself in the transition period which defines the weakness of the institutions and procedures, the low commitment of the actors to the existing norms. Secondly, the utilization of the Russian nationalistic rhetoric, particularly connected to the issues of the Russian language guaranteed the support of the referendum. The control of the Russia-oriented groups over the agenda in the parliament allowed referendum to be announced. Furthermore, the role of the military units that immediately took an oath to the Russian Federation was crucial - without it the conflict could have become frozen. Moreover, the media in the Crimea demonstrated their loyalty to the Russia. To sum up, the neoclassical realist potential in explaining the policy of the ARC in 2014 cannot be overestimated.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CRIMEA BEFORE 1991

3.1. Introduction.

For the understanding of the role of Russia in the Crimea, it is important to know the history of the region and the circumstances under which the territory of this region started to be settled by the Russians. This will shed light on the long-lasting links between the Crimea and the Russian Federation, the Russian language issue, the political parties and discourses. Otherwise, in author's opinion, it is impossible to elaborate on the Crimean crisis issue. The author starts with explaining the early settlements and cultures that existed on the territory of the Crimea, touching upon the Scythians, Sarmatians, Greeks and so on. The particular attention is paid to the discussion of the Crimean Khanate and its connection to Turkey. Furthermore, the author proceeds with the analysis of the Russian acquisition of the Crimea. The second part of this chapter aims at discussing the historical developments in the Crimea in the XX century, starting from the World War I till the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The importance of this period is determined by the following issues. The developments in the region during the World War I led to the establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist republic. In 1921, the autonomy was established. The World War II also was marked by such an important issue as a deprivation of the autonomous status and the deportation of many ethnic minorities, including the Crimean Tatars that is important political actor in Crimea. Finally, the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 was an implication for the later territorial claims of the Russian Federation. The third part of this chapter is devoted to this issue.

3.2. Historical Background of the Crimea

The author starts with explaining the early settlements and cultures that existed on the territory of the Crimea, touching upon the Scythians, Sarmatians, Greeks and so on. The particular attention is paid to the discussion of the Crimean Khanate and its connection to Turkey. Furthermore, the author proceeds with the analysis of the Russian acquisition of the Crimea.

3.2.1. Early Developments in the Region

The oldest traces of human habitation in the Crimea belong to the middle Paleolithic; one of them is the parking of Neanderthals in the cave Kiik-Koba aged 100 thousand years. Much later, in the Mesolithic era, the Cro-Magnons settled in the Crimea (Murzak-Koba).¹¹⁵ According to the hypothesis of the Columbia University scientists Ryan and Pitman, until the VI millennium BC, the Crimean territory did not constitute a peninsula and was a fragment of a larger landmass that included, in particular, the territory of the modern Azov Sea. Around 5500 BC, in a good effort from the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the formation of the Bosphorus, in a relatively short period of time, large areas were flooded, and the Crimean peninsula was formed. The flooding of the Black Sea approximately coincides with the final Mesolithic cultures and the onset of the Neolithic period. The Crimea, in the Neolithic wave, was not affected by the Neolithic cultures that came from the Anatolia via the Balkans. Local Neolithic had a different origin, associated with the cultures of the Circumpontic area (steppes and plains between the Black and Caspian Seas). In the IV - III millennia BC, through the territory of the north of the Crimea, westward migration of tribes, presumably carriers of Indo-European languages, occurred. In the III millennium BC, on the territory of the Crimea, the Kemi-Oba culture existed.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Андреев, А. (1997). *История Крыма: краткое описание прошлого Крымского полуострова*. Изд-во Межрегиональный центр отраслевой информатики Госатомнадзора России: 4

¹¹⁶ Андреев 1997: 4.

The first inhabitants of the Crimea, known to us by ancient sources, were Cimmerians (XII century BC). This is confirmed by the ancient and medieval historians, as well as the information that has reached us in the form of the names in the eastern part of the Crimea, 'Cimmerian ferry', 'Cimmeric'.¹¹⁷ In the middle of the VII century BC, Cimmerians were partly displaced by the Scythians to the steppe part of the peninsula in the foothills and mountains of the Crimea, where they created the compact settlements. In the foothills and mountainous Crimea, and on the southern coast of the Crimea, Tauri that were associated with the Kizil-Koba archaeological culture lived. Some scholars point at the possible Caucasian origin of Tauri using the traces of the influence of the Koban culture as an argument. From the ancient name of Tauri, the name of the coastal and mountainous part of the Crimea - *Taurica*, *Tauriya* and *Taurida* came. To this day, remains of fortifications and dwellings of the Tauri preserved; their circular fence of vertically set stones, and the Taurus tomb 'stone boxes' can be found.¹¹⁸

New period of the Crimean history begins with the capture of the Crimea by the Scythians. This period is characterized by the qualitative changes in the composition of the population. Archaeological data show that the foundation of the population of the northwest Crimea was people who came from the Dnieper region.¹¹⁹ In the VI-V centuries BC, when the steppes were dominated by the Scythians, on the coast of the Crimea, merchants from Greece started to base their trading colonies. Panticapaeum or Bosphorus (modern Kerch) and Feodosiya were built by the colonists from the Greek city of Miletus; Chersonesus, located within the current Sevastopol, was erected by the Greeks from Herculean Pont.¹²⁰

In the first half of the V century BC, on the shores of the Black Sea, there were two independent Greek states. One of them was the slaveholding Democratic Republic of Chersonesus, which included western Crimea land (Kerkinitida (modern

¹¹⁷ Андреев 1997: 9.

¹¹⁸ Андреев 1997: 6.

¹¹⁹ Андреев 1997: 11.

¹²⁰ Андреев 1997: 15, 17.

Yevpatoria), Kalos-Lyman (Chernomorskoye).¹²¹ Chersonesus was founded on the site of the Tauri settlement by the Greeks from Herculean Pont. Bosphorus was an autocratic state, whose capital became Panticapaeum. Acropolis of the city was on Mount Mithridates.¹²² Greek colonists brought to the shores of the Crimea shipbuilding, viticulture, the cultivation of olive trees and other crops, built temples, theaters, and stadiums. In the Crimea, there were hundreds of Greek settlements - *policies*. The ancient Greeks created great historical and literary monuments of the Crimea. Euripides wrote the material on the Crimean drama *Iphigenia in Tauris*. The Greeks, who lived in the Chersonese in Cimmerian Bosphorus, knew *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, where Cimmeria was wrongly characterized as "a sad area covered by ever-wet fog and clouds." By the end of the III century BC, Scythian state was greatly reduced under the pressure of the Sarmatians. The Scythians were forced to move their capital to the river Salgir (near Simferopol), where Naples Scythian, or Neapolis (Greek name) was.¹²³

By the middle of the I century BC, the Crimea was settled by the Romans. Bosphorus kingdom became dependent on Rome. They built Kharaks fortress that was abandoned in the III century.¹²⁴ They also paved the way through the Crimean Mountains Via Militaris (Kalenskaya trail), that connected Chersonese to the Ai-Todor Cape on the South Coast.¹²⁵ In the Roman period, Christianity began to spread in the Crimea. One of the first Christians in the Crimea was exiled Clement I, the fourth Pope.¹²⁶

Scythian state in the Crimea existed till the second half of the III century, and it was destroyed by the Goths. Staying of the Goths in the Crimean steppes lasted a

¹²¹ Хапаев В.В. (2015). Государственное управление и 'местное самоуправление' в византийском Херсоне во второй половине IX–X веке, *Альманах "КРЫМ"* (3), 27 - 45.

¹²² Андреев 1997: 17.

¹²³ Андреев 1997: 18.

¹²⁴ Андреев 1997: 25.

¹²⁵ Андреев 1997: 26 - 27.

¹²⁶ Катунин, Ю. А. (2013). Христианство в истории и культуре народов Крыма I-XVIII веках. *Ученые записки Таврического национального университета им. В.И. Вернадского Серия «Философия. Культурология. Политология. Социология»*. 24 (65-3), 130-141.

relatively short time. In 370, the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula were invaded by the Huns Balamber. Goths entrenched in the mountainous Crimea before the XVII century (Crimean Goths). By the end of the IV century, in the Crimea, there was only one ancient city Chersonese, which became an outpost of the Byzantine influence in the region. Under the Emperor Justinian Aluston, Gurzuf, Sudak and Simbolon forts were established, as well as Bosphorus revived.¹²⁷

In the VI century, Turks appeared in the Crimea. In the VII century, there were nomadic Bulgarians. In the beginning of the VIII century, the Crimea was divided between Byzantium and the Khazars. In the VIII century, in the Byzantine Empire a movement of iconoclasm began; this destroyed icons and murals in the temples. Monks escaping from persecution, moved to the outskirts of the Empire, including the Crimea. Here, in the mountains, they founded the cave temples and monasteries: Uspensky, Kachi-Kalon, Shuldan, Chelter and others.¹²⁸

The VI-XII centuries in the south-western Crimea are marked by the development of the feudal relations and formation of the fortified settlements in the internal ridge. In the IX century, in the Crimea, there were Pechenegs and Magyars. At the beginning of X century, the Crimea became arena of the battles between the armies of the Russ (Helga) and Khazar (Pesach).¹²⁹ After the death of the Khazar Khanate, Khazar part of the Crimea came under the influence of the ancient Tmutarakan principality. One of the important cities in this period was Korchev (contemporary Kerch). In 988, Kievan Prince Vladimir, after several months of siege, took Chersonese. This allowed Vladimir nominate their conditions to the emperor Basil II and marry a Byzantine princess Anna.¹³⁰

In the XII century, on the peninsula, there were the first documented archaeological traces of the Karaites, presumably descendants of the Khazars, a national religion of

¹²⁷ Андреев 1997: 30.

¹²⁸ Дюличев 1998: 143 - 144.

¹²⁹ Андреев 1997: 35 - 36.

¹³⁰ Дюличев 1998: 131 - 132.

which - Karaism - arose much earlier in the VIII century in Babylon.¹³¹ After weakening of Byzantium in its former possessions, the Crimean Gothalanami (Crimean Goths) founded Orthodox Christian Theodoro principality with its capital in the largest 'cave town' Mangup.¹³²

In 1223, the Crimea was invaded by the Tatar-Mongol troops Jebe, but soon they left. Steppe Crimea became the possession of the Golden Horde - the Jochi Ulus - no earlier than 1250. Krym was the administrative center of the peninsula. Other major city of the Crimean ulus was Karasubazar. The first coins in the Crimea were issued by the Khan Meng-Timur, dated 1267. Due to the rapid flourishing of the Genoese trade, the Crimea was becoming a major commercial and craft center fast.¹³³

In the XIV century, the part of the Crimean territory was acquired by the Genoese (Gazaria, Kafa).¹³⁴ By this time, in the Crimea, Cuman language had been widely circulated, as evidenced by the Code Kumanikus. In 1367, the Crimea obeyed to Mamay, who also relied on the power of the Genoese colony.¹³⁵ In 1397, the Lithuanian prince Vytautas invaded the Crimea and came to Kafa. After the defeat of the Edigei,¹³⁶ Chersonese turned to ruins (1399).¹³⁷ The important period in the history of the Crimea is the Crimean Khanate era. Its discussion will shed the lights on the Crimean Tatars roots in the regions, as well as the role of Turkey in the Crimea.

¹³¹ Дюличев 1998: 118 - 121.

¹³² Дюличев 1998: 155.

¹³³ Возгрин, В. Е. (1992). *Исторические судьбы крымских татар*. Москва: "Мысль": 127.

¹³⁴ Андреев 1997: 42.

¹³⁵ Андреев 1997: 43.

¹³⁶ Хромов, К. (2009). Правления ханов в Крымском Улусе Золотой Орды в 1419–1422 гг. по нумизматическим данным. *Историко-географічні дослідження в Україні*: 367.

¹³⁷ Дюличев 1998: 163.

3.2.2. The Crimean Khanate

After the collapse of the Golden Horde in 1441, the Crimean Tatar people and their government in the Crimea, the Crimean Khanate, formed.¹³⁸ In addition to the steppe and foothill part of the Crimea, the Crimean Khanate actually occupied the lands between the Danube and the Dnieper, Azov Sea and most of the modern territory of the Krasnodar region of Russia. At this point, the Crimea was divided between the steppe Crimean Khanate, mountain principality Theodoro and Genoese colonies on the south coast.¹³⁹ The capital of the principality Theodoro was Mangup, one of the largest medieval fortresses of the Crimea (90 ha), which, if necessary, could be taken under the protection of large numbers of the population.

In summer 1475, the Ottoman Turks, who seized Constantinople and the territory of the former Byzantine Empire before, invaded the entire Genoese fortress (including Tana on the Don) and the Greek cities in the Crimea and the Sea of Azov, led by Gedik Ahmed Pasha. In July, Mangup was besieged. Breaking into the city, the Turks destroyed almost all the inhabitants, looted and burned buildings. Seaside towns and the mountainous part of the Crimea became part of the Ottoman Empire. On the lands of the principality and conquered the Genoese colony Turkish *pashalik* Kef was created; later it was transformed into *Eyalet*. Turks kept there their garrisons, bureaucracy, and collected taxes. From 1478 onwards, the Crimean Khanate became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. In the three centuries that followed, the Black Sea became a Turkish 'internal lake'.¹⁴⁰ By the XVI century, the Ottoman Empire moved to strategic defense, the main components of which was the construction of fortifications at the mouths of rivers, creating a kind of buffer zone - an uninhabited territory, the transfer of armed struggle against northern neighbors - Poland and Russia - deep into the Polish and Russian possessions, using a dependent from her Crimean Khanate.¹⁴¹ In the XVI century, the Turks with the help of the Italian

¹³⁸ Возгрин 1992: 144.

¹³⁹ Дюличев 1998: 175.

¹⁴⁰ Возгрин 1992: 150 - 151.

¹⁴¹ Дюличев 1998: 197 - 200.

experts built a fortress Perekopor Kapu. Since the end of the XV century, the Crimean Khanate carried out repeated attacks on the Russian government and Rzecz Pospolita. The main purpose of the raids was the capture of slaves and their resale to the Turkish markets. The total number of slaves who passed through the Crimean markets is estimated at three million.¹⁴²

As soon as the Russian government got rid of the yoke of the Golden Horde, once again it faced the task to find the exit to the Black Sea. After defeating the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanate, Russia continued expansion to the south, toward the Turkish-Tatar threat. Defense line, under construction on the Russian borders, menaced the Wild Field. Reclaimed land started to be mastered by the farmers; cities were built, that put pressure on the defense lines of the Ottoman Empire, despite the unsuccessful Crimean campaigns of the Russian troops in the XVI and XVII centuries.¹⁴³

During the Russian-Turkish War (1735-1739), the Russian Dnieper Army, numbering 62 thousand people under the command of the Field Marshal Munnich, on May 20, 1736, stormed the Ottoman fortifications in Perekop and occupied Bakhchisaray on June 17. However, lack of food, as well as outbreaks in the army forced Munnich to retreat in Russia. In July 1737, the Crimea was invaded by the army under the command of the Field Marshal Peter Lacy, causing the series of defeats of the army of the Crimean Khan and capturing Karasubazar. But soon, Lacy was forced to leave the Crimea due to lack of supply.¹⁴⁴ The only outcome of the Russian army incursions appeared to be the devastation of the peninsula, because the gap between the new and already governed by the Russians territories was too great to ensure their economic development and effective defense and thus rely on the inclusion of the Crimea into the Russian possessions.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² Fisher, A. W. (1972). Muscovy and the Black Sea slave trade. *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 6(4), 575-594.

¹⁴³ Киселёв, С. Н., & Киселёва, Н. В. (2004). Геополитические аспекты истории Крыма. *Ученые записки ТНУ, серия «География*, 17(56): 75.

¹⁴⁴ Андреев 1997: 76.

¹⁴⁵ Киселёв & Киселёва 2004: 75 - 76.

Russian-Turkish War of 1768 - 1774 marked the end of the Ottoman rule over the Crimea and according to the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the Ottomans officially renounced claims to the peninsula. Russia received fortress Kerch and Yenikale that locked out the exit of the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. Kerch Strait became Russian, which was of great importance for the Russian South trade. The Crimean Khanate was declared independent from Turkey. The Crimean Khanate received former Ottoman possessions on the peninsula (South and South-East Crimea). However, it took a lot of time, money and effort (both military and diplomatic) before Turkey reconciled with the release of the Crimea and Northern Black Sea from its influence. The Turkish sultans, being the supreme Caliphs, retained in their hands the power of the religious right and the approval of the new khans that caused a great pressure on the Crimean Khanate. As a result, the Crimean nobility divided into two groups - the Russian and Turkish orientated.¹⁴⁶

Having achieved independence of the Crimea, Catherine II did not abandon the idea of joining it to Russia. This was determined by the vital interests of Russia, insofar as the Crimea had a large military-political and economic importance for the Russian state. Without the Crimea, it was impossible to have free access to the Black Sea. But the Sultan of Turkey, in his turn, did not think to abandon the peninsula.¹⁴⁷ The last Crimean Khan Shahin Giray received the throne in 1777 due to the Russian support. Shahin Giray ruled, disregarding the national Tatar customs, trying to hold in the state reform and reorganize the management of the European model, to equalize the rights of Muslim and non-Muslim population of the Crimea, and soon turned to his people in a traitor and apostate.¹⁴⁸

In March 1778, Alexander Suvorov was appointed the commander of the Russian troops of the Crimea and the Kuban. He radically strengthened peninsula's defense from the Turkish attacks and forced the Turkish fleet off the Crimean water. In 1778,

¹⁴⁶ Жуков, К. А. (2009). Некоторые узловые моменты русско-турецких отношений в конце XVII-начале XX вв. *Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Серия 13. Востоковедение. Африканистика*, (2).

¹⁴⁷ Андреев 1997: 87.

¹⁴⁸ Возгрин 1992: 265 - 267.

Suvorov on the orders of Prince Potemkin, governor of the Novorossiysk, Azov, Astrakhan and Saratov provinces, facilitated access to the Russian citizenship and resettlement of the Christian population of the Crimea (Armenians, Greeks, Voloh, and Georgians). As Mal'gin suggests this was conducted in order to prevent the possibility of Turkish troops to land at the expense of the local Christian (i.e. agricultural) population and its campaign of the evacuation from the Crimea was implemented.¹⁴⁹ It is also likely that as de Madariaga assumed, "the benefits of attracting a large group Christian settlers in the southern Russian territory soon overshadowed the original cause of migration".¹⁵⁰ It can be also explained by the necessity of rapid settlement of the fertile lands of the Northern Black Sea coast (primarily the lands of the liquidated Zaporozhye Sech, deserted in connection with the departure of the Zaporozhye Cossacks of the Danube and the eviction of the remaining Kuban). The departure of the economically active population of the treasury led to the loss of the significant revenue sources. As compensation 'for the loss of citizens', Khan, his brothers, *beys* and *murzas* were paid 100 thousand rubles from the Russian treasury.¹⁵¹ From May to September 1778, 31 thousand people were resettled in the Azov Sea and in the New Russia from the Crimea. Greeks that inhabited mainly western and southern coast of the Crimea were resettled on the north shore of the Azov Sea, where they founded the city of Mariupol¹⁵², and 20 villages.¹⁵³ Armenians, who inhabited mostly eastern and south-eastern regions of the Crimea (Feodosia, Stary Krym, Surhat and so on), settled in the lower reaches of the Don, near the fortress Dmitri Rostovsky, where they founded the city of

¹⁴⁹ Мальгин, А. В. (2013). Присоединение Крыма к России в свете мотивов имперской экспансии. *История и современность*, 1 (17): 60.

¹⁵⁰ Мадариага, И. де. (2002). *Россия в эпоху Екатерины Великой*. Москва: НЛО: 604.

¹⁵¹ Кащенко, С. Г. (2006). Выселение христиан из Крымского Ханства в Россию в 1778 г. *Ученые записки, Таврического национального университета им. В. И. Вернадского. Серия Юридические науки*. 19(58-2): 33.

¹⁵² Калоеров, С. А. (1998). О переселении греков в Приазовье и основании греческих населенных пунктов. Калоеров. *Материалы по истории и культуре греков Украины*, (1), 5-54.

¹⁵³ Масаев, М. В. (2003). Проблема переселения христиан из Крыма в 1778 г. на фоне заключительного этапа присоединения Крыма к России. *Культура народов Причерноморья*. (43): 189.

Nakhichevan-on-Don and 5 villages around it (the place of modern Rostov-on-Don). With the exodus of the Christians, the Crimean Khanate was ruined.

On March 10, 1779, Russia and Turkey signed Aynaly - Kavak Convention, according to which Russia should withdraw its troops from the Crimean peninsula, and, like Turkey, cannot interfere in the internal affairs of the Khanate. Turkey recognized Shahin Girayas the Crimean Khan, confirmed the independence of the Crimea and the right of free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for the Russian merchant vessels.¹⁵⁴ Russian troops, in accordance with the document, could leave six thousand soldiers garrison in Kerch and Yenikale, and in the middle of June 1779, withdrew from the Crimea and the Kuban region. Porte, however, could not accept the loss on the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and tended to return the Crimean Khanate and the lands of the Northern Black Sea coast to its sphere of influence. In the fall of 1781, in the Crimea, there was another uprising, provoked by Turkey. In the summer of 1782, Catherine II entrusted to Prince Potemkin to send Russian troops to help the deposed Khan Shahin Giray, risking going into an open conflict with Turkey. In September, with the help of the Russian troops, Shahin Giray Khan regained the throne.¹⁵⁵ For the sake of this thesis, one of the most important milestones in the Crimean past is the 1783 when the region was annexed by the Russian Empire. It is still a remarkable date for the pro-Russian political forces. Since then the Crimea had been settled by the Russians.

3.2.3. The Annexation of the Crimea by Russia.

Remaining threat from Turkey (for which the Crimea was possible springboard in case of an attack on Russia) forced Russia to build a powerful fortified line on the southern borders of the country and divert the forces and means of the economic development in the border provinces. Potemkin as the governor of these areas,

¹⁵⁴ Ратушняк, В. Н. (2013). Борьба за присоединение Крымского ханства к России на рубеже 1770-х–1780-х гг. *Историческая и социально-образовательная мысль*, (3): 39.

¹⁵⁵ Ратушняк 2013: 40.

realized the complexity and instability of the political situation in the Crimea, and came to a final conclusion about the need to attach it to Russia, which would have completed the territorial expansion of the empire as far south as natural boundaries and created a single economic area - the northern Black Sea region. In December 1782, after returning from Kherson, Potemkin submitted the memorandum to Catherine II that expressed his point of view.¹⁵⁶

Some researches link the Crimean annexation to the Greek project that presupposed the crushing of the Ottoman Empire and the division of its territory between Russia, the Holy Roman Empire and the Venetian Republic.¹⁵⁷ As Markova argues, the Greek Project was the camouflage of the planned conquest of the Crimea. The program would require the huge state material and human casualties. Internal conditions of the country did not provide the performance of the program. Russian finance was continually deteriorating. Events for the dispensation of the South of Russia demanded extraordinary costs. Peasant uprising of Pugachev had not been eliminated. In addition, Russia did not have any major business funds or existing bourgeois class interests which would correspond to such a broad program of conquest. The expansion in the size of the Greek Project would lead not to the strengthening, but, on the contrary, to a weakening of the country.¹⁵⁸ However, in his turn, Mal'gin argues that the Greek Project does not provide direct annexations. Possible Russian-Austrian rapprochement led Russia to define adopt an idea of their own goals and interests in the South, and conduct, so to speak, the audit of their political assets in the case of the Crimea's disappointing.¹⁵⁹

On December 14, 1782, Empress sent Potemkin a secret prescript, which announced her will "on the assignment of the peninsula." In spring 1783, it was decided that Potemkin would go south, and will personally supervise the addition of the Crimean

¹⁵⁶ Ратушняк 2013: 40 - 41.

¹⁵⁷ Коршунова, Н. (2003). Восточный вектор геополитики Екатерины II: "Греческий проект". *Вестник Челябинского университета. Сер. 10, Востоковедение. Евразийство. Геополитика*, (1), 62-68.

¹⁵⁸ Маркова, О. П. (1958). О происхождении так называемого Греческого проекта (80-е годы XVIII в.). *История СССР*, 958, 66.

¹⁵⁹ Мальгин 2013: 61.

Khanate to Russia. On 8 (21) April, Empress signed the manifesto "On the Adoption of the Crimean Peninsula, Taman Island and All Kuban Side Under the Russian Empire," on which she worked with Potemkin.¹⁶⁰ This document should be kept secret until the accession. On the same day Potemkin went south, but still on the way got the unexpected news of the abdication of Shahin Giray Khanate. The reason for this was the discovery of the hatred against citizens held their reforms and policies Shahin Giray, the actual financial bankruptcy of the state, mutual distrust and lack of understanding with the Russian authorities.¹⁶¹ On the territory of the Crimea, the Russian troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Count de Balmain were also introduced. In June 1783, in Karasubazar, Prince Potemkin took the oath of allegiance to the Russian Crimean nobles and representatives of all layers of the Crimean population. The Crimean Khanate ceased to exist, but its elites (over 300 genera) merged into the Russian nobility and took seats in the local self-government of the newly created Tauria *Oblast'*.¹⁶²

On the order of Catherine II, immediate steps to choose the harbor for the future Black Sea Fleet in the south-west coast were implemented. Captain Bersenev recommended the use of the bay near the village Akhtiar, near the ruins of Chersonese Tauride. Catherine II issued a decree on February 10, 1784, ordered to found a "military port with the Admiralty, shipyard, a fortress and make it a military town." At the beginning of 1784, the port was laid fortress, which Catherine II gave the name of Sevastopol.¹⁶³ By decree of Emperor Alexander I on October 8, 1802 Novorossiysk *guberniya* was divided into Mykolayiv, Ekaterinoslav and Taurida

¹⁶⁰ Орешкова, С. Ф. (2008). Крымское ханство в 70е годы XVIII в. *Вопросы истории*, 8, 3: 125 - 126.

¹⁶¹ Мальгин 2013: 62.

¹⁶² Лупанова, М. Е. (2008). «Греческий проект» Екатерины Великой. *Известия Российского государственного педагогического университета им. АИ Герцена*, (65): 203.

¹⁶³ Пастернак, Е. Н. (2015). К вопросу об определении юридического содержания статуса города федерального значения Севастополя как субъекта в составе Российской Федерации: историко-правовой аспект. *Евразийская интеграция: правовой и образовательный аспекты: материалы Междунар. науч. - практ. конф. (Новосибирск, 3–5 декабря 2014 г.) и II Школы интерэкоправа (Новосибирск, 4–5 декабря 2014 г.)*. Новосибирск: РИЦ НГУ: 59.

guberniyas. Taurida included the Crimean peninsula, Dneprovskiy, Melitopol and Fanagoriyskaya counties of the Novorossiysk province.¹⁶⁴

In June 1854, the Anglo-French fleet started to bombard the Russian coastal fortifications in the Crimea, and in September, in Yalta, Allies (United Kingdom, France, and the Ottoman Empire) started landing. Soon there was Battle of Alma. In October, the siege of Sevastopol took place, during which Kornilov died on Malakhov Hill. In February 1855, Russians unsuccessfully tried to storm Yevpatoria. In May, the Anglo-French fleet captured Kerch. In July, 1855, in Sevastopol, the chief inspirer of Defense Admiral Nakhimov was killed. On September 11, 1855, Sevastopol fell, but was returned to Russia at the exchange for the certain concessions.¹⁶⁵

As it can be seen, since 1783, the Crimea appeared to be under the Russian rule. This defined the ethnic composition of the population, political and economic changes in the region that, as the author argues, influence the regional dynamics in the XX and XXI centuries. Thus, according to the 1897 census, 546700 people lived in the Crimea. Of these, 35.6% were Crimean Tatars, 33.1% were the Great Russians, Ukrainians constituted 11.8%, 5.8% were German, 4.4% - Jewish, 3.1% were Greeks, Armenians constituted 1.5%, 1.3% was represented by Bulgarians, 1.2% belong to Poles, 0.3% of the population were Turks.¹⁶⁶ The dynamic of the population should be discussed here. In 1843, the new "Regulations on the Relocation of the Landless Government Peasants to the Land-rich Places" was issued. The document essentially supplemented the law of 1824. On the new places for immigrants, the food was purchased, cattle prepared and some fields were sowed. For these, it was allowed to spend 'up to 20 rubles per family'. Newly coming peasants were provided a 6-year-old exemption from military service and 8-year-old exemption from the payment of taxes and duties, comparing to the existed before 3-

¹⁶⁴ Андреев 1997: 90.

¹⁶⁵ Андреев 1997: 92 - 93.

¹⁶⁶ Старченко, Р. А. (2013). Динамика численности и расселения русских Крыма в XVIII–XIX веках. *Вестник Костромского государственного университета им. Н.А. Некрасова*, 19(6): 40.

year exemption.¹⁶⁷ In the 1830-40s, the ethnic composition of residents of the Crimea underwent significant changes. In that period, Russian share significantly increased (from 4.4 to 6.6%) as well as the share of Ukrainians (from 3.1 to 7.0%).

In 1850, the IX revision of the population was carried out in Russia. Between the IX and the X revisions the resettlement of peasants was carried out on the basis of the law of 1843. During the Crimean War of 1853 - 1856, a significant number of the Crimean Tatars acted on the side of the enemy. After the war, a significant part of Tatars emigrated to Turkey.¹⁶⁸ The X revision, the last in the history of Russia, was carried out in 1857 - 1858. The population of the Crimea between 1850 and 1858 decreased from 343.5 to 331.3 thousand people. The audit confirmed that in the 1850s, the share of the Crimean Tatars continued to decline (from 77.8 to 73.0%), while their dominance in all districts was still registered. Russians' share increased almost twice (from 6.6 to 12.6%). In the early 1860s, the second mass deportation of the Tatars from the Crimea to Turkey began. Its scale exceeded similar deportation out of the 1770s - early 1780s. After the Crimean War, on the part of the Tatar population, many Tatars were eager to emigrate to Turkey; the propaganda of the Muslim clergy played an important role in this decision.¹⁶⁹

By the spring of 1860, the majority of the Muslim population of the Crimea took over the elimination of their farms and resettlement. The majority of them headed to Turkey during April - October 1860. The total loss of population in the Crimea in 1860 amounted 116.6 thousand people, in 1861 it became 13.3 thousand people. Meanwhile, the colonization of the Crimean lands originated from the interior provinces of Russia continued. If in the 1950s, Tatars constituted 77.8% of all the Crimean residents, by 1864 this was about 52%, and by the beginning of the XX century, their share was reduced to 35.6%.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Старченко 2013: 40.

¹⁶⁸ Старченко 2013: 41.

¹⁶⁹ Старченко 2013: 41.

¹⁷⁰ Старченко 2013: 41.

The XX century brought important changes to the Russian Empire. In November 1905, the Sevastopol uprising led by Lieutenant Schmidt occurred. On December 16, 1917, soon after the October Bolshevik revolution, in Sevastopol, the Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee was established, which took power into their own hands. On January 4, 1918, the Bolsheviks took power in Feodosiya, knocking out the Crimean Tatar connection, and, on January 6, they took Kerch. On the night of January 9, Red Guards came to Yalta. On the night of January 14, they managed to conquer Simferopol. As it will be discussed later, on March 19, 1918, Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed in the Crimea.

The first autonomous establishments on the territory of the Crimea are traced back to the early years of the Soviet power. During the Soviet period, the region was given and then deprived of the autonomous status, suffered from the World Wars, deportation and the transfer to the Ukrainian SSR. The next section will discuss these events as well as their significance to the contemporary political process.

3.3. An Autonomous Status of the Crimea in the Early Soviet Era, 1917 - 1941

World War I and Civil war in Russia became the source of important changes in the Crimea. In this period, the first Taurida republic was established followed by the creation of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

3.3.1. Taurida Republic and the World War I

The Crimean expert Zaulochnaya distinguishes two aspects of the establishment of the Crimean ASSR. To address the first issue, one should refer to the main provisions of the Leninist theory concerning the national question.¹⁷¹ The first was formulated by the Lenin's position on the national question referred to 1902 and was worded as follows: "Recognition of the right for self-determination of all nations that

¹⁷¹ Заулочная, С. А. (2006). Политикоправовые предпосылки создания Крымской Автономии в 1921 г. *Ученые записки, Таврического национального университета им. В. И. Вернадского, Серия «Юридические науки»*. 19(58-2), 276-287.

are the part of the state."¹⁷² This formulation was expressed in the first program of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, adopted at its Second Congress in London, in 1903. But this slogan lurked a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, under the right of nations to self-determination the right to "secede from foreign national elements, the formation of an independent national state" was understood.¹⁷³ On the other hand, Lenin, as a supporter of the class approach, was an opponent of the process that may decompose large states into smaller, as large states contribute to the union of the working masses in their struggle against the bourgeoisie and Lenin therefore, ultimately, put the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat above the interests of the national-liberation movement.¹⁷⁴ The right of nations to self-determination is inextricably linked to the question of autonomy, Zaulochnaya stresses. The key phrase of Lenin's thesis on the autonomy: "Widespread local government, regional self-government of those areas, which are distinguished by special household conditions and the composition of the population".¹⁷⁵

These considerations were supported by the practice of the Soviet leadership regarding the Crimean Soviet republics in 1918 and 1919. The creation of these republics was motivated not by a desire to implement the program promises of the Bolsheviks and pragmatic considerations, but rather by the specific requirements of the situation. This view is supported by Dement'yev and Andronova.¹⁷⁶ Thus, the reason for the creation of the Republic of Taurida in 1918 was military-political situation that developed after the conclusion of the Brest Treaty between Soviet Russia on the one side and the countries of the Quadruple Union on the other side, on 3 March, 1918. Using Brest - Litovsk peace treaty with the Central Rada, Austrian -

¹⁷² Ленин, В. (1902). Из «Проекта Программы Российской социал-демократической рабочей партии». Art. 7. Retrieved from <http://leninism.su/works/115-conspect/4248-v-i-lenin-o-natsionalnom-voprose-i-natsionalnoj-politike.html?showall=&start=2>

¹⁷³ В.И.Ленин, И.В.Сталин о национальном вопросе. (2009). Москва: ООО "Правда-Пресс": 14.

¹⁷⁴ В.И.Ленин, И.В.Сталин о национальном вопросе. 2009: 42.

¹⁷⁵ Н. Ленин – Критические заметки по национальному вопросу Написано в октябре – декабре 1913 г. Напечатано в ноябре – декабре 1913 г. в журнале «Просвещение» №№ 10, 11 и 12. Retrieved from <http://transformations.russian-literature.com/node/83>

¹⁷⁶ Дементьев, Н. Е., & Андропова, И. Ф. (2000). О теоретических и практических предпосылках образования Крымской АССР. *Культура народов Причерноморья*. (15): 60-64.

German troops entered the territory of Ukraine. The invaders were prepared to seize the Crimea, the Caucasus and the Don region and at any moment could resume hostilities against Soviet Russia, which is extremely feared Bolshevik leaders and above all, Lenin. Therefore, to combat Austrian - German intervention in the south it was decided to use the Crimea, declaring it an independent Soviet republic.¹⁷⁷

Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the RSFSR adopted measures to release the Crimea from the Russian Federation, the proclamation of the independent republic in the Crimea and its inclusion into the single defensive front. However, there were two dangers: increased separatism of some senior officials of the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet Left Socialist Revolutionary Party members; and the need for the Russian Federation for the right of the diplomatic protection of the newly established republic.¹⁷⁸

On March 15, 1918, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a special resolution of the Crimean Republic and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR which formulated the main conditions of its proclamation: declared new republic in the Crimea; Black Sea Fleet was regarded as belonging to the Republic of Taurida; all the institutions of the Crimea had to obey to the Central Executive Committee of Taurida which was in its turn responsible to the Central Executive Committee and CPC of the RSFSR. It is noteworthy that the decree of the Central Executive Committee and CPC of the RSFSR said nothing about the reasons for the creation of Taurida.¹⁷⁹ Proclamation of the Republic Taurida let government to avoid charges against Germany and Austro-Hungary in violation of the terms of the Brest peace and at the same time oppose intervention. Leninist pragmatism prevailed.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Заулочная 2006: 282.

¹⁷⁸ Заулочная 2006: 283.

¹⁷⁹ Заулочная 2006: 283.

¹⁸⁰ Дементьев & Андропова 2000: 62.

3.3.2. Establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

The situation appeared to be similar, but with a different composition of actors, in spring 1919, and led to the creation of the Crimean SSR. After the surrender of Germany and Austro-Hungary in the World War I, squadron of Entente came to the Black Sea. In accordance with the Convention on the rejection of the southern regions of Russia between the governments of Britain and France, in the Southern Ukraine and the Crimea landings armies of these countries were deployed. Furthermore, the White Volunteer Army stationed in the Black Sea region, including the Crimea, joined army of invaders. The Red Army under the command of Dybenko took Perekop and turned to Sevastopol. Government of the Crimea was forced to evacuate. But the Red Army failed to capture Sevastopol, although CPC of the RSFSR insisted on it.¹⁸¹ Therefore, in order to avoid war with the Entente countries, whose ships were in the bays of Sevastopol, Lenin proposed the creation of the Crimean Soviet Republic, on behalf of which government decided to combat the invaders. The decision was taken on April 20, 1919, at a meeting of the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(B). The word 'autonomy' was missing, because the whole point of it was about the proclamation and was a military action against the Entente interventionists. Moreover, the reference to 'the right of nations to self-determination' was absent in these documents.¹⁸² Therefore, the creation of the Crimean SSR was not an act of implementation of the 'Leninist principles of the national policy', but a pragmatic act aimed at strengthening the power of the Soviets in the South. The Crimean SSR lasted less than two months, but had completed the task assigned to it.

The second component in the solution of the problem was the tendency among the Crimean Tatars striving for the national statehood which appeared after February 1917, when the Crimean Tatars social and political movement intensified¹⁸³ and put

¹⁸¹ Дементьев & Андропова 2000: 62.

¹⁸² Заулочная 2006: 284.

¹⁸³ Громов, С. Е. (1997). К вопросу о деятельности крымскотатарской национальной партии Милли-Фирка (1917-1920 гг.). *Культура народов Причерноморья*. (1): 109 - 110.

forward more radical demands, having put the aim to create Crimean independent state.¹⁸⁴ The result of this movement was the convening of 26 November, 1917, Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar people, where delegates adopted first time in the history of the Crimean Constitution. New state was named the Crimean People (Democratic) Republic. The Crimean Tatar parliament was elected, which formed the national government - the Directory, headed by Chelebiyev.¹⁸⁵ As the Crimean Tatar newspaper *Golos Tatar* stressed, the Crimean Tatars "... do not demand a political autonomy", but would not allow the establishment of "the political hegemony of a nation that has no cultural or historical or ethnographic rights per se" in the Crimea.¹⁸⁶ However, Directory began a power struggle with the Bolsheviks which ended with the defeat of Directory and Kurultay. As a result, already on 14 January, 1918, Kurultay was forced to decide on the termination of the military actions.¹⁸⁷

The question of the political structure of the Crimea was the subject of the discussion of the Crimean Regional Committee of the RCP(B) on May 7, 1921. Opinions of the executives differed significantly. Thus, the representatives of the Crimean Tatar Communists offered to create the Crimean Tatar national republic. This statement contradicted to the resolution of the Tatar Communists Conference that earlier, in May, decided that for the revolutionary goals the most suitable form of the government is the International Republic within the Russian Federation.¹⁸⁸ Party workers among Ukrainians considered the most appropriate to include the Crimea

¹⁸⁴ Хаяли Р.И. (2015). Концепция культурно-национальной автономии временного Крымского Мусульманского Комитета и Татарской Партии (1917–1918 гг.). *Юридический научный электронный журнал*. (3): 37 - 39.

¹⁸⁵ The official web-page of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. Retrieved from <http://qtm.org/%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%89%D0%B0%D1%8F-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%BE-%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%80%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0>

¹⁸⁶ Первый Курултай: "Принятия таких законов... не постыдились бы и самые культурные народы Европы". (2014, December 14). *Крым. Реалии*. retrieved from <http://ru.krymr.com/a/26743069.html>

¹⁸⁷ Заулочная 2006: 284.

¹⁸⁸ Заулочная 2006: 284.

into the Ukrainian SSR, given its geographical location and economic ties. The majority of participants were in favor of the creation of an independent region, reporting directly to Moscow. Eventually, it was decided to transfer the final decision to the discretion of the Central Committee of the RCP(B).¹⁸⁹ Particular attention was paid to ensure the representation of the Crimean Tatars. They were guaranteed 20 seats of the 50 seats on the CEC. It was agreed on the presence of the members of the Crimean Tatars in the CPC of the Crimea.¹⁹⁰

On October 18, 1921, Mikhail Kalinin, Enukidze, Lenin signed a decree on creation the Republic of Crimea. At the first All-Crimean Constituent Congress of Soviets, 7 - 11 November 1921, the Crimean constitution was adopted; it was based on the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918. In the General Provisions, it is noted that "the Crimean Socialist Soviet republic is the republic of the working people - workers and peasants; power in the territory of the Crimea is carried out by the Soviets."¹⁹¹ According to it, "The Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic claiming equality and the right to the free development of all nationalities of the Crimea, cancels all preexisting national and national-religious restrictions". Russian and Tatar were declared the state languages.¹⁹²

Even before the declaration of the Crimean republic, measures on the *tatarization* of the administrative apparatus were carried out. Thus, in July 1921, on the initiative of the regional Tatar Bureau of the RCP(B), actions on *tatarization* of the management unit were identified, particularly in the areas dominated by the Tatar population; the question of the appointment of the Tatar - Communists for the leading positions in a number of Soviet institutions of the Crimea was raised. Moreover, leadership took other measures to involve the Crimean Tatars to work in all levels of the government,

¹⁸⁹ Крапивенцев, М. (2014). *История трансформации политико-правового статуса Крыма в 1917 - 1921 годах*. (Doctoral Dissertation, Федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение высшего образования "Московский государственный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова", Филиал МГУ в городе Севастополе). Retrieved from http://www.hist.msu.ru/Science/Disser/Krapivencev_a.pdf: 149 - 151.

¹⁹⁰ Заулочная 2006: 286.

¹⁹¹ Крапивенцев (2014): 164 - 168.

¹⁹² Заулочная 2006: 286.

which would contribute to a more successful attraction of the poorest sections of the Crimean Tatars on the Soviet side. The claim of the Tatars to provide them 30 seats in the Central Executive Committee were rejected,¹⁹³ however, the decision to increase the *tatarization* of the apparatus, strengthening cultural and educational work among the Crimean Tatar population was adopted.¹⁹⁴

In the literature on the Soviet Crimea, particular place is given to the issue of *indigenization* or *korenizatsiya*. These policies of the promotion of the ethnic groups' languages, education and culture require particular attention insofar as they contributed to the preservation of these groups' culture and identities by means of the literature publishing, mass media, association.

3.3.3. Development of National Education and Culture in the Crimea before World War II

Analyzing this period, it is important to distinguish two sub-periods in this time frame. Such division is related to the peculiarities of the *indigenization* or *korenizatsiya* policies that were conducted in 1920s - 1930s in the Soviet Union. This political and cultural campaign carried out in 1924 and aimed at strengthening the role of the 'titular' nations respectively in the autonomous entities. The campaign was held on the basic principles of the Leninist national policy, based on the Declaration of the Rights of Peoples of Russia (1917) and it was designed to bridge the gap between the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet state and the interests of minorities account for more than half of the population, and was intended to strengthen the Bolshevik power in the non-Russian areas of the country through the formation of human resources the composition of the Party, government and economic institutions of persons of the indigenous nationality.

Korenizatsiya regarding the Crimean Tatars. As it was mentioned before, national issues became acute since the first days of the establishment of the Soviet power in

¹⁹³ Кондратюк 2011: 30 - 31.

¹⁹⁴ Заулочная 2006: 286.

the Crimea in November 1920. During the Civil War, both in Ukraine and in the Crimea, a number of parties built on ethnic criteria operated, that displayed primarily the interests of the peasantry. In the Crimea, it was Milli Firka that represented the interests of the Tatar stratum of the population. In addition to the party Milli Firka, with the establishment of the Soviet government, other political organizations tried to restore their work.¹⁹⁵ On December 18, 1920, Sevastopol Revolutionary Committee received the following message: "Sevastopol Muslim Democratic organization that existed in 1919 under the Soviet regime and due to the arrival of the White Army had to stop their work, now, from 14 November, resumed organizational work". However, the Bolsheviks immediately tried to suppress any other political force. Milli Firka could not exist legally. On November 30, 1920, at the meeting of the Regional Committee of the RCP(B) the party Milli Firka was discussed. The decision was to launch a campaign against Milli Firka "as oral and written propaganda".¹⁹⁶

The national policy of the 1920s regarding the Crimean Tatar people included several important components. Firstly, it was the creation of national regions, rural municipalities and quotas. Second, it was the desire to create a Crimean Tatar national proletariat by the indigenization in the industry.¹⁹⁷ Third, it was land reform, which in practice, became the most difficult to implement.¹⁹⁸

Efforts to organize and conduct foreign exchange activities, and quotas in the People's Commissariat brought results. By 1926, in the village councils of total 2080 people, the Crimean Tatars constituted 806 or 39.9%. Among 143 chairmen of village councils, 54 or 40% were the Crimean Tatars. As a part of the members of district executive committees, the Crimean Tatars accounted for 20%. Among 75 people elected to the Central Election Commission of the Crimean Autonomous Republic 30 or about 40% were the Crimean Tatars. The completion of the party

¹⁹⁵ Бекиров С., & Бекирова Э. (2009). Развитие национального движения крымских татар в начале XX века. *Проблеми сучасної педагогічної освіти: педагогіка і психологія* 21(5): 3.

¹⁹⁶ Хованцев 1999а: 201.

¹⁹⁷ Кондратюк 2011: 30.

¹⁹⁸ Господаренко, Н. М. (1999). Особенности культурно-политической работы среди национальных меньшинств Крыма в 1920-е годы. *Культура народов Причерноморья*. 10: 57.

organization was significantly slower. On January 1, 1925, in the RCP(B), 236 Communists were the Crimean Tatars, or 4.6% of the total number of party organization. By October 1, the number had risen to 440 people and made 7.1% of the party organization.¹⁹⁹

An important area of the national policy was the creation of the Crimean Tatar village councils. Village Council is a grassroots element of Soviet power and virtually personified power in the eyes of the population. Village councils were to serve a smaller number of villagers and formed on national criteria. Before the start of the program, in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, there were 51 Crimean Tatar village councils, but in December 1926, already 145 Crimean Tatar village councils existed. It was planned to increase this number to 184. Authorities sought to speak with peasants in the literal sense of the word in their own language, so the work of the rural councils was carried out in the Crimean Tatar language.²⁰⁰ One of the important elements of indigenization was the creation of national regions. On December 15, 1930, a decision on the new administrative structure of the peninsula was adopted. A number of areas became national. National Crimean Tatar areas were Bakhchisarai, Sudak, Balaklava, Yalta and Alushta.²⁰¹

The second most important area of indigenization was to attract the Crimean Tatars to the work of the industrial enterprises. The political component of indigenization in the industry was a priority. The doctrinal position was the formation of the Crimean Tatar national proletariat. The Bolshevik ideology was focused on urban industrial workers.²⁰² But the social composition of the Crimean Tatars was peasants, whose main interest was the agrarian reform. In a review of "Work of the Party Organization Regarding Indigenization of the Party, Government, Professional and Co-operative Apparatus," it is noted that "one of the specific problems of a practical

¹⁹⁹ Кондратюк 2011: 31.

²⁰⁰ Кондратюк 2011: 31.

²⁰¹ Кондратюк 2011: 32.

²⁰² Кондратюк 2010: 165 - 171.

national policy is the involvement of the Tatars into the industry, creating a layer of Tatar proletariat".²⁰³

On March 1, 1929, the decision of the CEC Crimean Autonomous Republic of indigenization in the industry noted that "the Soviet government took a decisive course for the industry from the imposition of sources of raw materials and the creation of cadres of the proletariat of the indigenous suburbs, as the most important measure needed to strengthen the social base of the Soviets." In the decree "On the Control Figures of the National Economy of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1932", it is noted that in 1929, in the industry, there were 610 employees of the Crimean Tatars; there were 1912 employees in 1930 and already 6394 in 1932. Indigenization in the industry is not confined to involvement in the production of additional workers, and had to realize political objectives.²⁰⁴²⁰⁵

The third direction of the national policy in the Crimea was the agrarian reform. The Crimean Tatars were peasants. According to the Soviet census, in December 1926, in the Crimean Autonomous Republic, 179094 Crimean Tatars lived. Of these, 143752 were rural residents and only 35342 were the city dwellers. Therefore, the redistribution of land affected the interests of a large part of the Crimean Tatars. Land reform, as part of national policy, involves an intra-settlement and inter-settlement land. The former meant that within a small radius, land use was ordered. Inter-settlement land management implied the eviction of the Crimean Tatars from the Southern coast in the steppe regions. However, land reform was also a specific component. The agrarian reform involves the allocation of the land to the Crimean Tatars, re-emigrants from abroad. In October 1925, the initiative group asked for the establishment of the organization on the re-emigration and resettlement of the Crimean Tatars *ORK* (Koch Yardymi). The charter envisaged the general objectives as "in every possible way to help them and their descendants to settle back in the

²⁰³ Кондратюк 2010: 166.

²⁰⁴ Андропова, И. Ф. (2001). Архивные документы о крымской земельной реформе конца 1920-х годов. *Культура народов Причерноморья*. (17): 107-110.

²⁰⁵ Кондратюк 2011: 32.

Crimea as well as to support them in future; facilitate the resettlement of landless and land-poor Tatars".²⁰⁶

National Education Policies in the Crimea. Basic, fundamental issue of the Government of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic since the early days of its existence was the preparation of the national cadres. It was carried out through the school system; vocational, specialized secondary and higher education; training and the retraining of national staff. By the beginning of 1930, there were 15 schools with 9-year education system, 36 schools with the 7-year system, 8 secondary schools and 16 schools of agricultural youth with instruction in the national languages. In professional technical schools, an enrollment of total 23.6% of Tatars, 8.6% of Ukrainians, 6.6% of Jewish, 3.2% of Greeks, 1.6% of Bulgarians, 1.2% of German and 1.2% of Armenians was recorded. Among the students of the technical schools, Tatars were 22.9%, 20.2% constituted Jews, Ukrainians amounted for 3.9%, 1.7% were Armenians, Greeks constituted 1.6%. In Soviet Party Schools, Tatars accomplished 44.1%, 7% of the students were Germans, 6.3% belonged to Ukrainians, 6.6% were Jews.²⁰⁷ In the 1929-1930 academic year, the government operated 65 courses for a period of 10 days to 1 year for national workers that involved 5167 people. By the beginning of 1930, the process of eliminating illiteracy in autonomy intensified. Training of the uneducated covered 13000 people; in the rural area it was 12000 people, while the share of the Tatars was 27.3%.²⁰⁸

The analysis shows that there was a quite difficult process of staffing universities with the students, especially among the Tatar youth. In the 1931-1932 academic year, the government operated 3 institutes (pedagogical, agricultural, medical), 1 Komvuz and 1 post-graduate institute operated. They had an enrollment of 1265 students, including 438 Tatars (34.6%), 174 Jewish (13.7%), 79 the Ukrainian population (6.2%).²⁰⁹ Government annually funded political education of the minorities in the

²⁰⁶ Кондратюк 2011: 33.

²⁰⁷ Пащенко 2005: 36.

²⁰⁸ Пащенко 2005: 36.

²⁰⁹ Пащенко 2005: 36 - 37.

region on a large scale. Thus, for the 6 national libraries (4 of them were Tatar, Jewish and Armenian) 16.9 thousand rubles was allocated in the 1929-1930 financial year; 57 village reading rooms (51 Tatar, 2 Greek, 3 German and Jewish respectively) received 63.4 thousand rubles; 24 clubs were granted 42.4 thousand rubles; Eastern Museum received 6 thousand rubles; Bakhchisarai Museum got 1.1 thousand rubles.²¹⁰

At the beginning of the 1930s, 38 newspapers and magazines, including Tatar, Jewish and German, were published. All of them were practically subsidized. In 1934, 39 titles of newspapers and magazines were published, as well as 30 kinds of newspapers and political departments of the motor-tractor stations, 13 political departments of state farms.²¹¹ By 1941, in the Crimea, there were 5 high schools (pedagogical institutes in Simferopol and Feodosia, agricultural, medical, teacher institutes) with a total of 2900 students, 41 colleges, 6 theaters, 25 museums, 1263 schools with a total of 191 thousand students. Besides, 450 reading rooms, 117 libraries, 641 film projectors, 28 telephone stations, 150 radio centers, 60 thousand radio sets operated in the region.²¹² Apart from language, education and culture, religious affairs also received impetus from the Soviet government despite the atheism of the Marxism - Leninism. The controversy of this process is discussed in the next section.

3.3.4. Religious Affairs

On the one hand, the Bolsheviks sought to present themselves as the rescuers of Muslims from the national-religious oppression. But on the other hand, the Bolshevik doctrine sought to take the place of religion to minimize the role of Islam in the life of the Crimean Tatars and educate a new generation of youth - conscious Komsomol members. As a compromise, the Central Commission for Religious Affairs under the

²¹⁰ Пашеня 2005: 37.

²¹¹ Пашеня 2005: 37; Змерзлый, Б. В. (2006). Издание районных газет на крымскотатарском языке в Крымской АССР. *Культура народов Причерноморья*, 81: 89.

²¹² Пашеня 2005: 37.

Central Executive Committee of the Crimean Autonomous Republic authorized to teach the basics of doctrine, but only to boys of 14 years and only at mosques. In February 1926, the Central Commission for Religious Affairs asked the representatives of the II Congress of the Muslims to demand for some changes in the order of the teaching doctrine. The Commission gave a positive review and decided to leave the final decision of the Church Commission of the Crimean Regional Committee of the CPSU(B). The regional tables on the cult under the district executive committee sought to establish control over the clergy, to monitor the level of religious sentiment among the population.²¹³

The information report "State of the Religious Movement in Crimea" characterizes the event in 1927. Particular attention is paid to the processes taking place in the environment of the Crimean Tatars:

The Muslim clergy inside is divided into two orientations: regressionist and progressivist. The first is more reactionary and anti-Soviet ... The second is more loyal to the Soviet power and shared the education of the youth in Soviet-style, as well as education of the village.²¹⁴

Mid-1920s were marked with the weakening of the negative impact of the state. One reason is that under the indigenization policy Bolsheviks did not stimulate discontent and resistance on the part of the Crimean Tatars. In 1928, in the Crimea, there were 495 mosques, 546 priests and 7 Koranic schools.²¹⁵ At the same time, in the end of the 1920s, the anti-religious activities were carried out in various forms. It was a lecture in some cases. However, the most firm form of the anti-religious activity was the closure of mosques. The Bolshevik authorities tried to present the situation in a way that members of the Muslim communities themselves abandoned the idea of building mosques. But beneath the surface, the tax mechanism, the complexity of

²¹³ Белоглазов Р. Н. (2016). Нормативно-правовая база функционирования мусульманских конфессиональных школ в Крымской АССР в 1920-е годы. *Достижения науки и образования* 5(6): 30.

²¹⁴ Кондратюк 2012: 142.

²¹⁵ Кондратюк 2012: 142.

procedures for periodic re-registration was utilized by the Bolshevik authorities in order to put the community into a dead end. One such act was the complete elimination of the sphere of the religious education of the Muslims. So, on July 20, 1928 CEC issued a circular "On the Abolition of the Rights of Teaching Muslim Faith in the Mosques". This document assumed that the instruction, regulated the organization of denominational schools, was cancelled; the permission to conduct classes was cancelled.²¹⁶ No less important kind of anti-religious activities, aimed to reduce the role and importance of Islam in the lives of the Crimean Tatars, became the ideological work. This type of work was carried out by clubs and reading rooms.²¹⁷

In the academic and intellectual discourse on the Crimean Tatars, particular attention is paid to the deportation. While it is discussed in the upcoming section, it is also crucial to examine the interethnic relations in the Crimea before 1944.

3.3.5. Interethnic relations in the Crimea before the WWII.

In opinion of the Crimean scholar Pashenya, the starting point of solving the problem of nation-building in the 1930s was the adoption of the first five-year plan of indigenization of the state apparatus in the Crimea on 25 July, 1929. It was to be inseparable part of the 1st Five-Year Economic Development Plan of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, and solved the problem of the nation-state and social-economic development of the region. It designed the reduction, but in practice it has led to an increase of the apparatus by 9%. It envisaged the reduction of the Russian officials by 11.95%, Ukrainians by 1.7%, while the growth of the Tatar representatives in the apparatus - by 10.5%, of Germans - by 1.6%.²¹⁸

The study showed that the issue of *tatarization* was taken under the tight control, with clearly defined certain positions, which could be held only by the national

²¹⁶ Белоглазов 2016: 31.

²¹⁷ Кондратюк 2012: 143.

²¹⁸ Пащенко 2004а: 88.

minorities, primarily Tatars. In the Crimean CPC, the number of posts, which were held by the Russians reduced from 10, in 1931, to 5, in 1932, i.e., twice, and the number of persons of Tatar nationality in the same period increased from 5 to 12, despite the fact that on 1 January, 1930, Russians accounted for 41.9% of the population, and the Tatars 25.3%.²¹⁹

Analysis of the documents shows that, in parallel with the course of the development of national minorities in the nation-state and cultural spheres there was a process folding it, primarily in the economic sphere. On 15 September, 1931, Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Crimean ASSR adopted a resolution "On the Procedure of Liquidation of the *Natsmenobschestv* (communities of national minorities) of the Crimea." It provided the elimination of the private national local industry and transferring it to the Industrial Cooperation program. The study showed that if the first five-year plan of the socio-economic development was fulfilled ahead of schedule, the implementation of the five-year plan for autonomy fell through indigenization. It could be explained by both objective and subjective reasons, including a lack of the trained national cadres, social and economic problems of the most of the national minorities, inhibition of the old cadres, and others. In these circumstances, the leadership introduced new steps to promote solutions of the administrative problems.²²⁰ Resolution of 1932 organized the Department on National minorities. It acted to involve national minorities into the industry and trade cooperation, to create independent cooperatives, to involve gypsies into the agriculture, to involve national minorities in the unit for national development, to organize and strengthen economically the national collective farms and others.²²¹

An important point in the life of the Crimean Tatars was the transition from the Arabic alphabet to Latin. The complexity of solving the problem was as it follows: 38.8% of the adult population was trained earlier in the Arabic alphabet. Number of teachers among Tatars, Karaims and Krymchaks was only 700. There were only 40

²¹⁹ Пащенко 2004а: 88.

²²⁰ Пащенко 2004а: 89.

²²¹ Пащенко 2004а: 89.

typewriters in the Crimean Tatar language, of them new - 4. Not completing a reform of the Tatar language, the Soviet government went to its second phase. Resolution of the People's Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR of 22 June, 1938, announced the transition from Latin to Cyrillic. It changes not only the alphabet but people's worldview. Once again, the problems of retraining teachers, publication of new textbooks arose. Earlier, on June 20, 1938, the Bureau of the Crimean Regional Committee of the CPSU(B) decided to use Cyrillic in the Crimean Tatar language. Furthermore, on June 4, 1937, IX Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of the CASSR adopted the second constitution. Article 90 enshrined equality of citizens regardless of their nationality or race in all spheres of economic, cultural and political life. The Constitution changed the structure of the supreme bodies of state authority and management in the autonomy.²²²

Thus, article 19 declared the supreme legislative authority, public authorities - Supreme Council. Article 38 asserted the supreme executive and administrative organ of the state power in the Crimean ASSR Council of People's Commissars (CPC). Changes appeared not only in the structure of the supreme bodies, but also in its policies, including the national question. Upon recommendation of the CEC, Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Crimean ASSR adopted a top secret decision in 1938 to liquidate nineteen national village councils, and reorganize 11 national village councils into regular, as well as to eliminate 13 created and small rural councils.²²³

In opinion of the Crimean scholar, Professor Oleg Romanko, 'loyalty crisis' of the Crimean Tatar population in autumn 1941 that resulted in collaboration with the Germans had objective reasons. Firstly, according to the researcher, this crisis was associated with the peculiarities of the socio-political development of the pre-war Soviet Union. Thus, for instance, the policy of indigenization was implemented in the Crimea through the administrative methods. Moreover, the sheer superficiality of

²²² Пащенко 2004а: 92.

²²³ Пащенко 2004а: 92.

some of its measures did not promote smoothing inter-ethnic relations on the peninsula, more than ever exacerbated during the Civil War, but rather only led to escalation.²²⁴

In 1928, the indigenization and tatarization policies came to an end. In political life, it was marked by the trial of the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Crimean Autonomous Republic V. Ibrahimov and the actual removal of the Crimean Tatars from the Office of the Republic. In the social and cultural sphere, it was marked by the reprisals against the 'Tatar bourgeois nationalists'. All this, naturally, could not but cause irritation in the Tatar intelligentsia and the Tatar officials. The subsequent collectivization only reinforced these sentiments, in the broader layers of the Crimean Tatar population.²²⁵ Moreover, the first decade of the Soviet power, the Bolsheviks in the Crimea were quite easy on the Muslim religion. Of course, atheistic propaganda, with all its attendant moments, was conducted continuously. Still, this relationship was not such as to Orthodoxy, put, in fact, illegal. With the curtailment policy of indigenization, the peaceful coexistence of Islam and the Soviet regime ended: atheist propaganda became more aggressive, selected places of worship were destroyed, and the priests were arrested.

Soviet scholar Semiryaga considers that collaboration of the Soviet citizens was born from not so much sympathy for fascist ideology and Hitler's Germany, as those of socio-economic and national conditions in the Soviet Union, which was created by Stalin's regime. It is not excluded, of course, ambitions and careerist motives, as well as psychological reasons: fear of the fierce cruelty of the Nazis, the desire to protect and save their families, survive unthinkable harsh conditions of occupation. He believes that this is precisely the specificity of collaboration in the Soviet Union, in contrast to its appearance in other European countries, where the proportion of the population supported the Nazi slogans on their 'racial howling proximity' (Denmark,

²²⁴ Романько, О. (2015). Крым в период немецкой оккупации. Национальные отношения, коллаборационизм и партизанское движение. 1941-1944. Litres: 19.

²²⁵ Пащенко, В. Н. (2004b). К решению татарского вопроса в национально-государственном строительстве Автономной Крымской ССР в 1920-х гг. *Ученые записки Таврического национального университета имени В.И.Вернадского. Серия "История"*. 17(56): 11.

Norway), of the 'new Europe' and some other.²²⁶ In his turn, Russian expert on collaboration during the WWI and WWII, professor of the Kazan' University Giliyazov, with the reference to Mühlen, argues that there was a nationalist factor. Such a liberation nationalism was not only a product of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy, but also the previous policy of '*russification*' that goes back to the period of the *Christianization* of the Russian Empire.²²⁷

The World War II brought numerous changes to the Crimea including famine, deportation of many ethnic groups, and deprivation of the autonomous status. These shaped the region ethnic composition and the oblast' status till the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

3.4. Developments in the Region during the World War II, 1941- 1945

The World War II appeared to be a serious litmus paper of the Soviet regime. Despite the support of the national education and culture, the Bolsheviks decided to prevent possible collaboration of the Crimeans with the Germans.

3.4.1. Ethnic Cleanings as a Preventive Measure

The most significant changes in the region occurred in the 1940s. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 revealed the problems of the inter-ethnic relations that have been accumulated. The result was a massive collaboration of some ethnic groups with the Nazi.

During the war, Soviet authorities decided to take the work of the Crimean Tatars more seriously; this resulted in the Decision of the Crimean regional committee of 18 November, 1942 "On the Errors Made in Assessing the Behavior of the Crimean Tatars in Relation to the Partisans, on Measures to Eliminate These

²²⁶ Семиряга, М. И. (1996). Военнопленные, коллаборационисты и генерал Власов. *Другая война, 1939 - 1945*. Москва: 322.

²²⁷ Гилязов, И. (2000). Коллаборационизм тюрко-мусульманских народов СССР в годы Второй мировой войны—форма проявления национализма?. *Ab Imperio*, 2000 (1): 166.

Errors and More Political Work among the Tatar Population." Its main thesis was that the majority of the Crimean Tatars remained the 'Soviet patriots', only corresponding feelings should have been awakened. Collaborators were offered the possibility of the redemption of their guilt. Such position, although it was overly optimistic assessment of the situation, was strategically correct, as was the only option that allowed building relations with the Crimean Tatars from scratch. And this strategy gave the results in the second half of 1943. Nevertheless, the majority of the Crimean Tatars' military forces continued to fight against the Soviet troops and partisans until the end of the war.²²⁸

In May 1944, the deportation of the Crimean Tatars began. They were followed by the Crimean Greeks, Armenians and the Crimean Bulgarians that were forcibly removed from the peninsula (in 1941 and 1942 Germans and Italians left the Crimea). On June 30, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was canceled and converted into the Crimean Oblast'.²²⁹ The document officially explained the reasons for this decision: the lack of counteraction of the representatives of individual nations to the Nazi occupation forces and their supporters. Three years later, Sevastopol was removed from the field and was granted the status of the city of the particular subordination - in connection with the special strategic importance of the fleet.

²²⁸ Сосновский, Д. В. (2014). *Процессы формирования региональной идентичности в Крыму в контексте поляризации украинского общества* (Doctoral dissertation, Московский Государственный Университет имени М.В. Ломоносова): 54. Retrieved from http://polit.msu.ru/pub/DISS_accept/Sosnovsky_2014_CD.pdf

²²⁹ Мандельштам, Ю. И. (Ed.) (1956). *Сборник законов СССР и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР, 1938-1958 гг.* Москва: Госюриздат: 46. Retrieved from https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B0:Sbornik_zakonov_1938-1956.djvu/79

3.4.2. 1944 Stalin's Deportation Decree and the Change of the Status of the Crimea in 1945

On the eve of the World War II, on the territory of the Crimean Autonomous Republic 1126529 people lived. National composition of the population is presented in the table

Table 1. National composition of the Crimean population according to 1939 census²³⁰

Ethnic affiliation	Number of citizens (1939 census)	% of the whole population
Russians	558481	49.5
Crimean Tatars	218879	19.4
Ukrainians	154123	13.7
Jews	65452	5.8
Germans	51299	4.6
Greeks	20652	1.8
Bulgarians	15344	1.4
Armenians	12923	1.1
Others	29276	2.7

In accordance with the 1935 zoning, area dominated by certain ethnic groups was transferred into separate administrative units. For example, in Alushta, Balaklava, Bakhchisarai, Karasubazarsk, Kuibyshev, Sudak, Yalta districts, most of the population were the Crimean Tatars. In Biyuk-Onlar and Telman - Germans prevailed; in Larindorf and Fraydorf districts mostly Jews were residing. The structure of 25 districts included 441 local government units (village council),

²³⁰ Габриелян 2000: 26.

including 177 Tatar, 130 Russian, 40 German, 32 Jewish and 72 Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian and others.²³¹

Soon after the war began, on August 14, 1941, a directive of the Supreme Command, in which troops formed in the Crimea 51th Army was ordered to "clean the peninsula up from the locals, Germans and other anti-Soviet elements immediately" was issued. In fact, an entire ethnic group was to be deported on the basis of the threat of possible cooperation with the Soviet Germans occupiers. Operation to evict the Germans from the Crimea began on August 18, 1941, and was completed in three weeks. To the North Caucasus and the Stavropol region more than 61 thousand were removed, including 50.2 thousand Germans and other nationalities of members of their families.²³² In late autumn, the Crimean Germans were transported to Kazakhstan, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Altai region and some other regions of the Urals and Siberia. In April 1944, during the liberation of the Crimea, 2230 citizens of German nationality, and more than 1.5 thousand of Austrians, Romanians, Hungarians, Italians were additionally identified and sent to the Omsk region. Simultaneously, preparations were made for the upcoming expulsion of the Crimean Tatars and Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks. In an order dated April 13, 1944, signed by Beria, the task was as soon as possible "to clean the territory of the Crimea from the agents of the German and Romanian intelligence services, traitors and betrayers, active supporters and surrogates fascist invaders, members of anti-Soviet organizations, gangs and other anti-Soviet elements."²³³

NKVD (National Commissariat on Internal Affairs) received direct instructions to find confirmation of mass betrayal among the Crimean Tatars. A month later, Beria informed Stalin that, during the war, thousands of the Crimean Tatars went to work for the Germans and fought against the Red Army. In this regard, the People's Commissar of the NKVD took a decision on eviction of the Crimean Tatars from the

²³¹ Пашеня 2004: 91.

²³² Бердинских, И. В. (2006). Депортации народов СССР в годы Великой Отечественной войны. *Вестник Вятского государственного гуманитарного университета*, (15):141.

²³³ Бердинских 2006: 141.

Crimea. On May 11, 1944, Stalin signed the relevant decree of the State Committee of Defense. More than 20 thousand internal troops and 5 thousand NKVD soldiers stood out for the campaign. Government created a special commission for the organization of the reception and registration of houses, property and livestock left by migrants.²³⁴

The deportation of the Crimean Tatars began on 18 May, which has become a national day of mourning, and ended the evening on May, 20. 60 hours required for its implementation. From the Crimea, 71 echelons exported 187859 people. In addition, about five thousand Crimean Tatars were directed at the disposal of the trust *Moskovugol* to work in the mines and peat development. About 70% of immigrants were sent to special settlements in the Uzbek SSR, and the rest of them were sent to Mari ASSR, Gorky, Sverdlovsk, and Kostroma Oblast' of the RSFSR. The bulk of the deportees were old men, women and children. Edge had issued a special order of dismissal of the Crimean Tatars from the army. They also were sent to the special settlements. Taking into account the total number of the ex-servicemen, the number of the deported Crimean Tatars exceeded 200 thousand.²³⁵

The fate of the Crimean Tatars soon was shared by the Armenians, Bulgarians and Greeks. Their eviction from the Crimea began on June 24, 1944. 11296 Armenians, 12420 Bulgarians and 14368 Greeks underwent deportation to Kazakhstan, the Ural Mountains and Siberia. Along with them, living in the Crimea Kurds, Roma, Turks were sent to the special settlements. During the war, in the Crimea more than 300 thousand residents were deported. Deportation was the reason for the elimination of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, transforming it into one of the regions of the RSFSR and the renaming of most settlements and administrative units.²³⁶

In summer 1944, at the time of arrival to the destination region, 228392 people were considered as deported from the Crimea. Employable special settlers immediately

²³⁴ Бердинских 2006: 141.

²³⁵ Габриелян 2000: 28 - 29.

²³⁶ Габриелян 2000: 29.

started working on the next enterprises, collective and state farms. Living and working conditions in the field expulsion were extremely heavy. Due to the constant malnutrition, disease, unusual climate, in 1944 - 1948, 44887 people died. In the special settlements, a special regime was introduced, which destroyed the traditional way of life, culture, limited intra contacts, freedom of movement, and so on. In 1948, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a decree, which established that the deportees are placed on special settlement forever. Escape from the place of dispatch had to be punished by 20 years of hard labor. By January 1953, in the areas of expulsion, there were 204698 deportees from the Crimea (without the Germans), including 165259 Crimean Tatars, 14760 Greeks, 12464 Bulgarians and 8570 Armenians. Most of them (133731 people) were living in Uzbekistan. In addition, 56821 deportees were resettled in the RSFSR, 7188 in Tajikistan and 6560 people in Kazakhstan.²³⁷

Proposals to mitigate the regime of the special settlers began to arrive after the death of Stalin. According to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in 1954, children under 16 years and young students were removed from the account in special settlements. In 1955, members of the CPSU, war veterans and the disabled were added to this group. Finally, special settlers from the Crimea were freed from administrative oversight in spring 1956, but since they have not removed the charges of treason and the ban on the return to the Crimea was not removed. For many years Soviet leadership under various pretexts obstructed every effort to their return home, although for most deportees of other nationalities such bans were lifted soon after the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.²³⁸

After the deportation of the Crimean Tatars from the Crimean peninsula, in 1945, the autonomous status was abolished and the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic became the oblast'. Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on 30 June, 1945, created the region. On June 25, 1946, the corresponding amendment was

²³⁷ Габриелян 2000: 29 - 30.

²³⁸ Габриелян 2000: 30.

made in the Article 14 of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1937.²³⁹ Issued on October 29, 1948, the Decree of the Presidium transformed Sevastopol into a separate administrative and economic center (city of republican subordination).²⁴⁰ However, the administrative changes continued in the 1950s.

3.5. 1954 changes, their implications and consequences

On February 19, 1954, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR in the USSR" was issued. It stated that

given the generality of the economy, the proximity and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean region and the Ukrainian SSR, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves: Approve the joint submission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the transfer of Crimean region of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.²⁴¹

In 1954, on the initiative of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev, who until 1949 was the head by the Communist Party in Ukraine, the Crimean region was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Subsequently dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada, the document was explained by the economic expediency.

²³⁹ Закон РСФСР "Об упразднении Чечено-Ингушской АССР и о преобразовании Крымской АССР в Крымскую область" (1946, 25 June). (РСФСР). Retrieved from https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B0:Сbornik_zakonov_1938-1956.djvu/79

²⁴⁰ Указ Президиума ВС РСФСР № 761/2 "О выделении города Севастополя в самостоятельный административно-хозяйственный центр" (1948, 29 October). (РСФСР). Retrieved from <http://sevkrimrus.narod.ru/ZAKON/sew48god.htm>

²⁴¹ Указ Президиума Верховного Совета СССР № 4 (798) "О передаче Крымской области из состава РСФСР в состав УССР" (1954, 9 March). (СССР). In Ю. И. Мандельштам (Ed.) (1956). *Сборник законов СССР и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР, 1938-1958 гг.* Москва: Госюриздат: 35. Retrieved from https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B0:Сbornik_zakonov_1938-1956.djvu/68

Some researchers note that the transfer took place with a number of serious violations of the law of the USSR, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.²⁴² Author of the book *Crimea: Law and Politics* Victor Vishnyakov, on the basis of the thorough examination of the All-Union and republican legislation, stresses that the bodies which took key decisions in this matter, - the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR - had no such authority. In addition, changes of the boundaries of the union republics required the holding of referenda in both Soviet republics. Vishnyakov also notes that the 'appropriateness' - especially when it came to the interests of the Russian Federation - also did not have to say - in connection with the finding in the region of defense complexes, cultural values, infrastructure, which had strong ties with RSFSR.²⁴³

As Kremnev admits, it is recognized that the transfer of the Crimea was implemented in contravention of the Union - republican legislation of the USSR and legally indisputable right to the Crimea Ukraine acquired with the entry into force of the Russian - Ukrainian agreement of 1997.²⁴⁴ Furthermore, Fedorov, in his study of the historic aspects of the legal status of the Crimea, insists on illegality of the act of transfer of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. Researcher stresses there is a question of compliance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of February 5, 1954, to the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council the Soviet Union from 19 February, 1954, "On the transfer of the Crimean region of the RSFSR to the USSR" of the then USSR Constitution of 1936 Constitution of the RSFSR and USSR. The transfer of the Crimean region was made on the joint recommendation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, approved by the Bureau of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on February 19, 1954. It was preceded by its approved

²⁴² Сосновский 2014: 50.

²⁴³ Сосновский 2014: 50.

²⁴⁴ Кремнев, П. П. (2004). К истории вопроса о государственной принадлежности Крыма. *Московский журнал международного права*, (4): 203 quoted in Усачева, О. С. (2008). К вопросу о государственной принадлежности Крыма. *Ученые записки Орловского государственного университета. Серия: Гуманитарные и социальные науки*, (1): 259.

Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and USSR, regarding transfer of the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1937 does not mention the power of the Presidium to decide questions of territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Article 16 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation contains a provision stating that the territory of the Russian Federation cannot be changed without the consent of the RSFSR.²⁴⁵

It is also important to mention the Canadian political scientist and historian of the Ukrainian origin Orest Subtelny. In his work on the history of Ukraine, he makes a point of view:

...However, the Crimean 'gift' was not at all an act of goodwill. First, since the peninsula was a historic homeland of the Crimean Tatars, the Russian had no moral right to give it, and Ukrainians - to accept it. Second, Crimea, was strongly attracted not to Russia but to Ukraine due to the territorial proximity and economic dependence on it...²⁴⁶

At the same time, Russian scholar Usacheva argues that the dissolution of the Soviet Union made put the end to the power of the legislation adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.²⁴⁷

Brovka, the researcher from the Belarus State University, claims that the decision on the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine was not a manifestation of 'voluntarism' of Khrushchev. According to him, there were serious economic and political reasons for the corresponding transformations. At the time, the Soviet Union embarked on a decentralization of economic management, the policy of rejection of excessive centralization, to empower the Union republics. Management of the national economy of the Crimean peninsula directly from Moscow became increasingly difficult, impacted geographic isolation of the Crimean region of the RSFSR. Decision on the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine was adopted at a meeting of the

²⁴⁵ Федоров, А. В. (1999). *Правовой статус Крыма. Правовой статус Севастополя*. Москва: Изд-во МГУ: 10, quoted in Усачева 2008: 259.

²⁴⁶ Субтельный, О. (1994). *Украина: история*. Киев: Либідь: 624.

²⁴⁷ Усачева 2008: 260.

Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, and according to the Constitution of the USSR and the Soviet Union republics, which was assigned the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this body de facto occupied a dominant position in the USSR.²⁴⁸ In 1966, the Constitution of the USSR has been recorded on Sevastopol as a city of republican subordination - unilaterally.²⁴⁹

3.6. Conclusion.

As it can be seen from the historical analysis of the region, the Crimea experienced the presence of the different ethnic groups and political powers on its territory. The geographic position as well as the ethnic composition and past developments can at least partially help to explain the contemporary events in the Crimea. Needless to say that the independent status (although *de-jure*) can be treated as an experience of the statehood. The autonomous status and the formation of the main state organs also contributed to the formation of the political forces that stood for the independence of the Crimea. The period of the Crimean Khanate should be treated as particularly important insofar as the Crimean Tatars managed to establish their power in the region, create a state that sustained for a long period of time. Besides, the proclamation of the republic by Kurultay in 1918 was also a step in the development of the Crimean Tatar history. This gave the contemporary Tatar community the precedent to demand securing their rights from the government. The Russian presence in the Crimea since 1783 determined the change in the ethnic structure of the population, as it was shown in the beginning of this chapter. The majority of Russians determined the political landscape and the voting mode later. Besides, the foundation of Sevastopol and the establishment of the Black Sea fleet base in there was one of the reasons of Russia's attachment to the Crimea.

²⁴⁸ Бровка, Ю. П. (2014). *Международно-правовые и конституционно-правовые основания передачи в 1954 г. Крымской области из РСФСР в Украинскую ССР* (Doctoral dissertation, Изд. центр БГУ): 99 - 100. Retrieved from http://elib.bsu.by/bitstream/123456789/107707/1/brovka2_BMW_2014.pdf

²⁴⁹ Сосновский 2014: 50 - 56.

Particular attention was paid to the Soviet period, insofar as it molded the region in the way it continued its existence till 1991. The deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic groups determined their underrepresentation in the independent Ukraine. The autonomous status, the Crimea proclaimed in 1992, was done with the reference to the early XX century documents, while its location within Ukraine was possible due to the Krushchev's decision. Consequently, the author finds it necessary to proceed with the discussion of the political, economic, and social dynamics in the post-1991 Crimea. As it is argued in this thesis, these processes are responsible for the outcome of the Ukrainian crisis.

CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CRIMEA IN 1991 - 2014

4.1. Introduction

The period after the dissolution of the USSR is crucial for understanding the events of March 2016. The lack of the centralized power led to the strengthening of the pro-Russian political forces. The referendum was used and the Crimea became a republic with its own president. The author starts with the analysis of the events of the early 1990s. The proclamation of the autonomous status, later, the introduction of the presidency institution were conducted in line with the pro-Russian speeches. The position of the Ukrainian president Kuchma and the Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 defined the borders of the Crimean autonomy and the relations between the region and Kyiv. The chapter also touches upon the political, economic issues and focuses on the ethnic structure and inter-ethnic relations. From the neoclassical realist viewpoint, the discussion of the domestic political actors and elites, the economy and resource mobilization, the nationalism and ideology are keys for the understanding the events of 2014 in the Crimea.

4.2. Development of the Governmental System of the Crimea after 1991

Before Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma forced Verkhovna Rada to adopt the Constitution, the Crimean Supreme Council proclaimed the autonomous status of the Crimea, and even managed to establish the post of the president of the Crimea. The pro-Russian sentiments were not the least in the early 1990s.

4.2.1. Autonomous Status and the Institution of Presidency in the Crimea

The institutional weakness of Ukraine and the dominance of the president in decision-making process created the conditions in which the Crimea's powers were limited. Despite the autonomous status, the Crimea was deprived of the right of the legislation, administrating its budget as well as the wide ownership rights. However, this was preceded by the conflict between the main governmental bodies of the region.

The first referendum in the Crimea was held on January 20, 1991. The decision to hold it was adopted on 12 November, 1990, during the extraordinary session of the Crimean regional Council of People's Deputies. The question was put: "Are you for the reconstruction of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a subject of the USSR and a member of the Union Treaty?" 1777841 Crimeans had the right to vote, 81% of them took part. 93.26% of the votes were positive. The vote was boycotted by most of the Crimean Tatars.²⁵⁰ On February 12, 1991, following the referendum, the law "On the Restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" within the Ukrainian SSR was adopted.²⁵¹ According to Article 2 of the law, the Crimean Oblast' Council of People's Deputies temporarily was recognized a supreme organ of the state power on the territory of the region. After Ukraine declared its independence, on September 4, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Crimea issued a Declaration of State Sovereignty, later the name *Autonomous Republic of Crimea* and its anthem were adopted.²⁵²

"Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Crimea" proclaimed the principle of the rule of law in the Republic of Crimea. At the same time, representatives of the Crimean moderate policy did not exclude the probability of holding a referendum in case if

²⁵⁰ История референдумов в Крыму. Досье. (2014, 13 марта). TASS. Retrieved from <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1043447>

²⁵¹ Law of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic "On the Restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialistic Republic", 1991. (Ukrainian SSR) Retrieved from <http://www.ndkt.org/zakon-pro-vosstanovlenie-krymskoy-avtonomnoy-sovetskoy-sotsialisticheskoy-respubliki.html>

²⁵² *Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Crimea, Supreme Council of Crimea, 1991.* (Republic of Crimea). Retrieved from <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/krym/show/rb001d002-91?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYA4.ZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8Ie6>

Ukraine fails to establish good relations with Russia and other CIS countries. According to the survey, in 1991, 69% of the population of the Crimea supported joining Russia and 41% positively evaluated the idea of independence.²⁵³ 8% of respondents voted for the preservation of the status of the republic within Ukraine. During the national referendum on independence of Ukraine, in a number of areas of the peninsula turnout was below 50%, people tend to emphasize their indifference to Ukrainian affairs.

The delimitation of powers between center and the regions was provided by the Law of Ukraine "On the Delineation of Powers between Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea". However, on 29 April, 1992, the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine "On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea", which ignored all the reached agreements, and empowered the Crimean authorities with the region state administration powers only.²⁵⁴ As a response, on May 5, 1992, the Supreme Council of Crimea adopted the Act on the Proclamation of the State Independence,²⁵⁵ and, on May 6, - Constitution of the Republic of Crimea. According to Article 1 of the Constitution, the Republic of the Crimea is the legal, democratic, secular state within Ukraine.²⁵⁶ The Constitution enshrined democratic government based on the will of the people of the Crimea, through the election. The principle of power of the people as a fundamental principle of the state system had determined all other principles of organization and operation of public authorities: the division of powers into the legislative, executive, and judicial (Article 102); legality and responsibility; supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the Republic, and others set forth in the adopted Constitution (electoral system, the formation of the government, and others). On the basis of what was said above, one can conclude

²⁵³ Токарев, А. А. (2015). Электоральная история постсоветского Крыма: от УССР до России. *Вестник МГИМО-Университета*. 5(44): 34.

²⁵⁴ Мандрыка, Е. В. (2003). Эволюция процесса конституционно-правовых норм, регламентирующих статус Автономной Республики Крым (Украина). *Вестник СевНТУ, Серия "Политология"*, 50: 182.

²⁵⁵ *Act of the Declaration of the State Independence of the Republic of Crimea, 1992*. (Republic of Crimea). Retrieved from <http://sevkrimrus.narod.ru/ZAKON/1992ref.htm>

²⁵⁶ *Constitution of Crimea. 1992*. Retrieved from <http://sevkrimrus.narod.ru/ZAKON/1992konst.htm>

that with the adoption of the Constitution of May 6, 1992, the Crimea regained its statehood.²⁵⁷

However, Kyiv never abandoned its desire to control the region. Thus, in December 1992, the position of the Representative of President of Ukraine in the Republic of Crimea was introduced. This body of the central executive authorities was designed in order to protect the interests of the center in the Republic to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, President of Ukraine to submit to the Supreme Council and the Government of the Crimea. The Supreme Council of the Crimea took this move negatively, but could not prevent it.²⁵⁸ At the same time, contradictions between the ARC and Ukraine aggravated. Nevertheless, in June 1993, on the basis of the proposals of the Supreme Council of the Crimea, the Law of Ukraine "On the Delineation of Powers Between the State Authorities of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea" President of Ukraine issued a decree "On the Mode of an Open Economy in the Republic of Crimea" that stimulated, in its turn, the adoption of the package of economic laws by the Supreme Council of the Crimea.²⁵⁹ The law "On the Delineation of Powers Between the State Authorities of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea" provided a wide range of powers in the sphere of state administration, economic sphere, as well as in others. Under the Law, the Crimea received the highest legislative and executive authorities, the authority to establish and form the judiciary as a whole, provided the ownership of the Republic of Crimea on its land and natural resources. According to the Law, laws adopted within the framework of the mentioned legislation operated on the territory of the Republic.²⁶⁰

Later, it became clear that Ukraine would strengthen and other levers of influence in the Crimea.. On May 18, 1994, President of Ukraine issued a decree that reorganized

²⁵⁷ Мандрыка 2003: 182.

²⁵⁸ Габриелян 2000: 20.

²⁵⁹ Decree "On the Establishment of the Open Economy Mode on the Territory of Crimea". 1993. (Republic of Crimea). Retrieved from <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/krym/show/rb0333002-93>

²⁶⁰ Law of Ukraine "On the Delineation of Powers Between the State Authorities of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea". 1992. (Ukraine). Retrieved from <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/krym/show/rb0022002-92?test=dCCMfOm7xBWMYA4EZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8le6>

the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Crimea into the General Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the Crimea. It was confirmed by the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on June 28, 1994, and output the police from the jurisdiction of the Government of the Crimea and subjected them to the General Directorate of Internal Affairs. The Supreme Council of the Crimea was actively expressing their protests by recognizing these laws null and void, and declaring them as undermining the statehood of the Crimea. But the Ukrainian authorities were firm in their decision. Subsequently, two more institutions were established - General Directorate of Justice of the Ministry of Justice and the General Directorate of the Security Services of Ukraine in Crimea. Chiefs of these Directorates were appointed in Kiev without the consent of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea. The financial interests of Ukraine in the Crimea began to be represented by the State Tax Administration, and then by the Office of the State Treasury.²⁶¹ Later, the institution of presidency was established and the first and the only Crimean president was elected.

4.2.2. Institution of Presidency in the Crimea

Important to note that the given law did not regulate the issues of relations between Kyiv and the Crimea. In 1993, the Crimean Supreme Soviet adopted the Law "On Elections of the Supreme Council" and "On the Election of the President of the Republic of Crimea",²⁶² adding later the provisions about the elections according to the single-member constituencies. In January 1994, the first President of the Republic of Crimea Yuriy Meshkov was elected. Having won the elections with the program of the restoration of the unity with Russia as the desired goal of the majority of the population - Russian, Yuriy Meshkov subsequently did not implement any point of his program. With the election of the President, contradictions between Ukraine and Crimea aggravated. Besides, conflict between the President and the

²⁶¹ Габриелян 2000: 20.

²⁶² *Law of the Republic of Crimea "On the Election of the President of Crimea", Supreme Council of Crimea. 1993.* (Ukraine). Retrieved from <http://sevkrimrus.narod.ru/ZAKON/preziden.htm>

Supreme Council of Crimea became escalating.²⁶³ In May 1994, the Supreme Council of Crimea takes the decision to restore the Constitution of the Republic, as amended on May 6, 1992. From that moment, prolonged conflict between the Republic and the center on the one hand, the President of Crimea and the Supreme Council, on the other hand, started. The result of this confrontation was the adoption of the Decree of the President of Crimea in September 1994 titled "About the Bodies of Public Administration in the Republic of the Crimea during the Preparation and Conduct of the Referendum on the Draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea", which actually suspended the activities of the Supreme Council of Crimea and local authorities. This factor had a negative impact, as promoted degradation of the system of public administration in the Republic, and discredited the very idea of autonomy.²⁶⁴

In March 1995, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, after consideration of the political and legal situation in the Republic, abolished the Constitution of the Crimea, and the majority of its legal acts as contradictory to the Ukrainian legislation, and adopted the Law "On the Autonomous Republic of Crimea"²⁶⁵ by repealing the law "On the Delineation of Powers Between the Organs of the State Power of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea". Supreme Council of the ARC demanded preparation of the new constitution, which was adopted in November 1995. It was based on the concept of the sovereign state of the Crimea as part of Ukraine, which was the cause of new exacerbations in relations of the center and the region.²⁶⁶ The tensions between Simferopol and Kyiv as well as between branches of the Crimean power were solved by Leonid Kuchma and the first Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in June 1996.

²⁶³ Мандрыка 2003: 183.

²⁶⁴ Мандрыка 2003: 183.

²⁶⁵ *Law of Ukraine "On the Abolishment of the Constitution and the State Acts of the Republic of Crimea". 1995.* Retrieved from <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/92/95-%D0%B2%D1%80>

²⁶⁶ Мандрыка 2003: 183.

4.2.3. 1996 Constitution of Ukraine. Provisions on the Status of the Crimea

The 1996 Constitution of Ukraine continued the restriction of powers of the ARC. The decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of December 10, 1997, declared the need to submit the ARC Constitution for approval to Verkhovna Rada. As a result, legislative and budget powers, as well the ownership right of the ARC, granted in accordance with the Law "On the Delineation of Powers..." were lost.²⁶⁷ It should also be noted that 131 of the 136 articles of the Constitution of the ARC appeared to be contradicting to the Constitution of Ukraine. In October 1998, the Supreme Council of Crimea adopted the third, since 1992, Constitution of the ARC. Crimea was specified as a composite integral part of Ukraine.²⁶⁸ Ukrainian, Russian and the Crimean Tatar language were declared the official languages of the ARC.²⁶⁹ Only 2 years after the adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea issued its main document.

4.2.4. 1998 Constitution of Crimea

On October 21, 1998, the second Constitution of the Crimean Republic was adopted. This constitution changed the status of the Crimean government. According to Article 1, Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine. The *Verkhovna Rada* of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is the representative body; it realizes representative, normative, control functions and powers within the limits of its competence. The Council of Ministers is the executive body; it implements executive functions and powers within the limits of its competence. In accordance with the Articles 10, 11, 12 of the Constitution 1998, use and protection of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and languages of other nationalities are provided along with the state

²⁶⁷ Гарчева, Л. П., & Никифорова Н. (2012). Особенности правового статуса Республики Крым как территориальной автономии. *Ekonomika Kryma*, 2(39): 271.

²⁶⁸ *Constitution of the Autonomous Republic Crimea. 1998*, Art. 1. Retrieved from http://www.rada.crimea.ua/constitution/soder_constit.html

²⁶⁹ *Constitution of Crimea. 1998*. Ch. 3.

language.²⁷⁰ In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Russian language, as the language of the majority of people and as acceptable language to the interethnic communication, is to be used in all spheres of public life²⁷¹.

4.2.5. Issue of Referendum

The 1998 Constitution of the ARC grants greater powers in all spheres of political, social and cultural life in comparison with the other regions of Ukraine. This has affected the legal status of the local representative bodies. Thus, if the regional councils of Ukraine do not have their executive bodies and delegate own powers to fulfill to their regional administrations, the ARC has its own executive body - the Council of Ministers, which "independently carries out executive functions and powers on matters within the jurisdiction of the ARC ... ". However, there is no clear division of powers between the center and the Crimea, therefore the contradictions regularly arose that prevented the development of their relationship. Formed by the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC, Council of Ministers "also served as the state executive functions and powers delegated by the laws of Ukraine in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine." To fulfill these state functions and powers the Crimean autonomy received financial and material resources as well as the state property.²⁷²

It is noteworthy that when the Crimean crisis arose, the Ukrainian legislation lacked legal provisions concerning the referendum on the status of the territory of Ukraine. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, issues concerning the territory of the country are resolved exclusively by the national referendum (Article 73). Given the unitary state system, all issues related to the organization and procedure of the elections and referenda are determined solely by the laws of Ukraine. Moreover, according to Ukrainian legislation, the issues of the dissolution of the parliament of the ARC, as well as the compliance of the documents adopted by the Crimean

²⁷⁰ Constitution of Crimea. 1998. Art.10, 11, 12.

²⁷¹ Language issue will be analyzed in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

²⁷² Constitution of Crimea. 1998. Art. 35, 36, 37, 38.

Parliament with the Constitution of Ukraine is related to the exclusive authority of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.²⁷³ According to these provisions, the referendum conducted by the ARC on 16 March, 2014, was illegal.

However, according to the Article 18 of the 1998 Constitution of Crimea, it has the right to appoint and conduct the referendum on the issues, related to the ARC. The referendum is to be appointed by the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC.²⁷⁴ It is noteworthy that, after the 2010 elections to the Crimean parliament, the pro-Russian Party of Regions which stood for the status of the Russian language as an official in Ukraine and closer relations with the Customs Union and the CIS, got 80 sits in the parliament out of 100, and received the control over the agenda. This made it possible to appoint the referendum and declare the independence using the political crisis in Ukraine and change of the central government. Given the 70% of the Crimean population is Russian; the question on the unification with Russia was supported univocally.

To conclude, the lack of the legal provisions in Ukrainian legislation as to the conduct of the referenda, as well as the lack of the delineation of powers between Kyiv and the ARC made it possible for the Crimean parliament to appoint the referendum on its status. The ethnic composition of the region's population that determined the composition of the republican parliament also defined the result of the referendum. Finally, the political and economic crisis in Ukraine, as well as the weakness of the government created the conditions for the referendum. The discussion of the state-building policies in the Crimea would be incomplete without the reference to the social and demographic characteristics of the Crimea.

²⁷³ *Constitution of Ukraine. 1996. Art. 73.*

²⁷⁴ *Constitution of Crimea. 1998. Art.18.*

4.3. Social and Demographic Characteristics of the Region

4.3.1. General Overview of the Ethnic Composition and Regional Identities in the Crimea

According to 2001 all-Ukrainian census, the ethnic composition of the region included 58.5% of Russians, 24.4% of Ukrainians and 12.1% of the Crimean Tatars.²⁷⁵ According to the same census, 76.55% of the Crimean population specified Russian as their native language; 11.33% named Crimean Tatar as their native language, and 10.02% of the Crimeans said that Ukrainian was their native language.²⁷⁶ According to the constitution of the Crimea, three languages were granted the status of the state language: Russian, Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar.²⁷⁷ It is important to note that the law on national minorities of Ukraine was adopted in 1992.²⁷⁸ At the same time, the legislation on the rights of the formerly deported peoples did not exist in the country until 17 April, 2014.²⁷⁹

Analyzing the ethnic identities of the residents of the region, it is important to touch upon the issue of the Crimean regional identity as such. Many Crimean and Ukrainian researchers discuss the issue. Thus, according to the Ukrainian Razumkov Research Center, the vast majority of Ukrainians and Russians who lived in 2009 in the Crimea, "form a single socio-cultural community".²⁸⁰ It was noted that the majority of Ukrainians - 52.7% - considered themselves as belonging to Russian

²⁷⁵ All- Ukrainian Population Census. (2001). Retrieved from [http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=19A050501_02_001&ti=19A050501_02_001.%20%D0%EE%E7%EF%EE%E4%B3%EB%20%ED%E0%F1%E5%EB%E5%ED%ED%FF%20%E7%E0%20%F0%B3%E4%ED%EE%FE%20%EC%EE%E2%EE%FE,%20%C0%E2%F2%EE%ED%EE%EC%ED%E0%20%D0%E5%F1%EF%F3%E1%EB%B3%EA%E0%20%CA%F0%E8%EC%20\(1,2,3,4\)&path=../Database/Census/05/01/&lang=1&multilang=uk](http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=19A050501_02_001&ti=19A050501_02_001.%20%D0%EE%E7%EF%EE%E4%B3%EB%20%ED%E0%F1%E5%EB%E5%ED%ED%FF%20%E7%E0%20%F0%B3%E4%ED%EE%FE%20%EC%EE%E2%EE%FE,%20%C0%E2%F2%EE%ED%EE%EC%ED%E0%20%D0%E5%F1%EF%F3%E1%EB%B3%EA%E0%20%CA%F0%E8%EC%20(1,2,3,4)&path=../Database/Census/05/01/&lang=1&multilang=uk)

²⁷⁶ Ukrainian population according to native language. (2001). Retrieved from <http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/i/u/cens2001.pdf>

²⁷⁷ Constitution of Crimea. 1998. Art.10.

²⁷⁸ Закон України "Про національні меншини в Україні". (1992). Retrieved from <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2494-12?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYA4.ZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8Ie6>

²⁷⁹ Закон України "Про відновлення прав осіб, депортованих за національною ознакою". (2014). <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1223-18>

²⁸⁰ Кримський соціум: Лінії поділу та перспективи консолідації. (2009). *Національна безпека і оборона* 5(109): 3 - 4.

cultural tradition, and 26.6% of them - to the Soviet.²⁸¹ Another research center showed that 40.1% of the Crimean Russians and 34.1% of the Crimean Ukrainians believed that they constituted a single socio-cultural community, and those who 'tend to agree' with this were still 36.1% and 39.6% respectively.²⁸² The basic role of the Russian language and culture in the formation of special Crimean community (or sub-ethnos) was obvious. At the same time, the Crimean Tatars are considered as the countervailing factor. This is confirmed by research of the Crimean scholar Nikiforov.²⁸³

Another important survey of the Crimean researcher Natalia Kiseleva was dedicated to the identity of the Crimean population. To the question "Who do you feel yourself?" the majority of the respondents of the Russians, Ukrainians and other ethnic groups (except the Crimean Tatars) answered '*krymchanin*,' 'Crimean', (38.7%, 38.9% and 45%, respectively). The majority of the Crimean Tatars primarily associated themselves with their ethnic group (65.8%) and only 16.4% considered themselves primarily Crimeans. Among the Russians, 35.2% of the participants gave preference to this ethnic identity; very small part of them identified themselves as Ukrainians (1.1%). Ukrainians in the Crimea, who regarded themselves as Russian constituted 4.2% (the experts explain this by the impact of the Russian culture on the peninsula). 36.1% of the Crimean Ukrainians pointed out the link with their own ethnic group. Among the representatives of other ethnic groups of the Crimea (only 12.2% of whom identified themselves with their ethnic groups), 4.1% considered themselves Russian and 2% Ukrainian. This suggests that the Russian cultural space has always been defined and dominated on the role of the Ukrainian state in the life of the Crimeans.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹ Кримський соціум: Лінії поділу та перспективи консолідації 2009: 3 - 4.

²⁸² Росіяни та українці — це один народ (соціокультурна спільнота) чи два різні народи? (опитування в Криму). (2009). Центр Разумкова. Соціологічні опитування. Регіони. Крим. Retrieved from http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=471

²⁸³ Никифоров 2009: 13.

²⁸⁴ Киселёва Н. (2008). Потенциал межэтнического конфликта в Крыму: социологическая оценка. *Этническая и власть: региональные, национальные и глобальные проекты. Материалы VII международного семинара 15-17 мая 2008 г., г. Ялта*. Севастополь: ЭКОСИ – Гидрофизика: 76.

Also, the religious issues appeared to be acute in the region, particularly after the Crimean Tatars' return to the region. It is also important to note the role of the Orthodoxy in the Russian political discourse.

4.3.2. Main Religious and Ethnic Actors of the Crimean Autonomous Republic

In the beginning of this section, it is important to note the following. While the Russians and the Ukrainians of the Crimea are generally Orthodox, the Crimean Tatars are Muslims. At the same time, the Islam, in the Crimea, is more than a mere religion, but rather has political aspects that is reflected in the organizations. Orthodoxy is less influential; the Russian cultural organizations have no such impact of the religious actors, as it can be seen in the Islamic organizations. I will start the discussion with the analysis of the state of art in the spiritual sphere.

Andrey Baranov, in his article, analyzing the political Islam in the Crimea, notes that, while in 1990, the Crimea occupied the 27th place among the regions of Ukraine according to the number of the religious organizations, in 2007, it held the 8th place.²⁸⁵ According to the Republican Committee on the Religious Affairs of the ARC, in 2008, 1339 organizations representing 48 religions and confessions were registered. Among them, 42.7% was recorded as Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). In the Crimea, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy had 509 organizations, while, UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchy had only 40 organizations. Second place belonged to the Muslim Organizations - 28.8% of the organizations in the Crimea (4% in Ukraine). They were coordinated by the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Crimea (DUMK). Since 1997, all-Ukraine association of the public organizations Alraid had been operating in the Crimea. Moreover, more than 600 Islamic organizations existed in the Crimea without registration. The third place

²⁸⁵ Баранов 2013: 196 - 200.

in this list of the registered organizations belonged to the protestant organizations which constituted 23%.²⁸⁶

Baranova, in her article, analyzed the correlation between ethnic and religious identities of the Crimeans. Thus, with the reference to the research of the Razumkov center, she argued that the inhabitants of the peninsula tended to associate its confessional determination to ethno-national, linguistic and cultural.²⁸⁷ So, most of the representatives of each of the ethno-national group (65% of the Crimean Tatars, 59.4% Russian, 56.6% of Ukrainians) identified a particular measure of confidence in the fact that human ethnic and religious affiliation must be connected according to traditional beliefs. The Crimean Tatars, who identify themselves with Islam, constituted 74.6%. Accordingly, the vast majority of believers of Ukrainians (76.6%) and Russian (76.5%) who identify with a particular denomination, indicated their affiliation to Orthodoxy; while 86.6% of the Crimean Tatars considered themselves followers of Islam. The author also drew attention to a clear correlation between ethno-national identity and language, as well as linguistic behavior, on the one hand, and membership of a particular denomination, and among the Orthodox - to a certain church, on the other hand. Thus, among the Muslims, the Crimean Tatar language as their native had been recognized by 97%; a group of those for whom the Ukrainian language is native, among the faithful of the UOC KP constituted 19.9%, among the faithful of the UOC - 4.3%.²⁸⁸ Baranova also noted a correlation between the cultural and religious identity, particularly between religious and confessional affiliation and foreign orientation of the Crimean people. The vast majority of believers of the UOC (82%) and a relative majority of the faithful of the UOC KP (46.3%) believed into the priority of the relations with Russia. Instead, a relative majority of Muslims

²⁸⁶ *О состоянии и тенденциях развития религиозной ситуации в Автономной Республике Крым, государственно - церковных отношений в автономии в 2007 году. Тезисы выступления Председателя Республиканского комитета АРК по делам религий В.А. Малиборского.* Retrieved from <http://old.crimea-portal.gov.ua/index.php?v=13&tek=13&art=9983&f=fr> (дата обращения-04.03.2012).

²⁸⁷ Баранова, А. Н. (2011). Особенности религиозной ситуации и межконфессиональных отношений в АР Крым. *Ученые Записки Таврического национального университета им. В.И. Вернадского. Серия "Философия. Культурология Политология. Социология."* 24(63), 3-4: 218.

²⁸⁸ Баранова 2011: 219.

(29.9%) supported the relationship with the EU; while the relations with Russia was acknowledged by only 18.6% of this group. Furthermore, joining the EU was considered as positive by 51.4% of Muslims (not supported by 18.1%), 18.6% of the believers of the UOC (against 57.3% who did not express their support). Among the faithful of the UOC KP, the share of the supporters and opponents of the entry appeared to be the same - 36%.²⁸⁹

As to the Muslim organizations and associations that act in the region, it is important to understand that they, apart from being ethnic and religious organizations, bear political character. As to the Crimean Tatar political actors, one of the most important organizations is Milli Mejlis. Mejlis considers itself the prototype of the state (political) structure, however it was not registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and the Ministry of Justice of Russia as a socio-political organization. Mejlis is the executive body of the national congress (parliament) of the Crimean Tatars - Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar people, elected every 5 years in the general election. Mejlis was founded in 1991 by the decision of the second Kurultay (the first modern) convocation. It acts as a representative body of the Crimean Tatars, and represents the interests of the people in the relationship with the Governments of Ukraine, Russia and other countries of the world.²⁹⁰ Permanent chairman of Mejlis since its inception to November 2013 was Mustafa Dzhemilev; since November 2013, Refat Chubarov became the Chairman of Mejlis. Mejlis was recognized by Ukraine as a supreme executive body of the Kurultay through the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada on March 20, 2014. However, Sergey Aksyonov, the acting head of the Republic of Crimea, announced that Mejlis legally does not exist, as "organization

²⁸⁹ Баранова 2011: 219.

²⁹⁰ Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people. General Information. Retrieved from <http://qtm.org/%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%89%D0%B0%D1%8F-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%BE-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%B5-%D0%BA%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0>

was not registered properly". On September 18, 2014, at the request of the Central District Court of Simferopol, Mejlis left the building it used to occupy.²⁹¹

Despite the claims of Mejlis for the right to represent the interests of all people on the peninsula, the majority of the Crimean Tatars did not quite trust him. Political scientist Natalia Kiseleva, in her study, showed that for the direct question "Is Mejlis representing the interests of all the Crimean Tatars?", only 18% of the Crimean Tatars answered 'yes', 'more likely than not' - 12%, 'probably not, than yes' - 34%, 'no' - 26%.²⁹² Elmira Muratova, another Crimean expert on the issue, provided different results. Thus, according to Muratova, 25.7% of the respondents recognized the right of Mejlis to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatars, 51% expressed 'selective support' for the organization, and 20.5% of informants said that they do not consider Mejlis as competent.²⁹³ Both studies demonstrated the absence of the full trust and legitimacy of the organization.²⁹⁴

It should be emphasized that the confessional identity, which has a large mobilizing potential, is particularly important for the Crimean Tatar ethnic identity, while Russian and Ukrainians give it much less important. Muratova showed that religious revival in recent years had occupied a significant place in the life of the Crimean Tatars. At the same time, she noted the problem of choosing between the Arab and Turkish Islam.²⁹⁵ Although the Turkish secular Islam is spiritually close to them, the author states, one cannot reject the manifestations of Islamic solidarity with the Arab countries. Given the fact that the Arab-Turkish rivalry for influence in the recent years had been growing, the clergy and political leaders of the Crimean Tatars tried to stick to the tactics of maneuvering. Arabic support was not fully regulated by the

²⁹¹ Здание Меджлиса в Симферополе заблокировали судебные приставы. (2014, 18 September). ZN. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/zdanie-medzhlisha-v-simferopole-zablokirovali-sudebnye-pristavy-153574_.html

²⁹² Киселева 2008: 76.

²⁹³ Muratova 2009: 23.

²⁹⁴ Сосновский 2014: 85.

²⁹⁵ Muratova 2002: 186.

Mejlis, so it could be used in the Crimea for the transmission to the radical version of Islam.²⁹⁶

According to Muratova, Crimean Muslim organizations and groups were represented by the so-called 'official' (legal) and 'unofficial' (acting without legal recognition, but relying on mass support) organizations. The first type included two structures. This was the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea (DUMK), created in the early 1990s. It positioned itself as a spokesman of the 'traditional' Islam among the Crimean Tatars.²⁹⁷ Besides, the Spiritual Center of Muslims of the Crimea (DTsMK) was recorded at the end of 2010. This organization was under the ideological influence of the Muslim leaders from Ethiopia Abdullah al-Harari al-Habashi, but like DUMK, aimed at creating a framework for developing the religious traditions of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea existed for centuries.²⁹⁸ 'Unofficial' Islam organizations in the Crimea, as Muratova noted, included a number of Islamic groups, developing the ideas that resonate global Islamic projects. Among the most widespread and visible in the public space are Salafists, members of the party Hizb-ut Tahrir,²⁹⁹ supporters of the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood and some other.³⁰⁰

All of them with certain reservations can be attributed to 'political Islam'.³⁰¹ In opinion of Muratova, the most politically oriented Islamic organizations of the region are the party of Hizb-ut Tahrir and movement Muslim Brotherhood, associated with the organization Alraid. These organizations used to create newsworthy informative events (organizing conferences, seminars, round tables, press conferences), where representatives of media were invited. Secondly, they established their own media - newspapers and websites through which they inform the public about the mentioned activities. Similar was the focus of both organizations - the Islamic call to bring the

²⁹⁶ Никифоров 2008: 43-44.

²⁹⁷ Spiritual Administrations of the Muslims of Crimea. Principles of the Spiritual Administrations of the Muslims of Crimea. Retrieved from <http://qmdi.org/>

²⁹⁸ Spiritual Center of the Muslims of Crimea. Retrieved from <http://dcmk.org/>

²⁹⁹ Official page of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Party in Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://hizb.org.ua/>

³⁰⁰ Муратова 2011: 24-30.

³⁰¹ Муратова 2011: 24-30.

society into compliance with the norms of Islam, promoting moral values. For this purpose, they spread the Islamic literature, moreover, education was held through the special camps for youth (Alraid)³⁰² or small communities for the devoted citizens (Hizb-utTahrir). Both organizations declared the rejection of violence as a means to achieve their goals.³⁰³

One significant difference between the discussed organizations was the concept of the Caliphate (global Islamic state governed by faithful caliph), which occupied a central place in the Hizb ideology, but almost was not appealed to by the Muslim Brothers. To develop a draft of an ideal political state, the Caliphate, Hizb considered all other forms of government as defective, contrary to the norms of Islam. The appeal not to participate in the elections, not to join the ranks of the non-Islamic political parties, and generally minimize contact with the non-Islamic state derived from this principle. Against this background, the position of the Brothers appeared to be conformist and therefore more acceptable for the authorities.³⁰⁴ Moreover, Alraid demonstrated greater flexibility with respect to the ritual practices of Muslims of the Crimea than Hizb. It refrained from openly criticizing the state religion of the Crimean Tatars and had shown a willingness to establish a dialogue and cooperation with the official Islamic structure represented by the DUMK.³⁰⁵ Besides, the Brothers focus on social work while the Hizb focus on the ideological.³⁰⁶

No less attention should be paid to the organizations of the Russian culture that existed in the Crimea. The most influential actor is the Russian Community of Crimea (*Русская община Крыма*) which was established and officially registered on 24 October, 1993. Revitalization of the Russian Community of Crimea (RCC) began after 1995, when they banned some Crimean parties (in particular - the party, were

³⁰² Al-Raid center in Crimea. Retrieved from <http://www.arraid.org/ru/taxonomy/term/64>

³⁰³ Муратова 2011: 24–30.

³⁰⁴ Муратова 2011: 33.

³⁰⁵ Муратова 2011: 34.

³⁰⁶ Муратова 2011: 34.

part of the Block *Russia*).³⁰⁷ The highest governing body is the Council, which convenes every two years. Between these meetings, Duma meets monthly. Permanent governing body is the Presidium of the Duma that meets weekly. Chairman of the Russian Community of Crimea since 2003 had been Sergey Tsekov. Russian community of Crimea is present at the Presidency of the International Council of the Russian Compatriots, which was created in 2002 with the assistance of the Government of Moscow.³⁰⁸ One of the main purposes of the RCC was to create a community-based Russian national movement aimed at protecting the rights of the Russian Crimea, and those who considered the Russian language and culture as their native. Community opposed nationalism and Russophobia, forced *Ukrainianization*, opposed the split of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In the Crimea, it sought to maintain schools with Russian language of instruction.³⁰⁹

One of the events Russian community of the Crimea initiated was the celebration a number of holidays and anniversaries related to the history of Russia. For instance, these included January 18, Day of the Reunification of Russia (the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Rada when Ukraine united with Russia); April 19, Day of the Reunification of the Crimea with Russia (the anniversary of the signing of the Empress Catherine the Great Manifest on acceptance Taman island and the Crimea under the Russian State in 1783); June 6, Day of the Russian language (the birthday of Alexander Pushkin, in 1799); September 9, Day of Remembrance of the Russian army soldiers who died in the heroic defense of Sevastopol in the Crimean War of 1854-1855.³¹⁰

Many of these dates were celebrated not only in public, but at the official level. Day of the protection of the Russian language had been celebrated since 1996. In 2011, 6 June became the official Day of the Russian language in the Russian Federation. Since 2007, on the initiative of the Russian community, the Crimea annually hosts

³⁰⁷ Russian Community of Crimea. Retrieved from <http://ruscrimea.ru>

³⁰⁸ Russian Community of Crimea. Retrieved from <http://ruscrimea.ru>

³⁰⁹ Russian Community of Crimea. Retrieved from <http://ruscrimea.ru>

³¹⁰ Russian Community of Crimea. Retrieved from <http://ruscrimea.ru>

the International Festival of Russian, Slavic culture *Great Russian Word*.³¹¹ Goals and objectives of the festival focused on the development of the Russian culture, strengthening the position of the Russian language in the Crimea and Ukraine, strengthening the Ukrainian-Russian friendship.³¹²

In December 2009, the Russian community of the Crimea, together with the Civil asset, initiated the creation of all-Crimean movement *Russian Unity*.³¹³ This initiative was supported by many other Russian organizations. Sergey Tsekov and Sergey Aksyonov were elected co-chairs of the movement. In 2010, Russian organizations came to the conclusion of the formation of Russian Party of Ukraine. This party, also named Russian Unity, was established and officially registered in September 2010. Sergey Aksyonov became the leader of the party.³¹⁴ After the accession of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation, in March, Sergey Tsekov became the member of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation.³¹⁵

The role of the Russian organizations was noted by the ordinary Crimeans. Thus, during the research, the Crimeans that participated in the interviews, were asked about the activities of the abovementioned organizations. Interestingly, the representatives of all ethnic groups mentioned the role of Russia and the Russian organizations the Crimea, particularly the Russian Cultural Center.³¹⁶ At the same time, respondents noted the lack of the Ukrainian organizations in the region. Furthermore, one of the Crimean Tatar activists noted that the Hizb-ut organization that was prohibited in the Russian Federation used to act freely in the Ukrainian Crimea. Its activities included religious and cultural events, education, and they insisted on the adherence to the Islamic norms, such as veil for Muslim women.³¹⁷

³¹¹ Great Russian Word festival. Retrieved from <http://mfvrs.org/>

³¹² Great Russian Word festival. Retrieved from <http://mfvrs.org/>

³¹³ Party Russian Unity. Retrieved from <http://russ-edin.org/>

³¹⁴ Party Russian Unity. Retrieved from <http://russ-edin.org/>

³¹⁵ Sergey Tsekov, personal page at the Federation Council's web-site. Retrieved from <http://council.gov.ru/structure/persons/1167/>

³¹⁶ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

³¹⁷ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 26 October, 2016). Ankara.

4.3.3. Development of the Ethnic Contradictions in the Region

The issue of the ethnic contradictions as well as the communication of the ethnic groups with the governmental structures deserves particular attention in this chapter. First of all, it should be noted that the author deals mostly with the Crimean Tatars in this section, due to their return, resettlement, and restitution of the property that provoked tensions in the region. Secondly, the aspects of the relations between the Crimean Tatars and Slavic population, as well as the relations of the Tatars with the power bodies are discussed. Thirdly, I touched upon the most crucial dynamic since 1991.

Thus, as the Crimean experts on the issue Shvets, Bednarsky and Yakovlev maintained, in the post-Soviet Crimea, conflict situations and conflicts, in the most cases, are either ethno-confessional or socio-economic nature.³¹⁸ Ethnic tensions on the peninsula, for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, revealed in 1991-1995. It was due to two factors: complicated relationships between the Russian and Ukrainian population of the Crimea, in a new reality of the sovereign Ukraine; as well as the general wariness of the Slavic population of the peninsula against process of the return of the Crimean Tatars. The first signs of the exacerbation of the religious contacts were seen in the Crimea, according to some Crimean analysts, after 1995. The basis of this aggravation was the politicization of the religious systems in two major religious communities autonomy: Orthodox and Muslim.³¹⁹

The core of the socio-economic conflicts with ethnic overtones became the situation with the possibility of the free land acquisition for the personal use. As of Ukraine, this process began in the mid-1990s, long before the end of the mass return of the deported people to the Crimea. Among the Crimean Tatars, there was dissatisfaction with the difficulties in the acquisition of the land of the former collective and state

³¹⁸ Шве́ц, Бедна́рский & Яковле́в 2005: 166.

³¹⁹ Шве́ц, Бедна́рский & Яковле́в 2005: 166.

farms. The problem of the return of the so-called *waqf* lands, which in the past were in charge of the Muslim clerics, also manifested itself.³²⁰

According to some analysts, the Crimean land problem looked statistically curious. According to *Reskomzem* (Republican Committee on the Land Issues of the ARC), in 2004, the formerly deported peoples were allocated 17% of all land used for housing, built since the beginning of the mass repatriation. At the same time, in 2004, Crimean Tatar families were provided with land at 114.25%, while the other nationalities received only 50.24% of the land.³²¹ In the absence of the well-organized control system for the already allocated areas in the Crimea, most of them were used by the members of the different nationalities in order to resale on the secondary land market.³²²

Shvets and Yakovlev, in their article, discussed the evolution of the ethnic contradictions in the Crimea since 1990 till 2011, mainly between the Crimean Tatar community and the Russians as well as the government. They specified few periods of this process depending on the most acute issues that the returnees faced. Thus, according to their chronology, the first stage is called the *renaissance* and dated 1990 - 1999. During this period, authors argue, as a result of the mass immigration, especially due to the influx of the Crimean Tatars, ethnic composition of the peninsula became more complex. The revival of the Orthodox and Muslim identities showed the need for the construction of new and the reconstruction of the lost religious objects (churches, temples, mosques, etc.). From 1990 to 1999, the authors identified 110 cases of social and cultural contradictions, out of which, 72 cases referred to the socio-economic, and 38 conflicts had inter-confessional character.³²³ Unsettled immigrants, in the early years of their return to the Crimea, naturally pushed faith-based issues to the second place. Emerging in this period contradictions were associated with the failure of the authorities to satisfy the requirements of

³²⁰ Шве́ц, Бедна́рский & Яковле́в 2005: 166.

³²¹ Шве́ц, Бедна́рский & Яковле́в 2005: 167.

³²² Шве́ц, Бедна́рский & Яковле́в 2005: 166 - 167.

³²³ Шве́ц & Яковле́в 2012: 112.

immigrants regarding settlement in the places from which they were evicted in 1944; the allocation of the lands for construction; guaranteed jobs; the necessary infrastructure in the areas of their settlement and others.³²⁴

The most acute phase of the renaissance period was signified by the conflicts concerning the land issues. From 1990 to 1999, the researchers recorded 54 resonant manifestations of the controversy over the allotment of the land to the Crimean Tatars, which accounted for 75% of all socio-economic conflicts of the period. Conflicts related to the land issues took place almost everywhere on the peninsula. Only 3 northwestern districts remained unaffected by the confrontation: Krasnoperekopsk, Razdolnoye and the Black Sea region. This was determined by the remoteness of the regions from the traditional places of the Crimean recreational business and their low economic development indicators.³²⁵ The most conflictual regions appeared to be the foothill of Simferopol and Bakhchisaray areas.³²⁶

Due to the high spatial and temporal dynamics of the socio-cultural conflicts on the peninsula, during the period from 2000 to 2005, the analysts called it the *expansion*. According to the study, since 2000, the conflicts had been localized in the northern and the central regions of autonomy. It is there, on the territory of Dzhankoy, Krasnoperekopsk, Krasnogvardeisky, Pervomayskiy areas since the late 1980s, the authorities of the Crimea sent the main streams of immigrants according to the program of the state aid for their return and resettlement.³²⁷ By 2000, the research maintained, immigrants already accumulated experience of the confrontational interaction with the Crimean authorities. The most resonant cases of this interaction can be regarded as an assault by the activists of the Crimean Tatar national movement on building of the Supreme Council of Crimea in 1992; Feodosia shootouts of 1995; blocking the railways and highways in Simferopol and other regions of the Crimea in 1998. This experience, as well as constantly increasing

³²⁴ Швец & Яковлев 2012: 112.

³²⁵ Яковлев 2010: 193.

³²⁶ Швец & Яковлев 2012: 113.

³²⁷ Швец & Яковлев 2012: 113.

number of returnees, bumping into the imperfection of the Ukrainian legislation for allowing change of the ownership on the ground long before the mass return of Crimean Tatars to the peninsula, enabled them to start solving the most acute problems at the time, reallocation of the former state and collective farms land.³²⁸

Furthermore, in 2006, socio-cultural contradictions moved to the central-western and central-eastern regions of the peninsula. This was explained by the inability of the Tatars to normalize their lives in the regions of the primary settlement. Inter-district migration of the Crimean Tatars, their active involvement in the process of competition for the most prestigious lands, places in the market, business and prestigious career options had an impact on the behavior and reactions of the Crimean population of other nationalities in areas where migrants rushed to. The end of 2002 was the turning point in the expansion stage: the conflict turned into the inter-confessional.³²⁹ Thus, in late 2005, in the Crimea, an area with a stable socio-cultural tension formed, it was designated as Central South Coast.³³⁰ Moreover, in the foothill regions of this area (Simferopol, Belogorsk, Bakhchisaray areas) inter-ethno-confessional conflict expanded, while in coastal area (Yalta, Alushta, Sudak, Feodosia), socio-economic conflicts dominated.³³¹ The emergence of this area coincides geographically with areas of the highest concentration of the Crimean Tatar population. Ukrainian population census in 2001 noted maximum proportion of the Crimean Tatars (29.2%) in Belogorsk region. In addition, the southern and south-eastern part of the Black Sea coast of the Crimea, were the most attractive areas for the recreational business with high market value of the land.³³²

The third stage of the socio-cultural contradictions was designated from 2006 to 2010 and called *legacy*. In accordance with Shvets and Yakovlev, most of the socio-

³²⁸ Шве́ц & Яковлев 2012: 113.

³²⁹ Шве́ц, А. Б. (2008). Паспортизация социокультурных противоречий в Крыму. *Геополитика и экогеодинамика регионов*, 4(1-2): 76.

³³⁰ Яковлев, А. Н. (2008). Территориальные формы локализации социокультурных противоречий в современном Крыму. *Геополитика и экогеодинамика регионов*. (1-2): 115.

³³¹ Шве́ц 2008: 74.

³³² Шве́ц & Яковлев 2012: 112.

cultural conflicts actualized in that time originated from the previous stages. For example, in 2006, in Bakhchisaray, mass arrests of the representatives of the Slavic-Orthodox and Turkic-Muslim segments of the urban community occurred. These were provoked by the revolt of the Crimean Tatars, aimed at transferring the city market, located, in their opinion, on the place where the Muslim acropolis existed.³³³ Response to the above steps was the spontaneous self-organization of workers of the market and 'sympathizers' among the Slavic population of the city, an active opposition to the elimination of the market. The growth of the contradictions around Bakhchisaray market had been recorded by the media since the summer of 2004.³³⁴

Furthermore, in the specified time period, conflict situation around the hill Kilse Bair with Golubinka village of the Bakhchisaray district has not lost its relevance. This situation was a part of a long-lasting problem associated with the presence of a large number of ruins and medieval areas of Christian churches and monasteries claimed by representatives of all the Orthodox branches. The role of arbiter in resolving it belonged to Mejlis which opposed to the transfer of these to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Explaining his position, Mejlis argued that medieval churches belonged to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and it deprives modern Moscow Patriarchate property rights in such places of worship. In addition, the remains of some medieval buildings and burial sites without solid scientific evidence are declared monuments of the Crimean Tatars, who lived on the peninsula in the pre-Islamic period.³³⁵

It is important to note that since 2000, competition for dominance of the sacred symbols of each of the religions occurred in the Crimea. This was evident in the events of 2000-2001, included in the recent history of the Crimea as *krestopoval*

³³³ В Бахчисарае крымские татары опять требуют убрать рынок с кладбища. (2006, 7 July). *Агентство "Крымские Новости"*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/v-bahchisarae-krimskie-tatari-opyat-trebuyut-ubrat-rinok-s-kladbischa/1627/>

³³⁴ Яковлев, А. Н. (2010). Религиозный фактор межэтноконфессиональной конфликтности в современном Крыму. Этапы развития, локализация. *Ученые записки ТНУ, серия «География»*, 22(61): 294.

³³⁵ Швец & Яковлев 2012: 116.

(dismissal of the crosses).³³⁶ For instance, resonance in the process of the emergence of the Christian symbols in the Crimea was the conflict caused by the intention of the city council of Feodosia to install a monument to the Holy Apostle Andrew. The Muslim community did not allow Feodosia city administration to place a monument at the entrance to the city, claiming there used to be a Muslim cemetery. Under the pressure of the protests of the Crimean Tatar population of Feodosia, location of the monument was changed, and its installation began in May 2006. During this period, the opponents of the construction of the monument committed acts of public vandalism. Now a monument to the Holy Apostle Andrew is set near one of the Orthodox churches of the city.³³⁷

In the period between 2006 and 2010, the number of cases of vandalism significantly increased. These recurrent cases included the desecration of the monument to the Crimean Tatar poet and specialist on Turkic studies Bekir Choban-Zade in Belogorsk marked in 2006 and repeated in 2007; a memorial to the deported peoples was repeatedly desecrated in the area of the park Salgirka in Simferopol.³³⁸ Rampant vandalism at the cemeteries of the Crimea occurred in 2007 - 2008. In summer 2007, Muslim cemeteries in Sofiyivka, Simferopol district, and Krymskaya Roza, Belogorsk area were attacked. In early 2008, riots erupted in the Muslim cemetery in the village Uvarovka, Nizhnegorsk area, and Chistenkoye. The same year, mosques were desecrated in a hooligan inscription in villages Oktyabrskoe (Pervomaisky district) and Belogorsk. Moreover, Orthodox cemetery in the village Vojkovo Leninsky district was destructed. Orthodox and Muslim cemeteries in village Marfovka Leninsky district were desecrated by drawings of satanic characters.³³⁹

³³⁶ Яковлев 2010: 293.

³³⁷ Место установки памятника св. апостолу Андрею в Феодосии охраняют казаки. (2006, 19 May). *Пресс-служба УПЦ/Патриархия.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/113979.html>

³³⁸ В Крыму могилы разрушают на почве межнациональной розни. (2009, 9 June). *Новости Крыма - крымская служба новостей*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2009/6/19/1245406500/>

³³⁹ Швец, А. Б., & Яковлев, А. Н. (2011). Некоторые особенности географического изучения резонансных случаев вандализма в современном Крыму. *Ученые записки ТНУ, серия: география*, 24(63): 270.

Socio-economic contradictions also got acute in the mentioned period. The most resonant were the events in November 2007 on the street of Balaklava in Simferopol and Ai-Petri plateau. Land conflict on the Balaklava Street in Simferopol was associated with another attempt of the "Olvi-Krym" company to eliminate the Crimean Tatars' squatting on the land, which the firm acquired for the building of a residential complex.³⁴⁰ The conflict on Ay-Petri happened due to the actions of the police and bailiffs aimed at the demolition of seven illegal trade and catering places following the decision of the Economic Court of the ARC.³⁴¹

In 2006 - 2010, Simferopol region (68 conflicts), Sudak and Yalta City Council (12 and 11 conflicts respectively), became an area with a high level of social and cultural conflicts, while in the metropolitan area ethno-confessional conflicts quantitatively dominated. In January 2008, the project of the acquisition of land for the cathedral mosque was approved. This decision caused an outcry from the DUMK. Muftiyat filed a claim on the decision of the City Council to the Economic Court of the Crimea. In addition, together with the DUMK, Mejlis organized indefinite information picket. On January 28, 2011, according to the news agency *E-Crimea*, the Supreme Economic Court of Ukraine adopted a decision according to which Simferopol city council was obliged to conclude with DUMK a lease of land for the mosque construction.³⁴²

Socio-economic conflicts in 2009, in most cases, formed around the issue of the elimination of squatting. At that time, the anti-acquisition activity resulted in the self-organization of the population to confront the authorities. 2010 was quite calm in terms of the confrontation, only vandalism remains very widespread. Since 2011, the

³⁴⁰ Земельная война в Крыму: в Симферополе подрались татары и застройщики. (2007, 1 November). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/events/214630-zemelnaya-vojna-v-krymu-v-simferopole-podralis-tatary-i-zastrojshchiki>

³⁴¹ Земельный конфликт на Ай-Петри. (2007, 7 November). *Новости Крыма - крымская служба новостей*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/photo/1194433629/>

³⁴² Симферопольские депутаты обещают вернуться к вопросу соборной мечети после каникул. (2009, 24 July). *Новости Крыма - крымская служба новостей*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2009/7/24/1248421500/>

scholars had noted the growth of the inter-confessional contradictions. Also, the scholars recorded the spread of the issue to the remote regions of the peninsula.³⁴³

It is important to mention the Crimean Tatar National Movement as an important actor in the political spectrum of the Crimea. The evaluation of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (CTNM) can be found in the article of the Crimean researcher Andrey Nikiforov. The author defined the Crimean Tatar National movement as a whole range of the ethno-political processes in the Crimean Tatar milieu. Particularly, he talked about the Council of the Representatives of the Crimean Tatar people under the President of Ukraine and the attempts of the Crimean Prime Minister Mogilev to oppose Mejlis. According to the study, since the appointment of the Crimean Prime Minister Dzharty, attempts to reformat the power relationship with the CTNM took place. That is why the Council of the Representatives of the Crimean Tatar people under the President of Ukraine was reformed and the communication channel was virtually paralyzed.³⁴⁴ In January 2011, Dzharty addressed to the leader of Mejlis Dzhemilev an open letter, beginning with the following words:

My treatment is dictated by the intention to put an end to the situation related to the so-called Crimean Tatar land squatting. Squatting becomes a serious obstacle to social and economic development of autonomy and destabilizing interethnic harmony.³⁴⁵

Further text of the letter sounds even more ominous:

The government refuses to turn a blind eye to ignorance and disregard of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine on the part of some representatives of the Crimean Tatars ... The Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, all their actions to restore order in the land sector in the last year has shown that in the Crimea no untouchables, no matter what nationality is not concerned.³⁴⁶

Furthermore, the Crimean prime minister addressed to the leader of Mejlis a proposal to use its authority for immediate coagulation squatting.

³⁴³ Швец & Яковлев 2012: 122.

³⁴⁴ Никифоров 2014: 214.

³⁴⁵ Освободительное движение. Крымских татар попросили уйти с захваченных земель. (2011, 19 January). *Коммерсантъ-Украина*. Retrieved from <http://crimea.comments.ua/digest/2011/01/19/001322.html>

³⁴⁶ Освободительное движение. Крымских татар попросили уйти с захваченных земель. (2011, 19 January).

If there is no reaction to my proposal for the release of illegally captured areas, I will send a corresponding appeal to the law enforcement bodies and the prosecutor's office demanding immediate action against violators.³⁴⁷

In fact, it was a declaration of war against Mejlis. That's what this letter was seen then by Ukrainian mass media. However, a few days later, the position of the Crimean prime minister changed to the opposite: he entered into an active dialogue with the leaders of the Parliament, approved a plan of the legalization of squatting, lobbied for adoption at the session of the Simferopol city council decision on land allocation (before that - illegally occupied) for the construction of the mosque and he took part in the ceremonial laying of the memorable capsule at the site of its construction.³⁴⁸

The Crimean Prime Minister Anatoly Mogilev approached the Crimean Tatar issue more specifically and consistently. Since his appointment to the post of the head of the government, he had been steadily pursuing a policy of minimizing contact with the Parliament and the maximum displacement of his *protégé* to official posts in the republic. So, in July 2012, adviser to the prime minister, a retired police colonel Kenzhaliyev was appointed as Chairman of the National Committee for International Relations and Deported Citizens. In February 2013, a prominent functionary of the Mejlis Remzi Ilyasov was appointed to the position of the head of the Permanent Parliamentary Commission on International Relations. Thus, he replaced Enver Abduraimov, expelled earlier from the faction Kurultay-Ruh. Nikiforov argues that the activity of Mogilev contributed to the formation of the national movement. Thus, the author mentioned the Unity Conference of the Social Forces of the Crimean Tatar people of 28 January 2012, in Simferopol, which was attended by about 450 delegates from 15 Crimean Tatar public organizations and Muslim communities of the Crimea. This was established by the Crimean Tatar People's Front (CTPF). Among the founders of the CTPF, Milli Firka, Generation of the Crimea, the Foundation for Research and Support of the Indigenous Peoples of the Crimea,

³⁴⁷ Освободительное движение. Крымских татар попросили уйти с захваченных земель. (2011, 19 January).

³⁴⁸ Никифоров 2014: 214.

Charitable Foundation *Vatandash* Countryman and others can be recorded. The opposition, rallied around the CTPF, became known as Mogilev's Tatars, thereby indicating their closeness to the leadership of the Crimean government. However, despite a number of organizational changes, in general, the opposition had not been able to seize the initiative from the Parliament.³⁴⁹

Besides, for understanding the claims of the ethnic groups and parties, it is important to touch upon the issues of the languages in the Crimean Republic.

4.3.4. Language Issue

Language issue had a particular importance in the Crimea. Partially, this was explained in the previous sections: the language was the factor of the ethnic and religious identity. Thus, according to the research of the Razumkov center, conducted in the Crimea and Sevastopol between 18 October and 9 November, 2008, 96% of the Russians, 77% of Ukrainians and 9% of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea see Russian as a native language. Furthermore, only 18% of Ukrainians, 2% of Russians and 2.5% of the Crimean Tatars called Ukrainian as their mother tongue.³⁵⁰ The same research discovered that 75% of the Crimeans see forced Ukrainization in the Crimea. At the same time, 18% of the respondents disagreed with the statement.³⁵¹

Interestingly that, according to the Ministry of Education and Science of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, in 2008-2009 academic year, 621 general education institution operated, including 340 secondary schools with Russian as the language of instruction, where in 4205 classes, 84165 thousand students were studying. Besides, 3602 classes (with 75403 students) with the Russian language

³⁴⁹ Никифоров 2014: 214.

³⁵⁰ Центр Разумкова. *Яку мову Ви вважаєте рідною? (опитування в Криму)*. (2008). Retrieved from http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=395

³⁵¹ Центр Разумкова. *Чи згодні Ви з твердженням, що населення АР Крим піддається насильницькій українізації? (опитування в Криму)*. (2008). Retrieved from http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=401

teaching existed in other schools. In total, 159568 students, i.e. 89.6% of the total number of students were educated in Russian, in the Crimea, in 2008 - 2009. In 2007-2008 academic year, the number of the students who studied in Russian reached 90.6%. The decline was explained by the reduction in the total number of students of secondary schools.³⁵²

The network of schools and classes with the Ukrainian language of learning included only 7 secondary schools with the Ukrainian language of instruction, where, in 105 classes, 2246 students were studying. Besides, 784 classes (10614 students) with the Ukrainian language of instruction functioned at other schools. In total, in 2009, 12860 students received education in Ukrainian language that is, 7.2% of the total number of students. In contrast, in the 2007-2008 school year 6.2% of the students were studying in Ukrainian. In recent years, there was a tendency of a growing number of children from national minorities to join schools with the Ukrainian language learning.³⁵³ In the Crimea, there were 15 secondary schools with the Crimean Tatar language of instruction (177 classes, 2919 students). Besides, one general education school with the Crimean Tatar language classes with the Ukrainian language of instruction (25 classes, 449 students) existed. This was supplemented by 236 classes (2725 students) with the Crimean Tatar language of instruction at other schools.³⁵⁴ Moreover, in total, in all educational institutions of the Crimea, including higher educational institutions, with the total number of students constituting 251360, only 7% had Ukrainian as their language of education, while 90% of the students studied in Russian, and 2.3% - in Crimean Tatar language.³⁵⁵ In such conditions, it is hard to claim about the forced *Ukrainization* and the limitations on the Russian language. Additionally, as to the mass-media, 74% of the Crimeans

³⁵² Мазука, Л. Языковая политика в Крыму: Спекуляции и реалию (2010, 15 March). *Флот 2017*. Retrieved from <http://flot2017.com/item/analitics/20936>

³⁵³ Мазука 2010.

³⁵⁴ Мазука 2010.

³⁵⁵ Мазука 2010.

called Ukrainian channels as a source of information; 61% of the Crimeans preferred local TV channels; and 53% of the respondent chose Russian channels.³⁵⁶

The language issue was paid attention during the field research. Thus, those Crimeans who identified themselves with Russia expressed their negative attitude toward the Ukrainization policies in the Crimea at the expense of the Russian language. Particularly, they mentioned the bigger share of the lessons of the Ukrainian language and literature, while the Russian language and literature lessons hours were decreased;³⁵⁷ the obligatory use of the Ukrainian language in the cinemas;³⁵⁸ the low quotas for the Russian language at radio and TV broadcasting.³⁵⁹ At the same time, those Crimeans who identified themselves with Ukraine reported extremely small use of the Ukrainian language in the Crimea.³⁶⁰ Similarly, the Crimean Tatar interviewees that participated in the survey stated that the Ukrainian government did not create any conditions for the use of the Crimean Tatar language in the region.³⁶¹

The mentioned above research of the Razumkov Centre showed that 32.9% of residents of the Crimea did not see Ukraine as their motherland; only 28.6% of the Crimean residents called themselves Ukrainian patriots; while those who did not recognize themselves as such constituted almost half (49.3%).³⁶² Head of the center Yuri Yakimenko, in his report, also noted that, according to the survey, 70% of the Crimeans would support the introduction of the dual citizenship. According to the expert, Russian citizenship turned out to be the most attractive in this regard.³⁶³ At

³⁵⁶ Центр Разумкова. *Які ЗМІ є для Вас головним джерелом інформації про події у Криму? (опитування в Криму)* (2009). Retrieved from http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=729

³⁵⁷ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

³⁵⁸ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

³⁵⁹ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

³⁶⁰ Interview with the Crimean entrepreneur living in Kyiv. (2016, 18 October). Simferopol.

³⁶¹ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 1 November). Istanbul.

³⁶² Центр Разумкова. *Третина кримчан не сприймають Україну як Батьківщину*. (2008, 19 December). Retrieved from http://www.uceps.org/ukr/expert.php?news_id=1014

³⁶³ Центр Разумкова. *Чи підтримали б Ви запровадження в Україні інституту подвійного громадянства? (опитування в Криму, віковий розподіл)*. (2008). Retrieved from http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=744

the same time, according to the survey, 55.5% of the Crimean residents identify themselves with the Russian cultural tradition. Also, very noticeable share of the Crimean people (mostly Russian and Ukrainian) associated themselves with the Soviet cultural tradition. Among the Crimean Tatars, only a small proportion admitted belonging to other cultural traditions, rather than their own.³⁶⁴

Another research showed that 32.4% of inhabitants of the Crimea were prone to separatist sentiments. Furthermore, the share of those who were willing to personally pursue separatist implementation options was smaller and did not exceed a quarter. According to the survey, 69% of the Crimean residents believed that priority of Ukraine's foreign policy should be relations with Russia, 9% of the replies preferred the EU countries and 6.7% of the respondents admitted other CIS countries. Relations with Russia as a top priority were accepted by the vast majority of Russian and Ukrainian population. 78.6% of the Crimeans consider Ukraine's accession to the Union of Russia and Belarus necessary. Support for the EU membership for Ukraine in the Crimea was significantly lower and constituted 25.9%. Introduction to the EU was supported by nearly 48.3% of the Crimean Tatars, 30.6% of Ukrainians and 19.5% of Russians.³⁶⁵ Ukraine's accession to NATO, in 2008, was supported by 7.6% of the Crimeans. 77.7% of the population stood against the Northern Alliance. These include absolute majority of Russians, most of the Ukrainians and a relative majority of the Crimean Tatars. In the matter of attitude to the prospects of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, 69.9% of the Crimeans indicated that the term of the agreement on the fleet should be extended. 5.9% of the population answered in favor of the fact that, after 2017, the Fleet should be withdrawn.³⁶⁶

The ethnic composition of the region is reflected in its voting behavior and political processes. As it was shown by the author, the ethnic identity is linked to the religious observations and language, as well as the political orientations. As it can be seen, the

³⁶⁴ Центр Разумкова. *Чи підтримали б Ви запровадження в Україні інституту подвійного громадянства? (опитування в Криму, віковий розподіл)*. (2008).

³⁶⁵ Юрій Якименко. (2008, 19 December). 32% жителів Криму схильні до сепаратизму. *Центр Разумкова*. Retrieved from http://www.uceps.org/ukr/expert.php?news_id=1015

³⁶⁶ Якименко: 2008.

respondents noted the lack of the Ukrainian language in schools and universities, on radio and TV channels, in mass culture and commercials in the Crimea. The next section of this chapter analyzes the main political parties and blocks, their success during the elections as well as the political processes in the region after 1991.

4.4. Political Dynamics in the Crimea, in 1991 - 2014

During 24 years after Ukraine gained its independence, the Crimea experienced different political processes. For the sake of this thesis, I would like to touch upon the most crucial issues, such as the elections to the regional parliament, and the main political actors in the Crimea in order to present the nature of the elites responsible for the agenda as well as the conditions and mechanisms under which they acted. For the Crimea, an important issue was the formation of the parties and blocks without strong ideological platform but rather around the leader with the goal to win the seats in the parliament. Another peculiarity that should be mentioned was the engagement of the nationalistic rhetoric by the main actors, i.e. the appeal to the ethnic identity of the citizens by means of the language issues, connection to the religion, the foreign policy orientations. While the Russian organizations had their own parties that entered the blocks with the all-Ukrainian parties for the sake of the higher results, the Crimean Tatars used the Ukrainian rightist political forces.

According to Korneyeva, in the end of the XX century, in terms of the socio-economic crisis in the Crimea, historical split between the Slav population and the Crimean Tatars exposed, which gradually moved to the level of the internal conflict. Ethnicity remained the basis of the political parties positioning as the most affordable and emotionally powerful tool for the political mobilization, in opinion of the scholar.³⁶⁷ Thus, to understand this, one should look not only at the dynamics of the ethnic contradictions discussed earlier, but also at the dynamics of the political processes. This can be derived from the analysis of the parties and their blocks that

³⁶⁷ Кorneyева, Е. А. (2014). Факторы и динамика развития современного этнополитического конфликта в Автономной Республике Крым. *Современные проблемы науки и образования*, (3).

had been acting in the region; the election results; the relations between the branches of the power.

Russian Community of the Crimea originated from the Republican Movement of the Crimea and the Republican Party of the Crimea. In 1993, the leaders of both organizations came to the conclusion about the creation of a public organization, focused on the protection of the rights and interests of the Russian Crimea and the Crimeans who considered the Russian language and Russian culture as their native.³⁶⁸ Vladimir Terekhov, Crimean writer, poet, was the initiator of the Russian Community of the Crimea and its chairman in 1993-2003. Together with Terekhov, Sergey Tsekov supervised the work of the Russian Community. In 1994, pro-Russian political actors in the Crimea achieved significant victories by relying on the Republican Party of the Crimea. Together with the People's Party of the Crimea, representatives of the Republican Party of the Crimea, in late 1993, formed the electoral block *Russia*.³⁶⁹

In the first officially elected parliament of the Crimea (1994), the Russia Block obtained 57 seats out of 100; Kurultay of the Crimean Tatar People got 16 seats; while the Communist Party of Ukraine received only 3 seats. 20 seats were allocated to the independent candidates.³⁷⁰ The same year, the presidential election in the Crimea was held, and Yuriy Meshkov won.³⁷¹ Elections of the Presidents of Ukraine and the Crimea, the deputies of the Crimean Supreme Council were held in the similar conditions: Crimeans struggled with the ex-Communist power to protest against the unprecedented fall of the living standards and actively supported, in their opinion, pro-Russian minded candidates. Crimean expert on the electoral geography and behavior Evgeny Khan argued that the processing of the election results by the major component gave a similar set of factors for each election: for the presidential

³⁶⁸ Портал Русского народа Крыма. *Этапы становления Русской Общины Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://www.ruscrimea.ru/cms/?go=mon&in=view&id=18>

³⁶⁹ Портал Русского народа Крыма. *Этапы становления Русской Общины Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://www.ruscrimea.ru/cms/?go=mon&in=view&id=18>

³⁷⁰ Корнеева 2014.

³⁷¹ Корнеева 2014.

elections in the Crimea, the opposition, regional and Russian nationalist components appeared to be decisive. For the election of the Supreme Council of the Crimea the opposition mattered the most; while for the presidential elections in Ukraine regional opposition demonstrated its importance.³⁷²

During 1994, a growing support for the universality of the candidates from election to election was recorded, according to Khan. While in January 1994, a wide range of political forces operated, receiving strong support in the community, in March, the Block Russia immediately gathered 68% of the votes (as the party of the victorious president), but the turnout had fallen sharply. Kuchma was literally Crimean-universal support for increased attendance. All territorial differences and thus erased from the global confrontation between the cities and regions of the Crimea came to internal political regionalism. In parallel, there was a process of growth of the subjective component in the vote, in fact indicators of the electoral behavior: the will of the voters is less determined by the political views but more by the political and organizational factors.³⁷³ It is also important to note that till 1994, the Crimean Tatars had a quota of 10 seats in the Crimean parliament.

Formed in 1994, the new political regime lasted only for one year. Scored an impressive victory in the presidential election, Meshkov and his Block Russia, in the spring 1995, came to a complete collapse of their policy. They failed to implement the pre-election promises, appeared to be unable to cope with the economic difficulties, bogged down in a mutual strife, and lost the support of the population.³⁷⁴ Therefore, the new political regime was powerless to resist the decisions of the Ukrainian authorities that torpedoed the Crimean autonomy.³⁷⁵ The collapse, in 1994, of the amorphous Block Russia led to the emergence of a number of organizations, acting on behalf of and in defense of the rights of the Russian (Russian lingual)

³⁷²Хан, Е. А. (1997). Электоральная география Крыма (по результатам выборов в 1994 г.). *Ученые записки Симферопольского государственного университета*, (3): 42.

³⁷³Хан 1997: 42.

³⁷⁴ Звезда и политическая «смерть» Юрия Мешкова? (1995, 3 February). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/zvezda_i_politicheskaya_smert_yuriya_meshkova.html

³⁷⁵ Мальгин, А. (2000). Крымский узел. *Симферополь: Таврида*.

population of the peninsula, numbering, according to the Ukrainian census of 2001, 1890 thousand people. In autumn of 1994, 14 regional organizations out of 18, in the Republican Party of the Crimea/the Russian Movement of the Crimea left the party as a protest against the position of its leadership in conflict with the president Meshkov. They registered another Republican Party of the Crimea *Russia* under the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet deputy Eroshkin (it soon fell apart).³⁷⁶ Another part of the functionaries of the Block Russia, 'hid' in the subsoil of the Russian Community of the Crimea. In September 1996, the Republican Party of the Crimea / the Russian Movement of the Crimea faced the next crisis, which led to the formation of the community-based so-called Simferopol Russian *Fatherland* community (Boris Zazhigaev).³⁷⁷

In opinion of the Crimean expert Malgin, to the some extent, Russian organizations play the situation of 1994 - 1995 with all the ensuing consequences. In fact, in 1994, power was taken by the pro-Russian President Leonid Kuchma, who was supported by the record number of voters in the Crimea. However, no one, including the anti-Russian Viktor Yushchenko, caused the political status of the Crimea more damage than Kuchma.³⁷⁸ That reputation of the pro-Russian leader to a great extent allowed Kuchma to bring the region into the legal field of Ukraine; autonomy was preserved only as an ornamental.

At the same time, the representatives of the People's Party, Vladimir Klychnikov and Svetlana Savchenko, announced the creation of a new Crimean Party. However, this period of party building stopped in 1996, with the adoption of the law of Ukraine that prohibited the creation of the regional parties. In this situation, Russian organizations had to find masquerade associations (with no formal right to conduct political activity), or choose a 'roof' among the Ukrainian parties. The process of legalization was successfully passed by the People's Party activists, then the Crimean Party. In 1997, they created the party Union, which was registered as an all-Ukrainian political

³⁷⁶ Мальгин 2012: 334.

³⁷⁷ Мальгин 2012: 334.

³⁷⁸ Мальгин 2012: 333.

union. This success can be explained by the fact that the project was in the sphere of the interests of the large Crimean businessman Lev Mirimskiy that used Union as his political representation.³⁷⁹ An informal body of the party was the popular newspaper *Crimean Time* (*Krymskoye Vremya*). The Republican Party of the Crimea/ the Russian Movement of the Crimea - Russian Community of the Crimea of Sergey Tsekov integrated into the Civil Ukrainian Congress (Alexander Bazilyuk), which became in 1997 the Slavic Party.³⁸⁰

Another important political figure of the 1990s was the founder of the Russian Party of the Crimea Sergey Shuvaynikov who, in 1995, headed the Congress of the Russian Communities of the Crimea³⁸¹ that was the subsidiary structure of the Russian Congress of the Russian Communities of Dmitry Rogozin. But most of all, he was attracted to another Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.³⁸² Additionally, the left side of the Crimean political sector contained the Communist Party of Leonid Grach³⁸³, advocating both national and social interests. The crisis of 1995 - 1998 led to a significant growth of the communist influence. During the 1998 elections, the Communist Party received a significant number of votes in the Crimea, which led to the election of its leader Leonid Grach, the speaker of the Crimean parliament. Progress has also been demonstrated by the party Union, which obtained 4 seats in the parliament. As for the Russian organizations in the parliament, they only got one of their representatives Oleg Rodivilov largely because he was not a deputy before and was not bind in the public opinion with the Block Russia.³⁸⁴

Analyzing the causes of the failure of the Block Russia and the subsequent decline of the Russian organizations in the second half of the 1990's, the director of the Institute of the CIS (Moscow) Konstantin Zatulin as the main reason names the absence of the

³⁷⁹ Официальный сайт Льва Миримского <http://mir.im/content/biografiya>

³⁸⁰ Мальгин 2012: 335.

³⁸¹ Сергей Шувайников. Библиографическая справка на сайте Государственного Совета Республики Крым. Retrieved from <http://crimea.gov.ru/deputy/250>

³⁸² Мальгин 2012: 335.

³⁸³ Personal page of Leonid Grach. Retrieved from <http://lgrach.ru/>

³⁸⁴ Мальгин 2012: 335.

Moscow's interest in supporting the compatriots abroad, and in particular, in the Crimea. Indeed, there were no policies towards the compatriots in the Russian Federation partly due to the negative standpoint of Kyiv, with the exception of the Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who supported the First Congress of the Russian Communities of the Crimea in 1997. Another example of the collaboration could be the Foundation of the Cultural and Humanitarian Connections established in 1996.³⁸⁵

In 1998, the Crimean parliament was composed of the following parties: Communist Party received 38% of the seats, People's Party got only 5%; Union Party and People's Democratic Party obtained 4% of the votes respectively. Party of the Economic Revival and Socialist Party of Ukraine received 1% of the votes respectively. At the same time, 47% of the votes were received by the independent candidates.³⁸⁶

Regarding this election, the absence of the Crimean Tatar parties can be noted. As Natalia Belitser maintains, the growth of the Turkish influence scared the Ukrainian government, which, at first, saw the Crimean Tatars as their political allies in the fight against the Russian majority in the Crimea. As a result, the government of Ukraine, in early 1998, abolished the quota of 14 seats for the Crimean Tatars in the Supreme Council of the Crimea;³⁸⁷ and appointed March 1998 elections strictly by the majority system (one of the candidates who gains more votes, gets a seat in the Supreme Soviet of the Crimea).³⁸⁸ Tatars without the Crimean residence had not received the right to vote. At the same time, the procedure for obtaining Ukrainian citizenship and residence in the Crimea had been tightened. On the eve of 1998 election to the Supreme Council of the Crimea, thousands of Tatars blocked the main highway and railway in Simferopol. Leaders of *Imdat* stated that they were ready to

³⁸⁵ Мальгин 2012: 336.

³⁸⁶ *Депутаты Государственного Совета Крыма. Депутаты Верховного Совета Крыма 3-го созыва.* Retrieved from <http://politika-crimea.ru/state-sovet-kryma/deputat/18-deputaty-3>

³⁸⁷ Белицер, Н. Крымские татары и выборы-2002 в Украине. CA&CC Press. Retrieved from http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2002/journal_rus/cac-04/16.beliru.shtml

³⁸⁸ Хан, Е. А. (2003). Избирательная система как элемент электоральной инженерии. *Ученые записки Таврического национального университета им. В.И. Вернадского. Серия "Политические науки"* 16(1): 142.

resort to machines. In response, Ukraine introduced a tank division in the Crimea and Crimean police was transferred to the barracks. The election was conducted peacefully, but none of the Crimean Tatars was elected to the Crimean parliament.³⁸⁹

The new period in the development of the cultural bonds between Russia and the Crimea started with the change of the government of the Russian Federation. A landmark moment was the opening of the Russian Consulate General in Simferopol, in October, 1999. Gradually, the Russian Community of the Crimea becomes the main partner of the RF in the Crimea. In 2001, the Council of the Russian Compatriots was established where the Russian Community of the Crimea entered.³⁹⁰ Also, during this period, the Crimean organizations made attempts to integrate into the parties at the all-Ukrainian level. The Civil Congress of Ukraine was the example that unified the parties of the Donbas and Kharkiv. After 1998, the Russian - Ukrainian Union (headed by Ivan Simonenko) became the new partner of the Russian organizations. In 2002, as a result of the merge of the For Rus' United (*Za Rus' Yedinuyu* headed by Svistunov) and the Russian - Ukrainian Union, the new *Russian Block* headed by Svistunov formed. As a part of the Russian - Ukrainian Union, Russian Block included the representatives of the Russian Community which used the newly created party for the future representation.³⁹¹

According to the Ukrainian Law of 5 April, 2001, the parties in Ukraine could be established and function only on the state level.³⁹² This document one more time prohibited the regional parties of the Crimea from the participation in the elections. Thus, during 2002 election, the Communist Party of Ukraine obtained 16.1% of the votes in the region; Agrarian Party of Ukraine received 11.8%; People's Democratic Party got 8.6% of the votes. 3.2% of the seats were allocated to the Party of Regions; the same share was given to the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine. Peasant Party of

³⁸⁹ Кашлинский, Р. (1998). Татары вновь завоевывают Крым. *Журнал Вестник online* 14(195). Retrieved from <http://www.vestnik.com/issues/98/0707/win/kashlin2.htm>

³⁹⁰ Мальгин 2012: 336.

³⁹¹ Мальгин 2012: 336.

³⁹² Закон України "Про політичні партії в Україні". (2001, 5 April). Retrieved from <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14ф>

Ukraine, Labour Party, Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine and Democratic Union managed to collect 1.1% of the votes each, while 49.5% of the votes were obtained by the independent candidates.³⁹³ One can trace the downgrade of the Communists due to the struggle of the Parliament and Government of the ARC, but nevertheless, the Communist Party managed to keep the leading position.³⁹⁴ A similar pattern at the time testified to the mismatch of the political interests of the ARC and Ukraine, of a split between center and periphery, of sufficient reducing the influence of the Soviet past in the mentality of the central and western Ukrainians.³⁹⁵

Many experts explain the decreasing influence of the Communists by the conflict between speaker Grach and Prime Minister Kunitsyn. The confrontation between the branches of the Crimean authorities began long before May 1998, when Kunitsyn became prime minister, and Grach became speaker. When the process for the re-division of the Crimean economy began, Parliament was perceived as a means to achieve the control over the land, plants, financial resources, while the government was seen as an obstacle. In addition to the pro-presidential centrist parties with a common faction in the Crimean Verkhovna Rada, and communists, analyst Valery Novikov called three political-financial entities, which had had substantial influence on the political situation in the autonomy. Those were the deputies of Ukraine Anatoliy and Igor Franchuk, Lev Mirimsky and the party Union as well as the ex-deputy prime minister of the Crimea Andriy Senchenko.³⁹⁶ These actors in different sequences and different configurations had been acting as a 'third force' in all of the Crimean processes. Father and son Franchuk, received during the premiership Anatoliy Franchuk considerable economic influence and property; they always

³⁹³ Parties and Elections in Europe. *Crimea*. Retrieved from <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/crimea2.html>

³⁹⁴ Выборы 2002: Война за Крым. (2002, 5 March). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/41492-vybory-2002-vojna-za-krym>

³⁹⁵ Корнеева 2014.

³⁹⁶ Новиков, В. (2001, 13 July). Третья сила локализация политической нестабильности в Крыму в конфликте Грача и Куницына — хитрая маскировка действительной природы крымских конфликтов. *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/tretya_silalokalizatsiya_politicheskoy_nestabilnosti_v_krymu_v_konflikte_gracha_i_kunitsyna_hitraya.html

appeared in the Crimean arena when it comes to the fuel and energy sector, in particular the *Chornomornaftohaz*. The peculiarity lied in the fact that none of these entities had the critical majority, sufficient to capture the political and economic situation (particularly in the ownership and management issues of the industry revenue). Franchuks, Mirimsky and Senchenko did not allow each other and other forces to take up the full autonomy of management. Party Union sought to enter a large number of the coalition government, but the Communists suddenly abandoned their promises and supported significantly fewer candidates of the Union party than expected leader of the party. The first episode of the vote of no-confidence expression to the Crimean government a year ago, observers connected to the contacts between Franchuk and Leonid Grach. None of these political entities could afford the loss of the influence on the situation in the Crimea. They acted against a strong prime minister and against a strong speaker, and against the strengthening of the pro-presidential party. So in order to prevent the prime minister who was responsible for the economy of the regions from strengthening his power, they chose to support the speaker of the parliament.³⁹⁷

As the Crimean expert Mal'gin noted, election to the local authorities, in 2002, was marked by the decrease of the Communist influence, associated with the continuous acute political struggle between the parliament and the government of the ARC, between the Speaker of the Crimean Parliament Leonid Grach and prime minister Sergey Kunitsyn (representative of the pro-Ukrainian National Democratic Party). The major political objective of Kyiv was to prevent the Communists from the access to power. The support for the party Union decreased; this increased the chances of other Russian organizations. In the regional elections of 2002, the Russian Community managed to get 4 mandates in the Crimean parliament (out of 100 deputies) including Sergey Tsekov and Oleg Rodivilov. As to the members of other

³⁹⁷ Новиков 2001.

Russian organizations in the Crimea, Shuvaynikov, as well as the representative of the Union Klychnikov entered the parliament of the ARC.³⁹⁸

In a crisis of the Kuchma's regime and under the pressure on him from the Ukrainian nationalistic and national liberal forces, Russian organizations conducted rather restrained, if not sluggish policy. However, they had a trump card to raise their rates in the political game which was the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars and in general the interethnic relations. It began to aggravate mainly due to the land problems that had arisen with the beginning of the privatization of the land in Ukraine. In March 2004, there was an incident in Simferopol Cotton bar, where gang of the Crimean Tatars in search of the 'Skinheads' beat the visitors. This can be treated as a response of the Crimean Tatar community to the assault on the Crimean Tatar activist Dilyaver Maksudov on 23 March, in Simferopol.³⁹⁹ This and similar facts provoked a series of statements of the Russian community, Party *Russian Block* and other organizations, which, together with a sharp condemnation of the extremism demonstrated a willingness to use force. For the first time in many years, the rally and a small march of the Russian organizations, dedicated to the Day of the Annexation of the Crimea to Russia (19 April, 2004) was attended by the ordinary citizens apart from the party activists.⁴⁰⁰

A new era in the Crimean politics began with the election campaign in 2004, resulted with the Orange Revolution. Although being in opposition to Kuchma's regime, Russian organizations decided to support the candidacy of the representative of 'power', Viktor Yanukovych with whom they associated the preservation of the Russian language in the public life of Ukraine, as well as the continuation of the friendly relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. However, the presidency of Yushchenko provoked the growth of the Russian activism in the

³⁹⁸ Мальгин 2012: 337.

³⁹⁹ В Крыму подрались крымские татары и русские. (2004, 24 March). *Podrobnosti.ua*. Retrieved from <http://podrobnosti.ua/109602-v-krymu-podralis-krymskie-tatary-i-russkie.html>

⁴⁰⁰ Мальгин 2012: 337.

Crimea and increased the number of the Russian organizations as a response. Thus, Shuvaynikov announced the creation of the *Russian Front*.⁴⁰¹

In 2006, eight political blocks and parties took seats in the Crimean Parliament as a result of the election. The distribution of deputies was the following: block *Za Yanukovycha!* (For Yanukovich block unified the Party of Regions and Russian Block) obtained 32.55% of the votes or 44 mandate. The Union party got 7.63% of the seats that equaled 10 mandates. Block of Kunitsyn received the same number of seats in the Crimean parliament. The Communist Party of Ukraine's performance was a bit worse, 6.55% (9 mandates). 8 mandates were allocated to the *Narodnyi Rukh Ukrayiny* (the People's Movement of Ukraine) with 6.26%. The same number of the seats was received by the Block of Yulia Tymoshenko. Block of Natalia Vitrenko *Narodnaya oppozitsiya* (People's opposition) received 4.97% (7 mandates), Block *Ne tak!* got 3.09% (4 mandates).⁴⁰²

After 2002 election, new institutional environment formed demanded from the parties revaluation of their own resources, forcing them to seek a new way of exposure, which would stabilize their political engagement and maximize their symbolic capital. By 2006, a new association, Party of Regions, had formed, which, by 2010, had pushed away the Communist Party in the ARC. Party's initial success was possible due to the balance between the course of friendship with Russia and the course of the Euro-integration.⁴⁰³ The Crimean Tatars started to pursue the double policy, while continuing to push the boundaries conflict: occupy new positions at the state level as part of *Rukh*, in parallel joining the ranks of the Party of Regions (PR) in the Crimea. Mejlis voluntarily started to become the part of the PR, which

⁴⁰¹ Мальгин 2012: 337.

⁴⁰² Оглашены результаты выборов в Верховный совет Крыма (Украина). (2006, 19 April). *ИА REGNUM*. Retrieved from <http://regnum.ru/news/626150.html>

⁴⁰³ Григорян, А. (2014). Особенности эволюции крымской политической элиты в новом тысячелетии. *Культура народов Причерноморья. Вопросы духовной культуры – Исторические Науки* (274): 17.

provided new opportunities for overcoming the ethno-political conflicts on the land question.⁴⁰⁴

Further developments in the region were related to the attempts of the various political forces to form a ruling coalition. Party of Regions and the Russian Block proved to be in the most advantageous position, because they got 44 seats and expected to unite with the close to them party Union, the Communist Party, Blocks of Kunitsyn, Vitrenko and *Ne Tak!*. All of them entered the Crimean parliament under the anti-NATO slogans and called for closer cooperation with Russia. Their opponents, Rukh and Block of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT), were not able to keep counterplay, insofar as the former was supervised by Mejlis, and the latter received strict instructions from Yulia Tymoshenko.⁴⁰⁵

However, in the administration of the President of Ukraine, there was a view that the absolute power of the Party of Regions in the Crimea should be countered by the proven figures from the former leadership of the ARC. The stake was made on Kunitsyn. For a meeting with the Ukrainian President Yushchenko, Kunitsyn, the leader of Mejlis Dzhemilev, Grach and head of the local Division of BYuT Senchenko were invited. During the conversation, President offered the following government of the Crimea: the parliament would be chaired by the representative of the Party of Regions, and Kunitsyn would become the prime minister. At the same time, Yushchenko even named the preferred candidate for the post of the speaker. It was Ivan Burey, the head of the local audit department.⁴⁰⁶ As to the candidate for the prime minister, Yushchenko ignored the provision of the law under which the nomination of the prime minister of the Crimea was the prerogative of the speaker, while the president was only entitled to approve it. The reaction of Yanukovich's Party of Regions on this commotion followed quickly: at the organizational meeting of the winners of the elections as a candidate for speaker of the parliament was

⁴⁰⁴ Корнеева 2014.

⁴⁰⁵ Корнеева 2014.

⁴⁰⁶ Ющенко уже решил, кто возглавит крымский парламент и правительство. (2006, 10 May). *NovoCrimea.Ru*. Retrieved from <https://novocrimea.ru/crimea/66341.html>

nominated Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Gritsenko (who served as Chairman of the Crimean parliament in 1997-1998, before Grach). He was elected on May 12, 2006, at the session of the Verkhovna Rada of the Crimea, and received 71 votes.⁴⁰⁷ Yanukovych needed a quiet actor in the Crimea who did not have an opinion and was ready to justify any. As a response, President Yushchenko appointed a new representative in the Crimea, a well-known local politician Gennady Moskal. As head of the Crimean police department, General Moskal quickly dispersed the main criminal groups in the region.⁴⁰⁸

However, the newly elected deputies were not frustrated by the appointment of Moskal: his capabilities were to inform Kiev about what was happening on the ground. At the next session, the presidium of the Verkhovna Rada was elected from the Regions, Communists, supporters of Vitrenko and members of the party Union. The head of the Russian Community of the Crimea Sergey Tsekov became the first deputy chairman of the Crimean parliament. Elected according to the list of the Communist Party, chief of the newspaper *Krymskaya Pravda* Mikhail Baharev became Vice-Chairman.⁴⁰⁹ The next step in the formation of the new Crimean government was the appointment of the prime minister. As it turned out, in the Presidential Administration of Ukraine, a suitable candidate for the position was not found. However, the strong personality from the Party of Regions as a head of the government, also did not suit. However, here, the interests of Kyiv and speaker Gritsenko matched. In June 2006, the Crimean parliament approved Viktor Plakida, an unknown electrical engineer, as a prime minister.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁷ Спикером ВС Крыма стал Анатолий Гриценко. (2006, 12 May). *Коммерсант.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1697737>

⁴⁰⁸ Назначен постоянный представитель Президента в Крыму. (2006, 17 May). Информационное агентство УНІАН. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/5043-naznachen-postoyannyiy-predstavitel-prezidenta-v-krymu.html>

⁴⁰⁹ Сформирован состав президиума Верховной Рады Крыма. (2006, 19 May). *Корреспондент.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/154168-sformirovan-sostav-prezidiuma-verhovnoj-rady-kryma>

⁴¹⁰ Назначен премьер Крыма и министры. (2006, 2 June). *Корреспондент.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/155353-naznachen-premer-kryma-i-ministry-obnovleno>

In 2007, Moskal' abandoned his post in the Crimea. Formally, it was a question of moving it to the position of deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), and some observers believe that by doing so, Yushchenko was trying to take control over the security services.⁴¹¹

In 2009, Russian Community of the Crimea/ Russian Block felt strong enough to stand against the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of the Crimea Gritsenko, who has been rightly accused of the policy in the interest of a business group, to which he belonged.⁴¹² As a result of the parliamentary crisis in autumn 2009, representatives of the Russian Community had to leave most of their positions and go into the opposition to the leadership of the Crimea⁴¹³ (maintaining support for Yanukovych) that led to the actual disintegration of the coalition *For Yanukovych* in the parliament of the ARC. However, the victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the parliamentary elections of 2010 and the subsequent removal of Gritsenko by him led to the return of the Russian organizations to the power, primarily due to the need to restore the coalition *For Yanukovych* for new appointments in the Crimea.⁴¹⁴

Conflict with Gritsenko became, meanwhile, the catalyst of the new important processes within pro-Russian organizations of the Crimea. Even in 2008, without any connection with the Russian movement, the organization *Civil Active of the Crimea* formed. It was headed by Sergey Aksyonov.⁴¹⁵ This organization had no ideological base and opposed the mayor of Simferopol 'regionalist' Gennady Babenko, who supported the Speaker of the Crimean parliament Gritsenko. Civil Active acted forcefully enough, used rallies as methods of taking power in Simferopol, essentially

⁴¹¹ Аргуп Миллер: Москаль ушел. В Крыму зачистка? (2007, 22 January). *Maidan.org*. Retrieved from <http://maidan.org.ua/static/krymmai/1169476622.html>

⁴¹² Гриценко, Анатолий Павлович, Бывший губернатор Херсонской области. *Lenta.ru* Архив. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/lib/14164085/>

⁴¹³ Из крымской Партии регионов вышли лидеры Русской общины. (2009, 16 September). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2009/09/16/crimea/>

⁴¹⁴ Президент снял бывшего крымского спикера с поста главы Херсонской администрации. (2010, 21 June). *milli-firka.org*. Retrieved from <http://www.milli-firka.org/content/HCAA/title/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82-%D1%81%D0%BD%D1%8F%D0%BB/>

⁴¹⁵ Гражданский актив Крыма. Официальный блог. Retrieved from <http://gak-crimea.livejournal.com/>

a political siege.⁴¹⁶ A similar conflict of Russian organizations with the Speaker of the Crimean parliament brought the positions of Russian Community of the Crimea, Russian Block and Civil Active closer, and soon, after the release of their representatives, from the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Crimea, they announced the creation of the movement Russian Unity (*Russkoye Yedinstvo*).⁴¹⁷ It was the draft of the new Russian mega-organization designed to overcome the fragmentation of the Russian political movements in the Crimea. Russian Unity was chaired by Tsekov and Aksyonov. In late 2009, Russian Unity launched activity in order to incorporate 10 other Russian organizations into their ranks.⁴¹⁸ So, after the failure of the head of the Russian Block Svistunov to enter the Russian Unity, he was promptly dismissed and the party received a new guide. The effectiveness of the political campaign of the Russian Unity was so great that even usual opposition in the Russian movement Shuvaynikov with his Russian Front decided to join it.⁴¹⁹ Proof of the impact of the Russian Unity was the return of its members to their positions in the parliament and government of the ARC, after the victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the election, in 2010, and the removal of Gritsenko.

In 2005 - 2010, a clear increase in the number of the Russian organizations and the growth of sympathy for them on the part of the electorate was recorded. There is a consolidation and internal structuring, and a leadership of the Russian Community of the Crimea. There were political alliances (such as Russian Unity) seeking to include smaller organizations. One can also note a more effective information policy and attempts to develop a more precise ideology.⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁶ Гражданский актив Крыма провел антимэровский митинг. (2009, 16 April). *QHA, Агентство "Крымские новости"*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/ru/photo/grajdanskii-aktiv-krima-provel-antimerovskii-miting-17/1958/>

⁴¹⁷ Партия "Русское Единство" – стратегический партнёр Русской общины Крыма. Официальный сайт. Retrieved from <http://www.ruscrimea.ru/>

⁴¹⁸ Коалиция русских организаций в Крыму расширяется. (2009, 12 December). *Zarusskiy.Org – Новости Малороссии (Украины)*. Retrieved from http://molodie.org/content/russkie_kryma_obedinilis

⁴¹⁹ Русские Крыма объединились. (2009, 14 December). *Русское Единство*. Retrieved from http://molodie.org/content/russkie_kryma_obedinilis

⁴²⁰ Мальгин 2012.

During 2010 elections in the Crimea, the Party of Regions obtained 80 seats out of 100. The party entered the elections with the program of the collaboration with Russia and the demand of the official status for the Russian language. Meanwhile, Communist Party received 5 seats, *Rukh*, Russian Unity, *Syl'na Ukrayina* obtained 5, 3 and 2 seats respectively. Among 80 seats in the Crimean parliament, 48 mandates were elected according to the single member constituency system. They embraced the 'recruits' and the representatives of other political parties and blocks; non-party candidates and representatives of the business groups. Thus, according to the research, 71% of the candidates in 2010 elections were from the economic groups.⁴²¹

One of the first steps of President Yanukovych was actually appointment of (with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC) Prime Minister Vasily Dzharty, the curator of the Crimea Party of Regions during the campaign and the representative of the Donetsk business administrative circles.⁴²² During the prime ministry of Vasiliy Dzharty there were some important changes. It coincided with the period of the President's administrative reforms in the country. In January 2010, for the first time, agencies and national committees in the government were dismissed. Significant positive changes took place in the relations with the Crimean Tatars. Dzharty facilitated the early resolution of the conflict over the Cathedral mosque. The land disputes for a long time impeded the construction of the mosque. Thanks to Dzharty, land for a mosque had been allocated.⁴²³ The Council of Ministers of the Crimea, recorded that for the first time in 20 years there had been a voluntary release of the land squatting. Moreover, the 'cleansing' in the ranks of the Crimean elites was appreciated by the Crimeans. Thus, many politicians and celebrities were arrested. Among them, the former speaker of the Crimean parliament Anatoly Gritsenko, former deputy of the Simferopol City Council Joseph Feingold, mayors of Alushta,

⁴²¹ Валентина Самар (2010, 19 November). Победа над Крымом. *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/pobeda_nad_krymom.html

⁴²² Мальгин 2012.

⁴²³ Григорян 2014: 18.

Partenit, Gurzuf, Alupka, Simeiz could be found. However, in August 2011, Dzharty died because of illness.⁴²⁴

On 16 June, 2011, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law regarding Council of Ministers of the Crimea. According to the Crimean prime minister Vasyl Dzharty, the document bore no threat to the autonomy of the region, but would allow to use the potential of the executive authorities in the implementation of the social and economic reforms initiated by the president.⁴²⁵ According to the law, the Council of Ministers should have the right to suspend acts of the executive bodies of the local self-government with a simultaneous appeal to a court to terminate them. It is important that, in case of the executive committees of the city councils, the right to cancel the decisions of them, according to the law of Ukraine "On Local Self-Government", had belonged to the city council, acting on behalf of the relevant territorial community.⁴²⁶

Among the main tasks of the Council of Ministers of the Crimea, according to the document, the development of the budget of the ARC and changes thereto on the basis of a uniform tax and budget policy of Ukraine were listed. Therefore, the Crimea lost the opportunity to negotiate with Kyiv on the development and implementation of a single-channel budget securing up to 80% of tax revenues collected on the territory of the Crimea. Meanwhile, the acting Constitution of the ARC envisaged the financial autonomy of the Crimea, which was thus ignored, because did not take into account regional specifics of the peninsula (the growth of revenues in the budget during the holiday season).⁴²⁷ One of the main tasks of the Council of Ministers was ensuring inter-ethnic harmony in the Crimea. However, nothing was said about the fact that the Council of Ministers should work with

⁴²⁴ Григорян 2014: 18.

⁴²⁵ Закон "О Совете Министров АРК" является очередным шагом по укреплению автономии, - В. Джарты. (2011, 16 June). *Ukrinform*. Retrieved from http://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-lastnews/1207220-zakon_o_sovete_ministrov_ark_yavlyayetsya_ocherednim_shagom_po_ukrepleniyu_avtonomii___v_dgarti_1063527.html

⁴²⁶ Закон Украины №3530-VI "О Совете министров Автономной Республики Крым" (2011, 16 June). Retrieved from http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=45811

⁴²⁷ Закон Украины "О Совете министров Автономной Республики Крым" 2011.

registered actors according to the law national organizations,⁴²⁸ therefore opening the space for the cooperation with the Mejlis. The document ignored the Constitution of the ARC as the main instrument of 'checks and balances'. Crimean executive branch received today a fairly significant powers, while Supreme Council remained 'weak'.

After Dzharty's death in August 2011, Yanukovych decided on the candidacy of the new Chairman of the Crimean government, Anatoliy Mogilev. The new prime minister said he would continue his predecessor's line, and held a meeting with the head of the Mejlis Dzhemilev. During Mogilev's prime ministry, the Council of Ministers aimed at attracting investments in the region's economy. It was successful. It implemented a number of projects, including the modernization and construction of a modern winery in Bakhchisaray district. It also created new jobs for the Crimeans. Besides, the Law "On Investment Activity in the Crimea" was adopted. Nevertheless, one should recognize that Mogilev was more a bureaucrat than a politician. Despite the fact that, over the whole period of political crisis in Ukraine, the Crimean government served as a guarantor of stability in the peninsula, the course of the events in Kyiv began to be a growing threat to the Crimean security. The situation required an adequate response. Mogilev appeared to be quite skeptical to the desires and aspirations of the Crimeans to come to the defense of the republic and to defend its right to self-determination. The results were not long in coming. On February 27, deputies of the Crimean parliament voted for no-confidence to the Council of Ministers headed by Anatoliy Mogilev. During that, 55 deputies out of 64 registered voted in favor of the decision. At the same session (by 53 votes) they approved the new chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sergey Aksyonov, the deputy of the Crimean parliament and head of the party Russian Unity.⁴²⁹

As it can be seen from the analysis of the political actors in the Crimea, the parties and groups that were propagating Russian language and connections with the Russian Federation dominated the political spectrum. As one of the interviewees

⁴²⁸ Закон Украины "О Совете министров Автономной Республики Крым" 2011.

⁴²⁹ Григорян 2014: 19.

noted, "Ukrainian government failed to make the Crimea truly Ukrainian" in the sense that the use of the Ukrainian language in the education and mass culture, the elites orientations were not in line with the nation-building policies of Ukraine.⁴³⁰ Apart from the discussed peculiarities of the political structures in the ARC, the region used to be dependent on Kyiv financially. Tourism and agriculture of the region were insufficient sources of the budget even together with the capital investments.

4.5. Conclusion

The analysis of the dynamics in the Crimea in 1991 - 2014 showed the importance of this period from the political and analytical points of view. In the early 1990s, the political system of Ukraine, the Crimean Autonomous republic formed as well as the relations between both. This period demonstrated not only the vague character of the state norms and procedures, but also the domination of the president in the system, particularly the role of personality of the leader. It also proved the lack of the attention to the national policies, particularly the securing the rights of the formerly deported people. As one of the respondents noted, the "Crimean political arena never showed our belonging to Ukraine. There always have been Russian actors."⁴³¹ The ethnic composition determined the results of the elections to the parliament. Kyiv, in its turn, was trying to balance by means of the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Crimea. Besides, the budget of the republic was dependent on Kyiv. The lack of the Ukrainian language in the secondary and higher education, mass media was also discussed in this chapter and noted by the respondents.

The discussed political, economic and social structures of the region are seen as explanatory of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2013 and consequent separation of the

⁴³⁰ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 26 October). Ankara.

⁴³¹ Interview with the 25-year old Crimean Tatar activist, living in Turkey. (2016, 26 October). Ankara.

Crimea. The next chapter of this thesis concentrates on the domestic factors of the Crimean separation and the dynamics of the February - April 2014.

CHAPTER 5

DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRIMEAN CRISIS

5.1. Introduction

The events of 2013 - 2014 that started with the failure of the Ukrainian government to ratify the EU Association Agreement, followed by the protests in the main square of Kyiv, and led to the separation of the Crimea and the Eastern regions of the country used to be analyzed from the position of the realist and imperialist Russian policies. This chapter, among other issues, concentrates on the domestic policies of the Ukrainian government and the political system of the country that created preconditions for the separation of the regions. This analysis is followed by the study of the consequences of the separatism in the East and the Crimea for Ukraine. Using the neoclassical realist approach, I argue that the weak political institutions of Ukraine (and in the Crimea as its part), the inability of the political actors to follow the formal norms and procedures, the capture of the presidential post by a political actor with a strong propensity for non-institutional behavior, as well as the low commitment to the democratic norms and procedures determined the political system which was not able to solve the political crisis started in November 2013. In addition, the lack of powers of the Crimea and the absence of clear delineation of the powers between the center and the Autonomous Republic aggravated the situation. Besides, the inconsistent nation-building policies, the absence of national minorities protecting legislature, the failure to adopt regional language law determined the different loyalties of its regions and raised the ability of the Crimean leaders to use nationalism and identity issues for the mobilization of the mass support during Anti-Maidan and referendum. The inconsistent foreign policy and the use of the East-West divide, as well as the 'self - other' dichotomy for the political goals, jeopardized the region dissatisfaction and provoked the government whose losses in the case of the victory of nationalists would be significant. Additionally, the expertise cannot

neglect the mismanagement during the political crisis, legal provisions and violence against the protestors, and the economic crisis that made it possible for the Crimean government to use the crisis situation for extracting human resources.

At the same time, the Crimean elites appeared to be solid and demonstrated decisiveness in the crisis situation, basically they managed to use their historical chance for self-definition and unification with Russia. The basis of their consolidation appeared to be the Russian ethnic identity as well as the pro-Russian political orientation in the parliament that allowed them to establish connection with the Russian leadership. Additionally, I will demonstrate the role played by military and media in the Crimea.

5.2. Political System of Ukraine and its Domestic Policies as a Precondition for the Political Crisis of 2014

The Crimea's lust for self-determination goes back to the early years of the Ukrainian independence. In 1990s, Ukrainian government managed to curb the Crimea's desire to separate and join Russia. Nevertheless, the subsequent developments in Ukrainian state-building created the conditions, in which the Crimeans univocally undertook decision to enter the Russian Federation. In this part of the thesis, I argue that the form of the government, the undemocratic policies of the government, the status and power of the Crimea within Ukraine, created a fruitful soil for political crisis and separatism in Ukraine.

5.2.1. Form of the Government, Weak Institutions and Non-Democratic Procedures as the Factors of the Separation

The form of the government in Ukraine, after 1991, defined the peculiarities of the political processes in the country: weak institutions and the actors not adherent to the legal rules of the game, as well as the lack of the dialogue and consensus between different political forces as to the main directions of the domestic and foreign

policies made it impossible to take crucial decisions which would be accepted by the whole population, as well as to curb the political crisis with no loss. Ukraine's governmental system, until June 1996, had been weak semi-presidential regime. Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk and Taras Kuzio characterized it as a hybrid regime: the government was subordinated to the president, but also accountable and responsible to the parliament.⁴³²

In December 1994, president Kuchma submitted to the parliament the draft law on state power and local government which delegated wide powers to president. The draft caused conflict between two branches that was solved only after 6 months, in May 1995, when the Constitutional Agreement was concluded. Parliament agreed on it simply in order to avoid referendum (Verkhovna Rada had low popularity among Ukrainians) and in order to postpone the struggle, insofar the Agreement was not a solution but rather a short break.⁴³³ As Oleh Protsyk shows, presidential decree making dominated the political process and the design of public policy in Ukraine during the first post-communist decade. Perceived necessities of economic and social reforms, political imperatives and electoral concerns all played a role in determining the extent of the presidents' reliance on decree powers.⁴³⁴

After long discussions on June 28, 1996, the new constitution was adopted. Two main achievements of the new Constitution were the separation of powers; and the establishment of semi-presidential system, however with 'domination of presidency'.⁴³⁵ New Constitution declared Ukraine's parliament, Verkhovna Rada, 'a sole body of legislative power';⁴³⁶ it has the right to amend the Constitution of Ukraine and call All-Ukrainian referendum.⁴³⁷ It is important that Verkhovna Rada

⁴³² Rainow, P., D'Anieri, P., Kravchuk, R., & Kuzio, T. 2000: 99.

⁴³³ Solchanyk, R. (1998). The Post-Soviet Transition in Ukraine: Prospects for Stability. In T. Kuzio (Ed.). *Contemporary Ukraine: dynamics of post-Soviet transformation*. Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe: 22.

⁴³⁴ Protsyk, O. (2004). Ruling with decrees: presidential decree making in Russia and Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56(5): 652.

⁴³⁵ Wilson, A. (1998), Ukraine. In R. Elgie. (Ed.). *Semi-presidentialism in Europe*. Oxford University Press: 278.

⁴³⁶ Constitution of Ukraine. (1996, 28 June), Art. 75.

⁴³⁷ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art. 85.

received crucial power to impeach president. However, impeachment had to be initiated by the votes of two-thirds of the deputies and final vote had to be made by three-quarters after the examination of the case by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine with the conclusion of state treason or other crime.⁴³⁸ According to the Constitution, Verkhovna Rada terminated the authority of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC), based on the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine that the latter violated Constitution or laws of Ukraine; designated special elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the ARC.⁴³⁹

The Constitution designated the Verkhovna Rada as the sole law-making body. In practice, however, this authority must be shared with the president, Cabinet of Ministers, and National Bank, all of which possessed the right of legislative initiative.⁴⁴⁰ Committees of the parliament were deprived the right to propose legislation in order to avoid businessmen lobbying the committees. Verkhovna Rada received the right to dissolve the Cabinet of Ministers with the vote of no-confidence.⁴⁴¹ However this did not imply new elections. President, within 60 days, could appoint new cabinet.⁴⁴² New Constitution gave a power of veto to the president that can be overcome by two-third of deputies in the parliament.⁴⁴³ President can dissolve the parliament if within thirty days of the single regular session meetings of the deputies could be started.⁴⁴⁴ This was a very important provision to prevent some factions from the block of Verkhovna Rada's work. However, in this case, to provide stable work of the parliament after the pre-term elections to Verkhovna Rada, its authority cannot be terminated for a year from the day of elections.⁴⁴⁵

⁴³⁸ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art.111.

⁴³⁹ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art. 85.

⁴⁴⁰ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art. 93. D'Anieri et al.1998:100.

⁴⁴¹ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art. 87.

⁴⁴² D'Anieri et al.1998: 101.

⁴⁴³ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art. 94.

⁴⁴⁴ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art. 90.

⁴⁴⁵ Constitution of Ukraine 1996, Art. 90.

Kataryna Wolczuk characterized the system, established by the new constitution as presidential-parliamentary system, with two key features: asymmetrical control over the cabinet (the president nominated and recalled it, but parliament could take a vote of no-confidence in it) and law-making authority granted to the president. She continued by stressing that in the attempt to balance out the authority of the president and parliament, the powers of those institutions were duplicated rather than separated. New constitution did not outline the role of parties in structuring the executive-legislative relations.⁴⁴⁶

The Orange revolution of 2004 changed parliamentary election law, subnational government election law, and, most importantly, the Constitution. Mixed electoral system with half of the members elected from single member districts was changed to a proportional representation system with all members elected from party lists. Threshold for parties and electoral blocks was lowered from 4% to 3%.⁴⁴⁷ Changes to the balance of powers between president and parliament can be summarized as a move from strong president-parliamentary system to a strong parliamentary-president system of government. The parliamentary majority now had to be formed within one month of single parliament convocation or after the dissolution of the parliamentary majority. Otherwise, president had the right to dissolve the parliament.⁴⁴⁸ The majority had to submit to the president the candidates for prime minister and other ministers. The president proposed the prime minister's candidacy to the parliament for approval after consultations with a coalition of deputy factions that constitute the majority in the parliament.⁴⁴⁹ The parliament had the right to dismiss these officials unilaterally. Amendments included very important provision –

⁴⁴⁶ Wolczuk 2001: 239.

⁴⁴⁷ Закон України "Про внесення змін до Конституції України" (2005). Art.44. Retrieved from <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2222-15>

Christensen, R. K., Rakhimkulov, E. R., & Wise, C. R. (2005). The Ukrainian Orange Revolution brought more than a new president: What kind of democracy will the institutional changes bring?. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 38(2): 222 - 223.

⁴⁴⁸ Constitution of Ukraine, as amended on December 8, 2004, Art. 83. Retrieved from <http://portal.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/27396.pdf>

⁴⁴⁹ Constitution of Ukraine, as amended on December 8, 2004, Art. 88, 114.

if a deputy did not join the faction of the party he had been elected from or leaved his faction, his mandate would be terminated.⁴⁵⁰

Premier-presidentialism, which functioned in Ukraine during 2006 - 2010, prevented the monopolization of power in the hands of any political actor by effectively dividing the executive and maintaining just enough veto players to block any attempts at unilateral rule. However, it appeared to be vulnerable to the president's attempts at consolidating power after the 2010 presidential elections. According to Sydorchuk, two factors contributed to the failure of premier-presidentialism in Ukraine:

the generally low commitment of the main political actors to formal rules during the independence period which naturally resulted in a weak institutionalization of these rules and the particular constellation of power which emerged at that time, i.e., the capture of the presidential post by a political actor with a strong propensity for non-institutional behavior.⁴⁵¹

As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the important issue was the adoption of the Law on the Council of Ministers of the Crimea.⁴⁵² The analyst Nikolay Kuz'min commenting on the Law stated that the document is the

natural result of the weakness of the political elite of the Crimea as well as the fragmentation of the Crimean society and its inability to create their own elite and defend their interests. That is, if the development of the Crimea there is actually due to the redistribution of the budget across the state, respectively, the Crimea should depend more on central government.⁴⁵³

As Dueck, Mansfield, Snyder suggested, lack of democratic procedures results in the absence of the accountability of the elected officials and the lack of the control of the citizens over the agenda. The electoral behavior in Ukraine demonstrated this assumption - the lack of access to the information, the absence of the well-defined

⁴⁵⁰ Constitution of Ukraine, as amended on December 8, 2004, Art. 81.

⁴⁵¹ Sydorchuk, O. (2014). The impact of semi-presidentialism on democratic consolidation in Poland and Ukraine. *Demokratizatsiya*, 22(1), 117- 144ю

⁴⁵² Закон Украины №3530-VI "О Совете министров Автономной Республики Крым". (2011, 17 June). Retrieved from http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=45811

⁴⁵³ КрымСовмин в Крыму хозяин. По закону. (2011, 17 June). *Milli Firka*. Retrieved from <http://www.milli-firka.org/>.

political and economic program of the parties and candidates before the elections as well as the strong ideological platform lead to the low impact of the citizens on the policy-making or the concentration of the national security decision-making power in the hands of the small circle of elites. This circle is responsible for the evaluation of the threats coming from international system and decisions as to the response to it that inevitably excludes the whole population from the process. Additionally, the personality of the President Yanukovich and his 'Family' aggravated the situation - the authoritarian regime marginalized the institutions and leveled down the citizens' impact on the decision making. The control over media, ban on funding the opposition, extended security services characterized Yanukovich's era.

5.2.2. Consolidation of Power by the President Viktor Yanukovich

Having discussed the peculiarities of the political system of Ukraine, it is important to discuss the policies of the Ukrainian leadership that led to the strengthening power vertical in the country as well as the absence of the dialogue between the government and opposition. In this regard, particular attention will be paid to the presidency of Yanukovich, elected in 2010. One of the first documents approved by Viktor Yanukovich after the election was the law abolished constitutional amendments of 2004. On 30 September, 2010, Constitutional Court undertook a decision that the amendments of 2004 were adopted in contradiction with the legislature of the country and cancelled them.⁴⁵⁴ By this decision, Yanukovich acquired the right to form the Cabinet of Ministers, and the opposition could not impede this due to the lack of coherence and organization as well as the control of the Party of Regions over the parliament.

The negotiations as to the Association Agreement with the EU also appeared to be a litmus paper of the Ukrainian regime. Thus, on October 20, 2011, Viktor Yanukovich was expected to visit Brussels at the invitation of the President of the

⁴⁵⁴ Constitutional Court of Ukraine. (2010, 30 September). Decision of the "On the Correspondence of the Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine of 8 December, 2014 to the Constitution of Ukraine". Retrieved from <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v020p710-10?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYA4.ZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8Ie6>

European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso in order to reach political agreements on the completion of talks on the Association Agreement.⁴⁵⁵ Earlier, on October 11, 2011, main opposition leader of the country Yuliya Tymoshenko was sentenced to seven years in jail and three years of prohibition to occupy state posts.⁴⁵⁶ The reason for this was the misuse of powers by the ex-prime minister during the completion of the gas agreement with Russia in 2009. The decision of the court was followed by the new trial initiated by the Security Service of Ukraine against Tymoshenko. The basis for new criminal case was the \$405.5 million debt of the company United Energy Systems of Ukraine, headed by the ex-prime minister, to the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation. Tymoshenko was accused of transferring the debt of the company to the Ukrainian budget.⁴⁵⁷ The court decision provoked wide responses of the European officials: they addressed to Ukrainian authorities demands to respect the rule of law and expected considerable changes in political situation of the country. However, their appeals fell on deaf ears. Instead, Ukrainian leader declared that if Europe was not ready to accept Ukraine, the negotiation and completion of the agreement could be postponed. The EU reacted decisively and cancelled Yanukovich's visit to Brussels to show who establishes the rules of the game.⁴⁵⁸

Besides, new concerns of the European leaders were provoked by the attempt of the Party of Regions to change the electoral system in the country. In late September 2011, pro-presidential Party of Regions initiated bill in the parliament that would change the electoral system toward the mixed one. In this case, the Party of Regions, which was losing the support of the citizens, could get the support of the independent candidates elected in the single member districts and achieve majority in the

⁴⁵⁵ Янукович может посетить Брюссель 20 октября - Левочкин. (2011, 17 October). *UNIAN*. Retrieved from <https://ria.ru/world/20111017/462573918.html>

⁴⁵⁶ Обнародован текст приговора Тимошенко. (2011, 13 October). *UNIAN*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/554030-obnarodovan-tekst-prigovora-timoshenko.html>

⁴⁵⁷ Обнародован текст приговора Тимошенко. (2011, 13 October).

⁴⁵⁸ Брюссель подтверждает информацию об отмене визита Януковича. (2011, 18 October). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/1273427-bryussel-podtvzhdает-informaciyu-ob-otmene-vizita-yanukovicha>

parliament after 2012 elections. The document, adopted in November, among others, raised the threshold to 5% and prohibited the political blocs to run for the elections.⁴⁵⁹ Moreover, earlier, in May 2011, the Pechersk Court of Kyiv initiated the case against one of the leaders of the Orange Revolution, former Minister of Interior, Yuriy Lutsenko on the basis of the misuse of powers.⁴⁶⁰

Having sentenced Tymoshenko to seven years on the grounds of misusing of power and public finance, the Security Services launched the new case. It was related to the 2006-2007 agreements on the supply of the construction materials by the United Systems of Ukraine Corporation to the Russian Defense Ministry and the exchange of Russian gas. At the same time, Prosecutor General Viktor Pshonka said that criminal cases against Tymoshenko closed in 2005 by his predecessor Sviatoslav Piskun should be revisited. These included the assassination of the Ukrainian deputy Yevhen Shcherban in November 1996. The sentence – seven years in jail plus three years in which Tymoshenko would not be able to occupy any official post – would not allow her to participate in the parliamentary elections of 2012 and 2017, and presidential elections of 2015 and 2020. It meant Tymoshenko would not be an opponent for Yanukovych during the two next presidential terms, and would not compete during the 2020 election campaign. In addition, Tymoshenko would be discredited as a politician.

The consolidation of regime by Yanukovych has been widely discussed by Taras Kuzio. As he argued in his 2012 article, Ukrainian politics, after 2010, became similar to the Russian one due to the role of the security structures in both countries.⁴⁶¹ Apart from the imprisonment of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko, buying off Yushchenko and threatening other politicians, Kuzio mentioned the following issues.

⁴⁵⁹ Council of Europe. OSCE. (2011, 17 October). Conclusion of the Venice Commission regarding the draft law "On the Election of the People's Deputies in Ukraine". Retrieved from http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/994_a54

⁴⁶⁰ Appeal of the Ombudsman of Ukraine to the Judges of the Pechersk Court of Kyiv regarding the violation of the right on personal freedom and inviolability of the former Minister of Interior Yuriy Lutsenko. (2011, 20 May). Retrieved from http://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1438:n-&catid=102:2011&Itemid=124

⁴⁶¹ Taras Kuzio (2012a): Russianization of Ukrainian National Security Policy under Viktor Yanukovych, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 25:4, 558-581.

Thus, he noted that the Western foundations had been taken under surveillance and big business' funding of the opposition had been banned.⁴⁶² SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), Interior Ministry and military were given additional powers to deal with unrest. *Siloviki* had been taken under the control of *The Family*, and its heads were personally loyal to President Yanukovich.⁴⁶³ The funding of the security and intelligence services was increased. Thus, in June 2012, the President adopted the changes to the 2012 budget of Ukraine that increased the financing of the intelligence services by 47 million hryvnias.⁴⁶⁴ Legislation on combating terrorism and extremism was approved.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, on 25 April, 2013, President Yanukovich signed the "Conception of the Fight with Terrorism".⁴⁶⁶ The document was adopted 2 days after the explosion on the Boston marathon and once again enforced the Security Service of Ukraine to act legally despite the mentioned in the document fact that Ukraine is not prone to the terroristic acts and organized activity.

Moreover, the President managed to establish control over the parliament and Parliamentary Chairman Lytvyn by means of the mixed system of elections. He also succeeded in marginalization of the Supreme Court and control over the Media.⁴⁶⁷ According to the analytic media *Zerkalo Nedeli*, channels have been accused of betrayal due to the bulk of information about the Maidan events and have been placed under the strict control of the team formed by the president and his eldest son:

At the top of the pyramid, there is Alexander Gurbich verified himself from the time of the Donetsk governor position who was close to Alexander Yanukovich. Under it one can find Yuri Chmyr, the newly appointed deputy head of the presidential administration, designed to oversee the production and dispersal of the signal in the media. Mikhail

⁴⁶² Kuzio 2012a: 568.

⁴⁶³ Kuzio 2012a: 568.

⁴⁶⁴ Закон України "Про внесення змін до Закону України "Про Державний бюджет України на 2012 рік". (2012, 22 June). Retrieved from <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5022-17>

⁴⁶⁵ Kuzio 2012a: 568.

⁴⁶⁶ Указ Президента України "Про Концепцію боротьби з тероризмом". (2013, 25 April). Retrieved from <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/230/2013>

⁴⁶⁷ Kuzio 2012a: 568.

Pogrebinsky, Anna Herman and Roman Kostitsa have been called to help him.⁴⁶⁸

The latter group was the activists of the Party of Regions. In his turn, Serhiy Kudelia called the presidency of Yanukovych as 'authoritarian restoration'. The coercive approach was used.⁴⁶⁹ However, according to Kudelia, it appeared difficult to consolidate the regime due to the resistance from the western regions of the country.⁴⁷⁰ The logical continuation was the merger of the opposition parties: Tymoshenko's *Fatherland* and Arseniy Yatsenyuk's *Front for Change* allied with the other two major parties—the liberal Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR) and the nationalist Svoboda. Together they won 121 seats out of 255 that were elected through the proportional system.⁴⁷¹ This idea is shared by Mykola Riabchuk who maintains that the identity split in Ukraine had an impact on its development, preventing consolidation of the regime, no matter democratic or authoritarian. He adds that the ethnic identity issue dominates the agenda of the parties and actors, therefore determines the outcome of the political rivalry, as well as the formulation of the domestic and foreign policies.⁴⁷²

Alexander J. Motyl went further and used the term 'Sultan of Ukraine'⁴⁷³ regarding the Ukrainian President. The author distinguished the following features of Yanukovych's regime that allowed him to come up with such a conclusion. Firstly, Motyl pointed out regime's incompatibility with the institutions and developed economy. Secondly, the decision-making process was seen as ineffective and inefficient due to the passivity of the citizens, lack of initiative, and the control of the

⁴⁶⁸ В преддверии президентской кампании-2015 олигархи "сдали" телеканалы Семье. (2013, 28 December). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/POLITICS/v-preddverii-prezidentskoy-kampanii-2015-oligarhi-sdali-telekanaly-seme-135976_.html

⁴⁶⁹ Kudelia, S. (2014). The house that Yanukovych built. *Journal of Democracy*, 25(3), 19-34.

⁴⁷⁰ Kudelia 2014: 23 - 24.

⁴⁷¹ Kudelia 2014: 25.

⁴⁷² Riabchuk, M. (2012). Ukraine's 'muddling through': National identity and postcommunist transition. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 45(3), 439-446.

⁴⁷³ Motyl, A. J. (2010). The New Political Regime in Ukraine—Toward Sultanism Yanukovych-Style?. *Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper*, (10/06). Retrieved from http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Alexander_J_Motyl_THE_NEW_POLITICAL_REGIME_IN_UKRAINE.pdf

process by the president. Thirdly, the government apparatus was considered ineffective, while army, secret police were not acting. Finally, Motyl added the lack of education and the public derision to the characteristics of Yanukovych's regime.⁴⁷⁴

The decisions undertaken by the President Yanukovych allowed him to consolidate the power within the country, on the one hand, and minimize the number of those who can influence the decision making process. Consequently, due to these issues and the opposition to him in the Crimean parliament, his decisions were perceived as a threat to the Russian-speaking Crimea by the leadership of the ARC. The following section of the thesis will elaborate on the issue of nation-building and nationalism in Ukraine that will help to understand the role of ethnicity and state-sponsored nationalism in the extraction of the country resources.

5.2.3. Nation-Building Policies in Ukraine

The analysis of the political system and regime in Ukraine showed the formal framework, which should be complemented by the analysis of the policies, particularly the issue of identity. In this part of the thesis, I analyze how the Crimea and the Eastern regions of Ukraine appeared to be different from the rest of Ukraine in terms of identity; and how inconsistent policies of the Ukrainian government, throughout last 20 years, impeded the construction of the civic nation in Ukraine.

According to Taras Kuzio, nation-building process in Ukraine, in the 1990s, was going toward the creation of the civic nation; however national democrats always insisted it should be based on the traditions and values of the core ethnic group, i.e. Ukrainian.⁴⁷⁵ The Crimea had been always treated differently by the Ukrainian authorities and there are three factors of this. First, two thirds of its population were Russians. Second, Tatars began to return in 1980s and became a minority in the Crimea. Finally, the history of the Crimea made Ukrainian authorities to treat it differently. The separatist attempts of 1992 – 1994 were halted and status quo

⁴⁷⁴ Motyl 2010: 3-4.

⁴⁷⁵ Kuzio 1996: 592.

remained. As the identity analysis showed the peninsula itself, its regional identity, had the primary importance, followed by the significance of its close ties with Russia.⁴⁷⁶ Besides, backing the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea by the national democrats was seen as a good way to balance pro-Russian separatists.⁴⁷⁷

It is noteworthy that the nation-building policies in Ukraine were changing depending on the political leader and situation in the near abroad. Thus, when in early 1990s, Yeltsin put emphasis on democratization and free-market reforms, Ukrainian president Kravchuk concentrated on nation- and state-building, perceiving Russia as ethnoterritorial 'Other' which was quite useful for the nation-building. After 1994 elections in Ukraine, when Kuchma came to power, Russia was no longer perceived as ideological enemy. New president introduced economic reforms; Russia was no longer seen as threatening the Ukrainian elite. Perception changed from ethnoterritorial to territorial. Moreover, the Black Sea Fleet deployment in Sevastopol, solution of the border issues between two countries, all served to constituting Russia as the 'Other'.⁴⁷⁸

As Stephen Shulman argued, in 1990s, support for nationalism (Ukrainian independence) and democratization went hand in hand with nation-building and had strengthened the pro-reform and pro-Western camp, that is 'ethnic Ukrainian' nationalism.⁴⁷⁹ Another factor which was defined by the scholars as central to nation-building, in addition to national integration, was territorial consolidation. In the first half of the 1990s, more time was spent on discussion of the new Ukrainian constitution, national symbols, cultural and language policies than democratic and human rights. Ukraine completed the international recognition of its borders and a resolution of the Crimean separatism in the second half of the 1990s.⁴⁸⁰ Between 1997 and 1999, Russia recognized Ukraine's borders. In other words, the

⁴⁷⁶ Kuzio 1996: 602 - 603.

⁴⁷⁷ Kuzio 1996: 597.

⁴⁷⁸ Kuzio 2001: 356.

⁴⁷⁹ Shulman, S. (2005). Ukrainian nation-building under Kuchma. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 52(5), 32-47.

⁴⁸⁰ Roeder, P. G. (1999). Peoples and states after 1989: The political costs of incomplete national revolutions. *Slavic Review*, 58(4), 854-882.

consolidation of Ukrainian territory had taken up Kuchma's entire first term in office. Therefore, in 2000s more attention was to be paid to the nation-building process and democracy strengthening policies.

Much of attention was also paid to the history writing. During Kuchma' second term (2000 - 2004), Ukrainophile school which stood for the use of the Ukrainian language and national symbols and re-unification of Ukraine with Europe dominated educational system and intellectual discourse, while Eastern Slavic that called for closer relations with Russia and Belarus, as well as importance of the Russian language and culture for Ukraine school was more represented by centrist political parties (e.g. Party of Regions).⁴⁸¹

Important to note that the national democratic political forces that were the backbone of anti-regime protests and the Orange Revolution, have been the strongest supporters of democratization, the greatest opponents of authoritarianism and the strongest proponents of a foreign policy of 'returning to Europe'. Over the course of two decades of independence, nation and state building in Ukraine has strengthened the national democratic, and thereby Orange Revolution, political camp by increasing the proportion of Ukrainians holding an 'ethnic Ukrainian' identity, enabling the candidate espousing this identity, Yushchenko, to win the 2004 elections.⁴⁸² 'Eastern Slavic' nationalism in Ukraine has remained passive at two crucial junctures in contemporary Ukraine's history: the drive to independence in the late Soviet era and during anti-regime protests and the Orange Revolution during Kuchma's second term in office. 'Eastern Slavic' nationalism, grounded in a preference for stability over change and ensconced in the paternalistic political culture of eastern Ukraine, has reacted to rather than initiated or supported, protests and democratic breakthroughs in Ukraine from the late 1980s to the 2004 Orange Revolution.⁴⁸³

⁴⁸¹ Kuzio 2006: 422 -423.

⁴⁸² Shulman 2005.

⁴⁸³ Kuzio 2010: 294 - 295.

According to Kuzio, the division between abovementioned centrist and centre-right camps in their views as to the content of the nation-building policies, and relations with Russia, explains why the domestic lobby for reform was unable to unite and remained weak. The centrist Party of Regions that strengthened its positions after 2010 presidential elections brought its vision and policies to the agenda again. The 2012 Law on Regional Languages, which granted the special status to the languages of the national minorities constituting 10% of the population and more in their regions, was one of the important provisions of this period. However, this government was swept by the civic uprising and ethnic Ukrainian nationalism that backed the European vector of the foreign policy. The lack of coherent nation-building policies, dialogue between different ethnic groups and their political representatives, and inconsequent implementation of these policies in Ukraine even after the completion of the territorial consolidation and overcoming economic crisis of 1990s, made it impossible to complete the process of constructing the civic nation in Ukraine and consolidation of the different ethnic groups. Different loyalties of the Ukrainian regions appeared to be very crucial during the political crisis of 2014.

The pro-Russian Crimean elites used the existing East - West divide in Ukraine, basically by emphasizing the 'Self - Other' dichotomy where the supporters of the EuroMaidan appeared to be the Other. They speculated on the threatened Russian identity by means of the language law, and the rhetoric of Ukraine that would become the raw material supplier for the EU in order to mobilize support of the Crimeans during the referendum. At the same time, as the Russian scholar Olga Baysha maintained in her analysis of the blogs of *Ukrayins'ka Pravda*, popular Internet media with the nationalistic standpoint, it jeopardized existing social cleavages, as demonstrated by the Anti-Maidan protests that took place across the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine. With the reference to the Enlightenment discourse of the progress, she uses the concept of exclusion to prove that the EuroMaidan supporters produced the domestic 'other' as an impediment of the human

progress.⁴⁸⁴ The domestic policies analysis would be incomplete without understanding the international context. The use of the neoclassical realism as well as the area approach requires the analysis of the independent variable which is the international system as well as the foreign policy of the state or dependent variable.

5.3. Foreign Policy Inconsistencies of the Ukrainian Government

The absence of the consensus as to the direction of the domestic and foreign policy between the main political forces in Ukraine made it impossible to conduct the consequent foreign policy and resulted in the failure to finalize the EU Association Agreement in November 2013. The neglect of the interests of the half of the Ukrainian population created political crisis aggravated by the inability of the leadership to cope with the protest movement. As Paul D'Anieri stated, Ukraine's foreign policy passivity results from three uneasy balances: an external balance between the pulls of Russia and the West; an internal balance between Ukraine's regions, and an internal balance between forces of democracy and authoritarianism. These balances mean that while few are happy with Ukraine's policy, no one has been able to decisively change it. While Ukraine's domestic regional division is unlikely to change, change in the balance between domestic political forces or that between international forces could reduce the inertia in Ukrainian foreign politics, most likely leading to a drift toward Russia.⁴⁸⁵

5.3.1. The EU - Ukraine Association Agreement's Abrogation

The EU Association Agreement failure appeared to be the cause of the mass rallies in Ukraine. It was important not only due to the economic benefits, as well as political cooperation, but it also had symbolic significance and meant opportunity for reforms.

⁴⁸⁴ Baysha, O. (2015). Ukrainian Euromaidan: The exclusion of otherness in the name of progress. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 18(1):13 - 14.

⁴⁸⁵ D'Anieri, P. (2012). Ukrainian foreign policy from independence to inertia. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 45(3), 447-456.

One of the most important provisions of the Agreement was the establishment of the Free Trade Area for the 10 years transitional period.⁴⁸⁶ Each party was to reduce or shift customs duties on the goods of the other party. Both parties would not institute or maintain any customs duties, taxes or other measures on the exportation of goods to the territory of each other. Existing customs duties or measures would be phased out over a transitional period. Each party is restricted from maintaining, introducing or reintroducing export subsidies or other measures on agricultural goods destined for the territory of the other party.⁴⁸⁷

Internal EU estimates showed the total EU loans and grants to Ukraine between 2014 and 2020 would be at least €19 billion, provided Kyiv signed the trade deal with the EU and reached an agreement with the IMF.⁴⁸⁸ The European Commission estimated that the implementation of the EU-Ukraine deal would boost Ukraine's income by approximately €1.2 billion per year and its exports by €1 billion per year.⁴⁸⁹ The agreement was tied to a \$17 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Instead, Yanukovych chose a Russian aid package worth \$15 billion plus a 33% discount on Russian natural gas.⁴⁹⁰

Moreover, apart from the economic gains, it is important to mention the cultural and territorial proximity of the western regions of Ukraine to the EU. According to the research conducted by the State Statistics Committee and the Academy of Science, Institute of Demography between January 2010 and June 2012, 1.2 million people (3.4% of the population) were working abroad. The highest number of Ukrainians,

⁴⁸⁶ Agreement on the Association between the European Union and Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine' Annotation). Retrieved from <http://mfa.gov.ua/ua/about-ukraine/european-integration/ua-eu-association>

⁴⁸⁷ EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. Draft. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/pdf/5_ua_title_iv_trade_and_trade-related_matters_en.pdf

⁴⁸⁸ Ukraine stood to gain 19 billion euros from EU pact. (2013, 18 December). *REUTERS*. Retrieved from <http://in.reuters.com/article/ukraine-eu-idINL6N0JX4H020131218>

⁴⁸⁹ European Union's Factsheet. Frequently asked questions about Ukraine. The EU's Eastern Partnership and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. (2014, 12 June). Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140612_01_en.pdf

⁴⁹⁰ Mousseau, F. (2014, 12 August). What Do the World Bank and IMF Have to Do With the Ukraine Conflict?. *Inter Press Service*. Retrieved from <https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/what-do-the-world-bank-and-imf-have-to-do-with-the-ukraine-conflict>

10.8%, was from the Western regions of Ukraine, while the representatives of other regions constituted 1 - 1.9%.⁴⁹¹ No need to say that these groups of people would benefit economically from the Association with the EU in terms of free movement to the host countries.

Besides, the cultural proximity of the Western Ukraine to the Central European countries is a significant factor. Western Ukraine has a history of political activity and civil society stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century in the Austrian–Hungarian Empire, while Tsarist Russia denied political participation to eastern Ukrainians, even the Ukrainian language was banned.⁴⁹² Besides, religion had strengthened the link between nationalism and reform in Ukraine, as is evidenced by the support given by its two largest denominations – Greek-Catholic and Orthodox – to the Orange Revolution. The former appeared to be in support of the civic participation and democratic values.⁴⁹³

As Kuzio noted, the West expected cooperation with Viktor Yanukovich following his February 2010 election after taking at face value his claim of becoming a more democratic leader, compared with during the 2004 elections, coupled with an expectation he would bring political stability to Ukraine. Partnership quickly evaporated into Disillusionment the following year.⁴⁹⁴ The scholar admits that disillusionment was the result of the numerous factors. One of them was the abolishment of the National Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and the Euro-Atlantic coordination body therefore the elimination of the NATO from the agenda.⁴⁹⁵ Besides, the lack of the implementation of the EU requirements,

⁴⁹¹ Количество граждан, выезжающих за рубеж на заработки, уменьшилось. (2013, 29 May). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/kolichestvo-grazhdan-vyezzhayuschih-za-rubezh-na-zarabotki-umenshilos-123031_.html

⁴⁹² Kuzio 2010.

⁴⁹³ Prizel, I. (1999). The first decade after the collapse of Communism: why did some nations succeed in their political and economic transformations while others failed?. *SAIS Review*, 19(2), 1-15.

⁴⁹⁴ Kuzio, T. (2012b). Ukraine's relations with the West since the Orange Revolution. *European Security*, 21(3), 395-413.

⁴⁹⁵ Kuzio 2012b: 13.

particularly the release of Tymoshenko sobered the Western leaders up as to the Ukrainian position.⁴⁹⁶

In this regard, the refusal of the government to sign the Agreement was perceived by those who supported the EU integration as an economic failure, as well as the political stagnation and the rule of the oligarchic authoritarian regime. At the same time, as it is shown in the discussion of the Ukraine - Russia relations and the Customs Union, it posed the threat of the growing Russian influence, and, consequently, provoked the Euro-Maidan. In this thesis, I consider these factors as systemic pressure on the Crimean region the costs of which would be the economic and political dependence of the Crimea on Kyiv, the EU agreement, the nationalist policies.

Apart from the European Union, an important dimension of the Ukrainian foreign policy was the Russian Federation, and promoted by Kremlin Customs Union.

5.3.2. The Role of the Eurasian Union and the Russian Federation in Ukraine's Domestic Turmoil

According to Vladimir Putin's article,⁴⁹⁷ the cooperation on the post-Soviet space has started with signing the Union between Russia and Belarus in 1996, followed by the Collective Security Treaty Organization and then Eurasian Economic Community. It was supposed to be followed by the Customs Union, then by Common Economic Space and finalized by the establishing the Eurasian Union. As it was shown before, for the Eastern and Southern Ukrainians, the Union as well as the Russian Federation itself bore symbolic meaning of historical and cultural proximity. However, one should consider economic benefits of entering the Eurasian Union.

The estimated Russian aid package constituted \$15 billion plus a 33% discount on Russian natural gas,⁴⁹⁸ which was quite important for Ukraine. However, as Ardak

⁴⁹⁶ Kuzio 2012b: 14.

⁴⁹⁷ Putin 2011.

⁴⁹⁸ Mousseau 2014.

Yesdauletova and Aitmukhanbet Yesdauletov noted, there were certain obstacles on the way of the EurAsEc implementation. First of all, they pointed out the economic issues. The economies of the republic needed to change their markets in terms of structure, diversification of production and its orientation insofar as they used to be oriented on Western or Eastern countries, but not toward the EurAsEc member states' markets. This was followed by the number of political issues, which were expressed by the leader of Kazakhstan Nazarbaev and Belarus' president Lukashenko. The most important issue was the sovereignty of the member states. Despite the fact that the Union was designed as an economic integration project, it will inevitably lead to the change in political structures of the states. Therefore, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Belarus are concerned about keeping their power in domestic and foreign affairs of their countries and their participation in decision making process within the Union. Lastly, the scholars name the geopolitical issues. The EurAsEc will inevitably have Russia as a center of it due to the size and the amount of the resources it has. Certainly, the integration may serve to Russia's interests mostly.⁴⁹⁹

Ukraine appeared to be vulnerable to Russia's influence due to the gas issue. As it was declared in December 2013, the joining the Customs Union means for Ukraine lower price for the natural gas which will constitute \$200.⁵⁰⁰

According to the recent analyses, in 2013, Ukraine's energy security strategy was based on two specific aspects. Firstly, the prospect of buying cheaper Turkmen gas convincing Gazprom to reduce the price it charges Ukraine from the present \$430 to \$280 per ton. However, due to the transit issue which was only possible to solve through the Russian transportation system, it was unlikely that Ukraine would succeed in this direction. Furthermore, the price of Turkmen gas with the addition of expected transportation costs is would be similar to the price that Russia proposes to Ukraine. Secondly, establishment of the Russian-Ukrainian gas consortium which

⁴⁹⁹ Yesdauletova, A., & Yesdauletov, A. (2014). The Eurasian Union: dynamics and difficulties of the post-soviet integration. *Trames*, 18(1), 3–17.

⁵⁰⁰ СМИ узнали о решении Украины вступить в Таможенный союз. (2013, 7 December). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2013/12/07/sochi/>

would be using Ukraine's transit system allowed Ukraine to expect the price of \$280.⁵⁰¹ Therefore, the economic and energy issue became one of the important factor in Yanukovych' decision. On 21 November, 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers issued decree which suspended the negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU. The document aimed at achieving higher trade volumes with the CIS countries, particularly with the Russian Federation. Moreover, the document orders to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Industrial Policy to propose to the EU and Russian Federation conducting negotiations on trade and economic cooperation. The main emphasis was made on the strengthening the relations with the Customs Union.⁵⁰² However, as one can note this document was Yanukovych's attempt to play with the EU and Russia at the same time, and not taking into consideration the Western Ukraine's lust to Europe appeared to be very risky.

Kudelia, in his analysis of Yanukovych's regime, summarized the risks of the Association Agreement completion as it follows. In case of signing the Agreement, the President could have lost the support of the electorate from the Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, the economic response of Russia could be severe. Finally, the release of Tymoshenko that had been the condition of the EU could destabilize the politics in the country.⁵⁰³

To sum up, the declaration of Yanukovych on the deepening the cooperation between Ukraine and the Customs Union, particularly, Russia, could boost the Ukraine's trade with its members, as well as secure gas deliveries from Russia. However, it would mean higher political dependence of Russia, as well as the economic dependence on Russian *rubl'* which was not very desirable considering the economic weakness of Russia. From the neoclassical realist perspective, the abrogation of the EU DCFTA

²⁷ Yiğit 2013b.

⁵⁰² Department of Information and Communication of the Public Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2014, 27 November). The Government Took the Decision to Suspend the Process of Preparation and Completion of the Association Agreement with the EU. Retrieved from http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=246864953&cat_id=244276429

⁵⁰³ Kudelia 2014: 27.

provoked the EuroMaidan the demands of which could put Ukraine (and the Crimea as a part) into the difficult situation. It posed the threat to the region on the subsystemic and domestic level. That was perceived by the Crimean leadership regarding its interest in the relations with the Russian Federation. The switch of the foreign policy priorities in 2013 provoked the response from the Ukrainian *socium*.

5.4. The Role of the EuroMaidan in the Separation of the Crimea

The mass rallies in Ukraine that started in November 2013, also demonstrated the failure of the Ukrainian government to manage the conflict situation as well as to guarantee peace and security in the country.

5.4.1. Mismanagement of the Ukrainian Leadership During Maidan

Following the failure of the ratification of the EU Association Agreement by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 24 November 2013, a group of opposition leaders organized protest which was defined as one of the biggest mass actions in Ukrainian history, collecting 150 thousand participants, most of them were the students of Kyiv and L'viv universities.⁵⁰⁴ The participants expressed the demands such as the resignation of the Azarov's government claiming they betrayed Ukrainian national interests; the special session of the Verkhovna Rada before the Vilnius summit in order to adopt the legislature on the EU Association Agreement and release Yuliya Tymoshenko from the prison; cancelation of the president's decision of 21 November and signing the Agreement with the EU during the Vilnius Summit. The protestors called the Western countries to introduce personal sanctions against Yanukovich and his team, as well as "not to close the door to Europe for Ukraine".⁵⁰⁵ Besides, the important demand concerning the introduction of the amendments to the Constitution

⁵⁰⁴ Євромайдан вистояв ніч: "Беркут" пытался разогнать митингующих. (2013, 25 November). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/evromaydan-vystoyal-noch-133548_.html

⁵⁰⁵ Євромайдан: "несшиваемый" раскол между властью и обществом. (2013, 31 January). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://gazeta.zn.ua/socium/evromaydan-nesshivaemyy-raskol-mezhdu-vlastyu-i-obschestvom-_.html

which were brought by the Orange Revolution was made. The changes of 2004 aimed at creating parliamentary presidential republic in Ukraine which means the balance of power move to the parliament, stronger party system and the stronger link between the government and citizens.⁵⁰⁶ As Snyder noted, the word '*maidan*' means

... a place where they deliberately meet, precisely in order to deliberate, to speak, and to create a political society. During the protests the word *maidan* has come to mean the act of public politics itself.⁵⁰⁷

The revolution side of the protests was represented by the students, veterans of the Afghan war, Ultras, All-Ukrainian Organization *Maidan*, parties *Bat'kivshchyna*, *Svoboda*, *Udar*, nationalistic organizations *Praviy Sector (Right Sector)*, *Congress of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)*. The social networks like Facebook and Twitter were used in order to coordinate people's actions. As Olga Onuch showed in her research, social media and internet news sites played an important role in diffusing information and framing protest claims, however, they were not mobilizing. She proved that social media compounded and facilitated the role of pre-existing social network ties that were more influential in the mobilization process.⁵⁰⁸

One of the first actions of the protestors was the petition to the US president Obama with the demand to introduce sanctions against Ukrainian president Yanukovych and his team. This petition gathered 135 thousand signatures between 26 November and 6 December.⁵⁰⁹

Ukrainian government was trying to suppress the protests using the *Berkut* groups of the Ministry of Interior as well as by gathering volunteers from the Eastern regions of Ukraine. One of the biggest cleanings against the participants of the EuroMaidan

⁵⁰⁶ Christensen [et al.] 2005: 222 - 224.

Bielasiak, J. (2002). The institutionalization of electoral and party systems in postcommunist states. *Comparative Politics*, 34(2): 205.

⁵⁰⁷ Snyder, T. (2014). Fascism, Russia, and Ukraine. *The New York Review of Books*, 20.

⁵⁰⁸ Onuch, O. (2015). EuroMaidan protests in Ukraine: Social media versus social networks. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 62(4), 217-235.

⁵⁰⁹ Petition the Obama administration to Impose personal sanctions on President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine members. (2013, 26 November). Retrieved from <https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/impose-personal-sanctions-president-ukraine-viktor-yanukovych-and-cabinet-ministers-ukraine-members/h58Fz30V>

took place on 30 November night.⁵¹⁰ On 1 December 2013, the revolutionaries succeeded in storming the Kyiv City State Administration and the Administration of the President buildings.⁵¹¹ December 2013 became remarkable with the *March of the Million* which was organized in Kyiv, and followed by the motor rally to Mezhyhir'ye (the residence of Yanukovych).

The law "On Conviction of the Violence which Led to the Deaths of the Peaceful Citizens" issued by Verkhovna Rada on 20 February became the turning point of the Maidan. It affirmed that the actions of the government were illegal and ordered the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and subordinate military and paramilitary forces to stop immediately and to prevent further use of force, as well as to prohibit the use of any weapons and special equipment against protestors.⁵¹²

On February 21, 2014, the opposition leaders signed an agreement aiming at solution of the crisis in Ukraine with the president Yanukovych. According to it, within 48 hours, the Constitutional amendments of 2004 had to be brought back; a new coalition government was to be formed. Until September 2014, the constitutional reform should be implemented. Besides, the agreement stated the necessity to hold early presidential election as well as the need to adopt new electoral law and elect new head of the Central Electoral Commission. Finally, the agreement declared the will to abandon power actions by the government and opposition.⁵¹³

On February 21, 2014, Verkhovna Rada, by the majority of the votes supported a resolution to restore the legitimate constitutional order (as amended on 8 December, 2004), which meant that now new government had been formed, and Yanukovych

⁵¹⁰ Ukraine police smash pro-Europe protest, opposition to call strike. (2013, 30 November). *REUTERS*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-protest-idUSBRE9AT01Q20131130>

⁵¹¹ Автомайдан снова побывал в гостях у Януковича. Дорогу в Межигорье блокировали "титишки" и ГАИ. (2014, 12 January). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/avtomaydan-v-voskresene-zaedet-v-gosti-v-mezhigore-k-yanukovichu-136489_.html

⁵¹² Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On Condemnation of the Use of Violence that Led to the Death of People". (2014, 20 February). Retrieved from <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/740-18?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYA4.ZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8Ie6>

⁵¹³ Опозиція підписала з Януковичем угоду про подолання кризи. (2014, 21 February). *Radio Svoboda*. Retrieved from <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25272405.html>

had lost its power to control the government. On the same day, during strike on the main square of Kyiv, leaders of the opposition demanded resignation of Yanukovych. Following these events, on the night of 21 - 22 February, Yanukovych escaped from Kyiv leaving his post of the president of Ukraine. The head of the Verkhovna Rada Aleksandr Turchynov, one of the leaders of the *Bat'kivshchyna* Party in the past, became President on interim. Arseniy Yatseniuk was appointed the prime-minister of Ukraine. Needless to say, the new government was met warmly by the European political community and negatively by the Eastern and Southern regions of the country, as well as Russia.

One of the responses to the political crisis in Ukraine was the debate on federalization. Thus, the deputies of the Party of Regions Kolesnichenko, Tsarev, as well as the Communist Party member Grach stated that Ukraine should move from unitary to the federalist model. This idea was supported by the Russia's Presidential Advisor Sergey Glaz'yev and the envoy of the Russian Embassy in Kyiv Andrey Vorob'yov. Despite the organized roundtables and publications in the press, Yanukovych did not support this idea.⁵¹⁴

EuroMaidan undoubtedly can be treated as the event that provoked the Russian nationalism splash. Thus, Taras Kuzio mentioned that the rhetoric by the Ukrainian and Russian authorities against EuroMaidan protesters sought to present them as 'extremists', 'fascists', and far-right nationalists.⁵¹⁵ This view is supported by Anastasiya Ryabchuk who used the dichotomy 'Nazis vs bandits'. In her opinion, with such a dichotomy, the supporters of the rallies who stood against the 'bandits of 'the Family' tolerated even the extreme nationalistic groups if they were also against the acting government. At the same time, she underlined, the leadership was trying hard to present the remonstrants as 'Nazis' that were splitting the country, and to lead

⁵¹⁴ Президент считает, что вопрос федерализации сейчас не актуален, но подлежит изучению. (2014, 14 February). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/POLITICS/prezident-schitaet-cto-vopros-federalizacii-seychas-ne-aktualen-no-podlezhit-izucheniyu-138825_.html

⁵¹⁵ Kuzio, T. (2015). Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian- Ukrainian Conflict. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 15(1): 161.

all those concerned with the 'brown plague' to support 'bandits' as the lesser evil.⁵¹⁶ As Likhachov argued, this dichotomy appeared to be so sharp in the first weeks of EuroMaidan that ended up with the violence's victory over the human rights and European values.⁵¹⁷ These issues were used to mobilize the public support of the Russia's actions in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, according to Kuzio: "Putin's strategy was to mobilize a Russian-speaking counter-revolution against the EuroMaidan throughout eastern and southern Ukraine and detach 'New Russia'.⁵¹⁸ At the same time, there is an opposite view on the issue: Marlene Laruelle, the expert on Russian nationalism, tends to perceive the nationalistic discourse as used post-factum in order to justify the events in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine after they happened.⁵¹⁹ The author insists on the fact that since the Russian nationalists do not constitute the school of the foreign policy, they have limited impact on the foreign policy making. The relation between foreign policy and nationalistic discourse is rather a 'chicken-egg dilemma'. Russia is seen as a 'divided nation' in terms of the foreign policy, nationalism and compatriots agenda.⁵²⁰

The response of the Ukrainian government to the mass rallies was not only the use of force. On 16 January, 2014, during the special session of the Ukrainian parliament the deputies adopted the package of laws that restricted mass activities in Ukraine. The session was closed and the legislature was simply adopted by raising hands. The documents introduced restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 39 of the Constitution, which means unreasonable strengthening of the accountability and the introduction of additional restrictions; restrictions on freedom of expression of thoughts in the media and the Internet, creating conditions for

⁵¹⁶ Ryabchuk, A. (2014). Right revolution? Hopes and perils of the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 22(1): 131.

⁵¹⁷ Likhachov, V. (2013, 7 December). 'Bloody Sunday': provocations, Nazis and bandits. In *Krovavoye voskresenye': provokacii, nazisty i bandity* "[J]. *Eurasian Jewish Congress* 7. Retrieved from <http://eajc.org/page18/news42012.html>

⁵¹⁸ Kuzio 2015: 163.

⁵¹⁹ Laruelle, M. (2015). Russia as a "Divided Nation," from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 62(2), 88-97.

⁵²⁰ Laruelle 2015: 95.

censorship. Organizations receiving assistance from foreign organizations and individuals must be registered as 'foreign agents', which is complemented by the introduction of the tax mechanisms limiting financial assistance for the social activism. Moreover, the legislature prohibited gathering information about the financial position of judges, law enforcement officers and their families (protection against anti-corruption investigative journalists). Besides, adopted laws on extremism may now be used against peaceful demonstrators. The legislature even touched upon the motor rallies and prohibited organizing motor column.⁵²¹ However, the critical document appeared to be the language law.

The law "On the Principles of the State Language Policy" was aimed at giving Russian or any other minority language the status of a 'regional language'; approving its use in courts, schools and other government institutions in areas of Ukraine where the percentage of representatives of national minorities exceeds 10% of the total population of a defined administrative district.⁵²² In practice, this was mostly the case in the country's predominantly Russian-speaking southern and eastern regions. Ukrainian remained the country's only official country-wide language. The bill was adopted amid fistfights in the Ukrainian Parliament building on 3 July, 2012. The law came into force on 10 August 2012. Since then, various cities and regions of Ukraine declared Russian a regional language in their jurisdictions.⁵²³

On February 23, 2014, the second day after the flight of Viktor Yanukovich, during the parliamentary session, a deputy from the *Batkivshchyna* party, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, proposed to include into the agenda a bill to repeal the 2012 law "On the Principles of the State Language Policy".⁵²⁴ The bill was approved with 232 out of

⁵²¹ The full package of the laws adopted against the EuroMaidan. (2014, 21 January). *Golos Ukrayiny*, No.10. Retrieved from <http://www.golos.com.ua/userfiles/file/210114/210114-u.pdf>

⁵²² Draft of the Law of Ukraine "On the Principles of the State Language Policy" (in redaction of 6 August, 2012). Retrieved from <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYA4.ZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8Ie6>

⁵²³ Мовний закон опублікований і набув чинності. (2012, 10 August). *Українська Правда*. Retrieved from <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2012/08/10/6970579/>

⁵²⁴ Верховна Рада скасувала закон про мови авторства Ківалова-Колесніченка. (2014, 23 February). *Українська Правда*. Retrieved from <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/23/7015948/>

450 votes in favor and made Ukrainian the sole state language at all the levels.⁵²⁵ The attempt to repeal the 2012 law "On the Principles of the State Language Policy" was met with great disdain in the Crimea and Southern and Eastern Ukraine, provoking waves of protests against the Maidan installed government ultimately culminating with the Crimean crisis. As Sergey Salushev argued that this law was understood by the Crimeans as 'grim harbinger' of the future events in Ukraine that contributed to the loss of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government.⁵²⁶

The issue of the language law was used by the Crimean officials as a mobilizing factor that unified the Russian-speakers of the Crimea against the Ukrainian government. This opinion is shared by Taras Kuzio. His main idea was that domestic and foreign factors served to change the dynamics of Russian speakers in Ukraine from one of passivity in the late 1980s through to the 2004 Orange Revolution; low-level mobilization from 2005 to 2013; and high-level mobilization, crystallization of pro- and anti-Ukrainian camps, and violent conflict from 2014.⁵²⁷ In her turn, Ryabchuk called this standoff as 'Nazi vs bandits',⁵²⁸ meaning that while the Western Ukrainians were perceived as extreme nationalists, the Eastern supporters of the 'family' were seen as bandits due to the role of the assumed connections with the shadow structures and mafia. The domestic actors that for a long time appeared to be in the parliament due to the promotion of the language (often it was the only issue they could present in their programs in order to pass the threshold) considered the costs of such loss as significant. They managed to present the supporters of the rallies as 'others' by means of the sponsored media. As Joanna Szostek maintained, three factors influenced the role of media in presenting the Maidan. They were: "dissent and activism among Ukraine's professional journalist community; the autonomous

⁵²⁵ Верховна Рада України ухвалила Закон "Про визнання таким, що втратив чинність, Закону України "Про засади державної мовної політики". (2014, 23 February). Retrieved from <http://rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/Povidomlennya/88068.html>

⁵²⁶ Salushev, S. (2014). Annexation of Crimea: Causes, Analysis and Global Implications. *Global Societies Journal*, 2: 42.

⁵²⁷ Kuzio 2015.

⁵²⁸ Ryabchuk 2014.

nature and increasing accessibility of online communication; and the sensitivity of media-owning oligarchs to public and international opinion".⁵²⁹

Turchynov - Yatseniuk tandem was seen as the surrender of the Party of Regions and Eastern interest groups in the control over the agenda. The losses of the Crimea in case of the establishment of the pro-Western government would be significant - the lack of the regional language law, the association agreement, the education and administrative reforms. The living standards level was also expected to decrease as well the stability in the gas sector due to the rivalry with Russia. The Crimean elites chose the most pay off promising option that was the unification with Russia.

According to the opinion of the Crimeans, Ukraine failed to protect its territory during the crisis, and the people from the 'bloody bacchanalia'⁵³⁰ that was going on in Kyiv. The desire 'not to stay any longer in Ukraine' was expressed by many interviewees.⁵³¹ As to the events in February - March 2014 in the Crimea, one of the Crimean Tatar activists noted that the absence of the order to the military resulted in the control of the Russia over the Crimea.⁵³² His opinion was not the only.⁵³³ At the same time, the Russia-oriented respondents talked about the 'historical justice' when Russia appeared to be the rescuer of the Crimeans while Ukraine failed to secure the stability and manage the crisis situation;⁵³⁴ and about return to the 'native shore' as a result of 'the expression of the Crimea's will for freedom'.⁵³⁵ While the next section of this chapter discusses the economic deterioration in Ukraine during the political turmoil, it is worth to note the economic factor that many interviewees note: the Crimeans expected the life standards in Russia to be better comparatively to Ukraine, especially after the described events. These include, first of all, pensions and

⁵²⁹ Szostek, J. (2014). The media battles of Ukraine's EuroMaidan. *Digital Icons*, 11, 1-19.

⁵³⁰ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

⁵³¹ Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

⁵³² Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist living in Turkey. (2016, 21 October). Ankara.

⁵³³ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 26 October). Ankara.

⁵³⁴ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

⁵³⁵ Interview with the Russia-oriented Crimean living in Simferopol. (2016, 18 October). Simferopol.

salaries.⁵³⁶ However, at the same time, almost 2,5 years after the separation, even the pro-Ukrainian interviewees among the Crimean Tatar activists say they can accept the separation referendum if the living standards in the Russian Crimea had been really decent. But they are not.⁵³⁷ Obviously, under the conditions of the political crisis and instability, the economic situation got worse.

5.5. Anti-Maidan in the Crimea and the Crimea's Separation

5.5.1. The Role of Different Elites in the Crimean Crisis of 2014

From the neoclassical realist perspective, the role of the elites had particular significance for understanding the case. In the Crimea, as it was shown in the previous chapters, the elites could be classified according to their ethnic affiliation, among others. Thus, according to 2001 Ukrainian Census, the ethnic makeup of the Crimea's population consisted of the following self-reported groups: Russians constituted 1.45 million (60.4%), Ukrainians constituted 577000 (24.0%), the Crimean Tatars - 245000 (10.2%) and Belarusians - 35000 (1.4%).

As Russian President Vladimir Putin said in his address to the Federal Assembly on March 18, 2014, the position of the Russians was particularly important due to the numerous violations:

We came to meet Ukraine not only in the Crimea ... What we proceeded from? We proceeded from the fact that a good relationship with Ukraine is important for us, and it should not be held in a hostage to the dead-end of territorial disputes. But it was expected, of course, that Ukraine would be our good neighbor, that Russian and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, especially those from its south-east and in the Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic, civilized state, that their legitimate interests would be observed in accordance with the international law. However, the situation started to develop in a different way. Time after time, attempts to deprive the Russians of their historical memory, and sometimes the mother tongue, to implement the forced assimilation were made. And of course, Russians, as well as other citizens of Ukraine, suffered from

⁵³⁶ Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

⁵³⁷ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist living in Turkey. (2016, 21 October). Ankara.

Interview with the Crimean Tatar student living in Turkey. (2016, 12 November). Ankara.

constant political and state crisis, which has been shaking Ukraine for more than 20 years.⁵³⁸

On February 27, 2014, the member of the Supreme Council of the Crimea, leader of the Russian Unity Sergey Aksyonov was appointed a chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea.⁵³⁹ The decision was not recognized by the new Ukrainian authorities.⁵⁴⁰ Sergey Aksyonov and chairman of the Supreme Council of the Crimea Vladimir Konstantinov said they still believed the legally elected president of Ukraine was Yanukovich, with the aid of whom the Crimean authorities managed to obtain assistance from Russia.⁵⁴¹ On February 23, during the mass rally in Sevastopol, where Alexey Chaly was proclaimed the leader of the city, deputy of the city council of Sevastopol and the leader of the Russian Block Gennady Basov announced the creation of self-defense units of the volunteers.⁵⁴² On March 12, the first and the only president of the Republic of the Crimea Yuriy Meshkov came back. At the airport of Simferopol Meshkov said: "The people of the Crimea gave me the Motherland".⁵⁴³

At the same time, on February 7, the representatives of the Ukrainian community in the Crimea criticized 'irresponsible politicians' who "put the Crimean peninsula to the brink of ethnic conflict and provoked an armed clash between Ukraine and the Russian Federation" and 'foreign politicians' involved in "blatant provocative interference in the political life of an integral part of Ukraine - the Crimea and Sevastopol." The authors of the appeal called on the Ukrainian authorities to

⁵³⁸ Президент Российской Федерации. Обращение Президента Российской Федерации. (2014, 18 March). *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20603>

⁵³⁹ Премьером Крыма стал лидер партии "Русское единство" Аксенов. (2014, 27 February). *INTERFAX*. Retrieved from <http://www.interfax.ru/world/361702>

⁵⁴⁰ Новым премьером Крыма избран лидер Русского единства Аксенов. (2014, 27 February). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3312515-novym-premerom-kryma-izbran-lyder-russkoho-edyinstva-aksenov>

⁵⁴¹ Крымские власти объявили о подчинении Януковичу. (2014, 28 February). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/27/truepresident/>

⁵⁴² В Севастополе "Русский блок" формирует отряды самообороны, под городом - противотанковые "ежи". (2014, 23 February). *Украинская Правда*. Retrieved from <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/02/23/7016000/>

⁵⁴³ В Крым приехал первый президент автономии Мешков. (2014, 12 March). *UNIAN*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/895721-v-kryim-priehal-pervyyi-prezident-avtonomii-meshkov.html>

"immediately take steps to ensure peace, tranquility and security of the Crimean people."⁵⁴⁴

The statement also said:

(We call) nuclear states, the UK, the USA, France and China, to guarantee the territorial integrity and security of Ukraine, according to the Budapest Memorandum, to take measures to prevent foreign interference in the internal affairs of our country; the UN, the OSCE, the EU and Council of Europe to have action upon the position of Russia in terms of non-provoking separatism in the regions of Ukraine, in particular, in the ARC and Sevastopol.

The statement was signed by the leaders of the NGO Crimean Center of Business and Cultural Cooperation *Ukrainian House*, Andrey Schekun and Archbishop of Simferopol and the Crimea of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate Clement.⁵⁴⁵ On March 2, in order to protect the Ukrainian minority at the conditions of the Russian occupation and the separatist regime, the collection of the information about violations of the rights of the Ukrainian citizens of different nationalities in the Crimea and the provision of its international public organizations and intergovernmental structures began. Coordination was implemented by the pro-Ukrainian organizations, a number of NGOs that created All-Crimean Ukrainian Rada. Andrey Schekun became its coordinator.⁵⁴⁶ It was reported that activists of the Crimean EuroMaidan took part in protests against the blocking of Ukrainian military units.⁵⁴⁷

At the same time, elected on 1 November, 2013, the new leader of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars, Refat Chubarov, expressed his support for European integration by citing the European Union's ability to solve minority rights issues existing in

⁵⁴⁴ Украинцы Крыма попросили власть о защите. (2014, 27 February). *Украинская Правда*. Retrieved from <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/02/27/7016570/>

⁵⁴⁵ Украинцы Крыма попросили власть о защите. (2014, 27 February). *Украинская Правда*. Retrieved from <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/02/27/7016570/>

⁵⁴⁶ В автономии создана Всекрымская украинская радаю (2014, 2 March). *Gordon.ua*. Retrieved from <http://gordonua.com/news/society/a-avtonomii-sozdana-vsekrymskaya-ukrainskaya-rada-12394.html>

⁵⁴⁷ Около воинской части в Симферополе возник конфликт между противниками войны и дружинниками. (2014, 4 March). *Новости Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/3/4/okolo-voinskoi-chasti-v-simferopole-voznik-konflikt-mezhdu-protivnikami-voiny-i-druzhinnikami-6500/>

Ukraine.⁵⁴⁸ In September, the representatives of the Mejlis had met with *Stefan Fule*, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, to discuss the rights of the native peoples of the Crimea and solutions to the problems of those deported by Stalin as a prerequisite for the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.⁵⁴⁹ Following the Ukrainian parliament's failure to ratify the Agreement, the Crimean Tatar activists joined the EuroMaidan in Kyiv. In addition, Tatars initiated protests in Simferopol in front of the buildings of the Crimean Parliament and the Council of Ministers expressing their dissatisfaction with the policies of Speaker of the Crimean Parliament Vladimir Konstantinov, who later stood for the unification of the Crimea with the Russian Federation.⁵⁵⁰

It is important to note that Russian leaders were trying to convince the leaders of the Mejlis that Russia was eager to guarantee the rights of self-determination for the Crimean Tatars, offering the example of the Republic of Tatarstan and the powers it was granted. Nevertheless, the Crimean Tatar leader Refat Chubarov called for Tatars to boycott the referendum of 16 March 2014 on the status of the Crimea.⁵⁵¹

From the neoclassical realist perspective, Russians appeared to be the ethnic group responsible for the agenda and threat identification in the Crimea on the eve of the separation. The ethnic factor was utilized by the representatives of the pro-Russian groups in the parliament for a long time, as a means to pass the election and during the referendum as well. They used the mismanagements of the Ukrainian interim government in order to jeopardize the situation in the Crimea, basically to present the Ukrainian party as an enemy. Particular attention should be paid to the Crimean media. The vice speaker of the Crimean parliament Mikhail Bakharev who used to

⁵⁴⁸ Рефат Чубаров: "Никто не должен тешить себя иллюзиями, что крымские татары откажутся от борьбы за восстановление своих прав. (2013, 1 November). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/refat-chubarov-nikto-ne-dolzhen-teshit-sebya-illyuziyami-chto-krymskie-tatary-otkazhutsya-ot-borby-za-vosstanovlenie-svoih-prav-_.html

⁵⁴⁹ Непростая наука — услышать друг друга. (2013, 20 September). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/neprostaya-nauka-uslyshat-drug-druga-_.html

⁵⁵⁰ На Евромайдан в Киев выезжают крымские татары. (2013, 5 December). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3274445-na-evromaidan-v-kyev-vyezhaui-krymskye-tatary>

⁵⁵¹ "Референдум" у кримськотатарських масивах у Бахчисараї зриваний – Умеров. (2014, 16 March). *Radio Freedom*. Retrieved from <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/25298474.html>

be the deputy in 1994 - 1998 and 2006 - 2010 Crimean parliament, at the same time heads the biggest Crimean newspaper *Krymskaya Pravda* that in the beginning of 2015 had circulation around 30 thousand copies in Russian.⁵⁵² At the same time, the official media of the Supreme Council of the Crimea is the *Krymskiye Izvestiya* newspaper that has print run of 22 thousand.⁵⁵³ Furthermore, *Krymskaya Gazeta* issued by the Supreme Council of the Crimea has print run of more than 84 thousand.⁵⁵⁴ Moreover, the state-run TV and radio channel *Krym* covers more than 75% of the Crimean territory.⁵⁵⁵ Needless to stress the role they played in monitoring and presenting the events in Ukraine. As it was shown, the military of Ukraine that was being located in the Crimea immediately changed its loyalty and supported the 'green men'.

5.5.2. EuroMaidan in the Crimea

Following the resignation of Yanukovych from the post of the Ukrainian president, the Supreme Council of the Crimea called for a special session of the parliament in order to discuss new political reality. The same day, the opponents of new Ukrainian government launched the strike in front of the Crimean parliament building demanding separation of the Crimea from Ukraine and creation of an independent state.⁵⁵⁶ One day before, the bus with the Crimean citizens who participated in Anti-Maidan in Kyiv was attacked.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵² Крымская Правда. Газета. Official web-page. Retrieved from <http://c-pravda.ru/about>

⁵⁵³ Крымские Известия. Газета Государственного Совета Республики Крым. Official web-page. Retrieved from <http://new.crimiz.ru/>

⁵⁵⁴ Крымская газета. Official web-page. Retrieved from <http://www.gazetacrimea.ru/>

⁵⁵⁵ Телерадиокомпания "Крым" Охват территории Республики Крым телевизионным вещанием телеканалом «Первый Крымский» в аналоговом формате. Retrieved from <http://1tvcrimea.ru/pages/content/000004-oblast-pokrytija>

⁵⁵⁶ У здания крымского парламента произошла потасовка. (2014, 21 February). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/21/fight/>

⁵⁵⁷ Крымских "защитников президента" заставляли петь гимн Украины. (2014, 21 February). *Gigamir*. Retrieved from <http://gigamir.net/news/kyiv/regions/pub623223>

On February 22, in Kharkiv, a congress of deputies of local councils of the south-eastern Ukraine and the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea was held. The participants agreed to "take responsibility for ensuring the constitutional order in their territories," blame for the situation on the ground in local government, to advise the public to organize themselves together with law enforcement agencies, as well as to call the Army to remain in places. In addition, it was proposed to withdraw the deputies of the Ukrainian parliament for field work.⁵⁵⁸ Few days later, Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people organized a rally in the center of Simferopol, calling the Crimean Tatars to block the building of the Supreme Council of the Crimea in order to avoid taking a decision on becoming a part of Russia.⁵⁵⁹ At the same time, there was a rally of the Russian Community of the Crimea. The clashes appeared ripped off an extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of autonomy, which was expected to decide in favor of the Russian language and the deepening of the independence of the region.

27 February, 2014 appeared to be the day of particular significance for the Crimeans: to the capital of the Crimea numerous armed groups started to come. On the one hand, they were self-defense units of the local residents, *Berkut*, Cossacks and Russian-speaking representatives of the various non-governmental organizations, who arrived in the Crimea on their own initiative to 'protect the fellow'; on the other hand, they were a group of well-armed and equipped men in uniform without insignia (so-called the 'green men'), acting autonomously, on the orders of its own leadership, and disobeying the local authorities. Until the end of the Crimean events, these formations provided control over strategic assets and local authorities; their protection and operation blocked Ukrainian military facilities, military units and staffs. Ukrainian and Western media, the Ukrainian authorities and the leadership of the Western states from the first day could say with confidence that the actions of the

⁵⁵⁸ Съезд в Харькове: всю власть на Юго-Востоке берут местные советы. Резолюция. (2014, 22 February). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3309669-sezd-v-kharkove-vsui-vlast-na-yuho-vostoke-berut-mestnye-sovety-rezoluitsiya>

⁵⁵⁹ Симферополь определяется. (2014, 26 February). *Gazeta.ru*. Retrieved from http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/02/26_a_5927553.shtml

units of the Russian troops took place, qualifying events as aggression, military invasion and occupation. Russian officials refused to admit it publicly. For the first time, Russian President Vladimir Putin made it only on April 17, 2014.

On February 27, early in the morning, two groups of unknown people (10-15 people each) seized the building of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and the Council of Ministers.⁵⁶⁰ Deputy Sergey Kunitsyn was appointed the Representative of the Ukrainian President in the Crimea.⁵⁶¹ Russian flags were raised over the buildings, and there were barricades at the entrance.⁵⁶² Prime Minister Anatoliy Mogilyov, during the broadcast at the state TV and radio channel *Crimea*, urged the Crimeans to remain calm and assured them that the situation was under control.⁵⁶³ The Crimean Parliament held the extraordinary session and decided to express non-confidence to the Council of Ministers of the Crimea and to terminate its activities. The new Prime Minister of the Crimea was appointed: the leader of the Russian Unity Sergey Aksyonov became the head of the government.⁵⁶⁴ The parliamentarians also decided to hold a referendum in the Crimea "On Improving the Status and Powers" of the region. Presidium of the parliament gave the assessment of recent developments in Ukraine, saying that in the country, there had been "unconstitutional seizure of power by radical nationalists, supported by armed gangs."⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁰ Переворот в Крыму: хроника четверга. (2014, 27 February). *Новости Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/2/27/v-simferopole-zahvacheny-administrativnye-zdaniya-obnovlyayetsya-5954/>

⁵⁶¹ Куницын стал представителем Президента в Крыму. (2014, 27 February). *Новости Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/2/27/kunitsyn-stal-predstavitelem-prezidenta-v-krymu-6033/>

⁵⁶² По факту захвата зданий Совета и Совмина Крыма возбуждено уголовное дело по статье "террористический акт". (2014, 27 February). *РБК*. Retrieved from <http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20140227131627.shtml>

⁵⁶³ В Крыму объявили выходной, Могилев идет на переговоры с террористами. (2014, 27 February). *UNIAN*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/890436-v-kryimu-obyyavili-vyihodnoy-mogilev-idet-na-peregovoryi-s-terroristami.html>

⁵⁶⁴ Премьером Крыма стал лидер партии "Русское единство" Аксенов. (2014, 27 February). *INTERFAX*. Retrieved from <http://www.interfax.ru/world/361702>

⁵⁶⁵ Премьером Крыма избрали лидера «Русского единства». (2014, 27 February). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/27/crimea4/>

The very next day, President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov issued a decree in which he stated that the appointment of the Supreme Council of the Crimea Sergey Aksyonov had been carried out in violation of the Constitution of Ukraine and the Constitution of the Crimea, and suggested the Supreme Council of the Crimea to cancel it.⁵⁶⁶ On March 3, press service of the Supreme Council of ARC reported the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Crimea Sergey Aksyonov in accord with the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych.⁵⁶⁷ The newspaper of the Supreme Council of the Crimea *Crimean News* published a clarification on the issue, which would be put to a referendum on 25 May. It was noted that the issue proposed for the referendum, had not implied the independence of the ARC, its separation or unification with any other state:

The question of the referendum does not contain provisions on violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The purpose of the referendum is to improve the status of the ARC in order to guarantee the right of autonomy despite the change of the central government or the Constitution of Ukraine. All steps taken are intended to make the autonomy to betaken into the consideration, to be talked and agreed when it comes to the decisions of the central authorities.⁵⁶⁸

On March 1, Putin has made an appeal to the Federal Council on the use of the Armed Forces of Russia in Ukraine "for the normalization of the political situation in this country".⁵⁶⁹ The Federation Council, meeting in extraordinary session, unanimously agreed to send troops to Ukraine. Late in the evening of March 1 appointed by the Verkhovna Rada acting president of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov said that he had ordered to bring the armed forces of Ukraine in full combat

⁵⁶⁶ Турчинов издал указ о незаконности избрания нового премьера Крыма. (2014, 1 March). *Obozrevatel*. Retrieved from <http://obozrevatel.com/politics/08249-turchinov-izdal-ukaz-o-nezakonnosti-izbraniya-novogo-premera-kryima.htm>

⁵⁶⁷ Парламент Крыма: крымский премьер назначен законно с разрешения Януковича. (2014, 3 March). *Новости Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/3/3/parlament-kryma-krymskii-premer-naznachen-zakonno-s-razresheniya-yanukovicha-6353/>

⁵⁶⁸ В крымском парламенте разъяснили суть вопроса, вынесенного на референдум. (2014, 28 February). *Новости Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/2/28/v-krymskom-parlamente-razyasnili-sut-voprosa-vynesennogo-na-referendum-6070/>

⁵⁶⁹ Владимир Путин внёс обращение в Совет Федерации. (2014, 1 March). *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20353>

readiness.⁵⁷⁰ On March 1, Sevastopol city council voted not to obey the decisions of the new government of Ukraine.⁵⁷¹

5.5.3. The Crimean Declaration of Independence

On March 3, press service of the Supreme Council of the ARC issued a statement that the development of the political situation in Ukraine "gave good reasons to fear for the fate of the country and posed a threat to peace and stability in the Crimea." The statement indicated that, in the opinion of the Crimean parliament, the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On Disengagement Ukrainian President to Fulfill the Constitutional Mandate and Call on Early Presidential Elections in Ukraine" was adopted in violation of the Constitution, which did not provide termination of powers of the head of state because of disengagement from performing their authority; "therefore, the legal basis for laying duties of the president of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada Turchynov, including the signing of the laws of Ukraine, were absent."⁵⁷² The Supreme Council of the Crimea postponed date of the referendum on the status and powers of the Crimea till March 30.⁵⁷³ According to the Chairman of the Supreme Council Vladimir Konstantinov, residents of Sevastopol had sent the initiative to change the legal status of the city, and relocating it directly to the authorities of the Crimea.⁵⁷⁴

On March 6, the Supreme Council decided to join the Russian Federation as a subject and to hold a referendum on the entire territory of the Crimea (including the city of Sevastopol), on March 16. The issue of the future status of the Crimea was to be

⁵⁷⁰ Турчинов: Вооруженные силы Украины находятся в полной боеготовности. (2014, 1 March). *Gordon.ua*. Retrieved from <http://gordonua.com/news/politics/turchinov-vooruzhennyye-sily-ukrainy-nahodyatsya-v-polnoy-boegotovnosti-12314.html>

⁵⁷¹ Депутаты горсовета Севастополя проголосовали за неподчинение киевским властям. (2014, 1 March). *TASS*. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1014091>

⁵⁷² Власти Крыма: развитие ситуации на Украине "создает угрозу миру и стабильности в Крыму". (2014, 3 March). *TASS*. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1017492>

⁵⁷³ ЦИК Украины: проведение референдума в Крыму невозможно. (2014, 3 March). *TASS*. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1018166>

⁵⁷⁴ Севастополь хочет войти в состав Крыма. (2014, 3 March). *TVZvezda*. Retrieved from http://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201403031445-t1i8.htm

solved by choosing one of two possible answers: "Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation?" or "Do you support the restoration of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of the Crimea, and the status of the Crimea as part of Ukraine?"⁵⁷⁵ The same day, the decision to hold a referendum was passed by the Sevastopol city council.

The Crimean deputies decided to appeal to the Russian government with a proposal "to start the procedure of joining the Russian Federation as a subject of the Russian Federation".⁵⁷⁶ Explaining this decision, the parliamentarians said that in Ukraine "as a result of the anti-constitutional coup power had been seized by the nationalist forces" that "violate the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, the inalienable rights and freedoms, including the right to life, freedom of thought and expression, the right to speak their native language, and the "extremist groups have made several attempts to penetrate the Crimea in order to aggravate the situation, to escalate the tensions and to seize the power in an illegal way".⁵⁷⁷

First Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Temirgaliev reported that ownership of Ukraine in the Crimea would be nationalized in favor of the new authorities in the region; all private property in the Crimea would be re-issued in accordance with the Russian legislation. He indicated a willingness to join the Crimea in ruble zone.⁵⁷⁸ On 7 March, a delegation of the Supreme Council of the Crimea, headed by its chairman, Vladimir Konstantinov, met in Moscow with the Chairman of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin. Naryshkin said that Russia would support "free and democratic choice of the people of the Crimea and Sevastopol". On the same day, the delegation met with the speaker of the Crimean parliament of the Federation Council Valentina

⁵⁷⁵ Парламент Крыма принял решение о вхождении в Россию и назначил референдум на 16 марта. (2014, 6 March). Retrieved from <http://www.politnavigator.net/parlament-kryma-naznachil-referendum-o-vkhozhdenii-v-rossiyu-na-16-marta.html>

⁵⁷⁶ Парламент Крыма попросил Путина принять полуостров в состав РФ. (2014, 6 March). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/06/crimea/>

⁵⁷⁷ Парламент Крыма принял решение о вхождении автономии в состав России. (2014, 6 March). *Gazeta.ru*. Retrieved from http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2014/03/06/n_5995413.shtml

⁵⁷⁸ Власти Крыма пообещали провести национализацию. (2014, 6 March). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/06/nationalise/>

Matviyenko. She ensured that senators would support a decision on joining Russia, if it was taken.⁵⁷⁹ On the next day, Simferopol, Sevastopol, Yalta and Kerch held first meetings in support of the unification of the Crimea with Russia. Senior representatives of the Crimean autonomy called the Crimean residents to vote for annexation to Russia. "With Russia we will build our future, together we will win!" Sergey Aksyonov said at the meeting. The head of the Crimean parliament, Vladimir Konstantinov, presented the results of the visit to Moscow:

We came from Moscow with the good news. Our brotherly people takes us into their composition, we will be the subject of the Russian Federation. To do this, come on March 16 and vote as necessary. On March 16, we are going back to our homeland.⁵⁸⁰

Vladimir Konstantinov, in his address to the residents of the Crimea, on the website of the Supreme Council said that the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 without the consent of the local people was a 'gross injustice':

The Crimea exhausted the possibilities to achieve a decent status within Ukraine. Our further stay in the political arena of this state threatens the Crimeans with not just humiliation and discrimination on cultural and ethnic lines, but the most literal physical destruction. Homeland is waiting for us. If we make the right choice, they will help us to adapt to their country. For students, state employees, retirees, the necessary programs have worked out which include protecting the interests of our citizens and allow them to avoid losses during this transition. We are ready to help the central government of the Russian Federation, the Russian regions. Ukraine, in which we have lived for the last 23 years, no longer exists, and there is no one in Kyiv to negotiate life together in one state.⁵⁸¹

As of March 9, on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea all Ukrainian television stopped and instead the Russian TV channels started broadcasting. These include *First Channel*, *Russia 24*, *NTV*, *TNT*, *STS*, and *Russia 1*. Among the local broadcast channels, state TV and Radio Channel *Crimea* continued

⁵⁷⁹ Нарышкин: в РФ поддержат "свободный и демократический выбор населения Крыма и Севастополя". (2014, 7 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/politika/1027950>

⁵⁸⁰ В центре Симферополя проходит митинг за присоединение к России. (2014, 9 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1032682>

⁵⁸¹ Глава парламента Крыма: передача полуострова Украине была вопиющей несправедливостью. (2014, 9 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1032750>

to operate.⁵⁸² On March 9, it became known that the Russian government had allocated about 40 billion rubles to support the development of industrial and economic infrastructure of the Crimea.⁵⁸³ On March, 10, the Crimean government restricted air communication between the Crimea and Ukraine, which would run until March 17. As the First Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Temirgaliev explained: "This is a temporary action to prevent the provocateurs from entering the peninsula".⁵⁸⁴

The Declaration was adopted by the Supreme Council at the extraordinary plenary meeting on March 11, 2014. Decision of the Sevastopol City Council was adopted at the extraordinary plenary meeting on March 11, 2014. For the adoption of the Declaration 78 out of 81 deputies of the Supreme Council voted.⁵⁸⁵

Taking into account the reaffirmation by the international Court of Justice on Kosovo of July 22, 2010, the unilateral declaration of independence by the part of the state does not violate any rules of the international law. In case if, during the referendum, the Crimeans decided to join the Russian Federation (including Sevastopol), the Crimea, after the referendum, would be announced an independent and sovereign state with the republican form of government. Republic of the Crimea was declared a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic state, which was obliged to keep the peace, interethnic and inter-confessional accord in its territory. Besides, Republic of the Crimea, as an independent and sovereign state, in the case of the corresponding results of the referendum, would appeal to the Russian Federation

⁵⁸² □ В Крыму начали вещание российские телеканалы. (2014, 9 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1033291>

⁵⁸³ Государственный Совет Республики Крым. (2014, 9 March). *Правительство России зарезервировало порядка 40 млрд рублей на поддержку развития промышленно-экономической инфраструктуры Крыма*. Retrieved from http://crimea.gov.ru/news/09_03_14_2

⁵⁸⁴ Вице-премьер Крыма: воздушное сообщение автономии с Киевом будет ограничено до 17 марта. (2014, 12 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1040367>

⁵⁸⁵ Декларация о независимости Автономной Республики Крым и г. Севастополь. (2014, 11 March). *Qirim.ru*. Retrieved from http://www.qirim.ru/about/docs/Independence_Declaration

with a proposal for the adoption of the ARC based on the relevant international agreement to the Russian Federation as a new subject of the Russian Federation.⁵⁸⁶

As it can be seen from the analysis provided in this and the previous chapter, it was the pro-Russian elites in the Crimea who were responsible for the political decisions. Due to the ethnic compositions of the population in the region, the structure of the parliament was dominated by the pro-Russian parties and deputies. Thus, in 2010, Party of Regions managed to obtain 80% of the seats in the Crimean parliament, while Russian Unity got 3% of the votes. This secured the control over the decision making process in the ARC. However, during the events of Maidan in Kyiv, the head of the Crimean Council of Ministers Mogilyov (the Party of Regions) was substituted with the more radical representative of the *Russian Unity* Sergey Aksyonov. In this regard, from the neoclassical realist perspective, the domestic elites appeared to be the factor that determined collaboration of the population with the Russian 'green men' not the confrontation. As it was shown in the press release of the Supreme Council of the ARC, the events in Ukraine posed a threat to the Crimea: the nationalism of the rallies provoked the nationalism in the Crimea, on the one hand, and the Russian actions, on the other. The numerous appeals of the Crimean parliament were issued to mobilize population on the eve of the referendum.

5.5.4. Referendum of 16 March 2014 and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea

On March 14, 2014, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled that the referendum conducted in the Crimea was unconstitutional. However, the referendum was held on the appointed day, in spite of the opposition of the authorities of Ukraine. According to officially published figures, in the Crimea 96.77%⁵⁸⁷ of the voters chose the first paragraph of the bulletin "For the reunification of the Crimea with Russia on a

⁵⁸⁶ Декларация о независимости Автономной Республики Крым и г. Севастополь 2014.

⁵⁸⁷ Малышев: за воссоединение с РФ проголосовали 96,77% крымчан, участвовавших в голосовании. (2014, 17 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1052196>

subject of the Russian Federation", in Sevastopol this figure constituted 95.6%⁵⁸⁸. Referendum results were approved by the Supreme Council and Sevastopol City Council. According to the Constitution of Russia, the admission of new federal subjects is governed by the federal constitutional law (Article 65.2). The law was adopted in 2001, and it postulates that admission of a foreign state or its part into Russia shall be based on a mutual accord between the Russian Federation and the relevant state and shall take place pursuant to an international treaty between the two countries; moreover, it must be initiated by the state in question, not by its subdivision or by Russia.⁵⁸⁹ This law would have seemed to require that Ukraine initiate any negotiations involving a Russian annexation of the Crimea.

Following the referendum, on March 18, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin began the process of adoption.⁵⁹⁰ Thereafter, an intergovernmental agreement on the adoption of the Crimean Republic to Russia⁵⁹¹ was signed, according to which, new entities, Republic of the Crimea and the federal city Sevastopol were formed. The Treaty entered into force on the date of ratification by the Federal Assembly on March 21, but applied provisionally from the date of signing. On March 18, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation received a request for verification of compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. The request has been accepted for consideration without a public hearing.⁵⁹²

The perception of the referendum and the unification of the Crimea with Russia were ambivalent. On the one hand, there were Russians who noted the following during

⁵⁸⁸ В Севастополе 95,6% проголосовавших высказались за вступление Крыма в РФ. (2014, 17 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1052517>

⁵⁸⁹ Российская Федерация. (2001, 30 November). Федеральный конституционный закон "О порядке принятия в Российскую Федерацию и образования в ее составе нового субъекта Российской Федерации". Retrieved from http://cikrf.ru/law/federal_constitutional_law/fkz_6_2001.html

⁵⁹⁰ Президент уведомил Правительство, Госдуму и Совет Федерации о предложениях Госсовета Крыма и Заксобрания Севастополя о принятии в Российскую Федерацию и образовании новых субъектов. (2014, 18 March). *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/news/20599>

⁵⁹¹ Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Крым о принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым и образовании в составе Российской Федерации новых субъектов. (2014, 18 March). *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/20605>

⁵⁹² Конституционный Суд РФ. (2014, 18 March). Конституционный Суд РФ проверит международный договор о принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым на соответствие Конституции РФ. Retrieved from <http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/Pages/ViewItem.aspx?ParamId=3160>

the interview: "At the polling stations, there were crowds of people. They were congratulating each other! I do not remember such a turnout in the Crimea for a lifetime. I saw veterans who were crossing the ballots and were crying out of happiness."⁵⁹³ At the same time, the representatives of the Crimean Tatar called it 'pseudo-referendum'⁵⁹⁴ and the one where the military officers were observing.⁵⁹⁵ Many interviewees noted the lack of understanding of the questions and situation in the region in general by the Crimeans.⁵⁹⁶ As to the unification of the Crimea with Russia, the Russians understood it as logical and right decision of the Crimeans⁵⁹⁷, 'the return to the motherland',⁵⁹⁸ while the Crimean Tatar respondents had negative feelings about the issue.

5.5. Conclusion

Having analyzed recent developments in Ukraine, one can conclude the following. From the neoclassical realist perspective, Ukrainian domestic developments as well as the Ukraine's negotiations with the EU as to the DCFTA, with the Russian Federation regarding the Customs Union appeared to be the independent variable that defined the context of the Crimean separation. Here, one had to deal with the subsystemic threat that was perceived as one coming from the Ukraine - EU partnership.

At the same time, as the volume by Talliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman suggest, the most important appeared to be the perception of the international circumstances by the domestic actors, as well as their impact on the decision making and the national security decision as well. In this regard, the low commitment of the main political actors to the formal procedures resulted in a weak institutionalization of these rules

⁵⁹³ Interview with the Russian journalist in the Crimea. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

⁵⁹⁴ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 1 November). Istanbul.

⁵⁹⁵ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist living in Turkey. (2016, 21 October). Ankara.

⁵⁹⁶ Interview with the Crimean Tatar student living in Turkey. (2016, 12 November). Ankara.

⁵⁹⁷ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

⁵⁹⁸ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

and the strengthening the power vertical by the president with a strong propensity for non-institutional behavior. This also determined the poor development of the democratic norms and procedures in Ukraine, and in the ARC correspondingly. Furthermore, the lack of the legislative and the budget powers of the ARC defined the lack of autonomy in the Crimea. Moreover, the absence of the provisions as to the delineation of powers between center and the region worsened the tensions between Kyiv and the Crimean government, especially in the period when the more nationalistic and Western oriented government of Ukraine was trying to implement its policies which contradicted to the interests of the Russian-speaking majority in the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. In such cases, Ukrainian government preferred to back the Crimean Tatars in order to balance the pro-Russian groups. As it was seen the pro-Russian political elites appeared to be the most influential and responsible for the identification and assessment of the menace coming from the EuroMaidan. The payoffs expected by the Crimean elites from the Russian side obviously would overcome the losses of the voices from the Crimean Tatar segment of society; as well as the costs of the empowerment of the pro-European, right-segment, backed by the Crimean Tatar political forces would be high. Particular attention should be paid to the Crimean media. Needless to stress the role they played in monitoring and presenting the events in Ukraine. As it was shown, the military of Ukraine that was being located in the Crimea immediately changed its loyalty and supported the 'green men'.

As to the nation-building, which was particularly important for Ukraine considering its Russian and the Crimean Tatar population after the dissolution of the USSR, the inconsistent policies, the absence of the national minorities protecting legislation, the failure to adopt the law on the regional languages resulted in the dissatisfaction with the government of the Eastern and Southern regions. In fact, Ukrainian government failed to construct the civic nation in the country that, under the conditions of the political and economic crisis, defined the loyalty of these regions to the Russian Federation. Consequently, the Ukrainian population that supported Maidan appeared to be the 'Other' for the Russian-speaking Crimeans. The inability to conduct

consistent foreign policy and neglect of the interests of the half of the population aggravated existing contradictions. The domestic pro-Russian oriented group managed to obtain the control over the security agenda in the Crimean parliament that resulted in the election of Aksyonov. Additionally, through more than 20 years it demonstrated electoral support and the single-issue orientation, although it was not the unification with the Russian Federation.

Mismanagement during the political crisis, including legal provisions and violence against the protestors, the escape of the president revealed the institutional weakness of Ukraine, the lack of flexibility and the asymmetry with the domination of Kyiv in the relations with the regions, especially with the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The absence of the strong central government and the inability of Kyiv to control the whole territory of the country during the mass rallies made it possible for the Crimea to conduct its own policy, such as the appointment of the new head of the Council of Ministers of Crimea by the pro-Russian Supreme Council of the ARC. Economic crisis that immediately followed the mass rallies in Ukraine worsened the domestic turmoil: the economically strong Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts undertook the decision to stop 'feeding' the rest of Ukraine. These factors appeared to be crucial in the separation of the Crimea, also supported by the Russian Federation's decision to protect Russian-speaking Crimeans. The crisis in the Ukrainian politics appeared to be challenge for the Crimea. Under these conditions, the Crimeans felt insecure as a part of Ukraine and had to re-evaluate the possibility of the new statehood.

The situation got worse after the separation of *Novorossiia* (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) which put Ukraine to the edge of the civil war and the weakened sovereignty. As a result, Ukraine considers the Crimea as temporarily occupied territory, and the military conflict in the Eastern regions is defined as anti-terroristic operation which makes it impossible for Kyiv to control the whole territory of Ukraine. Different military units, not subordinated to Kyiv are operating in the Eastern part of Ukraine. In addition, an unbalanced relation with Russia which is eager to use its economic and energy leverage deprives Kyiv the right to use severe measures against the rebels of the East in order to preserve the territorial integrity.

At the same time, it should be noted that this thesis does not disclaim the Russian invasion into the territory of the Crimea, but rather discusses the response of the Crimean and the regional elites to this incursion as well as the lack of the actions from the Ukrainian side. The reaction and the behavior of the Crimeans are explained from the domestic dynamics in Ukraine and in the region in this chapter, while the following chapter concentrates on the role of the Russian Federation in the separation of the Crimea, as well as the silent position of the international community.

CHAPTER 6

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT LED TO THE SEPARATION OF THE CRIMEA

6.1. Introduction

As it was recognized internationally, the Crimea was invaded and annexed by the Russian Federation. However, apart from this, there were several external factors that created the conditions for the separation of the region. The catalyst appeared to be the Association Agreement of the European Union and the position of the NATO during Ukrainian crisis. Employing the neorealist framework I argue that these two issues created the conditions that can be treated as a systemic pressure or an independent variable. The abrogation of the Association Agreement with the EU and the response to it, Maidan, was considered as a threat to the stability and development of the region, as it was presented in the press release of the Crimean parliament. The latter, on behalf of the population, chose not even to bandwagon⁵⁹⁹ but to enter the Russian Federation. This became possible also due to the silent position of the NATO block.

The first section of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Russian foreign policy as to Ukraine, as well as the discourse on it. The significance of the Association Agreement as well as its failure that resulted in the mass rallies in Kyiv and other big cities of Ukraine will be analyzed in the second section of this chapter. It will be followed by the study of the role of the NATO's enlargement and its silent position during the Russian invasion into the Crimea. Besides, I will touch upon the issues of the ambiguity of the international law regarding the right for self-determination of the peoples and the respect to the territorial integrity of the states.

⁵⁹⁹ Mearsheimer, John (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company: 163.

6.2. Russian Foreign Policy Discourse and Implementation

For the understanding the incentives and the implications of the Russian policy towards the Crimea in 2014, it is important to analyze Russian foreign policy regarding the ex-Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine, the documental provision of it, as well the importance of the post-Soviet region for Russia, particularly the compatriots in the neighboring countries. Furthermore, the Russian-led formal structure on the post-Soviet space, as well as the energy issue as the cornerstones of the Russian policy deserves particular attention.

6.2.1. Documental provisions of the Russian Foreign Policy

The Russian government widely used the official documents to define the grounds of its domestic and foreign policies. Thus, Dmitry Medvedev, in August 2008, during his interview to one of the Russian channels maintained that the primary duty of the Russian Federation is to guarantee peace and security in Eurasia, and defined the region as the area of the primary importance for Russia.⁶⁰⁰ Vladimir Putin, in his turn, summarized his ideas about the developments in Russia and Eurasia in the essays and articles. Particularly, the sketch of the cooperation activities among the former Soviet Union countries was presented by the Russian President in the newspaper *Izvestiya* on October 3, 2011.⁶⁰¹ Putin listed the advantages of the economic cooperation within the Eurasian economic space and presented the timetable of the introduction of the main institutions. Being a bridge between Europe and the Asian-Pacific region, the EurAsEc was called to secure the global development along with the EU, USA, China and APEC.⁶⁰²

⁶⁰⁰ Interview of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev. (2008, 30 August). Sochi. Retrieved from <http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205991.shtml>

⁶⁰¹ Путин, В. (2011, 3 October). Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня. *Izvestia*. Retrieved from <http://izvestia.ru/news/502761>

⁶⁰² Путин 2011

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in February 2010, first of all, declares the 'weakening of ideological confrontation' in the modern world while still international system with its legal mechanisms are seen insufficient for providing equal security for all states. This is followed by the list of the threats to the Russian Federation, which includes

the desire to endow the force potential of the ... (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc ⁶⁰³

Besides, The Military Doctrine sees the threat for the RF in "the attempts of individual states and regions to undermine strategic stability"; and "the deployment of troop contingents of foreign states on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies".⁶⁰⁴

Article 19 of the Doctrine pays attention to the collective security in the region. It is designed to be strengthened by the efforts of the CSTO, CIS, OSCE and SCO.⁶⁰⁵ It is noteworthy that according to Russian doctrinal documents, the Kremlin sees possible threats from everywhere: NATO expansion, and its military bases in neighboring countries; possible turmoil in Central Asia and Caucasus. Furthermore, the placement of the military forces in Eastern Military District shows that China is also seen as a danger for the country.⁶⁰⁶

"The Program for Systematic Effective Use of Foreign Policy for the Long-Term Development of the Russian Federation" issued in 2010, discusses the implications of the global economic crisis on Russia, as well the neighboring and Western countries and calls for the Western community to stop confrontation in order to build closer economic ties. It stresses the need to use the foreign policy as a tool for

⁶⁰³ President of the Russian Federation. (2010, 5 February). *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*. Art. 8a. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf

⁶⁰⁴ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Art.8 b, c.

⁶⁰⁵ The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Art.19.

⁶⁰⁶ Norberg, J. & Westerlund F. (2014, 7 April) Russia and Ukraine: military-strategic options, and possible risks, for Moscow. *Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)*. Retrieved from <http://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/april-7347/russia-and-ukraine-3b92>

modernization and foreign investment.⁶⁰⁷ As it is known, modernization was the cornerstone of the Medvedev's presidency, for instance the Skolkovo project. The documents maintain the need to move beyond the energy based economy and nuclear based military power. Despite the obvious liberal character it bears the pragmatic character - the emphasis on the economic cooperation with the EU and the US reveal the economic weakness of the Russian Federation and the need in foreign investments.

2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation once again underlined the importance of the regional cooperation for Russia. Eurasian Economic Community is seen as having the prior significance for Moscow and as a 'key transit country' between the European and the Asian-Pacific regions.⁶⁰⁸ As Andrei Tsygankov argues, Russia is trying to act globally merely in order to secure its regional great power.⁶⁰⁹ This can be traced in the Article 4's provisions about "ensuring comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad"; "promoting the Russian language and strengthening its positions in the world", disseminating information on the achievements of the peoples of Russia and consolidating the Russian diaspora abroad. Also, the utilization of the 'soft power' concept allows conclusion about broadening interests and tools of Moscow. 53 Articles of the document are devoted to the regional cooperation, where the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Union are given priority.⁶¹⁰ One can see the interconnection of the economic and geopolitical issues in the Russian foreign policies. In opinion of Dmitri Trenin, "modernization is basically a

⁶⁰⁷ Trenin, D. (2010, 14 May). A New and Modern Foreign Policy *The Moscow Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/a-new-and-modern-foreign-policy/405955.html>

Western-friendly foreign policy report leaked. (2010, May 27). *The ISCIP Analyst*. An Analytical Review 16(13). Retrieved from <http://www.bu.edu/phpbin/news-cms/news/?dept=732&id=56303>

Saivetz, C. R. (2012). The ties that bind? Russia's evolving relations with its neighbors. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 45(3), 401-412.

⁶⁰⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2013, 18 February). *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*. Retrieved from http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/122186

⁶⁰⁹ Tsygankov, A. P. (2011). Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia's Grand Strategy. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 58(2), 28-44.

⁶¹⁰ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2014, chapter IV

tool to reassert Russia's position and role in the world as a major power".⁶¹¹ Leonid Grigoriev, the member of the Valdai Club, the professor of the Higher School of Economy in Moscow, maintains that the modernization is the necessary precondition for the fostering integration on the post-Soviet space: only modernization can allow the production of the certain types of goods as well as the creation of the new work places.⁶¹² Central place in the Russian foreign policy is given to the Russian-speakers in the near abroad protection. This was seen in the case of Georgia in 2008, as well as in the Crimea, and, later, in the Eastern regions of Ukraine.

Particular attention is paid to propaganda and mass media. As the Foreign Policy Concept states, Russia will seek to

develop its own effective means of informational influence on the public opinion abroad, to ensure strengthening of the position of the Russian media in the global information space, providing them with the necessary state support.⁶¹³

This issue of the mass media, propaganda and public opinion formation will be particularly important during the Ukrainian crisis when Kremlin will need to prepare citizens to the invasion into the Crimea. Besides, the role of the media coverage of the Ukrainian crisis during the intervention allowed scholars like Kuzio;⁶¹⁴ Erol and Oguz;⁶¹⁵ Popescu;⁶¹⁶ Kofman and Rojansky⁶¹⁷ argue about the 'hybrid war' of Russia.

The new Foreign Policy Concept, issued on 1 December, 2016,⁶¹⁸ contains a response to the consequences of the sanctions against Russian. Thus, the provision

⁶¹¹ Trenin, D. (2010, 2 August). The Modernization of Russia's Foreign Policy. Carnegie Moscow Center. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=41322>

⁶¹² Grigoriev, L. Expanding economic reintegration in the former Soviet Union. (2011, 21 March). Valdai Discussion Club.

⁶¹³ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013.

⁶¹⁴ Kuzio, T. (2015). A new framework for understanding nationalisms in Ukraine: democratic revolutions, separatism and Russian hybrid war. *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, (1), 30-51.

⁶¹⁵ Erol-Şafak, O. & Seyfettin, M. (2015). Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia's Example in Crimea. *Journal of Gazi Academic View*, 9(17): 261.

⁶¹⁶ Popescu, N. (2015). "Hybrid tactics: neither new nor only Russian." *EUISS Issue Alert* 4 (2015).

⁶¹⁷ Kofman, M., & Rojansky, M. (2015). A closer look at Russia's 'Hybrid War'. *Kennan Cable*, 1(7).

⁶¹⁸ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016). (December 1, 2016). Retrieved from http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248

about the importance of strengthening "Russia's position in global economic relations" and preventing "any discrimination against Russian goods, services and investments" was included in 2016.⁶¹⁹ Besides, Russia still declares its readiness to assist neighboring states "in eliminating the existing and preventing the emergence of the new hotbeds of tension and conflicts on their territory".⁶²⁰

6.2.2. EurAsEc and the Customs Union

In the context of the Russo- Ukrainian relations, the cooperation within the Customs Union can be regarded as an effort to involve Ukraine into the project especially taking into the consideration the EU and NATO's march to the East.⁶²¹

Already on September 24, 1993, Agreement on the Establishment of the Economic Union (i.e. higher form of the interstate integration, implying the existence of a single economic space, harmonization of the fiscal and monetary policies of the Member States and as a consequence of the introduction of the single currency) was signed.⁶²² Abandoning a single socialist planned economy, the CIS countries decided to unite their economies to the new market basis by successive passage of a number of stages. On the first stage, free trade zone was to be created. In the second stage, the plan envisaged the formation of the customs union. The third step is to catalog the common market was to be formed, capital and labor, and the final (fourth) stage was to be creation of the economic union.⁶²³

It formed two camps, who had diametrically opposed visions of the Commonwealth. If the first camp (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan), spoke for deep integration and pursued as the minimum objective the construction of the customs union, the second

⁶¹⁹ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016, Art.3d.

⁶²⁰ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2016, Art.3f.

⁶²¹ Shadikhodjaev, S. (2009). Trade integration in the CIS region: a thorny path towards a customs union. *Journal of International Economic Law* 12(3): 564.

⁶²² Договор стран СНГ "О создании Экономического союза". (1993, 24 August). Retrieved from http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_5465/

⁶²³ Кембаев Ж.М. (2011). О Таможенном союзе Беларуси, Казахстана и России (проблемы и перспективы зарождающегося Евразийского союза). *Юрист*. (1): 12.

camp, whose members later formed the regional organization GUAM, considered the CIS existence only as a form of the 'civilized divorce' and considered as the maximum acceptable the creation of a free trade zone within the CIS (i.e., rule out any form of political integration). By virtue of any contradictions between the CIS countries in their totality could not even agree on the creation of the most elementary forms.⁶²⁴

At the same time, in the mid-1990s, within the CIS a group of states, decided to implement the provisions of the Treaty on economic union at least among themselves. Thus, on January 6, 1995, Agreement on the Customs Union (CU) between Russia and Belarus was signed⁶²⁵ to which on January 20, 1995, Kazakhstan joined, and on 29 March 1996 - Kyrgyzstan. The desire to provide a higher level Integration was also reflected in the Treaty on the deepening of integration in economic and humanitarian areas of 29 March 1996 which set a goal to create in the long term "integrated community States through gradual deepening of integration in the economy, science, education, culture, social services while respecting the sovereignty of the Parties".⁶²⁶

Despite the loud proclamations, the progress made by States towards building Customs Union, however, was insignificant. Even the little that has been achieved, could not resist the first serious test - the global financial crisis of 1998, when the CU participating States saw only right way to solve their economic problems in the construction of the protective barriers apart.⁶²⁷ Another evidence of the existence of the Customs Union on paper was that one of its members - Kyrgyzstan became a WTO member individually in 1998.⁶²⁸ However, the result of the economic crisis was not the final collapse of the emerging alliance and adoption on February 26,

⁶²⁴ Кембаев 2011: 12.

⁶²⁵ Соглашение о Таможенном союзе между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Беларусь. (1995, 6 January). Retrieved from http://www.tsouz.ru/DOCS/INTAGRMNTS/Pages/Dogovor_06011995.aspx

⁶²⁶ Соглашение о Таможенном союзе 1995: Art.1.

⁶²⁷ Кембаев 2011: 13.

⁶²⁸ Kyrgyz Republic and the WTO. Member Information. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/kyrgyz_republic_e.htm

1999, Agreement on Customs Union and Common Economic Space,⁶²⁹ under which the parties undertook decision to complete the formation of customs union and go on the next stage of integration - namely, to build Common Market.

At the same time it was obvious that the construction of a common economic space requires a departure from the classical international legal decision-making methods based on unanimity and sovereign equality of States. Achievement this goal required new organizational and legal solutions, search for that was reflected in the signing of the above five states on October 10, 2000, signed an Agreement on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC).⁶³⁰ EurAsEC justifiably be described as the successor and continuer preceding it integration schemes, endowed besides a number of progressive innovations. However, in the first years of its existence the Community frankly mired. Evidence of this can be, for example, the signing of the September 19, 2003 on the formation of the Agreement on Common Economic Space (CES) between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.⁶³¹ In their turn, Ukraine and Moldova were reluctant as to EurAsEC and the role of the Russian Federation within it. Therefore they obtained the observer status in May 2002.⁶³² The main purpose of this agreement is the creation of a free trade area between the above-mentioned States (to which Ukraine has always sought), but at the same time, the agreement provided for harmonization of macroeconomic policies and the creation of conditions for free movement of goods, services, capital and labor (i.e. the creation of a customs union and a common market, which has always been the first objective Troika countries). The conclusion of this agreement is certainly welcome, if only because the fact that it incorporates all of the most economically

⁶²⁹ Договор о Таможенном союзе и Едином экономическом пространстве. (Signed on 1999, 26 February), as amended on 2014, 10 October. Retrieved from http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_31914/

⁶³⁰ Евразийское Экономическое сообщество. (2010, 10 October). Договор об учреждении. Retrieved from <http://www.evrases.com/docs/view/3>

⁶³¹ Соглашение между Правительством РФ, Правительством Республики Беларусь и Правительством Республики Казахстан (2003, 28 October). "О едином порядке экспортного контроля государств - членов Евразийского экономического сообщества". Retrieved from http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_106209/

⁶³² Евразийское Экономическое Сообщество. Basic Documents Collection. Retrieved from <http://www.evrases.com/en/about/>

developed republics of the former plan *THE USSR*. However, it also indicated, and that progress was made EurAsEC immaterial. If it were otherwise, it would only go on the agreement between the Eurasian Economic Community and Ukraine on building a free trade zone.

However, since the middle of the first decade of the new century, the situation changed dramatically. Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, on the one hand, and the rapid rise in energy prices, on the other hand, again EurAsEC made the most promising integration union in the former Soviet Union. Member States of the Central Asian Cooperation (CAC), after Uzbekistan announced its intention to join the Eurasian Economic Community, in October 2005, adopted the decision to disband the CAC and the implementation of its integration projects under the auspices of the EAEC.⁶³³

Another significant event in the history of development of integration processes in the Eurasian space was the establishment on 12 January, 2006 of the Eurasian Development Bank, the international financial organization, to promote economic growth in member states, the expansion of trade and economic relations between them and the development of integration processes in the Eurasian space.⁶³⁴ Finally, it should be noted the meeting of the supreme body of the EurAsEC - Interstate Council, held on 6 October 2007, at which it was decided to complete the formation of the Customs Union between the three most economically developed countries of the alliance, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, until 2011.⁶³⁵

⁶³³ Евразийское Экономическое сообщество. (2006, 25 June). Протокол об Интеграции Организации "Центрально-Азиатское Сотрудничество" в Евразийское Экономическое Сообщество. Retrieved from http://www.lex.uz/pages/GetAct.aspx?lact_id=1332015

⁶³⁴ Евразийский Банк Развития. *О Банке*. Retrieved from <http://www.eabr.org/r/about/>

⁶³⁵ Межгосударственный Совет Евразийского Экономического Сообщества. (2010, 19 November). Решение N 510 "О Формировании Таможенного Союза В Рамках Евразийского Экономического Сообщества". Retrieved from [http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/tam_sotr/dep_tamoj_infr/SiteAssets/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82-688.%20%D0%9D%D0%9F%D0%90%D0%9C%D0%93%D0%A1%D0%95%D0%90%D0%AD%D0%A1.%20%D0%A0%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%9C%D0%93%D0%A1%D0%95%D0%90%D0%AD%D0%A1.%202010.11.19%D0%E2%84%96510%20\(%D0%9E%20%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8%20%D0%A2%D0%A1%20%D0%B2%20%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%85%20%D0%95%D0%90%D0%AD%D0%A1.%20%D0%904=](http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/tam_sotr/dep_tamoj_infr/SiteAssets/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82-688.%20%D0%9D%D0%9F%D0%90%D0%9C%D0%93%D0%A1%D0%95%D0%90%D0%AD%D0%A1.%20%D0%A0%D0%B5%D1%88%D0%9C%D0%93%D0%A1%D0%95%D0%90%D0%AD%D0%A1.%202010.11.19%D0%E2%84%96510%20(%D0%9E%20%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B8%20%D0%A2%D0%A1%20%D0%B2%20%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%85%20%D0%95%D0%90%D0%AD%D0%A1.%20%D0%904=)

According to the estimations, provided Ukraine enters the Customs Union, apart from the removal of the trade barriers and regulations, Ukraine's state revenues would increase by \$6.5-9 billion annually, which would translate into a rise in GDP of 1.5- 2%. Moreover, Ukraine would be treated as a domestic consumer in Russia which means the reduction of gas prices by \$8 billion annually.⁶³⁶ As to the gas issue, Sureyya Yigit notes that the Eurasian Union is the demonstration of the smart power of Russia, based on the energy importance - it can embrace the hard power - military and payment along with the soft power of attraction to enhance the cooperation in the region.⁶³⁷

Apart from the issue of the greater political influence of Russia within the Customs Union, as well as the incompatibility of the Customs Union with the DCFTA, the organization bears economic difficulties for Ukraine, such as the need to adjust its bound tariffs, and the formation of the customs union between Ukraine, the WTO member, and non-WTO members.⁶³⁸ Moreover, according to Hartwell, including Ukraine is not as necessary as adoption of the Central Asian republics. At the same time, he explains the importance of Ukraine by its size (the second largest country in the region); by the ability to bring the Customs Union goods to the European Union acting as a conduit; by the diversified economy of the country that opens the way for more effective trade.⁶³⁹ These advantages for the Customs Union preclude the disadvantages for Ukraine, such as the over-performing in trade with the CIS, while neglecting the EU countries; the gas dependence on Russia and lesser orientation on market reforms according to the EU sketch.⁶⁴⁰

7)%20%D0%9A%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%9F%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%81.pdf

⁶³⁶ Russia plays gas card to keep Ukraine in its club. (2011, 8 April). EurActiv. Retrieved from <http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/russia-plays-gas-card-to-keep-ukraine-in-its-club/>

⁶³⁷ Yiğit, S. (2013a). Eurasian Union= Energy Union?. *Middle Eastern Analysis/Ortadogu Analiz*, 5(51); Yiğit, S. (2013b). Ukraine: Actively Seeking Energy Security. *ORSAM*. Retrieved from <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=2146>

⁶³⁸ Loo & Elsuwege 2012: 438 - 439.

⁶³⁹ Hartwell, C. A. (2013). A Eurasian (or a Soviet) Union? Consequences of further economic integration in the Commonwealth of Independent States. *Business Horizons*, 56(4), 417 - 418

⁶⁴⁰ Hartwell 2013: 418

In their turn, Guillaume Van der Loo and Peter Van Elsuwege argue that Ukraine's state revenues would increase by USD 6.5-9 billion annually, which would translate into a rise in GDP of 1.52%.⁶⁴¹ The success of the Eurasian Union depends on the participation of Ukraine. For Ukraine, according to the authors, the Customs Union treaty signed before the Association Agreement with the EU would mean the necessity to implement common customs tariff with the members and adjust its policies regarding the third countries. In this case, Ukraine would depend on Russia. Besides, the bilateral DCFTA would be excluded: the agreement would be only possible with the CU as a whole.⁶⁴² In case, if Ukraine concludes AA before the Customs Union agreement, it would mean the legal deadlock for the country and the inability to conduct the reforms. The most vulnerable sphere in Russia - Ukraine relations is energy. As the numerous conflicts showed, this was an important tool of bargaining in countries' relations.

6.2.3. Energy Security of Ukraine and Russia's Policies

Ukraine has been very vulnerable to the Russia's policies due to its energy consumption issue. Ukraine consumed approximately 1.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2012, with domestic production accounting for approximately 37% of the total at 694 billion cubic feet. The remainder of supply is made up by Russian natural gas, imported through the *Bratstvo* and *Soyuz* pipelines.⁶⁴³ Ukraine has absorbed Russian gas price increases from \$50 to \$355 per 1,000 cubic meters between 2000 and 2010. Nevertheless, annual negotiations over the gas contracts continue to be overshadowed by anger and accusations. The Ukrainian energy sector remains very corrupt, and this factor reduces the ability of Ukraine's elites to act in unison toward Moscow. Moreover, the leadership rivalry undermined Ukraine's leverages and lead to angry exchanges inside Ukraine and between Russia and Ukraine.

⁶⁴¹ Loo & Elsuwege 2012: 437.

⁶⁴² Loo & Elsuwege 2012: 442.

⁶⁴³ The U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2012). Ukraine Data. Retrieved from <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=UP>

Ukraine has two strategic advantages over Russia: pipelines carrying 80% of the Russian gas to Europe and storage facilities. However, the situation with the routes is currently changing due to the North Stream pipeline, the first line of which was inaugurated on November 8, 2011. The pipeline is to deliver natural gas from Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany. The route bypasses Ukraine, and therefore gives Russia more freedom in exporting its gas.⁶⁴⁴ Another pipeline that bypasses Ukraine is South Stream which was to be completed by 2019 and deliver natural gas through the Black Sea to Bulgaria and through Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia further to Austria.⁶⁴⁵

Following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the gas issue became very acute. Thus, gas disputes of 2008–2009 were remarkable for both countries. The cuts of the gas supplies resulted in the EU's mistrust to both countries as unreliable partners in the field of energy. At that time, Tymoshenko and Putin managed to agree on the 20% gas discount for Ukraine for 2009. However, in 2010, the price would increase to the European rates and Ukraine was to increase the tariffs for its population.⁶⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Ukraine received a 30% discount for gas in exchange of the prolongation of the agreement on the Russian Black Sea Fleet deployment in Sevastopol. In accordance with 2010 Kharkiv treaty, the Russian fleet is to remain in the Crimea until 2042.⁶⁴⁷

It is noteworthy, that the Russia's reluctance to revise the gas treaties was defined by the idea of the control over the Ukrainian pipeline system that was clearly seen in Putin's statement about the merger of Gazprom and Naftogaz, and the pressure on Ukraine to enter the Customs Union.⁶⁴⁸ According to Sureyya Yigit's estimations, prior to domestic crisis of 2013, Ukraine's energy security strategy based on two

⁶⁴⁴ Nord Stream. *The Pipeline*. Retrieved from <https://www.nord-stream.com/the-project/pipeline/>

⁶⁴⁵ The South Stream. Retrieved from <http://www.south-stream-transport.com/project/>

⁶⁴⁶ Газовое соглашение Тимошенко-Путина. Полный текст. (2009, 22 January). *UNIAN*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/183201-gazovoe-soglashenie-timoshenko-putina-polnyiy-tekst.html>

⁶⁴⁷ Угода між Україною та Російською Федерацією з питань перебування Чорноморського флоту Російської Федерації на території України (укр/рос). (2010, 27 April). Retrieved from http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_359?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYA4.ZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8Ie6

⁶⁴⁸ Trenin, D. (2001) *Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 13.

options. The first one - the prospect to receive cheaper Turkmen gas would convince Russia to reduce the price for Ukraine from the present \$430 bum to \$280 bum. However, due to the necessity to use the Russian transition system for the delivery of the Turkmen gas made this option very unlikely. Besides, the transportation cost would make the price of this gas similar to the one Russia offers. The second option, in opinion of Yigit, would be the establishment of the Russian-Ukrainian which could utilize the Ukraine's transportation system and owned by Kyiv. It is through cooperating with Gazprom that Ukraine hopes to be offered the price of \$280.⁶⁴⁹

December 2013 gas agreements secured a Russian bailout of the Ukrainian economy that included the buyback of \$15 billion in Ukrainian and a 33% gas discount, with the new price constituting \$268.50 per thousand cubic meters. However, even these provisions could slightly guarantee the energy security of Ukraine. The weakness of Naftogaz, its chronic and growing debt to Gazprom and domestic lenders, the change of the transit pipeline to the Northern Stream, and Russia's import sanctions to the Ukrainian goods present the real energy and economic leverage of Russia over Ukraine.⁶⁵⁰ Finally, recent discoveries of shale gas deposits in Ukraine provide the country with a possible means to diversify its natural gas supplies away from Russia. In January 2013, Shell agreed to explore an area which the government estimates holds about 4 Tcf of shale natural gas in reserves. Current plans include development of shale gas resources for domestic consumption and exports to Western Europe by 2020.⁶⁵¹

6.2.4. Russian Intervention during the Ukrainian Crisis and the Annexation of the Crimea

While the fifth chapter of the thesis was devoted to the separation of the Crimea, including the issue of the Russian invasion into the territory of the Crimea, this

⁶⁴⁹ Yigit 2013b.

⁶⁵⁰ Balmaceda, M. M. (2014). Will Cheap Russian Gas Save Ukraine?. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 61(2), 61-67.

⁶⁵¹ The U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2012). Ukraine.

section will draw attention to the peculiarities of the Russian invasion. The issues raised by the Crimean campaign provoked the splash of the articles on the topic. The authors tend to neglect the regional peculiarities, rather paying attention to the Ukrainian and Russian foreign policies. Needless to say that the leading approach in the analysis of the case appears to be realist. For instance, realists are discussing the restoration of the empire within the Russian Federation, not necessarily the USSR. Thus, Aurel Braun as well as Michael Rywkin,⁶⁵² point out the conservatism of Putin's thinking:

He wants to rebuild what he considers nineteenth-century Russia's grandeur in the former soviet space, but he doesn't want to acknowledge the obstacle to such a desire posed by Russia's failing economic monoculture, the corrosiveness of his country's endemic corruption, or the fact that, while he might manage to swallow Ukraine, actually digesting its political activism would, ironically, deeply threaten his hold on power.⁶⁵³

The idea of the revival of the USSR is touched upon by Jeffrey Mankoff.⁶⁵⁴ He argues that before the Crimea, Russia felt free to intervene the frozen conflict in the former Soviet republics, if its influence in the region was challenged, using the aim to protect compatriots. This flexible term was adjusted to the foreign policies of Kremlin correspondingly. Thus, Russia intervened Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia but left apart Central Asian republics, giving them no strategic significance. However, in the case of the Crimea, the intervention was followed by the annexation of the region that bolstered Ukrainian nationalism and drew the country away from the Eurasian economic cooperation projects.⁶⁵⁵

Jeffrey Gedmin, in his analysis, argues that the foreign policy was utilized by the Russian leader in order to strengthen his authoritarian power in Russia.⁶⁵⁶ This idea is supported by the surveys conducted in Russia shortly after the Crimean campaign

⁶⁵² Rywkin, M. (2014). Russia: Mythology in the Service of Realpolitik. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 36(3), 195-200.

⁶⁵³ Braun, A. (2014). Tougher sanctions now: Putin's delusional quest for empire. *World Affairs*, 177(2): 36.

⁶⁵⁴ Mankoff, J. (2014). Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine. *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 60-68.

⁶⁵⁵ Mankoff 2014.

⁶⁵⁶ Gedmin 2014: 12.

by the Levada center and VCIOM that reveal the euphoria of the citizens about the annexation of the Crimea and support to the president. According to their estimates, the Russians felt dizzy about the Crimea that became the part of the Russian Federation, the same was noted shortly after the war in Georgia.

In his recent article for *Foreign Affairs*, Michael McFaul is cautious to call Putin's policies realist. Instead, he argues that the Ukrainian crisis is not about the contradiction between NATO and Russia, but "about Putin and his unconstrained, erratic adventurism", which gains, however, are very limited. Russia's actions in the Crimea only "forge a stronger, more unified, and more pro-Western identity among Ukrainians". This made it easier for Ukraine to make its choice of the EU, not the Eurasian Union. At the same time, Belarus and Kazakhstan, who always have been concerned about the Eurasian Union, became even less enthusiastic. Finally, "Putin has strengthened NATO, weakened the Russian economy, and undermined Moscow's international reputation as a champion of sovereignty and noninterference".⁶⁵⁷ Stephen Blank, in his turn, analyzes Ukrainian crisis from the neo-realist perspective and gives recommendations for the US in terms of possible actions of Russia in Caucasus and Central Asia. The expert says that the Russian legislation allows the president to send the military aid in order to protect the compatriots in the near abroad without the consent of the State Duma. Therefore, in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe, the similar situation may happen due to the variety of threat and they require sustained U.S. attention and even sometimes intervention.⁶⁵⁸

This ideology and doctrine of Kremlin contains the vision of Russia as a 'civilization-state', based on the traditional values; the leading role in the post-Soviet economic integration; and the desire to defend the 'Russian World'.⁶⁵⁹ This view is supported by Michael Rywkin, who argues that Putin utilizes the myths of the Moscow as a

⁶⁵⁷ McFaul, M., Sestanovich, S., & Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Faulty powers: who started the Ukraine Crisis. *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 167.

⁶⁵⁸ Blank, S. (2014). From Eurasia with love. *American foreign policy interests*, 36(3), 162-174.

⁶⁵⁹ Shevtsova, L. (2014). The Russia Factor. *Journal of Democracy*, 25(3), 74-82.

Third Rome and 'elder brother' in order to fill the ideological vacuum of 1990s and contrast the Messianism of Russia to the US' multiculturalism.⁶⁶⁰ Such ideology can be called 'marketable'⁶⁶¹ and, according to Kaylan, it moved from anti-Americanism to 'discernible, exportable, full-fledged... conservatism' based on 'populist tricks', and the promotion of Orthodoxy that could keep him in power.⁶⁶² Special role is ascribed to the spirituality of the Russians represented by the Orthodox Church, as a contrast to de-Christianized West,⁶⁶³ which provokes the opposition of the Russian values to the Western ones.

The nationalistic rhetoric is closely related to ideology. The former was particularly chosen by Kremlin during the last 15 years. It is engaged in various forms in different campaigns of the former, representing a good example of the nationalism mobilization. For instance, in his appeal to the Russian Parliament on 18 March, 2014, Putin underlined that the Crimea has always been the part of Russia in the hearts and minds of the people and stressed the only possibility for Russia during the Ukrainian crisis: "Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part." However, this was followed by the pragmatic desire to control the region: "Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian."⁶⁶⁴

The nationalistic discourse was used post hoc as well: for justification of the actions on the Crimea. This view is supported by Laruelle,⁶⁶⁵ Hansen⁶⁶⁶, Rotaru.⁶⁶⁷ Hansen

⁶⁶⁰ Rywkin, M. (2014). Russia: Mythology in the Service of Realpolitik. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 36(3), 195-200.

⁶⁶¹ Kaylan, M. (2014). Kremlin values: Putin's strategic conservatism. *World Affairs*, 177(1): 11.

⁶⁶² Kaylan, M. (2014). Kremlin values: Putin's strategic conservatism. *World Affairs*, 177(1): 10.

⁶⁶³ Buchanan, P. (2013, 17 December). Is Putin One of Us? *Townhall*. Retrieved from <http://townhall.com/columnists/patbuchanan/2013/12/17/is-putin-one-of-us-n1764094>

⁶⁶⁴ Address by President of the Russian Federation. (18 March, 2014). Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>

⁶⁶⁵ Laruelle, M. (2015). Russia as a "Divided Nation," from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 62(2), 88-97.

points out the construction of the minimum action space: "Putin framed himself into a corner from which there was only one way out – and that was through the door leading to Crimea".⁶⁶⁸ This was possible due to the use of the state sponsored media, while the audience was expected to draw conclusions about the proposed dichotomy of 'enemy - rescuer'. Legitimization discourse contained the references to the UN Charter, Kosovo case, and the right to self-determination. As Rotaru notes, in doing so, Moscow was mimicking the West's rhetoric.⁶⁶⁹

The analysts also admit the role of the combined with the populist discourse of the 'rescuer' in Russia. The combination of the conventional, irregular and cyber warfare allowed some scholars to use the notion 'hybrid war'. While this thesis does not seek to analyze the warfare, the media, as an important element of the state power in neoclassical realist perspective. It is resembled in the 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept:

Russia will seek to ... strengthen the role of Russian mass media in the international information environment providing them with essential state support, as well as actively participate in international information cooperation, and take necessary measures to counteract information threats to its sovereignty and security.⁶⁷⁰

The importance of the support for media is stressed by the 2016 Foreign Policy Concept. The role of the Russian media is underlined by many scholars: it pictured the 'Other' that was the Ukrainian nationalists and activists, it formed the public opinion in the way that Russia had no other choice except of the protection the compatriots, it justifies the policy makers. In their research of the Russian media, Stephen Hutchings and Joanna Szostek analyzed the Russian media outlets. They argued that the media cannot be treated as puppets in the Kremlin's hands, Rather than a passive tool in the Kremlin's hands, but they rather serve as an active agent.

⁶⁶⁶ Hansen, F. S. (2015). Framing yourself into a corner: Russia, Crimea, and the minimal action space. *European Security*, 24(1), 141-158.

⁶⁶⁷ Rotaru, V. (2016). Russia's Post-Crimea Legitimization Discourse And Its Challenges For The Eap Countries. *EURINT*, 3, 27-44.

⁶⁶⁸ Hansen 2015: 153.

⁶⁶⁹ Rotaru 2016.

⁶⁷⁰ Foreign Policy Concept 2013, Art.41

Besides, they reflect rather the Russia's perception of threat to the Russian status as a great power, and struggling to be seen as a truly European nation as a contrast to the American hegemony.⁶⁷¹ The cleavages in the Russian media were examined by Alexander Graef.⁶⁷² Graef distinguished two camps in the media outlets. One of them, the scholar argues, included mostly state-sponsored channels therefore tried to justify the annexation of the Crimea and conflict in the Eastern Ukraine. Another camp, according to Graef, is represented by the liberal media that stood against the Putin's policies as well as against the corrupt Yanukovych's regime.⁶⁷³

As to the perception of the situation in the Crimea in February - March 2016 by the ordinary people, it can be said that the Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean see the situation as the Russian invasion.⁶⁷⁴ Those who identified themselves as Russians and supported the annexation of the Crimea insist on the expression of the free will of the Crimeans, as it was discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, the residing in Kerch couple remembered the tanks coming from the Southern Russia through the ferry boats.⁶⁷⁵ They also note the presence of militants at the polling stations during the referendum.⁶⁷⁶ The intrusion into the Crimea seems to be logical continuation of the Russian policies in the post-Soviet space. However, the EU and, more importantly, Northern Alliance's policies in the region jeopardized Kremlin.

⁶⁷¹ Hutchings, S., & Szostek, J. (2015). Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse during the Ukraine Crisis. *Ukraine and Russia*: 173.

⁶⁷² Graef, A. (2015). The Discourse on the Ukrainian Conflict in Russian Media: November 2013-April 2014. Retrieved from http://www.imre-kertesz-kolleg.uni-jena.de/fileadmin/imre-kertesz-kolleg/Portal/The_Ukrainian_Crisis/Russia/Graef_Alexander_Russian_discourse_Ukrainian_conflict_25.04.2015.pdf

⁶⁷³ Graef 2015: 13.

⁶⁷⁴ Interview with the Crimean entrepreneur living in Kyiv. (2016, 18 October). Simferopol.

Interview with the faculty member of one of the Crimean universities. (2016, 27 October) Simferopol.

Interview with the Crimean employed in Kyiv. (2016, 27 October). Kyiv.

Interview with the Crimean Tatar student living in Turkey. (2016, 12 November). Ankara.

⁶⁷⁵ Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

⁶⁷⁶ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 1 November). Istanbul.

6.3. The EU Policies

In November 2013, Ukrainian president Yanukovych took decision to suspend the negotiations with the European Union on the Association Agreement. This became the impulse for the mass rallies in Ukraine. The discussion of the European Union and its significance for Ukraine deserves special attention in this chapter.

6.3.1. EU - Ukraine Relations. Negotiations on the EU - Ukraine Association Agreement and the DCFTA

Ukraine in the first half of the 1990s, declared the course of the European integration. Ukraine's foreign policy concept was formulated in the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada "On the main directions of foreign policy of Ukraine" dated July 2, 1993.⁶⁷⁷ The decree stated that "the long-term goal of Ukraine's foreign policy is membership in the European Community." The first document that established the cooperation between the EU and Ukraine was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998.⁶⁷⁸ The document which was to be renewed automatically each 10 years required revision due to Ukraine's acceptance to the WTO.⁶⁷⁹ Moreover, the sensitive goods including textile, steel and coal were excluded from the Agreement. The document did not contain any concrete provisions as to the establishment of the free trade zone or any regional integration plan, therefore was considered by the analysts as a declaration of intent.⁶⁸⁰ Nevertheless, the PCA underlined the importance of bringing the Ukrainian legislation to the European standards.

⁶⁷⁷ Верховна Рада України. (1993, 2 July). Постанова Верховної Ради України "Про Основні напрями зовнішньої політики України". Retrieved from <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12>.

⁶⁷⁸ Policy background: Bilateral policy agreements between the EU and Ukraine. Retrieved from <http://www.bilat-ukraine.eu/en/186.php>

⁶⁷⁹ Loo & Elsuwege 2012: 424.

⁶⁸⁰ Loo & Elsuwege 2012: 425.

In 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy was initiated by the EU with the goal to promote prosperity, stability and security in its neighborhood by means of reforms.⁶⁸¹ However, the lack of concrete provisions and the membership perspective, very abstract goals of the ENP has limited its impact in Ukraine, on opinion of Kataryna Wolczuk. She argued that the ENP had had an overall weak mobilizing effect on the political elites of the country. The prospect for membership was the motivating factor for the Ukrainian government after 2004, and it took the decision to implement the reforms. Wolczuk argues, this was a decisive factor for the proceeding with the negotiations under the ENP.⁶⁸² It is noteworthy, that, after the Orange Revolution, the relations between the EU and Ukraine received new impulse. New member states of the Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the negotiation process, particularly the recognition of the processes in Ukraine. However, the response of the EU was modest and vague. This can be attributed to the different standpoints among the member states. Thus, while Poland and the Baltic States stood for the closer relations with Ukraine, larger old members were against the confrontation with Russia.⁶⁸³

In 2008, the European Union established the Eastern Partnership that aimed at political association and the economic integration.⁶⁸⁴ The EaP envisaged economic integration of the countries, has mobility and security as its goals and recognizes "commitments to the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, and the principles of the market economy and sustainable development"⁶⁸⁵ as the fundamental conditions of the proceeding the negotiations. The documents did not contain the timetable of the negotiations, but it declared the 450 million euro funding for 2008, with the possibility to raise it up to

⁶⁸¹ European Union External Action. European Neighborhood Policy. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm

⁶⁸² Wolczuk, K. (2009). Implementation without coordination: the impact of EU conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61(2): 208.

⁶⁸³ Roth, M. (2007). EU-Ukraine relations after the orange revolution: The role of the new member states. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 8(4): 522 - 523.

⁶⁸⁴ European Union External Action. Eastern Partnership. Retrieved from <http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/>

⁶⁸⁵ Eastern Partnership. (2008, 3 December). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Brussels, COM(2008) 823 final. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/com08_823_en.pdf: 3.

785 million euro, in 2013.⁶⁸⁶ The detailed program of the reforms and main spheres of cooperation was provided in EU-Ukraine Action Plan, concluded in 2005. This Action Plan gave Ukraine the opportunity to move from the abstract cooperation to a significant degree of the economic integration, including the stake at the EU internal market.⁶⁸⁷ The priorities of the Action Plan are the strengthening democracy and the rule of law; ensuring the democratic conduct of 2004 presidential and 2006 parliamentary elections; the accession of Ukraine to the WTO; gradual removal of the trade barriers; improving the investment climate; and the approximation of the Ukrainian legislation to the European norms.⁶⁸⁸

The Action Plan became a blueprint for the action of the Ukrainian government and officials that contained precise and clear set of reform suggestions. Moreover, it envisaged the enclave of bureaucracy that would be responsible for the implementation of the AP. This meant the constant expertise in all the spheres as well as the opportunity for the EU to observe the performance of the Ukrainian party. In this regard, the AP became the road map for the team work of the Ukrainians and the EU.⁶⁸⁹ The Action Plan was replaced by the Association Agenda in November 2009 that aimed at facilitating the completion of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.⁶⁹⁰ In 2006, the EU announced its intention to negotiate the establishment of the deep and comprehensive free trade area with Ukraine.⁶⁹¹

In October 2011, the EU and Ukraine finalized their negotiations on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area as part of the Association Agreement. However, the EU poses several conditions to the Ukrainian leadership. Thus, the EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht declared that "it is up to the Ukrainian leadership to

⁶⁸⁶ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Brussels: 13.

⁶⁸⁷ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Brussels: 2.

⁶⁸⁸ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Brussels: 3-4.

⁶⁸⁹ Wolczuk 2009: 208 - 209.

⁶⁹⁰ Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine. Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/2010_eu_ukraine_association_agenda_en.pdf

⁶⁹¹ EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. (2006). Retrieved from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150981.pdf

create the political conditions wherein this deal can materialize".⁶⁹² As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the major concern of the European officials was the case of imprisoned Yuliya Tymoshenko, the former Prime Minister and the leader of opposition. In this regard, the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton has warned that the Tymoshenko case would affect the EU-Ukraine relations insofar as her trial "did not respect international standards as regards fair, transparent and independent legal processes".⁶⁹³ Finally, after the several delays, the EU and Ukraine initialed the Association Agreement on 14 September, 2012.⁶⁹⁴

The significance of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine is the lifting the trade barriers and regulations that would open the way for movement of products and capitals. Two issues were the areas of the most concern of the parties; they were gas and agricultural production. The impact of the protectionism on the agricultural sector of Ukraine was discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the analyses based on the simulation of the free trade zone revealed the opportunities as well as the challenges for the agricultural producers of both partners. Thus, Nekhay et.al. show that the EU would actually increase net exports of wheat while net imports of coarse grains would decrease. This is an opportunity for producers in the EU, however, it poses a challenge for the Ukrainian agricultural sector, as it could try to enhance productivity and further exploit their natural comparative advantages in the production of these commodities. Nevertheless, in order to use the potential benefits of a FTA, Ukraine has to correspond to the quality standards of the EU,⁶⁹⁵ which is hardly possible in the near future.

⁶⁹² Karel De Gucht (2011, 20 October). European Commissioner for Trade. EU – Ukraine trade negotiations: a pathway to prosperity. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-692_en.htm?locale=en

⁶⁹³ Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the outcome of the appeal in the case of Yulia Tymoshenko. Retrieved from <http://avrupa.info.tr/resource-centre/eeas-news/eeas-single-view/article/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-high-representative-catherine-ashton-on-the-outcome-of-the-appeal-i.html?cHash=b9455629a79f960f0796b894d6a13adb&print=1>

⁶⁹⁴ Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part. Retrieved from http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/docs/association_agreement_ukraine_2014_en.pdf

⁶⁹⁵ Nekhay, Fellmann, & Gay, 2012: 351-363.

A comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of the EU - Ukraine Association was published by the Russian Council of the Civil Initiatives headed by the former Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin in June 2014.⁶⁹⁶ Thus, according to the document, the annual loss of Ukraine on creation of a free trade area with the EU and reduce the level of trade and economic relations with Russia and the Customs Union would amount to \$33 billion, or 19% of the Ukrainian GDP. At the amount of the losses the authors of the report included a possible reduction in export revenue, attracted foreign investment and migration income, and rising gas prices, along with the reduce of its transit, tourism decrease, etc. To sum up, the authors estimate that "the implementation of shock scenarios for the Russian-Ukrainian relations ... will cost Ukraine \$ 100 billion". The authors do not disclose the technique but the final figure is perplexity. In 2013, the volume of trade between Ukraine and the EU totaled US \$ 43.8 billion, and with Russia - 38.3 billion and these numbers are not correlated with the said sum of the loss of Ukraine equal almost 60% of its GDP, in the case of an FTA with the European Union. With less methodologically point of view, the main flaw of the report is that it lacks analysis and calculations.⁶⁹⁷

6.3.2. Ensuring Energy Security

As it was discussed in the previous section of this chapter, Ukraine is the transit country which delivers Russian natural gas to Europe. The 2005 - 2006 and 2008 - 2009 gas conflicts between Russian and Ukraine revealed the unreliable nature of these countries as the partners. The EU decided to decrease its dependence on the Ukrainian transit routes. The Yamal pipeline, a joint Russia-EU project, was the first attempt of the parties to decrease their dependence on the Ukraine's transit system. It started to transport natural gas from the Siberian fields to Western Europe through

⁶⁹⁶ Тупик борьбы интеграций в Европе. (2014, 20 June). *INSOR*. Retrieved from <http://www.insor-russia.ru/files/INSOR20140620.pdf>

⁶⁹⁷ Борко, Ю.А. (2015). Отношения России с Украиной и ЕС в Контексте Соглашения об Ассоциации. *Евроинтеграция Украины: перспективы, последствия и политика России. Доклады Института Европы* (317): 19 - 20.

Belarus, Poland, and Slovakia, in 1999.⁶⁹⁸ As a result, Russia managed to lessen its dependence on Ukraine by 14%.⁶⁹⁹

One of the most important projects in this regard is the Nord Stream pipeline which delivers from Russian Vyborg to Greifswald on the German coast through the Baltic Sea. Germany's dependence on Moscow is high: the country sources 36% of its natural gas imports and 39% percent of its oil imports from Russian energy suppliers;⁷⁰⁰ therefore it became the target for the Russians. The transportation of the gas through the Line 1 of the Nord Stream began in November 2011, the Line 2 started to be utilized in October 2012.⁷⁰¹

Since 2002, the Blue Stream pipeline which delivers the natural gas from Russia to Turkey through the Black Sea.⁷⁰² This project gave access to the Turkish market, which, at the time, seemed important. Even though Russia's exports via this pipeline are growing, its capacities, nevertheless, have remained underused, as Russia overestimated the gas demands of the Turkish market and disagreements with Turkey arose in 2003. Nevertheless, this can change in the future.

Another important project is the South Stream pipeline. The total length of the gas transmission system will account for 2446 kilometers. The project requires that 10 compressor stations are constructed. The project execution period is from September 2010 to December 2019. There are several options of the South Stream route across the Black Sea. At the moment, the route passing through the exclusive economic zones of Russia, Turkey and Bulgaria is being worked out as a primary one.⁷⁰³ If these projects are implemented, according to different estimates, as soon as 2015

⁶⁹⁸ Gazprom. "Ямал - Европа". Retrieved from <http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/pipelines/active/yamal-evropa/>

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⁷⁰⁰ Germany's Russian energy dilemma. (2014, 29 March). *DM*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.de/germanys-russian-energy-dilemma/a-17529685>

⁷⁰¹ Nord Stream. *The Pipeline*. Retrieved from <https://www.nord-stream.com/the-project/pipeline/>

⁷⁰² Blue Stream. *Significance*. Retrieved from <http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/>

⁷⁰³ The South Stream. Retrieved from <http://www.south-stream-transport.com/project/>

Russia would be able to reduce its dependence on transit services of Ukraine to a large extent or even to provide its EU customers (as of 2007), completely bypassing it.⁷⁰⁴

The energy partnership within the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue which was initiated in 2000 aims at improving the investment opportunities in the energy sector to ensure continued energy production, to secure and expand transportation infrastructure as well as to reduce the environmental impact. Besides, the parties seek to encourage the opening up of the energy markets, to facilitate the market penetration of more environmentally friendly technologies and energy resources, and to promote energy efficiency and energy savings on the way to a low-carbon economy. Following the gas dispute from 2009, the EU and Russia established an Early Warning Mechanism. This instrument ensures rapid communication and aims to prevent further supply interruptions in the field of gas, oil or electricity.⁷⁰⁵ On 22 March 2013, in Moscow, the Coordinators of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue Oettinger (Member of the European Commission for Energy) and Novak (Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation) signed the "Roadmap EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050".⁷⁰⁶

However, after the Russian-Ukraine energy conflicts the EU realized not only the necessity to diversify pipeline routes, but the sources of supply as well. The EU turned to Central Asia, Caucasus and North Africa, although Russia was trying to counteract to this. Since 1990s Ukraine and the EU are trying to implement projects that would decrease that dependence of the European countries on the Russian gas. One of the first projects was a White Stream pipeline which was to deliver natural gas from the Caspian region through Georgia and Black Sea to Europe. In 2008, it was included into the Southern Corridor project.⁷⁰⁷

⁷⁰⁴ Kropatcheva, E. (2011). Playing both ends against the middle: Russia's geopolitical energy games with the EU and Ukraine. *Geopolitics*, 16(3): 562 - 563.

⁷⁰⁵ European Commission. Energy. *EU-Russia Energy Dialogue*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/russia_en.htm

⁷⁰⁶ Roadmap. EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050. (2013). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf

⁷⁰⁷ White Stream. Retrieved from <http://www.white-stream.com/>

Another project was Odessa - Brody pipeline, which was to connect the Caspian region with the terminal *Pivdenniy* near Odessa, linked to *Southern Druzhba* pipeline, owned by *UkrtransNafta*, the subsidiary of *Naftogaz*.⁷⁰⁸ This pipeline was planned to be extended to Polish city Plock. However, Russia, willing to impede the Ukraine - EU collaboration pushed Kazakhstan to announce the lack of fuels to deliver. At the same time, Russia proposed to deliver the natural gas to Europe through the Black Sea, and the EU found itself dependent on Russia again.

Besides, in 2007, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Azerbaijan established a venture to connect Odessa - Brody pipeline to Plock, and the EU agreed to provide a financial support for this project.⁷⁰⁹

6.3.3. Cancellation of the Agreement

On 21 November 2013, Verkhovna Rada during the voting on legislation which would allow the jailed ex-Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko failed to pass the bill due to the position of the ruling Party of Regions and Ukrainian Communist Party which abstained from voting.⁷¹⁰ Earlier, the EU demanded from Ukrainian government to allow Tymoshenko going to Germany for medication as a prerequisite for the signing free trade agreement.⁷¹¹

The same day, Cabinet of Ministers issued decree which suspended the negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU. The document aimed at achieving higher trade volumes with the CIS countries, particularly with the Russian Federation. Moreover, the document orders to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with the

Locatelli, C. (2010). Russian and caspian hydrocarbons: energy supply stakes for the European Union. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62(6), 959-971.

⁷⁰⁸ EC Press Release. (2003, 26 November). EC, Poland and Ukraine Boost "Odessa-Brody-Plock Oil Transportation Project". Document IP/03/1606. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-03-1606_en.htm

⁷⁰⁹ Kropatcheva 2011: 565.

⁷¹⁰ Ukraine Suspends Preparations for EU Association Agreement. (2013, 21 November). *The Interpreter*. Retrieved from <http://www.interpretermag.com/ukraine-suspends-preparations-for-eu-association-agreement/>

⁷¹¹ EU urges Ukraine to act on Tymoshenko to reach trade agreement. (2013, 18 November). *DM*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.de/eu-urges-ukraine-to-act-on-tymoshenko-to-reach-trade-agreement/a-17237098>

Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Industrial Policy to propose to the EU and Russian Federation conducting negotiations on trade and economic cooperation. The main emphasis was made on the strengthening the relations with the Customs Union.⁷¹² However, as one can note this document was Yanukovich's attempt to play with the EU and Russia at the same time, and not taking into consideration the lust to Europe of the Western Ukraine's population appeared to be very risky. On the very same day, 21 November, Kyiv was flood with the protestors against Yanukovich's government.

Needless to say that Ukrainians would benefit from the Association Agreement. The institutional reforms envisaged by the EU would allow economic benefits by means of the improving business and investment climate, minimize corruption and bureaucracy. The quality of life as well the quality of products would improve due to the need competitiveness. Besides, judicial reforms, environment protection would be an important part of the reforms. According to latest estimates, a deep and comprehensive FTA, inclusive of regulatory reforms, can bring about welfare gains of 4.3% of GDP in the medium-term and 11.8% in the long term.⁷¹³ The perception of the DCFTA had been ambiguous. In terms of the pros and cons, Elena Gnedina and Evghenia Sleptsova argued that, first of all, Ukrainian elites had not been prepared for the completion of the document insofar as reforms and greater transparency would affect them, especially those determined as *The Family*. Secondly, the authors mention the costs of the adaptation to the EU legislation. Besides, the competition that Ukrainians producers could have faced on the European market could have negatively impact their business.⁷¹⁴

Starting from the end of 2009, the share of the Ukrainians who consider the relations with the European countries as the main priority has constantly increased: from

⁷¹² Кабінет Міністрів України. Урядовий Портал. (2013, 21 November) Уряд прийняв розпорядження про призупинення процесу підготовки до укладання Угоди про асоціацію з ЄС. http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=246864953&cat_id=244276429

⁷¹³ Gnedina E. & Sleptsova E. (2012). Eschewing Choice: Ukraine's Strategy on Russia and the EU. CEPS Working Document No. 360. Retrieved from <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eschewing-choice-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strategy-russia-and-eu>

⁷¹⁴ Gnedina & Sleptsova 2012.

around 23% in 2009 to around 36% in 2012. This new trend can be observed in all regions of Ukraine (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the region). In 2011 and 2012, for the first time in many years, in Ukraine as a whole, the share of the population that ranks relations with European countries as the main priority is higher (38.2% in 2011, 36.7% in 2012) than the proportion of Ukrainians that consider that relations with Russia should be the main foreign policy priority (35.3%, 31%).⁷¹⁵ As Armandon noted, in the minds of citizens, the characteristics that best represent the EU include economic prosperity (72%), human rights (62%), democracy (55%), and peace and security (51%).⁷¹⁶

While the EU had economic and political plans as to Ukraine, the Northern Alliance was perceived by the Russian policy-makers as the threat to its security and its interests in the Eurasia.

6.4. Role of NATO in the Crisis and the Silent Position of the West

Some analysts perceive that the NATO's expansion eastward facilitated the imperialistic policy of Russia in the near abroad: the war in Georgia and the annexation of the Crimea. Others argue it was the non-interference of the Western countries during the political crisis in Ukraine that allowed Russia to invade the Crimea. This section seeks to analyze the policies of NATO, US and the United Nations Organization as factors that contributed to the separation of the Crimea.

6.4.1. NATO Eastern Enlargement and Alliance's Standpoint during the Crisis

John J. Mearsheimer in his recent article for *Foreign Affairs* "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault" argues that the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. NATO's enlargement and its strategy to decrease Russian influence on Ukraine became the decisive factor of the Russian politics,

⁷¹⁵ Armandon, E. (2013). Popular assessments of Ukraine's relations with Russia and the European Union under Yanukovich. *Demokratizatsiya*, 21(2): 289.

⁷¹⁶ Armandon 2013: 298.

whereas the EU's DCFTA negotiations and the role of these institutions during the Orange Revolution also facilitated Russia's policies as to the Crimea. Russia has always opposed to the NATO's enlargement in its territory but the overthrow of the legally elected acting president Yanukovych became the last point for Kremlin. Russian leadership took a decision to demarcate its zone of prior interest and annex the region of the possible deployment of the NATO's troops.⁷¹⁷ On 17 April, 2014 Putin announced: "when the infrastructure of a military bloc is moving toward our borders, it causes us some concerns and questions. We need to take some steps in response."⁷¹⁸ This view is shared by Edward W. Walker who discussed the NATO enlargement and crisis in Ukraine and came up with the following conclusion. According to his findings, new Ukrainian government was perceived by Kremlin as the one that would seek partnership with the EU, instead of the Customs Union. Therefore, Moscow policy makers decided to respond with the intrusion into the Crimea and destabilization of the Eastern regions of the country.⁷¹⁹

The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This provoked serious concerns of the Russian leadership, particularly regarding the further movement of the bloc. Thus, during the Bucharest Summit of 2008, Putin said that "the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders will be taken by Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country".⁷²⁰ The reason of this was the following declaration of the summit: "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become

⁷¹⁷ Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the West's fault: The liberal delusions that provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 77.

⁷¹⁸ The annual special *Direct Line with Vladimir Putin* was broadcast live by Channel One, Rossiya-1 and Rossiya-24 TV channels, and Mayak, Vesti FM and Radio Rossii radio stations. (2014, 17 April). *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034> accessed on 1 November, 2014

⁷¹⁹ Walker, E. W. (2015). Between East and West: NATO Enlargement and the Geopolitics of the Ukraine Crisis. E-International Relations. In A. Pikulicka-Wilczewska & R. Sakwa (Eds.) *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives* (pp. 141-54). Retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf>: 141.

⁷²⁰ Putin Says 'NATO Expansion Is Direct Threat to Russia' (Update2) (2008, April 4). *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from

members of NATO."⁷²¹ The further enlargement to the East and its entering into the zone of the prior interest of the Russian Federation was perceived as a threat by the Kremlin.

However, it was not Putin who firstly expressed his concern about the NATO's enlargement. In 1997, during Helsinki Summit, President Boris Yeltsin expressed his worry about the alliance's policies: "We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that. Nevertheless, in order to minimize the negative consequences for Russia, we decided to sign an agreement with NATO".⁷²² Then, in 1997, Yeltsin accepted as inevitable the fact that NATO will enlarge eastward and accept Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The Bucharest Summit declaration of 2008 became a mile-stone of the Russian policy in the near abroad. August 2008 war in Abkhazia and South Ossetia proved that Kremlin will not abandon its strategic interests in Ukraine and Georgia. Despite the desire of the Georgian president Saakashvili to bring his country to the Alliance, Putin "sought to keep Georgia weak and divided -- and out of NATO".⁷²³ In August 2008, when the conflict arose, Medvedev was hesitating to start the military campaign whereas Putin directly announced the beginning of the war.⁷²⁴ Nevertheless, the expansion of NATO continued, and 2009 Strasbourg Summit welcomed Croatia and Albania (Article 2) and reaffirmed the desire to accept Ukraine and Georgia (Article 29).⁷²⁵

The EU enlargement also disturbed the Russian leadership. Thus, as a response to the Eastern Partnership Initiative announced in 2008, at the EU-Russia summit in

⁷²¹ Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest. (2008, 3 April 2008). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm

⁷²² Lippman T. W. Clinton, Yeltsin Agree on Arms Cuts and NATO. (1997, 22 March). *Washington Post Foreign Service*, Page A01

⁷²³ Mearsheimer 2014.

⁷²⁴ Putin Says 'War Has Started,' Georgia Claims Invasion (Update4). (2008, 8 August). *Bloomberg*.

⁷²⁵ Kehl Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg. Kehl, Press Release (2009, 4 April) Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natolive/news_52837.htm

Khabarovsk Medvedev said EU officials had "failed to persuade" him that it was not harmful to Russian interests. "What confuses me is that some states ... see this partnership as a partnership against Russia," he said.⁷²⁶ Needless to say that Russia reacted negatively on the Kosovo's declaration of independence backed up by the European Union. In April 2008, during a joint news conference with visiting Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis in Moscow, Putin said that

The Russian position has not changed. We believe that the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence is unjust and illegitimate. We consider it unacceptable to say that it just happened to turn out that way. It did not just happen by itself, it happened with active support from some members of the international community. We don't understand why people who fight for independence in some regions of the world are considered independence fighters, while in other regions, under the same conditions, they are called separatist while action is urged against them.⁷²⁷

In this regard, the EU and NATO enlargement, and their democracy promotion that for Russia meant the interference into the domestic affairs of the countries in the near abroad, was a stimuli for Russia to protect its interest in this area. The invasion into the Crimea became an action for this.

It is noteworthy that NATO tried to co-opt Moscow. Thus, in 2002, NATO - Russian Council was established.⁷²⁸ As it was said in the NATO - Russia Rome Summit declaration, the meeting

marks a new stage, even a revolution, in the relationship between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Russian Federation. Today, in creating this Council at 20, we give new meaning to the cooperation between the Alliance and Russia. As from today, Russia will be directly associated with formulating our answers to new threats against stability and peace, in Europe and in the rest of the world.⁷²⁹

To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially,

⁷²⁶ Putin to the West: Hands off Ukraine. (2014, 26 May). *Time*. Retrieved from <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1900838,00.html>

⁷²⁷ Russia steadfast on Kosovo, says Putin. (2008, 29 April). *BETA*. Retrieved from http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=29&nav_id=49845

⁷²⁸ NATO - Russian Council. *About NRC*. Retrieved from <http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/about/>

⁷²⁹ NATO - Russia Council. (2002) *Rome summit*. Retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf>

rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But these provisions did not change Russia's position as to NATO's enlargement.

Russian analyst Alexander Lukin, is thinking similar to Mearsheimer, maintaining that the seeds of the Ukrainian crisis should be searched in the Cold War period when the United States acted according to the zero-sum mindset. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush fostered the NATO's enlargement and provoked the severe response from Russia, which was the Georgian war. The annexation of the Crimea, in opinion of Lukin, was the response to the aspiration of the majority of its residents as well as the desire of the NATO to deploy its navy in the Black Sea. Important drivers were also the need to protect the Russian speakers as well as the rejection of the unipolar world by the Russian leadership.⁷³⁰ However, one of the most provocative analyses on the topic has been made by Stephen Cohen. His vision of the Ukrainian crises has been criticized on the grounds of justification of the Russian invasion into the territory of Ukraine. He summarizes the factors of the crises in five points, arguing that Ukraine has always been two nations in one state. In thi regard, the EU proposal is seen as provocative and forcing the torn country to choose between two options. Besides, he states that since 1990, the US administration has been treated Russian as a defeated nation and this affected NATO enlargement: the Alliance used to non-reciprocal negotiations and started entering into the Russia's traditional spheres of influence.⁷³¹

Walter Russel Mead analyzes the role of NATO in terms of geopolitics. He defines Russian policy as revisionist and argues that Putin hope that decline of the US and NATO will help him to reorder its region of influence. Revisionist powers, he says, "Rather than challenge the status quo head on, they seek to chip away at the norms and relationships that sustain it". Mead maintains that Putin

...has stopped NATO expansion dead in its tracks. He has dismembered Georgia, brought Armenia into his orbit, tightened his hold on the

⁷³⁰ Lukin, A. (2014). What the Kremlin Is Thinking: Putin's Vision for Eurasia. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(4): 85.

⁷³¹ Cohen, Stephen F. (2014, 12 August). The New Cold War and the Necessity of Patriotic Heresy. US fallacies may be leading to war with Russia. *The Nation*. Retrieved from <https://www.thenation.com/article/new-cold-war-and-necessity-patriotic-heresy/>

Crimea, and, with his Ukrainian adventure, dealt the West an unpleasant and humiliating surprise. From the Western point of view, Putin appears to be condemning his country to an ever-darker future of poverty and marginalization. But Putin doesn't believe that history has ended, and from his perspective, he has solidified his power at home and reminded hostile foreign powers that the Russian bear still has sharp claws.⁷³²

The NATO's involvement into Ukrainian crisis and its concerns as to the Russian invasion into the Crimea was narrowed down to the statements of the Alliance officials. Thus, on 16 March, the North Atlantic Council considered the so-called referendum held on 16 March in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of the Crimea to be both illegal and illegitimate.⁷³³ Following the annexation of the Crimea, on 1 April, 2014, during the meeting of the NATO foreign ministers it was announced that the Alliance "decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. Our political dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council can continue, as necessary, at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow us to exchange views, first and foremost on this crisis".⁷³⁴ "I urge Russia to step back and not escalate the situation in east Ukraine," NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in Paris where he was attending a seminar on NATO reforms.⁷³⁵

On 25 June 2014, a head of a meeting of the foreign ministers from NATO member states, Rasmussen told reporters: "I regret to say that we see no signs that Russia is respecting its international commitments. Today, we will review our relations with Russia and decide what to do next."⁷³⁶

The North Atlantic Alliance preferred to avoid the direct confrontation with Moscow and abstained from the intervention. Michael E. Brown explains the failure of NATO to prevent Ukrainian crisis by the following factors. He states, firstly, that for the

⁷³² Mead, W. R. (2014). Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers, *The. Foreign Affairs*, 93(3): 69.

⁷³³ NATO - Russia Relations: Home. Retrieved from <http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-russia>

⁷³⁴ NATO - Russia Council. (2014, 1 April). *Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers*. Retrieved from <http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/articles/20140327-announcement/>

⁷³⁵ Ukraine crisis: NATO warns Russia against further intervention. (2014, 8 April). *BBC News Europe*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26941799>

⁷³⁶ NATO chief says Russia not meeting international commitments over Ukraine. (2014, 25 June). *REUTERS*. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUSKBN0F00UL20140625>

Western leaders Russia had no longer posed a threat due to the soften politics. Moreover, the Western leaders pointed at the need of the Northern Alliance to leave the region due to the fact that there was no need to keep the NATO members together solely for the collective defense. Besides, Western leaders assumed that Russian policy-makers had perceived NATO's expansion as benign therefore it would not provoke a response from Russia.⁷³⁷

Afterwards, the NATO-Ukraine Commission investigated the consequences of the Ukraine crisis and relations with Russia. Ukraine's new Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin outlined Poroshenko's peace plan. Speaking to the press afterwards, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen praised the peace plan as 'a major step forwards', and pledged NATO support.⁷³⁸ During Poroshenko's visit to the United States in September 2014, President Obama declared that the Russian invasion into the Crimea violated sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, and undermined democratic reforms in the country. He repeated that the NATO members commit themselves to provide security and stability in Ukraine, and assured the Ukrainian leader that they would provide economic as well as security assistance to overcome the crisis.⁷³⁹

After the visit to the US, on 24 September, 2014, Ukrainian president Poroshenko signed the decree of the National Security and Defense Council "On Urgent Measures to Protect Ukraine and Strengthen Its Defense Capability".⁷⁴⁰ According to the website of the president, the Council found it necessary to prepare for resurgent aggression against Ukraine and define strategic partnership with the United States,

⁷³⁷ Brown, M.E. (2014). NATO's Biggest Mistake The Alliance Drifted From Its Core Mission -- And the World Is Paying the Price. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2014-05-08/natos-biggest-mistake>

⁷³⁸ Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany. (2014, 27 June). NATO foreign ministers meet in Brussels. Retrieved from http://www.london.diplo.de/Vertretung/london/en/__pr/Latest__News/06/NATO-meeting.html

⁷³⁹ The White House Office of the Press Secretary. (2014, 18 September). Remarks by President Obama and President Poroshenko of Ukraine After Bilateral Meeting. Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/18/remarks-president-obama-and-president-poroshenko-ukraine-after-bilateral>

⁷⁴⁰ Указ Президента України "Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 28 серпня 2014 року "Про невідкладні заходи щодо захисту України та зміцнення її обороноздатності". (2014, 24 September). Retrieved from <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/744/2014?test=4/UMfPEGznhhYA4.ZitvBb5ZHI41ws80msh8Ie6>

the EU and NATO as a priority interest in the country's foreign policy. Some items of the decree are confidential. The Council also agreed on the use of Ukraine's defense industry and on strengthening cybersecurity in the country. Additionally, Poroshenko decided to exempt defense products from taxation. "The law [...] simplifies the defense imports of Ukraine during the specified period, the state of emergency and during the anti-terrorist operation by means of exempting the defense products on the list, which is established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, from duties", - the president's website reports.⁷⁴¹

6.4.2. The US Position

The U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs Victoria Nuland, estimated in December 2013 that

since the declaration of Ukrainian independence in 1991, the United States supported the Ukrainians in the development of democratic institutions and skills in promoting civil society and a good form of government - all that is necessary to achieve the objectives of Ukraine's European. We have invested more than 5 billion dollars to help Ukraine to achieve these and other goals.⁷⁴²

Nuland said the United States will continue to "promote Ukraine to the future it deserves."

One of the initiatives of the US government aimed at achieving these goals was the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has been working with the NGO's in Ukraine in order to strengthen the media freedom, civic participation, NGOs' work in the country.⁷⁴³ In 2004, NED received around \$80 billion from the American government.⁷⁴⁴ U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry

⁷⁴¹ Указ Президента України "Про рішення Ради національної безпеки... 2014.

⁷⁴² American Conquest by Subversion: Victoria Nuland's Admits Washington Has Spent \$5 Billion to "Subvert Ukraine". (2014, 7 February). *Global Research*. Retrieved from <http://www.globalresearch.ca/american-conquest-by-subversion-victoria-nulands-admits-washington-has-spent-5-billion-to-subvert-ukraine/5367782>

⁷⁴³ National Endowment for Democracy. Retrieved from <http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/eurasia/ukraine>

⁷⁴⁴ Mearsheimer 2014.

delivered the flowers himself, laying them at the spot in Kyiv saying "We will be helping", "President Obama is planning more assistance".⁷⁴⁵

President Obama in his speech of 26 March, 2014 in Brussels condemned the Russia's invasion into the Crimea:

Together, we've condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine and rejected the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum. Together, we have isolated Russia politically, suspending it from the G-8 nations and downgrading our bilateral ties. Together, we are imposing costs through sanctions that have left a mark on Russia and those accountable for its actions.... majorities cannot simply suppress minorities and big countries cannot simply bully the small.⁷⁴⁶

The US position towards the Eastern and Central European countries could be understood from the discussion on the NATO enlargement. Stephen Blank and Younkyyoo Kim in their 2013 article maintained that Ukraine seeks the US support however is slow with the implementing economic and political reforms, ensuring energy security and promoting democracy. They argue that the potential allies may not want help Ukraine any more if they see its engagement with Russia.⁷⁴⁷

6.4.3. United Nations Security Council

On March 15, 2014, the UN Security Council discussed a draft resolution, which was to announce the upcoming referendum in the Crimea 'null and void' and called all countries not to recognize the results. Russia's ambassador to the UN Security Council, Vitaly Churkin, said: "Russia will respect the choice of the people of the Crimea".⁷⁴⁸ Thirteen of the fifteen current members of the UN Security Council⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁵ Kerry visits Ukraine bearing roses, \$1 billion energy aid as Putin defends troops use. (2014, 4 March). *New York Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/putin-ukraine-unconstitutional-coup-yanukovych-legitimate-leader-article-1.1709894>

⁷⁴⁶ Full Transcript: President Obama gives speech addressing Europe, Russia on March 26. (2014, 26 March). *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-president-obama-gives-speech-addressing-europe-russia-on-march-26/2014/03/26/07ae80ae-b503-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html

⁷⁴⁷ Blank, S., & Kim, Y. (2013). "Ukraine Fatigue" and a New US Agenda for Europe and Eurasia. *Orbis*, 57(4), 595-614.

⁷⁴⁸ Россия заблокировала резолюцию Совбеза ООН против референдума в Крыму. (2015, 15 March). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/15/sovbez/>

⁷⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council. Current Members. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/>

(Argentina, Australia, United Kingdom, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, the United States, France, Chad and Chile) voted for the adoption of the draft resolution.⁷⁵⁰ China abstained. Russia, using the veto (as a permanent member of the UN Security Council) voted against the draft, thus blocking the adoption of it.⁷⁵¹ On March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the text of which declares the Crimean referendum of March 16, as null and void.⁷⁵² 100 out of the 193 UN Member States voted for the adoption of resolution, whereas 11 states (Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria and Sudan) voted against it. 58 countries abstained from the voting and 24 states did not vote.

6.5. Ambiguities of the International Law: Territorial Integrity vs. Self-Determination Right

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter declares its respect to the equality and the self-determination right of the peoples. Article 2 of the Charter declares that the Members should refrain from any actions that may threaten the territorial integrity of the countries.⁷⁵³ This contradiction was being discussed and, in 1970, the UN General Assembly made the attempts to clarify the issue by stating that the member states should abstain from the using the military force

... against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; the principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; the duty not to intervene in matters within the

⁷⁵⁰ Security Council Fails to Adopt Text Urging Member States Not to Recognize Planned 16 March Referendum in Ukraine's Crimea Region. (2014). *United Nations Security Council*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11319.doc.htm>

⁷⁵¹ Россия заблокировала резолюцию Совбеза ООН против референдума в Крыму. (2015, 15 March). Lenta.ru. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/15/sovbez/>

⁷⁵² Генассамблея ООН приняла резолюцию в поддержку территориальной целостности Украины. (2014, 27 March). TASS. Retrieved from <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1079720>

⁷⁵³ United Nations Organization. Charter. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>

domestic jurisdiction of any State... the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.⁷⁵⁴

In this way, the UN clarified the cases in which the use of military forces can be justified, and stressed the right of the peoples for self-determination once again. The issue of declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008 underlined this ambiguity. Yet, while in 2008 the EU and the UN backed up the declaration of Kosovo, in 2014, Western organizations were unable to counteract Russia. Russia simply used the legal ambiguity of the UN Charter and the Kosovo's case to conduct its policy in the Crimea.

As William Burke-White argues, Russia managed to utilize the principle that countries cannot use force against one another and, particularly, cannot secure territorial gains through the use of force; and the principle of self-determination of peoples.⁷⁵⁵ The former principle is declared in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state".⁷⁵⁶ It was mentioned in 1970 Resolution of the General Assembly of the UN. As the Resolution says, "a post-colonial or severely oppressed population has the right to freely determine its future government and status in the international community". Under the extraordinary conditions, if crime against humanity or genocide occurs, the Resolutions underline the rights of the population to secure "political and legal independence, even where doing so undermines the territorial integrity of another state".⁷⁵⁷

In 2014, Putin exploited the contradiction between the right of the Russian-speakers of the Crimea, oppressed by the newly established pro-Western Ukrainian government on the one hand, and the principle of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, on the other hand. His speech at the State Duma demonstrates this:

⁷⁵⁴ Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 2734 (XXV). (1970, 1 December). Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, General Assembly of the United Nations. Retrieved from <http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2734.htm>

⁷⁵⁵ Burke-White, W. W. (2014). Crimea and the international legal order. *Survival*, 56(4): 66 - 67.

⁷⁵⁶ United Nations Organization. Charter.

⁷⁵⁷ Burke-White 2014: 67.

As it declared independence and decided to hold a referendum, the Supreme Council of the Crimea referred to the United Nations Charter, which speaks of the right of nations to self-determination. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that when Ukraine seceded from the USSR it did exactly the same thing, almost word for word... Moreover, the Crimean authorities referred to the well-known Kosovo precedent – a precedent our western colleagues created with their own hands in a very similar situation, when they agreed that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia, exactly what the Crimea is doing now, was legitimate and did not require any permission from the country's central authorities.⁷⁵⁸

With respect to the first principle, the prohibition on the use of force to acquire territory, Putin adopted strategic denial: "Russia's Armed Forces never entered the Crimea; they were there already in line with an international agreement."⁷⁵⁹ Significantly, till October 2014, Putin was denying that the actions of the unidentified forces in the Crimea.

What is more important, in spite of the 2 Article of the UN Charter about the non-use of the military force against any other state, Putin he justified Russia's actions in the Crimea by the need to protect compatriots: "We had to help create conditions so that the residents of the Crimea for the first time in history were able to peacefully express their free will regarding their own future".⁷⁶⁰ Besides, Russian president labeled the Western condemnation of Russia's actions in the light of the support of Kosovo as the policy of double standards, "amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism".⁷⁶¹

The principle of the protection of the compatriots or Russian-speakers in the near abroad was discussed in the beginning of this chapter. It is widely used by the Russian officials. Thus, it was the justification of the Russian invasion into Georgia in 2008.⁷⁶²

Eugene Kontorovich, in his recent article, makes a comparative analysis of the cases of Israel and Palestine on the one hand, and Russia's invasion into the Crimea, on the

⁷⁵⁸ Address by President of the Russian Federation. (2014, 18 March). *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889>

⁷⁵⁹ Address by President of the Russian Federation 2014.

⁷⁶⁰ Address by President of the Russian Federation 2014.

⁷⁶¹ Address by President of the Russian Federation 2014.

⁷⁶² Burke-White 2014: 65-80.

other hand, from the legal perspective. The analyst argues that the vague definition of the self-determination right which in fact does not presuppose the creation of the independent state, allowed Russia to act decisively in March 2014.⁷⁶³ Kontorovich uses the principle known as *uti possidetis iuris* (meaning 'you possess under law'). It has been applied to the borders of new states around the world and recognized as a basic principle of international law by the International Court of Justice. Even when several states emerge from one, as Russia and Ukraine did from the USSR, the prior internal administrative divisions become the new international frontiers.⁷⁶⁴ But when it comes to the real action, author says, the international community is driven by the exigency and the convenience of the moment.⁷⁶⁵

6.6. Conclusion

The discussed above developments appeared to be the international context of the events in Ukraine. While this thesis argues that the historical, political, economic and social structures of the Crimea are key for the understanding the separation of the region from Ukraine and its annexation by Russia, it is impossible to neglect the international context or the independent variable, in the neoclassical realism terms. The analysis showed that the possible rapprochement between Ukraine and the Western institutions, in case of the Maidan's victory, put a threat to the Russia's interests. It was important to secure the Black Sea on the one hand, as well as demonstrate the Russian's might to the West, on the other. Besides, according to many scholars, the Kremlin uses the foreign policy in order to secure the consent and support within the country. The 'victory' in such crisis periods clearly delineates the enemy, and the party that should be protected. Moreover, I would like to agree with Mearsheimer's argument about the responsibility of the Western institutions for the

⁷⁶³ Kontorovich, E. (2014). Crimea, International Law, and the West Bank. *Commentary*, 137(6), 25-29.

⁷⁶⁴ Kontorovich 2014: 26.

⁷⁶⁵ Kontorovich 2014: 29.

outcome of the Ukrainian domestic turmoil. The economic sanctions do not seem as effective measure to curb Kremlin.

CHAPTER 7

DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CRIMEA AFTER ITS ANNEXATION BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN MARCH 2014

7.1. Introduction

This chapter will discuss the developments in the Crimea after its unification with the Russian Federation on 18 March, 2014. I focus on the period till October 2016, particularly political, economic dynamics, as well as the national policy issues. I argue that using the lesson of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013 - 2014, Russia seeks to prevent any separation movements in the region. On the one hand, by collaborating with the Crimean Tatars that might be the trump card of the Ukrainian government the Russian leadership tried to seduce the resentment of this ethnic group. Alternatively, in order to secure the power vertical in the Crimea, the autonomous status of the region was abolished, and later, the Crimean Federal District was transferred to the Southern Federal District. At the same time, the elites are being substituted with the ones from the mainland in order to secure the loyalty of the region. The local activists, especially those who stood against the annexation, are being purged. The chapter starts with the analysis of the key documents, designing the Crimean Republic, main power bodies, and then proceeds with the analysis of the policies of the Russian government as to the Crimea. Attention will also be paid to the human rights abuses in the Crimea, particularly violation of the rights of the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians as to their education and language use, as well as freedom of speech and property rights. Besides, the last section of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the economic developments in the region.

7.2. Formation of the Power Structures and Policies

In order to integrate the Crimea into the Russian Federation, three sets of tasks should be accomplished, Mikhail Deliagin, director of the Institute for Problems of Globalization, maintains. These are solving the most acute current problems of life support; unifying the normative-legal field; and achieving strategic goals.⁷⁶⁶ By the end of 2016, as the study shows, these task have not been accomplished yet. In his turn, Nikolai Petrov, in his recent article, specified three issues characterizing the inclusion of the region into the Russian political and social system. Firstly, he noted, Crimean integration underlined the features of the Russian space. Furthermore, Russia itself continues to evolve insofar as the region changes the Russian Federation. Moreover, the changes occur, not only in the region, but also in the mainland, as well as in the relations of the both.⁷⁶⁷ Petrov pointed out the spheres that were paid particular attention by the Kremlin. He mentioned new cadres in the Crimea; the establishment of the relations of the patrons and vassals; securing judicial power; establishing the Ministry of the Crimean Affairs; re-registration of the political parties; solving the Crimean Tatar issue; and reconfiguration of the elites.⁷⁶⁸ This section will concentrate on the issues mentioned above.

7.2.1. Legislative and Institutional Provisions

After the unification of the Crimea with the Russian Federation, the transition period between 18 March, 2014, and 1 January, 2015, was announced.⁷⁶⁹ Moreover, on 31 March, 2014, by the special decree of the President Putin, Ministry of the Crimean

⁷⁶⁶ Deliagin, M. (2015). Crimea: The First Step in Russia's Return to the World. *Russian Politics & Law*, 53(2), 6-31.

⁷⁶⁷ Petrov, N. (2016). Crimea: Transforming the Ukrainian Peninsula into a Russian Island. *Russian Politics & Law*, 54(1), 74-95.

⁷⁶⁸ Petrov 2016.

⁷⁶⁹ Переходный период по вхождению Крыма в РФ будет действовать до 2015 г. (2014, 18 March). *РИА Новости*. Retrieved from <http://ria.ru/world/20140318/1000045686.html#ixzz3ZGzDGKmB>

Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Крым о принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым и образовании в составе Российской Федерации новых субъектов. (2014, 18 March). Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20605>

Affairs (*Министерство по делам Крыма*) was established, and former vice-minister on economic development of the Russian Federation Oleg Savel'yev was appointed its Minister.⁷⁷⁰

On 11 April, 2014, the new Constitution of the Crimean Republic was adopted. According to it, the Crimea becomes the subject of the Russian Federation.⁷⁷¹ The head of the Crimean Republic is the head of the executive branch of power, appointed by the parliament of the republic.⁷⁷² The head of the republic has the right to appoint ministers, to suspend the legislation issued by the Supreme Council of the Crimea as well as to dissolve it.⁷⁷³ The head of the republic can be removed from his post in case if his/her activity contradicts to the laws of the Russian Federation or if he/she loses the trust of the President of the Russian Federation.⁷⁷⁴ The official languages of the republic are Russian, Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar.⁷⁷⁵ At the same time, as the leader of the Crimean Tatars Mejlis Refat Chubarov noted in his interview to the Ukrainian *5 Channel*, there is no any provision in the new constitution that would secure the rights of the Crimean Tatars despite numerous promises of the government to solve this issue.⁷⁷⁶ In fact, Chapter II of the Constitution, devoted to the rights and duties of the Crimeans, declares the equality of people regardless their religion and ethnic identity.⁷⁷⁷ Besides, Article 19 guarantees the right of the Crimeans to use their mother language or any other

⁷⁷⁰ Указы Президента РФ "О Министерстве Российской Федерации по делам Крыма" и "О Министре Российской Федерации по делам Крыма". (2014, 31 March). *Kremlin.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20665>

⁷⁷¹ Constitution of the Republic of Crimea. (adopted on 11 April, 2014). Retrieved from <http://www.rada.crimea.ua/content/uploads/files/Constituciya.pdf>, Article 1

⁷⁷² Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 2014, Art. 61.

⁷⁷³ Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 2014, Art. 64.

⁷⁷⁴ Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 2014, Art. 69.

⁷⁷⁵ Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 2014, Art. 10.

⁷⁷⁶ Чубаров: Нова "Конституція Криму" неприйнятна для кримських татар". (2014, 11 April). *5 Channel*. Retrieved from <http://rfe.5.ua/okypaciya-krimy/chubarov-nova-konstytutsiia-krymu-nepriyniatna-dlia-krymskykh-tatar-52565.html>

⁷⁷⁷ Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 2014, Art. 13.

language for communication, education and arts.⁷⁷⁸ Finally, Article 22 prohibits any agitation or propaganda that aggravate race, ethnic or religious conflicts.⁷⁷⁹

Natalya Belitser, in her 2000 article devoted to the Constitutional process in the Crimea, says that

from the very beginning, the principal aim of the entire constitutional process in the Crimea was not so much to find a proper legal solution that would take into consideration all of the historic, ethnic, and cultural specifics of this region and integrate them into the general texture of Ukrainian political and economic life, but rather to appease the pro-Russian majority there, to pacify its pronounced secessionist trends, and by doing so, to avoid more violent scenarios. As a result, the Crimean peninsula has been turned into something akin to a Russian national autonomy (sic!) within Ukraine —a fact never officially recognized by the state authorities, but gradually becoming a matter of public debate.⁷⁸⁰

Despite past 16 years, this analysis is applicable to the nowadays situation in the region. It is important to say that the new Constitution does not contain any quota for the Crimean Tatars despite the promises of the Russian leadership of the 20% quota for Mejlis.⁷⁸¹ On 18 May, 2014, the head of the Council of Ministers of the Crimea Aksyonov rejected the idea of quota for Tatars, justifying this with the need of the official registration of Mejlis, status of which was illegitimate, as well as the principle of the professional background of the deputies of the Crimean parliament, which is more important than their ethnic identity.⁷⁸²

Under the Constitution, the State Council of the Crimea (*Государственный Совет Республики Крым*) is entitled to enact the laws that will be in effect on the territory of the republic.⁷⁸³ The State Council also receives the right for a legislative initiative

⁷⁷⁸ Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 2014, Art. 19.

⁷⁷⁹ Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 2014, Art. 22.

⁷⁸⁰ Belitser, N. (2000). The Constitutional Process in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the Context of Interethnic Relations and Conflict Settlement. International Committee for Crimea. Retrieved from <http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/nbelitser.html>

⁷⁸¹ Крымские татары лишатся квоты на участие в органах власти. (2014, 28 March). *KM.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.km.ru/world/2014/03/28/protivostoyanie-na-ukraine-2013-14/735956-krymskie-tatary-lishatsya-kvoty-na-uchast>

⁷⁸² Аксенов: признание курултая и меджлиса будет происходить в соответствии с законами РФ. (2014, 18 May). *TASS*. Retrieved from <http://special.itar-tass.com/politika/1195014>

⁷⁸³ Constitution of Crimea 2014, Art. 69.

in the State Duma of the Russian Federation.⁷⁸⁴ The Constitution envisions a reduction in the number of the deputies by a quarter – from 100 to 75.⁷⁸⁵ The rule would become effective only after the elections to the State Council of the Crimea.

The first election of deputies of the State Council of the Republic of the Crimea took place on 14 September, 2014. The party of the Russian president *United Russia* won 25 seats in single-member constituencies and 45 seats according to the party list out of 75 seats. The Liberal Democratic Party of the RF won the rest 5 seats according to the proportional system.⁷⁸⁶ Since 2010, the post of the head of the State Council has been occupied by Vladimir Konstantinov. The first vice head of the parliament became Grigoriy Ioffe, who was occupying this post for a long time. Besides, the vice head of the parliament became Konstantin Bakharev, another vice speaker became Sergey Tsekov, who was the speaker of the Crimean Parliament in 1994 - 1995, under the presidency of Meshkov, and who opposed to the political standpoint of the Crimean president. Tsekov also received a membership in the upper house of the Russian parliament - the Federation Council.⁷⁸⁷

As to the Crimean Tatars, the absence of quota as well as the prohibition for the Mejlis leaders to enter the territory of the Crimea⁷⁸⁸ prevented them from participating in the elections. Another issue that will be discussed below is the citizenship legislation that made some of the Crimean Tatars illegal in the Crimea. Therefore, the leaders called the Crimean Tatars to boycott the elections to the

⁷⁸⁴ Constitution of Crimea 2014, Art. 75.

⁷⁸⁵ Constitution of Crimea 2014, Art. 75.

⁷⁸⁶ Electoral Commission of Crimea. (2014, 14 September). Результаты выборов по единому округу. Выборы депутатов Государственного Совета Республики Крым первого созыва. Retrieved from http://www.crimea.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/crimea?action=show&root=1&tvд=293200067855&vrn=293200067850®ion=93&global=&sub_region=93&prver=0&pronetvd=0&vibid=293200067855&type=228

Государственный Совет Республики Крым. Состав депутатских фракций. (2014, 14 December). Retrieved from <http://crimea.gov.ru/content/uploads/files/sostav-fr-ru.pdf>

⁷⁸⁷ Госсовет Крыма наделил полномочиями члена СФ России Сергея Цекова. (2014, 20 March). *RIA Novosti*. Retrieved from <https://ria.ru/politics/20140326/1001115381.html>

Federation Council of the Russian Federation. Цеков Сергей Павлович. Retrieved from <http://council.gov.ru/structure/person/1167/>

⁷⁸⁸ This issue will be discussed in the section on the ethnic issues of this chapter

Crimean Parliament.⁷⁸⁹ It is also important to note that the passport of Ukraine was allowed for use during the election. Besides, the use of the administrative positions by the pro-Russian political forces prevented opposition from the participation in the election. Twelve pro-Russian parties and blocks managed to register for the election. Needless to say that none of the parties that could possibly represent the Crimean Tatar or Ukrainian electorate entered the list of the candidates.⁷⁹⁰

On 28 July, 2016, the President of the Russian Federation signed the document about the creation of the Southern Federal District on the basis of the Crimean and Southern Federal Districts. The aim was declared as the strengthening of the federal organs of power and raising the effectiveness of their work. The head of the Southern Federal District became Vladimir Ustinov, the former Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.⁷⁹¹ Under these circumstances, the former includes Republic of Adygea (Adygea), the Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of the Crimea, Krasnodar Kray, Astrakhan Region, Volgograd region, Rostov region and the city of Sevastopol. Paul Goble, the expert on the ethnic issue in Eurasia, argues that the Crimean Federal District's "existence 'symbolized the special status of the annexed region within the Russian Federation', a status which gave its leaders direct access to Putin and Dmitry Medvedev".⁷⁹² He suggests that Putin's establishment of the now-defunct federal district also gave him the opportunity to reward 'two military criminals', Oleg Belaventsev and Sergey Menyailo, who have now been dispatched to the North Caucasus and Siberia where they may be able to engage in even more

⁷⁸⁹ Глава Меджлиса призвал татар бойкотировать выборы в Крыму. (2014, 13 September). *Українська Правда*. Retrieved from <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/09/10/7037318/>

⁷⁹⁰ Electoral Commission of Crimea. (2014, 14 September). Список политических партий, их региональных отделений, имеющих право участвовать в выборах. Выборы депутатов Государственного Совета Республики Крым первого созыва. Retrieved from http://www.crimea.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/crimea?action=show&root=1&tvd=293200067855&vrn=293200067850®ion=93&global=&sub_region=93&prver=0&pronetvd=0&vibid=293200067850&type=240

⁷⁹¹ Указ «О Южном федеральном округе». (2016, 27 July). Retrieved from <http://rk.gov.ru/rus/index.html/news/340178.htm>

⁷⁹² Goble, Paul, Putin's shell game with Crimea intended to cut importance and costs of the anchluss. (2016, 30 July). *Euromaidan Press*. Retrieved from <http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/07/30/putins-shell-game-with-crimea-intended-to-cut-importance-and-costs-of-the-anschluss/#arvlbdata>

corrupt activity than they have in the Crimea. The Crimea, according to the new system, will be under the head of the *siloviki*. According to journalist Portnikov,

Putin and Medvedev have simply had enough of the 'sacred' Crimea as they would any useless toy, especially one that needed money that Moscow does not have. And they have also 'had enough' of complaints by the leaders of other regions who have been insistently asking why the Crimea should get more than they.⁷⁹³

Particular attention should be paid to the issue of the citizenship insofar as the majority of the Crimeans appeared to possess two passports, Russian and Ukrainian.

7.2.2. Citizenship in the Crimea

According to the Federal Law of the Russian Federation, Ukrainian citizens and persons without citizenship permanently residing on the territory of the Republic of the Crimea and Sevastopol on the day of the adoption of the law were recognized as citizens of the Russian Federation, with the exception of persons who within one month declared their intention to retain their or their children's existing citizenship or to stay without any.⁷⁹⁴ It is important to say that in this short term the declaration on preservation of one's own citizenship was brought by only 3427 residents of the Crimea.⁷⁹⁵ According to the human rights report prepared by Andrii Klymenko for Freedom House, the citizenship obtaining procedure violated all norms of international law related to citizenship. Moreover, it was complicated. In the Crimea, only four offices - in Sevastopol, Bakhchysaray, Simferopol and Bilohirsk - were established to accept the petitions of those willing to stay as Ukrainian citizen. Applications by mail or proxy were not accepted.⁷⁹⁶ There was no any provision as to

⁷⁹³ Goble 2016.

⁷⁹⁴ Федеральный конституционный закон Российской Федерации N 6-ФКЗ "О принятии в Российскую Федерацию Республики Крым и образовании в составе Российской Федерации новых субъектов Республики Крым и города федерального значения Севастополя" (2014, 21 March). Retrieved from <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102171897>

⁷⁹⁵ В Крыму истек срок подачи заявлений об отказе от гражданства РФ. (2014, 22 April). *INTERFAX*. Retrieved from <http://www.interfax.ru/russia/373136>

⁷⁹⁶ Klymenko, A. (2015) Human Rights Abuses in Russian-Occupied Crimea. *The Atlantic Council of the United States and Freedom House*. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/CrimeaReport_FINAL.pdf, p. 7

the submission of the declaration by the Crimeans temporarily living outside of Russia and Ukraine. Later, having calculated the number of such petitions, the Crimean government limited the number of residence permits which would be issued in the Crimea to 4500, a number that leaves no space for many Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars to remain in their homeland legally.⁷⁹⁷ Besides, obtaining residence permit, according to the legislation, requires the exams on Russian language, history and the knowledge of the basics of the legislation of the RF that significantly complicates the process.⁷⁹⁸

The Crimeans without residence permits are considered as foreigners; accordingly they have the right to stay in the Crimea for maximum 90 days per each 180 days period.⁷⁹⁹ Those who belong to this category have to travel to Ukraine constantly. Besides, foreigners working in the Russian Federation must apply for the work permission, that expects the employer to pay around 10 000 rub for each foreigner, apart from the mentioned exams.⁸⁰⁰

In response, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law, aimed at protection of its citizens on the 'temporarily occupied territory'. The document guarantees the preservation of the Ukrainian citizenship for those Crimeans, who was imposed to accept the Russian one.⁸⁰¹ Besides, this law guarantees the pensions for the residents of the Crimea if they do not receive pensions from the Russian Federation; electoral rights; rights to inherit and so on. Moreover, the Ukrainian government issued decree regulating the work of the migration service in Ukraine regarding the Crimeans. It

⁷⁹⁷ Крымчан, несогласных с аннексией, вынуждают брать Российское гражданство. (2014, 22 September). *Krym.Realii*. Retrieved from <http://ru.krymr.com/a/26600512.html>

⁷⁹⁸ Федеральный закон о внесении изменений в федеральный закон "О правовом положении иностранных граждан в Российской Федерации". (2014, 16 April). Retrieved from <http://www.fms.gov.ru/documentation/860/details/108671/>

⁷⁹⁹ Постановление Правительства РФ "Об утверждении Положения об установлении формы визы, порядка и условий ее оформления и выдачи, продления срока ее действия, восстановления ее в случае утраты, а также порядка аннулирования визы". (2003, 9 June, amended 2016, 14 October). Retrieved from http://www.fms.gov.ru/foreign_national/formvisa/

⁸⁰⁰ Управление Федеральной Миграционной Службы. Порядок оформления разрешения на работу иностранным гражданам, прибывающим в Российскую Федерацию на основании визы. Retrieved from http://www.fms.gov.ru/government_services/withoutvisa/

⁸⁰¹ Закон України "Про забезпечення прав і свобод громадян та правовий режим на тимчасово окупованій території України". (2014, 15 April). Retrieved from <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18>

aims at easing all passport-related matters for the Crimeans, such as applying for a passport for foreign travel, changing the name in the passport, etc. under simplified rules. Thus, according to Ukrainian legislation, Ukrainians can only apply for passport-related formalities to the migration service office at their place of residence, but the Crimean residents are now allowed to apply anywhere in mainland Ukraine.⁸⁰²

As a response, the Russian Parliament, on 28 May, approved the amendments to the Federal Law of the Russian Federation "On Citizenship". The amendments require citizens of the Russian Federation who possess another citizenship or residence permit of the foreign country to declare this within 60 days after acquisition otherwise they would be charged administrative penalties of 500 up to 1000 rub. The law comes into force on January, 2016.⁸⁰³ Furthermore, public officials in the Crimea, such as judges, police officers, and government officials have to surrender their Ukrainian passports in order to keep their jobs.⁸⁰⁴ This is also applicable to all employees of state institutions, including hospitals and schools.⁸⁰⁵

As it was mentioned before, the validity of the Ukrainian passports in the Crimea finishes with the end of the transition period on 1 January, 2015. Therefore, after this date, Ukrainians are no longer able to obtain medical treatment in the Crimea (because of the absence of insurance), register phone starter kits, buy property and receive education.⁸⁰⁶ As Andrii Klymenko argues in his report, by granting Russian

⁸⁰² Migration Service of Ukraine. Інформація для громадян, які проживають (zareєстровані) на території Кримського півострова. Retrieved from <http://dmsu.gov.ua/informatsiya-dlya-krimchan>;

Кабінет Міністрів України. Постанова № 289 Про затвердження Порядку оформлення документів, що підтверджують громадянство України, посвідчують особу чи її спеціальний статус, громадянам, які проживають на тимчасово окупованій території України (2014, 4 June). Retrieved from <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/289-2014-%D0%BF>

⁸⁰³ Федеральный закон о внесении изменений в статьи 6 и 30 Федерального закона «О гражданстве Российской Федерации» и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации. (2014, 28 May). Retrieved from http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_163689/

⁸⁰⁴ Shevel, O. (2014, 16 April). The Aftermath of Annexation: Russia and Ukraine Adopt Conflicting Rules for Changing Citizenship of Crimean Residents (updated). *European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship*. Retrieved from <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1113-the-aftermath-of-annexation-russia-and-ukraine-adopt-conflicting-rules-for-changing-citizenship-of-crimean-residents>

⁸⁰⁵ Klymenko 2015: 7.

⁸⁰⁶ Klymenko 2015: 7.

passports to the Crimeans, Russia tries to restrict their freedom of movement. Ukraine does not recognize the Russian passports issued on 'temporarily occupied territory',⁸⁰⁷ therefore, the Crimeans will not be able to use them for travelling to Ukraine. Moreover, as EU representative in Russia Soren Liborius explained, the Crimeans can only obtain Schengen visa in Ukraine.⁸⁰⁸ According to the citizenship expert Oxana Shevel, in January 2015, a Crimean court denied the appeal of Oleksandr Kolchenko, to preserve his Ukrainian citizenship. In April 2014, Sentsov and Kolchenko appealed to the European Court on Human Rights in order to protect their rights reporting the violation of Article 8 of the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms were violated.⁸⁰⁹

Since March 2014, numerous documents regulating the public life in the Crimea were adopted. They touched upon the activity of the public organizations, media, telecommunication and other spheres.

7.2.3. New Legislation and Regulations in the Crimea

Another important sphere that was affected by the annexation is the communication. TV channels, radio and Internet outlets, as well as telecommunication of the Crimea appeared to be under the control of the Russian services. Additionally, to continue their work they have to be registered accordingly.

First of all, Russian government secured itself from the protests and meetings. Before the annexation, on 28 December, 2013, State Duma adopted the law that amended the Criminal Code of the RF. Public call for actions aiming at violating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation would be punished by administrative fee, public

⁸⁰⁷ Migration Service of Ukraine. Інформація для громадян, які проживають (zareestrovani) на території Кримського півострова.

⁸⁰⁸ ЕС не признает выданные в Крыму российские загранпаспорта и отправляет за визами в Киев. (2014, 24 October). *UNIAN*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/1000288-es-ne-priznaet-vydannyye-v-kryimu-rossiyskie-zagranpasporta-i-otpravlyaet-za-vizami-v-kyev.html>

⁸⁰⁹ Shevel, O. ECHR to examine legality of automatic extension of Russian citizenship to Crimean residents. (2015, 4 May). *European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship*. Retrieved from <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1377-echr-to-examine-legality-of-automatic-extension-of-russian-citizenship-to-crimean-residents>

works or even imprisonment. The same actions in the Internet can be punished with imprisonment up to 5 years.⁸¹⁰ The document came into force on 9 May, 2014, and automatically made illegal protests and rallies in the Crimea. Crimean media outlets were forced to re-register in accordance with Russian law, and, as a result, independent media essentially ceased to exist on the peninsula.⁸¹¹ Besides, in accordance with the regulations of the Federal Service on Mass Media, since 2011, internet outlets must be registered.⁸¹² Since in Ukraine, such provisions did not exist, the Crimean Internet publications were affected severely.

Additionally, Russian government amended the criminal law, particularly its articles regarding the extremism.⁸¹³ Extremism is now mentioned along with the terrorist actions. President of the RF coordinated the work on the contraction and elimination of any extremist activity. This law was complemented by the list of the extremist activities, spread in the mass media. This list included the number of video, audio materials, texts, poetry etc., including the works of the Ukrainian authors. First created in 2002, it is being constantly updated and extended.⁸¹⁴ Correspondingly, the issue of extremism received the attention of the Russian scholars. Thus, the faculty members of the Kazan' Judicial Institute (Tatarstan) Butkevich and Konoplyova, in their article, are justifying the measures of the Russian government regarding extremism in the Crimea.⁸¹⁵ Thus, as the main threat to the region they call two groups of organizations. One of them is represented by the spreading vahhabist ideas

⁸¹⁰ Федеральный закон Российской Федерации. (2013, 28 December). N 433-ФЗ "О внесении изменения в Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации". Retrieved from http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_156577/

⁸¹¹ В Крыму остановлена работа телеканала ATR. (2015, 1 April). *Голос Америки*. Retrieved from <http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/ukraine-crimea-atr/2702728.html>

⁸¹² Федеральная служба по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций. Особенности регистрации сетевых изданий. Регистрация. Retrieved from <http://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/smi-registration/#4>

⁸¹³ Federal Law (2014, 30 June). "О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты РФ". Retrieved from http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_198860/

⁸¹⁴ Федеральный список экстремистских материалов. (2015, 28 April). *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Retrieved from <http://www.rg.ru/2015/04/28/ekstremizm-dok.html>

⁸¹⁵ Буткевич, С. А., & Коноплёва, А. А. (2015). Распространение экстремизма в Республике Крым: проблемы противодействия и пути их решения. *Вестник Казанского юридического института МВД России*, (1 (19)), 76 - 83.

and religious extremist organizations. They include I'-Dzhamaa Al'-Islamija (*Islamic Community*); Al'-Ihvan al'-Muslimun (*Muslim Brothers*); Hizb ut-Tahrir al'-Islami; At Takfir wal'-Hidzra (*Excommunication and Exodus*); Takfir Dzhamaat; Islamic charity organizations; Muslim movement Nurdzhular; hafiz.⁸¹⁶ Another group is represented by the 'neo-fascist and neo-Nazi' organizations such as *Svoboda*, *Pravyj sektor* (Right Sector) and its units *Tryzub* by the name of Stepan Bandera; UNA-UNSO; *Patriot Ukrainy*; *Karpats'ka Sich*; *Bratstvo* of Dmytro Korchynsky.⁸¹⁷ The authors argue that the activities of the radical organizations goes back to the period before 2014 and see the legislation of the RF as necessary to impede "the involvement of the population, particularly youth into the work of these groups".⁸¹⁸ The document that should be mentioned is the Federal Law of 25 June 2002 "On Counteraction of the Extremist Activity", updated and extended as it was mentioned above.⁸¹⁹ Additionally, the attention is drawn to the Decree of the Head of the Crimea Republic on the adoption of the measures of counteraction to the ideology of terrorism in 2015 - 2018.⁸²⁰ The latter document, among others, precludes the establishment of the Anti-terrorist Commission of a Republic of Crimea as well as the anti-terrorist municipal commissions. The measures include the actions to distinguish the main actors; distributors of the terrorist, extremist ideology and related information; measures to protect the Internet space of the Crimea from the terrorist and extremist materials; instructions on making explosive objects, incitement to commit terrorist acts; detection and blocking the Internet sites containing terrorist and extremist materials; development of training programs (training) state and municipal employees to work in the field of education of youth,

⁸¹⁶ Буткевич & Коноплева (2015): 77.

⁸¹⁷ Буткевич & Коноплева (2015): 80.

⁸¹⁸ Буткевич & Коноплева (2015): 80.

⁸¹⁹ Федеральный закон N 114-ФЗ. (2002, 25 June). "О противодействии экстремистской деятельности" (с изменениями и дополнениями). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/12127578/#ixzz4UsagTVfa>

⁸²⁰ Указ главы Республики Крым. (2015, 30 January). "Об утверждении Комплексного плана противодействия идеологии терроризма в Республике Крым на 2015 – 2018 годы". Retrieved from http://rk.gov.ru/rus/file/pub/pub_238807.pdf

countering the ideology of terrorism and extremism, etc.⁸²¹ In April 2016, Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars was included into the abovementioned list of the extremist organizations and was prohibited in the Crimea.⁸²²

As Klymenko reports, in the Crimea, media that express their disagreement with the politics in the region have left the peninsula for mainland Ukraine, including the Center for Investigative Journalism, Black Sea News, Crimean Events, the Black Sea TV and Radio Company, the Information Press Center, and the Taurus Institute of Regional Development.⁸²³ Since the beginning of the Russian invasion into the Crimea, the broadcasting of the Ukrainian TV channels was stopped;⁸²⁴ only Russian channels left.

As to the Internet connection, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, soon after the Russian invasion the Internet connection via Ukrainian state provider was cut. Within few months after the occupation, Russian state-owned provider *Rostelekom* via its branch provided fiber optic cable through the Kerch Strait.⁸²⁵ Private providers of the Internet in the Crimea are required to register themselves according to the Russian legislation⁸²⁶ under which they must store information of users for six months and disable access to any site if so ordered by Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).⁸²⁷ Telecommunication in the region also became the victim of the

⁸²¹ Указ главы Республики Крым. (2015, 30 January). "Об утверждении Комплексного плана противодействия идеологии терроризма в Республике Крым на 2015 – 2018 годы".

Буткевич & Коноплева (2015): 80 - 81.

⁸²² Суд признал меджлис крымских татар экстремистской организацией (2016, 26 April). *BBC*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2016/04/160426_mejlis_crimea_court

⁸²³ Klymenko 2015: 8.

⁸²⁴ Вещание украинских телеканалов в Крыму полностью прекращено. (2014, 9 March). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/09/stop/>

Аксенов заявил о невозможности украинского вещания в Крыму. (2015, 24 March). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2015/03/24/tvradiocrimea/>

⁸²⁵ «Ростелеком» взял Крым. (2014, 28 May). *Vedomosti.ru*. Retrieved from <http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2014/05/08/rostelekom-vzyal-krym>

⁸²⁶ Началась регистрация российских доменных имен в интернете для Крыма. (2014, 10 April). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2014/04/10/krymdomen/>

⁸²⁷ Klymenko 2015: 9.

Russian policy-makers. The leading Ukrainian companies - mobile operators *MTS* Ukraine, *Kyivstar*, and *Astelit* stopped operation in the Crimea in August 2014.⁸²⁸

7.2.4. New Cadres in the Region

The new era in the development of the relations between Moscow and Crimea started with the cleansing and new appointments. In order to guarantee the legitimacy of the Kremlin's policies, to secure the stability and prevent any rallies the new bureaucracy was called for. To secure the loyalty of the population, the Moscow authorities insisted on the acceptance of the Russian citizenship by the Crimeans, and major cadres replacement.

Within a very short time after the annexation of the Crimea, the local professionals and cadres have been replaced with the staff from the mainland Russia. The main attention was paid to the judges, prosecutors, investigators, police, and members of the security services.⁸²⁹ Thus, on March 21, Putin appointed Russian navy Vice Admiral Oleg Belaventsev as his official representative to the new Crimean Federal District.⁸³⁰ Putin's top crisis manager and deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak became government curator on the issues of the Crimea and Sevastopol. Previously, Kozak occupied the position of the minister of regional development, and also was responsible for the Sochi Olympics. The post of chief federal inspector of Crimea was filled by the officer of the Federal Security Service of the RF. Andrei Shishkin was granted the post of the deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet.⁸³¹ Oleg Savelyev was put in charge of a specially created Ministry of Crimean Affairs, which was designed to husband Crimea's economic development and integration into the

⁸²⁸ "Київстар" прекратил предоставление услуг связи в Крыму из-за захвата офиса компании. (2014, 11 August). *Gordon.ua*. Retrieved from <http://gordonua.com/news/society/kyivstar-prekratil-predostavlenie-uslug-svyazi-v-krymu-iz-za-zahvata-ofisa-kompanii-35914.html>

⁸²⁹ Klymenko 2015: 7.

⁸³⁰ Petrov, N. (2016a). Chronology of the Transformation of the Crimean Peninsula into a Russian Region. *Russian Politics & Law*, 54(1): 99.

⁸³¹ Petrov, N. (2016b). Crimea: Transforming the Ukrainian Peninsula into a Russian Island. *Russian Politics & Law*, 54(1): 76.

Russian Federation. FSB for the Crimea and Sevastopol was headed by the retired Victor Palagin. Palagin, former head of the FSB in Bashkortostan (2008–13), had proved himself effective at combating Islamic radicalism and calming national elites.⁸³² On April 16, the port city of Feodosiia was assigned a new prosecutor from the Krasnoyarsk region of Russia. Furthermore, on April 25, 2014, a prosecutor from Orsk in the Orenburg region of Russia was given a similar post in the Crimean city of Alushta.⁸³³

On May 2, 2014, Natalia Poklonskaya was appointed a prosecutor general of Crimea. Born in 1980, she became the symbol of the series of the appointments in the region. Before Poklonskaya occupied the position of the prosecutor general she had been working as a head of the department in Simferopol prosecutor office. Her cases have been mainly political and against those who were treated as extremists. At the moment, Poklonskaya is a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, party *United Russia*.

Also in May, new head of the Crimean gas-producing company *Chernomorneftegaz*, a subsidiary of Ukrainian state energy company *Naftogaz*, was appointed from the Krasnodar region. He was Sergey Komissarov, later, in September, replaced by Crimean Sergey Beym who had experience in the energy sector. Also in May, Yevpatoriia in western Crimea got a prosecutor from Russia's Sverdlovsk Aleksandr Moshegov. Later, the heads of the traffic police of the Crimea and Sevastopol changed. In the Crimea, local servant of the relevant department Anatoliy Borisenko became the head of the traffic police; while in Sevastopol this post was given to Sergey Krikushenko. The three new prosecutors came to the Crimean regions in July. One month later, seventy-three staff members of thirteen territorial bodies of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service were sent to the Crimea.⁸³⁴

⁸³² Petrov 2016b: 77.

⁸³³ Klymenko 2015: 7.

⁸³⁴ Klymenko 2015: 7.

Particular attention should be paid to the law enforcement structures. As it was mentioned before, Natalia Poklonskaya was appointed the interim prosecutor on March 11, and 2 months later, she became the full acting prosecutor. Later, Poklonskaya received four deputies, while only one of them was the local, and the rest came from Tomsk, Tula and Yaroslavl' cities of the RF. The Investigation Committee did not exist in Ukraine and was established in the Crimea in 2014, as well as the Federal Drug Control Service of the RF. While the personnel of the former were mainly from St. Petersburg, the latter was composed of the locals. The post of head of the Investigation Committee was granted to Mikhail Nazarov, who used to work in the same organ in Republic Mordovia.⁸³⁵ According to Petrov, 500 judges of the general courts had to apply for the Russian citizenship immediately. They also underwent the acceleration courses and were assisted by the Russian colleagues to transit to the Russian system.⁸³⁶

At the same time, Moscow decided to dismiss from the office few ministers of the Crimean government. First of them was the transport minister Anatoly Tsurkin (March 2015), that was preceded by the critique of the Kerch ferryboat system expressed by the Russian minister of transport Sokolov.⁸³⁷ He was followed by the dismissal of Elena Yurchenko, minister of tourism, in the middle of the season - June 2015. She was replaced by inexperienced Sergey Strelbitsky.⁸³⁸ As Andrey Sambros notes, the criticism of the ineffective work of the Free Economic Zone of the Crimea and Sevastopol led to the discharge of the economy minister Nikolay Korezhkin.⁸³⁹ Furthermore, due to the investigation on charge of the corruption, property and land minister Aleksandr Gorodetsky was fired on 26 June. Three days later minister of industrial politics Andrey Skrynnik was replaced. Additionally, the head of the tax

⁸³⁵ Petrov 2016b: 79.

⁸³⁶ Petrov 2016b: 81.

⁸³⁷ Министр транспорта Крыма Анатолий Цуркин написал заявление об отставке. (2015, 27 March). *Kommersant.ru*. Retrieved from <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2697114>

⁸³⁸ Abalkin, Lev. (2015, 8 June). Лев Абалкин: Почему российского министра курортов и туризма Крыма уволили в разгар сезона? *Krym.Realii*. Retrieved from <http://ru.krymr.com/a/27059175.html>

⁸³⁹ Sambros, Andrey. (2015, 30 June). Кадры решают Крым: как строится кадровая политика Москвы на полуострове. *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=60556>

policy of the Crimea Nikolay Kochanov was arrested.⁸⁴⁰ As Sambros argues, while some dismissals were initiated by the federal government in order to put an end to the corruption in the region, some of the cadre replacements were implemented by Aksyonov. Somehow this is convenient for the Moscow that is trying to escape the full responsibility for the development of the regional economy. For instance, Strelbitsky and new economy minister Valentin Demidov are more convenient figures for Aksyonov. But, in case with the transport ministry, new minister Andrey Bezsalov is seen as an attempt to solve the situation with the ferryboat transportation - Bezsalov is originally from Kerch and used to be a top-manager in St.Petersburg. The trials against Skrynnik and Kochanov is rather a warning to Aksyonov regarding corruption and power abuse.⁸⁴¹

7.2.5. Political Parties in the Annexed Crimea

On 7 April, 2014, the Crimean department of the party *United Russia* was established. Konstantinov, the head of the parliament, became the chairman of the new organization.⁸⁴² The presidium of the United Russia political council also included two of Vladimir Konstantinov's deputies (Konstantin Bakharev and Andrei Kozenko), Peter Zaporozhets, the head of the State Council Committee on industry, transportation, and energy, and Sergey Tsekov, a senator and former head of the Supreme Council of Crimea.⁸⁴³ People's Front for Russia, the Crimean branch of the Liberal Democratic Party, *A Just Russia* also held their assemblies in April.⁸⁴⁴ People's Front was chaired by the prime minister Aksyonov, speaker Konstantinov and the deputy head of the Crimean Federation of the Greco-Roman wrestling

⁸⁴⁰ Sambros 2015.

⁸⁴¹ Sambros 2015.

⁸⁴² В Крыму создано региональное отделение "Единой России". (2014, 7 April). *ТВЦ*. Retrieved from <http://www.tvc.ru/news/show/id/36398>

⁸⁴³ Petrov 2016b: 84.

⁸⁴⁴ Petrov 2016b: 84 - 85.

Rustem Kazakov.⁸⁴⁵ As to the LDPR, the regional branch was opened on 10 April, 2014.⁸⁴⁶ A Just Russia's first meeting in the Crimea was held on 18 April, 2015. The post of the head was given to the local Aleksandr Tenrentyev, who used to work at the Altai regional branch of the party.⁸⁴⁷

During election to the parliament of the Russian Federation on 18 September, 2016, that was held according to the mixed electoral system, In the Crimea, the United Russia party won absolute majority in all districts.⁸⁴⁸ The turnout appeared to be very low - around 42% in the Crimea, and 45% in Sevastopol.⁸⁴⁹ Six deputies entered the State Duma from the Crimea. They were deputy Prime Minister Sheremet, deputy prime minister Balbek and prosecutor general Poklonskaya (proportional system), deputy speaker Kozenko, the head of the parliamentary committee on the cultural affairs Savchenko, and deputy speaker Bakharev (single member constituency).⁸⁵⁰

7.2.6. The Perception of the Transition Period by the Crimeans

The transition period is perceived by the Crimeans ambiguously. All interviewees note the difficulties due to the lines at the passports issuing organizations;⁸⁵¹ re-registration of the vehicles and the firms;⁸⁵² tax system changes; registration of vehicles and obtaining the plates, as well as KASKO;⁸⁵³ the need to obtain new

⁸⁴⁵ Общероссийский народный фронт создал отделения в Крыму и Севастополе. (2014, 2 April). *Российская газета*. Retrieved from <https://rg.ru/2014/04/02/front-site-anons.html>

⁸⁴⁶ У ЛДПР появилось региональное отделение в Крыму, (2014, 13 April). *Новости Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/4/13/u-ldpr-poyavilos-regionalnoe-otdelenie-v-krymu-9869/>

⁸⁴⁷ Справедливая Россия пришла в Крым, Справедливая Россия. (2014, 1 May). *Региональное отделение Партии в Республике Крым*. Retrieved from <http://krym.spravedlivo.ru/005105880.html>

⁸⁴⁸ В Крыму подвели окончательные итоги выборов: победила "Единая Россия". (2016, 19 September). *REGNUM*. Retrieved from <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2182105.html>

⁸⁴⁹ Виталий Червоненко Выборы в Крыму: куда делись избиратели? (2016, 20 September). *BBC Украина*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/russian/features-37421234>

⁸⁵⁰ Аксенов назвал имена депутатов Госдумы от Крыма. (2016, 27 September). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from https://lenta.ru/news/2016/09/27/aksenov_deputies/

⁸⁵¹ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

⁸⁵² Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

⁸⁵³ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

medical insurance.⁸⁵⁴ Besides, the problem of transportation to the Crimea through Moscow or through Kherson is disturbing for many interviewees,⁸⁵⁵ especially those, residing outside the region. At the same time, the insufficient logistic routes determine the high prices for the goods coming to the region from the outside. When it comes to the medical sphere, the dissatisfaction of the citizens with the service provided cannot be exaggerated.⁸⁵⁶ According to the opinion of the journalist the author talked to, the hospitals are trying to digitize the folders of the patients and that is why the medical centers are overloaded with the paperwork and bureaucracies.⁸⁵⁷ But this topic appeared to be crucial for the retired people of the Crimea. As they note, it is impossible to get an appointment to the specialists due to the lines, therefore people with the oncology diseases face the need to travel to Krasnodar (Southern region in Russia) in order to be checked.⁸⁵⁸ At the same time, the nurse from the hospital in Dzhankoy admitted the full supplies of the hospitals with the medicine, equipment, food and all other necessities.⁸⁵⁹ At the same time, the Crimeans note the mafia wars at the industries. One of the interviewees explained how the mafia seized the property of the central market in Simferopol and insisted on the resignation of its director.⁸⁶⁰ On the other hand, the Russian actors think positively about the occurring changes.

Irina Khalii, the Russian Institute of Sociology, conducted a large-scale survey based on informal observation, in-depth interviews with the representatives of the healthcare, educational and cultural sector, and focus groups with the students.⁸⁶¹ According to the conclusions drawn, "transformation is being performed, and the initiative of its implementation belongs to the biggest part of the Crimeans", although

⁸⁵⁴ Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

⁸⁵⁵ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 1 November). Istanbul.

⁸⁵⁶ Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

⁸⁵⁷ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

⁸⁵⁸ Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

⁸⁵⁹ Interview with the nurse of the city hospital of Dzhankoy. (2016, 2 February). Dzhankoy.

⁸⁶⁰ Interview with the official of one of the Crimean universities. (2016, 5 February). Simferopol.

⁸⁶¹ Khalii, I. A. (2016). The process of Transformation in the Modern Crimea. *Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences* 4(9): 978 - 985.

she focuses on the "clear transit from one political and cultural mode to another". The driving force of the transition is youth that will stay in the Crimea. The author neglects those who moved to Ukraine following the separation. The whole approach of the article is extremely positive, aims at showing the positive changes in the regions. At the same time, author worked only with the representatives of the 'budget sphere' and ignored the Crimean Tatar population.

Apart from the discussed bureaucratic innovation, the vital actions were done regarding the ethnic groups and their activists in the Crimea. First of all, this touched the representatives of the Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians. The human rights monitors and reports prepared reports on the violations of the rights of these people, underlining the lack of the transparency and legality of the actions.

7.3. Policies Regarding Non-Russian Ethnic Groups' Discordance

It is important to remember that the Crimean Tatars and the small number of Ukrainians remained in opposition to the unification of the Crimea with the Russian Federation. Therefore, soon after the annexation they became the target of the persecution by the security services of the Russian Federation. In the best cases, they were deprived the right to develop their language and culture in the Crimea.

7.3.1. The Crimean Tatars in the Annexed Crimea

As it was shown before, the Crimean Tatars remained in opposition to the new government of the Crimea during the anti-Maidan in Simferopol and referendum of March 16. All the promises of the Russian leadership to create the conditions for the development of the Crimean Tatar language and culture, as well as integration of the formerly deported people into the Crimean community ended up with the violation of the human rights and the rights of minorities.⁸⁶²

⁸⁶² Klymenko 2015.

Two months after the referendum, on 18 May, the Crimean Tatar Memorial Day of Deportation, the march of sorrow was prohibited by the government on account of possible clashes between Russian and the Crimean Tatar activists.⁸⁶³ According to Aksyonov's decree,

in connection with the ongoing events in many cities in the south-east of Ukraine, that has resulted in deaths and injuries of the civilian population, in order to eliminate possible provocations by extremists who are able to enter the territory of the Republic of the Crimea, in order to avoid disruption of the holiday season in the Republic of Crimea prohibit mass events in the Republic of the Crimea until June 6, 2014.⁸⁶⁴

Nevertheless, despite the ban, about 15 thousands of the Crimean Tatars gathered in Akmechet district of Simferopol, to commemorate the victims of deportation. The event was attended by head of Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov, the Crimean Mufti Emirali Ablayev, veterans of the Crimean Tatar national movement and the others. However, the Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev is not attending the event, amid his ban from entering the Crimean peninsula for 5 years.⁸⁶⁵ At the same time, the Crimean Tatar community in Kyiv, together with Ukrainians, commemorated the 70th anniversary of the deportation. Earlier, on May 17, the event "Light a fire in your heart" took place on Mykhailivska square in Kyiv with and lasted for hour.⁸⁶⁶ The Crimean Tatars diaspora in Turkey conducted meeting on 18 May, 2014 in Ankara.⁸⁶⁷ Action of solidarity with the Tatar community was held in Warsaw and Tbilisi.⁸⁶⁸

⁸⁶³ Аксенов в канун Дня депортации ввел запрет на массовые акции в Крыму. (2014, 16 May). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/aksenov-v-kanun-dnya-deportacii-krymskih-tatar-vvel-tabu-na-massovye-akcii-na-poluostrove-145141_.html

⁸⁶⁴ Аксенов в канун Дня депортации ввел запрет на массовые акции в Крыму. (2014, 16 May). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/aksenov-v-kanun-dnya-deportacii-krymskih-tatar-vvel-tabu-na-massovye-akcii-na-poluostrove-145141_.html

⁸⁶⁵ Mourning meeting in Akmechet district gathers 15 thousand people. (2014, 18 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <https://qha.com.ua/en/search?t=mourning%20meeting>

⁸⁶⁶ Kyiv commemorates 70th anniversary of Crimean Tatar deportation. (2014, 18 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/society/kyiv-commemorates-70th-anniversary-of-crimean-tatar-deportation/131435/>

⁸⁶⁷ Turkey announces support on anniversary of Crimean deportation. (2014, 20 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/politics/turkey-announces-support-on-anniversary-of-crimean-deportation/131437/>

⁸⁶⁸ Action of solidarity with Crimean Tatars held in Warsaw. (2014, 19 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/society/action-of-solidarity-with-crimean-tatars-held-in-warshaw/131440/>

Needless to say that this ban did not affect the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War on 9 May, 2015. In Simferopol and Sevastopol, tens thousands of the Crimeans participated in parade although the entrance was according to the pass system and through metal detector.⁸⁶⁹ The policies of Kremlin demonstrate it is attempting to preemptively control the situation in the event that the Crimean Tatars rise against Moscow. This is affirmed by the ban on the Crimean Tatar activists from entering the Crimea, for instance. Thus, on 22 April, 2014, Mustafa Dzhemilev was prohibited to enter the Crimea for 5 years.⁸⁷⁰ Earlier, the state TV channel *Krym* was prohibited to show the Crimean Tatars leader Mustafa Dzhemilev and head of Mejlis Refat Chubarov in its programs.⁸⁷¹ Later, in July, 2014, Refat Chubarov was banned from entering the Crimea for 5 years.⁸⁷²

Activities of the Crimean Tatars were limited in many aspects. In accordance with a court decision, in September 2014, the Crimean Tatars had to vacate the buildings Mejlis used to occupy in Simferopol and terminate all of its personnel; the organization's corresponding bank accounts are also to be seized. This decision was accompanied by a search of the Mejlis buildings, and the main mosques and medrese of Simferopol.⁸⁷³ Later, on 22 September, the Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov, in the interview, declared the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars as illegitimate based on its extrajudicial status according to the Russian legislature. Furthermore,

Action of solidarity with Crimean Tatar held in Tbilisi. (2014, 19 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/society/action-of-solidarity-with-crimean-tatar-held-in-tbilisi/131443/>

⁸⁶⁹ Парад 9 мая в Крыму: спецпропуски, металлоискатели и недовольные горожане. (2015, 9 May). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/parad-9-maya-v-krymu-specpropuski-metalloiskateli-i-kazaki-175531_.html

⁸⁷⁰ Лидеру крымских татар запретили въезд на полуостров. (2014, 22 April). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3352664-lyderu-krymskykh-tatar-zapretyly-vezd-na-poluostrov>

⁸⁷¹ В Крыму запретили показывать по ТВ Джемилева и других членов Меджлиса. (2014, 21 April). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3352547-v-krymu-zapretyly-pokazyvat-po-tv-dzhemyleva-y-druhykh-chlenov-medzhlysa>

⁸⁷² Главе крымско-татарского Меджлиса запретили въезд в Крым. (2014, 5 July). *РБК*. Retrieved from <http://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/07/2014/57041efe9a794760d3d3fcd0>

⁸⁷³ Крымские татары освободили помещения Меджлиса и фонда "Крым". (2014, 22 September). *Ukrainian News*. Retrieved from <http://112.ua/obshchestvo/v-simferopole-krymskie-tatary-osvobodili-pomescheniya-medzhlysa-i-fonda-krym-118935.html>

Aksyonov added that all those unsatisfied with the policies of the Crimean government can leave the territory of the Crimea.⁸⁷⁴

The same court decision was applied to the charity foundation of the Crimean Tatars, *Krym*. Along with the judicial proceeding against the Mejlis, the Crimean Republican library carrying the name of Tatar writer and poet Ismail Gasprinski was closed.⁸⁷⁵ The searches in the houses of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea are still going on.⁸⁷⁶ At the same time, according to the data of the Ministry of the Social Policies of Ukraine, by May 2014, 7700 Crimeans had moved to Ukraine.⁸⁷⁷ 30% of them are the Crimean Tatars. Coordinator for refugees of coordination Rada of Maidan Gaide Rizayeva announced this in her interview:

It should be noted that about a half of the refugees are entrepreneurs. These are people who for the past 5-10 years owned trading places, restaurants and cafes on the southern coast of the Crimea. And now they faced the fact that they cannot continue their work, because they are refused to extend the lease or something. I have checked this information. People say there is no opportunity to work in the Crimea, so they made a decision to settle down in Kyiv or Lviv.⁸⁷⁸

One of the measures of the Russian government against the Crimean Tatars activists was the arrests and kidnappings of the people. Numerous reports of the European human rights protecting agencies as well as media outlet point out the kidnappings of the activists. At the same time, the precise figures remain unknown.⁸⁷⁹ The most recent cases include the disappearances of Marcel Aliautdinov (February 2016), Ernest Ablyazimov (January 2016), and Ruslan Ganiev and his friend Arlen

⁸⁷⁴ Аксенов: Ни у кого нет четкого плана действий. (2014, 22 September). *Kommersant.ru*. Retrieved from <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2569810>

⁸⁷⁵ В Симферополе ликвидировала главную крымскотатарскую библиотеку. (2014, 19 September). *UNIAN*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/society/986818-v-simferopole-likvidirovali-glavnuyu-krymskotatarskuyu-biblioteku.html>

⁸⁷⁶ В Крыму проводят массовые обыски крымских татар. (2015, 2 April). *Ukrayins'ka Pravda*. Retrieved from <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/04/2/7063464/>

⁸⁷⁷ Почти 8 тысяч крымчан перебрались в Украину. (2014, 10 May). *AllCrimea*. Retrieved from <http://crimea.comments.ua/news/2014/05/06/170008.html>

⁸⁷⁸ Crimean Tatars make 30 percent of refugees from Crimea: coordinator. (2014, 20 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/society/crimean-tatars-make-30-percent-of-refugees-from-crimea-coordinator/131450/>

⁸⁷⁹ European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department. The situation of National Minorities in Crimea Following Its Annexation by Russia. (2016, April). Retrieved from [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU\(2016\)578003_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578003/EXPO_STU(2016)578003_EN.pdf), p.14

Terekhov (in December 2015).⁸⁸⁰ The cases of the disappearances are presented in the mass media as the exodus of the activists in order to join extremists groups in Syria. The legislation on extremism and the propagandist work of the TV channels create conditions in which the Tatar youth has started to be seen as extremists and terrorists. Such cases include Elvina Razakova, Muhtar Arislanov, Fyodor Kostenko, Eskender Apselyamov, Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet Islyamov, Leonid Korzh, Timur Shaimardanov, Seiran Zinedinov, all members of pro-Ukraine civil society groups, disappeared in May 2014. Moreover, two people who had disappeared were found dead: Edem Asanov (September 2014) and Belial Belialov (October 2014).⁸⁸¹

The Crimean Muslims are also being accused according to the 'Case of 26 February', and 'Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir'. The first trial was launched against the Crimean Tatars who participated in the mass rallies on February 26. Ahtem Chiygoz, Mustafa Degermendzi, and Ali Asanov remained imprisoned. Arsen Yunusov, Eskender Kantemirov, and Eskender Emirvaliev were released under personal surety. At the end of 2015, Eskender Nebiev and Talyat Yunusov were sentenced to two and a half and to three and a half year suspended sentences, respectively.⁸⁸² As to the 'Hizb ut-Tahrir case', criminal prosecution was based on the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation from 14 February 2003⁸⁸³ on the recognition of the Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization and banning its activities in the Russian Federation. Under the excuse of Hizb ut-Tahrir members search, massive searches and regular interrogations and arrests are conducted in the homes of Muslims. According to Ukrainian law, Hizb ut-Tahrir acted legally and freely in the Crimea. Currently, 14 activists are under the arrest in the Crimea for alleged violation of Article 205.5 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation "Organization of the activities of a terrorist organization and participation in the activities of the organization".

⁸⁸⁰ The situation of National Minorities in Crimea Following Its Annexation by Russia 2016.

⁸⁸¹ The situation of National Minorities in Crimea Following Its Annexation by Russia 2016.

⁸⁸² The situation of National Minorities in Crimea Following Its Annexation by Russia 2016: 15.

⁸⁸³ Федеральная Служба Безопасности Российской Федерации. (2016, 25 October). Единый федеральный список организаций, в том числе иностранных и международных организаций, признанных в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации террористическими. Retrieved from <http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm>

Klymenko notes the lack of the evidence⁴ about their participation in extremist activities. Only books and movies with religious content were found during searches.⁸⁸⁴

Another target of the Crimean government was the Crimean Tatars mass media. The Crimean Tatar channel ATR was accused of promulgating extremism. Earlier, it was ordered that all TV channels broadcasting in the Crimea report less on the activities of the Mejlis, and its former leader Mustafa Dzhemilev in particular.⁸⁸⁵ Additionally, the director of the Art Union of the Crimean Tatar Program at the *Krym* channel Kishveyev as well as its editor Ganiyev were sent to vacation obligatorily.⁸⁸⁶

Earlier, in June 2014, Russian president Putin, by special federal law amended the existing law on extremism in the Russian Federation. New provisions established the legal responsibility for the financing extremism, as well as sharing in the Internet.⁸⁸⁷ Such legislation, although not containing concrete criteria of what extremism is, allowed Ministry of Interior to act freely against all those discordant.

In April 2015, Aksyonov signed decree establishing the Crimean Tatar Public TV Channel. 177 million rub was allocated for this project. As the Crimean prime-minister said the journalists from the closed ATR channel can apply for job as well: "If you want to participate in the process, then why not. There are no restrictions. There is only limitation for individuals who do not recognize the annexation of the Crimea to the Russian Federation. We are ready to invite professionals."⁸⁸⁸ During the press-conference he also noted that the creation of this channel is the part of the program of the signed by Putin on 21 April, 2014, decree "On measures for the

⁸⁸⁴ 14 Muslims are detained under the 'Hizb ut-Tahrir case'. (2016, 9 June). Crimean Human Rights Group. Retrieved from <http://crimeahrg.org/en/hizb-ut-tahrir-case-the-authorities-de-facto-use-standart-of-anti-terrorist-legislation-of-the-russian-federation-for-the-persecution-of-muslims-in-crimea/>

⁸⁸⁵ Независимое ТВ в Крыму обвинили в экстримизме. (2014, 24 September). *Русская служба BBC*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/09/140924_crimea_atr_extremism

⁸⁸⁶ В Крыму запретили показывать по ТВ Джемилева и других членов Меджлиса. (2014, 21 April). *Korrespondent.net*. Retrieved from <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3352547-v-krymu-zapretyly-pokazyvat-po-tv-dzhemyleva-y-druhykh-chlenov-medzhlysa>

⁸⁸⁷ Federal Law "О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты РФ". (2014, 30 June).

⁸⁸⁸ В Симферополе создается Общественное крымско-татарское телевидение. (2015, 24 April). *Vesti.ru*, 24 April, 2015. Retrieved from <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2528884>

rehabilitation of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, the Crimean Tatar and German peoples and the state support for their revival and development."⁸⁸⁹ According to the document, in the near future a separate program for the economic development of the Crimea until 2020 will be developed, whose authors will include measures aimed at national, cultural and spiritual revival of these peoples.

Furthermore, on 1 April, 2015, the registration of the Crimean mass media expired. At midnight on 31 March 2015, the Crimean Tatar channel *ATR* ceased to broadcast the first, due to the refusal to register in *Roskomnadzor*. Until March 31, 2015 in the Crimea, a number of national, the Crimean Tatar media operated, including the newspaper *Yany Dunya*, *Qırım*, *Voice of Crimea*, *Avdet* magazine - *Kasevet*, *Yildiz*, news agencies - *Crimean News Agency - QHA*, and Internet portal *15minut.org*, TV channels - *ATR* and *Lale*, radio *Meydan*. Among these media outlets, only the newspaper *Golos Kryma (Voice of Crimea)* obtained Russian registration, which has Russian edition, and issues the Crimean Tatar children's magazine *Armanchyk*.⁸⁹⁰ In addition, the *Avdet* newspaper decided to reduce its print run till 1000 in order to save the outlet, which is possible according to the Russian legislation.⁸⁹¹

Searches and confiscations were also conducted in religious and educational institutions of the Crimean Tatars. The deputy mufti of the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of the Crimea Asadullah Bairov said that between June and September 2014, 8 out of 10 religious schools in the Crimea operating under the auspices of the DUMK had been searched for prohibited literature.⁸⁹² According to Bairov's interview for Human Rights Watch, in September 2014, searches for 'extremist literature' in several mosques and Islamic schools had been conducted. On September

⁸⁸⁹ Указ Президента Российской Федерации N 268 "О мерах по реабилитации армянского, болгарского, греческого, крымско-татарского и немецкого народов и государственной поддержке их возрождения и развития". (2014, 21 April). Retrieved from <http://www.rg.ru/2014/04/21/reabilitaciya-site-dok.html>

⁸⁹⁰ Газета "Avdet" сократит тираж, чтобы работать в Крыму без регистрации в Роскомнадзоре. (2015, 20 May). Retrieved from *Крым.Реалии*. <http://ru.krymr.com/a/news/26944658.html>

⁸⁹¹ Federal Service on Control in the Sphere of Communications, Information Technologies and Mass Media. Способы и адреса подачи заявления о регистрации СМИ. Retrieved from <http://rkn.gov.ru/mass-communications/smi-registration/#0>

⁸⁹² Human Rights Watch. (2014, November). *Rights in Retreat. Abuses in Crimea*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/11/17/rights-retreat/abuses-crimea>: 17.

17, authorities searched a mosque in Simferopol and on September 2, a mosque in Yalta.⁸⁹³ According to the data gathered by the Crimean Field Mission, on September 9, police and the FSB searched a boarding school in the Bakhchisarai area, confiscating three religious books from the school library. Children were on the school premises at the time of the search. As reported by the Crimean Field Mission, some of the students' parents said that police asked the children to remove all items with the Crimean Tatar symbols on it.⁸⁹⁴ Also, Asadullah Bairov told Human Rights Watch that between June and October 2014, DUMK had had several meetings with the *de-facto* prime minister of the Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, during which they voiced concern about the searches, noting that religious schools, mosques, and the Muslim population in general were not given enough time to dispose of literature prohibited by Russian law.⁸⁹⁵

Nevertheless, important instrument of the integration of the Crimean Tatars with Russian was created.⁸⁹⁶ Taurida Mufti was considered as a counter institution for the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Crimea (DUMK).⁸⁹⁷ The Mufti was established in August 2014, under the auspice of the head of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Russia, supreme mufti Talgat Tadjuddin. As the head of the World Russian Peoples' Synod, expert on Islam Roman Silant'yev said underlying the link between the religion and state in Russia, as well as targeting those disloyal:

Most of the pro-Russian Crimean Tatars thus restored historic clutch that had been prescribed to establish by Catherine II, and established by

⁸⁹³ Rights in Retreat: 2014: 17.

⁸⁹⁴ Crimea Field Mission. (2014, September). *Brief overview of the human rights situation in Crimea [Краткий обзор ситуации с правами человека в Крыму]*. Retrieved from http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/obzor_krymskoy_polevoy_missii_sentyabr_2014.pdf (accessed October 21, 2014).

⁸⁹⁵ Brief overview of the human rights situation in Crimea 2014.

⁸⁹⁶ Petrov 2016a.

⁸⁹⁷ Новый Таврический муфтият - инструмент интеграции с РФ - эксперт. (2014, 22 August). *RIA Novosti*. Retrieved from <https://ria.ru/religion/20140822/1021033752.html>

Nicholas I in the XIX century. Now the state will have a reliable support among Muslims of the Crimea.⁸⁹⁸

As Kazarin notes, from the very first day of the occupation, Moscow has been trying to tame the Crimean Tatars. When Dzhemilev and Chubarov refused to cooperate with Moscow they were banned from entrance to the Crimea. Another attempt of Kremlin was a cadre policy. Thus, the vice head of Mejlis Ilyasov agreed to become a deputy speaker of the Crimean parliament from the United Russia party. And Ruslan Balbek became the deputy prime minister of the republic. Besides, the head of the DUMK Emirali Ablayev also appeared to be loyal to the Russian leadership.⁸⁹⁹ However, these are the only achievements of Moscow. It failed to coopt even the ATR channel in the Crimea. The worsening of the relations between Russia and Turkey affected the position of the Crimean Tatars not in a positive way, Warsaw University expert Ridvan Bari Urcosta maintains.⁹⁰⁰ Thus, on 26 April 2016, Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars was recognized an extremist organization and prohibited. During the hearing, Prosecutor General Poklonskaya called Mejlis not the organization of the Crimean Tatar people but 'the puppet of the West'.⁹⁰¹

Such oppression of the Crimean Tatars provoked a response by their leaders. Here, Mustafa Dzhemilev and head of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov took part in the UN World Conference on Indigenous Peoples which was held in late September 2014 in New York despite Moscow's protest. During the conference, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin expressed his concern as to the oppression of the Crimean Tatars and called for the international community's response to the actions of Russia in the Crimea.⁹⁰²

⁸⁹⁸ Новый Таврический муфтият - инструмент интеграции с РФ - эксперт. (2014, 22 August). *RIA Novosti*. Retrieved from <https://ria.ru/religion/20140822/1021033752.html>

⁸⁹⁹ Казарин, Павел. (2015, 20 May). Почему Москва не может договориться с крымскими татарами. *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=60137>

⁹⁰⁰ Бари Уркоста, Р. (2016, 10 May). Крым как экспериментальная площадка нового русского тоталитаризма. *Хвиля*. Retrieved from <http://hvylya.net/analytics/politics/kak-konspirologiya-kremlya-prevratila-kryim-v-eksperimentalnuyu-ploshhadku-novogo-totalitarizma.html>

⁹⁰¹ Суд признал меджлис крымских татар экстремистской организацией. (2016, 24 April). *BBC*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2016/04/160426_mejlis_crimea_court

⁹⁰² Украина привлекла внимание ООН к нарушениям прав крымских татар. (2014, 22 September). *UN News Centre*. Retrieved from <http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp?newsID=22331#.WF6lhfmLRPY>

In its turn, Minority Rights Group Europe (MRG) and the Eastern Partnership Minorities Network condemned the physical attack against the Crimean Tatar activist, Nadir Bekirov which prevented him from attending the UN World Conference on Indigenous Peoples in New York. "The protection of minorities is not only a challenge and a human rights imperative for the authorities of the occupied territory of the Crimea, it is also part of the solution of the conflict, and a way to prevent further degradations," said Neil Clarke, the Director of MRG Europe.⁹⁰³ Furthermore, in March 2015, members of the UN Security Council held informal consultations on the situation in the Crimea with participation of the former head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Mustafa Dzhemilev, who stated the need to strengthen sanctions against Russia to force it to abandon the Crimea, as well as the infringement of the rights of the Crimean Tatars and their massive outflow from the Crimea.⁹⁰⁴

On 18 May, 2014, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule said that Europe will keep tabs on the observation of the rights of the Crimean Tatars and relies on the support of the Ukrainian authorities in this matter, Interfax-Ukraine reported.⁹⁰⁵ In its turn, United Nations noted the violation of the human rights in the Crimea in its report. The report condemns the violations of the citizenship rights, property rights, freedom of speech and mass media, and particularly mass trials among the Crimean Tatars population in the Crimea.⁹⁰⁶ Following the publication of the numerous reports and resolutions of the international organizations, the State Duma finally approved the law recognizing

⁹⁰³ Minority Rights Group International. (2014, 24 September). *Crimean Tatar activist attacked and prevented from speaking at a UN conference – this continues a pattern of intimidation of Crimean Tatar people*. Retrieved from <http://minorityrights.org/2014/09/24/crimean-tatar-activist-attacked-and-prevented-from-speaking-at-a-un-conference-this-continues-a-pattern-of-intimidation-of-crimean-tatar-people/>

⁹⁰⁴ Мустафа Джемилев призвал не допустить превращения Крыма в ядерную базу. (2015, 19 March). Центр Новостей ООН. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/russian/news/story.asp?NewsID=23393#.WF6JK_mLRPY

⁹⁰⁵ Europe to respond to all violations of Crimean Tatars' rights: Fule. (2014, 18 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/politics/europe-to-respond-to-all-violations-of-crimean-tatars-rights-fule/131429/>

⁹⁰⁶ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014, 15 December). *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine*. Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/OHCHR_eighth_report_on_Ukraine.pdf

the activity of domestic and international organizations as objectionable if "it threatens the foundations of the constitutional system of Russia, its defense and security". Although the law prescribes fines and even imprisonment, it does not provide the criteria for defining the unwanted actors.⁹⁰⁷

It would be incorrect to suggest that Tatars in the Crimea abandoned all activities. Although, due to the legislation on extremism of the Crimea expressing any discordance is impossible, the Crimean Tatars chose to act through diaspora in Ukraine and Turkey. Thus, the Crimean Tatars diaspora in Ankara and Eskisehir (Turkey) is actively involved into these activities. For instance, the Platform of the Crimean Tatar Organizations was established by 43 Crimean Tatar NGOs in Turkey and their meeting was held in Ankara on 4-5 April, 2015. The resolution of the meeting condemned the occupation of the Crimea by Russia, called for the restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and declared the non-recognition of the new status of the Crimea.⁹⁰⁸ Furthermore, on 17 May, 2015, in Ankara, the meeting of the commemoration of the victims of the deportation was held.⁹⁰⁹ The Crimean Tatars diaspora in Eskisehir was actively preparing the commemoration of the deportation, by organizing meeting on 18 May, opening memorial to the victims of this event.⁹¹⁰

Moreover, the Platform of the Crimean Tatar Organizations in Turkey made a decision to arrange World Congress of the Crimean Tatars in Turkey on 31 July - 2 August, 2015. There were two committees established for preparations for the World Congress of the Crimean Tatars, which were the Organization Committee - which

⁹⁰⁷ Закон РФ "О нежелательных организациях". (2015, 19 May). Retrieved from <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201505230001?index=0&rangeSize=1>

⁹⁰⁸ A Platform of Crimean Tatar NGOs adopts a resolution regarding Crimea. (2015, 7 April). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/politics/preparations-for-the-world-congress-of-crimean-tatars-started/133430/>

⁹⁰⁹ Embassy of Ukraine to Turkey. (2015, 14 May). Проведення заходів із вшанування пам'яті жертв народів, які були примусово переселені з Криму.

⁹¹⁰ Eskişehir Kırım Derneği. Facebook page, Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/Eskisehirsporfan/photos/a.10152453109569631.1073741830.7917399630/10153268084909631/?type=1&theater>

would choose the city, invite the participants; and the Law Committee to prepare the draft status of the Congress.⁹¹¹

Turkish government did not impede the activities but rather supported the community, as the Ukrainian government did. The state level support in Turkey could be seen not only in the permission of the Crimean Tatars Community to act, and meetings to take place, but also in cultural events. Thus, the Presidency on Turks Abroad and Related Communities under the Prime Ministry, together with the Association of the Crimean Turks conducted a Congress on "Interstate Crimea, Exile and Ismail Gaspirali" as well as "May 18, 1944 Deportation Commemoration" ceremony.⁹¹²

As to the Ukrainian government, on 14 May, 2015, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine decided to call the Crimean Simferopol Airport in the name of fighter ace and twice Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan Sultan who shot down 49 aircraft of the Reich during the Second World War.⁹¹³ On 15 May, Refat Chubarov became the deputy of the Ukrainian parliament as a member of the Presidential party - Petro Poroshenko's block.⁹¹⁴ Besides, the same day, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a decree on commemoration of the deportation's 71th anniversary on the state level.⁹¹⁵

Earlier, President Poroshenko called for the Constitutional Commission to protect and secure the rights of the Tatars. It is also important to note that Ukrainian government, within 25 years of independence, failed to adopt the legislation on the indigenous status of the Crimean Tatars. At the same time, the law on the

⁹¹¹ Preparations for the World Congress of Crimean Tatars started. (2015, 7 April). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/en/politics/preparations-for-the-world-congress-of-crimean-tatars-started/133430/>

⁹¹² İstanbul'da Devletlerarası Kırım, Sürgün Ve İsmail Bey Gaspirali Kongresi. (2015, 18 May). Retrieved from <http://www.turkasi.net/istanbulda-devletlerarasi-kirim-surgun-ve-ismail-bey-gaspirali-kongresi/>

⁹¹³ Украина назвала аэропорт Симферополя в честь Амет-Хана Султана. (2015, 14 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/ru/politika/ukraina-nazvala-aeroport-simferopolya-v-chest-amethana-sultana/145010/>

⁹¹⁴ Завтра Рефат Чубаров станет народным депутатом Украины. (2015, 14 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/ru/politika/chubarov-prinyal-prisyagu-narodnogo-deputata-ukraini/145045/>

⁹¹⁵ Logvinskiy: Kırım Tatar Sürgün Günü devlet düzeyinde anılacak. (2015, 15 May). *Crimean News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/tr/siyaset/logvinskiy-kirim-tatar-surgun-gunu-devlet-duzeyinde-anilacak/137545/>

rehabilitation of the rights of the deported people was adopted only on 17 April, 2014, right after the referendum on the status of republic, by the interim government of Ukraine. This document, apart from defining the main concepts of the issue, promoted voluntary return of the formerly deported people to Ukraine, their adaptation and integration into Ukrainian society of deported persons, created conditions for their resettlement, land supply, housing, employment, education, preservation and development of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. It also specified the financial measures of the support of this category of citizens.⁹¹⁶

In March 2015, during the visit of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Ukraine, the presidents of both republics agreed on measures to ensure the rights and freedoms of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine.⁹¹⁷ Additionally, it is important to note that the Crimean Tatars supported the anti-terroristic operation in the Eastern Ukraine that was launched by the president Poroshenko after the separation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine in May, 2014. Thus, the special Crimean Tatars battalion was acting in the Southern Ukraine against separatism.

One of the radical activities of the Crimean Tatars organized together with the *Rights Sector* activists was the food blockade of the entrance to the Crimea on 20 September, 2015. The trucks with the goods could not enter the territory of the peninsula in the Chaplynka, Chongar and Kalanchak. Another important issue is the project of the Crimean Tatar national autonomy in Kherson region of Ukraine that was discussed widely. In November, 2015, the journalist of *ATR* Osman Pashaev, on his Facebook page proposed the idea of the autonomy the goal of which would be to revive the Crimean Tatar language in all spheres and the renewal of the work of the Crimean higher educational institutions. This idea was supported by the president Petro Poroshenko who initiated the establishment of the commission on this

⁹¹⁶ Закон Украины №1223-VII "О восстановлении прав лиц, депортированных по национальному признаку". (2014, 17 April). Retrieved from http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=67525

⁹¹⁷ Порошенко договорился с Эрдоганом о защите прав крымских татар. (2015, 20 March). *RIA Novosti*. Retrieved from <https://ria.ru/world/20150320/1053699775.html>

project.⁹¹⁸ However, initially, the document defined the autonomy of the Crimean Tatars as national-cultural autonomy, which did not satisfy the Mejlis leaders: they insisted on national-territorial autonomy. Poroshenko, in his turn, agreed to submit the bill that would presume "the provision in the Constitution according to which Crimea would remain an integral part of Ukraine, and at the same time, would become a "national-territorial formation, whereby the Crimean Tatar people would realize their right to self-determination."⁹¹⁹ Such formulation Carnegie Moscow Center expert Kazarin explains by the intention of Kyiv to please the Crimean Tatars, on the one hand, but to escape the accusations of the surrender of the region to the Tatars, on the other.

Later, on 22 September, 2015, Verkhovna Rada approved the document that included recommendations to the President of Ukraine to prepare amendments to the Constitution and laws of Ukraine and submit them to the Parliament regarding the deprivation of the special status of Sevastopol, as well as recognition of the Crimean Tatars, the Karaites and Krymchaks indigenous peoples of Ukraine. It was also proposed to consider changes of the status of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea to the Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic; to consider the possibility of creating a consultative body under the President of Ukraine for de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea and Sevastopol into Ukraine.⁹²⁰

However, there is still the Crimean Tatar population loyal to the Russian government. *Sebat* is the public organization of the Crimean Tatars that was established in 2011 and opposed to the land acquisitions by the Crimean Tatars as

⁹¹⁸ Порошенко намерен создать в Крыму национальную автономию крымскотатарского народа. (2016, 18 May). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/POLITICS/poroshenko-nameren-sozdat-v-krymu-nacionalnuyu-avtonomiyu-krymskotatarskogo-naroda-213698_.html

⁹¹⁹ Казарин, Павел. (2015, 4 August). Татарская республика Крым: зачем Киев признает полуостров автономией крымских татар. *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=60943>

⁹²⁰ Верховна Рада України. Поіменне голосування про повернення до розгляду проекту Постанови про Рекомендації парламентських слухань на тему: "Стратегія реінтеграції в Україну тимчасово окупованої території Автономної Республіки Крим та міста Севастополь: проблемні питання, шляхи, методи та способи" (2016, 22 September). Retrieved from http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_golos?g_id=8783

well as to Mejlis. As it was stated in the open letter of the organization, it stood for the closer collaboration with the Crimean government as well as the Federal center for the sake of the well-being and future developments of the region.⁹²¹ It accused Dzhemilev of provocations. Another pro-Russian organization is *Qirim Birligi*. However, the more important is the position of the *Muftiyat*. The head mufti of the Crimea haji Emirali Ablayev appeared to be collaborating with the Russian government. Thus, in September 2014, it was announced that there would not be a separate Crimean Muftiyat established; rather only the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Crimea (*DUMK*) would continue to operate.⁹²²

However, the Taurida Muftiyat was established by the Russians. Unlike *DUMK*, it did not enjoy the influence among the Crimean Tatars.⁹²³ For its 'promotion' Kremlin would have to spend more than one year, and considerable sums from the Russian budget. Getting control of the finished structure was a less costly and troublesome option for Russia. At the same time the Muslim Board for over 20 years worked in sync with the Mejlis, and was in fact its department. The Mejlis believed that Islam was the only one of the components of national identity that had been preserved in the deportation and was to preserve and develop the historic homeland.

In opinion of the journalist Derkach, fatal error of the Crimean Tatar leaders was the decision to transfer to *DUMK* monopoly on the religious life of the Crimean Muslims. This became evident on the eve of the World Congress of the Crimean Tatars in Ankara, in July-August 2015. Then it was discovered that the Mufti Ablayev set out on my own and no longer coordinate with the Majlis. Russia has failed to take control of the most influential organization of the Crimean Tatars, and was forced to limit its 'religious department'.⁹²⁴ Mejlis received heavy blow - it did not have people

⁹²¹ Sebat. Official web page of the organization. Retrieved from <http://sebat-crimea.ru/sebat>

⁹²² Руководство ДУМК обсудило с властями Крыма проблемы мусульман. (2014, 9 September). *ЦРО Духовное Управление Мусульман Крыма и г. Севастополь*. Retrieved from <http://qmdi.org/index.php/ru/arkhiv-novostej/2014-god/316-rukovodstvo-dumk-obsudilo-s-vlastyami-kryma-problemy-musulman>

⁹²³ Деркач, А. (2016, 3 February). Крымский Муфтият: скорее мертв, чем жив.. *Крим.Реаліти*. Retrieved from <http://ru.krymr.com/a/27530185.html>

⁹²⁴ Деркач 2016.

with religious education, with influence among the faithful. When Mustafa Dzhemilev expressed the need to create a coupling on the 'mainland', the question arose as to who will implement this idea. And then there was an awkward pause. This situation was ideal for the occupants: they took control of the organization, which was authoritative, not because of the potential, but because of the status, which could be easily adjusted. *DUMK* for the Crimean Tatars, as opposed to all movements of the *Qırım* and *Qırım Birligi* is a legitimate organization, because Ablayev was elected by the Kurultay of Muslims. In this case, it is not a religious authority on the level of their knowledge of Islam. In Russia, which is trying to integrate the Crimea, there is much more educated Islam muftis. A deputy and assistant head of the Muslim Board, with fairly deep knowledge of religion, is too young and undistinguished, to become spiritual leader.⁹²⁵

Thus, during the OSCE conference in Warsaw, in late September, 2016, his assistant Ayder Islyamov noted that "within 23 years that the Crimea was a part of Ukraine none of the documents on rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars had been adopted".⁹²⁶ At the same time, the head of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine Said Ismagilov talked in his interview about the religious cleanings in the Crimea regarding the Crimean Tatars and Russian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchy.⁹²⁷

It is also noteworthy that the European Union failed to address the issue of the Crimean Tatars and the persecution of the activists within the Minsk Agreements framework. While it imposed the economic sanctions on the Russian Federation, it cannot be treated as sufficient measure against the violation of the international law and the human rights abuses that can be recorded in the Crimea since 2014.

⁹²⁵ Деркач 2016.

⁹²⁶ Заместитель муфтия Крыма рассказал членам ОБСЕ о ситуации в Крыму. (2016, 27 September). *ЦПО Духовное Управление Мусульман Крыма и г. Севастополь*. Retrieved from <http://qmdi.org/index.php/ru/glavnye-novosti/2874-zamestitel-muftiya-kryma-rasskazal-chlenam-obse-o-situatsii-v-krymu>

⁹²⁷ Муфтий Саид Исмагилов: Россия создала в Крыму параллельное духовное объединение мусульман, чтобы взять под контроль крымских татар . (2014, 12 December). *IPress.ua*. Retrieved from http://ipress.ua/ru/articles/muftyy_sayd_ysmagylov_rossyya_sozdala_v_krimu_parallelnoe_duhovnoe_obedynenye_musulman_chtobi_vzyat_pod_kontrol_krimskyh_tatar_100040.html

It is important to note that the Crimean Tatars have high group coherence, and ethnic and political consciousness. This was noted by the author during the research. The Tatars follow the trials in the Crimea, kidnappings, arrests and searches. All interviewees insisted on the anonymous replies. Thus, discussing the issue of the arrests and trials according to the '26th February' case, one of the Crimean Tatar activists said that "if this happened when the Crimea was the part of the Ukraine and in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation, why Russia is investigating it and punishing activists according to the Russian legislation? Isn't it just a purge?"⁹²⁸ She continued by describing the Hizb-Ut organization, the activity of which in the Crimea was no more than cultural and educational; however, the Russian security services ascribe all discordant in the Crimea to the list of the political activists of this organization and treat them as terrorists.⁹²⁹ Similarly, one more activist was threatened to be under the trial in case if she did not provide prejudicial evidence against one of the Muslim activists the prosecutor needed. Another minority that has been the target for the Russian security services is ethnic Ukrainian of the Crimea. Due to the lower number of them, as well as lack of the organized activities and registered organizations, they are treated better by the Russian government.

7.3.2. Ukrainians in the Annexed Crimea

In case of the Crimean Ukrainians, religious and educational institutions became the first target of the Russian authorities. In the schools, curriculum is being changed. Firstly, the Crimean departments of education announced that Ukrainian language and literature would be studied only as an elective.⁹³⁰ Secondly, the number of lessons in Russian language and literature, history and geography was raised.⁹³¹ On October 9, the Crimean Minister of Education, Science, and Youth, Nataliya

⁹²⁸ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 26 October). Ankara.

⁹²⁹ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 26 October). Ankara.

⁹³⁰ Украинский язык в школах Крыма будет изучаться по желанию. (2014, 27 May). *Новости Крыма*. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2014/5/27/ukrainskii-yazyk-v-shkolah-kryma-budet-izuchatsya-po-zhelaniju-13415/>

⁹³¹ Учить по-русски. (2015, 3 March). *Kommersant.ru*. Retrieved from <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2680187>

Goncharova, said that the demand for Ukrainian instruction in the Crimea was rapidly declining.⁹³² As a result, only twenty schools in the Crimea have separate Ukrainian classes; while none of the schools offers instruction fully in Ukrainian.⁹³³ Such situation determined massive job losses among teachers of Ukrainian, who now have to choose another source of income or retrain at their own expense. In addition, high school students planning to take the External Independent Evaluation (the Ukrainian equivalent to the United States' Scholastic Aptitude Test) in order to enter universities in Ukraine are thus deprived of an opportunity to study in accordance with the Ukrainian curriculum.⁹³⁴

On 20 May, 2015, the Crimean parliament adopted the law on education in the Crimea. Although, during the readings of the draft, Remzi Ilyasov tried to include the obligatory lessons of the three official languages in the schools, this was not supported by the vice speaker Ioffe and speaker Konstantinov that argued for the elective classes of Ukrainian and the Crimean Tatar languages.⁹³⁵

Human rights reports and observers draw particular attention to the orphan children. Thus, Klymenko notes that after the annexation, 4323 children deprived of parental care were automatically recognized as Russian citizenship and therefore lost their chance to choose the citizenship or place of residence.⁹³⁶ Taking into the consideration the law on adoption of children by foreigners known as Dima Yakovlev law, these children have lesser chances to be adopted by Ukrainians or foreigners.

As to the persecutions, the arrests and court trials on the participation in 'extremist' activities are going on. Leonid Kuzmin and Veldar Shukurdzhiyev are some of those

⁹³² Гончарова: спрос на украинский язык в крымских школах резко падает. (2014, 9 October). *RIA Novosti*. Retrieved from <https://ria.ru/education/20141009/1027621414.html>. Klymenko 2015: 11.

⁹³³ Гончарова: спрос на украинский язык в крымских школах резко падает. (2014, 9 October). Klymenko 2015: 11.

⁹³⁴ Klymenko 2015: 11.

⁹³⁵ Крымский парламент принял в первом чтении закон «Об образовании в Республике Крым». (2015, 20 May). *REGNUM*. Retrieved from <https://regnum.ru/news/cultura/1926294.html>

⁹³⁶ Crimea Field Mission on Human Rights. (June 2014). Brief Review of the Situation in Crimea. Retrieved from http://crimeahr.org/sites/default/files/crimea_field_mission_report_june_2014_eng.pdf: 18.

who were detained at a rally in memory of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko March 9 in Simferopol. Then, on March 12 the trial took place, where activists carried a punishment for the use of Ukrainian attributes - the presence of the yellow-blue flags and ribbons on said shares. According to the court decision, activists were assigned community services lasting 40 hours each.⁹³⁷ Another activist Vladimir Baluha's house was searched on the ground of his use of the Ukrainian flag.⁹³⁸ There are also numerous reports as to the assaults on the Ukrainian activists in the Crimea.⁹³⁹

Nevertheless, feeling the assimilation of the Ukrainian culture, Ukrainians of the Crimea managed to establish a cultural center in Simferopol. They underlined that the mission of this center is rather public and cultural than political: the center aims at establishing Ukrainian library, popularizing Ukrainian folk culture and preparing student for entering Ukrainian universities.⁹⁴⁰

Apart from the activists, the representatives of the Ukrainian religious communities in the region who expressed their discordance during the Anti-Maidan events in the Crimea also appeared to be the target of the Russian authorities. Thus, in March 2014, five parishes of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church reported the fact of the getting threatened. Besides, the priests from Sevastopol, Yalta, and Yevpatoriia were kidnapped and later released. One of them, Mykolai Kwich, said he was questioned by members of the Crimean 'self-defense' force and Russian intelligence officers and charged with extremism.⁹⁴¹ On September 2, the priest from Yevpatoriya, Bohdan Kostetsky, and twelve parishioners were detained on the way to Yalta, placed in a

⁹³⁷ В Крыму создали "Украинский культурный центр". (2015, 8 May). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/CULTURE/v-krymu-sozdali-ukrainskiy-kulturnyy-centr-175390_.html

⁹³⁸ ФСБ провела обыск в доме украинского активиста в Крыму. (2015, 7 May). *Gordon.com*. Retrieved from <http://gordonua.com/news/crimea/fsb-provelo-obysk-v-dome-ukrainskogo-aktivista-v-krymu--79717.html>

⁹³⁹ В Крыму задержали двоих украинских активистов и польского журналиста. (2015, 14 March). *TSN*. Retrieved from <http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/v-krymu-zaderzhali-dvuh-ukrainskih-aktivistov-i-polskogo-zhurnalista-415608.html>

⁹⁴⁰ В Крыму задержали двоих украинских активистов и польского журналиста. (2015, 14 March).

⁹⁴¹ В Севастополе из храма похитили греко-католического священника. (2014, 15 March). *УНИАН*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/896876-v-sevastopole-iz-hrama-pohitili-greko-katolicheskogo-svyaschennika.html>

basement, interrogated, and released the following day without charge. These actions were likely acts of intimidation related to the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Maidan position of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine.⁹⁴² The Greek Catholic priests remaining in the peninsula await clarification of the church's legal status.⁹⁴³

Parishioners and the priest of St. Clement of Rome, a Ukrainian Orthodox church in Sevastopol that sits on the grounds of a Ukrainian Naval Academy facility, have been barred from using the building.⁹⁴⁴ On June 1, a group of armed men in Russian Cossack dress broke into a Ukrainian Orthodox church in Perevalnoye village, in the Simferopol district, and destroyed religious relics. Archbishop Klyment of Simferopol and the Crimea reported that the police took the invaders' side and refused to register a complaint.⁹⁴⁵

The pastor of the Salvation Army's Crimean branch, Ruslan Zuyev, who had reported on the pressure applied to representatives of Protestant religious groups in the Crimea, was forced to leave the Crimea with his family in June. He had been repeatedly summoned by the FSB for airing 'pro-Ukrainian' views.⁹⁴⁶ In early March, Rabbi Mikhail Kapustin of the Communities of Reform Judaism of Simferopol and Ukraine fled the Crimea with his family. Kapustin had denounced Russian aggression in the Crimea.⁹⁴⁷ In late February, someone painted a swastika and anti-Semitic graffiti on his Ner Tamid synagogue. In April, vandals defaced Sevastopol's monument to the 4,200 Jews, including Krymchaks (a small and separate indigenous

⁹⁴² В Крыму неизвестные похитили священника УГКЦ и 15 прихожан. (2014, 3 September). *NB News*. Retrieved from <http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/131000/>

⁹⁴³ Klymenko 2014: 11.

⁹⁴⁴ Католикам Севастополя решили не возвращать костел Св. Климента, который во времена СССР был переделан в кинотеатр «Дружба». (2015, 23 December). *SEVKOR.RU*. Retrieved from <http://sevkor.ru/katolikam-sevastopolya-reshili-ne-vozvrashhat-kostel-sv-klimenta-kotoryj-vo-vremena-sssr-byl-peredelan-v-kinoteatr-druzhba/>

⁹⁴⁵ Храм УПЦ Киевского патриархата в Перевальном отобрали. В чью пользу? (2016, 1 June). *Крым.Реалии*. Retrieved from <http://ru.krymr.com/a/25406300.html>

⁹⁴⁶ Жители Крыма на кухнях говорят о возвращении полуострова Украине. (2014, 10 June). *Обозреватель*. Retrieved from <http://obozrevatel.com/crime/05914-zhiteli-kryma-na-kuhnyah-govoryat-o-vozvrashchenii-poluostrova-ukraine.htm>

⁹⁴⁷ Главный раввин Крыма был вынужден покинуть Республику. (2014, 15 May). *Аргументы Недели*. Retrieved from <http://an-crimea.ru/page/news/62192>

group of Tatar-speaking Crimean Jews), who were murdered by the Nazi occupiers on July 12, 1942.⁹⁴⁸ On June 13, the façade of the Chukurcha Jami mosque in Simferopol was damaged when someone threw a Molotov cocktail at it. A surveillance camera recorded the attack, but a perpetrator has yet to be identified or arrested. In addition, the fence next to the mosque was painted with a black swastika and the arson date.⁹⁴⁹

During the research, the author met with the Ukrainians of the Crimea as well. Unfortunately, few of them refused to answer the questions of the interview simply saying 'I don't want to go to prison'⁹⁵⁰ or 'You know everything. There is nothing new I can surprise you with'.⁹⁵¹ It is important to note that these people do not have plans to stay in the Crimea. They are trying to move to Kyiv or anywhere in Europe. To conclude, ethnic and religious minorities in the Crimea experienced a serious violations of their rights to freedom, security, property, education and cultural developments; freedoms of expression, assembly, movement, association, religion. Such tensions on the peninsula are aggravated by the economic recession which is discussed in the next section.

7.4. Economic Developments in the Crimea

Needless to say that the transition period in the Crimea touched upon not only legal provisions but also economy. The economic decline was severe, that can be explained by industrial production decline, economic sanctions, withdrawal of investments, less number of tourists in the region, break-up of the main transportation routes.

⁹⁴⁸ В Севастополе осквернили памятник Жертвам холокоста. (2014, 22 April). *ВННАН*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/910196-v-sevastopole-oskvernili-pamyatnik-jertvam-holokosta.html>

⁹⁴⁹ Klymenko 2015: 11.

⁹⁵⁰ Interview with the official of one of the Crimean universities. (2016, 5 February). Simferopol.

⁹⁵¹ Interview with the faculty member of one of the Crimean universities. (2016, 27 October). Simferopol.

7.4.1. Economic Sanctions of the European Union

Economic sanctions affected the economy of the Crimea, as well as economies of Ukraine and Russia. Having signed the Association Agreement with the European Union, Ukraine found itself facing additional pressure from Russia: the Kremlin demanded that Kyiv delay the implementation of the Free Trade Zone procedures with the EU as a condition for not introducing additional customs duties for Ukrainian goods.⁹⁵² In response, Kyiv made a list of Russian goods whose importation to Ukraine could be banned.⁹⁵³ This tactic resembled what was seen in August when Russia reacted to the economic sanctions of the EU and the US by launching trade bans on certain categories of goods originating from involved countries, as well as those from Ukraine and Moldova.⁹⁵⁴ Thus, the EU prohibited the import of the Crimean goods without Ukrainian signs. Furthermore, on October 10, Kyiv announced a ban on products from the Crimea on the grounds of their disparity with the sanitary norms of Ukraine, demanding that food production companies of the Russian Federation mark their goods in a certain way.⁹⁵⁵ As I said earlier, the economic embargo is an important tool of the EU for punishment Russia but it is not sufficient.

7.4.2. Economic Development

According to the data of the newly established Ministry of Economic Development of the Crimea, the volume of industrial production in 2014 dropped by 9.9% in comparison with 2013. Index of industrial production, that constituted 90.1% in

⁹⁵² Украине предъявили пятый пункт. (2014, 10 September). *RIA-Novosti*.

⁹⁵³ В Киеве составили перечень российских товаров, которые могут обложить дополнительной пошлиной. (2014, 6 October). *Zerkalo Nedeli*. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/v-kieve-sostavili-perechen-rossiyskih-tovarov-kotorye-mogut-oblozhit-dopolnitelnoy-poshlinoy-155194_.html

⁹⁵⁴ Правительство сократило список запрещенных к ввозу в РФ продуктов. (2014, 20 August). *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Retrieved from <https://rg.ru/2014/08/20/sankcii-site-anons.html>

⁹⁵⁵ Киев запретил со следующей недели ввоз на Украину продуктов из Крыма. (2014, October 10). *RIA-Novosti. Crimea*. Retrieved from <http://crimea.ria.ru/news/20141010/1027804431.html>

2014, constitutes 98.1% in 2015.⁹⁵⁶ According to the same report, the growth rates in extracting industry dropped from 23.7 to 7.2%, in 2014, comparatively to 2013. At the same time, the recession in processing industry aggravated from - 2.7% to - 11.8%; energy production - from - 2.8% to - 16.1% respectively.⁹⁵⁷

The negative impact on the overall index of industrial production has a branch of engineering: in 2014 the volume of production declined by 17.1%. The decline in engineering production due primarily to the absence of a sufficient volume of orders for large shipbuilding enterprises of the Republic of the Crimea - Ship building factory *More*, and *Zaliv*, as well as reduced heavy machine production of products at *Firm SELMA*, Simferopol Electrotechnical Plant, plant *Simferopolselmash*.⁹⁵⁸

Russia has illegally taken control over more than 400 Ukrainian enterprises and seized some 18 onshore and offshore hydrocarbon fields. In 2013, Ukraine signed exploration and production agreements for large areas of Crimea's eastern and western coast with a number of international energy giants including Eni, EDF, ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell.⁹⁵⁹ At the enterprises of crude oil and natural gas, increase in the index of industrial production amounted 20%. High growth rates of the mining industry due to the increase in natural gas production in the Black Sea by 23% equal to 1.977 billion cubic meters. Oil production decreased by 5% to 9.4 thousand tons, which was caused by the suspension of the process in connection with the maintenance of wells in the oil field *Aktashskoe* of *Krymtopenergoservis*. Production of gas condensate decreased by 2% and amounted 63.5 thousand tons. The decline in gas condensate admitted to *Shtormovoye* condensate field in connection with the development of the resource. At the same time, works for the

⁹⁵⁶ Министерство экономического развития Республики Крым. (2015, February). *Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за январь-февраль 2015 года*. Retrieved from http://minek.rk.gov.ru/file/File/2015/macro/macro_02_2015.pdf

⁹⁵⁷ Министерство экономического развития Республики Крым. (2014). *Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за 2014 год*. Retrieved from http://minek.rk.gov.ru/file/File/2015/02-February/09/macro2014_16-02.pdf: 5.

⁹⁵⁸ Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за 2014 год, 2014: 5.

⁹⁵⁹ Paul, A. (2015). Crimea one year after Russian annexation. *European Policy Centre*, 24.

extraction of minerals and quarrying output decreased by 28.4%⁹⁶⁰ Investments into the main capital decreases from 51 billion rub, in 2013, to 21.5 billion rub in 2014.⁹⁶¹

Not only sanctions, but also the need to re-register the enterprises in accordance with the Russian legislation affected the economy of the region. Besides, as the report of the Ministry says the economic recession in the Crimea, in 2014, had following implications: renegotiation of contracts) and the development of new business relations between enterprises of the Crimea; changes in logistics (significantly increased the time spent on transportation of goods, virtually no railway communication exists); loss of traditional markets; reorientation of the trade enterprises of the Crimea to cooperation with the producers from other regions of the Russian Federation; review of the structure of sown areas of crops towards replacement of the water-dependent crops with the drought-resistant.⁹⁶²

The entry of the Republic of the Crimea into the Russian Federation and the difficulties of the transition period had the most significant impact on the results of the transport industry. According to the estimations of the Ministry of economic development of the Crimea, in 2014 cargo decreased by 32.1% due to: decrease of the volume of work in enterprises of maritime and rail transport due to the lack of cargo to be transported, before arriving in transit through the Ukrainian railways; break-up of the long-term relationships with companies performing cruise voyages to ports of the Crimea, due to the fear of the ship-owners on the introduction of international sanctions upon arrival in the Crimean port; insufficient capacity of ferry that arose due to the redistribution of passengers and freight traffic flows entering the Republic of the Crimea. The most significant decline was recorded in the railway transport. Given the share of the rail in the total volume of commercial freight of goods constitutes 52.3% this kind of transportation decreased by 41.5%.⁹⁶³ This determined the wider use of the airlines and sea transportation means. The total

⁹⁶⁰ Paul 2015: 6.

⁹⁶¹ Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за 2014 год, 2014: 11.

⁹⁶² Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за 2014 год, 2014: 2

⁹⁶³ Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за 2014 год, 2014: 7.

number of passengers served by the airport *Simferopol* in 2014 increased by 2.4 times and amounted to 2.8 million passengers.⁹⁶⁴

As it can be seen from the estimations above, for the Crimea, the lack of the transport routes connecting peninsula with the mainland of the Russian Federation is one of the biggest challenges. In this regard, the bridge over the Kerch strait that will connect the Eastern Crimean town Kerch with the Krasnodar region of the Southern Russia was launched in April 2015.

As Pavel Kazarin with the reference to the Crimean Statistics Committee estimates,⁹⁶⁵ one year after the annexation, products have risen in price by about 43%, alcohol and tobacco - by 50%. Public services also rose - by 27%. In addition, he notes the loss of the working places by those engaged in the foreign trade and tourism. Besides, the absence of the international payment systems determined the only cash payments in the region. Russian banks, fearing sanctions preferred not to work in the Crimea, therefore, the commission for the use of their cards in the regions is significant.⁹⁶⁶

Political conflict and sanctions negatively affected the *foreign trade* of the Crimea. If in 2013, the export constituted \$904.9 million,⁹⁶⁷ in 2014, it dropped to \$147.9 million.⁹⁶⁸ As to the import of goods, in 2013, it amounted \$1044.4 million, compared to \$84.2 million, in 2014. At the same time, it has positive effect on trade balance which changed from \$-139.6, in 2013, to \$63.7 million, in 2014. The structure of the foreign trade has also changed due to the political reasons. Thus, in

⁹⁶⁴ Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за 2014 год, 2014: 9.

⁹⁶⁵ Государственный Комитет Статистики Крыма. *Индексы потребительских цен (тарифов) на товары и услуги в группировке КИПЦ в феврале 2015 года*. Retrieved from http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/resources/c97f688047a025dc8115a5ed3bc4492f/%D0%9A%D0%98%D0%9F%D0%A6+%D1%84%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C+%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%82.pdf

⁹⁶⁶ Казарин, Павел. (2015, 16 March). Корсунь в цифрах. Что поменялось в Крыму за год в составе России. *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=59383>

⁹⁶⁷ Государственный Комитет Статистики Украины. *Объемы экспорта-импорта товаров по регионам Украины за 2013 год*. Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2013/zd/oet/oet_r/oet1213_r.html

⁹⁶⁸ Итоги социально-экономического развития Республики Крым за 2014 год, 2014: 17.

2013, the CIS countries constituted 40.9% of the export of the republic, and 24.6% in the structure of import.⁹⁶⁹ In 2014, its value amounted 23.8% and 9.5% respectively.⁹⁷⁰ In 2014, the largest exports of goods were carried to Turkey - 18.3% of total exports, Switzerland - 17.8%, Panama - 12.5%, Saudi Arabia - 9.8%, Belgium - 8% and Libya - 6.2%. The largest volumes of imported goods come from Romania - 45.1% of total imports, Germany - 8.5%, Italy - 12.6%, Turkey - 6.7%, Finland - 4% and Panama - 3.1%,⁹⁷¹ since most of the European countries imposed trade bans on the goods of the Russian Federation and the Crimea, in particular.

Tourism constituted one of the important sources of the Crimean budget before 2014. However, following the annexation, the region appeared to be the place for vacation only for the Russians: Europeans have to avoid the Crimea because of the sanctions while Ukrainians prefer not to support Russian economy. In 2014, Romanian expert Ștefan noted a drop in tourist arrivals, down from 6.1 million arrivals in the previous year to only 4 million. This change he attributed to the political events that took place that year and their consequences, which were described in the previous sections. The target announced by the Crimean Tourist Authority for 2015 was 4.5 million. But as of September 2015, after the summer season, only 3.4 million tourist arrivals were registered in the Republic of Crimea.⁹⁷² At the same time, in January - September 2016, 4.9 million tourists attended the region.⁹⁷³ Prior to 2014, approximately 75% of the international tourists consisted of Russian citizens, the rest being from other countries, including Turkey, the Baltic countries, Western Europe and the USA. Starting with 2014, the role of international tourists was taken by

⁹⁶⁹ Державний Комітет Статистики. *Географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі послугами Автономної Республіки Крим за 2013 рік*. Retrieved from <http://gosstat.crimea.ru/2010/operativ/ukovesarh2013.php>

⁹⁷⁰ Государственный Комитет Статистики Крыма. *Географическая структура внешней торговли услугами Республики Крым в апреле-декабре 2014 года*. Retrieved from <http://gosstat.crimea.ru/2010/operativ/arhukoves-2014.php>

⁹⁷¹ Географическая структура внешней торговли услугами Республики Крым в апреле-декабре 2014 года.

⁹⁷² Ștefan, C. (2015). The Influence of Major Geopolitical Factors on a Region's Tourist Industry and Perception by Tourists. Case Study: Crimea. *Cactus Tourism Journal* 12(2): 23.

⁹⁷³ Министерство курортов и туризма Республики Крым. Отчеты о деятельности Министерства. Статистические данные. Ежемесячная справочная информация о количестве туристов, посетивших Республику Крым в течение 2016 года. Retrieved from <http://mtur.rk.gov.ru/rus/info.php?id=627931>

Ukrainian citizens. In other words, since the Crimean change of sovereignty, the number of visitors from Russia has roughly doubled, but the bulk of visitors from Ukraine has visibly decreased. Since this moment the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian component of tourist arrivals has almost completely disappeared. Simply put, the mix of visitors to Crimea has become less diverse and clearly consists predominantly of an internal component.⁹⁷⁴ Besides, following the introduction of the visa regime for the Turkish citizens in January 2016, the number of the tourists from Turkey decreased.

Since the annexation, property rights in the Crimea have been violated on a massive scale. All Ukrainian state property on the peninsula is now being expropriated. Private companies have also been effectively confiscated through hostile takeovers and forced management changes carried out by 'self-defense' forces. According to the document issued in late July 2014, all lease contracts on property completed before the annexation could be terminated prematurely and 400 of them have been 'nationalized'. The lists of the property included all seaports, airports, railroads, wineries, grain elevators, agricultural enterprises, water and energy supply infrastructures, and some two hundred health resorts.⁹⁷⁵ The famous *Nikitskyi* Botanical Gardens, the *Artek* Children's Center, the oil and gas company *Chernomorнеftegaz*, and the *Morye* shipyard have also been seized.⁹⁷⁶

Not only Ukrainian state property is being nationalized. Many 'nationalized' entities also include trade unions, higher education institutions, the Academy of Sciences, and civic organizations. Private companies are not officially expropriated, but are instead subject to hostile takeovers and smear campaigns from the region's de facto authorities. In August 24 incident, 'self-defense' henchmen blocked managers of the

⁹⁷⁴ Ştefan 2015: 24.

⁹⁷⁵ Портал Правительства Республики Крым. (2015, 14 October). *Перечень национализированных объектов недвижимости, планируемых к продаже*. Retrieved from <http://rk.gov.ru/rus/info.php?id=621851>

⁹⁷⁶ Постановление ГС РК. О национализации имущества предприятий, учреждений, организаций агропромышленного комплекса, расположенных на территории Республики Крым. Приложение к Постановлению Государственного Совета Республики Крым № 1836-6/14 Перечень предприятий, учреждений, организаций агропромышленного комплекса, расположенных на территории Республики Крым, имущество которых национализировано. (2014, 26 March). Retrieved from <http://crimea.gov.ru/act/11841>

large *Zaliv* shipyard in Kerch from entering—supposedly at the request of the workers.⁹⁷⁷ The plant belonged to Ukrainian billionaire Konstantyn Zhevago, a member of parliament who supports the democratic changes in the country. Russian government as well as the largest state-owned monopolies avoids direct involvement into the nationalization fearing sanctions. Instead, the de-facto government has been established to control the process.⁹⁷⁸ At the same time, the Crimean leadership faced serious problems while dealing with the nationalized enterprises. First of all, the lack of the top managers revealed; secondly, the lack of the investments aggravated the economic deterioration. Besides, the old markets and contacts have been lost, only the loans of the Russian banks allowed the Crimean enterprises to survive. As Klymenko argues, the plan for economic development of the region lacks system, consistency and funding. Under such conditions, given promises will make Kremlin to subsidize the region in order to secure at least pensions and public employees' salaries. Moscow started using national retirement savings funds, as well as the budget reserves of some regions of Russia, which increasingly fuels local irritation.⁹⁷⁹ According to many experts, this was one of the reasons of the abrogation of the Crimean Federal District.

Thus, the analyst from the Moscow Carnegie Center Andrey Sambros sees the nationalization as an attempt of the local authorities to prove that the region will not consume budget sources but rather contribute to. He notes that while the Russian oligarchs that owned certain enterprises in the Crimea were at least paid symbolic money, the Ukrainian owners of the Crimean property were accused of numerous violations and their possessions were simply seized. Some assets were expropriated in order to target the political enemies - oligarchs Kolomoysky (Privat Bank) and Taruta (Ayvazovskoye resort complex on the Southern coast of the Crimea).⁹⁸⁰

⁹⁷⁷ В Керчи захватили завод «Залив»? (2014, 25 August). *Kerch.FM*. Retrieved from <http://kerch.fm/2014/08/25/v-kerchi-zahvatili-zavod-zaliv.html>

⁹⁷⁸ Klymenko 2015: 17 - 18.

⁹⁷⁹ Klymenko 2015: 17 - 18.

⁹⁸⁰ Sambros, Andrey (2015, 19 March). Imitating Chavez: A Year of Nationalization in Crimea. *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=59421>

According to Carnegie Center expert Malashenko, the annexation of the Crimea is dual. On the one hand, it is considered as a victory of Putin, and supports his ratings. On the other hand, the region requires huge amount of money from the federal budget. For the Crimeans, the situation is the same. While people are satisfied with the annexation, they face numerous economic, political and social issues, such as the Russian official and new regulations, growing prices and the ruining of the touristic potential of the region. As to the future of the region, he mentions two ways of the development. The one way is to create, first of all, a resort area, some peaceful economy. And the second way is to equip the Crimea as a territory, which is adjacent to the Russian military base.⁹⁸¹

The economic deterioration is one of the issues all the interviewees agreed on, as well as the enormous growth of the prices in the Crimea. Some explained this by the absence of the price regulation;⁹⁸² some noted the logistics issue.⁹⁸³ At the same time, perception of the economic crisis changes depending on the identification and political views of the participants. Thus, the Crimean Tatar student from Ankara called the economic situation in the Crimea 'ruin and devastation', underlying the absence of the investment and failure of the touristic sector.⁹⁸⁴ In contrast, those who expressed the support for the Crimea's annexation see the economy in extremely positive way:

Ukraine shut the North Crimean Canal for us [so] we have constructed deep wells, new water lines, changed river channels. [We also] Switched to the cultivation of crops that do not require copious irrigation. We built a drip irrigation system. Ukraine cut off electricity to us [and] we have built new energy bridges from the Kuban. Staged food blockade [therefore] we had to build a new logistics and optimize the performance of the Kerch ferry.⁹⁸⁵

⁹⁸¹ Помпон, Мюрель & Алексей Малашенко. (2015, 19 March) О двух путях развития Крыма: Крым-курорт или Крым — форпост России. *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/2015/03/19/ru-pub-59457>

⁹⁸² Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

⁹⁸³ Interview with the Crimean Tatar activist. (2016, 1 November). Istanbul.

⁹⁸⁴ Interview with the Crimean Tatar student from Turkey. (2016, 12 November). Ankara.

⁹⁸⁵ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

In general, their perception of the transitional period, including the exchange of the passports, re-registration of vehicles, property, new tax system, medical insurance issues, is more positive in comparison with those who perceive the annexation in a negative way. For instance, the entrepreneur from Simferopol praised the improvement of the city center of Simferopol, the increased number of the sport arrangements in the Crimea.⁹⁸⁶ However, it should be noted that the pensioners who agreed to participate in the research are not satisfied with the changes even despite backing the referendum. The couple, author talked to, noted the high number of tourists coming from Moscow and Saint-Petersburg to spend their money in the Crimea; the higher number of the expensive cars in Kerch and in the Crimea; the acquisition of the estate and local business by those came from the mainland and, correspondingly, the very unfair position of the locals with their small salaries. They told the author about the local business (food industry enterprises) that was basically shut down by the new administration and now people have to buy basic products, such as milk, eggs, oil and butter coming from the remote regions of the Russian Federation.⁹⁸⁷ Due to the discussed above issues, many Crimeans prefer to migrate. First of all, they consider Kyiv.

7.5. Conclusion

The internal dynamics in the Crimea display the Russia's efforts to justify its image as a savior of the region from the Ukrainian government. The issues of the most acute needs, legal provisions and the strategic goals are seen as the most important to solve. Logistics, electricity and power supply are seen as the most important in the region. As to the formation of the power structures in the Crimea, the former were designed according to the Kremlin's interests to secure the loyalty of the Crimeans. The interests of the minorities, ethnic and religious, were not taken into consideration. Furthermore, the appointments in the Crimea showed the role of the

⁹⁸⁶ Interview with the entrepreneur from Simferopol. (2016, 18 October). Kyiv.

⁹⁸⁷ Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

security structures in Russia and the desire to spread it in the Crimea while neglecting the locals. During the transition period, Russian leadership had to face many problems with establishing new legislations, with ousting Ukrainian business and economic actors in the Crimea, with protecting Russian Orthodoxy of Moscow Patriarchy as a channel that may connect the Crimeans to the rest of the Russian population.

It is noteworthy that the annexation of the Crimea was justified by means of the nationalistic and patriotic rhetoric and received a wide support of the Russian population. Despite the military conflict on the border with Ukraine, growing prices, striking nationalism and conservatism of the Russian leadership, Russians believe that it is still better to live in Russia than in Western Europe or the US.⁹⁸⁸ The experts explain such feelings by the patriotic raise following the acquisition of the Crimea. The head of the VCIOM Fedorov says that it is the first time within last 25 years Russia enlarged its territory, and people are excited about this. The similar trends were seen in 2008 - due to the economic growth and the victory in the Georgian war, just and liberating; as well as in the beginning of 2000s when Putin managed to stabilize political and economic situation in Russia and patriotic feelings raised tremendously. Nowadays, Fedorov says, Russians are still dizzy about the annexation of the Crimea and cannot realize the consequences of the governmental decisions.⁹⁸⁹ The euphoria of the Russians about the annexation of the Crimea seems to go down, regardless of everything.⁹⁹⁰ The decreasing euphoria about the victory is complemented by the growing understanding of the consequences of the war, Gudkov says. Growing prices were already mentioned, besides, Russians expect the worsening of the economic situation due to the sanctions.

⁹⁸⁸ VCIOM press-release #2672. (2014, September 16). *Russia is the Country of Opportunities*. Retrieved from <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=114977>

⁹⁸⁹ VCIOM. (2014, August 27). *Why Russians Do not Fear Anything*.

⁹⁹⁰ Levada Center press release. (2014, 15 September). *Erosion of the Mutual Hatred*. Retrieved from <http://www.levada.ru/2014/09/16/eroziya-oboyudnoj-nenavisti/>

At the same time, the Crimea attempted to build relations with other regions of the Russian Federation, and some foreign countries. These issues are examined in the last chapter of the thesis.

CHAPTER 8

THE CRIMEA'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, RUSSIAN REGIONS, AND PARADIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES

8.1. Introduction

After the unification with the Russian Federation, the Crimea faced the need to build new relations not only with Kremlin but also with other regions of the Russian Federation, as well as with the foreign countries and organizations. This chapter of the thesis aims at discussing the relations of the Crimea with other regions of the Russian Federation, with Ukraine, Turkey. I will start with the discussion of the Crimea's relations with Moscow, particularly, establishing new federal legislation and I will touch upon the status of Sevastopol. Furthermore, the important place is given to the political relations between Moscow and Simferopol, as well as the economic ones. After the annexation, the Crimea started to build relations with other regions of Russia, especially Tatarstan. The relations with Ukraine remained troublesome. At the same time, Turkey was seen as an important trade partner of the Crimea before the incident with the military jet in November 2015.

8.2. The Crimea - Moscow Relations: Federal Center vs. Subject of the Federation

On 21 March, 2014, Crimean Federal district was established. It included the Republic Crimea and the city of federal significance Sevastopol and became the smallest district within the Russian Federation.⁹⁹¹ Following the establishment of the Crimean Federal District, the new legislative measures and appointments took place in the region.

⁹⁹¹ Указ Президента Российской Федерации N 168 "Об образовании Крымского федерального округа". (2014, March 21). Retrieved from <https://rg.ru/2014/03/22/kfo-site-dok.html>

8.2.1. Establishing New Federal Legislation in the Crimea

First of all, the Law of 18 March, 2014, on adoption of the Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation, draws attention to the issue conferring the status of Sevastopol as a city of federal significance. According to Article 4 of the Law, in case of the Russian Federation's adoption of the new subject which is the part of the foreign state, that subject is given the status of republic, territory, region, autonomous region or autonomous region, in accordance with the international agreement.⁹⁹² Thus, the question about the possibility of adoption of the new subject of the Russian Federation and granting it the status of a city of the federal significance arises.⁹⁹³

Another issue is the possibility of making two new entities the part of the Russian Federation, on the basis of the same international treaty. Thus, the provisions of Article 4 of the Law imply that the adoption a new entity by the Russian Federation can be implemented through the mutual agreement of the Russian Federation and the foreign state (or its part). Therefore, this implies that each new unit of the Federation shall be adopted by means of a separate international treaty. However, one should note that, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of March 17, 2014, "On Recognition of the Republic of Crimea", the city of Sevastopol is a part of the Republic of Crimea, which was recognized as an independent state, and therefore, the conclusion of a separate international treaty to accept it as part of a foreign state was not required.⁹⁹⁴

During the transition period, Ukrainian *hryvnia* in cash and cashless forms was allowed in the Crimea until 1 January, 2016, but already from the moment when the Republic of Crimea joined Russia, payments made only in rubles were taxes,

⁹⁹² Федеральный закон N36-ФЗ "О ратификации Договора между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Крым и образовании в составе Российской Федерации новых субъектов" (2014, 21 March). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/70618344/>

⁹⁹³ Федеральный конституционный закон N 6-ФКЗ "О порядке принятия в Российскую Федерацию и образования в ее составе нового субъекта Российской Федерации". (2001, 17 December). Retrieved from http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_34452/

⁹⁹⁴ Указ Президента Российской Федерации "О признании Республики Крым". (2014, 17 March). Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38202>

customs duties and other charges, payments to the state off-budget funds; salaries in the budget organizations; social payments; other payments if one of the parties is an organization registered in other regions of Russia, except for payments made during banking operations between credit institutions. In addition, *hryvnia* could be exchanged for rubles at the official rate of the Central Bank of Russia. Since 2015, settlements between legal entities, as well as calculations involving individuals associated with their business activities were to be made in cash in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation. This provision of the law was very ambiguous and can be interpreted as a complete ban on non-cash payments in 2015.⁹⁹⁵

In addition, a draft order for the introduction of the Russian Interior Ministry in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city state registration plates of the Russian sample was issued. This gets the Republic of Crimea region code '82' (formerly second-hand Kamchatka Territory), and the city of Sevastopol received a code '92', previously not used. Replacement state driver's license numbers was planned routinely, for example, when selling a car. However, insurance companies had expressed the position that without replacing the state registration plate of the car it would not be possible to provide an insurance while driving without insurance in Russia is prohibited.

In accordance with Article 13 of the Federal Law dated April 2, 2014 "On the Specifics of the Financial System of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol City of Federal Significance, for a Transitional Period", until 1 January 2015, compulsory insurance of civil liability of vehicle owners who have residence in the Republic of Crimea, or in the territory of the federal city of Sevastopol, in respect of vehicles registered in these territories should act according to the Russian legislation and obtain *OSAGO* insurance.⁹⁹⁶ The Russian tax system was applied on the territory of

⁹⁹⁵ Информационно - правовой портал Гарант.ру. *Переход Республики Крым под юрисдикцию Российской Федерации*. Retrieved from <http://www.garant.ru/actual/krym/>

⁹⁹⁶ Федеральный закон N37-ФЗ "Об особенностях функционирования финансовой системы Республики Крым и города федерального значения Севастополя на переходный период" (с изменениями и дополнениями). (2014, 2 April). Retrieved from http://base.garant.ru/70626852/#block_136#ixzz4L06Fc7LG

the Republic of Crimea only from 1 January, 2015. In this context, up to 2015, on the territory of Crimea relations for the establishment, administration and collection of taxes and fees, including the establishment of tax benefits, as well as the relations arising in the process of tax control, appealing against acts of the tax authorities, actions (inaction) of their officials and prosecution for tax offenses had been regulated by the existing legislation. New organizations and individual entrepreneurs were to be registered in accordance with the Federal Law of August 8, 2001, "On State Registration of Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs".⁹⁹⁷ Two fundamental differences from the rest of the registration of the Russian entrepreneurs and organizations are the following. Residents of the Crimea and Sevastopol till 2015 are exempt from the state duty for state registration of the legal entity or natural person as an individual entrepreneur. Before the creation of the Notary Chamber of the Republic of Crimea and the Notary Chamber of Sevastopol, notarial acts committed in their territory by persons authorized to do so in accordance with the Ukrainian legislation, respectively, to certify documents for registration are notaries in Ukraine. All previously registered legal entities and entrepreneurs could continue to operate.⁹⁹⁸

Documents confirming the right to receive pensions, benefits, compensation and other forms of social payments, the right for health care, issued by the competent authorities of Ukraine, continued to operate without restrictions. Citizens of Ukraine and stateless persons permanently residing in the Crimea obtained the right to receive pensions and benefits and the provision of other social support, as well as to health care in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation. Pensions, benefits (including non-recurring), compensation and other forms of social payments and guarantees established in the form of money cannot be less than the size of these established in the form of money and paid to these categories of citizens and

⁹⁹⁷ Федеральный закон N129-ФЗ "О государственной регистрации юридических лиц и индивидуальных предпринимателей" (с изменениями и дополнениями). (2001, 8 August). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/12123875/#ixzz4L0A8UhGj>

⁹⁹⁸ Федеральный закон "О государственной регистрации юридических лиц и индивидуальных предпринимателей", 2001.

individuals as at 21 February 2014.⁹⁹⁹ In addition, in accordance with the presidential decree of March 31, 2014, those who receive the pensions and other social payments are to obtain the rise: from 1 April, 2014 the rise will amount 25%; from 1 May 2014 - 50%; from June 1, 2014 - 75%; from July 1, 2014 - at the rate of 100%.¹⁰⁰⁰

According to the President's Decree, employees of the Prosecutor's Office, shall have a preferential right to enter into service in the Prosecutor's Office, created in these areas, if they have Russian citizenship, and if they pass by them examination on the knowledge of the legislation of the Russian Federation and their compliance with the requirements in the legislation of the Russian Federation to the prosecutors.¹⁰⁰¹ The last provision makes it almost impossible for the local specialists to enter the job. Although, it is stated that the education and qualifications of those who are applying for a job at the Prosecutor's office are taken into account as well as their existing ranks and dates of service.

Judges of courts operating in the territory of the Republic of the Crimea and Sevastopol have the preemptive right for the position of judge in the courts of the Russian Federation, established in these areas, if they have Russian citizenship and provided that they correspond to the requirements of the legislation. Competitive selection for the position of judges in these courts is exercised by the Higher Qualification Board of Judges.¹⁰⁰² The law-enforcement bodies of the Russian Federation will be taken ex-police officers, agencies and units of the tax police of Ukraine, located in the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, the nationality of the

⁹⁹⁹ Указ Президента РФ N192 "О мерах государственной поддержки граждан, являющихся получателями пенсий на территориях Республики Крым и г. Севастополя". (2014, 31 March). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/70625208/#ixzz4LLtJJs32>

¹⁰⁰⁰ Указ Президента РФ "О мерах государственной поддержки граждан, являющихся получателями пенсий на территориях Республики Крым и г. Севастополя", 2014.

¹⁰⁰¹ Указ Президента РФ N200 "О некоторых вопросах поступления на службу в органы и учреждения прокуратуры Российской Федерации граждан Российской Федерации, являющихся работниками органов прокуратуры, действующих на территориях Республики Крым и г. Севастополя". (2014, 4 April). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/70628830/#ixzz4LLz6lDzL>

¹⁰⁰² Указ Президента РФ N233 "О некоторых вопросах кадрового обеспечения судов Российской Федерации, органов и учреждений Судебного департамента при Верховном Суде Российской Федерации, создаваемых на территориях Республики Крым и г. Севастополя". (2014, 14 April). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/70635918/#ixzz4LMYUUIbT>

Russian Federation. However, their special ranks, the documents on service in the internal affairs bodies and units of the tax police of Ukraine recognized as valid in the presentation of the originals of the relevant documents, and their documents on education and qualifications are recognized in Russia and provide their holders the same professional rights as and holders of documents on education and qualifications obtained in Russia, in the presentation of the originals of the relevant documents.¹⁰⁰³ When applying for military service under contract in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies of military control of the military and military formations of the Republic of Crimea, their ranks, documents on education and military service in the armed forces, military formations and law enforcement bodies of Ukraine, which provides for military service, and military command and military formations of the Republic of Crimea shall be effective when submitting the originals of the relevant documents. For admission to the service should be taken Russian citizenship.¹⁰⁰⁴

According to the Decree of Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation from April 4, 2014 № for 2014 and 2015 up to 18000 free budget places in universities of the Russian Federation were allocated to accept citizens residing in the territory Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Results of the competition on the distribution of seats among the universities would be announced by May 28, 2014.¹⁰⁰⁵ The new Russian legislation that was to be applied on the territory of the Crimea was complemented by the new appointments.

¹⁰⁰³ Указ Президента РФ N180 "О некоторых вопросах поступления на службу в федеральную противопожарную службу Государственной противопожарной службы граждан Российской Федерации, являющихся сотрудниками органов управления и подразделений гражданской защиты, расположенных на территориях Республики Крым и г. Севастополя" (2014, 28 March). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/70622804/#ixzz4LMaIXZCG>

¹⁰⁰⁴ Указ Президента РФ N164 "О признании действительными воинских званий, документов об образовании граждан Российской Федерации, являющихся военнослужащими органов военного управления и воинских формирований Республики Крым, и документов о прохождении ими военной службы". (2014, 20 March). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/70617206/#ixzz4LMbcvBz1>

¹⁰⁰⁵ Приказ Министерства образования и науки РФ N273 "Об определении объемов контрольных цифр приема граждан по специальностям и направлениям подготовки для обучения по имеющим государственную аккредитацию образовательным программам высшего образования за счет бюджетных ассигнований федерального бюджета для осуществления приема граждан, постоянно проживающих на территории Республики Крым и города Севастополя, в 2014 и 2015 годах и о проведении открытых публичных конкурсов на распределение организациям,

8.2.2. Economic Relations and Funding of the Republic

In August 2014, Russian government issued a Federal program of Economic and Social Development of the Crimea and Sevastopol till 2020.¹⁰⁰⁶ The first stage of this program is designed for 2015-2017; the second one was specified between 2018 and 2020. The funding of the program constituted 681.2 billion rub or \$13.6 billion. Among this, federal budget provides 658.14 billion rub or \$13.162 billion, while non-budget sources provide - 23085 billion rub or \$461 million.¹⁰⁰⁷ Such volumes of funding made the Crimea one of the biggest recipient of the state subsidies due to the economic crisis. For instance, in 2015, republic received 24.8 billion rub or \$496 million, which makes the Crimea the fourth largest subsidy recipient after Republic Sakha (Yakutiya) - \$957 million; Dagestan - \$866 million; and Kamchatka - \$684 million.¹⁰⁰⁸ In 2016, the Crimea was supposed to receive \$413.64 million. Sevastopol's subsidy in 2015 and 2016 constituted \$55.2 million and \$43.9 million respectively.¹⁰⁰⁹

The document starts with the criticism of the socio-economic situation in the region, discussion of the low GDP, foreign trade volumes, worsening environmental pollution. At the same time, the goals and the funding of the programs show the most crucial spheres for the Crimea. Thus, the chapter devoted to the main goals of the program implementation, notes the importance of the increase of the length of the electric lines, increase of the water supply, renewal of the water supply and canalization networks, as well as the water storage ponds and pump stations;

осуществляющим образовательную деятельность, контрольных цифр приема граждан по специальностям и направлениям подготовки для обучения по имеющим государственную аккредитацию образовательным программам высшего образования за счет бюджетных ассигнований федерального бюджета для осуществления приема граждан, постоянно проживающих на территории Республики Крым и города Севастополя, на 2014 и 2015 г. (2014, 4 April). Retrieved from <http://base.garant.ru/70630722/#ixzz4LMcx8y7r>

¹⁰⁰⁶ Паспорт федеральной целевой программы "Социально-экономическое развитие Республики Крым и г. Севастополя до 2020 года". (2014, 11 August). Retrieved from <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102357218>

¹⁰⁰⁷ Паспорт федеральной целевой программы... 2014: 4.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Министерство финансов РФ. Результаты распределения дотаций на выравнивание бюджетной обеспеченности субъектов Российской Федерации на 2015 год, тыс. руб. Retrieved from http://old.minfin.ru/common/upload/library/2014/09/main/FFPR_2015-2017.pdf

¹⁰⁰⁹ Результаты распределения дотаций на выравнивание бюджетной обеспеченности

construction and rehabilitation of landfills; the reconstruction of the transport routes between the Crimea and the Russian mainland. The costs of these projects are estimated as it follows. The largest share of benefits will be allocated to the sphere of transportation - 61% of the total budget or \$8.361 billion. This, first of all, includes the construction of the Kerch Bridge that would connect the Kerch peninsula of the Crimea with the Krasnodar region of Russia - \$4.9 billion.¹⁰¹⁰ After the separation of the Crimea, the Kerch straight appeared to be the only route of the goods cargo (the airlines are limited to the civil and trains were cut). Besides, the construction and the renovation of the roads in the Crimea is estimated at \$2.24 billion.

Another issue that the Crimea had to face after the separation was water supply that used to be conducted through the North-Crimean channel from Ukraine to the Crimea. In April 2014, Ukraine closed the gates of the North-Crimean channel that secured water supplies for the Crimea and the Kherson oblast' of Ukraine, threatening not only the agriculture of the region but also the sustainability of the Crimea in general. According to the Federal program, the water supply and related infrastructural projects received - \$1.3 billion that is nearly 10% of the program costs. Energy infrastructure projects will receive 7.4% of the whole program budget or \$10 million.¹⁰¹¹ \$1.3 billion was granted for the social payments in the region that constitutes almost 10% of the resources. The Crimea as an important touristic place also was to renew recreational zones. Therefore, Federal government granted \$791 million (6%) for the corresponding innovations. Additionally, \$205 million was given to the "measures aimed at national cultural and spiritual the revival of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German peoples". Interestingly that the share of the industry in the total recipients of the state grant is only \$111 million.¹⁰¹² For modernization, reconstruction and construction of facilities of the gas transportation system \$397.34 million was provided.

¹⁰¹⁰ Результаты распределения дотаций на выравнивание бюджетной обеспеченности: 51.

¹⁰¹¹ Результаты распределения дотаций на выравнивание бюджетной обеспеченности: 51.

¹⁰¹² Результаты распределения дотаций на выравнивание бюджетной обеспеченности: 53.

The volume of exports for 2015 amounted in January - February 2015 \$13.3 million, imports - \$10.8 million. The positive balance of foreign trade was in the amount of \$2.5 million. The coverage ratio of export import of goods amounted to 1.23. The largest exports of goods were carried to Turkey - 43.9% of the total, Ukraine - 22.8%, Libya - 12.2% and India - 11.1%. Mainly exported to the following groups of products: inorganic chemical products - 34.5% of the total, oil seeds and fruits - 28.3%, cereals - 20.1%, ferrous metals - 7.7%, and cocoa products thereof - 2.3%. The largest volume of imports came from Ukraine - 18.6% of the total, Italy - 17.2%, Turkey - 16.8%, Libya - 10.6%, Germany - 9.3%, the USA - 8.8% Switzerland - 3.5% and Poland - 3.4%. In the commodity structure of imports was dominated by boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, furniture, bedding, means of ground transport (except for railway transport), articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, electrical machinery and equipment, edible fruits and nuts, vegetables, artwork as well as alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.¹⁰¹³

The question of the budget was raised during the interview with the Crimeans. Thus, one of the journalists noted:

The current budget of the Crimea had never been seen in Ukraine. A lot of money, federal money - indecently a lot. I hope, the local Crimean authorities will use these funds for the purposes wisely.¹⁰¹⁴

Those, who supported the annexation of the Crimea see positive changes in the economy, first of all the rise of the budget. They also perceive positive changes in the infrastructure of the region despite 'Ukraine's attempts to stop electricity and water supply'.¹⁰¹⁵ As this quotations show the source of the trouble is seen in Ukraine as well - as the lack of desire to support its own citizens by maintaining electricity and water channels.

¹⁰¹³ Итоги социальноэкономического развития Республики Крым за январь-февраль 2015 года: 11.

¹⁰¹⁴ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

¹⁰¹⁵ Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 20 October). Simferopol.

8.2.3. Federal Infrastructural Projects in the Crimea

After March 2014, for sustaining the Crimea, first of all, water, electricity and gas supplies needed due to the fact that Ukraine used to provide these facilities for the Crimea.

As to the water supply, on April 2014, Ukraine closed the gates of the North Crimean channel, after which the water access to the territory of the Crimean peninsula was almost completely stopped. *Gosvodagentstvo* (State Water Agency) of Ukraine and the Crimean authorities had failed to agree on the conditions of the water supply; channel has been filled to a level that ensures water for Kherson region (Southern Ukraine), which allowed to obtain only a small amount of water at the pumping station under Dzhankoy (Central part of the Crimea) directing it further to the Crimea.¹⁰¹⁶ Soon, the water began to flood one of the villages in the Kherson region.¹⁰¹⁷

After the construction of the dam, 'excess water' was discharged into the Black Sea. Remaining water was used by the Crimean *Soda* plant for the industrial needs and for heating residential areas of Krasnoperekopsk (Northern Crimea).¹⁰¹⁸ In this regard, the farmers were forced to switch to drought-resistant crops and drip irrigation.¹⁰¹⁹

¹⁰¹⁶ Доступ воды в Крым прекращён. (2014, 26 April). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from <https://lenta.ru/news/2014/04/26/water/>

Лешан, Е. (2014, 28 April). Страсти по крымской воде. *Обозреватель*. Retrieved from <http://obozrevatel.com/politics/21397-strasti-po-kryimskoj-vode.htm>

¹⁰¹⁷ Козлов, К. Украина пытается устроить в Крыму засуху. (2014, 25 April). *Комсомольская Правда*. Retrieved from <http://www.kp.ru/daily/26224/3107352/>

¹⁰¹⁸ Крымское управление водного хозяйства и мелиорации. Красноперекопский филиал. (2015, 14 April). *Вода не сбрасывалась, а используется*. Retrieved from <http://kuvh.ru/%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%8B%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%8C-%D0%B0-%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%B7%D1%83%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%81%D1%8F/>

¹⁰¹⁹ Минсельхоз РФ делает ставку на развитие в Крыму засухоустойчивых культур и капельное орошение. (2015, March 3). *Крыминформ*. Retrieved from <http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/19661>

The volume of water supplies for irrigation decreased from 700 million cubic meters in 2013 to 17.7 million cubic meters in 2015.¹⁰²⁰ A year after the annexation, on May 18, 2015, the volume of filling the reservoirs of the natural flow in the Crimea was 182.3 million cubic meters (72%), which is 35.5 million cubic meters higher than the figure in 2014.¹⁰²¹ The amount of liquid filling of the reservoir is 40.7 million cubic meters (28%).¹⁰²² Since 2014, for the partial filling of the channel waters of Belogorsk Taygansk reservoirs and artesian wells began to be used. However, the transfer losses constituted 18-28%. The greatest losses occur in riverbed Bink-Karasu in the transfer of the reservoirs.¹⁰²³

Water supply to the North Crimean Canal was resumed on May 12, the cost of the construction's first stage amounted 3 million rub. On December 26, 2014 construction of waterworks near village Novoivanovka Nizhnegorsky region, launched on October 2014, was completed. The object was a technological extension of the project of the transfer of the runoff Bink-Karasu in the North Crimean Canal. The cost of it was 7.9 million rub.¹⁰²⁴

First Deputy of the Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN Security Council Speaking at a meeting of the Security Council Pyotr Ilyichov, during the meeting of the Council in late November 2016, stressed that "purposeful actions of Kyiv violate human rights", particularly the "right to drinking water and sanitation, as well as the right to food and the relevant UN Council on Human Rights' resolutions, article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 11 of the International

¹⁰²⁰ Минсельхоз РФ делает ставку на развитие в Крыму засухоустойчивых культур и капельное орошение, 2015.

¹⁰²¹ Водохранилища естественного стока Крыма наполнены водой на 72% - Госкомводхоз. (2015, 19 May) *Крымформ*. Retrieved from <http://crimea-news.com/society/2015/05/19/90324.html>

¹⁰²² Водохранилища естественного стока Крыма наполнены водой на 72% - Госкомводхоз, 2015.

¹⁰²³ Краснопольская. В. (2015, 30 January). В обезвоженном Крыму надеются на минприроды и небесную канцелярию. *РИА «Федерал Пресс»*. Retrieved from <http://pda.fedpress.ru/news/society/reviews/1422605598-v-obezvozhennom-krymu-nadeyutsya-na-minprirody-i-nebesnyu-kantselyariyu>

¹⁰²⁴ Минприроды частично решило вопрос водоснабжения Крыма за счет переброски воды из реки Бююк-Карасу в Северо-Крымский канал. (2014, 16 May). *Крымформ*. Retrieved from <http://www.c-inform.info/news/id/5663>

Covenant on Economic, Social and cultural Rights".¹⁰²⁵ As it can be seen, the topic of electricity and water supply appears to be a useful tool for public opinion manipulation in the region: Ukraine is being accused of cutting the supplies to the peninsula. In order to prove the sustainability of the region and the ability of Moscow to protect the Crimeans, the government of the RF submitted the bill about the use of the underground waters in the region.¹⁰²⁶

Another acute problem of the Crimeans is the electricity supply. On 22 November, 2015, in the Crimea, due to the explosion at the electric line in the Southern regions of Ukraine, the electricity cut occurred. Normally, there were two electric power plants in the Crimea. One of them produced about 140 MW. Another 330 MW were generated by wind and solar power plants, which are highly dependent on the weather and time of day. Total amount of electricity produced on the peninsula should be 1.2 GW. On the night of November 20, in Kherson region of Ukraine, in the explosion of reinforced concrete poles two of the four power lines were knocked out, through which electricity had been supplied from the territory of Ukraine to the Crimea. Supports of the third and fourth transmission lines were damaged, but did not fall. They provided delivery of 650 MW, while the peninsula needs about 900 MW. On November 21, the head of the Crimea Sergey Aksyonov said that the situation is normal, and there were 'no blackouts'.¹⁰²⁷ At first, it was impossible to get access to the transmission line - repairmen were not allowed by the participants of the Crimean blockade, are in favor of the termination of food supply and the gap of economic ties with the peninsula. On November 22, as the result of the second attack, remaining two lines run out of order. The Crimea was left without electricity.

¹⁰²⁵ Россия подняла в СБ ООН вопрос о водной блокаде Крыма. (2016, 23 November). Новости Крыма. Retrieved from <http://news.allcrimea.net/news/2016/11/23/rossiya-podnyala-v-sb-onn-vopros-o-vodnoi-blokade-kryma-70347/>

¹⁰²⁶ Правительство подготовило законопроект об использовании подземных вод участниками СЭЗ в Крыму. (2016, 30 November). *Парламентская газета*. Retrieved from <https://www.pnp.ru/economics/2016/11/30/pravitelstvo-podgotovilo-zakonoproekt-ob-ispolzovanii-podzemnykh-vod-uchastnikami-sez-v-krymu.html>

¹⁰²⁷ В темноте меж двух огней: почему Крым остался без света. (2015, 4 December). *BBC Русская служба*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/russian/business/2015/12/151204_electricity_blockade_crimea_consequences

In large cities, electricity was provided for a few hours with breaks, while some small villages were not provided with electricity at all. The regional authorities were not ready for such a development. The Crimean residents rushed to buy electric generators and gasoline for them.¹⁰²⁸

Andrey Sambros, Moscow Carnegie Center, connects the sabotage to the food blockade, initiated by the group of the Crimean Tatars and the Right Sector activists earlier in September. He argues that the efforts of Kyiv to repair the damage was insufficient that indicated the soft line policy of Kyiv despite the risks. At the same time, the analyst points out the lack of other leverages except of the energy line sabotage and food blockade.¹⁰²⁹

The complete cut of electricity supplies to the Crimea from Ukraine took place on December 24, 2014. One day before, Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov announced the signing of a contract on transit of electricity to the peninsula from Russia via Ukraine. The agreement between the *Inter RAO* and *Ukrinterenergo* for the export of electricity from unified energy system (UES) of Russia into a UES of Ukraine was concluded. Annual contract came into force on December 30, 2014 and provided for a uniform schedule of deliveries of up to 1500 MW.¹⁰³⁰ Power supply of the peninsula was 70% dependent on supplies of Ukrainian electricity, and during peak periods this number constituted 90%. Russian experts of the energy market have repeatedly noted that the issue of energy security of the new subject of the Russian Federation had not yet been resolved. Total consumption of the peninsula is 1050-1100 MW. Ukraine provides only 400 megawatts and as much again provides its own generation of the Crimea.

Russian authorities are planning to build two power plants - around Simferopol and Sevastopol. In cable networks, laid on the bottom of the Kerch Strait, the electricity

¹⁰²⁸ Медведев: необходимо добиться полной энергетической независимости Крыма от Украины. (2014, 2 September). *TASS*. Retrieved from <http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1415235>

¹⁰²⁹ Sambros, Andrey. (2015, 25 November). Crimea Struggles With Ukraine's New Energy "War". *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=62072>

¹⁰³⁰ Электричество задним числом. (2015, 2 January). *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Retrieved from <https://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/12/31/6365657.shtml>

will be transferred from the Taman Peninsula, the first deputy general director of *Russian Network* Roman Berdnikov said.¹⁰³¹ 42.4 billion rubles will go to the construction of generation and 22.8 billion - on the web.¹⁰³²

For Putin, the energy supply suspension was useful: while he was perceived as a 'rescuer', Ukraine once again was presented by the Russian channels as not providing the basic needs of those who are still considered by Kyiv as Ukrainian citizens. This, in opinion of Kolesnikov, was a serious miscalculation of the official Kyiv since the response to the Russian policy-makers caused damaged to the well-being of the ordinary people:

Regime, of course, only grows stronger because of this; a besieged fortress becomes even more beleaguered; and therefore transforms into a sacred object; the workers consolidate around their Batman carrying peace to Syria with the bombs, even tighter.¹⁰³³

The same consolidation was the result of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West. The only difference is that while anti-sanctions and 'substitution of the import' were initiated by Moscow, the electricity cuts are Kyiv's initiative and it more and more draws the line between the Crimeans and Ukrainians.¹⁰³⁴

Some analysts link the termination of the electricity supply by Ukraine to the US Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Kyiv on December 7, 2015, where he met with the Ukrainian officials. This visit is treated as an indication of the pressure of the US on the Ukraine to avoid jeopardizing situation in the region. Cutting off the electricity was seen to be an attempt of Ukraine to impose a cost on Russia and draw Washington's attention to Ukraine.¹⁰³⁵ The US was interested in keeping the pro-Western government in Ukraine, however, such moves of Kyiv could pose a threat to

¹⁰³¹ Энергобезопасность Крыма обойдется почти в 177 млрд рублей. (2014, 7 July). *RosBalt*. Retrieved from <http://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2014/07/07/1288937.html>

¹⁰³² Паспорт федеральной целевой программы "Социально-экономическое развитие Республики Крым и г. Севастополя до 2020 года", 2014.

¹⁰³³ Колесников, Андрей. (2015, 29 November). Украина потеряла Крым. *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/2015/11/25/ru-pub-62096>

¹⁰³⁴ Колесников (2015).

¹⁰³⁵ Electricity Partially Restored in Crimea. *Geopolitical Futures*. Retrieved from <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/wp-content/uploads/wp-post-to-pdf-enhanced-cache/1/electricity-partially-restored-in-crimea.pdf>

Washington's relations with Moscow therefore American leaders tried to use some pressure on Ukraine.

Nevertheless energy blockade of the Crimea caught the Russian government by surprise, but the short-sightedness - is not the most serious miscalculation on the part of officials. In April 2016, it turned out that, after the annexation of the Crimea, peninsula received power from the 1400 Russian diesel power generators and 13 mobile gas turbine power plants of 22 MW each. After that, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev set to the government the task of achieving energy independence of the Crimea from Ukraine. A little later, in October a competition for the construction of an energy bridge to the Crimea was announced. On December 2, Vladimir Putin launched the first line of an energy bridge, which will provide 400 MW of electricity to the region. Earlier this year, Ukraine's Minister of Energy Vladimir Demchishin stated that the electricity supply in the Crimea and the Donbass would not stop, because "it is the territory of Ukraine, and the country's citizens live there [in Ukraine]." ¹⁰³⁶ The second and third lines of the energy bridge were completed in the end of the February 2016. ¹⁰³⁷ The fourth and the last lines were launched on May 11, 2016. ¹⁰³⁸ Energy bridge is a series of undersea cables across the Kerch Strait located between Krasnodar Krai of the mainland Russia and the Kerch peninsula.

Despite the suspension of the gas supplies to the Crimea from Ukraine, the region has its own gas from both onshore and on the shelves of the Azov and Black Seas. Hydrocarbons are extracted from three gas condensate fields, six gas fields and one oil field. They are Arkhangelskoye, Golitsynskoye, Stormovoye, Bezymiannoye,

¹⁰³⁶ Крым был, есть и останется территорией Украины. В новом договоре на поставку электроэнергии будет отражена та же позиция, - Демчишин. (2015, 9 December). Цензор.нет. Retrieved from http://censor.net.ua/news/364414/krym_byl_est_i_ostanetsya_territoriyei_ukrainy_v_novom_dogovore_na_postavku_elektroenergii_budet_otrajena

¹⁰³⁷ Third Line of Energy Bridge to Crimea Completed, Ukraine Is Furious. (2016, 28 February). *Fort Russ*. Retrieved from <http://www.fort-russ.com/2016/02/third-line-of-energy-bridge-to-crimea.html>

¹⁰³⁸ Russia Launches Fourth Electricity Line To Crimea. (2016, 11 May). *Radio Free Europe*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-crimea-fourth-power-line/27728822.html>

Odesskoye, North-Bulganakskoe East Kazantip gas and gas condensate, Semenovskoye overland and Subbotina offshore oil fields.

As it was declared, the South Stream can enter the territory of the Crimea. According to the words of the minister Oleg Savelyev, Russian authorities tend to build a branch of the South Stream gas supply to the Crimea for two years. According to the data submitted to the Ministry of Energy, it is possible for two years, but it's obviously not in 2014. South Stream will go through the old direction, but there will be an offshoot. According to the minister, high pressure gas pipeline can be built at the expense of *Gazprom*.¹⁰³⁹

However, in June, Bulgaria suspended the work on the construction of the South Stream to consult with the European Commission. The works are suspended due to a request from the European Commission; Further decisions will be taken, depending on consultations with Brussels. On June 9, Serbia also deferred work on the project South Stream because of the statements of the authorities of neighboring Bulgaria suspend its construction. The EU has demanded to suspend the implementation of the project South Stream on June, 4. At the European Commission found the claims to the satisfaction of the draft rules of the Third Energy Package. The European Commission has accused Bulgaria of violating European norms in tenders for the construction of infrastructure projects, as well as in the provision of "privileged opportunities for Russian and Bulgarian companies."¹⁰⁴⁰

On the peninsula, state unitary enterprise *Krymgazseti* was established. As the head of the "Corporation of the Crimea" Yevgeniya Bavykina already prepared an action plan for the transfer of activities from the gas supply private companies *Krymgaz* to a new venture. In order to integrate the Crimea to the Russian legislation on gas supply

¹⁰³⁹ В Крым проведут ответвление от "Южного потока". (2014, 16 June). *РБК*. Retrieved from <http://www.rbc.ru/economics/16/06/2014/57041e539a794760d3d3f5cc>

¹⁰⁴⁰ Россия построит ответвление от «Южного потока» для подачи газа в Крым. (2014, 16 June). *RIA Novosti*. Retrieved from https://ria.ru/crimea_today/20140616/1012183428.html

and prevent the illegal use of public property - the gas supply networks should be under the newly established State Unitary Enterprise *Krymgazseti*.¹⁰⁴¹

Moreover, Council of Ministers of the Crimea at a meeting in August 2014, decided to return to state ownership of the network of gas mains and gas networks, previously owned by the private joint-stock company *Krymgaz*. High-pressure gas pipelines relevant to refer to the property of the state enterprise *Chernomorneftegaz*. Aksyonov said that the practice of transferring public gas network to individuals - a consequence of the total corruption in Ukraine and promised that, in connection with the decision of gas tariffs for households and enterprises in the Crimea will not grow.¹⁰⁴²

The absence of rail links with the territory of Ukraine (since 28 December, 2014 when Ukrainian side cut the rail link between the cities of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea) is one of the significant impediments for the trade. Reduction of the volume of work in enterprises of maritime and rail transport due to the lack of cargo to be transported is also a significant loss for the Crimea. Insufficient capacity of the ferry, which arose in connection with the redistribution of passenger and freight traffic flows entering the Republic of Crimea, and adverse weather conditions make the connection between the Crimea and the Russian mainland very difficult.

In February 2015, government approved timetables of bus routes of the regular communication connecting the Crimea with a variety of subjects of the Russian Federation: 'Yalta - Rostov-Na Donu', 'Yalta-Volgograd', 'Astrakhan - Sevastopol'. From the airport 'Simferopol' flights to 13 cities of the Russian Federation are carried out. Moreover, to ensure the smooth and continuous transport of passengers and vehicles in the Republic of Crimea and back ferry lines are arranged: 'Novorossiysk - Kerch'; 'Novorossiysk - Sevastopol'; 'The Caucasus - Kerch'; 'The Caucasus - the Crimea'. In 2015, the line 'Temryuk - Kerch commercial port' and 'Temryuk - Kerch Sea Fishing Port' opens. Also on the line 'Caucasus - Crimea' two railway ferry *Peter*

¹⁰⁴¹ Государственное Унитарное Предприятие "Крымгазсети". *О предприятии*. Retrieved from <http://crimeagasnet.ru/>

¹⁰⁴² В Крыму национализировали газовую сеть республики, *RIA Novosti*, 19 August, 2014

and *Annenkov* operate. Each has a capacity of 20 rail wagons, which during the day can carry 200-250 wagons.¹⁰⁴³

8.3. Russian Military Presence in the Region

As Ridvan Bari Urkosta argues, military exercise of 8 February 2016 had two goals. One of them was to demonstrate NATO, and Turkey in particular, that if necessary, the region may become the outpost of confrontation as well as aggression. The other aim was to strengthen the military capabilities of the region. Thus, as the analyst notes, the Black Sea Fleet received two small missile ships and submarine of the new project 636.3. In total it was planned to deploy 6 submarines in the Crimea. The head frigate *Admiral Grigorovich* was also given to the Black Sea Fleet.¹⁰⁴⁴ Crimean Air force has got a second wind. Thus, military airports, first of all, oriented towards Ukraine started operating. As Bari Urkosta lists, the following strike fighters were deployed in the Crimea: Su-24, Su-24MR; patrol aircraft Be-12, An-26 transports and helicopters Ka-27 and Mi-8; bombers Su-24M, Su-34, Su-25SM; fighters Su-27P, Su-27UB, Su-27SM and Su-30M2; helicopters: three squadrons, including the Ka-52, Mi-35M, Mi-28N, Mi-8AMTSh and Mi-26. The airspace of the Crimea is now protected by two anti-aircraft missile regiment with the S-300PM systems in Sevastopol and Feodosiya. These are supplemented by Carapace-S and Osa-AKM anti-aircraft missile and gun complexes.¹⁰⁴⁵

According to the agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, Russia could have on the territory of Crimea only forces associated with the fleet. Therefore, placement of the tanks and other ground forces changed the situation qualitatively. So there were the T-72B3 tanks, howitzers MSTA-B, MLRS Tornado-G and anti-tank systems Chrysanthemum-S. In addition, in the Crimea, anti-missile complexes

¹⁰⁴³ Итоги социальноэкономического развития Республики Крым за январь-февраль 2015 года, pp. 6 - 7

¹⁰⁴⁴ Bari Urkosta, R. (2016, 28 August). Аннексированный Крым как военно-стратегический плацдарм России. *Хвиля*. Retrieved from <http://hvylya.net/analytics/geopolitics/anneksirovannyiy-kryim-kak-voenno-strategicheskii-platsdarm-rossii.html>

¹⁰⁴⁵ Bari Urkosta 2016.

Bastion and Ball were stationed, as well as missile system Rock. Russia has received professional staff, the technique of both marine and terrestrial, including military bases. It certainly can be seen as a significant strengthening of Russia's military presence in the Black Sea region. Moreover, Ukraine is simply cut off from the Black Sea is actually half of its coastline, which it had before annexation. Before the annexation of the Crimea, Russian Federation had only 475 kilometers of Black Sea coastline. Russia has acquired 750 kilometers. Now this figure makes it de facto owner of the Black Sea. Together with 240 kilometers of coastline of Abkhazia, it appears to be 1465 km.¹⁰⁴⁶

De facto Russian annexation of the Crimea has become a figurehead for the possession of the coastline. The eastern part of the Northern Black Sea was constrained in the area of the continental zones: Donbass and Mariupol. The main thing is that in 2014 the Kerch Strait area is full of Russian domination and as the construction of the bridge will be growing suspicion on the passage of the Ukrainian courts in the region. After gaining control of the Kerch Strait, they actually made it their inland lake.

8.4. Relations With Other Regions of the Russian Federations

8.4.1. Cooperation between the Crimea and Other Regions of the Russian Federation

As Nikolai Petrov argues, since the beginning of the transition period, the 'patron-vassal' relations were established in the Crimea.¹⁰⁴⁷ Thus, this can be traced in the decision to establish the curator system when the regions of the mainland Russia assist some districts in the Crimea. Particularly, they will provide advice, legal and financial assistance. Simferopol was attached to St. Petersburg; Simferopol district - to the Leningrad region; Sevastopol was to be assisted by Moscow; Kerch and the

¹⁰⁴⁶ Bari Urkosta 2016.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Petrov 2016b: 77.

Leninsky district was given to Kuban; and Bakhchisaray was assigned to the Republic of Tatarstan.¹⁰⁴⁸

The State Council of the Republic of Crimea in the framework of inter-parliamentary (inter-regional) cooperation in 2014, signed a number of agreements with the legislative bodies of subjects of the Russian Federation: with the Samara Regional Duma (April 18, 2014); with the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg (May 22, 2014); with the Legislative Assembly of the Rostov region (6 June, 2014); with the Legislative Assembly of the Irkutsk region (20 June, 2014); with the Parliament of the Chechen Republic (23 October, 2014); the Smolensk Regional Duma (November 5, 2014); with the Legislative Assembly of the Ulyanovsk region (24 November, 2014).¹⁰⁴⁹ In addition, an agreement on cooperation between the Secretariat of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation was completed (5 April, 2014). Active work was completed to prepare for the signing of agreements on inter-parliamentary cooperation between the State Council of the Republic of Crimea: State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan; State Assembly - Kurultai of the Republic of Bashkortostan; Legislative Duma of Stavropol Territory; Legislative Assembly of the Amur Region; People's Khural of the Republic of Buryatia; Legislative Assembly of Kaluga region, as well as preparation for the signing of an agreement on cooperation Office of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea with the Office of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.¹⁰⁵⁰

8.4.2. Tatarstan's Special Role for the Crimea

The main objective of the paradiplomatic activity of Tatarstan in the Crimea was to facilitate the integration of the region into the Russian Federation. The paradiplomacy of Tatarstan in Crimean crises starts on February 26, 2014, during the

¹⁰⁴⁸ У городов и районов Крыма появятся российские регионы-кураторы. (2014, 1 April). *KPYMinfo*. Retrieved from <http://www.kryminfo.net/u-gorodv-i-rayonov-kryma-poyavyatsya-rossiyskiye-regiony-kuratry/>

¹⁰⁴⁹ <http://crimea.gov.ru/mezhreg>

¹⁰⁵⁰ <http://crimea.gov.ru/mezhreg/plan>

Anti-Maidan in Simferopol. As Richat Sabitov analyzes in his article,¹⁰⁵¹ on 26 February, 2016, president of the Republic Tatarstan Minnikhanov appealed to the Crimean Tatars on the Russian Channel 1 and called for "preservation of interethnic and interfaith peace and harmony, a categorical rejection of the radical ways to resolve the conflict". He also condemned the authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea for use of force by all parties to internal conflict."¹⁰⁵² On the very next day, during the World Tatar Congress, the participants made a statement about the concern of the destiny of the Crimean Tatars and the fear that the EuroMaidan radicalism can spread in the Crimea.¹⁰⁵³

In April, 2014, the delegation of the Parliament of Tatarstan was sent to the Crimea. The members of the delegations expressed their readiness to promote the formation of the legal framework of the Republic of Crimea on the legal foundation of Russia, to share the experience of building relations between the republic and the federal center.¹⁰⁵⁴ Furthermore, the representatives of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Tatarstan visited the region. During March, the President of Tatarstan Minnikhanov paid the visit to the Crimea three times.¹⁰⁵⁵

On 5 March, 2014, an agreement on cooperation between Tatarstan and the Crimea was signed. The head of Tatarstan stated that the Crimea is attractive for the republic in terms of the investments and expressed the hope that the Crimean authorities would support the Crimean Tatar language and culture, particularly, would not close

¹⁰⁵¹ Sabitov, R. (2014). Paradiplomatic activity of Tatarstan during Ukrainian crises. *Krymskoje istoriczeskoje obozrienje*, (1), 68-76.

¹⁰⁵² Президент Республики Татарстан. (27 February, 2014). Парламентарии Татарстана приняли текст Обращения Государственного Совета Республики Татарстан к народам Автономной Республики Крым. Retrieved from <http://president.tatarstan.ru/news/view/120740>

¹⁰⁵³ Всемирный конгресс татар. (2014, 26 February). Заявление Всемирного конгресса татар в связи с ситуацией в Автономной Республике Крым Украины. Retrieved from <http://tatar-congress.org/ru/yanalyklar/zayavlenie-vsemirnogo-kongressa-tatar-v-svyazi-s-situatsiey-v-avtonomnoy-respublike-krym-ukrainy/>

¹⁰⁵⁴ Делегация крымских татар посетила парламент Татарстана. (2014, 28 April). *Новости Государственного Совета*. Retrieved from <http://www.gossov.tatarstan.ru/news/show/2524?print=1>

¹⁰⁵⁵ Sabitov 2014: 72.

the TV channel ATR.¹⁰⁵⁶ Furthermore, Minnikhanov participated in an extraordinary parliamentary session of the Crimean Republic where the declaration of independence was adopted. He also expressed hope that the Crimean Tatar population would attend the referendum for independence and vote for independence.¹⁰⁵⁷

The former President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev also did not stay away from the events of March 2014. On March 12, in Moscow, he met Mustafa Dzhemilev. The same day, Dzhemilev also has a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin who guaranteed that rights of the Crimean Tatars would be respected in case of peninsula's incorporation into Russia. Tatarstan managed to establish a permanent representation of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Republic of Crimea.¹⁰⁵⁸ Moreover, as it was mentioned before, Tatarstan was assigned to assist the development of the Bahchisaray providing the region with methodological and material aid. In the context of ongoing tensions between the Crimean Tatars and Crimean authorities, Minnikhanov, requested Putin to integrate the Crimean Tatars to the list of peoples protected by the federal law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples". Tatarstan President also pleads to let the representatives of the Crimean Tatars meet with Putin and, finally, to legitimize the Crimean Tatar residences in the peninsula.¹⁰⁵⁹

On April 21, Russian President signed a decree rehabilitating the Crimean Tatars and other ethnic minorities on the peninsula, victims of 1944 Deportation.¹⁰⁶⁰ On May 16, Vladimir Putin met in Sochi with representatives of the Crimean Tatars where, among other issues, cites Tatarstan as an example of a well-developed republic. In

¹⁰⁵⁶ Соглашение о сотрудничестве между Татарстаном и Крымом подписано в Симферополе. (2014, 5 March). *INTERFAX*. Retrieved from <http://www.interfax.ru/russia/362910>

¹⁰⁵⁷ Sabitov 2014: 73.

Постоянное представительство Республики Татарстан в Республике Крым и городе Севастополе. Retrieved from <http://postpredrk.tatarstan.ru/>

¹⁰⁵⁸ Sabitov 2014: 73.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Sabitov 2014: 73.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Указ Президента Российской Федерации № 268, О мерах по реабилитации армянского, болгарского, греческого, крымско-татарского и немецкого народов и государственной поддержке их возрождения и развития. (2014, 21 April). Retrieved from <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/38356>

late April, the delegation of the Crimean Milli Mejlis paid a return visit to Tatarstan. On May 26, a historical "Agreement on cooperation between Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and the World Congress of Tatars in 2014–2018 years" was signed in Kazan.¹⁰⁶¹ The agreement sets a mechanism to integrate the Crimean Tatars in Russian Society. The document calls to develop the extensive public relations between the Crimean Tatar and Tatarstan people, as a form of manifestation of people's diplomacy.¹⁰⁶²

As it can be seen, Tatarstan was called to persuade the Crimean Tatars leaders to cooperate with Moscow. The experience of Tatarstan was to convince the Crimean Muslims that they would have a potential to have an autonomy within the Russian Federation in case of the cooperation with Moscow. This was Kremlin's attempt to tame the Mejlis. However, as it can be seen little success has been achieved so far on this issue.

8.5. Relations between the Crimea and Ukraine

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law, aimed at protection of its citizens on the 'temporarily occupied territory'. The document guarantees the preservation of the Ukrainian citizenship for those Crimeans, who was imposed to accept the Russian one.¹⁰⁶³ Besides, this law guarantees the pensions for the residents of the Crimea if they do not receive pensions from the Russian Federation; electoral rights; rights to inherit and so on. Moreover, the Ukrainian government issued decree regulating the work of the migration service in Ukraine regarding the Crimeans. It aims at easing all passport-related matters for the Crimeans, such as applying for a passport for foreign travel, changing the name in the passport, etc. under simplified rules. Thus, according to Ukrainian legislation, Ukrainians can only apply for passport-related

¹⁰⁶¹ Договор о сотрудничестве межджлиса крымско-татарского народа и международного союза общественных объединений «Всемирный конгресс татар» на 2014 - 2018 годы. (2014, 26 May). *БИЗНЕС Online*. Retrieved from <https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/105210>.

¹⁰⁶² Sabitov 2014: 72 - 74.

¹⁰⁶³ Закон України "Про забезпечення прав і свобод громадян та правовий режим на тимчасово окупованій території України". (2014, 15 April). Retrieved from <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1207-18>

formalities to the migration service office at their place of residence, but the Crimean residents are now allowed to apply anywhere in mainland Ukraine.¹⁰⁶⁴

Cabinet approved the procedure for entry to the occupied territory of the Crimea and exit from it. The corresponding decree was promulgated on June 4 on the government website. According to it, to enter the territory of the Crimea and exit from it is possible only through checkpoints, working around the clock. Ukrainian citizens to cross administrative border need to have a document that confirms the citizenship of (domestic or foreign, official, diplomatic passport, seaman's travel document the child). For foreigners and stateless persons it is possible on the basis of passport documents and the special permit, which gives State Migration Service. Special permits are issued in case of: residence in the temporarily occupied territory of the close relatives or family members of a foreigner or a stateless person located in the territory of the Crimea burial place of relatives or family members, death of close relatives or family members.¹⁰⁶⁵

Despite the separation from Ukraine and Russia's proclamations about self-sufficient Crimea, the region has to preserve trade relations with Ukraine. Due to the inability of the Crimea to pay taxes to the Ukrainian budget, in August 2014, the free economic zone in the Crimea was created. The law provides for the establishment in the Crimea free economic zone for 10 years. There, it is said, will act special legal regime of economic activities of individuals and entities, in particular as regards tax and customs law. According to the law on FEZ, the Crimea is not charged state taxes and fees. There can be used a multi-mode, in which to pay for goods and services can be used as the *hryvnia*, and other currencies. In fact, it legitimizes the transition to

¹⁰⁶⁴ Migration Service of Ukraine. Інформація для громадян, які проживають (zareєстровані) на території Кримського півострова. Retrieved from <http://dmsu.gov.ua/informatsiya-dlya-krimchan>.

Постанова "Про затвердження Порядку оформлення документів, що підтверджують громадянство України, посвідчують особу чи її спеціальний статус, громадянам, які проживають на тимчасово окупованій території України". (2014, 4 June). Retrieved from <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/289-2014-%D0%BF>.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Кабінет Міністрів України. Постанова №367 Про затвердження Порядку в'їзду на тимчасово окуповану територію України та виїзду з неї. (2015, 4 June). Retrieved from <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/367-2015-%D0%BF>.

settlements in the Crimea Russian rubles, which are carried out from June 1 this year. The Act also provides that in the Crimea will be free customs zone.¹⁰⁶⁶

8.6. The Crimea's Relations with Turkey: Issue of the Crimean Tatars and Cooperation

Although Turkey does not recognize the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation, its relations with the region are determined by the presence of the Crimean Tatar community in the Crimea and their strong diaspora in Turkey, as well as trade partnership.

As to Turkey's position concerning the Crimean Tatars, it is noteworthy that Turkey used to provide humanitarian support for the Crimeans. Thus, TICA through its projects succeeded in rehabilitation of schools, building medical centers and repairing water system in the Crimea, mostly in the districts of compact residence of the Crimean Tatars. Besides, the Crimean Tatar students could enter Turkish universities through the state programs and scholarships. During the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed the status of the Crimean Tatars with the Russian president Vladimir Putin. Prime Minister Erdogan as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu assured the Crimeans that Turkey would not abandon the Crimean Tatars. Needless to say that Turkey was always trying to keep a fragile balance between these countries, so Turkish leaders avoided blunt statements on the issue. Following the court decision that appropriated the assets of Mejlis and *Krym* foundation in mid-September, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey made statement which called the international community to react on Russia's actions toward the Crimean Tatars.¹⁰⁶⁷

¹⁰⁶⁶ Закон Украины № 1636-VII "О создании свободной экономической зоны "Крым" и об особенностях осуществления экономической деятельности на временно оккупированной территории Украины". (2014, 12 August). Retrieved from http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/T141636.html.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Турция призвала мировое сообщество защитить права крымских татар. (2014, 18 September). Zerkalo Nedeli. Retrieved from http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/turciya-prizvala-mirovye-soobshchestvo-prinyat-mery-po-zaschite-prav-krymskih-tatar-153599_.html

Most probably Turkey's assistance to the region will include humanitarian aid for the Crimean Tatars. Seemingly, Turkey will avoid direct confrontation with Moscow due to economic reasons. Around 60% of gas supplies to Turkey are coming from Russia.¹⁰⁶⁸ Moreover, recent import bans in Russia can boost Russian-Turkish collaboration, not only in trade but also in the implementation of strategic projects such as construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the laying of the South Stream as well as the implementation of a number of joint infrastructure projects. Therefore, the relations with Moscow require serious calculations.

Another example of the rhetoric of the Turkish leadership is the commemoration of the events of 24 April, 1915 in Erevan, where Russian president was invited and came. In his speech in front of the memorial to the victims of the genocide, Putin condemned Turkish policies of 1915, using the term 'genocide' which provoked the reaction of the Turkish President Erdogan. He said "The latest countries to speak of genocide are Germany, Russia and France". Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed a hope that the Turkish leader's reaction "would not influence the relationship between Moscow and Ankara, and, above all, the Turkish Stream," a 63-billion-cubic-meter-per-year pipeline that would carry Russian gas under the Black Sea to Turkish territory, and on to European markets.¹⁰⁶⁹ Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız said that Putin's comments had 'surprised' him, but would not cause a rethink of an ambitious gas project with Russia.¹⁰⁷⁰ These issues demonstrate that Turkey would hardly do anything to protect the Crimean Tatars in order not to put under risk the relations with Kremlin. Ankara's policies if any, would be very cautious.

In Turkey, the Prosecutor General's Office filed a case concerning the closure of the Federation of the Crimean Tatar communities of Turkey, which is known for its pro-Russian activities and cooperation with the Crimean authorities. Moreover,

¹⁰⁶⁸ U.S. Energy Information Administration. Turkey's Profile. Retrieved from <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tu>

¹⁰⁶⁹ Russia, Turkey Bicker Over the G-Word. (2015, 29 April). *The Moscow Times*. Retrieved from <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-turkey-bicker-over-the-g-word-46199>

¹⁰⁷⁰ Russia, Turkey Bicker Over the G-Word. (2015, 29 April).

Department of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkey communities conducted an investigation, which found that the Federation of the Crimean Tatar communities in Turkey, whose head is Unver Sel violated Turkish law. By law, the Federation of the Crimean Tatar Turkish companies must have at least 5 members, but as it became known after checking the Turkish Interior Ministry, the Federation did not fulfill this requirement. Two members of the federation left the organization. Furthermore, another member of the organization said the termination of membership, but the leadership of the federation does not comply with the relevant procedures. Federation of the Crimean Tatar communities in Turkey ceased to exist in 2011.¹⁰⁷¹

According to the analyst from the Atlantic Council Hannah Thoburn, the Russo - Turkish relationship continued largely unharmed until last autumn, when Russia began to move its forces into Syria. But since Russian got closer to the Syrian - Turkish border, Turkey's concern about Kremlin's strategy increased. The turning point was the incident with the Russian jet hit by the Turkish forces in November 2015. Promptly, Russia introduced visa regime for the Turkish citizens starting from 1 January, 2016; embargo on Turkish goods; students and those Turkish citizens working in the Russian Federation were expelled from the country. This opened the chance to the Turkish - Ukrainian cooperation.¹⁰⁷²

After the incident, relations between Turkey and Ukraine became closer. This can be seen in the visits the countries paid to each other. Thus, in February 2016, Minister Davutoglu visited Kyiv¹⁰⁷³ and the two nations agreed to heighten their bilateral cooperation on defense production and procurement. Turkey and Ukraine plan to cooperate in turbojet aircraft engines, radars, military communications technologies and navigation systems. On March 9, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko visited Ankara for the fifth meeting of the Turkey-Ukraine Strategic Cooperation Council, a

¹⁰⁷¹ В Турции закрывают пророссийскую Федерацию крымскотатарских обществ. (2015, 6 June). *Крым Реалии*. Retrieved from <http://ru.krymr.com/a/news/27057191.html>

¹⁰⁷² Thoburn, H. (2016, 23 March). Ukraine and Turkey's Newly Strengthened Relationship. *Atlantic Council*. Retrieved from <http://www.hudson.org/research/12338-ukraine-and-turkey-s-newly-strengthened-relationship>

¹⁰⁷³ Премьер Турции Давутоглу прибывает с визитом в Украину. (2016, 15 February). *УНІАН*. Retrieved from <http://www.unian.net/politics/1264976-premer-turtsii-davutoglu-pribyivaet-s-vizitom-v-ukrainu.html>

framework established in 2011 that has seen the abolition of visa regimes between the two countries and an increase in trade volumes. Poroshenko noted that this cooperation is quite important under the condition of the Russian policies in Syria and Ukraine.¹⁰⁷⁴

Apart from the issues of the economic cooperation, problems of security, touristic and technical spheres, the declaration touched upon the issues of the Crimean Tatars. Thus, it mentioned the need of the assistance to the Crimean Tatars who were forced to leave the Crimea; to establish the connection between TİKA, Mejlis and the corresponding organs in Ukraine; secure the quotas for the Crimean Tatars in the universities of Turkey as well as provide language courses for them.¹⁰⁷⁵ No need to say that Turkey did not recognize the September elections results in the Crimea recognizing it the part of Ukraine.¹⁰⁷⁶

Moreover, in late November 2016, the delegation from Turkey paid a visit to the Crimea coming through Moscow. It included head of the Turkish Association of Eurasian Governments Hasan Cengiz, deputy mayor of Ankara Ahmet Tunc, Turkish presidential representative Ibrahim Erilli, and various representatives of Turkish businesses interested in the implementation of projects in Crimea. During the visit, delegation attended the Crimean cities and discussed the possibility of the ferry boat transportation between Turkey and the region.¹⁰⁷⁷ This provoked the response of the Ukrainian side, immediately published on the web-page of the Embassy of Ukraine in Ankara. The document stated that

Ukraine considers such visits by some foreign individuals and vessels as attempts to legitimize the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic

¹⁰⁷⁴ Thoburn 2016.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Посольство України в Турецькій Республіці. (2016, 10 March). Спільна Декларація за результатами П'ятого засідання Стратегічної ради високого рівня між Україною і Турецькою Республікою. Retrieved from <http://turkey.mfa.gov.ua/ua/press-center/news/45521-spilyna-deklaracija-za-rezulytatami-pjatogo-zasidannya-strategichnoji-radi-visokogo-rivnya-mizh-ukrajinoju-i-turecykoju-respublikoju>

¹⁰⁷⁶ Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü Tanju Bilgiç'in 18 Eylül 2016 Tarihinde Gerçekleştirilen Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Duması Seçimlerinin Kırım'da da Yapılmasına İlişkin Bir Soruya Cevabı. (2016, 23 September). Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc-34_-23-eylul-2016_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu-tanju-bilgic_in-8-eylul-2016-tarihinde-gerceklestirilen-rusya-federasyonu-de.tr.mfa

¹⁰⁷⁷ В Крым прибыла делегация из Турции. (2016, 23 November). *Российская Газета*. Retrieved from <https://rg.ru/2016/11/23/reg-ufo/v-krym-pribyla-delegaciia-iz-turcii.html>

of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol that led to numerous economic, social and humanitarian problems on the temporarily occupied Peninsula.¹⁰⁷⁸

Despite the support of the Ukrainian integrity, provided by the Turkish authorities, Ukraine assures that the citizens and companies will bear full responsibility for such visits.¹⁰⁷⁹ Moreover, the head of the Mejlis Chubarov called it illegal and expressed the hope for the sanctions for such visit.¹⁰⁸⁰ Meanwhile, official Ankara stated that the visit was unofficial and does not change the position of Turkey on the issue.¹⁰⁸¹ On 19 December, 2016, UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the Crimea and Sevastopol¹⁰⁸² which was supported by Turkish side.

Turkey is one of the key trade partners of the Crimea. Its share in the export from the republic is the largest and equal to 43.9%. At the same time, Turkey is the third largest source of import to the Crimea constituting 16.8% of the total import. Apart from this, the entrepreneurs of the Crimea and Turkey have business and trade connections. Thus, on April 17, 2015, some websites and newspapers issued news regarding collaboration between Association of Independent Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (MÜSİAD), the Republic of Turkey) and Republic of the Crimea and that Sergey Aksyonov, the President of Autonomous Republic of Crimea undersigned an enactment to this end. In its turn, Association denied the information about possible cooperation with Russia's current Crimean government.¹⁰⁸³ In addition, the head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar

¹⁰⁷⁸ Посольство України в Турецькій Республіці. (2016, 24 November). Прес-реліз щодо незаконних візитів деяких громадян та суден на тимчасово окуповані території України (англійською мовою). Retrieved from <http://turkey.mfa.gov.ua/ua/press-center/news/52651-pres-reliz-shhodo-nezakonnih-vizitiv-dejakih-gromadyan-ta-suden-na-timchasovo-okupovani-teritoriji-ukrajini-anglijsykoju-movoju>

¹⁰⁷⁹ Прес-реліз щодо незаконних візитів деяких громадян та суден на тимчасово окуповані території України 2016.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Чубаров требует уголовной ответственности для членов турецкой делегации в Крыму. (2016, 25 November). *РИА Крым*. Retrieved from <http://crimea.ria.ru/politics/20161125/1108154181.html>

¹⁰⁸¹ Turkish delegation visit to Crimea was unofficial: Turkish Foreign Ministry. (2016, 26 November). *Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-delegation-visit-to-crimea-was-not-official-turkish-foreign-ministry-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=106596&NewsCatID=510>

¹⁰⁸² UNGA Resolution. (2016, 19 December). Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine). Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/ga/71/resolutions.shtml>

¹⁰⁸³ Турецкие предприниматели не будут сотрудничать с Аксеновым. (2015, 29 May). *QHA*. Retrieved from <http://qha.com.ua/ru/politika/turetskie-predprinimateli-ne-budut-sotrudnichat-s-aksenovim/145332/>

people Refat Chubarov posted on his page on Facebook disposal Sergey Aksyonov on signing the Agreement on Cooperation between the Council of Ministers of the Crimea and the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen of Turkey (MUSIAD) under the number 344-r dated April 17, 2015. According to the text of the document signed between Turkey and the Crimea was a member of the Crimean government Georgy Muradov.¹⁰⁸⁴

After such a statement Head Office of the Company Culture and Mutual Aid of the Crimean Tatars (*dernek*), Ankara, requested an explanation from the organization MUSIAD on cooperation with the current Crimea. MUSIAD Association, in a written reply to the Turkish and English languages, posted on the official website of the organization, has denied the information about possible cooperation with the current Crimean government. MUSIAD called such statements are unfounded and not true.¹⁰⁸⁵

Therefore, it can be stated that official Ankara does not recognize the occupation of the region and demonstrates the support to Kyiv on the issue. This includes the abrogation of the direct flights to the Crimea, the withdrawal of the business. At the same time, as the incident with the Russian jet in November 2015, introduction of the visa regime and the failure of the touristic season in Turkey in 2016 show, Turkey is also interested in good relations with Russia, particularly taking into consideration the gas supplies and the cooperation regarding Akkuyu.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Турецкие предприниматели не будут сотрудничать с Аксеновым 2015.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği. (2015, 6 May, 2015). *Kırım ile Alakalı Yayınlanan Asılsız Haberler Hakkında Açıklama*. Retrieved from <http://www.musiad.org.tr/tr-tr/dis-iliskiler/kirim-ile-alakali-yayinlanan-asilsiz-haberler-hakkinda-aciklama>

8.7. The Crimea in the Context of EU - Russia and NATO - Russia Relations

8.7.1. European Union's Position as to Ukrainian Crisis and the Russia's Annexation of the Crimea

In the Joint statement, President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso on the Crimea made on 16 March, 2014, said that "the solution to the crisis in Ukraine must be based on the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in the framework of the Ukrainian Constitution as well as the strict adherence to international standards". EU officials condemned the unprovoked violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and called on Russia to withdraw its armed forces.¹⁰⁸⁶ Following the referendum on the status of the Crimea, in the Joint statement, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso in line with the declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the EU of 6 March, stressed once more that the "European Union does not and will not recognize the annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation".¹⁰⁸⁷

As the EU does not recognize the annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol, the following restrictions have been imposed. European Union introduced ban on all goods coming from the Crimea and Sevastopol that severely affected the economy of the region as it was discussed before. Besides, investments in the region are no longer legal. Persons or companies from the EU are prohibited to buy any property in the Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as any entity. Financing of the local companies as well as supplying them with services is outlawed. As it was discussed earlier, tourism services are no longer available. Except of the emergency cases, cruise ships cannot attend the Crimean ports. The list of the goods and technologies that cannot be exported to the region has been issued by the EU as well. It includes transport,

¹⁰⁸⁶ Joint statement by President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso on Crimea. (2015, 16 March). European Commission Press Releases Database. Retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141566.pdf

¹⁰⁸⁷ Joint statement on Crimea by the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, 2015.

telecommunications and energy sectors or the prospection, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources. Technical assistance, brokering, construction or engineering services related to infrastructure in the same sectors must not be provided.¹⁰⁸⁸ Russia, in its turn, responded to the European sanctions by issuing the list of the European goods coming to its territory that seriously affected the economy of the country, and the Crimea as well, as it will be discussed below.

Along with economic measures, the diplomatic measures have been applied. Thus, the EU-Russia summit in Sochi was cancelled and EU member states decided not to hold regular bilateral summits. Bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters as well as on the New Agreement between the EU and Russia were suspended. Instead of the G8 summit in Sochi, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels on 4-5 June, 2014. There, the sanctions measures for Russia were announced. Since then, meetings have continued within the G7 process. EU countries also supported the suspension of negotiations over Russia's joining the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Energy Agency.¹⁰⁸⁹ 152 people and 37 entities appeared to be subject to an asset freeze and a travel ban over their responsibility for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. On 15 September 2016 the Council prolonged these measures until 15 March 2017.¹⁰⁹⁰

Needless to say that these sanctions affected the economy of the region, first of all. As the sections of this thesis analyzing economy and trade show, the trade volumes decreased dramatically leaving many people without jobs. But what is more

¹⁰⁸⁸ EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis. European Union Newsroom. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm

EUR-lex. (2014, 18 December). Council Regulation (EU) No 1351/2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 concerning restrictive measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.365.01.0046.01.ENG

Joint Staff Working Document. (2014, 11 August). Information Note to EU business operating and/or investing in Crimea/Sevastopol. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/pdf/swd_2014_300_f2_joint_staff_working_paper_en_v8_p1_776932.pdf

¹⁰⁸⁹ EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Retrieved from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/>

¹⁰⁹⁰ EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine.

important, the Western community could not raise the issue of the Crimea during Minsk Agreement 1 and 2 negotiations. Also, the issue of the human rights abuses in the region has not been addressed.

8.7.2. NATO's Position as to the Crimean Crisis

Following the plebiscite in the Crimea, North Alliance, in its statement of 17 March, 2014, called the referendum in the Crimea both illegal and illegitimate. According to it, "the referendum violated the Ukrainian Constitution and international law, and Allies do not recognize its results".¹⁰⁹¹ Foreign Ministers of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, condemned Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine, and Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, not recognizing Russia's illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of the Crimea.¹⁰⁹² NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, commenting on these events in his article explained the suspected NATO - Russia Council by the actions of Russia which is no longer a partner, but adversary of the Alliance:¹⁰⁹³

The Russian propaganda against NATO and the West is nothing but smokescreen to cover up its own illegal actions. Dispel the smokescreen, and the truth on the ground is clear: Russia has annexed the Crimea at the barrel of a gun, in breach of all its international commitments.¹⁰⁹⁴

Following the annexation of the Crimea, Russia increased its military presence in the region. The Russian military has put together nearly 100 units and organizations in the Crimea in 2014 as part of the program of deploying a self-sufficient group of forces at the peninsula. The force grouping created in the Crimea not only defends Russia's interests in the Black Sea area and in the Crimean Federal District, it can

¹⁰⁹¹ NATO. (2014, 17 March). *Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the so-called referendum in Crimea*. Press Release. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108030.htm

¹⁰⁹² NATO. (2014, 1 April). *Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission*. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_108499.htm

¹⁰⁹³ Rasmussen, A.F. (2014, 13 April). *De-escalation starts on the ground*. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_109102.htm

¹⁰⁹⁴ Rasmussen 2014.

also accomplish missions in the offshore maritime zone. The Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet as well as Northern and Baltic Fleets provided a permanent presence for Russia in the Mediterranean. The Russian Aerospace Defense Forces will also have presence at the Crimean peninsula as "a separate command and measuring center in the city of Yevpatoriya is being equipped with state of the art hardware, which will enables to control all types of military spacecraft". According to minister Shoigu, new barracks, warehouses and parks are being constructed at five garrisons on the peninsula, while the existing buildings undergo major repairs.¹⁰⁹⁵

Such increase of the Russian military presence in the Crimea provoked NATO's concern. During meeting of the foreign ministers, in Turkey (Antalya) in May 2015, the joint statement was issued, saying:

We condemn Russia's ongoing and wide-ranging military build-up in the Crimea, and are concerned with Russia's efforts and stated plans for further military build-up in the Black Sea region, which will potentially have further implications for the stability of the region. We are also deeply concerned by statements of the Russian leadership with regard to possible future stationing of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in the Crimea, which would be destabilizing.¹⁰⁹⁶

In April 2014 the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia including in the NRC. However, the Alliance agreed to keep channels of communication open in the NRC and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost on this crisis. In April 2016, almost two years after the last meeting of the NRC, NRC members agree to convene a meeting.¹⁰⁹⁷

¹⁰⁹⁵ 100 Russian military units created in Crimea – defense minister. (2015, 30 March). *RT News*. Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/news/245305-russian-military-crimea-shoigu/>

¹⁰⁹⁶ NATO. (2015, 13 May). *Joint statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission*. Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_119425.htm

¹⁰⁹⁷ NATO-Russia Council. (Last updated 2016, 15 April). Retrieved from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm

8.8. Foreign Economic Activity of the Region

As to the foreign trade of the Crimea, it would be logical to rely upon the data of the Russian Statistics Committee. However, when it comes to the trade relations with Ukraine, these data is significantly different from the figures provided by the Ukrainian Customs and statistics. Although the situation in the Crimea seems quite stable, it needs detailed analysis. According to these figures, the occupied peninsula has a positive foreign trade surplus of \$63.7 million (export - \$147.9 million, import - \$84.2 million). For comparison, in 2013, Crimea's export totaled \$904.9 million, import - \$1.1439 billion, the deficit equaled \$239 million.¹⁰⁹⁸

Given that today the Crimea does not include the volume of foreign trade with the countries of the Customs Union, Anatoliy Frizorenko, the head of the department on trade, Statistic Service of Ukraine, in his analysis, makes the appropriate correction data for 2013 and obtains export - \$587.1 million, import - \$844.4 million; the negative balance constitutes - \$257.3 million. The author shows that the Crimea has reduced its exports by almost five times, imports by six times and negative balance changed to positive. A region became self-sufficient. According to experts, such changes are possible only if the manipulated figures of foreign trade. First of all, export figures need clarification. At a time when European sanctions actually made it impossible to supply the Crimean goods to the EU, the main trade partners of the occupied peninsula were Turkey (18.3% of total exports), Switzerland (17.8%) and Panama (12.5%). The exports to Ukraine constituted only \$3.5 million, representing 2.4% of the Crimean exports.¹⁰⁹⁹

With regard to the trade with the European Union, the volume of exports fell by more than 90%, to \$17.4 million. Exports from the Crimea to most of the European countries have fallen to zero. Against this background, Frizorenko finds it strange the trade statistics with Belgium, which totaled 8% of the total exports of the Crimean

¹⁰⁹⁸ Структура экспорта Крыма. (2014, 24 June). *КрымИнформ*. Retrieved from <http://www.c-inform.info/dossier/id/52>

¹⁰⁹⁹ Фризоренко, А. (2015, 27 February). Считать по-русски. Внешняя торговля Крыма – без ЕС и Украины. Госстат. *European Truth*. Retrieved from <http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/experts/2015/02/27/7031354/>

(worth \$11.9 million). Another \$4.5 million of goods were exported from the Crimea to the Netherlands. Now the export of goods from the Crimea in the EU can only with the Ukrainian certificates. However, perhaps the exports were shipped before the introduction of the EU embargo on trade with the occupied territory. The share of Ukraine, according to the customs of the Crimea, only account for \$2.6 billion, or 3.1% of total imports (for the period April-December, 2014). And this is not to mention the fact that, according to the Crimean statistics, occupied Crimea has a positive balance of trade with Ukraine. In other words, the Crimea feeds Ukraine.¹¹⁰⁰

We suggest considering the structure of imports of the Crimea for 2014, which is unveiled by *Krymstat*. It turns out that, in the Crimea, there is no imported meat or dairy products, while imports of sugar and confectionery products together with alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages does not exceed \$100 thousand. At the same time, one should not neglect the reports about the numerous trucks with the Ukrainian goods waiting on the Crimean border.¹¹⁰¹

Frizorenko compares the customs statistics of the Crimea and the State Fiscal Statistics Service of Ukraine. According to the law "On Creation of the Free Economic Zone *Crimea* and the characteristics of the economic activity in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine" customs clearance in the FEZ *Crimea* began on September 27, 2014. But even the data late last year is significantly different from the customs data. According to the Ukrainian Customs, exports in the FEZ *Crimea* constituted \$416.9 million, import amounted \$35.2 million. At the same time, the customs of the Crimea declared import from Ukraine as equal \$2.6 million, while export as equal \$3.5 million. Volumes of supplies of goods from Ukraine to the Crimea exceed total imports of the region almost three times. We have a discrepancy of the cost of goods imported from the by the Crimea from Ukraine more than 160 times. If one analyzes the commodity structure of the export to the Crimea, then the following groups of products can be noted: sugar - \$14.5 million,

¹¹⁰⁰ Фризоренко 2015.

¹¹⁰¹ Фризоренко 2015.

drugs - \$11.7 million, cheeses - \$11.4 million, bird eggs - \$8 million, sausages and meat products - \$8,2 million, pork - \$7.7 million, beer - \$ 7.2 million.¹¹⁰²

These figures and analysis let us come up with the conclusion that despite the figures proclaimed by the Statistics of the Crimea, the real situation is quite different. Such manipulations are used in order to persuade the locals and, more importantly, all Russians and foreign actors, that the region has a stable economy. Though, it should be noted, the news from the Crimea, as well as the interviews with the ordinary people show that the economic situation is perceived by the people as deteriorating, first of all, due to the prices of the good, logistics problems, and food blockade in the Southern Ukraine. The situation is aggravated by the incident with the Russian jet that was hit in November 2015 that led to the introduction of sanctions and visa regime for the Turkish citizens. For example, if in January-March 2015 goods in the amount of \$5.8 million were taken from the Crimea to Turkey,¹¹⁰³ over the same period of 2016 it constituted only 1.8 million US dollars. Although in the total volume of the Crimean exports Turkey retained the second place (24.8%).¹¹⁰⁴

The third place in the export countries (after Ukraine and Turkey) is divided between India (11.3% of exports) and Belarus (11%). However, compared to the same period in 2015, India has reduced the purchase of the Crimean goods by 3 times: from \$2.4 million to \$845 thousand. Belarus, on the other hand, increased its exports from the Crimea by a one third: from \$550 thousand to \$823 thousand.¹¹⁰⁵

¹¹⁰² Фризоренко 2015.

¹¹⁰³ Территориальный Орган Федеральной Службы Государственной Статистики. (2015). Географическая и товарная структура внешней торговли товарами с основными странами-партнерами за январь 2015г. Retrieved from http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/resources/9bd1fd0047b585f6bb3cbfed3bc4492f/%D0%93%D0%B5%D0%BE+%D0%A1%D0%90%D0%99%D0%A2.pdf

¹¹⁰⁴ Территориальный Орган Федеральной Службы Государственной Статистики. (2016). Географическая структура внешней торговли товарами Республики Крым в январе-марте 2016 года. Retrieved from http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/crimea/resources/ddee59004d49b1cba3d8f74fc772e0bb/%D0%BE%D1%84.%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82+%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%82+%D0%92%D0%A%D0%A1+%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BE+%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82+2016.pdf

¹¹⁰⁵ Географическая и товарная структура внешней торговли товарами с основными странами-партнерами за январь 2015г.

In 2015, the situation with import has changed radically, and the main suppliers of production to the region was Ukraine (41.2%), Turkey (12.2%) and China (7.7%).¹¹⁰⁶ 2016 introduced new adjustments for the foreign trade: because of the restrictions imposed on the import / export of goods from the Crimea (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine №1035),¹¹⁰⁷ Ukraine ceased to be the main importer of the goods for the Crimea. Therefore, in January-March 2016, the four countries from which the import to the Crimea is possible, are as it follows: Belarus (19% of total imports), Armenia (14.6%), China (11.8%) and Spain (10.9%). Thus, in 2015 the share of Belarus amounted to only 3.6% in total imports (614 thousand US dollars).¹¹⁰⁸ Today Minsk boosted the supply of goods to the Crimea by 3 times - up to 1.9 million.¹¹⁰⁹

A similar situation exists with Armenia, which previously almost did not trade with occupied Crimea. Today, this country is the second largest importer of their goods in the Crimea (\$1.4 million US dollars). Despite the fact that China is among the top three, the amount of imports from it to the Crimea in the first quarter fell by 2 times: from \$2.4 to \$1.2 million. Spain, by contrast, increased deliveries in Crimea is almost 4 times: from \$229 thousand to \$1. However, it remains a mystery what the Crimea buys from Spain - the country is under the food embargo of Russia.¹¹¹⁰

8.9. Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter let us conclude the following. The transition period in the Crimea was established in order to solve the routine issues connected to the

¹¹⁰⁶ Географическая и товарная структура внешней торговли товарами с основными странами-партнерами за январь 2015г.

¹¹⁰⁷ Кабінет Міністрів України. (2015, 16 December). Постанова Кабінету Міністрів України № 1035 "Про обмеження поставок окремих товарів (робіт, послуг) з тимчасово окупованої території на іншу територію України та/або з іншої території України на тимчасово окуповану територію". Retrieved from <http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/cardnpd?docid=248714822>

¹¹⁰⁸ Географическая и товарная структура внешней торговли товарами с основными странами-партнерами за январь 2015г.

¹¹⁰⁹ Географическая структура внешней торговли товарами Республики Крым в январе-марте 2016 года.

¹¹¹⁰ Сергеева, Е. (2016, 5 July). Крутое пике внешней торговли Крыма. *Крым Реалии*. Retrieved from <http://ru.krymr.com/a/27836848.html>

citizenship, passports, pensions, vehicles registration, diplomas and the conditions for the admission to the jobs in the Crimea. Although, in the beginning, the Crimea was given a set of priorities and concessions that provoked the dissatisfaction of other regions of the Russian Federations, later, as it was shown in this and previous chapters, the appointments of the Prosecutor General Poklonskaya, the head of the Southern Federal district and others displayed the Moscow's desire to spread the *siloviki* structures into the Crimea as well. As Andrei Soldatov showed, the security organ has been reincarnated.¹¹¹¹ Additionally, the need to pass the exam on Russian history and language left many officials outside their jobs, additionally, the new appointments prevailed.

As to the external relations of the Crimea, it should be noted that Tatarstan played an important role in this. Turkey is trying to continue economic relations with the Crimea, although the incident with the Russian jet impeded the process. Ukraine while proclaiming the issues of the support for the citizens in the Crimea manipulate the situation by the issues of water and electricity supply.

From the neoclassical realist perspective, the Russian policy-makers, within the short period of time after the acquisition of the Crimea and Sevastopol, tended to modify the state apparatus and to substitute the majority of the elite with the more loyal, or, in other words, to deal with the intervening variable. The Ukrainian crisis as well as the authoritarian regime in Russia did not allow neglecting the institutions, elites, and state-society relations in the Crimea. Therefore, as it was shown in this and previous chapter, the design of the new legislation and new governmental bodies appeared to be the first step in securing the loyalty of the region. The election to the parliament in September, 2014, brought 70% of the *United Russia* to the Crimean parliament. The new appointments from Moscow complemented this process successfully. Needless to say that Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars were excluded from the decision-making process not only as electorate, but also as the deputies. The closure of the media and acquisition of the assets of the Tatar channel were to guarantee the only

¹¹¹¹ Soldatov, A. (2016, 21 September). Putin Has Finally Reincarnated the KGB. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/21/putin-has-finally-reincarnated-the-kgb-mgb-fsb-russia/>

pro-Russian media-coverage in the republic. In such way, the ideology *Krym Nash* (*Crimea Is Ours*) could be spread the most. At the same time, the state-supported nationalism was demonstrated immediately - the parades in Sevastopol, various celebrations and events of the Russian community followed the annexation of the Crimea. Particular role was given to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy and the Russian Muftiyat that Russian leadership considered as an important marker of identity. Moreover, in order to provide the sources for the policies the nationalization of the property of the Ukrainian businessmen was launched. Later, some of the nationalized objects were sold out.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This thesis demonstrates the application of the area studies interdisciplinary approach in the analysis of the region, particularly its strengths and deficiencies. The case of the Crimea appears to be an excellent academic example of the region which has its own identity, history that is crucial for understanding the contemporary developments and elites discourse. Contrary to the views of some experts who argue that the Crimean crisis and the annexation of the Crimea as well as the developments in the aftermath of this annexation could be explained with the reference to foreign policies of Kyiv and Moscow, this thesis argues that local regional dynamics in the form of historical, social, cultural, political and economic structures have played a decisive role in the outbreak and development of the Ukrainian crisis.

The analysis of the Russian invasion into the Crimea that was followed by the annexation of the region allows us to come up with the certain conclusions. Although, as it was shown in the consequent chapters, realist scholars tend to analyze the Crimean crisis from the realistic standpoint using the fact of the military annexation of the region by the Russian Federation, this approach has certain limitations in understanding the case. First of all, it fails to see the role of the domestic institutions and ethnic groups in the development of the conflict. Classical realist examining the Crimean case would omit the discussion of its history, the existing institutions as well as the experience of statehood and the region's relations with the Ukrainian government. In fact, the region itself would be ignored: the priority would be rather given to the state-level analysis, i.e. the discussion of the Ukrainian and Russian politics. The importance of the ethnic conflict cannot be neglected insofar as the contradiction between Russian and Crimean Tatar groups, as well as the dominant position of the former in the Crimean parliament determined the outcome of the Crimean referendum. Besides, the fled of the Ukrainian president to

Russia in February 2014, allowed the nomination of the Prime Minister Aksyonov who was responsible for negotiation with Kremlin shortly before the annexation. Furthermore, while state is seen as a primary actor in the international system, the sub-state actors, such as regions are underestimated. Nevertheless, as the Crimean case shows, the region may become an actor that causes the conflict between main actors on the international arena.

Secondly, the issue of identity, particularly, the Russian identity of the majority of the Crimean population is generally neglected by the realist scholars examining Crimea. In our opinion, it should be added to the list of factors that contributed to the Crimea's separation insofar as the 'Russian profile' of the Crimea, the expectations and the perceptions of threat coming from the Western institutions defined cooperation with the Russian institutions. Although the RF acted in realistic terms, while the president Yanukovich tended to cooperate with the EU in a liberal sense, the constructivist analysis of the public orientations should be added. Besides, the ideology of the Crimean politicians (although the Crimean political parties have weak ideological platform but rather form around the leader in a short time before the election) clearly underline which institutions and actors (domestic and international) are perceived as a threat.

While the liberalist approach is widely engaged in the discussion of the Ukraine - EU relations, it also should not be idealized. From the perspective of the liberal peace theory the advocates of this approach would discredit themselves. The invasion itself demonstrates not the protection of the compatriots but rather the control over the Black Sea region. The Crimean autonomy was abrogated in July 2016. As the critical theory scholar Robert Cox notes the hierarchy of power shifted and at the same time the external control was thrust on the region. Another issue that raised is the human security. As it will be shown in the seventh chapter of my thesis, the Crimean Tatars appeared to be very vulnerable to the change of the status of the Crimea.

In the discussed case of the Crimea, the social constructivism seems to be applicable due to the several reasons. The role of the Russian language, i.e. the abrogation of the

regional languages law of 2012 during the anti-Maidan appeared to be one of the factors that led to the separation of the region from Ukraine. The practical as well as symbolic value of language was demonstrated by the Crimean population. The Russian identity of the population that was shown by the numerous researches defines the parties in the parliament of the ARC. Moreover, the adherence to the borders of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union before the Crimea became the part of Ukraine in 1954 was used in the justification of the legality of the Russian actions. It makes the social constructivism a valuable and important tool in the analysis of the issue insofar as the perceptions as such became the motivation of the people's choice during the referendum of April 2014. Moreover, the international norms and institutions' value displayed in the Ukraine's European vector that was being contrasted by the Russian policy makers to the cooperation on the post-Soviet area and the Customs Union, in particular, also defined the perception of the more promising choice.

Nevertheless, the analysis proved the deficiency of this approach from the Russian aggression' point of view. Social constructivism fails to explain the invasion of the 'green men' into the Crimean in February 2014. It is also not sufficient in the analysis of such pragmatic motives of the Crimeans as wellbeing and living standards that cannot be disregarded in the analysis of the voting behavior during the plebiscite. Moreover, from the democracy theories and the institutional behavior point of view, the Crimeans failed to internalize their norms, therefore the approach can be treated as inadequate in the discussion of the referendum that is internationally accepted as illegal.

The analysis of the traditional IR approaches allows concluding that they display certain limitations applicable to the cases, particularly in the case of the Crimea. At the same time, the neoclassical realist approach is seen as the most powerful tool in the examination of the Crimean crisis of March 2014. The value of the approach for this thesis is, first of all, in the emphasis on the intervening variable, or the state institutions, state-society relations, domestic actors and interest groups, nationalism and ideology. I argue that despite the rhetoric about the Russian invasion in Crimea

and the analysis of the Russian foreign policy in realist and neoclassical realist terms, the neoclassical realist perspective from the Crimea's standpoint become a significant contribution to the bulk of literature on the case. Although we have to accept the international conditions that threatened Russian interests in the near abroad, they were the Crimean elites who perceived the system incentives in the way they did and undertook the decision of separation and unification with the Russian Federation.

The analysis of the domestic actors and interest groups provided by the neoclassical realists is significant due to the several reasons. Firstly, Ukraine finds itself in the transition period which defines the weakness of the institutions and procedures, the low commitment of the actors to the existing norms. These issues defined the weak control of the citizens over the agenda and the lack of knowledge about the political situation in the country combined with the lack of critical thinking. Secondly, the utilization of the Russian nationalistic rhetoric, particularly connected to the issues of the Russian language guaranteed the support of the referendum. The control of the Russia-oriented groups over the agenda in the parliament allowed referendum to be announced. Furthermore, the role of the military units that immediately took an oath to the Russian Federation was crucial - without it the conflict could have become the frozen. Moreover, the media in Crimea demonstrated their loyalty to Russia. To sum up, the neoclassical realist potential in explaining the policy of the ARC in 2014 cannot be overestimated.

As it can be seen from the historical analysis of the region, Crimea experienced the presence of the different ethnic groups and political powers on its territory. The geographic position as well as the ethnic composition and past developments can help to explain the contemporary events in the Crimea. Needless to say that the independent status (although *de-jure*) can be treated as an experience of the statehood. The autonomous status and the formation of the main state organs also contributed to the formation of the political forces that stood for the independence of Crimea. The period of the Crimean Khanate should be treated as particularly important insofar as the Crimean Tatars managed to establish their power in the region, create a state that sustained for a long period of time. This gave the

contemporary Tatar community the precedent to demand the securing their rights from the government. The Russian presence in the Crimea since 1783 determined the change in the ethnic structure of the population, as it was shown in the beginning of this chapter. The majority of Russians determined the political landscape and the voting mode later. Besides, the foundation of Sevastopol and the establishment of the Black Sea fleet base in there was one of the reasons of Russia's attachment to the Crimea. The Soviet period was crucial due to the establishment of the republic in the Crimea, the World War II, and the deportation. The return of the deported to the Central Asia Crimean Tatars caused the conflicts on the peninsula related to the land squatting, quotas etc. The inability of to influence the agenda through the pro-Russian forces made them seek representation through the Ukrainian right parties and explain the opposition to the change of power in Simferopol.

Besides, during the Soviet rule, the Crimea was deprived the autonomous status and transferred to the Ukrainian SSR. These issues had a considerable influence on the politics in the Crimea in the 1990s.

The analysis of the dynamics in the Crimea between 1991 and 2014 shows the importance of this period from the political and analytical points of view. In the early 1990s, the political system of Ukraine and the Crimean Autonomous republic formed; as well as the relations between both actors formed despite many tensions. This period demonstrated not only the vague character of the state norms and procedures, but the domination of the president in the system, particularly the role of personality of the leader. It also proved the lack of the attention to the national policies, particularly the securing the rights of the formerly deported people. As one of the respondents noted, the "Crimean political arena never showed our belonging to Ukraine. There always have been Russian actors." The ethnic composition determined the results of the elections to the parliament. Kyiv, in its turn, was trying to balance by means of the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Crimea. Besides, the budget of the region became the issue after 2011. The lack of the Ukrainian language in the secondary and higher education, mass media was also important factor and noted by the respondents. The figures of the Crimean prime

ministers Dzhartiy and Mogilyov, both from Donetsk region and close to Yanukovych require particular attention. Mogilyov was criticized by the Crimean Tatars and, during the crisis, declared his readiness to obey the decisions of the Verkhovna Rada and was dismissed as well as his government.

From the neoclassical realist perspective, Ukrainian domestic developments as well as the Ukraine's negotiations with the EU as to the DCFTA, with the Russian Federation regarding the Customs Union appeared to be the independent variable that defined the context of the Crimean separation. Here, one has to deal with the subsystemic threat that was perceived as one coming from the Ukraine - EU partnership. At the same time, as the volume by Talliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman suggest, the most important appeared to be the perception of the international circumstances by the domestic actors, as well as their impact on the decision making and the national security decision as well. In this regard, the low commitment of the main political actors to the formal procedures resulted in a weak institutionalization of these rules and the strengthening the power vertical by the president with a strong propensity for non-institutional behavior. This also determined the poor development of the democratic norms and procedures in Ukraine, and in the ARC correspondingly. Furthermore, the lack of the legislative and the budget powers of the ARC defined the lack of autonomy in the Crimea. Moreover, the absence of the provisions as to the delineation of powers between center and the region worsened the tensions between Kyiv and the Crimean government, especially in the period when the more nationalistic and Western oriented government of Ukraine was trying to implement its policies which contradicted to the interests of the Russian-speaking majority in Crimea of Eastern Ukraine. In such cases, Ukrainian government preferred to back the Crimean Tatars in order to balance the pro-Russian groups. As it was seen the pro-Russian political elites appeared to be the most influential and responsible for the identification and assessment of the menace coming from the Anti-Maidan. The expected by the Crimean elites payoffs from the Russian side obviously overcame the losses of the voices from the Crimean Tatar segment of

society; as well as the costs of the empowerment of the pro-European, right-segment, backed by the Crimean Tatar political forces would be high.

Particular attention should be paid to the Crimean media. Needless to stress the role they played in monitoring and presenting the events in Ukraine. As it was shown, the military of Ukraine that was being located in the Crimea immediately changed its loyalty and supported the 'green men'. As to the nation-building, which was particularly important for Ukraine considering its Russian and Crimean Tatar population after the dissolution of the USSR, the inconsistent policies, the absence of the national minorities protecting legislation, the failure to adopt the law on the regional languages resulted in the dissatisfaction with the government of the Eastern and Southern regions. In fact, Ukrainian government failed to construct the civic nation in the country that, under the conditions of the political and economic crisis, defined the loyalty of these regions to the Russian Federation. Consequently, the Ukrainian population that supported Maidan appeared to be the 'Other' for the Russian-speaking Crimeans. The inability to conduct consistent foreign policy and neglect of the interests of the half of the population aggravated existing contradictions. The domestic pro-Russian oriented group managed to obtain the control over the security agenda in the Crimean parliament that resulted in the election of Aksyonov. Additionally, through more than 20 years it demonstrated electoral support, and the single-issue orientation, although it was not the unification with the Russian Federation. Rather, it was the Russian as a state language and closer relations with Russia and CIS countries.

Mismanagement during the political crisis, including legal provisions and violence against the protestors, the escape of the president revealed the institutional weakness of Ukraine, the lack of flexibility and the asymmetry with the domination of Kyiv in the relations with the regions, especially with the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The absence of the strong central government and the inability of Kyiv to control the whole territory of the country during the mass rallies made it possible for Crimea to conduct its own policy, such as the appointment of the new head of the Council of Ministers of Crimea by the pro-Russian Supreme Council of the ARC. Economic

crisis that immediately followed the mass rallies in Ukraine worsened the domestic turmoil: the economically strong Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts undertook the decision to stop 'feeding' the rest of Ukraine. These factors appeared to be crucial in the separation of Crimea, also supported by the Russian Federation's decision to protect Russian-speaking Crimeans. The crisis in the Ukrainian politics appeared to be challenge for the Crimea. Under these conditions, Crimeans felt insecure as a part of Ukraine and had to re-evaluate the possibility of the new statehood. The situation got worse after the separation of *Novorossiya* (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) which put Ukraine to the edge of the civil war and the weakened sovereignty. As a result, Ukraine consider Crimea as temporarily occupied territory, and the military conflict in the Eastern regions is defined as anti-terroristic operation which makes it impossible for Kyiv to control the whole territory of Ukraine. Different military units, not subordinated to Kyiv are operating in the Eastern part of Ukraine. In addition, an unbalanced relation with Russia which is eager to use its economic and energy leverage deprives Kyiv the right to use severe measures against the rebels of the East in order to preserve the territorial integrity.

While this thesis argues that the historical, political, economic and social structures of the Crimea are key for the understanding the separation of the region from Ukraine and its annexation by Russia, it is impossible to neglect the international context or the independent variable, in the neoclassical realism terms. The analysis showed that the possible rapprochement between Ukraine and the Western institutions, in case of the Maidan's victory, put a threat to the Russia's interests. It was important to secure the Black Sea, on the one hand, as well as demonstrate the Russian's might, on the other. Besides, according to many scholars, the Kremlin uses the foreign policy in order to secure the consent and support within the country. The 'victory' in such crisis periods clearly delineates the enemy, and the party that should be protected. Moreover, Mearsheimer's argument about the responsibility of the Western institutions for the outcome of the Ukrainian domestic turmoil explains the role of the West as a factor of the crisis. The economic sanctions do not seem as effective measure to curb Kremlin.

The internal dynamics in Crimea, in 2014 - 2016, display the Russia's efforts to justify its image as a savior of the region from the Ukrainian government. Needless to say that this was used by Putin to raise his personal ratings. Despite the military conflict on the border with Ukraine, growing prices, striking nationalism and conservatism of the Russian leadership, Russians believe that it is still better to live in Russia than in Western Europe or the US. The experts explain such feelings by the patriotic raise following the acquisition of Crimea. The head of the VCIOM Fedorov says that it is the first time within last 25 years Russia enlarged its territory, and people are excited about this. The similar trends were seen in 2008 - due to the economic growth and the victory in the Georgian war; as well as in the beginning of 2000s when Putin managed to stabilize political and economic situation in Russia and patriotic feelings raised tremendously. The decreasing euphoria about the victory is complemented by the growing understanding of the consequences of the war. Growing prices were already mentioned, besides, Russians expect the worsening of the economic situation due to the sanctions.

As to the formation of the power structures in Crimea the former were designed according to the Russian population of the peninsula. The interests of the minorities, ethnic and religious, were not taken into consideration. Furthermore, the appointments in Crimea showed the role of the security structures in Russia and the desire to spread it in Crimea. During the transition period, Russian leadership had to face many problems with establishing new legislations, with ousting Ukrainian business and economic actors in Crimea, with protecting Russian Orthodoxy of Moscow Patriarchy as a channel that may connect the Crimeans to the rest of the Russian population. The transition period in Crimea was established in order to solve the routine issues connected to the citizenship, passports, pensions, vehicles registration, diplomas and the conditions for the admission to the jobs in Crimea. Although, in the beginning, Crimea was given a set of priorities and concessions that provoked the dissatisfaction of other regions of the Russian Federations, later, as it was shown in this and previous chapters, the appointments of the Prosecutor General Peklonskaya, the head of the Southern Federal district and others displayed the

Moscow's desire to spread the *siloviki* structures into Crimea as well. As Andrei Soldatov showed, the security organ has been reincarnated. Additionally, the need to pass the exam on Russian history and language left many officials outside their jobs, additionally, the new appointments prevailed.

As to the external relations of Crimea, it should be noted that Tatarstan played an important role in this. Turkey is trying to continue economic relations with Crimea, although the incident with the Russian jet impeded the process. Ukraine while proclaiming the issues of the support for the citizens in Crimea manipulate the situation by the issues of water and electricity supply.

From the neoclassical realist perspective, the Russian policy-makers, within the short period of time after the acquisition of the Crimea and Sevastopol, tended to modify the state apparatus and to substitute the majority of the elite with the more loyal, or, in other words, to deal with the intervening variable. The Ukrainian crisis as well as the authoritarian regime in Russia did not allow neglecting the institutions, elites, and state-society relations in Crimea. Therefore, the design of the new legislation and new governmental bodies appeared to be the first step in securing the loyalty of the region. The election to the parliament in September, 2014, brought 70% of the *United Russia* to the Crimean parliament. The new appointments from Moscow complemented this process successfully. Needless to say that Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars were excluded from the decision-making process not only as electorate, but also as the deputies. The closure of the media and acquisition of the assets of the Tatar channel were to guarantee the only pro-Russian media-coverage in the republic. In such way, the ideology *Krym Nash (Crimea Is Ours)* could be spread the most. At the same time, the state-supported nationalism was demonstrated immediately - the parades in Sevastopol, various celebrations and events of the Russian community followed the annexation of Crimea. Particular role was given to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchy and the Russian Muftiyat that Russian leadership considered as an important marker of identity. Moreover, in order to provide the sources for the policies the nationalization of the property of the

Ukrainian businessmen was launched. Later, some of the nationalized objects were sold out.

Important part of this work lies in the field research. The field research was conducted in January - February 2016, in the Crimea and, in October - November 2016, in Ankara. It included semi-structured elite and expert interviews with Russians, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians as well as in-depth interviews with ordinary people and activists from the local ethnic groups. Respondents for interviews were chosen through the help of convenient and purposive sampling with the mediating role of gatekeepers. The interviewees proved the general standpoint of the Crimeans: those who identify themselves as Russian, showed the support for the annexation; while the Crimean Tatars are the opposite end of the political spectrum. Those who identified themselves as Ukrainian are not univocal in their attitude towards the referendum and the following annexation of the Crimea. It should be noted that those who voted 'for' express more positive view as to the situation in the Crimea and the region's future. They note the infrastructural projects, the budget increase, the new work places, financial wellbeing and the stability. At the same time, those who do not recognize the referendum think critically. They note difficulties in travelling to the Crimea; change of documents; the extremely high prices; the fall of the local business; the lack of investments and foreign business in the Crimea. Generally, people are afraid to talk due to the possible penalties, particularly loss of the job.

To sum up, this thesis argues that despite the ability of the neoclassical realist approach to explain the Crimean issue, the area studies approach with the concentration on the history and identity of the region can overcome the limits of the neoclassical realism. This thesis shows that despite the argument of some scholars that the Ukrainian crisis and the separation of the Crimea can be understood through the analysis of the foreign policies of Moscow and Kyiv, it can be stated that the examination of the historical, political, economic, social and cultural structures in the region provide better understanding of the events in the Crimea.

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Приказ Министерства образования и науки РФ N273

"Об определении объемов контрольных цифр приема граждан по специальностям и направлениям подготовки для обучения по имеющим государственную аккредитацию образовательным программам высшего образования за счет бюджетных ассигнований федерального бюджета для осуществления приема граждан, постоянно проживающих на территории Республики Крым и города Севастополя, в 2014 и 2015 годах и о проведении открытых публичных конкурсов на распределение организациям, осуществляющим образовательную деятельность, контрольных цифр приема граждан по специальностям и направлениям подготовки для обучения по имеющим государственную аккредитацию образовательным программам высшего образования за счет бюджетных ассигнований федерального бюджета для осуществления приема граждан, постоянно проживающих на территории Республики Крым и города Севастополя, на 2014 и 2015 г. (2014, 4 April). Retrieved February 1, 2017, from <http://base.garant.ru/70630722/#ixzz4LMcx8y7r>

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Interview with the Crimean Tatar student living in Turkey. (2016, 12 November). Ankara.

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Interview with the faculty member of one of the Crimean universities. (2016, 27 October). Simferopol.

Interview with the nurse of the city hospital of Dzhankoy. (2016, 2 February). Dzhankoy.

Interview with the official of one of the Crimean universities. (2016, 5 February). Simferopol.

Interview with the retired couple from Kerch, Crimea. (2016, 1 February). Kerch.

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Interview with the Russian journalist from Simferopol. (2016, 22 October). Simferopol.

Interview with the Russia-oriented Crimean living in Simferopol. (2016, 18 October). Simferopol

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Demydova, Viktoriia
Nationality: Ukrainian (UA)
Date and Place of Birth: 18 July, 1985, Kerch (Ukraine)
Marital Status: Single
Phone: +90 507 034 56 61
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	METU Eurasian Studies	2010
MA	Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University (Simferopol) Political Science	2007
BS	Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University (Simferopol) Political Science	2006
High School	Kerch Secondary School #12	2002

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2007 - 2008	Crimean State University of Humanities (Yalta, Ukraine)	Teaching Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent Turkish, Russian, Ukrainian

PUBLICATIONS

DEMYDOVA, Viktoriia, "Crimean Crisis 2014: Domestic Implications", Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, Vol.9, No.19 (June 2015), pp.49 - 78 .

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B. TURKISH SUMMARY/ TRKE ZET

Bu alıřma, 2014 Kırım krizini, bařka bir deyiřle Kasım 2013'te Kiev'de bařlayan EuroMaidan, takiben Kırım'da Anti-Maidan ve sonu olarak bağımsızlık ilanı ve referandum yoluyla Rusya ile Kırım'ın birleřmesi konularını kapsamaktadır. Aynı zamanda, bu analizin nemli bir n řartı olan Kırım'daki tarihi geliřmeler de tartiřılmaktadır. Kırım'da ilk yerleřim yerleri tartiřmasıyla bařlarken, Kırım tarihindeki Kırım Hanlığı ve Rusya İmparatorluğı dnemlerine zel nem verilmiřtir. Ayrıca, Sovyet dnemi analiz edilmiř ve bunu takiben Sovyetler Birliğı'nin dağılmasından sonraki siyasi ve etnik dinamikler daha detaylı incelenmiřtir. Ek olarak, Ukrayna'daki uzun sren siyasi atıřmanın bir bağılamı ve itici gc olarak, uluslararası bağılam incelenmektedir. AB, NATO ve Gmrk Birliğı ile Rusya'nın, Ukrayna'nın i karmařalarını tehlikeye atan faktrler olarak oynadığı role nemli bir yer verilmektedir. Dahası, 2014 yılındaki stat değıřikliğınden sonra Kırım'daki geliřmelere değınilmesi gerekli grlmřtr. Bu nedenle, iki tarihsel blmn tezin iine dahil edilmesine rağımen arařtırmamın odağında olan zaman periyodu 2014 - 2016 yılları arasıdır. Tez, Anti-Maidan ve Rus istilası sonucundan sorumlu olarak grlen Kırım'daki (siyasi, ekonomik, etnik gruplararası) geliřmeleri sunmayı amalıyor. Blge arařtırmaları yaklařımı ve neoklasik gerekilik kullanılarak, blgenin ayrılıřında Kırım elitlerinin rol zerine yoğıunlařılmıřtır.

Kırım zerk Cumhuriyeti her zaman Ukrayna'nın 'Rusya yanlısı' blgesi olmuřtur. Bu, nfusunun etnik yapısındaki Rusların oranından, Rus dilinin statsnden, semen davranıřından ve Rus filosunun ss olarak Sivastopol'n zel neminden anlařılabilir. Bu nedenle, Kırım referandumunun aıklaması ve Rus istilasının sonucu olarak ortaya ıkan değıřiklikler yetersizdir. Bu alıřma, Kırım'ın siyasi kurumlarının, sekinlerin, devlet - toplum iliřkilerinin, ideoloji ve milliyetilik syleminin rol ve kaynak ıkarma mekanizmalarının siyasi kriz sırasında zerk cumhuriyetin seimlerini nasıl etkilediğı konusundaki soruları yanıtlamayı amalamaktadır. Bu tez, 1991 yılından bu yana Kırım'daki i dinamiklere ve bu

dinamiklerin Kırımlıların ayrılarak Şubat - Nisan 2014'te Rusya Federasyonu'nun bir parçası haline gelme arzusuna etkilerine ışık tutacaktır.

Bu tez, Kırım krizinin ve Kırım'ın ihakının ve bu ilhak sonrasında yaşanan gelişmelerin Kiev ve Moskova'nın dış politikalarına istinaden açıklanabileceğini iddia eden bazı uzmanların görüşlerinin aksine, tarihi, sosyal, kültürel, politik ve ekonomik formdaki yerel bölgesel dinamiklerin Ukrayna krizinin patlak vermesi ve gelişmesinde belirleyici bir rol oynadığını iddia eder. Bu çalışmada, bölge çalışmaları yaklaşımından yararlanılıyor olsa da, Kırım krizinin analizine yönelik geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımları arasından neoklasik gerçekçiliğin yetersizliğine rağmen davanın incelenmesi için gerekli analitik araçları sağladığı savunulmaktadır.

Yukarıda tartışılan literatüre dayanarak iddianın kanıtı sunulmaktadır. Tarihsel bölümde, etnik yapının ve güç yapılarının oluşumuna ve Rusya Federasyonu'nun bölgedeki rolüne dikkat çekilmektedir. Ayrıca, Kırım'daki seçkinlerin oluşumu ve ana çıkar grupları, Ukraynalı yetkililerle olan bağlantıları ele alınmıştır. Tezin odağı, ayrılma sürecinde elitlerin rolü ve söylemleridir. Bununla birlikte, Kırım'daki ayrılık sonrası gelişmeleri analiz eden bölümler de temel argümanı desteklemektedir ve 2014 sonrası Kırım'da Rus politikalarının öncelikli olarak elitlerin, devlet adamlarının yeniden yapılandırılmasını ve Kırım'ın Rusya ile birleşmesine karşı koyan bu grupların rolünü en aza indirmeyi hedeflediğini belirtmektedir.

Tezde öncelikle belgesel araştırma ve saha çalışması kullanılmaktadır. Belgesel araştırma, resmi istatistiklerin, resmi belgelerin ve mevzuatın çalışılmasını içermektedir. Bunlardan birincisi, Rusya Federasyonu Anayasası (1993), Ukrayna Anayasası (1996) ve Kırım Anayasası (1998) analizlerini içermektedir. Ayrıca, tezde seçim ve referandum sonuçlarının yanı sıra demografik, ekonomik ve sosyal istatistik verileri de kullanılmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, bu çalışmada başkanların özel kararnameleri ve yasa tasarıları, parlamentoların kanunları incelenmiştir. Belgelerin dilleri Rusça ve Ukraynaca'dır. Belgesel araştırmanın bir diğer kısmını Avrupa Komisyonu, NATO, BM Güvenlik Konseyi ve diğer uluslararası kuruluşlar ve

aktörlerin resmi belgeleri oluşturmaktadır. Bu kaynak yığınının ise İngilizce dilinde erişilmiştir. Tüm bunlar ve saha araştırması incelemenin ana kaynaklarını oluşturmaktadır.

Saha araştırmaları Ocak - Şubat 2016 tarihlerinde Kırım'da ve Ekim - Kasım 2016 tarihlerinde Ankara'da gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ruslar, Kırım Tatarları ve Ukraynalılar, sıradan insanlar ve aktivistler ile yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine mülakatlar içermektedir. Mülakatlara katılanlar, *gatekeeper*'ların arabulucu rolüyle uygun ve amaçlı örnekleme yardımı ile seçilmiştir.

Görüşülen iki mülakat grubu için iki ayrı soru seti vardır. Kırım'da ikamet eden (Simferopol ve Kerç) Rus, Ukrayna ve Kırım Tatar etnik gruplarından sıradan insanlarla yapılan yarı yapılandırılmış derinlemesine mülakatlar saha çalışmasının ikinci bölümünü oluşturmaktadır. Mülakatların soruları şu konuları kapsamaktadır: özgeçmiş; dil yeterliği; meslek; 1954 yılında Kırım'ın Ukrayna Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti'ne devredilmesinin değerlendirilmesi; Ukrayna'ya bağlı bulunan Kırım'ın 1991'den beri gelişimi ve Rusya Federasyonu'nun Kırım'ın siyasi hayatındaki rolü; bölgenin ayrılmasını belirleyen faktörler; Kırım'da karar alma sürecinden sorumlu aktörler; Rusya Federasyonu ile birleşmesinden sonra Kırım'da iç ve dış dinamikler; uluslararası bağlamın yanı sıra siyasi süreçlerin ve yaşam standartlarının değerlendirilmesi; yaşam standartları ve yaşam kalıplarındaki değişiklikler. Mülakatların dili Rusça olmuştur.

Ayrıca, aktivistlerle yapılan mülakatlarda, Kırım'daki ve bunun yanı sıra dışardaki (Herson, Kiev, Lviv, Türkiye) aktivist hareketlerin en yüksek düzeyi; mevcut teşkilatlar; faaliyetler ve ana yayın organları; Rus hükümetinin uyumsuz faaliyetleri durdurmaya yönelik önlemleri ile ilgili sorular da yer almaktaydı. Son olarak, mülakatlar yardımıyla toplanan veriler, bölgelerdeki alan gözlemlerinden elde edilen verilerle bütünleştirilmiştir. Vakanın araştırma alanı üç etnik grubun ikamet ettiği Kırım'dır. Vatandaşlığın ve pasaportların elde edilmesi, araçların yeniden kaydı ve tıbbi sigorta prosedürleri hakkındaki sorunlar; elektrik ve su temini sorunları; sınır ve ulaşım sorunları; eğitim kurumlarının işleyişi; Kırım halkının Kırım dışına taşınması;

günlük hayat ve mal ve hizmet tedarikindeki sorunlar ele alınmıştır. Mülakata katılan kişiler, bu araştırmaya anonim olarak katılmayı nazikçe kabul etmişlerdir. Mülakat içeriği, ses kayıtları ve soruların yazılı cevapları olarak saklanmaktadır ve yazarla temasa geçilerek erişilebilmektedir.

Araştırmanın teorik altyapısı neoklasik gerçekçiliktir. Kırım seçkinlerinin ve siyasete yön verenlerin, siyasal kurumların, bunların toplumla olan ilişkilerinin, ideoloji ve devlet tarafından desteklenen milliyetçiliğin, Kırım toplumunda mevcut kaynakların çıkarılması mekanizmalarının rollerinin bölgenin ayrılması sürecini anlamaya yarayan analizi, disiplinlerarası alan yaklaşımı olmaksızın tamamlanmış olmayacaktır. Neoklasik gerçekçilik, bağımsız değişken (uluslararası sistem ve kısıtlamalar), ara değişken (devlet kurumları, devlet ve toplum arasındaki ilişki, ideoloji, algılamalar) ve bağımlı değişken (devletin dış politikası) üzerinde yoğunlaştığı sürece Kırım üzerine yapılan araştırmalara en iyi şekilde uymaktadır. Neoklasik gerçekçiliğin, gerçekçi ve yeni-gerçekçi yaklaşımlarla karşılaştırıldığında ayırt edici özelliği, neoklasik gerçekçi akademisyenlerin devletin müdahil rolüne özel bir önem vermeleridir. Özellikle, devletlerin iç karakteristiklerinin - siyasi-askeri kurumların özütleme ve mobilizasyon kapasitesi, yurt içi toplumsal aktörlerin ve çıkar gruplarının etkileri, devletin toplumdan özerkliğinin derecesi ve seçkin ya da toplumsal uyum seviyesi - liderlerin uluslararası tehdit ve fırsatları değerlendirmesi ile liderlerin sürdürdüğü gerçek diplomatik, askeri ve dış ekonomi politikaları arasında neden, nasıl ve hangi koşullar altında müdahale ettiklerinin açıklanmasına odaklanmışlardır. Uluslararası sistemin realist anlayışındaki kara kutu olan devlet, bir taraftan çözümlenmemiş ve analiz edilmiş ve sistematik teşvikler ve kısıtlamalar arasında bir 'iletim kayışı'dır, diğer taraftan devletlerin seçtiği gerçek diplomatik, askeri ve dış ekonomi politikalarıdır.

Neoklasik gerçekçiliğin ana koşulu, devletlerin uluslararası sistemin istikrarsızlıklarına ve belirsizliklerine yanıt olarak dış çevresini kontrol etmeye ve şekillendirmeye çalışmasıdır. Bu yaklaşım, devletlerin daha fazla dış etkiye sahip olmak istediğini savunmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu yaklaşımın savunucuları, ülkelerin sahip oldukları maddi güç kaynaklarının göreceli olarak miktarının dış politikalarının

büyükliğini ve hırsını şekillendireceğini öngörmektedir: güçlerinin artmasıyla devletler yurtdışından daha fazla nüfuz arıyor olacaklardır. Bununla birlikte, bu faktörlerin analizini sistemik baskı ile sınırlandırmak bir ihmaldir. Daha ziyade uluslararası ilişkiler öğrencileri, sistem baskısının birim düzeyinde değişkenler (karar vericiler, ideoloji, devlet ile toplum arasındaki ilişkiler) aracılığıyla nasıl iletildiğini incelemelidir. Dış politika araştırmaları, (devletlerin rekabet ettiği durumlarda) sistemik ve alt sistemik güç dengesi ile (toplumsal blokların rekabet ettiği yerlerde) yerel güç dengesi üzerine odaklanır. Uluslararası sistemdeki veya iç yerel arenadaki değişimler, büyük güçleri tehdit etmektedir. Ayrıca bölgesel güçler için, alt sistemdeki değişiklikler de tehdit yaratabilmektedir. Lobell tehditleri dört ayrı türde ayırt etmektedir: sistemik tehditler, alt sistemik tehditler, yerel tehditler (kökleri devlet içi rekabettir) ve çok katmanlı tehditler. Norrin M. Ripsman, eserinde yerel çıkar gruplarının, hangi yerli aktörlerin hangi koşullarda en çok önem taşıdığı sorusunu yanıtlamaları konusunun ayrıntıları üzerinde durmaktadır. İç siyasi aktör ışığında, araştırmacı yasama, medya ve örgütlü çıkar gruplarını anlamaktadır. Demokratik olmayan hükümetlerin bile askeri, ekonomik seçkinleri ve hatta halkı bir bütün olarak ele almaları gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Mansfield ve Snyder'e göre, iç siyasal kurumlar ne kadar zayıf olursa, demokratikleşen ülkeyi savaşa götürecek milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkma ihtimali o kadar yüksektir. Akademisyenlere göre milliyetçilik, iki durumda ortaya çıkmaya eğilimlidir. Bir yandan, siyasal kurumların yokluğunda, toplumsal lider ulusalcı düşünceleri belirli bir eylem için birleştirici güç olarak kullanmaya meyillidir. Kurumlar ne kadar az olgunlaşmış ise, liderliğin çağrıları o kadar fazla seferber etme etkisi taşımaktadır. İkinci husus, otoriter rejimlerin dağılmasının, yerli çıkar gruplarının olası savaştan kazanç elde etme girişimini tehdit etmesidir. Bu koşullar altında, rejim toplum içinde daha büyük bir destek elde etmek için milliyetçilik çağrısı yapmak eğilimindedir. Olgun demokrasilerde vatandaşlar toplumsal liderlerle ilgili bilgi edinmek ve seçmenleri tatmin etmeyenleri cezalandırmak için daha fazla fırsata sahiptir.

Colin Dueck, sırası geldiğinde, büyük askeri müdahale ihtimaliyle karşı karşıya kaldıklarında, devlet liderlerinin genellikle devletin ulusal güvenlik çıkarları olarak

algıladıkları şeylere danışarak başladıklarını iddia etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, iç politika müdahalenin başlıca nedeni olarak değil, onun şekillendirilmesi üzerinde güçlü bir etki yaratması açısından önemlidir. Yapısal gerçekçilik hayranlarıyla karşılaştırıldığında, neoklasik gerçekçiliğin temsilcileri, sistemik baskının koşulları altında dış politikanın sadece birime özgü değişkenlere bakılarak açıklanabileceğini savunarak, ikinci ve üçüncü imgeler arasındaki boşluğu doldurmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, bu yaklaşımın savunucularına göre, elitlerin algıları ve iç politika prizmasından bakıldığı sürece dış politikanın açıklanmasında sistematik baskı en önemli faktör olmaktadır.

Taliafero, yazısında farklı elit ve çıkar grupları arasındaki rekabetin kaçınılmaz olarak ortaya çıktığı düşüncesiyle, bazı vakalarda uygulamak zor olsa da devletlerin makul bir şekilde tutarlı olduğunu varsaymaktadır. Akademisyene göre, sistemik faktörlerin baskısı altında, ülke hükümeti iki farklı strateji - seferberlik ve çıkarma - kullanabilmektedir. Seferberlik iki davranış biçimiyle temsil edilebilmektedir. Bir taraftan devlet, ekonomik faaliyeti doğrudan kontrol edebilmekte ve kaynakları merkezileştirilmiş planlama, anahtar sektörlerin veya belirli işletmelerin kamulaştırılması ve diğer araçlar vasıtasıyla yeniden tahsis edebilmektedir. Ayrıca, ülkenin servetini arttırmak isteyen otorite, ekonomiye ve özellikle vergi toplama işlemlerine müdahale edebilmektedir. Hükümet, geniş idari vasıtalar üzerinden yapılan harcamalar (doğrudan seferberlik) biçiminde veya devlet dışı aktörlere üretim arttırma teşviki olarak sübvansiyonlar ve imtiyazlar (dolaylı seferberlik) biçiminde de olsa bu seferberlikler çerçevesinde belirli siyasi ve ekonomik kaynaklara yatırım yapmak zorundadır. Kaynak yaratma konusunda devlet, toplumsal zenginliği vergilendirme, el koyma ve kamulaştırma yoluyla doğrudan askeri güce dönüştürmektedir. Merkezileştirilmiş ve yalıtılmış devletler, merkezsizleştirilmiş ve kısıtlanmış devletlerle karşılaştırıldığında servet çıkarımında daha fazla yeteneğe sahiptirler.

İdeoloji ve devlet destekli milliyetçilik, devlet iktidarının diğer iki bileşenidir. Genel olarak, devlet milliyetçiliği sosyal bütünlüğü ve bireylerin devletle özdeşleşme eğilimini güvence altına alır; bu da, liderlerin, ulusal güvenlik hedefleri için

topluluktan kaynak toplama ve seferber etme çabalarını kolaylaştırır. Kaynakların çıkarılması ve seferber edilmesinde ideolojinin başarısı, içeriğine ve elitlerin devletin toplum ve ekonomi karşısındaki rolüyle ilgili uzlaşmasına bağlıdır.

Tezin yapısı ileriki cümlelerde açıklandığı gibidir. Giriş bölümü, araştırmanın kapsamını ve amacını, araştırma sorusunu, argümanı, literatür taramasını, araştırma tasarımı ve yöntembilimini ve aynı zamanda tez yapısını ele almaktadır. İkinci bölüm, tezin teorik altyapısının tartışılmasına adanmıştır. Bu çalışmada değerlendirilen neoklasik realist yaklaşım tanıtılmıştır. Son olarak, araştırma alan çalışmaları yaklaşımıyla ilişkilendirilmiştir. Tezin üçüncü bölümü, yarımada'daki ilk yerleşimlerden bu yana bölgedeki gelişmelere odaklanan tarihsel bölümdür. Ayrı alt bölümler, Kırım tarihindeki Kırım Tatar Hanlığı ve Rus İmparatorluğu dönemlerini tartışmaktadır. Üstelik bu bölüm, Sovyet hakimiyetinin ilk yıllarında Kırım'da özerk cumhuriyetin kurulması, çok sayıda etnik grupların sınır dışı edilmesinin nedenleri ve Kırım'ın Ukrayna Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti'ne devredilmesi konularına değinmektedir. Tarih tartışmasının mantıksal devamı, dördüncü bölümde tamamlanan Kırım'daki iç dinamiklerin analizidir. Tezin bu bölümüne, Kırım'daki referandumla ilgili not ve cumhuriyeti ve Kiev ile olan ilişkilerini şekillendiren önemli belgelerle başlanmıştır. Kırım parlamentosunun rolüne özellikle dikkat çekilmiştir. Ayrıca, 1996 Anayasası ve Kırım'a getirdiği değişiklikler, seçim dinamikleri ve seçkinlerin oluşumu, üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. Bölgedeki ekonomi analizi ve etnik gruplararası ilişkiler konularına önemli bir yer verilmiştir. Tezin bir sonraki bölümü, Kırım'ın ayrılmasını belirleyen iç faktörlere ışık tutmaktadır. Bu bölüm, Kiev'deki EuroMaidan tartışması, Kırım'da verilen karşılık ve kriz dönemindeki farklı etnik grupların tutumu ile başlamaktadır. Ayrıca, Kırım parlamentosu'nu ele geçirilmesinde, kontrol noktalarının ve askeri üslerin kontrolünde 'yeşil adamların' rolü üzerinde durulmaktadır. Altıncı bölüm, buna bağlı olarak, Ukrayna ve Kırım krizlerinin uluslararası çevresinin incelenmesine ayrılmıştır. Böylece, Ukrayna'nın AB, NATO ve Rusya ve Gümrük Birliği ile ilişkileri, Ukraynalıların farklı bağlılıkları arasındaki çatışmanın ön şartı olarak görülmektedir. Sonuç olarak, yedinci bölüm, Rusya Federasyonu'yla birleşmeden

sonra Kırım'da yaşanan yerel gelişmeleri açıklamaktadır: kurumsal oluşumlar, yeni atamalar ve yasal hükümler. Bu bölüm ayrıca cumhuriyetin başlıca siyasi ve ekonomik süreçleri hakkında ayrıntı sunmaktadır. Son olarak, son bölüm Kırım'ın dış ilişkilerini, diğer bir deyişle Moskova, Ukrayna, Rusya Federasyonu'nun diğer bölgeleri ve Türkiye ile olan ilişkilerini ele almaktadır. Bu tezin sonuç bölümü, yazarın araştırmasını ve bulgularını özetlemektedir.

Bu çalışma, bölge çalışmaları disiplinlerarası yaklaşımın bölgeye uygulanmasını, özellikle de güçlü yönlerini ve eksikliklerini göstermektedir. Kırım vakası, çağdaş gelişmeleri ve elitler söylemini anlamak için çok önemli olan kendi kimliğini oluşturan bölgenin mükemmel bir akademik örneği gibi görünmektedir. Bu tez, Kırım krizinin ve Kırım'ın ilhakının ve bu ilhak sonrasında yaşanan gelişmelerin Kiev ve Moskova'nın dış politikalarına istinaden açıklanabileceğini iddia eden bazı uzmanların görüşlerinin aksine, tarihi, sosyal, kültürel, politik ve ekonomik formdaki yerel bölgesel dinamiklerin Ukrayna krizinin patlak vermesi ve gelişmesinde belirleyici bir rol oynadığını iddia eder.

Bölgenin ilhakı ile sonuçlanan Rusya'nın Kırım'ı işgalinin analizi, belirli sonuçlara ulaşmamızı sağlamaktadır. Tezin ilk bölümünde yazar, konunun tartışılmasında sınırlı olduğu değerlendirilen geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımlarını ele almaktadır. Realist akademisyenler, ilerleyen bölümlerde de gösterildiği gibi, Rusya Federasyonu tarafından bölgenin askeri ilhakı gerçeğini kullanarak gerçekçi bir bakış açısıyla Kırım krizini analiz etme eğiliminde olsalar da, bu yaklaşım vakayı anlamada belirli kısıtlamalar içermektedir. Her şeyden önce, çatışmanın gelişmesinde yerel kurumların ve etnik grupların rolünü gösterememektedir. Kırım vakasını inceleyen klasik realist, tarihinin, mevcut kurumların ve bunların yanında devlet olma tecrübesinin ve bölgenin Ukrayna hükümeti ile olan ilişkilerinin tartışılmasını da ihmal edecektir. Aslında, bölgenin kendisi göz ardı edilecektir: öncelik, devlet düzeyinde analize, diğer bir deyişle Ukrayna siyasetinin tartışılmasına verilecektir. Etnik çatışmanın önemi, Rus ve Kırım Tatar grupları arasındaki çelişki ve öncekilerin Kırım parlamentosundaki hakim konumu Kırım referandumunun sonucunu belirlediği sürece ihmal edilemez. Ayrıca, Ukrayna cumhurbaşkanının

Şubat 2014'te Rusya'ya kaçması, Başbakan Aksyonov'un ilhaktan kısa süre önce Kremlin ile görüşmelerden sorumlu olarak atanmasına izin vermiştir. Dahası, devlet uluslararası sistemde birincil aktör olarak görülürken, bölgeler gibi alt devlet aktörleri azımsanmaktadır. Yine de, Kırım vakasının gösterdiği gibi, bölge uluslararası alanda ana aktörler arasındaki çatışmaya yol açan aktör olabilmektedir.

İkinci olarak, kimlik meselesi, özellikle de Kırım nüfusunun çoğunluğunun Rus kimliği, Kırım'ı inceleyen realist akademisyenler tarafından genellikle ihmal edilmektedir. Bizce, Kırım'ın 'Rus profili', Batı kurumlarından gelen tehdit beklentileri ve tehdit algıları Rus kurumlarıyla olan işbirliğini tanımladığı sürece, bu mesele de Kırım'ın ayrılmasına katkıda bulunan faktörlerin listesine eklenmelidir. Rusya Federasyonu gerçekçi koşullarda davrandıysa da cumhurbaşkanı Yanukoviç liberal manada AB ile işbirliği yapma eğiliminde iken, kamusal yönelimlerin yapılandırmacı analizi de eklenmelidir. Ayrıca, Kırım siyasetçilerinin ideolojisi (Kırım siyasi partileri zayıf ideolojik platforma sahip olmakla birlikte, seçimden kısa süre öncesinde lider etrafında şekillense de) hangi kurumların ve aktörlerin (yerli ve yabancı) bir tehdit olarak algılandığının altını açıkça çizmektedir.

Liberalist yaklaşım, Ukrayna-AB ilişkilerinin geniş çapta tartışılması ile iştigal ederken, aynı zamanda idealleştirilmemelidir. Her şeyden önce, ekonomik bağımlılık bakış açısı perspektifinden, Kasım 2013'te ilan edilen Gümrük Birliği'ndeki mutlak kazanç arayışı fazla tahmin edilmemelidir. Liberal barış teorisi perspektifinden bakıldığında, bu yaklaşımın savunucuları kendilerini itibarsızlaştıracaklardır. İstilanın kendisi vatandaşların korunmasını değil, daha çok Karadeniz bölgesinin kontrolünü göstermektedir. Kırım özerkliği Temmuz 2016'da yürürlükten kaldırıldı. Eleştirel teori akademisyeni Robert Cox, güç hiyerarşisinin yön değiştirdiğini ve aynı zamanda dış kontrolün bölgeye hücum ettiğini belirtmektedir. Ortaya çıkan bir diğer konu insan güvenliğidir. Tezimin yedinci bölümünde gösterileceği gibi, Kırım Tatarları, Kırım'ın statüsünün değişmesine karşı çok savunmasız görünüyordular.

Kırım'ın tartışılan vakasında, toplumsal inşacılık çeşitli nedenlere bağlı olarak uygulanabilir gibi görünmektedir. Rus dilinin rolü, diğer bir deyişle anti-Maidan

sırasında 2012 yılında çıkarılan bölgesel dil yasasının yürürlükten kaldırılması, bölgenin Ukrayna'dan ayrılmasına neden olan faktörlerden biri gibi görünmektedir. Dilin sembolik değeri kadar pratik değeri de Kırım halkı tarafından ispat edilmiştir. Çeşitli araştırmalarla gösterilmiş olan nüfusun Rus kimliği, Kırım Özerk Cumhuriyeti parlamentosundaki partileri tanımlamaktadır. Dahası, Kırım 1954'te Ukrayna'nın bir parçası haline gelmeden önce Rusya İmparatorluğu ve Sovyetler Birliği sınırlarına bağlılık Rus aksiyonlarının yasallığının gerekçelendirilmesinde kullanılmıştır. Dolayısıyla bu durum toplumsal inşacılığı, bu tarz algılamalar Nisan 2014 referandumu sırasında halkın seçim motivasyonuna dönüştüğü ölçüde, konunun analizinde değerli ve önemli bir araç haline getirmektedir. Ayrıca, Rus politika yapıcıları tarafından eski Sovyet alanı ve Gümrük Birliği ile işbirliğine zıt tutulan Ukrayna'nın Avrupa vektöründeki uluslararası normların ve kurumların değeri, özellikle de daha umut verici bir seçme algısını tanımlamıştır.

Bununla birlikte, analiz bu yaklaşımın Rusya'nın saldırganlığı bakış açısına göre eksikliğini kanıtlamaktadır. Toplumsal inşacılık, Şubat 2014'te 'yeşil adamların' Kırım'a girmesini açıklamakta başarısız olmaktadır. Referandum sürecindeki oy kullanma davranışının analizinde refah ve yaşam standartları göz ardı edilemeyeceğinden, Kırımlıların bu tür pragmatik güdülerinin analiz edilmesinde de yetersizdir. Dahası, demokrasi teorileri ve kurumsal davranış bakış açısıyla, Kırımlılar normlarını içselleştirmekte başarısız oldular ve bu nedenle, uluslararası olarak yasadışı olduğu kabul gören referandumun tartışılmasında bu yaklaşım yetersiz kalmıştır.

Geleneksel uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımlarının analizi, özellikle Kırım vakasında olduğu gibi, vakalara uygulanabilir olan belirli sınırlamaları gösterdikleri sonucuna varmaya izin vermektedir. Aynı zamanda, neoklasik realist yaklaşım, Mart 2014'teki Kırım krizinin incelenmesinde en güçlü araç olarak görülmektedir. Bu tez için bu yaklaşımın değeri, öncelikle ara değişken veya devlet kurumları, devlet-toplum ilişkileri, yerli aktörler ve çıkar grupları, milliyetçilik ve ideoloji vurgusundadır. Kırım'daki Rus istilasına ilişkin söylemler ve Rus dış politikasının realist ve neoklasik realist yaklaşımlar yönünden analizine rağmen, Kırım'ın bakış açısından

neoklasik realist perspektifin vakayla ilgili literatüre önemli bir katkı sağladığını iddia ediyorum. Her ne kadar yakın çevresinde Rus çıkarlarını tehdit eden uluslararası koşulları kabul etmek zorunda olsak da, sistem teşviklerini istedikleri şekilde algılayan, ayrılma ve Rusya Federasyonu ile birleşme kararı alanlar bizzat Kırım elitleridir.

Neoklasik realistler tarafından sunulan yerli aktörlerin ve çıkar gruplarının analizi, birkaç nedenden ötürü dikkate değerdir. İlk olarak, Ukrayna kendini kurumların ve süreçlerin zayıflığını, aktörlerin var olan normlara karşı zayıf bağlılıklarını tanımlayan geçiş döneminde bulmuştur. Bu sorunlar, vatandaşların gündem üzerindeki zayıf kontrolünü ve eleştirel düşünme eksikliği ile harmanlanan ülkedeki siyasi durumla ilgili bilgi eksikliğini tanımlamaktadır. İkinci olarak, özellikle Rus dili sorunlarıyla bağlantılı olarak Rus milliyetçi söyleminin kullanılması referanduma desteğin garanti altına alınmasını sağlamıştır. Rusya eğilimli grupların parlamentoda gündem üzerinde hakimiyet kurması referandumun ilan edilmesine ortam oluşturmuştur. Üstelik, anında Rusya Federasyonu'na ant içen askeri birimlerin rolü çok önemliydi - bu durum gerçekleşmeseydi çatışma donuklaşmış olacaktı. Dahası, Kırım medyası da Rusya'ya olan bağlılığını göstermiştir. Özetlemek gerekirse, Kırım Özerk Cumhuriyeti'nin 2014'teki politikasını açıklarken neoklasik realist potansiyel fazla tahmin edilememektedir.

Bölgenin tarihsel analizinden görülebileceği gibi, Kırım kendi içinde farklı etnik grupların ve siyasi güçlerin varlığını tecrübe etmiştir. Coğrafi konumu ve etnik bileşimi ve geçmiş gelişmeleri, Kırım'daki günümüze ait olayları açıklamaya yardımcı olabilmektedir. Tabii ki bağımsız statü (de-juro bile) bir devlet olma tecrübesi olarak görülebilmektedir. Ana devlet organlarının otonom statüsü ve oluşumu da Kırım'a bağımsızlığını kazandıracak politik güçlerin oluşumuna katkıda bulunmuştur. Kırım Tatarlarının bölgede hakimiyet kurmayı başarmaları ve uzun süre devam ettirdikleri bir devlet kurmaları kadar Kırım Hanlığı döneminin önemi ayrıca vurgulanmalıdır. Bu, günümüz Tatar topluluğuna, hükümetten haklarının korunmasını talep etme emsalini vermiştir. 1783'ten beri süregelen Kırım'daki Rus varlığı, bu bölümün başında gösterildiği gibi nüfusun etnik yapısındaki değişimi

belirlemiştir. Rusların çoğunlukta olması, daha sonra siyasi manzara ve oylama yöntemini belirlemiştir. Ayrıca, Sivastopol'un kuruluşu ve orada Karadeniz filo üssünün kurulması, Rusya'nın Kırım'a ilgisinin nedenlerinden biridir. Sovyet dönemi, Kırım'da cumhuriyetin kurulması, II. Dünya Savaşı ve sürgün nedeniyle hayati önem taşımıştır. Sınır dışı edilenlerin Orta Asya Kırım Tatarlarına dönmesi, yarımadada arazi gecekondulaşması, kotalar ve benzeri çatışmalara sebep olmuştur. Rus yanlısı güçler vasıtasıyla gündemi etkileme yetersizliği, onları Ukrayna'nın sağ partileri aracılığıyla temsil aramaya ve Simferopol'daki iktidar değişikliğine muhalefeti açıklamaya zorladı.

Ayrıca, Sovyet yönetimi sırasında, Kırım özerk statüsünden mahrum bırakılmış ve Ukrayna Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti'ne devredilmiştir. Bu sorunların 1990'lardaki Kırım siyaseti üzerinde önemli etkisi olduğu görülmektedir.

1991 ve 2014 yılları arasında Kırım'daki dinamiklerin analizi, bu dönemin siyasi ve analitik bakış açılarından önemini ortaya koymaktadır. 1990'ların başında, Ukrayna'nın ve Kırım Özerk Cumhuriyeti'nin siyasi sistemi biçimlenmiştir; ayrıca birçok gerilime rağmen iki aktör arasındaki ilişkiler şekillenmiştir. Bu dönem, yalnızca devlet norm ve süreçlerinin anlaşılması güç karakterlerini değil, ayrıca başkanın sistemdeki hakimiyetini, özellikle de liderin kişiliğinin rolünü göstermiştir. Ayrıca, özellikle daha önce sürgün edilmiş insanların haklarının güvence altına alınması gibi ulusal politikalara olan dikkat eksikliği de kanıtlanmıştır. Mülakat katılımcılardan birinin de belirttiği gibi, "Kırım siyaset arenası bizim Ukrayna'ya aidiyetimizi asla göstermedi. Daima Rus aktörler vardı."Etnik bileşim, parlamento seçimlerinin sonuçlarını belirlemiştir. Buna karşılık Kiev, Ukrayna Cumhurbaşkanı Daimi Temsilcisi aracılığıyla Kırım'da denge sağlamaya çalışmaktaydı. Bununla birlikte, cumhuriyet bütçesi Kiev'e bağımlıydı. Bazı katılımcıların belirttiği gibi orta ve yüksek öğrenimde Ukrayna dilinin eksikliği ve kitle iletişim araçları da önemli etkenlerdi. İkisi de Donetsk bölgesinden ve Yanukoviç'e yakın olan Kırım başbakanları Dzharty ve Mogilyov da dikkat gerektirmektedir. Mogilyov, Kırım Tatarları tarafından eleştirilmiş ve kriz sırasında Verkhovna Rada'nın kararlarına uymaya hazır olduğunu ilan ettikten sonra hükümeti ile birlikte görevden alınmıştır.

Neoklasik realist perspektiften bakıldığında, Ukrayna yerel gelişmeleri ve Ukrayna'nın Ortaklık ve Derin Kapsamlı Ticaret Antlaşması (DCFTA) ile ilgili olarak AB ile olan görüşmeleri, Rusya Federasyonu ile Gümrük Birliği'ne ilişkin görüşmeleri, Kırım'ın ayrılması bağlamını tanımlayan bağımsız değişken olarak görünmekteydi. Burada, Ukrayna-AB ortaklığından geliyor olarak algılanan bir alt sistemik tehditle başa çıkılmak zorundaydı. Aynı zamanda, Talliafero, Lobell ve Ripsman'ın kitaplarında belirttiğine göre, en önemlisi uluslararası koşulların yerli aktörler tarafından algılanmasının yanı sıra karar verme ve ulusal güvenlik kararlarındaki etkileri gibi görünmekteydi. Bu bağlamda, ana siyasi aktörlerin resmi prosedürlere karşı bağılılık göstermemesi, bu kuralların zayıf kurumsallaşması ve cumhurbaşkanı tarafından kurumsal olmayan davranışa güçlü bir eğilimle dikey gücün sağlamaştırılması ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu aynı zamanda, Ukrayna ve Kırım Özerk Cumhuriyeti'nde demokratik normların ve süreçlerin zayıf bir şekilde gelişmesine neden olmuştur. Ayrıca, Kırım Özerk Cumhuriyeti'nin yasama ve bütçe yetkilerinin eksikliği, Kırım'da özerkliğin eksikliğini tanımlamıştır. Dahası, merkez ile bölge arasındaki yetkilerin tarifine ilişkin hükümlerin olmaması, özellikle Ukrayna'nın daha milliyetçi ve Batı yanlısı hükümetinin politikalarına aykırı politikalarını Doğu Ukrayna'nın Kırım'ında Rusça konuşan çoğunluğun çıkarlarına ters düşecek şekilde uygulamaya çalıştığı dönemde Kiev ile Kırım hükümeti arasındaki gerilimi daha da kötüye gitti. Bu gibi durumlarda, Ukrayna hükümeti Rus yanlısı grupları dengelemek için Kırım Tatarlarını desteklemeyi tercih etmiştir. Görüldüğü gibi, Rus yanlısı siyasi elitler, Anti-Maidan'dan gelen tehdidin tanımlanması ve değerlendirilmesi için en etkili ve sorumlu kişiler olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Kırım elitlerinin Rus tarafından beklediği kazançlar, toplumun Kırım Tatar segmentindeki seslerin kaybolmasını engellemekti. Hem de Kırım Tatar siyasi güçleri tarafından desteklenen Avrupa yanlısı, sağ kesimin güçlendirilmesinin maliyeti yüksek olacaktı.

Kırım medyasına tüm dikkatler verilmelidir. Ukrayna'daki olayları izlemek ve sunmak için oynadıkları rolü vurgulamak gerekmiyor. Gösterildiği gibi, Kırım'da bulunan Ukrayna ordusu derhal sadakatini değiştirmiş ve 'yeşil adamları'

desteklemiştir. SSCB'nin dağılmasından sonra Rus ve Kırım Tatar nüfusunu dikkate alan Ukrayna için önemli olan ulus inşasına gelince, tutarsız politikalar, yasaları koruyan ulusal azınlıkların bulunmaması, bölgesel dillerle ilgili yasanın kabul edilmemesi Doğu ve Güney bölgelerinin hükümetine karşı memnuniyetsizlik yaratmıştır. Aslına bakılırsa, Ukrayna hükümeti, siyasal ve ekonomik kriz koşulları altında bu bölgelerin Rusya Federasyonu'na sadakatini tanımlayan sivil milliyeti ülkede kuramamıştır. Sonuç olarak, Maidan'ı destekleyen Ukraynalı nüfus, Rusça konuşan Kırımlılar için 'Öteki' olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Tutarlı bir dış politika yürütmenin yetersizliği ve nüfusun yarısının çıkarlarının ihmal edilmesi mevcut çelişkileri şiddetlendirmiştir. Yerli Rusya yanlısı grup, Kırım Parlamentosu'ndaki güvenlik gündemini kontrol altına alarak, Aksyonov'un seçilmesini sağlamıştır. Buna ek olarak, 20 yılı aşkın bir süredir Rusya Federasyonu ile birleşme olmasa da, seçim desteği ve tek politika yönelimini göstermiştir.

Protestoculara karşı yasal hükümler ve şiddet de dahil olmak üzere siyasi kriz sırasında yanlış yönetim, cumhurbaşkanının kaçışı, Ukrayna'nın kurumsal zayıflığını, esneklik eksikliğini ve bölgelerle özellikle de Kırım Özerk Cumhuriyeti ile olan ilişkilerde Kiev'in egemenliğindeki asimetriyi ortaya çıkarmıştır. Güçlü merkezi hükümetin olmaması ve Kiev'in kitlesel gösteriler sırasında ülkenin bütün topraklarını kontrol etme yetersizliği, Kırım Bakanlar Kurulu'nun yeni başkanının Kırım Özerk Cumhuriyeti'nin Rusya yanlısı Yüksek Meclisi tarafından atanması örneğindeki gibi Kırım'ın kendi politikasını yerine getirmesini mümkün kılmıştır. Ukrayna'daki kitlesel gösteriler ile hızla devam eden ekonomik kriz iç karışıklıkları daha da kötü hale getirmiştir. Ekonomik açıdan güçlü Donetsk ve Luhansk oblastları, Ukrayna'nın geri kalan kısmını 'beslemeyi' bırakma kararı almıştır. Rusya Federasyonu'nun Rusça konuşan Kırımlıları koruma kararı ile de desteklenen bu faktörler, Kırım'ın ayrılmasında çok önemli yer tutmuştur. Ukrayna siyasetindeki kriz, Kırım için zorlu bir görev gibi görünmekteydi. Bu koşullar altında, Kırımlılar Ukrayna'nın bir parçası olarak güvensiz hissettiler ve yeni devlet olma ihtimalini yeniden değerlendirmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Novorossiya'nın (Donetsk ve Luhansk oblastları) ayrılmasıyla birlikte, Ukrayna, iç savaşın ve zayıflamış egemenliğin

sınırına dayanmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Ukrayna Kırım'ı geçici olarak işgal edilmiş bölge olarak görmekte ve Doğu bölgelerindeki askeri çatışmayı, Kiev'in Ukrayna'nın tüm topraklarını kontrol etmesini imkansız kılan anti-terör operasyonu olarak tanımlamaktadır. Kiev'e bağlı olmayan farklı askeri birlikler Ukrayna'nın doğu kesiminde faaliyet göstermektedir. Buna ek olarak, ekonomik ve enerji kaldırıcı kullanmaya hevesli olan Rusya ile dengesiz bir ilişki, Kiev'i toprak bütünlüğünü korumak için Doğu'daki isyancılara karşı şiddetli tedbirler kullanma hakkından mahrum etmektedir.

Bu tez, Kırım'ın tarihi, siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal yapısının, bölgenin Ukrayna'dan ayrılması ve Rusya tarafından ilhak edilmesini anlamada kilit nokta olduğunu iddia ederken, neoklasik gerçekçilik açısından uluslararası bağlamı veya bağımsız değişkeni ihmal etmek mümkün değildir. Yapılan analiz, Maidan'ın zaferi durumunda Ukrayna ve Batılı kurumlar arasındaki muhtemel uzlaşmanın Rusya'nın çıkarlarına bir tehdit oluşturduğunu göstermiştir. Bir taraftan Karadeniz'i güvenceye almak diğer taraftan Rusya'nın kudretini göstermek önemliydi. Ayrıca, birçok akademisyene göre, Kremlin ülkedeki rızayı ve desteği güvence altına almak için dış politikayı kullanmaktadır. Bu kriz dönemlerinde 'zafer', düşmanı ve korunması gereken partiyi açık bir şekilde tasvir etmektedir. Dahası, Ukrayna'daki iç karışıklıkların sonucu olarak Batı kurumlarının sorumluluğuyla ilgili Mearsheimer'in görüşüne katılıyorum. Ekonomik yaptırımlar Kremlin'i zapt etmek için etkili bir önlem olarak görünmemektedir.

2014 - 2016 yılları arasında Kırım'da iç dinamikler, Rusya'nın, bölgeyi Ukrayna hükümetinden kurtarma imajını haklı gösterme çabalarını göstermektedir. Tabii ki bu Putin tarafından kişisel derecelendirmesini yükseltmek için kullanılmıştır. Ukrayna sınırındaki askeri çatışmalara, artan fiyatlara, dikkat çeken milliyetçilik ve Rus liderliğinin muhafazakarlığına rağmen, Ruslar Batı Avrupa ya da ABD'ye kıyasla Rusya'da yaşamanın daha iyi olduğuna inanmaktalar. Uzmanlar bu duyguları Kırım'ı kazandıktan sonra gelişen vatanseverlik artışıyla açıklıyor. Rus Kamuoyu Araştırma Merkezi (VCIOM)'nin başkanı Fedorov, Rusya'nın son 25 yılda ilk kez topraklarını genişlettiğini ve insanların bu konuda heyecanlı olduğunu söylüyor. Benzer eğilimler

ekonomik büyüme ve adil ve özgürleştirici Gürcistan savaşı zaferine bağlı olarak 2008'de görülmüştür; bununla birlikte 2000'lerin başında Putin Rusya'daki siyasi ve ekonomik durumu istikrara kavuşturmayı başardığında ve vatanseverlik duyguları muazzam bir biçimde yükseldiğinde de aynı eğilimler görülmüştür. Azalan zafer sarhoşluğu, savaşın sonuçlarının artan bir şekilde anlaşılmasıyla tamamlanmaktadır. Artan fiyatlardan daha önce bahsedilmişti, ayrıca Ruslar yaptırımlardan ötürü ekonomik durumun daha da kötüleşmesini beklemekteler.

Kırım'da iktidar yapılarının oluşumu konusuna gelince, eski yapı yarımada'nın Rus nüfusuna göre dizayn edilmiştir. Etnik ve dini azınlıkların menfaatleri dikkate alınmamıştır. Dahası, Kırım'da yapılan atamalar, Rusya'daki güvenlik yapılarının rolünü ve bunu Kırım'da yayma arzusunu göstermektedir. Geçiş döneminde, Rusya liderliği, yeni yasal düzenlemeler yapmak, Kırım'daki Ukraynalı işadamlarını ve ekonomik aktörleri kovmak, Rus Ortodoks Kilisesi Moskova Patrikliği Kırımlılar ile Rus nüfusunun geri kalanı arasında bir köprü vazifesi görmek üzere korumakla ilgili birçok sorunla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Kırım'da geçiş dönemi, vatandaşlık, pasaportlar, emeklilik aylıkları, araç tescili, diplomalar ve Kırım'daki işlere kabul koşullarıyla ilgili rutin sorunları çözmek amacıyla oluşturulmuştur. Başlangıçta, Kırım'a Rusya Federasyonu'nun diğer bölgelerinin memnuniyetsizliğini kışkırtan öncelikler ve imtiyazlar verilmesine rağmen, daha sonra bu ve önceki bölümlerde de belirtildiği gibi, Başsavcı Poklonskaya, Güney Federal bölgesi başkanı ve diğer atamalar Moskova'nın siloviki yapılarını Kırım'a yayma arzusunu da göstermektedir. Andrei Soldatov'un gösterdiği gibi, güvenlik organı yeniden dirilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, Rus tarihi ve dili üzerine yapılan sınavı geçme ihtiyacı, birçok yetkiliyi işlerinin dışında bırakmış, buna ek olarak yeni atamalar hakim olmuştur.

Kırım'ın dış ilişkileri konusunda Tataristan'ın önemli rol oynadığına dikkat çekilmelidir. Rus jeti hadisesi sürece engel oluştursa da, Türkiye Kırım'la ekonomik ilişkileri sürdürmeye çalışmaktadır. Ukrayna, Kırım'daki vatandaşlara verilen destek konularını ilan ederken durumu su ve elektrik tedariki sorunları ile manipüle etmektedir.

Neoklasik realist perspektiften bakıldığında, siyasete yön veren Ruslar Kırım ve Sivastopol'ün kazanılmasından kısa bir süre sonra devlet aygıtını değiştirmeye ve elitlerin çoğunu daha sadık kişilerle değiştirmeye, başka bir deyişle ara değişkenin üstesinden gelmeye eğilim göstermişlerdir. Ukrayna krizi ve Rusya'daki otoriter rejim, Kırım'daki kurumları, seçkinleri ve devlet-toplum ilişkilerini ihmal etmeye izin vermedi. Bu nedenle, yeni mevzuatın ve yeni hükümet organlarının tasarımının bölgenin sadakatini güvence altına almanın ilk adımı olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Eylül 2014'te gerçekleştirilen parlamento seçimleri, Birleşik Rusya'nın %70'ini Kırım Parlamentosu'na getirmiştir. Moskova'dan yapılan yeni atamalar bu süreci başarıyla tamamlamıştır. Tabii ki, Ukraynalılar ve Kırım Tatarları karar alma sürecinden sadece seçmen olarak değil, aynı zamanda milletvekilleri olarak da dışlanmışlardır. Medyanın kapatılması ve Tatar kanalının mal varlıklarına el konulmasının amacı, cumhuriyette Rus yanlısı medya ilgisini garanti altına almaktır. Bu şekilde, *Krym Nash (Kırım Bizimdir)* ideolojisi çok fazla yayılabilmekteydi. Aynı zamanda, devlet destekli milliyetçilik kapsamında Sivastopol'daki geçit törenleri, Rus topluluğunun çeşitli kutlamaları ve etkinlikleri, Kırım'ın ilhaki sonrasında derhal uygulanmıştır. Rus Ortodoks Kilisesi Moskova Patrikliği ve Rus Müftülüğü'ne, Rus liderliğinin önemli bir kimlik belirleyicisi olarak gördüğü özel rol oynamıştır. Ayrıca, politikalar için kaynak sağlamak amacıyla Ukraynalı işadamlarının mülkiyetlerinin kamulaştırılması başlatılmıştır. Daha sonra, kamulaştırılan nesnelerin bir kısmı satılmıştır.

Bu çalışmanın önemli bir kısmı alan araştırmalarına dayanmaktadır. Alan araştırması Ocak - Şubat 2016 tarihlerinde Kırım'da ve Ekim - Kasım 2016 tarihlerinde Ankara'da gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu araştırma, Ruslar, Kırım Tatarları ve Ukraynalılar ile yarı yapılandırılmış seçkin ve uzman mülakatların yanı sıra bölgesel etnik gruplardan sıradan insanlar ve aktivistler ile derinlemesine mülakatlar içermektedir. Mülakatlara katılanlar, *gatekeeper*'ların arabulucu rolüyle uygun ve amaçlı örnekleme yardımı ile seçilmiştir. Mülakat katılımcıları Kırımlıların genel bakış açısını kanıtlamışlardır: kendilerini Rus olarak tanımlayanlar, ilhak için destek göstermişlerdir; Kırım Tatarları ise siyasi yelpazenin zıt tarafındadır. Kendilerini

Ukraynalı olarak nitelendirenler, referanduma ve bunu takip eden Kırım'ın ilhakı konusundaki tutumlarında tek anlamlı değillerdir. Referanduma destek vermiş olanlar, Kırım'daki duruma ve bölgenin geleceğine yönelik daha pozitif yaklaşmaktaydılar. Onlar altyapı projeleri, bütçe artışı, yeni iş imkanları, finansal refah ve istikrarı işaret etmektedirler. Aynı zamanda, referandumu onaylamayanlar eleştirel düşünmektedirler. Kırım'a yolculuktaki zorluklar, belgelerin değiştirilmesi, aşırı derecede yüksek fiyatlar, mahalli ticaretin çöküşü ve Kırım'da yatırım ve dış ticaret eksikliğinden söz etmektedirler. Genel olarak, insanlar olası cezalardan ötürü, özellikle işten atılma, konuşmaktan korkmaktadırlar.

Özetlemek gerekirse, neoklasik realist yaklaşımın Kırım konusunu açıklama kabiliyetine rağmen bölgenin tarihi ve kimliğine yoğunlaşan bölge çalışmaları yaklaşımı, neoklasik gerçekçiliğin sınırlarını aşabilmektedir. Verilen çalışma, bazı akademisyenlerin Ukrayna krizinin ve Kırım ayrışmasının Moskova ve Kiev dış politikalarının analizi yoluyla anlaşılabilirliği argümanlarına rağmen, bölgedeki tarihsel, siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel yapıların Kırım'daki olayları daha iyi anlamayı temin ettiğini göstermektedir.

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